



Littlejohn, Gary Maxwell (1981) Class structure and production relations in the U.S.S.R. PhD thesis

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CLASS STRUCTURE AND PRODUCTION RELATIONS
IN THE U.S.S.R.

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Thesis submitted in fulfillment of requirements
of the degree of Ph.D. at the University of Glasgow,
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December 1981

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My first thanks must go to Hillel Ticktin, who supervised this thesis, and who was very understanding and helpful in the face of the difficulties which I confronted in completing this work. In addition, I should also like to thank Stephen Feuchtwang, Barry Hindess, Paul Hirst, Professor Marie Lavigne and Professor Pierre Lavigne, all of whom read parts of this thesis and whose comments improved it. None of them are responsible for the remaining deficiencies, nor for the views expressed here.

P R E F A C E

This thesis is a work of sociological theory. While it does have recourse to sources in Russian (and in French), most of the sources used are in English, and are either analyses of the Soviet Union itself or sociological works (or both). The aim of the thesis has not been to examine hitherto unused source material (although this proved necessary in the case of Kritsman, because of the variety of views in English concerning the merits of his work), but to evaluate a wide range of material with a view to making a theoretical contribution to the sociology of the Soviet Union. Consequently, it is the theoretical portions of the thesis which can lay claim to being original, and which it is hoped throw new light on the empirical evidence discussed.

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SUMMARY

This thesis analyses the extent and forms of class relations in the Soviet Union. The theoretical approach adopted to the analysis of the Soviet class structure is based on a critique of the classical Marxist approach to class, as well as of common sociological approaches to class, particularly the Weberian conception of class. These issues are the concern of the Introduction, which outlines an alternative approach to class structure based on a conception of relations of production which differs from the classical Marxist approach, particularly in avoiding any reliance on the labour theory of value for defining relations of production and hence for demarcating class boundaries.

Chapter One provides an outline of developments in the Soviet rural class structure in the 1920s, and by criticising common conceptions of such developments, argues that the strategy of socialist transformation adopted in the policy of forced collectivisation was economically unnecessary and politically disastrous. The purpose of this Chapter is to throw the contemporary class structure of the Soviet Union into historical relief, by indicating the historical context out of which many contemporary features of the Soviet Union developed. It is hoped that this will indicate that many features of the contemporary social structure are historically specific, rather than being necessary features of a state socialist society.

Following from this, the analysis of relations of production in the 1960s and 1970s is begun in Chapter Two, where the relations between different kinds of economic agents, particularly collective economic agents (economic units) are examined, using the approach developed in the Introduction to analyse the relations of production as relations between economic agents, which affect the relative economic capacities of agents. It is argued that, because such

capacities are always subject to change through processes of struggle and negotiation, an important but hitherto rather neglected aspect of the relations of production concerns the policies of economic agents. Consequently, the manner in which agents at various levels in the economy calculate both their own internal state and the course of action which they adopt with respect to other agents is subjected to detailed scrutiny in this Chapter.

Chapter Three analyses the legal and political conditions of the relations of production, since in the Soviet Union such economic relations are operative primarily between state agencies, or collective agencies whose relations to the state agencies are legally and politically regulated by the state. Consequently, the issue of the 'withering away of the state' with the decline of private property is considered, as well as various common Western conceptions of Soviet politics. Following on from this, the analysis of politics in terms of a series of 'arenas of struggle' is proposed, and in the light of this approach the capacities of the main central party and state agencies to regulate the economy (and hence to determine the relations of production by implementing effective economic plans) is reviewed. The conclusion from this review is that there are serious limits on the capacity of such central party and state agents to co-ordinate the division of labour, so that theories of an all-powerful totalitarian party or elite dominating Soviet politics and the economy are misguided. Nevertheless, it is argued that there is sufficient central control of the state agencies for one to be able to say that various state agencies do not pursue autonomous objectives. In other words, political relations between state agencies are not such as to preclude socialist planning of the overall economy.

Chapter Four examines welfare and social policy as a means of assessing the importance of non-wage forms of income, and concludes that the overall effect of such forms of public expenditure is probably, as intended, to equalise incomes. This point is taken up again in Chapter Five, where the occupational structure and wage differentials are examined, prior to an overall assessment of the distribution of income, which concludes that a policy of income equalisation has been pursued fairly successfully over the past twenty-five years or so. While such a policy may now be running into difficulties of various kinds, in so far as it has been successfully pursued, it has meant that the connection between the distribution of income and the access of agents to the means of production has been partially undermined. Hence class relations have been seriously weakened in the Soviet Union, and it is concluded that they are non-existent within the state sector of the economy. However, this does not mean that there is no class structure in the Soviet Union, since collective farm members are still in a different class position from state employees. There may also be capitalist relations in the so-called 'parallel economy' but their extent must be severely limited by the official prohibitions on such activities, which means that, if resources are diverted from official purposes, this is largely done on an individual 'self-employed' basis. It is also argued that the 'intelligentsia' cannot be considered as a single, separate stratum from the state employed 'working class' or the collective farm members. Consequently, the official theory of the Soviet class structure must be considered to be seriously deficient.

Introduction: The Analysis of Relations of Production and Class Structure

The purpose of this introduction is to indicate what kind of approach is being used to analyse the Soviet Union in this thesis. This is necessary because of the continuing prevalence in sociology of analyses of class structures which fail to define sufficiently clearly the basis of the categorisation of classes. In other words, it will be argued that the prevailing modes of analysis of what is often called 'social inequality' or 'social stratification' fail to provide sufficiently clear theoretical grounds for distinguishing different classes, or for analysing class relations.

This is not to say that there is ready to hand a clear mode of analysis which is easy to use and which suffers from no problems, but rather that the prevailing approaches scarcely even attempt to analyse the determinants of class relations. The only exception is provided by analyses in the Marxist tradition, which at least attempt to theorise the determinants of class relations, using some conception of 'relations of production'. However, while such approaches have the merit of at least posing the problem of the determinants of class relations, it is not clear how far they have satisfactorily resolved the issues which they raise.

Perhaps the best way to illustrate the issues involved would be to make a brief, and by no means comprehensive or systematic, examination of the history of the concept of class. Without going into too much detail, it is clear that Marx was correct to acknowledge that he did not 'discover' classes.

The concept was being used by the Physiocrats, if not by earlier economists, and was related to their theory of the distribution of income. The concept of class was based on the classification of the population of, say, eighteenth century France, into distinct groups, each with their own source of income. What made the groups distinct in such analyses was their possession of an asset which gave them that income or revenue. Usually, there were three such assets in classical political economy: land, labour and capital, with entrepreneurial or managerial skill sometimes forming a fourth asset. The basis on which these 'factors of production' constituted assets for the classes which owned them was not posed as a problem by these economists (including those whom Marx called 'vulgar'). That is, the social conditions, which both made these 'factors of production' generate revenues and enabled the factors (and hence their revenues) to be appropriated by certain categories of economic agents called classes, these conditions were not considered problematic. Consequently, as we shall see, there was no theoretical basis for saying there should only be three classes, and not more: as has just been indicated, sometimes a fourth factor (or asset) was admitted, which implied a distinction between profit (entrepreneurial skill) and interest (capital) as forms of revenue. The analysis of the way in which these factors generated revenue went little further than an acknowledgement that such revenues were generated in production and/or exchange. The theory was more concerned with the amount of income distributed to each class and with features affecting the flow of revenue than with the analysis of the determinants of such revenues.

This concern with what Marx called 'relations of distribution' was the main target of Marx's critique of such theories of class. It is precisely the kind of problem generated by the 'revenues' approach to class which Marx is criticising in his famous unfinished chapter on class at the end of Capital¹. The chapter on classes comes in a section entitled "Revenues and their Sources", and follows a chapter on "Distribution Relations and Production Relations", in which he says (page 882);

"Let us moreover consider the so-called distribution relations themselves. The wage presupposes wage-labour, and profit - capital. These definite forms of distribution thus presuppose definite social characteristics of production conditions, and definite social relations of production agents. The specific distribution relations are thus merely the expression of the specific historical production relations."

After demonstrating this with respect to profit (of enterprise), interest, and capitalist ground rent, Marx continues (page 883);

"The so-called distribution relations, then, correspond to and arise from historically determined specific social forms of the process of production and the mutual relations entered into by men (sic) in the reproduction process of human life. The historical character of these distribution relations is the historical character of the production relations, of which they express merely one aspect. Capitalist distribution differs from those forms of distribution which arise from other modes of production, and every form of distribution

disappears with the specific form of production from which it is derived and to which it corresponds."

Thus, when in the chapter on classes Marx criticises the conception of classes as constituted by the identity of revenues and sources of revenue, it is already clear to the reader that he considers that the sources of revenue are determined by the relations of production, which are social conditions (and consequently subject to historical change). It is also implicit that the analysis of revenues (for example, of their amount and the forms of their distribution) should not be completely identified with the analysis of the sources of revenue, that is, with the analysis of the social conditions which constitute them as revenues. However, distribution relations are one aspect of production relations, so the analysis of the forms of distribution of income is a part of the analysis of production relations, and hence of the class structure.

To reiterate, the 'revenues' approach, which treats class relations solely in terms of relations of distribution, without analysing the social conditions of their existence, forms the object of the critique developed by Marx in the unfinished chapter on class. If one has no theoretical basis for saying that these groups (and not others) possess these assets (and not others) as their source of income, and that the possession of these assets is what constitutes these groups as classes, then there is no defence against adding other groups to the class structure. A class then becomes any group constituted by the possession of a socially distinct source of income. In criticising this position which treats revenue as determining class, Marx says:

"However, from this standpoint, physicians and officials for example would also constitute two classes, for they belong to two distinct social groups, the members of each of these groups receiving their revenue from one and the same source. The same would also be true of the infinite fragmentation of interest and rank into which the division of social labour splits labourers as well as capitalists and landlords "

In other words, although classical political economy divided society up into three great classes (the 'holy trinity' of landowners, labourers and capitalists, whose sources of revenue - land, labour and capital - are as naturally homogeneous as beetroot, music and lawyers' fees), it did so on a basis which allowed for the elaboration of "an infinite fragmentation of interest and rank" since it lacked an adequate analysis of the division of labour. It thus opened the way for the analysis of the class structure in terms of an inadequately theorised concept of stratification, that is, in terms of a geological metaphor of strata which did not distinguish strata in terms of some theory of the social relations operative between the members of the different strata. This latter approach requires a principle of stratification, that is a quantitative measure which enables one stratum to be placed higher or lower than another on what is implicitly a qualitatively homogeneous scale. Initially this principle of stratification was the amount of income.

As Marx's analysis indicates (contrary to those who treat the unfinished chapter on classes simply as evidence of the difficulties of Marx's own position), the tendency to add to the number of classes, and to analyse them simply in terms of the distribution of income, these tendencies result from an inadequate theorisation of the division of labour. An adequate analysis of the division of labour would enable one to sustain a defensible categorisation of economic agents into classes. This categorisation would be defensible on the grounds of the social relations which the theory stated were in operation between the different economic agents.

Before turning from Marx's critique of the classical position to Marx's own position, it is worth indicating that his critique is also applicable to much sociological thinking on classes since his death, because of the continuing, if unacknowledged, influence of classical political economy on the sociological analysis of class. The work of Max Weber provides an illuminating and influential example of the sociological elaboration of the 'revenues' approach to class. Weber defines a class as any group of persons occupying the same class position (so the most pertinent kind of economic agent is the human individual). The concept of class position for Weber² (page 424) refers to:

"the typical probability that a given state of
(a) provision of goods (b) external conditions of
life and (c) subjective satisfaction or frustration
will be possessed by an individual or a group.

These probabilities define class position in so far
as they are dependent on the kind and extent of
control or lack of it which the individual has
over goods and services and existing possibilities

of their exploitation for the attainment of income and receipts within a given economic order."

A little later Weber writes:

"The concepts class and class position as such only designate the fact of identity or similarity in the typical situation in which a given individual and many others find their interests defined. In principle control over different combinations of consumer's goods, means of production, investments, and capital funds constitute class positions which are different for each variation and combination."

Ignoring the subjective aspect (satisfaction or frustration) of this definition of class, which is related to his conception of economic action, it is clear from the definition of class in terms of control of goods and services and their exploitation for incomes and receipts that Weber is using a 'revenues' conception of class. The result is that class positions are different for each variation and combination of assets, thus producing an "infinite fragmentation of interest and rank", or in other words, a highly differentiated stratification hierarchy in terms of class position. Precisely because there is no theorisation of what constitutes an asset, or possession of an asset, there is no clear basis for demarcating class positions from each other. Consequently any lines drawn between the strata are necessarily arbitrary.

A skill can be an asset, and a high level of skill constitutes for Weber a 'monopolistic asset' commanding a monopolistic position, which enables him to treat the working class as a series of different class positions because of its 'qualitative

differentiation', that is, the variety of skills within it. This basic definition of class position (in terms of 'chance in the market' as determined by the acquisition of assets) is later added to by Weber: as well as 'acquisition' class, Weber also introduces the concepts of 'property' class and 'social' class. A property class is one where the class position of its members is primarily determined by the differentiation of property holdings. This produces two difficulties for Weber's theory. Firstly, it indirectly subverts the distinction between 'class' and 'status group', the latter being defined in terms of 'social honour'. For example, slaves change from being a negatively privileged status group to a negatively privileged property class. This is inconsistent with the original definition of class which refers to actors in the market. Slaves are not actors in the market. Secondly, it creates problems as to the definition of an acquisition class. Weber's concept of property is not theoretically elaborated - it is simply an enumeration of such things as human beings, land, mining property, fixed equipment, ships or money. Consequently it is difficult to distinguish it from the assets which determine the chance in the market of an acquisition class. For example, shipowners appear as both a property and an acquisition class, and many of those listed as members of acquisition classes might under the above listing of property be considered as members of property classes, namely, industrial and agricultural entrepreneurs, bankers and financiers. The concept of a 'social' class also has its problems: it is actually a plurality of class positions between which an interchange of individuals on a personal basis or in the course of generations is readily possible or typically observable. In other words a 'social' class refers to a unity of various different class positions on the basis of what would nowadays be conventionally termed 'social interaction' or else

on the basis of 'social mobility'. An example of a 'social' class is the working class as a whole. This is ironic in view of Weber's criticism of Marx³:

"The unfinished concluding section of Karl Marx's Kapital was evidently intended to deal with the problem of class unity of the proletariat, which he held existed in spite of the high degree of qualitative differentiation."

It should be clear that this is a misunderstanding by Weber, but Weber's use of the concepts of 'property' class and 'social' class clearly represents an attempt to have one's cake and eat it. Weber is able (at considerable theoretical cost) both to maintain a highly differentiated view of the class structure, and to refer to what to him plausibly appear as important lines of demarcation within the stratification hierarchy.

The other interesting aspect of Weber's theory is, of course, the distinction which he makes between class stratification and stratification in terms of other phenomena which affect 'the distribution of power', namely, 'status groups' and 'parties'. This is the major development which sociology has added to the class analysis of classical political economy - the supposed generalisation of stratification to other non-economic aspects of social relations. In the case of Weber this is related to his attempt to develop the microeconomic theory of transactions in the market into a general theory of social action. Each of these two other aspects of the distribution of power requires a principle of stratification analogous to the amount of income in the class hierarchy. In other words, they each require a quality or attribute or dimension (call it what you will) which the strata possess or do not possess to some degree. The

theoretical basis for the two stratification principles introduced by Weber is even more opaque than that for level of income. The two principles are prestige and political power, and the latter is implicitly distinguished from the more generalised conception of power to which all three aspects of stratification are thought to refer. At least the level of income is measurable by a socially determinate means in a market economy, namely money. The concepts of prestige and political power used by both Weber and the many later studies using a 'three-dimensional' (and sometimes 'multi-dimensional') approach to stratification require subjective judgement, either by the researcher, a panel of judges or those being investigated, as to the distribution of prestige and political power. This produces the most banal kinds of research, such as correlations of the degree of 'status consistency' between the rankings on each dimension or international comparisons of prestige hierarchy rankings. It is not the process of ranking according to some quantitative index that is the problem with such research, nor the use of the word 'stratification' (which is also used by some Marxists, usually in the phrase 'class stratification'), but the failure of such approaches to adequately theorise the determinants of the stratification with which they are concerned.⁴

Since Marx's critique of classical political economy raised the problem (not yet resolved in conventional sociological theory) of the determinants of the class structure, it is appropriate to examine his own position. As is clear from his critique, the determinants of class are to be found for Marx in the analysis of the relations of production, which, in showing the relations between various economic agents, amounts to an analysis of the division of labour. Because most of Capital is concerned with capitalist relations of production, Marxists frequently tend

to argue that the whole of Capital is about class analysis, but this is of little help in deciding which are the most salient features of the relations of production for class analysis.


Fortunately Marx gives some indication in the critique discussed above which appears at the end of Volume Three: the reproduction schemas in Volume Two⁵, which indicate how the capitalist mode of production as a whole reproduces itself, are of considerable importance, since in reproducing itself, capitalism reproduces its class structure. To situate the discussion of the reproduction schemas, one must first discuss the labour theory of value and the reproduction of the individual capitalist enterprise (which appear in Volume One⁶ and already constitute a partial analysis of capitalist relations of production).

While there is some dispute amongst Marxists about whether the 'law of value' only applies to the production of commodities, even those who limit it to commodity production usually see it as related to a more general law of the distribution of labour-time among different production processes.⁷ If the latter, more general law is also referred to as 'the law of value', then the law of value expresses the proportion of the total labour-time available to a society (within a given time-period, say a year) which is devoted to a particular production process. Each of the products of that production process thus embodies a value which is a fraction of the proportional labour-time devoted to that production process. In other words, if one thousand products are produced in a year, then each product embodies one thousandth of the value of that production process. If two thousand products are produced, then the value of each product is halved. Thus the value of each product is inversely proportional to the productivity of the production process associated with it. The value of a product thus refers to the amount of labour time (as a proportion of the total socially available labour-time) which is necessary

to produce it: the value of a product is the embodiment of the socially necessary labour-time required to produce it, and the socially necessary amount of labour-time depends on the productivity of the particular production process and its economic relation to other production processes. In the case of commodity production, according to Marx, where the fact that commodities are exchanged has an effect on the social distribution of labour-time between different production processes, the absolute amount of labour-time embodied in a product is not measured. Only the relative amount of labour-time is measured, and this occurs in the process of commodity exchange where the relative amount of labour-time is expressed by the ratios in which the commodities exchange for each other. If one pound of sugar regularly exchanges for ten pounds of potatoes, then for Marx this is because these physical quantities of the products each take the same amount of socially necessary labour-time to produce. Whether that labour-time is one hour or five days cannot be directly measured by this exchange ratio of one to ten, which only indicates the relative value of the products. This 'exchange value', as Marx calls it, forms the basis for the price of commodities, once money becomes an integral part of commodity exchange. According to Marx, this occurs on the basis of one commodity becoming a socially acceptable measure in terms of which all the other exchange ratios are established.

Commodity exchange, then, for Marx, establishes a series of social relations between economic agents (including monetary relations) which allow the distribution of labour-time among different production processes to develop considerably, involving profound changes in the division of labour. In cases where this leads to the development of capitalist production, which depends crucially on commodity exchange (and particularly on the social

appearance of labour-power as a commodity), the economic reproduction of each capitalist enterprise (with its associated production processes) depends on commodity exchanges. Marx thus begins analysing capitalist relations of production by the analysis of the reproduction of the capitalist enterprise in terms of the value embodied in each of its elements and the value created by that enterprise. Schematically, these elements are designated in the following diagram:



As is well known, in this schema M represents a sum of money sufficiently large (with the right social conditions) to be used as capital, that is, to be used to purchase means of production, M.O.P., and labour-power, L.P., which are necessary for capitalist production. Labour-power is the capacity to labour (a capacity which entails both physical and intellectual capacities), and it is this capacity or ability which is purchased by the capitalist. However, as with any production process, capitalist production requires the combination of labour, L, the activity of work, with the means of production. It is the amount of time spent in labour, the socially necessary labour-time, which determines the new value of the product of each production process. However the total value of the product also includes the value of the means of production (which are themselves products embodying labour-time) transferred to the product over a period of time. The product, P, is treated as a commodity, C, and is sold for money, M', the superscript indicating that this is usually more than the original sum of money.

In other words, Marx is arguing that commodity relations, conceptualised in terms of the theory of value, establish certain relations between the elements of the capitalist production process which enable it to reproduce itself economically. The value of the product, a commodity, is determined by the value transferred to it by the means of production and by the value of the labour-time spent on producing it. For the value of the product to be greater than the outlay spent on producing it, Marx argues that the value of the labour expended on it must be higher than the value of the labour-power which was bought by the capitalist for the period of the production process. This is possible precisely because labour-power (a capacity) is not the same as labour (an activity), and the very conceptualisation of value (as a proportion of the total socially available labour-time) means that only labour can create value. The value of the means of production which is transferred to the products over a period of time, as the means of production depreciate, cannot exceed the labour-time embodied in them, unless for some reason their replacement cost increases. Because labour is for Marx the source of the extra value of the product, or surplus value, Marx calls the capital spent on the purchase of labour-power 'variable capital', whereas the capital spent on the purchase of the means of production is called 'constant capital'. The variable capital varies in amount between the beginning and end of the production process, because it is the source of the surplus value which appears as profit when the commodity is sold.

To sum up Marx's analysis of the reproduction of the individual capitalist enterprise, then, it can be said that it presupposes a certain social distribution of the means of production such that certain economic agents, capitalists, possess them while others, agents, wage-labourers, do not, and must

therefore sell their labour-power to reproduce themselves economically. Starting from this differential access to the means of production, the analysis indicates how a process of production of commodities by means of commodities can reproduce that social distribution of the means of production, with capitalists able to purchase them and wage-labourers unable to purchase them. It thus provides a partial analysis of how the class structure is reproduced.

As Marx recognises in Volume Two, an analysis of how capitalist enterprises reproduce themselves cannot be a full account of how a capitalist economy reproduces itself. An analysis of the distribution of labour-time (value analysis) is necessarily partial if it is not related to an analysis of the physical distribution of the product: an analysis in terms of 'use-value' as Marx calls it. The concept of 'use-value' refers to the physical properties of the product (as understood by science at a particular time) and to the demand or 'need' for the product: if a product is not wanted, it has no use-value, so it is a waste of labour-time to produce it, and hence has no value either, according to Marx. The main aspect of the use-value of products with which Marx is concerned in the reproduction schemas of Volume Two is whether the products are means of production or means of consumption. As is already evident from the analysis in Volume One, the class relations between different categories of economic agent are concerned with their relation to the means of production (crudely, possession or non-possession of the means of production), so an analysis of the distribution of the product which is conducted in terms of a distinction between means of production and means of consumption is likely to elucidate the process of the social distribution of the means of production, and consequently aid the analysis of the class structure.

Since Marx is dealing with a wholly capitalist economy, all production processes are capitalist and hence reproduce themselves by commodity exchange. In this sense, they are economically independent of each other in that the continuing economic activity of each enterprise depends on the success of its commodity operations. A capitalist enterprise producing means of consumption will purchase its means of production from one or more capitalist enterprises producing means of production. A capitalist enterprise producing means of production will be staffed by personnel who purchase their means of consumption from a variety of capitalist enterprises. Marx thus sees the interdependence of the production of means of production (Department I) and production of means of consumption (Department II) as an important aspect of the division of labour. The reproduction schemas of Volume Two of Capital are concerned with how the different classes of economic agents (capitalists and wage-labourers) in the two Departments derive their revenues from their differential access to the means of production. Capitalist and wage-labourers in Department I buy their means of consumption from Department II, as do capitalists and wage-workers in Department II. However, only capitalists buy the means of production from Department I, and this is true whether they themselves are Department I or Department II capitalists. In other words, only other capitalist enterprises are customers for Department I products, whereas both wage-labourers and capitalists are customers for Department II products. Indeed it is the social character of the demand for the product, rather than its physical properties, which determines whether it counts as a Department I or Department II product. Coal or electricity, for example, can be both means of production and means of consumption.

Since each capitalist enterprise is attempting to make a profit, and, if successful, is in Marx's view reproducing itself according to the value diagram reproduced above, what the reproduction schemas must do is indicate how this is possible for a whole economy composed of capitalist enterprises. This means that the amount of labour-time devoted to producing Department I products must be such as to satisfy, broadly speaking, the requirements of Department II for means of production (consisting mainly of raw materials, ancillary materials and instruments of production). Similarly Department II must be able to broadly satisfy the demand for its products from capitalists and wage-labourers in both Departments. In explaining the reproduction of the capitalist economy, then, the reproduction schemas simultaneously explain several things:

- (a) the proportional distribution of labour-time between different production processes, which must enable individual enterprises to make a profit.
- (b) the physical distribution of the product, so that the economy is physically capable of continuing with production.
- (c) the social distribution of the means of production, which is effected through the physical distribution of the product by means of commodity exchange, at the same time as the means of consumption is distributed.

The social distribution of the means of production, however, is the main determinant in this process. It determines the form of the production process (the conditions under which labour is combined with the means of production), and consequently which agent disposes of the product. Hence it determines the kind of revenue (profit, wages) available to each class of economic agent and the relative amounts of these revenues. The social distribution of the means of production thus determines the social distribution of the means

of consumption. In other words, the reproduction schemas, in explaining the relations of production, also explain the relations of distribution and the basic class structure of a capitalist economy. This is what might be called the 'hidden secret' of the reproduction schemas. As already mentioned, Marx refers to these schemas in Volume Three when mounting his critique of the view of class maintained by classical political economy, so it is only 'hidden' from those sociologists who tend not to read the apparently technical economic parts of Marx's work.

Of course, the reproduction schemas are of considerable potential interest to economists from two points of view:

- (a) in the history of economic thought, they constitute a link between Quesnay's Tableau Economique and the development of both input-output analysis and the Soviet use of material balances.
- (b) the reproduction schemas, in indicating the complex conditions to be fulfilled, according to Marx, for the reproduction of the capitalist economy, also indicate that the potential 'problem areas' are numerous, and are thus also the starting point of Marx's theory of capitalist crises. However, the reproduction schemas will not be appraised from those standpoints here. What is of concern here are the possible problems with this analysis, and the extent to which it can be used as a basis for class analysis.

It is evident that the labour theory of value is an important element in this analysis. In this sense, Lenin's well-known summary⁸ of the Marxist position on classes is quite correct:

"Classes are large groups of people differing from each other by the place they occupy in a historically determined system of social production, by their relation (in most cases fixed and formulated in law) to the means of production, by their role in the social organisation of labour, and, consequently, by the dimensions of the share of social wealth of which they dispose and the mode of acquiring it. Classes are groups of people one of which can appropriate the labour of another owing to the different places they occupy in a definite system of social economy."

The problem which must be raised in the light of recent critiques of the labour theory of value⁹ is its role in the analysis of class, and if it is to be abandoned, the problem of possible alternative ways of analysing relations of production and class structure must also be discussed. No attempt will be made here to provide a detailed exposition of the recent critiques of the labour theory of value, or of criticisms of them¹⁰. Rather a few comments will be made indicating the limitations of the concepts associated with the labour theory of value for the analysis of the division of labour¹¹. This can most readily be done by examining various other aspects of the division of labour, since Marx's analysis of the division of labour is by no means exhausted by the reproduction schemas. There are clearly present in Marx's work three aspects of the division of labour, although he does not designate them by the following terminology:

(a) The technical division of labour

This refers to the form of organisation of the unit of production, here called the 'enterprise' for brevity. Marx refers to this as the 'division of labour in the factory', which refers to the way in which labour is combined with the means of production. This entails determinate forms of co-operation and supervision, and is related among other things to the technology being used.

(b) The division of social production

This refers to the division of production into socially distinct branches, such as steel, aviation or electronics. It could also be used to refer to the division between Department I and Department II, although certain parts of some branches of industry (such as coal, electricity or water production) could be considered to be in different Departments. Marx sometimes refers to this as the 'division of labour in society'.

(c) The social division of labour

This refers to the division of economic locations such that the agents occupying them have differential access to the means of production. These agents need not be human individuals, for example, a joint stock company could occupy the position of capitalist. Marx's analysis of the relations of production is about precisely this - the social distribution of economic agents in relation to the social distribution of the means of production.

The distinctions which Marx makes by discussing these aspects of the division of labour constitute a significant advance over most economic and sociological discussions of the division of labour. Theorists from Smith to Durkheim have treated the division of labour as in effect emanating from individual differences in aptitude and hence skill. Thus they tend to treat all aspects of the division of labour as arising out of the division of labour in the factory (or on the hunt). While the other aspects of the division of labour may be described, the fact that they are treated simply as effects of an apparently primary (or even primordial) cause means that the articulation of these three aspects is poorly theorised. In Marx, on the contrary, there are various indications as to how to theorise their articulation. The division of social production, for example, clearly affects the technical division of labour. The development of a new branch of production, say microprocessors, may well affect the technical division of labour within enterprises in other branches of production. This has already happened recently with the introduction of rudimentary robots into car production, and is now affecting the technical division of labour in the enterprises of car component manufacturers, as microprocessors are introduced as car components to improve economy and reliability of performance.

However, some of the effects which Marx attributes to the technical division of labour and the division of social production create problems for his conception of the 'social division of labour' if it is defined in terms of the relation of economic agents to the means of production. For example, the increase in the scale of production, according to Marx, means that the scale of production becomes too great for one person

to supervise. This is related in Marx's analysis to the virtual disappearance of the 'captain of industry' and the development of a category of managers. This is just one indication among several which show that Marx himself argues that various economic activities which he attributes to capital can become specialised and differentiated, rather than residing in a single agent.

Rather than the individual capitalist owning his own money capital and means of production (including his factory and land), who supervises the production process and sells the product, we discover a whole series of economic agents at various points in Capital. Each of these agents has its own source of revenue. With the increase in the scale of production, the capitalist may borrow money for investment from bank capital (interest), while the land may be in the possession of a landowner (capitalist ground rent). The supervision of the production process involves a management hierarchy drawing wages (Marx likens it to the ranks of an army), while commercial capital specialises in wholesale and retail selling (commercial profit) and employs clerks as well as manual workers for book-keeping and warehousing purposes (again, drawing wages). The joint stock company, as already mentioned, may replace the individual capitalist (interest of various kinds, including share dividends). While Marx attempts, with varying degrees of success, to reconcile the explanation of these sources of income with the labour theory of value, the concept of value does not really explain why such agents appear. Consequently, the differentiation of economic activities attributed to capital threatens to disrupt the conception of the 'social division of labour' because it is clear that the relation to the means of production is not the same for all agents whom Marx treats as capitalist. Whereas Marx can allow for specialisation amongst labourers as part of

the development of the technical division of labour, the specialisation amongst capitalists raises the issue of the basis of capitalist possession of the means of production. The distinction between possessors and non-possessors of capital seems to be based on the labour theory of value, yet it is not easy to explain the incomes of some of the 'capitalist' agents in terms of the distribution of surplus-value. This can be briefly indicated by pointing to the problem of capitalist ground rent and the problem of the distinction between productive and unproductive labour.

Both kinds of differential rent (I and II), and absolute ground rent presuppose the formation of a general rate of profit under capitalism. They appear as a surplus profit over and above the general rate, and accrue as a source of revenue to the landowner (who may also be the capitalist). Rent thus accrues as an effect of technical (fertility or market location) determinants in the case of differential rent, or of political or legal determinants in the case of absolute rent. Furthermore the social development of a 'class' of landowners is also apparently a matter which cannot be explained in terms of the labour theory of value. Hence a variety of other determinants are introduced as affecting the division of labour without recourse to the labour theory of value. Yet they are thought necessary to explain the distribution of income. A similar point can be made with unproductive labourers such as managers and clerks in a manufacturing capitalist enterprise, and clerks and manual workers engaged in warehouse work in a commercial capitalist enterprise. These workers are not thought to produce surplus value, hence they are unproductive; yet they are necessary to the processes of capitalist production and commodity exchange. Here again agents are introduced as determining the

distribution of surplus value, yet they are explained in terms of either the technical division of labour or the social division of production.

In other words, the labour theory of value on its own does not enable one to decide where to demarcate the boundaries between classes. Do any of the agents just mentioned constitute classes in their own right or are they fractions of a larger class? On what basis does one decide? Clearly any such decision must be made on the basis of the social relations which the theory postulates as operative between the different categories of economic agent, but the problem here is that both the production (or non-production) of surplus value and other determinants are introduced by Marx to explain the social relations operating between the various agents (the relations of production, and relations of distribution which are an aspect of production relations). The introduction of the other determinants is an implicit recognition of the inadequacy of the labour theory of value on its own for explaining class relations, yet the other determinants create difficulties for the labour theory of value, as the continuing debates on ground rent and unproductive labour bear witness. The introduction of determinants of the division of labour which are not derived from the labour theory of value also opens the door for other such determinants, for example, what may be loosely referred to as ideological determinants. It would, for instance, be possible to construct an argument that the economic activities of various religious bodies (maintaining priests and buildings and so on) also affect the relations of distribution. If one treats all those who are not manual wage-labourers in the primary and secondary 'sectors' of the economy as unproductive, in an attempt to reconcile the diversity of economic agents with the theory of value, then one would find

oneself arguing that the majority of the population were exploiters. Any attempt to widen the category of the exploited by introducing other agents into it would involve the recognition of the pertinence of some determinants of the division of labour, but not others. It is extremely difficult on the basis of the labour theory of value to see on what grounds the choice could be made to recognise only some of these determinants, particularly since it is clear that Marx's position allows for a constantly changing division of labour.

If the labour theory of value cannot explain why some agents should be counted as possessors of the means of production (with their income deriving from this possession thereby counting as surplus-value), and if other determinants of the division of labour are to be recognised for the purpose of demarcating class boundaries, then a variety of problems have to be faced. (Indeed some of these problems have to be dealt with even if one does accept the labour theory of value, but wishes to allow for additional determinants of the class structure). If a variety of determinants are to be admitted as relevant to the definition of classes, there is a danger of a collapse into the 'infinite fragmentation' position which I have criticised in Weber and the other 'revenues' theorists of class. This is because the 'intersection' of a variety of determinants of the division of labour may well produce a whole series of demarcation lines between groups of economic agents. There is no need for all such cleavages to demarcate the same groups of agents. In other words, the effects of some determinants may be to cross-cut or else to sub-divide the groupings of agents generated by the effects of other determinants. One possible way round this problem is to treat some determinants as relevant for the purposes of class definition, and others as not relevant. This

is what the labour theory of value in effect attempts to do. However, in my view it fails because, in realising that theoretical priority cannot be given to the physical act of labour and thus in emphasising the social conditions of labour, the labour theory of value 'allows back in' other determinants of the division of labour without a clear specification of their relevance. In so doing, it not only allows a differentiation of the labourers, but a differentiation of the non-labourers who possess the means of production, namely the capitalists. The acceptance of the differentiation of capitalists threatens Marx's concept of effective possession of the means of production (whether this is defined as legal ownership or de facto control), since each of the different kinds of capitalist specified by Marx controls some of the conditions of production, and consequently secures a revenue. Yet none of these capitalists could be said to possess the means of production in the sense of controlling them to the exclusion of other kinds of capitalist. It is only in relation to the labourers that the capitalists might be said to collectively possess the means of production. Yet even this remark does not resolve the problem of the unproductive labourers whose work is a condition of the specialisation of the different kinds of capital. Can one say that unproductive labourers such as managers do not also control some of the conditions of production?

What is needed, then, are grounds for treating some determinants of the division of labour as relevant for the definition of classes, and others as not relevant. However, even if one succeeds in defending such grounds, the very admission of a variety of determinants of the division of labour still poses a problem for any theory of class. This problem is that there is no reason to suppose that different determinants (whether legal, political, technological or whatever) will be

equivalent in their mode of operation or effect. Even if only some of the determinants affect the class structure, the other determinants are still operative. Hence even in a classless society, the social organisation of production involves various different demarcations between economic agents. Why then does class matter? Without denying the importance of other lines of demarcation between economic agents which are not usually considered as class boundaries (for example, gender or race) one can say that the class structure matters because an economic agent's location in relation to the means of production can be a significant condition of action of that agent. This may seem a rather bland justification for the study of class relations, compared to the claims made by both Marxism and Weberian sociology that the class structure forms the basis for identifying significant or potentially significant collective actors. Yet this argument has something in common with such claims, for to say that the relation to the means of production can be a significant condition of action of an economic agent is to imply that such an agent may potentially act with other agents who have the same or a similar relation to the means of production.

In the Weberian tradition, parties are organisations aiming to affect the policy of the rulers, and may be formed on various bases, including status groups or (less likely in Weber's view) class position. The sort of class most likely to act 'communally' in Weber's view was a social class, which was defined in terms of the social interaction among its members. The classical Marxist use of class to identify potentially significant collective actors rests on the claim that the economy either directly or 'in the last instance' determines the superstructure, so that politics is primarily a matter of class struggle. In

my view this claim has been cogently criticised as reductionist,¹² but it is still possible to say that economic agents may be politically engaged in struggle along class lines (in the enterprise and elsewhere over other conditions of production) without reducing politics to class action. The problem of reductionism is that it attempts to reduce one level (or domain or instance) which is supposed to have effects in its own right, to another level. The logical problem is how to reconcile the claim that a level has effects of its own with the claim that it is determined from outside, from another level with which it is somehow structurally connected but not merged. This is the problem of 'relative autonomy' of a superstructure determined 'in the last instance' by the economy, the problem being crudely that either politics is wholly determined by the economy, in which case it is difficult to treat them as distinct levels, or else the effects of the economy on the separate domain of politics are theoretically indeterminate, in which case the claim of 'determination in the last instance' cannot be sustained.

Yet it is possible to argue that class structure is potentially relevant to political struggle if politics is not treated as a structurally separate domain, but as a process of struggle (including negotiation) between socially defined agents. If some agents are in a position to control the conditions of production, and hence to permit access to the means of production by other agents on conditions which they, rather than the other agents, largely determine, then potentially the relation to the means of production could either become an issue over which struggle takes place or a demarcation line along which agents engaged in some other struggle form into contending forces. However, although the class structure could be considered a

basis for identifying potential collective actors, whether political struggle takes place along class lines is less important than the way the relation to the means of production opens up or reduces the capacity for action of the various economic agents. To put it another way, the class structure matters not because political struggle primarily or potentially takes place along class lines, but because the relation to the means of production gives greater freedom of action to some agents and restricts the capacity for action of other agents in a fairly systematic way. If this cannot be demonstrated, then the concept of class cannot be considered an important tool for analysing forms of social organisation, no matter what grounds one offers for drawing class boundaries.

Why should the social organisation of production give rise to fairly systematic variations in the capacities of economic agents because of their relation to the means of production? As we have seen, the classical Marxist answer has been because the relation to the means of production determines the sources of revenue and the associated levels of income and consumption. This could perhaps be criticised on the grounds that production and consumption are interrelated, so that there are no grounds for giving priority to the relation to the means of production as the defining characteristic of classes. It is certainly true that if one abandons the labour theory of value, one cannot claim any ontological privilege for the production process per se, and in an economy with an advanced division of labour other economic activities increase in importance as conditions of production, and cannot be treated as passive effects of the production process. However, since production is a necessary part of any economy, and since other economic activities can be considered as conditions of production, the use of a concept of

relation to the means of production as a tool for analysing the division of labour as a class structure does not preclude reference to other economic relations. Rather it is a way of dealing with the interconnections of economic relationships, since treating them as conditions of production relates other economic activities to production (which must be a feature of any economy so the concept of relation to the means of production has a general applicability) without giving production a privileged position as the main or ultimate cause of the structure of the economy.

To some extent Marx was approaching such a position in his discussions of the differentiation of capitalist activities, many of which (such as banking) are not directly associated with production, but which do form important conditions of production. It is because for Marx they formed such important conditions of capitalist production that he was able to treat them as providing access to the means of production which was basically the same kind of access as that of the industrial capitalist; in other words, Marx argued in effect that control of such conditions as finance capital and commercial capital provided access on the various capitalists' 'own' terms, by and large, whereas the access of the labourers to the means of production was for Marx largely on the terms of the capitalists. The problem with Marx's position lay not in his treatment of the class structure in terms of relation to the means of production, but his attempt to specify possession and non-possession of the means of production in terms of the labour theory of value. The specialisation of capitalists meant that possession could no longer be adequately conceived in terms of the legal analogy of a single agent with complete rights of use and disposal of the possessed object, since the control of the social conditions of use and disposal of that possession gave other agents effective access to the

benefits of that possession (the means of production). Consequently the distinction between a class of agents possessing the means of production and a class which did not possess them was threatened, and the idea of a single line of demarcation between the classes based on the labour theory of value ran into serious (and in my view, fatal) difficulties. However, as already indicated, if one does not have a single line of demarcation between agents, and if one admits of a variety of determinants of the relation to the means of production (and hence a variety of agents whose relation to the means of production differs in important respects) then there is a danger of falling into an 'infinite fragmentation' position, or denying that class matters.

Paradoxically, the solution to this is probably to concede that the traditional concept of possession or control of the means of production is problematic. If it is conceded that possession can never be totally exclusive to one agent, or even to a class of agents, because the capacity to use and dispose of a possession is always dependent on social conditions and hence on the relative capacities of other agents, then one is forced to specify what the relative capacities of the various agents are and to analyse how far these capacities determine and are determined by access to the means of production. In other words, since the social organisation of production always involves relations between economic agents (the relations of production), all economic agents have some access to the means of production, since they condition the access of those agents most directly concerned with production. Relations between economic agents become class relations when certain agents are able to establish a predominance over the conditions of access to the means of production; that is, when certain agents are able to establish a relatively exclusive control over the means

and conditions of production. When this occurs, other agents are only able to gain access on terms which are significantly determined by the 'possessing' agents, and thus the capacity to act of these other agents is significantly restricted. If one argues that there are various agents with differential access to the means of production, then the only way to avoid falling into the 'infinite fragmentation' approach is to argue that the relations between some of those agents are such that collectively those agents effectively establish relatively exclusive access to the means of production; that is, other agents' access is largely determined by the relations between the first group of agents. Thus one is not talking of legal ownership or control by a particular kind of agent as the criterion for class relations, but rather of the relations between various different kinds of agents being such that these somewhat different kinds of agents' relations with each other establish a set of conditions which restrict the access to the means of production by most other economic agents.

If such a boundary demarcating fairly systematic differences in the capacity for action of various economic agents can be shown to be a feature of the social organisation of production, then a class structure is a significant aspect of the social formation in question. This is not to deny that economic agents on different sides of this boundary are differentiated by other determinants which also affect their capacity for action; nor is it to deny that such other determinants may be more important than relation to the means of production, even in affecting the way an economy is organised. It is simply to affirm that the class structure is a theoretically significant feature of a social formation wherever relations of production generate a series of social locations, the conditions of which give the

agents occupying them differential access to the means of production in a manner which fairly systematically enhances or diminishes their capacity for action. Since the conditions of production are always changing in response to the struggles between agents, the enhancement or diminution of the capacity for action of agents consequent upon their differential access to the means of production can never be a static affair. That is why it is difficult to be more specific about the extent or forms of access which determine such fairly systematic differences in the various agents' capacity for action, when making such general remarks about the class structure. What can be said in general is that differential access to the means of production not only enables all agents to act in the division of labour, since it provides their conditions for action; differential access to the means of production also enables some agents to act more effectively on the division of labour. That is, their relation to the means of production also enables some agents to co-ordinate the diverse economic activities of other agents, thus partially determining the conditions for their own actions. It is for this reason that the relation to the means of production can be considered a potentially important demarcation line between economic agents, because it can enhance the capacity of some agents to act upon their own conditions of existence, while restricting the capacities of others to do so.

In the case of capitalist relations of production, the restrictions on the access to the means of production are effected through the 'control' by some agents of the conditions of commodity exchange. The accumulation or concentration of substantial amounts of money as capital enables the agents in a position to decide how that capital is to be used to become predominant in determining the social distribution of the means

of production and the distribution of income, while the capacity of other agents to determine such outcomes is seriously reduced. The maintenance of such systematic differences in the capacity for action must be in part an effect (even if unintended) of the policies of those agents with access to the means of production on favourable terms. Otherwise in circumstances where other agents were struggling to improve their access to the means of production there would be little to stop those other agents from eventually altering the conditions of production in their own favour, since the very fact of the division of labour means that all economic agents have some impact, however minimal, on the conditions of production. Consequently, both the maintenance and the transformation of relations to the means of production involve policy decisions on the part of various economic agents.

In the case of state socialist societies, one of the issues for analysis is the extent to which access to the means of production is open, that is, the extent to which class relations have been abolished. Certainly this is the main criterion by which such societies judge themselves and justify their policies, and it forms one of the main issues for debate in commentaries on such societies. How would one decide whether or not there was fairly exclusive access to the means of production? In other words, what pattern of differential access to the means of production would prevent some agents from predominating in a fashion which seriously diminished the capacities of other agents? To claim that a situation arises where no set of agents predominates in determining the conditions of access comes close to claiming that the division of labour does not produce differential capacities in economic agents; in other words, that the division of labour does not produce important effects, and does not really matter. This would amount to saying that the conditions of action of economic agents either did not affect economic agents, or

affected them all equally. In that case it would make no sense to talk of a division of labour. However, if a set of agents does predominate in determining the conditions of access to the means of production, this does not necessarily mean that they are able to determine access on terms which systematically favour themselves. The co-ordination of the diverse activities of various economic agents is almost bound to place the co-ordinating agents in a position where they predominate in determining the terms of access to the means of production, and hence the distribution of income. Yet such agents do not form a class if they are unable to use their predominant position to secure for themselves a disproportionate share in the distribution of income, or otherwise substantially enhance their capacity for action at the expense of other agents. In other words, a set of agents may predominate in determining access to the means of production in a way which prevents other agents from 'dictating the terms' of access, yet those predominant agents might themselves be unable to use their position to 'dictate their own terms'. In such a case, the predominant agents cannot be considered a class. The central planning agencies in state socialist societies could in principle be considered as such a set of agents, provided it could be demonstrated empirically that they were only 'holding the ring', in the sense of following policies which prevented all agents, including themselves, from securing the disproportionate benefits which can result from privileged access to the means of production. This would imply that non-class societies would have a very egalitarian policy with respect to the distribution of income and that this policy was being fairly effectively pursued.

To sum up the discussion so far, then, it could be said that various determinants of the division of labour only produce relations of production which can be called class relations when they generate conditions of access to the means of production which permit substantially greater scope for some economic agents to act in and on the division of labour, taking on functions of co-ordination of the diverse kinds of economic activity engaged in by various economic agents, and when the conditions for this predominant access to the means of production permit the predominant group of agents to secure for themselves substantial benefits, particularly in the form of diverting to themselves a disproportionate share of the total real income of the social formation in question. Consequently, while it is difficult to envisage a division of labour in which no agents have a predominant access to the means of production, the conditions under which in certain social formations some agents do predominate may be such that agents with a lesser capacity for action are able to establish sufficient access to the means of production to prevent any agent or group of agents from using their predominance to substantially affect the distribution of income in their own favour. This would imply 'multiple' access to the means of production, that is a series of overlapping forms of access.

It follows from this argument that the concept of 'social ownership of the means of production' which has traditionally been used by classical Marxism to describe socialist or communist relations of production must be reconsidered. If any division of labour entails agents with different capacities, some of which are determined by their different relations to the means of production (differential access), then non-class relations of production cannot be conceived of as referring to the ownership

or control of the means of production by society as a whole. That would be to deny that the division of labour does indeed differentiate economic agents. Nor could the means of production be considered to be under the control of an agency which somehow represents society as a whole, since any such agency would necessarily be composed of sub-agents who could be considered to have privileged access to the means of production, particularly if a serious criticism could be mounted of the claim by that agency to represent the whole of an internally differentiated social formation. Hence any concept of social ownership of the means of production (that is, of classless relations of production) must take account of the very complexity of an advanced division of labour, which implies a multiplicity of relations between economic agents. That very multiplicity or complexity of relations may well provide the conditions in which agents who would otherwise be less powerful could gain sufficient access to the means of production to prevent the predominant agents from using their social location largely for their own benefit. Thus any concept of 'social ownership' or 'communal possession' cannot refer to a series of undifferentiated agents, each of which has access to the means of production on the same terms, but rather to a set of conditions where the form of access of one set of agents does not seriously preclude the access of other agents. This would imply a situation of continuous negotiation and struggle between agents to prevent unacceptable restrictions on their own capacity for action deriving from their differential relations to the means of production. Since the outcome of such a continuous struggle could not be guaranteed, classless relations of production cannot be conceived of as a 'point of stasis', a state of affairs which could be thought of as necessarily reproducing

itself. Thus a classless society cannot be considered as the end point of a process. In particular, it cannot be considered as the 'goal of history' and social formations cannot be assessed by 'measuring their distance' from such a goal. State socialist societies are often considered as 'transitional social formations'. However, this is not because they are at a certain staging point down the road of progress to an ideal state of affairs, but rather because it presumably can be demonstrated that class relations have been seriously weakened. Since the continuous process of struggle between agents means that there is no state of affairs in which the process of restoration of class relations cannot begin, it is probably better to avoid the phrase 'transitional social formation', or else to restrict its use to designating social formations where major transformations of the relations of production are taking place. The 'state of play' of the relations of production, with regard to whether these involve a class structure, and if so what the conditions and effects of this are, this 'state of play' can only be decided after a fairly detailed examination of various possible determinants of the division of labour.

The position which will be adopted in this thesis, therefore, will be to concentrate on analysing relations of production and class structure without attempting to reconcile this analysis with the labour theory of value. Instead, the decisions as to the demarcation of different positions within the class structure will have to be made in the light of historically specific analyses of the division of labour in a particular society, the Soviet Union, without attempting an a priori delimitation of the determinants of the division of labour. This implies having recourse to empirical analysis (probably the most difficult kind of theoretical work to do well), but it is

hoped that this thesis will avoid the pitfalls of the more common approaches to empirical work on class.

The main pitfall has already been indicated with reference to Weber and approaches influenced by him, namely that the absence of a clear theorisation of the social relations operative between different agents has meant that the class structure has usually been treated as qualitatively homogenous (classes having more or less of some quality, attribute or possession). Where the stratification hierarchy has not been treated as qualitatively homogenous, as in certain 'multidimensional' approaches, the strata or classes have been conceived as defined by the concatenation of various dimensions, which are themselves poorly theorised, and whose interaction in structuring the strata is also unclear. Thus the avoidance of treating stratification as entailing a homogenous hierarchy is achieved after a fashion, but the benefits are dubious. However, this has still resulted in theoretically arbitrary dividing lines being drawn between the classes (or class positions) leading to the adoption of an empiricist approach to research.¹³ A good example of an approach influenced by Weber can be found in the well-known article by Goldthorpe 'Social Stratification in Industrial Society'.¹⁴ This article establishes a distinction between market stratification which is, so to speak, unconscious or unintended, and political stratification, which is deliberate. Yet there is no real attempt to specify the kinds of social relations between the strata which are produced by these different stratifying mechanisms, the market and the political structure. Consequently there is no real basis for empirical analysis based on conclusions drawn from this distinction, since the nature of the different kinds of strata is opaque.

The analysis of the class structure, then, requires a theoretical specification of the causal mechanisms generating a variety of economic locations and of the possibly distinct mechanisms distributing agents to the different locations, as a basis for categorising agents into classes. It has been argued here that a concept of relations of production which admits of a variety of determinants of the division of labour would be the best way to approach this specification, and that this causal specification must be historically specific. However, as should be clear from the above discussion of the problems involved, only those determinants which affect the access of agents to the means of production, and consequently their capacity for action in and on the division of labour, can be considered as relevant for the analysis of class. On the basis of this theoretical specification of class relations, it is possible to appraise empirical indices of the class structure in terms of their pertinence to the theoretical concerns of the analysis. A technically competent piece of empirical work may well be irrelevant to the concerns of the analysis, but often the researcher is in a position of being able to use empirical material compiled by others whose theoretical concerns were different from those of the researcher. They may nevertheless be in a form that renders them open to reworking, that is, to recalculation which transforms them into indices, albeit imperfect ones, of the theoretically specified mechanisms in which the researcher is interested.¹⁵ This was precisely the problem confronted by Lenin in his use of zemstvo statistics in The Development of Capitalism in Russia¹⁶, and by agricultural researchers in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, as will be seen in Chapter One. It implies that empirical work where one is using already existing sources (and one is thus not in control of the research design) must be

conducted on the basis of both a theoretical critique of the conceptual basis of the research and where necessary what might be termed a technical critique of the process by which the empirical results were compiled. Clearly, the more details recorded about the process of collecting, sorting and performing the original calculations on the material the better, since they are then more amenable to reworking in terms of the critique. This means that even where a decision is made to use certain indices of the class structure, their pertinence to the analysis being conducted will vary. The relative merits of the various sources is thus a worthy matter for discussion in each case. What should be evident, however, is that the use of such indices by themselves does not entail the use of theoretically arbitrary demarcation lines between the different class positions. It does not, in other words, entail a collapse into empiricism, precisely because it is related to a theory of the social relations operating between the various agents. It must be said, however, that adoption of certain Marxist concepts does not create a talisman which guarantees immunity from adopting an empiricist approach to research.¹⁷ Consequently, the relationship between the theoretical basis of the empirical material being used and the analysis being conducted must be kept under constant review. It is hoped that this thesis succeeds in doing so.

In the light of all these considerations, the structure of the thesis can now be outlined, together with the rationale for this structure. Chapter One is concerned with the rural class structure in the 1920s, because this formed the main set of conditions which had to be taken into account in the formulation of a strategy of industrialisation and socialisation of the means of production in the Soviet Union. As such the rural class structure formed a major starting point of the process of social transformation which led to the modern Soviet Union. The extent

to which capitalist relations of production were developing, and how far such developments acted as a constraint on kind of socialist strategy which was possible, are issues which often appear in debates on the contemporary Soviet Union. It is hoped that an examination of such issues will illuminate the current social structure of the Soviet Union, if only by indicating the extent to which it has been able to transform the conditions which posed such acute dilemmas for a socialist strategy in the 1920s.

Chapter Two is an examination of the Soviet economy of the 1960s and 1970s, paying particular attention to relations between various economic agents, such as the central planning agencies, state enterprises, collective farms and retailing outlets, as well as various individual human agents, such as enterprise managers. The main concern of this Chapter is with the conditions of action of such agents, as determined not only by their relation to other agents, but also by their internal forms of organisation and modes of calculation.

Chapter Three is concerned with the law, the state and politics, in so far as these are determinants of the division of labour and affect access to the means of production. In particular, the treatment of politics as a process of struggle, which continuously changes the conditions of action of various agents, including economic agents, is elaborated. The implications of this treatment of politics for theories of socialist democracy are considered, and in the process of relating this view of politics to the Soviet Union, various other approaches to Soviet politics are criticised. However, the main concern of this Chapter is to analyse the legal and political determinants of the relations of production.

Chapter Four follows on from this analysis by examining the policy outcomes of such political struggles in so far as they affect the distribution of income. Hence it investigates the various agencies most directly concerned with distributing non-wage forms of income such as housing, health care and assorted welfare benefits. It is thus concerned with social consumption and the extent to which an effectively egalitarian policy on the distribution of income is being pursued.

Chapter Five attempts to build on the work of Chapters Two to Four, which are concerned with major determinants of the division of labour, to examine the mechanisms differentiating economic locations, the mechanisms distributing agents to those locations and the consequent distribution of income to determine whether the relations of production in the Soviet Union can be said to involve class relations.

NotesIntroduction

1. K. Marx (1972) Capital, Volume 3, Lawrence and Wishart, London.
2. M. Weber (1964) The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, The Free Press, New York.

I have used the term 'class position' instead of the translation 'class status' because the latter may be confused with Weber's concept of 'status'.

3. M. Weber, *ibid.*, page 427.
4. The bland phrase 'social stratification' is perhaps symptomatic of this theoretical vagueness, but it should be pointed out that substituting a phrase like 'social inequality' does little to help, unless backed by some theoretical support: on its own, the phrase 'social inequality' merely avoids the assumption that forms of social differentiation coalesce into strata.
5. K. Marx (1967) Capital, Volume 2, Lawrence and Wishart, London.
6. K. Marx (1970) Capital, Volume 1, Lawrence and Wishart, London.
7. See G. Littlejohn (1979) 'State, Plan and Market in the Transition to Socialism: the legacy of Bukharin' in Economy and Society, Volume 8, Number 2, May 1979, pages 212-215, for a brief discussion of the views of Bukharin and Preobrazhensky on this issue.

8. V.I. Lenin (1965) 'A Great Beginning' in Collected Works, Volume 29, Lawrence and Wishart, London, pages 409-434.
The quotation is on page 421.
9. See I. Steedman (1977) Marx after Sraffa, New Left Books, London.
and A. Cutler, B. Hindess, Marx's Capital and Capitalism
P.Q. Hirst and A. Hussain Today, Volumes One and Two,
(1977) and (1978) Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
These critiques are by no means the same. Marx's Capital and Capitalism Today, for example, contains a critique of the Sraffan concept of the economy.
10. For example, L. Harris 'The Science of the Economy' (1978) in Economy and Society, Volume 7, Number 3, August 1978.
It must be said, however, that Harris' article seems to be based on the supposition that one cannot both understand the labour theory of value and be critical of it. The debate is continued in Economy and Society, Volume 8, Number 3, August 1979.
11. Various somewhat different comments on the difficulties of using the concepts of the labour theory of value for analysing the division of labour have already been made in G. Littlejohn (1980) 'Economic Calculation in the Soviet Union' in Economy and Society, Volume 8, Number 4, November 1980.

12. See for example P. Hirst (1977) 'Economic Classes and Politics' in A. Hunt (ed) Class and Class Structure, Lawrence and Wishart, London, pages 125-154, or B. Hindess (1978) 'Classes and Politics in Marxist Theory' in G. Littlejohn, B. Smart, J. Wakeford and N. Yuval-Davis (eds) Power and the State, Croom Helm, London.
13. For a critique of a fairly explicit example of an empiricist approach to this kind of research, see G. Littlejohn, mimeo, 'A Critique of Landsberger's Approach to Peasants and Peasant Movements'.
14. J.H. Goldthorpe (1967) 'Social Stratification in Industrial Society' in R. Bendix and S.M. Lipset, Class, Status and Power, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, second edition.

This was criticised at some length in my unpublished dissertation for the Diploma in Soviet Studies, University of Glasgow, in 1968, entitled Education and Social Mobility in the U.S.S.R. Basically the criticism was that the claim was empirically misleading that stratification in the Soviet Union was phenotypically similar to, but genotypically distinct from, stratification in the West. The dissertation argued that Goldthorpe's reliance on S.M. Miller's article 'Comparative Social Mobility', Current Sociology, 1960, was somewhat misplaced since Miller had inaccurately computed the rates of social mobility in the U.S.S.R. on the basis of data provided by A. Inkeles and R.A. Bauer (1959) The Soviet Citizen, Oxford University Press. Correct use by Miller of the data produced by Inkeles and Bauer, it was argued, would have shown that the Soviet Union had a different 'mobility profile' from that of the U.S.A. This conclusion was further supported by the use of Miller's criteria in

the analysis of the data for women supplied by Inkeles and Bauer. While this sort of criticism of Goldthorpe was correct as far as it went, it did not question the arbitrary nature of the categories used for constructing Miller's social mobility tables, nor did it question Goldthorpe's analysis of the difference between market stratification and political stratification. Goldthorpe's analysis was mainly relied upon in the dissertation as a means of criticising convergence theory.

15. This position is based on that of B. Hindess (1973) The Use of Official Statistics in Sociology, Macmillan, London.
16. V.I. Lenin (1960) The Development of Capitalism in Russia, in Collected Works, Volume 3, Lawrence and Wishart, London.

For discussions of The Development of Capitalism in Russia see Chapter 7 of A. Hussain and K. Tribe (1981) Marxism and the Agrarian Question, Macmillan, London, and Chapter 8 of S.M. Shipley, (1979) The Sociology of the Peasantry, Populism, and the Russian Peasant Commune, M.Phil. thesis, University of Lancaster
17. For a clear example of a collapse into empiricism due to attempting to construct a general defence of incorporating non-Marxist empirical material, regardless of its merits, see J.H. Moore 'The Evolution of Exploitation' in Critique of Anthropology, Volume 2, Number 8, Spring 1977.

CHAPTER ONE

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET RURAL CLASS STRUCTURE IN THE 1920S

Introduction

No analysis of the contemporary Soviet Union can safely ignore its history. Yet this history is complex and has already been extensively studied. Despite this, the developments of the 1920s have been the object of renewed interest in recent years, largely because various historical options were still open at that time and because of the high standard of debates in various arenas on how the Soviet Union should develop. Since the concern of this thesis is the analysis of the class structure of the Soviet Union, the period of the New Economic Policy (NEP) from 1921 to 1928 is of particular interest. NEP represented an attempt to construct a non-coercive socialist policy towards a peasantry which was not conceived of as a class or as a unified social force. The historically anti-democratic effects on the Soviet Union (and on world politics) of the failure of this attempt are extremely well known, at least in broad outline. There is a lot to be gained from the analysis of the reasons for this failure, both in terms of understanding the contemporary Soviet Union and in terms of the pertinence of the problems faced under the New Economic Policy to the contemporary problems of developing countries. This acknowledgment of the importance of the 1920s provides the justification for many of the studies of that period, yet precisely because of the complexity of these developments, the richness of the empirical

sources and the high standards of the various debates, the contemporary debates in the West about the 1920s are still continuing. This chapter can hardly lay claim to being a definitive analysis of the class structure in the 1920s, but it does attempt to investigate some relatively neglected aspects of that intellectual area, in the light of the growing view in some quarters that the policy of forced collectivisation of the peasantry was not only economically and politically unnecessary, but actually impeded the implementation of the first Five Year Plan.

The prevailing view among many shades of political opinion has tended to accept the terms of the Soviet industrialisation debate within the Bolshevik leadership as an adequate definition of the problems which the country then faced. A good example of this approach is the essay by Professor Novè entitled 'Was Stalin Really Necessary?' in the book of the same name containing a collection of his essays.¹ The argument there accepts that the period of restoration of the economy from the ravages of civil war had passed by the latter 1920s, and that the reconstruction of the economy was reaching the point where further investment would have to be on a much greater scale than before if production was to continue growing at the same pace and if the country was to be industrialised. Since the majority of the population were engaged in agriculture, the investment funds would have to come from agriculture. Thus basically the investment would have to take place at the cost of a relative or even absolute decline in the incomes of the peasantry, with the 'surplus' being pumped into industry. Industrialisation under the direction of the Bolshevik Party thus almost necessitated

forced collectivisation as a means of controlling the peasantry while the surplus was pumped out of agriculture. In this sense, if the Bolshevik party were to retain power, Stalin probably was necessary, according to this line of reasoning. The main alternative view has tended to be that collectivisation was necessary in order to increase agricultural productivity beyond the limits set by small-scale peasant production, but that forced collectivisation, rather than voluntary collectivisation, was not only very costly in lives and highly detrimental to the whole political structure, but reduced the scale of the surplus that might otherwise have been extracted from the peasantry. The latter kind of argument has been common, for example, among Marxists of various persuasions. Briefly, then, most analyses have accepted that collectivisation was a precondition for socialist industrialisation because of the limitations of small-scale peasant agriculture. It has often been part of such arguments that without collectivisation any agricultural surplus would be under the control of small-scale rural capitalists or 'kulaks' who would thus be in an economic position to challenge the Bolshevik control over the pattern of industrialisation. The main challenge in English to this latter point came (at least until the mid-1970s) from writers such as Chayanov² or Shanin³, who argued that the peasantry was not undergoing a process of substantial class differentiation along capitalist lines.

However, the terms of the debate were somewhat changed, even for those who might have been reluctant to accept arguments along the lines of Chayanov or Shanin, by the work of Barsov appearing in the

Soviet Union itself which apparently demonstrated that the first Five Year Plan was carried through without the extraction of an agricultural 'surplus'. Not only had the real incomes of collective farm workers (kolkhozniki) declined, but agricultural deliveries to the towns and industry had also declined. Collectivisation had proved irrelevant to the process of industrialisation, in the sense that it did not deliver any agricultural 'surplus' for investment. The implications of this were already beginning to be registered in the well-known debate between J. Karcz and R.W. Davies on the 'grain problem' of the late 1920s.⁴ and were further discussed in Harrison (1978), Hussain and Tribe (1981), and in Smith (1979)⁵. The last two publications have criticised the conception of agricultural surplus involved in the previously prevailing terms of the debate, and have stressed the possibility of generating investment funds within the industrial sector itself by various means, including organisational improvements both in the planning process and in terms of the technical division labour. The conclusion is that such changes must have been the main source of investment funds, since agriculture did not provide them. Such a conclusion has many implications, but the main one which will be pursued here is that it changes the terms in which developments in the class structure in the 1920s should be appraised. It also changes the terms of appraisal of state policy towards the rural class structure of the time.

Whatever changes in the class structure may have been registered by research or official statistics, one need no longer analyse them primarily in terms of their impact on the delivery of an agricultural

surplus to provide the basis for an industrialisation programme.

This is not to deny that the division of social production meant that agriculture supplied both raw materials to industry and consumer goods to the town. It simply means that the appraisal of the role of agriculture need not be conducted in the same terms of those used by the leadership and Left Opposition of the Bolshevik Party. In particular the development of capitalism within agriculture, with the supposed capacity of capitalists to control the delivery of the surplus by controlling its production, did not necessarily threaten to subvert the industrialisation programme, as most of the Bolshevik leadership increasingly came to believe.

The conceptualisation of industrialisation as requiring the extraction of an agricultural surplus (as a source of rapid accumulation) was prevalent in the 1920s, and its influence among later commentaries is evident. Yet the rejection of such a line of reasoning does not imply an indifference to the rural class structure of the 1920s, nor does it entail a denial of the view that collectivisation could have eased and speeded the process of industrialisation by providing additional sources of investment and consumption goods. It simply means that these issues were not as critical for the development of socialism as the Bolshevik leadership came to believe, even though some form of industrialisation was a condition for the survival and development of socialism in the Soviet Union.

The conclusion that collectivisation was not a critical precondition for industrialisation can also be established on the basis of the analysis of the NEP itself by Grosskopf (1976)⁶. A major conclusion to be drawn from her superb study is that the difficulties of the NEP at the end of the 1920s were due primarily to policy failure in implementing

the NEP, so that the NEP itself did not constitute a major obstacle to the industrialisation programme. Grosskopf's work has been cited by Hussain and Tribè and by Smith⁷, but it also forms a major influence on the somewhat different work on the 1920s by Bettelheim (1978)⁸.

The reliance by Bettelheim on Grosskopf means that Part Two of Volume Two of his work is probably the best known indication so far available in English of Grosskopf's arguments, but the positions of Grosskopf and Bettelheim should not be equated. Grosskopf's work does lend support to the analysis of the peasantry developed by Lenin towards the end of his life, but it is convincing because of its extensive use of primary empirical sources⁹. On the basis of an extremely detailed analysis of developments during the period of NEP, Grosskopf demonstrates that the 'Smychka', that is the union or linking between the peasantry and the proletariat, was by no means economically moribund after the crisis of 1925-1926 and that the later crisis of the NEP in 1927-1928 was primarily due to the failure to 'learn the lessons' of the earlier crisis. This occurred despite the comparatively clear analysis of the problems by Dzerzhinsky prior to his death in 1926, so the failure was not an analytical one but a political one. A more rigorous pursuit of certain neglected aspects of the NEP, particularly of the supplying of means of production to the poor peasantry, would have substantially increased agricultural output, making industrialisation that much easier. Thus her analysis shows that the supposed 'limits' of small scale production could be considerably extended by an appropriate policy of state support for the poor peasantry. More to the point, such support for the poor peasantry would have provided the economic conditions for voluntary forms of cooperation and collectivisa-

tion, that is it would have facilitated the undercutting of capitalist relations of production and the development of socialist relations. It is from this standpoint, rather than a concern with a surplus for industrialisation, that the class structure of the 1920s will be examined in this chapter.

However, despite the considerable importance of Grosskopf's work, it must be said that she devotes comparatively little space to the direct analysis of the processes of class differentiation of the peasantry. She concentrates instead on the appraisal of state policy towards the peasantry, on economic relations between agriculture and industry and on the economic effects of these on the production and distribution of agricultural produce, particularly grain. These do constitute the main social conditions of the processes of class differentiation (or lack of differentiation) among the peasantry, and Grosskopf does refer to the main sources of research in her estimate of the extent of class differentiation, including Khryashcheva, Gaister, Strumilin, and Kritsman. Nevertheless, there is scope for a more detailed discussion of these processes within the context of the analysis provided by Grosskopf. There is still to-day a considerable amount of controversy over the mechanisms and extent of such class differentiation, as the works of Chayanov and Shanin already mentioned indicate. In addition, any critique of the state policy towards the countryside which is concerned with its effectiveness (or lack of it) in fostering socialist relations of production must include an analysis of the mechanisms and extent of development of capitalist relations of production¹⁰.

Kritsman's Work

To elucidate the processes of development of capitalist relations of production and a capitalist class structure, a substantial part of this chapter will be devoted to a discussion of the work of Kritsman, particularly of his 1926 work Class Stratification of the Soviet Countryside¹¹. Kritsman's work has recently been the object of renewed attention. For example, Shanin (1972)¹² discusses his work as follows (pages 60 and 61):

"The main group of party scholars, led by Kritsman, developed research whose direction was governed by ideological commitment to detect a rising tide of polarisation. The hiring-out of horses and equipment was seen as the main new form of class-exploitation. It was predicted that socialism in the countryside would come as a result of state intervention and a rise in urban wages and productivity, which would rob richer farmers of their wage-labour and make their influence crumble. Few only defended the purity of the Marxist definition by which capitalist class-differentiation could be measured only qualitatively, ie. in terms of the predominance of wage-labour - which would have put it, in this period, next to nil".

Later, in discussing the methodological problems involved in the use of quantitative indices of wealth to analyse stratification, Shanin remarks (pages 132 and 133):

"The stratification by land sown was bitterly denounced by Kritsman and his lieutenants in the agrarian section of the Communist Academy. They claimed that this index was suitable only for the pre-capitalist period and that it helped to conceal real differentiation - processes because of the levelling of land-holdings which had taken place during the revolutionary period. Stratification of peasant households by capital and income was proposed as an alternative and put into operation in a Ts. S.U. (Central Statistical Administration - G.L.) handbook and in a study by Gaister, both published in 1928. This method revealed some new methodological weaknesses, however. The amount of land held was not taken into account, since it was not considered part of capital - a limitation which made estimates of actual production factors in terms of 'capital'

doubtful. Moreover, any estimates of capital and income for peasant households in a type of economy producing a great part of its own needs were extremely dubious. In fact, the advantages of using indices of wealth and income in money terms were quite offset by the difficulties of correctly estimating them."

However, despite various criticisms of Shanin's own position,¹³ interest in Kritsman's work as providing a possible alternative mode of analysis did not appear in Western publications until the work of Solomon (1977)¹⁴. A comparatively favourable review by Harrison (1978)¹⁵, however, suggests that Solomon is somewhat influenced by the multifactorial approach of Shanin. For this reason the more recent work by Cox (1979a, 1979b)¹⁶ is of considerable interest, as is the 1979 article by Harrison¹⁷. Cox in (1979 a), 'Awkward Class or Awkward Classes?', contrasts the positions of Shanin and Kritsman, and concludes his article by saying:

".... furthermore, the Soviet research of the 1920s shows that Marxists have been able to deal with problems in the analysis of peasant society in a more flexible way which offers real insights into the complexities and peculiarities of the peasantry which neither Shanin nor the type of Marxism he attacks have been able to reveal." ¹⁸

In his (1979b) paper, 'Class Analysis', Cox further develop his remarks on Kritsman and his colleagues, pointing to differences in interpretation among them, indicating the originality of Kritsman's own approach and defending him from some of Solomon's criticisms. Harrison, on the other hand, is somewhat more critical of the 'Agrarian Marxists', including Kritsman, but primarily on the grounds that they failed to transform their critique of the Chayanov school into a practical theory forming the basis of the construction of an alternative, socialist mode

of rural intervention¹⁹. In this way they constituted an early example of what Harrison calls 'subordinate Marxism', which tends to be restricted to an academic critique, rather than the presentation and practice of an alternative strategy²⁰.

Yet it is not clear to me that Kraitsman had no strategy for the socialist transformation of agriculture. He certainly had fairly well-developed ideas on cooperatives as a potential path to socialism, as well as of the conditions under which cooperatives could foster capitalist relations. For example, in a November 1927 article entitled 'Ten Years on the Agrarian Front of the Proletarian Revolution' in Kraitsman (1929), he argued that rural cooperation was a field of fierce struggle between capitalist and socialist tendencies of development. Both forms of transformation of the petty-bourgeois economy depended on the self-activity of the small farms, and where capitalist elements did not predominate, this self-activity (collective, not individual) was a product of the interlocking of the petty-bourgeois economy and the state economy of the proletariat. This interlocking opened a way for the petty-bourgeois economy which was a non-capitalist road to the predominance of the petty economy, but not on the basis of its destruction, but of its organic development. Consequently, Kraitsman was critical of the 1925 abolition of the direct formal prohibition (sustained for four years after the transition to the NEP) of capitalism in agriculture. This de jure recognition of what was already to a significant degree recognised de facto led among other things to the downfall of the hopes of the poor as a social stratum to retain the means of raising up their own individual farm, because they did not dispose of enough of their own means of production to conduct their own farms. (Elsewhere Kraitsman argued

that the proletarian state should not create proletarians in the countryside). In other words, Kritsman's view of a socialist strategy in the countryside was to provide the poor peasants with enough means of production to engage in petty farming in their own right, and to encourage various forms of cooperation: a conclusion remarkably similar to that of Grosskopf. In addition, as a means of combatting Soviet bureaucratism, Kritsman advocated in this article the raising of the cultural level of wide strata, both ruling and ruled, above all of the mass of the peasantry, and the attraction of large masses into social work and work of direction, to create the preconditions for the gradual liquidation of this 'survival of the past'. Superficially, at least, such a position is rather similar to that of Lenin and Bukharin as described by Harrison²¹. Kritsman's analysis of the mechanisms of class differentiation of the peasantry is thus related to a strategy for socialist development which was influenced by Lenin, but is also based on extensive knowledge of the research conducted not only by the Chayanov ('Organisation and Production') School but also the research conducted by his colleagues in the Agrarian Section of the Communist Academy. It is precisely because his appraisal of the empirical material is related to a conception of forms of development of socialist relations of production that his work is so interesting.

Shanin is correct that part of Kritsman's strategy of socialist development involved the development of urban wage-labour to absorb rural unemployment (a change in the division of social production which would alter the social division of labour), but as already indicated, he was more concerned with preventing the generation of that rural unemployment by developing socialist forms of organisation in the countryside, and by providing the means of production to poor peasants to sustain

their farms until such times as they could enter or establish collective farms. Kritsman had reservations about the development of urban labour (at least in the short term) to absorb rural unemployment, because although urban employment was expanding, so was urban unemployment.²² Thus for Kritsman the mode of state intervention to encourage socialist relations could take a variety of forms, including the organisation of rural wage-labourers (batraki).

This approach to agrarian problems forms the background to Kritsman's investigations of the extent and forms of development of capitalist relations of production in the Soviet countryside of the 1920s. While such developments were important for a socialist strategy of transformation of the relations of production (one has to know the problem in order to solve it), Kritsman was careful not to overestimate the strength of rural capitalist development and to point to the social bases of socialist transformation (including the small but growing proportion of collective farms and state ownership of the commanding heights of the economy). This is particularly clear from Class Stratification of the Soviet Countryside, which is discussed at length in the Appendix.²³

I have devoted a considerable amount of space to an extended exposition of one of Kritsman's works for a variety of reasons. Firstly, it is not widely available and provides an excellent account of the first half of the 1920s. Readers can readily decide for themselves how adequate my commentary is on Kritsman, but it seems fairly clear that a process of capitalist class differentiation was taking place, although it was in its early stages, as Kritsman emphasised. Given the debate still surrounding Kritsman's approach,

the presentation of a detailed exposition seemed the best way to avoid misunderstandings as to the nature of his analysis. Secondly, Kritsman's work Class Stratification of the Soviet Countryside is exemplary in its painstaking attention to detail and its methodological sophistication. It is hardly a dogmatic approach; for example, he refused to argue by analogy (in the two industrial volosti with insufficient data) that class stratification must be taking place. His grasp of the complexities of the changing division of labour and of regional diversity meant that he was unlikely to favour the use of any single index of class differentiation, and this probably formed one of the bases of his critiques even of members of his own 'school'. Such critiques were not purely negative; they were clearly made in order to improve later research - hence the preliminary nature of his conclusions based on the empirical material presented.

Thirdly, Kritsman's work was related to both a historical analysis of the period and a strategy which was similar to that of Lenin or Dzerzhinsky, and in some respects to that of Bukharin. As Cox points out,²⁴ Kritsman had a conception of structures within the Soviet social formation that was influenced by Lenin's analysis in The Tax in Kind, but Kritsman considered that Feudalism as a structure could be added to the 5 structures mentioned by Lenin, especially for some parts of Central Asia.²⁵ This conception of coexisting structures which interpenetrated each other was related to Kritsman's view of the predominant role of the state sector in structuring the economy. He argued that cooperation was a way of integrating the commodity peasant farms into the

general system of the Soviet national economy.

For this reason Kritsman placed great emphasis on the planning of agriculture. This was surely the reason for his devastating critique of the Five Year plan produced by Kondrat'ev and Oganovskii for the Narkomzem, the People's Kommissariat of Agriculture.²⁶

This is briefly discussed by Jasny (1972), in my view without indicating how penetrating Kritsman's critique was.²⁷ Part of the reason for his interest in the minutiae of the collection of agricultural statistics was because of their potential for plan construction and policy formation, a potential that was very real because of the extensive apparatus for collecting statistics developed after the Revolution. The relation between the collection of statistics and planning is 'described' in Grosskopf (1976, Preamble and Chapter One, Section III). Grosskopf describes the lack of relation between the collection of statistics and plan construction between 1917 and 1921, and it is evident from Kritsman's critique of the above 1924 Five Year plan of the Narkomzem that these problems had not been fully overcome.

Similarly, he placed emphasis on particular policy measures which would help foster the socialist development of the peasantry.

For example, he drew attention to the burden of taxation on the poor peasants, and noted that it had been lifted. However, as Grosskopf points out, in the absence of other policy measures, this adversely affected the marketing of grain. Yet these 'absent' policy measures were of the kind also advocated by Kritsman, or at least implied by his analysis: (a) a credit policy favouring the poor peasantry, which would enable them to buy means of produc-

tion and thus secure their independence of the prosperous peasantry (as well as providing the preconditions for cooperative work, since there would be a basis for joint purchase and use of such means of production). (b) a pricing policy on means of production so that they were cheap for the poor peasantry. (Adequate indices for the identification of poor peasants would have perhaps even made a differential pricing policy possible which favoured the poor.) As Grosskopf points out, a policy of supplying implements at prices the poor could afford would have encouraged them to deliver grain to market even in the absence of tax pressure. Grosskopf, and following her Bettelheim, draws attention to the economic conditions of such a policy of supplying cheap means of production to the poor peasantry. It required the development of Department I industry, and not only in the form of heavy industry or only in the towns. This implied a diversion of resources away from what might be considered luxury consumer goods for the towns, but it would have rapidly and cheaply led to increased agricultural production, including production of industrial crops as raw material for various industries, especially textiles. This was precisely what Lenin intended by his advocacy of an alliance between heavy industry (metal for agricultural implements) and the peasantry. It was a precondition for developing cooperatives and collective farms on a voluntary basis, with the incentive of rising living standards for the poor and middle peasantry. (c) finally, Kritsman's analysis of trading capital and his criticisms of the practices of trading cooperatives and mutual aid committees implied a policy of much more

attention to these non-state forms of potentially socialist organisation. On this issue his views were similar to those expressed by Lenin in 'On Cooperation' ²⁸, but Kritsman was not simply following an official party line (which was in any case increasingly ignored): his views were clearly founded as much on the empirical material as on Lenin's remarks.

As Grosskopf demonstrates, the developing crisis of NEP, which finally came to be mistakenly considered in the party leadership as a 'grain strike' by the kulaks, was closely related to the failure to pursue such policies properly. Bettelheim in Class Struggles in the U.S.S.R., Volume Two, provides additional grounds for adhering to such a view. Yet it is clear from Kritsman's analysis that the kulaks were often not a direct political danger - they were often in the party and were beneficiaries of its policies in many unintended ways. Neither were they a serious economic danger, given the strength of the state sector, even if they were economically powerful in their own localities. Furthermore, the process of capitalist stratification had only just begun and could have been readily undercut by the sort of policies indicated above. One wonders how much attention was paid by the party leadership to these studies, despite Kritsman's prominence. ²⁹ It is doubtful if Stalin read the material (compiled by Central Committee members) presented on the Urals and Siberia before embarking on his 'Urals- Siberia' methods.

This is not to say that Stalin was unaware of the activities of Kritsman and the school of Agrarian-Marxists. According to Solomon's account,³⁰ the first attack on Kritsman's analysis which both came from a Marxist and was coupled with a call for "the congruence of research findings and Party dicta" had come from S.M. Dubrovskii.³¹ By April 1929 the Agrarian Marxists were being accused of holding positions that conflicted with party policy in the countryside.³² By November 1929, the campaign to start immediate collectivisation of the peasantry had begun, and in December a Politburo commission was established to devise methods of implementing collectivisation. It was preparing to submit its proposals to the Politburo, just around the time when rural scholars were assembling in Moscow on December 20th 1929, for the start of the First All-Union Conference of Agrarian-Marxists.³³ While the Conference was to some extent remote from the political developments at the time, it is clear that the proceedings of the conference were being noted. For some reason, members of the Agrarian-Marxist group launched an attack on Dubrovskii. Dubrovskii's reply centred on what he claimed was Kritsman's insensitivity to the heightening of class conflict in the period of transition to socialism.³⁴ Solomon does not stress the point, but this was a departure from the lines of Dubrovskii's earlier attack on the Kritsman approach, where he had claimed that there were too many capitalists and poor peasants and too few middle peasants.³⁵ The December 1929 reply by Dubrovskii thus appears to have been a volte-face, falling in line with Stalin's theoretical innovation of the time, the supposed exacerbation of class contradictions prior to their eradication with the completion of the transition to socialism.³⁶ It is therefore not completely surprising, with hindsight (although from Solomon's account, it electrified the Conference at the time), to discover that it was

after Dubrovskii's defeat by Kritsman (on 27th December, 1929) that Stalin appeared to address the delegates, and made his famous announcement that the kulaks were to be liquidated as a class.³⁷ The most immediate effect of this historic intervention was to neutralise the victory of the Kritsman school over Dubrovskii, and to prevent the development of what might be called an 'Agrarian-Marxist establishment' whose views did not fit in with the now-predominant line on the countryside. Within months, the Agrarian-Marxist school was being forced to leave the field of rural inquiry, a process which was completed early in 1932.

The End of NEP

Perhaps more than any other single event, Stalin's intervention in the Agrarian-Marxist Conference signalled the end of the New Economic Policy, although for some time after it was claimed in some quarters that NEP was still being implemented. As indicated earlier, there is still debate today over whether NEP was compatible with a programme of industrialisation; this is usually taken to mean that NEP implied a policy of concessions to the kulaks, forced on the Soviet state by the reaction of the peasantry to the forced requisitions of War Commission. Such a view of NEP is common in Western historiography, as Grosskopf points out,³⁸ but she argues convincingly against the view that the Soviet regime had a tragic destiny to coerce the peasantry into a socialist orientation. Such an approach, she argues, is heavily influenced by the 1925 ideology, associated with Bukharin, which was a response to the fact that the government had practically neglected the poor peasantry during the years 1923 to 1925.³⁹

This neglect of the poor peasantry was exacerbated by the 'Provisional Ordinances' promulgated in the spring of 1925, which decisively accelerated the differentiation of the peasantry.⁴⁰ In the spring of 1925 there was a grave shortage of agricultural

implements, since there had been virtually no process of replacement of implements since the beginning of the First World War, and they had worn out. The 'Provisional Ordinances' were designed to reduce the great disproportion between the extent of land and the few instruments of production possessed by the majority of the peasants, which was retarding the optimal development of agricultural productivity. However, this was attempted by repealing the agrarian code of 1922, whose objective had been to protect the disadvantaged peasants against exploitation from the kulaks. (It will be remembered that Kritsman protested against this precisely because of its effect on poor peasants). According to the source cited by Grosskopf, this removed restrictions on the employment of poor peasants as wage labourers. It was above all the large individual farms of the most important cereal regions (North Caucasus, Urale, Siberia, the Crimea) which profited from this possibility. Rabkrin (The Workers' and Peasants' Inspection) showed in 1927 that in these areas, 75 per cent of wage-labourers were working on average 13 hours per day. Thus the 'Provisional Ordinances' reinforced the dependence of poor peasants on the kulaks, a development which is sometimes treated as the enlargement of NEP (or 'neo-NEP').⁴¹ This policy amounted to a provisional abandoning of the passage to a socialist agriculture, as the party leaders of both right and left acknowledged.⁴² It was precisely in 1925 that the terms of credit for the poor peasants deteriorated, so that implements were not delivered to them until too late, after the autumn. The result was the situation which Lenin had warned against in 1920: it became difficult to supply the towns with food. The failure of the Soviet government to provide the qualitative social conditions to assure commodity production by agriculture led to the grain crisis of 1925. It was above all the poor peasantry which refused to sell its harvest (the fiscal

pressure to do so had also been relaxed).

Far from this being a 'kulak grain strike', as Kamenev supposed, it was a policy failure by the Soviet government. Instead of the government making its planned 70 per cent of all its grain purchases by 1st January 1926, it had scarcely more than half the grain it needed by then. The figures on which Kamenev based his view of a 'kulak grain strike' (a theme later taken over by Stalin) were challenged by a government commission.⁴³ The decisive mistake, however, had been that Kamenev had confused the indications of the Central Statistical Administration on the distribution of grain surplus with those on the distribution of marketed grain. Even peasants with little or no surplus in fact sold part of their harvest, although they had later to buy back, at a greater price, the grain necessary to feed themselves. Thus, although Grosskopf does not put it this way, Kamenev's confusion is related to a form of agricultural planning which was mistakenly restricted to working on net surpluses from agriculture. Because of this, calculations tended to be based on an overall balance of supplies between agriculture and industry, which ignored the conditions of existence of different types of peasant enterprise and hence class relations. (This mistake is also evident in the 1924 Narkomzem plan, judging by Kritsman's comments.) The result of this mistake in Kamenev's case was the illusion that only the kulak supplied produce to feed towns or raw material for industry. The poor peasants had few means of getting the money to pay the former tax in kind (which had been changed in 1924 to a money tax). In the most important grain regions, the possibility of getting money from non-agricultural pursuits was greatly reduced.⁴⁴ Yet the poor peasants normally bore the brunt of the agricultural tax. The poor and middle peasants also bought the majority of urban manufactured products, rather than the rich peasants, as Kamenev claimed.

Kamenev claimed in 1925 not only that the rich peasants were most involved in commodity exchange, but that the co-operatives mostly helped the rich peasants.⁴⁵ Certainly Kritsman's work provides some evidence that this was so, but he also pointed to the genuinely co-operative use of the means of production, a point which is further reinforced by Grosskopf. Grosskopf argues that the willingness of the poor peasants to engage in the supryaga (collective use of means of production, and even in her view, of credits) and other forms of spontaneous mutual aid was responsible for an increase in the proportion of middle peasants by 1926-27, compared to 1924-25. The result of this was to lead to a specific feature of rural class differentiation in the later 1920s. The growth in the numbers of the rural proletariat was not at the expense of the middle peasantry, but as a result of the decomposition of the class of poor peasants: while one part of the poor peasants completely lost its economic independence, because of the difficulties just described, and enlarged the ranks of the rural proletariat, another part succeeded in integrating with the class of middle peasants, the number of which continued to increase throughout N.E.P. According to Grosskopf, this evidence confirmed certain party claims on the pattern of rural class differentiation.⁴⁶ This development suggests very strongly that while capitalist relations were developing fairly rapidly in the countryside, particularly after the 'Provisional Ordinances' of 1925, the option of undercutting this development by a policy of support for the poor peasantry still remained. Such a policy would have generated a much greater marketing of agricultural produce than the kulaks could manage on their own.

However, such a policy was more difficult to pursue after 1925, because agricultural productivity went down after 1925 as the price policy of the Soviet government from then on meant that

the poor peasants lost hope of escaping from their misery by their own efforts, and as the price policy confirmed their dependence on kulaks as normal. This reduction in productivity took place despite the fact that at this point agricultural technical equipment began again to be made available. When the Soviet leadership provisionally renounced the pursuit of the road to socialism in the rural sector, they deprived themselves of an important means of increasing cereal production, according to Grosskopf.⁴⁷ This corroborates the view expressed by Kritsman, and while there is undoubtedly some truth in it (the political conditions of economic performance are often neglected), the reduction in productivity may have been partly due to the weather and to remaining equipment wearing out even faster than it was replaced.

The effects of this approach to agriculture became evident by the winter of 1927-28. Despite the fact that when the 1927-28 plan was definitively fixed in August 1927, it was estimated that the grain harvest would be 2.5 per cent down on the previous year,⁴⁸ the plan envisaged an increase in grain deliveries of 11 per cent (and an increase in the agriculture surplus of 14.1 per cent) over the previous year. The months October to December were essential to the campaign of collecting grain, since at that time both the demand by the national economy and the supply of grain were at their maximum. The cereal crisis of 1925-26 had shown that the factors determining the supply of grain from October to December were mostly subject to Soviet power and could be methodically regulated. The policy on grain collection during 1926-27 showed that the government had accepted this: the agricultural tax had been reimposed, a lot of industrial commodities had arrived in the grain surplus regions from October to December 1926 and the costs of collecting grain had been reduced considerably (making it

possible to reduce the gap between state and private prices, and between autumn and spring prices, at least outside the villages). Consequently, marketed grain reached a new record.⁴⁹ This made the state policy during 1927-1928 all the more remarkable. Sufficient grain stocks were not built up during the summer of 1927. Manufactured goods which could have been sold in grain surplus regions were diverted to urban markets, because of the so-called 'goods famine' again, which resulted from increased wages in state industry in the summer of 1927.⁵⁰ On top of this, to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Revolution, the poor peasantry had received a dispensation from the payment of almost all the agricultural tax, and the taxes on the other sections of the peasantry had not been raised. With a reduction in taxes and the absence of a stock of commodities to exchange against cereals, the mistake of the autumn of 1925 had been repeated. Rich peasants had sold significantly during the summer of 1927, prior to the anticipated price reduction in October, but from October to December, the supply of grain had greatly diminished. Far from being a kulak grain strike, this was a 'strike' by the poor and middle peasants, exacerbated by the passive attitude of the state and co-operative collecting organs.⁵¹ This passive attitude was partly the result of poor preparation and contradictory orders from the state, which wished to prevent competition between purchasing agencies from undermining the state price policy, although the control figures of Gosplan indicated that no such competition was likely and Gosplan was insisting that the buyers pursue an active policy of encouraging peasants to market their products.

Yet the grain collection results were not particularly bad after the end of December 1927. They only appeared bad in the light of the annual economic plan mentioned above, and in relation to the XV Party Congress held in December 1927 which discussed

the implementation of the first Five Year Plan. In 1925-26 the Soviet government had been able (after the autumn crisis) to considerably improve grain purchases, so that eventually the growth in the agricultural marketed surplus for that year surpassed the increase in gross production. At least one of the devices used earlier was still available in January 1928: an increase in agricultural prices was rightly rejected because it would have, as before, led to grain speculation the following year. However, an increase in prices in certain regions, coupled with an increase in deliveries of commodities would have been economically and politically effective. This was because what were usually grain surplus areas had a relatively poor harvest in 1927, whereas areas in the industrial centre, for example, had a more successful harvest. On top of this, state purchase prices, which had been 27 per cent above cost prices in 1925-26, were only 1 per cent above cost prices in 1926-27, and 0.4 per cent above in 1927-28. An increase in price, coupled with a greater supply of commodities, in the relatively successful areas would almost certainly have yielded bigger state purchases. Instead, from January to July 1928 (with a short break in April) 'extraordinary measures' were taken, under the direction of Stalin, who toured the regions normally considered as grain surplus areas, plus Siberia.⁵² (Hence the 'extraordinary measures' were sometimes referred to as the 'Urals-Siberia' methods, before the rest of the party came to appreciate the significance of the phrase).

The result was that in the spring of 1928, peasants in the normally grain surplus areas unexpectedly repurchased grain, on the open market (as opposed to the intra-village market). For all regions, the open market purchases by peasants exceeded

those of the previous year by 40 per cent. This caused unexpected difficulties for the distribution of the grain surplus, with the overall result that, far from increasing by 14.1 per cent over the previous year, as envisaged in the plan, it diminished by 18.5 per cent. Thus the pace of industrialisation seemed threatened, both in terms of grain exports and supplies to the towns. Thus the cereal crisis of the summer of 1928 was the result, not of a kulak grain strike, but of the 'extraordinary measures' themselves. As Grosskopf puts it, ⁵³ it became clear at this point, precisely because of the exigencies of a methodical and accelerated industrialisation, that the rules of NEP had to be strictly followed. These rules were, firstly, that agriculture should not supply its products beyond its own capacity, or peasant repurchases would increase further, and secondly, that the Soviet state should not suppress private commerce before it was able to replace it. Grosskopf follows this with a critique of Stalin's famous article "On the Grain Front", which used Nemchinov's data to claim that small scale peasant production was incapable of supporting industrialisation. Grosskopf argued that thanks to the technical alliance between industry and agriculture, and the social alliance between the working class and the poor and middle peasantry, such a strategy would have been possible. However, the technical alliance advocated by Lenin had not been implemented: in 1926-27 the instruments of production in agriculture had reached at most 60 per cent of their 1913 level (and this, rather than peasant consumption, as claimed by Stalin, was the main cause of the restriction of agricultural deliveries to the town). Similarly, the 1925-26 crisis had shown how fragile the social alliance was. Nor had co-operatives been seriously promoted by 1926-27. Thus the principal tasks of NEP as outlined by Lenin had scarcely been undertaken by 1926-27.

As is well known, the grain crisis of 1928 (prompted by the 'extraordinary measures' which contradicted the party line established at the XV Party Congress and which were conducted without the knowledge of much of the party leadership) produced a wider crisis in NEP. The reaction of the peasants to these measures was the same as to the grain requisition of the Civil War - to sow less. This then appeared to justify to a wider section of the party the use of 'extraordinary measures' and to gain support for the idea of a sharpening of class conflict in the transition to socialism, as well as for the idea of rapid collectivisation of the peasantry. The use of 'extraordinary measures' was repeated on a larger scale in 1929, and, as was mentioned in the discussion of Kritsman, by December 1929 a Politburo Commission was established to devise methods of implementing collectivisation. These developments were tragic, but also ironic in view of the fact that the technical, political and organisational preconditions of collectivisation had been virtually neglected during NEP. The technical conditions were the supplying by industry of the instruments of production to raise the level of equipment above the 1913 level. The political conditions were to ensure that this equipment was distributed to the poor and middle peasants, and the organisational conditions were the encouragement of cooperatives as a means of achieving the transition to a socialised agriculture. Grosskopf's evidence indicates that in the later 1920s such developments were happening to some extent anyway, despite the neglect of most of the party leadership, and that where they occurred, they were having the expected effect of encouraging both the marketing of grain and the development of collective forms of agriculture. Furthermore, contrary to Stalin's suggestion that peasant consumption was a potential threat to industrialisation,

Grosskopf shows that urban consumption was a greater threat since it adversely affected exports by 1927 in comparison with 1913.⁵⁴ While the intensification of agriculture had taken place during the 1920s, particularly in oil-seed and vegetable crops, rather than grain, it was still the case that in 1928-29, between 25 and 30 per cent of the 1913 sown area in the former 'granary' area was still fallow. Grain production was still 10 per cent less per capita than before the First World War, although production of other foodstuffs such as milk and meat had surpassed the 1913 level.⁵⁵ Thus the grain figures were misleading if one took them on their own, ignoring the changing structure of agricultural production. Nevertheless, there was still a great potential to increase grain production in the fallow areas by supplying more means of production. The effect of the 'extraordinary measures' was to reduce the amount of livestock, which meant less meat and milk, and greater difficulty in ploughing. While Stalin was in a sense correct that grain was marketed less than before the First World War, this was offset by the production and marketing of other agricultural products which were important for the national economy. The growth in urban consumption between 1926 and 1927 was entirely at the expense of exports.

On the evidence provided by Grosskopf, it is clear that Western (and to some extent, as she says, Soviet⁵⁶) historiography was wrong to take its analysis of the 'need' for collectivisation from Stalin's analysis of small-scale peasant consumptionist farming being incapable of supplying the raw material for industry and the food for the towns and for export. Far from the NEP policy being played out economically, it had in important respects not been given a proper chance in agriculture. A policy of supplying further means of production, quite apart from aiding

a further intensification of agricultural production, would have facilitated a growth of grain production by recultivating the fallow land in the pre-War 'granary' area.

Conclusion

One must conclude that the demise of NEP was largely a result of its faulty implementation. The dangers of an incorrect method of implementing NEP were signalled as early as the 'Scissors Crisis' of 1923, but they should have been clear enough by the time of the cereal crisis of 1925, when the restoration of industry to pre-war levels was virtually complete, while the restoration of agriculture was only just beginning. As Grosskopf points out, Dzerzhinsky clearly analysed the general lines NEP should take prior to his death in 1926. During 1926-27, the Soviet government implemented its agrarian policy in a manner which suggested it had learned the lessons of the previous year. The change of course in the following year seems primarily to be related to the struggle going on in the party leadership at the time. The XV Party Congress had not been a clear victory for Stalin, and this appears to be related to his clandestine use of 'extraordinary measures' against the peasantry, mobilising the support of that section of the party which had always seen NEP as a retreat and who were only too ready to believe that Kamenev's mythical 'kulak grain strike' was again a reality in the autumn of 1927.

Clearly in this situation, the emphasis of the Agrarian Marxists, and particularly of Kritsman, on the careful evaluation of the mechanisms of class differentiation, its extent and its implications for the construction of economic plans, this emphasis was completely vindicated. While the Kritsman school were not the only ones to supply important evidence on the state of

agrarian class relations in the 1920s, and to attempt to relate it to economic policy, they were just **reaching** the point of sufficient pre-eminence in the field to have a real potential for influencing party policy in favour of continuing NEP as a means of industrialising the economy and collectivising the peasantry, when Stalin intervened so dramatically to neutralise them as a potential **political** force. It will never be known how the Agrarian Marxist school would have developed, but their careful definition of class indices meant that they were aware in 1927-28 that the middle peasant was not disappearing. On the evidence of Grosskopf, this was due to mutual aid, rather than the effects of periodic repartition of farms. The work of the Agrarian Marxist school clearly has implications for current policy in some developing countries. They were interested in the agrarian class structure not just as a matter of academic curiosity, but as a vitally important component of a rural (and urban) development strategy. Precisely because the class structure affects the capacities of various economic agents, it has a considerable impact on the effectiveness of state policy.

Notes to Chapter One

1. A. Nove (1964) Was Stalin Really Necessary?
George Allen and Unwin, London
2. A.V. Chayanov (1966) The Theory of Peasant Economy
Richard Irwin Inc., Homewood,
Illinois
3. T. Shanin (1972) The Awkward Class,
Oxford University Press, London
4. J. Karcz (1967) 'Thoughts on the Grain Problem'
in Soviet Studies, Volume XVIII,
No. 4, pages 399-434
- R.W. Davies (1970) 'A Note on Grain Statistics' in
Soviet Studies, Volume XXI, No. 3
pages 314-329
- J. Karcz (1970) 'Back on the Grain Front' in Soviet
Studies, Volume XXII, No.2, pages
262-294
5. M. Harrison (1978) 'The Soviet Economy in the 1920s
and 1930s in Capital and Class,
No. 5, pages 78-94
- A. Hussain and
K. Tribe (1981) Marxism and the Agrarian Question
Macmillan, London
- K. Smith (1979) 'Introduction to Bukharin: Economic
Theory and the Closure of the Soviet
Industrialisation Debate' in Economy

and Society, Volume 8, Number 4,
November 1979

Smith had access to the typescript
of Tribe and Hussain before it was
published.

6. S. Grosskopf (1976) L'Alliance Ouvrière et Paysanne en
U.R.S.S. (1921-1928): Le Problème
du Blé, François Maspero, Paris
7. A. Hussain and K. Tribe (1981) op.cit. and K. Smith (1979) op.cit.
8. C. Bettelheim (1978) Class Struggles in the U.S.S.R.
Second Period 1923-1930
Harvester Press, Hassocks
9. It is perhaps worth stressing that the apparent vindication in
Grosskopf of Lenin's position on the peasantry as it was
developing towards the end of his life, this apparent vindication
cannot be dismissed simply on the grounds that Grosskopf is
the latest in a long line of Marxists suffering from an uncritical
adulation of Lenin. There may be some force to such a
criticism of Bettelheim's analysis, however. See, for example,
R. Miliband (1975) 'Bettelheim and the Soviet Experience' in
New Left Review, No. 91, May/June 1975. This is a review
of the French edition of C. Bettelheim's first volume of
Class Struggles in the U.S.S.R. First Period : 1917-1923,
which was published in English in 1977 by Harvester Press,
Hassocks. Yet whatever force there is to such an argument
against the 'apotheosis' of Lenin, Miliband pushes it too far.
While Miliband's remarks on 'Economism' and the 'State
Bourgeoisie' are quite acceptable, the review deteriorates in
the section entitled 'From Leninism to Stalinism'. While the

first volume of Class Struggles does concentrate too much on Lenin, it does treat Lenin's changes of position seriously, and more importantly, contrary to what Miliband suggests, it does not treat the development from Leninism to Stalinism as a single evolving process rather than clearly marking the break between the two. It is difficult to see how the first volume could be read in such a way, and the appearance of the second volume even more clearly undermines such an interpretation of Bettelheim's position. The second volume is clearly concerned with analysing the break between Leninism and Stalinism.

10. Feudal or pastoral nomadic relations will only receive passing treatment here, since their impact on the development of socialist relations was of secondary importance during the 1920s.
11. L. Kritsman (1926) Klassovoe Rassloenie Sovetskoi Derevni, Communist Academy, Moscow
reprinted in Proletarskaya Revolyutsia i Derevnnya, 1929, State Publication, Moscow-Leningrad. The latter publication, some 578 pages long, contains other work by Kritsman to which reference will be made. The whole volume will be referred as Kritsman (1929).
12. T. Shanin (1972) The Awkward Class, op.cit
In addition to the reference to Kritsman quoted here, there is a quotation of Kritsman on page 211, in which he refers to the peasantry as a "petit bourgeois mass."
13. See, for example, G. Littlejohn (1973a) 'The Peasantry and the Russian Revolution' in Economy and Society, Volume 2, Number 1, February 1973, pages 112-125, and the ensuing

(1973)

debate - T. Shanin 'Gary Littlejohn's review of T. Shanin, The Awkward Class' in Economy and Society, Volume 2, Number 2, May 1973, and G. Littlejohn (1973b) 'The Russian Peasantry: a reply to Teodor Shanin' in Economy and Society, Volume 2, Number 3, August 1973. See also M. Harrison (1977) 'Resource Allocation and Agrarian Class Formation' in The Journal of Peasant Studies, Volume 4, No. 2.

14. S.G. Solomon (1977) The Soviet Agrarian Debate : A Controversy in Social Science, 1923-1929, Boulder, Colorado

15. M. Harrison (1978) untitled review of Solomon in The Journal of Peasant Studies, Volume 6, No. 1, October 1978, pages 104-105

16. T. Cox (1979a) 'Awkward Class or Awkward Classes? Class Relations in the Russian Peasantry before Collectivisation' in The Journal of Peasant Studies, Volume 7, No. 1, October 1979. (This will be referred to as 'Awkward Class or Awkward Classes?')
 T. Cox (1979b) 'Class Analysis of the Russian Peasantry: the Work of Kritsman and his School', unpublished paper given to the 'Peasants Seminar', Centre of International and Area Studies, University of London, 12th October 1979. (This will be referred to as 'Class Analysis')

17. M. Harrison (1979) 'Chayanov and the Marxists' in Journal of Peasant Studies, Volume 7, No. 1, October 1979

18. T. Cox (1979a) op. cit. page 84. It should be stressed at this point that my position on these issues is very similar to that of Cox, and that any disagreements with the analysis of Cox registered here are only of secondary importance with respect

to the main issues under discussion. Two of the sources by Kritsman to which Cox refers are also available in Proletarskaya Revolyutsia i Derevnya, op.cit., namely 'O staticheskome izuchenii rassloenii sovremennoi derevni' and 'Klassovye gruppirovki 'krest' yanskikh khozyaistv.' The other article cited by Cox in (1979a) is 'K voprosu o klassovom rassloenii sovremennoie derevni', 1925, and is not available to me. Cox also cites Proletarskaya Revolyutsia i Derevnya in (1979b), op.cit., but as indicated, this contains a large collection of Kritsman's work and Cox makes no specific mention of 'Klassovoe Rassloenii Sovetskoi Derevni', which contains analysis of a variety of empirical sources. In some respects, then, the discussion of Kritsman here could be considered complementary to that of Cox. Shanin cites Klassovoe Rassloenii v Sovetskoi Derevni and three other sources not mentioned by Cox. The title was slightly changed when it was included in Kritsman (1929)

19. M. Harrison (1979), op.cit., page 95
20. Harrison argues that later critiques of Chayanov or of other general conceptions of 'Peasant Economy' suffer from similar limitations. He specifically refers to three articles appearing in 1977, two of them in The Journal of Peasant Studies, July 1977, namely M. Harrison 'The Peasant Mode of Production in the Work of A.V. Chaynov' and J. Ennew, P. Hirst

and K. Tribe "'Peasantry" as an Economic Category.'

The third article is G. Littlejohn (1977) 'Peasant Economy and Society' in B. Hindess (ed) Sociological Theories of the Economy, Macmillan, London. Certainly at the time of writing my critique of Chayanov I was in no position to suggest socialist modes of intervention among the peasantry, and I was well aware of the fact. It had already been made painfully clear to me, even at the time of writing my earlier critique of Shanin, that I could not even successfully grow a dozen lettuces. However, Harrison is correct in attempting to analyse the problems of the lacuna of any 'negative' theoretical critique: it does indeed provide no strategic or tactical political guide, and this is a serious limitation.

21. M. Harrison (1979), op.cit., page 96. While I accept that Bukharin was attempting to defend and elaborate the ideas which Lenin 'developed towards the end of his life, I have pointed to certain theoretical and political weaknesses in Bukharin's position in G. Littlejohn (1979) 'State, Plan and Market in the Transition to Socialism: the legacy of Bukharin' in Economy and Society, Volume 8, Number 2, May 1979. See also K. Smith, (1979), op.cit.

It is also clear from the already cited remarks by Grosskopf on Dzerzhinsky that Bukharin was not alone in his attempt to defend the line advocated by Lenin, and Kritsman shows a considerable degree of familiarity with Lenin at various points in his work. There is also evidence that this was publicly recognised, since the second paper in Kritsman (1929) is 'Lenin and the Road to Socialism' delivered to the Communist Academy on the first anniversary of Lenin's death.

22. See 'The Union of the Proletariat and the Majority of the Peasantry in the U.S.S.R. after the Victory of the Revolution', January 1925, especially pages 42 - 43, in Kritsman (1929).
23. See particularly the beginning of Class Stratification, where Kritsman counselled against both complacency and panic in dealing with the question of the extent of capitalist relations. Such advice could not have been more well-placed, yet it was effectively ignored, with complacency the order of the day until about 1925 (particularly on the part of Bukharin), and panic in at least a section of the Bolshevik leadership with the developing crisis in the NEP from the winter of 1927 - 1928. While Kritsman's work did show that capitalist relations were becoming stronger, he finished Class Stratification by reminding the reader of processes in the countryside favourable to a socialist strategy: see the end of the Appendix.
24. T. Cox (1979b), op cit., page 8.
25. It is also possible to add 'pastoral' relations of production with reference to the Buryat Mongols in the Soviet Union, although the impact of both the Romanov state, and in Mongolia itself the impact of the Manchu dynasty, was to make the relations of production feudal in certain respects. See Caroline Humphrey 'Inside a Mongolian Tent' in New Society, 31st October 1974, 'Pastoral Nomadism in Mongolia: The Role of Herdsman's Cooperatives in the National Economy' in Development and Change, Sage, London and Beverly Hills, Volum 9 (1978) pages 133 - 160,

and 'The Uses of Genealogy: A Historial Study of the Nomadic and Sedentarised Buryat' in Pastoral Production and Society, C.N.R.S. and Cambridge University Press (1979). The complexity of such relations of production raises questions as to the usefulness of conceptualising the articulation of these relations as an articulation of structures, as Cox does, the danger being that one may fall into implying that the essences of each structure are co-present in the social formation. Cox appears to argue this by saying that the structures in a pure form would each have their own laws of motion. Preobrazhensky, whom Cox mentions, seems to me to fall into this position: See G. Littlejohn (1979) 'State Plan and Market in the Transition to Socialism: the legacy of Bukharin' in Economy and Society, Volume 8, No. 2, May 1979. For Lenin's The Tax in Kind, see Collected Works Vol. 32, Lawrence and Wishart, London 1973.

26. The plan was called 'Osnovy Perspektivnogo Plana Razvitia Sel'skogo i Lesnogo Khozyaistva', published in 1924, and edited by Teodorovich. Kritsman's critique, which appears in Kritsman (1929) was given to the Praesidium of Gosplan in 1925, and is called 'Plan Sel'skogo Khozyaistva i Industrializatsia'.
27. N. Jasny (1972) Soviet Economists of the Twenties: Names to be Remembered, Cambridge University Press, pages 167-172. S. G. Solomon (1977), op. cit., page 19, briefly discusses the Narkomzem plan, pointing out that Kritsman, "the Marxist historian who would become the leader of the

Agrarian-Marxist group", was in 1925 a lone voice who challenged the planners' view that agriculture would continue to be conducted by a large decentralised mass of individual farms. He was apparently silenced with the assertion that socioeconomic change in the countryside was out of tune with the Party line in the rural sector. Solomon also points out that this plan has not received much attention from Western historians, apart from E. H. Carr. For this reason, it is perhaps worth giving a brief account of Kritsman's criticisms of this plan. Kritsman argued that the principles of the plan were either commonplace or wrong. ('Plan Sel'skogo Khozyaistva i Industrializatsia', 1925, reprinted in pages 67 - 78 of Kritsman, 1929). It was a platitude for an economic plan to envisage the development of the productive forces. The other principle of the plan was either a general phrase or wrong, namely, a two-sided agrarian-industrial development, similar to the United States. Kritsman argued against the idea of an undefined 'Narodnik-mystical' harmony of agriculture and industry, but he was also against industrialisation at the expense of agriculture. The facts showed that the Soviet Union was not developing agriculture in proportion to industry. In the last two years, agriculture had been growing at 4 per cent per annum, as against 30 - 40 per cent for industry, so that agriculture after the famine was at the same level as in 1920.

Kritsman then distinguished between 'projection' plans and plans of 'current' production, arguing in 1925 that it was only possible at that time to plan

'current' production for one year ahead. (He added in a 1929 footnote that in the changed situation one could plan further ahead). The use of an extrapolation or 'projection' type of plan showed that agriculture could not be much influenced at that time from the outside, but if that were accepted, then Kritsman argued that one should go in for short-term extrapolation. A 5 year extrapolation was unfulfillable; a 5 year plan was only possible when one could regulate what was planned. He showed that even within a year, the differences between the plan and the actual figure were huge. The extrapolations had been poor; they were mostly too pessimistic, and this may have undermined the confidence of the agricultural section of Gosplan. The perspective plan had failed brilliantly (that is because it was so overfulfilled, with various branches achieving between 50 and 90 per cent of the 5 year target in one year). This did not occur accidentally. One should not approach the charting of a perspective plan for agriculture by individual branches, as this plan sought to do. For such an approach to be realistic, it was necessary to narrow the limits of the plan (to one year). Otherwise the plan had to be constructed in another way. A detailed calculation of the market, of the possibilities of selling, and of the possibilities of production, was necessary. This meant one had to take account of the class structure of the peasantry, or at least recognise that it was difficult to plan where class differentiation was not what was assumed in the plan. Kritsman argued that such a calculation was not taken into account in the plan. The plan talked of the

peasantry in general, not of its division into groups, and then mentioned as a general phrase: "The process of socioeconomic differentiation of the countryside in its turn is a factor ... the significance of which must be taken into account".

Yet Kritsman did not overstress this differentiation, arguing that it was less in the countryside than in the towns. He argued that in each branch of agriculture it was necessary to separate the commodity side from the consumption side. To do so, it was necessary to take account of the interesting data on how the batrak (rural wage labourer) was paid wages. This varied in different regions. There were not enough data on this, but without an apportionment of the commodity producing groups of the peasantry in market areas, it was easy to arrive at erroneous conclusions. Consequently, it was necessary first, to classify branches (of agriculture) into market and non-market areas, and, second, in the market areas themselves to separate commodity and non-commodity farms. Related to the latter were the (in essence) proletarian part of the peasantry, on the one hand, which worked a certain plot of land with alien means of production, and on the other hand, partly related to this were some groups of peasants who were independently running their own farm, in so far as they did not produce for the market. Without such an analysis (which was fraught with difficulty, of course) the serious elaboration of a perspective plan for agriculture was impossible.

It was also insufficient to give definite figures for an agricultural (as for an industrial) plan: one ought

to give plan variants and say how it would work in relation to other plans. Not only was this plan unsatisfactory from the point of view of the resolution of the problems posed (which among other things was showed by a comparison of the plan and its realisation), it was also distinguished by its quite exceptional slovenliness, and by the rather strange (to say no more) character of the work, which it was extremely rare to encounter. Despite the published criticisms of various faults, the Narkomzem did not try to correct the plan. It had fallen to Kritsman to show the various statistical and arithmetical errors, primarily in the work of Professor Oganovskii. A special commission had been set up in Narkomzem, which confirmed everything shown by Kritsman, but was limited to these points. Then Professor Kondrat'ev appeared in print with the observation that Kritsman's charges against him were unsubstantiated. Kritsman had then showed that his charges in relation to Kondrat'ev were more than sufficiently substantiated. Following this a list of printers' errors were published. Kritsman then pointed out various other problems with the plan, such as its claim that between 1921 and 1923 the number of working horses had increased by 5.1 per cent, whereas in a footnote Professor Lositskii said that the number of working horses went down by 6 per cent in 1922, giving an overall reduction in the number of horses by 1923. Such inconsistencies were even acknowledged in the main text of the plan. Kritsman took the view that a plan completed in this manner could not serve as a basis for judgement. The plan could not calculate

the resources of the peasantry, nor the resources of the state, since its compilers were mistaken on both counts.

The plan had only been fulfilled in a bureaucratic sense. The calculation of Professor Makarov showed that the plan was not implemented; the conclusions of the agricultural section (of Gosplan) on each point showed that the plan was not implemented. It could not be implemented. By the whole of its construction, the perspective plan for the development of agriculture presented a strange combination of a Marxist and non-Marxist approach to the matter. The latter approach had been correctly characterised in the journal Bolshevik as a 'turn of the century' approach, and it was visible in many parts of the works of Zemplan. This was evident in their treatment of the Soviet Union as an example of state capitalism, which was like private capitalism, only regulated by state power, an approach which contrasted with Lenin's. Furthermore, the growth of the national population was taken as one of the bases for the construction of the plan. Kritsman argued that this amounted to the theory of rural overpopulation as the basis for the growth in productive possibilities, due to the quantity of working hands, quite contrary to the views of Marx on the relative decline of the agricultural population. The attempt to base agricultural development on population growth meant in practice a huge army of unemployed, the basic solution to which was the growth in industry. On the supply side, there was no need in current conditions to fear a lack of workers. If one approached the matter of population growth from the

demand side, then the growth in population played a different role for the two main parts of agriculture: for that part of agriculture which supplied the means of production (that is, raw materials for industry) and for that part which supplied the means of consumption (that is, food products). If one proceeded from the point of view of the market for food products, then of course the growth of population played a colossal role. But it would be laughable on the basis of changes in the population of the U.S.S.R. to seek to form the extent of the market for foodstuffs. This would require an examination of the dependence of foreign markets on foodstuffs produced in the U. S. S. R.

In conclusion it was necessary to say that the perspective plan bore a quite strange character, combining an attempt at a communist, Marxist approach with an approach of a quite different sort which appeared in many places, in conclusions and in the posing of questions. It was right to return this work to the Narkomzem and to propose that it be reworked in a radical manner, both in its principles and its execution. Here as in other cases, it was necessary to say what was the state of affairs, and thus to achieve the correction of what was done badly.

It should be clear from the brief account of Kritsman's criticisms of this plan that he was not so much advocating 'socioeconomic change' as Solomon puts it (although he definitely favoured the growth of cooperatives as a way of transforming agriculture) but was criticising the theoretical assumptions of the plan, as well as the shoddy workmanship which was evident in its construction. It should also be clear that his interest in the various

processes of differentiation of the peasantry was related to his interest in plan construction: adequate plans for both developing agricultural production and developing socialist relations in the countryside (and town) had to take account of the changing class relations, including the development of commodity production, and their impact on the markets for agricultural products.

28. V. I. Lenin (1966) 'On Cooperation', in Collected Works, Volume 33, Lawrence and Wishart, London.
29. See M. Lewin (1968), Chapter 3, pages 71 - 78 for a discussion of the controversy over the definition of the kulak, including the views of Kritsman and his colleagues. Only in June 1929 did the Sovnarkom accept the hiring out of equipment as a criterion for including a farm in the kulak category (ibid., page 74). Lewin also describes the controversy over stratification and the reception of Kritsman's work in Chapter 2 (ibid), especially page 47. However, although he is right that the significance of the indices of stratification varied, by not explicitly setting these variations in the context of an analysis of the division of labour (and of geographical variations in it) Lewin seems to undervalue the usefulness of Kritsman's work. Lewin was right to argue (page 49): "For the moment, the difficulties of studying the stratification of the peasantry proved insurmountable, and in the end no valid and authoritative survey of this intractable problem was ever produced." However, it is surely evident from Lewin's account that this was partly because of the political debate which forced some of Kritsman's colleagues, such as Gaister,

to retract their results. The studies were not authoritative in the sense of being accepted, but despite their problems they were surely authoritative in terms of their level of analysis. Gaister was apparently forced to retract his results because they were being used by the Left Opposition to support its own arguments.

30. S. G. Solomon (1977), op. cit., Chapter 9.
31. ibid. page 149. Solomon had the chance to interview Dubrovskii on a bi-weekly basis in 1969 (ibid, page 188). This attack in January 1928 had little effect at the time.
32. ibid., page 162. There is no suggestion that Dubrovskii made this charge at this point.
33. ibid., page 163.
34. ibid., page 165.
35. ibid., page 148.
36. As Harrison points out in his 1978 (op. cit.) review of Solomon, she provides no account of Stalinism, which Harrison rightly argues should not be treated as impacting on academic life from outside. The attack on Kritsman by Dubrovskii can surely only be understood as giving voice within the academic agrarian debate to the views of the ascendant Stalinist sections of the party. However, such a conclusion is based purely on the theoretical similarities between Dubrovskii's remarks and the ascendant Stalinist line on the countryside. Solomon does not draw attention to these similarities, which seems to corroborate a remark made by Cox (1979b, op.cit): "The problem with her interpretation, both on this specific question

and on the work of the Agrarian Marxists in general, is that in attempting to locate the research in its social and political context she tends to lose sight of the theoretical basis of the research which provides the logic of the categories chosen". Paradoxically, in the case of the December 1929 attack on Kritsman by Dubrovskii, losing sight of the apparent theoretical basis of the remarks makes it somewhat more difficult to locate them in their political context. The similarities of Dubrovskii's remarks and the position of the Stalinist sections of the party are fairly evident, and this suggests that there may have been some substance to Kritsman's charge, in reply, that Dubrovskii was an opportunist, (Solomon, op.cit., page 167). In my view Solomon is completely misleading in treating Kritsman and Dubrovskii as showing an almost equal lack of intellectual honesty and restraint. Dubrovskii had indeed taken Kritsman out of context, as the latter claimed.

37. Stalin began this speech with a denunciation of five 'bourgeois' prejudices which he claimed were rampant in current rural enquiry, including those of the Chayanov school. In my critique of Chayanov (Littlejohn, 1977, op.cit) I give the impression in a footnote that Chayanov was the main opponent of the Marxist approach to the peasantry, and that this was why Stalin attacked him. It is clear from Solomon's account, which despite certain disagreements I found very interesting and informative, that the criticisms of 'bourgeois' prejudices were merely a prelude to the core of the speech. Chayanov's school had in many respects already lost the argument to the Agrarian-Marxists,

and the speech, particularly its famous announcement on the liquidation of the kulaks as a class, rendered the entire Agrarian Marxist Conference irrelevant.

38. S. Grosskopf (1976), op.cit., pages 283-284. She draws particular attention to Lewin's exposition of such a position: see M. Lewin (1968), op.cit., pages 133-135. However, on page 317 she does not forget to point out the similarities in the work of E. H. Carr (1970), Socialism in One Country, pages 259-303, Volume 1, Harmondsworth.
39. S. Grosskopf, op.cit., page 286.
40. *ibid.*, pages 316-319, entitled 'L'importance sociale de la crise des céréales de 1925'.
41. *ibid.*, page 317.
42. *ibid.*, page 317, where Grosskopf quotes both Rykov and Trotsky to this effect. Thus it is not only Western historeography which has shared the view that agricultural investment required concessions to the kulaks; in effect, the entire party leadership took this view. Its corollary is of course that the kulaks were an obstacle to industrial investment.
43. *ibid.*, page 140. It was a Rabkrin commission, directed by Yakovlev, Tsyl'ko, Rybnikov and Chelintsev, and its members included Paskovskii, Lositskii, Lifshits, Vishnyevskii, Groman and Strumlin. The definition of the social categories of peasants in the evidence available to Kamenev was on the basis of sown area, which the commission criticised. (Thus Kritsman was by no means

alone in his scepticism about the use of sown area as an index of class relations). The results of this survey were published in extracts in Pravda in December 1925 and republished in a 100 page brochure in 1926. It is difficult to see how the party leadership could have been unaware of this.

44. *ibid.*, page 142.

45. *ibid.*, page 169.

46. *ibid.*, page 311. In a footnote, she argues that this contradicts the supposition of Lewin (*op.cit.*, pages 56-57) that such a pattern of class differentiation only existed in the proclamations of the party. It seems to me that Grosskopf's evidence should not simply be taken at face value, however. Kritsman's emphasis on the diversity of forms of cooperation, and the diversity of effects of this in terms of class relations, is probably correct. While Grosskopf's evidence is more systematic and apparently convincing than that of Lewin, Kritsman's remarks on what could be reported as 'supryaga' makes one a little wary of the evidence supplied by Grosskopf. The same is true of her evidence on page 312 of the growth of 'simple' production cooperatives during NEP. Yet it must not be forgotten that in the late 1920s Kritsman was also emphasising the growing spontaneous movement into cooperatives and collectives. Furthermore, Grosskopf's case against Lewin on this point is supported by two further points which she makes elsewhere in her book. Firstly, on page 396, she refutes the suggestion of Carr and Davies (1969, page 117) that during NEP the

process of redivision of farms was extended to the middle and poor peasants. This refutation is on the basis of evidence provided by Khryashcheva. Many of the redistributions were fictional to avoid tax on large-scale enterprises. If this is the case, then one of the grounds disappears for Lewin's doubts about the supposedly 'special nature of differentiation' at this time. Lewin claims (op.cit., page 57) that if the numbers of serednyaks (middle peasants) were not decreasing, it was because they were being reinforced by frequent divisions of households, whose members, while formally continuing to be classified as seredynaks, were becoming poorer as a result of these divisions.

Grosskopf argues that repartitions were only about 2 to 3 per cent of all farms, and that these were more numerous among the prosperous than the middle peasants. This argument, if accepted, certainly undercuts the grounds for Lewin's doubts about the 'special nature of differentiation'. The second point which Grosskopf makes which strengthens her case on the role of cooperatives in supporting some of the poor peasantry is the evidence and argument on pages 415-419 which shows the growth in cooperatives for soil improvement, use of agricultural machinery, improvement of seeds and livestock breeding and rearing. None of this was reported under the heading of 'supryaga' so the doubts raised by Kritsman about some forms of 'supryaga' do not apply to these cooperatives. In any case, according to Solomon, op.cit., Chapter 6, the Agrarian Marxists themselves found that the middle peasant refused to disappear.

48. *ibid.*, page 327. A few months later it became clear that the harvest was in fact 6 per cent less than the previous year.
49. *ibid.*, page 329.
50. C. Bettelheim in Class Struggles in the U.S.S.R., Volume 2, *op. cit.*, dwells on this point at length: see Part III, on the contradictions and class struggles in the industrial and urban sectors. N. Lampert (1979) The Technical Intelligentsia and the Soviet State, Macmillan, London, Chapter 2, also provides evidence on some of the tensions within the industrial sector in the 1920s, which suggests that attempts were made to bolster up the authority of the technical intelligentsia in order to help restore Soviet industry. It is possible that wage increases to the workers were an attempt to contain the resentment generated by this strengthening of managerial authority. Whatever the causes of the wage increases, they fostered the diversion of manufactured goods away from the countryside, which did not help the 'Smychka' between workers and peasants.
51. S. Grosskopf, *op.cit.*, page 333.
52. *ibid.*, pages 334-336.
53. *ibid.*, page 343.
54. *ibid.*, page 351.
55. *ibid.*, page 349.

56. See, for example, Part I, Chapter 1 of Yu. V. Arutyunian (1971). Sotsial'naya Struktura Sel'skogo Naseleniya SSSR', Mysl', Moscow. There one can find arguments that in the 1920s peasant commodity production was not sufficiently mobilised for the needs of industrialisation, because of the poor price relations for the peasantry, called forth by the backwardness of light industry (pages 23 - 24, my emphasis). On page 28 we find the claim that the peasantry applied its means of production irrationally, and on page 31 we find a discussion of agrarian overpopulation. All of these arguments ignore the basic lack of means of production of the peasantry, and in effect blame the peasantry for the failure of NEP. The remark on the irrational use of means of production is reminiscent of Stalin's claim to Churchill that the peasantry were reluctant to use tractors and other machinery. Grosskopf shows that this was not the case in the 1920s: op.cit., pages 248-250.

CHAPTER TWOECONOMIC UNITS AND ECONOMIC CALCULATIONIntroduction

The purpose of this Chapter is to explore the relative capacities of various economic agents. It was argued in the overall Introduction to this work that a theory of the class structure could only demarcate the boundaries between economic agents on the basis of specifying important differences in their capacities for action, deriving from their relation to the means of production. Thus the relations of production, that is the relations operating between economic agents deriving from their differential access to the means of production, must be examined in some detail if one is to have adequate grounds for either claiming or denying that class relations exist. The relations between the agents concerned need not be exclusively interpersonal relations: indeed they cannot be exclusively interpersonal if some of the economic agents are collective agents. If a monastic order can be a feudal landowner, or a joint stock company can be a capitalist, then a theory of the relations of production which restricts itself to relations between human agents runs the risk of missing vital aspects of the social formation in question.

However, if it is accepted that non-human agents are potentially important in the relations of production, then the conditions of such agents must be analysed. If one is to avoid treating them in a rationalist manner, as a collective subject capable both of recognising the appropriate means to

realise its ends and of acting on those means (for example, in the manner of Parsons' collectivities), then the following features of collective agents are pertinent to the formation of their objectives and their capacity to conduct a course of action in pursuit of those objectives. Firstly, the internal form of their organisation. Collective agents cannot be treated as unitary entities, and sub-agents within them may be crucial in affecting the relations of the collective agent with other agents. Secondly, their means of calculation. Concepts which may be widely available in the social formation, or specially developed for the collective agent in question (or some admixture of the two) are necessary if the agent is to monitor its own internal state and to calculate courses of action with respect to other agents (for example, struggle over access to the means of production). Unless the means of calculation are treated as having some effects of their own, then the collective agent will in effect be analysed as if its objectives were the result of its 'consciousness', and as if the means of realising its ends were somehow directly observable in the real. Thirdly, the resources at its disposal. These resources may be 'internal' (that is, directly at its disposal) or may be accessible because of the economic location of the agent.

In addition to these considerations which seem to be implicit in accepting that collective agents are pertinent to the relations of production, the examination of the relations of production in a planned economy carries other implications. Not only must one pay particular attention

in such an economy to relations between non-human agents, examining their respective capacities, but one must consider whether class relations might operate directly between such collective agents, or between collective and individual agents, or finally between individual agents as a result of the relations between collective agents. Furthermore, in any economy with an advanced division of labour, one must assess the relations between units of production in agriculture and in industry, as well as retail distribution units, and units of social consumption (the latter is a category which includes families, as well as hospitals, schools, and, in the case of the Soviet Union, cultural and holiday centres). However, as well as these kinds of collective agents, in the case of the Soviet Union, one must also examine the capacities of the various state agencies involved in plan construction, and the regulation of plan implementation. This is because Soviet national economic planning involves the attempt to coordinate the division of labour at the level of the overall social formation. If it is at all effective, it must have a major impact on the relations of production, either exacerbating or mitigating class relations. The means of economic calculation within all these various kinds of agencies involved in the construction and implementation of the overall economic plans will thus be a concern of this chapter, although units of consumption will be more the concern of Chapter Four.

The concern with the means of economic calculation in this Chapter is not simply because it is relevant to the organisational forms of collective agents, but also because

it is important for the analysis of policy formation and hence to the analysis of struggles between agencies. Ultimately, it is such struggles which determine the relative capacities of agents, so without neglecting both resources and organisational forms as determinants of the capacities of agents, a particular concern of this chapter will be with forms of economic calculation. This is because different economic units (agents) use different means of calculation, and these cannot be totally unified (otherwise the distinct economic functions of different units would be nullified, that is, there would be no division of labour).

This Chapter is divided into two main sections, agriculture and industry. This is primarily because conditions in Soviet agriculture have historically 'lagged behind' those in industry, largely as a consequence of the policy of forced collectivisation of the peasantry at the beginning of the 1930s. Consequently the organisational forms and the capacities of agricultural economic units are different from those in industry. It is also important to examine agriculture carefully to be in a position to evaluate the official Soviet theory of the class structure, according to which collective farmers are in a different class from state employees. Because some agricultural units, the private plots and the collective farms, have a particular relation to urban consumption, the discussion of retailing units at the end of the section on agriculture is used as a device to lead into the section on industry, where the main units discussed are the state enterprises, production associations, Ministries and the central planning agencies.

I. Agriculture

The condition of agriculture in the Soviet Union is still a serious cause for concern, some half a century after the forced collectivisation of the peasantry. Partly this is due to the difficulties of making good the neglect of a generation, a process which really only started around 1965. Partly it is due to the positive damage done, not only by the forced collectivisation itself, but also by the 1941-1945 war ('The Great Patriotic War') and later by Khrushchev's voluntarist attempts at a sudden improvement in agriculture. The inadequate performance of agriculture is also partly because of current policies, forms of planning and economic organisation, even though these have been improved since the fall of Khrushchev. Since this is not a thesis on Soviet agriculture, the developments before the 1960s will only be mentioned in passing, even though their impact on contemporary agriculture is still evident.¹

The main changes in agriculture under Khrushchev were the abolition of the Machine Tractor Stations (M.T.S.) in ^{many} 1958 and the conversion of ~~kolkhozy~~ into sovkhozy, mostly between 1955 and 1962. The other related change was the increase in the size of the kolhozy, often produced by amalgamating them into a single large one. However, as Stuart² points out, structural change in agriculture has been going on since 1950. In addition to the amalgamation of small kolkhozy to form larger units, there have been two forms of conversion of kolkhozy into sovkhozy (either attachment of kolkhoz to an existing sovkhoz, or combination of kolkhozy to form a new sovkhoz) and land has been taken

from the agricultural sector. According to Stuart, from 1950 to 1968, the number of kolkhozy declined from 121,400 to 35,600³. Stuart summarises the rate of these changes by means of the table reproduced below.

Table 1.

USSR State and Collective Farms: Organizational Adjustments, 1950-1968

	1953 ^a	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
1. Kolkhozy (decline)	30,200	8,200	6,486	8,854	14,245	9,455	3,487	761	1,156	1,106	1,340	224	313	587
2. Sovkhozy (increase)	(-131)	241	807	97	494	879	906	289	606	902	1,603	508	594	615
3. Kolkhozy ^b (newly org)	109	30	26	0	7	7	4
4. Kolkhozy (dismantled)	1,031	368	101	163	504	317	343
5. Kolkhozy (amalgamated)	1,866	8,010	12,271	4,550	1,092	683	1,037
6. Kolkhozy (converted)	5,730	1,256	2,074	5,068	2,906	402	271

Sources: Data for the years 1957 through 1963 from V.G. Venzher, *Ispol'zovanie zakona stoimosti v kolkhoznom proizvodstve* (2nd ed. rev.; Moskva: Nauka, 1965), p. 113. Remaining data from selected volumes of *Narkhoz-SSSR*.

^aChanges are between column years, the base year being 1950. For the years 1953, 1956 and 1966, the number of kolkhozy are to be the nearest hundred and, accordingly, year to year changes are approximate.

^bData on amalgamation and conversion should be considered as approximate due to possible double counting. For example, in any given year, several kolkhozy may be newly formed but later amalgamated or even converted.

Source: R.C. Stuart, *ibid.*, page 48

On a somewhat longer time-scale, Lavigne (1979) gives the following picture of structural changes in agriculture:⁴

Table 2


<u>Number of enterprises and agricultural exploitations</u>					
	<u>1927</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1979</u>
Kolkhozy (in thousands)	14.8	236.9	123.7	27.1	26.4
Sovkhozy (in thousands)	1.4	4.2	5.0	20.1	20.8
Enterprises, organisations, unions associating kolkhozy and sovkhozy (in thousands)	-	-	-	7.7	9.3
Individual farms of poor and middle peasants (in millions)	23.7	3.6	0.7	-	-
Farms of kulaks (in millions)	1.1	-	-	-	-

The sovkhozy in 1977 had an average area of 5,600 hectares each, whereas the average for kolkhozy was 3,800 hectares, so although there were fewer sovkhozy in 1977, they formed 52.6 per cent of the area, with the kolkhozy farming 46.2 per cent and the remaining 1.2 per cent being constituted by the 'personal plots'⁵ of kolkhozniki, workers and employees. As in the 1920s, sown area is only of limited use as an indication of economic relations, not only because the personal plots produce just over 25 per cent of all agricultural output, specialising in vegetables, meat, milk and eggs, but also because an adequate analysis of Soviet agriculture must confront the issue of the interrelation of these three forms of property, as well as their relation to other agencies such as the planning and supply agencies, the kolkhoz market and so on.

To start with the kolkhozy, the changes in size of the kolkhozy and the conversion of some of them into sovkhozy have been related to other practices which have changed the internal structure of the kolkhoz as an economic unit.

Stuart produces the following figure (in addition to figures showing regional differences in the same indices).

Figure 1



Structural Change in Soviet Agriculture: Selected Indicators, 1959-1965 (1959 = 100). Source: *Narkhoz*, selected volumes.

The figure indicates that for the U.S.S.R. as a whole from 1959 to 1965 the number of kolkhozy went down, but that the sown area and labour force went down less, while 'kolkhoz capital investment' (Stuart's phrase) went up.

The number of brigades went down more than the number of kolkhozy, which indicates that the brigade increased in size (and, as we shall see, in importance in some respects). There are various kinds of brigades (which are the main sub-unit of the kolkhoz). For the period between 1953 and 1957 Stuart distinguishes between them in terms of (a) time and (b) task:

- (a) temporary, seasonal and constant brigades
- (b) specialised and combined brigades

To the extent that a temporary brigade performed a single task, such as repair or land reclamation, it was also a specialised brigade, but Stuart uses the latter term to refer to a brigade with a particular regular production task. After 1957, and particularly after the abolition of the M.T.S. in 1958 (which both laid the financial burden on the kolkhozy of purchasing tractors and made them responsible for handling mechanisation), brigades were classified according to the structure of output and the method of handling mechanisation:

1. The complex brigade (crop and animal production)
2. The branch brigade (field brigades, tractor-field brigades, potato brigades and so on)
3. The specialised brigade (single product)
4. The tractor-complex brigade (after 1958)

The complex and tractor-complex brigades grew from just over 14 per cent of all brigades in 1957 to 34 per cent in 1962 and remained about that proportion until at least the late 1960s.⁶ This form of brigade is used where production is not highly specialised, and where both field crop and animal breeding sectors are relatively highly developed. Despite talk of agricultural specialisation, many Soviet writers seem to see the complex brigade as the most appropriate form of organisation within the kolkhoz, and in certain areas, even though it does not differ from other complex brigades, it may be called a department (otdelenie) which is the pattern of organisation prevailing on the sovkhoz.⁷ In essence, a department is a complete farm as a sub-unit of the kolkhoz. It closely resembles an entire collective farm of the late 1940s. It may well be the most appropriate organisational form, but that lack of specialisation in turn may be related to the inadequate distribution network (poor

roads, poor quality vehicles, inadequate storage facilities and an insufficient number of retail distribution points).

Not all kolkhozy have the same organisational structure, even over time. Stuart gives three examples of organisational structure, one for a farm in the 1940s, one in the 1950s and one in the 1960s. The latter farm seems to have the most sophisticated technical division of labour, and this cannot simply be attributed to the fact that it was one which Stuart had visited and therefore knew more about: farms clearly became more complex internally as they grew in size, but there is still regional variation in their internal structure. Both the brigade and the kolkhoz are nowadays sufficiently large that product specialisation can be handled by sub-units within the brigade. It is not at all clear how far this specialisation within a multi-product brigade has helped to raise productivity. Stuart attributes to the Soviet leadership a tendency towards the promotion of "agricultural gigantomania", yet he does seem to consider that there are benefits to it. In a large multi-product unit, the problem of the seasonal employment of labour may be reduced by the broadening of the output structure. It is difficult to know to what extent labour is transferable between animal breeding (non-seasonal) and field crop growing (seasonal) tasks. It may be that less specialised workers are shifted according to seasonal needs, and that specialised workers are fully employed in large units. Yet if this is so, it is not clear why complex brigades did not take over to some extent from the various kinds of branch and specialised brigades during the 1960s, instead of remaining at roughly one-third of all brigades.

It may well be that to transfer more brigades to the complex brigade system would have required a greater expenditure on equipment and on the education of personnel. This in itself would perhaps explain why this favoured system is not more widely spread, since the kolkhozy themselves would have difficulty in obtaining the equipment, and although there is a system of in-service education for kolkhoz personnel⁸, it is not clear how successful it is. Certainly formal educational qualifications are very low at brigade or ferma levels, although they are higher among kolkhoz chairmen.⁹ Thus the conditions for the spread of the complex brigade may not be present.

The relatively poor education may be more of a bottle-neck hindering the improvement of agricultural performance than it appears at first sight. For example, the evidence already cited from Stuart indicated that kolkhoz investment increased in the early 1960s, even after the purchase of machinery from the abolished M.T.S. Much of this investment would be on machinery (since the state takes responsibility for major infra-structural works such as roads), yet it was not apparently very productive investment. A rough indication of this can be seen from the figures cited by Lavigne¹⁰ on the growth of agricultural production: from 1950-1954 it grew by 22 per cent, from 1955-1959 by 49 per cent, but from 1960-1965 it only grew by 14 per cent. This latter period was precisely when the relative investment in kolkhozy was increasing, according to Stuart. Naturally this is only a very rough indication of the efficiency of investment: kolkhozy were already a declining proportion of agricultural enterprises, there was still considerable net emigration from rural areas at this time which the investment may have partly

offset, and the high percentages of growth in the early 1950s were partly because the starting point was so low. Nevertheless, there were (and still are) reports of machinery lying idle not simply because of lack of spare parts, but because of inadequate maintenance. In this sense, the level of skills of kolkhoz personnel may be an important aspect of their relative inefficiency in some areas of agricultural activity.

Furthermore, the relatively low level of skills may well be one of the reasons for the complex internal organisation of the kolkhoz as a whole, with complex brigades, field brigades, the ferma (concerned with livestock rearing, and headed by a zootechnician) construction brigades and so on. The organisational diversity means that, apart from the complex brigades, a specialist (often with higher formal educational qualifications than the chairman) can oversee the work of unskilled workers within a relatively narrowly specialised 'span of control'. The organisational rigidity produced by the proliferation of relatively narrow specialisations among heads of different kolkhoz sub-units may well account for both the limiting of the spread of complex brigades and for the apparently continuing high cost of certain aspects of farming, such as livestock rearing, which creates the economic opening for the 'personal plots' (the 'private sector'). For this reason, Stuart's conclusion (page 76) on the development of the internal structure of the kolkhoz is somewhat misleading: "Increasingly, the brigade (or department) is a large multi-product permanent unit, typically with its own mechanisation and encompassing both the production of field crops and animal products. From an organisational point of view, the typical kolkhoz has come to resemble the sovkhoz. More important, though, the brigade of the present

day differs very little from the pre-amalgamation collective and, indeed, has come to be a farm in its own right." While other authors also point to the increasing organisational similarity between kolkhozy and sovkhozy, a point which will be taken up later, it is clear from Stuart's own evidence (page 64) that the picture of the multi-product brigade only refers to around one-third of all brigades, even in the late 1960s, with the other brigades being more specialised. While he argues (page 73) that the various types of branch and specialised brigades remain in wide, though declining, usage, the evidence which he presents for the decline in their usage only goes up to 1961.

This picture of comparative stagnation in terms of the 'formal organisational blueprint' within the kolkhoz since the early 1960s would also be more consistent with Stuart's suggestion (page 195) that the 'good' kolkhoz may be less a function of the organisational form as such and more a function of other factors, for example, natural conditions and state credits. The lack of development of the apparently more flexible complex brigade system, in so far as it is an effect of organisational rigidity (as opposed to, say, being ecologically unsuitable, which could be true for certain parts of the U.S.S.R.), would then be related to other organisational features which are difficult to change and which are in part responsible for the poor performance of Soviet agriculture.

This organisational rigidity, rather than sheer size alone, or the combination of size and product diversity as Nove¹¹ seems to argue, would appear to be one of the reasons for the poor system of economic incentives. This incentive system, even after the abolition of the trudoden' (labour-day unit) in 1966 makes it difficult for the kolkhozniki to

calculate the relation between effort and reward and subjects the kolkhozniki to very detailed supervision. The detailed supervision is in part the effect of the fact that the "rewards of higher level managerial personnel depend directly upon the performance of lower level managers" as Stuart puts it. The usual success indicator problem exists on the kolkhoz, as in other economic units, where a multiple system of (perhaps mutually inconsistent) indicators are related to a bonus system which may not be used in many cases due to its complexity: there is a severe shortage of personnel trained in economics and available to collective farms, according to Stuart.

In addition to the difficulties which face personnel working within the kolkhoz in calculating appropriate courses of action, the system of decision-making (forms and conditions of calculation) pertaining to the kolkhoz as a whole is also fraught with difficulties. As both Nove and Stuart point out, although the juridical status of the kolkhoz as a co-operative has given it a formal autonomy, this has been limited in practice by constant outside intervention. The autonomy in fact has often had the effect, as Stuart points out (page 107), that kolkhoz chairmen "were not integrated into the important information flows of the planning system, did not participate broadly in the important decisions of production and distribution of the product, and were not sufficiently well trained to perform a significant managerial role." Since the ending of the trudoden system in 1966, it has been possible for the first time to calculate costs, gross output, gross revenue and net revenue, and the basic indicator of plan fulfillment is the volume of state procurements. Even more than in industry, agricultural capacity is difficult to define, which makes the planning of state procurements

difficult, and has led to a tendency to informally continue planning inputs, particularly in terms of crop rotation patterns. This, combined with the organisational rigidity (and poor transport facilities within the kolkhoz) which restricts the flexibility of labour supply¹², means that administrative pressure to increase agricultural production produces an acute 'labour shortage' which can only be overcome by investment. According to Nove(1977, pages 131-132) agricultural investment rose from an average of under 3 milliard roubles a year in 1951-55 to 7.27 milliards in 1961 and then to 23.7 milliards in 1973 - over 24 per cent of total investment in that year.¹³ Nove provides an excellent analysis (pages 132-137) of why 'unbalanced planning' of inputs makes much of this investment inefficient, and the figures from Lavigne (1979) cited above suggest that much of the investment may indeed be inefficient. However, the point which I am emphasising here is that in addition to the problems mentioned by Nove, the very internal structure of the kolkhoz itself causes problems, both in creating a 'labour shortage', which may be generating an additional demand for investment, and in making it difficult for the kolkhoz to calculate its own investment priorities, which would enable it to relieve Gosplan and the Ministry of Agriculture of some of their planning burdens.

Nove is well aware that there are no easy answers to the problem of the relation of economic units (including state enterprises and Ministries) to the central planning organs, so that one cannot simply advocate 'decentralisation'. The difficulties of the kolkhoz in calculating its costs and investment priorities appear to be even greater than for industrial state enterprises because of the connection between the 'personal plots' and the kolkhozy (and sovkhozy). In

addition, even such scope as exists for autonomy in investment decisions seems to be poorly utilised: Stuart, following James R. Millar, points out (page 133) that the finance policy of the kolkhoz sector is on balance very conservative. Although it has access to credit, it has for the most part utilised funds obtained from increased prices and has tended to pursue a policy where income must precede outlays.

To be fair, this autonomy due to access to credit may be more apparent than real, since kolkhozy are probably given very low priority in the case of conflicting demands on the State Bank for credit. Certainly Stuart points out (page 195) that it is more difficult to channel state assistance into kolkhozy than into sovkhozy, and this must be related to their juridical status as co-operatives, which, while not really protecting them from a tendency by the state to plan inputs, does not help them in the political struggle over investment. One of the major problems of planning investment at the level of the kolkhoz is that machinery and equipment tends to be held at brigade level, and this is where its purchase and utilisation will be planned, according to Stuart. Yet the planning of investment is even at this level related to technical norms which must tend to ossify the planning of investment even if deliveries of machinery are planned 'from above' and thus do not fit in completely with brigade plans. Stuart describes the calculation and resulting adjudication of competing claims as follows (page 133):

"The utilisation of equipment will be a function of the targets facing the brigade and the technical norms translating these targets into specific fulfillment tasks. This translation is typically accomplished with the use of a technological map (tekhnologicheskaja karta). If additional equipment is needed, the brigadier forwards a

request to kolkhoz management which in turn is forwarded to the raispolkom. If the request is for a deficit commodity, the decision as to who will in fact receive the equipment is apparently made at the raion level. The equipment is recorded at the brigade level as an asset and depreciated according to standard norms (usually over a ten year period). Capital repairs are planned in advance and based upon anticipated usage. The costs of these repairs are recorded at brigade level although the brigade does not make payment."

Stuart's description is now out of date, since Sel'khoztekhnika, not the raion, is now the supply agency for agriculture. However, one can still conclude that it is difficult to make the calculation that the brigade could meet its targets by organisational improvements or practices raising the productivity of existing equipment, or by re-organising relations (and the distribution of equipment) between brigades. The planning of investment at this level thus tends to perpetuate the existing internal structure of the kolkhoz, generate a certain amount of otherwise unnecessary demand for investment (by precluding certain kinds of economies) and restrict the ability of the kolkhoz as a whole to manoeuvre vis-a-vis the planning of deliveries of equipment. The rural tolkach can look forward to a long existence in these circumstances, particularly when the problem of lack of spare parts (a problem throughout the Soviet economy) is taken into account. Despite the shortage of equipment, Stuart cites a Soviet source for 1965 showing that 15 per cent of tractors stand idle every year due to technical inoperability.

If there are problems about the farm calculating its own costs and investment needs, the difficulties of calculating the costs of the kolkhoz faced by the central planning agencies are also formidable, even with the introduction of wage-payments in 1966. This becomes clear when the accounting practices are examined more closely: the costs of the kolkhoz are 'monetised' by the attribution of a rouble cost to physically determined inputs. Thus the technological map will have a regionally defined scale setting forth the rouble cost of a specified kind of tractor operating on a particular kind of land for a specified time-period. But the interpretation of whether the land falls into that category will be left to that kolkhoz. Even if farms within a region give a similar interpretation to such a technological norm, inter-regional comparisons of costs are more difficult, and it is these which are likely to be of most interest to the central planners. In addition there is the problem, familiar to students of Soviet industry, of the slow rate of change of such technical norms, despite constantly changing conditions. Such problems of costing methodology are the subject of continued discussion, and like the issues of land rent charges and 'capital' charges, must be resolved if a satisfactory form of measuring agricultural costs is to be developed. Without a form of measuring costs in a manner that does not perpetuate existing practices, but rather helps indicate how costs could be reduced, the poor performance of agriculture is likely to continue, and agricultural investment is likely to remain a high proportion of total investment.

The Convergence of Kolkhozy and Sovkhozy

Many of these problems apply also to the sovkhozy, since the administrative and operational differences between the two kinds of farm have diminished over the years, as both Nove and Stuart indicate. This raises the issue of the extent to which they can be conceived of as distinct forms of property. Nove (1977, page 122) argues that the following are the significant differences between kolkhozy and sovkhozy:

"Firstly, the juridical fact of co-operative as against state ownership. Secondly, the formally elective nature of the kolkhoz chairman and management committee, as against the appointed sovkhoz director. Thirdly, the degree of autonomy, legal and to some extent real, of a kolkhoz is greater, in that a sovkhoz is directly subordinated to a territorial sovkhoz administration, whereas the nominally co-operative nature of the kolkhozy gives them greater leeway. Fourthly, the kolkhozy finance the bulk of their investments out of revenue, while sovkhozy receive more grants from the state, though with the spread of 'full khozraschet' among the sovkhozy this element of difference is diminishing. Finally, despite the changes introduced in 1966 there is a greater dependence of incomes in the kolkhozy on the financial results of that kolkhoz. That is to say, subject to a minimum, there is a greater variation in payment to labour than in sovkhozy. There is at present a clear trend towards 'bringing closer together' the two types of property, as a number of party pronouncements bear witness, above all by involving them in joint enterprises and other activities."

Some of the differences are more important than others. The juridical position of the kolkhoz (apart from the 1977 Constitution and other statutes) is set out in the 1969 Model Kolkhoz Charter, which replaced the 1935 Standard Charter, both of which are reproduced as appendices in Stuart.

The greater dependence of kolkhoz incomes on financial performance, and the poorer pension rights, poorer state aid for investment, and so on, are only juridically possible on the basis of the distinction between co-operative ownership and state ownership. Yet as Stuart makes clear, the kolkhoz chairman is not really elected, and the autonomy of the kolkhoz is limited within the planned economy, even though, as Stuart puts it (page 45) "the mechanisms utilised to integrate the kolkhoz into the planned economy have differed from those utilised for other organisational forms in the Soviet economy". This may be a reference to the Territorial Production Administrations, established in 1962, although Stuart points out that these have faded into the raion administrations as organs of local control over agriculture. Although Stuart seems to consider, like Nove, that the kolkhozy do have greater autonomy than the sovkhozy, one could take a jaundiced view and argue that the autonomy exists when it comes to looking after themselves and their members, but does not exist when it comes to fitting in with state economic plans. Although Nove argues that the greater autonomy of the kolkhoz is to some extent real, he does point to examples of detailed operational supervision by the party (however, it also applies to sovkhov directors) and Stuart suggests that at least in some areas the party in the late 1950s was extending its membership and improving its organisation within the kolkhozy. Whatever the extent of kolkhoz autonomy (and in the absence of developed forms of calculation extended autonomy would only be of limited use to its members anyway), the development of joint enterprises linking kolkhozy and sovkhozy, together with the increasing power of Sel'khoztekhnik over maintenance, repairs and certain

services, may well have reduced kolkhoz autonomy as part of the process of assimilating the two forms of property.

The development of these organisational links between kolkhozy and sovkhozy is one of a series of measures taken to improve agriculture since 1965, and the impact of these is perhaps best described by Lavigne (1979). She divides the pre-1965 period up into a period before 1958, characterised by a policy of constraint and the period 1958-1965, characterised by a policy of liberalisation. Yet despite the changes after 1958, the policy of intensification of agriculture was not well conducted since (among other things) the kolkhozy did not have enough resources to buy machinery or to develop the use of fertilisers. The 1965 reforms improved the situation much more noticeably. This was when sales, rather than total production, became the main plan target. Yet beginning in 1975, because of the mediocre results of agriculture (the targets of the 1971-75 five-year plan not having been reached) a tendency developed towards the return to voluntarist planning. The margin between the anticipated volume of production and the plan of sales fixed for the kolkhoz narrowed. For example, in 1976-80, for cereals, total production was to increase by 19 per cent, but sales were to increase by 33 per cent; for meat the percentages were 9 and 13 respectively. (Admittedly, despite the implication of Lavigne's argument, production could rise faster than sales, if, for example, the on-farm use of cereals remained relatively stable, but, realistically, to sustain increased production, a greater proportion would presumably be have to be used for seeds, and as fodder.) The part of sales in

addition to the plan was thus expected to decrease (this being compensated by an increase in price paid to the kolkhozy), but in addition purchases over and above the plan became obligatory to the collecting organisations, for a certain number of products (potatoes, cotton, beetroot, sunflower seeds - some of these, in my view, being crops where the 'personal plots' have had a better record than the kolkhozy and sovkhozy). It was no surprise when from 1976 the sales plan was not realised for a whole series of products.

A decree effective from the beginning of 1968 set up a system of contracts between the collecting organisations and the kolkhozy, based on the detailed sales plan. As in industry, this system began to be abused by the modification of the contracts by the collecting organisations, with the latter sometimes forcing kolkhoz chairmen to sign blank contracts. As in industry, in other words, there was a return to directive planning, since the experiments in managing direct relations with the kolkhoz customers, such as food-processing enterprises or shops, were not always crowned with success.

Despite this, the position of the kolkhozy improved in several respects. Base prices of cereals were raised after 1965, and above-plan sales were priced at an extra 50 or 100 per cent (depending on the products). In 1970, base prices were raised for livestock products, potatoes, vegetables and fruits, and supplements were introduced for above-plan sales. The same procedure was introduced

in 1972 for sugar beet, in 1975 for flax and in 1979 for milk, wool, mutton and astrakhan fur. These measures influenced the 'profitability' of the kolkhoz, which increased from 20-41 per cent between 1964 and 1966, then returned to 25 per cent in 1975. This high rate of profitability was necessary to finance investment (apart from large infra-structural projects). High purchase prices from agriculture combined with low retail prices have meant a heavy burden of subsidies on the state budget. The effect of the 1979 price rises alone has been estimated by Brezhnev at 3.2 milliard roubles of subsidy. Relating this to the figures cited above by Nove on agricultural investment, this is more than the total annual agricultural investment for the years 1951-55.

From 1965 the tax burden on kolkhozy was lightened, and given the exemption for kolkhozy with a rate of 'profitability' of over 15 per cent, most kolkhozy these days will escape the tax, although members earning a wage over the minimum guaranteed wage for industry will be taxed at a rate of 8 per cent. In addition debts prior to 1965 were annulled, and they gained access to both long and short term credit (though according to Stuart they seem to make little use of it, as mentioned above). Finally kolkhozy were encouraged to develop their non-agricultural activities, particularly by means of the inter- kolkhoz organisations, grouping several kolkhozy: for the construction of small electricity stations, irrigation schemes, building construction; for the construction and use of enterprises for the transformation and treatment of agricultural products; for the use of centres of artificial insemination, incubation

and so on. In addition, a 1967 decree encouraged the development of auxiliary enterprises or handicraft workshops within the kolkhoz to encourage the use of seasonally unemployed labour-power.

The intention of the authorities is clear, particularly in view of the large investment programme. Despite the voluntarist tendencies of plan implementation, the kolkhoz sector is not perceived as a sector to be "pressured" but an element of the economy to be developed by means related to its material interest. The aim is to produce a convergence between agriculture and industry. Between 1967 and 1975, state farms were reformed on the basis of 'full khozraschet' and run like state industrial enterprises. Similarly a series of measures have been taken which appear to be aimed at reducing differences between kolkhozy and at running them more like sovkhozy. Following a kolkhoz congress in 1966, a series of kolkhoz councils were set up at federal, republican and regional levels. While according to Nove (page 143) it does not appear that the councils have either executive authority or an effective representative function, they may well serve to standardise certain kolkhoz practices with a view to improving overall standards. For example, the federal council of kolkhozy met for the first time in 1970 and decided that the management of the kolkhoz social insurance funds (created in 1964) be run by the trade union system under the overall charge of the federal council of kolkhozy. At the centre, the regulations on the constitution and use of the social insurance funds are decreed jointly by the federal

council of kolkhozy and the central federal council of trade unions. This form of standardisation of practice seems to have paved the way for the 1976 recommendation of the XXV Party Congress that kolkhozniki could enter an agricultural trade union, on a strictly voluntary basis. In 1977 a regulation was issued adapting to the kolkhoz committee the 1971 statute on trade union committees at workshop, factory and local levels. These measures have brought the state and collective sectors closer together.

Clearly bringing the two main sectors of agriculture closer together will ease the task of bringing agriculture as a whole closer to industry. According to Lavigne, the aim seems to be continue to industrialise agriculture, by mechanisation, use of chemicals, electrification (still not fully achieved all these years after Lenin's famous slogan and the Goelro plan), and also by developing the means of transport, by techniques of preservation and transformation of agricultural products. Despite all this, Lavigne quotes Brezhnev's speech to the Party Central Committee in July 1978 to show that all the old defects in the above aspects of agriculture are still present. The other way of bringing agriculture and industry closer together, started in 1965 and formally confirmed in 1976, is to concentrate agricultural enterprises, not by the former methods of amalgamation into larger kolkhozy and conversion into sovkhozy, but by the already mentioned method of forming of associations or unions between sovkhozy and kolkhozy, and by the creation of 'agro-industrial complexes', integrating industrial and

agricultural activities. In 1978 there existed 8,000 enterprises of this type, associating 90 per cent of the kolkhozy and 60 per cent of the sovkhozy, many of them participating in several enterprises. These enterprises employed 1.6 million workers in 1978. Lavigne says that the Republic of Moldavia has served as the field of experimentation for this (organisational) formula since the 1960s, and in 1978 almost two-fifths of agricultural production came from these entities. This is interesting because according to Nove, Moldavia is also the place where the kolkhoz council carries out administrative functions, unlike the rest of the U.S.S.R. He argues (1977, page 143): "This may be an interesting experiment. But such a trend runs counter to the policy of joining kolkhozy and sovkhozy together." Yet Moldavia appears to manage to do both, which suggests that the distinction between state and collective property is already becoming quite blurred in Moldavian economic practice, if not in Soviet juridical discourse.

The development of agro-industrial complexes is according to Lavigne the first step towards a profound transformation of rural life, the urbanisation of the countryside. In other words, the final aim is to unify as much as possible the living conditions of town and country dwellers, offering them an equivalent set of services. At the moment the level of schools, hospitals, cultural and commercial establishments is less dense in the countryside. The introduction of pensions in 1965 slowed down the rural exodus,

but did not keep the young in the village. The introduction of the work-permit for kolkhozniki, from 1977, meant that a member leaving the kolkhoz did not lose her or his pension rights, which favoured labour mobility. The idea of the agrogorod (agro-town) seems to have been resurrected, although in a different form from that advocated by Khrushchev in 1950 (and later). This could have adverse effects, as Wädekin has pointed out, on the 'personal plots' which is one of the reasons why, as Lavigne remarks, kolkhozniki seem to be attached to their individual houses. Indeed many of these ambitious hopes for agriculture could well imply a transformation (or even eventual abolition) of the 'personal plots'. Consequently, this third form of agricultural property must now be examined.

Personal Plots

As Wädekin (1973) makes clear, 'personal plots' do not simply belong to kolhozniki, but also to workers and employees. The latter are often thought to be employed in sovkhozy, but as both Nove and Wädekin make clear, they also consist of state-employed persons working in suburban or urban areas. The distinction between those plots on kolkhoz land, and those of sovkhov land is of very little significance, except that sovkhov plots are usually smaller, which is related to higher wages of sovkhov workers. In contrast to earlier times, the income of kolkhozniki from 'personal plots' is now only a secondary income. It might well be possible to argue now that the most significant difference among 'personal plots' is that between sovkhozy and

kolkhozy on the one hand, and the agricultural activities of urban workers and employees on the other. However, the scanty empirical material available makes such an argument difficult to sustain.

In urban areas, 'personal plots' are granted by municipal soviets, but not directly to households, whereas they are granted by the kolkhozy or sovkhozy directly to households in rural areas. Thus the juridical conditions of existence of these plots are the legal designation of households, and the legal powers of the political or economic agencies concerned, which are empowered to grant the plots. This is why the extent of the plots can be legally limited and changed in certain circumstances.

The urban 'service' plots (those at some distance from the house) are usually allotted for a limited period only (Wadekin, page 34), and they are registered in the name of the enterprise, local authority, organisation or institution which has issued them to the individual. Yet even these plots appear to be retained year after year, and in the case of retirement or invalidity are normally retained for life. Tenure in all other plots is for an unlimited time and free of charge. In contrast to a simple distinction between town and country plots, Wadekin (page 35) classifies plots as belonging to the households of: (a) workers and employees in rural areas engaged in agricultural or connected occupations (b) workers and employees in rural areas not engaged in occupations connected with agriculture (c) workers and employees in urban areas. Like the kolkhozniki, the workers and employees

in rural areas are given no legal confirmation of their tenure: the right is merely delegated to them by the kolkhoz or sovkhos. So rural plots are certainly not legally private property, although the means of production used on them (including livestock) and the products themselves are legally private property. Some urban plots surrounding private houses are indistinguishable from private property even though all land is nationalised. However, apart from such urban and suburban plots (whose economic importance is hard to assess but which seems to be considerable from Wadekin's description of the enormous extent of informal suburban development round some large cities), the main impression given by Wadekin's painstaking work to glean evidence from a large variety of sources is of the interdependence of kolkhoz (or sovkhos) and 'personal plot' sectors.

This interdependence applies to mutual aid (not all of it legal) between the kolkhoz and 'personal plot' in terms of inputs, and what is effectively a division of labour between them in terms of products, with the 'personal plots' concentrating on what the kolkhozy do badly - potatoes, vegetables, eggs, fruit, meat and dairy produce. This division of labour has become more evident with rising living standards, so that the private plots did not just produce means of consumption for the kolkhozniki; but began to cater for developing urban markets for the above products rather than for the staple foods based on grains.¹⁴ To some extent

this interdependence mitigates the tension mentioned by Nove arising out of division of work time between 'private' and collective (or state) work. Wadekin's argument implies that some Soviet writers on this issue are mistaken in emphasising the tension over allocation of time between collective and plot work. He argues that most work on the plots is spare time as far as the kolkhoz is concerned. Nove himself points out that much of the work on plots is done by middle aged women, and Stuart's evidence (admittedly for an earlier period) suggests that very few fail to do the minimum work required of them, although Wadekin suggests it is different with overtime. Since there is a 'labour shortage', overtime could be important for plan fulfilment, which lends support to Nove's view of the situation.

The interdependence between kolkhoz and personal plot both helps to explain why the latter appears so productive (for example, it receives feed grazing and young animals for its livestock rearing) and why plots continue to exist. They compensate (or have in the past) for the underinvestment in agriculture by producing output for very little investment. Furthermore, in adapting to the market, they have provided the kind of flexibility which has been precluded, it seems, by the organisational rigidity of kolkhozy, but which is required in the face of varying harvests, often voluntaristic approaches to agriculture and, more recently, the changing demand for agricultural products. However, the role of the 'personal plots' appears to be declining: in 1950, they amounted to 5.1 per cent of

of total sown area in the USSR, by 1959 they were 3.7 per cent any by 1969, they were 3.2 per cent (Wadekin, page 45). In the last decade, the decline has continued: thus according to Lavigne (as already mentioned) in 1979 they were only 2.7 per cent of total sown area.¹⁵ This is somewhat puzzling, since both Noye and Wadekin cite Soviet sources which either make favourable comments on the 'household plots', or point to the counterproductive effects^{of} restricting the activities associated with this sector, or else which argue that the unsatisfactory productive performance of the socialised sector precludes the ending of the reliance on the plots. In the light of such arguments, which in view of Wadekin's analysis I accept, the plots, even if they are considered as 'private property', are scarcely an 'alien cancer' undermining the socialised sector. However, it may be that the Soviet authorities wish to check the tendencies towards the development of large areas of what seem to be effectively suburban private market gardens. This is probably why some sovkhosy have been set up close to cities. However, overall the official policy towards the plots has been favourable since the mid-1960s. The decline in the private plot may be in part simply a demographic effect, as old people in kolkhozy and sovkhosy die, while the household rights to their plots are not transferred to a new households because younger people have been moving out of the countryside. If this is so, it may in itself be the cause of a slight deterioration (or stagnation) in overall agricultural performance in the Soviet Union, because of

the economic support which the private plots give to kolkhozy and sovkhozy.

Yet this decline in sown area devoted to 'personal plots' has not been matched by a proportionate decline in output. It still produced in 1979 25.5 per cent of total agricultural production (and sustained 21 per cent of the livestock), according to Lavigne. She rightly stresses the dependence of the plots on the kolkhozy, but if Wädekin is right that the plots also help the kolkhozy in certain respects, the reduction in the number of private plots, as just indicated, may be slightly detrimental to kolkhozy performance and thus to overall agricultural performance. The non-kolkhoz plots (which do not benefit from interdependence with the kolkhozy and may thus with perhaps more justice be called 'private') seem to have been expanding at the expense of the kolkhoz plots. According to Wädekin (page 345) even by 1968 the output of the nonkolkhoz population amounted to 44 per cent of total private agricultural output, and by 1971 may have risen to one half. If this trend has continued (the reasons being the decline in the kolkhoz population and the growth in demand for fruit and vegetables) then the 'personal plots' producing directly for urban markets are probably much more important now than has generally been realised. This would help explain why their proportion of total output has remained around 25 per cent, while at the same time their positive contribution to the socialised sector has gone down, resulting in a disappointing overall agricultural performance. This raises the issue of the kolkhoz markets, and retail trade, since the urban private plots

are particularly geared to these.
Retail Trade

Nove says that turnover statistics show that retail sales in rural areas have been rising steadily, but argues that judging from criticisms, there is ample scope for improvement in marketing, particularly by the rural consumer cooperatives. He mentions the most pressing physical problems - poor roads, inadequate transport, a serious lack of packaging materials and of storage space. Quite apart from these problems, retailing enterprises are reluctant to take perishable goods, since spoilage adversely affects profitability. Wadekin also emphasises the scope for cooperatives, and mentions their reluctance to take perishable goods. Despite high level official support for the kolkhoz markets, Wadekin reports continual instances^{of} kolkhoz and sovkhos chairmen forbidding kolkhozniki and sovkhos workers to sell products on the kolkhoz market. Price limits, it seems, were still being illegitimately being fixed in the late 1960s, and raion authorities still at times forbade people to sell in neighbouring towns, so that they had to sell to local procurement agencies at the lower state prices. Construction plans for kolkhoz markets were still not being fulfilled almost everywhere. These comments refer to the period up to 1970. It is not clear how far the raising of state prices during the 1970s has reduced the incentive to interfere with the kolkhoz market in order to meet state procurement plans.

Not too much stress should be laid on the kolkhoz market, however. In 1977, according to Lavigne, state commerce and

retailing cooperative commerce were responsible for 69.6 per cent and 28 per cent respectively of all retail turnover, both food and non-food. Hence the kolkhoz market in 1977 accounted for 2.4 per cent of all retail turnover. This figure compares with 2.8 per cent in 1969 and 2.6 per cent in 1979. So while the share of the kolkhoz market in all retail turnover has not really fallen during the 1970s, it is still not a very high proportion of all retail trade. Nevertheless, the kolkhoz market is somewhat more important if one concentrates on food retailing alone, which is what they specialise in. (They should not be confused with retailing cooperatives which deal in various kinds of goods. The kolkhoz markets provide a retail outlet for the output of producers' cooperatives, the kolkhozy, which is not taken up in the state procurement plan. In addition, they provide a retail outlet for some of the produce from the private plots). If one restricts oneself to food retailing, then according to Wà dekin (page 133), the kolkhoz markets accounted for 8.7 per cent of turnover of 'comparable products' in 1969 not in volume, but according to the effective prices of these sales, which would be higher in the kolkhoz commerce than the socialised (state and retail cooperative) commerce. In 1979, this percentage was 9.4, according to Lavigne (private communication). However, the reference to 'comparable products' is somewhat misleading if one is attempting to assess the share of the kolkhoz markets in the retail turnover of all food products. The phrase 'comparable products' refers to the range of products which are sold both in socialised commerce and in the kolkhoz markets. However, the socialised commerce sector also sells an additional range of food products, mostly processed foods, which are not available in the

kolkhoz markets. If one takes kolkhoz market sales as a percentage of all food sales, then the share of the kolkhoz market was 4.5 per cent in 1969, 4.3 per cent in 1977, and 4.7 per cent in 1979.

Consequently, after a period of relative decline in the 1950s and 1960s, the kolkhoz retail markets have stabilised their share of the food markets in the 1970s. The rise in the share of the state and cooperative retailing sector, even in food, up to the late 1960s may have been partly due to the retail cooperatives purchasing directly from the kolkhoz and urban private plots, and selling these products both in their own shops and on the premises of the kolkhoz markets. This practice has certainly been advocated for some years, but it is not clear to what extent it has actually occurred. It could equally be the case that state and cooperative sector 'middle management' opposition to kolkhoz markets is effectively restricting their development. This may be responsible for the apparent move into the 'informal sector' of the black market, the grey market and so on, which seems to have grown considerably in recent years.

The defects of the current system of retail trade are well-known and are adeptly summarised by Lavigne: these remarks also apply to the retail distribution of industrial goods. Despite a 1969 regulation, direct enterprise-shop contracts remain the exception. The system does not function as an intermediary between production and consumption: it does not transmit demand to the enterprises, and does not inform the consumer. The methods of planning production do not adapt supply to the consumer's needs, so that enterprises are slow to adapt to the changing structure of demand, and to plan for complementarities (for example, ski-boots as well

as skis). There are absolute shortages which are related to the privileging of heavy industry, which are 'dealt with' by decrees, such as the 1976 decree which said that consumption goods would increase by 70 per cent between 1976-1980, when the five year plan for the same years only envisaged an increase of 32 per cent and investment had already been fixed on that basis. (The priority given to heavy industry meant that it had the means to make up for some of defects of light industry, for example, by making refrigerators. In 1965, 19 per cent of consumption goods came from heavy industry, and this rose to 28 per cent in 1976). The functioning of retail trade leaves a lot to be desired, with very poor stock management, too few sales points, especially in new residential areas, and irregular supplies. These features lead to queues even where there is not an absolute shortage of goods. The shortage of rural retail outlets brings rural customers into towns. There is inadequate priority given to services, and these are even worse than commerce in goods. The reform of commerce started in 1970 did not do much good, and the 1979 decree, with its centralising emphasis, made the Ministry of Commerce responsible for satisfying demand, with provisions for long-term contracts between commerce and industry, and a planned increase in shops selling a particular trade-mark. Lavigne rightly doubts the virtues of such centralisation in this part of the economy, but then she doubts whether the distribution system could function in a still worse manner.

Overview of Agriculture

It is now possible to try to discuss agriculture as a whole. Clearly the distinctions between kolkhozy and sovkhozy are diminishing, a task which requires a massive allocation of resources to agriculture both to invest and to subsidise agricultural prices. As Nève points out, the geographical and climatic features of the Soviet Union mean that for a particular volume of output it will probably always require greater investment than, say, the United States. Nevertheless, a lot of the resources devoted to agriculture must be wasted both because of forms of planning, and because of the organisational forms of the 'socialised sector' and their inadequate means of calculation. As Lavigne puts it, it is astonishing and disturbing that the Soviet Union cannot cover its needs for agricultural products, nutritional produce and raw materials when 22 per cent of its population is engaged in agriculture and such a high proportion of total investment is devoted to it. Yet even in October 1980 Brezhnev was still pointing to the inadequate performance of agriculture. This global underdevelopment leaves the way open for the activities of the 'private sector' which even if it is selling to consumer cooperatives is still very prosperous and produces one-quarter of total agricultural output. Unless and until organisational forms and means of calculation can be developed which will enable the sovkhozy and kolkhozy to produce as efficiently as the 'personal plots' on the same products, agriculture will continue to be a chronic problem. The distribution of agricultural products (as of industrial ones, as well as services)

will similarly have to improve if the agricultural organisations are to have the means of planning production starting from calculations as to likely consumption. This may well require a radical alteration of both priorities and planning techniques in the Soviet Union.

II Industry

It is not very easy to separate agriculture from industry, as the preceeding discussion probably shows. Not only do agriculture and industry produce means of production for each other, but they share common problems in many ways with regard to retail distribution, and with regard to relations between the units of production and the ministerial authorities and planning authorities themselves. However, the greater importance attached to industry in the U.S.S.R., and the organisational differences between industrial and agricultural economic units, make it easier to discuss them separately.

State Enterprises

As with agriculture, I propose to start with the units of production before discussing other economic units. Retail trading units will only be mentioned in passing in view of the discussion of them in relation to agriculture. Whereas in the case of agriculture the main works referred to were those of economists, it is possible to begin by discussing an explicitly sociological account of enterprises, or at least of the social location of their directors, namely Andrle (1976).¹⁶ The theoretical mode of analysis used by Andrle is role theory and although no attempt is made by him

to defend his use of role theory,¹⁷ the defects of this mode of analysis are limited to some extent by a distinction which is made between theoretical and empirical work. While Andrle argues (page 158) that "it is taken to be axiomatic that a theoretical choice has consequences for the questions asked and answered in the subsequent enquiry", the distinction between theoretical and empirical work, which even appears explicitly at times in the book (for example, in the conclusion), means that much that appears in the text is heavily influenced by his reading of primary Soviet sources. These do not use role theory as a mode of analysis. Fortunately for those who have little time for role theory, Andrle has not systematically transmuted the discourses of the Soviet sources into role theory, which means that much of the empirical material is of use to those who espouse different theoretical positions.

Andrle begins his analysis of the position of the manager in the relations of production (conceived of as primarily interpersonal relations) by positing two basic types of state intervention in the economy - regulative and directive planning, or put another way, market regulation versus administrative planning. The history of this conception can be traced back to debates in Germany and Austria in the late 19th century, through Weber (and von Mises) up to Granick's distinction between the khozraschet and formal models.¹⁸ The problem with administrative or directive planning is according to Andrle (page 9) "the Weberian one... of the

precipice between 'extensively and intensively infinite reality' on the one hand and the conceptualising activities of the human mind on the other." Thus it is the inadequacy of concepts to the real which requires the supplementation of directive planning by regulative planning, since the gap between concepts and the real leads to a proliferation of central checks on managerial activity which must nevertheless be effective and which hence coexist with a certain amount of managerial autonomy if the system is to work. The main arguments which I would raise about this conception of the 'dialectic' (as Andrle calls it) between managerial initiative and plan discipline are as follows: firstly, that it does not stem from any gap between the conceptual and the real, but from differences between different discourses;¹⁹ secondly, that the problems of Soviet planning should not be analysed in terms of the mutual interaction of two organising principles which define the range of variation of the structure. Andrle (page 8) quite explicitly does the latter by positing regulative and directive planning as two polar opposites defining the 'gravitational field' within which all proposals to set individual interests in harmony with a specific notion of 'general interest' would have to fall.

Yet, despite what I consider to be the weaknesses of Andrle's mode of analysis of planning, he is able to give a reasonable (if by no means original) account of the basic problems facing Soviet planning: "the centralised planning of complex diversified industrial production is based on inadequate knowledge of the

minutiae of specific conditions under which decision makers at the production level have to operate. Centrally formulated prescriptions tend to become ambiguous or inconsistent (depending on how specific they are) by the time they arrive on a factory manager's desk. From the central planner's point of view, the response of managers - and by chain reaction of all those affected by managerial decisions - is insufficiently determinate, with consequences which may contradict some of the planner's objectives.

Therefore, the administrative structure of directive planning must be such as to offer the central planner some way of salvaging at least some of the objectives which appear to be denied in the process of implementation. In the Soviet Union, the central organs of the state, with the central organs of the Communist Party playing the crucial coordinative and policy formulating role, fight for control over the productive process by continuous issue of corrective directives, multiple checks on their fulfilment, and periodical, large scale campaigns against whichever managerial policies are brought to the attention of the central authorities as detrimental to the national goals. The efficiency of these efforts of course requires that no managerial decision making is protected by autonomously enforceable legal status. However, as a consequence of the inadequacy of centralised information, the whole system would simply grind to a halt if factory managers did not have the initiative to arbitrate between conflicting directives and cut corners by officially unblessed practices in their pursuit of the chosen goals."

Of course, it is not simply factory directors who must have such initiative - it is necessarily open to a greater or lesser extent to all economic agents. The closest Andrle gets to saying this is his remark (page 10) that "each official is something of a policy maker in his own right", a position which implies that only human beings can be economic agents. He also gets close to analysing the conditions of the partial autonomy of enterprise directors in a brief discussion of what Kaser and Zielinsky call 'state-parametric' planning, in which enterprise performance parameters are set by the state (not the market) in such a way as to increase enterprise autonomy as to the manner in which the success indicators are met. Andrle rightly points to one of the problems of such 'synthetic' success indicators (ones which 'cover' a wide range of economic events): "Parametric planning offers the central planner better control over the aggregated results at the expense of surrendering his administrative power of involvement in the concrete processes of production: in other words there might be a well-regulated 'production for synthetic criteria', but a less well regulated 'production for use', a circumstance which presumably does not escape the attention of these concerned."

Largely because of this difficulty with the theory of 'state-parametric' planning Andrle decides to stick to his dichotomy of market regulative versus directive administrative forms of state intervention in the economy. The point of the attempt to develop a concept of 'state-parametric' planning, of course, is to theorise forms of planning in a way that escapes from such dichotomies as state versus

market and takes account of the organisational exigencies of aggregating information to coordinate the activities of a multiplicity of agents while at the same time allowing for a necessary measure of autonomy being available to those agents for dealing with the inevitable inconsistencies in the plans. The difficulty which Andrle in effect raises is the well-known one of deciding on the most appropriate indicators. Whatever the deficiencies of the 'state-parametric' attempt to theorise these problems, the problems must be analysed, and this can only be done by analysing the criteria used to measure plan fulfilment in relation to the organisational exigencies (and means of calculating action with respect to them) which face enterprises (or other economic agents, as the case may be). The conceptual couple of 'regulative' versus 'administrative' planning, which is supposed to define the terrain of economic decision-making, actually precludes such an analysis, as Andrle's text makes clear, by denying the possible effectivity of other modes 'state intervention' which do not conform to the features of the 'pure ideal types' of the couple. Since the two parts of the conceptual couple are thought of as organising principles which define the 'gravitational field' of economic decision making, forms of planning other than these two cannot be admitted without undermining the analysis. According to Andrle's mode of analysis, within this field, decisions will either gravitate towards the regulative pole (market, catering for self-calculated individual interest) or the directive pole (administrative, catering for some

conception of the general interest). However, he does not rule out the feasibility of a successful compromise, whereas followers of Granick (such as R.C. Stuart) tend to argue that one or other 'model' will tend to predominate, the 'winner' so far being the 'fundamental model', analogous to Andrle's 'directive planning'.

Andrle then analyses the relations between state enterprises and the higher organs of state economic planning and management in terms of the directive and regulative principles of control over the economy, but his close adherence to the empirical sources enables him nevertheless to make a series of useful points. The 1965 Enterprise Statute did not provide for the legal enforcement of enterprise rights vis-a-vis the higher organs, a problem which is exacerbated by the difficulty of distinguishing between a law and an administrative directive, which means that complaints against higher authorities' 'unlawful decisions' are rare. Reversal of higher decisions is more likely to be successful on the grounds that they were made on an 'unscientific basis', that is, without due regard to, say, the calculated or reported productive capacity of the enterprise. There is no system of accounting whereby the damage caused to an enterprise by its higher organ can be assessed. Despite the pressures to interfere at enterprise level, it is in the interest of officials of the higher organ that the enterprises under their jurisdiction appear to work well. Relations with superior organs are likely to be better if the industry is high on the priority scale and thus gets scarce supplies, if there is a direct link between the

enterprise and its ministry, if the primary production of the enterprise is central to the brief of the ministry, and if the higher organ has a broad scope and is wealthy. These latter points, of course, all relate to the problems of supply. Despite the importance of Gosstap (which is of the same order of importance as Gosplan), some of the Ministries have managed to organise their own supply offices. External control of the supply of raw materials and instruments of production is of course an important limitation on enterprises, but the partial ministerial control of supplies clearly enhances the Ministries' own autonomy in plan implementation vis-a-vis the central planning agencies such as Gosplan. With regard to financial autonomy of enterprises, Andrle makes the interesting point that the enterprise accountants are often better qualified than the Ministry of Finance inspectors. (This is in sharp contrast to the position in agriculture). The State Bank inspectors are probably more effective, and have a wider range of sanctions, but Andrle makes the same point as Lavigne²⁰ that extreme financial sanctions against enterprises are exceptional. Some powerful enterprises even keep State Bank inspectors off the premises! Finally Andrle makes the important point that "the structural circumstances of directive planning based on imperfect knowledge make mutual trust a scarce and highly valued commodity which can be obtained through the exchange of personal favours extended at personal risks (sic). Thus there emerge cliques whose members use the resources to which they have access through

office for preferential treatment of each other's interests. Woe to the director who does not manage to develop personal bonds across institutional boundaries." Leaving aside criticisms of the use of the concepts of 'directive planning' and 'imperfect knowledge', Andrle is right to stress the importance of informal inter-personal relations, but apart from indicating that these are related to supply difficulties and success indicators, his analysis is of little help in analysing the determinants of the formation of these cliques.

What Andrle does say, as I indicated above, is that factory managers do not have legal autonomy as regards the discharge of their managerial function: this is necessary if they are to be at all responsive to directives and campaigns. Yet managers do enjoy a good measure of factual autonomy because operative management cannot easily be supervised, and because it is recognised by all interested parties that in the last analysis it is the manager's pragmatic initiative that gives some recognisable results to the plans. "Since this autonomy is non-legal, a director has to secure immunity from law enforcement and party crusades, and conditions for continuous success, by striking personal bargains with individual party and ministerial officials. Thus there emerge interlocking cliques whose members flexibly dispose of their respective bureaucratic powers to mutual advantage. It is through these cliques that plans - and political control over the productive process - are administered and modified." Now it is not my intention to deny such that relations are political. On the contrary I would argue that

not only can enterprises constitute arenas of struggle, but that, for example, enterprise - ministry relations can also constitute such arenas, with alliances being sought and formed. However, the problem with Andrle's analysis is that the determinants of such political relations are not really analysed beyond what has already been indicated: with supply problems and pressure from to increase production superiors who cannot supervise in detail, there is scope for informal alliances which may be illegal, particularly when the legal autonomy of the enterprise is restricted. This is reminiscent of the traditional distinction in organisation theory between the formal organisational blueprint and the informal organisation which it generates. Yet usually in such analyses there is an attempt to specify the mechanisms by which the informal organisation is produced in terms of the pressures or exigencies of the formal organisation, leading in this sort of analysis to such features as 'goal displacement' or conflicts between 'bureaucrats' and 'professionals!'. Apart from what has already been indicated, the only such organisational exigencies analysed by Andrle are those within the enterprise, not those between enterprises or between enterprises and other agencies.

The effect of this is to make the formation of alliances to which Andrle refers a matter of the subjective decision of the managers themselves: it is a matter of role playing with the choice as to how to play the role being determined by the 'symbolic environment' and by membership and reference groups, which help

to create their own symbolic environment or subculture and which may not fit in with the official or dominant culture. The four membership or reference groups to which Andrle refers are the narrow occupational group of plant directors, the wider occupational group of economic managers, the specialist intelligentsia and the local power elites. The first two and the fourth are potential membership groups, while the third is a normative reference group, according to Andrle. The determinants of the formation of such groups are either cultural (such as a common educational background) or interactional, in this kind of analysis. These groups are formed as membership groups to the extent that they are self-conscious: consciousness is their main condition of existence. On the basis of the evidence, Andrle concludes that plant directors are a self-conscious group, the broader managerial group may or may not be self-conscious, the specialist intelligentsia has become an important normative reference group (in forming the managerial self-image of a rational professional), and local power elites do indeed exist. The primacy of self-consciousness (partly determined by the 'symbolic environment' which may or may not be reinforced by interpersonal interaction in these groups) is an important point when it comes to appraising Andrle's concept of local power elite. Andrle argues in his 'Conclusion' that the local power elites are "concrete social formations which serve to integrate, and thus transcend, the two incipient structures of (market) class and (planning) officialdom." This purports to be an

improvement on Bauman's argument (derived from Weber, which is why it is so readily compatible with Andrle's own position) that "the Soviet social structure is based on two contradictory though coexistent principles of surplus control - the plan and the market; it therefore consists of two contradictory though coexistent structures - the 'officialdom' which administers the 'construction of communism' and the 'classes' which emerge from the operations of the market." Andrle argues that this theory does not offer any account of how the rival structures of officialdom and market manage to coexist; positing a need - the need for the market by the planners - as the cause of the duality constitutes a functionalist answer to the question. The local power elites are offered by Andrle as the concrete mechanism which integrates and thus transcends the two structures.

Andrle does not seem to realise that this too is a functionalist answer to the question: in his position the regulative and directive principles are not two separate structures but define the range of variation of the elements of the actual planning structure. Since they are not readily compatible, these elements need to be reconciled somehow (as already mentioned he does not rule out the feasibility of a successful compromise), and this need is met by the local power elite, which is a self-conscious group that reconciles the two kinds of elements, thereby enabling the system to continue functioning. This is the classical form of functionalist analysis: a structural need calls forth an integrating structure which meets

that need, presumably by operating through the 'symbolic environment' on the consciousness of the actors in the system. One can only comment that Parsons constructed this kind of argument in a much more explicit and rigorous manner. Despite the occasional reference to Parsons, Andrie's analysis is noticeably lacking in any detailed specification of the consciousness of the local power elites, nor does he specify the structural determinants which give them (as opposed to some other agency) their apparently pivotal role in sustaining enterprise autonomy while integrating it with directive planning. Consequently one is forced to turn elsewhere for an analysis of the relations between enterprises and other economic units.

However, before doing so, it is worth mentioning that Andrie's analysis of relations within the enterprise is much more adequate in terms of its specification of the determinants of the kinds of struggles which take place there. While the principle of one-man management was reaffirmed in the September 1965 Enterprise Statute, there are a number of well-known formal and informal limitations on the capacities of enterprise directors. These limitations stem in various ways from the Party, the Trade Unions, labour legislation and the rank and file workforce. The Party attempts to retain political control over production by various means: mobilisation of the masses; and supervision by higher party organs, both of which tend to be formalistic and inadequate; Party Commissions and Commissions of People's Control, both of which make it hard for the rank and file to criticise superiors in ways which are not called for. However, there is effective Party control of recruitment and selection of managers, but in-service training seems to be very ineffective - indeed in municipal, light and food processing industries, managers seem to get by with no effort to raise their qualifications, which seems to be (at least nominally) a worse situation than in agriculture, where at least token attempts are made, as described by R.C. Stuart. The main form of Party control of enterprises is through the co-ordination of and arbitration between managerial interests: in re-allocating resources in ways not envisaged in the plans, and in arbitrating between managers, the Party retains some control over production. This political reconciliation of the disparate planned objectives is clearly important, but in my view precisely because it is not clear how or to what end these objectives should be reconciled, and because local

Party officials are judged by their ability to help enterprises meet their plan, even this form of Party "supervision" of enterprise directors is limited in its effects. Andrle reports that the secretaries of enterprise Party organisations rarely fall out with the directors, even when the latter are criticised from above. Similarly, there are generally good relations between directors and the secretaries of regional and district Parties.

The trade unions are in some respects quite a good defensive organisation (from the viewpoint of the manual workforce), although they can be lax on safety and legal standards, and they tend to take a softer line in the bigger enterprises. However, more than half the cases referred to the Commissions for Labour Disputes are won by workers. Similarly the labour legislation provides a reasonable defensive support, but that is not the same thing as participation in management. Only a few sacked employees seek redress in court when dismissed (but this could well be because they are genuinely in breach of factory discipline, which is poor). Of these who do go to court, more than half are reinstated. Of the 'agencies of mass participation', the Production Conferences, whose acts are judicial or quasi-judicial, do limit the directors' autonomy to some extent, but the Production-Technical Councils do not constitute a serious limit on one-man management. The poor discipline, poor motivation and high labour turnover are serious limits on the capacities of directors and can only be effectively countered by official and unofficial incentive schemes, for example, when management takes over the basically trade union function of allocating flats. There is little that is surprising in this picture painted by Andrle, but it is the kind of evidence which must be borne in mind in the analysis

of relations between economic agents.

Production Associations and Ministries

In a 'Post-script' written in November 1975 Andrie briefly describes the changes in industrial organisation which took place starting at the beginning of 1973. Since there are further comments on these changes in Nove (1977) and Lavigne (1979), I propose to use these works as well. The original intention, as described by Andrie, was to set up a system in which the basic production unit would no longer be the industrial enterprise, but the 'production association' or 'union' (proizvodstvennoe ob'yedineniye) or 'combine' (kombinat). This was to consist of a number of factories plus a research and development institute or similar functional organisation. The 'centre' or 'top' of each state-management hierarchy was to be the sectoral ministry, as before, but with the departments (glavki) abolished. The higher organ of the production association or union was to be an 'industrial association' or the ministry itself. The industrial associations were to work on a khozraschet basis but with strict centralised discipline in price formation. Thus, despite the organisational diversity to which Nove draws attention in his later analysis of these associations or unions, it was possible for Nove to divide them into production associations, and administrative associations. Nove pointed out that this new system could alter 'the distribution of economic power' between ministerial departments, managers and party officials and that the reform was being obstructed, delayed and resisted, so that the old system might survive. Although the transition to the new system was supposed to be completed by the end of 1975, according to Andrie, Nove pointed out that little had changed by February 1976 when associations of all types produced less than one quarter of total industrial output.

Among the various reasons given for the attempted introduction of this system (for example, administrative economies, economies of scale, shortening the hierarchical chain, and facilitating technical progress) one is particularly striking to me: to wipe out the small enterprise. It seems that 'gigantomania' is not yet dead, and the benefits of small units in an economy with a changing technical division of labour and division of social production are not appreciated.

This partial reform (which was only partially implemented) occurred in the context of 1965 Reform and its implementation. As is well known, the 1965 Reform attempted among other things to tackle the 'success indicator' problem, a problem which could be characterised as an effect of the disparity between planning on the basis of aggregated information and implementation on the basis of disaggregated information. The aggregated planning information is discursively distinct from the information necessary to operate an enterprise (or other sub-unit) of the agencies of plan implementation (the Ministries). Crudely, the disparity could be overcome by (a) laying down only a few targets whose pertinence to the operation of the sub-units is problematic but which allow substantial autonomy to the enterprises in calculating how to meet those targets (a procedure which may lead to the serious 'subversion' or failure of the overall economic plan) or (b) laying down a whole series of detailed targets or norms which ensure greater subordination of enterprises to the Ministries (a procedure which, since the detailed norms are likely to be mutually inconsistent and ambiguously related to the overall plan, usually leads to 'subversion' or failure by a different route). The danger is that if the first option is taken,

enterprises may meet targets in a way which ignores or even endangers other objectives of the overall plan which are not specified in the targets laid down, whereas if the second option is taken, the enterprises lose the very decision making capacity necessary to flexibly operate the plant under changing conditions, so that some targets are met at the expense of what might for the time being be more important targets in the priorities of the overall plan. The 1965 Reform attempted to resolve the problem of the most appropriate form of success indicators by reducing the number of compulsory indicators. Basically, these were to be: output sold, total profits, profitability, contributions to and receipts from the state budget, the size of wages fund, norms establishing the size of centralised investment and the introduction of new productive capacity, the fulfilment of basic tasks for the introduction of new techniques and supply of raw materials and equipment.²¹ However, the Reform also attempted to retain Ministerial control of the enterprises, despite the increase in enterprise autonomy apparently implied in the reduction of the number of success indicators.

The result of the reform was that the Ministries effectively won the struggle to retain a substantial degree of control over the enterprises. Lavigne (1979) traces the development of the reform between 1966 and 1970 in terms of four headings: (a) a contradiction between law and fact (b) a contradiction between conservatism and the reform spirit (c) a contradiction between freedom of enterprise management and the maintenance of regulation (d) the paralysis of the incentive system. Without recounting the details of her discussion here, it is worth noting some of the points which she makes under the headings: (a) Ministries illegally changed the plan during the year, and imposed extra indicators

(especially the supposedly discarded index of gross output), but there was nowhere to arbitrate disputes between enterprises and Ministries. The State Bank and Investment Bank also behaved illegally, for example, the former did not always release socio-cultural funds. (b) Enterprises which in the spirit of the reform proposed taut plans and mobilised reserves discovered after the first year that they were effectively being penalised for it. All enterprises were subjected to almost daily Ministerial interference in various ways (c) Ministerial regulation of enterprises reproduced the same old problems: for example, metallurgical factories delivered goods which did not conform to specifications, so making the appropriate metal inputs in the factory took up half the workers in mechanical construction! (d) Ministries took most of the profits, around 60-70 per cent. Workers received bonuses anyway, of around 8-10 per cent. Enterprise funds varied annually in a way which did not correspond to the efforts or results of enterprises. The 'material stimulants' (economic incentives) worked in such a way as to lead to pressure to increase expenditure on wages, but the bonuses themselves could not be spent in any very useful way, because of the way in which consumption is planned, so they were not a great incentive. Ministries controlled enterprise finances for investment and enterprise socio-cultural funds, which were used for such purposes as building recreational facilities.

The partial reform of 1973-1975 must consequently be analysed in the context of this re-establishment of Ministerial capacity to regulate enterprise activities despite the 1965 enterprise reform. From 1970 the extra success indicators which had been imposed began to be imposed officially. The development of the 'production associations' and the so-called 'industrial associations' (that is, administrative associations

within Ministries) must be seen as yet another attempt to enhance enterprise autonomy in relation to the Ministries, and the gathering of enterprises into associations was certainly opposed by the Ministries, doubtless with the collusion of some of the enterprises protected by them. The enterprises were not supposed to be subordinated to their associations as they otherwise were to their Ministries. Rather there was supposed to be a division of labour, with the association centralising certain communal services while the enterprises had room for manoeuvre in daily management. However, with the development of a variety of forms of association, the industrial associations remained an administrative relay, federating juridically autonomous enterprises, while the production associations ran their component establishments in a variety of ways, even within the same Ministry, sometimes interfering in the plans of constituent enterprises. The net result, according to Lavigne, was that there was less enterprise autonomy in 1977 than in 1965, despite the partial industrial restructuring from 1973 to 1975.

This raises the issue of why the Ministries struggle to retain control of the enterprises, and the means by which they regularly succeed. In analysing this issue it may be possible to show what the determinants are of the informal connections mentioned by Nove and emphasised (at local level) by Andrle. Nove analyses the Ministerial system of plan implementation in terms of 'centralised pluralism', by which he means that the central decision-making of the planning agencies such as Gosplan, Gossnab and Gosstroï is modified by the disparate decisions taken by the Ministries, even though the latter are operating within state plans which

they must enforce on their subordinates. Nove argues (1977, page 63): "In practice the sheer volume of work and of decisions in Gosplan places very considerable powers in the hands of the ministries. They are more likely than the planning agencies to have information about the existing situation and future possibilities. Their proposals, and their reaction to proposals made by 'their' enterprises, affect the plans and instructions which they receive. Those with experience of these matters speak of a constant tug-of-war between the ministries and Gosplan". While this indicates that the Ministries are not simply passive instruments of plan implementation (a feature which would only surprise adherents of a rationalist conception of planning²²), Nove's concept of 'centralised pluralism' is couched in terms of empire-building by Ministerial interest groups. However familiar this may appear as a 'motive' for certain kinds of action in large-scale organisations, Soviet Ministerial struggles with the planning agencies, with other Ministries and with 'their own' enterprises still need to be explained. The much-cited supply problem is certainly part of that explanation, but it is generally agreed that problems over supplies are also an effect of these struggles. Why have attempts to modify Ministerial control over enterprises failed?

One answer to this problem, considered by W. Andreff²³, is that the Ministries (and secondarily, production associations) are 'autonomous centres of appropriation', that is, effectively private properties in the sense used by Bettelheim.²⁴ Ministries in this kind of argument would be like monopoly capitalist properties with subordinate production enterprises. However, Andreff points out that such an argument, to be sustainable, would entail the

relegation of the central state agencies to the role of supporting the decentralised accumulation of capital, by collecting savings which were re-distributed to the monopolies, in a manner analogous to the role of the state in certain analyses of 'state monopoly capitalism'. Such an analogy would appear to be supported by the de-specialisation of Ministries, which do not restrict themselves to a single branch of industry, but appear to have moved into the production of more 'profitable' and highly demanded goods, such as consumer durables. However, Andreef rejects such an analysis, even for Western economies, on the grounds that (a) it assimilates capitalist relations of production to property and distribution relations, which leads to the lack of an analysis of the foundations of the relations of production, wage-labour (b) there is no demonstration that production, including monopolist production, is production of surplus value (c) consequently, an ambiguous status is given to profit, which is not treated as transformed surplus-value, and hence there is no study of that transformation. Even if one does not accept the labour theory of value, one must agree with Andreef that the capitalist nature of this 'monopolism' is simply presumed or postulated in such an argument, due to an inadequate theorisation of capitalist relations. In addition to Andreef's criticisms, one could add that it would be difficult in such a conception of Ministries as independent capitalist properties to explain their resistance to the development of production associations, since their development would simply be an indication of the concentration of capital: in the usual Marxist conceptions of capitalism, this would be quite compatible with the centralisation of capital in monopolistic properties controlling a series of large-scale production units.

Clearly the resistance of the Ministries to production associations and administrative associations is related to the latter's potential as an organisational mechanism for an alternative mode of intervention in plan implementation by the central planning agencies. The development of such organisational alternatives by the central planning agencies would reduce their dependence on the Ministries for accounting information on past performance and would provide a certain flexibility in plan implementation, since it would be possible for certain purposes for the central planning agencies to by-pass the Ministries in laying down targets or norms, and enterprise autonomy from the Ministries would be enhanced to a certain extent. Precisely because the Ministries are not capitalist properties able to control a 'de-centralised' series of production units by means of financial accounting procedures, Ministerial control of 'their' enterprises must take the form of administrative regulation by setting detailed targets and norms. If such control is lost or reduced, Ministries would be in the position of being nominally responsible for the performance of a particular sector of the economy while losing some of the armoury of weapons which are used to secure 'adequate' performance of that sector: crudely, they would have responsibility without power. This approach to the reaction of Ministries to attempts to provide alternative or supplementary modes of intervention in the economy implies that it is precisely because they are effectively subordinated to the central planning agencies in certain respects that they evade or resist attempts at control or at by-passing of their functioning in other respects. It is the fact that they are effectively responsible for the performance of a certain sector in an uncertain supply situation that accounts

for the 'interference' in enterprise management, and for the Ministerial hoarding of supplies, while it is the combination of taut planning with inevitably inadequate indices of plan fulfilment which helps create the uncertain supply situation. To investigate this issue further, it is necessary to examine firstly the organisation of material-technical supply and secondly the forms of regulation of plan implementation.

Material Technical Supply

The problems of organising adequate supplies for production have in a sense increased as the most basic shortages have been overcome and the economy has diversified. Since 1965, the bulk of the supply of intermediate goods has been organised by Gosplan, the State Committee on Material Technical Supplies. Its decisions on the distribution of production goods are based on calculations by the 'material balance' method, 'a form of double entry table specifying needs and resources for items of output. The functioning of Gosplan itself exacerbates the supply problems related to taut planning (that is, planning based on full use of known production capacity). This is, according to Lavigne (1979), because it functions ponderously (with poor co-ordination between its various sub-agencies) and because of the incoherence and lack of precision in its supply plans (related to the difficulties of measuring 'adequate' plan fulfillment). Lavigne argues (1979, page 143) that the ponderous nature of the Gosplan system is related to the superimposition of two processes: the planning of supply and the concrete distribution of goods among users. However, it is not clear to me how the system would be improved by separating planning of supply from actual distribution. The two processes would still have to be co-ordinated, and it is not clear how introducing yet another institutional boundary would improve that co-ordination. Rather it might

be argued that improved co-ordination and speed of implementation of supply plans within Gosplan would ease supply problems. Yet perhaps it is the current lack of co-ordination to which Lavigne is referring, since she points out that at the moment actual distribution is in the hands of over 200 juridical persons (such as Ministries, Federal Republics, the State Bank) which are the 'principal arrangers of supplies'. The incoherence is accentuated by this admixture of Ministries in the process of distribution: although they are only supposed to collect information on supply needs, aggregate it and present it to the central planning agencies (and later provide enterprises with papers authorising supply purchases), certain Ministries have preserved their own supply services, while others specialise in supplying particular products. The lack of precision was increased by the 1965 reform which reduced the number of products covered by Gosplan's material balances from 18,000 to around 2,000 (of which 277 have to be approved by the Council of Ministers). These features of the supply system - slowness, incoherence and lack of precision (in the specification of what is to be supplied) - generate a 'seller's market' where supplies are the main condition of a sub-agency (such as a Ministry or enterprise) fulfilling the plan. The failures of the supply system in a planning system which prioritises physical production determine both the scope and the need for inter-enterprise arrangements, and for other forms of politicking to secure supplies. These then are the conditions for Andre's 'local power elites' and for Ministerial resistance to alternative modes of intervention in the economy, but these conditions can only be fully understood in terms of the forms of regulation of plan implementation which ensure that the priorities established by the central planning agencies and the upper

levels of the Party are indeed effective to some extent.

The Regulation of Plan Implementation

The problems of central regulation of plan implementation are raised in Tartarin (1980).²⁵ Tartarin is responsible for the final version of what is in many ways a group effort,²⁶ and the paper represents an attempt to escape from the formal oppositions and abstract dichotomies which characterise much work on the Soviet Union. For example, the oppositions between rationality and irrationality, plan and market, centralisation and decentralisation,²⁷ official economy and parallel economy are common. It also attempts to avoid overall structural characterisations such as command economy, state capitalism or bureaucratic socialism, and concentrates instead on organisational forms and their mode of functioning, in a way which attempts to break with the idea of a unity or homogenous totality which many earlier analyses have retained. This seems to me to be an entirely laudable project, and a particularly promising one since the approach to the regulation of the economy is in terms of the modalities of measuring results without denying structural constraints delimiting individual behaviours (or, as I would prefer to put it, determining the capacities of action of agents).

The regulation of the economy is conducted by the setting of norms for sub-agents within a sphere of supervisory competence of an agent. These norms (using the term in a broad sense) are of a variety of kinds: ratios, norms (normativity), standards, assortments, indices, scales, legal rules, instructions, organisational models to be followed, and so on. They relate to diverse domains, yet there is a strong unity between statistics, planning indices and accounting data, a unity which is ensured by their

subordination to planning objectives. There are various organisational means of ensuring this unity, but the effect of the unity is that accounting norms are the means of controlling the execution of the plan. Relations between agents consist of the exchange of orders or information relating to the norms. The reconciliation of conflicts is achieved by the modification of norms. Reforms consist in the suppression of some norms and their replacement by others which are thought to lead to better behaviour by decentralised units (or, as I prefer to call them, sub-agents or sub-units). If an economy defines its functioning by a system of norms, this is not just a matter of relations between particular levels of the administrative hierarchy, nor of optimal calculation. The increase in the number of norms in 1979 was not just about economic calculation, but about control. There are often too many norms for them all to be usable by a higher level for calculating purposes.

Tartarin introduces the concept of 'accounting value' (valeur comptable) to refer to the abstract properties of the rules, and statistical and accounting practices, in so far as they serve as a basis for the functioning of Soviet type socialist economies. Norms establish external control over hierarchically organised units. In this sense, it is not like use-value or exchange-value, because of the subordination of units, the nature of the signals transmitted (norms and reports of their execution), and the unified direction which is supposed to define choices between production and consumption. There is a hierarchisation of units of decision-making and a 'normalisation' of orders and controls. ('Control' is used here in the sense of supervision or inspection). What is produced is not commodities but items on a list. This requires

a classificatory system, a system of accounting and recording. Accounting values vary according to the characteristics and quantities of articles, but also according to the system of accounting and recording. (This statement implies a distinction between the real and the conceptual, a point to which I shall return). The attribution of accounting values to items is by no means an automatic process. Calculation does not proceed by means of a universal equivalent, as in exchange value, or by direct reference to needs, as in use-value. Despite the impossibility of aggregating the norms into a unique significatory index, the norms are supposed to be the same at each hierarchical level and to be integrated between the levels of the hierarchy. The concepts of use-value and exchange value are established in Tartarin's paper by reference to the concepts of a domestic economy and a market economy, respectively, a point to which I shall return. The relations between agents in these economies are supposedly unitary in a domestic economy (the user is the producer) or binary in a market economy (enterprises as producers are distinct from consumers). In a socialist economy, they are ternary, with the Centre, enterprises and users being differentiated as agents. All administrative levels are 'provisionally' considered as merged with their summit, so the 'Centre' refers to administrative as opposed to productive or distribution agents.

The relations between these agents are assymetric, with the Centre in a dominant position. The relation between enterprise and user is never direct, unless the Centre itself is the user: enterprise-user relations are mediated by Centre-enterprise relations. For the enterprises, norms are constraints which delimit the possible behaviour, since they

must produce accounting values corresponding to the imposed norms. So a part of total production is only produced as the real condition of producing accounting values. For the Centre, norms are objectives which must be respected by enterprises. However, these objectives concern both the results and the means of achieving them, so often accounting values are parameters. They are also to some degree use-values for the Centre (for example, military production), while other norms are only a result of a choice by the Centre (for example, fixed payments into certain funds).

Norms are 'hierarchised' according to the priorities of the Centre: those which are use-values for the Centre have an essential role, and quality is easier to monitor by the Centre if the Centre is the consumer. There is no means for the judgement of the pertinence of norms, unless the Centre is the consumer. The influence of final consumers at best affects the fulfilment of planned indices of distribution enterprises, but this implies no effect on the producers unless the Centre decides to revise both the indices of distribution and those of production.²⁸ The Centre, in establishing norms, determines the demand of the population, which is paternalist and imprecise. Paternalist, because it depends on the sensitivity of the Centre to the well-being of the population, or on the importance of this well-being for the Centre's own objectives. Imprecise, because these norms are of lower priority than the Centre's own objectives, and because numerous characteristics of consumption articles are not registered by the norms. This leads to a seller's market, to disequilibria and so on. The commodity distribution of consumption goods is 'beside the point' in a system of management by norms of production. The system of accounting value requires the 'normalisation' of consumption to ensure

the coherence of the relation between production and consumption. The reserved shops, the privileges related to function, the access to goods on the basis of place of work, features which are often considered as accessory or contingent traits of distribution, mark in reality the permanence of accounting forms of rationing, if not their pre-eminence over commodity forms, in Tartarin's view. Significantly, the socially differentiated criteria of rationing have more importance in the formation of the revenues of individuals if the latter are closer to the Centre and to political power. Use-values for the Centre comprise both state consumption and the private consumption of members of the apparatus.

Apart from the satisfaction of the use-values of the Centre, results are measured by norms (on paper). The conformity with norms is not absolute; it depends on the quality of inspections used by the supervisory agents (organes de tutelle). These inspections are rare, superficial and conducted by services of little competence whose interests are not independent of the 'decentralised units' and whose sanctions are excessively weak. There is a large margin of interpretation of norm fulfilment even without fortuitous error and deliberate fraud. This process of inspection occurs at each level of the hierarchy for information going 'up' and 'down'. So in addition to accounting in terms of planned tasks by an accounting chief, there is economic accounting for internal goals by an economic chief. But the latter is effectively a palliative since the accounting validation of task performance leads to a formal execution of tasks, a form which admits of a certain play in relation to reality. The outcome of attempts to overcome this play is a perpetual oscillation between a paralysing overcentralisation for both

the controlled and the controller, and a reduction on controls destined to give enough room for manoeuvre for the controlled and an effective focus for the controller on the really high priority objectives. The cyclical movement is an effect of the universal character of any modification which leads to a different bias, to different organisational costs and so on. It is not just an effect of the limits of language: the interdependence of higher and lower levels leads to negotiations and informal conflicts over the fixing of tasks and their evaluation and over the reciprocal rules which superiors and subordinates should respect. This leads to informal solutions such as mutual exoneration.²⁹

Autonomy also occurs when norms which are interdependent in ways unknown to the Centre are fixed in a mutually contradictory fashion, imposing partially unrealisable results. (It is at this point that a manager might claim, as Andrle indicates, that a plan is 'unscientific'). The more the network of norms attempts to be comprehensive, the more the superiors must tolerate (partial and local) violations. Periodic reforms of indices clarify and reaffirm the fundamental criteria of the actions of decentralised units. Contrary to some arguments, the enterprise is not the real foundation of the plan which is imposed upon it; rather the norms 'concretise' a relation of subordination. (Nove, 1977, also mentions the argument that 'orders are made by those who receive them' because he considers there is a grain of truth in it). The norms are the result of negotiations by the forces present, but they are a process of adjustment of superior and inferior agents. In the last resort they are imposed by the Centre, but this does not signify that the Centre decides in a completely independent way, or that the Centre disposes of the organisational and informational

capacities to fix the levels as a consequence of choosing the best variant in relation to clearly enunciated objectives. The norms coming from above coexist with 'metanorms' which are a redefinition of the injunctions as an effect of practical necessities. In their turn, these 'metanorms' directly influence the information transmitted by the decentralised units and the conflicts between levels aim particularly at reducing the gaps between the norms, imposed externally, and the 'metanorms', which are historical products of the 'endogenisation' of past norms.

These leads to a circular causality in which the norms lead to an artificial reality created to satisfy the fulfilment of norms: it has a conservative effect because the sole guarantee of the coherence of norms is past reality. This is the essential justification for planning from the level achieved. On the other hand, it also explains the downward revision of plans on the basis of actual performance, as a way of obtaining 100 per cent plan fulfilment.³⁰ The formal and informal aspects of 'accounting value' are thus intrinsically related. There is not a 'second' economy, but a series of economic activities at each level between which (activities) the law traces the limit of the legal and the illegal, the permitted and the forbidden. But for various reasons, the disjunction between these aspects cannot be retained because of the ideology of accounting value where the real is retraced as a series of gaps in relation to the norms. The legality to be set in motion is incoherent and practically inapplicable. Almost all economic activity necessarily entails an infraction, so the execution of orders can only be illegal. This is scarcely surprising: incoherence and lack of precision mean that legality gives way to

arbitrariness, or rather to the sovereignty of the superior level which goes with all administrative subordination. Since each level is not a passive agent in the hands of the superior level, objectives are pursued which are added on to the goals whose execution the system of norms is supposed to ensure. The importance of these individual objectives is all the greater since the organisation considers itself impersonal and only the Centre is supposed to know which objectives need to be sought.

At each level, not just the Centre, use-values are pursued. The possibility of this is due to (a) the existence of particular preferences among the agents concerned (b) the impossibility of the superior level to control all their actions (c) the eventual incoherence of the norms imposed. (d) the disposition of means of action permitting not only the execution of norms but other uses. Concerning the last point, it is clear that the étatisation of the means of production which is a condition of existence of the system of value accounting does not establish a social property or a unique collective property, but rather a series of enclosed 'privative' powers which are divided according to the variable modalities of use, 'fruitfulness' and abuse. That the superior level can impose its conceptions if it wishes to does not exclude the fact that the lower level also disposes of a large autonomy from the moment when it is in possession of particular assets. So each agent arbitrates permanently between the ensemble of possibilities of action open to it, taking account of the use-values which it searches for, the system of norms to which it is subjected, and the means (material or otherwise) which have been delegated to it. The real functioning of the system of accounting value is thus defined by the interaction of real decisions of agents

and not by the production of accounting values which define only what has value for the Centre.³¹ The system produces specific effects of opacity in so far as it permits the Centre to dissimulate its own use-values, (yet) not to discount either 'negative' phenomena or the real activities of agents according to dimensions which are essential for them (the agents).

This gap between reality and 'normativity' is not constant. If the Centre tries to reduce it, the adaptive behaviours of all levels, taking account of the relative stability of the system of norms, tend to augment it. When a new system of norms is set up, it takes a certain time for agents to discover all the potentialities of autonomy which it conceals. It also requires a certain time for the necessary compromises to be reached with superior levels, to regulate litigious interpretations, and to establish the exact significance of diverse measures. The efficiency of a new system relates less to its specific content and more to its novelty in so far as it authorises a readjustment and clarification of all the controls, benefits which disappear little by little in the long term. In so far as deviations are recorded at the Centre, ad hoc norms are introduced. This 'rampant centralisation' is accompanied by a progressive jumbling of commands which presses little by little towards a new general reform.

The specific character of crises in Soviet type economies is thus related to accounting value. With exchange-value, there is a crisis of overproduction. With accounting value, there is an a priori valorisation of 'normed' tasks, and workers are paid for a rate of success of over 100 per cent. Products do not exchange against products or money, but at best (with a coherent outcome) the rates of realisation of

norms condition each other, the reciprocal accomplishment of tasks being the condition of realisation of the plan. But it is a formal accomplishment, even though the neglected characteristics are essential for the fulfilment of tasks by other units. If the latter have enough autonomy, they can still present satisfactory indices of success. There is a systematic over-valuing of real results in the reported and compiled numbers. This is evident in the a priori valorisation of all results exceeding the imposed norms, in the tendency (if norms are not fulfilled) to redefine the expected result starting from the achieved result, and in the independence of the calculation of the rates of realisation of norms from the final effect (final consumption).

At the limit a decline in production may not be translated into a decline in indices. Is it possible to say a crisis does not exist? No, but in the forms adequate to accounting value, the crisis dissimulated by the stability of the indices develops slowly as a progressive paralysis. Units have greater and greater difficulty in getting the real means necessary to their functioning. When the indices do register a halt in growth and then a reduction, the Centre only reacts when the physical indices decline and the use-values of the Centre are directly threatened. But the crisis concerns all levels of the hierarchy in the same way. However, from the viewpoint of the Centre the crisis is probably worse than the accounting data let it suppose. For the rest of society, the greater the possibilities of substitution between activities entering into accounting value and those not entering, the more the effects of the crisis can be limited.³² In attempting to resolve the crisis once it is revealed by the accounting values despite the specific dissimulation which they engender, the Centre has the choice of abandoning or reinforcing the

rules which constitute the system. Solutions are conceived of either as a partial or total abandoning of the system of norms or as a profound reorganisation of the system (to reinforce their effectiveness).

The decree of July 1979 is an example of the latter kind of solution - a return to directive methods, reinforcing massively the control of execution, in seeking to eliminate the reducible incoherences. It shows that the way followed by the authorities, despite its intrinsic faults, is that of the amelioration of the system of norms in a way which increases the ability to foresee the results and increases the conformity of the results (with the plans). It confirms, just in the crisis, the importance of this system with respect to the fundamental structure of Soviet type economies.

Leaving aside an appraisal of the 1979 reform for the moment, there are several comments which I should like to make on this interesting paper by Tartarin. It is not clear to me why the terminology of 'accounting value' is used to analyse these relations. It seems to be so that a type of economy can be treated as a system based on a particular principle which organises economic relations within the system: a domestic economy is a system based on use-value, a market economy is based on exchange value and a Soviet type planned economy is based on accounting value. A comparative table of the features of these systems is presented in the paper, presumably dealing with what are thought to be the most salient features of economic systems. Does this mean that all economies have to be conceived in terms of the predominance or fundamental role played by a particular kind of value? Earlier in this chapter I have argued against conceiving of structures in terms of principles which are thought to organise them, but even if one accepted such an

essentialist conception of value, what is distinct about accounting value? This may seem a strange question after a lengthy exposition of a paper devoted to answering precisely that question, but consider the two other concepts of value, which are clearly derived from Marxist discourse. Exchange value refers to a common substance which is the precondition of exchange and whose presence in the commodities enables the ratio in which they exchange to be calculated: abstract labour, measured in terms of socially necessary labour-time. Use-value refers to the known physical properties of a product (or the physical nature of a service) and to the demand or need for it. Use-values exist (for Marx) where there is no commodity exchange, but they also exist where there is commodity exchange: without a use-value, a product has no value. According to Tartarin, they also exist where there is accounting value, but what is the difference between use-value and accounting value? In both cases there is conceptualisation of the physical properties of the product (or service) and a calculation of the need or demand for it. The means of calculation of need or demand of course vary - for example, they differ between non-commodity and commodity production, according to most Marxist analyses. For Tartarin, use-values are calculated in kind, and exchange-values are calculated in terms of money, the universal equivalent. But of course consumers and enterprises in capitalist societies calculate needs or wants, even if they do so partly in monetary terms, and the calculation of these needs or wants depends on how they are conceptualised. For example, capitalist enterprises for Marx will calculate the use-value of means of production in terms of their effect on the rate of profit. The conceptualisation of needs or wants varies even between 'pre-capitalist' non-monetary economies, and the problem of how to analyse the different forms of calculating needs or

wants in different 'pre-capitalist' economies is not helped much by saying that the calculation is in kind (en nature). Ecological or kinship considerations, for example, can be 'in kind' in the sense that they enter into non-monetary economic calculations, but these considerations can be conceptualised in radically diverse ways. The calculation of needs is determined by the means of calculation socially available and by the organisational exigencies of production and consumption (intermediate and final).

Tartarin's concept of 'domestic economy', like many conceptions of the 'natural economy', avoids the problem of the potential varieties of ways of calculating needs or wants, by treating this form of calculation as a natural quality or attribute of the single agent in the fictional 'domestic economy': an agent who can calculate the relation of production to consumption because they are both co-present in the household, and can be directly experienced. The concept of use-value for Tartarin refers to the experienced needs or wants of individuals. Tartarin ignores the treatment by Marx of the calculation of use-values in a market-economy (for example, the use-value of the commodity labour-power to the capitalist), and deals with them in a Soviet type economy in terms of individuals calculating in kind, although the relation between production and consumption is not directly experienced by them. The individuals experience these needs or wants without being able to relate them to production or the plan, and simply use resources for the satisfaction of these needs where the range of autonomy available to them allows scope for such non-planned uses. The only exception to this treatment of use-values is the discussion of use-values such as military equipment for the Centre. Here the Centre is

treated as a supra-individual economic agent able to calculate its own needs.

However, the Centre is for the most part treated as a series of individual agents engaged in administration who informally pursue their own needs or wants. In the latter case it is possible to retain the concept of use-value as defined in terms of directly experienced needs, but it is not possible to retain such a concept where a supra-individual agent is concerned (unless one is going to posit something akin to a group mind). The ambiguity in the use of the term 'Centre' (both a series of individuals not engaged in production or distribution and the summit of the administrative hierarchy) prevents this difficulty with the treatment of the concept of use-value from becoming too readily apparent. However, the Centre in the second sense, the summit which regulates the relation between production and consumption and which has a use for military equipment, can only calculate its needs in terms of norms. 'Accounting value' is the means by which a particular kind of agent (or series of supra-individual agents at the Centre) calculates its own needs and the needs of the overall economy.

To say that this differs from the use-values of individuals is only to say that different agents have different means and criteria of calculating use-values. If the concept of use-value is to be retained (as opposed to some other theoretical approach to the conceptualisation of needs and wants, such as marginal utility) then the idea that use-value is related to 'direct experience' must be questioned. One could do so, as already indicated, by pointing to the variability of non-monetary forms of calculating need, or by pointing to the use of monetary categories in calculating intermediate consumption by capitalist enterprises.

Alternatively, one could question the epistemological character of the notion of 'direct experience', but this line of criticism will not be pursued here. If such criticisms are accepted, then the distinction between 'accounting value' and 'use-value' is impossible to sustain, because any calculation of needs involves the use of concepts, and in an economy with an advanced division of labour giving rise to both human and non-human agents (loci of decision-making and loci of means of action), the calculation of needs will not be conducted by a single means. A variety of forms of discourse will necessarily be used by different agents, and discursive forms of regulation and co-ordination of the activities of these diverse agents need not be identical to the forms of discourse used for internal purposes within such agents.³³ Nor can there be a single form of regulation of the various agents, precisely because of the varying relations of the agents to the overall plan. The same agent will simultaneously have a variety of relations to the objectives of the plan, even if these objectives are consistent with each other. Much of the value of Tartarin's paper consists in its drawing attention, not to the problems of 'accounting value', but to problems of regulating the economy in any conceivable form of socialist planning. The discursive incommensurability between, on the one hand, the means by which agents calculate their own objectives and regulate their own practices more or less according to these objectives and, on the other hand, the means by which various relations between agents are handled is a disjunction which is endemic in any advanced (and changing) division of labour, whether capitalist or socialist.

Economic Calculation and Central Planning

Whereas the rationalist conception of planning implies a single means of calculation, for example in terms of 'time' in many conceptions of socialism, the position just outlined by way of a critique of Tartarin's concept of use-value implies a variety of means of calculation, each with its own conditions and effects. The calculation of needs or wants (or, if this terminology is preferred, of socially useful effects) must take account of the needs of the agencies which implement the planned objectives, that is, various administrative exigencies and exigencies of production and distribution (including intermediate or 'productive' consumption). Even within, say, a productive enterprise, these needs are not directly experienced, so it is impossible to counterpose the 'real' characteristics of production against their measurement in terms of norms or indices. The 'real' characteristics of a mechanical spare part are defined in terms of engineering discourse which specifies those characteristics by means of concepts and measurements within certain ranges of tolerance. The latter are no less parameters than the parameters of performance specified for a productive enterprise by another agency. It is for this reason that discursive disjunctions rather than a real/conceptual disjunction has been stressed at various points in this chapter.

The collapse of the real/conceptual distinction (which is related to the conceptualisation of use-value in terms of experience) may appear to undermine much of the force of Tartarin's critique of the use of norms in Soviet type economies. However, problems such as the non-registration of salient characteristics of products by the centrally determined norms, or the development of 'metanorms' (which do not provide means of adjudication between norms in Tartarin's analysis, but are the results of the redefinition of the norms

in terms of 'practical necessities') can be explained in terms of the different discourses operative in the various arenas of plan construction and implementation. The decision that certain characteristics not registered by the norms are salient, or that certain 'practical necessities' must be taken into account, can only be made in terms of an alternative mode of calculating. Such alternative calculations could either be made by agencies other than the ones which established the official norm, or they could in principle be made by the same agencies. The official deployment of alternative modes of calculation would certainly make possible a greater disjunction between monitoring and regulating the performance of the economy on the one hand and the provision of economic incentives to sub-agents on the other hand, which could ease the 'success indicator' problem as analysed by Nove, Lavigne or Tartarin. It would certainly make it easier to estimate the extent to which the 'official' regulating measures were effective. For example, to take Tartarin's analysis of economic crisis in such economies as a form of creeping paralysis which takes time to register on official norms because of practices designed to conceal non-fulfilment or 'formal' fulfilment of the plan, such a crisis could in principle be registered earlier by other means of measuring performance. This is not a case of the real imposing itself on the theoretical, but of the deployment of means of calculating the effectiveness of measures to regulate the implementation of economic plans. A good example of this can be found in Seurot (1980).³⁴ Seurot shows that by using an alternative measure of productivity (a measure, as he is aware, with problems of its own) rather than the official index of productivity, a much lower rate of growth of productivity is registered, and for the 1970s it is lower than the rate of growth of average monthly wages. The divergence is particularly

acute in the years 1978 and 1979, at the end of the five year plan period, which is when most of the five year plan is usually fulfilled. The official index shows productivity rising faster than wages for these two years, although it does show 'creeping paralysis' and non-fulfilment of the plan. The decision that all is not well or that there is a crisis is possible on the basis of both the official and unofficial measures, although the problem of stagnating productivity seems more acute on the unofficial index. The decision that a particular measure is inadequate can only be made by a critique of the way the measure is constructed which determines its mode of calculation of the effects which it registers. Such a critique is more readily mounted and accepted if alternative modes of calculation are also available and are deployed. The measurement problems involved in regulating the economy are not a matter of the inadequacy of the conceptual to the real, but of the disjunction or dislocations between the various discourses which are inevitably present in an economy with an advanced division of labour.

To say that such problems are inevitable is not to say that Soviet indices or norms are adequate or acceptable. Most of the work cited in this chapter implies a criticism of them in one way or another. In addition, even if many of these problems were minimised, the problems of regulating the Soviet economy are not merely discursive, but political. The implementation of plans is not a matter of neutral instruments realising ideas, as the earlier remarks treating intermediate consumption as needs in their own right have already indicated. The means of action, of plan implementation, clearly have their own effectivity. As mentioned earlier, this is related not only to the discourses deployed by them but also to their own organisational exigencies. Relations between agencies of plan

construction and plan implementation, and between various kinds of agencies within each category (for example, between Ministries, production associations and enterprises - all agencies of implementation) constitute arenas of struggle. The outcomes of these struggles determine the capacities of the various agencies for the time being - hence the diversity of relations between production associations and enterprises even within the same Ministry, as mentioned by Lavigne. The fact that the struggles by the agencies of implementation take place over reporting productive capacity, reporting results of the last plan period, and over supplies indicates their effective subordination (despite their struggles) to the central agencies of plan construction which construct plans in a very 'productionist' manner, using material balances.³⁵ Thus both the means of economic calculation and the related struggles are conditions of the capacities of the various agents. This is important in appraising the 'norms' established, since otherwise there is a danger of treating them in a manner similar to many kinds of sociological theory which sees them as an effect of a 'central value system' (to use Parsons' phrase). This sort of theory implies a unified centre with norms as a neutral means of realising its aims; failure by subjects to conform to the norms amounts to 'deviance'. At times Tartarin approximates to this position, with the informal individual pursuit of use-values being the 'deviance' in his analysis.³⁶ Yet Tartarin also begins to show how such action is an effect of inconsistent norms, and argues that the distinction between formal and informal cannot be sustained even by the higher level agencies of implementation - hence the mutual exoneration of superiors and subordinates. The analysis of the relations between the various economic agents in terms

of arenas of struggle takes one further away from the traditional sociological account which treats social structure in terms of norms and treats actors in terms of conformity to or deviance from the norms.

Tartarin is right to say that the problems of regulation of the economy do not only stem from language, but are problems of relations of superiors and subordinates. Unfortunately, his treatment of 'the Centre' either as a single unit or as a series of individuals leads him to ignore the problems of the political relations between agencies at 'the Centre'. The potential and actual arenas of struggle constituted by relations between Gosplan, Gossnab, the other State Committees, the Council of Ministers, the individual Ministries and so on mean that 'the Centre' cannot be treated as a unity laying down norms: its non-unity is precisely the source of some of the incoherence in the plans. However, the discursive sources of plan incoherence must also be taken seriously. To say that commodity relations do not 'fit in' with the regulation of the economy by means of norms is somewhat misleading. In the presence of commodity relations, some of the norms must be specified in monetary terms. The problems of final consumption are not necessarily the effect of planning by norms, or if they are then the prospects for the socialist planning of final consumption are poor indeed. As I have tried to indicate, many of the problems of retail distribution stem from its low priority, poor organisation, inadequate resources, and the form (not the fact) of intervention by the central planning agencies. It is the form of planning which prioritises production and which does not adequately coordinate monetary policy with material balance calculations that generates many of the problems of final consumption. No serious attempt has been made to plan from

a projected final consumption,³⁷ but in the broad sense used by Tartarin this would still entail the use of norms of consumption. Before I am accused of paternalism, let me ask what the alternative is: it is not 'consumer sovereignty', since even in the West demand is partly generated by the placing of new products on the market, that is, by supply. There was no market for products using the microchip until such products were launched. Capitalist firms have to establish production norms, particularly for new products, although of course they are on the whole much more flexible than Soviet enterprises in responding to changes in demand. However, arguing for flexible norms is not the same as arguing for their abolition. In addition, norms of consumption have to be established (however democratic or otherwise the process of establishment) for social consumption in the form of social security, health care, education, and certain kinds of leisure. Finally, there have to be norms for intermediate consumption to define criteria of 'disproportionate' use of resources in this manner. Much of Tartarin's critique of norms refers to rigid norms, established centrally (although as Nove, 1977, points out, some norms must be centrally determined), and which give primacy to production. One cannot object to these criticisms, but norms per se will only disappear in the utopian world here socialist planning is conducted with reference to the directly experienced needs of the freely associated producers.

If forms of regulation of the capacities and activities of agents are inevitable for their effective coordination in implementing a plan, this is not to say that such norms need be rigid.

Flexible norms, however, require flexible forms of organisation and the co-existence of alternative means of calculation of, say, productivity, to facilitate the monitoring of the effectiveness of particular forms of regulation. The effectiveness of a particular form of regulation can never be taken for granted precisely because of the struggles for autonomy by sub-agents whose performance is being monitored.

The 1979 Reform

Considering the 1979 reform in the light of the above remarks, it must be seen as an attempt to improve both planning and the regulation of the economy by increasing the number of calculations conducted by the central planning agencies, by reorganising the system of norms, and by reinforcing the control of plan implementation. If Tartarin's analysis were correct, the benefits of this reform, like others; will disappear little by little in the long run, but in my view the norms used are not neutral. They affect the capacities of sub-agents and thus the scope for evasion of supervision and regulation. This is precisely why reforms are resisted by some agents, such as the Ministries. The ability of sub-agents to evade regulation depends partly on the form of regulation. The simultaneous deployment by the central planning agencies of alternative modes of supervision (accounting

indices) would certainly enhance their capacity to regulate the plan implementation, and help combat the progressive dissipation of effective regulation. However, as Tartarin points out, each form of calculation has its organisational costs and this limits the capacity of the planning agencies in this respect. This limitation is exacerbated by the chronic delays in deploying computer capacity. The reinforcement of control over implementation following the July 1979 reform has, according to Tartarin, led some economists to renounce the distinction between administrative management and economic management, but such a position implies that administrative regulation of the production and distribution agencies will be wholly effective. Certainly, the reform seems to aim at such control of enterprises, effectively attempting to overcoming the successful resistance in the 1970s by Ministries to attempts to make enterprises more responsive to central objectives (as opposed to Ministerial ones).

The law of 10th November, 1978 could be seen perhaps as a precursor of the July 1979 reform. The 1978 law concerned the Council of Ministers and reinforced the coordinating role of the first vice-presidents and the vice-presidents of the Council of Ministers, to whom are attributed the control of the Ministries. The law also insisted on the role of Gosplan and the need to organise the administration of groups of homogenous branches. According to Lavigne (1979, page 44) this is one of the three ways used to try to control the Ministries : from above, from below

and from inside. We have already seen that attempts to control Ministries from below using production associations and industrial associations as intermediaries between enterprises and Ministries ran into trouble. In 1976 the completion of this restructuring, supposed to be accomplished by 1975, was put back to 1980. The control of Ministries from inside has been attempted by putting some of them on khozraschet, but this has raised the prospect of the loss of control of investment by the central authorities. The July 1979 decree attempted to amalgamate these forms of control. In the first place, the predominance of Gosplan over the Ministries was confirmed through closer supervision of their plan preparation and of their management of their enterprises: plans cannot now be lowered during the year in order to make plan fulfilment appear better. In the second place, the completion of the restructuring of industry in terms of production associations has been retained as an aim to be achieved "in two or three years" that is by 1982, or later. In the third place, the use of khozraschet is to be extended among Ministries from 1981," in so far as Ministries are prepared for it."

This reform of the position of Ministries, which are sectoral agencies of plan implementation, has been supplemented by enhanced territorial regulation of plan implementation, although the latter is still subordinated to the central plan. The powers of local Soviets have been enhanced, sectoral Ministry plans must be broken down by territorial divisions and examined jointly with the republican

Councils of Ministers, and the 'territorial production complexes' of Siberia and the Far East must be planned in an integrated way, regardless of the administrative attachment of the activities planned (Lavigne, 1979, page 57). Consequently, the reform places a lot of weight on the central planning agencies, that is, the eighteen State Committees, the State Bank and the Central Statistical Administration. The most important single State Committee is Gosplan, particularly since the July 1979 decree. The application of the measures envisaged by the decree are its responsibility. However, Lavigne (1979, page 58) points out that this gain in authority is not accompanied by a reinforcing of its powers. Gosplan cannot give orders, either to the Ministries nor to other functional administrations (which I call central planning agencies) notably Gossnab which has so often held Gosplan in check : Gosplan is thus in a situation of being responsible for failure without necessarily being credited with success.

The effect of the reform at enterprise level has been to limit its autonomy, while increasing the technological autonomy of the workshop or brigade, "in a distinctly productivist vision." (Lavigne, 1979, page 78). The 1979 reform has also given a certain degree of organisational autonomy to brigades, following on the Shchekino and more especially the Zlobin experiments. The Zlobin method is simple : the brigade voluntarily undertakes to complete its target at a certain date before the officially planned date, with a higher quality of workmanship and without any

increased costs. The administration of (in this case) the building site contracts to supply the brigade, according to the plan of work, with all the necessary materials. The brigade gets a bonus of up to 40 per cent of wages when the work is completed (Lavigne, 1979, page 105). The 1979 decree has tried to improve productivity in this way by giving workers greater control of the production process, and also by insisting on the demand for consumption, notably for new products and for better quality. The enterprise as a whole, however, is subordinated to a plan defined strictly in terms of physical units. The enterprise, or production association or kombinat, will function from 1981 on the basis of a five year plan, broken down annually. Its participation in plan construction will be limited. The Ministries themselves will have to operate on the basis of the control figures of Gosplan to present their own plan proposals, and it will be difficult for enterprises or Ministries to hide reserves, since each enterprise will be on file, having a 'passport' giving the details of the state of its productive capacity, its use, and a certain amount of technical-economic data. The effectiveness of the passport is related to the industrial restructuring, since the passports will only be operational when all enterprises are in production associations.

The five year plans will operate using 14 indices, which according to Lavigne (1979, page 106) are rational and sophisticated, although it raises the question of how the statistical services will

cope. Most of the indices are in kind; output sold and profitability, the characteristic indices of the 1965 reform, have been abandoned. The prerogatives of enterprises have been reduced, despite the rather deceptive "counter-plans" which can be proposed by enterprises. These can only increase the plan, not reduce it. The annual plans and the five year plans are to be tied together, so that enterprises cannot impose their own plans and there is less scope for collusion between enterprises and Ministries to get advantageous plans. This means that annual plans will not predominate over five year ones, and Gosplan has more time to construct a coherent and 'scientifically founded' five year plan (because of the enterprise 'passports'). The positive gap between the counter-plan and the annual 'slice' of the five year plan determines the size of the enterprise incentive funds. The 1979 decree re-establishes the value of direct commercial contracts, backed this time with judicial sanctions, even against Gosplan. Enterprises will not be able to consent to "mutual amnesties" for delivery failures as in the past. The use of long-term five year contracts between enterprises or production associations is to be generalised. Lavigne rightly asks how it will be possible to control the application of these measures.

This raises the general issue of the appraisal of this reform. There are now a series of plans whose relation to each other is more coherent than in the past. There is a 20 year plan of technical progress; a ten year plan, broken down into two five-year plans (the first with annual details); a five year plan, broken down by year, which is the linch-pin of the planning process; an annual plan using the enterprise counter-plans for correcting the corresponding 'slice' of the five-year plan (now with the same indices as the five year plan); and a series of finalised programmes which can be special, sectoral or regional. This rationalisation of the plan structure using a refounded system of indices implies a rapid unification of the 'nomenclatures' (classificatory lists) used by different agencies. Lavigne points out (page 240) that this is no easy task for the Central Statistical Administration. Regional and sectoral planning are more strictly coordinated. While the decree gives great importance to plans of social development (working conditions, professional training, general education, culture, housing, living conditions, public health) it also gives great importance to labour resources. The latter plan must develop extra resources of labour-power, increase 'rational' labour mobility in relation to the needs of the economy and reduce 'spontaneous' mobility, and allow for the regrading of qualified workers in case of rationalisation of productive processes. These measures clearly indicate that the July 1979 decree is a serious attempt to improve Soviet economic performance by improving

both plan construction (particularly in terms of coherence and of lengthening the time-scale of the planning horizon) and the regulation of plan implementation.

The potential problems with plan construction are clear: the increased coherence in terms of indices used in various plans is highly desirable, but there are bound to be difficulties in unifying the 'nomenclatures' (which describe the specifications of items) and still retaining manageable lists of items to plan. Aggregation leads to imprecision, but even partial disaggregation will require substantial and sophisticated computing capacity, together with some means of monitoring the appropriateness of the agreed specifications of items. There will, in other words, continue to be liaison problems within and between the central planning agencies. The problems of coordination will also continue at an unnecessarily high level if Gosplan cannot give certain 'technical' orders to Gosstat, even though both would continue to be subject to supervision by the Party or Council of Ministers. However, the most important problem for plan construction is the dependence on 'passports' of enterprises. The independence of Gosplan from the Ministries as regards information on enterprise capacity is thus postponed until the restructuring of industry, a restructuring whose completion has already been postponed twice since it was started.

In addition, there does not seem to be much prospect of an agency such as Gosplan going in for the simultaneous

deployment of a variety of indices measuring the same norm. The organisational costs of this must be prohibitive at the moment, so it is unlikely that this will occur on any scale in the near future. Finally, while the reform would be a substantial improvement if it were carried out as envisaged, it would still give primacy to planning of production and intermediate consumption. The insistence on the importance of final consumption (partly for the effects of this as an economic incentive, that is, with a view to increasing overall production) and the increased role for local Soviets, do not confront the issue of the organisational forms and forms of calculation which would give final consumption of goods and services higher priority than production.

With regard to the regulation of plan implementation, there are also evident problems: for example, the problems of ensuring that direct commercial contracts finally are effective, which entails an ability to have recourse to civil litigation, as Lavigne realises. The more important problems are firstly, those of limiting Ministerial intervention in enterprises, which means completing the transition to production associations, and secondly, using the increased brigade autonomy and other measures to increase labour productivity. It is impossible on the basis of the information available to predict the outcome of the struggle to bring all enterprises into production associations. It is possible that the improved information at the disposal of Gosplan, even without effective 'passport' files on enterprises, will make

it is easier to counter certain practices by Ministries, but much depends on the political support behind such restrictions on Ministries. However, the measures based on the reform of the brigade are likely to improve productivity, although their impact on one-man management is not too clear, nor is their relation to the 1977 Constitution's recognition of worker's collectives. The Zlobin method has been in use since 1970. For the five-year period 1976-1980, the proportion of brigades in the construction industry on the Zlobin method was expected to rise from one quarter to 70-80 per cent. According to M. Drach³⁸, productivity among such brigades overall has risen faster than average and faster than wages. For example, in a factory making metallurgical equipment, productivity rose by 13.6 per cent and wages by 7.1 per cent. Other examples are more spectacular, but the proportion of workers in such brigades varies in different sectors, so it may only work in some sectors of industry. Such brigades may also, with their stress on quality as well as quantity, lead to pressure to modify machinery, and to improve the quality of inputs. While this may be a good thing, it may not fit in with the central plans. Some tension between a degree of self-management and central planning of resource allocation is inevitable. Brigades have attempted various kinds of wage-bargaining, but this has not worked because it blocked the role of the Party in the enterprise, according to Drach.

In any case, brigade bargaining over wages would tend to conflict with the 1979 reform of wages, which sets wages in terms

of norms per rouble of production. These norms are supposed to operate for the whole of the five year plan, according to Seurot ³⁹, and there are few grounds for changes in the norms. Although the wages reform is an attempt to exert greater control over the macroeconomic relation between wages and production, Seurot argues that the success of these norms is very problematic. If there is an increase in capital costs, the price of the product (calculated on a 'cost plus' basis) will rise, so the value of production and hence wages will rise even without an increase in labour productivity. In addition, to be calculable, these norms require an index of net production, which has not yet been constructed, which is perhaps why the norms have not yet been applied, according to Seurot. Rather than raising productivity or economic growth, the result of the wages reform is likely to be a better policing of wages and a reduction in repressed inflation. Too rapid an increase in productivity could well lead to too much unemployment. One of the interesting implications of Seurot's paper stems from his remark that part of the apparent reduction in labour productivity is the result of the spread of production associations, since such larger units reduce the extent of double counting of production. If this is true, the successful spread of production associations could well make productivity appear to fall further, or rise more slowly than it otherwise would. This might, by making the current economic problems more apparent, either lead to still greater attempts at central direction of the economy

and at increased labour discipline, or it might be used by Ministries to 'demonstrate' that production associations are bad for productivity, thereby undermining the basis of increased central control.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to analyse the relations of production as relations between agents whose capacities are determined partly by the means of calculation available to them, partly by their organisational forms and partly by the various struggles in which they are or have been engaged. Relations of production are thus not only economic but political. For this reason, various human and non-human economic agents have been analysed in terms of these main determinants of their capacities.

One of the interesting effects of this approach has been that differences in terms of juridical property have been less important in the analysis than might have been imagined. This is partly because of the policy of assimilating kolkhozy to sovkhozy in various respects, but also because minor juridical distinctions in the status of different personal plots seem to be of little importance in comparison with the economic relation between kolkhoz personal plots and the collective output from the kolkhozy. The differences between the three types of property in the Soviet Union (state, collective and personal plots) are no longer one of the major

features of the economy, although they are still important, and will continue to be until the situation in agriculture is much improved. The juridical determinants of organisational forms in agriculture have been much less important than state policy towards the various kinds of agents or economic units in agriculture over the last fifteen years. The same is clearly the case for industry, and for this reason the analysis has concentrated on the discrepancies in the means of calculation employed by various agents and on the role of struggle in determining the current relations of production. Consequently, the system of regulating the implementation of plans has received a lot of attention, since sub-agents struggle to resist or amend the plan implementation as centrally envisaged.

The 1979 reform is thus particularly interesting as an attempt to modify the relations of production in favour of the central planning agencies in an attempt to improve economic performance. However, even if it were entirely successful, it would do little to solve the problems of planning from final consumption, which would not only imply perhaps changes in social policy norms for the delivery of health, education, welfare and leisure services, but also imply a capacity to respond to changing demands for consumer durables and retail services. It is not clear how far the 1979 reform will curb excessive intermediate production, since some of the 'excessive' intermediate production may simply result from the priority given to physical production of manufactured goods. It is arguable that 'structural shortages'

result partly from the pressure to increase such production (as well as from organisational difficulties over supply), and the pressure to increase such production may be related to military insecurity.

Since some of the low productivity in industry is due to 'spontaneous' labour mobility associated with a search for housing, according to Seurot (1980), the 1979 decree may raise productivity indirectly by its measures to improve housing and working conditions. An additional obstacle to raising productivity in industry could be removed by creating more 'unproductive' jobs in retail trade, services and transport, which would make easier for industrial enterprises to reduce their labour force, especially the unskilled ancillary labourers, as they took measures to improve productivity. Paradoxically a higher priority given to final consumption could thus perhaps ease the supply problems of industry. However, in the absence of a radical change in economic strategy and forms of calculation in favour of final consumption, the 1979 reform does at least hold out the promise of improved performance by rationalising the structure of industry, curbing the power of the Ministries, increasing the coherence of the overall economic plans, and giving greater autonomy to workshops and production brigades. Whether it will turn out that way remains to be seen.

Notes to Chapter Two

1. See, for example, N. Jasny (1949) The Socialised Agriculture of the U.S.S.R.: Plans and Performance, Stanford, and A. Nove (1969) An Economic History of the U.S.S.R., Allen Lane, London. For a detailed discussion of developments between 1953 and 1964, see K. E. Wädekin, (1973), The Private Sector in Soviet Agriculture, chapters 8 and 9, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London.
2. R. C. Stuart (1972) The Collective Farm in Soviet Agriculture, Lexington Books, D. C. Heath and Co., Lexington, Mass., chapter 4 'Structural Change in the Kolkhoz Sector'.
3. *ibid.*, page 47. This is from official sources.
4. Lavigne, using different sources from R. C. Stuart, gives a figure of 123,700 for 1950, as can be seen from this table taken from page 155 of M. Lavigne, (1979) Les Economies Socialistes: sovietique et européennes Armand Colin, Paris. This figure for 1950 given by Lavigne is confirmed by Narodnoe Khozyaistro SSSR v 1970 g. The 1979 figures for Table 2 are from Narodnoe Khozyaistro SSSR 1979, page 215 (private communication from M. Lavigne).
5. This is the Soviet term for what in the English language literature are usually termed 'private plots'. Wädekin (1973) *op.cit.*, devotes a small chapter to this issue before effectively deciding to call them 'private'. Lavigne also calls them 'private' at times. The issue of the form of property which these plots constitute will be discussed later, but for the moment the term 'personal plots' can be

retained as at least indicating their scale of operation.

The figure of 1.2 per cent given by Lavigne for 1977 (it is 1.4 per cent for 1979) refers to the percentage of total exploited area, including pasture and so on. This should not be confused with sown area. Personal plots in 1979 comprised 2.7 per cent of sown area (private communication from M. Lavigne).

6. Stuart, op.cit., page 64. I shall refer to both complex and tractor - complex brigades as 'complex brigades'.
7. Stuart, ibid., page 66.
8. See Stuart, ibid., pages 177-186. Agricultural specialisation is usually discussed in geographical terms, but such regional specialisation in terms of, say, crops, could affect the need for complex brigades.
9. The word 'chairmen' is used advisedly, since probably around 1 per cent of kolkhoz chairs are held by women. This was certainly the case for the late 1950s, according to Stuart, ibid., page 164. He says that in 1959, the U.S.S.R. percentages of women in 'middle level' kolkhoz management positions were as follows: field brigadier - 8.3 per cent, animal brigadier - 12.7 per cent; ferma leader - 15.0 per cent, link leader 87.3 per cent. Interestingly, the role of the link (zveno, the lowest rung on the hierarchy) is apparently the subject of a certain amount of controversy these days, despite some high level support for the idea of an autonomous zveno, described by Nove (1977), The Soviet Economic System, George Allen and Unwin, London, pages 140-142. A. Heitlinger (1979) Women and State Socialism: Sex Inequality in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, Macmillan, London, cites evidence on page 103 from the 1970s which suggests that in Latvia just over 1 per cent of sovkhos chairs were held by women. She says this typical.
10. Lavigne, op.cit., page 161.

11. A. Nove (1977) The Soviet Economic System, op.cit, pages 137-142.

12. Stuart's discussion of the allocation of labour within the kolkhoz is unfortunately of little help on this issue. In the mid-1960s, labour accounted for roughly 40 per cent of the costs of gross agricultural production (page 116). He begins by a 'formal analysis' of labour allocation within the kolkhoz in the traditional, and largely futile, manner of exposition of economics textbooks. Thus he assumes that the peasants (as he calls the kolkhozniki) are striking an income - leisure balance, although it is well-known that they have very little free time because of work on the 'personal plots'. This is determined for the kolkhozniki, as Wädekin (1973), op. cit., shows, because of the division of labour between the kolkhoz and the 'private sector' in terms of crops which means that unless one is going to sacrifice an adequate diet and accept a very low monetary income, there is little 'balancing' to be done between income and leisure. In addition, in starting his analysis, Stuart relies to some extent on analyses which formally treat the kolkhoz as a producer cooperative, even though he himself has rejected this notion. All this, of course, is to endow the peasant with the capacity of choice, the precondition for 'rational economic decision-making'. In making the 'model' a little more 'realistic', these assumptions are effectively abandoned, without Stuart raising any questions about the appropriateness of the concepts which required such assumptions. It is because I find such a mode of analysis unacceptable that I have concentrated on organisational determinants of the labour supply within the kolkhoz. One can only discuss economic

calculation in an adequate way by relating it to the available means of calculation and to the structures to which the calculation refers. There are also, of course, demographic and migratorial determinants of the labour supply.

13. Lavigne (1979), op.cit., page 164, says that the proportion of total investment going to agriculture was 15 per cent between 1950 and 1960, 18 per cent between 1961 and 1970 and 26 per cent between 1971 and 1980. According to The Guardian, October 24th 1980, Brezhnev's proposed remedy for the expected 20 per cent shortfall in the 1980 grain ^{increase} harvest is to invest still further and to boost efficiency. How will the latter be achieved?
14. This is described in detail in Chapter 7 of Wädekin (1973) op.cit., 'The Interdependence of Private and Socialised Production'.
15. (Private communication). On page 164, she mentions a figure of 1.4 per cent of cultivated surface area, an increase over the figure of 1.2 for 1977.
16. V. Andrie (1976) Managerial power in the Soviet Union, Saxon House/Lexington Books, D.C. Heath Ltd., Westmead and Lexington.
17. There are of course various kinds of role theory, but all of them are compatible with a theatrical metaphor which treats social structure in terms of actors playing roles. The most well-known differences within role theory are probably those between the social phenomenologists, the

ethnomethodologists, the symbolic interactionists and the attempts to integrate role theory with structural-functionalism, of which the most sophisticated exponent was Parsons. Judging by the references in Andrie, he tends (but not exclusively) towards the symbolic interactionist approach to role theory. This is precisely the kind of role theory which has come in for the least criticism, not because it is the most sophisticated, but for precisely the opposite reason: it constitutes the least worthy opponent. This is not the place to remedy this 'gap' in the critical literature: many of the criticisms of the more rigorous and philosophically sophisticated 'founding fathers' of action theory, such as Weber and Schutz, also apply to the symbolic interactionists: see, for example, B. Hindess (1977) Philosophy and Methodology in the Social Sciences, Harvester Press, Hassocks. Another aspect of Andrie's use of role theory which is not defended is its relation to his proposal in Appendix A that "a social structure constitutes a mechanism by which the surplus product of a society is created, appropriated and controlled." This proposal amounts to a virtual equation of the interpersonal conception of social structure espoused by role theory with the Marxist conception of a 'mode of production'. No attempt is made to explain or defend this conflation of two concepts which are usually considered to be related to two quite distinct theoretical positions.

18. R.C. Stuart (1972, op.cit.) uses Granick's distinction between the khovraschet model and the fundamental model in his 'Conclusion' to analyse trends in the management of collective farms. Stuart describes the two models as follows (ibid, page 190, footnote 1): "The fundamental model in simplistic form can be equated with the traditional

command model - a high degree of centralisation, planning largely in physical terms with multiple objectives, formal and informal managerial response to a rigid incentive structure and so on. The khozraschet model, on the other hand, is a prototype of a market model - a measure of decentralisation of decision-making, greater reliance upon a cost-profit calculus etc."

19. See G. Littlejohn (1980) 'Economic Calculation in the Soviet Union' in Economy and Society, Volume 9, Number 4, November, 1980, for an elaboration of this argument.
20. See M. Lavigne. 'The Creation of Money by the State Bank in the U.S.S.R.' Economy and Society, Volume 7, No. 1, February 1978.
21. For discussion of the 1965 reform, see A. Nove (1977) op.cit., pages 87-92, and M. Lavigne (1979) op. cit., pages 85-98.
22. For a discussion of the rationalist conception of planning, see G. Littlejohn (1980) 'Economic Calculation in the Soviet Union' in Economy and Society, Volume 9, No. 4, November 1980. The concept of 'the rationalist conception of planning' is based on the analysis of the rationalist conception of action provided by B. Hindess in 'Humanism and Teleology in Sociological Theory' in B. Hindess (ed.) (1977) Sociological Theories of the Economy, Macmillan London. It could be argued that recent claims in the journal Soviet Studies that the Soviet economy is not planned are the product of just such a rationalist conception of planning. The controversy appears in Soviet Studies in April 1978, April 1979 and January 1980. There is an intervention by Nove in January 1980

23. W. Andreff (1978) 'Capitalism d'Etat ou monopolisme d'Etat? Propos d'etape' in M. Lavigne (1978) (ed.) Economie politique de la planification en systeme socialiste, Economica, Paris.

24. C. Bettelheim (1976) Economic Calculation and Forms of Property, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London and Henley.
 Bettelheim in this work considered the enterprises, rather than Ministries, as separate properties.

25. R. Tartarin (1981) 'Planification et Regulation dans les Economies Socialistes: Pour une Theorie de la Valeur Comptable', in Revue d'Etudes Est-Ouest, Number 2, 1981.

26. Tartarin is a member of the Research group on the Theory of the Socialist Economy which meets at the Centre d'Economie Internationale des Pays Socialistes, Universite Paris I Pantheon-Sorbonne. While I attend this group about twice a year, I did not participate in the discussions around the paper, unfortunately. Because it is published in French, the exposition of the arguments of this paper will be extensive.

27. The distinction between centralisation and decentralisation has already been criticised by Lavigne 1979, op cit., page 47, who points out that it stems from the influence on American 'Sovietologists' of American juridical discourse. One could add that a similar discursive presence is evident in sociological organisation theory for similar reasons: see, for example, A. Etzioni Modern Organisation Prentice Hall, 1964, Chapter 3. Lavigne argues that another notion, derived from French law, is more appropriate for the analysis of the socialist countries of Europe: 'deconcentration', which is a "technique of organisation which consists in remitting important powers of decision to agents of central power placed at the head

The formal/khozraschet distinction used by Granick, Andre and others, could be considered as constructed by overlaying the centralisation/decentralisation dichotomy with a plan/market dichotomy.

28. See the resumé of Lavigne's account of retail distribution at the end of the first section of this Chapter.
29. There is a footnote referring to M. Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon at this point, and the reference to a cyclical process of what could be described as centralisation and decentralisation is also reminiscent of some writings in sociological organisation theory.
30. I assume the argument here is that granting such a downward revision shows the 'real' conditions for achieving coherence which can guide plan formulation for the next period. If this is what is being argued here, then it must be remembered that downward revision of the plan is also allowed because Ministries wish to report the success of their enterprises.
31. This sentence is difficult to reconcile with the earlier claim that the formal and informal aspects are intrinsically related. Why are the informal aspects suddenly given discursive priority as 'real' at this point in the argument? The equally real norms are a condition of the informal actions of agents.
32. I completely agree with this, and it would for example partly explain why the reduction in kolkhoz 'private plots' would be related to the apparently deteriorating position of Soviet agriculture: products of informal economic activity could no longer be reported as results of the formal activities of the kolkhozy and sovkhozy, since the scale of informal or unreported economic activity would be reduced with the reduction of kolkhoz and sovkhoz 'private plots'.

33. Tartarin mentions the impossibility of using a single signifying (or signficatory) index of economic activity, and this is a point which is becoming increasingly widely appreciated among students of the Soviet economy. For example, quite independently of my remarks on this issue in 'Economic Calculation in the Soviet Union', op. cit., Nove draws attention to the growing appreciation of this point among Soviet economists themselves. See A. Nove (1980) 'Soviet Economics and Soviet Economists: Some random observations', paper given to the Panel on The Theory of Economic Planning and Regulation in the Socialist System, Second World Congress for Soviet and East European Studies, Garmisch.

34. Francois Seurot (1980) 'Salaires et Productivité en URSS: La Reforme de 1979' paper given on 24th October 1980 to the Groupe de Recherche sur la Théorie de l'Economie Socialiste, Centre d'Economie Internationale des Pays Socialistes, Universite de Paris I, Panthéon - Sorbonne.

35. The role of material balances in relation to other forms of calculation used by the central planning agencies such as Gosplan is discussed in G. Littlejohn (1980). 'Economic Calculation in the Soviet Union,' op.cit.

36. Indeed, the second part of his paper is entitled 'Deviancies in the System of Value Accounting'.

37. However, there is a discussion of this issue in the October 1980 issue of Planovoe Khozyaistvo.

38. M. Drach, 'La Brigade sous Contrat dans L'Industrie Sovietique et la Reforme de juillet 1979', paper read on 24th October 1980 to the Groupe de Recherche sur la Theorie de l'Economic Socialiste, Centre d'Economie Internationale des Pays Socialistes, Universite de Paris I, Pantheon-Sorbonne.
39. F. Seurot (1980), op. cit.

CHAPTER THREE
LAW, STATE AND POLITICS

Introduction

The analysis of the relations of production as relations between economic agents (both individual and collective) has raised various issues whose implications require further exploration. The analysis of the relations of production as affecting the relative capacities of economic agents, capacities which can change as a result of struggle between agents, has raised the issue of the political determinants of the relations of production. These political conditions are important if one treats the relations between agents as being themselves partly political. In addition, the inclusion of collective agents in the analysis of the relations of production has raised the issue of the legal conditions of such agencies, an issue which is particularly relevant in the case of the Soviet Union, where most of such agencies are state agencies. Even those agencies which are not legally state agencies, such as collective farms and trade unions, have a legal specification of their role in the economy. Furthermore, the legal conditions of agents are relevant to the appraisal of the official theory of the class structure of the Soviet Union, which implies that forms of property determine class boundaries. In other words, the official theory of class implies that the distinction between state and non-state property, and within the latter the distinction between collective farms and 'personal' plots, are crucial determinants of class relations. The 'personal' plots are crucial because legal restrictions on their size and economic activities prevent them

developing from what might be called household or family property (and in that sense, perhaps private property) into private property in the sense of capitalist property. They are restricted to being a supplement to other forms of personal or family income, rather than being the main source of income, deriving from private ownership of sufficient means of production.

As was indicated in Chapter Two, the legal definition of collective farms and even of personal plots has some impact on their economic capacities, but it does not seem to be as important as one might have expected. State policy seems to be a more important condition of such agents' capacities than is their legal specification. Similarly, the discussion of the regulation of plan implementation implied that legal constraints have only a limited effectivity, in comparison with political struggles between state agencies, such as enterprises, Ministries and the central planning agencies. Thus the relation between legal and political determinants on the one hand, and the economic capacities of agents on the other, requires further investigation. To do this, an analysis of law and politics, and hence of the Soviet state, must be undertaken. For reasons of space, the discussion will be restricted (where possible) to only those aspects of the law, the state and politics which appear most relevant to the relations of production. However, since a discussion of law almost inevitably requires a reference to the state, and since in the Soviet Union the most important political relations are probably those between state and party agencies, the discussion of law will be partly concerned with the issue of how to theorise the state and law in a socialist society.

It will thus deal with the issue of the 'withering away of the state' in the conditions where private ownership of the means of production is on the decline or has been eliminated. In addition, the relation of the law to the economy will be of particular concern, since legal regulation of the economy is a potentially important determinant of the relations of production, whatever may be the state of affairs in the Soviet Union today.

In analysing Soviet politics, the most important aspects of which are intimately connected with relations between state and party agencies, it has proved necessary to discuss various theories of Soviet politics which have some currency in the West. This will be done mainly to remove various misconceptions (as I see them) which present obstacles to an adequate analysis of the effects of the law, state and politics on the relations of production, which in the case of the Soviet Union are in a sense more politicised than in the West. The main approaches which will be dealt with are totalitarian theory, elite theory, and Hough's approach to Soviet politics, which eclectically combines the 'directed society' approach, the 'conflict school' approach, and the interest group approach with an attempt to analyse Soviet politics in terms of 'institutional pluralism'. Thus Hough's approach is useful to the purposes of this Chapter because it combines a wide range of approaches (which can thus be quickly discussed) and because it includes a serious empirical discussion of various state and party agencies which are heavily involved in economic policy or supervising its implementation. Consequently, prior to using his more empirical analysis, the more theoretical aspects of his position are discussed to avoid the danger of simply accepting Hough's empirical analysis at face value, useful though it is. Hence

following the discussion of Hough's theoretical position, and prior to the discussion of the role of various state and party agencies in the formation and implementation of economic policy, an alternative approach to the analysis of Soviet politics is presented and discussed. The aim of this section of the Chapter is to integrate the empirical discussion of state and party agencies more fully into the analysis of the relations of production presented in Chapter Two, and what might be called the analysis of the relations of distribution presented in Chapter Four. Both relations of production and relations of distribution (of income) are profoundly affected by state policy in the Soviet Union, so the relations between the state and party agencies most heavily involved in state policy formation cannot be ignored.

I Law

The previous chapter on economic units and economic calculation has raised the issue of the regulation of plan implementation, and has indicated that the effects of legal forms of regulation are limited. This is because legal norms appear to be mutually inconsistent, because the plan itself, which is a legally enforceable order for each enterprise, is in many ways inconsistent, and because various kinds of de facto autonomy of economic units or agents are not legally recognised. Consequently, it seems necessary to investigate certain aspects of Soviet law in order both to understand better the nature of legal regulation of the economy and to begin an analysis of the Soviet state and politics.

Law and Socialism

Beginning the analysis of the state with a discussion of law does not amount to treating the state as emanating from law. Discussing the law in the context of legal regulation of the economy does not entail accepting the traditional Marxist conception of the law as a reflection of the relations of production, that is, law as defining property rights. The latter conception, which implies that the law is an effect of ontologically prior economic relations yet is a condition of the effective functioning of those relations, has been subjected to very serious criticism by P. Hirst (1979).¹ As Hirst points out (page 96): "Law as analysed in Marxist theory is divided into two distinct social functions which it performs: the function of regulation of possession and the function of regulation of the struggle between classes." Consequently, Hirst argues, the Marxist theory of law has tended to divide into relatively distinct bodies of theory - the theory of

property and the theory of the state. Hirst concentrates his criticism on the theory of property in the text cited, but one of the issues raised by his critique, particularly his critique of Pashukanis², is the adequacy of a discussion of law which is relatively distinct from a discussion of the state. Hirst argues against the "conception of property right as an 'expression' of social relations borne by an individual subject and necessary to his (socially determined) practice"³ and consequently against Pashukanis' treatment of public law as formed by analogy with private law. The avoidance of treating law as a proprietorial right of individual subjects which makes possible their (intersubjective) economic and social relations, avoidance of this position implies taking public law and the state seriously even in the analysis of private law. The argument is further extended in Hirst's more recent essay 'Law, Socialism and Rights',⁴ where the role of law in socialist states is considered.

Among the problems considered by this later work is the question of "whether the elimination of a certain legally sanctioned class of agents - 'private' owners of the means of production - problematises the existence of the institution of 'law' itself." Contrary to Pashukanis, whose position is that socialists must work for the progressive deconstruction of law, the facilitation of its 'withering away', Hirst argues that in a realm of differentiated agents (whether human individuals or not), the scope and limits of these agents' actions must be defined and limited: this is a condition of their having a determinate capacity for decision. Regulation is definitive of agents and imposes requirements of action on them: it also establishes a

a relation between agents and the 'public power', not merely a relation between agents with the public power as adjudicator. In contrast to Pashukanis, who conceives of law as recognising prior realities and regulating an already given realm of relations between agents, Hirst is arguing that regulation of relations between agents is a condition of their existence and their capacities for action. Regulation concerns the form of definition of agents as agents. "This necessarily arises whenever a realm of differentiated agencies of decision must be constituted (my emphasis), whether or not these agents are directly concerned with production, and whether or not the relations between those agents take a commodity form." (Hirst's emphasis). While I have no reason to disagree with Hirst's critique of Pashukanis, nor indeed with his critiques of various other legal theorists, Hirst to my mind does not make it sufficiently clear why regulation of social relations should take the form of legal relations.

Pashukanis distinguishes between legal and technical regulation, but his conception of 'the legal form' as intimately linked with commodity exchange has been effectively demolished by Hirst. Consequently the relation between legal and non-legal or technical regulation must be analysed. Hirst argues: "Law (as an institutionally differentiated instance) cannot be the sole means of construction of agents. Various forms of administrative rules, practices and policies (state and semi-state.....) also serve in this direction..... These agencies are not, however, 'outside' the law: they are in turn differentiated agencies of decision constituted in a particular way in public law." This is a position which concedes the importance of non-legal regulation, yet insists that the agencies engaged in administrative regulation, or

in providing means of co-operation, reconciliation and control are themselves defined in public law.

There are two possible objections to this position: firstly, that agencies engage in forms of regulation which are illegal, and some of the agents themselves may not be legally defined; secondly, that the various forms of regulation could exist without a state or the form of law. The latter objection might be considered as an attempt to revive Pashukanis or the 'classical' Marxist view on the withering away of the state in a new form or it could stem from a non-Marxist form of socialism. It is a much more serious objection than the first. The first could be dealt with by arguing that if the public law existed and did define certain agents, the existence and capacities of the agents which were not legally defined could be explained in terms of the malfunctioning of the legally defined agencies, or in terms of successful struggles to escape or avoid legal or administrative regulation. However, the constitution of such agencies would then be a very indirect effect of the law, and their relation to the law would be indeterminate, especially where the law was poorly enforced. The second objection is more difficult to deal with, despite the force of Hirst's critique of Pashukanis and other Marxist approaches to the state.⁵ Hirst argues with good reason that regulation requires a specific agency which is not at par with those to be regulated, but that there is no reason why for any given activity this regulatory instance should take the form of a state, a single dominant public power. In that case it is legitimate to ask, if the state is not required to regulate any given activity, why it is required to regulate any activity at all? The effective answer seems to be to give a certain degree of coherence to the activities of the

various regulatory agencies. While there is no doubt that a certain degree of coherence is given to the various state apparatuses and practices by public law (particularly constitutional law), the 'requirement' of coherence of forms of regulation cannot explain the law and the state. Hirst is well aware of the problems of general explanations of social institutions in terms of the requirements or needs generated by other social relations.⁶ However, despite the extremely rigorous analysis of a variety of issues in this essay, and despite the presence of arguments which undermine such a form of explanation, at one or two points the analysis does appear to fall into explaining the state and law by reference to the requirement to co-ordinate various agencies of regulation and to limit their action.

This point can be elaborated by examining his discussion of G.D.H. Cole's conception of guild socialism, where Hirst argues that "Cole's merely ad hoc and consultative conception of the co-ordination of the activities of a complex of interacting associations is inadequate." It is inadequate for two reasons: "Firstly, there are requirements of information and division of labour which necessitate continual co-ordination not a constant process of ad hoc adjustment. But these are no better handled by the notion of a single centre rather than a centreless plurality: There can be no general solution to the questions of information collection and relay, of techniques of control, etc. Secondly, what all questions of organisation involving a plurality of associations or agencies generate are the problems of the definition of their form and the regulation of their action in the form of limits. Associations cannot be co-ordinated if no limits are placed on their competencies and actions: the absence of such

limits generates a plurality of agencies of decision limited only by their own objectives, dependent on each other's compliance and goodwill as to the areas in which the respective decisions of each pertain. The absence of imposed limits inhibits organisations' calculation and the performance of definite tasks: competition for resources in the absence of imposed conditions for interaction and multiple performance of functions would be the result." It is not my intention to defend Cole's concept of guild socialism, but merely to raise the question of why law and the state are necessary to co-ordinate the activities of diverse agents. Only if co-ordination took the form of regulation by a superior agent would the law be necessary as a means of 'regulating the regulators'. Yet Hirst's own analysis points to the problems of such a position: neither is the state a unified agency, nor is the law a consistent form of discourse or a consistent series of practices. As Hirst says, the problems of the requirements of information and division of labour are no better handled by the notion of a single centre rather than a centreless plurality. In that case, even conceding the necessity of continual co-ordination, rather than ad hoc adjustment, why need such co-ordination take the form of regulation by a superior agency or instance?

Co-ordination certainly implies the regular supply of information so that different agencies can calculate their actions with respect to each other, but it does not necessarily imply 'external' control. As Hirst points out earlier in the essay (when discussing the implications of the concept of a realm of differentiated agencies of decision), "the agent's actions, however much circumscribed by conditioning factors, are determined in their form by calculation and not given to

them by some other agent." While co-ordination may be more likely to work well if it takes the form of regulation, it need not do so. Hirst certainly indicates the probable costs of a lack of regulation: a plurality of agencies of decision, dependent on each other's compliance and goodwill, competition for resources and multiple performance of functions. They would thus not only be limited by their own objectives, but by the means at their disposal and their various (limited) forms of calculation. However, these costs of a lack of overall regulation of the different agencies do not impose a requirement of a regulatory instance. Hirst argues (on page 34) that a realm of differentiated agencies of decision requires a regulatory instance which imposes limits by defining the forms of existence and norms of conduct of these agencies. The regulatory instance makes such a realm possible. "This differentiation/limitation of agencies must have a general support, a regulatory instance..... This general support can only have the form of a 'public power': a specific instance of regulation advancing claims in this regard."

It is extremely hard to distinguish between this latter argument and a general theory of the state and law as a condition of the existence of a realm of diverse agencies.⁷ Indeed Hirst argues that the need for the state in socialist societies is enhanced by the increased scope and diversity of agencies of decision. Yet it is possible to conceive of a series of agencies working by administrative regulation of their own sub-agents and co-ordinating their activities at the level of the overall society by means of an admixture of ad hoc adjustment, regular flows of information and struggle over resources. Admittedly, the co-ordination would be much poorer without legal regulation, but there would be non-legal

limits on their forms of existence and their capacities for action. It does not require the positing of an ontologically prior realm of diverse agents to construct such an argument, since it does not deny the necessary existence of some regulation in the society; it merely denies the necessity of an overarching regulatory instance successfully making general claims as to its own scope as a public power.

Of course, if there is no ontologically prior realm of agents, then the state and the law cannot be considered as necessarily oppressive. This latter conclusion underlines one of the main themes of Hirst's essay, which I support, namely that if the state and the law are not necessarily oppressive, there is no necessity to abolish them. Even if one does not accept that a general regulatory instance is a necessary condition of a realm of differentiated agencies of decision (that is, of an advanced division of labour), the probable costs indicated by Hirst of the absence of a body which makes general claims to regulate other agencies could be considerable. While the state cannot resolve all the problems of regulation and co-ordination, its capacity to resolve at least some of these problems provides a forceful political argument in favour of retaining the state and law in socialist societies. As Hirst makes clear in a section on 'Pashukanis and Socialist Social Policy', Pashukanis' concept of 'social defence' could only be realised (by replacing legal regulation of social policy) at the cost of lower standards of control of administration than are accepted in the West. This is not the same thing as supporting the current forms of law and state organisation in the Soviet Union, as Hirst makes clear. Indeed one of his arguments in favour of legal regulation imposing limits on state agencies is that this can prevent such institutions from serving as means of suppression

of political opposition. He is not arguing for a restoration of 'socialist legality' but for changes in the law, and more importantly for the provision of effective means of limiting certain capacities of state agencies. While I accept such arguments, there is no need to posit the state as a necessary condition of existence of a realm of differentiated agencies, as Hirst seems at times to do.

Nevertheless, Hirst's work on law makes it difficult to ignore the role of public law in analysing the Soviet Union, particularly since, as Hirst among others points out, the Soviet Union has an ineffective legal framework of control. Perhaps the most striking recent example of this is the provision made in the 1977 Constitution for workers' collectives, although the organisational form for implementing them is not made clear. This means that it is conceivable that the 1979 decree enhancing the role of production brigades in the enterprises could be considered as related to the implementation of this provision of the Constitution, even though, as the Lavignes point out,⁸ some juridical interpretations treat the workers' collectives as extensions of the trade unions in the enterprises.⁹ If the production brigades were to be able to legally function as workers' collectives, their relation to the Party and to the trade unions' factory committees would have to be legally specified. Until some such legal enactment is made, the Constitutional provision for workers' collectives will remain ineffective.

Legal Regulation of the Soviet Economy

The Constitutional position on the agencies for regulating the economy is clear¹⁰: the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers - the Government of the U.S.S.R. - is the highest executive and administrative agency of state power of the U.S.S.R., subject to the control of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet. The various

state committees, chief administrations and other departments are attached to the Council of Ministers. However, the legal commentary on 'The Directing and Planning Agencies' provided by Hazard, Butler and Maggs (1977)¹¹ is not very enlightening, since it is concerned with historical swings between centralisation and decentralisation, and has no analysis of the contemporary effectivity of the law in the relations between the various central agencies. However, its citation of cases of disputes over plan enforcement and production quality control is helpful. The role of the law in regulating relations between 'The Operating Agencies' of various kinds such as Ministries, production associations (which Hazard et al. translate as 'production combines') and enterprises is clearer. There is legal specification of organisational forms of these relations for separate branches of industry, of enterprise powers, of measures for checking against fraud and mismanagement, and of legal successors in the event of liquidation of an enterprise. Perhaps the most interesting chapter for the purposes of the present discussion is the one on 'Law as an Instrument of Administrative Order'.

This chapter discusses the inauguration of the concept of the plan as law and the use in the 1930s of 'contracts of supply' and 'State Arbitration' of disputes over these contracts. Since the plan designated the suppliers and customers of an enterprise, the contracts were not entered into voluntarily, but the 'contract of supply' proved necessary to specify with sufficient precision the terms of the planned relationship, so that disputes over performance could be resolved. 'State Arbitration' was a system of administrative courts, apparently distinct from civil law courts. Certainly this interpretation was the position of those who argued that civil law was

distinct from 'economic law'.¹² The grounds for the distinction was that civil law concerned the relations between private individuals, whereas 'economic law' concerned the relations between public corporations. However, the arbitrators did in fact have recourse to civil law in reaching their decisions even prior to 1937, when the proponents of the distinction were purged. After Stalin's death, with the drafting of a new set of fundamental principles for civil codes, the question was raised again of separating rules relating to public corporations from the civil code. Many influential professors and administrators argued for it, but when the legislative drafting committee of the Council of Ministers published a draft in 1960, it combined the law of public enterprise with that of private individuals. According to Hazard et al, "Opponents of the combination have not only not been silenced, but they have published for a discussion of a draft economic code. They think the Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation adopted in 1961 to be an absurd document, and they have not hesitated to say so. They agree that it is self-evident that the relations of the public corporations have a special character. For example, a private individual cannot go to court to require another individual to sell him something. The public corporation may do so, and pre-contract disputes are a significant part of the practice of arbitration tribunals, for they bear relationship to performance of the plan."

In this argument, civil law is linked to commodity exchange between individuals, but in a different way from Pashukanis. Hazard et al. supply extracts of fairly recent Soviet arguments for and against a separate 'economic law', which are worth discussing. Bratus' who is against such a distinction argues that the Fundamental Principles of Civil

Legislation proceeds from the principle of the unity of the regulation of socialist property relations independent of the nature of their participants. "This unity is determined by the unity of the socialist economy, its planned character, by the interconnection of all the elements of Soviet economic circulation, the combination of the interests of society and of the individual." Bratus' also argues that it is wrong to combine under 'economic law' civil legal relations whose participants are socialist organisations as subjects with equal rights (on the basis of economic contracts, etc.) with relations arising from the activity of agencies for management of the economy. Partisans of an Economic Code of the U.S.S.R. are according to Bratus' proceeding from the incorrect assumption that it is possible to combine different types of social relations (civil, based on equality of the parties, and authoritative-organisational) as one subject of regulation. Similarly they thought it possible to separate civil relations between citizens from civil relations arising between socialist organisations. Bratus' argues that "this separation of like and joining of different relations contradicts the natural principles of legal regulation of these relations..... Every branch of law regulates not different types but one type of social relations." Hirst has argued (convincingly, in my view) in 'Law, Socialism and Rights' that legal regulation does not require the positing of subjects with rights, and that the law does not 'recognise' prior social relations which it then proceeds to regulate, so if one accepts Hirst's views then much of the argument of Bratus' collapses. The nature of the participants does affect the nature of the legal relationship. That is why, as Hazard et al. point out, it is possible to have contractual disputes between state corporations (where one compels the other to sell) which are not possible between private individuals. The involuntary

nature of the contract between state agencies is related to the fact that in constituting them as state agencies, the law obliges them to carry out the plan (a legal order). The other problem with the position of Bratus' is that it posits a one to one relationship between the law and social relations, whereas, as is clear from Hirst's discussion of Renner (1979), there need be no such correspondence.

This is not to say that the arguments of proponents of an Economic Code are acceptable, merely that a particular defence of the status quo is inadequate. Nevertheless, Laptev, the proponent of an Economic Code cited by Hazard et al., does have some interesting criticisms to make of the economic legislation as it existed after the 1965 Kosygin Reform. Hazard et al. clearly consider that the situation has changed little since then. Laptev argues that the rapid development of economic legislation is being conducted mainly by the issuance of normative acts of the government on the critical questions of the building-up of the economy. "However, the issuance of numerous normative acts on economic matters will lead to a very intensive increase in the volume of economic legislation. The number of legal acts on economic matters now numbers in the tens and even hundreds of thousands. Besides unwieldiness, another shortcoming of the economic legislation is the fact that different normative acts enacted at different times are poorly co-ordinated with one another. All this greatly complicates economic practice. Even for the experienced lawyer it is difficult at times to figure out which normative act is in force and which is not. Particular difficulties arise from this fact in the work of enterprises which do not have the possibility to undertake an exact accounting of normative acts in force. In the circumstances which have

developed it is rather difficult to put the economic legislation in order. Up till now, we have been using a method of organisation of economic legislation, by which when a new decree was enacted it was usually accompanied by an assignment to work out a list of normative acts repealed and amended in connection with its enactment. However, the absence of a defined core around which the acts of economic legislation could be placed leads to the situation that such lists are compiled extremely slowly The economic legislation can be put in order only by a radical change in the methods of its codification and systematisation."

Clearly then, the existence of public law need not give coherence or very great coherence to the activities of the various agencies regulating the implementation of the plan. However, the demand for greater coherence does not by itself entail a single Economic Code, as Laptev realises. Laptev accordingly argues for an Economic Code on grounds other than those indicated by the commentary of Hazard et al., which in effect posited a simple distinction between public and civil law related to a realm of freedom of the private individual (based among other things upon commodity exchange and the associated freedom to undertake contracts, in this view). Laptev differs from the account by Hazard et al. of proponents of an Economic Code, and he differs from the 1930s school which advocated 'economic law' and administrative courts as a step towards the withering away of law. Instead Laptev argues for a single Economic Code because a series of codes for each branch of the economy would still require co-ordination between, say, the Construction Code and the Banking Code. He argues against three objections to economic law. These objections are: 1. the recognition of economic law as a branch of law destroys the unity of the regulation of civil

legal relations, 2. it violates economic accountability¹³ and the economic independence of the enterprise which are ensured by civil legislation¹⁴, 3. the legal relations of parties who are equals and authoritative-organisation relations may not be joined.

In response to the first argument, Laptev argues that there is not and cannot be uniform regulation of civil legal relations by one branch of law, because the different types of these legal relations have their peculiarities which are taken account of in the norms of the different branches of law (civil, collective farm, land, administrative, financial, family and labour). On the second argument, he points out that economic accountability is usually violated by superior agencies and the relations of these agencies with the enterprise are not regulated by civil legislation. Therefore the treatment of economic accountability as a purely civil law category does not strengthen but destroys the economic independence of the enterprise and leaves them without legal protection in their relations with superior agencies. Economic law, regulating these relations as well as others, guarantees the economic accountability of enterprises against violations which have taken place in the past just because civil law illusions were substituted for real guarantees of economic accountability. His reply to the third argument is much weaker, because it rests on the assumption that in the aftermath of the 1965 Kosygin reform relations of authority and subordination would tend to be replaced by mutual rights and duties in the rejection of administrative methods in the economy. We have seen in the previous chapter that this is not how the 1965 reform turned out. Laptev argues that, in both horizontal and vertical economic relations there are

combined at the present civil-law and planning-organisational elements, and this shows the unity in principle of these relations and the incorrectness of separating them in legal regulation. "The unity of the management of the economy and the conduct of economic activity is the basis of the economic reform. From this must proceed also the development of economic legislation regulating all details of the single process of socialist economic operations."

Thus Laptev's ultimate argument in favour of a single Economic Code rests on positing a unity in principle to all socialist economic operations which the law must then recognise and regulate. In this, he differs little from Bratus' who simply posited a differently conceived unity as the basis for his different propositions for the organisation of law. While Laptev's criticisms seem to be substantial, and while his responses to some criticisms of his position seem acceptable, both sides in this debate are subject to Hirst's strictures against conceiving of the law as recognising a prior realm of relations between agents which it then sets out to regulate. Since the law partly defines the relations between agents, coherence is a worthwhile objective, and codification is one useful means of achieving this. However, such conclusions cannot automatically enable one to decide what range of laws (or governmental normative acts) need to be codified under one rubric, or what the relations should be between the various branches of law. Laptev's argument that, say, a Construction Code and Banking Code would need to be co-ordinated could equally well be applied to relations between the proposed Economic Code and other branches of law. The differentiation of law into various branches occurs because of the problems of unification, and arguments for a single

Economic Code of the U.S.S.R. will need to be conducted on some other basis than the supposed unitary nature of the economy. The broader the span or range of a legal code, the greater the danger of internal inconsistency within the domain which it purports to regulate; the corollary of this is that there is a greater danger of avoidance or evasion of the law by various means, including simple confusion as to which laws are applicable. It would seem then that to be effective the law must, like the technical aspects of an economic plan, be capable of specifying agents and relations between them with reasonable precision and be capable of enforcing those relations (or enforcing the conditions for negotiating those relations), while at the same time maintaining a reasonable degree of coherence with other domains being legally regulated and with other forms of non-legal regulation. This is a problem to which there is no final or optimum solution; acceptable solutions will depend on the theorisation of existing social relations and on current political objectives.

Even within the relatively narrow sphere considered here of administrative law and civil law concerned with the regulation of the economy, there is a substantial diversity of legal relations. For example, in the area of establishing and fulfilling contracts, the State Arbitration of the U.S.S.R. is still the main agency for adjudicating in contract disputes, including pre-contract disputes. Although it is attached to the Council of Ministers, it cannot adjudicate a contract dispute between enterprises within the same Ministry. It can establish fault and assess damages, but it requires the consent of both parties before exacting sanctions which have not been legislated for, or before setting the amount of the sanctions above the legislated requirement, if this is to be

written into the contract. Unplanned contracts (for example, within the collective farm sector) are also actionable in the courts. There are various model contracts between state enterprises and private citizens. Thus, the possibilities for codification depend partly on the diversity of relations which are already legally specified.

This diversity, and the legal inconsistency which often accompanies it, should lead to caution in analysing the effectivity of the law in social relations. It is partly for this reason that the Soviet state cannot be treated as emanating from law. Even though legal definitions of institutions partly determine its structure, political determinants of the state structure (forms of struggle between agencies, as well as forms of co-operation) do not simply take place in legally defined arenas according to legally defined norms of conduct. For this reason, the Soviet state and the forms of politics associated with it will be analysed together.

II State and Politics

One need look no further than Hough and Fainsod¹⁵ for an adequate institutional account of the Soviet state (The Supreme Soviet, its Praesidium, its Standing Committees, the Council of Ministers, the Ministries and State Committees and so on). It is not proposed to repeat this account here, although Hough's analysis of both state and party institutions will be discussed, since the effectivity of institutions cannot be ignored. The Soviet state and politics will be appraised from the viewpoint of what such an analysis contributes to an understanding of the formation of economic and social policies affecting the relations of production. This approach diverges from those which analyse the state in terms of the representation of class interests¹⁶,

since the impact of state policy on the relations of production is not going to be treated as an outcome of the successful representation of class interests, but rather as an outcome of struggle between various (state and non-state) agencies, whose objectives or interests need not coincide with those of any particular class, however defined. As already indicated in the preceding section on law, the state is not going to be analysed in terms of the developing conditions under which it could wither away, since the concept of a social totality composed of a unitary agency (for example, 'the people') on which such a conception rests has been abandoned. Even in the absence of class relations, the classical Marxist conception of a unitary property at the disposal of the free, associated producers is impossible to sustain, since the diversity of uses to which the property could be put will entail a diversity of agencies disposing of parts of the total social property and a diversity of means of calculating the various objectives and means of securing them: in other words, some division of labour is inevitable.

Thus without arguing for a structural necessity of the state, the Soviet state will not be criticised for refusing to wither away or to conform to Lenin's conception of a 'semi-state'. However, such a position does not amount to a refusal to consider whether the Soviet state is repressive, authoritarian or in some sense undemocratic. The classical Marxist approach has tended to criticise 'bourgeois' or Parliamentary democracy for retaining an institutional separation between the decision-making agencies of the state and the working class or the people, and has proposed that true democracy will overcome this separation.¹⁷ The current

Soviet theory of the state, which according to Hough is closely associated with Fedor Burlatskii, attempts to treat the Soviet state in the stage of 'developed socialism' or 'advanced socialist society' as an 'all-people's state'.¹⁸ Even ignoring the problematic relationship between this position and the classical Marxist position, the current official Soviet theory of the state, effectively enshrined in the 1977 Constitution, faces the problem that 'the Soviet people' is a 'fictional' entity in the sense that it is not a homogenous unity. Even officially sanctioned discourses such as the Constitution divide the population up in terms of workers, peasants and employees, and in terms of nationalities. To take only the latter form of differentiation (national distinctiveness), it is by no means clear that Soviet nationalities policy is "reducing national self-consciousness", as White (1979) puts it.¹⁹ After reviewing various tendencies which seem to support the official view of the developing 'complete unity' of the Soviet people, White shows that the situation is by no means clear-cut, and argues that the national-territorial framework, "far from providing for the peaceful solution of the nationalities question which was originally envisaged, may in fact have led to precisely the opposite result by establishing a system in which sectional interests, denied any other form of expression, can in practice take only the form of 'nationalism'."²⁰ White argues that "it may be significant that recent pronouncements have placed more emphasis upon the 'harmonious relations' which exist between the nationalities in the U.S.S.R. than upon their ultimate disappearance."²¹

In the face of such divergences within the Soviet population, any theory of democracy which criticises the Soviet state for failing to represent 'the whole people' is bound to be an effective means of attack on the Soviet state, just as the current official theory of the state is bound to provide an inadequate means of defence. A theory which attempts to legitimise the state as representing the interests of 'the whole people' yet recognises significant forms of differentiation among 'the people' is wide open to a critique which identifies an officially recognised sub-unit of 'the people' as a constituency whose democratic interests are not being represented.²² This weakness in the official theory is not too important if only a few subdivisions of 'the people' are officially recognised and if the state has the means to prevent the articulation of objectives which are not officially sanctioned, as is the case in the Soviet Union to some extent. However, this does not necessarily mean that conflicts of interest are extremely restricted in the Soviet Union: it simply means that the scope for legitimate conflicts is very narrow. This follows from the aim of a unitary agency (the people) which is enshrined in the Soviet Constitution, and which renders illegitimate any critique of Soviet democracy as not representing the interests of an important (perhaps even officially recognised) section of the population.

Nevertheless, the discursive play between the official aim of the unity of the people (which recognises that this unity has not yet been achieved) and the official designation of sub-units within the population (workers, nationalities and so on) means that even official discourses can 'recognise' specific means of representation of the interests of those sub-units (as in the already cited case of workers')

collectives, whose legal and organisational form is by no means clear). Consequently, even the official discourse on the Soviet state is ambiguous about the unity of the people, although the implicit possibility of legitimate conflicts of interest is not acknowledged. The occasional remarks on 'harmonious relations' which appear in official statements seem to both refer to actual or potential conflicts yet designate them as illegitimate. Yet in another sense some conflicts of interest (conflicts arising from diverse objectives) are regarded as 'legitimate' if not in official public discourse, at least de facto because they do not threaten the institutional structure of the Soviet state. These are conflicts between and within state agencies, and while they are not the only form of political struggle in the Soviet Union (for example, there are also the activities of the dissidents and the feminists) these struggles are probably the most important form of conflict, apart from intra-party conflict, in so far as the latter is separate.

Politics and the Relations of Production

It seems appropriate to concentrate on struggles between state agencies over economic policy, and to discuss the related differences within the party in conjunction with them, because according to White, one of the main sources of support for the current political set-up in the Soviet Union is its economic performance.²³ It also focuses the discussion on the political conditions of the relations of production, which is the main reason for analysing the law, state and politics in this thesis. This approach may seem to have much in common with Brown's brief discussion of Soviet politics in terms of 'bureaucratic pluralism',²⁴ or the apparently independent and lengthier analysis of 'institutional pluralism' by Hough.²⁵ Yet, as will be seen,

while the analysis here will rely heavily on the work of Hough, the theoretical basis of the analysis will be somewhat different. Furthermore Hough's analysis is by no means confined to an analysis of the upper levels of party and state, which is what forms the main focus of concern here. Such an approach may appear strange to those unfamiliar with fairly recent developments in the study of Soviet politics, and indeed Hough spends a considerable amount of space discussing alternative approaches, as does Brown.²⁶ Consequently, it is impossible to proceed in this contentious area without at least briefly discussing the main alternative approaches.

Totalitarianism

Probably the best known approach, at least in popular discussions, is analysis of Soviet politics in terms of totalitarianism. This approach has, as Brown indicates, become increasingly difficult to sustain in view of the widely acknowledged changes in Soviet politics since the fall of Khrushchev. The major element in Brown's defence of the concept²⁷ is that it can be used as an ideal type, which by accentuating certain elements of Soviet reality, can provide a classificatory framework for the periodisation of Soviet history. Thus the years 1934 to 1953 would be the period most closely approximating to the ideal type of totalitarianism. However, the use of ideal types, for which Hough also displays a weakness, is by no means as unproblematic as Brown seems to imagine.²⁸ In addition, the content of the ideal type of totalitarianism itself poses further problems, for there is little to distinguish it from the concept of autocracy as deployed by Friedrich and Brzezinski²⁹, except the additional use of modern technology (the mass media and modern forms of effective armed combat) and bureaucratic co-ordination of the whole

economy. This concept of a (modernised) autocracy performs many of the same theoretical and political functions as the concept of "Oriental Despotism" which has been popular from the time of the Enlightenment to Wittfogel as a means of casting 'the West' in a favourable light, but which collapses under detailed scrutiny of the societies which are supposed to form the basis of the analysis in question.³⁰

The main paradox of the 'totalitarian' approach to the study of Soviet politics is that it emphasises tight central control, yet assigns to the mass party and the mass media the functions of mobilisation of the population for mass participation in politics, while denying that this mass participation has any significant effects on the form and scope of central control. Such a position can only be sustained on the assumption of almost literally total control of the population, so that 'participation' is of the most passive and formalistic kind. Quite apart from the rationalism of such a position (the implicit claim that the means of control are fully adequate to the imputed ends of the political leadership), the evidence produced by Hough³¹ and even by White³³ on contemporary political participation and political beliefs is difficult to reconcile with such a view. Even in discussing the Stalin period, one need hardly claim that the society was under totalitarian control in order to demonstrate that politics were in many respects conducted in a repressive and autocratic manner. As Hough points out³³, "for all its popularity as a description of the Stalin era, the totalitarian model always had certain shortcomings. The drive to transform society, to remake man, and to keep the administrators from becoming a privileged elite implies the continuing use of radical reformers against established authority.

In practice, it requires the toleration of a considerable amount of disorder..... The drive to achieve total political control, on the other hand, suggests restraints on the wild radicals, for such persons may well be disrespectful of all authority. This aspect of the model implies the re-establishment of authority and authority figures, even many of a traditional nature. It suggests rigidity in structure rather than a constant transformation. The totalitarian model gained plausibility as a depiction of the Stalin regime because the policies of the First Five-Year Plan period could be cited as evidence of a determination to transform society while the rigid controls in the late Stalin period could be cited as evidence of the authoritarian features. In the process, however, the conservative nature of most of the Stalin period - the immobilism of the Stalin regime in the dictator's last years - was obscured from view."

It could perhaps be argued that Brown's use of the ideal type of totalitarianism (which he explicitly distinguishes from a model of totalitarianism) and his restriction of its applicability to the period from after the First Five-Year Plan to Stalin's death mean that Brown's use of totalitarianism escapes from the above criticism by Hough. Certainly Brown distances himself from Friedrich and Brzezinski, but he retains the elements of an all-embracing ideology, police terror on a mass scale, which atomises society, and the technological means to impose central control over an entire country. Brown thus probably does escape the above criticism by Hough, in restricting the use of 'totalitarianism' to the period of 'immobilism', but Brown's position must then be subject to Hough's other criticism that "the totalitarian model was especially weak

in gliding over the implications of the succession," namely that the experience of the terror placed limits on the post-Stalin conduct of politics. In contrast to Brown's use of the ideal type of totalitarianism to draw attention to factors inhibiting more radical political change, Hough's argument implies that 'the totalitarian model' is weak on the "long-term dynamics of the system" and precludes an analysis of certain sources of change. Nor can Brown escape criticism by claiming that totalitarianism is an ideal type and that consequently the absence of some of its elements from the real situation being analysed does not invalidate its use as a heuristic device. Certainly ideal types are intended as heuristic devices, and unlike other forms of model, the aim is not to construct an ideal type as similar to the real as possible, but ideal types nevertheless are a form of model. As such they purport to give knowledge because of the relation between the model and the real: ideal types are simply thought to do so by registering the discrepancies, rather than the similarities, between the model and the real. However, like other models, they are thought to embody a set of relationships between their elements which are in principle capable of being manifested in the real. It is this correspondence (and partial non-correspondence) between model and reality which is thought to make knowledge of the model also knowledge of the reality it is supposed to help explain. Consequently, if one of the elements of the ideal type is not present in reality, this epistemological position implies that a case must be made out that the relations between the other elements are not thereby significantly changed. No such case is made out by Brown; it is simply assumed. So even if one accepted in general the use of ideal types, Brown's

defence of this particular one is inadequate. It would be difficult to claim now, for example, that police terror operates on a mass scale in the Soviet Union or that police activity results in an atomised society. Such a conclusion would be at serious odds with Hough's work, or White's somewhat different form of analysis. There is simply no need to conceptualise the current forms of suppression of opposition, of policy formation or of political mobilisation in totalitarian terms.

Elite Theory

Another approach to the analysis of Soviet politics relies heavily on the use of the concept of an elite, or oligarchy. This approach is only briefly discussed in Hough and Fainsod³⁴, perhaps because Hough retains the use of the term elite, albeit used in a very loose sense, and is consequently not too critical of it. The notion of an elite refers to a relatively small, self-conscious group which is differentiated from the rest of society by its social location and by its access to esoteric knowledge.³⁵ It is the common access to knowledge not widely available which constitutes it as a group, and the resulting cohesion is in some sense (perhaps indirectly, depending on the theory in question) related to the successful seizure or retention of power (which is conceived of in a zero-sum sense). Hough at points deviates from this position by arguing that the elite need not be unified.³⁶ He also deviates from the zero-sum conception of power in his criticism of Dahl's definition of power (which, although Hough does not mention it, is identical to Weber's conception): "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do."³⁷ Hough argues against this by pointing to the difficulties of analysing power in terms of a counterfactual (what B would otherwise have done). Since

B is presumably subject to various influences, the attribution of B's action to the power of A (as opposed to C, D or any other source of influence) is problematic.³⁸ More importantly, Hough points out that "power is clearly situational and relational in nature. In the words of V.O. Key, power is not 'a substance that could be poured into a keg, stored and drawn upon as the need arises.' It varies with the issue at stake and the circumstances existing at the moment."³⁹

These two modifications by Hough (allowing for disunity in the elite, and effectively abandoning the zero-sum conception of power) seriously compromise his (or indeed any other) use of the concept of elite. This is an issue which has been clouded by the common use, particularly in American political science, of the concept of 'competing elites' in such notions as 'polyarchy'. This treatment of elites makes it possible to retain the concept of elite, with its connotation of power concentrated in the hands of a small group, while avoiding the problems of arguing that there are no serious divisions among the 'holders' of power. However, this latter approach still requires that there be no serious disunity within each elite, whereas Hough allows for disunity within 'the' elite. Even if one argued that this puts Hough close to the 'polyarchy' position, Hough's criticism of the zero-sum conception of power means that the kind of pluralism implied by the 'competing elites' approach must be abandoned in favour of a pluralism that has more in common with the so-called 'interest group' approach. (Of course, one could abandon the conception of pluralism altogether, but Hough does not take up this option). If power is not something that can be held (and this is the implication of Hough's reference to Key), then it cannot be seized or distributed unequally in the manner of a physical

thing like gunpowder. Such a metaphor must be rejected if one accepts Hough's view that power is situational and relational in character.

The focussing of the analysis on the situational and relational character of power means that the theorisation of the social location of people or groups thought to be part of the elite must be taken more seriously. The common Weberian approach treating the elite as constituted by the chiefs of bureaucracies⁴⁰ shows some of the difficulties of the use of any concept of an elite. At first sight it does seem to specify the social location of the elite, but it is extremely difficult to specify where the elite ends and the mass begins when dealing with a bureaucracy with (in most conceptions) a hierarchical chain of command. It is difficult to restrict the elite simply to the titular heads of the various bureaucracies while denying that their immediate subordinates are also comparatively powerful in relation to the mass, and once this is acknowledged it is not clear where the line should be drawn.⁴¹ It is not drawn in terms of the social location of the elite, but in terms of its self-consciousness as a group. The elite is thus treated as a collective subject and the esoteric knowledge to which it has access (which may be as mundane as simply the knowledge of the unpublicised activities of the other members of the elite) then becomes the main defining feature of the elite: the apparent definition in terms of social location has collapsed into an almost tautological definition of the elite as a collective subject. Such a conception is simply not compatible with a situational and relational conception of power since the concept of power entailed by such a definition of an elite is of power deriving from its unity as a group and its capacity for

collective action to realise the collective ends of the group, thus wielding power over the mass. In other words, the concept of elite implies a unity of purpose within the elite, and a zero-sum conception of power, which are precisely the two aspects of the concept which Hough questions. His attempted eclectic retention of the concept under these circumstances is pointless.

Hough's Approach to Soviet Politics

Hough also tries to retain other explanations of Soviet politics, namely the 'directed society' approach, the 'conflict school' and the interest group approach, since they each focus attention on aspects of Soviet politics which he wishes to discuss. For example, the directed society approach is for him clearly useful "in pointing to the unquestioned authority of the top political officials in the Soviet Union over all spheres of life, the placing of the most important posts in all institutions within the nomenklatura of the party Central Committee, and the highly centralised nature of the formal political and administrative structure."⁴² However, in fairness to Hough, it must be said that he does argue that the totalitarian approach, the elite-domination approach and the directed society approach all suffer from a lack of serious attention to the complex process of policy formation. It is to Hough's credit that he does pay serious attention to this aspect of Soviet politics, without denying the repressive and authoritarian aspects of contemporary Soviet politics. This is the basis of his discussion of Soviet politics in terms of 'institutional pluralism'. He claims that the 'directed society models' are really models of the administrative side of the political system and argues (1979, page 528): "While the directed society and elite-domination models focus on the manner in which the Soviet Union is controlled, the interest group

and conflict approaches really are more concerned with another aspect of the political process: the way in which decisions are reached." Consequently there is for Hough no reason why these approaches cannot be 'wedded together' to give a more complete picture. While this eclectic approach at times avoids the problem of what Tartarin (discussed in the previous Chapter of this thesis) called 'global definitions', and enables Hough to treat Soviet politics as a complex combination of struggle and bureaucratic regulation, it leaves open the question of the adequacy of current conceptualisations of Soviet politics.

Admittedly there are some apparent grounds for this in the lack of available information, but Hough does seem to recognise that the current concepts being used in 'political science' leave something to be desired, and in view of that his failure to attempt some form of reconceptualisation is puzzling.⁴³ One could begin the process of attempting a new approach to Soviet politics by examining Hough's remark that much of the literature of the conflict school has tended towards an image of the Soviet political system in which the content of policy is determined by a struggle of Politburo factions that are largely independent of major societal interests. It is by no means clear what Hough or the conflict school would consider as major societal interests, yet this relation to major societal interests seems to be a criterion of the extent to which the Soviet Union could be described as democratic. Democracy, it seems for Hough, is closely related to the responsiveness of policy formation to major societal interests. The expression of these interests depends on a plurality of interest groups, which contend with each other in attempting to influence the process of policy formation. If such interest groups are

absent or ineffective (because ignored or suppressed), then struggles over policy formation take place between factions within the 'ruling group' or elite and the political system is undemocratic, as the conflict school argues.

What are the grounds for distinguishing between this position of the conflict school and the interest group approach? For many purposes, Hough puts the two schools in the same category, yet the concept of a faction implies a division within a group or organisation, while the reference to 'interest groups' implies divisions between groups or organisations. The 'interest groups' approach thus implies that struggles over policy formation are wider in scope and reflect wider (if not major) societal interests, and are accordingly more democratic. In other words, the two theoretical positions on the Soviet Union appear to have much in common conceptually, while differing over the extent of political struggle and over the social forces contending in the struggles.

It is difficult to be more precise, since various assertions are made by Hough which are inconsistent with the positions as I have outlined them, but these seem to me to be an effect of the vagueness of the positions themselves. Both positions seem to conceive of democracy as a mechanism for reflecting or responding to the underlying interests of the population (in contrast to the position of Hindess outlined above in note 22). This implies that these interests exist regardless of whether they are articulated or not, which entails all the problems of designating the appropriate counterfactual to the current situation: which sections of the population are distinct from other ones, and which interests ought they to pursue? In other words, the conception of the underlying interests

of the population (as opposed to interests or objectives which are articulated) raises all the problems of the attempted derivation of political objectives from social locations, the main problem being that the social locations of agents are by no means necessarily structurally static or unambiguous. Yet, whatever the problems of this view of democracy which seems to be shared by both positions, Hough (1979, page 529) also cites "the classic western definition" of interest groups which defines them in terms of shared attitudes that form the basis for claims upon other groups in society. In this definition then, the only interests or objectives to be considered are those explicitly formulated by self-conscious groups. While this avoids the problems of designating the appropriate counterfactual, it does mean that 'meaningful conflict' occurs between the groups, not within and across them. This must be so if the groups advance claims on the basis of shared attitudes, as opposed to other bases, despite what Hough refers to (1979, page 529) as "the original theorists' repeated contentions to the contrary".

There appears to be genuine confusion in Hough's work over whether interest groups should be considered as constituted by shared attitudes, or on some other basis. Only a few pages before the definition of interest groups in terms of shared attitudes, Hough argues that interest group theorists focus far more upon bureaucratic or occupational groups, and that some theorists, while in the broadest terms still working within the interest group framework, have abandoned the word 'group' with its connotations of unity. Instead of 'groups' these authors use the words 'tendencies', 'whirlpools' or 'complexes'. This is close to Hough's own position, and forms part of his conceptualisation of 'institutional pluralism'

(1979, page 526); as such it will be discussed later. It is probably better not to use 'the interest group framework' in its broadest sense, which as indicated is confusing as to the basis of group formation, but rather to distinguish between a 'complexes' approach, and an interest group approach (which defines groups in terms of shared attitudes).

However, Hough does not consistently distinguish between the two approaches, and if one follows Hough and distinguishes between a broadly defined interest group approach and a conflict approach (which tends to concentrate on struggles between "factions based on personalistic ties to important Politburo leaders" ,1979, page 524), then one is effectively forced to choose between an analysis which allows a potentially wide scope for struggles of various kinds and one which really allows only for a rather confined struggle on a personalistic basis. The only way to avoid this choice is to combine the two positions, but this means conceding that the struggles between the Politburo factions are related in some fashion to the other struggles, rather than arguing that they are "independent of major societal interests" (as the conflict school usually argues).

Once the possibility of a relation between factional struggles within the Politburo and other struggles is conceded it is only possible to retain the conflict approach by claiming that interest groups pursuing their own objectives and bargaining with each other have little effect unless the leaders of the interest groups associate themselves with one of the leading Politburo figures and his faction, as Hough points out (1979, page 534). This argument implies that interest groups only have the effectivity they are allowed by the state of play in factional struggles. There is no reason why this should be the case for any length of time,

since the outcomes of struggles are unpredictable. Hough reviews the evidence of factional activity, but concludes that although it clearly does go on, its relation to the policy formation process is unclear (1979, page 541).

Despite the meagre evidence, Hough concludes that factional struggles within the top leadership are not of paramount importance in forming policy, and by implication the factional struggles among the leadership are not of paramount importance in Soviet politics. Hough is thus opting for an interest group approach, in the broadest sense.

However, if one compares the interest groups approach in the narrower sense, defined in terms of shared attitudes, with the conflict or factional approach, both these positions leave one in the awkward situation of analysing politics primarily in terms of the actors' perceptions, that is, in terms of individual or collective subjects. Consequently, they make it difficult to analyse the conditions of struggle in terms other than the concepts thought to be deployed by the contending forces themselves.

In contrast to these two positions (which like the totalitarian, elite and directed society positions, Hough does not completely reject) what I call Hough's 'own' position seems to be an improvement. This position of 'institutional pluralism' conceives of Soviet politics as a series of 'complexes', that is complexes of agencies. Relations within and between complexes are affected by 'tendencies' whose interaction with other tendencies form 'whirlpools' on particular policy areas. A 'tendency' consists of an expression of views by a loose coalition of actors, operating at different levels of the political structure, whose articulations of views tend in the same direction, but who are unlikely to be fully aware of the

common thrust and consequences of their activity. Hough follows this approach to some extent, which has the merit of avoiding the need to assume that the articulation of objectives requires either self-consciousness as a group or explicit group organisation. However, in conceiving of the interaction of tendencies in whirlpools, he adds the assumption that political conflicts in the Soviet Union, as in the U.S.A., tend to be compartmentalised, with the debate in such policy areas being largely limited to those whose careers are associated with it, those most directly affected by the decision, and a few who have developed a special interest in it.

Hough does not advocate this position very strongly. He says (1979, page 526): "If such an analysis were applied to the Soviet system, the scholar would focus on analogous policy areas, predict a number of 'tendencies' within each area, but suspect that they would largely be limited to the confines of the complex." Later on the same page, he adds, in an equally diffident manner: "If the analysis were pushed to the extreme, it might be suggested that the Soviet Union has moved toward the model of 'institutional pluralism.' In a system . . . marked by institutional pluralism one can speak of 'complexes' and of 'whirlpools' of specialised party, state, 'public' and scientific personnel working within the respective policy areas. The definition of goals formally remains the responsibility of the party leadership, but except for ensuring that the Marxist goals in social policy are pursued, the leadership is not to act with 'voluntarism' - that is, it generally should follow the advice of the specialised 'complexes' or 'whirlpools' in their respective policy areas, limiting itself to a mediation of the conflicts that arise among them. In practice, policy-

making power informally comes to be delegated to these complexes."

Such an approach both attempts to conceptualise struggles without positing a necessary group cohesiveness to the contending forces (which would imply that personnel always formed into the same groups on different policy issues) and attempts to relate these struggles to the existing structure of political institutions in the Soviet Union. Consequently, it seems to be the most promising line of analysis among what might be termed conventional Western political science work on the Soviet Union, despite the apparent diffidence of Hough in advocating it and his refusal to give up other modes of analysis. It is worth seeing what use Hough is able to make of it, given his command of the empirical material available on Soviet politics.

In discussing policy initiatives (that is, the beginning of struggles to change policy or develop policy in a previously neglected area), Hough argues (1979, page 531) that the initiation process surely must include the stream of proposals and pressures impinging upon the leadership and the apparatus coming from a variety of directions, particularly from individual specialists writing in specialised journals who do not necessarily represent any 'interest group's' perspective. However, while such specialists may (in my terminology) make available new means of political calculation, Hough makes some interesting points about what he calls 'agenda-setting and the building of support'. Since there is a vast range of potential alternative objectives, Hough asks (1979, page 532): "How is attention narrowed to a manageable range of alternatives? How is support built for the different alternatives? What types of alliances tend to

be formed most often in the struggle to achieve policy goals? The answers to these questions will depend in large part on the level of our analysis. The setting of the agenda and the building of support extends from the first substantial efforts to focus public or governmental attention on a proposal to the movement of that proposal toward a final vote in Congress or the Politburo or a final decision by the General Secretary or President. Obviously these processes are going to be very different in character."

Hough argues (and no one would disagree, I imagine) that the most important questions in the Soviet Union are decided by the General Secretary and the Politburo (the party leadership). He goes on (1979, page 533): "This agenda must basically be set by top Politburo leaders and Central Committee secretaries (and perhaps their personal assistants) on the basis of suggestions made by Central Committee departments, the governmental agencies, the top regional leaders, and leading scholars. The alliances within the Politburo must be based on a number of factors but similarity in philosophical orientation and/or in the basic interests of the branch being supervised by the respective members must be of fundamental importance. Such a level of analysis, however, is rather formalistic What really interests us is how the key political decision-makers become convinced that a proposal should be on the agenda, and how they come to support this alternative rather than another. Are these decisions made autonomously on the basis of the ideology and values of the decision-makers, or do they reflect societal pressures of various types?"

Despite the attempts by the leadership to define the agenda, vigourously using the secret police and censorship to enforce its definition, Hough argues (1979, page 534) that the leadership's "decision to permit debates implies a willingness to let others try to organise support for their ideas, at least in a verbal way. Its desire to be exposed to information about societal shortcomings and to proposals for improvement implies a willingness to let others influence the setting of the agenda, at least as long as the proposals do not become too threatening. And regardless of the regime's desires, nothing could prevent some of those affected by a policy from attempting to influence it in whatever manner they can". This then is the basis for Hough's concept of institutional pluralism: outside the Politburo there is scope for formulating objectives and struggling for them, but since factional victories and defeats do not coincide with policy decisions (on the evidence presented by Hough) the institutions, such as ministries, trade unions, regional party and governmental units, and scientific institutes, must be the most important agencies in defining which problems are most important and which solutions are the reasonable policy alternatives. Hough justifies his 'institutional pluralism' (as opposed to some other basis for the development of a plurality of contending agencies) by arguing (1979, page 543) that "the antifaction rule is fairly effective in curbing the formation of any substantial network of alliances along philosophical lines among regional and other middle-level political officials. The nature of censorship - especially the restriction of the more sensitive debates to specialised journals - strengthens the tendency for the policy relevant alliances to remain compartmentalised within specialised 'whirlpools' even more fully than occurs in the West, with the selective censorship

making it difficult to appeal through the press for outside allies."

The concept of 'institutional pluralism' as used by Hough, then, is an attempt to deal with what he calls the informal distribution of power. He argues (1979, page 547) that there has been a major diffusion of power in the Soviet Union in recent decades, especially since the removal of Khrushchev. The word 'pluralism' is used to denote this, and the word 'institutional' is intended to indicate that it is different from Western pluralism, not that institutions are the only actors in the political process. Thus Hough argues (1979, page 547): "Institutional pluralism means only that the legitimate political process must take place within an institutional framework and perhaps the phrase 'institutionalized pluralism' would convey the meaning better. Our discussion of policy processes shows the Soviet system as a highly participatory one for the individual as well as for the institution. The distinctive feature of individual participation in the Soviet Union is that people must work through official channels. They cannot picket, hand out leaflets, speak on the street corner, or the like: they cannot form interest groups around issues; they cannot organize competing political factions or parties." One could thus conclude from Hough's analysis that this limited diffusion of power and growth of participation has strengthened the hand of various state agencies in the process of policy formation.

It is this aspect of his position which makes it relevant to the concern of this thesis with the analysis of struggles among state agencies (particularly over economic policy). Hough's analysis both shows that state agencies

are in a position to struggle for certain of their own objectives and that there are effective limits on the extent of such struggles, limits which are set by the regulatory capacities of other party and state agencies. In other words, Hough begins to analyse the conditions (including the limits) of struggle between state and party agencies. Hough's analysis avoids most of the critical remarks on interest group theory made by Brown⁴⁴, but there are still problems with the concept of 'institutional pluralism', as Hough in a sense acknowledges (1979, page 548), when he asks what aspects of pluralism are associated with the consequences "that we associate with pluralism". The concept of institutional pluralism (like 'Western' pluralism, or the concept of totalitarianism or the other conceptualisations of Soviet politics discussed so far in this chapter) designates what is considered to be an empirical set of relations which produces certain effects. Since the concept refers to the complex of social relations as a whole (and this is a 'global definition' in the sense referred to by Tartarin in Chapter Two) the relevance of the definition becomes questionable as soon as part of that complex of social relations is no longer considered to be present. Once part of the complex of social relations has disappeared, can the former concept still be used? Which aspects of the complex are 'really' associated with the effects which it is thought to engender? As we have seen, the problem cannot be really avoided by designating the concept as an 'ideal' type. The insistence on attempting 'global definitions' creates this problem and gives rise to the explicit eclecticism that is by no means confined to Hough or Brown. Thus, for example, the 'elite-domination model' is perhaps combined with elements of the 'interest group model' to deal conceptually with, say, the relatively restricted access to

some struggles co-existing with wider access to other struggles. Apart from eclecticism, this kind of mode of conceptualising Soviet politics also gives rise to charges that a particular 'model' is 'outdated' (for example, totalitarianism).

The combination of 'bureaucratic regulation' and struggle against it by sub-agents is what produces the pattern of access to some struggles (and thus access to policy formation) by certain state and party agencies. The varying degrees of openness of policy formation and implementation to proposals, initiatives or simply resistance from subordinate state agencies seem to be related to the priority attached to the policy in question by the most important central party and state agencies. In other words while the central agencies cannot completely determine the political agenda or determine which state agencies can have an impact on a particular policy, they do preponderate in structuring the access of other state and party agencies to the processes of policy formation and implementation, so that the degree of openness of such processes varies with the issue. This is largely managed by designating certain state and party agencies as the ones to be involved in particular policies. Hough's concept of 'institutional pluralism' is an attempt to deal with the greater openness of policy formation in some issues, while not denying that this is still largely restricted to specific state agencies. However, because the concept functions as a descriptive designation of a historically specific complex of social relations (a global definition), it is vulnerable to historical changes in those social relations.

An Alternative Approach to Soviet Politics.

What is needed is a mode of conceptualising politics in which concepts do not become redundant once it is conceded that fairly important social changes have taken place. Indeed the concepts must be usable to conceptualise the changes themselves. It is for this reason that the concept of 'arenas of struggle' is proposed here as a key element in the conceptualisation of Soviet politics, although it need not be restricted to the Soviet Union, and is by no means used for the first time here.⁴⁵ An 'arena of struggle' refers to the conditions under which agencies (or individuals) contend for the realisation of their objectives. The arena may be institutionally regulated, that is, legally, administratively or customarily regulated. The extent of the arena is defined by the range of issues, the scope of the various struggles and the nature of the contending agents; in addition, the extent of the arena may be determined by other conditions of its existence, such as the outcome of struggle in another arena. Precisely because some arenas are institutionally regulated and defined, and societies are institutionally differentiated into a variety of agencies of decision, struggles cannot all take place in the same arena. The articulation of arenas of struggle is thus an important area of analysis, since the relations between arenas may change, and arenas may appear and disappear. Thus arenas cannot be considered in complete isolation, although the extent to which the conditions of struggle are taken into account in a particular analysis will vary in terms of what is pertinent to that analysis. Thus, outcomes of Parliamentary struggles in Britain may affect, say, trade union struggles with individual employers, but for some aspects of trade union struggles little reference may be necessary

to their legal conditions.

This mode of analysis does not attribute in advance any particular set of qualities to any arena or to the agents engaged in struggle in it. Agents may be involved in more than one arena. The precise nature of the agents and the alignment of forces engaged in an arena is a matter for analysis in each particular situation. The outcome of the struggles could include a change in the nature of the agents engaged in the struggle, a change in the alignment of forces, a policy change, a change in the extent of the arena, its mode of operation or its relation to other arenas, and so on. The analysis of struggles taking place in an arena requires reference to the socially available means of calculation of political objectives and of ways of achieving them. This aspect of the analysis implies recourse to at least some of the material used by Brown and White in their analyses of 'political culture'.⁴⁶ Without recourse to currently available means of calculation, the analysis of the formation and pursuit of objectives or 'interests' would be adversely affected by the common tendency to reduce 'interests' or political objectives to the social location of the agents pursuing them, whether it be class position, location in the bureaucracy, nationality or whatever. The available means of calculation may be fairly slow to change on some issues or in some arenas, but may change rapidly in others (where specialist policy debates may be taking place, where there are continual shifts in alliances or where the arena is in a 'subordinate' position making it very susceptible to the outcomes

of struggles in other arenas). One of the problems of the concept of 'political culture', even though it refers to relatively distinct sub-cultures of various kinds, is that it provides little means of analysing the conditions of such differential changes in the socially available means of political calculation, although White's work does indicate that some such changes may be taking place in the Soviet Union. ⁴⁷

The legal or administrative regulation of the arena may well mean that the contending forces also have to cooperate as well as struggle with each other (for example, in British Parliamentary struggles over legislation). For this reason analyses of 'power' which treat it as a quality or attribute which is inherent in a particular social location run into difficulties: such a conception implies that the agent occupying that social location exercises power ipso facto over other agents and tends to treat cooperation by other agents as compliance. However, if the capacities of agents in an arena are conditioned by the actions of other agents (that is, if as Hough points out power is always situational and relational), power cannot be considered as a capacity to act which inheres in the social location of a certain agent (or class of agents): that capacity to act must always be related to conditions within (and outside of) the arena of struggle. Cooperation need not be merely compliance, since it may create dependence on the 'less powerful' agent. Consequently, the relative capacities of the contending agencies (perhaps even the same agencies) will vary in different arenas.

Hough provides ample evidence which could be used to support such an analysis of Soviet politics. For example, in the section on 'The Distribution of Power' in Chapter 14 of Hough and Fainsod (1979), Hough argues that the system is an authoritarian one in terms of political freedom (particularly for the individual), but points to the development of restraints on government that have developed in recent decades, including increased formal political controls over the police, and the development of informal constraints such as greater freedom of criticism. Hough argues that power in the Soviet Union varies with the policy area (1979, pages 550 and 551): "In the spheres of foreign and defense policy, one gains the impression of deep leadership involvement and of participation limited to specialists..... In the transportation realm, on the other hand, one has the sense of little leadership involvement, fairly wide debate in the media, and domination by the major interest group, the railroads. In the realm of wages, it is unclear who is making policy, but one gains the sense of real responsiveness to workers and peasants." He regards this variation of power with the policy area as the safest generalisation about the distribution of power in the Soviet Union. He goes on to argue as a second generalisation that the strongest political actors below the leadership level are 'vertical' or branch, not regional, officials (page 551): "Whether one wants to emphasise the role of the ministries, the Secretariat and departments of the Central Committee, or a specialised complex cutting across these and other institutions, one is talking about a type of politics that is different from, say, Yugoslavia, where bargaining among republics seems to dominate."

His third generalisation is that among the specialised branch interests those associated with industrial growth have been in a position of special power. His fourth generalisation ('the most difficult judgement of all') is that the distribution of income, which has shifted in an egalitarian manner in favour of workers and peasants, may well be a response to the power of these occupational groups.

On the basis of such conclusions it seems that the concern of this thesis with the political conditions of the relations of production (that is, struggles between state and party agencies) touches on what are in any case the most important arenas of struggle in Soviet politics. However, the analysis of such struggles, particularly struggles over attempts by the party leadership to regulate the Ministries, will not be concerned with which agent 'has the power', since power is not a capacity to act which is inherent in an agent occupying a particular social location. Rather the analysis will simply be concerned to elucidate the political relations operative between the top-level party and state agencies, since if power can be said to be located anywhere, it is located in the arenas of struggle, that is, in the political relations between agents, not in the agents themselves. This is not to deny that agencies can extend their capabilities by improving their internal organisation and their means of calculation, and increasing their resources, but such improvements themselves are conditioned by relations with other agents.

State and Party Agencies and Economic Policy

While constitutionally the Supreme Soviet is the supreme authority of the state, with two chambers (the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities), Hough's analysis makes it clear that it is not the most important political arena in the Soviet Union. While not

treating the Supreme Soviet simply as an ornamental figurehead, Hough (1979, page 368) argues that its role in the policy process is less than that of other major institutions. Its Standing Committees have increased their activity in recent years, which must have affected the process of policy formation to some extent, and its Praesidium does have legislative powers in between meetings of the Supreme Soviet itself. Nevertheless, a great deal more legislative work is done by the Council of Ministers, sometimes together with the Party Central Committee. Consequently, although the Supreme Soviet is a legislative body, and Soviet government is parliamentary in form, the parliament is not the only legislative body, and the legislative power of extraparlimentary organs such as the Central Committee constitutes a major restriction on the role of the Supreme Soviet. The Communist Party predominates over the state although as Hough points out (1979, page 449), this is not the same thing as party apparatus domination over the state apparatus.

Apart from the Supreme Soviet, and its associated arenas of Praesidium and Standing Committees, the Council of Ministers is as Hough says (1979, page 380) a vital institution in the Soviet political system, although its associated Praesidium is much more important since it is a smaller body composed of senior members of the Council, meeting more frequently, and is termed "the working organ of the Council of Ministers", empowered to decide "urgent questions" and to "speak in the name of the government of the U.S.S.R.", according to Hough (1979, page 381). The division of labour between the Praesidium of the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee Secretariat is obscure, according to Hough (1979, pages 382-383). It appears to

handle economic questions just below the level of significance required for Politburo consideration. The function of the various interdepartmental committees or commissions attached to the Council of Ministers are a mystery, since they are rarely even mentioned in Soviet sources. A little more is known, according to Hough, about the departments of the apparatus attached to the Council of Ministers. For our purposes, the main point to remember is that the Council of Ministers must examine the economic plan as a whole, and confirm the material balance of the most important economic items worked out by Gosplan.

Apart from the regulation of individual Ministries conducted by the Council of Ministers itself, or its associated agencies, the main regulatory agents are the top-level party agencies themselves : the Central Committee, its Secretariat (with its own apparatus) and the Politburo of the Central Committee. Their inter-relationships and their relations to the Ministries are discussed in Hough and Fainsod, 1979, Chapter 11 and 12 (that is, effectively by Hough). This discussion will rely heavily on the material provided there. The predominance of party over government is most clearly shown by the formal obligation (which is adhered to in practice) on party members working in government agencies to carry out the decrees of the extraparlimentary party committees, particularly the Central Committee. The only decisions which are unconditionally obligatory on the government are those emanating from the collective party organs, and except for a period in the 1940s and early 1950s, these have been the scene of the most crucial policymaking decisions. However, the relationship between party agencies and state agencies

is much more complicated than simply one apparatus subordinating the other, and it is in analysing these relationships that a concept like 'articulation of arenas of struggle' shows its uses. Many of the agencies themselves can be considered arenas of struggle, since the concept does not imply that the struggle need take a particular form or be conducted overtly or with a particular intensity. The arenas themselves must consequently be discussed in order to clarify the effectiveness with which activities within some agencies can be regulated by other agencies.

Thus, for example, many Western analyses (such as elite or totalitarian ones) treat the Party Congress as effectively regulated by the Central Committee or the Politburo, despite the fact that party rules designate it as the ultimate authority within the party. Yet Hough argues quite effectively that despite its tame appearance, speeches there are attempts to influence future policy, and that they may even affect current policy if a strong current of opinion is seen to be running among the delegates. Certainly, the speeches at the Twenty-Fifth Congress advocating that certain rivers be diverted to flow into Central Asia seem to have had an effect, since that is now official policy, despite lobbying to locate industry in Siberia (where the raw materials are), rather than Central Asia (where the population is rising quickly).⁴⁸ Certainly, however, the Congress does not have democratic control of the Central Committee in the sense of a free vote to elect the Central Committee. It is not clear how the 'slate' of candidates to be elected is compiled, but it may be that the size of the 'slate' is manipulated so that the Central Committee generates a balance of forces inside the Politburo. If

Congress members crossed off the names of Central Committee nominees (which they have not apparently done in recent years) they could at least prevent some nominees from being elected to the Central Committee. As a remote possibility, this could affect the balance of forces inside the Politburo, since the long average tenure of Central Committee members following the removal of Khrushchev may enhance their position in relation to the General Secretary, so the balance of forces in the Central Committee may affect the line-up inside the Politburo. Pre-Congress meetings may indicate the balance of forces and this may affect the drawing up of the 'slate' for the Central Committee.

However, election to the Central Committee seems to depend more on the post held than on personal characteristics and loyalties (which is an argument against the 'personalistic factions' approach of the conflict school discussed above). It is institutions rather than individuals who are represented, according to Hough, which suggests to me that the 'slate' is compiled partly as an administrative device to ensure adequate information flows, and is partly an attempt to create a unified agency of decision, which Hirst argues is a conception which has haunted Marxist political theory.⁴⁹ This is also suggested by the fact that 88 per cent of 1976 voting members of the Central Committee had already been selected as Supreme Soviet deputies, although the Central Committee has a narrower social base than the Supreme Soviet and has on average an older membership. Unfortunately there is little information on the work of the Central Committee, as opposed to its membership. It meets comparatively rarely; it does not feature the kind of debate between party leaders which it did in the

1920's. Judging by Brezhnev's published replies, many of the speeches seem to be requests for more resources. Thus it might seem that the Central Committee has played a relatively minor role in politics in the Brezhnev period. Yet both the low turnover of members since 1965 and the policies emerging suggest that the Central Committee may be an arena of institutional bargaining, and members do, it seems, receive Politburo papers on policy issues, which means they have a political role outside the actual Central Committee meeting. This provision of information suggests the possibility that the Politburo leadership makes a real effort to informally elicit Central Committee members' views and to respond to them. Even if Brezhnev simply gathers information in an informal fashion and avoids antagonising too much of the Central Committee, then, as Hough says (1979, page 466): "the Central Committee still is a crucial body in the political system. Since the Central Committee encompasses representatives from all types of ministries and all regions of the country, a policy that is responsive to a consensus or to the centre of opinion in it is going to be responsive to a wide range of interests in the country. In addition, of course, the Central Committee's potential role in any succession crisis always makes it of even more crucial interest in the long run." It seems to me that this point must be made a little more strongly than Hough does: the Central Committee, even when not in session, must be an arena of informal struggle between various state agencies, and only those struggles that cannot be resolved by informal accommodation must go on to the Politburo.

This implies that the Politburo is run on the basis of 'consensus' committee politics, with Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Party,

operating in many respects as 'chairman of the board' on the Politburo, arbitrating between conflicting institutional objectives to reach a workable consensus. Certainly Hough's analysis (1979, pages 473-479) suggests such a conclusion: he argues (1979, page 466) that the Politburo has been the real cabinet of the Soviet system. It meets once a week, usually on a Thursday, in sessions of three to six hours. The Politburo discusses the annual economic plan. In the past, different variants of the plan have been discussed and the plan has been returned to Gosplan for reworking. On another occasion, discussion was detailed enough to lead to an increase in the number of grain elevators. The Politburo discussions which are most frequently referred to are economic ones, although foreign policy questions occupy what is officially described as "a large place" in the work of the Politburo. Other issues are mentioned less frequently. The preparation of questions to be discussed is assigned to officials of the Central Committee Secretariat apparatus, although Ministries also prepare reports for it and the Minister may stay for that discussion. Apparently, (although this semi-official account should not be taken at face value) decisions are reached on the basis of arriving at a consensus, rather than votes, in a manner similar to many Western committees. Thus, although the Constitution designates the Council of Ministers as the supreme state executive body, the Politburo is effectively the most important executive body in the Soviet political system, and it is clear from what is known about the matters which it decides upon that it is the most important agency regulating the activities of the planning and plan implementing agencies (particularly the economic Ministries).

However, the detailed regulation of the Ministries by the party (as opposed to regulation by the Council of Ministers and its Praesidium) is left to the departments attached to the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Crudely, the Secretariat consists of politicians (such as the General Secretary) while the attached apparatus consists of officials. The various departments are formed along branch lines and supervise Ministries and other similar institutions such as State Committees. However, the complex and subtle relations between the Secretariat apparatus and the Ministries make it impossible to discuss this supervision and regulation in terms of the dominance of one apparatus over another (party over state).

To understand this, it is necessary to review Hough's evidence on the structure of the Secretariat apparatus and the career patterns of its staff before going on to examine the relations operating between Secretariat and the Ministries. The Secretariat departments are formed along branch lines, that is, they supervise Ministries or other similar institutions. These departments are headed by the Secretariat itself, with most of the secretaries responsible for more than one department. These secretaries (Brezhnev, Kirilenko, Suslov and so on) have a general political background, but the officials in the departments have much more specialised backgrounds, which makes them highly qualified specialists in the policy area which they oversee. The career patterns of these Central Committee staff are as differentiated as the structure of the apparatus itself, which is to say, highly differentiated, with at least twenty-one departments, divided into a total of 150 to 175 sections. The basic staff members of departments are called 'instructors', but there are also a number of

high-level 'inspectors' for special assignments, and a fairly large number of departments also have a 'group of consultants' attached to them. The latter seem to be involved in the task of preparing major decisions, on leading a year-long study on a problem, and so on. Hough argues (1979, page 423) that these departments and sections do not direct the activities of the Ministries which they oversee, but serve more as a 'White House staff' to the General Secretary and Politburo, so they do not require an enormous staff.

The most formalised responsibility of the Secretariat apparatus is that of selection of personnel. As Hough puts it (1979, page 430) "The various political and administrative posts in the country are, of course, formally filled either through appointment by an administrative superior or through election. However, personnel action regarding the most important of these posts.....must also be 'confirmed' by a party committee..... Each committee has a list (nomenklatura) of the posts for which it has the right of confirmation..... The most important posts of all are in the nomenklatura of the Central Committee in Moscow." As is well-known, the existence of nomenklatura is one of the most important bases of western critiques of Soviet elections as undemocratic, and in my view it is certainly not a free vote when a single list of candidates is compiled by a superior party agency, although at times party confirmation may only be a formality.

The second major responsibility of the Secretariat apparatus is the 'verification of fulfillment' of party and governmental decisions. This appears at first sight to give this apparatus a major regulatory role, but Hough points out that the back-up staff is too small to engage in comprehensive or systematic inspection of the performance of the

vast party-state hierarchy. What it seems to do is to organise investigations by other agencies, such as 'temporary commissions' or 'brigades' using outside experts set up for the purpose, or else using the staff of the various party newspapers.

Its third responsibility is that of preparation of memoranda, and drafts of decisions, and preparation of questions for examination and decision by a plenary session of the Central Committee, the Politburo or the Secretariat. Hough concludes from its organisational structure that this seems to be its main role. Such decisions often seem to be the result of a periodic review of policy (hence the similar decrees issued periodically). The Secretariat apparatus is thus not necessarily a policy initiator: it seems to respond to the stream of appeals coming from lower level institutions, and interested institutions are always consulted on a decision (according to the evidence available to Hough). Rather than the Secretariat apparatus initiating policy, it is always the 'temporary commissions' that draft legislation or a major decision. The initial draft is often done by a major institution in that policy realm. The lower Secretariat apparatus officials must put together the commissions, organise the necessary meetings, help in the drafting of decisions and clear the various drafts of top party decisions with interested officials. As Hough puts it (1979, page 438), they frequently act more as the mid-wives for the ideas of others, but they must have some leeway in determining what will survive and prosper.

To sum up Hough's analysis so far, then, one has the picture of a Secretariat apparatus which confirms some important nomenklatura appointments and elections (although this is sometimes a formality), which supervises fulfilment of party and state decisions (but cannot on its own do so in a comprehensive or systematic way) and which prepares draft decisions for consideration by the most senior party agencies (but does so with the help of and in consultation with other interested parties). This is hardly a picture of a very powerful regulatory body ensuring close party control over the state apparatus. It certainly does not support a conception of a totalitarian monolith or elite domination (unless the elite is defined as much wider than the Politburo and Central Committee).

In trying to assess the relation between the Secretariat apparatus and the senior government agencies, one is forced to acknowledge that these relations are complicated by the fact that the Secretariat is structured like a mini-government, not only in its division into branches, but in its hierarchy of offices. Relations between the apparatus and various state agencies are thus affected by the relative standing of the officials concerned. As indicated before there is very little evidence on relations between the Secretariat and the Praesidium of the Council of Ministers, but Hough argues on the basis of biographical details, including whether an individual is a full member or a candidate member of the party Central Committee, that most Secretariat department heads are of a lower political standing (are in a lower 'status' position) than the Minister whom they oversee. Similarly, on the basis of biographical material he argues that deputy head of department ranks below a first deputy Minister but above a

deputy Minister in standing, and that a section head of a Secretariat department is below a deputy Minister. This clearly means that on an interpersonal level relations between the officials of the Secretariat and those of the Ministry they oversee can be ambiguous but it does not tell us about the relative strengths of these agencies in the case of conflicting objectives.

As Hough says, this duplication of offices in the Secretariat apparatus and the Ministries is intended to give the leadership access to more than one source of advice and information, but the extent to which it does so is by no means obvious, as will become apparent. Hough argues (1979, page 443) that what is important is not the precise rankings of each official, but that the differences are subtle ones, so the Secretariat and its apparatus cannot pre-empt the policy-making role, with the government simply executing policy. At least short of the point of final decision, policy making must involve the sort of committee politics familiar in the West. It is in these ambiguous relations that one finds the basic explanation of why the Ministries are effectively subordinated to the Party in certain respects, but manage to escape regulation in other respects, as became evident in Chapter Two.

Hough analyses the apparatus - Ministry relationship (1979, page 444) as a relationship which is not purely an adversary one. This dovetails very well with my remark above that arenas of struggle may well involve cooperation as well as conflict between the various agencies engaged in the arena. Central Committee Secretariat officials, Hough argues, must be pushed into representing the interests of those whom they are supervising. That is, at times they must convey the objectives of the various Ministries to the Central Committee, or Politburo (or 'temporary commission') and support these objectives

themselves. In other words, the supervisory process at times leads to an advocacy role for the specialised Secretariat officials. The relevant department and the Ministry often seem to work together for 'their' branch in the appropriations process, according to Hough. He argues that the crucial question is whether to emphasise the conflict or the cooperation between the Ministries and the Secretariat departments. There is little information on this, but as he says, it obviously varies with the type of question involved.

On questions involving the performance of that branch, relations depend on whether it is an intrabranh or interbranch question. An intrabranh question will involve tension or struggle between the Secretariat department and the Ministry (usually I imagine the senior levels of the Ministry since they appear to protect their own sub-agents such as enterprises from outside supervision). Where it is an interbranch question (as in competition for, say, investment resources, in other words what Hough calls 'the appropriations process') there are likely to be alliances between the department and the Ministry. This is most evident in the budgetary and planning process. In such cases, apart from anything else, the alliance is likely to be founded on the similar educational background of the very specialised department officials and the senior staff of the Ministry they are supervising. Although Hough does not put it this way, these personnel are likely to have similar means of calculation at their disposal, so they are likely to reach similar conclusions as to the relative merits of their 'own' Ministry's case as against those of other Ministries.

If the department and Ministry are in agreement, then I presume that the struggle then moves on to the next arena, for example, where the Politburo considers the annual plan of the Council of Ministers (assuming the dispute has not been resolved in the Council of Ministers itself or in its Praesidium). Quite what the 'next arena' is could of course itself be a matter of struggle, since one Ministry might feel it has a better chance of winning in the Council of Ministers, while another may prefer the matter to go straight to the Politburo.

Hough argues that Western scholars have been absorbed with the regime's policy toward the intelligentsia, and have access to liberal intellectuals who have formed a strong impression of the role of Central Committee officials in enforcing this policy. Thus these officials have become familiar in an intrabranh, adversary role (ensuring compliance by the relevant Ministries, with consequent losses by liberal intellectuals in various cultural and overtly political struggles). Consequently, Hough argues (1979, page 446) Western scholars "often have not been sensitive to the possiblity that the Central Committee officials sometimes may be choosing or even mediating between conflicting cultural - literary groups and authorities as much as exercising a control function of their own. Despite the frequent conflict between the Central Committee officials and those they supervise, westerners clearly should be giving more attention to the cooperative side of the ambivalent relationship between supervisors and supervised." The cooperative side is particularly evident in the budgetary process, including the way funds are acquired in the cultural realm, in which according to Hough neither westerners nor liberal intellectuals are particularly interested.

To the extent that cooperation rather than overt conflict is operative in these relations, the supervisory or regulatory role of the Secretariat officials may be ineffective, from the viewpoint of the leadership. Thus although, as Hough puts it (1979, page 447), "the leadership evidently hoped to obtain independent advisers with sufficient expertise to judge the ministerial reports and proposals and hence to give themselves the ability to judge performance accurately and to decide policy for each branch on the basis of a real freedom of choice", this need not be the case. Hough wonders whether the use of specialised personnel in this way has not meant the penetration of the values of the specialised elite into the political leadership as much as or more than the enhancement of control over the policy process, giving rise to the familiar pattern of the regulated coming to dominate the regulators. Certainly, as was seen in Chapter Two, in the area of economic policy, the Ministries have been able to escape regulation in important respects, at least prior to the 1979 reform. However, this is not to be explained in terms of the 'values' of the officials concerned, for this sociological concept of 'values' treats them as the primary determinants of the 'goals' of the actors. Rather the formation of objectives by agents must be seen, not in terms of values which are thought to be somewhat passively internalised, but in terms of the available concepts which form the basis on which the agent calculates objectives in the light of current circumstances. This calculation involves both which objectives are to be pursued and the ways of achieving them. It is not a matter of values 'penetrating' an arena, that is being imported by agents who are carriers of a set of values which they have internalised like germs,

but rather of the means of calculation to which the agents have recourse. Often included in part of any struggle is an attempt to provide alternative means of calculating objectives, coupled with an attempt to win over the adversary to using the alternative means. As was clear, I hope, from Chapter Two, part of the reason why various aspects of economic performance in the Soviet Union are inadequately regulated is the fact that only one means of calculating and thus monitoring performance was being used.

Regardless of the 'values' or desires of various agents, this has meant that the activities of various sub-agents have been inadequately regulated. In this case, the lack of a serious attempt by the Secretariat officials or the central planning agencies to improve the 'accounting indices' measuring plan implementation has made it relatively easy for the Ministries to escape regulation or struggle successfully against forms of regulation which were disagreeable to them.

Conclusion

Discussion of these issues in this way avoids the reduction of political analysis to a 'personalistic' level at which some analysts (but by no means all) seem content to leave it. The concern here with these central political institutions has been to appraise them in terms of their capacity to regulate, despite struggles, the activities of the Ministries and thus to change the relations of production (including relations of distribution). This capacity is determined by the state of play in the various arenas of struggle, including the possibilities to have recourse to other arenas to affect the outcome in the initial arena.

One of the striking features to arise from the examination of the party machinery designed to help regulate the state agencies is the considerable specialisation of the Secretariat officials. Although Hough draws attention to this, and provides evidence of it, he does not appear to relate it to the problems of coordination of inter-Ministerial relations. It seems that only the most senior politicians (and perhaps those aspiring to senior posts) have acquired a broad range of experience and expertise. This lack of generalised expertise must be an additional factor in the difficulties of the Secretariat in supervising the Ministries (apart from the small size of the Secretariat apparatus in comparison with the rest of the party and state hierarchies). Any inter-Ministerial struggle will probably involve inter-departmental communication among the Secretariat officials who may have difficulty in resolving their differences because of a lack of sufficiently common means of calculation. This may be part of the reason why the common complaint is heard that "too many questions are dragged before the Central Committee. "

Certainly such practices may be partly for the desired lobbying effect of taking the dispute into a more powerful arena with a wider audience, or may be due to a reluctance to take responsibility for the resolution of the dispute, but the relatively narrow expertise and experience of the officials may genuinely create difficulties in deciding the best way to resolve the disputes, whatever agreement there may be on 'values' (ultimate objectives).

The major conclusion to be drawn from the political relations between party and state agencies, which is perhaps most clearly illustrated in the case of the relations between the Central Committee Secretariat and the Ministries, is that despite effective party control

over state agencies, such state agencies as the Ministries do have a political basis for alliances with sections of the central party agencies. Individual Ministries can at times use their relations with the section of the Central Committee Secretariat which supervises them to influence policy formation or policy implementation (the latter is probably easier to influence). This means that the capacities of Ministries and other subordinate state agencies to influence policy formation and implementation place definite political limits on the central agencies' regulation of the economy. Furthermore, the 'supreme' party and state agencies suffer additional limitations on their capacities to regulate the economy and to form economic policy because of the inherent difficulties of overall coordination of relations between the state agencies.

Such difficulties are not primarily the result of the narrow specialisation of the Secretariat officials, which has just been mentioned, but rather of the sheer volume of information which has to be dealt with in forming policy. This is probably the main cause, for example, of the involvement of Ministries and other agencies in the working of Gosplan, which is supposed to plan and supervise material technical supplies, as indicated in Chapter Two, but which functions ponderously precisely because of the difficulties of centrally designating the allocation of supplies with sufficient precision. Hence the planning of supply becomes entangled in the actual process of distribution of supplies by Ministries, which allows the latter considerable scope to escape regulation in certain respects, but only on condition that they engage in the struggle and negotiation within Gosplan over supplies. This ensures that they are regulated to at least the minimal degree necessary to secure the broadly defined fulfilment of the overall plan. To take

another example, Hough ⁵⁰ points out that while the Politburo has the final say in determining wages or social policy (such as welfare measures), Gosplan has to balance the various concrete demands with the available resources. This involves the participation of the Ministry of Finance. However, the sheer volume of information which threatens to inundate Gosplan means that it is not the main state agency dealing with wages and social policy. The process of policy formation in this respect devolves in large measure on to the State Committee for Labour and Social Questions, although it must coordinate its decisions with a non-state agency, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, as well as various other state and party agencies.

It is such difficulties (both of co-ordinating relations between various state and party agencies and of co-ordinating the information necessary to form a policy which can be effectively implemented) which give the subordinate agencies the capacity to influence policy formation and implementation. Rather than a totalitarian party or an elite co-ordinating the overall division of labour, by means of the regulation of plan implementation, what we seem to be dealing with is a series of agencies whose activities are indeed regulated, but whose capacities partly derive from the very difficulties of effective regulation. This means that various aspects of the process of policy formation are delegated to the very agencies which are supposed to implement policy: this is apparently also the case with legal policy ⁵¹, but our concern at the moment is with economic and social policy.

The effects of such political relations between party and state agencies on the relations of production could be summed up by saying

that there is sufficiently effective central regulation of the economy to prevent the various subordinate state agencies (such as enterprises or Ministries) from pursuing entirely autonomous objectives. In other words, it is reasonable to talk of a co-ordination of the division of labour at the level of the overall social formation. Yet such regulation does not preclude the various subordinate state agencies from pursuing their 'own' objectives within this regulatory framework, both by influencing policy formation and by using their partial autonomy to influence policy implementation. Thus inter-Ministerial disputes over resources, adjustments and mutual accommodations between various agencies, and a mutual dependence on regular flows of information, are important features of Soviet politics. Legal regulation of the economy has only a limited effect, because legal specifications of relations between agents are secondary to political determinants of those relations.

Rather than indicating that there is an elite or even a ruling class able to control the political conditions of access to the means of production, the analysis of the evidence presented in this Chapter suggests that party 'dominance' over the 'state machine' largely takes the form of effective but limited co-ordination of relations between agencies and of adjudication of disputes between state, party and trade union agencies.

While particular agencies may be excluded on particular issues, it seems that on to be the case /economic and social policy issues (rather than, say, defence or foreign policy) all the relevant agencies appear to have access of some kind to policy formation and implementation. In other words, all relevant agencies seem on the evidence available to have some effect on the co-ordination of the division of labour, which means that the processes of formation and implementation of economic policy give a multiplicity of agents access to the means of production, in a form which makes it difficult for a particular group of agents to set the terms of other agents'

access. Nevertheless, the central party agencies and the central planning agencies do predominate in determining other agents' access, but this Chapter has attempted to show that there are important limits on the central agencies' capacity to regulate the economy.

It is for this reason that disputes and elaborate processes of consultation and negotiation between the various party and state agencies appear to be endemic features of Soviet politics. They are the corollary of what might be called 'multiple access to the means of production', since if one set of agents does not very clearly predominate in regulating the economy and hence in fixing the terms of access to the means of production by other agents, then the terms of access must be an object of constant struggle and negotiation. In such a situation, regular flows of information are vital if the means of production are to be used effectively, but this raises the problem of the handling of that information, which will be qualitatively diverse and in some respects quite esoteric. The difficulties of co-ordinating and interpreting such information in the process of policy making are formidable, and this is one of the reasons why subordinate agencies are involved in what at first sight seems a highly centralised mode of policy formation. The genuine difficulties of handling information may be related to the conservatism which is apparent both in plan construction and other policy areas: where the ramifications and inter-connections between decisions cannot be calculated in advance, then past 'experience' becomes the best guide to the way to integrate diverse objectives into a reasonably coherent whole.

The conditions are thus present for what I called towards the beginning of this Chapter an 'admixture of adjustment, regular flows of information and struggles over resources'. This does indeed seem to be what much of Soviet politics is like. However, the apparent difficulty in resolving inter-Ministerial disputes can be guessed at from what Hough calls the 'incrementalism' of the budgetary process, and other policy processes. The apparent atrophy which has developed in Soviet politics since the mid-1970s cannot be due solely to the ageing of the leadership. The continual pumping in of increased resources for the same objectives with apparently little change in the relative priorities as to the allocation of resources between Ministries suggests a stalemate. This apparent stalemate can hardly be a genuine consensus unless Ministries are willing to accept their budgetary allocation because they all feel sure it will be greater the next year. Yet it cannot be said that this apparent stalemate can be resolved by, say, broadening the expertise of departmental and Ministerial officials, or by a better legal specification of relations between the top level state and party agencies, for not enough is known to be able to analyse these political struggles in such detail. On the face of it, it does seem unlikely that such changes by themselves would have a great impact on the conduct of Soviet politics.

However, despite the lack of detailed evidence on the political struggles which are the condition of the transformation of the relations of production, one need not despair of analysing the effects of such struggles on the class structure. This is because the outcomes of those struggles are observable in terms of the actual policies. Thus the 1979 economic reform may have broken the apparent stalemate

over economic priorities. The priorities which are of concern in this thesis are not simply economic ones in the narrow sense of the production and physical distribution of goods and services, but also social priorities in the sense of policies which affect the development of the relations of production. Of particular concern are the 'welfare' policies which affect the distribution of income, since this is an important component of any analysis of the class structure. For this reason, the next Chapter will be concerned with public policy in the area designated loosely by what are termed 'social consumption funds'. These cover, for example, health, education, housing, pensions and various kinds of recreation, although not all aspects of the areas covered by the 'social consumption funds' will be dealt with. The examination of such policies may well further elucidate the state of play in and between the various arenas and agencies discussed in this chapter, but more importantly it should provide the means of analysing the forces at work on the contemporary class structure of the Soviet Union.

Notes to Chapter Three

1. P. Hirst (1979) On Law and Ideology, Macmillan, London and Basingstoke, Chapter 5.
2. E.B. Pashukanis (1978) Law and Marxism: A General Theory. Ink Links, London. Hirst's critique of Pashukanis in Chapter 5 extends to Appendix 1 of 1979, op.cit., but he also discusses the work of the Austro-Marxist Karl Renner in some detail in Chapter 5.
3. P. Hirst (1979), *ibid.*, page 101. This position is attributed by Hirst not only to Renner, but also to "an Althusserian theorist like Bernard Edelman." Edelman is a French lawyer whose book on French photographic copy, right law was translated by E. Kingdom with an introduction by P. Hirst: B. Edelman (1979) Ownership of the Image: Elements for a Marxist Theory of Law, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, Henley and Boston.
4. This forms Chapter 4 of P. Carlen and M. Collinson (eds) (1980) Radical Issues in Criminology, Martin Robertson, Oxford
5. He argues that Marxist political theory has been haunted by the notion of the elimination of distinct agencies of decision. Usually 'the people' are treated as a unity with a single or common interests, which implies that they are, or are ultimately capable of becoming, one agency of decision. Consequently, a state will be unnecessary when there are no divergent interests. Hirst's position is that with distinct agencies of decision there will always be divergent objectives or interests whose interrelations will have to be regulated.
6. See, for example, the critique of Althusser in Chapter 3 of On Law and Ideology, (1979) op.cit.
7. It is important to point out that even if this is a reasonable interpretation of some parts of Hirst's essay, it by no means undermines other parts of the essay. It is only occasionally that Hirst appears to point a general, in effect functional, role for the law and the state: for example, on page 41, one finds "Legislative bodies are necessary to any instance of regulation, they are a condition for defining agents and limiting their action in the form of rules." While it is clear from the context that Hirst is not here seeking "to impose a model of parliamentary or representative democracy on socialist social relations," such a remark could be taken to mean that law is a necessary precondition to administrative or technical regulation, rather than a means of substantially improving the amenability of such non-legal regulation to implementing socialist policy objectives. Thus despite the statements to which I have

drawn attention, Hirst is not attempting to provide a general derivative theory of law, but is arguing for the political necessity of law if certain objectives are supported.

8. Pierre et Marie Lavigne (1979) Regards sur la Constitution Sovietique de 1977, Economica, Paris.
9. For a brief account of P. and M. Lavigne (1979), see G. Littlejohn (1980) 'The Soviet Constitution', in Economy and Society, Volume 9, Number 3, August 1980.
10. For an English language version of both the draft and final versions of the 1977 Constitution, see W.F. Butler, (1978) The Soviet Legal System: Selected Contemporary Legislation and Documents, Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law, Columbia University, New York.
11. J.N. Hazard, W.E. Butler and P.B. Maggs (1977) The Soviet Legal System, Third Edition, Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law, Columbia University, New York. Each chapter consists of a brief commentary on an area of Soviet law, followed by a series of extracts from Soviet sources giving parts of a statute or decree, reports of court cases. and sometimes comments on the area by Soviet legal theorists.
12. Pashukanis was probably opposed to the distinction between "economic law" and civil law; Bratus', his assistant in 1935, certainly is now. (Communication from P. Lavigne). Thus Hazard et al. say (page 243): "Even this attitude emphasizing the distinguishing features of 'economic law' suffered a harsh blow in 1937 when its major proponent and members of his school of thought were ousted and eventually purged as Stalin's enemies. They had been preaching the withering away of law with the advent of socialism, and this meant above all else the introduction of consideration solely of expediency in the relationships on the economic front. Stalin put an end to this view of the role of law in the society he chose to dominate, for he required strict orderly conduct from his administrators to achieve maximum results and the discipline his system required."
13. This is the usual translation of khozraschet, although Lavigne prefers 'financial autonomy'.
14. It must be clear to both sides in this dispute on economic law that this independence is limited.
15. J.F. Hough and M. Fainsod (1979) How the Soviet Union is Governed, Harvard University Press, Cambridge and London especially Chapter 10 'The Institutional Actors'.
16. The adequacy of such approaches have been challenged in P. Hirst 'Economic Classes and Politics' in A. Hunt (ed) (1978)

Class and Class Structure, Lawrence and Wishart, London, and in B. Hindess 'Classes and Politics in Marxist Theory' in G. Littlejohn, B. Smart, J. Wakeford and N. Yuval-Davis (eds) (1978) Power and the State, Croom Helm, London.

17. For an account and critique of such approaches, see B. Hindess (1981) 'Marxism and Parliamentary Democracy' in A. Hunt (ed) Marxism and Democracy, Lawrence and Wishart, London.
18. J.F. Hough (1977) The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory, Harvard University Press, Cambridge and London, page 112. P. and M. Lavigne, 1979, op. cit., do not draw attention to Burlatskii in the same way as Hough does although they do refer to him. The concept of an 'advanced socialist society' is also discussed by M. Lavigne in 'Advanced Socialist Society' in Economy and Society, Volume 7, Number 4, November 1978.
19. S. White (1979). Political Culture and Soviet Politics Macmillan, London page 153.
20. S. White 1979, ibid., page 154.
21. S. White 1979, ibid., page 154. Hough and Fainsod (1979) op. cit., also draw attention to the problems of the multinational character of the Soviet Union in the final chapter on 'The Future of the Soviet System'.
22. The implications of this in the case of 'national' constituencies for any nation-state theory can be deduced from S. Zubaida 'Theories of Nationalism' in G. Littlejohn et. al. (eds) (1978) Power and the State, op.cit. For a critique of the notion of democracy as representing the interests or desires of an underlying population see B. Hindess (1980) 'Democracy and the Limitations of Parliamentary Democracy in Britain' in Politics and Power 1, R. & K.P., London and Henley. Hindess in effect proposes an alternative conception of democracy in terms of the mechanisms for selecting personnel and for reaching decisions, a position which is elaborated from 'Marxism and Parliamentary Democracy' (1981), op.cit. This approach argues that democratic mechanisms (namely, the use of a 'free' vote within some relevant constituency or constituencies) for the appointment of personnel and the reaching of decisions always co-exist with non-democratic forms. Hence the approach concentrates on analysing the scope of the democratic mechanisms and their relation to the non-democratic ones. The theoretical rationale for this position is that the 'interest' or objectives of various parts of the population can only be articulated by specific organisational forms, and that to posit 'interest' as distinct from the organisational forms through which objectives are formulated is to posit an unknowable 'counterfactual' in terms of which expressed interests can be

appraised. Where the expressed interests or objectives do not correspond to the counterfactual (the 'true' interests of that section of the population) the forms of articulation of interests or objectives are then criticised from the utopian standpoint of their inadequacy or failure to represent the true interests of their constituency. Hindess argues that a concentration on the organisational forms both avoids this utopian critique (which it seems to me ultimately assumes the possibility of a unified agency within which there can be no conflicts of interest) and the complacency which ignores both the currently limited scope of democratic mechanisms and the extent to which such mechanisms are affected by their relation to non-democratic mechanisms. (However, acceptance of this position does not allow one to completely avoid discussing Soviet politics in terms of the 'representation of interests' since such a conception is implicit in the official Soviet theory of the state.) It might appear that Hindess's position makes it difficult to describe a form of state as repressive, if the notion of the interests or desires of an underlying population is abandoned. This might also appear to be a conclusion to be drawn from the discussion in the previous section of Hirst's analysis of the law. Yet even if one abandons the notion of the inherent interests of a population arising out of its supposed ontological structure, interests which the state then acts upon to express or repress, one could argue that it is still possible to characterise a state (or other overtly political organisation) as undemocratic or repressive if it actively interdicts the development of voluntary organisational forms for the articulation of objectives which are not officially approved. This is one form of restricting the scope of the 'free' vote, by restricting the issues which can be voted upon. Some states do permit the articulation of illegal objectives while enforcing the law until such time as it is changed. The conclusion that a particular law or aspect of state organisation is itself repressive can only be reached on the basis of an analysis of the relation between democratic and non-democratic ways of appointing personnel and reaching decisions, however. Far from precluding statements about the undemocratic nature of a particular form of state organisation, the position outlined by Hindess allows one to analyse democratic mechanisms in terms of their scope and organisation, and in terms of the conditions under which they operate (including the variously constituted social forces or agencies acting on the democratic mechanisms).

23. S. White (1979) op.cit., Chapter 8. This book elaborates the argument which can be found in S. White 'The USSR: Patterns of Autocracy and Industrialism' in A. Brown and J. Gray (eds) (1979) Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States, Second Edition, Macmillan, London and Basingstoke.

24. A. Brown 'Political Developments: Some Conclusions and an Interpretation', page 248, in A. Brown and M. Kaser (eds) 1975) The Soviet Union since the Fall of Khrushchev, Macmillan, London and Basingstoke.
25. J. Hough (1977), op.cit. pages 10-12 and 22-24. There is also a discussion of the concept in J. Hough and M. Fainsod (1979), op.cit., Chapter 14, passim, especially pages 547-548. References to 'Hough.(1979)' will be used as a shorthand way of referring to Hough and Fainsod (1979).
26. A.H. Brown (1974) Soviet Politics and Political Science, Macmillan, London and Basingstoke. This is an excellent introduction to Soviet politics which surveys the field and then concentrates on three approaches: (a) Political Institutions (b) Groups, Interests and the Policy Process (c) Political Culture. As S. White acknowledges(1979), op.cit., Archie Brown was instrumental in setting White's work on Soviet political culture in progress.
27. Brown (1974) ibid., pages 40-41. While Brown defends the use of the concept, it does not form one of the main approaches to be used, in his view. The main approaches are as indicated in the previous note.
28. In the first place, Weber did not use the concept of ideal type in the same way in all his writings: see J. Rex 'Typology and Objectivity: a comment on Weber's four sociological methods' in A. Sahay (ed) (1971) Max Weber and Modern Sociology, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. Secondly, the main assumptions embodied in Weber's concept of ideal type are highly questionable; see, for example, P.Q. Hirst (1976) Social Evolution and Sociological Categories, George Allen and Unwin, London. Thirdly, his use of the concept in his analysis of politics has been subjected to serious criticism: see, for example, A. Weights 'Weber and "Legitimate Domination"' in Economy and Society Volume 7, Number 1, February 1978. The critical literature on Weber is too vast to be seriously discussed here, yet it seems to have done little to diminish Weber's impact on contemporary political science, perhaps because the use of Weberian concepts there is largely unacknowledged. I am indebted to Professor J. Beetham for the insight that the contemporary concept of an elite as constituted by the heads of different bureaucracies owes more to Weber than to, say, Pareto.
29. C.J. Friedrich and Z.K. Brzezinski (1965) Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, Harvard and Oxford University Presses, Oxford.

30. For a critique of the concept of 'hydraulic despotism', see the Chapter 'Imperial China; Problems in History and Social Structure' in T. Megarry The Sociology of Pre-Capitalist Societies, Macmillan, forthcoming.
31. See J.F. Hough (1977) op. cit., Chapters 4-6 and J.F. Hough and M. Fainsod (1979) op. cit., Chapters 8 and 9 and passim.
32. S. White (1979) op. cit., Chapter 5. White argues for the continuity in many important respects between contemporary Soviet political culture and the pre-revolutionary political culture, and the possible changes to which he draws attention in Chapter 8 are hardly indicative of the kind of effectiveness of ideological means of control which is required to seriously sustain the totalitarian approach.
33. J.F. Hough and M. Fainsod (1979) op. cit., Chapter 14; pages 520-521.
34. J.F. Hough and M. Fainsod (1979) *ibid.*, pages 523-524. The use of the concept is retained in an eclectic manner on pages 527-528.
35. See G. Parry (1969) Political Elites, Allen and Unwin, London and P. Thoenes (1966) The Elite in the Welfare State, Faber, London.
36. J.F. Hough (1977) op. cit., pages 210-211.
37. J.F. Hough (1977) *ibid.*, pages 204.
38. The problems of such a position are perhaps more fully analysed in Hindess' review of Lukes (1974) Power: a Radical View, Macmillan, London. See B. Hindess (1976) 'On Three-Dimensional Power' in Political Studies, Volume 24, Number 3.
39. J.F. Hough (1977) op. cit., page 204.
40. Although I call this approach Weberian since Weber was one of the earliest to formulate such a position, similar conceptualisations can also be found in Marxist analyses of politics: see for example, Miliband's (1969) The State in Capitalist Society, Weidenfield and Nicolson, London. The unifying element is the common educational and social background and resulting social interaction between the heads of the various bureaucracies, in Miliband's argument.

41. For example, in J.F. Hough and M. Fainsod (1979) op.cit., page 527, we find "A high-level or even middle-level administrator clearly has a greater impact on decision-making than an average worker or peasant." This is typical of the vagueness in defining the elite which arises when its social location is thought to be an effect of the presence of bureaucracies, a view which is extremely widespread.
42. J.F. Hough and M. Fainsod (1979) *ibid.*, page 527.
43. For example, in J.F. Hough and M. Fainsod, *ibid.*, page 554, we read: "Although the study of power is said to be the central subject of political science, our knowledge of the comparative distributions of power in different countries and our understanding of the factors associated with these differences are still in an extremely rudimentary stage. Even such issues as the impact of competitive elections have been judged more on the basis of long-held assumptions than empirical analysis. The wisest course would be to avoid definitive conclusions and hope that Soviet experience will be one of the factors stimulating renewed attention to fundamental theoretical issues." This effectively postpones the reconceptualisation until more evidence is collected, but the evidence collected will be partly determined by the way in which politics are conceived, so some attempt must be made to begin the process of reconceptualisation.
44. A.H. Brown (1974), op.cit., Chapter 3, especially pages 72-74. However, Brown by no means completely rejects the 'interest group' approach, and indicates the types of group which would repay further study.
45. The concept originated in the Birkbeck seminar on Politics and Social Relations, which I attend, and I have already used it in G. Littlejohn (1979) 'State, Plan and Market in the Transition to Socialism: the legacy of Bukharin', op. cit.
46. A.H. Brown, (1974) op. cit., S. White in A. Brown and J. Gray (eds) (1979) op. cit., and S. White (1979) op.cit.
47. In Chapter 6 of S. White (1979) *ibid.*, called 'The Impact of Marxism-Leninism', White points out on page 142 that it seems "clear that the Soviet authorities have failed to bring about that total transformation of socio-political values to which (unlike western governments) they have for more than two generations been committed....." However, he also cautions on page 141 against "judging the performance of the Soviet propaganda agencies by altogether unrealistic criteria!" and towards the end of his last chapter he does provide evidence of a generational change in political attitudes among emigrés; these attitudes of younger emigrés appear to combine acceptance of extensive public ownership and the comprehensive provision

of welfare with a commitment to a thorough democratisation of Soviet political life and institutions. Such attitudes would not be too surprising in the light of Hough's analysis (1979, op.cit., Chapter 8) of public participation in policy formation. However, the evidence available is too meagre to reach firm conclusions about the distribution of forms of political calculation among the general population in the Soviet Union. Supporters of the concept of 'political culture' could claim with some justice that lack of available evidence is the main reason why this form of analysis is not more developed. However, unless the relation is established between the deployment of concepts in a struggle, on the one hand, and the conditions and outcome of that struggle, on the other hand, it will remain extremely difficult to establish why some 'cultural traits' persist and others change, and in these circumstances the 'political culture' approach will be left simply registering the changes taking place (where the evidence is available), rather than successfully analysing them.

48. Private communications: Unofficial plans are currently being worked out for a less ambitious development plan for Central Asia. Technically, the resources used for such planning are being used illegally, but clearly some economists feel the official policy will not work to locate a lot of new industrial investment in Central Asia, even if more water is supplied. In addition, one of the bodies concerned with the regional integration of economic planning in Siberia is lobbying for greater investment there, rather than Central Asia, and there is some high level support for this.
49. See note 5 above.
50. J. F. Hough (1979) 'Policy - Making and the Worker' in A. Kahan and B. Ruble (eds.) Industrial Labor in the U.S.S.R. Pergamon, New York.
51. G. B. Smith (1980) 'Socialist Legality and Legal Policy in the Soviet Union' in G. B. Smith (ed.) Public Policy and Administration in the Soviet Union, Praeger, New York.

CHAPTER FOUR

WELFARE AND CONSUMPTION

Introduction

It is impossible in one chapter to cover all aspects of welfare and forms of income. The educational system, for example, will not be dealt with here, despite the fact that consumption of educational resources could be considered a part of the real income of the Soviet population, and certainly constitutes a part of the social consumption funds for the purposes of the Soviet state budget. The areas which will be covered here will be housing, health (including sport), and social security, all of which affect family budgets. These aspects of welfare and income are useful indications of living standards and show the effects of social policies. As indicated in the previous chapter, while there is very little direct evidence available on the course of political struggles, the operation of social policies can be treated as an outcome of struggle, indicating to some extent the 'state of play'. In addition, the operation of social policies can be considered as part of the process of struggle, since the implementation of policy can itself be thought of as a 'strategy of power', a means of affecting the balance of forces within the social formation.

Thus social policies on welfare and consumption illuminate the political process and, since they form an important component of

relations of distribution, they are also vital to any understanding of relations of production and hence the nature of class relations in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, social policies on welfare and the associated patterns of consumption are important because, if socialist planning is not a matter of direct consciousness by society of its own needs and the willing of the means to meet those needs, then a policy of "to each according to his needs" requires a specification of needs.¹ The expenditure patterns of social consumption funds can only be effectively appraised in terms of the specification of needs and of the adequacy of the means employed to satisfy those needs. The specification of needs could take the forms of measurement of needs and/or the articulation of 'perceived' needs by the agents 'experiencing' the needs. Thus the specification of needs is partly a political process in the sense of a struggle by competing agencies to have their needs registered and hopefully satisfied (fully or partially).

Any specification of needs, and thus of socially defined standards, immediately runs into the problem of the diversity of criteria of need. This is a problem which is likely to grow as both knowledge of social relations and the capacity to meet basic criteria grow.² The diversity of criteria for the satisfaction of needs also generates the problem of the inter-relation between various social and economic policies. Thus, for example, in the Soviet Union improved housing may reduce the demand for certain kinds of health-care, particularly for hospitalisation of certain medical cases. Similarly, not only can good health (enhanced by comparatively high rates of sporting participation) improve industrial productivity, but the converse can also be true :

certain kinds of investment which raise productivity can reduce fatigue and industrial accidents or industrial disease, and in a more indirect way, improved productivity can foster good health by generating higher living standards and greater leisure.

Consequently, while the main aim of this chapter is to appraise the impact of the areas of social policy examined upon the real income of the Soviet population, and thus to provide a means of approaching the distribution of income and hence the issue of class relations in the next chapter, it is necessary to examine the way in which the implementation of the various social policies is organised, and to treat the process of implementation as itself a political process. Nowhere is this clearer, perhaps, than in the first policy area to be discussed, namely, housing.

Housing

The diversity of criteria which can be pertinent to the appraisal of an area of social policy is clearly apparent to George and Manning (1980)³: "the development of housing under socialism involves issues which touch on the very core of the new society: the nature of the city and the country, and the relationship between them; the nature of the family, property relations, architecture and the creative arts; and the pattern of economic investment." After a brief review of classical Marxist and early Bolshevik views on housing, they discuss historical developments, which show the enormous difficulties faced by Soviet housing policy from its inception to the present day.

The pre-revolutionary housing situation was appalling : even in Moscow and St . Petersburg well over half the housing was wooden, and the average dwelling space for the urban population (around 7 square metres per capita) was so badly distributed that 70 per cent of single workers and nearly 50 per cent of married workers had only a corner of a room. Such conditions may well have been a vital factor in the demise of the Tsarist empire.⁴ Much of this housing was burned for fuel during the Civil War, with the result that when the population started to return to the cities in the 1920s, overcrowding remained acute, since building was outstripped by migration to the cities. While by 1926 house building was taking 17 per cent of total investment in the economy (two thirds of it privately built), unplanned urbanisation between 1926 and 1939 set a world record. "Rural to urban migration totalled 40 million : equivalent to the total for Europe between 1800 and 1940".⁵ It is in this context that the Soviet internal passport system and the "infamously close liaison between house managers and police"⁶ should be understood.

To these difficulties should be added the damage caused by the 1941-45 war ; 1,710 cities and towns were destroyed, amounting to 6 million dwellings which had housed 25 million people.⁷ Reconstruction began where possible during the war, and the fourth Five Year Plan (1946-1950), while only 77 per cent fulfilled for housing, improved the average per capita space by half a metre over the 1940 level. Yet it must be remembered that around 20 million people had died in the war and that even then specifically

urban space at this time was scarcer than before the war. Housing construction was boosted during the 1950s, when it exceeded planned levels for the first and only time in Soviet history. This is partly because plans suddenly became more ambitious in 1957 when a decree ordered an immediate increase of 100 per cent in the volume of new housing to be built during the Five Year Plan period 1956-1960.⁸ This was more than fulfilled, as can be seen from the following Table.

Table 3

New Housing Construction in the Soviet Union since the Second World War ^a
(million m² of living space) ^b.

1946-1950	1951-1955	1956-1960	1961-1965	1966-1970	1970-1975 (Plan)	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975 (Plan)
140.6	168.4	331.9	343.9	363.0	406	75.3	74.7	77.2	76.8	74.9

a. Urban and rural housing, from all sources.

b. Calculated by multiplying total useful floor space by a factor of 0.7, according to Soviet practice (see text below).

Source : E.M. Jacobs, *ibid.*, page 65

However, while this represented a substantial increase in the house building programme, housing has since steadily slipped back as a proportion of total investment.

Table 4

Capital Investments in Housing in the Soviet Union (*all sources*)
1946-1972
(Comparable prices)

	1946-1950	1951-1955	1956-1960	1961-1965	1966-1970	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
Housing Investments (billion rubles):	9.2	17.9	39.6	45.4	60.0	10.6	11.5	12.1	12.4	13.4	14.1	14.6
% of total capital investments:	19.2	19.6	23.2	18.3	17.0	17.4	17.4	17.0	16.9	16.4	16.0	15.5

Furthermore, the quality of building workman ship has often been shoddy, and the planning of housing has been poor. The inadequacies in planning, particularly the poor coordination of industrial and urban growth, were officially recognised as early as 1960.⁹ "The basic dilemma was that industry favoured the economies of scale available in large cities, which overburdened the urban infrastructure, while small towns stagnated for lack of investment. However, since the majority of new housing construction was undertaken by industry, Khrushchev's rapid housing expansion was exacerbating this problem by undermining still further the control of the city soviets, notwithstanding the 1957 decree in their favour. The declared intentions of limiting large city growth and the expansion of housing had proved incompatible." While housing construction levelled off at the rate of the early 1960s and continued at these rates well into the 1970s, the charge that 'Khrushchev had sacrificed quality for quantity' may to some extent still be true of the present housing programme. The main problems in housing still seem to stem from the fact that as George and Manning note, "planning and finance spring primarily from different sources,"¹⁰ in other words, financing housing through industrial ministries does not aid the local coordination of local services which the city soviet must attempt; in addition, as was noted in Chapter Two, it contributes to a rapid turnover in the labour force as people change jobs in order to get better housing. How far the latter problem will be alleviated by the measures (associated with the 1979 economic reform) to improve housing and reduce labour turnover remains to be seen.

Political Aspects of Housing Provision

Having briefly indicated the historical conditions and some of the problems of the contemporary Soviet housing situation, it seems appropriate to turn now to the issue of the politics of Soviet housing, before discussing housing outcomes (the distribution of housing among the population) and their implications. According to George and Manning, as a result of conflicts between economic and social criteria, the supply of and access to housing is determined by two competing criteria - need and economic incentive.¹¹ Yet they structure their examination of the contemporary housing situation into three aspects - demand, supply and finance, thus creating a distinction between need and demand. The distinction between (legitimate) need and demand seems to rest on a conception of need as emanating from the population, which is presumably structured in some way, giving rise to a variety of needs. Allocation on the basis of legitimate need would then amount to the self-recognition by society of these needs and the supplying of the means to satisfy them. Where this process is 'blocked in some way, for example by competing government economic priorities, then they argue that it is "more accurate to talk of demand rather than need as the general determinant of supply."¹² The reservation of 'need to a non-conflictual situation (as in a socialist utopia?) amounts to an effective denial of any relationship between a definition of need and a political process of struggle and accommodation between various agencies. Yet the analysis by George and Manning shows that demand and supply (of which finance is itself an aspect) are not purely technical or economic matters in the present day Soviet Union.

What they do not seem to appreciate is that neither can 'need' be a purely technical or economic matter, but if that is so, then the distinction which they make between need and demand is pointless.

This can be seen from the way in which they treat demand, dividing factors into two types: objective and subjective. "The first type includes demography and the current short-fall in housing provision in terms of space per capita, availability of self-contained units, provision of utilities and services and location."¹³ What distinction can be sustained between this 'objective' demand and the usual sort of conception of need? The subjective demand factors which they refer to are "particularly the relative strength of economic and social planners, unplanned industrial activity, and the impact of popular expectations."¹⁴ While these might correspond to the usual sort of conception of demand, they can only be excluded from a concept of need by denying the salience to a conception of need of the expressed wants of the various agents themselves, in which case it would be difficult to call 'democratic' any planning which ignored such expressed needs. In other words, any conception of needs which attempted to develop both 'objective' and 'subjective' criteria of need would be virtually indistinguishable from the concept of demand employed by George and Manning. Perhaps a distinction between the two could be maintained by referring to 'objective' factors as 'needs' and 'subjective factors' as 'demand'. However, this approach would face the difficulty that 'objective factors' are effectively defined in terms which are related to the discourses and administrative practices of state agencies (even if they may have

originally derived from elsewhere, say, in academic research) and thus bear a certain relation to struggles between state agencies, which appear to disqualify them as needs in George and Manning's usage. Yet even the classical Marxist concept of use-value (which tends to be closely associated with the concept of need) does not simply refer to 'objective factors' such as the physical properties of what is needed (as understood in the existing state of knowledge) but also to 'subjective factors' namely the expressed wants of the population : if an object is not wanted it has no use-value and in the case of commodity exchange for Marx it has no exchange-value.

Consequently, there seems to be no good reason for George and Manning (who aim to explore the Marxist view of social policy) to shift the appraisal of housing from the criterion of need to that of demand (or economic incentive). The reason for my insisting on denying that George and Manning make any effective distinction between the concepts of need and demand (which is a comparatively minor problem in their otherwise highly useful discussion) is to prevent needs from being relegated to a non-conflictual (non-political) utopia and to subject the concept to a certain amount of critical scrutiny. Needs do not simply emanate from a population whose structure is transparent to observation, but are always discursively registered. Thus there are no unproblematic 'objective needs' since the 'recognition' of needs is a theoretical and political process. This has implications for the socialist debate over the relative weight to be given to 'moral' and 'material' incentives. We have already seen that George and Manning juxtapose need and economic incentive as two quite distinct criteria. However, the registration of need by a

state agency depends not only on the expressed wants of other agents and on the discursive specification of need (for example, so many square metres of housing space per capita) but on the aims of the registering state agency or of some 'superordinate' agency. Thus what is registered as a need will be the outcome of a struggle in which various technical and overtly political arguments will be deployed. The decision to register an expressed want as a 'legitimate' need to some extent excludes other expressed wants, and the reason for selecting one rather than another may well be the aims of the registering agency. A decision to emphasise 'moral incentives' rather than 'material incentives' is among other things a different specification of the needs of the social formation in question. It is for this reason that the criterion of 'need' cannot be completely separated from that of 'economic incentive', as George and Manning attempt to do. A political decision to rely on housing provision as a form of economic incentive amounts a registration of a certain need to be met, and therefore implies a radically different product mix in the economic plan to that where 'moral incentives' are the main ones relied upon. Where house building has been kept down, as seemed to be the case prior to 1957, George and Manning argue that access to housing was used as a form of social control by various Ministries.¹⁵ The policy of keeping housebuilding down and leaving it mostly to the Ministries, where Ministries and factories tore cities apart, each trying to build 'its' houses, produced a different product mix for the overall economic plan and a different housing outcome in terms of its distribution among the population,


compared to the post-1957 policy, which attempted much more seriously to hold out the prospect of better housing for all. Nevertheless both policies were a form of economic incentive, and implied different specifications of the needs of the Soviet Union, taking more or less account of the expressed wants of certain agencies or sections of the population. The same is true of a decision to rely on 'moral incentives' : once again there is a different specification of needs, but one which attempts to influence downwards the very expression of wants (or articulation of demands) by certain sections of the population. Thus, rather than juxtapose incentives (whether material or moral) and need as distinct and competing criteria determining the supply of a social service such as housing, the analysis of the provision of social services should concentrate on the inter-relation of need and incentive. That is, the analysis of need should not be conducted in terms of a de-politicised expression of the inherent characteristics of the population, but as the outcome of a process of reconciliation (however achieved) of diverse aims of various agencies, including the use of incentives to mobilise either the population at large or various agencies within the social formation towards the achievement of 'national' objectives.

With these considerations in mind, it is possible to return to George and Manning's discussion of "demand, supply and finance" of housing for information on the political processes involved in housing provision. In addition, the work of Sternheimer¹⁶ will be examined, since it is a contrasting analysis to the socialist approach

of George and Manning and thus at times concentrates on different aspects of housing. Beginning then, with George and Manning, in their discussion of 'demand' they argue¹⁷ that "ever since housing owned by industries was nationalised rather than municipalised after the Revolution, there has been conflict between industries and Soviets over the provision and control of housing and associated services." The sources of this conflict are illustrated in the following diagram which they provide:

Figure 2

The administrative structure of housing services in the USSR.



Source : V. George and N. Manning, *ibid.*, page 178.

The reasons for this conflict, they argue are as follows:

"First, city and non-city enterprises are only coordinated at a very high level. Second, at that level state planning responsible for city affairs continues to be divided between the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) for industrial production and the State Construction Committee (Gosstroï) for housing construction. Third, since industrial growth has been a major aim, this arrangement has enabled industrial ministries to dominate urban development, particularly in newer industrial or smaller cities where soviets are dependent on one industry, or are administratively remote from the Republic level where major decisions can be made. In effect the demand for housing space where industries need workers tends to be met by industries themselves. However, the proper standard of such housing in terms of adequate space, services, location (particularly with respect to pollution) and maintenance cannot be easily enforced by the Soviets. They are by comparison to industry financially weak, do not own the houses, and are politically weak with respect to controlling location."

While preoccupied with different theoretical concerns than George and Manning, Sternheimer provides evidence to support the argument of George and Manning at many points. For example, in discussing the control by Gosplan and the Ministries over decisions made at local level, he points to examples such as that of Volgograd, where 39 new enterprises were constructed in violation of the city's genplan (general municipal plan for a city's physical and economic development), a state of affairs directly attributable to Ministerial pressure.¹⁸ As both George and Manning and Sternheimer make clear,

the most significant result of this preponderance of Ministerial power has been for the pattern of location of housing and in particular the growth of large cities. In matters of budgetary allocations, the rich and powerful are consistently the most well-rewarded.¹⁹ The reasons probably concern external economies of scale; as George and Manning point out, in larger cities the infrastructure already exists, labour is more skilled, supply routes are shorter, and so on. "Indeed it has been estimated that in cities of more than a million, production per inhabitant is 20 per cent above the urban average, production per worker 38 per cent above, and return on investment 111 per cent above. These advantages, together with weak controls on industry have combined to upset all attempts to control and predict the growth of large cities begun in the 1930s, re-emphasised by Khrushchev, and still official policy today."²⁰

Clearly then, the provision of housing involves political processes which at least partially undercut official housing policy aims, and it is worth examining some of these processes in more detail, the better to understand the outcomes in terms of actual housing provision. Leaving aside the private and cooperative housing sectors, which will be dealt with later, state housing is allocated on the basis of a waiting list, rather like British council housing. According to George and Manning,²¹ "an applicant to get on the waiting list must demonstrate sufficient need in terms of existing space, amenities, state of health and so on. Subsequently, people are actually housed from the waiting list in order of original

acceptance. However, this system is modified in several important ways. First, the waiting list can be circumvented either by someone being housed directly, or by being placed at the top of the waiting list, or by being given preference 'other things being equal.' Second, extra space may be allocated to certain preferred groups. Third, rents are low for certain favoured groups, but higher for others (such as the 'free professions'). In general these advantaged groups include either those with exceptional needs (the ill, large families, and so on) or those politically favoured (specialists, the military, those who do 'socially useful activity')....."


Yet George and Manning accept the argument that too much should not be made of these housing privileges, which are in many cases small. However, what is important to note from their discussion is the conclusion that one can draw, that the political distribution of means of consumption can and usually does leave scope for those with greater political influence to affect the distribution process. For this reason, rationing is not necessarily better than a market distribution of means of consumption in terms of its economic and political effects, unless, say, the distribution is subject to public participation which closes off or diminishes such scope for political influence. It should be borne in mind, however, that such public participation may be as technically easy to effect in the case of supervised (planned and monitored) market distribution of the means of consumption. If, as I have argued in the past ²², the conditions of commodity exchange have an important influence on its social effects, then there is no a priori reason to treat 'the commodity form' as

having certain essential effects and in certain circumstances it may well be politically preferable to rationing or some other administrative means of 'distribution according to need'.

The specific administrative framework for 'distribution according to needs' (as modified by criteria of economic incentive) has important effects on the outcome of the various conflicting pressures, although these effects are not unitary throughout the social formation, precisely because the housing decisions are the outcome of struggle, and the various agencies involved in this arena have diverse relations with each other in different localities. This is a point noted by Sternheimer in his rejection of Brzezinski's 'bureaucratic degeneration model' because it overstresses the standardisation of administrative procedures and posits a high degree of uniformity among all local-level administrative units.²³ It is also noted by George and Manning, who like Sternheimer point to the willingness of the leadership to engage in organisational 'experiments' and to the lack of clear specification of the relationships between various agencies.²⁴ The result is "that their relative strength varies considerably from one area to another and confused jurisdiction is common; a decision may have to meet the interests of the local soviet, the housing office, the house committee, the party, a trade union and so on. There is 'widespread dependence on personal relations' and in many respects the outcome is the same as for higher level conflicts between soviets and enterprises - political ideals are compromised." George and Manning provide the following diagram to illustrate the administrative structure of local housing services in the USSR.

Figure 3

The administrative structure of local housing services in the USSR



Source: V. George and N. Manning (1980), page 179.

These housing agencies include the ones which are not subject to dual subordination²⁵, and therefore the ones most likely to enhance local control and public participation in the implementation of housing policy. However, their effectiveness is seriously diminished for a variety of reasons. The key body in the local housing arena, as can be seen from the diagram, is the housing office, within which the technical inspector is the most important single agent, who is broadly responsible for managing the housing stock, access and so on. However, the general level of training and efficiency at this level is poor, according to George and Manning, and since Khrushchev's time voluntary administrative bodies have been encouraged both to improve housing management and to generate greater public participation in government. "In the event

they came to be used far more as free labour than as a form of political representation."²⁶ Attempts have been made to get the House Committee (Domkom) to control the housing office, but like attempts to strengthen the city soviet itself, they have made little headway.

The weak position of the city soviets and of public participation is clear from the following points drawn from Sternheimer, and from George and Manning. There is no local fiscal control, since city and county budgets combined are only a small proportion of the total state budget (around 14 per cent in 1970, at a time when the urban population was around 56 per cent), and local taxes cannot be levied (since 1959 when the enterprise building tax was abolished). The mechanisms for ensuring local responsiveness do not work very well: there is a high turnover of deputies on local soviets, which militates against the development of expertise in dealing with the various agencies; the duties of local administrators exceed their powers; the attitudes of local administrators can be seen from the finding that 82 per cent of them believed that they took account of public opinion in reaching their decisions (and surprisingly in view of complaints about housing, 62 per cent of the population agreed with them); the administrative mechanisms for ensuring accountability of officials work poorly. These are the otchet, a periodic report by an agency head to an elected soviet or its executive committee, and the zapros, a legislative inquiry by the city council into an agency's operations or policies. The same is even more true of the nakazy, instructions to deputies and administrators from the electorate at

large, which occur at best on a biennial basis, usually after the relevant budgetary and planning decisions have been made.²⁷ In view of this it is extremely difficult to see what George and Manning mean when they say (page 155) that "housing is entirely controlled locally". This contradicts their own analysis, unless they simply mean that the distribution of housing is the outcome of struggle between local agencies, even if some of the latter are subject to dual subordination. If housing were really controlled locally, then it would be difficult to explain the chronic underinvestment in services associated with housing, particularly sewerage. Yet there is a degree of local coordination, as Sternheimer points out, with the party playing a fairly rational urban management role²⁸, without which Soviet urban administration would not work as well as it has through what has been and will continue to be a very rapid process of urbanisation. However, to say that there is some local coordination of decisions which has mitigated the effects of some of the ministerial agencies' pursuit of their own specific aims is not to say that the current situation of the city soviets is satisfactory. There is a clear need in my view to incorporate cities in a more politically effective way than hitherto. Some cities, such as Magnitogorsk, according to George and Manning²⁹, have not been incorporated at all by the Ministry of Municipal Services; that is they have not been officially designated as a city, which means there is no legal means of enforcing adequate heating, water and sewerage systems. Even where cities are legally incorporated, it needs to be done with more local fiscal control, and with the direct control of housing taken away from enterprises. We have

already seen the effect of enterprise control on job turnover, and the problems of coordinating enterprise housing decisions with an overall city genplan, but there is the additional problem of the obstacles to closing down enterprises or reducing their labour force because of rising productivity or a changing technical division of labour or division of social production. Enterprise control of housing makes it more difficult to plan the overall economy in terms of such considerations, and provides enterprises and Ministries with allies in the form of city soviets or local party agencies who are willing to reach accommodations with the enterprises and Ministries to encourage them to build more housing. The removal of housing from the control of Ministries and enterprises would make public participation in the implementation of housing policy a much more effective affair. As it is, George and Manning are probably correct when they argue (page 157) that "the existence of a private sector in housing including individual, collective farm and cooperative building, and a small market in subletting, has provided the most direct form of 'participation' in housing for many Soviet citizens". It seems appropriate, therefore, to turn to these sectors of housing provision.

Bearing in mind earlier remarks about the effects of administrative and commodity distribution of means of consumption, it should be pointed out that current forms of non-state housing provisions are varied. "Housing in the Soviet Union stands apart from the other social services in that around 50 per cent of existing stock is privately owned (including a small proportion of cooperative

flats which are effectively owned on mortgage from the state), and one-third of new housing built is private or cooperative" according to George and Manning.³⁰ However, the private and cooperative sectors should not be treated exclusively as 'bastions of privilege'. It is certainly true that in the early 1970's a cooperative flat cost about six times the average wage to buy, and a 40 per cent deposit was required. However, this is not the most privileged sector of housing provision, since official provision of housing at low rent for the politically privileged is the most favourable form of access to housing, and as we shall see later, the cooperative sector faces considerable planning obstacles which reduce its attractiveness as an option. Furthermore, with regard to other private forms of housing, rural private housing is often the only form available and frequently lacks basic amenities. State housing is generally of better quality and is heavily subsidised.

The existence of the private and cooperative sectors is due to the fact that the state cannot by itself provide enough housing construction. It needs to rely on rural inhabitants to provide much of their own housing using traditional materials, although in recent years the relevant skills among the population have become somewhat rarer. But the cooperative sector does not merely fill a gap in state provision, it also acts as a channel diverting funds from higher income groups which would otherwise create additional demand for consumer goods. Another function fulfilled by the non-state sector, in urban areas at least, is that it does register the short-fall in supply: the unofficial but legal subletting rates are a price mechanism which registers 'perceived need' without recourse to state agencies.

The extent of underprovision by the state can be assessed from the following Table, which estimates current ownership of new and existing housing stock in urban and rural areas:

Table 3

Estimated current ownership of new and existing housing stock in urban and rural areas (%)

			<i>New construction</i>	<i>Existing stock</i>
URBAN	State	Industry	35	30
		Soviet	45	35
	Private		9	30
		Co-operative	<u>11</u>	<u>5</u>
			<u>100</u> (75% of all construction)	<u>100</u> (66% of all stock)
RURAL	State		60	10
		Private	<u>40</u>	<u>90</u>
		<u>100</u> (25% of all construction)	<u>100</u> (33% of all stock)	

Source: V. George and N. Manning *ibid.*, page 151.

Thus the inadequacies in housing provision are to some extent made good by the private and cooperative sectors. It is perhaps easy to argue that it would be preferable if these inadequacies were rather eradicated by increased investment, better planning and by the dissociation of housing from industrial Ministries, so that city soviets were directly responsible for urban housing. However, this is easier said than done, since, as George and Manning point out, "the determinants of the supply of housing are divided amongst different (and in some respects competing) bodies. In general, there has been a close shaping of housing policy by economic policy, although the detailed realisation of this is in fact a quite complex political process. Consequently, political initiatives to affect the

organisation and supply of housing have often been frustrated, or at least distorted in their implementation"³¹ Thus the political processes involved in providing access to a major means of consumption (that is, the political processes involved in some of the relations of distribution) have their own effectivity which among other things reduces their amenability to any democratic pressure for greater public participation. This raises the question which will be the main concern of the next section, namely, what are the effects of these processes in terms of actual housing outcomes and their social consequences.

The Social Distribution of Housing

Perhaps the most striking outcome of the competition between Ministries to build their 'own' housing, and their consequent refusal to be constrained by the existing plans of city soviets, has been the inordinately high proportion of housing investment (around half the annual housing investment) which is "spent on repairing old buildings and constructing new buildings to replace habitable space demolished in redevelopment schemes"³². Elsewhere, Jacobs gives an idea of ^{the} both/scale of the repair and replacement problem, and of some of the reasons for it. From 1960 to 1972 roughly 15 per cent of the new housing built each year was replacement of demolished housing,³³ and by no means all the demolition is warranted, since some of the housing is quite new. A major consequence of this demolition is that, since those whose apartments and houses have been pulled down must be rehoused free of charge, the destruction of housing stock has

slowed down the Soviet housing programme, particularly when it is remembered how heavily subsidised state housing is. The scale of repairs is even more astonishing.³⁴ As much as 30 per cent of the labour in construction is spent on repairs to bring housing up to minimum standards, and repairs are often necessary on brand new buildings, with as much as 60 per cent of new housing being classified as defective. Moreover, structures do not last as long as they should, with in the case of one study 64 per cent of apartment roofs built in the 1960s needing repair within four years, and all of them within ten years (on a roof designed to last 30 years). The quality of repair is often substandard, and the cost is excessive, offsetting the labour-saving benefits of industrial pre-fabrication construction techniques. While Jacobs does not mention it, the repair problems (and internal decoration problems) lead to a flourishing black market, or rather 'grey' market to use Katsenelinboigen's terms.³⁵ Jacobs gives an excellent account of the reasons for the poor state of repair of Soviet housing:³⁶ "The emphasis on quantity of housing and the planner's obsession with cutting production costs are partially responsible for the low quality of Soviet housing. By trying to cut costs on capital repairs (during the period 1966 to 1969, 115 million roubles allocated for capital repairs was not used), the local authorities are actually shortening the life of their housing. Poor construction, followed by poor maintenance and repair, leads to premature decay of the buildings and might help explain the high rate of attrition of Soviet urban housing." The effects on quality of 'storming' at the end of the annual plan period, so well known in industry, are also noted by Jacobs and by George and Manning.

In the light of these phenomena, one can appraise the quality of Soviet housing. Since the late 1950s, there have been some remarkable improvements in conditions, and per capita living space in new apartments reached the 1922 sanitary norm of 9 square metres per capita during the 1971-1975 Five Year Plan. Overall in the Soviet Union living space is now approaching the average of 9 square metres per capita. New apartments have been much smaller than old ones, presumably because the trend has been away from communal apartments (which were cheaper to build because they had a lower per capita provision of amenities). The quality in terms of amenities has also improved, although by Western standards it remains poor to abysmal. Thus, between 1961 and 1971, 10 per cent of the living area constructed lacked the three basic amenities of running water, sewerage and central heating. "In 1970, only 77 per cent of Soviet urban dwellings in the public sector had running water, while only 74 per cent had sewerage and 72 per cent had central heating."³⁷ These figures take no account of privately-owned housing, which in 1970 accounted for about 30 per cent of the urban housing stock, and in which standards of amenities fall very far below public-sector standards. The expense of installing the amenities is probably the limiting factor here, since most of this housing is on a city's outskirts, which anyway tend to be less well provided with amenities. In small towns, the standard of amenities in public housing is appreciably worse than in larger cities, and since there is proportionately more private housing in small towns, presumably the standard of amenities there is abysmally low. Jacobs claims that in the public

sector, the list of building and design faults, and problems of planning and management, resulting in the poor quality of Soviet housing and the low standards of amenities, could go on for pages.³⁸ Thus while recent improvements in design and construction have substantially improved the quality of Soviet housing, particularly compared to the late 1950s, there is in Jacobs' view no other industrial country with housing conditions as bad as in the USSR.

If one puts together the fact that the largest cities have received the most investment with the fact that the largest cities are concentrated in European Russia, it comes as no surprise to learn that the massive overall development of housing has not decreased geographical inequalities in per capita living space. Rather it is surprising to find how little the regional inequalities have increased.³⁹ However, rural-urban differences in housing remain considerable. While urbanisation has substantially improved the overall level of accommodation of the Soviet population, the resulting rural-urban migration of currently around two million a year has not simply left behind the old, the female and the unskilled, and the poor, it has left them in accommodation which to-day seems rudimentary. Those who have not yet achieved residence in cities frequently commute since they are able to find jobs if not housing.

Apart from regional and rural-urban differences in housing, the major difference in the social distribution of housing is between the state, private and cooperative sectors. It has already been argued that the private and cooperative sectors are not necessarily 'bastions of privilege' and it should be clear from the above discussion on quality of housing why this is the case with most private housing,

which is either rural, located in small towns or located on the outskirts of larger cities. However, the cooperative sector is clearly an option for higher income groups, and while amenities are clearly better than much private housing, various obstacles are placed in the way of prospective cooperative members, "seemingly in an attempt to avoid a scramble for places on waiting lists, which can sometimes have backlogs of six years or more"⁴⁰. There are residence requirements (defined in terms of number of years in a city or place on the state waiting list), and the decision to build is subject to approval by the local soviet executive committee, which also supervises design. Construction is by state agencies at state prices, and completion is even slower than on state housing (since there are no economic incentives for the construction workers involved). Apartments in such a building cannot be sold, since they are all public cooperative property. When the rules are followed, the sites for cooperative housing are often on the outskirts of a city, far away from public services, transportation and members' places of work, thus causing a lot of complaints from cooperative members. In terms of various indices (absolute space or the percentage of public sector construction) cooperative construction has gone down since the mid-1960s to the early 1970s.

Thus official enthusiasm for cooperatives seems to be waning, according to Jacobs, which is in contrast to the impression given by George and Manning. One reason may be that some housing cooperatives are fairly privileged, and in catering for middle and upper income groups, housing cooperatives threaten the homogeneity

of Soviet society. Certainly planners seem to have been at pains to mix the cooperatives in with state housing and to limit the extent of cooperative housing, and while the personal expenditure involved did limit the purchasing power of the upper income groups, Jacobs suggests that "it may be that the availability of cars has now been able to do the same thing, at less cost in effort and materials of the state."⁴¹

Private house building in cities is discouraged, and in the capitals of the various constituent Republics and in most major cities, no land or credits have been granted since 1962. Just as in the state and cooperative sectors there are relatively privileged housing groups, so there are such groups in the private sector, mostly in the case of dachas owned by city-dwellers, but the general picture is that shortages of material and finance, coupled with a lack of official sympathy for private housebuilding, account for the poor condition of private housing which was indicated earlier. Despite the fact that private urban housing is a declining proportion of the urban housing stock, people resort to illegal private house construction, which is often jerry-built. This is a clear indication that the Soviet housing situation still falls far short of peoples' expectations (which are probably still rising as a result of improved provision). Soviet standards in housing are still well behind West European or American ones. Jacobs sets more limited goals for Soviet housing: a universal sanitary norm of 14 to 15 square metres of living space, with hot and cold water, sewerage and central heating. In his view, it is still open to doubt whether such standards will be achieved by 1990 or even 2000⁴².

The more immediate social implications of the distribution of Soviet housing must now be considered. The two most pertinent for the purposes of this thesis are the effects of housing policy on the distribution of income and on family structure (the latter because the family in the USSR as elsewhere is often an integral component of the social policies of state agencies, either as locus of various policy objectives or as an agency for the implementation of policy). To deal first with the distribution of income, it is clear that rent is only a very small deduction from the disposable income of families, despite the complex rules concerning rent which could in principle lead to greater variation in the proportion of disposable income which goes on rent. The three basic elements of a tenant's rent are basic scale rent, apartment tax and sliding scale rent. However, Jacobs argues that increases in the minimum wage have meant that since 1968 all tenants have paid the full maximal standard rate of rent for their accommodation, although if there is no common kitchen, the total rent paid for the apartment is reduced by one-quarter.⁴³ There are preferential rates of rent for pensioners, military, KGB and militia personnel, and holders of various decorations. In addition, health workers, educators and certain other categories of workers living and working in rural areas have a free apartment (including heating and lighting) for themselves and their families. Extra rent can be charged for above-standard living space, or for being a member of the 'free' professions, handicraftsmen and ministers of religion. Tenants must also pay for central heating and various communal services (although

pensioners pay only half-price for these). The complexities of the procedures for assessing charges on these services lead to disputes about rent charges, but the overall situation is fairly clear, despite the complexities of the system of charging rent. The average Soviet family (as opposed to the poorer than average family) spends four or five per cent of total family income on rent alone, compared with around 11 per cent in the USA or seven per cent in the UK. While it is possible to sub-let in the USSR, this cannot be done systematically in a way which creates a source of unearned income. Consequently, the subsidised nature of Soviet state housing, which is paid for from taxation (mostly turnover tax, that is, in the form of higher prices for consumer goods and services), means that the effect of Soviet housing policy on the distribution of income is probably on the whole fairly egalitarian.⁴⁴

The move away from communal apartments to private apartments means that there is now 'architectural support' in the Soviet Union for the nuclear family. To the extent that this trend continues, it will mean that whatever the legalities of various kinds of family structure and whatever the divorce rates, something like the present day family will be difficult to avoid because of the implicit co-habitation patterns of private flats. One could take a variety of positions with respect to the relation between architectural exigencies and family structure. Although the trend towards making self-contained state-owned flats available to all is far from realised, George and Manning point out⁴⁵ that in terms of design of housing this precludes any wide-scale development of communalism in domestic life. As more domestic facilities become available the focus on the nuclear domestic household

could intensify. However, they argue that this is not necessarily a retreat from socialism, and that eastern and western Marxists alike tend to over-emphasise the institutional economy and under-emphasise the domestic economy. They thus argue for investment in and design of housing as productive investment, that is, in favour of a 'garden city' type of socialism, presumably with massive domestic production of vegetables. While it is true that flats do increase the demand for vegetables as a commodity, a demand which the Soviet Union currently finds difficulty in satisfying, what George and Manning call the 'error' of the Soviet planners in treating only the institutional economy as productive stems from the classical Marxist conception of productive labour. While I would agree that this conception is problematic, pointing out that the domestic household is capable of producing means of consumption (a point in any case made some years ago during the 'domestic labour debate') does not eo ipso enable one to resolve the problem of the most appropriate units of production and family structure in a socialist social formation. Before advocating an increase in domestic household production, the relation of the nuclear family to the contemporary relatively poor housing and poor system of retail distribution need to be taken into consideration.

The most immediately striking aspect of the Soviet nuclear family in the contemporary housing and retail distribution situation is the burdensome nature of domestic housework and shopping. This is well documented by both Heitlinger and Dodge.⁴⁶ Such work is overwhelmingly carried out by women, although they constitute over

50 per cent of the waged labour force. Admittedly, the situation has improved very slightly in recent years, but given the role of women in rural households (in terms of work on the private plots), there is no reason to suppose that an emphasis on the 'garden-city' type of domestic household production would do anything but reinforce the current sexist practices within the Soviet nuclear family. This is not to say that any social or economic policy directed at the nuclear family is necessarily sexist. For example, Hirst⁴⁷ argues that "It is precisely by supporting and extending ordinary women's aspirations and actions in the family that modern feminism can have most effect on the family". This is not an argument for the support of the existing family structure and the subordinate position of women in it, since as Hirst makes clear elsewhere in this argument, liberal capitalist state policies of intervention in the family have historically entailed an attempt at partial transformation of the family.⁴⁸ The implication is that the same would be even more true of feminist interventions, and I would assume that under the appropriate circumstances, state socialist interventions in the nuclear family could substantially transform the family in a direction promoting the equalisation of the position of men and women.

The point here is not to speculate on what the appropriate circumstances would be, or what other effects policies intervening in the nuclear family could have (such as promoting social consumption or the acquisition of the complex cultural skills necessary for mass public participation in politics), but rather to point out that disagreement with George and Manning's proposals for domestic arrangements does

not mean a rejection of such issues as a matter of serious concern for social policy. Furthermore, disagreement with George and Manning's proposals does not necessarily mean a rejection of 'the' nuclear family as an important component of strategies aiming at socialist social policy objectives. In the case of the Soviet Union, the nuclear family has for a long time been implicated in the implementation of social policy.⁴⁹ This continues to be the case today, not only in housing as we have just seen, but also in health and social security. These areas of social policy will now be examined, before turning to the effect of such welfare policies on consumption as reflected in family budgets.

Health

As in the case of housing, it is difficult to understand the Soviet health service without an appreciation of its historical development, and this will be briefly discussed here.⁵⁰ In July 1918, the world's first health ministry was established, preceding the UK Ministry of Health (established in 1919): this was the People's Commissariat of Health of the RSFSR. Apart from the major problems of epidemics, starvation and war casualties, the medical profession itself posed an immediate problem in the form of the anti-socialist Pirogov Society which under the Provisional Government had been rapidly strengthening the position of the medical profession in the health service. It was dissolved in 1918, and a Medical Workers' Union (for all medical workers including doctors) was set up in 1919. For rural health services, despite initial unwillingness to use "second class doctors",

the Bolsheviks relied to some extent on 'feldshers' (from the German for 'army surgeon') who were (and are) not as highly qualified as doctors. However, even to-day feldshers do not 'fill the gaps' generated by lack of doctors. While there are still considerable problems in persuading doctors to live in rural areas, the feldshers do not predominate in areas where doctors are lacking. Rather there is a 'positive association' between the distribution of rural doctors and feldshers, suggesting that the latter at times function as medical auxiliaries to the doctors.

Once the epidemics associated with the Civil War were overcome, prophylaxis (preventive medicine) re-emerged as a key concern in 1924.⁵¹ With the introduction of the NEP, there was a limited resurgence of private practice, doctors having to choose complete public or private work. Despite 'penal' taxation of private practice, there are still a few private polyclinics in the Soviet Union, but no private hospitals and no system of 'pay-beds'. Related to the first Five Year Plan, the health services were explicitly directed (in a party resolution of 18th December 1929, nine days before Stalin's famous intervention in the Agrarian Marxist debate) to give priority to the industrial health service. The use of health posts in industrial enterprises now became the first priority, and with the increase in women at work a special health service section was developed for women and children. There was also a branch set up to plan and organise the sanitation of the rapidly growing urban areas, and medical training was taken out of the Universities, with the number of years of study reduced to four, in conjunction with which the rapid growth of medical research institutes was started (resulting in 223 institutes in 1941).

Collective farms were made largely responsible for their own health care, although there were medical 'flying squads' to deal with epidemics, and the number of rural hospital beds doubled during the first Five Year Plan. However, the general result of the emphasis on industry was the neglect of rural health, there being 750 patients per doctor in towns in 1933, compared to 14,200 per doctor in the countryside. The priority given to industrial health was obviously to aid production, and the effects of this can still be seen to-day in the design of the medical certificate which is still related to work-obligations.⁵² This reorientation of medicine from need to labour discipline was related to the political subordination of and a decline in the prestige of the medical profession, whose real wages were cut to 58 per cent of their 1928 level by the Second World War. At the same time, women were encouraged to become doctors, and 75 per cent of doctors were women by 1934. The 1936 Constitution included the right to free health care and established an All-Union Ministry of Health. This completed the development of central administration of medicine and the process of political subordination of the medical profession. The result of the tripartite division into industrial health, women and children, and urban sanitation, coupled with the absence of effective worker or public participation, was that the way was opened to increasing academic and technical dominance, and the influence of the hospital. According to George and Manning⁵³, this trend was confirmed when in 1947 polyclinics and in 1956 sanitary-epidemiological (public health) stations came under hospital control. One might add that related to this academic and technical predominance, as in the West, is the absence of women doctors from senior administrative and research posts. It is

noticeable that now, as the prestige and pay of the medical profession is being increased, half of those studying to become doctors are men, although this has not yet worked its way through into the profession itself, where women still form 70 per cent of practising doctors.

The rapid pre-war expansion and modernisation of the health services made a substantial contribution to the war effort and in many ways this seemed to confirm the general Soviet approach to health, but despite this the first post-war Minister attacked the 'industrial principle'. The 1947 combination of hospitals and polyclinics was part of the associated changes which included improved local access to health care (with greater utilisation of the urban 'block' or uchastok, the lowest administrative unit in the health service). From around 1954, however, the industrial orientation was restored, with factory health posts being reopened and priority being given to industrial workers in terms of access to hospital, but for the first time since collectivisation the farmer benefited from occupational priority.⁵⁴ Khrushchev's 'sovnarkhoz reform' of 1957 to some extent reduced the emphasis on the 'industrial principle' by enhancing territorial forms of administration, including Union-Republican Ministries of Health. Since then the trends have been towards greater rural-urban equality in provision (to the point where rural areas have more pharmacies per head than urban areas), greater emphasis on hospitals (especially bigger ones where economies of scale and greater medical specialisation are possible) and a deliberate emphasis on 'professionalising' the medical profession. The latter includes a professional oath on graduation and limitations on the practice of medicine by those without special training.

The general effect of these developments and the expansion of the Soviet health service has been to alter the patterns of morbidity to those more typical of high-income countries with low infant mortality, with the emphasis shifting towards diseases of middle and old age, particularly lung cancer, cardio-vascular disease and mental ill-health.⁵⁵ The demographic trends are towards an ageing population, with the size of the cohorts entering old age rising rapidly after 1980. While exact figures on morbidity and mortality are rather scarce, it does seem as if there is a greater problem than in Britain with some infectious diseases, particularly in the warmer southern parts of the USSR. There also seems to be greater provision for the treatment of tuberculosis than is the case in Britain.


Health Politics: Administration, Finance and Policy

As Kaser points out⁵⁶, "The absence of extensive morbidity series precludes judgement on the appropriateness of the Soviet medical service to meet the demands on it." The development of medical personnel differs markedly from that in the West and, being labour intensive, may appear wasteful, but this may not be the case given Soviet standards of nutrition and housing. The process of planning the deployment of personnel and equipment is related to the medical statistics coming in to the Ministry of Health from hospitals, dispensaries and mass screening, with the latter giving an indication of the extent of otherwise undiagnosed illness. Thus registered needs are partly generated by the administrative practices of the health service.⁵⁷ For this reason it is important to understand the administrative structure of the health service. While the Soviet health service is often described as highly centralised, it is

less so than it might at first appear. Certainly in December 1969, a new Public Health Act was passed by the Supreme Soviet, aiming at eliminating variations in medical practice and in the interpretation of regulations⁵⁸, but it did not eliminate the departmental structure of the health service. Other Ministries and corresponding organisations can run their 'own' health services, with permission from the USSR Council of Ministers, the most substantial being provided by the Ministries of Transport, Civil Aviation, Defence and Internal Affairs.⁵⁹ The USSR Ministry of Health is given the function of co-ordinating their services. With the above qualification in mind, the following figure gives an idea of the administrative structure of the health service, although it does not show all the bodies involved in the preparation and approval of the national health plan.⁶⁰

Figure 4

The administrative structure of the Soviet health service



At the bottom two levels of Figure 4, one is dealing with institutions directly responsible for the delivery of health care. As indicated earlier, such institutions are divided into three sectors, namely, general clinical and industrial medicine; maternity and child care, and public health. Despite the reduced emphasis on 'the industrial principle' since 1957, such a division of labour seems clearly designed to meet industrial needs: the first sector for maintaining a productive labour force, the second for reproducing the labour force efficiently, and the third to prevent illness from reducing the labour supply. Thus there is still scope for strong conflicting pressures on the doctor to meet both the needs of the patient and those of industry. A high degree of specialisation, so frequently reported in discussions of the division of labour in the Soviet Union, seems evident in the health services as well. Thus there is a variety of health institutions whose activities overlap with poor co-ordination.

Within the first sector are general cure and prophylaxis hospitals (bolnitsy), in some cases united with polyclinics; polyclinics on their own; panel surgeries (ambulatorii); dispensaries (for follow up treatment with record linkage to other institutions, the active participation of the patient, and survey of the local social circumstances causing the condition in question, as well as for screening and monitoring certain age groups and illnesses notably tuberculosis, venereal disease and alcoholism); health posts; military hospitals (gospitalii); sanatoria; pharmacies; and factory health services. The second sector is comprised of maternity homes, with ante-natal and post-natal clinics; children's hospitals; children's polyclinics; creches; children's convalescent homes and medical services to camps, schools and other educational

establishments. The third sector is composed of sanitary epidemiological stations and health education units. In addition to these three sectors, there are medical services for rural areas - raion hospitals and rural physicians, feldsher and midwife 'blocks' (uchastki).⁶¹

At the district level, the chief physician, as head of the district hospital, co-ordinates polyclinics, dispensaries and public and industrial health services. At the regional level, the chief medical officer is responsible for all medical services. The result is often that many primary-level physicians feel that they are merely referral agents for a hospital dominated set of institutions, at the district level. At the regional level, the dominance of academic medicine continues, with a proliferation of specialities that promote an excessively compartmentalised activity and a blinkered perception of the patient. These complaints are also familiar in Britain. Thus "the articulation and impact of popular demand has been weak in the face of political constraints on resource allocation and the planning process".⁶² It therefore seems appropriate to examine, firstly, the planning process and, secondly, the methods of financing the health service.

While the agencies involved in the process of elaborating the annual health plan (and integrating it to the annual economic plan) are clear from Popov's account⁶³, it is not clear which techniques or methods of planning predominate. Among the techniques referred to are expert evaluation, cost-benefit analysis, the balance method, the method of ratios and proportions, and the establishment of norms and standards. Judging by later chapters in Popov, it seems that the balance method, the method of ratios and proportions, and the establishment of norms and standards are the main planning methods. That is, the material and

labour balance methods are used as in the rest of the economic plan, while ratios and proportions, and norms and standards are used to establish targets for the plan. Thus "a standard ratio of medical facilities to population size is of great importance in planning the development of the health services."⁶⁴ Presumably this technique of ratios and proportions is used to relate the growth of facilities to demographic trends, and in that sense, to fit services to expected medical need, but on the whole it seems to be the 'supply side' which is emphasised. In other words, it seems to be the delivery of services which is the main criterion in the establishment of requirements. For example, requirements for medical personnel are established in such a manner, despite the fact that the average work-load for physicians in the USSR appears to be the lowest in the world. This has led Popov as well as Western observers to conclude that the increase in medical specialties may have been somewhat wasteful; or as Popov puts it:⁶⁵ "the conclusion may thus be drawn that insufficient attention has so far been paid to improving the organisational forms of medical care and the utilisation of the material and technical basis of public health, (and) the more rational distribution and utilisation of medical personnel, whether physicians or members of the paramedical professions ..."

However, while there may be a certain amount of over-emphasis in the planning process on increasing the delivery of health care, in the form of medical personnel, pharmaceuticals, hospital beds and so on, it would be misleading to imply that there was no attempt to relate health care provision to need. Popov distinguishes between 'health norms' and 'health standards'.⁶⁶ He defines the former as "scientifically established indices of environmental conditions and of the medical care required by the community or by various population groups, as well as of the utilisation of facilities," whereas the

latter are defined as "indices relating to the resources required to meet the needs specified by the norms, i.e. indices relating to the public health facilities and the availability of medical care." To put it crudely, 'norms' refer to needs (including needs as indicated by use of existing facilities) whereas 'standards' refer to the resources required to meet those needs. There are 300 such indices, and a substantial proportion of them could be counted as 'norms'. This sophistication of the Ministry of Health's definition and registering of need cannot be discounted in any serious appraisal of the social effects of the health service.

The implementation of the health plans is of course dependent on adequate finance, which comes mainly from the social consumption funds, of which they form nearly 20 per cent (or 4 per cent of the net material product). In addition, a further 1 per cent of the net material product (NMP) is spent by state enterprises, trade unions and collective farms, with a small contribution from social insurance funds and private payments. Soviet data on the composition of health finance are scarce, according to Kaser,⁶⁷ so the following table which he compiled for 1968 is invaluable.

Table 6Finance of health services in the USSR; official data and estimatesfor 1968

Millions of roubles

	Million roubles	Per cent
1. Government		
On health and physical culture	8138	
(a) of which paid through:		
1.1 All-Union and Union-Republican agencies	1069	
1.2 Provincial (<i>oblastnye</i>) authorities	1194	
1.3 City (<i>gorodskie</i>) authorities	3367	
1.4 Rayon (<i>raionnye</i>) authorities	2056	
1.5 Settlement (<i>poselkovye</i>) councils	142	
1.6 Village (<i>sel'skie</i>) councils	310	
(b) 1.7 less outlay on physical culture	-49 8089	77.1
(c) of which on health-care products		
1.1 Supplied in hospitals	542	
1.9 Supplied free to outpatients	385	
2. Social Insurance		
2.1 Contribution to prosthetic costs	90	
2.2 Resort cures and dietetic needs	490 580	5.5
3. Other socialized enterprises		
3.1 State and cooperative enterprises, trade unions, collective farms	2013	
3.2 less social insurance	-580 1433	13.7
4. Direct payment (by persons)		
4.1 Purchase of health-care products	288	
4.2 Payments in polyclinics	98 386	3.7
5. Total of officially-sanctioned payments	10488	100.0

Source: M. Kaser (1976), *ibid.*, page 88.

As can be seen from the above table, a variety of agencies are involved in the provision of health care. Government finance is predominantly channelled through the Ministry of Health, and apart from social insurance, the other main source of finance is from the socialised enterprises operating budgets or profits. In the case of collective farm hospitals, for example, the collective farm provides the building, heating, cleaning and so on, while the Ministry of Health supplies the medically qualified personnel. Roughly one-sixth of health care is provided in this way profits can be used for resort stays

at spas, or in holiday areas, with an enterprise or trade union sometimes building its own facilities in such areas. Such practices resulted partly from the take-over of spas after the Revolution, and partly from the housing problems of the cities. Sometimes their therapeutic or prophylactic effect is unclear⁶⁸, but in the case of, say, fishing enterprises inside the Arctic circle which have facilities on the Black Sea, there is clearly a health gain from such facilities.

At the level of regional health facilities, salaries take over 50 per cent of the budget, food about 10 per cent and medicines about 8 per cent. Medicines are charged for, except when provided in hospital. Free medicines constitute around 70 per cent of all medicine, but there is no sign of implementing the official policy of phasing out such charges. In addition, as indicated earlier, there is private payment for care (both legal and illegal payment). There are a few 'paying polyclinics', and those which exist are administered and financed by the local authority like any free facility. Payments of 1 to 2 roubles mean that they are in any case 'semi-free', as far as the incomes of the patients likely to use them are concerned. The payments which are not legally sanctioned are the unofficial fees for 'tipping' ordinary medical staff, but this is so general that a scale of rates has been set out by various commentators on Soviet health.⁶⁹

One result of the forms of organisation and finance of the Soviet health service has been that it has been provided in a remarkably inexpensive manner. This has continued to be the case despite the fact that the number of doctors increased by 85 per cent between 1960 and 1974, so that the Soviet Union provides over twice as many doctors per head of the population as Britain, and despite the fact that, administratively

speaking, hospitals predominate. One reason for this is that since the late 1920's real incomes in general have doubled, whereas the incomes of health staff have only increased by half. In addition, there has been a 'sparing use of capital' ⁷⁰ both in terms of ancillary equipment and in terms of hospital construction; part of the saving in terms of hospital construction has been achieved by standardising hospital buildings over very long periods, so that those built recently are generally indistinguishable from those which are much older. Furthermore, careful planning seems to have increased the occupancy rates for hospital beds, that is, has decreased the time during which beds are empty, thereby making further use of available facilities. This may partly account for the increase in treatment of rural patients in urban hospitals. Finally, some 80 per cent of patients receive their entire treatment in out-patient establishments. ⁷¹ Such considerations should not be forgotten when claims are made that Soviet health care is wasteful.

Following this discussion of the administration and finance of Soviet health, it is now possible to assess the priorities of Soviet health provision and their relation to need, despite the lack of evidence on patterns of morbidity. In other words, it is now possible to assess Soviet health policy. While it is clear that in the past industrial provision took precedence over other aspects, and urban provision took precedence over rural provision, this now happens despite rather than because of official policy. The attempts to reduce overlap in provision by different institutions (especially primary care institutions as opposed to hospitals) and the attempts to equalise urban-rural provision have had the effect of reducing such stark differences in priority as existed

in the past. Priorities are now of course partly related to demographic and morbidity trends. While the USSR has had a low dependency ratio (the ratio of (a) those too young or old to work to (b) the economically active population) this is now disappearing. As indicated earlier, the morbidity patterns are similar to Western Europe or the USA, with a residual problem of infectious disease. However, these determinants of medical priority are affected by others: the provision of doctors has generated a demand for home visits (despite the official preference for hospitalisation), the provision of polyclinics and dispensaries has generated a demand for specialist hospital services, and the provision of mass screening has generated need in the form of otherwise undetected illness.⁷² It is intended to extend this screening to the entire population. One effect of this would be to equalise to some extent the relative emphasis on prevention and on cure. Despite the official aim of keeping prevention as a high priority, it has tended to take second place to cure as a form of health care.

However, one area of what could be regarded as preventive medicine is sport (although it is also related to defence and to promoting industrial production, and is normally considered in the West simply as a form of consumption). The encouragement of mass participation in sport is not merely lip-service, although the extent of that participation is probably less than officially claimed.⁷³ Nevertheless, despite the fact that three times as many men as women participate in sport, and despite the fairly low priority of sports expenditure in the state budget, it must make a contribution to improving the level of health of the population. The encouragement of sport as a form of preventive medicine illustrates a point made by George and Manning,⁷⁴ namely that the notion of

prevention can be "stretched to include substantial aspects of the environment, such as housing and diet; and as far as mental illness is concerned, family life, social and occupational mobility, and so on. It is difficult for this reason to measure investment in preventive health care except by such narrow definitions as screening and health check-ups." Yet it is only in terms of such narrow definitions that they are able to conclude that prevention has not been extensively translated into practice. The production of better housing and more food, while still inadequate by West European standards, represents a massive investment which does have health side-effects, which are recognised in the planning indices used by the Ministry of Health. In view of this and of the aim of increasing mass screening to cover the whole population, the principle of prevention does seem to be well-established in Soviet medicine, even if it does not take precedence over cure.

Apart from prevention, the other early Bolshevik ideals for the health service were that it should be comprehensive, involving workers' participation, universal, free, and state-provided.⁷⁵ These form convenient headings for the discussion of contemporary Soviet health policy. As George and Manning point out, the notion of comprehensive health care is difficult to circumscribe, since it depends on the current state of knowledge. For that reason it tends to be left to professional judgement, which is powerfully influenced by economic and political constraints. The encouragement by the Ministry of Health of autonomous specialisation and technical development, and the increasing 'professionalisation' of the medical personnel (despite the lack of independent political status of the medical profession) have led to an emphasis on high-technology medicine concerned with acute life-threatening disorders such as cancer

and heart disease.

Although these diseases are of growing importance in an ageing population, this emphasis may not correspond very closely to the main patterns of morbidity (mental illness, bronchitis, influenza and back injuries) which suggests that the impact of workers' participation, or indeed any of public participation, is weak. The mechanisms of participation are, firstly, the public health commissions which exist at all levels from the Supreme Soviet to the district soviets. These offer participation through the normal channels of 'democratic centralism' but judging from the patterns of expenditure which indicate policy implementation, they seem no more effective than area health board consultative committees in the UK, that is, they seem to defer to technical expertise. Secondly, trade unions monitor industrial safety, but the effectiveness of this varies with the enterprise. They do, however, encourage physical exercise and the use of health resorts. Thirdly, patients and the party can use the press for quite severe criticisms of aspects of health care or even individual doctors.⁷⁶ Fourthly, there are popular movements, as well as organisations such as the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, with 80 million members. Despite these mechanisms of participation, George and Manning argue that they are outweighed by the specialisation of medicine and the centralisation of management, which is difficult to reconcile with real popular and mass participation.

What they seem to have in mind is greater experimentation in methods of health care, with greater public participation in prevention and an exploration of less 'high technology' forms of cure, perhaps involving folk medicine, and a 'chinese' involvement of lay personnel or else perhaps a 'California' style of do-it-yourself medicine. Without wishing to totally contradict arguments for a de-emphasis of professionalism and expertise, such arguments in

favour of a more democratic health service need to be made very carefully. It is by no means easy to democratise a largely state-provided health service and prevent the individual from becoming a passive recipient and consumer of health care. The reason is the obvious one that state provision of health care requires the establishment of standards of health care for the population if there is to be any attempt at uniformity and universality of provision. Among other things this requires the certification of various kinds of medical personnel as competent to deploy certain health care skills, since otherwise there would be no way of ascertaining whether provision was uniform or universal, or how far short of these aims the health service was. In the absence of market pressure by the consumers on the medical practitioners (although as we have seen this is by no means completely absent in the Soviet Union), democratic pressure by the laity on those certified as competent requires a considerable cultural improvement (acquisition of skills) by the population at large and the dissemination of knowledge about the changing social distribution of health needs and health provision. It must be remembered that the very knowledge about the social distribution of health needs and provision largely depends on the collection of statistics by the very medical personnel or agencies who are going to be subject to democratic scrutiny. While there does appear to be an over-emphasis on high prestige, high technology medicine in some parts of the Soviet health service, the de-emphasis of professional expertise cannot be carried to the point where treatment cannot be competently undertaken or where adequate statistics cannot be compiled. Soviet doctors currently spend a great deal of time on paper work, but presumably at least some of this is necessary for adequate health planning. Such arguments carry greater weight in the light of Hirst's remarks on the role of the law in securing adequate and uniform standards of

treatment (legal, medical or whatever) for relevant categories of the population.⁷⁷ Consequently, democratisation would probably involve changing medical training to promote the encouragement by medical personnel of the active involvement of lay personnel, a greater dissemination of medical knowledge among the population, and a greater emphasis on prevention.

To return to the discussion of the early Bolshevik ideals for the health service, three ideals have not yet been mentioned, namely, that it should be universal, state-provided and free. The concern with universal coverage of the population clearly concerns the problem of the distribution of services and of access to health care (access to an important means of consumption). There are various different categories of the population which could form the basis of differential criteria of access. Those discussed by George and Manning⁷⁸ are social class, geographical location, age, sex and illness type. With regard to social class, the 'closed access' facilities available to personnel in certain Ministries, certain occupational groups or to certain party members could be regarded as associated with the process of class formation. More clearly, the small private market and the much more widespread practice of 'tipping' must disadvantage the poor, although George and Manning do not point out that most of this 'tipping' is connected to hospital, home, dental or other specialist treatment, whereas 80 per cent of patients are treated entirely as outpatients. However, this merely enables one to gauge the extent of the advantage associated with monetary payments, it does not eliminate the fact of such advantage. To some extent, this may be offset by the additional health care which workers (including women workers) receive at their place of work - a service which is sometimes markedly superior to general medicine. As indicated earlier, geographical inequality is a more serious matter, and is not helped by the distribution

of feldshers, but is mitigated by urban treatment of rural patients. With regard to age, all children are regularly screened and are dealt with under the specialist maternity and child-care services, whereas the old lose access to industrial polyclinics, so they are disadvantaged. This disadvantage of the old is partly offset by measures to re-employ pensioners⁷⁹ which both maintains their eligibility for industrial health care and reduces the incidence of ill-health among pensioners. It will be further offset, probably, by the increased attention to geriatric care as the proportion of the population beyond normal retirement age increases. The relative advantage of children is partly offset by the higher birth-rate in rural areas, where health care facilities are scarcer. The influence of sex is less likely to disadvantage Soviet women, since so many doctors (especially in primary care) are themselves women. The influence of type of illness on access to health care is hard to determine. George and Manning argue that its assessment requires some measure of equivalence between qualitatively different needs such that one can decide that, for example, mental illness needs are as well-served as heart-disease needs. This example is interesting since, in their criticism of excessive technical and academic orientations in the Soviet health service policy, they appeared to be arguing as if they had some such measure of equivalence. At least some such claim is implicit in their arguments as to what kind of medical care to develop, although to be fair to them, they realise that this is not an easy issue, and they are merely advocating a change in emphasis among the various priorities (a change which I support, despite my remarks about the need for great care in this area). The priorities which they regard as compromising the ideal of universal coverage are those in favour of certain 'elite' members, workers, the young, and acute life-threatening illnesses, such as heart disease or cancer.

The ideal that the service should be uniform and state-provided has effectively been discussed when discussing democratisation and participation. The main limitations on this ideal are almost the same as those on the ideal that the service should be free, namely the formal and informal private sectors, which have also already been discussed. The fact that the health service is predominantly state-provided and free guarantees a minimum level of professional care, on which minimum level the lower income groups are more dependent than the higher ones ⁸⁰, so the overall effect of the Soviet health service on the distribution of income is probably to redistribute it to the lower income groups of the population, despite the privileged sectors of the health service.

To conclude this discussion of the Soviet health service, one could say that the early Bolshevik ideals have only been partially realised, and that there are various grounds for criticism, such as the provision of private health care or 'closed access' facilities for the privileged, and the political use of psychiatric hospitals. Whether one criticises the academic production of high technology medicine with little public participation in policy decisions ⁸¹ or praises the strategic role of the physician in directing and administering the health service ⁸² must remain a matter of continuing debate. Other shortcomings include lack of choice of "polyclinic facilities, bureaucratic rigidities, overlapping of services and their fragmentation for the care of different members of a family, and the time wastage by physicians on routine clerical duties which could be performed by others." ⁸³ These must be balanced against such positive features as general availability and accessibility of the health services, "planning towards definite goals, very high ratios of medical personnel and hospital beds per 10,000 of the population, the provision of an educational ladder from para-medical to medical education, refresher courses for doctors (and) excellent mid-wifery". ⁸⁴

Overall, one must agree with George and Manning⁸⁵, that the Soviet health service is one of the most technically adequate in the world (from what they consider to be a narrow perspective) and one of the most justly organised.

Social Security

In the case of health, it is clear that whatever the problems of lack of participation, health care does work to some extent on a basis of need (admittedly, defined in a way which reflects the concerns of the medical profession itself, as well as the party and Ministry pressures which are responsible for a small privileged health care sector). It is thus possible to appraise health planning in terms of health outcomes (patterns of morbidity) despite the limitations due to the scarcity of published morbidity data. The use of mass screening, polyclinics, dispensaries and health posts means that, despite an emphasis on the quantitative 'supply side' in medical services (so many hospital beds and so on), the provision of health care is related to need. It is not so clear that this is the case with social security, because, as we shall see, for some forms of social security, there is no set of mechanisms for the registration of need equivalent to the health screening and recording procedures just mentioned. Rather it seems to be assumed that the workings of other policies in the Soviet Union simply eradicate certain kinds of social security need (for example, the need for unemployment benefits).

To see why this is the case, a brief historical review of social security in the Soviet Union is necessary. Because they had used the inadequate social security provision before the Revolution as a major target for their criticisms of Tsarism, the Bolsheviks had little alternative but to attempt a comprehensive system of social insurance after the Revolution. However, despite various modifications, the policy was too ambitious to be properly implemented until economic conditions improved under the N.E.P.⁸⁶ State insurance coverage for wage-earners increased from 5.5 million people in 1924 to 10.8 million in 1928. Old age pensions were also introduced in 1928, for men

aged 60 and women aged 55. Life expectancy in 1928 was 44, whereas it is 70 today, but retirement ages remain the same. The result is that old age and disability pensions combined were around 73 per cent of all social security expenditures from 1960-1972.⁸⁷

Following the first Five Year Plan, social insurance benefits became subservient to the drive towards industrialisation. Social insurance was consequently designed, firstly, to increase the supply of labour; secondly, to increase labour discipline and, thirdly, to give more favourable treatment to workers in high priority industries. Included in the measures to increase the labour supply was the abolition of unemployment benefit in 1930, but in 1938 the length of maternity benefits was reduced from 16 weeks to 9 weeks. Pensioners were encouraged to stay on at work, by allowing them to keep part (and from 1938, all) of their pension in addition to their earnings from work. Labour discipline was favoured by gradually making benefits dependent on length of uninterrupted employment. Industrial priorities were reinforced by ease of qualification for benefits, or by higher benefits and more generally favourable treatment for workers in industries central to plan fulfillment or in hazardous or underground employment. Such priorities were easier to implement when the administration of these funds was transferred in the early 1930s from government departments to the trade unions. Trade union members were paid higher sickness benefits than other workers. Apart from changes concerning maternity benefits and the employment of pensioners, the social security system has not changed a great deal since the 1930s, and its administrative structure has remained the same.

The main change in the 1930s was an increase in the number of people covered, from 10.8 million in 1928 to 31.2 million in 1940, a small part of which was the provision of old age pensions for salaried workers, as well as manual workers. Collective farmers were still forced to rely on inadequate mutual aid societies, but the industrial social security system was now quite effective, in contrast to the early 1920s which saw a progressive ideology combined with a lack of resources to implement the progressive ideas. In the 1940s, the main change was the 1944 extension of family allowances, originally introduced in 1936. Family allowances have not changed much since then, and seem to set rather strict conditions of eligibility by contemporary Western standards, being designed to increase the birth rate yet not discourage women from working.

Following the death of Stalin, there was a substantial improvement in social security provision with the State Pension Law of 1956. Although collective farmers and other self-employed people were still excluded, it meant that henceforth social security was less dominated by the demands of the labour market and the drive for industrialisation. The four main changes of the 1956 Act, which was promoted by Khrushchev, were, according to George and Manning⁸⁸

"First, the coverage was extended to cover most workers and employees and their dependants. Second, the rates of benefits were substantially increased Only family allowances were not increased.. Third, benefits were made more egalitarian as between the low paid and the highly paid. The minimum pension was raised far more than the maximum pension. Fourth, the regulations concerning the coverage of the various risks in the scheme were streamlined to reduce anomalies. Thus the new Soviet social security became comprehensive both in terms of people in the industrial sector and risks. Government funds were to be used to supplement contributions from employers."

The situation of the collective farmers was improved considerably under the legislation of 1964, which helped to stem rural migration to towns. Old age, sickness, disability and maternity benefits were provided to all collective farmers. The scheme was financed on a national basis by contributions from each farm which were to be supplemented by state grants (thereby presumably forcing the richer farms to pay more in contributions). The level of benefits was lower than for workers, partly because of lower wages and partly because of regulations.

It may be the case that the slowing down of the process of converting collective farms to state farms is partly related to the extra social security costs which would be incurred, although the differential will have been diminished since 1964 because wage differentials between collective farmers and workers are now less, and because other social security provisions are now equal between the two groups.⁸⁹

There have been no major statutory reforms since 1964, but there have been a series of measures designed to improve the position of collective farmers and the low paid, as well as to emphasise the welfare, rather than the economic aspects of social security. Thus, while the contemporary social security system still bears the marks of its effective origins in the 1930s, a series of measures during the 1970s show an increasing awareness that individuals and families are still falling through the social security net. Probably the biggest changes have been the successive improvements in the minimum amount of pension, the 1974 introduction of an income-tested family allowance scheme, designed to deal with poverty, and the improvements in the minimum wage in relation to the average wage, which affects pensions since they are earnings related. The lot of collective

farmers has also been improved: in 1967, their retirement age was reduced by 5 years, to make it the same as for workers; in 1970, the rules for payment of sickness benefit became almost the same as for workers; and in 1971, the same happened for rules regarding pension payments. With regard to the shift of emphasis from labour discipline to welfare, length of employment was abolished as a condition for maternity benefit in 1973, although there is only one sign of this being extended to other benefits: in 1975 there was a change in the qualifying conditions for sickness benefit, so that those with three or more children can now receive their full earnings regardless of length of employment. Following this brief historical sketch, which emphasises how recent is some of the social security provision, it is possible to proceed to an analysis of the present social security situation, and some of its effects.


Social Security Administration, Finance and Policy

The most striking features of the (a) finance and (b) administration of social security are (a) the absence of employees', workers' and collective farmers' contributions (instead the state enterprises, collective farms and social organisations contribute, supplemented by the state budget) and (b) the role of the trade unions in administering the social security provisions. To deal with the administration first, the involvement of the trade unions in social security could be seen as part of the development of non-state forms of administration (part of 'the withering away of the state'), and as fulfilling one of Lenin's objectives for the development of social security, namely that workers should play a full part in its management.⁹⁰ However, although I have discussed the involvement of trade unions in the administration of this part of the social consumption funds in terms of non-state forms of administration in an earlier article⁹¹,

it should be clear from the discussion of law and the state in Chapter 3 that this is not necessarily the beginning of (or an aspect of) any process of 'the withering away of the state'. Such a conclusion is reinforced if one examines the precise nature of trade union involvement in social security. The following figure illustrates the main agencies involved in the administration of social security.

Figure 5

The administrative structure of social security in the U.S.S.R.



Source: V. George and N. Manning (1980), op. cit., page 175

Clearly the State Committee on Labour and Social Questions is the most important agency, in the sense of co-ordinating social security policy. As is indicated by the dotted lines placing the supreme trade union body hierarchically above Gosplan (here called the 'State Plan Committee of the USSR') and the other Ministries, the trade union control of the most important state agencies involved in administration and policy formation on social

security is more nominal than real.⁹² While there is direct trade union involvement in the State Committee on Labour and Social Questions, most commentators feel that its greatest effect is on wages.⁹³ This has a subsequent effect on pensions and other benefits, but this situation suggests that the trade unions are placing social security as a poor second compared to wages. In any case, the State Committee on Labour and Social Questions seems to function largely as an interpreter of decisions emanating elsewhere, rather than as a policy initiator. In interpreting and co-ordinating decisions, it issues directives to the fifteen constituent Republican Ministries of Social Security, which in turn operate through regional, district and local offices.⁹⁴ The trade unions are particularly involved at the local level, with elected members doing unpaid work over and above their normal working hours to administer social security.

Pensions for the old and disabled are determined and paid out by the Ministry of Social Welfare, with trade unions at the local level limited to producing the necessary documents and helping applicants to fill in the relevant forms. They also take part in decisions on eligibility for pensions. However, trade unions are entirely responsible for the administration of sickness and maternity benefits. As we saw in the discussion of the health service, sickness benefits are related to attempts to maintain labour discipline. The separate system of social security for collective farmers is run on similar lines. Consequently, George and Manning seem to have ample justification for their conclusion:⁹⁵

"Clearly workers do not control the administration of the social security system. They only assist in its administration. Moreover, workers do not decide directly on the structure or provision of the social security system; they only elect representatives who decide on their behalf. It is a system of state managerialism similar to those in capitalist societies but with greater involvement of trade unions at the local level."

To make the point a little more strongly, the involvement of trade unions lowers the costs of administering social security, and identifies the trade unions with measures which are at least partly designed to enhance labour discipline, while bringing very little return to the trade unions or their members in the form of capacity to exert democratic pressure on social security policy or its implementation (except decisions on individual eligibility). If this is taken to be the beginning of non-state democratic forms of administration, then it is not a very auspicious beginning.

In the light of this picture of the predominance of state forms of administration of social security, administrative structures which at least have the merit of being fairly straightforward, it is difficult to understand the reasons for the budgetary organisation of the sources of finance for social security.⁹⁶ As mentioned earlier, social security is non-contributory in the Soviet Union, that is, the beneficiaries do not contribute directly to the building up of the funds from which they draw benefits. As H. Vogel puts it⁹⁷:

"The system is non-contributory; most gratis payments take place through the agency of the state social insurance or the centralised social security union fund of kolkhoz peasants, supplemented by expenditure from state and co-operative enterprises, social organisations, or directly from the state budget."

Thus the principle propounded by Lenin that employers contribute to social insurance, rather than deducting the contributions from employees' wages (directly or through income tax) has been met. Yet while there might be some residual justification for separating the funding and administration of social security for kolkhoz workers, there seems little point in now insisting on separate contributions from state enterprises.

The fact that state enterprises contribute to the social security funds rests on the budgetary position of state enterprises which is supposedly distinct from that of other state agencies (including the Ministries to which they are subordinated). As M. Lavigne points out⁹⁸, this argument is weak and was in any case effectively ignored for budgetary purposes prior to the 1965 economic reform. There was in fact a confusion between the finances of the state and those of state enterprises, absolutely contrary to the principle of financial autonomy (khozraschet). In effect, the tax on enterprise 'profits' was a 'redistribution tax' which was planned for each budgetary year, and was used partly to subsidise loss-making enterprises. The 1965 reform which was supposed to change this had little effect. The main change introduced then, which did establish a more substantial budgetary distinction between state enterprise revenue and state revenue, was the establishment of duties paid by the state enterprise on its fixed and circulating production funds. However, by 1979 this had only risen to around 11 per cent of state budgetary receipts, instead of the 35 per cent envisaged in 1965, whereas one of the main components of budgetary receipts, turnover tax, had hardly decreased at all over this period (from 37 to 32 per cent). Furthermore, the 1979 reform tended to diminish again the distinction between state revenues and state enterprise revenues, since it envisaged a stable rate of taxation on enterprise 'profits', with the rates being differentiated by Ministries. Thus the economic distinctness of state enterprises from the state, and hence the fiscal nature (levy on an economically distinct agent) of these budgetary operations, is by no means clear. Consequently there seems to be no great merit in insisting on employers' contributions as distinct from state contributions (either directly or through the state social insurance scheme funds). The system of administration of social security is

complex in its procedures, but the organisational structure is

fairly straightforward. Since the payment of these benefits is not related to the 'profit' of the enterprise concerned (but is determined by other criteria such as length of employment), it seems pointless to retain a budgetary category which does not act as an economic incentive and does not (despite local trade union involvement) promote serious democratic involvement in the administration of social security.

Having dealt with the administration and finance of social security, it is now possible to turn to policy. One of the classical Marxist criteria for the appraisal of an area of social policy such as social security is the extent to which it contributes to the transformation of 'bourgeois right'.⁹⁹ In the case of social security, as with other aspects of social policy such as health and housing, the extent to which 'bourgeois right' has been transformed can be gauged in terms of extent to which criteria of 'need' predominate in the provision of benefits, rather than criteria related to wages. Failing that, the extent to which income inequalities are mitigated by the provision indicates how far the social effects of wages are undercut or neutralised. It is therefore necessary to examine the criteria for eligibility for the various social security benefits, as well as the scale of resources devoted to them.

It is best to begin with the largest component of social security expenditure, old age pensions, which probably comprise some 50 per cent of all social security outlays. As indicated earlier, the first general qualifying condition is that men must be at least 60 and women at least 55. The second condition is a work record of 25 years for men and 20 for women (for the maximum pension) or 5 years for both sexes (for the minimum pension). Intermediate pensions correspond to length of employment. The third condition is that the person must have retired, but as

indicated earlier, this is waived for many groups of workers over the retirement age. Those likely not to qualify are women who enter employment late in life (a rare phenomenon), those disabled who never enter the labour force, those who work part-time (mainly women) and some ex-collective farmers who have not worked long enough in either the state or kolkhoz sector. Thus waged labour is a condition of access to these benefits, even though the proportion of the population which does not qualify is small. In addition, these general conditions are modified to encourage the taking up of certain types of employment (defined geographically or occupationally), to encourage large families or to permit some disabled groups to retire early (in which case it replaces the disability pension).¹⁰⁰ So, the criteria of eligibility are structured to promote waged employment in general (even among those over retirement age)¹⁰¹ and certain specific employment objectives. Furthermore, retirement pensions are related to previous gross earnings, although pension inequalities are lower than income inequalities during working life.¹⁰² Since those with dependants who are not employed or do not receive a pension of their own receive only 10 or 15 per cent extra on their pensions, it is clear that most pensioners who were in low-paid occupations must receive inadequate pensions. There may be considerable hardship suffered by very old pensioners whose final wage would be relatively low, unless of course they are supported by members of their family, which is in fact a legal responsibility. Vogel suggests that much of the recent expansion in savings may be due to people saving up for their old age, a wise precaution given the probable growth of disguised inflation in the Soviet Union.¹⁰³ To sum up, the minimum pension is too low in comparison with the average wage, allowances for dependants are too small, and pensions are not raised automatically in line with prices or wages.¹⁰⁴

Consequently, the extent to which eligibility is dependent on need rather than work is limited, and, while basic consumption necessities are subsidised, thereby further reducing the inequalities of pension income compared to wage income, it is probable that many pensioners live below the officially defined subsistence level of 50 roubles per month per capita.

Moving on to disability pensions, which for many statistical purposes are combined with old age pensions¹⁰⁵, it is immediately apparent that the encouragement of labour discipline again predominates. Disability pension rates are effectively calculated in relation to old age pensions, the monetary value of the benefit being expressed as a percentage of the old age pension, depending on the degree of disability. There are three classes of disability, the partially disabled (class 3), the totally disabled (class 2) and the totally disabled requiring constant attendance (class 1), so this medically defined criterion of need is an important criterion of eligibility. However, previous earnings from work (weighted in favour of the low paid, as with old age pensions), the number of years of employment prior to the disability, the type of employment prior to disability and whether the disability was an industrial accident or occupational disease, as opposed to a general illness or accident - all these qualifying conditions show that benefits are provided much more according to work than to need, in the classical sense. This has the effect that the disabled are treated less favourably than the elderly.¹⁰⁶

Pensions for surviving dependants can be paid to children, brothers, sisters, grandchildren, spouses, parents and grandparents, depending on circumstances. Rates are calculated in a manner analogous to disability pensions, but they are lower.¹⁰⁷ (The employment qualifying conditions are the same as for retirement

or disability pensions.) There is an implicit assumption that surviving spouses should go out to work as soon as possible, and since widows (except industrial widows) lose their pension when taking paid employment, there is clearly pressure to take up full-time employment. This is made somewhat easier by the provision of nursery facilities with means-tested fees. One-parent families have to rely on family allowance. If they are the result of a divorce, the husband has to pay one quarter of his earnings to his wife. Such maintenance orders are easier to enforce in the Soviet Union since all partners are usually state employees, but sometimes (rarely) the husband avoids state employment without being reported, and leaves no address, so avoiding maintenance payments.

As indicated in the discussion of medical certificates for sick leave, sickness benefit requires a form of certification designed to reduce absenteeism from work. The strictness of the certification procedure reputedly irritates both doctors and patients. Sickness benefit is earnings related and rates are calculated on the basis of four main criteria: whether the cause of the incapacity is occupational or not; the length of uninterrupted employment; family responsibilities; and whether or not the beneficiary is a trade union member (non-membership means one receives only half the benefit one would otherwise be entitled to). Not surprisingly, practically all workers are trade union members. Collective farm workers who are not union members do not lose half their benefits. In contrast to old age, disability and survivors' benefits, sickness benefits are quite generous: occupational sickness or accident is 100 per cent of previous wage, whereas the other three criteria come into operation for non-occupational sickness or accident. People with three years or less continuous employment receive 50 per cent of previous

earnings, and this rises to 100 per cent for people with 8 years or more continuous employment. Sickness periods off work are counted as a part of continuous employment. With three or more children under 16, sickness benefit is 100 per cent. Sickness benefits for collective farmers are 10 per cent lower (whereas for retirement and disability pensions, they are 15 per cent lower). Various other minor provisions also indicate the close connection between sickness benefit and employment stability and discipline. For example, persons dismissed for indiscipline must serve six months in their new employment before they can qualify for sickness benefit.¹⁰⁸

Turning now to maternity benefit, discrimination against non-union members (who formerly received a lower percentage of their wage) was abolished in December 1973. It now consists of a maternity allowance for workers and employees (of 100 per cent of wages) for eight weeks prior to and eight weeks after the birth (with a possible extension of two weeks in the case of difficult or multiple deliveries). Provided that the claimant's monthly income does not exceed 60 roubles, there is an additional allowance of 12 roubles for baby clothes and 18 roubles nursing allowance. There is unpaid maternity leave until the child's first birthday, thereby facilitating the re-entry to paid employment.

Despite official concern at the low birth rate in European Russia, child allowances continue to be meagre, although a small supplement of 12 roubles for families with an income of less than 50 roubles a month per person was introduced in 1974. Child allowances consist of "a combination of grants and monthly allowances of very modest amounts heavily weighted in favour of large families. Even for such families, however, the allowances

are grossly inadequate and they are paid only during the child's first five years".¹⁰⁹

The social policy clearly implicit in all the criteria of eligibility for social security is quite evident: rather than promoting forms of income which are independent of wages (and in that sense defined in terms of the needs of the recipient) the social security system is on the whole defined in a way which sustains wage labour as a form of income. In other words, social security can hardly be considered to be undercutting the wage form. This connection of social security payments with the labour market means that while the system is comprehensive, it definitely does leave a variety of groups either partially covered or not covered at all, and there is no comprehensive public assistance scheme to act as a 'safety net' against poverty in these circumstances. As mentioned earlier, families are legally required to support those of their members who are in financial need. There are forms of public assistance, but these are the responsibility of constituent republics or individual collective farms. Consequently, such public assistance is neither uniform nor comprehensive, and provides only residual amounts to meet exceptional cases. Of course, social security payments need not be the only means of 'transforming bourgeois right', that is, undercutting the wage form of income and promoting social forms of consumption. Health and education within the state budgetary heading of 'social consumption funds' and state housing (which is technically outside the 'social consumption funds') are all potential means of doing so. Hence, an appraisal of the social policy implicit in social security must include a consideration of the scale of resources devoted to it, in comparison with other forms of social consumption.

The state budget represents over 60 per cent of national income in the Soviet Union, and within that budget, social and culture expenditures represent about 35 per cent of the total. Of these expenditures, education constitutes about half, while one sixth goes on public health and sports and the rest (about one-third) goes on social security.¹¹⁰ Social security expenditure has been growing faster than health care, and the two of them combined have been rising generally faster than education within the social consumption funds. The result is that social security and health combined have been showing slowly rising percentages in relation to the state budget and national income (the net material product, which is calculated on a somewhat different basis from the Western index of gross national product).¹¹¹ As is fairly well-known, this pattern of expenditure has largely been determined by demographic patterns, that is, the growing number of old age pensioners. Consequently, since the dependency ratio is likely to worsen after 1980, due mainly to a fairly rapid increase in the population living beyond retirement age, the prospects seem remote for the further use of social consumption funds in order to undercut wages as a form of income.

The Effects of Social Security

To complete the assessment of social security, it is necessary to consider the likely effects of its organisation and its various provisions. The first social effect to be considered is that of its organisation and finance. The administrative structure of social security means that it is a potentially readily accessible arena of popular participation in social administration, but this is hardly the case today, despite trade union involvement and the budgetary insistence on employers' contributions, which somewhat spuriously suggests workers' control of the profits of industry.

This certainly emphasises the point that workers and employees do not contribute, but since 90 per cent of state budgetary receipts come from the economy anyway (state enterprises and organisations), the additional 5 per cent coming directly from state enterprise funds (and calculated as a percentage of the wages bill for each enterprise) makes very little difference to the real state of affairs. While direct state expenditure forms about 20 per cent of social security expenditure, the state also subsidises the social insurance fund which provides almost all the remaining social security expenditure; the net effect is that the state budget directly finances around half of all social security expenditures, a proportion which is likely to grow as the retired population grows more rapidly than the social insurance fund. Thus social security is a form of redistribution of the social product which is largely effected through the state budget; in other words, it is a transfer payment, one of whose sources of funds (in the form of employers' contributions) does not form a tax in the usual sense. Since there is no strong reason in the state sector for sources of finance to coincide with the agencies making expenditure decisions, there seems to be a clear case for simplifying the budgetary arrangements by abolishing employers' contributions. These contributions form part of the cost price of industrial profits, but this accounting problem could be overcome by increasing turnover tax by the amount of the 'lost' contribution from state enterprises.

The redistributational effects of social security are difficult to assess in the absence of systematic data. Since the social security system does not use many qualifying conditions which are unrelated to wage labour, thereby undercutting the wage form, it might at least be expected by socialists that it would mitigate the effects of wage-induced income inequalities. To some extent,

it may seem that this does happen, since as we have seen workers on low wages benefit relatively more from various forms of social security provision. In addition, workers on low wages are also exempted from paying income tax, and various basic consumption items (transport, some kinds of food) are subsidised to keep the price down, which must help lower income groups more. On the other hand, income tax is not very onerous for any Soviet income group and these price subsidies were already taken into account in the calculation of the socially acceptable minimum subsistence level of 50 roubles per month per capita. It is evident that many pensioners and families with young children fall below this 'poverty line'. What is not clear is how many, but the findings of social scientists that many do fall through the social security net was probably largely responsible for the introduction in 1974 of child allowances (or family allowances, as they are sometimes called). This scheme, which has already been mentioned, provides a supplement of 12 roubles per month per child until the age of 8 for families with a per capita income below 50 roubles per month. George and Manning quote a source¹¹² which claimed that this scheme virtually doubled the number of children covered, which now became 37 per cent of all children under the age of 8, and involved a five-fold increase in total expenditure. Thus social security may now have some redistributational effect in favour of low income families with young children. The overall redistributational effect of social security is not easy to assess however (although there is a clear policy bias in favour of the young), and some commentators feel that the redistributive impact of such monetary transfers will be little.¹¹³ This point will be returned to in the discussion of the overall effects of the social consumption funds and housing.

The main effects of the lack of unemployment benefit in the Soviet social security scheme may be to cause hardship to some of the unemployed, but more likely it is to force people to take up jobs they do not like. Voluntary leaving of jobs has increased considerably in the late 1970s, for reasons apparently connected with the search for better housing (see Chapter 2). However, the very fact that unemployment is so comparatively low mitigates the income distribution effects of the lack of unemployment benefit. The loss of industrial efficiency and possible disaffection of younger workers who are often educationally "over-qualified" for their industrial jobs are adverse effects of this system, but Soviet policy makers are probably right to consider these problems are preferable to those of large-scale unemployment.

The attempt to reach completely full employment rather than provide unemployment benefit seems to be related to the lack of a systematic public assistance programme and the use of equalisation of wages as the main policy instrument to equalise benefits (and hence real income). Rather than a systematic monitoring of the conditions under which people are not adequately covered by social security (coupled with the provision of specific benefits to 'fill the gaps' in the system), the Soviet approach to these problems is simply to try to ensure that everyone has a wage and to regularly increase those wages in a manner which reduces wage inequality. While this approach is admirable in so far as it works, it has at least to the mid-1970s left many families in need of income maintenance. It has also generated inflationary pressures which could force price rises which reduce the purchasing power of the social security monetary transfers, thereby reducing any equalising effect which they may have.

Hence the effects of social security cannot be properly assessed without an appraisal of wages policy which is more the concern of the next chapter than this one. For the moment, it is sufficient to note that there has been a steady policy of reducing wage inequality which has had some effect.¹¹⁴ Yet, it is difficult to see how an overall policy on wages will help the 10 per cent of Soviet families which are one-parent families, who presumably depend on only one wage plus either divorce maintenance payments, survivor's benefits or an unmarried mother's allowance. This is precisely the sort of case where the issue of detecting gaps in the social security net becomes relevant. However, it must be admitted that there is no reason why the social security system alone should be expected to bear the burden of attempts to equalise real income in the Soviet Union. Apart from wages policy, the other aspects of social consumption need to be considered together with social security.

Conclusion: An Assessment of Welfare and Consumption

Without wishing to anticipate the analysis of the next chapter on the class structure, an analysis which it is hoped will be enriched by the discussion in this and preceding chapters of some of the determinants of the class structure, it is clearly impossible to consider some aspects of the relations of distribution (namely, some forms of consumption) in complete isolation from other aspects such as wages. Wages, housing and the various components of the social consumption fund all affect the distribution of income, and the connection is even closer than that because of the earnings related nature of many social security monetary transfers. Some estimate of the interrelation between these various aspects of the distribution of income needs to be made.

Evidently, such considerations are already taken into account in Soviet social policy, although according to Rzhnitsyna¹¹⁵, some accounting problems have still to be solved: the effects of the social consumption funds on family incomes are at the moment only assessed on the basis of aggregated estimates. According to these, payments and benefits from the social funds markedly reduce the differentials in living standards, averaging 30-40 per cent of the families' aggregate income in the lower income groups, and 15-20 per cent among high income groups. Unfortunately, the year of these calculations and the definition of the income groups are not given. This is particularly tantalising in view of a table such as the following one:

Table 7

Groups of Working People by Wages and Incomes
(per cent)

Groups of working people by income level	Groups of working people by wages			
	low	medium	high	total
Low	40.6	51.2	8.2	100
Medium	30.3	54.2	15.5	100
High	15.0	56.2	28.8	100

Source: L. Rzhnitsyna, *ibid.*, page 130

While one can say from this table that 30.3 per cent of medium income families have low wages, such a statement is difficult to interpret, if one is attempting to assess the redistributive effect of the social consumption funds. Similarly, one might think that one is clear what the cumulative effect of policy is when Rzhnitsyna says that between 1966 and 1975 the number of inhabitants in families living below the 50 rouble minimum declined by almost 70 per cent. Yet it is not clear how far this is due to wage increases, and how far it is due to expenditures on social consumption funds. Since she says that

an analysis shows that low-income families are usually those which have many dependants, and that in 1974 wage earners in these families had two or three times more dependants than those in medium and high income families, it is a reasonable guess that the child allowances introduced in 1974 made a substantial contribution to reducing the number of inhabitants who are below the 50 rouble minimum. However, it can be no more than a guess, in the absence of detailed data.

Even if some of this income equalisation is due to the social consumption funds and housing subsidies, rather than wages policy, is it redistributive in favour of the lower income groups when one takes account of the sources of such expenditure? In other words, is public finance generally redistributive in the U.S.S.R.? It has already been indicated that George and Manning and Vogel are doubtful about this. Wiles is equally doubtful.¹¹⁶ However, he argues that the regressivity of public finance does not matter if the pre-tax distribution is 'right' and allows for regressivity, say by previous confiscation or an incomes policy. This is not good enough for present purposes, since it is clear that social consumption funds expenditure and housing expenditure is intended to have progressive effects in addition to wages policy (in other words, the pre-tax distribution is not considered by the Soviet authorities to be 'right'). Although Wiles is correct that only vast research could extract an answer to the question, progressive or regressive, we do have the aggregate estimates mentioned by Rzhaniitsyna to go on. Furthermore, the argument put forward by George and Manning that the social security system is regressive or neutral has its weaknesses, particularly in their analysis of the state budget. They base their analysis of the state budget on 1965 figures provided in the English edition of M. Lavigne.¹¹⁷

They say, "In 1965, only 7.5 per cent of government revenues were from direct taxation, which is not very progressive in nature; 37.8 per cent were from indirect taxation, which is regressive; 30.2 per cent from the profits of state enterprises which is progressive and the remaining 24.5 per cent from a variety of undifferentiated sources." The remark about indirect taxation being regressive is probably misleading, although as Bush points out¹¹⁸, no comprehensive and systematic data are published on rates of turnover tax. Wiles is willing to hazard the opinion that it is slightly progressive.¹¹⁹ Furthermore, it is clear that the composition of the state budget has changed since 1965.¹²⁰ The 1979 state budget receipts were made up of the following components: income tax, 9 per cent; turnover tax, 32 per cent; profits from state enterprises and state organisations, 38 per cent (estimated); duties on fixed and circulating productive funds, 11.2 per cent; profits from the co-operative sector, 1 per cent; national lottery, 0.3 per cent; state enterprise payments for social security, 5 per cent; other sources (including bachelor tax, tax on households without children and tax on royalties), 3.5 per cent (estimated). Thus, even if turnover tax were regressive, it only constitutes 32 per cent of budgetary receipts and is offset by the very mildly progressive income tax (9 per cent) and revenues of various kinds from state enterprises (54.2 per cent). The effect of the remaining 4.8 per cent which is mostly personal taxation is probably progressive. While George and Manning point out that regressivity must also be judged in terms of benefits, and while they are arguing at this point only with respect to social security, it is likely that both health and housing have progressive redistributive effects. Thus Wiles puts a strong case for house rents being progressive¹²¹:

"kolkhozniki build, own and inherit their own dwellings tax free, the urban poor enjoy a vast subsidy, the upper middle class must join co-operatives and pay full cost (but can resell for a capital gain)." Similarly, unless one is going to put a very high price on the privileged sector of health care (the so-called 'fourth directorate'), then health care benefits probably are progressive, with low income families benefitting disproportionately from the care of non-life threatening morbidity which is dealt with mainly through outpatient care. Thus the aggregate estimates referred to above which are mentioned by Rzhnitsyna do not seem to be inconsistent with what is known about the provision of housing, health and possibly even social security.

In addition to the lack of systematic evidence on the effects of each of these forms of welfare, the effects of the inter-relation between them is even more obscure. Thus it is conceivable that good health care could in the future reduce the number of disability pensions (once those disabled in the war have died); or it could diminish the relationship between high income and longevity, so that the redistributive impact of the relatively egalitarian provisions of old age pensions would become greater. These kinds of complex inter-relation between the various aspects of social policy are virtually impossible to discuss seriously in the face of the lack of systematic evidence in the fields of housing, health and social security. While such evidence may be available within the relevant Ministries, it is not at all clear how much of it is co-ordinated with a view to producing an overall set of inter-related social policies. Such collection of information as does take place within the State Committee on Labour and Social Questions seems to be largely concerned with the distribution of income, although as the example of Rzhnitsyna makes clear, it is never published in sufficiently detailed form for it to be subjected to serious scrutiny.

While it is clear that maintenance of production and of a stable, disciplined labour force are not the only concerns of social policy, they still remain the predominant concern to a degree which is more appropriate to an industrialising society than to one which has already largely succeeded in creating an industrial base. While other instruments of social policy are actually and potentially available, the adjustment of wages and the quantitative provision of facilities (in housing, health care and so on) seem to be the main instruments used. The development of a sophisticated system capable of registering diverse needs, making its information available to public scrutiny and allowing substantial public participation in both policy formation and the administration of social policy, these are features of Soviet welfare provision which must remain a hope for the future.

Despite its rapid advance and considerable contemporary achievements, there is thus some justification for describing Soviet social policy as crude and heavy-handed, for while the thrust of the various policies is broadly egalitarian, many of the effects of these policies are opaque, even it seems to those concerned with implementing them and monitoring their effects.

Are these the welfare provisions appropriate to an 'advanced socialist society'? Unfortunately such criticisms are easier to make than to rectify. It could well be that the rising proportion of old age pensioners, whose pensions will register the 'knock-on' effects of large wage increases during the 1970s, will generate its own inflationary pressures, as well as reducing the scope for expanding other forms of social consumption. The rising birth rate among comparatively low income (often rural) families of Central Asia will generate further demographic demands on social consumption, again further reducing the room for manoeuvre. This demographic 'squeeze' from both ends of the age-spectrum, producing

a deteriorating dependency ratio, can only be offset by rising productivity, which is an area where the Soviet economy was experiencing difficulties in the late 1970s. The criticism of social welfare for concentrating on encouraging production in various ways will therefore not have much appeal or relevance in the near future.

However, although many social welfare provisions are evidently still designed to increase production, it is not at all clear that they do so. For example, the connection of some of the housing stock to particular Ministries and thus to particular state enterprises is now partly responsible for the loss of productivity due to high labour turnover, since people change jobs in order to improve their housing. That is why I argued in the section on housing for a dislocation of housing from industrial Ministries and for the politically more effective incorporation of city soviets. In addition, the combination of labour shortages in some sectors with poor productivity elsewhere suggests that there is room for considerable improvements in productivity if labour is moved and retrained. While there are retraining allowances, one of the other possible obstacles to the redeployment of labour in the economy is the fear of loss of housing, assuming it is reasonable housing. The redeployment would have to be negotiated with the trade unions whose defensive position on job security is well-entrenched, but such negotiations would be easier if the connection between housing (as well as access to health care) and place of employment could be broken. Redeployment could then be accomplished not only without unemployment, but without threatening the housing and health care provisions of a significant proportion of industrial workers and office employees. In other words, a complete dislocation of housing from place of work would stabilise that part of the labour force which moves

jobs voluntarily in order to secure better housing. This would bring the productivity returns which come from being in the job long enough to learn the appropriate skills; job turnover is now sufficiently high to prevent this in many cases. On the other hand, a dislocation of housing from place of work would also make it possible to persuade workers in good housing to agree to redeployment in situations where changes in work procedures or investment would make workers redundant (even if they kept their jobs). So it would make it easier to shed labour where this was appropriate and where alternative employment was available, thereby increasing productivity in a different manner.

This suggestion is not proposed as a remedy to the problems of the Soviet economy, but merely to indicate that a more detailed analysis of the interrelation of various social and economic policies than is possible at the moment could well yield proposals which both meet the kind of criticisms made in this chapter and improve Soviet economic performance. Without some such analysis based on detailed evidence, the 'incrementalism' which various commentators have suggested has characterised policy formation during the Brezhnev era could come to look more and more like the 'ossification' which some critics already claim to discern.

Notes to Chapter Four

1. See G. Littlejohn (1979) 'State, Plan and Market in the Transition to Socialism: the Legacy of Bukharin' in Economy and Society, Volume 8, No. 2, May 1979, where it is argued that among the 'needs' which have to be specified are the conditions of existence of agents of plan implementation, and that such agents could be organisations, rather than human individuals.
2. For a discussion of these and other problems confronting socialist attempts to specify 'appropriate' social policies, see N. Rose (1980) 'Socialism and Social Policy: the Problems of Inequality' in Politics and Power 2, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, pages 111 - 135.
3. V. George and N. Manning (1980) Socialism, Social Welfare and the Soviet Union, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, Boston and Henley, Chapter 5, page 133.
4. *ibid.*, page 135
5. *ibid.*, page 139
6. *ibid.*, page 141
7. *ibid.*, page 142
8. E.M. Jacobs (1975) 'Urban Housing in the Soviet Union' in Economic Aspects of Life in the U.S.S.R. NATO, Directorate of Economic Affairs, Brussels, pages 65 - 90.
9. V. George and N. Manning (1980), *op.cit.*, page 144.

10. *ibid.*, page 145.
11. *ibid.*, page 145.
12. *ibid.*, page 146.
13. *ibid.*, page 146.
14. *ibid.*, page 147
15. *ibid.*, page 148
16. S. Sternheimer 'Running Soviet Cities: Bureaucratic Degeneration, Bureaucratic Politics, or Urban Management?' in G.B. Smith (1980) (ed) Public Policy and Administration in the Soviet Union, Praeger, New York, pages 79 - 108.
17. V. George and N. Manning (1980), *op.cit.*, page 147.
18. S. Sternheimer (1980), *op.cit.*, page 94. Perhaps more important than such examples, however, is his classification on page 85 of city agencies into four types, the first three of which are subject to dual subordination, thus confirming the impression given by Figure 2
 "Many Soviet city agencies operate chiefly as branches of union-republic ministries. From these, they receive both directives and monies. A second group, however, while also attached to ministries as field offices, is in some measure subject to local control and co-ordination. Agencies of a third category are largely subordinated to the local council vis-à-vis detailed direction and budget resources

(mostly self-generated). Still others (a fourth division) perform service and co-ordination functions for agencies in (the) other three categories. The last type is funded and controlled locally without exception." This corresponds by and large to the impression given in Figure 2, except that the first type of agency seems in Figure 2 to be agencies of All-Union Ministries, rather than Union Republic ones. However, this probably varies to some extent in any case, so too much should not be made of this apparent difference. The service and co-ordinating agencies which are locally funded and controlled will be discussed later.

19. *ibid.*, page 97.

20. *op.cit.*, page 148.

21. *ibid.*, page 150. See also E.M. Jacobs (1975), *op.cit.*, pages 70 and 71 for a more detailed discussion of the administration of housing waiting lists. In contrast to George and Manning, Jacobs regards the privileged categories of entitlement to extra space as leading to considerable differences, but seems to modify his position on page 72.

22. G. Littlejohn (1979), *op.cit.*

23. S. Sternheimer (1980), *op.cit.*, pages 83 - 84

24. V. George and N. Manning, (1980), *op.cit.*, page 152

25. Seenote 18.
26. V. George and N. Manning (1980), op.cit., page 157.
27. See S. Sternheimer (1980), op.cit., page s 87 - 91. for a more detailed account of these administrative mechanisms of accountability.
28. ibid., pages 99 to 102. However, despite the local co-ordinating role of the party, Sternheimer argues that the trend of recent administrative reforms has been to strengthen vertical subordination. Yet while he is right to argue that the forces for increased centralisation are still well-entrenched (page 93), attempts to improve office technology, introduce a national filing system and introduce more precise rules and specific delineation of tasks do not per se show an increased trend to central control. There may be some force in the Soviet defence of such measures as steps towards decentralisation, since they can help prevent subordinates from pushing decisions up to their superiors and ease communication between subordinate agencies.
29. V. George and N. Manning (1980), op.cit., page 141.
30. ibid., pages 153 and 154.
31. ibid., page 153. Similarly, they point out on page 155 that "Generally the finance of housing and associated services is a very complicated affair influenced broadly by several interlocking 'markets' for housing, and several interlocking 'interest groups' for local services".

32. E.M. Jacobs (1975), op.cit., page 73. Jacobs continues: "While such repair work and redevelopment work may be beneficial, or even necessary, they absorb so great a proportion of housing investments that the volume of additional housing available each year must suffer as a result."
33. ibid., page 67.
34. ibid., page 76.
35. A. Katsenelinbolgen (1977) 'Coloured Markets in the Soviet Union' in Soviet Studies, Volume XXIX, No.I, January 1977, pages 62 - 85.
Presumably raw materials are frequently stolen from construction projects to effect semi-legal repairs.
36. E.M. Jacobs (1975), op.cit., page 76. However, Jacobs suggests that improvements in design and the increasing use of industrially produced prefabricated building components may reduce some of those repair problems, and the later remarks by George and Manning (1980) op.cit. page 151, on quality of housing to some extent vindicate Jacobs' prediction.
37. E.M. Jacobs (1975), op.cit., page 74
38. ibid., pages 75 and 76.
39. V. George and N. Manning (1980), op.cit., page 149.
40. E.M. Jacobs (1975), op.cit., page 82.

41. *ibid*, page 84.

42. *ibid.*, page 85.

43. *ibid.*, page 78.

44. This remark is necessarily conjectural, in view of the paucity of evidence on the distribution of income in the Soviet Union.

A. McAuley provides evidence that housing subsidies show a marked positive association with income, which would mean they have a non-egalitarian effect. However, this evidence refers to 1956: see

A. McAuley (1979) Economic Welfare in the Soviet Union, George Allen and Unwin, Hemel Hempstead, page 93. In addition, McAuley provides evidence on page 94 which suggests that in 1960 there was a negative association between education, medical care and housing subsidies on the one hand, and income on the other. Yet overall, he suggests on page 97, non-cash social consumption expenditures were regressive. So the position with respect to the effect of housing subsidies alone on the distribution of income is unclear, because the evidence is so meagre.

45. V. George and N. Manning (1980), *op.cit.*, page 156.

46. A. Heitlinger (1979) Women and State Socialism, Macmillan, London, chapter 9, and N.T. Dodge (1975) 'The Role of Women in the Soviet Economy' in Economic Aspects of Life in the USSR, NATO, Directorate of Economic Affairs, Brussels, pages 159 - 196.

47. P. Hirst (1981) 'The Genesis of the Social' in Politics and Power 3, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, pages 67 - 82. See also the comment on this article by F. Bennett, B. Campbell and R. Coward, entitled 'Feminists - The Degenerates of the Social?' on pages 83 - 92 of the same issue of Politics and Power 3. In my view, this comment seriously misunderstands Hirst's argument, as the 'Reply' by Hirst on pages 93 - 95 makes clear to some extent.
48. P. Hirst (1981), *ibid.*
49. A. Heitlinger (1979), *op. cit.*, Chapter 8. Jacobs (1975), *op.cit.*, page 73, argues that declining birthrates in Soviet urban areas are due to poor housing conditions, and this has been accepted, it seems, with consequent effects on the design of apartments since 1971. The improved facilities, increased per capita living space and the trend towards apartments catering for small (nuclear) families are thus directly related to demographic policy. Thus despite high divorce rates, it seems that the nuclear family will continue to receive official support for some considerable time to come.
50. For an extensive (roughly half the book) and sympathetic examination of the history of the Soviet health service, see G. Hyde (1974) The Soviet Health Service; A Historical and Comparative Study, Lawrence and Wishart, London. This book is particularly helpful to the British reader because of its comparisons with the British N.H.S. Historical accounts can also be found in V. George and N. Manning (1980), *op.cit.*, pages 106 - 111, and M. Kaser (1976) Health Care in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Croom Helm, London, pages 36 - 44.

51. As Kaser (1976) *ibid.*, page 40, points out, the battle strategy at this time was Lenin's oft-quoted remark: "Either the lice will defeat socialism or socialism will defeat the lice." Between 1916 and 1924 ten million people died of all epidemics, according to V. George and N. Manning (1980), *op.cit.*, page 109. George and Manning see the emphasis on preventive care as being as much the result of the fight against epidemics as the result of general policy, whereas Kaser seems to treat the emergence of preventive care as a change in emphasis which broadened access to the health services compared with the pre - 1924 period.
52. See G Hyde (1974), *op.cit.*, page 150. However, this emphasis on aiding production is not as strong today as it was in the 1930's, when according to a source quoted by V. George and N. Manning (1980), *op.cit.*, page 110, it was considered that "Damage to a worker's health is not as serious as economic damages to production." The Soviet attitude today is probably accurately indicated by G.A. Popov (1971) Principles of Health Planning in the USSR, World Health Organisation, Geneva. He argues (page 21) that health services should not be exclusively concerned with increasing production. Furthermore, whatever criticisms one may make of this industrial approach to health in the 1930s, it has left a useful legacy. G. Hyde (1974), *op.cit.*, page 148, argues that the evidence suggests that sickness in industry per 1,000 people is higher in the U.K. than in the USSR.

53. V. George and N. Manning (1980), *op.cit.*, page 111.
54. M. Kaser (1976), *op.cit.*, page 42.
55. G. Hyde (1974), *op.cit.*, page 288. The growth in mental ill-health is almost certainly more apparent than real, and is the result of a greater willingness to diagnose and treat it, following the lapsing in the 1950s of claims that mental ill health was dying out under socialism.
56. M. Kaser (1976), *op.cit.*, page 49.
57. The role of mass screening is made clear by G. A. Popov (1971), *op.cit.*, pages 38 - 44.
58. G. Hyde (1974), *op.cit.*, page 245.
59. M. Kaser (1976), *op.cit.*, page 44. This is doubtless related to the privileged 'fourth directorate' of the health service described by V. George and N. Manning (1980), *op.cit.*, page 122, a range of closed facilities provided for privileged government and party members. According to Kaser (pages 55 - 56) the closed access facilities are especially well-equipped and furnish a higher standard of care for those who are employed by the government department concerned. He suggests that such facilities have been implicitly but publicly criticised by a Union Republic Minister of Health.

60. For the latter, see G. A. Popov (1971), op.cit., pages 24 - 26.
61. This account is drawn from Kaser and from George and Manning, the most up to date sources available to me.
62. V. George and N. Manning (1980), op.cit., page 115.
63. G A Popov (1971), op.cit., Chapter 1, especially pages 25 - 26. Apart from the agencies shown in Figure 4, they include such agencies as Gosplan, the Council of Ministers and so on, down to the raiispolkom at local level.
64. G. A. Popov, ibid., page 22.
65. G. A. Popov, ibid., page 102. At the time of writing this book, Dr Popov was Deputy Director of Planning and Finance in the USSR Ministry of Health, so it is clear that the Ministry is aware of such problems. Nevertheless, to some extent the labour-intensive nature of Soviet medicine may be related to a lower degree of reliance on physical equipment than in the West, and to the sparsity of population and harsh conditions of winter travel between settlements: M. Kaser (1976), op.cit., page 66.
66. G. A Popov (1971), op.cit., page 130.
67. M. Kaser (1976), op.cit., page 62.

68. M. Kaser, *ibid.*, page 63. G. Hyde (1974), *op.cit.*, devotes a chapter to the emphasis on recuperative holidays in the Soviet medicine. While the system is sometimes abused, they do seem to have some value.
69. M. Kaser (1976), *op.cit.*, pages 64 - 66, as well as other sources referred to by V. George and N. Manning (1980), *op.cit.*, page 122.
70. M. Kaser (1976) *op.cit.*, pages 67 - 68. This lack of equipment may be why hospitals are considered rather poor by Western standards. There are problems of poor food, hospital spread infection (perhaps related to the wearing of everyday clothes under surgical gowns) and so on.
71. G. A. Popov (1971), *op.cit.*, page 133.
72. V. George and N. Manning (1980), *op.cit.*, page 114. Thus, unlike their discussion of housing, George and Manning appreciate here that technical and administrative practices affect the registration and even the articulation of demand. Similarly they recognise the political determinants of medical need which stem from the Ministry of Health and the medical profession itself. Thus many of my criticisms of their remarks on housing demand do not apply to their analysis of medical need.
73. For a comprehensive analysis of Soviet sport, see J. Riordan (1977) Sport in Soviet Society, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, as

well as J. Riordan (1980) Soviet Sport; Background to the Olympics, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. According to Riordan (1977), page 232, a Komsomol survey revealed that only 1 in 10 young workers and farmers engaged in sport regularly while another survey indicated that regular sports activity is undertaken by only 5 per cent of manual workers and 8 per cent of office workers. The figures for those who had nothing to do with sport were 80 per cent for workers and 70 per cent for employees. It is noteworthy that the Ministries of Defence and Internal Affairs seem to have the best sports facilities, according to Riordan, since these are two of the Ministries mentioned by Kaser as being most prominent in the provision of their 'own' health services: see note 59.

74. V. George and N. Manning (1980), *op.cit.*, page 123.
75. V. George and N. Manning *ibid.*, pages 122 - 123.
76. V. George and N. Manning, *ibid.*, pages 125 - 126; G. Hyde (1974), *op.cit.*, pages 290 - 291.
77. These remarks by P. Hirst are discussed in the first section of Chapter 3 of this thesis.
78. V. George and N. Manning (1980), *op.cit.*, page 124.
79. Dr. M. E. Ruben (1975), 'The Soviet Pensioner: An Element in the Labour Supply' in Economic Aspects of Life in the USSR, NATO Directorate of Economic Affairs, Brussels, pages 197 - 205.

80. Dr. H. Vogel (1975) 'Social Security and Medicare' in Economic Aspects of Life in the USSR, NATO, Directorate of Economic Affairs, Brussels, pages 207 - 233. This argument appears on page 215.
81. V. George and N. Manning (1980), op.cit., page 127
82. G. Hyde (1974), op.cit., pages 289 - 290.
83. G. Hyde, ibid., page 290.
84. G. Hyde, ibid., page 289.
85. V. George and N. Manning (1980), op.cit., pages 127 - 128.

86. V. George and N. Manning (1980), op. cit., page 38.
87. V. George and N. Manning, *ibid.*, page 44 gives figures from an I.L.O. report which differ slightly from those given by H. Vogel (1975), op. cit., Table 4, page 227. However, these differences are not serious for old age and disability pensions. In 1974, 28 million drew old age pensions, 12 million disability pensions and 4 million service pensions, so around two-thirds of these expenditures are on old age pensions. See K. Bush (1975) 'Soviet Living Standards: Some Salient Data' in Economic Aspects of Life in the U.S.S.R., N.A.T.O., Directorate of Economic Affairs, Brussels, page 59. If two-thirds of these pensions are old age pensions, then this means that around 50 per cent of social security expenditure is on old age pensions.
88. V. George and N. Manning (1980), op. cit., page 42.
89. The details of the measures to equalise provision for the two groups are given below. However, this does not mean that the situation is now equal. M. Lavigne in (1979) Les Economies Socialistes: Soviétique et Européennes, Armand Colin, Paris, points out on page 307 that despite a tendency in this area to an equalisation between town and country, the state only covers 80 per cent of the social needs of the collective farmers as against 90 per cent of workers and employees.
90. The other objectives advocated by Lenin were that the administration of social security should be uniform, rather than differentiated by risk, and national in scope; that benefits should equal full earnings and all costs should be borne by employers and the state; that all wage earners and their families should be covered; and that it should cover all cases of incapacity, including old age, illness, death of the breadwinner, as well as maternity and birth benefits. See V. George and N. Manning (1980), op. cit., page 33.

91. G. Littlejohn (1980) 'Economic Calculation in the Soviet Union' in Economy and Society, Vol. 9, No. 4, November 1980, pages 392-394. However, I did not mention then that the current trade union role was an effect of their activities being 'delegated' to them by the state.

92. While Gosplan is admittedly involved in many other aspects of planning, one can gain an indication of the relative administrative capabilities of Gosplan and the All-Union Council of Trade Unions by comparing the respective size of their buildings, which stand next to each other in Moscow. The trades union building seems rather small by comparison. More importantly, the very fact that Gosplan is integrating social security planning with other aspects of the economic plan must give it a considerable say in the outcome of discussions in the State Committee on Labour and Social Questions.

93. See the discussion in Chapter 3 of the remarks by J. Hough on the influence of various agencies in particular 'issue areas'. Hough is not alone in this view, although it is probable that the trades unions must have also successfully pressed for the high degree of job security which now exists in the Soviet Union.

94. V. George and N. Manning (1980), op. cit., page 61.

95. V. George and N. Manning, ibid., pages 61-62.

96. It is equally difficult to see why Britain continues to bother with the 'contributory' form of financing of some aspects of social security through the National Insurance scheme, since these aspects are really financed overwhelmingly out of income tax. It is probable that in both countries, this perpetuation of administrative practices, beyond the point where they have any relevance, is related to the supposed propaganda effect on the population concerned: in other words, such practices indicate and to some extent perpetuate the closure of these forms of administration to serious democratic scrutiny and pressure.

97. H. Vogel (1975), op. cit., pages 207-208.
98. M. Lavigne (1979), op. cit., pages 334-335.
99. Thus, for example, V. George and N. Manning begin their discussion of social security with a quotation from The Critique of the Gotha Programme; a brief commentary couched in similar terms on Lavigne's discussion of social consumption funds in general (including social security) can be found in G. Littlejohn (1980), op. cit., pages 391-395.
100. For details, see H. Vogel (1975), op. cit., pages 208-209. An account can also be found in V. George and N. Manning (1980), op. cit., page 45.
101. This is done not only for health reasons, but to overcome labour shortages, by avoiding the loss of skilled labour, and to reduce the financial cost of pensions, since many of the categories of workers who work beyond retirement age retain only part of their pension in addition to their wages. For a discussion of this aspect of employment of pensioners, see M.E. Ruban (1975), op. cit. Low paid women who continue to work and receive their pay plus full pension are probably the greatest beneficiaries of these provisions, according to V. George and N. Manning (1980), op. cit., page 47.
102. According to V. George and N. Manning (1980), *ibid.*, page 47, the minimum pension is around one-third of the average wage, and the maximum is around 90 per cent of the average wage. However, this may be out of date since the maximum limit for old age pensions is 120 roubles, according to H. Vogel (1975), op. cit., page 209. If this has not changed and average wages are over 150 roubles, then maximum pension can only be 80 per cent or less of the average wage. According to L. Rzhantsyna (1977) Soviet Family Budgets, Progress Publishers, Moscow, page 129, average wages of industrial and office workers were 146 roubles per month in 1975. This figure is consistent with other sources. Indeed, George and Manning themselves say on page 46 that the average

wage in the mid-1970s was 150 roubles. Assuming a 20 per cent growth in wages in the Five Year Plan since then, average wages of industrial and office workers will be around 180 roubles per month by now.

103. See the conclusions on pensions and subsistence on page 223 of H. Vogel (1975), op. cit. For discussions of disguised inflation see A.I. Katsenelinboigen (1975) 'Disguised Inflation in the Soviet Union' in Economic Aspects of Life in the U.S.S.R., N.A.T.O., Directorate of Economic Affairs, Brussels, pages 101-112; also R. and Z. Medvedev (1981) 'Soviet prices theory is upset by inflation' in The Observer, 6th September 1981, page 6. To the extent that such processes are occurring, the argument that inflation is contained in the Soviet Union is weakened: see, for example, G. Littlejohn (1980), op. cit., page 376.

104. This succinct summary of the weaknesses of Soviet retirement pensions is derived from V. George and N. Manning (1980), op. cit., page 48.

105. H. Vogel (1975), op. cit., page 227, seems to combine them in giving a figure of 73 per cent for the share of pensions in social security expenditure for 1972. If M. Lavigne (1979), op. cit., is giving an exact figure when she remarks (page 333) that 70 per cent of social security expenditure is on retirement pensions, then it would seem that disability pensions are of the order of 3 per cent of social security expenditure. However, this does not correspond to the remarks of K. Bush (1975), op. cit., referred to in note 87.

106. See V. George and N. Manning (1980), op. cit., page 49. H. Vogel (1975), op. cit., gives greater detail on the pension rates.

107. See H. Vogel, *ibid.*, for details.

108. H. Vogel, *ibid.*, page 213; V. George and N. Manning (1980), *op. cit.*, pages 51-52.
109. V. George and N. Manning (1980), *ibid.*, pages 53-54.
The figures given by them for child allowances are more detailed and evidently more accurate than those given by H. Vogel (1975), *op. cit.*, page 214.
110. M. Lavigne (1979), *op. cit.*, pages 332-333.
111. See the statistical discussion and Appendix to H. Vogel (1975), *op. cit.* Vogel's figures only go up to 1972, but the more general figures on the budget provided by M. Lavigne, *op. cit.*, for 1979 suggest that this trend has continued.
112. V. George and N. Manning (1980), *op.cit.*, page 54.
113. V. George and N. Manning, *ibid*, page 60, argue:
"Bearing in mind that benefits are earnings related, that the better paid live longer to draw retirement pensions and that there is no unemployment and assistance benefits (sic) which usually benefit the low paid, the overall conclusion must be that the Soviet social security system is either regressive or neutral." More cautiously, H. Vogel (1975), *op. cit.*, argues on page 224 that the redistributive impact of monetary transfers for large families will be little, since benefits are in the main dependent on income from work. Other measures such as the rise of minimum wages and reduction of tax rates since 1965 have in his view resulted in a general redistribution among individual earners, although he seems to allow that the child allowance for poor families will have some effect.
114. Thus M. Matthews (1972) Class and Society in Soviet Russia, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, London, page 75, Figure 6, notes a substantial equalisation of wages between 1946 and 1966. In 1968 the minimum wage was fixed at 60 roubles a month, he states on page 66. L. Rzhantayna (1977) Soviet Family Budgets, *op. cit.*, page 129, Table 24, suggests

that the minimum wage since then has gone up to 70 roubles in many occupations. K. Bush (1975), op. cit., page 53, suggests that this minimum wage was going to be extended to the entire public sector work force, other than kolkozniiks and domestic servants, by the end of 1975. According to M. Lavigne (1979), op. cit., page 337, income tax is not payable on wages below 70 roubles, and income tax rates are reduced for wages from 71-90 roubles.

115. L. Rzhantsyna (1977), op. cit., page 136.
116. P. Wiles (1975) 'Recent Data on Soviet Income Distribution' in Economic Aspects of Life in the U.S.S.R., N.A.T.O., Directorate of Economic Affairs, Brussels, page 125. The arguments by Vogel and by George and Manning are referred to in note 113.
117. M. Lavigne (1974) The Socialist Economies of the Soviet Union and Europe, Martin Robertson, London, page 284. The figures are quoted on page 60 of V. George and N. Manning (1980), op. cit.
118. K. Bush (1975) 'Soviet Living Standards: Some Salient Data', op. cit., page 55.
119. P. Wiles (1975), op. cit., page 125.
120. The following figures are derived from M. Lavigne (1979), op. cit., pages 334-337.
121. P. Wiles (1975), op. cit., page 125.

CHAPTER FIVETHE ANALYSIS OF THE CLASS STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET UNION

It was argued in the Introduction to this thesis that one could not designate state socialist societies as 'transitional social formations' on the grounds that they exhibited certain features which approximated to an ideal state of affairs. Rather than adhere to such a teleological definition of socialism, which would imply that a socialist society was tending in a certain direction, the argument in the Introduction implied that a society could be considered socialist if it could be demonstrated that class relations had been seriously weakened or were non-existent. The purpose of this Chapter is to investigate whether (and if so, to what extent) class relations are operative in the Soviet Union. It will be remembered that it was argued that the relations of production do not involve class relations if the variety of forms of access to the means of production are not sufficiently mutually exclusive to enable some agents to predominate in determining their own conditions of existence by acting on the division of labour and thereby securing for themselves a disproportionate share in the distribution of income. It was argued that if class relations were weak or non-existent, such relatively open access would mean that the differential forms of access of various agents would be subject to constant challenge by other agents, and would thus be an object of struggle and negotiation. One could add now that such struggles might well be subject to adjudication by certain legal or political agencies. Such a situation would not preclude differentiation of economic agents; indeed this is inevitable in any division of labour, and would include a differentiated occupational structure for individuals, but such differentiation would not entail a fairly systematic

enhancement or restriction of agents' capacity for action deriving from differential access to the means of production. This does not mean that there could be no systematic differences in the capacities of agents deriving from some other determinants of the division of labour, such as demarcations between individuals on the grounds of gender, ethnic group or age.

The Grounds for Demarcating Class Boundaries

It might be argued that all determinants of the division of labour which give rise to systematic differences in the capacities of agents affect their relation to the means of production, and thus their class position. For example, the fact that Soviet women currently do most of the domestic work might be considered grounds for arguing that they are thereby systematically excluded from the economic locations most involved in co-ordinating the division of labour and are thus in a different class position from men. However, while it is true that there are comparatively few women in the Central Committee, or at senior levels in Gosplan, or the State Committee on Labour and Social Questions, and while it is true that this is partly due to the difficulties of engaging in public politics when one is heavily engaged in domestic work, the peculiar 'relation to the means of consumption' of Soviet women cannot be said to constitute them as a distinct class, for several reasons. Firstly, the agents in the Soviet Union which are most predominant in co-ordinating the division of labour are non-human agencies (that is, collective agents). By their very predominance they exclude to some extent all human agents. The fact that the individuals who staff their senior positions are mostly men, while deplorable, is an effect of the mechanisms distributing individual agents to economic locations, rather than of the mechanisms generating those

locations themselves. Thus the social distribution of women among economic locations does not in itself directly indicate whether relations between various economic agents are class relations. Secondly, even if one were to establish that certain collective agents, such as Gosplan and other important state and party agencies, did effectively 'possess' the means of production, the relative exclusion of women from senior positions in these agencies would not establish that women were in a different class from men. Women do occupy some positions in such agencies and also constitute quite a large proportion of the staff in agencies of plan implementation such as the State Bank. Thus while the mechanisms distributing women to different economic locations do entail the gaining of various political and educational qualifications by evening work, which is difficult for women who are heavily engaged in domestic work, this restriction on women's capacities for action is not determined by an access to the means of production which is different from that of men. It might appear that the social position of women is determined by differential access to the means of production, because being 'tied to domestic consumption' does restrict women's capacities for action, including their chances of obtaining senior appointments. Thus it might seem that women's 'relation to the means of consumption' systematically denies them certain forms of access to the means of production, and hence puts them in a distinct class from men. However, I shall argue that this is not the case.

It is the social attribution of gender which determines both the differential domestic work-load of Soviet men and women (thereby affecting promotion prospects) and the different occupational distributions of men and women. Both of these aspects of the division of labour affect the distribution of

income between men and women, in a way which favours men.

However, this situation does not derive from the fact that men predominate in co-ordinating the division of labour, deciding the uses to which the means of production will be put. It is perfectly true that the capacity to control forms of consumption (by controlling retail outlets or forms of welfare provision) can provide a form of access to the means of production (because consumption affects subsequent production, or because planning consumption has implications for planning production).

However, this does not mean that the converse is true: that women's lack of control (in comparison to men) of the means and conditions of consumption stems from a lack of control (in comparison to men) of the means and conditions of production. I have already indicated that collective agents (institutions) rather than individuals predominate in co-ordinating the division of labour in the Soviet Union. If this is the case (and this whole line of reasoning has yet to be empirically substantiated in this Chapter) then the differential distribution of men and women in the division of labour does not derive from their differential access to the means of production. Rather it is the social or cultural attribution of gender which, in tying women disproportionately to domestic labour, or in allocating women to 'suitable' occupations, results in a systematic restriction on their capacities for action in comparison to men. Although it is a demarcation line with fairly systematic effects, the gender boundary does not derive from differential access of men and women to the means of production. A similar argument could be made with regard to the fairly systematic enhancement of the promotion prospects and political capacities of Russians, deriving partly from the use of Russian as the main administrative language. This does not mean that Russians are in a different class from the other nationalities.

What I shall loosely call these cultural determinants of the division of labour certainly affect the distribution of individuals to different economic locations (occupational positions), and they may even generate some of the locations themselves, but they do not directly determine whether class relations are present. They may also fairly systematically affect the capacities of various agents, but such effects do not derive from the access of different agents to the means of production. To put it another way, while cultural determinants do affect the capacities of agents and hence their relations with other agents, it is the capacities deriving from the economic locations themselves, with the differential access which they provide to the means of production, which determines whether the relations of production are class relations. The capacity of an economic agent deriving from its economic location is of course never fixed or static. To refer to an agent's economic location is to refer to its structural position, to the structural conditions of its action; but structure is not static and changes in accordance with the struggles between agents. Thus the capacity for action of an economic agent is a result partly of the resources available to it (deriving largely from its relation to the means of production), partly of its internal organisation (if it is a collective agent) and partly of its means of calculating courses of action with respect to other agents (which may be allied or struggling with it over some issue). Such struggles can change the position and/or capacity of an agent. It cannot be denied that culturally defined attributes such as gender or nationality may be used in such struggles, and by affecting their outcome, may indirectly affect the position or capacity of an agent. However, this is not the same as the direct determination of an agent's capacity resulting from its position in relation to the means of production. Only this determination of capacity by

economic location (defined in terms of access to the means of production) can involve class relations between agents.

The acceptance of the possibility of a change in location of economic agents, or of groups of agents, has led some theorists to define class boundaries in terms of the lack of movement of agents. Thus classes are sometimes said to coalesce or crystallize around some set of economic locations whose membership is fairly static. However, the specification of a class boundary should not be confused with the issue of whether an agent (or group of agents) can move across it. The concept of class does not refer to the openness or closure of the division of labour to the movement of agents between locations, but to the differential capacities of agents deriving from their occupying different economic locations (having different forms of access to the means of production). Without such a specification of a class boundary, it is impossible to decide whether the movement of agents in question should be considered simply as occupational mobility of individuals, a change of class position by individuals or groups, or a structural change in the relations of production. The difficulty of specifying the nature of boundaries, and the related difficulty of deciding on the nature of changes in the division of labour, have had important effects on the study of occupational or social mobility. It is in some ways fairly easy to study the occupational mobility of individuals, given that the payment of wages usually entails a specification of the tasks to be performed and the skills required. This is often already recorded or fairly easily obtainable from an interview. However, the study of 'group mobility' is generally defined less clearly. It may refer to a group of individuals from a common origin crossing a boundary, or a group of individuals constituting a collective agent whose location is

changing (either by crossing a boundary, or because the structure of the division of labour is itself changing). The concept of 'social mobility', as it is usually deployed, does not readily distinguish between the mechanisms generating economic locations (structural conditions of action of agents which are subject to alteration in the course of struggle) and the mechanisms distributing individuals or even collective agents to those locations. Consequently it does not make it easy to analyse the changing occupational structure as recorded in official statistics or in social surveys, since the features of that structure or the mechanisms of its changes are not clearly based on a theory of the social relations giving rise to it.

The most common confusion which arises from this state of affairs is the identification or confusion of the occupational structure (which can only refer to the economic location of individuals) with the class structure. However, the class structure can also refer to the economic location of collective agents. If one refuses to identify the occupational structure with the class structure, this raises two separate problems. The first is how to decide on the class position of collective agents, who do not appear directly in the occupational structure, for example, joint stock companies or state enterprises. The second is that while individuals may be located in occupational positions within such collective agents (positions which cannot be equated with the positions of the collective agents themselves), individuals may also be simultaneously located in several other collective agents. For example, individuals may simultaneously be members of a state enterprise, a trade union, the Communist Party, a sports club and a nuclear family. All these agents have some impact on the division of labour, although their importance as determinants of the division of labour varies. Both these problems raise in a new form a question which has already come

up, namely, which boundaries in the division of labour are to be considered as class boundaries? This time the question arises in the form: what is the unit of analysis of the class structure? The answer must be that there is no single unit, in the sense of an agent of a particular kind. In the past, various sociologists have attempted to treat individuals in occupational positions as the unit of analysis of the class structure, but this has tended to mean that other agents have been treated as identical to (or entirely derivative of) this 'prime' unit of analysis.¹ What the class structure refers to is the relations between economic agents of whatever kind, whether individual or collective. Economic agents are agents whose capacity for action is primarily derived from their access to the means of production. Non-economic agents are ones whose capacity for action is largely structured by other determinants. While these other determinants (and indeed the non-economic agents themselves) may have important effects on the division of labour, this does not mean the agents whose capacities are largely an effect of these non-economic determinants must be also considered as economic agents, for this would be to confuse the determinants of the division of labour with the effects of the division of labour. To reiterate, economic agents are agents occupying economic locations, that is, locations whose structural conditions of action are primarily derived from the relation to the means of production. Such agents do not occupy a different domain (or level or instance) from non-economic agents, but the main conditions of their action are determined by their differential access to the means of production. Of course, such economic agents themselves partly determine the division of labour, in so far as they are able to act upon the division of labour, but what makes them economic agents is that such capacities themselves are mainly

determined by their relation to the means of production. Thus their capacity to act is itself an effect of the division of labour, and is not to be confused with other determinants deriving from non-economic agents and structural features.

It is now possible to specify more clearly the relationship between the occupational structure and the class structure, assuming that class relations are a feature of the social formation in question. In a sense the occupational structure is both less than and more than the class structure. It is less than the class structure, because it does not coincide with collective economic agents which may be part of the class structure. It is more than the class structure, because it is determined not only by the class structure, but by other non-economic determinants of the division of labour such as gender attribution, nationality, state and party policy, and even the organisation of the state itself. To put it another way, the occupational structure does not directly register the presence of collective agents, although it does so indirectly because such agents have their own internal organisation and hence an associated occupational structure. On the other hand, the occupational structure may well register the effects of other, non-economic determinants of the division of labour. Consequently, the occupational structure is only a partial indicator of the effects of the relations of production, since it only shows the distribution of individuals within the division of labour. This distribution does not show directly the economic location of collective agents, or the relative capacities of any economic agents. Furthermore, it does not directly distinguish between mechanisms allocating individuals to economic locations (which may be affected by a variety of determinants) and mechanisms generating those locations themselves (which may be

affected by the same or other determinants). Finally, since it does not indicate the relative capacities of the different economic agents, it cannot show how far these capacities enable some agents to predominate in co-ordinating the division of labour, thereby to some extent determining their own conditions of existence, and securing for themselves a disproportionate share in the distribution of income.² In other words, it cannot directly show whether the relations of production involve class relations.

Nevertheless, the occupational structure is a good starting point to try to elicit the presence or extent of class relations, since it should indicate some of the effects of class relations on the division of labour. It should indicate at least some of the effects of class relations on individual economic agents, who are frequently used as the unit of analysis in official statistics or social surveys. Consequently there may be empirical evidence of such effects, and bearing in mind the above reservations about the somewhat opaque relation between the occupational structure and the class structure, it should be possible to appraise this evidence in terms of the extent to which it indicates any systematic effects of differential access to the means of production, as opposed to other, non-economic determinants of the division of labour.

The Soviet Occupational Structure

One of the problems of analysing any occupational structure is that individuals have usually already been aggregated into groups, in the process of collecting official statistics or of conducting a social survey. The classification scheme for aggregating varied tasks and skills into discrete groups of individuals may not be fully evident in the published results. One partial solution to this would be to conduct one's own survey,

but this is not possible in the case of the Soviet Union, where one must rely on Soviet sociologists or other Soviet research. Thus the ability to rework the empirical material in terms of the researcher's own concerns is limited. As mentioned in the Introduction to this work, this need not be an insuperable problem, but the limitations which this state of affairs imposes should not be forgotten. Even in conducting one's own survey, without an encyclopaedic knowledge of the division of labour one is forced to rely to some extent either on respondents' own classifications (or designations) of their occupation or on some available classification scheme, although both can be evaluated and if necessary modified in the light of the theoretical concerns of the research.

As is fairly well known, the official Soviet view of the class structure refers to the existence of two classes and one stratum, the workers, peasants and employees (some of the latter are sometimes called the intelligentsia), whose inter-relation is structured by non-antagonistic contradictions. As Lane³ points out, "A non-antagonistic contradiction is one which may be resolved by quantitative change, whereas an antagonistic contradiction can only be resolved by a qualitative one". Lane takes the view that the dialectical concept of contradiction entails antagonism and its resolution by qualitative change, so the term 'non-antagonistic contradiction' is in his view confusing and inappropriate. What the official theory seems to be attempting in using such a term is to distinguish contradictions which can be resolved "within the parameters of a given social system"⁴, rather than ones which can only be resolved by changing the social system itself. So a classless society can be achieved by a guided growing together of the classes. Be that as it may, the point which concerns us is that this theoretical approach has

influenced the way that official statistics on the occupational structures are presented and discussed. (The influence of this approach on the conduct of social surveys is less clear.) A typical example of this sort of discussion is the work by A.A. Amvrosov⁵ on the social structure of Soviet society, which uses all-Union and local statistical data, that is the censuses of 1939, 1959 and 1970, together with "concrete sociological research"⁶ to show the dynamics of the change in the social class structure. He provides the following table on the changes in the class composition of the Soviet population.

Table 8

The Dynamics of Change of the Class Composition
of the Population of the U.S.S.R.

	<u>1939</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1974</u>
Workers and Employees of which	50.2	68.3	82.2
Workers	33.5	49.5	60.6
Intelligentsia and Employees	16.7	18.8	21.6
Collective Farmers and Co-operative Artisans	47.2	31.4	17.8
Non-Co-operative Peasants and Artisans	<u>2.6</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.0</u>
Total	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>

Source: A.A. Amvrosov, *ibid.*, page 20

The problem is, then, how these two classes and one stratum are defined, and if this definition is unsatisfactory, how useful statistics on the Soviet occupational structure are for examining class relations. Amvrosov argues that the working class does not consist solely of those engaged in physical work in state enterprises. This sort of definition, based on the view that only they produce material values, ignores the effects of the scientific-technical revolution on the character of labour of the worker. Yet the working class is not all those engaged in the sphere of material production, since some of them belong to the intelligentsia. The differences between workers and intelligentsia have not yet been overcome. These are differences in the character and content of work, in technical-cultural level and so on.⁷ So Amvrosov defines the working class of socialist society as workers in state enterprises of town and country who are directly engaged in transforming the subject of labour in the process of creation of material values; it is the class having the highest degree of organisation and socialist consciousness and playing the leading role in all spheres of life. Ignoring the problem that the degree of organisation and class consciousness might be better treated as possible effects of class position, rather than as part of the definition, Amvrosov's approach amounts to saying that the working class is defined by the form of property (state/non-state) and by the division between mental and manual labour. Amvrosov says that it is not simply a matter of workers being engaged in physical work, but that their physical and mental work is directly connected with the transformation of the subject of labour, perhaps by means of a system of machinery. However, this does not amount to a significant modification of his approach, since all mental work implies manual operations and vice-versa: the distinction between the working class and the intelligentsia

is basically in terms of the qualitative content of their work. In other words, while claiming that the mental/manual labour distinction has been partly overcome, and while recognising⁸ that the increasingly high cultural and intellectual level of the population creates difficulties for defining the intelligentsia, Amvrosov retains the mental/manual labour distinction to define the working class.

Leaving aside the problems of this distinction for the time being, the problem of limiting the working class to the state sector also creates difficulties. Why is the working class different from what Amvrosov calls 'the kolkhoz peasantry'? Since it is claimed with some justice that the latter are approaching the working class, how are the latter different from the rural working class (on state farms)? Amvrosov appears to argue that the kolkhozniks have a different relation to the means of production, which is co-operatively owned, has a lower degree of socialisation, is economically independent and whose use is decided by its members. Yet even Amvrosov admits that the Soviet state constitutes the leadership of the kolkhoz sector; however, he argues that legally the distribution of property and financial means belongs to the kolkhozy themselves. In so far as this legal determination is effective, it would imply a different relation to the means of production, but it would also mean that the Soviet occupational structure can only be analysed in class terms by reference to collective economic agents, such as collective farms or state enterprises. In that case, if the class location of individual agents is to be defined in terms of membership of a collective agent, and by the division between mental and manual labour, then two conclusions should follow. Firstly, the rural intelligentsia employed on collective farms would be in a different class location compared to those on,

say, state farms. Secondly, the different types of collective agents within the state sector should be examined, to see if they have a different relation to the means of production from state enterprises. Of course, Amvrosov does not do so, effectively regarding all state property as giving all collective agents of the state the same relation to the means of production.

This sort of difficulty with drawing class boundaries is precisely the sort of problem discussed in the Introduction to this work and in the first section of this chapter. Separating out one stratum from a two-class structure on the grounds of the character and content of work leaves no grounds for keeping it at one stratum, especially when other class and non-class determinants of the division of labour are recognised, as they are by Amvrosov. In addition, defining the class boundary in terms of a legal determination of two types of socialist property (collective and state) places one in the position of either ignoring arguments that social relations are not simply an effect of legal determinants or of attempting to substantiate the importance of the state/non-state boundary in determining access to the means of production. To take the second alternative would require a careful examination of different kinds of economic agents, and of legal and political determinants of their capacities, as was attempted in Chapters Two to Four of this work. Amvrosov apparently chooses the first alternative - to ignore the problem.

However, this still leaves Amvrosov with the problem of the definition of employees and the intelligentsia. He admits the intelligentsia is not homogenous. Those working in state enterprises have much in common with workers, whereas the rural intelligentsia is not much different from other groups of kolkhozniks. (This ignores the fact that much of the rural intelligentsia work in state agencies, including state farms).

However, he argues that it is a special social group engaged in mental labour requiring a special secondary or a higher educational qualification.⁹ This definition immediately leads to a discrepancy between the category of employees and that of intelligentsia. Employees are not workers but they do not have a high enough qualification to be counted as members of the intelligentsia. Thus, while all non-workers in the state sector are employees, not all of them are members of the intelligentsia. This means that the distinction between mental and manual labour becomes even more problematic than Amvrosov admits, for it makes it difficult to define the distinction between highly qualified workers, and employees who do not have a very high level of educational qualification. Is one talking of a continuum rather than a division? What does one make of manual workers with a higher level of education and higher pay than some employees? However, if there is a difference between workers and employees in terms of the quality of the mental labour involved, why talk of only one stratum? This becomes particularly puzzling in view of the statement that the intelligentsia is divided into various socio-professional orders: managerial, engineering-technical, agricultural, scientific-cultural, military and so on, with the distinction between town and country intelligentsia being important. So why one stratum? To admit a plurality of strata would not even threaten the official theory of class boundaries, since the classes are demarcated by the two forms of socialist property.

These then are the sort of difficulties which the official theory of two classes and one stratum can run into, and while analyses of changes in the occupational structure based on this theory are not totally devoid of interest, they are unnecessarily problematic. Decisions as to the extent or even presence of class relations in the Soviet Union will thus have to be based on a

somewhat more detailed analysis of the occupational structure, which in conjunction with the analysis presented earlier in this work, should make it possible to resolve at least some of these problems.

In contrast to the official Soviet position, Lane and O'Dell¹⁰ define the working class "to include in the Soviet Union all manual and non-manual labour occupied in publicly owned institutions concerned with production, distribution and exchange." They elaborate this a little later:¹¹ "In our view, non-manual workers in production enterprises are not, as assumed by Stalin and others, part of a separate stratum outside of the working class; they become an integral part of it. This is because in a Marxist sense their relationship to the means of production is the same as that of manual workers: all are wage-earners employed in state-owned enterprises; all contribute directly to production in the national economy; all to some degree share a similar political ideology." This is consistent with the view expressed elsewhere by Lane¹² that state socialist societies are not classless, but are not antagonistic class societies either: they are single class societies or workers' states. According to Lane, "the cultural formation and political arrangements characteristic of the superstructure of society are not yet at the socialist level." These superstructural determinants generate forms of inequality which are not epiphenomena, but are contradictions built into the system as long as the level of production leaves some socially determined wants unfulfilled; in other words, as long as the level of productive forces is too low. This is not the place to rehearse arguments about the adequacy of the base-superstructure metaphor or the 'problematic of the productive forces'. Such arguments were referred to in the Introduction to this work.¹³ All that will be noted here is that Lane seems in these later works to have dropped his earlier objections to the

use of the concept of non-antagonistic contradictions, since he is arguing here that in the Soviet Union we face a non-antagonistic class society which is a class society precisely because the low level of the productive forces produces superstructural features whose contradictions apparently give rise to forms of inequality. Without these forms of inequality, it is clearly implied that the Soviet Union would be a classless, rather than a single class society. For my own part, I cannot conceive of a single class society, since as I have repeatedly stated, the concept of class relations refers to significantly differential access to the means of production. If all agents are in a 'single class' then relations between them are classless.

However, despite my not sharing this view on the difference between class and classless society, Lane's works (as well as that of Lane and O'Dell) are of considerable interest to an investigation of the Soviet occupational structure, because of their recognition of forms of inequality within the 'single class' society. For example, Lane (1978)¹⁴ points out that the Soviet literature on the subject of the intelligentsia and employees is highly ambiguous, with different sociologists dividing non-manual workers into different numbers of groups, even within the categories of employee and intelligentsia. Similarly various numbers of strata are distinguished within the manual working class (although usually the three strata are considered to be unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled manual workers), and within the 'peasantry' (although again three strata are often distinguished, namely, the unskilled, the mechanisers and the administrative personnel). Yet Lane is not content simply to note Soviet attempts to analyse these forms of inequality, as can most clearly be seen in Lane and O'Dell, where it is argued¹⁵ that "the simple categorisation of manual and non-manual workers in terms of the quality of their labour input becomes increasingly less relevant (but that)

other distinctions between various strata of the working class have more salience." These distinctions are based on occupational differentiation (itself based on the character of work performed and the place a worker has in the system of social production), educational background, financial rewards and culture. Unfortunately, Lane and O'Dell do not explicitly theorise the concepts of character of work performed and place in the system of social production. However, they do provide a clear account of the historical changes in the occupational structure, both in terms of the distribution between agriculture and industry (manual and non-manual being defined to exclude collective farmers), and in terms of distribution among various branches of the economy. The changes in the distribution between agriculture and industry (and within industry, between manual and non-manual) can be summarised by the following table, constructed from the text of Lane and O'Dell.

Table 9

Percentage Changes in the Overall Soviet Occupational Structure

	1928	1939	1977
Manual	12.4	33.2	61.6
Non-manual	5.2	17.0	22.7
<u>Industry sub-total</u>	17.6	50.2	84.3
Agriculture	<u>82.4</u>	<u>49.8</u>	<u>15.7</u>
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Lane and O'Dell, *ibid.*, pages 7-8 (derived and corrected).

It can be seen that the figures for 1939 are very similar to those provided by Amvrosov, so the earlier figures for 1928 and the later ones for 1977 confirm the trend indicated in Amvrosov. As Lane and O'Dell put it, "These facts serve to illustrate the rapid structural change that has taken place: a swift population

growth, a movement of population from village to town, the creation of an urban working class with a recent peasant background."¹⁶

It also illustrates the fact that the hope of being able to rework the official figures may be a pious one, since they may not be sufficiently detailed to be reworked. However, such a conclusion would be premature, as can be seen from the following table on occupational distribution by sectors of the economy.

Table 10

Industrial distribution of the labour force, Russia and the Soviet Union, selected years 1897-1976*

Industry	1897		1913	1926	1940	1950	1959	1964	1970	1976
	(i)	(ii)								
(1) Agriculture	64	77	75	71	54	48	41	33	27	23
(2) Manufacturing and construction	18	10	9	14	23	27	32	35	37	38
(3) Transport and communications	2	2	2	4	5	5	6	8	8	9
(4) Trade	5+	4	9	3	5	5	5	6	7	8
(5) Public administration	1+	1	**	2	3	3	3	2	2	2
(6) Education and health	1+	1	1	4	6	8	10	13	15	16
(7) Other services	7	5	4	2	4	4	3	3	4	4
(8) A (row (1))	64	77	75	71	54	48	41	33	27	23
(9) M (rows (2) plus (3))	20	12	11	18	28	32	38	43	45	47
(10) S (rows (4) to (7))	16	11	14	11	18	20	21	24	28	30
(11) Total civilian labour force (rows (8) to (10))	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
(12) M/S ratio	1.2	1.1	0.8	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.56

* 'The definitions and coverage of the data for the various years are not entirely consistent. Figures for 1897 (col. i) one worker per family business: 1926 excludes all family workers and 1959 excludes workers on private plots, but both count all persons reported as workers in the censuses. At least for the later years, there seems to be little difference between "family workers" and "workers on private plots" (cf. 1959) . . . 1897 (col. ii) is based on the distribution of the total population and thus "favours" agriculture to the extent that rural families are larger than urban. It appears to conform with the definitions of later years better than 1897 (i). The figures for 1913, 1940, 1950, 1959, are based on annual full-time equivalents and include family workers also as full-time equivalents' (Ofer, 1973:187).

**Included in other services.

Source: Lane and O'Dell, *ibid.*, page 11

Lane and O'Dell believe that this table and other evidence support the view "that the Soviet occupational pattern substantially follows that of Western capitalist countries . . . The more industrialised a society becomes, (i) the smaller the proportion of the labour force engaged in agriculture, and (ii) the higher the ratio of non-manual workers in the non-agricultural labour force."¹⁷ The pattern of growth in the service sector is

consistent with the growth in non-manual occupations shown in the previous table, but it is perhaps surprising that 'public administration' has declined as a percentage of the labour force since 1959. This is clearly related to the use of voluntary workers among the trade unions and social organisations, which is considered as enhancing popular participation in 'the administration of things'. We saw in Chapter Four that George and Manning did not consider that this was very effective as a form of participation, and from the arguments of Hirst discussed in Chapter Three we might expect that it may not be very effective as a form of administration either. Such a view is supported by Hough,¹⁸ who argues that both the State Committee for Labour and Social Questions and Gosplan face a real danger of inundation by the incredible level of detail on which they and the trade unions must work. The use of trade unions (in addition to stage agencies) must solve some of these problems by spreading the work load, but Hough argues¹⁹ that "the deep involvement of the trade unions in Soviet labour and wage policy creates a serious administrative problem for the Soviet system because trade unions are subordinated to no governmental agency." The party organs, as in so many similar situations, serve as the common superior which co-ordinates activities and adjudicates disputes. However, the Politburo has little time to deal with the details of wages policy, so the co-ordination of policy in this area remains a troublesome problem. More important, however, from the point of view of policy implementation is the lack of training in administration and the high turnover of voluntary trade union workers involved in social security administration. It is this lack of expertise and the problems associated with it which support Hirst's argument to the effect that state administration can be preferable to voluntary forms of provision of various services, since it can secure certain defined minimal standards of performance.²⁰ For such reasons, the

lack of growth of the 'public administration' sector of occupations indicated in the above table may be less desirable than proponents of democratic administration might imagine.

With regard to manual occupations, the above table is not very enlightening, but Lane and O'Dell argue²¹ that the general level of skill has increased between 1961 and 1972. While this is doubtless true, they themselves point out that part of the recorded increase in skill is due possibly to the use of re-grading as a disguised form of wage increase. Furthermore, in Chapter Two attention was drawn to the heavy use of ancillary workers and of workers to supply raw materials from within the same factory, using artisan labour. Lane and O'Dell argue that the continuing demand for manual labour is due to the relatively lower technological level of the U.S.S.R., which means that intensive and extensive growth are taking place in parallel, rather than in sequence.²² This is almost certainly still correct, but they then argue that the actual structure of the labour force is largely determined by the kind and level of technology, and the socially accepted ways of manning (or staffing, as I prefer to call it). They then refer to Braverman in arguing that it is in the context of similarities in the division of labour that the organisation of the work process in the U.S.S.R. has parallels with the capitalist West. Yet it is not clear to me that the structure of the labour force is all that similar to the capitalist West (unless one is contrasting industrialised societies with agrarian ones or something). Certainly, in the U.S.S.R. there has been the familiar tendency within industry for the proportion of the workforce engaged in 'material production' to fall, from 88.3 per cent in 1940 to 75.4 per cent in 1976.²³ It is also true that, using Western definitions of primary, secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy, the U.S.S.R. in 1976 resembled

Italy and Austria of 1960, rather than the U.S.A. of 1960,²⁴ so that it might be possible to attribute most of the differences within the secondary sector (manufacturing and construction) to a technological lag between the capitalist societies and the U.S.S.R. However, this would be courting the danger of attributing too great an effectivity to technological determinants in structuring the manual occupations in the labour force.

Lane and O'Dell are quite willing, it seems, to concede that the non-manual labour force is not occupationally structured to neatly fit in with the needs of technology. Thus they note the growing numbers of engineering and technical employees (ITRs),²⁵ and the smaller share than in the West of the labour force constituted by lower-grade white collar workers.²⁶ They quote a Soviet source to the effect that this smaller share of 'administrative' workers (office staff) is largely a consequence of the artificial limitation of the number of salaried workers when their functions were handed over to the ITRs (emphasis in Lane and O'Dell). The Soviet source argues that ITRs should be completely relieved of office work.²⁷ It is somewhat surprising that they do not seriously consider whether analogous 'artificial' limitations are placed on the manual labour force. It would be hard to deny that changing levels of technology are an important determinant of the occupational structure of the labour force, but if both intensive and extensive growth are taking place, it is not immediately clear that changes in technology are the main determinant, rather than, say, another determinant which they mention, socially accepted ways of staffing. In any case, changes in technology are themselves partly determined by the central planning agencies and the socially accepted ways of staffing. The last point is illustrated by Lee who argues²⁸ that 'rationalisation' of technology by the workers themselves is

symbiotically related to engineering failures, to badly designed equipment which has to be accepted in a situation of supply difficulties. It is an activity which declines as any new technology introduced gets older (that is, as the problems of its introduction are overcome). So the labour force is not only being restructured by technology, but is itself constantly adapting technology to existing practices. While the introduction of automation does affect the educational profile of the worker and the content of labour, and consequently does lead to a restructuring of the labour force in favour of more skilled manual occupations, the continuing difficulties of technological innovation should not be ignored. The 'parallels with the capitalist West' are mainly evident at the macro-social level (that is, with very broad classifications of the occupational structure, such as manual /non-manual) and over fairly long time periods which indicate trends which it is presumed will continue to eradicate the differences in Soviet and capitalist occupational structures. Lane and O'Dell argue²⁹ that the small service sector and the low proportion of employees in clerical occupations should not be allowed to obscure the similarities between the Soviet occupational structure and that of capitalist societies, but even if one accepts that in broad terms they are correct, then in a comparison between Soviet and capitalist occupational structures, surely the differences are at least as interesting. One can also quite accept their argument that greater attention should be paid to forms of socialisation and patterns of recruitment, and to the political context in which the Soviet worker is situated,³⁰ while still devoting greater attention than they seem to consider necessary to the occupational structure itself.

The extent to which the Soviet occupational structure continues its past trend of increasing similarity to that of the West cannot

be simply taken for granted, when, as Feshbach³¹ among others indicates, current practices may well slow down the rate of technological change which is supposed to bring about the restructuring of the labour force along lines similar to the capitalist countries. For example, to return to the issue of auxiliary workers, Feshbach points out that there are 85 of them for every 100 basic wagedworkers in the U.S.S.R., compared to 38 per 100 in the U.S.A. Furthermore, very little progress has been made in reducing their share of the workforce: in 1959 they comprised 55 per cent of all industrial workers, and by 1972 their proportion had only gone down to 49 per cent.³² The result is that the proportion of workers performing work by hand only went down from 59.7 per cent in 1965 to 55.7 per cent in 1972. These proportions include those who set and adjusted machines by hand. It must be admitted that Lane and O'Dell point out³³ that such work involves a decreasing proportion of time spent on manual labour, but even if such workers are excluded, Feshbach shows manual workers to have been 48.5 per cent of the labour force in 1965 and 43.1 per cent in 1972. Even if planned reductions have taken place by 1980 (which is open to question) manual workers will still be almost half the Soviet industrial work force.³⁴ There are various obstacles to the redeployment of this section of the labour force, some of which were mentioned in Chapter Two or at the end of Chapter Four. Firstly, there is the difficulty of firing an incompetent worker. Secondly, much of the secondary output in a given plant consists of work done to compensate for the vagaries of the supply system. Thirdly, the size of the work-force in a given factory is of prime importance in determining the basic wage levels for the manager, his assistants and the enterprise workers, which is a clear disincentive to efficient use of labour. On top of this is the often noted problem of labour turnover, which has remained

at around 20 per cent from 1959 to 1974. This reported rate understates the actual rate of turnover, because it excludes by definition certain 'acceptable' reasons for departure such as being drafted into the armed forces, becoming disabled, retirement, or ending temporary work. Feshbach estimates that inclusion of these cases would raise the annual turnover rate in industry to 30 per cent. Forty per cent of those who leave one job for another change their trade or speciality. In addition to problems of turnover, Feshbach raises doubts about the quality of education of the workforce, particularly engineers, the most highly publicised group. Around one-third to two-fifths of engineering graduates (depending on the definition of an engineer) graduating in 1975 had been trained on a correspondence or evening course, which Feshbach argues surely means lower levels of competence. Given these factors, Feshbach argues that it is no wonder that industrial labour productivity in the U.S.S.R. is about half that in the U.S.A. He concludes³⁵ thus: "In view of the inexorable decline in the size of new additions to the labour force, the projected reduction in capital investment in the current five-year plan, and the limited prospects for sustaining high gains in productivity among Soviet workers, the impact of labour force structure and composition on economic growth in the U.S.S.R. is likely to be of major importance in the next two decades." If such a conclusion is accepted, then any argument about the technological determination of the occupational structure must be qualified by a recognition of the reciprocal effect of the Soviet occupational structure on technological change (within the current institutional context of economic planning).

The issue of the similarity of the Soviet industrial occupational structure with that of the West can be further illuminated by examining the distribution of the industrial labour force among different branches of industry in 1960 and 1975,

as Feshbach does in the following table.

Table 11

<u>Branch of Industry</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1975</u>
Total	22,620,000	34,054,000
Electric power	397,000	686,000
Coal	1,196,000	1,009,000
Chemical and petrochemical	792,000	1,753,000
Ferrous metallurgy	1,047,000	1,369,000
Machine-building and metalworking	7,206,000	13,816,000
Construction materials	1,575,000	2,151,000
Timber, woodworking, and pulp and paper	2,698,000	2,795,000
Light industry	3,860,000	5,109,000
Food industry	2,164,000	3,015,000

Source: M. Feshbach, *ibid.*, page 17

The most striking features of this table are the rapid growth in industrial employment between 1960 and 1975³⁶ and the 'disproportionate' growth in the machine-building and metal working branch of industry. This is the most important branch in terms of numbers of workers, amount of investment and significance for defence. It accounted in 1975 for more than 40 per cent of the total employment in industry, being more than two and a half times as big as the next largest branch, the so-called 'light' industry sector. One-third of its output is reported by the C.I.A. to go on defence.³⁷ After the chemical and petrochemical branch, it is the fastest growing branch in industry. Can it really be said that this pre-eminence of one branch, with its associated skilled work-force, is similar to the occupational structure of a capitalist economy? It is clearly a result of the state economic policy, as are many other features of the Soviet occupational structure, whether directly or indirectly. This is evident from an analysis of mechanisms of allocation³⁸ and from an examination of changes in the overall Soviet economy which affect the occupational structure in various ways.

It is proposed, therefore, to examine various aspects of the Soviet occupational structure in more detail, to discuss the extent to which they are affected by state policy on the economy in general, or by the policies or unintended mechanisms of allocation of personnel. Perhaps the most striking aspect of the occupational structure in this context is the occupational distribution of women, which will be discussed first. This will be followed by an examination of the occupational position of collective farmers and of the intelligentsia. Following that, the educational system will be discussed in terms of its supposed role in allocating personnel to occupational locations. Having then surveyed the major aspects of the occupational structure, it will then be possible to return to the issue of class relations. This will be done, firstly, by examining the extent to which different occupational positions affect their incumbents' capacity for action, particularly in terms of access to the means of production, the conditions of this, and the resulting capacity for action. Secondly, class relations will be examined by looking at the distribution of wages and income levels. Finally, the importance of various collective agents in generating or dissipating systematic effects as a consequence of differential access to the means of production will be considered, before deciding on the pertinence of the concept of a class structure to the Soviet Union.

The Occupational Structure of Soviet Women

The position of women in Soviet society has already been briefly indicated in Chapter Four, and discussed as a problem for the definition of class boundaries in the first section of this Chapter. Given these earlier remarks about the relatively disadvantaged position of Soviet women, it may come as something of a surprise to find that Feshbach notes that "the educational attainment of women, especially in the younger ages, is higher than that of men."³⁹ This is stated with respect to industrial wage workers, rather than the whole population, a view which is corroborated by Lapidus.⁴⁰ Lane and O'Dell⁴¹ provide evidence to suggest that it may soon be true of the whole population. However, even if educational provision were perfectly dovetailed with the occupational structure, the improving educational position of women is something which would only show up in the future, since it is too recent a phenomenon to affect the current distribution of women in the occupational structure.

If we turn to the current occupational structure, the most striking feature is that women constituted 51 per cent of the labour^{force} in 1978, and have done so since 1970. For historical reasons, women are over half the population, so that not all of them are yet employed in wage labour, but over 87 per cent of them are now either employed or studying full-time⁴². This participation rate is supported by official ideology, as well as by economic pressure (with aspirations probably outrunning incomes), but it "has not obliterated many features which, in the U.S.S.R. as elsewhere, distinguish male and female employment. Indeed the sharpest line of differentiation among Soviet industrial workers today is that of sex. In the occupational structure as in the family, sex remains a significant basis for the allocation of social roles, with the result that male and female workers differ in the distribution of income, skill, status, power and even time."⁴³

Women are concentrated in particular sectors of the economy and in particular occupations. Of the roughly 68 million women employed in 1975, 20 million were in agriculture, 24 million were in services, 16 million in industry and roughly 7 million were in other sectors (construction, transport, forestry and communications). The distribution of women by sector can be seen from the following table.

Table 12

Distribution of Women Workers and Employees
by Economic Sector, 1960 and 1974

Sector	Women as Percent of Total Labor Force in Given Sector		Sector as Percent of Total Female Labor Force	
	1960	1974	1960	1974
All women workers and employees	47	51	100	100
"Productive" sectors				
Industry	45	49	35.0	32.0
Retail Trade and Public Catering	66	76	10.6	12.7
Agriculture	41	44	9.5	8.8
Construction	30	29	6.4	5.8
Transport	24	24	5.1	4.2
Communications	64	68	1.6	2.0
Forestry	21	21	0.3	0.2
Other "production" sectors	45	49	0.7	1.1
"Non-productive" sectors				
Education services and culture	70	73	11.5	12.7
Health, physical ed. and social services	85	85	10.1	9.4
Municipal & personal services	53	53	3.5	3.8
Research and auxiliary services	42	49	2.5	3.6
Government & economic administrative bodies, co-operative, & civic organizations	51	63	2.2	2.6
Banking & state insurance	68	81	0.6	0.7
Entertainment	36	45	0.4	0.4

Source: S. Turchaninova, "Trends in Women's Employment in the USSR," International Labor Review, Vol. 112, No. 4, October 1975, p. 369.

Three industrial branches (machine building and metal working, textiles and food) account for 70 per cent of all female industrial employment.⁴⁴ "Moreover, in industrial employment, as in the professions, women are concentrated at lower levels of the pyramid, in low-level, unmechanised and unskilled jobs."⁴⁵ In the 1960s, newly-mechanised and automated work went primarily to the males, and women still account for 80 per cent of the auxiliary workers in industry. This is an important point for any future attempts to raise productivity, because it will be difficult to retrain women by evening or correspondence courses if they continue to do most of the domestic labour. For similar reasons, women are less engaged in technical innovation by rationalisation,⁴⁶ and have lower levels of socio-political participation than their male counterparts.⁴⁷ While women are better represented among technical specialists than among skilled workers in industry, they are largely absent from positions of managerial authority. Although the percentage of female enterprise directors has risen from 1 per cent in 1956 to 9 per cent in 1975, they have not moved into management to the extent that their training, experience and proportion of the relevant age cohort warrant.⁴⁸ Women are frequently over-qualified for the job they hold, so their lower earnings are not exclusively the result of lower qualifications or productivity. The gap between male and female earnings is around 30 to 35 per cent. This is narrower than the 40 per cent gap in the U.S.A. and several West European countries, but wider than the 27 per cent gap in Scandinavia.⁴⁹ The uneven distribution of women across economic sectors and occupations, as well as the average earnings of these occupations, can be seen from the following table.

Table 13

Distribution of Women Workers and Employees
and Average Monthly Earnings by Economic Sector,
1975

Economic Sector	Number of Women Workers & Employees	Women as % of Total Workers & Employees	Average Monthly Earnings
Construction	3,002,000	28	176.8
Transport	2,211,000	24	173.5
Industry (Production Personnel)	16,662,000	49	162.0
Science and Scientific Services	2,015,000	50	155.4
<u>Nationwide Average</u>		<u>51</u>	<u>145.8</u>
Credit and State Insurance	423,000	82	133.8
Apparatus of Government and Economic Administration	1,457,000	65	130.6
Education	5,904,000	73	126.9
Agriculture	4,530,000	44	126.8
Communications	1,042,000	68	123.6
Housing and Municipal Economy, Everyday Services	2,010,000	53	109.0
Trade, Public Catering, Materials and Equipment, Supply and Sales	6,763,000	76	108.7
Arts	207,000	47	103.1
Public Health, Physical Culture, and Social Welfare	4,851,000	84	102.3
Culture	747,000	73	92.2
Total	52,539,000		

Sources: Calculated from figures given in Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR, Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR 1975 g. (Moscow: Statistika, 1976), pp. 542-543, 546-547.

Source: G. Lapidus, *ibid.*, page 246

The reasons for these differences in wages do not simply lie in the distinctive characteristics of the female labour force (whose occupational and educational distribution is equally clearly recorded in Lane and O'Dell or in the sources referred to in Chapter Four), but in certain features of Soviet economic organisation and policy, which are highlighted in a particularly clear manner by Lapidus, who is well aware of the interconnections

between economic and social policy. Indeed, she points out that since the mid-1960s, the Soviet leadership has become increasingly sensitive to the unexpectedly complex interaction between social and economic problems, which is one of the reasons for the recent growth in social science research.⁵⁰ The reasons which Lapidus adduces for the wage differences between men and women are, firstly, that those sectors which have high wage levels and high wage differentials are precisely the ones where women are under-represented, and, secondly, that blue collar jobs are better paid, even when white collar employees have a higher level of educational attainment. Finally, she argues that the possibility of direct wage discrimination cannot be ruled out. Thus "equality of economic opportunity for women has not followed automatically from higher level of educational attainment and labor-force participation."⁵¹

Turning from differential wages to other aspects of the disadvantageous position of women, Lapidus argues that sex role socialisation and occupational choice are important, but that these choices are made in a socially structured context of opportunities and costs. In my view, this 'socially structured context' forms what I have called the mechanisms of allocation of individuals to economic locations. What she is referring to are three main features affecting the allocation of women to occupations: the sexual stereotyping of occupations (based on biological and psychological stereotypes), the continuing identification by both men and women of authority with men (which is now recognised as a problem in political circles), and the official treatment of household and family responsibilities as primarily and properly the domain of women, leading to a reinforcement of cultural norms by legislation. Only women are assigned dual roles in the occupational structure and the family.

While women do seem to be starting to reject this attribution of a primary role in the family combined with a high labour force participation rate (for example, there is an increasing tendency for women to initiate divorce, which used to be fairly unusual when men were demographically 'in short supply') it is still the case that housewives have more children than working women, that time budget studies show that 75 per cent of domestic duties are done by women and that women effectively advance the occupational mobility of males by freeing them for study. Yet there is now a positive relationship between female employment outside the home and male help within it, so perhaps this link is now beginning to be broken. In the meantime, family roles continue to be assigned priority and so define the nature and rhythms of female employment. According to Lapidus,⁵² "Soviet family responsibilities intrude into the workplace to a degree unprecedented in contemporary industrial societies." Provisions which are officially made for pregnancy leave and so on are predicated on the view that child-rearing and other family responsibilities must take a certain priority which work arrangements can only accommodate. This is why women are so under-represented in enterprise activities requiring additional time and energy, as well as in volunteer movements, sport and in public affairs generally. As Lapidus puts it, the boundaries between occupational and family systems are permeable, but in opposite directions for men and women. For women, home intrudes into work, while for men, work intrudes into the home.

The sexual division of labour both on the job and at home, combined with the differential permeability of the work-family boundary for males and females, may have acted as buffers to cushion the strains created by changing female roles, as Lapidus argues.⁵³ Yet she is surely correct to point to the continuing

sources of strain. The first is that, since the massive participation of women in full-time paid employment has eroded the traditional rationale for a sexual division of labour within the family, it has increased the level of conflict between men and women over the division of domestic tasks. This is a source of marital instability. The second source of strain is the extreme tension which has been created between female work and family roles as currently defined. The pressure to reduce family commitments entails the deliberate limitation of family size. Lapidus considers this as the most threatening manifestation of female resistance to the combined pressures of work and family roles. By impinging on a wide range of economic, political and military concerns, it has compelled a fundamental reconsideration of the whole spectrum of policies involving female work and the family role.

This brings us back to the point raised in Chapter Four, that the family is often treated both as an object and as an agent of implementation of social policy. Soviet policy has encouraged women to acquire new skills and aspirations that compete with their traditional domestic roles. As Lapidus points out, this sort of policy contradicts the high value attached to the family, the critical social roles attached to it and the large investments of time and energy needed to sustain it. It is for this reason, and because the resulting tensions may be exacerbated by economic and demographic trends, that there has been a growing urgency in attempts to confront the social conditions and consequences of female waged labour. Without reforms in the system of vocational training and placement, women are likely to find it increasingly difficult to get into highly-skilled technical employment. They will tend to be absorbed into routine white-collar and service occupations. If the remarks in Chapter Four on the low level of office technology are borne in mind, the routine nature of such tasks are likely to be trying for the increasingly well-educated

women who come to fill them.

Lapidus gives a succinct review of the debates in which attempts have been made to grapple with these issues.⁵⁴ One group of proposals aims at changing the labour market by reforming vocational education to give the highest priority to upgrading the skills of women workers, as well as increased incentives to enrol in such programmes, which should be adapted to the schedules and responsibilities of working mothers. A second group of proposals aims at improving working conditions, partly by including domestic responsibilities in the definition of work. A third group of recommendations would increase the supply of consumer and everyday services to reduce the strain of women's dual roles. This group of recommendations is associated with studies which show the social and economic costs of inadequate services and child-care facilities, and the slow progress in these spheres has encouraged calls for a greater reliance on co-operative and even private arrangements (nannies and governesses). As Lapidus points out, none of these proposals call for the eradication of the distinction between 'men's' and 'women's' work, with the associated changes in the structure of family or work. There are more controversial proposals, such as the pro-natalist ones.⁵⁵ The intention of such proposals is to transform maternity into professional, paid, social labour. Apart from the economic and social costs of such a programme, indicated by Lapidus, Soviet critics of such proposals view them as a 'step backwards', recreating a division of labour based on sex. A different approach treats the more effective use of female labour, rather than the stimulation of fertility, as the overriding priority. This approach treats the quality of the labour force as being of prime importance to economic progress (as well as to women's social status and personal development), and so its proponents urge the further expansion of

women's economic role on terms of greater equality with men, along with a reduction in the household burdens which inhibit it. This argument also implies an assignment of women to positions of authority, as its proponents make clear. However, in the more immediate future, the problem of working mothers with young children would in this view be better alleviated by part-time work than by extended maternity leaves (as the pro-natalists propose). However, Lapidus points out that such a proposal would in all likelihood increase the concentration of women in low-skilled and poorly paid jobs, while also forestalling a more equal division of household responsibilities between males and females. She argues that recent small-scale experiments with flextime are especially promising because of its potential for avoiding an intensification of the sexual division of labour.

According to Lapidus, these issues now occupy a major place on the political agenda, as can be seen from the 1976 Party Congress, the 1977 Constitution, the reorganisation of the State Committee on Labour and Wages into the State Committee on Labour and Social Questions,⁵⁶ and the setting up in October 1976 of standing commissions to address the problems of women workers and mothers. So far the present leadership has tried to strike a balance (in its policy towards working women) between a labour-extensive and a labour-intensive strategy. As Lapidus puts it,⁵⁷ "On the one hand, it has sought to increase female participation rates to the demographic maximum by raising minimum wages, expanding the child-care network, modifying the pension system, and exploring the possibilities for expansion of part-time work. At the same time, concern over declining birth rates is evident in the family allowance program of 1974. This provides extension of maternity leave benefits to kolkhoz women, the liberalisation of sick leave for parents of young children, and partially-paid, year-long

maternity leave. Moreover, Article 35 of the new Soviet Constitution foreshadows further measures to reduce the working time of mothers of small children." She argues that the most critical problems of the years ahead will centre on adapting both occupational and family patterns to a new array of social and human needs, rather than on removing formal obstacles to women's entry into a world of work designed for men.

It is now clear that the social situation of women, in particular their occupational distribution, is partly an effect of a series of state policies (whose effects are themselves not unitary) and partly an effect of what I prefer to call gender attribution (rather than sex role stereotyping). The official ideology favours the easing of the dual burden of home and production, and has led to policies whose implementation is leading to some improvement in the position of women vis-a-vis men. In addition to the measures mentioned above by Lapidus, most of which have been discussed in Chapter Four, the educational position of women is clearly improving, male help in the household has improved to some extent, and general measures to improve housing, the production of consumer durables and the retail trade network must have eased the burden of domestic work somewhat (thereby further removing grounds for male resistance to participating in it, which of course by itself will not end such resistance). Those state policies which maintain gender differences in the occupational structure are clearly being increasingly questioned (although equally clearly the debate is not over yet⁵⁸), and they are partially mitigated by the effects of other policies.

The evidence examined in this section, then, does appear to support the view that the occupational distribution of women is an effect of mechanisms of allocation of individuals, rather than an effect of class relations between men and women. These

mechanisms have clearly themselves become an object of debate, with struggles over them beginning to take place in various arenas (not only individual families, but trade unions and even the State Committee on Labour and Social Questions). Consequently, prospects for changes in these mechanisms are opening up, and although such prospects are by no means overwhelming, the fact that the current operation of these mechanisms places certain obstacles in the path of a strategy of intensive economic growth gives one hope that they may be changed in a way which furthers the equalisation of the social situation of men and women.

Collective Farm Workers

According to Lane and O'Dell⁵⁹, there is little sign of collective farms withering away at present, so it would seem that the class of collective farmers is presumably with us for some time to come. This view is consciously contrasted with the official Soviet view⁶⁰ that the "creation of the material and technical basis of communist society not only destroys the basis of hostile (antagonistic) class relationships but also leads to the decline and eventual elimination of collective forms of ownership and the withering away of the class of collective farmers". The grounds for this Soviet view are set out in Lane (1978) where he points out that there are three main ways in which the countryside will be pulled up to the level of the town.⁶¹ Firstly, the 'growing together' of the urban working class and the kolkhozniki is related to the mechanisation of agriculture which will increase the number of machine workers and operators in the countryside.⁶² This makes such workers similar to the agricultural working class. Secondly, the development of 'intra-collective relations' will mean that conditions of production and consumption will move much closer to those in the towns. This refers particularly to wages and social services. Thirdly, the structure of the collective farm will change through migration from the country to the town, and through the increased level of skill and productivity.

This account ignores an important component of such Soviet views, namely, the so-called 'industrialisation of the countryside' and the associated development of inter-kolkhoz associations and agro-industrial complexes.⁶³ When one takes these developments into account, it is not so clear that there is no sign of the eventual elimination of collective ownership, and hence of collective farmers as a class. As the discussion in Chapter Two of the various forms of agricultural property (kolkhoz, sovkhoz

and personal plots) made clear, even the internal organisation of kolkhozy was becoming similar to that of sovkhozy. In addition, it is at least arguable that wage levels and social services are approaching urban levels. The continuing exceptions to this trend are housing and educational levels. Housing differences were discussed in Chapter Four, and the differences in educational level can be seen from the following table.

Table 14

Educational Level of Workers and Collective
Farmers

*Per 1,000 persons of a given social
group having the following education:*

<i>Social group</i>	<i>Higher, incompleter higher and middle specialist</i>	<i>Middle education</i>
Workers		
Both sexes	22	94
Men	26	105
Women	18	83
Collective Farmers		
Both sexes	13	37
Men	20	50
Women	8	28

Source: D. Lane (1978), op. cit., page 395

Despite such rural-urban differences in educational level, housing and to a lesser extent in health-care and social security, there does seem to be some justification for Soviet claims that the differences between collective and state property are being steadily eroded. These differences can be summarised as those relating to their respective juridical statuses, their internal organisation, their relation to external agencies and the forms and levels of distribution of income among their personnel. Dealing first with the juridical status of kolkhozy compared to sovkhozy, it is clear that this does have some effectivity, although this does not really stretch to election of kolkhoz chairman. The extent of this autonomy, and its effects on investment and on the incomes of kolkhoz members (making both more dependent on financial results than in the case of sovkhozy), were discussed in

Chapter Two. The autonomy of kolkhozy is being eroded by state control of certain infrastructural investment, by 'directive planning' of kolkhoz sales, and by the inter-kolkhoz associations and the agro-industrial complexes. In other words, the juridical autonomy is being increasingly eroded by the relations with external economic agencies whose impact on the decisions of the kolkhozy is considerable. To this process of erosion of autonomy can be added the various bodies set up by the state to encourage standardisation of practices, such as the federal council of kolkhozy.

If one turns to the internal organisation of the kolkhozy, it is clear from Chapter Two that they have become increasingly complex and similar to sovkhozy, as they have grown in size. This has altered the occupational structure of the kolkhozy, although the precise changes are not clear from the evidence available. It was already mentioned earlier in this Chapter that the non-manual rural labour must be around 7 per cent of the total Soviet population in the mid-1970s. A figure of similar magnitude is given by Lane⁶⁴ for the mid-1960s for the kolkhoz population. This suggests their occupational structure may be quite similar to that on state farms. However, he adds that mechanisers (tractor and machine-harvester drivers and operators) were around 10-13 per cent of the kolkhoz labour force, which means that between 78 and 84 per cent of the kolkhoz labour force was probably fairly unskilled. This contrasts with sovkhozy where only 41 per cent of the labour was unskilled in the mid-1960s. However, the massive investment in agriculture since the mid-1960s must have affected the occupational structure of manual collective farmers, by creating more skilled manual occupations. This trend has probably continued with the 1979-80 reforms, which have also affected agriculture, giving further encouragement to agro-industrial units,

and to the personal plots (with their associated livestock).⁶⁵

This recent encouragement of personal plots should perhaps not be taken as increasing the differences between the class position of the collective farmers and that of sovkhos agricultural workers, who are counted as an agricultural working class and whose numbers grew from 1.6 million in 1948 to 8.4 million in 1973.⁶⁶

As was indicated in Chapter Two, the personal plots within larger agricultural units such as kolkhozy and sovkhosy are very interdependent with these larger units (in contrast to urban personal plots). The difference in their economic function in the two sorts of farms is related to their different size, the greater size of personal plots on the kolkhozy serving to cushion the members against the effects of their lower (and somewhat more variable) level of income. The importance of 'private activity' (which is presumably largely concerned with the sale of produce from the personal plots) on the incomes of kolkhozniki and state employees can be seen from McAuley (1979)⁶⁷, who compiled the following table.

Table 15

The Structure of Personal Income,
State Employees and Kolkhozniki, USSR, 1960-74 (rubles per year)

Source of Income	State Employees				Kolkhozniki			
	1960	1965	1970	1974	1960	1965	1970	1974
Earnings from								
State	376.1	473.8	623.8	742.3	34.1	36.9	48.0	70.4
Kolkhoz	—	—	—	—	110.3	204.0	310.3	398.2
Private activity	24.2	29.8	41.4	41.3	171.7	194.6	227.2	239.8
Transfers	90.6	111.1	152.5	187.0	4.9	16.2	66.0	69.6
Other	8.8	9.6	16.2	13.7	7.9	8.3	7.6	13.5
Personal income	499.7	624.3	833.9	984.3	328.9	460.0	659.1	791.5

Source: A. McAuley, *ibid.*, page 35

This table refers to all state employees, and so it does not give a clear indication of the relative importance of 'private activity' on state farms. What the table does show, however, is that the proportion of total income which the kolkhozniks derive from their personal plots declined from over half their income in 1960 to less than one-third in 1974. This decline was a relative one, not an absolute one. Judging by the statistics provided by Lavigne (and discussed in Chapter Two) on the trends in the proportion of all marketed food produce which is sold through the kolkhoz market, a proportion which rose from 4.5 per cent in 1969 to 4.7 per cent in 1979, the absolute real income derived from personal plots has probably continued to go up, even though it has probably continued to decline relatively to total real income for kolkhozniks.

Yet despite the relative decline in the proportion of income derived from the personal plots, and despite the increasing similarities between kolkhozniks and state employees, McAuley is right to point out that there are still significant differences between the two groups. These differences in the sources and levels of income may be maintained, if output from personal plots is increased substantially as a result of the decree of January 1981.⁶⁸ In any case, the decree also applies to local authorities and may lead to a similar rise in the use of personal plots among state employees, both urban and rural. This decree will certainly increase the land available for use as personal plots, but it is too soon to say whether this encouragement of personal plots and private livestock will reverse the relative decline in the share of total kolkhozniks' income derived from 'private activity'. It may not do so, because improved transfer payments, such as the child allowance introduced in 1974, may offset any absolute increase in income from 'private activities', thereby reducing the differences in forms and levels of income between state employees and kolkhozniks.

The impact of transfer payments so far, however, has not been sufficient to equalise incomes between kolkhozniks and sovkhos workers. Rzhnitsyna shows that while the trend has been towards equalising transfer payments, full equalisation has not yet taken place.⁶⁹ Firstly, as the following table shows, kolkhozniks only received about three-quarters the wage in 1975 that state farm workers received (and only about two-thirds the average wage for the whole economy).

Table 16

**Growth of Payment for Work in Agriculture
(on State and Collective Farms)**

	1960	1965	1970	1975
Payment for work in absolute terms (roubles a month)				
Industrial and office workers in the economy	80.6	96.5	122.0	146
including:				
industry	91.6	104.2	133.3	162
state farms and subsidiary agricultural enterprises	53.8	74.6	100.9	127
Collective farmers	28.3	51.3	74.9	92
Payment ratios (per cent)				
state farms to the whole economy	67	77	83	87
state farms to industry	59	72	76	78
collective farmers to industrial and office workers in the economy as a whole	35	53	61	63
collective farmers to workers and office workers at state farms	52	69	74	73

Source: L. Rzhnitsyna, *ibid.*, page 165

Secondly, the lower average wages are not offset by higher payments from the social consumption funds (SCF). The reverse is the case, as can be seen from the following table:

Table 17

The Share of SCF Payments and Benefits
in the Aggregate Incomes
of Industrial Workers' and Collective
Farmers' Families (per cent)

Year	Aggregate Family Income		Pensions, aids, student grants and other receipts from social funds (including free education, medical assistance, and so on)	
	Industrial worker	Collective farmer	Industrial worker	Collective farmer
1940	100	100	14.5	4.9
1965	100	100	22.8	14.2
1970	100	100	22.1	17.7
1975	100	100	22.5	21.1

Source: L. Rzhanitsyna, *ibid.*, page 166

Thus the impression to be gained from the data provided by Rzhanitsyna confirms the stress laid by McAuley on the continuing differences in income level and composition between kolkhozniks and state farm workers. Consequently, while the juridical autonomy and internal organisation of kolkhozy may be changing, with resulting changes in their internal occupational structure, it is not at all clear that such changes will result in an elimination of differences between state farm and collective farm workers' incomes. For example, the 1975 establishment of a 70 rouble minimum wage for state employees may have made the kolkhozniks relatively worse off.⁷⁰ Nevertheless, despite these continuing differences, the policies of converting kolkhozy into sovkhozy, of raising the productivity of kolkhozy, and of linking kolkhozy more closely to the rest of agriculture by means of the inter-kolkhoz associations and agro-industrial complexes, these policies mean that the elimination of collective farms is still on the political agenda. Whether it will be completed without prior substantial improvements in agricultural performance remains to be seen.

The 'Intelligentsia'

Some of the difficulties of defining the 'intelligentsia' as a single, separate stratum have already been indicated, but the issue can not be left there, since various analyses of the role of the 'intelligentsia' in the class structure need to be examined. The varying definitions of the intelligentsia make it somewhat difficult to examine these diverse analyses within a brief space, however. For example, if we take Churchward's definition⁷¹, in which the intelligentsia consists of "persons with a tertiary education (whether employed or not), tertiary students, and persons lacking formal tertiary qualification but who are professionally employed in jobs which normally require a tertiary qualification", then we are faced with a stipulative definition which by itself is quite compatible with the claim that the intelligentsia includes state and party functionaries. This contrasts with the position of Lampert⁷², who draws a distinction between the intelligentsia and the functionaries of the state or the political apparatus. A position which might be considered as somewhere between that of Churchward and that of Lampert is taken by Hirsizowicz⁷³ with respect to Poland. She argues⁷⁴ that the "nineteenth century concept of the intelligentsia has been revived, securing the preservation of a myth deeply embedded in the national tradition of many East European countries. The components of this old concept, though not included in sociological definitions, affect contemporary understanding of the concept and explain the disparity between purely structural distinctions and the cultural meanings attached to them." It is perhaps to avoid such ambiguities that Churchward puts forward his stipulative definition mentioned above, although his definition appears primarily to be a response to the problems of 'the Soviet definition'.

Returning to Hirszowicz, it is interesting to find that she treats the ambiguities in 'the intelligentsia ethos' as having possible political implications, both expressing positive accommodation by professionals carrying out important social functions within the bureaucratic order and assigning an important place to political dissent.⁷⁵ Thus she treats the 'intelligentsia' as in a sense a myth, a part of the political culture, with its origins in the past, rather than as a distinct occupational group:⁷⁶ "The three main components of the nineteenth-century intelligentsia were (1) social status marked by social conduct inculcated by breeding and training; (2) qualifications for carrying out certain professional activities; and (3) social functions, especially ideological and political leadership. The difficulties of dealing with the problem of the intelligentsia in modern East European societies stem from the dissociation of these characteristics. The educated strata in Poland have lost their cohesiveness as a distinctive status group and are no longer characterised by common social and political aspirations, which accounted for their relative unity in the past. The dissociation of status characteristics makes of the educated strata a mixture of different occupational and professional groups with different norms, aspirations and attitudes. In political terms we are dealing primarily with a complex set of interest groups clustering around institutions, ranks, professional qualities, administrative divisions, etc. It follows that what could be regarded as broad generalisations about the intelligentsia have to be replaced with detailed studies of various institutions, professional groups and occupational communities including apparatchiki, technical intelligentsia, creative intelligentsia, higher and middle management, teachers and research workers." Without endorsing Weberian terms such as 'status groups', and without endorsing Hirszowicz's general approach⁷⁷, it seems to

me that her refusal to treat the intelligentsia as a single distinct occupational group (a stratum) is correct.

However, if the intelligentsia is not defined as a single occupational group, then it can only be defined in terms of its educational level or of its political role. Defining it in terms of its educational level entails a stipulative definition, as already indicated in the case of Churchward.⁷⁸ Such an approach certainly avoids many problems, since educational certification establishes fairly clear demarcation criteria, but it leaves open the theoretical question of what is the social significance of the group being demarcated.⁷⁹ As Churchward himself points out⁸⁰, such a group which on his definition numbers "almost eleven million is not likely to have any high degree of homogeneity." He goes on to argue that the intelligentsia is neither a 'ruling class' nor a 'managerial class'. In that case, the only basis for treating them as an object of analysis is their educational qualifications. To define them as distinct on educational grounds amounts either to confusing mechanisms of allocation with economic location, or to claiming that mechanisms of allocation are the main determinants of location, or else are very closely linked with the main determinants of economic location. That is to say, an educational definition of the intelligentsia amounts to saying that the process of allocation of individuals to occupations is (at least for the highly educated) intimately connected with the process of creation of occupations. While I have indicated earlier that I am critical of such a position, such criticism will be left till later.

Turning to a definition of the intelligentsia in terms of its political role or position, it must be clear that such a definition depends on one's analysis of Soviet politics. If the various central state and party agencies which are engaged

in the process of major national policy formulation are dependent on information which has to come either from enterprise managers, Ministry officials or technical experts of various kinds, then it is possible that one, or a combination, or all of such groups could act in concert to effectively control the decisions regarding the disposition and use of the means of production. In other words, their political position could be used to secure privileged access to the means of production, thereby securing a better income for themselves. This is quite a common sort of argument with regard to the Soviet Union, and would amount to grounds for treating them not simply as a single occupational group (a stratum) but as a class. However, while not denying that there is a substantial concentration of political power in the arenas of struggle constituted by relations between the central state and party agencies, the analysis in Chapter Three of this work suggested that no single group within the 'intelligentsia', or combination of groups (associated with different agencies) would be able to act in concert at all times in a situation of institutional struggle over various issues. While the analysis provided by Andrle and more especially Tartarin (among others⁸¹) indicated that it is entirely possible to use one's occupational position to illicitly divert some real income to oneself, due to the inability of the state to closely scrutinise many activities in a detailed way, the very fact that such practices are widespread, and by no means exclusively confined to white collar occupations, suggests that the 'intelligentsia' is not in a very privileged situation. It is certainly not able to secure for itself a very high income, if one accepts Churchward's definition of intelligentsia.⁸²

A section of the intelligentsia could nevertheless conceivably use its politically privileged position to secure a much higher income for itself. However, if this were the case, then it would not be grounds for treating the intelligentsia as a whole as a distinct occupational group. Rather, the position would be that a section of the intelligentsia was in the position of an elite or a ruling class. This is not the place to repeat the criticisms of the concept of an elite made in Chapter Three. So, concentrating on the concept of a ruling class, a section of the intelligentsia could be considered a ruling class, if it was able to organise itself across institutional boundaries within a non-homogenous set of state and party agencies, thereby securing effective control of national policy formation, particularly in the area of economic planning, with the result that its members' access to the means of production (and consequent on that, their level of income) was substantially different from the rest of the population, including the rest of the intelligentsia. While I have criticised 'state capitalist' versions of a ruling class theory elsewhere,⁸³ and while the analysis of Chapter Three of this work, if accepted, would make such a ruling class theory more difficult to sustain, the analysis of the concept of class developed in the Introduction did allow that the relation between various agents might be such as to enable them to effectively 'dictate their own terms' for the access by other agents to the means of production. In other words, even if agents (including collective agents) did not by themselves possess the means of production, the relations between a group of different kinds of agents might enable them collectively to establish favourable terms of access to the means of production, in a manner similar to the relations between, say, a landowning company, a bank and an industrial company. However, it was clear from the argument there that, for this to happen, a non-egalitarian policy on the

distribution of income would have to be effectively pursued.

Without wishing to anticipate the later section of this Chapter on the distribution of income, this issue can be briefly dealt with here. Perhaps M. Matthews is the most forceful proponent of the view that privilege and an associated highly unequal distribution of real income are important features of the social structure of the Soviet Union. In his 1975 article⁸⁴ 'Top Incomes in the U.S.S.R.', Matthews distinguishes between party officials; state, Komsomol and trade union officials; the 'intelligentsia'; enterprise managers; and the military, police and diplomatic service.⁸⁵ He also estimates their salaries, or accepts respondents' reports on their salaries. This is followed by a discussion of their access to secondary benefits, such as a 'thirteenth month' salary payment, the 'Kremlin ration', special access to consumer goods and holiday facilities, and so on. He correctly argues that the monetary incomes of these occupational groups should be notionally increased to take account of these secondary benefits. There are five thousand people in these occupational groups, by Matthews' estimate. By international standards, he concludes, the Soviet 'elite' is poor and lacking in independence, although it is a long way from the egalitarian ideals proclaimed by the Soviet state. However, his claim that the differences between the extreme income percentiles may be no less than the U.S.A. is effectively undermined in a Note by Wiles⁸⁶, who calculates that the U.K. (not the U.S.A.) has almost exactly the same ratio of top to average income as the U.S.S.R., if income is defined as wages plus fringe benefits including orthodox state social services. The ratio for both countries is 5.5 to 1. However, if all U.K. income (including 'capitalist' incomes) is taken into account, Wiles calculates that the U.K. is "considerably

more unequal than the U.S.S.R." There is no reason to suppose that the U.S.A. is more equal in this respect than the U.K. The case for a ruling class or elite able to secure a substantially unequal share of national income for itself thus seems weaker than Matthews would argue, even accepting Matthews' own evidence, which ignores the effect of the informal sector on the incomes of the rest of the population⁸⁷, and which probably overestimates the real income effects of better housing, health care and holidays.

Consequently, if the personnel of the central party and state agencies are in a different class position from the rest of the 'intelligentsia', the income benefits accruing from their favourable access to the means of production seem to be less than is the case in capitalist societies. More important, however, is the conclusion that the rest of the 'intelligentsia', while perhaps having above average real income, cannot be considered as a single occupational group or stratum. No good reason has been provided in any of the analyses discussed for treating the 'intelligentsia' as a single occupational group. It is for this reason that I agree with Hirszowicz that detailed studies are preferable to broad generalisations about groups in this part of the occupational structure. With the possible exception of the personnel of the central state and party agencies, the 'intelligentsia' cannot be considered a distinct class from the manual working class⁸⁸, and in this respect I agree with the position of Lane and O'Dell, although they do not address themselves directly to the other question of whether the 'intelligentsia' are a separate stratum. They simply argue, as quoted earlier, that non-manual workers in production enterprises (my emphasis) are not a separate stratum, on the grounds that in a Marxist sense they are in the same class position and share a similar political ideology. This is a

rather oblique answer, since various Soviet and Western analyses quite happily treat the 'intelligentsia' as a distinct stratum within the class of those employed by the state, and since the 'intelligentsia' is not usually considered as being confined to production enterprises.

This critique of the usefulness of the concept of 'intelligentsia' for analysing either the occupational structure or class relations has raised the question of the role of education as a supposed mechanism of allocation of individuals to occupational positions. It is to this question that we must now address ourselves.

Education

It has already been indicated with respect to women that educational level is not all that neatly dovetailed with occupational position in the Soviet Union. This is the case despite the existence of manpower (sic) planning and attempts at occupational placement.⁸⁹ Claims that education is functionally integrated with the occupational structure are common with respect to capitalist societies, even among Marxists⁹⁰, so it is not surprising to find educational level used to define the 'intelligentsia' in some cases, or to see Lane and O'Dell in effect adapting Hopper's functionalist analysis of educational systems to the Soviet Union.⁹¹ Lane and O'Dell's analysis of the relation between education and occupation will therefore be treated as an example of this sort of analysis, which closely associates mechanisms of allocation of individuals with determinants of economic location.

In analysing the educational system, Lane and O'Dell make use of Turner's concepts of 'sponsored' and 'contest' mobility, as well as the concept of 'cooling out', which form the basis of

Hopper's work.⁹² The Soviet Union is treated as a contest educational system⁹³ in which high levels of occupational aspirations are 'cooled out' by the educational system to achieve a better match between ambition and the occupational structure. This system is modified by a degree of sponsorship in the case of women, who are channelled into lower status occupations.⁹⁴ However, Lane and O'Dell do not argue that ambition or educational level are exactly matched to occupation. They point out that 'dissatisfied' manual workers tend to have a higher level of education than 'satisfied' ones, and they agree with arguments that manual workers are paid higher wages to compensate for the monotony of the work, drawing attention to the disjunction between the 'pyramid of preferences' of schoolchildren and the 'pyramid of requirements' of the nation.⁹⁵ However, this simply leads them to conclude that there will be further functional adjustment by the educational system., which will probably further develop its 'cooling out' processes so that high morale and work-force stability will be promoted by the reduction of the aspirations of school-leavers.⁹⁶

The two mechanisms by which the 'cooling out' process is thought to be developing in the Soviet Union are "the provision of an infinite number of channels for advancement (the alternative route)" and "forms of tempering ambition in the school system" such as vocational guidance.⁹⁷ The main criticism of Hopper which appears is where they point out that his description of the Soviet educational system as one with centralised recruitment of pupils is only 'half true': the demand for occupations has not been centrally controlled, and the rate of change of the occupational structure (affecting the supply of occupations) has been only partly centrally determined. They point out how seriously vocational guidance is taken, and they analyse the extent to which alternative routes to higher education are open,

if the main route through the general secondary school is closed off for some reason. Yet they recognise that many school-leavers want, and many students receive, an education for reasons of personal satisfaction, rather than as training for a job. They also argue that despite overt socialisation and explicit vocational guidance, the authorities have not been able to develop a general desire for a career in manual as opposed to non-manual jobs. Furthermore, they also point out that people who end up as administrative workers receive their education in engineering and the applied sciences.⁹⁸ These latter points suggest the following: that the 'alternative routes' have the effect of legitimating and perhaps even reinforcing educational aspirations, as much as cooling out these aspirations; that vocational guidance and other cooling out mechanisms have a limited effect; and that in any case the educational system does not have to fit all that closely with the occupational structure (even though it is intended that it should) because occupational positions are filled anyway, either by praktiki who have learned on the job as they have been promoted within the enterprise, or by people with an appropriate level of education, the content of which may not be very relevant to their occupational position.

If the latter points are correct, then educational selection and certification are not as intrinsically important for occupational placement as Lane and O'Dell seem to believe. They are certainly correct to point to the rapid secular decline in the proportion of 'practical men' (praktiki)⁹⁹, but this simply means that the expansion of educational provision provides a socially acceptable criterion for occupational selection, namely an educational certificate. It may mean that, as they argue,¹⁰⁰ "Education in the Soviet Union is becoming the

major determinant of occupational position". However, this is only true in the sense that education is becoming the predominant mechanism of allocating individuals to occupations. As they apparently realise, it does not mean that determinants of change or stability in the occupational structure itself are unimportant, nor does it mean that the educational qualifications which are administratively used as a criterion of occupational selection bear any very close relationship to the tasks and skills of the various occupations, any more than it does in capitalist societies. Indeed, given the high degree of specialisation of educational courses, any mismatch between educational qualifications and subsequent occupation could well mean that in those cases, Soviet educational level is less relevant to occupation than in capitalist societies.

This is not to deny the relevance, in the Soviet Union as in capitalist societies, of parental occupation to their children's educational achievement. Lane and O'Dell document some of the Soviet evidence on this. However, it is to deny that there is necessarily a close fit between the skills learned in the educational system and the skills 'required' by the division of labour. It would be surprising if, in the Soviet Union as in other countries, the educational system did not have a 'life of its own' in the sense that pedagogical concerns have their own impact on curriculum content and teaching methods, and that these concerns, as well as the ambiguities in what Lane and O'Dell¹⁰¹ call "the different values that the elites seek to inculcate", have the effect of insulating the content of educational provision from the 'requirements' of the occupational structure which are in any case poorly understood by the central planning agencies.

To the extent that the content of education is insulated from the 'requirements' of the occupational structure, any argument that the educational system adapts to these requirements is weakened. It is by no means clear that any planning to establish a closer fit between education and occupation will be all that successful, partly because the skills of an occupation often change even if the occupation itself retains the same designation, partly because the occupational structure itself changes (for various reasons including changes in state policy) and partly because the educational system is not amenable to rapid change, especially if the curriculum is specialised rather than general. Similarly, arguments that education determines the occupational structure, or even the occupational position of individuals, are weakened if one accepts that educational qualifications are often simply being used as a criterion of selection by non-educational agencies. Where this is the case, or where, as in the example of medical personnel, educational qualifications are quite closely related to occupational skills, then educational qualifications may well coincide with socially significant boundaries in the occupational structure. However, this coincidence is an effect of the use of educational qualifications to allocate personnel; it should not be confused with those determinants of the division of labour which structure occupations (for example, technological change, state policy, changes in the social division of production, the rise and fall of different collective agencies, and so on). For this reason, educational level is a poor basis for defining different occupational groups, such as the 'intelligentsia', although it might be a useful research indicator of occupational boundaries whose determinants would then have to be theorised.

The Occupational Structure and Class Relations

While broad historical changes in the occupational structure have been noted in this Chapter, along with more recent evidence on the distribution of the labour force by economic sector (including the distribution of women), it was argued earlier that the occupational structure can only be analysed in terms of class relations if it can be shown that various occupations have substantially different capacities for action, deriving from differential access to the means of production. Such enhancement or restriction of their capacities for action, it was argued, would have to enable certain categories of agents to act on the division of labour, thereby substantially affecting their own conditions of existence, in particular by affecting the distribution of income in their own favour. In other words, it was argued earlier that class relations would be operative between categories of agents, if some agents, because of their predominant access to the means of production, were able to affect the division of labour in a manner which secured the economic conditions of their own existence. No category of agents can ever control a social formation sufficiently to completely secure its own conditions of existence (hence the critique of elite theory in Chapter Three). All that is entailed in a claim that class relations are present is that a certain category of agents, because of its relation to the means of production, has sufficient 'room for manoeuvre' to pursue an effective policy on the division of labour which substantially enhances the economic conditions of its own existence (including the distribution of income), making other agents' conditions of existence dependent on that category of agents.

Consequently, the occupational structure in the Soviet Union must be examined to see whether class relations operate between occupational categories of agents. It was also argued,

however, that class relations may well be operative between collective agents and that, while the internal organisation of such agents would mean that they each had their own internal occupational structure, the class position of the individuals within such an agent should not necessarily be equated with the class position of the agent itself. Hence relations between occupations need not exhaust the possibilities for the existence of class relations in a social formation. As is now evident from the discussion of Amvrosov, Soviet theorists themselves take membership of a collective agency, such as a kolkhoz or state enterprise, as an important index of the class position of an occupation, yet they weaken this by their treatment of the 'intelligentsia' as a stratum. So the rejection of the idea that the 'intelligentsia' can be treated as a stratum at least clears out of the way an important obstacle to the analysis of class relations in the Soviet Union, since the treatment of the 'intelligentsia' as a stratum glosses over what may be important differences between collective agents within the state sector.

Such collective economic agents were discussed in Chapter Two, and that discussion is relevant to the attempt to assess the relative capacities of different categories of agent, particularly if it is taken in conjunction with the discussion in this Chapter of the Soviet occupational structure. The relative capacities of different economic agents are not immediately apparent from tables on the occupational structure. All that can be directly concluded from such evidence is that there have been rapid changes in the occupational structure which are now slowing down. Yet the discussion of the occupational structure has yielded more evidence than that on the relative capacities of agents, and this can be seen if we take broad occupational groupings one at a time.

Starting with industrial manual workers, the stagnation which is becoming increasingly evident in the proportion of auxiliary workers suggests that manual workers have very little capacity to influence even the technical division of labour, since it would clearly be in their interests to move into skilled manual occupations, thereby increasing their wages. Some manual workers manage to do this illicitly, since some of the movement into skilled grades or occupations is purely nominal, being a disguised form of wage increase. The gloomy evidence on technical 'rationalisation' and innovation in Soviet industry corroborates this inability to influence the technical division of labour. Many of these auxiliary workers are women, and as was indicated the chances of their obtaining further training while working are substantially reduced by their current domestic responsibilities. This picture of poor control by manual workers of the technical division of labour is corroborated by the evidence on relations within the enterprise discussed in Chapter Two or supplied by Lane and O'Dell¹⁰² or Ruble.¹⁰³ It is certainly the case that trade unions are fairly good at safeguarding wages, job security and working conditions. For example, Ruble argues that it is usually lack of resources rather than negligence which is responsible for management non-compliance with health and safety regulations. However, it is clear that factory trade unions and party committees do not actively intervene in co-ordinating the technical division of labour (that is, in managing the enterprise). There may be a high rate of participation in factory trade union meetings, but the available evidence suggests that a large proportion of Soviet industrial workers do not believe that their opinions matter.¹⁰⁴ Similarly with party supervision of management, Lane and O'Dell agree with Andrle's conclusion that in practice the party secretary's power is limited.¹⁰⁵

This lack of control of the technical division of labour (the manner in which labour is combined with the means of production) could well be offset by manual workers, if they were able to substantially affect the division of social production or the social division of labour in a way which favoured themselves. However, it is clear from the case of the Ministry of Machine Building and Metal Working (cited by Feshbach and discussed above) that the division of social production must be determined at the level of the central state and party agencies. Its predominance as a Ministry amounts to a relative neglect by the central agencies of production of means of consumption, particularly consumer durables. The same phenomenon (an inability by manual industrial workers to determine the division of social production) should be evident from the discussion of housing in Chapter Four. In the case of the social division of labour, there is some evidence of possible indirect influence by the manual workers, mediated by the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions and the State Committee on Labour and Social Questions. Thus the growth in the proportion of the population engaged in education and health, and in trade, could be considered as indicating a capacity by the manual workers to influence the distribution of real income in their own favour. However, this would have to be set against the reliance on trade union volunteers to administer social security, a form of participation which does not seem to enable them to have much influence on policy. Overall, then, one would have to conclude that the capacity of the manual industrial occupations to actively co-ordinate any of the three main aspects of the division of labour is not very great. National and local trade unions and local party bodies seem to act largely in a defensive capacity, if they pursue at all what might be considered as specifically manual industrial occupations' objectives.

This is perhaps not surprising, given the continued existence of a kind of labour market, and of extensive attempts at the political socialisation of the labour force. While some of the sanctions of the labour market, such as danger of losing one's job, are much less acute than in capitalist economies, the tying of welfare benefits and housing to wages or work location still does place manual wage earners in industrial enterprises in a weaker bargaining position than some other occupational groups. The political socialisation practices do seem to help secure support for the status quo, but the extent of this support, while substantial, does have its limits.¹⁰⁶ The knowledge in the central state and party agencies that these limits exist does enable manual workers to have some impact on major national economic decisions, such as wage levels. However, it is clear that manual industrial occupations do not predominate in co-ordinating the division of labour, thereby largely securing their own conditions of existence in a manner which makes other occupational groups' existence dependent on them and determining the distribution of income in their own favour. In other words, they are not a predominant class in the Soviet Union.

Yet if the economic capacities of the manual industrial occupations are limited, which is hardly surprising, it is even less surprising to find that the capacities of kolkhozniki are even more limited. As indicated in Chapter Two and in the earlier section in this Chapter on collective farmers, the juridical independence of the kolkhozy has not precluded state intervention in various aspects of their affairs. While some of this intervention has in recent years been quite beneficial in certain respects (for example, improved wages and social security provisions, the development of agro-industrial complexes), it has also enabled the state to continue to subordinate

collective farms by integrating their product mix into the overall national economic plan for agriculture, and by imposing a certain technical division of labour on them. At the same time, the juridical independence of kolkhozy has reduced their ability to secure state investment, compared to state farms. In addition to this, the organisational rigidity of collective farms which was discussed in Chapter Two, and the nominal nature of the election of collective farm chairmen, both indicate that the control by collective farm members over the technical division of labour is minimal. It is clear that their juridical independence from the state has reduced their capacity (and that of their members) to influence the division of social production and the social division of labour. Thus, while the situation of kolkhozniki has definitely improved considerably since the early 1960s, their access to the means of production is clearly only on terms set for them by various state agencies. Consequently, despite their internal occupational differentiation, kolkhozniki must be considered to be in a separate, and worse, class position from that of all those employed by the state, with the possible exception of kolkhoz chairmen, who are de facto state appointees. Until the juridical and other conditions of the differences between kolkhozy and sovkhozy are eliminated, this element of class relations will remain a feature of the Soviet social formation. The effects (in terms of the distribution of income) of their restricted access to the means of production have already been made clear earlier in this Chapter.

The occupational position of women has already been discussed at some length. While the evidence that women are fairly systematically disadvantaged is clear, it was argued that this has more to do with mechanisms allocating individuals to occupational locations than with a differential access of women

(in comparison with men) to the means of production. It was also noted that, in so far as class relations (which are always subject to struggle) are maintained by the policies of various agents, there are various policies (whose effects are admittedly ambiguous) designed to eliminate the occupational inequality of men and women, as well as the inequalities in their income. As in the case of elimination of collective farms, the presence of a policy of eliminating differences (even if that policy is fairly effective) does not mean that those inequalities are not the product of class relations. However, it was argued that occupational and income inequalities between men and women are primarily an effect of gender attribution on the workings of the mechanisms of allocating personnel, not the mechanisms generating occupational differentiation.

This leaves the issue of non-manual occupations. Since it is evident that the 'intelligentsia' cannot be regarded as a single occupational group, clearly the same is even more true of non-manual occupations as a whole. Some of them have better incomes than manual occupations, but some are paid less than skilled manual occupations. They usually have better working conditions than manual occupations, but the internal differentiation of 'the non-manual group' means that they can hardly be treated (as a whole) as in a different class position to that of manual workers. Indeed the growth in the proportion of the labour force in occupations associated with health and education, and to a lesser extent trade, implies a growth in services provided to the population as a whole through the social consumption funds and retail trade, rather than as exacerbation of possible class differences. While it is quite evident that many non-manual occupations do not have significantly different access to the means of production from manual occupations, it is nevertheless the case that some non-manual occupations are particularly

involved with the co-ordination of the division of labour. This is the case with regard to enterprise directors and other members of the 'technical intelligentsia' (the engineering and technical personnel, the ITRs), who are concerned with the technical division of labour. It is also the case with senior Ministry officials, senior party officials and members of the central planning agencies who are concerned with the division of social production and/or the social division of labour.

The enterprise director clearly predominates in co-ordinating the technical division of labour, despite the various institutional constraints on him in the form of the local trade unions, the factory party committee, the different organisations of rationalisers and innovators, labour law, the district party secretary and so on. However, the position of an agent such as the enterprise director is not static, and could be changed by the spread of brigade autonomy (as in the Shchekino or Zlobin experiments), or by the eventual success of the production association reform. Furthermore, even if these two changes do not extend throughout the economy, the capacity of enterprise directors to co-ordinate the technical division of labour is seriously constrained by the various central planning agencies concerned with plan implementation such as Gosstroi, the State Construction Committee, Gossnab, the State Committee on Material-Technical Supply, and Gosbank, the State Bank. These agencies, as well as the Ministries themselves, establish the conditions under which enterprise directors have access to the means of production necessary to fulfill the plan. While the enterprise directors do have a certain autonomy in this respect, the supervision by these superior agencies effectively keeps this autonomy within certain limits. This state of affairs would almost certainly continue to hold in the event of the successful spread of autonomous production brigades within enterprises, or

of production associations which combine enterprises. Enterprise directors could only become a capitalist class if they could extend their access to the means of production well beyond the co-ordination of the technical division of labour to the point where their autonomous decisions affected the division of social production and the social division of labour. As it is, the capacity to determine the division of social production does reside to some extent in individual Ministries (hence the high proportion of consumer durables coming from enterprises whose Ministries are in the 'heavy industry' sector). Yet this is only true to the extent that they are able to evade the supervision of (or get the agreement of) the central planning agencies, and it certainly is not true to any degree in the case of individual enterprises. Thus the capacities of enterprise directors, or of other ITRs working within enterprises, are effectively delimited to the co-ordination of the technical division of labour. They clearly do not predominate in determining their own conditions of existence, and could not do so unless they had greater access to the means of production, and hence a capacity to co-ordinate the division of social production.

Were this to happen, it could then lead to a limited capacity to co-ordinate the social division of labour, at least to the extent that such agents could then largely secure their own conditions of existence, but changes in the social division of labour are frequently an unintended effect of changes in the other two main aspects of the division of labour, or else of changes in state policy or the structure of the state itself.

The comparatively limited capacities of enterprise directors and other ITRs in production enterprises highlight the preconditions for the personnel in the central state and party agencies to constitute a 'ruling class'. These conditions have already been briefly indicated in the section on the 'intelligentsia' where

the possibility of a 'ruling class' was raised. However, all that was established in that discussion was that if such personnel do form a ruling class, then they have probably been less successful at securing a distribution of income favourable to themselves than is the case in capitalist societies. It did not establish that they have been unable to secure predominant access to the means of production, perhaps by controlling the political conditions of access to what is legally state property. For this to be the case, then the political interdiction of other agents' access to the means of production would have to be supplemented by an ability to substantially enhance their own capacity for action in a manner which rendered other agents dependent on the central state and party agencies, while leaving the latter comparatively independent of other agencies. This would imply either that one or two agencies would have to be supreme (a sovereign body), or that collectively these various agencies (which are themselves each a collective agent) would have to be capable of using their access to the means of production to co-ordinate all aspects of the division of labour (restricting the capacity of other agents to do so) thereby securing their own conditions of existence. Furthermore, since these collective agents are not themselves agents of consumption, the class relations between these agents and other economic agents would have to be utilised by the personnel who staff those agencies to substantially alter the distribution of income in their own favour. Otherwise it would be comparatively easy for these personnel to subvert the policies of these collective agents.

The concept of one or two agencies being capable of acting as a sovereign has already been rejected in the discussion of totalitarianism and elite theory in Chapter Three. Such bodies as the Politburo, the Central Committee and the Council of

Ministers are dependent on other central agencies both for information and for the implementation of decisions. Such other central agencies would presumably include the Central Committee secretariat and the various state committees attached to the Council of Ministers, particularly Gosplan, Gossnab, Gosstroï, Gosbank and the State Committee on Labour and Social Questions. Ministries themselves would presumably be on the other side of the class boundary.¹⁰⁷ If these other central agencies are therefore to be included as 'collective possessors' of the means of production, then it has to be demonstrated not only that they act in concert on all important decisions concerning the disposition of the means of production, but that they are actually capable of co-ordinating the division of labour in all its main aspects, because of their predominant access to the means of production. In other words, the central state and party agencies would have to be able to establish fairly exclusive control of the access by other agents to the means of production, so that they were able to set their own terms for the access by other agents to the means of production. This would imply that these central agencies would be capable of exerting sufficient control not merely to establish overall co-ordination of the division of labour (preventing sub-agents from usurping such decisions as are necessary for effective national planning), but also to subordinate sub-agents to the point where they had little capacity of their own to affect the division of labour, and thus could not prevent the means of production from being used in a way which substantially altered the distribution of income in favour of the central agencies and their constituent personnel.

It is by no means clear that this is the case. For example, despite all the restrictions on the capacities of enterprise

directors, they are still the main agents capable of co-ordinating the technical division of labour. Similarly, the participation of the Ministries in the activities of Gosplan has indicated that Ministries still have a considerable impact on the division of social production, because of their capacity to secure supplies by a process of mutual accommodation with each other and with Gosplan. Because Gosplan cannot issue orders to Gosplan, there is little that it can do about this state of affairs, since it is quite likely that the Council of Ministers will reflect any mutual accommodations reached between Ministries in the process of Gosplan's decisions on material-technical supplies. The effects of this, such as the location of consumer durables production in 'heavy industry' Ministries, have already been indicated. The 'inordinate' size of the Ministry of Machine Building and Metal Working is surely a result of similar processes. The failure of the Kosygin Reform and the repeated attempts to push through the production association reform both demonstrate that the capacity of the central state and party agencies to co-ordinate the division of social production is seriously limited by the non-compliance of sub-agents, particularly Ministries. Similarly, with regard to decisions which directly affect the social division of labour, there have been no attempts to cut back on health and education personnel to increase the central agencies' room for manoeuvre either to create other kinds of occupations, or to alter the distribution of income in favour of the personnel of the central agencies. The use of voluntary workers in trade unions to administer social security might be considered as an example of an attempt to alter the social division of labour in a way which 'releases' real income for use by the central agencies, but the recent pension increases imply that this money has simply been spent on the general population rather than on professional administrators.

Consequently, it is extremely difficult to argue that the undoubted predominance of the central state and party agencies in co-ordinating the overall division of labour in the social formation is sufficiently exclusive to seriously restrict the access of other state agencies to the means of production. In other words, the effect of the process of plan construction and implementation seems to be that a variety of agents (and sub-agents) have overlapping forms of access to the means of production, so that the relations between the various agents in the state sector establish conditions in which none can substantially enhance their own capacity for action at the expense of other agents, and none can substantially alter the distribution of income in their own favour.

This perhaps places in a new light the 'incrementalism' in policy formation, remarked on by Hough and others. It may well be that the caution with which policy changes are introduced is an indication of successful struggle by sub-agents such as Ministries within the state sector, and that this capacity to struggle successfully is partly an effect of the 'multiple access' to the means of production which was described in the Introduction as an indication that class relations are weak or non-existent. However, there is a danger here of implying that classless societies are incapable of effective reform, or are doomed to paralysis and stagnation. Much of the 'incrementalism' in the Soviet Union seems to be simply due to a poor process of policy formulation, where, as in the case of housing or the de facto priority given to heavy industry, the effects of existing practices are not calculated in a very sophisticated manner. Yet, some of the difficulties of economic reform in the Soviet Union do appear to be the result of the access of sub-agents to the means of production, so that the sub-agents themselves are

capable to some extent of co-ordinating the division of labour, thereby avoiding too great a dependence on the central state and party agencies.

In itself, the argument that sub-agents have access to the means of production which is sufficient to prevent too great a restriction on their capacity for action, this argument does not finally settle the issue of class relations within the state sector in the Soviet Union. It was argued in the Introduction that the central planning agencies could not be considered to have class relations with other state agencies if it could be demonstrated that they were only 'holding the ring' in the sense of following policies which prevented all agents, including themselves (or one should add, their constituent personnel) from securing disproportionate benefits. The implication of this, it was argued, is that non-class societies would have a very egalitarian policy on the distribution of income and this policy would have to be fairly effectively pursued. This issue must now be dealt with.

The Distribution of Wages and Income Levels

All recent analyses of wage differentials and inequalities in the distribution of actual earnings concur in the view that since the mid-1950s there has been a substantial reduction in both. McAuley, in reviewing the distribution of earnings from 1956 to 1972, and the growth of earnings from 1950-1974, is very clear on these effects.¹⁰⁸ Wiles presents a similar picture from 1946 to 1970.¹⁰⁹ Similarly Chapman, who concentrates on the industrial wage structure, argues that earnings differentials have been narrowed since the mid-1950s, while average industrial money earnings have more than doubled.¹¹⁰ Even if money earnings are reduced to estimated real earnings by taking account of Western estimates of disguised Soviet inflation, real earnings

have gone up by almost 63 per cent from 1955 to 1975.¹¹¹
 Nevertheless this still leaves Soviet real earnings at about
 80 per cent of those in the rest of Eastern Europe and about
 50 per cent of those in Austria.¹¹²

However, while improvements in real earnings are important
 (and improvements in money earnings are also important from the
 point of view of earnings-related welfare benefits), the level
 of earnings is less important for the analysis of class relations
 than the trend in earnings differentials. As just mentioned,
 the trend has been for these differentials to narrow considerably.
 The following tables provided by Chapman indicate this very
 clearly.

Table 18

Relationship between Earnings of
 Workers and Earnings of Managerial-Technical
 Personnel and of Office Workers in Soviet Industry
 1945-76

(Average earnings of workers = 100)

	<u>Average Earnings of Managerial-Technical Personnel</u>	<u>Average Earnings of Office Workers</u>
1945	230	101
1950	176	93
1955	166	89
1960	148	82
1965	142	83
1970	136	85
1971	134	84
1972	130	83
1973	127	81
1974	126	82
1975	124	82
1976	122	83

Source: J.G. Chapman, *ibid.*, page 173

This table shows clearly that in terms of earnings, non-manual occupations cannot be considered as a homogeneous group. Office workers clearly earn between 15 and 20 per cent less than the average (including industrial manual workers), while managerial and technical personnel earned over 20 per cent more than average. This table also shows clearly that managerial and technical personnel are now much closer to average earnings than formerly.

The following table shows the earnings distribution for all Soviet wage earners and salaried workers.¹¹³

Table 19

Indicators of the Distribution of Earnings
of Workers and Salaried Employees
1946-75 (P)

(Ratio between earnings at indicated
percentiles of the distribution)

	$\frac{P90}{P10}$	$\frac{P90}{P50}$	$\frac{P10}{P50}$		
	Reported	Computed ^a		Computed ^a	
		<u>M</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>C</u>
1946	7.24	--	2.7	--	.38
1956	4.4	2.0	2.2	.41	.46
1959	4.2	2.0	2.0	.47	.49
1961	(3.9-4.2)b	2.0	2.0	.46	.50
1964	3.7	1.8	1.9	.54	.53
1966	3.26	1.9	1.8	.58	.55
1968	2.7	1.7	1.8	.61	.56
1970	3.2	--	1.7	--	.58
P1975	2.9	--	--	--	--

Source: J.G. Chapman, *ibid.*, page 174

This table shows that the overall range of earnings (first column) has narrowed considerably, even from 1964 to 1970, and this ratio was expected to fall further by 1975 as a result of the delayed second wage reform of the 1970s. The first wage reform was started in 1956, but did not become widespread until the second half of the 1960s.¹¹⁴ The table also shows (second column) that the higher paid have had slower relative wage increases, and (third column) that low-paid workers have had

relatively large increases. This shows the effects of the substantial rise in the minimum wage, and the freezing of the upper-level salary rates.¹¹⁵

To place these figures into perspective, Chapman points out that these differentials are higher than in the rest of Eastern Europe, which when coupled with the lower level of earnings in the Soviet Union (compared to Eastern Europe) must be quite embarrassing for the Soviet authorities.¹¹⁶ However, she also points out that the decile ratio (as in the first column of the above table) was 4.48 in the U.S.A. in 1972. This refers to non-agricultural workers and salaried employees. On this evidence, the Soviet earnings differentials are much narrower than in the U.S.A., even ignoring U.S. income from profits and dividends. It will be recalled that Wiles¹¹⁷ gave a figure of 5.5:1 for the ratio of top to average incomes in the U.S.S.R. This is much higher than Chapman's 1.7:1 for the Soviet Union in 1970 (second column of the above table). The difference is largely explained by the fact that Chapman is referring to earnings from wages only, whereas Wiles is accepting Matthews' estimates of the real income addition of fringe benefits when added to the very top wages and salaries. It will be remembered that even accepting those estimates, Wiles found that they corresponded almost exactly to the British ratio of top to average incomes, defined as wages and salaries plus fringe benefits, but excluding orthodox social services of the state, and excluding 'profits and professional earnings'. Chapman is more sceptical than Matthews, it seems, on the income differentials generated by fringe benefits, for she points out that ordinary jobs also provide access to scarce goods and other sources of extra income.¹¹⁸ However, even accepting Matthews' views on this issue, Wiles is correct to point out that if one takes capitalist incomes such as profit into

account, Britain is considerably more unequal in incomes than the U.S.S.R. Chapman's evidence on the U.S.A. shows that in terms of earnings (ignoring fringe benefits and profits) it too was more unequal than the U.S.S.R. Thus it is quite clear that, although the U.S.S.R. has lower real earnings levels and wider earnings differentials than other countries in Eastern Europe, it also has narrower earnings differentials than the U.S.A. and Britain.¹¹⁹

However, earnings are only part of the real income of the population. The other major components of the real income of the Soviet population are of course comprised of housing, transport and basic food subsidies, as well as expenditures under the heading of the social consumption funds. If one is attempting to examine whether differentials in the distribution of income have declined, the impact of these measures must be assessed in some way. At the end of Chapter Four I attempted a rough assessment of the overall effects of such non-wage forms of income and concluded that arguments that such forms of state expenditure were regressive were not substantiated. McAuley is convinced that the authorities adopted a new approach to questions of economic welfare in the mid-1950s,¹²⁰ and that while neither wage and salary policy nor expenditures on social consumption have been administered as consistently or effectively as Soviet accounts would have us believe, there has been substantial achievement.¹²¹

McAuley points to three main deficiencies in most Western accounts of income inequality in the Soviet Union. Firstly, they tend to concentrate on earnings, or welfare measures, taken in isolation. If one is going to examine income, it is meaningless to consider the employed in isolation. This point is certainly correct since many welfare measures are directed at those not in employment. McAuley's approach requires that in the

study of inequality, occupational groups should be considered in their social context, including their family circumstances. In view of the fact that the contemporary Soviet family is an object of social policy, as well as an agent of consumption, it seems to me that there is no denying this. Secondly, he argues that Western analyses concentrate on the state industrial sector. This leads to a neglect of non-industrial state employees (for example, in retail trade or office work) and of kolkhozniki. Both types of neglect, but particularly the latter, lead to an exaggeration of the degree of equality of incomes. Thirdly, they ignore the importance of regional, linguistic and ethnic factors in income inequality. (While the last criticism is certainly applicable to this work, since such features of the Soviet Union are beyond its scope, it is hopefully clear that the other two deficiencies have been less in evidence). McAuley's awareness of these problems makes his analysis particularly useful for a discussion of the distribution of income. Thus, for example, he points out that, whatever measure is used, the gap between kolkhozniki and state employees closed between 1960 and 1970, so that by the end of the decade, total or per capita personal income for kolkhozniki for the U.S.S.R. as a whole was some 78 to 85 per cent of that of state employees. He rightly argues¹²² that this "gives a better indication of the relative living standards of the two classes than money income, which suggests that peasants received about two-thirds as much as the rest of the population." He also argues that the available evidence indicates that there was a marked reduction in inequality among the non-agricultural population between 1958 and 1967.¹²³ Not surprisingly, this is related to the reform of social security, the re-organisation of the wage and salary system, and the increased expenditure on pensions and other transfers.

Yet his claim that the momentum in this respect which was evident up to 1970 may not have been maintained, that the drive to equality may have slackened or even been reversed, is perhaps open to question, although it is difficult to refute without as careful an appraisal of the evidence for the 1970s as he has conducted for the pre-1970 period. There are certainly reasons why he should think this. As he points out, the continued growth in living standards between 1970 and 1974 (which is related to the reduction in inequality of income, because the latter has been achieved by a process of levelling up incomes) has only been achieved at the cost of some open inflation. Furthermore, the increase in living standards in the years 1970 to 1974 was at a slower rate than previously. It could (at present growth rates) only be increased more quickly at the expense of other forms of state expenditure, such as defence, which is unlikely. The alternative would be for a further equalisation in incomes to be achieved, not by a levelling up, but by an actual reduction in the incomes of the most affluent (by means of a change in tax policy). In either case, the effect of further equalisation of income would be inflationary and may well be resisted by the central authorities for this reason. Yet, despite these problems, some measures of equalisation of income have been implemented in the 1970s: for example, the child allowances in 1974, the increase in minimum wage in 1975, the retention of part of their pension by retired people who return to employment. In addition to this, the higher wage levels of the early 1970s must by now be working through to higher pensions, and it is clear from the discussion of wages and productivity at the end of Chapter Two of this work that wage increases probably exceeded productivity increases in the late 1970s. While the inflationary pressures generated by most of these measures cannot be doubted, all these

developments occurring at the same time as the restrictions on upper earnings mentioned by Chapman suggest that the process of levelling up may have continued. Whatever the reasons for this (and McAuley is probably correct to doubt that the main reason concerns the radical socialist egalitarianism of the leadership), it does suggest that the pressures for equalisation are fairly strong.

Some of McAuley's work is complemented by the work of Vinokur and Ofer,¹²⁴ although their analysis is primarily restricted to industrial workers. They confirm that the rise in real per capita income continued until 1975, being around 73 per cent higher than in 1965 if the Soviet retail price index is used, or 50 per cent higher if the Schroeder-Severin index is taken.¹²⁵ They also confirm that the gap in real incomes between kolkhozniki and state employees probably continued to narrow after 1970. They do this by comparing income per family member for industrial workers with average income per capita for the Soviet population as a whole (which as McAuley reminds us, contains retail and office workers as well as kolkhozniki, so this is only a rough indication). Their conclusion is as follows:¹²⁶

"In 1965, per-capita income for the Soviet Union as a whole was 41.1 rubles per month, while our estimate for industrial workers is between 54 and 58 rubles. Corresponding figures for 1970 are 57.1 rubles as against between 72 and 76, and in 1975, 72.6 rubles as against between 96 and 99. Over the ten-year period, the relative gap between the two levels narrowed slightly, from about 36 to 32 per cent. This is reasonable since incomes of kolkhozniki and low-paid urban workers, as well as of pensioners, rose more rapidly than incomes of better-paid industrial workers." However, on the basis of survey evidence they suggest that the predominance of industrial workers in terms of wages (in comparison with office staff and with manual workers in agriculture and services) is

offset by lower supplementary income from social consumption funds.¹²⁷ This latter phenomenon would not affect the overall distribution of income very much.

Overall, the distribution of income (not simply wages) has been considerably equalised from about 1955 to 1975. While the evidence is not available to form judgements about developments since then, and while it is clear that further equalisation of incomes may be fraught with difficulty and is perhaps only recently a process which has been monitored with any sophistication,¹²⁸ it is very clear that the combined effect of various policies has been to raise general living standards and to equalise incomes. Whatever the reasons for these developments, increases in the wages of the lowest paid and improvements in welfare are not the sort of outcome which one would expect of the central state and party agencies, in a situation where their room for manoeuvre in running the economy has been declining. The available evidence on the trends in the distribution of real income is thus quite compatible with the argument in the preceding section (on the occupational structure and class relations) that no category of agents seems to be capable of establishing privileged access to the means of production.

Conclusion: The Presence of Class Relations in the Soviet Union

It is clear from the fact that substantial changes in the occupational structure have taken place since the late 1920s, that the central state and party agencies are capable of co-ordinating the division of labour in a manner which broadly speaking enables them to fulfill their objectives. This has continued to be the case despite the slowdown in the rate of economic growth since the mid-1960s. However, it is equally clear that there are limits on the capacity of the central agencies to co-ordinate the division of labour. The difficulties

of economic reform of various kinds since the 1957 Sovnarkhoz Reform are evidence in support of such a conclusion. Some of these limits on their capacity derive from their form of calculation and on the organisational resources at their immediate disposal. However, the main limits on their capacity derive from the capacities of other economic agents such as Ministries, and from their sub-agents such as production associations, state enterprises (and in future even perhaps autonomous brigades within enterprises). While the access of each of these economic agents to the means of production is different, and hence their capacities are each somewhat different, the available evidence strongly suggests that within the state sector such differential access does not give rise to class relations.

This conclusion seems to hold not just for relations between collective agents but for those between individual agents: the examination of the occupational structure suggested quite clearly that the most systematic enhancement and restriction of individuals' capacity for action derived from gender attribution rather than class relations. The effect of this on the occupational distribution of men and women and on the consequent distribution of income between these two categories was quite clear. Apart from this, while there are certainly differences in individual capacities deriving from occupational location, and associated differences in income level, it is clear that within the state sector these derive largely from membership of state agencies rather than being an attribute of the occupation itself, for example the educational level required to enter that occupation. Hence attempts to define class or stratum boundaries within the occupational structure without an examination of the differential capacities of state agencies suffer from the usual difficulty of

stratification theories, namely that they are unable to define the boundaries of classes or **strata** because they do not attempt to do so in terms of the relations of production, the relations operative between economic agents, which determine their relative capacities. This problem is perhaps most clearly evident in attempts to define the 'intelligentsia' in the Soviet Union.

Thus the failure to find to find any class relations between occupations is related to the lack of class relations between state agencies. The predominance of such collective agents is of course an effect of the nationalisation of the means of production, which means that the only legal access which an individual has to the means of production is in the capacity of a member of a party or state agency. Hence the importance of analysing the relative capacities of the various state economic agents, as was attempted in Chapter Two. The complex relations between these agents, with 'dual subordination', and a multiplicity of arenas in which the decisions of superior agents can be challenged, and a degree of autonomy at the level of sub-agents due partly to the sheer burden of information at the centre, these complex relations have important effects. Firstly, because the capacities of various state agencies cannot be strictly delimited (we saw in Chapter Three the difficulties of even achieving a legal codification of these various capacities), the processes of plan formulation and plan implementation are inevitably politicised. Secondly, these relations are such that, while there is adequate delimitation of sub-agents to enable an overall national co-ordination of the division of labour to be achieved, this delimitation is not sufficient to render the sub-agents incapable of having any serious impact on the division of labour. In other words, while the central agencies are capable of formulating and effectively implementing a national plan (which means they are capable of preventing sub-agents from taking over

the means of production), the various agencies of plan implementation are nevertheless capable of exerting considerable control over that part of the total means of production which is at their disposal. This means they are also in a position to resist or even block certain kinds of economic policies, and to press for others. While this state of affairs continues, it will be difficult for either the central agencies or the Ministries or other sub-agents to gain sufficient control of the means of production to be able to decide their own investment and income distribution policies. Consequently, the various forms of access of different agents, even those with a more restricted capacity for action such as enterprises, do seem to be such that within the state sector there is 'multiple access' to, or 'social ownership' of, the means of production. This is not to say that the present forms of 'social ownership' in the Soviet Union are the most politically desirable or economically effective.

The conclusion that the relations of production within the state sector do not give rise to class relations within it does not mean that there are no class relations in the Soviet Union. The kolkhozy are not simply juridically distinct, they are a category of collective agents whose access to the means of production is clearly restricted to the terms set by state agencies. While the incomes of their members are evidently approaching those of employees of state agencies, that income depends more on the economic performance of each collective farm (each collective private property) than is the case in state agencies, where individual incomes are much more dependent on state policy. However, it is not the dependence of their members' incomes on their economic performance which places collective farm members in a different class position from state employees. The connection between individual wage and economic

performance could be strengthened in the state sector if the autonomous brigade reforms go through on the lines of the Shchekino and Zlobin experiments. Rather it is their effective subordination to various state agencies, which, by their investment, pricing and delivery policies, determine the farms' access to the means of production and consequently the disposition of their product. These state policies operate in a way which enables the state agencies to completely predominate in determining the farms' conditions of existence, and even their 'choice' of chairman and internal organisational form. Yet they are (or have been in the past) denied the Ministerial backing which would enable them to lobby for investment. These relations between state agencies and collective farms are of course the legacy of forced collectivisation. Fortunately conditions on collective farms are steadily improving. Yet the massive investment in agriculture must be much less effective than it could be, as indicated in Chapter Two. This is because collective farms do not appear to have the autonomy to co-ordinate their own division of labour (to develop their own most effective organisational forms for combining labour and the means of production) and hence to decide on the most appropriate kinds of on-farm investment. Agricultural investment off the farm (that is, infrastructural work on roads and kolkhoz markets, and so on) is controlled by the state, which further enables the state to determine the conditions of existence of the kolkhozy. In the absence of rapid improvements in agricultural performance, it will be difficult for the state to speed up the transformation of kolkhozy into sovkhozy. However, it would seem that in current Soviet conditions this is the only feasible way to eliminate these class relations.

Finally, there is the possibility that class relations operate in the 'informal sector' of the Soviet economy, the so-called

'parallel market' which is sometimes divided into various different kinds of market. While it is possible that capitalist relations operate here, and in aggregate the 'informal sector' must be economically significant, it appears that most of the economic activity in this sector takes the form of self-employed 'moonlighting'. Consequently, such class relations as exist here are not of major importance at the moment, and would only become so if the 'informal sector' seriously disrupted the national planning process, which would imply a fairly serious social upheaval on the scale of, say, recent events in Poland connected with the rise of Solidarity.

One can sum up by saying that there are class relations in the Soviet Union, which operate by means of mechanisms of state control of the kolkhozy. While other class relations may operate in the 'informal sector', they are much less important, and their exact extent is unknown. The class relations between state agencies and the kolkhozy, which put their respective members in different class positions, are being steadily if slowly eroded, by measures to transform kolkhozy and by opening up the access of kolkhozy to the means of production (by organisational devices such as inter-kolkhoz associations). In this sense, the official Soviet theory of the class structure, which treats the form of property (or collective agent) as important for defining the class position of individuals and which argues that class differences are diminishing, is defensible. However, the basis of this theory is not very clear and it is weakened by the insistence on attempting to find grounds for defining the 'intelligentsia' as a separate stratum.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

1. See, for example, the identification by both Goldthorpe and Halsey (in their Oxford Mobility Study publications) of the 'class structure' of occupational positions with the 'class structure' of family units, which is criticised by B. Hindess (1981) 'The Politics of Social Mobility' in Economy and Society, Volume 10, Number 2, May 1981.
2. It is probably clear that the word 'disproportionate' is being used very loosely here. It does not imply the possibility of establishing what a proportionate share in the distribution of income would be, as in 'to each according to his work.' It simply implies a sufficiently large share of the total available real income to sustain the predominant capacity to coordinate the division of labour, thereby being in a position to substantially affect one's own conditions of existence.
3. D. Lane (1971) The End of Inequality?, Penguin, Harmondsworth, page 38.
4. *ibid.*, page 38.
5. A.A. Amyrosov (1975) Sotsial'naya Struktura Sovetskogo Obshchestva, Politizdat, Moscow.
6. *ibid.*, page 9.
7. *ibid.*, pages 21-22.
8. *ibid.*, page 38.

9. *ibid.*, page 39. Here Amvrosov seems to be confusing the tasks, skills and functions of an agent in the division of labour with the mechanisms of allocation of individuals to locations. The educational system cannot be assumed to be closely fitted to the requirements of the economy, even in a highly planned society like the Soviet Union. For a critique of such views, see A. Hussain (1976) 'The economy and the educational system in capitalist societies' in Economy and Society, Volume 5, Number 4, November 1976. The issue of education and occupational placement will be returned to later.
10. D. Lane and F. O'Dell (1978) The Soviet Industrial Worker : Social Class, Education and Control, Martin Robertson, Oxford, page 3.
11. *ibid.*, pages 4-5.
12. D. Lane (1978) Politics and Society in the U.S.S.R., Martin Robertson, London, Second Edition, page 418.
13. This is at least true of the base - superstructure metaphor. For a criticism of the 'problematic of the productive forces', see Charles Bettelheim (1974) Les Luites de Classes en U.R.S.S. (1917-1923), Maspero/Seuil, Paris, 'Avant-propos.'
14. Lane (1978), *op.cit.*, page 389.
15. D. Lane and F. O'Dell (1978), *op.cit.*, page 6.
16. D. Lane and F. O'Dell (1978), *ibid.*, page 9. They also provide figures on population growth and movement from country to town before making this statement.

17. D. Lane and F. O'Dell (1978), *ibid.*, page 10. The apparent discrepancy between the figure for agriculture of 23 per cent in 1976 in this table, and the figure of 15.7 per cent in 1977 in the previous table, is explained by the inclusion of non-manual agricultural occupations under the heading of agriculture in this table. Hence the proportion of the total civilian labour force engaged in non-manual agricultural occupations is around 7 per cent. The decline after 1964 in the manufacturing - service ratio (M/S ratio, shown on row 12 of the table) is interesting. This seems to be largely due to the growth of the percentage of the labour force engaged in education and health (row 6), and to a lesser extent to the growth of the percentage of those engaged in trade (row 4).

18. J.F. Hough (1979) 'Policy-Making and the Worker' in A. Kahan and B. Ruble (eds.) Industrial Labor in the U.S.S.R., Pergamon, New York, pages 367-396.

19. *ibid.*, page 383.

20. For a discussion of these issues, see B.Q. Madison (1979) 'Trade Unions and Social Welfare' in A. Kahan and B. Ruble (eds.) Industrial Labor in the U.S.S.R., *op.cit.*, pages 85-115, especially page 108, where he points out that "unpaid activists cannot be held to an acceptable standard of performance."

21. D. Lane and F. O'Dell (1978), *op.cit.*, page 16.

22. *ibid.*, page 15.

23. *ibid.*, page 14.

24. *ibid.*, page 14.

25. *ibid.*, page 16.
26. *ibid.*, page 17.
27. *ibid.*, page 17. Similar remarks are made in other sources with regard to medical doctors: see Chapter Four.
28. R.W. Lee (1979) 'The Factory Trade Union Committee and Technological Innovation' in A.Kahan and B. Ruble (eds.) Industrial Labor in the U.S.S.R., *op.cit.*, pages 116-134.
29. D. Lane and F. O'Dell (1978), *op.cit.*, page 18.
30. *ibid.*, page 18. For a discussion of socialisation (in the sense of cultural acquisition rather than of, say, the 'socialisation of the the productive forces') see M. Swafford (1979) 'The Socialisation and Training of the Soviet Industrial Labor Force' in A. Kahan and B. Ruble (eds.) Industrial Labor in the U.S.S.R., *op.cit.*, pages 19-41.
31. M. Feshbach (1979) 'The Structure and Composition of the Industrial Labor Force' in A. Kahan and B. Ruble (eds.) Industrial Labor in the U.S.S.R., *op.cit.*, pages 3-18.
32. *ibid.*, page 8.
33. D. Lane and F. O'Dell (1978), *op.cit.*, page 16.
34. M. Feshbach (1978), *op.cit.*, page 8.
35. *ibid.*, page 16.
36. The figure for 1950 was 15.3 million persons, so that it is more than doubled in 25 years : *ibid.*, page 7. Increasing the industrial labour force as a source of increased output is virtually impossible in the next decade or so.

37. *ibid.*, page 7.
38. Such mechanisms of allocation could include those distributing women to particular occupations, or the use of educational qualifications as entrance criteria for occupational selection. These will be discussed later, but mechanisms of allocation also include a conscious state policy of occupational placement. This has certainly been and remains a matter of state policy: see P. Grossman (1979) 'The Soviet Government's Role in Allocating Industrial Labor' in A. Kahan and B. Ruble (eds.), *op. cit.*, pages 42-55. Grossman argues that the decline in compulsion in allocating the labour force has been accompanied by an increase in the government's participation in the process of allocation. It concentrates on serving new entrants and job changers, thus minimising unemployment, or at least its duration.
39. M. Feshbach (1979), *op. cit.*, page 10. He points out that in 1973, 54.9 per cent of female industrial wagedworkers had completed at least general secondary school studies, compared to 47 per cent of men.
40. G.W. Lapidus (1979) 'The Female Industrial Labor Force: Dilemmas, Reassessments and Options', in A. Kahan and B. Ruble (eds.) Industrial Labor in the U.S.S.R., *op. cit.*, pages 232-279. She points out on page 244 that "the educational attainment of much of the female labour force actually exceeds that of males."
41. D. Lane and F. O'Dell (1978), *op. cit.*, pages 117 and 118, where the tables show that women are now over half the students in secondary specialised educational institutions, and exactly half the students in higher educational institutions.

42. G. Lapidus (1979), op. cit., page 236.
43. ibid., page 239.
44. ibid., page 239. Lapidus points out that women comprise 80 per cent of food and textile workers, and 90 per cent of garment workers, but less than 30 per cent of workers in coal, lumber, electric power and mineral extraction.
45. ibid., page 239. This is certainly similar to the situation in capitalist countries: see, for example, M. Guilbert (1966) Les Fonctions des Femmes dans l'Industrie, Mouton, Paris. However such similarities in the treatment of women can hardly be explained by similar levels of technology.
46. R.W. Lee (1979), op. cit., page 131. G. Lapidus (1979), op. cit., page 242, points out that their occupational mobility is limited by their lower enrolment rate in programmes to raise professional qualifications. This is due to family responsibilities.
47. G. Lapidus (1979), ibid., page 242.
48. ibid., page 242.
49. ibid., page 244. Lapidus reports that Soviet economists treat the wage of the 'secondary' earner as being roughly two-thirds those of the 'primary' earner, for planning purposes.
50. ibid., page 233.
51. ibid., page 248.
52. ibid., page 261.
53. ibid., page 262.
54. ibid., pages 264-268.

55. These are also discussed in relation to Czechoslovakia in Chapter 17 of A. Heitlinger (1979), op. cit. Chapter 17 is entirely devoted to 'Pro-Natalist Population Policies'.
56. The internal organisation of the State Committee on Labour and Social Questions is discussed in J. Hough (1979), op. cit. Hough reports on page 381 that its Deputy Chairman handles pensions, but that she actually takes a far wider interest in wage and social questions. She is very interested in the women's problems and was described to Hough by an economist as the leading proponent for this question within the national government.
57. G. Lapidus (1979), op. cit., page 268.
58. Lapidus, ibid., page 267, cites one labour economist who recalls the post-revolutionary Women's Department (Zhenotdel) of the Central Committee and explicitly regrets its premature abolition. For a brief history of Zhenotdel, see A. Heitlinger (1979), op. cit., Chapter 6. However the Soviet leadership does not seem to be ready for such a radical move as refounding the Zhenotdel, although according to Lapidus, page 268, Brezhnev has said in his 1977 address to the All-Union Central Congress of Trade Unions "We men ... have thus far done far from all we could to ease the dual burden that [women] bear both at home and in production."

59. D. Lane and F. O'Dell (1978), op. cit., page 4.
60. ibid., page 4.
61. D. Lane (1978), op. cit., page 393. A similar argument can be found in A.A. Amvrosov (1975), op. cit., Chapter 5.
62. A.A. Amvrosov, ibid., page 95, points out that in 1975 the number of tractorist-machinists, tractorists, combine harvester operators and drivers was 3.8 million, as against 3.0 million in 1965. However, he does not give their distribution between kolkhozy and sovkhozy.
63. See Amvrosov, ibid., pages 92-95 and 99-103. These are also discussed in Chapter Two of this work, which relies heavily on Lavigne's (1979) account.
64. D. Lane (1978), op. cit., page 393, where he says that engineering/technical and administrative personnel in the 1960s made up 6 to 9 per cent of collective farmers.
65. See Z. Medvedev (1981) 'Russia learns to live without American grain', New Scientist, 8th January 1981, pages 58-61. This article gives a good indication of the increasingly sophisticated use of machinery, although it also shows continuing shortcomings in the use of machinery, transport and storage facilities. For another source indicating the extent of technical innovation in Soviet agriculture (without, however, throwing any light on the situation in collective farms), see G.B. Carter (1981) 'Is biotechnology feeding the Russians?', New Scientist, 23rd April 1981, pages 216-218.
66. A.A. Amvrosov (1975), op. cit., page 49.
67. A. McAuley (1979) Economic Welfare in the Soviet Union, George Allen and Unwin, Hemel Hempstead.

68. According to a personal communication from M. Lavigne, citing Sel'skaya Zhizn', 18th January 1981, the decree is called "On Measures Tending to Increase the Production of Agricultural Products on Personal Plots, and with the Livestock of Citizens". This decree recommends local authorities and agricultural units to place at the disposal of citizens land which is not used or is little used by the kolkhozy or sovkhozy, and raises the limits on the number of livestock which citizens can keep. In the light of the analysis by Wadekin of personal plots (discussed in Chapter Two), this seems to be a reasonable change, a view which is apparently shared by Medvedev (1981), op.cit., page 61 who was already aware before the decree of "the clear encouragement of privately owned land and livestock".
69. L. Rzhantsyna (1977), op.cit., pages 162-172. This confirms the impression given by A. McAuley.
70. A. McAuley (1979), op.cit., page 34.
71. L.G. Churchward (1973) The Soviet Intelligentsia An essay on the social structure and roles of Soviet intellectuals during the 1960s, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London and Boston, page 6.
72. N. Lampert (1979) The Technical Intelligentsia and the Soviet State: A Study of Soviet Managers and Technicians 1928-1935, Macmillan, London and Basingstoke, page 7. Lampert is concerned with the technical intelligentsia, that is the ITR, and is careful to point out that the conclusions from his study do not necessarily apply to the contemporary Soviet Union: ibid., page 10.

73. M. Hirszowicz (1980) The Bureaucratic Leviathan: A Study in the Sociology of Communism, Martin Robertson, Oxford, Chapter 5 'Intelligentsia versus Bureaucracy - The Revival of a Myth'.
74. *ibid.*, page 179.
75. *ibid.*, page 199.
76. *ibid.*, pages 198-199.
77. This approach appears to accept a Weberian conception of bureaucracy, as well as the concept of a totalitarian order, both of which are rejected by other authors, such as Lampert, *op.cit.*, pages 6-7. My reasons for also rejecting such conceptions should be clear from Chapter Three. The main problems with the analysis of Hirszowicz are as follows, in my view: Firstly, while she rightly refuses to treat the state bureaucracy as an 'instrument of the ruling class' she does so by treating the bureaucracy as itself sovereign. It is a bureaucratic Leviathan in the full sense (huge and sovereign). The whole thrust of such an approach is to analyse politics in terms of a single seat of power, an agent with its 'hands on the levers of power' controlling other agents. In contrast to that, in Chapter Three of this work, I have tried to discuss politics in a way which takes seriously the conditions of action of agents, and have argued in effect that the variety of such conditions and the varieties of arenas of struggle preclude the existence of a sovereign body, whatever may be the constitutional position. This is not to deny that arenas of struggles may be articulated in such a way as to produce a substantial concentration

of power within a few arenas, but it is to deny the existence of a sovereign body, large or small. Secondly, while she is critical of totalitarianism as a synonym for bureaucratic collectivism, she does not deny the analytic value of the concept. (Hirszowicz, page 36). She is able to retain it while criticizing it by recourse to the familiar device of treating it as an ideal type, a standard of comparison (ibid., page 38). I have already indicated some of the problems of using 'ideal types' in this way in Chapter Three. Thirdly, she displays a Weberian adherence to a 'gradualist' distribution of power within a bureaucracy (ibid., page 92), yet also accepts Hough's concept of institutional pluralism, preferring to call it 'bureaucratic pluralism' (ibid., page 40). It is difficult to see how a clustering of struggles around institutional differences necessarily leads to a gradualist distribution of power, or how it can be associated with a treatment of 'the' bureaucracy as a single sovereign body. Nevertheless, in Chapter 4 of her work she does make points similar to those of say, Andrle or Tartarin discussed in Chapter Two, concerning the bending of rules, the use of personal contacts, the 'success indicator' problem, and the parallel market; and she discusses the social costs of these problems, arguing that organisational changes lead to new informal adjustments, leading to the privatisation of the economy, the devaluation of legal norms, difficulties in detecting fraud and corruption and an erosion of moral and legal standards in society in general. It is difficult to be sure, but it is possible that these problems are worse in Poland than in the Soviet Union.

78. For some reason, Churchward (op.cit, page 6) regards his definition as "an objective definition in the Marxist tradition", but it seems to me that this simply indicates that pre-Revolutionary Marxists often shared the nineteenth century approach to the intelligentsia. It is true, however, that contemporary Soviet theorists such as Amvrosov, op.cit., also define the intelligentsia in educational terms.
79. M. Hirszwicz, op.cit., page 180, makes it clear that she is aware of this.
80. L.G. Churchward, op.cit., page 9. D. Lane (1978), op.cit., page 390, also argues that the Soviet intelligentsia cannot be considered a homogenous group.
81. For example, Kaser on the health service, as well as George and Manning, discussed in Chapter Four, or M. Hirszwicz, op.cit., Chapter 4 'The Limitations of Rationality in a Planning Society'.
82. See L.G. Churchward, op.cit., pages 79-81.
83. G. Littlejohn (1980) 'Economic Calculation in the Soviet Union' in Economy and Society, Volume 9, No. 4, November 1980.
84. M. Matthews (1975) 'Top Incomes in the U.S.S.R.' in Economic Aspects of Life in the U.S.S.R., N.A.T.O. Directorate of Economic Affairs, Brussels, pages 131-154.
85. ibid., page 140, Table 9.
86. P. Wiles (1975) 'Note on Dr. Matthews' Calculations', in Economic Aspects of Life in the U.S.S.R., op.cit., pages 155-158.
87. See D.K. Simes (1975) 'The Soviet Parallel Market' in Economic Aspects of Life in the U.S.S.R., op.cit., pages 91-100. However

this article does not attempt to assess the income distribution effects of the parallel market, which would be very difficult to do.

88. They are not a distinct class because, with the possible exception of senior party and state personnel, their occupational position cannot be said to give them significantly different access to the means of production from the manual working class. In both cases, their incomes are largely determined by state policy, which, as already indicated in case of women, often holds down relative incomes of many non-manual occupations to a level comparable with manual incomes.
89. See the reference in note 38 to P. Grassman, op.cit.; the difficulties of manpower planning in the 1950s and 1960s were discussed in G. Littlejohn (1968). Education and Social Mobility in the U.S.S.R., unpublished dissertation. The main difficulties discussed were those of forecasting changes in the occupational structure five years ahead (in the case of entrants to tertiary education) and of successfully placing specialised secondary and tertiary graduates in 'appropriate' jobs.
90. For critiques of such views, see A. Hussain (1976), op.cit., and also J. Demaine (1981) Contemporary Theories in the Sociology of Education, Macmillan, London, as well as R.J.V. Waton (1980) A Sociological Study of Education in Sweden and Britain, M.Phil. Thesis, University of Bradford.

91. E. Hopper (1971) (ed) Readings in the Theory of Educational Systems, Heineman, London. To be honest, I myself once (prior to its publication) attempted to adapt Hopper's analysis to the Soviet Union, so my criticisms of Lane and O'Dell are to some extent a criticism of my own past activities.
92. R.H. Turner (1961) 'Modes of Social Ascent through Education : Sponsored and Contest Mobility' in A.H. Halsey et al., (eds.) Education, Economy and Society, Free Press, New York. B.R. Clarke's article on 'The Cooling^{Out} Function in Higher Education' also appears in this volume.
93. D. Lane and F. O'Dell, op.cit., page 51.
94. ibid., page 77.
95. ibid., pages 86-87.
96. ibid., page 91. They treat the 1977 decree to improve labour training in schools as an indication of this.
97. ibid., page 93.
98. ibid., page 106.
99. ibid., page 122.
100. ibid., page 131.
101. ibid., page 105.
102. ibid., Chapter 2 'The Worker in the Industrial Enterprise'.
103. B.A. Ruble (1979) 'Factory Unions and Workers' Rights' in A. Kahan and B.A. Ruble (eds.), op.cit., pages 59-84.
104. ibid., page 73.
105. D. Lane and F. O'Dell (1978), op.cit., page 25.

106. Lane and O'Dell, *ibid.*, Chapter 3, argue that Soviet workers are incorporated rather than alienated. Thus they explicitly disagree with H. Ticktin (1976) 'The Contradictions of Soviet Society and Professor Bettelheim' in Critique, No. 6, Spring 1976 and with M. Holubenko (1975) 'The Soviet Working Class' in Critique, No.4, Spring 1975. It has already been indicated that on Lane and O'Dell's own account the participation of manual workers or of agencies claiming to represent them within the factory is rather limited. Lane and O'Dell are quite willing to accept that discontent does exist, but they argue that the political context of the factory and the political socialisation of the work force mean that it is less 'atomised' and discontented than Ticktin or Holubenko would claim. For a different attempt to gauge the extent of manual workers' discontent, see A. Pravda (1979) 'Spontaneous Workers' Activities in the Soviet Union' in A. Kahan and B.A. Ruble (eds), *op.cit.*, pages 333-366.
107. The possibility that Ministries might operate like capitalist multi-enterprise companies was briefly considered and rejected in Chapter Two.
108. A. McAuley (1979) Economic Welfare in the Soviet Union, *op.cit.*, Chapters 9 and 10. There seems little point here in giving an extensive account of McAuley's detailed analysis.
109. P. Wiles (1975) 'Recent Data on Soviet Income Distribution' in Economic Aspects of Life in the U.S.S.R., *op.cit.*, pages 113-129.

110. J.G. Chapman (1979) 'Recent Trends in the Soviet Industrial Wage Structure' in A. Kahan and B.A. Ruble (eds.), *op.cit.*, pages 151-183.
111. *ibid.*, Table 8.6, page 168. Chapman bases this conclusion on the Schroeder-Severin index of price increases.
112. *ibid.*, Table 8.5, pages 167.
113. In this table, 'M' refers to McAuley's calculations in A. McAuley 'The Distribution of Earnings and Incomes in the U.S.S.R.' in Soviet Studies, Vol. 29, No.2, April 1977. 'C' refers to Chapman's own calculations based on Soviet sources. The ratios in this table perhaps need a little explanation. The ratio in the first column refers to P 90 divided by P10. This is referred to as the decile ratio. P 10 refers to those at the upper end of the first (or bottom) 10 per cent of the earnings range. P 90 refers to those at the lower end of the last (or top) 10 per cent of the earnings range. In other words, P 10 refers to those whose earnings fall exactly in the 10 per cent category (not the bottom 1 to 9 per cent), while P 90 refers to those whose earnings fall exactly in the 90 per cent category (and not the top 91 to 100 per cent). Similarly, P 50 refers to those whose earnings are exactly at the median level. Thus, roughly speaking, the first column shows the ratio of top to bottom earnings (P 90 divided by P 10); the second column shows the ratio of top to middle earnings (P 90 divided by P 50); while the third column (P 10 divided by P 50) shows the earnings of the first decile as a decimal fraction of the median, that is, it shows the ratio of bottom to middle incomes.

114. J.G. Chapman (1979) *ibid.*, page 151.
115. *ibid.*, page 172. Chapman also points out that at least one 'perk' of high level officials has been ended: in 1973, a reduction in the number of official cars was begun, and officials of all but the highest rank were warned that they had three years to learn how to drive themselves. This may simply have been a political gesture, but it does indicate a sensitivity to conspicuous differences in real income. Although Chapman does not mention it in her discussion of minimum wages, McAuley pointed out that the minimum wage was increased to 70 roubles in 1975 (see note 70) which corroborates Chapman's analysis. She relates the increase in minimum wage to attempts to encourage female participation in the labour-force: *ibid.*, page 177. McAuley also considers that some of the changes in wages are the result of the workings of the labour-market: A. McAuley (1979), *op.cit.*, Chapter 12.
116. *op.cit.*, page 178.
117. P. Wiles (1975) 'Notes on Dr. Matthews' Calculations', *op.cit.*
118. J.G. Chapman, *op.cit.*, page 175.
119. If one ignores fringe benefits, so that the data are comparable with those provided by Chapman, then Wiles, *op.cit.*, Table 2, page 156, gives a ratio of the top 8 per cent to the average level of earnings of 3.31 for Britain in 1970. This compares with Chapman's figure in column two of her table of 1.7 for the U.S.S.R. in 1970. Thus on roughly comparable data, British earnings differentials are almost twice those of the U.S.S.R.

120. A. McAuley (1979), *op.cit.*, page 304.
121. *ibid.*, page 306.
122. *ibid.*, page 306. Since, on the evidence of Tables 16 and 17 of this Chapter (see above), social consumption funds payments do not seem to offset wage differentials between state employees and kolkhozniki, the income from personal plots must largely be responsible for closing the gap in terms of real income.
123. *ibid.* page 307.
124. A. Vinokur and G. Ofer (1979) 'Family Income Levels for Soviet Industrial Workers'. in A. Kahan and B. A. Ruble (eds.) *op.cit.*, pages 184 - 208.
125. *ibid.*, page 187.
126. *ibid.*, page 187.
127. *ibid.*, pages 200 - 205.
128. See McAuley's remarks on the instruments for income equalisation at the government's disposal: *op.cit.*, Chapter 12, *passim*.

It could be the case that the policy of income equalisation is being partly undermined by growing wage inequalities due to the payment of bonuses: see A. McAuley (1980), 'Wage differentials in the U.S.S.R: policy and performance' paper presented to the Second World Congress of Soviet and East European Studies, Garmisch.

APPENDIXKRITSMAN'S "CLASS STRATIFICATION OF THE SOVIET COUNTRYSIDE"

The purpose of this Appendix is to provide an account of one of Kritsman's works which indicates how he developed his approach. As indicated in Chapter One, such an exposition, amounting at times to almost verbatim translation, is felt necessary in view of the controversy surrounding his work, which is not available in English. This should help readers to formulate their own appraisal of his approach to the empirical material on the class structure, since such material is of considerable importance in developing or evaluating a strategy of socialist development.

Kritsman begins Class Stratification of the Soviet Countryside (pages 117-268 inclusive of Kritsman, 1929) by stressing that the development of capitalism in the countryside gave no basis for panic because large-scale industry in the hands of the proletariat was then (1926) growing more quickly than rural capitalism, and at the same time the dependence of all agriculture, including its capitalist part, on state large-scale industry, transport, wholesale trade and credit was growing. The development of capitalism in the countryside was taking place at the same time as the fall in the share of agricultural capital in the general production of the country. So clearly Kritsman did not see the development of rural capitalism as a serious threat, but neither did it provide grounds for complacency. The way to avoid both complacency and panic was to study the countryside, groping around for those specific forms of approach (methods of study) which corresponded to the specific peculiarities of the process of class stratification of the peasantry in the Soviet countryside - only after such work was done

would it be possible to actually study the process itself. Otherwise one would just be piling up useless data. For this reason Kritsman concentrated in this work on the elaboration of data which did not cover the majority of regions, but was detailed. Evidently this was a modest, cautious approach, and the "ideological commitment to detect a rising tide of polarisation"¹ is not its most immediately striking feature. Kritsman drew a distinction between 'dynamics' and 'statics' which amounted to distinguishing between indices of determinants of 'class stratification' (as he called it)² on the one hand, and the categorisation of individual farms as capitalist or proletarian, on the other. To say that a farm 'was becoming' capitalist was not to say, how far that process of 'becoming' had gone. He considered that the process of class stratification in the Soviet countryside was only beginning and hoped that his work would help to clarify the question. In brief, then, the concentration in this work upon detailed studies was to help develop methods of research. This required both a discussion of the historically specific context of the stratification and a critique of the other main approach to these issues, which Kritsman called the 'banal' approach.

The specific result of the antifeudal revolution (in the countryside) was the growth in the mass of independent small-scale farms, not employing wage-labour, that is, the economic rise of the middle peasantry, transforming the feudal or semi-feudal organisation of peasant agriculture. This was the economic root of the union of the proletariat and middle peasantry, strengthened after the Revolution by the NEP legalising the commodity form of connection between the state economy of the proletariat and the small farms (as well as among the small farms themselves,

of course). This was the form demanded by the interests of the farming peasantry and of small farms in general. The transition to the NEP signified the eradication of the use, on a compulsory, free of charge basis, by the poor peasants of the stock and livestock of the well-to-do. This led to the transformation of the potential of the capitalist strata of the peasantry and the deterioration among the poor of their own farming. Nevertheless Kritsman argued (page 127) that the process of class stratification was relatively slow.

In his critique of the 'banal' approach, Kritsman explicitly cautioned against the use of 'direct' indices of the development of rural capitalism such as the juridical renting of land or the hiring of wage-labour. This was because of historical circumstances, including the illegality of some of the 'direct' indices, which meant that they were partly hidden, and because he was dealing with the early stages of the process of class stratification, following the Civil War. (Elsewhere he referred to Lenin's remarks on the inappropriateness of using wage-labour as an indicator of the presence of small scale-rural capitalism, so wage-labour was not played down because it was next to nil, nor was there any 'purity' of a Marxist definition of capitalist relations in terms of wage labour to be defended ³). Kritsman defined the weak and the poor farms as those whose labour power could not be fully used on their own farm: in other words, for whom there were insufficient means of production. The prosperous (or well-to-do) farms were those whose means of production could not be fully used by means of their own labour power: in other words, for whom there was insufficient labour power. Thus in its initial stages the process of class stratification appeared as the strengthening of differences in the power (capacity) of farms. The need

to study the process of class stratification on the basis of groupings of peasant farms according to indirect indices (the extent of the farms) made the 'banal' approach to the resolution of the problem particularly dangerous. The material on the dynamics of stratification was not large and was quite ill-assorted, Kritsman argued. All these materials suffered from mistakes both in the primary sources and in the approach to the matter (methodology) not to mention mistakes in calculation. As an example of the mistakes in primary sources Kritsman (on page 139) cited an article by Vishnevsky (in Na Agrarnom Fronte, No. 5-6) which used some data from the Altaiskii Ezhegodnik for 1922/1923:

TABLE 1

Sown Area for one
Farm according to

<u>Sown Area</u> <u>Groups</u>	<u>Dynamic</u> <u>Studies</u>	<u>Short</u> <u>Budget</u> <u>Studies</u>	<u>Excess according</u> <u>to Short Budget</u> <u>Studies</u>
	<u>Dessiatines</u>		
Without sown area	—	0.98	0.98
Up to 0.5 Des	0.34	0.72	0.38
0.6 - 1.0 Des	0.85	1.41	0.56
1.1 - 2.0 Des.	1.53	2.35	0.82
2.1 - 3.0 Des.	2.49	3.78	1.29
3.1 - 4.0 Des.	3.56	4.68	1.12
4.1 - 6.0 Des.	5.02	6.11	1.09
6.1 - 8.0 Des.	6.69	7.34	0.65
8.1 - 10.0 Des.	9.59	12.0	2.41
10.1 - 16.0 Des.	12.52	15.75	3.23

Thus farms which according to the Dynamic Studies had no sown area, had (according to the more reliable data of the Short Budget Studies of the same farms at the same time) a sown area of an average around 1 dessiatine, and the range of error for other groups is evident from the right-hand column.

According to Kritsman, the entirely relative character of groupings by sown area made particularly dangerous its routine introduction into the explanation of the process of class stratification of the countryside. Under such circumstances, a judgement as to the stratification or equalisation of the peasantry was made only according to the growth or decline in the percentage of the extreme sown area groups, which in any case did not coincide with the extreme class groups of the peasantry (capitalistically exploited and exploiting). In other words, sown area in the 'banal' (or routine) approach constituted a principle of stratification, as I have called it. Kritsman argued that only a comparison of different kinds of data on the different groups of the peasantry could give sufficient material for judgement on the process of stratification of the peasantry ⁴.

Consequently, although studies of individual villages, volosti and regions were particularly 'sinful' in their approach to the matter, they contained much more detailed data which made it possible to call into question their economic analysis. In addition, because of the small extent of the region and of the groupings themselves (in particular grouping by sown area) they bore a much less abstract character because of the unified trend of agriculture (the inter-relation of different branches of agriculture) within the limits of a small region. The analysis of data on individual villages, volosti and regions gave - besides the immediate results - the chance to judge the adequacy of less detailed data on bigger territorial units (gubernii and so on) for the explanation of the process of rural class stratification.

Kritsman concluded his critique of the routine (or banal) approach by an analysis of data from six rural Soviets (sel 'sovety) in the Bogaevskii and Semikarakorskii regions of the Don area, which showed the interrelation between sown area and working livestock in 1924. The figures covered 3573 farms, and were taken from a brochure entitled The Face of the Don Countryside. The grouping by sown area gave the following results:

TABLE 2

<u>Farms</u>	<u>Percentage of all farms</u>	<u>Percentage of sown area</u>
Without sown area	15.4	—
Up to 1 Des.	23.1	4
1 - 2 Des.	15.5	7
2 - 4 Des.	19.3	19
4 - 6 Des.	11.8	19
6 - 10 Des.	9.6	25
10 - 16 Des.	3.8	16
16 - 25 Des.	1.3	8
Over 25 Des.	<u>0.2</u>	<u>2</u>
	100.0	100

These figures showed that while 54 per cent of farms disposed of only 11 per cent of sown area, less than 15 per cent of farms disposed 51 per cent of sown area. Yet while they revealed deep differences between groups of peasants distinguished by the extent of their farms, they did not show the interrelations between the different groups of peasants. It would be quite mistaken, argued Kritsman, to group peasant farms on the basis of sown area into poor, middle and prosperous. The grouping by working livestock told more of the relations of different groups of the peasantry:

TABLE 3

<u>Farms</u>	<u>Percentage of all farms</u>	<u>Percentage of working livestock</u>
Without working livestock	70.2	-
With 1 head	9.8	13
With 2 head	13.7	37
With 3 head	3.3	14
With 4 head and more	<u>3.0</u>	<u>36</u>
	100.0	100

This table showed that half the working livestock was in the hands of 24 per cent of the farms, and the other half was in the hands of 6 per cent of the farms. Regrouping the two distributions (as Kritsman did) into three groups with the large scale owning half of all working livestock (or sown area), the smaller owning the other half, and the third group consisting of farms owning no sown area or working livestock, Kritsman presented the following comparison:

TABLE 4Percentage of farms

	<u>Large-scale</u>	<u>Smaller</u>	<u>Posses- ing None</u>	<u>Total</u>
Grouping by working livestock	6	24	70	100
Grouping by sown area	15	70	15	100

This table showed that the 70 per cent of farms devoid of the basic means of production - working livestock - could not for this reason be actually independent farms, but were the objects of exploitation. According to Kritsman, the exploiting farms were hidden among the remaining 30 percent, in all probability, among the higher group classified by

working livestock. But only the comparison of both groupings, that is, by the farm and by the extent of its own means of production, uncovered the picture of the interrelations of the different groups of the peasantry. But to establish these relations more clearly it was necessary for Kritsman to examine the technical division of labour. The brochure indicated that the 'loading' on one animal was 4 dessiatines, that is, that one animal was necessary to cultivate this area. Kritsman pointed out that the loading differed in each type of farm, depending on its agricultural stock (implements), the quality of its working livestock and so on. It was less in a small-scale and greater in a large-scale farm (where one horse could provide the basis for the cultivation of a greater area). For this reason the establishment of a general norm of loading concealed the actual stratification. Nevertheless, using this norm gave the following grouping:

TABLE 5

	<u>Percentage of all farms</u>	<u>Percentage working livestock</u>	<u>The average for 1 farm of head of working livestock</u>
Without working livestock or sown area	15	-	-
Without working livestock and with sown area	55	-	-
With insufficient working livestock	4	8	1.6
With sufficient working livestock	16	39	1.8
With a surplus of working livestock	<u>10</u>	<u>53</u>	4.0
	100	100	
	—	—	

If one wished to subdivide the highest 10 per cent of farms, then 3 per cent disposed of more than 36 per cent of the working livestock, averaging 8.9 head of livestock per farm. Relating this to sown area, Kritsman produced the following table, which excludes farms with no sown area:

TABLE 6

<u>Among Farms</u>	<u>Percentage of all sown area</u>
Without working livestock and with sown area	36
With insufficient working livestock	14
With sufficient working livestock	32
With a surplus of working livestock	<u>18</u>
	100
	<hr/>

Thus the 10 per cent of farms with a surplus of working livestock officially concentrated in their hands only 18 per cent of all sown area, but actually (assuming those with insufficient livestock used half of their own land, that is, 7 per cent of all sown area), the farms with 'excess' livestock concentrated no less than 61 per cent of all sown area in their hands, according to Kritsman. Relating this to Table 5, Kritsman argued that this same 10 per cent of farms disposed of 53 per cent of working livestock and held in dependence on themselves 74 per cent of the farms. Only 16 per cent of farms, disposing of 39 per cent of the working livestock and 32 per cent of the sown area, could be considered as independent farms, neither exploiting

nor exploited, ignoring the possibility that some of these could be hiring wage-labour.

Comparing the results of the groupings by sown area and by working livestock, Kritsman found that of the 15 per cent of the farms in the highest sown area grouping, 6 per cent had insufficient working livestock, around 6 per cent had sufficient working livestock and around 3 per cent had 'excess' livestock. Of the 51 per cent of sown area which this 15 per cent of highest sown area farms disposed of, more than 20 per cent belonged to farms with insufficient working livestock, 18 per cent to farms with sufficient working livestock and only 12 per cent to farms with 'excess' working livestock. In other words, using the technical norm of the 'loading' on livestock as an index for calculating access to the means of production, Kritsman was able to establish that the grouping by sown area did not coincide with the class grouping of the peasantry. He was similarly able to establish a discrepancy between the grouping by working livestock and his class grouping of the peasantry, but it was not so great as that between sown area and class.

Despite the apparent power of this critique of the use of sown area as an index of class differentiation, Kritsman was very careful to point out its limitations as a means of analysing the class structure. The full details of these qualifications cannot be reproduced here, but they show that Kritsman understood that the above analysis did not apply to the whole of the U.S.S.R., and that among other things he understood the importance of organisational forms of the unit of production, that is, of the technical division of labour, for class analysis. Briefly though, he indicated that a part of those with no sown area

could be petty bourgeois or even capitalists in other branches of the economy than agriculture. In addition, some of those without working livestock could be petty bourgeois or even capitalists, in so far as they were not engaged in agriculture but in market gardening or viticulture (vine-growing), each of which was developed in one of the 6 sel'sovety being investigated. However, a horse was still necessary to them as means of transport. Some of the biggest farms hiring working livestock would be doing so not as exploited farms, and finally some (but not many) of the farms with insufficient working livestock might be using tractors. On the other hand, the grouping introduced above defined only by the comparison of the extent of the farms and the extent of the working livestock, employing a general norm of a loading on 1 head of livestock which concealed class stratification, did not catch exploitation on the basis of the hiring of stock, or the open exploitation on the basis of hiring day workers or time-rate workers. Having thus made his critique of the 'banal' approach and established the need to use as many indices as possible, taking account of the specific situation in different parts of the country, Kritsman was in a position to examine the few detailed studies then available which contained pertinent information.


He began with studies of individual villages. He knew of only one investigation containing serious material, which covered seven villages and five auly. It had been conducted by a commission of the South-East Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. The results were published in 1924, and it will be referred to here as the South-East study. This was followed by a study of individual volosti. To illustrate the relation of these volosti to the

overall economy, the following map shows the gubernii in which most of the volosti and villages analysed by Kritsman are to be found. The map is taken from page 71 of Grosskopf (1976) and indicates the proportion of non-peasant private property in the total cultivated surface of Russia in 1916. This in itself provides a useful pre-Revolutionary reference point for the developments in the first half of the 1920s analysed by Kritsman⁵. The map provides a rough indication of the extent of capitalist development before the Revolution in various gubernii (or provinces, as Grosskopf calls them). Unfortunately, it only covers European Russia⁶.

The material that was used by Kritsman, then, is as follows:

- A. The South East Study This consists of villages in the Don and Kuban regions of the Stavropol Gubernia and the Georgian Republic.
- B. The Agricultural Centre:
 - (i) The Nikol'skaya Volost' in Kursk Gubernia
 - (ii) The Znamenskaya Volost' and the Pavlodarskaya Volost', both in the Tambov Gubernia.
- C. The Transvolga:
 - The Malotolkaevskaya Volost' in the Samara Gubernia
- D. The Ukraine:
 - The Shamraevskaya Volost' in the Kiev Gubernia
- E. The Industrial Centre and the North-West:
 - (i) The Yaropolskaya Volost' in the Moscow Gubernia
 - (ii) The Tsurikovskaya Volost' in the Smolensk Gubernia
 - (iii) The Goritskaya Volost' in the Tver Gubernia

Proportion of Non-Peasant Private Property in the
Total Cultivated Surface in Russia in 1916



PROVINCES

- | | | | |
|---------------------|-------------------|---|-------------------|
| 1. Arkhangelsk | 20. Iaroslavl | 39. Astrakhan | 58. Baku |
| 2. Olonec | 21. Vladimir | 40. <u>Région du Dn</u> | 59. Elizavetopol |
| 3. Vologda | 22. Kostroma | 41. Kharkov | 60. Erivan |
| 4. Petrograd | 23. Nijegorod | 42. Poltava | 61. Région de Kar |
| 5. Novgorod | 24. Viatka | 43. Černigov | |
| 6. <u>Pskov</u> | 25. <u>Perm</u> | 44. <u>Kiev</u> | |
| 7. Estonie | 26. Toul'a | 45. Podolie | |
| 8. Livonie | 27. Rjasan | 46. Volynie | |
| 9. Kourlande | 28. Orel' | 47. Ekaterinoslav | |
| 10. Kovno | 29. <u>Koursk</u> | 48. Kherson | |
| 11. Vilna | 30. Voroneje | 49. Taurie | |
| 12. Grodno | 31. <u>Tambov</u> | 50. Bessarabie | |
| 13. Minsk | 32. Penza | 51. <u>Koubane</u> | |
| 14. Vitebsk | 33. Simbirsk | 52. de la mer Noire | |
| 15. Miogilev | 34. Kazan | 53. <u>Stavropol</u> | |
| 16. <u>Smolensk</u> | 35. Oufa | 54. Ter | |
| 17. Kalouga | 36. Orenbourg | 55. Dagestan | |
| 18. <u>Moscou</u> | 37. <u>Samara</u> | 56. <u>Tiflis</u> | |
| 19. <u>Tver</u> | 38. Saratov | 57. <u>Koutaï (Batoumi et Soukhoumi)</u> | |

(iv) The Prokshinskaya Volost' in the Pskov GuberniaF. . . The Urals:The Petrovskaya Volost' in the Bashkir Republic

This refers to data from three former volosti which were combined into one, and from several villages of the Chelyabinsk and Perm areas.

G. Siberia and Kazakhstan(i) The Shchuch'inskaya Volost' in the Akmolinskoy Gubernia(ii) The Alexandrovskaya Volost' in the Kustanai Gubernia(iii) The Tisul'skii Region of the Tomsk Gubernia

The Urals, Siberia and Kazakhstan are not shown on the map presented by Grosskopf.

A. The South East Study

Although this study covered only 12 villages (aul being the kind of village found in the Caucasus and Central Asia), Kritsman devoted a considerable amount of space to their analysis, on the already mentioned principle that examination of detailed studies could provide the basis for the evaluation of studies of larger territorial units. The biggest failing of the research for Kritsman was the arbitrary selection of reported data, for example, for some villages the data reported only sown area groupings, in others grouping by working livestock, and so on. Yet the data were quite interesting and relatively detailed, for example, on the decline in sown area between 1917 and 1922, followed by a rise in 1923 to about half the 1917 sown area. The research report claimed that the contemporary kulak

was different from the pre-revolutionary kulak in trying not to distinguish himself from the peasant mass. Exploitation was often hidden in the form of the 's pryaga' (a form of apparently communal use of implements) or 'nephew's service', and sown area registered as belonging to the poor in fact partly included sown area belonging to kulaks (for tax evasion purposes). Grouping by sown area gave the following picture ⁷.

TABLE 7

Staro-Mar'evskii Village : Percentage of Farms

	<u>Without</u> <u>sown area</u>	<u>Up to 2</u> <u>Des.</u>	<u>2-4</u> <u>Des.</u>	<u>4-10</u> <u>Des.</u>	<u>10-16</u> <u>Des.</u>	<u>Over 16</u> <u>Des.</u>	<u>Total</u>
1917	8.8	3.8	12.8	28.0	24.6	22.0	100.0
1920	1.3	7.0	27.0	55.0	8.5	1.1	100.0
1922	3.1	20.4	37.3	38.1	1.1	0.1	100.1
1923	7.0	13.1	2.7	44.3	11.3	1.6	100.0

Thus from 1920-1922 there was a so-called 'movement downwards' and from 1922-1923 an almost pure 'movement upwards' but from 1920-1923 there was undoubtedly differentiation by sown area.

TABLE 8

Giaqiiskii Station⁸ : Percentage of Farms

	Without sown area	Up to 1 Des.	1-2 Des.	2-4 Des.	4-6 Des.	6-8 Des.	8-10 Des.	10-13 Des.	13-16 Des.	Over 16 Des.	Total
1917	38.2	2.6	3.6	8.8	13.7	7.2	7.7	5.1	5.1	8.0	100
1920	25.1	8.4	8.5	20.6	12.1	9.8	6.2	5.3	2.0	2.0	100
1921	16.2	11.4	10.6	25.9	11.4	6.8	8.1	5.1	2.6	1.9	100
1922	15.6	5.6	9.3	24.1	18.8	11.7	7.1	4.6	2.0	1.1	100
1923	15.7	5.9	9.4	19.8	19.6	12.8	6.8	5.5	2.7	1.8	100

TABLE 9

Dyachkino Settlement : Percentage of Farms

	Up to 1 Des.	1-4 Des.	4-10 Des.	10-19 Des.	Over 19 Des.	Total
1917	27.6	12.2	28.0	16.8	15.4	100
1920	13.6	21.4	47.4	13.7	3.9	100
1921	15.4	49.4	30.9	2.4	1.9	100
1922	24.0	26.8	33.9	11.5	3.8	100
1923	13.0	24.5	29.3	23.1	10.1	100

In Staro-Mar'evskii the extreme groups grew only in the latter period. In Giagiiskii Station the same was true, although the growth in the lowest groups was completely insignificant. In Dyachkino Settlement, there was a growth only of the highest groups, evidently because farms without sown area were not distinguished from those with up to 1 dessiatine. There were no quantitative data on sown area for other villages, so Kritsman proceeded to data on the provision of working livestock used by each farm when the farms were grouped by sown area.

TABLE 10

Staro - Mar'evskii Village : Livestock per farm

	<u>Without sown area</u>	<u>Up to 2 Des.</u>	<u>2-4 Des.</u>	<u>4-10 Des.</u>	<u>10-16 Des.</u>	<u>Over 16 Des.</u>
1917	1	0.35	0.5	1.6	3	4.25
1920	-	0.27	1.03	2.22	3.65	4.1
1922	0.4	0.25	0.8	1.4	3.1	4
1923	0.07	0.08	0.36	1.9	2	2.8

The general fall in livestock did not hit the highest groups so hard (those with over 4 dessiatines of sown area). A similar pattern was evident for Dyachkino Settlement:

TABLE 11Dyachkino Settlement : Livestock per farm

	<u>Up to 1</u> <u>Des.</u>	<u>1-4</u> <u>Des.</u>	<u>4-10</u> <u>Des.</u>	<u>10-19</u> <u>Des.</u>	<u>Over 19</u> <u>Des.</u>
1917	0.12	0.73	2.24	3.64	6
1920	-	0.69	2.23	2.92	5.33
1922	0.3	0.99	1.36	1.73	3.42
1924	-	0.11	0.95	1.53	3.74

This difference in the provision of working livestock weighed most heavily on the lowest strata of the countryside, in that the number of farms without livestock grew:

TABLE 12Percentage of farms without working livestock

	<u>Dyachkino Settlement</u>	<u>Kievskii Village</u>	<u>Bystryanskii Khutor</u>
1915	-	-	11.0
1917	-	15.8	13.8
1920	24	-	53.9
1921	28	-	50.3
1922	36	-	52.1
1923	-	43.4	52.7
1924	37.5	-	-

In Bystryanskii Khutor, the farms without working livestock were almost entirely those with up to 4 dessiatines, and by 1923 they also included 42 per cent of those with between 4 and 10 dessiatines. A similar pattern was evident in the growth of farms without stock (instruments of production); in Bystryanskii Khutor 23.8 per cent of farms had no stock in 1917, 38.5 per cent in 1922 and 41.8 per cent in 1923. As with livestock, these farms were almost entirely those with up to 4 dessiatines, but also included around 40 per cent of farms between 4 and 10 dessiatines. While such evidence might suggest that at least in the South East, sown area was a reasonable index of class differentiation in the early 1920s, it was only possible to decide this on the basis of data on stock and livestock. What is most clear from this is the extent of class differentiation, and it was supported by other evidence. The researchers claimed that the hiring of stock and livestock from the prosperous farms was growing all the time in Giagiiskii Station. This sometimes occurred under the cover of 'neighbourly work' - the 's pryaga'. In Bystryanskii Khutor, the percentage of farms engaged in the 's pryaga' was as follows:

TABLE 13

Bystryanskii Khutor : percentage of farms with a sown area of:

<u>Up to 1</u> <u>Des.</u>	<u>1-4</u> <u>Des.</u>	<u>4-10</u> <u>Des.</u>	<u>10-19</u> <u>Des.</u>	<u>Over 19</u> <u>Des.</u>
92.3	87.4	69.8	92.7	100.0

The middle farms engaged in the 's pryaga' least, and when they did so, according to the researchers, they did so with other middle farms, so that it bore a cooperative character, and could

form the basis collective peasant agriculture. The lowest farms did so with the highest farms, when it amounted to a form of exploitation (a form of hiring of wage labour)⁹. There was also a growth of rural wage labour - for example, among the roughly 200 households of the Dyachkino Settlement, there were 65 batraki in 1917, 5 in 1920, 7 in 1922 and 29 in 1924. According to the researchers, this was probably an underestimate, since it was hidden by both those hiring and by the batraki themselves. In addition, work was paid for by the day but there was no fixed limit to the working day, which meant it was a quite oppressive form of employment. The prosperous farms also ruled on the grain market as the following table indicates:

TABLE 14

Purchases and Sales of Grain : Dyachkino Settlement

	<u>Farms selling grain*</u>	<u>Grain Sold per farm</u>	<u>Farms buying grain*</u>	<u>Grain bought per farm</u>
Up to 1 Des.	-	-	27	24
1-4 Des.	22	31	22	12
4-10 Des.	48	41	24	20
10-19 Des.	63	78	31	11
Over 19 Des.	100	141	25	102

* percentages within each sown area grouping.

Thus the none of the farms in the lowest group sold grain, but more than a quarter of them bought it. Furthermore the percentage selling grain increased in the groups with a larger sown area, while the percentage buying fell on the whole among these highest groups. The purpose of buying among these higher sown area groups was in any case the resale of grain later as the following table shows:

TABLE 15

Bystryanskii Khutor : percentage of grain sold
at different times of the year

Farms	In August- September	In October- November	In December- February	Total
Up to 1	-	-	-	100
1-4 Des.	74	8	-	82*
4-10 Des.	24	43	33	100
10-19 Des.	8	25	66	100
Over 19 Des.	3	15	82	100

* there is evidently a mistake in this grouping, but it does not affect the overall relationship. Probably 18 per cent was sold in December-February.

The farms with up to 4 dessiatines sold about three-quarters of their grain at the end of the summer at low prices; the farms with over 19 dessiatines sold four-fifths of their grain in the spring at higher prices. The prosperous also gained more benefits from cooperation:

TABLE 16Dyachkino Settlement

	<u>Number of Farms</u>	<u>Members of Cooperative</u>	<u>Percentage in Cooperative</u>
Up to 1 Des.	27	2	7
1- 4 Des.	51	8	16
4-10 Des.	61	20	33
10-19 Des.	48	14	29
Over 19 Des.	21	9	43

This refers to a consumer cooperative with a membership fee of 5 roubles, and could be compared with the figures provided by Yakovlev in the brochure "Our Countryside." 10

TABLE 17Percentage of Farms

	<u>Up to 1 Des.</u>	<u>1-4 Des.</u>	<u>4-10 Des.</u>	<u>10-19 Des.</u>	<u>Over 19 Des.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Among members of cooperatives	4	15	38	26	17	100
Among non-members	16	28	26	22	8	100

The only contrary evidence in the South East Study was a remark that the poor predominated in a cooperative with a membership fee of 1 rouble 50 kopecks, but no data were provided. The overall picture is sustained by the access of the prosperous to credit cooperatives:

TABLE 18

Dyachkino Settlement

	Number of farms	Members of credit coop- eratives	Percent in credit coopera- tive	Number receiving credit	Percent receiving credit	Roubles per farm receiving credit
Up to 1 Des.	27	1	4	-	-	-
1- 4 Des.	51	24	47	-	-	-
4-10 Des.	61	26	43	8	13	74
10-19 Des.	48	32	67	11	23	87
Over 19 Des.	21	18	86	3	14	100

According to the researchers, the same farms were receiving credit who were exploiting the poor by means of the 'spryaga' and 'working off' (as a form of repayment). The poor in the credit cooperative received no credit, but 7 cases were recorded of credit being given to the poor by the kulaks. There was a similar situation in Bystryanskii Khutor:

TABLE 19Bystryanskii Khutor

	Number of members of credit cooperative.	Number receiv- ing credit.	Roubles per farm receiving credit
Up to 1 Des.	-	-	-
1-4 Des.	13	-	-
4-10 Des.	15	5	100
10-19 Des.	15	5	88
Over 19 Des.	3	1	50

The prosperous farms also paid relatively less agricultural tax. In Vinodel'ny the rate of tax per desscantine of sown area was as follows:

TABLE 20Vmodel'ny Village: Agricultural Tax

<u>Farms of Sown area</u>	<u>Roubles per farm</u>
Up to 2 Des.	5.2
2 - 4 Des.	5.6
4 - 10 Des.	12.1
10 - 16 Des.	14.5
Over 16 Des.	11.6

Thus farms with a greater sown area paid less tax per dessiatine, partly because they obtained reductions due to a better knowledge of the law and better farm management. Even the Committee of Mutual Aid ran enterprises which were profitable for the prosperous, effectively making it a committee of 'self-supply'.

The data on the Georgian countryside were quite scanty. The researchers had claimed that there was a growth of the middle type of peasantry, but this was on the basis of provision of land. They also provided the following table, showing that differentiation was beginning again in 1923. (It should be borne in mind that there was famine in 1921 in the U.S.S.R.).

TABLE 21

Working Livestock in Georgia : percentage of farms

	<u>Without Working livestock</u>	<u>With 1 head</u>	<u>With 2 head</u>	<u>With 3 head</u>	<u>With 4 head</u>	<u>Total</u>
1920	17.3	47.9	26.4	5.5	2.9	100
1922	27.9	49.3	19.4	2.8	0.6	100
1923	19.1	44.9	27.4	6.3	2.3	100

The percentage of farms without sown area in Georgia were 1920-5.8, 1922-6.5, 1923-3.1, so the number of (presumably dependent) farms grew, that is, those with a sown area but no working livestock.

Kritsman concluded his analysis of the South East Study by saying that despite the partial and somewhat chaotic nature of the data, there was no doubt that a process of (class) stratification of the peasantry was taking place, with the lowest groups in terms of sown area being transformed by their dependence on the highest groups, so that they were working with alien means of production, and with the growth of rural wage labour, although its extent was not clear. I have discussed this part of Kritsman's analysis at some length both because it is a good example of how to re-work rather poor data and because it gives an idea of the sort of processes taking place at village level.

B. The Agricultural Centre

B. (i) Nikol'skaya Volost', Kursk Gubernia

These figures were much more systematic than the South East Study and all referred to the same subject of research - the volost'. Yet they were much less detailed, and did not include the farms which had been liquidated between 1917 and 1922. This undersampling was quite significant for 1917 and less so for 1922. The following table compared the survey by Yakovlev published in 1923 with the results of the agricultural census:

TABLE 22

	<u>Farms</u>		<u>Population</u>		<u>Sown Area</u>	
	Survey	Census	Survey	Census	Survey	Census
1917	100	100	100	100	100	100
1920	119	101	103	98	119	89
1922	126	101	109	95	120	94

Kritsman also discussed the undersampling in terms of absolute figures. For this reason, Kritsman proposed to compare both sets of figures where possible. The survey gave the following distribution of farms by sown area:

TABLE 23Percentage of farms

	<u>Without sown area</u>	<u>Up to 1 Des.</u>	<u>1-2 Des.</u>	<u>2-4 Des.</u>	<u>4-8 Des.</u>	<u>8-13 Des.</u>	<u>Over 13 Des.</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>n</u>
1917	16.5	12.5	18	23.5	20	7.5	2	100	612
1920	5	6	14	39.5	32	3	0.5	100	730
1922	4	7	15.5	42	29	2.5	-	100	775

Thus the middle groupings by sown area grew. Such a result was, said Kritsman, usually taken to mean that a process of equalisation rather than stratification was taking place. A similar result appeared in a grouping by (official) land-holding. However, the distribution by working livestock gave a somewhat different impression:

TABLE 24

	Without working livestock	With 1 head	With 2 head	With 3 head	With 4 head	With 5 head and more	Total
1917	24	36	26	9.5	2.5	2	100
1920	19.5	57.5	18.5	4	0.5	0	100
1922	22.5	64	12.5	1	0	0	100

However, the actual meaning of these tables was only possible if one compared them (the figures in brackets are those from the agricultural census):

TABLE 25Percentage of farms

	Without land	Without sown area	Without working livestock	Excess of farms without working livestock over farms without sown area	Hiring horses
1917	6	17 (10)	24 (18)	7 (8)	8
1920	0.6	5	19.5	14.5	15
1922	0.4	4	22.5	18.5	26

While there was a steady decline in the proportion of farms without land or sown area, after 1920 there was an increase in the percentage of farms without working livestock. In addition there was a steady increase in the percentage of farms hiring horses. Kritsman calculated that the number of farms hiring horses was directly proportional to the excess of farms without

working livestock over farms without sown area, so the hiring of horses was clearly a direct economic necessity for those farms with a sown area but no livestock. Not only horseless farms hired horses, as could be seen from the 1922 figures. Often they were hired by one-horse farms because of some misfortune, such as the horse being ill. The main conclusion which Kritsman drew from this data was that in 1917 farms without livestock did not sow, that is did not conduct their farming, but in 1920 and especially in 1922, they did conduct their farm with alien working livestock. The acuteness of the change between 1917 and 1920 showed that this process of hidden transition of farms to an essentially proletarian state took place to a significant degree during "War Communism".

It was impossible to forget that simultaneously with the growth in such hidden forms of capitalist exploitation went the decline in open forms, so that with the transition to the NEP the extent of capitalist exploitation was not very great. It was possible to estimate this by the number of farms without working livestock. The transformation of more small farms into capitalist ones doubtless took place in connection with the lowering (economically) of those very farms possessing means of production. With the sharpening of competition, this phenomenon would doubtless begin to disappear. The farms with a small sown area were predominant in hiring horses:

TABLE 26

Percentage of farms within each sown area grouping who hired horses
(1922)

Without sown area	Up to 1 Des.	1-2 Des.	2-4 Des.	4-10 Des.	Over 10 Des.
20	58	33	19	12	-

This picture was confirmed by the data on stock, the other main means of production:

TABLE 27

Number of farms

	Without stock	Excess of those without stock over those without sown area	Renting ploughs, <u>sokhi</u> and harrows
1917	168	67	34
1920	168	132	94
1922	172	141	118

Again the hiring of implements was proportional to the excess of farms without stock over farms without sown area, so the hiring of stock was evidently necessary for those farms with a sown area but no implements. This was confirmed by the following data showing that farms with little sown area were the ones hiring implements:

TABLE 28Percentages of farms . . renting stock

	Without some area or with up to 2 Des	With sown area over 2 Des.
1917	7	5
1922	33	9

Thus the basic forms of dependence of the weak on the prosperous farms were the hiring of horses and the renting of stock, although this dependence was covered by the use among the peasants themselves of the terms 'family', 'friendly' or 'neighbourly' help.

There was also clear evidence of changes in the hiring of wage labour (in open form):

TABLE 29Number of farms hiring

	Time-Rate Workers	Day and Piece-Rate Workers	Total
1917	17	13	30
1920	7	18	25
1922	3	31	34

Parallel to the decline in time-rate workers was the increase in day and piece-rate workers, yet official statistics only recorded time-rate workers. (Presumably this is why it appeared to Shanin to be next to nil, although in percentage terms the figure for this volost' was still pretty low). The number of farms engaged in the so-called 'promysly' grew. There were 126 farms in 1917, 114 in 1920 and 148 in 1922. (The term 'promysly' is usually translated as 'handicrafts and trades'.) The extreme sown area groups above all were engaged in 'promysly':

TABLE 30

Percentage of farms with 'domestic promysly'
within each sown area group

Without sown area	Up to 1 Des.	1-2 Des.	2-6 Des.	6-10 Des.	10-13 Des.
60	28	22	15	20	50

Kritsman concluded that these 'promysly' indicated the growth in the sale by the poor of their labour power.¹¹ Of 25 farms renting out their land in 1922, 19 had no livestock. In contrast, 232 farms (29 per cent of all farms) since the Revolution had constructed new buildings or made capital repairs to the old, all the more striking in an area without wood, which implies that such repairs or constructions required the purchase of at least the materials. The prosperous farms sold proportionately more grain:

TABLE 31

Percentage of farms selling grain
within each sown area group

Without sown area	Up to 4 Des.	4-8 Des.	8-10 Des.	10-13 Des.
13	18	26	33	50

The research report also claimed that the tax in kind particularly hit the weakest farms, unlike the razverstka (requisition) system of the old economic policy. During "War Communism" the president of the sel'sovet was usually a poor or middle peasant, according to the report, whereas under the NEP it was usually a prosperous peasant. To sum up the study of Nikol'skaya Volost', Kritsman argued that the years 1920-1923 showed an indubitable process of proletarianisation (an increase in the proportion of farms without stock or livestock) and an increase in work with alien livestock and agricultural implements (so that the means of production were in essence being used as capital). This was a process of class stratification of the peasantry, at the same time as the grouping by sown area showed a sharp decline in the extreme groups, that is, an equalisation.

B. (ii)a. Znamenskaya Volost', Tambov Gubernia

This study, like the preceding one, was conducted by Yakovlev and published in 1924. It was free from the under-sampling error of the previous study and was more systematic, if less detailed. The sown area grouping gave the following

stratification:

TABLE 32

Percentage of farms with a sown area of

	Without sown area and up to 0.1 Des.	0.1-2 Des.	2-4 Des.	4-6 Des.	6-10 Des.	10-16 Des.	16-25 Des.	Total
1920	2.1	17.1	31.0	29.1	20.1	0.6	0	100
1923	5.7	17.9	25.8	23.8	22.1	4.2	0.5	100

Even using the criterion of sown area, the stratification process was more intense than this table indicates, Kritsman argued. He supported this claim by showing the proportion of the total sown area held by each sown area grouping, as well as the population in each sown area grouping. This is not reproduced here, but the population was, as Kritsman argues, concentrated in the smallest sown area groupings, and the total sown area of the smaller farms fell, even though the number of such farms grew. In my view, this is hardly compatible with Chayanov's biological life cycle explanation of rural differentiation, although there was a population increase among the highest sown area farms (over 10 dessiatines). The average sown area per farm changed as follows:

TABLE 33

Average Sown Area per farm (in dessiatines) within each sown
area group

	0.1-2 Des.	2-4 Des.	4-6 Des.	6-10 Des.	10-16 Des.	16-25 Des.
1920	1.21	2.91	4.60	7.13	11.25	-
1923	1.03	2.89	4.82	7.38	11.28	19.00

At the same time there was, especially among the bourgeois peasantry, a fall in the old "large families" and the establishment of a family of bourgeois type, as the following table shows:

TABLE 34

Average family size per farm, within
each sown area group

	Without sown area and up to 0.1 Des.	0.1-2 Des.	2-4 Des.	4-6 Des.	6-10 Des.	10-16 Des.	16-25 Des.
1920	4.3	3.8	4.5	6.3	8.9	13.7	-
1923	4.2	4.1	4.5	5.6	7.0	7.7	11.7

This indicated a complete change in the character of the sown area groups, as could be seen from changes in the sown area per person within each sown area group:

TABLE 35

Changes in sown area per person (in dessiatines),
within each sown area group

	0.1-2 Des.	2-4 Des.	4-6 Des.	6-10 Des.	10-16 Des.	16-25 Des.
1920	0.32	0.65	0.73	0.80	0.82	-
1923	0.25	0.64	0.86	1.05	1.46	1.62

Kritsman argued that this was a whole revolution. The difference between the average sown area per person in the lowest and highest groups changed from $2\frac{1}{2}$ times in 1920 to $6\frac{1}{2}$ times in 1923. The commodity character of the highest groups was

indicated by the fact that in them were concentrated the special crops, as was evident in the case of flax:

TABLE 36

Distribution of farms, total sown area and
flax production

	Without sown area and Up to 2 Des.	2-6 Des.	6-10 Des.	Over 10 Des.	Total
Farms	24	49	22	5	100
Total Sown Area	4	44	38	14	100
Flax Production	0	32	43	25	100

The highest sown area groups also predominated in terms of productive livestock:

TABLE 37

Percentage of farms, population, sown area and
livestock, within lack sown area group for 1920 and 1923*

		Farms	Population	Sown Area	Pigs	Young Horned Live-stock	Grown Sheep	Cows
Without sown area and up to 2 Des.	1920	19.2	12.6	5.2	25.0	25.0	5.1	13.7
	1923	23.6	18.0	4.3	15.4	13.2	7.4	16.1
2-6 Des.	1920	60.1	55.4	56.9	50.0	50.0	55.1	60.8
	1923	49.6	46.1	44.1	19.2	43.9	38.0	47.9
6-10 Des.	1920	20.1	30.6	36.2	25.0	25.0	38.0	24.6
	1923	22.1	28.6	38.0	34.6	33.7	41.5	28.3
Over 10 Des.	1920	0.6	1.4	1.7	0	0	1.4	0.9
	1923	4.7	7.3	13.6	30.8	9.2	13.1	7.7

* each column for each year sums to 100 per cent.

However, Kritsman also attempted his usual comparison of farms without sown area and farms without livestock:

TABLE 38

Percentage of farms

	Without sown area	Without working livestock	Excess of those without working livestock over those without sown area
1920	2.1	29.9	27.8
1923	5.7	51.2	45.5

This indicated that there was a colossal growth in the number of farms being run with alien working livestock. The loss of working livestock was borne primarily by the lowest sown area groups:

TABLE 39

Percentage of farms without working livestock,
within each sown area group

	Without sown area and up to 0.1 Des.	0.1-2 Des.	2-4 Des.	4-6 Des.	6-10 Des.	Over 10 Des.
1920	85.7	67.5	37.7	13.8	4.5	-
1923	97.4	91.1	69.7	34.1	15.1	-

The same process was indicated by the number of working horses per farm (not reproduced here), but the evidence of class differentiation in terms of stock was not so clear: in 1920 37.1 per cent of farms had no stock at all, as against 37.7 in

1923. Similarly for complex machinery, 86.8 per cent of the farms had none in 1920, as against 89.6 per cent in 1923. However, the stock tended over the three years to become concentrated in the highest sown area groups. Kritsman showed this in various tables, but I have chosen one which compares working horses with ploughs and complex machinery in percentage terms, which makes it comparable with Table 37:

TABLE 40

Percentage of working horses, ploughs and complex machinery,
within each sown area group for 1920 and 1923*

		<u>Working horses</u>	<u>Ploughs</u>	<u>Complex Machinery</u>
Without sown area and up to 2 Des.	1920	7.1	3.1	4.2
	1923	3.3	1.5	0
2-6 Des.	1920	57.6	47.3	38.9
	1923	44.5	31.6	13.2
6-10 Des.	1920	33.3	47.3	52.1
	1923	39.0	47.8	53.8
Over 10 Des.	1920	2.0	2.3	4.8
	1923	13.2	19.1	33.0

* each column for each year sums to 100 per cent

These figures seem to corroborate the analysis of the distribution of stock and livestock by Grosskopf based on figures referring to the overall economy. Kritsman summarised these results as follows: the lowest sown area groups (up to 2 dessiatines) had lost a little sown area, but a great deal of stock and livestock, and were thus using alien means of production. The middle groups (2-6 dessiatines) had lost sown area, but

this had been offset by the decline in the number of farms and in population; however the loss of stock had been much greater than the loss of sown area. In the group from 6-10 dessiatines, the position was not definite. The highest group (over 10 dessiatines) had a concentration, not only of sown area (officially), but also stock and livestock. The data did not allow the grouping by livestock, nor the comparison of the extent of the farms (sown area) with the extent of means of production. But if one proceeded from the number of farms without working livestock and from the average sown area per farm within each sown area group, it was possible to estimate the sown area of farms without livestock:

TABLE 41

Estimate of the sown area of farms without livestock

	Sown area in Des.	(a) as a percentage of total sown area	Excess of no. of farms without livestock over no. of farms without sown area	(c) as a percentage of total no. of farms
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1920	487	18½	186	28
1923	913	31	314	46
Percent- tage increase	+ 87		+ 69	

Thus the number of farms being run without working livestock grew, but their sown area grew more quickly and the capitalist farms

in this way held in their hands almost half the farms with almost one third of the sown area. Farms with insufficient livestock were not counted in this calculation, nor were farms with no stock or not enough stock, nor, finally, were the open forms of capitalist exploitation (day and time-rate labour). On the basis of this picture of concentration of the means of production in the highest sown area groups, Kritsman used the data available to describe the inter-relations between the groups.

Between 1920 and 1923, over 8 per cent of the farms emigrated or were liquidated; two-thirds of these farms in 1920 had no horses, and four-fifths of them had no stock. The same could be seen from the sown area groupings:

TABLE 42

Percentage of farms which emigrated or became extinct, 1920-1923

Without sown area	Up to 2 Des.	2-4 Des.	4-6 Des.	6-10 Des.	10-16 Des.
86	23	6	1.5	0.8*	0

* this is an estimate since the figure given is 'less than 1'

The farms without sown area in 1920 had almost fully disappeared during the three years, and since the number of such farms almost trebled up to 1923 (see Table 32) this was because of other farms losing their sown area. Farms without means of production were compelled to rent it: Eighty per cent of farms hiring horses were horseless farms, or to put

it another way, 67 per cent of all horseless farms hired livestock of some kind (74 per cent if one excluded farms without sown area which were effectively not being run as farms). Of the remaining horseless farms (these not hiring stock) most ploughed by some other means: cow, bullock, pulling a scraper by hand, or harnessing themselves to the plough. Clearly these 'independent' farms were ones which could find no buyer for their labour power. The renting of stock showed a similar pattern: of those renting stock, 73 per cent were horseless farms, and 27 per cent were farms with horses. After a critique of a table showing the hiring of stock, livestock and workers according to a conventional definition of poor, middle and prosperous peasants (bednyaki, serednyaki, zazhitochnye), a critique which showed that the peasant running his own farm was one step from giving it up and renting out the land, Kritsman examined the renting of land for arable or fodder purposes:

TABLE 43

Renting of land, by sown area groups

	Up to 2 Des.	2-6 Des.	6-10 Des.	Over 10 Des.	Total
Farms	24	49	22	5	100
Sown Area	4	44	38	14	100
Rented Arable Land	1	28	47	24	100
Rented Haymaking Land	0	19	48	33	100

Thus the farms with highest sown area were renting in extra land, particularly for haymaking. All farms over 10 dessiatines were renting extra land, as were 77.6 per cent of farms between 6 and 10 dessiatines. Even state land was being rented by the peasants, and between one-third and one half of the weakest farms were renting out land, that is, no less than 15 per cent of all farms.

There were no data on wage-labour, but data were available on the so-called 'promysly'. The number of farms engaged in 'promysly' declined slightly between 1920 and 1923; in percentage points the decline was from 22.2 per cent to 20.9 per cent. However, closer examination revealed a different aspect to this decline:

TABLE 44

		<u>Farms with 'promysly'</u>							
		Without sown area and up to 0.1 <u>Des.</u>	Up to 2 <u>Des.</u>	2-4 <u>Des.</u>	4-6 <u>Des.</u>	6-10 <u>Des.</u>	10-16 <u>Des.</u>	<u>Total</u>	Overall Percen- tage
Number of farms	1920	7	43	46	33	19	0	148	22.2
	1923	37	53	25	14	14	1	144	20.9
Percen- tage of farms	1920	50	38	22	17	14	-	-	22.2
	1923	95	43	14	9	9	3	-	20.9
Percen- tage of men working in 'promysly'	1920	42	36	21	13	6	-	-	16.2
	1923	83	45	14	6	6	2	-	16.4

Thus 'promysly' were not 'trades and crafts' in the sense in applicable to an 'independent' farm. The highest sown area farms were most engaged in special crop production (see Table 36), yet their commitment to 'promysly' declined, and the percentage of male workers engaged in 'promysly' rose dramatically among the lowest sown area groups. Kritsman does not say so in so many words, but it is reasonable to conclude that this was a hidden form of wage-labour.

The prosperous farms also made most use of co-operation:

TABLE 45

Farm membership of co-operatives in 1923*

	Without sown area and up to 0.1 Des.	0.1-2 Des.	2-4 Des.	4-6 Des.	6-10 Des.	10-16 Des.	16-25 Des.	Total	Overall Percen- tage
Number of farms in co- operatives	7	16	29	74	116	29	4	275	-
Percen- tage of all farms in co- operatives	2.5	6	10.5	27	42	10.5	1.5	100	-
Percen- tage of all farms within sown area group	18	13	16	45	76	100	100	-	40
*Distribution of farms not in co- operatives	8	25.5	36	21.5	9	0	0	100	

The highest sown area groups (over 10 dessiatines) were all members of co-operatives. Although only 5 per cent of all farms, they were 12 per cent of co-operative members. Comparing the middle row with the distribution of farms not in co-operatives, it was clear that more than half the co-operative members had a sown area of over 6 dessiatines, whereas almost 70 per cent of the non-members had less than 4 dessiatines. The research report claimed that these co-operatives were only used as a cover for the large-scale peasants to rent government land. The poor peasants' share in these co-operatives were de facto the property of their rich relatives, according to the research report. Deliveries at the local railway station for one co-operative, for example, were not transported to the village co-operatively. Each farm had to transport its own seed loan from the station for itself. No-one, not even a relative, carried the seed free to any horseless farm. The transport charges were quite high. Similarly in the autumn each farm had to carry away its own harvest independently. The attitude of the peasants not entering co-operatives (due to poverty) to the agricultural co-operatives was very hostile. Sometimes wage-labourers were described by those hiring them as members of the artel'. However, some of the artely were typically composed of serednyaki. The prosperous also used the Committees of Mutual Aid, and predominated among the leadership. These committees only helped themselves and were composed of those who needed no help. Only those who could provide shoes and clothes for their children sent them to school. Even the tax burden fell most heavily on the poor, since they paid tax on the harvest they paid to those who had ploughed their land, or on the harvest of

the land they had rented out, whereas the larger farms renting the land, who disposed of the harvest, paid no tax on it.

In general the analysis of Znamenskaya Volost' confirmed the analysis of the data from the other regions. Hence the stratification of the peasantry took place significantly more quickly than could be judged from the movements in the percentages of the extreme sown area groupings. This circumstance was not surprising for the grouping was produced on the basis of data of sown area of 'one's own' farm juridically, and not in the economic sense of sown area, and hence were consciously distorted by the population.

B (ii) b. Pavlodarskaya Volost', Tambov Gubernia

This analysis was based on a report by G. Dronin, published in 1923, and suffered from the same problem as the Nikol'skaya Volost'. It counted only farms existing in 1922 and did not count farms which had been liquidated in 1922. For 1917 this undersampling comprised 11.4 per cent of all farms, and 10.8 per cent of the population. The significance of this for the weak farms could be seen by comparing their distribution on various indices in the survey with their distribution in the agricultural census:

TABLE 46

	<u>Percentages of farms in 1917</u>		
	<u>Without sown area</u>	<u>Without working livestock</u>	<u>Without cows</u>
Survey	4.5	21.4	12.5
Census	13.5	33.5	24.3

The sown area grouping showed the following changes:

TABLE 47

Percentages of farms with sown area

	Without sown area	Up to 1 Des.	1-2 Des.	2-4 Des.	4-7 Des.	7-10 Des.	10-15 Des.	Over 15 Des.	Total
1917	4.5	7.0	18.0	32.9	22.5	9.4	3.5	2.2	100
1920	3.0	3.5	17.3	42.2	28.0	5.3	0.7	-	100
1922	3.4	6.2	18.4	36.1	27.4	6.6	1.8	1.0	100

Evidently there was an equalisation from 1917 to 1920 and stratification from 1920 to 1922, but the grouping by working livestock bore a different character:

TABLE 48

Percentage of farms with working livestock

	Without working livestock	With 1 horse	With 2 horses	With 3 horses	With 4 horses and more	Total
1917	21.4	43.3	27.7	5.3	2.3	100
1920	36.3	49.4	13.0	1.2	0.3	100
1922	49.3	46.4	4.2	0.1	-	100

The volost' suffered quite a lot in 1920-1921 from banditry which killed off a significant part of the working and other livestock.

TABLE 49

Distribution of stock among farms:percentages

	Without any agricultural stock	Without plough or sokha	With sokha & without plough	With plough & without sokha	With plough and sokha	Total
1917	23.8	3.5	29.9	6.9	35.9	100
1920	29.2	4.9	27.1	9.7	29.1	100
1922	33.0	8.1	23.1	10.1	25.7	100

Judging by these groupings there was a general process of impoverishment. (The sokha was a kind of wooden plough). Kritsman tried to show the actual situation by comparing farms without sown area, farms without stock, and farms without livestock.

TABLE 50

	<u>Percentages of farms</u>			<u>Without sokha or plough*</u>	<u>Excess of farms without sokha or plough over farms without sown area</u>
	<u>Without sown area</u>	<u>Without working livestock</u>	<u>Excess of farms without livestock or over farms without sown area</u>		
1917	4.5 (13.5)	21.4 (33.5)	16.9 (20.0)	27.3	22.8
1920	3.0	36.3	33.3	34.1	31.1
1922	3.4	49.3	45.9	41.1	37.7

*This appears to be columns 1 and 2 of Table 49 added together

There was thus a clear and quite significant growth in farms without stock or livestock which were nevertheless running as farms. The figures in brackets were those of the agricultural census, so the effects of undersampling were not too great in this respect. Kritsman drew attention to the difference between the compulsory use of means of production by the poor in the early post-Revolutionary years and the later, dependent use of stock and livestock. However, the compulsion had not been heavy in the early years since many of the poor were at the front. There was only anecdotal evidence in the report on the hiring of livestock and stock, but apparently the conditions for doing so were burdensome. The peasantry were concentrating on repair and construction work on their own farms, despite the lack of wooden materials. Kritsman pointed out that the horseless farms could not be bringing the wood, and were giving themselves into servitude

in buying ready-made constructions. The report mentioned the development of renting land of up to 9, 13 and even 18 dessiatines and said "The conditions of exploitation of labour and of renting land out of the state funds and from the sovkhozy favour the process of growth of a new bourgeoisie at the expense of the Soviet state and the poor."

The report claimed that those hanging on to farms did so because there was not enough work outside the farm, and that this process could not last for long. While not objecting to this as the reason for the poor staying on their farms, Kritsman pointed out that the situation was that the poor were running their farms with alien means of production, a hidden form of proletarianisation which accounted for the relatively few farms without sown area, and which showed why this state of affairs could be a long-lasting one.

The Pavlodarskaya Volost' research was interesting because it gave the chance to compare the groupings by sown area, working livestock and stock with the general grouping by wealth which it also used. The wealth groups were defined as follows, with Kritsman's punctuation:

- "(1) Prosperous - those with full (?) presence of livestock, both working and productive (!), and with a male work force and agricultural stock.
- (2) Middle - those with a partial (?) presence of the above
- (3) Weak - those with a lack of working livestock, a small quantity of productive livestock and a decline (?) in agricultural stock. 'Promysly', as a rare phenomenon, is only taken into account in the volost' when the degree of prosperity depends on it."

This definition of degree of wealth gave the following results:

TABLE 51

Percentage of farms

	<u>Prosperous</u>	<u>Middle</u>	<u>Weak</u>	<u>Total</u>
1917	23	47.2	29.8	100
1922	4.5	38.2	57.3	100

The effects of this theoretical vagueness were shown by Kritsman by comparing the percentages of 'weak' farms with other relevant indices:

TABLE 52

Comparison of percentages of farms

	<u>Weak</u>	<u>Without working livestock</u>	<u>Without plough or sokha</u>	<u>Without sown area</u>	<u>Without sown area and up to 2 Des.</u>	<u>Without sown area and up to 4 Des.</u>
1917	29.8	21.4	27.3	4.5	29.5	62.4
1922	57.3	49.3	41.1	3.4	28.0	64.1

Neither the farms without horses nor those without stock exhausted the number of weak farms dependent on other farms, which apparently included those farms with stock but without livestock, and vice versa. In 1917 the lack of stock seemed fundamental, but in 1922 it was the lack of livestock which placed the weak in great dependence on the more powerful households (the impossibility not only of cultivating the land, but also of transport both of produce and of things bought in). The comparison showed that neither in 1917 nor in 1922 did the number without sown area correspond to the weak, but if in 1917 those with no sown area or up to 2 dessiatines roughly corresponded to the weak, then in 1922 it was those with up to 4 dessiatines. In other words, those sowing 2-4 dessiatines had changed from petty-bourgeois to proletarian farms (although hidden).

On the basis of a similar comparison for the prosperous, Kritsman concluded that if in 1917 not all two horse farms were prosperous, in 1922 all farms with two or more horses were prosperous. In 1917 most farms with a plough and sokha were prosperous, but in 1922 this was not enough to be prosperous. It was more difficult to draw conclusions about the middle peasants; in 1917 they roughly coincided with the numbers owning one horse, whereas in 1922 some of those with one horse (evidently those lacking stock) were weak. At the same time there was an increase in the proportion of middle farms with a plough and sokha by 1922, and their sown area also increased. This raised doubts about the definition of middle farms: the partial presence of necessary means of production could mean that they were insufficient in the means of production, that is, weak farms. In addition, a small quantity of productive livestock (yet with the necessary means of production) could mean that they were actually middle farms in the sense of independent but not exploiting. Yet despite all the inadequacies of the data on the Pavlodarskaya Volost', it showed the same process of stratification as the more detailed data collected earlier.

C. The Transvolga

Malotolkaevskaya Volost', Samara Gubernia

This was based on a report by M. Prokontsev, published in 1923. The data on this volost' were very scanty. There was 22 per cent undersampling of farms in 1917, and 30 per cent in 1920. The volost' had undergone famine and from 1920 to 1922 lost almost half its working horses, two-fifths of its cows, almost three-quarters of its sheep, more than 90 per cent of its pigs, and one quarter of its ploughs and machines. The sown area grouping gave the following results:

TABLE 53Percentage of farms with a sown area of

	<u>Without sown area</u>	<u>Up to 1 Des.</u>	<u>1-3 Des.</u>	<u>3-5 Des.</u>	<u>5-7 Des.</u>	<u>7-10 Des.</u>	<u>10-15 Des.</u>	<u>Over 15 Des.</u>	<u>Total</u>
1917	1	6	26	25	19	12	6	5	100
1920	2	13	44	26	10	4	1	-	100
1922	4	19	50	19	6	2	0	-	100

This showed an apparent overall decline in sown area. Other groupings were not produced by the survey, unfortunately, but there was a comparison of the number of farms, working horses and agricultural stock:

TABLE 54Number of farms, working horses and agricultural stock

	<u>Farms</u>	<u>Working Horses</u>	<u>Ploughs</u>	<u>Agricultural Machinery</u>
1917	889	2040	927	830
1920	997	1553	947	857
1922	1054	784	703	596

Clearly a significant part of the peasantry in 1922 conducted their farms with the help of alien working horses and agricultural stock. In particular it was noted that the report said that for ploughing two or more horses were harnessed together (the ploughs were two-horsed, the soil was solid). In 1922, almost half the farms had no working livestock, as the following table showed.

TABLE 55Distribution of farms, livestock and stock in 1922

	<u>Farms</u>	<u>Number of working horses</u>	<u>Ploughs</u>	<u>Machines</u>
Prosperous	157	297	209	258
Middle	419	416	670	287
Weak	<u>478</u>	<u>71</u>	<u>124</u>	<u>51</u>
Total	<u>1054</u>	<u>784</u>	<u>1003</u>	<u>596</u>

This suggests that the 1922 figure for ploughs in Table 54 should be 1,003, but there are few misprints in this work. The table demonstrated that around 410 (weak) farms had no working livestock (that is, around 39 per cent of farms), and about 354 had no ploughs (of whom 41 had no sown area). Kritsman paid no other attention to the grouping by wealth because it was not shown in the report how the categories were defined. The report claimed that the costs to the poor of hiring livestock were extraordinarily high, but the prosperous paid a low rent to the poor who rented out land to them. It also claimed that the poor, not having the strength to cope with the land which remained after the distribution according to the number (in the family), were compelled to give their allotment to peasants with horses and stock, either for rent or for cultivation. The poor often worked as day workers not because they needed to, but to 'work off' (as a way of paying for) the use of horses, stock, seed grain and other things. The prosperous parts of the peasantry often bought horses in Siberia. The following data on the interrelation of time-rate and day workers was interesting:

TABLE 56

The hire of workers

	<u>Time-rate</u> <u>in person-months</u>	<u>Day-rate</u> <u>in person-months</u>
1917	635	519
1922	41	483

Time-rate working had almost been extinguished, but day working had hardly diminished, being used during harvesting and threshing. The count of hired labour, especially day workers, was without doubt not complete in 1922 (and was far from full for day workers in 1917) but it

did express the change in the hiring of time-rate workers. If it was counted in person-months (at 25 working days in a month) then the open hiring of labour on a daily basis was 3 per cent in 1917 and 32 per cent in 1922.

D. The Ukraine

Shamraevskaya Volost', Kiev Gubernia

This analysis was based on a report by Z. Tsybul'skii, published in 1923. There was no undersampling, compared to the agricultural census. It was correctly remarked in the report that Kiev Gubernia was the region of the sugar industry, which had a great influence on the peasant economy. In the town of Shamraevka itself there was a sugar factory which was starting to have an economic relation with the peasantry. Nevertheless, there was not a sound on the sown area of sugar beet or its distribution in the report. There was the same banal sown area grouping without understanding that the sown area of beetroot was the determinant feature of a sugar beet region. The sown area grouping gave the following picture of equalisation, slowing down in the period 1920-1922:

TABLE 57

Percentage of farms with sown area of

	Without sown area	Up to $\frac{1}{2}$ Des.	From $\frac{1}{2}$ -1 Des.	1-2 Des.	2-3 Des.	3-5 Des.	5-8 Des.	Over 8 Des.	Total
1917	10.8	5.9	14.8	39.4	15.4	11	2.2	0.5	100
1920	3.7	2.9	15.2	49.4	17.4	9.8	1.5	0.1	100
1922	3.8	2.9	17.7	48	17	9.2	1.3	0.1	100

The grouping by working livestock bore a similar character:

TABLE 58

Percentage of farms with working livestock of

	<u>Without working livestock</u>	<u>With 1 head</u>	<u>With 2 head</u>	<u>With 3 head</u>	<u>With 4 head</u>	<u>Total</u>
1917	46	8	43	1	2	100
1920	45	14	38	1.5	1.5	100
1922	49	28	22	0	0	99

On stock there was only the following data:

TABLE 59

Percentage of farms with stock

	<u>Without any stock</u>	<u>Without plough</u>	<u>With plough</u>	<u>Total</u>
1917	50	20.3	29.7	100
1920	54.2	20.8	25	100
1922	55.4	21.6	23	100

Thus in 1922 all ploughs were concentrated in the hands of less than one quarter of the farms. The comparison of farms without sown area, without livestock and without ploughs gave the following results:

TABLE 60

Percentage of farms

	<u>Without sown area</u>	<u>Without working livestock</u>	<u>Excess of farms without working live- stock over farms without sown area</u>	<u>Without ploughs</u>	<u>Excess of farms without plough over farms without sown area</u>
1917	10.8	46	35.2	70.3	59.5
1920	3.7	45	41.3	75.0	71.3
1922	3.8	49	45.2	77.0	73.2

Apparently almost half the farms were running without working livestock, but the report produced no data on this. The following comparison indicated the hiring of stock:

TABLE 61

	<u>Percentage of farms</u>			
	<u>Without ploughs</u>	<u>Excess of farms without ploughs over farms without sown area</u>	<u>Renting in agricultural stock</u>	<u>Without working livestock</u>
1917	70.3	59.5	51.3	46
1920	75.0	71.3	63.8	45
1922	77.0	73.2	76.4	49

The percentage of farms renting in stock was colossal and grew in proportion with the excess of farms without ploughs over the per cent without sown area, showing that it was an economic necessity. Even some of the farms with working livestock rented in stock - in fact, more than half of them in 1922. The report said that the one-horse peasant was a serednyak (middle peasant) of a new type who was trying to move into the 'present-day serednyaki', and supported the latter (the two horse peasant). He lived in friendship with the 'present-day serednyak' for he used (for a 'working off' payment, of course) a plough, a cultivator and a chaff-cutter. Kritsman pointed out that since no farms had more than two horses in 1922, the 'present-day serednyak' with two horses disposed of almost two-thirds of the horses, although they were only one quarter of the farms. One had to look among them for those who were exploiting to some degree or other, three-quarters of the peasantry. The political effects of this were, according to the report, that the one-horse peasant felt himself strong, fearing neither the horseless peasant nor the local

powers, and together with the two-horse peasants ran the village.

There was also a grouping by wealth in the report (weak, prosperous, middle) which showed how careful one must be with such a grouping. Among the 'weak' were 133 farms with two horses, almost half the two-horse farms. The report then excluded them on the grounds that they were middle peasants! The report said that the peasants themselves considered the two-horse peasants as middle peasants.

E. The Industrial Centre and North West

E (i) Yaropol'skaya Volost', Moscow Gubernia

The data on both these industrial regions were quite unsatisfactory and took no account of the influence on the class stratification of the peasantry of the basic features of these regions: industrial crops, livestock rearing and the non-agricultural occupations of the peasantry. The most detailed data were those on Yaropol'skaya Volost', largely thanks to the fact that two investigations were conducted. The first, in 1922, was by P. Gurov and was published in 1923. The second, in 1924, was by F. Kretov and was published in 1925. It was only possible to compare them in rare cases, since the first contained data on 1917, 1920 and 1922, while the second concerned predominantly 1915, 1923 and 1924 (and only sometimes 1912, 1920 and 1922). Besides each author tended to remain silent on the issues discussed by the other. The earlier 1922 investigation only counted farms existing in 1922, excluding farms liquidated between 1917 and 1922, but undersampling was only 6 per cent for 1917, 1920 and 1922.¹² For this reason the comparison of the number of farms and

sown area in 1917, and the number of farms and working livestock for 1920 did not show a special undersampling of the weak farms:

TABLE 62

	<u>1917</u>		<u>1920</u>	
	<u>Farms</u>	<u>Sown Area</u>	<u>Farms</u>	<u>Working Livestock</u>
Counted	94.0	93.7	94.6	96.0
Not counted	6.0	6.3	5.4	4.0

A direct comparison for the 1922 research showed a certain undersampling of farms without working livestock, and without cows, and a more significant undersampling of farms without sown area.

TABLE 63

Percentage of farms

	Without working livestock		Without sown area	Without cows	
	<u>1917</u>	<u>1920</u>	<u>1917</u>	<u>1917</u>	<u>1920</u>
Agricultural Census	16.0	15.1	7.2	12.5	11.3
1922 Research	12.7	12.8	3.7	9.4	9.3

The apparent undersampling of farms without cows was possibly because 100 farms had somehow disappeared from the distribution of farms by number of cows, and it was not clear from which grouping they had been lost. Both investigations for Yaropol'skaya Volost' gave almost no data on the industrial crops or on the non-agricultural occupations of the peasantry. In the 1922 research there was only the remark, unsupported by data, that for the five-year period from 1917 to 1922 the number of farms with 'promysly' and the number of people occupied in seasonal and local 'promysly' had grown.

In the 1924 study, Kritsman found (besides the remark that "the peasantry receives its means of subsistence from agriculture, from earnings on the side and to an insignificant degree from handicraft 'promysly'") the following data on the number of passports issued to people going out to get earnings:

TABLE 64

1924 Study : Number of passports issued

	<u>Number of passports</u>	<u>As a percentage of the number of farms</u>
1913	2357	-
1914	2730	(136 per cent of the number of farms in 1915)
1921	269	-
1922	115	5.4
1923	480	21.7
1924	893	38.2

Clearly there was a rapid revival in the proportion going out to work after 1922, but there was no grouping of farms on this basis. The figures referred to both men and women. This was clearly a region of people primarily occupied outside their farms as workers. There was a growth in the sown area and in the amount of productive livestock, but not horses, after the Revolution: this process started in 1921 or 1922. Taking 1915 as 100 for sown area, and 1914 as 100 for livestock:

TABLE 65

Changes in crops and livestock

	<u>Sown Area</u>				<u>Livestock</u>			
	<u>Rye</u>	<u>Oats</u>	<u>Potatoes</u>	<u>All Sown Area</u>	<u>Cows</u>	<u>Sheep</u>	<u>Pigs</u>	<u>Horses</u>
1923	105	47	104	93	135	208	63	100
1924	120	152	165	128	143	275	310	99

This growth was composed of the growth in the farms of actual farm owners (middle and prosperous) and of the increase in sown area and productive livestock of the essentially unemployed (including many demobilised Red Army men) running their farm of necessity and going off to the city as soon as the possibility opened up. And in fact the growth in sown area and its transition to the pre-war level arrived in 1925 when the practice of leaving (for the town) was already quite widespread. On flax cultivation the 1922 study only gave remarks in brackets such as "Flax cultivation is highly developed in this region" or "Here flax is a quite important factor in peasant commodity circulation". There was a rapid growth in the number of farms selling flax:

TABLE 66

1922 Study : Percentage of farms

	<u>Selling flax</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>Selling, but not buying, grain</u>	<u>n</u>
1917	7.6	-	2.3	-
1920	17.2	332	7.9	152
1922	31.4	640	5.6	113

Thus with a reduction in the percentage of farms selling grain, there was a sharp increase in the percentage of farms selling flax. In the 1924 research, there was the following data on sown area of flax (in dessiatines):

TABLE 67

1924 Study : Sown area of flax

<u>1915</u>	<u>1921</u>	<u>1922</u>	<u>1923</u>	<u>1924</u>
1,557	578	663	700	928

Thus there was a direct growth from 1921 to 1924 of 61 per cent. However there was no grouping by flax cultivation in this study either. There was also a significant growth in pig and sheep rearing according to the 1924 study (which differs somewhat on pigs from the 1922 study in brackets):

TABLE 68

1924 Study : Livestock Rearing

	<u>Pigs</u>	<u>Sheep</u>
1914	807	1672
1915	360	1097
(1917)	(451)	
(1920)	(496)	
1922	153	2565
(1922)	(705)	
1923	509	3474
1924	2505	4591

Again there was no grouping in terms of these indices, but primarily by sown area (Kritsman pointed out various minor problems with this table):

TABLE 69

1922 Study : Percentage of farms with sown area of

	<u>Without sown area</u>	<u>Up to 1 Des.</u>	<u>1-2 Des.</u>	<u>2-3 Des.</u>	<u>3-4 Des.</u>	<u>4-5 Des.</u>	<u>5-7 Des.</u>	<u>7-10 Des.</u>	<u>10-15 Des.</u>	<u>Total</u>
1917	3.7	7.1	20.8	29.5	18.0	9.9	8.0	2.0	0.9	100
1920	3.4	7.7	21.3	28.6	19.2	9.7	7.9	2.1	0.1	100
1922	3.4	7.6	24.4	28.1	17.7	9.7	6.9	2.1	0.1	100

There was no grouping by sown area in the 1924 study, but grouping by working livestock gave the following results:

TABLE 70

1924 Study : Percentage of farms with working livestock

	<u>Without working livestock</u>	<u>With 1 horse</u>	<u>With 2 horses</u>	<u>With 3 horses</u>	<u>With 4 or more</u>	<u>Total</u>
1915	29.5	47.8	20.2	2.1	0.4	100
1920	15.1	72.5	12.1	0.3	-	100
1923	11.8	77.9	9.9	0.3	-	100
1924	13.4	76.3	10.0	0.3	-	100

There was no grouping by stock in either study, but in the 1922 study there was given the percentage of farms without ploughing equipment:

TABLE 71

1922 Study : Percentage of farms without ploughing equipment

<u>1917</u>	<u>1920</u>	<u>1922</u>
11.3	11.8	12.6

Kritsman combined the tables on the grouping by number of cows, although he was aware of various problems with this procedure: for example the 1922 study tended to undersample farms with 2 or more cows:

TABLE 72

Both studies : Percentage of farms with cows

	<u>Without cows</u>	<u>With 1 cow</u>	<u>With 2 cows</u>	<u>With 3 cows</u>	<u>With 4 and more cows</u>	<u>Total</u>
1915	26.9	41.3	26.7	3.6	1.5	100
1920	11.3	55.4	32.0	1.2	0.1	100
1922	7.7	63.3	27.5	1.3	0.1	100
1923	5.9	60.2	30.7	3.0	0.2	100
1924	2.3	57.9	36.2	3.3	0.4	100

This was interpreted in the 1924 study as a "general improvement in the material well-being of the peasantry", which implied a growth in the farms of all strata of the peasantry, but the decline in the number of farms without cows was paralleled by a growth in the number of horseless farms and in the number of passports issued to those leaving for paid employment. In a certain proportion of cases, what was happening was the growth of the domestic farm of workers and employees, usually in the care of their wives, so that the peasant could achieve a rise in living standards and improve the domestic farm by acquisition of a cow. Yet the farm, as the enterprise of an independent owner, collapsed: from being petty bourgeois, although very poor, he was transformed into a proletarian, although his living standard improved because of this. To a special degree this referred to peasants without horses, that is, without basic means of production.

Kritsman stated that he had noted earlier that the class stratification of the peasantry could appear in the form of the transition of farms with no sown area into sowing farms; and he asked rhetorically whether it was now appearing in the form of the transition of farms without cows into farms with cows. To avoid putting in the same pile those who lived by the alienation of their labour power outside their own farm, and those who conducted their own farm (enterprise), that is, to distinguish the economic types of the proletarian and the petty-bourgeois: this was for Kritsman the first demand which must be put to the researcher, which he was obliged to fulfill, if he were not to 'play games with numbers'. Up to that time, unfortunately, this demand was always transgressed. (In a footnote, Kritsman cited evidence that children of the poor did not go to school since they

had no clothes, no footwear and no text books). The growth in proletarianisation was shown by the growth cited above in the farms without plough instruments and without horses. It could be seen from the comparison of the farms without sown area, without livestock and without stock:

TABLE 73

1922 Study : Percentages of farms without sown area,
working livestock and stock

	<u>Without sown area</u>	<u>Without working livestock</u>	<u>Excess of farms without working live- stock over farms without sown area</u>	<u>Without stock</u>	<u>Excess of farms without stock over farms without sown area</u>
1917	3.7	12.8	9.1	11.3	7.6
1920	3.4	12.8	9.4	11.8	8.4
1922	3.4	11.9	8.5	12.6	9.2

Not surprisingly, the 1922 report stated that the general number of farms renting in stock was growing continuously. The general number of implements and machines had grown.

According to the report, after the Revolution, and especially after the NEP, the prosperous and middle peasants by some means took over the machines, and the poor fell into the role of renting these machines, to be paid by 'working off' in the field, house or farmyard, although originally they had access to these machines on a friendly basis. The prosperous rented out at hiring points a large part of the complex machinery, but the middle and poor rented simple machines from their prosperous fellow-countrymen. The 1924 report only said one word on this issue: in the single official machine co-operative there were 9 members and 40 ploughs and several other items of stock, that is, 4.4 ploughs per member!

The author of the 1924 study almost completely lacked a class approach to the analysis of the countryside, as can be seen from the fact that after introducing a table on the hiring of wage-labour by traders and the owners of dairy factories and other enterprises, he claimed that it showed that the base of the kulak was not in agriculture. This implied that a kulak was defined by the hiring of wage labour.

TABLE 74

<u>Hiring of wage labour</u>		
	<u>Yaropol'skaya Volost'</u> <u>(1924 Study)</u>	<u>Moscow Gubernia</u> <u>(Ts.S.U. data)</u>
1923	0.7	1.1
1924	0.6	7.2

Clearly the volost' was not typical of the whole Moscow Gubernia, if the 1924 study was accurate, but Kritsman demonstrated that wage-labour was also shown in data about workers and employees in rural co-operatives.

Apart from the significance of cows in some domestic farms, the growth (already indicated in Table 72) of the percentage of farms with more than 3 cows was somewhat more significant than it seemed, since the average number of cows in farms with 3 or more grew from 3.7 in 1922 to 7.4 in 1923, and 7.9 in 1924. But dairy farming was only one direction in which Yaropol'skaya Volost' was developing its commodity agriculture, it seemed. However, there were no data on other branches of agriculture. There were data on the number of permits for construction:

TABLE 75Permits for Construction

	<u>Living Accommodation</u>	<u>Outhouses</u>
1915	13	5
1920	13	-
1921	22	1
1922	47	-
1923	84	70
1924	42	148

Thus the construction of houses suddenly declined after 1923 and the construction of economic (outhouse) buildings suddenly increased greatly in 1923. Kritsman refused to use the 1922 study's grouping by wealth, because there was no indication of how it was constructed or how it could be corrected (some of the mistakes may have been simply printing errors in the research report). Kritsman concluded this section by saying that although these two reports did not give many of the most important data, nevertheless they could be used to show the growth of the class stratification of the peasantry.

E (ii) Tsurikovskaya Volost', Smolensk Gubernia

This was based on a study by A. Vinogradov published in 1923. It only included 41 per cent of the farms in its sample, and also omitted those farms liquidated between 1917 and 1922. There was no agricultural census data available, so the extent of undersampling of particular groups could not be estimated. From the research it was evident that in the volost' whole villages went off on paid carpentry work on occasions, but there were no numerical data on this. There were data for 1917, 1920 and 1922 only on agricultural stock:

TABLE 76Percentage of farms without ploughing equipment

<u>1917</u>	<u>1920</u>	<u>1922</u>
17	14	16

The report obscurely referred to "horseless and stock-less (farms), who for the use of horses and stock give away part of the grain harvested by them." It naively remarked that the farms without horses and without stock received help from their closest relatives, so the possibility of exploitation was reduced. But the 14 per cent in 1920 (and 16 per cent in 1922) of farms without stock signified a large growth in the number of exploited farms, because in 1920 they had compulsory access to the stock of the prosperous, but in 1922 this had already become impossible. Evidently, one-third of farms were engaged in 'promysly', that is, for every 100 farms there were 32 people so engaged in 1917, 1920 and 1922.

The best indication of the situation on working livestock was that the percentage of farms without it was 16.5 in 1917 and 11 per cent in 1922. According to a Dynamic Study, the percentage of farms without working livestock for the whole Smolensk Gubernia was 10.9 in 1920 and 12.4 in 1922. Evidently the percentage of farms without livestock had changed from 1917 to 1922 in a manner analagous to the changes in farms without stock (Table 76), that is a reduction to 1920 and an increase to 1922.

How far the situation had changed from 1920 to 1922 could be judged from the following statements of the report: "The struggle for equalisation in the years 1918, 1919 and 1920 included villages occupied in going off for carpentry work. Here the victory of the weak was most complete In another region impelled by tax pressure the weak

in the year just past of 1922 went over on to a definite offensive with the aim of achieving equalisation. But there was already not enough time. Here and there the struggle was not completed. And where it was completed, it finished not with the victory of the poor, but a compromise with the prosperous." "The taxes were heavy for the weak, not even mentioning those without livestock or without stock. Tax pressure above all hindered the weak farm from sustaining itself, and on the other hand, the relative weakness of taxes for the prosperous assisted them."

The research report had a grouping by wealth but it was not known how it was arrived at and it did not include all the farms studied; without indicating which farms were excluded or why. According to this classification, the middle peasantry had the best chance of changing their farm into a khutor, which again showed the dangers of the banal approach to the peasantry.

E (iii) Goritskaya Volost', Tver Gubernia

Kritsman relied here on a study conducted by A. Bol'shakov, published in 1925, which included liquidated farms. The main problem with the study was the introduction of the 1924 figures, which were not comparable due to a large increase in population and number of farms when the volost' was enlarged. Kritsman left them out of the tables. According to the report, formerly many went off on seasonal 'promysly' to factories and plants, but at the time of the study factory and plant workers stayed at home willy-nilly. In 1913 the volost' had received 159,298 roubles in this way, but in 1924 only 14,638 roubles. Before the war there had been a large amount of bazaar trade, which was evidently in flax: in Goritskaya Volost' there had been a fair eight times a year with an

annual turnover of a million roubles. In the volost' the percentage of sown area devoted to flax was:

TABLE 77

Percentage of sown area devoted to flax

<u>1913</u>	<u>1920</u>	<u>1923</u>
21	8	9

Unfortunately there was no grouping of the peasantry taking account of these features, but there was a classification by working livestock:

TABLE 78

Percentage of farms with horses

	<u>Without horses</u>	<u>With 1 horse</u>	<u>With 2 horses</u>	<u>With 3 horses</u>	<u>With 4 or more horses</u>	<u>Total</u>
1916	31.5	54.6	12.8	0.7	0.4	100
1920	34.0	65.0	1.0	0.1	0.0	100.1
1922	33.2	66.1	0.7	0.0	0.0	100
1923	32.7	66.5	0.8	0.0	0.0	100

There was no grouping by sown area, only the percentage of farms with no sown area:

TABLE 79

Percentage of farms

	<u>Without sown area</u>	<u>Without horses</u>	<u>Excess of farms without horses over farms without sown area</u>
1916	11.9	31.5	19.6
1920	13.2	34.0	20.8
1922	12.8	33.2	20.4
1923	11.9	32.7	20.8

In the bazaar trade of Goritsa, a large part was taken up by cow butter (1,000 puds against 3,500 puds of rye). The following percentages were under grass:

TABLE 80

Percentage under grass

<u>1916</u>	<u>1920</u>	<u>1922</u>	<u>1923</u>
3.9	0.2	1.3	1.5

For this reason, the classification by cattle was interesting:

TABLE 81

Percentage of farms with cattle

	<u>Without cattle</u>	<u>With 1 head</u>	<u>With 2 head</u>	<u>With 3 head</u>	<u>With 4 head</u>	<u>Total</u>
1916	18.7	49.4	28.3	3.2	0.4	100
1920	18.3	48.8	28.8	3.7	0.4	100
1922	17.8	46.3	30.2	4.9	0.8	100
1923	16.6	45.8	31.4	4.5	0.7	100

Thus the increase in the proportion of farms with 2 or more cows was an indication of the developing commodity relations. This could be seen more clearly by showing the proportion of cattle owned by these groupings:

TABLE 82

Distribution of cattle among different
cattle-owning groups

	<u>Farms without cows & with 1 cow</u>	<u>Percentage of all cows owned by this group</u>	<u>Farms with 2 cows</u>	<u>Percentage of all cows owned by this group</u>	<u>Farms with 3 cows or more</u>	<u>Percentage of all cows owned by this group</u>
1916	68.1	42.2	28.3	48.2	3.6	9.6
1920	67.1	41.3	28.8	48.0	4.1	10.7
1922	64.1	37.2	30.2	48.4	5.7	14.4
1923	62.4	35.5	31.4	48.9	6.2	15.7

The report also made the interesting remark that the tax policy and line of conduct of the most important Kommissariat for the peasantry, The People's Kommissariat of Agriculture, during the NEP had weakly supported the poorest farms, and weakly defended them from the stronger prosperous farms. The prosperous farms made better use of the co-operatives:

TABLE 83

Percentages of farms in Co-operatives in 1924

	<u>Without horses</u>	<u>With 1 horse</u>	<u>With 2 horses</u>	<u>With 3 or more</u>	<u>Not counted</u>	<u>Total</u>
Among peasantry in co-operatives	9.0	84.0	2.5	0.3	4.2	100
Among the whole peasantry	27.0	71.4	1.6	0.0	-	100

Unfortunately, for the reasons indicated above, these data were insufficient to form a judgement on the class stratification in the volost'.

E (iv) Prokzhinskaya Volost', Pskov Gubernia

The basis of this section was the study by A. Grafov, published in 1923. The data were even more scanty than for the previous volost'. Only farms existing in 1922 were counted. It was impossible to estimate the undersampling of liquidated farms since there was no agricultural census.

According to the report the Pskov peasantry were an unfailing supply of labour power to the Petrograd factories and plants, and the remaining part of the free hands were used in farms cultivating flax, but neither of these circumstances was taken into account in the research. According to the report, the Pskov peasantry were now being suffocated by a surplus of labour power. It was interesting that, judging by the farms left in 1922, the main mass of land redistributions (54 per cent) and of returns (to the country) from the city (80 per cent) were in 1918. The following was the percentage of total sown area devoted to flax:

TABLE 84

Percentage of total sown area devoted to flax

<u>1917</u>	<u>1920</u>	<u>1922</u>
13	4.2	3.4

In 1923, it was expected to grow by 1 or 2 per cent. However data on the number of farms selling flax showed its growing significance since 1920:

TABLE 85Percentage of farms selling but not buying

	<u>Flax</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>Grain</u>	<u>n</u>
1917	20	-	7	-
1920	2.5	31	2	26
1922	8.5	111	0.5	5

Consequently, despite what the report said, not all peasants were cautious in their approach to growing flax. There were also data on the growth of the renting of land:

TABLE 86Percentage of Farms

	<u>Renting in</u>	<u>Renting out</u>
1917	37.7	15.8
1920	1.2	2.3
1922	3.8	1.4

According to the report, the forms of payment were varied: metayage, money, grain, hay, a field for tilling another field. There were cases when the poor received from the prosperous peasant livestock and stock and seed, but a large part of these deals were connected with the renting of land. Elsewhere the report remarked that there was a mass movement of peasants into migration. Unfortunately there was no grouping by sown area of flax or by working livestock, nor even by sown area. There was only a grouping by wealth, and it was not known how it was arrived at. The prosperous were said in the report to be almost entirely traders, and were more friendly to Soviet power than before the NEP. The tax in kind, the new economic law, the opening of free trade and a series of other measures enabled them to pursue their well-being unhindered.

Despite the inadequacies of the data on the volosti of the industrial regions, the root of which lay in the banal approach to the question, the data for some volosti confirmed, in Kritsman's view, the growth of hidden capitalist exploitation, and in the others left the question open for further investigation. Evidently, the grouping by stock had a basic significance for these regions (besides the special groupings, such as by flax or by cows). For two of the four volosti examined above on which there were data on the percentage of farms without stock (Tsurikovskaya and Yaropol'skaya) there was growth in the percentage from 1920 to 1922 of the farms without stock at the same time as the percentage of farms without

livestock (for example, in Yaropol'skaya) fell somewhat. The percentage without stock in both volosti up to 1922 exceeded the percentage without livestock. The same phenomenon could be seen in the Shamraevskaya Volost' in Kiev Gubernia, where the sown area of sugar beet played a big role. Only the analysis of the special groupings (by sown area of industrial crops, by cows and so on) could uncover the significance of this fact; in addition the analysis of the essentially separate matter of the domestic agriculture of industrial and other workers or small owners whose basic occupation was not cultivation would help clarify the significance of this fact, as would the separate analysis of the actual rural owner-cultivators, but unfortunately there were no data on these in the studies of the above four volosti.

F. The Urals

Petrovskaya Volost' in the Bashkir Republic

The data on the Bashkir Republic were based on the unpublished report by S. Said-Galiev and referred to 1925, in comparison with 1912.

TABLE 87

Percentage of Farms

	Without sown area	Without horses	Excess of farms without horses over farms with- out sown area	Without cows
1912	27.7	18.7	- 9.0	24.0
1925	7.2	48.2	+41.0	30.5

This table described in unusually clear fashion the sharp decline in farms without sown area and the huge increase in farms without horses. The enlarged Petrovskaya Volost' was composed of three former economically different volosti - two cultivating and one livestock rearing. Hence the data on the three former volosti were examined separately, using the same indices as Table 87 for the two cultivating volosti:

TABLE 88

Former Petrovskaya Volost'

1912	7.0	12.2	+ 5.2	15.8
1925	0	43.7	+43.7	28.2

Former Makarovskaya Volost'

1912	21.8	25.4	+ 3.6	31.5
1925	2.5	64.6	+62.1	41.2

Former Girei-Konchakshaya Volost'

	<u>Without sown area</u>	<u>Without horses</u>	<u>Without cows</u>
1912	99.8	19.1	26.5
1925	98.0	65.3	38.0

The former Girei-Konchakskaya Volost' was purely livestock rearing and engaging in handicraft 'promysly'. In it because of the famine the population had declined catastrophically by 61.5 per cent, working livestock by 94 per cent, large horned livestock by 76 per cent and other livestock by 93-95 per cent. The character of the change indicated above is quite distinct. For example, in the former Petrovskaya Volost' all provided themselves with sown area, but the proportion of horseless farms quadrupled, going to almost half of all farms. In the former Makarovskaya Volost' the percentage of farms with no sown area declined by almost 9 times, while the percentage with no horses increased by 2.5 times, going up to almost two-thirds of the farms.

Kritsman also had recourse to a study of some villages in the Chelyabinsk and Perm areas, although he regarded it as "not serious" and "insignificant". It was published in 1925, and showed a lack of understanding of the stratification of the peasantry, since it constantly discussed distributions in terms of per farm averages of the whole sample. There was nothing on changes in the stratification of the peasantry. But there was a certain interest in the data on rural wage labourers working on farms in the Etul'sku region: in 1915 they counted up 1,500 people, whereas in 1924 there were 900 to 1,000 people. Since there were 4613 households in the region, then there was at least 1 wage labourer to every 4 or 5 households. The distribution of batraki (rural wage-laboures) by place of work was as follows:

TABLE 89

<u>Worked</u>	<u>People</u>	<u>Percent</u>
In farms of Red Army men	52	7.5
In farms without labour power	48	7
In 15 dairy <u>artely</u>	62	9
For the more prosperous and kulaks	<u>515</u>	<u>76.5</u>
	677	100
	—	—

That meant that only in less than 15 per cent of cases could the hiring be explained by the lack of labour power in the family. The researchers argued for a reduction in the land available to peasants so that it would correspond to the fertiliser available and the smaller farms could be properly run! They also analysed the khutory quite separately from the village where they hired their wage labour, with the result that class differentiation was less apparent. These four khutory in 1924 sowed 440 dessiatines. There was also a quite strange commune which hired a significant amount of wage labour. The better off peasants received on credit various machines which were very expensive. The most 'needy' received ploughs, horses and grain on credit. Thus in the Perm area a process of stratification was taking place.

In the village of Starkii the distribution of farms in terms of arable land changed as follows:

TABLE 90Arable land per farm

	<u>From 1.5</u>	<u>2-3</u>	<u>3-4</u>	<u>4-5</u>	<u>5-6</u>	<u>Over 6</u>	
	<u>2 Des.</u>	<u>Des.</u>	<u>Des.</u>	<u>Des.</u>	<u>Des.</u>	<u>Des.</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Number of Farms</u>							
1923	-	5	14	9	3	1	32
1924	2	11	12	3	1	4	33

This indicated some differentiation, but there was no grouping by sown area. The amount of haymaking land increased by 46 per cent. This shift into haymaking was to avoid the tax on sown area, not total arable land, indicating how statistics could express legal rather than economic changes. In 1923 there were 3 farms without horses, 28 with 1 horse and 1 with two horses, whereas in 1924 there were no farms without horses, 30 with one horse and 3 with 2 horses. In another village, Novye Tumachi, there were 10 horseless farms in 1923 and 1924, 16 farms with 1 horse in 1923 (18 in 1924) and one farm with 2 horses in 1924 only. The horseless farms paid for the hire of horses in grain or by 'working off'. The data on sown area and arable land were in a complete mess, so no more could be gained from this study.

G. Siberia and KazakhstanG. (i) Shchuch'inskaya Volost', Akmolinskaya Gubernia

The data were taken from a document by A. Morosanov (of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party). The date of publication was not given, but it was published in numbers 7-8 of Na Agrarnom Fronte and contained data up to 1925. The volost' was characterised by an abundance of sown area because of the colossal decline of sown area up to 1923. For this reason the extent of individual peasant farms was here determined not by their land, but by their means of production. Taking 1917 data as 100, there was the following distribution (based on tax returns):

TABLE 91

	<u>Number of farms</u>	<u>People</u>	<u>Sown area</u>	<u>Horses</u>	<u>Large Horned Livestock</u>	<u>Bullocks</u>
1917	100	100	100	100	100	100
1920	113	105	91	126	128	118
1923	106	94	42	52	97	58
1924	112	96	47	54	101	49

In 1925 this process of restoration continued, as the following data on Shchuch'aya Station (1st April 1925) showed, as a percentage of 1923:

TABLE 92

	<u>Farms</u>	<u>Horses</u>	<u>Large Horned Livestock</u>	<u>Bullocks</u>
1923	100	100	100	100
1924	112	101	96	82
1925	110.5	111	96	108

The groupings by sown area and working livestock were only available for Shchuch'inskaya Volost' for 1923-1924, so material for a judgement on the dynamics of stratification was only available for an interval of one year. To understand the actual character of the changes occurring, Kritsman started with the centre of the volost', Shchuch'aya Station, for which there were data for 1924-1925 as well.

TABLE 93

Percentage of households, Shchuch'aya Station

	<u>Without working livestock</u>	<u>With 1 head</u>	<u>With 2 head</u>	<u>With 3 head</u>	<u>With 4 head</u>	<u>With 5 head</u>	<u>With 6 head</u>	<u>Over 6 head</u>	<u>Total</u>
1923	21.9	23.9	16.7	16.3	7.4	8.4	2.1	3.3	100
1924	29.6	26.7	15.8	14.4	5.6	4.8	1.4	1.7	100
1925	25.9	24.8	14.3	15.9	5.8	6.9	2.6	3.8	100

Thus there was a so-called movement downwards from 1923 to 1924 in the possession of livestock, and a so-called movement upwards from 1924-1925, but the result, although not so clear as the two movements, from 1923 to 1925 was differentiation. This conclusion was confirmed by data on the percentage of livestock within each livestock group.

TABLE 94

Distribution of livestock within each livestock group

	Without working livestock	With 1 head	With 2 head	With 3 head	With 4 head	With 5 head	With 6 head	Over 6 head	Total
1923	-	11.3	15.7	22.8	13.7	19.3	5.9	11.3	100
1924	-	15.2	18.3	24.8	12.4	13.9	4.7	10.2	99.5
1925	-	11.9	13.7	23.0	10.9	16.7	7.3	16.5	100

The working livestock was concentrated in the highest groups. Because the differentiation was somewhat hidden by the movement downwards it was especially unsatisfactory to limit oneself only to the percentage distribution of farms: more detailed data was necessary. The grouping by sown area for the whole volost' was as follows:

TABLE 95

Classification by sown area

	Percentage of farms		Percentage of sown area		Working livestock per farm in 1922
	1923	1924	1923	1924	
Without sown area	5.5	6.0	-	-	0.5
Up to 1 Des.	28.4	25.6	9.1	7.1	0.46
1-2 Des.	25.0	24.9	17.5	16.2	0.95
2-4 Des.	25.34	26.7	32.0	32.7	1.95
4-6 Des.	9.3	10.1	19.0	19.6	3.3
6-8 Des.	3.8	4.1	10.8	11.6	4.2
8-10 Des.	1.5	1.3	5.7	4.4	4.8
10-12 Des.	0.6	0.5	2.7	2.3	5.2
12-15 Des.	0.5	0.4	2.7	2.3	6.9
15-20 Des.	0.03	0.2	0.2	2.2	8.9
Over 20 Des.	<u>0.03</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>6.4</u>
Total	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

The researcher's conclusion that stratification had decreased was a hasty one. Kritsman showed that there were problems in the report's treatment of the highest sown area groups, and consequently treated those with over 15 dessiatines as a single group for some purposes. Kritsman regrouped the table into the following groups: without sown area, up to 2 dessiatines, 8-15 dessiatines, and over 15 dessiatines. This gave an increase in the extreme groups and in the 2-8 dessiatine group, but a decline in the other two groups. It was therefore not possible on the sown area index to reach a definite conclusion, but this was related to the fact that in the volost' there was a lot of fallow land which was much harder to improve, since it was closely connected to virgin land (and thus rapidly returned to the wild), and it required two pairs of horses or oxen to plough any land, even soft land which was being ploughed again. Only 3 or 4 pairs made it possible to plough fully properly. Thus only farms with over 2 dessiatines (see Table 95) had enough horses to plough even easy land, and in most cases the 2-8 dessiatine group had insufficient working livestock to plough. Thus the growth registered in their number and their sown area was to a significant degree based on taking on alien livestock. Table 95 also showed that the 'loading' of horses in the very highest sown area farms was lower than in the ones just below them. Calculating the 'loading' per dessiatine on horses for the different sown area groupings, Kritsman concluded that the very highest group (over 20 dessiatines) did not rent out horses, but took on

hired wage labour, whereas the groups of from 12-20 dessiatines hired out livestock to the groups with a lower sown area. Kritsman then turned to the distribution of farms grouped by working livestock:

TABLE 96

Percentage of farms with livestock

	Without Working livestock	With 1 head	With 2 head	With 3 head	With 4 head	With 5 head	With 6 head	Over 6 head	Total
Percentage of Farms									
1923	28.3	24.6	17.7	12.8	6.1	6.3	1.9	2.3	100
1924	30.8	28.2	15.6	13.7	4.4	4.4	1.4	1.5	100
Percentage of livestock									
1923	-	13.3	18.9	20.9	13.2	17.1	6.4	10.2	100
1924	-	17.4	19.5	25.4	10.9	13.6	5.5	7.7	100
Percentage of sown area									
1923	12.4	16.5	17.6	16.7	10.5	13.9	5.1	7.3	100
1924	14.4	19.0	16.3	20.7	8.7	10.5	4.5	5.9	100

These figures seemed to support the results for Shchuch'aya Station, giving a downward movement, but it was only a stage in the process of class stratification, as the following table also indicated:

TABLE 97Average sown area within livestock groupings

	With- out Work- ing live- stock	With							Overall average
		1 head	2 head	3 head	4 head	5 head	6 head	Over 6 head	
Average sown area per farm									
1923		1.1	1.6	2.4	3.1	4.1	5.3	6.1 7.9	2.4
1924		1.2	1.7	2.6	3.7	4.9	5.9	7.5 10.2	2.5
Average sown area per head									
1923	-	1.6	1.2	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.1(or less)	-
1924	-	1.7	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.5(or less)	-

Taking Table 96 and 97 together, those with one or no horse had increased their sown area from 28.9 per cent in 1923 to 43.3 per cent in 1924. This required the use of alien working livestock, and could thus be considered as the growth of the hidden sown area of the highest group. The sown area of farms with three head of working livestock it could be considered partly as a growth of the sown area on the basis of the "supryaga" (joint use of stock) of farms of equal capacity, and partly the growth of sown area of powerful farms which had for the time being sold a horse (to pay taxes, for example). The reduction in the sown area (and number of horses) among the highest livestock groups was thus interpreted by Kritsman as being partly offset by the growth in their hidden sown area. The livestock group went down proportionately less than the number of farms in that group. In other words, the

surviving highest livestock farms concentrated more sown area and livestock in their hands, which was not evident simply from the classification of farms by livestock.

Finally, Kritsman compared the percentage of farms without sown area and without working livestock.

TABLE 98

Percentage of farms without sown area
and without working livestock: 1923-1924

	<u>Without sown area</u>	<u>Without working livestock</u>	<u>Excess of farms without live- stock over farms without sown area</u>	<u>Percentage of sown area in farms without livestock</u>	<u>Average sown area per farm without livestock</u>
1923	5.5	28.3	22.8	12.4	1.1
1924	6.0	30.8	24.8	14.4	1.2

There were no data on the hiring of livestock or stock, but the report said that the basic feature of stratification was working livestock, and that the poor peasant was compelled to hire under conditions that were quite heavy for him. There was no accurate count for the volost' of farms hiring in (or hiring out) labour power, but according to local workers, in the working season no

less than 25 per cent of farms hired in workers, which corresponded, Kritsman noted, to the percentage of farms with 3 horses and more. It was reported that there were around 1500 batraki in the volost', which for 3111 farms meant 1 rural wage worker for every 2 farms, and 2 batraki for every farm actually hiring wage-labour.

G. (ii) Aleksandrovsкая Volost', Kustanaiskaya Gubernia

This was taken from the article by A. Ermolenko (of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party) entitled 'The Kazakhstan Countryside' in Na Agrarnom Fronte, No. 9. It did not contain direct data on the dynamics of the class stratification of the peasantry. The report said that the ground was solid and needed 4-5 horses to a one-horse plough, and 3-4 horses on waste ground. Hence 70 per cent of the horseless and one-horse farms depended on the remaining 30 per cent with many horses. Usually the one horse farms 'cooperated' (jointly used the yoke) with 2 or 3 horse farms, more rarely with other one horse farms. In the majority of cases the form of exploitation was 'working off' in very varied ways, right up to the brewing by the poor peasant of home brew for the prosperous peasant. Ploughing was done almost exclusively with a plough, rather than, say, a sokha (wooden plough). In 1924 the distribution of peasant farms in terms of horses was as follows:

TABLE 99

Grouping by horses: 1924

	<u>Without</u> <u>horses</u>	<u>With</u> <u>1</u> <u>head</u>	<u>With</u> <u>2</u> <u>head</u>	<u>With</u> <u>3</u> <u>head</u>	<u>With</u> <u>4</u> <u>head</u>	<u>With</u> <u>5</u> <u>head</u>	<u>Over</u> <u>5</u> <u>head</u>	<u>Total</u>
Percentage of farms	35.6	35.1	20.0	5.8	2.1	1.0	0.4	100
Percentage of sown area	9.6	26.0	31.4	16.5	9.8	4.9	1.8	100
Shortage or surplus of grain in puds per farm	-17	+1.5	+63	+158	+260	+341	+259	-
Sown area per farm (Des.)	1.37	3.13	6.62	11.99	19.71	20.18	18.00	-
Average per horse	-	3.13	3.31	4.00	4.93	4.04	<3.00	-

Thus, in a manner similar to the previous study, the 'loading' on 1 horse (and sown area) was slightly lower in the highest livestock farms, than in the group just below them. This was partly explained by the fact that the most prosperous peasants bought wheat in the villages, using horses that were doing nothing in winter, and were hired out in summer. Thus the extra horses

were not used on their own farms, Characteristically, only 17 per cent of farms without horses did not sow. There were farms sowing up to 70 dessiatines, harvesting over 2,000 puds of grain. There were 170 registered batraki, averaging 1 to every 3 farms with 2 or more horses (and no less than 1 to every 6 farms living by 'working off').

Since it was similar to Shchuch'inskaya Volost', it was interesting to see the social composition of various kinds of rural organisations. On the direction of the cooperatives, it was reported that one was in the hands of the prosperous, one had three middle peasants running it (of whom one was a former local shop keeper), the third was run by the poor, but its Auditing Commission was run by prosperous and middle peasants, and the fourth was directed by two poor peasants and one middle peasant. Defining the poor as with one or no horse, the middle with 2 horses (although the report was not clear on this) and prosperous as those with 3 or more, the following table indicated access to school:

TABLE 100

	<u>Poor</u>	<u>Middle</u>	<u>Prosperous</u>
Percentage of farms	74	17	9
Percentage of children in school in autumn	41	29	30

Fifteen per cent of children of school age never studied, mostly because of lack of footwear and clothing. During the summer 25 per cent of children, most of them poor, were absent. The following table showed the social composition of the sel'sovety of four (or in brackets five) villages:

TABLE 101

Social Composition of rural Soviets

	<u>With- out horses</u>	<u>With 1 head</u>	<u>With 2 head</u>	<u>With 3 head</u>	<u>With 4 head</u>	<u>With 5 head</u>	<u>Over 5 head</u>	<u>Total</u>
Percentage of all farms	36 (36)	37 (36)	19.5 (20)	5 (5)	2 (2)	0.3 (0.8)	0.2 (0.4)	100
Among members of rural Soviets	29	36	21	7.	5	0.7	1.3	100
Percentage of farms with members in rural Soviets	9	11	12	14	29	25	67	-
Among the president and members of the praesidium	20 (15)	40 (31)	20 (15)	-	10 (15)	-	10 (23)	-
Percentage of farms with president or members of the praesidium	0.4 (0.4)	0.8 (0.8)	0.8 (0.7)	-	4.1 (6.7)	-	33.3 (50)	-

Three quarters of the most prosperous farms had members in rural soviets, and one half were in the praesidium (as member or president). The author remarked that the contemporary Soviet people were to be found among the very prosperous peasants.¹³ A similar conclusion could be reached on the basis of figures on membership of the Russian Communist Party in one village. Agricultural tax fell primarily on the poorest peasants:

TABLE 102

Incidence of taxation on harvest

	Without horse, but with <u>sown area</u>	With 1 <u>horse</u>	With 2 <u>horses</u>	With 3 <u>horses</u>	With 4 <u>horses</u>	With 5 <u>horses</u>	With 6 and more <u>horses</u>
Gross harvest per farm	41.1	93.9	198.6	359.7	591.3	605.4	540
Surplus grain (after deducting seeds and family produce)	-13.7	18.3	99.5	219.8	371.8	402.5	330
Tax per farm (translated into puds)	3.6	16.9	36.9	61.5	112	61	71
As a percentage of the surplus	-	92	37	28	30	15	21
As percentage of gross harvest	9	18	18	16	19	10	13
As a percentage of all the tax	5	28	35	17	11	3	1

This was a slightly misleading picture since the report took the harvest per dessiatine as the same. Consequently for the lowest group the gross harvest and surplus is exaggerated, and is reduced for the highest group. The translation of the tax into puds assumed a single price for all groups, while the author indicated that the poor received 80 kopecks for their grain, while the rich got 2 roubles, so the tax for the rich was exaggerated by up to $2\frac{1}{2}$ times. Thus one could truly say that in this volost' the prosperous actually paid a proportionately lower tax on their gross harvest than the horseless farm. The agricultural tax took all the surplus of a one horse farm, forcing them to work as batraki or by 'working off' for the prosperous. However, not only tax, but also state help to the poor (in the form of seed loans for sowing) sometimes became an instrument for the subordination of the poor by the prosperous, since it would be used as a means of payment to the prosperous, ending up among the two and three horse farms.

G (iii) Tisul'kii Region, Tomsk Gubernia

Once again this was based on a document by a member of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, A. Musatorv. This one was unpublished. (Even where there was a published version, Kritsman worked from longer unpublished documents). It contained data (from the Gubstatburo) on changes from 1922 to 1924 in working livestock and sown area, reproduced in the following two tables:

TABLE 103Percentage of farms with working livestock

	<u>Without</u> <u>working</u> <u>livestock</u>	<u>With</u> <u>1</u> <u>head</u>	<u>With</u> <u>2</u> <u>head</u>	<u>With</u> <u>3</u> <u>head</u>	<u>With</u> <u>4</u> <u>head</u>	<u>Total</u>
1922	3.82	20.61	40.84	18.70	16.03	100
1924	0.35	11.85	38.33	28.57	20.90	100

TABLE 104Percentage of farms with sown area

	<u>1922</u>	<u>1924</u>
Without sown area	0.76	0.35
Up to 1.1. Des.	19.47	10.80
1.1-2.1. Des.	22.14	17.77
2.1.-3.1. Des.	19.85	18.82
3.1.-4.1. Des.	17.17	19.51
4.1.-6.1. Des.	15.65	20.21
6.1.-8.1. Des.	1.91	7.32
8.1-10.1. Des.	1.51	3.83
10.1.-16.1. Des.	<u>1.90</u>	<u>1.39</u>
Total	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

The report claimed that these data were somewhat doubtful, since the Gubstatburo figures showed no farms with more than 4 horses, yet there were many farms with more than 6 horses and even 20 or 30 (that is, less than 1 per cent) with more than 10 horses. The same could be said in relation to sown area. The author claimed that in 1924 there were around 20 per cent (not 12) of farms with one horse, around 68-69 (not 67) per cent with 2 or 3 horses and with 4 or more horses 10-11 per cent (not 21). The author claimed that hidden sown area was a mass phenomenon in this region.

Yet Kritsman pointed out that on this evidence the kulaks were an insignificant part of the population, so that along with hidden sown area there was hidden stratification! In a word, it was impossible to take the figures presented seriously. Kritsman in a footnote showed that other figures were no better - they were absurd for Siberian conditions. The report claimed that the position of the rich was improving, and of the poor was deteriorating, but there was no evidence on how widely the rich exploited the poor since the peasantry simply hid the kulaks. If one defined the kulak as a peasant hiring wage-labour the whole year round, then the number of such kulaks was growing all the time, but in the region there were other forms by which the kulaks exploited the poor, such as:

(a) Paying for the use of machines. In this region, because of the very short and rainy summer and autumn, it was difficult without harvesting machinery to sow, harvest the grain

and provide sufficient fodder for the livestock. Grain was threshed exclusively by a thresher. Wheat in the region was full of weeds, so a sorting machine was completely necessary. The rich rented out these machines. By the accounts verified by the commission of the Sibrevkom and well known to the peasants themselves, a thresher paid for itself in a year, as did a harvester. There were farms which reduced their sown area or even stopped sowing and lived off their machinery. There were more than 30 such farms, that is, half of one per cent of the farms.

(b) Paying by 'working off' loan of grain, hay and so on. Such a form of payment was usually twice as dear to the peasant if one considered the cost of wage-labour.

(c) Renting out the best land. Often five or six of the rich used the best land, for 'help' with the grain or hay harvest. In 1923 this was because the poor could not afford to pay rent. Even the old obshchina (called 'love') was a form of exploitation. It widely and systematically used free labour power, employing on an annual basis an entire village within its boundaries, whose members brought their own horses, ploughed, threshed and so on, and were paid worse rates than by the local kulaks. Kritsman cited the figures - the obshchina paid between one quarter and one half of the rates paid by kulaks, depending on the task.

The political influence of the prosperous was also growing in the region: the members of prosperous peasants (with four or more horses) on the praesidium of the sel'sovet grew from two to five. Four peasants were elected to the Regional Executive Committee, all very rich, and poor and batrak candidates were often removed. The batraki did not go to the sel'sovet because they were not peasants. Where there was a clash of groups, the prosperous were the deciders.

Preliminary Conclusions

Following this survey of the ~~empirical~~ material of all these volosti, Kritsman drew his 'Preliminary Conclusions'. The data were not artificially selected. He had used all the material available to him. Despite problems of generalising from the data (they were small-scale-studies, although covering the main regions of the U.S.S.R.), Kritsman felt able to draw out from the data definite methods of approach to a greater mass of material. Only on the basis of the latter would it be possible to arrive at definite conclusions on the problems indicated, in further works. Nevertheless, it was possible to draw certain preliminary conclusions:

1. Until now the basic growing form of capitalist agriculture in the U.S.S.R. was the capitalist agriculture (predominantly petty-capitalist) based on the hiring out of working livestock and agricultural stock, under which the hidden capitalist appeared as a worker, working on another farm with his own working livestock and stock, and the hidden proletarian appeared as an owner without working livestock or without stock (or with insufficient livestock and stock) hiring the possessor of these indispensable means of production. The 'hirer'

paid by 'working off' on the farm of the person hired, which often left insufficient wages to the 'hirer'. Whether the 'hired' peasant worked on the farm of the hirer did not change the essence of the matter. In some areas this form of exploitation covered 70 to 75 per cent of peasant farms (the South East and the Ukraine). The hidden sown area went up to 30 or 40 per cent of the total sown area (in Tambov and the South East). In some regions the hiring of livestock predominated: the South East, Siberia, the Central Agricultural Region, areas of grain production. In others, the hiring of stock predominated: the Ukraine, the Industrial Centre, generally regions of industrial crops and livestock rearing. The recording of this kind of capitalist development was entirely unsatisfactory. Having sown area without livestock or stock led to a subordinate role. The 'supryaga' (literally yoking or harnessing together, sometimes called the 'spryaga') was often a cover for the hiring of working livestock and stock, depending on the different 'strengths' of the farms involved. Where there was equal strength, in some conditions it could be an embryo of collective agriculture.

2. There also existed the usual type of capitalism, based on the hiring of rural wage-workers. It also appeared to a small degree in covert form: every sort of fictitious family relationship served as a screen. This was a quite widely dispersed phenomenon in the Soviet countryside, judging by statements in the press, yet doubtless most cases went undetected. Even when not covert, rural wage labour was often not registered: daily wage labour was completely unregistered, despite Lenin's analysis of a quarter of a century

earlier indicating that the hiring of day labourers was to the greatest degree the characteristic sign of the peasant bourgeoisie. This had increased significantly after the Revolution. Finally, the statistical registration of time-rate hiring of wage labour was to the greatest degree unsatisfactory, so the increase in wage labour might have been simply due to better recording.

3. Besides these two forms of capitalist development, there were also the forms of action of manufacturing capital¹⁴, as opposed to trading and usury capital. Both the latter forms of capital appeared as rulers of changes in its means of production, whose activity in the countryside appeared to be widespread. The basis of usury capital was the instability of the majority of peasant farms, whereas the basis of trading capital was the monopoly of connections with the market (lack of working livestock). Usury and trading capital were also interlaced with credit, as also frequently were usury and manufacturing capital. The widely dispersed phenomenon of advances of grain was accompanied by the unpaid 'working off' on the farm of the lender. This was in effect a form of interest on the loan, although they would claim they made no profit out of it. There was a lack of recording of trading and especially usury capital.

4. The state apparatus operated in the same direction as trading, usury and industrial capital, by the pressure of its taxes. It forced the poor to bring their labour power on to the market. This situation might have changed somewhat with the removal of the tax burden on the poor and on 35 per cent of peasant farms in general, since the studies were conducted.

5. The prosperous (capitalists and those becoming capitalists) were, as well as the collectives, the bearers of progress in agriculture. (In an interesting footnote giving a critique of the ideologues of the petty-bourgeoisie, Kritsman nevertheless pointed out that capitalist farms were reactionary in Soviet conditions). Capitalist farms more than all the others used technical (agrotechnical and other) improvements, engaged in agricultural co-operation, used the Soviet school and so on. They tended to gain influence on the sel'sovety, their praesidiums, the Volost' Executive Committee and the apparatus of local power, and appeared as the leaders of the whole peasantry.

6. An index of the growth of the economic power of the capitalist part of the peasantry was the growth of rented land, relieving the poor of the land they received as a result of the agricultural revolution, partly being the land which they received in its second stage, the Committees of the Poor. The prosperous rented in the land rented out by the state, but renting in of land often took the form of hiring out working livestock and stock.

7. The growth of the class stratification did not occur as the stratification by land, but as stratification by working livestock. In so far as it occurred in a hidden form, it appeared in the form of equalisation in terms of sown area. Livestock and stock were the border dividing the proletarian from the petty bourgeois, but these indices did not distinguish among the peasantry with the means to conduct their own farm; in particular they did not characterise differences in the capitalist peasantry, because of the many sided character of capital.

8. The growth of class stratification was not only the growth in the numbers of lowest and highest groups, but in terms of the average means of production of these groups. There was an absolute and relative decline in means of production among the lowest peasants, and an absolute (and sometimes only relative) growth in the means of production of the highest groups, that is, a concentration of the means of production in the highest groups.

9. In the latter cases similar changes in the means of production characterized the hidden phases in the class stratification of the peasantry, which occurred dialectically, in quite often in the form of the so-called movement downwards and movement upwards, including in it as its own phase, a phase mainly of destruction (in all sown area or other groupings) of the weak farms, and then a phase mainly of increase of the strong farms.

10. The process of class stratification took different forms in connection with the ruling commodity direction of peasant farming (grain, special crops, dairy farming and so on) and proceeded basically by means of commodity peasant farming. This had radical significance for the industrial (and several other) regions, where grain production had a consumptionist character, based on the domestic farms of wage labourers or small farms engaged in non-cultivating activities, or cultivating non-grain crops. In so far as this was the case, then grouping was by the extent of the domestic farm, in which, generally speaking, the influence of capitalist differentiation was not present (for example, in the farms of industrial workers or town artisans). Where some farms were engaged in these regions in commodity grain production, the data would give an unclear picture

of the capitalist differentiations of peasant farming. For this reason, the consumptionist peasant household required special investigation.

These conclusions needed wider material, better prepared for this purpose in future. Kritsman also drew attention to the other processes besides capitalist differentiation: the co-operative unification of small farms (at the time only 1 or 1.5 per cent of them, although in a footnote added in 1928 Kritsman pointed to the speeding up of this process). He argued that all commodity farms were being drawn in by the many sided aspects of co-operation, into the general system of the Soviet national economy, with large-scale agriculture already in the hands of the proletariat (sovkhozy). Finally, there was the increase in the mass of active middle peasants, as well as capitalist differentiation, the middle peasantry no longer being the objects of feudal exploitation. All these processes were influencing and being influenced by the process of capitalist development. Without taking them into account, it was impossible to arrive at a correct judgement as to where the Soviet Union was going.

One can conclude this account of one of Kritsman's earlier works by stressing that the tentative nature of its conclusions is not indicative of a failure to develop an adequate strategy for the socialist transformation of the countryside. Rather it is indicative of an awareness of the need for careful research, taking account of differences in the technical division of labour and the division of social production, into the different forms of development of capitalist and socialist relations of production, before refining a strategy taken over in broad outline from Lenin.

Notes to Appendix

1. The phrase is that of T. Shanin (1972), op. cit., pages 60-61, as quoted in Chapter One of this thesis.
2. The phrase 'class stratification' carries the connotation of stratification as a process, rather than a settled state of affairs. For some reason, Kritsman seemed reluctant to use the word 'differentiation'.
3. On pages 141-146 of Class Stratification, Kritsman provides a critique of data on wage labour, using T.S.U. figures on Tula Gubernia. He argues that the figures are inaccurate, reflecting juridical relations, not economic ones. In particular they refer to permanent time-rate wage labour, ignoring, say, day wage labour or seasonal wage labour. It is in a footnote on page 144 that there is reference to Lenin's conception of a worker with an allotment. There is further discussion of wage labour where there are data on it in the individual surveys which he analyses later in Class Stratification. But it is clear even from the discussion on pages 141-146 that Kritsman does not treat wage-labour as a unitary phenomenon - it is related to the organisational forms of 'enterprise' occurring in the process of development of capitalism, and thus to hidden forms of capitalist exploitation. Hence Shanin's remarks on wage-labour seem to be misdirected; Shanin (1972), op. cit., pages 60-61.
4. In my view this approach enables one to take into consideration various determinants of relations of production, including various aspects of the division of labour.

5. Grosskopf is careful to point out that in 1916 there were evidently large properties which could properly be called capitalist, but that in the black earth zone, where in 1917 two-thirds of large properties possessed more than 500 dessiatines, the mixed type of enterprise was the most frequent: a capitalist organisation of the enterprise and a feudal organisation of peasants co-existed. See S.M. Shipley (1979) The Sociology of the Peasantry, Populism and the Russian Peasant Commune, M.Phil. Thesis, University of Lancaster, for the historical background (up to the end of the 19th century) of this geographical distribution of forms of enterprise.
6. The gubernii containing the volosti analysed by Kritsman are outlined with a continuous line, and their names are underlined in the list of gubernii below the map. Grosskopf's French transliteration of the Russian names has been retained in the list, but not in the main text. In addition, the Don gubernia, where the 6 sel'sovety used in Kritsman's critique of the 'banal' approach were located, is also outlined on this map. It is geographically close to the South East Study.
7. Kritsman's calculations of the percentage changes over the years are not presented here. I have corrected misprints.
8. 'Station' in the context means a large village.
9. The rates of pay by the poor farm for this form of the 's pryaga' where the prosperous peasant used his means of production on the poor farm can be indicated by the following examples:
 1. For ploughing and harvesting of 1 dessiatine - 2 workers (from the poor farm working on the prosperous farm) for the whole harvest and threshing.
 2. For ploughing and harvesting - 50 per cent of the harvested grain.

3. For ploughing $\frac{1}{2}$ dessiatine - a youth working for the whole summer (on the prosperous farm).
 4. For sowing three dessiatines - 50 per cent of the harvest and one worker for 18 days.
 5. For ploughing and harvesting 3 dessiatines - two workers for almost the whole summer.
10. Kritsman gives no indication of whether or not Yakovlev's figures refer to the whole country. I assume that they do, since there would otherwise be little point in introducing them at this juncture.
 11. This is consistent with the impression given by the note on 'promysly' called 'Crafts and Trades (English)' by R.E.F. Smith in The Journal of Peasant Studies, Volume 2, No. 4, July 1975, pages 489-490. Smith is discussing primarily the use of the term in relation to an earlier note by Shanin, 'Promysly (Russian)' in The Journal of Peasant Studies, Volume 2, No. 2, pages 224-225. Both Shanin and Smith are aware that at times 'promysly' refers to wage-labour.
 12. According to my calculations, the undersampling for 1917 was 9.2 per cent, but as I have indicated before, there are few misprints or arithmetical errors in Kritsman's work. Table 62 is thus slightly misleading for the 1917 number of farms, but there is no reason to doubt the sown area figure.
 13. This corroborates the analysis of the sel'sovet given for the period up to about 1926 by M. Lewin on pages 81-84 of Russian Peasants and Soviet Power, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1968. Lewin points out, of course, the spectacular change in policy towards the sel'sovet in 1929.
 14. 'Promyshlenny' is probably used here in the sense of 'promysly', referring to handicraft production.

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GLOSSARY

<u>Gosbank:</u>	The State Bank, which has the constitutional status of a State Committee, attached to the Council of Ministers.
<u>Gosplan:</u>	State Planning Committee
<u>Gossnab:</u>	State Committee on Material Technical Supply
<u>Gubernia:</u>	Province, that is an administrative region under the Tsarist state, and in the 1920s
<u>Khozraschet:</u>	A form of 'economic accounting' which gives the agent using it a certain degree of financial autonomy, and is consequently regarded by some commentators as being a concession to 'the market' in a predominantly 'command economy'.
<u>Kolkhoz:</u>	A collective farm (plural <u>kolkhozy</u>)
<u>Kolkhoznik:</u>	A collective farm member (plural <u>kolkhozniki</u>)
<u>Oblast':</u>	An administrative region within one of the constituent republics of the U.S.S.R.
<u>Politburo:</u>	The 'executive committee' of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
<u>Raiispolkom:</u>	<u>Raion</u> executive committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
<u>Raion:</u>	A district, a sub-unit of an <u>Oblast'</u>
<u>Sel'khoztekhnika:</u>	'Agricultural Technique', an agency responsible for the supply of means of production to <u>kolkhozy</u> and <u>sovkhozy</u>
<u>Sovkhoz:</u>	A state farm (plural <u>sovkhozy</u>)
<u>Tolkach':</u>	A 'pusher', an agent who uses informal connections to secure supplies, usually for a state enterprise.

Trudoden':

A 'labour day unit', which was prior to 1966 the main method of payment of kolkhozniki. The value of each 'labour day unit', calculated on a points system depending on the type of work contributed to the collective farm by an individual, was not known until the value of the harvest net of state planned procurements was known. This meant that the income of kolkhozniki was subject to considerable variations due to annual variations in the harvest.

Volost':

An administrative district within a Gubernia under the Tsarist state and in the 1920s (plural volosti).

