



Templeton, Douglas Alan (1967) A critique of some aspects of Kerygma as understood by Rudolph Bultmann and Charles Harold Dodd: Kerygma and its presuppositions. PhD thesis

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A CRITIQUE OF SOME ASPECTS OF KERYGMA
AS UNDERSTOOD BY RUDOLF BULTMANN
AND CHARLES HAROLD DODD

KERYGMA AND ITS PRESUPPOSITIONS

by

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A Thesis presented for the Degree of Ph.D.
of the University of
Glasgow

MAY 1967

SUMMARY

Essay I suggests that the context in which the enquiry concerning kerygma is being made is dominated by the rise of the historical-critical method. The hypothesis that theological language is an insoluble compound of historical and eschatological language is explored, then rejected in favour of the hypothesis that historical language is paradoxically identical with theological language.

Essay II explores what it means to speak historically of the resurrection, finds it necessary to define God, to assert that the past is present and that my acts and words, like the acts and words of Jesus, are the acts and words of God, though these ~~latter~~ *former* are qualified by sin.

Essay III assumes that the words of Jesus and the words of the early church were the words of God; that, if the words of the early church were kerygma, so too then were the words of Jesus kerygma. What differentiates kerygma from other language-games that deal with history is not that what they speak of remains past, whereas the kerygma makes present, but that in the kerygma he is present whose acts and words were, without the qualification of sin, God's acts and words.

Essay IV summarises the position so far, with a parenthesis on the inseparable relation of narration and proclamation; suggests that the New Testament includes not one kerygma, but many, some of which merely differ from one another, some of which contradict one another. It is further suggested that kerygma is created by men, or theologically speaking, by the Spirit, at the point where tradition and the present situation interact. As this interaction should be creating something new, it is not possible to test whether a new kerygma is true or false, as traditional norms cannot entirely measure what has gone beyond tradition.

Essay V outlines the presuppositions that have been accumulating throughout the essays and suggests that they, or something like them, are necessary for a comprehensive and consistent explanation of what kerygma is.

FOREWORD

A thesis may concentrate on exposition or on criticism. If it concentrates on the former, it will endeavour to set forth what an author has said, perhaps in many places in his writing, and to this exposition will append some criticisms. If it concentrates on criticism, it will see its task to ask why criticism has been undertaken at all, will enquire whether the criticism perhaps involves a set of presuppositions that can be distinguished from the authors under examination and will undertake the work of exposition only where it is seen to be necessary. In the following thesis the latter method was chosen.

In his History of New Testament Times R. H. Pfeiffer prefaces his foreword with the quotation: 'If you steal from one author, it's plagiarism; if you steal from many, it's research.' The footnotes here give some indication of the extent to which I have borrowed. The most important ideas I have taken from others are the theory of history of Collingwood, the analysis of 'the present moment' of Kierkegaard and Bultmann and the latter's doctrine of 'paradoxical identity'; and I have widely used the historical conclusions of the Bultmannian school of New Testament critics. And in my appropriation of all these I have everywhere been influenced by the views of my

theological teachers in Glasgow, Professor Ian Henderson and, before all, my Supervisor, Professor Gregor Smith. I can only apologise where a debt has gone unacknowledged.

Where so much has been borrowed it is somewhat impertinent to talk of originality. No doubt I could claim that the definitions of a Christian and of God are original, though the former is influenced by Ebeling, to mention no others, and the terms of the latter are taken from a saying of Wittgenstein. And I dare say that the terms 'ancillary norm' and 'kerygmata' have not been used before, though the facts they denote are spoken of widely.

But it might be of some use if I said something about the form of the thesis and something of my aims. It is an example of thinking in actu, endeavours to be something of a 'Programmschrift' rather than a closed system and represents how far I have been able to think on these matters: 'bis hieher ist das Bewusstseyn gekommen'.

It is something of a pity that the thought which forms the backbone of this thesis is the thought of the later Collingwood, when, as Sir Malcolm Knox was kind enough to point out to me in conversation and as he records in his Preface to The Idea of History, Collingwood was declining into both dogmatism and scepticism. But perhaps I may assume, for Collingwood, as Collingwood assumed for others, that if his thinking is not 'a body of truths to be blindly

accepted' neither is it 'a mass of errors to be repudiated wholesale, but a mixture of good thing and bad'.

Among the 'specimina philosophandi' in An Essay on Metaphysics, Collingwood has an essay on what the proposition, 'God exists', means for a theory of nature. What I would like to have done here is to have said what the same proposition might mean for a theory of history, that is, for Collingwood's theory of history; and, further, to have made an essay in theological method; and, further, to have sketched a theology "that was able to cope with change, in short, a theology of the Spirit. These aims are less temerarious if I do not claim that they have been realised.

But, however unrealised these aims, what I was thinking did appear to involve certain criticisms of Dodd and Bultmann. My 'a priori imagination' was unable to comprehend what Dodd had written on the resurrection and, as I was concentrating more directly than Dodd on the essential foreignness of the New Testament way of thinking from our own, and so more directly on the problems of hermeneutics, I was led to distinguish history from eschatology at a different juncture. Plato says somewhere that to philosophise is to 'divide reality at its joints'. Dodd's anatomy differed from mine. And I was further persuaded to lay Käsemann's stress on the variability of the kerygma and to account for this variability in terms of Collingwood's

view of historical process.

As regards Bultmann, many people think - and it is certainly thought by those who are engaged on the 'New Quest' - that it is insufficient to hold that Jesus was a Jew and that what he said is not Christian theology but 'belongs to its presuppositions'. I am of the opinion that these problems may be solved by transposing the kerygma into the life of Jesus - though without denying the undoubted differences between what Jesus said and what was said later. The differences are, I suggest, to be explained historically, but not theologically in such terms as relegate Jesus to Judaism. No doubt that transposition would mean a structural alteration in Bultmann's theology.

The definition of kerygma and the theology that these criticisms imply I have endeavoured to adumbrate in the last essay. That theology is set down as concisely and consistently as I was able, with only that comprehensiveness that I considered necessary to answer the question what kerygma is. For it was with that question alone that I was here concerned. For the rest, what Wittgenstein wrote in the Foreword to his Philosophische Bemerkungen is true for this, as it is perhaps true for all, that 'dieses Buch ist für solche geschrieben, die seinem Geist freundlich gegenüberstehen'.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Professor Conzelmann for an intensely interesting Seminar on the resurrection, Professor Bultmann, to whom Professor Gregor Smith kindly introduced me, for some help on the same subject and on hermeneutics, Professor Rückert for a conversation on historical identity and Professor Käsemann for his help during eighteen months study in Tübingen, for kindly reading the first chapter of this thesis and for his encouragement to continue. Professor Gregor Smith has continually exhorted, criticised and kept me in touch with the relevant literature, and given me the benefit of his Seminar discussions. . My friend Canon Walls, who first acquainted me with Collingwood's writings, has read every part separately and, again, given me the benefit of his criticism. There are many others, too many to mention, from whose writings, lectures and conversations I have been helped and, in particular, I would like to thank Miss Ann Henderson for her valuable secretarial offices in the closing stages. For the deficiencies in what remains I must accept responsibility.

Note: Bultmann's Heidelberg Academy essay, 'Das Verhältnis der urchristlichen Botschaft zum historischen Jesus', has been cited in the footnotes as SAH, 1960, and Dodd's The Apostolic Preaching and its Developments as The Apostolic Preaching. Information on works not included in the Bibliography is to be found in the footnotes ad loc.

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PROLEGOMENA

Definitiones

The history of modern Protestant theology is the history of its engagement with history. All the major problems for theology as a science have been raised for theology by the science of history. Whether the actual beginnings of the struggle¹ are to be found in the work of Strauss and Baur, who were in turn giving substance to the adumbrations of Michaelis and Semler, or whether the problem is already implicit in the Reformation valuation of scripture as against tradition, or, more fundamentally, if more unconsciously, as over against scripture itself, in the corrosive influence of Christ, or whether, by, as it were, a regressus ad infinitum, the problem is not rather rooted in the Entdämonisierung, or de-divinisation, of the world in the Gospel of Mark, is interesting genetically; under consideration here is not the origin, only the fact.

That the theologian be permitted to pursue the science of history, if not always to the bitter end, is a battle waged over the displacement of Strauss² and the some-time

1. v. Kümmel, Das Neue Testament, p. 147.

2. After the publication in 1835/36 of Das Leben Jesu, kritisch bearbeitet, Strauss was dismissed from his teaching post in Tübingen. He introduced the 'mythical' interpretation as one that would avoid the defects of the 'conservative' and 'rationalist' interpretations.

professorship of Robertson Smith¹ which is already won, if the anachronistically active pockets of resistance be ignored. In another sense, however, the science of history lies still undigested in the theologian's maw; and here the matter is by no means settled. That is to say, that history as an autonomous science may be legitimately pursued by the theologian is, with the above qualification, accepted. But the specifically theological problems raised by the activity of historians are not by any means solved or settled. Broadly speaking, this is the so-called problem of hermeneutics. That these specifically theological problems are still in full sail can be documented from Kümmel's history of New Testament research, where the era of history with no holds barred is followed by history of religions and then terminates, if not culminates, in the theological question in its relation to the historical.² It is with the concept 'kerygma', which is an attempt to solve these problems, that the following study is concerned.

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1. In 1881 Robertson Smith was removed from the chair of oriental languages and Old Testament exegesis at the Free Church College, Aberdeen, as a result of his articles in the 9th edn. of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, which were held by the General Assembly of the Free Church to undermine belief in the inspiration of the bible.
 2. The nomenclature in Kümmel, op.cit., is as follows: 'die konsequent geschichtliche', 'die religionsgeschichtliche' and 'die geschichtlich-theologische'.

To say so much is to place the problem in its widest setting. The problem could be made more precise in an infinite variety of ways and has indeed been defined as variously as the theologians concerned. Again, in the widest possible terms, the problem is the relation of history and faith, or, alternatively, the relation of historical speech to theological speech. Kierkegaard¹ formulated the problem in terms of the relation between 'contingent' and 'absolute', between (Lessing's) 'accidental historical truths' and 'eternal truths of the reason', between 'historical knowledge' and 'eternal happiness'. Bultmann² has formulated the problem in terms of history and eschatology and sought a solution in their paradoxical identity. Bonhoeffer,³ in an ethical context, in terms of the relation between penultimate and ultimate.

The following remarks will be an attempt, based on some of these theologies, to make a preliminary sketch of the problems that are involved in the question 'What is kerygma?'. For one thing is at any rate clear, that there can be no Verstehen (understanding) without a Vorverständnis (pre-understanding), nor answer without a question, however much any answer may modify the question. Accordingly the

1. e.g. in Concluding Unscientific Postscript.

2. History and Eschatology, The Gifford Lectures, 1955.

3. Ethics, pp. 79ff.

attempt will be made to formulate a preliminary hypothesis to act as a Fragestellung, or position from which to ask questions, for without such a preliminary procedure the problem cannot be grasped at all.

But, first, a general word on theological method. It was in the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries that history as the study of the past gained the 'sichere Gang einer Wissenschaft'.¹ Somewhat later, and yet perhaps more fundamentally, came the recognition of the historicity of the historian, that the historian himself is qualified by his past and responsible for his future.²

For the theologian in this situation either of two consequences may follow. His nerve may fail before what Mircea Eliade³ calls 'the terror of history', or he may be

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1. In The Idea of History p. 232, Collingwood writes: 'Since the time of Descartes, and even since the time of Kant, mankind has acquired a new habit of thinking historically.' But great precision is not possible in an estimate of this kind.
 2. e.g. Bultmann, Kerygma und Mythos, VI, p. 20 (my tr.): 'It has nowadays become increasingly recognised that there is no such opposition (sc. between history and the observer), since to perceive historical process is itself an historical event.' And cf. Heidegger, Being & Time, tr. Macquarrie & Robinson, para. 76, pp. 444ff., 'The Existential Source of Historiology in Dasein's Historicity'; and Collingwood, An Autobiography, p. 114: 'In the kind of history I am thinking of, ... historical problems arise out of practical problems. We study history in order to see more clearly into the situation in which we are called upon to act.'
 3. The Myth of the Eternal Return, tr. Trask, pp. 139ff.

braced by the cold but wider winds of possibility. In other words, the theologian stands between the past ^{and} the future, between tradition and the arising situation.

Failure of nerve may lead him to throw himself into the arms of a tradition which, once vocal but now dumb, he is doomed drearily to reiterate, or, breaking quite loose from tradition, to subject himself to every wind of fashion. As so often, a solution is not to be so simply found. An adequate theology must be measured by its ability to be Janus-faced, by its ability to keep simultaneously in view the demands of tradition and the demands of the situation.

But any science must be clean and certain root terms must be defined. The attempt must be made to distinguish as cleanly as possible between two different modes of speaking, namely: the historical and the theological.

History will be here defined as by Collingwood in The Idea of History. According to him, history, or the historian, studies 'the actions of men in the past'.¹ This definition, it must be clearly seen, excludes the New Testament. On such a definition the New Testament is 'theocratic history',² that is, the story of God's act or

1. Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 9: '... history is the science of *res gestae*, the attempt to answer questions about human actions done in the past.' (I have apparently included 'the object of history' in its definition, which is 'a kind of research or inquiry'.)

2. ibid., pp. 14-17.

acts in the past. And theocratic history, despite the attempts of Pannenberg¹ in Germany and Richardson² in England to re-introduce mythology in history's persona, is not history, but something else. The historian can, of course, recognise the influence on their actions of the beliefs of men, but when he investigates the truth of the belief itself or seeks to demonstrate that God had acted, he leaves history and turns theologian, and, in the latter case,

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1. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 104, writes (my tr.): 'But the end of history has already happened to Jesus, when he was raised, though it has still to happen to us.' It is, in my view, historical nonsense to suppose that history will have an end; nor do I think it theologically necessary to assert it. Bultmann, too, it is true, frequently uses the phrase 'the end of history', as, indeed, he continues to use many mythological expressions, but, despite the confusion this causes, Bultmann attaches to the phrase his own peculiar meaning. According to him, if I understand him aright, the Word brings my history till now to an end and allows me to set off on a new course. Far from being its end, Jesus of Nazareth is then its very motive force. I have tried to express this, deriving it from Kierkegaard, by the 'doctrine of the absolute moment' (v. the end of Essay 11).
 2. Richardson in History, Sacred and Profane takes, in my view, too broad an understanding of historical fact. Neither does he concede that some things are statistically impossible, nor does he sufficiently inquire into the literary genres of the period in which certain New Testament tales were composed.

a bad one at that.¹

History, then, studies the actions of men in the past. Theology, on the other hand, studies eschatology in its relation to history. It is true that as the term 'history' is common to both disciplines, confusion may easily arise, but this is just the point where the one must be carefully held apart from the other. For though history is common to both disciplines, the term history is in each case used in a different context and thus with a subtle shift in meaning which is decisive. In the one instance we are dealing with simple history, in the other with complex, with monopolar

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1. Having assumed Collingwood's definition of history, whether or no he 'was trying ... to erect his philosophy on the foundation of human credulity', and despite its 'affinities with Kierkegaard and even Karl Barth' (T. M. Knox, in his preface to The Idea of History, pp. xvif.), I have gone on to assume his definition of metaphysics as 'the science of absolute presuppositions', which was set forth in An Autobiography and developed in An Essay on Metaphysics, esp. chaps. IV and V. But it is true that, if 'nothing could be a completer error concerning the history of thought than to suppose that the historian as such merely ascertains 'what so-and-so thought', leaving it to someone else to decide 'whether it was true', and if 'all thinking is critical thinking' (The Idea of History, pp. 215f.); and yet if 'the distinction between truth and falsehood does not apply to absolute presuppositions at all' (An Essay on Metaphysics, p. 32), then it is hard to see how metaphysical thinking can be critical thinking. It would be worth enquiring further what Collingwood means by attributing changes in metaphysical beliefs to 'a modification (sc. 'of strains') not consciously devised but created by a process of unconscious thought' (ibid., p. 48, note to chp. V).

and bipolar, with non-dialectical and dialectical, with non-paradoxical and with paradoxical. This might be put more simply by saying that the historian is concerned with man, the theologian with God and man in relation. This is not, of course, to deny that an anthropological transcript of theology is possible, but only to say that such a transcript, if adequate, will always also be implicitly a theological transcript with the possibility of explication.

But the other term in the compound language of theology, eschatology, remains undefined. Since Schweitzer's Quest of the Historical Jesus¹ eschatology has moved from the eccentricity of a time-conditioned error to the centre of theological concern. Jewish apocalyptic eschatology is the mythological, of which the contemporary term, eschatology, is the demythologised expression. The assertion is that in each case the existential meaning is the same - and assertion it must remain, for demonstration is excluded. Or, if man's historicity is to be taken really seriously, it would be wiser to say that the modern term, eschatology, is not identical with, does not repeat, but corresponds to the Jewish understanding. It is not a 'Wiederholung', something that repeats, but an 'Entsprechung', something that corresponds to.

1. Von Reimarus zu Wrede, 1906; first English edn.: 1910.

Eschatology will here be defined as the situation of total or absolute responsibility. It is absolute in that it matters how I with my whole being respond to the situation before me, be it tree of man, nature or history. Whether this situation is merely anthropological, rather than an anthropological situation simultaneously and identically a theological situation, I shall bother to ask, but shall not bother to answer. I shall merely suppose that it is so, which, as 'theistic conviction in general as an element in man's understanding of the world is on the wane, and waning ever more rapidly',¹ and in the absence of that indispensable background of learned monographs which might have dealt with the specific problem of putting God on a scientific basis,² is the only course that is open to the conscientious student.

There are two ways in which this situation of absolute responsibility may be avoided, in classical terms, the method of the pharisee and the method of the publican and sinner, or, the nomistic and the antinomian. The latter

1. Ebeling, Theologie und Verkündigung, p. 25 (my tr.).

2. van Buren, The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, was, to my mind, the first to face the problem directly, if naïvely. One might also cite Bultmann's essay in Glauben und Verstehen, IV, pp. 113ff., 'Der Gottesgedanke und der moderne Mensch', which now appears in World Come of Age, ed. Gregor Smith, pp. 256ff., 'The Idea of God and Modern Man', and I am told that Ebeling has recently written on the subject.

refuses the terror of responsible historical decision and chooses something less, the former (unspeakably the more dangerous) attempts to create for himself and so bring under his own control, or 'Verfügbarkeit', the situation before it arises; that is, for him the coming situation, or 'der kommende Gott',¹ the God, who comes, is always assimilated to the pattern of the past, as his legal cunning has codified it. Thus he too, in Angst, seeks to avoid the terror, though precisely in the terror lies his freedom.²

And it is at this point that the situation of the categorical imperative suffers the religious metamorphosis. Confronted by total demand the victim is shown to have been and to be irresponsible; in traditional terms, a sinner. Accepting the irresponsibility of the past ^{and} ~~the~~ deciding to respond to the demand of the present, he finds himself no longer repelled by the situation, but held by it, no longer so much under responsibility as in freedom, under demand as receiving a gift, under judgement as in grace. Utterly detached from his past, taken out of the world (entweltlicht), he is free to be fully concerned with the coming present.

1. Bultmann, Glauben und Verstehen, III, p. 90; cf. ibid., p. 121.

2. cf. Fuchs, ZThK, 1956, p. 217 (cit. Bultmann, SAH, 1960, p. 18 (tr. Gregor Smith - privately, for Seminar use): '... that 'a man has found in the same God whom he otherwise flees, or should flee, a refuge which he now loves'.')

Such a situation may be approximately created in many ways. It is created par excellence when it is qualified by Jesus of Nazareth, or, more precisely, qualified by the verbum, or verbum visibile, in which Jesus Christ is preached. And this is such a way that the many ways are radically negated, then radically affirmed. By the ultimate communication, or act, the penultimate ways are totally destroyed and completely made. Along these lines what Christianity is is this: that by the existence of Jesus of Nazareth my existence is decisively qualified in such a way that my responsibility for others is radicalised; this responsibility is freedom.

The term existence in the above definition includes both word and act. So that speaking of present existence it would be as true to say that my existence is decisively qualified by the acts of my fellow Christians as to say by the words, or Word, of my fellow Christians. For I am qualified neither by the acts alone nor by the words alone, but by both. Or, my existence (act and word) is qualified by the existence (act and word) of others.

It would be inadequate to say that I am qualified by the acts alone, for acts are in themselves ambiguous. In order to understand an act I must know what the person who acted meant, or, in Collingwood's terms, I must know not only the 'outside' of an act but its 'inside'.¹ An act

1. The Idea of History, p. 213.

of itself requires words to explain it. At the same time to speak alone of a word is an abstraction. A concrete word, if the term be accepted, can only occur in the context either of a completed act or an act to be completed. Thus to avoid the danger of speaking either of an act alone which, without words to explain it, is ambiguous, or of a word alone, which is an abstraction, the term existence has been chosen to cover both. In the context of Christian existence the words, or kerygma, are the expression of such acts as have been done or are to be done. This is to follow the lead of Macmurray in his substitution for the self as thinker of the self as agent - though not to go so far as he does when he describes thought as the 'negative' aspect of action.¹ It could also be maintained (pace Ebeling)² that Bonhoeffer too tends in this direction, away from the primacy of word to the primacy of act. Or is it that there is some more fundamental reason for the stress on 'word' in Protestantism, 'word' usually with capital letter?

Such is a brief and skeletal sketch of the root terms which are necessarily involved in an examination of the

1. The Self as Agent and Persons in Relation, The Gifford Lectures, 1953. For 'thought as the 'negative' aspect of action', v. The Self as Agent, p. 89.

2. In Wort und Glaube, 'Die 'nicht-religiöse Interpretation biblischer Begriffe'', pp. 90ff.

concept of kerygma: history as the study of the actions of men in the past, theology as the study of those actions of men which can simultaneously be regarded as acts of God, or, in Bultmann's terms, that history which is paradoxically identical with eschatology; that is to say, that history which is decisively qualified by the existence of Jesus of Nazareth, or, more precisely, qualified by the acts of the believing community or, respectively, by the language in which those acts are expressed, i.e. kerygma.

A hypothesis dogmatically stated

If the Gospels are not simply history, but language about God's act in history, a 'Veranschaulichung', or illustrating, of the words: θεός ἦν ἐν χριστῷ,¹ the language of Kierkegaard's 'absolute paradox',² then, in so far as the New Testament critic works merely historically, he is stepping outside of the paradox. He may do this, of course, as a deliberate scientific restriction. Then blessed is he, if he knows what he is doing.

Within these two language-games, there are appropriate ways of talking which must not be confused. Within the historical, it is legitimate to speak of historical facts. Within the theological it is appropriate to speak of beliefs.

1. 2 Cor. 5:19.

2. Philosophical Fragments.

The object about which the believer speaks is not accessible to the historian qua historian, for the God himself must give the condition.¹ In Collingwood's terms in his Essay on Metaphysics, the metaphysician's statements must always be prefaced by 'the metaphysical rubric: I believe that ...'.² Such statements are not inferred from evidence. They are posited, or 'absolutely presupposed'.

If the language of the Gospels is not simply historical, nor on the other hand is it simply eschatological. The catalyst of faith has produced a new insoluble compound. The attempt to speak either simply historically or simply eschatologically ends either in Ebionitism or in Docetism. In other words, the apparently contradictory, paradoxical, absurd opposition of infinite and finite, ultimate and penultimate, eschatology and history, however the opposita be expressed, are united in the 'Verkündigungsakt', in the kerygma, in a new coincidentia. It is precisely this attempt to break the compound, to divide the coincidence, into which Dodd falls when he speaks of 'the facts of the death and resurrection' or 'the historical section of the kerygma'³ (the attempt to

1. Cf. Kierkegaard, op.cit., pp. 126f.

2. p. 187. The notion of 'the metaphysical rubric' is introduced on p. 55.

3. Dodd, The Apostolic Preaching, p. 13 and p. 47, respectively.

walk over seventy thousand fathoms¹ with one's feet on a sandbank).

The language of the Gospels, from the historian's point of view, is, as it were, the language of an inflated balloon. The historian, when he is quite clear about the distinction between historical facts and theological beliefs, can emerge from engagement with the Gospels only with a few scraps of rubber. 'Once a man has been deified, he has forfeited his humanity for good and all.'² Historically his results can only be minimal.

But there are two valuable results of a historical examination of the Gospels. In the first place, such a procedure proves quite conclusively that history is not the theologian's task. In the second place, it proves quite conclusively that the Jewish language-game is a time-conditioned jest, for their language of paradox is not ours. The superb hyperbole of myth and legend leads more surely to confusion than to the clarification of what existence means.

According to this analysis by which mythology has been introduced, we are now concerned with three language-games:

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1. Kierkegaard, 1, 111, A, 161 (cit. Lowrie, Kierkegaard, Vol. 2, p. 317).
 2. Strauss, Der alte und der neue Glaube, 1872, 2nd edn., p. 76 (cit. Ebeling, Theologie und Verkündigung, p. 22) (my tr.).

the historical, the mythological and the theological. Each of these requires some explanation.

First, the historical. The fact that the language of the Gospels is not historical can be demonstrated by the paucous remains that are left after a thoroughgoing critical examination of the documents as historical evidence. Certainly, not all scholars find only paucous remains, but the question arises here as to whether these scholars manage to retain what they do because they are working with such theological presuppositions as prevent them from treating the evidence with a critical faculty that, being absolutely unreserved, is prepared to be led where it has no wish to go. This judgement is based on the fact that form-criticism has for the most part found in the Anglo-Saxon world no place where it can lay its head, apart from tentative beginnings, not in the Gospels (apart from Nineham)¹ but in the Epistles.² In the Bultmannian wing of New Testament scholarship, when the theology of the early church and mythical and legendary accretions have been subtracted, the average remainder of genuine logia amounts

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1. e.g. The Gospel of St. Mark (The Pelican Gospel Commentaries). v. esp. Nineham's Introduction.
 2. e.g. Moule, The Birth of the New Testament. I am indebted to Prof. Käsemann for this observation.

to some ten¹ and of actions of Jesus the insubstantial shadows outlined by Bultmann.² Those who hesitate before form-criticism see only too clearly that to make a start here is to set one's feet on the primrose path that leads by a facilis descensus to the 'mere that'.³ The meagre results obtained from the attempt to treat the Gospels historically, to say nothing of their uncertainty, has every right to raise the question whether the attempt is not misconceived, not a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος,⁴ whether history is not the wrong form of thought.

Second, the mythological. Negatively, the definition of the language of the Gospels as mythological creates space for the assertion that myth is not historical event.

1. This is said to be the estimate of Käsemann. When I had occasion to put the question to him, he did not deny it, nor yet, it is true, confirm it.
2. In SAH, 1960, p. 11.
3. For a reference to the 'mere that' v. Bultmann, ibid., p. 9. References to the 'blosse Dass' occur frequently in Bultmann's writings. Cf. also the similar phrase of Conzelmann there cited (f.n. 10): 'das nackte Dagewesensein Jesu', which occurs in RGG, 3, Sp. 651, in Conzelmann's now famous article 'Jesus Christus'. But Henderson, Rudolf Bultmann (Makers of Contemporary Theology), p. 46, appeals - rightly, to my mind - for what may be called a 'blosse Wie' and supports his plea with evidence from Bultmann's own writings. I follow this view by insisting (v. infra) not only that Jesus was, but that he was for others. For the latter formulation v. f.n. ad loc.
4. Aristotle, Analyt.Post., 1, 7.

Accordingly it is misplaced to sound for sandbanks in the Sea of Galilee,¹ on the other hand pertinent to search for the dead man's bones.² Positively, it points the way to a religious language which is appropriate to the present situation. For mythology in the Gospels is merely the expression of first-century syncretistic religiosity. And the question: 'How did they speak?' cannot be allowed to suppress - as in Biblical Theology - the question: 'How am I to speak?'

Third, the (contemporary) theological. The first position here to be maintained is that the language of God and man can be expressed with complete adequacy either anthropologically or theologically. That is, that the same event which can be expressed physically, psychologically, historically or philosophically is at the same time and identically open to be understood as act of God, as miracle.³ This is Bultmann's 'stark assertion'⁴ that

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1. I allude to such explanations as that of Paulus, author of Das Leben Jesu als Grundlage einer reinen Geschichte des Urchristentums, 1828, whose explanation is summarised by Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, p. 52, as follows: 'Jesus walked along the shore, and in the mist was taken for a ghost by the alarmed and excited occupants of the boat.'
 2. Cf. Gregor Smith, Secular Christianity, p. 103.
 3. i.e., in the terms of Bultmann's essay, Glauben und Verstehen, 1, pp. 214ff., 'Zur Frage des Wunders', 'Wunder', not 'Mirakel'.
 4. Macquarrie, The Scope of Demythologising, p. 43 (cit. Ogden, Christ without Myth, p. 203).

'the question of God and the question of myself are identical',¹ which, as Ogden insists, does not mean (as Macquarrie understands it) that 'if religion always involves human existence then a religious question must be at least in part an existential question'. As Ogden points out:² 'He (Bultmann) does not say that the religious question is in part an existential question, but that the two questions are in fact one and the same'. Further, if one, in answer to Bultmann's statement that, because 'every assertion about God is simultaneously an assertion about man and vice versa', Paul's theology 'is not appropriately presented as the doctrine of man',³ accepts Ogden's counter-statement that 'one might equally well conclude that Paul's theology may best be presented as the doctrine of God',⁴ then the possibilities of religious language are twofold, theology in the strict sense and anthropology as a theological transcript without remainder. That is, as it were, human existence or existential analysis as reverse, God or theology as obverse.

But before this point is developed, an insertion should

1. Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 53.

2. op.cit., p. 203.

3. Theology of the New Testament, Vol. 1, p. 191, tr. Grobel.

4. op.cit., p. 173.

here be made. If Ebeling is right in observing that theistic conviction is on the wane, if Bonhoeffer's plea for 'the non-religious interpretation of religious concepts',¹ is 'zeitgemäss', and if such attempts as those of van Buren, Braun and others to understand faith anthropologically and historically have a particular relevance for the contemporary situation, then, on the one hand, one must recognise the legitimacy of Bultmann's 'most appropriately as the doctrine of man' and, on the other, that this is an axial point where our own situation differs both from that of the reformers and of Kierkegaard, for whom the concepts of God, the infinite and eternal happiness could with less impossibility be presupposed. Atheism is no new phenomenon, but the 'atheist theologian' is. And the atheist theologian has been called into being by the death of God, obsequies celebrated not alone by a group, like the sophists, but by a civilisation. This is the differential mark which gives our own historical situation its peculiar character.

But what is the consequence of an anthropological or historical understanding? Does this not abolish the

1. Cf. Letters and Papers from Prison, p. 156, where 'die Formel klingt zum erstenmal' (Ebeling, Wort und Glaube, p. 91, f.n. 2.) For further information v. Ebeling's footnote.

distinction that was claimed above to be nodal between history as 'the actions of men in the past' and theology as a non-mythological 'Göttergeschichte', the act or acts of God in history?

What faith asserts ⁵ ~~i~~ that the apparently hair-line difference between history and theology or alternatively between history and an implicitly theological anthropology is the straw that breaks the back of the world or changes the shirt of Nessus into the assertions of Lady Julian of Norwich,¹ or transposes history into law and Christian existence into freedom, or ontological possibility into a possibility in fact. The substitution by Paul for $\zeta\omega\ \delta\epsilon\ \acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega$ of $\zeta\omega\ \delta\epsilon\ \omicron\upsilon\chi\acute{\epsilon}\tau\iota\ \acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega$ ² turns as it were morality on its head and religion takes its place. So that the last word to man is not what he does or should do, but what is done to him. Thus Bultmann's statement: 'Only those who are loved are capable of loving'³ becomes the articulus stantis et cadentis theologiae.

But would it still not be enough to say that Jesus of Nazareth had loved with a love still active according to

1. I allude to T. S. Eliot, Four Quartets, Faber & Faber, pp. 41f.

2. Gal. 2:20. And cf. 1 Cor. 15:10.

3. Kerygma and Myth, 1, tr. Fuller, p. 32.

Croce's 'all history is contemporary history'¹ or Collingwood's doctrine of a 'living past'?² This would be the simple historical view, a Christocentric humanism. The counter-question is to ask whether it is adequate to the sources to remove Jesus from the paradoxical context of the βασιλεία. In other words, the history of Jesus can be demythologised and written 'etsi deus non daretur' (as if God were not given), but can it be written without Bonhoeffer's concluding *coram Deo*?³

That is: the Heideggerean and Christian understandings of existence do not differ in their ontological analyses, but in that the Christian claims that the ontological possibility becomes an ontic possibility, or possibility in fact, only because it is firmly anchored in a history which is paradoxically supposed to be identical with an act of God. A Christian anthropology in terms, negatively, of 'radikale Unverfügbarkeit', a radical acceptance that things are not in one's own control; and, positively, of 'radikale Offenheit für die Zukunft', radical openness to

1. The phrase is Collingwood's (The Idea of History, p. 202) in his summary of Croce's thought.

2. e.g. An Autobiography, p. 97.

3. op.cit., p. 196: 'And we cannot be honest unless we recognize that we have to live in the world *etsi deus non daretur*. And this is just what we do recognize - before God!'

the future,¹ cannot divorce itself from the decisive existence of the Jesus who stood paradoxically related to the βασιλεία. Thus ontologically the Christian and philosophical analysis are without remainder. The difference is ontic. And it is all important.

So much having been said about the anthropological obverse, the question now arises concerning the theological reverse.

The language of the Gospels, regarded theologically in the stricter sense, is analogical language. By the language of the Gospels is meant here not how it is, for that is mythology, but how it is to be interpreted. That is, analogy is not used to describe historically, but is chosen as a hermeneutic tool. That is, the transition has been made from the Dogmengeschichte of early Christianity to the appropriate method of a modern dogmatic. Further, as the term analogy is being used within Christian discourse the analogia is analogia fidei, not analogia entis. Which latter contention requires further explanation.

1. The thought, if not this precise terminology, is Bultmann's; cf. Glauben und Verstehen, I, p. 172: 'der Mensch ist nicht sein eigener Herr; so hat auch der Christ sich nicht in der Verfügung ...'; and ibid., p. 148: 'Im Glauben wird das Jetzt dadurch, dass wir die Offenbarung anerkennen, frei von der Vergangenheit, vom Tode, wird die Zukunft eröffnet.' But the idea occurs passim.

Regarding the Gospels in their aspect as analogy, one could say, for example: As Jesus lodged with Zacchaeus,¹ so God lodges with men. This is, however, apparently, to draw an analogy not from a possible human situation (οἷ' ἂν γένοιτο), as the story of the Prodigal Son, but from what did happen (τὰ γινόμενα),² the actions of an historical person, Jesus. For if one says: 'As Jesus lodged with Zacchaeus', is this not to fall back into historical speech, so that one would have, on the one hand, an historical fact (Jesus lodged with Zacchaeus), from which on the other hand one could then draw an eschatological analogy: 'So God lodges with men'? And this would be to break what was above called the insoluble compound of theological speech into Dodd's dualism of 'eschatological interpretation' and 'the facts of the ministry of Jesus'.³

Once again, however, one is saved by form-criticism from the threat of an historical fact. The story is not

1. Lk. 19:1-10.

2. Aristotle, Poetics, 1451b.

3. The Apostolic Preaching, p. 45. I find myself, later in this essay, after the hypothesis of the 'insoluble compound' of historical and eschatological speech has been dropped, asserting precisely the same 'dualism' (which I then call 'paradox'). It is later, esp. in Essay 11, made clear that Dodd and I do not disagree that there is a 'dualism', but on where the distinction between eschatology and 'the facts' is to be drawn.

history but 'clearly and 'ideal scene', a further developed variant of Mk. 2:14'.¹ The historical difficulty, however, goes a stage further, for by treading, with some vigour, the wax fruit of 'ideal scenes', there is distilled after all the unadulterated wine of history - unless the metaphorical confusion of created kinds does not after all suggest a more profound confusion of forms of thought. For, though 'with some caution', Bultmann himself admits 'fellowship with outcasts like tax-gatherers and fallen women'.² Thus the argument moves still sway from the *analogia fidei* in the direction of an *analogia entis*, or, better, as historical, an *analogia facti*.

We have at any rate an historical fact on our hands. The question is whether this historical fact is theologically relevant.

But (in parenthesis to the main argument) supposing the theologian does make historical statements, then they must be judged by normal historical criteria. Theological talking may to a historian be absurd. But the theologian, if he talks history, must talk historical sense. That is, if he leaves his own proper form of thought, he is then subject to the canons of the 'ἄλλο γένος' he has adopted.

1. Bultmann, Geschichte der Synoptischen Tradition, p. 34 (my tr.).

2. Bultmann, SAH, 1960, p. 11 (tr. Gregor Smith).

Thus if the theologian supposes that an Iranian myth is the record of a historical event, the historian can well point out the historical absurdity. It is in this sense that 'science should be to religion and the Church like the waters of the sea in Keats' Sonnet,

"... at their priestlike task
of pure ablution round Earth's human shores."¹

It is, then, possible to treat the Gospels as historical evidence. Where in this process historical facts are discovered they are subject to historical criteria. But whereas the Gospels may be 'tortured', in Bacon's phrase,² to reveal historical facts, they were not written as historical accounts, but as kerygmatic documents. They were not written as Geschichte and must be treated as Dogmengeschichte. What Collingwood writes of Sumerian historiography could apply, mutatis mutandis, to the Gospels: 'The knowledge furthered by such a record is not, or at any rate is not primarily, man's knowledge of man, but man's knowledge of the gods'.³ The problem of theology, as he writes elsewhere,⁴ is relating to a finite fact to the infinite - or, perhaps better, it is not his problem, for

1. von Hügel, Selected Letters, Editor's Memoir, p. 38.

2. Bacon's metaphor is recorded, without reference, by Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 237.

3. ibid., p. 12.

4. I cannot now locate this reference.

this would, in Bonhoeffer's terms,¹ be to fall back from the question 'Who' to the question 'How', but his presupposition; it is something from which he argues, not to which he argues.²

But to return; when the Gospels speak analogically, are they drawing analogies from what Jesus did (history) or from what God did in Jesus (theology)? And, of course, this theological statement is complicated by the twofold nature of theological method. For theology may either (a) study what God did in Jesus - theology in the strict sense, or (b) - the anthropological transcript - study and explain the believed fact that Jesus, being wholly free from the past and so completely open for the future was free to act in total responsibility to situations as they arose, or, more simply, as van Buren, that Jesus was a 'remarkably free man'.³

The analogy that is spoken of here is not analogia facti (what Jesus did in the past) but analogia fidei (what God did in Jesus, or, anthropologically, on the basis of

1. Wer ist und wer war Jesus Christus? pp. 11ff. Esp. p. 14: 'Die Frage nach dem 'Wer' ist die Frage nach der Transzendenz. Die Frage nach dem 'Wie' ist die nach der Immanenz.'

2. Cf. Dodd, op.cit., p. 12: 'It is not something for which Paul argues, but something from which he argues ...'

3. van Buren, The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, p. 121.

the fact that Jesus was a remarkably free man). It is analogy not based on historical facts, but on the central paradox of faith. And it is *analogia fidei* for this reason, namely that the statement is not as such historically demonstrable, either in its theological or in its anthropological form. That God acted in Jesus could be historically proven only apparently as when the Gospels speak in the objectifying language of demonstrable epiphany. But this is mythology. In the case of the transcript, the problem is somewhat more difficult. What the historian could prove with some caution is that in comparison with contemporary Judaism such logia as Mk. 2:27 (if genuine) and 7:15 (if genuine) suggest a singular freedom of action. What he could not prove is that the fact is certain, the freedom absolute and by Jesus not created but received.

But if no historically certain instance can be given, has the theologian not left the dust and heat of history for the hygienic but unliving room of abstraction? On the contrary, the central theological assertion is precisely that God did act, in concreto, in terms of blood and bone, that Jesus, who existed once, was a remarkably free man. It is not that the statement is not concrete, but that it is not demonstrable. Illustrations of the statement are abundant. Evidence of its truth there is none. Accordingly the appropriate question to address to the

Gospels is: what does the central paradox mean, as illustrated by this pericope? - and not: did what is recounted in this pericope take place in fact? The Gospel pericopes are then analogies or parables to illustrate the central paradox, and it is inappropriate or at any rate irrelevant to theological discourse to ask of any pericope 'But did it happen?' For this presupposes the separability of the two elements of theological language, the historical, that is, and the eschatological, which, in fact, never appear separately, but only in the compound form created by the 'Verkündigungsakt', the act of preaching.

Christian faith is faith in the paradox that the historical event of Jesus of Nazareth is identical with the eschatological event, that Jesus' historical existence was God's historical existence. And religious language, it was suggested, and it is especially the language of the Gospels that is here under consideration, can be either analogy based on this paradox or existential/anthropological interpretation, existence being again understood paradoxically as 'I .. yet not I, but Christ'.¹

A further complex of problems, connected with the religious language of paradox and analogy, may, in parenthesis, be alluded to here. There is the question of the relation of analogical speech to the central paradox,

1. Gal. 2:20.

the question in what way analogy can be based on a paradox. Further, is it enough to speak alone ~~of~~ the central paradox, for the paradox has, so to speak, many particular concretions: 'the blind see and the lame walk ...'¹ - but ~~the~~ blind and lame did not and do not; the walking on the water, interpreted as: 'though Nero threaten, even burn me, yet am I safe'² - how is this to be understood in the light of the emperor's garden?³ Or, as eminent instance, the resurrection. Does this mean something like Wittgenstein's remark: 'the experience of feeling absolutely safe. I mean the state of mind in which one is inclined to say "I am safe, nothing can injure me whatever happens."'?⁴ Thus there remains outstanding how the analogies are related to the central paradox, how the 'little paradoxes' are related to the central paradox and the problem of determining the scope and limit of each kind of speech.

A stated hypothesis dogmatically replaced

In what sense are historical facts relevant or irrelevant to theology? It was asserted above that theological language is an insoluble compound of the

1. Mt. 11:5f.

2. Rawlinson, The Gospel according to St. Mark (Westminster Commentaries), p. 88 (cit. Nineham, op.cit., p. 181).

3. Tacitus, Annals, XV, 44, 6-7.

4. Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Memoir, p. 70, f.n.

historical and the eschatological, a compound created by the 'Verkündigungsakt'. But it is rather difficult to see just what kind of language this would be. The suspicion arises that there is merely being asserted an illegitimate chimaera, whose foreparts are historical, whose hindparts are eschatological and whose middle parts are a 'Verkündigungsakt' which connects the beast and gives it some sort of unity. But is the hypothesis zoologically viable?

Another hypothesis, however, suggests itself, namely that theological language does not appear as an insoluble compound, but as a dialectical compound. This would mean that theological language does not appear as a unity, but as the apposition of two seemingly contradictory statements, a simple historical statement, the statement of an historical fact and an eschatological interpretation - which however is not the same as an historical interpretation, if eschatology be understood as in some, not yet clarified, sense as the 'end' of history. In this case the admittance of historical facts within theological discourse would not be a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος, but merely an abstraction or an irrelevance if made outside an eschatological context. Thus one would say, what Jesus did (historical statement)¹

1. By 'historical' is not meant - and within this essay never is meant - the 'brute facts' of positivistic historiography, but an understood fact, in the sense of Dilthey and Collingwood, a fact, which has not only an 'outside', but an 'inside'. I regard positivistic historiography as a problem that has been already settled.

was what God did (eschatological statement). Accordingly one would not say, as Kähler, that historical facts and faith 'flow apart like oil and water',¹ but that being dialectically, or paradoxically related they become not one simpliciter, but paradoxically one in faith. Or, putting the matter with somewhat greater complexity, as the historical Jesus was related paradoxically to the Kingdom of God (i.e. the historical facts concerning Jesus themselves stand in a paradoxical relation), so the history of the believer stands paradoxically related to God, or, my acts are, paradoxically, God's acts.

If, on this new basis, the question is asked: in what sense are historical facts relevant to theology, an answer might run as follows. (a) If historical research could show that Jesus of Nazareth had never existed, then the centre of Christianity would be touched. (b) If historical research could show that Jesus' life were not, in any intelligible sense, a 'being there for others',² then the centre of Christianity would be touched. This is to say that, in its aspect as historical, the Christ-event does not, like the Epicurean gods, or Kähler's Christ, lie in a

1. I am indebted to Prof. Gregor Smith for bringing this remark of Kähler to my notice. It is to be found in Der sogenannte historische Jesus und der geschichtliche, biblische Christus, p. 51.

2. Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, p. 209.

storm-free region beyond the 'flammantia moenia mundi',¹ but is indeed vulnerable to these two historical criteria. These criteria are, of course, negative; they could falsify, but could not verify.

The first proposition could in principle be proven, though it must be admitted that the fact of Jesus' existence ought to be tolerably certain except to the most solipsist student. The second offers more ground to the sceptic. It might be with greater credibility suggested not only that Jesus, as Bultmann tastefully puts it, 'liked to eat and drink a glass of wine'² but that he is to be identified more with the milieu of The Power and the Glory³ than as the practitioner of the sinlessness of orthodox doctrine; or, alternatively, that he was a paranoid fanatic. Whatever be thought of the eccentricity of these proposals, it is still in principle possible historically to demonstrate their truth and, if so, the centre of faith, it is claimed, would then be touched - unless to take the second objection seriously is to presuppose a Donatist conception of revelation.

Despite the paucity of history in the Gospels, however, critical consensus suggests that neither of these proposals

1. Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, 1, 74.

2. SAH, 1960, p. 11 (tr. Gregor Smith).

3. The novel by Graham Greene.

is more than eccentric. It is certain enough, historically speaking, that Jesus existed once and certain enough that he was there for others. For is this latter point not proved by Dodd's observation¹ that between the Messianic conception of late Judaism and that of early Christianity there is a difference which can only be explained by an historical career, unless it be supposed that predications of the pre-existent fell down from above.

But lest this emphasis on historical facts should be thought to lead away from the centre of the Gospel into what Kierkegaard called the 'parenthesis',² the labyrinthical byways of historical evaluation, that have - alas - already given so much 'occasion for the writing of folios',³ it should be insisted that what it meant on any particular occasion for Jesus to have lived 'under the conditions of existence',⁴ of first-century Judaism is neither here nor there. What matters is that, historically, Jesus was there for others 'in the humble figure of a servant',⁵ but that even if there was no evidence to prove

1. History and the Gospel, p. 48.

2. Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 29.

3. Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, p. 129.

4. The phrase occurs in Tillich passim, e.g. Systematic Theology, 2, p. 126.

5. Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, p. 130.

this, faith would have to assert it, as an historical fact, and that, paradoxically, Jesus' historical existence was, in some sense, the historicity of God. The way in which love is at any time realised belongs to the ethical commonplace of mankind, that there are at no time any limits that I can place to what love may demand of me, and this can be studied as well from the Sage Mo¹ as from Jesus. The Gospel consists not merely in that anything may be demanded but also, and primarily, in that everything is given.

Disputationes

What has been written above is an attempt to set out a series of categories, on the basis of which an adequate and consistent theology might be constructed. And this has been done, if not with the aim, certainly with the result not of solving difficulties, but of indicating where they lie. The next step will be, on this basis and with the aim of illuminating the concept of kerygma, to sketch a critique of the theologies of Dodd and Bultmann, again in such a way that criticisms will merely be indicated which only a fuller treatment could demonstrate.

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1. Bouquet, The Christian Faith and Non-Christian Religions, p. 91, writes: "Anyone can see that 'graded love' as practised by the Confucians is incompatible with the practice of Christian ἀγάπη, but it is by no means impossible to argue successfully that the jienai of Mo comes very close to it."

First the work of Dodd requires examination in the light of the question in what sense the theologian is interested in the history of Jesus of Nazareth. Of fundamental importance here is the distinction between what is historically necessary and what is historically interesting. The danger, if the distinction is not made, is the 'parenthesis', of entering upon a multiplicity of facts no less numerous than it was promised to the children of Israel to become, whose certainty ebbs and flows with the tide of dissertations under the moving moon of the contemporary Zeitgeist. On the presupposition that only the purity of the 'that' can save ^{from} the wilderness of the 'how', it might be pertinent to ask to what extent History in the Fourth Gospel, for example, is historically interesting, to what extent theologically relevant.

Secondly, if the theologian is concerned on the one hand with history and on the other hand with the paradoxical interpretation of this history, i.e. eschatology, it is all important where the line is drawn between them. When Dodd speaks of the 'facts of the life and ministry of Jesus',¹ he has a certain estimation of what those facts are, which varies from what is merely conservative to what is dangerously, but not scandalously,² absurd. Two quotations

1. The Apostolic Preaching, p. 30.

2. Etymologised, of course, from Kierkegaard's understanding of the 'skandalon' or 'offence'.

should suffice: (1) '... so Jesus heals the blind and the deaf, and restores strength to the palsied and life to the dead'.¹ That Jesus healed is an historical fact, but it could nevertheless with justification be maintained that the above statement, not only in its conclusion but in its length, is, on one level, totally legendary and, on another, purely eschatological. (2) 'They ... insisted upon the crude actuality of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus sub Pontio Pilato while affirming that in these historical facts the eternal God Himself ... had acted for the salvation of man.'² To include the resurrection as an historical fact is to fall into Paul's error of 1 Cor. 15.³ The implication for New Testament scholarship of the distinction between the directness of paganism and the inwardness of Christianity⁴ needs examination.

Thirdly, how does Dodd understand eschatology? If Eliade is right⁵ in maintaining that mythological thinking is essentially circular and that the genius of Hebrew

1. The Apostolic Preaching, p. 49.

2. History and the Gospel, p. 14.

3. I am assuming the justice of Bultmann's criticism, Glauben und Verstehen, 1, pp. 38ff., 'Karl Barth, "Die Auferstehung der Toten"'.
 4. For the distinction v. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp. 218-20.

5. op.cit.

thinking was to break out of the bonds of the paradigmatic, atemporal situation into the unpatterned historical moment as the place where reality is met, then the Christian philosophy can only be adequately expressed in terms of the temporality of God¹ or the historicity of man. And what is true of mythology is no less true of philosophical idealism, in which existence slips backward into the timeless abyss of anamnesis.² It is relevant to ask whether Dodd does not in fact work within a form of Platonic idealism with the result 'that he understands the concept of eschatology in the sense of timelessness, and consequently his 'realised eschatology' contradicts the nature both of eschatology and of a present that is, without the future, unintelligible. To that extent it is neither 'eschatology' nor 'realised', but rather a dogmatically asserted dialectic of time and eternity which makes use of paradox as its basis and hermeneutic tool.'³

Lastly there is the problem common to both Dodd and Bultmann of the relation of kerygma and kerygmata.

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1. The allusion is to Ogden's essay in Zeit und Geschichte (Dankesgabe an Rudolf Bultmann zum 80. Geburtstag), ed. Dinkler, pp. 381ff., 'The Temporality of God'.
 2. v. Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments.
 3. Jüngel, Paulus und Jesus, pp. 115f. (my tr.).

Contemporary scholarship works with four¹ sociological units, namely Jesus and the disciples, the Palestinian, the Jewish-Hellenistic and the heathen-Hellenistic communities. Each of these had its own distinctive kerygma and theology. In what sense are they identical? Or, working on the other hand with particular authors, in what sense is the theology of Mark, for example, identical with that of Paul or John? A hydra-headed complex of problems of this magnitude, a complex perhaps traditionally subsumed under the title, 'Scripture and Tradition', but which, with the refinement of Traditionsgeschichte, can no longer be regarded as occurring between the canon and what follows it, but as a process taking place within the New Testament itself, can only be solved by a method of 'divide et impera'. But, on the most general level, the problem is to do justice to both elements of the dialectic of change and continuity within the New Testament and, mutatis mutandis, beyond it. The problem of the relation between Chalcedon and the Westminster Confession is a palpable one. Quite as acute is the relation between, say, the Marē-Kyriology of the Palestinian community and the Kyrios cult of the Hellenistic community.² Is adequate

1. I should, perhaps, have said: 'some contemporary scholarship ...' The matter is taken up again in Essay IV, where I cite Hahn Christologische Höheitstitel, pp. 11f., and Fuller, The NT in Current Study, p. 84.

2. e.g. Hahn, op.cit., pp. 67ff., chap. entitled: 'Kyrios'.

justice done to the element of change by speaking of the continuity of eschatological self-understanding (Bultmann),¹ by regarding the formulation as variable, and the self-understanding of faith as constant (Braun)² or by speaking, as Dodd, of the one kerygma which is decisively reinterpreted³ - how does it then remain the one kerygma?

Implied here is that two questions must be clearly distinguished: (1) the past-historical question: What did Mark, for example, consider to be the centre of the Gospel? (2) the present-historical question: What does the exegete consider to be the centre of the Gospel? The question of

1. This is, I hope, fair comment on SAH, 1960, but it somewhat misses the point. For Bultmann's aim is so to stress the discontinuity between the preaching of Jesus and the preaching of the early church, that Jesus remains a Jew (pp. 8f.) and his message the presupposition of Christian theology (not denied: p. 8. For the original statement v. Theology of the NT, tr. Grobel, p. 3: 'The message of Jesus is a presupposition for the theology of the New Testament rather than a part of that theology itself.'). As for the relation between subsequent kerygmata (a term which Bultmann does not use) his practice is (e.g. Glauben und Verstehen, 111, pp. 131ff., 'Die Wandlung des Selbstverständnisses der Kirche im Urchristentum') to use the theology (a) of the Palestinian community and (b) of Paul (with the possible addition of John) as a norm by which Luke and subsequent 'early Catholicism' are measured and found wanting. But the question whether the norm itself can be said to change is, so far as I know, not discussed by Bultmann.
2. Spätjüdisch-häretischer und frühchristlicher Radikalismus, 11, 115-136 (cit. Bultmann, SAH, 1960, p. 22). Cf. also the important latter essays in Gesammelte Studien zum Neuen Testament und seiner Umwelt.
3. The argument of The Apostolic Preaching. v. esp. Dodd's summary: pp. 74f.

the unity of the New Testament, or the kerygma of the New Testament, is in itself meaningless. It can only be answered by a process of scientific abstraction, by reducing a series of unharmonisable centres to a lowest common denominator. The only sense in which it could have meaning is to ask the past-historical question: what did those who formed the canon consider to be the centre of the Gospel?

The question of how then kerygma is formed can be answered only by asking on the one hand what the preacher understands of his tradition and on the other by asking what he understands of his situation and thirdly by asking what he then says. If he merely repeats the tradition or merely adapts himself to the situation, he will be executing the movements of a foreshortened understanding of his historicity. Thus it could be demonstrated that neither Luther nor Barth on Romans, nor Dodd nor Bultmann on eschatology are merely repeating their original sources, but what each on the basis of a dialogue with the past considers to be the answer to his own situation.

Thus if the historicity of the kerygma is to be taken seriously, continuity can never be asserted without asserting discontinuity nor kerygma without asserting kerygmata. Or, in other words the assertion of identity is always a paradoxical assertion. For the kerygma can never remain the same without becoming something else. And further as a new kerygma can never be simply derived

either from tradition or from the situation in which it comes to be, the only possible criterion that can be had is by a duly reflective recourse to the Holy Ghost.¹ And then Gamaliel's caution is salutary.²

Of solutions to what Ogden might call 'the main theological problem of our time,'³ Bultmann's is the least quickly intelligible, the most quickly misunderstood and the most worth understanding. For Barth speaks of God, biblical theology offers an archaeology, redesigned, it is true, for high-Mach numbers, and Dodd remains swound in the ideal clothes of the emperor Plato. But the question relevant to Bultmann's theology is whether the paradox, which Hasenhüttl⁴ alleges is not radically sustained in ecclesiology, is in the right manner sustained at the church's origin.

The desiderandum is a theology with, on the one hand, as firm a grasp on history as Pannenberg or Richardson, and on the other hand on an eschatology which flies firmly under the banner of an ontological analysis of temporality,

1. Ebeling, Theologie und Verkündigung, p. 38 (my tr.), adapted.

2. Ac. 5:39.

3. op.cit., p. 20.

4. Der Glaubensvollzug, pp. 323ff.

conducted on phenomenological principles.¹

But what Bultmann has done in order to quit himself of the interminable parenthesis of Jesus-research, which is, to be sure, nothing more than the miserable subterfuge of those who cannot face the present, is to shift the paradox from Jesus to the kerygma, so that the curious post-Schweitzer situation arises in which Dodd realised eschatology in the life of Jesus and Bultmann in the kerygma. It is tempting to suppose that the problem can only adequately be solved by positing the paradoxical identity of Dodd's and Bultmann's theologies. Or, more simply, to ask how Bultmann's theology would appear after a structural transposition of the paradox into the life of Jesus.

But does not Bultmann already say this? The danger of attempting to criticise Bultmann is that on the whole the critic finds himself wrestling not with reality but with a mythical river deity,² wrestling with his own illusions about what Bultmann has neither said nor implied or offering

1. This phrase is modelled on the terminology of Körner, Eschatologie und Geschichte, pp. 69ff., where he describes, briefly, the position of Heidegger and, more or less, Bultmann. I say 'more or less', because '... nun vollzieht Bltm. den Schritt von der Philosophie zur Theologie, indem er an die Stelle des Nichts Gott, an die Stelle des Todes das Überempirische Leben bzw. Christus setzt.' (Körner, ibid., p. 71).

2. Gen. 32:22ff.

objections which were already answered in the rosy-fingered dawn of demythologising. And were one to appeal to the existence of the New Quest, as an indication of structural inconsistency in Bultmann's thought,¹ it would be replied that as a phenomenon this is no less ambiguous than any other 'vorfindliches Phänomen', phenomenon that one comes across. It could merely be the cries of those tormented by their inability to exist in Bultmann's thinking. However, if it were to be done it were well that it were done without either falling foul of historicism or of the attempt to reconstitute a mythology now so thread-bare that it affords what has traditionally been called salvation only to the vanishing island of adherents who are unwilling to or unable to understand the ontological analysis of temporality conducted on phenomenological principles. As Paul said, and rightly, 'not all have $\gamma\nu\omega\sigma\iota\varsigma$ '.²

With the above preliminaries in mind the attempt will now be made first to make the problem more precise, secondly to offer some remarks in the direction of historical clarification and thirdly to discuss in what sense the life of Jesus, his existence and preaching might have theological legitimation.

1. v. the reply of Ogden and Harvey, ZThK, 59 (1962), 46-87, to Robinson, The New Quest of the Historical Jesus.

2. 1 Cor. 8:7.

The problem might be put in either of two ways.

(1) Why are the words of Jesus not kerygma? (2) When did Christianity begin? Ebeling¹ defines Bultmann's understanding of kerygma as 'the preaching that Jesus was the Christ which arose after the death of Jesus'. With this post-mortem kerygma the preaching of Jesus shares three characteristics in common: it is address, it demands decision, it is eschatological. But it differs from the kerygma in the strict sense at two points: (a) Jesus' eschatology is futurist;² (b) Jesus' preaching is non-Christological.³ Consequently Jesus was a Jew and not a Christian and his preaching belongs to the presuppositions of New Testament theology.

The two problems requiring consideration here are, first, the investigation of Jesus' understanding of time: what is the difference in the understanding of time between, for example: ἄρα ἔφθασεν ἐφ' ὑμᾶς ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ⁴ and: ὅτε δε ἦλθεν τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου ἐξαπέστειλεν ὁ θεὸς...?⁵

1. Theologie und Verkündigung, p. 33 (my tr.).

2. '... that which for Jesus is future Paul sees as present, or as a present that took its start in the past.' (Bultmann, Glauben und Verstehen, 1, p. 201 (my tr.)).

3. 'Concerning his own person Jesus gave no express teaching.' (ibid., p. 174 (my tr.)).

4. Mt. 12:28.

5. Gal. 4:4.

Secondly, what is the function of Christological statements? Christological statements, it will be maintained here, represent an historical, not a theological transition.

At the least it is curious that the founder does not belong within his religion. Was Luther, one might ask, a Catholic or a Protestant, or is Protestantism the 'preaching of justification which arose after the death of Luther'? By radicalising Occam, Tauler, Augustine and the Nominalists, Luther did not purify, but break Catholicism. And Bultmann implies so much himself in contending that the ~~unexplicit~~ implication of the Sermon on the Mount is δικαιοσύνη πίστεως,¹ and that in this respect Jesus and Paul need not, as Paul and Peter, quarrel. (Unless the terms 'founder' and 'religion' are inapplicable and so inadmissible in a religion that 'ends' history?) Moreover without becoming entangled in the mortal coils of Diethelitism or biographical irrelevancies, it is surely true that, at least qua man, Jesus was a man of faith, however absurd, if it is so, it would be to say 'a man of Christian faith'. Unless we know him now so no more?²

1. 'Nevertheless I am of the opinion and conviction that the situation, in which the hearer of the Sermon on the Mount is in fact placed, is the same situation which Paul's theology makes explicit.' (Bultmann, Glauben und Verstehen, 1, p. 199, f.n. 1 (my tr.)).
2. 2 Cor. 5:16.

Did Jesus exist authentically? Under authentic existence is understood a correct orientation within the three temporal modes, sc. of past, present and future. And of the present, theologically speaking, the *praesentia salutis* is a constitutive element, that is, that a man is not only 'one who is waiting for' but 'one who receives'.¹ Then it is surely true that as little as Paul can be excluded from the centre of the Gospel by the remnants in his thinking of a futurist~~ic~~ apocalyptic, with as little justification can it be denied that Jesus was a Christian. Though here belongs the characteristic theological qualification, namely that the contention that Jesus existed authentically belongs within theological discourse as a necessary affirmation and not as a demonstrable fact of history. Such a contention only God who sees more than we do, and thus consequently has more evidence at his disposal, could demonstrate.

The second difference that distinguishes 'Verkündigung', or preaching, from kerygma was the Christological factor. The point of view to be adopted here is that Christological statements do not characterise a change in theological significance, but refer to a change in historical

1. 'But because Jesus is only waiting, his preaching reveals man's situation as the situation of one who is waiting, while Paul reveals it as the situation of one who receives ...' (Bultmann, Glauben und Verstehen, 1, p. 201 (my tr.)).

circumstances. When Jesus was there, he qualified the present by his existence; when Jesus was no longer there (or, as even the most hardened champion of the resurrection could not deny, no longer there in the same sense) the present of the early church was qualified by Christological statements. That is, the function of Christological statements is to make present or, perhaps better, to qualify the present, that is, a new historical situation, by Jesus and his message. Thus the discontinuity between the preacher and the preached is not the discontinuity between: Christianity to begin-Christianity begun, but the discontinuity of historical events: Jesus there with followers - followers there after his death. To characterise the difference as: implicit~~x~~ Christology - explicit~~x~~ Christology is misleading. More accurately, more historically, Jesus' message implies the message of the Urgemeinde in precisely the same way as the message of the Urgemeinde implies Chalcedon and Chalcedon the Scots' Confession.

Were this hypothesis tenable, Jesus' message would be kerygma.

And this is not to say that one must then drop the 'Übermalung', or theological embroideries, of the Urgemeinde

as 'superfluous'¹ and return to the pure milk of God's kindness as expounded by Jesus. It is not that the kerygma becomes superfluous - this is a misunderstanding - but that the historical Jesus cannot be fully understood historically. The God in time is the paradox, but the actor does not become the paradox after the performance. Jesus' theology and the theologies of the early church represent merely different stages in the development of the understanding. As little as the Urgemeinde remained content with repetition - this would be to ignore the phenomena of addition and alteration of the tradition (for the kerygma of the Urgemeinde is a message that does not merely repeat, but corresponds to Jesus' kerygma) - so little can we be content with the revelation of Jeremias² that is punctually frozen

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1. I refer to Bultmann's sentence, SAH, 1960, tr. Gregor Smith, p. 23: '... if authentic historical interpretation makes the Now of that time into the Now of today, if therefore the historian, on the basis of his existential encounter with the history of Jesus can lead his hearer (or reader) into the situation of decision in face of Jesus, has the kerygma concerning Christ in that case not lost its meaning, has it not in that case become superfluous?' And cf. Fuller's sentence from his review of Robinson, The New Quest of the Historical Jesus, ATR, 41 (1959), pp. 272-275 (cit. Bultmann, ad loc.): 'The effort to demonstrate the continuity between Jesus and the kerygma may so blur the difference between them that in effect it will make the kerygma unnecessary.'
 2. Das Problem des historischen Jesus (Calwer Heft, 32) - also printed in Der historische Jesus und der kerygmatische Christus, pp. 12ff.

circa A.D. 29.¹ Neither Jesus' kerygma nor the Urgemeinde kerygmata for that matter can simply be repeated. All are, in that sense, 'superfluous', or past-historical phenomena. The moving finger writes, but is no copyist.

Arising from the discussion above there is one theological question that remains outstanding and as its scope is as wide-ranging as to comprise what is called the Gospel, it can only be put here as a question.

Were one to ask: 'What is the centre of the Gospel?', one might with some justification assert that the doctrine of justification has to do with it - though to assert it today in the Reformation form requires almost as much

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1. Jeremias, ibid., p. 12, to illustrate the position he is attacking, summarises Ebeling, Die Geschichtlichkeit der Kirche und ihrer Verkündigung als theologisches Problem 1954, as follows: 'Die Offenbarung ist 'kein historisches Faktum' (Ebeling, ibid., p. 59), sie begegnet nicht als 'geschichtliches Geschehen' (ibid., pp. 59ff.); sie ist nicht in den Jahren 1-30 eingrenzbar abgeschlossen, sondern sie findet jeweils da statt, wo das kerygma gepredigt wird. Im Ereignis des Glaubens geschieht die Offenbarung (ibid., p. 63).' Then at the end of his essay (p. 23) Jeremias continues: 'Nach dem Zeugnis des Neuen Testaments ist der fleischgewordene Logos die Offenbarung Gottes, nur er. Die Verkündigung der Urkirche dagegen ist das geistgewirkte Zeugnis von der Offenbarung. Die Verkündigung der Kirche ist nicht selbst Offenbarung. Offenbarung geschieht, wenn eine überspitzte Formulierung erlaubt ist, nicht am Sonntag von 10 bis 11 Uhr. Golgatha ist nicht überall, sondern es gibt nur ein Golgatha, und es liegt vor den Toren Jerusalems. Die Lehre von der revelatio continua, der fortdauernden Offenbarung, ist eine gnostische Irrlehre.' I would, myself, here support what Ebeling says and reply to Jeremias' accusation of heresy by accusing him of unbalancing trinitarian Christianity at the expense of the Spirit and of, as it were, a 'Docetism of history', whereby the present is drained of all but a derivative significance.

forsaking of one's own time as the assertion of apocalyptic eschatology. The key Reformation question is the antithesis of Law and Gospel and the right understanding of their relation to one another. There seems little doubt that Bultmann understands the relation of history and eschatology as the relation of Law and Gospel. As Law, so history is brought to its end. Everything however hangs on how history is brought to its end.

In this context the question to Bultmann is to ask what relation the $\chi\rho\iota\sigma\tau\acute{o}\varsigma \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha \sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\kappa\alpha$ bears to the Christ of faith, or, in other terms, what relation his Jesus bears to the Theologie des Neuen Testaments. And any shorter way here than the length of existence would draw implacably in its train that failure to relate to nature and to history, under which, if a statement of Bonhoeffer may be hyperbolically tortured by an illegitimate Procrustes, the whole of Protestant theology suffers. 'The concept of the natural', he writes, 'has fallen into discredit in Protestant ethics'.¹ A theology that fails to relate to the living room on Monday, and a walk in the Deer Park on Wednesday² has failed where it most needs to succeed. As the idiot

1. Ethics, tr. Horton Smith, p. 101.

2. An area of woodland north of Copenhagen. v. Kierkegaard's remarks, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp. 386ff., and esp. p. 430: 'Where then do the difficult tasks arise? In the living-room and on the Shore Road leading to the Deer Park.'

Prince pointed out: 'I cannot understand how anyone can pass by a green tree, and not feel happy only to look at it!'¹

1. . Dostoevsky, The Idiot, Everyman edn., p. 535.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE RESURRECTION

It was said in Essay I¹ that the history of modern Protestant theology is the history of its engagement with history. The purpose of the following chapter is to explore and clarify what Dodd means by calling the resurrection an historical fact. Clarity gained at this point should throw light on other historical facts which, it is said, the Gospels contain.

(sc. The Christians), according to Dodd, 'insisted upon the crude actuality of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus sub Pontio Pilato, while affirming that in these historical facts the eternal God Himself ... had acted for the salvation of man.'²

This statement is an interpretation. For 'historical facts' is a phrase which did not belong to the vocabulary of the early Christians. And to say that, whatever we think, at any rate they thought they were talking about historical facts is again to make an assumption, this time that we know what they were thinking, or rather what they would have said, had they been asked this particular question which they themselves did not in fact ask. It is true, of course, that without making this assumption, that

1. p. 1.

2. History and the Gospel, p. 14.

we know what they were thinking, no interpretation is possible at all. The object of this inquiry is not to throw doubt on whether we can know what they thought, but to question whether it was in fact this, sc. historical factuality, that they were thinking. In view of the kind of literature the early Christians wrote - and in this respect the Old Testament is no different - if this is what they were trying to do, they did not do it very well.

Paul, too, apparently, shared this view, for his preaching 'was centred in the facts of the death and resurrection of Christ'.¹ And by 'facts' it is historical facts that are meant, for Dodd himself speaks of 'the brief recital of historical facts in 1 Cor. 15:1sq.'. ² And, interestingly enough, it is also the view taken by the NEB translators of this passage, where ὁ παρέλαβον is rendered by 'the facts which had been imparted to me'.

For the resurrection, if it is an historical fact, is an historical fact of a very peculiar kind. And the question is whether it is not so peculiar that it cannot be regarded as an historical fact at all, or, at least, as an historical fact in the simple sense. For it is certainly easier to understand what is meant by talking of the 'crude actuality' of the life and death of Jesus than it is to

1. The Apostolic Preaching, p. 42.

2. ibid., p. 29.

understand the 'crude actuality' of the resurrection. It is significant that Kierkegaard in his famous sentence¹ says only that 'he (sc. the God) lived and taught in our community and finally died.' This was 'more than enough'.² And, moreover, leaving the resurrection on one side, it is a further question to ask in what sense the theologian is interested in the life and death of Jesus. Are these of interest to him qua 'crude actuality' or historical fact? Or do they interest him in some other way? That is, to anticipate, in so far as they are eschatological - a word about which we must say more later.

At this point I wish to turn from a further discussion of Dodd's views and to recapitulate, perhaps with greater precision, some definitions that were given above in Essay I.

The term history I wish to reserve for the inquiry into what men have done in the past; the term eschatology or theology (the two I take to be synonymous) for the inquiry into what God has done in the past. (The present and the future aspects of eschatology can for the moment be on methodological grounds ignored.) To say what God has done,

1. Philosophical Fragments, p. 130: 'We have believed that in such and such a year the God appeared among us in the humble figure of a servant, that he lived and taught in our community, and finally died.'
- 2, ibid.

to speak of God's acts, is to use historical language of God. But this is not to speak straightforwardly, for God is neither a green parrot, as Kierkegaard regretted,¹ nor a man. And to speak of the 'God-man', as Kierkegaard and, perhaps, Chalcedon, is to speak not simply, but paradoxically. The language of God's acts is therefore analogical; God is spoken of as acting by analogy from human acts.

In order, however, to make a lucid differentiation between history and eschatology as distinguishable sciences, it is necessary to define in what respect God is unhistorical. To return to an earlier definition, theological language was analysed as either anthropological, that is, the understanding of oneself as totally free and totally responsible, or analogical, that is, the understanding of God as radical giver and radical demander, or, to preserve a unitary terminology, of God as radically free and radically responsible. 'Total' and 'radical' were however left undefined. For it was not said in what respect responsibility before God differs from responsibility before a natural object or a man, before nature or history.

1. Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 219. Although I cannot compare it with the original, I like better Lowrie's version op.cit., Vol. 2, p. 304): 'Suppose, for example, that God should take upon Himself the form of a rare and prodigiously big green bird with a red beak, perching on a tree upon the city rampart, and perhaps chirping in a way totally unheard of ...'

It may be, of course, that on many, or most, occasions the two responsibilities coincide. But, where they coincide, what is it that is coinciding? And where they do not coincide, what is it that is not coinciding? God, that is, must be defined.

By God I mean the name for that which keeps me absolutely safe.

This definition is based on a saying of Wittgenstein, that 'he sometimes also had "the experience of feeling absolutely safe. I mean the state of mind in which one is inclined to say 'I am safe, nothing can injure me whatever happens'".¹ And Malcolm there gives two illustrations of this experience. He writes² that 'in Vienna he (sc. Wittgenstein) saw a play that was mediocre drama, but in it one of the characters expressed the thought that no matter what happened in the world, nothing bad could happen to him - he was independent of fate and circumstances.' And, secondly,³ 'he praised one of Dickens' sketches - an account of the latter's visit on board a passenger ship crowded with English converts to Mormonism, about to sail for America. Wittgenstein was impressed by the calm resolution of those people, as portrayed by Dickens.'

1. Malcolm, op.cit., f.n. to p. 70.

2. ibid., p. 70.

3. ibid., p. 72.

The purpose of these quotations is to illustrate what is meant by absolute safety, what is meant by God and the believer as responsible and free. This is how the eschatology is here defined. But the point in question here is the consequence of the doctrine of absolute safety for the understanding of nature and history.

For by this doctrine nature and history are relativised. For no natural event nor historical action could count against the idea. Not only am I free for history, but free from it, even from the ending of my own history, death. Not that I can make any intelligible utterance about the other side of my own history, about what will happen then, if anything, but that that problem I can ignore. It is in safe hands. As far as history is concerned, there is set up a dialectical relationship to it, which is for Bultmann the special characteristic of Christian existence. That is, this dialectical relationship is how Bultmann interprets Paul, the $\omega\varsigma\ \mu\eta$ of 1 Cor. 7:29-31.¹

Again to anticipate, the resurrection is not the basis for this conviction; the resurrection is this conviction itself - to omit for the moment the relation of this conviction to Jesus of Nazareth.

But what is an historical fact?

1. Bultmann uses these verses of Paul passim. An example is Glauben und Verstehen, 111, p. 104.

The first principle of successful science is asking the right questions. 'In unscientific thinking our thoughts are coagulated into knots and tangles; we fish up a thought out of our minds like an anchor fouled of its own cable, hanging upside-down and draped in seaweed with shellfish sticking to it, and dump the whole think on deck, quite pleased with ourselves for having got it up at all. Thinking scientifically means disentangling all this mess, and reducing a knot of thoughts in which everything sticks together anyhow to a system or series of thoughts in which thinking the thoughts is at the same time thinking the connexions between them!'¹

To ask what is an historical fact is to commit the fallacy of many questions. The question resolves itself on examination into many, each of which can only be asked singly, each of which requires different methods for its answer.

In History and the Gospel.² Dodd defines an historical event as follows: 'We might indeed say that an historical "event" is an occurrence plus the interest and meaning which the occurrence possessed for the persons involved in it, and by which the record is determined.' The word 'occurrence' seems to be used by Dodd as a synonym for what he elsewhere

1. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics, p. 22f.

2. p. 20.

calls a 'fact'. For (sc. the Christian philosophy of history) 'starts from the Christian valuation of a particular set of facts';¹ or: 'the aim of this particular method (Dodd is speaking here of a kind of form-critical method) is to recover the purest and most original form of tradition, which inevitably includes both fact and interpretation ... In this primitive tradition the facts are given from a particular point of view, and with a particular meaning.'²

If I read Dodd aright, 'occurrence' and 'meaning' are a parallel pair to and synonymous in meaning with 'fact' and 'interpretation'.

But what is an occurrence? What is an historical fact? Leaving aside the question of the appropriateness of the terms, occurrence and event, for they are words devoid of intentionality and belong on that account more properly to the language of natural science, the word fact refers in its origin (Lat. facio: I make or do) to, and within historical discourse properly should mean, an human action. (That this is the proper sense of fact in historical discourse I shall not here argue. I shall assume it on the basis of Collingwood.) But, following Collingwood further, an action has two sides. There is

1. ibid., p. 19.

2. ibid., p. 72f.

on the one hand the question 'What did so-and-so do?' And on the other the question 'What did so-and-so mean by doing what he did? Thus from the standpoint of the agent an action has two distinguishable aspects, called by Collingwood respectively the 'outside' and the 'inside' of an action.¹ Thus, Brutus knifed Caesar ('outside') in order to prevent, as he hoped, the supersession of a republican by a monarchical system of government ('inside').

But these two distinguishable aspects are aspects of the one action. Thus the word 'fact' includes the agent's deed and his thought of that deed. No-one does anything without meaning to do something by it, whether his knowledge be explicit or remain implicit. That is, rather than analysing an historical event as 'occurrence plus meaning', or as fact and interpretation, an historical fact is here being analysed as 'inside' and 'outside', or as deed and the thought of that deed.

To be clearly distinguished from the agent's interpretation of his own action - and I do not find this distinction clearly made by Dodd - is the interpretation of that agent's action by some other person. If interpretation is spoken of, the question at once arises: 'Whose interpretation?'

At this point three further questions arise: (1) Why

1. The Idea of History, p. 213.

should anyone want to interpret anyone else's action?

I mean, the question implied by Dodd when he defines an historical event as 'an occurrence plus the interest ... which the occurrence possessed for the persons involved in it'. (2) How is theological, or, in current terminology, eschatological, interpretation to be distinguished from other interpretations, such as the political, the economic, etc.? (3) What was the 'outside' of the event which is called the resurrection?

I will take these questions in reverse order.

The third question is one that Dodd himself asks. 'What was the Resurrection, as mere occurrence?'¹ In accordance with his terminology elsewhere, he could as well say 'as bare fact', or even as 'fact' simpliciter.

This is an important question. It may not be the most important question which the historian has to answer, but if his investigation is to be more than a 'creation of his own fantasies',² it forms an indispensable part of his task. Unless the historian can ascertain, in Collingwood's terms, the 'outside' of an event - for example, that Caesar crossed the Rubicon, that he was stabbed by Brutus - unless he can ascertain 'the simple facts of the deeds and events ... and

1. History and the Gospel, p. 75.

2. I am thinking of Bultmann's word, 'Phantasie-Gebilde' (Kerygma und Mythos, VI, 1, p. 23). For the complete quotation v. infra, ~~fn. 64~~, fn. 1.

in this sense determine "how it was",¹ then the historian has no means of distinguishing history from tradition. History is not history because it is handed down, but because the historian reconstructs a coherent picture of the past in his own mind.² This relation between 'outside' and 'inside', between Historie and Geschichte, between occurrence and meaning, between fact and interpretation is dialectical, 'in so far as in actual fact the one does not occur without the other.'³

But the establishing of facts in this sense, that is, the establishing of the 'outside' of an event, depends on whether any evidence is available or not. The question arises as to whether history could still be written if no facts at all could be established. What of the case 'where the element of mere occurrence is evanescent'?⁴ 'But it

1. ibid., p. 22 (my tr.): '... so sehr kann und muss er doch die einfachen Fakten der Taten und Ereignisse zu erkennen suchen und in diesem Sinne feststellen, "wie es gewesen ist".'
2. I am thinking of Collingwood's discussion of the work of the 'a priori imagination' (The Idea of History, pp. 241ff.).
3. Bultmann, Kerygma und Mythos, VI, 1, p. 23: 'Man wird das Verhältnis der beiden Weisen des Selbstverständnisses (sc. 'die existentielle Interpretation der Geschichte und die objektivierende Darstellung der Geschichte') als ein dialektisches bezeichnen müssen, insofern es das eine ohne das andere faktisch nicht gibt.'
4. Dodd, History and the Gospel, p. 75.

is plain that an interpretation is no mere creation of the historian's own fantasies, but that an interpretation interprets something and that what is to be interpreted is the "facts", which, with whatever degree of approximation, are available to the objectifying view of the historian.¹

But is 'approximation' always possible? To what degree must it be possible if the distinction between history and fantasy is to be drawn? Could interpretation stand by itself without any facts to interpret?

I answer no. Why?

There are two historical questions that may be asked of the resurrection: (1) What did Jesus do? (2) What did the twelve² do?

Each of these questions can be divided into two more precise questions: (1) What did Jesus/the twelve do, in the sense of deed? (2) What did Jesus/the twelve mean by

1. Bultmann, Kerygma und Mythos, VI, 1. p. 23 (my tr.): 'Aber eine Interpretation ist doch offenbar kein Phantasie-Gebilde, sondern durch sie wird etwas interpretiert, und dieses zu Interpretierende sind doch die "Tatsachen", die dem objektivierenden Blick des Historikers (in welcher Annäherung immer) zugänglich sind.'
2. I am using the 'twelve' in the sense of the closed group of twelve men that was called into existence by Peter after the crucifixion. Conzelmann, RGG, 111, art. 'Jesus Christus', Sp. 628f., cites both the theory that this group already existed before the crucifixion and the theory that it came into existence after it and does not there make up his mind either way. However, in Ev. Theol., Jan./Feb. (1965), 'Zur Analyse der Bekenntnisformel 1 Cor. 15, 3-5', he decides for the latter theory.

doing what he/they did? These questions are respectively 'historisch' and 'geschichtlich' - this being not all that is meant by these terms, but at least this being meant. The answers to both questions would together constitute the historical fact.

Besides these two historical questions, there is a third question, the theological or eschatological question, namely, in its two aspects: (1) 'What did God do?' and (2) 'What did God mean by doing what he did?' This language is analogical, the analogies being drawn from the historical acts of men.

Each of these three questions, that is, the historical question about Jesus, the historical question about the twelve and the theological question about God, has two aspects: the 'historisch' and the 'geschichtlich', the deed aspect and the word aspect - in the third question, of course, 'historisch' and 'geschichtlich', deed and word, being used analogically. The two aspects are distinguishable but not separable. There can be no deed without word, nor word without deed. The former is meaningless, for without a word the deed has not been understood. The latter is speculation or fantasy.

Another way of saying this would be to say that to exist is to exist in one's own thinking or that to think is to think in one's own existence. Or, to use

Macmurray's language in his Gifford Lectures¹ (but, again, without following him in his preference of action before thought) the self as agent is identical with the self as thinker, and vice versa. (And by 'identical' is meant not that the two questions are the same question, but that both questions are asked about man as a whole and that not one alone, but both questions together must be asked.)

The assumption, then, that I wish to make is this: it is meaningless to speak of an interpretation when you cannot say what fact you are interpreting. In other words, there cannot be an action which has an 'inside' but no 'outside', nor 'Geschichte' without 'Historie'.²

Similarly it is meaningless to speak of an act of God, if you cannot at the same time speak of an act of man. Just as 'Geschichte' is meaningless without 'Historie', so is a theological statement meaningless if unaccompanied by an historical statement.

1. op.cit.

2. But does this then mean, for example, that, if Plato's Republic is an interpretation of the facts of Greek politics, the 'inside' can belong to one person, Plato, and the 'outside' to others, as, for example, Alcibiades? Or do we learn of the 'inside' of Alcibiades' actions from his own statements, supplemented, perhaps, by Plato's explicit statement of ideas that Alcibiades implicitly had? But what of the 'outside' of Plato's actions? Are Plato's abortive activities with Dionysius of Syracuse the 'outside', of which his political thought is the 'inside'? In other words, do a thinker's actions have no 'outside'?

With these presuppositions in view, what of the resurrection?

If one asks, what did Jesus do (in the sense of 'outside'), the answer is, he died.

At the least, it is obvious that the logic of the language whereby a man goes through doors by opening them (historical logic) differs from that logic whereby a man goes through them when they are closed (fabulation logic?).

If one asks, 'What did Jesus mean by doing what he did (or by having that done to him which he suffered)?' the answer is more difficult, because the Passion narratives, according to the scholars I am following, are considerably infected with 'Gemeindetheologie' and legendary features of various kinds. 'The most embarrassing point for this attempt to reconstruct a portrait of the character of Jesus is the fact that we cannot know how Jesus regarded his end, his death.'¹

But perhaps one can get some guidance from such sayings as Mt. 10:30 &//s: ὅμων δὲ καὶ αἱ τρίχες πᾶσαι ἡριθμημέναι εἶσιν. Now whether this is a saying of Jesus himself, or

1. Bultmann, SAH, 1960, p. 11 (tr. Gregor Smith). Cf. Conzelmann's judgement, RGG, 111, art. 'Jesus Christus', Sp. 646 (cit. Bultmann, ibid., f.n. 18) (my tr.): 'It (sc. the Passion narrative) is shaped from beginning to end from the perspective of the Easter faith.'

something he plagiarised from the Jewish Wisdom tradition,¹ or indeed something said subsequently by his followers, yet I am not at all sure that this saying does not with sufficient probability represent his mind on the subject. It is possible that Jesus, too, was not unaware that men in his day suffered, as our own contemporaries, from acts of God and died. Yet he too seemed convinced of the point of uttering absurdities of this kind.

To sum up, the resurrection stories do not recount the historical acts of Jesus.

This view rests on the presuppositions (1) that Jesus really died; and that the biological law which states that corpses are not resuscitated² is statistically valid; and (2) that the resurrection fabulation of the Gospels betrays

1. At any rate, to Mt. 10:29 ('Are not two sparrows sold for a penny? And not one of them will fall to the ground without your Father's will.') there is a parallel which is frequently quoted by the rabbis (Bultmann, Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition, p. 112, refers to Billerbeck, 1, 582f.): 'No bird meets its end without your heavenly Father. How much less then does man.' (My tr.)
2. Dodd, History and the Gospel, p. 76, cites this as a theory which is not 'entirely satisfying'.

a particular logic.¹

To ask what occurred at the resurrection, in the sense of the question 'What did the twelve do?' (or 'What was done to them?') is to ask for an answer that can only be given in terms of the activities of the early church, such as that they spoke to others, ate together, healed perhaps, and quarrelled, as theologians will, over the meaning of the history they were engaged in. This is the truth which is commonly stated in such terms as: the proof of the resurrection is the existence of the church.

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1. Dodd, in Studies in the Gospels, ed. Nineham, 'An Essay in Form-Criticism of the Gospels', differentiates the resurrection stories from 'the stuff of apocalyptic visions' and from myth. He concedes (p. 34, f.n.) that 'It is, of course, true that the risen Christ is visible or invisible at will, and that closed doors are no bar to His entrance. This feature is a necessary datum of the situation (Why?), and though it is, no doubt, abnormal or praeternatural, it has little in common with the stuff of apocalyptic visions ...' He further concedes (p. 35) that 'The more circumstantial (Why only that?) narratives certainly include traits properly described as legendary, but 'legend' and 'myth' are different categories, and should not be confused.' And in his f.n. there he continues: 'The term 'legend', as a formal category, does not carry any necessary judgement about the factual truth of the story. It refers to a manner of telling the story. The relation of legend to fact is different from that of (let us say) a chronicle or a letter from someone concerned, but the relation exists, and should be investigated.' Slightly less cautiously, Conzelmann, RGG, 111, art. 'Auferstehung Christi', Sp. 700, writes: 'Die Form der Erzählung ist die der Legende (nicht des Mythos; wenn im einzelnen mythische Motive eingewirkt haben, so geben sie doch für eine motivgeschichtliche Erklärung wenig her).' By 'a particular logic', then, I mean negatively a logic that is not historical, as Collingwood understands the term, and positively a logic which there is sufficient agreement to call legendary.

But it does not prove that which it is commonly taken to do. For those who make this statement usually imply that something else happened, but they do not say what it was.

But this is an *ens praeter necessitatem multiplicatum*. No other occurrence is necessary than their present memory of the man that had been and what they now did in view of what they were remembering.¹

Of the three theories which Dodd mentions,² resuscitation, mediumistic experience and hallucination, only the third deserves any consideration. Resuscitation was remarked on above. As for mediumistic experience, the Gospel stories are neither trivial in content nor is the man of whom they speak the mere vestiges of a personality in fragments. But hallucination, or, as I should prefer

1. To make this assertion is to take up, I think, a Zwinglian position where the Eucharist is concerned and implies that the category of memory is capable of bearing the weight of what has, 'in aristotelian and thomistic language' (Henderson, *op.cit.*, p. 47), been called Real Presence. Cf. Henderson's remarks (*ibid.*) on Bultmann's statement (*SAH*, 1960, p. 27) that 'Jesus ins Kerygma suferstanden sei!' I do not think it necessary to discuss, at this point, the difference between 'what I remember' and 'what I say in a sermon', between, that is, memory and kerygma. I will merely observe that I do not think it wise to discuss memory, or tradition, in abstraction from situation, or either of these in abstraction from the Spirit. But more is said on these problems throughout what follows.

2. History and the Gospel, p. 75.

to say, visionary experience of some kind, is a tenable hypothesis. But not on that account either necessary or demonstrable.

For it is not theologically necessary to suppose that their memory took the particular form of a vision. It might not be true to say that the question is properly speaking not an historical question at all, but of interest only to the psychologist, though it is certainly true to say that the important question is not how they remembered, but whether they remembered and, if so, then what they remembered.

The difficulty with the vision hypothesis is that it attempts to find in the resurrection stories either psychological or historical evidence, call it what you will. The real question is whether that can be done. For it may be a profound error in method to ask either psychological or historical questions of stories which, if they are written in the language of objective epiphany,¹ offers no evidence of that kind for their answer. The resurrection stories offer

1. Cf. Braun in Zeit und Geschichte, 'Gottes Existenz und meine Geschichtlichkeit im Neuen Testament', pp. 399f.: 'Jesu Auferstehung wird von einem Teil der Tradition als welthaftes Ereignis gefasst: die Augenzeugen sind daraufhin befragbar (1 Kor 15,6); er demonstriert durch Essen, dass er Fleisch und Knochen besitzt (Lk 24, 39-42) ... Die Texte meinen ... Wirklichkeiten, die sich in der Sphäre welthafter Vorfindlichkeit ereignen oder ereignen werden. Die Texte reden also in der Tat von einer Gegenständlichkeit im Sinne dinglich-objektiver Gegebenheit.'

no more evidence for the fact that the apostles had visions than the Baptism pericope¹ for the fact that Jesus did.

Thus 'the element of occurrence' may indeed by 'evanescent'² if the question is asked, did they see visions, or did they simply think something; or were there particular occasions on which they had visions or when they remembered with particular intensity.

But we have in fact left the first question behind, sc. what was the 'outside' of the event which is called the resurrection, and have moved imperceptibly to the second, how is theological to be distinguished from other interpretations. And I say moved, because, if one asks, what the early Christians remembered, their answer would have been given by means of such a theological statement as: ὁ θεὸς ἤγειρεν Ἰησοῦν, as Kramer³ reconstructs one at least of their early formulations.

But before explicitly considering this second question, it will be well to sum up the results of examining the first question.

As far as Jesus is concerned the question 'What was the 'outside' of the event which is called the resurrection?' can only be answered negatively. As far as the twelve are

1. Bultmann, Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition, pp. 263f.

2. Dodd, History and the Gospel, p. 75.

3. Christos Kyrios Gottessohn, p. 30.

concerned, the question can be answered with the same accuracy with which the earliest history of the church can be reconstructed. And, on this point, whereas it is possible that the very first action of all was then 'he (sc. Peter) collected the group of twelve representatives of the people of God',¹ it is perhaps safer to be content with the impreciser generalities of preaching, baptising and the like, that can be reconstructed from the Gospels, Acts and elsewhere.²

Does this, however, contradict a statement that was made earlier, namely, that it is meaningless to speak of an interpretation when you cannot say what fact you are interpreting? I do not think so. For it is historically certain that the church came into existence and it is further possible to speak with some approximation of the church's earliest activities.

It is then, of course, still quite possible to say that 'the element of mere occurrence is evanescent',³ but this is

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1. Conzelmann, 'Zur Analyse der Bekenntnisformel 1. Kor. 15, 3-5.', Ev.Theol., Jan./Feb. (1965), p. 9 (my tr.). And Conzelmann continues (ibid.): 'Die Idee des eschatologischen Gottesvolkes ist also fundamental. Und sie ist unlösbar mit Person und Stellung des Petrus verknüpft. Das ist das einzige, was wir über seine Theologie sicher wissen.'
 2. As e.g. Kümmel reconstructs them, RGG, 111, arts. 'Urgemeinde (Palästina)' and 'Judenchristentum'. v. also Haenchen, op.cit.
 3. Dodd, History and the Gospel, p. 75.

only to put the resurrection as an occurrence in the early church more or less on a par with occurrences in the life of Jesus. Such ignorance or such incomplete knowledge has little significance for faith, if the Philosophical Fragments of Kierkegaard are to be believed.

What it is not possible to say is what Dodd seems to be saying in History and the Gospel,¹ where he is writing not of the resurrection alone, but of the Gospel 'facts' in general. Dodd writes: 'Either the interpretation through which the facts are presented was imposed upon them mistakenly - and in that case few facts remain which we can regard as strictly ascertained - or the interpretation was imposed by the facts themselves, as they were experienced in an historical situation, and gave rise to historical consequences - and in that case we do know, in the main, what the facts were.' This, in its simplest terms, apparently means that if Christians are wrong, the historical facts that can be ascertained are less, but that if Christians are right, more historical facts can be ascertained. Now either Dodd is using 'facts' here to mean something different from what he means elsewhere, or he is not talking sense. The Christian may ask different questions of the facts, but if he asks what the facts are

1. p. 77.

he cannot get a different answer from anyone else who may be asking the same question. The suspicion arises that Dodd is eager to paint as convincing fact what already convinces as legend and legends make such facts as cannot be rescued by the scholar's ink.

Let us now turn explicitly to the second question.

The same uncertainty attaches itself to the place and time at which it occurred to Peter, if it was he, that ὁ θεὸς ἤγειρεν Ἰησοῦν. But Peter's decision to make this statement is no darker than many historical decisions. For example, we know, if indeed we know it, that what John the Baptist said was something like: 'Repentance is the precondition of salvation'; and we know that Jesus, belonging, as he did, to the Baptist's movement, must at one time have held much the same view, else why did he in the first place join the Baptist. We know, too, that subsequently Jesus stood the Baptist's message on its head, preaching that salvation is the precondition of repentance. But when, where and why he did this, we do not know, or clearly know. All we know is that Jesus joined the Baptist's movement and that he broke away from it, that he joined John, who preached one thing, and that he left it, himself preaching another.¹

1. The evidence for this paragraph is my recollection of a paper by an American professor to the 'Ausländerseminar' of Prof. Käsemann, who described it as 'the unwritten Gospel', by which I took him to mean a Gospel written in terms not of story; but of the historical critical method. I do not remember the author's name.

Concerning the occurrence of the formula to Peter all we can be reasonably sure of is that the normal process of telescoping and stereotyping that is elsewhere characteristic of the pre-critical historiography of the Gospel writers has been active here also and that what is described as a punctual flash was in all probability no more than a fitful dawning of awareness, and τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῇ τρίτῃ no more than a dogmatic echo of Hosea 6:2¹ - which reconstruction is not so much based on reading the epiphany stories of the resurrection as historical evidence as on interpolating by the 'a priori imagination' the missing link between the death of a man and the subsequent occurrence of a widely used formula.

But why should the 'pistis-formula'² have occurred to Peter, or why should he have chosen to use this formula?

The resurrection notion held by the early church derives from Judaism, itself a combination of Old Testament and Iranian elements, and from there it passed into Pharisaic circles and so to the early church. The genesis

1. Grass, Ostergeschehen und Osterberichte, p. 138, writes: 'Unsere Analyse hat eine starke Wahrscheinlichkeit dafür ergeben, dass das "am dritten Tage" als eine dogmatische Setzung mit Hilfe des urchristlichen Schriftbeweises entstanden ist und zwar durch christologische Deutung der bereits im Judentum auf die allgemeine Auferstehung bezogenen Stelle Hos 6,2.'
2. Kramer's term, op.cit., p. 17, is 'Pistisformel': 'So führen wir den Terminus "Pistisformel" als Bezeichnung für die Formel ein, welche die Heilsakte Sterben und Auferwecktwerden beinhaltet.'

of the idea is not in doubt.¹

Only two matters remain obscure: (1) that resurrection should be predicated of Jesus and (2) what it means to predicate resurrection of anyone.

In Iranian religion and Pharisaic Judaism the resurrection notion belongs to a complex of ideas called eschatological (the word here being used in its past sense, that is, in the sense in which it refers to the first century phenomenon known as apocalyptic eschatology). That it, it appears together with a number of other ideas, such as final judgement and abolition or reconstitution of the world.

But is there within this complex one central idea, from which all the others follow, such that if the central idea should be expressed the others would be implied? Is there the eschatological statement, of which resurrection is an implicate? If it were said, to choose one expression for the sake of brevity, not clarity, that 'Jesus is the last man', would it follow of necessity that he is raised? Could to say that Jesus is raised be merely one way of saying, or a mere consequence of saying, that Jesus is the last

1. Lohse, RGG, 111, art. 'Auferstehung IV. Im Judentum': 'Um die Wende vom 3. zum 2. Jh. vChr findet sich im Judentum zuerst die Hoffnung auf eine A(uferstehung) verstorbenen Israeliten. Diese Erwartung kann nicht allein aus der Weiterentwicklung von Ansätzen innerhalb des AT ... erklärt werden. Vielmehr werden iranische Einflüsse auf das Judentum eingewirkt haben ...'

man and belief in the resurrection be not the statement of faith, but one way of stating it among others?

Having adumbrated this as a possibility, I shall now simply assume that this is so. That is, I shall assume that the resurrection statement, Jesus is raised, is a part-implicate of the eschatological statement, 'Jesus is the last man'. Within an apocalyptic eschatological context Jesus' death was, as it were, the Pavlovian stimulus that called forth, as it had to, the idea of resurrection. To say that God raised Jesus is one way, and only one, of saying that Jesus is the last man and, further, the right way of saying it when he died.

Leaving aside the question whether Jesus knew himself to be the last man, though I should myself say that something of the sort is implied by εἰ δὲ ἐν πνεύματι θεοῦ ἐγὼ ἐβόλλω τὰ δαιμόνια, ...¹ if genuine, if it were proved that to the apostles this awareness first appeared not in a Messianic form, be it at Caesarea Philippi or after the crucifixion, but in a resurrection form after Jesus' death, that would in no other way alter the fundamental assertion that the resurrection is merely one mode of making the eschatological statement. Even if the resurrection form were temporally prior, it need not on that account be logically so.

1. Mt. 12:28 (& //).

Now that this assumption is made, two problems remain outstanding: (1) What does it mean to say that Jesus is the last man? For to say 'the last man' is to repeat the language of apocalyptic eschatology - and it is fundamental to hermeneutics as a science that what is simply repeated is neither relevant nor understood.¹ However, as eschatology has already been defined above, the question to be asked resolves itself into the question how talk about Jesus must lead to a more precise definition of eschatology, or, in other words, 'What is Christian eschatology?' And (2) what did it mean to the early church and what does it mean now to use the present tense of Jesus?² This is the

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1. Cf. Braun in Zeit und Geschichte, 'Gottes Existenz und meine Geschichtlichkeit im Neuen Testament', p. 404: 'Sie (sc 'die Texte von Gen 1 bis Apk 22') sind Offenbarung ... derart, dass sie selber dem geschulten Leser deutlich machen, wie ihre Aussagen sich wandeln. Dieser Wandel ist ein Wandel im geistigen Aspekt der damaligen Menschen, ein Wandel secundum hominem recipientem. Der heutige Interpret braucht das nur wahrzunehmen und fortzusetzen.' Cf. also Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, p. 292: 'Nun gingen wir von der Erkenntnis aus, dass auch das in den Geisteswissenschaften geübte Verstehen ein wesentlich geschichtliches ist, d.h. dass auch dort ein Text nur verstanden wird, wenn er jeweils anders verstanden wird.'
 2. For the early church, e.g. Ἰησοῦς Κύριος (Rom. 10:9 - although ἐστίν is not expressed, I do not think one need dispute that a present tense is, or, at any rate, is also being understood) and 'οὐ γάρ εἰσιν δύο ἡ τρεῖς ... ἐκεῖ εἶμι ἐν μέσῳ αὐτῶν.' (Mt. 18:20 - with Bultmann's comment, Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition, p. 160 (my tr.): 'It has already been said more than once that in many of these sayings it is the resurrected Jesus who is speaking ...')

problem of the presentness of the past.

Christian eschatology is stated by Bultmann in the doctrine of 'paradoxical identity'.¹ That is, to be free and responsible before Jesus is paradoxically identical with being free and responsible before God. By this doctrine what Jesus did was what God did and what Jesus said was what God said. Jesus' acts were God's acts and his words God's words. As a doctrine this is not something to be proved, but something assumed.

Thus what was said on eschatology above, that man is radically responsible and radically free, that is, responsible and free before that which keeps him absolutely safe, safe, that is, from nature and history - and, of course, free for nature and history - was a statement of Jewish eschatology. Christian eschatology equates, paradoxically, freedom and responsibility before God with that before Jesus.

But the doctrine has, I think, a further extension, which I shall call the 'doctrine of the absolute

1. The idea of 'paradoxical identity', even where the term does not occur, turns up in Bultmann's writing passim, e.g. Theologie des Neuen Testaments, p. 402: 'Die historische Gestalt Jesu, seine menschliche Geschichte, ... ist das eschatologische Ereignis.' and Kerygma und Mythos, VI, 1 p. 26: 'So aber enthält der Satz (sc. 'von Gottes Schöpfer - und Herrschertum') eine Paradoxie. Denn er behauptet die paradoxe Identität des innerweltlichen Geschehens mit dem Handeln des jenseitigen Gottes.'

moment'.¹ It is, in effect, a doctrine of the church. By this I mean that responsibility and freedom before the natural objects that surround me and before my contemporaries is paradoxically identical with my responsibility and freedom before (a) God and (b) Jesus. And not only so, but my acts are, by paradoxical identity, God's acts and my words God's words.

But between Jesus' acts and mine there is a difference, perhaps; namely the qualification introduced by sin; and by sin I mean that to be confronted now by what people say about Jesus or by what they do in the light of his having been is to become aware that I have been neither free nor responsible. But in so far as the question whether I will be free or responsible is put to me or the question whether I will receive these as a gift, the possibility is there that my acts be his.²

Despite, however, my unfreedom and irresponsibility, the human situation which was threatened by the doctrine of

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1. The idea is, of course, Bultmann's, who in turn derives it from Kierkegaard. v. Hasenhüttl, op.cit., 'Der Augenblick des Glaubens', pp. 228ff., and his references there.
 2. Can I ever really realise my freedom and responsibility, or really receive them? I can, but I do not. cf. Bultmann, Glauben und Verstehen, 1, p. 199, f.n. 1: 'Die Forderungen (sc. der Bergpredigt) sind aufgestellt, um erfüllt zu werden ... Die Frage, die Jesu Forderungen wie die des Gesetzes wecken, ist die, ob die Forderungen faktisch erfüllt sind.'

absolute safety is by the doctrine of the absolute moment again made absolute. (Is this a logical contradiction, or a dialectic of existence?)

As for the problem of the presentness of the past, my contention here is that this problem is not specifically theological, for it belongs to the past as such to be present, for this is the structure of time. Thus Jesus does not differ from Socrates (or from 'the soul of my granddam',¹ for that matter) in that he is present whereas Socrates is not, but in that he is present whose acts were and are, in so far as I now act, without qualification (that is, sin) paradoxically identical with God's acts. Thus Jesus' presence is 'real', not because it is historical, which it also is, but because it is eschatological.

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1. The phrase is from Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, IV, ii, 56f.: '... that the soul of our granddam might haply inhabit a bird.' Prof. Gregor Smith reminds me that the view that the way that Jesus is present does not differ from the way that any other historical figure is present is also the view he expresses in Secular Christianity, p. 86: '... there is no formal difference between the way in which we apprehend, or are encountered by, the past of Jesus and any other past person or event in history.'

THE ORIGIN OF THE KERYGMA

The former chapter was concerned with the relation of the kerygma to historical facts. The present chapter will be concerned with the question, when did the kerygma begin.

Jesus of Nazareth, between the years, let us say, 4 B.C. and 30 A.D.,¹ made certain statements; and the early church made certain statements after his execution. Were the things that Jesus said while he was alive, supposing we still had them, kerygma, or should that term be restricted to what was said by others after he had died? And, if so, why?

But, first, let us leave aside the question as to how the category kerygma ought properly to be used and ask, on the one hand, how Bultmann uses the term and, on the other, why he uses it in this way.

Most terms of moment, as, for example, parliament or prehistory, win prominence by degrees. The term kerygma is no twentieth century neologism, but has nonetheless attained in recent years a peculiar status, which genetical

1. Neither of these dates is more than a good guess. Braun, RGG, 111, art. 'Christentum 1, Entstehung', Sp. 1693, writes: 'Nur dass die Tradition von der noch zu Lebzeiten Herodes d.Gr., also bis 4 vChr, erfolgten Geburt Jesu Zutrifft (Mt 2,1; Lk 1,5), wird aus der Entstehungsmöglichkeit jener Legende gefolgert werden dürfen.' and Conzelmann, RGG, 111, art. 'Jesus Christus', Sp. 626, summarises the chronology by remarking: 'Nach alledem fällt also Jesu Auftreten in die Zeit um 30 nChr. Eine solche Fixierung ist für die Zwecke des Historikers hinreichend genau.'

probings in Paul, Semler and Herder do little more than obscure.¹

As for many of the terms that Bultmann uses, it is not the writer who supplies, but the reader who must supply a definition. To define at all, it is true, is to risk movement in that light 'where all cats are grey'.

One reader, however, has already carried out this task. Ebeling² has defined Bultmann's use of kerygma 'at any rate in most instances' as '... the preaching that Jesus is the Christ, which arose after the death of Jesus. It is the message of God's eschatological act of salvation in Jesus Christ, the message that constitutes the church, the message which has from that point on been continually handed down and proclaimed, though without being restricted to any one formula, but with the one Christological meaning which is the same for all formulations.'

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1. v. Ebeling, Theologie und Verkündigung, 'Zum Gebrauch des Wortes "Kerygma" in der neueren Theologie', p. 109. Both terminology and the discussion are a 'novum', which the prehistory of the word 'kerygma' does little to illuminate.
 2. ibid., pp. 33f. In Ebeling's own words: 'Jedenfalls in den meisten Fällen versteht er (sc. Bultmann) darunter die Christusverkündigung, wie sie nach dem Tode Jesu als die die Kirche konstituierende Botschaft von der eschatologischen Heilstat Gottes in Jesus Christus entstanden und von daher in fortdauernder Verkündigung weitergegeben worden ist, freilich nicht eingegrenzt auf eine bestimmte Formel, aber als der identische christologische Verkündigungssinn kerygmatischer Formulierungen.'

If we suppose that Ebeling is correctly reproducing what Bultmann says, the answer to the question: when did the kerygma begin, is answered by the phrase: '... which arose after the death of Jesus'. The term, kerygma, that is, is improperly applied to what Jesus said, but is reserved for what was said by the early church after his death.

It is true, of course, that the literature that we possess was written after the death of Jesus, even if it does contain the memory of what the authors had forgotten. But the time the literature was written does not answer the question, when did the kerygma begin.

Ebeling's definition above is, however Ebeling's definition and the question is justified which asks whether or not he reproduces correctly what Bultmann says.

This question, as indeed, this whole study, will be examined in the light of only one document, namely the Heidelberg Academy essay of 1962, entitled: The relation of the early Christian message of Christ to the historical Jesus.¹ And the present question, whether or not kerygma is a category which is properly used only of what was said after the crucifixion, is answered in the first paragraph of that essay. It reads: 'In the period of study of the

1. i.e. SAH, 1960 (tr. Gregor Smith). I have chosen to concentrate on this essay, but not, of course, in abstraction from what he has written elsewhere.

life of Jesus (the time of so-called liberal theology) the question was controlled by the desire to free the portrait of the historical Jesus of the overpainting it had suffered in the early Christian message, in the "kerygma". The emphasis was therefore laid on establishing the difference between Jesus and the kerygma'.¹ And, later in the same paragraph, '... it is the question of the historical continuity of the work of the historical Jesus, especially what he proclaimed (Verkündigung), with the early Christian kerygma of Christ.' That is, whatever other differences there may be, there is, at least, a chronological difference between Jesus and the kerygma.

It is, then, for Bultmann normal usage to name what Jesus said 'Jesus' preaching (Verkündigung)' and kerygma what the early church said.

But why should this be so? In answering this question Bultmann first of all concedes certain similarities between what Jesus said and what the early church said. Indeed, he goes so far as to speak of 'the relation of his (sc. Jesus') kerygma to the church's kerygma concerning Christ',² and, in slightly vaguer terms, to say 'that the proclamation of Jesus has kerygmatic character',³ though both these

1. ibid., p. 5.

2. ibid., p. 15.

3. ibid.

usages are deviations from his norm. What, however, persuades him to deviate from the norm is that, like the kerygma in the strict sense, Jesus' 'kerygma' is eschatological.¹ That is, in speaking of the coming kingdom, it uses the mythological eschatology of Jewish apocalyptic. And further, Jesus' 'kerygma' is christological.² Or, rather, supposing the term 'Christ' to be a post-crucifixion formulation which has been retrojected, Jesus' 'kerygma' is, in all probability, not christological, but, in precise jargon, semeiological.³ That is to say that Jesus drew a connection between what he was talking about and the man, sc. himself, who was talking. And this connection is well enough described in terms of σημεῖον or sign. Jesus, that is, understood that what he did and what he said was a sign or indication of the arrival, sometime, of the Kingdom.

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1. 'It was not as a teacher or a rabbi that he appeared, but as a prophet with an eschatological message.' (ibid.)
 2. The necessary qualification, which I go on to call 'semeiological', is made by Bultmann in terms of 'implicit christology': 'Wohl aber kann man sagen, dass Jesu Auftreten und seine Verkündigung eine Christologie impliziert ...' (ibid.) v. infra.
 3. I create the term from Bultmann's sentence, ibid., p. 16 (my underlining): '... Jesus' eschatological preaching proclaimed the imminent irruption of the rule of God, and he understood his own public appearance clearly as a 'sign' of this ...'

Bultmann sums up this situation somewhat as follows. In view of such possibly genuine sayings as: 'if I by the finger of God cast out demons, then the kingdom of God has come upon you',¹ he concludes not only that what Jesus said was eschatological, but 'that he regarded himself as, so to speak, an eschatological phenomenon',² or, again, 'dass Jesu Auftreten und seine Verkündigung eine Christologie impliziert, that Jesus' appearance and his message imply a Christology'.³

To these two characteristics, the eschatological and the semeiological, to add such tautologies as 'claim to authority',⁴ and 'directness',⁵ would be no more than the unnecessary multiplication of somewhat clandestine entities.

So much for the similarities between Jesus' preaching and the kerygma. But there is also a difference.

In Bultmann's opinion the difference is indicated by the following question:⁶ 'Does Jesus' claim to authority,

1. Lk. 11:20 // Mt. 12:28. In this context Bultmann, ibid., cites further: Lk. 12:54-56, Mk. 3:22-27, Mt. 11:11-13// Lk. 16:16, Lk. 10:18.

2. ibid.

3. ibid.

4. ibid. and v. Bultmann's references (f.n. 31) to Fuchs and Bornkamm.

5. ibid., p. 17 and f.n. 32.

6. ibid.

seen an an historical phenomenon, extend beyond the time of his earthly work?' The question is rhetorical.

For with the remark that: 'this is precisely what does happen in the kerygma' Bultmann implies that without the kerygma what Jesus said and what he did would remain in the past and remain there beyond the possibility of recall. That is, the past is present because the kerygma makes it so. To the same effect Bultmann writes elsewhere:¹ 'The proclamation is itself an eschatological happening. In it qua address the event Jesus Christ is on each occasion present - present as the event which on each occasion encounters my existence.'

To make the present position somewhat more transparent, let us now combine in the argument four categories, two not yet stated in this essay and two already stated; in the first place two ways of considering the past, 'Historie' and 'Geschichte', and two places in the past to be considered, the preaching of Jesus and the kerygma of the early church. (Because the concentration in the present essay is on kerygma, that is, on words spoken, the acts, or, perhaps,

1. Kerygma und Mythos, VI, 1, p. 27 (my tr.). It is true that the word I have translated 'proclamation' is not 'Kerygma', but 'Verkündigung'. But I would judge it no more than pedantic to point this out, for Bultmann's use of his own terms is more flexible than unitary (as Hasenhüttl, op.cit., p. 24, also observes). By 'proclamation' (Verkündigung), that is, I take it that Bultmann means what he more regularly calls 'Kerygma'.

Verhalten,¹ of Jesus and the early church are, by way of Augustus' maxim, 'divide et impera', being left out of account.)

If there are two ways of studying the past, it follows that what Jesus said (the preaching of Jesus) can be studied not only 'historisch' (that is, to use Bultmann's words above, 'seen as an historical phenomenon'), but 'geschichtlich', even as what the early church said, the early Christian kerygma, can be studied not only 'geschichtlich' but 'historisch'. And the question at issue is this, whether, if studied 'geschichtlich' what Jesus said need be any less present than what the early church said, or, in other words, why the term kerygma should be denied to what Jesus said and reserved for the words of the early church.

In what sense, then, is kerygma to be distinguished from 'Geschichte'? And the answer I wish to give is this: it belongs to the nature of the past as such, in so far as it has at all left traces of itself, whether tumuli, potsherds, ink, or memory, to be present. Thus it is not in so far as the past is present that kerygma differs from 'Geschichte' - no less communion is available with Socrates or Napoleon than with Jesus - but, in so far as in the

1. A term of Fuchs, ZThK, 1956, p. 220 (cit. Bultmann, SAH, 1960, p. 19).

kerygma he is present whose acts were, by the doctrine of paradoxical identity, the acts of God, that part of 'Geschichte' is kerygmatic in a way that other parts are not, until that possibility is by the kerygma conferred upon them.

To say that Jesus is present because Jesus is preached is Bultmannian orthodoxy. Thus Conzelmann¹ writes: 'Therefore the theological question is then how an historical event ('geschichtlich') can be the eschatological event which, as such, can be encountered today.' And continues: 'The answer must be given by reference to the proclamation: it can be present in preaching.'

But the problem is how what is said in lectures maybe said to differ, so far as the presence of what is spoken is concerned, from what is said in sermons. What is being said here is that the differentia lies not, as for Bultmannian orthodoxy,² in the category of 'presence', which

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1. RGG, 111, art. 'Jesus Christus', Sp. 648 (cit. Bultmann, SAH, 1960, p. 25).
 2. If my account of Bultmannian orthodoxy is correct, then, in Glauben und Verstehen, 1, p. 157, Bultmann lapses into a heterodox statement by suggestion that the past is present, not because it is preached, but because it is historical ('geschichtlich'). He writes (concerning teaching (Belehrung) on guilt, conscience, repentance, etc.): 'In such teaching I do not hear of repentance, gratitude, etc., as if I were hearing of interesting psychological facts in which I was not myself involved, but in which I am involved; I understand only as one who is repentant and grateful.' And then (v. infra, f.n. 1) he comments: 'No-one who understands what is at issue would take it into his head to say 'was' instead of 'is'. For if the experiences of repentance and gratitude, etc., are understood as historical ('geschichtlich') events in the proper sense, as, that is, experiences that on each occasion happen to me, then they cannot become mere past facts that one has happened to come across (vorfindlichen Fakten in der Vergangenheit).' (My tr.)

is common to the language-games of the scholar and the parson, though, certainly, because the language-games are different, the meanings of the same term in different contexts will not be the same,¹ but in the fact that the history spoken of in the sermon is claimed to be not only historical but also eschatological. And it is this simultaneity of history and eschatology and not the monopolising appropriation by the sermon of the category of 'presence' that distinguishes the sermon from the historical lecture. So when Bultmann writes:² 'The earliest community understood the history of Jesus with increasing clarity as the decisive eschatological event, which as such can never become merely past, but remains present, and present moreover in the proclamation', the sentence from 'which as such ...' could without loss be docked as the merest tautology.

To put the matter succinctly, the history of Jesus is not present because it is preached, but the history of Jesus is kerygma because it is about Jesus, that is, about the man whose actions and whose words were, to speak analogically, God's actions and God's words.

For what is in question as far as the kerygma is

1. Cf. Luther, WA 39, 1; 231, 1-3 (Disp. 1537) (cit. Ebeling, Wort und Glaube, p. 257): 'Omnia vocabula fiunt nova, quando e suo foro in alienum transferuntur.'

2. SAH, 1960, p. 25.

concerned is not the presence of the past; for the past, properly understood, whether of holy, or merely secular, men, whether of the crossing of the Empty Quarter¹ or of the Reed Sea,² is always present, but the presence of a certain man of the past, who, when he is present, God is too.

Thus the main problem would cease to be, as it is for the New Questers, the working out of the particular kind of continuity and discontinuity between what must now be defined as two kerygmata, that is, between what Jesus said and what the early church said - hence the fear of Fuller,³ reiterated by Bultmann,⁴ of the superfluity of the kerygma would itself be superfluous - but the working out ever more precisely what is meant by speaking of the man whose actions were God's actions and thus evolving a criterion by which the documents

1. The Empty Quarter, or Rub al Khali, in South Arabia, was first crossed by Bertram Thomas, author of Arabia Felix, in 1931 and again, a few months later, by St. John Philby (v. Wilfred Thesiger, Arabian Sands, London, Longmans, 1959).

2. Ex. 14:19ff.

3. ATR, 41 (1959), pp. 272-275 (cit. Bultman, SAH, 1960, p. 24).

4. And cf. Bultmann's own remarks, ibid., pp. 23f.

relating to him, whether Luke,¹ whose claim no reasonable German would anyway entertain, or, as should be added, Paul and Luther, should be measured at the bar of guess or God and be found wanting.

To summarise: Bultmann maintains that the kerygma began not with the preaching of Jesus but with the preaching of the early church. Despite similarities to the preaching of Jesus, which I have called the eschatological and the semeiological, the kerygma (sc. of the early church) differs from Jesus' preaching in so far as it makes present what would otherwise remain in the past. This view of Bultmann was countered by the suggestion that the question of presence is irrelevant if it is, in any case, true that not only that historical phenomenon but all historical phenomena as such

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1. Luke has recently, in Germany at least, come in for strong criticism. As an example, I cite Käsemann, Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen, 'Neutestamentliche Fragen von heute', pp. 29f.: 'Lukas ist nicht ... ein später Paulusschüler, sondern der erste Repräsentant des werdenden Fröhenkatholizismus. Dass er die Geschichte des Christentums mit Einschluss derjenigen Jesu historisch zu betrachten unternimmt, beweist, wie sehr die Anfänge schon zurückliegen, ist andererseits nur möglich, wenn die urchristliche Eschatologie, die bewegende Kraft der neutestamentlichen Botschaft, verblasst ist und einzig noch die Behandlung der letzten Dinge bestimmt.' Käsemann concludes the passage with both praise ('... er (sc. Lukas) vertritt ... eine profilierte und sehr ernst zu nehmende Theologie.') and qualification ('Das ist freilich eine Theologie, welche sich von der urchristlichen wesentlich unterscheidet und in ihrem Zentrum wie in vielen ihrer Einzelaussagen als fröhenkatholisch bezeichnet werden muss.'). The important question of 'evolving a criterion' will be taken up again in Essay IV.

are present in the same way. What is relevant is that in this case there is present not an historical merely, but an eschatological phenomenon, in so far as it is supposed, by those who think it, that he is present whose acts and words were, by the doctrine of paradoxical identity, God's acts and words.

But to return. The present essay is concerned with the question, 'When did the kerygma begin?'. Bultmann's answer, 'With the early church', is being here said to be less satisfactory than the answer, 'It began with Jesus'. Thus the endeavour is being made to transpose the Bultmannian centre from the kerygma of the early church to the kerygma of Jesus.

But certain caveats should first be entered. This is no simple return to the historical Jesus 'after the flesh' nor, it may be added, a withdrawal from what McIntyre¹ calls the 'historical scepticism' of Kierkegaard; but, because Bultmann's explanations appear to distinguish between the χριστός κατὰ σάρκα and the χριστός κατὰ πνεῦμα chronologically, as if Jesus, before the crucifixion, was 'after the flesh', until by the emergence of the kerygma the situation was metamorphosed, it is a complex return. But - and this, for a theology of the spirit, or for an existentialist theology, is not unimportant - it is complex also in so far as this is no

1. The Shape of Christology, pp. 119ff.

atavistic shift to the corn pastures of Gennesaret, for no jot or tittle will either be added to or subtracted from the understanding of the present as the axial phase of the modes of time. That is to say, this enquiry concerning the kerygma is a question of past kerygma. There is no question of transposing the centre of the gospel, which is, and remains the present, or, as Bultmann might call it, the eschatological 'now',¹ but only the question of the proper understanding of tradition. For while the gospel is not unconcerned with tradition, the tradition is not its centre.

But a further word on Bultmann's post-resurrection chronology of the kerygma. His definition of kerygma implies that the caesura between the absence of faith and its datable emergence lies between the crucifixion and the first sermon after it. As here defined the caesura of faith is retrojected at least one stage and lies between Jesus understood from outside and Jesus understood from within the circle of faith. Whether faith may be further retrojected as far as Abraham, or Adam, or, in other words, whether, and if so, in what sense, Jesus may be said to have been pre-existent, I propose to discuss, however clamant, as little as the relation between tradition and gospel was discussed above.

But, where answers lopped off others, further questions

1. eg. Glauben und Verstehen, 1, p. 209 (cit. Hasenhüttl, op.cit., p. 95). And N.B. 2 Cor. 6:2, which Bultmann very often quotes in this connection.

grow on. For the above description of the caesura of faith is not precise. Did, for example, Jesus of Nazareth believe? Did twelve, or seventy, or some, of his contemporaries believe before the resurrection, or, conceding resurrection to be a confused category, before the crucifixion? If the caesura is not between pre- and post-crucifixion, did that event or action alter, in any sense, the nature of faith?

Yes, the form and content of faith is altered by historical actions. If faith is historical, it does not have a nature. But the topic of the 'new' in history must remain in abeyance until it is resumed under the heading of 'Kerygma and Kerygmata'. Except that it may be added that neither that action, the crucifixion, nor others, mean that the word, faith, may not be played with both before and after it had happened, for words, too, are historical.¹

Whether, to take the second question, the followers of Jesus of Nazareth had faith before the crucifixion cannot, I imagine, be demonstrated by the evidence of sources which, apparently, had little interest in recording it. That the

1. I mean here that a word must be understood in the context in which it is used. In different contexts it will mean different things. But the same word may nevertheless be used in different contexts, because, although history is discontinuous, although the 'new' occurs, it is also continuous, or, to use Collingwood's word, it also contains 'incapsulations'.

historian should interpolate it is certain; historically certain, that is, or certain enough.

As for Jesus himself the case is more complex. On the one hand there is no pressing ground for doubting that he believed in God, unless, perhaps, archaeology should provide the waiting world with further material. Whether, on the other hand, Jesus was a Christian is another matter.

If it is true that 'Christ' is a term of later provenance, Jesus was no christian. Supposing, however, as we have, that his self-understanding was semeiological, that he believed that he was himself a sign of the coming kingdom, then there is involved with his faith in God the relation of himself to himself which is analogous to what is commonly found in the self-conscious human animal. In simpler terms, a little less than precise perhaps, Jesus, like Kung-Fu-Tze, knew he had a vocation.¹

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1. I am struggling here with a question which I am now convinced is entirely misleading (v. infra, Essay V). However, if the question 'Was Jesus - der historische Jesus! - denn ein Christ?' (sc. 'or a Jew?' - Bultmann, SAH, 1960, p. 8) is posed and if one replies 'No, Jesus was not a Christian, because a Christian is a man who believes in Jesus and how could Jesus believe in Jesus?' it is, I think, just worth pointing out that that answer is not quite adequate, if it is true that Jesus did believe in Jesus in the sense that he believed that there was something to be done, that there was a 'mission', and that he was the man to do it. However naïve it may be to entitle a book 'The Mind of Jesus' (Barclay), I nevertheless would follow Käsemann in contending that '... it may be deduced, say from Mt. 12:28, that the historical Jesus thought of himself as a spirit-filled personality/ (continued on following page)

Now, obviously, the relation of a man to himself is not the same as the relation of others to him, nor can a man say of himself all that others might say of him - which would be one a priori criterion for denying the authenticity of what Jesus is said to say in the Fourth Gospel *passim*, *partim* in the Synoptics.¹ But the question here is whether that difference is such as to preclude the term *kerygma* from what Jesus said on the grounds that *kerygma* is said of the object of faith, but not by him.²

(continued from previous page) personality (*Pneumatiker*); and (that) this is in fact confirmed by the *ᾠστος ἀνθρώπου* stratum of tradition (Käsemann, *Protokoll der Seminarsitzung vom 15:1:65* (my tr.)) and that, therefore, that much of what Jesus thought may be 're-enacted'. I have described the relation of Jesus to his mission in Kierkegaard's terms in *The Sickness unto Death*, p. 146: 'Man is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self is a relation which relates itself to its own self ...'

1. Others might say of a man: 'He and the Father are one' (Jn. 10:30), but it would be unwise, if not impossible, for a man to say it of himself. Such a criterion of the 'a priori imagination' can be used to discriminate between authentic and inauthentic logia, e.g. Buber's phrase: 'Messianische Selbstmitteilung ist Zersprengung der Messianität' (*Die Chassidischen Bücher*, 1925, p. XXVIII) and Dinkler's use of this phrase in *Zeit und Geschichte*, 'Petrusbekenntnis und Satanswort', pp. 127f. and 152f.
2. 'Was Jesus - the historical Jesus - a Christian? Now if Christian faith is faith in him as the Christ, then the answer is certainly no; and even if he knew himself as the Christ (Messiah) and asked for faith in himself as the Christ, then he would still not be himself a Christian and could not be described as the subject of Christian faith, whose object in fact he is.' (Bultmann, *SAH*, 1960, p. 8, my underlining).

But the problem whether Jesus was a Christian or a Jew is scarcely to be solved by the question of the relation of a man to himself. May it not rather be that the problem is no problem at all, because the question is posing impossible alternatives? That question, however, will be relinquished for the present and I will summarise these observations by denying that the kerygma is distinguished from other 'Sprachereignisse' by the fact that it makes present and by asserting that such differences as exist between the words of Jesus and the words of the early church are explicable in terms of the historical situation in which each of these kerygmata was proclaimed.

KERYGMA AND KERYGMATARecapitulation

The first essay in this series endeavoured to indicate a context in which the question of kerygma arises. It would be hazardous, perhaps, to claim that that was the only proper context for contemporary theological thinking, but it might be still more hazardous to deny it.¹ Whether or no the former or the latter, it is the context, of the present study.

The context was said to be history, first, in the sense that history is the study of what men have done in the past; and, second, in the sense that we, as men, are makers of history,² so that, because we have to, or are free to, or

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1. McIntyre, op.cit., p. 172, writes: 'Concerning the models it must by this time be fairly obvious that it would be wrong to attach a compulsive character to any one of the models ...' Contrary to supposing what might be termed 'the parity of all models' I should, myself, argue that in a particular historical situation one model may become so dominant that to treat others as having an equal importance is uncritical - which is not the same thing as saying that they are devoid of hermeneutic importance.
 2. And this is now common knowledge, e.g. Bernard Fergusson, The Black Watch - A Short History, Intro., p. 9 (my underlining): 'Nobody knew on the eve of Ticonderoga in 1758, or of Crete in 1941, that the fighting on the morrow, with all the casualties which it brought, was to shine among the annals of British arms; nor did anybody realise as they fought at Waterloo or Alamein that they were having a direct influence, every man-jack of them, on the history of the world. One never knows. But one can always be sure that one is making history, whether on a big scale or a small, and whether good or bad.'

are free not to, make it, we are interested in what has been made.

It should be added, however, that I am further supposing that the second sense is primary and that the first sense, if it exists, or can exist at all, is the stage of preliminary ratiocination, which, if taken for the last stage, declines swiftly to the isolated speculation of the man who has found for himself a better employment than to exist.

History is thus not, more than only preliminarily, 'the re-enactment of past thought in the historian's own mind',¹ nor is its task 'to interpret the phenomena of past history as possibilities of understanding of existence and thus make it clear that they are also contemporary possibilities', or to suggest, without qualification, that 'tua res agitur'.² History - this is, I take it, the burden of Gadamer's Wahreit und Methode - is not interpretation, but re-interpretation. For it is not a man's job to jump out of his own skin, but, remaining in it, to put his questions to other men who are remaining in their's.

1. Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 215, and passim.

2. Bultmann, Das Urchristentum, Einleitung, p. 8 (my tr.) (cit. Diem, Theologie als kirkliche Wissenschaft, 11, p. 68).

History is not monological, but dialogical.¹

Before making a transition to the theme of the second essay, I would like to insert a short parenthesis on the question to what extent the kerygma offers information about the historical decisions of other men, or another man, and to what extent it offers what is variously termed 'challenge', 'summons' or 'address' to make one's own historical decisions, and in what way these two questions

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1. The primary distinction to be grasped here is that between man as student of history and man as maker of history. I am here asserting (1) that man is interested in past history because he has to make history, but (2) that man does not find out how to make history from studying past history, because, by the 'logic of question and answer', the questions that men asked in the past are not the same questions that he is asking now - and that is why it is not entirely true to say: 'tua res agitur', or to say: 'past possibilities are also my contemporary possibilities.' The question then arises 'What, in that case, is the use of the past?' To that question I give two answers: (1) The past is relevant in so far as the past is 'incapsulated' in the present, though that use of the past is only of restricted value, in so far as we are still left with the problem of moving from the past into the future - which is, incidentally, the point where Collingwood's thinking breaks off, though he does say something about the matter, where he speaks of 'acting without rules' (An Autobiography, pp. 103ff.); and (2) the past is relevant in so far as a man who studies the questions and answers of men in the past in full consciousness of his own questions will answer his own questions more wisely by, as it were, a dialogue with the past (cf. Gadamer, op.cit., p. 359: 'Denn die Dialektik von Frage und Antwort ... lässt das Verhältnis des Verstehens als ein Wechselverhältnis von der Art eines Gespräches erscheinen.'). For a fuller answer to these questions I refer the reader to Gadamer's book and what he says of 'Wirkungsgeschichte', 'Verschmelzung der Horizonte' and 'die Geschichtlichkeit des Verstehens'.

are related. This is, in Bultmann's terms, the problem of 'Anrede' (address) and 'Mitteilung' (information) and their relation.

In Glauben und Verstehen¹ Bultmann writes:

'Correspondingly the answer to the question how revelation is understood in the New Testament cannot be understood as a simple giving of information (Mitteilung), but only as address (Anrede)'. And later on the same page: 'That does not, of course, mean that in the New Testament there could not also be simple direct statements on revelation and the limitation of man, which could be reproduced by a descriptive account. But if one does that one must only take into consideration that such statements cannot really be understood if they are taken to be simple statements of information and if what they originally meant and the original speaker's understanding of himself, which is the basis of their meaning, is not re-enacted (nachvollzogen).'

Now, in so far as the Christian faith is historical, there can be no re-enactment without something historical, as deeds done and words spoken, to be re-enacted. Thus, suppose we take Wittgenstein's analogy of the boxer:² 'Let us imagine a picture which shows a boxer in a particular fighting stance. Now this picture can be used to inform

1. 111, p. 7 (my tr.).

2. Schriften, 1, Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 1960, p. 299 (my tr.).

someone how he ought to stand, to hold himself; or, how he ought not to hold himself, or, how a certain man at such and such a place did stand; or, etc. etc.'

So far as the Christian faith is concerned, the 'boxer' depicted is, to use a term, 'datierbar'. And were there no 'Datierbarkeit' there would be no Christian faith. And of this boxer every Christian has his own individual, or personal, picture; and these pictures range from the linear minimalities of Kierkegaard and those historians for whom the idea of Geschichte is dialectically related to Historie,¹ for whom, that is, historical thinking and historical truth involves sobriety and precision, and extends, as for Renan, to the eyelashes of Jesus' mule.² And not only is the boxer anhistorical datum, something given to the historian, by which, if it does not stretch language too far to say it, the historian is accepted, but the boxer exerts a claim ('how he ought to stand, to hold himself'). And not only that, for, as eighteenth-century prize-fighting, let us say, was a time-conditioned exercise, that is, as the style of boxing is not the same, though

1. Bultmann, Kerygma und Mythos, VI, 1, pp. 22f.

2. Schweitzer, op.cit., chap. XIII, 'Renan', p. 184: 'He (sc. Jesus) constantly rode about, even in Galilee, upon a mule, 'that favourite riding-animal of the East, which is so docile and sure-footed and whose great dark eyes, shaded by long lashes, are full of gentleness'.'

related, perhaps, to what it once was, it is also a picture 'how he ought not to hold himself'.

Thus all the alternatives Wittgenstein gets as far as stating are all distinguishable, but inseparable, moments, *mutatis mutandis*, within the science of the Christian faith, called Hermeneutics.

However two things remain to be said more clearly. If it is true that the picture of the boxer is also a picture 'how he ought not to hold himself', then the word 're-enacted' (*nachvollzogen*) in Bultmann's quotation above¹ is inappropriate; it is subject to the same defects as were claimed for 're-enactment' and 'tua res agitur' above. Perhaps this may be further illustrated.

The primary aim of the theologian's² interpretation is to interpret what the Spirit is saying to the churches, and the world, but not what was said to the churches and has since been bound in one volume. The written witness to what the Spirit said once is relevant, and only relevant, in so far as it may be of help in articulating what the Spirit says. Where the present speaker uses the same words that were once said, it will invariably be found,

1. i.e. Glauben und Verstehen, 111, p. 7.

2. I do not think I can be allowed to mean here more than the dogmatic theologian or philosopher of religion (as opposed to students of the bible, church history and *Dogmengeschichte*).

I think, if analysis is sufficiently rigorous that the meaning of the words is different. No doubt, in this context, it would be instructive, for example, to compare Paul's δικαιωσύνη with Luther's 'Rechtfertigung', or Barth's Romans with Paul's or Bultmann's John with John's.

F. C. Grant in The Gospels: Their Origin and Growth¹ writes that: 'Whereas for many centuries the church maintained its claim to exercise a sole and exclusive authority in the interpretation of the New Testament, interpreting it in strict accordance with the later formularies of the faith, and, in fact, not infrequently in terms of far later theologies, that right is now challenged, where it is not ignored, throughout the Protestant world ...'

Now it is true that this quotation occurs in a context where it is maintained that 'history still moves, always moves and that nothing, however sacred, ever continueth in one stay',² but Grant does not make it clear, first, and less important, that there are now no pressing grounds, and from year to year, or monograph to monograph, there are less, to distinguish the New Testament from church interpretation, for identicals may not be distinguished; and second, and more important, that the interpretation of the New Testament is only relevant where it may be re-arranged, or transformed,

1. p. 14.

2. ibid., p. 15.

to interpret the Spirit.¹

For allegory was not wrong in what it tried to do, but in how it tried to do it. For 'to speculative minds it offered the only escape from the tyranny of the letter; despite its hopelessly unhistorical character it was thus in a sense an instrument of progress ... Christians and pagans were alike schoolmen: they could not challenge the authority of ancient texts; they could only evade it by reading back their own thoughts into them.'² The problem, in the first instance, is not to interpret the past, but to interpret the present through the past.

But the question remains whether Bultmann is more than rhetorical and less than just in what he sometimes says on the relation between 'Mitteilung' (information) and 'Anrede' (address). Wittgenstein enumerates three ways in which the picture of the boxer may be understood and implies there are more. For the present purpose it is sufficient to point out that his picture contains both the possibility of 'Mitteilung' and of 'Anrede'.

Bultmann, however, sometimes speaks as if the possibility of 'Anrede' excludes 'Mitteilung'. In the quotation above³

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1. Cf. Oman, Honest Religion, p. 104 (cit. T. M. Knox, JTS, Vol. XVII, Pt. 2, Oct. 1966, p. 549): 'Take the same liberty with Paul as he very freely did with Moses.'
 2. E. R. Dodds, Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety, pp. 130f.
 3. i.e. Glauben und Verstehen, 111, p. 7.

there is included the phrase: '... but only as address ...' And, later in the same essay,¹ he writes of 'die Predigt, die aber nicht vergegenwärtigt in der Weise des Mitteilens von etwas Vergangenen, des Erinnerns daran, sondern als Anrede' (the sermon, which however, does not make present by giving information about something in the past, by recalling it, but as address). But he has written above, on the same page: 'In so far as the sermon gives information about something, it addresses at the same time ...' I shall take this latter simultaneous possibility to be correct and for the reason that the man of faith is addressed by a reality, a concretion, by something done, so that both information and the claim on the man informed to decide are simply two distinguishable moments in an inseparable unity.

In the following passage Käsemann describes the complexity of this hermeneutic situation, in which information and address, or, in his own terms, narration and proclamation, are inseparably, if distinguishably, joined. And I quote the passage for the further reason that Käsemann is also aware that this complex relation is further complexified, in so far as the narration and the proclamation must change to cope with new experience and new situations, or, as Braun might put it, 'secundum hominem recipientem'. '... it was

1. p. 22.

Apocalyptic,' Käsemann writes,¹ 'that first made historical thinking within Christianity possible. For as in Apocalyptic the world has a definite beginning and a definite end, so too the course of history flows unrepeatably in a definite direction, divided into a sequence of clearly distinguished epochs. Accordingly each single thing has its fixed position, its uniqueness, its context and to these historical thinking returns. And from this too is derived the necessity not only of preaching the kerygma about Jesus, but of narrating it. Then there becomes possible the unparalleled literary genre of the Gospels, which - despite all criticisms that have been with justice and ad nauseam levelled against understanding them as biographies - nevertheless provide a sort of life-history very much in their own fashion, which is to say eschatological in perspective and interpretation. As the Passover Haggada of Judaism proves, Apocalyptic cannot dispense with recalling historical experiences of judgement and salvation, if it wishes to continue to encourage and to warn. Nor²

1. Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen, 2, p. 95 (my tr.)

2. In Käsemann's own words: 'Sie (sc. Apokalyptic) kann sich auch nicht mit einer einfachen Fassung des Evangeliums begnügen, weil sie die heilige Geschichte immer wieder in neue Situation hinein und aus neuer Erfahrung heraus erzählen muss. Das Evangelium bleibt ohne die Evangelien nicht, was es ist. Kerygma wird, sofern es nicht auch erzählt wird, Proklamation einer Idee und, sofern es nicht immer neu erzählend gewonnen wird, historisches Dokument.'

can it be content with a simple conception of the Gospel, because it is always having to narrate the sacred history out of new experience to a new situation. The Gospel does not remain the Gospel without the Gospels. And in so far as the kerygma is not also narrated, it becomes the proclamation of an idea and in so far as it is not always being recovered anew in narration, it becomes a mere historical document.' Kerygma, that is, is both proclamation and narration, information and address. It is both together, or it is neither.

Sed redeamus ad rem.

The second essay set out from Collingwood's definition of history, that it is the science of *res gestae*,¹ the attempt to answer questions about human actions done in the past. History may, of course, be defined in other ways, as, for example, and, it is true, 'from the Christian standpoint', 'the term by which we seek to understand the reality of God's relation to man'.²

However, it is here presupposed that history and theology are distinct sciences and that the theologian, far from being allowed by the rules, or mere presuppositions, of the game here played to introduce a definition that is private to one institutional sector, must concede that the language

1. The Idea of History, p. 9.

2. Gregor Smith, Secular Christianity, p. 68.

of Athenian science is universalisable even within the confines of Jerusalem. History, that is, means history, even within the policies of theology, even if any one science be merely one pale within the total demesne, or, in Heidegger's terms,¹ even if 'historiology ... has Dasein's historicity as its presupposition in its own quite special way.' It is, that is, here presupposed that there may be no scientific nostrum that is not also a vestrum, or, 'you must read your bible in the same way as you read Livy'.²

Thus, if the historical question, in this sense, is asked of the literature of the Gospels, to restrict ourselves to these, then much of it falls to the ground, regarded as history. This does not solve the problem, of course, but it reveals it in a way that is proper to our own questions. There is little use in exercising temerity by a critique of the historicity of virginal conception.

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1. Heidegger, Being and Time, tr. Macquarrie and Robinson, p. 444.
 2. A view of Lessing; v. Gregor Smith, op.cit., p. 70. I am here supposing that the theologian's history belongs to the public discourse of all historians, in the same way as biochemistry to all biochemists. To avoid another possible misunderstanding, I would not be thought to be criticising Gregor Smith's definition above, although I think our emphases are somewhat different. I begin from the supposition of the 'paradoxical identity' of history and theology/eschatology, or in other terms, from the supposition that history and theology are distinguishable, but inseparable. Gregor Smith, above, emphasises the inseparability of these sciences, while I am emphasising their distinguishability.

Accordingly the second essay took the resurrection for its theme and concluded that 'it may well be that no images at all can be utilized out of the traditional store',¹ for it was suggested that if the word 'fact' is understood etymologically and historically, historically, that is, in the ordinary or secular sense of history, as something done by someone in the past, then resurrection cannot be said to be something that Jesus of Nazareth did.

But this, I think, is scarcely to begin to practise theology, if interpretation is withheld and the rude remainder eliminated. But if the development of one science has the consequence that the others be re-organised, then the approach that theology has been making since the late eighteenth century, however negative and destructive of icons that have been apotropaic for an 'incurable plurality',² of Christian time, is one that, if it is not the beginning of theology, shows where it is proper to begin it.

But it was further suggested that if what Jesus did is what God did and this past is understood as present, as, indeed, all past is, and if the word God implies, no less than freedom to engage in it, an indifference to history,

1. Gregor Smith, op.cit., p. 76. I did not there use these words, but it is what I meant.

2. I have taken the phrase from a poem of Louis MacNeice (which I cannot now locate), where he speaks of 'the incurable plurality of things' in the world.

then the death of Jesus may be confronted as much without anxiety as without mythology.

If, the third essay maintained, the things that Jesus did were the actions of God and the words said by the early church were the words of God, then why should what Jesus said not be, any less than his deeds, the words of God? That is to say, both the words of Jesus and the words of the early church are kerygma. The two kerygmata are scarcely distinguished because one is present and the other is not; for all history is present. The shift in formulation, from 'the preacher to the preached', for example, depends on the shifted situation out of which the question is asked. The two kerygmata are distinguished by nothing that makes the term improper to either.

The situation may be summed up as follows: the word 'kerygma' has come to the fore in a post-eighteenth century context where history has come to the fore. The history that has come to the fore where kerygma has come to the fore is a record of words said and deeds done like any other piece of history and no special historical method applies, even if this history is also open to be understood theologically in a special way. The segment of history that is under examination is not only what was said and done after Jesus was executed, but what was said and done by him.

It should also be pointed out that this summary, from

the theological point of view, is incomplete. On the other hand, it poses the theological question in a way that is appropriate, it is suggested, to the current historical situation, or, in other words, God's contemporary acts.

The Problem

The problem under consideration in the present essay might be stated as follows: with what justification does the historian speak of kerygma when what confront him are kerygmata? With what justification may he speak of a 'common Gospel'¹ when he is confronted by a plurality of gospels? Moreover, if Scripture doth greatly err not only in matters of fact, such as Luke's transposition of Quirinius' census to a date some ten years before it happened,² but in theology, too, as the rigorism of Matthew³ or Luke's picture of Paul which hardly coincides with Paul's picture

1. So Dodd, The Apostolic Preaching, p. 14.
2. v. Creed, St. Luke (Macmillan Commentaries), p. 29: 'These considerations point to the conclusion that Luke has transposed the well-known census of Quirinius to a date some ten or eleven years before it actually took place ...'
3. Käsemann, op.cit., 2, p. 84: 'Mit Recht hat ihn (sc. Matthäus) A. Schlatter (Der Evangelist Matthäus, 2. Aufl., 1933 (referred to by Käsemann ad loc.)) als ethischen Rigoristen und als Vertreter eines beginnenden christlichen Rabbimates beschrieben.' and, less pejoratively, Bornkamm, RGG, 111, art. 'Evangelien, synoptische', Sp. 763: 'Das Gesetz und seine Gültigkeit bis zum Jota und Häkchen (5,18f.) und die Abwehr der Gesetzlosigkeit sind das zentrale Thema und bestimmen das Verständnis der Reichspredigt Jesu, seiner Messianität und die eschatologische Erwartung.'

of himself;¹ that is, if not only 'Tatsachenkritik' (criticism in matters of fact) but also 'Sachkritik' (theological criticism) is in order, by what criterion is the kerygma to be determined from amidst a cacophony of discrepant confessional voices? Has any New Testament author normative authority? Has any author anywhere?

For the present essay let a statement of Käsemann serve as starting point, who writes: '... that the historical period that came before the writing of the gospels was filled with theological tensions of the strongest kind and knew what was more or less a strife of confessions, which in the positions they fought over boasted of possessing ~~of~~ the Spirit themselves and at the same time measured their opponents by their own criterion of what the Spirit was.'²

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1. Hänchen, op.cit., p. 100: 'das lukanische Paulusbild stimmt nicht mit dem der paulinischen Briefe überein.'
 2. Käsemann, op.cit., 2, p. 83 (my tr.). Since the 18th cent. and especially in recent years the historical-critical method, working with the tools of source criticism, 'Formgeschichte' and 'Redaktionsgeschichte', has made it possible to reconstruct with increasing refinement and sophistication the history of the actions and the ideas of Jesus and the early church. That history is complex, pluralist and reveals competing and contradictory theologies. The critic is thus confronted by a plurality of what I call 'kerygmata' and thus with the question what each grouping and individual within the early church took the Gospel to be and then with the question, whether he answers it or not, what the critic understands by the Gospel. Accordingly, the διδάχριστις πνευμάτων becomes a question of the first importance. Which is the right answer: 'Enthusiasmus', the Hellenists, James, the 'presentist' eschatology of John, the Gospel of Paul - which he failed to demythologise (Bultmann)/which it is quite wrong to demythologise (Käsemann), and etc.? It is in/(continued on following page)

Early theology may only with difficulty be reconstrued. However, the evangelical strata are nowadays commonly, and, perhaps, crudely, divided into ipsissima^{verba}, Palestinian, Jewish-Hellenistic and Hellenistic Christianity.¹ These four kerygmata, in whatever literary form they occur, are further augmented by the kerygmata of the authors in which the earlier kerygmata are embedded. And then there is Paul and John, to go no further.

There is, of course, no need to infer that variation implies contradiction. It is only a foolish man who will ask the same question in different situations and the heretic may only be hunted if to the same question different answers are being offered. 'What is the gospel?' is a question that has no location and it is part of wisdom to ask the right question. An historical man must ask instead what the kerygma was for a Palestinian Christian, for Matthew, etc.; and what the kerygma is for me. That is to say, the adequacy, or truth of a document must be measured by its ability to deal with the situation for which it was written. On the other hand, where divergent answers are given to the same question, one, or both, must be in error.

(continued from previous page) in this particular historical work that Käsemann excells (though I should perhaps wish to criticise him for assuming, rather too hastily, that Paul - together, one might add, with Martin Luther - stands in the theological centre of the canon).

1. e.g. Hahn, op.cit. pp. 11f., and Fuller, The New Testament in Current Study, p. 84.

It may be true that the Tübingen school was misled by a philosophical theory to exaggerate divergencies within the early church but it is no solution either in life or the sciences which study it, to 'pour all the balm of Gilead on the least ripple of vinegar',¹ to deny, for example, the divergence of the kerygma of Peter, which summoned Gentiles to assume Jewry, from the kerygma of Paul, which urged them, without the law, to 'put on' Christ. And both these kerygmata are extant, even if the former must be inductively reconstrued. But to decide here for Paul need not, of course, imply that he is always right elsewhere.²

That is the case of extant³ contradiction; but there

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1. I am indebted to a friend for this expression. The defect of the Tübingen school was to have written history on the basis of a preconceived theory. Although Hahn is not working with a philosophical theory, as F. C. Baur with Hegel, it is a defect of his book that he over-systematises the early theological developments. It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that the example which lies at the back of my mind in this paragraph is the disagreement between Paul and Peter in Gal. 2 and the theological divergence that that disagreement implied.
 2. The fact of 'theological tensions of the strongest kind' and 'what was more or less a strife of confessions' raises the question of 'the canon within the canon'. I ask here with what right Paul should occupy the centre of the canon, as many Lutherans assume, and, further, even if Paul is granted that position, whether, even then, he is right in everything that he says. And the same question arises with the Synoptics, if Matthew was a rigorist, Luke a 'historiciser', etc.
 3. Extant, i.e. in Gal. 2.

are other instances where what is extant contradicts something else that is not, if, for example, it is true 'that the fourth gospel mirrors the historical development which leads from the enthusiasts in Corinth and from 2 Tim. 2:18 to Christian gnosticism, so that its inclusion in the church's canon was effected 'errore hominum et providentia Dei'.¹ How the critic concludes that John, let us call him that, has fouled the rules of the Johannine language-game is an important question. But here it is necessary nicely to distinguish and keep unconfused two criteria: one that belongs to John's history and one that is the critic's. If John presupposed what John presupposed, how should his game be judged right and wrong? If I presuppose what I do, by what measure do I judge what I have written to be true or false? There is, that is, both a past historical and a present historical criterion.² By what process are they reached and, then, how are we to relate them when we have found them? Are we to state the

1. Käsemann, Jesu Letzter Wille, p. 132 (my tr.). And cf. ibid., pp. 129f., and also the contrasting view of Dodd, The Apostolic Preaching, p. 75: 'It is in the Fourth Gospel, which in form and expression, as probably in date, stands farthest from the original tradition of the teaching, that we have the most penetrating exposition of its (sc. the teaching of Jesus) central meaning.'

2. I mean by this that if John presupposed certain things there was a right solution to the questions raised by these. Our presuppositions are, however, different and we have to discover the right solution to the questions our presuppositions raise.

matter as 'the question as to the continuity of the gospel in the discontinuity of the times and the variation of the kerygma'?¹ Is the problem to be stated in terms of continuity? In terms of identity?

The starting point of the present observation is the three lectures, and supplement, of Dodd, entitled: The Apostolic Preaching and its Developments. The question at issue is not whether what was said in public oration in the book of Acts reproduces what was said in early days by the Christians of Jerusalem, being translations, or not, from the Aramaic, or what was said by the Hellenistic Christians of 75 A.D., or merely the personal views of what is sometimes termed a 'historicising'² theologian, or even all three of these in varied stratification or conglomeration. Whether or no 'scholarly opinion has shifted sharply'³ and whether or no that opinion can be called knowledge, will not be discussed, even if I must confess the cogency of Hänchen's views,⁴ that the composition of the speeches in Acts are the

1. Käsemann, Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen, 1, p. 213 (cit. Robinson, op.cit., p. 13 (Robinson's tr.)).

2. e.g. Käsemann, ibid., 1, p. 215: '... während Lukas historisierend und die Heilsgeschichte als Entwicklungsprozess schildernd zum ersten Male ein sogenanntes Leben Jesu schreibt.'

3. Robinson, op.cit., p. 58, f.n. 1.

4. Hänchen, op.cit.

work of Luke and that his book represents not so much the theology of the time of which he wrote, but of the time when he wrote. It is not Dodd's conclusions, but his presuppositions that I wish, in the first instance, to examine.

If what I am here proposing is not merely a wilful or uncomprehending misrepresentation, which is designed by the critic for the purpose of refuting what the author did not say, in crudest outline Dodd presupposes a kerygma that was fundamental and which was common to the Apostles. This 'Jerusalem kerygma',¹ extant in Acts and reconstrued out of Paul, was further developed by Mark and John, and from it Matthew and Luke diverge.

Suppose we concede for a moment that embedded in the Acts speeches or in certain of them² and in the Epistles of Paul, there is recoverable the Jerusalem kerygma, which is common to both (though whether this, in fact, so is a question that arises, but which I shall not consider). And a further question whether, or to what extent, it is ever possible to speak of a 'common gospel', whether, that is, individual Christians, who were permanently or temporarily settled in Jerusalem, would not, under an examination sufficiently Socratic, or Baconian, break down and confess to as many heterodoxies, or orthodoxies, if any human

1. Dodd's term, e.g. The Apostolic Preaching, p. 25.

2. v. Dodd's table, ibid., at the end of the book.

thinking deserves the name, each man interpreting as he was able, as there were interrogations, will, too, for a moment be shelved.

And then two questions arise: how does what Luke thought relate to what the Jerusalem Christians thought, and, second, how does what Paul thought relate to what he has included of the Jerusalem kerygma. And, indeed, how does any historically isolable kerygma relate to any other?

My intention here is not to analyse such differences from the Jerusalem kerygma as the 'Enteschatologisierung'¹ ('de-eschatologising') of Luke, or the δικαιοσύνη χωρὶς νόμου² of Paul, but, assuming them, to discuss what they signify.

By way of converging on the problem by negation, I will discuss, first, two remarks of Dodd. In his conclusion to The Apostolic Preaching he writes:³ 'first that within the New Testament there is an immense range of variety in the interpretation that is given to the kerygma; and, secondly, that in all such interpretation the essential elements of the original kerygma are steadily kept in view.'

But, as Dodd concedes to be apparent in an extreme

1. For the fact, not the word, v. Käsemann, Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen, 2, pp. 29f.

2. Rom. 3:21.

3. p. 74.

case, the book of the Revelation of John is evidence of a 'relapse into a pre-Christian eschatology'.¹ But, just as to concede that the predictions of the passion are vaticinia ex eventu is to set foot on that slippery slope which leads to a breathless retention of 'Abba', supplemented, with some good fortune, by 'Amen', so the man who makes a concession here will be lucky if he escapes with his life and the succinct confession: 'Ἰησοῦς Κύριος'. How, that is, do matters stand where we do not have the clarity of an extreme?²

1. ibid., p. 40.

2. The question at issue is 'How does one decide what a correct statement of the Gospel is?' Now Barth, for example, takes (I am told) Jn. 1:14 as his starting point. The interpreter is then faced with two questions, with what I have called 'the past historical criterion' and 'the present historical criterion' - or, in this case, perhaps rather three: John's, Barth's and the interpreter's. He must ask: 'Did John mean the right thing by Jn. 1:14, or does he interpret his remark, perhaps, docetically (cf. Käsemann, Jesu Letzter Wille, p. 129: '... die konsequente Darstellung Jesu als des über die Erde schreitenden Gottes ...')? And he must ask, second, 'What does Barth make of what John says? Is Barth, perhaps, guilty of 'Offenbarungspositivismus' (v. Prenter in World Come of Age, 'Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Karl Barth's Positivism of Revelation', pp. 93ff.)? Thirdly, he must ask: 'By what criterion do I measure Barth? Now Dodd seems to be taking the kerygma as reconstructed out of Acts as his starting-point. He might argue that, chronologically, this is the earliest kerygma we have. This is far from proven (v. Hänchen, op.cit.), but, even if he is right, is the theological question, 'What is the gospel?' to be decided by chronology? As soon as he admits that any document, or even any view within any document, is divergent, he cannot avoid the question of what his theological criterion is, a question that I would judge he has neither raised nor solved. ('Abba' and 'Amen' are judged to be ipsissima verba. Jeremias has made a special examination of these.)

Throughout The Apostolic Preaching Dodd everywhere supposes that there is one kerygma or 'fundamental Christian message',¹ however much it be interpreted in 'fresh and invigorating forms'.² But where is this 'fundamental message' to be found?

The seat of the matter is, we are to understand, the Jerusalem kerygma.

Dodd's aim is to move away from an 'analytical stage of criticism',³ to the construction of a 'synthesis',⁴ or, if 'synthesis' is an inadequate term, to the exploration of 'the common faith'.⁵ The task is hard enough to warrant the question whether it is not misconceived; not totally misconceived, perhaps, but misconceived in such a way that the truth of the question is implicated in error.

Despite the meagre advancement of the argument it may illuminate the matter further to take up the second remark of Dodd, where he, somewhat, or altogether, with Paul (Dodd quotes 1 Cor. 3:10sq.), compares the relation of the kerygma to its interpretation to that between 'foundation' and 'superstructure'.⁶ According to Dodd, then, there is a

1. p. 75.

2. ibid.

3. ibid., p. 74.

4. ibid.

5. ibid.

6. ibid., p. 10.

clear distinction between 'what Paul was accustomed to preach as Gospel' and 'the theological superstructure of his thought',¹ or between 'the fundamental Gospel and the higher wisdom'.²

Even if Dodd correctly recounts Paul's account, what Paul is doing may not be what he says he is doing. For, suppose Pier Luigi Nervi were commissioned to complete an unfinished Gothic foundation and he then completed it in his own style, it would require no discerning architect to note a discrepancy between the foundation that was laid and what was built upon it. If unity is a criterion, an architect requires his own foundation. For if Nervi was asked to build in his own style, he would either have to design a foundation that was appropriate to his own building, or, if he was asked to complete an ancient building, of which the foundation was already laid, he would have not only to subordinate his own individual idiosyncrasies, but also to relinquish the historical stage that the art of architecture had reached in his own time.

That is the obvious case. The matter is less clear where the phenomenon is in process, where identity to the untrained eye turns out on expert examination to be mistaken. Such as, for example, the flying buttress, which continues

1. ibid., p. 11.

2. ibid., p. 10.

to be included no longer for structural, but for traditional reasons; and such as Davidic descent 'in which Paul does not seem to have been particularly interested'¹ - and this is the very means by which what is earlier and traditional can be detected. If such instances do not already indicate a new foundation, they point to its future arrival, for a transition is a transition to something.

The problem is, then: confronted by a plurality of kerygmata, in what sense may one speak of one kerygma? If many foundations are unearthed, how are they to be related, or is that attempt impossible and illegitimate?

Suppose one asks how many foundations, or kerygmata, there are, three may be cited, not because there are not more than three, but because three are sufficient for the present purpose. Once again it should be noted that what is so distinguished need not be separable, though much will depend on how what is inseparable, if it is, is joined.

First, it would be possible to say that Jesus of Nazareth is the foundation; which formulation is chosen as being without the confusing overtones of 'Jesus Christ and him crucified'.² Second, it would be possible to say:

1. ibid., p. 14. Davidic descent, which had been an important element in certain Palestinian theologies, is a mere relic in Paul's theology, which he was not yet able to see fit to exclude.

2. 1 Cor. 2:2.

the Jerusalem kerygma - that is on the assumption either that we have it or can assume it. The third foundation can be stated in four ways as (a) what I say, (b) what I do, with their paradoxically identical correlates: (c) what God says to me and (d) what God does to me. And this third possibility must be capable of statement without Montanist or Anabaptist¹ defects.

A kerygma is its own foundation. There is not one foundation, one kerygma, be it what Jesus said, or what the Jerusalem church said, or the like, to which all other analogous 'language-events' are related as 'interpretations'. These 'interpretations' are themselves kerygmata, directly, if the literary form is address; in other forms, indirectly. What Jesus said and what the Jerusalem church said are past kerygmata and as such objects of the historian's study. What a Christian says now is kerygma and has passed into history as soon as what he was to say was said.

Dodd's assertion that there is one kerygma in the New Testament which is interpreted in an immense variety of ways is a fundamentally unhistorical statement. For it

1. If these essays could be described as an attempt to lay the foundation of a *theologia Spiritus*, it would be relevant, at some point, to clarify their relation to Montanism and Anabaptism, to mention no others. I content myself here with recognising the problem, but do not undertake to examine it.

presupposes that what has been presupposed by Christians has been the same 'semper, ubique, ab omnibus'. To speak of the kerygma simpliciter is an abstraction, where the answer to the question, 'Whose kerygma?' is not. A casual comparison of Ritschl and Calvin with the Jerusalem kerygma, or, to remain by the same, or rather, changing literary form, of Colet and Chrysostom with the Jerusalem kerygma should swiftly dispel the illusion of eternity. Or even of Paul and John.

Why Dodd is not thinking historically is a separate question, whether, that is, he is platonising, or some such, and will not be examined here. But not only in Essay II was Dodd shown to be thinking unhistorically about the resurrection, by failing to distinguish at the proper joint history from eschatology, as well as failing to distinguish a particular eschatology composed of determinants quite alien to historical thinking from the kind of eschatology that belongs to a situation where historical thinking is the dominant scientific model, but here too Dodd is working with an unhistorical conception of identity in the kerygma.

For the kind of identity that Dodd presupposes is like that of the centre of the one circle, whereas the kind of identity that belongs to the kerygma, historically understood, is the identity of a process where, in Collingwood's

term,¹ what is earlier is 'incapsulated' in what is later, and is analogous to the way in which a man can look at a picture of himself as a child and still assert that that was he.² But only analogous, for history is not a person, but persons in community, some of these contemporary, to speak sarkically, some not.

If the reader has been convinced, he and I have by now seen no need to refuse the appellation kerygma to what Jesus said,³ nor of canonising what was merely one moment in the history of kerygma in such a way that other sermons should either be prescribed as heretical or relegated as interpretation.

But, lastly, I wish to conclude these tentative adumbrations by asking about the transition from past kerygma to present kerygma, from 'what was kerygma and has been handed down' to 'kerygma which happens in the present'.⁴ Some other questions that range themselves in the penumbra of this question concern the crisis of authority and whether anything new can happen in history.

1. An Autobiography, p. 98.

2. "I am indebted for this observation to a remark in conversation by Prof. Rückert of Tübingen.

3. v. supra: Essay III.

4. Ebeling's terms (Theologie und Verkündigung, p. 40) are 'überliefertes, gewesenes Kerygma' and 'gegenwärtig geschehendes Kerygma'.

Theologically speaking, the moment has a triple structure, as it consists of tradition, situation and the Spirit. It is, in the first place, important to be quite clear that the past cannot be more than an ancillary norm for the present; in other words the διάκρισις πνευμάτων¹ cannot be resolved other than by taking a risk or allowing the Spirit to do it. To remain content with previous norms in religion is like clinging, in questions of ethics, to 'the low-grade morality of custom and precept'.² Suppose, by way of illustration, we take Collingwood's analysis of a process into the stages P1, P2, P3. In P2 not only is P1 'incapsulated', but something else is added, if addition is an adequate term for a more subtle reaction. And so on. And addition may only be described in the dialectical categories of continuity and its opposite and may only be made by guess or by God.³

1. 1 Cor. 12:10.

2. Collingwood, An Autobiography, p. 106.

3. These brief, concluding remarks are somewhat expanded in Essay V.

KERYGMA AND ITS PRESUPPOSITIONS

The Presuppositions

The purpose of this final essay is to clarify and expound; it is not to take the matter further, but to say more clearly what has been already said. What is to be expounded is a set, or 'constellation',¹ of absolute presuppositions, expounded in some sort of order, and, it is hoped, 'consupponible',² without undue strain. And these presuppositions are, I suggest, the necessary ones, for answering the question, what kerygma is.

After enquiry, three documents were eventually selected for concentration. They were The Apostolic Preaching and its Developments by Dodd (1936), The Relation of the Early Christian Message of Christ to the Historical Jesus by Bultmann (1960), and Ebeling's Theology and Proclamation (1962).

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1. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics, p. 66: 'I speak of a set of absolute presuppositions, because if metaphysics is an historical science the things which it studies, namely absolute presuppositions, are historical facts; and any one who is reasonably well acquainted with historical work knows that there is no such thing as an historical fact which is not at the same time a complex of historical facts. Such a complex of historical facts I call a 'constellation'.'
 2. The relation between these 'absolute presuppositions' is not (ibid., p. 67) 'a relation of such a kind that a person supposing any one of them is logically committed to supposing all or indeed any of the others.' But (ibid., p. 66) 'since they are all suppositions, each must be consupponible with all the others; that is, it must be logically possible for a person who supposes any one of them to suppose concurrently all the rest.'

But the method chosen was not to expound what these men had already said, but, presupposing that, to reveal that which, on the basis of presuppositions different from theirs,¹ they had not said rightly. More exactly, then, the question that was being asked was not what another, but what I took kerygma to be.

Nor did this consupposable constellation spring into existence fully grown. The roots, rather, of the conception were three. For it originated in an acquaintance with the New Testament studies, or, better, conclusions, of the form-critics, with the existential philosophy of Heidegger and of Bultmann, in so far as I could understand it, and, before any other, perhaps, with the historiography

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1. By 'different from theirs' I mean: (1) that I disagree with Dodd on where he distinguishes history from eschatology (this disagreement would, I think, be supported by Bultmann); (2) that I disagree with Bultmann by asserting Jesus' words to be kerygma (it is conceivable that Dodd would be able to support this view); (3) although I have not undertaken any criticism of Ebeling, as what he is trying to say and what I am trying to say is 'post-Bultmannian', so that properly he should not be included in 'different from theirs', yet perhaps I may be allowed to say that I disagree with the prominence he gives to 'the Word', which is a concept I do not follow, and refer, if I may, to Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Oakeshott, Collier Classics, New York, The Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 1962, p. 39: 'And therefore you shall hardly meet with a senseless and insignificant word, that is not made up of some Latin or Greek names. A Frenchman seldom hears our Saviour called by the name of parole, but by the name of verbe often; yet verbe and parole differ no more, but that one is Latin, the other French.'

of Collingwood. For if the inhabitants of Jerusalem have no alternative but to use the language of Canaan, and if it is true, as it may not be, that history is the appropriate model for scientific thinking, then here, in Collingwood's writing, was an accurate pellucidity, if, too, an orientation to history that was made, that relegated the making of it to the second place.¹

The preceding pages have hinted at more questions than attempts have been made to answer them, so that this thesis represents rather a programme for thought than a finished performance. But in a subject, the invisibility of whose object gives the greater occasion for talking nonsense, even if it is not true that everything that can be said can be said simply, it is as well, at whatever cost, be it only less than falsehood and provided the Spirit be not quenched,² to speak with the mind but five words, ^{before} ten thousand in a

1. What Collingwood is writing about in The Idea of History is about the science of history. His questions are concerned, primarily, with the history that has been made and our knowledge of it and he was only incidentally concerned with the making of history in the present, which is, I think, Heidegger's primary concern, for whom 'historiology' was only of incidental interest. In Heidegger's terms, Collingwood was primarily concerned with 'historiology', Heidegger with 'historicality' (cf. Heidegger, op.cit., p. 444: '... historiology ... has Dasein's historicality as its presupposition in its own quite special way.' and cf. Bultmann's criticism of Collingwood, History and Eschatology, Gifford Lectures, 1957, p. 136).

2. 1 Thess. 5:19.

tongue.¹

At the least, kerygma is words spoken. And to say 'words' is to exclude acts. But the exclusion of acts is not an exclusion on principle, but a methodological exclusion. And this is because the question I am asking is not about pragma (act), but about kerygma.

Not, however, that the two can be separated, although they may be distinguished. For they must always occur together, as distinguishable aspects of the one unity. And this unity I call 'existence'; existence is the unity of word and act. But, if they do not occur together, then they are occurring as abstractions from the rich unity of existence.²

If kerygma is words, are these words spoken by all men or just by some men? I answer: kerygma is the words of Christians.

And what, then, is a Christian?

1. 1 Cor. 14:19.

2. Descartes: Cogito ergo sum; Hamann (Gregor Smith, J. G. Hamann, p. 24; cf. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 302 (cit. Gregor Smith, ibid., p. 45): '... the individual puts an end to the mere possibility and identifies himself with the content of his thought in order to exist in it.'): Sum ergo cogito; Macmurray (v. op.cit.): Ago ergo cogito; I am saying here: Ago et cogito: scilicet sum (Ebeling, Luther, Einführung in sein Denken, p. 71, might imply something similar with his term 'Tätwort' (cf. the term he uses in common with Fuchs, 'Sprachereignis'), but his emphasis is on the latter half of that word; cf., ibid., p. 61: '... dass... die Reformation Sache allein des Wortes sei.')

The Christian man is one, whose existence (words and acts) is qualified by the existence (words and acts) of Jesus of Nazareth, in such a way that his responsibility for others is made radical; and this responsibility is freedom.

To say 'qualified' means that on each occasion he is made the sort he is by a free and responsible relation to Jesus of Nazareth. And this relation is an historical relation, of the same kind as a man's relation to William Wallace, the only difference being that the words and acts of William Wallace were the words and acts of God, but qualified by lack of freedom and responsibility. Qualified, that is, if you must have it so, by sin. But that is to anticipate, for we are, at present, arguing 'etsi deus non daretur'.¹

To say that one is 'qualified by Jesus of Nazareth' is to say, in the first place, that one is qualified by the man who is ascertained by historical science to have been, and to have 'been for others'.² And by science is meant both

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1. Bonhoeffer uses the phrase e.g. Letters and Papers from Prison, p. 195. The origin of the phrase, I am informed by Prof. Gregor Smith, is Grotius and no doubt occurs in the context of a discussion of 'natural law' (Elze, RGG, III, art. 'Grotius', Sp. 1885f.: 'Dieses (sc. das Naturrecht) ... hätte seine Geltung auch, wenn es Gott nicht gäbe. '), but I have not been able to locate the reference.
 2. The phrase is Bonhoeffer's, ibid., p. 209. His own words are (Widerstand und Ergebung (Siebenstern-Taschenbuch), p. 191: 'Begegnung mit Jesus Christus. Erfahrung, dass Jesus nur "für andere da ist". Das "Für-andere-da-sein" Jesu ist die Transzendenz-erfahrung.'

the kind that is practised by professors and the kind that is practised by servant-girls,¹ for, despite the fact that there are many who operate below the threshold of articulateness, nevertheless to remember is human.

By 'historical' is meant that history, which is defined by Collingwood as the study of the actions of human beings in the past. Not that the theologian, of course, has an object of study that is different from the actions of human beings - in the past, if he is a biblical scholar or church historian; in the present,² if he is a systematic theologian or dogmatist - but that the theological facts are not only historical facts and involve not only the risk of imaginative reconstruction,² but faith.

But, in the first place, by 'Jesus of Nazareth' is meant both the 'mere that', that he existed, and the 'mere how', that he existed for others.

The meaning of 'to exist for' is more precisely expressed in the categories of 'freedom' and 'responsibility'. And then the obvious polarity of these two categories is

1. Cf. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 19: 'I Johannes Climacus, born in this city and now thirty years old, a common ordinary human being like most people, assume that there awaits me a highest good, an eternal happiness, in the same sense that such a good awaits a servant-girl or a professor.'
2. I allude, again, to the 'a priori imagination' of Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 241.

further heightened to the point of paradox by their equation, sc. 'this responsibility is freedom'. This is deliberate, for it indicates a problem - or is it a solution? - along the lines of '... whose service is perfect freedom'.¹ But as a problem, or a solution, I shall leave it, not because nothing more need be said, but because the issue would pervert the direction of the present argument.

God himself, if he is, and the word we use to call him that are much abused. And there is a time, both for persons and, no doubt, for cultures, to speak of aphasia. But, at least for the thinker in his study, who is willing to suppose that when he talks of God he is neither unnecessarily multiplying what is not, nor making the creature of his own despair, it will hardly be enough to season his humanism with a suggestion of something more.² What, then, is meant to say that 'the freedom and responsibility is made radical'?

An age of rapid social change is an age of anxiety. What if God were one that suffered in and saved men for that world, enabling them, by leaving them alone, to suffer and enjoy it? Let us suppose that this is so.

1. The phrase is found in the Sacramentaries of Gelasius and Gregory the Great: '... cui servire est regnare.'

2. I find myself sympathetic to the question of van Buren, op.cit., but not his solution.

By 'God', then, I will mean that which keeps me absolutely safe. When the definition is introduced by a word no more pronominal than the word 'that', I mean that, if we go so far as to speak of God as 'person', we have no real need to suppose that in himself, he is one; though persons can hardly go less, in the same way as no-one would suppose the language of horses to be less than equine, or of oxen less than bovine - though, for those horses that have experience of persons, it would be nice to enquire whether their equipment would be sufficient for them to speak of it.¹ God-talk, in short, is analogical.

By 'absolutely safe' is meant, merely, that no thing in life, nor one's leaving of it, could make that safety insecure, though, lest assertion should seem to run, more than need be, in advance of ignorance, the rest is silence. For if what we know of life convinces us of God's care, we may, perhaps, presume his sufficiency for what we do not.

But what is the connection between this talk of God and what was said of Jesus?

Now, if theological statements are, in Collingwood's

1. I refer to the fragment of Xenophanes, who remarks 'that if horses could reflect on the semblance of the gods, they would portray them as horses.' (Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought, London, SCM Press Ltd., 1963, p. 57.)

sense, 'absolute presuppositions',¹ that is, do not depend on questions, but on them questions depend, then the question of the manner of their relation is banned at the bar of the Spirit as a pseudo-metaphysical anathema. For we have arrived at the paradox and conclude with, or begin from, the belief, the fact, the believed fact, the not-only-historical fact, that they are related. The question 'how' is solved and the Gordian knot is cut by proving the question to be illusory.²

To suppose the paradox is to suppose that what Jesus did was what God did and that what Jesus said God said. By what Jesus did and said is meant his historical acts and words as ascertained by historical science. And these

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1. For the equation of metaphysics and theology v. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics, p. 10; ^{he} writes (paraphrasing Aristotle): 'The ordinary name for that which is the logical ground of everything else is God. The most adequate, explicit, and easily intelligible name for the science which in its relation to other sciences is alternatively called First Science or Wisdom, the name which tells us what it is about, is therefore Theology.' But it is also, by implication (ibid., p. 46), his own view. Cf. An Essay on Philosophical Method, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1933, p. 126. For the doctrine of 'absolute presuppositions', v. An Essay on Metaphysics, esp. chaps. IV and V.
 2. I begin, that is, by presupposing the relation between infinite and finite, God and the world, God and Jesus. To debate whether that is, or is not, a datum is, within theological discourse, a fallacy of misplaced argument. Cf. the 'Wer-Frage' and the 'Wie-Frage' of Bonhoeffer, Wer ist und wer war Jesus Christus, pp. 11ff.

historical activities of Jesus, his doing and speaking, at the same time as they are the historical activities of a man, are, to speak analogically, the historical activities of God, who ate with men when Jesus did. What may be called the 'analogia facti' is to believe, or presuppose, that 'the facts of the life and ministry of Jesus'¹ are the facts of God.

If the reader has followed all things closely till now, he will see that he has been engaged, on the one hand, in a narrative of things that have been accomplished, and in a series of analogical assertions, on the other. He has been asked to consider how it actually was² and how what actually was was God's history. He has been asked to remember the past, but not yet to remind himself that he, too, exists in the present and faces a future.

Suppose, then, I say that I ask these questions of another,

1. Dodd, The Apostolic Preaching, p. 30.

2. I have been persuaded by Ranke's famous phrase 'wie es eigentlich gewesen ist' to write 'how it actually was ...', etc. To avoid confusion with the rejection of the 'Wie-Frage' above, it would be better if I explained that I mean by this: 'who, historically speaking, Jesus actually was and who, historically (that is, analogically), God was'; or, in Collingwood's terms: 'what Jesus did and what he meant by doing what he did and what God did ...' etc. But I do not mean that, despite what I said above, I am after all taking up the question how God is related to Jesus, though it is legitimate to enquire what it means to assert that relation.

because I must answer some questions of my own. I ask what he did, because I am also asking what I must do. If I am interested in what I remember, I am also interested that it is I that am remembering.

Suppose, then, that the question I find myself having to answer is how I am to move out of my past into the future that is appropriate to me, or, in slightly different terms, how I am to make the future into my present. Thus formulated, the question is general, structural, ontological; ontically, however, the question will be defined by the situation in which I think I am standing.

If it is true that the question arises in the situation and if it is true that situations are historical in the sense that present situations are not exhaustively explained by the situations of the past, if, that is, each situation is a new situation, then the question, what he did, cannot answer for me the question, what I must do.

Now, if the past is 'incapsulated' in the present, there must have been a time when, in the first place, the past came to be. Rather paradoxically formulated, there must have been a time when the past became its present. And things come into existence by being created. If my present is to come into existence, it must be created, and be created now, unless I recoil from the task, or suppose there is none.¹

1. v. supra, p. 9: respectively, the 'antinomian' and the 'nomistic' error.

Thus the whole enquiry till now has been a preliminary enquiry concerning an ancillary norm, namely, the historical Jesus, or, by the doctrine of paradoxical identity, the historical God. But does he do anything now?

Whatever is replied to that question, at any rate by ancillary norm I mean that what he did offers me a criterion for what I must do, but a criterion that does not answer my questions. For the questions for which what he did is a criterion are not the questions I am asking. What he did is a norm, but it is an ancillary norm.

And so, now that an answer has been suggested to the question of tradition and the scriptural and ecclesiastical past, the step is taken into the axial phase of the three modes of time, where the past is left behind and a man presses forward into the arising situation, where the future becomes the present; because 'for a man about to act, the situation is his master, his oracle, his god.'¹ For 'history is now and Scotland'² and now is the absolute moment.

Something was said, to speak analogically, of God the Father, above, and something, to speak historically, of

1. Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 316.

2. If I may so adapt T. S. Eliot, Four Quartets, Faber & Faber, 1944, p. 43:

A people without history
Is not redeemed from time, for history is a pattern
Of timeless moments. So, while the light fails
On a winter's afternoon, in a secluded chapel
History is now and England.

Joseph's son. But I am now compelled to add the third, to speak, that is, of the Spirit, to speak, that is, one must also say, of the church.

It was also said above that the Christian man was qualified by the existence of Jesus of Nazareth. That is true, of course, but not directly true. For, more precisely, he is qualified by a discontinuous and continuous succession of those who have been thus qualified. Nor can the *communio sanctorum* be circumvented by a searching of the scriptures, for to search them is to enter the community of those who interpret them.

The doctrine of paradoxical identity is no mere segment of the history of dogma, but a current dogma to explicate the absolute moment. As a matter of past history, what those who have been qualified by Jesus have said has been the words of God. And so, too, what Christians say, if, at the same time, what they say is qualified by sin, as what Jesus said was not. Thus not only is it true that what Jesus did and said was what God did and said, but it is also true that what I do and say is what God does and says. Or, in short, with the qualification of sin, the doctrine of paradoxical identity applies now as then.

Thus I, yet not I, but the Spirit, regulated, it is true, but not confined by tradition, answer with freedom and responsibility, in so far as I assume or receive these, the

questions that the situation poses, questions that follow, but do not repeat the questions that were asked in the past, but which by dialogue with these I answer with the greater wisdom.

But lest the preaching of the Baptist should seem to supplant the place of Jesus, or Gospel be subordinate to Law, all does not depend on how I answer, on whether I fly from the question or deny there is one, but on the belief, or presupposition, that whether I answer or no, my safety is not touched. Demand and gift remain, but the greater of these is gift.

The Criticisms

The presuppositions that have now been expounded were found necessary to explain what is meant by saying that kerygma is what Christians say. And these presuppositions are involved not only in talk of Jesus, or God, or the Spirit, but in all that a Christian says, even if they are, for the most part, no more than implicit - as if he should say 'my pipe is out' and be implying that 'tobacco is God's gift to me'.

But if it was these presuppositions that were being presupposed, then, it was suggested, the theologies of Dodd and Bultmann were in places vulnerable.

In the first place, to take the question of kerygma

and the resurrection,¹ if the kerygma involves, on the one hand, historical statements and, on the other, what was called 'the analogia facti' or theological statements, then it is important that the historical statements should be really historical. And that is important if Christian theology is to win emancipation from a metaphysics of 'the story says ...' and move to a metaphysics of 'history says ...',² or, to take more customary terms, from a faith that is mythological to a faith that is historical.

That is not, of course, to say that a metaphysics of the story is bad metaphysics; it is only to say that such metaphysics is untimely when most people have given up that kind of thinking and do not have the time, and often the equipment, to immerse themselves in another age in order to understand the presuppositions of others far removed, which are neither their own nor need be. If servant-girls do not at any time take kindly to metaphysical analysis, it is

1. Essay II.

2. Cf. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics, p. 56: 'History has its own rubric (for the 'metaphysical rubric v. ibid., p. 55: 'In such and such a phase of scientific thought it is (or was) absolutely presupposed that ...'), namely 'the evidence at our disposal obliges us to conclude that' such and such an event happened. What I call scissors-and-paste history has the rubric 'we are told that' such and such an event happened. There is also a rubric for use in narrating legends, which in some kinds of legendary literature is here and there explicitly inserted: 'the story says that ...', or 'now the story goes on to say that ...'.

still more unkind to burden them with two, their own and others', than saddle them with one.

The notion of the resurrection belongs to that complex of notions, which is called apocalyptic eschatology. All these notions suppose that history will have an end. But the notion that history will have an end is scarcely one that the historian can countenance. Nor, I would further suppose, need it be a notion which the theologian need accept.

It is true, of course, that the personal history of the historian, as of all men, will, sooner or later, come to an end in death. But death ceases to be a problem, if one believes, or supposes, that as far as what we know is concerned God keeps us safe, so that, accordingly, those questions that we have no means of answering, if there are any questions to be answered, may be entrusted to God's economy. Whether, that is, I survive the ending of my life, lies entirely in his hands, not mine.

As far as the resurrection in the New Testament is concerned, 'the evidence at our disposal obliges us to conclude that' Jesus died and that his followers, after his death, went on doing the kind of things he had done. So much for the 'outside' of their actions. As for the 'inside',¹ the early Christians made use of the only metaphysical tools they possessed. In the terms of their mythology, whose rubric is

1. Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 213.

'the story says ...', they said that God had raised Jesus. In the terms, however, of an historical metaphysic, they would have outlined the 'constellation' of presuppositions, which has been implicit in each of these essays and has been made explicit in this. Or if not these presuppositions, then something like them.

In the second place, to take the question of the origin of the kerygma,¹ if we suppose that what Jesus said was what God said and that what a Christian says is what God says;² and if what a Christian says is kerygma, then what Jesus said is kerygma. There is, however, between what Jesus said and what the early church said, if also continuity, undoubted discontinuity. But, one must also add, the relation of continuity and discontinuity between what Jesus said and what the early church said is no different from the relation between any one kerygma and any other, between, for example, the Palestinian Marē-kyriology and the kyriology of Hellenistic Christianity. The question is, however, whether the discontinuity between what Jesus said and what his followers said after his death is different in such a way that the term kerygma may not be used of what he said at all. Jesus' message would then be not kerygma, but its

1. Essay III.

2. This is quite orthodox Bultmannian doctrine, e.g. SAH, 1960, pp. 25ff. In such a context it is Bultmann's wont to cite 2 Cor. 5:18-20.

presupposition.¹

The view I adopt here is to suppose that it was as much possible to become a Christian by hearing what Jesus said as by hearing what the early church said.² The shift in what the early church said away from what Jesus said, in so far as that is true, to 'preaching the preacher',³ is explained in part by the fact that a man may not say of himself what others may say of him, in part by the fact that new historical circumstances necessitate new ways of talking.

At one point⁴ Bultmann asks why the apostolic preaching is not content to repeat the preaching of Jesus. But the history of Buddhism or Plato's treatment of Socrates or the development from Luther to Calvin or any movement of thought one cares to mention are instances which suggest the contrary.

1. Bultmann, Theologie des Neuen Testaments, p. 1: 'Die Verkündigung Jesu gehört zu den Voraussetzungen der Theologie des NT und ist nicht ein Teil dieser selbst.' (In this quotation Jesus' preaching is, of course, one presupposition among others, as Jeremias points out, op.cit., p. 11.)
2. Accordingly, I should wish to interpret Jn. 5:24f. to refer also to the historical Jesus (though I do not, of course, suppose that these are ipsissima verba); whereas Bultmann writes, SAH, 1960, p. 25: '... es ist klar, dass Johannes nicht das Wort des historischen Jesus meint, sondern das Wort, das ihn verkündigt.'
3. A frequent formula of Bultmann, e.g. ibid., p. 17: '... wie aus dem Verkündiger der Verkündigte wurde.'
4. ibid., p. 23.

And it would be unkind to add that Bultmann might have learnt from his own pupils that no apt pupil repeats his teacher.

This is, of course, very far from suggesting that there was need to correct Jesus' teaching, but merely to say that no philosophy in history has eternal validity, for new situations, such as, for example, Jesus' death or the Gentile mission, demand that the new 'strains'¹ be taken up by a modified metaphysic; or, to put the same point in theological terms, because the Spirit leads into all truth.²

Thus, in answer to Bultmann's and Fuller's anxiety that 'the effort to demonstrate the continuity between Jesus and Kerygma may so blur the difference between them, that in effect it will make the Kerygma unnecessary,'³ one must point out that not only did Jesus' message become 'unnecessary' to Paul and John, but that the messages of Paul and John themselves became unnecessary as they in turn were superseded by early Catholicism.

It was further pointed out above⁴ that if all history is present history, discussion of the presentness of the

1. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics, p. 48, Note to Chapter V, and cf. pp. 74ff.

2. Jn. 16:13.

3. Fuller, ATR, 41 (1959), pp. 272-275 (cit. Bultmann, SAH, 1960, p. 24).

4. Essay III.

kerygma is beside the point. The right question is not how the 'Christ-event' is present, but who Christ is. And here Bultmann's dichotomy between Jesus the Jew and Jesus the Christian¹ is false, for neither category applied. Jesus was no Jew, in so far as, being the Messiah, he ended Judaism; nor was he a Christian, in so far as what God said and did may be predicated of what he said and did in a way that may be predicated of no other. For such a predication may only be made of another, if it is made with the qualification introduced by sin.

In short, the kerygma of Jesus differs from the kerygma of the early church in so far as the former is without that qualification. Any other differences are to be explained by the movement of history, which the thought of men must move to meet or the Spirit of God move over² to pacify.

In the third place,³ it was alleged that the New Testament critic is confronted by the phenomenon not of kerygma, but of kerygmata. Analogous problems occur, of course, in the field of church history; and the dogmatist, too, knows that others are declaring other dogmata. The concentration, however in these essays, is primarily on the

1. SAH, 1960, p. 8.

2. I am thinking of Gen. 1f. and the 'pacific' symbolism of the dove, but not supposing that pacification is the only 'work' of the Spirit.

3. Essay IV.

New Testament and the analogous situations are used merely for the purposes of allusion or illustration.

What was happening in the fourth essay was, quite simply, playing off the factual historical insights of Käsemann and the theoretical insights of Collingwood against Dodd's theory of the development of the apostolic preaching. Dodd speaks of one kerygma which is proclaimed in 'fresh and invigorating forms'.¹ This is Dodd's synthetic approach or his unearthing of 'the common faith'² or 'the fundamental Christian message'.³ But Käsemann would reply: 'What common faith?' In Käsemann's own words,⁴ 'a theological problem is already implicit in the fact that the canon presents us with four Gospels instead of one and that even the first three reveal important divergences in order, selection and presentation.'. And, a little later in the same essay,⁵ he declares that the Gospels (to content ourselves with these), '... take divergent roads. The pattern is as follows: Mark, by means of his many miracle stories, depicts the secret epiphany of him who receives his full

1. The Apostolic Preaching, p. 75.

2. ibid., p. 74.

3. ibid., p. 75.

4. Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen, 1, 'Begründet der neutestamentliche Kanon die Einheit der Kirche?'

5. ibid., p. 215.

glory at Easter, Matthew points to the bringer of the Messianic Torah, John to the ever-present Christ, while Luke, historicizing and portraying salvation history as a process of development, composes the first 'Life of Jesus'.¹ And Käsemann concludes¹ that '... the question 'What is the Gospel?' cannot be settled by the historian according to the results of his investigations but only by the believer who is led by the Spirit and listens obediently to the Scripture.'

If one applies Collingwood's 'logic of question and answer',² and his theory of 'historical process',³ to what Käsemann is doing, and what Dodd has not done, then certain questions arise and certain answers may be, must be attempted

First, let it be assumed that 'a fresh and invigorating form',⁴ is not the 'superstructure' on a 'foundation',⁵ but, to retain the metaphor, a new building, which, certainly, stands in an architectural tradition, but is not simply traditional. St. Paul's, in a word, is not simply the Parthenon built by an architect who did not know his job.

1. ibid., p. 223.

2. Collingwood, An Autobiography, chap. V, 'Question and Answer', pp. 29ff.

3. ibid., pp. 97ff.

4. Dodd, The Apostolic Preaching, p. 75.

5. ibid., p. 10.

As far as kerygma is concerned, a 'fresh and invigorating form' is not a development or interpretation of the kerygma, but is itself kerygma.

Second, let it be assumed, that no science may be said to deal with 'eternal' problems, in the sense that all philosophers and all theologians have everywhere and always asked the same question and have given different answers. Let it be, on the contrary, assumed that, if different answers are given to the same question, then one or both are mistaken - and I ask, *en passant*, the question whether, at least in theology and religion, any one man, after careful analysis of his question, asks the same question as any other, and so whether contradiction occurs, though it is perhaps possible to say that one man may rightly evaluate his question as more important or relevant than the question of another.¹

And let it be further assumed that the correct answer to one question gives rise to new questions and that, therefore, a theology that is correct for one set of questions will scarcely be correct for the new questions which those answers raised.

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1. Suppose, for example, that one man is asking a question about mission and another about ecumenism. It would still be possible for the first to assert that his question was the more important and so invite the other, not to ask the same question, but to ask his own question about mission.

So much for the 'logic of question and answer'. When this logic is applied to the problems of kerygma, it is clear that there is no eternal kerygma, but a plurality of kerygmata proclaimed in a plurality of situations. Suppose that one kerygma conflicts, or appears to conflict with another, then we must ask whether they are different answers to the same questions or different answers to different questions. Where they are different answers to the same question, one must risk a judgment, or be led by the Spirit,¹ or be confused by anti-Christ, as to which is right. Where they are different answers to different questions one must risk a judgement or be led by the Spirit or be confused by anti-Christ as to which is the right question to ask, and then as to whether the question one has chosen has been rightly answered. Where one judges, or is led to think, or is deceived to think, that correct answers have been given, one must go out after the new questions that now arise, even if one does not know whither one is going.¹

Next arises the problem of what is called in theological circles 'tradition' and of what is called by Collingwood 'historical process'. I quote him in extenso. He writes² that:

1. Heb. 11:8.

2. An Autobiography, pp. 97f.

'... history is concerned not with 'events' but with 'processes'; that 'processes' are things which do not begin and end but turn into one another; and that if a process P1 turns into a process P2, there is no dividing line at which P1 stops and P2 begins; P1 never stops, it goes on in the changed form P2, and P2 never begins, it has previously been going on in the earlier form P1. There are in history no beginnings and no endings. History books begin and end, but the events they describe do not.

'If P1 has left traces of itself in P2 so that an historian living in P2 can discover by the interpretation of evidence that what is now P2 was once P1, it follows that the 'traces' of P1 in the present are not, so to speak, the corpse of a dead P1 but rather the real P1 itself, living and active though incapsulated within the other form of itself P2. And P2 is not opaque, it is transparent, so that P1 shines through it and their colours combine into one. Therefore, if the symbol P1 stands for a characteristic of a certain historical period and the symbol P2 for the corresponding but different (and therefore contradictory or incompatible) characteristic of its successor, that successor is never characterized by P2 pure and simple, but always by a P2 tinged with a survival of P1.'

Mutatis mutandis for kerygma, it is plain that a man may find himself confronted by a new situation, by new questions, but he does not come to it destitute of what I have called 'ancillary norms'. In Collingwood's terms, if he finds himself moving from P2 to P3, both P1 and P2 are there to guide his steps. So much is transparent. But where the matter is not transparent is that the actual move from P2 to P3 must be taken into the dark, where his only light will be his own judgement or God's.

The historical Jesus, to call him that, is just such

an ancillary norm. But the present norm is the Christ of Faith, to call him that; or (what is the same thing) the Spirit. And who he is may not be known without deciding anew whenever a new question arises. And what a Christian then does is pragma, or not; and what a Christian then says is kerygma, or not.

These pages, though concise, must be concluded; but not without a word on their genesis. For they took their origin in a persistent, but incoherent dissatisfaction with what Dodd and Bultmann had said about kerygma. The problem was to express this dissatisfaction. And this could only be done by asking what I took kerygma to be and asking why Dodd and Bultmann should take it to be something else. And that could only be done by asking not only what kerygma was, but asking a great many other questions as well. What, in short, was involved was, willy-nilly, an essay in theological method.

No doubt, if these speculations are true, or, if not true, then tenable, they have implications for further criticisms of Dodd and Bultmann and almost certainly for other areas of theological concern. But to divide was to conquer; and the immediate problem was to examine what I took to be three central problems: the resurrection, the 'historical Jesus' and the problem of the plurality of

'Sprachereignisse' to which that Jew or Christian gave rise.

Progress here or clarity here might mean progress and illumination at other points as well. But only by making these presuppositions on what I took kerygma to be and by examining what they took kerygma to be was it possible to conclude with a definition and to know what was meant by it.

Kerygma, then, is what a Christian says, if he has not been deceived by "the father of lies;"¹ and not only that, but, if he has been led by the Spirit, what God says, too.

1. Jn. 8:44.

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