How the Citizen-Warrior was created in Classical Athens and Sparta

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Abstract

This study explores how Classical Athens and Sparta created the warrior citizen and continued to motivate citizens to fight throughout their lives. It engages with the issues of the 'hoplite ideal', exploring the extent to which it existed in practice and the implications of hoplite ideology for other types of warrior. This study also considers various methods of training and proliferation of state ideology, both formal modes of training such as the Spartan *agoge* and also informal modes of training such as hunting. Modern sociological and psychological evidence regarding military training and the fostering of aggression are also considered. The important role of religious beliefs and mythology are examined with both the role of gods in battle (for example, in pre-battle sacrifices) and also the depiction of gods and heroes as military figures are considered as potential motivating factors. The potential for inter-state rivalries as played out during Panhellenic festivals and as displayed in Panhellenic sanctuaries is also explored as a motivating factor for individuals and for the state as a whole.

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The Greek translations throughout this thesis are my own.

Author's Declaration

Any oversights or mistakes in this thesis are entirely my own. I have made every effort to provide full references to the work of other scholars, direct quotes or further reading wherever relevant.

This is an original work.

Abbreviations

Collections of Inscriptions

IG = Inscriptiones Graecae

SEG = Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum

Journals

ABull = The Art Bulletin

ABSA = Annual of the British School at Athens

AJA = American Journal of Archaeology

AM J ORTHOPSYCHIAT = American Journal of Orthopsychiatry

ANNU REV SOCIOL = Annual Review of Sociology

ARCH PEDIAT ADOL MED = Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine

BICS = Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies

ClAnt. = Classical Antiquity

CJ = The Classical Journal

CPh = Classical Philology

CQ = Classical Quarterly

CW = The Classical World

DEV PYSCHOL = Developmental Psychology

EDUCATIONAL RES = Educational Researcher

EMC = Echos du Monde Classique

FGrH = Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker

G&R = Greece and Rome

GRBS = Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies

IJHS = International Journal of the History of Sport

J CONFLICT RESOLUT = Journal of Conflict Resolution

J EXP PSYCHOL = Journal of Experimental Psychology

J PERS SOC PSYCHOL = Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

JHS = Journal of Hellenic Studies

PSYCHOL BULL = Psychological Bulletin

PSYCHOLOG RELIG SPIRITUAL = Psychology of Religion and Spirituality

SOC FORCES = Social Forces

SOC PSYCHOL QUART = Social Psychology Quarterly

TAPA = Transactions of the American Philological Association

ZPE = Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik

Introduction

This thesis intends to answer the question of how the ancient warriors of Classical Athens and Sparta were moulded by the societies of which they were members. The question will be tackled by looking at various different aspects of society, not simply by focusing on explicitly military practices. The study will attempt to be take a broad approach to the subject and will examine aspects of daily life such as athletic training, the role of poetry, education and the role of festivals in encouraging acceptance of a martial ideology and in increasing civic pride. Although work has been completed that addresses, to some extent, the issue of training and the creation of a standing army, no one has attempted, to my knowledge, to tackle the social construction of the ancient Greek warrior as an issue in itself in order to create a full picture of how the warrior culture was created and maintained on an individual and corporate level.

This thesis engages with a general movement in Greek history towards an assessment of the hoplite or warrior as an individual and also as a concern of his individual polis. These studies will be discussed further in the literature review section of this introduction. It examines the various types of informal and formal training available to the warrior and the issues associated with ensuring that citizens embrace the civic ideology that requires them to fight when necessary, potentially risking their lives for the sake of the state. Ancient Greek military service clearly differed quite significantly from that of the modern Western world where service is frequently voluntary, servicemen/women are paid for their duty and supplied with the necessary equipment and are essentially professionals, trained to do their duty through rigorous selection, specialization and task-specific training programmes. In contrast, military service in the ancient world was essentially based on conscription or the pressure of society to comply when needed, pay was not always available and equipment was often provided by the individual rather than the state. Most importantly, with the exception of the Spartiates, Classical warriors were generally not professional soldiers. Many of those required to fight did not live and train as soldiers on a daily basis and had their own commitments outside of campaigns, perhaps their own land to farm or supervise the farming of. Considering that modern armies, despite intensive pre-selection testing, psychological profiling and extensive training still can face problems with service people refusing to fight, deserting, disobeying orders and facing psychological trauma both during and after battle, it seems surprising that historians seem to have limited interest in

examining the mechanisms that were in place in ancient society to encourage or compel soldiers to fight. As far as I am aware, a comprehensive survey of the evidence in regard to training the soldier and preparing him for battle (by both direct and indirect means) has not been completed. This thesis addresses this issue.

It would be simplistic to regard preparation for battle purely as state-sponsored training. Of course, this is a key component of how the *polis* prepares its warriors wherever we can 11prove that such training existed. However, it is by no means clear that it existed for all, or even most, states and therefore cannot be relied upon.[1] Furthermore, the issues are more complex than this. Even in modern day armies, soldiers are not always motivated to fight and serve by pay alone but often for other attractions such as the desire for adventure, due to a feeling of nationalistic pride, a desire to do one's duty, or pressure from family, friends or society. For this reason, this thesis will not be confined to an examination of only the most obvious ways to train a potential citizen-soldier such as formal training but will extend into the broader influences of society in general. In such a context, aspects of life such as religion and the role of festivals in encouraging patriotic feeling are integral in understanding how a Classical Athenian or Spartan may have been influenced to readily accept their duty to fight for their *polis*. It is also important to accept that the creation of a soldier is not necessarily a single process, initiated when the soldier is a young boy or teenager, completed as they reach manhood and then forgotten about by the state. It is, instead, both in ancient and in modern armies, an ongoing process. Even when a warrior has experience of battle and has proven himself multiple times in warfare, he still needs to be motivated to continue to go out and fight. He still needs to be prepared in the future, whenever necessary, to pick up his weapons and support the state. Therefore, the state has to have a mechanism in place that encourages not only young boys and men to embrace this ideology of warfare but that is just as relevant to older men and currently serving warriors.

In a work of this size, boundaries need to be drawn. Therefore, this thesis will focus on the Classical period for various reasons. Firstly, the primary evidence for this period is relatively expansive. Secondly, the scale of the evidence allows the study of a period of time that is not so narrow as to be unhelpful for investigating trends or too wide for any useful picture of the system of training as it stands at one particular point to be gained.

[1] In regard to Sparta and Athens, it is clear that Spartan training existed although the existence of the Athenian *ephebeia* at this period is contested. The issues surrounding Spartan and Athenian state training will be discussed further in Chapter 2.2 and 2.3.

Finally, the politics of this period allow a contrast between the fighting of an allied Greek force against a foreign Persian invader at the start of our period and the later fighting of two large Greek power blocks controlling other states during the Peloponnesian Wars. During this period we also see a high degree of change in the fighting forces as Athens moves away from more purely land-based forces towards being the leader of a naval empire, Sparta founds a cavalry and institutes a naval force and both sides discover the usefulness of peltasts.

The thesis is going to be largely focused on Athens and Sparta due to their prominence during this period and because of the availability of a fair amount of evidence for both states. The analyses in this thesis will necessarily have a rather hoplitic bias due to the nature of much of our evidence but the intention of the thesis is not to focus exclusively on the hoplite and the role of other troops will be discussed in Chapter 1. Many of the factors that create militarily active citizens apply to all citizens, regardless of their specific military role, even though formal training tends to focus more on the hoplite. Therefore I have attempted throughout to make limited use of the term 'soldier' as this tends to imply hoplites or light infantry troops and particularly tends to exclude consideration of sailors. Instead I have attempted to make more liberal use of the terms 'warrior' or 'fighter'.

Literature Survey

Greek warfare, as a field of study, has been heavily furnished with many studies on the technicalities of war such as battle tactics and the technical specifications of weaponry. The encyclopedic work of Pritchett's *The Greek State at War* in five volumes has attempted to study warfare more completely. The study has a broad focus, assessing the evidence for Greek warfare from a multitude of angles such as religion and is useful as a reference tool due to its sheer breadth and his careful collation of all the available evidence and discussion of the current research in each topic. It has filled a void in the scholarship and paved the way to facilitate future scholarly research into Greek history. Traditional Greek history, of course, generates interesting and useful research and increases our knowledge of the Classical world. However, it tends to focus on the technical and to either completely ignore the human element of warfare or treat it as an aside that is of limited importance. More recently, however, there has been a movement towards a more abstract approach to the field and an attempt to understand what warfare meant to the individual and to each society.

The work of V.D. Hanson, in particular, has proved enlightening. Hanson was aware of the limitations of traditional Greek history and looked beyond the technical focused studies to examine battle in a wider context. His book *The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece* both examines both the experience of battle for an individual hoplite and places Greek battle in the wider context of the Western military experience and what we, in the Western world, have inherited from the Greeks as our military ethos and expectations. His focus is on the fundamental, decisive battle which was a common element of Greek warfare in contrast to long, protracted, guerilla campaigns. His step away from the more traditional study of Greek history which was steeped in the examination of military strategy, the exact dimensions of armour and other such pursuits has paved the way for a more holistic approach to the material which allows examination of the experience of the citizen himself and the society of which he was a part. His experience as a farmer on a vineyard has allowed him to draw illuminating analogies and conclusions regarding agriculture and how it relates to warfare in the Greek world. Ultimately, his work has paved the way for a thesis such as the one that I am now presenting.[2]

As the editor of *Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience*[3], Hanson has continued the process of exploring a hoplite's view of battle and collected together the work of other scholars exploring this idea. This collection represents a marriage between traditional history and the more novel approach displayed in *The Western Way of War*. Although the focus is always on the hoplite and his experience of battle, some of the papers included follow more traditional research topics such as discussion of arms and armour while other articles tackle the subject of Greek battle from a less traditional perspective such as Lazenby's paper entitled *The Killing Zone* which builds an emotive blow by blow account of a typical hoplite battle. This volume, I believe, testifies to the benefits of approaching Greek warfare from a non-traditional angle as a method of expanding the perspective of traditional Greek history. Papers from traditionalist and non-traditionalist perspectives co-exist side by side, yet together create a coherent, interesting and useful analysis of Classical battle.

Hanson, in *A War Like No Other*[4], follows a general, traditional chronological approach to the study of the Peloponnesian War while focussing his analysis on how war was fought

[2] Hanson (1989)

[3] Hanson (1991)

[4] Hanson (2005)

from a human, rather than state or tactical perspective, and on the human experience of war.

He discusses the role of destruction in warfare, using his own farming experiences to suggests that long-term damage to crops would have been difficult, either by fire or by uprooting, but emphasising that farmers would, of course, suffer short-term economic loss. He states that mud brick housing would also be difficult to completely destroy and so it is unlikely that many whole estates were lost to invading troops. However, he stresses the psychological importance of a successful campaign of destruction on the defending city due to the shame brought upon the defenders if they allow destruction to occur unchecked.

He examines the plague as a contributing factor to the ultimate failure of Athens in the Peloponnesian war and analyses the social, financial and psychological cost of such a disaster. He studies the Peloponnesian Wars as the catalyst for an emergence of new styles of warfare and gives examples of the use and importance of both cavalry and naval forces. He examines the increase in sieges, discussing the psychological implications of a successful siege and his narrative details the terror and confusion of both hoplite and naval battle.

The work of Hans van Wees, particularly *Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities*[5], also expertly engages with traditional Greek history while not losing sight of a wider, social context. Written in six parts, it comprehensively tackles issues relating to Greek warfare from the archaic to the Classical period, examining many issues which are more traditionally associated with Greek history such as the development of the hoplite phalanx, the presence, or lack thereof, of the *othismos*, the use of ambushes and the difficulties of provisioning.

However, he does not ignore the human experience of warfare. As such, there is a great deal of discussion related to the motivations for war where the importance of honour and status is highlighted and the importance of booty for most campaigns and most states is downplayed. However, he does consider a desire to conquer land in order to control natural resources found therein or to gain control over the people was another potential motivation. Some pages are devoted to the discussion of *pleonexia*. He suggests that Greek states strove to gain a leisured existence for many of a state's citizens, if possible, and this

[5] Van Wees (2004)

required the acquisition of great wealth and the subjugation or control of others in order to provide freedom for leisure. He also states the links between masculinity and warfare, stating that the close association of the two may have provided personal motivation for many men to pursue an engagement in war in order to prove themselves.

The concept of the amateur warrior is then examined, stating that public training, outside of Sparta, was rare during the archaic and Classical periods and soldiers would rely more heavily on private training and ensuring their own physical fitness. It seems likely that formation drill was rare, even though soldiers could practice with their weapons on an individual basis and hunting was of limited usefulness as training since it would mainly be small game that would be hunted. Athletics was a preserve of the more leisured classes and was of debatable usefuless and introduction to military life was often achieved through periods of raiding, segregation or guard duty for the young men but the level of overall competence in the military forces must have been generally low.

The role of religion is also considered, in particular discussion of how they relate to the process of entering into battle itself. Van Wees states that religious scruples were taken seriously but could be overlooked by an impatient commander.

This thesis continues in this tradition of examining warfare from a wider angle and assessing the human experience of warfare. However, previous assessements of the warrior experience can focus too acutely on the battlefield experience rather than more broadly examine the soldier as a product of, and a member of, his society. This thesis extends the scope further than the battlefield experience or, indeed, even the military experience in the city itself, viewing the social conditioning process that enables a soldier to fight for his state as an extensive process that is not limited to the battlefield itself or even to training in peacetime (whether official or private). Instead, military conditioning is part of the daily experience of an ancient warrior, built into every aspect of his daily life.

As part of this new, phenomenological approach it would seem reasonable to extend the study of the individual experience of battle by drawing on psychological evidence. Hanson's *A War Like No Other* already engages with psychology in the context of Greek warfare, often discussing the psychological implications of an event and this thesis takes psychological enquiry further by engaging with modern psychological research.

Since I am trying to answer the question of how society created the warrior as comprehensively as possible, this thesis draws on various different fields of research and, therefore, each chapter benefits from specific literature related to specific fields. Chapter one benefits from broader historical research that places the warrior in a wider socio-military context, assessing the military roles that the state required men to undertake and examining the existence of an ideal and whether any ideal was expressed in the military realities.

The Cambridge History of Greece and Roman Warfare: Volume One[6] presents a broad overview of Greek warfare from archaic through to Hellenistic Greece. A select few of the articles are referenced in Chapter One. The paper of van Wees situates warfare in a wider social context and notes a connection between changes in warfare and changes in society. Wheeler discusses some of the issues related to hoplite battle and traces the development of the phalanx as well as the development of warfare until the genesis of *polis* warfare. Krentz follows a potential campaign from start to finish and both Krentz and Wheeler engage with the question of whether war for the Greeks was agonal. Both authors remain unconvinced, although acknowledge adherence to some rules and ritual aspects to warfare. Hunt's paper provides an overview of the development of various military forces from the archaic to the classical period.

Pritchard's[7] edited volume has proved instructive for this chapter with Pritchard's introductory paper noting the transformation of warfare in the fifth century due to the influence of the Persian wars and subsequent rise in power of Athens' fleet. The articles within reflect this theme of the transformation of Athenian warfare. Spence's "Cavalry, democracy and military thinking in classical Athens" discusses the decision of Athens to establish a cavalry at a time when the establishment of a cavalry force was a relatively unusual decision in Greece. Spence acknowledges that this was strategic thinking on the part of Athens and attributes their decision to their ability to think beyond hoplitic warfare. Trundle's "Light troops in classical Athens" continues examining the strategic thinking of Athens in adopting other types of non-hoplite fighter, this time focussing on light infantry rather than cavalry. Hunt argues that Athenians were encouraged to view their military past as successful, mainly through discussion of the past in funeral orations. This led to an overly optimistic view of themselves which, in turn, led to an increased likelihood of

[6] Sabin *et.al*. (2007)

[7] Pritchard (2010)

voting to go to war. Miller's contribution examines the famous Eurymedon vase, suggesting that the Greek displayed on the piece is actually a lower class figure who is ridiculed alongside the vanquished Persian, and that the vase is, therefore, indicative of ideological tensions in Athens.

The collection of papers in *Demokratia*[8] includes some interesting discussions for this topic. Hanson's paper argues for hoplites as middle-class citizens who were more inclined to side with the thetes than the aristocrats. Strauss includes a paper which focuses on the service of the thetes in the naval forces. He believes that the paucity of references to the thetes in the sources is not necessarily reflective of their significance in reality and states that their naval service provided the thetes with an opportunity to develop a collective self-confidence.

The work of Christ has been particularly illuminating for the study of cowardice. Christ's article on draft evasion[9] and his subsequent publication on *The Bad Citizen in Classical Athens*[10] were utilised extensively in this chapter's examination of *atimia*. Ducat's[11] article on the Spartan "tremblers" has supplemented Christ's examination of the situation at Athens with an analysis of the comparable situation in Sparta.

The focus of Chapter two is training, both formal and informal. There is sparse evidence to support the idea of direct, organised military training at Athens. The notable exception to this is, of course, the *ephebeia* which would be instrumental in creating the citizen warrior if it could be found to apply to the Classical period.

The scholarship surrounding the dating of the foundation of the *ephebeia* is contentious with Wilamowitz[12] arguing for a date of 335/4. Subsequent scholars have argued against this, most notably Lofberg[13] and Reinmuth[14]. Lofberg does not specify an alternative date but argues that the evidence supports one of two possibilities. Either the *ephebeia* had an earlier date of foundation or else the term *ephebe* prior to 335 referred only to a boy entering manhood who took an oath on entering the citizen body. Reinmuth proposes that

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[8] Ober and Hendrick (1996)

[9] Christ (2004)

[10] Christ (2006)

[11] Ducat (2006b)

[12] Wilamowitz (1893)

[13] Lofberg (1925)

the *ephebeia* was founded after the end of the Persian wars while Athens was both financially secure and flushed with her successes.

This thesis will argue for a rejection of both extremes in dating the *ephebeia* and, in light of how contentious the evidence is for the institution at this period, argue against accepting it too readily as evidence of a form of direct training for the Classical period. Instead, alternative forms of collective training will be proposed as possibilities for the period.

Athens contrasts with Sparta in regard to its provision of state-provided citizen training. The institutionalised education system of the Spartan *agoge* has been discussed in length by both Kennell[15] and Ducat[16]. Kennell argues for caution in approaching the evidence for the *agoge* on the grounds that it underwent a revival under Cleomenes III and, subsequently, another revival under the Roman empire. His approach to the evidence is insightful and he is entirely correct in trying to analyse the evidence in the context of the period in which it was written instead of creating a hybrid depiction of the *agoge* which is an amalgamation of all the sources. In agreement with Kennell's theory and method, this thesis will place greater emphasis on the evidence of Xenophon than that of later authors for the analysis of the Spartan *agoge*.

Ducat questions Kennell's theory and, although admitting that Kennell's case for greater care in the examination of the evidence has some credence, believes that there is a greater continuity in Spartan education than Kennell permits. Ducat places a stronger emphasis on education as part of wider, Spartan society and examines aspects of the process that Kennell, wrongly, omits to discuss in depth such as the Spartan *Krypteia*. Ducat is also heavily influenced by the work of Jeanmaire[17] and Brelich[18] with their focus on initiation and convincingly places elements of Spartan education into an initiatory framework.

The field of psychology has proved extremely useful for the examination of the creation of willing warriors in the ancient world. However, the analysis of psychology as a route to understanding how an ancient soldier functions is still a relatively unexplored area of research. Its potential fruitfulness has been proved by collaboration between Classical

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[14] Reinmuth (1952)

[15] Kennell (1995)

[16] Ducat (2006a)

[17] Jeanmaire (1913 and 1939)

[18] Brelich (1969)

archaeologist Barry Molloy and Dave Grossman, a retired U.S. serviceman and military psychologist, resulting in an interesting paper published in a collection edited by Molloy called *The Cutting Edge: Studies in Ancient and Medieval Combat*.[19] This paper was heavily influenced by the previous work of Grossman on military psychology based on his own experiences in warfare and those of men whom he had interviewed. Barry Molloy's historical knowledge combined with Grossman's psychological expertise results in an interesting paper. However, the emphasis of the paper is largely on the soldier's psychological experience in battle itself which, although instructive, does not create a full picture of military psychology. The creation of the warrior in the ancient world is necessarily rooted in normal society and not only the battlefield and this article fails to examine the full extent of military psychology.

Grossman's book *On Killing: The Psychological Cost in Learning to Kill in War and Society*[20] is the fullest discussion of military psychology that I have encountered and his research has been used extensively in this thesis. Grossman proposes that the majority of people do not have an innate desire or ability to kill others and, in fact, are normally repulsed by the act. He discusses situations in which killing becomes more difficult and also methods of training used to help prepare soldiers psychologically for the task of killing. He also presents some discussion of the psychological repercussions for soldiers who have not been adequately prepared for warfare. His work is, perhaps, lacking in scientific rigour at times but his first-hand experience of military life adds an interesting dimension to his writing. His book justifies the reason for this thesis and asks the question of why, if soldiers need to be psychologically prepared to fight, did the Greeks manage to fight so successfully without appearing to suffer great psychological distress.

In discussion of psychological distress, the work of Shay[21], a clinical psychaitrist, is instructive. The premise of his text is an unusual one as he brings his skills in psychology to illuminate the ancient work of Homer. However, his work brings some insight into the world of trauma that extends far beyond Homer to the Classical period and up to the modern day. He attributes the actions of Achilles in his rage after the death of Patroclus to combat trauma and he draws parallels with modern day Vietnam veterans. Interestingly, he discusses issues such as the honouring of war dear as a method of reducing psychological distress after battle and his analysis will go some way in helping formulate a solution to the

[19] Molloy (2007)

[20] Grossman (2009)

[21] Shay (1995)

question posed by Grossman's work of how the Greeks could kill without psychological distress.

This interest in psychology is continued and expanded in Jason Crowley's recent monograph.[22] This study furthers the analysis of the hoplite as an individual and also as a member of a fighting group. Crowley draws extensively on psychological evidence, as his title suggests but focusses heavily on group psychology, viewing the hoplite as a member of his primary group on campaign, then of his larger military group and, finally, of his wider socio-political system. Although his analysis of group psychology is valid, his analysis at the socio-political end of the scale is more limited than his anlaysis of the battle group and military group. He oversimplifies the process of conditioning at state level. This thesis, in its analysis of the conditioning and creating of soldiers, will convey how subtle the process can, at times, be with neither soldier nor state always consciously setting out to create or pursue conditioning at all times but, instead, it existing as an almost incidental benefit to other pursuits such as athletics. He also downplays the psychological effects of warfare without analysing why modern soldiers are so effected by the difficulties of warfare and ancient warriors seemingly so little effected. This thesis will aim to rectify that, somewhat, by an analysis of negative psychological implications in the Greek world. Furthermore, Crowley's work is mainly centred around the power of the group in the psychology of the Athenian soldier, neglecting the interesting comparison that could be held with the Spartan psychology.

This thesis will build on these previous studies to push the analysis of psychology and sociology in connection with Spartan and Athenian warriors further than previous research. A soldier is much more than the product of a military system and certainly much more than a member of his fighting group and the wider psychological and sociological influences of society in general are integral to a full understanding of the motivations of a warrior. Although examining the experience of battle itself is both valid and vital as the work of scholars such as Hanson attests, I believe that the influence of a warrior's *polis* is similarly vital in understanding how his motivation to fight was created and maintained. A warrior is a product of his environment, formed over a lifetime of experiences in his home *polis*.

Hunting is another potential fruitful area of research for the question of how society created the citizen warrior and as a potential indirect form of military training. Anderson's

[22] Crowley (2012)

work[23] gives a comprehensive overview of hunting in the Greek and Roman worlds, although he tends to focus on the technicalities of hunting rather than on a social context. For the ancient Greek city state, he discusses the multiples purposes of hunting as an activity which can be a sport, provide food, protect the fields and also serve an educative role, to some extent.

Research on hunting has also been completed by Barringer.[24] Barringer's work, although professing to be about Greece as a whole, has a tendency towards being Athenocentric. The examination of hunting as it is depicted on vase paintings, where, over time, hunters begin to be depicted as hoplites, leads to the drawing of a conclusion that hunting and warfare are linked. She deems the change in vase paintings with an aristocratic class, threatened with the rise of democracy, laying claim to their *arete* through the hunt. She does not, however, agree with Vidal-Naquet[25] that the hunt can be viewed as initiatory in character.

Anderson's broad analysis of hunting and its usefulness in the city-state is slightly misleading in its scope. Hunting was probably not a major source of food provision by the Classical period although, of course, food may have been supplemented by hunting. For those who needed to rely on hunting for food provision to any great extent, small game such as rabbit and hare would have most probably have been targeted over the larger, heroic kills. However, he is correct in asserting the usefulness of it as a sport and, to a limited extent, its educational potential. Barringer, however, is correct in asserting a link in art between hunting and warfare and this echoes the link between hunting and warfare that exists in literature, particularly that of Xenophon.

Another important element of society that is necessary to examine in regard to the question of how the Greek city state created and maintained a military ethos among its citizens is that of pederasty. The field of study surrounding Greek homosexuality and pederasty is vast and the bibliography selected for this thesis necessarily has to be selective. The canonical text is, of course, Dover's *Greek Homosexuality*[26] where he argues for culturally entrenched age-gap relationships with a clear older *erastes* and a younger, passive *eromenos.* He states, quite rightly, that Greek society had no objections to accepting the

[23] Anderson (1985)

[24] Barringer (2001)

[25] Vidal-Naquet (1981)

[26] Dover (1978)

notion of bisexuality and that a homosexual relationship did not, therefore, have to have any subsequent bearing on a future heterosexual relationship. However, homosexuality did allow two social equals to conduct a relationship that could include courtship and sexual consummation.

Dover chooses to place less emphasis on the philosophical evidence as he does not believe this is reflective of ordinary morality. In this, too, I think he is broadly correct but his emphasis on oratory as being a stronger reflection of normative morality is somewhat undermined by his lack of serious consideration for the evidence of Aristophanes. If oratory can be viewed as a reflection of ordinary morality, it should follow that Aristophanes, too, could be reflecting the views of his audience. However, Dover's analysis of the speech *Against Timarchus* is both exhaustive and informative, culminating in Dover's conclusion that prostitution and payment were what could be deemed offensive, not homosexuality itself.

Dover examines *Against Timarchus* in such detail, however, that his work could be considered overly Athenocentric and he labours to find a simplistic, unified solution to the question of Greek homosexuality and, in doing so, fails to appreciate the nuances of the evidence.

This is rectified, somewhat, in Davidson's work.[27] He reacts against Dover and Foucault who placed, in Davidson's view, too great an emphasis on the power play they seen evident in Greek homosexuality. Davidson views these relationships as far more complex with power not simplistically lying in the hands of the *erastes.* Davidson wishes to emphasise the relationship as a whole, including elements of love and affection, and not simply focus on the technicalities of the physical consummation of the relationship.

Davidson does not seek to find one unifying theory for the evidence, placing the primary texts as his central focus and discussing the notable exceptions to the *erastes/eromenes* relationship. His work is exhaustive but meandering, although an attempt to study the concept of Greek love may well be expected to be, and his conclusion differs from Dover's in regard to viewing Greek love and homosexuality as serving a single purpose. Instead, he views it as a complicated subject that can vary from state to state and from person to person.

[27] Davidson (2007)

It is no surprise that matters of love and sexuality have many more intricacies and complexities than might initially present themselves and Davidson is, of course, justified in attempting to capture these complexities and present a fuller picture of Greek homosexuality. He is, I believe, particularly correct in downplaying the power of the *erastes* over the *eromenos* and highlighting the relationship over the sexual consummation. However, it is also clear that the *erastes/eromenos* pattern did exist and was commonly adhered to. Davidson does not deny this but focusses also on exceptions to this rule which, although they certainly exist, do not seem to be standard practice. This thesis will tend towards examining the traditional *erastes/eromenos* partnership as the most standard practice and will examine the usefulness of such a relationship as serving an educative or mentorship function at both Athens and Sparta. Indeed, Davidson's interpretation of homosexual relationships as being less focussed on power and more concentrated on real affection bolsters the strength of the argument that these relationships could prove useful in education of the future citizen.

In examining the role of festivals and athletic events at such festivals in Chapter Three, psychology and sociology are once again of prime importance. A great deal of research into violence and aggression has been completed in the last few decades, largely due to the rise of mass media and the considerations of its effects. There is now a strong consensus that exposure to violence or aggression in mass media leads to increased aggressive behaviour and this is particularly relevant for this thesis since athletics included many aggressive disciplines such as boxing, wrestling and *pankration*. Citizens would view aggressive sports on a fairly regular basis either at festivals or within the city on a daily basis.

The literature on the subject is vast and this thesis has to be selective. On the links between television and aggression, Bushman and Geen[28] noticed a direct correlation between mass media violence and subsequent aggressive cognitions after they had exposed experimental candidates to violent video tapes. A further study by Bushman and Huesmann[29] again found modest but significant increases in aggressive behaviour, aggressive thoughts, anger and physiological signs of arousal after exposure to violent media. They found that these effects tended to be more short-term for adults but had long-term effects for children. These results correlate with a previous longitudinal study completed by Huesmann[30] that

[28] Bushman and Geen (1990)

[29] Bushman and Huesmann (2006)

[30] Huesmann (2003)

concluded that children who were exposed to violent media were more likely to behave aggressively as adults. Philips[31], concerned that many studies on the effects of viewing violence on subsequent aggression were laboratory based, examined statistics to analyse real-world responses to viewing violence. Taking his findings from the years 1973-8, he noticed a correlation between televised heavyweight boxing fights and subsequent short-term homicide rates increases of 12.46%. A quasi-field study by Turner *et. al*. [32]confirmed the real-world effects of exposure to violence and also found that there were long-term effects to exposure to violence for boys.

There has also been research completed on the link between school athletics and aggression in both participants and spectators. Bryan and Harton[33] found a link between school athletics and spectator aggression. They also suggested a correlation between victory and perceived masculinity which they suggested could be linked to the aggression. Arms, Russell and Sandilands[34] also found that aggressive sports were linked to aggressive fan behaviours while Kreager[35] found a correlation between participation in aggressive sports and violent behaviour which he concludes is related to the participants being rewarded for violence on the field and translating this behaviour, subsequently, to normal life.

Finally, Sipes'[36] study into warfare and how it relates to combat sports found a positive correlation between warfare and combat sports. This disproves the "drive discharge theory" which argues that combative or aggressive sports are a way of dispelling energy which could otherwise by used towards violence and warfare. However, Sipes discovered that more peaceful people were less likely to engage in combat sports whereas those who were more inclined towards warfare were more likely to include combat sports as integral parts of their culture.

Therefore, the psychological and sociological evidence presents a strong case for violent and aggressive behaviour being linked with the viewing of violence and aggressive sports and the participation in aggressive sports. Therefore, this thesis will argue that creating

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[31] Philips (1983)

[32] Turner *et. al.* (1986)

[33] Bryan and Harton (1976)

[34] Arms, Russell and Sandilands (1979)

[35] Kreager (2007)

[36] Sipes (1973)

boys and men who were inclined towards aggressive behaviours was institutionalised in Greek society through participation in and in viewing combat sports.

The role of athletics as potential training for warfare is also vital to the questions asked by this thesis. The works of Miller[37] and Harris[38] provide excellent detailed studies of Greek athletics, the technicalities involved and the role of athletics in the Greek festival calendar.

The work of Kyle[39] has a more sociological focus, placing Greek athletics in its social context and examining the socio-economic implications of participation which is particularly important for the question of whether athletics is accessible enough to ever be truly considered training for war in any real sense. Kyle argues, as convincingly as the evidence allows, for a widening of participation in competitive athletics. He suggests that there was a move away from a participation of birth to one of wealth, noting that this extension of participation did not make participation possible for all but, simply, made it less limited than previously.

Pritchard[40] furthers the analysis of the role of athletics in society by examining why, if athletics was an elitist activity, it was tolerated and even celebrated by society as a whole. He, perhaps, pushes his argument of physical activity being a purely elitist activity a little too far, even though he is surely correct in stating that living the life of an athlete who competed in the festival circuit would be beyond the financial reach of most. However, suggesting that fathers would be unlikely to consider sending their child to a *paidotribes*, lest they were viewed as wealthy and were then subject to liturgies, is taking some liberties with the evidence.

Pritchard tries to rely on sources which he believes most closely reflect the views of the common man on athletics so favours the theatre and oratory over philosophy. He argues that, in general, the sources present a positive picture of athletics and argues that, despite the rise of democracy, elite athletic participation was still celebrated by the Athenians due to the parallels that can be drawn between athletics and warfare. For example, both required great commitment, endurance (particularly in the combat disciplines), both had

[37] Miller (2004)

[38] Harris (1964)

[39] Kyle (1987)

[40] Pritchard (2012)

elements of risk involved and victory in both could be seen as indicative of the favour of the gods.

His theory is broadly convincing although it is perhaps misleading to present one single reason to explain the popularity of any socially entrenched activity.[41] However, he presents a strong case for warfare and athletics being linked in the popular mindset and, therefore, presents important evidence for the creation of, and encouragement of the existing, citizen warrior.

Evidence

The problems of the literary evidence encountered in this thesis are many of the same problems frequently encountered in a study of any area of the ancient Greek world. First, there is the problem of the differing degree of evidence that exists for Athens and Sparta. A far greater amount and variety of sources are available for a study of Athens during this period than exists for Sparta. The literary sources that do exist for Sparta tend to have been written outside ofthe fifth century. Thus, this thesis will rely greatly upon Xenophon and Plutarch, neither of whom were Spartan although Xenophon did have a close affinity to the Spartan culture.

Although Xenophon did have a great deal of first-hand experience of Sparta, it is necessary to be cautious due in using him as a source for the earlier Classical period due to the possible change in Sparta between this period and the time Xenophon was writing. There is also a pro-Spartan bias present throughout the majority of Xenophon's work. Dillery suggests that even though, at the end of Xenophon's life, he may have become disillusioned somewhat with the Sparta system.[42] However, he seems to have kept a "loyal opposition" to Sparta.[43] Therefore, as a source, he may present Sparta in a more positive light than is necessarily reflected in reality. It is fortunate that Xenophon left behind so rich a corpus of work that allows the historian to gain greater insight into his thoughts and potential biases. Dillery proposes that Xenophon's work, as a body, displays not only a pro-Spartan bias but also a devotion to panhellenism, an obsession with the military-

[41] Consider the complexities of sport in modern society. If we consider the single example of the game of football, it can serve multiple purposes as wide and varied as serving as simple entertainment to being a focus for national pride. It can even be used as a tool to incite racial or religious hatred.

[42] See the final chapter of the *Spartan Constitution* and *Hellenica* 5.4.1 following. For analysis of the view of Sparta present in the *Hellenica*, see Tuplin, C. (1993)

[43] Dillery (1995: 16)

focussed community and an ardent belief that good leadership is the key to success in both military and civic life.[44] The obsession with military orientated communities, in particular, is problematic for this thesis as Xenophon may be more inclined than most to attribute military benefits to activities that may not be widely regarded as associated with warfare, such as hunting.

As for Plutarch, we have no way of knowing all of the sources he had at his disposal and of their quality, although he does prove that he is not uncritical in his acceptance of sources.[45] He had access to a far greater range of sources than the modern historian does and states around one hundred and thirty five separate sources over the course of his series of *Lives* although he probably did not read all of these authors and is only intimately familiar with a few of them.[46] As a source on Sparta, in particular, he can be problematic as Sparta had changed significantly by his period when it was viewed as an interesting anomaly and tourist attraction. The differences between Plutarch and Xenophon's depictions of the Spartan rite at the altar of Artermis Orthia are startling and illustrate the great degree of change between the two periods. Also, Plutarch's *Lives* are not history but biography and Plutarch has a moralistic purpose in presenting them, wishing to use them to improve the lives and character of himself and others.[47] He is not always concerned with history in his depiction of a character and sometimes prioritises the usefulness of an anecdote in capturing someone's personality over historical accuracy.[48] Pelling points out that Plutarch himself states that the historian should try to present a character in the best possible moral light, leaving out material that is irrelevant if it should detract from the depiction of a person's good character.[49] Pelling does, however, also state that Plutarch does not always follow his own advice, perhaps because Plutarch did not consider himself subject to rules

[44] See Dillery (1995: 15). For Xenophon and panhellenism see also Harman (2013: 427-454). For Xenophon and the military, see also Anderson (1974). For Xenophon and leadership, see also Tamiolaki (2013: 563-590).

[45] Pelling (2002: 145-6) details examples of Plutarch's critical skills in accepting or rejecting sources.

[46] Schettino (2014: 418)

[47] Pelling (2002: 102)

[48] Pelling (2002: 143) discusses an example where Plutarch chooses to include the story about the meeting of Solon and Croesus (*Solon* 27.1) despite knowing that the chronology of it was debated by historians and that, therefore, the story may or may not be true. Pelling does, however, point out that Plutarch did not disregard choronolgy altogether but remains unconvinced with it for this particular example. Plutarch does not, however, discuss the chronological uncertainties. Pelling (2002: 148) details other examples where Plutarch's historical method is questionable.

[49] Pelling (2002: 150); Plutarch *On Herodotus' Malice* 855a-6d.

that he intended for historians.[50] However, he seems to resist the urge to fabricate material when he lacking sources and will instead leave gaps in his biography, if necessary.[51]

Other non-Spartan sources such as Herodotus, Thucydides and Aristotle can give us information about Sparta but it is inevitable that we are never as well informed about Sparta as we are about Athens.

The historians are also, of course, useful on Athens but Thucydides and Herodotus are not, in themselves, unproblematic. Both are relatively silent on their sources and would have been heavily reliant on oral sources. Herodotus includes mythological and poetic material.[52] Thucydides is authoratitve in tone but to the extent of forcing his opinions on to his reader.[53] He did, however, live through the war which he is recounting and was of a mature enough age to be able to assess it with a critical eye.[54] Herodotus occasionally provides the reader with the information as he has received it, allowing the reader some freedom of interpretation but does not use the critical selection criteria that we today would expect from a historian. Some scholars suggest that Herodotus is Athenocentric in outlook and this prejudices his reporting on the Ionians and makes him biased in accepting Athenian traditions;[55]others argue that his work is meant as a warning to the Athenians not to repeat the imperialistic mistakes of the Persians.[56] Marincola notes that the ancients tended to discredit him on the grounds of partiality and sensationalism but that modern archaeology has often proven much of what he state to be true. Therefore, Marincola argues that we cannot honour Herodotus as "the reliable historian" or discredit him as "the tall-tale-telling liar".[57]

Thucydides features some notable omissions and is rigidly devoted to staying relevant to his subject of the war and therefore avoids any digressions.[58] This obsessive focus on the subject of the war itself means that Thucydides can omit information that would be of

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[50] Pelling (2002: 151-152)

[51] Pelling (2002: 153) states that notable lives that display this tendency are *Themistocles, Phocion, Aristides, Philopoemen, Poplicola, Artaxerxes* and *Crassus*.

[52] Asheri (2007: 18). For more general treatment see Gould (1989) and Lateiner (1989)

[53] Badian (1993: 127); See also Luce (1997: 70) on his reluctance to elaborate on anything other than his conclusion.

[54] Luce (1997: 61-2)

[55] E.g. Bury (1909: 64-70)

[56] Moles (1996: 259-284)

[57] Marincola (2001: 39)

[58] Bury (1909: 87)

interest. For instance, Luce points out that if the modern audience only had Thucydides to rely upon, we would be completely unaware of the artistic and intellectual success of Athens.[59] Yet, Thucydides also fails to furnish us with information which, to the modern mind, would be vital for a full history of a war such as logistical information on the transportation of food and war materials.[60] However, Thucydides attempts to evaluate his material as critically as possible, comparing written sources to material evidence and assessing the probability of evidence.[61]

There is, also, of course, the habit of the ancient historian to present speeches. For the fifth century BC, these are not written-down records of an actual speeches and do perhaps even include some of the historian's voice as well as the speaker's and, in some cases, must be wholly fabricated. Thucydides himself admits that in writing his speeches he had to keep to the general sense of what was said or what he believed would have been fitting for a particular occasion.[62] However, in the case of more public orations such as Pericles' Funeral Oration, complete or part-fabrication would be less likely as the speech would have been more widely heard and discussed. The historian would have more sources to draw upon to accurately sketch the outlines of the speech and would be far more likely to be questioned if the speech he recorded was a work of pure fantasy. Hornblower has suggested various methods for deciding whether a Thucydidean speech is one that is 'authentic', meaning that Thucydides either heard it or heard of it through sources and was able to record an approximation of it.[63] The use of evidence from speeches is limited in this thesis and although it is important to note the problems associated with their use, it is also worth remembering their usefulness in capturing ideological thought, whether the actual words are authentic or the partial or complete fabrication of a historian. Even the speeches for which the historian is unlikely to have had any reliable evidence, such as private conversations, and which are perhaps wholly fabricated surely give us some idea of ideology and what general belief was at that time. We may never know exactly what Demaratus said to Xerxes in reality but what Herodotus records him as saying tells us something of the ancient mindset in what they are willing to believe he might have said.

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[59] Luce (1997: 69)

[60] Luce (1997: 69)

[61] Luce (1997: 75)

[62] Thucydides 1.22.

[63] Hornblower (1987: 45-72). His suggested methods include considering a speech more likely to be 'authentic' if the speakers are explicitly named or if the speech includes weak arguments that Thucydides would not have included himself.

There are some problems regarding evidence that are unique to Athens. How useful, for example, is comedy, or even tragedy, as a source for history? At least, however, some strong and relatively certain inferences can be made from using drama as a source. Pelling proposes that tragedy is useful as a source with some necessary *caveats*. He states that competitive poets would want to present works that are, at the very least, not entirely offensive to their audience but that there need to be an awareness of the difficulties in interpreting evidence that is transmitted to us in an entirely different form than that in which it was initially intended to be delivered. The modern reader will be presented with a written text devoid of any of the additional expression that would have initially been present in terms of dance, music, gesture or method of vocal delivery and, therefore, will also lose any additional information that was present in this delivery. He also states that the modern historian should be cautious of the ancient belief that the poet was also a teacher and, due to this, the text might be assuming different the listeners to have a particular attitude while aiming to encourage a different attitude. However, Pelling believes that any attempt at moralising on the part of the poet would be most successful if he did not challenge his audience too directly. Pelling believes that tragedy is permissable for us by the historian so long as the historian considers the ideologically exploratory nature of the art and its ability to display both what it means to be a citizen and also what a citizen may be uneasy about.[64]

There must be a degree of plausibility in much of the comedy of Aristophanes. If the audience could not relate to the joke and it was completely divorced from reality, in many cases it would lose its humour. Since comedies are performed in the context of festivals where as prize is being fought for, it is unlikely that a comedian would write a line so shockingly controversial that he was likely to alienate his audience and lose the prize, so in this respect, comedy can give an insight into the popular views and interests of the *demos*. However, it can be difficult to divorce fantasy from reality when interpreting ancient comedy as a modern reader and drawing lines of demarcation to differentiate where one ends and the other begins is not always unproblematic.[65]Pelling suggests that we can utilise other evidence to confirm if elements of comedy are realistic and also occasionally use metre to identify lines that are out of metre and may, therefore, be based in reality and be recording a set phrase, for example.[66]However, Pelling also states that humour rarely easily

[64] Pelling (1997: 213-235)

[65] Pelling (2000: 126)

[66] Pelling (2000: 131)

crosses cultural boundaries and our interpretations of comedy using modern prejudgements are not necessarily relevant to the ancient world. He uses the example of Birds to illustrate his point. Aristophanes draws light humour from the destruction of Melos but this is not the kind of subject matter that would, necessarily, be received with humour in modern day Britain.[67]

That is not to say the evidence from theatre must be rejected since it is problematic and for the purposes of this thesis theatre provides useful material on the possible opinions and ideologies of the average citizen. However, caution must be exercised and any particularly problematic passages that are referenced will be discussed alongside any necessary *caveat* in the body of the thesis.

The main and recurring problems of evidence have been briefly discussed here. More specific problems with regard to evidence will be handled in each individual case in the body of the thesis.

Methodology

I believe that the human mind remains essentially unchanged in the space of time that has passed between the ancient Greeks and modern man. Two thousand, five hundred years is a relatively short space of time in evolutionary terms and the neurology of the human species will not have changed greatly. If modern soldiers fear death, or fear killing, then so too must the ancients have feared it. If training allays that fear for a modern soldier then training, if it existed in any form, must too have aided the ancients. Indeed, it has been previously remarked that the historian will, inevitably, apply their own psychological and sociological assumptions when considering history. Therefore, assessing modern psychological and sociological evidence as a move towards grounding our assumptions on firmer evidence can be useful for the interpretation of history despite the fact that the process is far from devoid of problems.[68]

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[67] Pelling (2000: 134)

[68] Runyan (1988:3) states: "…psychology could usefully be employed in analysing the psychological component of historical events and processes rather than relying solely on implicit and common-sense psychological assumptions." Similarly, Weinstein (1988:183) states: "The problem is that writers-historians, psychoanalysts, social scientists, novelists-cannot make complex statements about the subjective intentions of people in the past without some such organizing preconception of how the mind works."

The main problem with such analogies, I believe, does not arise from the temporal distance between Classical Greece and the modern day, but from cultural differences. Psychological studies have been mainly conducted in Europe and the USA until fairly recently and it had been assumed that the results were valid worldwide. However, psychology is now more frequently pursued outside of the West and it has become instantly apparent that results do not always apply across cultures. For example, one study conducted both in America and in Japan showed shockingly different results. The test was simple. Participants were shown a diagram featuring five pencils, four of which were the same colour and the fifth pencil was a different colour. When asked to pick a pencil, participants from America, who had often been raised in cultures which valued individualism and independent though, tended to opt for the single, differently coloured pencil. Japanese participants who, in contrast, had been raised in cultures that valued collectivity and preservation of the group, tended to pick one of the four pencils that matched in colour.[69] Therefore, caution must be used when assessing the psychological evidence.

The experiments discussed above both involve American and Japanese participants and the discussions in the psychological literature attribute the differences in results to the fact that Far Eastern cultures such as those of Japan and China tend to value the group as a whole over the individual. The success of the group at the expense of individual determinism is intrinsic to these cultures and is taught and encouraged from a young age. Therefore, for a Japanese experimental candidate, being one of the group, blending in and not being prominently individual is valued. In contrast, American culture places importance on being strongly individual, standing out from the crowd, being noticed and possessing your own individual thoughts, even if this is at the expense of the group.[70]

Although these variations in results announce that it should not be assumed that psychological research will necessarily always cross cultural boundaries, it is worth noting that the modern West is not dissimilar to ancient Athens and Sparta. The example of collectivism as versus individualism above illustrates this. Even though Classical Athens became an increasingly collective culture and even though Spartan culture highly valued the idea of Spartiates being similar to one another in terms of their education and mess

[69] Kim and Markus (1999). A study by Nisbett (2003) highlighted further differences between Eastern and Western thinking by showing people an underwater scene. Japanese participants were far more likely to recall background features and notice relationships between fish or objects in the picture. American participants, however, were more likely to focus on one focal object such as a single, large fish. See also Myers (2010: 65) on the dichotomy between Western individualistic culture and Eastern collectivist culture.

[70] Myers (2010:65)

rations, both cultures also valued individualism. Examples of citizens in both cultures can be thought of who strove for power, success or to achieve military valour. Even in Sparta, the best boys would be selected to rule over the others and select troops were selected to join the *hippeis*. Those who could afford to strove for athletic success and were often celebrated or commemmorated by their states for their victories.

In other ways strong similarities exist. For example, modern Western societies and ancient Greek societies value many of the same things such as athletics and poetry. Hanson in *The Western Way of War* even argues that our concept of warfare in the West is still heavily influenced by the warfare of the Greeks in that we value decisive face to face battles and do not respect guerilla or terrorist warfare. In the modern West, humour can still be found in ancient Greek comedy and our ideals echo many of the ideals upheld by the Greeks.

However, our culture is not a clone of Greek culture and there are clear, distinct differences. The modern Westerner can quite easily be shocked or sometimes even appalled by the Greek practice of pederasty, for example, and practices such as the exposure of infants is morally reprehensible to the modern, Western mind. Athenian culture mirrors our modern culture more closely than Spartan culture and so we should proceed with even greater caution when considering Sparta. Therefore, it is worth bearing in mind the *caveat* that psychology does not always cross cultural divides and when considering psychology or sociological evidence, it is worth considering if the similarities between our society and the ancient world are close enough, on the subject being considered, to warrant our use of the modern evidence.

In general, the surest footing in drawing evidence from modern sociology and psychology for the ancient world is found in reference to the most innate and animalistic of human traits. Such impulses such as aggression are deeply embedded into the human *psyche* as integral impulses for our survival as a species. As such, these emotions and responses are less rational and more dictated by our unconscious selves and accompanying physiological responses. Therefore, I believe that modern research on aggression as a learned or mirrored response is extremely relevant to the study of the ancient world.

As subject matter becomes increasingly abstract, it becomes more difficult to be confident that the modern research is fully relevant and more care needs to be taken in interpreting it. For example, the research done on modern soldiers being unprepared to kill could be a result of modern soldiers coming from a more sanitised society where violence and

aggression in warfare are less rarely seen or experienced first hand and this may not apply quite so clearly to the ancient world. However, Grossman has attempted to find historical evidence for this phenomenon and has found that soldiers in the American civil war faced similar difficulties in killing. It could, of course, be argued that their society was less familiar with warfare than the ancient societies, even though it may have been less sanitised than our society. However, any civilised society has to have some level of restraint for society to survive, otherwise murder would be a frequent crime and extreme violence would be tolerated. Any society where this is not the case has to, by definition, create an understanding that such behaviour is wrong, unacceptable or immoral and it is this very belief that soldiers have to overcome when killing in a "legitimate" setting such as warfare. Therefore, although caution must certainly be used when examining the modern evidence for ancient society and the warrior within, it should not be rejected entirely as a fruitful method of understanding the ancient warrior.

At the highest levels of abstraction, the psychological and sociological evidence becomes almost entirely unhelpful. For example, drawing parallels with any modern studies completed on religion would be fraught with difficulties to the extent that the evidence would be almost worthless. There are really no modern religions that closely parallel that of ancient Greece and the majority of psychological and sociological studies in religion that have been completed tend to be focussed on subjects from a Christian, Islamic or Jewish background. It is clear that such monotheistic religions are so clearly divorced from the ancient pantheon that the evidence derived from studying their adherents is of very little assistance.

Psychological or sociological theories regarding propaganda and political psychology must be employed with great care. Firstly, most research on propaganda is very much a product of a specific environment such as Second World War Britain or post 9/11 USA and the research can be very heavily coloured by this. Furthermore, propaganda in the modern world is necessarily very different to that in the ancient world. There are cultural differences, of course, but also differences of technology. The advent of printing and mass media communications necessarily create a starkly different method of delivering propaganda to that of the ancient world. Finally, many of the nations that practice political psychological techniques in a very clear and obvious way, such as China parading military resources through the streets, must be treated with care due to the fact that there may be cultural differences and psychological studies performed in Europe and American may

generate results that do not apply to other cultures, as previously demonstrated with the example of the pencil experiment conducted in both America and Japan.

Nevertheless, the modern psychological theories provide us with a different approach to the ancient evidence, opening up possibilities for assessing the evidence in new ways and potentially gaining a deeper understanding of Athenian and Spartan cultures. This thesis, then, will utilise traditional, historical evidence in order to assess the extent to which training or ideological preparation for war existed in Classical Athens and Sparta, but will draw on modern research in fields such as psychology and sociology while keeping in mind the risks of doing so. These analogies not only allow us to answer certain questions that cannot be answered from the traditional historical sources alone but also raise new and perhaps more useful questions.

This methodology can at times create its own problems. Many studies that have been done or are being done into the psychology of modern soldiers are funded and supported by defense departments around the world and are therefore restricted material, not published in the public domain. However, enough material is available, I believe, to allow interesting comparisons and contrasts.

Thesis Structure

It is necessary to prepare the way before a detailed discussion of the question can begin and, therefore, chapter one will discuss the military landscape as it existed in the fifth century BC. If the concept of creating a warrior is to be discussed, it must first be ascertained exactly what qualities that warrior needs to obtain and whether these differ depending on his role. Chapter one will examine the concept of the hoplite ideal to examine whether it truly existed and what it entailed. The role of other warriors such as rowers in the fleet and lighter-armed peltasts will be studied and where they fit into this programme of warrior creation will be discussed. The contrast between the military reality and ideology of both Athens and Sparta will be examined and important concepts such as cowardice and masculinity will be covered.

Chapter two will discuss training in its more explicit forms, whether formal and state-sponsored such as the Spartan *agoge* or informal such as hunting. This chapter will draw particularly upon psychology to ascertain whether there is truly a need for training or whether men are born with the ability to fight. Analogies will be drawn between the

modern soldier and the ancient warrior in the issues with which they struggle and the way these are or are not countered by training. Thus, this chapter will ascertain how citizens who intended to go to war gained the necessary practical skills but also the necessary psychological protections that could be utilised in warfare.

The final chapter will continue, partly, to focus on religion but will look at the wider communal picture in the context of festivals. It will examine how festivals can be used as a tool for furthering a military ideology, either on the state level or at the Panhellenic level. Athletics will be assessed as a tool of soldier creation as will athletic competition. This discussion of athletics will complement the discussion of formal and informal training techniques in Chapter 2. The topic will be covered in this final chapter in more depth due to the inextricably close links between athletics and religious festivals. There will also be an analysis of the power of propaganda in festivals for furthering a military ideology, convincing citizens of the power of their state and acting as a form of military posturing towards other states. This chapter, in contrast to the previous chapters, will place a greater emphasis on how society motivated both the individual citizen and the citizen body as a whole to fight.

The conclusion will regard the evidence from each of the previous four chapters in order to answer the question of how the societies of Classical Athens and Sparta created citizen-warriors who were both willing and motivated to fight whenever it was required of them. The ideal will be discussed to ascertain what society expected of their citizens and whether the model to be followed was a hoplite model, wholly or in part. The provision for state training, both formal and informal, will be discussed as will the conclusions drawn from chapter two as to whether or not formal training is necessary to create a soldier. The conclusions drawn from chapter three and four in connection with wider society as reflected in religion and in festivals will be analysed in order to ascertain the extent to which these influences strengthened the motivation of a soldier and whether models of behaviour were offered up to him through these experiences.

Chapter 1

The Hoplite Ideal and Military Realities

The military ideal that was in existence across Greece throughout the period of the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars was reflected in Greek art work, literature and even through representations of the gods. The heroic image of the warrior figure created for us by many artists, poets, philosophers and statesmen portrays a citizen who of his own free will goes courageously into battle, displaying his *andreia* and desiring to claim *arete* in battle, or, indeed, to die a beautiful death. As this thesis intends to assess how ancient warriors were formed and maintained by the state, it is necessary first to analyze this military ideal, to question what constituted an ideal and to ascertain the extent to which it was adhered to and achieved. Did society aim to achieve the ideal for all its citizens and does the evidence demonstrate that these attempts were successful, either in full or in part?

During the fifth century, fighting styles moved away from a heavy reliance on hoplites and therefore it is necessary not only to consider the heavily armed hoplite but also other troops such as the light-armed fighters and those who manned the fleets. These figures are particularly prominent during the Peloponnesian War and the fleet, in particular, is of notable importance at Athens but, of course, there was development of a fleet at this period in Sparta, also. This chapter will explore the tensions between the various types of warriors in both Athens and Sparta and will analyse the ideology of the warrior in both cultures. What exactly did it mean to be a warrior in Athens or Sparta and did class influence the manner in which you fought and the respect you deserved for that service? What exactly constitutes a warrior needs to be firmly ascertained in order to provide a firm basis for subsequent discussion of how such a figure is created and maintained by the state.

1.1 The Warrior Ideal: Warriors in Art, Literature and History

It is necessary to include a brief survey of how warriors of various different types are represented in sculpture and in the written sources in order to construct a theory about whether an ideal warrior existed in the Greek mind and, if so, what constituted such an ideal warrior.

In art, both sculpture and vase painting, hoplites appear to be the most dominant figures.[71] Hanson points out that hoplites are far more commonly depicted in sculpture and art than any other type of fighter and states that Greek gods are never depicted as peltasts or rowers and are rarely even depicted as mounted.[72] Although it is certainly noteworthy that there are more frequent depictions of hoplites than other types of fighters, it is worth noting some important exceptions to Hanson's argument. In regards to the depictions of deities, Hanson is correct in asserting that gods are not depicted as peltasts or rowers but, with the possible exceptions of Ares and Athena, they are rarely depicted as heavily armed hoplite figures, either. Indeed, on the north frieze of the Siphnian treasury where the battle between the gods and the Giants is depicted, it is the Giants, not the gods that are depicted in hoplite armour.[73] Furthermore, there are common examples of gods and heroes depicted as archers such as Artemis, Apollo and, often, Hercules.[74] Also, the Dioscouroi, although not necessarily depicted as sailors themselves, are often associated with naval matters and the protection of sailors.[75]

The Parthenon frieze, of course, is also notable for its focus not on the hoplite but, instead, on the cavalry; although this frieze is certainly not unproblematic and is frequently discussed (further discussion of this frieze will follow in Chapter 3.3.1 Panathenaia). Nevertheless, it is important to note that there is a divergence from the displaying of hoplites in this important example of sculpture.

In literature again, we largely find the dominance of the hoplite. If first we look to historical works for evidence of the hoplite ideal, we find Herodotus detailing a conversation between Solon and Croesus where Solon gives the prize for the happiest of

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[71] Miller (2010: 328-332) mentions that the hoplite is dominant in art with naval depictions being rare.

[72] Hanson (2000: 221).

[73] Giants are commonly depicted in hoplite armour on Greek pottery, also. For example, Poseidon battles Polybotes who is clad in a helmet and bearing shield and spear (Williams College Museum of Art 64.9; Beazley Archive No. 275166). They battle again with Polybotes in armour but armed with a sword (Kunst-historisches Museum, Vienna 688; Beazley Archive No. 202916. Poseidon and Polybotes again appear with the giant depicted with shield, sword and helmet (Museo Gregoriano Etrusco, Vatican 84; Beazley Archive No. 202472. A vase from Berlin depicts Hera, Ares, Apollo and Poseidon on the interior, all of whom are individually battling with giants armed as hoplites (Antikenmuseen, Berlin F2531, Beazley Archive No. 220533).

[74] For example, Louvre Paris G341, Beazley No. 206954 and Boston Museum of Fine Arts 10.185, Beazley No. 206804 for Apollo and Artemis and British Museum London B163, Beazley No. 301062 for Heracles as an archer. It is worth noting the discussion of Cohen (1994), however, on the varying depictions of Heracles as an archer before the Persian wars and as a clubman afterwards.

[75] Homeric Hymn 33

men to a certain Athenian named Tellus.[76] His great happiness is attributed to multiple factors including wealth enough to live on and having had fine sons, but it is his valour and death in, by the description, a clearly hoplitic battle, that is most praised. Later, in his account of Marathon, Herodotus specifically stresses that the Athenians soldiers had no support from cavalry or archers, painting a picture of the event as the ideal hoplite battle.[77] Thucydides, in the Funeral Oration delivered by Pericles, potentially furthers the hoplite ideal by failing to offer specific praise to the naval forces.[78] In an example of masterful civic rhetoric, glory and honour is offered to the fallen. Although the navy is mentioned, the speech implies a hoplite basis, for example, when it is stated that:

> τεκμήριον δέ· οὔτε γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καθ᾽ ἑαυτούς, μεθ᾽ ἁπάντων δὲ ἐς τὴν γῆν ἡμῶν στρατεύουσι, τήν τε τῶν πέλας αὐτοὶ ἐπελθόντες οὐ χαλεπῶς ἐν τῇ ἀλλοτρίᾳ τοὺς περὶ τῶν οἰκείων ἀμυνομένους μαχόμενοι τὰ πλείω κρατοῦμεν. ἀθρόᾳ τε τῇ δυνάμει ἡμῶν οὐδείς πω πολέμιος ἐνέτυχε διὰ τὴν τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τε ἅμα ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ γῇ ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπίπεμψιν·
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> "And a sure sign is this: for the Lacedaemonians do not invade our land themselves but bring with them every ally, while we ourselves when we attack our neighbours mostly do not find it difficult in another's land to defeat people fighting for their homes. Our full power has not yet fallen upon an enemy because we bestow care on our fleet and by land we send out our citizens on many missions..."[79]

The explicit mention of fighting on land (τὴν γῆν) immediately makes us aware that the discussion in this passage is about land based forces, not the navy. Most notable is the fact that the navy is only mentioned as little more than an aside when Thucydides' Pericles states that no state has yet encountered the full strength of Athens as their military might is divided between land and sea forces.[80] Considering this speech was delivered at the end of the first year of the war between Athens and Sparta, the lack of explicit praise of the navy seems strange. During the first year of the war, Pericles had urged the acceptance of an "island policy". The Athenians were to rely on their fleet to protect them and their property.[81] There was a small cavalry skirmish that resulted in some Athenian dead and at

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[76] Herodotus 1.30.3-5.

[77] Herodotus 6.112.2.

[78] Thucydides 2.35-46.

[79] Thucydides 2.39.2-4.

[80] Thucydides 2.39.3

[81] See Thucydides 2.13 on the institution of the island policy. At 2.14, the Athenians send their livestock off to islands off their coast. A fleet of 100 ships is sent around the Peloponnese at 2.17 and this force succeeds in capturing Sollium and winning over Astacus and Cephallenia (2.30). A further force of 100 ships is established as a protective force against potential enemy attack by sea (2.24) and 30 ships are sent to Locris (2.26).

the close of the year there was an invasion of the Megarid which involved the whole army but, in general, the defence of Athens and the military gains of the year were largely due to the fleet.[82] Admittedly, the fleet of one hundred Athenian ships that had been active in the Peloponnese that year also had one thousand hoplites on board who fought on land when necessary.[83] However, the relative silence on the fleet may be suggestive of a desire to protect a hoplite ideal.

Pseudo-Xenophon's *Constitution of the Athenians* implies that the Athenian constitution inverts the natural order of things by putting the power in the hands of the people instead of the nobler classes. He categorizes the poor and the common as 'bad' people while contrasting them with the 'useful' category of men in which he specifically includes hoplites. He states:

> περὶ δὲ τῆς Ἀθηναίων πολιτείας, ὅτι μὲν εἵλοντο τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας οὐκ ἐπαινῶ διὰ τόδε, ὅτι ταῦθ᾽ ἑλόμενοι εἵλοντο τοὺς πονηροὺς ἄμεινον πράττειν ἢ τοὺς χρηστούς· διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦτο οὐκ ἐπαινῶ.
>
> "And concerning the constitution of the Athenians, I do not praise their choice of constitution, for the reason that in making their choice those oppressed by toils gain more than those who are useful: and so for this reason I do not praise it."[84]

Then he goes on to say:

> πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοῦτο ἐρῶ, ὅτι δικαίως <δοκοῦσιν> αὐτόθι [καὶ] οἱ πένητες καὶ ὁ δῆμος πλέον ἔχειν τῶν γενναίων καὶ τῶν πλουσίων διὰ τόδε, ὅτι ὁ δῆμός ἐστιν ὁ ἐλαύνων τὰς ναῦς καὶ ὁ τὴν δύναμιν περιτιθεὶς τῇ πόλει, καὶ οἱ κυβερνῆται καὶ οἱ κελευσταὶ καὶ οἱ πεντηκόνταρχοι καὶ οἱ πρῳρᾶται καὶ οἱ ναυπηγοί, - οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ τὴν δύναμιν περιτιθέντες τῇ πόλει πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ ὁπλῖται καὶ οἱ γενναῖοι καὶ οἱ χρηστοί. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι πᾶσι τῶν ἀρχῶν μετεῖναι ἔν τε τῷ κλήρῳ καὶ ἐν τῇ χειροτονίᾳ, καὶ λέγειν ἐξεῖναι τῷ βουλομένῳ τῶν πολιτῶν.
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> "And so I will say this first, that the people and the poor justly think that they should have more than the well-born and the wealthy for this reason: that the people are the ones rowing the ships and thus the ones giving power to the city, and the helmsmen and commanders of the rowers, the ship-commanders and the look-outs and the shipbuilders-they are the men who give power to the city

[82] See Thucydides 2.22 on the cavalry battle and 2.31 on the invasion of the Megarid. It is worth noting that the fleet of 100 ships that had been sailing around the Peloponnese also joined in the invasion of the Megarid but their involvement had not been planned and it was by chance that they arrived back in time to participate.

[83] Thucydides 2.23 on hoplite numbers and 2.25 on their land incursion into Methone.

[84] Pseudo-Xenophon 1.1.

> much more so than the hoplites and the well-born and the good. And so, this being so, it seems right to expect all to have a share in public offices, both those elected and chosen by lot, and for anyone to say what he wishes."[85]

He clearly understands the important role of the navy and realizes that the lower classes may justifiably yearn for power when they are also serving a useful military purpose but he also clearly resents this change and resents this non-hoplite class.

There are further echoes of the hoplite ideal in tragedy. For example, in Aeschylus' *Persians*, the figure of the hoplite looms large. Atossa questions how large the army is and then there is later discussion of lances, shields and spears.[86] Although the fact that Salamis was primarily a naval victory and a naval success is discussed in the play, it can be seen that hoplite practices and weapons are not absent from the discussion of military skill and Atossa's question about the Athenians being archers is instantly and unquestionably answered in the negative.[87] There was, of course, a land action which took place on Psyttaleia simultaneously and was also a success, which could account for some of the emphasis on shields and spears, but it was the naval victory that was the decisive one, and therefore, the clear mention of hoplites rather than focused praise of the naval forces is a notable feature.[88] It is also true that hoplite weapons could be used, especially in these early days of naval warfare, as tools of war where sea battles were fought as if the men were on land and spears and shields could have been used to prevent boarding and to ward off arrows.[89] However, in this particular engagement the tools used were broken oars and fragments, although perhaps this is poetic license.[90]

An anecdote from Plutarch regarding the conduct of Cimon during the Persian Wars will illustrate the general ancient attitude towards rowers in the fleet. He states:

> ὅτε γὰρ τὸν δῆμον ἐπιόντων Μήδων Θεμιστοκλῆς ἔπειθε προέμενον τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν ἐκλιπόντα πρὸ τῆς Σαλαμῖνος ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶ τὰ ὅπλα θέσθαι καὶ διαγωνίσασθαι κατὰ θάλατταν, ἐκπεπληγμένων τῶν πολλῶν τὸ τόλμημα, πρῶτος Κίμων ὤφθη διὰ τοῦ Κεραμεικοῦ φαιδρὸς ἀνιὼν εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν

[85] Pseudo-Xenophon 1.2.

[86] Aeschylus *Persians* 235 and 241.

[87] Aeschylus *Persians* 240-1; Goldhill (1988: 190) argues that this rejection of archery is a deliberate attempt by Aeschylus to juxtapose the Athenians and the Persians and is further developed in later lines.

[88] On Psyttaleia, see Plutarch *Aristides* 9; Herodotus 8.76; Herodotus 8.95.1; Aeschylus *Persians* 449-470.

[89] See Thucydides 1.49 on this style of naval warfare as old-fashioned.

[90] Aeschylus *Persians* 425-230.

> μετὰ τῶν ἑταίρων, ἵππου τινὰ χαλινὸν ἀναθεῖναι τῇ θεῷ διὰ χειρῶν κομίζων, ὡς οὐδὲν ἱππικῆς ἀλκῆς, ἀλλὰ ναυμάχων ἀνδρῶν ἐν τῷ παρόντι τῆς πόλεως δεομένης. ἀναθεὶς δὲ τὸν χαλινὸν παρόντι τῆς πόλεως δεομένης. ἀναθεὶς δὲ τὸν χαλινὸν καὶ λαβὼν ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸν ναὸν κρεμαμένων ἀσπίδα καὶ προσευξάμενος τῇ θεῷ, κατέβαινεν ἐπὶ θάλασσαν…
>
> "When the Persians were attacking, Themistocles was persuading the people to abandon the city and leave its territory behind before Salamis to put the arms in the ships and to pursue the struggle by sea, many were astounded at the daring plan at first, but Cimon was first to be seen with his companions going through the Cerameikos up to the Acropolis resplendent to dedicate a horse's bridle to the goddess, as in the present circumstance the strength of horse was not needed by the city but sea-faring men were. He dedicated the bit and, having seized one of the shields hanging around the temple and having offered prayers to the goddess, went down to the sea…."[91]

It is noteworthy that Cimon takes a shield and goes to battle essentially as a marine. He does not take an oar in his hands. Admittedly, this is evidence from a late author concerning a period earlier than the period in which the thetes and the fleet truly become prominent, but it certainly shows that Plutarch believed that during the time of Cimon, at least, the hoplitic culture was very much still in force. Cimon was naturally drawn to serve as a hoplite. He may have seen this as a tactical necessity or, more likely, a role more befitting of his class but regardless of his motivations, he simply did not even consider serving as a rower.

This survey of examples of hoplite ideology is by no means exhaustive but displays the extent to which hoplite ideology pervaded various different aspects of expression in the ancient world. The hoplite ideal was undeniably in existence and the average citizen would be constantly exposed to it through various mediums. However, in order to fully explore the question of whether a hoplite ideal existed, it is necessary to first examine the full range of warrior types that existed in the Classical period.

1.2 Warrior Realities

During the period of the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, Athens and Sparta came to move away from the strictly hoplitic mode of warfare that is so often celebrated in art and literature. Tactics and strategy required utilisation of light-armed troops, cavalry and, of course, naval forces. Hanson argues, compellingly, for an eighth-century essentially middle-class agrarian soldiery in Athens fighting to protect farmland whose position in society is associated with their ability to produce food and their ability to fight as hoplites.

[91] Plutarch *Cimon* 5.2-3.

He argues that this ideology was affected by the rise of the fleet and the ability to import grain, lessening the Athenian need for agricultural self-sufficiency and allowing for a more democratic approach to military practices.[92] This is reflected in the incorporation of lower-class citizens into the military ranks over time, leading to a more inclusive soldiery in the Classical period than what existed in the eight-century.[93]

Necessarily, different fighters fought in different ways and often it was more difficult for other fighters to display courage in the explicit way that a hoplite could by standing firm in the ranks. As Pritchard points out, naval warfare did not allow for acts of individual courage in the way that hoplite battle may have done, at least not for the rowers, although marines and authority figures on board may have had more opportunity to display their individual fighting prowess. Ships necessarily had to utilise manoeuverability in order to win sea battles, including backing away from ships that they had rammed in order to prevent boarding, which may have appeared uncomfortably similar to a retreat for anyone more accustomed to land based fighting.[94] Therefore, it is useful first to consider the types of warrior figures each in isolation to analyse various aspects of their character: what area of society they were normally recruited from, what society expected of them and how they could be utilised in battle. The focus in Greek military history is often on the hoplite but it is important to also consider the other fighters, those of the naval forces, cavalry and the lighter-armed men. Although much of the ancient evidence on training has a broadly hoplitic bias, this thesis will discuss a great amount of psychological, sociological and religious evidence that is applicable to the creation of all citizen warriors and not only hoplites. Therefore, it is important to establish the range of fighting types at this stage.

1.2.1 The Hoplite

The iconic Greek military figure of the hoplite is generally regarded as being drawn from the ‘middle’ class of Greek society. Hoplite equipment was not an insignificant financial outlay and would have been out of the financial reach of the very poorest members of society. Van Wees has challenged this concept of the middle-class soldier, stating that the hoplite panoply can be broken down to simply just a shield and spear at the most basic level and that all but the poorest citizens would be able to afford to equip themselves so

[92] Hanson (1996), Krentz (2002: 27) points out that the change in economic conditions also led to pay for military service.

[93] On the issue of the military role of thetes in Athens, see Hunt (1998), Hanson (1996: 292-4), Strauss (1996).

[94] Pritchard (2010: 19).

simply, while only the very rich would be able to serve in the cavalry, thus leaving a broad range of 'middle' class citizens able to serve as hoplites.[95] He argues that it is not useful to consider these men as 'middle' class simply because they are not at either extreme end of the scale. He also points out that the figures are simply too high for hoplite numbers to come from a limited middle class (30 000 hoplites and cavalry in 431 and 9 000 hoplites at the battle of Marathon, for instance) and argues that hoplites came from both leisured and working class backgrounds.[96] De Ste Croix has argued that a hoplite does not need to only afford his panoply but also needs to be able to afford to sustain himself and his family while away on campaign and also suggests that this situation could lead to some downward mobility, for example, where a poor hoplite has multiple sons and therefore each son is not allocated enough property to provide him with the income needed to serve as a hoplite.[97] However, de Ste. Croix admits that this would have become less problematic after the introduction of pay which was probably instituted in the middle of the fifth century.[98] He also later makes mention of thetes who served as marines on board ships and remarks that perhaps the state provided the armour for this.[99] It is clear from Thucydides that thetes were able to serve as hoplite marines and must have had the required armour either by providing their own or by state armour provision. Either way, it would follow that these same thetes should, in theory, by able to serve as land based hoplites, too, perhaps only in emergencies if it is the state providing the armour, but it is clear that thete hoplites are not beyond the realm of possibilities.

Indeed, van Wees has made a compelling argument for thete military service, stating that he believes they served both on land (during mass levies of troops) and at sea. He argues convincingly that the *zeugitai* could not have provided the full complement of hoplites at Athens as their farms were too extensive for it to be feasible for all hoplites to own a plot of that size. He suggests that, at a modest estimate, thetes made up a third of the hoplite force but that they may, conceivably, have made up more than fifty percent of the force. He believes thetes may have been particularly attracted to serving as naval marines due to

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[95] Van Wees (2004: 47). Also, on armour, see Krentz (2007a) for a detailed discussion on armour in general and Jarva (1995) for a review of the archaeological data concerning armour.

[96] Van Wees (2007: 277-280); Thucydides 2.13-6-7 mentions that Athens had 13 000 heavy infantry with a further 16 000 on garrison duty and in Athens but mentions that the latter group also included those metics who possessed the requisite armour. On the figures for Marathon see Pausanias 10.20.2.

[97] de Ste. Croix (2004: 17, 27).

[98] de Ste. Croix (2004: 17).

[99] de Ste. Croix (2004: 22); Thucydides 6. 43.

the appeal of pay and the fact that they were not already committed to other forms of service like other citizens from higher property qualification groups may have been.[100]

The situation at Sparta would have been similar in respect of the fact that although a hoplite may have been expected to have been of a certain class and status in society, the demands of war may have required the honour of serving as a hoplite to be extended beyond that specific class.[101] Van Wees discusses the Spartan reliance on *perioikoi* and sometimes even helots at times of need.[102] Possibly, the Spartan reliance on *perioikoi* echoes the Athenian use of metics in their forces rather than being a parallel for lower class citizens being use to serve as hoplites, but nevertheless it illustrates that the necessities of war could often lead to the widening of the gulf between ideal and reality.

Van Wees argues, sensibly, that the distinction lies in the fact that the men who met the property qualification at Athens and the men who qualified as Spartiates at Sparta were obliged to arm themselves and to serve whereas for other, less wealthy individuals, it was a moral rather than legal obligation that compelled them to buy arms if possible and to serve.[103] This distinction may, however, have become less distinct during the Peloponnesian war period, particularly in Athens, where pay was sometimes offered and opportunities for service were wider, with naval service being an important and prominent area for service. Indeed, the fleet may have resulted in a degree of social mobility if the figures are reflected on. Gabrielsen suggests that the trireme needed approximately two hundred men to man it with one hundred and seventy serving as rowers, and gives as an example of the scale of the undertaking a passage from Thucydides regarding the movement of the fleet in 428.[104] At this time one hundred ships were sailing along the Isthmus and the Peloponnese to display the strength of Athens while another one hundred and fifty were elsewhere (including Potidaia, Euboia and Salamis). This would have resulted in the need for 42,500 rowers. Gomme suggests that the population of men aged

[100] Van Wees (2001: 45-71)

[101] See Plutarch, *Lycurgus* 12.2 on the requirements of members of the Spartan hoplite class to contribute quantities of food to their mess. This would, of course, be a financial burden that the poor would not be able to meet.

[102] Van Wees (2007: 277) provides two examples of this during the Persian wars of *perioikoi* being utilised at Thermopylae (Isocrates 4.90, 92 and 6.99-100; Diodorus Siculus 11.4.2, 5) and Plataea (Herodotus 9.10-11).

[103] Van Wees (2007: 278).

[104] Gabrielsen (1994: 106-7); Thucydides 3.16.1.

between eighteen and fifty nine fell from 43,000 in 431 to 29,000 in 425.[105] These figures would suggest that Athens could not run its fleet on citizen manpower alone. They would have been able to rely on metics, mercenaries and other non-citizens to row for the fleet, particularly since pay was on offer,[106] but perhaps those who would normally serve as hoplites may have occasionally assisted by rowing in the fleet, even though this may have been infrequent. Gabrielsen provides an example from Xenophon where the battle of Arginusae in 406 led to all men of military age (including those who normally served in the cavalry) to embark on the ships.[107]

To understand fully the concept of the hoplite, consideration of their role in battle is necessary. Hoplites were, of course, often used in phalanx fighting, a relatively inflexible style of fighting not necessarily suited to the mountainous Greek terrain.[108] However, the hoplite was more flexible than this and, Wheeler points out, they could be used for fighting as marines on board ships, in raiding parties and in amphibious operations.[109] Certainly, the ideology of the hoplite as a phalanx fighter seems to persist, in the imagination, at least, even if in practice phalanx fighting becomes less prominent during the fifth-century. The Oath of the Athenian ephebes, which will be discussed in depth at 2.3.2 The Problem of the Ephebeia, makes explicit mention of not abandoning the man at one's side, whereas Plutarch records that the Spartans are disgraced by throwing away their shield but not for throwing away their breastplate or helmet because the shield is there for the whole line.[110]

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[105] Gomme (1933: 26). Population numbers are difficult to ascertain with any degree of certainty, however. See also Hansen 1988 for further discussion. Hansen postulates approximately 60, 000 citizens for 432/1 and although this larger figure would make the provision of 42, 500 seamen from the citizen body a slightly more realistic prospect than using Gomme's figures, it would still require seventy percent of the citizen body to serve on board the fleet at the particular occasion discussed by Thucydides. It seems unlikely that the remaining thirty percent of citizens could provide all other non-naval forces as well as providing citizens to undertake normal day-to-day duties in running the cities.

[106] Thucydides 1.121.3

[107] Gabrielsen (1994: 107); Xenophon *Hellenica* 1.6.24.

[108] This style of warfare may have stemmed from a need or a desire to protect farmland which was more likely to exist on flat plains rather than in the mountains, hence the development of phalanx fighting. Hanson (1998) has, however, argued against the ultimate effectiveness of attacks on agricultural land and believes any damage must have been limited and short-lived.

[109] Wheeler (2007: 199). He also discusses how hoplite flexibility could be increased due to the fact that the hoplite panoply was itself flexible. Greaves, breast plates etc. could be added or shed from the panoply as the situation dictated.

[110] Plutarch *Moralia* 220A.

1.2.2 The Navy

The fleet, which became increasingly important during the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars, consisted of men of different classes serving in various roles from elite members of society serving in a command appointment, to hoplites serving as marines, down to rowers. For a rower in the fleet, the expenditure was necessarily much lower than it would have been for the same man to serve as a hoplite. Even a shield and a spear, the basics of the hoplite panoply, were a considerable expense which would have been difficult, or impossible, for the poorest in society to afford. The navy afforded the poorest citizens the chance to serve the city without needing to buy expensive equipment but slave rowers could also be utilised when need be.[111]

A statement from Thucydides shows how disparate crews of ships might be. While narrating the failed Sicilian expedition, he details a supposed letter of Nicias which states:

> τὰ δὲ πληρώματα διὰ τόδε ἐφθάρη τε ἡμῖν καὶ ἔτι νῦν φθείρεται, τῶν ναυτῶν [τῶν] μὲν διὰ φρυγανισμὸν καὶ ἁρπαγὴν καὶ ὑδρείαν μακρὰν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων ἀπολλυμένων· οἱ δὲ θεράποντες, ἐπειδὴ ἐς ἀντίπαλα καθεστήκαμεν, αὐτομολοῦσι, καὶ οἱ ξένοι οἱ μὲν ἀναγκαστοὶ ἐσβάντες εὐθὺς κατὰ τὰς πόλεις ἀποχωροῦσιν, οἱ δὲ ὑπὸ μεγάλου μισθοῦ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπαρθέντες καὶ οἰόμενοι χρηματιεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ μαχεῖσθαι, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ γνώμην ναυτικόν τε δὴ καὶ τἆλλα ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀνθεστῶτα ὁρῶσιν...
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> "Our crews have been destroyed and are still being destroyed by the following. The sailors have to go far for firewood, booty and drinking water and the enemy cavalry are utterly destroying them. The slaves are deserting when we stand against the enemy, and the foreigners who were compelled to board are going at once back to their cities. Those who at first were excited by high pay and thought that they would receive pay rather than fight, contrary to their expectation see the enemy fleet and all the rest from the enemy setting themselves against them..."[112]

Just as we have seen for service as hoplites, this quotation displays that personnel serving in the navy is similarly not clear cut. The crew of the *Paralus* were all free-born Athenian citizens, according to Thucydides, but most ships had crews that were made up of a

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[111] Krentz (2007b: 150) suggests that Peloponnesian fleets tended to rely on slave rowers more heavily than the Athenian fleet with 50-80% of the manpower on Peloponnesian ships being that of slaves while 20-40% of the manpower on Athenian ships was provided by slaves, stating IG I3 1032 as evidence.

[112] Thucydides 7.13.2; Hornblower (2008: 564) certainly sees it as a possibility that the slaves mentioned here were actually serving and cites the evidence that the word θεράποντες can be found in a casualty list dating to 464 and also the evidence from Pausanias 1.29.7 which mentions slaves buried publicly for their actions during the Persian invasion. Hornblower (2008: 564) also believes that the foreigners mentioned in this passage were returning to Sicilian cities.

mixture of citizens (some, no doubt, encouraged by the prospect of pay more than the desire to serve their city), slaves and conscripts from among foreigners and allies.[113]

A successful navy had obvious benefits, particularly for Athens during the post-Persian war period when they had an empire consisting largely of islands. However, a ship also had various problems to tackle whenever it was deployed, in that the crews needed to sleep ashore and food and water needed to be obtained so being near a friendly area was fairly crucial.[114]

The question of the development of the Athenian navy is one that is worth a brief discussion. The idea that Athens became a naval power during the 480s on the instigation of Themistocles which is ubiquitous in the ancient sources[115] has been questioned on various grounds. Jordan simply thinks that it is unlikely that a single politician could encourage the Athenians to abruptly adopt seamanship. He thinks it is equally unlikely that the Athenians would have been able to build a fleet and develop the necessary seafaring skills so quickly.[116] Van Wees argues convincingly on the basis of evidence from Pseudo-Aristotle's *Athenian Constitution*, that the Athenians only built one hundred triremes at the instigation of Themistocles, yet sent almost two hundred against Persia and therefore must have been in possession of one hundred prior to Themistocles' suggestion to build triremes.[117] He also suggests that pay was not introduced to the Athenian navy as late as is commonly accepted, and argues for an earlier introduction of pay at Athens due to an inscription from Eretria, dating to 525-500 BC, suggesting that pay might have been available for sailors there.[118] He suggests that instituting pay for sailors would have made it

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[113] Thucydides 8.73.5 on the *Paralus;* Gabrielsen (1994: 122-3) remarks that pay may have varied depending on skill level and the difference from the pay allocated by the state for these men met by the trierarch. Gabrielsen (1994: 111) also discuses the problems regarding the evidence for rates of pay. Thucydides 3.17.3-4 says that each man was paid a drachma a day at the siege of Potidaea but there is evidence for the pay being 3 obols for a Peloponnesian crew paid by Tissaphernes (Thucydides 8.29.2).

[114] Hunt (2007: 125).

[115] Herodotus 7.144 and Plutarch *Themistocles* 4.

[116] Jordan (1972: 6).

[117] Van Wees (2010: 223), Pseudo-Aristotle *Athenian Constitution* 22.7, Herodotus 8.44.1. Rhodes (1993: 277-278) remarks that Herodotus 7.144 states that Themistocles proposed the building of 200 ships but that both the *Constitution of the Athenians* and Plutarch give the figure as 100 ships. He therefore suggests Herodotus' 200 ships was an error. He furthermore points out that in 489 Athens was already in possession of at least 70 ships (Herodotus 6.132) and therefore these ships with the later addition of the 100 ships built at the instigation of Themistocles would have totalled the ships utilised during the sea battles against the Persians.

[118] Van Wees (2010: 1); IG XII.9 1273.1274 lines 10-16 = SEG 41.725 states that those sailing beyond a certain point are to receive a wage.

possible for a new style of naval warfare to develop and flourish and also suggests that we cannot reasonably expect Athens to lag a few decades behind Eretria in its development.[119] Although caution must be applied to avoid adopting too Athenocentric a view, it seems possible and, indeed, likely that although the Athenian fleet may have swelled considerably under the influence of Themistocles, it was in existence prior to the 480s. If this were the case, the navy could have been firmly established by the fifth century as an alternative to hoplite service.

1.2.3 Cavalry

During the Persian Wars Sparta, that nation of professional soldiers, was without a cavalry force and the Athenian force was either limited or perhaps did not exist at all.[120] At the height of the Athenian empire, however, their cavalry was expanded, however, by various measures as a matter of policy.[121] The period of the Peloponnesian Wars changed the face of war for the Greeks to an extent. Therefore, in accordance with Pericles' tactics to avoid pitched battle with the Spartans, the Athenians were forced to rely heavily on this newly created cavalry to protect themselves against Spartan incursions onto their territory.[122] A pressured Sparta later created a force of four hundred cavalrymen.[123]

The cavalry was populated, as can be expected, by the more wealthy citizens who were able to support the substantial financial demands of keeping a horse. To broaden the recruitment base, in the fifth century, the cavalry was expanded through financial help in order to assist a potential cavalryman in meeting the expenses of a horse. The *katastasis*, a grant to assist in the purchase of a horse and the *sitos*, a daily allowance for feeding a horse, were instituted around the late 440s or early 430s.[124] Spence argues, however, that this financial assistance would not have widened the cavalry class greatly as the *sitos* probably did not fully cover the costs of feeding a mount and the *katastasis* would have

[119] Van Wees (2010: 205-222).

[120] On existence of cavalry at this time see Worley (1994: 63-69) for a summary of the discussion and the ancient evidence.

[121] Aeschines 2.173-4 states that at the height of the empire, Athens boasted a twelve hundred strong cavalry force.

[122] Thucydides 2.22.1-2.

[123] Thucydides 4.55.2.

[124] Spence (2010: 113). Spence argues that this expansion was a deliberate decision made in order to increase Athens' war making abilities on land. Spence (2010: 120) states that fragment 293 of Eupolis' *Philoi* has a clear reference to the *katastasis*. Spence concedes that dating for this play is uncertain but it could date as early as 429-425. Spence states that the sitos is mentioned in the Treasurers for Athena for 410/9, IG I^3 375.

been useless in giving financial assistance in some cases due to the fact that it had to be repaid at the end of service and for long serving cavalrymen, the horse could have depreciated in value so completely by their retirement from service that the cavalryman would have been required to repay the *katastasis* from his own funds. He argues that the *katastasis* may have mainly assisted younger men into affording a mount before they had yet come into their own funds.[125]

It is clear that these measures may also have assisted those on the cusp of being able to afford to become cavalrymen. The *katastasis* will surely have acted like a long-term, interest-free loan for them and it is possible that they would be able to afford to repay this from their own personal funds on retiring if they were already fairly wealthy to begin with. For a serving cavalryman who served for a short length of time and who was able to resell his horse in a reasonable condition, the repayment of the *katastasis* would have been even less arduous. Similarly, those who were fairly wealthy would be able to absorb the cost of horse feed that was not covered by the *sitos*. Spence is probably correct in arguing that these measures did not widen the opportunities to join the cavalry corps to any great extent, but they must have made joining the cavalry attainable to the class of people directly below those who traditionally served as cavalry.

On land, infantry was certainly more useful in the ancient world than cavalry. The small stature of ancient horses alongside the absence of modern tack such as saddles and stirrups and the lack of horseshoes, led to a cavalry that would have had limited manoeuvrability, with horses being frequently injured.[126] This limited the usefulness of cavalry as shock troops. They were normally used on the wings of battle to prevent outflanking, for scouting and for chasing down troops that had been routed or driven out of formation.[127] Cavalry may not have been as flexible as infantry or other forces but, as we have seen, they played a vital role in the Periclean defence strategy nevertheless and became increasingly prominent, despite the drawbacks associated with ancient cavalry, during the Peloponnesian wars.

Worley argues, using Medieval evidence, that casualty numbers were likely to be high in cavalry units and suggests this is why cavalry units were always relatively small. He suggests that as wealthy cavalrymen would often have been leaders of their communities,

[125] Spence (2010: 113-4).

[126] Hunt (2007: 119).

[127] Hunt (2007: 119-120).

their communities could not afford to lose them in dangerous cavalry battles. However, it is clear that in the Classical world, the leaders could, and did, fight alongside their men in battle, exposing themselves to risk.[128] It could also be argued that casualty numbers in hoplite battles were not negligible, and, surely, an aristocrat would have needed to serve in the phalanx, if not in the cavalry.[129] In fact, evidence from Lysias and Aristophanes suggests attempts may have been made by men to have their names taken off the infantry conscription lists and transferred to the cavalry lists.[130] There are two possible reasons why someone would choose to have their name moved over into the cavalry list. The first is as a sign of their status although this would surely be clear to others even if they chose to serve in the hoplite ranks despite the fact that they could afford to serve as a cavalryman. The second reason is the relative safety of serving in the cavalry as opposed to serving in the hoplite ranks. Therefore, it may well be the case that cavalry service was safer than the alternative of hoplite service and it is inconceivable in a state that viewed honour, courage and valour as necessary attributes for a citizen, let alone for a leader, to think that an aristocratic leader would be kept from service entirely, whether cavalry or hoplite, in order to protect him from danger.[131] It is also worth noting that Medieval battles are not ancient Greek battles and perhaps using Medieval evidence to make a comparison with an earlier period is misleading. Worley's Medieval evidence for cavalry casualties attributes high cavalry casualty rates to both horses and men being speared with pikes.[132] Worley fails to note that this Medieval casualty evidence is not relevant since Medieval cavalry were often used to charge the infantry ranks whereas ancient cavalry were not suitable for direct attacks to the phalanx and were instead utilised more often for flanking attacks, chasing down men after a rout or, under the Periclean strategy, for the prevention of raids on Attic

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[128] Worley (1994: 49).

[129] Krentz (1985:19) has completed a thorough survey of hoplite battle casualties and suggests that casualties can range between 1.7-10% for the winning side and between 3-25% for the losing side. It is worth noting that due to the figures recorded in the sources, some of his calculations include other fighters aside from hoplites. His evidence suggests that although casualty figures were generally relatively low, they could, albeit rarely, be as high as a quarter of the force for a losing side in a hoplite battle.

[130] Lysias 15.5 and Aristophanes' *Knights* 1369-1372. Demosthenes pours scorn on the wealthy Meidias for deserting and also for hoping to avoid service before serving in the cavalry in luxury and never donning a weapon (*Against Meidias* 110 and 133).

[131] For example, Plutarch *Pericles* 10 where *Pericles* fights in the ranks. In Sparta the one of the two kings marched out to battle and fought alongside the men. If there had been concern over protecting leadership, this would surely have extended to not only civic but military leadership, also but this is not the case and generals fought alongside the men. For example, the War Archon, Callimachus lost his life at Marathon (Herodotus 6.114) and Brasidas and Cleon died at Amphipolis (Thucydides 5.10).

[132] Worley (1994: 49). His examples are the death of 400 out of 6,000 horsemen within hours of the commencement of hostilities at the battle of Arbedo in 1422 and the 2,000 dead at the battle of St. Jacob in 1444.

land.[133] Also on this basis, it is difficult to believe that serving in the cavalry in ancient Greece would have been more dangerous than serving as a hoplite. The cavalry would, of course, be more mobile than a phalanx and the only danger the cavalry could face would be from the enemy cavalry or light-armed troops. Considering that many states had little or no cavalry and often also seem to have had few light-armed troops, not to mention the fact that a cavalryman should be able to escape from an attack by light-armed troops quickly, it seems difficult to believe that they were greatly endangered in battle. Cavalry units in Greece may have been small or non-existent simply due to the expense of owning and keeping horses making it an option only available to a small number of people. Also, the nature of phalanx battles did not easily allow for cavalry participation, so perhaps a large cavalry force would have been of little use but of large expense and as such was not seen as necessary.

1.2.4 Light Troops

Light-armed troops allowed for a degree of flexibility and mobility that the traditional phalanx did not always give. Archers, for example, could be used on board triremes against the unarmoured enemy crew or to pick off fallen enemy in the water. They could be used also against other light-armed troops although their effectiveness against hoplites was limited. Peltasts could be used for reconnaissance and ambushes and unlike hoplites were effective in rough terrain.[134] Light-armed troops such as slingers, peltasts and archers could be particularly effective in situations where the enemy army had no light troops or cavalry of their own that could be used to harass them.[135]

With a need for less armour and equipment, poorer citizens could fight as light-armed troops, or fighters with specialised skills such as archery could be recruited from elsewhere.[136] However, the large corps of archers established in Athens may well have consisted purely of Athenian citizens and metics.[137] Peltasts, in contrast, were often

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[133] Examples of cavalry use include Thucydides 2.22; 4.96.8; 5.58.4; 6.37.2.

[134] See Hunt (2010: 119-123) for the above and further discussion of the uses of light armed troops.

[135] Trundle (2010: 146).

[136] Trundle (2010: 142) points out that archers were typically recruited from Crete, Scythia or Thrace, for instance.

[137] Trundle (2010: 149-50) believes this to be possible for various reasons, one of which being that archers contributed money to the upkeep of the sanctuary of Apollo Lyceios. The establishment of a corps of 1, 200 archers is dated to the year 446 by Andocides 3.7 and Aeschines 2.174. Trundle (2010: 149) points out that this group of archers is separate to the Scythian archers that were used to keep order in the city.

imported, but Trundle argues that the poorer citizens could be supplied with kit in order to become peltasts when necessary, using Thucydides' to support his claim[138]:

> Δημοσθένης δὲ ὁρῶν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μέλλοντας προσβάλλειν ναυσί τε ἅμα καὶ πεζῷ παρεσκευάζετο καὶ αὐτός, καὶ τὰς τριήρεις αἳ περιῆσαν αὐτῷ ἀπὸ τῶν καταλειφθεισῶν ἀνασπάσας ὑπὸ τὸ τείχισμα προσεσταύρωσε, καὶ τοὺς ναύτας ἐξ αὐτῶν ὥπλισεν ἀσπίσι [τε] φαύλαις καὶ οἰσυΐναις ταῖς πολλαῖς· οὐ γὰρ ἦν ὅπλα ἐν χωρίῳ ἐρήμῳ πορίσασθαι...
>
> "Demosthenes, seeing the Lacedaemonians intending to strike by both land and sea together, was preparing himself also. He drew up the triremes which remained for him from the ones left behind below the wall and enclosed them in a palisade. And he armed the sailors from them with paltry shields, many made from wicker: for there were no shields to obtain in that desolate place..."[139]

However, I do not think we can assume that the sailors are being armed simply as peltasts here. They are, indeed, lightly armed like peltasts but that is due to necessity. The fact that they are provisioned with a shield first and foremost could indicates rather that Demosthenes here was not trying to make *ad hoc* peltasts but instead, he was trying to create impromptu hoplites. Trundle may be correct in asserting the possibility of arming poorer citizens as peltasts but the evidence he gives here for such a practice is entirely unconvincing. Therefore, we cannot assume that state provision necessarily offered upward social mobility for those unable to afford to equip themselves as peltasts. Perhaps in this statement there is evidence instead for the arming of poorer citizens as hoplites at times of necessity as previously discussed.[140] The default position of arming poorer citizens in necessity as hoplites is also in agreement with de Ste Croix's position discussed earlier where he states that the poor served in emergencies as hoplite marines, armed by the state.

1.2.5 Conclusion

This brief survey has examined the scale and extent of warfare during the Classical period, displaying the flexibility and inclusiveness of the Classical military machine. Vast numbers of men were needed to man the fleet and to ensure the ranks were filled by land. Missions may not always, by the fifth century, be short-lived but men may be away from their homes for extended periods of time on naval missions, for example. These changes in military practice meant that a highly motivated citizenry was required. Warfare was no

[138] Trundle (2010: 155).

[139] Thucydides 4.9.1.

[140] de Ste. Croix (2004: 22).

long limited to a few days of battle for a select class of men in the summer season. A broad array of men were needed to fulfil various different roles. This presented opportunities for citizens of various backgrounds to participate. Wealth was not a pre-requisite for many of the military roles such as serving in the fleet or as light-armed soldier. However, many poorer citizens may not have been expected or required to fight in the past. Society had to redefine roles and responsibilities, encouraging men who may have previously been militarily disenfranchised to participate fully in society through military service. Society had to encourage the full community to embrace the martial spirit of society collectively, particularly as campaigns may require a great deal of commitment in terms of time. This thesis will examine the various ways in which society fostered a martial spirit in the citizenry and created a military participative citizenry.

This survey of fighting types also clearly displays that lines of demarcation between grades of fighters were not always clear. Military service provided opportunities for social mobility. The class of men who served as heavily-armed soldiers, for example, encompassed a broad range of citizens of varied wealth, while there was some limited financial assistance available to assist some men to gain entry into the cavalry, albeit this would have been applicable to men who were already wealthy citizens. The scale of the forces even required the state to turn to slaves and metics or to employ mercenaries. The reality of military life, then, is clearly very far apart from the ideal presented in art. The ideal paints a picture of the hoplite as the quintessential Greek warrior but the reality embraces men from every background, including the poor and the enslaved. Men may serve as hoplites without full panoplies or may take a wage for service; a hoplite may serve as a marine with the fleet or a poor man may gradually save financially to rise from a position in the fleet or a light-armed soldier to afford enough of a panoply to join the hoplite ranks. Military service was a far more fluid affair than the ideal presents and although this undoubtedly presented the state with more military possibilities, it also presented an ideological tension which will now be explored further.

1.3 Tensions between the Ideal and Reality

Now that it has been ascertained both that a hoplite ideal existed and that, in spite of it, many different types of troops were utilised by the state, it is necessary to consider the ideological tensions created by this situation. A key area where tensions could exist is wherever non-citizens, including slaves, are used in warfare. In the ideal, military service tends to be associated with citizenship, honour and masculinity, all of which are attributes

that are denied to slaves. Use of slaves in warfare could, potentially, be demotivating for the citizenry who may feel the honour associated with their role is undermined by the inclusion of slaves in the forces. Therefore, use of slaves in warfare must be examined in order to understand how society managed this apparent ideological tension.

Similarly, a study of the concept of courage will analyse tensions created by the reliance on types of soldiers other than hoplites. The hoplite, so often viewed idealistically, would experience battle in a different manner to a cavalryman or an archer. A light-armed soldier would have mobility enabling him to run to safety when necessary and would often be able to operate at range (as is the case for a slinger or an archer). He would not have to hold his place in the line while preparing for attack by an enemy force that he is able to visually spot approaching. However, as previously discussed in our survey of warrior types, other fighters aside from the hoplite were militarily useful, enabled poorer citizens to participate in the military and were commonly used. It is necessary, then, to assess the tensions that could be found in society when fighters were viewed as unequal in their roles.

A further consideration is the role of courage in relation to the necessity of service. The ideal associates military service with citizenship and manliness. The reality then, if in keeping with the ideal, should see men willingly fighting whenever necessary. It is necessary, then, to discuss the evidence for participation to analyse whether the ideal can be seen in practice in reality.

1.3.1 The Use of Slaves in Warfare

Certainly, there are examples of slaves and helots being used as troops or attendants in battle as well as *perioikoi* and metics being used in warfare. Slaves used as attendants rather than fighters, of course, poses no ideological difficulty. The use of *perioikoi* and metics is slightly more problematic in that they are not citizens but, if they are able to arm themselves and fight for the state they dwell in or near, then there is no real reason why the state should reject their loyalty. Slaves, however, are far more problematic in that they are certainly not citizens and are simply property. The most obvious contravention of any citizen hoplite ideal is the idea of slaves serving in battle. Some troops were traditionally conscripted from abroad while other troops such as rowers were conscripted from the body of slaves whenever necessary. However, the presence of slaves in the land forces in both states is particularly problematic for the existence of any military ideal. If an ideal existed, then the presence of these foreigners and slaves in the body of the troops must have raised

questions among the men whose very identity rested on their ability to serve their state as free citizens. Hunt argues that the hoplite ideology broke down during the fifth century, allowing for the use of slaves in war. He states that due to economic expansion, the Classical period led to states being able to arm more citizens and for longer. Furthermore, the Persian wars had exposed Greece to war beyond what was expected in hoplitic warfare and the navy furthered this situation of opening up new styles of warfare. He states that these three factors taken together led to massive changes in warfare away from the traditional hoplite *agon* which was controlled by specific rules and paved the way for changes such as the use of slaves in warfare. [141]

Examining the evidence for slaves in warfare is not unproblematic. It is likely that they would frequently have gone largely unmentioned in the sources regardless of the capacity in which they were used. For example, Herodotus makes no mention of their presence at Marathon. Pausanias, however, mentions that here slaves fought for the first time beside their masters and are thus mentioned on the grave slab.[142] Hunt also argues for the use of helots as part of the fighting force at Plataea and suggests that the seven helots to each man, mentioned by Herodotus, allowed the ranks to be filled almost completely with helots while the front rank was composed of Spartiates.[143] Certainly, the use of the verb ἐφύλασσον at 9.28.2 strengthens Hunt's argument as there would be no reason for helots serving simply as attendants to act as guards for the Spartiates and certainly not in such great numbers as a seven-to-one ratio. During the Sicilian expedition Thucydides makes mention of the desertion of slaves from the fleet.[144] Thucydides also speaks of a large force of helots and Spartiates that march out to try to prevent Tegea from going over to the Argives but once again it is not clear whether the helots were marching out in the capacity of attendants or warriors.[145] A further passage in Thucydides strongly suggests helots serving in a military capacity when a picked force of both helots and freedmen is sent out under the Spartan commander Eccritus.[146] Although slaves are rarely mentioned explicitly as fighters, it seems that they were involved in fighting. Whether their involvement was

[141] Hunt (1998: 11), Krentz (2002: 34-35) argues against considering the changes in hoplite being considered a 'decline' and instead argues that the changes we see in hoplite practices from 480 onwards are new protocols being introduced.

[142] Pausanias 1.32.3.

[143] Hunt (1997); Herodotus 9.10.1, 9.28.2, 9.29.1.

[144] Thucydides 7.13.

[145] Thucydides 5.64.2.

[146] Thucydides 7.19.3.

rare in itself or whether it was more frequent but authors chose not to mention it is largely irrelevant. What is important is that they fought at all.

There is something of an ideological paradox in the use of slaves in war. Battle is associated with *arete* and *andreia*, two qualities that are quite distinct from what is expected from slaves. Slaves, of course, would be capable of attaining *arete* as slaves: an excellence in their servitude or devotion to their master, but should not be capable of winning the *arete* due to a citizen; an *arete* that can be won in battle.[147] By allowing them to fight alongside citizens in battle, the lines between citizens and slaves become somewhat less distinct. Secondly, as already demonstrated, there is a clear link between citizen-rights and participation in battle.[148] Finally, there is the issue of entrusting weapons to slaves. In Sparta, at least, there was a certain degree of nervousness surrounding slaves, perhaps most clearly seen in the Spartan suspicion towards the helots. To entrust enslaved people with weapons and allow them to join citizens on the battlefield was to open up the possibility of citizens becoming harmed or killed by their own slaves.[149] Hunt, however, proposes it could potentially be just as dangerous to leave the slaves behind when the men were away on campaign.[150] Of course, the alternative was to let slaves serve in the navy where they are entrusted with oars instead of dangerous weapons and are kept under close supervision instead of left at home in the city with the women and children.[151]

Hunt's assertion that slaves participating in battle results in complications for the concept of citizenship seems to be well-founded, but the argument that slave warriors present a threat is perhaps somewhat more problematic. Certainly, Sparta had concerns about the helots and that these suspicions were not unfounded is evidenced by the helots revolting, but the situation at Sparta was unique and the helots shared a heritage that might more naturally lead them towards a revolt.[152] Slaves, in Athens, however, were a more disparate group of people from various different regions. They did not share a national identity and it would surely have been difficult for them to gather *en masse* in order to plan and stage a

[147] See Aristotle *Politics* 1.13 1260a4, for example, where he distinguishes slaves from women and children by saying that slaves lack the ability to deliberate.

[148] Hunt (1998: 122).

[149] Hunt (1998: 39).

[150] Hunt (1998: 39), see Thucydides 4.80.2-3 on the Spartan fear of leaving the Helots behind when they went on campaign.

[151] Hunt (1998: 83).

[152] Helot uprisings occurred during the 7th century (the Second Messenian revolt); during 464BC (see Pausanias 4.24.5) and at Ithome (see Thucydides 1.101-1.103).

revolt. Hunt does remark that on an individual basis slaves may have been prevented from any attempts at harming their masters or fleeing by the knowledge that their families may have been in the master's household, essentially held as hostages.[153] Furthermore, some slaves must have been left behind when the men went off to war to assist the women and children with farming and other tasks that required manual labour, so the threat of slave rebellion cannot have loomed exceedingly large in the minds of ancient Greek men. Even on board the ships of the fleet, a large contingent of slaves armed only with oars, or even their bare hands, could surely easily overpower a small contingent of citizens supervising them, perhaps even if the citizens were armed, although there is, of course, no evidence for this. Finally, hoplites must have kept their weapons at home where slaves, if they intended to harm their masters, should have been able to access them. Even if the weapons were supervised carefully or somehow kept away from slaves, it would be hard to conceive that slaves would have been unable to get hold of some other kind of weapon if they were contriving to harm their master. Admittedly, it would be easier for a slave to hide his act in the din and disarray of battle than it would be for a slave to commit murder and escape in a domestic setting but it seems, perhaps, that the threat of slave rebellion is more imagination (of the modern mind rather than the ancient) than reality.

1.3.2 Courage and Atimia

Perhaps the most important characteristic for a fighter to possess was that of *andreia*, or courage, without which he had no honour. The ideal of both Athens and Sparta required their men to stand courageously and steadfastly in battle, risking injury to themselves, or even death. Cowardice could, of course, take many forms. From draft-evasion, to not appearing for muster, to desertion on the field of battle, the possibilities for an act of cowardice were many and varied.[154] The *polis*, as I shall argue, attempted to indoctrinate its citizens into a military ideology and, no doubt, succeeded with many of its citizens. Courage is an essential part of that ideal and an exploration of how courage was encouraged in fighters is imperative in order to understand fully the creation of the military citizen by the state.

It is important to understand how courage was viewed in relation to other warriors at Athens, with the specific example of archery being considered, as it is clear that various

[153] Hunt (1998: 39).

[154] For an extensive analysis of draft-evasion, including analysis of categories of exemptions, see Christ (2006: 45- 62) and also Christ (2004).

types of troops were utilized in the fifth century and analyse how this contrasted with the definition of courage as presented as part of the hoplite ideal. It is also important to understand willingness to fight, both as a method of understanding the extent to which the ideal of brave and willing civic warriors is reflected in reality and also to understand the deterrants to draft evasion or desertion. Deterants, whether they are legal or created by a system of peer-pressure, would have been part of a wider system of motivating the warrior to fight for his state.

It is important to note the differences between the concepts of courage at Athens and Sparta, particularly during the period of the Peloponnesian Wars when both states felt it necessary to express how their ideologies opposed one another. The Spartan view of courage was based on their respect for their laws and their reliance on their customs. In the speech of Archidamus to the Spartans reported by Thucydides, Archidamus says:

> ὡς οὖν ἐπὶ τοσαύτην πόλιν στρατεύοντες καὶ μεγίστην δόξαν οἰσόμενοι τοῖς τε προγόνοις καὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα ἐκ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων, ἕπεσθ᾽ ὅπῃ ἄν τις ἡγῆται, κόσμον καὶ φυλακὴν περὶ παντὸς ποιούμενοι καὶ τὰ παραγγελλόμενα ὀξέως δεχόμενοι· κάλλιστον γὰρ τόδε καὶ ἀσφαλέστατον, πολλοὺς ὄντας ἑνὶ κόσμῳ χρωμένους φαίνεσθαι.
>
> "And so as we are marching against such a great city and will be bringing very great reputation to our ancestors and ourselves from whichever of the two possible outcomes, go where you are led, make order and security of prime importance and listen keenly for commands. For this is more beautiful and safest, for many men clearly to maintain a single discipline."[155]

Also, Archidamus states:

> ... εὔβουλοι δὲ ἀμαθέστερον τῶν νόμων τῆς ὑπεροψίας παιδευόμενοι καὶ ξὺν χαλεπότητι σωφρονέστερον ἢ ὥστε αὐτῶν ἀνηκουστεῖν...
>
> And we are prudent, educated in a manner ignorant of contempt for the laws and with too strict a self-control to disobey them."[156]

Also, Demaratus, the exiled Spartan king, speaking to Xerxes states:

> Ἐλεύθεροι γὰρ ἐόντες οὐ πάντα ἐλεύθεροί εἰσι· ἔπεστι γάρ σφι δεσπότης νόμος, τὸν ὑποδειμαίνουσι πολλῷ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ σοὶ σέ· ποιεῦσι γῶν τὰ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ἀνώγῃ· ἀνώγει δὲ τὠυτὸ αἰεί, οὐκ ἐῶν φεύγειν οὐδὲν πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων ἐκ μάχης, ἀλλὰ μένοντας ἐν τῇ τάξι ἐπικρατέειν ἢ ἀπόλλυσθαι..

[155] Thucydides 2.11.9.

[156] Thucydides 1.84.3.

> "For although they are free, they are not free in every way: for they have a despot and that despot is their laws, which they stand in awe of to a greater extent than your subjects stand in awe of you. They, at any rate, do whatever the law orders: and its commands are always the same. They must never flee from battle no matter how great the crowds of men, but staying in the ranks they must conquer or die."[157]

The harsh system of Spartan upbringing ensured Spartiates were educated on these martial values from a young age, learning the importance of discipline and obedience to both the laws and to their commanders.[158]

In contrast, Thucydides believed that courage at Athens was based on the grounds of reason and intellect, necessarily so for a state basing its governance on a democratic system where citizens were expected to participate in debate themselves and decide upon the course of action to be taken. Thucydides records the words of Pericles' Funeral Oration where Pericles states:

> διαφερόντως γὰρ δὴ καὶ τόδε ἔχομεν ὥστε τολμᾶν τε οἱ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἐπιχειρήσομεν ἐκλογίζεσθαι· ὃ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀμαθία μὲν θράσος, λογισμὸς δὲ ὄκνον φέρει. κράτιστοι δ' ἂν τὴν ψυχὴν δικαίως κριθεῖεν οἱ τά τε δεινὰ καὶ ἡδέα σαφέστατα γιγνώσκοντες καὶ διὰ ταῦτα μὴ ἀποτρεπόμενοι ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων.
>
> "For we have the ability especially to calculate courage in regards to our undertakings: while others are bold out of ignorance, and then reckoning brings with it fear for them. Those might be rightly judged strongest in courage who know clearly what is terrible and what is pleasant, and do not turn away from danger because of them."[159]

This system of rational judgement being the source of courage, Balot argues, allows Pericles to invert the traditional concept of hoplite courage by implementation of an 'island

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[157] Herodotus 7.104.

[158] It has been argued by Epps (1933) that the radical Spartan system of indoctrination is suggestive of a culture that is inherently fearful. Indeed, Sparta even had a temple to Fear. However, a respect for fear and an acknowledgement of its existence is not, necessarily, indicative of fearfulness itself and I do not believe that Sparta was any more inclined to be affected by fearfulness in regards to decision making than any other polis. Sparta was, of course, inclined towards caution and tended to be slower than Athens to take military action, but perhaps their fortunate position in the Peloponnese, somewhat cut off from the rest of Greece, was the reason for this rather than a fear of engaging in battle. For the natural caution of Sparta see Thucydides 1.70.2 and 8.96.5.

[159] Thucydides 2.40.3-4.

strategy' during the Peloponnesian Wars, encouraging the Athenians to focus on the sea and fleet instead of their land and importantly, to avoid pitched battle outside the city-walls.[160] That Thucydides attributes such a strategy to Pericles is, of course, undeniable but Balot fails to explain why, if Pericles wishes to invert the traditional view of hoplite courage into a more rational view of courage based on Athens' strong navy, he does not go further in glorifying the navy and sailors and does not down-play the role of hoplites. Balot, therefore, misinterprets the evidence, perhaps as an attempt to force the ideology to coincide with the practicalities of the Athenian naval reliance. I believe, however, that Pericles' Thucydides here is continuing to portray the hoplite as an ideal. He is not trying to raise the profile and respect of the navy by viewing courage as rational and innate but simply stating where he believes the contrast between the Athenians and the harshly trained Spartans lie. It is true that this idea of rational courage could be seen to be applicable to both naval and land forces but the speech does not evidence that his intentions were to invert the hoplite definition of courage. Indeed, this discussion of rational courage could be intended to bolster Athenian morale in light of the island strategy. The Athenians would be feeling weak and cowardly by adopting such a strategy, refusing to go out to face the enemy as a massed body of troops and this speech could justify this action to the citizenry, allowing them to reframe their thoughts from viewing their actions as cowardly to viewing them as a rational form of courage.

There was also a distinct divide between different groups of warrior and the levels of courage associated with each. The archer, for example, is often portrayed as more cowardly than a hoplite. Aeschylus' *Persians* constantly contrasts the archer Persians with the shield and spear-wielding Greeks.[161] Lycus in Eurpides' *Heracles* denounces Heracles' traditional association with the bow:

> ὁ δ' ἔσχε δόξαν οὐδὲν ὢν εὐψυχίας
> θηρῶν ἐν αἰχμῆι, τἄλλα δ' οὐδὲν ἄλκιμος,
> ὃς οὔποτ' ἀσπίδ' ἔσχε πρὸς λαιᾶι χερὶ
> οὐδ' ἦλθε λόγχης ἐγγὺς ἀλλὰ τόξ' ἔχων,
> κάκιστον ὅπλον, τῆι φυγῆι πρόχειρος ἦν.
> ἀνδρὸς δ' ἔλεγχος οὐχὶ τόξ' εὐψυχίας
> ἀλλ' ὃς μένων βλέπει τε κἀντιδέρκεται
> δορὸς ταχεῖαν ἄλοκα τάξιν ἐμβεβώς.
>
> "He who has undeservedly won a reputation for courage from hunting animals, but is otherwise not warlike; who has never borne a shield in his left hand, nor

[160] Balot (2004: 411).

[161] Aeschylus *Persians* 85 and 230-40.

> marched near a spear-head, but holding a bow, the worst of tools; was ready to flee. A bow does not test a man's courage, but he who has entered the ranks, stays in line, looks at and faces the swift wound of the spear, shows courage."[162]

Amphitryon defends himself against Lycus' attack by countering:

> ἀνὴρ ὁπλίτης δοῦλός ἐστι τῶν ὅπλων
> θραύσας τε λόγχην οὐκ ἔχει τῶι σώματι
> θάνατον ἀμῦναι, μίαν ἔχων ἀλκὴν μόνον·
> καὶ τοῖσι συνταχθεῖσιν οὖσι μὴ ἀγαθοῖς
> αὐτὸς τέθνηκε δειλίαι τῆι τῶν πέλας.
> ὅσοι δὲ τόξοις χεῖρ' ἔχουσιν εὔστοχον,
> ἓν μὲν τὸ λῶιστον, μυρίους οἰστοὺς ἀφεὶς
> ἄλλοις τὸ σῶμα ῥύεται μὴ κατθανεῖν,
> ἑκὰς δ' ἀφεστὼς πολεμίους ἀμύνεται
> τυφλοῖς ὀρῶντας οὐτάσας τοξεύμασιν
> τὸ σῶμά τ' οὐ δίδωσι τοῖς ἐναντίοις,
> ἐν εὐφυλάκτωι δ' ἐστί. τοῦτο δ' ἐν μάχηι
> σοφὸν μάλιστα, δρῶντα πολεμίους κακῶς
> σώιζειν τὸ σῶμα, μὴ 'κ τύχης ὡρμισμένον.
>
> "The man who fights as a hoplite is a slave of shields, and if those men fighting alongside are not courageous, the man himself dies due to his neighbours' cowardice, or having broken his spear, he cannot ward off death from his body as he only has that one defense. Whoever has a steady hand for the bow has the best single weapon: when he has sent forth countless arrows, he still has others to defend his body from death. He wards off the enemy from far off, wounding them with invisible arrows, despite their watchfulness, and he does not expose himself to the enemy but keeps himself safe. In battle this is especially clever: harming the enemy while securing yourself, not tied up by fortune."[163]

This debate neatly sums up the Greek system of thought regarding archery. Archery was, no doubt, effective and useful.[164] As Amphitryon states, it minimizes casualties, yet still harms the enemy, but Lycus states the hoplite ideal and explains exactly why archery is sniffed at. The archer may well be militarily effective but he does not display the courage and steadfastness of a man that stands in a phalanx. Perhaps this is why many figures of myth that wield bows are female: Atalante, Artemis and the Amazons, for example. This, perhaps, implies that archery is generally viewed as unsuitable for a man. Some masculine, heroic figures, however, are also depicted as archers such as Odysseus and archaic

[162] Euripides *Heracles* 157-164.

[163] Euripides *Heracles* 190-203.

[164] For example, it was a force of light-armed troops and archers that caused the Lacedaemonians to surrender at Sphacteria (Thucydides 4.36). The Athenians in a skirmish with the Aetolians (Thucydides 3.98) were able to hold their own for as long as their archers had arrows but when the commander of the archers was killed and the archers dispersed, the Athenians had the worse of the altercation.

representations of Heracles.[165] These examples of masculine archers are, however, firmly placed in an earlier period, although they are still respected in the fifth century. Nevertheless, archers are utilized in warfare by both Athens and Sparta. For example, Thucydides states that Sparta created a force of archers at the same time as a force of cavalry and tells us that Athens' forces at the start of the Peloponnesian Wars included a large number of both mounted and unmounted bowmen.[166] Indeed, it has been noted that light-armed troops and archers were warriors far more suitable to the mountainous terrain of Greece than the heavily armed phalanx fighters who needed a level plain to fight effectively.[167] It seems, then, that regardless of how they were viewed by society and regardless of the fact that they may have been showing less courage than their hoplite counterparts, the state did not place the hoplite ideal before the military effectiveness of archery.

The view of archery and cavalry service (discussed above) as less courageous than hoplite service brings to the fore the difference between the courage that all military participation requires and the specific steadfastness required by a hoplite. An archer can easily take cover or run away. Similarly, a member of the cavalry would be able to make a hasty retreat from a battle without difficulty. It is the hoplite, alone, who is required to stand fast in the face of the enemy. It is both his professional duty as a soldier and a personal duty to the men standing next to him, as the phalanx is only as strong as its weakest member. Battle would surely be a terrifying experience for all the participants, but particularly so for the hoplites approaching the imposing structure of an enemy phalanx.

Christ states that a distinction should be drawn between cowardice as displayed by a reluctance to be drafted and an act of cowardice on the battlefield as, in the former case, the coward can make a calm, reasoned decision to avoid risking his life but in the latter panic and fear can cause a man to respond in an uncontrolled way to the dangers to which he is exposed.[168] Indeed, many of the behaviours encouraged by the state before and during battle must, to some extent, have been used to dispel fear among the ranks. Sacrifice and prayer before battle and the singing of the paean must have been useful for both terrifying

[165] Cohen (1994: 695-715); also note Pandarus, Paris and the lesser Ajax as archers in the *Iliad*. Note, however, that Paris' morals and bravery are questionable throughout and the lesser Ajax is specifically referred to as a lesser man than Ajax, son of Telamon (2.529).

[166] Thucydides 4.55.2 and 2.13.8.

[167] See Cartledge (1977: 11-27)

[168] Christ (2006: 89 and 90).

the enemy and calming the army who utilized them. Eteocles in Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes* states:

> καὶ πρός γε τούτοις ἐκτὸς οὗ ἀγαλμάτων
> εὔχου τὰ κρείσσω, ξυμμάχους εἶναι θεούς.
> κἀμῶν ἀκούσα εὐγμάτων ἔπειτα σὺ
> ὀλολυγμὸν ἱερὸν εὐμενῆ παιώνισον,
> Ἑλληνικὸν νόμισμα θυστάδος βοῆς,
> θάρσος φίλοις, λύουσα πολεμίων φόβον.
>
> "And indeed stay clear of the images of the gods, and make a stronger prayer that the gods are our allies. And having heard my prayers, then you chant the auspicious, sacred cry aloud, the Greek tradition of the sacrificial roar, bringing courage to friends and releasing fear of the enemy."[169]

It is also important to stress the difference between courage and the idea of remaining steadfast. Courage can take many forms and be shown by citizens in many different situations, both in and out of battle. Steadfastness is a far more specific concept, however. It describes the particular variety of courage that allows a soldier to stand firm in the ranks, refusing to move from his position regardless of his fear and the situation of the battle. This is the specific type of courage required by the hoplite at the point of meeting the enemy in battle and requires supreme self-control. It is quite a different type of courage required by the navy or an archer or another such fighter. It is only the hoplite who experiences the need for steadfastness in this very specific manner.[170]

The fear of injury, death, and, less dramatically but potentially no less deadly, loss of earnings must have affected many of the men called to serve. The temptation to attempt to avoid service is reflected in the evidence for draft evasion and state mechanisms to deal with it, as collated by Christ.[171]

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[169] Aeschylus, *Seven Against Thebes* 265-270. Although these lines are addressed to a chorus of women and not to men, I believe that it still follows that Aeschylus is expressing the use of the paean here and explaining that it inspires courage.

[170] Other troops would, of course, have required a degree of courage and steadfastness also but the hoplite exemplifies this quality most clearly. Light-armed troops and cavalry would have been afforded the luxury of mobility in war and could have escaped from danger in a way the hoplite could not. The navy, particularly the rowers were in a similar situation to the hoplite in regards to the lack of opportunities for them to leave their post and escape. They were, however, less exposed to the psychological test of viewing the coming onslaught of weaponry and the ship must have felt like it offered some degree of protection, particularly for the rowers in the lower benches.

[171] Christ (2006); Hunt (2010: 231) remarks that although we hear complaints from Athenian sources from those being called up to serve, we do not hear complaints of those being denied the chance to serve and display their prowess and bravery. Perhaps, though, this is because those who wished to serve regardless of the draft lists could volunteer their services.

As Christ points out, however, many may have attempted draft-evasion not out of cowardice or a lack of public spirit, but because they may already have been recently called up and felt that they had done their duty.[172] It is also worth noting an excerpt from Thucydides when Athens had two large forces fighting in Aegina and Egypt. The Corinthians moved into Megara assuming the Athenians would be unable to respond unless she withdrew her troops from Aegina. Thucydides states:

> οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸ μὲν πρὸς Αἰγίνῃ στράτευμα οὐκ ἐκίνησαν, τῶν δ’ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὑπολοίπων οἵ τε πρεσβύτατοι καὶ οἱ νεώτατοι ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς τὰ Μέγαρα Μυρωνίδου στρατηγοῦντος.
>
> "And the Athenians did not move the force at Aegina but raised a force from those remaining in the city, both of the oldest men and the youngest, and they arrived at Megara under the command of Myronides."[173]

Surely it can be inferred that by the very young and very old, Thucydides is either referring to those who were not yet aged to serve and those beyond the age of military service or to those age groups that, although technically able to serve, were not generally mobilized. Yet, even though it was not necessarily normally the duty of these people to serve in this manner, this force seems to have been raised without difficulty. Perhaps it is safe to infer that in a democratic state where the citizens were voting on potential campaigns that it followed that they were largely supportive of the military decisions made and were, therefore, generally willing to serve.[174] There will still have been, of course, those who voted against the military decision, who did not vote at all (perhaps due to restrictions related to distance from central Athens) or people who, although broadly supportive of the military action being taken, did not wish to fight themselves through fear, potential loss of earnings or through the feeling that they had already given the *polis* enough service in previous campaigns. These men may have been reluctant to fight or even practiced draft evasion but it is perhaps safe to assume that the majority of citizens would be supportive of the decision and, therefore, willing to fight.

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[172] Christ (2006: 51) Christ also suggests that by 366 B.C. conscription was by age group and, indeed, Thucydides 2.13 discusses men from the oldest and youngest of the Athenian citizens being conscripted. However, if age group conscription was a general policy, surely it would be more likely to lead to a bias towards the youngest and fittest and also the oldest and most experienced troops. Surely this would make draft-dodging more common among men who fell into these categories and already felt like they had done their duty more than others.

[173] Thucydides 1.105.4-5.

[174] Christ (2006: 49) offers various explanations why citizens may have been compliant with conscription including honour; natural optimism about chances of survival, collective interests being preserved and adventurism.

However, the Athenian system does seem to lend itself to abuse by those unwilling to serve when the catalogue of possible categories of exemption are considered.[175] A citizen wishing to evade the draft would, in many cases, be able to convince a general of illness or disability with relative ease. As Christ states, those with means could essentially evade the draft by travelling abroad, or propose themselves as candidates for democratic offices as office holders were also exempt.[176] For a citizen who failed to be granted an exemption, there was a final, although somewhat more high-risk option, of failing to appear for muster.[177] This could lead to prosecution in Athens, but often did not; largely, no doubt, due to the personal risk that a prosecutor was taking if he failed to win his case.[178]

Athens seems to have been more lenient than Sparta in its treatment of those who show cowardice on the battlefield, perhaps prosecuting them on the return to Athens.[179] It is important to note, also, that the Athenian system relied on a private prosecutor to take the case to the courts, while in Sparta, punishment was a state affair. The Athenian citizen prosecuted for *atimia* could expect, if punishment was given in full, to be debarred from public offices, have limited access to sanctuaries, lose his right to attend the assembly and to speak in court cases.[180] Essentially, these men were stripped of their political and civic roles in society, being debarred from politics as well as having his religious interactions strictly controlled. These sanctions are undeniably harsh but do not subject the coward to mockery, extreme suffering or death. Sparta, however, was totally unsympathetic towards cowards, labeling them *tresantes* (tremblers) and forcing them to live a life of shame. Plutarch tells of how these men were forbidden to hold public office, could be struck by anyone who met them, were debarred from marrying and were forced to dress in an unkempt manner, growing half their moustache and shaving the other half.[181] In every way, the Spartan *tresantes* were thus made to declare their *atimia* in everyday life and were essentially debarred from fulfilling the proper duties of a Spartiate, such as marrying and

[175] Christ (2006: 53) lists as possible categories of exemption: those below 18 or over 59; those unable to afford armour; the sick or disabled; tax collectors; chorus members; performers of liturgies; and those serving in the cavalry. Christ further suggests that generals could grant further exemptions on personal grounds and also suggests that those living or travelling abroad were probably exempt on the grounds that the would not be able to respond to the call-up on time.

[176] Christ (2006: 56).

[177] See Xenophon *Hiero* 8.8-9; Diodorus Siculus 11.81.4-5; Lysias 14.5.

[178] See Christ (2006: 60-61).

[179] See Christ (2006: 95) on the reluctance of generals to prosecute deserters.

[180] Hansen (1976).

[181] Plutarch, *Agesilaus* 30.2-3.

producing Spartan children. There must have been a real fear that the characteristic of cowardice could be passed on to the next generation by a Spartan father who had displayed cowardice himself, as the shame attached to any family who allowed a daughter of theirs to marry a coward.

Another example of the radical reaction towards cowardice shown by Sparta can be found in Herodotus when Aristodemus, the Spartan who because of an eye complaint, or alternatively, who loitered on his return from delivering a message as a method of deserting his fellow Spartans at Thermopylae, attempts to regain his honour at Plataea. Herodotus states that although he fought extremely well, the Spartans refused to honour him as they believed that his daring exploits in battle were merely an attempt to win back his previously lost honour.[182]

It is important to note that at both Athens and Sparta, the punishments for cowardice are harsh, but do not completely exclude the offender from society. He may well be completely politically disenfranchised; he may be mocked as part of a formal system such as that in place at Sparta or informally in comedy at Athens, but he is not, as a general rule, exiled or put to death. Ducat suggests that the reference to Spartan soldiers being put to death for throwing away their shield in Diodorus (11.62.5) can be ignored due to the rhetorical nature of the sentence and, similarly, the reference in Lycurgus (*Against Leocrates* 129) that says all Spartans who refuse to risk their lives for their homeland are put to death can also be ignored due to the fact this is one of the offences specifically mentioned as covered by the punishment meted out for 'tremblers'.[183] It has also been suggested that the very reason that Spartan *tresantes* still retain the right to own property but not to sell it, is a way of preventing them from going into exile.[184] Furthermore, it has been suggested that they also did not lose their citizenship, even though they lost all the privileges that accompany citizenship. Thus, cowards at both Athens and Sparta served as living examples warning others against cowardice, particularly at Sparta where they were highly visible. If the offenders had been exiled or put to death then they could not have served such a vital role to society. However, being kept in their cities as pitiful creatures, citizens in name only, served as a reminder to other citizens of what was expected of them. If they wished to have the rewards of citizenship, they must also endure the dangers of citizenship.

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[182] Herodotus 7.229 and 9.71.2-4.

[183] Ducat (2006b: 46).

[184] Thucydides 5.34.2 and Ducat (2006b: 31).

Punishment for cowardice in battle is not unproblematic. In the panic of battle, it must have been difficult to always identify who acted bravely and who played the coward. More difficult, still, is the concept of corporate cowardice. How can a state punish a whole force for fleeing *en masse* in battle without bringing shame upon the state itself?[185] Corporately, failure of a whole force tended to be overlooked and left unpunished by both Athens and Sparta. Punishment of a whole force of soldiers after a lost battle would, of course, present problems in a democratic state such as Athens, where a large number of citizens would therefore be politically disenfranchised but evidence from Plutarch suggests that disenfranchisement of a large number of cowards at Sparta would also have raised difficulties for the state. In the *Life of Agesilaus*, Plutarch states:

> ... ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀποριῶν ἰατρῷ καὶ διαιτητῇ, τοῖς ἐν τῇ μάχῃ καταδειλιάσασιν, οὓς αὐτοὶ τρέσαντας ὀνομάζουσιν, ὀκνοῦντες τὰς ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἀτιμίας προσάγειν, πολλοῖς οὖσι καὶ δυνατοῖς, φοβούμενοι νεωτερισμὸν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν... δεινὸν οὖν ἦν τοιούτους ἐν τῇ πόλει περιορᾶν πολλοὺς οὐκ ὀλίγων δεομένῃ στρατιωτῶν....
>
> "...but as physician and umpire of civic problems, they hesitated to take away by law the citizen rights of those who had shown cowardice in battle and whom they call *tresantes*, as they were many and powerful, and they feared that they might attempt a revolution...And so terrible it was to look upon so many of them in the city at a time when the city needed very many fighting men..."[186]

Although this evidence is from a period later than the focus of this thesis, it can be assumed that disenfranchising a large number of men would be a dangerous and risky act for a state to undertake at any period unless they had resources at their disposal which allowed them to police the disenfranchised and ensure that they did not cause civic unrest.

Of course, whereas political disenfranchisement and public mockery were to the lot of cowards, great honour was in store for any soldier who served his country bravely. The desire to win honour and glory must have led many a fearful hoplite to acts of great courage. The concept of winning glory and honour is prominent throughout Homer and is, to some extent, still common in Herodotus, but wanes throughout the post-Persian War period.[187] This is due to the distinct move away from viewing war as an opportunity for

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[185] See Christ (2006: 104) on the benefits of a defeated force retreating for the future military endeavours of a *polis*.

[186] Plutarch, *Agesilaus* 30.2-4.

[187] Krentz (2002: 34) states that Herodotus mentions sixteen individuals who won awards for their bravery, but there is no mention of individual awards in Thucydides and Xenophon. However, there is evidence of awards for valour such as can be found in Plutarch, *Alcibiades* 7.3. Nevertheless, when taken alongside other evidence such as collective funerals for the war dear,

individual prowess to be displayed, as is largely the case in Homer[188], to a view of war as a strictly community activity, engaged in by the *polis* as a whole, as in the Peloponnesian Wars. However, even during the Peloponnesian period honour can be won collectively and an individual can benefit posthumously from the praise of the dead. In his Funeral Oration, Thucydides' Pericles states:

> δοκεῖ δέ μοι δηλοῦν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν πρώτη τε μηνύουσα καὶ τελευταία βεβαιοῦσα ἡ νῦν τῶνδε καταστροφή. καὶ γὰρ τοῖς τἆλλα χείροσι δίκαιον τὴν ἐς τοὺς πολέμους ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος ἀνδραγαθίαν προτίθεσθαι· ἀγαθῷ γὰρ κακὸν ἀφανίσαντες κοινῶς μᾶλλον ὠφέλησαν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων ἔβλαψαν.
>
> "It appears to me that the recent turn of events reveals the excellence of these men, both revealing it in the first place and confirming it at the last. For it was just, even for those who were inferior in other respects to manliness (courage) against the enemy on behalf of their country: for having made evil unseen by good, they have done a greater public good than they have done harm as a result of their private circumstances."[189]

For the dead soldier, his bravery and courage always ultimately led to some reward. In the earlier period this may have been an individual prize; in the later period all his previous faults and failings were collectively forgiven by the state as a whole, overshadowed by the sacrifice he ultimately made for the *polis*. Indeed, even in burial, the sacrifice made is viewed as a collective activity not as an individual one as the bones are laid to rest in a coffin containing all the bones from one tribe rather than each individual hoplite being laid to rest separately.[190] The state did not forget the family of the soldier, either. They would be honoured, and his children provided for.[191]

1.4 Conclusion

This chapter set out to explore questions relating to military ideology and, in particular, hoplite ideology in Classical Athens and Sparta. The question of the military ideal has been

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it seems likely that less emphasis is placed on individual *aristeia* in the Classical period than in earlier periods of Greek history.

[188] Exceptions to this where collective rather than individual glory are stressed in Homer can be found at Iliad 12.310-330 when Glaucos and Sarpedon talk of their role in leading the Lycians. However, this is still related to their individual glory as they wish to retain the honour already bestowed upon them and realise that they need to take their place leading the force to do so. Also at 6.440-448 Hector talks of his duty to fight for the Trojans but again, this is linked very clearly with individual honour as he fears the shame he would feel if he did not fight well.

[189] Thucydides 2.42.2-3.

[190] Thucydides 2.34.3; for more on the collectivity of the funeral process at Athens see Loraux (2006).

[191] Thucydides 2.46.1.

discussed and the evidence seems to suggest that there was a hoplite ideal in existence during the fifth century and that the figure of the hoplite was particularly dominant in art, but that literature often also centred itself around hoplitic themes and virtues. The hoplite was, in many ways, an easy figure to idolise. The very nature of hoplite battles required hoplites to stand firm, shoulder to shoulder, holding their ground against the threat of the oncoming enemy. This conveys a very powerful image of courage, bravery and devotion to the state. The corporate nature of hoplite warfare where every man relies on every other man is vital and neatly illustrates the cohesion of the military group and could be viewed, in some ways, as a metaphor for the cohesion and unity of the state as a whole.[192] Since a man could serve as a hoplite with a relatively sparse panoply or with a fuller one, the ranks of the hoplite were open to a relatively large section of the civic body. For men below hoplite status, the figure of the hoplite was not an elite cavalryman difficult for them to respect due to the gap in wealth, nor was he one of the landless poor, difficult for the elite to relate to.

That a hoplite ideal existed is clear but was it adhered to? It is clear that both Athens and Sparta had to implement strategies to discourage desertion and lack of courage in battle. Therefore, not all serving fighters seem to have lived up to the high expectations of courage which were set for them. On an individual basis, a state can control the effects of cowardice and dissuade others from embracing cowardly behaviour by implementing punishments for those caught failing to fulfill their duty to the state. However, a *polis* cannot win every contest it enters and the nature of ancient battle essentially requires the defeated side to turn and flee. Punishment of an entire defeated force, or those that survive the battle, is both impractical and potentially dangerous and damaging to troop numbers and overall civic morale. Therefore, this presents a paradox. Courage and the honour that courage carries with it are essential and the hoplite ideal presents them as such. They are the qualities celebrated beyond any others in a hoplite and are what society most ardently desires to promote in each individual soldier and in society as a whole. However, they are often also the most fleeting, volatile and delicate qualities that can be possessed. A hoplite who proves his bravery in one battle could as easily be reduced to panic in his next and similarly a cowardly soldier, ashamed by his actions, can be a valiant warrior when he next has an opportunity to fight. Courage can be easily damaged, both corporately and

[192] The collectiveness of the hoplite phalanx is, perhaps, particularly important in the two states that this thesis is focussed on. In democratic Athens the state consciously tried to minimise the role of individualism and maximise the role of collectivity as discussed by Loraux (2006). In Sparta, the men term themselves as "similars" and value collectivity over family. For example, living in barracks and eating in messes rather than with family.

individually, by one bad experience and a lack of courage can become infectious in battle leading to a rout. Therefore, the hoplite ideal, as produced by the *polis*, must encourage courage individually, yet simultaneously the *polis* must overlook collective failures of the army in order to protect citizen morale.

It is clear that, in reality, the hoplite was not the only type of fighter utilized in the fifth century and that a varied array of fighters could be commonly used in warfare. The model of the hoplite may have served, to some extent, as a convenient metaphor for the warrior in general and certain aspects of the hoplite ideal were certainly relevant to other types of fighter. For example, courage would be required of all fighters even if the hoplite exemplified courage most clearly due to the fact that they could not easily flee like an archer and were more exposed to the psychological effects of viewing the approaching enemy in a way that a rower in the fleet (particularly those rowing in the lower tiers) might not be. It is also worth remembering that changes in the scale and scope of warfare had occurred relatively suddenly during the Persian invasion and then beyond.[193] During the Persian wars, warfare began to expand its boundaries. The hoplite was certainly still utilised but the fleet began to rise into a position of importance and subsequently, during the Peloponnesian wars, there was an increased reliance on light-armed troops. These changes occurred fairly rapidly, essentially over one generation. Perhaps this further explains the continued existence of the hoplite ideal. Not only did it easily and quickly capture an idea of staunch bravery but it was an ideal that people had been wed to for generations, had been relied upon previously and was only slowly beginning to give way to other forms of warfare.

The hoplite ideal could also have been clung onto as a method of social control, protecting the status of the hoplite at a time of great military change. As Hanson states:

> "Ideologically, hoplites were made to feel that the landless “thetes” were becoming more like themselves, rather than vice-versa. This “big tent” notion that others were brought up, rather than insiders pulled down was important to the Athenian experimentation with democratic polis transformation."[194]

[193] It would be incorrect to assert that there had been a sharp change from strictly hoplitic warfare in the archaic period to a new style of fighting that belonged to the fifth-century alone. The use of light troops, for example, was not a strictly fifth-century invention but the rise of the fleet, the development of the cavalry and the gradual separation of light-armed forces from hoplites were all notable developments that impacted on the fifth-century citizen. Most notably, the rise of the Athenian empire and the subsequent provision of pay for service allowed for much longer campaigns than could have previously been undertaken. See Krentz (2002).

[194] Hanson (1996: 306).

He argues persuasively that the continued representation of hoplites in art, drama and sculpture during a time when military participation was becoming available to others prevented the hoplites from feeling threatened by the participation of the lower classes in military service.

Furthermore, the hoplite group was probably the group of citizens that allowed for the greatest degree of social mobility. It seems likely that it was possible, although perhaps only in exceptional circumstances, for poorer citizens to serve as hoplites and cavalrymen could serve as hoplites without facing shame or ridicule. Therefore, this makes the proliferation of the hoplite ideal the obvious choice in order to appeal most widely.

Now that a survey of the warrior ideal and, in particular, the importance of the hoplite ideal has been completed, it is necessary to examine how society encouraged citizens to accept and embrace their roles in society as warriors, with particular regard for those serving as hoplites. Many of the techniques society used to create military personnel could be equally applicable to light-armed troops, the naval forces or the cavalry and so throughout the thesis, the terms "warrior" and "fighter" will be preferred to the term "soldier" although the emphasis in the sources and subsequently in this thesis is on the hoplite.

Chapter 2

Training the Hoplite

To some extent, the hoplite ideal existed and was adhered to within both Athenian and Spartan societies. There can be no doubt that citizens of both states were expected to do their duty when called upon and a degree of formal training, formulated and administered by the state itself would be a reasonable way of creating a citizen willing to serve as a hoplite. This chapter will analyze, first of all, the extent to which training would really be necessary by drawing on modern psychological evidence. To what extent did ancient Greek warriors undergo similar training to modern fighters and was the training for similar reasons? This chapter examines the evidence for more formal methods of training at Athens and Sparta namely the *ephebeia* and the *agoge*, bearing in mind that the evidence for both is from later sources. It will also focus on aspects of training that were not necessarily state-sponsored but were common and were used to prepare boys for war, such as hunting, *erastes/eromenos* relationships and private weapons tuition. This chapter will mainly emphasize active, physical training that has parallels with modern military training and will discuss whether it was needed in the ancient world as it is in the modern militaries. In contrast, the subsequent chapters will focus on ideological conditioning via religious beliefs and practices.

2.1 The Psychology of the Soldier

Much is required of the infantry soldier whether ancient or modern. They are required to march for long periods, often carrying a large amount of weight in equipment or armour. They are required to endure periods of discomfort living away from the comforts of their home. They are required to eat sparse rations and, at times, to starve. But the one skill that they require more than any other is the ability to kill another human being if the situation calls for it. Throughout history the warrior figure can be found and can usually be simply expected to do his duty. However, World War I and II started academics questioning the psychology of soldiers. The academic literature on conditioning men to kill is both interesting and relevant to the discussion of the creation of the Greek hoplite.

2.1.1 Difficulties Faced by Modern Soldiers

It would be easy to assume that killing should be fairly unproblematic in a situation where a soldier is faced with an advancing enemy and is acutely aware of their own mortality. However, Marshall conducted a study into firing rates during World War II and discovered that the vast majority of men in a combat situation are extremely reluctant to kill.[195] Men will not fire at all or will fire but deliberately aim to miss their targets. His methodology could, however, be questioned as unscientific as he collected his information from interviews of soldiers who, of course, may or may not have been giving him accurate information. Following on from this theory, however, Grossman collates evidence from various periods including the American Civil War, the Battle of Belgrade in 1717 and World War I to support this theory of a soldier's reluctance to kill his fellow man.[196] To give some idea of the extent of this reluctance to kill, Grossman uses the Battle of Gettysburg as an example. When soldiers are using muskets, they can really only be either firing on the enemy or engaged in the process of reloading. Soldiers, therefore, would repeatedly load and reload their weapons in order to appear busy while still avoiding the act of killing. After Gettysburg, almost 30,000 muskets were recovered with almost all being loaded and almost half being loaded more than once. Approximately a quarter of the weapons had been loaded multiple times with one weapon even having been loaded twenty-three times without being fired.[197]

In addition to the psychological pressure inherent in having to kill, is the psychological pressure of having to endure warfare, in general. Another modern study details that after sixty days of continuous combat, ninety-eight per cent of soldiers will have become psychological casualties.[198] Psychological problems are more frequently found in front-line infantry troops than troops that are firing from mid-range (such as snipers) or long-range (such as artillery).[199] A final point worth noting is that soldiers struggle to kill with edged weapons and are extremely reluctant to use bayonets. When edged weapons have to be used, soldiers are more likely to inflict slashing or hacking wounds than piercing ones.[200]

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[195] Marshall (1978).

[196] Grossman (2009: 5-29).

[197] Grossman (2009: 23-26).

[198] Swank and Marchand (1946).

[199] Grossman (2009: 106).

[200] Grossman (2009: 120); Also, with regard to the ancient world there has been some discussion of the "Harmodius" blow, a downwards slashing movement as is being performed by Harmodius

Of these key psychological problems that face the modern soldier, most are also pertinent to the ancient hoplite. The ancient hoplite would be spared long continuous periods of fighting such as the sixty days mentioned above but would not have the luxury of doing their duty by killing the enemy from long-range. In fact, the hoplite would have to face what would seem to be the modern soldier's worst case scenario: fighting at close quarters with a weapon that could only really be effective when used to pierce the opponent.

2.1.2 Teaching the Soldier to Kill

The modern soldier learns to overcome, to some extent, these psychological barriers through training provided by their state. The key training tool for the modern army is that of conditioning. Grossman explains that when a person feels extreme fear or anger, their thinking process moves from their forebrain into the more primitive midbrain and conditioning alone can force the midbrain to respond.[201] Molloy and Grossman describe the psychological and physiological stages that are gone through by a human in a situation such as warfare as ranging between condition white (a normal state) through yellow, red, grey and black (loss of bladder/bowel control, motor skills reduced to a basic level) with the midbrain starting to take control in condition red where the heart rate reaches around 115-45 beats per minute. It is at this stage that conditioning starts to come into play with actions becoming more instinctive and muscle memory being relied upon.[202] Therefore, a key part of training is repetitive actions ensuring that a soldier will know how to respond in a situation of fearfulness. A soldier will learn to instantly shoot at a target the moment it appears on a range and will be rewarded for his success.[203] It is also worth noting that after Marshall's survey of firing rates, most military training schools no longer use bulls-eye targets but silhouettes of human form or training simulators where soldiers shoot at enemy attacking on film in front of them.[204] This more realistic battle training may have resulted

in the casts of Harmodius and Aristogeiton from Rome University (Shefton 1960: 177-179, plates 50-52). It has been detailed by Shefton (1960: 173-179) and discussed by Cook (1989: 57-58). Cook suggests that this would have been a move of desperation as it is more dangerous and less effective than a thrusting movement. However, if Grossman is correct in indicating that thrusting movements tend to be avoided; the Harmodius blow could have been a technique of choice rather than desperation.

[201] Grossman (2009: xxi-xxii).

[202] Molloy and Grossman (2007: 191-4).

[203] Grossman (2009: 254-257).

[204] Grossman (2009: xix).

in the reported increase in firing rates from the 15-20% of World War II to 55% in Korea and to 90-95% in Vietnam.[205]

Soldiers have to be prepared to come face to face with extremely hostile human beings. Non-commissioned officers shouting at them daily on parade squares or during inspections fulfill this requirement as do boxing matches or acts of violence incorporated into the training of new recruits, such as the 'milling' of the British Parachute Regiment where potential new recruits face a brief sparring bout where points are awarded for sheer doggedness and determination and deducted for blocking or ducking.[206]

Another tool used to make men into soldiers is the drill sergeant. Not only do his shouts induce the recruits to endure hostility but he acts as an all-round role model for the recruits to aspire to become.

The drill sergeant obviously oversees the training of the recruits and issues both punishment and reward (both of which further support the conditioning the soldier is going through) but he is a powerful influence outside of that as a man and a role model. He is the visual embodiment of what the recruit should become. As Grossman explains, the drill sergeant will himself wear the uniform that the soldiers wear and will also, at times, do the same things that they do such as obeying orders but he will be a practiced soldier and experienced in war. He has the authority and power and the soldiers will both look up to him and envy him simultaneously. [207]

Both during training and in combat, the importance of a group structure should not be underestimated. The group, in the modern military, will often form firm bonds during the training process which can then be taken into the battle. Even where no previous group structure exists, it is in the best interests of soldiers to form one in battle to increase their chances of survival. Going through a stressful process such as battle as part of a group also increases morale and, ultimately, decreases the long-term psychological effects of the experience.[208]

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[205] Marshall (1978) and Glenn (1989).

[206] Grossman (2009: 81).

[207] Grossman (2009: 323-3).

[208] Crowley (2012: 8-9).

A final method of ensuring a recruit is able to kill can be found on the battlefield itself. Human beings in general respond to authority figures. Milgram famously conducted an experiment in which he asked subjects to administer electric shocks to other unseen people. Despite the screams of the unseen victims, the subject was then asked to increase the voltage each time that a shock was administered up until the voltage reached a lethal level. He discovered that when an authority figure (in this case, a man in a lab coat) ordered the subjects to administer the shocks, 65% of them were willing to administer lethal level shocks despite their own personal distress at doing so.[209] It is not surprising, then, that in the army where obedience and response to authority are integrated into the mindset of the soldier throughout training, authority figures are particularly potent. Therefore, a man who may not be able to bring himself to kill on his own will often be able to find the ability to kill when an authority figure orders him to do so. Grossman's research states that four factors affect the soldier's ability to perform his duty while under the influence of authority: how close the authority figure is, how respected the authority figure is, the intensity of the demands made and the legitimacy of the authority figure.[210] Leaders were, of course, present in the ancient military but leadership in the modern military differs from that of the ancient world. In the modern military men very rarely choose their own leaders and may not have great confidence in the leader's ability. For example, in the British military there is often a clear dichotomy between soldiers' opinions of non-commissioned officers and commissioned officers. Although both will have authority over a private soldier and a soldier will obey the orders of either, non-commissioned officers tend to be held in higher esteem by private soldiers. Non-commissioned officers tend to come from the same social class as private soldiers and have undergone similar or identical training during their careers as private soldiers. They tend to have more contact with the private soldiers both inside and outside of battle and perform similar kinds of tasks. In contrast, commissioned officers are generally from a higher socio-economic social class and undergo separate officer training at Sandhurst that the private soldiers have never experienced. They mix less with the private soldiers (and this is even more pronounced in the higher ranks of commissioned officers) and often perform very different kinds of task to the private soldier that the private soldier may not be aware of. This leads to a certain degree of distrust on the part of the private soldier and questions are often raised on the abilities of commissioned officers whereas trust is generally easily given to non-commissioned officers who the soldiers see more often both in and out of battle and

[209] Milgram (1963).

[210] Grossman (2009: 144).

therefore see them as proven warriors like themselves. In the ancient world, this may have been less of a problem. In the modern British military, there is a degree of reliance on academic achievement in order to become a commissioned officer rather than promotion to the officer ranks necessarily being due to natural leadership skills or previous battle experience. In the ancient world, however, leaders could sometimes rise to power due to their natural leadership skills as noticed by the citizen body. This is particularly true in democratic Athens where the *strategoi*, for example, were elected, punished or ostracised as the *demos* saw fit. Furthermore, leaders in the ancient world were expected to be older and, therefore, have some degree of military experience. The men fighting under them could therefore feel assured that they were competent and had been trained in battle.[211] Leaders in the ancient world tended to be more actively involved with the battle itself also and would be more likely to be seen fighting side by side with the other warriors, thus generating even more respect for themselves. This style of leadership would have been even more likely to create obedience from those in the ranks than the modern style would be.[212] Ancient leaders were often highly visible and led by example which is very different from many leaders in a modern army, many of whom the men will never see or meet, personally, and who, particular when highly ranked, will not serve on the battlefield alongside the men.

Shay, a clinical psychologist, sees this process as a "what's right" mentality, something that he feels was violated, or was viewed by the soldiers as violated, in Vietnam where commands were given by men rarely, if ever, seen, from positions of relative safety. Weapons issued and commands given often were not fit for purpose and the leaders could not see the errors of their decisions since they were not 'on the ground', leading to frustration and anger on the part of the soldiers who felt that they had been betrayed.[213] In the ancient world, this was less likely and soldiers were more likely to see their commanders frequently fighting beside them and bearing the same, or a similar, burden to themselves. In a similar vein, Shay points out that modern soldiers are often totally reliant on the military for everything from food to weapons to transport and that this can cause resentment when things fail, whereas ancient troops tended to provide their own provisions

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[211] Crowley (2012: 124).

[212] See Plutarch *Lycurgus* 5 on the natural leadership qualities of Lycurgus and also 17 on how the Spartan boys undergoing the *agoge* chose their own *eiren* and would pick the young man that they felt was the most sensible and warlike; also Crowley (2012: 117) on legitimacy of the leader being increased through their participation in battle which was made possible largely due to the non-complex nature of commanding an ancient battle.

[213] Shay (1995: 5).

and, at this period, their weapons, and therefore resentment if they failed was not an issue.[214]

Modern training, therefore, addresses the specific issues that a soldier will encounter on a battlefield but it also can be considered more broadly. Strachan considers five broad criteria that training fulfills. These are that it counters boredom, it defines a clear distinction between a professional soldier and a civilian, it creates unit cohesion, it allows soldiers to learn tactical thinking and for it to become instinct, and finally it allows soldiers to learn new technologies.[215] It is clear that not all of these criteria would apply to the ancient world in all cases. For example, in Athens there was no standing army or navy or professionals who served, like modern soldiers, in that role as a career choice so training did not need to create a distinction between the professional warrior and civilian. The situation is, of course, slightly different in the case of the Spartans where a class of men did serve as "professional" soldiers, to the extent, at least, that they had no other career and that much of their identity was built on their role as a soldier. Similarly, in Athens there would be no need for training as a remedy for boredom as the men who served in the forces would have had other professions and tasks to complete in their daily life when the state was not at war. They would not be held in barracks awaiting deployment on a daily basis. Unit cohesion was important in both the ancient and the modern world and training would certainly help strengthen this in both cases, but the learning of new technologies and tactical thinking are perhaps not quite as relevant to the ancient soldier as to the modern. Strachan here seems to overlook the very important role of training as a means of preparing the soldier to kill, see death and potentially be killed. Essentially Strachan here seems to lay emphasis on the practical rather than the psychological which is a mistake since psychological preparation is of paramount importance.

2.1.3 Aggression On and Off the Battlefield

It was noted above that many of the problems faced by modern soldiers, for example killing at short range, using piercing weapons and facing the open hostility of an enemy are also issues that the hoplite had to face as a matter of course. Most of these problems are addressed in modern armies by intensive pre-battle training and the Spartan and Athenian training systems will be examined in detail later in this chapter. However, perhaps starting this training at an adult stage when a soldier enters the Armed Forces is not particularly

[214] Shay (1995: 18).

[215] Strachan (2006: 216).

useful in comparison to starting the training as a child. Indeed, the issue of childhood aggression is particularly interesting, as the US Air Force discovered when attempting to pre-select fighter pilots after World War II. They noticed that their most successful aces all had one thing in common: they had fought often as children.[216] No doubt this was indicative of a particularly violent or aggressive pre-disposition in these particular pilots that led them to be equally aggressive and pro-active in their aerial missions. Surely, though, children and teenagers who are perhaps not predisposed to have these characteristics but are encouraged to fight and express their aggressiveness are more likely to develop pugnacious characters as they age and develop and would, therefore, be more likely to express these in battle.

Indeed, studies in the 1960s and '70s appear to prove that aggression can be learnt. Children who were shown an adult acting aggressively towards a doll were subsequently shown to act in a similar way when playing when they were feeling frustrated. In contrast groups of children who had watched a cartoon of a cat acting aggressively towards the doll and a control group who did not watch any aggression, did not act aggressively in play, even when they were feeling frustrated.[217] This therefore proved that the children mimicked the aggressive behaviour of humans but not of anthropomorphised animals. A further study proved that these effects were long-term and the children were still acting aggressively in play six months after the initial experiment.[218] This study, perhaps, draws into question the conclusion of Stein *et. al*., who suggested that aggression after exposure to violent TV could be attributed to arousal theory rather than observational learning theory.[219] The study of Huesmann et. al. suggests, however, that the effects of violent viewing can be diminished by teaching that TV violence is not a realistic portrayal of real life and violence is also not acceptable in real life.[220] It is also worth considering that the viewing of violence may not have the same effects on all viewers and some may be more

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[216] Grossman (2009: 182).

[217] Bandura (1973) and Walters (1963) via Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1979: 115-6). Cline *et. al.* (1973) completed a study that showed that teens who had previously had high exposure to violence on TV were less aroused after exposure to a violent film than teens with a low previous exposure to violent TV. A further study by Huesmann *et. al*. (2003) suggests that childhood exposure to violent media leads to aggression as young adults even when socio-economic status, intellect and parenting factors are taken into account. It has also been suggeted by Molitor and Hirsch (1994) that children are not only likely to act more aggressively themselves but also are more likely to tolerate aggression in others if they have first been exposed to violent media.

[218] Hicks (1965) via Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1979: 115-6).

[219] The study of Stein *et. al*. (1981) shows that children who are observed playing before and after watching TV were less likely to engage in imaginative play when exposed to high action, high violence TV and were also slightly more likely to show aggression.

[220] Huesmann *et. al.* (1983).

susceptible to aggression after exposure to violent content than others.[221] It is also worth taking into account that these studies are in relation to media violence whereas an ancient Greek would be witnessing aggression and violence first hand, live and possibly even often at close range. One area where, perhaps, modern soldiers (or at least those under the American and British systems) might not be completely adequately prepared and which ancient soldiers would most likely be more accustomed to, is that of the gore associated with warfare. During World War I many of the youths drafted were considered unfit for purpose because they had grown up in urban areas and were, therefore, unaccustomed to the slaughter of animals.[222] A Greek hoplite would have witnessed slaughter of livestock at festivals and would have probably participated in hunting. This must have prepared them somewhat for what they would witness on a battlefield although the remains of slaughtered enemy soldiers or worse, slaughtered friends and family members, would surely be considerably more psychologically disturbing than those of livestock. The success of desensitisation procedures in regards to reducing phobic responses is well documented in psychological research. Exposure to the thing feared over time reduces fear. In a similar fashion, it could be believed that revulsion or shock at the sight of gore and slaughter would be reduced through frequent exposure to it. Again, it is worth stressing that desensitisation to gore and slaughter of livestock would perhaps make the battlefield a less horrific place than for a modern soldier but there would surely still have been a fairly high degree of shock and disgust in seeing humans, possibly friends or family, slaughtered in contrast to livestock[223]

Controlled aggression is integrated into modern training in the form of boxing and other pugilistic activities but participation in these sports both inside and outside of the Armed Forces is not particularly wide-spread. Furthermore, pugilistic sports such as boxing are often not taken up at a young age and even in the field of martial arts, for example, where participants may well be young, the sport tends to be sanitized to allow their inclusion with padded body armour being used and sparring bouts being held either as no contact fights or as limited contact fights. In contrast, wrestling and other aggressive sports were, of course, a key part of the lives of most young Greeks. Participation was wide-spread from a young age and was not sanitized to the extent that the modern sports can be. Therefore, it can be assumed that any benefits to the soldier that can be gained by participation in pugilistic

[221] Gunter (2008).

[222] Jones (2006: 232).

[223] For example see May *et. al.* (2013), Garvey and Hegrenes (1966) and Bandura *et. al.* (1969).

sports would have been amplified in the ancient Greek world where this activity was common and encouraged from a young age. Class would have been an issue in regards to participation, particularly in Athens but viewing aggressive sports would have been a relatively common activity, regardless of class.[224] The issue of athletics and aggression will be covered in greater depth in chapter 3.1.2 The Sociology and Psychology of Athletics.

The psychological support that is given from being part of a group was also a striking part of the hoplite experience. The Spartan training provided a group environment for boys and teenagers from a young age and even as grown men the group was still paramount as men ate and, the younger men, at least, also slept in their barracks. This necessarily loosened their ties to their family or their individual lives and strengthened their inclusion into and their unity as a group.[225] This is not, of course, dissimilar to modern military training where men often train and live as members of a group both in and out of warfare. Various studies have been undertaken to ascertain the effect of the group on an individual soldier. Weiner found a correlation between the cohesion of the group and the performance motivation of the individual soldier.[226] A quantitative survey of various studies on the subject found that group cohesion was positively linked with better retention of military personnel, increased well-being for personnel and increased combat readiness. Furthermore, cohesive groups were less likely to suffer from indiscipline.[227] Therefore, a cohesive group that has had the opportunity to form firm social bonds is more likely to be militarily motivated.

Crowley argues for the Athenian deme levy as serving as the 'primary group', the main, generally relatively numerically small group, which a soldier associates himself with. I believe Crowley is correct both in placing the emphasis on the deme levy as the primary group and in rejecting the notion of identifying the tribal *taxis* as occupying a place not dissimilar to that of the modern regiment. [228] Crowley suggests that the bonds between demesmen were easily created on a day to day basis, particularly in the more rural demes, where agriculture, economy and local governance required a degree of insularity. He also suggests that participation in religious ceremonies as members of a deme would deepen this connection and that it would be a strong motivating factor for an Athenian citizen to be

[224] Although most Greeks may never have travelled to watch major Panhellenic festivals often or, indeed, at all, many local festivals also featured athletic events and most Greeks would, presumably, have witnessed wrestling practices in gymnasia.

[225] Cartledge (2001: 14).

[226] Weiner (1990)

[227] Oliver *et.al.* (1999)

[228] Crowley (2012: 43).

mobilised for war alongside and as part of his community, rather than as an individual.[229] Soldiers who are sent out and return from war as part of a unit rather than as individuals are less likely to suffer psychological problems and both Athens and Sparta sent out their troops in units and as units they returned.[230]

A final consideration but an extremely influential one is that of the role of the society of which the soldier is a part. The process of killing a human being requires a degree of rationalization on the part of the soldier. If killing is wrong and unacceptable in ordinary everyday life, then he must explain his actions to himself and assure himself that his actions are just and correct. Much of this process will be internalized but it can be aided by external influences. A soldier who returns to a country that praises and rewards his actions will be more likely to successfully rationalize his actions. The opposite is true of a soldier who returns to his country to be made into a villain, as was seen with the Vietnam veterans who returned to the U.S.A. These soldiers were more likely to suffer from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and psychological difficulties than their World War II counterparts. Both of these issues are well-handled in ancient Greece. Spartan society is a warrior society that showers glory and praise on hoplites who perform well in battle and derision on the cowardly. A Spartan hoplite who kills in battle will be supported and lauded by his state on return. The Athenian state makes democratic decisions concerning war and, as a general rule, praises its hoplites on their return. For those fathers who died in war, their sacrifice was acknowledged and rewarded by the fact that their sons were reared at state expense and afforded a full panoply when they came of age.[231] Finally, there was less moral confusion regarding killing in war in the ancient world than in the modern. An enemy in battle existed as a separate entity to a fellow citizen or a fellow Greek outside of wartime.[232] The moral ambiguity of the kill that is present in the modern world was largely absent in the Greek mind.[233]

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[229] Crowley (2012: 44-45).

[230] Grossman (2009: 288-293). See also Viatkus and Griffith (1990) on the increased levels of cohesion, morale and willingness to go to war with a unit when soldiers were sent out to war as a unit rather than as an individual.

[231] Aeschines, *Against Ctesiphon* 154; Isocrates, *De Pace* 82.

[232] Crowley (2012: 94).

[233] Xenophon *Hiero* 2.15 describes the pursuit and slaughter of battle as a joyful experience. Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* 7.1.13 categorises chasing the enemy and the dealing of death alongside other 'prizes' afforded to the victors such as plunder, freedom and power.

2.1.4 Conclusion

In conclusion, a survey of the modern evidence proves that it is not enough to consider the battle experience of the hoplite without considering formal training. The modern evidence suggests that it is not natural or easy for a soldier to kill and that conditioning is necessary to make killing an instinctive act for him rather than a rational act. This raises the question of the extent to which we can find similar techniques in the ancient world and how else the hoplite could learn to kill. These issues will be examined in detail in the remaining part of this chapter. Training, it seems, is essential, but to what extent could the ancient hoplite rely on formal training from the state and to what extent did he really need it?

2.2 The Classical *Agoge*

The harsh Spartan system of education is famous, often discussed and even served as a model for more modern military training systems. It can be considered on many levels: as military preparation, as a civic education teaching boys how society expects them to behave, and as an extended initiation rite. In this thesis I will be focusing mainly on the military aspect but it is also important to remember that the *agoge* was not necessarily purely a military institution.

Kennell's *The Gymnasium of Virtue* and Ducat's *Spartan Education: Youth and Society in the Classical Period* are two of the most thorough studies of the Spartan *agoge*. Kennell argues for three separate incarnations of the Sparta education system in the Classical, Hellenistic and Roman periods. This approach necessitates a careful assessment of the evidence to ascertain which period it refers to and Kennell provides this. In contrast, Ducat argues for continuity in the Spartan education system throughout history. Ducat's approach is somewhat wider than Kennell's as he does not believe that the Spartan education system was entirely centred around the *agoge* and believed that the family and private education also played a part.

2.2.1 Difficulties in Studying the Agoge

Firstly, the word *agoge* is perhaps somewhat misleading. It is not a term specific to Sparta and is not solely connected with the Spartan form of education but can also be used more broadly to describe education in general across Greece or to describe the general collection

of Lycurgan customs at Sparta.[234] Furthermore, it is not used to refer to the Spartan education at all in the Classical period and only appears to be used in relation to it from the third century B.C. onwards.[235] However, it is a convenient and conventional term to use to refer to the Spartan system of education and with this *caveat* borne in mind, it will be used in this way throughout this thesis.

Secondly, and more importantly, there is the issue of the *agoge* in its various forms and how this impacts upon the evidence. The two main sources for the *agoge* are Xenophon and Plutarch. Neither author is writing in the period this thesis is exploring, namely the fifth century B.C. This situation is further complicated by the fact that the *agoge* existed in three different forms in three different periods of time, these being the original 'Lycurgan' form which existed down until approximately 270-250 B.C., the Cleomenean revival influenced by Sphodrias which existed from 226-188 B.C., and the Roman revival which existed from 146 until the fourth century A.D.[236] This makes the evidence more problematic. Can Plutarch, writing in the wake of all this change, possibly be useful as a source for the Classical period? Ducat believes, contrary to Kennell, that there was a large degree of continuity between the three phases and he argues for the use of all sources for the Classical period. He suggests that there was not necessarily a complete cessation of the function of the *agoge* between the Classical period and first revival and he also argues that the Cleomenean revival did not necessarily mean a change in practices. Furthermore, he disagrees with the dating of Kennell and instead suggests only a twelve year gap between the revival of Cleomenes and the Roman revival.[237] Although the sparse nature of Classical evidence does make this approach tempting, I believe that Kennell's more cautious approach is perhaps more sensible. We do not have a sufficiently broad range of evidence across all three periods to truly decide whether there was a high or low degree of continuity. Indeed, the descriptions of the ceremony at the altar of Artemis Orthia given by Xenophon and by Plutarch differ so widely that it seems to suggest that the form of the *agoge* has changed quite drastically from the Classical to the Roman period. Xenophon describes a cheese stealing ritual where the participants get whipped if they are not swift enough, while Plutarch describes an endurance contest where the whipping must be

[234] Ducat (2006a: xiii); also Kennell (1995: 116) on the broader use of the word as a general term to mean "leading".

[235] Kennell (1995: 116).

[236] Kennell (1995: 13-14).

[237] Ducat (2006a: x-xvi).

endured for as long as possible, even to the point of death.[238] It is perhaps more prudent to focus mainly on Xenophon's evidence, who, although slightly outside our period is still writing about the original manifestation of the *agoge* and not about a later form or an amalgamation of all the manifestations. For this reason this chapter will rely primarily on evidence from Xenophon.

There is also a great deal of debate over Spartan age categories. It is unclear, particularly in the Classical period, when boys entered into the *agoge*, what names existed for various age categories and when each was entered.[239] This, however, is outwith the scope of this thesis and it will suffice for the purposes of this chapter to demonstrate that a Spartan boy would have been undergoing intense training, often with a military focus throughout his teenage years, if not earlier.

2.2.2 Xenophon's Agoge

Xenophon describes a situation where the state and not the family is responsible for education. The boys were under the control of an authority figure who had at his service a group of whip-wielding youths which he could utilize to punish a disobedient boy.[240] The citizenry in general could chastise or advise a boy, if they thought fit.[241] As a boy grew into adolescence, the customs required him to be constantly working to ensure that he did not grow disobedient or attracted to pleasure and his future as a valid Spartan adult citizen depended on his behaviour and obedience to the regime as a youth.[242] Already, parallels can be drawn with modern training. The Spartans had authority figures present just like the modern soldier has a drill sergeant. The authority figure had the ability to punish for disobedience just as the modern drill sergeant can. However, the Spartan trainee was also subject to chastisement or encouragement from the general populace as well and was never away from the scrutiny of authority. Even at the end of their period of training, the Spartan youths are not entirely free from this scrutiny. Xenophon states:

> αἱροῦνται τοίνυν αὐτῶν οἱ ἔφοροι ἐκ τῶν ἀκμαζόντων τρεῖς ἄνδρας· οὗτοι δὲ ἱππαγρέται καλοῦνται. τούτων δ᾽ ἕκαστος ἄνδρας ἑκατὸν καταλέγει, διασαφηνίζων ὅτου ἕνεκα τοὺς μὲν προτιμᾷ, τοὺς δὲ ἀποδοκιμάζει. οἱ οὖν μὴ

[238] Xenophon *Athenian Constitution* 2.9; Plutarch *Instituta Laconica* 40.

[239] See Kennell (1995); Ducat (2006a).

[240] Xenophon *Lacedaemonian Constitution* 2.1-2.

[241] Xenophon *Lacedaemonian Constitution* 2.10.

[242] Xenophon *Lacedaemonian Constitution* 3.1-3.

> τυγχάνοντες τῶν καλῶν πολεμοῦσι τοῖς τε ἀποστείλασιν αὐτοὺς καὶ τοῖς αἱρεθεῖσιν ἀνθ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ παραφυλάττουσιν ἀλλήλους, ἐάν τι παρὰ τὰ καλὰ νομιζόμενα ῥᾳδιουργῶσι. καὶ αὕτη δὴ γίγνεται ἡ θεοφιλεστάτη τε καὶ πολιτικωτάτη ἔρις, ἐν ᾗ ἀποδέδεικται μὲν ἃ δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸν ἀγαθόν, χωρὶς δ᾽ ἑκάτεροι ἀσκοῦσιν ὅπως ἀεὶ κράτιστοι ἔσονται, ἐὰν δέ τι δέῃ, καθ᾽ ἕνα ἀρήξουσι τῇ πόλει παντὶ σθένει ἄν. ἀνάγκη δ᾽ αὐτοῖς καὶ εὐεξίας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. καὶ γὰρ πυκτεύουσι διὰ τὴν ἔριν ὅπου ἂν συμβάλωσι· διαλύειν μέντοι τοὺς μαχομένους πᾶς ὁ παραγενόμενος κύριος.
>
> "The Ephors therefore choose the three most vigorous men and these are called leaders of the horse guards. And each of these men chooses a hundred men, making clear their reasons for honouring one group and rejecting the other. And so those not reaching honours are at war with those who have sent them away and those who have been chosen instead of them and they watch one another to see if anyone does anything contrary to what is reckoned good practice. And indeed this strife is dearest to the gods and the most civic kind of strife, in which it has been shown what a good man must do and both parties strives to be always the strongest, and if there is a certain need, every man may aid the state with all their strength. And it is necessary for them to continuously take care of their fitness. For in fact, due to the rivalry they box whenever they meet. Every passer-by, however, is authorized to part the fighters."[243]

Here Xenophon paints a picture of a society driven by competition and using competition, jealousy and the love of honour to create citizens who are both striving to be the best they can be and simultaneously scrutinizing their peers for faults. Xenophon describes the Spartan love of competition elsewhere, too, such as when he details Agesilaus' use of prizes to induce cities to compete to provide him with the best forces.[244] It seems almost a contradiction that a society that aims to create citizen soldiers known as *homoioi* also encourages an environment of competition and jealousy. It is not, however, much different from the modern army training with participation in violent sports built in to the training where competition is encouraged between units of men in order to raise the overall standard.

Sherif has studied competition between groups by breaking boys at a summer camp into two groups and opposing them to each other in various tasks. Although the competitive

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[243] Xenophon *Lacedaemonian Constitution* 4.3-6. Interestingly, modern psychology shows that this singling out of some men may have actually created better soldiers out them than they would otherwise have been just by simply labelling them as 'achievers'. Miller, Brickman and Bolin (1975) showed that when trying to improve the behaviour of children, it was significantly more effective to label them as an achiever or as tidy than it was to simply encourage them to achieve or be tidy. Whether this study would translate to adults who were already high achievers, however, is untested.

[244] Xenophon *Hellenica* 4.2.5. Competition is, of course, found throughout Greece and also found prior to the fifth century. For example, the positive implications of *eris* are found in Hesiod's *Works and Days* 20-24 and the importance of competition is a theme that runs continuously throughout Homer. Competition in regards to athletics will be further discussed in Chapter 4.

environment encouraged hostility between the two groups and the boys from separate groups grew to dislike each other, they discovered that giving both groups a collective task to complete or uniting them against a common enemy broke down these barriers, at least temporarily.[245] Therefore, if this holds true more generally, the competitive Spartan culture would presumably not have led to tensions on the battlefield.

Famously, Spartan children were kept on short rations and were encouraged to steal food when necessary. Xenophon explains:

> σῖτόν γε μὴν ἔταξε τοσοῦτον ἔχοντα συμβολεύειν τὸν εἴρενα ὡς ὑπὸ πλησμονῆς μὲν μήποτε βαρύνεσθαι, τοῦ δὲ ἐνδεεστέρως διάγειν μὴ ἀπείρως ἔχειν, νομίζων τοὺς οὕτω παιδευομένους μᾶλλον μὲν ἂν δύνασθαι, εἰ δεήσειεν, ἀσιτήσαντας ἐπιπονῆσαι, μᾶλλον δ’ ἄν, εἰ παραγγελθείη, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ σίτου πλείω χρόνον ἐπιταθῆναι, ἧττον δ’ ἂν ὄψου δεῖσθαι, εὐχερέστερον δὲ πρὸς πᾶν ἔχειν βρῶμα, καὶ ὑγιεινοτέρως δ’ ἂν διάγειν·
>
> "Lycurgus instructed the *eiren* to contribute enough food so that they were never weighed down by indulgence and would not be unused to living with limited food. He thought that those who were brought up in this way would become accustomed to a lack of food and be more able to carry on working while fasting, if they were in need, and would last longer on the basis of the same food, if ordered. Also, they would have less need of delicacies, but have a greater tolerance to all meat, and they would be in better health too."[246]

The idea of being kept on short rations has striking parallels to the training of modern day elite units such as the U.S. Army Rangers who are often given little, or no food in order to allow them to cope better in stressful situations where food might be scarce or unavailable. The modern day elite trainee will be encouraged to forage or hunt for his food while in the field. For example, Grossman relates his own experiences of swallowing live frogs during his exhausting and grueling special forces training.[247] The Spartan was encouraged to steal. Xenophon describes the practice:

> ὡς δὲ μὴ ὑπὸ λιμοῦ ἄγαν αὖ πιέζοιντο, ἀπραγμόνως μὲν αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἔδωκε λαμβάνειν ὧν ἂν προσδέωνται, κλέπτειν δ’ ἐφῆκεν ἔστιν ἃ τῷ λιμῷ ἐπι-κουροῦντας. καὶ ὡς μὲν οὐκ ἀπορῶν ὅ τι δοίη ἐφῆκεν αὐτοῖς γε μηχανᾶσθαι τὴν τροφήν, οὐδένα οἶμαι τοῦτο ἀγνοεῖν· δῆλον δ’ ὅτι τὸν μέλλοντα κλωπεύειν καὶ νυκτὸς ἀγρυπνεῖν δεῖ καὶ μεθ’ ἡμέραν ἀπατᾶν καὶ ἐνεδρεύειν, καὶ κατασκόπους δὲ ἑτοιμάζειν τὸν μέλλοντά τι λήψεσθαι. ταῦτα οὖν δὴ πάντα δῆλον ὅτι μηχανικωτέρους τῶν ἐπιτηδείων βουλόμενος τοὺς παῖδας ποιεῖν καὶ πολεμικωτέρους οὕτως ἐπαίδευσεν.

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[245] Sherif (1966) and (1961) via Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1979: 82-65).

[246] Xenophon *Lacedaemonian Constitution* 2.5.

[247] Grossman (2009: 66-67).

> "And so that they should not be strongly pressed by hunger, Lycurgus granted that they could take what they needed but not do so easily and he decreed that they could steal some things to ease their hunger. It was not due to an inability to provide for them that he instructed them to contrive their own nourishment. No one, I believe, could fail to know that. And it is clear that someone intending to steal needs to be awake at night and to deceive by day and lie in wait and, if he wishes to seize anything, to set scouts. And so it is clear that he educated the boys in all these ways to be were resourceful in securing necessities and to be more warlike."[248]

The military language makes the act of stealing sound more like army manoeuvers, particularly ἐνεδρεύειν and κατασκόπους. The idea of stealing as a skill that must be learned is further confirmed by the fact that the boys were punished for any failure to succeed in their task.[249] This custom, then, had a double benefit. It accustomed boys to the hardship that they may encounter on a military expedition where food may be hard to come by and also teaches them stealth, spying and general resourcefulness which may also have been of use to them in manhood on the battlefield on occasion. It would have also acted as a process of initiation, the harsh rituals mirroring those of modern day special forces and making them aware of their own ability to operate under difficult conditions and their own ability to endure.

It is also at Sparta where we see the most emphasis on team-work, a skill that is essential for any soldier but perhaps even more so for a hoplite who will fight as part of a phalanx. Spartan boys were trained and kept in their 'herds' and no doubt this created a team spirit where all the boys are undergoing arduous training together. It is likely that boys in this environment, training together constantly, would form a support network for each other and learn the value of being 'brothers-in-arms', a lesson which would serve them well when they grew to adulthood and went to war. Even if the boys undergoing the *agoge* together where never to serve together or near each other in battle as adults, the lessons they had learned as boys about how to operate effectively as a team would be of use to them in adult, military life where they would have to learn to operate effectively as a military unit. Also, we have a relatively large amount of evidence for team sports in Sparta compared to what evidence exists for other states, although the evidence is late. One of these games is described by Pausanias who says it includes fighting of the boys.[250] At a later point he discusses the sacrifices made before the game and states that they also set wild boars to fight with one another before the fight at the Platanistas and the company

[248] Xenophon *Lacedaemonian Constitution* 2.6-8.

[249] Xenophon *Lacedaemonian Constitution* 2.8.

[250] Pausanias 3.14.8.

who have the winning boar, usually are victorious in the fight to come, making it clear that this is a team affair.[251] However, it is worth bearing in mind that the evidence of Pausanias probably refers to the Roman revival of the Spartan *agoge* and it cannot be assumed that these team sports existed in the fifth century.[252]

Some further evidence from Plutarch must be discussed with some caution. Kennell believes that Plutarch can be useful as a source for earlier incarnations of the *agoge* other than the Roman period and suggests that when Plutarch writes in the present tense, as in his description of the cheese stealing ritual, we should assume he is discussing an aspect that it still current at the time of writing. However, when he does not use the present, Kennell suggests that we can assume the practice has died out by the time Plutarch has written and it belongs to an earlier period.[253] His evidence, then, should perhaps not always be rejected outright but considered with some caution.

An aspect of Spartan education discussed by Plutarch was that of their attendance at the adult male common messes where they were able to listen to the discussions taking place and were able also to join in with the joking (although it seems that they were the ones who had to accept the teasing).[254] This would surely have been an invaluable part of their educational process. They would have been exposed to conversations about warfare and politics from a young age and the joking and teasing would have displayed aspects of their character to the men of the mess and would have created bonds of friendship, making the transition to serving as a warrior easier as they grew older and already would have created ties with serving soldiers. It was also at this common mess that negative examples were created by the occasional bringing in of helots and making them drunk to display the effects of drunkenness to the young men and also, no doubt, to create a contrast between the Spartiate citizen body and that of the helots.[255] These messes would have an impact and influence on the men throughout their adult lives serving in the military, not only during their formative years, and would have been part of an ongoing process of training and warrior formation.

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[251] Pausanias 3.14.10.

[252] Kennell (1995: 20-25). He thinks that as Pausanias visited Sparta at the height of the archaistic revival, it is perhaps better to ascribe his evidence only to the Roman period revival.

[253] Kennell (1995 : 24).

[254] Plutarch, *Lycurgus* 12.4. This statement about the boys attending the mess seems to be corroborated in Xenophon *Lacedaemonian Constitution* 3.5. He does not provide the detail of Plutarch but does state that boys did attend public meals and behaved modestly at them.

[255] Plutarch, *Lycurgus* 28.4

It is also worth noting the closed nature of Spartan society which made travel outside of Sparta and the acceptance of foreigners into Sparta extremely rare. Plutarch notes that this protected the state from infection by corrupting influences.[256] It would have been important for the Spartan state to protect their lifestyle in this way, particularly due to the harsh nature of it which the state would not want the citizens to question if they became familiar with other ideologies and ways of living.[257]

2.2.3 The Krypteia

Our understanding of the Spartan *krypteia* suffers, like our understanding of many Spartan institutions, from a general lack of evidence with only four sources discussing it specifically and in a useful degree of detail.[258] However, the sources are problematic since they offer up descriptions of the institutions which, although not being entirely contradictory, are certainly not fully in agreement with one another.

The four sources in question can be divided into two groups. The first group consists of a passage from Plato alongside a discussion of the passage by a scholiast. The second group consists of two sources that are influenced by Aristotle. To consider the sources in this context, it is necessary to first consider the passages from Plato and the scholion on Plato.

Plato's brief description of the institution stresses the severity of the training and seems to view it as an act of endurance. He states:

> ἔτι δὲ καὶ κρυπτεία τις ὀνομάζεται, θαυμαστὼς πολύπονος πρὸς τὰς καρτερήσεις, χειμώνων τε ἀνυποδησίαι καὶ ἀστρωσίαι καὶ ἄνευ θεραπόντων αὐτοῖς ἑαυτῶν διακονήσεις νύκτωρ τε πλανομένων διὰ πάσης τῆς χώρας καὶ μεθ᾽ ἡμέραν.
>
> "Also, there is something called the *krypteia*, an amazingly laborious form of endurance, in winter both shoeless and without bedding and without servants,

[256] Plutarch, *Lycurgus* 27.3

[257] Indeed, Pausanias, the victor of Plataea, is a prime example of what the Spartans feared in terms of degeneration of behaviour after being exposed to other cultures. See Thucydides 1. 94 on his being sent out and 1.132 on his subsequent behaviour when he grew contemptuous of the laws and imitated the ways of the barbarians.

[258] Ducat (2006a: 293-5) rightly rejects Plutarch's *Cleomenes* 28 and Justin 3.3.6 as sources, considering the former passage to be either in reference to a subsequent development of the *krypteia* as described in the sources above or as a military unit that the *krypteia* described above served as a recruitment test. The latter author seems to Ducat to be describing Spartan education in general and not specifically the *krypteia*.

> they attend to themselves, and go wandering by night and by day throughout all the territory."[259]

The scholion to this passage seems to broadly agree with Plato in stating that the participants were required to be self-sufficient but emphasises the element of hiding during the process. He states:

> ἠφίετό τις ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως νέος ἐφ᾽ ᾧτε μὴ ὀφῆναι ἐπὶ τοσόνδε χρόνον. ἠναγκάζετο οὖν τὰ ὄρη περιερχόμενος καὶ μήτε καθεύδων ἀδεῶς, ἵνα μὴ ληφθῇ, μήτε ὑπηρέταις χρώμενος μήτε σιτία ἐπιπερόμενος διαζῆν. ἄλλο δὲ καὶ τοῦτο γυμνασίας εἶδος πρὸς πόλεμον. ἀπολύοντες γὰρ ἕκαστον γυμνόν προσέταττον ἐνιαθτὸν ὅλον ἔξω ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσι πλανᾶσθαι, καὶ πρέφειν ἑαυτὸν διὰ κλοπῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτον, οὕτω ὥστε μηδενὶ κατάδηλον γένεσθαι. διὸ καὶ κρύπτεια ὠνόμασθαι·ἐκολάζοντο γάρ οἱ ὁπουδήποτε ὀφθέντες.
>
> "A young man is sent out from the city with orders not to be seen for an amount of time. And so he was compelled to wander the mountains and not to be sated with enough sleep, so as not to be caught, neither being furnished with slaves nor carrying food to sustain them. This was also a kind of training for war; for each young man, discarding their clothes, were ordered to spend a full year wandering outside of the city in the mountains and to feed himself through theft and other such behaviour, in such a way as not to become conspicuous. For that reason, it was known as the *krypteia*; for those having been seen, whenever that happened, were punished."

It is worth noting that the scholiast specifically states that he considers the ordeal as a method of training for warfare.

The second group of sources, those influenced by Aristotle, differ greatly from the two passages discussed above, most notably due to their insistence that the stress that the institution included, as an integral feature, the slaughter of helots.

Heraclides Lembus briefly describes the *krypteia*. Heraclides is here presenting excerpts from Aristotle's lost *Politeia* when he states:

> λέγεται δὲ καὶ τὴν κρυπτὴν εἰσηγήσασθαι, καθ᾽ ἣν ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐξίοντες ἡμέρας κρύπτονται, τὰς δὲ νύκτας μεθ᾽ ὅπλων…καὶ ἀναιροῦσι τῶν Εἱλώτων ὅσους ἂν ἐπιτήδειον ᾖ.
>
> "And it is said that he [Lycurgus] instituted the *krypteia*, due to which, even still, men go out to hide by day, and by night with arms…they kill as many Helots as they think is necessary."[260]

[259] Plato *Laws* 633 b-c

Our fullest source for the institution is that of Plutarch. He details the *krypteia* in a passage about the reforms of Lycurgus and specifically mentions Aristotle, making it clear that he utilised him as a source. He describes it as follows:

> ἐν μὲν οὖν τούτοις οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀδικίας ἴχνος οὐδὲ πλεονεξίας, ἣν ἐγκαλοῦσιν ἔνιοι τοῖς Λυκούργου νόμοις, ὡς ἱκανῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς ἀνδρείαν, ἐνδεῶς δὲ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην. ἡ δὲ καλουμένη κρυπτεία παρ᾽ α ὐτοῖς, εἴ γε δὴ τοῦτο τῶν Λυκούργου πολιτευμάτων ἔν ἐστιν, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης ἱστόρηχε, ταύτην ἂν εἴρηκαὶ τῶ Πλάτωνι περὶ τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐνειργασμένη δόξαν. ἦν δὲ τοιαύτη· τῶν νέων οἱ ἄρχοντες διὰ χρόνου τοὺς νοῦν ἔχειν δοχοῦντας εἰς τὴν χώραν ἄλλως ἐξέπεμπον, ἔχοντας ἐγχειρίδια καὶ τροφὴν ἀναγκαίαν, ἄλλο δὲ οὐδεν· οἱ δὲ μεθ᾽ ἡμέρ αν μὲν εἰς ἀσυνδήλους διασπειρόμενοι τόπους, ἀπέχρυπτον ἑαυτοὺς καὶ ἀνεπαύοντο, νύκτωρ δὲ κατιόντες εἰς τὰς ὁδοὺς τῶν εἱλώντων τὸν ἁλισκόμενον ἀπέσφαττον. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἀγροῖς ἐπιπορευόμενοι τοὺς ῥωμαλεωντάτους καὶ κρατίστους αὐτῶν ἀνήρουν. ὥσπερ καὶ Θουκυδίδης ἐν τοῖς Πελοποννησιακοῖς ἱστορεῖ τοὺς ἐπ᾽ ἀνδρείᾳ προχριθέντας ὑπὸ τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν στεφανώσασθαι μὲν ὡς ἐλευθέρους γεγονόντας καὶ περιελθεῖν τὰ τῶν θεῶν ἱερά, μικρὸν δὲ ὕστερον ἅπαντας ἀφανεῖς γενέσθαι, πλείονας ἢ δισκιλίους ὄντας, ὡς μήτε παραχρῆμα μήτε ὕστερον ἔχειν τινὰ λέγειν ὅτῳ τρόπῳ διεφθάρησαν. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ μάλιστά φησι καὶ τοὺς ἐφόρους, ὅταν εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν καταστῶσι πρῶτον, τοῖς εἴλωσι καταγγέλλειν πόλεμόν, ὅπως εὐαγὲς ᾖ τὸ ἀνελεῖν.
>
> "And so in these things there is no sign of injustice or arrogance which some claim about the laws of Lycurgus, saying that they are sufficient for producing manliness but are wanting in righteousness. And what is called "the *krypteia*", if indeed this is an institution of Lycurgus, as Aristotle narrated, this may have formed Plato's opinion of the man and his policies. And it [the *krypteia*] was thus: the leaders sent out from time to time some of the ablest young men into the country, armed with daggers and necessary provisions and nothing else: during the day they scattered into hidden places where they hid themselves and waited and by night they came down to the roads and cut the throats of Helots they had captured. Often they travelled to the fields and killed the strongest and most powerful Helots. Thucydides, in his history of the Peloponnesian War, said that those of the helots, having been selected by the Spartiates for their bravery, were wreathed as a sign of their freedom and taken round the shrines of the gods but a short time later, they all vanished, being more than two thousand in number, in such a way that neither immediately nor later could anyone say in what way they had been destroyed. And Aristotle especially said that the rules, whenever they first took up office, declared war on the Helots so that they were free to kill them without impiety."[261]

Three of our four sources specifically mention hiding and all but Heraclides state that the men were sparsely provisioned. Ducat suggests that Plato, perhaps, deliberately omits

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[260] Fragment presented in *FrHG* 2: 210 wrongly attributed to Heraclides Ponticus. See Bloch (1940): 27-39 on the attribution of the fragment to Heraclides Lembos. Also see Dilts (1971) for translation of fragments and brief discussion.

[261] Plutarch *Lycurgus* 28

mention of the hiding aspect of the institution as Megillos' theme here is specifically related to warfare requiring endurance of difficult circumstances and hiding does not fit into this theme.[262] All but Heraclides mention the wandering nature of the institution, while both of the sources associated with Aristotle specifically make reference to the killing of helots. Neither Plato nor his scholiast make no mention of any weapons with the scholiast using the γυμνόν to describe the participants but it is not clear whether he intended this to mean physically naked or simply unarmed. Of course, there would be no need for the men to be armed if they did not intend to slaughter helots. Of course, if the participants were sparsely provisioned, they may have been sent out with weapons in order to hunt for food and this may give strength to the argument that γυμνόν should be interpreted as physical nudity. However, the sources only specifically mention theft as a method of supplementing their provisions.

Clearly, the most striking difference in the texts is the lack of helot hunting in the first pair while it is explicitly included in the second set of passages. This is such a glaring inconsistency in the two descriptions that it simply cannot be ignored. Ducat has proposed that it is conceivable that Plato was simply unaware of the helot hunting aspect of the institution but Ducat realises that although this could be a defence of the Platonic passage, it would seem unlikely to apply also to the scholiast who, surely, would have been aware of the helot hunting tradition through Aristotle, at least.[263] Ducat's solution to this is to propose that two traditions of recording the *krypteia* co-existed with one being pro-Spartan and pro-Lycurgus and, therefore, omitting to mention the helot hunting.[264] Perhaps the passage from Plutarch hints at these opposing traditions when he attempts to protect the reputation of Lycurgus and the earlier Spartiates by suggesting that the ferocious treatment of the helots was a product of a post-earthquake Sparta.

Whether Ducat is correct in suggesting two opposing traditions or not, most scholars have considered these four passages together to create a single picture of the *krypteia* and have included helot hunting as part of the institution. The idea of slaughtering helots is certainly not one that is incompatible with the Spartan way of life. In fact, this could be attested by Thucydides' description of the missing helots whom the Spartans had presumably

[262] Ducat (2006a: 284)

[263] Ducat (2006a: 293)

[264] Ducat (2006a: 293)

murdered ruthlessly after identifying them, ostensibly in a bid to reward their valour.[265] The idea of a helot hunt is, therefore, far from inconceivable.

Ducat also finds the contrasting descriptions of helot hunting problematic, believing that the hunting must have been either at random or targetted with a list of names given by the authorities but that it could not have been both. He believes that Plutarch implies that if a target failed to materialise, the participants in the *krypteia* would then, instead, go searching for a name on their hit-list. Ducat finds this absurd and believes that the hit-list targets would, necessarily, have to be prioritised over a random killing.[266] However, it is not necessary to find complications with Plutarch's description. There is no specific mention of a hit-list given to the participants and it is not necessary for one to be imagined. The young men would, surely, know the area and be aware of farms nearby. The close community found in Sparta would mean that the young men would be aware of helots who might be particularly troublesome through overheard conversations either during their daily training or when being permitted to attend the *syssition*. Indeed, one of the participants, themselves, may be aware of a particularly powerful helot working on their own farm or that of a neighbour. Therefore, if a target fails to materialise, it would be easy for the young men to select one that they were aware of and specifically seek the target out without any need for being given a state-issued list of targets.

Perhaps it is not surprising that, with only brief and, at points, contradictory descriptions of the institution, scholars have struggled to come to a consensus on its purpose. Wallon has proposed that it served as a secret police force under state control and Michell broadly supports this proposal, pointing out that secret assassinations are often found in association with tyrannical governments. He also asserts that it would certainly have been a successful way of dealing with the dangerous, marginalised Helots and ensuring that they were controlled. He does not, however, think that these murders were "indiscriminate" and believes that they were only occasional affairs.[267]

However, this theory does not seem entirely convincing. Although control over the helots, via terrorism, intimidation or otherwise harsh treatment, would be essential for the Spartan state, there is surely no need for it to be as highly secretive as the *krypteia*. The ephors,

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[265] Thucydides 4.80.3-4

[266] Ducat (2006a: 287 and 306)

[267] Wallon *Explication d'un Passage de Plutarque sur une loi de Lycurgue nommoe la Cryptie* and Michell (1952): 162

after all, publicly announce their enmity with the helots and the helots are frequently subjected to public ridicule. It would, therefore, be feasible for the state to require men to kill any influential helots at any moment and, therefore, it would not be necessary for these men to go into hiding and attack at night. Furthermore, according to Plutarch, the ablest young men are selected for the task and, again, this would not be a necessity. Any man or group of men should, in theory, be able to slaughter a helot, particularly if the Spartiate is armed and the helot unnarmed and caught unawares. The necessity to go into the wild sparsely provisioned would also seem unnecessary for a secret police force.

Levy is troubled by the contradictory nature of the sources and, therefore, proposes that the krypteia was not a single institution and, instead, was a selection test for an elite group of commandos and also a patrol of *ephebes* similar to the Athenian *ephebeia*. However, he believes the elite group of commandos chosen through this selection test were utilised to terrify and kill helots and that seems unconvincing for the reasons stated above. Also, the description we have of the institution does not necessarily seem to be consistent with the idea of patrolling. Ducat points out that the wandering nature of the *krypteia* seems, initially, to contradict Levy's patrolling theory. However, after consideration, it becomes clear that a patrol can either be a focussed mission with a set target or it can be a more general sweeping of an area that could, conceivably, be described as "wandering".[268] However, Ducat questions why a patrol would need to be as sparsely provisioned as the participants in the *krypteia* were, particularly in regards to a lack of footwear as Plato attests.[269] Furthermore, the age of the participants in the *krypteia* would make a patrol group seem more questionable. They are described as *neoi*, young men of about age twenty who would be about to embark on military service. The Athenian *ephebeia* enrolled men slightly younger than this. Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of Levy's patrol theory is the fact that the *krypteia* seems to be limited to a select few. Surely, if the *krypteia* were akin to the Athenian *ephebeia*, it would have been necessary for all potential Spartiates to participate. Finally, Plutarch suggests that intelligence was the key criteria for being selected to participate and intelligence would not seem to be a trait that would be particularly necessary for a patrol.

Köchly also argued for an interpretation of the *krypteia* as a form of military training, not dissimilar to the Athenian *ephebeia*.[270] It is true that the scholiast to Plato seems to believe

[268] Ducat (2006a: 283)

[269] Ducat (2006a: 284)

[270] Köchly (1835) *Commentatio de Lacedaemoniorum cryptia*

that the *krypteia* served as a form of military training. However this, again, raises the question, however, of why only select young men were selected to participate and why Plutarch stresses that it happened only from "time to time". This would seem strange in the context of Spartan culture where training for all Spartiates is extremely regimented, prescribed and exact. The Spartiates all follow a common education and a common subsequent lifestyle that revolves around the military mess. Both education and Spartan daily life follow a very distinct set pattern and timescale. It would seem strange, then, that the *krypteia*, if educative in function, breaks from these rules in being available only to a select few. Furthermore, during the process of Spartan education, the boys were forever watched, examined and corrected by their peers, their leaders and men in the community. The *krypteia,* again, seems to break with this tradition in respect to the fact that the young men disappear off into the countryside alone, far from observing eyes.

There is also the question of what educational function the activities involved in the *krypteia* could truly serve. Certainly, surviving on limited rations or using ingenuity to supplement them could, potentially, be a useful skill for warfare on occasion but there is less call for prolonged periods of hiding. Although learning to kill and being accustomed to the act of killing could be seen as a form of psychologically conditioning the young man to kill in warfare, he certainly would not be experiencing the same kind of killing as he would during war since he would be using a weapon to take the life of an unarmed man.

Dodd has stated that he finds a purely educational function for the *krypteia* as simply unbelievable due to the fact that the it was such a tool of terror that it cannot possibly be ascribed simply an educative function without having to be related, to a greater or lesser extent, to "destroying the political will of a large portion of the Spartan population."[271]

Jeanmaire draws on anthropological evidence to propose an initiatory purpose for the *krypteia.*[272] He argues that in Sparta we see a reflection of the anthropological evidence where the young are temporarily rejected by society by being sent to a place of isolation which, very frequently, is the border lands of the country or tribal area. He points out that in some cultures this initiation is not experienced by all members of an age group but by an elite selection of young men. Furthermore, he explains the death of the helots by illustrating that in many primitive cultures, a boy can not be considered a man until he has spilled the blood of an enemy.

[271] Dodd (2003): 75

Ducat gives further force to the initiation argument by pointing out that the passage concerning the *krypteia* in Plato exists within a wider discussion of what could broadly be considered initiation rites.[273] Ducat finds the initiation theory broadly convincing, in general. He argues that various aspects of the institution, as discussed in the sources, are suggestive of a regression to childhood or a regression even beyond that to a primitive, animalistic state. For example, the lack of bedding may have necessitated the building of *stibades* just as they were expected to do as part of their training in the *agoge* as young boys, stealing of food also echoes what we know of Spartan education from Xenophon and the inversion of diurnal and nocturnal activities where the boys hid by day and hunted at night hinted at a regression to a primitive, animalistic state.[274]

Ducat, also, finds anthropological comparisons illuminating and sees echoes of the *krypteia* in initiation ceremonies of Africa, N. America and Australia. For example, initiation often includes wandering, killing, sleep-deprivation and hiding. However, Ducat suggests that since the participants are described as *neoi*, a description that evokes that of a young man aged between twenty and thirty, we cannot view them as initiates but should instead view them as those who are newly initiated. This process of initiation releasing in them energy that makes them a danger to society and, as such, they must be expelled from society temporarily.[275]

Vidal-Naquet views the *krypteia* as an initiatory ceremony whereby the moment of leaving childhood behind is dramatised by the process of inversion, similar to the Spartan practice of marking a girl's progress into womanhood through marriage by inverting her gender and making her dress as a man.[276] He considers the participant in the *krypteia* to represent the opposite of all that the hoplite was. The young adult became, by this process of inversion, the anti-hoplite and through this, finally, became a full member of Spartiate society. He remarks that while a hoplite is fully armed, the young man in the *krypteia* is either not armed or is sparsely armed. The youth is either on his own or in a small group as opposed to the hoplite who is a member of a large phalanx. The hoplite is associated with the plain while the youth is found in the mountains and, if Plato is to be believed, the youth could be found training in winter while a hoplite normally would operate in summer. The youth is

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[272] Jeanmaire (1913)

[273] Ducat (2006a: 283)

[274] Ducat (2006a: 298-304); Xenophon *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians* 2.6-7

[275] Ducat (2006a: 336-8); on *neoi* and ages, see Ducat (2006a: 101)

[276] Vidal-Naquet (1981: 113-114)

identified by intelligence and cunning, having to hide and steal food, as opposed to the honourable hoplite for whom neither would appear honourable. Similarly, the youth operates by night and the hoplite operates by day. The youth would have to eat whatever was available to him in the wild in contrast to the civilised hoplite who is an established member of a common mess. Finally, the youth is relegated to the borders of frontiers of the *polis* whereas the hoplite is associated with the city itself.

The initiation theory seems to be the most compelling of the three possible explanations discussed, particularly since a few select members of the group could undergo the process as representatives of their whole age class. However, perhaps it is too simplistic to make a choice between a helot police force, an educational purpose and an initiatory rite. Instead, perhaps, the *krypteia* may have embodied an element of all of these simultaneously. Indeed, Ducat, although enamoured with the initiation concept, sees the process as an initiation rite which also serves a double function aside from pure initiation. He believes that the *krypteia* fits into the Spartan system of continuously picking out elites from within the ranks that begins in the *agoge* and continues up to the *gerousia*. The second function that Ducat identifies for it is that of solidifying the structure of Spartan society by confirming the Spartiates as superior and the helots as inferior.[277]

Ducat, I believe, is correct in asserting that the *krypteia* has both an initiatory character and serves a useful function in affirming the status of the Spartiates as lords of the helots. However, he perhaps does not go quite far enough in highlighting the educative function of the process. There would be, no doubt, a great psychological benefit to those who participate in preparing them to kill in battle by killing helots. It would be easier for those who have killed ruthlessly and in cold blood to kill in battle when their own lives are threatened. The culture of dehumanisation of the helots may, itself, have helped condition Spartiates to the killing fellow Greeks. It was previously discussed that soldiers find it easier to kill those who do not look or talk like them as they can more easily dehumanise them. In Greece, hoplites were often fighting other Greeks who looked like them and talked the same language but the Spartans would have endured a lifelong conditioning in learning to dehumanise people who were similar to them through this war on the helots. Even the Spartiates who were not themselves selected to participate in the killing would, of course, have been aware of this divide and been touched by the cultural dehumanisation of the helot class.

[277] Ducat (2006a: 309)

Furthermore, the participation in tests such as this that were uncomfortable, difficult and perhaps even psychologically distressing, would have acted as a preparation for warfare and the mental fortitude demanded of an adult Spartiate. It is largely irrelevant that the initiation itself did not include acts that were immediately reminiscent of hoplite warfare. The endurance of difficult conditions, in itself, would require and help to create a mental toughness, increase resourcefulness and build team cohesion in the small group of participants. Comparison could even be drawn, on some levels, with modern day corporate survival skills courses that are popular with businesses to encourage team building and resourcefulness. In fact, the entire Spartan educative system required high levels of endurance. In the modern military troops are often required to endure exercises that require endurance and suffering. Often, too, these exercises have very little with the likely operational requirements of that soldier in warfare. For example, the modern British Army often conducts extensive training exercises on Dartmoor due to the inhospitable, difficult conditions there even though most British soldiers are unlikely to ever be required to operate in a war zone that bears any remote similarity to a British moor. Nevertheless, the exercise serves the purpose of both teaching the recruit how to cope in an unpleasant situation and of proving to others that the recruit has the psychological ability to perform under pressure. In a similar way, the *krypteia* could serve both as an initiatory ritual and as a form of additional military training for the select few participants who were chosen.

2.3 Education at Athens

Education at Athens, in contrast to that of Sparta, fell much more frequently within the private sphere rather than being a public concern. Emphasis does not seem to have been placed on military education and training and evidence about such preparation for the recruit soldier is sparse and complex. Xenophon states explicitly that military education is not provided by the state but that a man should pursue it himself.[278]

Dance may have served a training purpose, to some extent. Plato describes the pyrrhic dance as a dance which represents various movements that can be used to avoid missibles such as swerving and ducking and also includes other offensive postures.[279] The Athenian in Plato's *Laws* notes the usefulness of mimetic dancing as training for war and states that

[278] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 3.12.5. See also Thucydides 2.39.1-4 where Thucydides maintains that the Athenians relied on their natural courage over laborious training and Aristotle Politics 8.1338b where it is stated that the Spartans trained where others did not.

[279] Plato *Laws* 7.815

Athens and Sparta both have armed dances as part of their cultures.[280] The Spartan form of armed dance is described in Philostratus who states that it included movements that could be utilised to avoid missiles as well as dexterous shield handling manoeuvres.[281] Dancing while carrying a heavy shield would certainly build physical fitness and increase the strength of the participants if practiced frequently. The dance seems to have involved a high degree of movement and whether such a degree of mobility would have been possible in a hoplite battle is not certain.[282] Movement such as these would, however, have been unquestionably possible for more lightly armed troops. However, there is also evidence for the pyrrhic dance being practiced by females.[283] It seems unlikely that a dance that is seen primarily as a form of military training would be associated with female involvement. Therefore, the dance most probably served a religious purpose primarily and any related military training benefits were secondary and probably not extensive enough to be considered part of any structured, state training.

There may have been some sort of training for the fleet as Thucydides mentions the improving of naval tactics.[284] The rowers themselves, of course, would not have any need to decide naval tactics but would need to be able to respond to the commands given in order to achieve the naval tactics the situation demanded. For example, reversing the ship, encircling or moving forward at a pace would surely need a degree of practice. Attempts at naval training before Lade under the control of the Phocaean commander Dionysius were unsuccessful with the Ionian fleet refusing to obey his commands after a period of being trained relentlessly.[285]It is not clear whether the response of the Ionians could be attributed to an unfamiliarity with naval training, in general, or whether Dionysius simply trained the Ionians too extensively and this led to a breakdown of morale. It would seem unlikely, however, that men familiar with the concept of training would be unfamiliar to submit to it, even under a harsh regime, when in a dangerous situation so it can perhaps be tentatively assumed that naval training is still viewed as a new approach at this period. Thucydides

[280] Plato *Laws* 7.796b-c

[281] Philostratus *On Gymnastics* 19

[282] Van Wees (2004: 186) states that the ranks of a hoplite force did not necessarily have to be densely packed together, therefore this degree of mobility may, indeed, have been possible.

[283] See Goulaki-Voutira (1996) for a survey of this evidence.

[284] Thucydides 1.121.4; on naval training also see Plutarch *Cimon* 6 and 11 and *Pericles* 11.

[285] Herodotus 6.11.1-6.12.4

mentions the necessity of practice for a successful naval fleet but does not furnish us with details of what this training consisted of or how often it was undertaken.[286]

The possibility of naval training and lack of hoplite training does not need to be a contradiction, however, for two reasons. Firstly, the crew of a ship are not simply responsible for their own bodies but essentially for the operation of a machine. They must ensure that they know how to work as a group in order to get the ship to respond in a particular way. Secondly, for hoplites the idea of training may have seemed somewhat abhorrent as they may have believed their skills should be innate as they had been born into a warrior class.[287] The operation of the *phalanx* would not necessarily have been greatly impacted by lack of regular training, so long as more complicated drills such as counter-marching were avoided. Advancing while keeping formation shield to shield would necessarily be relatively difficult over rough terrain and some sort of informal, irregular training may have gone some way towards remedying any problems with this but once the two sides met, it would largely be up to the individual skill and strength of each man to fight and hold their place in the line rather than the collective skill of the whole force to move in concert with each other (as is the way with modern military drill which, similarly, often serves little purpose on the battlefield itself).

2.3.1 Rudimentary Education and Literacy

General education at Athens and Sparta differed greatly in both scope and emphasis. Plato considers Athenian education as a combination of gymnastics and music with stories being included in the realm of music.[288] Xenophon's description of education outside of Sparta agrees broadly with Plato's as he states that parents send their children to learn letters, music and physical exercises.[289] This famous passage from Plato's *Protagoras* details the educative process at Athens in greater depth:

> ἐκ παίδων σμικρῶν ἀρξάμενοι, μέχρι οὗπερ ἂν ζῶσι, καὶ διδάσκουσι καὶ νουθετοῦσιν. ἐπειδὰν θᾶττον συνιῇ τις τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ τροφὸς καὶ μήτηρ καὶ παιδαγωγὸς καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ πατὴρ περὶ τούτου διαμάχονται, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος ἔσται ὁ παῖς, παρ᾽ ἕκαστον καὶ ἔργον καὶ λόγον διδάσκοντες καὶ ἐνδειχνύμενοι ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον, καὶ τόδε μὲν καλόν, τόδε δὲ αἰσχρόν, καὶ τόδε

[286] Thucydides 1.142.6-7

[287] At Athens the idea of having innate skills as warriors is captured in the words that Thucydides assigns to Pericles in his funeral oration at 2.39.1

[288] Plato *Republic* II.376e-377a

[289] Xen. *Const. Lac*. II.1

μὲν ὅσιον, τόδε δὲ ἀνόσιον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ποίει, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποίει. καὶ ἐὰν μὲν ἑκὼν πείθηται· εἰδὲ μή, ὥσπερ ξύλον διαστρεφόμενον καὶ καμπτόμενον εὐθύνουσιν ἀπειλαῖσ καὶ πληγαῖς. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα εἰς διδασκάλων πέμποντες πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐντέλλονται ἐπιμελεῖσθαι εὐκοσμίας τῶν παίδῶν ἢ γραμμάτων τε καὶ κιθαρίσεως· οἱ δὲ διδάσκαλοι τούτων τε ἐπιμελοῦνται, καὶ ἐπειδὰν αὖ γράμματα μάθωσιν καὶ μέλλωσιν συνήσειν τὰ γεγραμμένα ὥσπερ τότε τὴν φωνήν, παρατιθέασιν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν βάθρων ἀναγιγνώσκειν ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα καὶ ἐκμανθάνειν ἀναγκάζουσιν, ἐν οἷς πολλαὶ μὲν νουθετήσεις ἔνεισιν πολλαὶ δὲ διέξοδοι καὶ ἔπαινοι καὶ ἐγκώμια παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἵνα ὁ παῖς ζηλῶν μιμῆται καὶ ὀρέγηται τοιοῦτος γενέσθαι. οἵ τ᾽ αὖ κιθαρισταί, ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, σωφροσύνης τε ἐπιμελοῦνται καὶ ὅπως ἂν οἱ νέοι μηδὲν κακουργῶσιν· πρὸσ δὲ τούτοις, ἐπειδὰν κιθαρίζειν μάθωσιν, ἄλλων αὖ ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα διδάσκουσι μελοποιῶν, εἰς τὰ κιθαρὶσματα ἐντείνοντες, καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς τε καὶ τὰς ἁρμονίας ἀναγκάζουσιν οἰκειοῦσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν παίδων, ἵνα ἡμερώτεροί τε ὦσιν, καὶ εὐρυθμότεροι καὶ εὐαρμοστότεροι γιγνόμενοι χρήσιμοι ὦσιν εἰς τὸ λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν· πᾶς γὰρ ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ εὐαρμοστίας δεῖται. ἔτι τοίνυν πρὸς τούτοις εἰς παιδοτρίβου πέμπουσιν, ἵνα τὰ σώματα βελτίω ἔχοντες ὑπηρετῶσι τῇ διανοίᾳ χρηστῇ οὔσῃ, καὶ μὴ ἀναγκάζωνται ἀποδειλιᾶν διὰ τήν πονηρίαν τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πράξεσιν. καὶ ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ μάλιστα δυνάμενοι μάλιστα - μάλιστα δὲ δύνανται οἱ πλουσιώτατοι...

“From their early childhood as long as they live, they teach them and warn them. As quickly as a child is able to understand the things that are said, the nurse and mother and tutor and the father himself struggle so that the child can be the best, and teaching each task and each word, they point out that this is just and this is unjust, this is virtuous and this shameful, this holy and that unholy and that he should do these things and not these other things. And if he willingly obeys, well and good, if not, they view him like a twisted piece of wood and straighten him with threats and strikes. After this, they send him to a teacher where greater emphasis is placed on the behaviour of the children than on letters and cithara playing. The teachers manage these things and when the children know letters and they are about to understand letters just as they before understood what was spoken, they are supplied with the works of the good poets to read upon their seats and are compelled to learn them thoroughly. In these works they are inspired by many warnings and many detailed accounts and praises and commendations of good men from the past, in order that the boy in jealousy will imitate them and aim to become as they were. Then also the music teachers, similarly, take care to foster discretion so that the young boys do not do evil. When they have learned to play cithara, they are taught the works of other good poets, the lyric poets, setting these to music, both the rhythms and harmonies they compel the souls of the boys to become familiar with, in order that they might become more civilised, more rhythmical and harmonious and thus become more suited to both speech and action: for all of a man’s life requires harmony and rhythm. Accordingly, over and above these things, they send the child to a gymnastics trainer, so that their bodies might better serve their virtuous thoughts and so they are not compelled, through a bad physical state, to play the coward in war or at any other occasion. And that is what they do, those who are especially able – and those especially able are the wealthy…”[290]

[290] Plato *Protagoras* 325c-326c

This suggests that education followed a prescribed route starting with moral and behavioural education, progressing on to basic literacy, continuing with the study of literature and culminating with musical training. The language of this passage seems to suggest that gymnastic training may have continued as an additional activity over and above the other educative pursuits. As Plato remarks, education was most accessible to the wealthy. However, there is no real reason to believe that the full course of education from letters to music and inclusive of gymnastics needed to be attained. Beck argues that although a full education may well have been the preserve of the wealthy, those of more humble means could afford a basic education in literacy.[291] Beck argues that the fact that Cleon in Aristophanes' *Knights* assumes that the humble sausage-seller has attended school, attests to the fact that most youngsters would have gained a basic education.[292] However, it is worth noting that the sausage-seller responds that his school was the kitchen and does not confirm that he gained any literary education. Beck argues, more convincingly, that the poorest probably could not afford a musical education and, therefore, inability to play the lyre suggested a lack of education. He evidences the conversation in Aristophanes' *Wasps* where both Bdelycleon and Philocleon refer to a lack of knowledge of the lyre as a metaphor for ignorance.[293] However, this passage may give further evidence to support Beck's claim that a basic literary education may have been standard. Bdelycleon begs forgiveness for the dog he is defending by claiming he is ignorant, as his inability to play the lyre testifies. Philocleon replies that he wishes that he did not know how to write, either, suggesting that writing was a common skill, even among those who had never went on to further musical study.[294] Marrou certainly believes that the general prevalence of writing suggests that it was widely taught to most.[295] This is a convincing point to make considering that in Athens the written word was commonly used and seemed to be commonly understood with call-up lists being displayed publicly and with citizens having to mark a piece of pottery as a method of ostracising a fellow citizen. Morgan sees democracy as a catalysing force for the spread of literacy in Athens and states the common uses for writing in Athens were wide and varied with the written word being used in temples, the law courts, the council, to mark boundaries, to ostracise, do make

[291] Beck (1964: 83)

[292] Beck (1964: 83) and Aristophanes *Knights* 1235-9

[293] Beck (1964: 129) and Aristophanes *Wasps* 959 and 989

[294] Aristophanes, *Wasps* 989-990

[295] Marrou (1956: 43)

dedications, to publish laws, for contracts, banking and diplomacy.[296] Indeed some of these uses may well be limited to an elite audience but others would have an appeal to a wider audience.

Harris has argued strongly against widespread literacy. He argues that ancient Athens failed to meet the necessary preconditions for widespread literacy such as a wide-ranging, subsidised school system, availability of low cost texts and availability of writing materials. He also believes that rural populations do no assist the spread of literacy and suggests that literacy levels could have been under fifty per cent.[297] Although he does acknowledge that different levels of literacy could be possible, his low estimate of overall literacy does not seem to take this entirely into account.

There will have been, no doubt, citizens who were completely illiterate. Plutarch relates an account of Aristides being asked to write his own name on an *ostraka* by a man who is described as being without letters and ἀγροίκων.[298] Perhaps, then, it is fair to suggest that some rural dwelling Athenians, who made their livings in the fields and had limited contact with the city, did not obtain a basic education. However, the school system that was in place might not have necessarily been prohibitively expensive for most Athenians. After all, Aristophanes' sausage-seller did have a basic education. Availability of low cost texts and writing equipment may make it difficult for some Athenians to gain a higher level education but many Athenians could find it useful to be able to read without, necessarily, ever having any need to write or, indeed, to read texts other than the ones which he would encounter around his city.

Thomas argues that assessing the evidence to obtain an estimate of how widespread literacy may have been in the ancient world is counter-productive, not only because of the near impossibility of the task itself but also because focussing on literacy detracts from understanding how oral and written traditions interacted. Thomas emphasises the continuation of a strong oral culture that continued long after the Classical period.[299] The idea of oral culture being as important as literacy is particularly important for this thesis

[296] Morgan (1999: 53-4). See Sickinger (1999) for an extensive study of the written records and archives kept in Classical Athens.

[297] Harris (1989: 12-22)

[298] Plutarch *Aristides* 7.5

[299] Thomas (1989: 15-34)

due to the educative uses of poetry and theatre whether transmitted orally or read, of which further discussion will follow.

Marrou suggests that another defined type of education existed in the form on an older mentor passing on knowledge to a younger man. Marrou believes that Peleus' relationship with Achilles and Athena's relationship with Telemachus under the guise of Mentor serve as Homeric examples of this educative process at work.[300] Marrou argues that this type of education could be both technical and ethical at the same time with a younger man being taught the technicalities of warfare while also being taught a moral code.[301]

There would have been broad scope for this kind of education at both Athens and Sparta. It could have been a formal or ritualised affair in the context of a pederastic relationship or it could have been a less formal affair with family members, neighbours and friends passing on information to the younger man. Mentor relationships need not have even been long-lasting and it is surely conceivable that an older, more experienced man could watch over a younger, less experienced man who was stationed next to him on the battle-field, for example, without necessarily having any lasting mentor relationship with the boy. At Sparta, the boys were under constant surveillance from older boys and from any member of the citizenry who took an interest in them. Again, it would be easy for dissemination of advice or information to take place without a formal relationship and, when the boy became a member of a mess, his mess-mates would surely act in a mentorship capacity whenever necessary.

2.3.2 The Problem of the Ephebeia

A programme of military training is attested in Athens in the form of the Athenian *ephebeia.* A passage from pseudo-Aristotle details the process:

> μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα δ[οκ]ιμάζει τοὺς ἐγγραφέντας ἡ βουλή, κἄν τις δόξ[ῃ] νεώτερος ὀκτωκαίδεκ' ἐτῶν εἶναι, ζημιοῖ τ[ο]ὺς δημότας τοὺς ἐγγράψαντας. ἐπὰν δὲ δοκιμασθῶσιν οἱ ἔφηβοι, συλλεγέντες οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν [κ]ατὰ φυλάς, ὀμόσαντες αἱροῦνται τρεῖς ἐκ τῶν φυλετῶν τῶν ὑπὲρ τετταράκοντα ἔτη γεγονότων, οὓς ἂν ἡγῶνται βελτίστους εἶναι καὶ ἐπιτηδειοτάτους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν ἐφήβων, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ὁ δῆμος ἕνα τῆς φυλῆς ἑκάστης χειροτονεῖ σωφρονιστήν, καὶ κοσμητὴν ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ πάντας. συλλαβόντες δ' οὗτοι τοὺς ἐφήβους, πρῶτον μὲν τὰ ἱερὰ περιῆλθον, εἶτ' εἰς Πειραιέα πορεύονται, καὶ φρουροῦσιν οἱ μὲν τὴν Μουνιχίαν, οἱ δὲ τὴν Ἀκτήν.

[300] Marrou (1956: 8)

[301] Marrou (1956: 8)

> χειροτ[ο]νεῖ δὲ καὶ παιδοτρίβας αὐτοῖς δύο καὶ διδασκάλους, οἵτινες ὁπλομαχεῖν καὶ τοξεύειν καὶ ἀκοντίζειν καὶ καταπάλτην ἀφιέναι διδάσκουσιν. δίδωσι δὲ καὶ εἰς τροφ[ὴν] τοῖς μὲν σωφρονισταῖς δραχμὴν α΄ ἑκάστῳ, τοῖς δ' ἐφήβοις τέτταρας ὀβολοὺς ἑκάστῳ· τὰ δὲ τῶν φυλετῶν τῶν αὐτοῦ λαμβάνων ὁ σωφρονιστὴς ἕκαστος ἀγοράζει τὰ ἐπιτήδεια πᾶσιν εἰς τὸ κοινόν (συσσιτοῦσι γὰρ κατὰ φυλάς), καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμελεῖται πάντων. καὶ τὸν μὲν πρῶτον ἐνιαυτὸν οὕτως διάγουσι· τὸν δ' ὕστερον ἐκκλησίας ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ γενομένης, ἀποδειξάμενοι τῷ δήμῳ τὰ περὶ τὰς τάξεις, καὶ λαβόντες ἀσπίδα καὶ δόρυ παρὰ τῆς πόλεως, περιπολοῦσι τὴν χώραν καὶ διατρίβουσιν ἐν τοῖς φυλακτηρίοις... διεξελθόντων δὲ τῶν δυεῖν ἐτῶν, ἤδη μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων εἰσίν.
>
> "After these things, the council examines those who have been registered and if someone is thought to be younger than eighteen, those from the deme that registered him are punished. And when they examine the ephebes, their fathers are gathered, take an oath and they choose three men from the tribe over forty years old, these men being the best and most suitable to superintend the ephebes, and the *demos* elects one man from each tribe as *sophronistes* and they also elect a *cosmetes* from all of the Athenians. These men take the ephebes and first go around the temples and then travel to Piraeus, and some guard Munichia and others Acte. And they elect two *paidotribes* for them and teachers who teach them to fight with arms, use missiles, throw spears and discharge catapults. They give one drachma for each *sophronistes* and four obols for each *ephebe*. Each *sophronistes*, taking his tribe's money, buys all that is necessary for them collectively (as they mess by tribe) and he superintends all other things. And in this way they pass the first year. In the next year the assembly convenes in the theatre and the ephebes display to the *demos* their battle formations and, having received a shield and spear from the city, they go around the borders and occupy themselves with acting as guards...And when two years have elapsed, at this time the ephebes become part of the others."[302]

There are some striking similarities here with Spartan practice. The education is a very public affair, provided by the state and supervised by selected citizens. The cadets are scrutinized by the citizen-body at a public event at an appropriate point in their training. They are dressed in a way to differentiate them from citizens and at the successful culmination of their training, they join the citizen body as full citizens. Like the young Spartan recruits, the Athenian ephebes have no control over the amount of food they eat, as it is provided for them by their trainers, although there is certainly no mention of the short rations endured by their Spartan counterparts. Most importantly, the Athenian cadets learn the technicalities of warfare: how to correctly utilize common weapons and, or so we may assume by the use of the word maneuvers, fight as part of an infantry force.

Clearly, however, this text is written at a later date than that which we are studying, and 335/4 is often suggested as the date of the creation of the Athenian *ephebeia*. This date was

[302] Pseudo-Aristotle *Athenian Constitution* 42.2-5.

proposed by Wilamowitz on the grounds of the date of the ephebic inscriptions, the language of the decrees and also due to the institution being mentioned by Aristotle but being absent in earlier authors.[303] This date has subsequently been widely accepted with some notable exceptions, including Lofberg who is persuaded to believe that the *neotatoi* of Thucydides equate to Aristotle's ephebes due to their similar activities and that the mention of the ephebic oath in Plutarch and Demosthenes hint to a far earlier date than the proposition of Wilamowitz. He does not, however, suggest an exact date himself and instead settles for offering up two possible conclusions. Either the *ephebeia*, in some form, existed prior to the date of Wilamowitz or, instead, the term of ephebe did not have the technical meaning we now attach to it prior to 335 and simply referred to a boy who had come of age and, in doing so, spoke an oath as part of his introduction to the citizen body.[304]

Reinmuth also disagrees with Wilamowitz' date and presents a thorough and largely convincing case for his argument.[305] He argues that Aeschines[306] mentions service as a *peripolos* in the year 372/1 and also suggests that the creation of a new military-orientated training system for youths at Athens at the period suggested by Wilamowitz would have attracted the attentions of Alexander the Great, who would have quashed it. He suggests that he would have been less likely to do so if the system had already long been established. Reinmuth is convinced that the *ephebeia* existed long before the date proposed by Wilamowitz and instead suggests that it was established soon after the end of the Persian Wars. He argues that directly after the Persian Wars, the foundations of a great navy were in place, the Athenians were still flushed with the success of Marathon, the state was financially secure after the discovery of the silver mines and had a steady income from tribute from their allies. Furthermore, the language of the Ephebic Oath, taken alongside possible allusions to it in other sources suggests that it may very well have been in existence in the fifth century.[307]

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[303] Wilamowitz-Mollendorf in *Aristoteles und Athen* (1893: 1.193-4). The relevant ephebic inscriptions are IG$_2$ 2 1156 and 1189.

[304] Lofberg (1925)

[305] Reinmuth (1952).

[306] Aeschines 2.167-8. See also Aeschines 1.49 on mentioning his service in a corps. of cadets.

[307] Siewert (1977: 104-5) discusses passages from Thucydides (1.144.4 and 2.37.3) and suggests that the language of these passages is reminiscent of that of the Ephebic Oath inscription. Although the Thucyididean passages are clearly the most convincing examples that he states, he also discusses (1977: 106-7) possible echoes of the oath in Sophocles' *Antigone* 663-671 and Aeschylus' *Persae* 956-962. Siewert is also convinced that the epigraphic version of the oath displays various archaic features (1977: 109-111).

However, with regard to the Ephebic Oath, its existence in the fifth century does not necessarily indicate the existence of an accompanying training regime. The Oath could simply have been taken on its own without prior completion of any *ephebeia*. Also, it is surely unlikely that the institution of this ephebic military training in the period between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars would have gone unnoticed or unmentioned in our sources. Thucydides may have possibly made mention of Athens' attempts to secure her future by developing her army as well as her navy, if something such as the establishment of the *ephebeia* had taken place. In contrast, Thucydides' record of Pericles' Funeral Oration seems to confirm the lack of such an institution when he says:

> καὶ ἐν ταῖς παιδείαις οἱ μὲν ἐπιπόνῳ ἀσκήσει εὐθὺς νέοι ὄντες τὸ ἀνδρεῖον μετέρχονται, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀνειμένως διαιτώμενοι οὐδὲν ἧσσον ἐπὶ τοὺς ἰσοπαλεῖς κινδύνους χωροῦμεν.
>
> "And in regard to education, they [rivals of Athens] from a young age painfully train to pursue manhood, while we live without worry but no less enter into equal dangers."[308]

This statement suggests that either no system existed at this date at Athens, or that if a system did exist the training was so 'soft' as to not be worth mentioning. Of course, Thucydides could be deliberately failing to mention any infantry training either because he felt that it would detract from his thesis that Athens was the strong naval power in juxtaposition to Sparta's sea power or because, ideologically, he was aware that Athens itself chose to believe their strength lay in innate ability or strength of character rather than training. However, the system described by Aristotle seems extensive enough for Pericles' statement to fail to ring true for an Athenian audience if such a system was in existence at the time of his speaking. Xenophon, also, wrote extensively on Spartan ephebic training and if such a system had existed in Athens at Reinmuth's suggested date, he would surely have had knowledge of it and might be expected to make at least a passing reference to it in his discussion of the Spartan youth. Admittedly, he is writing for an Athenian audience and would not need to inform them of their own provisions for military training, but if anything akin to the Spartan system was in place at Athens, he would presumably have used it as a point of comparison at least once. Therefore, I do not believe the evidence supports Reinmuth's suggestion of the establishment of the *ephebeia* in the period directly following the Persian Wars. However, the evidence from Aeschines does make it seem likely that Wilamowitz' date of 335/4 is incorrect and that there was an earlier incarnation

[308] Thucydides 2.39 and Xenophon *Memorabilia* 3.12.5 also states that no training is provided by the state and it is up to the individual to make his own provisions for training himself.

of the *ephebeia* in some form, even though to suggest a date as early as the end of the Persian Wars may be overly optimistic and ultimately unsupported by the evidence.

However, the modern evidence suggests that training is necessary and it would be difficult for a body of men to function effectively as a military force without at least some training. Even the simple of act of moving together while managing to hold the formation of a straight line would be difficult without at least some practice. It has been pointed out that it would be difficult for a man to be able to entrust his life in a battle line to the men beside him who may well be "untrained fools".[309] Perhaps training occurred, either formally or informally within the individual tribes or at deme level. Winkler suggests that this would explain military exemptions for chorus members as they could be expected to have time to train for war with their tribesmen or to train for the chorus, but not both at once.[310] If this were the case, there is surely no reason why, if the state during the fifth century lacked an official *ephebeia*, the young recruits could not simply train alongside the rest of their tribesmen and learn the ways of war as a member of a tribe, rather than as a member of an age-class.

Crowley points to the evidence of Aeschines who mentions serving in the *peripoloi* and that of Thucydides, who mentions the *peripoloi*, as suggestive that some sort of training similar to the *ephebeia* existed through the fifth century.[311] He does, however, also note that Xenophon explicitly states that military training is not provided by the state.[312] The evidence of Xenophon leads him to suggest suggest that the *ephebeia*, if it did exist at all during the fifth century, was neither compulsory, publicly funded or intended for all citizens, but instead served a more aristocratic base. Crowley instead focuses on the fact that during the fifth century the *neotatoi* and the *presbutatoi*, the youngest and oldest members of the citizen militia, did not generally serve in battle but instead undertook light duties such as guard duty on the Athenian fortifications.[313] Crowley perhaps does this practice an injustice by relegating the discussion of its potential as a source of training to a footnote but examples of these forces even going so far as engaging in warfare can be

[309] Winkler (1990: 26).

[310] Demonsthenes 21.15 and 39.16; Winkler (1990: 48).

[311] Crowley (2012: 25-26); Aeschines 2.167; Thucydides IV.67.2; VIII.92.2.

[312] Crowley (2012: 25-26); Xenophon *Memorabilia* 3.12.5

[313] Crowley (2012: 26). This idea of being on the frontiers has been explored by Vidal-Naquet (1981: 106-128). He explored the myth associated with the Apatouria which is the festival at which a young man would be admitted to the *phratry*. He concluded that the *ephebe* is the anti-hoplite found on the frontiers, associated with hunting, often wearing black and sometimes being made to appear as a female at festivals such as the Oschophoria.

found.[314] The majority of their duties would be relatively safe and going out to attack seems relatively rare. There may well have been plenty of time, when on duty, for the older men to share their experience with the younger men prior to the younger men joining the massed ranks when they became aged to do so. It is not entirely far removed from the modern officer training units found in many universities where young adults can learn military skills in what is, generally speaking, a safe environment under the tutelage of serving soldiers, many of whom are either close to retirement age or close to finishing their term of service.[315] However, it is not possibly to speculate on whether training of younger men by older men in the contingent occurred, whether it was standardised in any way, nor is it possible to gauge the frequency or intensity of any potential training.[316]

It seems reasonable to assume that, for the Classical period, the *ephebeia* , as a formal institution, can be broadly rejected as a source of organised military training of any significance. However, there may have been less formal knowledge exchange between the oldest and youngest contingents of the forces.

2.3.3 *Hoplomachia*

A further aspect of military training that was available in Athens was that of *hoplomachia*, weapons training provided by men who could teach their skills for a fee. Necessarily, this would only have been an option for the more elite members of society who had the time and the money to invest in their personal training.

In Plato's *Laches*, *hoplomachia* is discussed extensively with the Athenian general Nicias defending it as a positive activity that aids physical fitness, improves skill in battle, encourages the practitioner to take an active interest in learning about tactics and generalship and gives a man a smarter appearance which will be more frightening to the enemy. In contrast, Laches argues that since it is not practiced by the Spartans, who do not overlook anything that would improve them in war, and instead is sold by teachers who refuse to go anywhere near Sparta, he questions its usefulness. He also states that none of these weapons trainers are of any use in actual battle before detailing an anecdote about

[314] Thucydides 1.105.4 and Lysias 2.50

[315] Officer Cadets tend to complete training in drill halls and army camps and are not generally expected to serve or be mobilised although some cadets may choose to suspend their studies to go on a tour of duty with a TA unit that they are attached to. This, however, is not common.

[316] It is worth noting that the evidence of Demosthenes *Against Conon* 1-4 suggests a garrison rather lacking in discipline, at least among some of the citizens undertaking military duties there.

one such trainer who, while using an innovative and unusual weapon in a sea battle, managed to become spectacularly entangled in the other ship's rigging.[317]

There is the possibility that hoplomachos was a category in the Olympic games as a helmet found near Olympia was marked featuring the inscription ΟΠΛΟΜΑΧΟΣ. However, the helmet was discovered in the early nineteenth century and has subsequently been lost and therefore cannot be dated.[318]

There is also mention made of a certain Dionysodorus in Xenophon, who came to Athens to teach generalship. There is no mention in the passage of weapons training accompanying the teaching of tactics but it is certainly made clear that he charged a fee for his teaching. Socrates makes it clear to the young pupil of Dionysodorus that what he has been taught is two-dimensional and oversimplified.[319]

These *hoplomachoi* are infrequently mentioned in the sources and exactly what the training consisted of is not clear, but its usefulness is questionable. Even if Plato's *Laches* is merely making a caricature of the very worst *hoplomachos* that could be found and even if we could suspect that there were at least some weapons trainers who were legitimately skilled at their art and could teach the willing learner some tricks, tactics and techniques that increased his abilities in battle, these techniques would necessarily be rather individualistic in nature. Not every Athenian, as previously mentioned, could possibly afford to train in this manner and as the debate in *Laches* shows, not every elite would be interested in taking up such training, so this would result in an armed force where some had this extra training and others did not. A small number of better trained men in a unit would not necessarily add much to the unit's effectiveness and Nicias in *Laches* acknowledges this, also, when he states that weapons training really comes into its own when the ranks become broken and soldiers are fighting man to man.[320]

Admittedly, particularly if the student participated in weapons training while wearing armour, which may not always have been the case as the story of the young pupil being taught about tactics in Xenophon implies, then this would have increased their physical

[317] Plato *Laches* 179d-184a.

[318] Wheeler (1982: 229).

[319] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 3.1.

[320] Plato *Laches* 182a.

fitness.[321] Physical fitness is, of course, of prime importance in a warrior and also, for elites who may pursue a career in leadership, training in tactics could be a useful undertaking for them. However, the passage in Xenophon shows that this teaching may not have always been of a particularly high standard.

In conclusion, training in *hoplomachia* appears to have been a rather limited, fringe activity, available only to the elite. Elite opinion on the effectiveness of such training appears to have been divided and anecdotes in the sources related to particular teachers of *hoplomachia* appear to be unfavourable. Therefore, although this practice existed during the fifth century in Athens and deserves acknowledgement, its overall impact on the training of Athenian warriors appears to be limited.

2.4 The Educative Function of Poetry

The poets, particularly Homer, were used as standard educative material. For example, in Xenophon's *Symposium*, in the course of a discussion about what kind of knowledge men could be proud of, Niceratus responded with the following:

> ὁ πατὴρ ὁ ἐπιμελούμενος ὅπως ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γενοίμην ἠνάγκασέ με πάντα τὰ Ὁμήρου ἔπη μαθεῖν· καὶ νῦν δθναίμην ἄν Ἰλιάδα ὁλην καὶ Ὀδύσσειαν ἀπὸ στόματος εἰπειν.
>
> "My father, being keen to ensure that I would become a good man, forced me to learn all of Homer: and even now I am able to recite from memory the entire Iliad and Odyssey."[322]

In Aeschines there are further statements that confirm that Homer and the poets were integral to a basic education and were taught from childhood. In his speech *Against Timarchus*, he states:

> ἐπειδὴ δὲ Ἀχιλλέως καὶ Πατρόκλου μέμνησθε καὶ Ὁμήρου καὶ ἑτέρων ποιητῶν, ὡς τῶν μὲν δικαστῶν ἀνηκόων παιδείας ὄντων, ὑμεῖς δὲ εὐσχημονές τινες...
>
> "And since you mention Achilles and Patroclus and Homer and other poets, as if the jury lack education and you are a superior type..."[323]

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[321] Xenophon *Memorabilia* 3.1

[322] Xenophon *Symposium* 3.5

[323] Aeschines *Against Timarchus* 141

Furthermore, in *Against Ctesiphon*, he attests:

> ...γὰρ οἶμαι παῖδας ὄντας ἡμᾶς τὰς τῶν ποιητῶν γνώμας ἐκμανθάνειν, ἵν᾽ ἄνδρες ὄντες αὐταῖς χρώμεθα...
>
> "...for I think that as children we thoroughly learn the opinions of the poets, so that we can utilise them as men..."[324]

Marrou argues convincingly that Homer remained a basic mainstay of Greek education due to the fact that education in Homer served a dual purpose. It both taught a young man the technical skills necessary to become a warrior while also providing a moral education. Education in Homer upheld an ideal and created a man and warrior that was more than an "efficient barbarian".[325] Due to the continued existence of an ideal at the heart of that ancient warrior, Homer continued to serve a purpose as a text book of manliness.[326]

The educative power of literature did not, however, begin and end with Homer. Educative potential existed in other forms of poetry and, indeed, many may have viewed the poet's key role as being an educator. Aristophanes' *Frogs* includes discussion between the characters of Aeschylus and Euripides on what the role of poetry is in society and over which of them better fulfilled that role. Comedy has to be approached with caution but the voice of Aeschylus who claims the voice of the poet should be used to create good citizens is echoed in other sources and so Aristophanes seems to be voicing a commonly held belief through Aeschylus when he says:

> **Αἰσχύλος**
> σκέψαι τοίνυν οἵους αὐτοὺς παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ παρεδέξατο πρῶτον,
> εἰ γενναίους καὶ τετραπήχεις, καὶ μὴ διαδρασιπολίτας,
> μηδ᾽ ἀγοραίους μηδὲ κοβάλους ὥσπερ νῦν μηδὲ πανούργους,
> ἀλλὰ πνέοντας δόρθ καὶ λόγχας καὶ λεθκολόφους τρυφαλείας
> καὶ πήληκας καὶ κνημῖδας καὶ θθμοὺς ἑπταβοείους.
>
> "Therefore, look at the sort of men he first received from me, if they were true to their birth and four cubits tall and if they were not shirkers, not idlers, not rogues like now, nor were they villainous, but men who breathed spears and lances, white-crested helmets and helmets and greaves and the courage of seven bull hides."[327]

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[324] Aeschines *Against Ctesiphon* 135

[325] Marrou (1956: 8-9)

[326] Marrou (1956: 9)

[327] Aristophanes *Frogs* 1013-1017

It is clear that the character of Aeschylus views his art as directly responsible for producing great men who are full of courage. He goes on to discuss how his *Seven Against Thebes* produced men who loved being hostile to others and how *The Persians* taught men to desire to beat their opponents. He further labours the points about the educative function of poets, drawing examples from fields other than warfare, when he states:

> **<u>Αἰσχύλος</u>**
>
> ταῦτα γὰρ ἄνδρας χρὴ ποιητὰς ἀσκεῖν. σκέψαι γὰρ ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς
> ὡς ὠφέλμιοι τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ γενναῖοι γεγένηνται.
> Ὀρφεὺς μὲν γὰρ τελετάς θ᾽ ἡμῖν κατέδειξε φόνων τ᾽ ἀπέχεσθαι,
> Μουσαῖος δ᾽ ἐξακέσεις τε νόσων καὶ χρησμούς,Ἡσίοδος δὲ
> γῆς ἐργασίας,καρπῶν ὥρας, ἀρότους: ὁ δὲ θεῖος Ὅμυρος
> ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμὴν καὶ κλέος ἔσχεν πλὴν τουδ᾽ ὅτι χρήστ᾽ ἐδίδαξεν,
> τάξεις ἀρετὰς ὁπλίσεις ἀνδρῶν
>
> ”For these men poets should work on. Look at how beneficial the race of poets has been from the start. For Orpheus made known to us rites and to keep away from killing. And Musaeus taught us to cure sickness and oracles. Hesiod taught us about working the land, times for harvest and ploughing. And divine Homer, from where did he get honour and fame, if not from instructing us in useful things, battle arrays, courage and the arming of men.”[328]

Aeschylus states that he created warrior characters for the citizenry to emulate and desires citizens to be inspired by these characters when they hear the war-trumpets.[329]

Aeschylus’ character sees the role of poets as educators of the adult male citizenry and states such when he says:

> τοῖς μὲν γὰρ παιδαρίοσιν ἔστι διδάσκαλος ὅστις φράζει, τοῖσιν δ᾽ ἡβῶσι
> ποιηταί. πάνυ δὴ δεῖ χρηστὰ λέγειν ἡμᾶς.
>
> “For the little boys have their teacher to advise them, while adults have poets. Indeed it is necessary for us to speak of good things. “[330]

It is clear that although the character of Aeschylus views tragedy as a possible source of good influence, he views the drama of Euripides as having the opposite effect and destroying the good character of the people. In the eyes of Aeschylus in *Frogs*, poetry is strongly seen to have an influencing effect on listeners and, therefore, poets have a duty to ensure that their poetry encourages courage and morality in the citizenry.

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[328] Aristophanes *Frogs* 1030-1036

[329] Aristophanes *Frogs* 1006-1044

Tragedy and comedy were frequently performed at Athens but Sparta was not lacking in exposure to poetry. Musical contests were frequently a prominent part of religious festival life, both at Athens and Sparta, and contests in the recitation of Homer were not rare.

Plato discusses poetry frequently and intensely, questioning its purpose, its effect and its legitimacy. In the *Ion*, Socrates engages a prize winning rhapsode in debate about his art. Ion considers himself both as a man capable of reciting Homer and also as a man capable of interpreting Homer's works but Socrates questions how Ion can possibly interpret the acts of, for example, generals or fishermen when he, himself, has no practical knowledge of generalship or fishing. After establishing that neither Homer nor Ion had the technical knowledge of such arts and, therefore, should be less capable of understanding them than a general or fisherman would be, the proposal put forward by Socrates is that poets and rhapsodes are divinely inspired to create poetry or interpret it.

Plato's discomfort about poetry is further discussed in the *Republic*. Book Two contains a discussion of the ideal education wherein Socrates suggests that the stories created by the likes of Homer and Hesiod should be rejected as they contain falsehoods in their descriptions of the gods. Socrates argues that young minds are unable to distinguish allegory from truth and should, therefore, not be exposed to such falsehoods.

The argument against poetry continues in Book Three with Socrates stating that in order to instil courage and temperance in the citizens, poetry should not include negative references to death or the Underworld, nor should it feature characters who lament their misfortunes. Furthermore, he suggests that imitation of characters is dangerous and can lead to the imitator taking on the characteristics that he acts out in real life. Therefore, he believes that the ideal state should only welcome poets and rhapsodes who imitate only the virtuous.

Finally, in Book Ten, he further questions the usefulness of poetry, describing the poet as merely an imitator who does not have any real, practical knowledge of what he describes. He also argues that an intelligent and reasoned disposition, although desirable, would be difficult to convey through theatre and, therefore, it is easier and more effective for a poet to imitate an inferior character. This, therefore, can lead to the empowering of the weaker parts of a person's character and the weakening of the more desirable parts. His final rejection of poetry is in regard to the strong, emotional connection a listener can have to poetry, whereby they are engaged with a character who is displaying a strong emotion such

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[330] Aristophanes *Frogs* 1054-6

as grief. However, Plato believes that, in reality, outpouring of emotion is undesirable and a man should, instead, act with restraint. When this extreme emotion is displayed on stage, it can, in turn, lead to an undesirable change in the character of audience members.[331]

It is clear that Plato does not deny the possible influential nature of poetry. In fact, it is partly because of this inherent part of the nature of poetry that he views it as potentially dangerous and undesirable. It is also clear that his reaction against poetry is partly fuelled by how ubiquitous poetry is in both education and society. When the discussion turns to education for the perfect state in Book Two, the immediate reaction is to consider poetry before any other aspect of education, reflecting the importance of poetry in standard educational practice.

Testimony to the value that the Spartans placed on poetry can also be found. Plutarch, in the *Lycurgus*, talks at length about the role of music and poetry in Sparta, viewing them as rousing and associated with valour. He specifically mentions marching songs and records that the king sacrifices to the Muses before battle.[332]

In a passage of Plutarch, he details an anecdote about Leonidas who says:

> Λεωνίδαν μὲν γάρ τὸν παλαιὸν λέγουσιν, ἐπερωτηδέντα ποῖός τις αὐτῷ φαίνεται ποιητὴς γεγονέναι Τυρταῖος, εἰπεῖν ˙γαθὸς νέων ψυχὰς κακκανῆν,᾽ ἐμπιπλάμενοι γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιημάτων ἐνδου σιασμοῦ παρὰ τὰς μάχας ἠφείδουν ἑαυτῶν...
>
> "For Leonidas of old, they say, having been consulted on what kind of poet he considered Tyrtaios to be, he said: "A good one to incite the courage of the young." For they were filled with enthusiasm by his poems and were unsparing of themselves in battle..."[333]

Athenaeus states that Philochorus asserted a Spartan tradition which was first introduced due to the successful generalship of Tyrtaios in subduing the Messenians. The tradition stated that during supper on expeditions, the paean should first be sung and then, following this, each man should sing some Tyrtaios as a solo with the polemarch acting as judge and assigning a prize of meat to the best. [334]

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[331] Plato's *Republic* 10. 601a-606c

[332] Plutarch *Lycurgus* 21

[333] Plutarch *Cleomenes* 2.3

[334] Athenaeus *Deipnosophists* 14.29

Tyrtaios' poetry placed more emphasis on what constituted a good soldier over what constituted a good man and stressed the importance of the state over the individual. Arete was only achievable through the group and was a consequence of the existence of the group and the state.[335]The poetry had power to educate and to disseminate the state ideology. Poetry could, in effect, be used "as a metaphorical weapon on the state's behalf."[336]

Bowie suspects that the performance of martial elegy almost exlusively took place in a pseudo-symposium setting with a select group of aristocrats in the king's *skene*. He sees no reason to believe they were performed before battle or in place of speeches of exhortation.[337]He states that a symposium context for elegy, in general, is relatively clear but that the context for martial elegy has always been somewhat more problematic.[338]He argues that words such as νύν in martial elegy should not be read literally but, instead, read as a way to draw the listener into the poetry.[339]He does, however, concede that although not all of the men would be able to enter the king's tent and it would be limited to the aristocracy, it would still constitute a larger number than a standard symposium and so the performance of poetry in this context would be a semi-public performance that was sympotic in character.[340]

Bowie argues that the performance of poetry in the context of competition was not entirely dissimilar to performance in a symposium context as both serve similar purposes. On the one hand, festivals allow the *polis* to define its corporate identity and, on the other, the symposium allows groups within the *polis* to bond and define their identiy as a group.[341]If anything, poetry may, in some instances, have been the bridge that linked the individual group with society, furthering *polis* ideology and disseminating poetry in a smaller, more aristocratic setting that may, at other times, be shared at festivals in a community setting.

Athenian poetry could also have been shared and disseminated in the context of symposia and Bowie states that most early elegy and lyric would have been written with the context

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[335] Tarkow (1983:50-60)

[336] Tarkow (1983: 66)

[337] Bowie (1986: 15-16); see Lycurgus *Against Leocrates* 107 for reference to king's skene.

[338] Murray (1990: 221)

[339] Murray (1990: 223)

[340] Murray (1990: 228)

[341] Bowie (1986: 34)

of symposia in mind.[342]However, for general educative or inspiration purposes of the entire citizenry, the symposium at Athens is of limited usefulness due to its necessarily aristocratic nature. Wecowski argues that the nature of a symposium at Athens, where impromptu performances can be expected, necessarily insists that participants should have at least some basic musical training and some degree of poetic aptitude. He also states that citizens who are not members of the leisure class and need to work to make their living may not be able to accommodate late night drinking parties into their schedules.[343]

There has been modern research that supports the theory that narrative can serve a useful educative function in society and can "be a very powerful way to represent and convey complex, multi-dimensional ideas."[344]

Sole and Wilson's research into the role of the story in an organisational setting presents story-telling as serving various purposes. Firstly, it allows the sharing of norms and values across generations in the organisation, describing the past of the organisation and also, potentially describing the future. Secondly, stories allow trust and commitment to develop. Stories also allow for the sharing of experience-based knowledge and facilitate the unlearning of unhelpful behaviours. Finally, stories allow an emotional connection to be built.

This research must be treated carefully as it is based on an organisational setting in the business world and also places great emphasis on personal story-telling whereby an employee shares his personal experiences of a situation that they have previously encountered. However, parallels can still be drawn with ancient Athens and Sparta. Both cities had their own corporate identities which story-telling could be used to strengthen and, in a similar manner to an organisational setting, story-telling was a process that built a stronger group of individuals within that corporate identity. Personal story-telling was not entirely non-existent in the ancient poetic context, either. For example, Archilochus' poetry was drawn from personal experience. Furthermore, the research above does not discredit organisational story-telling in favour of personal but considers both as valid.

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[342] Bowie (1993: 358). Bowie suggests typical poets to be considered in this context include Theognis, Alcaeus, Ibycus, Anacreon and Archilochus.

[343] Wecowski (2004: Oxford)

[344] Sole and Wilson (2014: 3)

It is clear that poetry in the ancient world did further cultural norms and values. There may, certainly, have been debate about which poets did so most successfully and discussion over the point at which poetry became submissive to unnecessary emotionalism, but such critical questioning only proves that ideals of martial valour, piety and social responsibility were commonly disseminated through poetry and theatre.

The development of trust and commitment, as presented in Sole and Wilson's research, lends itself more appropriately to personal story-telling in a business setting but there are hints of this benefit in ancient poetry, too. Tragedy and poetry often displays the responsibilities both of the citizen to the state and of the state to the citizen. As such, literature can further the belief that the citizen will fulfil its duties to the citizen in return for the citizen behaving dutifully towards the *polis* in regard to such details as honouring the warrior for his sacrifice in battle.

Literature also provides experience-based knowledge to the listener even if it is, admittedly, in poetic form. Homer, for example, does not shy away from detailing the cut and thrust of battle and both Homer and theatre often paint pictures of examples of both good and bad leadership and the subsequent reactions to it.

The process of facilitating "unlearning" is also something that literature provides. As mentioned above, examples of bad leadership can allow citizens to rethink future leadership. Attic tragedy, in particular, excels at providing citizens with an opportunity to rethink how the *polis* conducts itself. Tragedy can often be morally ambivalent in tone, presenting the citizenry with moral, ethical and political complexities with which it can engage.

Finally, poetry provides the ancients with an excellent way of creating an emotional connection with either their *polis*, their fellow citizens or even with an abstract ideal or characteristic.

The particular power of story-telling perhaps lies in its lifelong influence. It is taught to the young and inspires them from a young age, teaching them the principles and ideals of society but it continues to engage the citizenry long after they leave the classroom. Continued interaction with poetry, whether through recitation at festivals, at the symposium or in the theatre, reiterates those ideals and values for citizens of all ages, involving them in a programme of continuous education and engagement.

2.5 Continuous Education

It is clear that poetry did not only serve an educative purpose for the child or adolescent but was a recurring feature of adult life at the symposium, or a similar setting, at festivals and in the theatre at Athens. Poetry would have constantly played an educative role, reaffirming state ideology either explicitly, like Tyrtaios, or by exploration and inversion of normative values, as both tragedy and comedy at Athens often did. Motivating the citizen to respect his *polis*, and to desire to be respected himself in the eyes of his fellow citizens, did not end when a child reached citizen status but was a continuous process.

Other forms of activity would have had benefits of a military nature, too, such as hunting, *hoplomachia* and athletics but these will be further discussed in detail.

At Sparta, the educative process continued even when the men had entered the mess as fully fledged citizens. Xenophon states that, in contrast to the practices of most other states, Lycurgus instituted mixed messes at Sparta rather than same-age messes. The purpose of this was educative in nature and allowed the younger members to learn from their seniors.[345]

In terms of direct military training, Xenophon tells us that the Spartans excelled in military drill movements.[346]Although Xenophon does not state explicitly that the Spartans train frequently in drill, it is inconceivable that they would be able to have complete mastery over drill sequences without training. Training as youths and then neglecting drill practice as adults would not yield the precision of movement that Xenophon discusses. Therefore, it seems likely that adult Spartans continued military training as a body at least fairly regularly.

From Xenophon we also know that men were required to take exercise regularly on campaign.[347]It can surely be assumed that for many Spartiates exercise was also a regular undertaking in non-campaign life. The Spartan system, of course, differed from most city states in that the numbers of helots at their disposal left the citizenry able to devote time to other activities.

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[345] Xenophon *Lac. Pol*. 5.5

[346] Xenophon *Lac. Pol*. 11.8-10

[347] Xenophon *Lac. Pol*. 12.5

At Athens, many of the citizens who served in the army would have spent a great deal of their time making their living in the fields. Training collectively may have been difficult to arrange but there was perhaps a degree of informal training between friends or neighbours or between fathers and sons. However, there is no evidence to attest this.

In fact, to the contrary, Thucydides portrays a Pericles who is proud of the very fact that the Athenians avoid training and, yet, are able to fearlessly approach battle.[348]Sparta is implied in the juxtaposition in this passage as training itself in manliness, in contrast to Athens where, the suggestion is, courage in warfare comes naturally. In the context of a funeral oration it is not surprising that ideals like this would be proliferated but it is hard to believe that, in reality, this was the only training in place for established soldiers.

However, naval warfare seemed to be viewed differently. It is described as a skill that takes commitment to master.[349]It would necessarily be difficult to manoeuvre a *trireme* without some training even if that training was limited for certain members of the crew, such as the rowers. Plutarch states that Pericles would send out sixty triremes per year furnished with citizen crews who would sail and train at sea for eight months under pay.[350]It seems clear that naval training, of some form, existed but the sources do not furnish us with information on what the programme of training included or how citizens were selected for the training.

2.6 The Ideology of War

Another significant difference between Athens and Sparta was, of course, their ideologies. It is worth considering the impact ideology could make on the ability of hoplites to serve their country. Did the ideology of Athens in effect reduce their need for intensive training?

2.6.1 The Persian Wars

First, we must consider the situation of Athens during the Persian Wars. Athens was very much a state under threat when they fought at Marathon and during subsequent battles, whether fought on land or at sea, the Athenian troops were well aware that their survival and livelihood depended on their success. They essentially had no home to return to if they failed at Salamis and surely this in itself would be a powerful motivation to fight.

[348] Thucydides 2.39.1

[349] Thucydides 1.142

[350] Plutarch *Pericles* 11.4

Secondly, psychologically, soldiers find it easier to fight and kill when their enemies are different to themselves. The greater the difference, the easier the process of killing. Grossman details the work of Stouffer who claimed that 44 per cent of U.S. soldiers were keen to kill a Japanese soldier while only 6 per cent were keen to kill a German.[351] The Persians were not fellow Greeks. They did not look the same, act the same, wear the same clothes or fight in the same way. They were the distinctly different and dangerous foreign invader. Moreover, the Persians were the invading force and the aggressors, so the Greek fighters would surely have found it easier to justify the act of killing when they were fighting to protect their homes and families than they would have if they themselves had been the aggressors attacking another state unprovoked. Essentially, the Persian Wars presented a situation where many of the psychological barriers to warfare would have been torn down.[352]

2.6.2 Democracy and Empire

The psychological effects of the system that soldiers live under is also an important consideration for examining their will to fight. This is particularly of interest in the case of Athens where no rigid training system existed which could indoctrinate citizens into adopting the role of warrior. Motivation for fighting in the period directly following the Persian Wars seems to have remained high despite the Athenians being faced with the problem of rebuilding their broken city. Then, as the Delian League gradually morphed into an Athenian Empire that subsequently brought in the necessary income for their city to be rebuilt, their confidence must have gradually grown. Their military legacy of defeating the Persians almost completely unaided at Marathon and then subsequently playing a key role in the defense of Greece was a proud one that must have added to their self confidence and must have further motivated Athenian citizens to be willing to serve in the military. They must have truly believed that they were militarily strong, perhaps even unbeatable when tensions began to grow between themselves and Sparta.[353] The personality of Pericles who led them through the early period of the Peloponnesian Wars cannot be underestimated, either. A charismatic and successful leader can attract unflinching loyalty and respect, particularly after a period of hardship. Flushed with success, at the helm of a

[351] Grossman (2009: 162); Stouffer, S.A. (1949).

[352] It is worth noting that modern scholarship rejects the notion that belief in a cause can sustain a soldier in battle, even if it can encourage him to sign up to the forces (see Crowley (2012: 17); Shiron (1976)). This may well be true of modern armies in modern warfare but in the exceptional circumstances of the Persian conflict, the soldiers would have been fighting for more than belief in a cause. They would have been fighting for their very homes and families.

[353] For example see Thucydides 1.73-74, Lysias 2. 27-44.

growing Empire and with a strong leader, the Athenians would surely have felt motivated, confident and willing to fight against Sparta or any rebellious subject-allies. Victories such as the battle of Eurymedon would, of course, have bolstered them further but defeats such as the Egyptian expedition did not seem to have long lasting consequences for the democratic will to fight as the Sicilian expedition was still subsequently supported in the Assembly.[354] Even the strongly defensive position promoted by Pericles where land battle against the Spartans was avoided did not seem to resonate with the Athenian citizens themselves since many were reluctant to leave their homes and when the Spartans came in sight of them in the city, many wished to fight against Pericles' tactics.[355]

There is also, of course, the issue of democracy to consider. People who vote for a particular act of war in a direct democracy vote for it fully in the knowledge that they, or their brothers and sons, will have to fight. In a direct democracy such as Athens, it is probable that any decision to go to war will broadly have popular support in order for that course of action to be voted on in the Assembly and, therefore, citizens will be more supportive of practical implications of undertaking the war effort.

The question of political ideology as it related to combat motivation in Athens has also been discussed by Crowley who suggests the dichotomy between slave and free in Athens as well as the dichotomy between autochthonous Athenian citizens and the legally defined 'outsiders' of the *metoikoi* would have also fostered an environment that encouraged citizens to wish to participate in their community. He points out that the survival of the Athenian system relied on political and military participation from its citizenry and that all citizens, whether rich or poor, had something to gain from the continuation of their socio-political system and, therefore, a reason to ensure that they participated in it.[356]

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[354] Thucydides 1.100 and 1.109-10.

[355] Thucydides 2.16 and 2.21.

[356] Crowley (2012: 83-84). Crowley also remarks that he believes Athenian belief in their socio-political system was one of the strongest combat motivators for Athenian troops as their monetary remuneration was not high or, indeed, reliable and there was only a limited degree of opportunities to coerce participation from soldiers in the battle itself, see pages 106-114. It is also worth noting that metics served in the Athenian army although not in the cavalry so the mentality between citizens and metics was certainly not one that fostered a view of citizens as militarily useful and metics as militarily unhelpful. Whitehead (1977: 82) states that although the evidence mentions metics serving as hoplites, that it can safely be assumed that other metics probably served among light-armed troops. Whitehead (1977: 83) also presumes that metics served as part of a territorial army and were utilised defensively rather than offensively. Whitehead (1977: 85) also argues that metics not only served in the Athenian navy but were essential to the existence of the navy.

2.7 Non-military Modes of Training in Ancient Greece

2.7.1 Hunting

Parallels have been drawn in the preceding sections between ancient and modern training methods but there is a stark omission: that of the target practice so important to modern troops in conditioning soldiers to kill. This gap may, however, have been filled by informal modes of training. In particular, hunting is likely to have served to an extent as an analogue to such modern conditioning techniques.

The ancient trainee warrior would have embarked on hunting and responded in a point and shoot manner to the target of the animal as it presented itself. Hunting in the ancient world would have both been employed as a means to protect livestock from attack from wolves and also to provide meat to supplement the diet. The plains would have been utilized for farming, so hunting must have taken place in the mountains.[357] It would, therefore have been an arduous activity and would have increased physical fitness and stamina in participants.

Xenophon comments:

> Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν παραινῶ τοῖς νέοις μὴ καταφρονεῖν κυνηγεσίων μηδὲ τῆς ἄλλης παιδείας· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ γίγνονται τὰ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἀγαθοὶ καὶ [εἰς] τὰ ἄλλα ἐξ ὧν ἀνάγκη καλῶς νοεῖν καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν.
>
> "And so I advise young men not to scorn hunting nor other forms of education. For as a result of them they become good men in warfare and in all other things from which one necessarily becomes accomplished at thinking, speaking and acting."[358]

And also:

> Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν χρὴ ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα τὸ τῶν κυνηγεσίων τὸν ἤδη ἐκ παιδὸς ἀλλάττοντα τὴν ἡλικίαν, εἶτα δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα παιδεύματα, [τὸν μὲν ἔχοντα] σκεψάμενον τὴν οὐσίαν…

[357] Anderson (1985: 10). Indeed Xenophon in his treatise *On Hunting* (4.9) states that it is easier for hounds to track scent in the wilds and mountains than it is for them on cultivated land and so they should be taken into the mountains whenever possible.

[358] Xenophon *On Hunting* 1.18.

> "And so first it is necessary for a boy at that time of life when he is just leaving boyhood to practice hunting, and next to undergo other forms of education, having considered himself to have the means..."[359]

In both these statements Xenophon explicitly links hunting with education and in the former also links it explicitly with war. Isocrates states that the Spartans sent their boys out to hunt, although in reality they went to steal.[360] David suggests that the young Spartans were not sent out to simply hunt or to steal but to do both.[361] David's suggestion is reasonable, as the children needed to supplement their sparse rations and it seems unlikely that they would rely only on stealing if the opportunity to hunt small game presented itself. Furthermore, many of the skills required by hunting are also required to steal successfully such as stealth, patience and cunning, skills that are also useful in battle as Xenophon remarks (see quotation above).

Indeed, Xenophon enumerates the many benefits of hunting when he states:

> ὠφελήσονται δ’ οἱ ἐπιθυμήσαντες τούτου τοῦ ἔργου πολλά· ὑγίειάν τε γὰρ τοῖς σώμασι παρασκευάζει καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν μᾶλλον, γηράσκειν δὲ ἧττον, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον μάλιστα παιδεύει. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὰ ὅπλα ὅταν ἔχοντες πορεύωνται ὁδοὺς χαλεπάς, οὐκ ἀπεροῦσιν· ἀνέξονται γὰρ τοὺς πόνους διὰ τὸ εἰθίσθαι μετὰ τούτων αἱρεῖν τὰ θηρία. ἔπειτα εὐνάζεσθαί τε σκληρῶς δυνατοὶ ἔσονται καὶ φύλακες εἶναι ἀγαθοὶ τοῦ ἐπιταττομένου. ἐν δὲ ταῖς προσόδοις ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἅμα οἷοί τε ἔσονται ἐπιέναι καὶ τὰ παραγγελλόμενα ποιεῖν διὰ τὸ οὕτω καὶ αὐτοὶ αἱρεῖν τὰς ἄγρας. τεταγμένοι δὲ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν οὐ λείψουσι τὰς τάξεις διὰ τὸ καρτερεῖν δύνασθαι. ἐν φυγῇ δὲ τῶν πολεμίων ὀρθῶς καὶ ἀσφαλῶς διώξονται τοὺς ἐναντίους ἐν παντὶ χωρίῳ διὰ συνήθειαν. δυστυχήσαντος δὲ οἰκείου στρατοπέδου ἐν χωρίοις ὑλώδεσι καὶ ἀποκρήμνοις ἢ ἄλλως χαλεποῖς οἷοί τ’ ἔσονται καὶ αὐτοὶ σῴζεσθαι μὴ αἰσχρῶς καὶ ἑτέρους σῴζειν· ἡ γὰρ συνήθεια τοῦ ἔργου παρέξει αὐτοῖς πλέον τι εἰδέναι.
>
> "Those who have desired this work will experience many benefits for it prepares the body to be healthy and especially in sharper eyesight and hearing and weakens the effects of old age and it especially provides an education in what is needed for war. For first, whenever they carry arms over difficult terrain, they will not struggle and will cope with the work as they will be accustomed to it in order to seize animals. Then they will be able to lie down on a hard bed and to be good guardians of a designated area. And in attacking the enemy they will be able to advance and to do whatever is commanded because of what they do when they seize wild beasts alone. And having marshalled at the front, they will not leave the ranks as they are able to stand firm. And when the enemy flee, they will pursue their opponents in a direct and safe manner in every terrain because of their experience. And if their camp has

[359] Xenophon *On Hunting* 2.1.

[360] Isocrates *Panathenaicus* 211.

[361] David (1993: 398).

> encountered difficulties in a woody, waterless or otherwise difficult area, they will be able both to save themselves and their comrades without dishonour; for their experience of hunting prepares them to know many things."[362]

Certainly, many of these benefits would seem obvious: fitness, familiarity with rough terrain, strength, stamina and general hardiness. However, in other aspects perhaps Xenophon stretches the truth further than is plausible. Hunting is a very different situation from warfare and one man holding his post steadfastly against a beast, perhaps often a harmless animal such as a deer, is a very different matter to a man who holds his post when faced with an approaching, opposing army. Wild boar, which was also hunted would have been a far more threatening prospect than a deer. The hunting of boar is often mentioned in tales of initiation and Xenophon also details how best to hunt boar.[363] Spartan evidence provides us with boar remains found in a seventh century funeral mound as well as an amphora with a boar hunting scene as well as sixth-century vases depicting boar hunting.[364] Yet Xenophon also details how to hunt deer, fawns and hare and it can be imagined that hare, in particular, would be far more prolific than boar. Perhaps the Spartan grave goods were included in the dead hunter's funeral mound precisely because a boar kill was a fairly rare achievement and decorated pottery could be displaying an ideal just as easily as it could depict a real life hunt. As for lion, Xenophon characterizes it alongside bear, panther, lynx and leopard as a foreign beast, not native to Greece, remarking that they are often captured by poisoning or trickery.[365] The more dangerous and exotic animals were hunted but perhaps far less often than the less aggressive beasts.

Xenophon also goes on to point out that many fear that a love of hunting will lead to the laying aside of one's civic duties.[366] The situation, then, is perhaps more complex than it at first appears. Hunting was believed by some to have beneficial, educational properties but by others was shunned as dangerous to the citizen body as a whole, keeping men from their duties. Perhaps those who worried about neglected duties were more concerned about the hunting participants who were grown men who would be the ones who had civic responsibilities. The young boys who are in the course of being educated would have no civic duties to neglect. Perhaps we see this sentiment echoed in Hippolytus who chose hunting over an adult, sexual existence and subsequently suffered for his choice. Indeed,

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[362] Xenophon *On Hunting* 12.1-4.

[363] Rubin and Sale (1983: 146) and Xenophon *On Hunting* 10.

[364] David (1993: 397).

[365] Xenophon *On Hunting* 11.

[366] Xenophon *On Hunting* 12.10.

Barringer points out that mythological hunters tend to be found being sexually transgressive. Hippolytus stayed chaste when he had entered the adult realm. Aktaion lacked sexual self-control and Atalanta acted sexually like a man rather than a woman.[367] Perhaps, the reason for hunters being used in this way in myth was to express the idea of the liminal status of young men. If young men hunted for educational purposes and were also on the threshold of their sexual maturity, it would explain why myth often depicts hunters as making inappropriate sexual decisions. Hunting can also, however, provide a successful initiation into manhood. Rubin and Sale contrast the story of Odysseus with that of Meleager's failure.[368] Odysseus kills his quarry (a boar), being scarred himself by the beast in the process. He does not, however, in contrast to many other mythological hunters dangerously mix the world of Aphrodite with that of Artemis in the process of this initiatory hunt. Nor does he focus exclusively on hunting, to the neglect of other aspects of adult, male life.

However, at Sparta in particular, hunting was an activity not only confined to young men at a liminal stage in their lives but was celebrated throughout life. From both Xenophon and Plutarch we learn of the Spartan practices of adult hunting where dogs were shared and hunters brought their spoils back for their mess-mates to share.[369] Hunting in itself is quite often a communal activity, particularly if the hunt calls for the use of both nets and dogs as described by Xenophon.[370]

However, hunting may have been an activity largely reserved for the leisured classes or at least in some of its forms. In Menander's *Dyskolos*, the poor farmer Gorgias expresses his belief that the rich are lazy and work shy and even though the rich young man Sostratos is described as a hunter, Gorgias' opinion of him only changes when he picks up a mattock to engage in farm work. Perhaps this suggests that hunting was often considered the reserve of the leisured classes and, contrary to what Xenophon believes, was not commonly considered to be strenuous and difficult labour. Aristotle speaks of hunting as an activity that friends can share in but suggests athletics and the study of philosophy as similar

[367] Barringer (2001: 205); Rubin and Sale (1983: 147) demonstrate that Meleager violates the rules by becoming sexually interested in his fellow hunter Atalante while participating in hunting, the realm of the virgin goddess, Artemis.

[368] Rubin and Sale (1983); *The Odyssey* 19.410-460.

[369] Xenophon *Lacedaemonian Constitution* 6.3-4 and Plutarch *Lycurgus* 12.2-3.

[370] Xenophon *On Hunting* 2.3 on nets in hunting and 6.11-26 on hunting as being at least a two-man task, even for relatively small game such as hare.

communal activities.[371] Serious athletics training was generally considered a preserve of the leisured classes and the study of philosophy was certainly a more elitist endeavour, so including hunting in the same category suggests that it, too, was an activity more frequently enjoyed by the upper classes. Plato, when framing his laws, regards certain categories of hunting as less worthy than others and states that using nets and snares, for example, is a form of hunting practiced only by lazy men whereas hunting with dogs and horses is a worthy activity.[372] Horses, of course, would be unaffordable for anyone other than the upper classes. However, it is worth noting that Xenophon in his treatise on hunting does not mention the use of horses and only mentions the use of dogs throughout while also suggesting that hunting is more affordable than other forms of education and he also states that hunting does not keep young men from following any other honourable occupation.[373] Yet, he also advises that unless the dogs are ill or there is a strong wind, the hounds should be taken out every other day to hunt and this would require a relative degree of leisure time.[374]

It can be assumed that hunting came in various guises. The very poorest, particularly in the country, may have laid traps and nets or fished in any free time they had in order to supplement their diets. Those who were able to spare more time and money, perhaps those who served as hoplites but were in possession of a greater amount of expendable income, may have invested in some hounds and hunted in the mountains fairly frequently, partly for the sport and partly to supplement their diets. The very richest may have been able to spend a great deal of their leisure time hunting and may even have been in possession of horses as well as hounds.

In conclusion, hunting served a role, but a limited one, both in preparing young men to become warriors and in initiating them into the culture of men. More aggressive beasts would have required multiple men to hunt them and this would have been a good exercise in team work and communication, skills that could also be of use in battle. It also served to keep established warriors beyond the age of *ephebeia* fit and able to fight. However, as it was an activity largely reserved for the wealthiest, it had limited potential for overall military training of the citizenry. However, there may have been some limited benefit in

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[371] Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 9.12.

[372] Plato *Laws* 7.824a. However, using horses without stirrups to hunt in mountainous terrain must have been extremely difficult and it is difficult to believe that horses would have been of any great benefit during a hunt.

[373] Xenophon *On Hunting* 2.1 and 12.8.

[374] Xenophon *On Hunting* 6.3.

hunting even for the poorest citizens using traps and nets since the process of killing and butchering meat would assist in desensitizing them to some extent to battle-field slaughter. The situation differed somewhat in Sparta where it was built into the Spartan system of education and remained an important part of life in the mess. That there was a degree of association in ancient thought between hunting and warfare cannot be denied and the links between hunting and warfare were made explicit both in vase painting and in writing, particularly that of Xenophon.

2.7.2 Pederasty

References to pederasty are fairly commonplace in the literary sources and images of pederastic scenes are frequently depicted on pottery. Each *polis* fostered their own specific view of the practice of pederasty and had their own unique legislation in place in order to control the practice and, indeed, Spartan and Athenian practices and beliefs differed from each other relatively widely. It is a subject on which much ink has been spilled in the past and to examine it in depth would be beyond the scope of this thesis. Most notably, it was examined in depth by Sir Kenneth Dover in his authoritative text *Greek Homosexuality* but recently James Davidson has challenged and questioned some of Dover's assumptions and argued for a more fluid approach to an assessment of Greek sexuality, varying from person to person and state to state. It is, however, important for the question of the education of the warrior to ascertain the extent to which pederastic relationships included an educational element. It is also important to briefly survey the view of pederasty held by the general populace in order to ascertain whether a man engaged in a pederastic relationship, or who had previously engaged in one, would be celebrated, treated with disdain or neither in order to understand the potential implications of pederasty on the psychology, morale and motivation of the individual soldier.

2.7.2.1 Athenian Society

A key text in the examination of Athenian pederasty is Aeschines' speech *Against Timarchus* which must be approached with a degree of caution due to it dating to 346, some years later than the period we are dealing with. Aeschines' information on Greek homosexuality is key in Dover's analysis of the practice and the passage clearly shows that homosexual relationships in Athens were, on some level, problematic to the extent that legal prohibitions were in place in order to protect young boys. In a section detailing the laws regarding boys in Athens, Aeschines states:

> οἱ δὲ τῶν παίδων διδάσκαλοι ἀνοιγέτωσαν μὲν τὰ διδασκαλεῖα μὴ πρότερον ἡλίου ἀνιόντος, κλειέτωσαν δὲ πρὸ ἡλίου δύνοντος. καὶ μὴ ἐξέστω τοῖς ὑπὲρ τὴν τῶν παίδων ἡλικίαν οὖσιν εἰσιέναι τῶν παίδων ἔνδον ὄντων, ἐὰν μὴ υἱὸς διδασκάλου ἢ ἀδελφὸς ἢ θυγατρὸς ἀνήρ: ἐὰν δέ τις παρὰ ταῦτ᾽ εἰσίῃ, θανάτῳ ζημιούσθω. καὶ οἱ γυμνασιάρχαι τοῖς Ἑρμαίοις μὴ εἄτωσαν συγκαθιέναι μηδένα τῶν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ τρόπῳ μηδενί: ἐὰν δὲ ἐπιτρέπῃ καὶ μὴ ἐξείργῃ τοῦ γυμνασίου,ἔνοχος ἔστω ὁ γυμνασιάρχης τῷ τῆς ἐλευθέρων φθορᾶς νόμῳ. οἱ δὲ χορηγοὶ οἱ καθιστάμενοι ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἔστωσαν τὴν ἡλικίαν ὑπὲρ τετταράκοντα ἔτη.
>
> "The teachers of the boys must not open the schools before dawn and they must shut them before sunset. And it is not possible for those above the age of boyhood to enter in among the boys, unless the person is a son of the teacher or his brother or his son-in-law: and if a person should enter, he is punished by death. And the gymnasiarchs do not permit anyone in manhood to enter into the contests of Hermes and if a gymnasiarch should not shut out such a person from the gymnasium, the gymnasiarch is bound by the law concerning the seduction of freeborn youths. And the *choregoi* appointed by the *demos* must be above the age of forty."[375]

This passage illustrates that not only was seduction a distinct possibility in Athens but it was something which the boys needed to be protected against to the extent that a man who enters a schoolroom can be put to death and that the boys must never be travelling to and from school in the dark. The fact that the proviso regarding the age of the *choregoi* is in place suggests that either older men had the self-restraint to avoid seducing boys or that the boys may not view them as an attractive proposition were they to try to seduce them. It should come as no surprise that Aeschines later informs us that slaves should never be the lovers of freeborn boys, nor should they follow them as admirers.[376]

He furnishes us with further information when he states:

> ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸν ἐλεύθερον ἐκώλυσεν ἐρᾶν καὶ ὁμιλεῖν καὶ ἀκολουθεῖν, οὐδὲ βλάβην τῷ παιδί, ἀλλὰ μαρτυρίαν σωφροσύνης ἡγήσατο συμβαίνειν. ἀκύρου δ᾽ οἶμαι καὶ ἀδυνάτου ἔτι ὄντος κρῖναι τὸν ὄντως εὔνουν καὶ μή, τὸν ἐρῶντα σωφρονίζει,καὶ τοὺς τῆς φιλίας λόγους εἰς τὴν φρονοῦσαν καὶ πρεσβυτέραν ἡλικίαν ἀναβάλλεται: τὸ δ᾽ ἐπακολουθεῖν καὶ ἐφορᾶν φρουρὰν καὶ φυλακὴν σωφροσύνης ἡγήσατο εἶναι μεγίστην.
>
> "But the free man is not prevented by the lawgiver from love and can consort with and follow a boy, and nor does this harm the boy but rather is testimony to his discretion. But, I think, while the boy is yet unable to distinguish between who is actually well-disposed to him and who is not, the lover has to recall his love, and be minded to wait with the words of friendship until the other has

[375] Aeschines *Against Timarchus* 1.12.

[376] Aeschines *Against Timarchos* 139.

> come of age: and to pursue the boy while observing and guarding him, as this is the wisest thing for his chastity."[377]

It is now that we learn why the law is so concerned with protecting young boys. It is not because they fear seduction as a general principle but there is a fear that a boy will be seduced at a young age at which he is unable to interpret a potential lover's true intentions and whether they are honourable or not.

The main thrust of Aeschines' *Against Timarchus* is finding faults in the character of Timarchus with Aeschines' attention largely being focussed on Timarchus prostituting himself to various men and he specifically mentions Timarchus being paid for his services.[378] Taking that into account alongside the above quoted passage from the speech Dover is, I believe, correct in asserting that Aeschines is commenting negatively on the practice of prostitution in this speech and not negatively commenting on the practice of Greek homosexuality as a whole.[379]

Dover believes the concept of an Athenian taking the submissive position in a relationship is problematic, seeing this as a "fundamental contradiction within the Greek homosexual ethos" and stating that adopting a sexually submissive role would make an *eromenos* into a woman, essentially politically disenfranchising himself.[380] Dover thus concludes:

> "The point of the fierce sanctions imposed by Attic law on hubris was that the perpetrator 'dishonoured' (*atimazein*) his victim, depriving him of his standing as a citizen under the law, and standing could be recovered only by indictment which in effect called upon the community to reverse the situation and put down the perpetrator. To choose to be treated as an object at the disposal of another citizen was to resign one's own standing as a citizen."[381]

Dover's solution to this supposed problem is to suggest that male Athenian lovers primarily practiced intercrural sex instead of penetrative sex.[382]

Cohen broadly agrees with Dover that the situation with regard to homosexuality at Athens was complicated. He discusses the legal standing of pederastic relationships in Athens and

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[377] Aeschines *Against Timarchos* 139.

[378] See Aeschines *Against Timarchos* 51, 52, 94 and 184.

[379] Dover (1978: 42).

[380] Dover (1978: 103-4 and 137).

[381] Dover (1978: 104).

[382] Dover (1978: 99).

his argument is heavily influenced by the evidence in Aeschines about the protection of boys with laws regarding the opening and closing times of the school and regarding the people who are allowed to enter. He discusses the laws regarding *hubris* and questions whether or not they can be applied to the younger partner in pederastic relationships and whether an age of sexual consent existed in Classical Athens or whether any act, consensual or not, could be considered an act of *hubris* on the active partner's part.[383] He argues that the legal evidence is suggestive of a society that is well aware that pederastic practice goes on but is alarmed by this and frightened by the fact that future citizens are taking a submissive position within these pederastic relationships.[384] He argues for a collective self-consciousness surrounding the issue of homosexuality and a contradiction between what society valued as 'proper' behaviour and what took place in reality.[385] In order to bridge the gap between perceived 'proper' behaviour in Athens and the reality, Cohen uses anthropological comparisons to suggest that the sexual field is a field of competition in Athenian society and that the only possible way to pursue a sexual *agon* was through the pursuit of boys since courting unmarried females was not deemed appropriate and adultery with another man's wife was too dangerous as the adulterer could be legally killed if caught. He suggests that slaves and prostitutes were not considered appropriate targets for competition as their services could be bought, so this left boys as the only feasible option.[386] His proposed solution to this contradiction was a situation where both partners could retain their honour, by permitting a relationship where the *eromenos* granted favours to the *erastes* but without granting sexual favours, or at least, not letting it be known if sexual favours were granted.[387]

However, perhaps Dover and Cohen protest too much and the contradiction they see does not exist in reality. In response to Dover's argument, it is not necessarily the act of anal penetration that deprives the victim of his rights as a citizen but instead the act of being sexually attacked when, as a citizen, he is entitled to respect. Rape can often be about domination rather than, or in addition to, sexual fulfillment and in this context an act of *hubris* undermines the citizenship of a victim. The perpetrator has to be punished in order to restore the natural order of society. In contrast an Athenian who submits himself

383 Cohen (1987: 6).

384 Cohen (1987: 9); Also, Hubbard (1998: 55-6) points out that any man acting as an *erastes*, the dominant partner, could reasonably be assumed to have been the passive *eromenos* in his younger days.

385 Cohen (1987).

386 Cohen (1987: 12).

387 Cohen (1987: 20).

willingly to anal penetration would not be submitting himself to *hubris* as the act of submission itself defines the act as something other than *hubris*. As for Cohen's argument about sexual competition being important in Athens with the boys being the only legitimate target, it does not necessarily follow that winning a boy would always have to lead to copulation. There would be an inherent element of competition in winning the heart and affection of a beautiful boy regardless of whether that process ended in a sexual consummation of the relationship or not. However, Cohen may not be wrong in asserting that lovers were coy about their sexual actions since no explicit descriptions of the acts of lovers exists, it may well follow that lovers were discreet even though that discretion does not need to imply that sexual submission in that context was something which society was unduly concerned about.[388]

Hindley is also not convinced by Cohen's argument and states that there is no law against intercourse between a free born male boy and a citizen on the evidence that, in Plato's *Symposium*, Pausanias states that he wished such a law existed.[389] He argues that the term *hubris* applies to a vast range of situations and that Cohen is oversimplifying it when he states that it has a strong sexual connection.[390] He also remarks that Aeschines in his speech *Against Timarchus* discusses what love is pure on the grounds of whether money is paid or not.[391] He also, quite rightly, suggests that the rules for the opening of schools and gymnasiums were in place to protect younger children and points out that Xenophon states that a *paidagogos* was no longer responsible for boys after puberty.[392]

Further evidence regarding the situation in Athens can be found in Plato's *Symposium* when he discusses the laws at Athens further through the voice of Pausanias and certainly does not indicate that society was concerned by submission *per se*, although he is also not explicit in his description of how an *eromenos* would grant favours to his lover, either.

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[388] It is worth noting that Plato suggests that some members of society discouraged yielding to lovers. For example, see *Phaedrus* 255a-255b and *Symposium* 182a. However, I do not believe he suggests that this equates to any change in legal standing for any submissive beloveds but implies that it is simply a matter of opinion at Athens. Plato admits that the situation in Athens is complicated and not clear like it is in Elis.

[389] Hindley (1991: 168) and Plato *Symposium* 181d. It is worth noting that Plato talks of love (ἐρᾶν) and this need not necessarily imply sex. It is unclear whether by 'intercourse' Hindley is implying sexual intercourse but with the legal prohibitions in place, I would think it would be unlikely for a relationship between a man and a boy to progress as far as sexual intercourse.

[390] Hindley (1991: 169) and Cohen (1987: 7). On the complexity of 'hybris', see MacDowell (1976) and Fisher (1992). For further discussion of sexuality as related to hybris, see Cohen (1991).

[391] Hindley (1991: 175-176).

[392] Hindley (1991: 179) and Xenophon *Lacedaemonian Constitution* 3.1.

Pausanias insists that the laws at Athens are difficult to understand with the pursuit of a lover not being seen as simply honourable or simply dishonourable. Instead, he argues that it would be dishonourable to pursue a lover for money or political gain but honourable to show love if lovers are enamoured with the souls of one another. He concedes that the protections put in place to stop young boys conversing with lovers makes it appear as though having a lover is frowned upon but insists that this is not the case and that as long as a lover is not only interested in youthful beauty and as long as conventions are followed and an interval of time is observed before capitulation, then having a lover is a noble act. He also insists that it is acceptable for a beloved to gratify his lover if his lover has improved him and educated him.[393]

Perhaps a great deal of the modern concern over submission in Greek pederastic relationships stems from certain vocabulary present in Aristophanes, namely the terms *euruproktos* and *katapugon/katapugos*.[394] Davidson has argued that *euruproktos*, translated as "wide-arsed" refers not to passive homosexuals but to people who are all hot air and who are considered to talk out of their backsides.[395] His argument is interesting and quite compelling when he examines the evidence from *Clouds* in which various oral activities such as national speeches, the delivery of tragedies and speeches of prosecution are listed for it to be confirmed that they are all delivered out of "wide-arses".[396] The evidence from *Thesmophoriazusai* perhaps weakens his argument somewhat as the word is here used in the context of whorish behaviour when describing a man as making himself accessible to lovers. However, even if the word is sometimes used in a sexual sense, it does not necessarily follow that any sexually submissive male automatically becomes a *euruproktos*. It could simply be a term used to describe a male who gives of himself freely to other men rather than giving himself to one lover to whom he is committed and that certainly seems to be the context it is used in when it features in the *Thesmophoriazusai*.

Davidson also explains the use of the term *katapugon* as a term to describe general lewd behaviour and lack of restraint and argues it could be applied as freely to someone who was a prolific active homosexual partner just as easily as it could to someone who was

[393] Plato *Symposium* 182c-184e.

[394] For the former term see *Clouds* 1089-94, *Acharnians* 713-18 and *Thesmophoriazusai* 200-1. For the latter term, *Knights* 638, *Wasps* 83 and 686, *Clouds* 528 and *Thesmophoriazusai* 200.

[395] Davidson (2007: 53-4).

[396] Davidson (2007: 53-4).

frequently a passive homosexual partner. He argues that neither of these words needs to necessarily stigmatize the passive sexual partner in a relationship.[397]

Davidson is justified in examining the vocabulary of comedy and re-evaluating the often narrow translations. It seems clear that Aristophanes does not necessarily find comedy in homosexual behaviour in itself but in men who lack restraint and self-discipline. Furthermore, it is always prudent to be cautious with comedy as an audience may laugh at a caricature without necessarily rejecting the reality.

It seems clear, then, that being sexually submissive as an *eromenos* did not automatically make you effeminate and therefore unsuitable to be a citizen and a warrior although sexual degeneracy in the form of being too sexually free could make you unsuitable to be a citizen and, indeed, legally did so if you took payment. Personal opinion on the consummation of a homosexual relationship may have varied but I see no reason to believe that those who chose to consummate, so long as they followed the unwritten rules of pederasty such as not consummating too soon or having multiple partners or openly talking about their sexual behaviour, would have been viewed as unfit citizens and warriors. It is important to note that although this discussion of perceptions of homosexual relationships in Athens is vital for a broad understanding of the concept of *erastes/eromenos* relationships in Athens, the question of consummation or the manner of consummation is not integral to this thesis. What matters for our purposes is the possibility of same-sex relationships to provide an educative function.

If *erastes*/*eromenos* relationships were acceptable in Athens, then the issue of their usefulness in education and the creation of a citizen warrior must be examined. It is worth noting that such formalised homosexual relationships would probably have largely been the preserve of the rich since the *erastes* often would have given gifts to his beloved and the focus of homosexual attentions was often the gymnasiums. Therefore, pursuit of a beloved required both leisure and money while being a beloved would require time for leisure and wealth to provide that leisure.[398]

Plato discusses the usefulness of the practice of pederasty for education in some detail in both the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*. In the *Symposium* he states that the educative benefit gained by the beloved is the reason why he should yield, essentially as payment for

[397] Davidson (2007: 59-63).

[398] Dover (1978: 150).

being made wise and good (σοφόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν) by his lover.[399] The *Symposium* also presents the case that a relationship such as this can strengthen a man's moral compass by encouraging him to feel shame when they commits a shameful act and to inspire him to achieve noble acts. It implies that both the lover and beloved benefit from this motivation for improvement of the character.[400]

In the *Phaedrus* a scenario is established whereby a lover who is a follower of a specific god will look for a beloved who shares attributes of this god and will then attempt with all his energies to mould the character of the beloved to make them more godlike. This process also benefits the lover as through this he learns more about the god and subsequently loves his beloved more for bringing him to this knowledge.[401]Although this passage reads like a Platonian fantasy, it still encapsulates the idea that lovers benefit and improve each other despite the fantasy elements.

However, an alternative view is also presented in the *Phaedrus*, whereby an *erastes*/*eromenos* relationship is portrayed in a negative light. This argument suggests that a lover will praise his beloved in an exaggerated fashion either to please him or because he is so blinded by his love. A lover will also wish his beloved to be inferior to him and will aim to make him inferior so that he can enjoy him, if he is not already inferior by nature.[402] It is worth noting that the negative aspects of *erastes*/*eromenos* relationships is established and discussed first before Socrates states that his *daemon* requires him to clear his conscience and reverse his offence against the god by giving a speech in defence of such relationships.[403] It is interesting to note that the initial discussion of the potential negatives associated with these relationships are quickly disregarded and viewing pederasty in this way is almost regarded as impious, to the extent that Socrates has to quickly issue a defense of pederasty to satisfy his *daemon*.

To say, then, that pederastic relationships in Athens had an educational quality might be slightly misleading, but it certainly seems likely that they had a motivational and inspirational quality that might indirectly affect the military life of either party. Neither partner would want to be associated with a man that showed cowardice in battle or who

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[399] Plato *Symposium* 184d.

[400] Plato *Symposium* 178c-178d.

[401] Plato *Phaedrus* 252d-253a.

[402] Plato *Phaedrus* 233a-233b and 239a.

[403] Plato *Phaedrus* 242c.

repeatedly avoided call-up and so, in the upper-class circles at least, pederasty will most likely have acted as further inducement to valour in battle. It would not be surprising for two men in a close relationship to also train physically together either in the gymnasium or in some informal battle training, although the sources do not specify this.

2.7.2.2 Spartan Society

Spartan society, to judge from the scarce sources (see the discussion above), appears to lack the self-consciousness of Athens when it comes to pederasty. The rules seem to be more explicit and perhaps easier to enforce in a strict society such as Sparta where all citizens and boys are constantly under the surveillance of their fellow citizens and fellow students in the *agoge*. Xenophon describes the situation at Sparta, introduced by Lycurgus, as follows:

> ...εἰ μέν τις αὐτὸς ὢν οἷον δεῖ ἀγασθεὶς ψυχὴν παιδὸς πειρῷτο ἄμεμπτον φίλον ἀποτελέσασθαι καὶ συνεῖναι, ἐπῄνει καὶ καλλίστην παιδείαν ταύτην ἐνόμιζεν: εἰ δέ τις παιδὸς σώματος ὀρεγόμενος φανείη, αἴσχιστον τοῦτο θεὶς ἐποίησεν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι μηδὲν ἧττον ἐραστὰς παιδικῶν ἀπέχεσθαι ἢ γονεῖς παίδων ἢ καὶ ἀδελφοὶ ἀδελφῶν εἰς ἀφροδίσια ἀπέχονται.
>
> "...if a certain man being the honest sort, admired a boy's soul and attempted to make him his blameless friend and associate with him, Lycurgus approved this and thought this practice to be the best form of education. But if this man seemed to desire the boy's body, he made this the most shameful behaviour and established it so that lovers kept away from boys just like parents keep away from their children sexually or as brothers keep away from their sisters."[404]

Plutarch relates that from the age of twelve the Spartan boys in the *agoge* would start to be courted by lovers.[405] Xenophon seems adamant that the relationships in Sparta stayed strictly chaste, in contrast with Athens.

Xenophon's insistence on Spartan chastity could perhaps be indicative of an intellectua ideal which may or may not have been strictly adhered to in reality. Davidson proposes that the strict Spartan chastity only applied to the pair while the beloved was still a boy on the basis of a passage where Cicero mentions that the Spartans lay down together but with cloaks between them. Davidson is convinced that since Plutarch mentions cloaks being given out to boys at the age of twelve, that this cloak is associated with their period of

[404] Xenophon *Lacedaemonian Constitution* 2.13.

[405] Plutarch *Lycurgus* 16.6-17.1.

boyhood and that as it is discarded as they grow older, so is their chastity.[406] However, the issue of whether the relationships had a carnal element or not is largely academic for the purposes of this thesis as the relationships could have had an educative function regardless of whether they were sexually consummated or not.

The previously quoted passage of Xenophon affirms that Lycurgus suspected that pederastic relationships has a strong educative function and, indeed, punishment was possible if the lovers did not succeed in creating a noble beloved. Plutarch mentions the fining of a lover due to his beloved crying out while fighting but similarly states that lovers shared in any honour bestowed on their beloved as well as in any disgrace.[407]

The relationship, however, had no place in actual battle and Xenophon is appalled by the Theban and Elean practice of stationing lovers next to each other in battle and suggests that would be completely unnecessary in Spartan practice since lovers make each other brave so that they will perform well in battle even if they are surrounded by foreigners.[408] Davidson proposes that this refusal to station lovers next to one another could potentially become problematic and suggests that either lovers chose beloveds from a different social background in order to avoid ever fighting alongside them or that the age gap ensured that by the time the beloved was old enough to serve, his lover had moved on.[409] Perhaps, however, Davidson is creating a problem unnecessarily. Two lovers could fight in the same battle easily without being stationed next to or near each other. Xenophon simply seems to suggest that stationing lovers together was standard practice in the Theban and Elean armies whereas this was not the case in Sparta.

The situation in regard to pederasty both in Athens and in Sparta recalls vaguely the practice of acquiring or being assigned a "buddy" in the modern military. Such relationships can be intense, particularly when they are formed or sustained during actual conflict, and the desire to assist each other both in barracks and in the battlefield is a key component of the relationship. However, it is important to note that there exists a key difference between modern "buddy" relationships and pederastic relationships which is that in "buddy" relationships, loyalty generally lies first and foremost with the "buddy" rather than the military organisation. In a modern military it could be expected that a soldier

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[406] Davidson (2007: 330-333), Cicero *De Republica* 4.4, Plutarch *Lycurgus* 16.6.

[407] Plutarch *Lycurgus* 18.4.

[408] Xenophon *Symposium* 8.34-35.

[409] Davidson (2007: 326).

would save his "buddy" from harm, if possible, even if this meant a potential strategic loss for the organisation. In contrast, in Athens and Sparta, the *polis* tended to take precedent.[410]

2.7.3 Inadvertent Modes of Training

Society also created soldiers simply by the way society operated. It is worth noting, for example, that discipline for children in both Athens and Sparta often took the form of corporal punishment and this continued to be a possibility for adult citizens in Sparta. Capital punishment existed as a possible sentence for serious crime. Cultural spillover theory from the field of sociology states that whenever a society legitimizes violence by using it as a means to control or change behaviour (for example, hitting a child in order to teach them to behave or killing citizens who murder), the more likely it is that citizens will use violence themselves in an illegitimate manner (for example, there will be higher rates of violent crime such as rape and murder).[411] A study conducted by Straus proved that children who were physically punished were three times more likely to severely assault a sibling than children who were not physically punished. These effects continue, also, into adulthood. The more physical punishment a person suffers as a child, the more likely they are to physically assault a spouse when they are an adult. [412] It seems, then, that even the choice of punishments found in ancient society inadvertently led to increased violence in the populace and would have created citizens more able to be violent in a military situation. The situation becomes circular when we consider the evidence that parents in the military who serve in combat units (even when serving in these units in non-combat roles such as a mechanic) are more likely to physically punish their own children than parents who serve in the military in non-combat units.[413] Therefore, legitimate physical violence in society leads to increased aggression in the citizens which would lead to better battlefield performance and would also, perhaps, increase the general will to fight and to serve in the military. Those who participate in war are more likely to use physical violence in their home lives with their children and therefore, the creation of aggressive citizens continues.[414]

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[410] Little (1964) discusses the "buddy" system in operation in the American system during the Korean Conflict.

[411] Straus (1991: 137).

[412] Straus (1991: 142).

[413] Straus (1991: 144).

[414] Crowley (2012: 93) lists as examples of legitimate violence in Athens the following: fighting in war, beating of slaves, beating of women and children, legal execution, corporal punishment,

Another potential source of inadvertent training could happen on the battlefield itself. Battlefield skills would, of course, have increased the more often a warrior fought but forces could also learn from their enemies, realising what tactics were most effective. The Spartans believed that there was a real risk of inadvertently training your own enemy by fighting with them too often. Lycurgus forbade repeated campaigns against a particular state for this reason and Plutarch states that some Spartans believed that Agesilaus' constant campaigns against Boeotia taught them to fight as well as the Lacedaemonians.[415]Although tactics would not be the realm of most individual warriors, these statements encapsulate the idea of the battlefield as a potential learning environment in its own right. The individual soldier would, perhaps be able to learn, from their enemies or comrades, which techniques were most effective and how to use their weapons, shield and footwork to their advantage. This process could have taken place in the heat of battle itself or before the battle when encamped. However, this would have been a case of technicalities being learned. The conditioning process, as a whole, would be a wider movement not confined to the battlefield alone but the battlefield may well have been a fertile source of information for the warrior on the practicalities of warfare and an arena where he could learn and improve his weapon handling skills.

2.8 Psychiatric Breakdown and Post-War Effects

It has already been discussed that modern militaries train their soldiers in order to equip them with the necessary psychological tools that will allow them to cope with the stressful conditions of battle. The ancient training has also been discussed and although, particularly in the case of Athens, this training was not formalized to the extent that it is in modern Western militaries, training and indoctrination of various kinds did exist that helped to prepare soldiers for warfare. However, it is worth examining the evidence to assess whether ancient warriors seem to have been affected psychologically in similar ways to modern soldiers. This, of course, is extremely problematic territory as the ancients obviously did not have the discipline of psychology to explain the behaviour of soldiers. Even modern militaries only recently began to accept the reality of shellshock and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. However, it is one of the major concerns of the modern army and the modern training regimes are designed to lessen the chances of a soldier experiencing these symptoms. Evidence for psychological distress in warfare might

religious sacrifices (throats of animals being slit), betting on cockfights, hunting,, *pankration* and boxing.

[415] Plutarch, *Lycurgus* 13.

illustrate the similarities in the psychology of both ancient and modern soldiers although a lack or paucity of evidence does not necessarily imply that ancient soldiers were somehow different to modern soldiers in terms of their neurological processes but could imply that the methods of training discussed in this chapter were highly effective for the ancient soldier and minimised psychological distress.

Melchior, in examining the Roman evidence, remained unconvinced about the existence of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) among the ancient troops. He cites evidence drawn from Iraqi data that tentatively suggests a correlation between head trauma and PTSD in some cases and argues that head trauma would have been less common in ancient battles than in modern warfare.[416] He also suggests the ancient world was more uncertain and that people were more likely to have a fatalistic attitude and therefore would be somewhat immune to the psychological traumas that warfare creates in a modern soldier.[417] The possible link between head trauma and PTSD as mentioned by him is intriguing and further data on this subject could prove enlightening. It certainly could go some way to further explaining the limited instances of PTSD in the ancient world as spears and swords lend themselves better to use on the body rather than the head, helmets would have given some limited protection and a head injury, if it did occur, may have led to severe disablement or death in the ancient world more easily than today with modern medicine. His latter theory about fatalism remains unconvincing, however. Firstly, a higher mortality rate in the ancient world would not necessarily make people less likely to care if they lived or died or less likely to be affected by watching their friends and fellow citizens be killed in battle.[418] The survival instinct is a strong one and is generally not lessened by the knowledge that one might not live into a healthy old age but is instead driven by surviving at that instant. Psychologically, the mechanisms that cause a modern soldier to become damaged by their lives being threatened would surely also have applied to the ancient soldier. Furthermore, a modern soldier is not necessarily less fatalistic. Indeed, normal life is less brutal and unpredictable but warfare is far less predictable than the ancient world. A modern civilian

[416] Melchior (2011: 219).

[417] Melchior (2011: 220).

[418] It is worth noting that it is difficult to ascertain mortality rates and life expectancies in both Greece and Rome from the extant evidence. Woods (2007) discusses previous attempts at stating life expectancy, noting the difficulty of the exercise. Woods (2007: 394) himself suggests life expectancy to be around the late 20s or early 30s. This seems unconvincing and far too low when we consider references to age categories in both Athens and Sparta where men in their late teens were considered young and men in their sixties considered old. If life expectancies were really as low as Woods suggests, surely men in their forties would be considered old while men in their sixties would be considered exceptional. However, infant mortality figures will have reduced the suggested average life expectancy quite considerably.

would perhaps be less inclined towards fatalism than an ancient civilian but a modern soldier may be more fatalistic than an ancient one, knowing that even in surroundings that appear safe, they could easily be killed by a hidden explosive device, a sniper or by another unpredictable method.

In contrast, Shay is convinced that PTSD could exist in the ancient world and draws on evidence from Homer to support this, citing Achilles as a key example of someone suffering from similar afflictions to those he has found in the Vietnam veterans he works with. He summarises the plot of the *Iliad* as follows:

> "Agamemnon, Achilles' commander betrays "what's right" by wrongfully seizing his prize of honor; indignant rage shrinks Achilles' social and moral horizon until he cares about no one but a small group of combat-proven comrades; his closest friend in that circle, his second-in-command and foster brother, Patroklos, dies in battle; profound grief and suicidal longing take hold of Achilles; he feels that he is already dead; he is tortured by guilt and the conviction that he should have died rather than his friend; he renounces all desire to return home alive; he goes berserk and commits atrocities against the living and the dead."[419]

Over the course of his text, Shay gives examples of how the veterans he worked with who were suffering from PTSD underwent similar experiences. They, too, felt betrayed by their commanders giving inappropriate commands, not participating in the fighting and in the issuing of faulty M-16 rifles. This incompetence led to many of them becoming disillusioned with the war, with the government and even with other soldiers and they at times became only interested in a small group of men or even just one close friend. In instances where a close friend died, the grief was intense and often led to feelings of extreme guilt even in circumstances where the surviving soldier could have done nothing to prevent the death of his comrade. In some cases this led to soldiers going berserk, losing all control and often signing up for further tours of duty rather than returning home. These berserk soldiers are also more likely to maim corpses or be less discriminating about who they kill.[420]

There are also other issues to consider. For example, the sustained nature of modern combat being more likely to cause psychological distress, whereas ancient battles were relatively quick affairs. It would also be psychologically demanding to be present in a

[419] Shay (1995: xxi).

[420] Shay (1995: 98) discusses his own experiences of speaking to soldiers who fought Vietnam and states that this berserk state seemed to him indicative of those who had undergone severe psychological trauma.

modern field of war where an attack could happen at any moment. A soldier might not even be aware that he is to be hit by a grenade, bullet or mortar until it happens. Similarly improvised explosive devices and landmines in modern theatres of war present an ever-present, yet invisible threat. In an ancient battle, although surprise attacks were not completely impossible, in the main the soldier would be prepared for the attack, would see his enemy and would have no reason to be in a constant state of "high alert" like his modern counterpart. Furthermore, in a phalanx battle, in particular, it can be imagined that for many of the fighters involved, there would be a great deal of jostling, pushing and movement but a view of the action might be limited and participation in the killing might be limited to the first few ranks of men, therefore limiting the psychological effects of the battle. It would also be the men who were participating in the killing who would be at the highest personal risk to themselves and would, therefore, be the most likely both to suffer psychological symptoms but also be the most likely to be killed outright on the battlefield or die of their wounds, so their psychological distress may never be given time to show.

There was also no advantage to be gained from ancient city states acknowledging that some men were not able to cope with battlefield conditions. Even if they were aware that some men struggled to fight or struggled to return to normal duties after they had served, to officially acknowledge that this is a legitimate problem would create an opportunity for other citizens to claim that they, too, were unable to fight for these reasons. Both Athens and Sparta, instead, handled those less well psychologically equipped to cope with combat by punishing them, labelling them as cowards.[421]

Both Athenian and Spartan culture honoured those who died in battle and heaped praise upon them and this would have gone some way to remove the fear of battle from participants and also remove the moral stigma from the act of killing another person as the killer would see death in battle as an honourable death.[422] Indeed, Shay discusses how Vietnam veterans often have problems overcoming their PTSD due to the lack of honour they have bestowed on their enemy. They were trained to dehumanize them and refer to them as 'Gooks' rather than seeing them as fellow humans and worthy opponents. Shay says that this honour needs to be restored before the American soldier can begin to

[421] Wessely (2006: 271) pointed out that similarly in Germany, the state could not gain by acknowledging psychological breakdown as a legitimate reason to not perform in battle. To do so would have risked creating a manpower crisis.

[422] Plutarch *Agesilaus* 29: This is most clearly seen, perhaps, at Sparta after the battle of Leuctra as Plutarch details when the families of those killed in the battle were joyous while those of the survivors were despondent.

recover.[423] This process of dehumanisation is a double-edged sword as on one hand, it facilitates the process of killing on the battlefield making it easier for the soldier to divorce themselves psychologically from the fact that they are killing a fellow human being. On the other hand, however, it causes further distress off the battlefield after the act by stripping the enemy of their honour. However, this dehumanisation process is largely absent in Classical Greek warfare. Wars were generally against people culturally similar in that they spoke the same language, worshipped the same gods and were similar in physical appearance. Of course, the exception is the war against the Persians but even here we do not see a complete dehumanisation process, to the extent seen in the Vietnam War, where they are seen as completely unworthy, sub-human opponents.

A further issue that can lead to post-battle trauma is the lack of mourning for the dead. Shay notes that corpses were often taken off the battle-field by helicopter before fellow soldiers had time to mourn or, indeed, sometimes even time to realise that their comrade had even been killed.[424] It is imperative to give "time and safety to mourn" and this is not always possible in modern warfare but was often possible in ancient warfare where fighting tended to stop as night fell and truces for the collection of the dead were frequently arranged, not to mention state funerals like the collective state funerals held at Athens.[425]

Overall, then, for various reasons it can be expected that we will see less evidence of psychological trauma in the ancient world after battle than in the modern world. Firstly, although there was an awareness of the *psykhe* in the ancient world, the developed discipline of modern psychology was, of course, absent and subsequently the likely effects of trauma were not understood to the extent which they are in the modern world. Secondly, the culture created an environment where such trauma was less likely to occur (the deme group structure[426], the accepting attitudes of the *polis* towards war and fighting). Furthermore, those most likely to display it were also the most likely to be killed in battle, and finally there was, as this chapter has shown and the following chapters will expand upon, a 'training' system of sorts in place both through more formal systems, particularly at Sparta, but also through a more civic and less intrusive process at Athens.

[423] Shay (1995: 115).

[424] Shay (1995: 39).

[425] Shay (1995: 58).

However, it is wrong to assume that ancient soldiers were psychologically immune to the pressures of battle. The first piece of evidence that I wish to discuss as being suggestive of psychological trauma in battle itself is found in Xenophon.[427] He discusses the need to put the strongest fighters in the front and the rear and the weaker in the middle so that they can be led forward by those in front and driven forward, if needed, by those behind. These weaker soldiers could, of course, be young, inexperienced soldiers unsure of themselves who need to be inspired to fight by the stronger, more experienced soldiers who are in front of them. However, the mention of the rearguard driving them forward suggests that there may be soldiers among these 'weak' soldiers who are far from inexperienced. Instead it sounds as though among these weak soldiers, there was at least an element of soldiers who were unwilling or unable to move forwards and required physical coercion to enable them to do so. Such inability to function under battle conditions would, in a modern military environment, be recognised as 'shell-shock' or combat trauma.[428] As Tritle has remarked, there exists a fifth-century source who verifies that men in war can, and did, often lose control. The Sophist Gorgias remarks that terror can make men lose their presence of mind at the moment the thing feared is encountered but he also states that there can be long-term effects to this fear and men can later become overwhelmed with disease and dementias as a result of their experiences.[429]

The second piece of evidence worth mentioning is found in Herodotus.[430] Here, the sudden blindness suffered by a certain Epizelus at Marathon, as Herodotus relates, accompanied by a strange vision could also be related to psychological distress due to the circumstances he found himself in.[431] Tritle suggests that the trauma of watching the man beside him die resulted in his body reacting to his over-stimulated mind and causing his blindness. Tritle, rightly, explains away the vision that Epizelus reportedly seen as simple myth-making in order for Epizelus and others to explain away a situation that they would otherwise be unable to understand.[432]

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[426] Grossman (2009: 288-293). See also Viatkus and Griffith (1990) on the increased levels of cohesion, morale and willingness to go to war with a unit when soldiers were sent out to war as a unit rather than as an individual.

[427] Xenophon *Memorabilia* 3.I.8.

[428] The discussions of 'shell-shock' are too numerous to mention in detail but examples include Weinberg (1946), Jones (2006) and Mosse (2000).

[429] Tritle (2013: 280-1); Gorgias *Enconium of Helen* 17

[430] Herodotus 6.117.

[431] Worcester (1919: 230).

[432] Tritle (2000: 64)

Defeat in Sicily also led to a mass breakdown where the Athenian troops began to weep and complain in fear.[433] This, of course, may have been a natural reaction in their particularly desperate situation but it is certainly a clear contrast with the staunch warrior that we might otherwise anticipate.

Tritle suggests other examples from literature of combat trauma being expressed such as Sophocles' Ajax responding to the death of Achilles by later slaughtering a flock when the armour of Achilles was awarded to Odysseus instead of himself. He also suggests Odysseus' tears when Demadocus sings a song of Troy can be attributed to the effects of combat trauma, as can the madness of Heracles, leading to the slaughter of his children and wife, in Euripides.[434]

The evidence of psychological trauma caused by warfare may not be vast, for various reasons previously discussed above, but to claim it does not exist would be unrepresentative of the evidence. Ancient soldiers were certainly not immune to the pressures of the battlefield. They, too, like their modern counterparts, could suffer psychological symptoms from the experience of warfare. I believe, however, that the structure of ancient Greek society, as previously discussed throughout this chapter, shielded the citizenry to some extent from experiencing psychological symptoms associated with warfare. Most notably, society respected and lauded the soldier. There was very little moral ambiguity surrounding their position in society which is a marked contrast to the situation that modern Western soldiers can sometimes experience such as the negative popular response experienced by many Vietnam veterans on their return. This acceptance by society allowed the soldier to accept his actions in battle and limited any guilt they may feel over killing. Furthermore, the fact that the men left as a body of warriors and returned as one psychologically protected them in a manner that was not experienced in previous modern conflicts where men might be sent out on their own or in a small group and be forced to try to assimilate into a larger combat unit that was already engaged in active military service on the front line. Classical Athenians and Spartans were also slightly less likely to be negatively impacted by the sight of slaughter on the battlefield than their modern day equivalents as they would have been exposed to slaughter

[433] Plutarch, *Nicias* 26.

[434] Tritle (2000:186-8 and 2013: 281); Sophocles *Ajax*; Euripides *Herakles* 821-1162 and Homer *The Odyssey* Book 8.83-100

of animals either for their own personal consumption, at festivals or they may even have been involved in hunting.[435]

2.9 Conclusion

The evidence above gives a survey of the broad spectrum of activities that can be said to have constituted military training in the ancient world. Military training can be formal and state-sponsored like the Spartan *agoge* or the Athenian *ephebeia*. The Athenian *ephebeia* is evidenced for the fourth century, although it cannot be stated with certainty that it, or any earlier manifestation of it, was practiced in the fifth century. However, the evidence for training existing at Sparta is more certain. The training that existed at Sparta has parallels with modern military and elite forces training and this modern training has been designed with soldier psychology in mind. Sparta's training would have therefore equipped soldiers both mentally and physically for the battlefield.

Training did not necessarily have to be state-imposed or state-sponsored and did not even have to be explicitly military in character. Hunting, in particular, would have served an important role in training the youth for war. The tendency to use bladed weapons in warfare, although abhorrent to the modern soldier, would have been simply all the ancient mind would have been used to and with no less horrific alternative such as a rifle available to them, they will, no doubt, have been less horrified by the prospect of killing in war with a bladed weapon than a modern soldier, given they would have witnessed or participated in hunting or sacrificing an animal. The modern mind which is unaccustomed to real-life blood, violence and gore no doubt is more inclined to find killing with a bladed weapon as unappealing as killing and butchering their own meat instead of buying it already prepared. Furthermore, pederastic relationships should, in theory, if not always in practice, have encouraged youths to grow into good men and reliable warriors. In Athens there was also the opportunity to pay for private weapons training, although the quality of this training is questionable.

The very fabric of ancient society also encouraged and supported the soldier, enabling them to do their job. For example, the fact that soldiers were honoured and praised by their

[435] Tritle (2000: 191) has suggested that the pyrrhic dance served as a healing ritual for warriors, allowing them to re-enact their experiences in battle and find healing through the ritual of acting out their fear and trauma. However, I do not find this particularly convincing due to the evidence that women, who would certainly not be in a position to re-enact the experiences of a serving warrior, sometimes danced the pyrrhic. Therefore, I believe the pyrrhic should be viewed primarily as a religious ritual. See Goulaki-Voutira (1996) on females dancing the pyrrhic.

home states so long as they served bravely and honourably and, also, the fact that warfare in this period was a corporate activity participated in by groups fighting together not by individuals using guerilla tactics. Legitimate violence and the inevitable absence of many fathers may have had further sociological implications in creating boys of a violent character.

All this evidence taken together displays how rich the culture of training could be in the ancient world. Admittedly, much of the training discussed would have been open only to the richest citizens with paid weapons training and pederastic relationships at Athens being elite activities. Even at Sparta, the Spartiate had to be able to contribute to his mess in order to be considered a citizen. Therefore, the elites with the most money, the best armour, and, perhaps, with the best training paid for by themselves or their families would be the most sensible choice for the front ranks in any fighting force. Of course, other aspects of training would be open to both elites and non-elites. Hunting, for example, would have been a possibility for both the rich and the poor to some extent and the familiar sight of sacrificing animals at religious festivals would have accustomed both rich and poor to the gore inflicted by a bladed weapon. Similarly, the city ideology, the psychology of fighting as a group, and the bolstering provided by constant state support would have had an effect on any warrior, regardless of his financial resources.

Military training in Sparta may well have been institutionalised and not dissimilar to the practices of modern militaries, but the fully immersive experience of the *agoge* would not have been available to all who were subsequently utilised in warfare, such as the *perioikoi*, whereas in Athens it seems unlikely that training was institutionalised at all in our period of study. It is clear that benefits could be gained from structured military training and the reputation of the Spartan forces stands testament to this. However, little is said in the sources of any potential psychological ill effects that could be expected from a lack of structured training at Athens. The additional, non state-sponsored training must have gone some way to prepare warriors for battle and also to ensure that they were able to cope and function on their return. However, other factors that have not been discussed in this chapter may also be of prime importance for the mental well-being and efficiency of the ancient soldier and these will be considered in the remaining chapters.

This chapter lacks, with some regret, a comparison of the success of the Spartan and Athenian techniques of training. It would be extremely interesting and useful to compare, even if only for hoplites, how the Spartan and Athenian systems varied in what they

ultimately produced. The Spartans, of course, had a rigorous training system for boys and young men that even crossed over into their adult lives, keeping them from their wives and associating them strongly with a specific mess. Their system was extremely close, in many regards, to that offered up as training to modern professional soldiers, particularly special forces troops. The Athenians, in contrast, most probably lacked such an official training regime in the Classical period but what they lacked in training, they perhaps made up in political ideology. As a democracy, they voted on when to go to war, who with and under which generals and modern research has drawn some interesting conclusions about the success of modern democracies in warfare. To be in a position to draw conclusions about the success of each regime would be enlightening but to do so we would need a reliable collection of kill figures. Unfortunately, the figures available to us are not entirely helpful in completing such a survey. Not all accounts of battles are furnished with such figures. Some battles detail the numbers killed but not the numbers marshalled at the start of battle and in this circumstance the figures are of limited usefulness. Furthermore, and most importantly, the Spartans did not always pursue their fleeing enemy and this could, of course skew the figures even if reliable figures were available.

Chapter 3

Festivals and Communal Worship

As discussed in chapter three, religion played a prominent part in the life of the ancients with many gods and heroes having explicit links to warfare. Worship of the gods often took place collectively as a *polis* festival or as a Panhellenic affair and again, the military influence is often clear throughout many of the festivals. This chapter will engage less with the psychological preparation of an individual soldier and will demonstrate a greater engagement with the wider concept of motivation to fight that can be generated through collective activity as a *polis* and the encouragement of a feeling of civic pride through this collective activity and also through the achievements of other citizens. The importance of festivals in generating a degree of civic pride and, therefore, motivation to fight cannot be overlooked when the frequency of such festivals is considered.

This chapter will firstly tackle the role of athletics as a preparatory tool for citizens who may in the future be fighting in battle. Athletics will be considered in terms of what disciplines utilised skills which may have been of use in war and also in terms of the evidence gathered from sources in regard to the usefulness of athletic training as preparation for warfare. The modern sociological and psychological research will then be examined in order to ascertain whether athletics training, particularly in combat sports or aggressive sports, is linked to increases in aggression in either participants or spectators. The evidence for the long-term exposure to violence will also be discussed.

The concept of war as *agon* will then be examined. It has been discussed fairly frequently as a concept in the secondary literature and the validity of the theory that war was fought according to a set of unwritten rules or conventions must be ascertained in order to state whether athletics could be seen as a parallel situation to warfare where rules and conventions also need to be adhered to on a Panhellenic stage.

The possibility of utilising festivals, particularly those that draw a Panhellenic or geographically wide audience, for propaganda purposes or self promotion by individual states will be explored. The issues relating to participation, individual self promotion and prominent displays that promote a particular state will be explored. Finally, some of the major Athenian and Spartan state festivals will be studied in order to discuss the military

elements within them and the impact that these elements may have had on the intended audience.

3.1 The Role of Athletics

Athletics was a key part of ancient Greek life, particularly in the period which we are examining, when athletics began to move out of purely aristocratic circles with the subsidisation of public gymnasia.[436] Greek athletics is a relatively well studied field with informative 'textbooks' such as *Greek Athletes and Athletics* by Harris and Miller's *Ancient Greek Athletics* being available as a useful starting point to inform the interested scholar of the technicalities of athletics and the details of major athletic venues. Other texts with a more focussed approach to the study of athletics include Kyle's 1987 study *Athletics in Ancient Athens* where he explores the connections between athletics, politics and society, noting the changes in the elitist bias of sport to a more general wealth based bias and also the power of athletics in politics. Another 1987 study by Poliakoff entitled *Combat Sports in the Ancient World* focusses on the agonistic culture of Greece where the role of winning and the competitive element of sport are integral to an understanding of ancient athletics. Poliakoff views athletics as an arena for the winning of honour due to the nature of Greek warfare which made winning individual honour in battle difficult. Golden's *Sport and Society in Ancient Greece* presents an image of Greece as being unique in their love of competition. He discusses the 'discourse of difference' that was presented in Greek athletics where males were contrasted with females, older males with younger boys, winners with losers, Greeks with foreigners and rich with poor. Most recently Pritchard's *Sport, Democracy and War in Classical Athens* explores the apparent contradiction between athletics being the preserve of the elite or, at least, the wealthy yet athletes being popular among the non-elite citizens of Athens. His study explores the possible reasons for why athletics remained an activity for the wealthy even under the democracy and also suggests reasons to explain the non-elite protection of athletics and athletes, believing this primarily to be related to the link in Athenian psychology between athletics and warfare.

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[436] Plutarch *Cimon* 13.8 talks of the conversion of the Academy into athletics grounds. At 13.7, Plutarch tells us that Cimon funded the foundations of the long walls himself and Pritchard (2012: 102) believes that this information also applies to the funding of the Academy, although the evidence for this seems ambiguous. Pritchard (2012: 102) points out that Pericles used public funds to renovate the Lyceum (Harpocration s.v. 'Lyceum) and that Alcibiades proposed a law concerning Kynosarges (Athenaeus 6.234e and IG I^3 134). Kyle (1987: 101) suggests that a passage from Thucydides (2.13.3-5) could be interpreted to include the Lyceum among public buildings that the state had spent money on. Pseudo-Xenophon, *Constitution of the Athenians* 2.10 mentions the public palaestras and complains that the mob enjoy these more than the "few". Plato also discusses the ideal society as featuring public gymnasia (*Laws* 7.804c).

Although public gymnasia appeared during the fifth century, it is important to note that they would not have truly opened up athletics to all as there would still have been a necessity for any athlete to have the time to pursue athletics which would not be possible for those at subsistence level.[437] Furthermore, any athlete would need to have lived close to the city in order to use the gymnasia and if they seriously wished to pursue athletic glory, would have needed to be able to afford a high-protein diet.[438] Harris points out that Coroebus of Elis, the earliest recorded Olympic victor was a cook and Glaucos of Carystus a ploughman and suggests that a system of patronage may have been in place for poorer athletes.[439] Kyle points out, however, that there is no evidence for subsidisation of an athlete pre-dating the year 300 B.C. and most recently, Pritchard argues that people would be reluctant to train professionally in athletics without means as that would place them at risk of being identified as 'elite' and therefore eligible for the financial burdens placed on the rich.[440]

However, the public gymnasia did allow athletics to make small steps away from being a purely aristocratic pursuit, even though 'professional training' for the competition circuit would essentially have been beyond the scope of all but the wealthy. [1] Kyle (1987) surveys the evidence for known athletic victors and concludes that in the years 594-490, all the athletes that we have sufficient information for are known to be both wealthy and noble. In the period 490-404 he believes that he sees a sufficient change in athletics in that they were no longer necessarily aristocratic but still required wealth. This would mean that in the Classical period professional athletics would have opened up somewhat but would still be beyond the means of most hoplites, unless a wealthy citizen chose to serve as a hoplite rather than in the cavalry.[441]

[437] Hubbard (2008: 385).

[438] Hubbard (2008: 385).

[439] Harris (1964: 37), Strabo *Geography* 8.3.29.

[440] Kyle (1987: 150) and Pritchard (2012: 76).

[441] Kyle (1987). I am convinced that serious athletic training (in order to compete in the games) would be impossible for most members of the hoplite class due to the need for large amounts of leisure time and the expense of the diet and intensive training. There would have been variation in hoplite wealth, however, and some of the more wealthy members of the class may have been able to afford it. The question of whether training was accessible to the hoplite class, however, has been a matter of some debate. Golden (1998: 25) believes that the hoplite reform is tied in with the appearance of public gymnasia and also linked to the appearance or restructuring of the Pythian, Isthmian and Nemean games.

3.1.1 Athletics as Training for War

The modern mind can certainly see obvious advantages to physical training for the potential soldier and it is an integral part of modern military training. Some of the events in the ancient games would have been very clearly useful in warfare. For example, the running races would have increased the cardio-vascular strength of athletes and potential soldiers, while boxing and pancration would have accustomed the athlete to facing hostility and hand-to-hand combat. Perhaps the event with the most apparent usefulness in war is that of the *hoplitodromos* (the race in arms). Undoubtedly practice in carrying and running in such heavy equipment would have been of great use in warfare. In fact, it is hard to imagine a man fighting, even in just the main pieces of armour, without having already accustomed himself to their weight in some type of pre-battle training. It has also been pointed out that the action of thrusting a spear is a very similar movement to that which a Greek boxer would have made when making a straight punch.[442]

However, the link for the ancients between warfare and athletics is not quite so clear. Plutarch details the differences between a soldier and an athlete when he states that athletes need to have a surplus of food, much sleep, and periods of activity and rest in order for his athletic form to be maintained. In contrast, the soldier must be prepared for anything, must often go without food and must be able to cope without sleep.[443] Therefore, in this view, it could be difficult to train at the highest level as a professional athlete without damaging your ability to be an effective soldier. Both Hippocrates and Aristotle reject athletic training: Hippocrates believing the state of the athlete to be unnatural and Aristotle believing that a citizen should not follow the habits of an athlete or be lazy but should find a balance somewhere in between the two extremes.[444]

A fragment of Euripides explicitly rejects the idea of the warrior-athlete:

> τίς γὰρ παλαίσας εὖ, τίς ὠκύπους ἀνὴρ
> ἢ δίσκον ἄρας ἢ γνάθον παίσας καλῶς
> πόλει πατρῴᾳ στέφανον ἤρκεσεν λαβών;
> πότερα μαχοῦνται πολεμίοισιν ἐν χεροῖν
> δίσκους ἔχοντες ἢ δι᾽ ἀσπίδων χερὶ
> θείνοντες ἐκβαλοῦσι πολεμίους πάτρας;

442 Peatfield (2007: 27-28).

443 Plutarch *Philopoemen* 3.2-4.

444 Hippocrates, *de Alimento* 34 and Aristotle *Politics*, 7.1335b.

> οὐδεὶς σιδήρου ταῦτα μωραίνει πέλας
> στάς.
>
> "For which good wrestler, which swift-footed man, or discus thrower or man who is talented at striking the jaw has assisted his native city by obtaining a crown? Will they fight their enemies with discuses in their hand or will they expel their country's enemies by striking through shields with their hands? No one standing near to iron is so foolish."[445]

Many athletic events, as this quotation demonstrates, have limited significance to warfare. However, this sentiment that no athlete has done his homeland a service is clearly not one that a popular audience agrees with since crowned athletes are treated with great respect and ceremony in their home towns. Their athletic tendencies may not be directly valuable in warfare but value is certainly attached to their victories. Kyle remarks that this fragment should be treated with caution on the grounds that the *Autolycos* was a satyr play and therefore a degree of farce could be expected. Furthermore, he points out that Euripides is also known to have written an athletic ode in 416, so it is not certain that this fragment accurately reflects the views of Euripides. The fact that the play only exists in fragments necessarily means we cannot know if there was a rebuttal to this argument at another point in the dialogue. Pritchard comments that Autolycos was a victor in the boys' *pankration* at the Greater Panathenaia of 422/1 and that his personal life made him an easy comic target but Storey is not convinced that Euripides' play is associated at all with him and instead suggests it is based on the myth of the arch-thief Autolycos.[446] Regardless, it is interesting to note that there were grounds for mocking or being derogatory towards athletes at all.

More positive depictions of athletic training tend to focus more on general gymnastic training, not motivated by a desire to compete professionally. Agesilaus, for instance, stopped his troops at Ephesus and encouraged them to exercise on campaign by offering prizes which resulted in:

> …τὰ μὲν γυμνάσια πάντα μεστὰ ἀνδρῶν τῶν γυμναζομένων, τὸν δ' ἱππόδρομον τῶν ἱππαζομένων, τοὺς δὲ ἀκοντιστὰς καὶ τοὺς τοξότας μελετῶντας.
>
> "….the gymnasia full of exercising men, the hippodromes of men riding, and the spearmen and the archers practicing."[447]

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[445] Euripides *Autolykos* fr. 282; Kyle (1987: 130-131).

[446] Pritchard (2012: 114-115), Xenophon *Symposium* 1.2, Storey (2003: 85-86).

[447] Xenophon *Hellenica* 3.4.16-17.

The specifics of how the men trained are not detailed but the emphasis does seem to be placed on skills related to their place in the forces.

> ἀσκῆσαι δ’ αὐτὸ βουλόμενος ἆθλα προύθηκε ταῖς τε ὁπλιτικαῖς τάξεσιν, ἥτις ἄριστα σωμάτων ἔχοι, καὶ ταῖς ἱππικαῖς, ἥτις κράτιστα ἱππεύοι· καὶ πελτασταῖς δὲ καὶ τοξόταις ἆθλα προύθηκεν, ὅσοι κράτιστοι πρὸς τὰ προσήκοντα ἔργα φανεῖεν.
>
> "…Wishing to exercise it [the army] he set up prizes for both the unit of hoplites that were in the best bodily condition and for the cavalry division which had the strongest horsemanship. Prizes were also set up for the peltasts and archers who showed that they were in possession of the greatest strengths in their work."[448]

It seems that the focus is on athletics that are most closely linked to military matters, such as cavalry practicing their horsemanship rather than practicing non-equestrian sports. Perhaps boxing and *pankration* were also avoided in case of injury. Regardless of what the training entailed, this is clear evidence that some Greeks believed that training in a competitive, athletic style did have some degree of use in a military environment. The men in the passage are being tested mainly on their military skills but it is interesting to note that the training for these tests took place, at least partly, in the gymnasia. Plato also links physical exercise explicitly with military training in a similar fashion to what we have seen in the previous passage from Xenophon. The Athenian speaking, in the course of a discussion about which festivals and religious practices it is proper for a state to implement states:

> τούτων δὲ ταύτῃ σχεδὸν ἐχόντων, οὐκ ἐν πολέμῳ τὸν πόλεμον ἑκάστοις γυμναστέον, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ τῆς εἰρήνης βίῳ… καί τινας ἀεὶ παιδιὰς μηχανᾶσθαι καλὰς ἅμα θυσίαις, ὅπως ἂν γίγνωνται μάχαι τινὲς ἑορταστικαί, μιμούμεναι τὰς πολεμικὰς ὅτι μάλιστα ἐναργῶς μάχας. νικητήρια δὲ καὶ ἀριστεῖα ἑκάστοισι τούτων δεῖ διανέμειν ἐγκώμιά…
>
> "This being generally the case, each individual must train for each war, not during war, but during peace time.....And one must devise some good games at festivals so as to act as festival competitions, imitating as clearly as possible warlike competition. At each of these they must distribute awards for victory and excellence as praise... "[449]

The Athenian advocates the agonistic style of military training that appears similar to athletic competition.

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[448] Xenophon, *Hellenica* 3.4.16.

[449] Plato, *Laws* 8.829a-c.

Another episode from Xenophon details a conversation between Socrates and a certain Epigenes:

> Ἐπιγένην δὲ τῶν συνόντων τινὰ νέον τε ὄντα καὶ τὸ σῶμα κακῶς ἔχοντα ἰδών, Ὡς ἰδιωτικῶς, ἔφη, τὸ σῶμα ἔχεις, ὦ Ἐπίγενες. καὶ ὅς, Ἰδιώτης γάρ, ἔφη, εἰμί, ὦ Σώκρατες. Οὐδέν γε μᾶλλον, ἔφη, τῶν ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ μελλόντων ἀγωνίζεσθαι• ἢ δοκεῖ σοι μικρὸς εἶναι ὁ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἀγών, ὃν Ἀθηναῖοι θήσουσιν, ὅταν τύχωσι; καὶ μὴν οὐκ ὀλίγοι μὲν διὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος καχεξίαν ἀποθνῄσκουσί τε ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις…
>
> "Having seen that Epigenes, a man whom he was associated with, was in bad physical condition, for a young man, he [Socrates] said: "What an ordinary condition your body is in, Epigenes." He replied, "I am an ordinary citizen, Socrates." "As much as the man who intends to compete for the prize at Olympia," he retorted, "Does it seem to you a small thing, the mortal contest with the enemy into which the Athenians will enter? No few have lost their lives due to bad habits of body in the dangers of war…."[450]

This passage displays a clear link between athletic training as a preparation for war, although we can perhaps suppose that the encouragement that Socrates gives Epigenes to train as one who competes at Olympia is simple hyperbole. In this context it is also worth noting that depictions of Ares and Agon sat side by side on the table at Olympia where the victory wreaths were kept.[451]

The discussion on non-elite participation in athletics in Athens has a range of arguments being proposed. Scholar such as Kyle and Golden, accept that the institution of public gymnasia at Athens would have led to an increase in access to the athletic world but do not necessarily think that this was far reaching.[452] Pritchard argues that those lacking wealth would not be able to afford to pay a *paidotribes* and would, therefore, be unable to participate in athletic activities.[453] At the other extreme lies Miller who accepts wider spread democratisation.[454]However, many of the arguments put forward are related to participation in athletics with a view to competition rather than participation for health or general training. It would seem unlikely, for example, that a person wanting to train without a view to competing would require specialist instruction at any point from a *paidotribes* or other instructor. It would also seem strange that Athens would subsidise access to exercise facilities if there was no call for such provision to be made and the only

[450] Xenophon, *Memorabilia*. 3.12.1-2.

[451] Pausanias 5.20.3.

[452] Kyle (1987, 1997) and Golden (1998)

[453] Pritchard (2003, 2009, 2013)

people likely to use such facilities are those who can afford to pay for their provision. Christesen points out that the provision of three public gymnasia in addition to privately owned palaistrai would seem excessive in scale if they were to be only accessed by the wealthy. Furthermore, he states that an explosion in government-sponsored sport competitions in the fifth century may well imply that participation in athletics was not limited to a select group and, indeed, says that Pseudo-Xenophon implies broad participation in sport when he suggests the people (in opposition to the wealthy) are willing to take prize money for running, singing and dancing.[455] It seems likely, then, that a broad range of citizens trained in athletics and some even managed to train to competition standard but it would be highly speculative, however, to estimate precisely how many citizens trained in athletics, how often and what form their exercise may have taken.

Perhaps the most convincing ancient association of warfare and athletics can be found at Sparta where athletic victors were positioned in front of the king in battle. However, perhaps this has less to do with a belief that a professional athlete would be a powerful and successful warrior able to protect and serve the king because of his prowess and more to do with the idea of the victorious athlete as a totemic figure whose power lies in the fact that they have previously been blessed by a god.[456] An anecdote from Plutarch demonstrates the honour that the Spartans attached to the position.

> καί φασί γέ τινα χρημάτων πολλῶν ἐν Ὀλυμπίοις διδομένων αὐτῷ μὴ δεξάμενον, ἀλλὰ πολλῷ πόνῳ καταπαλαίσαντα τὸν ἀνταγωνιστήν, ὥς τις εἶπεν αὐτῷ, “Τί σοι πλέον, ὦ Λάκων, γέγονε διὰ τῆς νίκης;” φάναι μειδιάσαντα, “Πρὸ τοῦ βασιλέως τεταγμένος μαχοῦμαι τοῖς πολεμίοις.”
>
> "And they say indeed that a certain Spartan did not accept a great deal of money that was offered to him in the Olympics, but having thrown his wrestling opponent with a great deal of effort, when someone spoke to him and said, “What did you gain through your victory, Spartan?” He smiled and said, “The right to fight against the enemy having been marshalled in front of the king.” "[457]

Evidence from Aristotle and Tyrtaios that initially seems to take a dim view of athletics, with Aristotle stating that the Spartans have avoided bringing their children up in too

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[454] Miller (2000, 2004). See Kyle (2014) for further discussion on the positions of all these scholars.

[455] Christesen (2014b: 218-9); Pseudo-Xenophon *The Constitution of the Athenians* 1.13

[456] Harrison (1962: 221) points out that Olympic victor, in general, tend to be treated as both “regal and divine” with feasts, crowns and potentially even hero worship after death. Perhaps, then, this practice of victors accompanying the king into battle is similar to the practice of the Dioskouroi accompanying Spartan kings into battle.

[457] Plutarch, *Lycurgus* 22.4.

athletic a habit and Tyrtaios stating that military prowess should be valued over that of athletics, has been interpreted differently by Hodkinson.[458] He points out that both of these sources do not reject athletic training outright but instead value it in moderation with other qualities seen as preferable. Christesen discusses the place of physical training in Spartan society with reference to Herodotus and Xenophon who both suggest that regular physical exercise was a normal and expected part of Spartan daily life.[459]

Hodkinson also points out that Spartan evidence suggests that, contrary to other Greek states, much of their physical training took the form of team sports with various ritual sporting activities of an agonistic nature competed for in groups. This includes the game of *sphaireis*, the whipping contest at the altar of Artemis Orthia and perhaps also the notable team game held at the plane-tree grove.[460] He suggests that this practice of team sport could be related to the structure of Spartan society and their need for group cohesion.[461] Christesen agrees, believing that sport not only allowed for social control and increased group cohesion in Sparta but also offered for meritocratic competition where men who were not wealthy could win honour for themselves through their athletic achievements.[462] The suggestions are convincing as team sports are rarely mentioned for states other than Sparta. Although *sphaireis* may have been played elsewhere in Greece under another name, at Sparta team sports seem to have been taken more seriously and treated more competitively than elsewhere, often resulting in violence.[463] At Sparta there was also, of course, a great degree of emphasis placed on the team and group cohesion, as discussed in Chapter 2.1 The Psychology of the Soldier. The importance of the group was placed even before the importance of the family unit; therefore it is not surprising to see the group rather than individual being important in team sporting activities.

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[458] Aristotle *Politics* 8.1338b and Tyrtaios fr. 12.1-9.

[459] Christesen (2014a: 146-150); Herodotus 7.208 where the Spartans continue to exercise while awaiting the beginning of battle at Thermopylae; Xenophon *Lacedaemonian Constitution* 5.8-9 on Lycurgan rulings on exercise and *Lacedaemonian Constitution* 12.5-7 on the Spartan practice of continuing to exercise while on campaign.

[460] On *sphaireis* see Xenophon *Lacedaemonian Constitution* 9.5; on the contest for Artemis Orthia see Xenophon *Lacedaemonian Constitution* 2.8-9 and on the battle at the plane-tree grove see Pausanias 3.14.10. Christesen (2012: 202-3) notes that all firm evidence for the plane-tree grove battles comes from Roman sources but suggests that Plato's *Laws* 633b may make reference to the game. The evidence from Plato, however, does not seem entirely convincing as it could make reference to other aspects of Spartan life such as physical training or the fights in the street that Xenophon speaks of in *Lacedaemonian Constitution* 4.6.

[461] Hodkinson (1999: 148-149).

[462] Christesen (2012: 232-3).

[463] On *sphaireis* being known by the name of *episkyros*, see Kennell (1995: 60-61); on the violence involved in the Spartan games see Pausanias 3.14.10 and Lucian *Anacharsis* 38.

It has been suggested by Pritchard that many of the sources that despise athletics are written for an upper class audience whereas comedy and tragedy, for example, were broadly positive in regard to athletics. He suggests that although comedy could easily have utilised athletes and athletics in order to poke fun at them, comedy is largely silent in regard to these subjects. Pritchard believes that when athletics is mentioned in comedy it is in broadly positive terms, with the exception of the fragment of Autolycos mentioned previously.[464] He suggests that tragedy tends to be relatively positive with regard to athletics, too, viewing it as normal practice for the well-bred and an activity that can win a man glory.[465] It has been suggested that the poorer citizens in Athens respected and enjoyed athletics, seeing it both as a mirror of warfare in many respects and also seeing athletic victors as the recipients of divine favour in the same way that the winning side in a battle has received divine favour.[466] Pritchard suggests that this is why the public was keen to lavish gifts on victors such as the honour of public dining.[467] Pritchard notes that this connection with this idea of divine favour could be developed even further with some athletes even worshipped quite literally as heroes themselves.[468]

Despite the differing views, there were certainly opportunities available for those who wished to pursue athletic training. In Plato we find a statement about the professional trainers available in Athens for those who wish to prepare for competitions and we also find specific details on the programme of training available for boxers which include daily sparring with partners, wearing gloves to practice, hitting dummies and shadow boxing.[469] However, these opportunities would have been beyond the financial reach of the majority of Athenian citizens. The wealthy would have had the time and the finances to commit to

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[464] Pritchard (2012: 114). He comments on passages such as Aristophanes' *Clouds* 971-82 and 1002-8 and *Frogs* 727-33 to illustrate the broadly positive approach to athletics found in comedy.

[465] Pritchard (2012: 120-130). He cites passages such as Euripides' *Suppliants* 314-15, *Alcestis* 1026-7, *Trojan Women* 834, *Phoenician Women* 366-70 and *Electra* 528 and Sophocles' *Electra* 681-9 as illustrations of positive depictions of athletics in tragedy.

[466] Pritchard (2012: 211-213).

[467] Prichard (2012: 85-6) states as the earliest evidence for this IG I^3 131 dating to the 430s. This inscription makes mention of other gifts also, which Pritchard suggests probably includes front row seating in the theatre. Pritchard believes that the wording of this inscription suggests that these awards for victors were in place before the 430s and the inscription simply confirms the practice. He also argues that evidence from other authors suggests the possibility of home-coming parades for victors returning to Athens. See Aristophanes *Knights* 498-502, Euripides *Electra* 880-5 and Thucydides 4.121.

[468] For example, Kleomedes of Astypalaia (Pausanias 6.9.6-8), Oibotas of Dyme (Pausanias 6.3.8) and Theagenes of Thasos (Pausanias 6.11).

[469] Plato *Statesman*, 294d and Plato, *Laws*, 8.830a-c; Nicholson (2005) argues that trainers, although clearly in existence, are often struck from the record in an aristocratic attempt to protect the idea that talent and skill are innate rather than learned.

training at a high level, if they so wished. Their training could have been intense and may have been focussed on an attempt to compete in athletic events but it is clear that this type of training would not have been of particular use as military training, mainly due to the small number of citizens able to make that sort of commitment. The ancient sources seem to hold athletics in poor regard when it is connected with these sort of athletes and they are caricatured as over-fed and over-exercised figures. To become such an athlete would require time that perhaps other citizens believed could be better spent on civic duties or preparation for war.

Generally, athletics seemed to be viewed more positively when practiced by amateurs and in moderation. Sport and exercise were commonly practiced in Sparta as part of daily life and campaign life. The situation at Athens is more complex but it seems likely that many did participate in athletics to some level and the provision of public *gymnasia* would have assisted in making athletic training more broadly accessible.

However, even if athletic training can be assumed to be commonly practiced, the usefulness of it as a military training tool must be considered. In terms of practical military skills, very few of the disciplines would have been helpful in increasing the skills of the participants. Some athletic disciplines such as the long jump would be completely irrelevant in terms of military efficiency. Others, such as javelin throwing, may have had some limited usefulness in training a potential warrior but a javelin would differ from a spear and a spear would generally be thrust rather than thrown. However, javelin throwing could be of some limited use to a lightly armed warrior in increasing his range or accuracy. Other disciplines such as running would surely increase general fitness and stamina which would, of course, have some usefulness on the battlefield. Swiftness of foot would be a skill more useful to the light-armed contingent but the gains in general fitness would be useful to all. The pugilistic sports such as boxing and wrestling could have a role in conditioning warriors to face aggression. Modern military units often include pugilistic sports in training for this very reason. Naturally, the aggression faced in battle is entirely dissimilar to a wrestling or boxing bout but preparing for battle by pugilistic activities can teach participants how to control their nerves and stay focussed in a dangerous and antagonistic situation where they are filled with adrenaline.

Athletics also aided in creating social solidarity, taught obedience, discipline and the importance of following rules. The *gymnasium* may have served as a way to interact with other men, build community bonds and foster a civic spirit. A citizen may have trained

alongside men in the gymnasium that he would later serve alongside in war, strengthening his desire and will to fight in order to avoid shame on his return and also due to a desire to protect a group that may include friends and acquaintances.

3.1.2 The Sociology and Psychology of Athletics

Another approach to the issue of ancient athletics and its role as a potential preparation for war is by considering the evidence of modern research in sociological and psychological fields to ascertain whether sports and athletics have been proven to have links with aggression. An obvious place to look for links between aggression and sports is the world of combat sports. Two modern theories exist to explain the purpose of combat sports: the drive discharge model and the culture pattern model.[470]

The drive discharge model states that aggression is innate in human beings and society. Therefore, aggressive tension will accumulate without an outlet such as war or aggressive sports. According to this theory, warlike or aggressive sports serve as alternatives to war and societies that practice them are less likely to go to war. In contrast, the culture pattern model states that aggression is primarily learned by human beings and suggests an overlap for war and warlike sports. It suggests that a society that has the presence of more warlike sports is more likely to go to war.[471] Sipes conducted a study of various cultures in order to ascertain which of these theories seemed most plausible and discovered that combat sports are most frequently found in countries where war is common and are rare in more peaceful societies.[472] Furthermore, he discovered in a survey of the evidence for the US that more combative sports that involve violence and harm such as American football and hunting became more commonly pursued during major conflicts that involved the US such as the Second World War and the Korean War where a less combative sport such as baseball dropped in popularity.[473] This evidence seems to fit the pattern we see in fifth-century Greece. Athens and Sparta are both societies who practice pugilistic sports. This is seen particularly at Sparta where the boys were encouraged to wrestle, fight and engage in rough sports such as the game held at the Platanistas grove. At times of war, these combat sports did not stop. Indeed, inter-state conflicts were paused for the major panhellenic festivals to take place.

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[470] Sipes (1973).

[471] Sipes (1973: 64-65).

[472] Sipes (1973: 71).

[473] Sipes (1973: 79).

T.J. Cornell has analysed these two models with regards to the ancient world and is unconvinced by either. Instead he argues for sports being autotelic, that is being an end in themselves.[474] However, his rejection of the culture pattern model seems to rely on two assumptions: firstly, that the ancients did not really have any contact sports such as football or ice hockey and secondly, he seems to assume the need for a degree of consciousness on the part of the society as a whole that they are engaging in games for military purposes. With regard to his first point, Sipes only argues that for a link between aggression and war, the society in question must practice aggressive sports. There is no reason why it should be assumed that these sports are contact team sports similar to those we find in the modern world and it is undeniable that aggressive sports such as boxing, wrestling and *pancration* were practiced in the ancient world. Furthermore, as Cornell himself notes, there did exist in Sparta team games that are more similar to our modern idea of contact team sports, even if these sports were only practiced in Sparta and not across Greece or at the games. In regard to the second point, there is no reason why it should be assumed that the society in question needs to be conscious of what they are doing by practicing aggressive sports. Sipes has clearly shown a link between aggressive sports and warrior cultures but whether these cultures were aware of the effects of practicing aggressive arts seems largely irrelevant. In fact, Cornell's statement that the Greeks practiced sports as an end in themselves is not wholly contradictory with the theory of Sipes. The Greeks may have believed they were practicing athletics as an end in themselves while being unaware, or not entirely aware, of the implications of practicing these sports. Similarly, today there are many children and adults who play contact sports for the pleasure of the game without considering the possibility of aggression being increased by this or while being aware of such possibilities but not viewing them as a major consideration.

In the modern era there is much discussion of the effects of watching violence. The concern in our modern world is for children watching television or playing violent computer games, but many of the modern studies also give interesting evidence that could relate to the ancient world. The results of studies into aggression are not always clear. This could, in many cases, be due to laboratory conditions and the different behaviour expected of people who are aware of the fact that their behaviour is being monitored. Felson records a series of studies where children or adolescents were exposed to aggressive or non-aggressive films and their subsequent behaviour monitored. In sixteen of these studies the subjects were more aggressive after violent films; in another seven of the studies subjects

[474] Cornell (2002: 32).

in the control group were more aggressive and in five of the studies there was no difference in aggression between the two groups.[475] These results are not entirely convincing although they do display a slight general tendency for those exposed to aggression to be subsequently more aggressive. The key here is the effects of witnessing aggression. These studies were into the effects of witnessing aggression on television but the ancient Greek, whether child or adult, would be witnessing it in person frequently. In fact, one modern study made an explicit, although controversial, link between the viewing of boxing and violent behaviour when he stated that the murder rate increased for a period after highly publicized heavyweight championship fights.[476]

Felson discusses two separate theories for why viewing aggression can result in aggressive behaviour. The theory states that watching violence can activate violent thoughts and can cause a viewer to retrieve memories associated with violence and aggression.[477] The second theory states that children learn how to deal with problems and how to react to situations partly by observation. Therefore, if a child is exposed to violence frequently, they may consequently learn to deal with problems using aggression.[478] Frequent viewing of violence can also lead to desensitisation to violence and if the violence is sanctioned or left unpunished, then the viewer of the violence will feel less guilt or worry in committing violent acts themselves.[479]

Various studies have examined the long-term effects of exposure to media violence and it would surely follow that exposure to violence in sports could be expected to yield similar results. A study by Huesmann *et. al*. yielded results that indicated that exposure to media violence in childhood predicted aggression behaviour in both males and females approximately fifteen years later even when other factors such as socio-economic background were taken into consideration. This study contrasted with some earlier studies such as the study conducted by Turner *et.al*. who found a link between exposure to media violence and long-term effects in aggression but only for boys and not for girls. Bushman and Huesmann found that exposure to violent media tended to produce long-term effects for children but short-term effects for adults and hypothesised that this was due to children

[475] Felson (1996: 107).

[476] Philips (1983) discussed in (Felson 1996: 108).

[477] Berkowitz (1984); Bushman and Geen (1990); both discussed in Felson (1996: 112).

[478] Huesmann (1982), discussed in Felson (1996: 112).

[479] Felson (1996: 118 and 120).

developing 'scripts' for understanding how to respond to situations via observational learning. [480]

Many studies have been done to examine the emotions of spectators at sports events, specifically to see whether aggression on the sports field affects non-participants. Many such studies have found a correlation between aggressive sports and spectator aggression such as the study of Arms, Russell and Sandilands who examined the sports of ice hockey (as a contact sport), professional wrestling (as a sport which features contact but much of the action is simulated or 'fake') and swimming (as a non contact sport). They discovered that post-match hostility scores were higher for those watching wrestling and ice hockey but were not higher for those watching swimming. They also proved that there was a downturn in certain other emotions, such as the emotion of social affection at all three events.[481] Admittedly, not all Greek athletics were violent sports or combat sports but many of them were. Constant exposure to these, especially for children and adolescents, would have resulted in psychological changes.[482] Watching such sports at a panhellenic festival at a time of war would surely have only helped to fuel hostile feelings of each opposing side in the war, even if their athletes were not participating, and would have increased the efficiency of each individual soldier.[483] The modern studies show that even limited exposure to violence has long-lasting effects on children, leading them to respond more aggressively to situations. Therefore, although most children would not have commonly witnessed Panhellenic festivals, for example, they would have had fairly frequent exposure to contact sports from local festivals that included athletics events, watching practice in the gymnasium and possibly participating themselves. Violence was fairly institutionalised in Sparta throughout the Spartan education system and corporal punishment would also have been utilised to discipline children. Spartan and Athenian boys would, therefore, have had relatively frequent exposure to aggression through sports and other methods and modern

[480] Huesmann et. al. (2003) , Turner et. al. (1986) , Bushman and Huesmann (2006).

[481] Arms, Russell and Sandilands (1979: 278-9).

[482] Huesmann et. al. (2003) , Turner et. al. (1986) , Bushman and Huesmann (2006).

[483] Crowther (2010: 37-8) accepts the figures suggested by Romano (1993: 19-23) for spectator capacity at Olympia of approximately 24 000 for the late sixth century Olympia II stadium and approximately 40 000 for the Late Classical Olympia III stadium. Crowley points out that we have no way of knowing whether the stadium was full but suggests that we can assume high attendance due to sources mentioning crowds at Olympia such as Epictetos *Discourses* 6. Romano (1985) suggests a stadium for the Panathenaia on the Pnyx which could have held approximately 5-6000 spectators. However, Greeks must have been exposed to aggressive sports fairly regularly in their home states even if they were not able to attend large scale festivals such as Olympia or the Panathenaia frequently or, indeed, at all.

psychology would suggest that this would causing long-lasting changes to their behaviour and lead to them acting more aggressively.

The participants in these sports, themselves, are sure to have increased aggression for at least a period after participating, if not long term. One study found that an American motel suffered more damage by occupants who had just participated in an American football match (a contact sport) than in a basketball game (a game where contact is limited).[484] Today, as in the fifth century BC, athleticism is rewarded. If rewards are given for aggression, this could lead to increased aggression from the athlete towards those he views as 'outsiders'.[485] In fact, Kreager's study proved that adolescents who engaged in contact sports were far more likely to get into fights and engage in violence outside of their sport. His study showed that American footballers were forty per cent more likely to get into fights than adolescents who did not play sport and wrestlers were forty-five per cent more likely to get into fights. Tennis players, in contrast, were thirty-five per cent less likely to get into fights than adolescents who did not play sports.[486] Contact sports, then, are linked with violent behaviour, although there are caveats associated with accepting the modern studies too readily, and in the athletic, agonistic culture of ancient Greece, it can be assumed that participation in such sports would have produced a similar tendency towards violence. There evidence seems to be quite clear that children exposed to violence from a young age seem to have their personalities moulded somewhat by that exposure. Therefore, the constant exposure to violent sports from a young age that continued into adulthood would have maximised the potential of children growing into adults who had the potential to be aggressive and would have also ensured that aggression was continually fostered in adults, contributing to the creation of a hoplite force that should not have had difficulty in displaying aggression in warfare.

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[484] Bryan and Harton (1976: 8-9). However, it must be considered that perhaps more naturally aggressive personalities are drawn to more aggressive sports, although the fact that the damage took place post match is suggestive of higher levels of aggression after participation.

[485] Kreager (2007: 706).

[486] Kreager (2007: 716-717). However, it is worth noting that in the modern world there are social factors linked to sports in regard to the fact that different classes tend to gravitate towards pursuing different sports. For example, tennis tends to be practiced more by the middle and upper classes and perhaps aggressive sports are more likely to be pursued by those from a lower class background, therefore the links between sport and aggression may also be related to other social factors.

3.1.3 Conclusion

Physical fitness is clearly an important element in modern warfare and in ancient warfare, too, physical fitness must have increased the effectiveness of citizens in warfare. However, training to the level of an athlete who is capable of competing and winning in crown games would have been time-intensive, requiring a degree of commitment that would almost entirely debar the athlete from participating in other aspects of community life. It also required an intake of food much greater than that required by the ordinary person. Perhaps unsurprisingly there is tension in the sources about whether athletic training was of use or not. Even though professional trainers were available, most citizens would have been unable to afford them. Similarly, most would not have been able to afford the time-commitment and the high protein diet and thus full athletic training would not be possible for most of the citizens.[487]

In reference to modern sport, it has been said that sport can be viewed as:

> "…a social ceremony structurally capable of fulfilling social functions comparable to those of religious ceremonies, specifically by serving as an arena for the creation of symbolic leaders and the display of heroic action."[488]

This can also be applied to the athletics of the ancient world. Sport in the fifth century was still, despite subsidisation of public gymnasia, largely an aristocratic pursuit and the democratic Athenians may have struggled to marry this with their ideology. However, the games and success in them would surely have drawn to mind the funeral games of Patroclus and the great heroic names of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Athletics could, as previously mentioned, sometimes lead to literal hero worship of an athlete and generally lead to civic honours at the very least, such as feasting at public expense or a place in battle near to the king.[489]

Modern studies indicate that sports, particularly combat sports, brought benefits to a warrior society that the ancients themselves did not even imagine. Not only participants but spectators, too, will have had their aggression levels raised. The effects would most probably have been short-lived for adults but since athletic festivals were celebrated often,

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[487] Poliakoff (1987: 103) suggests that athletics may have been a poor and indirect training for war but most states were unwilling to submit to anything else.

[488] Birrell (1981: 356).

[489] Xenophanes Fragment 19 on dining at public expense, Pausanias 6.14.10 on erection of victory statues in honour of an athlete and Plutarch, *Lycurgus* 22.4 on the Spartan battle placement of victors.

aggressive games such as wrestling will have been practiced frequently by many more citizens than only those who were of competition standard and conflict between states was almost constant, even short-lived increases in aggression may have had an impact on warrior aggression. However, witnessing aggression, even for short periods of time, has been shown to have long-term consequences for children and, therefore, for children growing up in states where aggressive sports are common would lead to children growing into adults with more aggressive tendencies. Therefore, in such an environment, the consequences of the links between sports and aggression may well have played a significant part in creating a warrior culture.

3.2 Power, Politics and Propaganda

The creation of a citizen-warrior is not an uncomplicated affair but a series of events and interactions in the life of the citizen that encourage him to embrace the warrior ideology and motivate him to continue believing that this ideology provides the correct model for living his life. One powerful way to do this is by making villains out of other states and therefore controlling their access, or lack thereof, to a specific festival. Alternatively, festivals provide excellent opportunities for making the superiority of one's own state explicit, particularly festivals that allowed representatives of many different states to be present together in one location. The festivals not only served as a platform from which states could display their success, wealth and power but also, although albeit rarer, could provide opportunities for states to flex their political muscle. In essence, festivals provided an opportunity for states to persuade both their own citizens and citizens from other states that they were powerful and through this act, persuade and motivate their own citizens to be keen to fight in future wars.

Throughout the rest of this chapter, it is important to consider how propaganda or persuasion could function successfully. Pratkanis and Aronson propose four stages in successful persuasion of a target audience. This four stage process includes pre-persuasion, a stage in which the persuader "establishes what everyone knows or takes for granted". This is followed by the creation of a favourable image of the source of persuasion as being likeable, powerful, trustworthy or whichever other attribute that they wish to project. Third is the delivery of the message and fourth is controlling the emotions of the target.[490] This model is a useful one to follow and I will refer back to it throughout the rest of this chapter. However, I do not believe that all stages necessarily need to be completed in order to

[490] Pratkanis and Aronson (2001: 51).

persuade an audience to accept a particular view although a more complete persuasion could be completed if all four stages are followed. I also think that often the pre-persuasion stage and the creation of a favourable image can occur as the same process or as two processes occurring simultaneously so as to almost appear to be the same process.

Finally, I wish to clarify two points before discussion of the evidence. First of all, I do not wish to imply that the Greeks embarked on a planned, deliberate propaganda campaign in the manner in which a modern state might. Of course, the ancients did not have the discipline of psychology to rely upon nor did they have civic departments established whose sole purpose was to persuade the masses and there was no mass media to be utilised. However, many of the practices of the ancient world would have served the same purposes as modern propaganda even if the ancients did not have a full understanding of psychology and how propaganda might influence citizens.

Secondly, the term propaganda is a loaded one. Jowett and O' Donnell provide the following definition:

> "*Propaganda*, in the most neutral sense, means to disseminate or promote particular ideas."

They contrast it with persuasion in the following definition:

> "Propaganda is a form of communication that attempts to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist. Persuasion is interactive and attempts to satisfy the needs of both persuader and persuadee."

What occurs in the ancient world seems to lie somewhere in between these two definitions, particularly in regards to Athens. There is, as previously stated, no separate government department trying to promote their own agenda. At festivals like the Panathenaia and the City Dionysia, some of the persuaders (the citizens who are involved in making the festivals take place) are also persuadees (members of the target audience of the festival). Therefore, I use propaganda and persuasion throughout as interchangeable terms but it is necessary to preface their use with this *caveat*.

3.2.1 Propaganda and Participation

The crown games were by their inherent nature inclusive (for Greeks, at least) and glory could be won or lost for states in clear view of the assembled representatives of the other Greek states. To debar a state from competition was to withhold from them the chance of

glory and although it seems to be relatively rare there is a clear example of this occurring at Olympia in the fifth century.

Thucydides tells of a Spartan incursion into Lepreum in 420 which subsequently incurred a fine of 2000 minae due to the fact that the Eleans claimed the Spartans had made this attack during the time of the Olympic truce. The Spartans appealed to the Eleans to state that as the truce had not yet been announced at Sparta, they had done no wrong. The Eleans, however, insisted that since it had been announced at Elis, they were living in peace conditions regardless of whether or not it had been announced at Sparta, and therefore had not been expecting an attack. They did concede that they would pay themselves what the Spartans owed to the god if the Spartans would agree to return Lepreum to them but Sparta rejected this offer and also refused to pay the fine. The Eleans banned the Spartans from the games and the Spartans instead sacrificed at home. The story, however, does not end there. Thucydides informs us that the Eleans were fearful of a Spartan attack and so their own young men were kept at the ready for an attack alongside 1000 Argives, 1000 Mantineans and some Athenian cavalry. To further complicate matters, a certain Spartan named Lichas entered a chariot into the games and won. He came forward to crown the charioteer in order to make it known that he had entered the chariot but since the Spartans were banned from the games that year, the victory was given to the Boeotians and Lichas was given a beating.[491]

Thucydides' account of this particular event ends here but in Xenophon it becomes clear that the Spartans by 399/8 are still feeling the sting of these events. Xenophon states that the Spartans invaded Elis due to their being debarred from the Olympics in 420 and also due to other dishonours that they felt they had suffered at the hands of Elis in the intervening years.[492] After this attack on Elis, Lichas even went so far as to erect a statue in the Altis at Elis to claim the victory of the 420 chariot race in his name, although the official records still attributed it to the Thebans.[493]

It is clear from this example, then, that the crown games were certainly not just a simple matter of sport, but politically powerful events. Miller discusses this event and suggests that as we know from Xenophon that the Eleans had made a treaty with Athens, Argos and Mantinea, there is a distinct possibility that the debarring of the Spartans was associated

[491] Thucydides 5.49-50.

[492] Xenophon, *Hellenica* 3.2.21-31.

[493] Pausanias 6.2.3.

with the Athenian-Spartan conflict rather more than with the reasons the Eleans gave for debarring them.[494] This theory is *a priori* tempting to accept. However, it does raise the question of why Thucydides states that the Eleans were willing to drop the fine of the Spartans if they gave back Lepreum. If the Eleans were in actuality more concerned with the Athenian-Spartan conflict rather than the Lepreum situation then this offer would not make sense, unless the Eleans made this offer in order to appear magnanimous even though they suspected that the Spartans would reject it? It seems more likely that if the details Thucydides gives us are correct, that the debarring of Sparta had more to do with the harm that they had caused Elis than the hostilities that existed between themselves and Athens, although the debarring of Sparta would, of course, have pleased Elis on two counts. Firstly, on the grounds that they had managed to get revenge for their attack and secondly, on the grounds that the debarring of the Spartans would please their new Athenian allies. It is also worth considering that the Spartan attack on Elis may have been motivated by the fact that Elis had made a treaty with Athens. To refer back to our model of persuasion, Elis here could be considered to be creating a favourable image of itself as authoritative, on the one hand, and also as a trustworthy ally of Athens on the other.

Miller also argues convincingly for a state of one-upmanship between Athens and Sparta enacted through the Olympic games at this period. He argues that the *tethrippon*, the one race that truly displayed the wealth and power of a state, was completely dominated by Sparta from 448 onwards, except for an Athenian victory in 436. By 420, then, as Miller points out, Sparta would have had seven victories to their name while the Athenians had only one until Alcibiades entered seven chariots into the race in 416.[495] Again, the process of the creation of a favourable image is clear here. Of course, this would have been on a personal level as individuals would be burdening themselves with the expense of providing the chariots and riders for this race, but it would also reflect on the home states of the participants.[496] It is impossible to tell how strongly both the Spartan and Athenian contributors were motivated by personal promotion but clearly an image of success and wealth is being promoted by both sides.

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[494] Miller (2004: 221); Xenophon, *Hellenica* 3.2.21.

[495] Miller (2004: 221); Miller also details other times when the games were disrupted due to power struggles although later than our period. See Xenophon *Hellenica* 4.5.1 and also, Xenophon, *Hellenica* 7.4.28 following.

[496] See Thucydides 6.16.2 where Thucydides states that Alcibiades in a speech specifically mentions his Olympic involvement and asserts that his victories made Athens look powerful.

It is also worth mentioning that both Philostratus and Plutarch state that Spartans would not participate in competition at boxing or *pancration* as these sports might require the Spartan to signal submission.[497] If this were true, it would be evidence that certain states were extremely aware of the image that was being projected of themselves at events such as the Olympics and were keen to protect themselves from being seen as weak. Essentially, submission in sport would be potentially a reflection of their willingness to submit in battle. Golden, however, is not entirely convinced by the statement that Spartans refused to participate in combat sports.[498] He states that since Philostratus also claims that the Spartans invented boxing, that this statement creates a contradiction and similarly, that there is evidence of *pankration* competitions at Sparta itself. A solution to this would be to consider that competitions within Sparta itself may have been acceptable due to the fact that they were not showing submission to outsiders. However, Golden also states epigraphical evidence and tells of a Spartan Olympic boxing winner as evidence.[499] It is therefore prudent, perhaps, to put aside the statements of Plutarch and Philostratus as ideas that may have been tainted somewhat by the Spartan mirage.

These instances of political posturing were also present in the decoration and dedications that existed. The military victory dedications that are on display at Panhellenic festival venues also have a clear role in showing all of Greece who has the power and the military might. For example, Pausanias mentions a shield at Olympia with an inscription stating that it was offered up as a victory tithe from the Lacedaemonians and their allies to celebrate a victory over the Athenians, Argives and Ionians at the battle of Tanagra in 457 BC.[500] Similarly, the Athenians built a victory portico at Delphi from spoils of war and a treasury in addition to displaying figureheads and bronze shields.[501] Offering up military victory dedications to the gods was, of course, standard practice in the Greek world and it is not surprising that both Athens and Sparta wished to honour the gods for their victories by offering up dedications of this sort. However, the battle site itself is not the chosen location for these particular dedications. Nor have the dedications been built in Athens or Sparta themselves. Instead, they have been displayed in sanctuaries that attract a Panhellenic audience with the Lacedaemonian example even displaying an inscription that clearly states the name of the victorious state and, in opposition, the names of the defeated

[497] Philostratus *De Gymnastica* 9 and Plutarch *Lycurgus*: 19.4.

[498] Golden (1998: 54).

[499] Golden (1998: 54); Diogenes Laertius 1.73

[500] Pausanias 5.10.4.

[501] Pausanias 10.11.5-10.11.6.

states. The particular manifestations of Zeus at Olympia and Apollo at Delphi were not particularly strongly associated with warfare and so there would have been no strong reason for states to be so keen to dedicate military commemorations at either sanctuary aside from the benefits, or perceived benefits, that could be gained from having such dedications very publicly displayed to as broad a Greek audience as possible. Once again, states are promoting a favourable image of themselves as both powerful and victorious. Since some dedications would contain either text or images that could be interpreted by the viewer as making particular statements, these dedications could also be considered as passing into stage three of the process of persuasion and delivering a message.

There were also, of course, athletic victor statues, often paid for by a wealthy athlete himself. Such a statue would certainly be an act of self-promotion for those who could afford it, but the fact that victory statues were often also erected in the home *polis* of an athlete suggests that there was also a civic ideal being promoted via the figure of the successful athlete.[502] The state could take pride in his victory and grasp some of the glory of his success for the state as a whole.

The propaganda value of winning or losing at the games seems quite clear. However, propaganda is not simply confined to the Panhellenic festivals; and a state can make a statement about their own power through their own state festivals. The clearest example of this in practice is the Greater Panathenaia of the Athenians.[503] The vast sums of money offered up to athletic victors in prizes would have attracted competitors from outside of Greece to be present in the city for the festival and would have surely left them in awe of the financial might of a state able to afford to offer up such lavish prizes every four years.[504] The Athenian allies had to present a cow and a panoply at the festival, a practice

[502] Smith (2007: 95, 97 and 100) observes that some athletes may have had statues erected by their home *polis* in a sanctuary or agora but Athens was a notable exception, who during the fifth century had a statue only of the Tyrannicides in their agora. Athenians did celebrate their athletic winners but seem to have felt that public statues in public spaces was an inappropriate way to do so.

[503] The founding of the Panathenaia is open to debate. The traditional date of the foundation is 566 and although many ascribe the creation of the festival to Peisistratus, Kyle (1996: 117) argues against this on the ground that he was not yet tyrant at this period. He instead suggests it may have been founded by that year's archon, Hippokleides. The earliest reference to the Great Panathenaia comes from a victory monument dating to the fifth century (Neils, 1992: 14). Raubitschek (1949: Item Number 164) discusses this monument and puts forward a date of 482 for the Panathenaic victory since the monument also mentions an Olympic victory of the same victor which can be dated to 472 (Shear 1935: 179).

[504] Kyle (1992: 98) accepts an estimate of a value equivalent to approximately $67, 000 for the prize for the men's stadion. This figure is based, however, on a fourth-century inscription listing the prizes for each event and the prizes may have differed in the fifth century.

that made them appear like Athenian colonists who were required to do the same, but it also ensured that there would be representatives from each ally in Athens to witness the grand spectacle of the festival.[505] Athens, it seems, was promoting itself visibly in front of the Hellenic world, displaying the wealth of the state and displaying the state's power by ensuring the allies present what was due to the *polis* on an occasion when all eyes were on Athens.

Some of the events were open only to Athenian competitors. These events were largely tribal and were financed by liturgies.[506] Therefore, these Athenian-only events were always sure to run and be an impressive sight (as no tribe would be able to plead poverty to avoid competition and there may well have been a degree of competition between the elite citizens providing the liturgies to ensure that their tribe provided the best spectacle).[507] Interestingly, one of the events open to only Athenian citizens was that of the *euandria* which is a relatively mysterious event that is much discussed.[508] However, whether this event is related only to physical beauty or whether it also involves some sort of assessment of moral goodness, it is important to note that keeping it closed to outsiders is either an attempt to dictate that only Athenians can possess such a virtue or, alternatively, limits the potential embarrassment if non-Athenians won. Either way, it essentially allows the Athenians to protect their identity as a superior people. Similarly, the armed dance was a tribal competition, open only to Athenians.

Thus, Panathenaia was creating a favourable image of Athens to both citizens and outsiders, portraying her as powerful and wealthy. The Panathenaia was also disseminating a message although not explicitly and not verbally. Victors would carry away large, decorated amphorae that would remind both themselves and, to some extent, their communities of Athens, her power and her wealth.

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[505] IG I2 66, also IG I2 10 on Erythrai. See Meiggs and Lewis (1988: 121) on cow and panoply mirroring colonies. Meiggs (2008: 63) states that it was unlikely that allies viewed this invitation to behave like colonists favourably. Similarly, tribute was brought to the City Dionysia by allies also.

[506] Kyle (1992: 82).

[507] Osborne (1988: 216) stresses the importance of these tribal competitions for fostering a feeling of *esprit de corps* among the members of each tribe.

[508] Kyle (1992: 96) suggests a contest associated with physical and moral beauty as well as value to the community. Boegehold (1996) suggests that it is associated with the chorus that performed at the Panathanaia and the winners of the contest were given the honour of performing in the front rank.

3.2.2 Conclusion

It is clear that festivals offered an opportunity for display and self-promotion both on a personal and a state level. A successful, wealthy athlete would be keen to erect a victory statue of his own, but his home *polis* would also, in general, be quick to erect their own publicly visible statue of the returning athlete. There may even have been personal, rather than state, one-upmanship within a particular discipline such as the competition that may have existed between Athens and Sparta in the *tethrippon* which played out between wealthy private citizens of the two states. Yet this sort of commemoration and celebration of an individual athlete or more personal level of competition between states was relatively inconsequential in comparison with the opportunity for state displays at Panhellenic venues.

Of course, not every citizen of every *polis* would pass through each Panhellenic venue frequently or, indeed, at all, but there would be representatives from many states, and this was key to displays such as grandiose victory dedications which were very visible acts of self-promotion, clearly displaying the military prowess of the state responsible. War, religion and athletics could be easily intertwined in this way, reminding those who passed through just where the power lay in the Hellenic world.

The Panhellenic games provided an opportunity for states such as Elis, normally relatively militarily inconsequential, to frustrate a powerful *polis* such as Sparta by debarring them from participation in the Olympic games. Once again war, politics and religion become mixed together via the Panhellenic festivals.

The case of Athens is particularly interesting in the ostentatious displays that it was able to provide through the Great Panathenaia. Although this religious festival was not part of the Panhellenic circuit, the large prizes offered for the Panathenaia would have tempted many to visit Athens either to participate or to spectate and Athens ensured that representatives from their own allies were required to attend. This festival provided Athens with a platform to display her wealth, her success and her allies and to also ensure a degree of control over her allies.

The constant power displays played out at these large festivals offered an opportunity for the larger and successful states to promote themselves to both their own citizens and others. A citizen being constantly reminded of the successes of his city state would be a

citizen motivated to fight both because he would be encouraged to uphold a history of success and also because he would be more likely to feel certain that success was a highly likely result in any battle that his state engaged in. Other states being constantly reminded of the strength of states such as Athens and Sparta may have been less inclined to try to engage them in warfare or may have been less confident in their own chances of success if fighting became necessary.[509] The celebration of successes, both the personal successes of individual athletes and also, more importantly, the successes of the *polis* through war, encourages patriotism in the citizens of the celebrated states.

3.3 The Military Elements of Festivals

Festivals often incorporated either implicit or explicit military features and could serve as important events to showcase to both citizens and outsiders the military prowess of the city. Festivals could encourage civic pride in various ways which could encourage warriors to be motivated to fight for their city state in times of need. Already, we have seen how the Panhellenic festivals incorporated events that had a degree of association with warfare such as the race in armour. Many of the other events are certainly not as explicitly related to warfare, but encompass skills or equipment that would be useful in war. For example, the running races display speed and fitness of the competitors, useful for warriors charging the enemy at a run and more generally for a soldier facing the arduous conditions of battle. The javelin, although thrown and not thrust, has clear similarities to a spear and was utilised by some light-armed troops. Even the heavy events of boxing and wrestling encapsulate the strength and ability to wound others that you would expect in a warrior, as well as the ability to endure punishment and pain. Furthermore, in actual battle when the two enemy sides had met, it might have been hard to utilise a short sword once a spear has been lost or broken. So it seems conceivable that men would have resorted to punching and grabbing their enemies, like they would in boxing or *pancration*, if the tight packed ranks and the pushing of both sides made it difficult for them to use their swords at points during

[509] It has been noted by McKernan (2002: 369) that propaganda is most effective at convincing 'home' citizens or neutral citizens and is rarely likely to be effective in changing the perspective of the enemy. Therefore, in ancient Greece the propaganda displayed would bolster 'home' citizens sense of morale and purpose and may possibly attract a state new allies or solidify existing alliances by convincing such states that they are strong. This, in turn, would have a positive effect on the morale of the population of the 'home' state' if they were able to expect to have allies in a military situation. Also, Bacon (1979) and Schwartz (1982) argue that repetition is key in accepting information as valid, so the more widely states could disseminate their message of power and prestige and the more often it could be seen by their own citizens and by citizens of other states, the more likely it would be to be believed and accepted.

the battle.[510] Whether explicit or not, it seems the athletic events of Panhellenic festivals would have, at the very least, a vague association of military skills for spectators. Spectators would be able to witness which boxers were able to withstand the most physical punishment, which runners displayed the most speed and stamina and which javelin throwers had the strongest throwing arms and, no doubt, translated this loosely to potential physical ability on the battlefield to endure or administer pain, to run at speed or to thrust a spear with the most force.

3.3.1 Panathenaia

The clearest association with the military comes not with the Panhellenic athletic festivals but with more local festivals. The Panathenaia, of course, is an exceptional festival. Although Athenian and not Panhellenic in character, it did attract a far greater audience than an exclusively local festival. The Great Panathenaia, in particular, was extremely international. The Great Panathenaia required the allies to bring a cow and a panoply, as mentioned above. The cow, of course, was a fairly generic sacrificial victim, but a panoply has clear military overtones. Of course, the festival was in honour of Athena, a goddess associated with war and often depicted as a martial goddess, but even if the panoply was chosen for this reason, the givers and the receivers would still be viewing it as a sign of Athena's continued military support. The allies were required to present a panoply just as they were meant to present their own military support to Athens whenever it was requested. See mention of the cow and panoply at 3.2.1 Propaganda and Participation.

There were also recitations of Homeric poetry at the Great Panathenaia and with the militaristic themes, particularly in the *Iliad*, it seems that they too could play a part in presenting military ideology to spectators. Two sources stress the usefulness of Homeric poetry in education. Firstly, Plutarch in his biography of the Spartan Lycurgus states the usefulness of Homer in general education and in political lessons (πολιτικὸν καὶ παιδευτικὸν). The second source is the Athenian orator, also named Lycurgus, in his speech *Against Leocrates*, who says explicitly that he believed their inclusion in the Panathenaiac festival was in order to educate men how to behave nobly by persuasion rather than by simply laying down the law.[511] It seems that some ancients, therefore,

[510] Hanson (1989) creates an informative picture of the chaotic nature of hoplite battle where the spear can easily be lost or broken in the initial charge for those in the front ranks.

[511] Plutarch *Lycurgus* 4.4 and Lycurgus *Against Leocrates* 102.

believed that Homer had a role to play in exhorting the citizen to valour and may have seen these recitations as containing an important didactic, civic and military message.

While discussing the Panathenaia, it is necessary to consider the Parthenon frieze. As noted previously, visual representations are a message and can be used for persuasion just as easily as the spoken word. The subject of the frieze has been much discussed. Boardman has linked the frieze explicitly with military ideology and argued that the cavalrymen are a representation of the 192 men who were killed at Marathon.[512] To get to the figure of 192, however, he had to be very selective about whom he included and he counted the children who get the riders ready but not the charioteers.[513] I would argue that it would also seem strange if the dead of Marathon were being depicted, to depict them on horseback when they were hoplites and the battle itself was very much a hoplitic battle.[514] Shapiro suggests that the prominence of the cavalry on the frieze reflects the resizing of the cavalry by Pericles from 300 to 1000.[515] Also, it has been suggested that as all the men look to be a similar age, perhaps another interpretation is possible. Since ephebes on horses are known to escort holy items on processions such as from Eleusis, Simon has suggested that perhaps that is what we see in the Parthenon frieze.[516] Alternatively, perhaps the cavalry are depicted in their role as marshals for the procession. Demosthenes describes military leaders and cavalry-commanders who busy themselves with marshalling processions rather than fighting wars.[517]Perhaps the cavalry-commanders recruited members of the cavalry for marshalling duties and the relative mobility of horses taken alongside the view of the procession provided for the rider would make cavalry a useful choice to execute marshalling of a large procession.

The idea of the frieze depicting a procession is, of course, a famous interpretation. Many have interpreted it not as the procession to Eleusis but as the Panathenaic procession, and this view is often accepted without question.[518] A case, however, has been made for the Parthenon frieze to be interpreted as a depiction not of a procession but of a mythological

[512] Boardman (1977).

[513] Harrison (1996: 200).

[514] Herodotus (6.112) explicitly mentions that the Persians were shocked to see the Greeks advancing without any cavalry or archers.

[515] Shapiro (1996: 219).

[516] Simon (1983: 59).

[517] Demosthenes *Phillipic* 1.26.

[518] The idea of the frieze as depicting the procession is adopted in Deubner's *Attische Feste* and Mommsen's *Feste der Stadt Athen*. Noel Robertson accepts this view without discussion or mention of debate surrounding it in *Festivals and Legends* (1992).

event, which would be in keeping with the other decorations on the temple. Connelly argues for a mythological interpretation due to the fact that temple decorations are generally drawn from myth and not real life and bases her interpretation of the frieze on a fragment of Euripides which details the story of the first royal family of Athens when Erechtheus served as king. The attack that took place on Athens at this time required the king to sacrifice a daughter for the salvation of the city and his other two daughters wished to die alongside their sister. Connelly, therefore, believes that we see three daughters of various ages standing with their father, dressed as a priest and ready to sacrifice, and their mother.[519] The East frieze, she suggests, features the gods facing away from the scene as it would not be appropriate for them to watch a mortal dying while she interprets the North and South friezes as a sacrificial procession but a chthonian one with offerings of honeycomb.[520] She argues that the frieze, taken in context with the other temple decorations, serves as a metaphor for the Athenian triumph over the Persians.[521]

Connelly is correct that most temples display scenes from mythology rather than real-life scenes, but the Parthenon is exceptional in many ways and could, therefore, be exceptional in the depiction of a procession on the frieze. For example, it was a Doric temple but featured an Ionic frieze, as well as an unusually extensive Doric frieze. It was built from tribute money and the statue that it contained was unusual.[522] Furthermore, the idea of a procession being depicted might not be entirely exceptional after all, even if it is clearly unusual. Kroll collates the evidence of Frank Brommer of temples portraying imagery similar to that of the Parthenon, including a procession on the Peisistratid temple on the north side of the Acropolis.[523] Connelly's suggestions are interesting, but her argument does not make an entirely compelling case for the rejection of the procession interpretation.

However, acceptance of the theory that the frieze portrays the Panathenaic procession is problematic as the figures depicted on the frieze do not seem to coincide with the figures mentioned by the literary sources. Evidence from Aristophanes suggests that the frieze is

[519] Connelly (1996).

[520] Connelly (1996: 67-69).

[521] Connelly (1996: 71).

[522] Nagy (1992: 55-56) argues for the Parthenon as exceptional supporting his argument with all these points and of the statue of Athena as exceptional due to the fact that it was used as a reserve of gold. He also points out that the statue did not appear to have a priestess, an altar or a cult-name and therefore argues that it cannot be even considered as a cult-statue at all.

[523] Kroll (1979: 349).

missing some key figures such as that of the *diphrophoroi* and *skiaphoroi*.[524] It has been suggested that this problem can be remedied by viewing the frieze not as the actual procession but as a regrouping of the procession on the Acropolis, or it can also be presumed that with limited space for the sculptor to utilise, the depiction of the procession would have needed to be selective.[525]

The situation is further complicated by suggestions that the frieze was influenced by Persian reliefs.[526] Nagy believes that the imperialistic overtones of the reliefs are transformed to a democratic interpretation of the Persian reliefs by including all the Athenians celebrating alongside the gods, rather than a single "Darius" figure.[527] However, I would question this theory. Firstly, I do not find the comparisons between the Apadana reliefs and the Parthenon reliefs particularly compelling. There are similarities but these similarities are not striking. Secondly, it is questionable whether the Apadana reliefs would have been familiar to Pheidias and it certainly seems unlikely that they would have been familiar to the ordinary Athenian, which would mean that their meaning would be lost on the audience. Finally, even if all or some of the Athenian audience were aware of the parallels with the Persian reliefs, it seems unlikely that they would be content to have such parallels publicly displayed. The Athenians collected allies originally on the grounds of being a protecting force against the might of Persia and to consciously and deliberately base the Parthenon frieze on Persian imagery, reshaping it to display an imperialistic Athenian *demos* rather than a Persian king, seems to be a dangerous and questionable act. Admittedly the Athenians act rather unashamedly imperialistic towards their allies at times, but to prominently display a Persian-inspired imperialistic frieze at the centre of their city perhaps would be too shocking for the Athenians and their allies to endure.

As this brief survey has shown, although most scholars accept that the Parthenon friezes depict the Panathenaic procession, there is still some debate. It seems likely, since no other convincing proposals have been put forward, that the frieze depicts a procession in some

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[524] Rotroff (1977: 379-381) on the Aristophanic evidence and a comparison with the frieze.

[525] Rotroff (1977: 381); See also, Osborne (1987: 98-105) on an interpretation as the viewer as part of the procession by following the frieze around the temple until they finally arrive at the statue of Athena. Also to be noted are the problems of interpretation of many of the figures on the frieze. For example, Nagy (1992) rejects the interpretation of the figures on the East frieze as the Eponymous Heroes of Athens and instead argues for their interpretation as *athlothetai*.

[526] For example, Root (1985: 103-120); this theory is accepted by Nagy (1992: 58). However, Kroll (1979: 349) suggests such arguments cannot be accepted while there is evidence of similar scenes to those on the Parthenon found in Greek art.

[527] Nagy (1992: 58).

form and despite the difficulties of interpretation, the Panathenaic procession seems to be the most obvious and convincing choice. If the procession displayed is that of the Panathenaic, the frieze encapsulates both the Athenians' imagined close relationships with the watching gods and their democratic ideology, encapsulated in the procession that included various members of society. However, interpretations of many of the figures are still being frequently debated. Certainly the evidence for a strictly military interpretation such as Boardman's does not seem to be strong. The possibility of the frieze representing democratic ideology, however, is particularly pertinent to our topic, as is the possibility of the frieze highlighting the close relationship between the Athenians and the gods. The Panathenaic procession was a fairly inclusive affair in which people from all classes of Athenian society participated and in which all demes were represented.[528] This was a prominent frieze on a prominent temple and would have been a reminder to Athenians and those that entered the city of democratic ideology and the relationship between Athens and the gods. It would have been yet another occasion in which citizens could feel inspired by a sense of civic pride, be reminded of the protection of the goddess and an event which could create a degree of patriotic fervour. Importantly, the inclusive aspect of the festival, and the procession in particular, would be an opportunity for all citizens and metics to celebrate their *polis* together regardless of whether they served or might potentially serve in the idealised hoplite ranks, in the elite cavalry or in the navy.

The inclusive aspects of the festival extended beyond the procession itself. It is worth noting that during the fifth century, the *peplos* for Athena that was woven for the Great Panathenaia was displayed as the sail of a ship that was taken up the Acropolis.[529] Clearly, as Shapiro notes, this would have been particularly significant due to the importance of the Athenian fleet for the continued success of Athens.[530] Perhaps this was an attempt to acknowledge the power and importance of the fleet and to make them feel included in the city. Similarly democratic sentiments are expressed in the fact that the procession probably passed by the statue of the Tyrannicides as they progressed up the Panathenaic Way and the Tyrannicides are featured on a shield-device of Athena on a prize amphora that can

[528] Thucydides 6.56 details the inclusion of girls and also citizens in the procession. Xenophon *Symposium* 4.17 talks of good looking old men serving as *thallophoroi* while Photios s.v. *skaphai* mentions that even metics were included in the procession and Harpokration s.v. *skaphephoroi* mentions not only metics but their daughters as well. IG II$_2$ 334 confirms that all the demes were represented. Demosthenes *Philippic I* mentions generals, squadron-leaders and cavalry-commanders assisting in marshalling processions.

[529] Philostratus *V.S.* 2.550, Heliodorus *Aethiop*. 1.10 and scholion to Aristophanes' *Peace* 418 all mention the ship while the scholion to Aristophanes' *Knights* makes mention of the ship and the *peplos*.

[530] Shapiro (1996: 217).

probably be dated to 402.[531] Shapiro suggests that this explicit expression of democracy is a statement to the Athenian citizens and to their allies that Athens is protecting freedom and democracy against the Persian tyranny.[532] It would certainly seem an important tool in attempting to control the allies and convince them that they are giving their continued support to the 'right' side: the side with the ideology of democracy and the side with impressive wealth and glory. Athens is deliberately and explicitly projecting an image of democracy and associating that with positive attributes. This would have further strengthened the military ideology of the city, assuring citizens that they were fighting a good and just fight for a strong city. This would have been a powerful motivating factor for the Athenian warriors, ensuring that they felt a strong degree of civic pride. When the process of persuasion is considered, the act of processing in this way seems to both spread a message about the city (in this case, it seems, a largely democratic message) and would also create strong emotions in the citizens participating. The final stage of persuasion is control of emotions and large scale civic events can create intense emotions of patriotism, joy and unity even for those who are simply observers, but particularly for active participants.

Passages from Thucydides and Pseudo-Aristotle, although in disagreement with each other, also highlight the militarily ideological side of the Panathenaic festival. Thucydides states:

> καὶ αὐτοῖς τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πρὸς τοὺς ξυνεπιθησομένους τῷ ἔργῳ ἐπέπρακτο, περιέμενον δὲ Παναθήναια τὰ μεγάλα, ἐν ᾗ μόνον ἡμέρᾳ οὐχ ὕποπτον ἐγίγνετο ἐν ὅπλοις τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς τὴν πομπὴν πέμψοντας ἀθρόους γενέσθαι· καὶ ἔδει ἄρξαι μὲν αὐτούς, ξυνεπαμύνειν δὲ εὐθὺς τὰ πρὸς τοὺς δορυφόρους ἐκείνους. ἦσαν δὲ οὐ πολλοὶ οἱ ξυνομωμοκότες ἀσφαλείας ἕνεκα· ἤλπιζον γὰρ καὶ τοὺς μὴ προειδότας, εἰ καὶ ὁποσοιοῦν τολμήσειαν, ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα ἔχοντάς γε ὅπλα ἐθελήσειν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ξυνελευθεροῦν.
>
> "And having completed the plan with the others who were assisting them, they now awaited the Great Panathenaea, which was the only day on which the citizens conducting the procession could gather with weapons without being suspected. And they [Aristogeiton and Harmodius] were to begin, and the others were to assist straight away against the men wielding spears [Peisistratus' bodyguards]. On account of their safety, there were not many conspirators, for they also hoped that those who did not know about the plot before, if they saw a daring example in whatever way, would be willing to join in freeing the city since they were at that moment armed, anyway."[533]

[531] Shapiro (1996: 220-1).

[532] Shapiro (1996: 222).

[533] Thucydides 6.56.2-3-57.1.

Furthermore, he states:

> ἀγγελθέντος δὲ Ἱππίᾳ ἐς τὸν Κεραμεικόν, οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ γενόμενον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τοὺς πομπέας τοὺς ὁπλίτας, πρότερον ἢ αἰσθέσθαι αὐτοὺς ἄπωθεν ὄντας, εὐθὺς ἐχώρησε, καὶ ἀδήλως τῇ ὄψει πλασάμενος πρὸς τὴν ξυμφορὰν ἐκέλευσεν αὐτούς, δείξας τι χωρίον, ἀπελθεῖν ἐς αὐτὸ ἄνευ τῶν ὅπλων. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀνεχώρησαν οἰόμενοί τι ἐρεῖν αὐτόν, ὁ δὲ τοῖς ἐπικούροις φράσας τὰ ὅπλα ὑπολαβεῖν ἐξελέγετο εὐθὺς οὓς ἐπῃτιᾶτο καὶ εἴ τις ηὑρέθη ἐγχειρίδιον ἔχων· μετὰ γὰρ ἀσπίδος καὶ δόρατος εἰώθεσαν τὰς πομπὰς ποιεῖν
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> "When the deed was announced to Hippias in the Cerameicus, he did not go to where the act had been performed, but approached the armed men in the procession before they understood what had happened as they were far away. He put on an expressionless face and pointing to a piece of ground he urged the men to go there without their arms. The men, thinking that he had something to say, did it, and Hippias then told his assistants to take the arms away, and straight away he picked out those men that he was accusing and anyone who he found holding a dagger in his hand – for Athenians were accustomed to process with shields and spears."[534]

Robertson suspects that the tradition of carrying arms in the procession no longer existed in Thucydides' day since he needs to explain that the men had arms and the pluperfect tense of εἴωθεσαν suggests that also.[535] Pseudo-Aristotle, however, says:

> οὐ γὰρ ἐδύναντο παραχρῆμα λαβεῖν οὐδὲν ἴχνος τῆς πράξεως, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ λεγόμενος λόγος, ὡς ὁ Ἱππίας ἀποστήσας ἀπὸ τῶν ὅπλων τοὺς πομπεύοντας, ἐφώρασε τοὺς τὰ ἐγχειρίδια ἔχοντας, οὐκ ἀληθής ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ ἔπεμπον τό<τε> μεθ᾽ ὅπλων, ἀλλ᾽ ὕστερον τοῦτο κατεσκεύασεν ὁ δῆμος.
>
> "At that time they were unable to discover the key to the affair but the story of Hippias separating the men from their arms and then discovering the ones carrying daggers is not true. For at that time they did not process equipped with arms but the *demos* armed them at a later date."[536]

Presumably, by the use of *demos* Pseudo-Aristotle is proposing that the arming of men in the Panathenaia happened under the democracy in the fifth century. If he is correct in this assertion, the procession takes on an additional and overt military character during the fifth century. However, since Thucydides was writing at a time close to the event in question, it might be prudent to give his testimony precedence over Pseudo-Aristotle and it certainly appears from the language that the anecdote is expressed in, that processing in arms no longer took place but had previously (for some of the citizen body, at least). Perhaps the

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[534] Thucydides 6.58.1-2.

[535] Robertson (1992: 115).

[536] Pseudo-Aristotle *Athenian Constitution* 18.4-5.

Panathenaia had a greater military focus in the late sixth century, or perhaps the growth of democracy had necessitated the discontinuance of the processing under arms. Presumably, the hoplites would have processed under arms, but this may have left the sailors or light-armed troops feeling politically disenfranchised if the practice had continued under the democracy. The discontinuance of the hoplites marching armed may have been a further attempt at making the procession even more inclusive. but without conclusive evidence this hypothesis is necessarily conjecture.

3.3.2 City Dionysia

The City Dionysia is another example of an Athenian festival that creates a platform for the city to project an image of itself and to further their military ideology, particularly to the Athenian citizens and the allies of Athens.

A particularly poignant martial moment from the City Dionysia is that of the parading of the war orphans when the state equips them with panoplies after announcing their names and the names of their fathers.[537] Again, many of the allies will have been present at this festival and would surely have witnessed this display, which would have been a display of the state's wealth as well as care for its citizens. It would have given assurance to the Athenian citizens that protection for their children (or sons, at least) would be given if they were to die in warfare, and would thus have furthered the warrior ideology. This parade would surely lead to a strong emotional response from the audience which would lead to a more complete indoctrination into civic ideology.

For democratic Athens, though, this poses a problem as stated by Raaflaub. Do only the sons of killed hoplites receive this panoply and protection? Raaflaub suggests that since there is no evidence to the contrary, we must expect that the sons of deceased thetes also received this and, furthermore, that this must have included a rise in status for them.[538] This is, however, an argument from silence. It is true that there is no explicit mention of the sons of thetes in the sources, but it does not follow that we should assume their presence. A hoplite panoply is mentioned and, therefore, perhaps we should infer that only those of the hoplite class were honoured in this way. Even if we assume that thetes were included in this parade, it does not necessarily follow that this required a rise in status for them. Perhaps the panoply was treated as a symbolic item, kept but never used or, indeed,

[537] Isocrates *De Pace* 82 and Aeschines *Against Ctesiphon* 154.

[538] Raaflaub (1998: 31).

dedicated to a god. Regardless of whether or not all sections of society were permitted to receive the panoplies, this act portrayed the city in the role of the father.[539] It made it clear to citizens that their duty was to serve the city as they would obey a father, and that the city, in turn, would offer financial support and protection to its sons.

It was at this festival, also, that the tribute, or at least some of it, was laid out. Isocrates states:

> Οὕτω γὰρ ἀκριβῶς εὕρισκον ἐξ ὧν ἄνθρωποι μάλιστ᾽ ἂν μισηθεῖεν, ὥστ᾽ ἐψηφίσαντο τὸ περιγιγνόμενον τῶν φόρων ἀργύριον διελόντες κατὰ τάλαντον εἰς τὴν ὀρχήστραν τοῖς Διονυσίοις εἰσφέρειν ἐπειδὰν πλῆρες ᾖ τὸ θέατρον·
>
> "For so exactly did they discover the reasons by which men might be particularly hated that they made a decree to divide into talents the excess silver from the tribute and to carry it into the orchestra, when the theatre was full, at the festival of Dionysos..."[540]

It seems unlikely that there would be any need for such a display as this unless it was specifically intended to serve as propaganda. It seems to be a conscious effort to parade the wealth and might of Athens in front of the citizens and allies and, indeed, Isocrates' comments suggest that it was interpreted as such when he states that this behaviour made the Athenians particularly disliked.

Goldhill interprets this laying out of tribute and parading of the war orphans when taken alongside the pouring of libations by the generals and also the presentation of honours at the City Dionysia as evidence to support his theory that this is essentially a democratic festival which stresses both the power of the city and the duties of the citizens in regard to their city.[541] He also considers tragedy itself to be a "didactic and a questioning medium" which offers "affirmation of the duties and obligations of a citizen".[542] He draws on the work of Loraux on funeral orations to bolster his argument and to prove that democratic Athens was greatly concerned with honouring the city. Griffin, Rhodes and Carter have argued against this theory. Rhodes argues that it seems likely that the genesis of the festival and the performance of the first plays happened under the tyranny and not under democracy.[543] Rhodes also argues that the behaviours listed by Goldhill, such as the laying

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[539] Goldhill (1990: 112) points out that the city came to adopt the language of the family over time.

[540] Isocrates *De Pace* 82.

[541] Goldhill (1987: 58-76) and he confirms this belief in the face of criticism in (2000: 34-56).

[542] Goldhill (1987: 75).

[543] Rhodes (2003: 107).

out of tribute, are not "distinctively democratic" but were simply *polis* institutions that took a particular form under the democracy.[544]Griffin argues that what applies to part of a festival does not necessarily apply to the whole and, furthermore, that the festival may not necessarily have had democratic roots and continued on after the end of Athenian democracy.[545] He also takes issue against the idea of tragedy as "didactic" and cites the entrance fee as evidence against this and, as Carter points out, there is no contemporary evidence for the theoric fund at this period.[546] Carter's argument against Goldhill's assertion that the City Dionysia is a democratic festival centres on the historicity of the four pre-play rituals that Goldhill uses to evidence his theory, i,e, the display of tribute, the parade of war orphans, the libations of the generals and the presenting of honours. He has little problem accepting the libations of the generals but rejects the presentation of honours as inadmissible on the grounds that there is no fifth-century evidence for such a practice.[547] The issue becomes further complicated due to the semantics involved in the Isocrates passage quoted above.[548] Carter argues against Meiggs' interpretation of τὸ περιγιγνόμενον as τὸ περιγιγνόμενον τῶν φόρων ἀργύριον which would negate the need for translation as "the surplus". Carter argues that if it can, indeed, be translated as "the surplus" that this raises the question of whether the city would want to present an ever decreasing surplus of money as the war progressed. He suggests an alternative explanation that this display was, in fact, merely a one-off, but remains unconvinced himself by the Greek and instead concludes that the presentation of the tribute and the presentation of the war orphans in the theatre may or may not have occurred annually.[549]

Goldhill is correct in asserting that there is clear potential for propaganda in festivals (not simply the City Dionysia, nor simply Athenian festivals) but Carter and Griffin are right to assert that he stretches the evidence somewhat too far in stating that it is strictly democratic propaganda on display. Indeed, there are clear democratic elements to the festivals as

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[544] Rhodes (2003: 107).

[545] Griffin (1998: 47).

[546] Griffin (1998: 50), Carter (2004: 5).

[547] Carter (2004: 9); it is worth noting that Wilson (2009) discuses some late fifth-century inscriptional evidence regarding crowns, in particular that of IG I3 102, dating to 409 BC and regarding the crowning of Thrasybulus of Calydon who assassinated one of the oligarchs of 411, Phrynichus. He sees this as a very democratic event and believes it is a continuation of the democratic ideology of the Dionysia that has gone before. In general, however, Carter is correct in rejecting the argument Goldhill makes for the crowns as applicable to the whole of the Classical period. I agree with Rhodes (2011: 74) that the evidence for crowning is late and related to very unusual circumstances (the overthrow of the oligarchy) and therefore cannot be taken to prove anything about the Dionysia previous to this point.

[548] Isocrates, D*e Pace* 82.

discussed in Goldhill's reply to Griffin[550] but this is inevitable in a democratic society and it does not follow that the whole festival is merely a tool in order to further this democratic ideology.

Griffin is also correct in questioning Goldhill's interpretations of the tragedies themselves as obliquely furthering the civic ideology in a complex and convoluted manner. Griffin states that Athens was generally straight-forward in giving self-praise and there is no real reason why the tragedies would need to present the ideology in such a convoluted manner.[551] Any large, organised gathering of people is bound to initiate various different feelings and interpretations in the varied people in attendance. The City Dionysia was, in itself, a varied festival that included religious procession, tragedies and comedies, and to interpret this collectively as simply democratic propaganda does seem simplistic. It may be important and useful to keep the democratic context of the festival in the fifth century in mind, but it is not simply democratic and the propaganda appears, as argued by Carter, more imperialistic than democratic.[552] Athens, I believe, benefitted from displaying herself as powerful and wealthy at the City Dionysia. This portrayal of Athens would be a powerful motivator for her citizens and a powerful warning to her allies but portraying herself as democratic at the City Dionysia was not particularly important. The festival of the Panathenaia, with the broadly inclusive procession, is more reflective of democratic ideology than the City Dionysia although it, too, projected an image of Athens as rich and powerful.

The City Dionysia was, of course, a festival that also included theatrical works which may not seem to be directly associated with the military sphere. However, Winkler makes the suggestion that the chorus was, in fact, composed of ephebes who are iconographically portrayed on vases as beardless and he links this with military training. He notes that in the later fourth-century manifestation of the *ephebeia*, the young men were required to display drill manoeuvres in the theatre of Dionysos and points out that tragedy, in contrast to dithyrambic choral performances, required a rectangular, rank and file formation.[553] He

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[549] Carter (2004: 7-8).

[550] Goldhill (2000).

[551] Griffin (1998: 49).

[552] Carter (2004: 11). As Rhodes (2003: 113) states: "I believe that the democratic details are comparatively unimportant, that it is much more important that the institutional setting is a *polis* setting than that it is a democratic setting: that what we have here is the *polis* in action, rather than especially democracy in action."

[553] Winkler (1990: 22). See Pollox *Onomasticon* 4.108-109 on rank and file structure and Pseudo-Aristotle *Athenian Constitution* 42.4 on the requirement of young men to display drill in the

does not regard these choral performances as a pre-cursor to the fourth century *ephebeia* as he does not believe that the training required for them would be open to all or compulsary.[554]

This theory has been vigorously discussed. Nagy broadly supports Winkler, although admits that his theory may seem implausible initially. He supports his proposed link of theatre to initiation and suggests that earlier choral performances of poetry such as that composed by Alcman do seem to be linked to initiation and that the Classical chorus could be considered as a stylized version of this.[555] He sees the traditionally non-professional nature of the chorus and the fact that they often display marginal characters such as old men or women as a support for this initiation theory. Furthermore, he views the fact that the chorus reacts to "ordeals of transition" such as falling in love and the shock of combat as a method of teaching them about the pains of "growing up".[556] Lech argues that Winkler's article is undermined by his reliance in parts on evidence derived from Pollux who, like us, was deficient of first-hand knowledge of fifth-century Athenian theatrical practices.[557] Furthermore, he questions the logic of Winkler's argument that "rank" and "file" can be viewed as specific technical terms for tragic choruses, even if the evidence of Pollux is to be accepted, since Pollux also states that comedic choruses enter in rectangular formation, and Lech suggests that rank and file were utilised simply for choreographic purposes.[558] However, this particular point could potentially be remedied by including comedy into the initiatory framework alongside tragedy. Compellingly, Lech questions the need for rank and file marching 'training' in a chorus when there is no evidence that it was utilised by the Athenian army in battle and, in fact, a passage from Thucydides seems to suggest that in contrast to the Spartans, the Athenians and the Argives did not march.[559] Furthermore, Lech states that if a vague *ephebeia* did exist at this period where young men went out on border patrols as a form of training, then it does not seem to make sense that some completed this training while others were made exempt to train for choral

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theatre. Dillery (2002) suggests that close order drill in the fourth century *ephebeia* was never completed in the theatre of Dionysos but rather in the stadium due to lack of space in the theatre. He also disputes that there is any connection between the earlier parade of the war orphans and the later display of the ephebes.

[554] Winkler (1990: 28).

[555] Nagy (1994-5: 48).

[556] Nagy (1994-5: 49-51).

[557] Lech (2009: 345).

[558] Lech (2009: 346-7).

[559] Lech (2009: 353); Thucydides 5.70.

performance and also, that if Aristotle is correct in asserting that some served more than once in a chorus, the educative function of it is brought into even more of a questionable status.[560] Wilson questions Winkler's use of the Pronomos vase as evidence for beardless ephebes used in choruses, considering it too "delicate and elusive a foundation" for his argument to be founded on.[561]

Winkler's argument, then, is certainly not unproblematic. Nagy may be correct in drawing comparisons to earlier choral works and suggesting a possible link with initiation that has morphed and become stylized as the chorus in the Classical world. Whether it can be proven that the Classical chorus members or those training them saw their participation in the chorus as initiation or not, is entirely another question. Nagy's suggestion of the chorus representing marginal characters that respond and thus learn about the harsh realities of life also seems questionable in some ways. It is difficult to fully accept this suggestion about marginal characters represented in choruses as some choruses represent men in their prime, and it is also difficult to fully embrace Nagy's acceptance of 'old men' as a marginal group. Furthermore, Nagy does not explain why he believes the young people in the chorus would necessarily be better educated by acting in the chorus than the audience would by watching the chorus perform.

Foley is convinced that choruses represent marginal groups, stating that it is only seldom that we see choruses that represent young, military aged men, but she also proposes a compelling reason for this, unrelated to the education of the young men in the chorus. She states:

> "Choruses consisting of men of military age, especially if they acted as civilians rather than soldiers, could indirectly raise awkward questions about the relation between leaders and followers in the democracy, whereas the choruses culturally defined as "natural" followers like women or foreigners would not."[562]

Furthermore, tragedy does not always encapsulate simple, unproblematic lessons about growing up and therefore seems a strange medium for introducing young men to what is to come before them in life. Even if an argument for the initiatory character of the tragic chorus could be firmly made, the argument for a military initiatory character certainly looks rather thin. Lech's argument seems convincing on this point.

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[560] Lech (2009: 354-355); Aristotle *Politics* 1276b4-6.

A more explicit and less controversial link between drama and the military sphere can be found in Plutarch where he details that Cimon and the ten generals entered to make the customary libations before the dramatic performances and were compelled to serve as judges also on one occasion.[563]

With regard to plot content, tragedy, as pointed out by Zeitlin and confirmed by Saïd, occasionally contrasts the positive Athenian kings such as Theseus with the negative example of rulers of other states and also creates a clear contrast of Athens as opposed to other states such as Thebes.[564] Again, this is a powerful propaganda tool, portraying Athens as superior to others, particularly when tragedies are being performed in front of such a mixed audience of both foreigners and citizens.

The power of tragedy can also be viewed in the anecdotes about the Syracusans releasing prisoners who could recite Euripides and the Spartans deciding against the destruction of Athens because of a fragment of Euripides.[565] If tragedy has such inspirational power over 'foreigners', then the influence of it over native Athenians surely must also be great.

Both tragic and comedic productions have a vital role to play in supporting the city's ideology or, indeed, by challenging it or its leaders. However, challenging or mocking the city had to be done with caution, particularly when foreigners were present in the city watching the plays as well as citizens. Cleon took Aristophanes before the Council for pointing out the faults of the *polis* before foreigners.[566] The potential of a festival for disseminating ideology and projecting an image of oneself to both citizens and outsiders was vast.

3.3.3 Gymnopaediae

The key Spartan religious festivals were quite different from the Athenian festivals previously discussed. There are three key festivals to be discussed and these are the Gymnopaediae, the Hyacinthia and the Carneia. A conclusion about the purpose of these

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[561] Wilson (2000: 78).

[562] Foley (2003: 11-12).

[563] Plutarch C*imon* 8.7.

[564] Saïd (1998: 281), Zeitlin (1986).

[565] As discussed by Davidson (2005: 5); Plutarch, *Nicias* 29.2 and *Lysander* 15.3.

[566] Henderson (1998: 263); Aristophanes *Acharnians* 496-519 and also *Knights.*

festivals will be drawn at the end of a brief discussion of the events of each individual festival.

Of all the Spartan festivals, the Gymnopaediae was the most unique and quintessentially Spartan. Like the Great Panathenaia or the City Dionysia, the Gymnopaediae offered scope for display on the part of Sparta as foreigners could attend the spectacle.[567] The name is problematic, as Ducat discusses. The word γυμνος could be interpreted as naked or as unnarmed, while the suffix –παιδια could come from the word 'child' or the verb 'to play' or 'to dance'. Ducat accepts the latter of the suggestion in regardes to the suffix but prefers the acceptence of literal nudity, so the festival is the festival of the 'naked dance'.[568]

Pausanias describes it briefly when he states:

> τόπος καλεῖται πᾶς, ὅτι ἐν ταῖς γυμνοπαιδίαι διὰ σπουδῆς Λακεδαιμονίους εἰσίν ἐν ταύταις οὖν οἱ ἔφηβοι χοροὺς ἱστᾶσι τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι.
>
> And all this region is called 'dancing' because at the Gymnopaidia – the festival which the Lacedaemonians place above all others – the ephebes perform dances to Apollo.[569]

The festival was so important to the Spartans that despite being brought news of the disaster at Leuctra in the middle of the performances, the ephors insisted on the festival being continued with, without any changes to the schedule.[570]

A statement in Plutarch may be taken to apply to this festival and shows an explicit link with manliness and valour, key personality attributes that the state would desire its citizen warriors to attain.[571] Plutarch states:

> τριῶν γὰρ χορῶν κατὰ τὰς τρεῖς ἡλικίας συνισταμένων ἐν ταῖς ἑορταῖς, ὁ μὲν τῶν γερόντων ἀρχόμενος ᾖδεν·
>
> Ἄμμες πόκ' ἦμες ἄλκιμοι νεανίαι.

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[567] Flower (2009: 208); Plutarch *Cimon* 10.5; Xenophon *Memorabilia*. 1.2.61; Plutarch *Agesilaus* 29.3.

[568] Ducat (2006a: 266 and 272)

[569] Pausanias 3.11.9

[570] Plutarch *Agesilaus* 29.3 and Xenophon *Hellenica* 6.4.16.

[571] Although Plutarch simply mentions "festivals" and not specifically the Gymnopaediae, Flower (2009: 209-210) argues sensibly that his statement fits well enough with other evidence for it to be taken as referring to the Gymnopaediae.

ὁ δὲ τῶν ἀκμαζόντων ἀμειβόμενος ἔλεγεν·

Ἄμμες δέ γ’ εἰμέν· αἰ δὲ λῇς, αὐγάσδεο.

ὁ δὲ τρίτος ὁ τῶν παίδων·

Ἄμμες δέ γ’ ἐσσόμεσθα πολλῷ κάρρονες.

"At the festivals, three choruses brought together the three stages of life, and the chorus of old men would begin singing, “We were once warlike young men.’ And those in their prime replying said ‘And may we be so - watch if you want.’ And then the third chorus of boys would sing, ‘And we, for our part, will be much better.’"[572]

We can see here the emphasis on these important warrior characteristics but also the competition between age groups. The older men are challenging the younger men to live up to their example and, presumably, that of their ancestors. The men are assuring them that they are able to be just as worthy as those that have gone before and the young boys are promising to be greater yet than all the others. All the warriors and potential warriors of Sparta are being held up against a standard and promising to meet or exceed that standard. If visitors are present, then all the more appropriate for such a display to take place in front of them, assuring them of the manliness and quality of the Spartan citizen body.

However, this passage is slightly problematic as Pausanias specifically only mentions *ephebes* performing.[573]Xenophon mentions a chorus of men, however, and this has been suggested by Kennell to prove that the festival had changed over time to become a competition between only *ephebes* while Ducat suggests that Pausanias had been misled by the name of the festival to assume a close connection with children.[574]Regardless, as Xenophon is the closest source to our period, it is perhaps safe to assume that men were included in the Classical period as well as boys. However, the text is further complicated by the variations of it that exist not agreeing on one of the terms for the participants. The chorus of boys and old men is unproblematic but variations exist on the description of the

[572] Plutarch *Lycurgus* 21.2; triple chorus is also mentioned by Pollux (4.107), the three choruses in Plato *Laws* 1.633a may be indicitive of this triple chorus and also it is mentioned in Plutarch elsewhere at *Inst. Lac*. 15 and *Mor*. 544e.

[573] Pausanias 3.11.9

[574] Kennell (1995: 68-9); Ducat (2006a: 268).

men's chorus and Ducat suggests it is reasonable to translate this third category as "young men" due to the discrepancies in vocabulary.[575]

Sosibius, via Athenaeus, also discusses this festival but only mentions two choruses.[576]Ducat, however, attributes this to a lacuna as he argues that the text seems to be expressed oddly, mentioning a chorus in front and one on the left, when it would be expected one would be in front and one behind or one on the left and the other on the right, if there were only two choruses.[577]This fragment also links the triple chorus structure with the Gymnopaidiai explicitly whereas the passage from Plutarch mentions multiple festivals.[578]

Plato describes the Gymnopaediae as an act of endurance performed during the summer heat.[579] Pettersson focuses his examination of the festival on the nudity of the performers, stating that the nudity emphasises the loss of outward signs of rank and identity of the participants.[580] Both of these ideas, that of endurance and of nudity, could be associated with preparation of warriors and the changing of categories from boy to man. However, Ducat argues against both of these points. He argues that since the nudity seems to apply to all participants and not only the boys, it would be difficult to interpret the nudity in an initiatory context.[581]In regard to the endurance aspect, Ducat argues that only Plato mentions this aspect of the festival while all the other sources are silent on it and there is also no correllation with success in the festival being related to endurance of the heat.[582]Finally, if this endurance had any association with the initiation of boys, as Ducat believes the passage from Plato implies, then it would appear nonsensical that other age categories also participate in the festival.[583]Ducat argues this point convincingly and is correct in asserting that the evidence that exists for the festival does not seem to imply a strong initiatory context.

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[575] See Ducat (2006a: 269) for discussion of the variations in the sources.

[576] Athenaeus *Deipnosophists* 15.22.

[577] Ducat (2006a: 269)

[578] Ducat (2006a: 269-270)

[579] Plato *Laws* 1.633c.

[580] Pettersson (1992: 47).

[581] Ducat (2006a: 273)

[582] Ducat (2006a: 274)

[583] Ducat (2006a: 274)

Flower has demonstrated another possible link between this festival and military matters when he discusses a piece of Laconian red-figure pottery found in the Lacedaemonian tomb in the Athenian Cerameikos which features a hoplite battle scene on one side and on the other a beardless youth wearing a distinctive crown. Flower believes this crown matches the description given by Athenaeus of crowns worn during the Gymnopaediae. These crowns are linked with the Spartan victory at Thyrea and are worn at the Gymnopaediea by the leaders of the chorus in commemoration of the victory.[584] Here we see an explicit link through this practice of the festival with warfare. He argues that this pottery thus represents two sides of the Spartan character, that of the youth coming of age at the Gymnopaediae and then his duty to serve as a hoplite in manhood.[585] Although this is an interesting hypothesis, I believe that Flower may perhaps be stretching the evidence somewhat for two reasons. Firstly, the two painted pottery scenes, although on the same vase, do not necessarily have to be related to one another. They could have been painted as two separate decorative scenes and the artist may have not intended for them to be linked in any way. Secondly, Flower lays the emphasis here on the Gymnopaediae as a festival where the emphasis is on the youth (and, it seems, their progression into manhood) and this is not necessarily the picture created by the limited evidence for the festival. In fact, the Hyacinthia would seem to be a more appropriate festival to be linked with youth since Hyacinthos was himself a youth who met an untimely death and then became linked with kourotrophic features.

3.3.4 Hyacinthia

The Hyacinthia was a three-day festival which began with a sombre period of mourning for the dead Hyacinthus which included restrictions with regard to food. It progressed to the second day which included a spectacle where boys played music and sang to Apollo, there was dancing and a procession of horses, and girls were paraded in decorated carts. The festival reached a climax where victims were sacrificed and the participants feasted.[586] Athenaeus, quoting Polycrates, gives a detailed description when he states:

> "πολυκράτης," φησι, "ἐω τοῖς Λακωνικοῖς ἱστορεῖ ὅτι τὴν μὲν τῶν Ὑακινθον θυσίαν οἱ Λάκωνες ἐπὶ τρεῖς ἡμέρας συντελοῦσι καὶ διὰ τὸ πένθος τὸ γινόμενον περὶ τὸν Ὑάκινθον οὔτε στεφανοῦνται ἐπὶ τοῖς δείπνοις οὔτε ἄρτον

[584] Pausanias 3.2.2-3; 3.7.2; 3.7.5; Athenaios 15.22.

[585] Flower (2009: 210-211), Cerameikos Museum, Athens, fragments 4779 (a), 4780 (b) and 4778 (c). Fragments discussed by Stroszeck (2006: 286-7), catalogue number 171.

[586] Athenaeus *Deipnosophists* 4.139 D-F.

> εἰσφέρουσιν οὔτε ἄλλα πέμματα καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἀκόλουθα διδόσι καὶ τὸν εἰς τὸν θεὸν παῖανα οὐκ ᾄδουσιν οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον εἰσαγουσιν οὐδὲν καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις θυσίαις ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ μετ΄ εὐταξίας πολλῆς δειπνήσαντες ἀπέρχονται. τῇ δὲ μέσῃ τῶν τριῶν ἡμερῶν γίνεται θέα ποικίλη καὶ πανήγυρις ἀξίολογος καὶ μεγάλη. παῖδές τε γὰρ κιθαρίζουσιν ἐν χιτῶσιν ἀνεζωσμένοις καὶ πρὸς αὐλόν ᾄδοντες πάσας ἅμα τῷ πλήκτρῳ τὰς χορδὰς ἐπιτρέχοντες ἐν ῥυθμῷ μὲν ἀναπαίστῳ, μετ᾽ ὀξέος δὲ τόνου τὸν θεὸν ᾄδουσιν. ἄλλοι δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἵππων κεκοσμημένων τὸ θέατρον διεξέρχονται. χοροί τε νεανίσκων παμπληθεῖς εἰσέρχονται καὶ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων τινὰ ποιημάτων ᾄδουσιν, ὀρχησταί τε ἐν τούτοις ἀναμεμιγμένοι τὴν κίνησιν ἀρχαικὴν ὑπὸ τὸν ἀυλὸν καὶ τὴν ᾠδὴν ποιοῦωται. τῶν δὲ παρθένων αἱ δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἁμίλλαις ἁρμάτων ἐζευγμένων πομπεύουσιν, ἅπασα δ᾽ ἐν κινήσει καὶ χαρᾷ τῆς θεωρίας ἡ πόλις καθέστηκεν. ἱερεῖά τε παμπληθῆ θύουσι τὴν ἡμέραν ταύτην καὶ δειπνίζουσιν οἱ πολῖται πάντας τοὺς γνωρίμους καὶ τοὺς δούλους τοὺς ἰδίους. οὐδεὶς δ᾽ ἀπολείπει τὴν θυσίαν, ἀλλὰ κενοῦσθαι συμβαίνει τὴν πόλιν πρὸς τὴν θέαν.”
>
> “Polycrates says in his history of Sparta that the Spartans complete the festival of the Hyacinthia over three days and because of their grief over the death of Hyacinthos they neither wear crowns at meals nor bring in bread nor cakes with the other accompanying things that they bring, and they do not sing the paian for the god nor introduce the sort of things they would at other festivals but with much obedience they eat and then leave. And in the middle of the three days there is a varied spectacle and a great and large celebration. For boys in a chiton belted high play the lyre or sing to the flute together with running the plectrum over the strings, they sing to the god in anapaestic rhythm and in a high pitch. Others go through the theatre on adorned horses. Multiple choruses of young men enter and sing local songs, and dancers mix among them and perform old-fashioned dances, accompanied by the flute and singers. And the girls come, some in decorated wicker carts, others parading in two-horse chariots. And the whole city is filled with the joy and excitement of the festival. They sacrifice a multitude of victims on that day and the citizens dine with all their acquaintances and slaves. No one misses the festival, but it happens that city empties for the festival.”[587]

This description places the focus firmly on the youth. First boys (παιδες) are mentioned singing and riding, followed by the choruses of the young men (νεανισκοι) and, lastly, the maidens parade. The overall impression is one of energy and exuberance. Ducat remarks that the high belted garments of the boys would have allowed free movement for dancing.[588] It is perhaps not surprising that we see such a firm association with youth in this festival due to its dedication to Hyacinthos who was, himself, a youth. Pettersson has suggested that the choruses of young men sing the paean but Ducat has rejected this on the grounds of the evidence from Xenophon that states that men returned from a campaign to sing the paean to Hyacinthos.[589]Ducat is justified in rejecting this assertion as, aside from

[587] Athenaeus *Deipnosophists* 4.139 D-F.

[588] Ducat (2006a: 263)

[589] Pettersson (1992; 21); Ducat (2006a; 263); Xenophon *Hellenica* 4.5.11

the evidence from Xenophon, the paean does not seem to fit the description from Polycrates of what the young men sing.

Parallels have been drawn with the Athenian festivals of the Panathenaia and the Adonia, with the large procession being remicent of the former and the mourning and subsequent rejoicing over the death of a youth being reminiscent of the latter.[590]As a festival, it is particularly notable for being a full community affair including women and slaves.[591] This participation of the full community also clearly echoes the Athenian Panathenaia.

Evidence from Thucydides suggests a link between the realm of warfare and that of festivals and the evidence links directly with the Spartan festival of the Hyacinthia. The link this time, however, is not found in explicit military posturing or the fostering of manly qualities in the citizen body but in the affirmation of treaties of alliance between states. Thucydides states that the Peace of Nicias between Athens and Sparta was meant to be renewed every year by both parties at the Dionysia in Athens and at the Hyacinthia in Sparta.[592] Furthermore, when Sparta later went into discussion with Argos, the Argive representatives were told to return to Argos and, if the proposals were accepted, to come to Sparta at the time of the Hyacinthia to take the oaths.[593]

3.3.5 Carneia

Another festival to Apollo was that of the Carneia, notorious for delaying the sending of the full force of Spartan troops to Thermopylae.[594] Very little is known of this festival and the paucity of evidence does not allow us to build an accurate reconstruction of events.

Once again, we are reliant on information transmitted through Athenaeus. He states:

> Δημήτριος δ᾽ ὁ Σκήψιος ἐν τῷ α᾽του Τρωικοῦ διακόσμιου τὴν τῶν καρνείων φησὶν ἑορτὴν παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίοις μίμημα εἶναι στρατιωτικῆς ἀγωγῆς. τόπους μὲν γὰρ εἶναι θ᾽ τῷ ἀριθμῷ, σκιαδες δὲ οὗτοι καλοῦνται σκηναῖς ἔκοντες παραπλήσιόν τι. καὶ ἐννέα καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἄνδρες δειπνοῦσι, πάντα τε ἀπὸ

[590] Fulkerson (2006: 395); note that Dillon (2002: 164) does not believe that the Athenians celebrated a resurrection of Adonis in the Classical period but only remembered his death.

[591] Euripides *Helen* 1469-73 on women and Athenaeus 4.139F on slaves being entertained at dinner by their masters.

[592] Thucydides 5.23.

[593] Thucydides 5.41.

[594] Herodotus 7.206.

> προστάγματος κηρύσσεται, ἔχει τε ἑκάστη σκιὰς φρατρίας τρεῖς καὶ γίνεται ἡ τῶν Καρνείων ἑορτὴ ἐπὶ ἡμέρας θ'.
>
> "Demetrius of Scepsis, in the first book of The Trojan Battle-Order, says that the festival of the Karneia mimics the military way of life. For there are nine positions, known as 'parasols' because they are like tents and nine men dine in each. Everything is done by the command of the herald. Each parasol houses three phratries and the festival of the Carneia lasts for nine days."[595]

The military overtones are clear. The men dine in their *phratries* in a military style, as though encamped before battle. Pettersson argues that the inclusion of common meals, obedience to commands (of the herald) would have created a situation wherein men were moulded into the role of a soldier.[596] This is clearly a ritualised 'performance' of military life and would, presumably, have been of most value to those youngsters aged to graduate from the *agoge* and into the adult military system, as a way of introducing them ritually to barrack style living and adult military discipline. However, there is a difficulty with his interpretation in that the people mentioned in the tents are described as *andres* and there is no use of any of the technical terminology such as *hebontes*, *ephebes* or *neoniskoi* that would generally indicate a youth on the cusp of entering into full citizenship. Ducat suggests that since the *hebontes* in Xenophon are also warriors and describe themselves as *andres*, they could be included in this militaristic part of the festival.[597] However, this still leaves Pettersson's initiatory context up for questioning. If the *hebontes* are already considered both men and warriors in Xenophon then there really is no pressing need to 'teach' them about military life through this festival. However, the festival could act as a ritualistic formal acceptance of the *hebontes* into the military community. There is, however, no specific reason to see initiation in this description of the dining in tents. There is nothing in the passage that suggests it and, for that reason, it may well be most prudent to view this ritual as a reaffirmation of the military *ethos* of the adult, citizen-warrior community without, necessarily, any attached initiatory context.

There is, however, an element of the festival that is more directly related to youth. Hesychius mentions a group known as the Karneatai who he describes as unmarried and chosen by lot to serve for four years. At first sight, this might not appear to be related to youth. However, Ducat has convincingly argued that the unmarried are generally figures of scorn yet here they are being honoured by being selected for the service of a god and, so

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[595] Athenaeus *Deipnosophists* 4.141f

[596] Pettersson (1992: 63).

[597] Ducat (2006a; 276)

Ducat believes, to undertake the responsibilites of organising the festival. Therefore, they must be the "legitimate" unmarried, young men who are still within the legal age range at which they can remain unmarried.[598]Ducat does not make a convincing argument for these young men organising the festival but it is clear that they served the god associated with the festival in some form.

Another hint at the associations of youth with the festival can be found in a gloss in the *Lexeis Rhetorikai* where *neoi* act as grape-runners, chasing a man adorned in sacrificial ribbons. Catching him is indicative of a good omen for the crops that year. Ducat states that according to Hesychius, these grape-runners are chosen from among the Karneatai.[599]Therefore, we see the youth of the community in service to the god which the Karneia honours and the youth of the community also ensuring the agricultural health of the community at this festival every year by chasing and catching the scapegoat figure.

3.3.6 Interpretation of the Festivals of Apollo

All three of these major Spartan festivals are related to Apollo and are therefore often grouped together and treated as a unity.[600] Jeanmaire argued for them to be considered as festivals of initiation and Brelich linked them with the *agoge*.[601] Pettersson makes a case for them being considered as initiation.[602] He follows van Gennep's model of initiation following a three-part structure which includes separation, marginality and aggregation. He interprets the Hyacinthia as the part of the triple structure which emphasises separation due to the fact that there are strict rules about what can be eaten during what he describes as the first part of the festival and also due to the negative conditions such as the sombre atmosphere of mourning created during this first part of the festival.[603] The second part of

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[598] Ducat (2006a: 275); see Plutarch *Lycurgus* 15.1-3 on the unmarried as scorned.

[599] Ducat (2006a: 276); Bekker (I: 305)

[600] Pettersson (1992: 73) states that considering these festivals as a unified whole is sensible since they are all celebrations of the same god and are celebrated over a short period close together.

[601] Brelich (1969) and Jeanmaire (1939).

[602] Pettersson (1992: 73-78); A. van Gennep (1960).

[603] Cartledge (2001: 19) states that only residents of Amyclai and not of the other four villages were released from campaign in order to celebrate this festival. Although Cartledge does not state his source for this information, it can be presumed to be Pausanias 3.10.1 where Pausanias relates an anecdote about Agesilaus releasing the troops from Amyclai from campaign in order to celebrate the Hyacinthia. Xenophon also mentions in his *Hellenica* (4.5.11) that the Amycleans return for the Hyacinthia regardless of whether they are away from home on campaign or for some other reason. It seems Cartledge is correct, then, in asserting the strong associations of Amyclai with this festival. Even if it came to be regularly celebrated as part of Spartan celebrations, at a date later than the fifth century, it was still being strongly connected with the Amycleans rather than the Spartans in general.

the Hyacinthia he links with creating conditions of marginality through the moving of the festival away from the centre and towards the periphery and the breakdown of social norms that is encouraged through the presence of foreigners and slaves. He also links the Gymnopaediai with marginality due to the nakedness of the participants and the presence of foreigners and argues that the endurance needed for the festival as mentioned by Plato is initiatory. The Carneia he links with the final part of the tripartite structure, that of aggregation. He argues that the military structure of the festival, the consumption of common meals and the obedience to the herald mark the acceptance of military customs and aggregation into a warrior culture.

Although I find this interpretation interesting and do agree that there may be an initiatory element to the festivals, I believe that to reduce the trio of festivals to an extended initiatory ritual is probably too simplistic. However, most of the aspects of the festivals that Petterson links with this initiatory ceremony are not limited only to the young but apply to everyone. For example, at the Hyacinthia the food prohibitions do not apply only to the young, the nakedness at the Gymnopaidia is not exclusively attributed to the young people and, similarly, any aspect of endurance tested at the Gymnopaidia is tested for all age groups, not only the young.[604] Furthermore, surely heat is not particularly unpleasant when compared with other aspects of Spartan culture such as the ritual carried out at the altar of Artemis Orthia. Surely the discomfort of the heat is suffered by many outside of Sparta, too, at festivals or in their daily work and is not a particularly Spartan trial of endurance. I also do not think the separation of youngsters is particularly clear in any of these festivals, certainly not their exclusive separation from society either physically or metaphorically and therefore if Pettersson is following van Gennep, the first part of this structure, that of separation, is missing or unclear. It is true that the first day of the Hyacinthia could be viewed as ritual separation from society due to the prohibitions that accompany it but, as mentioned above, these prohibitions involve all of society and not specifically the young. As for Pettersson's proposal that the Carneia was a festival of aggregation, I would argue that the youth, although involved, seem to be on the peripheries of the festival. There is no clear evidence that the youth were involved in the dining in the tents which is the part of the festival that would be most useful in an aggregation context.

Ducat proposes a more moderate and reasonable explanation of these festivals. He argues that, as a rule, initiation separates and marginalises while religion integrates and, therefore,

[604] Athenaeus *Deipnosophists* 4.139 D-F talks of the Hyacinthia and does not state that the restrictions on food applied only to the young.

he sees the Spartan festivals as community festivals that integrates all age groups into society.[605]

The Spartan festivals seem to have a focus on the Spartan community and are primarily centred around the *polis* and its citizens. Although there may be initiatory aspects to their character, they seem to mostly focus on community and the continuation of military living. For example, the military character of the Carneia where the men eat in tents and respond to the call of the herald and, at the Gymnopaediae, the proclamation about their service to the state of the three choruses of various age groups. This is not particularly surprising. Sparta was a relatively insular state which even forbade the young men from travelling abroad.[606] They valued community, even over family, and this is what is reflected in their festivals.

The complexities of religion are not easily subjected to analysis and should not be oversimplified. As such, a single explanation for a festival or, in this case, a trio of festivals would be doing a disservice to the intracacies of the religious life of the Greeks, particularly when we consider how relatively limited our evidence is for these festivals, particularly the Carneia. The festivals could, no doubt, have served multiple purposes and may have evolved through time, initially being instituted in one guise, only to gradually serve an additional, or altogether separate, purpose. For instance, the grape-runners and their chasing of a scapegoat figure to assure a good harvest may be indicative of an earlier iteration of the Carneia as an agricultural festival or it may indicate that the Carneia functions on multiple levels. Neverthless, most festivals have an association with community on at least some level and the Spartan festivals to Apollo have a particularly strong association with the community and the military *ethos* of that community.

Reaffirming the community through festival is vital to the continuation of the citizen-warrior *ethos*. At Sparta, of course, the men lived a very military orientated life, centered around their mess, and were continually reminded of their role as warriors. Festivals were another reminder of this for the men but also an opportunity for them to invite their community to catch a glimpse of their military identities which served the purpose of both allowing the men to strongly reaffirm their identities through, essentially, a theatrical display of their selves as soldiers to the community at large and also to allow the rest of the community to understand the role of the men, to feel an affinity to it through a closer

[605] Ducat (2006a: 277)

[606] Plato *Protagoras* 342c-d.

connection with it and to, therefore, continue to foster the spirit of the strongly militaristic community. The women would be able to catch a glimpse of the lifestyle of the soldiers at the Carneia and would have a better understanding of the role their husbands played in the state, the importance of the mess to their husband and the future roles of their sons. The youths would be able to witness what lay in store for their future and would be given opportunities to ascribe to the state ideology at the Gymnopaidia by announcing in the trichorus that they intended to be better soldiers than those that had come before.

3.3.7 Other

The Athenians held a festival for the war dead which is mentioned in various sources. Diodorus states the establishment of such a festival occurred directly after the end of the Persian Wars:

> ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων δῆμος ἐκόσμησε τοὺς τάφους τῶν ἐν τῷ Περισκῷ πολέμῳ τελευτησάντων, καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τὸν ἐπιτάφιον τότε πρῶτον ἐποίησε, καὶ νόμον ἔθηκε λέγειν ἐγκώμια τοῖς δημοσίᾳ θαπτομένοις τοὺς προαιρεθέντας τὼν ῥητ□ρων.
>
> "And so similarly the Athenian people also adorned the memorials of those who had died in the Persian wars, and held the funeral games for the first time, and passed a law to say that a public speakers should deliver a praising speech at the funeral rites of those being honoured at public expense."[607]

Jacoby believes Diodorus to be inaccurate with dating the institution of the funerary cult to directly following the Persian Wars and prefers to date it to 465/5.[608] However, Kyle argues that Diodorus' date is strongly supported by the archaeological evidence. He states that three bronze prize vessels have been discovered, with one being reminiscent in shape to a Panathenaic prize amphorae, and the earliest of these is dated through letter forms to approximately 480 BC. The three vessels all share the same inscription (Ἀθεναῖοι· ἀθλα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐν τοῖ πολέμοι) and were found outside of Athens but linked to the Athenian games of the Epitaphia.[609] Both Kyle and Parker think that it is likely that the games and

[607] Diodorus Siculus 11.33.3

[608] Jacoby (1946): 37-66

[609] Kyle (1987: 44); Vanderpool (1969: 1-5).

the funeral oration were closely linked with the probability being that the games directly followed on from the public funeral.[610]

The organisation of the games was the responsibility of the war archon at Athens[611] and the games are detailed in a passage from Plato's Menexenus. The passage is spoken by the character of Socrates detailing a funeral speech that he states he had learned from Aspasia:

> αὐτοὺς δὲ τοὺς τελεθτήσαντας τιμῶσα οὐδέποτε ἐκλείπει, καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν αὐτὴ τὰ νομιζόμενα ποιοῦσα κοινῇ πᾶσιν ἅπερ ἑκάστον ἰδία γίγνεται, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀγῶνας γυμνικοὺς καὶ ἱππικοὺς τιθεῖσα καὶ μουσικῆς πάσης, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τῶν μὲν τελευτησάντων ἐν κληρονόμου καὶ υἱέος μοίρᾳ καθεστηκυῖα τῶν δὲ υἱέων ἐν πατρος, γονέων δὲ τῶν τούτων ἐν ἐπιτρόπου...
>
> "Nor does the City fail to honour the fallen themselves, in so far as each year she performs the customary rites for all which are privately performed for each and institutes games in gymnastics and horse-riding and all music. And simply establishes herself among the fallen in the position of son and heir, as father of the sons and as guardian of the parents of the fallen..."[612]

It is worth noting that there has been some debate about whether funeral speeches are being parodied in the *Menexenus* or whether Plato is capturing a political idea in the dialogue.[613] However, if the former is true then Plato must be capture popular sentiment in parodying the speech. Therefore, there will be an element of the capturing of truth in the parody.

The festival, then, features elements common with many other festivals such as musical and athletic competition, the importance of which in the continuation of the warrior ideology has been previously discussed.

However, here is also illustrated Plato's view of the duty of the *polis* to the citizen. The city is not only anthropomorphised but becomes family. The citizen dies to protect the city and, in turn, the city assumes the role of the now absent citizen, taking on the responsibilities that he would have borne if he had survived. The city assumes guardianship of both the citizen's children and of his parents in an echo of the situation previously seen at the City Dionysia where the children of fallen fathers are presented with armour.

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[610] Kyle (1987: 45) and Parker (2007: 469)

[611] Aristotle *Ath. Pol.* 58.1

[612] Plato Menexenus 249b-c

While the city assumes a human role, the fallen soldiers are transformed beyond mortality. Lysias states:

> καὶ γάρ τοι θάπτονται δημοσία, καὶ ἀγῶνες τιθενται ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς ῥωμης καὶ σοφίας καὶ πλούτου, ὡς ἀξίους ὄντας τοὺς ἐν τῷ τετελεθτηκότας ταῖς αὐταῖς τιμαῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀθανάτους τιμᾶσθαι.
>
> "For they are honoured publicly with funeral rites and games are established for them in strength and wisdom and wealth, for those who have fallen in war are worthy of being honoured in the same manner as the immortals."[614]

Presumbly, the competitions in strength, wisdom and wealth mentioned here are abstractions of gymnastics, horse-riding and music with strength coinciding with the former, wisdom coinciding with the later and wealth signifying horse-riding. This pseudo-deification is echoed in Plutarch's description of the Eleutheria, games held in Plataea in honour of the Hellenes who died there, when he states that the fallen are called upon to come to the banquet. The stelai standing in memory of the fallen are also washed and anointed.[615] The sacrificial banquet is normally enjoyed by the living with a portion assigned to the gods. The invite being extended to the dead soldiers echoes the sentiments of Lysias. In their inclusion, they are being elevated to a semi-divine status. The washing and anointing of the stones is also reminiscent of the care and attention given to various cult statues in ritual such as the annual washing of Athena at the festival of Plynteria.

It is notable that games and festivals, normally held in honour of a specific deity, are held, in this instance, with no mention of a specific deity being honoured. Instead, the dead themselves appear to stand as a substitute for the immortals.

Funeral games are, of course, familiar from Homer and the pseudo-deification seen in Classical Athens is not entirely absent from Homer. Achilles pours a libation and calls out to the spirit of Patroclus while his body burns on the pyre.[616] This is, perhaps, more an outpouring of individual grief than a concentrated decision to assimilate Patroclus with the gods. Homeric funeral games diverge most obviously from the Athenian Epitaphia in regards to who is being celebrated. Individual achievement and honour, as celebrated in the Homeric world, is now shunned in favour of the collective. Parker points out that honour

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[613] See, for example, Trivigno (2009)

[614] Lysias 2.80

[615] Plutarch *Aristides* 21.5

[616] *Iliad* 23.215-225

was no longer reserved just for an Achilles and, instead, any man could now be celebrated so long as he had met the pre-condition of being killed in battle.[617]

It is clear that the Athenian funeral games, almost Archaic in their form, were a very different festival to that of the Panathenia or the Dionysia. It would be wrong to assume that they were limited only to Athenian participants as the excavated bronze vessels associated with the games were found outside of Athens.[618] However, it can be imagined that the games had a more sombre, reflective tone to them than the celebrations at the other Athenian competitions may have.

They would, however, have served an important function in linking corporate, *polis* ideology to personal considerations. They would, of course, have acknowledged the sacrifice of the fallen, encouraging the bereaved families to feel that their loss was not in vain but part of a common goal. They would have loaded honour even, as we have seen, to the point of a pseudo-deification onto the collective dead. For many of the more lowly citizens, lacking the benefits of wealth or aristocratic breeding, their only chance of achieving glory would be through their sacrifice in battle. Recognition of the achievements of the fallen would have given encouragement to the other men of military age and to the young men and children yet to join the citizen-militia. They would, on a yearly basis, be reminded of the honour to be won by full military participation. It was not only their duty but their route to recognition, even in death.

The festival would also have framed the *polis* in terms of family, creating a sense of duty in the citizens to serve the city as they would serve their own family. It would be dishonourable for a man to reject his son or his father if they asked for his assistance and, similarly so, it would be dishonourable for him to reject his city's plea for assistance. The festival would also be a reminder that the city, in its role as family, would not neglect the responsibilities that it had undertaken to its citizens. Participation in a military campaign would, naturally, be a cause for concern for a citizen-warrior but festivals such as the Epitaphia would serve to remind him that he, at least, would not need to be concerned that the needs of his family would fail to be met if he died on the battlefield. The city would serve in his place as a father to his sons or a dutiful son to his parents.

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[617] Parker (1997: 132). Parker suggests that Plato's Socrates subtly expresses his distate for this change in the *Menexenus* at 234e.

[618] Vanderpool (1969: 1-5)

3.4 Conclusion

The integral nature of religion and festivals in the life of the average Greek citizen is striking and this chapter has explored the various explicit and implicit military links that can be found in such collective worship. Athletic training for festivals was questioned in the ancient world in regard to its validity as a form of training for warfare. Some authors accepted it as useful while others rejected it outright as unnatural; yet the modern sociological evidence suggest that athletic training (and spectating) could actually be valuable in creating a soldier. Combat sports such as boxing and wrestling were ubiquitous in the ancient world, not only at festivals but in every-day life and a large proportion of citizens would have been both participating and spectating frequently. The culture pattern model suggests that cultures that practice aggressive sports are more likely to pursue aggressive policies in regard to their relations with other states. This theory, when taking in combination with psychological and sociological evidence concerning participation in such sports and the witnessing of violence and aggression, suggests that aggression breeds aggression. Furthermore, success in such sport also leads to rewards which, in turn, lead to more aggression as reward-seeking behaviour. Athletics may not ever have been viewed by the ancients as a pursuit that would lead to the creation of the ideal warrior but, whether consciously or not, athletics would almost certainly have played a part in creating societies naturally aggressive and willing to serve.

There are also parallels between athletics and warfare in regard to the concept of the *agon*. Warfare in the Classical world can often appear to be somewhat formulaic and rule-laden and Panhellenic displays of athletic contests between states may have appeared as warfare in miniature to the spectators, both requiring similar personal characteristics and divine aid for victory.

Panhellenic festivals also allowed states ample opportunities to engage in power play, often simply by competing and striving to beat other states in athletic pursuits but at other times in more complex ways, such as debarring states from competing for political reasons. In this way athletics and Panhellenic festivals can reflect the political situations that they are being played out within and allow states to assert their political and military dominance both to others and to their own citizens. This environment will allow states to have a degree of control over the thoughts of their own citizens and those from other states, encouraging their own citizens to believe in the strength of their city state, filling them with civic pride in the state's achievements and inspiring and motivating them to fight in

subsequent battles as representatives of that state. Citizens from other states might be psychologically demotivated to fight against a state that they perceive as strong or powerful, leading them to make alliances with such a state or retain alliances or to avoid warfare with the state.

Athenian-led festivals such as the Panathenaia and the City Dionysia in particular give Athens an opportunity to self-promote and to display to their own citizens, allies and visitors their military, financial and political strength. Spartan festivals are, perhaps not surprisingly, more insular affairs with a possibly initiatory aspect to their character. The emphasis in Sparta seems to be on the collective of the *polis* rather than on projection of an image with festivals featuring common meals, enduring the heat and comparisons between the young boys, the grown men and the older generation.

The difference between Athenian and Spartan festivals can perhaps be explained by reference to their cultures. Sparta focussed on the citizen body as a collective and had a well-established programme of military education. Athens, in contrast, was less collectivist and did not have state-sponsored military education in the fifth century. For a Spartan, participation in the military would have been a more natural choice since he would have been trained from a young age and would be more sensitive to the needs of his community. Athenians were more likely to think more individualistically and would not have been exposed to military training from a young age. Therefore, grand festivals such as the City Dionysia or Panathenaea may have encouraged Athenians to reflect on the city as a collective and may have encouraged feelings of patriotism in citizens. This, in turn, may have made them feel more motivated to fight for their *polis*. Spartan culture, however, was already so strongly collectivist with developed and intense military training that most men would naturally have felt compelled men to fight and, therefore, their festivals simply highlighted this sense of community and military duty without the need for the pomp and grandeur of Athenian festivals.

Conclusion

This aim of this thesis was to comprehensively assess the evidence in order to ascertain how Classical Athenian and Spartan men were moulded by their respective states into citizens who were both capable and motivated to perform military duties when necessary. To answer this question, the thesis was structured into four chapters with the initial chapter assessing the evidence for the military ideal and what this consisted of. The second chapter examined the evidence for training, both state-sponsored and informal or personally arranged training. Chapter three widened the analysis studying the role of festivals and corporate worship as a tool for motivating soldiers, creating patriotic feeling and potentially projecting an image of strength and power outwardly to other states.

The initial chapter asked whether a military ideal existed and, if so, what it entailed. In response to this question, it was established that there appears to be an idealisation of the figure of the hoplite in art and literature, even when the fleet had grown in importance. Although the fleet was not ignored entirely, exaltation of the fleet is rarer and generally fairly brief. However, there is a general acceptance of other troops, even though they might not be frequently idealised and sometimes might even be viewed negatively. There was even acceptance of non-citizens such as metics and *perioikoi* into the ranks. Military necessity outranked military idealisation in the Greek mind.

This chapter also raises the issue of ‘class’ and whether it was important or relevant in military service. The evidence examined demonstrates that there were a range of military opportunities for people with different degrees of wealth from rowers in the fleet who did not need to afford equipment , up to those men who could afford to keep a horse and serve in the cavalry. The class divide was not necessarily a distinct one, and there was a degree of social mobility. The “middle-class” nature of the hoplite was discussed and it was concluded that the hoplite class could have covered a very broad range of people. Thucydidean evidence of armed thetes suggests that upward social mobility for the poorest citizens may have indeed been possible and similarly, the Athenian state provided some limited financial assistance for those wishing to enter the cavalry which may have allowed a degree of social mobility for those who were already quite considerably wealthy. However, the possibility of military participation for all classes and even, when necessary, for non-citizens and slaves did create ideological problems. The chapter also asked the question of what qualities the warrior needed and whether his creation was successful. The sources do not particularly strongly stress skill as a necessary prerequisite to being a

successful member of the military but consistently stress courage as being paramount as the most important characteristic for a fighter to possess. On examination of the evidence, both Athens and Sparta had punishments in place for those who failed to show courage or failed to muster for battle, indicating that this was a possibility. The punishments, however, were harsh, particularly at Sparta and so many would have been dissuaded by them. The fact that both states were able to maintain sustained campaigns of war over the Classical period is testament to the fact that citizens were, largely, willing to serve.

Chapter two examined both the need for and the existence of training in the ancient world. The question of whether training for warfare was, and is, a psychological necessity was asked and comparisons were drawn between ancient and modern soldiers to assess whether ancient warriors underwent training similar to that of the modern soldier and whether it was for the same reasons. On analysis of the modern evidence, it was immediately clear that modern soldiers find killing and enduring warfare difficult and that military training is somewhat effective in reducing the psychological pressures placed upon them when they find themselves placed in a battle situation. First of all, Greek society was examined to see if elements of day-to-day life could replicate the modern soldier's training environment. Modern-day sociological evidence confirmed that exposure to violence as a child leads to more aggressive behaviour patterns being formed. The ancient Greek child would have been exposed fairly frequently to wrestling and combat sports, whether as a participant or a spectator. Other elements of Greek society such as the fact that witnessing the slaughter of animals would be common also would have served a purpose in ensuring men were less traumatised by the battlefield experience. The power of the group in the ancient world and also the support of one's state on return from war were also shown to reduce psychological stress in a soldier and guilt on return from battle.

Formal, state-sponsored training was then assessed and it was clear that the system in place at Sparta largely echoed the training available to modern soldiers whereas the *ephebeia* at Athens most likely did not exist during the fifth century, however, there may have been the possibility of some form of military training where the youngest and oldest citizens conducted light duties and richer citizens may have afforded private weapons training. Athens, however, had another element aside from formal training that may have been useful in creating a motivated soldier, namely their political system. The study of modern sociological evidence suggested that democracies tend to be militarily successful and many of the reasons suggested for this correlate with aspects of Athenian democracy.

Informal forms of 'training' were also considered such as hunting and pederasty for the potential benefits that a warrior could gain from partaking in these activities and both were found to serve some potential purpose in creating an effective and motivated soldier.

Finally, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder was considered. Modern soldiers quite often suffer from this condition on their return from war and it is indicative of the psychological pressures that they experience. The evidence for it, or of behaviour that seemed to indicate it, in the ancient world is relatively sparse and potential reasons for this were suggested. Warriors in ancient Greece did, to some extent undergo training similar to that of the modern soldier, particularly in Sparta where training was particularly intense. However, the psychological need for a modern approach to training was less pressing due to the structure of Greek society which was generally extremely supportive of the military and the method of carrying out warfare, for example, the group structure tended to be strictly adhered to and campaigns were brief.

The final chapter questions whether festivals can be used as a tool for furthering state ideology and motivating people to feel pride or patriotism in their city. The evidence discussed suggests that festivals are a powerful method of promoting an image of a particular state both to that state's citizens and beyond as well as providing an important opportunity for a state to gather collectively. Fifth-century Athens shows a degree of mastery in projecting a strong, wealthy image of itself through the state festivals of the Panathenaia and the Dionysia. This image would have, no doubt, acted as an inspiration to the Athenian citizens but would also have sent out a clear message to the allies of Athens and any potential enemies. The state festivals of Sparta were more local affairs with a focus on the collective life of the *polis* but seem to be loosely associated with initiation of young men into military life.

This chapter also showed that festivals, particularly the Panhellenic ones, offered opportunities for propaganda, self-promotion and military posturing. Again, a state that can convince its own citizens and potentially other states that it is powerful, strong and successful in military matters should have a motivated citizen body keen to uphold and protect that projected image.

This chapter also engaged more fully with the issue of athletics and the potential usefulness of athletics as training for war. It was concluded that as an activity that was a preserve of the wealthy at the very highest levels, the usefulness was not great, particularly when

success at the highest levels also required a strict diet and regimen. However, athletics did tie in to the idea of a state projecting an image of itself as powerful and, more importantly, sociological evidence suggests that athletics and aggression may be linked not only for participants but also for spectators.

Overall, this thesis has pieced together an image of a society that creates and moulds their citizens into military roles through many different experiences and influences, some overt and explicit, others less so. I do not wish to suggest that this moulding of military citizens was always conscious although at times it most certainly was. For example, the Spartan *agoge* is clearly indicative of a conscious desire for a state to create efficient and motivated soldiers. Other aspects of ancient culture were simply fortuitous in the fact that they partly served the purpose of creating potential warriors or maintaining the skills of those already serving in the military despite the fact that this may not have been their purpose. For example, hunting would have served as an enjoyable pastime for the wealthy and a necessary way to supplement the diet for poorer citizens but it would also have increased physical fitness and accustomed the citizen to slaughter and gore..

Classical Athenian and Spartan society created citizens who were motivated and relatively efficient warriors, although both states created such citizens in quite different ways. Sparta emphasised intense training, submission to the group and communal behaviour, whereas the democratic structure of Athens and her constant self-promotion through grandiose festival displays may have provided her citizens with the motivation needed to go into battle willingly. It is clear that the creation of a warrior is not a simple process that begins and ends with battle itself. Rather it is a process that the citizen is born into, raised in and continues to live in throughout his life. It is a process that society is integral to.

This survey is by no means complete. Due to limitations of length and evidence this thesis tended towards a hoplitic bias and also focussed on only two Greek states. Other troops constitute a major part of warfare, particularly during the conflict between Athens and Sparta. There is still, therefore, significant scope for further study of this topic in relation to other states and other types of troop.

This thesis has demonstrated the value of the application of psychology and sociology in understanding the ancient citizen warrior. It expands significantly on previous work on the psychology of the citizen warrior significantly by placing him in a wider social context. He is a citizen first and a soldier, sailor or cavalryman second and, as such, his training does

not begin and end on the battlefield. He is truly a creation of his *polis* and is influenced in every detail by his state. The social context is imperative in understanding the citizen-warrior. Learning the practicalities of battle and developing the physical fitness needed to fight is only part of the story. As modern research and training attest, there is a need for psychological preparation for battle. In Classical Athens and Sparta this was mainly provided by the structure of society rather than by formal training. Furthermore, a citizen has to feel motivated to serve his *polis*. This motivation, again, is not provided by official training but by encouraging collectivism, feelings of patriotism and a belief in the strength of the *polis*. A soldier can feel motivated to fight or he can feel compelled to fight for fear of legal or social sanctions. Particularly at Sparta, the social sanctions that a coward would suffer were harsh indeed. Both motivation to fight and punishment for cowards, therefore, arises out of a citizen warrior's social context. This study has been necessarily brief and each of the chapters has potential for significant development and further study. Much could be added to our understanding of the subject by more purposeful cooperation between ancient military historians and scholar of Greek religion, education and ideology. There is also great potential for cross-discipline collaboration with psychologists and sociologists. As the fields of sociology and psychology continue to expand, so too will the opportunities for further research into the ancient soldier.

The application of modern psychological theory to the ancient evidence has proved fruitful in this study of the creation of the citizen warrior. As the discipline of psychology develops and evolves, it will likely continue to be useful for ancient military history. For instance, the field of narrative psychology may prove fruitful for future studies into ancient warfare. As a field of psychology, it focuses on how narrative affects human psychology in regards to how we narrate our own stories or have them narrated to us by others. The field is currently filled with studies that emphasise the telling of personal stories or group stories with a basis in reality but it seems to have potential to expand into studying the effects of collective tales and stories that may not necessarily have a basis in reality, or have a weak one, but may have a moralising or educative role. In modern Western culture, there exists a rich tapestry of fairytales, legends and pseudo-history that repeatedly gets told to children and to adults. If narrative psychology began to explore such tales then the results of their studies could be illustrative for ancient military historians who study cultures so rich in pseudo-history and mythology.

Wilfred Owen in his poem *A Terre* wrote the words:

> Little I'd ever teach a son, but hitting,
> Shooting, war, hunting, all the arts of hurting.
> Well, that's what I learnt....

These words, though written by a soldier of the First World War, are just as applicable to the ancient world where men learned the arts of war as a rite of passage and so, too, would pass them on to their sons. The development of a corps of willing and able citizen-fighters was such an intrinsic part of society that it was almost inconceivable that a man would do anything other than accept that role with pride.

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