



<https://theses.gla.ac.uk/>

Theses Digitisation:

<https://www.gla.ac.uk/myglasgow/research/enlighten/theses/digitisation/>

This is a digitised version of the original print thesis.

Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author

A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge

This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author

The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author

When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given

Enlighten: Theses

<https://theses.gla.ac.uk/>
research-enlighten@glasgow.ac.uk

**Comrade Consumer:
Economic and Technological Images of the West in the Definition of
the Soviet Future 1957-1969**

By

Nordica Thea Nettleton
MA, University of Alberta, 1999
BA Honours, University of Alberta, 1996

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

In the Department

Of

Central and East European Studies

University of Glasgow

August 2006

All rights reserved. This work may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by
photocopy or other means, without permission of the author

ProQuest Number: 10390647

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



ProQuest 10390647

Published by ProQuest LLC (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.

All rights reserved.

This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 – 1346

GLASGOW
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY:

ABSTRACT

The goal of the Soviet government in the 1950s and 1960s was not to emulate the political or economic system of the Western capitalist democracies; it was to overtake them in terms of the provision of wealth; a wealth that was to be equitably distributed and to which social programmes were implicitly understood to belong. Positive statements about the economic and technological successes of the West, particularly as they pertained to the Soviet future, were means by which individuals and the state could share a language and established a common ground for discussion while pursuing interests that met and diverged. Criticism of the current material reality within the USSR fell within the realm of permitted dissent. Thus, consumption served as both a prime motivational factor and a safety valve for releasing the pressure of discontent.

Soviet failure to maintain the belief that the communist system was capable of providing a socially acceptable level of consumerism while the government still purported Marxist ideology, resulted in the social acceptance of modernisation and consumerism, both intrinsically linked with the West, as the most favourable objective but devoid of the belief that the Soviet system was best able to achieve this. The positive information about the West which was intended to motivate Soviet citizens, instead served to provide them with an alternative means of achieving their future objectives.

The de-stabilising effect of Party permitted information affected Soviet society on multiple levels and was introduced through numerous means. This study is an examination of the introduction of the economic and technological ideas as they entered Soviet discourse through official statements in the form of speeches, newspaper articles, books etc.; through cultural diplomacy in the form of exhibitions; and through science and technology, specifically the SCST and the turn key factory AVTOVAZ. Taken together, these image conduits resulted in the creation of a mythical other: that is to say externally and internally constructed image of the West that was to challenge the economic legitimacy of the Party's leadership and to call into question the goals of the communist system.

DEDICATION

For my parents: thank you for your support, assistance and faith over the long years.
This work would not have been possible but for you.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank all those who have assisted me in some way during this lengthy endeavour. I am grateful to my supervisor, James White, for his advice, his patience, and his guidance.

I wish to thank the staff of the Department of Central and East European Studies and professor Klaus Waschik for their contributions and support.

I owe a great deal to the staff at the various libraries and archives where I conducted research while in London, Moscow and Tol'iatti.

I also owe a special debt of gratitude to the individuals and families who shared their life histories and experiences in the name of scholarly research.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract	ii
Dedication	iii
Acknowledgements	iv
Table of Contents	v
List of Figures, Tables and Charts	vii
INTRODUCTION: THE PROVISION OF ALL LIFE'S COMFORTS	
Introduction	1
Timeframe	8
Historiography	10
Methodology	24
Chapter Breakdown	30
Conclusion	33
1: THE PARTY, SOCIETY AND CATCHING UP WITH THE WEST	
Introduction	38
Where Soviet society was coming from	39
Where society was going: impact of demographical changes	44
Where Soviet society was going: perceptions of standard of living	54
Where state was taking society: government fuelled expectations	66
Where the state was taking society: an American example	76
Conclusion: Why Khrushchev needed external comparison	86
2: COMMENTING ON COMMUNIST CONSUMPTION	
Introduction	91
Housing	92
Clothing	102
Automobiles	119
Culture	125
Conclusion	141
3: EXHIBITING ALTERNATIVES	
Introduction	145
Historical Background of Exhibitions	150
Exhibitions	174
Conclusion	201
4: IMAGE CONDUITS: SOVIET ELITES AND WESTERN TECHNOLOGY	
Introduction	203
Science, Technology and the State	207
Gathering, Purchasing and Assimilating Science and Technology	218
Conclusion	254

5: DRIVING TOWARDS COMMUNIST CONSUMERISM: AVTOVAZ	
Introduction	260
The Necessity of Foreign Presence?	274
Incentives for Workers	279
Conclusion	293
CONCLUSION: The beginning of the end and the end of a beginning	297
APPENDICES	
Appendix A: Tol'iatti Questionnaire	309
Appendix B: Poster Images	310
Appendix C: <i>Angliia</i>	312
Appendix D: Exhibition Chart	313
Appendix E: Comparison of Soviet and American Consumer Goods	323
Appendix F: <i>Vneshniaia trgovlia</i> : Trade Exports and Imports of Foreign Trade	324
Appendix G: Profile of Questionnaire	325
Appendix H: Song, 'Turinskoe nebo...'	326
BIBLIOGRAPHY	327

LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 1	'In the 'Free World''	59
Fig. 2	'Kormushka'	84
Fig. 3	Chemistry Meets Footwear	105
Fig. 4	Shoes?	107
Fig. 5	<i>I nashin i vashim</i>	111
Fig. 6	Pittsburgh Youth Welcome N. S. Khrushchev	115
Fig. 7	'Welcome!'	116
Fig. 8	Mrs. K Looking at the British <i>Triumph</i>	122
Fig. 9	Fiat	124
Fig. 10	Missing Shoes	184
Fig. 11	Visitors on American Geodesic Dome	185
Fig. 12	Visitors	186
Fig. 13	Shoes-69	195

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1	Profession	56
Table 2	Yearly Registered Marriages and Construction of New Flats	95
Table 3	Western Participation at Shoes-69	197
Table 4	Shoes-69: Contracts	198
Table 5	Industrial Output Compared By Ioffe 1939 and 1957	218
Table 6	Table of Soviet Imports of Western Machinery and Transport Equipment	221
Table 7	Import into the USSR of Important Goods in 1960-65	222
Table 8	Knit Wear Production	224
Table 9	Foreign Car Models Researched	246
Table 10	Introduction and Implementation of Technology	249
Table 11	Some Indicators of Soviet Consumption 1965-1970	257

LIST OF CHARTS

Chart 1	Place of Residence	56
Chart 2	Imports of Consumer Goods	216
Chart 3	Passenger Car Production	267
Chart 4	How Soviet Workers Rated Their Level of Satisfaction With Salaries	280

Introduction: The Provision Of All Life's Comforts

*Paradise is a place where people want to end up, not a place they run from.
(Nikita Khrushchev)¹*

*The Thaw was not about freedom but about 'a period of striving to legitimate
the socialist project, while recoiling from the horrific excesses of Stalinism.'²
(Victor Buchli)*

Introduction

From its inception, Soviet Russia strove to achieve technological and economic parity with the West. The Soviet future was the West minus social injustices and plus a Russian soul. While Soviet economic 'superiority' could be bolstered by social, moral and cultural successes, it remained dominated by production and consumption. Early on in Soviet history, the objective of instilling the masses with socialist ideals and morality was dominated by industrialisation. Through industrialisation a Soviet society was to be built; and the Soviet Union was to establish parity with and eventually superiority over the West. This focus on production was to place enormous stress on the Soviet system.³

The economic momentum begun under Khrushchev's leadership was to fade into the early years of the Brezhnev leadership and the comparative sense of aspirational deprivation that resulted can be attributed to two sources: a failure to achieve a fictitious future fast enough and a failure to compete with external comparators.⁴ In 1959, the US government analyst Hans Haymann Jr. observed that 'since about the middle of last year, and particularly coincident with the launching of the new 7-Year Plan, which was in itself an aberration from the usual 5 Year Plan, the prestige-laden objective of 'catching up with America' has been rapidly transformed by Khrushchev from a mere propaganda slogan into something

¹ Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes (Boston: Brown and Little, 1990) 203.

² Victor Buchli, An Archaeology of Socialism (Oxford: Berg, 1999) 138.

³ This need to surpass was distinctive of Soviet socialism. While socialism in the West has always been in competition with capitalism, it has not focused on the need to out-produce the capitalists. Indeed, many Western socialists simply replaced the optimal production value with other values, for example more humane or environmentally sound principles, thus effectively removing Western socialism from the industrial rat race.

⁴ The term aspirational derivation can be attributed to Katherine Verdery. See Katherine Verdery, What Was Socialism and What Comes Next? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992)

approaching a national obsession.⁵ Although it was clear that a race was to be won, the benchmarks of success were fluid, fluctuating from per capita output, to total output, etc., and the finish line was a Soviet future that bore a striking resemblance to a cultured and just American dream. As late as 1981, the writer Alexander Zinoviev, bemoaned it:

On top of everything else, there's abroad. Oh, if only it didn't exist! Then we'd be through in two ticks. But over there they keep on inventing things, and we're obliged to keep up with the competition, to prove our superiority. We hardly have time to steal one machine from them before we have to start thinking about the next. By the time we've introduced something, it is out of date already.⁶

This focus on comparability resulted in a culture that required technological and economic comparison to define itself.

This study examines the information sources upon which images and perceptions were based: the forms in which information was communicated; the pervasiveness of its dissemination; and the blurring of the line official line of Cold War hostilities in order to create serviceable economic and technological images of the West that were to help define the Soviet future. Christopher William Smart has proposed that it is 'through the more passive medium of the ill formed public opinions that images are at their most influential' in the Soviet Union.⁷ Images do not occur in an information void. There must be sufficient information (or misinformation) upon which to formulate them. The intensity of interest in things Western and Westerners in the post-WWII Soviet Union is indicative of sufficient information to create an image but insufficient to sate curiosity.⁸ The level of public discourse is indicative of a relatively high level of state tolerance, as a public image must make the transition from a private thought to one that is shared.⁹

As mass consumption, consumer goods, and industrialisation are prominent features of post WWII America, and as Russia (Soviet or otherwise) has historically defined itself at least in part in relation to the West, it is not surprising that the

⁵ Philip Hanson, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy* (Harlow: Longman, 2003) 72.

⁶ Alexander Zinoviev, *The Yawning Heights* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981) 513-514.

⁷ Christopher William Smart, *The Imagery of Soviet Foreign Policy in West Europe* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992) 1.

⁸ See any of a number of Shlapentokh's sociological surveys, some of the first permitted in the Soviet Union.

⁹ Kenneth E Boulding, *The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society* (New York: Ann Arbor, 1956), 14.

absorption of a defined economic image of the West would be a significant aspect of the Soviet decision making process. Soviet leaders could represent Western modernisation as positive while not running counter to Marxism-Leninism. This is not to say that the positive economic image was not potentially destabilising. The confines of economic determinism and the legitimisation of the Communist Party rule rested on its ability to provide an equitable and superior standard of living, thereby magnifying the intensity or scale of the economic mirror image. Those individuals who were supposed to be the staunchest defenders of communism were often those who were exposed to the most positive aspects of the alternative system of capitalism. ¹⁰

The present study examines the function of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in the creation of a technological and economic image of the West from 1957 to 1969 that was to help define the Soviet future. The main research question is: What was the mythical other and how did it and its creation impact Soviet society? This main question is composed of several subsidiary questions. What were the economic and technological images of the West? How was the Soviet Union defining itself in economic and technological terms post WWII and what was the impact of the mythical other on Soviet society's view of itself and its future? Who participated in the building of the mythical other and why? How was

¹⁰ Mass production is dependent on mass consumers. Be the consumer governments, other industries, or individuals, they must subscribe to the belief that allows mass production to perpetuate itself: that change is beneficial. This is a learnt social norm and a high tolerance for change distinguishes the late 20th century from other eras. While the term 'new' implies a concrete state, it has a conceptual meaning implying a state of perpetual acquisition of goods and services. The life span of employment, technology, objects and trends has been drastically reduced over the centuries and now the emphasis is as much on the concept of new as it is on the object or event itself. This half-life of goods is not tied simply to their utility, but relativises the modernity and function of a good with that of successor models or technologies. This allows a shift whereby consumptive behaviour is limited largely by wealth and only to a lesser degree by desire or necessity. The acquisition of the 'new' acts as a temporal segue to the future. This perpetual acquisition must be accepted as beneficial, and as necessary, as fundamental to a better standard of living and the status of the individual as modern. The general social change from industrialisation (machines and technology are durable) to modernisation (both the durability and the desirability of long term durability are diminished) is often indicative of a nation having co-adopted the social ethos of mass consumption. This transformation is most apparent in large consumer durables such as automobiles and refrigerators. Openness to accept new economic and technical developments, to be in a perpetual state of consumption has been greatest in the West. For a further discussion of the concept of what is new and its relationship to present reality and the future see Jan Ola-Ostman 'Pragmatic makers of Persuasion,' *Propaganda, Persuasion, and Polemics* ed. Jeremy Hawthorn, (London: Edward Arnold, 1987) chapter 6, 138.

this image built and who adopted it? What effect did the mythical other have on the comrade consumer? A premise of this thesis is that there is something profound in saying to a citizen of a country where the rapid development of the means of production and production techniques with the objective of fully satisfying the demands of all members of society is a prime objective, that superior technology and better standards of living exist in another socio-economic system. Under the early Bolsheviks and Stalin large-scale industrialisation took precedence over modernisation¹¹. However, the Post-War era necessitated that the Soviet Union both industrialise and modernise. The crux came in the late 1950s, when the residual effects of the Great Patriotic War had lessened, and a pervading sense of uneasy stability in the international situation arose.

An enduring myth of the Cold War is that the Soviet government did not permit access to information about the West, an *information* iron curtain, and that the information that was provided was derogatory and negative. While a great deal of research has been conducted on the concurrent negative image of the West and on non-official images, for example the West in *samizdat* literature, there is a comparative dearth of research into positive, primarily economic and technological, official images and public reception of this image. This is due, in part, to the commendations having co-existed with the more salacious vilification of the West, in part due to Cold War politics in which positive images failed to fit into the polarisation of the two world systems, and in part due to the need for the passing of time and eras before historical research can begin. The purpose of this study is to contribute to a growing body of research on western influences in the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Specifically, the rise of the comrade consumer and the effect of economic and technological images of the West as part of the Soviet future will be examined. This is not a study of those who were stepping outside of the official confines of the system, for this is a period in which a concerted attempt was made to create a comrade consumer. The question that remained to be answered was how to meld the consumer, as the embodiment of materialism, choice, modernity, mass consumption and recipient of rapid technological change, with the comrade. The

¹¹ For an in-depth study of the relationship between workers, factory and state during the 1920s and 1930s see Sergei Zhuravlev, *Malen'kie liudi i bol'shaya istoriia* (Moskva: ROSSPEN, 2000). Five of the eight chapters focus on the foreign workers.

focus is on technological and economic images as these were of prime importance both in Communist ideology and internationally in the post WW II era. National prestige and success were equated with mass production and cutting edge technology. J. D. Parks has argued that Khrushchev's faith in the ability of the socialist system to compete with the capitalist system formed the basis for greater exchange with Western countries.¹² While Khrushchev was neither the first nor the last Soviet leader to espouse catching up with the West, he was arguably the most vocal.

The Khrushchev era was a period during which government and party officials were often resented for their elite status, which included their contact with foreigners, and their general consumption of things Western. They were also the people empowered to govern a socialist state. During the Brezhnev regime, the society's moral expectations of the *nomenklatura* and *apparatchiki* was to degenerate to a level at which they were virtually absolved of 'fulfilling the most important moral prescriptions, those of discipline and initiative.'¹³ This decrease in moral prescriptions was matched by an increase in economic expectations. In essence there was an inverse relationship between moral expectations placed on *apparatchiki* and the demand for higher personal standards of living. The decreased focus on moral objectives left the Party with primarily an economic mandate. Factored into the economic mandate was the belief that elsewhere economic aspirations were, at least for some, being better fulfilled. The predominance of the economic mandate and the belief in the existence of a wealthy other led to aspirational deprivation:¹⁴ a state in which demand was greater than supply. This was contrary to the regime's motivational aspirations and self-image.

Today, the aspirations of modernity, the utilisation of ordinary means for the creation of the extraordinary for the benefit of all, are generally regarded as nostalgic longing. Whether the Soviet leadership believed in its ability to fuse socialism and consumption, saw no alternative to attempting it, or had set aside communist ideology warrants discussion but is not a prime focus of this study for all

¹² J. D. Parks, Culture, Conflict and Co-existence: American Soviet Cultural Relations, 1917-1958 (London: McFarland, 1983) 3-4.

¹³ Vladimir Shlapentokh, Soviet Public Opinion: Ideology, Mythology, and Pragmatism in Interaction (New York: Praeger, 1986) 67.

¹⁴ David Lane and Felicity O'Dell, The Soviet Industrial Worker: Social Class, Education, and Control (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1978) 137.

three alternatives result in the propagation of a positive image.¹⁵ This image was to function as a 'mythical other'. The mythical other was an economic and technological West that was constructed on several levels by divergent groups furthering often-contradictory interests. The combined images of Soviet tolerated Western images as well as official Soviet images of the West provided Soviet citizens with a body of information sufficient for the formulation of a concept of the West that was unique to the Soviet Union. While the West and the Soviet Union were proclaiming 'irreconcilable ideological differences'¹⁶, they were co-operating, consciously or otherwise, in myth formation.

Were Soviet citizens more interested in consumer goods and material standards of living than in social, political and/or cultural comparisons? This study does not suppose that there was a lack of interest in political or cultural issues. However, interest both political and cultural issues lies outside the scope of this study as they often lay outside the bounds of permitted dialogue. While there were members of Soviet society, from Central Committee members to collective farm workers to dissidents who had an interest in the political systems of the West, there was no effective and accepted conduit for this information. However, an interest in, praise for, and aspirations of acquiring Western technology and economic norms did not lie outside the limits of *permitted dissent*,¹⁷ as the state was both passively and actively involved in the cultivation and articulation of this image. The positive economic image was contextualised within another image, one that vilified the Western political system and scorned the Western cultural system. The inequities, injustices and inequalities of the West accompanied its phenomenal economic and technological achievements. The resulting paradoxical image of the West as unjust and war mongering while at the same time providing a cornucopia of consumer goods and luxurious living is one that has survived the Soviet Union. While the wealth and scientific/technological advancement of the West minus the evils of bourgeois democracy were once held up as an important aspect of the Soviet future,

¹⁵ A study addressing this issue is Stephen A. Resnick and Richard D. Wolff, Class Theory and History: Capitalism and Communism in the USSR (New York: Routledge, 2002).

¹⁶ To use a phrase from Slava Gerovitch, 'Mathematical Machines of the Cold War: Soviet Computing, American Cybernetics and Ideological Disputes in the Early 1950s,' Social Studies of Science 31/2 (April 2001) 253-287, 256.

¹⁷ This term is used by Dina Spechler in her work Permitted Dissent in the USSR *Novyi mir* and the Soviet Regime (New York: Praeger, 1982) 4-5.

it was the fused image 'Chicago 1930s' that survived and served as the dominant image of the immediate Post-1989 Russian future.

The contradictory image of the West pictures a West that was successfully realising the consumerism of modernisation (and of globalisation) and was completely devoid of any soul. The retired Russian professor Mikhail Usatenko, an avid fan of Frank Sinatra and Western films, stated: 'We always knew that you Americans had it better than we did in material things, but we thought that you had no spirit [soul].'¹⁸ Vladimir Shlapentokh has written along similar lines noting that the image of America as a bastion of consumerism and vanity escalated concurrent with a general increase in interests in material comfort in the Soviet Union: the 'image of Americans became a part of the mythological balancing within the Soviet mentality, with the claim to cultural superiority over Americans being used to rationalize the growing economic and technological gap between the two countries.'¹⁹ The changes in both political and economic policy with regards to the West were to have a profound impact on the everyday life of Soviet citizens. It is not possible to separate Khrushchev's calls to improve the daily life of average citizens from his activities in the international arena. The socio-cultural history of the Soviet Union cannot be understood without studying the impact of the economic opening towards the West. Similarly, the resonance of economic policy cannot be assessed without examining the impact that the policies were to have on Soviet society.

The goal of the Soviet government was not to emulate the political system of the Western capitalist democracies; it was to overtake them in terms of the provision of wealth; a wealth that was to be equitably distributed and to which social programmes were implicitly understood to belong. Difficulties in achieving these goals were to contribute to the backlash against the West and materialism that was so rampant in the 1970s and 1980s, notably amongst the intelligentsia. Thus, the Soviet leadership had set the terms for the debate. Calling for multi-party elections was treason - calling for fashion alternatives, access to passenger cars, etc. was not.

¹⁸ As quoted in Amanda Wood Aucoin, 'Deconstructing the American Way of life: Soviet Responses to Cultural Exchange and American Activity During the Khrushchev Years,' diss., University of Arkansas: 2001, 9. This researcher would use soul as opposed to spirit in the translation.

¹⁹ Shlapentokh, 'The Changeable Soviet Image of America,' American Political Science Review no. 5 (1988): 157-171, 157.

The adoption of consumption as a social goal was a means by which members of the society could simultaneously follow the letter if not the spirit of government policy and pursue individual objectives that would contribute to the growth of the private sphere. As 'a reward for prior austerity measures and an attempt to attain some semblance of normalcy, popular preoccupation with the private was imbued with a sense of citizenship'.²⁰

The political ramifications of the image include: alternative paths to socialism; the knowledge of another system succeeding where the Soviet system was failing; the growth of social discontent with economic progress despite economic growth; and the rise of the private sphere. The early Cold War period, that of the Khrushchev and early Brezhnev leaderships is of prime importance for the study of this phenomenon as this was the period when changes in technology permitted a rapid acceleration in the mass dissemination of information and increased contact with the West.²¹ It is the period when the Soviet population began to demand a level of parity with economically leading nations. Perhaps most importantly, it is the era in which both a finite objective, the creation of communism by 1980, is set for the Party and the state, and in which a comrade consumer and a mythical other are created.

Timeframe

This research encompasses a period between two highly symbolic events; the launching of Sputnik (04.10.1957) and the landing of the first man on the moon (20.07.1969). The launching of Sputnik into orbit has been taken as a beginning point for several reasons. Sputnik was the ultimate representation of technological progress in an era in which technological progress and modernisation were lauded. The Soviet Union, so long trailing Western states and so devastated by war, had

²⁰ Christine G. Varga-Harris, 'Green is the Colour of Hope?: The crumbling façade of Postwar *byt'* through the public eyes of *Vecherniaia Moskva*, Canadian Journal of History Vol. 34 (August 1999) 193.

²¹ Hitler, Roosevelt, and Churchill all used technology, for example the radio during the 1930s and 1940s for the mass dissemination of information/propaganda. Technology in the form of railways had also increased contact. However, the post WWII technological developments marked a rapid acceleration in the speed, accessibility, and breath of information dissemination.

succeeded in leading the world to the heavens.²² As Khrushchev was to announce in his concluding remarks at the 22nd Party Congress: '*Sovetskii Soiuz seichas bukval'no i figural'no shturmuet nebo*' (today, the Soviet Union is literally and figuratively storming the heavens).²³ The Soviet system appeared to be rocketing ahead of capitalist contemporaries. Soviet dominance in economics, technology, and in the provision of all life's comforts, was plausible. The launching of Sputnik represented the zenith of Soviet optimism in an unlimited future. This research period ends not with a Soviet achievement but with an American one, the landing of Neil Armstrong on the moon. Falling outside of the standard delineation of the Thaw period, being post-Khrushchev, post-Hungarian revolution, post-Prague Spring and after the period of political liberalisation, it represents the end of the era of optimism. While it would be an overstatement to list the American success as representing a Soviet failure, the first moon landing highlighted the failures of the Soviet system to deliver, embodying not only the failure to perpetuate the momentum and successes of the space programme but also its failure to harness the optimism of 1957. Over time, Khrushchev's promises of catching up with and overtaking the West, of burying the as yet unborn grandchildren of the United States, went from arrogant but not inconceivable to ludicrous. What was possible in 1957 was laughable in 1969. If the Khrushchev era was the thaw after the frigidity of the Stalinist era, then this study marks the transition from a turbid yet potentially fertile period to the drought of stagnation.

As the period from 1957 to 1969 overlaps the Thaw era a few words on the nature of the Thaw are warranted. The commencement and termination of social phenomena and of natural phenomena are gradual events. The establishment of an economic image of the West is connected with, but not confined to, the Thaw era. The Thaw era, like the image of spring that it evokes, is difficult to temporally define. Should it be placed in the late Stalinist period as the groundwork for reform appears to have been laid by a reform enlightened bureaucracy that was willing but unable to implement limited reforms? Elena Zubkova's work supports this line of

²² For a contemporary Soviet analysis of the role that Sputnik was to play in East-West relations see L. Ilyichov, 'The Sputniks and international relations,' *International Affairs* 3 (1958) 7-18.

²³ Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Otchet tsentral'nogo komiteta kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza XXII S'ezdu Partii* (Moskva: Gospolitizdat, 1961) 185-186.

reasoning and she has written that 'Stalin's death alone introduced substantial adjustments in the relationship of people and government. As the chief link between them had disappeared, so did the harmony of their interests, and thus there was a progressive alienation of the two'.²⁴ The beginning of the Thaw can also be associated with First Secretary N. S. Khrushchev's rise to power. By the time the Secret Speech was made at the 20th Party Congress things were flowing. Part of the difficulty surrounding the temporal defining of this era is that the term Thaw encompasses several social, political and cultural changes, which, each taken separately, ebbed and flowed and taken together overlapped and separated. The years 1953, 1956, 1959, and 1962 act as milestones for the period. The end of the Thaw is as imprecise as its beginning. The Thaw period provided Soviet citizens with an inconsistent world full of change, anxiety and uncertainty that vied with optimism as the dominant cultural mood. Having introduced the subject and having presented the research questions, this chapter will now turn towards a historiography of the comrade consumer and the mythical other, the methodology used for this work and description of the following chapters.

A Historiography of the Comrade Consumer and the Mythical Other

The historiographical research for this work consists of several branches of research that combine to provide a not insignificant collection of sources. As is indicated in the title of this section, the works tend to fall into two separate categories, consumption in the USSR and the technological and economic image of the West. As there was interest in things Soviet during the Cold War era, there is a rather consistent source of solid secondary sources concerning Soviet economic and technological capabilities and Soviet politics. However, research pertaining to the mythical other and to the comrade consumer intensified during two distinct periods. The first period is during the 1950s and 1960s, when laymen and academics wrote on their personal and professional opinions of the USSR, its standard of living, economic developments and potential, East-West relationships and perceptions of each other. These sources are interesting from a methodological viewpoint as there is a connection between primary and secondary sources. For example, when the

²⁴ Elena Zubkova, *Russia After the War: Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945-1957* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998) 153.

historian Frederick Barghoorn wrote on Soviet images of the United States he was writing as both a historian and as US embassy staff in Moscow. The well-known British professor Mervyn Matthews has published both memoirs of his time in the Soviet Union (which include meeting his Russian born wife) and numerous academic works on the era in question.²⁵ William Turpin, former US Foreign Service Officer and professor, was using the term 'Soviet consumer' in his works in the 1960s.²⁶ One of the significant advantages of many of these 'dual' works is the ability to use them as a form of checks and controls against temporal perception changes. The charge that opinions and recollections are modified over time is legitimate and these sources provide the opportunity to compare 1950s and 1960s perceptions and academic assessments with research conducted in the 1990s and on. Two significant bodies of information from the 1950s and 1960s on Soviet public opinions were the Harvard Interview Study and *Komsomol'skaia Pravda's* institute for public opinion.

The military stalemate of the Cold War meant that the government could expect to enter into long-term negotiations with the Post-War generation. Significant insight into the nature of the Post-War generation was provided by the Harvard Interview Study (1953), one of the most influential Western undertakings to gather the opinions of Soviet citizens under the direction of Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, in which recent emigrants from the USSR were interviewed and the numerous surveys conducted by the Institute for Public Opinion in Moscow. The Harvard study was funded under the US Air Force contract No. 33(038)-12909 and involved 2,700 questionnaires of former Soviet citizens in Europe and the USA, 327 life history interviews, and a sub sample questionnaire of 700 individuals who had completed either or both the original questionnaire and an interview. Despite the inherent flaw that émigrés may not hold opinions that are representative of the masses who stayed, there appears to be little discrepancy when cross referenced with other interview projects and foreign commentaries based on conversations with Soviet citizens in the USSR. The main conclusions of the social processes examined can be summarised as:

²⁵ Mervyn Matthews, *Mila and Mervusya: a Russian Wedding* (Bridgend: Seren, 1999).

²⁶ William N. Turpin, 'The Outlook for the Soviet Consumer,' *Problems of Communism* no.6 (1960) 30-37.

1. Stalinism resulted in a hostile relationship between the public and the state, which had the potential to undermine the legitimacy of the Communist regime.
2. After the terror of Stalinism the next greatest source of discontent was the low standard of living. This low standard of living was often attributed to the poor management of industrialisation and collectivisation.
3. Russia and Russian society had been changed from a predominately religious society to an industrialised urban society on the cusp of modernisation and the accompanying value shift from continuity and tradition to success and security had taken root.
4. The majority of the respondents were pleased with large sections of Soviet life, in particular the equity of some services, the development and accessibility of high culture, and the idea of social mobility.
5. Grievances were specific. The main grievances were the Terror, slow economic pace of development, and the current standard of living. Fault lay not in the concept of socialism but in its execution.
6. Interviewees felt that the leadership had accepted that the Soviet people wanted and had a right to an easier lifestyle.²⁷

In the Harvard Project two of the top three grievances of individuals leaving the Soviet Union were economic in nature. A section of the survey involved standard of living and these findings illustrate the pre-existing discontent with the Soviet provision of amenities and commodities. Without terror to pacify the hostile population and with economic issues being of paramount importance, the communist government had little alternative but to attempt to rectify the economic situation. This is particularly relevant when the increased sense of self-worth and entitlement on the part of the average citizen is taken into consideration. The fourth conclusion of the study indicates that social negotiations were possible as most respondents were pleased with large sections of Soviet life.

From January to March 1961, *Komsomol'skaia Pravda's* institute for public opinion conducted a survey titled 'A Self-Portrait of the Young Generation', in which 17, 446 Soviet citizens under the age of thirty participated. Published in *Komsomol'skaia Pravda*, as well as in Western newspapers such as the *Observer*, *Daily Telegraph*, *New York Herald Tribune*, *New York Times*, *Stuttgarter Nachrichten*, *Unita*, *Stampa*, and *L'Humanité*, the results of this study support the fourth conclusion of the Harvard Project. In response to the question what are the

²⁷ Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society* (New York: Atheneum, 1968) 380-382, 396.

strongest features/characteristics of the Soviet youth the dominant responses were patriotism and a love for the *rodina* (32%), high moral standards (31%) and fidelity to the Party and the ideas of communism (22.1%).²⁸ A later study by Susan Reid supports the theory of the belief in the reformability of the Soviet state.²⁹ The perception that the general standard of living was not improving is inconsistent with the general economic trend as seen in both the Soviet and American statistical information, which shows significant increases that were then to taper off. The CIA estimated that there was a 26.5 percent increase in per capita consumption between 1953 and 1958 and 44.6 percent for 1953 to 1964.³⁰ For as much as the Soviet Union's economic advances constituted a comparative failure, in absolute terms there was a great deal of progress.³¹ Thus, the historiographical research shows a marked degree of consistency in findings over several decades of research.

For Bauer and Inkeles the fundamental question was 'in what degree are the distinctive features of Soviet totalitarianism compatible with the rest of the social structure we associate with large-scale industrial society?'³² Reflecting back on the 1960s and projecting into the future David Lane wrote that the key challenge was how the political and economic system was to satisfy pragmatic economic considerations.³³ If unable to meet this challenge, could the presence of an image of a system able to meet this challenge prove to be destabilising to the Soviet system? Ultimately unable to meet this challenge, was the Soviet Union destabilised by the presence within itself of an image of another system that was meeting the challenge?

After promising beginnings in the 1950s and 1960s there is a lull in research into public opinion and consumption until the 1990s, when primarily in the disciplines of sociology and social anthropology a concentration of studies into Soviet perceptions of the West and a focus on the theory of communism and consumption occurs. This is not to argue that researchers during the 1950s and the 1960s did not address concepts of consumption in the Soviet Union, but it is in the 1990s that a concentration of detailed theoretically grounded sociological and

²⁸ B. A. Grushin, *Chetyre zhizni Rossii: v zerkale oprosov obshchestvennogo mneniia* (Moskva: Progress-Traditsiia, 2001) 179.

²⁹ Susan Emily Reid, 'Photography in the Thaw', *Art Journal* Summer (1994) 33-40, 33.

³⁰ Hanson, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy* 54, 65.

³¹ For more on the relative successes of the Soviet economy see Hanson, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy* 49.

³² Inkeles, *The Soviet Citizen* 384.

³³ Lane, *The Soviet Industrial Worker* 51.

anthropological work appears. The lapse in time is due in large part to past limitations resulting in a scanty corpus of available source material; with the collapse of the Soviet Union the research situation was to change. The groundbreaking work of such academics as Victor Buchli (common artifacts in socialism), Penelope Harvey (the idea of nations communicating modernity through the presentation of goods, primarily exhibitions), the anthropologist Daniel Miller (a 'grandfather' of the study of material culture, specifically automobiles), and Katherine Verdery (defining socialism and its successor) serves as a rich basis for further researchers in the field of the consumption and socialism.

According to Anthony Giddens, one of the promises of modernity is that it is without end and without limit. It has an inherently restless and mobile nature and a disposition to expand, change and discard the old that derives from the investment – profit – investment cycle.³⁴ Modernity requires that the consumer never be satisfied, that there always be something new on the purchasing horizon. Modernity is the antithesis of provincialism and the stability and continuity that is inherent in provincialism. The defining motifs of the early Post-War era, such as space travel that opened up the unlimited scope of the heavens for human exploration reinforced the concept of modernity. The need for unlimited consumption, ever changing, growing needs, and the focus on the individual were all integral concepts of the modern capitalist system.³⁵ The competition and freedom associated with choice were embodied in consumption and personal freedom was expressed through consumption. Modernity and mass consumption are not synonymous, but the connection between the introduction of new goods and technology and the idea of being modern can be found throughout history.³⁶ The anthropologist Daniel Miller has stated that 'consumption is the key means of creating culture in the urbanised and industrialised societies of the modern world.'³⁷ It seems improbable that Soviet modernity could have existed without attaching some significant importance to consumption.

³⁴ Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990) 11.

³⁵ For more information on the logic of industrialism see Clark Kerr, John T. Dunlop et al., *Industrialism and Industrial Man: The Problems of Labour and Management in Economic Growth* (London: Heinemann, 1962).

³⁶ Daniel Miller, *Modernity: An Ethnographic Approach* (Oxford: Berg, 1994) 203.

³⁷ See Daniel Miller, *Material Culture and Mass Consumption* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987).

Several researchers from Resnick to Verdery have noted that the unlimited nature of modernity was an anathema to the Soviet state. Khrushchev's statements about consumption are indicative that he believed not in the concept of modernisation (unlimited consumption) but in industrialisation and the concept of limited consumption.³⁸ For example, in 1959 he stated that '[a] person cannot, for instance, consume more bread and other foods than his organism needs. There are also definite limits to the amounts of clothing and housing that can be used.'³⁹ Soviet modernity was to be distinguished by the notion of controlled consumption. Also known as 'goulash socialism', or 'a different kind of consumer society' the Communist Party attempted to redefine and to limit social expectations.⁴⁰ One of the key aspects of this contract was the provision of 'all life's comforts', a then ubiquitous term that is contradictory in principle to controlled consumption. During the 1990s sociologists and historians such as Susan Strasser and Matthias Judt embarked upon research into Post War consumer history comparing Europe, America and the former Soviet Union and addressing such issues as the relationship between consumerism and politics, the role of the state in consumption, the role of consumption in Cold War Politics, and the language of consumption in various social, political and cultural groups.⁴¹ In Art Historian Susan Reid's recent works consumer durables and goods are used to illuminate the solidification of the idea of the consumer and consumption through her argument that the 'main economic task' was to demonstrate the superiority of the socialist system over the capitalist system.⁴² Perhaps the most important contribution that Verdery has made to date in terms of this research is the notion that as there is no constraint due to exploitation, the very process of socialist economic development fosters aspirational deprivation and a fixation on consumption. Verdery has argued that:

the regimes themselves paradoxically abetted the emphasis on consumption.

³⁸ See Verdery, What Was Socialism and What Comes Next?; or Resnick, Class Theory and History: Capitalism and Communism in the USSR.

³⁹ Nikita. S. Khrushchev, Pravda (02.10.1959) 2-3.

⁴⁰ Both terms were widely used.

⁴¹ See for example, Susan Strasser, Charles McGovern and Matthias Judt eds. Getting and Spending: European and American Consumer Societies in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

⁴² David Crowley and Susan E. Reid, 'Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-War Eastern Europe,' in Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-War Eastern Europe Eds., David Crowley and Susan E. Reid (Oxford: Berg, 2000) 1-24: 9.

First, organised shortage made procuring something – anything – a major triumph. Second, even as the regimes prevented people from consuming by not making goods available, they insisted that under socialism the standard of living would constantly improve... Socialism...aroused desire without focusing it, and kept it alive by deprivation. That is, in socialism desire floated free in endless search of goods people saw as their right... The arousal and frustration of consumer desire and East Europeans' consequent resistance to their regimes led them to build their social identities specifically through consuming.⁴³

One of the basic tenets that will be forwarded in this research is that within the USSR, the idea of consumption was consumed more readily than the ever-scarce goods. One sociologist whose work is not confined to the post 1990s is Vladimir Shlapentokh. Trained as a sociologist in the Soviet Union, and one of a small group of sociologists who conducted surveys in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev, Shlapentokh's work spans from the Khrushchev era to the present and provides numerous studies on Soviet society.⁴⁴

In conjunction with the developments in the research of consumption in the USSR was an increased interest into the uses of culture during the Cold War. J. D. Parks, Walter Hixson, Frances Stonor Saunders, Stephen Whitfield and in a less direct manner Richard Stites, have all published works dealing with the politics of cultural contact.⁴⁵ These works share the central theme that cultural and to the extent that economic contact could be cultural, economic contact served as the Trojan horses of the Cold War. Each of these works challenged the idea of a cultural iron curtain and put forward the concept of culture as a medium that is interconnected with other mediums such as economics or technology. Of the above-mentioned historians, only Parks published his groundbreaking work in the 1980s. Without exception, the above-mentioned historians acknowledged that these connections were recognised and often deliberately manipulated during the 1950s and 1960s. The argument that western failure to recognise the importance of Western economic standards in the construction of the mass perception of the Soviet

⁴³ Verdery, *What Was Socialism and What Comes Next?* 25-26.

⁴⁴ For example see Vladimir Shlapentokh, 'The Changeable Soviet Image of America'; *Soviet Intellectuals and Political Power: the Post-Stalin Era* (London: I. B. Tauris and Co., 1990) and *Soviet Public Opinion*.

⁴⁵ See for example Walter Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War: 1945-1961* (Houndmills: Macmillan press, 1998); Frances Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (London: Granta Books, 2000); Stephen Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); and Richard Stites, *Russian popular culture: Entertainment and society since 1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

future resulted in the West failing to appropriately target a critical aspect of the Cold War has been forwarded by historians such as Walter Hixson. Hixson has written that the Americans in particular, far more concerned with military preparations and closed-door politics, failed to respond accordingly and as such squandered energy and resources on a conventional war programme for a Cold War that was at its essence a struggle for the loyalty, the hearts and minds, of individuals.⁴⁶

The aforementioned Vladimir Shlapentokh has written that the contradiction of images of the West translated into a contrary perception: 'it is remarkable that even the most committed haters of the West and especially of America among Russophiles are convinced of the absolute scientific and technological superiority of the United States.'⁴⁷ A Khrushchev contemporary E. S. Varga displayed this contradictory nature in his published speech 'Capitalism of Our Day' in which he lamented the increases in capitalist output (five times since the turn of the century), and declared that the capitalist world had all the technology needed to free the world from 'hunger, poverty and fear of the future' if it was inclined to do so.⁴⁸ This is in contrast to declarations of the maximisation of Soviet capacity that was resulting in the 20th century being a 'century of Marxist Leninist victories'.⁴⁹ Dina Khapaeva has written that the belief in a higher foreign standard of living was to remain a consistent aspect of Soviet social perceptions, arguing that Western influence increased dramatically in the 1950s, reaching its zenith between 1989-1993. Furthering her argument on the impact of images of the West, Khapaeva has argued that the ideal image of the West continues to coincide with the desired future.⁵⁰ Historian Martin Malia has defined two periods in Russian history where international forces were at their most significant in Russia. The first was from the accession of Peter the Great until 1815, and the second was from the battle of Stalingrad in 1943 until the 1980s. During both periods, the state attempted to counterbalance the relative poverty of Russia by importing high levels of external

⁴⁶ Hixson, *Parting the Curtain* 232-233.

⁴⁷ Shlapentokh, 'The Changeable Soviet Image of America,' 163.

⁴⁸ E. S. Varga, 'An Analysis of the Evolution and Trends of Capitalism,' *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* vol.12 no.4 (1960) 3-9, 5.

⁴⁹ Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Za novye pobedy mirovogo kommunisticheskogo dvizheniia* (Moskva: Gospolitizdat, 1961) 6.

⁵⁰ Dina Khapaeva, 'L'Occident Sera Demain,' *Annales HSS* November-December no.6 (1995) 1259-1270, 1268.

technological and scientific knowledge.⁵¹

In her study of 1930s *Vechniaia Moskva*, Sheila Fitzpatrick coined the phrase 'life as it was becoming' to refer to the phenomena of illuminating the utopian and bountiful future.⁵² Images of this future were often based on the reality of other countries. In Christine Varga-Harris' examination of World War II and Post-War articles in *Vechniaia Moskva*, she noted that a prominent theme was 'living in peace and contentment' and that Muscovites were to interpret the right to peace and contentment as the right to 'decent housing, high quality inexpensive consumer goods, and adequate and respectful service... demands were made in the language used by the state and Party, and justified in the very terms used by the authorities.'⁵³ Soviet failure to meet these demands and its failure to maintain the belief that the communist system was capable of providing a socially acceptable level of consumerism resulted in a situation where the society accepted modernisation and consumerism as the most favourable objective but was devoid of the belief that the Soviet system was best able to achieve this. Instead of motivating citizens, the positive information about the West provided them with an alternative means of achieving their economic objectives.

Consumption is the act of an individual, and its social prominence increases in relation to the empowerment of the individual. Two works on the historical impact of consumption in Europe in which the ideas of national identity and Americanisation/globalisation during the 1950s and 1960s are present and that speak to the international aspect of the phenomena of adopting a mythical other are the works of Reinhold Wagnleitner in his work on American consumer culture in Post War Austria and Erica Carter's study of the role that West German women played by internalising consumption and melding it into an essential aspect of the new West German identity.⁵⁴ Both these studies attest to the creation of an image of the industrial, modern, and technologically advanced abroad that was to play a role in

51 Martin Malia, Russia Under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mausoleum (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1990) 415.

52 Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 223-224.

53 Christine Varga-Harris, 'Green is the Colour of Hope?: The crumbling façade of Postwar byt through the public eyes of *Vechniaia Moskva*,' Canadian Journal of History, Vol. 34 (August 1999) 193-219, 217.

54 See Erica Carter, How German is She? (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997); Reinhold Wagnleitner, Cocacolonization and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994).

the national understanding of self. Along the same lines, Elena Zubkova has argued that through the struggles of the Great Patriotic War there was the creation and an intensification of civic spirit, responsibility and self worth that was to contribute to the creation of the Soviet consumer.⁵⁵ Elena Zubkova was not the only researcher to argue that WWII lent itself to the alteration of the self perception of Soviet society, Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Paul Goldberg have argued that as from the masses a collection of citizens arose; a ‘collective’ of faceless people could not have won the war...they acted as citizens.’⁵⁶

Shifting from West Germany and Austria to East Germany and placing economic and technological systems and artefacts within a social, cultural and political context are the works of, for example, Raymond G. Stokes, André Steiner, and Ina Merkel. In *Constructing Socialism*, Stokes examines the communist inability in East Germany to join the high-powered post war German technology with Soviet ‘dedication’ to technological development to produce internationally credible and competitive results.⁵⁷ In his edited work *Überholen ohne einzuholen: Die DDR- Wirtschaft als Fußnote der deutschen Geschichte?* Steiner gives attention to a main challenge of the Socialist system: how to realise the smallest of changes in such a manner as to neither call into question the credibility and viability of the whole or to act as the impetus for uncontrollable change.⁵⁸ Highly complex and theoretical discussions of ‘the social construction of technological systems’ can be found in the similarly named compilation of historical and sociological works. The main themes of this compilation include: the relationship between science and technology; the role of science and technology in broadening existing culture; the role of the artefact in culture and with various social groups (this idea is present in much of the sociological writing on consumption); the concept of the technological system as an evolutionary system that has adapted over time to most efficiently provide for a society and thus the inherent difficulty in consuming new technology and technological systems without modification; and technology as a social product

⁵⁵ Zubkova, *Russia after the War*: 11-19.

⁵⁶ Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Paul Goldberg, *The Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post Stalin Era* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1990), 28.

⁵⁷ Raymond G. Stokes, *Constructing Socialism: Technology and Change in East Germany, 1945-1990* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).

⁵⁸ André Steiner, *Überholen ohne einzuholen: Die DDR-Wirtschaft als Fußnote der deutschen Geschichte?* (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2006).

that cannot be isolated from the economic, political and social milieu in which it is developing.⁵⁹ The idea that the Cold War shaped and was shaped by science and technology is particularly well articulated in these works. There is a striking pattern of confrontation and manipulation of consumption and images based around technology and economics common to the works on Austria, West and East Germany that speak to the Soviet myth building process being both unique to the Soviet Union and part of a larger international movement. A comparative study between Soviet bloc countries (East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary) in which calls to catch up with and overtake or, to overtake without catching up as was the slogan in East Germany, and Soviet Russia would provide for an interesting comparison in terms of what images were introduced, why they were introduced, and what role they performed in the shaping of a national vision of the future. One of the aspects that makes the comparison interesting was the Moscow habit of projecting some nations, such as Czechoslovakia, simultaneously as an obtainable periphery of the mythical other and a key part of the Soviet bloc, while the nations themselves were purporting to a similar duality for entirely different purposes falls outside the delineations of this study.

Required reading for historians studying the relationship between technology and Soviet authority are the numerous works by Paul R. Josephson, Alexander Vucinich, David Holloway and Loren Graham in which the discussion of science and technology as objective truth about nature (scientific realism) and science as a product of socio-economic and political forces (social constructivism) is examined.⁶⁰ Graham has argued that despite science serving as a protective enclave

⁵⁹ Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor Pinch eds, The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).

⁶⁰ See for example Paul R. Josephson, Totalitarian Science and Technology, (New York: Humanity Books, 2005); New Atlantis Revisited: Akademgorodok, the Siberian City of Science, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Paul R. Josephson, 'Projects of the Century, Soviet History: Large Scale Technologies from Lenin to Gorbachev,' Technology and Culture Vol.36, No.3 (July 1995), 519-59; Alexander Vucinich, Empire of Knowledge: The Academy of Sciences of the USSR (1917-1970), (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); David Holloway, 'Physics, the State, and Civil Society in the Soviet Union,' Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, Vol.30, 1 (1999), 173-92; and Loren R. Graham, What Have We Learned About Science and Technology from the Russian Experience?, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). In the case of Totalitarian Science and Technology, the first edition is of more use to the student of Soviet history than the second as in the second the totalitarian systems is expanded from the original Soviet and Nazi study to include North Korean and Cuban studies.

against the politics of the Soviet Union, the dependence of scientific and technological development on the Soviet government resulted in the procuring of funding to be more important than autonomy. Vucinich has looked at the campaigns and public discourse in which intellectuals were attacked for ideas of idealism, formalism, cosmopolitanism, and kowtowing before the West, and concluded that intellectual freedom in the field of science and technology was subjugated to ideology.⁶¹ The argument that science and technology were relatively independent of politics was also posited by David Holloway who sees a range of intellectual independence with the ultimate being conferred upon the closed defence laboratories. Two historians who have argued that a symbiotic relationship existed include Mark Adams with his argument of a flexible, continuous form of negotiation between Party and scientists, and Nikolai Krementsov with his theory of 'cultural unification' in the shared public rituals, didactics, and institutional structures.⁶² Josephson steps outside of the argument about the essentially democratic and confrontational nature of science and technology and calls for the objective examination of governmental impacts on science and scientific policy as science and to this end also technology, was a tool with which to transform not only nature but society, politics, and culture. 'Authoritarian regimes use film, radio, and print media to shape and direct citizens' beliefs no less than housing, public transportation systems, and monuments.'⁶³ Another important theme for Josephson is how authoritarian regimes seek to implement rapid industrialisation/modernisation in economics in which resource allocation is top down and not bottom up. In *Technology and Communist Culture: The Socio-Cultural Impact of Technology under Socialism* edited by Frederic Fleron, technology is examined in its role of ensuring the Soviet regime's ability to deliver, and the conclusion is drawn that any failure to provide would contribute to a

⁶¹ Vucinich, Empire of Knowledge: The Academy of Sciences of the USSR (1917-1970) chapter four.

⁶² See Mark B. Adams, 'Science, Ideology and Structure: The Kol'tsov Institute, 1900-1970,' in Linda L. Lubrano and Susan Gross Solomon eds., The Social Context of Soviet Science (Boulder, Westview Press, 1980) 173-204 and Nikolai Krementsov, Stalinist Science (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 6.

⁶³ Josephson, Totalitarian Science and Technology 15.

reduction in the regime's legitimacy.⁶⁴ This interplay between government and scientists and industry is also seen in the aforementioned works of Stokes and Steiner.

To be Western meant having a high standard of living, as represented by the newest consumer products. It meant mass-produced jeans, computers, radios, frozen and instant food products, polyester clothing, the biggest and fastest cars, and rock and roll. The crux of the matter for the Soviet Union became, could culture be separated from technology? Could technological development be separated from what is so quintessentially Western, the drive for consumer goods, and the faith in the system that provides for these developments?⁶⁵ Is the culture that has arisen in the West one which is formed by technology or does culture form technology? If technology and culture are inseparable, then the importation of Western technology into the Soviet Union had the potential to introduce non-socialist societal and cultural change. Technology and industrialisation were integral aspects of Soviet ideology. Technology is also an integral aspect of democratic capitalism. Did this common denominator provide a basis for comparison? Culture and technology are the objects that display economic and political power. Penelope Harvey has argued that the inclusion of technology extends further back into Western society than the consumerism of American society that became so dominant in the 1950s. She notes that Western liberal tradition is founded on the idea of a 'modernity that was built upon the idea of progress through the scientific establishment' and the creation of the 'domains of cultural homogeneity and continuity' which one can trace back to 19th Century Britain and Europe.⁶⁶ Frederic Fleron has explained the link between technology and culture stating that '[a]s an artefact of human experience, technology must be viewed as an element of culture. The process of technical transfer, can be viewed as an aspect of the more general process of cultural diffusion.'⁶⁷ During the 1990s, Hilary Pilkington defined the Soviet concept of culture as 'not simply the

⁶⁴ Frederick Fleron, 'Introduction,' Frederick Fleron ed., Technology and Communist Culture: The Socio-Cultural Impact of Technology under Socialism (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977).

⁶⁵ See Carter, How German is She?, Wagnleitner, Cocacolonization and the Cold War; Mary Louise Roberts, 'Gender, Consumption, and Commodity Culture,' The American Historical Review vol. 103 issue 3 (1998), 817-844.

⁶⁶ Penelope Harvey, Hybrids of Modernity: Anthropology, the Nation State, and the Universal exhibition (London: Routledge, 1996), 99.

⁶⁷ Fleron, 'Introduction,' 11.

product of the interaction between people and nature [the artefacts of everyday life] nor the treasure trove of that which is valued by society of the day, it was rather the sphere of the living interaction of society and its subjects.’⁶⁸ As a phenomenon of man’s existence, technology is a part of Soviet culture and society. Parks’ study of cultural relations has revealed that it was only in rare circumstances of extreme political conflict that Cold War cultural connections were suspended *en masse*.⁶⁹ Even in nations that have rejected liberal democratic forms of government, industrialisation and modernisation have occurred through the incorporation of capitalist practices and have resulted in notable levels of Westernisation. Writing about the inherent contradictions in the Soviet leadership’s attempts to integrate capitalism into the Socialist system, Alex Nove questioned: ‘[c]an one have state capitalism and no capitalists?’⁷⁰ Daniel Miller contends that popular culture, more accurately termed the culture of consumption, is the logical and most dominant cultural form for contemporary industrial culture.⁷¹ The mass consumerism of Western society is dependent on the mass production of goods, which ultimately only occurs with the necessary technological advances. Despite what the objectives of the Soviet government may have been, the reality was that the policies it instituted resulted in a society that, while socialist in name, behaved similarly to a culture of consumption. The social implications of this were magnified by the state’s inability to satisfy the population. Building on the established research that concepts of consumption were part of Soviet culture and that an image of the other existed, historians now have the opportunity to further the discussion through concrete examples. This has been facilitated by the opening up of archives and Russian society. Significant contributors to this body of research on material culture in the former USSR are David Crowley, Susan Reid, Larissa Zahkarova, Eleonory Gilburd, Heino Nyysönen, and Anne Kropotkine whose works on consumption present tangible arguments with a degree of normalcy.⁷²

⁶⁸ Hilary Pilkington, Russia’s Youth and its Culture: a Nation’s Constructors and Constructed (London, Routledge, 1994) 51.

⁶⁹ Parks, Conflict and Co-existence, 1.

⁷⁰ Alec Nove, Political Economy and Soviet Socialism (London: George, Allen and Unwin, 1979) 207.

⁷¹ Miller, Mass Culture and Mass Consumption, 11.

⁷² While all of the above have numerous publications the latter four come together in a special edition ‘Repenser le Dégel: versions du socialisme, influences internationales et société soviétique’ Cahiers du MONDE RUSSE January to June 2006. 47/1-2.

The historiography of this work is similar in composition to the work itself. Both draw on divergent sources that overlap and resonate to form a whole. In order to address the topic of this thesis, the research draws on the above fields of research (historical discussions written during the 1950s and 1960s, sociological, anthropological and historiographical research into consumption, technology, society and the state) to highlight how economic and technological images of the West acted as links between concepts of consumption, the mythical other and communism in the Post-War era. Having reviewed the main fields of research that provide the bases of secondary research and the theoretical underpinnings for this study, the focus will now turn to a discussion of methodology.

Methodology

Due to the diverse primary sources used in this work, a discussion of the methodology is warranted. The four main pillars of primary source work are: published Soviet literature (for example newspapers, magazines, collections of official speeches), published non-Soviet literature (for example travel memoirs), unpublished official information (primarily archival documents) and unpublished unofficial experiences and opinions (questionnaires and interviews). Of the four pillars, only the later was created largely *post factum*. This is due to the then limited research possibilities to gather information on 'average' Soviet opinions during the Khrushchev era. This is not to say that there were no attempts, the *Komsomol'skaia Pravda's* institute for public opinion conducted numerous surveys and sociologists began active field research during this period, but it is not until the collapse of the Soviet system that opinions could be voiced without fear of official reprisal. Taken together, the four pillars serve to provide a combination of official and non-official sources as well as Soviet and Western perceptions with each checking the other against historical revisionism. Each of the four main pillars was selected in order to address a particular aspect of the main research question. Published Soviet literature provides an insight into mass produced information that Soviet citizens could access, the banal everyday news sources about the West. The published non-Soviet literature provides a foreigner's opinion, thus an opinion that had the advantage of being outside the system and that could be expressed during the era. It also provides a foil between then contemporary Western and Soviet society through the topics

upon which Westerners chose to comment. The archives provide information on the phenomenon of the social dissemination of the image of the West and examines if the idea of the West as part of the Soviet future was entrenched in the opinions of those individuals who were to be leading the nation down the path to communism. The final pillar consists of unpublished, unofficial information and allows for the circuit of the government, government propagated and tolerated information about the West, and individuals to be completed. For it was citizens that were to consume the images and build the Soviet future. In the case of the AVTOVAZ project, this group of individuals was chosen as they worked both in a field that incorporated foreign technology and they produced a product that spoke to the consumerism of the times (the passenger car). Each of the four pillars will now be dealt with separately and with particular attention being given to the fourth pillar.

The first pillar, consisting of published works in the Soviet Union, includes newspapers, women's magazines, trade journals, foreign journals published in the Soviet Union (for example the British publication *Angliia*), and government statements. These documents were analysed with respect to positive references about the West with a focus on science and technology and consumption. A specific filter was the incorporation of English words. A sub-category of analysis was the examination of images that accompanied articles and speeches. The term image is used as articles were often accompanied by graphs, diagrams, cartoons, or photos that contained clear and direct messages. The particular cross section of printed materials was chosen in order to provide a range of styles, interests and readership. The main printed materials examined are: *Angliia*, *Vecherniaia Moskva*, *Moskovskaia pravda*, *Rabotnitsa*, *Volzhskii avtostroitel'* and *Vneshniaia torgovlia*. Thus, providing coverage from a women's magazine, to one of the capital's newspapers, to a provincial paper, to two elite orientated journals. The uniformity of the image that was presented in these various sources speaks to the relatively stable, uniform and widespread image of the mythical other. It also addresses the ubiquitous nature of the concept of consumption in the Communist system. These sources are supplemented by official speeches, thereby including the Soviet leadership in the ubiquitous images of consumption and the mythical other.

In addition to the information found in mass published literature in the Soviet Union, materials published outside of the Soviet Union predominantly but

not exclusively by Westerners were studied. The dominant form of this material was the travel memoir written by Western students, academics, reporters and businessmen. These sources provide a check on contemporary Soviet sources, as they were without the filter of Soviet censorship. They gauge personal reactions of Soviets to Westerners and Western goods as seen through Western eyes. They serve as an independent source of evidence of Western penetration and chart the introduction of ideas and images. The existence of these works in themselves, is a testimony to the issue of contact and openness. Finally, the works provide not only first hand accounts of the Soviet Union during the 1950s and 1960s but conclusions on developments. The conclusions drawn by contemporaries of Khrushchev must be accepted as opinions and should not be used as a basis upon which to form new conclusions. However, the first hand reports contained within the works were examined as primary sources upon which interpretations could be founded. The focus of these works on consumption, consumerism and perceptions of the West, affirms that current interest in the field of consumer communists and the mythical builds upon an aspect of Soviet history that previously could not be thoroughly addressed.

Perhaps the most straightforward of the four pillars from a methodological standpoint is the third pillar, archival information. The documents came primarily but not exclusively from the *Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki (RGAE)* and *Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii (RGANI)*. While much of the information found in RGAE can be found in RGANI and other archives, RGAE was preferred due to the comparatively high level of access. This can be attributed to the information at RGAE being classified as economic and not political. Indeed, numerous files that were listed as classified in RGANI were unclassified in RGAE. Archival information was used to determine the penetration of the myth of the technological and economic superiority of the West into the Soviet elite and the extent of industrial contact. The former was assessed in essence to help determine if the stewards of communism were still faithful. Documents were analysed with specific attention to the structure of reports, both general scientific and technology reports as well as exhibition reports tended to begin with an assessment of Western developments and then a comparison of Western developments with the Soviet Union, and to the depth and breadth of industrial contact. Documents specifically

on exhibitions were examined with particular attention being paid to the nature of participation and the evaluation section regarding Western participation and Soviet official and nonofficial reactions. The 'cultural' aspects of the exhibitions (for example art exhibitions) were not analysed. The final pillar, unpublished Soviet opinions will now be discussed.

Qualitative research is often legitimised by stating that only through this form of research can certain individuals, groups and sensitive issues be included in historical knowledge and as such is often conducted when working with a group or perspective that has been excluded previously from academic history. Thompson has stated that "[h]istory, in short, is not just about events or structures, or patterns of behaviour, but also about how these are experienced and remembered in the imagination."⁷³ Life histories are used to forward an argument, and not to state a fact. Two areas of strength for oral history are in events that were of such a magnitude as to be impressed upon the individual memory and on repetitive habitual actions.⁷⁴ Contact with the West can fall into either of the two categories, thus making surveys and interviews suitable research methods. Due to the nature of the Cold War and the Soviet political system, the open discussion of the lives and perceptions of Soviet citizens has traditionally been excluded from Western and Soviet historiography. In this thesis, the works of a life history research project conducted in St. Petersburg and a questionnaire/interview project of initial workers at AVTOVAZ have been included.⁷⁵ The overriding research questions driving the surveys and interviews were: what were the perceptions of standard of living, was there contact with the West, what was the nature of this contact, and how was this contact seen? Like all forms of research, life stories, interviews and questionnaires contain inherent strengths and weaknesses and the objective must be to accept the limits and to recognise that the inverse of the limitations is often the attributes. While the complexity of human nature and memory pose specific challenges to the writing of history they must, with all of their idiosyncrasies, be preserved. Paul Thompson has referred to these idiosyncrasies as the 'original multiplicity of

⁷³ Paul Thompson, *The Voice of the Past: Oral History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 3rd Ed. 162.

⁷⁴ Anthony Sheldon and Joanna Pappworth, *By Word of Mouth: Elite Oral History* (London: Methuen, 1983) 17.

⁷⁵ See Appendix A for a translation of the questions found in the questionnaire.

standpoints” that enrich history and maintain its humanness.⁷⁶ As Sheldon has written, in “talking to those who participated in events, the historian is less likely to make simplistic judgements and understanding is broadened to accommodate the underlying factors that caused individuals to behave in a certain way.”⁷⁷ According to recent research into the nature of memory, the retelling of life history tends to become more reliable after a prolonged period over which the mind becomes more detached and better able to reconstruct events. Memories become “clearer and also franker. Deliberate misinformation about the past is very rare.”⁷⁸ One reason for this is that compliance with political and social constraints decrease with age. While the later of the two studies is more important for this study, both will be discussed, as they are methodologically similar.

In terms of format both surveys were two pages long and consisted only of open-ended questions about personal experiences and opinions, for example during the creation of AVTOVAZ, contact with foreigners and opinions about the production of *Ladas* (see Appendix A for a list of the questions). An initial description of who the researcher was and the academic purpose of the research was given along with the option that respondents did not need to provide their names in the personal section that included (name, date of birth, place of birth, profession, and Party status). At the end of the questionnaire were contact details for those who were willing to consent to an interview. In the 1997 St. Petersburg project, most of the interviewees completed surveys, while in the VAZ project there was little overlap, with potential respondents asking if they could participate in an interview instead of filling in a survey. All respondents were assured anonymity, and with the exception of only a few respondents, names were provided. An issue with anonymity arose as academics and higher-ranking Party members requested that their proper names be used. In search of a compromise, all questionnaires have been made anonymous and in those interviews in which the individual felt interviewed in their professional capacity actual names have been used.

Initial contact was conducted through a three-pronged approach, students who contacted family members, interviews with (former) officials, and through

⁷⁶ Thompson, *The Voice of the Past: Oral History* 6.

⁷² Sheldon *By Word of Mouth: Elite Oral History* 51-52.

⁷⁸ Thompson, *The Voice of the Past* 131.

personal connections. In all three instances further referrals were made. There was some triangulating of interviewees, which permitted a limited amount of cross-referencing. The issue of representativity is tertiary as the research addresses the issue of cultural penetration but does not attempt to measure the degree of penetration. The question is, was there an image, what did it look like, and what effect did it have. To use the words of Hilary Pilkington, respondents were not chosen "in order to obtain a 'representative' assortment of socio-democratic characteristics but these were examined *post factum*."⁷⁹ The criteria for the St Petersburg life history project was that the individuals were born before or during the Russian Revolution and for the VAZ survey that the individuals were present from either the beginning of the construction of the city/factory, or from the beginning of production. In the VAZ project, of the 40 respondents 25 were male and 15 female. In total, 7 were members of the Communist Party. Those who responded to the questionnaires represent a broad section of workers at the factory from individuals who worked (work) on the assembly line, as well as in design, translation, engineering, and other sectors run by the factory but not part of production, for example doctors in the AVTOVAZ polyclinic. In addition to the questionnaires, interviews were conducted either as a supplement to, or instead of, the written questionnaires. Interviews were conducted as life stories with specific questions elaborating on the 1950s –1960s.

Long answer questionnaires and life histories are highly personal forms of history.⁸⁰ Each individual will have different views, different emphases, and different recollections. The life of one individual cannot be held as an absolute or definitive interpretation of an era. It is however the micro level of history in which

⁷⁹ Hilary Pilkington, *Migration, Displacement and Identity in Post-Soviet Russia* (London: Routledge, 1998) 110.

⁸⁰ The role of the researcher is pertinent to any analysis of the methodology of life stories/interviews. As with any role, the researcher had multiple characteristics that labelled her as simultaneously being both an insider (gender, education, religion) and an outsider (age, nationality). The insider relationship is potentially restrictive as it tends towards the danger of social conformity while offering a broad base for commonality and understanding. Being an outsider often facilitated the prompting for further explanations and prevented the respondent from being able to simply state that it was understood or, 'you know'. Taking the role of insider/outsider into consideration, it is a mistake in the current era of increasingly recognised social and cultural distinctiveness and with the rise in local culture, to overlook the overarching umbrella of humanity. This is not a romantic thesis of universal brotherhood or solidarity. Most people, regardless of gender, race, or nationality enjoy the attention afforded to them when talking about themselves.

the human element is best maintained. As much as history is the mass sum of individual lives in various eras, movements, and events, at its most human level, it is the lives of individuals. The four research pillars used in this thesis are an attempt to provide a history that addresses the challenges put forth to the historian.

Chapter Breakdown

This research has been divided into five chapters. The purpose of each chapter is to both forward the overall study of the technological and economic image of the West in the Soviet future, as well as to provide a detailed study of an aspect of this image formation and reception. Each chapter can stand alone as a representation of a time in Soviet history when the state either permitted or propagated a positive economic image of the West. Although such sources as newspapers, speeches, and interviews are used throughout this work, each chapter has a main medium and thematic focus. For example, the first two chapters focus heavily on published memoirs and speeches while the third and fourth focus on official archival documents and media reports. The variety of sources and subjects (for example exhibitions or the AVTOVAZ factory) when taken together, show the pervasiveness and the normalcy of positive economic and technological images of the West. The term West is taken to include Western Europe and North America (excluding Mexico). The major Western powers represented in the study are France, Great Britain, Italy, and the United States of America, with mention made of other nations. Three countries notable by their relative absence in this study are West Germany, Finland, and Japan, all of which were significant trading partners, and fall outside of the parameters of this study due to their Post-War political status. In addition, the image of West Germany was often filtered through East Germany. Japan was shuffled between Western and Eastern status by Soviet officials and the Soviet public. For example, the culture was eastern but the imported Japanese machine lines were western. All three merit further study, but the study scope is sufficiently different as to fall outside the scope of this work.

While the governments of the Khrushchev and early Brezhnev era did not seek to foster the political or economic system of Western Europe and North America, they were intent on imitating and overtaking them in the provision of the highest standard of social programmes together with of an equitable distribution of wealth.

This focus on the provision of material comfort was communicated through numerous mediums, for example, press releases, speeches by the leadership, exhibitions, film and literature, and scientific and industrial contact, turnkey factories, and expertise imports. In this introductory chapter 'The Provision of All Life's Comforts,' the implications of the participation by the Soviet leadership in the idea of consumption, albeit controlled, and the effect this was to have on the relationship between that leadership and general population is discussed. This discussion serves as the basis for the subsequent chapters. From this introduction, the study proceeds to the next five chapters in which various information entry points and sources as well as Soviet reactions are used to further discussion of the aforementioned research questions.

In 'Society and Catching Up With the West' the relationship between government declarations and changes in the Post-War Soviet society in respect to rising expectations is examined. This chapter addresses the subsidiary questions: How was the Soviet Union defining itself in economic and technological terms post WWII? and Who participated in the building of the mythical other and why? An important aspect of the relationship of rising expectations and the creation of the comrade consumer is the increased emphasis on external contemporary comparison as opposed to internal historical comparison. Also addressed is the fact that positive information was not exclusively Western propaganda tolerated by Soviet officials, but Soviet generated propaganda. This chapter is followed by 'Conceptualising Communist Consumption' in which specific examples, drawn from the automotive, clothing and housing sectors, are used to further the case made in 'Society and Catching Up With the West.' The third chapter 'Exhibiting Alternatives,' moves away from the official Soviet construction of future material comfort and focuses on the images of wealth that the Western nations were permitted to display through exhibitions and trade fairs. This chapter taken with 'Image Conduits' and 'Driving Towards Communist Consumerism: AVTOVAZ' address both the question of: What were the economic and technical images of the West? and How was this image built and who adopted it?. It is in the chapter on exhibitions that the myth of an iron curtain shrouding the Soviet Union is most significantly challenged. Foreign exhibitions and trade fairs were massive breaches in ideological control and fraught with potential problems. Trade fairs and exhibitions had both cultural and

industrial components. The industrial aspect is focused upon in this study and one notable characteristic of the primary sources is a relative dearth of angst expressed over economic, technological and scientific contact in comparison with cultural aspects of Western contact.⁸¹ Building upon the technical and scientific contact, in 'Image Conduits' the exposure and sensitivity of Soviet elites (political, industrial and scientific) to the positive images are discussed. These elite groups were charged with reforming the Soviet economy and overtaking the West. The support of these groups was vital to Communist leaders. These were also the groups most exposed to images of the West. Their failure to maintain the pretence of Soviet superiority amongst themselves made the effectiveness of the Post-War social contract between the Soviet rulers and the masses dubious. This research combined with that of the first chapter ('Society and Catching Up With the West') and with the final chapter (Driving Towards Communist Consumerism: AVTOVAZ) puts forward the argument that the positive economic image of the West was pervasive: sources varied but the image itself was relatively constant. 'Driving Towards Communist Consumption: AVTOVAZ', is a study of highly publicised co-operation between Fiat and the Soviet Union and its roll of spearheading Soviet light passenger car industry. Tens of thousands of workers and specialists were involved directly, and few industries remained untouched by the 'project of the decade'. The AVTOVAZ factory is an example of officially sanctioned contact with Western ideas, individuals, and products. Together the chapters provide an opportunity to assess the historical significance of the economic image of the West, its reception, and the role it was to play in negotiating a social contract between the Communist rulers and the common citizen. Questions also arise as to the extent to which this image forms the foundation of the modern Russian image of the West and the extent to which the image contributed to the implosion of the Soviet Union.

⁸¹ For an example of the discussions concerning cultural imports see E. S. Afanas'eva ed., *Ideologicheskie komissii TsK KPSS 1958-1964: Dokumenty* (Moskva: Rosspen, 2000).

Conclusion

The future and the past are a nation's two reference points for myth building. The Soviet future was of paramount importance for the country. In a nation that had had a violent and bloody break with the Tsarist past, that was faced with the challenge of rewriting history, and that was enduring the hardships of mass social changes, it was often more advantageous to forget the cumbersome past and to focus on the utopian future of communism.⁸² After the death of Stalin in 1953, and the concerted efforts of the new Party leadership to denounce Stalinism and the cult of personality, the recent past was also problematic, thus further strengthening the need to focus on the future.⁸³ Defining the future is an ephemeral process that combines aspects of reality and fantasy and can be as simple as taking the technology of a massive computer and imagining that someday computers would be small and affordable enough to be present in every household. The Soviet Union maintained the Russian tradition of looking towards the West to define its objectives and perceptions of the future that it was building.

What was Soviet Russia's image of its future? Isaiah Berlin has written that: 'one of the most arresting characteristics of modern Russian culture is its acute self-consciousness. There has surely never been a society more deeply and exclusively preoccupied with itself, its own nature and destiny.'⁸⁴ Soviet Russia was not the first nation to struggle with the creation of a national identity. However, it was one of the few nations, certainly in terms of great powers, which consistently struggled to define itself. It failed to produce a common vision or ideal, similar to the American dream, the glory of the British Empire, or the aspirations of the French Republic.⁸⁵ Soviet Russia's image of itself was constructed primarily through external comparison. Its perceived place within the dominant political, cultural and social community was based on similarities with other dominant societies, namely

⁸² For an analysis of this issue through poster art see Klaus Waschik and Nina Baburina in Werben für die Utopie (Stuttgart: Edition Tertium, 2003).

⁸³ Bertram Silverman and Murray Yanowitch have argued that the need to minimise and even 'destroy' the past is a commonality between communism and free market liberalism. Bertram Silverman and Murray Yanowitch, New Rich, New Poor, New Russia: Winners and Losers on the Russian Road to Capitalism (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1999) 6.

⁸⁴ Isaiah Berlin, The Soviet Mind: Russian Culture Under Communism (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2004) 760. A similar idea is found in Isaiah Berlin 'The Silence in Russian Culture,' Foreign Affairs Vol.36 (1957) 1-24.

⁸⁵ Gerhard Simon, 'Zukunft aus der Vergangenheit: Elemente der Politischen Kultur in Russland,' Osteuropa 05 (1995): 455-482.

with the West. This comparative image allowed past and present Russia to assume a legitimised place in Western history and society. Frederick Barghoorn, who worked in the American embassy in Moscow, has attributed the Soviet 'inferiority complex' and sense of moral superiority to foreign capitalism to the 'developmental gap' between the USSR and the West.⁸⁶ Commenting on the image of the West, and in particular the USA, he wrote: 'during the war, this leading democracy [USA] had to be presented as an ally without arousing too much sympathy. Since the war, it has had to be presented as a rival without arousing too much fear.'⁸⁷ During the Thaw, it had to be presented as a competitor without arousing too much envy.

The Soviet Union was a superpower that defined itself in opposition to and in comparison with its ideological enemy. Both before and after the introduction of the concept of peaceful co-existence by Nikita Khrushchev, the tenets of communism involved the notion of political, social and economic supremacy through industrialisation, good government, and equality.⁸⁸ There were areas in which the Soviet society could integrate into the Western mores, and others, like ideology where they were diametrically opposed. The Soviet Union of the 1950s encompassed one sixth of the world's landmass, had an arable land territory equal to that of the United States and Canada combined, and had an abundance of natural resources. It was the first country to put a satellite into space in 1957, and the first to put a man into space in 1961. Khrushchev's prediction that the USSR would 'bury' the USA was widely reported. Indeed, as early as 1959, statements such as the oft repeated and quoted phrase 'in the next ten to fifteen years the USSR will draw ahead of the USA economically and become the country with the world's most powerful economy' were uttered with plausibility.⁸⁹

Soviet leaders were not in a position to create an antithetical self-image to the West, as there were sectors of the West that they sought to emulate. The result was an unconvincing combination of vilification and praise that permitted the rejection and condemnation of Western practices such as discrimination, poverty and war

⁸⁶ Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Détente and the Democratic Movement in the USSR* (New York: Macmillan, 1976) 39. see also his work: *The Cultural Offensive*.

⁸⁷ Frederick C. Barghoorn, *The Soviet Image of the United States, a Study in Distortion* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1950) xviii.

⁸⁸ Khrushchev was not the first Soviet leader to use the term 'peaceful co-existence'. There are examples of both Lenin and Stalin having used the term.

⁸⁹ Varga, 'An Analysis of the Evolution and Trends of Capitalism,' 50.

mongering; while accepting innovation, technology, and economic prowess. 'Soviet citizens were told that they were at the forefront in every sphere, they led the world, and yet disorienting glimpses on TV, and above all foreigners themselves, seemed like evidence that this might not be so.'⁹⁰ Present developments in Russian society do not constitute a reawakening of the issue of West versus East in the Russian identity. It is simply that the combination of the loss of superpower status, the loss of communism and the appeal for many of the economic image/reality of the West has resulted in a deluge. The pillars making being different from the West more palatable have crumbled, and Russia is experiencing the full effect of Westernisation/Americanisation.

The two defining aspects of the Thaw era were the changes in the Gulag system and the presence of the West in all strata of Soviet society. Western influences in the Soviet Union were ubiquitous and nebulous. If 'they' had access to Western music, fashion images, literature, films, and cars, who were the 'they'? How does one trace the dissemination of an image into Soviet society? This process can be described by the metaphor of a rock being dropped into a pond of water. The entry point, an exhibition, a turnkey factory, international travel, a film festival, literature, newspaper articles etc, can be documented. In many instances the initial impact is measurable, for example the number of individuals attending an exhibition or the number of factory workers involved. It is the subsequent ripples that become unclear: who then read or heard about events? What is clear is that these impacts were socially significant as a general concept of the West entered into Soviet culture. The widely held beliefs and perceptions about the West that survived the Soviet Union act as the tangible ripples in the sand on the shore. To further complicate the clarity of events, it was not a case of a rock being dropped in, the reverberations settling and then another one being added. These were scattered and prolific events. By analysing the entry points, the diffusion of information as far as can be measured, and the evident final social impact, the role of the image can be studied.

If culture was to be used as a substitute for ideology, and technology was a

⁹⁰ Caroline Humphrey, 'Creating a Culture of Disillusionment: Consumption in Moscow, a Chronicle of Changing Times' Daniel Miller ed., Worlds Apart: Modernity Through the Prism of the Local (London: Routledge, 1995) 55.

fundamental component of culture, then ideology was linked to technology. This was not a good prospect for the Soviet Union, a superpower, founded on ideology and lagging in technology: especially in an era when a nation's potential and its place in the international hierarchy was based largely on technological progress and possibilities.⁹¹ Failure or perceived failure, in the areas of technology, science and standard of living was destabilizing and de-legitimising both domestically and internationally. What was of prime importance to the *nomenklatura* within the Soviet Union was whether it was possible to have technical transfer without the cultural diffusion. If this was not possible, what were the ramifications? The greatest cost was that the cultural diffusion would be residual in nature and that the compound effect on society of technological importations would eventually be greater than the compound effect of the teachings of socialism. To this end, the Party needed to distinguish between universal technology, which involved the importation of homogenous world culture, and that which was 'contingent on Western culture and the specific requirements of the capitalist system.'⁹²

The derisive image of the West and Westerners as intellectually shallow, materialistically driven and morally corrupt was not coupled initially with a dismissal of the inherent desirability of modernisation or consumerism. Under Khrushchev there was some faith that a comrade consumer could be created. However, consumption could not be allowed to replace ideology nor could it be effectively used as a replacement for terror.⁹³ By the end of the Brezhnev era it was generally accepted that the Soviet Union was unable to close the technological and scientific gap with the mythical other of the West. This loss of faith can be cited as a major contributing factor to the rise of anti-Americanism. If the launching of Sputnik represented the zenith of Soviet optimism in the future, and a correlating positive image of the US, then the landing of the first man on the moon by the Americans in 1969 marked the beginning of the descent. The economic image of the West defined the gravitational centre that served as the abstract definition of one

⁹¹ Harvey, *Hybrids of Modernity* 126.

⁹² Andrew Feenberg, 'Transition or Convergence: Communism and the Paradox of Development', in Frederic Fleron ed., *Technology and Communist Culture* 73.

⁹³ *Les Fluctuations Économiques en URSS 1941-1985* (Paris: Éditions de l'École des Hautes Études en Science Sociales, 1989).

of the most highly valued parts of the Soviet future. The central challenge for the regime was how to Thaw without melting away.

1: The Party, Society and Catching up and Overtaking

Introduction

This research proposes that during the post-Stalin era a type of consumer society with ties to images of the West was formed. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the social and political background that contributed to the creation of the comrade consumer. To do this, changes within Soviet society in respect to empowerment, rising expectations, and government declarations sign posting the path of expectations have been examined. These changes in Soviet society occur within the context of a society with a generation maturing without terror, war, or famine. The Soviet people were no longer the people of a struggling nation but of a superpower. Socialism in one country had not resulted in complete isolation, but political, economic and cultural contact had been kept to a minimum on the governmental level and severely restricted on the personal level. After decades of an official policy of looking inwards the emphasis turned outwards. Internal historical comparisons would have had the advantage of being more controllable, as history can always be rewritten to be more sympathetic to current and future successes and goals, but Khrushchev needed the West to form his socialism.

In this chapter and the following one 'Commenting on Communist Consumption' the ideas of the glorious Soviet future and of comparison with the West are traced. The ideas of catching up, of comparison, and of the contradictions of Soviet life in many of those very areas of consumerism that the Soviet Union declared to be priorities are focused upon. Under the Soviet government, norms were set for what was reasonable in terms of food consumption, square metres of living space, footwear etc and the government then pledged to meet these norms. Khrushchev himself was to publicly declare that if capitalism proved better at providing an equitable non-excessive free standard of living, he would convert. In response to Senator William Fulbright's direct question as to 'what Khrushchev would do if it was proven that the capitalist system was able to prove better for more people?' Khrushchev answered that "if history were to confirm that the capitalist system really offers the best opportunities of developing the productive forces of society and of providing a better life for man – and we don't believe that a kopek's

worth – I would be the first to vote against communism.’⁹⁴ In private, Khrushchev was to write that if ‘capitalism satisfies these requirements [consumer/standard of living] better than socialism it will be increasingly difficult for us to propagate our point of view and consolidate our way of life.’⁹⁵ This concept of failure was part of a larger phenomenon: the introduction of the idea of institutional and personal fallibility.

The impact of the demographic and social changes, with a focus on how this affected the concept of consumption are examined in this chapter, which is divided into three main sections of where society was, where it wanted to go and where the state was guiding society. The main research objective is addressed in this chapter by looking at how Soviet society saw itself and its future as well as by looking at how the Soviet regime was defining the economic and technological future vis-à-vis the West. The primary source materials for this chapter include memoirs, speeches, newspaper articles, popular anecdotes and the St. Petersburg questionnaires.

Where Soviet society was coming from

Under Stalin, there was a sense of the infallibility of the leader. Stalin was a man-god who understood all, knew all, and acted accordingly. Communism was the only alternative, and there was only one path. Khrushchev’s economic policy involved charges of backwardness, mistakes and inefficiencies; his social policy involved the return of Gulag prisoners, enemies of the state transformed into pardoned citizens; and his political policy involved denouncing the cult of personality and exposing Stalin’s excesses. Having debunked the Cult of Personality, Khrushchev effectively destroyed the Party’s ability to convey itself as the all-knowing purveyors of truth. Robert Rozhdestvensky’s poem *Rodina* printed in *Pravda* (16.12.1962) openly alluded to this loss:

*We do not want to say anymore:
Somebody thinks for us
We know how that ends.*

Soviet individuals began to trust their own judgements and a diffusion of critical public commentary occurred. ‘Everywhere – in the stadiums, in the buses, in the

⁹⁴ *Zhit’ v mire i družbe* (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 1959) 83.

⁹⁵ Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament* (London: Little, Brown, and Co., 1974) 146.

subways – people talked freely, judged men and events, leaders and political acts. Everywhere people expressed their opinions, detailed criticisms and recounted anecdotes. The highest political figures had no immunity from public opinion'.⁹⁶ Indeed, as this process matured, even the communist nature of the leadership was scrutinised. The multi-pronged and prolonged onslaught against the concept of the infallible leader solidified the widespread dissemination of the concept of fallibility. A popular bit of satire is symbolic here is representative at how far the process went: 'Brezhnev's mother visits her son in the Kremlin soon after his coming to power. When she hears about his fine apartment, his luxurious dacha, his expensive cars, and other material comforts, she says, 'Leonid, my son, I'm so proud of you, but one thing worries me: what will you do when the communists take over?''⁹⁷ It also reinforced the need for economic success. If, Khrushchev and the Communist Party could no longer count on the automatic acquiescence of the society, then legitimacy must be established. The ultimate form of legitimisation would be to provide a system in which people preferred to live. Thus, consumption was a prime political goal, and over the course of the 1950s and 1960s, the Communist regime's legitimacy became increasingly dependant on the provision of material wealth.

Robert Tucker has written that the iron curtain represented the external walls of a 'Potemkin Russia... fabricated not out of wooden facades but out of words and pictures and mass spectacles in Red Square.'⁹⁸ Only through absolute control was Stalin able to maintain the image of a Russia that was or would soon be providing for all man's needs and dreams. Stalin had an intense aversion to travelling and avoided foreign contacts. This aided the creation of the Potemkin Russia and contributed a sense of isolationism to the image of the Soviet Man. Controlling the image of the past, present and future constitutes one of the defining features of totalitarianism. By contrast, Khrushchev actively pursued travel opportunities. Not for nothing did his colleagues complain about him constantly 'knocking about' abroad and in the pre-corn period gave him the nickname of *Intourist*.⁹⁹ Fedor

⁹⁶ Giuseppe Boffa, Inside the Khrushchev Era (New York: Marzani, 1959) 87-88.

⁹⁷ As found in Robert Strayer, Why Did the Soviet Union Collapse: Understanding Historical Change (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1998) 53.

⁹⁸ Robert C. Tucker, 'The Psychology of Soviet Foreign Policy,' Problems of Communism Vol.6 no.3 (1957): 1-8, 6.

⁹⁹ Fedor Burlatsky, Khrushchev and the First Russian Spring (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991) 153.

Burlatsky has noted that claims that Khrushchev's wanderlust constituted 'the first step towards opening up our society' were not unfounded.¹⁰⁰ In 1955, Khrushchev went to the Geneva Summit, in 1956 along with Prime Minister N. A. Bulganin, he travelled to Great Britain, and in 1959 to the United States. Travel abroad peaked in 1960. The prestige associated with these high level visits contributed to the prestige assigned to many things foreign and an acceptance that foreign contact was valuable. Richard Nixon's assessment was that Khrushchev 'is an intensely pragmatic and curious man who likes to see for himself, and he believes what he sees far more than what he hears.'¹⁰¹ Khrushchev's curiosity was to legitimise the curiosity of a nation.

In trying to define the Thaw to Giuseppe Boffa, the writer Galina Nikolaieva explained it as: "we all notice how our life is awakening... this atmosphere is made by us, the product of the will of men, the product of the work of the Party, the product of far from easy labour which developed and is developing everywhere, from the factories to international relations."¹⁰² Boffa's recollections of this time include impressions of Soviet technology and culture renewing ties with the West; *Inostrannaia literatura* publishing the works of modern Western writers 'from Daldwell to Mariac, from Hemingway to Moravia'; Soviet film makers making documentaries in major foreign cities; and film festivals etc. In his assessment it was from the renewing of the international commitment that an awareness of Soviet problems could be put into context and demands could emerge. They did.¹⁰³

An important feature of the Thaw period was the ending of the Soviet Union's isolation from capitalist countries. Tatyana Zaslavskaya recalled that from her first trip abroad, to Sweden in 1957, she gathered impressions of another way of life and the idea that the working class in the West suffered miserably was shattered: 'we saw that, in fact, the countries of the West had in many instances overtaken us and we had lively discussions about ways of overcoming our weaknesses...'¹⁰⁴ However, Soviet citizens did not need to go abroad in order to glean information

¹⁰⁰ Burlatsky, *Khrushchev and the First Russian Spring* 154.

¹⁰¹ Richard Nixon, *The Challenges We Face: Edited and Compiled from the Speeches and Papers of Richard Nixon* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company Inc, 1960) 42.

¹⁰² Boffa *Inside the Khrushchev Era* 19.

¹⁰³ Boffa *Inside the Khrushchev Era* 31.

¹⁰⁴ Tatyana Zaslavskaya, *The Second Socialist Revolution* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990) 34.

about the West. Dissident and professor Yuri Glazov recalled how when workers 'are shown movies about strikes in capitalist countries they see that the striking workers come to meetings in their own cars, and that, however poor they may be, the unemployed also have cars, which they drive to their private homes after collecting an insurance cheque.'¹⁰⁵ The acceptance of Khrushchev in the international arena and the subsequent prestige this brought the USSR was acknowledged by the Soviet people and was to contribute to the feelings of betrayal and loss caused by incidents such as the U-2 flyovers. Alexander Werth recalled a conversation with a young (late twenties early thirties) Soviet diplomat after the U-2 incident in which the diplomat assessed Khrushchev's mood and that of the Soviet public as being upset and angry, noting that Khrushchev had been arguing that despite the presence of warmongers in the USA, Eisenhower could be trusted. Khrushchev's trust in Eisenhower was seen by many, according to the diplomat, as un-Marxist and concluded by saying that the 'real point is that by behaving the way he did, Eisenhower destroyed, temporarily I hope, that system of peaceful coexistence and international negotiations which is the very basis of Khrushchev's policy.'¹⁰⁶

In 1935, Stalin announced that life was becoming 'better, more cheerful' and in the Third Five Year Plan of 1938, it was announced that the Soviet Union was to catch up and surpass the West. Despite the better and more cheerful life, many Soviet citizens took refuge in the idea of the West as an escape from the Soviet present. While studying in Moscow in 1952, the Russian writer Vasilii Aksenov attended a party of the privileged youth who owned a radiola and numerous records of Bing Crosby, Nat Cole, Peggy Lee, Louis Armstrong, and Woody Herman.¹⁰⁷ He watched astonished as the young guests did the jitterbug, smoked Camels and Pall Malls, addressed each other as darling and baby, and identified themselves as *shtatniki*.¹⁰⁸ The university educated daughter of a successful Moscow actress studied French and English 'as a form of escapism... she would go to anything, just

¹⁰⁵ Yuri Glazov, The Russian Mind Since Stalin's Death (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1985), 29.

¹⁰⁶ Alexander Werth, The Khrushchev Phase: The Soviet Union Enters the Decisive Sixties (London: Robert Hale Limited, 1961) 9-10.

¹⁰⁷ Vasilii Aksenov, Zvyozdnyi bilet (1961)/ A Starry Ticket (London: Putnam, 1962).

¹⁰⁸ Aksenov, Zvyozdnyi bilet.

to hear French and to get away from the Soviet Union.’¹⁰⁹ Tanya Matthews, a Russian secretary who worked regularly with foreigners and married an Englishman, was to ponder the attraction of the ‘weak chested, physically unattractive male of the mysterious West’ especially when Siberian camps were a real possibility. She answered her question herself when she wrote that her dream was the end of pretending that it was nothing when during a midnight visit a neighbour or family member was taken away, and that if ‘there was a hero who could take one away from all that and give one chewing gum, silk stockings, lipstick and soap, together with his devotion, one could not help loving him.’¹¹⁰ Thus, as early as the Stalin period, interest in the West was a combination of genuine curiosity and a response to Soviet reality.

The West was also used as a metre stick by the Soviet government. In July 1955, Bulganin gave a report to the Central Committee in which the problems in industry and agriculture were acknowledged. Bulganin’s conclusions were frank - although Soviet industry was producing more than three times the pre-war level, it was being held back by technical backwardness, poor organisation and cumbersome bureaucracy. He then gave supporting facts. Bulganin unfavourably compared machines from the USSR with those made in the USA, Germany and Czechoslovakia. Khrushchev then decried the under-valuation of foreign progress as an additional detriment to Soviet industry. The phrase ‘catch up with and surpass the most advanced capitalist countries’ was reintroduced. Catching up with the West was to become the new rallying cry, a cry that was ‘superficially comprehensible to the simplest mind.’¹¹¹ In the late 1960s a Soviet economics professor, ‘Professor X’, said in conversation with Alexander Werth that as ‘things are at present, America still has certain serious advantages over us... Socially, we are progressive, but our economic mechanism is still conservative and inefficient.’¹¹² Professor X believed that fault lay in the implementation of the economic system. He also believed that only when the current backward kind of socialism was reformed, would socialism take off and dominate internationally. In

¹⁰⁹ Interview with scholar of Soviet literature Martin Dewhurst, Glasgow April 2001.

¹¹⁰ Tanya Matthews, *Russian Wife Goes West* (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1955), 15.

¹¹¹ Gregory Grossman ‘Communism in a Hurry: the Time Factor in Soviet Economics,’ *Problems of Communism* Vol. 7 no.3 May/June (1959): 1-7,4.

¹¹² Werth, *Russia: Hopes and Fears* 129.

acknowledging economic failures, Khrushchev and the leadership tore down the illusion of success that Stalin had so carefully cultivated in order to control the chaos that the Bolshevik revolution and industrialisation had unleashed. As the means of production belonged to the workers, the population could also take the criticism personally. Khrushchev then tried to rebuild the illusion based on optimistic, bordering on incredulous, statements of future successes. Concurrent with Khrushchev's open attacks on the Soviet economy, which had been a wonder of progress just months before, and negative comparisons between it and the West, political certainty was cast aside. The Soviet Union was left with neither an omnipotent leader nor a glorious past. Even the present revolutionary industry was marred with backwardness: at a steel workers meeting in April 1958 Khrushchev said: 'and do not take it amiss comrades if I tell you that looking at your plant – it fails far to meet the requirements of modern socialist production'.¹¹³ In attempting to overcome the devastations of WWII and Stalinism, a strong Soviet society without the shroud of socialist realism was drawn to ideas of consumption and the future.

A party agitator, addressing a factory meeting of workers, holds forth on the country's glorious achievements. For an hour he piles up statistics on growth in steel, petroleum, coal, new housing units, railroads. Then he wipes his brow and invites questions from the audience. 'Don't be shy, comrades,' he urges, 'what would you like to know?'

Finally a shabby little man in the back row stands up. 'I have only one question, comrade,' he says meekly. 'If everything is so good, why is everything so bad?'¹¹⁴

Where society was going: impact of demographical changes

Khrushchev was to call upon the young generation to become the foundation for the creation of the *homo sovieticus*, a person with a relentless focus on the future and the ability to withstand the allures of bourgeois consumerism. Mihajlo Mihajlov has written that *homo sovieticus* was a man whose world had begun yesterday. This lack of a past was to reinforce the naïve belief placed in science and technology that through them mankind would achieve happiness and solve all its

113 Nikita S. Khrushchev, For Victory in Peaceful Competition with Capitalism (London: Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1960) 325.

114 Eugene Lyons, Workers' Paradise Lost: Fifty Years of Soviet Communism: A Balance Sheet (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1967) 211.

problems.¹¹⁵ However, a lack of interest in the past resulted in far less latitude for the interpretation of the present as it changed the fields of comparison from historical to international. Although the new Soviet man was to be immune to the allure of bourgeois influences, there was a disturbing fascination with the West in all classes of Soviet society, and particularly the youth. Soviet literature was unable to compete with even the most censored Western works.¹¹⁶ Western fashion was mimicked, and foreign words were incorporated into slang. There was also a significant demand for travel, especially notable among Party officials and the intelligentsia.¹¹⁷ This desire to travel may have been for personal reasons but it was couched within the language of official policies with claims of the need to gather information and build professional contacts with Westerners.¹¹⁸ In the *Statement of Policy by the National Security Council on East West Exchanges* (NSC 5607 June 29 1956) the third point under general considerations of the American basic strategy is to build upon the greater demands for freedoms and goods as expressed by the young now educated population, noting that the 'demands referred to must be considerable because the Soviet rulers judge it necessary to take drastic and hazardous measures to meet them.'¹¹⁹

'Drastic and hazardous measures' included academic exchanges which brought the future Soviet educated class into contact with Westerners and Western ideas. In September 1956, four Cambridge students spent the month of September at the Moscow State University. While there, the students participated in extracurricular activities. Their assessment was that these Komsomol and Trade Union activities were well attended. Either foreign films or documentary films about abroad were common; the Cambridge students saw films on Milan and Indonesia, and several Italian films. Evenings to introduce foreign and Soviet students to each other were held, on average, once a week. During the Cambridge students' stay, one such evening was advertised as 'a meeting with English, Danish,

¹¹⁵ Mihajlo Mihajlov, *Moscow Summer* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1965) 153.

¹¹⁶ David Allchurch, 'Leisure-Time Activities,' Alex Inkeles and Kent Gelger eds., *Soviet Society: a Book of Readings* 520-527, 526.

¹¹⁷ Yale Richmond, *US-Soviet Cultural Exchanges, 1958-1986* (London: Westview Press, 1987) 5-6.

¹¹⁸ Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History: 1929-1969* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company Inc., 1973) 387-388.

¹¹⁹ Richmond, *US-Soviet Cultural Exchanges: 1958-1986* 133.

and Italian students.'¹²⁰ *Vechers* usually started with a concert, then speeches by the Western student delegations, then a dance with live music. Rex Brown had this to say about his *vecher* experience:

three girls trap me to practise their English on me. Then I keep on being taken aside to meet students of philosophy and journalism. Soon I have my back to a pillar, and am surrounded by a dense press of Arts students, all asking questions. I move aside to drop a cigarette in an ashtray, and find myself in a new crowd, natural scientists this time. From then on until one in the morning I can scarcely move for people, who stand around firing questions at me.¹²¹

Due to the active nature of control and surveillance that surrounded visitors, Brown was uncertain if the subsequent parties to which he was invited were spontaneously organised by fellow students or if they were orchestrated by the Komsomol. Regardless, his recollections of the parties included jazz records on the gramophone, dancing to the Voice of America or any other station playing dance music.¹²² Sally Belfrage recalled being invited to an end of year party in 1957 by several Muscovite students. Her first impressions were of 'pig tails and frizz' peasant like girls in G.U.M. like fashions or girls 'dressed to kill in foreign looking ensembles' that ranged from 'winter suits to summer evening dresses.'¹²³ The boys were wearing trousers and silk ties. In terms of fashion, a lot of the Youth Festival had been left behind. Mervyn Matthews, who was in Moscow during the Youth Festival, recalled that students at MGU were all short of money but that they consistently got parcels from their parents and that they 'all seemed to end up having these Western clothes'.¹²⁴ Despite being danced from friend to friend and not being permitted to speak to other students, Sally's identity as an American who had been at the Festival (images of her were in the Soviet film about the festival that many who had not attended the Festival had seen) was known.

Yuri Glazov believed that the average young Russian was quite knowledgeable about other countries, generally disinterested in Africa or South America and occasionally thought about Europe and America. He has commented that when thinking about the West, the average citizen believed that the majority of

¹²⁰ Rex V. Brown, 'Recreation and Social Life at Moscow University,' Alex Inkeles and Kent Geiger eds., *Soviet Society: a Book of Readings* 449-453, 450.

¹²¹ Brown, 'Recreation and Social Life at Moscow University,' 450.

¹²² Brown, 'Recreation and Social Life at Moscow University,' 451.

¹²³ Sally Belfrage, *A Room in Moscow* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1958) 91.

¹²⁴ Interview with Mervyn Matthews, Spring 2002, London.

families had their own houses, that a monthly salary was sufficient to purchase a pair of shoes, a coat, and a quiet evening in a restaurant.¹²⁵ According to Glazov, there was a particular fascination with America that on the one hand was 'like a fairy-tale land: shops filled up with produce and meat, shopping centres where you can always buy a raincoat or solid boots. But at the same time crimes [were] committed there every minute.'¹²⁶ Co-authors Peter Vail and Aleksandr Genis wrote of the image of the United States in the immediate post-Stalin era as a place that was 'not known but believed in. An enormous, not yet open country' that was to spring into Soviet consciousness.¹²⁷ Their list of important events contributing to impressions of the United States included:

- 1955 – beginning of the distribution of *Amerika* and staging of *Porgy and Bess*
- 1957 – 'Live Americans played at the Moscow Festival' (International World Youth Festival)
- 1958 – Nixon visits
- 1959 – Khrushchev goes to Washington in a TU-114 (translation lessons for the gymnasium were based on radio broadcasts on this trip and American news reports)
American exhibition at Sokol'niki ('*dlinnye, kak minonostsy, mashiny tsveta 'bryzgi burgundskogo'*')
- 1962 – '*Velikolepnaia Semerka*' (Magnificent Seven) on Soviet screens
- 1963 – Murder of Kennedy in a taxi (sic).¹²⁸

One result of the aforementioned destruction of faith and infallibility was that the Soviet leadership needed to produce results quickly. The significance of the generational gap can be felt here. Although the concept of the USSR as socialist superpower was universal, there were generational differences in levels of patience and compromise. In comparison with the often-idealistic youth, many of the older generation were prone to high levels of disillusionment and yet more willing to accept compromise. Alice Rossi studied generational differences among the respondents of the Harvard project, and concluded that members of the younger generations had a higher positive rating of the institutional organisation of the USSR and were at the same time more inclined to favour violence and overthrowing the

¹²⁵ Glazov, *The Russian Mind Since Stalin's Death* 19.

¹²⁶ Glazov, *The Russian Mind Since Stalin's Death* 20.

¹²⁷ Petr Vail' and Aleksandr Genis, *60E: Mir sovetskogo cheloveka* (Moskva: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2001) 63.

¹²⁸ Vail', *60E: Mir Sovetskogo Cheloveka* 64.

regime in light of failures.¹²⁹ In essence, the youth were more willing to believe but support was highly conditional, while the older generation was more sceptical but willing to compromise for the sake of stability. One area in which the generations converged was in the general apathy towards politics, with perhaps the exception of public anger in regard to Khrushchev's brinkmanship over Cuba. On the apparent indifference to politics, a friend of American journalist Eddy Gilmore made the distinction between weariness and indifference. The Soviet friend grew up hearing that fascism was evil, then was told that the country had made a pact with good Hitler, then was told that Hitler was indeed the enemy; that WWII was an imperialist war until it became a fight for the Soviet fatherland before changing to a fight for the Russian motherland; and that Americans and the allies were friends who sent aid, food, transport, factories etc, and then the enemy. However, the greatest confusion came from the denunciation of Stalin, who was omnipotent and infallible until he died and people began saying that life was better without him and culminated with his denunciation as a 'monster.'¹³⁰ In response to the questioning of his total lack of interest in propaganda and politics and the solving of political issues: 'that's their [the Party's] job, I suppose. As for me, I've got other things to worry about... Such as that new apartment I've been promised and who's going to win the football championship next summer.'¹³¹

In the testimony of defectors a decline in the ideological élan of youth, as compared with the idealism of the civil war days or the great outpouring of energy and dedication that accompanied the first phase of the Five Year Plans is emphasised.¹³² Political apathy or weariness often leads to new interests and increased susceptibility to consumption as a political alternative. In the late 1950s articles such as 'Soviet youth have lost their heroes' in which it was written that 'a day does not pass, that in this or that Moscow newspaper that there is not an article

129 One section of the Harvard study looked at alienation and asked from what are the citizens alienated (the leadership, the Communist Party, the system etc). The results found alienation varying by class. The intelligentsia was twice as likely to call for private ownership of light industry as peasants or ordinary workers. Raymond A. Bauer, 'Political Alienation Among Former Soviet Citizens,' ed. Alex Inkeles and Kent Geiger, Soviet Society: a Book of Readings 228-241, 237.

130 Eddy Gilmore, The Cossacks Burned Down the YMCA: Russia Revisited (London: The Bodley Head, 1964) 165.

131 Gilmore, The Cossacks Burned Down the YMCA 165.

132 Merle Fainsod, 'The Komsomol: Youth Under Dictatorship,' American Political Science Review Vol.45 (1951) 18-40, 36.

or a letter ... [commenting] that in my time there was a different enthusiasm' were common.¹³³ Acknowledging the need to restore faith through results, Khrushchev set dates for a respectable level of parity with the West and for the attainment of full communism and overtaking the USA. In Khrushchev's words 'America occupied a special place in our minds and our imaginations. It couldn't have been otherwise.'¹³⁴

In a study of eighty-five fifth year students in the late 1950s at the University of Moscow, the respondents were interviewed as to their expectations for the future. The results showed high expectations that often exceeded the promises made by the Party. For example, eighty of the eighty-five respondents said that they expected to own a car within six years, despite the fact that Khrushchev had made it clear that the focus of the Soviet automotive industry would be on the creation of rental pools and not private passenger cars.¹³⁵ Another official study was carried out in 1966 and involved 2,204 youth between seventeen and thirty in Leningrad. More than half were factory workers, the rest were engineers, students and technicians. No names were required but twenty percent of respondents voluntarily gave them. The results of the study were published in 1969 in booklet form under the title *Young People: About themselves and their contemporaries*. In one section of the survey, respondents were asked to rank their primary and secondary goals. The desire for good housing and for material prosperity ranked third and fourth within the category of primary goals. First and second place were taken by an interesting job and higher education.

In an attempt to moderate demands, the standard propaganda means were instituted. For example, in a letter from a young woman to *Komsomol'skaia Pravda* one reads that: 'Igor's room is crammed with expensive things: beautiful furniture, rugs, a tape recorder, two record players, two radios, cameras, a photo-enlarger, and a movie camera, and there is even a typewriter. In short, his room has all the equipment needed to enable a modern, stylish young man to shine among his

¹³³ NEF No.8 (1957) 82-94. A Various documents in which the issue of youth apathy is discussed can be found in the archival documents of RGANI fond 5 opis 33 delo 31.

¹³⁴ Sergei Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower* trans. Shirley Benson (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University, 2000) 320.

¹³⁵ John Bushnell, 'The Soviet Man Turns Pessimist,' Alexander Dallin ed. *The Khrushchev and Brezhnev Years* (New York: Garland Publishing Inc, 1992) 137-157, 141.

friends.'¹³⁶ The girl is from modest circumstances and feels that she and her beloved Igor should begin their married life together modestly within their means. Igor has become accustomed to the wealth provided by his father and expects this standard to be maintained regardless of his marital status. The rising expectations of the youth and parents who catered to them were regularly scorned in the press. In *Pravda* (19.06.1969), a mother wrote in about her daughter's school graduation. Having set out in search of 'a bright and youthful' dress for her daughter, the mother ended up purchasing a wedding dress as nothing else was good enough. However, even a wedding dress failed to impress the other girls whose attire was 'resplendent with gold filament, beads and sequins and their heads were crowned by towers, decorative braids, fantasies and other hairdos. These weren't girls, they were New Year's trees.'¹³⁷ The mother then ponders the psychology of a teenager who can demand: "either a white lace dress over nylon, or I won't go to the party!"¹³⁸ and concludes that these excessive expectations are tied to the increasing family income, considerations of prestige, and laws of fashion.¹³⁹ In A. Kuznetsov's *Continuation of a Legend* the hero Tolya leaves his family, friend Victor and girlfriend, to travel along the Trans-Siberian rail to Irkutsk where Tolya soon begins working. On the first day his muscles ache and he has bloody hands. Exhausted, lonely and mentally fatigued he regularly contemplates going home but is repulsed by 'Victor's cynical letters, full of talk of imported clothes and rock and roll.'¹⁴⁰

In 1966, Valeri Agranovskii conducted a self-designed 'social experiment'. He fictionally gave twenty-five Gorky university students 10,000 roubles and told them to spend it all. The results of the experiment were published in *Yunost* no. 2 1967. Of all of the students, only two managed to spend all the money and this was because they purchased *Volgas*. Many of the students said that they would travel, but most restricted themselves to the Soviet Far East and North. The student Lebedev wanted to take a girlfriend to France, however, it was decided that this would cost twenty to thirty thousand and was disqualified. In response to student

¹³⁶ 'I don't want to be dependant,' *Komsomol'skaia Pravda* (28.01.1969) as found in Colette Shulman ed., *We the Russians: Voices from Russia* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971) 74.

¹³⁷ As in Shulman ed., *We the Russians* 81.

¹³⁸ As in Shulman ed., *We the Russians* 81.

¹³⁹ As in Shulman ed., *We the Russians* 81.

¹⁴⁰ Katerina Clark, *The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981) 229.

avowals that they did not need material possessions the author was to argue that the necessity was there, what was in question was if the funds were also there. 'I [Agranovskii] met a first year girl who spent her stipend on a pair of high fashion shoes for twenty-seven roubles and then for the next four days, until her parents responded to an urgent request for replenishment, subsisted on thirty kopeks a day: salad, tea, and the indispensable pastry.'¹⁴¹ In a sardonic travel memoir, Marc Polonsky and Russell Taylor wrote that the Russian fashion industry was countering the reputation of poorly and drably dressed Russians by producing 'paisleys and polka-dots in shades of garish orange and purple which would have appeared outré at the Woodstock Festival'¹⁴²

The changes in Soviet Russia imbedded in the consciousness of Soviet citizens were to appear more pronounced to foreigners. This is evident in the travel memoirs of the time. Eddy Gilmore, an American journalist, who after 1955 lived in England was married to a Russian woman and had lived and worked as the Chief of the Moscow Bureau for the Associated Press from 1941 to 1953. Unable to leave until 1953, it was with some trepidation that he and his wife returned in 1963 for a visit. His impressions of changes are particularly acute due to having left almost immediately after Stalin's death and returning near the end of Khrushchev's reign. The title of his travel memoir is *The Cossacks Burned Down the YMCA* and refers to the system of using English words to codify Soviet institutions. In this instance: The Central Committee of the Communist Party had burned down (taken control of) the NKVD. A 'big difference' (phrase commonly used at the time) between the Stalinist and Khrushchev eras was in the restaurant in the National Hotel, reputed to be the best in Moscow at the time, with its second floor location overlooking Red Square, the Church of St Basil and the Kremlin. The clientele were no longer rich factory managers, Soviet officials, or Red Army, Navy or Air Force officers but young Russians in their twenties and thirties. While their clothes could not be described as elegant, it was the best-dressed group of young people that Gilmore had ever seen in the Soviet Union. The music was no longer traditional and staid but a six-piece band playing Western numbers, including Kurt Weill's 'Mac the Knife'.¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ As in Shulman ed., *We the Russians* 87.

¹⁴² Marc Polonsky and Russell Taylor, *USSR: From an Original Idea by Karl Marx* (London: Faber and Faber, 1986) 90.

¹⁴³ Gilmore, *The Cossacks Burned Down the YMCA* 41.

This new generation was a generation that could see the effects that Stalinism and the war had had on the older generation but was removed from them. Take for example the young reporter for *Vecherniaia Moskva*, Sasha, born in Moscow in 1949.

We lived in a pretty dingy old house in the Zamoskvorechi till the end of 1961, and then we got a beautiful modern three room flat not far from the present university. By this time I was already twelve. After the twentieth Congress of 1956, which terribly upset my father, who had been a Party member since 1952, he did not take Stalin's portrait down. Only when we moved into the new flat did he not put it up again. But then that was after the 22nd Congress, after which Stalin's body was thrown out of the Lenin Mausoleum. I think my father was still very upset about it, but he said nothing. Instead of the portrait we now have an enlarged photograph of Uncle Petya. Uncle Petya died fighting in Kaliningrad.¹⁴⁴

In response to the question if Sasha had ever suffered he answered 'no, not much. The dark basement where I lived until I was twelve was pretty awful, all the same; however, as I said, we got a nice new flat in 1961. Actually, I did suffer last year. I was in love. But she went and married someone else.'¹⁴⁵ On Khrushchev, Sasha was to comment that Khrushchev had been amusing but that the routine soon grew old. More was expected from the head of the CPSU. 'Of course, we had good moments under Khrushchev. I remember the first Sputnik; I was only eight or ten, but the excitement at our school was terrific.'¹⁴⁶ Werth's assessment of Sasha was that 'he was not wildly interested in ideology, but was very proud of living relatively prosperously in a well run country that took such good care of all its citizens.'¹⁴⁷

Condemnation of the trend towards excessive materialism came not just from official Soviet organs but also from hipper members of society. For example, in the 1960s the song 'Tonyechka' by the Russian poet and songwriter Alexander Galich was popular.¹⁴⁸ In this song, the fallen 'hero' has left the girl of his heart for another under the accusations of seeking money, material goods and privileges.

*She gathered up her things and said in a small voice:
'As for your falling in love with Tonka, well, she has nothing to do with it!'
It's not Tonka's moist lips that seduced you,*

¹⁴⁴ Werth, *Russia: Hopes and Fears* 121-124, 162.

¹⁴⁵ Werth, *Russia: Hopes and Fears* 121-124, 162.

¹⁴⁶ Werth, *Russia: Hopes and Fears* 162.

¹⁴⁷ Werth, *Russia: Hopes and Fears* 163.

¹⁴⁸ This translation can be found in Shulman ed., *We the Russians* 76-77.

*But the fact that her Papa has a bodyguard assigned to him,
 that her Papa has a dacha in Pavshino,
 that Papa is surrounded by toadies with secretaries,
 that Papa has access to the Central Committee privilege shops!
 And that on holidays there are movies starring Tselikovskaya!
 Your Tonka is too ugly for words-
 But don't listen to me, I belong to the past!
 And now you're going to sleep with a washboard,
 for the sake of her private car...
 That's what you wanted, and you know it yourself.
 You know it but you're embarrassed
 Over and again you talk about love, about trust
 about lofty things!
 But in your mind's eye you see – the dacha in Pavshino,
 the bodyguard and the toadies with secretaries,
 and how you will watch movies at home with the family
 and happiness will be a caramel on your tongue
 (Boy responds)
 I now live in a house where nothing is lacking,
 Even my trousers have zippers,
 the wine flows in our home us from a well,
 and we have an indoor toilet – eight by ten
 Papasha himself gets home by midnight,
 the bodyguards and the toadies all stand at attention!
 And tell him a joke about the Jews!
 But when I go to bed with this idiot, this Tonka,
 I remember that other sweet voice.
 What a temper that girl has – downright violent,
 I telephone her and she hangs up.
 Drive me to Ostankino, chief,
 To Ostankino, where the Titan movie theatre is.
 She works there as a ticket taker,
 stands in the entryway, all frozen,
 freezing and shivering,
 but she has overcome her love
 chilled to the bone and grown cold,
 but uncompromising and unforgiving.*

The hero acknowledges the materially wealthy reality of his new situation, as well as the emotional void. This juxtaposition of materially wealthy with spiritually empty was commonly applied to the West and those that emulated it.

Apparently mistrustful of the younger generation, the leadership revoked the relaxed requirements for party membership as instituted under Khrushchev and raised the joining age from twenty-one to twenty-four at the 23rd Party Congress. It has been argued that the Brezhnev-Kosygin team implicitly promised to insure the

economic position of the newly entrenched privileged class thus, sidestepping the demands and desires of the masses, and failing to deliver on the promises made under Khrushchev. 149

Where Soviet society was going: Perceptions of standard of living

As the improvement of living standards was a prime political goal, Soviet citizens could espouse the idea of consumption with minimal fear of charges of political deviation. Eventually, this was to translate into a blurred line on such phenomena as the *shitatniki* and the *stilyagi*. These trends are but two of many that serve as indicators of the Soviet government's inability to provide an acceptable alternative to the consumption of Western popular culture. This failure was not unique to the Soviet government as the general process of globalisation involves a substantial amount of homogenisation of culture. What was unique was the fundamental nature of the threat this posed to the Communist system. The Soviet system failed not only to provide an alternative to Western popular culture but also to provide an acceptable alternative to Western style consumption. It was a system that was not dependant on mass participation (unlike Western economies that needed mass consumption of goods and culture to perpetuate growth and foster expansion) but which invited/permitted images of culture and consumption for which mass participation and consumption were fundamental, without having the institutional ability to respond appropriately to the new delineations of the social contract. In 1960, Alec Nove wrote:

Of course, people's attitudes and expectations are relevant to the efficacy of incentives as well as to political stability. The more the Soviet Union boasts of its great technical progress, of its Sputniks and moon rockets, of its equality with or superiority over the United States in weapons, the more impatient its citizens become with their backward living conditions, and the less reasonable it seems to them that nothing drastic is done to improve them... The increasing range of contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners plays a dual role in this process. Many more Soviet citizens are now learning at first or second hand how the other side lives, and this affects their own expectations. Then, too, with the increasing flow of foreign visitors to Russia, it must certainly appear politically advantageous to the leadership to impress them with higher standards of living. This is much more than a matter of impressing unsophisticated tourists from the West, who can if necessary, be fobbed off

149 Giuseppe Boffa, Ot SSSR K Rossii: istoria neokonchennogo krizisa 1964-1994 (Moskva: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1996) 21. A similar theory can be found in Lyons, Workers' Paradise Lost 186.

with Potemkin villages... Khrushchev is well aware that relative living standards will play an important role in the world impact of the two opposed systems.¹⁵⁰

Despite a general dearth of sociological studies during this period, journalistic bodies (for example *Komsomol'skaia Pravda*) had public opinion institutes and conducted quasi-sociological surveys. These surveys were published along with official commentaries from respective Soviet ministers, combined with the letters to the editors were to provide *Komsomol'skaia Pravda* with literally hundreds of thousands of opinions. In 1960, the average number of letters to editor was 16-17,000 per month.¹⁵¹ From August to September (results published in October) 1960, *Komsomol'skaia Pravda* interviewed citizens about their perceptions of their standard of living. The survey began with the following preamble:

In our times, the efforts of our government, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, is towards the quick resolution of problems concerning future increases in the material wealth of the people. Not long ago at the 5th Session of the All-Union, a new mandate was taken to lower taxes, to shorten the working day, and to raise standards of living.¹⁵²

The four long answer questions asked were: How do you compare your current standard of living with your past standard of living?, How is this expressed/With what is this primarily associated?, What issues are of prime concern for you?. Of the 1,625 surveys distributed, 1,399 were returned. In an attempt to gather a representative survey the survey was distributed to passengers on sixty-five trains, from those to Leningrad to those heading for Kazakhstan. Of the respondents 59.3% (830) were male and 40.7% (569) were female with the dominant age group (53.6%) being 30-55 years of age followed by under 30 (41.7%) and over 56 (4.7%). The following chart and graph are breakdowns of the profession and place of residence of the respondents.¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ Alec Nove, 'Toward a Communist Welfare State? Social Welfare in the USSR,' *Problems of Communism* Vol. 9 no.1 (1960): 1-9, 9.

¹⁵¹ Grushin, *Chetyre zhizni Rossii: v zerkale oprosov obshchestvennogo mneniia* 47.


¹⁵² Grushin, *Chetyre zhizni Rossii: v zerkale oprosov obshchestvennogo mneniia* 113.

¹⁵³ Figures as found in Grushin, *Chetyre zhizni Rossii: v zerkale oprosov obshchestvennogo mneniia* 117.

Table 1: Profession

Profession	Percentage of respondents
Worker	34 %
Office Worker	33.4%
Engineer/Technician	13.2%
Military	7.5%
Housewife	3.3%
Student	3.2%
Pensioner	3.1%
Kolkhoz	2.3%

■ Chart 1 Place of Residence



Of the respondents seventy three percent said that their standard of living had improved in recent years and seven percent reported a 'deterioration.'¹⁵⁴ In response to the second question about concrete representations of improvements in standards of living the answers included receiving new flats, increased pay, the shortening of the work day, more books, more foodstuffs and products in general, and raised cultural standards. Suggestions for improving areas of concern included better organisation (the refrigerator was delivered to the flat before the building was finished), faster implementation of automation, cheaper or free public transportation, strengthening the military, the new stores should be accompanied by goods, and a shorter working week (one suggestion was for a four hour day).¹⁵⁵ Only one of the 1,399 respondents called for a different political system and the majority of the responses involved a strong belief in the paternal responsibility of the state to provide for the masses.¹⁵⁶

In a conversation between two twenty something Ukrainian university students in 1960 and a youthful Martin Dewhirst (who in addition to numerous travels and work in the USSR went on to lecture Russian language and literature at the University of Glasgow) the discussion turned to the probability of the Soviet Union catching up with the USA by 1980: 'I [Dewhirst] thought, in my naiveté and ignorance that the Soviet Union would go on making great economic advances and that life would become easier and better for most people and I said so on this occasion and the two young Ukrainians burst out laughing and they said in Russian... that the Soviet Union would never catch up on the West.'¹⁵⁷ Ronald Hingley's interpretation of the Russian image of the West: 'some Russians have exaggeratedly glossy ideas of Western prosperity so that I have even found myself defending their Seven Year Plan and rising living standards. Some of them

¹⁵⁴ The newspaper began large-scale survey projects in May 1960 with a survey of Soviet citizens about the Cold War and the U-2 affair, with the organisation (department) responsible for the sociological studies being called the *Institut obshchestvennogo mneniia* (IOM). The formation of IOM was given wide press coverage in the West, for example by the Daily Telegraph (09.01.1961), and the New York Herald Tribune (28-29.01.1961). For more information on the surveys of the IOM see Grushin, Chetyre zhizni Rossii: v zerkale oprosov obshchestvennogo mneniia 41-68. For an analysis of the October published 1960 survey see Bushnell, 'The Soviet Man Turns Pessimist,' 140; or Grushin, Chetyre zhizni Rossii: v zerkale oprosov obshchestvennogo mneniia 112-132.

¹⁵⁵ Grushin, Chetyre zhizni Rossii: v zerkale oprosov obshchestvennogo mneniia 118-124.

¹⁵⁶ Grushin, Chetyre zhizni Rossii: v zerkale oprosov obshchestvennogo mneniia 155.

¹⁵⁷ Interview with Martin Dewhirst, Glasgow April 2001.

wouldn't have this. 'Things here will never change'.¹⁵⁸ Both Hingley and Dewhurst found themselves defending the credibility of the improvements in the Soviet economic system in the face of unfounded praise for Western standards and harsh condemnation for the Soviet system by Soviet students. This is not to argue that there were not individuals who believed initially in the Soviet Union's ability to catch up. Sally Belfrage recalled a conversation with a man named Kolya who believed that the material standard of living would soon be more favourable than in the West and that when this happened Soviet citizens would be permitted to travel and discover that life in the Soviet Union was better than that abroad: 'you have seen, there are many people here who think in terms of flats and clothes and material luxuries, just as they would anywhere... They're bitter and they complain, and think that capitalism is better because people have more *things*. When there are more things, these petty people will be satisfied.'¹⁵⁹ Dissatisfaction, despair and resignation were not restricted to the general population. Sergei Khrushchev recalled how in 1953, his father was given an American inflatable rubber dingy that was designed to be attached to the floats of a plane. Nikita Khrushchev was so impressed with the inflatable boats that he tried to have them produced in Ukraine. This proved unfeasible.¹⁶⁰ Dissatisfaction was not restricted to material shortfalls. Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Paul Goldberg were young adults under Khrushchev and they recall feeling great indignation at his 'idiotic kitchen debate' with Vice President Richard Nixon, his shoe incident at the United Nations, his laughable attempts to 'catch up with and overtake America in per capita production of milk and meat,' his illiterate pronouncements on art, his attacks on writers whose work was 'inaccessible to the people,' and his shameful mistreatment of Boris Pasternak.¹⁶¹ Respect for Khrushchev and a sense of appreciation for what he had done came after 1964 according to Alexeyeva and Goldberg.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁸ Ronald Hingley, Under Soviet Skins: an Untourist's Report (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1966), 178-179.

¹⁵⁹ Belfrage, A Room in Moscow 43.

¹⁶⁰ Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev 43.

¹⁶¹ Alexeyeva, The Thaw Generation 105.

¹⁶² Alexeyeva, The Thaw Generation 105.

In the cartoon 'In the 'free world'' a couple are discussing their financial situation in the comfort of their home and the man saying to his wife: 'If you had not blown all our money on food and the flat, we could buy a new car'.¹⁶³




Fig. 1 'In the 'free world'' *Novoe vremia* no. 30 (1959)

The political message of this Canadian cartoon was that so much money is consumed by food and shelter that there is no disposable cash left over. However, this cartoon was published in the Soviet Union in 1959, a time when food was still scarce, when there was a massive shortage of housing, and a private car was dreamed of. The concept of the availability of goods in the West would have been reinforced by the plethora of 'things' drawn in the cartoon and the contrast to the Soviet Union where the shortage in the Soviet Union was goods, not money, would have been pronounced.

Due to their privileged positions, Communist bosses had access to inordinate quantities of Soviet and foreign goods. This put them in a powerful position vis-à-vis their fellow citizens. The result was that it was often these citizens who engaged in black market earnings, and who (along with their children) wore the Western fashions, had the Western goods and spoke the Western infused slang. This was met with resentment from the general population. In his memoirs, N. Dubovin noted the

¹⁶³ F. Raita, cartoon 'In the 'free world'', *Novoe vremia* no. 30 (1959): 21.

constant presence of the black market as being very capitalistic. For example, in 1953-54 the secretary of the company Komsomol where he worked would take batteries and sell them on the black market but 'in the meetings he always called for honesty and economy in handling state property,' or the third secretary who was in charge of supplying officers' quarters with fuel and who would sell truck loads of firewood on the side.¹⁶⁴ The *Pravda* journalist referred to as Kolya by Werth declared that it was impossible to 'get away from the fact that there is a technical and intellectual elite in this country. And it'll take far more than twenty or thirty or fifty years to create any semblance of real equality.'¹⁶⁵ The use of Western status symbols and activities by the elite blurred the distinction between communism and capitalism further.

The reports of foreigners from the same period are consistent with the above findings. Thomas Whitney wrote in 1961 that every week brought letters with news of former friends enjoying 'these years of abundance and peace.'¹⁶⁶ Maria Ivanovna, the family's former cook, wrote how prosperous, healthy and happy the family was. The lyric-writer and journalist David wrote that he had a 'spacious new flat' and a car.¹⁶⁷ Giuseppe Boffa also made mention of the improvements: 'from year to year people ate better, dressed better, had more fun.'¹⁶⁸ John Gunther noted that Soviet production of consumer durables during the late 1950s was 'quite respectable... In 1960, the USSR produced 453,800 vacuum cleaners, 2,783,000 bicycles, 26,038,000 clocks and watches, and 1,764,000 cameras.'¹⁶⁹ Despite the general increase in living standards, figures such as Gunther's were not indicative of customer satisfaction. In a published interview with the American Victor Perlo, then First Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan answered questions on the Soviet economy and used the example of the failures in the bicycle industry despite satisfactory outputs, to illustrate the need for the Soviet economy to be more flexible. 'An example is bicycles. We decided to make three and a half million

¹⁶⁴ N. Dubovin, 'For the Sake of a Furlough,' Soviet Youth: Twelve Komsomol Histories (Munich: Institut zur Erforschung der UdSSR, 1959) 242-256, 251-252.

¹⁶⁵ Werth, The Khrushchev Phase 102.

¹⁶⁶ Thomas P. Whitney, Russia in My Life (London: George G. Harrap and Co. Ltd., 1962) 303.

¹⁶⁷ Whitney, Russia in My Life 303.

¹⁶⁸ Boffa, Inside the Khrushchev Era 170.

¹⁶⁹ John Gunther, Inside Russia Today: Revised Edition (New York: Harper and Row, 1962) 404.

bicycles per year. Previously there were long waiting lines for bicycles. Soon there was an oversupply. We lowered the price, with some success, but still there were too many. So we cut production to two million bicycles per year, improved quality, and advertised.'¹⁷⁰ Both the American Meyer Bernstein and the Yugoslav Mihajlo Mihajlov were less impressed than John Gunther with the supply of customer goods and durables. While gathering information that might be of interest to union members, Meyer Bernstein, the head of the United Steelworkers of America's International Affairs Department, frequented various department stores (G.U.M. and Z.U.M. in Moscow) and both converted the prices to USD and compared them to the average income of Soviet workers during his tour of Soviet steel mills at the end of 1966. His conclusion was that although there was an acceptable range of goods, items were expensive: 'a suit of clothes, \$191.40; women's shoes, \$44; a small stereo radio, \$247.50; a small tape recorder, \$198. The same items, if and when in stock, can be bought at more reasonable figures, of course, in less swanky shops. When matched against the average income of \$26 a week, however, it helps point out the plight of the ordinary consumer.'¹⁷¹

Mihajlo Mihajlov, who was imprisoned by Tito for his publication about his summer spent in Moscow in 1964, wrote that in general 'electric appliances and cameras are extremely cheap, while textiles, shoes and vodka are incredibly expensive.'¹⁷² He also noted that living standards in the USSR were about forty percent lower than those in Yugoslavia. Richard Edmonds, touring Russia in 1958 with a British town planning delegation, reported on shopping in Stalingrad that while it was clear that the government was bent on eliminating shortages, they still existed. 'The shoe shortage is probably not as obvious as once it was, but the foreign visitor is still likely to be accosted outside his hotel and offered a generous price for his shoes.'¹⁷³ Ronald Hingley recalled that he was often interviewed by Soviet radio or press reporters and asked to speak about life in England. He felt that the main interest was in ascertaining the nature of the general standard of living. To this end, Hingley was regularly 'interrogated about my income, house, car and

¹⁷⁰ Victor Perlo, How the Soviet Economy Works: An interview with A. I. Mikoyan First Deputy Prime Minister of the USSR (New York: International Publishers, 1961) 18.

¹⁷¹ Lyons, Workers' Paradise Lost 213.

¹⁷² Mihajlov, Moscow Summer 13.

¹⁷³ Richard Edmonds, Russian Vistas: The Record of a Springtime Journey to Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Stalingrad, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus (London: Phene, 1958) 104.

family. When they got down to detail it was hard to satisfy their curiosity. For instance, I could not tell them how much we pay for a kilogram of bread.’¹⁷⁴ This absorption with detailed prices speaks of the social significance prices had for many Soviet citizens. Learning that many necessity goods were cheaper in the USSR than the West reinforced the fairness and socialism of the Soviet system. The challenge that was to arise was the blurring of the definition of ‘necessity’ versus ‘luxury’ items, as items such as refrigerators, radios, televisions, etc. became necessities. The transfer from luxury to necessity was based on expectations formed by internal and external comparisons. That the Soviet Union was unable to provide luxury items in the quantity, quality and affordability of the West was tolerated; that it was to provide the necessities more cheaply and with an all consuming distribution was one of its prime responsibilities to Soviet citizens. Two former Soviet citizens of the Thaw generation were to comment that the 1960s were a time of ‘already not living in the past and not yet troubled by the future.’¹⁷⁵ To use Khrushchev’s words the Thaw era, was one of ‘it is possible’ (*vosmozhno*).

Differences between proclamations, reality and the viability of future achievement during the late 1950s and 1960s presented often painfully comical contradictions. It is during this period that anecdotes soar in number. As a questionnaire respondent wrote in reflection on the Khrushchev era: ‘it was evident to the whole country that there were issues, but only a few protested. The people told anecdotes instead.’¹⁷⁶ The rise of anecdotes is indicative of a knowledgeable, if dis-empowered, population. Vitaly Komar, an art student at the Stroganoff Institute in Moscow recalled the period as being ‘peculiar’, with everything in a state of great fluctuation. Teachers were always changing, thus allowing the students to ‘willy-nilly learn pluralism’ and the curriculum was in fluctuation with one day drawing one way and another day another way, even occasionally like the Americans. Access to significantly increased numbers of Western journals also contributed to the pluralism.¹⁷⁷ Pluralism contributed to the ability to criticise Khrushchev and to

174 Hingley, *Under Soviet Skins* 173.

175 Vail’ *GOE: Mir sovetskogo cheloveka* 70.

176 Questionnaire 3 (St. Petersburg: 1997).

177 Vitaly Komar, ‘An Island in the Past,’ Norman Stone and Michael Glenny ed. *The Other Russia* (London: Faber and Faber, 1990) 406-414, 412.

envisage an alternative leader. From the idea of an alternative leader, an alternative system did not constitute an insurmountable leap.

In a 1997 survey in St. Petersburg of persons born before or around the time of the Russian Revolution, and who remained in the Soviet Union and witnessed its collapse, respondents were asked to list their dominant impression of all Soviet leaders and on the best era. Although these surveys have the filter of history, they represent an opportunity to glean some understanding of the opinions of individuals who remained within the Soviet Union and who were perhaps unable or unwilling to express their opinions under the Communist regime.¹⁷⁸ The general consensus was that Khrushchev was a good but ignorant and silly man of the people¹⁷⁹ who tried but failed to reform the system but who succeed in reigning over a period of relative prosperity, although not, as one respondent wrote a time of stability: 'Khrushchev exposed the cult of the personality and he tried to reform the country's economy. Unfortunately, he did not have the time necessary to do this... Brezhnev, despite representing a stagnation brought stability'.¹⁸⁰ Respondents often simultaneously mentioned Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin and his botched economic reforms. On Khrushchev's mixed successes: 'he wanted to do a lot, but he couldn't do anything'¹⁸¹ or 'he wanted to improve [things] but made [them] worse.'¹⁸² Irina Loukina noted that Khrushchev struck her 'as amusing and poorly cultured. He wanted to provide freedom, a thaw, a spring, I remember that it was during Khrushchev's era that the first rehabilitations of the terror occurred.'¹⁸³ Another individual wrote that Khrushchev: 'was closer to the people. We began to live wealthily, many became free.'¹⁸⁴ She was to continue that the 'best years, in all probability, were the 1960s: we were not hungry; we were becoming wealthy: we built a dacha, in the summer we went with my husband and son to the Black sea.'¹⁸⁵

178 This research was conducted by the researcher in St. Petersburg in 1997. It involved respondents answering both written long answer form questions and oral interviews. The criteria for the respondents was that they were born before or during the Russian Revolution. Contact with respondents was made through the branch method. Names have been changed to protect the anonymity of the respondents who chose to give their names.

179 For a further discussion of the role of Khrushchev's personality in influencing the post-Stalin political course see Boffa, *От СССР К России*.

180 Questionnaire 2 (St. Petersburg: 1997).

181 Questionnaire 29 (St. Petersburg: 1997).

182 Questionnaire 31 (St. Petersburg: 1997).

183 Questionnaire 3 (St. Petersburg: 1997).

184 Questionnaire 4 (St. Petersburg: 1997).

185 Questionnaire 4 (St. Petersburg: 1997).

Another respondent was to write that Khrushchev was 'happy and *khotevshii* – [he] did the best he could. We started to acquire wealth. In my opinion he wasn't overly cultured.'¹⁸⁶ This jumping back and forth between the personal and the political was typical for the comments on Khrushchev. This is in contrast to the comments on Stalin for example, which focused almost exclusively on his sly intelligence, brilliant leadership during the war and forceful nature of a 'real' leader. One of the few male respondents (born in 1918) was the only respondent to talk about Khrushchev's reforms to the military and how no officer that he (the respondent) knew was pleased with them.¹⁸⁷ The same respondent conceded that Khrushchev 'did a lot for the revision of communal apartments (but then dismissed him). Often his words and actions were stupidity, for example: corn, the achieving of communism in the 'near future' and so forth.'¹⁸⁸

Looking for shimmers of light on the horizon, one respondent noted that while 'there have never been good periods in Russia, the somewhat improved periods were 1924-25 [NEP] and the late 1960s.'¹⁸⁹ Other respondents expressed similar sentiments.¹⁹⁰ Iosif Emanuilovich Dyuk was born in 1918 and described his Post-War life as such: 'I got married in 1946; by 1956 we had four children, three girls and a boy. Life was hard during those post war years. I worked as a painter and decorator, doing a full day's work and then a lot of moonlighting on the side. Even then it was difficult to make ends meet, though by the mid -1950s things were looking up a bit.'¹⁹¹ Anna Glazov said that the best time was in the '1960s. Yuri Gagarin flew into space, our country rejoiced in it, we were proud of it. And in power was Nikita Sergeivich Khrushchev.'¹⁹² Valentina Titova noted that Khrushchev's greatest achievements were exposing the cult of Stalin, and opening up space and Siberia.¹⁹³ While most respondents listed the birth of their children and the victory in WWII as the best moments in their lives, some listed the obtaining of personal goods. Thus, the following: the 'greatest joy was when I, with my husband and children, received a flat. Up until then we lived in a communal flat:

¹⁸⁶ Questionnaire 9 (St. Petersburg: 1997).

¹⁸⁷ Questionnaire 14 (St. Petersburg: 1997).

¹⁸⁸ Questionnaire 15 (St. Petersburg: 1997).

¹⁸⁹ Questionnaire 18 (St. Petersburg: 1997).

¹⁹⁰ For example Questionnaire 18 and 2 (St. Petersburg: 1997).

¹⁹¹ Iosif Emanuilovich Dyuk, 'Hunger,' *The Other Russia* 352-365, 363.

¹⁹² Questionnaire 19 (St. Petersburg: 1997).

¹⁹³ Questionnaire 30 (St. Petersburg: 1997).

five tables in the kitchen. The waiting list was many years, and then we received a two room apartment, there was so much happiness.’¹⁹⁴ In an interview that was conducted in conjunction with the St. Petersburg surveys, interviewee David Makarovich recalled the changes in the housing situation: ‘we married in 1951. At the beginning there wasn’t anything, we only had a room. Then we received a *khivara* [flat]... It was sixteen metres for five people. Put succinctly, we lived like that from 1951 to 1961. But then Nikita Sergeivich decided, it was from his good will one could say, he decided for mass construction.’¹⁹⁵ David was to recall that he lost his faith in the possibility of a better future coming first during the Brezhnev regime as he realised that the USSR was not living up to its promises. Gershon Solomonovich Shapiro born in 1899 in Rovno, once a confirmed communist, also lost his faith post-Stalin in the 1950s. He concluded that the ‘very foundations, economic and political, of Soviet type socialism are rotten.’¹⁹⁶ This stemmed from the fact that ‘scarcity and inadequacy of goods and services leads to their inequitable distribution; to a massive degree of bureaucratic abuse of office, embezzlement and plain theft; to endemic popular discontent that is then suppressed by force or the threat of force.’¹⁹⁷ Commenting on the general generational difference in terms of opinions of Khrushchev, Evgeni Arsenyevich Boltin theorised that ‘those who suffered in the purges will never forget that Khrushchev, though not he alone – another Western myth, threw open the camps; and they are grateful to him. But to younger people the purges and the camps are ancient history now; what they do remember, though, is his brinkmanship over Cuba, and for that they will never forgive him.’¹⁹⁸

One aspect of the Liberman report was an analysis of Soviet and foreign consumption. This report was published abroad and in the Soviet Union despite the contention that it was written for the West. Liberman’s report noted the impressive pace of Soviet growth in comparison to the USA but then mentioned that the USSR was behind the more developed capitalist nations in consumption and that as living

¹⁹⁴ Questionnaire 20 (St. Petersburg: 1997).

¹⁹⁵ ‘Life Story: David Makarovich,’ Winter (St. Petersburg: 1997)

¹⁹⁶ Gershon Solomonovich Shapiro, ‘Following Alien Paths,’ The Other Russia 340-343, 342.

¹⁹⁷ Gershon Solomonovich Shapiro, ‘Following Alien Paths,’ The Other Russia 340-343, 342.

¹⁹⁸ Werth, Russia: Hopes and Fears 167.

standard was essential to international economic competition, it must be given priority.¹⁹⁹ In Andrei Amalrik's essay 'Will The Soviet Union Survive Until 1984', he likened the state of Soviet society to one man holding a gun on another, noting that over time both men will weary of their strained positions and relax slowly. One could witness this relaxing in the Soviet Union as there is 'a growing yearning for a quiet life and for comfort – even a kind of 'comfort cult' – on all levels of our society, particularly at the top and in the middle.'²⁰⁰ The 'comfort cult' was driven from the top down as the leadership sought to prove Soviet parity with the West and it was driven from the bottom up as average citizens sought comforts befitting citizens of a modern Soviet state.

Where state was taking society: government fuelled expectations

In struggling for peace, our Party well remembers Lenin's dictum that victorious socialism exerts its main influence on the fate of mankind by its economic successes. These successes can only be multiplied under peaceful conditions. In the peaceful economic competition with capitalism, Socialism undoubtedly will gain a decisive economic victory and will insure for the people their right to a higher standard of living than they now have. This will demonstrate to an even greater extent than now the superiority of our social system and will serve as a mighty, inspiring example to all people of the world in their struggle against capitalism and for socialism. Frol Kozlov²⁰¹

Expectations were created by the government (it allowed people to aspire) and were fuelled by private desire. Achievements such as Sputnik I and II, the atomic icebreaker Lenin, and Yuri Gagarin's flight into space, dramatically eased the task of proving the modern nature of the USSR.²⁰² This pride in technological advances is clearly conveyed in the 1960 Soviet film *Russian Souvenir* in which a plane full of foreign tourists (mostly American) crashes in Siberia. The foreigners are equipped with only a pre-revolutionary guidebook and prejudices. As the foreigners wander their way back towards civilisation, they encounter high-rise complexes where they expected to find wood huts and hydroelectric dams where they

¹⁹⁹ The English translation of this report was first published under the title 'The Soviet Economy Forges Ahead,' New Times no.29 (1967); Werth, Russia: Hopes and Fears 121-124, 122.

²⁰⁰ Andrei Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? (Allen Lane: Penguin Press, 1970) 29.

²⁰¹ Frol Kozlov 'Kozlov's Anniversary Speech,' East Europe Vo. 19 no.12 December (1960) 51-57, 55.

²⁰² Boffa, Inside the Khrushchev Era 121.

anticipated untouched nature. At one point in the film, the foreigners are woken early and escorted to a hilltop. There they find a peasant looking through a telescope. One of the Americans asks the peasant if he can read and write. There is an unintelligible response and the American is motioned to peer through the telescope himself. At this point there is an explosion of colour as a rocket soars into space. The peasant then approaches the group and introduces himself as Academician Bobrov: 'so you see I do sometimes have occasion to read and write, and even to do the odd spot of calculating.' The visitors continue to be stunned and amazed but the zenith remained the Sputnik. The message of the film was that despite foreign misconceptions and continued underestimation, the USSR was advancing at rocket speeds and was no longer a peasant nation. Naturally, the film also portrayed evil spies within the foreign group, and the sexual promiscuity of the Americans. Ronald Hingley, who viewed the film in 1960, noted that the cinema was full (he bought his ticket from a speculator) and that the only real sign of animation from the audience was when the Scottish Presbyterian Minister among the foreign group went to a Kremlin reception in a kilt.²⁰³ For the Soviet leadership, Sputnik was used as the irrefutable proof, even for the most obdurate opponents, that the Soviet Union possessed a potent combination of gifted scientists, innovative engineers, advanced laboratories and workers and a highly developed industry. Despite Sputnik and other impressive technological achievements the perception of being behind was not eradicated. In his memoirs Khrushchev recalled: 'I remember how our engineers would travel to Japan and bring back models of various products. They would pass them around and our experts' mouths would gape in wonder. There is apparently some great defect in our system, for we have no fewer engineers, scientists, or mathematicians than West Germany or Japan.'²⁰⁴ Although, the successful launch of Sputnik eased 'the task of demonstrating that the USSR was a modern advanced country ... a thousand fold,'²⁰⁵ it did nothing to ease consumer expectations. Indeed, it fuelled them.

This section involves a chronological analysis of the development of the ideas of catching up and surpassing the West as presented in public statements. As

²⁰³ Hingley, *Under Soviet Skins* 186.

²⁰⁴ Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes* 93.

²⁰⁵ Boffa, *Inside the Khrushchev Era* 121.

mentioned previously, the term catching up with and surpassing the West was reintroduced in 1955. This phrase was then employed for domestic and international consumption. During a speech made at a meeting of electors of the Kalinin constituency in Moscow (14.03.1958 covered in *Pravda* the following day) Khrushchev explained the need of the communist system for economic and industrial improvements stating that they are 'vivid evidence of the viability and invincibility of the new social system – socialism.'²⁰⁶ In the same speech, he spoke of Great Britain, France and the United States as having garnered the respect of the Soviet regime and deserving due praise for their 'great contributions' to the development of world science, technology and culture.²⁰⁷ In an interview with *Figaro* correspondent Daniel Groussard that ran in *Figaro* and *Pravda* (27.03.1958) Khrushchev was to respond to Groussard's statement that he understood the main task of the USSR to be an economic one, with 'Yes, to surpass the West.'²⁰⁸ With Khrushchev making such bald statements, it is not surprising to find these sentiments reiterated by other individuals. It was also in 1958 that the Minister of Culture told film workers that they must produce films that show new management methods 'and the struggle of farm workers to outstrip the United States in per capita production of meat, milk and butter.'²⁰⁹ These films were to show American crops and equipment, outline their comparative advantages and then detail how the state collective farm would prove itself more efficient. In an attempt to gather agricultural information, Khrushchev was to visit numerous foreign, primarily American, farms, slaughterhouses and food processing factories. Upon returning to the USSR from fact gathering visits he would not only supply information for documentary films, but also include this information in various speeches. Along a similar vein to that of the Kalinin constituency speech was the speech at the Baltic Works in Leningrad in honour of a visiting Polish delegation (03.10.1958) in which Khrushchev was to explain the importance of proving economic superiority as 'after we raise our economy, culture and the standard of living to still higher levels, the ordinary people all over the world will see for themselves that communism is a

²⁰⁶ Khrushchev, For Victory in Peaceful Competition with Capitalism 157.

²⁰⁷ Khrushchev, For Victory in Peaceful Competition with Capitalism 179-180.

²⁰⁸ Khrushchev, For Victory in Peaceful Competition with Capitalism 193.

²⁰⁹ Inkeles, 'Mobilizing Public Opinion' 224.

social system embodying all mankind's finest dreams for a happy life.'²¹⁰

While perhaps unaware of what exactly the construction of a social system that embodied all of mankind's finest dreams for a happy life entailed, there is little doubt that the Soviet leadership had sufficient information about the West to formulate an accurate understanding of their respective positions along the path to that life. Prior to Khrushchev's visit to the United States, the First Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan (in an unofficial capacity at the insistence of Khrushchev) visited the USA as a guest of Ambassador Mikhail A. Menshikov (04.01-20.01.1959). American Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson interpreted accurately the purpose of the trip to be the discussion of increased trade and Berlin. Mikoyan travelled to Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York and Washington DC, spreading diplomacy and gathering impressions along the way. In talks between Mikoyan and Vice President Richard Nixon in Washington (06.01.1959) the State Department's assessment of Mikoyan's message was that the new Soviet leaders were well-read, open to foreigners and based decisions on a full understanding of the facts. The leadership was cognisant of the prior suffering of the Soviet people and felt that Soviet citizens had a right to a better life. Thus, the new slogan of catching up with America. The State Department's assessment was that the new slogan did not constitute a 'menace' but 'admitted that America was ahead of the Soviet Union and it raised America's prestige. If the Soviet people lived better, what kind of threat was that to America? The Soviets did not want to flood the United States with goods. They wanted them for their own people.'²¹¹ In the same conversation Mikoyan was to remark that peaceful co-existence and the ensuing deterrence of war was of prime importance. 'This was not because they were weak or were cowards. They wanted peace in order to develop their country and have it become rich like the United States.'²¹² In a discussion with US Ambassador Lacy Thompson and Secretary Strauss held at the Department of Commerce, the first topic that Mikoyan brought up was praise for the organisation

²¹⁰ Khrushchev, *For Victory in Peaceful Competition with Capitalism* 705-708.

²¹¹ 'Visit to the United States of Anastas I. Mikoyan: Conversation with the Vice President. Washington January 6 1959,' Department of State Eastern European Region, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1183, US Department of State Vol X Part 1, FRUS, 1958. <<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/frus/frus58-60x1/08soviet2.html>>.

Notations on the sources indicate that Dulles and Herter saw the memorandum.

²¹² 'Visit to the United States of Anastas I. Mikoyan: Conversation with the Vice President. Washington January 6 1959'

and multiplicity of motorways and roads. He also voiced his reservations at Russia developing such a road system quickly.²¹³ While visiting the USSR in 1955, the American millionaire farmer Roswell Garst had advised the construction of more and better roads to facilitate grain delivery.²¹⁴

Shortly after Mikoyan's return from the USA, the 21st Congress of the Communist Party met in Moscow (27.01.1959-05.02.1959).²¹⁵ Khrushchev opened the Congress with a speech in which he emphasised catching up with and surpassing the West in per capita output by the end of the Five Year Plan and prophesied that by 1970, the USSR would assume first place internationally in per capita output.²¹⁶ In his address, Mikoyan reported that Manukovsky and Gitalov had stayed on Garst's farm in order to learn how one person could manage one hundred hectares of land, and then increase this to one hundred and fifty. This information was to be communicated to specialists and to the general population through the news media and documentary films displaying Garst's other American farm methods.²¹⁷ That many of the American methods and crops were not suitable for the proposed incorporation into Soviet agriculture was known. For example, Garst was well aware that there were large sections of the USSR that were not suitable for growing corn. In 1955, he had distributed a generous number of Russian language pamphlets in which he detailed where corn could be grown in the USSR and the preconditions for its success: hybrid seeds, fertilisers, insecticides, herbicides, irrigation etc. Many of these things were missing in the USSR. A reported incident in the Krasnodar Territory involved Garst yelling at farmers for sowing the corn without using the readily available fertiliser. The brigade leader told Garst to 'bug off', Garst threatened to tell Khrushchev (which one has to assume he did as the incident

213 'Visit to the United States of Washington January 19 1959,' Department of State Eastern European Region, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1183. US Department of State Vol X Part 1, FRUS, 1958. <<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/frus/frus58-60x1/08soviet2.html>>.

214 Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev 337. In 1955, a delegation of American farmers toured the USSR bring back, according to Naum Jansy 'a lot of fairy tales, accounts of Potemkin villages, and the like.'

215 Upon returning to the USSR Mikoyan held a news conference on 24.01.1959, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP) (04.03.1959) 28-31 and gave a speech to the 21st Congress on 31.01.1959, see CDSP (1.04.1959) 56-60, 79.

216 See CDSP (11.03.1959-03.06.1959) for abridged versions of the speeches. For Khrushchev's speech see CDSP (18.02.1959) 2-19; (25.02.1959) 3-10; (04.03.1959) 17-25; and (11.03.1959) 13-20.

217 Perlo, How the Soviet Economy Works 44.

appears in the family memoirs) and the fertiliser was spread.²¹⁸ Both publicly and with specialists, Khrushchev would hold up Garst and his methods as exemplary producers.²¹⁹

In Khrushchev's address to the 21st Party Congress (28.01.1959 *Pravda*) the major accomplishments since the 20th Party Congress three years earlier were listed as: a) the path to communism was farther walked along, b) the strength of the nation had increased, c) international prestige had increased, d) industry, agriculture and science had improved and e) living standards had risen.²²⁰ The topic of consumer goods, and standard of living was directly addressed and an attempt was made to define needs and thereby curb expectations. It was declared that the time was not far off when man's 'essential requirements within necessary and reasonable limits... [of] all the Soviet people's requirements of food, housing and clothing' would be satisfied.²²¹ There were limits to man's requirements, for example people could not wear unlimited quantities of clothing, or use unlimited housing space. A distinction was made between the provision of 'wholesome' requirements for the cultured person and the potentially whimsical claims for luxuries for the bourgeois. The Soviet regime recognised the need to confine expectations: 'essential requirements', 'full satisfaction within necessary and reasonable limits', the concept of limited material needs, and the refusal to cater to 'whims' or to 'luxuries' are all indications of this awareness. In the address it was acknowledged that the Soviet Union was currently failing to provide 'the full abundance of material goods and cultural benefits necessary to satisfy the growing requirements of our people, necessary for their development' and that without this 'communism is impossible'.²²² The issue was further clarified by stating that communism could be achieved only if the Soviet Union surpassed the production levels and labour productivity level of the West. 'The creation of the material and technical base of communism presupposed a 'highly developed, modern industry, complete electrification of the country,

218 Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev 337.

219 Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev 338.

220 Nikita S. Khrushchev, Rezoliutsiia po dokladu tovarishcha N. S. Khrushcheva 'O kontrol'nykh tsifrakh razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR na 1959-1965 gody (Moskva: Gos. izd-vo polit. lit-ry, 1959).

221 Nikita S. Khrushchev, 'New Stages in Communist Construction and Some Problems of Marxist Leninist Theory' Part IV of a Speech to the Extraordinary 21st Congress of the Communist Party,' (*Pravda* 28.01.1959): 2-10.

222 Khrushchev, 'New Stages in Communist Construction and Some Problems of Marxist Leninist Theory' 2-10.

scientific and technical progress in all branches of industry and agriculture, complex mechanization and automation of all production processes, maximum utilization of new power sources and of our wealth of natural resources, new synthetics and other materials, and a higher cultural and technical level of all the working people.' 223

Overtaking the United States was not sufficient for the completion of communism, as the defects within the American system had to be avoided: 'if America's production level is taken as a yardstick for the growth of our economy, it is only in order to compare this economy with the most developed capitalist economy.' 224

Overtaking the USA was the first stage of communist construction, 'only a way station from which we shall be able to overtake the most highly developed capitalist country, leave it behind, and push ahead.' 225 This was to remain the main objective throughout Khrushchev's leadership. Once official proclamations had been made, Soviet society was in a position to take aspects of such proclamations that appealed (high standards of living) and overlook those that were less appetising (no provision for whims or luxuries). This selective process was to reinforce the backlash against Khrushchev, his claims, and eventually the Soviet system, that arose as it became irrefutably clear that the Soviet Union was not providing the basics let alone whims and luxuries. It was not for naught that a common anecdote of the time asked 'what is a Soviet woman's favourite gift? An onion wrapped up in toilet paper' in response to the persistent shortage of the latter.

The Russian publication 'Concerning the abolition of taxes on factory and office workers and other measures to advance the well being of the Soviet people' published in English under 'Raising the Soviet Standard of Living' was a collection of documents based on Khrushchev's published address to the Supreme Soviet (05.05.1960) together with an explanation of resulting laws. In the main address it was announced that the Soviet people were in the process of catching up with the most highly developed capitalist countries, and that the feasibility of this task was incontrovertible. The more dedicated workers were to fulfilling the Seven Year Plan, the more vigilantly shortcomings would be conquered and the 'more vigour

223 Khrushchev, 'New Stages in Communist Construction and Some Problems of Marxist Leninist Theory' 2-10.

224 Khrushchev, 'New Stages in Communist Construction and Some Problems of Marxist Leninist Theory' 2-10.

225 Khrushchev, 'New Stages in Communist Construction and Some Problems of Marxist Leninist Theory' 2-10.

we display in cleaning our Soviet house of everything stagnant and outmoded the faster we shall accomplish this.'²²⁶ The focus of the report then turns to the role of technology in achieving Soviet supremacy. Within this technological section the leading role of the USA is reiterated. The concluding argument held that the superior Soviet pace of growth was such that the gap would be closed in the near future.²²⁷ Then Soviet statistics were given (The inclusion of Soviet statistics into this study is not an acceptance of their accuracy rather it represents information, accurate or otherwise, that was made available to the masses). This particular document claims the 1960 plan provided for the production of 7.9 billion metres of fabric; more than France, Britain and West Germany together. It claimed also that the Soviet Union was manufacturing more wool and linen textiles than any individual capitalist country, and that Soviet fabric consumption per person was equal with France and was set to overtake West Germany and Britain. From the main address: 'We shall have to do a big job, take measures to reduce the time required for building textile and shoe factories, enterprises for the manufacture of chemical fibres, synthetic leather and top quality dyes. We must expand more rapidly the building of machines for the light, textile and chemical industries.'²²⁸ The greatest challenge was in meat production that was to remain lagging behind the USA throughout the Seven Year Plan.²²⁹ Ideally, the end of the Seven Year Plan was to witness a Soviet Union that was the most advanced country in consumption of 'many important consumer goods.' The clothing and footwear requirements of the population were to be plentifully met, housing was to be adequate, more meat was to be available etc. In Khrushchev's concluding remarks there is a denunciation of doubters, a reiteration of well placed faith in the Soviet worker, a promise to match and overtake American production levels, and a reiteration of the idea that abundance refers only to necessities: 'I wish to stress once again that as regards all consumer goods which are really needed by the people, we shall soon reach the level of production and consumption of the United States of America.'²³⁰

²²⁶ Nikita. S. Khrushchev, Raising the Soviet Standard of Living: Report by N. S. Khrushchev to the USSR Supreme Soviet: May 5, 1960 (New York: Crosscurrents, 1960) 12.

²²⁷ Khrushchev, Raising the Soviet Standard of Living 34.

²²⁸ Khrushchev, Raising the Soviet Standard of Living 45.

²²⁹ Khrushchev, Raising the Soviet Standard of Living 42-43.

²³⁰ Khrushchev, Raising the Soviet Standard of Living 47.

At the 5th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, Khrushchev spoke about the challenge facing the Soviet Union: 'not for one moment must we forget that in all branches of industry and agriculture we are still lagging behind capitalist countries and are not as yet meeting in full the constantly growing requirements of the population of our countries.'²³¹ Also in 1960, 'For Victory in Peaceful Competition with Capitalism', a series of Khrushchev's speeches and responses to questions from foreign journalists, was published. This is a particularly optimistic collection of interviews in which it was declared that the Soviet Union was to overtake the US in food and consumer goods within the 'next few years,' in terms of housing in the next ten to twelve years,²³² and in which it is noted that standard of living should not be based on quantity of goods produced but on consumption. The idea that recognition was representative of respect was communicated in such documents as the interview with I McDonald, the foreign editor of the *Times*, published in February in *Pravda* and in *International Affairs* no.4 (1960). In this particular interview Khrushchev reiterated the standard hortatory sovietese that the Soviet Union was soon to outstrip advanced capitalist nations in per capita output and that 'when this has been achieved the indisputable superiority of the socialist system will be even more obvious to everyone.'²³³ It is also this interview that contains a phrase summing up the inevitable failure of the Soviet economic system. 'A minister had to be greater than God because he had to know everything that was being done.'²³⁴

Frol Romanovich Kozlov became first Deputy Premier in March 1958 and in 1960 he joined the Party Secretariat. In 1959, he served as Khrushchev's interpreter at the American exhibition. His propensity to dress nattily, he had a 'liking for good jewellery and shirts with button down collars,' drew comments from the foreign press and was not overlooked by the Soviet press.²³⁵ In November 1960, Kozlov gave a published speech in celebration of the 43rd anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in which he reiterated many of Khrushchev's ideas about the state of the Soviet economy vis-à-vis Western ones and substantiated this with figures. The

²³¹ Nikita Khrushchev, '5th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany' as reprinted in *For Victory in Peaceful Competition with Capitalism* 548.

²³² Khrushchev, *For Victory in Peaceful Competition with Capitalism* 25.

²³³ Khrushchev, *For Victory in Peaceful Competition with Capitalism* 104.

²³⁴ Khrushchev, *For Victory in Peaceful Competition with Capitalism* 104.

²³⁵ 'Men in the News: Frol Kozlov,' *East Europe* Vol. 9 no.12 December (1960): 50.

Soviet Union was a rich and flourishing country with exceptional prospects, and everything necessary to satisfactorily provide for its citizens.²³⁶ 'The Soviet Union is already ahead of the United States in the output of iron ore and coal, coke, passenger cars for trunk railways, grain harvester combines, lumber, woollen fabrics, butter and sugar. We realise, of course, that the United States is still leading in a number of industrial fields.'²³⁷ What is not mentioned were such details as the US had moved away from woollen fabrics to synthetics and that the lack of destruction to the American rail system during the war combined with its previous expansion and the advanced state of automotive transportation resulted in the US not needing to expand at a rate similar to the USSR. Kozlov continued by declaring that 'only the victory of socialism and communism will insure the complete and fullest satisfaction of the material and spiritual needs of the working people.... Life in the Soviet Union is becoming more and more joyous and happy.'²³⁸ As proof of the Party's commitment to improving living standards Kozlov draws upon the success of the housing industry in which from '1957 to 1960 houses with a total area of almost 300 million square metres were built in towns and workers' settlements.'²³⁹

In 1958, a highly influential and prestigious drafting committee was brought together under the auspices of the Central Committee's International Department chief Boris Ponomarev. The committee was charged with gathering scientific, technological and economic information on the state of the Soviet economy and on international developments. Two leading economic theorists Evgenii Varga and Stanislav Strumilin participated. Particular attention was to be paid to ten-year comparisons between the USSR and USA. Fyodor Burlatsky joined the group in 1960 and recalled that the working group's comparisons were 'complete fabrications' but that the figures had come to the committee in a separate folder with Khrushchev's instructions that they be included.²⁴⁰ After the presidium had received the draft with minor changes, it was published (30.08.1961) and presented by Khrushchev at the 22nd Party Congress. The role of the committee was to make the fictitious figures seem functional.

²³⁶ Kozlov, 'Kozlov's Anniversary Speech,' East Europe 52.

²³⁷ Kozlov, 'Kozlov's Anniversary Speech,' East Europe 53.

²³⁸ Kozlov, 'Kozlov's Anniversary Speech' East Europe 54.

²³⁹ Kozlov, 'Kozlov's Anniversary Speech' 54.

²⁴⁰ Fyodor Burlatsky, Khrushchev: The Era of Khrushchev Through the Eyes of His Advisor (New York: Scribner, 1991) 130.

In Khrushchev's 'Report on the Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: October 17th at the 22nd Congress', Soviet citizens heard that previously Russia was seen as a land of the 'pick and wheelbarrow, the wooden plough and the spinning wheel. It had one tenth of the machinery that the United States had, and one fifth of what Germany had.'²⁴¹ By contrast, the Soviet Union was a country of advanced technology, of high-powered machine tools and precision instruments, of assembly lines, electronic computers and spaceships. It was a country of steel and aluminium, of cement and plastics. Its steel production figures were on a par with Britain's, West Germany's and France's combined.²⁴² The Soviet public heard that the United States offered incentives for agricultural dumping in an attempt to maintain high prices and that the US was the 'richest and mightiest power in the capitalist world' and that it was past its prime.²⁴³

In addition to official reports and speeches from within the Soviet Union based on the Soviet economy, Khrushchev was to have his speeches, transcripts of press conferences etc from abroad published in the Soviet Union. One such example was the press coverage surrounding his trip to the United States in 1959. This trip and the subsequent press coverage had a significant impact on Soviet perceptions of Khrushchev and of capitalist consumption.

Where the state was taking society: An American example

One example of coverage linking consumption, technological and economic images of the West and the Soviet future was Khrushchev's extensively publicised visit to the USA in 1959. Khrushchev's visit was reported on before, during and after the trip in all Soviet newspapers under such titles as 'Thirteen days that stirred the world' and 'A triumphant journey'.²⁴⁴ Alexander Werth arrived in Moscow just after Sputnik was launched and was there as Khrushchev arrived back from his USA trip. His dominant impression of press coverage at this time was 'columns and

²⁴¹ Nikita S. Khrushchev, Documents of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU: Report on the Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York: Crosscurrents Press, 1961) 11.

²⁴² Khrushchev, Documents of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU 11.

²⁴³ Khrushchev, Documents of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU 25.

²⁴⁴ *Rabotnitsa* was to feature the visit with a three page untitled article that included pictures of Khrushchev's speech in the UN, the atomic icebreaker Lenin and American crowds welcoming Khrushchev. Oleg Pissarzhevskii *Rabotnitsa* no.10 (10.1959) 1-3.

columns of Khrushchev in every paper.²⁴⁵ Press coverage was prolific and the subject matter, the nation's leader combined with the United States, guaranteed an audience.

The pace of the American trip was gruelling, packed with political, industrial, and press meetings. The focus was on establishing trade ties, increasing the Soviet leader's prestige at home, and included the potentially fruitful Camp David talks. Upon arriving back in the USSR, Khrushchev undertook a tour of Russia (primarily of Siberia) in which he often referred to the United States. In conjunction with the American trip and the daily coverage the work *Zhit' v mire i druzhbe*, an edited volume of Khrushchev's American speeches, question and answer sessions and comments thereon was published. Both the foreign language editions and the Russian editions ran the same photos, albeit not in the same order. The images portrayed Khrushchev and his entourage interacting with Americans. The pictures contained images of American automobiles, fashion, and architecture.

Before leaving for the United States, Khrushchev had insisted that he be treated as head of state and head of government, despite this being an affectation (he was the head of government). However, being recognised as both would allow for the full ceremonial welcome. In Geneva in 1955, Khrushchev felt that he had been humiliated and shunned during the greeting ceremony claiming that a Swiss guardsman man had deliberately stood directly in front of him just as Bulganin stepped forward to review the Swiss guard of honour. Khrushchev ascribed great importance to being properly respected by the West in general and the Americans in particular: that he received a full ceremonial welcome and send off was considered official recognition of his success. In Khrushchev's opening address, he began with what many Americans were to assess as a warmongering boast and many Soviet citizens as evidence of poor taste: 'upon the eve of our meeting with you, Mr. President, Soviet scientists, engineers, technicians and workers gladdened us by launching a rocket to the moon.'²⁴⁶ Sputnik was often mentioned during the trip; Eisenhower was even given a model of the satellite. A partial explanation for the chortling over Sputnik was Khrushchev's sense of inferiority:

²⁴⁵ Werth, *The Khrushchev Phase* 15.

²⁴⁶ *Zhit' v mire i druzhbe* 45.

For one thing, we still have a lot to learn from the capitalists. There are many things we still don't do as well as they do. It's been more than fifty years since the working class of the Soviet Union carried out its revolution under the leadership of the Great Lenin, yet, to my disappointment and irritation, we still haven't been able to catch up with the capitalists. Sometimes we jokingly say that capitalism is rotten to the core. Yet those rotten capitalists keep coming up with things, which make our jaws drop in surprise. I would dearly love to surprise *them* with our achievements as often. Particularly in the field of technology and organisation, rotten capitalism has borne some fruits which we would do well to transplant into our own socialist soil.²⁴⁷

Shelest's account of Khrushchev's assessment of his final public speech in which he lambasted Soviet arts and sciences reinforces this idea. Shelest recalls Khrushchev saying: "Yes, I recognise that I allowed myself to behave less than tactfully toward people in the arts and sciences... But after all, it's no secret that our science lags behind foreign science and technology in many areas."²⁴⁸ In his memoirs, Khrushchev writes of having repeatedly shared his displeasure with Soviet workers and engineers. For example, during his 1960 trip to France, Khrushchev was terribly impressed by the quality of the runway and how well equipped D'Orly was. "Much as I've tried over the years and much as I've criticised our construction engineers, our runways still look worn-out and potholed a year after they're built. I don't think that there is any secret about why everything is always so neat in the West: it's a matter of good production, discipline, strict standards, and well-designed processes. It's just a higher level of culture in the West."²⁴⁹ He went on to continue that this "isn't the first time I've mentioned the problem. I used to speak of it whenever I came home from a trip abroad; unfortunately, the comparisons I made were rarely in our favour."²⁵⁰ Khrushchev was not the only Soviet citizen to comment on Soviet inadequacies. Carl Rowan, the former head of USIA, recalled a conversation with a Russian citizen waiting for a defective lift in which the Russian noted that the leadership "can get to the moon but they can't get me to the fifth floor."²⁵¹ A Muscovite voiced a similar antipathy to Sputnik when she remarked that it was fine to have Sputniks but all she wanted was to buy a new teapot.²⁵²

²⁴⁷ Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament 532.

²⁴⁸ Khrushchev, Khrushchev on Khrushchev 156.

²⁴⁹ Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament 419.

²⁵⁰ Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament 419.

²⁵¹ As quoted in Lyons, Workers' Paradise Lost 223.

²⁵² Belfrage, A Room in Moscow 44.

In the USA, Khrushchev's speeches emphasised, catching up and surpassing the United States. During his opening speech at the White House (15.09.1959), the world was to learn that the Soviet leaders and citizens wanted nothing from the USA and that the Soviet people were well aware of the fact that the United States was richer than the Soviet Union. The world was then informed that a prime Soviet objective was to be 'as rich tomorrow' as the United States was then.²⁵³ This idea could not have been news to either the American administration or the American public. Richard Nixon, who visited the USSR in the capacity of Vice President earlier on in 1959, recalled Khrushchev telling him as they perused the American Exhibition: "Mr. Vice President, you're ahead of us now economically, but we're moving faster than you are, our system is better than yours, and we're going to pass you by pretty soon, and we're going to wave to you as we go by and then we're going to say 'come on, follow us and do as we do so that you don't fall behind any farther'."²⁵⁴ During the joint televised addresses to mark the official opening of the American exhibition, Nixon stated that 'the world's largest capitalist country has, from the standpoint of the distribution of wealth, come closest to the ideal prosperity for all in a classless society.'²⁵⁵ Khrushchev was to audibly interject that the USSR was catching up. Nixon believed that Khrushchev was attracted to the West's economic successes as he was striving to provide economic progress for 'his poverty stricken Soviet people. He also knew that without this progress his goal of world domination would be a pipe dream.'²⁵⁶ A Soviet journalist put it less charitably when he commented that Khrushchev 'liked the supermarkets and all that.'²⁵⁷

In an interview with leaders of the US congress and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Khrushchev recalled that the 'Soviet people always think highly of the achievements of the American people, rejoice in these achievements, are a little envious at times, and want first to bring our economy level with yours, then gather strength and outstrip you.'²⁵⁸ In addition to acknowledging the current state of competition between the two nations, Khrushchev often called

²⁵³ *Zhit' v mire i druzhbe* 53.

²⁵⁴ Nixon, *The Challenges We Face* 23.

²⁵⁵ As quoted in Andre Fontaine, *A History of the Cold War: from the Korean war to the Present* (New York: Renaud Bruce Patheon Books, 1969) 325.

²⁵⁶ Richard Nixon, *Leaders* (New York: Warner Books, 1982) 199.

²⁵⁷ 'A' in Werth, *The Khrushchev Phase* 173.

²⁵⁸ *Zhit' v mire i druzhbe* 80.

on examples of historical co-operation to justify increased trade co-operation and exchanges of scientific and technical information.

You may rest assured that the Soviet Union will hold its own in this economic competition: it will overtake you and leave you behind.... Incidentally, competition as we Soviet people understand and practise it by no means excludes cooperation and mutual assistance...haven't we cooperated with you in the past? Some thirty years ago, when our country started building a large-scale industry, good economic contacts were established with leading US firms. Ford helped us build the motor works in Gorky. Your engineers helped us build the tractor works in Stalingrad and Kharkov. Americans, along with the British, were consultants during the construction of the Moscow subway. We were grateful to your specialists for their cooperation and many of them returned home with Soviet decorations and letters of thanks, to say nothing of remuneration in cash.²⁵⁹

Khrushchev was to taunt the Americans with information about trade with Western Europe noting that trade relations with Britain were 'shaping up quite well', were expanding with West Germany largely due to the West German government's 'correct understanding of the interests of its country in this matter,' were 'shaping up' with Italy, and were 'not bad' with France.²⁶⁰ Two chemical plants that an American company had purchased from Krupp of Germany had also been purchased by the USSR; an automobile tyre factory for the Dnepropetrovsk Economic Region was to be provided by a British company; Italy was active in the field of Soviet synthetic fibre and chemical equipment and thus equipment that the Soviet Union would be willing to purchase from Du Pont was being purchased in Western Europe.²⁶¹ Due to the extensive nature of the Soviet press coverage, Soviet citizens at home were able to gather information not only about the United States but also about their nation's trade relations. An added benefit for those learning English was the use of the American broadcasts for translation lessons in schools, colleges and universities.

The various comments by Henry Cabot Lodge provided figures on the American economy and standard of living. At the dinner given by the economic club of New York (17.09.1959), Lodge was to declare that there were 14 million Americans who owned shares; that two thirds of the American GDP went towards consumer items such as food, entertainment, refrigerators, automobiles, etc; that

²⁵⁹ Zhit' v mire i druzhbe 128.

²⁶⁰ Zhit' v mire i druzhbe 128.

²⁶¹ Zhit' v mire i druzhbe 316.

seventy-five percent of American families owned their own automobiles; that services had overtaken production despite production quantities being the highest in the world; and that the proportion of families making over \$10,000 a year had tripled in the last ten years. He declared that the term 'economic humanism' was the most accurate term to describe the American system as the system existed for 'the benefit of the everyday rank and file of citizens.'²⁶² Five days later, Lodge was to give a similarly detailed speech regarding labour, farm machinery, and consumer durable consumption amongst farmers. According to Lodge, between 1940 and 1958, the average amount of farm machinery per worker had increased nine hundred percent (with over five million tractors); availability of farm electricity went from thirty-one percent of farms to ninety-four percent; fifty-two percent of farms had telephones; seventy four percent had cars; ninety percent had refrigerators; fifty three percent had televisions; and thirty-nine percent had home freezers. In a very sovietesque manner, he then reported that the average American consumed 8.4 pounds of butter, thirteen pounds of cheese, 151 pounds of meat and 180 litres of milk a year.²⁶³

Khrushchev's answer to Lodge was to acknowledge the high levels of mechanisation and output of American farms and to express an interest in applying American methods to kolkhozes.²⁶⁴ 'We must learn from your experience. We pay due tribute to the knowledge, industry and experience of American farmers, scientists and farm specialists. Your achievements are worthy of praise and your experience is worthy of study and imitation.'²⁶⁵ Khrushchev also commented on the density of the crops: he had seen such crops in films but that it was good to see it in real life.²⁶⁶ Despite lower yields and poor mechanisation the kolkhoz remained superior as it worked for the people and not for profit. Khrushchev was not so against the American profit system that he felt that all individuals involved either on a governmental or private level were inept. He was to publicly mention a conversation with Harriman in which he stated that after Harriman had been replaced by the US government, he could have the post of 'Economic Adviser to

²⁶² Zhit' v mire i druzhbe 116-117.

²⁶³ Zhit' v mire i druzhbe 271.

²⁶⁴ Zhit' v mire i druzhbe 273.

²⁶⁵ Zhit' v mire i druzhbe 275-76.

²⁶⁶ Zhit' v mire i druzhbe 282.

the Chairman of the Council of the Ministers of the USSR, with a good salary and a good country house.'²⁶⁷

Khrushchev believed that good trade relations were indicative of good relations between governments and repeatedly called on examples of past co-operation as grounds for future negotiations.²⁶⁸ He liked to highlight the industrialist Armand Hammer, whose family had owned a pencil factory during the Tsarist times, who had a son in the Soviet Union, and who was an economic emissary for the US government under the Kennedy administration. Hammer's friendly activities received wide Soviet media coverage, notably after he donated two letters written by Lenin to the Soviet state. In 1961, he visited the old pencil factory that was now within Moscow city limits, walking in on the night shift (with the exception of a few new machines, all of the machines that he had purchased in Germany under Lenin were still being used). Press coverage of this visit reinforced Hammer's connection to Lenin. For example, this report ran in *Pravda*:

'Hammer went to V. I. Lenin and said that he had decided to apply for a concession for the manufacture of pencils. V. I. Lenin looked at him with surprise and said, 'Why do you want to take a concession for the manufacture of pencils?' 'Mr. Lenin,' said Hammer, 'you have set a goal that everybody should learn to read and write and you haven't any pencils! Therefore, I will manufacture pencils!' [Noisy applause in the hall] Some of the old employees were still there to greet Hammer. 'See how pleased our old boss is with our progress,' they said [Laughter and applause]. So, you see, V. I. Lenin went even further than we by granting concessions to foreigners.'²⁶⁹

During the 1960s, Hammer sought to negotiate a massive agreement for an American technology based factory system for the production of fertilizer but Khrushchev was removed from power before it was ratified. In 1978, under Brezhnev, the scheme was resurrected. The proposal was for a complex of ten plants, eight ammonia plants and two urea plants, with a total annual capacity of approximately four million metric tons of liquid ammonia and one million metric tons of urea.²⁷⁰ Great Britain was to provide the credit.

²⁶⁷ *Zhit' v mire i družbe* 120.

²⁶⁸ *Na vsekh kontinentakh mira* (Moskva: Bol. isdatel'stvo instituta mezhdynarodnykh otnoshenii, 1963) 4.

²⁶⁹ Bob Considine, *Larger Than Life: a Biography of the Remarkable Dr. Armand Hammer* (London: W. H. Allen, 1976) 167.

²⁷⁰ Considine, *Larger Than Life* 182.

Western moguls, such as Eaton, Hammer or Rockefeller were often given positive press coverage in the Soviet Union. Cyrus Eaton was showcased regularly as an industrialist who understood economics and did not let politics influence what should be economic decisions. Typically, Eaton's visits to the Soviet Union received first page coverage. This image of the good industrialist was in direct contrast with the stereotype of the businessman. Individual men contemplating conducting business with the USSR were depicted as objective, scientific, wealthy, and intelligent in contrast to fat swine with blood dripping down their jowls, over the riches stuffed in their pockets and ruining their tuxedos. Under Khrushchev the stereotypical evilness of the capitalist was de-personified and transferred to large corporations, as seen in a *Krokodil* caricature of the American firms Boeing, General Dynamics, Hughes Aircraft, Lockheed, and Douglas all depicted as wild swine eating out of a trough labelled 'pentagon'.²⁷¹ Charles Levinson travelled in the USSR with a group of prominent American businessmen and recalled that all the men, but Rockefeller in particular, were treated like celebrities. His assessment as to why the capitalists received red carpet treatment was that 'American capitalists in the USSR have a special status, based on a strange reversal of principle, just as in our own democratic society crowds turn out to cheer royalty.'²⁷²

²⁷¹ 'Kormushka' *Krokodil* (02.01.1967) 16.

²⁷² Church as quoted in Charles Levinson, *Vodka-Cola* (Great Britain: Gordon and Cremonesi, 1979), 198.




Fig. 2 'Kormushka' Krokodil (1967)

Throughout the American trip, Khrushchev was to urge American businessmen to be less illogical and allow business to be business. During an exchange with US businessmen (25.09.1959), Eric Ridder, publisher of the *Journal of Commerce* and host of the gathering, opened up discussion by asking whether trade would improve because of Khrushchev's visit and inviting comments from the panel. The panel consisted of several prominent American moguls and Khrushchev. The comment from J. Strauss, the President of R. H. Macy and Co., was that Americans did not like to purchase goods from behind the Iron Curtain. This was refuted by A. Moore, the President of Moore-McCormack shipping lines, whose company regularly carried shipments of Polish ham, Czech goods and Russian caviar to the USA. Khrushchev's response was full of irritation at the American

businessmen's propensity to combine political and economic considerations declaring that the Americans were 'making a hash of everything' and that regardless of the evident American dislike of the Great October Socialist Revolution there was a fondness for Russian caviar.²⁷³ In his memoirs, Khrushchev was to complain about Poland's high grain requisitions despite Poland having the best agricultural yields in the Comecon and hypothesised that in Poland pigs were being fed wheat and the ham was being sent to the USA. He charged Poland with being motivated by dollars and the USA with having a policy of divide and conquer.²⁷⁴

In response to the question 'Why, in spite of all this [American fear of communism, illogical trade restrictions etc] do you adopt a lot of what there is in the capitalist countries?' Khrushchev was to answer: 'Because we are not fools!'²⁷⁵ During the course of the American trip, it was made clear that the Soviet interest in purchasing consumer goods did not lay in sausages, shoes or machine equipment. Interest lay in exactly those industrial fields that were the subject of recent trade deals with Western Europe: tyre production, automotives, synthetic materials, petrochemicals, chemicals etc. However, Khrushchev was to overlook one of the great technological innovations of the time in favour of his stomach. During the American exhibition, IBM had exhibited a functioning RAMAC computer.²⁷⁶ During the planning stages of Khrushchev's visit to the USA, he was offered the opportunity to tour IBM. (Soviet press coverage attributed the invitation to the State Department.) In a speech at a civic authorities' reception in San Francisco (21.09.1959) after his visit to IBM Khrushchev was to speak fondly of Mr. Watson, the President of IBM Corp, with whom he had had contact in the Soviet Union and USA. Then he declared that the tour was 'evidently' interesting but that as a non-specialist his evaluation 'meant nothing' and that only time would tell which country was producing better machines.²⁷⁷ This was followed by praise for the self-service cafeteria system that was instituted as a highly efficient and novel system. Upon returning to the USSR, Khrushchev sought to have the cafeteria system

²⁷³ Zhit' v mire i druzhbe 311-312.

²⁷⁴ Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament 213.

²⁷⁵ Zhit' v mire i druzhbe 317.

²⁷⁶ a discussion on the merits of the RAMAC computer and the questions that it posed during the American exhibition can be found in A. Eprin, 'Vopros robot,' Ogonek no.35 (23.08.1959) 27.

²⁷⁷ Zhit' v mire i druzhbe 257-258.

implemented, the result of which failed to impress at least one Soviet professor, Evgenii Arsenyevich Boltin, who referred to them as 'completely useless.'²⁷⁸ In his final address on American soil, Khrushchev brought the essence of the visit around from politics and economics to the people: 'we liked your beautiful cities and fine roads, but most of all your fine amiable, kind hearted people.'²⁷⁹

Khrushchev spoke of his American trip and his ceremonious departure during his subsequent tour of the USSR. At a rally in Vladivostok (06.10.1959), he conveyed his pride in the ceremony given to the Soviet delegation and the sense of validation of Soviet achievements that this gave:

as I stood in the aerodrome near Washington before departing from America, the salute of nations was given in honour of our motherland, just as during the welcoming ceremony. I was delighted to hear our national anthem and the twenty-one cannon salvos. After the first volley I thought, 'that's in honour of Karl Marx, the second – Friedrich Engels, the third – Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, the fourth His Majesty the working class, the toiling people!... And so on, one volley after another in honour of our motherland and her people. *Not bad, comrades, not bad!*²⁸⁰

A Moscow journalist put it succinctly when he said: 'on the whole, there is something very nice about Americans, and, my God, it's an impressive country; and it's no use denying that Nikita was really impressed by their standard of living.'²⁸¹

Q: Is it true that Comrade Khrushchev's health is declining?

A: Yes. He is suffering from a hernia caused by lifting the level of agricultural production, hyperventilation caused by trying to catch up with America, and verbal diarrhoea caused by God knows what.²⁸²

Conclusion: Why Khrushchev needed external comparison

Praise for the United States was common and accepted enough during this time that even Soviet military backed publications like *Krasnaya zvezda* were to carry positive statements such as there is no 'doubt the American people are industrious and talented. They have made a great contribution to world civilization and culture in subjugating nature.'²⁸³ I. R. Borisov of *Inostrannaia literatura* was in New York in 1959. In his coverage of America he wrote that he had come to accept

²⁷⁸ Werth, Russia: Hopes and Fears 165-166.

²⁷⁹ Zhit' v mire i družbe 343.

²⁸⁰ As quoted in Burlatsky, Khrushchev and the First Russian Spring (160).

²⁸¹ Werth, The Khrushchev Phase 169.

²⁸² Alexeyeva, The Thaw Generation 104.

²⁸³ CDSP (17.07.1957)

that 'in science and technology, the USA represented the epicentre,' and that in terms of the provision of all life's comforts the American economy had provided 'not a few results.'²⁸⁴ In describing the general perception of the West, specifically America in the 1950s and early 1960s in Russia, R. K. White wrote that within Soviet society there was the notion that life 'in America is a kind of magic crystal in which they hope to catch glimpses of their own future and their children's future.'²⁸⁵ In conversation with two Siberians who were in Moscow on business in the early 1960s, Eddy Gilmore was surprised by both the level of information and praise that he found:

'Siberia's like the great West in America,' said Konstantin. 'We've got everything out there, just as your west has everything. We've got cattle, oil, coal, gold, diamonds-waving fields of grain and the Mexicans'
'You don't have Texas millionaires,' I interrupted.
'We have collective farms that are millionaires.'
'Not the same as a Texas millionaire,' I said.
'I don't suppose so. But we'll have them one of these days.'
'Under Communism?'
'Who knows? He roared with laughter. 'Here's a toast. To Siberian millionaires.'
'How do you know about the West?' I asked.
'I've been there, *tovarich*. I've been to Texas, to Oklahoma, the whole thing - Arizona and New Mexico too. Now, Texas, that's a state for you. I loved it. It's so much like Siberia'²⁸⁶

Gilmore's conversation with the Siberian businessmen highlights a number of the then contemporary issues. A willingness to put faith in the successes of the Communist system (the wealthy collective farms, the future of millionaires in Siberia); praise for the wealth of the West; and an increasingly large group of privileged citizens who could travel abroad.

The West was a foil for the Soviet Union in many of the anecdotes that were to gain such popularity during this era. As Peter Vail and Aleksandr Genis have noted, without the West in general and the United States in particular, many of the most enduring pointed anecdotes of the period would not have existed. For example,

²⁸⁴ R. Borisov, 'Reklama i zhizn', *Inostrannaya literatura* no.9 (1959) 213-218, 213, 214.

²⁸⁵ He also noted that part of this image was formed or reinforced by the American publication *Amerika* and the extraordinary demand thereof. Raiph K. White, *Fearful Warriors* (USA: Macmillan, 1984) 257.

²⁸⁶ Gilmore, *The Cossacks Burned Down the YMCA* 160-161.

'How do you undermine a capitalist country? Send Soviet planners'²⁸⁷; 'A vagrant lies in the gutter, dressed in filthy rags, starving, and almost comatose. Comment of the observer: 'somebody has reached socialism;'²⁸⁸ or, 'What is the difference between democracy and communism? Abundance.'²⁸⁹ Even Khrushchev's pet project of agriculture was subjected to this ridicule: 'Khrushchev appealed to Kennedy with a request to sell grain. Kennedy replied: Fine, We will sell you grain. But, you want to spread communism throughout the world. Where will you buy grain from then?'²⁹⁰ Or the fictitious taunting by Soviet and American children:

- American and Soviet children playing with/ taunting each other.
- You don't have flour, and you don't have grouts.
 - Your president was murdered.
 - And you won't have flour and you won't have grouts.²⁹¹

Official comparison with the West was not restricted to the Khrushchev era. However, by the late 1960s and the Brezhnev regime, the proclamations of catching up and surpassing had been quieted. Neither the population nor the leadership believed in the viability or the benefits of the claims. In Brezhnev's 1967 closing speech to the CPSU he excused the fact that the Soviet Union was lagging behind through historical justification, noting that when the bourgeoisie came to power it received 'a well designed and tested vehicle, a well prepared road and previously tested appliances' while the proletariat had received 'no vehicle, no road, absolutely nothing that had been tested beforehand.'²⁹² Under Brezhnev the attempt was made to return comparison to the historical and internal from its foray into the contemporary and external. However, the goal of providing an improved standard of living remained part of official rhetoric and the need for some Western technology remained. In 1976, Kosygin declared the need to improve 'the quality of products, especially consumer goods.'²⁹³ At the 25th Party Congress in February 1976, Brezhnev declared that the Soviet government was like any other government

287 Dora Shturman and Sergei Tiotin, The Soviet Union Through the Prism of the Political Anecdote (London: Overseas Publications Interchange Ltd, 1985) 34.

288 Gunther, Inside Russia Today 427.

289 Evgenii Andreevich, Kremf i narod (Munkhen, Golos naroda, 1951) 111.

290 Shturman, The Soviet Union Through the Prism of the Political Anecdote 37.

291 Shturman, The Soviet Union Through the Prism of the Political Anecdote 212.

292 Leonid Brezhnev, Fifty Years of Great Achievements of Socialism (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), 17.

293 Aleksei N. Kosygin, Guidelines for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR for 1976-1980 (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1976) 9.

in that it sought to make use of the 'advantages provided by external economic links for the purposes of mobilising additional opportunities for the successful resolution of economic tasks and the gaining of time, for raising the effectiveness of production and accelerating the progress of science and technology.'²⁹⁴ At the 26th Party Congress in February 1981, he instigated an investigation into why 'we sometimes lose our lead [in technology], spend large sums of money on purchasing abroad equipment and technology that we are fully able to make for ourselves often indeed at a higher level of quality.'²⁹⁵ By late 1970s and early 1980s there were public statements expressing concerns with the high level of Soviet importation of Western equipment and technology and the false application of technology purchased. For example, the press reported that in 'a number of cases the imported equipment was left outdoors exposed to Russian weather and component cannibals. In a number of instances, it was not used at all'.²⁹⁶ Another cautionary note came from Andrei Amalrik when Sidney Monas questioned how increased exposure to the United States could possibly fail to bring improvements, Amalrik responded with doubts that 'foreign tourists, jazz records and mini-skirts will help to create a 'humane society''.²⁹⁷

As a newly formed country that had inherited a backward economic system, the state of the Soviet economy looked more impressive when compared with the Tsarist period, than with the economies of the West. However, external emphasis was essential to Khrushchev's programme. Indeed, it is arguable that without the West, Khrushchev would not have been able to build his type of communism: if Lenin's communism was Soviet power plus electrification of the whole country than Khrushchev's was Soviet power plus Western prosperity. Khrushchev visualised two equally ranked entities (either the two superpowers or the East and the West match this description), marching towards a similar future of world dominance of their respective ideology and the highest international standard of living for their citizens. However, historical differences had resulted in the West being farther along economically than the USSR. After tremendous gains from industrialisation

294 As quoted in Abraham S. Becker, Economic Relations with the USSR (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1983) 36.

295 Becker, Economic Relations with the USSR 36.

296 Becker, Economic Relations with the USSR 160.

297 Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? 78.

at break-neck speed, despite the tremendous costs involved, and the punishing losses of WWII, the Soviet Union was, notwithstanding persistent shortages and industrial shortcomings, catching up with the West in general and was to overtake capitalist nations, which had neither 'steam power nor hauling power'²⁹⁸ in some fields by 1970 and completely by 1980. This idea of catching up was reiterated both at home and abroad. In New Delhi in 1959, Khrushchev stated that the competition between the communist and capitalist world was like a horse race and that the 'horse you are riding in the United States is an old horse. It was a fine horse at one time, but now it's old and worn out and beginning to go lame. But the horse we're riding, our Communist horse, is young and vigorous and spirited, and we're going to pass you and win this race.'²⁹⁹ The imagery of a horse race is less common than the more industrial image of the steam engine that was to be used throughout the American visit in 1959 with comments to the effect that the Soviet 'whistle calling' was ringing increasingly clearer and louder in the ears of the West.³⁰⁰ Failure to catch up with and surpass the West would constitute de facto a failure to achieve communism and severely de-legitimised the rule of the Communist Party. It was one of the great contradictions of Soviet life that Soviet citizens lived in a modern industrial state but endured the living conditions of an economically backward state.³⁰¹ In the subsequent chapter, the focus is on several areas of consumption that were of particular importance to the public and the state: housing, clothing, passenger cars and food. In these areas, Khrushchev created a ground for common dialogue, or in his words 'I think that the mood of the average housewife is a better indicator than the bureau of statistics about the health of our economy,'³⁰² and opened up the possibility for an increased sense of personal empowerment and involvement.

²⁹⁸ the image of the locomotive was a play on the old bolshevik song 'Our steam locomotive is speeding forward, bound for communism' and can be found in many speeches and works including Khrushchev, Documents of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU: 130; Khrushchev, Otchet tsentral'nogo komiteta kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza XXII S'ezda Partii.

²⁹⁹ Nixon, The Challenges We Face 24.

³⁰⁰ Zhil' v mire i druzhbe (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1959); Let Us Live in Peace (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959) 295.

³⁰¹ Nove, 'Toward a Communist Welfare State? Social Welfare in the USSR,' 9.

³⁰² Nikita. S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament trans. Strobe Talbott (London: Little, Brown, and Co. 1974) 139.

2: Commenting on Communist Consumption

Introduction

Marxism, like any ideology, faces the charge of being abstract, theoretical, non-accessible and elitist. The theoreticians within the Communist Party were often dismissed as being intellectual but not practical and unable to connect with the workers. Khrushchev's programme of peaceful coexistence was straightforward and while the meaning of such slogans as 'full abundance' was questionable, the building of the material basis of communism was concrete and affected the daily lives of citizens. The result of combining consumption and communism was that Khrushchev established a common ground for dialogue. The state opened up the channels for discussion about housing, clothes, passenger cars, food etc and the public entered into these dialogues. The crux of the problem was that the success in establishing a dialogue left the regime fighting a rear guard action in an attempt to control the unleashed expectations. As Boffa has written of the era (his words echoing the novel *Not By Bread Alone*): 'after all, there was bread, and even a type of butter.'³⁰³ Khrushchev was seeking a broad base of support and the bringing together of the people and the government while citizens wanted not merely cars, motor scooters, casseroles, and umbrellas, but affordable and attractive Soviet ones. Khrushchev himself acknowledged the general preference for foreign goods amongst Soviet consumers who had a particular penchant for 'hard to find imported goods, which satisfy their aesthetic demands much better than domestically manufactured products.'³⁰⁴ His attempts to control consumption 'if you want to get more than is possible you may even lose what you already have' were ineffectual.³⁰⁵

In this chapter four areas of importance for both Soviet society and the Soviet leadership (housing, clothing, automobiles and culture) will be discussed within the context of what was provided, what was expected and how expectations were tied to technological and economic images of the West. Housing has been chosen for as the post Soviet era faced severe housing shortages; there was a political commitment made to changing the housing situation; there was a technological and thus economic change in housing construction that symbolised modernity and a new

³⁰³ Boffa, *Ot SSSR k Rossii* 21.

³⁰⁴ Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament* 146.

³⁰⁵ Nikita. S. Khrushchev, *Marxism-Leninism is Our Banner, Our Fighting Weapon* Soviet Booklet no.112 (London: 1963) 12.

efficiency; and architectural and construction ideas were being introduced from the West. The housing drive in the 1960s is also indicative of the state abandoning the idea of a socialist living quarter (communal flats) for a private domestic sphere. Clothing has been chosen as it represents a field of consumption that is highly subjective, malleable and omnipresent. Clothing trends within the Soviet Union were politicised and were clearly delineated on Western and Non-Western lines. Clothing was a field where Soviet citizens could transform Soviet exteriors into Western ones. It is also a field that speaks directly to the state's attempt to come to a compromise with citizens, distinguishing between need and want. Both housing and clothing appear again in connection with how the West was presenting itself in the following chapter on exhibitions. Automobiles appear several times in this study, in this chapter, in AVTOVAZ and to a lesser degree in the chapter 'Image Conduits'. The automobile is a symbol of national technological and economic prowess as well as private freedom and prosperity. The debate surrounding the private passenger car in the Soviet Union highlights issues of external comparison, social expectations, and technological pride. More about the significance of automobiles as cultural artefacts will be discussed in chapter five. The final section deals with culture. Of all the subjects looked at in this chapter, culture was subject to the greatest ideological scrutiny, as it was considered by the ruling elite to be the most potentially subversive aspect of contact. The field of cultural contact is extensive and the purpose of this study is to provide a brief insight into some aspects of cultural contact to highlight how images of the West could be formed through seemingly benign (benign in the sense that Soviet authorities judged them permissible) forms of a typically ideologically charged medium. Each of these examples addresses the idea of who participated in myth building and how images were created.

Housing

The immediate post-war housing situation in the Soviet Union was dire. Poor housing, and inadequate utilities plagued the countryside while massive overcrowding, poor housing and inadequate utilities plagued the cities. The Stalinist architecture (the so called Stalinist wedding cakes), provided visually impressive buildings, but was expensive, inefficient and difficult to build. Soviet architecture

of the post-war period revealed its sins: it was arguably unattractive; it was costly, irrational, and based on antiquated construction methods. A campaign against waste and conservatism and for the adoption of modern industrial methods was needed. Under Stalin, a law was passed giving every individual a right to ten square metres and a family to a minimum of thirteen square metres of living space.³⁰⁶ The communal housing project (*Kommunalka*) was an example of communist ideas being superimposed on bourgeois space. Individuals or families had a room or a partitioned room and shared all other rooms including the red corner (the red corner was to metamorphosis from an icon corner under the Tsars to a corner for a picture or bust of Lenin, then Stalin, and under Khrushchev - the TV). The ideological justification for the communal flat was that as public life was personal fulfilment, and as public life was becoming 'better and more cheerful', then the need for a private sanctuary was null.³⁰⁷ The move away from the communal flat under Khrushchev represents both a significant political concession by the Party to individual citizens and the abandoning of an ideological theory.

One of the earliest primary goals of the post Stalin government was an impressive housing project. In 1957, a formal decision was made to liquidate the 'most acute problem' of housing. Under this new decision, man's living space requirement for large cities was nine square metres per person. The desire for more space was dismissed as abnormal and irrational. The irrational need of some for more than nine square metres of living space did not apply to Party officials' dachas. In an interview with UPI correspondent Henry Shapiro (*Pravda* 19.10.1957) Khrushchev acknowledged that there was a housing problem and the government has chosen to address this by 'satisfying the people's housing needs within ten to twelve years. We wish to provide an apartment for every family, not a room but an apartment... we shall end the housing shortage and create normal human living conditions in urban and rural housing.'³⁰⁸ The 1965 article, '*Moskva, 197... god*' contains detailed information about the near future composition of Moscow

³⁰⁶ Actual per person square metres was 8.07 square metres in the cities, the average house build by collective farmers was 36.9 square metres, the average private flat was 35.8 square metres and the average state built flat was 29.6 square metres. See Arcadius Kahan, *Some Problems of the Soviet Industrial Worker: Volume 1* (Oriental Research Partners: Newtonville, 1994) 283.

³⁰⁷ Susan Buck-Morss, *Dreamworld and Catastrophe: the Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000) 201.

³⁰⁸ 'The Long Road to the Good Life,' *Problems of Communism* Vol.9 no.1 (1960): 19.

including the quantity and nature of private dwellings (nine and sixteen-storey buildings) and the proliferation of restaurants, entertainment and services. The concluding sentence of the article is that 'in a word, Moscow will grow, get younger, and improve from year to year.'³⁰⁹

During the plenary session of the CC CPSU (23.11.1962), Khrushchev gave the speech 'On the Development of the USSR Economy and Reorganisation of Party Guidance of the National Economy' in which he spoke of the Party's continuing commitment to improving the well being of the working people. To this end, the output of consumer goods was reported as having increased and 'large scale housing construction was proceeding on schedule with a total space of 325,000,000 square metres, or 8,800,000 new flats in cities and workers' settlements during the first four years of the Seven Year Plan, and 2,400,000 rural homes having been built.'³¹⁰ The housing project was to take into consideration the needs of the family (including newly weds) for a private flat complete with 'central heating, piped water, sewerage systems, bathrooms, electric lighting and gas.'³¹¹ Promises such as the above were on line with promising the Soviet population the moon. The provision thereof was part of the responsibilities of a superpower and thus was promised based on comparison with the West, specifically the USA and not with past Soviet provisions. In the Seven Year Plan, Khrushchev officially announced the objective as the provision of a separate flat for each family. The dimensions of the flats were approximately forty-four square metres per apartment, small by Western standards, however, depending on the size of the family, the flats could potentially provide more than the official minimum allotted living space of nine square metres per person for persons dwelling in large cities.³¹²

The construction initiative was successful enough to regularly provide more flats than new families formed by marriage, but it did not provide sufficient leeway for families in communal flats looking to get out and families trying to get into cities, nor did it account for divorce.³¹³ Using marriages as an indication of newly

309 'Moskva, 197... god,' Rabotnitsa no.8 (1965) 8.

310 Mervyn Matthews, Soviet Government: A Selection of Official Documents on Internal Policies (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974) 215.

311 Sbyvalutsia mechty chelovecheskie; Man's Dreams are coming true (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966) 276.

312 Nove, 'Toward a Communist Welfare State?' 7.

313 Kahan, Some Problems of the Soviet Industrial Worker 288.

formed families, the increase in housing can be contextualised for the period of 1965-1970.

Table 2 Yearly Registered Marriages and Construction of New Flats 1965-1970 in Thousands

Year	Estimated Registered Marriages	Constructed Apartments
1965	2,009	2,227
1966	2,067	2,291
1967	2,122	2,312
1968	2,111	2,233
1969	2,251	2,231
1970	2,365	2,266

*Tsentrāl'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR*³¹⁴

Logistically, the construction programme was a monumental undertaking: flats needed to be built quickly, efficiently and cheaply. To this end, Khrushchev placed a great deal of emphasis on the adoption of modern Western construction methods and designs and the Party instituted wide sweeping reforms for the industrialisation of construction work. New materials were to be adopted, assembly line production for prefabricated elements progressed and the allotted housing budget increased from fifty-eight billion roubles in 1950 to 172 billion roubles in 1959.³¹⁵ Despite official proclamations to the contrary, prefabricated reinforced concrete did not prevail as the dominant construction material for many years. This was due to significant internal reluctance from Party officials to the use of foreign techniques and industrial limitations, in particular the failure of the concrete department to supply the quality and quantity of product needed. In the late 1950s in Moscow and St. Petersburg contain descriptions of a large percentage of buildings still being built using the traditional method of bricks and mortar. The rapid pace of construction, swelling demand and a general dearth of skilled workers and masters resulted in dubious quality. The government and citizens acknowledged these problems. Reports appeared regularly in the press, with the most common complaints being cracks in walls and ceilings, dysfunctional plumbing, and the need for festooned

³¹⁴ Kahan, *Some Problems of the Soviet Industrial Worker* Source: *Tsentrāl'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR, Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1975* (Moskva: Statistika, 1976) 7, 571.

³¹⁵ Khrushchev, *Raising the Soviet Standard of Living* 77.

nets to catch falling debris from outer walls. The witticism 'instant antiquity' was applied to the new buildings. In a published response to complaints, Mikoyan acknowledged that the majority of Soviet workers were untrained in construction and in the new building methods. In an attempt to rectify poor standards of workmanship, the Soviet government enacted a directive that labourers were to have first priority on flats in the building on which they worked. John Scott of *Time Life Magazine* visited Leningrad in 1960 after a three-year absence and noted that while there were improvements, the legal sanitary minimum was not being met and that officials acknowledged this.³¹⁶ As the provision of private living quarters was adopted as 'normal' for Western nations and 'required' for a superpower and as the methods and techniques were lauded as modern, better, more efficient and so on, the Soviet production of 'instant antiquity' called the credibility of the Soviet Union achieving in the present and the future what was being propagated as established reality in the West. In addition to the problematic juxtaposition of the Soviet reality and the Western image, there was the fantastic Soviet future.

These difficulties in achieving even legal minimums were in contrast to some of the images of the future Soviet city and dwellings. The Soviet city of the future was described by one Moscow architect as dominated by building facades with huge windows made of a synthetic material with gold and silver veins running through them. Main thoroughfares were to be filled with music, cars and people. At night time the skyline was to appear to be a mountain range and in autumn after sundown there was to be the image of golden leaves everywhere. The 'most favourable living conditions' were to be provided for everyone complete with easily accessible amenities. 'Is the city we have just pictured really so remote? No, because such cities are already being planned and built in the Soviet Union.'³¹⁷ What Soviet citizens also knew was that Britain, USA and West Germany were leading in the production of synthetic materials (see reference to huge windows), that images of huge thoroughfares were associated with Britain's motorways and the United States highway system; that Western music was temptation; and that the production of passenger cars was dominated by the West.

³¹⁶ Lyons, *Workers' Paradise Lost* 216.

³¹⁷ *Sbyvalutsia mechty chelovecheskie: Man's Dreams are coming true* 274.

An attempt was made to inspire confidence in the new building techniques through a series of international construction exhibitions and architectural displays in national exhibitions/trade fairs. During these exhibitions, foreign governments and companies built their own structures, often with the assistance of Soviet workers and supplied Western technical publications and documents. Iurii Gerchuk was to recall the excitement surrounding the construction of foreign architecture in this instance during the American National Exhibition in 1959 when workers 'wearing strange helmets of coloured plastic' appeared and began work on an 'openwork, tubular, spherical construction, which they filled with a six-sided honeycomb with metal panels', this geodesic dome was to serve as the central pavilion for the exhibition.³¹⁸ Next to the geodesic dome was a series of plastic multi faceted, semi transparent fan-like structures that were to house various exhibits. Gerchuk recalled that the 'demonstrative simplicity and strange, purely technological elegance, quite incompatible with any kind of applied ornament, was received as a visual lesson in genuinely contemporary architecture.'³¹⁹ There was an intense interest (testified to by the long queues of visitors) in the prefabricated American home.³²⁰ The historian Stephen Bittner has argued that Khrushchev's praise for foreign architecture and his association of Soviet progress with the West, for example in the autumn of 1960 Khrushchev commented on the improvements in Moscow by saying that the city now compared favourably with cities in the United States, resulted in successful measures in Soviet architecture being associated with the West, regardless of the veracity' of such ideas.³²¹ In the 1963, Soviet study 'The World Of Values of Soviet Youth' the 6,425 were asked to rank the most important architectural edifices. The top ten included the Kremlin (first place), MGU (second), UN headquarters in New York (fourth), the Empire States building (seventh) and modern western apartment buildings (fifth). Of the top ten, four were Western, and except for high-rise housing, all were public buildings.³²²

318 Iurii Gerchuk, 'The Aesthetics of Everyday Life in the Khrushchev Thaw in the USSR (1954-1964),' Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-War Eastern Europe 81-100, 84.

319 Gerchuk, 'The Aesthetics of Everyday Life' 84.

320 Information about the American home was published in the same year: V. N. Goriaev, Amerikantsy u sebja doma (Moskva: 1959).

321 Stephen Bittner, 'Remembering the Avant-Garde: Moscow Architects and the 'Rehabilitation' of Constructivism, 1961-1964' Kritika Vol.2 no.3 (2001): 553-576, 561.

322 Grushin, Chetyre zhizni Rossii: v zerkale oprosov obshchestvennogo mnenia 407.

Design was an integral aspect of modernity and universality. Along with modern amenities, a sleek, multifunctional efficient design broadened Soviet citizens to world citizens. This linkage was often, but not exclusively, restricted to the upper echelons of Soviet society. In his description of the average executive's flat of the late 1950s, David Granick described a lucky executive as one who received a flat in a recently constructed complex as these had a 'fairly airy and light architectural feeling rather than the heavy pomposity which characterised the construction of even five years ago.'³²³ The flat would consist of two small to medium sized rooms, a kitchen, a toilet and a bathroom. A single wall closet in the flat would be a luxury. Appliances in the small kitchen would include a two-burner stove, a small sink with workspace, and overhead cupboards. There would be little room for any other appliance, but a small refrigerator could be added later.³²⁴ The lack of space for a refrigerator is perhaps one reason why only 'the smallest refrigerators seem to be produced.'³²⁵ John Massey Stewart, press centre employee at the 1966 British Trade Fair was invited to the flat of a Soviet journalist living in Moscow. He wrote that two room flat was comfortable with an entrance hall, a room for two children, a living room cum bedroom for the parents, a bathroom, lavatory, and a kitchen with an American refrigerator containing American cake mixes that had been brought over recently by a friend.³²⁶ The flat owner Katya was to comment that some 'foreigners think these new apartments are only for privileged people...They're wrong. The only intellectuals here besides ourselves are an architect and his wife, she's a movie director, a magazine editor, a woman chief engineer with her son and his family, and a head librarian'.³²⁷ That the woman considered 'intellectuals' to be privileged people is an issue that will be addressed in Chapter Four. Ray Pierre Corsini was to visit a flat in a new housing project building that belonged to 'Mrs S-', the widow of a former Soviet official who had been stationed in New York. Corsini was to describe the four room flat housing five family members as 'quite liveable, light, airy, and with larger rooms than those in

³²³ David Granick, The Red Executive: a Study of the Organisation of Man in Russian Industry (New York: Anchor Books, 1961) 93.

³²⁴ Granick, The Red Executive 93.

³²⁵ Granick, The Red Executive 99.

³²⁶ John Massey Stewart, Across the Russias (London: Harvill Press, 1969) 33.

³²⁷ Stewart, Across the Russias 34.

our housing projects.'³²⁸ The bathroom was small but with all the necessary amenities and the kitchen had a large window, enough space for a family dining table and a refrigerator. In a conversation with John Gunther, a Moscow-based French expatriate was to comment on the general sense of 'yearning for bright colours and chromium furniture and trips to the seaside.' and noted further that after 'forty years of privation, their sense of fun is coming out.'³²⁹ Gunther was to respond that his dominant impression from a recent trip to a housing project was the lack of closets to which the woman replied: 'they [the Russians] just haven't come to closets yet!'³³⁰

With the acquiring of the flat came the need to furnish the flat, not least of all with storage space. It is in the design of furniture that one sees foreign influences even more strongly than in architecture. Furnishings were to be sleek, multifunctional, plentiful and in line with those seen from Scandinavia and Finland. In Moscow, there was a furniture shop called *1000 Items for Your Home*, named after the magazine *1000 Tips for Young Homemakers*. The idea of a thousand items for the house was as revolutionary as the contents. However, furniture stores were often barren entities, one observer noted that her local furniture store was always empty of goods with the exception of one day when she saw two lorries delivering glass-fronted bookcases that filled the store to overflowing. Within days the store was again barren.³³¹ Shortages in furniture were exasperated by the drive to convert Soviet taste from heavy and ornate to chrome, synthetic, multifunctional and contemporary (by contemporary read international). Women's magazines and decorative magazines were to publish pictures of the modern style alongside images of old massive furniture being discarded, and the state was left providing not only for the newly created living spaces but new tastes as well.

In 1955 a campaign against ornamentalism was launched, in which ornamentalism was denounced as superfluous, pompous and *petit bourgeois*.³³² Mass-produced, simple, elegant and multi functional items for domestic

³²⁸ Ray Pierre Corsini, *Caviar For Breakfast* (London: Harvill Press, 1967) 125.

³²⁹ Gunther, *Inside Russia Today* 94.

³³⁰ Gunther, *Inside Russia Today* 94.

³³¹ Belfrage, *A Room in Moscow* 75.

³³² November 1955 directive of the Union of Architects was released shortly after the 1955 directive of the Party and Government Against Superfluity in Project Design and Construction. Victor Buchli, 'Khrushchev, Modernism, and the Fight against *Petit-bourgeois* Consciousness in the Soviet Home' 166.

consumption was communist. The refining of the new Soviet Man's tastes was to result in the rationalisation of consumption. First to be eliminated was kitsch, particularly subject to ridicule were the seven elephants that adorned windowsills, wardrobes and china cabinets. A piece of clothing or article of furniture was not worthy of a Soviet purchaser unless it was versatile. The coat for all seasons, the low bed without bed posts that could be made into a sofa, or the sofa without a back that could be made into a bed, the chair with a storage unit under the cushion, or the table that folded up into the wall. Multifunctionality meant that individuals required fewer objects; fewer objects meant that individuals were decreasing their dependence on the material and were advancing towards the realisation of communism. However, Soviet authorities were concerned with the possibility of specifically women exceeding the bounds of limited consumption and demanding excessive and unnecessary goods. Having witnessed the rowdy reopening of G.U.M. in the 1950s, Richard Edmonds noted that perhaps the authorities had cause for concern.³³³

Another aspect of furnishing the house was the provision of appliances. Gilmore was to recall one of his biggest surprises in Russia occurred when his mother-in-law turned to his wife Tamara and said 'Please dear, will you go into the kitchen, look in the refrigerator and take out the caviar?' Ten years ago this sweet and generous woman, in her wildest dreams, would not have dreamed of using an electric refrigerator, much less owning one.³³⁴ Officially, the CPSU was committed to lightening women's burdens through the mass provision of modern, affordable, inexpensive domestic machines, appliances, and electrical devices.³³⁵ This lightening of the women's burden bears a striking similarity to the Western refrain of technological development for the easing of the housewife's burden. Interestingly, the Western refrain of technology reducing the housewife's burden was held up as representing the insidious subjugation of Western women to the mechanised hearth. One example of this message is a series of newspaper articles on the visit of a group of Soviet tourists to an average American home. The tourists reported that they were told that the family was saving money in order to purchase

³³³ Edmonds, *Russian Vistas* 111.

³³⁴ Gilmore, *The Cossacks Burned Down the YMCA* 55.

³³⁵ *The Road to Communism: Documents of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU*: 17-31.10.1961 (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1961) 543-544.

several new appliances that were to ease the housewife's chores. This surprised the Soviet visitors as the kitchen contained a 'range with numerous buttons, a set of ovens, a dish washing machine, a closet refrigerator, a washing machine, etc.'³³⁶ The tourists noted that the woman was as bound to the household as those women without the plethora of appliances, the only difference being the difficulty of the physical labour. The intended message was that within the West/America women were not as free as in the Soviet Union and that technology without socialism did not essentially change the role of women. The other message conveyed was that in the average American house there was a wealth of goods that eased the physical work of women, that an average American family had their own house, that the husband earned enough money for the wife to stay at home and that a kitchen that was not yet adequate in terms of appliances contained multiple ovens, a dishwasher, and a large refrigerator etc.

There can be no doubt that the 'modernisation' of *dizain*, (design) and architecture, was a politically co-opted phenomenon. Minimalism, multifunctionality, and simplicity were efficient means of providing the highest number of goods to the greatest number of individuals with the lowest output cost per item. Calls for redecorating and the launching of housing campaigns often coincided with important public holidays such as May Day or the anniversary of the October Revolution. The shift towards ornamentalism that had occurred under Stalin was labelled a social deviation and in discarding ornamentalism, the acquiring of new modern items resulted in civic duty involving consumption. However, the material and political need for modern consumer items exacerbated the need for and focus on technologically advanced forms of mass production.

Despite the best intentions, housing remained problematic: waiting lists were long, charges of unfair allocation were common, problems with new flats abounded and expectations grew faster than housing opportunities. Starting to deal with the issue of housing gave birth to a new series of issues from furniture and appliances to ever increasing utility usage. As in other areas of life, the cynicism and scepticism associated with perceived governmental promises was conveyed through anecdotes.

³³⁶ *Sbyvaiutsia mechy chelovecheskie: Man's Dreams are coming true* 277.

- A friend says to a friend, 'I have just written a book.'
- What about?
 - Boy meets girl.
 - Ah, a story!
 - They fall in love.
 - Ah, a romance!
 - They get married and find a flat.
 - Ah, a fable!³³⁷

Clothing

Clothing and fashion were to be particularly problematic aspects of the planned economy. Under Stalin, a pair of boots for one out of every three citizens was standard. An interview respondent from the St. Petersburg project was to recall her father's joy during the 1930s, when as a reward for his stellar production norms, he received a coupon for a pair of red girl's shoes (later in life she was to recall this with horror – that a grown man could be so delighted that the state was going to grant him the possibility of obtaining a pair of necessary shoes for his daughter). Isaac Deutscher has declared 'the barefooted and the owner of a pair of shoes are not equal; and not even a government consisting of communist angels could make them so.'³³⁸ Under Khrushchev, an attempt was made to eliminate this expression of anti-egalitarianism when he proposed that production increase to a level that would provide one pair of new shoes per person per year. One of the first post-Stalin, public acknowledgements that the clothing and textile industry needed reforming came from Kosygin in 1954 in the 'Consumer Goods Programme.'³³⁹ In this programme the need to provide 'beautiful high quality and varied working clothes, home, holiday, evening and sports clothes, with due regard for the consumer's age and tastes' was acknowledged.³⁴⁰ It was also acknowledged that at present, consumers were complaining not only about quantity but quality. This public discontent is in contrast with the thankfulness of the Stalinist era as noted above. As production had increased and the issue was not only quantity but also quality and variety, it stands to reason that Soviet production was sufficient to meet only the most basic of needs. While it is arguable that the desire for attractive

³³⁷ Gunther, *Inside Russia Today* 427.

³³⁸ Isaac Deutscher, *Russia After Stalin* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1953) 99.

³³⁹ *Pravda*, (15.11.1954).

³⁴⁰ Aleksei N. Kosygin, 'Kosygin's Report on the Consumers' Goods Programme,' *CDSP* Vol.I no.4 (1954): 9-13, 11.

clothing is part of human nature, Soviet fashion trends indicate that they were driven by both internal and external considerations.

The provision of adequate beautiful clothing in accordance to consumer preferences was an extremely problematic endeavour not only from a fashion point of view but also from the definition of adequate quantity. A passage from the work *Sbyvaiutsia mechty chelovechestva* is illustrative of the concept of limited abundance as it pertains to clothing. The passage opens with an acknowledgement that clothing and footwear, unlike foodstuffs, have no non-transcendable bounds. Clothing and footwear requirements were a combination of basic function, the need to protect the body against the elements, and socio-economic and cultural functions. The Soviet citizen was to be above the 'philistine craving to show off' and socialist fashion was to be better aligned with function and beauty representing the ultimate in their 'quality, comfort and beauty.'³⁴¹ Fashion provisions from the state were a means by which the state would provide clothing for work, home and leisure while simultaneously cultivating appropriate aesthetic tastes. The question as to whether the Soviet Man should have clothes for all occasions was rhetorical and followed by the more pertinent query: 'Can society fully satisfy people's rational requirements in high quality and beautiful clothes? Of course it can.'³⁴² Both economic systems were to provide beautiful clothing and shoes, with both having well dressed citizens, but the Soviet system was to provide classic quality immune to the fickleness of fashion trends and an external ranking system. What constituted the highest standard of living or the fulfilling of all man's needs was the 'rational' provision of consumer goods. These ideals are in contrast with such Soviet practices as producing bourgeois knock-offs of western designer labels.

Speaking during an election campaign in the Kalinin District of Moscow, Khrushchev acknowledged that attractive and good quality clothing and shoes were not a luxury but a right and were an integral part of the increased production of consumer goods. He also acknowledged the rising expectations: 'our people not only want to have all the prime necessities of life, they also want to wear attractive and good quality clothes. Has our industry done everything to meet these demands?

³⁴¹ *Sbyvaiutsia mechty chelovecheskie*; [Man's Dreams are coming true](#) 159-160.

³⁴² *Sbyvaiutsia mechty chelovecheskie*; [Man's Dreams are coming true](#) 159-160.

No, far from it.³⁴³ Khrushchev was getting ahead of himself, jumping over the provision of the basics that had not yet been fulfilled, while simultaneously questioning the ability of industry to meet demands. The provision of quality was problematic as Soviet industry was struggling to introduce new production methods, which by the very nature of new methods involved a period of experimentation and thus decreased production while still attempting to meet high production quotas.

According to Aleksei Adzhubei, Khrushchev considered the shortages of footwear and clothing to be of priority and that synthetic fabric was essential to ending shortages.³⁴⁴ Synthetic material would have been known initially through its usage in Nazi Germany military uniforms and subsequently through British, American and later French and Italian fashions. In the June plenum of 1960, synthetic fabric was attributed as being responsible for the output volume and style of modern French, English and West German fashion. In part, this focus on quantity was an attempt to convince a sceptical public of the merits of synthetics. Scepticism was often exhibited in face of new materials be it prefabricated concrete or velvet precisely because the Soviet results were substandard. The production of synthetic fabric ties in with the perceived necessity of the chemicalisation of all industries. Through the chemicalisation of the fabric industry, citizens became walking testimonies to the industrial and technological prowess and wealth of their nation. As many of the new fashions, particularly fabric patterns, could only be produced using modern technology and synthetic materials, there was no means for the Soviet Union to achieve the required results without implementing the technology. At Bratsk, Khrushchev discussed the relationship between science and clothing, claiming that during WWII Soviet officials used to laugh at the Germans for making their uniforms out of wood and yet now they accepted that this was the correct approach. To this end, the Soviet Union was to import cellulose fibres for clothing from the GDR.

As early as 1955 newspapers and magazines began running articles about the wonders of synthetic material that would keep the wearer dry through rain and snow, cool through scorching heat and warm through freezing temperatures.

³⁴³ *Pravda* (15.03.1958), and 'The Long Road to the Good Life,' *Problems of Communism* Vol.9 no.1 1960:19.

³⁴⁴ Aleksei Adzhubei, *Te desiat' let* (Moskva: Sov. Rossiia, 1989) 98.

Research into gas, wood and oil was translated into the production of synthetic textiles and leathers. The potential for synthetic cloth was stressed in the Soviet press, 'beautiful fabrics can now be made out of polymers... They cannot be strictly called fabrics because they are not woven, and do not contain a single thread, but still have all its properties... It sheds water like a duck's back. It does not rot or bleach, moths will not eat it, and oils and dirt will not stick to it. Finally, it is very cheap.'³⁴⁵ In addition, modern fashion designs (referred to as the New Look) of France and the USA necessitated the use of synthetic fabric.³⁴⁶ Despite attempts to assure the public that the synthetic materials were superior (see image below), they were poorly received. This resulted in the demand for natural based products, particularly leather shoes and boots, being driven up and shortages exasperated despite increases in the production of clothing and footwear as synthetic based products were passed over for more expensive natural based products.




Fig. 3 *Chemistry meets Footwear: Rabotnitsa no.8 (1964)*

By the late 1950s, claims that the situation was visibly improving were being made. In the early days of the first Russian Sputniks there began an urban legend of an unusually naïve Western diplomat and a woman member of the ruling Soviet hierarchy. During the course of a discussion the Western diplomat was forced to concede that yes, the Soviet Union had made Sputniks but added the rejoinder that it could not make nylon pants. The woman was to have thought about it for a moment and replied, 'True, Mr. Ambassador, but I think it's going to be a lot easier to go from Sputniks to nylon pants than it will be to go from nylon pants to Sputniks.' A perusal of 1964 Soviet drawers in Moscow revealed that one could purchase 'frilly drawers at prices ranging from 19 shillings to 5 pounds for a super pair with a

³⁴⁵ *Sbyvalutsia mehty chelovecheskie: Man's Dreams are coming true* 72.

³⁴⁶ Natal'ia Lebina 'Plius khimizatsiia vsei odezhdy' *Rodina* 9 (2002): 82-86. 83.

matching slip.’³⁴⁷ Maurice Hindus, was to note that ‘women were better shod than at any time since the coming of the Soviets: round toes, heavy soles, thick flat heels, were visibly out of favour with the younger generation; even spiked heels had come to Leningrad.’³⁴⁸ Boffa believed that the Soviet citizen ate better but dressed worse than the Italian, but that bundled up in winter dress the Soviet citizen portrayed an unusually negative image. He considered the English, Germans and Americans to be more lenient in their fashion critique, but then dismissed them as not having particularly good fashion sense either. His final assessment was that ‘it is true that his [the Russian’s] clothes look shabby; all clothes are scarce, of inferior quality, and very expensive’.³⁴⁹ John Gunther conceded that clothes had improved but maintained that ‘they are still revolting. Their positive sloppy manginess, as well as cheap quality and lack of colour, is beyond description.’³⁵⁰ In a speech at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee (21.06.1963) Khrushchev quoted his good friend Roswell Garst as proof that the situation was improving. When ‘I [Garst] first came to the Soviet Union and walked through the streets of Moscow, my suit was better than the suits of others. This time, when I walked in your city, I saw that mine was perhaps the worst suit around.’³⁵¹ Given that Garst was a multi millionaire it seems unlikely that he made this statement, but Khrushchev’s use of the statement reinforces the idea of the use of the West as a benchmark.

The availability and price of clothing was problematic. One issue was sizing, as there was often an overproduction of unusual sizes and a shortage of ‘average’ sizes. Eddy Gilmore recalled being surprised to learn that a hotel floor waiter who had disappeared for several hours in the hopes of purchasing Czech made shoes (he returned empty handed as the sizes were all too big) had been willing to spend forty-six roubles for the shoes despite the fact that his monthly income without tips was forty-eight roubles.³⁵² As Sally Belfrage compared consumer prices with her neighbours, she learnt that her neighbour’s shoes had cost three hundred roubles (or thirty Post-1961 roubles), or triple the price of her own shoes. When she questioned

347 Gilmore, The Cossacks Burned Down the YMCA 182.

348 Maurice Hindus, House without a Roof: Russia after Forty-three Years of Revolution (London, 1962) 15.

349 Boffa, inside the Khrushchev Era 170.

350 Gunther, Inside Russia Today 63.

351 Khrushchev, Marxism-Leninism is Our Banner 12.

352 Gilmore, The Cossacks Burned Down the YMCA 183.

her neighbour about the high price the neighbour answered that she understood that it was high but that 'the little too much that we pay we know is for the welfare of the country.'³⁵³ Also relating to production and costs, Belfrage was to note that the tasteless Soviet designed goods sat in stores while there were line-ups for the expensive but beautiful imported goods and that she had to airmail her winter jacket to Moscow as she could not afford to purchase a good quality jacket in Moscow. Illustrative of public awareness of the shortage is a cartoon of the time showing two toddlers sitting bundled up in their prams looking into a shop window. One of the toddlers says to the other: 'Its time that we should be able to walk' to which the other answers 'Yes – but in what?'³⁵⁴




Fig. 4 Shoes? *Krokodil* no.2 (1958)

As in the case of most Soviet social issues, anecdotes arose around clothing. For example, 'Go ahead, Nikita, catch up with America, if you can, but for heaven's sake don't run ahead. If you do, people will see your bare behind.'³⁵⁵ The quality

353 Belfrage, *A Room in Moscow* 31.

354 Elisabeth Helmrich and Ursula Neuman, *50 Jahre Sowjet Union im Spiegel Ihrer Karikatur* (München: Udo Pfriemer Verlag, 1967) 115.

355 Hindus, *House without a Roof* 21.

of ready-made clothing was often dubious. Boffa noticed long queues outside of stores and individuals wearing 'a striped shirt, badly cut, with a worn collar and strident colours.'³⁵⁶ The clothing of the queued individuals was in sharp contrast with that displayed in windows. A 1963 study of twenty-six Soviet cities' storefronts showed that the luxury items on display were either not produced at all, or were produced in severely limited quantities. The officials in charge of the investigation dismissed the practice as a confidence trick. 'Beautifully embroidered children's rompers and well-cut suits were so exclusive that they could not be bought. Kid leather shoes... were hand made, especially for the fashion shows. (Commenting on the limited nature of the items) Chief Engineer V. V. Goravneva in a Leningrad fur factory when interviewed by the magazine *Krokodil*, said 'Do you think we want to lose the money incentives for the sake of those model coats and hats?''³⁵⁷ A charitable explanation of the discrepancy came from Maurice Hindus writing about the fashionable formal dresses on display in Nevskii Prospekt: 'I could only assume that the state was making a promise that it was not yet in a position to fulfil.'³⁵⁸

The promise of synthetic clothing was furthered with the opening of the store *Sintetika* in Moscow in 1962 and in Leningrad in 1964. Alexei Feodorovich Kulichev, the Chief Designer of *Dome Modele* in the early 1960s was to comment that despite his own personal fondness for 'American designs, colours and fabrics', he was especially enamoured with the Galanos collections and the Fifth Avenue shop of Bergdorf Goodman, 'high styles are not acceptable here. Models and actresses wear high styles. But working people prefer simple clothes.'³⁵⁹ Another means of conveying a sense of immediacy was through fashion shows. Fraternal fashion houses, particularly Lithuanian, Estonian and Polish were respected for their simple chic fashions, and the accompanying patterns that were often for sale after shows. For five roubles, one could be invited into the G.U.M. auditorium with its moulded ceiling, chandeliers and brown and yellow plush carpet to wait for a show complete with a five-piece band playing marches and waltzes. The fashions at

356 Boffa, Inside the Khrushchev Era 14.

357 Gilmore, The Cossacks Burned Down the YMCA 185.

358 Hindus, House without a Roof 21

359 In an interview with Corsini, Caviar For Breakfast 138.

G.U.M. tended to involve more complicated styles often introducing Western fashions with high prices shortly after trade shows or exhibitions.

In preparation for festivals and exhibitions the press ran articles cautioning Soviet citizens to not be too impressed by Western fashions. For example, prior to the World Youth Festival citizens were instructed 'not to be too excited about 'women's jewellery, cigarette cases and lighters, and cuff-links'' and not to criticise foreigners for their 'sharp colour combinations in dress.'³⁶⁰ The Sixth International Youth Festival held in Moscow in the summer of 1957 was a massive international event; Soviet figures put attendance at thirty thousand youths from 131 countries.³⁶¹ In the name of peace and friendship, it brought together young adults from around the world. Both Moscow and Muscovites were to be beautified for the event. As one journalist noted 'Moscow had never been so young and beautiful'.³⁶² Women were directed to wear no more than three colours; that a bright pretty scarf and clean shoes greatly improved any outfit and that makeup should not be worn.³⁶³ A highlight of the festival, according to *Rabotnitsa*, was the outdoor ball. For those readers not aware of what a *bal* was, *Rabotnitsa* provided this definition: 'Ball! What a small word! Ball - it is simply dancing.'³⁶⁴ Soviet women were advised that should they attend, they would be able to 'see new types of outfits, dresses, and receive consultation about what one is wearing in the upcoming season.'³⁶⁵ S. Vladimirova noted that for her, the most interesting aspect of the festival was being able to see the Italian models, fashions, and temperaments.³⁶⁶ Information about foreign styles could be found in newspapers, films, novels and local and foreign magazines. Maria Williams recalled how influential the styles of Laura Ashley as seen in advertisements in foreign magazines were for her and her mother, setting the standard for a fashionable young woman regardless of the woman's political background.³⁶⁷ At times the coverage was direct, as in the article 'Italian Fashion,' but it was also indirect as in the articles about film festivals, for example, the

³⁶⁰ Max Frankel, *New York Times* (28.05.1957) in Gunther, *Inside Russia Today* 102.

³⁶¹ Serafima Kolova, 'Zhdam vas, druž'ia,' *Rabotnitsa* no. 7 (1957): 1; and 'Festival' molodezhi,' *Rabotnitsa* no. 8 (1957): 1.

³⁶² 'Festival' molodezhi,' 1.

³⁶³ S. Vladimirova, 'Prazdnik Devushek,' *Rabotnitsa* no.7 (1957): 2-4.

³⁶⁴ Elena Kononenko, 'Sliaiushchee budushchee,' *Rabotnitsa* no. 9 (1957): 4-6, 4.

³⁶⁵ Vladimirova, 'Prazdnik Devushek' 3.

³⁶⁶ Vladimirova, 'Prazdnik Devushek' 4.

³⁶⁷ In conversation with Maria Williams, Cambridge August 2003.

coverage of the Moscow Film Festival in 1961, which focused on Elizabeth Taylor and Gina Lollobrigida both of whom were honoured guests; or in articles about struggling women in the West, for example the plight of a Parisian worker.³⁶⁸

The American Sally Belfrage who was to attend the World Youth Festival and then return to live in Moscow for five months recalls her friend Sergei, whose mother had a 'touch of chic' about her, whose brother was a reporter in Paris, and who was 'comparatively well-dressed' in a Western cut sports jacket, and beige suede shoes. Sergei was distraught at having missed the World Youth Festival due to his need to redeem himself by working on a Komsomol farming team in Siberia. For Sergei's friends, the festival had been an opportunity to meet interesting people and to buy foreign clothes. Sergei had bought his jacket and shoes fourth hand through 'biznes' friends; the original owner was an Italian boy. According to Sergei the first non-Italian owner had been thrown out of the Komsomol after making it a habit to stand outside hotels and purchase foreigners' clothes.³⁶⁹ During the Early 1960s, Andrew Webb was approached on the street and offered nine hundred roubles (at the then official exchange rate almost one thousand USD) for his suit.³⁷⁰

Custom clothing was available but not overly common due to prohibitively high prices. In David Granick's judgement based on the 'rather tasteless cuts of clothing seen on people in the expensive hotels and in the first rows of the theatre, I would judge that ready-made clothing is the rule.'³⁷¹ The other means of acquiring fashionable clothing was to have foreign or foreign like clothing. Upon seeing a young man with a derby/bowler hat, Eddy Gilmore asked from whence it came. The young man, who was accompanied by a stylishly dressed girl with a beehive hairdo, responded nonchalantly that he had ordered it from England.³⁷² The conversation then turned to Cool Jazz and attracted other Russians who were more cautious than the dapper young man and his companion. When the other Russians left after their tentative foray, Gilmore asked if the others were scared of someone from the Komsomol chastising them for discussing jazz with a foreigner. The young man

³⁶⁸ N. Gollkovi, 'Ital'ianskaia moda,' *Rabotnitsa* no.8 (1963): 32; see also 'Siiiaushchee budushchee,' and 'Festival' molodezhi'.

³⁶⁹ Belfrage, *A Room in Moscow* 31.

³⁷⁰ Corsini, *Caviar For Breakfast* 21.

³⁷¹ Granick, *The Red Executive* 96.

³⁷² Gilmore, *The Cossacks Burned Down the YMCA* 132.

answered that they were 'just cautious... I'm the Komsomol.'³⁷³ This episode is representative of a larger trend of the greater access to Western clothes by the privileged youth. A Soviet image that draws attention to the issue of the West and the privileged youth is 'I nashim i vashim' from 1963.




Fig. 5 *I nashim i vashim* *Krokodil* no.1 (1963)

This image has the youthful card carrying Soviet man straddling communism, as represented by the Kremlin, the red star and a sheet of paper declaring that 'I am always with the Party' and capitalism as represented by images and words of skyscrapers, Pepsi, Camel cigarettes, sex, Hollywood, striptease, night club, Cadillac, and a sheet of paper saying 'but here appeals to me too!' The fashion of

³⁷³ Gilmore, *The Cossacks Burned Down the YMCA* 133.

each side changes as well. The Soviet side is a conservative suit with a tie and lace up dress shoes; the Western side is loafers, stripped socks, short-sleeved shirt, and short-cuffed trousers. The access of Soviet elite youth to Western goods reinforced their social status while eroding away at the ideological system. As Mervyn Matthews was to note of the elite Moscow University students, they were not 'interested in Party documents, they were interested in money, getting decent food, travelling and that sort of thing, not boring party documents.'³⁷⁴

The word 'style' (*stil'* in Russian) was to form the root of the name for the most prominent youth counterculture, the *stilyagi* and be a defining theme for the cra, one danced, dressed, and acted with and in style. As with the term *modern'*, *stil'* was infused with Western connotations and removed the user, if only by a small step, from everyday Soviet reality. The constant charge made against the *stilyagi* was that they were anti-social elements, seduced by a mirage of the West and its consumer goods'.³⁷⁵ Boffa described the *stilyagi* as those who dressed with 'style' as quasi-Western in nature, children of individuals with money who were lacking in personality and sought to distinguish themselves through eccentricity.³⁷⁶ Olga Vainshtein has written of the radical fetishisation of Western clothing being a society wide phenomenon with the *stilyagi* being the most prominent example at the time.³⁷⁷

The *stilyagi* male favoured narrow, straight-leg pants or 'pipers', pointed shoes, a Hawaiian shirt, sunglasses, and a bandana around his neck; he wore his hair short, was in love with jazz, and danced the 'twist' and the 'shake'. The female version was the ingénue, characterized by a childlike hairstyle, a round turndown collar, a slight décolleté, a naïve gaze, light pastel hues in makeup, a miniskirt, clothes that outlined the figure, and the mannerisms of a capricious child. In many respects, quite obviously, this image corresponded to the tendencies dominating Western fashion of the time, exemplified by the British model Twiggy.³⁷⁸ By the 1960s, the socially deviant *stilyagi* were being re-evaluated perhaps in response to

³⁷⁴ Mervyn Matthews, Interview 2002, London.

³⁷⁵ Crowley, 'Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-War Eastern Europe' 17

³⁷⁶ Boffa, *Inside the Khrushchev Era* 214.

³⁷⁷ Olga Vainshtein, 'Female Fashion, Soviet Style: Bodies of Ideology,' Helena Goscilo and Beth Holgren eds., *Russia, Women, Culture* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996) 64-93, 73.

³⁷⁸ Vainshtein, 'Female Fashion, Soviet Style: Bodies of Ideology,' 65.

the rise of more insidious elements such as the *kippi*. In the article 'Not by clothes alone' one reads of how Z. Balakh erroneously judges an extremely well dressed young woman as being *stilyagi*, 'most likely without intelligence, without a heart'. As fate would have it, Balakh soon learnt that this fashionable young woman had a heart. Not only did she help a lost child find his mother but she herself was an orphan who did not remember her mother who had died on the day of victory.³⁷⁹ The prestige afforded foreign fashions served both the ruling class and the dissenters. To wear Western clothes was to officially thumb one's nose at the Communist party while having access to Western fashions often set the privileged class (here read largely communist party member or their families) off from the masses. The dissident for whom Martin Dewhirst bought jeans and who wanted American Levi's because 'he wanted the best' from a fashion point of view, could have been a Party official's son.³⁸⁰

Officials were aware of the contradictory nature of the elite youth sporting Western fashions. The *stilyagi* had a weak spot for the fox trot and jazz, and 'were a serious challenge to Soviet ideology, not because they were numerous or powerful, but because they were the first manifestation of a new phenomenon for which the country was ideologically unprepared.'³⁸¹ Writing for the Soviet press in 1954, Ivanov noted that the *stilyagi* risked becoming 'an over refined intellectual with petit bourgeois tastes and propensities.'³⁸² The American Sally Belfrage described her *stilyagi* friend's background as representative:

Sergei had been brought up with all the money he wanted and nothing to buy with it. The family had had a big black Zim to drive around in and a chauffeur to drive it, two maids and a cook and his father's assistant, a dacha in the country, and English, French and piano tutors for Sergei and his brother... He wasn't very interested in his career, though he had confidence that he'd be a success because of influential friends. Every evening was spent living it up in a restaurant or at a party dancing rock'n'roll. He never read anything, but used up a lot of time speculating over foreign things. Nothing was any good unless it was foreign, he thought. Often he or those like him gave me foreign pens, jewellery, cigarette cases or holders, lighters, sometimes even American cigarettes and chewing gum.³⁸³

379 Kononenko, 'Siiaiushchee budushchee,' 6.

380 Interview with Martin Dewhirst, Glasgow April 2001.

381 Pilkington, Russia's Youth and its Culture 67.

382 G. Ivanov, 'Bad taste,' CDSF vol 39 no.6 (1954): 10-11, 11.

383 Belfrage, A Room in Moscow 32.

There were inventive applications of legitimate products in the quest to be Western to be seen in the early 1950s when youth would pin American cigarette packs to their clothing and chew paraffin wax as gum.

A condemning charge laid against the *stilyagi* by Soviet officials was that they tried too hard to be like their foreign idols and were rewarded with the scorn of foreigners who saw them as hopelessly outdated. One example of this was an AGITPUNKT caricature that John Massey Stuart saw posted during his visit to Russia in 1969 of a 'caricatured American tourist, with a wad of ten rouble bills in his hand, and a *stilyagi*, drooling over a pair of old trousers.'³⁸⁴ The *stilyagi* were not the only group to imitate the West. In the 1950s there were the *shtatniki* and in the 1960s there were the *bitniki* and *khippi*. Despite initial official condemnation of these groups members of these groups were not *de facto* failed citizens. Soviet papers and journals ran articles cautioning citizens against misjudging these youth. For example, from *Komsomol'skaia Pravda*:

This one? He is dressed in a wide-shouldered jacket and extremely narrow short trousers from beneath which flash brightly coloured socks. He spends a large part of his time on his appearance. He wears his hair long and sprinkles his speech with such words as 'colossal' 'charming' 'simply' etc. If he is Boris, he calls himself Bob, and if he is Ivan, he calls himself John...He 'adores' everything foreign and is ready to give his right arm for a fashionable record...

However, despite such an introduction, the article then continues, declaring that the habits of aimlessness, selfishness etc were more harmful than a flair for fashion. Persecuting individuals for their fashion accoutrements constituted a lack of attention being paid to 'real bourgeois elements' and that Young Communist League members lost respect for leaders who engaged in such superficial pursuits. The article continues: 'you can have a moustache and a fashionable suit and still be a good YCL member. An elegant ring on the beautiful hand of a girl can make her hand still more beautiful. YCL honour does not suffer from this. The desire to dress well is natural. It is bourgeois only when it becomes almost the main concern of one's life.'³⁸⁵

Official and public awareness of Western fashion was such that fashion trends in the USSR only lagged about two or three years behind those in the West,

³⁸⁴ Stewart, *Across the Russias* 135.

³⁸⁵ Ye. Rusakova, 'Which of Them is the *Stiliaga*,' in *CDSP* Vol.8 no.33 (1956): 8-9, 8.

brand names were known, and certain countries garnered more respect than others. During various stays in the USSR (1959-1964) Martin Dewhirst was asked continually for Levis, despite Levis just coming into widespread use in Britain during this time. The semiotics of dress, to 'have something that looked as if it had been made in Italy, if only a tie, was very important for one's self respect, at any rate in Moscow and St. Petersburg/Leningrad.'³⁸⁶ In an attempt to provide consumers with something foreign, Soviet factories began placing foreign labels on Soviet products.



Fig. 6 Pittsburgh Youth Welcome N. S. Khrushchev *Zhit' v mire i družbe*

Soviet media often provided contradictory images of Western fashion, often with the derisive intent. The images of the West provided templates for fashion conscious Soviet citizens. For example, in January 1961, the magazine *Krokodil* ran images of the British the staff gathered during an official trip to England. The sketch 'Welcome!' (in English), showed various images of Brits. The dominant central image is of an impeccably dressed pencil thin businessman with umbrella, attaché, and a handkerchief in pocket. His trousers have a front pleat, his jacket is single breasted, and his tie is narrow. Other images form a rough circle around the businessman and include a woman with long straight hair wearing a fuzzy cardigan,

³⁸⁶ Interview with Martin Dewhirst, Glasgow April 2001.

a mini skirt, and court shoes (with ornamental buckle) walking several dogs. Then a couple, he in a kilt - she in flared trousers, leather boots, and a floppy hat. Another pair is looking at modern art with their arms around each other. She has long hair and is wearing bell-bottoms and a striped shirt, and he has on a baggy jumper, cargo trousers and boots. Two more stereotypical pictures neither large nor centrally placed include a British guard in full military regalia including beaver hat and a poor man in tattered clothing working as an advertising post.³⁸⁷



Fig. 7 'Welcome!' *Krokodil* (1967)

The *stilyagi* trend is representative of a larger trend of increased interest in fashion. Fashion was no longer perceived 'unconditionally [as] a bourgeois perversion but [as] a legitimate phenomenon of contemporary socialist life'.³⁸⁸ To be fashionable meant to be contemporary. The concepts of contemporary as well as the production realities (i.e. synthetic material) were intrinsically linked with modernity and the West. According to *Rabotnitsa* fashion was a highly visible aspect of modernity, and of universality; 'even' the Italian women turned their heads at pretty dresses.³⁸⁹ In terms of modernity, the ability to produce wrinkle free,

³⁸⁷ Boris Efimov, 'Welcome!' *Krokodil* (02.01.1967) 7.

³⁸⁸ Reid, 'Cold War in the Kitchen' 241.

³⁸⁹ Renata Bestegi, 'V komnate', *Rabotnitsa* no.7 (1957):3-4, 4.

dynamically patterned and coloured synthetic textiles as well as synthetic leather into new fashion was possible only through a combination of innovative design and advanced manufacturing capabilities. Sophisticated machinery was needed to mass-produce clothing and footwear. In articles such as 'In exhibition and in the stores' new Soviet clothing was praised for its innovation and lamented for its scarcity.³⁹⁰ Along with the promise to get clothing into the shops there was a warning that part of the problem was the increasing demands and selectivity of Soviet shoppers. No longer were shoppers content with acquiring just any garment, they now had preferences in style, colour, fabric, quality, and size. In a conversation between a *Rabotnitsa* journalist and a shopper the journalist asked why the woman did not want to purchase a particular perfectly respectable jacket. The response was: 'young lady, I want a jacket that is stylish and not too expensive'.³⁹¹ The reader is reminded to remember the dismal state of clothing production during the early 1940s. No longer dealing solely with scarcity, the 1960s problem is that there are not enough nice dresses and too many unattractive ones: '[a]nd so, there are no dresses. And there are too many dresses.'³⁹²

The two countries that epitomised fashion during this period were France and Italy. There were exhibitions, films, fashion shows, the purchasing of materials and production lines, and official statements describing and promoting the new fashions from these nations. After Khrushchev's visit to Paris and the fashion show put on by Christian Dior in Moscow, he publicly stated that all Soviet citizens should have clothes made of a quality and fashion comparable to Christian Dior. Khrushchev's international visits and the fashions involved were regularly reported on in *Rabotnitsa*. In an article on Italian fashion, the focus was on light, ultra thin synthetic fabrics, bright bold patterns and on how to take limited articles of clothing and create a comparably dynamic and versatile wardrobe. Articles that discussed what was trendy in the West typically contained the reassurance that these products or styles would be available to Soviet citizen. Having acknowledged that the world of fashion was dominated by the styles of France and Italy, and the synthetic fibres of the United States and United Kingdom, the Soviet Union's contribution was not

³⁹⁰ L. Kornilushin, 'Na vystavkakh i na skladakh,' *Rabotnitsa* no.8 (1959): 9; T. Aleksandrova and S. Lapteva, 'Otchego nadmenny manekeny,' *Rabotnitsa* no.7 (1964): 22-23.

³⁹¹ E. A. Fedorova, 'Samostoiatel'nost' i otvetstvennost', *Rabotnitsa* no.12 (1965) 6-7.

³⁹² Lapteva, 'Otchego nadmenny manekeny' 22-23.

to be underestimated. The article 'Boots from synthetic material' claimed there was international recognition of Russian boots as 'very stylish' in form but failing to be the most stylish. It claimed that the most fashionable footwear was no longer made from leather but from synthetic materials, which allowed the Soviet Union to be a contender, if not a leader, in the international fashion world. One then reads that the production of synthetic boots in the Soviet Union is to begin in 1964 with the first million pairs being produced at the Kalininskii Factory.³⁹³ Articles on synthetic footwear ran before production thereof began in the Soviet Union and associating synthetic material with the West was an attempt to foster acceptance. Despite attempts to sway opinions, synthetic materials were largely distrusted by the public as not being durable, difficult to wash, hot in summer and cold in winter (particularly true of nylon), bleeding of colours (stockings or 'stretch socks' were the worst for bleeding often staining women's legs), and were perceived as an attempt by the regime to produce a cheap inferior substitute.

In order to produce new materials in large quantities old factories needed to be revamped and new ones built.³⁹⁴ The article '*Ot ulitsy Batratskoi do ulitsy Tereshkovoii*' ran an in-depth report on four modern textile factories, all with large windows and air conditioning. The textile patterns produced by factories were not developed by mere *dissinatorov*, but by artists. The newest factory, the *Kamyshina*, produced knitwear, flannel for children's clothing, satin, and specialised in velvet (the article switches regularly between the transliteration of 'velvet' and *barkhat*). A prime objective of the *Kamyshina* factory was to reproduce lightweight high elasticity velvet that matched their Italian and French samples.³⁹⁵ The article summed up the future of the factory by prophesising that should one come back in 2018, one would find built here on the Volga River the largest and best textile factory in Europe, producing stylish patterns on luxurious fabrics. The factory *Krasnoe znamia* was also a major source of synthetic fabrics. Situated in Leningrad, it was one of the first producers of synthetic material, in this instance kapron, and became a main supplier of synthetic furs. Khrushchev had a papakha out of

³⁹³ 'Sinteticheskaia obuv', *Rabotnitsa* no.8 (1964): 32. For a discussion on the merits of synthetic materials see also T. Kostygova, 'Kabluk, moda i zdorov'e', *Rabotnitsa* no.10 (1965): 28-29.

³⁹⁴ See for example T. Aleksandrova, *Rabotnitsa* no.10 (1965): 9-11; Ts. Golodnyn, 'Net, nevidimaia...', *Rabotnitsa* no.11 (1962): 16-17.

³⁹⁵ For example, T. Aleksandrova, *Rabotnitsa* 10 (1965): 9-11, 10.

synthetic lambskin produced in *Krasnoe znamia* and would quiz people as to if it was synthetic or natural.³⁹⁶

Soviet fashion trends were a combination of Soviet ingenuity in the face of shortages and poor quality with enough attention being paid to the West that the Western influences and origins of many of the trends were recognisable. The chemicalisation of the clothing industry was to result in clothing and footwear serving as a conduit between the general population, the chemical industry and the government. Added to this was the dynamic of fashion as a symbol of progress and thus national pride. The adoption of Western fashion trends served to incorporate Soviet fashion culture into a greater world culture; accentuate both class distinctions (access to Western fashion greater for elite) and dissent; and provide an alternative to 'soviet'. In 1963, Khrushchev acknowledged that despite great progress having been made over the past decade, Soviet people were dressing better than previously, 'some clothes are still on the dismal side. We are producing an ever-growing quantity of all kinds of consumer goods; all the same, we must not force the pace unreasonably as regards the lowering of prices.'³⁹⁷

Automobiles

Cars were visions of modernity, enshrouded in images of power and speed. As with modern fashion, it was impossible to separate the prestige of the private passenger car from the West. Foreign cars were rare in the Soviet Union and an image of the foreign car existed. In particular, the American automotive industry not only underpinned the American economy, but ubiquitously exported and imported the American dream.³⁹⁸ American cars were built and designed to accommodate the aesthetics of the middle-class. In his memoirs, one of the original management members and later general director of AVTOVAZ, Anatolii Anatol'evich Zhitkov wrote that: 'the United States of America brought in the 20th Century with the automobile, [and] that the automobile appeared in the majority of various Western countries as an engine of progress, that thanks to it, there was a

³⁹⁶ Natal'ia Lebina 'Plus khlizatslia vsei odezhdy,' 86.

³⁹⁷ Khrushchev, *Marxism-Leninism is Our Banner* 29.

³⁹⁸ David Nye, *Consuming Power: A Social History of American Energies* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998) 178.

large collective technological, scientific and economic programme'.³⁹⁹ Again, as with housing and clothing, automobiles linked national industrial prestige with personal consumption and images of the Soviet future fused with images of the mythical other. In chapter five, 'Driving Towards Communist Consumerism: VAZ,' the formation of images through direct industrial contact is examined in detail. In this section of chapter two, 'Commenting on Communist Consumption' the public lore surrounding the passenger car with its links to the West and the role the passenger car was to play in Soviet society is briefly approached.

Soviet anecdotes about automobiles illustrate the broad social impact of the car and the linkage of cars to the concepts of wealth and foreign. The connection with wealth was a combination of the wealth of the individual that owned a vehicle and that of the society (Italy could produce the Fiat and Ferrari, the British the Land Rover and the United States, the chrome laden Cadillac) that had the resources to divert to the private car industry. The phenomenon of the car-wealth linkage is illustrated in the following well-known anecdotes. Both date from the 1960s.

An American tells a Russian:

-I have three cars. In one I go to work, in another I visit guests and when I go to Europe, I take the third car.

The Russian responds:

-Well, to work I go by tram, to guests in the metro.

The American asks:

- and to Europe?

The Russian answers:

- and to Europe I go by tank.⁴⁰⁰

An American was looking around Moscow and went with the Intourist guide to a factory where there stood three cars.

American: To whom does this factory belong?

Intourist: The workers

American: and the three cars?

Intourist: One is the Director's, the other, the Chairman of the Trade Union committee, the third, the Secretary.

A Soviet official was looking around Detroit and sees at one of the factories a thousand cars. He asks his guide, an American communist: To whom does this factory belong?

American communist: to the Capitalist Ford.

Soviet official: and these cars?

American communist: the workers.⁴⁰¹

399 A. Zhitkov, *Vershinoi zhizni stal VAZ* (Tol'atti, 1997), 24.

400 Shturman, 351-52.

401 Andreëvich, 111.

The first anecdote combines the notion of relative American prosperity with the idea that the Soviet Union has diverted, at least in part, some of its wealth into the military and Eastern Europe. A third anecdote highlights the admiration in which foreign technology and workmanship was held, and the limits of Soviet society to express their knowledge of the West.

A large, handsome American automobile was parked on a street in Moscow. A man walked by and stopped to admire it. He rubbed his fingers over the finish, he felt the tyres; he stared awestruck at the upholstery. 'What a beautiful Russian car,' he said to a second man who had also stopped to admire it. 'What magnificent, magnificent work we do here.' 'Fool,' said the second man. 'Don't you know that this is an American car, not a Russian car?' 'Yes,' said the first man. 'I know it's an American car. But I don't know you.'⁴⁰²

Recalling the reaction of Soviet citizens to the American Exhibition in general and the car display in particular 'Friend D' felt that the exhibition did not have the impact it should have had, due to its department store nature full of items that could be dismissed. There were 'a lot of very nice goods, rather better than ours; but so what? We'd catch up with them in a few years where that sort of thing was concerned. They hadn't had a war the way we had; so what the hell? All the same, our young people went pretty crazy about their cars.'⁴⁰³ A popular joke that arose surrounding the American exhibition and American cars that supports the opinion that the cars were popular went as follows:

A young man got so rapturous about a Cadillac that he asked an American guide how he could possibly get such a car. 'You've got to show that you Russians are really tougher than we Americans.' 'What do I have to do?' 'First you've got to drink a whole bottle of scotch in one draught; then you've got to shake hands with a lion; then you have to have sexual intercourse with an old Eskimo woman.' So he drinks off the bottle of whiskey without turning a hair; he gets into the lioness's cage; after forty minutes he comes out, looking badly bruised, scratched and tattered and says: 'Now, Where's that Eskimo woman whose paw I've got to shake?'

During Khrushchev's Siberian lectures in 1959 he noted that the Americans had yet to send a rocket to the moon yet wanted praise for their passenger cars and that the Soviet Union did not intend to give this praise, as there was no intention of

402 A. Lif, Forbidden Laughter: Soviet Underground Jokes (Los Angeles: The Almanac Publishing House, 1973) 45.

403 'D'in Werth, The Khrushchev Phase 173.

competing in this realm. The Soviet automobile industry was going to avoid the American pitfalls of 'it's a lousy car, but it's mine' and the frustration of insufficient parking space. The Soviet solution was car pools and the improvement of public transportation. The car pool system was promoted as relieving individuals of the onerous job of upkeep and yet placing cars at their disposal.⁴⁰⁴ This policy decision did not prevent the Soviet people from being interested in passenger cars.




Fig. 8 Mrs. K looking at the British Triumph (courtesy of J.M. Stewart)

In his memoirs, Khrushchev made clear his opinion on the shelving of the car pool system for mass production of passenger cars, tying it to food and agriculture. In 1961, in an attempt to increase poultry production, the USSR purchased a poultry plant from the Finely Moody Corporation of Aurora Illinois. In the USA the plant yield one kilogram of meat for three kilograms of feed. In the USSR, the same plant needed five kilograms of feed for one kilogram of meat. 'How could we compete with the US if there was such a vast discrepancy? I [Khrushchev] was simply ashamed to talk with the president of the American firm, just as it fills me with shame to hear that we're importing chicken from relatively small countries like France, to say nothing of Holland.'⁴⁰⁵ When Finely Moody was asked why the plant

⁴⁰⁴ *Sbyvaiutsia mechty chelovecheskie* 164.

⁴⁰⁵ Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament* 141.

was not producing as it should they could not provide an answer as their experts had not been permitted to view either the plant nor to oversee the installation. In 1964, despite the poultry factory never having reached the promised norms, Khrushchev entered into discussions for the purchase of a bacon plant from Finely Moody. Talks were tabled with the removal of Khrushchev from power: 'I [Khrushchev] think it certainly would have been better from an economic standpoint to buy that license rather than one for a Fiat automobile plant.'⁴⁰⁶ Modern food production was a combination of Soviet and Western technology and driven by the Soviet leadership's belief in the need to improve provisions.

In *Kommunist* the argument against private car ownership was taken further by contending that American capitalists permitted workers to have cars as this resulted in workers, no longer fatigued from the subway, being more productive. Along the same vein, TV was developed in an attempt to curb excessive drinking and all night parties.⁴⁰⁷ In 1961, architect Ya. A. Kornfel'd spoke scornfully on automotive centred American cities saying that 'there exists a peculiar understanding about travel by automobile, which is considered and advertised, like American Coca-Cola, as something that is impossible to do without.'⁴⁰⁸

By the mid 1960s official Soviet policy on passenger cars had changed to support mass production of economy cars. This was to be achieved through improvements to existing factories, the designing of a small Soviet economy car, and most significantly, from Fiat a multi-million dollar turnkey factory in Tol'jatti. The agreement with Fiat did not constitute a fundamental change in the Soviet automotive industry from the aspect of cooperation as the Soviet automotive industry had developed in conjunction with foreign assistance. Prior to his removal, Khrushchev had publicly lauded Soviet-American automotive ties, typically noting that during the Revolution, engineers went to study in American colleges and universities and to work as ordinary workers at Ford and elsewhere. The head of the automobile industry Engineer Strokin, used to work for Ford, and 'Ford thought highly of him; he suggested that Strokin stay and work for him.'⁴⁰⁹ The Fiat factory was to provide the bulk of the small passenger cars. The magazine *Krokodil*

406 Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament* 142.

407 As quoted in Gunther, *Inside Russia Today* 81.

408 Bittner, 'Remembering the Avant-Garde' 562.

409 *Zhit' v mire i druzhbe* 193-94.

(01.1969 no.1) was to announce the beginning of production in Tol'jatti with a front cover cartoon. 410



Fig. 9 Fiat *Krokodil* no.1 (1969)

410 'Fiat,' *Krokodil* no.1 (1969)

The belief in Western superiority in car production, and in consumer goods in general, was part of the secret that everyone knew. The anecdotes in this section are all dependent on certain basic cultural assumptions about the West. The West had to be technologically advanced, adept at mass production, and have consumers. If there was a plethora of vehicles in the West, were there then many other less expensive consumer goods available?

A common Soviet response to the idea of abundance and mass distribution of goods was the denunciation that this abundance was false and that goods were only available to the elite or that the goods seen were prototypes that were not in general production. This argument would have sounded logical to Soviet citizens who were able to view the economic and technological wonders of Socialism often only in exhibition halls or museums and who had direct experience with a system which did reserve such goods for the elite. However, anecdotes like the first one with the Soviet official in Detroit and articles like that from *Kommunist* are indicative of an image of wide spread material wealth. This belief existed at a time when core to Soviet discourse were the issues of: increases in the production of consumer goods, increased access to them, and concerns about the level of Soviet quality all of which were intrinsically connected with such goods as cars.

Culture

The linkage between state, technology, society and the West can also be seen in the field of culture in general but popular culture in particular. By nature popular culture and the arts were designed for an audience and proved a particularly sensitive medium. This was not lost on the Soviet leadership and regardless of the era, culture was consistently viewed as more subversive and ideologically threatening than science and technology. During the post WWII era the ties between technology and culture strengthened both due to technological changes to the medium itself, for example the introduction of colour pictures, and dissemination, for example advances in music recording and reproduction. Under Khrushchev, cultural contact was advocated by the West and the Soviet regime consented to it in order to achieve other objectives. Between Western governments using the incentive of possible economic ties to gain cultural concessions and the Soviet government not being as cautious as it had been previously and would be in

the future, cultural contact increased during the late 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, this was an era when most organisations had a foreign branch of some sort.⁴¹¹ Cultural diplomacy was remarkably resilient to political tensions, indeed neither Boris Pasternak being forced to turn-down the Nobel Prize for Literature (October 1958) nor the U-2 surveillance plane incidence (May Day 1960) had long-term ramifications for cultural exchanges.⁴¹²

In this section, examples from three forms of both Soviet and Western popular culture (film, music and a popular magazine) have been chosen to show the origins of the image, the image of the West being conveyed, and the linkage of the medium to technology. Generating interest not only due to their foreign nature, imported culture was a refreshing alternative to the stilted nature of socialist realism which had resulted in artists, cultural organisations and the public being thoroughly disinterested in much of the popular Soviet culture at the time. As one commentator of the period was to note that the 'Soviet Union will collapse, if it ever does collapse, of boredom.'⁴¹³

a. Films

Films are one example of how technology, society and the state interacted and constructed an aspect of the image of the mythical other. The technology behind film production was to develop quickly with the advancement to colour pictures coinciding with the race for space. Films were also a form of media designed for the modern mass audience. In addition, films could be viewed by the entire population and did not necessarily favour an urban elite. Indeed, film was a cultural medium particularly well suited to the youth, as it was modern, affordable, universal and accessible. Thus, a film could convey a message of modernity on three levels: the technology with which it was produced; the mass nature and demographics of its audience; and the message contained within the film. Images of the West were to occur both in Western and Soviet films played in the USSR.

Initially under Khrushchev films were a popular medium for exchange. Western governments, in particular the American government, favoured information and

411 Richmond, *US-Soviet Cultural Exchanges* 63.

412 Frederick Starr, *Red and Hot: The fate of jazz in the Soviet Union 1917-1980* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) 262.

413 Gunther, *Inside Russia Today* 383.

cultural exchanges partly because they were perceived as a breach in Soviet information control. For the West, films were a form of cultural diplomacy that required little investment or work. For the Soviet officials films were modern, mass-produced and had the potential to earn the Soviet state money. While Soviet officials always screened potential Western films, by the 1970s, the practice was largely set-aside in the West largely due to a general lack of public interest in Soviet films. After the initial interest in Soviet films such as 'My Name is Ivan', 'Ballad of a Soldier', and 'The Cranes are Flying', public interest dwindled exacerbating the process of establishing reciprocal agreements. By contrast, Western films were box office successes in the Soviet Union.

Western films during the Khrushchev era built upon the wartime popularity of foreign films and were to remain a significant aspect of Soviet film culture. Under Stalin, film production had dwindled to the point that cinema works from the 1930s such as *Volga, Volga* were resurrected and played regularly. When Soviet films were produced, in the early fifties five to ten per year, they did not depict the realities of contemporary life (a trend that had begun internationally). By the late 1950s under Khrushchev, Soviet film production increased to over fifty per year and the regulation requiring that scripts be centrally approved was abolished. In conjunction with this abolishment of central control, there was a decrease in political content and an increase in representative stories and characters. Under Brezhnev, film scripts were brought back under scrutiny. Soviet films such as 'The Cranes are Flying' and 'Ballad of a Soldier' demonstrated an ability on the part of the Soviet film industry to produce films that audiences willingly viewed. However, even within the Soviet Union, Soviet films did not dominate the film industry during the 1950s.

The importance of Western films in Soviet culture was based on quantity, quality, and simply being western. In 1956, such masterpieces as 'La Strada' and 'Lady Hamilton' were highlights that drew in Soviet audiences. 'La Strada' (director Federico Fellini) was first released in Italy in 1954 and in the USA and the USSR in 1956. It is the tragic story of the impish Gelsomina who is sold by her poor mother to the carnival man Zampanò. Abused and living a life of servitude, Gelsomina meets Il Matto (The Fool) who shows her the possibility of a life without subjugation and pain. In the end Zampanò kills Il Matto breaking Gelsomina and

leaves her. 'Lady Hamilton' (also released under 'That Hamilton Woman'), first released in 1941, was director Alexander Korda's attempt to produce a war propaganda film in a United States that was not yet ready for such a film. The film was seen by contemporary critics as being bad history, the usage of Napoleonic wars to symbolise Hitler and the war in Europe, with the British safeguarding against ambitious dictators, but good propaganda for Britain. The latter of these two films was in keeping with the more traditional nature of Soviet films in that in technically dealing with a historic subject, there was little to be learnt about contemporary life. The former was modern and edgy but due to its storyline politically acceptable. However, in showing the poverty of Italian life through the fate of Gelsomina, it also showed through images the wealth of Italy. The presence of foreign film was also felt through its quantity.

In 1957 alone, seventy foreign films were shown. During Mihajlov's summer in Russia he saw four Western films playing: 'Divorce Italian Style' (recorded as playing in twenty-nine theatres), 'The Secrets of Paris', 'Fanfan the Tulip', and the American Western 'The Magnificent Seven'.⁴¹⁴ Popular American films during the Khrushchev era included:

- 'Marty',
- 'Roman Holiday',
- 'All about Eve',
- 'Twelve Angry Men',
- 'Inherit the Wind',
- 'Some Like It Hot',
- 'To Kill a Mockingbird',
- 'Zorba',
- 'My Fair Lady',
- 'Romeo and Juliet',
- 'Around the World in Eighty Days',
- 'Lust for Life',
- 'West Side Story',
- 'Deanna Durbin' (US singer) films,
- 'Stagecoach' (released in USSR as 'The Journey Will Be Dangerous'),
- 'Mr. Deeds Goes to Town' (renamed 'The Dollar Rules'),
- 'The Roaring Twenties' (renamed 'A Soldier's Fate in America'), and
- 'Tarzan's New York Adventure'.

⁴¹⁴ Mihajlov, Moscow Summer 51.

Again, as with the examples from 1956, popular American films were a combination of historical and contemporary films. Films such as 'Roman Holiday' (director William Wyler), and 'West Side Story', would have given Soviet audiences images of Western fashion, cities and homes. For example, in 'Roman Holiday' runaway Princess Ann (Audrey Hepburn), discovers Rome and the life of a commoner at the side of American reporter Joe Bradley (Gregory Peck). In this film elegant fashions from Ann's world as a princess attending balls and gatherings throughout Europe are combined with daily fashions in Rome. Princess Ann laments having to wear silk nightgowns with roses and is bored with her lovely lingerie and longs to wear only the top half of pyjamas. One sees cafes and street life as well as an average flat in Rome. At the beginning of the story, Princess Ann escapes into an open supply truck, then Joe Bradley takes her to his flat in a taxi and they discover Rome on a scooter together. In 'West Side Story' (1961) set in late 1950s Upper West Side New York City, images of racial strife, gang wars between the newly arrived Puerto Rican immigrants (gang name Sharks) and second generation European immigrants (gang name Jets), juvenile delinquency, racism, and inner city problems vie with American fashion, slang, a rebellious youth subculture, kinetic dance scenes and a jazzy score. The opening scene is a bird's eye view of Manhattan with its bridge traffic, skyscrapers and motorway ramps that reduces to a concrete playground and youth playing basketball. Passive information gathering about fashion, music, and American culture is reinforced by the immigrants' assimilation into American culture. For example, the founder of the Jets, Tony, first sees his Maria in a bridal shop full of luxury fabric, wedding gowns, and evening dresses where she is getting a dress altered. The dress is to be perfect as she is to wear it to an upcoming dance that will mark the beginning of her life as a young lady in America. In a beautiful, sexy dress (Maria's brother Bernardo objects to the low neckline) Maria is to become part of American culture. Modern Western films dealing with contemporary life derived a degree of credibility from addressing contemporary issues. The sheer quantity of films, allowed for a consistent representation of cities, homes and fashions. However, images of the well off Westerner were not solely found in Western films.

Soviet officials themselves furthered the images of the wealthy West in their portrayals of life in the West. One example of this is the Soviet film 'The Memory of the Heart' written by Sergei Gerasimov and directed by Tatyana Lioznova. The film was first released in the Soviet Union in 1958 and in 1959 in Finland. The picture is about an English pilot who crashed in Soviet territory during the Second World War and was saved by two partisans (a woman and young boy). Long after returning to London, he remembers the two partisans and resolves to return to Russia to find them. Set both in the Soviet Union and in England, the main English scenes involve the hero in his home in the London suburbs. In one scene, eleven members of his family have gathered at his home to comfortably listen to his tales. In order to create a 'realistic' hero's London suburb home for Soviet audiences, the home was filled with copies of *Good Housekeeping* and *Looks*; a hunting dog was brought in; reproductions of abstract art were hung; the table was decked out with a gold Lomoges coffee set, a large birthday cake and decanters of port; and fashionable clothing and footwear were custom-made for the 'English' actors and actresses. Images such as the above mentioned, of the West as full of modern fashion, busy cities, masses of passenger cars, modern homes and social problems could be found both in Western and Soviet film during the 1950s and 1960s.

b. Music

In her study *Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia*, Svetlana Boym has noted music is not just a 'cultural or diversionary phenomenon. It is also a political phenomenon... Music brings people together and evokes for them collective emotional experience to which common meanings are assigned. It gives them common reference points, common idols, and often a common sense.'⁴¹⁵ During the 1950s and 1960s the music scene was relatively progressive and international. In late 1962 speaking at an Moscow art exhibition Khrushchev declared his support for music, and inadvertently his praise of foreign technology: 'I like music a lot...and often listen to it on the radio. I even went so far as to carry a little Japanese radio around in my pocket.' He proceeded to lambaste new music and dances as indecent

⁴¹⁵ Sabrina Petra Ramet ed., *Rocking the State: Music and Politics in Eastern Europe and Russia* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994) 1.

and failing to 'ennoble the individual and arouse him to action.'⁴¹⁶ Richard Stites has noted in his study of popular culture that the drive for jazz during the 1950s was neither exclusively the work of the intelligentsia nor did it begin only after Stalin's death.⁴¹⁷ Jazz was to flourish in the late 1950s through to 1962. In 1959, the Yale Russian Choir included jazz in its repertoire and this was well received according to *Soviet Music*. When it was conceded that some jazz was permissible, this in contradiction to the Stalinist line that all jazz was decadent, Western, and bourgeois, the Composer Yuri Miliutin was called in to help navigate between the staunch anti and pro forces. His article as printed in *Komsomol'skaia Pravda* (22.09.1960) concluded that jazz should be permitted but that Soviet musicians must write the songs. Preceding this article, the first official jazz club formed in Leningrad in 1958 under the leadership of Yuri Vikharev. The first two jazz cafes in Moscow (the 'Molodezhnoe' and the 'Aelita') were opened in 1961. The clubs were an overwhelming success, much to the pleasure of the Party that realised that by creating upbeat and modern venues young upstanding Communists could be enticed to spend an enjoyable evening in a controlled environment. The clubs were also a popular place to bring foreign guests who admired the paintings by young artists and the modern music. To some, the jazz cafes were 'very strange, almost like private clubs'; to others, they appeared to be more the exclusive domain of the Party's youth hierarchy.⁴¹⁸ In 1966, the state recording agency *Melodiia* began recording Soviet jazz and pop for distribution. By the mid 1960s European jazz groups frequented the USSR regularly drawing crowds, by the late 1960s only the big names drew significant crowds (i.e. The University of Illinois Stage Band (1969), Duke Ellington (1971), Thad Jones-Mel Lewis orchestra (1972)). In 1962, Benny Goodman toured five cities from June-July and his sidemen held numerous jam secessions. Khrushchev was at the Moscow show and joined the standing ovation.

In 1958, an American jazz LP sold on the black market for approximately four hundred roubles.⁴¹⁹ As with jazz, the first rock songs were imitative and initially in English. Sabrina Ramet argues that while part of the rejection of rock music in the

416 Nikita Khrushchev, (01.12.1962) Priscilla Johnson, *Khrushchev and the Arts: the Politics of Soviet Culture, 1962-1964* (Cambridge: MIT, 1965) 103.

417 Stites, *Russian Popular Culture*.

418 Frederick Starr, *Red and Hot* 270.

419 Gunther, *Inside Russia Today*.

USSR was due to the generational gap, rock coming into existence post WWII, it was also dismissed as not 'serious'. 'It was too Western. It got young people thinking about LA, the Big Apple, Chicago.'⁴²⁰ However, as with jazz, rock and roll was to be taken over by the state with performers and audiences being granted a relative degree of freedom until the mid 1970s when control restricted but did not outlaw rock and roll. State bands such as the praisers of the glorious socialist future 'Happy Guys' (founded in 1968) were to benefit from the increased controls.

In 1957, rock and roll from the West was permitted at the World Youth Festival thus ushering in such songs as See Ya Later Alligator, Love Potion Number 9 and Tutti Frutti. The first rock music in the USSR was American and British in origin (both had rock concerts as part of their exhibitions in the 1950s), but Elvis Presley, Chuck Berry and this generation of rock was largely missed. Sally Belfrage recalls that on her train from Britain to Moscow and the festival the compartments were filled with Oxford, Cambridge and London School of Economics students, Scots in kilts with bagpipes who played and danced reels at every station along the way, several jazz bands, rock and roll bands, and folk singers.⁴²¹ Later, in a conversation with the Muscovite Sergei in his flat that Belfrage was to describe as 'large and well furnished', Sergei asked all about jazz: he was 'simply horror-struck to find that I [Belfrage], a real American girl, didn't know anything. He switched on a tape recorder and I recognised some of the latest American hit parade music, as well as old songs and the newest jazz.'⁴²² Sergei revealed his source of the music as Voice of America and the World Youth Festival. Zoot-suiters, the Western equivalent to *stilyagi*, appeared in the 1950s with enough of a presence to make an appearance in *Krokodil* in which a call was issued to write a song about them. Alexander Gradsky, who was to form the group *Tarakany* (Cockroaches) in 1963 recalled that upon hearing the Beatles for the first time 'I went into a state of shock, total hysteria. They put everything into focus.'⁴²³ For Kolya Vasin recalling the introduction of the Beatles in the late 1950s early 1960s the Beatles were: 'something heavenly. I felt blissful and invincible. All the depression and fear

420 Ramet, *Rocking the State* 7.

421 Belfrage, *A Room in Moscow* 13.

422 Belfrage, *A Room in Moscow* 30.

423 Sabrina Ramet, Sergei Zamascikov and Robert Bird, 'The Soviet Rock Scene,' Ramet ed., *Rocking the State* 181-218, 182.

ingrained over the years disappeared. I understood that everything other than the Beatles had been oppression.’⁴²⁴ Martin Dewhurst also witnessed the impact of the Beatles in the USSR: ‘It is unbelievable to somebody who was perhaps not around to follow it.’⁴²⁵ A generation of Soviet citizens were given a means of expressing themselves, the challenge for the state was to convert this predominantly English voice into a Soviet one. If in the 1960s the queues of youth outside the *Molodezhnoe Café* were there to hear Vadim Sakun’s jazz; then the lines in 1973 were ‘for imported clothes and rock music.’⁴²⁶ From the period of the 1960s to the 1970s the issues dominating lyrics changed from going to the countryside and a return to nature to the West and materialism.⁴²⁷

Frederick Starr has argued that despite the mandate of creating an ideologically correct Soviet taste in the field of culture, the Soviet government consistently failed to provide a viable communist alternative to Western modern culture.⁴²⁸ Music, like other cultural forms, fostered the idea that Russia was and needed to be part of Europe. This need was adopted and accepted by various sectors of society to further their own objectives. During the Khrushchev era the result was an ever-increasing exposure and availability of information. By the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 cultural diplomacy had all but ground to a halt but the links with Western popular culture remained.

c. Printed Material: *Angliia*

In the post WWII era the West spent significant amounts of time and money, propagating an image of itself, typically to members of the Soviet elites. What they chose to focus on is indicative of how they wanted to be perceived, what they thought the Soviet audience should know, and what the censors would tolerate. It has been included in this study as it is a medium disseminating an image of the West that was both tolerated by the elite in the sense that the journal was distributed in the USSR and it is representative of a medium that was specifically targeted at the Soviet elite. Another interesting aspect is that the images of Britain as seen in

424 Hamet ‘The Soviet Rock Scene’ 182.

425 Interview with Martin Dewhurst, Glasgow April 2001.

426 Frederick Starr, *Red and Hot* 293.

427 Svetlana Boyrn *Common Places: Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994).

428 Frederick Starr, *Red and Hot* 262.

Angliia are remarkably similar to those generally held international stereotypes of Britain. *Angliia* is an example of British propaganda, or as many then preferred to call it, 'projection'. The loss of prestigious markets, Soviet and other, to France, Italy, the United States and Germany, galvanised support for British involvement in cultural diplomacy, despite general British distaste for it. Sir Harold Nicolson wrote that:

the amicable tolerance of all our ways, persuaded us that we were universally liked, respected and admired. Our complacency was pierced by intimations that our best markets were being invaded by persistent and ingenious competition; even our self-assurance became clouded by the suspicion that foreigners did not invariably regard us as either so charming or so intelligent as we seemed to ourselves; and once aeroplanes came to crowd the sky above our island we realised that we had ceased to be the most invulnerable of the Great Powers and had become one of the most vulnerable. It was then that we first realised that our foreign competitors had been devoting effort, skill, and large sums of money to rendering their languages, their types of living, their scientific or technical resources and inventions, and the desirability of their exports, familiar to students and buyers overseas.⁴²⁹

Angliia: zhurnal o segodniashnei zhizni v Velikobritanii was first published in 1962 with a run of fifty thousand copies. By 1964, the run had increased to one hundred thousand copies per issue. When the British organisers of the British Light Industrial Trade Fair of 1966 failed to get Soviet approval to distribute *Angliia* at the trade fair, they took to dumping them as rubbish in quantities too large for the dustbins behind the press tent. It was published quarterly without interruption until 1993, when it became a supplement to *Ekho Planety*. Distribution limitations set by Soviet officials and agreed to by the British resulted in *Angliia* being produced ostensibly for an audience of senior officials, party members, and specialists working within various institutes. However, the plethora of articles on fashion, cosmetics, children's toys, and the coverage of personal relationships is indicative of the targeting of a female readership. Between 1927 and 1976 the percentage of women in the party increased from 12.2 percent to 24.3 percent, but their presence was distinctly lacking in the senior levels.⁴³⁰ As women rarely held senior Party positions in the USSR, the inclusion of articles for them suggests that *Angliia* was

429 Harold Nicolson, The British Council 1934-1955: Twenty-First Anniversary Report (London: 1955).

430 David Lane, Politics and Society in the USSR (Redwood Burn Ltd: Trowbridge, 1978), 2nd ed., 140.

not intended to be read exclusively for 'official' purposes. Thus, *Angliia*'s readers encompassed a broad elite social stratum in both public and private terms. This targeting of the elite was in contrast with the Americans and their publication *Amerika* that targeted the masses. It was the assessment of the British Council and the British Foreign office that while Americans were excellent at the mass dissemination of information, and indeed the English language, the British strength lay not in addressing the masses but the elite. In his study of British propaganda Philip M. Taylor concluded that British propaganda is directed: 'towards the educated classes of foreign societies. It was designed to influence people in governments, the media, education and commerce, individuals in other words, who were in a position to influence much larger numbers of their own people.'⁴³¹ The British focus on those with influence is significant when considered in the context of Vera Dunham's theory. Vera Dunham's thesis of the Big Deal is that within the Soviet Union there existed an unwritten and unspoken contract between the government and that group of individuals, members of the *intelligentsia*, technocrats, and others exhibiting middle class like values. This group's tacit support of the government stabilised and legitimised the Communist party's rule. The British were directing their propaganda at the group upon which the government was highly dependant. The disillusionment of this targeted stratum would contribute to the implosion of the communist system.

Angliia was a forum for British scientific and technological developments and a means of propagating trade relations. It was also a means of prosecuting the Cold War. If the West could create the image of itself as offering greater opportunities and material goods than the USSR, then there was the possibility of increasing discontent and rejection of the communist system. Whether the results were to be an active rejection of the economic viability of the communist or a crippling sense of despondency and apathy. The outcome would be the victory of the West (capitalism and liberal democracy).

In terms of formatting and general appearance *Angliia* was an impressive publication. It was printed on high quality heavy glossy paper, averaged one hundred pages during the 1960s and was full of pictures. The average picture count

⁴³¹ Philip M. Taylor, The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) 3.

(1962-1970) was forty black and white and ten colour photos per edition. That is one photo for every two pages. The photos tended to be large and accompanied articles on consumer goods, technology, or agriculture. When photos involved people, they were happy and active. For example, the accompanying photos of British student Caroline Derston in her article on university life show her as well dressed and always smiling, even when bent over her books.⁴³² The glossy, colourful, high quality nature of *Angliia*, was similar to that of the comparable American publication *Amerika*, the impact of which has been described by the student Shura as: 'so popular that it was almost impossible to get... it was something beautiful in a world of shoddy production.'⁴³³

The respectability of the journal was enhanced by both the Queen's addresses and those of then Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. Each volume consisted of a general theme as well as regular features. Editions would feature several articles on a single topic, which were then complimented by various other articles on other topics. The regular features were: quarterly indexes, BBC broadcast schedules, English crosswords, an English language section (essays, short stories, poetry or music lyrics in English), a travel section highlighting a British town, district, or city and a sports section.

The British editors chose topics perceived as being quintessentially British, either in a historical or modern sense, thus including articles on Shakespeare, T.S. Elliot, the Beatles, the Rolling Stones, Rolls Royce, synthetic fabric, the London theatre scene etc. Automobile manufacturing, agricultural production, consumer goods and children were all foci of Soviet society during this era, and there are a correspondingly large number of articles about them. For example, the amount and specificity of information on the costs and availability of consumer goods is conspicuous. In addition to the regular features on the English language, the study guide for the Cambridge English as a Foreign Language competency test was published occasionally.⁴³⁴ (See Appendix B for a chart of the general themes of the issues from 1962 until 1970). Themes that regularly appeared included science and technology, education, society (fashion, fine arts, literature, popular persons, etc.),

432 *Angliia*, no.16 (1965) 4.

433 Belfrage, *A Room in Moscow* 50.

434 *Angliia* no.30, 1969.

consumer goods, English tourism, sports, (including sporting terms in English), and agriculture.

The overriding themes in the photos are abundance and modernity. In 'How Farmers Live' a photo of fertile fields precedes a two-page spread of a herd of fat healthy cattle. This idyllic image becomes a bit less bucolic but no less abundant as the herd is transformed into a mass of carcasses hanging from meat hooks.⁴³⁵ Images of masses of bananas from Jamaica, overflowing fruit stands, supermarkets, fishmongers, butchers, and children's toys permeate the magazine. Produce is often depicted in its final processed stage, clean and packaged. This cleanliness, the pre-washed eggs, fruit and vegetables, was a new trend. During the exhibition in Sol'niki in 1959, the Americans flashed large colour images of the United States on movie screens. One of the images frequently commented upon was that of washed and topped carrots. The introduction of open shelved supermarkets in Eastern Europe was based on the American and/or English model and was justified as 'modern' and therefore socialist.⁴³⁶

In an article on health care there appears a picture of a pharmacy. This pharmacy has an open serving section with goods that one can collect oneself as well as goods that are kept behind the counters. On the counters and on the shelving every available space is full of goods. Well-dressed customers waiting for goods are seated comfortably and the pharmacists are, of course, smiling. The caption beside the photo reads that this is a photo of a pharmacy in Cheshire and that the majority of pharmacies work for the National Health Service. They also sell goods such as cosmetics, camera film and so on.⁴³⁷ As the intended audience was the Soviet elite, the editors of *Angliia* did not have to convince the readership that the goods were produced in quantities sufficient for the masses but that they were within an affordable price range. To this end, many of the articles about consumer goods are accompanied by captions that list the price of the articles both in British pounds sterling and in roubles. For example, when discussing modern footwear production a British subject was said to have on average 4.2 pairs of shoes that cost approximately six roubles and fifty kopeks per pair for women's shoes and

435 'Peremeny, proisshedshie v angliiskoi pishchevoi promyshlennosti,' *Angliia*, no.25 (1968) 28-44.

436 Crowley, 'Warsaw's Shops, Stalinism and the Thaw' 44.

437 *Angliia*, no.7 (1963): 10-11.

eight roubles seventy kopeks for men's (an average pair of women's shoes in the Soviet Union cost forty roubles).⁴³⁸ The photograph accompanying the article showed dozens of stylish shoes. The ease of shopping in Britain was featured to the extent that it was explained that a customer could simply pick up interesting articles, try them on if clothing or footwear and then pay for them all at one till.⁴³⁹ This idea of ease of shopping due to open shelves, a wide variety of goods and sizes, and the ability to pay at a single electronic till, can be seen in Soviet archival documents in which the merits of shopping cultures in various countries are discussed.⁴⁴⁰ Prices in roubles and pounds were given for clothing, cars, cosmetics, services, children's toys, etc. Some examples of prices given are as follows (price listed in roubles/pounds sterling unless stated otherwise):

- sterilising washing machine from 165-400/66-160,
- a load of washing washed at a Laundromat costs 1.25/10 shilling and 6 pence if the client washed the clothes themselves or 1.65/13 shilling 6 pence/ if the laundry was left to be done⁴⁴¹
- the car model 'Princess' by BMN 2,240/ NA
- the Triumph Spitfire, 1,600/640
- the Sunbeam Alpine 2,100/840
- Rolls Royce Silver Cloud approximately 13,750 /5, 500
- a tour of Kenya by two students 250/100
- the travel costs of forty-one students who rented a bus and travelled to Moscow for 500/200 for the bus and 75/30 for Moscow.⁴⁴²

If the reader was one of the more affluent Soviet citizens who had disposable income but had found insufficient goods upon which to spend that money, this dual listing of prices would have permitted a mental comparison.

In the article 'Changes taking place in the food-processing industry' the food consumption of the average family is listed. While most of the products are standard foodstuffs such as milk, cheese, meat, and eggs, it also included modern items such as margarine and cornflakes.⁴⁴³ When first introduced margarine represented a significant scientific advancement in edible oil products and when

438 'Obuvnaia promyshlennost', *Angliia*, no. 31 (1969): 10-25, 21, 23.

439 'Odezjda, sootvetstvuiushchaia obrazu zhizni,' *Angliia*, no. 9 (1964): 100-101.

440 See for example the study about Swedish stores in which the main characteristics were listed as large airy buildings, open shelves, service available immediately upon requesting it, and the electronic till. 'Otchet: o rezul'tatakh poezdki delegatsii Tsentrosoiuza v Shvetsiiu' *RGANI* fond 5 opis 20 delo 178: 194-207, 195-196.

441 'Laundry Day,' *Angliia*, no.23 (1967): 97.

442 'Lets go to abroad,' *Angliia* no.15, (1965): 27.

443 'Changes taking place in the food processing industry,' *Angliia* no.25 (1968): 28-44, 31.

introduced to the United States by Dr. Kellogg, cornflakes were labelled a dangerous aphrodisiac. Other exciting new foodstuffs listed included Heinz ketchup, Bird's custard, Bournville cocoa, Nescafé instant coffee and coffee cream, and bottled soft drinks with straws.⁴⁴⁴ All of the previously listed foodstuffs were photographed in their convenient, modern packaging. Be the subject education, makeup, science, classical English literature or sports, the focus was on representing the cutting edge in various fields and on building a connection with the readership. One major difference between *Angliia* and its American counterpart *Amerika* was the large number of articles about complex scientific and technological advances. In *Angliia* the term 'modern' is used incessantly, despite the respected directive to illustrate the good, the bad and the ugly about Britain and British industry and life. The following is a list of various major articles that appeared during the 1960s.

⁴⁴⁴ *Angliia*, no. 3, (1962): 23.

- 'The radio telescope'
- 'Vertical flight'
- 'The use of polyester and other synthetic products'
- 'British Technology' (repeated)
- 'Across the Atlantic ocean in one night'
- 'British Fashion'
- 'Military planes'
- 'Thomas Cooke: how to work as a tourist agent'
- 'Clothes for the whole family'
- 'Nuclear power'
- 'Radio and TV in England'
- 'Modern pictures in England'
- 'The modern British menu'
- 'Shakespeare in our time'
- 'Modern England'
- 'Fertilisers- a basis of production for agricultural farms'
- 'Technology helps school children'
- 'The well dressed Englishman'
- 'New construction techniques in England'
- 'New building materials'
- 'Winter fashion'
- 'Research work in the field of communication'
- 'The country where everyone produces'
- 'Methods of revealing public opinion'
- 'A nation of cars'
- 'Rolls Royce: the best car in the world?'
- 'Lorries of England'
- 'Problems of automobile movement in England'
- 'High pressure oxygen treatment'
- 'New methods of training footballers'
- 'The British technician'
- 'News in science in England'
- 'The point of view of the buyer'
- 'Fashion for the young and the self proclaimed young'
- 'The British Industrial Exhibition 8-24.07.1966'
- 'The prize for innovation'
- 'The new electronic microscope'
- 'New cross-country vehicles'
- 'News from automobile industries'
- 'Orienteering: a new type of sport'
- 'Coal mining without miners'
- 'Methods of sociological research'
- 'The modern English home'
- 'Changes taking place in the food processing industry'
- 'Our very own modern combine'
- 'Modern English furniture'
- 'What is new in fashion'
- 'Innovations on the railways'
- 'The future of doctors'
- 'IBM in our lives'
- 'How to make records'
- 'How to collect albums'
- 'New trains'
- 'Modern English opera'
- 'Problems of today'
- 'Pulsars'
- 'How to help an alcoholic'

The British image of a well ordered parliamentary system, an efficient postal and rail service, the well dressed English man, the land of Shakespeare and Dickens, London theatres, rugby and rowing, grand universities, Bird's custard, treacle and proper English persists. Soviet youth during the late 1950s and 1960s were fascinated by British music, fashion and culture. The image of Britain as a bastion for all things modern was to reach its zenith in the 1950s and to wane during the late 1960s.

The permitting of information about the West resulted in the formulation of an image of the West that was not entirely negative. Indeed, in areas of what was 'modern' it was lauded. This praise meant that there was the basis for the creation of a positive image of a mythical other, an alternative. Once a non-negative alternative was created, the true path to a prosperous and better future became forked. It was only a matter of time until those travelling along the road to socialism became tired and distrustful of travelling along the road less travelled, and that has made all the difference.

Conclusion

Nixon asked God when Americans will be happy and prosperous.

- *Not earlier than thirty years.*

- *Pity, I will not live to then.*

Pompidou asked God, when the French would become prosperous and happy.

- *Not sooner than fifty years.*

- *Pity, I will not live until then.*

Brezhnev asked God when, finally, the Soviet people would become lucky, God answered

- *To this, I will not live. (Popular anecdote)⁴⁴⁵*

By the time that Neil Armstrong was to walk on the moon, the belief in the Soviet ability to catch up with and surpass the West had dwindled leaving behind a Castor and Pollux. Werner Knop described the image of the West as 'greedy, cruel, decadent and voluptuous' and 'rich and efficient, so inventive, and glittering.'⁴⁴⁶ Gunther's assessment was that despite a generally evil nature, the West garnered respect for its 'basic wealth, technological skills, and industrial energy.'⁴⁴⁷ In

445 Dozens of variations of this anecdote exist, all with the same punch line. Shturman, The Soviet Union 231.

446 See Barghoorn, The Soviet Image of the United States 257.

447 Gunther Inside Russia Today 84.

Krasnaya Zvezda the American folk were accepted as industrious and talented and as having made great contributions to world civilisation in the form of great scientists, writers and musicians but American billionaires remained 'up to their knees in blood'.⁴⁴⁸ Former Soviet spy and high ranking CIA official Karel Koccher wrote of sentiments in Czechoslovakia that were common to the USSR in general, when he stated that should the question be asked as to how powerful a factor the economic image of the West was in scuttling the communist regime 'I [Koccher] would say that in my opinion [it] was indeed by far the strongest and possibly even the only really decisive one – ideological opposition to communism in Czechoslovakia was certainly not so widespread as it is now being claimed...the anti regime feelings were indeed primarily a matter of materialistic envy.'⁴⁴⁹ This materialistic envy was widespread throughout the Soviet world. Officially, the fulfilment of materialistic aspirations was the charge of the communist regime. The material and technical basis of communism was to provide the Soviet people with the highest standard of living, as put in a popular anecdote:

- What is Communism?
- You go out onto the street – there are cars. Take any one and drive. You see jeans – you take them and drive farther. You get to the square and there-beer, shoes, every thing you could need. This is communism.⁴⁵⁰

Praise for and the desire to emulate various aspects of Western technological development were to be overshadowed by the rise of anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism in the 1970s. After events in Hungary, Poland and Prague illustrated the limited nature of the Soviet regimes' political tolerance combined with economic shortcomings there was an increase in passive discontent and apathy. Andrei Amalrik was to write this about the increased vocalisation of discontent:

Everybody is angered by the great inequalities in wealth, the low wages, the austere housing conditions, the lack of essential consumer goods, and compulsory registration at their places of residence and work and so forth. This discontent is now becoming louder, and some people are beginning to wonder who is actually to blame. The gradual though slow improvement in the standard of living, due largely to intensive housing construction, does not diminish the anger though it does somewhat neutralize it.⁴⁵¹

448 QDSE (11.09.1957).

449 Email from Koccher Subject: 'Research' 06.02.2002.

450 Marc Dybovskii, *Istoriia SSSR v anekdotakh* (Rossliia: Smolenksii, 1991) 133.

451 Amalrik, *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?* 31.

Anger was stoked by the privileged life led by Party members and their families. 'The elites were leading privileged and comfortable lives, buying Western consumer goods and foodstuffs in the *beriozka*, had cars, high level medical care etc and in many respects their standard of living... was commensurable with the standard of those living in the West.'⁴⁵² If the Party elite as the vanguard of communism could emulate Western consumption then the average citizen had the right to aspire towards it as well. One of Khrushchev's most significant contributions to Soviet politics was the solidification of the concept of the alternative, even if the system could not tolerate the ramifications of the implementation of this idea.

The idea of the West that was to enter into Soviet consciousness was not based solely on the idea of the West as it was propagated by Western sources. It was a combination of Western sources, government sources and of a Soviet vision of the future. This melding of sources resulted in a particularly Russian/Soviet version of the West that was communicated largely through ideas of consumption and technology. Three specific examples, housing, clothing and automobiles, have been used to illustrate this melding. The final section of this chapter, culture, has been included to highlight the breadth of sources from which the images could be gleaned. Perhaps it is most accurate to use the term Russian and not Soviet as this perception of the West as evil but jolly (due to having a soft life), inequitable but with unlimited potential characterised by technological genius but with spiritual poverty was to endure past the collapse of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's calls for modernisation were accompanied occasionally with calls for restraint, for example, in 'developing a country's economy one must not set impractical tasks, one must not undertake to do more than is feasible in practice. If you do, you will overstrain yourself and roll back; [and] life will thrust you aside,'⁴⁵³ but did little to curb rising expectations. That expectations rose and the desire to consume skyrocketed did not mean that consumption was blindly adopted. The group *Alisha* was to use the infamous lemon squeezer from the American model kitchen in 1959 of which Khrushchev spoke so disparagingly (he commented that it was just as easy to stick a fork into a piece of lemon and twist) to represent the inane nature of some Western technology and consumption.

⁴⁵² Email from Koecher Subject: 'Research' 06.02.2002.

⁴⁵³ Khrushchev, Marxism-Leninism 14.

*All of a sudden, I see something coming my way
But I can't figure out what it is
No matter how hard I try
It looks like a tractor, like a nuclear reactor
And somewhat like a squeezed lemon
It is white like a hospital, birds are scared of it
It is strong as a safe
It is slimy like a jellyfish
It is of no use like a burden
It is moving among flowers and different types of grass
What are you? What the hell are you?
And it answers me: I am your juice squeezer. 454*

454 As translated in Ramet, 'The Soviet Rock Scene' 194.

3: Exhibiting Alternatives – Windows to the West

Introduction

The early Cold War period presented untold opportunities for the propagation of mass images. In the Soviet Union, the population was highly literate; media was state controlled; changes in technology facilitated the rapid acceleration of mass information dissemination; and life within the nation, for the majority of citizens, had reached a level of stability and comfort that allowed for the luxury of inquiry. A spin off of the post War stability and superpower status was a demand for parity with Western nations. This parity was not an ambiguous goal: it was defined and delineated. It is into this milieu of communist consumerism and rising expectations that the burgeoning international and national exhibitions are inserted. Promoted as advancing peaceful co-existence and expanding trade ties, exhibitions were simply too large to not have a significant impact on Soviet society. Evidence of the dispersion of information from trade fairs can be seen in the incorporation of aspect of the fairs into popular culture: for example the lemon squeezer of the American Exhibition into popular music, the usage of paraffin wax as chewing gum or the introduction of new music and fashion styles. Exhibitions had a special status as they constituted short and intense occasions when Soviet citizens were permitted controlled but direct contact with the West (this author in no way seeks to suggest that censorship did not occur, but does suggest that what was permitted occurred with comparatively little Soviet filtering). Exhibitions allowed for first hand contact with foreigners, foreign goods and foreign ideas and were to occur with a degree of regularity that constituted a steady cultural impact but infrequently enough to satisfy piqued curiosity. In terms of the research questions of this study, in this chapter the formation of the image of the mythical other as well as its dissemination and impact is addressed. As the focus is on the technological and scientific sections of exhibitions a particular picture of technological images can be formed. Exhibitions involve the participation of the West, the Soviet government and the Soviet populace in the process of myth creation and dissemination. By showing what was being achieved and what could be achieved, the linkage between consumption, the Soviet future and the West is particularly clear in this chapter. In this introductory section, an overview of the nature of

foreign exhibitions will be presented as well as a breakdown of the subsequent sections of this chapter.

The first foreign exhibition in the post-War Soviet Union is generally accepted to have been the Finnish National Exhibition in 1946, in which the Finnish government and industry displayed goods and industry over twelve thousand square metres. After 1946, the number of exhibitions increased almost yearly, and in 1966 there were eighty-three 'foreign' exhibitions, of which seven were international, three were national and seventy-three specialist exhibitions. Seven million people attended the eighty-three exhibitions. Of the ten major exhibitions involving Westerners in 1961, which attracted approximately 6.6 million spectators, the British Trade Fair was deemed the most prominent, at the time being referred to as the most prominent of all foreign exhibitions.⁴⁷² Between 1957 and 1969 over 140 exhibitions involved Western nations/companies. Foreign participation in industrial exhibitions was actively sought by Soviet planners, while national exhibitions tended to be tolerated. An example of Soviet efforts to host an international exhibition can be found in the bid to host Expo 67 (Moscow was passed over for Montreal). The theme was to be 'peace and progress' and the 'massive progress that humanity has obtained through the development of science and technology and the culture and work that can accompany the human genius'. A principle impetus for hosting Expo 67 was the possibility of combining the celebration of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the October Revolution (Expo was to run from 20.05.1967-20.11.1967) thus using the international prestige of Expo to validate the successes of the October Revolution. This conflating of foreign status symbols and success with Soviet achievements was not uncommon during the Khrushchev era. In addition to prestige building, post-WWII Soviet officials used exhibitions for several purposes that included but are not restricted to: showcasing technology (notably Sputniks and peaceful uses of atomic energy), gathering information on foreign technology, providing Soviet citizens with a glimpse of their technological future, demonstrating the superpower standing of the state, and advancing the idea of peaceful co-existence.

472 'Protokol: zasedaniia soveta VTP 23.06.1961,' Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki (RGAE) fond 635 opis 1 delo 450: 2-26, 19. From here on fond, opis, delo will be listed as such 635/1/450 for example.

During the 1950s and 1960s the vast majority of exhibitions were in Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev. Larger exhibitions were held in parks, for example Sokol'niki while smaller exhibition were held in institutes and factories. Both larger and smaller exhibitions often had 'pavilions' in local factories, or had local workers man lines exhibited. The large international exhibitions such as Chemistry (1965, 1970, 1974) or Agriculture (1966, 1972, etc) operated on a four to six year cycle. By the 1970s, exhibitions were moving out of Moscow and Leningrad to other cities, for example the British Literature Exhibition in Novosibirsk (1968). An exhibition or trade fair could range in size and media coverage from the Shoe Company Krauss and Co. (28-29.11.1968) that was attended by forty-six invited individuals and received no official press coverage to the Exhibition of Chemistry in Industry, Construction and Agriculture (11-26.09.1965) in which twenty-one countries represented by 969 firms entertained over 1,500,000 Soviet citizens directly and received national coverage. The average attendance figures for exhibitions in the 1960s were between 300,000 to 500,000 individuals. From 1957 to 1965, the number of exhibitions in which Western companies or countries participated remained constant, between five and ten, with Western exhibitions per year being outnumbered by socialist exhibitions by approximately five to one. Using 1960 as an example, there were thirty-three exhibitions in total of which six were international and these six had a combined attendance figure of approximately 6.6 million visitors. The annual number of exhibitions with foreign (capitalistic) content was sufficient to allow exhibitions to form a habitual form of entertainment for the citizens of Moscow and the ensuing press coverage would have rendered exhibitions a potentially interesting source of foreign information but not an unusual occurrence.

Exhibitions could be broad national affairs, industry specific or product specific. For example, for seven days in September 1965, the Polytechnical museum, exhibited a single model of a modern cash register that listed quantity, itemised pricing and calculated a total sum at a fast tempo. Due to 'significant advertising' undertaken before the exhibition opened, the exhibition of the cash register was covered by *Izvestiia*, *Vechernaia Moskva*, the radio and TV.

Attendance was four thousand.⁴⁷³ Of the eight tills left in the Soviet Union, two were allotted to three months of in-store testing in Moscow.⁴⁷⁴ Large thematic exhibitions, for example the Automotive Industry Exhibition of 1968 involving 280 companies from fourteen countries (Austria-7 companies, England-12, Denmark-1, West Germany including West Berlin-54, USA-3, France-3, Switzerland-1, Sweden-2, Japan-2) were preferred by Soviet planners and had higher attendance figures than national exhibitions. Attendance at industrial exhibitions was often fostered through the workplace, for example the largest single group of viewers at the Automotive Industry Exhibition came from the automobile factory Ch. A. Mikhailev.⁴⁷⁵ If one was unable to attend this exhibition in person, it was possible to read about it in *Izvestiia*, *Vremia* (TV), radio, the cinema journal *Novosti Dnia*, and the journal *Moskovskii avtozavodets* etc.⁴⁷⁶ As with other exhibitions the number of foreigners present (293 in this case) was considered worthy of press coverage. Participation in all exhibitions was by invitation only, and the general failure of American companies to act upon their invitations was a source of disappointment.⁴⁷⁷

The presence of foreigners was as problematic as the existence of exhibitions; proud of having foreigners present and advertising their presence, the Soviet officials also instituted policies and procedures to limit contact between foreigners and locals. In the official debriefing of exhibitions there was a section for incidents and notables that typically held details of minor indiscretions by Soviet staff, complaints of inadequate training of translators, a list of which firms left their exhibition material behind, and an overview of trade deals discussed and concluded. In the case of Automotive Industry Exhibition the section included: the sale of the ZIL; the items left behind by the Swiss and English components firms; the inability of twenty-five to thirty percent of Soviet translators to translate freely (and a notable lack of knowledge of scientific and technological terms); the refusal of Western

473 'Op. otchet: Upolnomochennogo Vsesoiuznoi Torgovoi Palaty na spetsializovovannoi vystavke elektronnykh kontrol'no izmeritel'nykh, nauchnykh, i analiticheskikh priborov britanskoi assotsiatsii 'Saima',' *RGAE* 635/1/635: 50-86, 59.

474 'Op. otchet: Upolnomochennogo Vsesoiuznoi Torgovoi Palaty na vystavke kassovykh apparatov,' *RGAE* 635/1/637: 50-65, 52.

475 'O provedennoi vystavke sovremennogo tekhnologicheskogo oborudovaniia,' *RGAE* 635/1/800: 51-73, 53.

476 'O provedennoi vystavke sovremennogo tekhnologicheskogo oborudovaniia' 61.

477 'O provedennoi vystavke sovremennogo tekhnologicheskogo oborudovaniia' 51-53.

firms to pay for the poor translation services; and the organisation of international drinking nights by three of the Soviet controllers (apart from taking tickets, they were charged with ensuring that parts of the exhibition were not removed who subsequently came to work unshaven).⁴⁷⁸

In an attempt to dampen the impact of Western exhibitions, the Soviet government ran a concurrent East European or Baltic exhibition. Announcements of an impressive Soviet/socialist exhibition not in Sokol'niki were read as indicative of a possible Western exhibition at Sokol'niki, for this was the preferred exhibition location. This face-off was not always in the best interest of the Soviet exhibitions. For example, an All-Soviet exhibition ran simultaneously with the American Exhibition in 1959 with a content that competed directly with the American Exhibition in such areas as the use of plastics and prefabrication in building construction, colour documentary films, and home appliances. Unlike the temporary plastic pavilions of the Americans, those of the All-Soviet proved to be unstable and suffered major damage during a strong storm at the beginning of the exhibition. Counter-exhibitions did serve their purpose when the national exhibitions were overcrowded, and this drain-off effect was used to lower attendance. During the French National Exhibition in 1961, the counter-exhibitions were the Hungarian National Exhibition and the Japanese National Exhibition. Despite fluctuating between Western and non-Western in the eyes of Soviet officialdom, the Japanese exhibition can be seen as diversionary as the Japanese tendency to exhibit machines and production lines and techniques resulted in drier exhibitions that were preferred by Soviet organisers. In 1961, the fact that the Japanese had a more 'technical' exhibition than either the French or the Hungarians, resulted in it being the favourite with organisers. Both the Hungarian and the Japanese exhibitions focused on that French industry that was of great importance for the Soviet Chamber of Commerce: clothing and textiles. The Japanese focused on the production of materials and the Hungarians on finished products (work clothes, winter attire and children's clothing). One result of the different exhibition styles was that by focusing on finished products, the Hungarians exhibited a more luxurious image of their economy than the Japanese. The French also focused on

⁴⁷⁸ 'O provedennoi vystavke sovremennogo tekhnologicheskogo oborudovaniia' 63-72.

the finished products, presenting the finest that they produced choosing to maintain the image of *haute couture*.

This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, the historical significance of exhibitions, why exhibitions occurred and the general nature of foreign exhibitions will be examined. Building upon the first section, the second section then examines and compares several national and industrial exhibitions, in particular the British Industrial Exhibitions, the French and American National Exhibitions and such international industrial exhibitions as Shoes-69.

Historical Background of Exhibitions

a. Historical significance of exhibitions

The historical significance of exhibitions is as multi-layered as the levels of society upon which exhibitions impacted. In general, exhibitions provided windows to the West, not just for the specialists, or for those of correct political indoctrination, or even for those who attended the exhibitions but also those who read about or heard about the exhibitions. Exhibitions were government organised, sought, and promoted events. This afforded exhibitions and the information contained within them a degree of legitimacy, not because it was always perceived as objective but because it was non-Soviet. Regardless of Soviet government reports questioning the availability or the necessity of many items displayed, the very existence of the goods and their desirability was accepted. Governmental acquiescence to foreigners exhibiting to Soviet citizens permitted a degree of flexibility in the image of 'foreign'; all foreigners, foreign information and goods could not be subversive or the Soviet government would not expose its citizens to them. Thus, all things foreign could not be corruptive. The consumer-based nature of Western society was prevalent in the Western exhibitions and trade fairs and thus reinforced the idea that consumption was acceptable. That the information source was Western further underscored the legitimacy: 'if, during the trips of Soviet specialists in Europe the best of the Western experience was taken, but then presented as a national Soviet success, then exhibitions did not permit this genre of camouflage.'⁴⁷⁹

479 Larissa Zakharova, 'Le réseau des canaux officiels de transferts des modes vestimentaires occidentaux en URSS dans les années 1950-1960' conference paper. Susan Reid ed. Women in the Khrushchev Era (Forthcoming) 6.

Exhibitions served to normalise the adoption of Western goods, practices and standards as goals for the Soviet elite, specialists and to some degree public. Attending an exhibition or reading about one in the press was a legitimate risk-free means of making contact with and informing oneself about the West. This was not an illegally disseminated image and one did not have to be politically active or even overly concerned with politics to engage in exhibitions. The women's journal *Rabotnitsa* contained regular coverage of international festivals and exhibitions typically mentioned developing nations sympathetic to the USSR and Western nations. The former was subjected to patronising and token coverage, while the latter received both praise and condemnation.⁴⁸⁰

Occasionally, even if citizens were not attending an exhibition or paying attention to the media, they were brought into contact with foreigners and their technology through their place of work. Most foreign visitors were treated to an intensive 'cultural and ideological excursions' programme that would include not only the fine arts but also industry-specific tours. For example, workers and representatives of the 'Holz Maschine Ring' of Brussels attended a performance at the Bolshoi theatre, and visited *Furniture Factory 13*. *Furniture Factory 13* employees, whether they were privy to the exhibition from the Holz Machine Ring company or not, would have participated in the creation of an image of the West through the customary sprucing up of the factory, instructions to wear one's best work clothes (frequently new outfits, and when not handkerchiefs, were issued). Another aspect of the integration of the workplace into the exhibition was the installation of foreign machines into local factories and the manning of foreign machines both on exhibition grounds and in factories by Soviet workers. One such interactive display occurred during the Swiss Industrial Exhibition (28.05.1966 – 11.06.1966) when production lines of Swiss timepieces were manned by Soviet workers from the Second Moscow Watch Factory (later known as the Slava Factory⁴⁸¹). Western mass production and cutting-edge technology was quite

⁴⁸⁰ *Rabotnitsa*, No. 8 August, (1957): 2. Page one also illustrates this point, as the lead photo is of extremely elegantly dressed women from a country with an European heritage, while the smaller trailer picture shows women from Sudan swathed in their traditional dress.

⁴⁸¹ Slava produced civilian watches and the movement of the earlier watches was based on the pre-war French movement the Lip T-15.

literally within the grasp of the average Soviet worker.⁴⁸² It was an 'interesting and intelligent demonstration of modern Swiss machine-tool machines, and machine construction.'⁴⁸³ Factory visits as well as the use of factories to demonstrate foreign running machine lines were an intimate form of contact, controlled, direct and not as Potemkin villagesque as visits to the theatre.

Foreign exhibitions were representative of the new social contract between the state and the population as the populous' demand for consumer goods and information about the West was in part satisfied through exhibitions. Exhibitions were windows to the West, affording Soviet citizens the opportunity to 'travel' abroad. In this sense, the exhibition was a highly effective means by which the Soviet government released some of the pent up pressure to travel without having to deal with Soviet citizens travelling abroad. Exhibitions also complemented the government policy of catching up with and surpassing the West as it gave a tangible image of the economic and technological objectives, while often warning of the cultural pitfalls (for example abstract art). Exhibition attendance was a confirmation that fascination with and belief in the fruits of capitalism was not restricted to the Soviet elite, but was a cultural perception. The bounty portrayed was the Soviet future and existed not merely within the imagination of the Soviet planners and socialist realist authors. With the motivation of obtaining and surpassing the wealth of the capitalist system, the Soviet regime invited exhibitions as external bargaining chips into its negotiations with Soviet society. Musya Glants has written that: 'it is widely acknowledged that the Soviet Union sought to use both Western and Soviet cultural output to shape popular opinion'.⁴⁸⁴ Thus, the Soviet Union was increasingly defining itself not in terms of opposition to the West but as attempting to follow on a path of modernisation and consumption with the West, while maintaining its own path of moral superiority and a command economy. Inevitably, failure to successfully implement either path resulted in the tarnishing of the image of the socialist economic path, while the path followed by the West remained successful and obtainable: so long as one did not follow socialism.

482 A. Babadzhanian, 'Shveitsarskaia vystavka v Moskve,' Vneshniaia torgovlia no.8 (1966): 36-37, 37.

483 Babadzhanian, 'Shveitsarskaia vystavka v Moskve' 37.

484 Musya Glants and Pamela Kachurin, 'General introduction,' Journal of Cold War Studies Vol.4 no.1 Winter (2002): 3-5, 4 .

Having accepted the highest standard of living as an objective, the West's success in improving the general standard of living allowed the ends to justify the means.

b. Why exhibitions?

Exhibitions represent moments in which the Soviet government raised the Iron Curtain, occasionally to a select audience, often literally to millions. They tended to be massive logistical and organisational undertakings followed by fanfares of activities. Inherently illogical from an information control viewpoint, exhibitions were either actively sought or grudgingly tolerated. The official public explanation given for exhibitions was that exhibitions were part of peaceful co-existence and supported international contacts of cultural, scientific and economic nature and promoted trade. Press coverage and government assessments of completed exhibitions regularly listed tentative sales agreements. The inter-governmental justifications were that trade fairs/exhibitions provided opportunities to examine technical innovations, to acquire scientific knowledge (without the need to purchase or to exchange ideas), to increase trade ties, and to motivate Soviet specialists/workers. In a 1959 governmental explanation as to why exhibitions were permitted it was stated that exhibitions afforded: 'a large number of Soviet specialists with attainable access to branches of foreign science and technology.'⁴⁸⁵ In an attempt to maximise the economic and technological potential of exhibitions, the Soviet Chamber of Commerce was active in foreign exhibitions. The lists of important goods imported into the Soviet Union during the Thaw period (chemical industry equipment, automotive parts, textiles, synthetic thread, furniture, footwear, and pharmaceuticals etc) were all to appear in numerous exhibitions.

Foreign responses to *Interorgtekhnika 1966* contribute another piece of the justification for exhibitions. Marcello Checcoli, a representative for the Italian firm Olivetti is quoted in *Moskovskaia Pravda* as saying that: 'the director of the Moscow factory 'Freezer' was interested in our 'provincial' technology and told me that in a year he would be able to obtain it. I would like to give the director some advice. A year is time, time that is needed to prepare the internal systems. We are prepared to help 'Freezer'' achieve the technology more quickly.'⁴⁸⁶ The issue was

⁴⁸⁵ RGAE 635/1/388: 5.

⁴⁸⁶ 'Vystavka zakryta,' *Moskovskaia Pravda* (16.09.1966): 1.

not that the Soviet Union could not produce the goods, but that in the interest of saving time, of fulfilling the wishes of the population faster, foreign technology should and could be purchased. There were those within the elite, among them Khrushchev, who often blamed the turgid nature of the Soviet economy on the failure of workers to drive themselves. The publishing of comments such as those made by Checulli served as a promise for the future, as a verification of the immediacy and as a provocation for harder and faster work during the present. A superpower that had Sputniks should be able to master 'provincial technology' and its citizens should have access to freezer units. As reported in the Soviet press the Olivetti representative then went so far as to remind the public that Olivetti representatives were always present in Moscow and that they could be contacted by telephone.⁴⁸⁷

Despite the ties between imports and exhibitions, exhibitions were not the most productive way to obtain information and to procure trade agreements. Reports from the State Committee for Science and Technology (SCST) show that sending specialists abroad for long visits to gather information, often with the intent to purchase technology from the host company, was more effective than exhibitions despite foreign companies often seeking to limit visits in size, duration and frequency. Also, for exhibitions to serve their role as foreign science and technology outlets, there was no need for them to be public, and not all exhibitions were open to the public. Thus, the public nature of numerous exhibitions must be attributed to sources other than the gathering of technical information. This would include, but is not limited to: motivating the masses, the use of information about the West as a bargaining chip in the new social contract and as part of co-existence. As much as exhibitions were about trade, they were about perceptions. Science, and innovation, as aspects of socialist theory, had become instruments of policy and tools of economic progress.⁴⁸⁸ At the time of the American Exhibition *New York Times* columnist Max Frankel wrote: 'Surely one reason why the obviously uneasy Soviet hosts tolerated this carnival was to give Russians a glimpse of the rewards of

487 'Vystavka zakryta,' *Moskovskaia Pravda* (16.09.1966): 1.

488 Paul Cocks, 'Organizing for Technological Innovation in the 1980s,' Gregory Guroff and Fred Carstensen, *Entrepreneurship in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983) 307.

hard work and the fulfillment of Premier Khrushchev's economic plans.⁴⁸⁹ National exhibitions like the American Exhibition were public because the participating governments insisted that they be so. In a documented conversation between Soviet officials, the response to murmurs of discontent over the toleration of a model home at the American Exhibition in 1959 was met with: 'this exhibition can open the doors for trade between the Soviet Union and America; desired goods that the Soviet Union could then purchase would be present!'⁴⁹⁰ National exhibitions like the American or the French drew tremendous crowds, but or perhaps because of this, were not favoured by officials. Exhibitions like the British or Italian Industrial Exhibitions, which took the form of national exhibitions, but which took place without any official government participation, were more positively received by the authorities, and industrial exhibitions like those for construction, chemistry, automotives etc were preferred. Lack of official foreign involvement was a nebulous concept, as most foreign governments had accepted the importance of cultural activities in order to foster political and economic relations. Even the British who studiously separated business and government worked on a policy that acknowledged 'to those who say that this extension in influence (cultural) has no connection with commerce, we reply they are totally wrong; the reaction of trade to the more deliberate inculcation of British culture which we advocate is definitely certain and will be swift.'⁴⁹¹ Perception of the lack of official governmental participation vacillated between being perceived as a compliment from foreign businesses that were willing to treat Soviet purchaser and specialists as trade equals and as a political slight from Western governments. Concretely, low levels of governmental involvement typically resulted in more numerous smaller negotiations and increased difficulties in procuring the corresponding loans.

The propagandistic potential of national exhibitions led to them being a delicate balance between cultural diplomacy and propaganda, with some nations fairing better than others. The French tended to display the best they had to offer, and the result was a correlating positive image of their nation. The English

489 Max Frankel, 'Ivan Appears to Like the Way the Joneses Live: but Visitors to Moscow Fair Have Doubts on Wealth's Distribution,' *New York Times* (02.08.1959), 5(E).

490 'Protokol 1: Zasedania soveta VTP: 21.04.1959,' *RGAE* 635/1/ 387: 22-49, 23.

491 'Report of the British Economic Mission to South America: 18.01.1939,' Public Records Office (PRO), Foreign Office (FO) 371/14178, A 1908/77/51, 55.

approach was moderate with the idea that plausibility was tied to discretion and that an acknowledgement of challenges and problems would complement the modest information give. While the British image put forth was largely accepted, it did not evoke the same degree of envy as the French or the American. The American image was brash and impressive, yet subject to more incredulity than either the British or the French. Despite being praised for their objectivity, the Japanese, like the British, were also to suffer for their modesty. The Japanese were extolled as exemplary exhibitors: they focused on production, not end products, functionality not flare, and were not particularly active in exhibiting their nation's 'way of life'; they were also extolled as excellent at replicating Western technological advancements, but they did not arouse envy.

Another reason for governmental acquiescence was the faith, perhaps arrogance, that the Soviet Union had nothing to fear. It had survived the war and Stalinism, it was a superpower and it was going to dominate the world. Communism was going to provide the world with the highest equitable standard of living, so why not allow citizens glimpses of the future through the windows of the West? Why should the regime worry about toasters, plastic dishes, modern tractors or fashion? Writing after the Christian Dior shows in 1959 in Moscow, Harrison Salisbury's comments follow this line of reasoning:

Dior was brought in because the government wants to take the Russian woman out of her flowered print and give her a chance to look like her Western sisters. Why? Because, I would guess, the Russian woman wants to look like her Western sisters and the present Russian government can see no reason of policy why she should not. Neither Puritanism nor emphasis on heavy industry is going to divert the Russian woman much longer from the heritage of her sex, the right and opportunity to look just as pretty as she wants to.⁴⁹²

But why the governmental inclination to pay attention to the fashion interests of the Soviet woman? It was as much a question of national prestige and the need for a social contract as it was support for the Soviet woman's right to pursue the aesthetical heritage of her sex. John Gunther attributed exhibitions with playing a role in the social negotiations between state and society:

pressure from the people for more and better consumer goods, as well as food, grows more apparent all the time... Not only do people yearn for motor-

⁴⁹² Harrison Salisbury, *To Moscow and Beyond: a Reporter's Narrative* (London: M. Joseph, 1960) 47-48.

scooters, silk thread, casseroles, and umbrellas, but for prettier things, articles more gay...Khrushchev wants above all to broaden the basis of his support, to bring people more closely into the family of government so to speak, but the only substantially effective way to do this is to increase vastly the amount of consumer goods available, which at the present moment cannot be done.⁴⁹³

Through exhibitions, both foreign and Soviet, the idea of goods could be consumed. The Czechoslovakian National Exhibition of 1959 was tremendously popular and the crystal was to set the Soviet 'must have' standard for many years. The Christian Dior fashion show organisers made no concessions to the supposed conservatism of Soviet fashion or to the practical clothing requirements of the Soviet people. Despite mixed official reviews, within a few weeks of the exhibition women were wearing imitations of the simpler design, and expensive spiked heels appeared in the House of Shoe Styles.⁴⁹⁴ This openness to the West and occasionally accompanying frivolity gave the impression that the Soviet Union was leaving the period of pride in austerity and sacrifice behind and entering into a period in which the society as a whole expected the provision of practical and aesthetically pleasing goods in exchange for its support of the communist system.

The grounds for the participation of foreign firms and nations in exhibitions are also varied. As early as 1951, American sociologist David Riesman imagined an alternative to the arms race, 'Operation abundance,' alias the 'Nylon War.' The basic principle of the Nylon War was that if Soviet citizens had knowledge of American riches they would become intolerant of Soviet national funds being diverted away from such consumer 'riches' towards the military and demand that the Soviet regime supply said riches. 'Thus, the Soviet leadership would be forced to divert resources towards consumer goods or face mass discontent. 'By bombarding the USSR with Toni wave kits, nylon hose, stoves, and refrigerators, the United States would force Moscow to abandon weaponry for consumer goods.'⁴⁹⁵ The gendered nature of the term nylon war ties in with historical research into the formation and modification of national images during the 1950s and 1960s. In essence, the prime consumers during this era were women and as consumers, women assumed a key role in the creation of the new economic life of

⁴⁹³ Gunther, *Inside Russia Today* 423.

⁴⁹⁴ Salisbury, *To Moscow* :47.

⁴⁹⁵ Reid, 'Cold War in the Kitchen' 222; also see Stephen Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).

the nation. While developed through the improving of the hearth, this very public role of consuming citizens was to contribute to the defining of a national identity as national prowess came to be increasingly associated with personal prosperity. One of the most readable and convincing examples of the genderization of consumption and the ties to national identity can be found in Erica Carter's work on the role of female consumption in the reconstruction of post-war West Germany, in which Carter clearly and concisely illustrates the roots of so many now accepted aspects of German national identity.⁴⁹⁶ That women were granted the role of the bearer of consumerist rationality did not protect them from being viewed as potentially weak points in nations ideological defences. It is interesting to note that during the 1950s, the idea of consumption as a form of 'voting' (democratic empowerment) co-existed with the notion of consumption as a particularly female weakness.

In an era when conventional weapons were increasingly limited in usability and nuclear weapons came to represent MAD, moving the battlefield to such innocuous items as Hoovers held appeal. The Nylon War dealt with the winning of the average citizen, ostensibly side stepping ideology, politicians and political systems. Thus, it appealed to the populist mentality of many Americans allowing them to de-villainise the average Soviet citizen. This citizen offensive was facilitated by the close relationship between business, foreign policy and consumption in the West (USA in particular), for example the inventor of the Polaroid camera was an intelligence consultant for the U-2 flyovers; and Jack Ryan helped design both Barbie and Hawk and Sparrow III missile systems.⁴⁹⁷ Participation in an exhibition allowed businesses to promote peace, educate Soviet citizens, display civic responsibility and contribute to the war effort, all while pursuing possible business ventures.

Doing business in the Soviet Union was potentially lucrative for Western businesses, but the way to success was convoluted and long. Sufficiently lucrative successes, or the image thereof, existed and businesses continued to do business in the Soviet Union, despite issues of red tape, credit, licence agreements, and industrial espionage. By the mid-1960s exhibitions had been occurring regularly for ten years. Businesses were perceptive to the practices in the Soviet Union and

⁴⁹⁶ Carter, How German is She?.

⁴⁹⁷ for more information on the topic see Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War 238.

cognisant of the challenges, but this did not prevent Western representatives from becoming frustrated with the Soviet system. Western comments in visitor books from the 1960s testify to this.⁴⁹⁸ For example, the entry from the American President of Peterson Engineering discussing his team's experiences at the Agricultural Exhibitions.

At the present agricultural exhibition we two lived in different hotels. At the 1964 exhibitions we were three and we were divided between three hotels. Ideally, it would be preferable if all personnel of a firm could be in one and the same hotel... Today is the 31st of May. Only three days until the closing of the exhibition, and we still do not know for certain if we have sold our goods... For Americans in Moscow – it is losing time. Here, the value of time is truly unknown. In order to resolve a few questions, for which one really need spend a few minutes, here one needs several hours, and occasionally days.⁴⁹⁹

The President of Peterson Engineering did praise the women working at the exhibition as being very competent. The representative of French company Renault praised the organization of the exhibition, the accommodation provided, the personnel, and the food, but voiced his displeasure at the failure of the Ministry of Trade to visit Renault's stand. Renault's representative continued by comparing the trade habits 'in all exhibitions throughout the world, before the exhibitions or, at the very least, during the exhibition, it is already known, what would be purchased and what would not be purchased. Not a few times were we asked to wait for them [the Ministry of Trade] at our stand. And only after three to four days, as a result of our protests, did we finally meet with one of them.'⁵⁰⁰ The representative for the Belgium Firm Mandrel was less critical, but voiced a similar concern with the failure to utilise the full economic potential of the exhibition: 'we are very happy, that we received a medal, but it would be better if our machines would be purchased.'⁵⁰¹ G. D. Rempel, the spokesman for the New Aidia Farm Equipment Company, was succinct in his condemnation: 'should you decide to host another

498 Visitor books were not archived with other VTP documents. The archivists at RGAE supposed that visitor books for smaller exhibitions were held at the host location.

499 'O mezhdunarodnoi vystavke sovremennykh sel'skokhoziaistvennykh mashin i oborudovaniia 16-19.05.1966,' RGAE 635/1/698:180-236, 232-233.

500 'O mezhdunarodnoi vystavke sovremennykh sel'skokhoziaistvennykh mashin i oborudovaniia 16-19.05.1966,' 233-234.

501 'O mezhdunarodnoi vystavke sovremennykh sel'skokhoziaistvennykh mashin i oborudovaniia 16-19.05.1966,' 235.

agricultural exhibition in 1968, we are afraid that you will have to excuse us.⁵⁰² Typically, Soviet authorities invited companies of economic and scientific interest to the Soviet Union to present and the refusal of companies to return constituted lost potential for business and information as well as an embarrassment for officials amongst themselves and specialists. Despite Western interpretations to the contrary, Soviet trade officials were making efforts to ensure that trade agreements occurred. Part of the 'limited' nature of the effort was due to official policy encouraging copying and reverse engineering, a policy aided by the jacking up of outgoing freight costs on exhibition goods. Companies invited to participate in exhibitions were often those with which negotiations were in progress, or indeed signed. In the period before Fiat had signed the contract for the AVTOVAZ, and in the period directly afterwards, it regularly participated in exhibitions. Despite having already agreed to the *Fiat 124*, Fiat was to display more modern and luxurious models. It was the era of the Thaw and the Soviet Union was a taiga of opportunity.

c. What was displayed?

Exhibitions were cornucopia of goods, services, and systems. Everything from production lines to fashion shows, modern artwork to building cranes, iron lungs to children's books, was on display. While Soviet officials preferred to have the focus on production, those displays that highlighted end products created a more luxurious, wealthy, and technologically advanced image of the company and of the ensuing nation than those that adhered to the Soviet request for processes. The luxurious, advanced technology images were to have a profound impact on leaders, purchasers and the layman. The nations known for their luxurious image were France and the USA. The French, like the Americans, were charged with 'not giving true technical information about the instruments' on display and for focusing on the product and not the process.⁵⁰³ This is in contrast to the Swiss and Japanese who were praised for their organisation, posters, diagrams, photos and descriptions. What appears to be a relative lack of American participation in exhibitions is

⁵⁰² 'O mezhdunarodnoi vystavke sovremennykh sel'skokhoziaistvennykh mashin i oborudovaniia 16-19.05.1966,' 233.

⁵⁰³ 'Na frantsuskoii vystavke elektronnykh priborov,' RGAE 635/1/801: 108.

deceptive, as while American firms participated relatively infrequently in comparison to French, Italian or Swiss companies, American firms avoided political repercussions and side-stepped strategic goods lists largely by displaying questionable or outright strategic goods through European affiliates. Strategic goods were displayed. On occasion they composed the entirety of the goods displayed. For example, in a closed exhibition at the Polytechnic Museum in Moscow, there was a two-week display of the latest in French and American aviation equipment and navigational systems.⁵⁰⁴ Assessing the exhibition as 'very interesting', and having gone 'calmly' the exhibition organisers were pleased to report that *Mashpriborintorg* officials were willing to purchase eighty to ninety percent of the exponents that were on display.⁵⁰⁵ While this particular exhibition was closed to an elite audience of four thousand, both firms were to display similar items at *Interorgtekhnik-66*. The range of products displayed at exhibitions was so broad as to make those items censored by Soviet officials appear as oddities, more conducive to a need to randomly censor something than as part of a systematic system of censorship. For example, public lavatories could not be built, but model homes and flats containing modern plumbing fixtures could and Pepsi-Cola was permitted but Heinz-57 sauce ran into difficulties when custom officials opened the boxes labelled "57" and the content far exceeded the quantity of fifty-seven.

d. Press coverage

Speaking before Congress in 1955, Eisenhower said that 'international exhibitions and fairs provided colossal significance for foreign governments'.⁵⁰⁶ For the Soviet Union, they provided the opportunity to increase trade contacts; improve national prestige; entice the local population; and broaden opportunities to gather industrial information. The coverage of exhibitions in *Vneshniaia torgovlia* ran almost exclusively after the exhibition had ended; included praise for socialist innovation; acknowledged Western participation and activities; and proclaimed the value of trade deals concluded. The international exhibition at Luzhniki in 1964 in

⁵⁰⁴ Exhibition of American Firm Friden and French Firm Aleksandr Gober and Co.

⁵⁰⁵ 'Operativnyi otchet po vystavke schetno-vychislitel'nykh priborov amerikanskoi firmy 'Friden' ustroitel' frantsuzskaia firma 'Aleksandr Gober i Ko.', *RGAE* 635/1/692: 67-76, 67,74.

⁵⁰⁶ I. Bol'shakov, 'Sovetskii Soluz na mezhdunarodnykh vystavkakh i iarmarkakh,' *Vneshniaia torgovlia* no.11 (1957): 53-60, 58.

celebration of the mechanisation of construction equipment, referred to as the development of 'armies of construction', can be used as an example of standard press coverage.⁵⁰⁷ Due to the nature of the equipment presented, the exhibition was spread over a massive area, with varying displays from both socialist and capitalist countries. The published list of guest nations read alphabetically: Austria, England, Belgium, East Germany, Holland, Denmark, Italy, Poland, USA, West Germany, Finland, France, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, and Japan.⁵⁰⁸ Articles about the exhibition opened by stating that during the course of the exhibition the USSR emerged 'as the largest producer and exporter of construction equipment'.⁵⁰⁹ The largest pavilion at the exhibition belonged to the USSR with two hundred exponents, and was followed by East Germany. From page three of the article 'At the international exhibition for construction and transport equipment' both socialist nations and capitalist nations received press coverage with the socialist countries receiving half a page while capitalist countries received one and a half. The Italian pavilion was perceived to be of particular interest as was the display by the Japanese firm Hitachi. The representative director of Hitachi, Kumashiro was quoted by the Soviet press as saying 'our nations are neighbours and neighbours should be well aware of the trade possibilities... Our business people are here to make purchases of goods and of licences'.⁵¹⁰ Speaking on behalf of Soviet attendees, the reporter stated that: 'we saw many beneficial things at the Swedish, French, Italian and English firms' stands. The exhibition showed such wonderful possibilities... This was the opinion of many of the guests'.⁵¹¹ In conclusion, it was also noted that a particularly high level of interest in foreign stands was shown and innovations of specific Western firms and the trade contacts/sales were presented. The idea of profitability, both in terms of exposure and establishing business ties but also in terms of purchases and sales, runs throughout the articles on exhibitions, typically occurring in the conclusion and occasionally in the introduction.

⁵⁰⁷ 'Na Mezhdunarodnom smotre stroitel'nykh i dorozhnykh mashin v Luzhnikakh,' *Vneshniaia Torgovlia* no.10 (1964): 3-6.

⁵⁰⁸ 'Na Mezhdunarodnom smotre stroitel'nykh i dorozhnykh mashin v Luzhnikakh' 3.

⁵⁰⁹ 'Na Mezhdunarodnom smotre stroitel'nykh i dorozhnykh mashin v Luzhnikakh' 3.

⁵¹⁰ 'Na Mezhdunarodnom smotre stroitel'nykh i dorozhnykh mashin v Luzhnikakh' 5.

⁵¹¹ 'Na Mezhdunarodnom smotre stroitel'nykh i dorozhnykh mashin v Luzhnikakh' 5.

Press coverage favoured the use of Westerners to legitimise the exhibitions. In an article Swedish trade representative L. Gustavsson was quoted as saying that 'trade between Sweden and the Soviet Union has a long tradition and we believe that exhibitions aid in the exchange and trade of Swedish-Soviet goods'.⁵¹² A representative from French company Tishauer, F. Cauchet was quoted as being pleased with his company's first visit to a Soviet exhibition. Participation had proven profitable, as Tishauer had signed a contract with *Mashinoimport* for ninety thousand roubles for a crane. For: 'a country that uses advanced industrial methods of building and planning, as is seen in the Soviet Union, this crane can but contribute to a high speed of building.'⁵¹³ Numerous quotes, of which the source was predominantly Western, reiterate the ideas expressed in the quote by K. Shtemmler, head of Shtemmler-Imeks of the Netherlands: 'the exhibition was grandiose. Its organisation and how it was conducted deserves good marks. The USSR showed that it can organise an extremely large exhibition'.⁵¹⁴ The inclusion of such quotes constituted more than mere self-praise. The department of trade, which was involved both in the publication of *Vneshniaia torgovlia* and in the organisation of the trade exhibitions, appears to have included the positive commentary as a form of validation of and a promotion for exhibitions. This interpretation is reinforced by the continuous references to the profitable sale of Soviet goods and of the purchase of special equipment that was to aid Soviet economic development.

Both open and closed exhibitions were covered in the press, just as both open and closed exhibitions were not. National exhibitions always received press coverage as advertising and coverage was regularly written into the agreements, but coverage of industrial exhibitions was a decision that lay solely with Soviet officials. Despite national exhibitions being guaranteed coverage, there were means by which Soviet officials could minimise coverage. The Americans complained that during the American Exhibition in 1959, the posters announcing the exhibition were late being put up, and then had no date or location listed. Soviet organisers excused the failure to produce fully detailed posters suitably early by claiming

512 'Torgovat' s Sovetskim Soiuzom vygodno,' *Vneshniaia torgovlia* no.11(1964): 37-38, 37.

513 'Torgovat' s Sovetskim Soiuzom vygodno' 37.

514 'Torgovat' s Sovetskim Soiuzom vygodno' 38.

insufficient high quality artistic and printing staff. Other means of reducing coverage included articles without any titles, pictures without articles, or articles that opened and closed with socialist achievements with the foreign information sandwiched in between. Occasionally, an exhibition would be covered retrospectively, or as close to the closing date as possible. In many ways the media coverage that did occur bore an inverse relationship to general public interest in an exhibition. For example, the 1966 international exhibition of agricultural machines was covered by forty-three newspapers, sixteen journals, was mentioned in seventeen television programmes and one hundred times on radio programmes. The 1965 exhibition of the American shoe company Roman Fielding received no official coverage. Shoe exhibitions rarely received coverage but the International Exhibition of Literature on Entomology (2-9.08.1968), at which twenty-five firms from capitalist countries were present, received national coverage. Consumer oriented exhibitions were not excluded from press coverage, but there was an inverse correlation between consumer goods and press coverage.

While not all exhibitions were of interest to, or for the consumption of, the public, this did not exclude them from being advertised. For example, the 'Technical Books USA' exhibition that ran in Moscow (23.01-24.02.1963), Leningrad, and Kiev, was announced with over four hundred posters for Moscow alone, and numerous radio advertisements. Official attendance in Moscow was listed at 25,000. The American firm Roman Fielding was a company that represented five US companies and by the time of its largest exhibition had completed two and a half million USD worth of agreements with the Soviet Union. In 1963, its displays featured synthetic cloth and leather and were targeted at specialists. Given 635 square metres of exhibition space 7 *Chermushkinskaia Kv. 20a Korpus 24*, Roman Fielding filled the space with sixty-five tons of material for the perusal of the ten thousand by invitation only visitors. Although closed to the public, news of the exhibition could be found in the local press, for example in *Moskovskaia Pravda* (23.11.1963) and *Vecherniaia Moskva* (16, 22.11.1963). The media coverage of closed exhibitions is indicative of the state wanting to appropriate the prestige conferred upon foreign exhibitions while controlling direct public exposure. In 1965, Roman Fielding would exhibit again, focusing on synthetic shoes, their production and repair. This time, only 2,500 special tickets

and twenty-eight information letters were sent, and while unofficial guests did attend it was not open to the public and there were neither advertisements nor press coverage. Machines, lines and synthetic material were purchased. Items and lines purchased or donated after the Fielding exhibitions were duly incorporated into larger exhibitions and displayed for the public.⁵¹⁵ A section on ideological work at the exhibition was an insignificant aspect of the reports on industrial exhibitions and consisted of the sites to which the visitors were escorted and any incidents that occurred.

The exhibition of the Danish electro-technology firm Brüel & Kjær A/S (precision instrumentation for acoustics and vibration measurement) was closed to the public but received official press coverage. This closed nature combined with media reports of the substantial monetary and technological purchases contributed to the creation of an unrealistic image of Western technology. Like Roman Fielding, Brüel & Kjær A/S had conducted several million roubles worth of agreements with the USSR in the two to three years prior to their exhibitions; and like the Italian firm *Innocenti* (an Italian machinery works, that Post-WWII was known for its Lambretta scooters and later the BMC – later British Leyland – Mini. The company is sometimes known as Leyland Innocenti at this time), official sources citing the firms' credentials included their relationship with other Western nations and companies. For example, Brüel & Kjær A/S was reported to export fifty percent of its goods to the USA and twenty-five percent to the Federal Republic of Germany and twenty-five percent to the USSR. The official specialist assessment of the 120 exponents displayed at the exhibition was that they were 'of a level of modern devices'.⁵¹⁶ The exhibition by the Swedish electro-medical equipment firms Elema Schonander (one of the pioneers in pacemakers-not to be confused with Siemens-Elema from the 1920s that was also in the field of medical technology and pacemakers) and Lars Ljunberg (ventilation systems for motors etc), involved three hundred standard invitations, eighty-six addressed invitations and 450 lecture tickets. Attendance exceeded this figure with 3,450 official visitors, in the official

515 'Otchet strochnogo remonta obuvi firmy Fomein Fel'ding Inc. USA,' RGAE 635/ 1/635: 1-6.

516 'Op. otchet upolnomochennogo VTP na vystavke elektronnykh izmeritelnykh priborov firmy Brüel & Kjær A/S Danlia,' RGAE 635/ 1/572: 118-127, 121.

report assessing the exhibition the respective comment was that the 'demonstration hall was always full'.⁵¹⁷

That the Soviet regime sought to limit the exposure of its citizens to Western/ foreign influences is logical. What is then perhaps surprising is the frequency with which foreign exhibitions received front-page coverage. Of sixty articles on international exhibitions found in *Moskovskaia Pravda* between 1961 and 1968, thirty-two were on the front page. From 1961 to 1966 exhibition articles were predominately on the first page, but as of 1967, were first seen on page three or four. The titles of the articles ranged from vague 'To a new exhibition of science and technology', to detailed 'The Italian trade fair opens in Moscow'. The attendance of foreign dignitaries received press coverage similar in nature to the attendance of the exhibitions by Soviet officials; see for example British Prime Minister H. Wilson's impending visit to the second British Trade Fair in 1966.⁵¹⁸

Exhibition articles had a standard format that included: a who's who list of foreign and Soviet dignitaries attending the opening/exhibition, if international a (usually alphabetical) list of Western and socialist nations participating; mention of a few interesting aspects of the exhibition with a balance between capitalist developed and socialist; the awarding of gold medals (balanced between Socialist and non-socialist nations); and a conclusion about the prospects of trade agreements or the amounts of trade agreements, contracts or offers established (typically listed in roubles and /or US dollars). Frequent mention was made of consumer goods that were within reach of the Soviet people. These goods needed to be judiciously chosen and introduced however as R. Borisov wrote: 'one of the prices of such technological progress was the growth of psychological illnesses'.⁵¹⁹ This formulaic reporting was to remain consistent throughout the period. Coverage of international exhibitions often focused on the achievements of the socialist bloc countries, for example during the International Construction Exhibition, the Day of Britain and the Day of Bulgaria occurred simultaneously and while the former got mention, the latter was the featured.

⁵¹⁷ 'Op. otchet upolnomochennogo VTP na shvedskoi vystavke elektronnoho meditsinskogo oborudovaniia firm: Elena Shenarder AV i AV Larslunberg I Co.,' RGAE 635/1/635: 7-16, 14.

⁵¹⁸ 'K priezdu Prem'er-ministra Velikobritanii H. Wil'sona,' Moskovskaia Pravda (08.07.1966): 1.

⁵¹⁹ R. Borisov, R. Borisov, 'Reklama i zhizn' 214, 215

In 1965, an international chemistry exhibition was held in Sokol'niki. Divided into two main themes, chemistry in industrial construction and chemistry in agriculture, it was attended by 1,800 firms from twenty-one countries including 'large' specialist firms from the West: ASA (British), Sina Viscosa (large scale production of the casein fibres - Italian), Union Carbide Corporation (ethylenes and polypropylene - USA) and others.⁵²⁰ The exhibition ran over two weeks and was viewed by one and a half million people.⁵²¹ With contracts totalling 220 million roubles having been signed the exhibition was deemed a success.⁵²² *VT* ran articles on the exhibition in November and December of 1965. Of specific importance were the contracts with the GDR, Poland and Italy. The majority of the companies exhibiting were active in various fields of the chemical industry with the Italian companies at the exhibition Eni, Snam, and Agip all specialising in the oil and gas/petrochemical industry, and were specifically interested in providing information on petrochemical plants and petrochemical product production. After noting Anich's leading role in the petrochemical industry, the head administrator for Anich (then parent company to Eni), is quoted as calling for increased contact between the two nations and their respective industries.⁵²³ In *'Itogi mezhdunarodnogo foruma po khimii'* Western companies with which contracts had been signed were listed before the discussion of the important role of socialist countries. After the comments on socialist countries, the article returns to Western business representatives. The director of the Dutch company Shtemmler-Imeks is quoted as acknowledging the fast rate of change in industry and the impossibility of scientists staying abreast without the use of exhibitions, conferences etc.⁵²⁴ The director of the British ASA is quoted as declaring that 'discussion' was one of the most beneficial aspects the exhibition and that building upon this basis would result in long standing working relationships.⁵²⁵ In articles on this exhibition, as well as on exhibitions in general, Western representatives were disproportionately quoted

520 K. Parmenov, 'Itogi mezhdunarodnogo foruma po khimii,' *Vneshniaia torgovlia* 12 (1965): 13-17.

521 'Khimia v Sokol'nikakh,' *Vneshniaia torgovlia* 11 (1965): 18-19.

522 'Khimia v Sokol'nikakh' 18-19.

523 'Khimia v Sokol'nikakh' 19.

524 Parmenov, 'Itogi Mezhdunarodnogo foruma po khimii' 15.

525 Parmenov, 'Itogi Mezhdunarodnogo foruma po khimii' 16.

on the value of contacts; the need for discussion; interest in Soviet products; and, successes in concluding trade contracts.

Susan Reid has written that: 'visitors' books are, it must be emphasised, a problematic source of evidence: the entries can hardly be considered a candid or representative reflection of opinion, least of all in a culture of surveillance such as the Soviet Union. To engage in assessing their degree of sincerity is a fruitless task. Rather, comment writing should be treated as a form of role performance or self alignment.'⁵²⁶ This is true of articles in the press as well. The opinions expressed by individual journalists were interpretations of official opinion. This consumer vision was often tempered with caution against excesses of consumerism. Opinion in press coverage ran the gamut. The severest condemnation was unleashed on modern art, despite such endeavours as the publishing of *Sovremennoe amerikanskoe iskusstvo* by Lloyd Gudrich concurrent with the American exhibition in which the development of modern art over the previous twenty-five years as characterising America and conveying the sensation of the mechanisation of life in the 20th century was explained.⁵²⁷ The highest praise was saved for the Socialist bloc countries, notably Czechoslovakia and East Germany.

Exhibitions opened with official addresses that were intended for both international and local audiences. Speeches made from abroad carried special significance both in their potential for the audience to glean information about abroad but also through Khrushchev's use of his acceptance from foreign leaders as a sign of his political prowess. Several well-known examples are: the Geneva Convention, his trip to the USSR, and his trip to Britain. Another example was the Leipzig Exhibition in 1959. Traditionally, Leipzig was internationally renowned for its trade fairs. The socialist regimes of the 1950s sought to retain Leipzig as a significant centre for trade, trade fairs, and as a 'showcase for socialist technology'⁵²⁸. The full text of Khrushchev's address at the Leipzig Exhibition was carried by the major media sources and is representative of his early exhibition

⁵²⁶ Reid, 'The Exhibition Art of Socialist Countries, Moscow 1958-1959' *Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-War Eastern Europe* 101-132, 116.

⁵²⁷ Lloyd Gudrich, *Sovremennoe amerikanskoe iskusstvo* (Moscow: 1959): 3.

⁵²⁸ Stokes, *Constructing Socialism*, 69. For more information about Leipzig and Leipzig trade fairs see Stokes, *Constructing Socialism*, Chapter three.

addresses.⁵²⁹ A brief introduction and pleasantries led into the importance of trade, 'I do not talk about socialist countries' he points out but 'Western countries like West Germany, England, France, Italy and others with whom trade has such large possibilities to grow.'⁵³⁰ Khrushchev then detailed the progress that had been made in developing working relationships with 177 Western capitalist firms of which eighty-one were from West Germany, twenty-eight from England, fifteen from France, and thirteen from Holland.⁵³¹ The English firm Marconi, (radio technology and televisions) was presented as an excellent example of a company with which the USSR had good trade relations but, according to Khrushchev, Marconi could be more active, and trade levels with Great Britain were 'not sufficient'.⁵³² Despite trade with the USSR being a 'profitable business' for Italian companies (trade with Italy, then most active exhibitor of the Western nations, had expanded two and a half times),⁵³³ the Soviet Union had to initiate talks. Khrushchev made it clear that he held the West responsible for low trade levels charging the west with the boycotting of Soviet goods, trying to secure an 'economic blockade' in order to ensure that 'technological development' in the socialist countries remained at a 'low level', and refusing to grant socialist countries 'the possibility to further raise the well-being of their people'.⁵³⁴ The situation with the United States was extremely disappointing, demeaning and senseless. Khrushchev's exasperation with the poor state of trade can best be summed up by his proclamation: 'don't want to trade with us? Don't trade. We will wait until you yourselves knock on our door'.⁵³⁵ Whether the Soviet Union quickly obtained technology through contracts or quickly through native developments, it would acquire the technology. These themes of trade potential, current needless trade difficulties, and the ability of the USSR to 'raise the well-being' of socialist peoples without Western trade were common refrains that appeared in the media reports and speeches surrounding exhibitions.

529 N. S. Khrushchev, 'Vneshniaia torgovlia – zdorovaia i prochnaia osnova mirnogo sosushchestvovaniia gosudarstv,' Vneshniaia torgovlia no.3 (1959): 1-8; and Pravda 07.03.1959:1.

530 Khrushchev, 'Vneshniaia torgovlia' 1-2.

531 Khrushchev, 'Vneshniaia torgovlia' 2.

532 Khrushchev, 'Vneshniaia torgovlia' 2, 4.

533 Khrushchev, 'Vneshniaia torgovlia' 3.

534 Khrushchev, 'Vneshniaia torgovlia' 4.

535 V. Naborov, 'Normalizatsiia sovetsko-amerikanskikh torgovykh otnoshenii otvechaet interesam obeikh stran,' Vneshniaia torgovlia no.12 (1959): 6-11, 11.

Khrushchev's public addresses also acknowledged the appeal and desirability of the consumerism exhibited. In this instance speaking about the American National Exhibition in 1959 as covered in *Izvestiia*:

[it] has many interesting things. For example, plastic articles, household goods, synthetic textiles, and various manufactured articles...I not only experienced a feeling of satisfaction, but also, to a certain degree, a feeling of envy. But this is good envy, in the sense that we should like to have all this in our country as soon as possible...This exhibition is useful to us, we can learn something from it. We regard the American Exhibition as an exhibition of our own achievements in the near future.⁵³⁶

In this instance the appropriation of the Western present as the Soviet future is clearly stated by Khrushchev. The coverage of consumer goods was less complete than reports of trade agreements but was prevalent through direct or indirect commentary. Writing about interesting aspects of *Interbutmash-68*:

A French firm showed an interesting machine for boiling water. At the Italian stand there was an interesting model of a machine for the chemical cleaning of clothes... There were also many interesting technical things to see in the pavilions of Yugoslavia, Japan, England, USA and other countries.⁵³⁷

Despite praise for interesting foreign technical items, it was not unusual for articles on international exhibitions to acknowledge Soviet superiority in overall terms, and to praise Western oddities, the Italian machine for boiling water or the American plastic lemon juicer, being representative of this practice. A common commentary style in regards to Western consumer goods was the qualified or backhanded complement that acknowledged the technological innovation while calling on Soviet intellectual and moral superiority to shun the frivolity behind the innovation:

Good kitchen – the dream of any hostess! And they constructed this taking it into consideration: a separate kitchen [as opposed to communal], a kitchen exemplary of a city apartment, a kitchen of a typical average American. But we know, that the USA –[is] a highly industrialised power. We have read and heard a lot about the talented American engineers and studies solving difficult modern technical problems, about the largest qualified worker force in the world; factories, creations of the wonderful century of production. Truly, what the Soviet people wanted to see was evidence of the

536 Nikita S. Khrushchev, 'Our people want friendship with the American people and with the people of all countries,' *Izvestiia* (25.07.1959): 1.

537 A. Zhetvin, 'Bol'shoi uspek interbutmash-68' *Vneshniaia Torgovlia* no.8 (1968): 37-40, 39.

technological progress of America ingenuity but not through kitchen appliances...⁵³⁸

Following along these lines, R. Borisov wrote that 'even the most modern of refrigerator will not keep perishable ideas.'⁵³⁹ Less common was unqualified praise:

For us America is – for many of us as a matter of fact, the not too distant future... it is our future because today the United States is first in the world in industrial production, in output production, etc.. The Soviet Union holds as one of its main economic objectives: to catch up with and overtake America in all of these areas. It is for this reason that all walks of professions workers, engineers, farmers, students, doctors, artists and the seniors and youth of the country, people with diverse professions and interests came with great interest to the exhibition at Sokol'niki... We liked the simple and comfortable furniture, the various electrical appliances, meant to alleviate the drudgery of housework, the refrigerators with freezer units, the televisions, the use of plastic materials, synthetic fabric and furs, the comfortable and attractive sport goods, and of course the sumptuous automobiles.'⁵⁴⁰

These are not the words of *samizdat* dissidents but official opinions. This is the public opinion of men like Khrushchev, of official policy makers. Once this information was released, individuals could incorporate it into their image of the West and of the Soviet future without fear of retribution. However, the acceptance of the image of the West was increasingly separated from the belief that communism as guided by the Communist Party of the USSR could provide this future. As the government became aware that it was providing an image not of the Soviet socialist future but of an alternative path of consumerism, positive government propagated images of the West were to wane.

The image of a technologically wealthy and advanced United States was a permanent aspect of Soviet thought during this era. The coverage of the technical side of a Western exhibition, with a few exceptions such as Khrushchev's comments about the stupidity of a lemon squeezer,⁵⁴¹ was subject to far less ridicule than the cultural components. Amidst praise for progress, caution was urged. Soviet citizens were requested to ask themselves: 'But do we need such automobiles?' or such

⁵³⁸ Konstanin Vishnevetskii, 'O mezhdunarodnoi torgovo promyshlennoi vystavke,' *Izvestiia* (26.07.1959).

⁵³⁹ R. Borisov, R. Borisov, 'Reklama i zhizn' 217.

⁵⁴⁰ V. Smolianskii, 'Liudi, tekhnika i vremia,' *Novoe vremia* no. 36, (1959): 25-27, 25.

⁵⁴¹ 'The U.S. in Moscow: Russia Comes to the Fair,' *Time Magazine* (03.08.1959): 13.

watches, or such a kitchen?⁵⁴² A response to Ford's claim that the automobile played a 'not insignificant role in the contemporary standard of living' of Americans was: 'of course, the automobiles of Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors are good and technically sound... [but] these cars possess excessive, practically non-warranted ratings. They are heavy and not economical, and very difficult to repair.'⁵⁴³ Luxury Italian cars received general praise but were occasionally dismissed as frivolous and unnecessary. The citizens of the Soviet Union did not need such vehicles; they needed vehicles 'suited for the terrain and the weather' of their country (the result was the *Lada/Zhiguli* based on the *Fiat 124* and which required a phenomenal alteration of sixty-five percent of its components in order to be produced in and suitable for the USSR).⁵⁴⁴ 'People who needed puerile goods were an anachronism to socialism'.⁵⁴⁵

In an interview the scholar Martin Dewhirst stated that the idea of a boomerang effect or counter-productiveness of Western exhibitions did not arise until the late 1960s – early 1970s. Later Soviet resentment could be interpreted as a combination of: a rejection of the unobtainable; a distaste for consumerism as it was co-opted by the Soviet regime; and part of a global trend towards consumption cynicism. Dewhirst's assessment of the Soviet population's reaction to the American, and British Exhibitions (1959-1961) warrants citing at length. Starting with the American exhibition he was to assess the general response as positive, there having been 'huge crowds', and a surprising sense of inventiveness as visitors stole a wide range of items at an astonishing speed. He believed the crowds of people 'went to see the new American gadgets at the American exhibition. They were very impressed they were very excited. Some of them I heard had been back time and time again if they could get in.'⁵⁴⁶ On the British Industrial Exhibition, at which he worked at a stand selling weaving looms, the crowds and queues were also substantial, the questions were extremely detailed and there was a dominant mood of optimism, and that the asking of questions into technological procedures that were as yet unknown in the Soviet Union was a patriotic inquiry into the near future.

542 Smolianskii, 'Liudi, tekhnika i vremia' 25.

543 Smolianskii, 'Liudi, tekhnika i vremia' 26.

544 Interview with K. Bakhtov in A. Shavrin, *VAZ: 30 Letii volzhskogo avtomobil'nogo posviashchaetsia. Stranitsy istorii* (Finland: Benecap, 1997) 130.

545 Smolianskii, 'Liudi, tekhnika i vremia' 26.

546 Interview with Martin Dewhirst, Glasgow April 2001.

However, there was a feeling that Western products were superior to Soviet made goods. At the British Light Industrial Exhibition, the British restaurant and pub (intended for exhibition staff but visited by Russians) were staffed primarily but not exclusively, with Soviet waiters. The languid nature of the Soviet serving style was to cause the British waiters great distress.

It is a little bit tantalizing - you could enter Sokol'niki and see the American exhibition or the British exhibition - it was as if you had suddenly left the Soviet Union behind you in most respects [and]... found yourself in the West for half a day or a whole day or two or three hours and then you have to go back again to the reality of Soviet grim life and it could well be that on the rebound you felt more fed up and distressed than ever.

Be the press coverage laudatory or dismissive, there was an overarching sense that the West was at a point in modernisation where the Soviet Union wanted to be. The West represented a fixed point in the Soviet future and this future was exhibited with the objectives of amassing information, building international political and economic contacts, and motivating Soviet citizens. It provided the images for Khrushchev's controlled consumption that was a significant aspect of the social contract between the state and the population. The idealism of the revolution had faded and the brutality of Stalinism was set aside and then consumerism filled this void. The imagery of the objective did not need to be created, as it existed within Western nations, all that needed to be done was to disseminate a motivational image; and to insure that there was no conflation of the ideas of consumption and democracy.⁵⁴⁷

⁵⁴⁷ Oleg Pizarzhevskii, 'Vstrecha v sokol'nikakh,' Kul'tura i zhizn' no. 9 (1959): 50-53, 51.

Exhibitions

a. American National Exhibition 1959

Khudozhniki Ameriki
Svezha Pamiati
Vot byla vremekhko voina!
Den'gi tekli v karman
Krov' tekla iz ran
No krov'
Leilas' daleko
Ot nas
Den'gi blizko
(A. Zamoshkin) 548

Organised by the United States Information Agency (USIA), the American exhibition was a collaborative government and industry effort with the industry contributions from approximately eight hundred firms supplying stands, samples, staff and shipping, surpassing that of the government. Despite calls from influential Americans such as US ambassador Llewellyn Thompson and George Allen that it would be best to keep the exhibition modest (under five million US dollars) the enthusiasm displayed by American businesses and the seizing of this potentially unique opportunity on the part of the American government, resulted in an extravagant display of the American way of life. For American businesses participation tended to be more patriotic than profitable.

The general themes presented in the American exhibition were similar to those at the French, English or Italian National Exhibitions. The themes included: labour, agriculture, health, education, atomic research, transportation, consumer goods, petrochemicals, fine art and lifestyles. Pavilions were designed and constructed to display successes with modern materials and architectural innovation. At the US exhibition, these structures consisted of a geodesic dome and a pavilion made entirely out of plastics. Some highlights of the American exhibition included the IBM RAMAC computer that was pre-programmed to answer four thousand questions in ten languages; the supermarket with its frozen food section; the photo exhibition of the Family of Man; the children's playground complete with building blocks, bicycles, paint sets, construction kits, doll houses, stuffed animals, games, sledges, scooters, fire trucks, chemistry sets, electric trains with railroad stations, a

548 A. Zamoshkin, 'Khudozhniki Ameriki,' *Ogonek* no.5 (31.01.60): 16.

cowboy ghost town, and a helical slide made out of fibreglass; the six room pre-fabricated ranch house; the Polaroid station where, based on official attendance figures, one in five visitors or fifteen thousand people per day could have their picture taken; the regular fashions shows with models of diverse ethnic origins dancing to rock and roll music; the twenty-two American cars; and the Pepsi-Cola sample booths. There was also a very popular variety show directed by Ed Sullivan. After becoming discouraged by the tense atmosphere surrounding those writing in the open guest books and the comments in the books, the Americans altered the format to simulate individual polling booths with comment 'ballots'. In addition, a poll run on the RAMAC computer was used to gauge the 'average' reaction to the exhibition. A positive rating of eighty-five percent was listed with the RAMAC computer and sixty-five percent of the comments in the guest books were predominantly favourable.

The umbrella theme of the American exhibition was 'average' America and lengths were taken to ensure that this was communicated. Coupled with the idea of average was the idea that the USA was a land of the people, that the wealth of the land was the wealth of the 'average' American. In his opening address, Vice President Richard Nixon went so far as itemise the wealth of the average family: 'every family purchases on average nine suits and dresses and fourteen pairs of shoes a year'.⁵⁴⁹ This concentration on 'average' was far more prevalent at the American exhibition than at other national exhibitions. For example, while the British felt that they had to present a realistic and plausible image, see such topics as 'Rolls Royce: the best car in the world?' in which the supremacy of the Rolls was not really questioned or 'Problems of automobile movement in England' in which the logistical problems of having a plethora of passenger cars was addressed (it was illustrated by a picture of a traffic jam on the motorway) they made little attempt to exhibit the 'average'. French participation, particularly in fashion, made no attempt at 'average'. The American obsession with presenting the 'average' was derided even by American journalists who interpreted it as 'the Russians' built-in suspicion that all national exhibitions are really lavishly produced Potemkin villages.'⁵⁵⁰ The

⁵⁴⁹ A poor family was said to be one that on average purchased one suit every two years, a jacket every 10 years, a woman's hat every two years and a woman's winter jacket every five years and a summer jacket once every four years.

⁵⁵⁰ Max Frankel, New York Times (27 July 1959) 12(P).

Soviet press, commenting on the General Electric kitchen, home of the infamous kitchen debate, praised it as 'such a kitchen' but noted that it could not possibly be representative of an 'average' kitchen in Kentucky (as was claimed), as Kentucky was a 'disaster region'.⁵⁵¹ The Soviet press dismissed the electronic kitchen with its wealth of gadgets as 'expensive, even for the United States'.⁵⁵² William Benton, former Assistant Secretary of State said that: 'the United States was selling its lifestyle... an image of a free and peace-loving America in which citizens lived in comfort with all modern conveniences'.⁵⁵³ Much to the disappointment of many Soviet officials, the consumer and cultural aspects of the exhibition overwhelmed the industrial. Even industrial aspects of the exhibition were geared towards the final product and its availability.⁵⁵⁴

Refusing to be limited by Soviet censors, initially all American films, performing art groups and slide shows as well as many books were censored, the USIA and American industries had a great deal of success in determining the composition of their displays and samples. Initially banned on the basis that it might cause 'stampedes,'⁵⁵⁵ the distribution of Pepsi Cola, Polaroid pictures, plastic bowls, and prepared foods was negotiated. The distribution of samples was not unique to the American exhibition. At most national and industrial exhibitions souvenir items, brochures and samples from working lines were distributed. John R. Thomas, an American guide, wrote that the distribution of cosmetics, Pepsi, Polaroid photos, prepared foods, plastic bowls, souvenirs, lapel buttons and an estimated twelve million brochures did indeed create 'near riots.'⁵⁵⁶ Particular concern was expressed that excessive attention would be paid to American cosmetics and cosmetic samples as Soviet policy had recently started promoting the

⁵⁵¹ Borisov, 'Reklama i zhizn' 215.

⁵⁵² Smolianskii, 'Liudi, tekhnika i vremia' 25.

⁵⁵³ Marilyn S. Kushner, 'Exhibiting Art at the American National Exhibition in Moscow,' *Journal of Cold War Studies* Vol.4 no.1. Winter (2002): 6-26, 7.

⁵⁵⁴ One method of displaying the facts was to have large placards detailing figures such as wages, and cost in terms of work hours. For example, the placards that surrounded a donated Chevrolet contained information describing the internal workings of the vehicle, the number of hours 'the average man' would need to work in order to purchase the car, and describe the waiting list for such an item. The Soviet spectators were to be informed that in the United States 'every seven seconds there is a new baby born and every twenty seconds a new car is turned off the production lines. 'McClellan, Harold, 'A Review of the American National Exhibition In Moscow July 25-September 4th,' *USIA* (1959): 8.

⁵⁵⁵ Hixson, *Parting the Curtain* 189.

⁵⁵⁶ John R. Thomas, *Report on Service with the American Exhibition in Moscow* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1960) 24.

use of skin care products and make-up: 'many women still have not thrown off the idea that taking care of one's face- the necessity of a nice complexion and the use of cosmetics is indulgent and vain. Exactly now, when the woman is constantly under everyone's gaze in the factory, in society, in enterprises, she should have a tidy, proper and beautiful appearance.'⁵⁵⁷ There was some Soviet cosmetic production, for example the *Svoboda* plant on the outskirts of Moscow was responsible for supplying forty percent of all toilet soaps and creams, the *All-Union Theatrical Association* that produced lipstick, rouge, nail polish and eye pencils for theatrical and general consumption, *Rassvet* manufactured lipsticks, mascara and creams, and *Novaya Zarya* which produced perfumed products. In response to a query about official opinion on using cosmetics, an official representative of *Svoboda* was to answer that the government had never been against cosmetics, but that it was only with economic improvements that industry and consumers could indulge in increasingly popular items such as powders, eye makeup, nail polish, perms and hair dyes.⁵⁵⁸

An American plastics and synthetics specialist uncharitably likened Russians to 'locusts' and declared that the children were proficient 'little capitalists' who would barter for souvenir pins and chewing gum.⁵⁵⁹ Martin Dewhirst, who worked at several British exhibitions, recalled similar reactions at the British exhibition in 1961. The British, Americans and other nations/firms, designed certain aspects of the exhibition to facilitate theft. Tangible exposure was not to be limited to those attending the exhibition. In the journal *Soviet Culture*, one can read of the novel open shelf book display containing eleven thousand titles, with multiple copies; and that the Americans were constantly ordering replacements.⁵⁶⁰ In the first day, six hundred books including fourteen bibles were missing and within a few days after opening, the display had to be shut down, as seventy percent of the books were gone. A photo of the British Industrial Exhibition of 1961 taken by John Massey

557 As quoted in Mary Neuburger, 'Veils, Shalvari, and Matters of Dress: Unraveling the Fabric of Women's Lives in Communist Bulgaria,' *Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-War Eastern Europe*, 169-188: 183.

558 Corsini, *Caviar For Breakfast* 130.

559 'Office of the American Exhibition in Moscow, Washington D.C.' *USIA American Exhibition in Moscow (AEM)* no. 65 (03.09.1959) 1.

560 A. Smimov, 'The exhibition is not a counter for rotten goods,' *Soviet Culture*, (06.08.1959).

Stewart shows a crowd of people looking at the shoe exhibit, which is represented by more empty spots where shoes used to be than actual shoes.⁵⁶¹

American self-censorship of goods and technology displayed was ridiculed. Why was America prepared to purchase the Soviet turbo drill, but refusing to exhibit or to sell bits?⁵⁶² Indeed, while caution to not exhibit goods on the strategic goods list was exercised at the American exhibition, it was not atypical for American firms to display strategic goods listed technology directly or to display and sell through European affiliates and branches. The International Exhibition of Chemistry in Industry, Building and Agriculture of 1965 with fifty-seven participating American companies is one such instance of American firms displaying goods that they were not permitted to sell.⁵⁶³ Soviet organisers were frustrated and disappointed that after having managed to get American companies to participate, the lack of American presence in most thematic exhibitions was striking, many of the American firms had failed to receive the appropriate authorisation that would have allowed the sale of the technology/goods exhibited.⁵⁶⁴ During the course of the exhibition in 1965, over one and a half million Soviet citizens viewed goods that could not be purchased. Another instance was the closed exhibition for four thousand specialists of the latest developments of French and American aviation equipment and navigational systems companies.⁵⁶⁵ Considered a success, success being defined as having been interesting for specialists and having gone 'calmly', Soviet officials were thwarted in their reported willingness to purchase eighty to ninety percent of the components.⁵⁶⁶ The companies were to man similar displays at *Interorgtekhnik*-66, which was attended by over one million visitors.

Preliminary American research of the facts to be presented at the exhibition involved scouring Soviet sources for figures about American goods and services. *Pravda* in particular, was a source of many of the American 'facts' and figures.

⁵⁶¹ Private collection of John Massey Stewart.

⁵⁶² as cited in 'Visitors' Reactions to the American Exhibit in Moscow: a Preliminary Report," *USIA AEM* (28.09.1959) 4.

⁵⁶³ 'O mezhdunarodnoi vystavke khimii v promyshlennosti, stroitel'stve i sel'skom khoziaistve,' *RGAE* 635/1/641: entire delo, 1- 2.

⁵⁶⁴ O mezhdunarodnoi vystavke khimii v promyshlennosti, stroitel'stve i sel'skom khoziaistve,' 17 .

⁵⁶⁵ Exhibition of American Firm Friden and French Firm Aleksandr Gober and Co

⁵⁶⁶ 'Operativnyi otchet po vystavke schetno-vychislitel'nykh priborov amerikanskoi firmy 'Friden' ustroitel' frantsuzskaia firma 'Aleksandr Gober i Ko.,' *RGAE* 635/1/692: 67-76, 67,74.

American reasoning was that as the figures were 'familiar' to Soviet citizens and as Soviet citizens could verify the figures, they allowed for greater plausibility. This tactic was not restricted to the Americans, Khrushchev used inflated American figures on Soviet missile capabilities in Soviet reports, which the Americans then translated, interpreting the correlation between the two figures as proof of American intelligence accuracy. Having established plausible figures, lists of products according to price, work hours needed to purchase an item, production figures, and/or availability were compiled. This breakdown was applied to items such as the twenty-two automotive vehicles and the prefabricated home with Macy's furnishings (including the white pincapple base lamps, wall-to-wall carpeting, cocktail tables, and enamel ashtrays). As was the accepted norm, prices of goods were listed in more than one currency. Despite the American use of some Soviet statistics, the Soviet government did not interpret the American presentation as an accurate representation of facts and figures, but as sensationalist propaganda.⁵⁶⁷

During the late 1950s and 1960s the average size of an overseas American trade fair/exhibition was one hundred tons of goods. The American Exhibition in Moscow consisted of over three thousand tons, of which seven tons were prepared foodstuffs.⁵⁶⁸ In comparison, the British Industrial Exhibition in Moscow in 1961 was made up of just over one and a half thousand tons. Enormous for a national exhibition, the American exhibition was comparable to the international thematic exhibitions that occurred during the mid 1960s, for example the Exhibition of Construction and Mechanisation of Construction Work (1964), Chemistry in Industry (1965), Construction, and Agriculture (1965), or Modern Means of Mechanising Administrative Governmental Work (1966). Exhibiting nations and companies were encouraged to leave unsold exhibited materials behind through a transportation pricing system that allowed for cheap transport of incoming goods and exorbitant transport of outgoing goods.⁵⁶⁹ In response to the punishing return shipping prices the commerce department of the American exhibition announced its intention publicly to auction off 1,800 items (including the model kitchen, the

⁵⁶⁷ 'Pokazyvaet amerikanskaja firma: noveishee oborudovanie dlja prachechnykh i khimicheskikh,' *Moskovskaja Pravda* (23.10.1963): 7.

⁵⁶⁸ 'The McClellan Report' 44.

⁵⁶⁹ see various documents in Torgovo-promyshlennaja Palata SSSR Upravlenie Mezhdunarodnykh i Inostrannykh Vystavok v SSSR; *RGAE* 635/1-.

contents of the model home, tools, automobiles, office supplies, photographic equipment/supplies, specifically Polaroid, etc). Humanitarian items such as the iron lung were to be donated. The donations were accepted, the auction banned, and most of the material was simply left behind. Six months after the exhibition closed, replicas of many of the displayed goods appeared. For example, G.U.M. carried clothes modelled on those seen in the American fashion show, and USIA documented an increase in the availability of processed foods.⁵⁷⁰ Considering the turgid nature of Soviet industry, that only six months were needed represents a significant political commitment to the provision of Western trends.

In principle, the American exhibition was not significantly different from other exhibitions/trade fairs. The Italian government supported its national industries' activities, the British displayed a plethora of consumer goods and promoted the Beatles, and in a display of all that was modern and chic the French imported hairstylists publicly to cut the hair of Soviet models. Articles featuring the French hair stylist Kurt Mumer described how he used technology to make women in over twelve countries beautiful.⁵⁷¹ The American exhibition was not such a breach in containment that the Soviet officials decided to do away with exhibitions; indeed, exhibitions were to increase in frequency. What the American exhibition was bigger (both in size and in attendance with official figures of seventy to eighty thousand per day over six weeks), brasher and earlier than most exhibitions. Most importantly, it was American. No other Western nation, and therefore exhibition, evoked such a strong reaction. By the 1950s, the question 'what is America?' was internationally answered with a list of commodities: cars, jeans, jazz, soft drinks, chewing gum and plastic products. The economic and cultural image of the United States in the Soviet Union correlated to the international economic and cultural image of the USA. In a study of Cold War cultural propaganda Frances Stonor Saunders wrote that due: 'largely to Russian propaganda, America was widely regarded as culturally barren, a nation of gum-chewing, Chevy-driving, Dupont-sheathed philistines.'⁵⁷² The American Exhibition reinforced this image. Russian writer Vasily Aksyonov described the exhibitions as one of the 'most important

⁵⁷⁰ Hixson, *Parting the Curtain* 211.

⁵⁷¹ see for example M. Stoianov and V. Markov, 'Chego ne znaet posetitel', *Moskovskaia Pravda* (04.06.1968): 4.

⁵⁷² Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper?* 19 and 191.

events in the opening up of the Soviet Union,' a process begun in the 1950s and continuing through to the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States.⁵⁷³

b. British Trade Fairs (1961, 1966, 1968)

Although there was a composite image of the West, each nation had its own separate identity. Britain, as the birthplace of industrialisation, had a special role within the umbrella image of the West. The economic image of Britain including ideas such as industrial, modern, dignified, modest, reserved, professional was one that both the Soviet government and English exporters of cultural images chose to propagate. To this end, the official Soviet and English images complemented each other. The nature of the British presence in the USSR was reinforced by the extent of British trade with the Soviet Union. During the 1950s, the main Soviet trade partners were Finland and England. By the end of the 1960s, they were West Germany, France and Italy. There were several conduits through which British organisations and the Government could directly present themselves to the Soviet public: *Angliia*, films, cultural exchanges (i.e. ballet, theatre groups), academic exchanges (both students and professors), and trade fairs/exhibitions.

The first British Industrial Exhibition, often referred to as the English Light Industrial Exhibition in the Soviet press, took place in Moscow 1961 at Sokol'niki under the auspice of the umbrella organisation English Industrial and Trade Fairs Ltd. The construction time was sixteen days, and involved the building of two pavilions by Belgian firms assisted by French and English companies. One of the two new pavilions was wired to hold one hundred quintessential British telephone booths with city lines.⁵⁷⁴ The park paid for beautification work on older pavilions, for example façade painting.⁵⁷⁵ Montage for the British exhibitions was a joint effort of English and Soviet workers. Large numbers of Soviet workers were regularly brought together to work with foreigners during the montage stage of

573 Kushner, 'Exhibiting Art at the American National Exhibition in Moscow' 19.

574 'Op. otchet upolnomochennogo VTP na angliiskoi torgovo promyshlennoi vystavke v 1961 godu,' *RGAE*, 635/1/456: 6.

575 Writing about the montage period of the American exhibition 'now between aluminium and plastic structures...Americans worked hand in hand with young Soviets' Pizarzhevskii expressed that for him, the greatest impact of the exhibition was the futuristic nature of engineering, decorations, and the *joie de vivre*. Oleg Pizarzhevskii, 'Vstrecha v Sokol'nikakh,' *Kul'tura i zhizn'* no. 9, (1959): 50-53, 50.

exhibitions; the British Exhibition of 1961 involved 503 workers. Soviet organisers were often critical of what they perceived to be the weak showing of the Soviet contribution, citing poor building organisation, poorly qualified workers and inferior grade equipment, tools and materials as their chief complaints.⁵⁷⁶ Soviet organisers also complained of poor Soviet departmental organisation, technical support, and maintenance of the fairgrounds.⁵⁷⁷ While the Soviet organisers of the British Industrial Exhibition voiced their displeasure, there were 'no reprimands' reportedly made by the English. This is in contrast to the American exhibition, as the Americans filed complaints about material quality, safety standards and worker motivation. Perhaps the Soviet workers had stopped claiming the right to a day off on one's saint's day as they had during the American exhibition when after one enterprising Soviet worker was granted the day off as it was his saint's day and others followed. The English did complain about the hotels, but this was attributed to the slowness of service in the restaurants, and about the need for English tea and cigarettes.⁵⁷⁸ In response, the English were permitted to sell tea and cigarettes:

the English workers complained about the lack of English cigarettes and tea. The exhibition organisers passed the complaints of the English workers on to the Moscow restaurant officials stating that Russian cigarettes and tea would not be to the taste of the English.⁵⁷⁹

The stress on Soviet departments and industries caused by exhibitions was pronounced. The large exhibitions constituted massive bureaucratic undertakings for the Soviet state with literally dozens of committees and hundreds of departments being involved. The Chemistry Exhibition in 1965 involved thirty-two Soviet committees and approximately eight hundred industrial enterprises.⁵⁸⁰ Thus, the impact of exhibitions included not only the hundreds of thousands who attended an exhibition, the millions of readers/listeners of various media sources, the hundreds, occasionally thousands that worked on the exhibitions, and the friends and families

576 'Op. otchet upolnomochennogo VTP na angliiskoi torgovo promyshlennoi vystavke v 1961 godu' 12.

577 'Op. otchet upolnomochennogo VTP na angliiskoi torgovo promyshlennoi vystavke v 1961 godu' 12.

578 'Op. otchet upolnomochennogo VTP na angliiskoi torgovo promyshlennoi vystavke v 1961 godu' 25.

579 'Op. otchet upolnomochennogo VTP na angliiskoi torgovo promyshlennoi vystavke v 1961 godu' 29.

580 'O mezhdunarodnoi vystavke khimii v promyshlennosti, stroitel'stve i sel'skom khoziaistve,' RGAE 635/1/641: entire dolo, 38.

of all of the above, but also workers in dozens of different governmental departments and enterprises.

Displays at the British Industrial Fair (1961) were divided into nine categories: factory and mechanical equipment; electronic technology (radars, radios, and TVs); precision instruments; electronics; chemical and pharmaceutical goods; transportation; raw materials and partially fabricated elements; and consumer goods (cloth, clothes, shoes, toys etc). 725 firms participated including:

- Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. (ICI),
- English Electric Co.,
- Rootes Group (now defunct British automobile manufacture that tried to take on the Mini with its Glasgow area produced Hillman Imp),
- Automatic Telephone Electric co.,
- Dunlop Rubber Co. Ltd,
- Frank V. Clifford Ltd,
- Associated British Landry Engineers, etc.

Many of the exhibitors were building on experience with the Soviet Union. For example in June 1960, the Imperial Chemical Industries of Great Britain organised an exhibition of plastics in Moscow which contained 'broad examples of the possibilities of plastics in our day'⁵⁸¹ that included: details on passenger cars, a motorboat, a bathroom made entirely out of plastic including tub and toilet, kitchen appliances and fixtures, (including a refrigerator); a building, shoes, clothing, rope, furniture, synthetic fur and leather, and toys. The plastics exhibit was to display items that were of interest 'even to the non-specialist'.⁵⁸² Of the components shown at the British Fair eighty percent were industrial components and twenty percent were consumer goods.⁵⁸³ This ratio of industrial to consumer goods was comparable with the ratio in Soviet national exhibitions, for example in New York in 1959. In accordance with standard practice, specialists received invitations to lectures, seminars and technical films. These lectures, films etc often comprised a significant aspect of the exhibition and the title specialist was flexible enough to permit large numbers. At the British Industrial Exhibition there were four hundred and thirty lectures and approximately two hundred technical films. Non-technical

⁵⁸¹ I. Karev, 'Na angliiskoi vystavke <<Plasticheskie massy v promyshlennosti>>,' *Vneshniaia torgovlia* no.7(1960): 16.

⁵⁸² Karev, 'Na angliiskoi vystavke' 16.

⁵⁸³ 'Op. otchet upolnomochennogo VTP na angliiskoi torgovo promyshlennoi vystavke v 1961 godu' 31.

films were shown at a separate film festival that same year. As with the American exhibition, thousands of Russian copies of an exhibition catalogue were printed for distribution, individual companies were permitted to distribute prospectuses, and souvenirs and samples were available. Another similarity with the American exhibition was the alarming rate at which pieces of the exhibition went missing.




Fig. 10 Missing Shoes (Courtesy of John Massey Stewart)

In the above photo, Soviet viewers are examining the open display of women's shoes. Note the missing of shoes on the right hand side of the display as seen in the empty gaps. In addition to the militiamen who at any time numbered twenty or more, there were ninety-six controllers. Official attendance figures put attendance at sixty to eighty thousand a day.⁵⁸⁴ (See images British Trade Fair courtesy of John Massey Stewart) The first major press conference was held on 18 April in Moscow well in advance of opening (05.06.1961). The press coverage of the fair was of a 'working nature,'⁵⁸⁵ and in comparison with the coverage of the American exhibition, was rather modest.

⁵⁸⁴ 'Op. otchet upolnomochennogo VTP na angliiskoi torgovo promyshlennoi vystavke v 1961 godu' 31.

⁵⁸⁵ 'Op. otchet upolnomochennogo VTP na angliiskoi torgovo promyshlennoi vystavke v 1961 godu' 4.



Fig. 11 Visitors on American Geodesic Dome: British Trade Fair 1961



Fig. 12 Visitors: British Trade Fair 1961

In conversation with British Council representatives, the chairman of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign countries G. A. Zhukov noted that Western nations demonstrated a pronounced inability to comprehend that the prime objective of contact was economic: “the rule we stick to is this: you offer us your ‘merchandise’, we choose and buy what we need. We offer you something in turn, and you buy what you like. If you don’t like it, you don’t have to buy it.”⁵⁸⁶ It should be ‘business like’ and not for ‘political propaganda.’⁵⁸⁷ It was Zhukov’s

⁵⁸⁶ ‘G. A Zhukov’ PRO USSR/680/1 (14/10/61).

⁵⁸⁷ ‘Record of a Meeting between Her Majesty’s Ambassador and Mr. Zhukov at the State Committee for Cultural Relations with foreign countries on 16/11/60,’ PRO USSR/1753/17/11

request that the British conduct themselves in a befitting manner, that is professionally and business-like.⁵⁸⁸

In 1965, the English organisation Sima (which represented 180 companies) opened a large exhibition (917 square metres), in the Polytechnical museum in Moscow. The Soviet press and organisers considered the exhibition prestigious due to the participation of numerous large British companies. In the report assessing the results of the exhibition, an abridged list of companies that participated is accompanied by a table of products that includes such details as equipment specifications, model numbers, price, function of machine and the contact address, and includes the following companies⁵⁸⁹:

- Associated Electrical Industries Ltd,
- AVO Ltd,
- Bell and Howell Ltd.,
- Cambridge Instrument Co. Ltd.,
- Croydon Precision Instrument Co.,
- Dow Industry Ltd.,
- Derritron Ltd.,
- Digital Measurements Ltd.,
- Electronic Instruments Ltd.,
- Electro-thermal Engineering Ltd.,
- Elga Pro. Ltd.,
- A. Gallen Kamp and Co. Ltd.,
- Griffin and George Ltd.,
- Hilger and Watts Ltd.,
- Joyce Isbel and Co. Ltd.,
- Marconi Instruments Ltd.,
- Metal Research Ltd.,
- Measuring and Scientific Equipment Ltd.,
- Muirhead and Co. Ltd.,
- Perkins-Elmer Ltd.,
- Pye-Ling Ltd. (mechanical acoustics/vibration engineering),
- W. G. Pye and Co. Ltd.(instrument makers),
- Racal Communications Ltd. (now part of the Thales Group),
- The Rank Organisation,
- SE Laboratories Ltd.,
- Solartron Electronic group Ltd.,
- H. Tinsley and Co. Ltd. (precision instruments).

⁵⁸⁸ 'Record of a Meeting between Her Majesty's Ambassador and Mr. Zhukov at the State Committee for Cultural Relations with foreign countries on 16/11/60'

⁵⁸⁹ 'Op. otchet upolnomochennogo vsesoiuznoi torgovoi palaty nespetsializirovannoi vystavke elektronnykh kontrol'no izmeritel'nykh, nauchnykh, analiticheskikh priborov britanskoi assotsiatsii 'Saima,' RGAE 635/1/635: 50-86.

This exhibition of scientific and analytical instruments was attended by twenty-five thousand people of whom fewer than half (ten thousand) were invited specialists. Nine lectures were given and drew an audience of 2,700 specialists (lecture halls were overflowing) and all major newspapers, radio and TV covered the exhibition. Soviet citizens who had organisational contact with the exhibition included: forty-two translators, one administrator, nine exponent watchers, one electrician, and one buffet person. The English provided 115 personnel. Of the 607 exponents that received 'high marks', ninety-six were purchased immediately. Half a billion roubles worth of import contracts to become effective in 1965 were signed during the course of the exhibition.⁵⁹⁰ Each firm displayed its own instruments and each firm negotiated its own contracts. The Soviet organisers saw the lack of thematic organisation and a central negotiating body as marked drawbacks.⁵⁹¹ In the 'ideological section' of the assessment of the exhibition the *Vsesoiuznaia torgovaiia palata (VTP)* reports having had difficulties in ensuring that the foreigners were sufficiently busy at spectacles and only transported by private bus.⁵⁹² However, the challenges did not deter the British from organising another fair in 1966.

In 1966, the second British Industrial Fair (08.07.1966-24.07.1966) was held in Sokol'niki. The exhibition involved 498 firms and cost the British 2,500,000 pounds. The British Prime Minister Harold Wilson represented the government and his speeches conveyed its support of the expansion of trade contacts between British and Soviet industry as well as alluding to facilitating the establishment of trade ties. While attended by the usual high-ranking officials and specialists, the Second British Industrial Trade Fair also drew significant general attendance. The habitually modest assessments of the Soviet press were that half a million Soviet citizens attended the festival.⁵⁹³ The official figures are in line with the published ones with 452,300 laymen and 75,000 specialists attending the exhibition and 31,000 specialists/students attending the coinciding sixty-two lectures, and twenty-

⁵⁹⁰ 'Op. otchet upolnomochennogo vsesoiuznoi torgovoi palaty nespetsializirovannoi vystavke elektronnykh kontrol'no izmeritel'nykh, nauchnykh, analiticheskikh priborov britanskoi assotsiatsii 'Saima' 67.

⁵⁹¹ 'Op. otchet upolnomochennogo vsesoiuznoi torgovoi palaty nespetsializirovannoi vystavke elektronnykh kontrol'no izmeritel'nykh, nauchnykh, analiticheskikh priborov britanskoi assotsiatsii 'Saima' 70.

⁵⁹² 'Op. otchet upolnomochennogo vsesoiuznoi torgovoi palaty nespetsializirovannoi vystavke elektronnykh kontrol'no izmeritel'nykh, nauchnykh, analiticheskikh priborov britanskoi assotsiatsii 'Saima': 70-71.

⁵⁹³ *Vneshniaia torgovlia* no.8, (1966): advertisement on inside back cover.

one technical films.⁵⁹⁴ In addition, 1,305 British guests attended. Advertising was adequate with 1,200 posters, seventeen advertisements in all major newspapers, TV exposure and the BBC had an open information centre.

As with other exhibitions, the official attendance figures are low due to unofficial entrance to the park. There were political motives behind accessing attendance at national exhibitions as lower than they were. The official figures have general attendance of the British Industrial Fair as being less than those for the International Poultry Farming exhibition of 1966 that reportedly drew 650,000 laymen and 32,000 specialists.⁵⁹⁵ Reporting on the exhibition, A. Ul'ina, noted that it was the 'largest exhibition of the economic potential/capacity of English firms for the Soviet Union.'⁵⁹⁶ Reportage on Great Britain increased during 1966 with journals such as *Dekorativnoe iskusstvo SSSR* featuring Britain. Articles were a combination of praise and caution, for example, an article on the London tourist design centre that produced 'great' tourist products, both modern and traditional: mugs, jugs, plates, highland cow plush key chains etc.⁵⁹⁷ The London street exhibition included the wonders of modern dustbins, bus stops and street lamps. These too got mention in the press.⁵⁹⁸

Dominated by such themes as metallurgy, electrical technology, pulp and paper etc the consumer industry was represented at the 1966 fair; of the 498 firms forty-four were textile-related and while many of these firms were selling lines, they exhibited end-products. Fabrics that were not yet available within the Soviet Union were displayed as common items; bright colours and intricate patterns were also popular. Appliances such as personal electronic and radio devices were also popular display items. More than nine hundred Soviet citizens were involved in the running of the exhibition. Two incidents were listed in the main report of *VTP*: that the controller Domanin Ivan Dmitievich while on duty was found drunk and in the company of equally inebriated foreign (predominantly Finnish) workers and that the translator Gennadi Ivanovich Smirnov was unable to work due to having taken

594 Mezhdunarodnye i inostrannye vystavki v SSSR 1946-1972 (Moskva: Torgovo-Promyshlennaia Palata SSSR, 1973).

595 Mezhdunarodnye i inostrannye vystavki v SSSR.

596 V. Ul'ina, 'Torgovyi partner...', Vneshniaia torgovlia no. 7(1966): 33-34, 33. In this article the attendance figures for specialists is given as seventy thousand.

597 Felisati Eshba, 'Londonskii dizain-tsestr,' Dekorativnoe iskusstvo SSSR no.11 (1966): 44-45.

598 'Gorodskoe oborudovanie Londona,' Dekorativnoe iskusstvo SSSR no. 8 (1966): 42-43.

ill.⁵⁹⁹ Officially, the British trade fairs were assessed as good in all areas, although the British were accused of often labelling an exhibition as international that exclusively contained British products/firms.⁶⁰⁰ Soviet specialists were reported to give 'high marks' to British machinists and instrument-making technicians.⁶⁰¹ In relation to the tool machine industry displayed at the Second British Industrial Fair, an unnamed Soviet engineer was quoted as saying that the British machine-tool industry machines demonstrated a 'comparatively high level'.⁶⁰²

Another British success was the British Exhibition of Scientific Instruments (18.03.1968 – 27.03.1968) in which eighty-one firms (295 staff members) manned displays covering 4,160 square metres. 251,768kgs of goods arrived and 118, 523 left, with purchases of just under two million roubles. Attendance was estimated to be sixty-four thousand with six hundred attendees coming in from other cities. Major themes included agriculture, medicine, and scientific research (laboratory work). *VTP* listed the exhibition as having been of interest to specialists, eighty percent of exponents being worthy of examination, the firms 'certainly displayed good and new technology in the exponents, among which were those that were listed on the so-called strategic goods list',⁶⁰³ while the Ministry of Culture dismissed the exhibition as not being of any particular interest.⁶⁰⁴ The British specialists were considered to know their material well and to be of a high level.⁶⁰⁵ The British also received praise for making the majority of their presentations in Russian. Metropol hired special waiters for the duration of the exhibition, as there were a prolific number of networking dinners. The hiring of special waiters to work both with the general public at exhibitions, for example, the combined waiters that worked the typical British pub at the English Light Industrial Fair (1961) or the special team of waiters that worked the small and largely exclusive Swiss firm Varian exhibition that was held at the Lomonosov University to serve foreigners, was common.

⁵⁹⁹ 'Op. otchet upolnomochennogo vsesoiuznoi torgovoi palaty na spetsializirovannoi vystavke elektronnykh kontrol'no-izmeritel'nykh, nauchnykh, i analiticheskikh priborov britanskoi assotsiatsii 'Saima'.

⁶⁰⁰ Na vsekh kontinentakh mira 17.

⁶⁰¹ V. Ul'ina, 'Torgovyi partner' Vneshniaia torgovlia no. 7, (1966): 33-34, 34.

⁶⁰² Ul'ina, 'Torgovyi partner' 34.

⁶⁰³ 'Na britanskoi vystavke nauchnykh priborov,' RGAE 635/1/803: 75-89, 77.

⁶⁰⁴ 'Na britanskoi vystavke nauchnykh priborov' 77.

⁶⁰⁵ 'Na britanskoi vystavke nauchnykh priborov' 81.

The image of the British as conservative, stable, hard working, logical (see the respect given to British engineers), culturally wealthy (think Shakespeare), modest and as having achieved modernity without excess, bore a marked similarity to Khrushchev's *homo sovieticus*. Britain was the land of the practical Land Rover as opposed to the chrome and fin-tails of the Americans, while still being modern enough to produce the Beatles. Perhaps in part because British exhibitions matched Soviet exhibition norms in terms of consumer goods content, the British image never contained the overpowering resonance of consumption of the Americans. In the inverse correlation between consumerism and soullessness, the British were the point where the two converged. Having given the world great literature, music, and art, England was buttressed by past culture and remained less debased. British trade fairs and exhibitions, and the participation in other thematic fairs reinforced this image. Passion, flair and style were given to the French and the Italians. As Martin Dewhurst recalled:

... I was rather offended by the fact that the favourite country, I often asked them where they would go if they could go to one Western country, it was neither Britain nor America but it was France...it was Paris that they wanted to see and die if necessary... there had been a little breath of France in Moscow in 1960...⁶⁰⁶

c. French and clothing exhibitions

In 1960 (08.08.1960), the Central Committee declared that the assortment of merchandise purchased from abroad would include clothing, textiles and associated clothing merchandise of the 'high quality and assorted diversity that was demanded by the population.'⁶⁰⁷ This allowed Soviet purchasers to solicit offers from Western countries regarding textiles, production lines, and garments. One means of acquiring information on Western textiles, clothing etc was to invite companies to exhibit their products in either national, industrial, or company specific exhibitions. 'Fashion shows, including foreign ones from East and West, were held regularly in the Soviet Union and annual meetings of fashion designers from the fraternal countries were convened.'⁶⁰⁸ In 1965, the American Firm Petrocelli Clothes Inc.

⁶⁰⁶ Interview with Martin Dewhurst, Glasgow April 2001.

⁶⁰⁷ KPSS v rezoljutsiakh i resheniakh s"ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK. Vol. 9 1956-1960 (Moskva) 563-564; Zakharova, 'Le réseau des canaux officiels de transferts des modes vestimentaires occidentals en URSS dans les années 1950-1960'.

⁶⁰⁸ Crowley and Reid Style and Socialism 2.

held a small exhibition of men's outerwear/overcoats, at which the ratio of Soviet attendees to US representatives, family and models was five to one. The outer clothes on display received praise for their workmanship, cloth and style.⁶⁰⁹ Many of the fashions exhibited at these fairs would be replicated and introduced in the larger Soviet fashion houses. Clothing and accessory exhibitions were small in comparison to other thematic exhibitions, but they were numerous and many received press coverage. The best articles of clothing and footwear displayed either at closed or open exhibitions during the 1950s and early 1960s were gathered for and displayed at the International Clothing Exhibition in the autumn of 1967. At the International Clothing Exhibition, the collusion between state and foreign was taken further than usual, as it was a Soviet organised event in which foreign fashions were displayed. Of the Western nations, France was the definitive nation in fashion.

The French National Exhibition opened on 15 August 1961 and its official purpose, as printed in the Soviet press, was that the French 'wanted to show the best achievements of our [their] country in industry, agriculture, science and technology. Along with this, we would like to show the character of France in the regions of culture, art and everyday life.'⁶¹⁰ It covered forty thousand square metres, and was proclaimed, like other national exhibitions, to be the 'biggest foreign trade fair ever'.⁶¹¹ The main themes included: school, professional life, public health, fine arts, fashion, transport and social security. For the public there were 'sweets in colourful wrappers, [with] bunnies and pretty little stars... We [the Soviet attendees] were amazed that France was able to do this'.⁶¹² Some newspaper articles mentioning the nicely wrapped French sweets also cautioned the reader against interpreting France as a children's paradise: 'but remember that 100,000 children per year fail to finish school as their parents lack the funds'.⁶¹³ The Soviet exhibition goers were reported as having been delighted by the 'beautiful dresses, make up, vehicles, and transformers'.⁶¹⁴ While the displays of fashion and make-up

⁶⁰⁹ 'Petrocelli Kloudz Eng ko.,' *RGAE* 635/1/ 635: 94.

⁶¹⁰ P. Efemov, 'Znakomstvo s Frantsiei i mysli o Frantsii,' *Novoe vremia* no.34(1961): 12-14, 12.

⁶¹¹ *Na vsekh kontinentakh mira* 21.

⁶¹² Efemov, 'Znakomstvo s Frantsiei i mysli o Frantsii' 12.

⁶¹³ Efemov, 'Znakomstvo s Frantsiei i mysli o Frantsii' 12.

⁶¹⁴ Efemov, 'Znakomstvo s Frantsiei i mysli o Frantsii' 13,14.

in the French exhibition received praise, they had been condemned in the American exhibition with comments such as: 'for whom were many of the goods on display? For the philistines! ... From the ultramodern dresses and to the painted faces.'⁶¹⁵ The modern synthetic French carpets, to which *Dekorativnoe iskusstvo* dedicated an entire article,⁶¹⁶ and the art display, were likewise well received. Perhaps the success of the art display can be attributed to the tractor theme that dominated a large section of the exhibit.⁶¹⁷ However, the French were subject to a charge similar to that levelled at the Americans for 'not giving true technical information about the instruments' on display.⁶¹⁸ Despite the charge of focusing on consumer goods, the exhibition organisers dedicated two days (17-18.08.1961) to technology during which lectures about construction, the chemical industry, electrical technology and prefabricated industry were given. Of particular interest for specialists was the discussion of France's uranium production and its role in atomic research and development. The final assessment of the journalist P. Efemov was that France had potential, but needed to be on a more socialist and peace-loving path in order to allow working families to eat meat every day and to achieve its potential as a great nation.⁶¹⁹

During the exhibition the French distributed 200,000 copies of the magazine *Elle*. The special edition of the magazine served the dual purpose of representing a typical French publication as well as serving as the fashion catalogue for the exhibition. The sale of the clothing was forbidden, nonetheless the majority of the clothing and exhibited goods remained in the USSR. Many of the clothing items, including lingerie from the lingerie boutique, were to serve as models for Soviet production. This use of French fashion for prototypes was the continuation of a process that had begun as early as 1957 when the president of USSR Chambers of Commerce Nesterov sought to have dresses of the great French fashion houses sold in G.U.M.⁶²⁰

⁶¹⁵ Smolianskij, 'Liudi, tekhnika i vremia' 26.

⁶¹⁶ V. Vygolov, 'Vozrozhdennoe iskusstvo – kovry na frantsuzkoj natsional'noi vystavke,' *Dekorativnoe iskusstvo SSSR* no.12 (1961): 39-43, 40.

⁶¹⁷ Vygolov, 'Vozrozhdennoe iskusstvo' 40.

⁶¹⁸ RGAE 635/1/ 801: 108.

⁶¹⁹ Efemov, 'Znakomstvo s Frantsiei i mysli o Frantsii' 14.

⁶²⁰ Zakharova, 'Le réseau des canaux officiels de transferts des modes vestimentaires occidentals en URSS dans les années 1950-1960' 7.

For Soviet planners the introduction of modern synthetic fibres was more important than modern fashion and the adequate provision of footwear was paramount. Chronic shortages of footwear had resulted in Soviet planners actively seeking external remedies: new production methods, new fabrics, and new styles. Thus, an ensuing number of shoe exhibitions. In 1965, the shoe company Fielding (USA) held a closed exhibition for two and a half thousand invited guests only. On 15, 18, 19, and 20 November 1968, the French Shoe Federation exhibited to an invitation only audience at *Dom modelei odezhdy*. While neither exhibition was publicly advertised nor open to the public, a contract with the federation, which represented twenty-five exhibiting firms, was signed and an initial 270 pairs and twenty-nine individual shoes were purchased from a total of 1,571 pairs of men's, women's and children's summer and winter shoes (almost twenty percent of the exhibited shoes).⁶²¹ While the purchased pairs of shoes could be used either for industrial purposes, or for personal purposes, going straight onto the feet of party elite and their families, it is fairly certain that the purchased half pairs of shoes served little purpose other than replication. Indeed, shoes and shoe production was such a notorious failing of the Soviet system during this period – there was a running anecdote about an Indian leader visiting the Soviet Union and seeing empty stores except for one with piles of shoes. Running in to get a pair of shoes he examines them and notes that in India they would not wear such shoes either. A week after the French Shoe Exhibition at *Dom modelei odezhdy*, the Austrian shoe company 'Kraus and Co.' (28-29.11.1968) exhibited. Attendance was limited, but the outcome was deemed positive as four hundred popular men's, women's and children's shoes were purchased. Of the four hundred, a reported one hundred were immediately slated for production.⁶²² The *VTP* report also notes that *Raznoeksport* had signed a contract with Kraus prior to the exhibition for the purchase of shoes for 1969, however no supporting figures are given.⁶²³ The Soviet specialists invited to the various shoe exhibitions were concerned with modern production methods, materials and given the number of different shoe models purchased, style. For the

⁶²¹ 'Osnovnye svedeniia o vystavke <Obuv'>,' *RGAE* 635/1/ 806: 1-2, 2.

⁶²² '<Krauz i Ko.> v gorode Moskve,' *RGAE* 635/1/ 806: 3-4.

⁶²³ '<Krauz i Ko.> v gorode Moskve,' 4.

Soviet shoe industry, foreign shoes serving as prototypes presented challenges in fashion as well as in production methods and materials.



Fig. 13 Shoes-69 in Volzhskii avtosroitel' (11.10.1969)

The largest thematic exhibition on footwear was Shoes-69 (24.09.1969-08.10.1969). Shoes-69 was of interest to both the layperson and the specialist due to its modern portrayal of 'new production and technological lines processing natural and synthetic leather, shoes and different handling of leather and other materials' as well as 'shoes of all types and models'.⁶²⁴ Through the display of 'new technological methods' one could learn about 'rational organisational forms of the work place'.⁶²⁵ Despite being extensively covered by the media and having an official attendance record of 700, 000 laypersons and 100,000 invited specialists with a number of foreign specialists from the GDR, FRG, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, France, and Italy, the attendance figures were perceived as low due to

⁶²⁴ M. Arabekov, 'Sokol'niki v 1969 godu,' *Vneshniaia torgovlia* no.11 (1969): 53-54, 53.
⁶²⁵ Arabekov, 'Sokol'niki v 1969 godu' 54.

competition from concurrent exhibitions including *Inpoligrafmash-69*, the Polish National Exhibition, and the Bulgarian National Exhibition.⁶²⁶ In addition to the concurrent exhibitions, the cold October weather was listed as another reason why attendance was lower than expected. Complaints were to come from *VTP* that not only was public attendance disappointing but business participation was weak, specifically firms from 'Austria, West Germany, Switzerland, Japan and the Scandinavian countries did not show sufficient interest in the exhibition.'⁶²⁷ Soviet officials determined that there was a lack of interest on the part of foreign companies and nations based on the square metres visiting companies and nations requested for a display and the comparative number of square metres that a nation had used for previous unrelated exhibitions. For example, while West Germany had used 9,514 square metres for *Avtomatizatia - 69* and 8,977 square metres for *Inpoligrafmash-69* they only reserved 2,944 square metres for *Obuv'-69* (Shoes-69). The Scandinavians and the Austrians had similarly low figures.⁶²⁸ The low figures were attributed to the fact that the dates of the exhibition were changed at the last minute from 10-24.09.1969 to 24.09.1969- 10.10.1969, in order to allow exponents that were to be shown at the Parisian exhibition 'Week of Leather' to be included in the Soviet exhibition. In the end, 998 registered firms from thirty-seven countries participated as well as two international shoe associations. The exhibition was open-air and housed with most of the space being used by capitalist and developing nations 23,689 square metre (socialist countries had 7,911 square metres) with a strong showing of non-Western nations including: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Iraq, Iran, Cuba, Pakistan, Singapore, and India. While the capitalist nations were both indoors and outdoors, the Socialist nations only exhibited indoors. Below is a list of the nine major participants.⁶²⁹

⁶²⁶ 'Obuv'-69,' RGAE 635/1/ 857: 57.

⁶²⁷ 'Obuv'-69,' RGAE 635/1/ 857: 52.

⁶²⁸ 'Obuv'-69,' RGAE 635/1/ 857: 53.

⁶²⁹ 'Obuv'-69,' RGAE 635/1/ 857: 54.

Table 3 Western Participation at Shoes-69

Country	Number of Companies	Square metres
Italy	91	5680
West Germany	35	2944
France	77	2850
Czechoslovakia	40	2200
Great Britain	33	2194
Netherlands	75	1532
Austria	38	1400
East Germany	83	1456
Hungary	27	1372

Norway, Denmark and the United States were reported as being 'weakly represented' with stands covering twenty, fifteen, and seventy-eight square metres respectively. The American stand was a particular disappointment not merely due to its size (VTP had tried and failed to convince American firms to attend either directly or through European affiliates without success), but because it was dominated by examples of finished footwear and leather goods.⁶³⁰ The official final exhibition report itemised each participant country and the relative success of its respective display. The thirty-three British firms were said to have generated 'great interest' at the exhibition and to have 'actively participated' in it.⁶³¹ The British display was of interest as it combined not only displays of shoes and boots but also automated machines for punching out forms, gluing, repair machines etc. The three strongest British firms were Lotus, John White, and International Shoe Machinery, each of which signed a contract with the Soviet Union.⁶³² The shoe association *Anchi* (Italian) representing a conglomeration of eighty-eight firms chose to dedicate sixty percent of its displays to industrial machines. In addition to the production lines on display, there was a 'large assortment of shoes, leather and leather goods.'⁶³³ The Canadian stand was deemed interesting as it had a large display of synthetic and natural leather women's, men's and children's shoes despite there only being one firm present (Satra).

⁶³⁰ 'Obuv'-69, RGAE 635/1/ 857: 69.

⁶³¹ 'Obuv'-69, RGAE 635/1/ 857: 63.

⁶³² 'Obuv'-69, RGAE 635/1/ 857: 63.

⁶³³ 'Obuv'-69, RGAE 635/1/ 857: 66.

In terms of size, the largest five foreign stands were in order of largest to fifth largest: Italy, West Germany, France, Czechoslovakia, and Britain. The graph below breaks down contracts and contract values for socialist versus capitalist countries.

Table 4 Shoes-69: Contracts

	Total	Socialist Countries	Capitalist countries
Signed contracts	165	45	120
Contracts (Roubles)	249,303,300	216,312,400	32,990,900
Export	8,648,500	6,216,800	2,431,700
Import	240,654,800	210,095,600	30,559,200
Purchased exhibition exponents	908,400	113,100	795,300

634

While the total number of contracts with capitalist countries was almost three times that with socialist countries, and is proportionate to allotted exhibition space, the total value of the imports was not quite one seventh that of socialist countries. The average socialist contract had a monetary value of approximately 4,800,000 roubles, while the average capitalist contract was only 27,000 roubles. The low monetary level of contracts with capitalist countries is in part off set by the value of goods purchased from the exhibition. The purchase of exhibition goods from the West was seven times greater than from socialist countries. When import contracts and purchased exponents are combined the socialist countries had a total sales figure of 210,208,700 roubles and the capitalist countries of 31,354,500 roubles. Neither sales nor purchase figures correspond with the statements of important and innovative participation at the exhibition. These comments focused on the capitalist nations.⁶³⁴ Both foreigners and *VTP* staff charged that the commercial centre worked poorly, opening only after the tenth exhibition day. The total purchases and signed contracts were regarded as disappointing and due not to the failure of firms to exhibit but to the exhibition having a similar content to another exhibition that had occurred the previous year.⁶³⁶

⁶³⁴ 'Obuv'-69, RGAE 635/1/ 857: 88.

⁶³⁵ 'Obuv'-69, RGAE 635/1/ 857: 55.

⁶³⁶ 'Obuv'-69, RGAE 635/1/ 857: 56.

A frequently published complaint about foreign and Soviet exhibitions was that the displayed items were not available for purchase. Exhibitions bore the charge of being impressive showcases for modern inventions and developments, which could not or would not be connected with everyday life. One of the common criticisms of the American exhibition was that the Soviet Union had similarly, 'wondrous' items in its exhibition halls. This concern was great enough to be discussed factually and fictionally in the press. 'In Exhibitions and in Stores' is a fictional conversation between several women regarding clothes fabric. One woman comments that there were such exciting new advances in synthetic clothes production, texture, patterns, colours, it was all so different from the basic coarse fabrics of old. Another agrees but asks where can one find the new fabric? Certainly not in the stores. The author of the article assures the readers that such fabric can indeed be found in the stores, 'that sort of fabric exists, but there is little of it' due to the need to conduct proper quality controls on the new synthetic material. The *Ivanovskii* textile factory exhibited twenty-five new fabrics in 1959 but was only able to efficiently produce nine. The article concludes that while in-store selection was more restricted than that seen in exhibitions, the Soviet goal was to produce enough fabric in enough variety that 'not one customer leave a store unhappy.'⁶³⁷ A *Rabotnitsa* article about the All-Union Exhibition of Clothes, Shoes, and Knitwear (1962) began with quotes of women complaining about the lack of purchasing ability: 'Great [exhibition]!.. If only you could buy'.⁶³⁸ This was followed by the rebuttal 'Do you remember the fabric exhibition? The synthetic fur was also fairytale like. And now, where can you go and not see it? It is on the children and adults.'⁶³⁹

After the closing of an exhibition the most interesting items went to a highlights pavilion that was attached to the Chambers of Commerce. This pavilion, more so than the exhibition, was representative of the Soviet future. From the pavilion goods would be selected to go to various laboratories to serve as prototypes. For example, in 1959 the pavilion released 5,595 items to be imitated

⁶³⁷ L. Kornitushin, 'Na vystavke i v magazine,' *Rabotnitsa* no.8 (1959): 9.

⁶³⁸ S. Lapteva, 'Bol'she veshchei, khoroshikh i raznykh,' *Rabotnitsa* no. 7, 1962: 9.

⁶³⁹ 'Bol'she veshchei, khoroshikh i raznykh' 9.

and the feasibility and desirability of 37,311 items to be studied.⁶⁴⁰ Direct purchases from international exhibitions remained impossible for the public; most exhibiting countries and some companies left all display models behind due to the Soviet policy of charging two widely divergent fees for shipping. The willingness of companies despite the high rate of left products is indicative of several mentalities. In some instances, the participating companies in the American exhibition being good examples, the companies participated more out of patriotism than for prospective financial gains. The ideas of peaceful co-existence, of understanding between citizens regardless of government, race, religion, etc were becoming popular. Another motivation was the possibility of a large contract. Soviet contracts had the potential to be considerable. Other companies were willing to abandon goods as they already had large contracts, one of the best examples of this was Fiat, which participated in numerous exhibitions after having received the VAZ contract. Countries, like France and the USA, unsuccessfully attempted to have consumer durables and goods auctioned off. While open auctions never occurred, many consumer goods filtered into the Soviet society.

The Soviet press heralded film as the cultural medium for the masses and the 'sensation of the 20th Century'⁶⁴¹ and hailed their presence in exhibitions and film festivals as meeting points of cultures and modernity. Film festivals had a cultural impact on several levels. First there were those who saw the films. Seemingly benign backdrops or setting displayed a sense of style, modernity and prosperity: the audience could watch as 'a man leaves his house, a train passes and a car tears along'.⁶⁴² Associated with the visit of French President Charles de Gaulle and various cultural activities was the release of the film *L'Amérique vue par un français* (François Reichenbach) portraying a balanced view of the American way of life. The film, which was widely distributed in the Eastern Bloc countries and the Soviet Union, caused a stir as many of its scenes of poverty and of incarceration contained images of conditions superior to average Soviet ones.

The first extended footage of ordinary Americans in [everyday] situations... was utterly revelatory, especially a scene showing prisoners staging a rodeo for their own entertainment, visual evidence that American convicts enjoyed

⁶⁴⁰ Zakharova, 'Le réseau des canaux officiels de transferts des modes vestimentaires occidentaux en URSS dans les années 1950-1960' 7.

⁶⁴¹ E. Tarasova, 'Glubina ekrana,' *Rabotnitsa* no. 8 (1963): 28-29, 28.

⁶⁴² Tarasova, 'Glubina ekrana' 28.

clothing and furniture of manifestly better quality than what was available in the USSR. The film inventoried material culture fads such as hula-hoops, and devoted much attention to teenagers in general.⁶⁴³

The second impact of the festivals was in those cities where the VIPs visited. Typically the foreign dignitaries were on controlled parade and many from the local population were able to catch glimpses of the visitors. The third and most widespread was the coverage in the mass media. Fashion was a glamorous and well-publicised aspect of international and national film festivals. Foreign directors and stars were present at the international and national film festivals, Federico Fellini, Sophia Loren, Simone Signoret, Marina Vladi, and Steve McQueen all attended festivals in Moscow. Press coverage in typically began with a brief statement noting the significant Western presence, then moved on to a discussion of socialist achievements or of those of a developing nation, perhaps mention of Soviet achievements, and then a detailed discussion of Western products and people.

Conclusion

The interest in Western exhibitions was to remain strong throughout the 1960s. John Preston, then European Manager of CalComp recalled an *Interorgtekhnik* exhibition in Leningrad for which more than a million citizens queued and the army was called in to maintain order, as the sheer pressure from the crowds was damaging the structure of the stands (the Mannesmann stand was destroyed).⁶⁴⁴ The West in general, and the United States in particular, represented a fixed point in the Soviet future. This future was exhibited with the objectives of: amassing information, building international political and economic contacts, and motivating Soviet citizens. Khrushchev's controlled consumerism was a significant aspect of the social contract between the state and the population. The idealism of the revolution had faded and the brutality of Stalinism was set aside, and consumerism filled this void. The imagery of the objective did not need to be created, as it existed within the West.⁶⁴⁵

[w]e may not like the toys depicting little monsters... but we understand very well the merits of a machine capable of answering four thousand

⁶⁴³ Mark Allen Svede, 'All You Need is Lovebeads: Latvia's Hippies Undress for Success' [Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-War Eastern Europe 194-195](#).

⁶⁴⁴ In an email 'Hello' from John W. Preston johnwpreston@dial.pipex.com 29.09.05.

⁶⁴⁵ Pisarzhevskii, *Vstrecha v Soko'nikakh* 51.

questions, or the quality of plastic dishes... But we also understand very well that to attain all this, one doesn't necessarily have to live under the capitalist system! We are confident that in the very near future all these blessings of material culture will have a greater mass distribution here than in America.⁶⁴⁶

Khrushchev said that: '[t]he socialist economy is developing towards increasingly greater satisfaction of the material and of the members of society, towards continuous expansion and improvement of production on the basis of better technology.⁶⁴⁷ This greater material satisfaction was intrinsically linked to the economic image of the enemy, which flooded and seeped into Soviet consciousness. The image was the result of the technical quality of a film at an international film festival, the durability of a lipstick sample, comments from Khrushchev that the pavement at French airports were better than that in the USSR, press releases declaring that the Soviet Union needed to work with Fiat if it wanted to mass produce reliable, affordable automobiles etc. Having chosen the West as a benchmark, any failure on the part of the Soviet leadership to provide an accepted standard of living could result in Soviet society accepting the ideas of modernisation and consumption as integral to the Soviet future without maintaining the faith that these could be achieved in the Soviet context.

⁶⁴⁶ N. Sergeeva, 'The American Exhibition,' *Soviet Culture* (30.07.1959).

⁶⁴⁷ Nikita S. Khrushchev, 'Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Twentieth Party Congress,' *Pravda* (15.02.1956): 1.

4: Image Conduits: Soviet Elites and Western Technology

We must study the capitalist economy attentively and not take a simplified view of Lenin's thesis of the decay of imperialism, but study all the best that the capitalist countries' science and technology have to offer in order to use the achievements of world technological progress in the interests of socialism. (Directives of the Sixth Five-Year Plan)⁶⁴⁸

The 'Soviet world has been seduced by the myth of technique, the sense of the cosmic [sputniks] and by great public works' (Abraham Guillen)⁶⁴⁹

One of the primary goals of international trade for the Soviet Union in all levels of socialist construction is the assistance to the maintenance of the high rates of the development of the Soviet economy. (D. Fokin, 1965)⁶⁵⁰

Introduction

The Thaw is marked by political, social and economic changes. The economic changes represent a nation's attempt to modernise and to negotiate a new social contract. The Party objective can be defined as having sought 'to bind the Soviet people to the regime by creating a society of plenty.'⁶⁵¹ The lurching attempts to graft modern consumer orientated economic policies onto an industrial, scarcity driven economy was fraught with problems. Foreign technology and expertise were often imported as short-term solutions, the proverbial plaster as it were, for inability to meet political promises and requirements. New technology either domestic or foreign was adopted in the hope of correcting economic problems that owed their origins to institutional issues. As Joseph Berliner wrote 'there is some disposition among the governors of the Soviet economy to regard borrowed technology as the *deus ex machina*. It offers a way of attaining the high rate of technical advance greatly sought, without having to tamper once again with the

⁶⁴⁸ 'The Directives on the Sixth Five Year Plan: 15.01,' Leo Gruliov ed. Current Soviet Policies II: The Documentary Record of the 20th Communist Party Congress and its Aftermath from the Translations of the Current Digest of the Soviet Press (New York: Praeger, 1957) 31.

⁶⁴⁹ Abraham Guillen, 'The Struggle Between Capitalism and Socialism,' Abraham Guillen ed., Philosophy of the Urban Guerilla: the Revolutionary Writings of Abraham Guillen (New York: Marrow, 1973) 164.

⁶⁵⁰ D. Fokin, 'SSSR v 1964 godu,' Vneshniaia torgovlia no.11 (1965): 7-19, 13.

⁶⁵¹ George Sokoloff, The Economy of Détente: the Soviet Union and Western Capital (Leamington Spa: Berg, 1987) 181.

fundamental economic structure.'⁶⁵² This faith in borrowed technology was indicative of an elite with both access to information about the West and a willingness to accept the West as positive. Importation as a solution to economic/industrial backwardness was a losing proposition as it failed to address social and organisational malfunctioning. Initially, the viability of importation was sustained by Post War opportunities and later through high oil and gas prices in the 1970s and shortages of natural resources in Western Europe, which allowed Soviet leadership to buy time, but left the fundamental malfunctioning unresolved. Paul Cocks has argued that:

The absence of an internal dynamic and adaptive capacity has resulted in the general pattern throughout Russian history of change largely by fits and starts. Intermittently, the state is forced to administer the shocks of adjustment in the form of modernising 'revolutions from above'. Typically, change is accomplished by heavy doses of technological borrowing from abroad and administrative coercion from within.⁶⁵³

The purposes to which foreign technology was put resulted in foreign technology being 'an instrument of policy and tool of economic progress.'⁶⁵⁴

Bezborodov has written that science and technology had multiple functions within Soviet society: as the locomotive in the technological race with developed countries of the West in the context of the Cold war; as the basis of the war technology revolution that permitted the USSR to maintain international superpower status; and as a means of transforming defence development into the civil sector of the economy.⁶⁵⁵ In 1967, the economist S. Heinman wrote that the Soviet policy in the field of technological progress provided a means of communication between the economic policy of the state and the core means of developing the sciences through technology and the production of goods.⁶⁵⁶ In general, the impact of trade with and sanctions against the Soviet Union was moderate in nature. Taken independently, each year of imports was not significant enough to destabilize the Soviet Union. However, with each successive year of imports, not only the economic burden but

⁶⁵² Joseph S. Berliner, The Innovation Decision in Soviet Industry (Cambridge: MIT Press 1976) 518.

⁶⁵³ Paul Cocks, 'Organizing For Technological Innovation,' in Guroff, Entrepreneurship in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union 306-346, 345.

⁶⁵⁴ Cocks, 'Organizing For Technological Innovation' 307.

⁶⁵⁵ A. B. Bezborodov, Vlast' i nauchno-tekhnicheskaja politika v SSSR serediny 50kh-serediny 70kh godov (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo ob"edinenija Mosgorarkhiv, 1997) 3.

⁶⁵⁶ Bezborodov, Vlast' i nauchno-tekhnicheskaja politika v SSSR 14.

also the cultural and social impacts increased. By the early 1980s, the myth of the Soviet capacity for superior technology and standard of living had been thoroughly rejected.

Faith in science and in the capacity of the USSR in scientific fields would not have been without grounds during the 1950s and early 1960s: in the post-war era USSR scientists took Nobel prizes in 1958, 1962 and 1964, won numerous other prestigious scientific awards and secured respect for Soviet academic achievements. The scientific and industrial community derived its legitimisation from a source other than the Party: the rationality of science. They were 'our scientific coryphaeus [leading light].'⁶⁵⁷ Between 1950 and 1965 scientific organisations were to increase five fold and between 1955 and 1960 the absolute growth in individuals studying or in the service of scientific institutions increased 256.7 percent.⁶⁵⁸ At the beginning of 1961, excluding military and defence, 3,660 scientific institutes employed 583,000 workers. Another 517,000 workers were employed in affiliated offices and design centres. The state ministries of aviation technology, radio electronic technology, shipbuilding and defence employed over 700,000 highly qualified specialists and workers in 1960.⁶⁵⁹ The growing group of specialists had a significant weight in Soviet society. They were also a group with marked exposure to positive aspects of Western science, technology and economics. For example, a wide range of journals notably in the fields of science, construction, and engineering were available. Foreign literature came under two categories: express and normal. Express literature received priority translation and dissemination within fifteen days. Some industries had greater percentages of express information: for example the chemistry industry, aviation, rockets (military), and atomic energy were favoured. Discussing the need of specialists in the chemistry industry for Western information, Deputy Director of the Institute of Computer Technology Dimitrii Panov went so far as to declare it 'impossible' to effectively develop the chemistry industry without contact with foreign countries and the research they were producing.⁶⁶⁰

⁶⁵⁷ Bezborodov, *Vlast' i nauchno-tekhnicheskaja politika v SSSR* 34.

⁶⁵⁸ Bezborodov, *Vlast' i nauchno-tekhnicheskaja politika v SSSR* 17.

⁶⁵⁹ Bezborodov, *Vlast' i nauchno-tekhnicheskaja politika v SSSR* 105.

⁶⁶⁰ 'Stenogramma zasedaniia Gostekhnika SSSR ot 19.01.1956,' *RGAE* 9480/2/14: 31-72, 44.

In Robert English's work *Russia and the Idea of the West*, an elite-identity framework methodology is used to provide a thorough assessment of intellectual contact with the West through publications, travel and Eastern European influences.⁶⁶¹ Technocratism dictated that an elite of professionals should rule in accordance with scientific principles and liberal socialism spoke for economic reforms: decrease Party control over economic affairs, increase consumer fields, increase real prices, increase the autonomy of factories, increase material incentives and increase the permission for risk taking in technological innovations.⁶⁶² What was needed was a vanguard overlapping the Party and the academic community. Merle Fainsod has argued that the incentive system rewarded those individuals who were part of or in direct contact with the Party officials or state administration, intellectuals who complied, and managers, engineers and shock workers who were particularly successful.⁶⁶³ The changing conditions and new demands associated with this new stage of industrial revolution placed unprecedented importance on scientific and technical progress. It was during the 1960s that science and technology were officially adopted as forces of production. Scientific and technical progress were key forces driving modern society and a major arena of competition between two opposing social systems.⁶⁶⁴ The significance of the policy is highlighted by contrast with the policy of the 1970s. During the 1970s, the Party objective was altered from tangible consumerism to more abstract ideas in an attempt to reduce the pressure to produce material goods and still retain a significant amount of tacit support from the scientific and technological elite.

The Soviet elite was the vanguard of the proletariat. Indications of the existence of the mythical other, a positive image of the West, within this vanguard would be evidence that the idea of an alternative to communism existed in the very group responsible for leading Soviet society. The then widely accepted belief that science and technology was inherently objective meant that they could be adopted with few charges of ideological deviation. This chapter is broken down into two main sections: 'Science, Technology and the State' and 'Gathering, Purchasing and

⁶⁶¹ Robert English, *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

⁶⁶² Shlapentokh, *Soviet Intellectuals and Political Power* 161.

⁶⁶³ Fainsod, 'The Komsomol: Youth Under Dictatorship' 37.

⁶⁶⁴ Cocks, 'Organizing for Technological Innovation in the 1980s' 307-308.

Assimilating Science and Technology'. The first half discusses the scientific technological revolution, various government organisations and Party officials in reference to their contact with, and perceptions of, the West. Together these subsections provide the background milieu for the second half of the chapter that deals with scientific and technological penetration, how Western technology and science was sought out, acquired and implemented. By adopting and implementing Western science and technology there was a tacit acceptance of Western leadership in fields that were so coveted in the Soviet Union.

Science, Technology and the State

The objective of industrialisation and modernisation is apparent throughout the Soviet period.⁶⁶⁵ It was fundamental to the economic policy of the state. Lenin wrote that: [t]he sole economic basis of socialism is large-scale machine industry. He who forgets this is not a communist.'⁶⁶⁶ He also stated that '[n]o dark force will withstand the alliance of science, the proletariat, and technology.'⁶⁶⁷ For Soviet Russia, bourgeois technology was a lesser evil than industrial backwardness and international weakness. Historically, the preference within the USSR was for disembodied technology. The underlying assumption was that technology was primarily 'an assemblage of pieces of information, which can be extracted or expelled from one sector of organised creativity and transposed to another to produce different outputs... The whole process is reduced to clerical reporting.'⁶⁶⁸ However, modern economies were increasingly dependent on human capital for their vitality, and the only effective way to import human capital was through human contact and cultural change.⁶⁶⁹ The importation of Western technology and science in the post-War period could not have occurred without human contact. In addition, Soviet political and scientific elites sought to expand this contact. Starting in the mid 1950s, not only 'Soviet-technology, but all Soviet culture renewed its ties

⁶⁶⁵ Coined by Franklin Mendels in 1972, the term Proto-Industrialisation explains the transition from traditional, autarkic, subsistence agricultural communities into modern, large, market orientated, industrial and capitalistic societies.

⁶⁶⁶ Vladimir Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii vol. 44 5th ed., (Moskva: Politizdat, 1964) 50.

⁶⁶⁷ Vladimir Lenin, Collected Works vol 30 4th ed., (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1960) 376.

⁶⁶⁸ Cocks 'Organizing For Technological Innovation' 312.

⁶⁶⁹ Dana Allin, Cold War Illusions: America, Europe and Soviet Power 1969-1989 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994) 159.

with countries East and West.⁶⁷⁰ Despite a preference for minimal non-elite contact, there were a number of turnkey projects, beginning in 1958, for the production of synthetic fibre, plastics, synthetic rubber and fertiliser. The West was the major provider of turnkey factories, which required a great deal of contact between foreign and Soviet citizens. An example of a turnkey factory was the factory in Mogilev where the Polyspinners Consortium built a synthetic fibre complex based on a contract signed in 1964. Fifty-two Soviet engineers spent three months in the UK with Constructors John Brown; twenty Soviet machinery inspectors went to the UK staying for up to two years. One hundred and ten specialists were trained in the UK; two hundred British technical staff spent several months each over a two year period in Moscow working on engineering; and hundreds of British construction technicians and supervisors together with their families spent up to four years on the construction site in Mogilev.⁶⁷¹ Two of the largest contracts in the chemical sector during the 1960s included: twenty million pounds for a high pressure polyethylene plant with Simon-Carves in 1963, and thirty-one million pounds with Polyspinners consortium in 1964 for the polyester fabric plant at Mogilev, (seven thousand Soviet workers producing seventy products). The polyester plant is but one example of numerous turnkey projects. In the next chapter another turnkey factory, AVTOVAZ, will be examined in detail.

The absorption and application of technology is a profoundly personal experience, affecting literally the food on one's table and the clothes on one's back. Post-Stalinist society upheld the idea of the necessity of technological and scientific progress and the international nature of this progress. This is expressed both in the attention given to science and technology by laypersons and in the preferential treatment of specialists by the regime. In incorporating Western technology scientists, who were amongst the most highly regarded citizens, often had extremely high levels of contact with Westerners and Western knowledge. One result of this was that when scientists, supposedly rational and objective by nature of their study, compared the Soviet Union unfavourably to the West, citizens listened. The Party goal was for the Soviet Union to acquire the brawn of industrialisation and

⁶⁷⁰ Boffa, Inside the Khrushchev Era 31.

⁶⁷¹ Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy 86.

modernisation without the brains that create a polycentric society. This research suggests that they failed.

a. Scientific Technological Revolution (STR)

Soviet Academician Piotr Nikolaeovich Fedoseev, full CPSU Central Committee member (since 1961) and Vice President of the Academy of Sciences defined the scientific technological revolution (STR) as: 'basically the radical, qualitative reorganisation of the productive forces as a result of the transformation of science into a key factor in the development of social production. The STR at the same time influences all aspects of life in present day society, including industrial management, education, everyday life, culture, the psychology of people, the relationship between nature and society.'⁶⁷² The theory of the STR has been described as a conservative doctrine that attempts to rationalise and to legitimise the 'wholesale incorporation' of capitalist technology, *technica*, and infrastructure, into the 'transfer culture of communism.'⁶⁷³ Mervyn Matthews has described the STR as being a euphemism for the computer age and the post-industrial process.⁶⁷⁴ Khrushchev used the term STR in the 1960s to legitimise the formation of the SCST (State Committee for Science and Technology) and in conjunction with the goals of the CPSU's third programme. The final document of the 1969 conference of Communist and Workers Parties contains the passage: the 'scientific and technical revolution has become one of the main sectors of the historic competition between capitalism and socialism.'⁶⁷⁵ Integrated into the idea of the STR was recognition of the gap between Western and Soviet technology. A letter of appeal from dissident but concerned Soviet scientists to Party and government leaders March 1970 acknowledged the new age: 'We are simply living in a different era. The second industrial revolution came along and now, at the onset of the seventies, we see that far from having overtaken America, we are dropping further and further behind.'⁶⁷⁶

⁶⁷² Matthews, Soviet Government 217.

⁶⁷³ Frederick Fleron, 'Afterward', Technology and Communist Culture, 484.

⁶⁷⁴ Matthews, Soviet Government 15.

⁶⁷⁵ Mezhdunarodnoe soveshchanie kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii: dokumenty i materialy (Moskva: Politizdat, 1969) 303.

⁶⁷⁶ Dissidents were Andrei Sakharov, Roy Medvedev, and V. F. Turchin 'Letter of Appeal of Soviet Scientists to Party and Government Leaders of the USSR,' March 19, 1970 reprinted in Survey, no. 76 (Summer 1970): 161-170; Cocks, 'Organizing For Technological Innovation' 308.

Developments in 'the productive forces touched off by science and its discoveries' were to 'become increasingly significant and profound.'⁶⁷⁷ The task ahead was 'to organically fuse the achievements of the scientific technical revolution (thus associating the STR with the West) with the advantages of the socialist economic system.'⁶⁷⁸ The new official policy was to be one of selective interdependence. 'If the gap in industrial development is to be narrowed, East-West intercourse must extend well beyond the mere exchange of physical goods. The domain of ideas, in both technology and management, must be given primary attention.'⁶⁷⁹ The idea of the international nature of the STR took root during the late 1950s and 1960s as it extended deeply into the organisation of Soviet production and institutes (for example, the Institute of World Economics and International Relations and the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada were to devote a large percentage of their research to management studies).

Beginning during Khrushchev's regime and extending to Brezhnev's Western technology was to be incorporated increasingly via a capitalist friendly framework. This involved the use of Western consultants in areas of design and construction; allowed for training by Westerners and in the West of both workers and managers; and involved Western onsite management. Western contribution was to be tolerated on the ground level and encouraged on the governmental level. Jeffrey Brooks has argued that despite high levels of investment in imported technology and industry, technological and economic stagnation and backwardness was inevitable due to the cultural constraints placed on Soviet leaders and their confederates. If this view was shared by Soviet society, either before or after coming into direct contact with Western industry, it would have severely undermined the legitimacy of the Party's rule.⁶⁸⁰

⁶⁷⁷ Materialy XXIV s'ezda KPSS (Moscow: Politizdat, 1971) 57.

⁶⁷⁸ Materialy XXIV s'ezda KPSS 57.

⁶⁷⁹ Samuel Pisar, Coexistence and Commerce: Guidelines for Transactions between East and West (Allen Lane: Penguin Press, 1970) 34.

⁶⁸⁰ Jeffrey Brooks, Thank You, Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture From Revolution to Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) 245.

b. Government Organisations and Party Officials

During the 1950s and 1960s, there was a wide spread idea that continual Soviet achievements in the creation of advanced machinery and equipment legitimated a high international standing. From this strong point, involvement with Western technology was put forward as enhancing technological and scientific development and international status. Thus, technological co-operation should not be rejected out of hand. In 'On improving management of industry, perfecting, planning and enhancing economic incentives in industrial production,' Alexei Kosygin declared that it was often more profitable to purchase a licence than to devote time and energy in developing an indigenous solution.⁶⁸¹ In the Directives of the 23rd Party Congress, the government was charged with 'improving the import structure of foreign trade [by ensuring the purchase of] such types of raw materials, commodities and finished goods as involve higher current costs and capital investments when produced within the country.'⁶⁸² Another ground was that it was 'essential that we make use of everything that science and technology give us in our country more rapidly and exhaustively and take more boldly all the best that foreign experience can give.'⁶⁸³ At the 23rd Party Congress Kosygin was to announce that 'it is becoming more and more evident that the scientific and technical revolution under way in the modern world calls for freer international contacts and creates conditions for broad economic exchanges between socialist and capitalist countries.'⁶⁸⁴ Through necessity-validation declarations for contact with the West, at least within the STR context, the Party created a realm within which the discussion with and about the West was permissible and formed a linkage between economics and politics. The linkage can be seen in the careers of the Central Committee members of whom, for the period of 1956-1959, twenty percent had industrial backgrounds.⁶⁸⁵

Numerous bodies were involved with Western science and technology. Under Khrushchev it was difficult to find an organisation that did not have a

⁶⁸¹ Alexei Kosygin 'On improving management of industry, perfecting, planning and enhancing economic incentives in industrial production' New Methods of Economic Management in the USSR (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1965) 19.

⁶⁸² XXII S^{ezd} KPSS, stenograficheskiĭ otchet (Moscow, 1961) vol.1, 63.

⁶⁸³ XXII S^{ezd} KPSS, stenograficheskiĭ otchet 63.

⁶⁸⁴ A. Kosygin, Direktivy XXIII s^{ezda} KPSS po piatiletnemu planu razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR na 1966-1970 goda (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1966).

⁶⁸⁵ Granick, The Red Executive 275.

friendship society or an international affairs department. The abundance and size of organisations that were ostensibly active with Westerners, is indicative of a high level of willingness to engage in international contact and a relatively high rate of potential exposure to images of the West. Below is a list of some of the major organisations that dealt with foreign trade, science and technology.

Council of Ministers – head of the Soviet government organisation and the formal repository of State authority. It was the theoretical locus of administrative responsibility for trade. The Council of Ministers was the highest executive – administrative organ to ensure that the policy aspirations of the Communist Party leaders were realised - notably in economic affairs. However, this body often did more rubber-stamping than decision-making. In 1962, six of the USSR Council of Ministers seventy-one ministers were Gosplan representatives. Kosygin, for example, was Minister of Light Industry in 1959, and in 1960 chairman of Gosplan, and Chairman of the Council of Ministries and Presidium.

USSR Academy of Sciences - made up of approximately six hundred members (1960s) who supervised scientific research work. Its jurisdiction included approximately two hundred scientific establishments employing roughly 300,000 people. Its Administration of Foreign Affairs monitored scientific development and participated in scientific exchanges. Research results and requests had to be submitted to the SCST.

Gosplan – state-planning commission. Gosplan was the chief agency of the central government for conducting general economic planning, including import planning. It was responsible for drawing up plans for the consideration of the government. This constituted submitting reports directly to the Politburo. A primary function was reconciling ministerial requests. It contained two types of departments, the summary (*svodnyi*) departments for overall balance and branch departments, as well as four research institutes for information and policy debate. Gosplan's Department of Foreign Trade had the prime responsibility of integrating foreign trade into the national economic plan. It was also responsible for Research and Development through the Department for the Comprehensive Planning of the Introduction of New Technology into the National Economy. Charged with enforcing national cooperation, this Moscow centred organisation transferred some power to the republics/regions in 1957 (*sovmarkhozy*).

Gostekhnika/State Committee on Science and Technology GKNT/ SCST – its primary responsibility was the coordination of Research and Development. It served as the chief advisory body to the central government on the issue of national technological policy, which included developing strategies to acquire Western technology and to integrate it with the R&D done by domestic industries. The SCST participated in the acquisition of and negotiations for sophisticated technology, often providing technical expertise. It represented the final decision on utility. It was the first initial entry point for foreign catalogues, brochures etc. and no licence was to be purchased without its approval. In exceptional cases it could be bypassed for the Council of Ministers. ‘SCST’s pre-eminence in the realm of technology transfer is illustrated by the fact that it may issue obligatory orders within its sphere of operation to all ministries, including the MFT (Ministry of Foreign Trade)’.⁶⁸⁶ The SCST was responsible for passing along pertinent foreign assessments of Soviet industry and technology.

As the body responsible for research and development coordination, the committee was often represented during contract negotiations. The reports, letters, and steno-graphed meetings of this committee provide an insight into the professional mentality of an elite group of individuals who were responsible in part for insuring that the Soviet economy was in line with Western norms. In the reports, Western production figures and economising techniques are used to justify investments, to spur action, to chastise the current techniques/outputs and to benchmark future objectives. That such a high ranking body refrained from forwarding its economic objectives without comparative Western information is indicative of the penetration of the idea that the basis of that comparison was international as opposed to temporal. Rarely did reports focus on progress, or lack there of, that had been made in an industry and then propose an entirely Soviet solution. Discussion of the necessity of an item typically began with a comparison between Soviet and Western (usually American) industry and the application of the item/method in the West. The prolific translations and summations of assessments by various Western economists of the Soviet economy and its potential are

⁶⁸⁶ George Holliday, Technology Transfer to the USSR, 1928-1937 and 1966-1975: the Role of Western Technology in Soviet Economic Development (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979) 100.

indicative of the value placed on Western assessments. For example, in the report from Gostekhnika chair V. Kirillin to A. N. Kosygin on the publication of the four-part American Congressional Committee on Foreign Economics and Political Developments, American and Soviet economies were compared with a focus on the effectiveness of Soviet economic reforms. In the Soviet assessment (Kosygin) was to read that some of 'the conclusions in the report are worthy of note especially those concerning the poor use made of products, the ineffective nature of the systems of technical supply, the backlogs of the rate of growth in worker's pay and the general rates of development in agriculture and transport, as well as the general tempo of technological progress.'⁶⁸⁷ The critical nature of reporting was not atypical and seems to call into question the ability of Soviet leaders and planners to 'place a screen between themselves and reality, which also acts as a mirror which transmits back to the planners an image of their own wishes.'⁶⁸⁸ This is not to argue that the elite world of planners did not insulate themselves from the full onslaught of Soviet reality.

Ministries – 43,788 industrial organisations served as the intermediate level between the enterprises of production associations and the central and republic governments. Ministries were organised by branch and by product and each ministry had its own Department of Foreign Affairs. Particularly active in foreign affairs were the chemicals, machine tools, automotives, and petroleum ministries. The Ministry of Foreign Trade consisted of dozens of import-export associations organised around various products and administered Soviet trade. Technically no trade could occur without its authorisation. Associations acted as intermediaries between ministries and foreign firms and in rare circumstances were empowered to sign contracts. R&D institutes under individual ministries specialised in applied research and were known for their expertise in accomplishing reverse engineering. There were over two thousand organisations in the USSR subordinated to various ministries that specialised in applied research.⁶⁸⁹

All of these organisations, in addition to others such as the State Bank that are not discussed here, contributed to the importation and dissemination of

⁶⁸⁷ 'No. 9-p 13/1-67g,' RGAE 9480/9 Ed. Kh314: 18.

⁶⁸⁸ Nove, Political Economy and Soviet Socialism 120.

⁶⁸⁹ Technology and East West Trade: Office of Technology Assessment Congress of the United States (Allanheld: Gower, 1979) 215.

information about the West, even if that information was specialised and localised. The USSR was simply too bureaucratic for the bureaucratic privilege of contact with things Western to not have had a significant impact. Also, the breadth and depth of the delving into information about the West often provided information that served as the factual basis for the decision making process of Soviet policies. 'The sessions of the Soviets show no fundamental criticism of policies. The amendments which are put forward and accepted have been agreed to beforehand by the government, and represent the end of a political process,'⁶⁹⁰ a process that involved considerable contact by large numbers of influential people with Western ideas.

One forum where the issues of Western and Soviet technology were addressed was in the publication of *Vneshniaia torgovlia*. An expensive publication by Soviet standards, its target audience was members of the various branches of government, foreign companies and governments and Soviet specialists interested in trade. Foreign words regularly used in *Vneshiaia torgovlia* include: *vizit, bank, kredit, vits president, boikot, firm, demping, biznesmen, mister, balans, prognozy, and marketing*.⁶⁹¹ Although there are no concrete indications that 'average' citizens read the journal, access to the publication was not restricted and the format of graphs (see image of graph illustrating increased in consumer goods below) seems indicative of a wide readership. Khrushchev's speeches; and coverage of exhibitions, trade agreements, statistics and industrial development are be used to help construct an understanding of the nature of industrial information about the West, and how this related to the average Soviet citizen.

⁶⁹⁰ Lane, *Politics and Society in the USSR* 164.

⁶⁹¹ See for example *Vneshniaia torgovlia* no.4 (1963): 46, or *Vneshniaia torgovlia* no.12 (1966): 21-22; or *Vneshniaia torgovlia* no.12(1966): 37.




Chart 2 Imports of Consumer Goods: *Vneshniaia torgovlia* no.11 (1965) 15

Lamentation about the current trade status with the USA was frequent in *Vneshniaia torgovlia*. For example, trade with the USA was listed as eight times lower than that with France.⁶⁹² This 'illogical situation', that the US and the USSR were equals in the international political, cultural and military arenas but failed to trade as equals, is indicative of the frustration of the then optimistic superpower. Trade, like the state of industrialisation and modernisation, was subject to the idea of catching up: 'now, in our time not only Soviet specialists can learn something in the USA, but American specialists can learn from Soviet engineers.'⁶⁹³ Some Americans, like Nelson Rockefeller, were reproached with being obstructive in their obsession with the Lend Lease Deal and deliberately obtuse about potential, thus overlooking present and future trade possibilities.

Assessing the Gross Domestic Product of Western Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union, Khrushchev acknowledged that although Soviet GDP had risen throughout the 1960s, it still lagged behind. This lag was due, not to the war, but to monopolies and boycotts conducted by the West from the 1920s on. Despite

⁶⁹² V. Naborov, 'Normalizatsiia sovetsko-amerikanskikh torgovykh otnoshenii otvechaet interesam obeikh stran,' *Vneshniaia torgovlia* no.12 (1959): 6-11, 7.

⁶⁹³ Naborov, 'Normalizatsiia sovetsko-amerikanskikh torgovykh otnoshenii' 10.

these challenges, the Soviet Union was currently importing those goods, materials and machines that would 'effectively' 'contribute to the technical progress' of the nation.⁶⁹⁴

Many aspects of the character of the Soviet economy are changed by the structure of our imports. The Soviet Union brings in such necessary goods for the people's economy like machines and production lines for the increased development of progressive industries, transport, rubber, ... wool, synthetic fibre etc.⁶⁹⁵

The media attention given to trade with the West belies the fact that three fourths of all trade was with socialist countries.⁶⁹⁶ Although direct statements indicate otherwise, the figures given, as well as statements about the nature of trade with capitalist nations indicate that many of the important aspects of trade involved the West.

The media often covered meetings between high-ranking Soviet officials and Western business contacts. Coverage tended to reinforce or refute stereotypes, expound on the visitors' satisfaction with various cultural and industrial activities, and speak of potential deals. For example, the 1963 visit of 170 British businessmen, bankers, commerce, industrial leaders and journalists, under the auspice of the British-Canadian company Thomson Newspapers Ltd. received simultaneous coverage. A *Vneshniaia torgovlia* article, which was written two days into the visit began: 'Saturday. Seven o'clock in the morning. The British guests are already up... And no word of relaxing at the end of the week, as it is written of English traditions. Work – before all else'.⁶⁹⁷ Having met with various ministries and Khrushchev, primarily about the automobile industry (V. Stewart, a director from Rolls Royce was in attendance), guests were invited to view Chaikas, Volgas, and Moskvich cars before touring Moscow in them. The visit was deemed successful as several of the businessmen stated that they would be returning shortly

694 N. Patolichev, 'Stroitel'stvo material'no-tekhnicheskoi bazy kommunizma v SSSR i vneshniaia torgovlia,' *Vneshniaia torgovlia* no.11 (1967): 3-14, 10.

695 Patolichev, 'Stroitel'stvo material'no-tekhnicheskoi bazy kommunizma v SSSR i vneshniaia torgovlia' 11.

696 Patolichev, 'Stroitel'stvo material'no-tekhnicheskoi bazy kommunizma v SSSR i vneshniaia torgovlia' 11.

697 D. Trofimov, 'Angliiskie biznesmeny v Moskve,' *Vneshniaia torgovlia* no.4 (1963): 32-33,32.

on business.⁶⁹⁸ In 1967, Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade Nikolai Patolichev published the 'Building of the material-technical basis of communism in the USSR and international trade' in which he discussed the importance of improving the welfare of the country through trade.⁶⁹⁹ Such rhetoric, hyperbolic as it is, warrants study as it provided a state dictated yardstick.

Gathering, Purchasing, and Assimilating Science and Technology

While the veracity of Soviet statistics has provided much fodder for scholars, this study is more concerned with what was said than its accuracy. That is to say that figures showing the USSR as behind the West in general and the USA in particular, would have conveyed a sense of backwardness, regardless of their statistical precision. In 1957, a collection of statistical materials under the title of *The Countries of Socialism and Capitalism* by Ya. A. Ioffe was published in which the relative industrial output between the USSR and the USA is compared. In the work Ioffe has changed his 1939 published percentages to allow the post-Stalin economic increases vis-à-vis the West to appear more impressive. Regardless of the set of figures used his report clearly states the Soviet Union's relative industrial output remains comparatively low.

Table 5 Industrial Output Compared by Ioffe. 700

	1913	1937	1950	1955
1939 publication	6.9	32.7
1957 publication	6.8	24.3	32.1	47.9

This lagging behind the West can also be seen in the Narkhoz figures for Soviet material production expressed as a percentage of American production in 1963 and in 1967. In the 1967 publication, the 1963 figure was sixty-three percent and in the 1969 publication it was sixty-five percent.⁷⁰¹ The Soviet annual statistical handbooks contained dollar value comparisons of Soviet and American national income and/or Soviet income as a percentage of the American figure.⁷⁰² The dollar

⁶⁹⁸ Trofimov, 'Angliiskie biznesmeny v Moskve' 33.

⁶⁹⁹ Patolichev, 'Stroitel'stvo material'no-tekhnicheskoi bazy kommunizma v SSSR i vneshniaia torgovlia' 3-14.

⁷⁰⁰ Jasny, *Essays on the Soviet Economy* 89.

⁷⁰¹ Hanson, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy* 126.

⁷⁰² Hanson, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy* 126.

valuation was usually based on purchasing power and the service sector was usually excluded. Inaccurate, incomplete and intermittent, published Soviet statistics could be favourable for specific industries vis-à-vis the West, but the overall picture was one of Western economic superiority. Trade with the United States was another area in which Khrushchev and other officials acknowledged that potential was failing to be met, in 1946 the United States held first place in terms of volume of foreign trade but by 1963 it had dropped to less than half a percent of Soviet foreign trade.⁷⁰³ However, this did not stop trade with the Americans from receiving an inordinate amount of coverage. In *Na vsekh kontinentakh mira*, the dismal state of trade is acknowledged just before an entire chapter is devoted to the United States. It is the only nation to receive an entire chapter to itself.⁷⁰⁴

Khrushchev's memoirs provide insight into the leader's belief in the need to catch up with the West and the reality of Soviet economic failures: 'we threw ourselves into the development of our oil and gas industries. We needed machine tools. I received reports that ours weren't anywhere near the same level as the American [tools].'⁷⁰⁵ The logistical challenge of promising consumer goods cannot be underestimated. Consumer goods were often lightweight and plastic. Few Soviet plants were equipped for the production of consumer goods. For example the steel industry was set up for heavy industrial equipment and not all machines and factories could be converted to consumer goods, so either re-equipping or building new plants was in order. In an attempt to meet the challenges associated with transforming from industrialisation to modernisation, foreign trade was expanded.

Between 1950 and 1958 Soviet foreign trade increased 257 percent, of which seventy-five percent was with socialist countries.⁷⁰⁶ Between 1953 and 1954 Western sales to the Soviet Union increased by fifty-two percent, between 1954 and 1955 by eighty-five percent and between 1955 and 1956 by 133 percent. Between 1961 and 1969 imports doubled and by 1975 they had increased tenfold.⁷⁰⁷ Despite the significant increase in trade both with socialist countries and the West, overall trade levels remained lower for the USSR than for Western nations. This low level

⁷⁰³ *Na vsekh kontinentakh mira* 7.

⁷⁰⁴ *Na vsekh kontinentakh mira*

⁷⁰⁵ Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: the Glasnost Tapes* 110.

⁷⁰⁶ Hanson, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy* 126.

⁷⁰⁷ Sokoloff, *The Economy of Détente* 10.

of trade has often resulted in foreign trade being assessed as comparatively inconsequential. However, foreign trade was to have a disproportionately large impact on industries and society. West Germany was the largest supplier of machinery and equipment for the USSR, providing a third of Soviet imports, Japan twenty percent and the USA less than ten percent. Japan was the largest supplier of oil refining equipment.⁷⁰⁸ France was more likely than Germany to export high technology, specifically computers and processors. By 1970, France was the Soviet Union's third largest trading partner. French exports consisted of fifty percent machinery and thirty percent semi-finished products in the form of turnkey plants, chemical products, gas lift equipment, computers, metallurgical, industrial and petrochemical equipment. France's status was to diminish over time. Between 1960-1966 American contracting organisations did sixty-four percent of world contacts for chemical plants, but did not fill any socialist contracts. During the same period the UK exported thirty percent of its chemical work to socialist markets. The UK was overtaken by West Germany and Japan as the major chemical industry supplier in 1969. As of the late 1960s, the Soviet Union got most of its plastics imports from the West (Italy, Japan and West Germany). The bulk of imported synthetic fibres came from Great Britain. From 1965 to 1970, one third of the Soviet imported chemical equipment came from West, but this was to decrease with the increased presence of Eastern Europe equipment sales.

⁷⁰⁸ Technology and East West 12.

Table 6 Table of Soviet Imports of Western Machinery and Transport Equipment⁷⁰⁹

Year	Millions of US Dollars
1955	104
1956	139
1957	128
1958	123
1959	717
1960	310
1961	390
1962	436
1963	402
1964	489
1965	366
1966	395
1967	457
1968	639
1969	889

Soviet imports remained relatively small in relation to the GDP. This accepted, Western imports occurred in greater proportion in priority industries. They also received coverage in the press, and naturally, were the topic of discussion within the ruling and scientific elite. *Vneshniaia torgovlia* annually ran figures based on imports and exports. It also ran figures of 'important imports'. During the 1960s, these tables of important imports were broken down into the total import in millions of roubles and then divided into capitalist and non-capitalist country. The average list contained approximately thirty items and contained heavy industry goods as well as consumer goods. Below is an excerpt from the 1960-1965 list that was printed in 1966.

⁷⁰⁹ Philip Hanson, 'International Technology Transfer from the West to the USSR,' US Congress, Joint Economic Committee *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976) 795.

*Table 7 Import into the USSR of Important Goods in 1960-65¹⁰
In millions of roubles unless stated otherwise*

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Light Industry Equipment Total	43.9	58.1	74.2	72.8	72.1	86.9
Capitalist	22.3	22.9	19.0	14.7	17.8	20.9
Chemical Industry Equipment Total	167	171	141.8	190.2	186.4	187.4
Capitalist	122.8	120.5	79	111.6	101.9	99.5
Automotive Parts Total (millions of pieces)	3238	2001	2100	1869	1798	1619
Capitalist	8	14	-	17	25	5
Raw Textiles Total	328	273.1	254.6	305	263.6	322.1
Capitalist	242.1	220.8	211.7	277.1	233.6	294.4
Synthetic thread/yarn Total (per 100,000)	12.2	12.9	13.8	11.7	4.2	4.2
Capitalist	12.2	12.9	13.8	11.7	4.2	4.2
Pharmaceuticals including perfume and makeup Total	27.5	40.9	65.8	86.1	99.3	111
Capitalist	3	2.7	14.8	6.1	8.1	9.2
Furniture Total	58.8	64.5	88.	134.4	146.8	139.6
Capitalist	1.5	1.4	2	1.6	1.6	2.4
Shoes (Leather) Total In thousands of pairs	3098	2580	3157	4063	2098	3484
Capitalist	2975	2435	3120	4020	2070	3448

a. Fact Finding

The Khrushchev era is one with comparatively high access to Western information. Exhibitions and displays were a public forum of information for both specialists and non-specialists. Printed material was restricted but the strata of the population granted access were relatively broad. Taking primary and secondary dissemination together, information about the West would have been sporadic in nature. Despite an increase in exchanges and delegations in the post-Stalin era, they were to remain an activity of the elite. Indeed, freedom of travel abroad was one aspect of international elite culture denied to the Soviet elite. Scientific and

¹⁰ 'Import v SSSR vazhneishikh tovarov v 1960-65', *Vneshniaia torgovlia* no.8 (1966) 11-16.

technological information gathering was permitted and encouraged in various governmental levels and in institutes. The SCST was a committee charged with gathering information about Western science and technology. It was not atypical to find statements in the reports of the SCST reminding the committee of the purpose of the foreign contacts and information: the rapid growth of Soviet science and technology in comparison to foreign countries. One sign of the Westernisation of the 'fact finders' was the prevalence of the term *nou-khau* (know-how) in reports. In this section archival material from the SCST will be used to look at how foreign material was being assessed. The first example is taken from the textile industry; an industry in which a comparatively large amount of interest was generated and the results of Western technology affected the decision makers, the producers and the consumers.

As early as the mid 1950s there was an awareness that the Soviet textile and garment industries were failing to meet national demand and to keep pace with international changes. In one SCST report assessing the state of the industry it was referred to as having 'weak technical levels and an absence of the necessary equipment resulting in factories not introducing new technological processes. The level of technology in the majority of factories lags behind the level of the most developed capitalist countries.'⁷¹¹ The resolution was to call on the Ministries of Chemistry, Machinery and Light Industry to prepare suggestions for the improvement of the quality of fabric production based on the wide introduction of progressive technology and to present them to the Council of Ministers of the USSR.⁷¹² In an article in the *Textile Research Journal* (04.1962), it was noted that in the USA research was being carried out in the field of volumetrics and elasticity of synthetic yarns and fabrics with positive results. The SCST recommendation was that this should be of interest to the Soviet Union and that investigations into various synthetic fabrics should be made.⁷¹³ After an initial introduction detailing improvements in Soviet production, the SCST report on the advances in the development of the manufacturing of knitted textile materials included a chart comparing Soviet production of stockings, underwear, and outer knit-wear with

711 'V. Kirillin,' RGAE 9380/ 9/ 96: 54.

712 'V. Kirillin' 54.

713 'Letter from K. Rudnev to A. N. Kosygin no.199p 20/Up-1962,' RGAE 9380/ 7/ Ed.Khr 64: 231.

Western nations. A year later, a similar chart detailed Soviet production in comparison with Western nations. The USSR was behind the West in all categories, as well as trailing the GDR in all three categories.⁷¹⁴

Table 8 Knit Wear Production

Item	Units of measurement per person	USSR 1961	USA 1959	England 1959	France 1960	FGR 1960	GDR 1960	Czechoslovakia 1960
stockings	pairs	4.6	10.2	8.5	5.8	7.8	8.9	3.6
underwear	pieces	2.3	7.6	3.7	3.4	5.8	8.2	2.9
knitted items	pieces	2.8	8.6	5.4	4.6	7.7	9.4	6.0

In another report it was stated that both quality and quantity needed to be improved in order to reach modern standards and that this was dependant on new machines/lines meeting foreign technical standards.⁷¹⁵ Foreign machines from GDR or Czechoslovakia were suggested as being modern enough, while British and American lines were superior.

Research into foreign garment and footwear production methods included visits to various factories, for example the 1962 tour of Italian shoe factories (26.10.1962-10.11.1962). A focus of the trip was on the efficient use of supplies in relation to both natural and synthetic leathers, rubber etc. For example, the Italian company *Cir* demonstrated synthetic shoe (slippers and boots for men, women, and children) production and the presence of a chemical factory for synthetic materials in front of the shoe factory was deemed as conducive to effective research and development and minimised supply issues. The Italian synthetic material production levels of 1.5 times higher than a comparable Soviet factory were attributed to a higher level of organisation.⁷¹⁶ The SCST recommended that a contract for technical cooperation be entered into and the Italians' expertise utilised in the construction of a Soviet factory for synthetic footwear materials. The report was sent to Gosplan (N.N. Mirotvortsev) and to the Council of Ministers. A related '*Spravka*' for the trip included a more detailed assessment of the findings, and contained the assessment

⁷¹⁴ 'O merakh po preimushchestvennomu razvitiu trikotazhnogo sposoba proizvodstva tekstil'nykh materialov 04.01.1963,' RGAE 9380/ 7/ Ed.Khr. 99: 14-17, 15.

⁷¹⁵ 'O merakh po preimushchestvennomu razvitiu trikotazhnogo sposoba proizvodstva tekstil'nykh materialov. 04.01.1963' 15.

⁷¹⁶ "Cir" 04.03.1963,' RGAE 9480/ 7/ Ed Kr 99: 188-190, 189.

that a most interesting aspect of the trip was the new leather factory in Pescara that was equipped with the 'latest' technology for box-calf leather. The specifics of the floor space and units not active in production were assessed as corresponding to accepted Soviet norms but the sanitary and industrial conditions were assessed as superior.⁷¹⁷ Of particular interest was the system of preparing the box-calf leather (black calfskin leather tanned with chromium salts) from large horned livestock for footwear. The quality was considered exceptionally good and the report continues that there was less wastage and fewer defective leathers than seen in Soviet factories.⁷¹⁸ Calfskin leather shoes were produced in the Soviet Union but were typically reserved for display or the elite. The document contained no criticisms of the Italian factory nor of its processes. In a period of mass production needs, scarcity and demand, research into calfskin leather suggests misplaced priorities on the part of the delegates and their ruling organisations. This focus on the best and highest quality is seen in other spheres as well and was common among those in a position to assess foreign goods and companies. Production techniques and products were often looked at based on prestige and not necessarily applicability to Soviet industry. The Italian shoe company mentioned above in one example: the Rootes Motor Co. that was invited to display transportation automobiles based on its prestige of working with Rolls Royce, Perkins, and Cummins is another. The firm Univac earned respect from Soviet researchers for its work with such military affiliated firms as Vickers. In her work on the clothing industry, Larissa Zakharova has remarked upon the disconnect between the priorities of researchers who favoured French fashion houses and luxury fabrics over the needs of the society. This disconnect exposes an elite with sufficient information about Western products to recognise and to be interested not only in high quality of goods but prestigious labels. It also exposes the elites' abuse of position: using the mandate of obtaining Western technology to provide needed goods for the people to provide luxury goods for themselves. Finally, the elite's consumption of Western goods was visible evidence of their attitude towards Western consumption and consumer goods.

717 'Spravka iz otcheta gruppy sovetskikh spetsialistov po komandirovkie ikh na kozhevno-obuvnye predpriatia Italii s 26 oktiabria po 10 noiabria 1962g.,' RGAE 9480/ 7 Ed Kr 99: 191-194, 192.

718 'Spravka iz otcheta gruppy sovetskikh spetsialistov po komandirovkie ikh na kozhevno-obuvnye predpriatia Italii s 26 oktiabria po 10 noiabria 1962g.' 192.

The introduction of new material under the auspices of the Ministry of Light Industry was discussed in *'O merakh po dal'neishemu uluchsheniui obespecheniia trudiashchikhsia spetsial'noi i rabochei odezhdoi'* (23.01.1964). Point twenty-three of the project involved approval for the foreign purchase of 1500 complete specialist costumes, eight hundred pairs of specialist shoes, and five hundred miners' helmets of the best quality. The SCST were entrusted to pass along the goods and samples of new techniques that came with the purchase.⁷¹⁹ In all reports, much mention was made of rationalising the ordering and purchasing of foreign stuffs. In a 1966 assessment on textiles, knits, and the shoe industry, the SCST considered it necessary to report on issues of volume and quality of basic products. In the opinion of the committee, 'the majority of the fabrics produced in the USSR are considerably inferior to the best foreign samples.'⁷²⁰ Soviet fabrics had a shrinkage rate that was two to three times greater than the analogous imported fabrics and a durability of painting that was one to two points below the imported materials. When there were synthetic materials they were inferior in quality. Finishing was poor and the ready-made fabrics had no packaging. There was an overall absence of attention to quality. Regardless of the material, output was too low.

Another challenge of modernising and expanding production of a product was the need to expand the affiliated factories. For example, from 1958 to 1965, cotton production increased by one billion metres, and silk fabrics by 250 million metres. In the same period, the capacity to finish and dye fabrics remained at two billion metres per year. A new, preferably Western, factory needed to be built to rectify the situation.⁷²¹ A report assessing textile production usually followed the format of an unfavourable comparison with the best of the West, moved to a condemnation of the failings of the Soviet system, and concluded with a recommendation for the import of Western (occasionally East European) technology. The format was provocative in nature, challenging readers to establish the Soviet Union as the best in the field. In 1966, as part of the third American Soviet agreement there was an exchange of textile delegations. The Soviet delegation toured five textile factories, three knitting factories, and several

719 '05.10.1965,' *RGAE* 9480/ 9/Ed. Khr. 10: 1-2.

720 '25.01.1996 to Presidium and Council of Minister of the USSR,' *RGAE* 9480/ 9/Ed.Khr. 86: 53.

721 '25.01.1996 to Presidium and Council of Ministers of the USSR' 53.

businesses. The American delegation saw, in Moscow alone, two textile institutes, The All Soviet House of Fashion, a knitting factory, several textile factories; as well as facilities in Minsk, Tashkent, Ivanovo and Leningrad.

The objective of mass synthetic fabric and 'modern' international clothing (multicoloured and patterned) production, necessitated that the textile industry modernise throughout - from yarn production, to fabrics, to designing and sewing. One example of the problems faced by the producers after an executive decision had been made was the decision to have the House of Models in Leningrad provide pleated skirts for the spring-summer collection of 1961. Technically unable to work with pleats, the Soviet textile manufacturers replaced the pleated skirts with appliqué skirts.⁷²² Internal tensions arose as purchasers of foreign technology, who were rarely directly affected by the ramifications of trying to implement the new technology, made purchases that were inappropriate for Soviet industry. Susan Reid has written that:

From 1959, the press began to publish more trenchant critiques of the negative effects of central state planning: it gave little incentive to innovate and encouraged factories to produce ornate, labour-intensive items that could be sold more expensively. Meanwhile, factories could continue to produce ugly, badly designed wares with impunity because, given the chronic shortages of consumer goods, they had an insatiable market.⁷²³

This is evidence of the widespread dissemination of knowledge of Western superiority in consumer goods.

Justification for a new technology could be as simple as that everyone in the West was doing it. In a committee meeting about the pulp and paper industry: the question arose of how to double output in four years in order to meet the 1960 targets. In response to V. A. Malyshev's question about the viable solution found by the delegation that went abroad, the response was that the foreign processes were 'very good processes but too expensive' and as Malyshev had noted 'the state needs products not forests',⁷²⁴ implying that even if natural resources needed to be sold off or high wastage occurred this was secondary to the prime objective of manufacturing products for the Soviet Union. According to the SCST, the Soviet

⁷²² Zakharova, 'Le réseau des canaux officiels de transferts des modes vestimentaires occidentaux en URSS dans les années 1950-1960' 2-3.

⁷²³ Reid, 'De-Stalinization and Taste, 1953-1963' 193.

⁷²⁴ 'Stenogramma zasedaniia Gostekhnika SSSR ot 15.03.1956,' RGAE 9480/ 9/ 14: 250-281, 272.

timber industry had wastage of twenty-five percent in the production of wood pulp and timber while the Swedish timber industry had one and a half to two percent.⁷²⁵ In a related discussion pertaining to paper producing machines it was declared that throughout Europe, the United States and Japan the capacity was double that of the Soviet Union. New technology was validated with: 'all European firms work with this technology.'⁷²⁶ Another example is found in *Gostekhnika*, as the auto industry and the ministry of car transport discussed the adoption of electrostatic lacquer application. Comrade Malyshev of SCST opened by stating that what was important was that in America there were thousands of such electrostatic installations; that in Italy three workers could paint 750 motorcycles per shift; and that it was cheaper to buy this technology than it was to produce it oneself. Malyshev continued that it was the 'work of scientific research to lead and to make use of foreign experiences and, if it is necessary, to purchase samples to get them cheaply and to master them.'⁷²⁷

A preferred form of information gathering was the delegation. Delegations were to be as large as possible and were to visit for as long as permitted. A truly successful delegation came back not only with contacts and product information but also with the ability to begin prototyping without the purchase of licences or machines. An example of delegation work was in the field of food technology. In 1960, Kozlov was to submit a report on foodstuffs in the USA, which he characterised as fast, filling, and mass-produced. Of special note for Kozlov was the mass processing of potatoes (crisps, chips, and instant mashed potatoes), corn (cornflakes and popcorn), soft ice cream and biscuits.⁷²⁸ Khrushchev himself was to visit farms and food processing factories. Delegations were sent to visit Garst on his farm and to gather information on corn production. In September 1964, a delegation spent thirty days in the US examining the food industry. They visited Green Giant, Post Co., Kellogg Co., Idaho Potato Processors, Lay's Foods and Potato Chip Institute, and Blue Star Foods. Food processors and retail outlets in the Washington area were also toured.

⁷²⁵ 'Stenogramma zasedaniia Gostekhnika SSSR ot 15.03.1956' RGAE 9480/ 9/ 14: 250-281, 272.

⁷²⁶ 'Stenogramma zasedaniia Gostekhnika SSSR ot 15.03.1956' RGAE 9480/ 9/ 14: 250-281, 272.

⁷²⁷ 'Stenogramma zasedaniia Gostekhnika SSSR ot 09.02.1956,' RGAE 9480/2/14: 134.

⁷²⁸ 'Sekretariu TsK KPSS Kozlovu F. R. 16.08.1960,' RGANI 5/20/195: 2-5, 3.

In 1963, there were thirty-seven British business delegations to the USSR ranging in size from one to twenty-three people, travelling for three to eighteen days and giving zero to eight lectures. Some of the companies involved were:

- Hercules Powder (Head Office USA),
- Dekka Navigator,
- Turner Brothers Asbestos,
- Hugh Smith (ENG) Ltd. (shipbuilding, pressure vessel and fabrication industries),
- Thermal Syndicate Ltd.,
- Guinness,
- Armour Hess Chemicals (in 1959 Armour Industrial Chemical and Dan Hess in England established a joint venture),
- Allen and Son, the Cigarette Components Ltd. (cigarette filters),
- Associated Electric Inc. Edward Vacuum,
- EIGA (European Industrial Gases Association),
- Sir James Farmer Norton (textile processing and finishing machinery),
- Langley, the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders Ltd.

Soviet delegations to the UK numbered thirty ranging in size from two to eleven participants, and travelling for periods of five to twenty days. Soviet delegations requested that their visits be not shorter than two weeks. In 1964, there were only thirty delegations to the USSR but they were on average for longer periods (up to twenty-four days) and included more lectures. Some of the companies in 1964 included:

- ASA Chemical Industry,
- English Electric (Leo computers),
- Davy Ashmore (Ashmore Benson Pease/Davy Ashmore, at the time one of the UK's largest plant design contractors),
- Shell International Petroleum (went on to give a symposium and lectures in 1967 June, and in August 1968 for twelve days),
- Kodak (went on to give lectures and demonstrations in 1967),
- Patterson Engineering (structural engineering and steel fabrications),
- Elliot Automation (through mergers was to become part of English Electric),
- Plessey,
- BBC,
- Thermal Syndicate,
- IPV Export (milk products, fruit juices and beer brewing)

In 1965 not one British delegation visited the USSR.⁷²⁹ In 1966, there were twenty English delegations and thirty-six Soviet delegations (138 individuals). In 1967, Electro-Chemical Engineering of England alone gave forty-five lectures. The standard lecture format was one and a half hours of presentation with questions. The text was to have been sent ahead for translation by SCST. Lectures could either be open or closed, with open lectures typically being attended by several hundred Soviet specialists and workers. When Kerry Willams spoke on specialised computer programming, each of the two 'open' lectures were attended by 250 individuals from the Ministries of Electricity, Radio, Academy of Science, Gosplan etc.⁷³⁰

A more specific example of involvement by Western firms and foreigners in the USSR was the case of Castrol Oil, which involved the Soviet government seeking simultaneously to improve domestic products while generating international revenues. Having fallen by the wayside, talks with Castrol Oil (UK) were renewed in 1965. From the Soviet side the idea was that they were forced to sell oil at a low price but if Soviet oil was sold under the Castor name than it would command a higher price.⁷³¹ The Soviet Union would provide oil, Castrol Oil the refining technology and then the resulting oil would be used in the Soviet Union and sold to pay for the technology. Castrol Oil had been used with better results than Shell or Esso Oil in the ZIL factory in Moscow since 1959. The primary targets for the goods were the auto and aviation industries. In the discussions with D. M. Gvishiani in June 1967, Castrol Oil was told that they could proceed with the scientific and technical agreement but that the commercial aspect would have to be resolved by a separate committee. Castrol Oil representative Parson's response was that despite interest in a scientific and technical agreement, it was not possible to have a scientific and technical agreement without a commercial one.⁷³² The issue of Castrol Oil was to come to a head with the construction of VAZ and the inadequate nature of Soviet motor oil.

Be it in potato processing (Lays Foods), motor oils (Castrol Oil) or computers, Soviet experts were busy investigating, assessing, and purchasing the

⁷²⁹ 'Central Statistics,' RGAE 9480/327/982: 147.

⁷³⁰ 'Otchet o prebyvanii v SSSR direktora angliiskoi firmy Computer Consultants 10-20.10.1966,' RGAE 9480/9/431: 1-67.

⁷³¹ 'Kastorol, 31.10.1966,' RGAE 9480/9/431:146-148.

⁷³² 'Kastorol, 13.06.1967,' RGAE 9480/9/431:167.

technology for application in the USSR. In 1951, the first Soviet stored programme electronic digital computer became functional less than a year after the American version. It was put into serial production two years later, less than a year behind the US. Shortly after this, the Soviet military chose not to invest in computers, denying the industry an influx of talent and resources that potentially would have allowed the USSR to compete with the West. The 1966-67 attempts (with military backing) to reverse engineer computers were largely unsuccessful. The next attempt, which involved East German knowledge (East Germany had access to IBM computers), was successful but was a case of functional duplication as opposed to reverse engineering and took as long to develop as the original IBM computers. When American Control Data Corporation Vice President Miles visited the Soviet Union in March 1967 to inform SCST that he had received US governmental approval to sell the model 3400 (01.1964) and 3600 (05.1962) computers, the same models as he was to be selling to West Germany and Switzerland, he was forced to acknowledge that further models, the 6600 (07.1962) and the 6400 (12.1964), were no longer in the prototype stage and were being used by NASA. Anatoli N. Miamlin informed him that the USSR had greater needs than other nations and that the only computer model of interest was the 6600. Miles responded that the sale of the 6600 would most likely be embargoed, but he would apply for a trade licence. G. N. Pronskii then requested that Soviet specialists visit Control Data in the US to which Miles agreed.⁷³³ In a subsequent conversation, Miles was asked if it was possible to get the programme for the model 1604 (first introduced 04.1958), to which he answered that it was indeed possible to acquire the programme through COOP despite the interjection from an unknown comrade that this was not necessary, Soviet labs could reproduce it themselves. In the end, Control Data was prepared to sell two 3300 computers and one 6600. Pronskii then asked about the price, which was 'complex to determine', approximately 5.6 million dollars. Miles then presented the official invitation for the Soviet specialists.⁷³⁴ In 1969, IBM made the computer and computing system IBM System/360 (mainframe computer first announced publicly in 04.1964) along with manuals, training of personal for

733 'Zapis' besedy Tov. Pronskogo G.N. s V. P. Kontrol Data Mailsom 17.03.1967,' RGAE 9480/9/455: 255-256.

734 'Zapis' besedy Tov. Pronskogo G.N. s V. P. Kontrol Data Mailsom 21. 12. 1967,' RGAE 9480/9/455: 309-310.

construction etc available. The co-manufacturing of the IBM System/360 began shortly thereafter, with the product being used in the Soviet Union and sold in Belgium, Holland, Finland and India. Other computer companies that were active during this period were Control Data, Sperry-Rand, UNIVAC, Honeywell and General Electric.

During the 1960s, the Soviet Union was to import electrical and computing technology (General Electrics, Mallard Equipment, Plessey and others). Plessey Company plc began as a manufacturer of wood machining tools, pianos and organs but soon expanded into electronics. During WWII, it specialised in classified navigation aids, radar, and aircraft radio systems. Plessey's post war production was based on radios, TV sets, and electronics for the defence industry. It also specialised in the manufacturing of semi conductors. In 1961, Plessey acquired the entire share capital of Ericsson Telephones Limited and the Automatic Telephone and Electric Company Limited, and merged them into a defence and civil electronics and communications company. In 1962, Plessey was a partner in the development of the Atlas computer. Discussions between Plessey and the Soviet Union began in 1964 and involved extensive visits from Soviet delegations: in May and June 1964 (five people per trip from Goskom Electric Technology and *GKKNIR*), in January, April, May, and September 1965 (thirteen, five, eleven, and three people from *AN SSSR* and the Ministry of Electrical Industry) and in March, July, and August 1966 (eleven, thirty-four, and four people from *AN SSSR* and the Electrical industry). Plessey representatives were to make two trips to the USSR, one of three persons in November 1964 and one of five persons in 1966. Lectures were given in conjunction with both visits. Visits occurred in 1967 and 1968 as well. Plessey was also active in exhibitions, for example at the British Industrial Exhibition in 1968. In the draft of the protocol between Plessey and SCST the five points tabled regarded purchasing radio navigation, television, radio components, computers, and licenses for computers. Added later were automation and aircraft equipment. Specific interest was expressed in the civil application of computer techniques in industry, notably construction; radio measuring instruments and control systems; air traffic control and radar systems; components for colour and monochrome TVs; equipment for the production of electrolytic foil and capacitors. The inquiries into Plessey's radio navigation equipment were not unique to Plessey.

Soviet officials also approached Hawker Siddeley, Fiat and other manufacturers. The specifications of the machines that were of interest to the Soviet planners would have revealed a great deal about the state of Soviet radar technology. As Plessey, Hawker Siddeley and Fiat all worked with various defence ministries (American, British, Italian etc) it is logical to conclude that the purchasing inquiries were known to the various military establishments. Knowledge of the Soviet radar technology and ground to air missile technology may help explain why the Americans felt confident in conducting the U-2 flyovers.

One field in which Hawker was not interested, at least in 1967, was the Soviet aviation industry. In 1967, talks were conducted between the USSR and Hawker Siddeley Group Inc., a British manufacturer of aircraft that was also active in the chemical industry, machine building and agriculture. Hawker Siddeley was interested in co-operation in the fields of ingots and agriculture. The British representatives first visited the USSR, then were asked to organise a return visit of Soviet experts. The British representatives then offered to send specialists to Moscow. The Soviet official understanding was that Hawker Siddeley was looking for an agreement that would allow construction in the USSR with sales of a percentage of the goods in developing nations. Amongst Soviet officials, the Soviet delegation to Britain was perceived as providing specialists with access to information 'not only in the area of agriculture'.⁷³⁵ In a letter from Sir Percy Lister to Academician Kirillin the potential sale of the following products and processes were to be the focus of discussions: a polythylene lining material (a moisture extracting material that could be used to keep cocoa, rice, etc dry), sewage and water cleaning units, and sheep shearing machinery equipment. The review of previous arrangements, for example the trade of Kestrel diesel electric locomotive engine and marine diesel engines for Soviet forgings, and aluminium ingots was cautious (Hawker was marketing Soviet ingots world wide). Mention was also made of the joint production of crop drying machinery.⁷³⁶ Hawker Siddeley's interest in agriculture did not prevent it from sending various test materials and machines to Soviet factories. The Soviet response to the expansion of ties with Hawker through agriculture is exemplified in a letter from Gosplan to SCST in

⁷³⁵ 'Rukovoditeliam firmy Khoker Sidlei,' RGAE 9480/9/432: 23.

⁷³⁶ 'Letter from Sir Percy Lister to Academician Kirillin 21.12.67,' RGAE 9480/9/432: 25-27.

which it was stated that one could not 'see how Hawker Siddeley goods could be of use to Soviet agriculture' and as the Soviet Union was producing its own diesel engines and had a contract with Burmeister and Wain (large established Danish shipyard and leading diesel engine producer) through a factory in Latvia careful consideration should be given before increasing the production of ingots.⁷³⁷ In October 1967, V. A. Kirillin met with the President of Fiat, Giovanni Agnelli. During the visit the discussion turned to the possibility of Fiat assisting with the civilian aircraft industry. The Soviet specialists had assessed Fiat's electrical aviation branch as 'small but of the highest technical quality.'⁷³⁸ Agnelli responded that although it was true that of Fiat's five thousand workers, one thousand worked in electrical aviation 'it is all military and the largest contracts come from the USA,' and declined the offer of civil aviation contracts.⁷³⁹

The study of Soviet information gathering on and purchasing of technology and the assimilation thereof, does not deal with an exclusive programme that impacted solely upon industries as the military, petrochemicals or oil and gas. Industrial exposure involved textiles and clothing for civilian usage (stockings, slippers, men's shirts etc), passenger cars, and prepared foods (potato crisps, frozen foods, popcorn) to mention just a few sectors upon which an impact was made.

b. Purchasing Information and Technology

Unlike Soviet researchers who inquired into the full range of technology from the practical to the frivolous, Soviet purchasers were typically charged with purchasing reliable, affordable, and not necessarily the most up-to-date and affordable equipment. This can be seen in the above mentioned purchasing request for the programme for the Control Data computer model 1604 that had been on the market since 1958, and was by Western and Soviet standards out of date by the request date in 1967, but for which the Soviet officials had been unable to create a successful programme. Government discussions conducted in the summer of 1959

737 'Letter from Gosplan to SCST 28.05.1968 No. 5454-142/20-142 -12.1966,' RGAE 9480/9/432.

738 Zapis' besedy Tov. V. A. Kirillina s prezidentom Fiatom D. An'elli 6.10.1967,' RGAE 9480/9/457: 189-191.

739 'Zapis' besedy Tov. V. A. Kirillina s prezidentom Fiatom D. An'elli 6.10.1967,' RGAE 9480/9/457: 189-191.

show the Soviet trade focus to be on chemical equipment, automatic machinery and textile machinery. These areas retained their high import status throughout the 1960s. The modern groups or sectors of the Soviet economy (for example petrochemicals) absorbed more than a third of the industrial investment. The logic behind the import plan was that 'no equipment or machinery, instruments or ships should be acquired from foreign markets except where it is economically more advantageous to buy them abroad than to manufacture them at home, or where the necessary quantities and desirable quality cannot be produced nationally within the specified time limits.'⁷⁴⁰ What constituted economically more advantageous, necessary quantities, desirable quality and an acceptable period was the Party's decision. As a Soviet institution could eventually produce most if not all of the new technology (if indeed not all), a major challenge was justifying the purchase, which often came in the form of promises of parity. In 1956, in a discussion of purchasing foreign technology and research for the Ministry of Oil and Gas, Comrade Galumov (SCST) said 'I don't understand the politics of the Minister for Oil and Gas. The ministry has six hundred million roubles for geographic work. Who would it bother if some of that money went towards technology? We lag behind not only the USA, but also neighbouring capitalist countries and even Hungary and Czechoslovakia.'⁷⁴¹ The lagging behind the USA and other capitalist countries was a frequent complaint and the lagging behind Czechoslovakia was not uncommon. Continuing with the idea of investing in technology for the oil and gas sector Western methods were held up as cost saving processes as the 'cost of the [Soviet] working method is ten to fifteen times more expensive than the American.'⁷⁴² The final statement was that in 'overall quality, we are ten or more times behind foreign levels. When we copy foreign samples, it is with greater backlogs.'⁷⁴³

In a discussion with Mikoyan and C. Douglas Dillon the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs in Washington January 19, 1959, Dillon said: 'I noticed that one of the main things you indicated an interest in were the products of the chemical industry, such as plastics, synthetics, and so forth. Purchases of those products

⁷⁴⁰ Metodicheskie ukazaniia 1974; Sokoloff, *The Economy of Détente* 161-162.

⁷⁴¹ 'Stenogramma zasedaniia Gostekhnika SSSR ot 01.03.1956,' *RGAE* 9480/2/14: 200.

⁷⁴² 'Stenogramma zasedaniia Gostekhnika SSSR ot 01.03.1956' 203.

⁷⁴³ 'Stenogramma zasedaniia Gostekhnika SSSR ot 01.03.1956' 205.

require negotiations with our chemical industry.’⁷⁴⁴ He goes on to note that the American chemical industry had bad experiences with the Soviet Union – specifically the lack of repayment and respect of royalties. Mikoyan’s response was that he had been informed of the issue but that of the seventeen oil and chemical firms with which there were patent disputes after WWII, fifteen of the disputes had been settled and of the two remaining the issue was the sum of compensation and not the right to compensation.⁷⁴⁵ Mikoyan himself was rather successful in securing deals with the West. His dealing with Rolls Royce resulted in a contract for the Rolls Royce Derwent that was to become the Soviet RD-500; the Rolls Royce Nene that was to become the RD-45 (the RD-10 was from Junkers Jumo 004 and the RD-20 was from the BMW 003).

The British Plastics Federation mission to the USSR (06.1968) was sponsored by the British National Export Council and actively sought by the Soviet officials. After the United States, the United Kingdom was a world leader in petrochemical production and products and sold a greater percentage of its products and licensed more of its methods than the USA. The mission concluded that the Soviet industry was developing but lagged in terms of volume and quality, that ‘the overall attitude is that an adequate job must suffice’ and that the Soviet officials were ‘keen’ on developments in the UK.⁷⁴⁶ However, it seemed unlikely that the British would get many contracts as although ‘satisfaction was expressed with the quality of British goods, it was said that we [the British] were uncompetitive on price.’⁷⁴⁷ Most of the chemical machinery that was being imported was Japanese and German and was described by Soviet officials as doing work and providing developments ‘along the same lines as Du Pont’s work.’⁷⁴⁸ A reading of the SCST reports on plastics reveals that Du Pont was regarded as the best in the field but due

⁷⁴⁴ ‘Visit to the United States of Anastas I. Mikoyan: Conversation with Vice President: Washington 06.01.1959,’ US Department of State Vol X Part 1, FRUS, 1958-1960: E. Europe Region: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1183 <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/frus/frus58-60x1/08soviet2.html>. 17/11/00.

⁷⁴⁵ ‘Visit to the United States of Anastas I. Mikoyan: Conversation with Vice President: Washington 06.01.1959,’ US Department of State Vol X Part 1, FRUS, 1958-1960: E. Europe Region: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1183 <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/frus/frus58-60x1/08soviet2.html>. 17/11/00.

⁷⁴⁶ The British Plastics Federation Mission to the USSR 17th to the 28th of June 1968 (London: British Printing Federation, 1968) 8,9.

⁷⁴⁷ The British Plastics Federation Mission to the USSR 17th to the 28th of June 1968 9.

⁷⁴⁸ The British Plastics Federation Mission to the USSR 17th to the 28th of June 1968 12.

to an outstanding patent issue with Du Pont, commercial relations were unlikely. Developments within the industry were heavily reliant on imported technology and the objective was modelled on a foreign capitalist company.

Du Pont was not the only company to show reluctance to enter into agreements with the Soviet Union, and numerous companies declined to enter into subsequent contracts. Despite Britain, along with Finland, having been a leading trade partner of the Soviet Union during the 1950s, British firms soon became increasingly cautious of entering into agreements, even for those that only concerned exhibiting. Statements from a SCST document from 13.01.1966 illustrate this point declaring that in 1964 'England has held its agricultural exhibition but at the end of the exhibition the English firms did not receive the agreements from the Soviet Union that they had expected. Due to this, English firms are now very cautious to enter into agreements for exhibitions and talks.'⁷⁴⁹ In response, it was stated that the Soviet representative was authorised to make it clear that his trip to the UK was 'not fact finding, but of a business nature'.⁷⁵⁰ In response to a repeated request that Soviet specialists be permitted to tour a filial of the American company Monsanto in Milan, the Monsanto representative Palmer answered that 'Soviet specialists had already been to the firm and were acquainted with the firm's production.'⁷⁵¹ By the late 1960s, this caution dampened but did not end international co-operation.

The May 1958 plenum dropped the Five Year Plan and replaced it with a Seven Year Plan. The Seven Year Plan involved a massive allocation of funds into industry and a huge capital construction programme. Investment in new and refitted plants between 1959 and 1965 was 9.1 billion roubles.⁷⁵² Construction work was conducted on four hundred plants and installations in 1959 alone. For 1959-1965, 47.6 percent of foreign investment went to nitrogenous fertilisers, chemical fibres, plastics and synthetic rubber. By 1960, over a third of the chemical equipment in

749 'Zapis' besedy zam. nachal'nika Upravleniia Vneshnikh Otnoshenii T. Ovsiannikova, 13.01.1966,' RGAE 9480/9/209: 2-5, 3.

750 'Zapis' besedy Tov. Ovsiannikova M. D.s togovym sovetnikom posol'stva Velikobritanii Rotni v SSSR. 19.01.1966,' RGAE 9480/9/209: 7.

751 'Zapis' besedy 13.05.1966,' RGAE 9480/9/209: 68-69.

752 Mathew J. Sagers and Theodore Shabad, The Chemical industry in the USSR: an Economic Geography (Westview Press: Boulder, 1990) 65.

usage (36.7 percent) was imported. This represented a 96.2 percent fulfilment of the investment plan.⁷⁵³ The

results of the chemicalisation programme were impressive, although not close to the target figures initially presented. In physical terms, the production of mineral fertilisers increased two and a half times, the output of plant protection agents went up four and a half times, the chemical fibre output grew by a factor of two point five, and the production of plastics increased by almost three and a half. However, the initial production levels of plastics and chemical fibres were quite low, particularly in comparison with those of the developed Western countries, and quality remained a severe problem.⁷⁵⁴

In the 1950s and 1960s, the chemical industry had industrial priority. In the 1950s it was ten years behind the West. It took six to seven years to import and install technology that was three to four years old at the time of purchase. In the University of Birmingham study *The Technological Level of Soviet Industry* it was found that in most of the areas examined – nuclear capabilities, electric power, metallurgy, machine tools, computers, and chemicals - the technological gap with the West had remained unaltered over the past fifteen to twenty (1950s-1960s) years and that growth in output had been the result of traditional technology.⁷⁵⁵

Petrochemicals had increased relative to chemicals in general despite of, or perhaps due to, being manufactured with older, proven technology. By the 1970s, the slow-down in the West provided the USSR with an increased opportunity of coming closer to catching up. However, for all of its priority, there is no documented case of the USSR first producing a major plastics material. This fact alone makes it seem implausible that the extensive funds of the chemical industry were invested into research and development on a national level.

'Characteristic for modern international trade of capitalist countries is the trade in new products, which were not available or practically not available before WWII'.⁷⁵⁶ These new products were of importance. Taking the United States, Britain and France as prime examples, there were numerous references to significant aspects of post 1937 trade in non-traditional goods, such as certain raw materials

⁷⁵³ Sagers, *The Chemical Industry in the USSR* 87.

⁷⁵⁴ Sagers, *The Chemical Industry in the USSR* 89.

⁷⁵⁵ R. Amman, J M Cooper and R W Davies eds., *The Technological Level of Soviet Industry* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

⁷⁵⁶ Iu. In'kov, 'Novyi tovar v mezhdunarodnoi torgovle,' *Vneshniaia torgovlia*, no.2 (1957): 28-33, 28.

(i.e. titanium), butane, propane and goods and technology related to the chemical and electronic industry.⁷⁵⁷ An article on the electrical industry opened with 'as a result of technological progress, in the market there are only new and newer goods'.⁷⁵⁸ Particular attention was given to the chemical and electronic industry, through the provision of figures, company names, identifying company directors etc. The basis of the new American trade was said to be 'new goods of a mass [produced] type' consisting of 'houses out of plastic, paper clothes, cars and turbines, etc.' that were the future of international trade and stood for the betterment of the people.⁷⁵⁹ The general mechanisation of agriculture was worthy of note, particularly the processes in England, Switzerland, and the USA as well as the proliferation of tractors (domestic and export) in the United States.⁷⁶⁰

The electronics industry can be segmented in four sections, the first two were military in nature, the third involved consumer goods, and the fourth was non-military industrial applications. Particular mention was made of General Electrics, UNIVAC, the Sperry Rand Corporation, the RAM – 650, RAMAC, Vickers and its counting machines, General Electric, English Electric, Ferranti, Elliot Brasers, IBM France etc., and of transistors, cameras with flashes, computers, calculators, and transistor radios. General Electric dominated the US industry and, along with Westinghouse Electric, profited from the combined military and civilian applications of new products. The US and Great Britain were the acknowledged leaders in electronics, followed by Japan and France, in that order.⁷⁶¹ The progressiveness of the increasingly widespread use of adding machines (calculators) and computers was promulgated as an economisation of time and labour, thus establishing 'stronger' firms.⁷⁶² The information on various pieces of technology could be remarkably specific, with lists of applications, capabilities and costs in foreign currency. At least one product of the above listed companies had its specifications published.⁷⁶³

⁷⁵⁷ E. Menzhinskii and I. Ivanov, 'Novye tovary v mezhdunarodnoi torgovle,' Vneshniaia torgovlia no.12 (1958): 29-33.

⁷⁵⁸ F. Levshin, 'Produktsia elektronnoi promyshlennosti v mezhdunarodni torgovle,' Vneshniaia torgovlia no.12 (1959): 35-41, 35.

⁷⁵⁹ Menzhinskii, 'Novye tovary v mezhdunarodnoi torgovle' 33.

⁷⁶⁰ G. Ignat'ev, 'Nekotorye osobennosti' Vneshniaia torgovlia no.1(1957): 19-22.

⁷⁶¹ Levshin, 'Produktsia elektronnoi promyshlennosti v mezhdunarodnoi torgovle' 35.

⁷⁶² In'kov, 'Novyi tovar v mezhdunarodnoi torgovle' 29.

⁷⁶³ For example see In'kov, 'Novyi tovar v mezhdunarodnoi torgovle' 28-33.

While the British (with 1,500 firms producing a range of 2,700 different electrical products)⁷⁶⁴ exported proportionately more than the US, the US led in overall quantity, controlling about one third of the international electronics trade.⁷⁶⁵ This market control was more noticeable when international branches of US companies were included in the calculations.⁷⁶⁶ European companies such as, Olivetti, Ericsson, etc. were listed as suitable alternatives to US firms. It was also noted that Japanese products were 'almost twice as cheap as an analogous product from an English or American company' and that in terms of the production of transistors, the Japanese were second only to the USA with the USA importing forty-six percent of Japanese exported transistors.⁷⁶⁷ Unlike articles on exhibitions in which Soviet and socialist achievements were regularly mentioned, there was little specific mention and direct comparison of and with the Soviet electronic industry. There was, however, some general information on Soviet electronic export. For example that the combined exports of England, France and Japan was less than the USSR, but that it was 'evident' that the US dominated the market, and that in the past few years Soviet electronics had started to gain international recognition (as noted in the *Financial Times*) and that the Soviet Union was set to export its goods to countries throughout the world.⁷⁶⁸

Continuing the theme of new, the introduction of articles on synthetic material tended to contain statements such as 'known to everyone, the international markets were full of new products.'⁷⁶⁹ In the article '*Sinteticheskie moiushchie sredstva – novyi tovar v mezhdunarodnoi torgovle*', the first synthetic compounds addressed were wash detergents and soaps. Both were reported as being widely produced and sold in many countries, notably in the USA (already during WWII), England (in the immediate post-war era), France, Italy, and Japan. This revelation was followed by an analysis of the properties of detergent, and its application. Specific companies mentioned as dominating research and the market included Procter and Gamble, Colgate-Palmolive, and Unilever (English-Dutch), which

764 Levshin, 'Produktsiia elektronnoi promyshlennosti v mezhdunarodnoi torgovle' 37.

765 Iu. Savinov, 'Mezhdunarodnaia torgovlia elektronnyim oborudovaniem,' *Vneshniaia torgovlia* no.10 (1969): 37-40, 37.

766 In'kov, 'Novyi tovar v mezhdunarodnoi torgovle' 33.

767 Levshin, 'Produktsiia elektronnoi promyshlennosti v mezhdunarodnoi torgovle' 39.

768 Levshin, 'Produktsiia elektronnoi promyshlennosti v mezhdunarodnoi torgovle' 40-41.

769 O. Tereshchenko, 'Sinteticheskie moiushchie sredstva – novyi tovar v mezhdunarodnoi torgovle,' *Vneshniaia torgovlia* no.10 (1957): 29-31, 29.

between them controlled sixty-six percent of the American market. The dramatic increase in sales permitted these extremely profitable companies to spend enormous amounts on advertising through cinema, television, radio and the printed press. The advertising budget of Procter and Gamble was listed at fifty million USD per year, and Unilever at not less than twenty-five million pounds sterling per year.⁷⁷⁰ Not only was capitalist technology closely followed, but methods of management, and marketing as well. In an article on marketing in the United States one reads about the numerous 'large' companies that maintain their own team of 'economists, statisticians, psychologists, and sociologists' in order to recommend marketing techniques.⁷⁷¹ Marketing has proven very successful for such conglomerates as Procter and Gamble, and for the manufacturer of the new detergent Bold (Unilever), the sales of which amounted to thirty eight million dollars in 1966.⁷⁷² The listing of companies in various industries is indicative of knowledge of the activities of foreign companies. The hierarchical ranking of companies/products based on size reinforces the concept of the large Soviet complexes by pointing to the successes of various large multinationals. It could also have served as a justification for or an indication to the industry specialist as to with whom negotiations ought to be conducted. Unlike exhibition articles in which most prices were quoted in roubles, the prices in the articles assessing new products used local currencies. This implied a general understanding of exchange rates.

Another area in which synthetic products was to be significant was in the textile industry. Reportedly, the Soviet textile industry had lagged behind those of the West due to a lack of opportunities and tradition in the sector. In turn, both of these factors allowed countries like the USA, Great Britain, Germany, Japan and Italy to advance, until hitting a crisis in 1952-53. The industry started to recover in 1955 with the mass production of synthetic fibres and automated weaving machines, although the American industry was considered to be struggling in the 1960s, as it was unable to compete with cheap imports. The US industry survived on the export

⁷⁷⁰ Tereshchenko, 'Sinteticheskie moiushchie sredstva – novyi tovar v mezhdunarodnoi trgovle' 31.

⁷⁷¹ V. Kolpachev, 'Marketing na kapitalisticheskom rynke,' *Vneshniaia trgovlia* no.10 (1969): 46-48, 46.

⁷⁷² Kolpachev, 'Marketing na kapitalisticheskom rynke' 46.

of machinery.⁷⁷³ Examinations of various levels of import/export sales, country specific and differentiating between equipment, finished products and raw materials appeared in *Vneshniaia torgovlia* concurrent with articles in *Rabotnitsa* about the need for and benefits of synthetic materials, specifically for textiles and shoes. It was acknowledged that during the 1920s and early 1930s machines were purchased almost exclusively from the West due to its 'monopoly'⁷⁷⁴ and that machines and lines would continue to be purchased from the West as they would fulfill a 'necessary place in Soviet imports' allowing for 'rapid progress'.⁷⁷⁵ This reliance on Western machines was however, expected to change. Since the end of WWII the Soviet Union could purchase machines and lines produced in socialist countries. In 1946, of 197 million roubles worth of machines, the Soviet Union imported 7 million roubles from socialist countries and by 1966 this figure stood at 1803 million roubles of 2308 million roubles.⁷⁷⁶ These machines or lines were often referred to as 'complete equipment for technical progress'.⁷⁷⁷

The deal with Pepsi permitted one of the prior symbols of capitalist decadence, soft drinks, to enter into the Soviet Union. Like the deal with Castrol Oil, it also represented an attempt to make the importation of Western consumer products self-funding. Prior to the deal with Pepsi Co, the Soviet Union had marketed Stolichnaya vodka through a small American import firm (Monsieur Henri Wines Ltd). Under an agreement that had been arranged with the assistance of Cyrus Eaton Jr, Richard Nixon, Donald Kendall, David Rockefeller and Meyer Lansky, Pepsi got the exclusive rights to sell Soviet vodka and wines in the USA. The drink was first introduced to the public at the American Exhibition and its presence required a shift in taste as well as political rhetoric as post WWII Russia had used cola as an anti-Western and more specifically anti-American totem, a symbol of the decadent degenerate decay. At the American exhibition Khrushchev initially declined the cola but Mikoyan sampled it and proposed that Khrushchev try it. The Chairman of the Presidium of Central Committee Kliment Voroshilov's comment was recorded as 'not bad' and the Minister of Culture Yekaterina A.

773 V. Mogutin, 'Rynok tekstil'nogo oborudovaniia,' *Vneshniaia torgovlia* no.10 (1958): 37-41.

774 V. Sushkov, 'Import mashin i oborudovaniia,' *Vneshniaia torgovlia* no.12 (1967): 9-11, 9.

775 Sushkov, 'Import mashin i oborudovaniia' 9.

776 Sushkov, 'Import mashin i oborudovaniia' 10.

777 Sushkov, 'Import mashin i oborudovaniia' 11.

Furtseva responded to Soviet reports asking if she liked the drink: 'Look for yourself, I'm drinking it.'⁷⁷⁸ In response to an American journalist's question 'do you think that the Soviet Union will now have a cola drink?' a Soviet bystander answered 'You saw who was drinking it and you saw how much they liked it, didn't you?'⁷⁷⁹ The deal was one litre of Pepsi concentrate for one litre of vodka, champagne or Armenian brandy, and was designed to prevent Soviet producers from getting the formula. Pepsi was to renovate a Soviet bottling plant in Novorossiisk, install high speed bottling lines, and train the Soviet personnel. After the initial plant in Novorossiisk had been built, plants in Leningrad, Tallinn, Kiev, Tashkent, Novosibirsk, Moscow, Alma Ata and Sukhumi were to be opened within seven years. Production was set at seventy-two million bottles per year. The bottles were not those traditionally used in the USA as there was concern that Soviet citizens would keep the bottles as collector items. To prevent this, standard Soviet bottles with foil souvenir stickers were used. The advertising campaign slogans were 'Feelin' Free' and 'a swallow of cold Pepsi-Cola will put you in a good mood and refresh you.' The price for a good mood and a refreshing feeling was steep: the Soviet government set the cost of the final product at forty kopecks per bottle in comparison with the local soft drinks that sold for a few kopecks. One theory as to why the Soviet government was willing to bring in Pepsi, as proposed to Kendall by a Soviet counterpart, was that 'if there was a prestigious consumer item like Pepsi, Russians would spend their savings on it instead of on vodka.'⁷⁸⁰ While it is plausible that the Soviet government sought to divert personal resources away from alcohol, the production of seventy two million bottles per year, for a population of 250 million would have resulted in one bottle per year for every third person. The initial sale of Pepsi was restricted to resorts, *beriozki* and some hotels and restaurants. This restriction further negates the argument of Pepsi being used as an alternative to vodka, but is indicative of the linkage between Pepsi as Western and Pepsi as a Soviet symbol of elitism and leisure. Another theory as to why Pepsi was permitted was that Western consumer goods were sought by the elite and that it 'was in the interest of the state to keep this Westernophile elite content and feeling

⁷⁷⁸ Joseph Finder, Red Carpet (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1983) 204-205.

⁷⁷⁹ Finder, Red Carpet 204-205.

⁷⁸⁰ Finder, Red Carpet 215.

prosperous for they run the organs of state, edit the newspapers, sing at the Bolshoi and design the nuclear rockets.'⁷⁸¹ The latter explanation is consistent with research into the techniques for and the purchase of calf leather boots and Alfa Romeos.

The record of a meeting on trade ties between the USA and USSR that included Averell Harriman and K. N. Rudnev reveals that there was a genuine interest in trade ties with the USA, but that the Soviet Union was willing to go elsewhere. This point was emphasised when Rudnev noted that the USSR had good scientific and technological ties with France, England, Italy and Japan. For his part, Harriman expressed interest in the Soviet agreement with Fiat, and the science and technology agreements with France, in particular the clauses covering colour televisions acknowledging that the Americans had been sluggish on the issue of colour televisions and expressing his hope that there was room for cooperation. When the Soviet representative Pronsky was asked why Fiat was chosen, the short answer was that the decision was made by the *pravitel'stvo*, followed by the explanation that Fiat was ready to cooperate with the USSR on mutually advantageous terms and was willing to acquaint Soviet specialists with its enterprises. Rudnev interjected that the agreement with France in the field of colour televisions was carried out on an equal footing and was mutually beneficial to the two countries, and that the agreement with France did not exclude cooperation with American industry so long as the systems were compatible. The very first experimental colour TV broadcasts were performed in 1928 in Great Britain Baird and H.E. Ives in the USA and the USA was the first nation to start regular colour broadcasts (1953). In 1960, Japan was second, using the American NTSC TV (National Television Standards Committee) broadcast system. In Western Europe, no consensus was found on a colour TV broadcast system with France instituting SECAM (Sequential Colour With Memory), while most of the remainder of Europe decided to use PAL (Phase Alternate Lines – a modification of the American system). Despite Britain's relatively late start with regular colour broadcasts (1967 along with West Germany), the British were active in promoting their system. In the end, Eastern Europe and Russia along with several African nations were equipped with a modified SECAM system. The SECAM system was developed in France in light of both technical and political considerations (the need to develop

⁷⁸¹ Finder, Red Carpet 216.

and support domestic industries and a strong resistance to initially German systems like PAL). The transmission of programmes could not be prevented by implementing SECAM as opposed to PAL, but these programmes could only be viewed in the least desirable black and white format. Work on SECAM began in 1956 in France with Russian assistance. Part of this co-operation led to the development of NIR or SECAM IV by the Moscow based Telecentrum. SECAM systems are highly individualised and the modified versions are not necessarily compatible with each other. An interesting research project would be the comparison of French, British, and American motives in actively pursuing colour television contracts with the Soviet Union.

Like the Americans and the French, the British had also been active in the contract bidding for colour televisions. The BBC engineering division for colour television was willing to supply technical help, engineering, training both in England and in Russia, and equipment (the same as used by BBC but with outsourced manufacturing). In a letter from L. Maksakov (on behalf of the *Goskomitet* for radio and television) to the Central Committee (09.07.1965) it was stated that despite differences between the British and the Soviet colour television systems, it was expedient to establish fields of cooperation with the British in this sphere.⁷⁸² In 1967, the BBC was again visiting the USSR to discuss colour TV systems. A general level of disappointment on the part of foreign firms in light of Soviet purchases after exhibitions and delegations, did not deter trade.

Despite Khrushchev's decision to favour car pools over private passenger vehicles, research into updating the automotive industry occurred during his leadership. Research into the issue began with assessments of the Soviet passenger car in comparison with foreign vehicles, and was limited initially to specifications and aspects of production that were seen as challenges to producing a 'Western' standard car. Foreign companies were contacted either with the intent to purchase parts that would be integrated into pre-existing plants and models; and/or the purchase of new models and production lines. An example of the first was fitting the *Moskvich* or the *Volga* with tubeless tyres 'as is standard in the USA and in

⁷⁸² '09.07.1965 3-11/379,' RGAE 9480/9/185: 1964-1966.

Western Europe.⁷⁸³ In the report on the production of auto parts based on foreign models for the *Moskvich* and *Volga* it was stated that 'it is necessary to act like the Japanese and to purchase a licence.'⁷⁸⁴ The initial research on foreign models focused on the below listed manufacturers and models.⁷⁸⁵

Table 9 Foreign Car Models Researched

	Brand	Model
Italy	Alfa Romeo	1900 super
	Lancia	Aurelia PS, GT 2500, GT 2500 super
	Fiat	1100
UK	Pathfinder Rover	Rover-90
West Germany	Hansa	BMW 502
	Mercedes	220, 300c
	Opel	Captain
	Ford (Germany)	Taurus
	Porsche	
France	Peugeot	203
	Citroen	
USA	Nash	Metropolitan

The new model *Moskva* of 1956 was compared unfavourably in the report 'On the question of the preparation of the automobile *Moskva*' with the *Fiat 1100*, *Austin A-50*, *Nash Metropolitan*, and *Volkswagen deluxe*. The research focused on specifications and not on price categories.⁷⁸⁶

In 1967 (28.02-18.03), SCST sent a delegation to look at the British automotive industry, specifically Ford, British Motors Corp, Leyland Motors and Perkins. During this trip, car parks, in house training, bonus systems and speed of model innovation for both passenger cars and buses were documented. 'The British system of repairs was considered 'good' but the Italian and American organisation of repairs were better.'⁷⁸⁷ The result of the trip was the purchase of three Panthers from Leyland and three Red Arrows, six model Viceroy's and thirty tourist buses from Duple Motor Bodies as well as four licences for three factories in Moscow and the Yaroslav Motor Factory.⁷⁸⁸

783 'Po voprosu podgotovki proizvodstva legkovogo avtomobila m-402 na moskovskom zavode malolitrazhnykh avtomobilei,' RGAE 9480/2/3: 115-125, 116.

784 'Z. b. St. Referenta UVS,' RGAE 9480/9/455: 113.

785 'Po voprosu podgotovki proizvodstva legkovogo avtomobila m-402 na moskovskom zavode malolitrazhnykh avtomobilei' 121-123.

786 'Po voprosu podgotovki vypuska avtomobilei 'Moskva',' RGAE 9480/2/3: 149-151, 151.

787 'Plessi 17.11.1967,' RGAE 9480 9/431: 103-104.

788 'O poseshchenii avtomobil'nykh i traktornykh zavodov Anglii,' RGAE 9480/9/431: 124-133.

The process of researching and applying foreign technology and practices was prominent throughout the 1960s, despite increased reservations of the viability of emulating Western practices. This emulation process can be seen not only in the attempt to provide equivalency in goods but in the use of foreign successes as indicative of Soviet successes. For example, in a letter to the Central Committee of the CPSU from SCST (12.03.1969) and signed by A. Shelepin, V. Kirillin, M. Keldysh, and G. Panisheva, the concept of a new scientific journal, described as providing information on scientific and technological progress, economic and scientific organisational research, propaganda for technical findings and results in the research fields of agriculture, applied sciences and technology, was floated. The journal was to be an accessible study of national and international scientific and technical progress for the layman and professional and serve as a technical supplement to the popular journals *Science and Life* and *Youth Technology* and a readable supplement to the existing, often inaccessible and overly technical, Soviet journals. The format of the proposed journal was modelled on *International Science and Technology* (USA) and its viability was justified by indicating that *International Science and Technology* had a print run of several million and that analogous journals were published in England, France, Czechoslovakia, GDR and other countries.⁷⁸⁹

The purchase of foreign technology and the importation of ideas provided a wide stratum of Soviet society with tangible evidence of Western scientific and technological skills. The careful deliberation surrounding the necessity of the purchase enhanced the prestige of what was purchased. In addition, through the purchasing process, the information was transferred from one group of Soviet specialists to another, thus further disseminating the idea of Western science and technology. The purchasing of Western science and technology showed the advances of the West in their own right as well as highlighting the deficiencies of the Soviet system. The next stage, the process of installation and integration, was often marred by bureaucratic failures and industrial shortcomings.

⁷⁸⁹ 'OTPR VTsSPSno.80n of 12.03.1969,' RGAE 9480/ 9/Ed. Klr. 772: 30-32.

c. Assimilating technology

Foreign technology was typically associated with short-term remedies in a system in which failing to meet short and medium term goals had the potential to cause great disruption. In the West, technology quickly became part of production and served as a springboard for new technology. However, in the Soviet Union the 'same quality of scientific resources that launched satellites into space were simultaneously incapable of incorporating sufficient technological potential into the production process in order to progressively improve consumer welfare.'⁷⁹⁰ Exposure to Western technology meant exposure to the potential of success or failure of the application of said technology. Western technology came at a high price: it strained systems, was associated with higher quotas, and often needed to prove itself. Failures to assimilate it were frustrating, embarrassing and potentially disruptive for personal careers and the Party.

Studies tracing the decision-making process to import new technology through to production have not cast Soviet industry in a favourable light. The unwieldy nature of the Soviet industrial complex was to frustrate both Western and Soviet specialists and workers, for example, on average it took Soviet chemical and tool sectors twice as long as their Western counterparts to complete a new process.⁷⁹¹ In 1967, it took the Soviet Union forty-one months from licence purchasing to production start up of the Pilkington float glass-making process⁷⁹²; the average time required by sixteen other international purchasers was twenty-seven months.⁷⁹³ Continuing to compare the UK and the USSR, the first electronic controller entered into production in 1951 in the USSR and 1949 in the UK. The next generation, the transistorised controller, did not start in the USSR until 1974 but was implemented in the UK by 1959. On average, the Soviet Union required two and half times longer than the UK to institute new technology.⁷⁹⁴ Below is a

⁷⁹⁰ Christoph Schneider, Research and Development Management From the Soviet Union to Russia (Heidelberg, Physica-Verlag, 1994) 1.

⁷⁹¹ Technology and East West Trade: Office of technology Assessment Congress of the United States 223.

⁷⁹² Float glass was often used in the automotive industry it is made by melting raw materials: sand, limestone, soda ash, dolomite, iron oxide and salt cake. Pilkington is considered to be an innovator of this process of producing flat, smooth, even sheets of glass.

⁷⁹³ Holliday, Technology Transfer to the USSR, 1928-1937 and 1966-1975 89.

⁷⁹⁴ 'Reshenie: Gostekhniki SSSR po voprosu razrabotki konstruktсии i tekhnologii izgotovlevniiia beskamernykh avtomobil'nykh shin,' RGAE 9480/2/3: 58-60, 58.

chart with a few examples of implementation times in the Soviet Union in comparison with other Western nations. The table below contains figures showing the introduction of technology by year, and the number of years until the first plant, commercial venture etc was operative.⁷⁹⁵

Table 10 Introduction and Implementation of Technology

	USSR	USA	UK	West Germany	Japan
Oxygen converters first plant	1956	1954	1960	1955	1957
	16	12	5	11	5
Continuous flood of steel first plant	1955	1962	1958	1954	1960
	17	7	16	14	10
Synthetic fibres beginning of mass production	1948	1938	1941	1941	1942
	25	21	23	23	21
Alternating high pressure current first line	1956	1954	1962	1955	NA
	14	16	7	18	
Nuclear energy first commercial electric station	1954	1957	1956	1961	NA
	21	14	6	9	
Machine tools with numerical programme first working mass produced prototype	1958	1952	1956	1958	1958
	13	13	12	15	15

The comparatively lengthy period from the introduction of a new technology, be it foreign or national, was attributed to vagueness, extensive documentation, lack of direct contact between the supplier of technology and the final user, inexperienced workers assigned to installation, inability to operate and maintain complex equipment, poor management, and shortages of trained personnel and raw materials.⁷⁹⁶ Slow start-ups were often due to labour problems exacerbated by a lack of living quarters. Indeed, the lack of living accommodation was severe enough that Soviet negotiators would occasionally insist on the foreign company building accommodation.⁷⁹⁷ In a report on the utilisation of American and Czechoslovakian machines in the agriculture industry one can read that the imported machines appear to work in accordance with the primary functions but 'with

⁷⁹⁵ Bezborodov, *Vlast' i nauchno-tekhnicheskaja politika v SSSR serediny 50kh- serediny 70kh godov* 163.

⁷⁹⁶ From an unpublished manuscript of Philip Hanson and M. R. Hill, *Technology and East West Trade* 224.

⁷⁹⁷ Nove, *Political Economy and Soviet Socialism* 163.

reference to our [Soviet Russian] conditions, have demanded some alteration.'⁷⁹⁸ These Soviet conditions involved energy spikes, overly high humidity levels, poor quality materials, inadequate oil, and substandard materials. Alterations often resulted in decreased efficiency and quality. Workers, plant managers and industry bosses could not but have been aware of and frustrated by the Soviet failure to successfully adopt the new technology. These difficulties occasionally appeared in the Soviet press. In 1969, a Soviet economist used six chemical projects designed for the Soviet Union by Western companies to illustrate the failure of the Soviet regime to properly use labour saving technology provided by the West. In one of the projects, the Western firm believed that the Soviet Union should have been able to work with the same number of auxiliary workers, in this case ninety-one. The Soviet project required 723 auxiliary workers, three and half times more engineering and technical workers and fifty-five percent more chief technicians than stipulated by the Western design.'⁷⁹⁹ Another example of the failure of implementation was the purchase of a foreign license for the production of disk brakes and brake equipment for the automobile industry: the Ministry of Automotive Industry did not organise quickly enough and the license expired before production could begin.⁸⁰⁰

Complaints about poorly qualified workers were common both in the press and amongst officials. When Kerry Williams of Computing Consulting presented his assessment of the Soviet computer programming sector he stated that he was prepared to help revamp the industry and to find foreign companies willing to provide information and machines but that Soviet workers were not ready to work with the current level of Western technology.⁸⁰¹ The American firm Puritan Fashion was invited to present production techniques (factories) for men's and women's light clothing (suits, dresses) in February of 1967, to tender an offer for new factories, and to assess the Soviet garment industry. The purchased factory for men's shirts employed 930 workers, cost 3.5 million USD and was financed at 7-7.5 percent interest with repayment to be half cash and half goods. It had a production

⁷⁹⁸ 'O Rezul'tatakh provedeniia v 1956 godu proizvodstvennykh opytov po vneseniiu zhidkikh... 21.12.1956,' RGAE 9480/2/13.

⁷⁹⁹ E. Manevich, 'Problemy vosproizvodstva rabochei sily i puti uluchsheniia ispol'zovaniia trudovykh resursov v SSSR,' *Voprosii ekonomiki* no.10, 1969.

⁸⁰⁰ *Pravda* (12.03.1974) 1.

⁸⁰¹ 'Otchet o prebyvanii v SSSR direktora angliiskol firmy Computer Consultants 10-20.10.1966' 1-67.

capacity of ten million units per year. Construction began two months after the contract was signed, the construction of two subsequent factories one for dresses with a production capacity of five million per (2.56 million USD) and one for corsets, bras etc with 1048 workers and a capacity of 8 million units per year (2.97 USD) were negotiated. The American firm provided the credits for all of the factories. In the contracts it was written that Puritan Fashion would build homes for workers around the new factories. Despite the large contracts, there was concern that Soviet workers would not have the technological knowledge to man the lines. Miles Rubin, the president of Puritan Fashion, toured *Soviet Factory 52* (shirts) and calculated that the factory should have been producing twelve million units per year and not three. According to Rubin, the problem lay in workers at thirty percent capacity, poor organisation of leadership, poorly qualified workers, slow speed of work, primitive production lines, poor mechanisation, outdated methods and machines, and poor quality controls (for example, he noted that the end of the work day was reached when a day's worth of goods - with or without flaws - had been produced). Rubin offered to revamp *Factory 52* by altering the ratio of master to worker, installing new machines, reorganising the factory, and retraining the workers for 1.5 million USD. Output was to increase from three to nine million units per year and income by forty to forty-five million roubles per year.⁸⁰² The ability to dramatically increase production and income without needing to build a new factory, was of interest to the Soviet government, and resulted in a great deal of attention being committed to Western organisational and management methods. Rubin was also underwhelmed by the skills and work ethic of the Soviet worker 'as I [Rubin] mentioned in our meetings, machinery alone cannot bring the desired result.'⁸⁰³ However, as Levison has commented: 'How do you motivate the appallingly low paid workers in a joint venture when they know that half of the profits are going back to the capitalist camp?'⁸⁰⁴ The railway worker Grigorii Artemenko (born 1942) was to transfer the charge of inefficiency back to the system when he commented in an interview with David Mandel 'on the imported equipment, the worker has all the conditions for productive work. The capitalists

⁸⁰² 'Z. b. zamestitelia predsedatelia Gostekhniki D. M Gvishiani s predsedatelem Soveta direktorov amerikanskoi firmy Puritan Fashion 11.03.1967,' RGAE 9480/9/456: 251-253.

⁸⁰³ 'Letter from Miles Rubin to Gvishiani 26.05.1967,' RGAE 9480/9/431: 77-78.

⁸⁰⁴ Levinson, Vodka-Cola 261.

insist on this with a view to their own profits.’⁸⁰⁵ According to Artemenko, Soviet equipment was of poor quality and design. The failures of the Soviet system were highlighted through the assimilation process, and responsibility was shifted from one social group to another. Ultimately, it was to be placed at the feet of the system itself.

Domestic and industrial electricity presented another large challenge to Soviet industry in relation to the assimilation of Western technology. In a published speech Malenkov stated that the Soviet: ‘lagging behind the USA in labour productivity is closely connected with our inadequate provision of electric power facilities to labour.’⁸⁰⁶ In the drive to provide a comparable standard of living there was a significant increase in housing, appliances etc. He went on to attribute the American growth in power resources to the construction of modern power plants with large turbine units with a capacity of 150,000 to 260,000kw. This was in contrast to the significantly lower capacity of Soviet turbine units.⁸⁰⁷ At the time of this statement the USSR did not have the necessary turbines in production let alone installed. In addition to not having the same level of electricity, utilisation patterns were different. In the late 1950s, Soviet electrical usage allotted 15.5 percent to agricultural and municipal use while the level of domestic electricity consumption alone in the USA was as twenty-seven percent. The Soviet energy famine was to challenge mass automation as well as the utilisation of labour saving devices in the home.

The failures of imported technology were also due in part to application and organisation. F. Brambilla of Pirelli’s assessment of Soviet tyre factories was that ‘we saw much good mechanised and automated equipment, but it is necessary to correctly use all of it.’⁸⁰⁸ Brambilla also noted a general lack of selection. In the 1950s, Pirelli Rubber Company had been contracted to build a plant worth fifty million USD for tyre production. In 1967, Pirelli agreed to sell eight different lines

⁸⁰⁵ Interview with Griogorii Artemenko in David Mandel, Interviews with Workers in the Former Soviet Union: Perestroika and After: Viewed from Below (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994) 12.

⁸⁰⁶ (19.02.1957 Pravda 6-8, Izvestija 2-4); ‘The Directives on the Sixth Five Year Plan 15.01’ Gruliov, Current Soviet Policies II 31.

⁸⁰⁶ Speech by G. M. Malenkov, Gruliov, Current Soviet Policies 94.

⁸⁰⁷ Speech by G. M. Malenkov, Gruliov, Current Soviet Policies 95.

⁸⁰⁸ ‘Z. b. zamestitelja predsedatelja Gostekhnike D. M Gvishiani s predsedatelem italijskoi firmy Pirelli F. Brambilla 28.04.1967,’ RGAE 9480/9/457:106-112, 109

for tyre production for the *Fiat 124*, thereby providing for some flexibility in the system and variety for the consumer. This was rejected by the Tyre Institute for a level more on par with the West: twenty-five lines producing three types of both winter and summer tyres. Gosplan was to reject the idea of twenty-five lines and favour the purchase of eight lines, which were to be dismissed as inadequate shortly after production began. The final contract was negotiated in 1975.

An American steel delegation surveying the Russian steel industry, notably Magnitogorsk in the summer of 1958, was to remark on the focus on speed and on the number of cranes at the open-hearth shops (double that which would be present at an American one).⁸⁰⁹ Writing at the time, David Granick stated that:

The economic forces at work are simple. Labour is relatively plentiful in the Soviet Union compared to the United States. Russia is still a country, which can afford to use women with brooms to keep the streets spotless. But machinery and gadgets are expensive. Freight cars are expensive. New investment is still concentrated upon increasing production, and not on saving labour. It is still cheaper to use seven men with hand trucks instead of one man with a power truck. When this situation changes, as it long ago changed in the United States and has recently changed in England, we may be confident that fork trucks will find their way into Russian plants. Until that time, the Russian leaders are sufficiently good businessmen to keep their wild-eyed engineers under wraps.⁸¹⁰

However, the Russian leaders were not able to keep vast sections of society under wraps. They simply could not control all those individuals who researched the West, had contact with the West, had contact with Western technology in their place of work, or had spoken with individuals who worked with Western technology. The Soviet press spoke of the successes and challenges of assimilating Western technology. Khrushchev spoke of it. The masses spoke of it. If it was a secret that it was one in which the empire wore no clothes.

⁸⁰⁹ Granick, The Red Executive 112.

⁸¹⁰ Granick, The Red Executive 212.

Conclusion

The terminology employed by the Bolsheviks was industrial. From the earliest days of the Soviet state terms such as constructing, building, forging, working, were emphasised.⁸¹¹ During the 1930s, it was not unusual to see personification of industrial processes with emotions typically associated with a family being applied to industry, 'little Magnitka,' love for one's furnace, life being given to machines, lines and factories and the use of human developmental stages to describe the construction of a factory. Statements about the building of factories were accompanied by statements about how man was being rebuilt, thus strengthening the ties between the Soviet person and industry giving each characteristics of the other. The adoption of Taylorism, the study of human movement in the attempt to make it more machine-like, is another example of this melding. This connection to and personification of industry was strengthened during WWII when the nation's survival depended in part on the tremendous endeavour of moving factories east of the Urals in order to ensure supplies for the front and for the population. The employment system and distribution of goods also contributed to this, as the work place was often responsible for supplying food, shelter and other goods and services. After WWII, technology in the form of nuclear advances assisted in vaulting the USSR into superpower status and endowing it with all of the rights and responsibilities that this entailed. All of this was to increase the importance of industry for the individual, and contribute to Soviet society's sensitivity to economic and technological success. Looking at the situation in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Richard Nixon was to conclude that need for economic and technological success was to result in significant deviations from Communist practices:

the people in the Communist empire [particularly true in the Soviet Union], in order to get production moving, have had to depart from Communist principles. For example, in factory after factory that I visited I found that the differential between those who were the top producers, the best thinkers, the most creative contributors, on the one hand, and the average worker, on the other, was far greater in the Soviet Union than in the United States, or in any other capitalist country in the world today. I found that the rewards, which are given to scientists and to engineers, are relatively greater than they are in

⁸¹¹ For examples of the use of the systems approach in management see G. Pospelov, 'The Systems Approach' *Pravda* (21.03.1974) 2.

a country like the United States...The way they are improving production is by departing radically from Communist principles.⁸¹²

Giovanni Agnelli was to extend this to senior Soviet officials when he commented: 'they're really ravioli revolutionaries, much more capitalist pasta than revolutionary meat.'⁸¹³

The basic economic law of socialism posits the 'steady expansion and improvement of production on the basis of advanced techniques with the aim of the fullest satisfaction of the steadily increasing requirements and the many sided development of the members of society.'⁸¹⁴ As the vanguard, the Communist Party sought to maintain power through an economic system that it acknowledged as failing to match Western economic development.⁸¹⁵ The Party was ultimately responsible for this failure, despite its attempts to deflect it.⁸¹⁶ The sense of official frustration and eventual avoiding of responsibility can be seen in such documents as the speeches concerning the Directives of the Sixth Five Year Plan.

The fact of the matter is that the successes of our industry have turned the heads of some economic and Party officials, have fostered conceit and complacency in them, and in a number of cases have brought about an underestimation of the need for continuous improvement of production, for introduction of the latest achievements of domestic and foreign science and technology. We still have many officials 'men in mummy cases' who fear everything that is new and advanced. An old fossil of an official argues: 'Why should I become mixed up in all this? There will be a lot of bother and it might even lead to unpleasantness. They talk about improving production! Is it worthwhile knocking your brains out over it? Let the highers up worry...Another official, after he has received instructions, directs his energies largely to evading a vital job or merely going through the motions of tackling it.'⁸¹⁷

Taking into account charges of inefficiency and of hare-brained schemes, the period from Sputnik to the first man on the moon, was one in which the isolation from foreign competition, restricted technology transfer and reduced contact with foreign specialists of the Stalin era was fundamentally altered and in which improvements in economic circumstances were brought to the average citizen. The

⁸¹² Nixon, The Challenges We Face 32-33.

⁸¹³ Levinson, Vodka-Cola 280.

⁸¹⁴ David Dyker 'Ideology and Soviet Economic Policy,' Stephen White ed., Ideology and Soviet Politics: 11-135, 115.

⁸¹⁵ Buck-Morss, Dream World and Catastrophe 39.

⁸¹⁶ Lewin, Stalinism and the Seeds of Soviet Reform 239.

⁸¹⁷ 'The Directives on the Sixth Five Year Plan 15.01' 39.

economic developments under Khrushchev in the early years were successful enough to 'give rise to unduly optimistic expectations and, unwisely, forecasts.'⁸¹⁸ The equipment, production lines, technical expertise and turnkey factories that were purchased and installed during the 1960s were to form the productive base of many enterprises into the 1980s.⁸¹⁹ Imported technology was used until it became obsolete and 'further domestic development to improve the national technology base and its international status was not encouraged.'⁸²⁰ The technological and economic gap between the West and the Soviet Union was a discussion with which scientists and Party officials were concerned and questioned the veracity of the claim that the Soviet Union was catching up with the West.⁸²¹ As early as 1965 Soviet physicist Petr Kapitsa had written that the gap between Soviet and American technology was increasing.⁸²² Airplane designer Oleg Konstantinovich Antonov entered into this discussion when he made the sardonic published remark: 'Kiev mathematicians have calculated that, in order to draft an accurate and fully integrated plan of material technical supply just for the Ukraine for one year, one requires the labour of the entire world's population for ten million years.'⁸²³

Despite the comparative economic failure, in absolute terms, there was a significant increase in the material wealth of the population. The failure to match American output while substantially increasing in consumer goods can be illustrated in increases in numerous consumer goods between 1965 and 1975 (See Appendix E). A solid estimate of consumption levels for the period of 1960-1964 shows a growth rate of 1.9 percent per annum.⁸²⁴ In 1950, consumption of goods and services constituted sixty percent of the Gross National Product (GNP). This was to rise promisingly and then fall. By 1980, it had fallen to fifty-four percent. This despite consumption of goods having grown at an annual rate of 4.3 percent per year since 1950 and services increasing from 4.2 percent to 4.7 percent of GNP. Thus, consumption fell relative to the wealth of the nation but not relative to historic

⁸¹⁸ Roger Munting, The Economic Development of the USSR (London: Croom Helm, 1982) 132.

⁸¹⁹ Boris Kagarlitsky, The Disintegration of the Monolith trans. Renfrey Clarke (London: Verso, 1992) 17.

⁸²⁰ Schneider, Research and Development Management From the Soviet Union to Russia 5.

⁸²¹ See Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy 92.

⁸²² As quoted in Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy 62.

⁸²³ As found in Nove, Political Economy and Soviet Socialism 120.

⁸²⁴ Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy 87.

precedents. Real per capita consumption nearly tripled between 1950 and 1980.⁸²⁵ Consumption of soft durables constituted a particularly successful branch of the economy increasing from six percent to eleven percent.⁸²⁶

*Table 11 Some Indicators of Soviet Consumption 1965-1970*⁸²⁷

	1965	1970
Per capita consumption of soft goods		
Cloth per square metre	26.5	30.4
Knitwear units	4.2	5.3
Footwear in pairs	2.4	3
Stocks of durables per 1,000 persons		
Radios	165	199
TVs	68	143
Cameras	67	77
Motorcycles	17	21
Refrigerators	29	89
Washing machines	59	141

Measured at factor cost, the Soviet per capita consumption increased at an average annual rate of 2.9 percent from 1950 to 1969 and 2.2 percent from 1970 to 1980. This decrease is a reflection of both the overall slow down of GNP growth and the falling share of consumption in the GNP. Khrushchev's era was one in which consumer consumption held a comparatively high economic priority. This occurred during a period of increased interaction with the West and Western science and technology.

Khrushchev's claims that important elements of communism could be attained in the space of a generation implied that the problems hindering progress were technical and not socio-political.⁸²⁸ It encouraged a focus on economic problems, and resulted in the evaluation of party activity in terms of economic

⁸²⁵ Gertrude Schroeder and Elizabeth Denton, 'An Index of Consumption in the USSR,' USSR: Measures of Economic Growth and Development, 1950-1980: Studies Prepared for the Use of the Joint Economic Committee Congress of the US (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1982) 317-401, 325.

⁸²⁶ John Pitzer 'Gross National Product of the USSR 1950-1980,' USSR: Measures of Economic Growth and Development, 1950-1980: Studies prepared for the use of the Joint Economic Committee Congress of the US; 3- 169, 19.

⁸²⁷ Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy 115.

⁸²⁸ Grey Hodnett ed., Resolutions and Decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Vol 4 the Khrushchev Years 1953-1964 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1974) 8.

production being a defining characteristic of Khrushchevism.⁸²⁹ As printed in *Pravda*: 'the toilers of our country know that the continuing improvements of the material well being of all segments of the population – workers, kolkhozniki, and intelligentsia - and the maximal satisfaction of the constantly growing material and cultural demands of the whole of society, have always been and continue to be the object of particular concern for the Communist party and the Soviet government' and that this was to be achieved by 'giving productive application to the achievements of Soviet and foreign science and technology.'⁸³⁰ Again in *Pravda*, but over a decade later (1965), the main task of the party was to ensure 'high rates of development... [and that] to achieve this it is necessary to ensure in practice the wide economic application of the newest achievements of domestic and foreign science and technology, scientific organisation of labour, and improvements in the quality of production.'⁸³¹ The responsibility was put on the ministries before the Party, state, and Soviet people for the successful development of the economy and the 'fuller satisfaction of the needs of the population for high quality consumer goods.'⁸³²

The groups of individuals who were charged with assessing and implementing Western technology were those from which the Communist Party required the most support. The access of broadly defined elite groups to things Western, was to be a source of contention for the public and meant that those at the top of the Soviet social structure were very likely to be disenchanted and disillusioned with the comparative results of the Soviet experiment. These elites had few illusions regarding the economic and technological differences between the Soviet Union and the West. As a group that had access to many of the economic benefits of the West, it is unlikely that they would have tried to maintain the illusion amongst themselves. By the mid 1960s, it was publicly acknowledged that there had been a significant amount of ineffective decision making from the state organs regarding science and technology.⁸³³ In a report for the Council of Ministers

⁸²⁹ Hodnett, Resolutions and Decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 8.

⁸³⁰ *Pravda* (06.03.1953) 1.

⁸³¹ *Pravda* (01.10.1965); Donald V. Schwartz ed., Resolutions and Decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Vol. 5: the Brezhnev Years 1964-1981 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982) 54.

⁸³² Schwartz, Resolutions and Decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 54.

⁸³³ Bozborodov, 'Vlast' i nauchno-tehnicheskaja politika v SSSR serediny 50kh- serediny 70kh godov 127.

Comrade Rudnev asked how the Soviet economic output could realistically increase by sixty times over 1960 levels by 1980.⁸³⁴ No answer was given.

⁸³⁴ 'Z. b. Soveta min. SSSR Tov. Rudnevy K. N.,' RGAE 9480/7/6 : 103-104.

5: Driving Towards Communist Consumerism:

AVTOVAZ⁸³⁵

In setting ourselves the task of overtaking and surpassing the capitalist countries in per capita output, we are setting ourselves the task of overtaking and surpassing the richest capitalist countries in the matter of per capita consumption, of achieving a complete abundance in our country of every type of consumers' goods.

(N. S. Khrushchev) ⁸³⁶

Introduction

The era in which the AVTOVAZ project was first proposed was one of optimism. The great patriotic war had been fought and won, the extreme scarcity of resources of the war and immediate post war era had passed and, even taking into consideration the potential doctoring of figures, an impressive growth in GDP/GNP had occurred. The AVTOVAZ was one of the first and largest post-WWII international projects, and had a significant impact that was not restricted to a few individuals or to a specific geographic area. The VAZ project brought together the Soviet elite, specific Soviet workers, the general Soviet public, and Western purveyors of technology. It also brought together the ideas of an elite with an openness to Western technology; the general Soviet belief in the benefits of Western technology; the usage of Western technology to forward a Soviet objective for its future; and demands of the general population for consumer goods. In the case of VAZ, one of the most prominent articles of consumption, the private passenger car, was being introduced to Soviet society as dependent on both Soviet and Italian efforts. The introduction of this chapter provides a description of the historical nature of the Soviet automotive industry, with its ties to the West, through Khrushchev's reluctance to invest in private passenger cars; and on to the public acclamations of the Italian-Soviet joint project. In the section 'The necessity of foreign presence' public opinion is surveyed regarding the Soviet ability to develop quickly and efficiently the automotive industry without foreign input. The overwhelming rejection of this possibility demonstrates the penetration of the positive technological and scientific image of the West. As the car was a prime

⁸³⁵ I would like to thank the Loukin family for their kindness and assistance with the research conducted in To'liatti.

⁸³⁶ XX S'ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza, stenograficheskie otchet 82.

symbol of consumption, an analysis of the connections between worker contentment, standard of living and the VAZ project can be used to highlight how Soviet workers were addressing personal consumptive expectations within a partially non-Soviet setting. The VAZ project provided Soviet citizens with a connection to the West through technological advancement and the universal theme of the passenger car.

'The Volzhsky automobile giant plant amazed people all over the world and made them believe again in the 'Russian miracle'. But it was not a miracle. It was a job that was as good as a deed, and it was a deed that was as good as a job.'⁸³⁷ The method of cooperation employed for the building of the AVTOVAZ was referred to as the 'modified systems approach', which involved long term or continuous contacts; project oriented industrial co-operation and Western involvement in training and in the decision making process. By the early 1970s this was to become the preferred method of production in high priority industries.⁸³⁸ The AVTOVAZ project is representative of the importation of a technical idea from the West and the reality of the West as seen in the cooperation with Fiat.⁸³⁹ The widespread awareness of knowledge of Western co-operation was to have an equally wide spread impact on mass perceptions. By publicly announcing the benefits, if not the necessity of international co-operation, the Soviet regime laid the groundwork for the assimilation of the idea of Western approaches into the *longue durée* of Soviet public thought.

The automobile remained an elite item in the Soviet Union until the 1950s when it became a symbol for, although not a possession of, the masses. This symbol included associations with freedom, power, privacy and technology. Cars granted individuals the opportunity to travel when they wanted, with whom they wanted, and where they wanted (within reason). The individual was encapsulated in a private possession that acted as a barrier to the togetherness of Soviet life. If the communal flat was adopted as a means of concretely bringing communism into the

⁸³⁷ Julia Smamova, *Avtovaz: Segodnia i zavtra* (Moscow: Interbook, 1991) 3.

⁸³⁸ Max Ralls, 'Worker's Social Perceptions,' Leonard Schapiro and Joseph Godson, *The Soviet Worker: Illusions and Realities* (Macmillan, 1982): 242.

⁸³⁹ The primary source material for this work reflects the primary objective of examining the economic image of the West through the VAZ experience. Thus, figures have been taken as representing what was being said and not what was actually the case. This approach also means that extremely rich archival material has not been included.

homes of citizens, than the introduction of privately owned passenger cars provided an escape route from the communalisation of daily life. One of the most important images associated with the car was as a haven from the panoptic eye of society and the unreliability of public transport. This can be seen in such mundane practices as the use of the parked car as a 'make out haven' and the use of 'going for a drive' as a synonym for needing to be alone or needing to speak in private. That the car was seen as a viable alternative to the unreliable and often crowded public transport and the failure of public transport to reach destinations (often dachas) resulted in a transfer of onus from the state to the individual. The state provision for the masses was seen as less desirable than the industrial provision for individuals. Here it is necessary to differentiate between state and industry, as this researcher would argue that individuals made this differentiation at that time. Thus, the image provision of transportation by the individual as preferred over provision of transportation by the state would have challenged both the role of the state as provider and the communist ethos. This researcher did not speak with anyone who felt that the state was responsible for their having acquired a vehicle. It was also a place where the individual was in control. The Soviet media put forward the idea that the car was a combination of international technical culture and of the national character, and that 'it may be ranked with such phenomena of culture as architecture, theatre, and painting.'⁸⁴⁰ The adoption of the car as a major cultural icon was logical because images of modernity, speed, and advancement were integral to the Soviet concept of self; and it was destabilising because it intrinsically involved 'values of individualism and private property' two values seemingly antithetical to the Communism of the USSR.⁸⁴¹ Viktor Nikolacvich Poliakov, the former first general director of VAZ, reiterated a phrase attributed to Stalin: 'the passenger car is a bourgeois notion'.⁸⁴²

From its inception, the Russian and then Soviet car industry has been international in nature. Although the Tsarist Empire paid little attention to the industry, by 1901 there was the beginning of an overwhelmingly imported auto-

⁸⁴⁰ Smarnova, *Avtovaz: segodnia i zavtra* 7.

⁸⁴¹ Michael Bull, 'Soundscapes of the Car: a Critical Ethnography of Automobile Habitation,' Daniel Miller ed., *Materializing Culture: Car Cultures* (Oxford: Berg, 2001) 185-202, 186.

⁸⁴² See for example: V. N. Poliakov, 'Molodezh' dolzhna reshat' na VAZe glavnye zadachi,' *Volzhskii avtostroitel'* (27.04.2000): 2.

industry. By 1918, based on sub-assembly lines, Nizhny Novgorod was the main automotive centre producing six models of vehicles. During WWI the Ryabushinsky Kuznetsov Company in Moscow produced and repaired a modest number of vehicles for the war, and in 1920, under Lenin's instruction, it began to work on a Soviet designed truck. The truck was first produced in 1924 at the Moscow Automobile Society (AMO), (the Ryabushinsky factory renamed) with a total production of one thousand units. The Soviet passenger car industry began when the Soviet Union signed an agreement with Ford to build the Gorkii Automobile Factory (31.05.1929). Production of the GAZ A, in essence the Model A Ford, began in 1931, with the first Soviet designed passenger car, the GAZ MI, being produced in 1936. In 1936, a new car factory, under the name of 'The Plant Named After Stalin' began production of the ZIS 110, a passenger sedan. While automobile production in Russia began at a relatively late date and in small quantities, by 1937 the Soviet Union was producing 200,000 units a year of which 18,300 were passenger cars. This placed the Soviet Union fourth in terms of international production.⁸⁴³ This rapid increase was due to the industry being granted a high level of ministerial priority, which spiked with the AVTOVAZ project in the late 1960s early 1970s and the Kama truck factory in the early 1970s.⁸⁴⁴ Both Kama and VAZ were publicly acknowledged to have planning priority: 'the central committee and the government have rendered the widest support for the construction of the plant. VAZ's orders were fulfilled very quickly, cargos bound for the All Union Shock Work Construction Project were given the green light'.⁸⁴⁵

WWII saw industrial priority being given to the production of transport with military and/or industrial capabilities and a drastic decrease in the production of passenger vehicles. This acknowledged, during the war GAZ maintained its overall industrial priority and received substantial allotments of natural resources and manpower. Thus, at the end of the war, GAZ was in a relatively strong industrial

⁸⁴³ William P. Baxter, *The Soviet Passenger Car Industry*, (Novato: Presidio Press, 1983) 219; or 'Avtomobil'nyi Transport za 50 let SSSR,' *Avtomobil'nyi transport* no. 1 (January 1973) 3-4. A comparative study of the East German Trabant can be found in Jonathan Zaitlin, 'The Vehicle of Desire: The Trabant, the Wartbug, and the End of the GDR,' *German History* Vol.15 no.3 (1997) 358-380.

⁸⁴⁴ A. Nikitin, 'Budet Na Kame Avtozavod,' *Trud* (11.10.1969): 4.

⁸⁴⁵ B. M. Katsman, 'Glavnyi vylgrysh vremia,' *Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva* no.1 (1976) 65.

position. Beginning in 1943, production of passenger vehicles resumed with the ZIS 110, a large luxury sedan designed for transporting the Party leadership. William Baxter has proposed that one of the prime motives behind the production of the ZIS 110 was to increase the 'Soviet prestige at Yalta and other high level international conferences'.⁸⁴⁶ This perceived need is consistent with the behaviour of various Soviet leaders, Khrushchev was to recall his chagrin at being the only world leader to not arrive at the Geneva conference of 1956 in a jet plane. Vladimir Nicholevich Novikov stated that in 'Europe, in the USA, ten new models were produced yearly, and the run on passenger cars was in the millions. And what did we have in comparison? The primitive *Moskvitch*...and, well, a few test models, and that was it. Nothing wealthy'.⁸⁴⁷ Giuseppe Boffa has argued that the agreement with Fiat is representative of Kosygin's most significant attempt at economic and technical parity with the West.⁸⁴⁸

In 1945, representatives from the car/truck factories of: Yaroslavl (two representatives), GAZ (three representatives), ZIS (one representative), and Ulianovsk (one representative) were sent to the USA to acquaint themselves with the American auto industry. Viktor Nikolaevich Poliakov, the first general director of VAZ, recalled that by the early 1960s it was widely accepted that, after a long period of isolation, it was time to produce automobiles to international norms, and using international methods.⁸⁴⁹ In 1950, the Automobile Plant Named Lenin, began production of the *Moskvitch 401*, a four-passenger sedan, and GAZ introduced a five-passenger sedan, the *GAZ M 20* (the early model known as *Pobeda* and the later model *Volga*).⁸⁵⁰ In 1957, the never popular *Zaporozhets*, a four-passenger sedan was introduced. Of the vehicles being produced during the 1950s and 1960s, the *Chaika* and the *ZIL* sedans were allocated for official use. By 1954 newspapers and journals were calling for changes to the car industry against: 'a background of rapid growth in other branches of machine building, the backwardness of the auto industry becomes ever clearer; gradually the situation of the auto industry has come to be

⁸⁴⁶ Baxter, *The Soviet Passenger Car Industry* 225.

⁸⁴⁷ Interview with V. N. Nicholevich Novikov in A. Shavrin, *VAZ* 25-26.

⁸⁴⁸ Boffa, *Ot SSSR K Rossii* 21. An indepth study of archival materials in which Soviet car production was compared with Western production can be found in *Istoriia avtomobil'noqo transporta Rossii: 1945-1965* (Moskva: Niiat) 2000.

⁸⁴⁹ Interview with V. N. Poliakov in A. Shavrin, *VAZ* 32.

⁸⁵⁰ Between 1950 and 1957 GAZ was changed to ZIM and then back to GAZ, and the ZIS was changed to ZIL.

characterised by the very unpleasant word, stagnation'.⁸⁵¹ Upon returning from a visit to the United States in 1959, Mikoyan began his official press release with a positive discussion of his visits to Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors.⁸⁵²

Discussion of the problems facing the Soviet light automotive industry began under Khrushchev, despite Khrushchev's decision to favour car pools over private passenger vehicles. Research was conducted into the viability of fitting current cars with modern Western components, for example fitting the Volga with tubeless tyres 'as is standard in the USA and in Western Europe'⁸⁵³ as well as purchasing new vehicles. Information was gathered on various models from Fiat, Alfa Romeo, Lancia, Rover, Opel, Mercedes, Ford, Porsche, Peugeot, Citroen and Nash etc.⁸⁵⁴ In 1962 the Second Industrial Exhibition of Italy was held in Moscow. Despite the general nature of the exhibition, including a focus on the Italian way of life, the purity of the sun, the beauty of the landscape, and the culture of the nation, a dominant theme of the exhibition was on transportation: displays, models, and examples of cars, buses, planes, gas stations, and electric trains. Highlights of the transportation section were the *Selena* a joint Fiat-Ford product and the *GIA* an elegant model from Fiat that had been displayed in the previous year but which now had a new steering wheel. The work of the Italian car designers and engineers was reported as 'astonishingly industrial and artistic'.⁸⁵⁵

Despite indications otherwise, Khrushchev was officially against further developing and expanding the passenger automotive industry.⁸⁵⁶ Instead, he advocated an increase in public transport and the creation of fleets of communal vehicles. To this end, in the 1950s, line mileage for the railways increased by approximately ten percent, passenger train service increased and the cost of tickets decreased.⁸⁵⁷ Khrushchev's enthusiasm for car fleets was not shared by the public.

⁸⁵¹ Promyshlennno-Ekonomicheskaja Gazeta 14.11.1954: 2.

⁸⁵² See A. I. Mikoyan 'Press-Konferentsiia A.I. Mikoiana,' Pravda, (25.02.1959): 5.

⁸⁵³ 'Po voprosu podgotovki proizvodstva legkovogo avtomobila m-402' 116.

⁸⁵⁴ 'Po voprosu podgotovki proizvodstva legkovogo avtomobila m-402' 121-123.

⁸⁵⁵ A. Radkin, 'Na Ital'ianskoi promyshlennoi vystavke,' Dekorativnoe iskusstvo SSSR no.8 (1962) 43-44.

⁸⁵⁶ Khrushchev's dislike of private cars was not shared by the other officials. See Papovskii 'Komu nuzhny legkovye avtomobili,' Kommunist XXXVI no. 14. (1959): 126-128.

⁸⁵⁷ Ernest W. Williams Jr., 'Transportation: some aspects of the structure and growth of Soviet transportation,' Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies: Papers submitted by panellists before the subcommittee on economic statistics Parts I-III (1959) (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968) 177-18, 185.

A public opinion poll conducted during the mid 1960s revealed that the average citizen wanted a passenger car above all other consumer goods.⁸⁵⁸ Given the lack of spare parts, the lack of service garages, the rationing of petrol and the poor state of the roads and highways, it is unlikely that this desire was based on reasons of practicality. Indeed, there was a trend for Soviet car owners to keep their cars in distant private garages, using them for special occasions or for going to the dacha: thereby maintaining their dependence on public transport during the working week.

In 1965, Aleksei Nikolaevich Kosygin announced that the Soviet Union was manufacturing vehicles that were obsolete in the West and that were poorly suited to the Soviet economy.⁸⁵⁹ Concurrent with Kosygin's announcement was increased coverage of international car shows, articles on the benefits and modernity of passenger car production, and the unfeasibility of development without foreign participation. The question was not if private passenger cars were necessary but what type was most suitable for the nation. A reading of the Soviet Press during the 1960s leads to the conclusion that there was a 'determination' on the part of the leadership to automobilise the nation.⁸⁶⁰ K. Bakhtov, a member of management at VAZ, recalled that during the 1960s it was widely accepted that the car industry was simply too far behind international standards to catch up independently.⁸⁶¹ Evgheni Artemovich Bashindzhagian, part of the initial negotiating delegation, believed that 'from the very beginning the course (of events) was such that it must be a completely modern European car'.⁸⁶² Although the Soviet elite did choose to introduce new lines and technology into pre-existing car and truck factories by means of foreign cooperation, the preference was to establish new international turnkey factories.⁸⁶³ Less mentioned were the extremely favourable credit conditions.

In the 8th Five Year Plan (1966-1970), the increased output of automotives was slated at 220 percent. This was to be achieved by renovating existing plants and

⁸⁵⁸ V. A. Zamozikin, L.N. Zhilina and N. I Frolova 'Sdvigi v massovom potreblenii i lichnost' *Voprosy filosofii* no.6, (06.1969): 33 or see N. F. Rokatushin 'Kakoi verkh avtomobillia vy predpochitaete?', *Volzhskij Avtostroitel'* no.25 01.11.1969: 4.

⁸⁵⁹ A. N. Kosygin, 'Povyshenie nauchnoi obosnovannosti planov - vazhneishaa zadacha planovykh organov,' *Planovoe khoziastvo* (April 1965): 6, 9-10.

⁸⁶⁰ Baxter, *The Soviet Passenger Car Industry* 225.


⁸⁶¹ Interview with K. Bakhtov in Shavrin, *VAZ*: 129.

⁸⁶² Interview with E. A. Bashindzhagian in Shavrin, *VAZ*: 63.

⁸⁶³ For details of this discussion see the December 1969 Party Plenum and the 24th Party Congress in March-April 1971.

new production (VAZ) and was to be complemented by increases in priority of support plants.⁸⁶⁴ The success of the renovations can be seen in the notable increase in passenger car production before VAZ began production. The following graph indicates the production and distribution of passenger cars from 1963-1971.⁸⁶⁵

Chart 3 Passenger Car Production



These increases left production six million units behind the United States, and seventh in world production, and large sectors of the society (namely agricultural workers) without means of obtaining an automobile.⁸⁶⁶ In 1969, the Minister of the Automotive Industry, Aleksander Mikhailovich Tarasov announced that automobile output was to be two million units per year by 1975. This meant that for the first time in Soviet history, the output of passenger cars, according to the 1971-1975 Five Year Plan, was to be greater than commercial vehicles. At the 23rd Congress of the CPSU Kosygin reiterated four times that the Soviet Union was committed to the development and expansion of the passenger car industry. In the opening address of the 24th Congress of the CPSU in 1971 Brezhnev confirmed his nation's commitment to the improvement of transport.⁸⁶⁷

⁸⁶⁴ Matveev, 'Perspektivy razvitiia avtomobil'noi promyshlennosti v novom piatiletii,' *Planovoe Khoziastvo* (July 1966): 28.

⁸⁶⁵ Distribution of Soviet Passenger Car Production 1963-1971 based on William Baxter 239.

⁸⁶⁶ Baxter, *The Soviet Passenger Car Industry* 226.

⁸⁶⁷ 'Na sovremennom etape ekonomicheskogo razvitiia vozrastает rol' otraslei narodnogo khoziaistva, prizvannykh obsluzhivat' protsess proizvodstva – transporta, sviazi, material'no-tekhnicheskogo snabzheniia i drugikh.' in 'Avtomobil'nyi Transport za 50 let SSSR.,' *Avtomobil'nyi transport* no. 1 (January 1973):.3-4, p.4.

Although the Soviet elite chose to introduce new lines and technology into pre-existing car and truck factories by means of foreign cooperation, the focus was on establishing new international factories. The partnership with Fiat constituted a public acknowledgement of the proposed benefits of economic co-operation.⁸⁶⁸ Inquiries were made into the possibility of a partnership with American, Swedish, French and German companies as well as with Italian companies. For various economic and political reasons, Fiat and Renault were the two companies most willing and able to enter into a deal with the USSR. West Germany and Japan were ostensibly dismissed as being too technologically inferior due to a lag caused by losses from WWII. This dismissal was not in accordance with purchasing patterns that showed substantial imports from West Germany and Japan. It is more likely that the German and Japanese companies were dismissed due to political or financial considerations or unwillingness on the part of the West German and Japanese manufacturers to enter into an agreement with the Soviet Union. Automobile industries with close ties to military complexes, i.e. Sweden's Saab with its connection to airplane/jet plane engines, were excluded themselves from the competition. Military ties were not a problem for Soviet purchasers, Fiat was active in radar technology (the military was the largest purchaser of this technology). Negotiations began with Renault, and were almost concluded when they suddenly failed to reach an agreement. Discussions with Fiat began on 1 July 1965 between the Soviet Ministry of Science and Technology and representatives of Fiat. Later, the Soviet Ministry of the Automobile Industry joined the negotiations. On 20 July 1966 the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR decided to build a new city and factory one thousand kilometres south east of Moscow, near Stavropol on the Volga. Production was to begin no later than 1972. Due to the priority given to VAZ, the leadership team was chosen personally by the Politburo. A contract with Fiat of Italy to build the AVTOVAZ, (VAZ) factory for the production of what was in essence the *Fiat 124* (estimated at 600 million US dollars), was concluded (15.08.1966)⁸⁶⁹ and construction was to begin six months

⁸⁶⁸ (for details of this discussion see the December 1969 Party plenum, and the 24th Party Congress in March-April 1971),

⁸⁶⁹ The 1965 reforms included a policy that stated that new technology enterprises were to have the opportunity to retain more of the self-generated profits to reinvest or distribute as

later (14.01.1967) with 25,000 workers, of whom 15,000 were youths, working in sub zero temperatures amongst snow and frozen ground.⁸⁷⁰ In the autumn of 1967 the project was announced in the major papers under titles such as 'Under the address of: Tol'iatti, automobile' in which it was explained that twenty ministries had travelled abroad to many countries in order to bring the most technologically advanced and suitable automobile to the USSR.⁸⁷¹ By 1968, the factory alone employed 19,760 workers and by 1969, the city's population had swelled to approximately seventy thousand of whom ten thousand were komsomols and eighty percent were youths. In addition to the deal with Fiat, there were contracts with Smiths of England to work on technological improvements for the Zaporozhets and with Renault of France to modernise and expand the capacity of Moskvitch production (estimated at 250 million Francs with an additional 37 million USD in machine tools).⁸⁷² This increase in commercial relations was not limited to the automotive industry. Between 1966 and 1975 commercial relations between the USSR and the West increased in general.⁸⁷³ V. N. Poliakov defended the deal with Fiat by stating that the technical levels of Fiat were in accordance with international standards and that Fiat often worked with Ford and other respected automotive manufacturers.⁸⁷⁴ The journal *Vneshniia torgovlia* described the agreement as giving 'Soviet specialists the opportunity, to the extent that it was necessary, to become acquainted with the firm's work experience – its achievements in the field of automotive production and also its plans for the future, especially the development of variants of the *Fiat 124*.⁸⁷⁵ In Italy, between 1963 and 1965 investment had decreased by fifteen percent, unemployment had increased by 530, 000 and hours were cut by eight and a half percent.⁸⁷⁶ Fiat faced a take-over by

the directors saw fit. It also required them to sell their products. This reform however, had little impact.

⁸⁷⁰ Photos from 'Step' drognula, nekhotia podchiriaias' Liudiam,' *Volzhskii avtoströitel'* (12.01.2002): 1.

⁸⁷¹ 'Po adresu, Tol'iatti, avtomobil'nyi,' *Sovetskaja Rossia* (10.08.1967): 1.

⁸⁷² 'The Modernization and expansion of Moskvitch production is being carried out by RENAULT of France, who agreed to furnish technical assistance.' A. Blokhn, 'Zavodskoi put' 'moskvicha,' *Izvestiia* (16.07.1969): 3.

⁸⁷³ Holliday, *Western Technology Transfer to the Soviet Union* 168

⁸⁷⁴ V. N. Poliakov, 'Vaz dlia menia – eto vse,' *Volzhskii avtoströitel'* (01.02.2000): 2-3, 2.

⁸⁷⁵ V. N. Sushkov, 'Sotrudnichestvo s firmoi Fiat rasshiraetsia,' *Vneshniia torgovlia* no. 8. (1966): 44.

⁸⁷⁶ Sergio Riccio, 'Italian Contradictions,' *International Affairs*, no.8 (August 1966): 39-43:40.

General Motors. These factors combined to result in Fiat and Italy offering extremely favourable terms of agreement in order to win the major long-term contract.

Leonid Sergeyevich Kolosov,⁸⁷⁷ recalls how the negotiations with Fiat had come to a standstill due to a disagreement over interest rates.⁸⁷⁸ The banking firm *Instituto Mobiliare Italiano* was to front a loan of 322 million USD (ninety percent of the total cost), but wanted the going rate of eight percent while the Soviet negotiators, under instruction from Kosygin, could go no higher than six. Leonid Kolosov met with one of his contacts and informed him that if the negotiations with Fiat went badly, the Soviet Union would conclude a contract with Renault. In response Kolosov received an unofficial document listing six and a half percent as the Italian minimum. Kosygin agreed to offer the six and a half percent thereby giving the Soviet minister Tarasov the green light for concluding the deal.⁸⁷⁹ The

⁸⁷⁷ Born in 1926, was a KGB spy who worked in Italy, Spain and France, under the auspices of being a reporter for *Izvestia*.

⁸⁷⁸ 'On April 15th and then in July 1966 a sixteen-man delegation, headed by the Soviet minister for the car industry, Nikolai Tarasov, came out to Rome to discuss details of how Fiat could help us build the factory of our dreams on the River Volga. Valetta led the Italian team in ten days of tough talks, held at the Ministry of Industry, which I covered for *Izvestia*. The Soviet side asked for a credit. The Italians agreed and offered the average European interest rate of eight percent. But Kosygin had made clear to our negotiators that Moscow could not afford to pay more than six percent. The talks were deadlocked. Tarasov called the Soviet team together at our embassy. 'What are we going to do?' he said. 'Kosygin won't budge. We have no room for manoeuvre.' 'What about your friend Fritz?' [Fritz was a long standing Italian KGB informer who reported to Kolosov] Konstantin Petrovich asked me. He knew that my informer, while being a member of the opposition, had good contacts in the Italian government. 'Leave it to me,' I said. I went out that night and made a small chalk cross on the column outside Fritz's house. He responded quickly to my signal. I told him the negotiations with Fiat were going badly and there was a big risk the Soviet Union would conclude a deal with Renault of France instead, thus depriving Italy of a major contract. It was a lie, but he believed it. He asked me to give him a little time and promised to do what he could. Three days later Fritz brought me a top-secret Italian government document that showed that Rome's bottom line was in fact an interest rate of six-and-a-half per cent. Tarasov cabled Moscow and Kosygin agreed to this figure. It made a huge difference to the Soviet Union, which saved about \$ 40 million on the deal worth a total of \$320 million. But the resident said: 'Let them wait another day before we say 'yes'.' The next day Tarasov returned to the negotiating table, banged his fist on it and told the Italians: 'Six-and-a-half- per cent or tomorrow we leave for Paris.' The Italians agreed instantly and that was how the Deal of the Century was concluded....' Helen Womack ed., Undercover Lives: Soviet Spies in the Cities of the World. (Phoenix, 1998) 12-15. Mafia involvement and trading of secrets is also propagated by Konstantin Bakhtov, an early management member at VAZ in 'Chtoby poluchit' VAZ, Fiat raskryl nam voennye sekrety,' *Vlast* no.4 (30.01.2001): 60-63.

⁸⁷⁹ Fritz received \$25,000 USD, and Kolosov was promoted to the rank of major, for being 'capable handling of an agent which led to considerable benefit for the Soviet state', and received a hand-made hunting rifle, one of a limited edition of 2,000 guns made by the

contemporary journal *Vlast* has run articles written by a former member of VAZ management who was present at the negotiations, in which it is alleged that Fiat received the contract as military secrets were used to sweeten the deal.⁸⁸⁰ In August 1966, Tarasov made the agreement public. The Fiat protocol was signed in Turin (04.05.1966), at which time the bank loan details were also ratified.⁸⁸¹

The contract with Fiat was based on the production of 600,000 passenger cars a year and included \$550 million USD worth of machinery plus technical assistance. The output level of VAZ was to be one car every twenty-two seconds.⁸⁸² Fiat was to assist with the start up, and to provide continuing technical and organisational advice. Production was to begin in 1969, with full capacity being reached by 1972. The streamlined factory was to employ between thirty-five and forty thousand workers, ten thousand fewer workers than a comparable plant in the West. This was to be achieved through copious amounts of automation.⁸⁸³ This high level of automation was to contribute to extensive technical ties, quality controls, training, joint technological developments etc, being maintained over a decade.⁸⁸⁴ Thus, the VAZ contract included several clauses that would result in personnel cooperation.⁸⁸⁵ AVTOVAZ was to epitomise the commitment to a modern management method that included: significant levels of independence, accountability of managers, the wage system and supplements for professionals. In reality, an average of ninety-six thousand workers were employed.⁸⁸⁶ Despite industrial priority and rapid construction, the first cars were not produced until April 1970, when in commemoration of Lenin's 100th birthday, the first vehicle was produced with the use of sub-assemblies brought in from Italy. General production

famous Kalashnikov manufacturers for Khrushchev to present to visiting dignitaries' see Womack.

⁸⁸⁰ Konstantin Bakhtov, 'Chtoby poluchit' VAZ, Fiat raskryl nam voennye sekrety,' *Vlast* no.4 (30.01.2001): 60-63.

⁸⁸¹ For more information on the background deal see V. Sushkov, 'Sotrudnichestvo s firmoi Fiat rasshiraetsia,' *Vneshniaia torgovlia* no.8 (1966): 43-45.

⁸⁸² M. Sbornik, *Avtovaz – sovremennoe proizvodstvennoe ob"edinenie*. (Znanie, 1977) 5.

⁸⁸³ Iz doklada pervogo sekretaria obkoma KPSS V. P. Orlova na VII plenumе obkoma KPSS o zadachakh oblastnoi partorganizatsii v sviazi so stroitel'stvom zavoda po proizvodstvu legkovykh avtomobilei 27.05.67, 27-31 as printed in *VAZ: istoria v dokumentakh:1966-1983gg* (1985) 28.

⁸⁸⁴ Sergio Riccio, 'Italian Contradictions,' *International Affairs*, no.8 (August 1966): 39-43: 43.

⁸⁸⁵ In a press interview, the president of Fiat, Giovanni Agnelli, stated that: 'construction of such scope ensured a great demand for our technical specialists.' See L. Yugov, 'Soviet-Italian Contacts Expand,' *International Affairs* July (7): 33-39, 3.

⁸⁸⁶ M. Sbornik, *Avtovaz – sovremennoe proizvodstvennoe ob"edinenie* (Znanie, 1977) 5.

began in August that year and capacity was reached in 1974. There were to be three versions of the *Zhiguli* produced: the standard, the luxury, and the family edition. Thirty percent of production was to be sold for export. Like most Soviet industries, VAZ was not dependent on exports for the continued survival of the factory, but typically workers received bonuses and/or higher wages for work on exports.⁸⁸⁷

Despite the generally positive response to the building of the AVTOVAZ there was some concern, voiced in such public forums as *Pravda*, that the technology being employed would cause problems for supplying factories. Concern was justified. Many of the initial parts for the *Fiat 124/VAZ2101/Zhiguli/Lada* were to be supplied by other plants, many of which were to be newly constructed or modernised. At the time that the contract with Fiat was signed, the Soviet Union did not produce the 92-octane petrol (if the vehicle were to run on the standard 66-octane petrol, then there would be no possibility of reaching the maximum 140kms/hr),⁸⁸⁸ lubricants, coolants, or the motor oil, upon which the *Fiat 124* ran. There were also safety concerns resulting from inadequate materials. For example, the Ministry of Petroleum-refining and Petrochemicals was unable: 'to supply us [VAZ] with good-quality door seals, packing glands, brake seals and other rubber articles. The safety of people riding in cars depends on these seals.... Probably it is unprofitable for the petrochemical plants to bother with 'small stuff' – after all, their plan is expressed primarily in tons'.⁸⁸⁹ N. I. Letchford recalled a conversation with Poliakov in which they spoke of the difficulties in producing the necessary quality of metals.

-Viktor Nikolaevich, I am not getting any results. All the regimes, all the variants that I have tried – crap

- What do you want from me?
- I need Italian metal
- Think again. It won't happen.
- Look, its necessary so that I can understand, as a metallurgist what to do, I need a sample.
- Ok. But only as an exception.⁸⁹⁰

⁸⁸⁷ Interview with Nikolai Naumov in which he discusses his work in Moscow in David Mandel, *Interviews with Workers in the Former Soviet Union* 66.

⁸⁸⁸ Zhitkov has said that the petrol was available in Moscow, but that it was difficult to find. A. A. Zhitkov, *Vershinoi zhizni stal VAZ* (Tol'fatti, 1997) 32.

⁸⁸⁹ 'More Difficulties of the Auto Age,' *CDSP* Vol. XXVII, no.1 6-7:7. For more complaints specific to the Zhiguli see *CDSP*, Vol. XXVI no. 51: 27-28.

⁸⁹⁰ N. I. Letchford in *VAZ: stranitsy istorii, vospominaniia i fakty* 116.

The plastics industry was simply unable to meet contemporary demand for automotive parts: the *Volga* had no basic plastic parts; and the *Moskvich* had forty-nine parts weighing in at 3.36 kilograms. The international average at the time was one hundred and thirty details at eight kilograms.⁸⁹¹ Eventually, the *Fiat 124* was modified for lower plastic usage. It was also modified for Soviet road and weather conditions. In the end, Soviet engineers altered sixty five percent of the parts.⁸⁹² Thus, it is not surprising that the press was able to run interviews with Italian workers in which one read: 'I come from Turin, am familiar with Fiat and thought that in Tol'iatii, I would see a copy of the Italian establishment, but nothing was duplicated'.⁸⁹³ In response to the increased production of passenger cars, the Ministry of Transportation called for the creation of new lorries in order to ship this new abundance of cars.⁸⁹⁴ Press commentaries agreed that the production problems lay not solely with VAZ but with its suppliers. V.N. Poliakov estimated that the VAZ production required the introduction of up to one thousand new components and materials and that this was an excellent opportunity to bring Soviet industry as a whole up to a new level of modernity.⁸⁹⁵ Subsequent research supports the idea that VAZ made a substantial contribution to bringing both car manufacturing and the national economy to a new qualitative level.⁸⁹⁶ As Soviet designers, engineers, planners, and workers were presented with the challenge of creating new materials and components to 'international standards,' the idea of Western modernism was reinforced. The AVTOVAZ with its plethora of new parts and materials was significant in this domino effect. In the official press release commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the USSR the heroic furthering of the socialist economy through the work of those at VAZ was hailed.⁸⁹⁷

⁸⁹¹ S. Mateev, 'Perspektivy razvitiia avtomobil'noi promyshlennosti v novom piatiletii,' Planovnoe khoziastvo (Moscow) no. 7. (July 1966): 21.

⁸⁹² For a detailed description of the technical details for the VAZ-2103/Zhiguli see 'Avtomobil' VAZ.2103 <<Zhiguli>>,' Avtomobil'nyi transport no. 6 (June 1973): 41-47, 47.

⁸⁹³ 'U vas est' chernu pouchit'sia,' Volzhskii avtostroitel' (25.05.1974): 2.

⁸⁹⁴ See A. Zbar, L. Piriatsinskii, and V. Iurchenko, 'Avtopoezd dlia perevozki avtomobilei VAZ 2101,' Avtomobil'nyi transport no. 6. (June 1973):45-47; or M. Sidorov, 'Avtopoezd dlia perevozki avtomobilei VAZ,' Avtomobil'nyi transport no.3 (March 1973): 44-46.

⁸⁹⁵ In an interview with Poliakov, 'Moiodezh' dolzhna reshat' na VAZe glavnye zadachi,' Volzhskii Avtostroitel' (27.04.2000): 2.

⁸⁹⁶ Smarova, Avtovaz: Segodnia i zavtra 19.

⁸⁹⁷ as reprinted in VAZ: Istorija v dokumentakh: 1966-1983gg 65.

The Necessity of Foreign Presence?

The Soviet Union was not bereft of technological advances under Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Its military capabilities had made it one of two superpowers, and its space programme was leading the world. However, when VAZ workers interviewed and surveyed in 2002⁸⁹⁸ by the researcher were asked if the Soviet Union could have developed and mass-produced an economy car without foreign co-operation, 92.3 percent (See Appendix F) said that foreign cooperation was necessary. Former VAZ translator Elvira Simonovna, stated that she felt that Fiat was as necessary to VAZ, as Ford was to Gorkiy, if not more so. She expanded on this by noting that foreign participation, 'this was more than just Italian', was necessary as it brought with it a new town, new technology and a better life for Soviet workers.⁸⁹⁹ Not one person interviewed believed that the Soviet industry could have adapted and modernised a pre-existing factory i.e., the Moskvitch factory. Question five of the survey asked why the factory was established at Tol' iatti as opposed to modernising pre-existing factories. The majority (37 of 40) responded that it was primarily due to the abundance of natural resources in the area, gas, hydro-electricity from the Volga, and proximity to a main transportation artery. A supplementary explanation given was the need to create something new: 'we in the Soviet Union had never had a normal automobile and we were far behind the West'.⁹⁰⁰ This need for the new was a by-product of the stunning political, social and economic changes of the Khrushchev era. Question six of the survey asked, 'if Fiat was necessary, why?' The answers focused on the fact that Fiat offered a modern, affordable product, an economical means of achieving a goal, and access to new technology.

⁸⁹⁸ The criteria for the representative sample were individuals present from either the beginning of the construction of the city/factory, or from the beginning of production. Of the 40 respondents 25 were male and 15 female. In total, 7 were members of the Communist Party. Those who responded to the questionnaires represent a broad section of workers at the factory from individuals who worked (work) on the assembly line, in the presses, in maintenance as well as in design, translation, engineering, and other sectors run by but not technically part of the production of the factory, eg. doctors who worked in the AVTOVAZ polyclinic. In addition to the questionnaires, interviews were conducted either as a supplement to, or instead of, the written questionnaires.

⁸⁹⁹ From an interview with Elvira Simonovna 17.03.2002.

⁹⁰⁰ Questionnaire no. 6.

- 'At that time in Russia we didn't produce an automobile of that class';⁹⁰¹
- it offered 'advanced technology to the standard that existed in other countries';⁹⁰²
- a 'more or less fast means of mass production';⁹⁰³
- 'for the USSR it was necessary to have experience in the European field of automobiles';⁹⁰⁴
- 'our level of automotive industry was low. At that time, the level of Fiat was at the level of the world';⁹⁰⁵ and
- 'I think that the partnership could have been with another European automotive firm but in the competition for the project Fiat won'.⁹⁰⁶

The theme of the necessity of a new standard of international passenger cars is indicative of effective propaganda intersecting with a welcoming recipient. That the international car industry was to be lauded and then overtaken could only be in the best interest of Soviet citizens. In 1969 public discussions about advances made in the compact car sector started appearing regularly. For example, the author Yu. Maksimov writing of the advances in the USA, Western European and Japanese markets, concludes that in capitalist countries 'it is difficult to find a another industry where scientific-technological strength has been so active, as in the automotive industry', noting that in the USA alone, between 1954 and 1969, between seven thousand and nine thousand inventions were patented.⁹⁰⁷ Beginning 11 February 1970, *Volzhskii avtostroitel'* contained a section entitled Technological Pages. On these pages were both Soviet and international developments pertaining to the automotive industry. Of the nine articles that ran on the first day, two dealt with activities of the USA, and one respectively with each of England, Japan, Italy and West Germany.⁹⁰⁸ Longer articles comparing the advantages of Honda,

⁹⁰¹ Questionnaire no.39

⁹⁰² Questionnaire no. 36.

⁹⁰³ Questionnaire no.31.

⁹⁰⁴ Questionnaire no. 26.

⁹⁰⁵ Questionnaire no. 3.

⁹⁰⁶ Questionnaire no. 7.

⁹⁰⁷ Yu. Maksimov, 'Gonka Na Avtomobil'nom Rynke,' *Volzhskii avtostroitel'* (22.10.1969): 4. See also Japanese advancements in 'Likvidatsiia Razbitykh Avtomobilei,' *Volzhskii avtostroitel'* (01.07.1970): 3.

⁹⁰⁸ see *Volzhskii Avtostroitel'* (11.02.1979): 2.

Volkswagen, Fiat, Toyota, and Ford vehicles were popular.⁹⁰⁹ As early as 1969, the Soviet press was commenting that the new Renault 12 and the Fiat 128, a 'wonderful small car', were already on the streets of Europe.⁹¹⁰ Three years after the plant began producing, articles were still being printed about foreign technology and Fiat. The general theme of the articles was that the foreign technology enabled well-trained, hard working Soviet workers, to optimise production capacity. Foreign technology was being adapted and improved by local engineers, and new technology was continuously being imported.⁹¹¹

Western technology did not remain an abstraction. VAZ engineer O. Rozenkov wrote that his fifty percent automated Fiat line was more economical in terms of materials and that the machine did not need as highly qualified workers as lines with which he had previously worked.⁹¹² Nikolai Maksimovich recalled how he and his fellow workers 'saw, learnt, and became acquainted with the Fiat factory - it was absolutely of another standard. More progressive rigs, instruments, effective control means, organised use of technology, and better economic and control standards'.⁹¹³ Head engineer Stanislav Petrovich Polikarpov, recalled the excitement and priority given to VAZ during the planning phases. He was always flown to Moscow, where he was put up in the best hotels, served at the best restaurants, and chauffeured in the best cars, 'all because we were to build the best automobile'.⁹¹⁴ Stanislav Petrovich recalled the gradual dwindling of optimism that followed quickly because, 'when we had finished VAZ, in the West it was already practically old...by that time, they had already gone further'.⁹¹⁵

The myth versus the reality of Soviet modernity, quality and organisation were to be sorely tested by VAZ. Three areas particularly affected were in the idea of modernity, as seen above, quality and organisation. In 1968, A. Tsygankov, a chemistry specialist who had worked at the automotive repair factory *Gruzia*, along with his 'enthusiastic friends' came to work in Tol'jatti, although they were aware

909 D. Belikanov, 'Trebovaniia narodnogo khoziaistva k tekhnicheskomu progressu v razvitiu avtomobil'nykh transportnykh sredstv,' *Avtomobil'nyi transport* no. 11 (November 1974): 1-11.

910 P. Livshits, 'Fiat 128 Na dorogakh,' *Volzhskii avtostroitel'* (01.11.1969): 4.

911 B. Antipov, 'Sluzhba KIPiA – operativnaia,' *Volzhskii avtostroitel'* (06.03.1973): 3.

912 O. Rozenkov, 'Svarka... Namorazhivaniem,' *Volzhskii avtostroitel'* (06.03.1973): 3.

913 Interview with Nikolai Maksimovich Golovko in *VAZ: stranitsy istorii, vospominaniia i fakty* 208.

914 Interview with S. P. Polikarpov in Shavrin, *VAZ* 42-43.

915 Interview with S. P. Polikarpov in Shavrin, *VAZ* 47.

that what was currently needed were construction workers, cement and steel specialists, etc. He was hired and placed in the department that produced radiators and decorative parts.⁹¹⁶ He remembered that there were so many new people that the majority of fellow workers were unknown and the working conditions were 'half chaos'. The result of the propaganda and hiring practices was a massive gender imbalance (more men than women), groups of men waiting to begin their work, and newly moved families without the usual support networks. In the spring of 1969 the chaos expanded with the flood of new workers to the main building that was not yet finished as bulldozers were doing double duty trying to finish work on the building and to keep the snow out, and the Italian specialists were to arrive in late spring with the main conveyor/assembly line. The subjective impact of the disorganisation was magnified by the push to achieve a high level of completion before the foreigners arrived and to produce the first car in time for the hundredth anniversary of Lenin's birth (19.04.1970). Unable to complete the building and the production lines, the building, as well as many of the smaller production units, were left unfinished.⁹¹⁷ K. Bakhtov recalled a conversation with the head Italian engineer Mr. Bono. Bono: 'Listen, you are trying to do everything quicker and quicker, and for what? We ourselves don't understand. We were at the factory together and saw how much work was left. It is not possible to complete it in a year and you want us to try to have it finished in half a year at the latest'.⁹¹⁸ Former motor master Vladimir Isakov remembers the oft-asked phrase in Italian: 'why isn't this work finished yet?'⁹¹⁹ Another rush to prepare the factory was in response to Henry Ford Jr.'s decision in 1970 to act upon an invitation to view the factory and to make recommendations.⁹²⁰ In a conversation with A. A. Zhitkov over dinner, Zhitkov asked Ford if he would be able to build a factory like VAZ. Ford responded with 'no' and that he would not want to do so. Ford explained that industry was organised differently in the United States, with separate factories for separate parts being built and modernised based

⁹¹⁶ Interview with Igor Nikolaevich 24.03.2002.

⁹¹⁷ A. Tsygankov, 'Kak molody my byli, kak iskrenne liubili,' Volzhskii avtostroitel' 01.07.1997: 4.

⁹¹⁸ See both R. Bannikov, 'Na kubok druzhby' or Y. Litovchenko 'Den' bystrykh koles,' Volzhskii avtostroitel' (02.09.1970): 4.

⁹¹⁹ Vladimir Isakov, 'Zdravstvui, VAZ!' Volzhskii avtostroitel' (12.04.2000): 2.

⁹²⁰ Yurií Bezdetnyi, 'Kak rozhdaesia avtogigant,' Tol'iatti segodnia' (19.06.1996): 6.

on necessity and economic viability. After recalling this, Zhitkov noted 'He was an intelligent man, Henry Ford Junior.'⁹²¹

Despite a degree of disillusionment following the construction of VAZ, public opinion of the *Zhiguli*, and of VAZ remained high. In 1967, the book 'New Soviet Automobiles' by O. V. Chirkin drew attention to the integral role of the VAZ 2101 in the realisation of the great possibilities of mass Soviet car production.⁹²² The magazine *Krokodil* (no. 1, January, 1969) was to announce the beginning of production in Tol'jatti with a front cover cartoon. In January 1970, the widely published journal *Za rulem*, ran a series on passenger cars that focused favourably on the VAZ 2101(*Fiat124*). The *Fiat 124* was generally considered to be the best economy car of the time, a 'European type' car⁹²³ that offered a cost-effective solution to the Soviet passenger car problem. When asked what their opinion of the *Zhiguli* was in the early 1970s, those surveyed generally praised both the car and the factory. VAZ employee Lidiya Nikolaevna stated that: 'the automobile was absolutely comfortable and pretty; the factory was the best in the country, as big as Fiat'.⁹²⁴ Other individuals surveyed wrote that: 'there wasn't a factory like VAZ in all of Russia';⁹²⁵ 'the factory was the best in the USSR and one of the best in Europe';⁹²⁶ 'I saw the prospective factory and automobile in 1969 and in response came to this city to build my life'.⁹²⁷

- 'My opinion about the automobile model *Zhiguli* is that it was a wonderful automobile, and about the factory - the foremost in technology';⁹²⁸
- 'the factory and the automobile were of a high quality. 60 percent were sold abroad, taken by various countries';⁹²⁹ and
- 'at that time [beginning of the 70s] I was really amazed by the factory'.⁹³⁰

⁹²¹ Interview with A. A. Zhitkov in *VAZ: stranitsy istorii vospominaniia i fakty* 73.

⁹²² O. V. Chirkin, *Novye sovetskie avtomobili* (Znanie, 1967), or see the review in 'Avtomobil'nyi transport' n.7 (1967): 1.

⁹²³ The term European type had only positive connotations and was used in regular speech as well as by the press. See V. Koftelev, 'Ha volne pamiati,' *Tol'jatti segodnja* (19.04.1997): 15.

⁹²⁴ Questionnaire no. 4.

⁹²⁵ Questionnaire no. 36.

⁹²⁶ Questionnaire no. 2.

⁹²⁷ Questionnaire no. 19.

⁹²⁸ Questionnaire no.20.

⁹²⁹ Questionnaire no. 38.

These opinions about the factory and its product were imbued with a sense of comparison with the West. The factory was as good as or better, as big as or bigger, as modern as any in Europe. It would take many years before the average citizen became disillusioned with the standards of the VAZ factory.


Incentives for Workers

Khrushchev's numerous public statements to the effect that the task of overtaking and surpassing the capitalist countries in the per-capita consumption and of achieving complete abundance implied that in the West there was a degree of complete abundance. This allowed the regime to co-opt the interests of the average Soviet citizen who was more concerned with 'status, job security, and more material goods and services for the nation and themselves' than with issues of ideology or the legitimacy of the regime.⁹³⁰ This co-opting was a means of legitimisation, and was of particular importance given the new regime's need to establish themselves with an increasingly dissatisfied population. A survey conducted by Aaron Vinokur illustrates the issue of discontent. Vinokur's research, conducted in 1967-68, involved groups of workers (2,460 workers) from four factories and looked at the levels of dissatisfaction as they correlated with age. The level of discontent was more prominent amongst the younger workers with workers under twenty indicating almost one hundred percent dissatisfaction and those between twenty-one and thirty registering a level of dissatisfaction of 93.5 percent. Even amongst the oldest groups surveyed, almost seventy percent rated their salaries as 'much below needs'. This dissatisfaction was indicative of a general spread of dissatisfaction.

⁹³⁰ Questionnaire no 26.

⁹³¹ See Barghoorn, The Soviet Image of the United States 41.

Chart 4 How Soviet Workers Rated Their Level of Satisfaction with Salaries (Based on Vinokur's results)⁹³²



Tol'iatti was to be a new modern city, affording all possible conveniences: a concrete example of the ability of the regime's ability to match Western levels in automotive production but also in standard of living for the factory workers.⁹³³ It was a balm for the dissatisfaction of the average worker and a promise for a better future that was currently being realised (See Appendix G). Calls went out to young workers and specialists: a position in Tol'iatti came with the promise of a single family flat, modern facilities, fertile plots of land/dachas, and the prospect of rapid professional advancement. Residents were to be housed in maximum comfort in one of three grades of flats: 'normal' and then two higher categories (the deluxe split-level flats were spread over two floors). Regardless of the model, all interior walls were to be made from 'modern wall materials'. Stores were to be located on every block, no workers' residence was to be more than fifteen minutes from public transport and local schools, crèches and medical centres were to be conveniently located both in each block of housing and in the factory. By 1972, 36,000 flats were

⁹³² Graph is based on a table 9.5 p.195 in Aaron Vinokur and Gur Ofer 'Family Income Levels for Soviet Industrial Workers, 1965-1975' in Ed Arcadius Kahan and Blair A. Ruble *Industrial Labour in the USSR* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979) 184-208.

⁹³³ Reporter A. Nikitin wrote of the city surrounding the Kama factory: the city will be representative of the 'communist tomorrow, a city experiment... built with the same skill and vision as the city of Tol'iatti'. 'Budet na Kame Avtozavod,' *Trud* (11.10.1969): 4.

to be completed, and the local population was set at 150,000.⁹³⁴ The streets were designed to be straight and wide, in anticipation of one in four residents having a car. In essence, an advanced city for the workers and specialists of an advanced 'European type' factory. Thus, there was a direct correlation between foreign standards and the new Soviet standard that was being built. As incentives to move were concurrent with the presence of foreign cooperation, the aura of new, prosperous, advanced, and to some extent personal wealth and freedom (due to the product being the personal automobile) was subconsciously linked with the West.

One of the many advantages of moving to Tol'iatti was the promise of a private flat. The average length of stay in the hostels was six months, a fraction of the time required in other cities, and flats were initially obtained directly thereafter. One interviewee from Moscow noted that while his family received a two-bedroom apartment within six months (1970) his friend, with whom he had studied and worked, and who had chosen to remain in Moscow, only received a private flat in the 1980s. Irina Mikhailovna, an interviewee originally from Novosibirsk, moved to Tol'iatti, as half of a young couple. The couple's primary objective was to get a flat, which they did within four months. Irina Mikhailovna noted that while she loved living in Tol'iatti due to the special theatre, numerous cultural groups, well stocked stores, and general modernity; and while working at the factory was wondrous (all you needed to do was 'to turn a key' and a line worked) she and her family left as benefits of working at VAZ decreased vis-à-vis northern pay.⁹³⁵ She did not regret having moved to Tol'iatti however, and credits her time there as laying the foundation for her and her children being able to acquire flats.

Another economic incentive was the absence of the old established elite, as this opened up advancement opportunities and the corresponding access to increased wages, goods and services. The average age of the workers was twenty-six,⁹³⁶ and

⁹³⁴ V. Pravosud, 'Ia znaiu gorod budet,' *Volzhskii avtostroitel'* (06.11.1969): 3. It is important to note that the figures given on the number of flats were published by the Soviet government and may be more inspirational than factual in detail. The propagandistic nature of figures used in the Soviet press is problematic only when used as facts. Here they are intended to convey the promises and the Soviet reality as presented by the Soviet government to Soviet citizens and not necessarily reality itself.

⁹³⁵ In an interview with Irina Mikhailovna, conducted in spring 2002 Tol'iatti.

⁹³⁶ A young master who transferred from Gorkiy to VAZ in 1970 commented that although the factory was huge and produced many cars, it was more compact than Gorky and that his working group was in principle small, 17 workers, all of whom were young. O. Salbiev 'Vernyi orientir,' *Volzhskii avtostroitel'* no.6 (05.08.1972): 2.

the average age of specialists sent to Turin was thirty-five. Igor Alekseevich Spektorov, remembers his mandate as being to locate 'the best workers from other factories and perspective young specialists who wanted to work and to bring them to Tol'iatti'.⁹³⁷ The newly created elite had high expectations, one of which was to own an automobile someday. Despite working at the factory, technically, VAZ employees were to be treated like any other citizen trying to obtain a car. One worker noted with disgust that 'Not only do automobile workers have to pay the same price for cars as other people, they even have to wait as long'.⁹³⁸ That said, the percentage of ownership found in the survey was approximately three times the national average. In a then contemporary series of articles about society and cars based on a survey of seven hundred Soviet citizens, citizens were asked when they thought that they would own a car. The response was within five to ten years among respondents under forty.⁹³⁹ An unanticipated result of the 2002 survey question 'what was your best memory of the *Lada* and the factory' was that 32.5 percent felt that purchasing their first car was their best memory. There were several ways of obtaining a car. The official channels were winning the state lottery, as a reward for outstanding labour or social contribution, or through a waiting list. The average waiting list for the purchase of a *Zhiguli/Lada* (export name)⁹⁴⁰ was six to ten years, which effectively nullified economic pressure for technical improvements.⁹⁴¹ Galina Valentinovna, an engineer who worked in design, recalled that she and her husband, a brigade leader, were on the waiting list although they doubted that they would ever have enough money to purchase a car.⁹⁴² When they did receive a car in 1980, nine years after starting in Tol'iatti⁹⁴³, and

⁹³⁷ Interview with I. A. Spektorov in Shavrin, *VAZ* 147.

⁹³⁸ Ralis, 'The Soviet Worker' 242.

⁹³⁹ See for example N. F. Rokatushin, 'Kakoi verkh avtomobilia vy predpochetaete?' *Volzhskii avtostroitel'* no.25 (01.11.1969): 4; or V. Ashkin, 'Bagazhnik nuzhen, no kakoi?,' *Volzhskii avtostroitel'* no.22 (22.10.1969): 4.

⁹⁴⁰ The original name was the Zhiguli but the export name was changed to Lada after Soviet officials were told that this sounded too much like Gigolo.

⁹⁴¹ Zsuzsa Kapitany, Janos Kornai and Judit Szabo, 'Reproduction of Shortage in the Hungarian Car Market,' Christopher Davies and Wojciech Charemza eds., *Models of Disequilibrium and Shortage in Centrally Planned Economies* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1989): 375-404, 397.

⁹⁴² Interviewees will be referred to using first names and patronymics in order to protect their anonymity. Initials, last names, and anonymity will be used in accordance with the journalistic practices of the time.

⁹⁴³ The transliterated spelling of Tol'iatti is being used. The city was named in honour of the Italian Communist Leader Palmiro Togliatti (1893-1964). Togliatti had a long and close

earlier than anticipated due to people before them having been unable to claim their cars, they still had not amassed enough money. Nonetheless, they received the car due to their status as 'senior workers'.⁹⁴⁴ Aleksei Pavlovich wrote: 'I bought my first car, the VAZ 2103, in 1972. This day was, naturally, the best'.⁹⁴⁵ Or Vladimir Gennadyvich who wrote: 'when I purchased the 2101 in 1974, I was very proud and ecstatic, my dream of having my own car was fulfilled, and more so as it was a *Zhiguli*'.⁹⁴⁶ Another received his *Zhiguli* from his father who originally purchased it in 1970 and between the two of them they drove the car for 24 years.⁹⁴⁷ 'When I sat at the wheel of a Fiat 124 in Italy [I] understood that the future *Zhiguli* would be '*klassno!*'⁹⁴⁸ The official means of obtaining a vehicle tended to be rife with cronyism and painstakingly slow. The non-official means included using *blat* or paying a black market price.⁹⁴⁹ Thus, there was a tension between the state mandate to provide cars for the 'average' citizen and the reality of obtaining, and maintaining, a car. This issue was internally generated but externally exacerbated by the use of and contact with foreign technology, personnel and knowledge of rapidly advancing standards in Western Europe and North America. In comparison to the 32.5 percent whose fondest memory was obtaining their first car, only two of the forty respondents, or five percent, mentioned working with foreigners or travelling to Italy as being their favourite memory, this despite 52.5 percent having worked with foreigners in Tol'iatti and 12.5 percent having been to Turin. 'Working

association with the Soviet Union having spent most of an 18 years exile in Stalinist Russia. Togliatti maintained ties with Khrushchev, despite his written but never presented Yalta Memorandum in which he ascribed to the need for the autonomous development of socialism in various countries. He was in Yalta to meet with Khrushchev, when he passed away in 1964. Two common transliterated spellings for the city are Tolyatti and Tol'iatti while the original Italian form of Togliatti is used typically to refer to the man but not the city. For more information on the naming of Tol'iatti see V. A. Ovsianikov, *Stavropol' – Tol'iatti* (Tol'iatti: Izdatel'stvo fonda <Razvitie cherez obrazovanie>, 1996) 350-355.

⁹⁴⁴ They did not drive the car but sold it for an older model, using the profits to purchase a garage and to help fund their daughter's move to Moscow. Field note from a discussion with Galina Valentinovna 15.03.02 Tol'iatti.

⁹⁴⁵ Questionnaire no. 19.

⁹⁴⁶ Questionnaire no. 6.

⁹⁴⁷ Questionnaires, 30 and 39.

⁹⁴⁸ Questionnaire no.28.

⁹⁴⁹ For an example of how the illegal means were showing up in society see the satirical letter 'If you like to ride' by R. Zakiyev and I. Loukin in *Pravda* as printed in *CDSP* Vol.XXVII no. 10: 20.

in a new modern factory was very interesting and informative... The work at VAZ also gave the possibility to visit and to learn closely about Italy'.⁹⁵⁰

Most individuals moved to Tol'jatti for the material incentives. Workers and specialists were made 'irresistible' offers: an apartment of their own, modern facilities, fertile plots of land/dachas, and the prospect of rapid professional advancement. The tradition of offering workers incentives dates back to the 1930s when the labour shortage lead factories to offer accommodation, food stuffs etc. in order to procure the necessary labour force. Like most colossal ventures, this one did not run on schedule and workers and families found themselves living in overly crowded hostels. Acknowledging the massive demographic changes occurring G. N. Andreev stated that: 'people are coming to our city. Only in the past four months [the population] has increased by five thousand people and is now at 155,000. This is not insignificant'.⁹⁵¹ On 19 March 1969, *Pravda* ran an article stating that the city and the Volga factory was encountering larger problems than anticipated,⁹⁵² but later that month A. Tarasov, the Minister of the Automotive Industry, wrote in *Nedel'ia* that construction was 'advancing on all fronts'.⁹⁵³

The increased possibility to travel and contact with foreigners were non-economic or non-direct economic incentives associated with VAZ. Two and a half thousand Soviet specialists worked in Italy over a five-year period. The first delegation was sent to Turin in February 1966 and stayed until the beginning of May 1966. The length of each stay was variable: three weeks to eighteen months. Soviet officials facilitated the travels wherever possible. For example, A. A. Butko, from the department of automotive imports, recalled how there was never an issue of the usual three to four week waiting period for a visa, he and other specialists could arrange to meet with any European firm within twenty-four hours. N. N. Poliakov noted that during the initial phases of VAZ he and his team of specialists were able get into the 'work plane [and fly to] Moscow, Turin, wherever they liked...that was

⁹⁵⁰ Questionnaire no.2.

⁹⁵¹ 'Iz doklada pervogo sekretaria Tol'jattinskogo GK KPSS G. N. Andreeva na VII plenum obkoma KPSS o zadachakh partorganizatsii g. Tol'jatti v svlazi so stroitel'stvom zavoda po proizvodstvu legkovykh avtomobilei' (23.05.1967): 33-34 as reprinted in *VAZ: Istorija v Dokumintakh: 1966-1983gg* 34.

⁹⁵² S. Bogatoako and E. Manko, '500 Gektarov pod kryshei,' *Pravda* (16.03.1969):2

⁹⁵³ A. Tarasov, 'Avtomobilizatsia,' *Nedel'ia* no. 9 (1969): 4.

the type of freedom the specialists had'.⁹⁵⁴ Travel was facilitated by VAZ having been allotted a plane and pilots. Contact with Tol'iatti was also facilitated in Turin, where there was a direct line with Moscow and Tol'iatti. These privileges of being exempt from some of the bureaucratic drudgery and of having industrial priority were non economic incentives that were to be associated, if only subconsciously, with Western industry.

When asked what was the beginning of VAZ for him, A. I. Grechukhin, who went to VAZ as an inexperienced institute graduate and who was sent to Turin for thirteen months where he met his future wife, answered 'an article by Marietta Shaginian in *Izvestiia* about VAZ, Fiat, the city. It was a well-written article. And I thought: it wouldn't be a bad place to work in this factory...It was only a thought. I decided then to go'.⁹⁵⁵ Not only did working for VAZ result in Grechukhin meeting his future wife, it also resulted in, soon after his return to Tol'iatti in 1968, being sent to Germany, Sweden and Denmark.⁹⁵⁶ The opportunity to work abroad provided new professional and personal experiences. Prior to 1968, engineer O. G. Oblovatskii had worked at the Yaroslavl tractor factory. Upon agreeing to work at VAZ, he was to spend a year abroad in Turin. Recalling this time: 'we [Oblovatskii and colleagues] became acquainted with how to build an industry in the West, what capitalism was and how it worked'.⁹⁵⁷ Head of the Department of Important Technology for VAZ, V. N. Ustinov remembered having great respect for the Italian specialists and his pleasure at being able to work with them in Italy. He discussed how the team of Soviet specialists and workers worked to assimilate knowledge down to the smallest piece. 'Everything was unknown to us, new. We had many questions'.⁹⁵⁸ V. Shuliatev, who spent almost a year in Turin, reiterated this thought when he noted in his interview for a local Soviet paper that his initial group sought to absorb everything, as 'everything was unknown and new'.⁹⁵⁹

In general, the respondents who worked abroad were satisfied with the amount of hard currency they were paid, and felt that they were able to purchase sufficient goods. Perhaps in recognition of the hardships of being abroad, or the

⁹⁵⁴ Interview with V. N. Poliakov in Shavrin, *VAZ* : 34.

⁹⁵⁵ A. I. Grechukhin, in *VAZ: stranitsy istorii vospominaniia i fakty – kniga vtoraiia* 29.

⁹⁵⁶ A. I. Grechukhin, in *VAZ: stranitsy istorii vospominaniia i fakty* 30.

⁹⁵⁷ A. I. Grechukhin, in *VAZ: stranitsy istorii vospominaniia i fakty* 30.

⁹⁵⁸ V. Shuliatev, 'Odin iz pervykh,' *Volzhskii avtostroitel'* (26.11.1969):3.

⁹⁵⁹ V. Shuliatev, 'Odin iz pervykh,' *Volzhskii avtostroitel'* (26.11.1969):3.

necessity of maintaining appearances, Soviet citizens who were to go to work or to train in Turin were given spending money, and extremely high away-from-home daily remuneration. This contentment with remuneration is in contrast with the reports of tourists who were interviewed in a study conducted in the 1970s by Max Ralis, in which five thousand Soviet citizens who were travelling in Western Europe were asked what they liked the best and the least about their country. The comments tended to note the insufficient quantity of hard currency:

- 'When you get the chance to travel abroad – which is rare, sometimes no more than once in a lifetime – you're so restricted in foreign currency that you're prevented from really enjoying your trip to the full' (thirty-seven year old mechanic from Rostov);
- 'They don't give us enough foreign currency.' (thirty-eight year old worker from Odessa);
- 'Unfortunately we get very little foreign currency, and we can only dream of buying souvenirs' (female worker from Orekhovo-Zuyevo).⁹⁶⁰

A degree of envy and resentment was expressed against those Soviet citizens who benefited personally from their time abroad. Upon leaving an interview conducted with a factory employee who often went abroad and a medical doctor from the factory polyclinic, the doctor asked if this researcher had noticed the unusually high quality of goods in the home. The doctor noted that the interviewee had gone abroad often and always came back with clothes, appliances and other sought-after goods, noting that the employee's children were always better dressed and her house was always finer than those of people who were not able to go abroad.⁹⁶¹ Another worker recalled that in the early period one of the best benefits of becoming a brigade leader at VAZ was that he could fly regularly and cheaply to the Baltics where he would buy children's toys and sweets.⁹⁶²

Residents of Tol'iatti had not good, but better, possibilities of travelling to Italy as tourists. The travels normally included a visit to Turin, Venice, Florence, and Bologna.⁹⁶³ For some, travel abroad was a benefit that they experienced only

⁹⁶⁰ Ralis, 'The Soviet Worker' 244.

⁹⁶¹ Interview spring 2002 Tol'iatti with Elena Aleksandrovna.

⁹⁶² Interview spring 2002 Tol'iatti with Anatoli Petrovich.

⁹⁶³ Reports of these travels were published in the local paper *Volzhskii avtostroitel'*. See F. Nikolaev 'Bol'shoi drug?' *Volzhskii avtostroitel'* (01.07.1970): 1; N. Korshunov, 'Turistskim

very late in their careers as there was the initial flurry and then a dry spell with travel resuming only towards the Gorbachev era. Galia Valentinovna travelled abroad for the first time when she was 50 years old. Although she had little to contribute to the delegation attending an exhibition in Birmingham, she was due for retirement, and her place in the delegation was seen as a retirement present.⁹⁶⁴ Other non-work related contact involved travellers visiting Tol'iatti in the early 1970s, as Tol'iatti was part of an organised tour of six cities and of cultural exchanges run by the United States Information agency, USIA.⁹⁶⁵ Not all the work and travel experiences in Italy were favourable. V. Ya. Aimukov described his stay in Turin as: 'we felt ourselves to be like participants in an anecdote, who had just fallen abroad. One saw in their [the Italian] stores at least twenty types of sausage, thirty types of cheese, and felt faint'.⁹⁶⁶ A future General Director of VAZ, V. V. Kadannikov, certainly did not enjoy the experience. Kadannikov started working in the factory in May 1967. Shortly thereafter he was sent as part of a large group of specialists to Turin. Although he found the new technology and production methods that were as then not present in the USSR interesting, he was 'always scared'. He repeatedly had a ticket to return home only to have his stay extended. 'I was strangely happy when VAZ was finished. All the same, the main work was done here, and over a year abroad was more than enough for me'.⁹⁶⁷

The individuals who were sent to Turin returned with new ideas, experiences and perceptions. Their new knowledge was transmitted to others in several ways. Professionally, they sought to quickly implement new norms, methods and practices, often straining the Soviet industrial system in their attempts to do so. They communicated their personal experiences to colleagues, friends and family. To some extent, the national press told and retold the stories of those individuals who, by working in Turin, were making a valuable contribution to the Soviet Union's great leap forward. The exposure was extensive but not remarkable, for

marshrutom, 'Volzhskii avtostroitel' (03.08.1971): 4; 'Vstrecha s molodymi kommunistami Rima, 'Volzhskii avtostroitel' (25.05.1974): 2. Interviewees also noted that one of the benefits of working in Tol'iatti was increased access to travel abroad, specifically to Italy.

⁹⁶⁴ Fieldnote from a conversation with Galia Valentinovna 15.03.02

⁹⁶⁵ Howard Sochurek, 'Russia's mighty River Road: the Volga,' National Geographic Vol. 143, no.5 (1973): 579-613, 606.

⁹⁶⁶ V. Ia Aitukov in VAZ: stranitsy istorii, vospominaniia i fakty: 131.

⁹⁶⁷ Interview with V.V. Kadannikov in Shavrin, VAZ 95.

this was a period in Soviet history when it was fashionable to discuss what the West had to offer.

While the majority of the foreigners were Italian, the result of Fiat subcontracting large portions of the work to other firms resulted in a strong presence of other foreigners. Poliakov recalled that along with the Italian specialists there worked many teams from foreign firms in West Germany, France, Sweden, England, Japan, the USA, and others.⁹⁶⁸ Due to American embargos against the USSR, Fiat would purchase from or contract the foreign firms and then ship the goods and services to Tol'jatti. Poliakov is careful to recall that it was during the cold war, there were tensions with all Western countries and that France and Italy simply happened to be a bit friendlier.⁹⁶⁹ Visiting delegations were often covered in the local and national press, in the former usually on the first page.⁹⁷⁰ For example, in June 1970, the Soviet press announced the arrival of four international companies represented by their specialists in Tol'jatti, one American (Landis Tool), two Italian, and one German (SAKK).⁹⁷¹ According to a US congressional report there were on average 850 foreigners present: six hundred workers from Italy, and two hundred other Westerners (Germans, British, French and Americans).⁹⁷² Translator Liudmila Petrovna noted that there was a demand for English that could not be fully met.⁹⁷³ The government sought to rectify this through a special course at the University of Leningrad for future VAZ employees. The course was a combination of English as a second language and a study of foreign car enterprises.

Part of the contract between the USSR and Fiat provided that Soviet specialists would visit the plants, notably in Turin, and the Italians would assist in training, construction, and establishing the quality control in Russia. In a press interview, the president of Fiat, Giovanni Agnelli, said of the exchange of workers that: 'construction of such scope ensured a great demand for our technical specialists. They [Fiat specialists] gained wonderful experience... Our young

⁹⁶⁸ Interview with V. N. Poliakov in Shavrin, VAZ 33.

⁹⁶⁸ A. I. Mikoyan, Press-Konferentsiia.

⁹⁶⁹ V. N. Poliakov, 'Vaz dlia menia -- eto vse,' Volzhskii avtostroitel' (01.02.2000): 2-3, 2.

⁹⁷⁰ 'Finskaia delegatsiia na VAZe,' Volzhskii avtostroitel' (18.07.1974): 1; untitled article with photo in Volzhskii avtostroitel' (14.12.1974): 1.

⁹⁷¹ Y. Gurin, 'Start blizok,' Volzhskii avtostroitel' (13.06.1970): 1.

⁹⁷² US Congress House Committee on Banking and Currency, Sub committee on International trade, The Fiat Soviet Automobile Plant and Soviet Economic Reforms (Washington Point: March 1967) 3.

⁹⁷³ Interview spring 2002 with Liudmila Petrovna.

people came back full of enthusiasm and resolve'.⁹⁷⁴ Several returned to Italy with spouses and approximately ten married and remained.⁹⁷⁵ A high-ranking interpreter, noted that life in Tol'iatti was extremely difficult for the foreigners and that many of them wanted to go home.⁹⁷⁶ While the Soviet workers and specialists were placed in Turin for six weeks to eighteen months, foreign workers tended to have far shorter stays, on average six weeks in Tol'iatti.

The Italians were either housed in the hotel in the 'old town', or in apartment blocks, which they themselves constructed. The hotel was supplied with an Italian chef, an espresso bar, Chianti, Italian TV and an Italian Catholic priest.⁹⁷⁷ To this day, the Italian constructed yellow brick buildings stand out from the monotonous rows of once white, slightly decrepit looking buildings that surround them and are considered to be prized accommodation, for, while they were constructed as communal flats, with five individual rooms sharing a kitchen and bathroom facilities, the walls are relatively soundproof. Those foreign workers who arrived before the completion of the housing complexes were put-up in the hotel and had their own chef, specially brought in Italian news, entertainment etc. While the city was designed so that no worker would have to travel more than twenty minutes by public transport to get to the factory, the foreign workers were shuttled in special buses to the factory. To the chagrin of some of the original Soviet workers, the foreign guests were allotted a single toilet in the entire two kilometre long central building, and this toilet was filled with water containing dead fish.⁹⁷⁸ The isolation and special considerations seem to be more in the nature of concessions and being a good host than deliberately trying to separate the Soviet citizens from the foreign workers.

P. M. Katsura has recalled how the working methods of the Italians were of interest to the Soviet workers. The Italian workers were 'ready to complete any type of work. What interested then most of all was their wages, for our workers what was important was to see the end of the line, that today they finished their work... Never more, and less is also not permitted. It is necessary to have the even amount

⁹⁷⁴ Agnelli, Giovanni as quoted in L. Yugov, 'Soviet-Italian Contacts Expand,' 3

⁹⁷⁵ Bystrova, *Na volne pamiati* 85.

⁹⁷⁶ Interview in Tol'iattii with Lydmilla Petrovna Spring 2002.

⁹⁷⁷ Sochurek, 'Russia's mighty River Road: the Volga,' 606.

⁹⁷⁸ Isakov, 'Zdravstvui, VAZ,' 2. It would be interesting to know how many toilets were allotted to Soviet workers and what that water was like.

that is needed'.⁹⁷⁹ The brigade formations were also different. The Italian teams worked more as a loose group of individuals with each doing what one could. In the article 'Together With Us' the press was pleased to report that 30 specialists representing companies from Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, GDR, Denmark, and Bulgaria contributed to the success of the 6th working day of the week.⁹⁸⁰ O. G. Oblovatskii, who worked both with the specialists from the German company Schuler as well as with Fiat specialists, remembered the impact of the Italians: 'for hundreds and hundreds of Italians the city of the *Zhiguli* was not just a work address...because here they not only worked but lived, and worked, closely with Russia and its people, even fell in love, started families'.⁹⁸¹ He also recalled that there were many arguments between the Italians and the Russians. The redesigning of the parts proved extremely problematic as it resulted in the need to rebuild many of the presses. Many of the Italian assemblers refused to do anything other than erect the presses to Fiat specifications, resulting in Soviet brigades being left to refit the machines. Vladimir Isakov, a motor master who began working at VAZ in 1969, recalled his conversation with the Italian engineer from the Mirafiori factory in which the Italian was against the proposed changes but concluded by saying that it was a matter to be resolved by the Russian engineers and that they were responsible. Iskov responded with 'thank you' and 'don't worry'.⁹⁸² The Soviet planners often refused to use the Italian recommended firms, choosing instead their own supplier or manufacturer. For example, the planners decided to employ the West German equipment producer Liebherr instead of Pfauter, because they felt that the former's new methods were better. In the end, Fiat refused to approve changes and thus to guarantee the part. However, some changes were common decisions. After the building of the first prototypes in the Krasnodarskii region it was discovered that the vehicles could not handle the Soviet road conditions: 'the roads were not very good...and the car drove, but did not drive more than nine thousand kilometres'.⁹⁸³ The Fiat also needed to be adapted in order

⁹⁷⁹ Katsura in *VAZ* 60.

⁹⁸⁰ A. Gusev, 'Vместе s nami,' *Volzhskii avtostroitel'* (24.04.1971): 3.

⁹⁸¹ O. G. Oblovatskii in Bystrova, *Na volne pamiati* 82.

⁹⁸² Isakov, 'Zdravstvui, VAZ' 2.

⁹⁸³ Interview with K Bakhtov in A. Shavrin, *VAZ* 130.

to function in winter conditions. The second test car drove a total of thirty thousand kilometres before needing major repairs.

Contact with the foreigners was neither restricted to the elite nor to work. Question seven of the survey asked about work with foreigners: 12.5 percent of the respondents had worked abroad, (sixty percent of them were male); and 52.5 percent of the total respondents had worked with foreigners in Tol'iatti, (thirty-three percent of them were women). From those who elaborated about working with foreigners came such comments as: 'I worked with the Italian specialists, they were good specialists';⁹⁸⁴ 'yes, we worked in Tol'iatti [with the foreigners], it was a fantastic work experience';⁹⁸⁵ and 'I didn't have contact with them, but I worked alongside them'.⁹⁸⁶ The tone of the newspaper articles discussing the participation of foreign workers is similar to that used by interviewees: there tends to be a generally positive discussion without any sense of exceptionality. Fiat and its employees were bringing modern technology that was impressive but which only through Soviet tempo, aggrandizement, and modification would become extraordinary.

The degree of outside help, and calls to do things 'as it is done in the factory of Fiat',⁹⁸⁷ do not seem to have affected the attitudes of the local citizens and employees of the factory, the overwhelming majority of whom said that the factory was 'theirs'. Indeed, management was under constant pressure to ensure that every aspect of the production and end product would 'be not worse than that in Fiat'.⁹⁸⁸ Issues of ownership became clearer with three events. The first was the dispute over the colouring of the first cars. It is commonly believed (the veracity of this belief was confirmed by a senior member of the paint department) that the Italians thought that the first three cars should be coloured red, green and white for the Italian flag.⁹⁸⁹ The Soviet officials objected and stated that the first colours should be that of the flag of the Russian Republic. In the end, the first several hundred cars were white. The second was the fulfilment of the initial contract in 1975. When a representative of the factory who had worked there from the beginning referred to

⁹⁸⁴ Questionnaire no. 22.

⁹⁸⁵ Questionnaire no. 15.

⁹⁸⁶ Questionnaire no. 13.

⁹⁸⁷ Visakov, *Volzhskii avtostroitel'* (15.09.1971):3.

⁹⁸⁸ In an interview with Poliakov, 'Molodezh' dolzhna reshat' na VAZa glavnye zadachi,' *Volzhskii avtostroitel'* (27.04.2000): 2.

⁹⁸⁹ Interview with Galina Valentinovna.

the leaving of the Italians in 1975, she made it clear that she felt that the Italians had abandoned the Soviet project. Their contract was up and they simply left, regardless of what work remained to be completed.⁹⁹⁰ By the autumn of 1975, the press wrote predominantly of the 'Soviet' *Zhiguli* with increasingly fewer references to the Fiat 124.⁹⁹¹ The third event was the development of the *Niva*, which was Soviet designed and produced.

During the stay of the Italian workers and specialists, various activities were organised that promoted contact. Many of these activities were organised by VAZ's international friendship club. These activities tended to either be cultural, or sports. One example of a cultural event (15.09.1967) occurred in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution. Italian workers who were preparing the technical documents for VAZ joined workers and engineers working in Tol'atti in celebration. The Day of the Fast Wheel was a cycling competition between employees of VAZ and of Fiat. Newspaper articles covering the events were peppered with Italian words and expressions, *buona sera, finito, si si, ok, Ciao* etc. Football matches, which eventually evolved into a tournament held in the local stadium, were, like cycling, to become a regular source of friendly national competition.⁹⁹² In 1972, the success of the Italian-Soviet venture was immortalised on film. The *Mosfilm* studios, working together with the Italian film industry, produced a colour documentary about the *Avtozavod* on the Volga. The film 'Factory: Big And At Once' was the story 'not only about the birth of VAZ, but about the life of the Italian colony'⁹⁹³ and was produced for Soviet and Italian audiences. As one Muscovite was to recall: 'we have to thank Italy, the *Zhiguli* was very well adopted – it was wonderful.'⁹⁹⁴

⁹⁹⁰ Interview with Larissa Ivanova.

⁹⁹¹ See for example P. Barashev and N. Mironov, 'VAZ: segodnia i zavtra,' *Pravda* (28.08.1975): 2.

⁹⁹² For an example of local coverage see R. Bannikov, 'Pod flagom družby,' *Volzhskii avtostroitel'* (16.09.1970): 4. or 'Uvlekatel'nyi polufinal,' *Volzhskii avtostroitel'* (09.09.1970):4.

⁹⁹³ Interview with O. G. Oblovatsk in N. Bystrova, *Na Volne Pamiati: Kniga Pervaia* 85.

⁹⁹⁴ Interview with A. Kalinin (04.03.2003) Moskva.

Conclusion

The international nature of the construction of the AVTOVAZ factory was much heralded by the Soviet press and leadership. For the Soviet regime it highlighted for its citizens its ability to provide Western quality consumer goods; that it was serious about meeting the material demands of the people; that there were impressive technological advances occurring within the Soviet Union, be this in terms of Sputniks or automobiles; and that the Soviet Union was indeed catching up with and would overtake the West. A then contemporary assessment of the relationship between VAZ and the Soviet regime was that the 'rapid expansion of production of private passenger cars at VAZ was an integral part of the new leadership's effort to provide quality consumer goods as incentives for Soviet citizens'.⁹⁹⁵ It was necessary in order to inspire and motivate collectively in order to create enthusiasm for new methods and products.⁹⁹⁶ It also constituted a commitment to a new, modern, management method that was to be advocated as the correct method for numerous industries. Elements of this style of management included: significant levels of independence, accountability of managers, the wage system, and bonuses for professionals. 'Both the style of management and the wage system at VAZ are claimed to be more appropriate to a modern, technologically progressive enterprise'.⁹⁹⁷ At the 24th Party Congress, G. K. Mironenko declared not only that the VAZ car was 'guaranteed for life' but also that it was a 'symbol of state quality'.⁹⁹⁸ It was also an endorsement of the policy of co-existence.

In Tol'iatti there was the newest, best and most technologically advanced equipment. In Tol'iatti one could more quickly achieve those material goods to which the majority of Soviet citizens of the period aspired: a flat, a dacha, easier access to nursery schools, a car, and professional advancement. The AVTOVAZ factory was a testimony to the hard work of the Soviet worker. The *Zhiguli/Lada* was a Soviet car made in a Soviet factory, but both official sources and survey

⁹⁹⁵ Holliday, Western Technology Transfer to the Soviet Union 165.

⁹⁹⁶ Sotnikov, 'Nekotorye voprosy khoziaistvennogo rascheta,' 124-128.

⁹⁹⁷ Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva no.1. (1976): 47-210, 181. A. K. Osipov, chief of administration of labour organisation and wages at VAZ, spent a year and a half at Fiat and intimates that this experience was instrumental in formulating VAZ's wage system. See 'VAZ—Shkola upravlenii,' Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva no.1. (1976):116-117.

⁹⁹⁸ N. Poliakov, 'Avtomobile Vaz 2101 — the state symbol of quality,' Volzhskii avtostroitel' (19.04.1972): 1-2.

respondents maintained that it could not have been done without the technological and managerial assistance of Fiat and other outsourced companies. The Soviet government did not issue only praise for the West. It was consistent in its condemnation of Western politics and the cruelties of capitalism. However, communists who professed to find the injustices of capitalist democracy repugnant, appear to have been able to laud Western-manufacturing methods. If these communists could call for Soviet workers to unite in catching up with and overtaking the West, then there must be something there worthy of the effort. The propaganda about the West in its entirety was inconsistent and complex. The separation of modern technology and capitalism as seen through the divergent nature of capitalist societies serves as a testament to the viability of a separation. However, Soviet propaganda never fully succeeded in articulating this partition, thus finding the nation bound to an oppositional image that was in the long term unable to convincingly present the argument of how to institutionalise modern technology without capitalism.

The AVTOVAZ is but one example of how the Soviet government facilitated the creation of a positive economic image of the West. Taken on its own it represents an intense episode of 'positive' economic exposure both industrially and personally. Placed within the context of its time, surrounded by numerous other examples of the propagation of this image, it illustrates the widespread phenomena that eventually resulted in Soviet citizens being provided with an 'other' that was seemingly better suited for the attainment of their material objectives. Images are a combination of concrete ideas and the shadows that surround them. What was not conveyed, the shadow as it were, of the economic image, was how it could be achieved without adopting the evils of capitalism. The society was provided with an objective, and an allusion to the system that was currently leading in the attainment of this objective. From the launching of Sputnik to the first man on the moon, the consistent valuing of Western technology and implicitly the standard of living, coupled with the consistent vilification of the means of creating and achieving this, resulted in the creation of an image of the West in which the means were unfair, unjust and unacceptable but in which the results were lauded and sought.

This image was one of advanced technological and production capabilities. It included images of youth, modernity, momentum, the power of the consumer, and

while perhaps not high, but definitely higher, standards of living. Bruno Hessenmueller's description of the new modern lifestyle was intended to apply to the Federal Republic of Germany but it is international in nature. Writing in 1956 he stated that:

this kind of lifestyle...is of course strongly influenced by technical and practical considerations...It may take any number of forms, from the three-piece suit, through cutlery and the radiogram, to beauty aids or the products of the latest research in nutritional science. But in every case, what we have is a combination of technical perfection with formal beauty in design.⁹⁹⁹

The interpretation of communist ideology within the Soviet Union after WWII restricted the concept of technology by attempting to place it outside of the field of culture. This policy was adopted in an attempt to realise the objective of modernisation and increased standards of living while still condemning the ideologies of those nations from which the Soviet Union sought ideas and technology. The destination was the same; both the regime and the people wanted to be caught up to and ahead of the West. This resulted in the image of the West being a complex combination of evil personified and yet nearer to utopia than the Soviet homeland was. While it falls outside of the scope of this study, it would be of interest to trace this idea through to the present day and examine the ramifications this dual image has had on post Soviet Russia, which appears to have accepted the evils of democracy and of capitalism and the joys of consumerism. The frustration of unmet expectations was internally driven and externally exacerbated.

In many ways the factory has come full circle. It was once a joint venture and is moving towards this again. After the 1990s, when various mafia groups fought for control over the autoworks, and which earned Tol'iatti the title of 'murder capital of Russia', the factory was subdivided with several divisions entering into partnerships with foreign automobile concerns. These joint venture divisions are considered more stable, and better paying than the independent Russian divisions. General Motors has revamped the *Niva* for the European market and production of the *Micra* is in the implementation stage. The general standard of living is higher in Tol'iatti than in the surrounding environs due primarily to the factory. The most 'modern' factory in the Soviet Union has re-established its international contacts in

⁹⁹⁹ Bruno Hessenmueller, 'Werbung für den modernen Lebensstil,' *Die Anzeig* 33, no.2 (1956): 76.

hopes of competing in the international arena. Many individuals today as in the late 1960s and 1970s would share the opinion of the widely read journal *Literaturnaia gazeta* when it declared succinctly: 'VAZ- Eto Stil'. ¹⁰⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰⁰ T. Koltsova, 'VAZ-Eto Temp,' Volzhskii avtostroitel (08.10.1974): 2.

Conclusion: 'The beginning of the end and the end of a beginning

It is time for us to stop seeming, and to start being. (Vissarion Belinskii)

How come in everything we do we have to be appealing to somebody else? Always somebody else to tell us if this right or wrong, if it good or bad... Is like we ain't have no self. I mean, we have a self but the self we have is for somebody else. Is like even when we acting we ain't the actor. (E Lovelace)¹⁰⁰¹

The economic and technological images of the West were constructed through a prism of Soviet tolerated and Soviet propagated images that found resonance in Soviet society. Examples of sources of these images included the Soviet media, foreign permitted media, Soviet and non-Soviet films, exhibitions, and contact through technical co-operation. These images were ones of technical successes that involved mass production, advanced technology particularly in the fields of clothing, petrochemicals, radio science, transportation and construction. In large part these images were associated with the consumer, with the notion that the technology would afford the individual more leisure and more comforts. An integral aspect of the economic and technological images was that they were positive and desired. A regime can hardly propagate the slogan of overtaking and surpassing the West if the image of the West is entirely negative. As David Joravsky has argued, overtaking and surpassing 'coexisted with the need to stop kowtowing to the West, each inflaming the other.'¹⁰⁰² The crux of these images was an economic and technological West that was appealing enough to motivate, excite aspirations and promote allegiance without crossing the line to social unrest. Another fundamentally problematic aspect of the images was that despite being promoted as Western, the artefacts of the images were to metamorphose to either culturally neutral artefacts or to Soviet ones. This process is seen in the VAZ factory as the Italian *Fiat 124* was, through a joint process, to become the Soviet *Zhiguli*.

¹⁰⁰¹ E. Lovelace, *The Dragon Can't Dance* (London: Longman, 1981) 188.

¹⁰⁰² David Joravsky, *Russian Psychology: A Critical History*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989) 406.

Participation in the building of the mythical other occurred on several levels from the elite to the general population to foreigners. One of the defining features of the Thaw was the melding of modern and modernity with an industrial superstructure and a relatively recently displaced peasant population. This process was pushed by the Party hierarchy who sought to secure their political future as well as by sectors of the public who sought to improve their standard of living and to maintain their nation's international status, which had been won in large part through the valiant efforts of the general population. As Guroff has written 'Marxism [had] added a pro-industrial presumption to the dominant traditional Russian ideology based on a single centred, hierarchical society in which legitimacy emanated only from the tsar or Party.'¹⁰⁰³ Susan Buck-Morss has written that the 'Bolshevik experiment, no matter how many specifically Russian cultural traits it developed, was vitally attached to the Western modernising project, from which it cannot be extracted without causing the project itself to fall to pieces.'¹⁰⁰⁴ The nature of the Cold War and the end of terror on a massive scale, civil war and direct military activity meant that for the first time in Soviet history the government was dealing with a stable population base. In addition to the new social contract with the masses, a new social contract with a broadly defined elite needed to be established. Situated between the general population and the Party leadership were petty officials, the intelligentsia and a scientific and industrial elite. While there was a great deal of uncertainty under Khrushchev, it seems improbable that there was less stability than at any other previous period in Soviet history. Thus, claims that his reforms were thwarted by petty official and industrial managers upset at the new instability is indicative of a comparatively high level of general social stability. Rising expectations from workers and demands that the direct employer (for example the factory) supply increasingly better living quarters, consumer durables etc and the pressure from the state for increased production left petty officials and industrial leaders grappling to address short term needs and unable to seriously contemplate long term objectives. It was also not in their best interest to concentrate on long-term objectives as their positions were tied to short-term output and not the success with which they laid the groundwork for further development.

¹⁰⁰³ Guroff , 'Economic Innovation: Observations' 308.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Buck-Morss, Dream World and Catastrophe 68.

The intelligentsia's position was strengthened by their role as the bearers of cultural and scientific knowledge, two fields in which the Soviet regime sought to impress upon the world the leading status of the Soviet Union. A 'social cushion' was needed between the power summit and the masses. The intelligentsia was, in part, to fill this role.¹⁰⁰⁵ The intelligentsia's moral, material, and political status afforded it the meagre luxury of eventually rejecting the West and consumption. Anti-Westernism was an affectation that came to separate educated individuals from the uncultured masses. This increasingly privileged position of the intelligentsia was furthered by the role afforded to it by the West with the superimposing of the concept of liberalisation on the Thaw period. It is an historical inaccuracy to afford the intelligentsia a central role in the Thaw period, which was a period of party leaders, mass social movement, bureaucratic upheaval and the rise of the intelligentsia.

Khrushchev's policies constituted a rejection of the atavistic excesses of Stalinism and marked a new, modern and inherently Western path for the Soviet Union. Fundamental to Khrushchev's policies was the idea of consumption, allowing the consumption of material objects to be a projection of both personal and collective identities, and an expression of both compliance with and resistance to the state.¹⁰⁰⁶ Consumption as an ideological and political ambition redefined the relationship between society and state, society and the enemy (the West), and society and the communist future. Khrushchev staked his legitimacy, and that of the Party present and future, on a post-industrial definition of material realities of everyday life. This definition was to act as a straight jacket for Khrushchev and subsequent leaders. As Boris Kagarlitsky has noted, the 'worse the situation in the economy became, the more the ideology of consumerism turned against the system, which was incapable of fulfilling its own promises.'¹⁰⁰⁷

If it is accepted that the problem lay in the nature of Khrushchev's reforms, the question arises: was a return to Leninism or Stalinism possible? A fair assessment would be that a return to the Terror was possible, events in Hungary,

¹⁰⁰⁵ Moshe Lewin, *Stalinism and the Seeds of Soviet Reform* (London: Pluto Press, 1991) 259.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Crowley, 'Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-War Eastern Europe' 4.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Kagarlitsky, *The Disintegration of the Monolith* 18.

Poland, Prague, the continuation of the gulag system and the repression of individuals and groups attest to this, but not probable. As the process of de-Stalinisation progressed, the prospect of a return decreased. The return to the monolithic idea of the Truth, the insistence of its existence having cost so many lives, was not possible. Accepting that a return to the Terror was improbable, that the concept of the Truth was shattered and that the government lacked the gravitas it once had, the government was left to renegotiate its relationship with society in general and with the industrial elite and intelligentsia in particular. Compensation for the loss of legitimacy that accompanied the loss of the communist Truth was sought through external factors (war victor, superpower status, world leader) and internal legitimacy (benevolent provider). The Khrushchev and Brezhnev regimes were, like other totalitarian regimes, sensitive to social pressure regardless of how voiceless and powerless the individual was meant to be. According to Vladimir Bukovskii:

These regimes are maintained by fear and the silent complicity of those who surround them. Each person should be absolutely powerless before the state, completely without rights and generally to blame. In this atmosphere the word, even spoken from abroad, comes to have a huge strength, it is not by chance that they executed poets among us. At the same time both the powers and the people understood perfectly the illegality of the regime, its illegitimacy. In this hidden civil war the external world (*zagranitsa*) becomes the highest arbiter. Just as a gangster, who has become wealthy through fighting, attempts to be accepted by high society, arrays himself in a dinner-jacket and imitates the habits of the profit-making businessman, the Soviet regime thirsts to be accepted as an equal in world society. The exclamations about being the most just, the happiest, the most progressive, and absolutely the most socialist state have long disappeared into the shadows. 'It's no worse among us,' or 'Do they have it any better?' – these are the subtexts of present Soviet propaganda. 1008

Consumption was needed as evidence that life was getting better, as a source of faith, as a replacement for terror, as a means of stability and as a diversion during upheaval and change. The adoption of limited finite consumerism was a crucial form of internal legitimisation. The focus on improving the material living of Soviet citizens, resulted in increased attention being paid to areas such as agriculture, housing, consumer goods, and thereby causing 'much greater consideration of scarcity in relation to competing needs' than was previously done, and placing strain

1008 Vladimir Bukovskii, *Pis'ma russkogo puteshestvennika* (New York: Chalidze, 1981) 29.

on the traditional mechanisms of the central planning system.¹⁰⁰⁹ The fact that consumption could be both stabilising and destabilising was recognised by the communist regime, which sought to temper the problematic aspects of consumerism by introducing the idea of controlled consumption, otherwise known as austere consumerism or goulash socialism.

Moshe Lewin has argued that the appearance of discrepancies between the official and non-official values and perceptions that a people use to guide their activities and a state uses to govern is inevitable.¹⁰¹⁰ However, if discrepancies arise within core sectors, for example the economy or if it becomes a general condition, the political structure itself is compromised. Within the Soviet Union, the discrepancy was not between perceptions between classes or groups but between the realisation of the official ideology and its utopian image. That this discord was universal can be seen in the consistent nature of the economic image of the West, and the nature of the collapse of the Soviet Union. That the Party was no longer leading but was in a state of reacting to social changes and needs is evidenced by its absorption with commonplace tasks as each implementation of innovations and reforms posed the risk of unleashing a process that could exceed the Party's ability to control.

The rise of inquiries, commissions and surveys conducted by the state during the 1950s and 1960s is consistent with notion of state sensitivity to social pressure. The economic expectations seen in various surveys from this era indicate that the rising sense of expectation was disproportional to current and often projected capacities. Was this discrepancy a failure of the state to communicate its limitations to the citizens? Was it a manifestation of optimism: a genuine sense of having achieved the impossible and a faith in continuing with comparable successes? Was it indicative of the success of the Soviet propaganda machine? Or was it a demand: we the Soviet people believe that there are other citizens with a higher standard of living and we want it for ourselves? The answer is all of the above.

Given the extensive nature of participation in the creation of the image of the mythical other from the intelligentsia, to workers, to Party officials to foreign cold warriors, it is perhaps not surprising that the image was built through an infinite

¹⁰⁰⁹ Nove, Political Economy and Soviet Socialism 137.

¹⁰¹⁰ Lewin, Stalinism and the Seeds of Soviet Reform 337.

number of sources. Employing an imagery that was used in the Introduction of this work: the image of the mythical other was built through a multitude of pebbles being dropped into a still body of water. The reverberations in the water are the dispersion of the information and the pattern of the ripples in the sand the image. The image was to be built through primary and secondary contact of a both Soviet and Western nature. Soviet based contact included but was not restricted to: general media, speeches, conferences, tourism, industrial contact etc. Non-Soviet contact included but was not restricted to tolerated Western media including films, reproduced media, tourism, exhibitions etc. Despite numerous sources, the image of the mythical other was relatively uniform: wealthy, consumer driven, impressive technology, frivolous/extravagant bordering on nonsensical/silly, desirable if not achievable, transferable and intertwined with the Soviet future. During the 1950s and 1960s, this image was adopted by the vast majority of Soviet citizens and the West for various reasons, some of which have been mentioned above. The child of the Party official wore his/her Levis jeans as a sign of his/her status within the system: the dissenter wore them as a sign of protest and non-compliance. The Western officials of a national exhibition seemingly casually incorporated them as a sign of consumer wealth and national mass production capabilities. The economic nature of the mythical other and its adoption into Soviet culture meant that it was to play a role in the shaping of the comrade consumer.

A problem lay in the potential diversion of loyalties resulting from modernisation. Writing about the creation of mass consumer society in the USSR, William Turpin prophesised that:

were the Soviet economy to develop in such a way as to encourage the citizen to become deeply absorbed in the acquisition and enjoyment of consumer goods, particularly of the durable variety, one result would very likely be the rapid growth of interests and preoccupations that would compete with ... and indeed, be detrimental to- the Party's claims upon the citizen's time and attention.¹⁰¹¹

The ideological ramifications border on the Kafkaesque: a dishwasher would free up more time for Party and communist oriented activities, but its presence might promote more private time. It may also promote increased private gatherings. This

¹⁰¹¹ William N. Turpin, 'The Outlook for the Soviet Consumer,' Problems of Communism no.6 (1960) 30-37, 32.

is to say nothing of the stress that it would cause to the already inadequate water and electrical lines. Consumption takes time and energy.

A study of Soviet policy establishes that consumption was not at odds with the official ideology. Consumption was an ill-fitted aspect of the official identity and an awkward and often shunned component of the new Soviet man. The price of the failure to produce can be seen in the increased dissatisfaction of Soviet society, despite improvements in living conditions; in the solidification of the image of the West as having the most viable system for providing for high consumption; in the acquiescence of the role of the Party in the race to impart the highest standard of living; and in the failure of the Communist ideological system to maintain its credibility. Aided by petrol-dollars, Brezhnev sought to minimise the instability by returning to a historically defined concept of prosperity that would allow for significant improvement. However, the dissemination of information about the West during the 1950s and 1960s and the contact with the images, if not the reality of, Western goods and technology had become too widespread to allow for the removal of the Western standard of living as a yardstick against which to measure Soviet material realities. Brezhnev's success at redefining prosperity from modern international to the historical national was moderate, that the Soviet system was to outlive Brezhnev is indicative of a compromise having been achieved. The Post-War social contract was one that befitted a modern superpower with initial concessions due to the war. The challenge was not in arriving at an agreement but in fulfilling it.

The mythical other was used to help define expectations by making them more concrete and to legitimise expectations and consumption. Expectations needed to be made concrete given the nature of Soviet history and understanding of the future. The political and ideological need to create a schism between the imperialist and Soviet past as well as to distance the Socialist leaders from Stalinism resulted in history being problematic and limited largely to the Lenin years. In part as a balance to the past and in part an aspect of international post war modernisation, the projection into the future was equally truncated allowing for a few decades. This time constraint not only exasperated the economic aspect of the social contract between citizens and the elite, it resulted in the mythical other being weighted heavily in the Soviet future and in the nature of the comrade consumer. This highly

Westernised comrade consumer was propagated by the state and retained as a comrade as the regime was seeking to create a new social contract through consumption. The mythical other was to have an impact on the comrade consumer and on a broader scale on Soviet society and its view of the future.

Coupled with the rise of expectations was the increase in vocalised discontent. Dissatisfaction was expressed as letters to editors soared, protests and workers' actions broke out, work apathy intensified, unstable work patterns increased (for example, the migration of skilled workers such as tractor drivers from the Virgin lands), the second economy grew, and social apathy was felt. Usually a driving force in any social change, the youth, specifically the urban youth, were absent from Thaw politics, but not from Thaw cultural, social or scientific life. Clear indications of the limits to political change drove youth into these other areas of which two of the dominant trajectories were the West and consumption. As with any new trend, there were those within Soviet society who rejected these trajectories. The aloofness towards Westerners and in particular towards consumer goods was to increase as disillusionment over the Soviet Union's inability to achieve parity increased.

There were distinct political advantages for Khrushchev's regime to co-opt Western material successes. For the individual, the promise of more goods was to serve the same motivational role as the potential to earn large sums of money served in capitalistic systems. A nation-wide high standard of living would legitimatise the Soviet Union's international position as a superpower in areas other than the military and had the prospect of legitimising the regime's status. However, the inherent risk in this approach was increased expectations and discontent. Writing in the early 1970s, Paul Hollander theorised that the 'key to the stability of the Soviet system lies in its management of expectations'.¹⁰¹² The principle of sacrifice, which almost became a 'psychological instrument of motivation' prior to and during WWII began to lose effectiveness by 1948 and by the mid 1950s had largely ceased to be a source of motivation.¹⁰¹³ One sees the absence of this mentality by the mid 1950s in Elena Zubokova's study of comments made on election ballots. As the comments

¹⁰¹² Paul Hollander, Soviet and American Society: A Comparison (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973) 388.

¹⁰¹³ Zubokova, Russia After the War 101.

on the electoral ballots make clear, people were less interested in politics than in their own material problems:

- What kind of faith can the voters have in the government when as long ago as 1930 the newspapers promised that people in the Soviet Union would soon cease to have to live in basements? This is deception. Until the present day people continue to take shelter in underground lodging in dreadful poverty.
- Everywhere it is said and written that we are prosperous and have everything, while in fact we have nothing. It is empty chatter... What has become of consumer goods? We have to stand in line all day. Are we under blockade? The truth is that abroad they have everything, and here at home we have only rubbish.¹⁰¹⁴

Particularly problematic was the rise of the perception of consumer desire as a 'right'; material plenty was an essential measure of the advancement of the Soviet socialist system.¹⁰¹⁵ In 1978, Vaclav Havel, stated that:

Our system is most frequently characterised as a dictatorship or, more precisely, the dictatorship of a bureaucracy over a society. I am afraid that the term 'dictatorship' ... tends to obscure rather than clarify the real nature of the power in this system... What we have here is simply another form of consumer and industrial society... [T]he post-totalitarian system has been built on foundations laid by the historical encounter between dictatorship and the consumer society.'¹⁰¹⁶

The Soviet Union was defining itself as a superpower that was technologically and economically behind while simultaneously making brilliant strides towards a glorious future (i.e. sputnik). Evidence of advance could be found in the closing of the standard of living gap between the Soviet Union and the West (think butter, milk, radio etc production) in general and between the Soviet Union and the United States in particular as the two superpowers. The race was close enough that after sputnik the Soviet slogan of catching up and surpassing the West was joined by the American slogan of 'Catch up with the Russians!' thus completing the image of tail chasing.

During the Thaw, cultural and industrial contacts were never subjected to an impermeable Iron Curtain. For political reasons, international co-operation and

¹⁰¹⁴ Zubkova, *Russia After the War* 162.

¹⁰¹⁵ Humphrey, 'Creating a culture of disillusionment: consumption in Moscow, a chronicle of changing times' 55.

¹⁰¹⁶ Vaclav Havel et al., *The Power of the Powerless: Citizens Against the State in Central-Eastern Europe* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1985): 37-40.

contact were represented often as mere snippets of hope within a battle for ideological survival. However, the ideology of communism was countered not with another ideology, in this regard the West was lacking, but by tangibles. It is highly plausible that that the majority of 'average' citizens did not know that Pepsi-Cola was being produced and sold in the USSR, that the *Kopek 40* ice cream used American technology, that popcorn was introduced in 1960 (1,000 industrial machines were purchased from the USA) after Khrushchev sampled it in America, that *Rot Front* used Swiss machines to produce its chocolates, or that the clothing and footwear industry drew heavily on Western technology and fashions. It is plausible, but not likely, that the average citizen had never been to an exhibition involving Western states/companies, read about the exhibitions, met a Westerner, seen a Western film or read a piece of Western literature. It is implausible, that having avoided informed contact with all of the above and with individuals that came into contact with the above, that the average citizen did not know about Party claims of catching up with and overtaking the West/the USA; of communism being achieved by 1980, of the coming of prosperity, of the scientific technical or technical material basis of Communism, or of works such as the AVTOVAZ. This exposure was a destabilising factor in internal Soviet politics.

A defining characteristic of the Thaw was that it was an era in which the limits of possibilities and probabilities were set. Prior to the Thaw, the future of the Soviet Union was a fantastical abstraction. During the Thaw an image of the future was created that drew heavily upon the reality of the West and combined it with the social utopianism of communist ideology. The concretisation of an idea made it more accessible but also allowed progress to be tracked. Thus, failures destabilised not only the social contract between the public and the government at that time, but also the willingness of the population to perceive the communist future as viable. As Denis Kozlov has written, the population 'emerged from the quest without much optimism and came to believe in the permanence of problems facing the country and the people.'¹⁰¹⁷ From its inception, the Soviet state made both internal historical and external contemporary comparisons. During the Thaw, external contemporary comparisons dominated. This provided an alternative path to consumption that

¹⁰¹⁷ Denis Kozlov, 'The Historical Turn in Late Soviet Culture', *Kritika* Vol.2 no.3. (2001): 577-600, 597-598.

while not perfect was increasingly perceived as more palatable. In many ways, the melting process of the Thaw was to unveil non-communist alternatives.

There has been a wealth of research into the Thaw period from various disciplines including but not exclusive to social anthropology, sociology, politics and the history of science and technology in particular and history in general. Previous research has provided the inspiration and the underpinnings for 'Comrade Consumer: Economic and Technological Images of the West in the Definition of the Soviet Future' in which images and ideas, that have either been examined in isolation or are underdeveloped (communist consumption, the Soviet future and the economic and technological West) are triangulated. The penetration of these correlated images was found to be ubiquitous, and to have had a significant impact on several strata of Soviet society. For every research question answered in this study, a new one arises. Potential veins of future research include pursuing similar research on a comparative basis with other former Soviet states. Of particular interest would be comparisons with the 'Near West' countries (for example Hungary and East Germany) that were perceived as both Western and Soviet in nature. Through a reading of the archival research, it became evident that another country that consistently shifted between West and East was Japan. Japan with its post War legacy, rapid modernisation, geographic location and dependency on imported raw resources had the potential to be a significant trade partner for the Soviet Union. A study into the economic and technological images of Japan and the role that they played in the development of Soviet-Japanese trade would be of interest. Perhaps the most logical continuation would be to continue with the mythical other and the elite in the Soviet Union, asking to what extent did the 'corruption' of the elite by western economic and technological images lead the elite to allow or even encourage the collapse of communism?

Khrushchev's legacy, and the legacy of the Thaw, was the establishing of the idea of alternatives: of alternative paths for socialism; of alternative leaders and leaderships; of alternative social contracts and the solidification of the idea of the importance of the individual in respect to the state; and of alternative means of achieving 'all life's comforts.' The concept of the alternative and the right to alternatives could not have been institutionalised to the extent that it was without the use of economic and technological images of the West. The introduction and

illustration of alternatives through Party disseminated and tolerated information was to serve the role of both social and economic pressure valve while destabilising the political legitimacy of the Party and communism. The mythical other was a composite image of the West based on officially permitted information that was to motivate Soviet citizens and to promote agreement on a new social contract. The short-term impact of the creation of the comrade consumer and the mythical other was a sense of momentum, progress, openness and even optimism. The Soviet Union had taken up its place in world culture and politics. It also reinforced increased demands for improved standards of living and decreased tolerance for Soviet reality. Ultimately, it provided a second path, an alternative future, which contained the consumer but not the comrade.

Theory without practise is sterile...Sometimes, as you know, an orchard blossoms and man rejoices when he looks at the blossoming trees. He expects that in the autumn the orchard will yield an abundant crop of fruit and reward his labour. But blossom time passes and the man sees that after the blossoms have fallen off, no ovary has been formed. So there will be no fruit, and this is a great disappointment. The man feels that his high hopes and expectations have been deceived. (Khrushchev, 7th Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 03.06.1958)¹⁰¹⁸

¹⁰¹⁸ Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers 203.

Appendix A
Tol'iatti Questionnaire Translated

1. Full Name
2. Date of Birth
3. Where and as what have you worked?
4. Were/are you a party member?
5. In your opinion, why did Fiat and VAZ build in Tol'iatti?
6. Was it necessary to have a partnership with Fiat? If yes, why?
7. Did you work with Italian workers in Tol'iatti or did you work in Italy?
8. During the first years of VAZ, what was your opinion of the *Zhiguli/Lada*?
9. Could you please tell me about your best memory about cars, working in a factory?
10. What do you think about the future of VAZ?

Appendix B
Poster Images



Рост социалистического производства
создал прочную базу для повышения
материального состояния и культуры
советского народа.



ЗРИМЫЕ ЧЕРТЫ КОММУНИЗМА

Appendix C

Anglia

YEAR	VOL.	THEME	YEAR	VOL.	THEME
1962	1	Science: satellites and radio astronomy	1966	18	Advertising in Britain
1962	2	Chemical industry	1966	19	British Politics
1962	3	Travel and tourism	1966	20	How to cope with Southampton: local politics
1962	4	Education in Britain	1967	21	An actor's art
1963	5	Radio and television	1967	22	Photography in England
1963	6	Agriculture	1967	23	Sociology
1963	7	Health Care	1967	24	The Soviet Union and Great Britain
1963	8	Atomic Energy	1968	25	British Life: food, wildlife, the National Trust
1964	9	British Culture and Clothing	1968	26	Agriculture
1964	10	Shakespeare	1968	27	The English (how they relate, their dogs, furniture)
1964	11	Artists and Designers in Britain	1968	28	Various. No real theme
1964	12	New building materials and construction	1969	29	No real theme
1965	13	The British Postal Service	1969	30	Literature
1965	14	Automobiles in England	1969	31	Varied includes a day with a parliamentary member and the department store Keddy
1965	15	Travel abroad	1969	32	Lead article on IBM, followed by music and recording thereof
1965	16	British University			
1966	17	Books in Britain			

Appendix D Exhibition Chart

Note: This chart is not exhaustive. Many non-Moscow based exhibitions have been excluded. The exhibitions, festivals, and fairs etc. listed include at least one country/firm present that could be defined as representing the industrialised West.¹

Acronym	Full Title
P-	<i>Pravda</i>
SK	<i>Sovetskaiia kul'tura</i>
I	<i>Izvestiia</i>
Is	<i>Iskusstvo</i>
-/	<i>Unknown</i>
VM	<i>Vecherniia Moskva</i>
MP	<i>Moskovskaia Pravda</i>
LZh	<i>Literatura i zhizn'</i>
KP	<i>Komsomol'skaia Pravda</i>

¹ Information for chart from:

- Mezhdunarodnye i inostrannye vystavki v SSSR 1946-1972
- Upravlenie mezhdunarodnykh i inostrannykh vystavok v SSSR
- EGAE 635/1-

DATE	EVENT	MEDIA REPORTS	ATTENDANCE Countries/Firms	General Public / Specialists	Lectures / Listeners
1957 28.07.-11.08	International Youth Festival	P-29.07.57, 1-7; SK- 15.08.57	-/-	-/-	-/-
1957 30.07-10.08	International Film Festival	I-31.07.57, 3; I-11.08.57, 6	-/-	-/-	-/-
1957 19-24. 08.	International Meeting to Discuss Scientific Questions	P-20.08.57, 4	-/-	-/-	-/-
1957-1958 12.12-28.02	Exhibition of US Artist Rockwell Kent	P-13.12.57, 6; Is-1958 No1, 79	-/-	-/-	-/-
1958 11.03-	Conference of Italian Dramatists and Directors with the Ministry of Culture	SK-4	-/-	-/-	-/-
1958 06.05-	Exhibition of Progressive American Graphics		-/-	-/-	-/-
1958 21.07-	International Seminar of Students of Russian Language and Literature (England, France, West Germany etc, represented)	Is-24.07.58, 6; LZh- 23.07.58.2	15/-	-/-	-/-
1958 01-10. 09-	4 th International Conference of Slavists (USA, most of Europe and some Asian countries represented)	Is-02.09.58, 2; LZh- 14.09.58.3	-/-	-/-	-/-
1958 10-19.09-	7 th Congress of the International Association for Academic Film (European countries and USA in attendance)	P-11.09.58, 4; SK- 11.09.58.3; SK-20.09.58,4; SK-23.09.58,4	-/-	-/-	-/-
1959 05.01	Paul Robinson Concert	I-06.01.59,4	-/-	-/-	-/-
1958 08-14.03	Week of French Films	P-09.04.59,4; I-04.04.59,4	-/-	-/-	-/-
1959	Industrial Exhibition of Austria	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-
1959 24.06-	National Exhibit of America/American Exhibition at Sokol'niki	P-25.06.59, 1; P- 05.09.59,4	-/-	-/-	-/-
1959 03-17.08-	International Film Festival	SK-04.09.59, 1; SK- 18.08.59, 1	-/-	-/-	-/-
1959 20-27.10	Week of English Films	SK-20.10.59, 4	-/-	-/-	-/-

DATE	EVENT	MEDIA REPORTS	ATTENDANCE Countries/Firms	General Public / Specialists	Lectures / Listeners
1959 22.11-	1 st English Exhibition of Modern Literature	P-22.11.59, 6	-/-	-/-	-/-
1960	4 th National Exhibition of Finland	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-
18.03-	Films of France	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-
1960	International Congress on Automobiles	P-02.07.60, 4	-/-	-/-	-/-
02.07-			-/-	-/-	-/-
1960	Exhibit of American Artists	KP-07.07.60	-/-	-/-	-/-
06.07-			-/-	-/-	-/-
1961	Industrial Exhibition of Japan	-/-	8	-/-	-/-
1960	Rockwell Kent Exhibit (Press conference given 16.11.60)	P-17.11.60, 4; P-20.11.60, 6	-/-	-/-	-/-
19.11-			1725	1,009,581/50,000	430/-
1961	The Trade Exhibition of Great Britain	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-
5-14.06			-/-	-/-	-/-
1961	National Exhibition of France	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-
15.08-			-/-	-/-	-/-
1961	International Exhibition of the International Conference on Biochemistry	P-17.08.61, 6; I-10.08.61, 3	57/-	5,000/-	-/-
10.08-			-/-	-/-	-/-
1961	Japanese Cultural Exhibition (museum of Eastern Culture)	P-16.03.61, 4	-/-	-/-	-/-
03.15			-/-	-/-	-/-
1961	International Film Festival	P-10.07.61, 3; 24.07.61,1	51/-	-/-	-/-
9.07-			-/-	-/-	-/-
1961	International Exhibit of Photography	P-08.09.61, 6	-/-	-/-	-/-
9.07-			-/-	-/-	-/-
1962	150 Years Since the Birth of Dickens (organised by UK- USSR friendship society)	P-01.04.62, 6; P-08.05.62, 4	-/-	-/-	-/-
07.02			-/-	-/-	-/-
1962	International Exhibition of the Science Conference	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-
1962	Italian Industrial Exhibition	-/-	1/Approx. 60	275,710/-	-/-
28.05-12.06			-/-	-/-	-/-
1962	Benny Goodman Concert	P-31.05.62, 3	-/-	-/-	-/-
30.05			-/-	-/-	-/-

DATE	EVENT	MEDIA REPORTS	ATTENDANCE Countries/Firms	General Public / Specialists	Lectures / Listeners
1962 10-20.06	Rockwell Kent Visits the USSR	Is-62 No 8, 78; Is-62 No 11, 80	-/-	-/-	-/-
1962 27.06-	French Exhibition of Dramatic Theatre	P-27.06.62, 6	-/-	-/-	-/-
1963 23-24.01	Technical Books of the USA	-/-	1/-	25,000/-	-/-
1963 16-26.05	English Exhibit of Scientific and Analytical Instruments	-/-	1/-	17,000/12,000	18/-
1963 16-30.10	Japanese Exhibition of Metallurgy and Mining Equipment	-/-	1/48	75,000/-	-/-
1963 04.02	British Philharmonic Concert	SK-05.02.63, 3	-/-	-/-	-/-
1963 22.11-6.12	Industrial Chemistry Exhibition by the American Firm Fielding	VM-16&22.11.1963; MP- 23.11.1963	1/1	6,000/6,000	-/-
1963 27.11-8.12	Exhibition of Danish Firm Brüel & Kjaer A/S	-/-	1/1	-/10,000	-/300
1963 06.12	Exhibition of American Graphics	P-07.12.63, 4	-/-	-/-	-/-
1964	Exhibition of Construction and the Mechanisation of Construction Work	-/-	19/377	1,500, 000/ 10,000	-/-
1964	Belgium Industrial Exhibition	-/-	1/-	50,000/13,000	-/-
1964 12.04	Royal Shakespeare Theatre (UK)	P-2-04.04.64, 6	-/-	-/-	-/-
1964	Holidays on Ice (USA)	P-30.05.64, 4; SK- 04.06.64, 1	-/-	-/-	-/-
May 1964	5th International Biochemical Congress	-/-	23/	-/-	-/-
August 1964	LaScala performs Turandot	P-06.09.64, 6	-/-	-/-	-/-
05.09 1965	Cleveland Philharmonic plays Moscow	SK-17.04.65, 1	-/-	-/-	-/-
16.04					

DATE	EVENT	MEDIA REPORTS	ATTENDANCE Countries/Firms	General Public / Specialists	Lectures / Listeners
1965 11-26.09	Chemistry in Industry, Construction, and Agriculture	TV and Radio	21/ 969 from capitalist countries, unspecified number from socialist states	1,500,000/ 100,000	155/9,000
1965	2 nd Industrial Exhibition of Japan	-/-	1/160	420,000/ 18,000	36/5,000
1965 21.08-08.09	Shoe Company Romein Fielding (USA) Exhibition	-/-	1/1	2,500 tickets sent out, attendance by invitation only	-/-
1965 24-31.05	Exhibition of Swedish Electro-medical Equipment Firms	Radio and TV coverage	1/ 2	3,450/-	4/240
1965 24.05	Exhibit by US Clothing Firms	-/-	1/1	600/600	-/-
1965 26.05-04.06	English Exhibit of Scientific and Analytical Instruments 'Sima'	I, MP, VM-26.05.1965; Radio and TV	1/1(180 firms were members of Sima)	35,700/10,000	9/-
1965 12.07	20 th International Congress of Theoretical and Applied Chemistry	P-13.07.65, 2	38/-	-/-	-/-
1965 25.07	Exhibition of the European Collection of French Art Works	P-25.07.65, 6	-/-	-/-	-/-
1965 23-29.09	Exhibition of Cash Machines by the Firm <i>Sweda</i> , Sweden- USA	I, VM; TV, Radio	-/1	-/4,000	7/250
1966	Modern Agricultural Machines and Equipment	-/-	20/585	700,000/ 180,000	85/5,000
1966	Poultry Farming	-/-	21/-	650,000/ 32,000	214/9,000
1966	Crystallographic Equipment Conference	-/-	13/64	29,000/18,000	-/-
1966	Mathematical Machines and Literature	-/-	13/106	19,000/14,000	-/-
1966	Laboratory Standards and Scientific Literature	-/-	16/71	66,000/15,000	-/-
1966 04-12.08	Exhibition of Psychological Literature and Experimental Equipment	-/-	13-14/53-89	6,500- 13,500/6,500	-/-
1966 12-19.07	International Crystal Conference	I-13.07.66, 6; I-19.07.66, 4	34/-	42/-	-/-

DATE	EVENT	MEDIA REPORTS	ATTENDANCE Countries/Firms	General Public / Specialists	Lectures / Listeners
1966 8-24.07	2 nd British Industrial Exhibition	-/-	1/498	452,300/75,000	62/31,000
1966 28.05-11.06	Industrial Exhibition of Switzerland	-/-	1/125	200,427/80,000	36/2,900
1966	Modern Means of Mechanising Administrative Governmental Work	-/-	19/383	1,000,000/350,000	-/-
1966 16-29.05	International Exhibit of Agricultural Machines	Covered in 43 Soviet Newspapers; 100 regional and city papers; 16 agricultural journals; 17x on TV programmes; 100 times on radio	?/300 foreign firms in attendance	100,000/15,000	-/-
1966 23.05-04.06	Exhibition of American Firm <i>Friden</i> and French Firm <i>Aleksandr Gober and Co</i> (Aviation and Navigational Equipment)	-/-	2/2	-/4,000	-/-
1966 05.30-.06.09	2 nd International Congress of Oceanographers	KP-10.05.66.1	50/-	300	-/-
1966 06.01-08.07	1 st International Exhibit of Children's Drawings	Is-No8.66.78	42/-	-/-	-/-
1966 09.01-18.06	Rodin Exhibition	Is-No8.66.78	-/-	-/-	-/-
1966 1-15.09	<i>Interorgtekhnika-66</i>	Radio (<i>Poslednie Izvestia</i>); TV (<i>Telenovosti</i>), Newspapers (I, P, MV etc), Journals	13/8,000	-/10,000	26/800
1966 04-11.08	International Conference of Psychology		44/-	4,500	-/-
1966 16-28.08	International Math Congress	-/-	54/-	4,000	-/-
1966 01-08-09	Exhibition of Radio Instruments (USA)	<i>Krasnoe Znamia</i>	1/-	268,552/-	-/-


DATE	EVENT	MEDIA REPORTS	ATTENDANCE Countries/Firms	General Public / Specialists	Lectures / Listeners
1966. 5-7.10	Finnish Clothing Exhibit	-/-	1/-	-/-	-/-
1967	Modern Mechanisation and Automation Equipment for the Food Industry	-/-	22/640	800,000/175,000	687,500
1967	Mining Equipment	-/-	19/187	5,000,000/20,000	20/4,500
1967	Clothes-67	-/-	27/1,474	1,000,000/80,000	71/6,000
1967 01.03-	French Drama Troupe	VM-01.03.67,4	1/-	-/-	-/-
1967	<i>Intergormash-6</i>	Radio; TV; Newspapers (P, I, SR, VM, etc)	-/-	-/-	/500
8-19.07	Communal and Household Equipment Exhibition	-/-	21/1,795	800,000/100,000	62/9,200
1968	Modern Fisheries Exhibition	-/-	22/642	1,157,000/125,000	67/2,600
1968	<i>Interbumash-68</i>	10 press conferences given	21/1,122	800,000/100,000	-/-
1968 02.08-	8 th International Entomology Conference and Exhibition Opens	P-03.08.68,3; I-09.08.68,5	7/13 (Exhibition) 60 (Conference)	1,500/1,500 (Exhibition) 3,500 (Conference)	-/-
1968	Catalysis and Science and Technology Literature	-/-	4/15	4,200/4,200	67/2,600
1968	Auto Industry-68	-/-	11/101	75,000/75,000	-/-
1968	<i>Orgtehnika-68</i>	-/-	3/4	18,000/18,000	1/80
1968	British Exhibition of Scientific Equipment	-/-	1/81	64,000/-	60/4,000
18-27.03 1968	Opening of the Exhibition of Parisian Children's Drawings	VM-20.03.68, 1	1/-	-/-	-/-
20.03	Industrial Measuring Scientific Equipment Ltd (UK, centrifuges)	-/-	1/1	-/3,000	-/-
20-22.03	Exhibition of Radio Logistical Equipment (French Firm)	2	1/1	-/6000	-/-
1968 21-30.03	Norwegian Firm Tandbergs Radiofabrik	-/-	1/1	800/600	-/-

DATE	EVENT	MEDIA REPORTS	ATTENDANCE Countries/Firms	General Public / Specialists	Lectures / Listeners
1968 16-24.05	Cotton Fabric from the French Fabric Association	-/-	1/16	-/400	-/-
1968 17.05-	Exhibition of Cash Register from the Swedish Firm <i>Klasygn</i>	-/-	1/1	-/1,500	14/-
1968 20-28.05	Dutch Firm <i>De Oude Delft</i> (Radiology Equipment)	-/-	1/1	-/500	-/-
1968 6-12.06	Wood Working and Furniture Industrial Exhibition	TV; VM; LP	3/16	6335/-	32/2,200
1968 10-18.07	International Math Olympiad	UG-20.04.68,4	Including Italy Sweden and England	-/-	-/-
1968 20.08	International Energy Conference	P-21.08.68,1	Including UK, US, and Japan	-/-	-/-
1968 02.08	Exhibit of French Artists	SR-03.08.68,3	-/-	-/-	-/-
1968 2-10.08	International Exhibition of Literature about Etymology	-/-	25 from capitalist countries	1,500+/-	-/-
1968 5-18.09	Italian Industrial Exhibition	2 major press conferences; TV; Radio; 68 Major newspapers covered event	1/500	500,000/100,000	50/18,800
1968 22-28.09	French Exhibit of Electronic/Electrical Equipment	-/-	1/2	6,000/-	-/-
1968 7-11.10	Swiss Firm <i>Varian</i>	-/-	1/1	-/3,050	1/400
1968 11-25.11	Exhibition for the Auto Industry	TV (<i>Vremia</i>), Radio. Newspapers (I), <i>Moskovskii avtozavodets</i> , <i>Novosti Dnia</i>	14/280	75,000/75,000	33/-
1968 15,18-20.11	Exhibition of French Shoe Federation	No Press Conferences no Advertising	1/-	-/100	-/-

DATE	EVENT	MEDIA REPORTS	ATTENDANCE Countries/Firms	General Public / Specialists	Lectures / Listeners
1968 25.11-04.12	Austrian Firm <i>Piker</i>	No Coverage	1/2	-/2,800	-/-
1968	<i>Orgteknika</i>	-/-	3/15	-/18,000	-/-
1968 28-29.11	Shoe Company <i>Kraus and Co (Austria)</i>	-/-	1/1	46	-/-
1968 9-18.12	Test Machines and Analytical Equipment Firms <i>Perkins (USA) and Instron Ltd. (UK)</i>	No Press Coverage	2/2	-/2,800	-/-
1969	Modern Automation Processes	-/-	23/1,500	800,000/200,000	41/6,500
1969	Modern Polygraph Technology	-/-	20/690	300,000/150,000	41/6,300
1969 24.09-08.10	Shoes-69	-/-	37/1,139	700,000/100,000	58/5,200
1969	Exhibition of Radio and Magnetic Equipment	-/-	4/6	2,500/2,500	-/-
1969	Blood Work	-/-	17/63	15,000/15,000	-/-
1969	Machine Tools	-/-	-/-	100,000/100,000	37/2,300
1969	Furniture Industry	-/-	2/3	10,000/10,000	-/-
1969	Scientific Devices	-/-	10/80	75,000/75,000	18/1,300
1969	Contact Welding	-/-	10/80	75,000/75,000	18/1,300
1960. 20-31-01-	<i>Stankoindustrija-69</i>	-/-	17/126+	-/-	-/-
1969 04.04-	Exhibit of French Artist <i>Matisse</i>	SK-15.04.69	-/-	-/-	-/-
1969 14-18.04	Exhibit of French firm for the Construction Industry, firm <i>Soris</i>	-/-	1/7	1,463/1,463	0/0
1969 08-16.04	Exhibit of Photocopying Technology by the British Firm <i>Rank Xerox Ltd</i>	-/-	1/1	4,731/4,371	-/-
1969 14-28.05	Automation-69	Press conferences held covered by major media sources	24/1,139	840,000/200,000	26/5,000

DATE	EVENT	MEDIA REPORTS	ATTENDANCE Countries/Firms	General Public / Specialists	Lectures / Listeners
1969 27.05-02.06	Exhibition of Electronic Machines by the French Firm Logabaks	-/-	1/1	-/2,100	-/-
1969	<i>Inpolitg/mash-69</i>	-/-	-/270-350 capitalist/ foreign firms	1,000,000/	24/
1969 16-24.08	Blood Work	-/-	15,000	-/-	-/-
1969 14.10	Scientific Instruments	-/-	-/-	-/75,000	-/-
1969 13-21.11	Exhibit by Firm Hewlett Packard	TV; Radio (<i>Moskovskie Novosti</i> @ 20:30 118.02.69)	1/1	2,300/	5/250
1969 17-21.11	Exhibit of SA/P (France)	TV; Radio; Newspaper	1/1	-/1,200	3/250
1969 9-12.11	Exhibition of Space and Radio Relay Technology	No press coverage	1/1	1,200/1,200	

Appendix E
Comparison of Soviet and American Consumer Goods²



² Based on table in Matthews, 'The Soviet Worker at Home,' Industrial Labour in the USSR: 209-231, 212.

Appendix F

Vneshniaia torgovlia: Trade Exports and Imports of Foreign Trade Divided According to Country ³

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Austria						
Total	115.8	109.7	100.8	106.3	98.1	102.3
Export	43.5	40.7	40.5	41.1	38	42.5
Import	72.3	69	60.3	65.2	60.1	59.8
Belgium						
Total	46.3	60.8	71.3	70	68.3	73.6
Export	26.4	30.3	41.5	44.2	48.4	45.4
Import	19.9	30.5	29.8	25.8	19.9	28.2
UK						
Total	270.5	319.5	297.4	310.4	307.6	396.6
Export	173.2	204.1	191.8	193.5	214.7	209.8
Import	97.3	115.4	105.6	116.9	92.9	136.8
Denmark						
Total	40.2	25.8	40.2	47.7	51.1	52.9
Export	24.3	21	18.3	18.9	19.3	25
Import	15.9	4.8	21.9	28.8	31.8	27.9
Italy						
Total	173.7	203.6	206.9	245.5	209.5	224.5
Import	92.4	117.2	118.2	123	121	133
Export	81.3	86.4	88.7	122.5	88.5	91.5
Norway						
Total	32.3	30.6	25.8	27.2	33.5	35.3
Export	16.3	16.6	14.3	15	18.4	18.4
Import	10	14	11.5	12.2	15.1	16.9
France						
Total	183.3	179.9	215.9	157	157.6	202.2
Export	66.4	71.5	76.9	93.2	95.3	99.3
Import	116.9	108.4	139	63.8	62.3	102.9
Switzerland						
Total	12.9	13.6	11.3	18.5	17.2	28.1
Export	3.4	5.6	4.8	8	9.1	15.9
Import	9.5	8	6.5	10.5	8.1	12.2
Sweden						
Total	89.6	92.9	116.6	120.4	128.8	98.4
Export	48.1	46.3	47.8	57.9	49.5	50.9
Import	41.5	46.6	68.8	62.5	79.3	47.5
USA						
Total	76.1	67.5	40	47.4	164.9	88.7
Export	22.2	21.9	15.7	22.3	18.6	30.5
Import	53.9	45.6	24.3	25.1	146.3	58.2

³ 'Vn. Torgovli SSSR, O eksporte i importe vazhneishikh tovarov', *Vneshniaia torgovlia*, no.8 (1966): 1-16.

Appendix G

Profile of Questionnaire Respondents

	Gender M=Male F=Female	Occupation B=Worker O= Office work	Member of the Communist Party	Contract with Fiat necessary	Worked with Foreigners in 'Togliatii	Worked abroad
1	M	B		No answer	√	
2	F	O		√	√	√
3	M	B		√		
4	F	O		√	√	
5	M	B		No answer	No answer	
6	M	B		√	√	
7	F	O		√	√	√
8	F	O		√		
9	M	B	√	√	√	
10	F	O		√		
11	F	O	√	√	√	
12	M	B		√		
13	M	B	√	√	√	
14	M	B		√	√	
15	F	B		√	√	
16	M	B		√	√	√
17	F	O		√		
18	F	O		√		
19	M	B		√	√	
20	F	B		√	√	
21	M	O				
22	M	B		√	√	
23	F	B		√	√	
24	M	B		√		
25	F	O		√		
26	F	O		√		
27	M	B		√		
28	M	B	√	√	√	√
29	M	B	√	√		
30	M	B		√		
31	M	O		√		
32	F	O		√		
33	F	O		√	No answer	
34	M	B	√	√	√	
35	M	B		√	√	
36	M	B		√	√	
37	M	O		√	√	
38	M	O		√		
39	M	B	√	√		
40	M	O		√	√	√
percentages	M- 62.5% F- 37.5%	B- 60% O- 40%	17.5% were Party members	92.5% felt that Fiat was necessary	52.5% worked with foreigners	12.5% worked in Italy

Appendix II

Song

*Turinskoe nebo pokryto tumanom,
I kazhetsia nebo ogromnym karmanom.
Karmanom, v kotorom chut'-chut' porabotay,
Popriatalis' zvezdy - svetit' neokhota.
Popriatalis' zvezdy - svetit' neokhota.*

*A v Tol'iatti vetra. Mnogo raznykh zabor.
Ot utra do utra liudi stroiat zavod.
A v Tol'iatti vetra. Mnogo raznykh zabor.
Ot utra do utra liudi stroiat zavod.*

*Po Tripoli c shumom nesutsia mashiny.
S asfal'tom tseluias', skvoz' noch' volut shiny.
Pod sumrachnym nehom molchit Gamalero.
Zabyv pro Turin, krepko spiat inzhenery.
Zabyv pro Turin, krepko spiat inzhenery.*

*A v Tol'iatti vetra. Mnogo raznykh zabor.
Ot utra do utra liudi stroiat zavod.
A v Tol'iatti vetra. Mnogo raznykh zabor.
Ot utra do utra liudi stroiat zavod.*

*Kogda-nibud' my soberemsia v Tol'iatti,
I vspomnim San-Karlo, potrogav sediny.
Poka zhe razlukoiu s sem'iami platim.
Za to, chtob v Tol'iatti my delali mashiny.
Za to, chtob v Tol'iatti my delali mashiny.*

First published in 1967, written by Lev Vainshtein

Bibliography

Archival Material

- PRO: Public Records Office
- RGAE: Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki
- RGANI: Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii
- TsALIM: Tsentral'nyi arkhiv literatury i iskusstva Moskvy. As of 2005, the archive has been renamed the Glavnoe arkhivnoe upravlenie goroda Moskvy.
- USIA: United States Information Agency
- US Department of State, FRUS:
<<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/frus/frus5860x1/08soviet2.html>>

Periodicals/Journals/Newspapers

- American Political Science Review
- Angliia
- Die Anzeig
- Avtomobil'nyi Transport
- Current Digest of the Soviet Press
- Dekorativnoe iskusstvo SSSR
- Design History
- East Europe
- Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva
- Inostrannaia literatura
- International Affairs
- Iskusstvo
- Izvestiia
- Journal of Cold War Studies
- Komsomol'skaia pravda
- Krokodil
- Kul'tura i zhizn'
- Literatura i zhizn'
- Moskovskaia Pravda
- National Geographic
- New York Times
- Novoe vremia
- Novyi Mir
- Ogonek
- Planovoe Khoziaistvo
- Pravda
- Problems of Communism

Rabotnitsa
Slavic Review
Sovetskaia kul'tura
Sovetskaia Rossiia
Soviet Culture
Studies in Comparative Communism
Trud
Vecherniaia Moskva
Vneshniaia torgovlia
Volzhskii avtostroitel'

Interviews

VAZ Interview Project Spring 2002 (names changed)

Elvira Simonovna
Igor Nikolaevich
Irina Mikhailovna
Galina Valentinovna
Elena Aleksandrovna
Anatoli Petrovich
Liudmila Petrovna
Larissa Ivanova

St. Petersburg Life Story Project January to June 1997 (names changed)

Emma Vasil'evna
David Makarovich
Raisa Mikhailovna
Yevgeny Andreivich
Maria Ivanovna
Tatiana Alexandrovna
Sergci Sergcivich
Evdokiia Zabkarovna
Katiia Piotrovna
Yuri Nikolayevich

Additional Interviews

Kalinin, Alexander. Moscow, Spring 2002
Dewhurst, Martin. Glasgow, April 2001
Matthews, Mervyn. London, Spring 2002
Koecher, Karel (by email). January-February 2002
Preston, John (by email). April-May 2005
Stewart, John Massey. London, September 2005

Primary/Contemporary Sources

- Afanas'eva, E. S. ed., Ideologicheskie komissii TsK KPSS 1958-1964: Dokumenty. Moskva: Rosspen, 2000.
- Adzhubei, Aleksei. Te desiat' let. Moskva: Sov. Rossiia, 1989.
- Aksenov, Vasili. Zvyozdnyi bilet (1961)/A Starry Ticket (London: Putnam, 1962).
- Alexeyeva, Ludmilla and Paul Goldberg. The Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post Stalin Era. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1990.
- Amalrik, Andrei. Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? Allen Lane: Penguin Press, 1970.
- Andreevich, Evgenii. Kreml' i narod. Miunkhen: Golos naroda, 1951.
- Barghoorn, Frederick C. Détente and the Democratic Movement in the USSR. New York: Macmillan, 1976.
- Barghoorn, Frederick C. The Soviet Image of the United States, a Study in Distortion. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1950.
- Belfrage, Sally. A Room in Moscow. London: Andre Deutsch, 1958.
- Boffa, Giuseppe. Inside the Khrushchev Era. New York: Marzariano, 1959.
- Bohlen, Charles E. Witness to History: 1929-1969. New York: W. W. Norton and Company Inc., 1973.
- Brezhnev, Leonid. Fifty Years of Great Achievements of Socialism. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970.
- The British Plastics Federation Mission to the USSR 17th to the 28th of June 1968. London: British Printing Federation, 1968.
- Bukovskii, Vladimir. Pis'ma russkogo puteshestvennika. New York: Chalidze, 1981.
- Burlatsky, Fyodor. Khrushchev: The Era of Khrushchev Through the Eyes of His Advisor. New York: Scribner, 1991.
- Chirkin, O. V. Novye sovetskie avtomobili. Znanie, 1967.
- Corsini, Ray Pierre. Caviar For Breakfast. London: Harvill Press, 1967.
- Deutscher, Isaac. Russia After Stalin. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1953.

- Dybovskii, Mark. Istoriia SSSR v anekdotakh. Smolensk: Smiadyn', 1991.
- Edmonds, Richard. Russian Vistas: The Record of a Springtime Journey to Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Stalingrad, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus. London: Phene, 1958.
- Ehrenburg, Ilya. The Thaw. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962.
- Fainsod, Merle. 'The Komsomol: Youth Under Dictatorship,' American Political Science Review. Vol.45 (1951) 18-40.
- Fontaine, Andre. A History of the Cold War: from the Korean War to the Present. New York: Renaud Bruce Patheon Books, 1969.
- Gilmore, Eddy. The Cossacks Burned Down the YMCA: Russia Revisited. London: The Bodley Head, 1964.
- Glazov, Yuri. The Russian Mind Since Stalin's Death. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1985.
- V. N. Goriaev, Amerikantsy u sebia doma (Moskva: 1959).
- Granick, David. The Red Executive: a Study of the Organisation Man in Russian Industry. New York: Anchor Books, 1961.
- Grossman, Gregory. 'Communism in a Hurry: the Time Factor in Soviet Economics,' Problems of Communism Vol. 7 no.3 May/June (1959): 1-7.
- Gruliov, Leo ed. Current Soviet Policies II: The Documentary Record of the 20th Communist Party Congress and its Aftermath from the Translations of the Current Digest of the Soviet Press. New York: Praeger, 1957.
- Gudrich, Lloyd. Sovremennoe amerikanskoe iskusstvo. Moscow: 1959.
- Guillen, Abraham ed., Philosophy of the Urban Guerilla: the Revolutionary Writings of Abraham Guillen. New York: Marrow, 1973.
- Gunther, John. Inside Russia Today: Revised Edition. New York: Harper and Row, 1962.
- Havel, Václav et al. The Power of the Powerless: Citizens Against the State in Central-Eastern Europe. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1985.
- Hindus, Maurice. House without a Roof: Russia after Forty-three Years of Revolution. London, 1962.
- Hingley, Ronald. Under Soviet Skins: an Untourist's Report. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1966.

- Ilyichov, L. 'The Sputniks and international relations,' International Affairs. 3 (1958) 7-18.
- Inkeles, Alex and Raymond Bauer. The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society. New York: Atheneum Press, 1968.
- Inkeles, Alex and Kent Geiger. Soviet Society: a Book of Readings. London: Constable and Company, 1961.
- Jasny, Naum. Essays on the Soviet Economy. New York: Praeger, 1962.
- Katsman, B. M. 'Glavnyi vyigrysh-vremia,' Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva. no.1 (1976).
- Kerr, Clark and John T. Dunlop et.al., Industrialism and Industrial Man: The Problems of Labour and Management in Economic Growth. London: Heinemann, 1962.
- Khrushchev, Nikita S. Documents of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU: Report on the Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. New York: Crosscurrents Press, 1961.
- Khrushchev, Nikita S. For Victory in Peaceful Competition with Capitalism. London: Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1960.
- Khrushchev, Nikita S. Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes. Boston: Brown and Little, 1990.
- Khrushchev, Nikita S. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament. Trans. Strobe Talbott. London: Little, Brown, and Co. 1974.
- Khrushchev, Nikita S. Marxism-Leninism is Our Banner, Our Fighting Weapon. Soviet Booklet no.112 London: 1963.
- Khrushchev, Nikita S. Otchet tsentral'nogo komiteta kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza XXII S'ezdu Partii. Moskva: Gospolitizdat, 1961..
- Khrushchev, Nikita S. Raising the Soviet Standard of Living: Report by N. S. Khrushchev to the USSR Supreme Soviet: May 5, 1960. New York: Crosscurrents, 1960.
- Khrushchev, Nikita S. Rezoliutsiia po dokladu tovarishcha N. S. Khrushcheva 'O kontrol'nykh tsifrakh razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR na 1959-1965 gody. Moskva: Gos. izd-vo polit. lit-ry, 1959.
- Khrushchev, Nikita S. Seven Year Plan Target Figures: Report to the Special 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Reply to Discussion by N. S. Khrushchev: 27.02.1959. London: Soviet Booklet No. 47, 1959.

- Khrushchev, Nikita S. Za novye pobedy mirovogo kommunisticheskogo dvizhenia. Moskva: Gospolitizdat, 1961.
- Khrushchev, Sergei. Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower. Trans. Shirley Benson Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University, 2000.
- Kosygin, Aleksei. Direktivy XXIII s'ezda KPSS po piatiletnemu planu razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR na 1966-1970 gody. Moskva: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1966.
- Kosygin, Aleksei N. Guidelines for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR for 1976-1980. Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1976.
- Kosygin, Aleksei N. 'Kosygin's Report on the Consumers' Goods Programme,' CDSP. Vol.I no.4 (1954): 9-13.
- Kozlov, Frol. 'Kozlov's Anniversary Speech,' East Europe. Vo. 19 no.12 December (1960) 51-57.
- KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh s'ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK Vol. 9 1956-1960. (Moscow).
- Lenin, Vladimir. Collected Works vol 30 4th ed. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1960.
- Lenin, Vladimir. Polnoe sobranie sochinenii vol. 44 5th ed. Moscow: Politizdat, 1964.
- Let Us Live in Peace. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959.
- Lif, A. Forbidden Laughter: Soviet Underground Jokes. Los Angeles: The Almanac Publishing House, 1973.
- Lyons, Eugene. Workers' Paradise Lost: Fifty Years of Soviet Communism: A Balance Sheet. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1967.
- Materialy XXIV s'ezda KPSS. Moskva: Politizdat, 1971.
- Matthews, Mervyn. Mila and Mervusya: a Russian Wedding. Bridgend: Seren, 1999.
- Matthews, Mervyn. Soviet Government: A Selection of Official Documents on Internal Policies. London: Jonathan Cape, 1974.
- Matthews, Tanya. Russian Wife Goes West. London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1955.
- Mauroy, Pierre. Ed. Michel de Maule. Entrétiens. France: Les Amis De L'Institut François Mitterrand, 2003.

- Medvedev, Zhores. The Medvedev Papers: Fruitful Meetings Between Scientists of the World; and Secrecy of Correspondence is Guaranteed by Law. London: Macmillan, 1971.
- Medvedev, Zhores. Soviet Science. New York: W. W. Norton, 1978.
- Mezhdunarodnoe soveshchanie kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii: dokumenty i materialy. Moscow: Politizdat, 1969.
- Mezhdunarodnye i inostrannye vystavki v SSSR 1946-1972. Moskva: Torgovopromyshlennaia palata SSSR, 1973.
- Mihajlov, Mihajlo. Moscow Summer. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1965.
- Na vsekh kontinentakh mira. Moskva: Bol. izdatel'stvo instituta mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii, 1963.
- New Methods of Economic Management in the USSR. Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1965.
- Nicolson, Harold. The British Council 1934-1955: Twenty-First Anniversary Report. London: 1955.
- Nikita S. Khrushchev: materialy k biografii. Moskva: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1989.
- Nixon, Richard. The Challenges We Face: Edited and Compiled from the Speeches and Papers of Richard Nixon. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company Inc, 1960.
- Nixon, Richard. Leaders. New York: Warner Books, 1982.
- Novak-Deker, Nikolai K. ed. Soviet Youth: Twelve Komsomol Histories. Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1959.
- Nove, Alec. 'Toward a Communist Welfare State? Social Welfare in the USSR,' Problems of Communism. Vol. 9 no.1 (1960): 1-9, 9.
- Perlo, Victor. How the Soviet Economy Works: An interview with A. I. Mikoyan First Deputy Prime Minister of the USSR. New York: International Publishers, 1961.
- Politicheskaiia ekonomia. Moscow: Gozpolitizdat, 1952.
- Polonsky, Marc and Russell Taylor. USSR: From an Original Idea by Karl Marx. London: Faber and Faber, 1986.
- The Road to Communism: Documents of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU: 17-31.10.1961. Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1961.

- Salisbury, Harrison. To Moscow and Beyond: a Reporter's Narrative. London: M. Joseph, 1960.
- Sbyvaiutsia mechty chelovechestv: Man's Dreams are coming true. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966.
- Shulman, Colette ed. We the Russians: Voices from Russia. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971.
- Soviet Economy in a New Perspective. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976.
- Soviet Youth: Twelve Komsomol Histories. Munich: Institut zur Erforschung der UdSSR, 1959.
- Stalin, Josef. Questions of Leninism. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1952.
- Stewart, John Massey. Across the Russias. London: Harvill Press, 1969.
- Technology and East West Trade: Office of Technology Assessment Congress of the United States. Allandheld: Gower, 1979.
- Thomas, John R. Report on Service with the American Exhibition in Moscow. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1960.
- Torgov- promyshlennaia palata SSSR 50 let. Moskva: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1983.
- Turpin, William N. 'The Outlook for the Soviet Consumer,' Problems of Communism no.6 (1960) 30-37.
- US Congress House Committee on Banking and Currency, Sub committee on International trade. The Fiat Soviet Automobile Plant and Soviet Economic Reforms. Washington Point: March 1967.
- US Congress, Joint Economic Committee. Soviet Economy in a New Perspective. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976.
- USSR: Measures of Economic Growth and Development, 1950-1980: Studies Prepared for the Use of the Joint Economic Committee Congress of the US. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1982.
- Vail', Petr and Aleksandr Genis. 60e: Mir sovetskogo cheloveka. Moskva: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2001.
- Varga, E. S. 'An Analysis of the Evolution and Trends of Capitalism,' Current Digest of the Soviet Press. Vol.12 no.4 (1960) 3-9.

VAZ: istoriia v dokumentakh:1966-1983gg. 1985.

Vse mirnaia vystavka 1967g. v Moskve. Moscow: Bureau of International Exhibitions, 1967.

Werth, Alexander. The Khrushchev Phase: The Soviet Union Enters the Decisive Sixties. London: Robert Hale Limited, 1961.

Werth, Alexander. Russia: Hopes and Fears. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969.

Whitney, Thomas P. Russia in My Life. London: George G. Harrap and Co. Ltd., 1962.

XXII S'ezd KPSS, stenograficheskii otchet. Moscow, 1961.

Zaslavskaya, Tatyana. The Second Socialist Revolution. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990.

Zhit' v mire i družbe. Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1959.

Zhitkov, A. A. Vershinoi zhizni stal VAZ. Tol'iatti, 1997.

Zinoviev, Alexander. The Yawning Heights. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981.

Zvorykin, A. A. Technology and Culture. Moscow: Academy of Sciences USSR, 1962.

Secondary Sources

- Allin, Dana. Cold War Illusions: America, Europe and Soviet Power 1969-1989. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.
- Amman, R., J. M. Cooper and R. W. Davies eds. The Technological Level of Soviet Industry. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.
- Aucoin, Amanda Wood. 'Deconstructing the American Way of life: Soviet Responses to Cultural Exchange and American Activity during the Khrushchev Years.' diss., University of Arkansas, 2001.
- Baburina, Nina. The Soviet Political Poster: 1917-1980. London: Harmondsworth, 1988.
- Baudrillard, Jean. Selected Writings. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001.
- Baxter, William P. The Soviet Passenger Car Industry. Novato: Presidio Press, 1983.
- Becker, Abraham S. Economic Relations with the USSR. Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1983.
- Berlin, Isaiah. The Soviet Mind: Russian Culture Under Communism. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2004.
- Berlin, Isaiah. 'The Silence in Russian Culture,' Foreign Affairs, Vol.36 (1957) 1-24.
- Berliner, Joseph S. The Innovation Decision in Soviet Industry. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1976.
- Bezborodov, A. B. Vlast' i nauchno-tekhnicheskaia politika v SSSR serediny 50kh-serediny 70kh godov. Moskva: Izdatel'stvo ob'edineniia Mosgorarkhiv, 1997.
- Bialer, Seweryn ed. The Domestic Context Of Soviet Foreign Policy. Boulder: Westview Press, 1980.
- Bijker, Wiebe E., Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor Pinch Eds. The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989.
- Bittner, Stephen. 'Remembering the Avant-Garde: Moscow Architects and the 'Rehabilitation' of Constructivism, 1961-1964' Kritika Vol.2 no.3 (2001): 553-576.

- Boffa, Giuseppe. Ot SSSR K Rossii: istoriia neokonchennogo krizisa 1964-1994. Moskva: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1996.
- Boulding, Kenneth E. The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society. New York: Ann Arbor, 1956.
- Boym, Svetlana. Common Places: Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994.
- Brooks, Jeffrey. Thank You, Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture From Revolution to Cold War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- Buchli, Victor. An Archaeology of Socialism. Oxford: Berg, 1999.
- Buchli, Victor. 'Khrushchev, Modernism, and the Fight against Petit-bourgeois consciousness in the Soviet Home,' Journal of Design History. Vol. 10 no.2 (1997): 161-176.
- Buck-Morss, Susan. Dreamworld and Catastrophe: the Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000.
- Burlatsky, Fedor. Khrushchev and the First Russian Spring. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991.
- Bystrova, N. Na volne pamiati. Finland: Benescape, 2001.
- Carter, Erica. How German is She? Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997.
- Clark, Katerina. The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981.
- Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies: Papers submitted by panellists before the subcommittee on economic statistics Parts I-III (1959). New York: Greenwood Press, 1968.
- Considine, Bob. Larger Than Life: a Biography of the Remarkable Dr. Armand Hammer. London: W. H. Allen, 1976.
- Cooper, Julian. 'Soviet Acquisition of Military Significant Western Technologies: An Update,' US Government Document (1987).
- Crowley, David and Susan E. Reid eds. Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-War Eastern Europe. Oxford: Berg, 2000.
- Dallin, Alexander ed. The Khrushchev and Brezhnev Years. New York: Garland Publishing Inc, 1992.

- Davies, Christopher and Wojciech Charemza eds., Models of Disequilibrium and Shortage in Centrally Planned Economies. London: Chapman and Hall, 1989.
- Ellman, Michael ed. The Destruction of the Soviet Economic System: an Insider's History. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998.
- English, Robert. Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.
- Finder, Joseph. Red Carpet. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1983.
- Fitzpatrick, Sheila. The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992.
- Fleron, Frederick. Technology and Communist Culture: The Socio-Cultural Impact of Technology under Socialism. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977.
- Les Fluctuations Économiques en URSS 1941-1985. Paris: Éditions de l'École des Hautes Études en Science Sociales, 1989.
- Gerovitch, Slava. 'Mathematical Machines of the Cold War: Soviet Computing, American Cybernetics and Ideological Disputes in the Early 1950s,' Social Studies of Science, 31/2. April: 2001, 253-287.
- Giddens, Anthony. The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990.
- Goscilo, Helena and Beth Holgren eds. Russia, Women, Culture. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996.
- Graham, Loren R. What Have We Learned About Science and Technology from the Russian Experience?. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998.
- Grushin, B. A. Chetyre zhizni Rossii: v zerkale oprosov obshchestvennogo mneniia. Moskva: Progress-Traditsiia, 2001.
- Guroff, Gregory and Fred Carstensen. Entrepreneurship in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983.
- Hanak, Harry. Soviet Foreign Policy Since the Death of Stalin. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972.
- Hanson, Philip. The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy. Harlow: Longman, 2003.
- Hanson, Philip and M. R. Hill, Technology and East West Trade (unpublished transcript).

- Harvey, Penelope. Hybrids of Modernity: Anthropology, the Nation State, and the Universal exhibition. London: Routledge, 1996.
- Hawthorn, Jeremy ed. Propaganda, Persuasion, and Polemics. London: Edward Arnold, 1987.
- Helmrich, Elisabeth and Ursula Neuman. 50 Jahre Sowjet Union im Spiegel Ihrer Karikatur. München: Udo Pfriemer Verlag, 1967.
- Hessler, Julie. 'A Postwar Perestroika? Towards a History of Private Enterprise in the USSR,' Slavic Review, no.3 (Fall, 1998): 516-542.
- Hixson, Walter. Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War: 1945-1961. Houndmills: Macmillan press, 1998.
- Hollander, Paul. Soviet and American Society: A Comparison. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973.
- Holliday, George. Technology Transfer to the USSR, 1928-1937 and 1966-1975: the Role of Western Technology in Soviet Economic Development. Boulder: Westview Press, 1979.
- Holloway, David. 'Physics, the State, and Civil Society in the Soviet Union,' Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, Vol.30, I (1999), 173-92.
- Hodnett, Grey ed., Resolutions and Decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Vol 4 the Khrushchev Years 1953-1964. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1974.
- Humphrey, Caroline. The Unmaking of Soviet Life: Everyday Economics After Socialism. New York: Cornell University Press, 2002.
- Hunter, David. Western Trade Pressure on the Soviet Union: An Interdependence Perspective on Sanctions. London: Macmillan, 1991.
- Istoriia avtomobil'nogo transporta Rossii: 1945-1965. Moskva: Niiat, 2000.
- Johnson, Priscilla. Khrushchev and the Arts: the Politics of Soviet Culture, 1962-1964. Cambridge: MIT, 1965.
- Joravsky, David. Russian Psychology: A Critical History. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989.
- Josephson, Paul R. New Atlantis Revisited : Akademgorodok, the Siberian City of Science. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997.
- Josephson, Paul R. Totalitarian Science and Technology: Control of Nature. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1996.

- Josephson, Paul R. 'Projects of the Century, Soviet History: Large Scale Technologies from Lenin to Gorbachev,' Technology and Culture Vol.36, No.3 July 1995, 519-59;
- Kahan, Arcadius and Blair A. Ruble eds. Industrial Labor in the USSR. New York: Pergamon Press, 1979.
- Kahan, Arcadius. Some Problems of the Soviet Industrial Worker: Volume I. Oriental Research Partners: Newtonville, 1994
- Kagarlitsky, Boris. The Disintegration of the Monolith. trans. Renfrey Clarke London: Verso, 1992.
- Khapaeva, Dina. 'L'Occident Sera Demain,' Annales HSS. November-December no.6 (1995) 1259-1270.
- Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. The Strategy of Deception: A Study in World Wide Communist Tactics. New York: Farrar and Straus, 1963.
- Kozlov, Denis. 'The Historical Turn in Late Soviet Culture', Kritika Vol.2 no.3. (2001): 577-600.
- Krementsov, Nikolai. Stalinist Science. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.
- Kul'turnaia zhizn' v SSSR 1951-1965: khronika. Moskva: Nauka, 1979.
- Kul'turnaia zhizn' v SSSR 1966-1969: khronika. Moskva: Nauka, 1981.
- Kushner, Marilyn S. 'Exhibiting Art at the American National Exhibition in Moscow,' Journal of Cold War Studies. Vol.4 no.1. Winter (2002): 6-26.
- Lane, David. Politics and Society in the USSR. Trowbridge: Redwood Burn Ltd, 1978.
- Lane, David and Felicity O'Dell. The Soviet Industrial Worker: Social Class, Education, and Control. Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1978.
- Lebina, Natal'ia. 'Plus khimizatsiia vsei odezhdy,' Rodina 9 (2002): 82-86.
- Levinson, Charles. Vodka-Cola. Great Britain: Gordon and Cremonesi, 1979.
- Lewin, Moshe. Stalinism and the Seeds of Soviet Reform: the debates of the 1960s. London: Pluto Press, 1991.
- Lovelace, E. The Dragon Can't Dance. London: Longman, 1981.

- Lowenthal, Richard. 'On 'Established' Communist Party Regimes,' Studies in Comparative Communism no.7 (1974).
- Lubrano, Linda L. and Susan Gross Solomon Eds. The Social Context of Soviet Science. Boulder, Westview Press, 1980.
- Malia, Martin. Russia Under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mausoleum. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1990.
- Mandel, David. Interviews with Workers in the Former Soviet Union: Perestroika and After: Viewed from Below. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994.
- Mezenin, V. K. Parad vse mirnykh vystavok. Moskva: Izdatel'stvo znanie, 1990.
- Miller, Daniel. Material Culture and Mass Consumption. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987.
- Miller, Daniel ed. Materializing Culture: Car Cultures. Oxford: Berg, 2001.
- Miller, Daniel. Modernity: An Ethnographic Approach. Oxford: Berg, 1994.
- Miller, Daniel ed. Worlds Apart: Modernity Through the Prism of the Local. London: Routledge, 1995.
- Munting, Roger. The Economic Development of the USSR. London: Cromm Helm, 1982.
- Nove, Alec. Political Economy and Soviet Socialism. London: George, Allen and Unwin, 1979.
- Nye, David. Consuming Power: A Social History of American Energies. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998.
- Ovsiannikov, V. A. Stavropol' -- Tol'iatti. Tol'iatti: Izdatel'stvo fonda <Razvitie cherez obrazovanie>, 1996.
- Parks, J. D. Culture, Conflict and Co-existence: American Soviet Cultural Relations: 1917-1958. London: McFarland, 1983.
- Pilkington, Hilary. Migration, Displacement and Identity in Post-Soviet Russia. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Pilkington, Hilary. Russia's Youth and its Culture: a Nation's Constructors and Constructed. London: Routledge, 1994.
- Pisar, Samuel. Cocistence and Commerce: Guidelines for Transactions between East and West. Allen Lane: Penguin Press, 1970.

- Ramet, Sabrina Petra ed. Rocking the State: Music and Politics in Eastern Europe and Russia. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.
- Reid, Susan Emily. 'Cold War in the Kitchen: Gender and the De-Stalinization of Consumer Taste in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev,' Slavic Review. Vol.61 no. 2 (Summer 2002) 211-252.
- Reid, Susan Emily. 'Photography in the Thaw', Art Journal. Summer (1994) 33-40.
- Reid, Susan Emily ed. Women in the Khrushchev Era (Forthcoming).
- 'Repenser le Dégel: versions du socialisme, influences internationales et société soviétique' Cahiers du MONDE RUSSE. January to June 2006. 47/1-2.
- Resnick, Stephen A. and Richard D. Wolff. Class Theory and History: Capitalism and Communism in the USSR. New York: Routledge, 2002.
- Richmond, Yale. US-Soviet Cultural Exchanges, 1958-1986. London: Westview Press, 1987.
- Roberts, Mary Louise. 'Gender, Consumption, and Commodity Culture,' The American Historical Review vol. 103 issue 3 (1998) 817-844.
- Robin, Gabriel. La Diplomatie de Mitterrand. France: La Bièvre, 2000.
- Reinhard Rode and Hans D.Jacobsen (ed.). Economic Warfare or Détente: An Assessment of East-West Economic Relations in the 1980s. London: West View Press, 1985.
- Rubenstein, Joshua. Tangled Loyalties: the Life and Times of Ilya Ehrenburg. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1999.
- Sagers, Mathew J. and Theodore Shabad. The Chemical Industry in the USSR: an Economic Geography. Westview Press: Boulder, 1990.
- Saunders, Frances Stonor. Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War. London: Granta Books, 2000.
- Sbornik, M. Avtovaz – sovremennoe proizvodstvennoe ob'edinenie. Znanie, 1977.
- Schapiro, Leonard and Joseph Godson. The Soviet Worker: Illusions and Realities. London: Macmillan, 1982.
- Schneider, Christoph. Research and Development Management From the Soviet Union to Russia. Heidelberg, Physica-Verlag, 1994.
- Schwartz, Donald V ed. Resolutions and Decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Vol. 5: the Brezhnev Years 1964-1981. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982.

- Shavrin, A. VAZ: 30 Letiju volzhskogo avtomobil'nogo posviashchaetsia. Stranitsy istorii. Finland: Benecap, 1997.
- Sheldon, Anthony and Joanna Pappworth, By Word of Mouth: Elite Oral History. London: Methuen, 1983.
- Shlapentokh, Vladimir. 'The Changeable Soviet Image of America,' American Political Science Review. no.5 (1988): 157-171.
- Shlapentokh, Vladimir. Soviet Intellectuals and Political Power: the Post-Stalin Era. London: I. B. Tauris and Co., 1990.
- Shlapentokh, Vladimir. Soviet Public Opinion: Ideology, Mythology, and Pragmatism in Interaction. New York: Praeger, 1986.
- Shturman, Dora and Sergei Tictin. The Soviet Union Through the Prism of the Political Anecdote. London: Overseas Publications Interchange Ltd, 1985.
- Silverman, Bertram and Murray Yanowitch. New Rich, New Poor, New Russia: Winners and Losers on the Russian Road to Capitalism. London: M. E. Sharpe, 1999.
- Simon, Gerhard. 'Zukunft aus der Vergangenheit: Elemente der Politischen Kultur in Russland,' Osteuropa. 05 (1995): 455-482.
- Smarnova, Julia. Avtovaz: Segodnia i zavtra. Moscow: Interbook, 1991.
- Smart, Christopher William. The Imagery of Soviet Foreign Policy in Western Europe. Michigan: Ann Arbor, 1992.
- Sokoloff, George. The Economy of Détente: the Soviet Union and Western Capital. Leamington Spa: Berg, 1987.
- Spechler, Dina. Permitted Dissent in the USSR Novyi mir and the Soviet Regime. New York: Praeger, 1982.
- Spulber, Nicolas. Russia's Economic Transitions: From Late Tsarism to the New Millennium. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Starr, Frederick. Red and Hot: The fate of jazz in the Soviet Union 1917-1980. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983.
- Steiner, André. Überholen ohne einzuholen: Die DDR-Wirtschaft als Fußnote der deutschen Geschichte? Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 2006.
- Stites, Richard. Russian popular culture: Entertainment and society since 1900. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

- Stokes, Raymond G. Constructing Socialism: Technology and Change in East Germany, 1945-1990. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000.
- Stone, Norman and Michael Glenny ed. The Other Russia. London: Faber and Faber, 1990.
- Strasser, Susan, Charles McGovern and Matthias Judt Eds. Getting and Spending: European and American Consumer Societies in the Twentieth Century Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Strayer, Robert. Why Did the Soviet Union Collapse: Understanding Historical Change. London: M. E. Sharpe, 1998.
- Taubman, William. Khrushchev: The Man and His Era. Great Britain: Free Press, 2003.
- Taylor, Philip M. The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-1939. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- Thompson, Paul. The Voice of the Past: Oral History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 3rd Edition.
- Tucker, Robert C. 'The Psychology of Soviet Foreign Policy,' Problems of Communism Vol.6 no.3 (1957): 1-8.
- Varga-Harris, Christine G. 'Green is the Colour of Hope?: The crumbling façade of Postwar byt through the public eyes of Vecherniaia Moskva,' Canadian Journal of History, Vol. 34 (August 1999) 193-219.
- Verdery, Katherine. What Was Socialism and What Comes Next? Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.
- Vucinich, Alexander. Empire of Knowledge: The Academy of Sciences of the USSR (1917-1970). Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.
- Wagnleitner, Reinhold. Cocacolonization and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994.
- Waschik, Klaus and Nina Baburina. Werben für die Utopie. Stuttgart: Edition Tertium, 2003.
- White, Ralph K. Fearful Warriors. London: Macmillan, 1984.
- White, Stephen and Alex Pravda eds. Ideology and Soviet Politics. London: MacMillan Press, 1988.
- Whitfield, Stephen. The Culture of the Cold War. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991.

Womack, Helen. ed., Undercover Lives: Soviet Spies in the Cities of the World. Phoenix, 1998.

Zakharova, Larissa. 'Le reseau des canaux officiels de transferts des modes vestimentaires occidentals en URSS dans les années 1950-1960.' in Susan Reid ed. Women in the Khrushchev Era. Forthcoming

Zatlin, Jonathan. 'The Vehicle of Desire: The Trabant, the Wartbug, and the End of the GDR,' German History Vol.15 no.3 (1997) 358-380.

Zhuravlev, Sergei. Malen'kie liudi i bol'shaja istoriia. Moskva: ROSSPEN, 2000.

Zubkova, Elena. Russia After the War: Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945-1957. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998.