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**The origins and evolution of Church-State
relations in Cyprus with special reference to
the modern era.**

By

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ABSTRACT

The subject of this dissertation is a survey of the evolution of Church-State relations in Cyprus from the fourth century, but with particular focus on the modern era, that is, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The aim is to provide a survey accounting for general and particular developments as well as highlighting various critical moments and issues.

After giving a brief account of the origins and early history of the Cyprus Church, I will concentrate on the emergence and development of the autocephalous Church of Cyprus from its origins in the fourth century. The historical autonomy of the Cyprus Church is very important to the history of the island because Orthodox Christianity managed to survive and thrive, in spite of so many invasions, due to the role played by the Church. The position of the ethnarchy (ethnarch= national leader) is central to the history of Cyprus. For the Archbishop of Cyprus as ethnarch was considered not only by the Greek Orthodox inhabitants of the island as their national leader, but also by the conquerors, especially by the Turks and the British.

I accordingly examine in detail the prerogatives and rights of the Archbishop of Cyprus granted during the Ottoman occupation (1571-1878) and also the acceptance of his leadership by the British administration (1878-1960). In the last two Chapters I stress that the role of the ethnarch, Archbishop Makarios III, leading up to the independence of Cyprus in 1960 is vital, as is evident during the negotiations with the British Government. It was he who signed, on behalf of the Greek population of Cyprus, the Zurich and London agreements by which the new State of Cyprus was established. It was also through his guidance and interventions that the new Cyprus constitution of 1960 was framed. This safeguarded the privileges of the Church, inherited from the time of the Ottoman Empire, and since Archbishop Makarios III was the Head of State from 1960-1977 nobody ever tried to dispute them.

Finally, I highlight and evaluate in this thesis the conflict arising from the two traditional roles of the ethnarch on the one hand, his new civil office on the other. It suggests that the manoeuvring by the ethnarch, Makarios III, saw him use his authoritarian and charismatic nature to achieve power by exploiting his spiritual and national roles. The culmination of this was the confusion and instability that led to the

deterioration of relations between Greece and Cyprus and the inevitable invasion of Cyprus by Turkey in 1974 after the Coup.

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Chapter I

THE ORIGINS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH IN CYPRUS

I-1 On the origins of the Christian Church in Cyprus we have two main sources. The primary source, that of the book of Acts, which is very minimal, refers to the original witness of anonymous Hellenistic Jews who fled or returned to Cyprus from Jerusalem after the death of Stephen. Their activity was later supported by the mission directed from the Gentile Church at Antioch, in the form of Paul, Barnabas and John Mark. The biblical source is designed to show that the chief mission to Cyprus was directed at pagan Gentiles (hence the story of the conversion of the Roman Governor) and that the chief obstacle was not paganism but traditional Judaism. Subsequent developments, apart from the Jewish revolt, are very obscure except for the Roman persecutions. Early Cyprus Christians were persecuted by Jews and Gentiles although the early Church was composed of both Jewish and Gentile converts, the so-called "new race".

I-2 Cyprus became a part of the Roman Empire in about 60 B.C. It was governed by a proconsul whose seat was at Paphos, then capital of Cyprus. During those years, there were two main religions on the island. That of the Greeks and Romans who believed in the Olympian gods, and the Jewish faith practiced by the many diaspora Jewish settlers and so-called Gentiles on the island. When the King of Egypt, Ptolemy Soter, conquered Palestine in 320 BC, a large number of Jews were taken prisoners and exiled to neighbouring countries including Cyprus. Here in Cyprus, and especially in

cities like Paphos, Salamis, Kition and Amathus, the Jews established their synagogues in which they worshipped God.

I-3 Cyprus was the third country in the Greek East where Christianity was introduced. According to the *Acts of the Apostles*,¹ after the martyrdom of Stephen, some refugee Christian Jews came to Cyprus and preached the gospel to the Jews. Afterwards, they moved on to Syrian Antioch preaching to the Hellenistic Jews and others.

I-4 The Cypriots regarded Barnabas as the founder of their Church in the mid first century. He was a Cypriot Jew and a Levite from Salamis and he came from a rich family. His parents sent him to Jerusalem to be educated where he met Saul (Paul) and the rest of the Apostles of Christ and he was converted to Christianity. According to the *Acts of the Apostles*, Barnabas, originally called "Joseph", sold a piece of his land in Cyprus and gave the proceeds of the sale to the Apostles to benefit the newly established Church.²

I-5 On leaving Palestine, Barnabas travelled to Antioch, Tarsus, and other cities in Asia Minor. At Tarsus, he met Paul and together they went to Antioch where they preached for a year converting a great number of people to Christianity. It was in Antioch that those people who believed in Christ were called "Christians", the first time the expression was used. In Jerusalem they stayed with "Mnason of Cyprus" an early

¹ Acts XI, 19-20.

² Acts IV, 36-37.

disciple and landlord of Paul.³ On returning to Jerusalem they surrendered the funds collected in Antioch to their fellow Christians.⁴

I-6 After returning to Antioch, where Paul and Barnabas were commissioned by the Church to advance the mission in Cyprus, they sailed back to Cyprus, taking with them John Mark, the nephew and disciple of Barnabas.⁵ They landed at Salamis where they taught the word of God only in the synagogues.⁶ Then they travelled across the island to Paphos, the capital of Cyprus, where again they taught in the synagogue the word of God. The Roman Proconsul, Sergius Paulus, having heard about the teaching of the two men, wanted to hear the word of their God. A certain Jew, a pseudo prophet named Elymas, who was in the service of the Proconsul, tried to dissuade him from meeting Barnabas and Paul and listening to them.⁷ At that time Paul, filled with the Holy Spirit, performed a miracle and blinded the unbeliever Elymas. On seeing this miracle, the Proconsul believed in Christ.⁸ This illustrated the power of the gospel to convert "the world".

I-7 The second source is related more to ecclesiastical and popular tradition. This is the largely legendary apocryphal *Acts of the Apostles* that emerged in the third or fourth century. Such information from literary and semi-historical accounts, informed chiefly by devotional concerns, obviously does not have the weight of the evidence in the book of Acts. This tradition asserts that at Paphos, Paul was tortured by the Jews, receiving 39 lashes for his teaching.⁹ A column of white stone over seven feet high is still pointed out to the visitors at Paphos as the one to which, allegedly, he was tied. On their return to Salamis, they went through Kition where they met a man called

³ Acts XXI, 16.

⁴ Acts XI, 29-30.

⁵ Acts XIII, 4.

⁶ Acts XIII, 5.

⁷ Acts XIII, 8.

⁸ Acts XIII, 12.

⁹ 2 Corinthians, XI, 24. (no reference is made to Cyprus).

Herakleides (Herakleon) whom they converted to Christianity.¹⁰ Herakleides was consecrated as the first Bishop of Cyprus, and his seat was at Tamasos.

I-8 Barnabas, accompanied by John Mark, visited Cyprus for a second time. Paul did not accompany them because of a quarrel between himself and Barnabas regarding John Mark.¹¹ At Salamis they met Herakleon, whom Barnabas urged to preach the word of Christ throughout the island, establishing churches and ordaining ministers. Barnabas himself taught the word of Christ at Salamis but very shortly he fell victim to the Jews of his native city and was stoned to death. According to legend, his body was found by John Mark and some other Christians and buried at a place a few kilometres from Salamis. They placed on his breast a copy of St. Matthew's Gospel in Barnabas' own handwriting.¹²

I-9 The revolt of the Jews in AD 115 during the reign of the Emperor Trajan (AD 98-117) broke out into an open rebellion against the Romans everywhere.¹³ The Jews in Cyprus, under the leadership of Artemion, allegedly killed about 240,000, many of them Christians, and completely destroyed the town of Salamis. It is very doubtful whether this number of people killed during the rebellion is accurate because there is no evidence of the actual population of Cyprus in those years. However, bearing in mind the population of the big cities in the Roman Empire, it is not unreasonable to envisage large numbers. The rebellion was suppressed by the Romans, who killed a great number of Jews and banished them from the island. No Jew was allowed to set foot on

¹⁰ *Acta Apostolorum Apocrypha, Act Barnabae*, ed. by Maximilianus Bonnet, (Hildesheim 1959), XVI, p. 298.

¹¹ Acts XV, 39.

¹² *Acta Apostolorum, Apocrypha, Acta Barnabae*, XXII-XXV, pp. 300-301.

¹³ Eusebius, *The Ecclesiastical History*, 2 vols. ed. by G.P. Gould, (The Loeb Classical Library), Vol. I, book IV, p. 305.

the island, and even if a Jew was driven upon its shores by a storm he was put to death.¹⁴

I-10 Although the Jews returned to Cyprus at a much later time, their banishment ensured the advancement of Christianity. Teachers came from Syria and hermits and recluses began to arrive in great numbers, undoubtedly helping the expansion of Christianity on the island.

I-11 From the time of the rebellion until the Council of Nicaea, in AD 325, almost nothing is known of how Christianity spread in Cyprus and at what speed. According to the existing list, which is rather defective, only two bishops from Cyprus attended the Council at Nicaca, Cyril of Paphos and Gelasios of Salamis.¹⁵ But from other sources we learn that 12 or 14 bishops were present, which shows that almost all Cypriots were Christians.¹⁶

I-12 Finally, we must also bear in mind that during the first three centuries Cyprus suffered from frequent earthquakes, which destroyed many of its cities. Famines caused by long periods of drought caused the population of the island to decrease. At the same time, the Christians of Cyprus did not escape the persecutions which their fellow Christians suffered in other parts of the Roman Empire. That is why the lists of martyrs of the Cyprus Church is so long, bearing in mind that for 300 years there was official opposition and hostility to Christianity from the Roman state. Surviving in a hostile environment was the Church's main task in the early centuries.

¹⁴ *Dio's Roman History*, 9 vols. ed. by T.E. Page, (The Loeb Classical Library), Vol. VIII, p.423..

¹⁵ J. D. Mansi, *Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova et Amplissima Collectio*, 35 vols. ed. by H. Welter, (Paris and Leipzig 1901 – 1902), Vol. II, col. 696.

¹⁶ Philippos Georgiou, *Historical notes about the Church of Cyprus*, (Athens 1875), new edn by Th. Papadopoulos, (Nicosia 1975), p. 10.

Chapter II

THE AUTOCEPHALOUS CHURCH OF CYPRUS

A. The Council of Nicaea

II-1 The first General Church Council was held at Nicaea and was convened by the Emperor Constantine in AD 325 in order to discuss and take action against the heresy of Arius that was spread not only in Egypt but also in the Christian world. This Council was attended by representatives of churches including that of Cyprus. Although in Cyprus at that time there were 12 bishops, only the names of two bishops are recorded, those of Cyril of Paphos and Gelasios of Salamis.¹⁷ The oldest list of those attending the Council is surely defective because besides the two bishops mentioned, the miracle-worker Spyridon, Bishop of Tremithus, was also present.¹⁸ Some assert that 14 bishops from Cyprus attended the Council.

II-2 A copy of the letter sent to all the bishops convening the Council is found in the British Museum.¹⁹ As to the number of bishops present, there is variation even among the contemporary writers. Eusebius quotes the number as 200, Eustathius of Antioch 270, Socrates 300 and the Emperor Constantine more than 300.²⁰

¹⁷ J. D. Mansi, *Collectio*, Vol. II, col. 696.

¹⁸ Archimandrites Kyprianos, *Chronological History of the Island of Cyprus*, ed. by Th. Papadopoulos, (Nicosia 1975), p. 101.

Adolf Von Harnack, *The Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries*, 2 vols. trans. by James Moffat, (Williams and Norgate, London 1904 – 1905), Vol. II, pp. 291-292.

¹⁹ MSS British Museum, IVD 14528 fol. 14b.

²⁰ J. D. Mansi, *Collectio*, Vol. III, col. 69.

II-3 The sixth canon of the Council of Nicaea is the most important for the Cyprus Church because it gives to the metropolis the right to govern and administer its own Church.²¹

The ancient customs of Egypt, Libya and Pentapolis shall be maintained, according to which the Bishop of Alexandria has authority over all these places, since a similar custom exists with reference to the Bishop of Rome. Similarly in Antioch and the other provinces the prerogatives of the churches are to be preserved.

In general the following principle is evident: if anyone is made bishop without the consent of the metropolitan, this great synod determines that such a one shall not be a bishop. If however two or three by reason of personal rivalry dissent from the common vote of all, provided it is reasonable and in accordance with the church's canon, the vote of the majority shall prevail.²²

II-4 This canon was again confirmed by the second canon of the first Council at Constantinople in AD 381, attended by four bishops from Cyprus. It states that the rights, which they formerly possessed, must be preserved for the churches of Antioch and other Eparchies.

If they are not invited, let the bishops refrain from going outside a diocese for an ordination or for any other ecclesiastical act. The above-mentioned rule about the dioceses being observed, it is obvious that the council of the province will direct the affairs of each province according to what was decided at Nicaea.²³

II-5 By the end of the fourth century, Christianity was well established in Cyprus and this was mainly due to Epiphanius, Bishop of Salamis (AD 315-403). During those years the Church of Cyprus was threatened by many heresies and Epiphanius was forced to ask for the assistance of the Emperor Theodosius I who was a great supporter of Nicene Orthodoxy. The Emperor's reply to Epiphanius was to issue an edict threatening with banishment all those who opposed him but permitting all those who were willing to renounce their error to remain on the island. The imperial intervention forced many to return to Orthodoxy and some to leave the island. As long as he lived,

²¹ J. D. Mansi, *Collectio*, Vol. II, cols. 669 – 672.

Acta Consiliorum Oecumenicorum, 8 vols. ed. by Eduard Schwartz, (Berlin, 1914-1915), Vol. I, p. 95
Peter L' Huillier, *The Church of the Ancient Councils*, (Crestwood, N.Y 1996), p.45.

Degrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. by Norman P. Tanner, (Sheed & Ward and Georgetown United Press 1990), pp. 8-9.

²² Peter L' Huillier, *The Church of the Ancient Councils*, p.45.

²³ *Ibid.*, p.115.

Epiphanius played an important role in wider ecclesiastical matters and he was present at all councils.

B. The Ecclesiastical independence of Cyprus and Antioch

II-6 From the beginning of the Roman Empire, Cyprus was part of the civil diocese of the East and was administered by an officer sent from Antioch.²⁴ The patriarchs of Antioch had the prerogative to consecrate the bishops of their metropolitans including bishops of Cyprus. The Patriarch of Antioch, Alexander, wrote a letter to Pope Innocent I, stating that he had the right to ordain the prelates of Cyprus, a right which was exercised by his predecessors. The Pope, without making any enquiries, accepted the demand made by Alexander and wrote to the Cypriot bishops advising them to conform to the canons and obey the supremacy of Antioch.

II-7 The death of Theodoros, Archbishop of Constantia (Salamis) in AD 431, gave to John, Patriarch of Antioch, the opportunity to make his first attempt to enforce his claims.²⁵ He persuaded the Governor of the East, Flavius Dionysus, to write a letter to Theodorus, the Proconsul of Cyprus, asking him to use all possible means, and even force, to prevent the election of a new archbishop before the case was resolved by the General Council, which was going to assemble at Ephesus. At the same time, Flavius Dionysus addressed the same letter to the bishops of Cyprus threatening them with severe punishment if they proceeded and elected a new archbishop. Two military officers and a deacon were sent to Cyprus from Antioch to make sure that the orders of the Governor were carried out. In the meantime the Cypriot bishops ignored the threats,

²⁴ Arch. Kyprianos, *Chronological History of the Island of Cyprus*, p. 98.

²⁵ J. D. Mansi, *Collectio*, Vol. IV, cols. 1465-1468.

Peter L' Huillier, *The Church of the Ancient Councils*, pp. 163-164.

elected their archbishop's successor, who was Rheginus, and immediately after his consecration set out for Ephesus to defend their case. Those on the mission were Rheginus, Archbishop of Cyprus, Saprikius, Bishop of Paphos, Zeno, Bishop of Kourio, Evargirus, Bishop of Soli and the Protopapas Caesarios.

II-8 The third General Council at Ephesus was summoned by the Emperor Theodosius II and his western colleague Valentinian III in AD 431 in order to examine the heresy of Nestorius, the Patriarch of Constantinople. He was charged with undermining the union of the two natures of Christ by calling the Virgin Mary *Christotokos* instead of *Theotokos*.

II-9 The Council at Ephesus was presided over by Cyril, of Alexandria. Nestorius, who refused to appear before the Council, was deposed and his opinion condemned.²⁶ Among those absent were John, the Patriarch of Antioch, and his 14 bishops who accompanied him. The deputation of Antioch arrived after the opening of the Council but the decisions about Nestorius had already been taken. John, on his arrival at Ephesus was informed about the condemnation of Nestorius by the Council. He summoned a separate council of his 14 bishops and 29 bishops from other provinces and sentenced Cyril and the rest of the bishops, numbering 198, to be deposed. As expected, Cyril, with his group of 198, condemned John and his bishops to excommunication.

II-10 Under these circumstances the Cypriot deputation presented their case during the seventh and final session of the General Council of Ephesus. The Council examined the case of the Cyprus Church under the following procedure. Rheginus, the Archbishop of Cyprus, on behalf of the deputation, presented the case before the

²⁶ Amilkas S. Alivizatos, (ed.), *The Holy Canons*, 2nd edn (Apostoliki Diakonia of the Church of Greece, Athens 1949), pp. 42-43.

Council by reading a statement. He explained the attempts made by Antioch to subordinate the Church of Cyprus and he mentioned the ill treatment, which two former Archbishops of Cyprus, Troilus and Theodorus, suffered at the hands of the clergy in Antioch because they refused to be subjected to the Antioch See. He also presented and read the letters sent by Flavius Dionysus to the bishops and Proconsul of Cyprus. The Council asked the purpose of sending those letters, and Zeno answered that Dionysus was induced by the Patriarch of Antioch to send them, wishing to subjugate the Church of Cyprus and to secure the prerogative of ordaining the bishops contrary to the canons and ancient customs. Finally, the Council asked if the Patriarch of Antioch had ever in the past consecrated any bishop of Cyprus. Zeno answered again stating that from the times of the Apostles no prelate had ever been consecrated by the Patriarch of Antioch. He mentioned that, from apostolic times, the previous archbishops, Epiphanius, Sabinus, Troilus and Theodorus were all appointed by the local Synod. The decision of the General Council of Ephesus concerning the Cyprus Church is the eighth canon.²⁷

An innovation contrary to church institutions and the canons of the holy fathers as well as an attack on the liberty of all has been reported to us by Rhuginus, the very religious fellow bishop, and by those who were with him, the very reverend bishops of the province of the Cypriots, Zeno and Evargirus... If no ancient custom exists according to which the bishop of the city of the Antiochians performed the ordinations in Cyprus (we have learned by written and verbal reports that this is so), the very reverend men who have had recourse to the holy council, the heads of the holy churches in Cyprus, without being bothered or exposed to violence, will proceed, according to the canons of the holy fathers and ancient usage, to the ordinations of their own very reverend bishops.

The same thing will also be observed in the other dioceses and everywhere in the provinces, so that none of the bishops beloved of God shall take over another province that, in former times and from the beginning, has not been under his authority or that of his predecessors; and if anyone has thus taken over any province and by force has placed it under his authority, let him give it back so that the canons of the fathers may not be transgressed... It has therefore seemed good and proper to the holy ecumenical council that the rights acquired from the beginning and established according to ancient usage from time immemorial be safeguarded intact and inviolate for each province. If anyone produces an ordinance contrary to what has now been defined, the holy ecumenical council with one voice declares it to be null.

²⁷ J. D. Mansi, *Collection*, Vol. IV, cols. 1465-1468.

Peter L' Huillier, *The Church of the Ancient Councils*, pp. 163-164.

II-11 It must be noted that the eighth canon states it is 'contrary to the customs of the Church and the canons of the Holy Fathers', meaning that the decision was taken according to the evidence produced by the Cypriot bishops. If, in the future, that evidence was proved false, then the decision could have been reversed. However, no attempt to do this was made by Antioch and this was stated by John himself in a letter sent to Proklus, Patriarch of Constantinople, in which he enumerated the provinces under his See without mentioning Cyprus.²⁸

II-12 The Antiochene claims on Cyprus were revived during the reign of the Emperor Zeno (AD 474-491) when the Patriarch of Antioch was the monophysite Peter the Fuller. His argument was that the Cypriots were converted to Christianity by the Antiochenes whose Church was apostolic. The Archbishop of Cyprus resisted vigorously the claim of Antioch and assistance came from a strange and unexpected source. Allegedly, Barnabas suddenly appeared in a vision and told him to lay his case personally before the Emperor of Constantinople, and at the same time revealed to him the place where he had been buried. On the next day, the archbishop, accompanied by his clergy and some other people, dug beneath a carob-tree and found the cave in which the Apostle was buried. In a chest they found the remains of the saint and a copy of Saint Matthew's Gospel in Barnabas' own handwriting.²⁹ The miracle was remarkably timely.

II-13 Archbishop Anthemius of Salamis went to Constantinople, presented the relics to the Emperor and asked for his protection. The Emperor ordered the Patriarch of Constantinople, Acacius, to summon a meeting of his Synod to decide on the matter.

²⁸ Arch. Kyprianos, *Chronological History of the Island of Cyprus*, p. 149.

Peter L' Huillier, *The Church of the Ancient Councils*, pp. 163-164.

²⁹ Philippos Georgiou, *Historical notes about the Church of Cyprus*, p.27.

The Antiochenes could not contest their case any further because it was believed beyond any doubt that the Church of Cyprus was as apostolic as theirs and of equal rank. The presented relics verified the validity of the medieval method of argumentation regarding the apostolicity of a regional church. They were shown as a symbol of the Holy Spirit's seal of approval. So, once again, the Cyprus Church was secure from outside interference. Zeno, in order to mark the importance of the discovery, conferred upon the Archbishop of Cyprus certain formal privileges. These were of a symbolical nature, such as permission:³⁰

- (a) to sign in red ink, a mark of distinction enjoyed only by the Emperors.
- (b) to wear a purple cloak during the Church ceremonies.
- (c) to carry an imperial sceptre in place of the ordinary pastoral staff.

Thereby, the archbishop embodies the spiritual and *de facto* temporal authority in Cyprus. The latter was crucial for further Cypriot developments.

II-14 The Emperor Zeno, by granting Cyprus its autocephaly, put an end to a long struggle for liberation from the domination of the patriarchate in Antioch. We do not have to ask why the Cypriots wanted independence from Antioch, but we need to ask why Zeno was prepared to grant it. The miraculous appearance of Barnabas' remains after four centuries in his grave allowed the Court at Constantinople finally to put an end to a rivalry it had no interest in continuing. The reality was that the supernatural entry of the skeleton of Barnabas into Cypriot politics was stage-managed at the highest levels of government. In terms of foreign policy, it allowed Cyprus to be detached from

³⁰ Encomium of Alexander the monk, 'How the relics of St. Barnabas were found', (Ο τρόπος αποκαλύψεως των αγίων αυτού λειψάνων), *Κύπρια Μηναία*, (Cyprus monthly), Divine services of June, (Nicosia 2002), pp. 28-37. (Alexander was a monk of St. Barnabas' monastery and lived in the 6th century).

the political orbit of Syria, where the non-Chalcedonian forces – the Monophysites – were gaining alarming strength. The autocephaly of Cyprus was part of a deliberate restructuring of the balance of power of the Byzantine state. This was necessary precisely because the economic and geographical position of the island could tip any balance. The Orthodox Christians of Cyprus had their own reasons for separation, but it should never be forgotten that Zeno had his. He was under no obligation to react as he did to the gospel on the breast of Barnabas, but reasons of state encouraged him.³¹

C. Nova Justinianapolis

II-15 During the seventh century, the Cypriots experienced the raids of the Arabs. Justinian II, Emperor of Constantinople, unable to protect the Christians of Cyprus, resolved to withdraw the Cypriots to a safer place in Hellespont in Asia Minor. So, John, the Archbishop of Cyprus with a considerable number of followers, migrated to the province of Hellespont at Cyzicus in AD 690. Many arguments have been expressed as to the real reasons of this migration of the Cypriots since during that time there was a peace treaty between the Emperor and the Caliph of Damascus. We are not going to examine the reasons, rather stress that in spite of this transportation of many of the inhabitants of Cyprus, the autocephalous Church of Cyprus was preserved. The Emperor ordered the Patriarch of Constantinople to summon a council in order to deal with the position of the Archbishop of Cyprus in that area. The council, assembled at Constantinople in AD 691, is known as the Council of Trullo. By the direction of the Emperor the Council re-assured John, re-instating the rights and privileges he had in Cyprus, by the 39th canon, which reads as follows:

Since our brother and fellow minister, John, president (Archbishop) of the island of Cyprus, has removed with his people from the said island, on account of the attacks, and to place himself entirely under the sceptre of the most Christian power, we decree, that the privileges bestowed by the Holy Fathers formerly assembled at Ephesus upon the throne of the before named man may be preserved intact, that nova Justinianopolis shall have the right of Constantinople, and that the most

³¹ Philippos Georgiou, *Historical notes about the Church of Cyprus*, p. 103.

reverend bishop appointed over it shall preside over all those of the provinces of the Hellespontines, and shall be consecrated by his own bishops of the city of Cyzicenes being subject to the President of the said Justinianopolis, for the imitation of the rest of the bishops, who shall all be under the said most reverend President, John, by whom, when necessity arises, the bishops also of the city of the Cyzicenes itself shall be consecrated.³²

II-16 Many arguments have been conducted over whether the Archbishop of Cyprus retained the extent of the privileges and rights bestowed upon him by the Council at Trullo, or whether he lost them on his return to Cyprus in AD 698. The most important point to this argument is that the Archbishop of Cyprus, the head of an autocephalous Church, was given authority over other Hellespontine provinces formerly belonging to the authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople, but only for a period, ended by his return to Cyprus. Archbishop Philotheus, in a tract published in 1740, states that the prerogatives of the Archbishop of Cyprus were merely temporary and personal.³³ It seems that those privileges came to an end on his return to Cyprus.³⁴

II-17 Another historian verified that those privileges came to an end when he compared the signatures of the archbishop at the Council of Trullo and at the second Council at Nicaea held in AD 787. In the former he signed as the Archbishop of Nova Justinianopolis whereas in the latter as the Archbishop of Constantia.³⁵ Even today, however, the Archbishop of Cyprus is addressed with the courtesy title of "Archbishop of Nova Justiniana and all Cyprus".

D. Conclusion

II-18 During the early Christian era, Cyprus was a part of the Roman Empire and Christianity expanded on the island at a quick pace, although not much is known until

³² G. Downey, *The claim of Antioch to Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction over Cyprus*, proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 102 (1958), pp. 224-228.

³³ John Hackett, *A History of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus*, (Methuen & Co, London 1901), pp. 37-38. A.S. Alivizatos, *The Holy Canons*, Canon 39, pp. 93-94.

³⁴ Arch. Kyprianos, *Chronological History of the Island of Cyprus*, pp. 375-376.

³⁵ J. D. Mansi, *Collectio*, Vol. XI, col. 989 and Vol. XIII, col. 994.

the General Council of Nicaea during which the Cyprus Church was represented by a surprisingly large number of bishops.

II-19 The origin of the autonomy of the Cyprus Church goes back to the Nicene Council in AD 325. It is known that the patriarchs of Antioch used various methods and objections as to the autonomy of the Cyprus Church but its independence was reaffirmed by the various ecumenical councils which followed and by the Emperor Zeno himself.

II-20 The autocephaly of the Cyprus Church helped the Church to manage and administer its own affairs without interference from other churches. It was, and still is, equal to other autocephalous churches and its archbishop enjoys appropriate privileges. Of particular significance is that the prerogatives, which the Archbishop of Cyprus enjoyed, help account for his recognition as an ethnarch of the Greek Cypriots during the Ottoman occupation. The British administration, at times, also recognised the status of the Cyprus Church and the political status of its prelates.

Chapter III

FROM LATIN RULE TO THE CONQUEST BY THE OTTOMAN TURKS 1191 - 1571

A. The impact of the Crusades

III-1 The developments that culminated in the Crusades being organised by the Church started with Pope Gregory VI (1073-1085). At that time the monastic and ascetic traditions of the Roman Catholic Church were changed and the legal claims of the Church as to the laity and theological doctrines were defined. The changes prohibited the clergy marrying, since, according to their doctrines, they were married to the Church. The Catholic Church had also prevented the laity intervening in the affairs of the Church, and more specifically it removed the power of the kings and the nobility to appoint priests, bishops and archbishops.

III-2 Once the Pope strengthened his position internally it was quite natural for the Church to deal with its enemies, such as the Muslims, who had occupied the Holy Places where Jesus Christ lived, and to remove the heretics who did not acknowledge the supremacy of the Catholic Church as "the mother of all churches". When the Popes imposed their rules on the kings and nobles in Western Europe, they wanted to extend their supremacy in the East and specifically over the Emperors of Byzantium. Consequently, the Crusades began in 1095 and each one had to be approved by the Pope. It is a fact that the Crusades aimed not only to free the Holy Places, but also to rid Spain of Islam and north-western Europe of heresies. Their scope included the expansion of the Roman Catholic Church in non-Christian areas. At the same time their

purpose was to impose Papal jurisdiction on all churches and clergy, including the schismatic clergy of the Byzantine Empire, who were under the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Constantinople.³⁶ The conquest of Cyprus in 1191 by the forces of the Third Crusade and the attacks against the Byzantine Empire by the Fourth Crusade in 1204, which resulted in the capture not only of Constantinople but also the greatest part of the Greek Christian dominion by the Latins and Venetians, were the direct results of the policy employed by the Popes to subdue all the Christian world.

III-3 Constantinople and parts of northern Greece were re-captured by the Byzantines shortly after their fall but areas like the Peloponnese, Crete, some Aegean islands and Cyprus remained under the Latin yoke for two to four centuries before they were conquered by the Turks.

B. The Frankish and Venetian Periods (1191-1571)

i) The Lusignan Dynasty (1192-1489)

III-4 The Frankish Lusignan dynasty in Cyprus started with Guy de Lusignan in 1192 after he bought the island from Richard the Lion Heart, King of England. The Lusignans ruled the island for almost 300 years (1192-1489). The new rulers of Cyprus became closely associated with the Crusades and many notables from Europe visited Cyprus during that period such as Frederic, Emperor of Germany, (during the Sixth Crusade), who was accompanied by an order of German monks.

III-5 The Franks brought to Cyprus a new system of administration, previously unknown to the Greeks, a feudal system. Accompanying this political subjugation was

³⁶ A formal and definite schism between Eastern and Western Christianity existed since 1054.

the introduction into Cyprus of the Church of Rome which displaced the Orthodox Church of Cyprus. This period will be examined in detail in a separate section.

ii) **The Venetian domination (1489-1571)**

III-6 With the death of King James III in 1474, the throne was occupied by Catherine, the widow of James II (1474-1489), who was under the thrall of Venice. At war with the Turkish Sultan, Bayazid, the Venetians decided to take complete possession of Cyprus. In 1489 Catherine was obliged to renounce her rights in favour of the Republic of Venice. The Venetians, naturally, supported Papal authority in Cyprus.

II-7 The end of the Lusignan dynasty saw the Cypriots about to enter an even more severe time of tribulation because they even lost the few traces of liberty which had remained under the Franks. The Venetian occupation was entirely military in character, and commerce as well as the agriculture of the island now suffered. Cyprus fell into decline both financially and culturally. The policy of Venice was the imposition and collection of taxes and the construction of strong fortifications, for fear of an invasion by the Turks, which eventually took place in 1570 and 1571.

C. The Church under Frankish (or Norman) rule

III-8 Cyprus was captured from Byzantium by King Richard I of England in 1191 during the course of the Third Crusade.³⁷ Richard offered the island to the Templars who occupied it for a year, but because of their inability to control it due to their own small numbers and the resistance of the Cypriots, they returned it to the King. In 1192

³⁷ Helen. J. Nicholson, *Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, A translation of the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*, (Ashgate, Aldershot Hampshire 1997), pp. 177-195.

the island was offered to Guy Lusignan, the dispossessed Latin King of Jerusalem, who established his dynasty which lasted until 1472 when the island came under Venetian rule. The Latin Catholic Church was established in Cyprus in 1196. The Bull of Pope Celestine III clearly stated that on account of the foundation of the Latin Church "The Church of Cyprus, long alienated from Rome, has now been recalled to the bosom of the Roman Church".³⁸ This passage shows that the reason behind the foundation of the Latin Church and the four bishoprics (the Archbishop of Nicosia and Bishops at Paphos, Limassol and Famagusta) was not only to crown the kings of Jerusalem and Cyprus, and to care for the spiritual needs of the Latin nobles and settlers, but to compel the Orthodox Church of Cyprus to acknowledge the supremacy of the See of Rome.

III-9 The first specific measures to subject the Greeks to the Roman confession were taken in 1220 and 1222. According to the agreements signed between the King, the Latin nobles and the Latin Church, the Greek bishoprics were reduced from 14 to four and these bishops were placed under the jurisdiction of the Latin bishops. They were also ordered to reside in remote localities within each of the four Latin dioceses and numerous other restrictions were issued as to the number of the Greeks entering the clergy and the need to obtain the Latin bishops' permission before serfs could be ordained as priests.³⁹ The Greek Orthodox Church was deprived of any property and income since it was not allowed to receive the percentage of the tithes which was collected by the Latin bishops.

III-10 The Greek clergy in Cyprus resented their subjection to Rome and resisted Papal demands, encouraged by the Patriarch of Constantinople, Germanus II, who was

³⁸ N. Coureas and C. Schabel, *The Cartulary of the Cathedral of the Holy Wisdom of Nicosia*, (Nicosia 1977), pp. 76-78.

³⁹ Nicholas Coureas, *The Latin Church of Cyprus 1195-1312*, (Aldershot 1977), pp. 250-274.

in exile at Nicaea as a result of the Latin capture of Constantinople in 1204.⁴⁰ The revolts of 1232 resulted in the martyrdom of the 13 Greek monks of the monastery of Kantariotissa, who were burnt because they refused to accept the validity of the unleavened communion bread used by the Latins.⁴¹ Pope Gregory IX tried once again to subjugate the Greek clergy. On this occasion, the higher clergy left Cyprus with their valuables and those who stayed behind were ordered not to co-operate with the Latin clergy, being threatened with excommunication.⁴² Pope Innocent IV, who succeeded Pope Celestine IV in 1243, (the throne was vacant from 1241-1243) tried to induce the Greek clergy of Cyprus and elsewhere to accept the Papal jurisdiction by ordering their direct subordination to Rome as opposed to indirect subordination through the Latin Archbishop of Nicosia and his three suffragan bishops. The Archbishop of Cyprus, Neophytos, accepted this proposal in principle, but he was negotiating some other demands for his Church such as the restoration of the Greek bishoprics on the island and the receipt of a part of the taxes paid by the Greek peasants for the economic support of the Greek Orthodox Church. Pope Innocent IV intended to consider those demands but his death in 1254 brought an end to these innovative policies. His successor, Pope

⁴⁰ Const. Sathas, *Bibliotheca Graeca*, 7 vols. (Venice 1872-1894), repr. by N. Gregoriades, (Athens 1972), Vol. II, pp. 7-8 and pp. 14 - 19.

⁴¹ Nicholas Coureas, *The Latin Church of Cyprus 1195-1312*, pp. 281-284.

⁴² *Acta Gregorii*, ed. by A. L. Tautu, PCRCICO III, II, (Rome 1950), p. 246.
Byzantinische Forschungen, Vol. V, ed. by Adolf M. Hakkert and Peter Wirth. A translation of the article: 'The tribulations of the Greek Church in Cyprus 1196-c/1290' by J. Gill, (Amsterdam 1977), pp. 73-80.

Alexander IV, put an end to the moderate policy of his predecessor and subordinated the Greek Church of Cyprus to its Latin counterpart. This policy found its final expression in the provisions of the *Bulla Cypria* of 1260, which repeated the articles found in the 1220 and 1222 agreements but with some notable differences.⁴³

III-11 One difference, perhaps the most important, was the acceptance of the Bull by the Greek Orthodox archbishop and his suffragans in return for being made directly and personally accountable to the Pope alone. Archbishop Germanus agreed to place his Church under the jurisdiction of the Latin Church of Cyprus and stipulated that, following his death, no Greek archbishop should succeed him, his successor simply being titled Bishop of Solia, a region in the district of Nicosia. Another difference was that the Greek rite was to be tolerated insofar as its provisions did not contradict the teaching of the Roman Church. From 1260 onwards, the Greek Orthodox of Cyprus were, at any rate in theory, Greek-rite Catholics, acknowledging the jurisdiction of the Roman Church, even though a considerable section of the Greek clergy and people of Cyprus rejected the provisions of the *Bulla Cypria*.

III-12 A series of constitutions published in 1340 under Archbishop Helias of Nabinaux showed clearly how the Latin clergy in Cyprus regarded the Greek, Maronite, Jacobite, Armenian and Nestorian clergy co-existing on the island. A meeting of all confessions was held in Nicosia under the *aegis* of the Latin Church, during the course of which interpreters explained to those present the articles in question. It was further acknowledged that non-Latin clergy practised different customs and rites from those of the Latins, as well as speaking different languages, but it was emphasised that they did this within the same faith and that the articles of the Catholic faith were applicable to all. It was once again stated that according to the provisions of the *Bulla Cypria* of Pope

⁴³ *Acta Alexandri*, ed. by T. Haluskynsklyj and M. Wojnar, PCRCICO IV, II, (Rome, 1962), pp. 91-102.

Alexander IV, the different rites of the Greeks and other denominations had to conform with the articles of the Catholic faith. The articles were translated into the languages of all confessions and they were humbly acknowledged as valid.

III-13 These constitutions and their articles created an impression of toleration and co-existence of the various rites and confessions under the overall supervision of the Latin clergy, and a struggle took place to ensure that the ruling Latin minority on Cyprus was not absorbed by any non-Latin Christian community, the Greek in particular. After accepting the primacy of Rome as far back as 1260 in accordance with the terms of the *Bulla Cypria*, the Greek-rite Catholics of Cyprus now formed the majority of the "Roman Catholic" population, at least in theory. In order to prevent the Latins of the Roman-rite, from becoming absorbed into the Greek majority by degrees, the Latin Church promulgated a series of rulings.

III-14 In the first ruling of Archbishop Philip, it was stated that, when a marriage was proposed between a Latin and a Greek, the banns had to be read out three times in the customary manner in a Latin Church. The Greek party had to receive the sacrament of confirmation in accordance with the Latin rite, while the children had to receive all the sacraments in accordance with the Latin rite and had to receive a Latin upbringing. In the second ruling, it was forbidden for a Greek priest to administer the sacraments to a Latin, or for Latin priests to administer them to Greeks. Towards the end of this ruling, however, it was decreed that an exception was to be made for Latin prelates able to administer the Latin sacraments of confirmation to Greeks wishing to go over to the Latin rite.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ J. D. Mansi, *Collectio*, Vol. XXIV, cols. 319-320.

III-15 In spite of these rulings, nearly a century after the promulgation of the *Bulla Cypria*, and although the Greek Church had accepted Roman primacy from 1260 onwards, the Latin Church faced many problems due to the scarcity of a Latin population in the rural areas and the absenteeism of its bishops. This resulted in the progression of the Greek-rite Catholic Church, and the Latin Catholic Church losing its congregation to Greek-rite priests. It was because of this alarming situation for the Latin Catholic Church that Pope Urban V sent a letter to the Latin Archbishop, Raymond of La Pradele, in May 1368 and referred to the letters addressed to him by King Peter I of Cyprus about the religious behaviour of Latin nobles who failed to partake of the sacraments in the Cathedral churches of the island.⁴⁵ Those nobles chose either their private chapels or the churches of "Greek and Schismatics". The Pope told the archbishop to put an end to this unacceptable situation and, if he needed any assistance, he was to ask the King.

III-16 The ecclesiastical relationships between Latins and Greeks was of great concern, not only to the Papacy, but also to the Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople. In 1405 a learned monk, Joseph Bryennios, examined the state of affairs within the Greek Church of Cyprus. The Greek clergy of Cyprus stressed the fact that their union with the Latin Church was the result of coercion and that they wanted to be in secret communion with the Orthodox while maintaining an outward show of obedience towards the Latin Church. At first, the Orthodox Synod was in favour of this arrangement and admitted the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus into communion with it. Bryennios rejected this idea and the Council of Orthodox clergy held in Constantinople in 1412 agreed to the views expressed by Bryennios.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ N. Coureas and C. Schabel, *The Cantuary of the Cathedral of the Holy Wisdom of Nicosia*, pp. 312-314.

⁴⁶ J. Hackett, *A History of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus*, pp. 186-196.

III-17 The Greek bishops of Cyprus complained that the Latins continued to abstain from maintaining social relations with them, as previously, when the Catholic and Orthodox churches were separate, in spite of the union of the two churches proposed at the Council of Florence in 1432.

III-18 In conclusion, one might stress that the Latin and Greek churches of Cyprus remained apart during the 400 years of Latin domination over the island because the Latin Church, while desiring the submission of the Greek Orthodox Church to Rome, wanted the two churches to remain separate entities, under Roman ecclesiastical jurisdiction. However Hill, in his conclusion on the period of the ecclesiastical relations on Cyprus, states "The tendency to fusion...was due to the weakening of Latins who wandered into the Greek fold, rather than to any approach on the Greek side",⁴⁷

III-19 This statement of Hill is rather paradoxical because in their letter to the Pope Eugenius IV in 1441, the Greek bishops of Cyprus complained that, in spite of the Council of Florence decision about the union of the two churches, the Latins in Cyprus continued to abstain from maintaining social intercourse with the Greeks and the two churches were separate.⁴⁸ At the same time Andreas Chrysobergos, a Uniate Greek, who was the Archbishop of Hospitaller Rhodes, was urged by the Greek bishops of Cyprus to compel the Latin clergy, on pain of ecclesiastical censure, to invite them to their functions in a spirit of welcome.

III-20 The fall of Cyprus to the Muslim Turks in 1571 finished one era and began another. This ended the Roman Church's domination of the Greek Orthodox Church. With the departure of the Latins, the history of the Orthodox Church underwent a

⁴⁷ George Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, 4 vols. ed. by Sir Harry Luke, (Cambridge University Press 1940 – 1952), Vol. III, p. 106.

⁴⁸ *Epistolae Pontificae ad Consilium Florentinum Spectantes*, ed. by G. Hofmann, (Rome 1946), pp. 40-41 and esp. note 1.

striking change. The strife between the two churches came to an end and the Greek Orthodox found themselves, undisturbed, in possession of their native Church and property. But the price of the fulfilment of their desires was indeed a heavy one. In the end, they found out that they had exchanged one master for another and, although the independence of their Church was no longer threatened, they had to tolerate the imperialism of the new conquerors and the effect of Muslim zeal.⁴⁹

D. The conquest of Cyprus by the Turks, 1571

III-21 The Turks wanted to conquer Cyprus for three reasons:

- a) It was the only place in the Eastern Mediterranean which did not belong to the Ottoman Empire.
- b) Venice was, at that time, a great naval power and the Turks wanted to control that power in the region.
- c) Cyprus was a trade centre between the East and the West and the Turks wanted to protect and control the trade routes.

The Turkish expedition against Cyprus started in 1570 by the Sultan Selim II. The Venetians fought bravely but Nicosia, which was not very well fortified, fell in the same year and Famagusta the following year.

III-22 After the successful Turkish invasion, the newly appointed *Pasha* (governor) introduced new methods of administration by abolishing the 12 districts and by

⁴⁹ J. Hackett, *A History of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus*, pp. 188-189.

establishing 17 new divisions. He made arrangements so that adequate troops were stationed on the island to protect it from internal and external enemies.

III-23 The Greek Cypriots, ironically, welcomed the coming of the Turks because it was their only hope of deliverance from the detested Latins.⁵⁰ It is not an exaggeration to say that the Greeks preferred the Turks to return to certain parts which they held such as Crete (then possessed by the Venetians)⁵¹ although the Cypriots, at a later stage, considered the return of the Franks by negotiating with the House of Savoy because the Ottoman administration was extremely oppressive. Was, then, the discontent of the Greeks against the Venetians and Franks compared to their preference for the Turks justified? Some claimed that the Latins were more amenable than the Turks and argued that the Latins did not convert the Greek Orthodox to Catholicism and contributed to their national convictions.⁵² This argument lacks sound proof because the Turks did not convert the Greek Orthodox to Islam and it is well known that, from the beginning of the thirteenth century, the autocephaly of the Cyprus Church was abolished and it was ruled by the Latins.

III-24 There is no doubt that the Greek Cypriots preferred the Turks to the Franks and we must examine whether the new conquerors came up to their expectations. The main changes effected were the following:⁵³

- a) social differences were abolished.
- b) the land, which belonged to the nobility, was given back to the peasants.
- c) important and valuable privileges were granted to the Church.

⁵⁰ J. Hackett, *A History of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus*, p. 227.

⁵¹ Philippos Georgiou, *Historical notes about the Church of Cyprus*, p.69.

⁵² D. Therianos, *Adamantios Korais*, 3 vols. (Trieste 1889), Vol. I, p. 35.

⁵³ H.T.F Duckworth, *The Church of Cyprus*, (London 1900), p. 43.

III-25 For the Orthodox, the defeat of Venice was not just a change from one conqueror to the other, but a change for the better. The taxes imposed by the Turks, at first, were much lighter than those paid to the Venetians and the behaviour of the Muslims towards the Orthodox Church was less extreme than that exercised by the Latins who considered the Orthodox schismatics. The Greeks enjoyed freedom of religion and this was recorded by visitors who came to Cyprus after the Turkish occupation.⁵⁴

III-26 When the victorious Turkish General, Mustafa, returned to Constantinople, a Cypriot deputation left for the *Porte* as well in order to press for the fulfilment of the promises made to them by the General. The Grand Vizier (Prime Minister) received the deputation and made most favourable concessions to the Cypriots, which were:⁵⁵

- a) Free enjoyment of their religion. The Latins were not allowed to possess churches, dwellings or to have privileges.
- b) The right to ransom the monasteries seized by the Ottomans.
- c) Permission to buy houses, estates and any other kind of property, to enjoy in freedom their property and the right of transmission to their heirs.
- d) The supremacy of the Greek Orthodox community over all the other Christian groups on the island.

⁵⁴ Andre Thevet, "Angoumois, Cosmo graphe du Roy", *Excerpta Cypria*, ed. by Cambridge University Press (1908), trans. by Claude Delaval Cobham, (Larnaca Cyprus 1908), new edn (The Library Nicosia, Cyprus 1969), p. 178-180.

⁵⁵ L. De Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre*, 3 vols. (Paris 1852-1861), Vol. III, pp. 583-584.

- e) The Greek Orthodox had the right to possess houses in Famagusta and the right to buy houses from the Turks of Famagusta if they wanted to sell them.

III-27 The Turks converted the Latin churches to mosques, like the Cathedral of St. Sophia in Nicosia and St. Nicolaos in Famagusta. Those which were not converted to mosques became stables and warehouses.⁵⁶ A few years after the conquest, some visitors to Cyprus noticed that there were Latin churches or chapels in Nicosia and Larnaca for the religious needs of the Catholic Consuls at Larnaca.⁵⁷ Therefore, the reference made by John Hackett that the Latins who remained on the island, after the conquest by the Turks, were compelled to attend services in Greek Orthodox churches is not accurate.⁵⁸ The Greek Orthodox were permitted to keep their churches although a small number were converted to mosques. It must be noted that the Greek Orthodox were allowed to build new churches and to repair those needing repair only if they obtained the permission of the Turkish administration. In the archives of the archbishopric in Nicosia many such permits in Turkish are preserved.⁵⁹

III-28 Soon after the conquest of Cyprus, the reunion of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus with that of Constantinople took place. The Patriarch, Ieremias B, asked for the restoration of the ecclesiastical union by summoning a Synod at Constantinople. Those who took part included the Patriarchs of Alexandria and Jerusalem, Silvestros and Germanos, the Bishop of Laodikia as deputy of the Patriarch of Antioch and 53 bishops. The Synod recognised the clergy and laity of Cyprus as Orthodox and proceeded to consecrate the first Archbishop of Cyprus, named Anthemius.

⁵⁶ Angelo Calepio, 'The Author to his dear and kind readers', *Excerpta Cypria*, pp. 122-162.

⁵⁷ Girolamo Dandini, 'Missione apostolica al patriarcha ei Maroniti del monte Libano', *Excerpta Cypria*, pp. 181-184.

⁵⁸ J. Hackett, *A History of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus*, pp. 210-215.

⁵⁹ Pietro della Valle, 'From his letters published at Rome', *Excerpta Cypria*, pp. 210-215.

Chapter IV

THE ORIGIN OF THE ETHNARCHY IN CONSTANTINOPLE

A. The fall of Constantinople

IV-1 From 1571, a new era began because the methods of administration and the role of the Christian Orthodox Church within the newly formed administration were so different from those prevailing under the Latin occupation. In order to understand those changes and the position of the Church, we have to give an account of what was happening in Constantinople at that time, because the role of the Patriarch and that of the Church underwent many changes after the initial Turkish occupation in 1453.

IV-2 It is known that, within a very short time after the fall of Constantinople, the conquerors made new arrangements for a new Patriarch to be elected since the Patriarch Athanasios, who was on the throne, fled to Venice and then resigned.⁶⁰ The new Patriarch was George Scholarios – monk Gennadios – a man famous for his education and known for his animosity towards the West and Catholicism. He was the anti-unionist, anti-western leader of the party within the Greek Orthodox Church. After his enthronement as Patriarch of Constantinople, the Sultan Mohamet II visited him in person and told him “Be Patriarch with good fortune and be assured of our friendship, keeping all the privileges that the Patriarch before you enjoyed”.⁶¹

⁶⁰ D. A. Kyriacou, *Church History*, 2 vols. (Athens 1881), Vol. II, p. 233.

⁶¹ Ibid., Vol. II, p. 234.

IV-3 The Sultan handed to the Patriarch a *Firman* (decree), which he had signed, giving him personal inviolability, exemption from taxes, freedom of movement, security from deposition and the right to bequeath these privileges to his successors.⁶²

«Ἐπαγγελίας ἀμετρήτους ἐπηγγέλματο δοῦναι τῷ Πατριάρχῃ· ἔδωκε δὲ προστάγματα ἑγγράφως τῷ Πατριάρχῃ μετ' ἐξουσίας βασιλικῆς ὑπογεγραμμένης κάτωθεν ἵνα μηδὲς αὐτὸν ἐνοχλήσῃ ἢ ἀντιτείνῃ, ἀλλὰ εἶναι αὐτὸν ἀναίτητον καὶ ἀφορολόγητον καὶ ἀδιάσειστόν τε ἀπὸ παντὸς ἐναντίου, καὶ τέλους καὶ δώσεως ἐλεύθερος ἔσται αὐτὸς καὶ οἱ με' αὐτὸν Πατριάρχαι εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, ὁμοίως καὶ πάντες οἱ ὑποταγμένοι αὐτῷ ὁρχιερεῖς.»

"He announced innumerable benefits to be granted to the patriarch, giving written decrees signed at the bottom by royal authority to the patriarch so that no one would trouble or work against him, instead he would be free of censure, not liable to taxation, and undisturbed by all those opposed to him. He and the patriarchs succeeding him, moreover, were to be free of tolls and duties for evermore, and those prelates subject to him likewise".⁶³

IV-4 The Patriarch of Constantinople became "Ecumenical" after the fall of the City and the disappearance of the Christian Emperor. The Patriarchate gained from the conquest because the vast territory of the Empire was reunited under one rule although the lay power was hostile. During the Christian Empire, Church and State were integrated in one Holy Realm. The Emperor was the head of the *Oecumene*, the representative of God before the people and the people before God. Now the Church was a separate entity although it had the power of discipline over its congregation.

IV-5 The new pattern of administration was different. The Patriarch was the head of the *Millet* (nation), meaning the Greek Orthodox under the Ottoman Empire. He and his bishops were granted political responsibilities over the Greek Christians and the Church became the tool for cooperation between the Sultan and his Christian subjects. The Patriarch and his bishops, the Holy Synod, were allowed to govern their own affairs

⁶² Th. H. Papadopoulos, *Studies and documents relating to the History of the Greek Church and People under Turkish Domination*, (Brussels 1952), 2nd edn (Variorum, Aldershot 1990), pp. 1-3.
Georgius Frantzes and others, *Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae*, ed. by Impensis et. Weberi, (Bonn 1838), pp. 304-308.

⁶³ Trans. into English by G. Theodoulou.

according to their own laws, habits and customs and according to those existing in the Byzantine Empire; and the religious head was responsible for its administration and its good behaviour towards the paramount power.⁶⁴ The Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople was an "Orthodox Emperor" to whom all the Orthodox Christians owed ultimate allegiance and his duty was to protect them although he could not administer them.⁶⁵

B. The Privileges of the Patriarch

IV-6 Some of the privileges granted by the Sultan to the Patriarch are mentioned below:

IV-7 The customs of the Church with regard to marriages and burials should be legally observed. The Easter holidays should be celebrated as a feast and the Christians should have the freedom of movement during the three Easter feast days. No more churches should be converted into mosques.⁶⁶

IV-8 The Patriarch, in conjunction with the Holy Synod, had complete control over all ecclesiastical organisations, the bishoprics, the churches, monasteries and their possessions. The Sultan had to confirm episcopal appointments. No bishop could be appointed or dismissed except on the recommendation of the Patriarch and the Holy Synod. The Patriarchate law courts alone had penal jurisdiction over the clergy and, with the Holy Synod, controlled all matters of the Greek Orthodox dogma. The Patriarch was the ethnarch, the quasi ruler of the *Millet* nation.⁶⁷ The Patriarchate Courts had religious jurisdiction over marriages, divorces, guardianship of minors,

⁶⁴ N. Eleftheriades, *Eastern Studies: The Privileges of the Ecumenical Patriarchate*, (M. Bidori, Smyrna 1909), p. 219.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 218.

⁶⁶ J. De De Hammer, *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*, 18 vols. (Bellizard, Barthos, Dufour et Lowell, Paris & London 1835), Vol. III, pp. 4-5.

⁶⁷ Th. H. Papadopoulos, *Studies and documents relating to the Greek Church and people under Turkish Domination*, pp. 27-47.
D. A. Kyriacou, *Church History*, Vol. II, p. 234.

testaments and succession. They also tried any commercial case if both disputants were Christian Orthodox.

IV-9 The Greek Orthodox were heavily taxed by the State although the clergy paid no taxes. The Patriarch and his Synod could also tax the Christians in order to raise money for the needs of the Church. Complaints about heavy taxation against the Patriarch could only be heard by the Holy Synod, if they agreed unanimously.

IV-10 The Patriarch was responsible for the orderly and loyal behaviour of his flock towards the authorities. He also had to ensure that the taxes were paid to the State. He did not collect the taxes for the State as this was the duty of the head man of the local commune. The Patriarchal courts administered justice according to Byzantine civil and customary law. In civil cases the judgement was a matter of arbitration award when the parties were Greeks. The criminal offences were reserved for the Turkish courts unless the accused was a priest.⁶⁸

IV-11 The Patriarchate was now obliged to concern itself with a number of lay affairs. The Patriarch, as head of the Orthodox *Millet*, was to some extent the heir of the Byzantine Emperor. He had to become a politician, able to defend and to intrigue for his people at the *Porte* (Court). He had to use his religious authority to encourage his flock to abstain from disorder and he had to ensure that taxes were collected.

IV-12 Since his duties were so weighty he had to employ laymen for assistance who had the necessary education and sense of obligation to fulfil their duties. In this respect, he employed financiers, lawyers and secretaries and gradually their posts and ranks were upgraded.

⁶⁸ N. Eleftheriades, *Eastern Studies: The Privileges of the Ecumenical Patriarchate*, p. 218.

IV-13 The hierarchy within the Church, such as the election of a new Patriarch or bishops, remained as it had been in the Byzantine period. The only difference was that the Sultan had to issue a document, known as *Berat*, formally appointing the elected candidate to his See. The integrity of the Church had been preserved and with it the integrity of the Greek people.

C. Reasons determining Ottoman Policy

IV-14 There were three main reasons, largely pragmatic, for the award of the privileges by the Sultan to the Patriarch. These were:

- 1) The alliance of the Church and the State against the West was essential. The Greek Orthodox Church, especially after the schism with the Catholic Church, was against the union of the two churches. Gennadios Scholarios actively opposed the union of the two churches proclaimed by the Synod at Florence in 1439, although he believed that an agreement could be reached on the question of the procession of the Spirit.⁶⁹ Gennadios left the Synod before the agreement was concluded and signed in order not to assist in the proclamation of the Union.⁷⁰ When an anti-Latin prelate, Mark Eugenikos died, it was Gennadios

⁶⁹ Vlasidis Fidas, *Church History*, 2 vols. (Athens 1992-1994), Vol. II, p. 626.

⁷⁰ *Historia Concilii Florentii*, ed. by Robert Creighton, (The Hague 1660), p. 268.

who undertook the task of defending the integrity of the Eastern Church. It is for these reasons that Gennadios became the leader of the Orthodox Church and was nominated as Patriarch.⁷¹ The Sultan, after the fall of Constantinople, was contemplating the improvement of relations between the two churches. His policy, in granting the Eastern Church autonomous status, was dictated by his wish to exclude any possible eventual amalgamation of the two churches and to make sure that their continued separation eliminated the possibility of any intervention by the West in favour of the Greeks with a new Crusade.⁷²

There are, of course, certain objections to these theories and the most important are:

- (a) if the privileges were granted because of the danger of a Crusade, and if that danger did not exist, then the privileges could have been withdrawn
- (b) the same privileges were granted to other nations such as the Jews without having the consideration of a Crusade
- (c) the Western nations were not prepared to undertake a new Crusade in the East.

These arguments might be valid, but the fear of armed intervention by the Christian West in favour of the Eastern Christians must have been real, as the idea of the Crusade against the Turks was the object and aim on the part of the Popes.⁷³

⁷¹ Gennadios Scholarius, *Oeuvres Complètes de Gennad Scholarios*, 7 vols. ed. by Louis Petit and others, (Paris 1928-1936), Vol. VI, p. 178.

⁷² K. Paparrhigopoulos, *History of the Greek Nation*, 6 vols. (Eleftheroudakis, Athens 1932), Vol. V, pp. 504-522.

⁷³ Const. Sathas, *Greece under Turkey*, (Athens 1869), repr. by Karavias Publication, (Athens 1985), pp. 1-5.

- 2) The second reason for granting those privileges to the Patriarch by the Sultan is based on the sacred law of the Koran. It was the traditional policy of Islam, during the early expansion in Christian countries, to tolerate other religions.⁷⁴ In the Koran, which is the first religious and civil code of the Islamic people, one can find the principle of toleration towards other religions. The successors of the Prophet followed His steps and their toleration to the monotheistic religions was evident. Once their subjects paid their taxes and obeyed the laws, they were free to exercise their religious duties. This was applied in the Treaty of Jerusalem in the year 657 when the religious freedom of the Christian inhabitants was recognised by Omar after the capture of Jerusalem. Mohamet, after the fall of Constantinople, followed a long established tradition by conferring privileges on the Church.⁷⁵ Some historians claim that the Sultan did not grant privileges to the first Patriarch Gennadios but only a *Berat* (decree).

According to this, all the Patriarch's rights were recognised but they were only personal, such as those granted to the Consuls of foreign countries or missions. In this way, the Patriarch was considered the leader of a nation but in that *Berat* were mentioned the Patriarch's rights, privileges and jurisdiction towards the State.⁷⁶ The privileges or rights of the Church must not be considered as such, but in summary are "The recognition of the existence of the Church of Christ in a Muslim country and the freedom of the Christians to exercise their Christian duties without being obliged to submit to the religious Islamic laws which are

⁷⁴ *The Koran*, trans. by Persa Koumoutsis, (Athens 2002).

(a) Chap. 2, Surah 257, p. 35, (b) Chap. 10, Surah 99, p. 134.

⁷⁵ N. Eleftheriades, *Eastern Studies: The Privileges of the Ecumenical Patriarchate*, p. 80.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-15.

contrary to the understanding and conscience of the Christians. These privileges cannot be considered as those existing in the pre-revolutionary France but according to the dogma and legislation of Islam, which were introduced from the very beginning of the existence of Islam and which were recognised by the Western civilised countries".⁷⁷

- 3) The third reason, which is also very important, concerns the administration of the Empire. With the fall of Constantinople, Mohamet II understood that he had to solve the most essential problem of his dominion which was to organise and establish a machinery for the administration. His own people were illiterate and mostly qualified for military campaigns, so he had to rely on his subject Greeks to carry out a great deal of the administration.⁷⁸ The Greek Church was now in a position to help in the administration because its jurisdiction extended to all the territory inhabited by the Christian population. This territory was divided into dioceses and sub-dioceses according to the population, and was a real system of political division. This division provided all the features needed for a good administration but the most important factor was the hierarchy -- having the parish priests and going through various graded officials we come to the supreme head, the Patriarch. It was, in other words, a ready-made mechanism for a good administration.

IV-15 In the light of the above, we can infer that Mohamet's policy in granting those privileges to the Patriarch was dictated by social and political necessities in order to satisfy his Christian subjects and solve his administrative problems.

⁷⁷ *The Koran*, chap. 2, Surah 257, p. 35 and chap. 10, Surah 99, p. 137.

⁷⁸ Pavlos Karolidis, *The History of Greece*, 3 vols. trans. from the work of G. Heryberg, (Athens 1925), 2nd edn (Sakellariou, Athens 1994), Vol. I, p. 221.

IV-16 According to a famous Greek scholar, N. Eleftheriades, the rights granted to the Patriarchate of Constantinople by the Ottomans were strongly tied in with the legal and political existence of the Greeks within the Ottoman Empire.⁷⁹ He claimed that, without the existence of those safeguards, neither the Greeks nor Christianity would have been able to exist. Those privileges are connected to the historical role of the Greeks within the Ottoman Empire. The privileges granted to every Patriarch, were, according to the Turkish language, "religious privileges", while later on the word "privileges" was substituted with the word "decision" which meant temporal and legal recognition of the Church accompanied by rights of self-government on condition of loyalty to the Ottoman Empire.

⁷⁹ N.Eleftheriades, *Eastern Studies: The Privileges of the Ecumenical Patriarchate*, pp. 212-213.

Chapter V

CYPRUS UNDER THE OTTOMAN TURKS, ESPECIALLY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

A. Attempts made by the Dukes of Savoy and Tuscany to recover

Cyprus and the involvement of the Church

V-1 During the Turkish occupation of Cyprus, and specifically in the seventeenth century, several attempts were made by the Dukes of Savoy and Tuscany to recover Cyprus on the assumption that, before the conquest by the Turks, Cyprus belonged to them. Those attempts were not very serious and although envoys were sent to Cyprus to find out the exact situation on the island and the prospects of getting help from the Cypriots, the Dukes were not convinced that any attempt would be successful. It is noteworthy to mention that the archbishops of Cyprus got involved in these plans because they wanted to free their people from the Turkish yoke which they considered very cruel.

V-2 The first attempt to regain Cyprus was made by the Duke of Savoy, Guy de Lusignan, in 1578 but his main object was to regain his titles. When he got no support from the Pope or Venice his scheme did not materialise.

V-3 In 1600, Charles Emmanuel, the Duke of Savoy, sent an envoy to Cyprus, Francis Accidus, to find out about the forces on the island, the number of soldiers needed to capture it and the support he could get from the Cypriots. Francis Accidus met Benjamin, the Archbishop of Cyprus, who accepted the terms of the Duke and gave

the envoy a letter stating the terms of the Cyprus Church. The Duke again sent two envoys to examine the situation in Cyprus but without result. Ferdinand I, Grand Duke of Tuscany, sent a small force to Cyprus in 1607. This attempt failed because the Cypriots made no effort to revolt against the Turks. Two appeals to the Duke of Savoy were made in 1609 and 1611, signed by the Archbishop and the Bishops of Cyprus, had no positive results. Theokletos, Abbot of the Monastery of the Panayia at Kozinitzia, Macedonia, a nephew of the Archbishop of Cyprus, wrote to Victor Amadeus I, Duke of Savoy, in 1632 on behalf of the archbishop. He gave a detailed account of the Turkish forces on the island and what was needed to conquer it.

V-4 Again this appeal had no effect. Archbishop Nikiforos wrote to Charles Emmanuel, the Duke of Savoy, in 1664 stating that if the Duke was willing to come to Cyprus it would soon be in his hands. The Duke again took no steps. The last attempt was made in December 1668 when one Peter Senni of Pisa, who had lived in Cyprus for a long time, presented a memorandum on the island.⁸⁰ It is not certain whether Peter Senni was an agent of Nikiforos, who in 1668 entrusted some letters for the Duke of Savoy to one Louis de Barrie. The Duke once more did not respond to this request.

V-5 The Cypriots had already learned their lesson "not to trust the Franks". As all their efforts to induce their fellow Christians in the West to liberate them had proved futile, they turned to the *Porte* to improve the conditions of their life.

⁸⁰ Const. Sathas, 'MSS from the Turin Archives', p. 195.

B. Deputations to the *Porte* led by the Prelates of Cyprus

V-6 During the Turkish occupation various deputations from Cyprus, led by the bishops, visited Constantinople to request a release from the heavy taxation imposed on them since they were not in a position to pay. Some of those deputations were successful while others failed to achieve their objectives, sometimes with terrible consequences.

V-7 The first deputation, headed by Archbishop Silvestros and accompanied by the Bishops of Kition, Paphos and Kyrenia went to Constantinople in 1730. Their purpose was to request the release from heavy taxation. The deputation failed to achieve its target and the Archbishop and the Bishop of Kition were exiled and only the Bishops of Paphos and Kyrenia were allowed to return to Cyprus. After a few months, and with the intervention of the Patriarch, the two exiles were allowed to return to Cyprus.

V-8 The second and third deputations were led by Archbishop Philotheos in 1744 and 1753 respectively. The first visit was unsuccessful and the archbishop was imprisoned, while the second was partly successful because the Grand Vizier agreed to reduce taxation. In 1754, the Archbishop and Bishops of Cyprus were recognised by the *Porte* as the national and political representatives of the Cypriots. It was also agreed that an annually fixed sum of money was to be paid as taxes. From that year, until 1821 when the Greek War of Independence started on the mainland, the Cypriot prelates were very powerful.

V-9 The fourth deputation took place in 1760. The two bishops who went to Constantinople had to persuade the Government of the harsh economic situation of the

Cypriots and their inability to pay the fixed taxes.⁸¹ Unfortunately, taxation increased instead of being reduced and many Cypriots left the island.

V-10 In 1772, Archbishop Chrysanthos and the three bishops applied to the *Porte* to change the system of the collection of taxes, but there is no information as to the result of this deputation.

C. The relations between the Church and the Turkish administration

V-11 The relations between Church and State were arranged not on the basis of unity between the two entities or on discretion. Christianity was not considered a religion of the State, but as an institution of private law with full freedom to act according to its own laws, without the intervention of the State within the Church, provided the laws of the State were obeyed.⁸²

V-12 Although the Ottoman administration was not interested in the application of law, nevertheless the Church in Cyprus was granted many powers. The archbishop and bishops of the island, on their election, received from the authorities the *Berats* (decrees) which stated the rights and the duties of each office. It is evident that *Berats* were granted from the first years of Ottoman rule. A letter written by the Patriarch Matthew in January 1601 stated the approval by the Sultan of the appointment of the Archbishop of Cyprus, Benjamin.⁸³ The privileges granted to the Church of Cyprus were not specific, such as those granted to the Church of the Dodecanese, but similar to those granted to the Patriarch in 1453 and to the Patriarch of Jerusalem and the monks

⁸¹ Arch. Kyprianos, *Chronological History of the Island of Cyprus*, p. 473.

⁸² M. Sakellariopoulos, *Ecclesiastical Law of the Eastern Orthodox Church*, (Athens 1989), p. 24.

⁸³ Const. Sathas, *Bibliotheca Graeca*, Vol. III, p. 549.

of Mount Sinai. Those privileges were authorised by the Koran, the holy book of the Muslims.⁸⁴

V-13 The powers granted to the Orthodox Church of Cyprus already existed during the Byzantine era, and many views were expressed about the reasons which induced the Turks to confirm this with their *Berats*. P. Karolides claimed that Mustafa, the Conqueror, granted them because he esteemed the great cultural and spiritual power of the Church and he wanted to use it as a contact between the Church and the State.⁸⁵ Some others believed that the Turks granted the privileges in order to avoid external dangers in case the Latin Church tried to free the Greek Cypriots from the Turkish rule. K. Paparrigopoulos favoured this version, claiming that Mustafa II wanted to preserve the cold relationship between the Eastern and Western churches.⁸⁶

V-14 The Sultan Selim "B" (1566-1574) wanted to protect the Orthodox Christians of Cyprus and, by following the example of his predecessors, he did not only want his subjects to be obedient but also to support him in case of war against the Venetians, who were very dangerous. The Sultan had in mind the dreadful results of the naval battle at Lepanto in October 1571 during which the Turks suffered a disastrous defeat. Furthermore, he issued strict orders to his soldiers to protect the *Rhajas* (Greek subjects) and threatened them with severe punishment if they acted against his orders. A document issued by the Sultan in 1571 urged the authorities in Cyprus to behave justly towards the Greeks and to protect them so that progress and prosperity on the island could prevail.⁸⁷

⁸⁴ N. Eleftheriades, *Eastern Studies: The Privileges of the Ecumenical Patriarchate*, p. 206. *The Koran*, chap. 109, p. 410.

⁸⁵ P. Karolides, *The History of Greece*, Vol. I, p. 221.

⁸⁶ K. Paparrigopoulos, *History of the Greek Nation*, Vol. V, p. 477.

⁸⁷ Philippos Georgiou, *Historical notes about the Church of Cyprus*, p. 68.

D. *Berats* preserved in Cyprus

V-15 A *Berat* was an official document issued by the Sultan which stated the following:

1. No archbishop or bishop elected could take his seat without obtaining a *Berat*.⁸⁸
2. A *Berat* contained the provisions stating the relations between the Church and the State, the privileges of the Greek clergy and generally those of the Church. When a *Berat* was issued, a sum of money was paid to the Grand Vizier. With the bestowed privileges the Church enjoyed its ancient dignity and freedom.

V-16 The preserved *Berats* are all of the nineteenth century and, according to their chronological order, they are:

1. The *Berat* of the Bishop of Paphos Panaretos – issued 1821
2. The *Berat* of the Bishop of Paphos Charitonos – issued 1822
3. The *Berat* of the Bishop of Kition Meletios – issued 1846
4. The *Berat* of Archbishop Makarios – issued 1855
5. The *Berat* of the Bishop of Paphos Lavrentios – issued 1855
6. The *Berat* of Archbishop Sofronios – issued 1866. This *Berat* can be found in the archives of the archbishopric in Nicosia.⁸⁹ (The *Berat* is given as an Appendix A).

V-17 The *Berats* contained clauses on administration, justice and protection. The administration clauses were:

⁸⁸ George Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, Vol. IV, p. 310.

⁸⁹ Philippos Georgiou, *Historical notes about the Church of Cyprus*, pp. 136-143.

1. The metropolitans, bishops, abbots, priests, nuns and other Christians, who are subject to his jurisdiction, shall in accordance with the usage, which has prevailed from ancient times, and their religious duty acknowledge him as archbishop, and shall not show themselves reprehensibly negligent in the duty of their obedience.
2. Without the sealed petition of the archbishop for the time being, the dignity of metropolitan or bishop shall not be bestowed upon any one, nor shall the authority and exercise of the rights of such be permitted.
3. When in accordance with their religious canons the question arises of expelling metropolitans, bishops, priests, monks and abbots and of substituting deserving persons for them, the said archbishop shall dismiss them according to their Canon Law. And in order that he may substitute for them deserving monks and appoint them metropolitans and bishops, he must report the case at our capital, notifying it in a memorial, and, after the customary and regular presents have been paid into the treasury, the *Berats* recognising their position and the necessary holy decrees shall be given into their hands.
4. Since the said archbishop is empowered in accordance with ancient regulations and by virtue of this *Berat* to receive archiepiscopal dues exacted from every class, metropolitans, bishops, monks, abbots and other Christians, the *Qazis* for the time being shall assist and cause them to be paid to the agents sent purposely for their collection and furnished with our sacred decree or with his mere letter.
5. The charitable moncys, which were formerly and from the first paid by the Christians, and the canonical dues received from holy wells, monasteries and marriages, as also the rest of the casual revenues of the archbishopric, shall, in

accordance with ancient custom and the support of his *Berat*, be paid to the said archbishop without objection or delay.

V-18 It is known that a *Berat* contained provisions regarding judicial power. During the Byzantine era the Church had the judicial power over all cases of the clergy, similar powers the Church had during the Ottoman occupation.⁹⁰ During the Frankish period, the Church courts had the jurisdiction to try the cases of people belonging to the same Christian dogma.⁹¹ The clauses of the *Berat* regarding judicial provisions are:

1. When a Christian wishes to be married or divorced in conformity with their religious canons, the archbishop or his agents appointed by our exalted decree, or his mere letter, shall officiate and no one else shall interfere or take part therein.
2. Whatever any of the monks and other Christians at their death shall bequeath as an offering, in conformity with their religious customs, to the poor of the churches, or to the archbishop, shall be allowed, Christian witnesses being heard by the tribunal according to their religion.
3. If any of the priests, or of the commissaries of the archbishop shall perform a marriage that is unlawful according to their religion, without his express sanction and approval, he shall be punished by the tribunal.

V-19 The clauses of the *Berat* referring to protection are:

1. He shall not be impeded in the office of his archbishopric by any one so ever, and no one shall interfere with or disturb him.

⁹⁰ Philippos Georgiou, *Historical notes about the church of Cyprus*, p. 140.

⁹¹ Const. Sathas, *Bibliotheca Graeca*, Vol. II, pp. 514-585.

2. No one without superior orders shall deprive him of the churches or monasteries, which have been in the possession of the archbishops from ancient times.
3. No one shall interfere in their repair when this is carried out within our ancient boundaries by permission of the tribunal and our exalted *Firman*.
4. No one shall have power to make a Christian a Muslim against his will.
5. When any of the metropolitans and bishops owing canonical dues have no money to pay them, and instead of money offer stuffs and clothing, which are intended to be reckoned in lieu of their canonical dues, his men and agents, who convey them are not to be interfered with during the whole of their journey by any of the superintendents at the different stations and customs piers, or by any one else so ever, for the payment of any fee or customs dues.

V-20 The relations between the Cyprus Church and the Ottoman Government up to 1754 were quite close. From that year, until 1821, the prelate of the Cyprus Church was very powerful as Ali Bey mentioned.⁹² The archbishop, as the head of the Greek Orthodox Church, was the spiritual and secular leader of the Greek community (ethnarch) and his influence was increased during the reign of Mustafa II. The tremendous power of the Church was reduced in 1821 when the archbishop, the bishops, a considerable number of the clergy and a number of eminent citizens were

⁹² Ali Bey, 'The Travels of Ali Bey', *Excerpta Cypria*, pp. 391-411. (He is the author of the Travels of Ali Bey, the son of Othoman Bey of Aleppo who directly descended from Abbas, son of Abd El Motaleb and uncle of Mohammad).

either beheaded or hanged following the Greek War of Independence which started on the mainland on 25 March 1821. The Turkish Governor, Kutchuk Mehmet, persuaded the *Porte* to allow him to commit those deeds in order to prevent or stop any disloyalty on the part of the Cypriots.

V-21 The most tragic figure of the prelates of Cyprus during the Turkish occupation is Archbishop Kyprianos, and it will be a great omission if I do not include a few lines about the life and work of this famous Cypriot archbishop.

V-22 As an archbishop, his first target was to improve the educational standard of his people. For this purpose, he founded numerous schools throughout the island including the still extant High School of Nicosia, now known as the Pancyprian Gymnasium, dedicated to the Holy Trinity. The school is opposite the archiepiscopal palace and opened on New Year's Day 1812.

V-23 When the Greek War of Independence started in 1821 on the mainland, it shook the Ottoman Empire. The Governor of Cyprus, Kutchuk Mehmet, known for his savage nature and bad temper, managed to persuade the *Porte* to introduce measures to stop any insurrectionary movement in Cyprus. Firstly, the *Porte* sent additional troops to Cyprus from Syria. Secondly, all the Greek Cypriots were disarmed, and thirdly, Kutchuk Mehmed managed to get authorisation to put to death the bishops, heads of the monasteries, superior clergy and chief men of the Orthodox community charging them with supporting the rebels on the mainland. His main object, however, was to confiscate the property of the Church and that of those murdered.

V-24 The massacre took place in the square before the Governor's palace on Saturday 9 July 1821. The three bishops were beheaded and the archbishop, along with two other clergymen, was hanged. The butchers continued their work on the following day and it is said that about 470 people were killed, although some historians estimate the number killed to be about 235.

V-25 Similar crimes were committed in Constantinople when the Patriarch Gregorios V was hanged after Mass and his corpse was thrown into sea. It was picked up after some days by a Russian ship and buried in Odessa.

V-26 Fortunately for the Cyprus Church those atrocities did not last for long. Soon after the murder of the archbishop and bishops, new prelates were appointed and, by the end of 1829, the Sultan issued a decree by which the authorities protected the prelates of the Church and no one had the right to terminate their office, unless they committed criminal offences contrary to their religion.⁹³ In 1838, the Ottoman administration improved further the conditions of the Christians. Due to new reforms, the archbishop was made a member of the newly appointed eight-member council, called the *Divan*, with executive and administrative powers.⁹⁴ Also, the Sultan Mahmoud II, in an effort to remove abuses, along with the new methods of government, put an end to the method of leasing the taxation to the highest bidder and a paid tax collector was appointed to collect the taxes and remit them to the imperial treasury. In 1856, the spiritual privileges of the Church were recognised and a Cypriot deputation was invited to Constantinople to resolve ecclesiastical and national matters. According to a decree issued in 1863, the Government could not intervene in the property of the

⁹³ From unpublished documents of the Archbishopric.

⁹⁴ J. Hackett, *A History of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus*, p. 193.

Church and monasteries, which were not officially registered in their name, and they were left unhindered to enjoy that property. Until the end of the Turkish occupation, the Church was protected by the State and its prelates were members of various administrative councils. Therefore, the Archbishop of Cyprus had not only religious but secular power as well.

E. Taxation and the Church

V-27 Shortly after the conquest of Cyprus by the Turks, and the privileges and dignity of the Church were restored, the property of the Church and monasteries was recovered and the archbishop was addressed as "His Beatitude" having the fifth place of order in all Orthodoxy after the Patriarchs. The position of the peasants, however, was dreadful because of the heavy taxation. The original taxes paid were not as high as those paid to the Latins but gradually they were increased, when the method of leasing the taxes to the highest bidder was introduced, and when the governors and the tax collectors sent by the *Porte* grew greedier. In the beginning, the Cypriots paid the following taxes:⁹⁵

1. A third of their crops in kind.
2. The *Kharaj* – a tax paid varying from three piastres to 11 according to the class each peasant belonged to.
3. A tax of six piastres paid by each individual to secure free exercise of his religion.

⁹⁵ Arch. Kyprianos, *Chronological History of the Island of Cyprus*, p. 301.

V-28 The position of the peasants deteriorated not only because of the high taxes imposed but also because of famines caused by drought, the scarcity of seeds to resume agriculture and destruction by locusts. Due to all these reasons, the bishops protested to the *Porte*, by sending various deputations, and demanded release from the heavy taxation. Many Cypriots preferred the Venetian domination to the yoke of their new masters and some chose to emigrate. This was the reason why the population of the island decreased and the Cypriots were in favour of attempts made by the Franks to recover Cyprus. In other words, the new regime privileged the clergy, but not the people, who voted with their feet!

Chapter VI

THE BRITISH OCCUPATION

A. The Anglo-Turkish Agreement of 1878

VI-1 The Anglo-Turkish Convention of Defensive Alliance was signed in Constantinople in June 1878. According to this alliance Britain would go to Turkey's assistance in the event of the re-occurrence of Russian attacks in Asiatic Turkey, and as a result Britain was given the occupation and administration of Cyprus. The supplementary agreement signed in August 1878 at Constantinople stripped the Sultan of all his substantive powers, which were transferred to the Queen who had full powers for making laws and conventions, regulation of commercial and consular relations and affairs free from the *Porte's* control.⁹⁶ Cyprus became an ordinary British Colony with a new independent currency system, a new judicial organisation and, above all, a representative Legislative Council for the first time.

B. Reforms introduced by the Colonial administration and how they affected the Church

VI-2 The reforms, amendments or replacements of the legal and governmental administration were very slowly and cautiously introduced. They were inspired by Lord Kimberley, Liberal Colonial Secretary. In fact, Cyprus owed to him the liberties enjoyed until 1931. In November 1882 the newly formed Cyprus Courts of Justice, by the Order in Council, put an end to the faulty and corrupt organisation of the Ottoman

⁹⁶ Colonial Office, (C.O) 229, London 1879, pp. 1-2.

Courts and the British rules of Court and civil and criminal procedures ended the Muslim *cadis* and the courts of four judges.⁹⁷ The law for the establishment of the Legislative Council was embodied in an Order in Council by a decision of Lord Kimberley.⁹⁸ This law gave the franchise to all the male population of the island over 21, who were paying taxes, to elect their representatives in the Legislative Council.⁹⁹ This Council was composed of 18 members, six nominated officials, always including the High Commissioner, and 12 elected members from three electoral districts of the two main communities, nine Christians and three Muslims, separately elected from their respective communities. The Legislative Council became the vehicle for the enactment of all the laws of Cyprus and the approval or rejection of the Government's annual estimate of revenue and expenditure. Bills, as revenue, taxation and expenditure were tabled in the Legislative Council after the consent of the High Commissioner, who had to obtain the consent of Her Majesty's Government. The Constitution of Cyprus could be amended or abolished if approved by the Queen. This new constitution had two irreconcilable ideas. The first one maintained the old Ottoman principle of representation by *Millet* (nation) without taking into consideration the western democratic concept of the rights of the majority. The second one, by introducing this electoral system, encouraged the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus to maintain their traditional ethnic identities and to approach the greater political opportunities offered by British rule from a predominantly communal stand-point.

⁹⁷ George Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, Vol. IV, pp. 416-417.

⁹⁸ Order in Council, (O.C) 3211, Constitution and functions of the new Legislative Council, London 1882.

⁹⁹ C.O 3791, London, 30 November 1882.

VI-3 The first High Commissioner of Cyprus was Sir Garnet Wolseley who, due to his different cultural values, developed a great dislike for the Greek bishops and for the Greek Orthodox clergy in general. Writing to the Foreign Office, a month before his departure from Cyprus, he described them "as cunning, deceitful and essentially untruthful", feelings which throw some light on his decision to minimise the influence of the Church by curtailing its revenues and by reducing the influence of its prelates.¹⁰⁰ At the same time the British administration was careful in husbanding the revenues of *Evcaf*, (the Turkish Muslim Council), in respect of its policy towards the Greek Church.¹⁰¹ Sir Garnet Wolseley provoked and antagonised the Church. He withheld his recognition of the Ottoman *Berats* of the prelates who found themselves stripped of their rights. In fact he disestablished the Orthodox Church. The Church lost its former immunity from the payment of land taxes and its power of enforcing, with the assistance of the civil authorities, the sentences passed by the ecclesiastical courts on Orthodox Christians who violated the canon laws and whose acts, such as cohabitation within the prohibited degrees of kinship, adultery and the officiation at church services of ex-communicated priests. The above were not considered as offences according to English Civil Law.¹⁰² Furthermore, the bishops' *ex-officio* representation on the administrative councils, together with that of the other Christian and Muslim representatives, lost much of its power as a result of the British decision to restrict the previous rights of the councils to formal duties connected with the levying of taxes.¹⁰³ The Church was unable to secure from the British Government the continuation of the protection of the clergy from civil arrest. In 1879 four priests were sentenced to prison for minor offences. Their imprisonment caused outrage, especially as one of the priests was put to

¹⁰⁰ C.O 67/4 Private, Wolseley to P. Currie, 2 April 1879.

¹⁰¹ C.O 67/12 No. 285, Biddulph to Granville, 28 June 1880.

¹⁰² C.O 3384, Biddulph to Kimberley, 9 December 1881, pp. 27-28.

¹⁰³ C.O 2930, Biddulph to Kimberley, 19 March 1881, p. 90.

work on the streets of Limassol, and two priests in Famagusta were humiliated by having their beards forcibly shaven.¹⁰⁴ Archbishop Sofronios protested to the Government which in turn refused to recognise the former privileges and rights of the clergy and the archbishop was informed that "immunity from the ordinary laws of the country is not a privilege which can be tolerated for a moment".¹⁰⁵ Thereafter, the Church-State relationship in Cyprus became one of conflict. In general, the Cyprus Church was going to be treated like the English non-conformist and Catholic churches.

VI-4 The most important consequence of the ill-disguised British hostility towards the Greek Orthodox Church was Wolseley's refusal to continue the Ottoman practice of assisting the bishops in collecting their customary dues, which included payment in kind, liturgical fees annually paid to the bishops by the villages in their dioceses and a personal tax which was paid to the bishops by each member of the Orthodox Church.¹⁰⁶ The Bishop of Kition, Kyprianos, who was the most active of all prelates, was convinced that Wolseley refused the usual police escorts to the collectors of taxes, on the grounds that there was no such law enforcing the collection of ecclesiastical dues, but Archbishop Sophronios referred to the *Berat* of the Sultan which specifically ordered the civil authorities to assist him in the collection of the Church dues. Since the Church could no longer collect the dues, its income was reduced to one third.¹⁰⁷ Therefore, its subscriptions for educational and charitable purposes were cut. The legal and political privileges of the Church shared the fate of its fiscal rights which were eventually abolished by the British administration. Various discussions took place from 1880 to 1890 between the British Governors, Biddulph and Sir Henry Bulwer,

¹⁰⁴ C.O 2324, C.O 2398 and C.O 2355, London 1879.

¹⁰⁵ C.O 2398, Holbech to Archbishop Sofronios, 5 June 1879, p. 7.

¹⁰⁶ Philios Zannetos, *History of Cyprus*, Vol. II, pp. 157-158.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 158.

and the Church regarding this issue of the collection of taxes, but no agreement was reached because the Church did not want the State to be associated with the disposal of the money.¹⁰⁸ No action was taken from 1900-1910 because of the archiepiscopal problem which will be discussed in a separate section. It was only in May 1914, after negotiations with the lay members of the Legislative Council and the Holy Synod, that the new constitution of the Holy Church of Cyprus was published, providing clauses for the administrative needs of the Church. According to this constitution the management of Episcopal properties was vested in committees in which lay and clerical interests were represented and the canonical and liturgical dues were paid to the parish churches which in turn paid the bishops. The 1914 Church Constitution kept the Government out of the affairs of the Church but the Church Constitution was not ratified by the Legislative Council.

VI-5 Wolseley's attempt to humiliate the Greek Orthodox Church and its clergy, by depriving them of the status which they enjoyed during the Turkish Occupation, failed to acquire for the Government the political influence of the Church and the Greek upper class because the Greek Cypriots were deeply attached to their religious traditions. The Church had been very active in the political, social and educational aspects of the Greek community. The abolition of the Church taxes did not earn much popularity for the Government because the poor villagers had to pay the heavy civil taxation. Finally, the pressure on the Church ceased with Wolseley's departure. Kimberley's judicial and political reforms enabled the Church to consolidate its position and the bishops retained their influence by becoming leading figures in the Legislative Council. At that time nobody questioned the involvement of the bishops in politics because the Head of the Church was the ethnarch, the religious and secular leader of his people.

¹⁰⁸ Philios Zannetos, *History of Cyprus*, Vol. II, pp. 382-383.

C. The Archiepiscopal Problem 1900 – 1909

VI-6 Archbishop Sophronios died on 22 May 1900. The next nine years saw continuous conflict between two political groups which favoured different bishops and, as a result of that conflict and the mutual antipathy, the Archbishop's See was vacant until the election of Cyril II, the Bishop of Kition, on 21 April 1909.¹⁰⁹

VI-7 On the death of the archbishop, the Bishop of Paphos, taking precedence over the other metropolitans, should have become responsible for arranging the election of the new archbishop. The throne of Paphos, however, had been vacant since its Bishop, Epiphanius, died on 5 February 1899 and his successor had not been elected. The Church of Cyprus, therefore, was left with only two bishops, Cyril Papadopoulos of Kition and Cyril Vasiliou of Kyrenia. Next in seniority was the Bishop of Kition who should have been the *Locum-Tenens*. He was, at that time, one of the Greek members of the Legislative Council, an active politician, a violent *Enosist* and a fierce opponent of the Government.¹¹⁰ In contrast, the Bishop of Kyrenia was of a milder character, and he refused the throne of Paphos which needed a stronger personality.¹¹¹ Bearing in mind the politics prevailing at that time, the main issue involved in the election was the agitation for union with Greece. The British authorities, although they did not wish to be involved in the dispute, supported the party opposed to the Bishop of Kition.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ J. Hackett, 'The Archiepiscopal Question in Cyprus', from *The Irish Quarterly*, (Dublin October 1908).

¹¹⁰ Philios Zannetos, *History of Cyprus*, Vol. III, p. 199.

¹¹¹ A. Fragoudes, *History of the Archiepiscopal Problem of Cyprus*, (Alexandria, Egypt, 1911), p. 15.

¹¹² Philios Zannetos, *History of Cyprus*, Vol. II, p. 402.

VI-8 The opponents of the Bishop of Kition alleged a number of charges against him. The most critical one was that he was a freemason.¹¹³ Due to the death of the Bishop of Paphos and that of the archbishop, the Holy Synod of Cyprus numbered only six members, the two metropolitans, the abbots of Kykko and Machaeras, the Archimandrite and the Exarch of the archbishopric. The Bishop of Kition, knowing that the five members of the Synod were against him, consented, unwisely, to the administration of the throne being controlled by the Synod, contrary to the rules of the Church. Eventually, the Bishop of Kition left the Synod, being unable to co-operate further with its members.¹¹⁴

VI-9 On 7 August 1900 the Synod issued a circular with instructions for the election of the Special and General representatives for the election of the new archbishop.¹¹⁵ In spite of the opposition to the Bishop of Kition, 46 of the 60 general representatives were in Kition's favour. His opponents, who controlled the Synod, raised an objection to the election, stating that if the objection was justified then the defeated candidate should take the throne without fresh elections. The 46 general representatives proposed that the other autocephalous churches of Constantinople, Alexandria, Jerusalem and Greece should be asked to send representatives to form a provisional Synod and resolve the matter. The members of the Synod rejected this proposal, claiming that this would be an intervention by the other churches in the affairs of the autocephalous Church of Cyprus. The situation was so tense that the High Commissioner, Haynes Smith, sent a telegram to his superiors in London seeking to deploy troops.¹¹⁶

¹¹³ Philios Zannetos, *History of Cyprus*, Vol. III, p. 141.

¹¹⁴ Ibid, Vol. III, pp. 164-165.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, Vol. III, p. 196.

¹¹⁶ C.O 67/125, 15 December 1900, C.O 67/127, 10 and 25 January 1901.

VI-10 In the meantime, both parties appealed to the Government for advice and help.¹¹⁷ The Kyreniaks insisted that the privileges of the Church should be protected, while the 46 representatives gave their reasons for applying to the other churches. Haynes Smith was strongly against the ecclesiastical mission to Cyprus and asked the *Chargé d' Affaires* in Constantinople, Mr Maurice de Bunsen, to persuade the Patriarch to stop such a mission. The Foreign Office telegraphed de Bunsen on this matter as well. In Athens, the Foreign Minister gave assurances to the British Government that the Athenian Synod would not interfere.¹¹⁸ The High Commissioner called the two parties involved and told them that the Government wished the dispute to be settled without any foreign intervention and he proposed a new election under the supervision of the Government. The Kition party accepted the proposal but the Kyrenia party rejected it and so the Government's attempt to solve the question failed. The Bishop of Kition and his 46 supporters continued to press for a solution and repeated the request to resort to the sister churches. He explained to the High Commissioner in a long and detailed letter dated 15 February 1901 that this was the practice in the case where there was no canonical Synod.¹¹⁹

VI-11 The Patriarch of Constantinople, Ioakim III, to the surprise of everyone, sent the Deacon Demetrios Georgiades, Professor of Canon Law at the Divinity School at Chalke, to Cyprus as the special Exarch of the three patriarchs to resolve the matter. The Colonial Office telegraphed the High Commissioner to inform Deacon Georgiades that he would not be recognised by the Government.¹²⁰ Deacon Georgiades' mission was unofficial and his task was to reconcile the two parties and find a solution to the

¹¹⁷ C.O 67/125, 24 December 1900.

¹¹⁸ C.O 67/125, 3 January 1901.

¹¹⁹ Philios Zannetos, *History of Cyprus*, Vol. III, pp. 283-287, C.O 67/127, 28 February 1901.

¹²⁰ C.O 67/128, 28 September 1901, Philios Zannetos, Vol. III, pp. 338-349.

problem by referring it to arbitration. The parties involved were not ready for reconciliation and the arbitrator, having concluded that no proposal could be accepted by either party, thought that the best solution was to elect an archbishop (a person not from Cyprus), a solution which the High Commissioner favoured in order to prevent the Bishop of Kition from becoming the new archbishop.

VI-12 The arbitration of the three patriarchs ended in failure and all other attempts proved fruitless. The patriarchs put forward a proposal excluding both metropolitans and gave the electors three names from which to choose their archbishop. The Kyrenia party accepted the proposal but the supporters of Kition, and the bishop himself, protested against such a solution which, if accepted, would destroy the autonomy of the Church of Cyprus. The patriarchs insisted on their proposal and chose for election the Archimandrite Constantinides, even fixing the date of his consecration. The British Embassy at Constantinople informed the Patriarch that such an election would not be recognised by the Government on the grounds that the election would not be accepted by one of the two parties involved and, furthermore, it would not be regarded as valid in accordance with the laws and customs of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus. In the meantime, the two Patriarchs, Joakim III of Constantinople and Damianos of Jerusalem, continued to insist on their decision, while the Patriarch of Alexandria, Photios, disagreed with them and his representative absented himself from any subsequent meetings.

VI-13 This unpleasant situation lasted for years, with each party maintaining its own position. The suggestion by the High Commissioner, of a new election, was once again put on the table. As before, it was accepted by the Kitiaks and refused by the

Kyreniaks, who were not ready to consider any proposal contrary to the one made by the arbitrators.

VI-14 Representatives of the two parties were sent to Constantinople to confer with the Patriarch who, on his part, suggested several candidates but they were refused by the Cypriots. On certain occasions the High Commissioner and the British Government, through its ambassador in Constantinople, intervened diplomatically to prevent outside intervention. Finally, Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, stated that the Government did not wish to be involved in any way in the question, except for the preservation of peace and order, and its only desire was that the inhabitants of Cyprus should be left free to elect their archbishop in the manner to which they had been accustomed from time immemorial.¹²¹

VI-15 Several attempts were made to solve the problem through the Legislative Council. The idea was to introduce a Bill to provide for a popular election under the supervision of the Government, thereby setting aside any control by the Holy Synod. The Bill was opposed by the Kyrenia party and the three Turkish members. Again the case was referred to the three patriarchs who each sent three delegates, and who conferred for six months with the two parties and the Holy Synod. Since no compromise could be reached, the election of a new archbishop from outside Cyprus was brought forward again by the Ecumenical Patriarch. The Government told the Patriarch once more that the archbishop should be elected by the people of Cyprus and the Government of Cyprus could not recognise election by any other method. The Ecumenical Patriarch, acting on his own and not taking into account the other two patriarchs, nominated in March 1908 the Bishop of Kyrenia as archbishop, and

¹²¹ Phillos Zannetos, *History of Cyprus*, Vol. III, p. 431.

summoned the people on the next day for his enthronement. A mob, composed of the Kition party, threatened to destroy the archbishop's palace and the High Commissioner was obliged to send troops to occupy the palace, also proclaiming Martial Law in the capital. A serious riot broke out during the night of 9 March and the police had to restore order.

VI-16 The agitation against legislation to regulate the elections continued, but finally the Secretary of State for the Colonies gave his approval for a Bill to be introduced in the Legislative Council and the "Archiepiscopal Election Law, 1908" was passed on 6 May 1908. The Law received the Royal Assent on 23 May and came into force on 25 May.¹²²

VI-17 The Law provided that the Senior Bishop should invite three or more bishops from the neighbouring Greek Orthodox churches to come to Cyprus and form a Synod. Following the approval of the High Commissioner and given his consent, then the election might take place according to the proper rites and ceremonies, and the archbishop would be invested with all the powers, privileges and property to which by law, custom or otherwise the Archbishop of Cyprus was entitled.

VI-18 The Law specified the number of the general representatives (40 laymen and 20 ecclesiastics), the age of those who could vote; the ages of the Special and General Representatives, the number each district could elect and so on. This Law hurt the prestige of the Patriarch of Constantinople who did all he could in his power to stop the election of the new archbishop according to the new Law. Failing to do so, he eventually agreed to send his representative in order to form a Synod and, in 1909, Cyril

¹²² *Cyprus Gazette*, (Supplement) 25 May 1908, (919), pp. 6513-6525.

Papadopoulos, the Bishop of Kition, was unanimously elected the new Archbishop of Cyprus without opposition. Although this election was not particularly welcomed by the Government, the High Commissioner formally gave his approval. The two vacant Sees of Paphos and Kition were filled in April 1910. By this settlement the Church of Cyprus now had a constitutional charter regulating its administration on the basis of the Church canons and the prevailing practice, which would prevent similar conflicts again.

VI-19 It is quite true to mention that, during the Church conflict, which lasted for nearly ten years, the British administration remained impartial, not wishing to get involved in the affairs of the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus. Greater involvement of the Government in the affairs of the Church occurred after 1931 with the controversial laws passed in 1937. This part of the history of the Cyprus Church will be examined in a separate section.

D. The Struggle for *Enosis* (Union with Greece) and the Involvement of the Church.

VI-20 Even when confronted with the historical proof of Achaean settlement in Cyprus in approximately 2000 BC, bringing Greek culture, language and religion, there are still some who dispute Cyprus' Greek heritage. This also ignores ten centuries of Byzantine rule.¹²³

VI-21 Contrary to what has been said about the Greek Cypriots, their history and agitation for *Enosis*, it is proper at this stage to state some ideas expressed by a number of British politicians who were involved in the Cyprus Question. Gladstone, who won

¹²³ George Chakalli, *Cyprus Under British rule*, (Nicosia 1902), p. 7

the general elections in 1880, publicly stated the following. "The great majority of the island's population is Greek and I am consequently certain that the inhabitants will earnestly desire to be united with Greece and nothing that Britain can do will stop the development of their strong sentiment of nationalism".¹²⁴ Winston Churchill, speaking in the Cyprus Legislative Council on 12 October 1907, during his visit to Cyprus, made the following declaration:

"I think it's only natural that the Cypriot people who are of Greek descent, should regard their incorporation with what may be called their mother country as an ideal to be earnestly, devoutly and fervently cherished".¹²⁵ Sir Ronald Storrs, the High Commissioner of Cyprus, stated that "The Greekness of Cypriots is, in my opinion, indisputable. No sensible person will deny that the Cypriot is Greek speaking, Greek thinking, Greek feeling, Greek just as the French Canadian is French-speaking, French-thinking, French-feeling and French".¹²⁶

VI-22 As soon as the British set foot on the island, the Greek Cypriots, having their bishops as their leaders, did not miss the opportunity to declare that the occupation of Cyprus by Britain would be a transitional period for the Union of Cyprus with Greece. The people of Larnaca cheered and welcomed the British soldiers on landing in Cyprus and the Bishop of Kition, Kyprianos, read an address of welcome. Among other things he said "We accept the change of Government inasmuch as we trust that Great Britain will help Cyprus, as it did with the Ionian Islands, to be united with Mother Greece, with which it is naturally connected".¹²⁷ Sir Garnet Wolseley received a similar address from Archbishop Sophronios on his arrival at Nicosia.¹²⁸ It is well known and accepted,

¹²⁴ George Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, Vol. IV, p. 497.

¹²⁵ *Eleftheria*, 19 October 1907, (74), pp. 1-2. (Churchill's address in the Legislative Council).

¹²⁶ Sir Ronald Storrs, *Orientalisms*, ed. by Nicholson Watson, (London 1945), pp. 469-470.

¹²⁷ Foreign Office Correspondence (F.O.) 1878-1879, p. 4.

¹²⁸ Philios Zannetos, *History of Cyprus*, Vol. II, pp. 46-47.

that no matter how philhellene Gladstone was, he could not cede Cyprus to Greece, even if he wanted to do so, because Cyprus was not a British Colony at that time but was only administered by Britain according to the provisions of the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 1878. His Government, however, granted to Cyprus a liberal constitution with separate voting and representation. As stated above, the new constitution contained the old Ottoman principle of representation by *Millet* (nation) and not the western democratic concept of the right of the majority.¹²⁹ Although the new constitution contained separate elements of the two main communities on the island, nevertheless there was a kind of collaboration between the Greek and the Turkish deputies in the Council in order to improve the conditions related to the tribute paid to Turkey.

VI-23 For Cyprus, a significant event in her modern history occurred during the First World War, when the British Government offered Cyprus to Greece in October 1915 on the condition that Greece entered the war on the side of the *Ententé* because of the war developments. The importance of the offer, as Captain Orr, Chief Secretary to the Government of Cyprus acknowledged, was "that England was prepared to recognise that on national grounds the claims put forward by the Greek-speaking Cypriots that the island should be united with Greece were not considered unjustifiable".¹³⁰ The offer made was not accepted by the Greek Government for two reasons:

1. The Prime Minister at that time was Alexandros Zaimis, a man known for his integrity as well as for his timidity, who always followed the instructions of the King.

¹²⁹ C.O. 67/21, minutes by E. Fairfield, 31 January 1882.

¹³⁰ Christos A Theodoulou, *The 1915 British offer of Cyprus to Greece*, Year book of the Cyprus Research Centre, IV, 1970-1971, (Nicosia 1971), pp. 426-427.

2. The King was pro-German, being the brother-in-law of Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany.

Had the offer been made earlier, it might have strengthened the position of the Prime Minister of Greece, Mr E. Venizelos, and been accepted. It is worth mentioning, for the historical record, that Lord Robert Cecil, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, informed Sir John Clauson, the High Commissioner of Cyprus, about the British Government's offer to Greece and he further authorised him to inform the archbishop of the offer and to take advantage of this opportunity. Furthermore he asked the archbishop to go to Greece immediately and press the Cypriot demand on the King and Parliament. Things, however, did not develop according to the wishes of the archbishop and the Greek Government rejected the offer because it decided to maintain its neutrality. By refusing to accept the conditions by which Cyprus was offered to Greece, Greece lost the best opportunity for acquiring Cyprus. In later years, however, the British Government was not interested in supporting the claim of the Cypriots for *Enosis* and easily resiled from its wartime offer.

VI-24 By the end of the First World War the Cypriots started an ambitious political campaign to unite the island with Greece by demanding the right of self-determination.¹³¹ A Cyprus Greek deputation, headed by Archbishop Cyril III as the ethnarch and political leader of the Cypriots, and all but one of the Greek members of the Legislative Council left Cyprus for London in December 1918. During their visit they were engaged in negotiations with Venizelos, the Greek Prime Minister and Lord Milner, the Colonial Secretary. The archbishop read a memorial on behalf of the Church and took the opportunity to congratulate the allies on their victory. He reaffirmed his

¹³¹ *Eleftheria*, 20/2 November 1918, (650), p. 3.

demand for the union of Cyprus with Greece and he paid tribute to the British liberal administration of the island.

VI-25 After a prolonged period of negotiations the archbishop and his deputation received a letter from Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, signed by J. F. Davies one of his principal private secretaries, which purported to support their position.¹³² Lloyd George's letter was a remarkable political document. It contained statements expressing the authority of the Prime Minister, which were different from those confidential opinions expressed by the Colonial Office. It did not question the credentials of the Cyprus deputation and the leadership of the archbishop as ethnarch, nor the popularity of the demand for union with Greece, and he encouraged the Greek Cypriots to look forward to future sympathetic consideration of their claims.

VI-26 The second Greek Cypriot deputation, led by Archbishop and ethnarch, Cyril III, (who was escorted by the lawyer A. Triantafyllides and four members of the Legislative Council), left Cyprus on 15 March 1920.¹³³ At Paris, Venizelos, the Greek Prime Minister, whom the deputation met, expressed his optimism about a satisfactory settlement of the Cyprus question and he urged the members of the deputation to continue being loyal to Great Britain and pursue actively their struggle. During their stay in London they made many efforts to meet the Prime Minister and other Government officials. Finally they met Amery at the Colonial Office and the archbishop, as usual, placed before him the demands of the Greek Cypriots for union with Greece. Amery dismissed their demand, using as his main argument the Turkish minority which was content with the British administration. When the deputation told

¹³² *Eleftheria*, 23/6 December 1919, (709), p.2. C.O 67/201/1920, The Cyprus Cause.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 29/13 March 1920, (724), p. 3.

Amery that about a million Turks in Asia Minor were well placed under Greek government he answered "those Turks were our enemies but the Turks of Cyprus are our allies and friends".¹³⁴

VI-27 When Venizelos, the Prime Minister of Greece, lost the election in November 1920 and the King returned to his throne in December, the Greek Cypriots were in a dilemma concerning their future tactics knowing that nobody would help them with their negotiations with the British Government. The Greek members of the Legislative Council at first decided to abstain from its meetings and eventually they resigned in December. They were re-elected in January 1921 but again decided to abstain from the meetings of the Legislative Council.

VI-28 Notwithstanding the above, the Greek members of the Legislative Council, led by the Archbishop and ethnarch Cyril III, asked the Government to carry out a plebiscite so that the people could decide their future.¹³⁵ The Government dismissed their demand and between 25 March and 7 April a plebiscite organised by the Church was carried out. The Church used its administration for the plebiscite and all the Greek inhabitants of the island passed a resolution demanding the union of Cyprus with Greece. The archbishop, as head of the Church and ethnarch and the elected members of the Legislative Council, sent a bound volume of the plebiscite to the High Commissioner. The demand of the Cypriots was rejected and although it was repeated in the following year it was again rejected by the Colonial Office¹³⁶ and a written

¹³⁴ As a former classics scholar at Oxford and an Ouseley Scholar of the Imperial Institute in Turkish, Amery had a working knowledge of both of the main languages of Cyprus.

¹³⁵ *Eleftheria*, 5/18 March 1922, (829), p. 2.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 12/25 March 1922, (830), p. 2. (memorial of the archbishop sent to the Governor on 19 March 1922).

answer to their demand was conveyed to the archbishop by the island's Chief Secretary.¹³⁷

VI-29 The National Council decided in December 1922 to support a resolution for constitutional liberties. The National Council held additional meetings during which it approved a memorial signed by the archbishop, as the ethnarch and political leader of the Greek Cypriots.¹³⁸ This memorial was sent to the Secretary of State for the Colonies through the High Commissioner. The position of the archbishop as ethnarch was well established and he could influence all decisions taken by the Greek members of the Legislative Council. The fundamental principles of the memorial were:

- a) Self-government with both communities to participate in the executive, legislative, administrative powers and also in public appointments in proportion to the population of each element.
- b) The acceptance by the Hellenic population of the island of the protection of the interests of the Turkish minority.
- c) Abstention from the elections of members of the Legislative Council unless reforms were carried out.

The National Council issued a manifesto explaining the abstention from the elections, hoping that in this way the Colonial Government would concede to political liberties.¹³⁹

¹³⁷ Eleftheria, 30/19 May 1922, (837), p. 2. (answer sent by the Governor to Archbishop on 8 May 1922).

¹³⁸ Ibid., 7/20 December 1922, (883), p.2.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 7/20 December 1922, (883), p.2.

VI-30 The High Commissioner suggested that his Government dismiss the proposals made by the National Council and proposed to promote semi-illiterate villagers as members of the Legislative Council. The National Council, in June 1923, approved moderate policies with regard to a fruitful collaboration with the British Government but the conflict between the Church and the Government was unsolved and this was demonstrated by the biased statement of W. Ellis, the Assistant Secretary for the Colonies, in charge of Cyprus affairs, who said the following concerning the Greek Orthodox Church "I would like to add that from all I can hear, the Church of Cyprus is utterly bad, rotten; the bishops thereof are in almost all cases men of notoriously evil life. Religion as tangled by them has no connection with morality; and the Church invites the fate which has already overtaken its equally corrupt Russian sister".¹⁴⁰

VI-31 Sir Malcolm Stevenson's administration (1920 – 1926) had provoked considerable resentment in Cyprus and the Greek Cypriots were relieved when it was announced that he would leave the island. The Cypriots favoured the appointment of Sir Ronald Storrs and a biographical note on the new Governor was published in the press in August 1926.¹⁴¹ On his arrival, the Archbishop of Cyprus, Cyril III, abstained from the welcome ceremony but a letter was handed to Storrs on behalf of the archbishop in which he explained the national feelings of the Greek Cypriots. He hoped that the new Governor would live up to his qualities and good intentions and that the Cypriots would find in him a good and just ruler and a sincere ambassador of their national feelings and ideals.¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰ C.O. bt/210/30283, Minutes by W. Ellis, 27 April 1923.

¹⁴¹ *New Cyprus Guard*, 18 August 1926, (92), p. 3. (The new Governor of Cyprus: a profile).

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 1 December 1926, (107), p. 3. (The arrival of the new governor: The Archbishop's address).

VI-32 Storrs' programme was filled with social contacts from his early days in Cyprus. He visited churches, mosques, factories, charity bazaars, schools, and he attended balls and so on. At the same time he visited the other towns of Cyprus, met and talked to people and tried to be friendly. He wanted the Cypriots to form a good opinion of him and he tried to convey to them the message that he took pride in his classical education and that he was a sincere admirer of Hellenic literature and culture. Accompanied by his wife he visited the archbishop at the archbishopric. During that meeting the three bishops were present. He visited the archbishop a second time and both men got on very well. Storrs suggested to the archbishop the establishment of a Cyprus Public Library, for the education of those who wanted to do extensive reading. In his book *My Orientations*, Storrs described his relationship with the archbishop as follows "For his Beatitude Cyril III, I cherished a sympathetic admiration. He was the only spiritually minded Orthodox prelate – or indeed priest – whom I discovered during my six years' Governorship. He would take tea with me at Government House, I with him at his Palace. We exchanged books..."¹⁴³ Storrs initiated the establishment of the Music School and the Musical Society, which shared premises with the Cyprus Library, and he took an active part in the creation of the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce in March 1927, which contributed to the export trade of goods produced in Cyprus.

VI-33 The question of the "tribute" was first raised by all members of the Legislative Council who refused to approve the budget for 1927. This question was discussed at high levels and finally the British Cabinet resolved the abolition of the "tribute". When the good news arrived in Cyprus the archbishop sent a letter to the Governor with his warm thanks for the abolition of the "tribute" and told Storrs that he had dealt a final

¹⁴³ Sir Ronald Storrs, *Orientations*, pp. 473-474.

blow against injustice, emphasising that he would have the Cypriots' eternal gratitude for his achievement.¹⁴⁴

VI-34 Storrs' most controversial decision was taken in 1928 when he decided to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of British rule in Cyprus. His decision, instead of producing more friendly relations with the Cypriots, provoked a serious reaction against him. The Holy Synod held a number of joint meetings with the Greek elected members of the Legislative Council.¹⁴⁵ It is said that they asked the advice of Venizelos, the Greek Prime Minister, and the Holy Synod of Athens with regard to their participation in the celebrations. All of them advised the Cypriots to participate because Venizelos always favoured a friendly solution of the Cyprus problem between the Cypriots and the British Government. Finally the Greek Cypriots (ie: the elected members of the Legislative Council and the Holy Synod) decided not to participate in the celebrations and in a proclamation in March 1928 addressed to the people of Cyprus expressed the opinion in favour of an absolute and completely popular abstention from the celebrations.¹⁴⁶ The Turks and the other minorities in Cyprus, on the other hand, decided to participate and to this effect they sent their congratulations to the Secretary of State and the King and they expressed their opposition to the political changes suggested by the Greeks.¹⁴⁷ Storrs was very annoyed with the behaviour of the Greek Cypriots and he blamed the politicians for their involvement in persuading the people to abstain from the celebrations. During his visit to Egypt, Nikodhimos Mylonas, the Bishop of Kition, gave an interview to the local newspaper *The Postman* in Alexandria on 19 February 1929. Among other things he said "Our first quarrel with the new

¹⁴⁴ *Eleftheria*, 14 September 1927, (1360), p. 2.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 8 February 1928, (1399), p. 2.

¹⁴⁶ *New Nation*, (Νέο Έθνος, Larnaca), 10 March 1928, (1774), p.1.

¹⁴⁷ C.O. 67/224/39101, confidential Storrs to Amery, 5 June 1928.

Governor is mainly due to his unwise and very bold suggestion that we should take part in the celebration for the completion of the fiftieth year of the occupation of the island by the English. It is true that these jubilee celebrations were meant to remind us of our redemption from the hands of the Turks but they also reminded us of our national servitude under the English. We flatly refused to accept the Governor's suggestion as it was both hard and improper for a slave to join in with his master celebrating the anniversary of this serfdom".¹⁴⁸

VI-35 The Labour Party in Britain won the general elections in 1929 and Ramsay MacDonald became the new Prime Minister. In June, Archbishop Cyril telegraphed his congratulations, expressing also the hope that the claims of the Cypriots would be realised.¹⁴⁹ It was also decided by the National Council and the Holy Synod that a two member deputation should take a new memorial to London and present it to the new Government. There was an atmosphere of hopefulness because Ramsay MacDonald had, in 1919, advocated the application of self determination for Cyprus. A copy of the memorial was handed to Storrs who undertook to forward it to London.¹⁵⁰ The deputation, consisting of the Bishop of Kition, Nikodhimos Mylonas, and Stavrinakis, a member of the Legislative Council, left Cyprus in September 1929. Nikodhimos Mylonas, the Bishop of Kition, according to Storrs, was the most intelligent and impressive member of the Legislative Council. He was very passionate in his speech and he was heard by all with attention and interest. Venizelos, the Greek Prime Minister, who was then in Western Europe, advised the deputation to be modest but he did not see the deputation in Paris. It seems that once again the Cypriots were very

¹⁴⁸ *Eleftheria*, 6 March 1929, (1507), p. 2.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 15 June 1929, (1534), p. 2. Archbishop Cyril III, 'Congratulations to the Prime Minister of Gr. Britain Mr. R. MacDonald', *Apostolos Barnabas*, (37), 12 September 1929, pp. 597 - 598.

¹⁵⁰ Memorial of the Cyprus Deputation, 'meeting with the Governor', *Apostolos Barnabas*, (37), 12 September 1929, p. 598.

naïve in believing that the new British Labour Government would satisfy their demands. It was very clear that it had no intention of appearing less patriotic on the broad issues of imperial policy than the Tories. The status of Cyprus could not change unless the Greek Government was prepared to raise the question as a bilateral issue with Great Britain but at that time it had not the strength to do so. Therefore, the Cyprus problem and the Greek Cypriot grievances were routinely examined by the junior officials of the Colonial Office who usually had in mind the comments expressed by the officials of the Cyprus Government. In the meantime, Storrs prepared his own answer to the memorial handed to him by the Greek Cypriots and he despatched it to London together with the memorial prepared by the minorities.¹⁵¹ On 11 October, the deputation saw Shuckburgh, Cowell and Dawe all from the Ministry for the Colonies. The Bishop of Kition handed Shuckburgh a short memorial for Lord Passfield, the minister for the Colonies, and the deputation had a discussion with them regarding the issues raised by the memorial. Shuckburgh submitted to Passfield a summary of the interview they had with the deputation and suggestions as to his forthcoming meeting with them. He rejected the demand for *Enosis* and for dominion status for the island and he stated that for the present time there would be no movement towards greater self-government.

VI-36 The deputation met Passfield in the presence of Lunn, Shuckburgh, Cowell and Dawe. The Bishop of Kition spoke on behalf of the deputation and presented letters of accreditation from the Greek elected members of the Legislative Council and the Holy Synod. It was significant because the Bishop of Kition spoke on behalf of the deputation. At that meeting he represented the archbishop and ethnarch of the Greek Cypriots and he was presenting their national case before the British Government. The bishop stated that *Enosis* was the only fundamental feeling that the Greek Cypriots

¹⁵¹ C.O. 67/227/39 518, (part 3) Confidential, (2) Storrs to Passfield, 18 September 1929.

would never cease to demand but under the present system they wanted control of the administration of the island and to have an effective voice in the executive power. He assured the Secretary of State for the Colonies that the Greeks would guarantee the liberties and rights of the minorities. Passfield replied negatively to the Greek aspiration for *Enosis* but he assured the deputation that a formal answer would be sent later about the other issues discussed during the meeting.¹⁵² In the meantime, Storrs was informed by Lord Passfield about the interview he had with the deputation.¹⁵³ Before returning to Cyprus on 27 November, the Bishop of Kition had a meeting with the Archbishop of Canterbury, Cosmo Lang. They were invited for lunch at the House of Commons and it was attended by Lord Passfield, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Home Secretary and Amery. They were also received by Lloyd George, Leader of the Liberal Party, who expressed his strong sympathy for their claims.¹⁵⁴

VI-37 The most noteworthy event which occurred in 1930 was Shiels' visit to Cyprus in October. Shiels was the Under Secretary for the Colonies and the main purpose of his visit was to see the various problems of the island. He was accompanied by George Mothers, an M.P., his parliamentary private secretary and A. J. Daw from the Colonial Office. From their landing in Famagusta to their arrival in Nicosia they were greeted by crowds of Greek Cypriots bearing Greek flags and calling for *Enosis*. All Greek Cypriot officials, from the mayors of Famagusta and Nicosia to the Greek elected members of the Legislative Council headed by the Bishop of Kition, Nikodhimos Mylonas, delivered speeches stressing the national aspirations of the Cypriots. Shiels avoided any discussion of *Enosis* and he did not show any interest on the subject raised by various

¹⁵² Minutes by A. J. Dawe, 28 October 1929.

¹⁵³ C.O. 67/227/39518, (Part 3) Telegram Confidential, No 33, Passfield to Storrs, 25 October 1929.

¹⁵⁴ Cyprus deputation in London, 'Telegram sent to the Archbishop Cyril III', *Apostolos Barnabas*, 48, (1929), pp. 774-775.

speakers. It must be noted, however, that everywhere he went he was greeted by crowds waving Greek flags and shouting for *Enosis*. On Monday 20 October, Shiels met the Greek representatives who handed to him a memorial signed by all 12 newly elected Greek members of the Council, by the archbishop as president of the Holy Synod and the other three bishops. The memorial was well drafted and it contained all aspects of the Cyprus problem.¹⁵⁵ On Shiels' departure, the archbishop transmitted to him two memorials, on 10 November and on 2 December. In both memorials the archbishop insisted that "the unremitting desire of the people of Cyprus is to be United with Greece",¹⁵⁶ On 24 December 1930, Passfield instructed Storrs to reply to the archbishop's first memorial and to mention that Dr Shiels had nothing to add to the statements he had made in Cyprus on *Enosis*.¹⁵⁷ On 19 January 1931, Passfield instructed Storrs to reply to the archbishop's second memorial, again stating that there was nothing further to add to the answer given to his first memorial.¹⁵⁸

E. The Riots of 1931 and the Abolition of the Constitution

VI-38 The economic crisis all over the world during the 1930's affected the Cyprus economy as well. As a result of this crisis the Greek elected members of the Legislative Council refused to approve the budget for 1931 which included more taxes on the people; instead, they suggested cutting down expenditure. The Governor, in his dispatch to Passfield, criticised the Greek members of the Council for their refusal to approve the budget.¹⁵⁹ Again, in his dispatch on 12 February 1931, the Governor interpreted the deputies' action as part of a deliberate design to exploit the financial embarrassment of the Government for political aims and he accused the Bishop of Kition, the main

¹⁵⁵ *Eleftheria*, 27 September 1930, (1664), p.2. Ibid., 22 October 1930, (1671), pp. 1-2.

¹⁵⁶ Secretariat Archives - SA/1140/1930 No 472, Storrs to Passfield, 26 November 1930.

¹⁵⁷ SA/1140/1930, No. 367, Passfield to Storrs, 24 December 1930.

¹⁵⁸ SA/1140/1931, No. 20 Passfield to Storrs, 19 January 1931.

¹⁵⁹ C.O 67/236/40354, (Part I) Tel. 9 Conf., Storrs to Passfield, 10 February 1931.

protagonist and organiser of the so-called national movement.¹⁶⁰ As a result of this economic situation, Storrs signed a local Order in Council, which was immediately published in an extraordinary issue of the *Cyprus Gazette*, affecting the revision of import duties, pending a decision by the Legislative Council.¹⁶¹ The new tariff was unpopular and, during the Council's meeting on 14 April, the Bishop of Kition, speaking in the Council as the deputies' spokesman, told Storrs that when prices of commodities fall then he should endeavour to reduce expenditure so as to bring about a balance between expenditure and revenue.¹⁶² The condition of public finances gave the Greek politicians the best opportunity for a general condemnation of the Government. A manifesto issued by the Greek members of the Council stated that prosperity could not be achieved under British rule and that their main aim was to have the constitutional rights to live free in racial harmony with their free brothers of Greece. A memorandum was sent to the Secretary of State for the Colonies explaining the deplorable economic situation of the island. In fact, London was very dissatisfied with the Colony's finances.¹⁶³

VI-39 The Bishop of Kition, Nikodhimos, and three other members of the Legislative Council, N. Kl. Lanitis, Ph. Kyriakides and G. Aradipiotis, resigned from their posts as members of the Council on 16 October 1931. The other members resigned on the following Wednesday at a mass meeting held at the Commercial Club in Nicosia. Their resignations were the direct result of tax increases. The Government, by not using the surplus money to cover the deficit of the budget and by enforcing the new taxation by the method of Order in Council, was in the bishop's words, committing acts of

¹⁶⁰ C.O 67/236/40357 Conf., Storrs to Passfield, 11 February 1931.

¹⁶¹ *The Cyprus Gazette*, (Extraordinary), 2 April 1931, (2122), pp. 197-199.

¹⁶² Debates in the Legislative Council, 1931, XL III, Part II, pp. 230-233.

¹⁶³ G. S. Georgiallides, *Cyprus and the Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs*, (Nicosia 1985), pp. 456-460.

“robbery”. (The Bishop’s letter of resignation addressed to the Governor, and his manifesto addressed to the Greek Cypriots are found in Appendix B).

VI-40 On 20 October 1931, the Bishop of Kition visited Linassol, at the request of Mr N. Kl. Lanitis, in order to explain to the people the reasons for his resignation. A crowd of about 3000 people gathered at the town’s stadium and the Bishop addressed the people in inflammatory terms. On 21 October, Lanitis telegraphed an exaggerated account of the meeting to Nicosia. Immediately copies of the telegram were posted in the clubs, the church bells rang, the shops shut and the people gathered at the Commercial Club in the centre of the town within the walls. Some deputies criticised the Bishop of Kition but they were shouted down. The mob cried “to Government House” and Dionysios Kykkotis the Chief Priest of Phaneromeni Church, the most important church of Nicosia, stepped forward and “declared revolution”. A Greek flag was handed to him and he urged the people to defend it. The crowd arrived at Government House at 8.00 pm. Inside the building were the Governor, the acting Colonial Secretary, the Commissioner of Nicosia and the Inspector of Police. What followed was tragic. Government House was set on fire and completely destroyed, the police opened fire, one Greek Cypriot was killed and about 30 wounded (five seriously, who later died) and 38 policemen were wounded. The Governor asked for reinforcements from Egypt, which were sent immediately, and in a few days peace and order was restored all over the island.

VI-41 The consequences of those riots, which started quite incidentally, were disastrous for Cyprus. Eight people, including the Bishops of Kition and Kyrenia, the Chief Priest of Phaneromeni, Dionysios Kykkotis, two members of the Legislative Council, Theodotou and Hadjipavlou, and three eminent citizens known for their radical

ideas, Colocassides, Tsaggarides and Loizides, were arrested and deported from Cyprus for life. Martial Law and curfews were imposed, the Legislative Council was abolished on 13 November 1931 and all the authority with regard to the government of the island was vested in the Governor. A fine of over £34,000 was imposed on all Greek members of the population for losses the Government suffered, and the courts tried 3359 persons in connection with the disturbances and convicted 2606. Storrs, taking advantage of his new powers to legislate, prohibited the flying of the Greek flag, restricted the ringing of church bells, and undertook the nomination of the councils in villages and parishes. (*moukhtars* and *azas*). He also sent 13 political leaders to live in remote places.¹⁶⁴

VI-42 With regard to those events it is necessary to mention two very important matters. The first one is the circular letter issued by the Archbishop of Cyprus, Cyril III, in November 1931 and read in all churches. The archbishop expressed his deep sorrow for the tragic events. He explained the endeavours of the Church, from the beginning of the British occupation, demanded the fulfilment of the aspirations of the Greek Cypriots and mentioned that Britain was a liberal country. He hoped that with the help of the Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. E. Venizelos, eventually the aims of the Greek Cypriots would be realised. He advised the people to abstain from any acts of violence and to obey the laws.¹⁶⁵ The late Benedict Englezakis, in his book, *The History of the Church of Cyprus*, gives the most impressive description of Archbishop Cyril III "In his face all the virtues of the great archbishops of the Turkish period shone in perfect harmony: prudence, good sense, the dignified recognition of compelling necessity and the avoidance of the extremes, united with, persistent work for a predetermined end, and

¹⁶⁴ *Annual report of the Cyprus Military Police for the year ended 31 December 1931, Nicosia 1931*, p. 13.

¹⁶⁵ *Phoni tis Kyprou* (Voice of Cyprus), 7 November 1931, ((2326/2632), p. 2.

love of learning and an antipathy to ostentation and vainglory. He was the only archbishop who won the respect and admiration of the British in spite of the fact that he clashed with them just as frequently as anyone else".¹⁶⁶ The second and most important event was the speech of the Prime Minister of Greece, E. Venizelos, in the Greek Parliament on 18 November. He mentioned the good relations and friendship between Britain and Greece and he bitterly criticised the Greek press because it omitted to condemn the riots in Cyprus. Venizelos assured the Greek members of Parliament that Britain would cede Cyprus to Greece under certain conditions when the time was appropriate, but he could not tell when that would happen. He also stated that if Britain considered the Cyprus problem closed then it was closed, although he did not believe that it was definitely closed. However, he was of the opinion that such riots would not help to bring about the realisation of the national aspirations of the Greek Cypriots.¹⁶⁷

VI-43 Storrs failed to restore good relations and understanding between the inhabitants of the island and their rulers. In March 1932 he had to confess to the Colonial Office that he was unable to report any progress in winning Greek loyalty for the Empire.¹⁶⁸ On leaving Cyprus for Northern Rhodesia in June 1932 many Greek Cypriots, according to his narration, came to bid him goodbye including the archbishop and the Mayor of Nicosia. He said that he was on excellent terms with many Greek Cypriots, and he came to Cyprus as "*philokypros* and *philhellene*".¹⁶⁹ No matter what Storrs thought about Cyprus and the Greek Cypriots the main consequences of his governorship were the following:

¹⁶⁶ Benedict Englezakis, *Studies on the History of the Church of Cyprus*, (4th-20th Centuries), trans. by Norman Russell, ed. by Silouan and Ioannou, (Aldershot, Hampshire 1995), pp 443-445.

¹⁶⁷ *Proia* (morning) Athens, 19 November 1931, (No 2121), pp. 1 and 3.

The Prime Minister of Greece Mr E. Venizelos, 'A statement made in the Greek Parliament about Cyprus', *The Greek Gazette*, 18 November 1931, pp. 7-9.

¹⁶⁸ C.O 67/243/98555/S.A No. 141, Storrs to Gunliffe-Lister, 16 March 1932.

¹⁶⁹ Sir Ronald Storrs, *Orientalisms*, p. 576.

- a) The island remained without a constitution until 1960 when it became an independent State.
- b) The laws imposed on the Cypriots were not equitable.
- c) The Church was deprived of its leadership because after the death of Archbishop Cyril III in 1933, it had only one bishop who was the *Locum-Tenens* until 1947.
- d) From 1931 to 1939 more restrictive laws were imposed on the Cypriots, depriving them of any kind of liberty.

F. From Constitution to Direct Rule 1931 – 1950.

VI-44 As mentioned earlier, as a result of the riots of 1931, instead of gaining a more liberal constitution, Cyprus lost all its liberties and a new regime was imposed. By acting this way, the British hoped to quieten the open agitation against the Government. According to the new laws, the flying of the Greek flag was prohibited, the ringing of the church bells was restricted except for regular services, meetings of more than five persons without permission was prohibited and there was an amendment of the Newspaper, Books and Printing Presses Law. The censorship of the press (Law no. 32 of 1932) caused much irritation.

VI-45 During the riots of October 1931, the Bishop of Paphos, Leontios Leontiou, was in London. Leontios, throughout his career as Bishop of Paphos and then as *Locum-Tenens* was the most persistent agitator for *Enosis*. When he tried to return to Cyprus on 13 November he was not allowed to land.¹⁷⁰ He went to Constantinople where he stayed

¹⁷⁰ *The Times*, London, 14 November 1931, p. 12f.

for a few months refusing to sign a declaration that, on his arrival in Cyprus, he would abstain from political activities. He was finally allowed to return to Cyprus and arrived on 23 June 1932, but he continued his sermons and speeches about the union of Cyprus with Greece.

VI-46 For his activities Leontios was brought before the Assize Court at Limassol where he undertook to abstain in future from similar sermons and speeches. He was bound over for three years in the sum of £250.¹⁷¹ The British administration was very annoyed when, in 1936, he forbade the celebration of services of thanksgiving on the King's Birthday in the Orthodox Church, claiming that it was contrary to the rules of the Church to hold services in Orthodox churches for non Orthodox Christians. Again in 1938 proceedings had to be taken against him under the Prevention of Crimes Act of 1935, and on 20 April 1938 he was placed under police supervision for a year and confined to the municipal limits of Paphos. Nevertheless, he continued to make sermons and speeches advocating *Enosis* and in May 1939 he had to be taken to court again.

VI-47 When Cyril III died on 16 November 1933, Cyprus was left without an archbishop because the Bishops of Kition and Kyrenia, Nikodhimos and Makarios, had been in exile since 1931 and no regular Synod could be convened for the election of a new archbishop. The Bishop of Paphos, Leontios, as a *Locum-Tenens* wrote a letter to the Governor Sir R.E. Stubbs on 18 November informing him of the death of the archbishop and the occupation of the throne by him as a *Locum-Tenens* until a new archbishop was elected. The Governor acknowledged receipt of the letter on 21 November. On 25 November the Colonial Secretary of Cyprus, writing on behalf of the Governor, informed Leontios, the *Locum-Tenens*, that under no circumstances would

¹⁷¹ *The Times*, London, 14 November 1931, p. 36.

the two exiled bishops be allowed to return to Cyprus for the election of a new archbishop. The *Locum-Tenens*, in his written protest of 28 November, received a reply from the Governor insisting on his decision and expressing the hope that other means would be found for the election of a new archbishop.¹⁷² It is said that the Secretary of State for the Colonies was advised that the actual presence of the exiled bishops was not necessary since they could give their votes from a distance. This, as stated, was the opinion of the Ecumenical Patriarch, the Patriarch of Alexandria and the Archbishop of Athens.¹⁷³ This argument had never been documented and, according to the charter of the Holy Church of Cyprus, the presence and voting of the members of the Holy Synod is necessary, but the most important point which George Hill missed is that after the election of an archbishop or bishop the members of the Holy Synod sign the minutes of the election on the altar of the Cathedral of St. John in Nicosia and soon after the ceremony of the enthronement begins.¹⁷⁴ (See Appendix C).

VI-48 In 1937 three new laws concerning the Church were passed. The aim of this legislation was the control by the civil authorities, not only of the finances of the Church, but also of the elections and its prelates. This resembled the Frankish period when the Franks subjugated the Greek Orthodox Church to the Latin Church. Law No. 25 provided for the investigation of the affairs and auditing of the accounts of the churches and monasteries. As to the archbishopric, Law No 53, the "Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus (Archbishop's disqualification) Law"; disqualified from election anyone who had been deported, or had been convicted of sedition or any offence punishable with imprisonment or penal servitude for more than two years, or

¹⁷² Letters exchanged between the *Locum-Tenens*, the bishop of Paphos Leontios and the Colonial Secretary Mr. H. Heaton, 'The Election of a new Archbishop' *Apostolos Barnabas*, 22, (1933), pp. 387-390.

¹⁷³ George Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, Vol. IV, p. 604.

¹⁷⁴ Appendix C.

was not a native of the Colony. An amendment to this Law exempted from disqualification a native who was originally a member of the Church of Cyprus but had become a member of another branch of the Orthodox Church. Law 34, the "Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus (Governor's Approval of the Archbishop) Law", provided for the Governor's approval of any person elected by the electoral Assembly before his election could be consummated by any religious or ceremonial rites. That is to say, any election to an Orthodox See having been canonically made, could be invalidated by the veto of civil authority, which was generally considered to be contrary to the Canon Law. Law No. 35 defined the meaning of "native of the Colony" more precisely. The repeal of these laws was attested by Law No. 20 of 1946 and the exiles were allowed to return.¹⁷⁵

VI-49 During the Second World War the relations between the British Government in Cyprus and the local Orthodox Church became friendlier, especially when Britain came to the aid of Greece in 1941. Relations improved further with the appointment of Lord Lloyd as Secretary of State for the Colonies, who knew and understood the Cypriots very well. The Cypriots believed that if the allies won the war, union with Greece would follow. An article by Compton Mackenzie in which he stated that "we should immediately declare our intention to cede Cyprus to Greece after the war" made a great impact in the Cypriot press.¹⁷⁶ Churchill's message to the Greek Prime Minister on the anniversary of the Italian attack on Greece was thought by the Cypriots to be a recognition of their claims for union with Greece.¹⁷⁷ Churchill said in that message "Their martyrdom will be avenged by the panhellenic army of liberation. The unity of all her sons and daughters behind their King and Government in the cause

¹⁷⁵ *The Cyprus Gazette*, (Extraordinary), 29 October 1946, Supp. No 2. (3270), p. 333.

¹⁷⁶ *Reynolds News*, London, 12 January 1941.

¹⁷⁷ *The Times*, 28 October 1941.

of their Fatherland will bring its own reward". It must be remembered that, during the war, the Greek Cypriots did not miss the opportunity to remind the British authorities that the ultimate aim of their aspirations was the union of Cyprus with Greece. In August 1944 Sir Cosmo Parkinson, representing the Secretary of State for the Colonies, visited Cyprus. All the organisations of the island, persuaded by the *Locum-Tenens*, presented to him a joint memorandum demanding *Enosis* but Sir Cosmo told the deputation that he was not authorised to discuss this question.¹⁷⁸

VI-50 In October 1946 the Secretary of State for the Colonies made a statement in the House of Commons proposing government reforms, such as the re-establishment of the Legislative Council, a ten year programme for economic development and social welfare, the repeal of the three Laws of 1937 and the return of those deported in 1931.¹⁷⁹ In view of the above, a four member deputation headed by the *Locum-Tenens* went to London to meet the new members of the Labour Government, hoping that this time, and after the statements made during the war by government officials, including Churchill, their aspirations would be realised. Unfortunately the Colonial Secretary, Arthur Greech Jones who received the deputation on 7 February 1948, stated definitely that a change in the status of the island was not contemplated and he invited the Cypriots to co-operate for a more liberal constitution.¹⁸⁰

VI-51 In the meantime the Bishop of Kyrrenia, Makarios, who was exiled in 1931, returned to Cyprus and he addressed a crowd of several thousands, who came from all over the island to Nicosia, on the subject of *Enosis*. Lord Winster, the new Governor of Cyprus, came to the island bringing the new constitution. The Greek population, obeying

¹⁷⁸ *The Times*, 14 August 1944, p. 3e.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 24 October 1946, p. 6g.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 8 February 1947, p. 4e.

the orders of the ethnarchy, boycotted the Consultative Assembly summoned by Lord Winster for constitutional reforms. The Assembly was officially dissolved on 12 August 1948 and Lord Winster repeated that no change in the sovereignty of the island was intended. His statement provoked protests from all organisations.

VI-52 The election of the new archbishop took place in June 1947 and the Bishop of Paphos and *Locum-Tenens*, Leontios, was elected by a large majority. On his enthronement he announced that he would continue the struggle for *Enosis* and that a new ethnarchic Council, consisting of lay and clerical members, would be formed. He also refused to take part in the Consultative Assembly summoned by Lord Winster. Archbishop Leontios died after a month on the throne and the Bishop of Kyrenia, Makarios, succeeded him as Makarios II. It was during his period as archbishop that the well known plebiscite of 15 January 1950 took place, during which 96% of the Greek population of the island voted for union with Greece. The volumes of the plebiscite were taken to Athens, London and New York by a deputation led by the Bishop of Kyrenia, Kyprianos. Archbishop Makarios II died in 1950 and he was succeeded by Makarios III, Bishop of Kition since 1948.

VI-53 Although the British occupation ends in 1960 with the establishment of the Cyprus Republic, I intend to discuss the Makarios III era in two parts. The first part will cover the period from 1950-1959, and the second, the period from 1960-1974. During those 24 years, Makarios III played a predominant part in the history of Cyprus as a political leader and archbishop.

G. Conclusion

VI-54 The British occupied Cyprus in 1878, not because they wanted to relieve the Cypriots from the Turkish yoke or to cede the island to Greece, but for their own imperial strategic, economic and political interests, like the Ottomans before them. This can be inferred from the stereotyped answers given by the government officials both in London and Cyprus to the demand of the Cypriots for union with Greece.

VI-55 It must be mentioned again, that the Orthodox Church of Cyprus and its prelates were involved in the struggle for *Enosis* as soon as the British set foot on the island. The Bishop of Kition, Kyprianos, and Archbishop Sofronios, welcoming the British troops to the island, expressed the wish that the British administration was transitional and that eventually Cyprus would be ceded to Greece as in the case of the Ionian Islands.

VI-56 When the British came to Cyprus they found an unfamiliar situation with regard to the Church and the archbishop. During the Ottoman administration the archbishop was the ethmarch, the leader of the nation, and that title gave him not only authority over the Church but also secular authority over the Greek Orthodox. Those privileges were granted to the archbishop on his enthronement by the Sultan with the issue of a *Berat* (decree). It was clear that the Church wanted to maintain those privileges even under the British administration but the British refused to recognise them and imposed their own rule. The Church was stripped of its powers and railed against the changes. The Greek Cypriots, however, continued to support their archbishop as the sole representative in the discussions with the administration.

VI-57 From the foundation of the Legislative Council until its dissolution in 1931, the most vociferous protagonists for reform of the system were the clerical deputies and most particularly the three consecutive Bishops of Kition. Without them the Legislative Council would have been a debating Club of the upper-middle class. The clerical deputies never missed the opportunity in the Council to raise the Cyprus problem which was the union of Cyprus with Greece.

VI-58 All the Greek Cypriot deputations which visited London after the First World War were led by Archbishop Cyril III or by the Bishop of Kition, Nikodhimos. This shows that the archbishop as the ethnarch, the leader of the nation, had the prerogative to represent his peoples during the discussions with the British Government officials and others. He was received as such by ministers, political leaders, and politicians, the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of London.

VI-59 In Cyprus, the archbishop was the head of the National Council and signed all memorials sent either to the Government in Cyprus or London. There is not a single case recorded of the British administration questioning the leadership or authority of the archbishop. Clearly there was no other person that carried such authority in the Cypriot community.

VI-60 The riots of 1931 had a serious impact on the Cyprus Church. Two bishops were exiled and the Holy Synod was left with one bishop and an old and sick archbishop who died two years later. The refusal of the British Government to allow the return of the two exiled bishops for the election of a new archbishop deprived the Church of its leadership and created many problems, especially social, at a time when the leadership of the Church was badly needed. The insistence of the Colonial

Government to exile the two bishops and leave the Church without a head is inexplicable, unless we accept the view that they were considered to be so militant that they threatened the whole harmony of British Colonial rule.

VI-61 The Church of Cyprus is the church of the people. It formed the leadership of the political opposition to the national question and could mobilise the masses against Colonial rule. This is probably the reason for British dislike of the Church of Cyprus, especially in the second period of Colonial rule.¹⁸¹

VI-62 The Cypriots were content to accept the rule of a Christian and liberal nation, yet there was always a conflict between the Church and the administration except during the Second World War. The reason for this conflict is the leadership of the Church in the struggle for union with Greece and the persistence of the British administration to keep the island under British Sovereignty.

¹⁸¹ Benedict Englezakis, *Studies on the History of the Church of Cyprus, (4th-20th Centuries)*, p. 434.

Chapter VII

ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS III (1913 – 1977)

PART I: 1950 - 1959

A. Introduction

VII-1 Archbishop Makarios III is the most dominant figure in the modern history of Cyprus because he administered the ecclesiastical and political life of the island for 27 years, from his enthronement as archbishop in 1950, until his death in 1977. He was loved by the majority of the Greek Cypriots but at the same time bitterly hated by many who disagreed with his policy and actions.¹⁸² When he spoke to the people he could instil enthusiasm and extol them to do whatever he asked them to. Makarios III exerted a magnetism never exhibited by any of his predecessors.

VII-2 It is not the purpose of this dissertation to examine Makarios III as a politician because this has already been done, and surely will be done again, by many historians. The purpose of this study is to examine the two roles of Makarios III as Head of the State and as Primate of the Cyprus Greek Orthodox Church and examine if the two roles conflict. When some historians or critics of Makarios III are asked if the two roles could co-exist they give a positive answer on the basis that his role as the ethnarch was to free his peoples from colonial rule and unite the island with mother Greece. Others do not share the same opinion.

¹⁸² Several attempts were made against his life, the most serious one was on the 8 March 1970, when his helicopter was shot down and the pilot seriously injured.
 Glafkos Clerides, *Cyprus: My deposition*, 4 vols. (Alithia Publishing, 1989), Vo. II, p. 361.

B. Notes on the life of Makarios III

VII-3 Makarios III was born on 13 August 1913 in the small village of Pano Panayia at Paphos. His father was a farmer and shepherd. The boy, whose name was Michael Christodoulos Mouskos, was the first-born and he helped his father in his fields. Michael was a very good pupil in elementary school and his teacher, Neoclis Constantinides, tried to persuade his father to send the boy to high school. His father, not having the means to do so, decided to send Michael to Kykko Monastery to become a monk and be educated at the same time. Michael showed a great desire to become a monk. At the age of 13, when he entered the Kykko monastery as a novice, his dreams were fulfilled. After completing his education, he continued his studies at the Pancyprian Gymnasium in Nicosia, the most famous school in Cyprus. At the Gymnasium he was a distinguished pupil and after finishing his secondary education Michael was ordained as a deacon and took the name Makarios, by which he was known thereafter. For two years he taught at the school of Kykko monastery and in 1938, at the age of 25, he left Cyprus for Athens and enrolled in the Faculty of Divinity there. During the Second World War and the German occupation of Greece he stayed in Athens where he continued his studies and at the same time was the Deacon of St. Irene's Church. It was a very hard time for him but his experience at the Kykko monastery as a young man helped him to overcome all difficulties.

VII-4 After the war, in 1946, Makarios was ordained as a priest and then took over a parish church in Piraeus. He did not stay there for long, because he received a scholarship from the World Council of Churches to study post-graduate theology in the United States. He went to the University of Boston in Massachusetts, accepting the American way of life, considering whether to stay in America or return to Athens after his studies. One day, early in 1948, Makarios received a telegram informing him that he

had been elected Bishop of Kition. It was the first time in the history of Cyprus that a student at the age of 35 and a priest was elected bishop. Initially he was shocked, not knowing what to decide, but after two months he returned to Cyprus. On 13 June 1948 he was consecrated Bishop of Kition and became secretary of the ethnarchy, the most important political adviser to the archbishop. His greatest achievement was the organisation of the plebiscite on 15 January 1950, according to which 96 per cent of the Greek population voted for the termination of the colonial status of the island and for union with Greece. When Makarios II died, Makarios, the young Bishop of Kition, having been a driving force behind the plebiscite of 1950, was elected unanimously as Archbishop of Cyprus and, in October 1950, he was enthroned as Makarios III, Archbishop of Cyprus and ethnarch. This event was the turning point in the history of Cyprus.

C. Revival of the *Enosis* struggle

VII-5 Makarios, on his election as Archbishop of Cyprus, inherited a legacy and burden of tradition from his predecessors to pursue the ideal of *Enosis*. During his enthronement speech he emphasised his adherence to the national aspirations of the Greek Cypriots saying "I shall not rest for a moment in my efforts to see Union with Greece achieved".¹⁸³

VII-6 Makarios' first visit to Greece in 1951 lasted for a month. During his visit he had meetings with the Greek Prime Minister Mr. S. Venizelos, all political leaders, the King, the Queen, the Archbishop of Athens, Mr. Spyridon, leaders of trade unions, students' committees, exiled Cypriots residing in Athens and many others.¹⁸⁴ In 1951 Greece was in a parlous condition after the Second World War and the Civil War with

¹⁸³ P.N. Vanezis, *Makarios: Faith & Power*, (Abelard - Schuman Ltd., London 1971), p. 30.

¹⁸⁴ *Eleftheria*, 16 March 1951, (7100), p. 1. Ibid., 22 March 1951, (7105), p. 1.

the communists. George Papandreou, the Vice President of the Government, told Makarios that only a fool could start a conflict with the guarantor allies to which Greece owed its existence.¹⁸⁵ Makarios had various meetings with the Prime Minister and his last one ended in a clash between the two men. Venizelos advised Makarios not to be in a hurry but to wait for a suitable opportunity. He promised that he would do what ever he could to promote the Cyprus issue and he tried to dissuade Makarios from seeking assistance from another country. Contrary to Venizelos' advice, Makarios spoke to a crowd of 10,000 people at the constitutional square in Athens and accused the Greek Government of not helping Cyprus. At that time Makarios dismissed the possibility of an armed struggle against the British in order to achieve independence, although he favoured the idea at a later stage. With regard to his meetings with Makarios, S. Venizelos, the Prime Minister, made a statement in the Greek Parliament about the Cyprus issue and stated that under the prevailing circumstances he thought that it was not wise to raise the Cyprus problem with Britain.¹⁸⁶

VII-7 In 1952 and 1953 Makarios exploited the general world wide anti-colonial sentiment in the post war era in order to promote the Cyprus issue. In 1952 he convened a Pancyprian Assembly in St. John's Cathedral to approve the struggle of the ethnarchy for *Enosis*.¹⁸⁷ In May he visited Egypt, Lebanon and Syria to promote the Cyprus issue. In June he visited Athens again and had meetings with the Prime Minister, political leaders and the King. Venizelos again refused to help and told Makarios to stop dictating the foreign policy of Greece.¹⁸⁸ Makarios spoke on the radio to the Greek people and condemned the Government and political leaders for lack of courage. In

¹⁸⁵ Andreas Pavlides, *Makarios*, 3 vols. (Nicosia 1978), Vol. I, p. 161.

¹⁸⁶ *Eleftheria*, 25 March 1951, (7108), p. 1.

¹⁸⁷ Archbishop Makarios III, 'Address to the Pancyprian Assembly' *Hellenic Cyprus*, 37, (1952), pp. 87-94.

¹⁸⁸ A. Pavlides, *Makarios*, Vol. I, p. 173.

October he went to New York to attend the seventh session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. In February 1953 there was a strong new Government in Greece with Field Marshal A. Papagos appointed as Prime Minister. Papagos was pro-British and he stated in Parliament that the Cyprus issue would be solved within the Greek-English friendship. He assured Makarios that the problem of Cyprus was embraced not only by Cyprus but also by Greece. Makarios returned to Cyprus from America in March 1953 and later he sent an official letter to the Governor, Sir Andrew Wright, requesting for the implementation of the right of self-determination for Cyprus and that a new plebiscite ought to be carried out by the Government. The Governor, in his answer, stated that the Government did not contemplate any change in the administration of Cyprus and considered the Cyprus issue closed. In his reply to the Governor, Makarios said that the issue would be regarded closed only if the people of Cyprus decided so.¹⁸⁹ On 28 June he called the people of Cyprus to assemble at Phaneromeni Church, since his application for an open rally was rejected by the Governor. On that day Makarios gave the most impressive speech of his career against the British Government's policy on Cyprus. In August he sent a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations, requesting discussion of the Cyprus issue in the General Assembly. He was advised by the Greek Government not to visit New York due to the imminent visit of Sir Anthony Eden to Greece in December. The meeting between Papagos and Eden in December 1953 was disastrous.¹⁹⁰ After a fruitless discussion Papagos made two decisions:¹⁹¹

- a) to apply to the United Nations in August 1954.

¹⁸⁹ A. Pavlides, *Makarios*, Vol. I, p. 194.

¹⁹⁰ Robert Stephens, *Cyprus a Place of Arms*, (Pall Mall Press, London 1966), p. 135.

¹⁹¹ A. Pavlides, *Makarios*, Vol. I, p. 205.

- b) to give the green light to Makarios for the armed struggle to begin in Cyprus.

D. EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters).

VII-8 General George Grivas, a retired Greek army officer and a native of Cyprus, was in favour of an armed struggle against the British as early as 1950. He visited Cyprus several times and had meetings with Makarios both in Cyprus and in Athens. According to his records, the archbishop was against the use of violence and the loss of lives. The most he would permit was sabotage against installations, which would help him to promote the Cyprus problem and make it known worldwide. Makarios wanted the problem to be solved through Greek-English negotiations or through the United Nations. Eden's "never" to Papagos and Henry Hopkinson's statement in the House of Commons on 28 July 1954 left Makarios with no other choice but to face the consequences of an armed struggle and bloodshed.

VII-9 It is not known whether Makarios had asked for expert advice before the armed struggle started in 1955. Since he decided to take up arms as his last resort to achieve *Enosis* it was his duty to examine the prospects of success and the consequences of a failure. It is also not known if he had taken into consideration other factors regarding the armed struggle such as the size of the island, its position, the world situation at that time and the strategic interests of Great Britain and her NATO allies. At that time many significant events were taking place in the world which influenced the strategic interests of Great Britain in Cyprus. Those were the Cold War between East and West, the blockade of Berlin, the Korean War, the evacuation of the British base from the Suez Canal and others. If Makarios believed that the British were ready to leave the island or come to a compromise according to his wishes with a few explosions, he was certainly

mistaken and politically inexperienced. It may be the case that Makarios was unaware of the previous disputes between the Cypriots and the British administration regarding the issue of self-determination for Cyprus from 1882 until 1930, because if he had been, he would have been alerted to the negative British response.

VII-10 All the British governments, no matter to which political parties they belonged, always gave the same stereotyped answers to the Greek Cypriot deputations stating the strategic interests of the British Empire in Cyprus and the rights of the Turkish minority. Makarios' gravest mistake, in raising the issue of *Enosis* or that of self-determination, was to ignore completely the Turkish factor and how British diplomacy could manipulate the Turkish minority and the Turkish Government. Makarios also ignored the post war position of Greece and the views expressed by the Greek political leaders, who believed that the Cyprus problem could only be solved through the good relations between Greece and Britain. It is apparent that during the years 1951 – 1955, and before the armed struggle began, many significant events were taking place throughout the world and the former colonies, which influenced the Cyprus problem and made its solution even more difficult.

VII-11 Reliable sources determine that the EOKA organisation was founded in 1952. It was couched in secrecy and composed of the following members: Archbishop Makarios, the Bishop of Kyrenia (Kyprianos), the Bishop of Kition (Anthimos), the Chief Priest of Phaneromeni Church (Papastavros Papagathangelou, who was a teacher of divinity in the secondary schools and the leader of the YMCA), Mr. Andreas Azinas (who was the liaison between Archbishop Makarios and General G. Grivas) and, of course, General George Grivas Dighenis. The aim of the organisation was to use force against the British administration to obtain independence and to force the British

Government to negotiate. On 7 March 1953, another secret organisation was formed in Athens, named EAK (Committee of the Cyprus Struggle), which aimed to promote the armed struggle in Cyprus. It had 12 members who were Archbishop Makarios, General George Grivas, Savvas and Socrates Loizides (the two Cypriot exiled brothers from Kyrenia), and eight people from Greece (retired Greek army officers, diplomats and University professors). All of them gave the following oath "I swear in the name of the Holy Trinity to keep secret all I know or come to know about the cause of *Enosis*, even under torture or at the cost of my life. I shall obey without question the instruction given to me at all times".¹⁹² Would any such group have sworn an oath based on the Holy Trinity if they had not been led by an archbishop? This again emphasises the duality of the role of Makarios.

VII-12 The EOKA operations started on 1 April 1955. The immediate response to EOKA bombs was to bring Turkey into the dispute. The tripartite conference, comprising Britain, Greece and Turkey, was brought about by Sir Anthony Eden. This conference was convened in London in August 1955 and ended in failure. It is worth noting that Makarios strongly objected to the participation of Greece in the London conference because he foresaw Turkey's involvement. Archbishop Makarios dispatched his secretary, Mr. N. Kranidiotis, to Greece to prevent the Greeks participating but failed because they had already agreed to attend. It is also worth noting that Harold Macmillan was surprised that Greece had accepted the invitation without any preconditions.¹⁹³ Soon afterwards, the United Nations Assembly voted on the Greek application for self-determination for Cyprus, at Makarios' insistence, on 23 September 1955 and received a negative response.

¹⁹² George Grivas, *The memoirs of George Grivas*, ed. by Charles Foley, (Longmans, Green and Co Ltd, London 1964), p. 20

¹⁹³ Nicos Kranidiotis, *The Difficult years, Cyprus: 1950-1960*, (Athens 1981), p. 95.

E. Makarios' involvement in EOKA – Conflict of roles

VII-13 Makarios was unanimously elected archbishop on 20 October 1950, receiving 77 votes in favour and only one void. He inherited, on his election, the mantle of ethnarch, a role dating from the beginning of the Ottoman occupation of Cyprus, which conferred the sole right of representing his people to the *Porte*. He was responsible for maintaining social order within his community, he bore the responsibility for tax gathering and he had the right to impose Church taxes. In addition, he had a judicial role within his own community.¹⁹⁴ These privileges he demanded back under British rule although the Colonial administration imposed new laws depriving him of this role. Nevertheless, the Greek Cypriots recognised the archbishop as *de facto* ethnarch and authorised him to be their representative to the British authorities.¹⁹⁵

VII-14 Makarios undoubtedly had the qualities of leadership; a quick mind, a firm belief in his convictions and a persistent ability to achieve his aims.¹⁹⁶ He believed that the Cyprus issue was a national problem which had to be solved according to the traditional ways of the national revolts of the nineteenth century, such as the Greek War of Independence in 1821. Makarios tried for some years to solve the Cyprus problem through the Greek-English traditional good relations, according to the wishes of the different Greek governments. When all attempts to solve the issue of self-determination failed he had recourse to the armed struggle.

¹⁹⁴ See Appendix A.

¹⁹⁵ N. Kranidiotis, *The Difficult years, Cyprus: 1950-1960*, p. 47.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

VII-15 EOKA – The National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters – was considered by the Colonial administration as a terrorist organisation and its members as terrorists, but to the Greek Cypriots it was the organisation fighting for their freedom. Makarios was deeply involved in the formation of this organisation both in Greece and Cyprus. He himself chose General George Grivas as its military leader and he financed the purchase of arms and ammunition.¹⁹⁷ It must be stated that Makarios did not wish the armed struggle to develop into a guerilla war and he was content, in order to make the Cyprus problem known worldwide, with a few explosions and some acts of sabotage.¹⁹⁸ Unfortunately, things did not develop as Makarios wished because in a guerilla war there is a lot of bloodshed, and in the case of Cyprus much blood was shed from either side.

VII-16 Although Makarios' involvement in EOKA and the armed struggle is certainly incompatible with his role as spiritual leader, nevertheless, the Greek Orthodox Church is full of examples of clergy who either fought the occupying forces or were determined to drive them out. Makarios ultimately believed that the freedom of Cyprus could only be achieved by fighting and sacrifices since all other methods had failed. For the Greek Orthodox clergy, religion and nationality are two entities which go together. It is generally accepted that all clergy agreed with these principles expressed by Makarios, although there is no evidence, however, of it being disseminated from the hierarchy to the village clergy.

¹⁹⁷ A. Pavlides, *Makarios*, Vol. I, p. 264.

¹⁹⁸ Angelos Vlachos, *Ten years of the Cyprus Problem*, (Athens 1980), p. 95.

VII-17 In order to illustrate the above we can show examples from the struggles of the Greek nation dating from 1821 onwards. When the Greek War of Independence started on 25 March 1821, the Bishop of Ayias Lavras, Paleon Patron Germanos, blessed the arms of the Greek fighters and declared the beginning of the revolution. Thus the Greek Orthodox Church played a leading part in the revolt.¹⁹⁹ Many members of the Greek clergy participated in the revolution and suffered humiliating tortures and death by the Turks. Such warriors were Gregorios Dikeos, known as Papaflessas; the Deacon Athanasios, a very brave young man of 30, who was impaled by the Turks; the Bishop of Salomon, Isaiah, who was killed in battle, and an endless number of clergy who fought and died for the freedom of their country, singing the following song which is characteristic of the Greek Orthodox Christians:

“For the holy faith of Christ.
For the freedom of my country.
For these two things I fight.
For these two things I wish to live.
And if I do not obtain them
What is the use of living?”²⁰⁰

There is no doubt that the clergy's participation in the fighting was a departure from canon law and the teaching of Christ. But, nevertheless, it is a custom of historical significance.

VII-18 The Patriarch of Constantinople, Gregory V, was hanged on 10 April 1821 after Mass, suffering the same fate as his predecessor, Cyril VI, and of many other archbishops, bishops, priests, deacons and monks. These came from the mainland and the islands including Crete, the Aegean islands and Cyprus. In the wars that followed

¹⁹⁹ Constantinos Vovolinis, *The Church in the struggles for Freedom*, (Athens 1952), pp. 103 – 105.

²⁰⁰ A folk song sung by Greek warriors in battle.

the clergy suffered the same fate and it is recorded that during the Second World War, 203 Orthodox clergymen were executed by the Germans, Italians and Bulgarians.²⁰¹

VII-19 It was the sacrifices of the Greek Orthodox clergy during the struggles for freedom that Makarios had in mind when he agreed to the formation of EOKA and the struggle that followed. Makarios never denounced violence, as the British demanded, because he believed that freedom could only be achieved by fighting and sacrifices.

VII-20 Similarly, there are numerous examples of non-Orthodox Christian clergy exhorting their members to kill in the name of religion and freedom. Many of these originating from the two Great Wars where clergy on both sides urged their troops to kill the enemy and regarded them as martyrs to the cause.²⁰² The clergy, who were engaged in guerilla action, were not bound by the Geneva Convention as the official chaplains were.

VII-21 Any Christian cleric, be he lay priest or archbishop, who embarks on a course of militant strife or causes other men to rise up and strike at their fellow men, must necessarily find himself in conflict with the teachings of Christ. It may be argued that the history of the Christian Church is a catalogue of horror and internecine warfare to establish the supremacy of one branch of Christianity over another, but it is nothing more than the failing of the Church and its prelates, and not the tenets of Christ.

VII-22 The body of Christian teaching and the essence of the manner in which an adherent should conduct his life is surely to be found in the New Testament. Everything

²⁰¹ Const. Vovolinis, *The Church in the struggles for Freedom*, pp. 513 – 522.

²⁰² David Martin, *Does Christianity cause war?*, (Oxford 1977), p. 128.

written since is merely a corruption or accommodation for the benefit of the worldly Church.

VII-23 *Mathew* Chapter V 1-48 contains the pure distillation of the path for the Christian. A professed Christian layman familiar with the New Testament sees clearly his role and responsibilities. How much more does this duty rest on the mantle of an archbishop? Should he not be a paragon of Christianity, a humble servant of the servants of God? Meek, righteous, pure in heart, a peace-maker and essentially merciful; constrained not to kill but to love his brother man and especially his enemies; in the face of violence to turn the other cheek. In other words, to be perfect in all ways. Can Christ have left his followers in any doubt? I think not.

F. Field-Marshal Sir John Harding – State of Emergency – Harding's negotiations with Makarios.

VII-24 Sir John Harding arrived in Cyprus in October 1955 succeeding Sir Robert Armitage. He was Sir Anthony Eden's choice as he believed that Harding had the diplomatic and military qualities to solve the Cyprus problem.²⁰³ In the meantime, the activities of EOKA continued against military targets and during that time killings occurred on both sides. The situation was grave and there was little hope for settlement.

VII-25 The new Governor declared a State of Emergency on 26 November 1956 and many harsh laws were introduced.²⁰⁴ The Government expected that, by enforcing this policy, it would prevent the Greek Cypriots from joining the EOKA organisation. Amongst those laws were:

²⁰³ Sir Anthony Eden, *Memoirs, (Full Circle)*, (Cassell-London, 1960), p. 402.

²⁰⁴ N. Kranidiotis, *The Difficult Years, Cyprus: 1950 – 1960*, p. 145.

- a) the restriction of movement, assembly, public speech and censorship of the press.
- b) curfews and detention in camps without trial of suspects or sympathisers of EOKA.
- c) Greek communities to be fined for damage caused to public installations by EOKA, with the fines imposed by special courts.
- d) capital punishment for the possession of weapons.

VII-26 The new Governor used extreme measures to defeat EOKA and restore law and order on Cyprus, but at the same time he was determined to co-operate with the archbishop, by having direct talks with him.²⁰⁵ The two men had seven meetings altogether between October 1955 and January 1956. The British Government decided to talk with Makarios, considering him as both the ethnarch and political leader of the Greek Cypriots, and by taking part in the negotiations they were prepared to recognise his role as such.

VII-27 The proposals handed by Sir John Harding to Archbishop Makarios included restricted home rule since foreign affairs, defence and home security were reserved for the Governor. The issue of self-determination for Cyprus, which was in the proposals, stated the following position of the British Government "It is not therefore their position that the principles of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus. It is their position that it is not now a practical proposition both on account of the present strategical situation and on account of the consequences on the relation between North Atlantic Treaty Organisation powers in the Eastern Mediterranean. They therefore have to satisfy themselves that any final solution safeguards the strategic interests of the

²⁰⁵ Sir Antony Eden, *Memoirs, (Full Circle)*, p. 403.

United Kingdom and her allies".²⁰⁶ It must be noted that the British proposals were first communicated to Turkey with the assurance that there would be no further concessions on the issue of self-determination.²⁰⁷ These proposals were handed simultaneously to Greece and Makarios. As expected, Makarios rejected the proposals since a period after home rule was not defined for the right of self-determination to be exercised unitarily by the people of Cyprus. Sir John Harding had instructions that the formula was not negotiable but just to confine himself to hearing the views of Makarios.

VII-28 The meetings between Sir John Harding and Makarios continued and the Greek and British Prime Ministers exchanged several personal letters with regard to the forthcoming agreement. The Governor visited London on several occasions for consultations with the British Government but the gap between the two sides could not be bridged because the British Government could not uncouple the exercise of the right of self-determination from British strategic interests. Finally, the Colonial Secretary, Lennox-Boyd, came to Cyprus and had one last meeting with the archbishop on 29 February 1956. That meeting did not last long. The Governor made a final statement regarding the British proposals and the archbishop objected on three points which he considered vital for the future of the Greek Cypriots. Those were:²⁰⁸

- a) the period for the exercise of self-determination after home rule.
- b) the period of transferring the home security to the newly elected government.
- c) Amnesty.

²⁰⁶ Glafkos Clerides, *Cyprus: My Deposition*, Vol. I, p. 32.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., Vol. I, p. 33.

²⁰⁸ N. Kranidiotis, *The Difficult Years, Cyprus: 1950-1960*, p. 171.

Lennox-Boyd refused to discuss even one word of the Governor's statement and Makarios, with a smile, said that with goodwill everything could be arranged. Instead of commenting on this, the Colonial Secretary looked at Makarios and sardonically said "God save your people", and immediately left the room.²⁰⁹ It is worth mentioning that the people present at that meeting were Archbishop Makarios, Mr. Nicos Kranidiotis and Mr. Paschalis Paschalides from the Greek Cypriot side and Mr. Lennox-Boyd, the Colonial Secretary, Sir John Harding the Governor, Mr. John Reddaway and one or two other officials from the British side.

VII-29 With the collapse of the talks things moved very fast. On 9 March 1956 Makarios, the Bishop of Kyrenia Kyprianos, Papastavros Papagathangelou and Polykarpos Ioannides were arrested and deported to the Seychelles. Sir Anthony Eden wrote the following in his memoirs "Makarios had close links with the terrorist organisation and had encouraged plans for bringing ammunition and explosives into the island."²¹⁰ We decided that the interests of order and security justified their dispatch to the Seychelles and we authorised the deportations on 6 March. These were carried out on 9 March."²¹¹

VII-30 Makarios objected to the Harding Plan, as it was called, for several reasons. Firstly, he wanted the backing of the Greek Government, which he did not have, because it was a pre-election period in Greece and C. Karamanlis, the Prime Minister, was accused by the opposition of not doing enough for Cyprus. Secondly, he had to

²⁰⁹ N. Kranidiotis, *The Difficult Years*, Cyprus: 1950-1960, p. 171.

²¹⁰ Sir Anthony Eden, *Memoirs*, (Full Circle), p. 412.

²¹¹ Ibid., p. 412.

consider the extremists in Cyprus whose main target was *Enosis* and, thirdly, he had to consider carefully General Grivas' demand for immediate amnesty.²¹²

G. Makarios in Exile

VII-31 After the deportation of Makarios and his three associates on 9 March 1956 and their transfer to Mahe in the Seychelles, there were many reactions in Cyprus, Greece and other countries where Greek communities lived. With the deportation of Makarios harsh measures were put into effect but, at the same time, and in order to reduce international reaction to the exile of Makarios, the British Government offered a constitution for home rule, the so-called Radcliffe proposals. If the British Government believed that after exiling Makarios, the political and spiritual leader of the Greek Cypriots, there would be any Greek Cypriot politician who would agree to consider the proposals, then they were badly advised and misinformed by the Colonial administration in Cyprus.²¹³

VII-32 The Radcliffe proposals made the situation more complicated. During the Makarios – Harding talks the British Government refused to define the time when the right for self-determination would be exercised. In the proposals a new idea was introduced that the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots should exercise the right of self-determination separately and that partition would also be an option. The proposals were rejected by all the Greek Cypriots, the ethnarchy, the Greek Government and, of course, by Makarios who was briefed by Mr Pearson, a British official and the Attorney General of Cyprus, Mr Kriton Tornarites, who travelled to the Seychelles for this purpose.

²¹² Sir Anthony Eden, *Memoirs, (Full Circle)*, p. 411.

²¹³ Glafkos Clerides, *Cyprus: My Deposition*, Vol. 1, p. 37.

VII-33 Makarios remained in exile for 13 months. During that time there had been no progress in the Cyprus problem but it was apparent that the British Government, due to the situation in this part of the world, wanted to maintain sovereignty of the island and encouraged Turkey to get more involved in the Cyprus issue.²¹⁴ The Greek Prime Minister, Karamanlis, succeeded in persuading President Eisenhower to ask Macmillan to release Makarios and allow him to proceed to Athens. Makarios was released on 27 April 1957 and returned to Greece where he was received by the Government and the people of Greece as a hero.

VII-34 It is not my purpose to examine the political situation prevailing in the world at that time (the conflict between nations, the Cold War between East and West, the interests of the Great Powers, the involvement of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots in the problem of Cyprus), but to point out that both Makarios and the Greek Government, reviewing the state of affairs, decided on a reassessment of the situation. They came to believe that the armed struggle should cease, made an evaluation of the situation and came to the conclusion that a change of course was needed. The Greek Government, urged by the U.S. Government, decided to engage in direct talks with Turkey on the issue of independence for Cyprus. Makarios was informed accordingly and he agreed to the new policy but General Grivas was unaware of this.

H. Makarios' new policy – The Zurich and London Agreements

VII-35 Makarios, evaluating the new situation in Cyprus and fearing that the British Government would proceed and implement the Macmillan plan, decided to make public the change of his policy without consulting the Greek Government and abandoned his pursuit of *Enosis*.

²¹⁴ Glafkos Clerides, *Cyprus: My Deposition*, Vol. I, p. 44.

VII-36 In September 1958 he invited Barbara Castle, a leading British Labour politician, to Athens to announce to her the change of policy and he authorised her to convey his new policy to the British Government and to make it publicly known. He even submitted his new plan to the British Embassy in Athens.²¹⁵

VII-37 In December 1958 the foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey discussed the issue of independence at the UN Headquarters, which led to a final meeting in Zurich in February 1959 between the Prime Ministers of the two countries. The two men reached an agreement and they signed the so-called Zurich agreements on Cyprus. Makarios was fully informed of the agreements, of which he freely approved, fearing a worse solution.

I. The London Conference – Makarios' crisis of conscience

VII-38 Makarios, the ethnarch and political leader of the Greek Cypriots, pursued an ambivalent role during the London Conference at which the Zurich agreements were to be signed. The Zurich agreements reached by Greece and Turkey created a constitution unparalleled and no other country has ever followed it in order to solve ethnic, communal or religious problems. Makarios was fully informed of those agreements and agreed with their provisions. On 11 February 1959, Prime Minister Karamanlis, in the presence of his Deputy Prime Minister and two foreign ministry advisors, briefed Makarios on the agreements reached and a copy of the full text was handed to him. After this meeting Makarios issued a statement congratulating the Prime Minister and the Greek Government for the agreements. A few days later, however, he refused to

²¹⁵ Glafkos Glerides, *Cyprus: My Deposition*, Vol. I, p. 68.
N. Kranidiotis, *The Difficult Years, Cyprus: 1950 – 1960*, p. 343.

sign at first, saying that he had had a crisis of conscience thus creating problems with the Greek Government.²¹⁶

VII-39 Makarios, who was in a dilemma as to whether accept or reject the agreements, invited 35 representatives from Cyprus to Athens in order to advise him how to proceed. After several meetings in Athens they decided to accompany him to London where the agreements were to be signed. The London Conference took place between 16-19 February 1959. On the 16th Makarios told the Greek Prime Minister that he had a crisis of conscience and could not accept responsibility for the agreements. In the evening he informed his main associates that he intended to resign his office. On the 17th he tried to negotiate some very important provisions of the agreements and he was severely criticised by the Prime Ministers of Britain, Greece and Turkey. Finally on the 18th he informed Karamanlis that he had decided to sign.

VII-40 The great enigma confronting political analysts was; did Makarios really have a crisis of conscience? Was he bluffing, and did he really want to negotiate and improve the provisions of the Zurich agreements? Was he influenced by comments in the Greek newspapers or by the Greek opposition leaders who were against those agreements? It is certain that all of these factors played a part in Makarios' attitude at this time.

VII-41 A summary of Makarios' character is given by Mr Glafkos Clerides and Mr N. Kranidiotis, two men who were very close to him. They claim he experienced a duality of purpose during the London Conference. On the one hand he was the ethnarch, the man who inherited the Byzantine tradition and determination to free the Greek Cypriots; deeply involved in the armed struggle to achieve *Enosis*, but at the same time aware of

²¹⁶ Glafkos Clerides, *Cyprus: My Deposition*, Vol. I, p. 71.

the unjust privileges conferred on the Turkish Cypriots, with the presence of the Turkish troops undermining his Presidency.²¹⁷

VII-42 Finally, Makarios agreed to sign for the following reasons:²¹⁸

- a) The majority of the Greek Cypriot representatives urged him to sign.
- b) The Greek Government, under Prime Minister Karamanlis, exercised much pressure on him, threatening to withdraw his support, and even Queen Frederica urged him to sign.
- c) Makarios feared that, by failing to sign, the British Government would impose the Macmillan plan which provided for the partition of Cyprus.
- d) Makarios feared for the lives of the detained freedom fighters who were incarcerated and under sentence of death.

VII-43 From the above analysis one may infer that the two roles could not be compatible because Makarios could not be the archbishop and political leader of the country at the same time. It can be argued that politics and religion can not go together because the way of Christ and the way of the world do not mix. But Makarios was a twentieth century Byzantine anachronism, reminiscent of the Emperors of Constantinople who ruled State and Church. It was obvious from the London Conference and from the crisis that arose that he could not coldly decide on crucial issues of the Cyprus problem. In the following section on Makarios, I shall examine in greater detail his two roles and come to some conclusions with regard to the tragic

²¹⁷ N. Kranidiotis, *The Difficult Years, Cyprus: 1950-1960*, pp. 365 - 372.

²¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 50 - 51.

events that followed. I shall also examine his role as the senior prelate of the Cyprus Greek Orthodox Church.

J. Makarios' Oration on his return to Cyprus

VII-44 Makarios returned to Cyprus on 1 March 1959 after three years in exile. On his arrival he delivered a triumphal oration at the archbishop's palace to an assembly of over 200,000 Greek Cypriots who had gathered to welcome him. He said to the people "*Νενικήκαμεν*" ("we have won"), the word uttered by Phithippides, the Greek runner, who ran all the way from Marathon to Athens to tell the Athenians that they had won the war against the Persians. He emphasised only the advantages and benefits of the agreement but remained silent with regard to the disadvantages which he was clearly conscious of. He had already formulated ideas on how he would proceed in the future to change them to his advantage.

Chapter VIII

ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS III (1913-1977)

PART II: 1960 - 1974

A. The Orthodox Church and Civil Authority

VIII-1 Makarios was elected as the first President of the newly established Cyprus Republic in 1960 and remained in office until his death in 1977. No explanation of the particular status of the Orthodox Church, as in the present political regime in Cyprus, can be offered without having recourse to historical circumstances. In the present Cypriot Government, the Head of State combines in his person both religious and political authority. This raises a question of principle, long debated by political theorists, concerning the relationship between the spiritual and civil authorities within the State. Are we, in the case of Cyprus, in the presence of an anachronism which is alien to contemporary political theory and practice, or can the situation be justified on historical grounds? Both views can, of course, be held and debated.

VIII-2 The Greek Orthodox Church can be considered in two ways; in its purely spiritual capacity it shaped and influenced the culture of people in the Eastern Mediterranean, and as an institution invested with civil jurisdiction it had far-reaching effects on the national fortunes of the people under its authority. The latter is the sole aspect of the role of the Church which concerns us here and we can trace the civil authority of the Orthodox Church from the fall of Constantinople in 1453.

VIII-3 After the fall of Constantinople, the Orthodox Church and its leaders were granted certain rights by the Sultan which included judicial and administrative matters. The Church in Greece benefited from these concessions until 1832, when the newly independent state separated the competence of the Church from that of the State. However, Cyprus uniquely retained the role of ethnarch not only during the remainder of Ottoman rule, but throughout the subsequent British administration.

VIII-4 The unique role of ethnarch, the spiritual and political leader of the Greek Cypriots, was inherited by Makarios and deeply influenced his position as President. It is from the conflict arising from the duality of these two roles that his subsequent behaviour must be examined. It is apparent that his function as ethnarch outweighed his role as President. This may be regarded as anachronistic by countries where Church and State are divided, but not so to Cyprus.

B. Makarios the Ethnarch and Party-Political Leader

VIII-5 According to Nicos Kranidiotis, the secretary of the ethnarchy, Makarios informed him in March 1959 of his intention to form a "political" party. He wanted the party to have as members all the EOKA fighters and people from all political leanings. He named the new party EDMA (Unified Democratic Front of Regeneration) and asked Kranidiotis to draw up a circular for the Cypriots and the party constitution.²¹⁹ Makarios needed this political party because he intended to contest the forthcoming presidential elections and the only political party existing at that time was the communist AKEL which was opposed to him.

²¹⁹ N. Kranidiotis, *The Difficult years, Cyprus: 1950 - 1960*, pp. 410-413.

VIII-6 The last Governor of Cyprus Sir Hugh Foot ratified Makarios' election as the President and Mr Fazil Kutchuck, the Turkish leader, as the Vice-President of the newly formed interim government (1959-60). Makarios appointed seven Greek ministers, who took over seven government departments. All of them were young men, between 24-30 years of age, most of them ex EOKA members or fighters. He also appointed the Greek members of the various committees, whose tasks were to draw up the Constitution of the Republic, the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty for the Sovereign Bases. The first conflict between Makarios and the old politicians started from those appointments. A fierce attack on Makarios' policy was led by Dr Themistoclis Dervis, the Mayor of Nicosia and an old right wing politician, who called Makarios' ministerial Council the "Children's Choir".²²⁰

VIII-7 Many arguments can be put forward against Makarios' decision to form a political party, to get involved in politics and to stand as a candidate for the presidency in the first presidential elections. These arguments can be summed up as follows:

- a) According to the *Holy Canons of the Apostles*, Chapter 52, Canon 6, and those of the General Church Councils, "no bishop or priest or deacon is allowed to undertake a secular position". If any clergyman, according to these canons, undertakes such a position then he is immediately deposed.²²¹ Makarios and the three bishops must have been aware of those canons. Ironically, the three bishops remembered those canons in 1972, 12 years later, when they were incited by the Greek Junta to demand the resignation of Makarios from the presidency;

²²⁰ Glafkos Clerides, *Cyprus: My Deposition*, Vol.I, pp.88-89.

²²¹ G. Ralles & M. Potles, (eds.), *Constitution of the Holy Canons of the Ecumenical Synods*, (Athens 1852), repr. by (Grigoris Publications, Athens 1992), p. 342.
George Th. Rammos, *Elements of the Greek Ecclesiastical Law*, (Nomikon, Athens 1947), p. 126.

- b) Makarios was committed to the oath he took in Phaneromeni Church in Nicosia, in August 1954, as archbishop and ethnarch of the Greek Cypriots. He said that he would never diverge from the aspiration of the Greek Cypriots which was the Union of Cyprus with Greece; Makarios took the following oath in Phaneromeni Church:- "Cypriot brethren, let us stand firmly. Let no one be afraid. Let no one betray one's principles and convictions. We are Greeks and with the Greeks we wish to live. Under these holy domes, let us give today, the holy oath. We shall remain loyal and faithful to our national demand until death. Without retreats, without concessions, without compromises. *We shall despise violence and tyranny.* We shall courageously raise our moral standard above the small and ephemeral obstacles; one, and only one, we demand; to the one and only one goal we aim at, the Union and only the Union with Greece".²²²
- c) Makarios was under excessive pressure to sign the London agreements. He fought for *Enosis*, he was involved in the EOKA armed struggle and he was the political leader of this organisation. He asked the Greek Cypriots for sacrifices to achieve *Enosis* but by signing the London agreements he had barred *Enosis* for ever.

²²² *Eleftheria*, 24 August 1954, (8135), p. 1. (The rally was organised by the Church of Cyprus and held on Sunday 22 August 1954. More than 10.000 people attended the rally). *The Works of the Archbishop of Cyprus Makarios III*, ed. by the Cultural Centre of Makarios III Foundation, (Nicosia 1991), Vol. I, 1948-1954, pp. 253-257. Trans. into English by G. Theodoulou..

- d) There was always a mistrust between Makarios and the Turkish leadership. Makarios was never trusted because he was the archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus and a strong advocate for *Enosis*, which idea the Turks wholly rejected with all their power during the British Occupation and especially during the EOKA uprising. Had another politician taken up the presidency immediately after the armed struggle, whom the Turks could trust, then the co-operation between the two communities might have been different.
- c) By deciding to contest the presidency, Makarios risked the unity of the Greek Cypriots which was badly needed after the struggle. During the election period there was bitter conflict between the supporters of the two candidates. It is evident that Makarios, by deciding to enter politics and stand for election, divided the Church instead of uniting it.

VIII-8 Immediately after the London agreements, the majority of Greek Cypriots held the opinion that Makarios was the only person who could lead the new government and their slogan was "Makarios and only Makarios". Their arguments in favour of Makarios were the following:

- a) Makarios was a towering figure amongst the Cypriots. He was the ethnarch, the spiritual and political leader of the Greek Cypriots, the man who led the anti-colonial struggle against the British, was involved in EOKA, a hero who was exiled, and had the charisma to lead his people, so that nobody could replace him.

- b) He was the only person who could be accepted by most of the EOKA fighters, as Head of State. If an outsider, a man who had not participated in the armed struggle, was elected as president then surely there could be civil unrest and bloodshed among the Greek Cypriots. It is well known that the EOKA fighters came from the Church, from the Young Men's Christian Associations and that they would accept none other than Archbishop Makarios as Head of State.
- c) At that time there was tension between the left and right political parties because the communists did not participate in the armed struggle and it was believed that Makarios, as Church leader, could keep the balance between the two parties.
- d) Makarios signed the London agreements on behalf of the Greek Cypriots as their political leader. It was stated then, that he was the only person who could implement those agreements and set the newly established Cyprus Republic on the right tracks.
- e) It was customary for leaders of armed struggles, who fought against colonialism, to head the governments of their newly independent countries and, of course, Makarios was no exception. Because of his position as a Church leader, his charismatic appeal to the other world leaders and his acceptance by the non-aligned countries, Makarios was a prominent figure in world politics.

VIII-9 The Young Men's Christian Associations were established in Cyprus in 1946, and the women's in 1953. These Associations were initiated by the Church and their leaders were educated teachers of religious instruction in secondary schools. Their establishment was needed at that time because the only active youth organisation was that of the communist AKEL, and the Church feared the expansion of communism amongst the youth.²²³ The most distinguished leaders of these Christian organisations were Papastavros Papagathangelou, a priest and teacher of religious instruction in Nicosia, who was later exiled with Makarios to the Seychelles in 1956, and Miss Ourania Kokkinou, a teacher, whose involvement in the EOKA armed struggle is well known, and who was arrested and detained in the central prison for nearly three years.

VIII-10 The purposes of these organisations were to stop the spread of communism amongst the youth, to promote Christian fellowship and the Christian way of life through healthy exercise and outdoor life, and to inspire love for Greece and devotion to *Enosis*.

VIII-11 Papastavros met General Grivas in December 1954 and agreed to recruit young fighters for EOKA through the youth organisations. It is not surprising, therefore, that 12 young men, members of the YMCA, were either killed in battle or hanged during the struggle, and many others were arrested and detained in camps or sentenced to long imprisonments for their participation in the armed struggle.²²⁴

²²³ Papastavros Papagathangelou, *My Testimony*, (Nicosia 2001), pp. 36-42.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 269-271.

C. The Elections for the Presidency and for the Members of the House of Representatives

VIII-12 Archbishop Makarios and John Clerides, Q.C., an eminent lawyer and politician, whose son Glafkos served as minister in the Interim Government, were the two nominated candidates for the Presidential election to be held on 13 December 1959. The pre-election campaign was fierce with many accusations uttered against both candidates by the rival supporters. Makarios won the election by receiving 68.85% of the votes and Clerides 33.15%. Makarios' election to the Presidency was expected because he was supported by the influential Greek Orthodox Church, with the exception of the Bishop of Kyrenia, Kyprianos, by most of the EOKA fighters and supporters, and by many professional organisations. His position as archbishop and ethnarch and his involvement in the EOKA armed struggle, ensured his election.

VIII-13 Makarios' goal and ambitions were achieved. The historical anachronism prevailed and Makarios, reminiscent of a Byzantine Emperor, was Head of Church and State. How these two roles can be reconciled in the twentieth century is a matter to engage the minds of political scientists and experts on canon law. However, the majority of the Greek Cypriots were extremely content to have Makarios as president because he fulfilled their belief that he was the only person who could establish order, peace and justice and pursue progress in the newly formed State.

VIII-14 The Governor of Cyprus invoked the old electoral law for the election of the members of the House of Representatives which was approved by the Interim Government. It was decided that the six administrative districts would constitute the six constituencies of Cyprus, each one electing a number of the 35 Greek members and 15 Turkish members. The number of members varied with the district and depended on the

aactual population. As such, the system was a multi-member constituency majority system.²²⁵

VIII-15 At the time of the election there were three political parties. The Communist AKEL, which was an old established party and covered the whole of Cyprus, the already newly established right wing party, the Democratic Union, whose leaders were Themistocles Dervis and John Clerides, who decided to abstain from the election for the House of Representatives, and the third political party was the Patriotic Front, which included all members of Makarios' party EDMA and many other political movements and organisations. AKEL, fearing that it would not win a single seat in the House due to the majority system of election, began to make approaches to Makarios to achieve representation. They reached an agreement and AKEL got five seats in the House and the Patriotic Front, thirty. Makarios preferred to have AKEL represented in the House rather than left outside to criticise him. On election day, 31 July 1960, the Patriotic Front contested the election with 30 candidates, who were all elected, and AKEL with five, who again were elected.

VIII-16 The above political analysis is necessary because it shows that Makarios exploited his ethnarchic role and was the master of the political situation in Cyprus. He not only gave AKEL the five seats but he also hand-picked the 30 members who came from the Patriotic Front, most of them being ex-EOKA fighters or supporters. He excluded from the list any pro-Grivas EOKA fighters. As a result of this there was a bitter hatred between the pro-Makarios' fighters on the one hand and the pro-Grivas' fighters on the other. The latter finally joined EOKA "B", a terrorist organisation. The

²²⁵ Glafkos Clerides, *Cyprus: My deposition*, Vol.I, pp. 104-105.

consequent split in the EOKA fighters was to seriously effect the history of Cyprus in general.

D. The Cyprus Constitution

VIII-17 A constitutional joint commission was established with the task of completing a draft constitution for the independent Republic of Cyprus, incorporating the basic provisions agreed at the Zurich conference. The commission was composed of representatives from the two communities and representatives from Greece and Turkey. The Commission completed its work in April 1960 and the draft constitution was signed in Nicosia. It is not the purpose of this study to highlight the deficiencies of the constitution and the difficulties in the implementation of its provisions. This is the work of constitutional experts. Here we have to point out the provisions made in the constitution to safeguard the position of the Church, its rights and privilege.

VIII-18 According to the Cyprus Constitution, the Greek and Turkish communities respectively, shall elect from amongst their own members a Communal Chamber which shall have the competence expressly reserved for it under provisions of the Constitution.²²⁶ The Communal Chambers have legislative power solely with regard to the following matters:

- a) all religious matters.
- b) all educational, cultural and teaching matters.
- c) personal status.

²²⁶ *The Cyprus Constitution*, (Nicosia July 1960), part V, The Communal Chambers, Article 86-111, pp. 125-133.

- d) courts dealing with civil disputes over personal status and religious matters.
- e) municipalities.
- f) co-operative societies.

The most important articles of the constitution related to the Greek Orthodox Church and to the Muslim Institutions are articles number 110 and 111. (See Appendix D).

E. Amendments to the Constitution

Inter-Communal troubles - Negotiations

VIII-19 When Makarios was elected president of the Republic, we have the same person occupying the role of the ethnarch and Church leader and that of the Head of State. But the present status of the head of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus as an ethnarch and political chief had devolved upon him from history, and the office of ethnarch carried with it unavoidable limitations. These derive from history itself, which prescribed that ethnarchic policy must keep in harmony with national aspirations.²²⁷ Therefore, with the establishment of the Cyprus Republic in 1960 and the abolition of colonial rule, the role of the ethnarch, exercised by Makarios, ceased to exist. Makarios, however, wanted to remain "ethnarch" because his ultimate goal was union with Greece. Therefore, we have to examine the relationship between the two roles and how they conflict.

²²⁷ Theod. H. Papadopoulos, 'Orthodoxy, Church and Civil Authority', *The Journal of Contemporary History*, (London 1967), pp. 201-209.

VIII-20 The Cyprus Constitution inevitably created problems between the two ethnic communities since its concept was a political, administrative and constitutional segregation, yet it attempted to provide equality in political status and power of the two communities, which were unequal in size. The basic articles of the constitution could not be amended and contained the threat that the newly formed Republic would be subject to foreign intervention if any such amendment was attempted unilaterally.

VIII-21 The most serious problem with regard to the amendment to the constitution started when the Turkish members of the House refused to vote for the taxation bill. They claimed that the Greek side was moving very slowly or refusing to implement certain provisions of the constitution which benefited the Turkish side. They would approve the bill only if the Greeks agreed to the increase of the subsidies to the Communal Chambers at the ratio 70:30. Makarios' refusal to approve such an increase did not help to cement confidence and trust between the two communities but created barriers of separation. Makarios was aware of the generous rights and privileges for the Turkish community and he had to face the hard core of *Enosis* supporters led by the Bishop of Kyrenia. Makarios, the President, was the guardian of the constitution he had signed. As ethnarch he had duties and responsibilities beyond the limited boundaries of the constitution.²²⁸ In wanting to amend the constitution he acted as ethnarch, but in the case of the subsidies as Head of State. But was his decision to refuse the increase of subsidies within his Christian responsibility knowing the economic position of the Turks?

VIII-22 During 1962 and 1963 Makarios' main aim was to amend those provisions of the constitution which he considered inequitable. He was aware that to amend the basic

²²⁸ Glafkos Clerides, *Cyprus: My deposition*, Vol. I, p. 134

articles of the constitution the majority of both Greek and Turkish members of the House was needed.²²⁹ Evangelos Averoff, the Greek Foreign Minister, assured the Turkish Government that the Cyprus Constitution would not be amended and informed Makarios.²³⁰ Constantinos Karamanlis, the Greek Prime Minister, sent a message to Makarios, through the Cyprus Ambassador in Athens, to stop any attempts to amend the Constitution. Makarios made an official visit to Turkey in November 1962 and discussed the constitutional problems in Cyprus with Turkish officials.²³¹ The Turks rejected constitutional amendments and recommended the settlement of differences through constructive and practical measures between the two communities. Sir Arthur Clark, the British High Commissioner, whom Makarios consulted, encouraged some amendments on an unofficial basis.²³² The question raised here is why did Makarios proceed to amend the constitution contrary to the advice received from the Greek and Turkish Governments? Was he at that time the ethnarch, whose main ambition was to lead the country to self-determination, or the Head of State, who took the oath in the House to obey and uphold the constitution?

VIII-23 Soon after independence, paramilitary organisations were set up by both communities due to the mistrust existing between them. The inter-communal troubles which were not unexpected, started in December 1963 in Nicosia and then spread through out the island. The consequences were tragic for both sides. The Turks took the opportunity to form their own enclaves. Because of the fighting, the Vice-President, the Turkish members of the House, all the Turkish government officials including judges,

²²⁹ *The Cyprus Constitution*, (Nicosia 1960), Article 78, p. 123.

²³⁰ *Eleftheria*, 7 August 1962, (10333), pp. 1 and 6.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, 24 November 1962, (10426), pp. 1 and 6.

Ibid., 25 November 1962, (10427), pp. 1 and 8.

²³² Menelaos Alexandrakis, V. Theodoropoulos and E. Lagakos, *The Cyprus Problem, 1950 - 1974: An Intersection*, (Hellenic Europublishing, Athens 1987), pp. 32-24. (The authors were diplomats. Mr M. Alexandrakis and Mr E. Lagakos served as ambassadors of Greece to Cyprus).

left their posts, stayed in their enclaves and in 1964 set up their own administration in isolation from the Greek community. More serious inter-communal fighting occurred in the summers of 1964 and 1967 with more casualties on both sides and the threat of invasion by Turkey which was stopped the last minute. Many attempts were made, through the United Nations, to bring the two communities together and start negotiations for the solution of the problem. Makarios was not in a hurry to solve the problem because the situation was to his benefit, since the administration of the State was in Greek hands. The Turks, also, found the existing situation convenient because it helped them with their plans for partition.

VIII-24 Inter-communal talks started at various intervals between the representatives of the two communities and at times between Greece and Turkey. The inter-communal talks between 1972-1974 were of the most earnest nature and would have resulted in a compromise if Makarios had agreed to give the Turkish community autonomy in local government, but the legacy of his ethnarchic role worked against it. Makarios struggled for years, both at home and abroad, to advance the view that the Turkish minority should be reduced from the position of partners to enjoy only minority rights.²³³ The Greek Government tried twice to solve the problem through *Enosis* but the high Turkish demands were not accepted by Makarios. All attempts to solve the problem failed because the leadership believed that the Turks could be satisfied with minority privileges or that Turkey would concede *Enosis* without substantial benefits. That was a serious political blunder.

²³³ Glatkos Clerides, *Cyprus: My Deposition*, Vol. II, p. 382.

F. The relations between Makarios and the Greek Governments - Makarios' decision to amend the London and Zurich agreements

VIII-25 From independence in 1960 until the catastrophe of 1974, Makarios never had good relations with the different Greek governments for two reasons:

- (a) He always considered the Cyprus problem more important than the broad interests of Greece.
- (b) He behaved like an ethnarch and not like a Head of State.

VIII-26 It is known that Greece faced many problems after the end of the Second World War. The situation did not favour Greece embarking on *Enosis* when she needed the support of her allies to combat internal unrest. However, Makarios' insistence on the Greek government to apply to the General Assembly of the United Nations brought the adverse results. Makarios, immediately after independence, planned to amend the constitution to the benefit of the Greek community. Constantinos Karamanlis, the Greek Prime Minister, advised Makarios to postpone any amendment of the constitution and to come to a peaceful solution with the Turks.²³⁴ Evangelos Averoff, the Greek Foreign Minister in Karamanlis' government, summoned the Cyprus ambassador, Kranidiotis and said to him, "The archbishop has pulled down all bridges and there is no way of understanding each other. Please convey to him the views of the Greek government".²³⁵

VIII-27 George Papandreou, the Greek Prime Minister, disagreed with Makarios' tactics and his letter on 29 August 1964, (to which Makarios did not reply for six months), shows the deteriorating relationship prevailing at that time.²³⁶ George

²³⁴ N. Kranidiotis, *Unfortified Country*, 2 vols. (Hestia Athens 1988), Vol. I, p. 47.

²³⁵ Evangelos Averoff, *The Story of Lost Opportunities*, (Hestia, Athens 1982), p. 324.

²³⁶ Glafkos Clerides, *Cyprus: My Deposition*, Vol. II, pp. 89-91.

Papadopoulos, the Greek dictator, told Makarios that Greece, concerned about her communist neighbours, could not help Cyprus in the event of invasion by Turkey and that he would solve the constitutional problem through negotiations.²³⁷ He further informed Makarios that the prevailing political and strategic situation could not permit union with Greece.²³⁸ Makarios, the ethnarch, did not appreciate geo-political realities and, as a result, there was always a conflict between his two roles. He was a prisoner of his preconceptions and so was inflexible.

VIII-28 Makarios signed the Zurich and London agreements out of necessity and his views regarding their implementation were very different from those of the Greek governments. Greece believed in the agreements and in the equitable predominance of the Greek community, whereas Makarios wanted to amend some articles of the constitution to marginalize the Turks. Various remarks made by Makarios on different occasions are identical with his policy and one can distinguish the conflict of his two roles. In his edict to the Greek Cypriots on 27 November 1959, just before the first presidential elections, he wrote "The objective has not yet been reached, the spirit of the revolution has not been fulfilled".²³⁹ Speaking on 28 October 1962, a Greek National Day, Makarios said: "The struggle has not ended...our duty will continue until our objectives are fulfilled, until the dream of our aspirations becomes a reality".²⁴⁰

VIII-29 Makarios visited Athens for a State visit in September 1962. In his speech to the Greek people he said "I am a Greek leader of a Greek island whose people, in their

²³⁷ N. Kranidiotis, *Unfortified Country*, Vol. I, p. 566.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 143.

²³⁹ Spyros Papageorgiou, *From Zurich to Attilas*, 3 vols. (Ladia, Athens 1980), Vol. I, p. 137.

²⁴⁰ N. Kranidiotis, *Unfortified Country*, Vol. I, p. 44.

great majority look upon Greece".²⁴¹ Nicos Kranidiotis, the ambassador of Cyprus to Greece and a man very close to Makarios, wrote in his book that Makarios was contemplating, from 1962, rejecting the Zurich and London agreements, abolishing the constitution and proceeding to full independence and self-determination.²⁴² The most astonishing comment was made in Makarios' letter to George Papandreou, the Greek Prime Minister, in March 1964. He wrote "My aim is to abolish the Zurich and London agreements. I believe that the time has come to try and get rid of those agreements which were imposed on us".²⁴³

VIII-30 Makarios and his ministers found it necessary to deliver patriotic speeches in order to defend themselves from accusations made by Grivas and his supporters that they had betrayed the sacred cause of *Enosis*. The Turkish leaders exploited those statements internationally to prove the bad faith of the Greeks and Rauf Denktash submitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations and to the President of the non-aligned conference in Algiers the text of statements made by Makarios and his Ministers.²⁴⁴

VIII-31 During the inter-communal talks, the Turks wanted Greece and Turkey to make statements barring *Enosis* and partition, and to incorporate in the new constitution Article 185 of the 1960 constitution. The Greek Government wanted Makarios to agree to that, but Makarios wanted the Greek Government to take the initiative. According to Glafkos Clerides, Makarios raised his hands in his presence and said "You see Glafkos,

²⁴¹ Spyros Papageorgiou, *From Zurich to Attilas*, Vol. I, p. 43.

²⁴² N. Kranidiotis, *Unfortified Country*, Vol. I, p. 73.

²⁴³ M. Alexandrakis, V. Theodoropoulos, E. Lagakos, *The Cyprus Problem, 1950-1974: An Intersection*, p. 31.

²⁴⁴ Glafkos Clerides, *Cyprus: My deposition*, Vol. III, pp. 264-265.

these hands, they can cut them off, but I will not sign again any constitution excluding *Enosis* unless Greece and Turkey sign first a protocol".²⁴⁵

VIII-32 Many statements made by Makarios from 1959-1974 can be quoted which reveal the conflict between his two roles. It is obvious, however, that the role of the ethnarch, which he inherited from the past, predominated.

G. The Crisis in the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus –The final blow and the catastrophe

VIII-33 The Greek junta, which ruled Greece from April 1967 to August 1974, deceived not only the pro-Grivas EOKA fighters, and those who wanted *Enosis*, but also the three bishops who demanded the resignation of Makarios from the presidency on the ground that the political and ecclesiastical office were incompatible. Makarios was first elected as President of the Republic in December 1959 and at that time he was supported at least by two bishops, the Bishop of Paphos and the Bishop of Kition. Now it is known that the junta played a double game against Makarios. The junta wanted his removal from the presidency because he was against their plans to solve the Cyprus problem and the three bishops, supported by junta, wanted him to resign because he retreated from his commitment to *Enosis* and approved the inter-communal talks. They then demanded Makarios' return to his original position – *Enosis*.

VIII-34 In March 1972, during the meeting of the Holy Synod, the three bishops demanded the resignation of Makarios from the presidency because, as they claimed, it was contrary to the Apostolic Canons and those of the Ecumenical Synods. Letters were

²⁴⁵ Glafkos Clerides, *Cyprus: My deposition*, Vol. III, p. 270.

exchanged between the bishops and Makarios with regard to this issue. Makarios, in his letter to the bishops on 10 June 1972, informed them that his "Greek" conscience and ethnarchic vocation did not permit him to abandon his people at the time of danger, and he considered his resignation as treason. (See Appendix E).

VIII-35 When the bishops' demand was made public, Makarios' supporters started protesting. The Bishop of Paphos was prevented from returning to his bishopric and a similar demonstration occurred in Limassol. The bishops were subjected to violence and humiliation. The police just stood by and took no action whilst the bishops were pelted with stones and rotten fruit. The Cyprus Government remained silent.²⁴⁶

VIII-36 The three bishops convened a Synod in Limassol on 7 March 1973 to deal with Makarios' resignation. The Greek Government by then had second thoughts about supporting the bishops, and their ambassador tried to get the bishops to withdraw their claim but they remained adamant.²⁴⁷ Makarios refused to appear before the bishops because, he alleged, the meeting was constituted improperly and without authority. The bishops proceeded, and tried and convicted Makarios in his absence. He was sentenced to be defrocked and reduced to the rank of a lay person. Makarios retaliated very quickly by calling a Larger and Supreme Synod consisting of two Patriarchs, four archbishops and eight bishops from Orthodox communion outside Cyprus. This Synod annulled the decision of the Cypriot Synod, found the three bishops guilty and defrocked them. Their decision was the following: "According to the testimony heard before the Larger and Supreme Synod all its members found the three bishops guilty of departing from canon laws. With regard to the undertaking by the archbishop the

²⁴⁶ Glafkos Clerides, *Cyprus: My Deposition*, Vol. III, pp. 272-273.

²⁴⁷ M. Alexandrakis, V. Theodoropoulos, E. Lagakos, *The Cyprus problem, 1950-1974: An Intersection*, pp. 57-79.

Presidency of the Republic they resolved that this did not contradict the true spirit and letter of the Holy Scriptures and the Holy Canons and it was confirmed that the two offices could coexist according to the tradition of the Orthodox Church and the history of the Greek Nation".²⁴⁸ Although many references were quoted with regard to the bishops' departure from canon laws, not a single reference was given to the coexistence of the two offices in the Orthodox Church and the history of the Greek nation. It must be noted that only one case is recorded of any similarity and it is that of the Archbishop of Greece, Damaskinos, who acted as viceroy in Greece during the German occupation.

VIII-37 The purpose of this study is not to examine the rules of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Cyprus or the Holy Apostolic or Ecumenical Canons in order to prove whether the Archbishop of Cyprus could hold political or secular office. This is the work of canonical experts. The principle to be examined is that the duality of roles exercised by Makarios created a crisis which is unique in the history of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus. Soon after the decision of the Larger and Supreme Synod new bishops were elected, the former ones were forced to evacuate their bishoprics by the police, new churches were built for the deposed bishops and generally there was tension and hatred among the Christians; such was the spirit of Christian forgiveness in the politico-ecclesiastical quarrel prevailing in Cyprus in those years. The words of Christ "Father forgive them, for they know not what they do" were completely forgotten in the heat and turmoil of the political conflict.²⁴⁹

VIII-38 After the death of general Grivas, the leader of EOKA "B", in January 1974, the Greek junta took over the leadership of this terrorist organisation. Its activities

²⁴⁸ Andreas Mitsides, *The Cyprus Ecclesiastical Crisis and the Larger and Supreme Synod*, (Nicosia 1973), p. 59.

²⁴⁹ Glafkos Clerides, *Cyprus: My deposition*, Vol. III, p. 274.

against Makarios and his government escalated. In response, Makarios organised and equipped paramilitary groups and special units of the police loyal to him. Because of the deteriorating situation, Makarios decided to act against the Greek officers of the National Guard, who spoke in favour of EOKA "B" and provided arms for its members. So, without asking anybody's advice about the consequences of the measures he was contemplating, he decided to deport all the Greek officers and to write a strong letter to the President of the Greek regime, General Ghizikes. (See Appendix F).

VIII-39 The response to his letter was the coup of 1974. His palace was bombarded and he escaped to the Kykko monastery, then to the Paphos bishopric where he broadcast a message to the Greek Cypriots, then he was flown by a British helicopter to the British base at Acrotiri and from there to London. From there he flew to New York where he addressed a meeting of the Security Council of the United Nations on 19 July 1974. Besides explaining the situation in Cyprus, he made some statements which will be long remembered. I quote some:

- (a) "It is clearly an invasion from outside, in flagrant violation of the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. The so called coup was the work of the Greek officers staffing and commanding the National Guard".
- (b) "It may be alleged that what took place in Cyprus is a revolution and that a Government was established based on revolutionary law. This is not the case. No revolution took place in Cyprus which could be considered as an internal matter. It was an invasion, which violated the independence and sovereignty of the Republic".

- (c) "The Coup of the Greek junta is an invasion and from its consequences the whole people of Cyprus suffers, both Greeks and Turks".²⁵⁰

VIII-40 As a result of the coup, Turkey invaded Cyprus on 20 July 1974, with the pretext of restoring constitutional order which had been abolished since 1964. The consequences of the invasion were catastrophic for the Greeks of Cyprus. Turkey captured 38% of the Cyprus territory, nearly 200,000 Greek and Turkish Cypriots became refugees in their own country, 1642 Greeks are still missing and many were killed.

VIII-41 It is evident that Makarios, during his hostility to the Greek junta, acted as the President of the Republic, who wanted to protect his country, himself, and his position by using all means, including force. If he had acted as a Christian leader then, probably, he would have used other methods of reconciliation with the Greek Government and the tragic results might have been averted. In the end, however, both his archiepiscopal and ethnarchic roles failed him in the face of mainland Greek nationalist aggression.

²⁵⁰ Glafkos Clerides, *Cyprus: My deposition*, Vol. III, pp. 354-356.

Chapter IX

CONCLUSION

A. From the Romans to the Turkish Occupation

IX-1 Christianity in Cyprus was established in the middle of the first century and it formed the third oldest Church in antiquity after the churches in Palestine and Syria. It is seen as an apostolic church because its founders were the apostles Paul and more particularly Barnabas, who had returned to Cyprus to evangelise the Jews. The apostles received a hostile reception from their fellow Jews, but despite that, they successfully accomplished their mission by converting many people to Christianity including the Roman Consul at Paphos. This ensured the rapid expansion of Christianity. Later, Barnabas and Mark returned to Cyprus where Barnabas was martyred at Salamis. Barnabas' sacrifice helped the Church of Cyprus to gain independence from the Church of Antioch and contributed to the subsequent decision of the Emperor Zeno to confer on the Archbishop of Cyprus certain formal privileges that he still enjoys. Barnabas is then considered as the founder of the Church of Cyprus and all the archbishops as his successors.

IX-2 Little is known of how Cypriot Christianity developed throughout the early centuries until the first Ecumenical Council of Nicaea in A.D. 325. Possibly, the Christians in Cyprus suffered similar persecutions during the first two centuries as their fellow believers elsewhere in the Roman Empire. It seems, however, that the greatest persecutions came from the Jews, so that Cypriots felt relieved when the Jews were expelled from Cyprus after their revolt and defeat by the Romans. Had the Jews stayed

in Cyprus it would have been very doubtful if Christianity could have spread at such pace.

IX-3 It is not accurately recorded how many bishops from Cyprus attended the Council at Nicaea. Some writers claim that there were only three Cypriot bishops present but other unofficial sources raise the number to 14; and in fact in those years there were 14 bishoprics in Cyprus thus demonstrating the expansion of Christianity. During the Byzantine era, the Emperor was head of the Church and State. However, all the autocephalous Churches enjoyed relative independence by electing their own archbishops and bishops and by managing their own ecclesiastical affairs including judicial power. Yet the Emperor could still preside over a general synod, protect the faith from heresies, dismiss a patriarch or an archbishop and approve the newly elected bishops. The Church enjoyed liberty in the use of its property and the State contributed to the maintenance of the Church. This underlined both the ultimate responsibility of the Christian emperor for the governance and integrity of the Church, and also the acute Church-State interaction in the Christian Orthodox East. Such a unitary paradigm was to leave an indelible mark on the Cypriot Church.

IX-4 The special privileges accorded to the head of the Cyprus Church were abolished by the Catholic Franks, and later the Venetians, following the occupation of Cyprus in 1192; at the same time papal jurisdiction was imposed on the Cypriot Orthodox Church. This deprived the Church and its hierarchy of their privileges and property, reduced the number of bishops from 14 to four, imposed restrictions on the clergy and finally reduced the Orthodox Church to a subordinate role. The most extreme example of persecution was that of the 13 monks of Kantariotissa, who were tortured to death. These monks were added to the long list of saints of the Orthodox Church of

Cyprus. Because of the suffering and humiliation of the Orthodox Church during the Frankish period, the Greek Cypriots, ironically, welcomed the Islamic Turks as their liberators from Western domination and Roman Catholic ascendancy. .

IX-5 The Turks restored to the Church all the rights and privileges which it enjoyed during the Byzantine era and even gave the Archbishop of Cyprus civil, judicial and administrative powers. It is not an exaggeration to say that *de facto* the Church enjoyed wider authority than it had during the old Byzantine era. The archbishop was the "ethnarch", the leader of the nation, which means that he was not only the Church leader but the political leader of the people as well. It is true that the Turks bestowed on the archbishop the role of ethnarch for their own pragmatic political and administrative purposes, notably to secure the political loyalty and compliance of the island. Consequently, the Church benefited tremendously, its authority safeguarded. The continuing historical identity of the Cypriots as Greek and Christian Orthodox was due to those guarantees - despite intermittent phases of Turkish anti-Christian hostility.

B. The British Occupation

IX-6 When the British occupied Cyprus in 1878, they found the system of government alien and anachronistic. For them, the rights and privileges of the Church and those of the archbishop did not conform to the Western concepts of governance with its much wider cleavage between the domains of Church and State. So they introduced legislation, by which they stripped the Church of many of its privileges. The archbishop himself, however, retained his role as the ethnarch, the spiritual and political leader of the Greek Cypriots, partly because the people wanted their archbishop to be their leader and accepted nobody else. It was in this role that the Archbishop of Cyprus and the Bishop of Kition welcomed the British troops and the officials to Cyprus. The

claim for *Enosis* with Greece was raised immediately with the arrival of the British; the Cypriots used the precedent of the Ionian Islands and the fact that Britain was a liberal and Christian country in contrast to the Turks. In the Legislative council, which was established in 1882 until its dissolution in 1931, the clerical deputies were the most vociferous advocates of *Enosis*, and the archbishop led all the deputations to London to demand the union of Cyprus with Greece. The bishops of the Cyprus Church, however, were very naïve in believing that their problem could be solved either by appeal to sentiment or religion. The wider exigencies of the European balance of power between imperial nations meant that their voices fell on deaf ears.

IX-7 During the administration, the British formed a dislike for the Orthodox Church and its clergy for a number of reasons. They could not easily comprehend why the bishops of the Church were involved so naturally in politics, why they led the political opposition against the colonial rule, mobilised the masses and exercised so much popular authority with consent. The Colonial administration, accordingly, did not succeed in winning the trust, loyalty and willing co-operation of the Greek Cypriots. The two worlds were incompatible: Western post-Enlightenment liberalism with the Church in the wings, Byzantine Greek pre-Enlightenment unitary and theocratic rule with the Church at the centre.

IX-8 Throughout its long history, the Cyprus Church suffered most at the hands of fellow Christian nations; the Franks, who wanted to subject the Greek Orthodox Church to the Papal Supremacy, through oppression and humiliation, and the British, who used discriminatory laws to marginalize the Church and its leaders and diminish or abolish their privileges. It was during the twentieth century when the British administration, on two occasions, exiled bishops of the Church and deprived it of their leadership. If the

British had shown more understanding of the long history of the Orthodox Church and the ethnarchic tradition that the Cypriot archbishops inherited - and so its contribution to the survival of the Greek Cypriots and their Church - then the relations between the British and the Greek Cypriots might have been much more harmonious. Unlike the Franks and Venetians, however, the British did not exert direct religious or ecclesiastical pressure on the Cypriots to wean them away from the Orthodox faith. It was the political profile of the Church that the British targeted for down-sizing.

C. Makarios III

IX-9 Makarios was elected to the See of Saint Barnabas at the age of 38. As archbishop, he was the ethnarch, the spiritual and political leader of the Greek Cypriots. He carried on his shoulders the ethnarchic legacy inherited from his predecessors. His objective was to unite Cyprus with the motherland, Greece. Being in the service of the Church from the age of 13 he was not well attuned to secular realities. He was a romantic idealist, like most clergy, and his grand vision was national Hellenic unity and Orthodox Greek reintegration (though Cyprus, while it had been part of the Byzantine Empire, had never "belonged" to Greece). Since he was politically inexperienced he followed the methods of his predecessors by exercising pressure on Greek governments for support and on the British to concede to his demands to cede Cyprus to Greece on historical and patriotic grounds - in accordance with wider anti-colonial sentiment at the time and the assertion of nationalist aspirations originating in nineteenth century Europe.

IX-10 When Makarios realised that *Enosis* could not be achieved through negotiations, he contemplated the legitimate use of force. That was a fatal decision. Makarios, being ambitious and an individualist, did not engage in wider consultations

on the matter. The consequences of his ambiguous decision were tragic for Cyprus. It is again necessary to point out that Makarios, being archbishop and Christian leader could not, *ex-officio*, personally get involved in the use of force and bloodshed. However, reference may be made to the many examples in Greek and Byzantine history of clerics participating in armed struggles against oppressors and political opponents.

IX-11 Makarios' emergence in political life coincided with the disbanding of the British Empire. At that time, Cyprus was the only foothold in the Near East for the strategic interests of Britain. Makarios, being a priest, had no interest in or political awareness of the wider unrest in the region and Britain's military requirements. He had no concept of the significance and position of Cyprus in international relations, nor of the possibility of the intervention of Turkey to aid the Turkish community in Cyprus, something exploited by British diplomacy. He also failed to estimate correctly the ability of the United Nations to resolve such problems as well as the limitations of Greece in this political turmoil. Consequently it was with these deficiencies that he signed the fatal Zurich agreement in London.

IX-12 It is impossible to conceive that a Christian archbishop who, in the case of Cyprus, combined intrinsically the unique role of ethnarch with his ecclesiastical office, could separate these two roles on becoming secular President of the Republic. The failure lies within this combination: how can a self-consciously Christian leader, whose wider Orthodox communion has historically suffered from Islamic powers (especially in early twentieth century Turkish Asia Minor), not carry a certain resentment into the role of president of a nation comprising of Christians and Muslims? The fault was not in himself but in Orthodox tradition. When the opportunity arose, the archbishop could not separate himself from the office of President. As religious leader, his responsibility was

clearly to his followers, but as President his duty was to serve the population of the whole of Cyprus, whether Christians, Muslims, Catholics or atheists. However, after independence his attempts at amending the constitution were a clear example of the President behaving as the Christian ethnarch, and so in the modern pluralist circumstance with lack of balance.

IX-13 In conclusion; the three combined offices would have overwhelmed any human being, let alone a cloistered monk. If there is a fault to be found with Makarios III it is that he never understood the anachronistic nature of the combination of these roles. It would be extraordinary to hold two offices effectively, but impossible to combine all three. The religious, "national" and secular dimensions could not coexist in this manner in the second half of the twentieth century. History had delivered him a burden that was too much to sustain.

IX-14 Makarios is the most tragic figure of the modern history of Cyprus, since his unique status failed ultimately to meet the needs of modern Cyprus. When he was enthroned as archbishop in 1950, Cyprus was a United Kingdom Crown Colony with all communities, British citizens, living peacefully side by side. In those years there was relative peace, security, justice, prosperity and a long-standing *modus vivendi* among the ethnic and religious groups. The imposed administration, however, deprived the Cypriots of free political determination. Makarios' vision was to unite Cyprus with Greece and, after four years of fighting and civil unrest, Cyprus achieved the limited freedom that was imposed by the Zurich agreement - but no union with Greece. After 14 years of Makarios' regime under independence, and three years before his death, Cyprus suffered unprecedented disaster: a Turkish invasion, permanent military occupation, partition, desecration of Christian sites, displacement of the population, and many killed

or missing. No outside powers came to her aid, there being no advantage to be gained. Future historians will need to determine where blame for this outcome lies - in unfortunate circumstances or in a representative deluded Churchman?

Appendix A

The *Berat* issued to Archbishop Sofronios after his Proclamation in 1865 by the Sultan, Abdul Aziz.

1. The said monk Sophronios shall govern the said Archbishopric of Cyprus, etc., according to ancient usage.
2. The metropolitans, bishops, abbots, priests, nuns, and other Christians, who are subject to his jurisdiction, shall in accordance with the usage, which has prevailed from ancient times, and their religious duty acknowledge him as archbishop, and shall not show themselves reprehensibly negligent in the duty of their obedience.
3. He shall not be impeded in the office of his archbishopric by any one soever, and no one shall interfere with or disturb him.
4. No one without superior orders shall deprive him of the churches or monasteries, which have been in the possession of the archbishops from ancient times.
5. No one shall interfere in their repair when this is carried out within their ancient boundaries by permission of the tribunal and our exalted *Firman*.²⁵¹

²⁵¹ The Romaic Version of this clause runs thus: *Ε' Ουδείς να μη επεμβαίνει διά την επισκοπήν των, όταν αύται εις τά παλαιά των όρια γίνωνται με την άδειαν της κρίσεως και με υψηλόν μου φερμάνιον.* As the word in the Turkish original corresponds to "repair," one is led to conjecture that *επισκοπήν* here is a misprint for *επισκευήν*.

6. Without the sealed petition of the archbishop for the time being, the dignity of metropolitan or bishop shall not be bestowed upon any one, nor shall the authority and exercise of the rights of such be permitted.
7. When a Christian wishes to be married or divorced in conformity with their religious canons, the archbishop or his agents, appointed by our exalted decree, or his mere letter, shall officiate, and no one else shall interfere or take part therein.
8. Whatever any of the monks and other Christians at their death shall bequeath as an offering, in conformity with their religious customs, to the poor of the churches, or to the archbishop, shall be allowed, Christian witnesses being heard by the tribunal according to their religion.
9. When metropolitans, bishops, abbots, priests, and others, monks and such like, who are subject to the archbishop, are charge with acting contrary to their religion, they shall be punished in accordance with their religious usages (provided that the punishment laid down by penal regulations is not exceeded or altered) in order that they may repent and promise they will never again fall into such error, and no one else shall interfere in such matters.
10. If any of the priests, or of the commissaries of the archbishop, shall perform a marriage that is unlawful according to their religion, without his express sanction and approval, he shall be punished by the tribunal.

11. When in accordance with their religious canons the question arises of expelling metropolitans, bishops, priests, monks and abbots, and of substituting deserving persons for them, the said archbishop shall dismiss (ἀζλι)²⁵² them according to their canon law. And in order that he may substitute for them deserving monks and appoint them metropolitans and bishops, he must report the case at our capital, notifying it in a memorial (ἀρζι)²⁵³ and, after the customary and regular presents have been paid into the treasury, the *Berats* recognising their position and the necessary holy decrees shall be given into their hands.

12. Since the said archbishop is empowered in accordance with ancient regulations and by virtue of his *Berat* to receive archiepiscopal dues exacted from every class, metropolitans, bishops, monks, abbots, and other Christians, the *Qazis* for the time being shall assist and cause them to be paid to the agents, sent purposely for their collection and furnished with our sacred decree, or with his mere letter.

13. The charitable moneys, which were formerly and from the first paid by the Christians, and the canonical dues received from holy wells, monasteries, and marriages, as also the rest of the casual revenues of the Archbishopric, shall in accordance with ancient custom and the purport of his *Berat* be paid to the said archbishop without objection or delay.

²⁵² *Azl* = dismissal.

²⁵³ *Arz* = petition, memorial.

14. If any monks through love of worldly cares shall contrary to their religious vows roam at will in the parts situated within the boundaries of his archiepiscopal jurisdiction, the archbishop shall send such back to the monasteries where they originally resided.
15. When it is necessary for them to traverse dangerous places, they may, with a view to making their journey easier, disguise themselves as laymen. And when in time of necessity they carry arms to ensure the safety of their lives and to avoid danger, no annoyance shall be caused them on the part of the *Miri-Miran* (Μῆρι-Μιράνδιδες)²⁵⁴, *Miri-Liwa* (Μῆρι-Λιβάδες)²⁵⁵ and other authorities.
16. No one shall have power to make a Christian a Mussulman against his will.
17. When any one of the metropolitans, who are under the jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Cyprus for the time being, proposes to visit our capital on private affairs, permission shall be granted by the said archbishop, and no one else shall hinder him.
18. When any of the metropolitans and bishops owing canonical dues have no money to pay them, and instead of money offer stuffs and clothing, which are intended to be reckoned in lieu of their canonical dues, his men and agents, who convey them, are not to be interfered with during the whole of their journey by any of the superintendents at the different stations and customs' piers, or by any one else soever, for the payment of any fee or customs' dues.

²⁵⁴ *Miri-Miran*, civil governor of a district with rank of Lieutenant-General.

²⁵⁵ *Miri-Liwa*, Major-General.

19. Custom-house and *octroi* superintendents and their chiefs, and any one soever, are not to trouble with demands those who convey fruit from vineyards, which the said archbishop cultivates for his own use, and such produce as the Christians have always given by way of charity in wine, oil, honey, and the like, according to ancient custom.

20. All the *Waqf* (Βακίφια)²⁵⁶ property of the churches under the control of the Archbishop, including vineyards, gardens, farms (τζίφλίκια)²⁵⁷, fields, pastures (τζίρπια)²⁵⁸, fairs, holy wells, mills, flocks and other ecclesiastical property, are all under the authority and direction of the said archbishop, and no one else shall interfere with them.

21. When an inquiry has been made on the part of the *Pashas*, *Qazis*, and *Na'ibs* (Ναΐπιδες)²⁵⁹ and a petition lodged against a metropolitan, or bishop of a diocese, dealing with his evil conduct and behaviour, and praying that he may be deposed or banished, this shall not take place until the exact truth of the matter is known, and even though they succeed in getting our exalted *Firman* published on the subject, yet notwithstanding it shall be of no effect.

22. If through any intrigue a sacred decree has been published on the part of our government and has reached the place, to which it was addressed, that it may be of none effect they shall write to the Imperial Government to report the affair and to put an end to it.

²⁵⁶ *Waqf* = property held in mortmain.

²⁵⁷ *Chiftliq* = farm.

²⁵⁸ *Chayir* = pasture land.

²⁵⁹ *Na'ib* – deputy of the *Qazi*.

23. If any Christians during their lifetime dedicate to the archbishop, metropolitans and bishops any small objects, or again, according to their religious customs, do so either by word of mouth or by expressing an intention to make such, after their death these shall be recovered from their heirs through the tribunal.
24. When canonical and other customary dues in general, whether much or little, according to the condition of each church, are being received by the metropolitans, or bishops, or the agents appointed by them, they shall not be interfered with by any one.
25. When a difference arises between Christians regarding marriage or divorce and other questions he (i.e. the archbishop) shall with the consent of the disputants reconcile them.
26. When they put a man on his oath, or punish him with excommunication, as this penalty is styled, in accordance with their religious customs, no interference or annoyance, as well as no harm or injury shall be caused them on the part of the judicial authorities.
27. Without the consent and permission of the archbishop and metropolitans, priests who are within the jurisdiction of their dioceses shall not perform marriages contrary to their religious ordinances or to any particular canon.
28. When metropolitans, bishops, nuns, and other monks die without heirs whatever property they may possess, whether cash, or chattels, or horses, or other ecclesiastical object, the archbishop acquires, and the officials of the *Beit-ul-Mal*

(Μπέι-ουλ-Μάλ)²⁶⁰ and *Qassâm* (Κασσάμ)²⁶¹ the *Mutevellis* (Μουτεβελλίδες)²⁶² the governors, or any one else shall not interfere.

29. If any persons of position or importance, whoever they may be, insist on demanding that such and such a woman shall be given to such and such a man, this shall not be carried out by force.
30. So also the demands that such and such a priest shall be expelled from his ecclesiastical position, that it may be given to such and such another, such offensive proposals shall not be carried out.
31. When for the punishment and correction of a Christian he (i.e., the archbishop), sends what they call an excommunication, viz., the document imposing the punishment, no one shall interfere.
32. When any of the above-mentioned persons, who are united in marriage contrary to the ordinances of their religion, die, since it would infringe these rules if they entered the Church, the judicial and civil authorities and persons of influence and position, whoever they may be, shall not force the priests saying: "Bury the dead" (σηκώσατε τὸν αποθανόντα).
33. When the said archbishop punishes in canonical form, as we have explained above, those of the bishops and priests who obstinately refuse to pay their

²⁶⁰ *Beit-ul-Mal* = public treasury.

²⁶¹ *Qassâm* = Probate Court.

²⁶² *Mutevelli* = trustee of property in mortmain.

customary canonical dues, and shaves their hair and expels them, and in their room substitutes others, no one shall interfere with him.

34. When any Christians bequeath a legacy of the third part of their property to churches, monasteries, and the archbishop, it shall be recovered from their heirs by the tribunal.
35. When the arrest of a priest, monk, or nun, has been decided on and deemed necessary by the tribunal, the arrest itself shall be effected through the said archbishop.
36. When any members of the monastic order, not having a recognised position in any church or monastery, wander at large and create scandals, the said archbishop shall punish and restrain them in the manner mentioned above.
37. When the archbishop annually inspects the accounts of the superintendents of churches and monasteries at the close of their year of office they shall, if found in arrears, be compelled by the tribunal to pay. And when he dismisses such defaulters and appoints in their stead according to their religious usages worthy and competent successors, he shall not be interfered with by anyone.
38. None of the monks, who by virtue of our exalted *Berats* are now in possession of the dignity and discharge the duties of a metropolitan, or bishop, shall be injured or annoyed by the civil authorities.

39. When any one of them dies, our necessary imperial *Berats* shall be granted to the person chosen to succeed him by virtue of the imperial decrees originally in force.
40. The Archbishops of Cyprus for the time being shall not be dismissed without just cause nor be replaced by others through mere favouritism.
41. The petition of the archbishops is regarded as admissible. In matters connected with their religion they shall receive a friendly hearing on whatever subject they may wish to report and make representations.
42. If any desire to become archbishops not the smallest consideration shall be given to their personal claims. For the bishops ought to be learned and devoted to their religious duties and have full powers in all such matters: and according to our exalted imperial decree as published *ab antiquo* they must be free from influence or annoyance from any one soever.
43. None of the executive or other officials shall prevent the said Archbishop from carrying his staff in his hand, and no annoyance also shall be caused him on account of the horse or mule which he rides.
44. Against the wish of the said Archbishop no one shall be permitted to molest him under the pretext that we insist on their employment as his servants.
45. In the management of affairs, which affect their religion, as also in the immediate possession and administration of their property no one shall in any

way whatever hinder them or take part in such matters, but he shall remain undisturbed and unmolested.

So let them know.

Let them respect our holy sign.

Written in the beginning of the month Shawwal in the year 1282.²⁶³

²⁶³ The beginning of the months *Shawwal*, *Anno Hegirae* 1282, would fall between 17th and 26th February, *Anno Domini* 1866, the fifth year of the reign of Sultan Abdul Aziz. Mr. Cobham in his *Excerpta Cypria* (p. 339) very justly remarks that this *Berat* is a document of some historical interest, as it is probably the last that will ever be issued to an Archbishop of Cyprus.

Appendix B

The texts of the letter and manifesto of the Bishop of Kition addressed to the Governor of Cyprus Sir Ronald Storrs and to the People of Cyprus on his resignation as member of the Legislative Council.²⁶⁴

a) Letter to the Governor:

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to tender my resignation as a Member of the Legislative Council of Cyprus. As you are undoubtedly aware the office of Member of the Council was not given to me by the foreign Government but by the Greek electors of the sub-district of Lefkara for the protection of their rights and more generally of the rights of the whole Greek population of the Island against the arbitrary acts of the foreign rulers. These arbitrary acts have been intensified recently to such a point that to face them in council is impossible any longer and call for the undertaking of a non-lawful fight for self-preservation.

It is a fact, Your Excellency, that even the most Christian patience has its limits: we have suffered for fifty-three whole years an administration by people of a foreign race, foreign to our sentiments and the most elementary of our rights and indifferent to the needs of this unfortunate island in the hope that the petty colonial interests of Great Britain would at last be overcome by those considerations which had so much assisted

²⁶⁴ S. Georgallides, *Cyprus and the Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs*, pp. 688-690.

our great mother country in regaining her liberty. We have let no occasion pass during these dark fifty years without proclaiming our desire to be united with Mother Greece, a desire the justice and sanctity of which England first acknowledged in October, 1915, by offering Cyprus to the Greek Government of that time. We have repeatedly sent deputations to England; union memorials and resolutions can be counted by hundreds; we had or rather called for the occasion first in 1907 and secondly last year to receive with Greek flags and with a single cry "Long live Union" two members of the British Government who had come to hold a local enquiry into the Cyprus question. Alas! instead of being moved by this beautiful sight of a small and poor but proud people in the pursuit of its claims for liberty, you have done and are doing everything which is possible in order to show to us that we have been deplorably deceived in having relied on your liberal sentiments. You are proud that Liberty and Right reign in England, but you wish that tyranny and injustice should continue to reign in Cyprus. And behold! The visit of Dr. Drummond Shiels, a visit which in our simplicity we wished to liken to one of the noblest pages of British history, namely the enquiry of Gladstone into the Ionian Islands a short time before their cession to Greece, has resulted in the imposition of new arbitrary measures and in the squandering of the surplus balances of poor Cyprus for the needs of England.

In the face of such a state of affairs my duty as a religious leader of the enslaved people of Cyprus leaves the narrow boundaries of the pseudo-parliamentary structure within which the lawful opposition of the people's representatives is stifled by the counterfeit majority and the tyrannic Royal Orders in Council from London.

As a member of the Council I had of necessity taken the Oath of Allegiance to King George, but as an ecclesiastical and national leader I am now obliged to recommend to

the Cypriots, subjects by the right of might, the disobedience dictated by our violated human rights. It will be my duty from now onwards to go about calling my compatriots to a non-lawful opposition to unlawful authorities and unlawful laws. The time has come for us to prove to our foreign rulers that if we have been deceived as to their liberal sentiments they are none the less deceived if they consider us such a depraved and debased people as to be intimidated by force and arbitrariness.

Who knows? Perhaps you will later be thankful to us because we shall have forced you by our manly attitude to adapt yourselves, thought late, to the reputation of liberal traditions.

In this century, Your Excellency, no people remains enslaved when it really desires its liberty and decides to have it. We, the Greek inhabitants of this Island, which has been a Greek Island for the three thousand years, who constitute five-sixths of the population, and being confident that our Musullman co-habitants, with whom we live so harmoniously, on being enlightened will to the present distress of the country unhesitatingly prefer equality of rights and prosperity which they will enjoy under Greek liberal rule, proclaim the union of Cyprus with Mother Greece and declare that we shall do everything humanly possible for the realization, as soon as possible, of this decision with the certainty that the God of Justice and Morality will assist in this struggle of Justice against vulgar force.

Copies of this letter have been addressed to Messrs. MacDonald, Baldwin, Lloyd George and Henderson in London.

I have, etc.,

(Signed) Nicodemos, Bishop of Kition.

b) Manifesto to the Greek Cypriots:

Greek Brethren,

Fifty-three years of English occupation have persuaded all and have proved most clearly that:

- a) enslaved peoples do not get liberated by means of prayers and solicitations and appeals to the tyrants' sentiments.
- b) the reply to the latter is contempt for the beseeching humble slaves, and arrogance.
- c) our only salvation from all points of view is our national liberation and that the foreigners are here in order to serve their general and special interests with a certain result, our moral and material misery.

Looking therefore steadily at the bright star of new Bethlehem and of our national salvation we have one and only one way to walk, the way which is narrow and full of sorrows but leads to salvation. We should hoist under the light of the day the flag of union and in the kiln of our continuous endeavours standing close together round it, reconciled and setting aside our differences we should with sacrifice and every means pursue our national liberation by getting united with mother Greece. In the name of

God, the Protector of justice, morality, and liberty, of those benefits in life which are insulted by the foreign tyrant, in the name of the eternal ideal for a united Greek Fatherland, let us to be obedient to the voice-law, voice-order which come down from the Mount Sinai of the National Edicts.²⁶⁵

Let us be disciplined trusting in the triumph of justice over might. What even if the foreign tyrants rely upon colossal columns of beastly force and power? Against force let us set up the justice of our cause which is sure to be triumphant at last, especially so when it is inspired with all the force of the soul. Against beastly force let us oppose the unconquerable arms of the soul which are inspired and fortified by the steady strength of un-enslaved faiths knowing and capable of being always victorious and of moving even the motionless steep mountains of impossibilities.

Let us show obedience to this voice, which is the voice of the Fatherland, a voice ascending from the graves of those who for seven centuries had sown their bones in the bosom of the land of Cyprus without the realization of their aspirations and dreams for a national salvation having sweetened the miserable days of their life of many woes. Citizens in thought of a free Greek land we betray those while being obedient to the laws and orders of the foreign ruler to whom and to whose illegal laws we owe no obedience. Let us oppose his unjust and arbitrary wishes and let us strain every nerve in order that he should clear out from our country for the sake of his own purification, this abomination which is called English occupation and Administration of Cyprus.

I have said that this way is narrow and full of sorrows and leads through sacrifices to the salvation of liberation. Children of that race which set up the triumphs of the heroism of

²⁶⁵ In the official translation the word "Legislations" was used.

the holocausts of Messolonghi and Arcadi ,let us not interrupt our way, the way which leads to the steep tops of the success of victory.

Let us on then and let the youth lead the way. Let them show that they are not young in body only but that they have also a young soul rushing towards the difficult aims and the difficult struggles for a free country, for a happy morrow which belongs more to them than to us. Let us on for God who has not created his peoples and his creatures to be the slaves of others in with us.

Nicodemos, Bishop of Kition, 17th October, 1931

Appendix C

The Charter of the Holy Church of Cyprus

Election of Archbishop

Article 59

When the Archbishop's See becomes vacant for any reason, the *Locum-Tenens* undertakes the administration of the See temporarily until a new archbishop is elected. This temporal administration refers only to the necessary day-to-day matters and it cannot inflict any major changes.

Article 60

Persons eligible for election:

- a) Bishops and assistant bishops.
- b) Unmarried clergy who have the qualifications to be elected.

Article 61

When the Archbishop's See becomes vacant the *Locum-Tenens* must send two circular letters within ten days informing the priests and all members of the orthodox church about the forth coming election. The priests of the parishes and communities have to

prepare the rolls of voters within ten days from the receipt of the circular letter. The second circular letter is sent to the orthodox Christians informing them the date of the election of the special representatives. If, according to the canons of the Holy Synod, the senior bishop, ie; the *Locum-Tenens*, fails to send the circular letters within the prescribed period, then the second in order bishop undertakes to send them.

Article 62

The election of the archbishop is completed in three stages:

a) The election of Special representatives

The election of the special representatives takes place within 30 days from the issue of the second circular letter sent to all orthodox Christians of the proposed secret ballot. All orthodox Christians, men and women over 18 years of age, who reside at least for a year in their community or parish, and who are registered in the roll have the right to vote. People who have offended against the regulations of the Church or talk against the Christian Orthodoxy or its prelates, cannot be included in the roll.

The rolls are affixed to the doors of the churches; the voters can check if their names are on the rolls and they can protest to the bishop, within three days, if they believe that a voter should not be included on the roll. The bishop deals with the protests according to the regulations. No one's name can appear on two rolls or can vote twice.

The special representatives must be Greek orthodox members of a community or parish, over 25 years of age, regardless of sex. They must submit their candidature by Thursday

noon, prior to the Sunday, the day of the election. If by that day and time, the number of candidates for the said community or parish, who stand for election, is not greater than the number of the candidates, according to the provisions of the charter, then those candidates are declared as elected and no election takes place in the said community or parish. The distribution of the special representatives is as follows:

1. Archiepiscopal area: 400 representatives.
2. In every bishopric: $200 \text{ representatives} = 5 \times 200 = 1000 \text{ representatives}$.

Note: The number of representatives elected by each community or parish is defined by the Holy Synod.

b) The election of General representatives

The special representatives assemble on a fixed date and time, within twenty two days from their election, at a place defined by the *Locum-Tenens* and elect one hundred general representatives. Fifty are elected from the archiepiscopal area, (17 clergy and 33 laymen); ten from the bishopric of Paphos, (4 clergy and 6 laymen); ten from the bishopric of Kition, (3 clergy and 7 laymen); ten from the bishopric of Kyrenia, (3 clergy and 7 laymen); ten from the bishopric of Limassol, (4 clergy and 6 laymen); and ten from the bishopric of Morphou, (3 clergy and 7 laymen).

All the general representatives must be Greek orthodox Christians, residents of Cyprus, not less than thirty years of age, enlisted in the rolls of their community or parish irrespective of sex, and known for their piety and love for the Church. The Holy Synod

confirms the election of the general representatives and deals with any objections. An objection for the election of a special or general representative must be made to the president of the Holy Synod in writing within three days from the date of the election, concerning the special or general representative, by a person who is registered as a voter.

c) Election Assembly for the election of the Archbishop

The assembly for the election of the archbishop consists of:

The *ex-officio* members who are:

- a) members of the Holy Synod.
- b) the abbots or their representatives of the monasteries of Kykko, Machaera, St. Neophytos, Trooditissa, Chrysoroyiatissa and Stavrovouni.
- c) the abbot or mother superior of an existing monastery whose number of monks or nuns is not less than five.
- d) two official clergymen of the archiepiscopal area, preferably teachers of divinity.
- e) three official clergymen; teachers of divinity; two from Nicosia district and one from the Famagusta district.

D) those general representatives, already elected.

All the general representatives are officially invited by the *Locum-Tenens*, three days after the confirmation of their election, to present themselves in fifteen days at the assembly hall of the archbishop's palace for the election of the archbishop. The invitation must be sent at least eight days prior to the election, stating the day of the week and the time of the assembly. If at the fixed day and time there are two thirds of the elected representatives, then there is a quorum and the assembly proceeds to the election, otherwise, the assembly is postponed for a day. If the absence of the electors is due to reasons attributed to an act of God then the election is postponed to another day.

The identities of those present are checked by two clergymen appointed by the *Locum-Tenens* and no one is allowed to enter the hall unless he is an elector. Before the proceedings of the election start, a prayer is said and the *Locum-Tenens* calls the electors to vote by secret ballot for the person they think fit for the Archbishop's See and has the qualifications according to the charter of the Holy Church of Cyprus. The secretary of the assembly calls out the name of each voter, who comes forward, receives his ballot, writes on it the name of the person he wishes to elect and casts his vote in the ballot box which lies in front of the members of the Holy Synod. The *ex-officio* members cast their votes in a different ballot box from the ballot box for the votes of the general representatives.

At the end of the voting the votes are counted by the members of the Holy Synod and the elected archbishop is considered the person who has received the majority of votes of the *ex-officio* members and of the general representatives. If no candidate receives the majority vote from both bodies then the voting is repeated and if again nobody is

elected the voting is repeated for a third time, between the two who have received most votes from either ballot box. During the third vote the two bodies vote together, casting their votes in the same ballot box and the candidate who receives the majority of votes is elected. If both candidates receive the same number of votes then the Holy Synod elects one of the two by secret ballot. If they again receive equal votes the Holy Synod draws lots.

After the election, the members of the Holy Synod with all the electors, *ex-officio* and general representatives, enter the Cathedral of St. John to ratify the election by signing the minutes of the election on the altar of the Cathedral. If the person elected is not eligible to be enthroned due to status, the enthronement takes place in fifteen days, otherwise the enthronement takes place on the same date in the Cathedral of St. John. The heads of the Orthodox churches are notified by the *Locum-Tenens* about the election and enthronement of the new archbishop.²⁶⁶

²⁶⁶ *The Charter of the Holy Church of Cyprus*, pp. 30-35. Translated into English by: G. Theodoulou.

Appendix D

Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (1960) regarding the authority and privileges of the Church.²⁶⁷

Article 90

1. Subject to the ensuing provisions of this Article each Communal Chamber shall have power by or in its own communal laws to provide for the application (εφαρμογή-tatbik) of its laws and decisions.
2. A Communal Chamber shall have no power to provide in any of its laws or decisions for imprisonment or detention for any violation thereof or failure to comply with any directions given by a Communal Chamber in exercise of any power vested in it under this Constitution.
3. The Communal Chambers shall have no competence to use measures of constraint (αναγκαστικά μέτρα – cebir) to secure compliance with their respective communal laws or decisions and of the judgments of the Courts dealing with civil disputes relating to personal status and to religious matters within their respective competence.

²⁶⁷ *Cyprus Constitution*, p. 30 and pp. 132 – 133.

4. Where it becomes necessary to use measures of constraint in compelling compliance with any law or decision of a Communal Chamber or with any matter connected with the exercise of the authority of control or supervision by a Communal Chamber such measures of constraint shall, on the application by or on behalf of the Communal Chamber, be applied by the public authorities of the Republic which shall have exclusive competence to apply such measures of constraint.
5. The execution of any judgment or order of a court in connexion with any matter within the exclusive competence of a Communal Chamber shall be carried out through the public authorities of the Republic.

Article 110

1. The Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus shall continue to have the exclusive right of regulating and administering its own internal affairs and property in accordance with the Holy Canons and its Charter in force for the time being and the Greek Communal Chamber shall not act inconsistently with such right.
2. The institution of *Vakf* and the Principles and Laws of, and relating to, *Vakfs* are recognised by this Constitution.
3. All matters relating to or in any way affecting the institution of foundation of *Vakf* or the *vakfs* or any *vakf* properties, including properties belonging to

Mosques and any other Muslim religious institution, shall be governed solely by and under the Laws and Principles of *Vakfs* (ahkâmül evkaf) and the laws and regulations enacted or made by the Turkish Communal Chamber, and no legislative, executive or other act whatsoever shall contravene or override or interfere with such Laws or Principles of *Vakfs* and with such laws and regulations of the Turkish Communal Chamber.

4. Any right with regard to religious matters possessed in accordance with the law of the Colony of Cyprus in force immediately before the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution by the Church of a religious group to which the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 2 shall apply shall continue to be so possessed by such Church on and after the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution.

Article 111

1. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution any matter relating to betrothal, marriage, divorce, nullity of marriage, judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights or to family relations other than legitimisation by order of the court or adoption of members of the Greek-Orthodox Church or of a religious group to which the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 2 shall apply shall, on and after the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution, be governed by the law of the Greek Orthodox Church or of the Church of such religious group, as the case may be, and shall be cognisable by a tribunal of such Church and no Communal Chamber shall act inconsistently with the provisions of such law.

2. Nothing in paragraph 1 of this Article contained shall preclude the application of the provisions of paragraph 5 of Article 90 to the execution of any judgment or order of any such tribunal.

Appendix E

During the dispute between Archbishop Makarios III and the three bishops (1972) several letters were exchanged between them, the bishops demanding Makarios' resignation from the office of the President of the Republic of Cyprus. Their last two letters show the conflict between the two sides.²⁶⁸

a) The Bishops' letter of 1 June 1972 insisting on Makarios' resignation.

Your Beatitude

We herewith wish to present once again to Your Beatitude the known position, which the Holy Synod of the Holy Church of Cyprus took at its last meeting, concerning your continuing to hold the office of the President of the Republic of Cyprus.

Considerable time has elapsed since the Holy Synod at its meeting of the 2nd March demanded that Your Beatitude resign from politics and devote his person solely to his ecclesiastical duties and the duties of ethnarch. The reasons for our insistence on this demand were expounded at the above mentioned Meeting of the Holy Synod, as well as in our common Dispatch sent to you on the 27th of March 1972, which constituted an answer to your letter of the 19th of March 1972. In both instances we expressed insistence on our demand that you should resign from your secular office as the letter and spirit of the Bible and the Rules of the Holy Church dictate.

²⁶⁸ Glafkos Clerides, *Cyprus: My Deposition*, Vol III, pp. 416-418.

To our consternation, we noted that despite your explicit assurance in the above-mentioned letter that, "If you wished to insist on your proposal, I would feel obliged to accept it (meaning your resignation from the Presidency) should no other choice be dictated by other reasons. I would never wish for a rift in the church and the creation of unrest". To this day you have exhibited no intention to fulfil your promise, which would prove beneficial both to yourself and the Church.

Thus, in the spirit of brotherly love and fully aware of our responsibility for the continuing plight within our Church, which is both unacceptable and detrimental, we address for this last time Your Beatitude and demand from you to abandon, at once and without fail the office of the President of the Cyprus Republic, which is incompatible with your office as archbishop, and to confine yourself to your distinct duties as archbishop and ethnarch.

We inform Your Beatitude that we shall expect Your answer by the 10th of June 1972. In the case that your Beatitude chooses to continue opposing the Holy Rules, with much regret we inform You that we will be obliged to enforce on your person the sanctions provided by the Holy Rules and the Charter of the Holy Church of Cyprus.

We remain

Yennadios, Bishop of Paphos

Anthimos, Bishop of Kition

Kyprianos, Bishop of Kyrenia

The Bishop's Palace at Kition

1st June 1972.

b) **Letter from Makarios to the three Bishops refusing to resign.**

To the Right Reverend of Paphos Yennadios, the Right Reverend Bishop of Kition, Anthimos and Right Reverend Bishop of Kyrenia, Kyprianos.

Beloved brethren in Jesus Christ.

I acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 1st June 1972 signed by all three of you by which I am invited to resign from the office of the President of the Republic of Cyprus "at once and without fail".

In response I inform you that the current critical conditions dictate that I should continue offering my services to the people from the office they entrusted to me. My conscience as a Greek and an archbishop and my mission as an ethnarch do not permit me to abandon the people who are in great danger and who have set their hopes on my person. Such abandonment of the people and flight would be considered high treason. In the face of wolves the good shepherd never abandons his flock and flees.

This is my answer, the rest is in the hands of God

The Lord's blessing be upon you

Your brother in Christ

Makarios, Archbishop of Cyprus

The Archbishop's Palace

10th June 1972.

Appendix F

The letter Archbishop Makarios President of the Cyprus Republic, wrote to General Ghizikis President of Greece on 2 July 1974.

Mr President

Nicosia, 2nd July 1974

It is with deep regret that I am bound to report to you certain unacceptable conditions and facts, for which I consider the Greek Government responsible.

Since the secret arrival in Cyprus of General Grivas, in September 1971, rumours have circulated and there were well founded indications that he came to Cyprus urged and encouraged by certain circles in Athens. It is, however, certain that Grivas, from the first days of his arrival in Cyprus, was in touch with Greek officers from Greece, serving in the National Guard, by whom he was given help and support in his efforts to form an illegal organisation and to struggle allegedly for *Enosis*. He created the criminal organisation EOKA "B", which was the cause and the source of many ills for Cyprus. The activities of this organisation which, under the mantle of patriotism and *Enosis* slogans, has committed political assassinations and many other crimes are well known.

The National Guard, which is officered and controlled by Greek officers, was from the start the main supplier of both men and materials to EOKA "B" the members of which euphemistically called themselves "*Enosists*" and the "*Enosist Army*".

On many occasions I considered the question why an illegal nationally damaging organisation, which divides and causes internal dissension, splits the internal front, and leads the Greek Cypriots to civil war in Cyprus, is supported by Greek officers. On many an occasions I have also considered the question whether this support is approved by the Greek Government. I had a number of thoughts and reflections in order to find a logical answer to my doubts and to my questions. No answer under any circumstances or reflections could be supported on a logical basis. But the Greek Officers' support of EOKA "B" is in reality an undeniable fact. The National Guard camps in various places and their surrounding areas are decorated with pro-Grivas and pro-EOKA "B" slogans and with slogans against the Cyprus Government and especially against me. Greek Officers make propaganda in favour of EOKA "B" within the camps of the National Guard, openly. It is also known and it is an undeniable fact that the opposition press, which supports the criminal activities of EOKA "B", is financed by Athens, and is guided and takes its line from the persons in charge of the 2nd Bureau of the General Staff and the Greek Central Information Office (KYP) in Cyprus.

It is true, that whenever complaints were transmitted by me to the Greek Government about the attitude and behaviour of certain Greek officers, I received the reply that I ought not to hesitate to report such officers by naming them, and to state concrete accusations against them so that they would be recalled from Cyprus. I did this only on one occasion. Such a task is displeasing to me. But the evil is not cured by dealing with it in this way. What is important is the uprooting of the evil and its prevention and not simply to deal with the resulting consequences.

I regret to say, Mr President, that the root of the evil is too deep and reaches as far as Athens. From there it is fed and from there it is conserved and spreads growing into a

tree of evil, the bitter fruit of which Greek Cypriots are tasting today. And in order to be more and absolutely specific I state that members of the military regime of Greece support and direct the activities of the terrorist organisation EOKA "B". This explains the involvement of Greek officers of the National Guard in the illegal actions, conspiracies and other unacceptable situations.

Evidence of the guilt of the circles of the military regime can be found in documents, which were found recently in the possession of leading EOKA "B" persons. It is from the National Centre that money was sent plentifully for the needs of the organisation. After the death of Grivas and the recall of Major Karousos, who came with him, orders were given regarding the leadership of the organisation, and generally all directives came from Athens. It is not possible to doubt the genuineness of these documents, because the typed ones have corrections made by hand, and the handwriting of the author is known. I enclose one such document as an example.

I have always had as a principle and have repeatedly stated that co-operation with each Greek Government constitutes a national duty for me. National interest dictates harmonious and close co-operation between Athens and Nicosia. Whichever the Government of Greece is, it is for me the Government of the motherland and I must co-operate with it. I cannot say that I have special sympathy with military regimes especially in Greece, the country which gave birth to and is the cradle of democracy. But even in this case I did not waver from the principle of co-operation. You should understand however, Mr President, the sad thoughts which occupy and torment me, after ascertaining that persons of the Government of Greece are guiding conspiracies against me, and worst of all dividing the Greeks of Cyprus and driving them to destroy each other. Not just on one occasion up to now have I felt, and in some instances

almost been touched by an invisible hand stretched from Athens, searching in order to destroy my human existence. However, for the sake of national expediency I kept silent. Even the crafty spirit which seized the three defrocked bishops who, created a great crisis in the church, had its source of origin and emanated from Athens. However, I said nothing regarding this. I just pondered and considered all this. I would have continued to remain silent regarding the responsibility of the Greek Government in the present drama of Cyprus, if I was the only sufferer on the stage of this drama. But covering up and silence are not permissible, when all of Cypriot Hellenism is suffering, when Greek officers of the National Guard, urged by Athens are supporting EOKA "B" in criminal activities, which include political assassinations and are generally aimed at the dissolution of the state.

In the effort to dissolve the state of Cyprus great is the responsibility of the Greek Government. The Cyprus state can only be dissolved in the case of *Enosis*. Since, however, *Enosis* is not feasible it is imperative to strengthen the statehood of Cyprus. The Greek Government in its entire stance regarding the issue of the National Guard is practicing an abrogative policy on the Cyprus state. Some months ago the General Headquarters of the National Guard, which consists entirely of Greek officers, submitted to the Government of Cyprus for approval a list of candidates for cadet officers, who would be trained in a special school and would subsequently serve, during the course of their service, as officers. The Council of Ministers did not approve fifty-seven of the candidates on the list. General Headquarters was duly informed by letter. Despite this, on instructions from Athens, Headquarters did not pay any attention to the decision of the Council of Ministers, which had, on the basis of legislation, the exclusive right to appoint officers of the national Guard. Acting with impunity and arbitrarily General Headquarters trampled on laws, ignored the decision of the

Government and enrolled the candidates which had not been approved in the school for officers. I consider absolutely unacceptable this attitude of the National Guard Headquarters, which consists of officers dependent on the Greek Government. The National Guard is an organ of the state of Cyprus and it must be controlled by it and not by Athens. The theory of a unitary defensive area of Greece-Cyprus has its sentimental side, but in reality the situation is different. The National Guard, in the way it is composed and officered today has deflected itself from its purpose and has become a place of burgeoning illegality, a centre of conspiracies against the state and a source of supplies for EOKA "B". Suffice it to say that vehicles of the National Guard in the recently increased activities of EOKA "B" transported arms and moved members of the organisation, whose arrest was imminent, to safety. The absolute responsibility for this deviation of the National Guard rests with Greek officers, some of whom are from head to foot mixed up and participate in EOKA "B". And the National Centre is not without its share in responsibility. The Greek government could, with a simple nod, put an end to this regrettable situation. The National Centre could order an end to the violence and the terrorism of EOKA "B", because it is from Athens that the organisation derives the means of its support and its strength, as is proved by various evidence and receipts. As proof of this unacceptable situation I note here in parenthesis, that in Athens slogans were written against me on the walls of churches and other buildings, including the building of the Cyprus Embassy, yet the Greek Government, despite the fact, that it knows the identity of the perpetrators made no attempt to arrest and punish even one of them, tolerating thus propaganda for EOKA "B".

I have a lot more to say, Mr President, but I do not think that I ought to speak at greater length. And in conclusion I convey to you that the National Guard which is officered by Greek officers, and whose sorry plight has shaken the confidence of the people of Cyprus, will be restructured on a new basis. I have shortened the period of service in

order to reduce the ceiling of the National Guard and the extent of the evil. Possibly it could be observed that the reduction in the strength of the National Guard, due to the shortening of the period of service, would render it incapable of fulfilling its duty in the case of national danger. For reasons I do not wish to state here, I do not share this view. And I would request that the Greek officers serving in the National Guard be recalled. Their continued service and command of the National Guard would be damaging to the relations between Athens and Nicosia. I would, however, be happy should you wish to send to Cyprus about a hundred Greek officers to act as instructors and advisers to assist in the reorganisation of the armed forces of the Republic. I hope that, in the meantime, instructions will be given from Athens to EOKA "B" to terminate its activities since while it is not disbanded definitely it cannot be excluded that it will start a new wave of violence and assassinations.

I regret, Mr President, that I found it necessary to say many unpleasant things in order to describe in these lines and in a language of raw sincerity the lamentable situation which has existed for a long time. This, however, is dictated by National interest, which I always have as a guide for all my actions. I do not wish to interrupt my co-operation with the Greek Government. It must, however, be kept in mind that I am not an appointed commissioner nor a *Locum-Tenens* of the Greek Government in Cyprus, but an elected leader of a large section of Hellenism and I demand analogous behaviour towards me from the National Centre.

The contents of this letter are not secret.²⁶⁹

With hearty wishes

Makarios of Cyprus

²⁶⁹ Glafkos Clerides, *Cyprus: My Deposition* Vol. III, pp. 320-325.

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²⁷⁰ Notes on bibliography

- (a) *The Cyprus Gazette*, as from 1880 up to date, all the Cyprus Greek newspapers and journals, including those which ceased publication and the unpublished documents of the Archbishopric can be reviewed in the Library of the Cultural Centre of Archbishop Makarios' Foundation in Nicosia.
- (b) *The Greek Gazette* and the Greek newspapers, published in Greece, can be reviewed in the Library of the Greek Parliament in Athens.
- (c) The *Annual reports of the Cyprus Military Police*, the *Minutes of the debates in the Legislative Council* and the *Secretariat Archives*, (S.A) documents of the Government of Cyprus are in files, numbered and dated and can be reviewed in the State Archives of the Ministry of Justice and Public Order of the Republic of Cyprus, in Nicosia.
- (d) The *Colonial Office* (C.O) documents, the *Foreign Office* (F.O) documents, the *Minutes of the Ministry for the Colonies* and the *Orders in Council* (O.C) documents are in files, numbered and dated and can be reviewed in the Public Record Office, (P.R.O) in Kew, London.