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A Gender Analysis of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Kosovo: Women's Access to Decision-Making

by

Kiril Sharapov
M.A.

This thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Politics, Faculty of Law, Business and Social Sciences, University of Glasgow

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Abstract

This study examines in detail the complexities of mainstreaming gender within the context of United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK).

By examining how gender has been incorporated within the context of the UN-managed post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo, this research draws upon current feminist theories in political participation, militarism, peace and violence, and the emerging framework of gender mainstreaming within the context of peace-support operations. In particular, this research investigates how gender and ethnic identities intersect to form a web of power relations in post-conflict Kosovo, studying the evolving forms of political participation experienced by Kosovo Albanian women at various levels of regional decision-making.

This research examines (a) how, and to what extent, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo was able to take advantage of the post-conflict ‘window of opportunity’ to engender the processes of post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo; (b) to what extent politically active Kosovo Albanian women exploited this opportunity to gain access to political decision-making in the region by means of formal and informal participation; and (c) to what extent this participation was beneficial towards political and economic empowerment of various groups of Kosovo Albanian women. In doing so it examines: (a) legal and institutional frameworks for gender mainstreaming established by UNMIK as a foundation for the post-conflict policies of gender mainstreaming; (b) the origins of these frameworks, including the unique ‘nation-building’ mandate of UNMIK, and unique cultural and political contexts in Kosovo within which these frameworks were established. This research examines the factors, which define the nature of Kosovo Albanian women’s political activism, exploring connections between gender, militarisation and ethnicisation of day-to-day life in Kosovo.
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<td>AAK</td>
<td>Alliance for the Future of Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPWC</td>
<td>Centre for Protection of Women and Children, Pristina, Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVPOL</td>
<td>UN Civilian Police in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAW</td>
<td>Division for the Advancement of Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRY</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDI</td>
<td>Gender Development Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEM</td>
<td>Gender Empowerment Measurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDR</td>
<td>Human Development Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICTFY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced People</td>
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<tr>
<td>IHFHR</td>
<td>International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRW</td>
<td>International Centre for Research on Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN INSTRAW</td>
<td>International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>KASI</td>
<td>Kosovo Assembly Support Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<td>KIHDR</td>
<td>Kosovo Human Development Report</td>
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<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPC</td>
<td>Kosovo Protection Corps</td>
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<td>KPS</td>
<td>Kosovo Police Service</td>
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<td>KSIP</td>
<td>Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>KtK</td>
<td>Kvinna till Kvinna</td>
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<tr>
<td>KWN</td>
<td>Kosovo Women’s Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGIB</td>
<td>Local Government International Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDK</td>
<td>Democratic League of Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODIHR</td>
<td>Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>OGA</td>
<td>Office of Gender Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMiK</td>
<td>OSCE Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSAGI</td>
<td>Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDK</td>
<td>The Democratic Party of Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>PISG</td>
<td>Provisional Institutions of Self Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTSD</td>
<td>Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAE</td>
<td>Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>SOK</td>
<td>Statistical Office of Kosovo</td>
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SRSG  Special Representative of the Secretary General
UDHR  Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN  United Nations
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA  United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF  United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM  United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNMIK  United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMISET  United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNTAET  UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNSC  United Nations Security Council
WB  World Bank
WHO  World Health Organization

1 See comments by Simon Chesterman, 'A measure of the speed with which the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo was established is the name itself. UN operations typically operate under an acronym, but 'UNIAMIK' was dismissed as too much of a mouthful. 'UNIAK' sounded like a cross between 'eunuch' and 'maniac' — associations judged unlikely to help the mission. 'UNMIK' was the final choice, having the benefits of being short, punchy, and clear. Only in English, however. Once the operation was on the ground, it was discovered that 'unmik', in the dialect of Albanian spoken in Kosovo, meant 'enemy'. No one within the United Nations was aware of the confusion until it was too late, at which point instructions went out to pronounce the acronym 'oon-mik' (Chesterman 2003, p. 11).
Acknowledgments

I would like to thank all of the women and men from various countries across the globe who gave of their time telling their stories, sharing their views about the past and present and, also, their hopes for the future. Without them this research would not have been possible. Special thanks go to the courageous women of Kosovo.

Special acknowledgment is due to Prof Chris Corrin for her continuous support, advice and encouragement. I could not have been more fortunate in having such a dedicated, competent and inspirational supervisor as Chris in guiding me through the ups and downs of a PhD research. I feel privileged to have met her and benefited from her wisdom.

I would also like to thank a number of staff at the Department of Politics and the Department of Central and East European Studies for making my field-work in Kosovo and a number of conference trips possible.

Personally, I would like to thank Richard Campbell for his support throughout the last four years and being there when it was so difficult to go ahead. Thanks also go to Colin Burden for his never-ending encouragement.

Finally, I would like to dedicate this thesis to my parents – Olga Sharapova and Vitaliy Sharapov – for making me believe in myself in whatever I do.
Technical Reservations

Focus of Analysis
This research focuses on specifically Kosovo Albanian women, and not on non-Albanian women (such as Serb and Roma women) residing in Kosovo. Although women throughout the region share similar experiences of the war and the period of post-conflict reconstruction, the current situation of the various ethnic groups differs in a variety of ways. Accordingly, the decision to focus specifically on the experiences of Kosovo Albanian people was driven by a number of methodological considerations, most prominent being that relevant data concerning non-Albanian women in Kosovo is scarce and difficult to obtain. This research focus does not, however, diminish the significance of the contributions of non-Albanian women to peace, nor does it devalue their experiences of war and the post-conflict havoc.

For methodological and practical reasons this study focuses on post-conflict developments in the region, spanning the period from June 1999 (when UNMIK was established) to the end of 2004, when the field-research in Kosovo was undertaken.

The researcher also makes no claim that this analysis represents a comprehensive and representative audit of all institutions, organisations and individuals working in the socially, economically and politically complicated environment in Kosovo. There are many organisations and individuals working in this field whom the researcher did not have the opportunity to interview. Despite this however, this acknowledgement does not invalidate the observations and conclusions resulting from this analysis; indeed, it has been suggested that "In analyzing social issues, it is hard to illustrate a principle without exaggerating many things and without omitting many things from the overall analysis, [while in the wake of continuous transition in Kosovo] it is impossible to analyse any particular social phenomena and not simplify the overall social picture" (UNDP in Kosovo, pp. 57-58).

Statistical Data
All efforts were made in the carrying out of this research to incorporate as much statistical data as possible. Importantly however, it was not always possible to obtain specific statistics on women due to a lack of gender-disaggregated data, and it was not always possible to draw from those that were gender divided with confidence.

Kosovo/Kosova
Throughout this manuscript, the most common English-language spelling of the region's name is used - Kosovo - as opposed to the Albanian 'Kosova' or Serbian 'Kosovo and
Metohija'. This use, however, does not in any way represent or imply a political belief regarding the appropriate resolution of the contested political status of the territory. Accordingly, 'Kosovo' is also used as an adjective to define the geographical belonging of the Albanian population residing within Kosovo. 'Kosovo Albanian' remains an internationally recognised and UN-endorsed definition, and does not represent any implied political opinion.

Confidentiality/Anonymity
All of the names of the people interviewed for this research have been changed and coded in a random manner to protect their identity, except in cases where they have published or otherwise made public opinions on the same topic.
Chapter 1: Introduction

Research Context

This study examines the unique nature of gender mainstreaming within the context of United Nations peacekeeping. Since the end of the Cold War, the number of UN peacekeeping missions has risen dramatically, to the point that in January 2005, some sixteen missions, including seven in Africa, two in Asia, three in Europe (including Kosovo and Georgia), three in Middle East and one in Haiti were in operation. This research examines in detail the complexities of mainstreaming gender within the context of United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK).

By examining how gender has been incorporated within the context of the UN-managed post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo, this research draws upon current feminist theories in political participation, militarism, peace and violence, and the emerging framework of gender mainstreaming within the context of peace-support operations. In particular, this research proposes to investigate how gender and ethnic identities intersect to form a web of power relations in post-conflict Kosovo, studying the evolving forms of political participation experienced by Kosovo Albanian women at various levels of regional decision-making. In this, Kosovo has much to gain from the engagement of women of all ethnicities in region’s political, economic and social arenas. However, many women in the region continue to experience not only economic poverty but what can be called a poverty of opportunity. This poverty of opportunity emerges from the entrenched gender norms embedded in Kosovo Albanian customs and traditions, and has been further cemented by the persuasive militarisation and ethnicisation of the region. This research examines the impact of these factors on the opportunities for meaningful political participation available to Kosovo Albanian women.

Kosovo is currently a province within the union of Serbia and Montenegro, though it is has been administered by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) since that mission’s establishment following the end of the 78-day North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) bombing campaign of Yugoslavia in June 1999. According to UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), which designated the Rambouillet Peace Accords as the basis for resolving the Kosovo crisis, Yugoslav sovereignty of Kosovo was replaced with interim UN and NATO sovereign responsibilities, buttressed by newly-formed local institutions of self-government. According to this resolution, Kosovo’s final status remains conditional upon its compliance with international standards of democratic governance and human rights, and subject to internationally mediated negotiations with the union of Serbia and Montenegro. Until such conditions have been satisfied, UNMIK is authorised to exer-
exercise near-absolute executive and legislative authority in Kosovo in the process of establishing provisional institutions of self-government. As these institutions become functional, UNMIK will transfer its governing competencies to the government of Kosovo.

UNMIK is one of the first UN peacekeeping missions to incorporate a special department designated to operationalise gender-mainstreaming policies within the context of regional post-conflict reconstruction and development. However, in assessing the extent of Kosovo women’s inclusion in the processes of post-conflict reconstruction in the region, this research draws attention to the lack of a consistent approach on the part of UNMIK and the international donor community in Kosovo regarding continuous evaluation of the content and effectiveness of gender mainstreaming policies in Kosovo. It must be noted at this stage that evaluating the ‘effectiveness’ of gender mainstreaming must not be confused with the assessment of the socio-economic and political positions of women in Kosovo, topics which have been the subject of many reports and inquiries by various international and local organisations and scholars (Corrin 2000, 2001a, 2002a, KWN 2001). Accordingly, the impact of UNMIK policies on the position of Kosovo women within the regional development framework is significant, and should be viewed as a rationale for comprehensive assessment of UNMIK’s contribution to achieving gender equality in the region.

Over the last two decades, the issue of women in war and post-conflict reconstruction has been recognised as a crucial dimension of conflict prevention and resolution. Meanwhile, international campaigns supported by feminist and human rights movements throughout the world promoting and recognising the rights of women as human rights have prompted many positive developments in international legal and political thinking. Such developments include UN SC Resolution 1325 (2000) and follow-up reports by the UN Secretary-General and UNIFEM, which have placed the issues of women, war and peace at the centre of the UN peacekeeping agenda (Cohn 2004), calling for all actors involved in conflict and peace-building to acknowledge and address the unique needs of women, promote their rights, and increase women’s participation at all decision-making levels in various institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict. At the same time, a new strand of thinking has paralleled the development of the UN gender mainstreaming discourse. Opposed to the ‘problem-solving’ strategy adopted by the UN in framing contemporary debates on gender and development, this approach advocates critical engagement with the issues of empowerment, participation and representation. Arguing that UN peacekeeping and the emerging discourse of ‘women, peace and security’ are already gendered and that inherent gender biases cannot be dismantled by targeted ‘add-women-and-stir’ interventions, this critical line of thinking has emphasised the need to go beyond incorporating gender perspectives by ‘recognising women’s specific roles
and needs', arguing for a consideration of why these needs and roles were not recognised and incorporated in the first place. Its main objective – re-gendering peacekeeping rather than engendering it – has influenced the analytical framework of this study.

The post-conflict reconstruction being conducted in Kosovo differs from other reconstruction efforts in a number of ways. These include the wide range of UNMIK’s development responsibilities, the long-term nature of anticipated international involvement, and a post-conflict context offering a variety of development ‘windows of opportunity’. In the course of the post-conflict ‘nation-building’ in Kosovo, UNMIK has faced many challenges and obstacles, from the provision of humanitarian relief to the institutionalisation of political, social and economic reform. Subsequently, the wide range of development responsibilities has placed additional pressure on the United Nations’ peacebuilding effort, leaving it often limited in its ‘resources, political will and institutional framework’ (Bellamy 2004, p. 249). In this light, the evaluation of the impact of the UNMIK gender mainstreaming policies on various groups of women and men in Kosovo, and the extent and nature of their involvement in the process of policymaking is highly relevant.

The 2004 Kosovo Human Development Report notes that significant progress has been achieved over the last five years by UNMIK and PISG in developing institutions of democratic governance at central and municipal levels, rebuilding socioeconomic and political infrastructure and, more generally, paving the way for the implementation of the ‘Standards for Kosovo’ (UNDP in Kosovo 2004). The Report also warns, however, that the problem of ‘stagnant democracy deficit’ coupled with ethnically and gender-uneven development could result in severe ‘development setbacks’ (ibid). Further to this, an unexpected outbreak of interethnic violence in March 2004 engulfed nearly all Kosovo municipalities and undermined prospects for ethnic and political reconciliation (ICG 2004b). Viewed in the light of the continuous criticism of UNMIK’s leadership and policies, the violence ethicised and gendered – not only pointed to the failure of Resolution 1244 to deliver peaceful reconciliation and interethnic tolerance, but also demonstrated a Kosovo-wide disillusionment with the ‘internationals’. Visible signs of UNMIK’s presence were the first to be targeted and looted, along with Serbian churches and monasteries.

In terms of gender mainstreaming, local disappointment in UNMIK manifested itself in deep distrust demonstrated by many women’s groups, echoing the earlier ‘neo-colonial’ women-blind policies. Such distrust was displayed by groups including Kosova Women’s Network, the largest Pristina-based umbrella organisation for women’s NGOs and groups in Kosovo. Numerous reports by Kosovo-based women’s groups, echoed by the findings of international experts, have suggested that gender mainstreaming in Kosovo still remains on the periphery of the regional development agenda, forced there by the

The role of UNMIK in establishing institutional and legal frameworks for gender mainstreaming and gender equality in Kosovo should not be underestimated. However, the relationship between gender mainstreaming policies or gender-sensitised legislation and their impact on women's socio-economic or political positions is not straightforward (Bouta et al. 2004, Cockburn 2004, Yuval-Davis 1997). Accordingly, evaluating the existence and scope of gender mainstreaming policies and their impact on local women's access to various forms of decision-making can provide an initial step towards developing a broader qualitative inquiry into the long-term impact of UNMIK's gender mainstreaming on the culturally and ethnically heterogeneous communities of Kosovo.

UNMIK's Office of Gender Affairs (OGA) is an example of an organisation in which the stated commitment to gender mainstreaming remains unmatched by the content of organisational policies, their effectiveness and their impact on various groups of local women and men. Following the establishment of the Office in 1999, the OGA was taken up in UN rhetoric as a showcase for gender mainstreaming practices within the broader framework of UN peacekeeping. However, since 1999 the OGA's role and level of authority within UNMIK had been downgraded, despite the increasing attention given to the issues of women, peace and security highlighted in the adoption of Resolution 1325 in October 2000. Meanwhile, rejected by Kosovo women's movements for ignoring local capacities and expertise and criticised by the emerging national machinery for its ambivalence towards cooperation (as opposed to imposing policies), the OGA example demonstrates that the mere existence of 'gender machinery' does not necessarily guarantee viable and empowering gender mainstreaming policies in and outside the mission.

The UNMIK gender mainstreaming efforts in Kosovo were the first UN gender mainstreaming policies to be implemented by the UN. In this, it must be recognised that on the one hand, the UN is a norm-making institution with responsibility for setting internal and external parameters for gender mainstreaming. At the same time however, the UN has been given in Kosovo full authority for implementing norms and policies originating from within the broader UN system without clear and transparent mechanisms for scrutinising UNMIK's compliance and adherence to these norms (Inglis and Marshall 2003, Wilde 2000). The only monitoring procedure set out in UN Resolution 1244 (1999) is a request for the Secretary General to report to the Security Council at regular intervals on the implementation of the resolution; including, among others, on the progress made in 'protecting and promoting human rights' (UNSC 1999a, art 11 (1), 20).
Research Question

This research examines (a) how, and to what extent, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo was able to take advantage of the post-conflict ‘window of opportunity’ to engender the processes of post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo; (b) to what extent politically active Kosovo Albanian women exploited this opportunity to gain access to political decision-making in the region by means of formal and informal participation; and (c) to what extent this participation was beneficial towards political and economic empowerment of various groups of Kosovo Albanian women. In doing so it examines: (a) legal and institutional frameworks for gender mainstreaming established by UNMIK as a foundation for the post-conflict policies of gender mainstreaming; (b) the origins of these frameworks, including the unique ‘nation-building’ mandate of UNMIK, and unique cultural and political contexts in Kosovo within which these frameworks were established. This research examines the factors, which define the nature of Kosovo Albanian women’s political activism, exploring connections between gender, militarisation and ethnicisation of day-to-day life in Kosovo. It explores how intersections of ethnicity, age, gender and class in Kosovo Albanian society set the parameters of Kosovo Albanian women’s activism.

Originality and Value of the Research

This research provides original contributions on both theoretical and methodological levels. Analytically, it examines gender mainstreaming in the context of post-war reconstruction as a process, rather than an objective in itself; locating it within the framework of a particular peace-building mission influenced by unique cultural, political and socio-economic contexts. Methodologically, it incorporates into the research frame various groups of Kosovo Albanian women who have been excluded or included (willingly or unwillingly) from various decision-making processes in the UN-sponsored reconstruction. This incorporation is informed by the ideas of gendered notions of peace and gendered praxis of peace.

Conceptually, this research seeks to challenge and deconstruct the gender-biased nature of post-conflict reconstruction, typified by supposedly unproblematic dichotomies of women vs. men, war vs. peace, combatant vs. civilian, equality vs. inequality. Further, this study treats inequality not as an isolated social phenomenon requiring targeted legislative and policy-making interventions, but as a self-reproducing category originating in patriarchal and often militarised systems of power-sharing. In turn, such systems generate certain political and socio-economic benefits which are unequally distributed and often mingled with costs for different groups of men and women. Looking at both qualitative
and quantitative aspects of political representation and participation within the emerging institutions of self-government in Kosovo, this research draws upon the principle that moving towards gender equality in a post-conflict setting requires a shift from gender consciousness built on dichotomy and privilege to a gender consciousness built on diversity and reciprocity.

Given the political nature of the United Nations' Best-Practice/Lessons Learnt reporting, it is important to establish the extent to which UNMIK can actually be considered as 'best practice' and, if it can be considered as such, how it managed to empower Kosovo women through developing and securing avenues for their meaningful participation at all levels of decision-making. Herein lies the originality of this research.

The key to this research lies in its provision of opportunities to influence and inform current thinking on post-conflict reconstruction (undertaken either under the UN Charter mandate or within the emerging framework of unilateral intervention), transforming the current paradigm of 'women, peace and war' to an all-inclusive 'gender, peace and security'. As Cynthia Cockburn has observed, 'It is important to examine our societies meticulously with a gender lens if we want to change them' (Cockburn 2004, p. 33). This research calls to re-gender – rather than en-gender – existing institutions involved in post-conflict reconstruction at macro- and micro-levels. In doing so, it invites policy-makers and major stakeholders to challenge the very foundations of existing power-sharing systems that legitimise the political and socio-economic exclusion of various groups of women and men. This goal has been underpinned by the all-inclusive participatory nature of this research that is reflected in its conceptual and methodological apparatus.

The practical and academic contributions of this research are considerable. In this, the findings of this study can:

- Influence the emerging gender mainstreaming discourse within the UN and the international donor community by bringing multiple voices to the framework, revealing ideas at both macro and micro levels;

- Influence women's and human rights movements by shedding more light on the complexity of taking advantage of the post-war 'windows of opportunity'. In consequence, it offers substantial scope for empowering and prompting grass-roots movements to re-consider current strategies of disassociation from UN nation-building missions;

- Influence policy-makers in Kosovo by revealing a need to disengage from current 'addon' approaches to gender, which aim to 'add' and 'compartmentalisce' gender concerns into existing gender-biased strategies at both central and local levels, towards a more transformative approach;
- Influence ongoing analytical and policy-oriented initiatives that aim to develop and strengthen categories critical to gender mainstreaming in post-conflict reconstruction and development.

The findings of this research hold meaning for various target groups. These include politicians in Kosovo, UNMIK's policymakers, the UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Political Affairs (DPA), the Kosovo human rights and women's rights communities, and the women and men of Kosovo. Importantly, existing and forthcoming UN peacekeeping missions in conflict-prone areas and the international donor community are also likely to prove receptive audiences. All are currently adopting gender-sensitive language, without necessarily subjecting their long-term policies to critical gender analysis.

With the principle in mind that any research can only be useful if it is delivered and understood by the intended target groups and beneficiaries, the impact of this research is threefold. Firstly, it offers a substantial contribution to the emerging field of gender/women, peace and security studies. Given the increasing awareness of the limited impact of gender mainstreaming policies in post-conflict reconstruction, the ultimate implications of this research may touch a very broad segment of the international development community and local human rights and women's rights social movements, extending well beyond those participating in the ongoing reconstruction of Kosovo. The dynamics of global communication have been changing dramatically over the last decade, with internet-based technologies enabling local and international NGOs to build and shape partnerships and joint programmes of action. This is especially true in the field of gender, peace and security, with a number of internet-based global networks bridging civil society, practitioners and the academic community.

Secondly, this research offers contributions to education. In this, the findings hold potential for incorporation as a case-study in pre-deployment training packages for UN peacekeeping contingents, including military, civilian police and civilian peacekeeping personnel. The requirement to incorporate gender perspectives in training for personnel involved in peace support operations has been recently emphasised by the UN Security Council. Accordingly, increasing attention given to the available material on the gender implications of UN peacekeeping is to be expected on the part of both the national governmental and international non-governmental constituencies responsible for peacekeepers' training.

Finally, this research holds considerable potential to influence various policymakers and decision-makers engaged in gender mainstreaming at a variety of levels, rang-
ing from senior officials in the transitional Kosovo administration and UN policy-making units to Kosovo human rights and women’s rights communities.

Organisation of the Manuscript

This manuscript is divided into chapters, with each chapter providing analysis of a particular thematic issue, setting the background and analytical framework for the discussion that follows. In Chapter Two, the emerging field of research on the changing nature of contemporary conflict and peacekeeping is considered. This discussion sets the background for the analysis of the complex dynamics of post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo, pointing to the importance of recognising women’s roles and contributions to conflict resolution. It also sheds light on the complexities of integrating gender perspectives into institutional and individual understandings of peace and conflict.

The components of the methodological framework developed for this study are discussed in Chapter Three. In this chapter, the main methodological approaches which influenced the overall design of the fieldwork and data-analysis are reviewed. This chapter also explains how data collection and analysis influenced and shaped the relationship between the researcher and the research participants. The nature and content of ethical and representation/validity protections built into the overall research frame are reviewed.

A background to the current situation in Kosovo is provided in Chapter Four. This discussion includes a brief overview of the historical developments setting the stage for the establishment of UNMIK in 1999, focusing on the history of Kosovo Albanian women’s involvement in clandestine resistance campaigns. This chapter provides an anthropological overview of Kosovo Albanian society, looking at its traditions and customs which continue to dominate the cultural landscape of the region. This chapter also reviews the concept of ‘civil society’ in the context of the historical and political developments of Kosovo. Finally, it reviews key pieces of the post-1999 legislation relevant to the issues of gender mainstreaming in post-war Kosovo.

Recent developments in international thinking on national architectures for gender mainstreaming are examined in Chapter Five. Recognition of these forms is given as unique mechanisms to promote equality between women and men, to mainstream gender, and to monitor the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action (UN 1995a) and Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (UN 1979). This chapter also provides a background to the current political situation in Kosovo within which the post-war machinery for gender mainstreaming has been developed; this discussion focuses on various institutions located at central and municipal levels of the regional self-government. While this chapter sets the background to, and explains the processes
leading to the emergence of the gender mainstreaming machinery in Kosovo, the following two chapters examine in greater detail the dynamics of local capacities, considering how the existing and emerging institutional arrangements differently affect (and are affected by) various groups of Kosovo men and women.

The nature of the complex socio-economic, cultural and political contexts currently existing in Kosovo are analysed in Chapter Six. The setting of boundaries and implicit limitations on women’s participation in circumstances where achievement of gender equality is noted as a development priority forms a core of this analysis. In turn, Chapter Seven examines the complexities of the politics of the women’s movement in Kosovo from a qualitative perspective, placing this within the frames of the pervasive militarisation and ethnicisation of political discourses in Kosovo. This chapter considers the nature, availability and accessibility of the informal avenues for decision-making available to Kosovo Albanian women following the withdrawal of Serbian troops from Kosovo in June 1999. It also sheds more light on the divisions within the Kosovo women’s movement grounded in the hierarchies of political, social and ideological belonging, where the processes of inclusion and exclusion not only operate along the male-female dyad, but at many other various levels as well.

Chapter Eight concludes the research, bringing together the key threads of analysis running through this research. This is achieved by summarising the discussions of the previous chapters, and by presenting ideas for future research in the developing fields of gendered phenomena of peace and war.
Chapter 2: Review of Literature: The Gendered Nature of the Changes in Modern Conflict and Peacekeeping

Introduction

Before analysing the gendered nature of the UN’s involvement in the post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo, the changing nature of contemporary conflict and peacekeeping must be considered. In this, the conflict itself is a profoundly gendered phenomenon, affecting various groups of men and women in various socio-economic and political ways. Moreover, it intensifies existing inequalities and often results in new ones. In setting out the background to the analysis of the dynamics of post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo, this literature review focuses on the gendered nature of recent changes in modern conflict and peacekeeping. It points to the various strands of thinking within international politics and feminist scholarship that have looked at the drivers of such change, highlighting the impacts of these changes on civilian populations trapped in the midst of the more than 40 conflicts that are ongoing in the contemporary world. In doing this, this review emphasises the role of feminist scholarship in developing a fuller understanding of women’s roles and contributions towards conflict resolution. At the same time, this review also sheds more light on the inherent complexities of integrating gender perspectives into institutional and individual understandings of peace and conflict.

The review begins with an overview of the changing nature of contemporary conflict, pointing to a blurring of the demarcation between war and peace, to complex interactions between ethnic and gender identities, and to the fact that the nature of international responses to the changing dynamics of war often objectify women in conflict areas as helpless victims and rape-survivors. It sheds more light on the nature of violence against women and girls in situations of war, and challenges the images portraying women as 'victims', instead pointing to the variety of roles and responsibilities women assume in surviving and resisting war and militarisation. It proceeds from this by analysing the changing nature of modern peacekeeping, which is often viewed as the only legitimate international mechanism to ‘...save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’ (UN Charter 1945). It touches on the complex issues surrounding the interaction between international peacekeepers and local populations, pointing out that as much as there can be no unified category of ‘women’ or ‘men’, there can be no one unified group of ‘peacekeepers’. The review concludes by looking at the varying international perspectives on the nature of

\(^2\)Mazumra 2005b, p. 31.
women's involvement in modern peacekeeping, ranging from the unproblematic image of the 'local martyr' to the one of the 'international goddess'.

The changing nature of conflict
The end of the 20th century witnessed dramatic changes in the nature of conflict and war (Mazurana 2005, at 21). Importantly however, while the means of fighting wars have changed over the past two or three decades, so too have the means of working towards peace. Both these sets of changes have been examined, conceptualised and acted upon differently by the various institutions and agencies involved in fighting wars and restoring peace; or, as many critics of the shape of post-Cold War international relations (Chomsky and Jardine 2002; Ignatieff 2003) have argued, such changes have occurred in both these realms at the same time (Mazurana 2005b, p. 31). Mazurana et al. have noted that in contemporary conflicts:

...the final weapon of mass destruction and mass terror [becomes] the body, the body as bomb.

(Mazurana et al. 2005a, p. 21)

The changes seen in the past few decades have had a profound effect on the various groups of men and women involved in conflict, though such an effect has been experienced differently at various stages, various levels and in various roles. In this, women and men experience conflict as individuals guided by a complex set of the personal identities, which are in turn influenced by gender, ethnic, cultural, or religious belongings. Importantly, the impact of war on each of these forms of identity is profoundly gendered (Cockburn 1998; 2004; Corrin 2000; 2003a Enloe 2000; 2004; Mazurana 2005b), requiring carefully gendered post-conflict reconstruction responses. Further to this, the very demarcation of the line between 'peace' and 'war' in the post-Cold War world has been blurred by the nature of the intra-state warfare, raising questions about what constitutes 'peace' and how this state differs from 'war' (Galtung 1996; Galtung et al. 2002; Luttwak 2002; Skjelsbæk and Smith 2001b). Reflecting on these ambiguities, Tarja Vayrynen has argued that modern warfare has diverged from that seen in traditional understandings of war and peace, ushering in 'zones of ambiguity' where neither absolutely prevails. In this, the vacuum created by the collapse or malfunction of state apparatus is often filled by a variety of non-state actors, leading to the disappearance of any unambiguous distinctions between combatants and non-combatants. In such a dynamic, those who might have been considered non-combatants in a traditional model end up contributing to warfare in many ways (Vayrynen 2004, p. 135).
Over the last two decades, international institutions fielding international peacekeeping operations have, as is demonstrated by the emergence of large-scale reconstruction and development programmes (see Figure 2.1), eagerly treated the prefix ‘post’ in ‘post-conflict’ or ‘post-war’ as a clear marker of the returning ‘normality’ of life. Often however, the question of what ‘normality’ means for the various groups of men and women experiencing the conflict remains unasked (Whitworth 2004, p. 33). Analysing the impact of war and militarisation on the social fabric of societies, Cockburn and Zarkov have noted that from the point of view of the individual caught up in armed conflict ‘...the moment that gun is silenced has something to be said for it’ (Cockburn and Zarkov 2002a, p. 10). Meanwhile, the application of a gender lens to the growing field of conflict analysis uncovers a continuum of violence running through the social, economic and political spheres long before and long after the ‘official’ beginning and end of war are declared. What this means is that modern wars can never be said to start or end at one clearly defined moment. Viewed in this light, international re-construction and conflict-prevention efforts, including UN peacekeeping, should be conceptualised, conducted and analysed as a continuous process, not divided into ‘discrete labelled chunks’. Treating them as elements of a broader strategy opens up space for peace-making and conflict-resolution in its diversity, including grass-roots organising, international and local peace-, gender- and human rights activism (Corrin 2002a). In particular, this study demonstrates that the ‘peacekeeping project’ in Kosovo should not be confined to the mere presence of UN-mandated international military and civil staff. Instead, ‘peacekeeping in Kosovo’ should include the broad variety of local and international stakeholders and the similar variety of political, social and cultural forms of ‘transaction’ between them completed in both public and private spheres.

Conflicts affect various communities, and the women and men within these communities differently (Fitzsimmons 2005). Apart from the deliberate devastation of physical infrastructure (Kumar 2001, Rehn and Sirleaf 2002), modern conflicts, first and foremost, target the social and cultural fabric of societies, evoking or intensifying existing social, cultural, economic and political divisions between and within communities, families and individuals. As Dyan Mazurana has noted:

...the characteristics of today’s conflicts – mass displacement, instability, targeting of civilians, use of child soldiers, and ethnic, religious and gendered forms of violence – are not unfortunate by-products of the conflicts; they are both the tools and the goals.

(Mazurana 2005b, p. 33)
Many, if not all, contemporary conflicts are structured around the competing identity claims based on the physical or imagined markers of religion, race, nationality, 'tribe' or clan. The Kosovo conflict was fuelled by differences of ethnicity (between Serbs, of Slavic origin, and ethnic Albanians who are Illyrian in origin) and religion (between Serbs, who are almost entirely followers of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and non-Serbs, who are overwhelmingly followers of Islam, and Roman Catholicism). Ginty and Robinson, analysing the role of 'identity contestation' as one of the features of contemporary conflicts, have noted:

One group may define itself in opposition to another and perceive gains by the other groups as automatically entailing an erosion of its own position.

(Ginty and Robinson 2001, pp. 31-37)

Meanwhile, analysing the intersection of gender, ethnicity and nationalism from a gender perspective, Nira Yuval-Davis has pointed to the impact of radical nationalism on political and social constructions of sexuality, which can lead in turn to the essentialisation of relations between men and women within such discourses (Yuval-Davis 1997). In this analysis, Yuval-Davis introduces the 'engendered' understanding of nations and nationalism, pointing to the complex dynamics of gender identity within 'nationalist' projects, including reproduction, culture, citizenship, national conflicts and wars (Yuval-Davis 1997a, pp. 3-4). Using Yuval-Davis' analytical approach in a regional framework, Julie Mertus has considered how national and gender identities intertwine and shape each other in post-Tito Kosovo. Linking these processes with the complexity of modern warfare, Mertus pointed out that these identities quickly become contested terrains to be won or lost, preserved, or dissolved (Mertus 1999; 2003). Further to this, the intersection of gender and ethnicity was also the main focus of Cynthia Cockburn's analysis of the prolonged ethnicity-centred conflict in Cyprus. Cockburn pointed to the 'universality' of the two 'components' or 'layers' of individual identity—gender and ethnicity—suggesting no one can avoid negotiating a relationship to the man/woman dyad, and no one can avoid accepting or refusing ethnic 'names'. Such 'compartamentalisation' forms the basis for the drawing of lines to mark and separate people as 'different'. The complex processes of 'compartamentalisation', in turn, are fuelled by the relations of power and the pervasiveness of the social forces that define and seek to enforce them (Cockburn 2004, pp. 27-28). Along these lines, the ethnicisation of the conflict and post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo may appear to originate from intricate tribal and ethnic fractures that have been running throughout the Balkans over the course of the last millennium. However, as this study demonstrates, competing claims over social, economic and political resources remain behind the complex
identity-based processes of inclusion and exclusion. Following Cockburn’s view, ethnicity is never the main cause of the conflict:

Although ethnicity may not be the initial trigger, conflicts can become ‘ethnicised’, or adopt features that suggest that the conflict revolves around ethnicity or identity. In fact, more prosaic factors normally lie behind the origin of ‘ethnic conflicts’.

Usually these are access to political, economic and social resources.

(Cockburn 2004, p. 27)

Most studies of ethnicity and nationalism have focused on the factors behind the induced transformation of ethnic lines into partition lines, splitting sovereign states and communities into heterogeneous cultural groups (Ginty and Robinson 2001, p. 33). However, the divisive nature of the gender line often remains overlooked, despite its overwhelming influence and presence. As Cockburn has observed, the gender line runs through and often divides every institution, every street, every building, every bedroom – and even the bed itself (Cockburn 2004, p. 32).

Continuous lobbying and advocacy efforts by international and local women’s groups and networks\(^3\) have enabled the international development community to start acknowledging the gendered nature and gendered impacts of armed conflicts. In this, the adoption of Resolution 1325 in October 2000 by the Security Council, calling on the United Nations and Member States to increase the participation of women in decision-making and peace processes, to ensure the protection of women and girls, and to institute gender perspectives and training in peacekeeping (UN 2000a), provides evidence of such activism being increasingly successful (Cohn 2004). Importantly however, gaps and challenges in the implementation of the Resolution (The NGO working group on women, peace and security 2005) demonstrate that such formal ‘acknowledgment’ does not necessarily amount to ‘action’. The international recognition of women’s and children’s vulnerability to structural and low-level violence (Ginty and Robinson 2001, pp. 31-37), to rape, torture, trafficking, forced marriages and pregnancies (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002) has had considerable influence on the policies of humanitarian and development agencies, including the UN system (UN 1999e). However, as many feminists have pointed out, the recognition of women’s contributions to conflict resolution and the resolution of the specific problems women face has occurred on a more limited basis. Indeed, humanitarian relief and post-conflict reconstruction programmes often stereotype women as helpless victims bearing the devastating physical and psychological impact of the conflict (Corrin 2000, Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). The role of women in rebuilding devastated communities and negotiating over the front-line has largely been overlooked (Kumar 2001, pp. 6-7). Meanwhile, the ‘front-

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\(^3\) For example AWID (http://www.awid.org) and ‘Women in Black’ (http://www.womeninblack.net)
line' of modern conflicts often runs deep through communities, families, towns and villages (Ginty and Robinson 2001), forcing many (but not all) women to assume a variety of 'new' roles throughout the conflict, not only in terms of assuming a broad range of caring responsibilities and support-roles, but also in terms of building trust and collaboration at the grass-roots level, laying the groundwork for organising across borders -- in sub-regions and internationally (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002, pp. 80-81). However, in all of these matters, women are often left with few choices and little influence. By examining the gender dynamics of post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo, this study demonstrates that such 'role-based' empowerment does not always amount to 'liberation', nor does it lead to the redefinition of the oppressive gender-biased political and social regimes. When the conflict ends, 'normality', often defined in male terms, returns. The inability of modern peacekeeping to re-define this normality to incorporate the broad spectrum of capabilities, interests and needs of the various groups of men and women is detrimental to the very nature of conflict resolution -- addressing the structural reasons of conflict and laying out foundations for inclusive and egalitarian peace. The following section reviews the gendered nature of violence against women and girls in conflict and war, and also the variety of roles and responsibilities women often assume in fighting militarisation and restoring peace.

**The continuum of violence against women**

Violence against women has, in recent decades, reached unprecedented heights around the globe. Such violence takes various forms and affects women of all ages, social groups and nationalities (Corrin 1996; Davis 1987; Moore 2004). Importantly, the proliferation of internal conflicts, religious fundamentalism and global economic disparities sit as factors important in the intensification of the violence against women. In this, the changing nature of warfare has been noted by many commentators (Dimitrijevic and Kovacs 2005; Vayrynen 2004; Whitbread 2004) as contributing a new military paradigm where the body of a civilian becomes a primary target -- the 'body as a bomb' in Mazurana's words (Mazurana et al. 2005a, p. 21). In this paradigm, women become the prime targets and victims of 'collateral damage' (Amnesty International 2004b), 'friendly fire', 'guerilla war' and 'depleted uranium weapons' (Gut and Bruno 2003) and throughout the continuum of economic, political, social and physical violence (Davis 1987; Cockburn 2004a; Jacobs et al. eds., 2000; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). According to the recent report by Save the Children, violence against women and children has reached epidemic proportions globally:

Women’s and girls’ bodies become battlegrounds soldiers use when they rape and force pregnancy as a form of ethnic cleansing. Girls are abducted and forced to stay with soldiers as sexual slaves. Families in refugee camps barter women’s and chil-
Children's bodies to get desperately needed food and assistance... within the family, mothers, girls and boys are beaten, or become incest victims, when frustration, fear and anger boil over into violence.

(Save the Children 2003, p.14)

Okechukwu Ibeanu, in her analysis of violence against women and girls in war and post-conflict contexts, has brought together two important analytical perspectives: analysing violence as a process rather than a direct or objective act, and considering various manifestations of violence along its continuum. In this analysis she has pointed to the importance of viewing and treating violence as a structural phenomenon, including such social conditions such as exploitation, domination, repression and discrimination. Viewed from this perspective, it is not only the 'enemy' that inflicts violence on women in conflict situations: community leaders, husbands, women's organisations and family members can also be involved (Okechukwu 2002, pp. 192-193). Extending the scope of the perpetrators should inform changes in post-war policies of social reconstruction and rehabilitation.

Anu Pillay, in analysing the patterns of violence against women occurring in the aftermath of conflict, has pointed out that such violence persists despite formal gains at the international and national levels, including national legislation, UN-sponsored World Conferences on women, and the establishment of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Pillay 2002, p. 27). Pillay’s analysis points to the growing concern amongst various commentators about the endemic proportions of violence against women and the lack of commitment to tackle its underlying cause – a solidly entrenched patriarchal system that marginalises women and denies them rights on the basis of their gender. Meanwhile, analysing the impact of militarisation on the growing incidence of violence against women in conflict zones, Enloe has suggested that overlooking the importance of addressing violence against women as a crucial dimension of post-conflict reconstruction and treating it as a mere 'add-on' issue is dangerous and damaging for the future of the re-constructed societies. As Enloe argued, it reaffirms a presumption that masculinised violence is natural and therefore unavoidable (Enloe 2002, at 27).

Recent feminist analyses of gender dynamics in post-conflict reconstruction contexts have made significant contributions towards understanding the scope, root causes and effects of various forms of violence on various groups of women and men (Afshar 2004). Anu Pillay, for example, has identified a number of factors adversely affecting the everyday life of women and girls in such environments: inequalities of power; social acceptance of violence; the construction of masculinity; and inequalities of economic power (Pillay 2002, p. 40). Further to this, a number of inquiries into the nature of war-time violence have critically assessed questions of power, access to and control of resources, gender and
the sexual division of labour within the context of war and peacekeeping. Commenting on the process of re-gendering relations of power in post-war contexts, Meredith Turshen has challenged the assumption that ‘women are never central to state power’. She argued that women’s contribution of productive and reproductive labour should not be framed by their lack of political power and their absence from public offices and decision-making bodies. That is, women always remain central to state power, which relies on women’s labour by institutionalising men’s control of women’s sexuality. Importantly, the role of violence in maintaining this control has been widely documented (Turshen 2002, pp. 85-86).

A number of gender analysts have pointed to the importance of re-examining the role of men and masculinities in war and post-conflict reconstruction. In this, a collection of essays edited by Cleaver (2002) focusing on men in gender and development, pointed to the need to recognise the diversity of men’s experiences and roles. The dominant models of ‘macho-style’ masculinity make not only women but also various groups of men vulnerable to the uniform views on ‘natural’ maleness. Anu Pillay noted on this point that inequalities between men and women are manifested through everyday social practices and beliefs and value systems maintained by patriarchal power structures, promoting male superiority and female inferiority. She stressed:

Gender is stereotyped into rigid, binary roles of male as protector and female as nurturer with the objectification of the female as ‘property’. Thus women are ‘owned’ by men.

(Pillay 2002, p. 40)

The militarised construction of masculinity has been recognised as a crucial factor contributing to the proliferation of violence against women in both peace and war-time. As Pillay has observed, ‘Peer group pressure plays an enormous role in wartime rape, as it does in peacetime gang assaults’ (Pillay 2002, p. 40). Tina Sideris, in turn, has argued that dominant discourses on masculinity/femininity fail to create any space for men outside of the ideology of superiority. Any threats to masculinity, abundant in war-time, result in the need to reassert manhood and superiority though often extremely violent forms of sexual control (Sideris 2002, p. 143). Sideris’ observation suggests the importance of deconstructing and challenging dominant constructions of gender and masculinity and day-to-day social acceptance of violence. Accordingly, many have recognised that any type of violence against women is embedded in male, and often female, consciousness as a legitimised form of discipline, even in societies where violence per se is not condoned (Pillay 2002, p. 40).

Meredeth Turshen has suggested that the economic vulnerability of women makes them extremely fragile and unprotected in the face of social and political upheavals and
male ex-combatants returning home. This position is in turn often further exacerbated by
the failure of most states to compensate women for their losses during conflict, to mean­
ingfully include women and girls into demobilisation programmes, or to reunite them with
their families in the same way as male soldiers (Turshen 2002, p. 85). Meanwhile, criticis­
ing the lack of comprehensive approaches to dealing with the structural roots of violence
against women and girls, a number of commentators, including international humanitarian
and human rights agencies such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Save the
Children, have developed various recommendations and strategies for agencies involved in
conflict resolution and peacekeeping. In this, the recent ‘State of World’s Mothers 2003’
report by Save the Children identified six critical ‘protection needs’ of women and children
during armed conflict, which include: protection from sexual violence and physical harm,
protection from trafficking and prostitution, protection of children from military recruit­
ment, protection from psychological trauma, protection from family separation, and protec­
tion of displaced women and children in camp settings (Save the Children 2003, pp. 14–16).
It emphasised in particular the importance of recognising and addressing the complex
social and economic dynamics existent in conflict and post-conflict zones which lead to the
shift in ‘traditional’ roles and identities.

Women and girls: changing roles and identities

In considering the impact of militarisation and war and changes in the nature of modern
warfare and peacekeeping, gender analyses of war and peace have emphasised the impor­
tance of de-constructing the allocation of public and private ‘spaces’ granted to men and
women during times of war. These spaces and activities have, in Cooke’s words, ‘been de­
defined as gender neutral so as not to disturb the abstracted and universalised paradigm of
men at the front dying to protect women back home’ (Cooke 1993, p. 177). Meanwhile,
Yuval-Davis has argued that warfare has never been gender ‘neutral’ or just a ‘male zone’.
Indeed, women have always been responsible for many, often vital roles on the whole
spectrum of conflict/post-conflict activities, though not on an equal basis to that of men
(Yuval-Davis 1997a, p. 93).

In considering the multiple roles that women assume in times of economic and so­
cial upheaval, it is important to analyse the impact of these changes on gender identities as
opening up new perspectives for challenging gender stereotypes and patriarchal structures.
A number of commentators have analysed the diversity of roles and responsibilities that
women take on in military and political struggles, caring for their families in the absence of
the traditional male ‘breadwinner’. Emphasising that the changing roles create the oppor-
tunities to forge new social relationships and identities, including those of gender, Mentjes has noted:

Women become soldiers, labourers for the war effort, national political actors, refugees, and survivors of violence, assuming roles previously reserved for men.

(Mentjes 2002, p. 64)

In such cases, traditional roles and gender relations within societies are often challenged (Byrne 1996, Kumar 2001c; Turshen 2002, p. 80), yet such transformations often remain short-lived. As soon as the conflict ends, male-centred ‘normality’ is often restored, while new post-conflict governments and communities neglect to capitalise on women’s contributions, experiences and expertise (Sorensen 1998). Cynthia Cockburn has observed that in the social turmoil of post-war periods, opportunities to transform gender power relations in the interests of women often remain unclaimed (Cockburn 2002, p. 69). Similarly, in her analysis of war and post-war shifts in gender relations, Mentjes examined the changing context of social and gender relationships: men and women exploited by militarised political economies of war are mobilised in different ways; they are also manipulated in different ways as the new forms of militarised control emerge. However,

Out of these changes in military, economic and political structures arise unique opportunities to redefine power relations between men and women.

(Mentjes 2002, p. 65)

Placing gender at the centre of the analysis of war opens up the opportunity to challenge the closed system of militarisation and violence, revealing the dynamic and fluid nature of gender constructions and identities. It permits the chance to question the usually unquestionable ‘normality’ of masculinised soldiering and the essential femininity of peace advocacy. As Cookes has noted, challenging binary thinking on the continuum of war and peace opens up a new space in which previously unheard voices can be heard and validated (Cooke 1993, p. 178). Similarly, feminist thinking and activism can challenge the maleness of war, stressing the importance of giving opportunities to act and chances to be heard to those who have been deliberately reduced to states of powerlessness and secondary artefacts of war – civilians – women and girls (Enloe 2005). Ruddick, in turn, has noted that bringing gender into the centre of debates on war helps us to challenge the same line of domination apparent within the peace-making processes, be it saving the world from terrorist threats or re-constructing countries bombed in the interests of ‘international security’ (Ruddick 1993, p. 110).

The close connectivity and interdependence of gender and national identities and conflict has seen much scrutiny in feminist thinking, where the nexus of war-military-masculinity and unprotected femininity has been brought into the centre of understanding
militarised national identities in recent ethnic conflicts. Zarana Papic, in analysing the 'nationalist project in Serbia', has examined the way in which Serbian women have been subjugated as both insiders – colonised and instrumentalised in their 'natural' function as 'birth-machines' – and outsiders, reified into targets of destruction as mediated instruments of violence against other men's nations and cultural identities (Papic 2003). In this Papic has argued that gender identities in Serbia were deliberately constructed within the framework of provoked, produced and instrumentalised political, public and private nationalist permutations, where women were constructed as breeders for the purposes of the 'Nation' and the ideologisation of femininity (ibid).

Examining gender identities and power relationships, Tina Sideris has observed that domination and subordination are not static, that they change and they are being actively changed, in turn influencing gender, ethnic and religious identities. Situations of war, she argued, usually provoke a substantial shift in gender roles, while at the same time securing the space for retreat to conventional notions of masculinity and femininity. Despite taking up a variety of the roles reserved for men in peacetime, Sideris suggested that women do not necessarily challenge social relations in the domestic sphere in order to sustain the change (Sideris 2002, pp. 145-146). As Sideris acknowledged however,

Consciousness shifts but not in a progressive linear direction. Resistance, reflection and shifts in consciousness are multi-dimensional and contradictory, framed by the particular conditions and circumstances in which women live.

(Sideris 2002, pp. 145-146)

Accordingly, social realities and the interconnectedness and interdependence of gender identities should be given special consideration in post-war situations, where the possibility exists for a new space for en-gendered social and personal constructions.

**Women organising in war**

Problematising the impact of peacekeeping on those most affected by it – various groups of local men and women – from a feminist perspective requires examination of the role of local people in setting the parameters of on-going peacekeeping operations. In this, women remain systematically excluded from peace-negotiations (Bop 2002; Eade 2004; Hamed 2004), decision-making and the implementation of the 'peace-building' mandates and post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

A number of case studies (such as a collection of essays on African women’s activism by Turshen and Twagiranmira (1998), Corrin’s gender analyses of post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo (2000, 2002a, 2003b, 2004a), Cockburn and Hubic’s analysis of peacekeeping in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2002), Olsson’s analysis of the Namibian peace
operation (2005), Harris’ analysis of gender, participation and post-conflict planning in Northern Sri Lanka (2004)) have demonstrated that local women’s groups acting in post-conflict environments are often in positions where they are better able to assess, prioritise and effectively address the root causes and consequences of the conflict and its impact on post-conflict reconstruction than other actors. Mazurana, for example, has noted, 

...[many women’s groups] have a much clearer understanding of the dynamics of the conflict than the majority of peacekeeping officials sent to build peace in their societies.

(Mazurana 2002, p. 50)

In this light, ‘women organising in war’ sits as another theme central to modern feminist analysis of conflict. In such a paradigm, women are placed at the centre of post-conflict reconstruction efforts and regarded as a key resource in the processes of restoring and sustaining peace. A Policy Audit on Women, Peace and Security published in 2001, demonstrated that women’s organisations, given the opportunity to participate, had considerable success in defining and affecting the processes of post-conflict reconstruction (Anderlini 2001). Similarly, Pillay and Tursbach have analysed women’s efforts to assure the survival of their families during war, pointing to the difficulty of ‘institutionalising’ women’s expertise and the unique place of local knowledge within highly formalised institutionally-based conflict-resolution mechanisms.

The importance of using the potential for social transformation rooted in women’s wartime experiences has been noted by many feminist writers (Corrin 2000; Cockburn 2004). In this, the importance of transforming not only social structures and conditions but also internal processes of consciousness, words and language have been emphasised as providing women with a sense of their own agency (Mentjes 2002, pp. 7-8). Examining women’s potential and motivations for being active and organised in delivering social transformation, Cynthia Cockburn has pointed out several reasons, including quelling ‘their own fear’, escaping confinement and regaining a sense of agency after the victimising nature of war. Analysing women’s organising efforts in the rebuilding of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cockburn referred to the experiences of local women, for whom ‘doing NGO’ is something that offers them a chance to move forward, ‘...to effect something’ (Cockburn 2002, p. 72).

Considering the variety of ways in which women can contribute to the rebuilding of post-war societies, Cockburn has distinguished between the three types of democracy, revolving around the gender identities of local women: inclusive, local and gender democracies. In this, the processes of being active on a local level, promoting ideas of ethnic tolerance, inclusiveness and integration, trying to heal and recover from the damage inflicted by
nationalistic militarised masculinities of war and domination, women contribute to the
de-ethnicisation of politics in their own way. Such processes contribute to the movements
towards integration and the dilution of nationalistic thinking by minimising the creation of
ethnic enclaves (Cockburn 2002, 2004). Meanwhile, conducting a feminist analysis of the
NATO-bombing of the FRY, Lepa Mladjenovic has made a powerful statement regarding
women’s capabilities and their willingness to look beyond constructed and imposed im-
agery of the ‘Other’. In this she noted that there have always been women in wars who
cared about ‘enemy’ women and men, transcending conventional ‘motherly caring’ into
the political act of caring for the Other, ‘...even during the self-made, self-organised rup-
tures of Serbian, pro-fascist nationalism during the seventy-seven days of its double war’
(Mladjenovic 2002, p. 177). Cynthia Cockburn, in her analysis of democratic development
in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, has elaborated on her definition of gender democ-
racy, focusing not only on the number of female MPs and governors, but emphasising the
importance of having democracy ‘...in marriage, in the family, in the street and in every
workplace, from the soup kitchen to the ‘dot.com’ enterprise’ (Cockburn 2002, pp. 80-81).

A number of recent studies have focused on the loss of rights won by women in pe-
riods of conflict (Bop 2002; Meintjes 2002; Pearce 2004), including the right to exercise
leadership on political and social levels in the course of post-war reconstruction. In this,
Bop has pointed out that the only issues perceived as deserving consideration at the end of
a conflict, when the men-managed peace process starts, are those relating to the conflict
itself – ceasefire agreements and power/resources sharing between the belligerents (Bop
2002, p. 31). In attempting to analyse the nature of socio-economic and political exclusion
women face within the diverse contexts of post-conflict reconstruction, a number of com-
mentators have also drawn attention to the complex interplay of factors affecting women’s
decisions to be involved or excluded. Meredith Turshen, for example, has pointed to the
diversity of perspectives amongst various groups of women:

...some women want to maintain their new freedoms and participate in decision
making in public forums, whereas others collude in the reversion to the old status
quo.

(Turshen 2002, p. 80)

Cynthia Cockburn has described a number of factors often detrimental to the pro-
gress of women’s movements and women’s access to formal and informal decision-
making. In the midst of post-conflict reconstruction, she argued, women’s organisations
are ‘still a long way from either effective self-management or effective organizational de-
mocracy’; she also noted the lack of opportunities for effective engagement with political
power would be aggravated by funding dependencies and constraints (Cockburn 2002, pp.
Further to this, Cockburn and Hubic have emphasised that in order for local women to be included and heard in political and social negotiations by local political ‘elites’ (police and bureaucrats), women need to establish their credibility and authority. This is, they suggest, where peacekeepers should play a crucial role. Here a quote by a Bosnian woman activist was used in Cockburn and Hubic’s study to demonstrate the importance of engaging with local women’s movements; in essence, summarising the central theme of recent feminist theorising in the area of war and peace: the importance of local women’s activism and knowledge in (re)building the foundations for sustainable ‘positive’ peace:

...instead of this ‘small change’ you give us, those goodwill visits and Christmas presents for children, offer us a genuine partnership for substantial projects on a basis of equality. Don’t be so closed to us, behind your ugly barbed wire fences. We can help you do your job, and you can help us to do ours – because the partnership we have with you will give us credibility in the eyes of local politicians, local police, bureaucrats and donor organizations.

(cited in Cockburn & Hubic 2002, p. 110)

Considering the role and position of women and women’s organisations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cockburn has identified a number of vital areas in which women’s involvement can be considered as challenging militarised patriarchy. Here she stressed the importance of getting women involved in the economic sector in order to contribute to women’s economic self-sufficiency and diminish their vulnerability to sexual exploitation. She also underlined the urgent need for action against violence, including the establishment of SOS lines and shelter projects. Cockburn also emphasised the importance of providing women with legal advice on various matters, such as housing disputes, divorce, alimony, inheritance and other problems made more urgent and complex by war. Getting women more involved in politics could be achieved by encouraging women to register and use their vote in elections, and by calling politicians to account (Cockburn 2002, pp. 80-81).

Shelia Mentjes has challenged formalistic commitments of local political elites towards gender equality. In this she has observed that gender sensitivity is well and good in bunkers, but in real life in the aftermath of war, when militarised macho culture sneaks into homes, urgent and effective action is required to capitalise on the short-lived period when gender relations are in a state of change. She also pointed to the two immediate problems that new governments face given even a genuine commitment to mainstream gender – lack of skills and resources; these are domains where the role of the international community is crucial (Mentjes 2002, p. 69). Further to this, Angela Raven-Roberts, in her analysis of
participation, citizenship and women's activism, has underlined a leading role that the international community should play in paving the way for ‘reconstruction’ and ‘peace-making’ to be simultaneously directed at the formal and informal levels of society (Raven-Roberts 1999, p. 40). She suggested that the need to create conditions making political space more open, inclusive and accommodating of dialogue.

The changing nature of peacekeeping

The changing nature of contemporary conflict has had a profound influence over the form and nature of modern peacekeeping. In this, the concept and practice of UN peacekeeping began to evolve shortly after the establishment of the UN in 1945 (Baehr and Gordonker 2005; Roberts et al. 1993). In its earliest phase, unarmed UN observers, deployed in Palestine in June 1948 (Bellamy et al. 2004), acted in a neutral capacity monitoring ceasefires and peace agreements. Subsequently, the first UN peacekeeping force, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in Sinai, Egypt, was established in 1956, representing a significant innovation within the United Nations (Bellamy et al. 2004; Briscoe 2003; Connaughton 1992; Jett 2001). This deployment was not a peace-enforcement operation as envisaged in Article 42 of the United Nations Charter (UN 1945), but a peacekeeping operation, carried out with the consent and cooperation of the parties to the conflict (UN 2005c, p.6). Importantly, the UN Charter (which has remained unchanged since 1945) contains no provisions directly authorising peacekeeping. This places such operations into what has been called ‘the twilight zone’ between Chapters 6 and 7 (Bellamy 1996, p. 156). The problems arising from having no internationally agreed definition of what constitutes peacekeeping - and from having no systematically defined schema for how to conduct such operations (Fetherston 1994, p. 88) - have become more pronounced in recent years, with the increase or ‘surge’ in the number of peacekeeping operations (UN 2004f). As has been suggested, the conceptual evolution of peacekeeping ‘...has been hampered by the element that once ensured its survival – its ad hoc nature’ (Fetherston 1994, p. 22). With a lack of a consistent definition, the nature and purposes of peacekeeping have often been understood differently by the various parties involved in it. Moreover, the growing number of peacekeeping classifications – emerging because of historical developments, mission mandates, the nature of the particular conflict and a number of other factors – reflect the lack of a uniform agreement, the degree of confusion over the form of peacekeeping and the nature of its continuous transformation (Bellamy et al. 2004; Fetherston 1994). As some have suggested, the end of the Cold War and the rising number of ethnic conflicts has spurred ‘a triple transformation’ of peacekeeping (Bellamy et al 2004, p. 75):
Firstly, a quantitative transformation occurred in peacekeeping. As of August 2005 a total of 60 UN peacekeeping missions had been performed since 1948, yet only 15 had been undertaken before 1988 (UN 2005d);

Secondly, a qualitative transformation occurred in peacekeeping, in which ‘classical peacekeeping’ (Mohamed 2005, p. 818) was replaced by ‘peace-building’ and ‘peace-support’ operations. In these, peacekeepers were charged with the ‘delivery of humanitarian aid, state-building programmes, local peacemaking and elements of peace enforcement’ (Bellamy et al. 2004, p. 75). Importantly, this transformation received some significant criticism: the expansive nature of the NATO-led peacekeeping operations in the Balkans provoked observers in the United States to point to the ‘feminisation’ of the American Military and proliferation of the ‘Peace Corps’ mentality justifying the employment of the US marines in ‘vaccinating dogs in Bosnia’ (Gutmann 2001; Mitchell 1998);

Thirdly, a normative transformation occurred, in which ideas of post-Westphalian liberal-democratic peace became imposed, without the incorporation of local perspectives. This led to intervening forces often being perceived as ‘undemocratic’ and counterproductive.

Importantly, as noted by many observers have noted, none of these transformations have meaningfully brought ideas of gender equality and women’s rights into peacekeeping (Randriamaro 2004, p. 1); many still suggest that such operations fail to acknowledge the differential impact of conflict and peacekeeping on various groups of men and women (Hill 2001; Peacewomen 2004; Whitworth 2004). Accordingly, in her gender analysis of UN peacekeeping, Sandra Whitworth criticised the rather limited UN approach towards gender: gender remained, she suggested, limited to ‘women’ as victims of sexual violence or women’s ‘motherly care’-styled contributions to peace and peacemaking. Yet importantly, as Whitworth noted, the UN has not been able to live up to even these limited understandings of ‘women, peace and security’ (Whitworth 2004, p. 132).

The peacekeeping ‘failures’ of the 1990s led to a growing awareness amongst commentators of the limitations of peacekeeping (Fleitz 2002; Ignatieff 2003; UN 20001). On many fronts, the UN was criticised for undertaking something it was neither created to achieve nor prepared for: multi-dimensional peacekeeping and peace-building (Chopra 2002; Kreilkamp 2003; Stahn 2005). Analysing the trajectory of the UN’s engagement with various forms of peacekeeping, Thakur and Schnabel concluded that while more field expertise exists today (owing to the increasing number and complexity of peacekeeping operations), the capacity to ‘occupy and run’ countries emerging from war is still lacking (Thakur and Schnabel 2001, p. 7).
Meanwhile, in his analysis of the UN involvement in running transitional administrations, Bellamy identified three broad areas of contention, generating debate within the organisation itself (UN 2001), between its members (Sorensen 2004) and between other actors engaged in peacekeeping in various capacities. These were whether the UN should follow the Westphalian or post-Westphalian conception of peacekeeping, or the combination of both; whether UN peace-building in transitional administrations contributes to democracy or, on the contrary, creates a democratic deficit by imposing political processes while failing to incorporate the wishes and expectations of the local people; and whether the UN possesses sufficient resources, political will and institutional capacity to conduct the peacekeeping business effectively (Bellamy et al. 2004, pp. 246–249).

The inability of the international community to secure a compromise on what 'peacekeeping' is and how it is conducted cannot be blamed solely to the diverse nature and conflicting economic and political interests of the UN member-states. It is also rooted in the fact that peacekeeping is generally based on a number of paradoxes and conflicting assumptions. Firstly, the vision of the post-war world as enshrined in the UN Charter is not suited to the accommodation of the realities of 'non-traditional' intrastate conflicts, where the difference between 'aggressor' and 'attacked' is often blurred (Fetherston 1994, pp. 3–4, 10). Secondly, the founders of the UN intended that the organisation would provide collective security based on security cooperation between the P-5 nuclear powers (the United States, the Soviet Union/Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China), yet for most of the life of the UN, this did not occur (Fetherston 1994; Le Mon and Taylor 2004; Mohamed 2005). Another significant contradiction — and in Fetherston's words, a 'basic paradox' — of modern peacekeeping lies in its nature: that peacekeeping, or 'keeping of the peace' is entrusted to military-trained personnel (Fetherston 1994, p. 223). Sandra Whitworth has summed up this argument by arguing that modern peacekeeping remains a military exercise in its nature, failing to deliver the promise (of making/keeping peace) to those who are subject to the mission (and, indeed, those who are deployed on peacekeeping missions) (Whitworth 2004, p. 186).

Another element of modern peacekeeping is its 'ideographic' nature, which points to the complex circumstances surrounding every mission. At heat, each mission is unique and, as Fetherston has pointed out, its lessons do not carry over to others. This makes it impossible to develop a 'unified' conceptual model of peacekeeping (Fetherston 1994, p. 144). This points to the importance of context-specific studies, looking at unique 'peacekeeping' dynamics within particular geographical, political and cultural contexts.

Importantly, modern peacekeeping suffers not only from a lack of conceptual foundations; it is also significantly (and often adversely) affected by a number of practical op-
eral issues. Problems with coordination and systematic flaws in the management of missions (including understaffing, lack of qualified personnel, the problem of communication between the New York-based DPKO and ‘the field’, the divide between the civilian and military sections of a mission) - all hamper modern peacekeeping (Fetherston 1994, pp. 34-40). Perhaps most importantly, the inadequate levels of financial support have led to the situation where, in Fetherston’s words, ‘...the UN’s role, especially in the maintenance of peace and security, had expanded dramatically, but with no concomitant growth in financial support’ (ibid). Simon Chesterman, in his overview of the UN’s involvement in transitional administrations, has linked the availability of funds for the particular mission with its prominence on the political agenda of the contributing states (Chesterman 2003, at i – ii). The examples of East Timor and Kosovo, where double standards towards the notions of sovereignty and human rights were clearly applied by the US and its NATO-allies in organising and managing the international response to human rights violations (Thakur and Schnabel 2001, p. 23) demonstrates the contingent nature of peacekeeping and its dependence on variable levels of political will within the international community (Azimi and Li In 2003; Chomsky and Jardine 2002; Martin 2001).

Vague and unviable mission mandates have regularly been cited as impediments to the effective protection of civilians during UN missions (Langille et al. 2003, p. 6). The March 2004 outbreak of inter-ethnic violence in Kosovo, aside from demonstrating the failure of UNMIK to deliver and implant the vision of inter-ethnic reconciliation in the region, also demonstrated the direct consequences of the mandate’s ambiguity (ICG 2004a). Minorities under attack were left largely unprotected and at the mercy of the rioters following the lack of cooperation between UNMIK and KFOR, and, generally, the failure of Resolution 1244 to clearly outline the levels of authority and responsibilities (HRW 2004). Indeed, most peacekeeping mandates derive from multilateral diplomacy and the conditionalities and compromises imposed by the influential member states. They are usually crafted through arduous negotiations and a consensus-building process which forces ambiguities, which in turn leave peacekeepers caught in the middle (Fetherston 1994, pp. 34-40). Further, the attitudes of the member states towards peacekeeping vary dramatically, from those who are fearful of bringing their internal conflicts to the attention of the UN to those who might be opposing UN interests but might exploit peacekeeping as means to justify their army, or those who rely on UN peacekeeping for its contributions towards national (often militarised) budgets. In this, in 2003 the average UN rate of reimbursement

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4 See, for example, Whitworth commenting ‘One common observation has been that national militaries can gain financially by contributing to peacekeeping missions. The United Nations compensates troop-contributing countries through a leasing agreement, and for militaries with lower relative operating costs (typically those from lesser developed countries), this can be very beneficial. For countries such as Pakistan,
to troop-contributing countries was 1,100 US dollars per soldier per month, often significantly more than the cost of provision (Barringer 2003).

Whitworth, in her gender analysis of militarism and peacekeeping, has summarised the essence of the modern peacekeeping crisis. She noted that even in its present form the UN is theoretically capable of preventing and resolving armed conflicts. It has instruments available to it for doing so: preventive diplomacy, early warning, fact-finding, peacemaking, peacekeeping, confidence-building, and institution-building. However, its past and present failures to prevent and resolve conflicts around the world have largely resulted from the quality and quantity of resources devoted to these instruments. In this light, the complexity of the relationship between international peacekeepers and local populations, affected by the host of factors pointed out by Whitworth, deserves more detailed consideration.

United Nations' nation-building: peacekeepers vs. 'the locals'

'Keeping the locals in a good mood makes it easier to get information on who the troublemakers are'.

James Dunnigan, a lecturer to the US State Department, the CIA, and the U.S. Army War College (Dunnigan 2004)

The history of the UN's involvement in nation-building operations dates to December 1992, when the UN Security Council declared the situation in war-torn Somalia a threat to international peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter (Dobbins et al. 2005). With this, UN SC Resolution 794(1992) was adopted, establishing Unified Task Force (UNITAF). Five months after this, UNOSOM II took over from UNITAF to assist the Somali people in '...rebuilding their economic, political and social life, through achieving national reconciliation so as to recreate a democratic Somali State' (Lyons and Samatar 1995; UN 1996a; UN 1997a). UN SC Resolution 814, authorising UNOSOM II, introduced a new concept of 'transitional government institutions' (UN 1993a). This laid the foundation for the legitimised expropriation of executive, law-making and judicial powers from local populations – in other words, to 'build nations' in the name of human rights. These included the right to be equal in dignity, without distinction between race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status (Universal Declaration, art. 1-2). These were not, however, unproblematic concepts, as Slavoj Žižek has noted:

Bangladesh, Nepal, and India, compensation helps them off-set the large standing armies they wish to maintain for local strategic reasons. Individual soldiers also often benefit financially: Nigerian troops, for example, earn their usual pay, a daily UN allowance, a Nigerian Special Overseas allowance, and a family allotment' (Whitworth 2004, p. 32); see also Bellamy et al (2004, p.52).
...what the 'human rights of Third World suffering victims' effectively means today, in the predominant discourse, is the right of Western powers themselves to intervene politically, economically, culturally and militarily in the Third World countries of their choice, in the name of defending human rights (Žižek 2005, p. 128).

Accordingly, the countries where such interventions occurred have been seen, in Anne Orford's words, as 'disordered, chaotic, tribal, primitive, pre-capitalist, violent, exclusionary and child-like' (Orford 2003 cited in Whitworth 2004, p. 15), forming the ground for the UN-led '...contemporary colonial encounter' (Bellamy et al. 2004, p. 248). This drew on knowledge claims about 'us' and 'them', knowledge claims that then served to legitimise the missions themselves (Whitworth 2004, p. 15). Earlier involvement in post-conflict governance had occurred with the 1991 Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement in Cambodia. This provided the UN mission (UNTAC) with direct control over Cambodian agencies in the areas of foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security and information, and authority to take corrective action over the local governmental organs if those sought to undermine the accords (Ratner 1993). However, what differentiates UN missions in Somalia, Kosovo and East Timor from their Cambodian 'predecessor' is that the establishment of UNTAC was endorsed by the Cambodian factions representing the majority of the Cambodian population (Doyle 1997). The UN missions in Somalia, Kosovo and East Timor were authorised by the UN Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (UN 1945), giving the missions the force of an international obligation without the consent of the states (or any other parties) in question (Matheson 2001). Commenting on the UN's involvement in Somalia (and considering it as the first manifestation of an emerging neo-colonial approach to development), Kreilkamp has noted:

In practice, it was never clear whether the visiting foreigners were simply assisting political development or imposing a blueprint of the sort of political system they believed necessary for the Somalis.

(Kreilkamp 2003, p. 637)

The location of peacekeeping within the changing framework of international relations has been attracting increasing attention, both from scholars and practitioners. In particular, the issue of peacekeeping and peacekeepers, and their position in relation to the local population in 'host-countries' has been a subject of many inter-disciplinary inquiries and conceptual debates. For example, in his analysis of the UN's involvement in postconflict reconstruction, Jacob Kreilkamp has described two models of the relationship between the United Nations and local political actors. In a 'consent-based' model, the United Na-
tions' authority is limited and represents only one of the elements in a complex powersharing mechanism which necessarily includes local actors. This model provides for a number of mechanisms that can enable political reconciliation and allow for meaningful cooperation between the UN and local political actors (Kreilkamp 2003, p. 620). Against this, in the 'neo-colonialist' model, regional authority rests in the hands of the UN’s Secretary-General, his representative and the missions' international leadership (ibid). Cockburn’s observation on the power-driven drawing of dividing lines becomes relevant in this case:

A subordinated or marginal collectivity or identity group must retain the right to point out where a line is being drawn to its disadvantage. It is when a dominant collectivity or identity group uses difference to draw a line in its own interests that we should begin to be suspicious.

(Cockburn 2004, p. 27)

Accordingly, the dangers of political and cultural detachment of UN missions from realities on the ground have been pointed by many observers (Barakat and Chard 2002; Klusmeyer and Shurke 2004; Large 1997; Roberts 2003). Michael O’Connor, for example, has noted that ‘...any policy of non-fraternization or non-involvement with the local community will doom the operation’ (O’Connor 2001, p. 64); Marshall and Inglis have described national/local ‘ownership’ as a key component of a successful transitional process (Inglis and Marshall 2003, p. 97). Meanwhile, criticising the UN’s ‘terra nullius’ approach, Simon Chesterman has noted that modern ‘peacebuilding’ requires, above all, trust on the part of local actors. However, earning and keeping this trust is contingent upon a certain level of understanding, on sensitivity and respect for local traditions and on political aspirations. How that trust is managed determines the political trajectory of transnational administrations (Chesterman 2003, p. 12).

In this mix, UNMIK’s 'lack of cooperation', 'ignorance', 'arrogance' and 'disrespect for local opinions, culture and traditions' has been raised by Kosovo women and men as a decisive factor leading to their disillusionment with the body and its policies. Many observers have suggested that UNMIK’s failure to ‘integrate in’ and ‘integrate with’ the existing local constituencies, including the emerging civil society (Corrin 2000; 2002a; 2003a), was one of the major contributing factors leading to the overall failure of the organisation to prepare Kosovo ‘...for the transition from war to peace, from socialism to the market economy, and from international political limbo to final status’ (ICG 2004a). As Isa Blumi has observed:
Instead of relying on local knowledge to identify criminality, the international community sought to shut out completely the inhabitants of Kosovo from being responsible for their own lives.

(Blumi 2001, p. 11)

The collapse of the formal institutions of power in a situation of political and economic post-conflict chaos does not necessarily result in a power vacuum – political and economic life continues through informal political, legal and economic networks and structures (Corrin 2000; 2002a; 2003a). However, as Simon Chesterman has observed, constructive and positive engagement with power at various local levels requires both a nuanced understanding of local history and culture, and respect for political aspirations of the population (Chesterman 2003, p. 5).

Along these lines, the reluctance of UNMIK to meaningfully involve local experts and embed existing local power arrangements in the reconstruction and development processes has been criticised by both international and local observers (Whitworth 2004, p. 41). A number of reasons for this have been pointed to, including: a lack of policy and direction on the mission level due to the political sensitivity surrounding the mission; the formal commitment of UNMIK to neutrality and impartiality; the lack of expertise and individual commitment; and the wide-spread bias and prejudice existent among the peacekeepers and the mission leadership (Corrin 2002a; KWN 2001b; 2002a). This ‘neo-colonial’ governance of Kosovo by UNMIK, rooted in the very nature of militarised peacekeeping, the ‘terra-nullius’ approach to local knowledge and the subordinate ‘Objectified Other’ (Said 2003; Butler 1999), will be systematically explored in subsequent chapters of this work, concentrating on the systematic disregard of UNMIK and emerging local political elites to dialogue with a variety of local groups and constituencies. The example of Kosovo does not stand, however, as an isolated ‘one bad apple’ occurrence. Roberto Belloni, analysing the post-conflict reconstruction effort in neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina, has commented that most of the international civil servants working in civil society programmes there were ill-equipped to understand and make sense of the local political, social and cultural contexts – hence disempowering and excluding its citizens (Belloni 2001, p. 170).

The acknowledgment that the introduction of peacekeeping forces, or the way they are deployed and settled may increase the insecurity of local people and dim the prospects for economic and political re-construction has gradually started to enter UN discourses on peacekeeping (Whitworth 2004, p. 12). In this context, Hillary Charlesworth has noted that the experience of violence of local men and women at the hands of UN peacekeepers demonstrates the unreality of the conflict/peace dichotomy: ‘peace’-keepers in this context become the source of conflict and violence (Charlesworth 1999, pp. 389-390). In 2000, the
Panel on United Nations Peace Operations acknowledged that UN personnel in the field are obliged to understand and respect local norms, culture and practices:

'They must behave with the understanding that they are guests in someone else's home, however destroyed that home might be, particularly when the United Nations takes on a transitional administration role.'

(UN 2001, par. 272, pp. 45-46)

As an indication of the gradual change in international thinking on women, peace and security (leading to the adoption of Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in October 2000 (UN 2000a)), a number of reports and studies have been issued by the UN pointing to the problematic nature of the relationship between peacekeepers and local populations (Cohn 2004; UN 2000b; 2003e; 2005c; 2005e; UN DPKO 2004a). This included a special report released in March 2005 by the UN Secretariat - '...the first comprehensive analysis of the problem of sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations peacekeeping personnel' - which acknowledged the reality of prostitution and other forms of sexual exploitation in peacekeeping contexts (UN 2005e). Interestingly, commenting on the nature and scope of the Report, the UN Secretary-General argued that the exemplary record of UN peacekeepers '...has been clouded by the unconscionable conduct of a few individuals' (UN 2005c, p.I). This clashes with Whitworth's observation regarding the relative silence of critical readings in peacekeeping, where too often a politically-charged image of benign and altruistic peacekeeping is projected. When problems are acknowledged, they '...have too often been dismissed as 'unusual, isolated events', 'unsubstantiated', or the result of a 'few bad apples'(Whitworth 2004, p. 17).

Despite the growing number of reports and investigations into various aspects of the interaction between peacekeepers and various groups of local men and women, systematic analysis into the long-terms effects of peacekeeping interventions for individuals and communities is still lacking. Quantitative reports are usually narrowed down to statistics on allegations and complaints about the incidents involving sexual abuse, and (usually smaller numbers) those prosecuted and remedied. These limited sets of figures, however, often vary depending on the issuing authority. In May 2004, Amnesty International presented a comprehensive qualitative study into trafficking in women and girls in Kosovo, raising the concerns that

...the UN administration in Kosovo has effectively allowed the development of a flourishing industry dependent on the exploitation of trafficked women. Although the Kosovo sex-industry now services both local and international men, it is clear that it initially grew out of post-conflict militarization and the presence of a highly-paid international military and civilian community.
UNMIK’s response to this report followed in a matter of days, denying the allegations and outlining their comprehensive strategy of combating human trafficking in Kosovo (UNMIK 2004). However, despite the growing international ‘consensus’ on the trans-national and trans-social nature of trafficking, UNMIK’s strategy remained limited to goal-oriented add-on approaches, such as conducting ‘raids, operations and bar checks directed at premises where trafficking in persons and/or prostitution activities were suspected’ (UNMIK 2004c). Continuous calls by local and international women’s groups and activists to revisit and address trafficking as a complex political and socio-economic phenomenon rooted in systemic inequalities were largely overlooked by UNMIK and the local male-dominated government (Corrin 2004a; Balos 2004).

**UN peacekeepers: one image – many groups**

The changes of the post-Cold War political landscape and the problems associated with the UN peacekeeping paradigm have led to a blurring of professional boundaries between UN peacekeepers, soldiers and civilian personnel engaged in peacekeeping. In this, the decline in conventional inter-state warfare has led to the following questions:

> What type of soldier will be needed to practise the new art of war and peace? He or she may be called on to act as an ambassador, the lone representative of his or her country, or the UN, at a disputed barricade.

(Bellamy 1996, p. 195).

The high-profile and nearly instantaneous media coverage of the peacekeeping endeavours of the 1990s, where the so-called ‘CNN factor’ held sway (Hawkins 2002, p. 226; Herman and Peterson 2000, p. 111), led to the international proliferation of ‘charged’ imagery of peacekeeping. In this, Jennifer Lee, analysing UN peacekeeping media coverage, has noted that instantaneous CNN-coverage from the theatre of peacekeeping operations has been a significant factor in garnering international support or opposition to the operation (Lee 1997, p. 160). The nature of the messages generated by the international media about peacekeeping in general and individual peacekeepers or peacekeeping contingents in particular (Zarkov 2002), has varied greatly between the two extremes. On the one side, there was a clear UN-endorsed image of a

> ...blue-bereted peacekeeper [who] is supposed to be benign, altruistic, neutral, and capable of conflict resolution in any cultural setting – a warrior-prince-of-peace.  

He is lightly armed and is directed to fire a weapon only in self-defence.

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5 See also recent statement by UN Secretary-General reinforcing the positive image of UN Peacekeepers:

> ‘The women and men who serve the blue flag do so under arduous and often dangerous conditions. The his-
On the other side, continuous media reports on the systematic involvement of UN peacekeepers in the sexual abuse and exploitation of local populations\(^6\) and the UN’s failures in Rwanda (Forges 1999) and Srebrenica (HRW 1995) portray a more sobering image for international audiences (UN 2005c, p. 7). What remains neglected however, as Whitworth has suggested, is any ‘…sustained analysis of the overwhelming reliance on soldiers to conduct peacekeeping operations’ (Whitworth 2004, p. 12). Meanwhile, the political convenience of using collective categories – such as ‘peacekeepers’ and ‘soldiers’ – falls short of revealing the gender, ethnic, national and educational diversities represented amongst the diverse peacekeeping personnel. No systematic research into the relationship between the overall gender ‘sensitivity’ of the UN peacekeeping missions and the ethnic, national, gender or professional composition of its employees has ever been conducted. The limited nature and the generally restricted forms of access to statistical data on the peacekeeping personnel employed and contracted by the UN impedes any further analysis in this area. For the purposes of this review, UN peacekeeping personnel are considered from the perspective of their functional role.

Any UN peacekeeping operation is usually composed of the three broad categories of personnel: a civilian component, a military component and a civilian police component (UN 2005c). These categories, in turn, include five subsets of personnel, with each possessing distinct legal status (UN 2005c):

Firstly, the UN Staff members, whether internationally or locally recruited, are appointed by the Secretary-General and are subject to the authority of that office. They usually form the decision-making and managerial echelon of the mission (UN information service 2002). In his analysis of modern peacekeeping, Bellamy has commented on the preparedness and professionalism of the mission leadership: ‘…usually little or no formal training is given to the mission’s staff officers before command and control of the operations shifts to them’ (Bellamy et al. 2004, p. 51).

Secondly, the UN civilian police and military observers represent national police contingents contributed by UN member-states and remain under the control of their own commanders and governments. Analysing the nature of the civilian police involvement in

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\(^{6}\) For more information see ‘Peacekeeping Watch’ – constantly updated web-service by Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, monitoring sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers and the efforts of the international community to respond, available at [http://www.peacewomen.org/en/pkwatch/pkwatch.html](http://www.peacewomen.org/en/pkwatch/pkwatch.html). See also UN SG accepting that the number of allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation made by and about United Nations personnel in 2004 was more than double the number reported in 2003 (UN 2005h).
modern peacekeeping, McFarlane and Maley have observed that most civilian police officers are poorly selected, trained and equipped, and deployed with little or no knowledge of the local culture, political situation or the UN doctrine to be implemented (McFarlane and Maley 2001, p. 197).

Thirdly, members of national military contingents are usually military staff, trained and supplied by the troop-contributing countries, and, as with the civilian police members, they remain under the control and authority of their national governments and commanders.

Fourthly, United Nations Volunteers are bound by the United Nations Volunteer programme's rules of conduct. They are appointed by and remain under the authority of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

Finally, individual contractors with specialised skills not available in the Secretariat remain bound by the conditions of the respective contracts.

Over the last decade, particularly following the failure of the militarised peacekeeping missions to meet higher human rights standards within politically and culturally sensitive conflict environments, members of the national military contingents employed by the UN under status-of-forces agreements, have been attracting much criticism from within the profession and from international and local human rights activists and international relations' scholars. Fetherston, for example, has noted that despite international recognition of the qualitative difference between peacekeeping and normal military activity, only rarely has this realisation been translated into mandates, policies, training and practice (Fetherston 1994, p. 213). Three main lines of criticism have emerged: the mismatch of military training with the purposes of the UN peacekeeping, poor standards of training, and the lack of the UN authority over national contingents.

It has been argued by many observers that the training and preparedness of the UN's 'blue berets' does not correspond or match with the purposes of modern peacekeeping characterised by exceedingly complex gender and cross-cultural dynamics. These dynamics require high levels of communication skills, creative thinking, gender and human rights-awareness (O'Connor 2001, p. 67). As Bellamy noted, '...there is a gap between what peacekeepers should be doing and the military training they are given' (Bellamy et al. 2004, p. 13). The lack of essential communication skills, including sufficient proficiency in English or the language of the 'host'-country (Inglis and Marshall 2003, p. 125), has jeopardised not only the process of building trusting relationships between peacekeepers and local populations, but also threatened the operational integrity of long-term missions such as UNMIK (ICG 2004a; HRW 2004).
It has been suggested that some of the world’s poorest states voluntarily supply troops for peacekeeping missions for a source of revenue (Bellamy et al. 2004; Fetherston 1994; Whitworth 2004). In such cases peacekeeping proceeds, paid as a flat rate for the troop units these countries supply, are most likely to fund the undemocratic political regimes reigning in these countries, fuelling the gendered cycle of militarisation both within the country where the ‘trained-to-kill-peacekeepers’ are stationed and their ‘home’ countries, communities and families (Whitworth 2004). As of August 2005, African countries represented 32 out of the 106 UN member states contributing police, troops, military observers and assets towards UN peacekeeping. Ethiopia was the top African contributor of personnel (3424), followed by Ghana (3320) and Nigeria (3175). Also, among the top ten contributors worldwide were Bangladesh (8812), India (6321), Jordan (2791), Nepal (3565), Pakistan (9881) and Uruguay (2435) (ibid). Analysing the failure of the multinational UN peacekeeping force in Kosovo to protect minorities during the March 2004 Kosovo-wide inter-ethnic riots, Human Rights Watch has noted:

UNMIK police officers come from some 49 contributing nations, from Argentina to Zimbabwe, and can range widely in terms of their policing experience and human rights awareness - as some come from nations with their own domestic record of severe police abuse.

(HRW 2004, p. 14)

A review of the annual country reports circulated by international human rights think-tanks and governmental agencies provides a rather gloomy picture of the systematic violations of human rights - including the persistent violation of the rights of women - in major troop-contributing countries. The recent Human Rights Watch World Report 2005, for example, provides detailed accounts of systematic violations of human rights in Ethiopia, including police brutality, torture and illegal detention, repression of opposition political parties, abuses committed by the Ethiopian armed forces, lack of food security and judicial delays (HRW 2005). Yet importantly, the widely-publicised involvement of Canadian peacekeepers in the sexual and physical abuse of local men and women in Somalia and Cambodia (Whitworth 2004) and the involvement of US troops in the systematic abuse

\[\text{See, for example, Bellamy observing '...some states could make profits because contributing governments have been reimbursed at a flat rate for the troop units they supplied. This meant that states supplying expensive military equipment received as little as one-quarter of their costs, while states sending ill-equipped forces could receive as much as 3.5 times their expenditure' } (\text{Bellamy et al. 2004, p. 52}).\]

\[\text{See, for example, Whitworth observing 'The recipe for creating soldiers involves selecting for and reinforcing aggressive behaviour; it also can entail an explosive mix of misogyny, racism, and homophobia, coupled with a siege mentality. A deeper analysis of the murders in Somalia and Canada's Somalia Inquiry reveals all of these ingredients to have been present in Canada's armed forces' } (\text{Whitworth 2004, p. 99}).\]

of individuals in post-Hussein Iraq points to the fact that the relationship between the human rights records of troop-contributing countries and the behaviour of their troops is not straightforward. The UN’s overwhelming reliance on soldiers to conduct peacekeeping operations is further complicated by the fact that the UN has limited authority in managing, coordinating and selecting national military and civilian police contingents. As Bellamy has noted,

National contingents regularly communicate directly with their home state, adhere to their own rules of engagement and choose whether or not they will obey the Force Commander. Finally, each component of the force may vary considerably in terms of its peacekeeping experience, basic military competence and funding.

(Bellamy et al. 2004, p. 51)

A number of recent ‘failures’ on the behalf of the UN ‘to protect’ in Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo (HRW 2004) and East Timor (Martin and Mayer-Rieckh 2005) point to the severe problems of command and control, and the lack of coordination and discipline within the broader UN peacekeeping context (Forges 1999; Houck 1993; Iji 2005; UN 1999f; UN 2000l; Williams 2005). The increasing number of reported (and often sensationalised) accounts of peacekeepers’ incompetence and their abuse of local populations has forced major stakeholders to acknowledge the existence of a widening gap in peacekeepers’ training. On this point, the Brahimi panel advised the United Nations to reject contributions if they do not meet the standards of training and equipment required for the job at hand (UN 2000l, p. xi). With the primary responsibility for training peacekeepers retained by member states, a training gap exists at two levels: the nature and volume of training, and its quality and content. Fetherston, on this, has noted that

These gaps in preparation for peacekeeping mean first that many peacekeepers receive little or no training before deployment and second that the training they do receive prepares them to fulfil non-contact roles, but does not prepare them for their third party role.

(Fetherston 1994, p. 220)

The overwhelming reliance of modern peacekeeping missions on the military and police forces of economically under-developed and politically unstable countries has resulted in a situation where the current state of training does not suit the requirements of modern peacekeeping: many troop-contributing countries do not offer any peacekeeping training at all, while for those that do, such training is a low priority. The most common justification for this is that peacekeeping is ‘low-intensity warfare’, and since this is included in the curriculum of most professional armies, further training is not required or considered necessary (Fetherston 1994, p. 182).
The acknowledgement of the problem by the Brahimi panel led almost immediately to the proliferation of international and national peacekeeping training centres\(^{16}\) and the development of international peacekeeping curricular which included training modules on cultural sensitivity, women's rights and gender awareness. One of the first generic gender-training programmes (released in 2000), was a 3-day module on gender and peacekeeping developed by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of the Government of Canada (DFAIT) and the Department for International Development of the Government of the United Kingdom (DFID).\(^{11}\) In 2001 it was 're-developed' into the UN DPKO's in-mission training programme on gender and peacekeeping (UN DPKO 2001). In July 2004, in response to Resolution 1325 requesting the UN to provide member states with training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights and the particular needs of women, as well as on the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peace-building measures (UN 2000a, par. 6), the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit at the UN's DPKO released a 'Gender Resource Package for Peacekeeping Operations' which included 23 chapters on various aspects of peacekeeping viewed through a gender lens.\(^{12}\) Further to this, an 18-page Inventory of the United Nations' Resources on Women, Peace and Security was produced by the UN Inter-Agency Task Force on Women, Peace and Security in October 2004 to provide Member States, UN-system agencies, civil society and NGOs with a list of United Nations resources in the field of women, peace and security (UN DAW 2004b).

Resolution 1325 invited member states to incorporate gender sensitivity training into their national training programmes for military and civilian police personnel preparing for deployment (UN 2000a, par. 6). However, the language of the Resolution reinforced the nature of the UN's limited influence in the training of its peacekeeping personnel (Cohn 2004). Angela Mackay, a senior UN Gender Affairs officer, noted on this that despite the availability of training materials, the UN cannot enforce any of the training standards upon sovereign states. UN personnel can suggest, advise or request, but not enforce or insist on the delivery of training (Mackay 2004, p. 104). Importantly however, the pressure from local and international advocates for women and women's rights continues to draw attention to the importance of broad peacekeeping reform, including reform of the mechanisms for the recruitment and training of peacekeepers. As a result, these issues have

\(^{16}\) See the web-site of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres providing an extensive list of national and international training centres and institutions. Available from http://www.iaptc.org/index.html [accessed 4 February 2005].

\(^{11}\) This programme, although modified, is available online from http://www.hommes-femmesetlesoperationsdelaneix.org/ [accessed 4 February 2005]. For the analysis of the programme's development and delivery in various contexts see Mackay (2005, pp. 265-279).

\(^{12}\) This programme is available online from http://www.nytimes.com/gender%20Affairs/start-gap.html [accessed 4 February 2005].
started to gain the increasing levels of legitimacy required for the reform process to begin. The recent UN Secretariat report on peacekeepers’ involvement in sexual exploitation has recommended the DPKO organise intensive training for peacekeepers on arrival and during missions.\(^\text{13}\) It also recommended that the memorandums of understanding arranged between troop-contributing countries and the UN should obligate troop-contributing countries to ensure that the contingent commanders are aware of their responsibility to ensure that their contingents attend and receive such training prior to deployment (UN 2005c, p. 18).

Women and Peacekeeping: local martyrs and international goddesses

The requirement for nuanced gender analysis throughout the course of any peace-support operation, including transparent systems of ‘gender accountability’\(^\text{14}\) at all levels, formed a focal point for international women’s activism throughout the 1990s (Kerr 2004, p. 19; Rees 2002). However, having managed to turn the attention of UN policymakers to this issue,\(^\text{15}\) the international women’s movement failed to persuade the ultimate decision-makers (UN member states) to allocate sufficient resources to re-gender modern peacekeeping by remediying long-lasting injustices, overcoming power imbalances and challenging gender-biased political discourses (Staudt 2003, p. 43). The incremental increases in the number of women in national militaries and the advisory gender-focal points within peacekeeping missions has failed to catalyse more substantial peacekeeping reform.

Dorota Gierycz noted on this matter the varying response of the member states towards the implementation of Resolution 1325: while some governments reduced their interest in the issues of women, war and peace on the grounds that it was no longer politically relevant, others tried to exploit this issue to gain inclusion in international debates on peacekeeping (Gierycz 2001, p. 17).

The UN and the ‘UN family’ agencies (including UNIFEM and UNDP) launched a number of initiatives supported by the international women’s movement pushing for the...
implementation of Resolution 1325 (UN 2000b; UN 2004c). However, as Sandra Whit­worth has observed:

When the UN turns to the ‘real business’ of war, security, and peace operations -- when it is not, in short, being pushed to explicitly address gender issues by women’s machineries within and outside the UN -- the silence accorded to gender (or women) is as deafening as it is revealing.

(Whitworth 2004, p. 127)

Accordingly, the near total exclusion of women and girls from the male-dominated ‘peacekeeping business’ is now being replaced by an invisibility of a different nature -- ‘visible invisibility’ (Whitworth 2004, p. 109). With this, criticism has come from within the women’s movement (Kerr et al. 2004) pointing to the damaging and detrimental effects of the ‘political appropriation’ of gender-related discourses (in various fields, such as gender and labour, gender and environment, gender and development, gender and conflict) by the male-dominated political and economic elites. In the realm of male-dominated and militarised peacekeeping, a distinct tendency has been emerging over the last five years, following the adoption of Resolution 1325, to ‘fit’ or ‘compartmentalise’ ‘women and children’ (Enloe 1990) into numerous projects and policies, usually designed without meaningful involvement of women. This process has been described by some as a ‘ghettoisation’ of women in peacekeeping (Datun 2004). The nature of such curtailed recognition presents another focus for the women’s movement -- to challenge the institutional convenience of the collective images of women portrayed as either victims and rape-survivors or, on the other extreme, as friendly and loyal peacekeeping ‘goddesses’. The latter image is often exploited as a problem-solving tactic to ‘engender’ peacekeeping by ‘bridging’ the gender gap: having more female peacekeepers ‘humanises’ peacekeeping and is good for the local female victims and rape-survivors.

At the same time, the international women’s movement campaign to raise awareness of Resolution 1325 led to the advent of another generalised perception: in contrast to the conventional imagery of women as victims and rape-survivors, a new ideological construct emerged (supported by charismatic women activists and international women’s networks) of women as agents and organisers of change and peace against men as perpetrators.

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16 Recent key events such as 2000 Millennium Summit, 2005 World Summit remain largely male-dominated political events where international consensus on many key issues such as environmental degradation, eradication of poverty (disproportionally affecting women and girls) is compromised by the conflicting politicised and militarised national agendas (Acker 1992).

17 See for example Julie Mertus criticising the process of ‘ghettoization’ of women in Kosovo into ‘women’s projects,’ spanning from women’s microcredit enterprises, post-agreement trauma counselling, women’s health care projects, to political leadership training for women’ (Mertus 2003).

18 See periodic UN press-briefings emphasising the importance of women’s involvement and participation -- phrased in neutral terms generalised statements, for example ‘Senior peacekeeping official urges more involvement of women in UN operations’ (UN News Centre, 28 October 2004).
o rather useless and irrelevant figures who leach [women's] energies and resources' (IDS, p. 21). Yet still, the diversity of women (and men), their roles, opinions and positions within diverse and chaotic conflict environments have too often been overshadowed by collective efforts to fight for 'the cause'. Analysing conflict from a gender perspective, Tsjerd Bouta has pointed to the complexity of women's experiences and involvement in all aspects of conflict and post-conflict reconstruction:

...girls were part of fighting forces in 55 countries and were involved in armed conflict in 38 of the 55 countries, all of them internal conflicts. In addition, girls in fighting forces participated in a number of international conflicts, including Lebanon, Macedonia, Sudan, and Uganda. Although female participation varies in armies, guerrilla forces, or armed liberation movements, generally they are between one-tenth and one-third of combatants.

(Bouta 2004, p. 11)

It has been documented that many female combatants join or are forced to join military forces in exchange for food and physical security. Further, sexual abuse and exploitation are often an unavoidable element of the military 'experience' for these women (Corrin 2002; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). Importantly, it is necessary in such analysis to include all women and all areas; the 'gender mainstreaming expectations' of Kosovo Albanian women living in remote areas differs significantly from those of their Pristina-based counterparts. Meanwhile, Chechen 'black widows', or female suicide-bombers, are considered heroines by some in Chechnya, and hardly fit the emerging monolithic image of women as 'peaceful agents of change'. While no justification exists for their acts of terrorism, Mazurana has observed that

...rebel forces often have legitimate complaints against governments (although they may use illegitimate means to address them), and their use of violence is anything but barbaric; indeed, it is exceedingly logical.

(Mazurana 2005b, p. 30)

Interestingly, the recent report by Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein of Jordan, the Secretary-General's Special Advisor on Sexual Exploitation, on the involvement of UN peacekeepers in sexual exploitation and abuse, mentioned 'empowerment' as a motivating factor for women-soldiers: one of the main motivations for women to join the military is, in Al-Hussein’s words, the ‘opportunity to empower themselves, both physically and emotionally’ (UN 2005c, p. 18). The nature and impact of the 'militarised female empowerment' remains largely unexamined, yet its relevance in the context of peacekeeping is obvious. The widely-publicised story of Lynndie England, a female US soldier sentenced to three years in prison for the torture of Iraqi detainees, demonstrates that
"empowerment" is not as straightforward as some commentators may suggest. Variations in social and cultural attitudes towards military service and its nature throughout the various contributing nation-states explains the varying impact of militarised training on female soldiers and their positions within military and civilian police contingents. Nira Yuval-Davis, for example, has noted that

In spite of the fact that women have always constituted an integral part of military life, the formal incorporation of women into the military as soldiers has encountered a lot of prejudice and male fear, although the overwhelming majority of women soldiers are positioned in roles which largely reflect the gendered civil labour market – that is, they are usually secretaries, nurses and teachers.

(Yuval-Davis 1997, pp. 100-101)

No systematic research exists on the impact of military training and the masculinised environment on women’s behaviour, socialisation and self-perception. Militarised training has always been an issue of a deep value conflict, power politics, analytical tensions, contradictions and dilemmas. What seems obvious is that the impact, implications (social, cultural and financial) and ‘empowerment’ potential of female soldiers serving, for example, in British and Bangladeshi armies is rather different. The inclusion of women in national contingents contributed to UN peacekeeping is determined by the nation-states, however the percentage of women contributed by member governments to peacekeeping is routinely lower than the percentage of women in their national militaries. On this, the UN, when it could have taken a lead, ‘...did not issue specific requests for women peacekeepers until 1994 – a peak year...in the demand for peacekeeping personnel’ (Whitworth 2004, p. 43). Conflicting evidence exists regarding the impact of women’s inclusion on the militaries themselves and, in case of peacekeeping, on the local ‘receiving population’ (Skjelsbæk 2001, p. 65). Dubravka Zarkov, for example, noted that despite women’s NGOs and activists in war-torn countries calling for the inclusion of more female soldiers in the relevant peacekeeping, political and military bodies, many have also pointed out that the inclusion of women in such militaries does not change the predominantly sexist and often racist organisational structure and dynamics (Zarkov 2004, p. 3).

The predominant discourses mostly rely on somewhat essentialist understandings of women’s potential contributions to social and political reconciliation, advocating the increased involvement of women for their ‘compassionate’, ‘less threatening or insistent’, ‘conciliatory’, ‘listening’ and ‘learning’ qualities (Gierycz 2001, p. 22). A number of commentators have followed Gierycz’s reasoning, calling to increase the number of women in militaries to bring positive change in values and perspectives (Chinkin 2003, pp. 877-878) and facilitate the mission tasks of making meaningful contacts with women, vul-
nerable groups and non-governmental organisations in host societies (UN 2005c). What is important in this is that the use of language and imagery is important in challenging stereotypes. While it has been widely reported that women and girls are more likely to interact for assistance on a variety of issues with female staff, and while it is accepted that female personnel are especially important in situations where local women are not permitted to interact with men outside their immediate family (Mazuwana 2005a, p. 14), the calls for the increased involvement of female peacekeepers should not rely on the essentialist assumptions about peaceful women and inherently violent men.\(^\text{19}\) Rather, they should be based on a more thorough evaluation of position and needs of women in host societies coupled with a genuine effort to de-militarise peacekeeping, making peacekeeping careers attractive and accessible to various groups of men and women.\(^\text{20}\) Sandra Whitworth concluded on this that unsystematic initiatives focusing on ‘gendering’ existing UN practices fail to transform these very practices, ignoring the ways in which they are already gendered. By asking difficult questions such as ‘Do soldiers make the best peacekeepers? Is peacekeeping a form of the colonial encounter?’ she suggests that ‘Not only do these questions remain unasked within this problem-solving terrain, they remain practically unaskable’ (Whitworth 2004, pp. 185-186).

Conclusion

The agency and role of women and girls in peace processes before, during and after conflict have been recently reaffirmed at the international level by Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (UN 2000a). This Resolution stressed the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and peace-building. It emphasised the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their participation at all levels of local and international decision-making (Cohn 2004).

Over the last decade, the UN system and the international community more generally have started to recognise and address the absence of gender perspectives in post-conflict reconstruction and development projects (UN 2002d; UN 2004a; UN 2004e; the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security 2002; 2005). This shift is particularly important with regard to the changing nature of peacekeeping, where

\(^{19}\) The danger of using such language could trigger or reinforce the processes of ‘othering’ and ‘normalising’, justifying the exclusion of female ‘rotten apples’ – women ‘failing’ to conform to the expected stereotype of a caring, sympathetic and sexually chaste female soldier.

\(^{20}\) See, for example, Tsjerdi Bouta, pointing to the qualitative difference between men and women, and emphasising women’s abilities to set different priorities for peace building and rehabilitation bridging political divides. However Bouta also cautions, ‘one should avoid the view that all female politicians are gender-sensitive, while all male politicians are not’ (Bouta 2004, p. 49).
such projects have rapidly expanded beyond the monitoring of ceasefire agreements to multidimensional operations aimed at the social, political and economic reconstruction of post-conflict societies, involving UN agencies, development and human rights organisations and elements of civil society, including women’s organisations (Bellamy et al. 2004; Fetherston 1994; Mazurana et al. 2005a; Raven-Roberts 2005; Whitworth 2004).

However, despite the growing international awareness of the special needs of women and the recognition of the importance of gender mainstreaming within all phases of the reconstruction processes, there has been a lack of understanding regarding how gender dimensions play a part in the design, management and implementation of post-conflict development processes (Whitworth 2004). This is especially acute in conditions where new governmental structures are being established, leading to the opening of the so-called ‘windows of opportunity’ (Charlesworth and Wood 2001; Wilson 2005).

As this chapter has demonstrated, there has been a growing body of literature, including various academic publications, reports by international humanitarian and human rights agencies, policy recommendations and other materials on the issue of women, peace and security (Bell and Narayanswamy 2003; Bouta 2004; Jack 2003). This growth reflects the variety of efforts undertaken by human rights communities and activists, by feminist activists and by academics to mainstream gender in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction efforts. However, a number of crucial issues require more detailed analysis, including the gendered nature of the United Nations’ ‘nation-building’, and its impact on various groups of men and women in contexts of post-conflict reconstruction. In this, the access of local women to various forms of decision-making deserves particular consideration as a primary mechanism through which the processes of post-war peace-building can be meaningfully engendered.
Chapter 3: Methodological Framework

Introduction

The importance of including a broad range of qualitative and quantitative indicators to evaluate the impact of post-conflict reconstruction and development programmes on local men and women has become a recurring theme in recent international dialogues on gender, peace and security. In this, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan described the concept of Human Development as reflecting:

...the profound conviction that what matters in development is not quantities produced, but the quality of life lived by human beings.

(UN, 1998a, p. 1)

Viewed from this perspective, assessing the impact of gender mainstreaming in post-conflict settings represents a complex methodological issue. This chapter outlines the components of the methodological framework developed for this study. This outline opens with a brief review of the main methodological approaches which have influenced the overall design of the fieldwork and data-analysis. This discussion includes an overview of the critical feminist approach and the rationale for relying on mostly qualitative methods supplemented by a range of quantitative data. Following this, this chapter also explains how data collection and analysis were influenced by and, in turn, influenced the relationship between the researcher and research participants. This discussion includes a review of the ethical and representation/validity protections built into the overall research frame.

The main focus of the present research – the impact of the renegotiation of gendered power dynamics on Kosovo Albanian women's access to decision-making – informs and addresses the need to sensitise contemporary research approaches by incorporating the voices of culturally diverse populations, including the voices of various groups of men and women diversely situated in post-conflict settings (Edwards and Ribbens 1998, p. 2). Drawing on this approach, this study takes on the view that traditional research approaches are not always suited to the examination of the complex challenges that culturally diverse populations face (Potocky-Tripodi and Rodgers-Farmer 2001, p. 445). The decision to include and draw on multiple voices, representing various groups of women often excluded from the male-dominated discourses on democracy-building in post-conflict societies, led to the need to construct a mixed methodological framework able to 'make sense' of these voices. Employing a combination of research strategies and methods allows the broadening of the scope of any research project, enabling the researcher to grasp a broader picture of human behaviour and experiences (Morse 2002, p. 189).
The 'doing of the research' was organised and perceived as (in Maxine Birch's words (1998)) a 'research journey' with its immediate outset, development and culmination resulting in the production of the final report, the PhD dissertation. Analysing the content and meaning of feminist research narratives, Birch (1998) identified three key research stages - intertwined and interpenetrative but distinct in their structure and content: 'going there', or theoretical exploration before the fieldwork; 'being there', or actual participation, involvement in the 'field'; and 'being here', or production of the final piece of work. Over the course of the present research, the boundaries between these three stages remained fluid, with the researcher continuously locating himself within the imagined and real locations of the 'field' and 'academic research world' and being '...a participant in concrete social relationships in both areas' (Birch 1998, p. 172). The final section of the chapter is structured around these three milestone research phases, providing further insight into the content of the methodological framework and the research contexts within which it was designed to operate.

This study seeks to overcome the typical limitations of male-centred gender-biased research, which often includes only male respondents, raises exploitative relationships between the researcher and those researched, makes claims to false objectivity and overgeneralises findings (Letherby 2003, p. 68). To this end, a number of protections were built into the research design. These include the methodological de-construction of the research framework in the form of a multi-layered research matrix; the reliance on qualitative data obtained during fieldwork in Kosovo, supplemented by available quantitative data; the researcher's self-reflection on the nature of the relationships between the researcher and research participants; and the consideration of ethical surrounding the gaining and analysing of primary and secondary data. The reminder of this chapter reviews these protections in greater detail.

**Methodological Framework: Qualitative Research Supplemented by Quantitative Data**

This study is primarily based on results gathered through a qualitative research methodology. However, its qualitative dimension has been complemented and supported by a range of quantitative data. By relying predominantly on qualitative accounts, this research has sought to avoid what Aguzino has called 'the fetish which conventional methods make of statistical analysis' (Aguzino 1995, p. 294). Various statistical evidence, although scattered.
and incomplete in the context of post-conflict Kosovo, was not rejected outright. Descriptive statistical measures, summarised in tables, were used as a means to support or contest the qualitative evidence. Given the absence of unified and reliable official gender-sensitised publications, this research relied on independent publications, direct observation, report of surveys of individuals and group discussions. Departing from strictly qualitative or quantitative approaches and relying on a combination of quantitative and qualitative data, this study sought to overcome the conceptual division between problem-solving and critical approaches articulated by Sandra Whitworth in her recent study of the UN peacekeeping. Reflecting on the statically descriptive nature of quantitative research, the problem-solving approach is often described as taking the world:

...as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action.

(Cox and Sinclair 1996, pp. 88-89)

A critical plane, offered by qualitative methods challenging the idea ‘...of an objective reality that can be understood through simple observation’, treats the material conditions of people’s lives as important and worthy of being documented. It is centred around the fact that ‘...knowledge about the world and all human activity is produced through the discursive practices associated with particular phenomena, issues, or events’ (Whitworth 2004, pp. 22-26).

One of the criticisms of the over-reliance on quantitative data is that gender equality policies should be a matter of principle rather than presenting some guide to the number of women elected or the a number of men and women affected by various manifestations of inequality:

I do not think the very precise figures are important at the moment. Everyone knows that women in Kosovo are often discriminated against and are not equal to men. Even if there were ten or fifteen women only -- it is already bad, it is an injustice and it would have to be remedied. We are talking about thousands and thousands.

(Interview with JQ, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March - April 2004, Kosovo)

Most of the interviewees in this study agreed that having ‘hard data’ was important in requesting the re-allocation of public funds at regional and municipal levels to gender equality initiatives. They agreed that most of the decisions were guided by an estimate of need, which was often difficult to prove without some quantitative support. It was also suggested that central authorities, including UNMIK and to a lesser extent PISG, were not in a position to work out funding priorities based on available data. Meanwhile, gender-
disaggregated statistics on the numbers of male/female candidates and those elected often fails to portray the complex picture of available 'decision-making capacity'. More detailed evaluations, conducted locally with the involvement of local expertise but relying on uniform methodology and data-collecting techniques, could form the basis for regional policy and the distribution of funds and technical assistance. Such evaluations should consider questions like 'how many women would take part in local elections if they had sufficient training/time/resources?', and 'what is the most acceptable training format for various groups of women?'

No sets of quantitative data were generated in the course of this study due to the fact that no questionnaire-based representative surveys were administered. However, a number of statistical summaries have been developed, including a gender-disaggregated statistical profile of political participation at the municipal level of regional self-governance. Meanwhile, a number of difficulties were encountered in accessing other statistical data on the topic at hand. On several occasions, statistical data, which was meant to be freely available in public domain, was not accessible in practice. This included 'Women and Men in Kosovo', a special report summarising gender-disaggregated statistics in Kosovo. It was published by UNMIK's Office of Gender Affairs (OGA) in 2003. According to the OGA, this report was 'the first complete survey of all available sex-disaggregated statistics'. However, none of the organisations interviewed were in possession of this document at the time of interviewing (March-April 2004). The official presentation of the report was held in June 2004. However, despite numerous references to the 'recently published' document on UNMIK's web site, no copies were made available for downloading. Another example of a gender-insensitive approach to collecting statistical data can be found in a series of 'Municipal profiles' published by OMiK. Published for each of the thirty Kosovo municipalities, these profiles provide a description of the political, economic and social landscape, contacts of local administration and international actors, organisations active in civil society, and the judicial and public services systems. Each profile lists the names of municipal assembly members, members of boards of directors and municipal departments, yet no summaries are provided on the gender balance of these structures. In order to establish the gender profile of Kosovo municipalities, each profile was examined and categorized by gender according to the entrants' names on the list. This was completed with assistance from Naim, a member of my host family in Kosovo, who was helpful in identifying male and female names on these lists.

In order to investigate the availability of gender-disaggregated information, a meeting was organised with a representative of the Kosovo Statistical Office. During this meeting I was provided with a number of general statistical overviews and forecasts, however...
no gender-disaggregated data was available. Indeed, the mandate of the Office does not include a responsibility to collect and analyse gender-disaggregated statistics. From the Kosovo Statistical Office I was referred to UNMIK’s Office for Gender Affairs and OMiK, while the latter referred me back to the Kosovo Statistical Office.

‘Going There’

Methodological de-composing of gender-mainstreaming policies: structural and institutional levels

Several factors influenced the decision to pursue a multi-method approach to evaluate women’s access to decision-making in Kosovo and the overall impact of gender mainstreaming policies in the context of provincial post-conflict reconstruction. In this, the ‘Gender mainstreaming continuum’ influenced both theoretical and methodological frameworks of the study: gender mainstreaming was considered as a dynamic and complex process. As Acuner and Kardam have explained:

> It is more useful to think of ‘mainstreaming a gender perspective’ as the process of assessing the implications for women and men in any planned action including legislation, policies and programmes in any area and at all levels.

(Acuner and Kardam 2003, p. 98)

In this light, following Ramazanoglu’s (2002, pp. 153-154) suggestion that the investigation of gendered lives, meanings, representations, power or relationships can be conceptualised in terms of a number of interrelated analytical ‘levels’, the first, structural, line of the methodological de-composing has been identified. This reflected the unique political organisation of post-conflict Kosovo society with formal and informal political authorities deposited at the levels of international administration (UNMIK), central (or regional) administration and local municipalities (ICG 2005a, 2005b).

In order to map the ways in which the institutionalisation of gender-based exclusion affects provincial development agendas, gender mainstreaming has been further deconstructed at the institutional level in order to:

> ...locate gendered experiences within more general conceptions of material conditions of existence and their histories.

(Ramazanoglu 2002, pp. 153-154)

The combination of institutional and structural lines of the methodological inquiry, reflecting specific levels and locations of analysis, allows the examination of gender and power relations in particular sites. This, in turn, enables the researcher
Letherby (2003, p. 101) observes in this respect: 'A postgraduate funding her or himself doing a small-scale qualitative project has very different resources from a team of researchers working on government-funded, large-scale multi-method longitudinal research projects'.

The latest large-scale survey 'Kosovo Mosaic' conducted by UNDP in January 2003 (UNDP in Kosovo 2003) included 6000 respondents from all Kosovo municipalities. While some of the data resulting from this survey was disaggregated by gender, the survey design failed to incorporate it as an operational value. Some of the questions were clearly worded in a gender-biased manner. For example, a question regarding respondent's occupation, provided the following options: 'housewife', 'working', 'student', 'retired', 'disabled', 'unemployed and looking for work' and 'unemployed, but not looking for work' (UNDP in Kosovo 2003, p. 95).

Kosovo Human Development Report 2004 acknowledged that 'Efforts to calculate human development indicators, as well as other standard statistical indices for Kosovo, are hampered by the lack of comprehensive, up-to-date and reliable data...Today, even basic statistics in Kosovo, such as population size, are hotly debated. In KHDR 2002 four different estimates for population were presented, varying up to 23%' (UNDP in Kosovo 2004, p. 12).

...to target what data you want to produce, and so help to specify what research subjects of sources of data will be most appropriate, and how far your resources will stretch.

(Ramazanoglu 2002, p. 156)

Time and financial constraints affected the inclusiveness of the overall research framework, denying the possibility of conducting large-scale quantitative surveys focusing on the involvement or exclusion of various groups of Kosovo men and women from formal and informal political networks. Further to this, the lack of any previous Kosovo-wide surveys which meaningfully incorporated gender into the survey design and analysis, along with the general lack of reliable statistical information, also influenced the decision to rely on qualitative data collected and analysed by the researcher.

De-composition of the provincial gender-mainstreaming policies at the institutional level into 'institutional segments' was essential to the process of acknowledging the diversity amongst the various actors involved in the broad range of activities located under the provincial 'gender-mainstreaming' umbrella. These actors inevitably possessed varying levels of authority, political influence and financial resources, and often pursued overlapping strategies and policies. Initially, no particular preference was assigned to any of the institutional segments. Nevertheless, it was acknowledged that varying degrees of accessibility, motivation and willingness to participate in this research would inevitably impact on the availability of data.

Decomposed on structural and institutional levels, gender mainstreaming policies located within particular institutional sites at various policy levels were then related to each other through graphic representation in a form of multi-dimensional matrix representing the methodological framework of the study – see Table 3.1. Divided by rather fluid and relative boundaries, all nine elements of the matrix, related to each other in a multiplicity of stronger and weaker links, represent both subordinate and dominant, intra- and over-sectoral relatedness and inter-dependency. This reflects the complexity and multidimen-

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22 Letherby (2003, p. 101) observes in this respect: 'A postgraduate funding her or himself doing a small-scale qualitative project has very different resources from a team of researchers working on government-funded, large-scale multi-method longitudinal research projects'.

23 The latest large-scale survey 'Kosovo Mosaic' conducted by UNDP in January 2003 (UNDP in Kosovo 2003) included 6000 respondents from all Kosovo municipalities. While some of the data resulting from this survey was disaggregated by gender, the survey design failed to incorporate it as an operational value. Some of the questions were clearly worded in a gender-biased manner. For example, a question regarding respondent's occupation, provided the following options: 'housewife', 'working', 'student', 'retired', 'disabled', 'unemployed and looking for work' and 'unemployed, but not looking for work' (UNDP in Kosovo 2003, p. 95).

24 Kosovo Human Development Report 2004 acknowledged that 'Efforts to calculate human development indicators, as well as other standard statistical indices for Kosovo, are hampered by the lack of comprehensive, up-to-date and reliable data...Today, even basic statistics in Kosovo, such as population size, are hotly debated. In KHDR 2002 four different estimates for population were presented, varying up to 23%' (UNDP in Kosovo 2004, p. 12).
sional nature of gender mainstreaming in regional post-conflict reconstruction contexts
and its immediate and long-term impact on women's access to and participation in formal
decision-making.

Table 3.1: Methodological matrix: sectoral representation of gender mainstreaming

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels</th>
<th>Segments</th>
<th>UNMIK</th>
<th>PISG</th>
<th>Kosovo Albanian Women’s Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Level</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>C1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK administra-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>A2</td>
<td>B2</td>
<td>C2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Level</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>A3</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td>C3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Exploring the impact of gender mainstreaming policies on women’s access to formal
decision-making at these three institutional levels was organised through the synergis-
tic combination of qualitative research and available gender-disaggregated quantitative
data on political participation. Organised in a form of ‘exploratory investigation’ (Ta-
shakkori and Teddlie 1998, p. 53), this study followed what Morse described as ‘the induc-
tive theoretical drive’, suggesting that ‘...the most important projects within the research
will probably be qualitative’ (Morse 2002, p. 196).

The complex nature of gender mainstreaming leads to a number of implications for
monitoring and evaluating gender and ‘gender sensitivity’ of post-conflict reconstruction.

The methodological complexity of accessing gender mainstreaming policies is sometimes
addressed by introducing and analysing limited sets of quantitative indices, such as the
number of women in national parliaments, municipal assemblies, the public service, or
women to men ratios in secondary/tertiary education. This approach to quantitative data
feeds into an ‘add and stir’ interpretation of gender mainstreaming policies adopted by
some international development agencies. In the context of post-conflict reconstruction, for
example, the quantitative approach to quota-based increase of women’s representation in
official governmental institutions might create an illusory picture of women’s political
empowerment. This, in turn, might overshadow women’s ‘qualitative’ exclusion from for-
mal and informal networks existing within and outside the quota-defined representative
bodies.

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25 Similar approach is advocated by Andjelka Milić (Milić 2004, p. 73). In her overview of Women’s Move-
ment in Serbia and Montenegro she distinguished a number of ‘circles of women’s involvement’.
26 In this respect Stiehm (2001, p. 42) notes ‘...gender mainstreaming is not well understood and it is difficult
to measure. Further, it is important to note that gender mainstreaming is the responsibility of both men and
women, and requires analysis of the concerns and experiences of both men and women’.
Methodological segments: qualitative and quantitative dimensions

Within the methodological matrix (as shown in Table 3.1), Segment A1 represents the impact of UNMIK's gender mainstreaming policies on UNMIK itself. This includes the content of the policies originating from within the organisation and their relevance and compatibility with international gender mainstreaming agendas. It also incorporates UNMIK's Office of Gender Affairs, a special unit tasked to mainstream gender horizontally and vertically throughout UNMIK activities. It was planned to generate qualitative data by means of in-depth interviews with senior and mid-level personnel at UNMIK and OGA; quantitative data was sought in the form of gender-disaggregated mission deployment statistics and annual/quarterly reports produced by the Office of Gender Affairs.

Segments A2 and A3 represent the overall gender mainstreaming policy in Kosovo viewed through the prism of regional legal and institutional frameworks. The latter fall within UNMIK's executive, legislative and judicial authority secured by Resolution 1244 (1999) (UN 2004a). These two segments involve: (a) qualitative legal analysis of relevant pieces of regional legislation, and (b) dynamics of institutional developments aimed at establishing gender mainstreaming institutions and increasing the representation of local women within these institutions.

Segment B1 represents institutional and financial support links between UNMIK and Kosovo's PISG, defined by the gradual transfer of responsibilities from UNMIK to local constituencies. Both qualitative and quantitative assessments were considered relevant within this sector. Relevant documents and statistical data available in the public domain were gathered to provide sufficient qualitative and quantitative data for this analysis. These included evaluation of the existing mechanisms for embedding gender in UNMIK-provisional institutions’ power transfer arrangements, such as:

- Specific gender-sensitive policy pronouncements and interventions;
- Budgetary provisions; and
- Availability of training programmes in the newly created Kosovo public service aimed at increasing women’s representation in formal and informal decision-making processes.

Segments B2 and B3 represent qualitative and quantitative evaluation of the PISG’s commitments to increasing women’s representation in the emerging institutions of self-government, at both central and municipal levels. Such evaluation involved longitudinal analysis of the available statistical data on women’s representation in decision-making bodies of local self-governance organs, judiciary and political parties, and personal opin-

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27 For more details on the OGA's mandate and activities in Kosovo see Chapter 5.
ions of the key stakeholders (both men and women) within major political parties, central and municipal legislatures and executive authorities.

Segments C1, C2 and C3 represent Kosovo Albanian women's groups and networks. Qualitative assessment, based on in-depth interviews with representatives of women's groups was deemed to be the most appropriate qualitative technique. In this, no suitable statistical indicators could fully convey the breadth of the complex interactions between formalised political institutions and community-based women's networks. The qualitative nature of this element of the study pre-determined the sampling strategies used in securing access to the research participants. According to Morse, a qualitative study necessarily uses a small purposeful sample (Morse 2002, p.202). Meanwhile, Tashakkori and Teddlie have recommended the investigation of groups of individuals or events/situations that are the most representative of their respective 'populations' (1998, pp. 65-72). Corrin's Gender Audit of Reconstruction Programmes in South Eastern Europe, completed in June 2000, mentioned more than 50 indigenous Kosovo organisations (including 15 working on women's issues) assuming active roles in regional post-conflict reconstruction (Corrin 2000, p. 7). According to the USAID 2003 NGO Sustainability Index, despite the fact that more than 2,000 NGOs were registered in Kosovo by the end of 2002, the number of active NGOs in 2003 ranged from 100 to 150 (USAID 2003, p. 102). Accordingly, the decision was made to focus on active Kosovo Albanian women's groups as the main source of qualitative data.

Having considered the suitability of qualitative and quantitative approaches to each of the nine methodological segments, the initial matrix was transformed into a more detailed model setting out specific tasks and implications for this study, as demonstrated in Table 3.2.

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28Corrin's Gender Audit of Reconstruction Programmes in South Eastern Europe, completed in June 2000, mentions more than 50 indigenous Kosovo organisations (including 15 working on women's issues) assuming active role in regional post-conflict reconstruction (Corrin 2000, p. 7). According to the USAID 2003 NGO Sustainability Index, 'The number of registered NGOs [in Kosovo] has doubled to 2,000 over the past year, but this number includes many defunct NGOs because there is no process for de-registering inactive NGOs. The number of active NGOs ranges from 100 to 150, not counting scores of informal citizen's groups that are also active, mostly at the local level' (USAID 2003, p. 102).
Table 3.2: Methodological matrix: sectoral representation of gender mainstreaming qualitative and quantitative research dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Segments</th>
<th>UNMIK</th>
<th>PISG</th>
<th>Kosovo Albanian Women’s Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Levels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK ad-</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ministration</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>C1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>QUAL: generated and available</td>
<td>QUAL: generated and available</td>
<td>QUAL: generated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>QUAN: available</td>
<td>QUAN: available</td>
<td>QUAN: available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A2</td>
<td>B2</td>
<td>C2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>QUAL: generated and available</td>
<td>QUAL: generated and available</td>
<td>QUAL: generated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>QUAN: available</td>
<td>QUAN: available</td>
<td>QUAN: available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A3</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td>C3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>QUAL: generated and available</td>
<td>QUAL: generated and available</td>
<td>QUAL: generated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>QUAN: available</td>
<td>QUAN: available</td>
<td>QUAN: available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

QUAL: qualitative data
QUAN: quantitative data
Generated: generated over the course of the study
Available: collected from already available sources

Pilot studies and questionnaire/interview schedules

In-depth interviewing was designated as the primary method of qualitative data collection, operating by soliciting personal views on gender mainstreaming strategies for the segments A1, B2-B3 and C1-C3. In order to assess the availability of representatives for these various segments, a pilot-study ‘X’ was undertaken in the form of an email-based survey. A generic questionnaire was prepared (May 2001, pp. 96-103; Johnson et al. 2002, pp. 303-305), translated into Albanian and sent to a number of sources representing UNMIK, the PISG at both central and municipal levels, senior members of the political parties, and Kosovo Albanian women’s groups. All questionnaires were accompanied by a covering letter, explaining the nature and purpose of the research, including a consent form detailing the issues of privacy and confidentiality. All surveys were emailed twice, at intervals of approximately two weeks. The response pattern reflected the general tendency in segments’ A1 and B2-B3 of an unwillingness to be approached for further in-depth interviewing. For these segments, only four respondents out of a possible twenty, representing segments B2 and B3, expressed their willingness to be interviewed during the forthcoming fieldtrip. The better response rate for segments C1-C3 informed the decision to view Kosovo Albanian women’s groups as the primary source of the interview-based qualitative data. Segments A2 and A3 were identified as the primary source of the documentary-based data.
qualitative data, while segments A1, B2 and B3 were targeted as a primary source of the statistically-based quantitative data.

Another pilot-study 'Y', focusing on Segment A1, was undertaken following the preliminary analysis of responses received from pilot study 'X'. In this, a lack of gender sensitivity on the part of UNMIK's personnel and a disregard for local capacities were identified as central to the accounts of local women's groups. The pilot study 'Y' aimed to evaluate the degree of gender-sensitivity of the national peacekeeping contingents' training programmes. Semi-structured questionnaires, based on Resolution 1325's approach to gender mainstreaming in post-conflict contexts (UN 2000a), covered three major fields, including questions on general policy implications, peacekeepers' training and women's representation within the UN peacekeeping forces. A decision to administer the questionnaires mainly by email was influenced by the degree of political sensitivity, the geographical limitations, and the status of the potential respondents. The research methodology sought to address the relevant ethical principles, providing a set of precautions in order to comply with ethical standards of confidentiality.

The sample for this study was based on information provided by the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations on the numbers of personnel provided by troop-contributing countries.20 Every country making a contribution of over one hundred peacekeeping personnel was included in the sample. For each troop-contributing country a list of contacts was compiled, including Permanent Missions to the United Missions, Press Officers at the Ministries of Defence and Ministries for Foreign Affairs, national non-governmental organisations, and research institutions working in the area of conflict resolution and gender mainstreaming. These were identified randomly with a reference to their profile in their given field. The questionnaires were emailed throughout February - March 2003. Forty-six countries were included. By the end of April 2003, thirteen responses had been received, bringing the response rate to 28%. However, only 4 countries returned the questionnaire with most of the questions answered, bringing the overall response rate down to 9%.

All of the questionnaires returned provided a clear picture of existing national commitments to the implementation of Resolution 1325. Viewed in the light of the low response rate, it could be inferred that the countries failing to return the questionnaire would have had different approaches to the implementation of Resolution 1325 (UN 2000a). However, this conclusion fails to incorporate a number of crucial methodological issues, such as the language barrier (only English versions of the questionnaire were administered), and the unwillingness of various national institutions to take part in this re-

search. A similar study was undertaken by the UN Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women in April – October 2004. Member States received a ‘Note Verbale’ in April 2004 requesting their inputs on the implementation of Resolution 1325 (UN 2000a). By October 2004, only 25 member states had replied. Moreover, responses ranged from a 1-page report submitted by the Russian Federation asserting Resolution 1325’s ‘irrelevance’, to detailed reports submitted by Canada and Germany (OSAGI 2004a).

The outcomes of the two pilot studies resulted in further adjustment of the methodological matrix reflecting the availability of qualitative/quantitative data. These changes are reflected in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3: Methodological matrix: sectoral representation of gender mainstreaming - methodological distribution of qualitative and quantitative approaches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Segments</th>
<th>UNMIK</th>
<th>PISG</th>
<th>Kosovo Albanian Women’s Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Levels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK administration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUAL: generated and compilation of available data</td>
<td>QUAL: generated and compilation of available data</td>
<td>QUAL: generated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUAN: compilation of available data</td>
<td>QUAN: compilation of available data</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Level</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>B2</td>
<td>C2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUAL: compilation of available data</td>
<td>QUAN: compilation of available data</td>
<td>QUAL: generated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Level</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>A3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUAL: compilation of available data</td>
<td>QUAN: compilation of available data</td>
<td>QUAL: generated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

QUAL: qualitative data
QUAN: quantitative data
Generated: generated over the course of the study
Available: collected from already available sources

The use of both qualitative and quantitative research methods has been adopted by a number of feminist scholars conducting sociological exploratory research. For example, in her study of the subordination of working women, Miriam Glucksmann justified the decision to shift from a purely qualitative methodology (which could lead to accepting at face value ‘what the women said’), to understanding the dynamics by which these women were subordinated. In her research, she treated women’s accounts as primary, but by no means as the only data relevant to generating feminist knowledge. Deploying a variety of sources and kinds of data, including interviews with supervisors and managers, company archive materials, surveys, trade union journals, census data and other official statistics, Glucks-
mann was able to develop ‘multi-sourced’ arguments welded from different research elements.

Overall, despite being essentially qualitative in nature, this study also relies on a combination of qualitative and quantitative data. Qualitative data was generated via in-depth field-based interviewing and gathered from a number of documents obtained during fieldwork in Kosovo. Quantitative data was collated from a range of sources, including official publications, statistical indexes and unpublished studies. The available quantitative and qualitative data was combined with desktop and internet research.

‘Being There’

Pristina: finding a new ‘home’

Relying on qualitative research as the primary method for translate the personal voices of Kosovo women into ‘readable’ and ‘publishable’ knowledge invokes another critical aspect of social research – that of the relationship between the researcher and those who are researched. Ramazanoglu has noted on this point that

In social research, researcher and researched always stand in some social relationship to each other, but these relationships are rarely balanced, or ones with fully shared meanings.

(Ramazanoglu 2002, p. 106)

The following sections shed more light on the unique nature of the relationship between myself and the research participants emerging during the field-based phase of this research completed in March-April 2004 in Kosovo.

Qualitative data depends, quite fundamentally, on the personal experiences of the researcher working ‘in the field’: the role he or she assumes in the ‘host’ society and amongst his or her research participants, the rapport established with informants, the particular routes of access to local expertise and cultural knowledge are all crucial. I was fortunate in finding a very sympathetic family to stay with in Pristina who provided me with a solid foundation for my field experience in Kosovo.

I arrived in Pristina in March 2004. Two major issues needed to be resolved first in the run up to the actual fieldwork. These were finding a place to stay in Pristina and, more importantly, securing a list of potential research participants and interviewees. The first aspect proved to be a little problematic given the ‘post-war’ status of Kosovo: no hotels were available for booking via the internet or travel agents in Britain. The second aspect was centred around my identity and the subject of this study.

In order to maximise the potential of open academic internet-based peer networks, an email was sent out to the members of several of such networks, including Balkans and
BalkanWomen, asking for advice on accommodation in Pristina. A number of responses from researchers from all over the world, including from the UK, the USA, Germany, Sweden and Serbia were received. These included recommendations to stay in Pristina’s ‘Grand Hotel’, a rather over-priced hotel (even by British standards) accommodating mostly international consultants seconded to Pristina; recommendations to stay privately with families and a number of contacts in Pristina renting out rooms on a short or mid-term basis; and recommendations to stay in private hotels or hostels with details and contact numbers. I also received a number of responses from Pristina-based Kosovo Albanians, mostly students, offering help in finding accommodation or suggesting staying with them and their families in Pristina. Having discussed these options with my PhD supervisor, who had significant experience of field-based research in Central and Eastern Europe, it was decided to take up one of the offers to stay privately with a Kosovo Albanian family.

My host family consisted of Remzije and Agim, their unmarried teenage daughter Sadete, and their sons Fatmir and Naim. Naim lived in Switzerland earning money as a labourer; I never had the chance to meet him. Naim only visited his family once a year – just for a few weeks, however, as Remzije once commented: ‘Of course he will come back – as soon as things come back to normal here – as they once were’. I had a dual identity in this family. In one sense, I was a student from ‘far and remote’ Scotland who had ventured out alone to Kosovo to do his ‘research’. One of the first questions they asked me was ‘Why did you come to Kosovo? Aren’t there any nicer places to go and do your research?’ Interestingly, the ‘older generation’ – Remzije and Agim – expressed rather mixed emotions towards the subject of my research. On the one hand, they were surprised to know that I was researching women’s political participation in Kosovo; on the other hand, when I started talking about gender and gender studies, Remzije responded:

‘Oh yes...I know...I know...many people seem to be involved in ‘gender’ in Kosovo these days – UNMIK, OMIK, PISG – all of them are doing ‘gender’.

(Interview with Remzije C., March – April 2004, Kosovo)

However, one of the aspects of my identity with which they could not cope so easily was my ethnicity. My dual Russian/Ukrainian citizenship allowed me to present myself as Ukrainian to avoid associations with Russia and Russians, who have been considered vocal supporters of Serbia and Serbs. However, even being ‘Ukrainian’ presented a challenge as this ethnicity was associated with Slavs and Slavic culture and therefore Serbs and anything Serbian. Discussing the history of post-Soviet Ukraine and its political journey towards independence from Russia helped to draw certain parallels contributing to a greater ‘acceptance’ of my personality by everyone in this family.
Fatmir, who was 27 years old, was the younger son and the second child in the family. He had originally responded to my e-list posting, and was a student studying agriculture at the University of Pristina. He was also an ex-KLA member or 'soldier', in his own words, fighting in the Kosovo Liberation Army against 'Serbs and their barbarian genocidal army'. His father, Agim, who was a lecturer at the University, and mother, Remzije, a housekeeper, both came from rural Kosovo. In spring 1982, the family had moved from Ferizaj/Urosevac to Pristina amid escalating ethnic, political and economic tensions in the region. Until 1990, the family managed to build a reasonably comfortable life within the 'middle classes' of Pristina – a new house was being built and Sadete was born. However, life took a turn for the worse after 1991: Agim was dismissed from the University, Naim illegally immigrated to Germany before moving on to Switzerland, and in 1998 Fatmir, then aged 21, joined the Kosovo Liberation Army. When asked about her reaction to Fatmir's decision to join the army, Remzije responded:

'I was terrified. We heard so many stories, so many of our sons were lost to this madness. So my heart was breaking but somewhere in my mind I knew it was a right decision'.

(Interview with Remzije C., March – April 2004, Kosovo)

Having no reliable source of income, family savings were used up very quickly. Agim remained unemployed, while Remzije, who looked after the household and was taking care of Sadete, had to take up additional employment as a part-time cleaner. Recollecting her anxiety about Sadete's future, Remzije noted:

'What a world to bring her into – she has never known peace – at the least the two boys had a childhood, we could still protect them then, but not anymore'.

(Interview with Remzije C., March – April 2004, Kosovo)

Following the end of the NATO-bombing campaign and the establishment of UNMIK in 1999, life had not changed much for Remzije's family. In the face of nearly 70% unemployment in Kosovo, the family remained largely dependent on remittances from Naim and a small income from renting out a room in their family house. Remzije continued to combine taking care of the household and working part-time as a cleaner at one of the buildings occupied by 'internationals'. Agim remained unemployed and somewhat of a 'recessed personality' figure. Since 1991, Remzije has been acting as head of the household, fulfilling many of the responsibilities traditionally perceived as belonging to Kosovo Albanian men. However, there remained strict and non-negotiable limits to the visibility of her authority, largely shaped by the Kosovo Albanians' understanding of ndera [honour] (Reineck 1991). In this, the family still assumes the outward appearance of traditional
Kosovo Albanian ‘normality’: while Remzjie makes all economic decisions, for outsiders Agim still remains the ‘head of the household’.

Facing up to the Challenges: Language Barrier and Security

As of spring 2004, Fatmir was in his third year at the University of Pristina, studying agriculture with an advanced level English elective. For Fatmir, my presence was a good opportunity to improve his English skills and also, as he mentioned, to ‘get the feel of what University life is like in the UK’. For me, it was an opportunity to at least partially overcome the language barrier in interviewing my research participants. In return for my time spent talking about academic opportunities in the West, helping Fatmir with his English class assignments, he helped me greatly with interviewing research participants who did not speak English and where no interpreter was available. Due to the considerable and continuous involvement of Kosovo women’s groups with international feminist and human rights’ networks, on most occasions every organisation had a member who was able to speak fluent English and assist with translating. Fatmir’s help was invaluable in translating various letters and emails from English into Albanian and vice versa during my stay in Pristina, and even when I left and was gathering feedback from the research participants from Glasgow. Prior my field-trip to Kosovo, I was fortunate to have been awarded a Mac Robertson Travelling Scholarship to enable PhD-related research; part of this grant was used to hire a professional English – Albanian interpreter on several occasions in Kosovo, while another part was used to pay translation fees to the Glasgow-based translation agency contracted to translate questionnaires, cover letters and consent forms.

Fatmir was also my point of reference for ‘finding places’ in Pristina (where most of the streets remain unmarked), and in negotiating many other practical issues. From just a member of the host family, Fatmir became a very good friend and intellectually stimulating companion. I also developed a good relationship with Remzjie who tried hard to make me feel comfortable, not only physically during the daily power-outages lasting up to 3 hours, but also spiritually, when my spirits were low. Agim was much less communicative and most of the time looked subdued and upset. The only time he became animated was during the outbreak of ethnic violence in Kosovo which coincided with my visit. In the evenings of these two or three days when public unrest engulfed Kosovo, Agim was out of the house, meeting with his friends and possibly helping to organise demonstrations and street protests. I had no conclusive evidence of this but still felt that he treated me with suspicion. I also found much (and often unexpected) practical help and support from men and women I happened to meet at various places in Pristina: in internet cafes, local taxis and even from the two Kosovo Albanian men managing the local grocery shop.
Every field-based research exercise can be said to carry potential security risks, not only for research participants but also for the researcher. In his discussion of the security dimension of field-based research, Brewer (1993, p. 127) distinguished between contextual and personal security problems. Contextual problems arise from the social, political and economic environment within which the research takes place. Problems of personal security refer to the researcher’s physical safety. As an independent researcher in Kosovo, I faced a number of potential risks to my physical security, mostly due to my ethnicity and being associated with Slavs and, in consequence, Serbs. A number of events that affected my security occurred to and near me, demonstrating how volatile and fragile the seeming normality of life in Kosovo was.

The first of such events occurred one late evenings when I was walking back to my temporary ‘home’ in Kosovo. In the evening, negotiating the streets of Pristina becomes challenging, as many parts of the city become submerged in darkness: long-term power outages and irregularities in the supply schedule often leave residents of Pristina in total darkness. While walking through one of the parks in central Pristina, deserted and rather dark at that time, I was approached by a group of men. They started talking to me in broken English asking whether I worked for UNMIK. I replied that I did not. One of them took a knife out of his pocket and, while making threatening gestures, demanded money. I was fortunate enough not to get injured or physically assaulted. The robbers left with my wallet, money and mobile phone. When I reported this to the nearest police station staffed with Kosovo Albanian policemen, a special police unit staffed with international police officers arrived. I was told by a French police officer that not being a UNMIK-employee probably saved me from being stabbed or injured:

Some of them [Kosovo Albanians] hate us and I guess those who got you were not the happiest bunch, so they could have just stabbed you if you had told them you were from UNMIK.

(UNMIK Police Officer, Pristina, March – April 2004)

I was taken to the Kosovo Police HQ in Pristina to give a statement. I was interviewed by a police officer from India on the circumstances of the incident. Everyone seemed to be sympathetic and even apologetic. In the middle of this interview, a woman was escorted into the room. She was of Asian origin and neither her English nor Albanian seemed to be good enough to explain what happened to her, however she managed to explain that she was sexually assaulted by a work-colleague. A male police officer was brought in to take her statement. This happened in the same room with two other men (including me) and without the help of a professional interpreter. Having finished taking my statement, the sympathetic police officer offered to give me a lift to the place I was staying.
I asked him whether there were any special procedures in place for dealing with the complaints involving sexual assault. His reply was as straightforward as it was shocking: ‘Didn’t you see? She was just a prostitute!’ My experiences of that night could not be said to be representative of the attitudes of Kosovo Albanians towards ‘internationals’, UNMIK-staff in particular, or of the attitudes of UNMIK’s personnel towards local people and women. However, viewed in the light of recognised and intensifying local hostility towards anything ‘international’ and ‘insensitivity of UNMIK’ towards local realities and contexts, this incident was very much indicative of existing tensions.

Another major event that affected the trajectory of my fieldwork was a dramatic outbreak of interethnic violence in Kosovo during which at least 19 people – 11 Albanians and 8 Serbs – died, and over 1000 more were injured (HRW 2004). During this outbreak I did not feel (or perhaps, did not realise) that my personal security was seriously compromised, despite watching UN vehicles set alight by Kosovo Albanian protesters in the next street. Pristina airport and Kosovo borders were closed by UNMIK; the only ‘escape strategy’ for me was to wait quietly in the perceived safety of the house of my Albanian host family while anti-Serb and, in some way, anti-Slavic demonstrations were raging outside. Within several days the Kosovo-wide unrest was contained. This, however, had a significant impact on my interviewing schedules. In the first couple of days after the protests had dispersed, many of my interviews were cancelled. However, this ‘flashback to Kosovo’s war’, as one of the interviewees put it, brought an additional dimension to the content of my interviewees’ responses.

**Sampling and access to respondents**

The focus of this study on qualitative data had a significant impact on sampling strategies, necessitating a purposeful search for small sample of individuals who were the most representative of their respective populations (Morse 2002, p. 202; Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998, pp. 65-72). In this light, research participants were selected on the basis of available information instead of on the basis of random selection.

Since the establishment of UNMIK in 1999, a number of studies have been conducted on the gender aspects of post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo (Corrin 2000; KtK 2001; SIDA 2004), providing detailed accounts of the engagement of Kosovo women groups’ with provincial post-conflict reconstruction. These studies, complemented by continuously updated information available from the Kosovo Women’s Network website.²¹

²¹ For more details see [http://www.womensnetwork.org/](http://www.womensnetwork.org/)
about women’s groups active in Kosovo, were used to identify ‘the most representative’ of the women’s groups.

The task of securing access to research participants was accomplished by relying on several ‘access routes’. Initially, I relied on detailed information provided by Prof Chris Corrin, who is respected and trusted amongst Kosovo’s women’s groups for her continuous engagement with feminist networks in South Eastern Europe. Prof Corrin was my starting point in establishing initial contact with Kosovo-based prospective research participants – a so-called ‘first round’ of ‘gate opening’. Owing to the unique political context of the Kosovo conflict, many non-governmental groups and organisations, including the Kosovo Women’s Network, have become very much engaged in international campaigning, actively participating in internet- and conference-based international networking. This made contacting these groups via email prior to the actual trip to Kosovo easier, yielding a good response rate and resulting in a preliminary interview schedule based on the confirmed dates of my stay in Kosovo and interviewees’ availability.

A second round of ‘gate opening’ occurred in Kosovo via contacts, informants and research participants engaged in initial interviewing. I was fortunate to gain the trust and support of some influential Kosovo women’s movement ‘gate-keepers’, who were not only helpful in providing their views and knowledge as interviewees, but also in institutional and personal ‘snowballing’. The initial pre-fieldtrip list of research contacts expanded significantly by the end of the first week of intensive interviewing in Pristina. Some of the respondents explicitly refused to disclose the identity or provide any contact information of their informants: a female director of one of the oldest women’s NGOs in Kosovo, for example, deleted the informant’s information from one of the unofficial transcripts – a rich source of qualitative data regarding UNMIK activities. At the end of the field-trip in April 2004, thirty self-addressed pre-paid envelopes with the questionnaires translated into Albanian were left with the head of the Kosovo Women’s Network, who promised to assist in distributing them amongst women groups’ members attending the Network’s HQ in central Pristina. No responses were ever received and no clear reason was given by the KWN regarding what happened to the questionnaires and envelopes.

The contact details of female parliamentarians at the Kosovo Assembly and additional or missing contact information for Women’s Network members were obtained from the internet. The third round of ‘gate opening’ was greatly assisted by colleagues working at the UNIFEM and UNDP headquarters in New York. They were helpful in linking me with staff at the UN family agencies in Pristina, including UNIFEM, UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA and UNMIK.
Men Conducting Research Focusing on Women: Methodological Dilemmas

Informed by feminist approaches to translate and fit 'the disorder of private and/or personal experiences' into 'the public concept of research, as ordered, academic and rational' (Miller 1998, p. 61), this study might well be described as 'feminist' in its nature. On several occasions in the process of conducting this study, I was confronted with the issue of men's 'suitability' or men's ethical/moral right to conduct research involving women, or 'feminist research'. As Agozino has pointed out, despite the complexity of methodological issues in feminist research, there is no uniform parameter for measuring feminist research (Agozino 1995, p. 287). However, including 'feminist' perspectives into the overall methodological design makes it vulnerable to criticisms including those suggesting that 'feminist research' should be done by, for and with women. It might also upset the supporters of more traditional empirical methods associating feminist research with predominantly qualitative methodology. Miller has argued in this context that any methodological decision makes a researcher vulnerable to criticisms from those taking other decisions (Miller 1998, p. 45).

Theoretical debates on this issue have questioned whether a male researcher is generally in a position to hear, understand and represent women's voices; to what extent inherent power-based gender inequalities manifesting themselves in the construction of 'knowledge' would affect his accounts of women's 'reality'; whether these accounts are credible; and whether these accounts can be trusted (Heath 1987). These debates also involve another critical issue: whether anyone can, or should attempt to represent groups that they do not belong to, especially groups with lower levels of power and influence (Edwards and Mauthner 2002, pp. 39-40). In their critical review of the intersections between ethics and feminist research, Edwards and Mauthner (2002) argued that '...even if we do share identities, we cannot assume that common identities produce common political perspectives'. Meanwhile, Phoenix (1994), in her discussion of race/gender matching of interviewees and interviewers, explored the ways in which the intersections of the 'race'/gender positions of interviewers and interviewees can have an impact on the interview itself and on respondents' reactions to it. She concluded that if different types of accounts are produced by researchers of different ethnic groups or different genders, then it becomes a research finding in itself illustrating the way in which 'knowledges are situated'. As Phoenix concluded, it is not methodologically 'better' to always have black interviewers interview black interviewees (Phoenix 1994, p. 66).

The possible criticisms of a man conducting research focusing primarily on women should be addressed at two different levels: the very fact of a man studying women, and
the impact of a man being a researcher on the questions asked, the manner they are answered and the research findings made. In his analysis of feminist methodology and arguments about men's 'suitability' to engage in feminist research, Agozino argued that perhaps the only indisputable advantage for women studying women is their access to information facilitated by shared layers of identity with their research subjects. However, this methodological advantage becomes ethically risky if an unsuspecting subject is exploited and misinterpreted by an uncommitted researcher who might nevertheless express sympathy and establish levels of trust and rapport (Agozino 1995, p. 293).

This research focuses on Kosovo Albanian women's access to decision-making, considering it through the lens of gender analysis. It considers the phenomenon of gender access to political power, how this is influenced by the processes of regional militarisation and ethnicisation, and unique cultural attitudes and customs. Kosovo Albanian women's political authority and participation are not being studied in isolation - their situation is considered in relation to men's roles and positions, and to the social, cultural, political and economic context of the region. In this light, the gendered nature of men's access to decision-making in Kosovo would merit the same consideration, yet it too could not be considered in isolation, or as unrelated to the status of Kosovo Albanian women. This study relies on feminist methodology to examine the political complexities of post-conflict reconstruction. It is informed by the principles of gender equality and the belief that some men are in positions able to empower the women they study, just as some women can empower their male research subjects depending on their objectives. The selection of research methodology for this study is based on the assumption that there is nothing inherent in any research method that makes it unsuitable for the study of any group of people by any group of people for the benefit of any group of people. The underlying goal guiding this research is to serve the non-exploitative interests of the whole society, regardless of how difficult this is in practice (Agozino 1995, p. 296-289).

**Researcher and Research Participants: Dynamics of Power Relations**

Gayle Letherby, commenting on the complex dynamics of relationships between researchers and those being researched, has noted that some aspects of the researcher's identity, especially those which are particularly difficult to disguise such as sex, age, skin colour, accent and so on, are likely to have an effect on how researchers are perceived by respondents. This, in turn, affects that data that is collected (Letherby 2003, p. 109). However, it is hardly possible to assess which factors and 'markers' of my identity - male, white,
able-bodied, non-Serb, non-Albanian, international, or any other -- had an impact on the respondents’ perceptions and, consequently, the nature and content of their personal accounts. For most of my interviewees I remained an 'outsider', with little prospect of being given what Naples labelled ‘conditional insider status’ (Naples 2003, p. 48). However, during all three main phases of this research project -- preparatory work and research, field-based research, analysis and writing up -- I was offered expansive help and support from all research participants involved in the study. In each case of such involvement, every research participant was offered a full explanation of the nature of this research, its methodology, purposes and objectives. On several occasions I had to also explain that I was not in a position to offer any help or consulting services apart from keeping my research participants updated on the progress of this research, including final report dissemination. On no occasion was the consent to participate in this research withdrawn.

The different genders of the interviewer and interviewees and the main focus of the interviews -- women’s access to decision-making in Kosovo -- on most of the occasions resulted in lengthy and informative discussions with the research participants. The open-ended dialogical conversation, known for its empowering effect, was chosen as the main vehicle for interviewing. Most of the interviews were organised in a form of so-called ‘funnel interviews’. In this, broad and open-ended questions were asked to obtain unrestricted information from respondents; this was followed by several closed-ended or structured questions that had a pre-planned response format (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998, p. 95). Research participants, most of whom were women, were given the opportunity to talk about something they were passionate about to someone who was genuinely interested without any assessment/monitoring or ‘potential funding’ constraints. On the other hand, reliance on predominantly open-ended questions allowed some respondents to shift the focus, especially in the wake of the tragic events unfolding in the region. As Gillham (2000, p. 46) noted, often ‘...in the flow of [interview] conversation, things get overlooked’. After two or three interviews resulting in very ‘dispersed’ accounts, a system of ‘prompts and probes’ was developed. Combined with a strategy to warn the respondents in the beginning of the interview, it helped to tackle the issues of relevance and reasonable brevity (Birch 1998, pp. 172-173).

The reassurance of anonymity and privacy helped in establishing good rapport with the interviewees. Most of the interviews started with questions about the role of the organisation that the interviewee belonged to, and questions about the position of women in post-war Kosovo. In this I was often viewed as both an outsider, who ‘...did not know much to be intimidated. There are political ambiguities about men contesting men’s benefits in a patriarchal society, and it is easy for mistrust and conflict to arise'.


about *real* Kosovo anyway' (Interview with JW, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March – April 2004, Kosovo) and as a man who by definition did not know as much about women as a woman could have known. This reasoning transpired in the course of content analysis of interview transcripts, when phrases like ‘I have to explain it’, ‘You have to see it through our eyes’, ‘You should get into our [women’s] shoes’, ‘You should get into our skin’ in the context of woman-man and international-local dyads were identified in 85% of the interviews.

The fact of me being ‘international’ or not Kosovo Albanian had a three-fold impact on the process of interviewing: first (and most obviously) was my lack of facility with the language. As described earlier, this problem was resolved by relying on the Mac Rob­ertson Travelling Scholarship fellowship field-research grant money to hire a professional interpreter on several occasions, and by relying on interpretation provided by a member of my Albanian host family. In most cases however, either my interviewees or someone who worked in their organisation had sufficient knowledge of English to mitigate this problem. Using English as the interview language, either with the help of an interpreter or relying on the respondent’s own commands, resulted in unforeseen clarity and straightforwardness of the respondents’ accounts.

The second dimension of me being an ‘outsider’ (combined with my assurances of privacy and anonymity) was my interviewees’ frankness and openness in discussing controversial issues, such as parochialism within the women’s movement. As one of the interviewees noted: ‘You are not staying...so...I could be a bit more open with you’. The third dimension, which has already been mentioned, was my interviewees’ determination to explain what ‘real’ Kosovo was about. As one of the interviewees commented:

Before coming here – you saw us on BBC and CCN, through someone else’s eyes and minds. But now you have to make it up for yourself.

(Interview with JE, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

Another interviewee commented on the impact of the interview on her vision and understanding:

You know, it was such a relief to talk to you. Here, we are in the same pot of soup so to say ...Everyone knows each other, everyone knows how things work or should or will work more or less. But looking at all this from a different perspective, looking at what we [the organisation] and I personally do from the point of view of someone who came from abroad just to get to know things – it was a moment of self-reflection for me too.
My personal commitment to researching the gendered nature of empowerment and participation within post-conflict settings stems from my work and research experience at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Canada where I worked as part of a team developing and delivering pre-deployment training programmes for international peacekeepers. Further to this, I felt it was necessary at the beginning of each interview to provide my interviewees not only with details about my research, its nature and objectives, but also with some information about my background and motivations for engaging in this research project. Talking about my work with human rights groups in Ukraine, Crimean Tatars’ advocacy groups in Crimea, LGBT activism in Kiev and my work at the Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre in Canada helped to ‘break the ice’ and put most of my interviewees at ease about being asked questions and talking about their life. By restating my critical attitude towards sexism and militarism, I was able to open up a space for a discussion of the interviewees’ experiences. Most of the interviewees in this research were women; their response to the fact that I was a man was mostly positive. As one of the interviewees put it:

Finally we have men who show interest in gender affairs. We need more guys like you - I mean not from the UK or elsewhere but from Kosovo. Men who would understand that in order to make life better in Kosovo we all need to work together, that we need to be equal.

I was offered help and information, personal stories, views and understandings not because I had personally experienced the problems and difficulties my research participants had but because I was aware of these problems because of my work, my genuine interest and my association with the women involved in my study in many different ways. Sympathy for the research participants, especially for those who have experienced any kind of trauma or oppression, is less important than personal commitment to ending racism, sexism and class exploitation. As Agozino noted, there are no essentialist biological or psychological traits that make it absolutely impossible for men with different or comparable experiences to sympathise with oppressed women (Agozino 1995, p. 289).

My personal experiences and identity, including my nationality, education and work background, my sexuality, were, although not exactly comparable, instrumental in establishing and fostering relationships of trust and in uncovering common or similar layers of oppression. Because of the nature of the Kosovo context, ethnicity remains a major means by which people assess identity and political attitudes. My Russian ethnicity pre-
presented a problem of whether or not to reveal this fact to the Kosovo Albanian interviewees—something that would not have been an issue in most other contexts. It was originally decided not to emphasise my ethnicity yet people in Kosovo are rather skilled at eliciting identity based on appearance and names. My name pointed to my Slavic origins and my ethnicity was easily uncovered. It proved, however, to not be a source of systematic bias; on the contrary my ethnicity placed the issue of inter-ethnic relations on the agenda. On this, Rosalind Edwards has commented that researchers' social characteristics in interacting with the interviewees could increase or lessen the sensitivity of their research topics. She noted that such processes are hardly predictable, especially in situations where respondents give particular weighting to certain social characteristics of a researcher that are not necessarily congruent with researchers' own perception of those characteristics (Edwards 1993, p. 195). This proved to be the case during my field-based experience in Kosovo—my multiple levels of identity were constantly assessed and re-examined, yet the content analysis of interviewees' responses revealed that none of these layers seriously 'compromised' the quantity or quality of the data obtained.

Several cases of my direct association with 'one of the internationals'—implying a negative connotation of being 'white male of non-Kosovo or non-Albanian origin'—were identified at a later stage of analysing interview transcripts. For some of the interviewees, my identity 'triggered' fierce criticism directed at UNMIK and 'internationals' for 'failing' Kosovo women (and men). On this, Phoenix observed that on some occasions a research participant can develop negative reactions to the researcher, responding against a category that the researcher fits into (Phoenix 1994, p. 56). Sometimes, it was obvious that following arrangements made via email, some of the female interviewees were visibly surprised to see a male researcher arriving for the interview. Many of the respondents in the first pilot study, unable to identify my gender based on my first name, automatically assumed I was female, addressing their responses to Ms rather than Mr.

The sensitive nature of the research was less inherent in the topic and subject of investigation and more located in the specific social and political context within which the research was conducted. The psychological and physical costs to research participants were minimal. No questions that could compromise any aspect of the interviewees' security were asked. In certain contexts research participants are likely to fear being identified, stigmatised or incriminated in some way. Accordingly, this study did not require research participants to identify themselves in any particular way or reveal any 'layer' of identity that they would not be comfortable with revealing to other people. Women's movement in Kosovo has been visible and played a role in civil resistance campaigning, gaining acceptance amongst the male-dominated Kosovo Albanian political elites; it has also been pub-
licly vocal criticising policies of UNMIK and PISG. A certain degree of sensitivity stemmed from the nature of women's organising in Kosovo, with its hierarchical structure and only a few authoritarian 'gate-keepers' at the top; some women from relatively smaller and newer organisations were sometimes reluctant to respond to the questions about women's movement leadership and hierarchies. On each occasion, however, I tried to perceive risk factors stemming from interviewing my respondents from the perspective of the person who would have been affected. I was aware that not everyone would perceive things as I had or would. In order to address the issue of power relations between the researcher and research participants, a number of steps were undertaken over the course of this research project:

The Researcher:
- Communicated respectfully and openly with research participants;
- Respected the autonomy and life-style of the research participants;
- Provided extensive information about the nature, findings and value of the research;
- Provided copies of the Albanian translation of the 'Gender Audit of Reconstruction Programmes in South Eastern Europe' by Chris Corrin and copies of the Albanian translation of UN Resolution 1325, following Sieber's suggestion that in return for their participation, respondents should receive something of value to them (Sieber 1993, p. 18).

If not in Pristina cafés – where women felt at ease to discuss various issues – meetings were organised in offices where women played an active role as hostesses. Most of them went to great lengths to be hospitable by offering me beverages and snacks. I spent time discussing my research with women, asking for their suggestions as to how to improve my research and whether there were topics or issues I was not addressing. On the whole most women seemed happy or content to have spoken to me and expressed hope that their information would help other women or 'the cause'. Similar to Bergen's experiences in conducting sensitive research on sexual violence against women, I felt that the research participants were empowered because they understood that their personal experiences were no longer raw material for the 'data mill'; instead, they were actively involved in sharing their stories and views with others and in this way were evoking change (Bergen 1993, p. 202).

**Research Fatigue**

One of the methodological challenges was the possibility of research participants expressing scepticism towards the study. As Renzetti and Lee have commented:
It is not unusual for the powerless or the disadvantaged to treat the researcher with scepticism, fearing that cooperation will bring in its wake only their further exploitation.

(Renziatti and Lee 1993b)

Despite the various difficulties and challenges facing the women’s movement in Kosovo, its representatives cannot be described as powerless or disadvantaged. Their rigour and passion about advancing women’s rights in Kosovo has enabled and empowered them to speak openly and proudly about the achievements and successes of the women’s movement in Kosovo. One of the difficulties that many researchers face when conducting research in regions that attract substantial international exposure is so-called ‘research fatigue’ which underlies poor response rates and difficulties in collecting sufficient and adequate data. The considerable number of studies and investigations conducted in Kosovo since 1999 is believed to have led to resistance amongst those being ‘researched’ and studied to research inquiry. The unique status of Kosovo as a major point of origin, destination and transit for trafficking in women and girls, and numerous acts of sexual violence against women during the conflict, has also attracted a substantial number of journalists in search of ‘sensational’ reporting and, also, a significant number of independent and contracted researchers focusing on various aspects of these highly sensitive issues. Other issues, including the gender dynamics of political participation have, by contrast, received little attention. Generally, the feeling of being ‘over-researched’ is related to the intrusion into respondents’ limited spare time, lack of feedback received about previous research studies, and respondents’ scepticism about the usefulness and relevance of the new study. In this light, many individuals remain unconvinced of the benefits of participation in further research, as they cannot identify how this research can lead to the desirable changes in policy or practice, or benefit their organisation or themselves personally.

Such research fatigue did not significantly affect the quality of data or interviewing schedules of this study. It did not manifest itself in outright rejections of availability for interviewing. However, some of the interviewees expressed their discontent with being over-researched in the course of the interview. A range of strategies to address this issue were adopted, including:

- Efforts to provide full explanation and re-assurance of anonymity and confidentiality;
- Explanation of the importance of qualitative data collection;
- Being creative with recruitment and research participants’ engagement strategies in order to ensure that research is relevant and has a clear purpose. A number of re-
search participants contributed to the re-formulation of some questions and working ideas, suggesting where and how appropriate information could be obtained;

- Providing clear information about the nature of research, why it was done and its potential benefits.

- An overview of research outcomes and conclusions is expected to be translated into Albanian and disseminated to all of the research participants of this study who expressed their interest in receiving the final report.

Each interviewee was informed of the nature of the study, its purposes and its methods in order to obtain individual consent to participate in the research. In order to comply with the principles of ethical research, an informed consent form included information about the nature, extent and duration of the participation requested and disclosure of the risks and benefits of participation in the research (Reamer 2001, p. 434). Within the overall methodological framework of the study, informed consent was treated as a continuous process rather than an isolated event of participants agreeing and signing informed consent forms. Interview transcripts, for example, were sent to the respondents for their review. No names or information that could potentially lead to the easy identification of the individuals in question have been disclosed at any stage of this study, despite the fact that some of the respondents agreed to have their names disclosed.

Overall, researching in sensitive and delicate contexts, such as Kosovo, presents a number of research challenges. These include access to research participants, language barriers, security of the researcher and research participants, and a number of ethical dimensions. Realising the importance of addressing these challenges before the actual field work significantly helped to minimise the detrimental impact of many factors, including those being outside the control of the researcher. This, in turn, had a positive impact on the quality and quantity of evidence collected. In addition, the very process of addressing and reconciling a number of practical challenges has been treated as valuable research experience informing the research framework and methodology of this study.

'Being Here': Analysis - analytical framework

Many social researchers have described data analysis as a unique experience of physical loneliness and isolation leading to a starting ground to project and transform multiple realities and personal accounts of research participants into a persuasive version of 'social reality' able to withstand the tests of external and internal validity (Birch 1998, pp. 172-173; Mauthner et al. 2002, p. 35). It should not, however, be perceived as a discrete phase of the
research process confined to quantifying or qualifying research data. Rather, as Mauthner and Doucet have argued

...it is an ongoing process which takes place throughout, and often extends beyond, the life of a research project.

(Mauthner and Doucet 1998, p. 124)

One of the conceptual difficulties that every researcher faces while interpreting variable sets of qualitative and/or quantitative data is how to interpret this data, how to construct and validate research findings relevant to his or her original research questions and not, as Glucksmann (1994, p. 163) noted, to twist it "...in a way that amounts to a misrepresentation of what was said". At the same time, feminist scholarship has largely rejected positivist claims to a single uncontested reality, arguing instead that

There are no general rules of validation that can impose an abstract order on the confusion or complexity of daily life...In any research project the quest for valid knowledge is at odds with a desire for order, stability and certainty in our methodology.

(Holland 2002, p. 145)

The nature of multi-level research, relying on both qualitative and quantitative sets of data and targeting various groups of research participants (including those underrepresented and marginalised), inevitably leads to a number of methodological and ethical dilemmas: which perspectives should be privileged when the researcher encounters "...the competing, and sometimes overlapping, viewpoints of groups represented?" (Naples 2003, p. 53). Does the fact that certain groups are marginalised and excluded — and therefore silenced in 'mainstream' research — afford more weight to personal accounts of respondents belonging to such groups? Is it possible to compare degrees of 'marginalisation' in order to privilege some accounts over others?

Any researcher who explores the experience of others and attempts to theorize on this experience is involved in selection and rejection of aspects of the data: qualitative or quantitative; primary or secondary...[where]...Not only are certain aspects of data drawn on and included or rejected and left out but also, sometimes, so are certain people.

(Letherby 2003, p. 78)

Apart from the power to include or exclude certain data from the overall research framework, the power of the researcher lies in his or her choice regarding how to interpret this data, filtering it through his or her own ideas and values and locating it within the framework of the chosen epistemology. In this light the process of interpreting data be-
comes a critical point in the politics of representing ‘others’ across difference (Holland and Ramazanoglu 2002, p. 115).

A broad range of data has been generated in this study, including in-depth interview transcripts, statistical overviews, archival records and documents. Such diversity, in turn, stipulated further need for the careful and theoretically grounded selection of methodological and analytical frameworks for analysis. The researcher was looking for more than just descriptive statistics giving the numbers of ‘women who...’. However, individual opinions and experiences of research participants in this study could not be translated into any, in Ramazanoglu’s words, ‘truth claims’ in a manner of replicating and presenting most powerful voices as one universal knowledge. Instead, the researcher sought to explore the underlying reasons and processes that forced these opinions and experiences to be lived through and, also, allowed them to be voiced and recorded. As Maynard et al. noted,

To repeat and describe what women might have to say, while important, can lead to individualisation and fragmentation, instead of analysis. Feminism has an obligation to go beyond citing experience in order to make connections which may not be visible from the purely experimental level alone.

(Maynard and Purvis 1994, pp. 24-25)

An ‘extra-discursive reality’ approach, developed by Glucksmann (1994) in her analysis of working-class women’s work, was adopted as a model to overcome the somewhat curtailed methodological value of relying exclusively on individual accounts. Constructing an external referent by which to access the testimonies and research data becomes crucial in the process of critical feminist analysis. In this, an emerging framework for gender mainstreaming in peace-support operations and post-conflict reconstruction, crystallised in formalised legal and political commitments at the level of the UN Security Council (UN 2000a), was taken as an external referent for locating individual accounts of respondents representing methodological Segment C. This allowed the conception of the politics of gender mainstreaming in Kosovo as a set of rules, commitments and policy recommendations, originating from the three institutional levels represented in the methodological matrix. These, owing to the unique political status of the region, were perceived as originating and governed by the same external referent source – the UN Security Council and its Resolution 1244 (UN 1999a). Within this particular methodological framework, the external referent was seen as relatively neutral in the sense of being distanced from highly ethnicised and gender-biased political discourses in Kosovo. At the same time, it served as a crystallised form of highly politicised feminist and human rights activism, bringing up the issues of gender (in)equality as one of the central concerns in post-conflict reconstruction and development, and therefore justifying the decision to locate personal accounts
within gender-sensitive discourse, limited but not entirely defined by patriarchy. Importantly however, locating personal accounts within a gender-sensitive extra-discursive framework does not necessarily lead to the production of neutral and bias-free ‘objective’ knowledge.

A further attempt to identify a number of factors that interact and influence the process of interpretation is essential. In their study of young women’s sexuality, Holland et al. (2002) explored the impact of the following dimensions: feminist theory and political values, the standpoint and subjectivity of the researcher, the social event of the interview, the ways in which interviewees formulate their accounts on that occasion, and their own standpoints and values. Meanwhile, Glucksmann’s approach to tackling ‘the grand narrative’ vs. ‘little story’ non-ethnographic nature of the study and the combination of quantitative and qualitative methodologies influenced a decision to treat recorded oral testimonies purely as discourse. Glucksmann (1994, pp. 159-160) noted, ‘In this case the transcript becomes a text, to be analysed as such, in linguistic or other terms’. Such informed departure from over-reliance on individual accounts feeds into the ‘extra-discursive reality’ analytical framework. It also corresponds with the goal of this study to uncover structural links between complex social events rather than reviewing personal standpoints and values of the interviewees and respondents.

Data analysis and analytical procedures

The analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data followed a general pattern of converting ‘raw material’ (interview notes, documents, statistical data) into partially processed data (transcripts and context-related statistical representations), which were then coded and subjected to a particular scheme of analysis (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998, p. 117). In analysing various sets of qualitative research material supplemented by quantitative data, this study relied on the concurrent mixed data analysis model offered by Tashakkori et al. (1998, p. 128), supplemented by a number of analytical procedures offered by Creswell et al. (2002, pp. 209-240) in their review of advanced methods research designs.

The bulk of the data obtained during the March – April 2004 field-trip to Kosovo was qualitative. In total, 29 in-depth interviews were conducted. Of these 29 interviews, twelve were conducted with Kosovo Albanian women representing community groups and organisations focusing specifically on women’s issues; two interviews were conducted with two men representing local human rights NGOs focusing on the issues of human rights advocacy. Efforts to involve more ‘human rights’ groups were not highly successful: 25 groups were invited to participate in the study, yet only 17 responded (16 male and 1 female respondents). Of these 17, a further twelve referred the researcher to the groups
which focused specifically on women’s issues. Four agreed to be interviewed, making stronger or weaker reservations before the interviews regarding the fact that their focus was human rights rather than ‘feminism’ or ‘women’s rights’. This apparent separation of ‘human rights’ and ‘women’s issues/rights’ represents a qualitative finding in its own right, indicating that ‘gender issues’ were predominantly associated with ‘women’s issues’, while ‘women’s issues’ were perceived as a separate domain from ‘human rights’, ‘ethnic minorities’ issues’ and ‘the status issue’. Five in-depth interviews were conducted with representatives of the UN-family organisations, including UNICEF, UNIFEM, UNDP and UNFPA. Five members of the Kosovo PISG were interviewed (including 2 municipal gender officers) in addition to the three female interviewees representing Pillar III (OSCE) of UNMIK and one female interviewee representing UNMIK’s Office of Gender Affairs.

The rich qualitative data presented in the form of interview transcripts was supplemented by a number of reports and documents provided by the research participants (including documents not available for general distribution). They were treated as an additional source of qualitative and quantitative information. Some of the qualitative data from in-depth interview transcripts was quantified, while a large portion of it was presented in the form of verbatim transcripts, marked and coded, and subjected to content analysis with the aim of developing ‘a typology of categories or themes that summarize a mass of narrative data’ (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998, p. 119). The content analysis of the interview transcripts utilised the ‘Four Readings’ model developed by Mauthner and Doucet (1998, pp. 119-146) in their gender analysis of motherhood and postnatal depression. This revolved around a set of three or more readings:

- Reading 1: Reading for the plot and for our responses to the narrative -- what are the main events, the protagonists and the subplots -- listening for recurrent images, words, metaphors and contradictions in the narrative. ‘The first reading of the interview text thus represents an attempt to know our response to the respondent and her or his story’;

- Reading 2 – reading for the voice of the ‘I’ -- ‘...represents an attempt to hear the person, agent or actor voice, her or his sense of agency, while also recognizing the social location of this person who is speaking’;

- Reading 3 – reading for relationships – ‘...how respondents spoke about their interpersonal relationships, with their partners, their relatives, their children, and the broader social networks within which they lived, parented and worked’; and

- Reading 4 – placing individuals within broader social, political, cultural and structural contexts.
The qualitative analysis of the interview transcripts was seen as a primary research method, yet following the inclusion of the 'external referent' in the methodological framework of this study, a number of qualitative-quantitative and quantitative-qualitative data transformations were conducted. These helped to explore existing links between the qualitative and quantitative aspects of political representation and participation of Kosovo men and women, and view these links through the lens of the external referent. The data transformations included a number of analytic procedures described by Creswell (2002, p. 233) as suitable for data analysis / interpretation procedures in mixed method design studies: quantifying qualitative data, qualifying quantitative data, comparing results and consolidating data.

Conclusion
Methodologically, this study has drawn upon a variety of resources following the principles of participatory feminist research whilst relying on the existing and developing body of knowledge on the gender aspects of peace-support operations. The work commenced with a review of the growing body of academic literature on various aspect of the emerging 'women, peace and security' discourse, working documents from a number of international agencies involved in the various aspects of post-conflict reconstruction, and articles from newspapers and professional/academic publications. This review culminated in the development of a proposal pointing to the critical issues to be examined. A multi-method mixed methodological framework was then developed in the form of a multi-dimensional research matrix representing various institutional and structural levels of gender mainstreaming policies in Kosovo. This allowed the researcher to map the gender and power relations affecting the trajectory of the UNMIK-managed process of engendering the post-conflict contexts of reconstruction in Kosovo in the form of particular 'methodological sites'. Appropriate research strategies for each of the 'sites' were then developed depending on the nature of the data each site could generate, the accessibility of potential research participants and the practical limitations envisaged in obtaining such data.

A number of protections were built into the overall research design. These included the researcher's self-reflection on the nature of his relationships with the research participants, and ethical considerations regarding the obtaining and analysing of the primary and secondary data. The mains sources of qualitative data included in-depth interviews with around thirty women and men involved in the process of post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo at various levels and in various roles; recent Kosovo-wide surveys conducted by the UN agencies; pre- and post-1999 ethnographic studies; documentary sources including
reports from various international agencies; UNMIK's regulations and internal documents; and local data on service provision, voting patterns and political participation.

A field-trip to Kosovo was undertaken in spring 2004. A number of difficulties influenced the quantity and quality of the information collected. Often, international administration and local women's organisations did not keep precise records, while where kept, the records were often not readily available to the researcher. Inadequate communication and transportation systems and the deteriorating security situation on the ground prevented the researcher from visiting remote areas where many grass-roots women's organisation, distinct from Pristina-based 'power-players' operated. Issues of risk, power relations between the researcher and research participants, the researcher's identity, and security influenced the trajectory of the research process and have been reviewed in corresponding sections of this chapter. The overall research process followed the 'research journey' approach developed by Maxine Birch (1998), with its periods of outset, development and culmination resulting in the production of the final report – a PhD thesis.

In analysing the breadth of the collected qualitative and quantitative data, including statistical indexes, in-depth interview transcripts, surveys, archival records and documents, an 'extra-discursive reality' approach developed by Glucksman in her analysis of working-class women's work was adopted. This was found to be most appropriate in meeting the overall objective of this study – uncovering structural links between complex social events rather than reviewing personal standpoints and values of the participants in this research.
Chapter 4: Women's Access to Decision-Making in post-1999 Kosovo: Historical, Anthropological and Legal Backgrounds

Introduction

Having overcome the initial turbulence of the dramatic events of 1999, when the crisis in the region challenged the international community in ways that were unprecedented even in this troubled area, Kosovo is now poised to take advantage of democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights - the overriding principles of the international administration governing Kosovo in cooperation with the locally elected Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. It has recently emerged, however, that a striking difference exists between the levels of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights anticipated and the daily realities ‘on the ground’. Political, social and economic pessimism are prevalent amongst the local population, while the depth and severity of poverty and the level of income inequality has increased in recent years. Meanwhile, Kosovo has become an origin, transit and destination point for victims of human trafficking and drugs trade. Despite the recent enactment of comprehensive gender-equality legislation and the fact that women in Kosovo now top the world ranking of women in national parliaments, gender inequality still persists and women’s participation in formal and informal politics remains fragmented. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this manuscript shed more light on the complexities of Kosovo Albanian women’s political participation, analysing the extent to which the newly created political institutions, including regional political parties, are ‘fit for purpose’. Consideration is also given to the complexities of internal dynamics within the women’s movement in Kosovo, including the impact of social and political ethnicisation and militarisation. This chapter provides a background to such analysis.

This chapter begins by outlining a timeline of historical events leading to the unprecedented escalation of inter-ethnic violence in Kosovo and the NATO-bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999. In doing so, it also provides an insight into the status of Kosovo Albanian women during the last century and their contribution towards civil resistance in the years preceding the events of 1999. In this, the virtual absence of Kosovo Albanian women from the public domain appears related to the unique cultural organisation of Kosovo Albanian society, to their traditions, customs and unique ways of seeing the world. An anthropological review presented in this section is based on Janet Reineck’s 1991 work, ‘The Past as Refuge: Gender, Migration, and Ideology among the Kosova Al-
Historical Background: 1913 – early 1990s

Kosovo is situated in the south-western part of Serbia, which, together with the state of Montenegro, forms the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (as of December 2005). The current political situation in Kosovo must be considered within the context of its history; a history marked by hundreds of years of struggle between its Albanian and Serbian populations. In setting out the background for gender analysis of the post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo, it is essential to shed more light on the position of Kosovo Albanian women within the continuously changing political and socio-economic landscape of the region. In this, in the course of the twentieth century alone, Yugoslav women, including women of Kosovo, lived under six different political systems: a dynastic monarchy (in the years up to 1918), a constitutional monarchy (between 1918 and 1941), a period of fascist occupation (between 1941 and 1945), a period of communist one-party rule (between 1945 and 1990), and a ‘flawed democracy and nationalism’ (since 1990) (Ramet 1999a, p. 5). Of these five systems, only Tito’s (1945-1990) adopted any policies on gender equality, or equality between men and women; even this was perhaps only rhetorical nature. The following section provides an insight on the complexity of Kosovo Albanian women’s experiences over the several decades preceding the establishment of UNMIK in 1999.

A review of the research and longitudinal data on Kosovo women’s participation in regional political life demonstrates that despite growing interest in the gender dynamics of political developments in Central and Eastern Europe, relatively few studies have focused on developments in Kosovo. Information on the political, social and economic standing of Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serbian women over the course of the last century remains sketchy and incomplete. In his overview of the post-Tito civil resistance in Kosovo, Howard Clark, for example, referred to only a few sources of information on the role of women in the Kosovo Albanian pro-independence movement in its early period, including Magas (1993) and Lindholm (1991). However, even Magas and Lindholm do not provide any further details apart from simply stating that by the end of 1990s ‘...women’s groups have managed to bring the need for change of women’s status in Albanian society to the political agenda’ (Lindholm 1991). No detailed accounts exist on the nature of Kosovo Albanian women’s political activism prior to UNMIK’s establishment in 1999. Svetlana Slapsak, analysing the role of women in the Yugoslav wars, has noted that despite a number of
‘slight’ changes in the position of women in the Albanian community in late 1980s – 1990s,

...no anthropological or sociological research has been carried out on this, nor has the topic itself yet penetrated the Albanian resistance media and organizations.

(Slapsak 2001, p. 179)

It is worth mentioning that post Second World War Yugoslavia, with its unique phenomenon of ‘self-managed socialism’, was quite removed from the Soviet orbit of communist and post-communist development (Ferfila 1991; Ramet 2002). During the period of self-managed socialism in Yugoslavia, women were politically active within the framework of the Socialist Association of Working People, where they focused primarily on the economic and social emancipation of women. However, the situation for Kosovo Albanian women was more analogous to that of Roma women in Central Europe, in that they were largely excluded from the politics and policies of Communist and post-Communist regimes. It is also worth mentioning that significant differences, as observed by Einhorn and Sever, arise in the nature of the state socialist regime within different national contexts and historical periods. This makes the experiences of each ethnic group within the larger socialist Yugoslavia unique (Einhorn and Sever 1993, p. 165). Kosovo Albanian women were considered to be ‘the lowest’ group by nature of their ethnicity – uneducated and rural ‘birth machines’.

Few similarities have marked the political developments of Kosovo and its neighbouring Albania since their separation in 1913. Under Enver Hoxha (the leader of Albania from the end of the Second World War until his death in 1985), Albania became the most closed and isolated society in Europe, moving from Soviet to Chinese protection (Vickers 1999). In the 1960s, women in Albania were given equal rights and encouraged to take up paid work in order to break cultural and religious traditions, and to compensate for labour shortages. Hoxha declared that anyone who stood in the way of the extension of women’s rights should be ‘hurled into the fire’ (Library of Congress 2005). However, these policies had a rather uncertain impact on the state of affairs in Albania.

At the close of the Balkan Wars in 1913, Serbia was given sovereignty over Kosovo, which it has retained to the present day. Since then, many Kosovo Albanians have aspired to escape Serbian rule, seeing their future either as an independent state, an autonomous region, or as part of Albania. In 1918 after the end of World War I (in which Kosovo Albanians fought at various times both alongside and against Serbs), Kosovo be-

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33 For example, Roma women were often paid to have a sterilisation to keep the Roma population down. For more information, see the web-resource of the ‘Roma Women’s Initiative’ http://www.romawomensinitiative.org/default.asp
came a part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. In 1919, ethnic Albanians rebelled against the Kingdom, and this revolt was brutally suppressed. In the spring of 1921, Serbian authorities imprisoned the wives and children of suspected kacak (members of the Kosovo Albanian resistance movement) in camps in central Serbia. To many Kosovo Albanians it seemed a calculated provocation, as some of the women were wives of clan chiefs exiled in Albania (Clark 2000). Since then, women on both sides have been used as 'hard currency' of ethnic hatred and confrontation. Papic has noted that in Serbia and Kosovo, gender became complimentary form of identity to Nation, negotiating between '...the spheres of History and reproduction, Nation and survival, battlefield and shelter, public glory and private survival, and so forth' (Papic 1999, p. 159). In an attempt to contain any future unrest, the government initiated a colonisation program between 1918 and 1941, providing land and tax exemptions for Serbs willing to move to Kosovo. In 1929, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes became the sovereign state of Yugoslavia, comprised of nine governorships. Kosovo was divided among three of these governorships. Although residents of Kosovo were recognised as Yugoslav citizens, the rights of the ethnic Albanian population were limited.

During World War II, the ethnic Albanian population took advantage of the 1941 invasion of Kosovo by Axis forces to attack Serbian villages within Kosovo. No detailed accounts exist on the scale and nature of Kosovo Albanian women's involvement in this campaign. Ramet has noted that many women in various regions in Yugoslavia took an active role in the war of 1941-45; however, there was a marked decline in female activism immediately after the war (Ramet 1999, p. 99). Women were not allowed to vote in Yugoslavia until shortly after World War II. By the end of the War, tens of thousands of Serb colonists lost their land and were expelled from Kosovo. Economic underdevelopment intensified the immigration of Serbian population to other areas of Yugoslavia in the early 1960s. After the war, the 1946 Yugoslav Constitution provided that Yugoslavia would consist of six republics: Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Slovenia. Kosovo became an Autonomous Region within the Republic of Serbia. According to the 1947 Serbian Constitution, Kosovo had the right to direct its own cultural and economic development and was responsible for protecting its citizens' rights.

The struggle of Kosovo Albanians for independence after 1947 considerably affected the trajectory of gender reform and policies in Kosovo. Gender inequality became entrenched in – and conditioned by – perpetual Albanian and Serbian nationalism. The scenario of 'Strong and worthy men fighting and women waiting' became so 'natural', that any effort to overthrow the 'natural' hierarchy was considered an assault not only on sacred traditions but also on the independence struggle (Mertus 1999). A female Kosovo Al-
banian interviewee commented on the involvement of Albanian women in the pro-independence struggle:

It was and it still is natural...it is...men fighting, women - taking care of children, home...there were some [women] who were very proactive, but you generally do not expect women to take up guns and go shoot...it was not an open war - it was and is a day-to-day struggle for survival. There had to be someone to stay at home, to keep the fire in the stove - I guess it was not the time for feminism and emancipation.

(Interview with JY, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women's group, March - April 2004, Kosovo)

In 1974, a new Yugoslav Constitution was introduced granting the Kosovo status of an 'autonomous province', making it a constitutional element of the Yugoslav Federation equal to other Yugoslav republics. The concession, given by the then Yugoslav president Tito, sought to improve the position of Kosovo Albanians, encouraging them to identify with Yugoslavia under Tito's policy of 'Brotherhood and Unity'. Kosovo was allowed to have its own government, parliament, police, judiciary and Supreme Court. In the field of public service, 80% of all jobs were reserved for Albanians and knowledge of Albanian became mandatory and sufficient. Albanian literature and culture flourished; Kosovo Albanian women, however, remained universally under-represented. In 1981, the last census with near universal participation, the total population of Kosovo was approximately 1,585,000, of which 1,227,000 (77%) were Albanians and 210,000 (13%) were Serbs. Even at this stage, Kosovo Albanians continued to identify themselves as 'victims' of the regime. This, as Clark has observed, made them over-protective regarding problems in their own community, including '...the treatment of women, the rates for birth and illiteracy, the existence of nepotism in the provincial Communist party, and the popular hostility towards Serbs' (Clark 2000, p. 45). During the 1980s, Serbs voiced concern regarding discrimination against them by the Kosovo Albanian-led provincial government. Kosovo Albanians accused Serbian authorities of undermining the Kosovo economy and called for greater political liberalisation and republican status for Kosovo. From 1981 onwards, Kosovo Albanians staged demonstrations, which were suppressed by the military and police forces of Serbia.

During the years of the Tito era (1943-1980) and the era of Titoism (1980-1990), the promotion of gender equality figured as an explicit plank in the socialist platform (Ramet 1999b, p. 89). The women-friendly policies of Tito were undoubtedly a positive factor in advancing women's political and economic interests in Yugoslavia. Analysing the trajectory of the 'women's question' in Serbia, Papic noted that the communist-patriarchal
legacy gave women legal rights but strategically prevented them from becoming active subjects of their own destiny (Papic 1999, p. 154). Moreover, significant cultural, social and customary differences were not easy to overcome, particularly in rural and economically weak areas like Kosovo. In 1931 nearly 55% of the female population over age ten in Yugoslavia was illiterate (vs 32% of men), in Kosovo this figure stood at 84% (Ramet 1999b, p. 96). By 1978, the female proportion of the work force in Kosovo was 20% – just 2% growth from the average 1940 levels of female employment in Yugoslavia. As of 1981, Kosovo had the lowest number of abortions relative to live births in Yugoslavia (Ramet 1999b, p. 97).

Despite the emergence of the first women’s organisations, clubs and societies, the collective power of the women’s movement remained for long periods rather weak. Women’s liberation and gender equality was never a part of Kosovo liberation thinking (Jancar-Webster 1999, p. 69). First and foremost, the Kosovo liberation/pro-independence movement sought to break free from the Serbian imposed communist ideology and regime. In 1953, a social organisation originating from the Anti-Fascist Front of Women of Yugoslavia (which played a substantial role in the spheres of medical care, health counselling, the organisation of such facilities as restaurants, collective laundries and other public services) was abolished (Ramet 1999b, p 93). This abolition was based on the argument that gender equality could be better promoted through party agencies which were not gender-specific. Given the general lack of trust and animosity towards institutions amongst Kosovo Albanians, anything to do with imposed institutionalisation was perceived as suspicious and mistrustful. Serbian authorities sought regional allies with Kosovo Albanian and Serbian women, anticipating their mobilisation in support of the new regime promising women’s emancipation. A number of offensives were launched against patriarchal practices seen as oppressive to all women, including arranged marriages, resistance to girls’ education and dowry (or bride-price). Although some women seized the opportunity to integrate into public life, the majority were pushed back into the confines of private homes and families. ‘Serbian’ efforts to ‘liberate’ women were often perceived as yet another strategy to curb the high levels of birth amongst Kosovo Albanians. One of the dimensions of the ideological shift in the official attitude towards the so-called ‘women questions’ in the 1980s Yugoslavia was an awakening of the discussion about the Yugoslav birth rate. The main question put forward was ‘the problem of high Albanian birth rate’ (Jalušić 1999, p. 117).

The alleged Serbian policy of enforced sterilisation of Kosovo Albanian women was perceived by many Kosovo Albanians as a very coarse intrusive ‘genocidal’ measure (Gasparic 1999), while Yugoslav policies of women’s emancipation were seen as a covert
strategy aimed at breaking down the unique cultural organisation of Kosovo Albanian society. Papic has argued that in unravelling ethnic hatred and mistrust, political and cultural forces '...intertwined in circular and claustrophobic ways: the Nation, Tradition, patriarchy, closure, fear, exclusion, conflict, violence, revenge, extinction, displacement, disempowerment, brutality, insecurity, unpredictability, and impoverishment' (Papic 1999, p. 158).

In the early 1990s, post-Tito Yugoslavia began to unravel along ethnic lines: Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina were recognised as independent states in 1992. The remaining republics of Serbia and Montenegro declared a new ‘Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ (FRY) in April 1992 and, under President Slobodan Milosevic, Serbia led various military intervention efforts to unite ethnic Serbs in neighbouring republics into a ‘Greater Serbia’. In March 1989, the Serbian constitution was amended, giving Serbia direct control over Kosovo. The amendment stripped Kosovo of most of its autonomous powers, including control of the police, educational and economic policy, and choice of official language, as well as its veto powers over further changes to the Constitution of Serbia. In May 1989, Slobodan Milosevic was elected President of Serbia. Following massive demonstrations in Kosovo for national liberation and autonomy, Serbian authorities imposed a curfew, placing the entire province under a state of emergency decree. In 1990 the Kosovo Provisional Assembly and Government were dissolved, Kosovo Albanians sacked from key positions, and demonstrations were brutally suppressed.

Throughout 1990s, Kosovo Albanians adopted a strategy of peaceful resistance, as led by Ibragim Rugova. In 1992 and 1998 Rugova was elected President of the self-styled ‘Republic of Kosovo’. A parallel system in education, health, social support and taxation was set up by Kosovo Albanians in the wake of intensifying discrimination and assaults from Serbian security forces. However, frustration amongst Kosovo Albanians grew as Rugova’s policies failed to meet the widely expected goals of autonomy and independence. In the mid-1990s, the Kosovo Liberation Army emerged, financially and politically supported by Kosovo Albanian émigrés in Western Europe and the US. There have also been claims that much KLA funding was funnelled through drug sales (Mutschke 2000). The KLA began a low-level campaign directed against Serb security forces and against Kosovo Albanians working for the Serbian regime.

**Kosovo Crisis: NATO-bombing and the establishment of UNMIK**

In February 1998, the conflict between the KLA and Serbian forces intensified, and a number of Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs were killed and wounded. As a result, Serbian forces engaged in a campaign of shelling Kosovo Albanian towns and villages,
widespread property destruction, and expulsion of the civilian population from areas in
which the KLA was active. Many residents fled the territory as a result of the fighting
and destruction or were forced to move to other areas of Kosovo. The United Nations has esti-

By the autumn of 1997, the Contact group (composed of France, Germany, Italy,
Russia, the EU Presidency and European Commission, the UK and the US) voiced con-
cerns over developments in Kosovo and called on the authorities in Belgrade and the lead-
nership of the Kosovo Albanian community to join in a peaceful dialogue. In response to the
intensifying conflict, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1160 in March 1998 (UN
1998b) condemning the use of excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians
and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo, and imposed an arms embargo on the FRY. Six
months later the Security Council passed Resolution 1199 (UN 1998c) which stated that
the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo constituted a threat to peace and security in the
region. The Security Council demanded that all parties ceased hostilities and that the secu-

In October 1998, negotiations between Serbia, NATO and OSCE were conducted
in order to diffuse tensions in Kosovo and avert a humanitarian catastrophe. An ‘Agree-
ment on the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission’ was signed. This agreement and the
‘Clark-Naumann agreement’ provided for the partial withdrawal of forces of the FRY and
Serbia from Kosovo, a limitation on the introduction of additional forces and equipment
into the area, and the deployment of unarmed OSCE verifiers. Despite the OSCE verifiers’
presence on the ground in Kosovo, hostilities continued. During this period, a number of
killings of Kosovo Albanians were documented by the international verifiers and human
rights organisations. In response to the continuing conflict in Kosovo, an international
peace conference was organised in Rambouillet, France, beginning on 7 February 1999.
Kosovo Albanians were represented by the KLA and a delegation of Kosovo Albanian po-
itical and civic leaders. Women were not formally included in the Rambouillet negotia-
tions and the agreement reached was largely gender blind. The peace talks collapsed in
mid-March 1999. On March 24, NATO began air operations against Serbia, which lasted
for 78 days. Since the commencement of air strikes, the forces of the FRY and Serbia in-
tensified their systematic campaign, forcibly expelling hundreds of thousands of Kosovo
Albanians and engaging in a number of killings of Kosovo Albanians.

On 10 June 1999, NATO announced a suspension of their air operations against
Yugoslavia. Serb security forces began withdrawing from Kosovo and UN Security Coun-
cil Resolution 1244 (1999) was adopted. Key elements of Resolution 1244 were the right of all refugees to return home, the commitment of all member states to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and, most importantly, a framework for a political solution to the Kosovo crisis. Resolution 1244 authorised the UN Secretary-General to establish an international civilian presence in Kosovo – the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The latter was given the responsibility to establish substantial autonomy and self-government for Kosovo within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia pending determination of Kosovo's future status. KFOR, led by NATO, and numbering between 40,000 and 50,000 troops, was responsible for ensuring peace and a secure environment throughout Kosovo.

UNMIK, headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), included four areas, or 'pillars' of administration:

- Pillar I – Humanitarian Assistance, led by the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This was phased out in June 2000 as the 'emergency stage' was declared to be finished;
- Pillar II – Civil Administration, led by the UN;
- Pillar III – Democratization and Institution-Building, led by the OSCE;
- Pillar IV – Reconstruction and Economic Development, led by the EU.

In May 2001, a new Pillar I was created by UNMIK – 'Police and Justice'.

In 1999, UNMIK set up a regional structure with five regional administrators and 30 municipal administrators. Initially established central departments administering public services were re-organised into a Kosovo-wide Administrative Department within the JIAS (Joint Interim Administrative Structure) system set up in February 2000. In May 2001, a Kosovo Constitutional Framework for Interim Self-Government was approved. It provided mechanisms for the establishment of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) in Kosovo through free and fair elections. Elections for a new Assembly of Kosovo, comprised of 120 seats, were held in November 2001. After months of political wrangling, the Assembly chose a President and a government in March 2002. LDK leader Ibrahim Rugova was elected as President.

To date, four elections have been held in Kosovo – at the municipal level in 2000 and 2002, and the central level in 2001 and 2004. All have been qualified as free and fair, both by domestic and international observers. A detailed discussion of women's participation in political processes in post-1999 Kosovo, including regional and municipal elections, is presented in chapter 5 of this dissertation. In 2002, UNMIK started to transfer responsibilities to Kosovo's provisional institutions. Serbian officials have sharply criticised the transfer of powers, viewing it as a further step towards the independence of Kosovo.
its final stage, UNMIK will oversee the transfer of authority from the interim autonomous institutions to permanent ones, after Kosovo's final status is determined. In 2002, UNMIK outlined a series of benchmarks of international expectations for Kosovo's institutions and society, and argued that they should be achieved before the issue of Kosovo's final status is discussed. The UN is due to review progress in establishing the foundations of democratic government in mid-2005 as a preliminary step towards negotiation regarding Kosovo's long-term status.

Kosovo Albanian women's activism in civil resistance

The nature and extent of the involvement of Kosovo Albanian women in the Rugova-led peaceful resistance, the later KLA-led paramilitary campaign and the subsequent transformation of this clandestine community-based activism into a viable and capable political force in post-conflict Kosovo still remains a contentious issue, generating various and often contradictory opinions amongst academic scholars, practitioners and local women and men. Following the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomous status in spring 1989, the period between December 1989 and February 1990 saw the emergence of a variety of community-based organisations in Kosovo. Women were the founders of the first NGOs in Kosovo (Tahiri 2000, p. 25), including several women-only groups (Clark 2000, p. 55) often defining their strategies in terms other than gender and rarely as feminist. Analysing the complex intersections of national and gender identities in pre-1999 Kosovo, Julie Mertus has provided an example of when a woman-activist from one of the oldest Kosovo women’s organisations, Motrat Qiriazi, had to resort to nationalist discourse to persuade Kosovo Albanian men to let their wives and daughters attend literacy workshops, equating the benefit of educating women with the benefit for the whole ‘Albanian nation’. Mertus noted that ‘Nationalism becomes a powerful legitimising force for organizing women as women’ (Mertus 1999, pp. 175-176). However, the first wave of women groups’ ‘NGO-isation’ in Kosovo did not last long. In 1993, feminist groups started to dissolve: ‘...now [when] the national question came first, this was not the time to talk about contraception or such issues’ (Clark 2000, p. 146).

Only a few groups continued their work advocating for the full recognition of women’s contributions towards civil resistance and demanding their wider political inclusion. The ‘Motrat Qiriazi’ project was re-launched in 1995, focusing on villages in remote regions of Kosovo. Similar groups began to work in other rural areas following the formation of the Rural Women’s Network for the benefit of mutual support, training and networking (Clark 2000, p. 148). In Pristina, the League of Albanian women was formed, while the LDK and the PPK formed their own Women’s Forums. In 1995, the Pristina
Women’s Network was formed, supported by the emergence of new projects and organisations such as the Centre for the Protection of Women and Children and the Women’s Media Project. In 1997, ‘Elena’ – a group specialising in activism against human rights violations against women was formed; in 1998 ‘Norma’, the Society of Women legal professionals, was set up (Clark pp. 148-149). The Pristina Women’s Network and the Rural Women’s Network became two of the most innovative organisations in the period between 1996 and 1998 (Clark 2000, p. 146).

The ‘socio-economic’ activism of Kosovo Albanian women developed through their dynamic role in establishing and running parallel systems of education and healthcare. The latter were principally based on the existing community networks and systems of extended family relations (Clark 2000). However, despite all the risks and dangers associated with the maintenance of the parallel structures, women’s involvement did not lead to a systematic change in the way that women’s activism was perceived by the ‘real’ liberation movement – comprised of ‘real’ Kosovo Albanian men: while (mostly) men were at the front-line fighting for independence, (mostly) women were caring for children, the sick and the elderly (Afshar and Eade 2004; Cockburn 1998; Mazurana 2005; Meintjes 2002). Kosovo Albanian women were not only under-represented within the political leadership of the civil resistance movement; their perspectives and concerns were not adequately reflected within the male-dominated decision-making circles (Clark 2000, p. 121). Janet Reineck, in her anthropological study of traditional attitudes in Kosovo, has pointed out:

Kosova has never had an active women’s movement. City intellectuals have been indifferent to social problems in the countryside. But the violence and repression derailing their lives have politicized and activated these women.

(Reineck 1993)

These views were echoed by Howard Clark in his monograph on civil resistance in Kosovo. He concluded that in the early 1990s, the most dynamic section of the women’s movement in Kosovo, mostly ‘city-dwelling modernisers’, used the language of pluralism, democracy and a greater say for women, gaining financial and ideological support from larger international women’s groups and networks. However, neither internal nor external conditions led to the popular adoption of this policy on a Kosovo-wide scale (Clark 2000, p. 67). At the same time, many reports circulated through the feminist networks, and bulle-

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34 Valur Ingimundarson notes, ‘Over 200 thousand Kosovar women were active in the parallel structure system during Milosevic’s reign’ (Ingimundarson 2003, p. 3). However, according to 2003 Kosovo Mosaic study conducted by UNDP, only 30% of women in Kosovo were ready to volunteer for the ‘women’s cause’. This finding points to the need to question the nature of women’s involvement into Kosovo-wide resistance: in which capacities were they involved? Why were they active? Did their involvement challenge or serve to re-enforce existing patriarchal attitudes?
tins and newsletters published by the Kosovo women’s groups (mostly the Kosovo Women’s Network), tended to stress rather radical developments within the Kosovo Albanian women’s movement breaking away from traditions and patriarchy, taking authority over their own lives and assuming the positions of power and political influence. For example, Edita Tahiri, a prominent Kosovo Albanian woman-activist, has noted:

Albanian women were the first to establish a democratic political organisation of women in the region. This is The Women’s Forum of Democratic League of Kosovo, an organisation that was raised into a most credible organisation. Women’s Forum of the LDK (Initially Women Association of the LDK), established by a number of intellectual Albanian women on March 7th, 1990 contributed significantly in the struggle for the independence of Kosovo.

(Tahiti 2000, pp. 24-25)

Milic, analysing the development of the women’s movement in Serbia and Montenegro, has noted that the success of the first pioneer women’s groups was not due to their strength and competence, but due to the fact that ‘...weak and scarce local groups could obtain support from well-established and politically defined women’s groups in Western countries’ (Milic 2004, p. 67). According to the study published in 2001 by KtK, one of the first large-scale women’s initiatives in Kosovo took place in November 1989 when 1,300 signatures were collected, followed by the announcement of the first women’s declaration and Platform for Action in March 1990 (KtK 2001, p. 11). Organised around issues of peaceful resistance, women’s frustration regarding the escalating violence in Kosovo boiled over into open political protests and demonstrations. In March 1990, Pristina women responded to police firing on students and mandatory conscription to the Yugoslav army (where Kosovo Albanian conscripts were systematically bullied and abused (Clark 2000, p. 58)) with a protest. Staging a protest on International Women’s Day, 8 March, was a unique celebration of ‘politicalised motherhood’ – Kosovo Albanian women’s concerns about the growing incidence of violence, mandatory conscription and university students’ expulsion were acceptable for a patriarchal culture, but the women’s determination to have their concerns heard was a sign of change (Clark 2000, p. 58).

35 The report does not provide any information as to the content of the documents, how they were drafted, whether accepted by the male-dominated Kosovo Albanians’ leadership and so on. Yet, this unreferenced and rather incomplete account has often been referred to in subsequent analyses of Kosovo Albanian women participation in peaceful resistance. See for example UNIFEM’s web-resource on women, war and peace http://www.womeninwarpeace.org/kosovo/kosovo.htm.

36 In her analysis of the human rights politics in today’s Kosovo, Jasmina Husanovic notes that ‘...during the period of widespread and brutal discrimination against Kosovar Albanians, and in conditions of unparalleled political and civic oppression, the human rights scene in Pristina – the informal networks of intellectuals, academics, feminists, students and so on – was impressive in its scope and in the quality of the resulting vision and action’ (Husanovic 2001, p. 269).
In 1991, a sacked radio journalist – Aferdita Saracini-Kelmendi – organised an hour-long silent demonstration in which more than 1000 Pristina women participated holding ‘Stop the Violence’ posters (Clark 2000, at 81). Against this however, the emergence of the KLA in the mid-1990s echoed the Kosovo-wide disillusionment with peaceful resistance, characterised by the dying spirit of voluntary solidarity when, as Clark has observed, people gave their homes to use as schools and student accommodation and created a net of social security (Clark 2000). Frustration mounted, but stronger tendencies were resignation and self-victimisation, wherein Kosovo Albanians reverted to the familiar images of the stigmatised and oppressed nation (Mertus 1999; Reineck 1991, 1993). With this many tended to exaggerate ‘...the regime’s power to prevent Kosovo Albanians from improving their own lives’ (Clark 2000, p. 121). Discussing the origins of the women’s movement in Kosovo, Edita Tahiri, one of its prominent activists, mentioned ‘biblical sufferings’ as the ‘...foundation of the political heritage of Albanian women in the last decade’ (Tahiri 2000, p. 25).

Women-led protests resumed in 1997, following a Serbian clampdown on the region in response to the intensified attacks of the KLA. As Clark has observed, these protests and demonstrations were instrumental in dramatising issues around Kosovo and ‘...providing images both for the media and for international supporters. The women’s demonstrations were especially skilled at this’ (Clark 2000, p. 133). On 1 March 1998, Kosovo Albanian women organised a mass protest with some 2000 women assembling outside of the US Information Office in response to the February 1998 Drenica massacres. The protest continued the following day with an estimated 100,000 protesters joining the organisers. On 8 March, International Women’s Day, women returned to the US Information Office waiving blank sheets of paper to symbolise the lack of rights in Kosovo. However, the most visual demonstration happened on 16 March, when a ‘Bread for Drenica Women and Children’ march was organised. Nearly 12,000 women marched from Pristina towards the besieged areas of Drenica, holding loaves of bread in their hands and placards displaying ‘Stop Genocide’, ‘We Are an Endangered People’ (Clark 2000, p. 175; HR-Net 1998).

37 According to the USIS Washington file, following her unlawful dismissal, Aferdita Saracini-Kelmendi launched with the support of the United States the Albanian-language Radio 21 from a small house in Pristina. Though Serbian authorities have forced her station off the air, she and her staff managed to get reports out through the internet (Spalter 1998).

38 In 1997–98 KLA carried out numerous attacks on police in Kosovo, and set up roadblocks in the countryside. In this period it was added to the U.S. State Department’s list of terrorist organisations. See http://www.answers.com/topic/kosovo-liberation-army for more background information on KLA. For more details on KLM involvement into drug and human trafficking and alleged connection to regional terrorist networks see Mutschke (2000).
Many feminist scholars analysing the involvement of women in nationalism-driven liberation campaigns have pointed to the temporary ‘suspension’ of traditional attitudes towards women’s political activism: ‘Women of the dominant groups... are recruited when the supply of older and younger men of the groups is insufficient to meet the demand’ (Miller 2001, p. 90). Svetlana Slapsak, analysing the exploitative nature of women’s inclusion in the nationalistic discourses of the former Yugoslavia, has explored the systematic pattern surrounding women’s participation in national liberation movements: women are urged to forget their demands and ‘serve the cause’. Slapsak concludes,

Other Balkan examples of this policy in the past show that such demands were forgotten as soon as the older patriarchal rules emerged with even greater force from the national liberation movement. (Slapsak 2001, p. 179)

Following the establishment of UNMIK and the influx of humanitarian and NGO-specific funding in 1999-2000, the women’s movement in Kosovo began to take the form of single-interest projects (what Sabine Lang has called the ‘NGOization of feminism’ (Lang 2000). Many of these projects were often driven by the funding priorities of international donors and not suited to the complex environment of the regional post-conflict reconstruction and the unique needs of the various groups of Kosovo Albanian and minority women (Baker and Haug 2002; Corrin 2000). Despite the growing number of women-led NGOs in Kosovo, most of them were involved in providing community-based services such as psychological support, vocational training (often in traditionally female areas such as sewing and hair-dressing), compensating for the lack of basic social infrastructure. The number of women’s groups openly involved in political activism remained low especially in rural areas. Many of the members in such groups are city-based intellectuals or foreign-educated professionals, while most of the Kosovo Albanian women remain removed from politics, instead seeking to provide for themselves and their families in the deteriorating economic environment. Women’s interests remain a low-priority issue on the political parties’ programmes, often substituted by rather nominal, OSCE-imposed commitments to gender equality. Similar to the situation of Hungarian women following the overthrow of Soviet rule, analysed by Corrin in her study of women’s experiences of change (Corrin

39See also Einhorn and Charlie noting that ‘These [ethno-nationalist] conflicts simultaneously constructed women in terms of their role as mothers, and influenced women’s activism around pacifism and violence. Yet women became active not only in peace politics (reinforcing stereotypical notions of femininity as “naturally” life nurturing) but also around issues of women’s rights seen as political issues’ (Einhorn and Sever 2005, p. 45).

40According to a recent study into Kosovo women’s political participation, ‘A party’s stance on women’s issues does not seem to be a deciding factor for Kosovar women when they choose which party to support—this criterion was important for only 6.6 percent of women voters. In addition, the activities of local party branches exert very little influence over votes—only 6 percent of women voters selected this as a determining factor’ (Kosovar Gender Studies Center 2005, p. 22).
It will be a long process to create political space for Kosovo Albanian women throughout regional, political and social agendas. It will be an equally long process for politically active women in Kosovo to gain the trust and support of the majority of Kosovo women, let alone Kosovo men. More detailed discussion of Kosovo women’s political participation in post-war Kosovo will be presented in Chapters 5 and 6.

Kosovo Albanians: Contours of the Cultural and Social Landscape

The aspiration of many Kosovo Albanians to reaffirm their national traditions, and by doing this to solidify their claim to nationhood, has considerably complicated Kosovo Albanian women’s exercise of their human rights in all spheres of economic, social and political life in Kosovo. The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in Kosovo have been exploiting the rhetoric of women’s rights as proof of Kosovo Albania’s evolving ‘modernity’ and as one of the prerequisites for the Kosovo status negotiations in 2005-2006. However, contradictory streams of official rhetoric have sent mixed policy messages, since all major political parties in Kosovo also point to women’s ‘traditional’ role as the foundation of the ‘national identity and custom’. The conflict in Kosovo can be characterised as a long and protracted process of growing ethnic antagonism centred around competing claims for political and economic power based on unique ‘ethnic identities’. With ‘ethnicity’ at the very centre of this conflict, it is essential to consider ‘what is it to be a Kosovo Albanian’ in order to understand the impact of ethnicity on the gender dynamics of political participation. As Reineck has observed, for many Kosovo Albanians, the first marker of their ethnic identity is _nëderë_ [honour]; the second is _besa_ [the oath] and the third is _fis_ [clan] (Reineck 1991, p. 43). As this thesis considers the influence of traditional attitudes associated with the sense of ethnic belonging (among other factors) on the trajectory of Kosovo Albanian women’s political participation in post-conflict reconstruction, the very notion of ‘traditional attitudes’ warrants further clarification.

Any references to traditional attitudes or ‘traditionalism’ amongst Kosovo Albanians should not be interpreted as a blanket denominator of uncompromising, sexist and misogynistic thinking. Rather, these labels describe a unique cultural context with families and individuals whose behaviour, attitudes and ideas are prevalent to the extent to typify those of the region, not individuals who have been rebelling against the status quo. Culture, as Brettell has pointed out, does not create binding rules which the individual doggedly follows, but rather ‘defines a continuum along which lie a range of acceptable norms or choices that can be taken by individuals in order to achieve their separate ends’ (Brettell 1986:8, cited in Reineck 1991, p. 19). As Reineck noted in her anthropological study conducted in 1981-1991 (a period of escalating political and inter-ethnic tensions in Kosovo),
According to the 2004 estimate by UNDP in Kosovo, over 60% of the population lives in rural areas (UNDP in Kosovo 2004, p. 79). Reineck also mentioned the diversity of social groups in Kosovo and in Pristina in particular: newly arrived villagers, first-generation urbanites mimicking western ways, the elite strata of officials and intellectuals. This points to the complexity of the social and cultural landscape of modern Kosovo. Any future mention of Kosovo Albanians' 'traditionalism' and 'traditional attitudes' in this thesis refers to the various aspects of the unique cultural context and traditional lifestyle of Kosovo Albanians described in detail by Janet Reineck in her anthropological study, 'The Past as Refuge: Gender, Migration and Ideology Among the Kosovo Albanians', based on more than four and a half years of field-work in Kosovo. This study is centred around the critical issues simmering in the mainstream of Kosovo Albanian life in the period when the study was conducted: denial of high school education to many village girls, problems of high birth rates and infant mortality, an increasing reliance on male out-migration, ideological conflicts between past and future, belief and apathy, fanaticism and scepticism, and the perceived correlation between 'progress' and materialism (Reineck 1991).

A unique element of Kosovo Albanian culture is the moral code, or customary law, that is deeply ingrained into every facet of the society. This law is codified in the 'Canon of Leke Dukagjin', a collection of laws which were operative in the Mirdita region of northern Albanian from the fifteenth century (Reineck 1991, p. 40). The Canon stipulates the norms for most aspects of rural life, codified in its twelve books: the Church, the Family, Marriage, Property, Labour, Inheritance, Oath-Taking, Honour, Assault, Criminal Wrongdoings, The Council of Elders, and Exceptional Cases' (Reineck 1991, p. 40). The impact of the post-1999 'modernisation' of Kosovo Albanian society on the authority and standing of customary law in various parts of Kosovo is yet to be assessed. However, manifest disregard for the post-1999 laws promulgated by UNMIK and the Assembly of Kosovo on the behalf of many Kosovo Albanians, coupled with 'widespread disillusionment with democracy in Kosovo' (UNDP in Kosovo 2004, p. 60) demonstrates Clark's observation that the oral customary law remains influential in Kosovo, while the population largely tends to ignore written laws and avoid contact with the legislative authorities (Clark 2001, p. 32). Reineck has pointed out that only a few contemporary Albanians have read the Canon or could quote its contexts, yet the Canon still represents an ultimate authority on the 'true' Albanian tradition for many (Reineck 1991, p. 40). The wide-spread acceptance of restrictive customary law, coupled with the historical legacy of political

41 According to the 2004 estimate by UNDP in Kosovo, over 60% of the population lives in rural areas (UNDP in Kosovo 2004, p. 79)

42 Reineck notes that in Kosovo certain rules of customary law, for example female inheritance rights, ignore the mandates of Koran (Reineck 1991, p. 52).
resistance and the century-long pro-independence campaign, have created a unique political and social environment legitimising two major forms of subordination and victimisation of Kosovo Albanian women: on the one hand, '...men rely on a customary law which reproduces a hierarchical patriarchy and male hegemony'; on the other, 'men compensate for their economic and social impotence in Kosovo, in [former] Yugoslavia and abroad by monopolising power and control in the domestic sphere' (Reineck 1991, p. 15). A longitudinal analysis of the Early Warning Reports published quarterly by the UNDP in Kosovo, and the International Crisis Group's Reports on the systematic analysis of the Kosovo final status process, draws an alarming picture of growing 'pessimism' and subjective feelings of political, social and economic impotence amongst the Kosovo Albanian population (UNDP in Kosovo 2005b). The time period for a comprehensive anthropological review of the impact of the post-1999 political transformations on the situation of Kosovo Albanian women, especially those living in rural areas, is somewhat limited. As Foucault observed, 'modernity is not an isolated 'event', a wholesale transformation of life. Rather, it is a particular way of taking up reality. Change does not come about in one sweeping motion' (cited in Reineck 1991, p. 197). Post-1999 developments in Kosovo, with the emergence of women's activism and the UNMIK-sponsored (and rather formalistic and unsystematic) 'women and gender' agenda have undoubtedly had a significant impact on Kosovo Albanian women's position in terms of opening up a number of opportunities for political activism and for a greater voice in the home. However, a significant dichotomy between men's and women's roles in private and public life is maintained in rural and urban Kosovo. As Reineck observed in 1991:

The female villager is secluded behind high walls, shrouded in public in a raincoat and scarf; the female urban professional presides at meetings, travel abroad, wears the latest fashions. But neither one questions the 'true role' of women and men. The majority of Albanian women are looking for a highest standard of living, not a change in their identity as keeper of the hearth.

(Reineck 1991, p. 185)

Although no large-scale anthropological research into Kosovo Albanians' 'way of life' has been conducted since Reineck's study, existing evidence, available from numerous reports and research into political transformations in the region, demonstrates that the current patterns of women's social and political inclusion appear to be consistent with the cultural practices described by Reineck in 1991. The remainder of this section touches on a number of aspects of Kosovo Albanians' 'traditional' way of life described by Reineck in her study. It sets out the background for further analysis of how these practices and expec-
tations have impacted (and continue to impact) the dynamics of Kosovo Albanian women’s political participation.

The very idea of political participation presupposes the existence of some form of individual or collective political agency. On this point, Reineck observed that Kosovo Albanians have no faith in the power and potential of an individual to break away from the status quo and bring about change. The force of public opinion remains so strong that any attempt to venture against the will of the ‘collective’ triggers complex processes of labelling and ‘othering’ (Reineck 1991, p. 13). As Clark has observed:

There are strong pressures to conform in Albanian society, each person feeling observed by their social circle (rreth) usually preferring to wait until it reaches consensus to change a norm than acting individually to breach it.

(Clark 2000, p. 31)

Venturing against the collective will becomes almost impossible for many Kosovo Albanian women in rural areas, where life is defined and determined by the hierarchies of territorial\textsuperscript{43}and linear\textsuperscript{44} inclusiveness and exclusiveness which place each Albanian in the social universe (Reineck 1991, p. 4-50). Although the veiling of women is not a common practice in Kosovo, the observance of behavioural taboos associated with ‘havale’ — the symbolic veiling and seclusion of women — remains wide-spread, particularly in rural areas. On this, experience from a number of on-going conflicts, including Afghanistan and Iraq, demonstrates that during armed conflicts and in the environment of ethnic and/or religious hostility, protecting and hiding women from untrusted outsiders serves as means of preserving the honour of family and ‘nation’ — one of the essential markers of Kosovo Albanians’ ethnic identity (Reineck 1991, p. 12). One of the female interviewees, a member of a Pristina-based women’s group, commented when asked about Kosovo Albanian women being ‘protected’ by men:

This is not so easy. It’s not like: we’ll give you law and regulations and appoint gender officers and bring more women in. It does not work this way in Kosovo. They [Serbs] were targeting us — women, girls...even old women. They knew that protecting women is a matter of honour for our men...I think it is for every man — Albanian or not. So now, because it was deliberately a target — women are getting even more protected. It is difficult to say whether women feel or want to be more protected — who would blame them if they do. Or [whether] their husbands and family want to protect them from Serbs, from ‘internationals’, from bad fate. But

\textsuperscript{43}Levels of inclusiveness and identity include dialect regions, major and minor geographical regions;

\textsuperscript{44}Levels of inclusiveness and identity include: The clan, the village, major and minor familial lineage; extended and nuclear family.
some women and families are now even more closed and it's not just enough to get a gender officer and a nicely-worded policy to get them out of these voluntary or involuntary shells.

(Interview with JU, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women's group, March - April 2004, Kosovo)

At the time when Reineck's study was conducted, most Albanians saw their social worlds as a patrilineal one, in which name, property and 'blood' were passed on through males (Reineck 1991, p. 46). This formed the basis for strict hierarchies of age and gender, including arranged marriages, and the denial of inheritance and custody rights for women in the event of divorce or death. The 'Madonna/Whore' dichotomy (although the subject is taboo), still functions in Albanian society: 'A man's bride must be a virgin, but he hopes she will be a sensuous, eager woman when they enter into intimate relations' (Reineck 1991, p. 80). Having concluded that the majority of Kosovo marriages were arranged by the couple's parents, Reineck observed that while 'elite urban Albanians' tended to believe that arranged marriages were a relic of the past which had all but disappeared, in villages they were still the norm (Reineck 1991, p.73). With this understanding, the need for an in-depth anthropological study of the current cultural landscape of post-1999 Kosovo Albanian society is crucial. However, while it could be suggested that the events of the last two decades have had a considerable impact on all aspects of life in Kosovo, it cannot be unconditionally claimed that political and social upheaval have significantly altered and reversed the gender-biased traditions and practices of the region. Some of the most outspoken Pristina-based Kosovo Albanian women's rights activists overwhelmingly deny the prevalence of traditional attitudes, acknowledging only that '...some problems do exist'. The limiting impact of such attitudes on Kosovo Albanian women's political autonomy will be discussed throughout this manuscript.

Another aspect of the resistance to change amongst Kosovo Albanian society examined by Reineck and Clark is the appropriation of the past to elevate personal and ethnic identity in times of social and political crisis (Clark 2000; Reineck 1991). Reineck pointed to the universal/global nature of the defensive retreat into conservatism as a characteristic of disadvantaged or socially marginalised communities. She noted that it occurs in rural communities challenged by their urban counterparts and among ethnic minorities fighting for political and social equality:

There is a prevailing sense in which all Albanians, both men and women, are the victims of yet another century of poverty, oppression and social injustice. The appearance of inferior status among women corresponds to a sense of economic and political impotence among many Albanian men. Women and men are both in sub-
ordinate roles. Subordination is exaggerated for women who turn their husband’s private impotence into their public impotence.

(Reineck 1991, p.112)

Victimisation within Kosovo Albanian society seems to work on two parallel levels: those who stayed and experienced the brunt of Serbian oppression over the course of the last four or five decades blame Serbs as a nation for ‘what we’ve been (and often still are) going through’. Those who fled abroad, avoiding persecution or economic hardship, were often forced to take up low-skill low-paid jobs stirring up nationalistic debates in the receiving countries about the ‘Albanian invasion’. Facing hostility from local communities, and legal uncertainty regarding their immigration status, many of these immigrants point at Serbs for ‘what they have made us to go through’. The impact of wide-spread self-victimisation and escapism to the traditions of the past on post-1999 dynamics of Kosovo Albanian women’s political participation will be further discussed in chapter 6.

Paradoxically, increased levels of emigration of ex-pat Kosovo Albanians following the 1999 ‘liberation’ of Kosovo failed to create a social and cultural influence capable of challenging the often repressive cultural norms of Kosovo Albanians’ ‘traditional’ way of life. This was especially the case in rural areas. On the contrary, on many occasions, expats only contributed to the re-emergence of custom and tradition. Reineck observed in this respect that Kosovo Albanians living abroad often became the most active participants in the older layers of customs, reaffirming their ethnic identity. She discovered that alternative behavioural models observed by Kosovo Albanian women abroad rarely seemed to influence their behaviour and way of life when these women returned home and very rarely affected the women remaining the sending community (Reineck 1991, p. 132). As one of the female interviewees observed:

…it is true for most of the cases…one cannot disregard the background of the returnees…there is surely no data available in this chaos but one could guess that most of them [Kosovo Albanians who return] are the people who left Kosovo because of economic and/or political hardship. They went off to do the cleaning, building, catering in Switzerland, Germany, Austria, other countries. When they heard that Kosovo was ‘free’ – what they wanted was to come back and live the life they always dreamt of. To have kids, a family house, land, respect their traditions – lead a normal life they always hoped for. There was no place in their dreams for many things they saw in the west – female drug-users, prostitutes, drunken girls, promiscuity…

(Interview with JI, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March – April 2004, Kosovo)
Many of the Kosovo Albanian women leaving rural Kosovo for a new life abroad or relocating to Pristina to complete their education and become employed as professionals, nurses or factory workers have faced a 'reputational challenge'. Their 'excessive' contact with strangers and their high levels of exposure to the 'outside world' make their moral reputations suspect, affecting their potential to serve as role-models and rendered '...invalid their testimony to the merits of alternative lifestyles' (Reineck 1991, p. 196). One of the female Kosovo Albanian interviewees who was educated abroad and set up a Pristina-based NGO focusing on women's issues observed, in response to a question regarding how Kosovo Albanian women generally perceive women-focused non-governmental activism, that:

Some women in villages or even in towns would look at me like: Yes, great you did what you did – went abroad, got education, set up your organisation...but we do not relate to you...we stayed here, we survived. We do not need your advice as it has no bearing on us...it's good if you give us something practical – like seeds, tools, may be some medicines...but we are different and we have our rules...it is like western soap-operas on television – every woman would watch it – you noticed all of those satellite dishes – but they say 'This is not our lives', why do we have to be like them?

(Interview with JO, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women's group, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

Reineck has also commented on the negative impact of the out-migration of men on the perceived importance of women's economic contributions within families. Women's labour at home is still considered to be part of their domestic responsibilities – unpaid and often unrecognised (Corrin 1999a). In this light, remittances from abroad, often referred to as the major 'fuel' of Kosovo Albanians' civil movements and resistance, on many occasions overshadowed the domestic economy, marginalising women's economic contributions and agricultural labour (Reineck 1991, p.138). Although no reliable data is available, the pre-1999 pattern of predominantly male economic-driven out-migration is believed to have resumed in Kosovo in 1999-2000, with most of the Kosovo Albanians blaming UNMIK for failing to 'put Kosovo back on economic track'.

The full impact of Kosovo Albanian traditions and customs on Kosovo Albanian men's and women's understanding and expectations of the events unfolding in the region since the 'international takeover' is yet to be assessed. In the same vein, the manner in which these traditions and customs were influenced by the very process of post-conflict reconstruction should be given full consideration from an anthropological perspective investigating the process of cultural change. Chapters 5 and 6 of this manuscript consider the
The primary focus of this study is the integration of Kosovo Albanian women in the processes of post-conflict governance and decision-making in Kosovo. In order to better reflect the multiplicity of views and perspectives amongst Kosovo Albanian women, this study considers perspectives informed by institutional location, including the views expressed by women representing the non-governmental women’s movement in Kosovo, women employed by the Kosovo PISG at central and municipal levels, women in the Kosovo public service, and women working for the international administration – UNMIK and OMIK. Incorporating the perspectives of women representing non-governmental organisations requires further clarification in order to address the limits of viewing NGOs as the main ‘driving forces’ of the post-conflict civil society developments in Kosovo. In this light, the very concept of ‘civil society’, viewed through the prism of historical developments in Kosovo, deserves particular consideration.

As Keane has noted, there exists growing agreement regarding the importance of civil society, yet there is a growing disagreement about its exact meaning (Keane 1998, p. 36). Economic and political transitions in Eastern Europe formed the principal terrain on which the popularity of the term ‘civil society’ became firmly established in the 1980s (Hann 1996a, p. 7). Arguing that civil society has many different forms, Hann has criticised the rather limiting usage of the term to mark a homogenised and unified realm standing in opposition to the homogenising and unifying state (Hann 1996a, p. 17). Meanwhile, Einhorn and Sever, analysing the gendered dynamic of civil society developments in East Central Europe, have noted that civil society becomes not just a descriptive term for any type of ‘non-state’ activity, but a discourse of political resistance to the state enabled by a democratic society (Einhorn and Sever 2003, p. 166). The following overview considers how the parameters and the very purpose of resistance within Kosovo Albanian civil society changed following the changes of political regime and modes of governance in the region.

By focusing on the Kosovo Albanian women’s groups and their relations with other governmental and non-governmental agencies and constituencies, this study presents only a snippet of the complex socio-political reality in Kosovo and its post-1999 dynamics. Indeed, as Fine and Rai have noted in analysing the nature of civil society, ‘...it is essential to consider it as a whole rather than highlighting one of the aspects of civil society at the expense of the others’ (Fine and Rai 1997, p. 2). However, as this study focuses on the
mechanisms of political participation available to Kosovo Albanian women, it does not provide a full consideration of the systems of needs, rights and non-state associations within the context of post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo (ibid). The following overview, however, sheds more light on the complex dynamics of pre- and post-1999 developments within Kosovo Albanian civil society, setting the background for the analysis of Kosovo Albanian women's political participation within formal and informal institutions of decision-making.

Hann points to the broad nature of the very notion 'civil society' as leading to the fusion of the moral, the social and the political in the constitution of all human communities (Hann 1996a, p. 3). For most Kosovo Albanians, ‘civil society’ represents the clandestine Kosovo-wide resistance campaign or ‘parallel society’ set up by Kosovo Albanians in a ‘valiant reassertion of their autonomy’ (Advocacy Project 2006). Viewed in this light, the Kosovo pre-1999 civil resistance movement could be said to have had clearly pronounced moral, social and political dimensions. These can largely be summed up by the matter of fulfilling the moral obligations of Kosovo Albanians’ presents to their pasts, reconnecting them to the cultural and historical legacy left by previous generations, and saving this legacy in the face of perceived Serbian ethnocide. The overarching political aim of the movement was the achievement of independence from Serbia. Families and local communities formed the backbone of the social safety net at the time of increasing Serbian government oppression directed at Kosovo Albanians. As Buchowski (1996a, p. 82) has observed, for the scholars who view participation in family life as not fully voluntary, family remains something opposed to civil society rather than part of it. However, in the context of Serbian oppression leading up to the complete closure of social and economic infrastructure to all Kosovo Albanians in the region, and given the weight afforded to family and family relations within Kosovo Albanian customs and traditions (Reineck 1991), extended Kosovo Albanian families became a major site not only of social and economic support, but also of political organising during the pre-1999 civil resistance: ‘the family and the community and kinship networks of the private sphere fulfilled many of the roles that civil society plays in liberal democracy’ (Einhorn and Sever 2003, p. 169). The role of Kosovo Albanian women in maintaining these family-based community-wide group activities was as significant and political as were the international appeals and campaigns by the Kosovo Albanian male politicians. As Sever and Einhorn (1993, p. 167) noted, if involvement in non-state organisations is considered political, then by definition so are the activities of women at the level of local communities. However, this Kosovo-wide involvement of women, although political, cannot be described as a broader movement for social change; nor can it be identified as feminist.
Pre-1999 Kosovo Albanian civil organising and civil society were influenced by local traditions, institutions and practices — in short, ‘...by symbolic worlds of particular communities and their cultures’ (Hann 1996a, p. 20). As pointed out elsewhere in this study, the symbolism and unique traditional organisation of Kosovo Albanian society (Reineck 1991) had a profound impact on the nature of social organising. In pre-1999 Kosovo, the calls for independence became a vehicle for strengthening the society by mobilising it around a militarised and ethnicised form of patriotism. Kosovo Albanians took up the call for ‘human rights and democracy’ (Clark 2000), modifying them to match the realties on the ground and making them central to their struggle for liberation from oppression. Teresa Crawford, in her overview of the challenges facing the ‘Albanian Civil Society’ put forward on a broad yet region-specific definition of civil society: ‘...the parallel political, medical and education systems... - autonomous structures developed by ordinary people’ serving the needs of nearly 2 million people in Kosovo for ten years (Crawford 1999). This influence continued into the post-1999 reconstruction processes, fusing with the institutionalised ethnicisation and increasing militarisation of Kosovo society.

Another manifestation of Kosovo Albanian ‘symbolism’ can be found in the processes and images of self-victimisation adopted by Kosovo Albanians in response to Serbian claims about ‘barbaric traditionalism’ and ensuing Serbian ethnocide. In post-1999 Kosovo, however, the Kosovo Albanians developed yet another framework of self-victimisation, centred around ‘the internationals’, who came to ‘exploit’, ‘colonise’ and ‘advance their careers on us’ (In-depth interview transcripts, Kosovo, March – April 2004). Although the processes of ‘NGO-isation’, often mistakenly associated with the emergence of a thriving civil society (Hann 1996a, p. 22), was well underway in Kosovo and was stimulated by an influx of international funding, a large number of the newly formed non-governmental organisations in Kosovo fell short of creating an inclusive space outside of the newly established governmental institutions to allow the development of ideas and practices through which cooperation and trust could be established in social life (ibid.). The charismatic male-dominated leadership of the pre-1999 resistance movement went on to dominate the new institutions of power (Einhorn 1991), appropriating political language and legitimacy to articulate political demands which previously formed the core of the majority of Kosovo Albanian’s calls for independence. The resulting void started to gradually fill with re-emerging traditionalism and an inward-looking stance, where the long-awaited ‘independence’ failed to deliver the long-awaited freedom and a better life, damaging the pre-1999 moral community, societal accountability, trust and cooperation (Hann 1996a, p. 20).

The voluntary contributions towards clandestine education and healthcare systems in pre-1999 Kosovo stand in contrast to the post-1999 Kosovo-wide tax-evasion and flour-
ishing grey economy, where routes once used for trafficking weapons to support the resistance against the Serbian army are now used to traffic drugs and people in and out of Kosovo. The lack of political ownership and inclusion in the light of the unresolved political status of Kosovo are not the only reasons for the overwhelming sense of local disenfranchisement from political life and reconstruction. The establishment of the provisional institutions of self-governance in Kosovo marked the end of the alternative form of civil society as developed by Kosovo Albanians in the face of Serbian oppression. The incorporation of male ‘dissidents’ into the new legitimate state power structures and the tightening of state power over civil society transformed the pre-1999 civil society into a fragmented social space—weak and secondary to the power of the new state (Einhorn and Sever 2003, p. 169). Analysing the dynamics of civil society evolution and its responses to changing political environments, Skapska has explored the Gramscian understanding of civil society, where civil society is defined as something that is ‘not the state’, with the moral components of such a concept regarded as self-evident, since civil society was often considered as being in opposition to a totalitarian regime: an evil ‘state’ pitted against the heroic ‘civil society’ (Skapska 1997, p. 147). Skapska concluded that the Gramscian concept helps to explain traditional aversion to and fear of the state. Over the course of the twentieth century, ‘the state’ in relation to Kosovo Albanians, was a direct source of danger threatening the very survival of their nation. Such a conception of civil society helps to explain the importance of unofficial solidarity bonds, reinforcing the duality of norms regulating the public and private life within the ‘rebellious’ Kosovo Albanian society (Skapska 1997, p. 148). This concept, however, loses its explanatory potential when applied to post-totalitarian environments, characterised by growing fundamental conflicts within the society, social disintegration, legal nihilism and ‘the ever more present norms of ‘dirty togetherness’; it also fails to explain the growing clientelism and corruption evident amongst members of the former opposition (Skapska 1997, p. 148). Skapska concluded that when new democratic institutions are established in a relatively uncluttered political space, as was the case in Kosovo, their performance is reciprocally linked with values and patterns of behaviour of the people who actualise them in their activities (Skapska 1997, p. 152).

This does not mean, however, that civil society in Kosovo ceased to exist in the post-1999 environment, nor that it replaced by the growing number of internationally funded NGOs. Rai and Fine draw attention to the importance of considering issues of exclusion, violence and isolation in civil society, coupled with the possibilities of resistance to injustice which the idea of civil society still offers (Fine and Rai 1997, p. 6). Skapska mentions the phenomenon of ‘familial egoism’, wherein the often unashamed fight for personal wellbeing in conditions of economic shortage and lack of trust in the official institu-
tions and the law should be considered as an element of the struggle for the very survival of civil society. Familial egoism is thought to contribute to the development of the broader networks and interconnections based on the exchange of goods and favours—a distinct characteristic of the pre-1999 Kosovo Albanian society where the well-being of individual families depended on the availability of goods and services generated and delivered by the community-based support networks. These processes led to the formation of two very specific frames of mind amongst Kosovo Albanians—on the one side, mistrust of Serbian institutions and law was a direct consequence of ethnocidal violence; on the other, seizing every opportunity presented by the state welfare system, or by smuggling drugs and weapons to fund the KLA’s paramilitaries was seen as a part of anti-Serb resistance—justified and necessary. This unique form of civil society organisation proved, however, to be dysfunctional in the context of the post-1999 UNMIK-administered Kosovo. The post-1999 UNMIK and PSIG administrations were set up to hold legitimate authority, giving accountability, transparency and respect for the rule of law. However, the inherited ethnically cleansed and militarised patriarchal Kosovo Albanian networks and connections, accompanied by the narrow and egoistic frames of mind and the lack of trust in official institutions and law (Skapska 1997, p. 154) remain far from being dismantled by internationally funded campaigns aimed at re-orienting civil participation towards inclusive democratic participation. They stand in hostile opposition to the democratically elected institutions, triggering the familiar processes of Kosovo Albanian self-pity and self-victimisation (Clark 2000, Mertus 2000, Reineck 1991). In this light, new problems, such as unemployment, economic decline, violence against women, trafficking in human beings, and environmental degradation have not prompted any new forms of unified civil action. Some forms of civil action, however, such as women’s organising, have continued to develop along the trajectory of pre-1999 activities: for most part, prominent Kosovo Albanian female activists were left out by UNMIK and, consequently, the PISG. Dissatisfied with the performance of the new political elites, they continued and expanded their political and social activism for the benefit of local women, challenging the boundary between the public and the private spheres in order to ‘…make visible the political nature of women’s activity’ (Einhorn and Sever 2003, p. 167).

The insistence of UNMIK in introducing gender-sensitive legislation and gender electoral quotas securing increased women’s representation in the Assembly of Kosovo and municipal assemblies has resulted in a situation where formal gender equality has ‘nearly’ been achieved, while women’s issues and local women’s movements’ struggle for women’s rights has become secondary to the imminent political goals of independence from Serbia and UNMIK. Kosovo women’s issues are still on the agenda of the PISG and
UNMIK in the form of socio-economic problems conditioned by the economic under­
development of Kosovo, but not as the matter of women’s rights. The economic recovery
of Kosovo is conditioned on its independence from Serbia, which becomes the matter of
political negotiation by trusted political male-dominated elites who once served the ‘cause’
by leading the clandestine resistance campaign. In this light, the very reason for civil or­
ganising is lacking, while Kosovo women’s groups activism becomes suspiciously political
and unnecessary: ‘independence from Serbia and withdrawal of UNMIK should make our
women less poor and more equal’ (Interview with JP, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo
women’s group, March – April 2004, Kosovo).

UNMIK, Gender Equality and Gender Mainstreaming in Kosovo: Legal
Foundations
A comprehensive and enforceable legal framework for gender mainstreaming suited to
specific political, economic and cultural contexts is generally regarded as one of the steps
vital for translating internationally recognised appeals for gender equality into real life ac­
tion, particularly in the context of post-conflict reconstruction and development (UN IN­
STRAW 2004). In providing a multitude of ‘windows of opportunity’, such contexts offer
a unique opportunity to set down strong foundations for ‘channelling’ gender into every
aspect of post-conflict reconstruction and development (UN 2000b, UN 2004e). Within
these processes, legal frameworks for gender mainstreaming should play a central role in
binding and coordinating newly established democratic institutions in their efforts to pro­
 mote gender equality. However, the need for such frameworks to be responsive to the
unique conditions is obvious. Taken out of context, ‘Western’ models for gender main­
streaming might not be suited to the specific ‘rule of law’ demands in countries recovering
from years of violent conflicts. However, certain key elements are becoming standard in­
clusions in newly developed legislation.46 In recent years, this has certainly become the
case in the post-Communist countries, including those of South-East Europe.

This section analyses the legal framework for gender mainstreaming in Kosovo as
it was developed by UNMIK since the (official) end of the war in 1999, setting out the
background for gender analysis of political participation. The remaining sections of this
chapter will then endeavour to critically assess one of UNMIK’s ‘peacekeeping best prac­
tices’ (Whitworth 2004). In doing this, the content of the UN policies to ‘engender’ post-

46 Julie Mertus, commenting on the appropriateness of the ‘Western’ models for mainstreaming gender notes,
‘When new laws affecting women are created in the peacebuilding stage, they often reflect the input of inter­
national specialists, with little attention to the suggestions of local women’s groups. It is no wonder then that
local women often see the laws that are supposed to “help them” as a foreign imposition with little relevance
to their lives’ (Mertus 2003, p. 547).
conflict reconstruction in Kosovo are considered from the position of the argument that socio-economic, political and cultural contexts in Kosovo have always been ‘gendered’, prior to the arrival of UNMIK. The latter, seen as a profoundly gendered institution in itself, has been involved in the (re)production of the ‘benign and altruistic’ image of peacekeeping, despite the fact that it remains rooted in ideas of militarised masculinity and patriarchy (Whitworth 2004, pp. 183-187). The following sections analyse the complex relationship between the emerging legal framework for gender mainstreaming and women’s positions within reconstruction contexts in Kosovo. However, this discussion will not touch on feminist debates on the inherent subjectivity and female-bias built into seemingly neutral norms of international law (Bryson 1999; Charlesworth 1999; Chinkin and Paradine 2001). While acknowledging that a significant degree of partiality and gender-bias exists within the legal profession and international law, the argument is based on a principle that women’s engagement with law can be productive in both the long and short term, provided that existing biases are recognised and addressed (Bryson 1999, p. 72).

Firstly, an overview of the controversial issue of UNMIK’s legitimacy in relation to the norms of international human rights law will be provided. Following this, the remainder of the chapter will identify relevant pieces of regional legislation in order to evaluate the existing mechanisms for mainstreaming gender and securing legitimate paths to decision-making for Kosovo women. A particular reference is made to the Anti-Discrimination and Gender Equality Laws adopted by the Assembly of Kosovo in 2004. A discussion of the electoral legislation in Kosovo and its impact on Kosovo women’s electoral gains appears in chapter 5 of this manuscript. In considering the emerging legislation aimed at ‘institutionalising’ gender within the processes of post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo, this section focuses on the available ‘support’-legislation. The latter sets out the legal basis for the functioning of various institutions not endowed with explicit gender mainstreaming mandates, but expected to contribute in various ways to the overall policies of mainstreaming gender and achieving gender equality.

**Applicable law in Kosovo**

The current political status of Kosovo must be considered within the broad context of the executive and legislative authority exercised by UNMIK in accordance with Resolution 1244 (UN 1999a), and the complex and volatile political and socio-economic environments in the region. When the first KFOR contingents entered Kosovo on June 12 1999, legal system was virtually non-existent: there were no functioning law-enforcement institutions, and importantly, neither was there any agreement on which laws applied in the territory (Hochschild 2004, p. 288).
Serbia was effectively devoid of its jurisdiction over the region, rendering the question of the applicability of Serbian laws both disputable and politically sensitive. At the same time, realities on the ground required a prompt decision to be taken regarding the law to govern the region. In July 1999, UNMIK Regulation 1999/1 was promulgated. It delineated and reaffirmed extensive legislative and executive authorities of the SRSG and extended the applicability of the Serbian, or Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, pre-March 1999 laws in UN-administered Kosovo, insofar as the pre-1999 laws did not conflict with the internationally recognised human rights standards (UNMIK 1999b). No local consultations preceded this decision. This was one of the early indications of UNMIK's unpreparedness to recognise the complexity of the intertwined cultural and political regional contexts, where political lines of division remained structured along ethnic and historical legacies manifesting themselves in various forms of ethnic and political affiliation. Betts et al. have noted in this respect that

...the initial law-making process did not include any formal mechanism for soliciting Kosovar input from interested constituencies or the general public...the selection of FRY/Serbian law was made without consulting those who would be applying the law or those who must submit to it.

(Betts et al. 2001, p. 374)

No resources were allocated to reconcile the compliance of FRY law with international human rights standards -- '...the SRSG did not have the resources to conduct such an analysis and the local legal community did not have the expertise' (Betts et al. 2001, p. 374). UNMIK Regulation 1999/1 was designated to end the legal mayhem in the region. Having failed to deliver its promise however, it also fanned the first flames of the Kosovo-wide disillusionment with UNMIK. For the Kosovo Albanians regaining their position on the regional political agenda, pre-March 1999 laws were, most of all, 'Serb laws'. To accept any part of the system that served to legitimise years of militarised oppression was inconceivable, insulting and humiliating. The legal chaos that followed (and lasted for nearly half a year) prompted many newly appointed Kosovo judges and public service employees to explicitly reject Serbian law or apply an eclectic combination of both pre-1989 and post-1989 laws (Betts et al. 2001).

Meanwhile, the devastation of physical infrastructure caused by the NATO air-strikes and violence in Kosovo delayed the administration of justice in nearly all Kosovo municipalities until basic facilities suitable for detention, investigation and court-hearings

Anastasijevic notes in this respect, 'Serbian policies in Kosovo not only destroyed the feeble embryo of interethnic coexistence but also made Kosovo Albanians despair of any hope of solving the Kosovo problem within the legal framework of Serbia' (Anastasijevic 2004, p. 106).
were rebuilt and/or re-allocated. The lack of local and international judicial and law-enforcement expertise was exacerbated by UNMIK’s unpreparedness to provide Serbian and Albanian translations of its own Regulations (Corrin 2000, p.16). No pre-entry training on applicable law was offered for the local appointees, who had not worked in the legal realm for more than ten years (Inglis and Marshall 2003, p. 97). These factors contributed to a swift disillusionment, prompting the local population to rapidly disengage from UNMIK’s legal institutions and turn back to the parallel system of ‘justice’ inherited from nearly a decade of non-violent anti-Serbian ‘resistance’ (Clark 2000; Mertus 1999). Julie Mertus, analysing the intersection of ethnic and gender identities in Kosovo in the midst of the 1990s ‘resistance’, has commented that the only law Kosovo Albanians recognised as legitimate was ‘human rights law’. The latter, according to Mertus, became a part of Kosovo Albanian culture, seen as not just written words but as a process:

...in which authority is deposited at the international, regional, domestic and sub-domestic (community) levels. What matters is not just what is true as a matter of positive law, but what people think is true: authority rests not only where it is granted by positive law but where people perceive it rests.

(Mertus 1999, p. 183)

The March 2004 inter-ethnic rioting in Kosovo, perceived by many observers as a foreseeable culmination of nearly five years of widespread disillusionment with the international administration (HRW 2004, ICG 2004a), was clearly linked with UNMIK’s failure to ‘...ensure respect for human rights both in legal institutions and the populace at large’ (Inglis and Marshall, p. 96). In this light, UNMIK’s contributions towards re-establishing the Kosovo legal system warrant further inquiry as they reflect a number of crucial issues in relation to the obligations and responsibilities of UNMIK to protect and promote international human rights standards throughout the broad spectrum of its nation-building mandate. This includes the issues of gender equality and women’s rights, legitimised within the emerging framework for gender mainstreaming in peace-support operations. The latter gains its legitimacy in Resolution 1325 (UN 2000a), originating from the same international authority as Resolution 1244 (UN 1999a) – the UN Security Council.

UNMIK Regulation 1999/24, promulgated by the SRSG in December 1999, sought to end the legal mayhem and ‘normalise’ the situation regarding the law applicable in the region (UNMIK 1999c). Further amended by UNMIK regulation 2000/59, it established a hierarchical structure for regional law, affording preference to UNMIK Regulations and all laws in Kosovo in force on 22 March 1989, making the only reference to the internationally recognised human right standards in defining the parameters of the applicability of ‘Serb’ law. No similar mechanisms were provided to review the compatibility of the first
two sources—UNMIK Regulations and pre-1989 'Kosovo' law—cementing a presumption regarding their inherent compatibility. A failure to introduce any mechanisms for the judicial review of the SRSG's unilateral legislative decisions had serious implications for the subsequent legislation, including executive detention orders (Ombudsman Institution in Kosovo 2001a; 2001b; 2001c).

**Applicability of International Human Rights Standards in Kosovo**

A list of internationally recognised human rights standards to be observed by any person undertaking public duties or holding public office in Kosovo was incorporated into Regulation 1999/24 (UNMIK 1999c), and later into the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government (UNMIK 2001a). However, no mechanisms to ensure the applicability and enforceability of these standards were ever provided. By failing to create a direct obligation for all persons undertaking public duties or holding public office not only to observe such standards but, also, to implement them, UNMIK established a legal regime based on a clear lack of accountability and unmatched levels of legislative and executive authority given to the international administration, its leadership and leadership of the PISG. The location and legitimacy of the international human rights standards within the existing legal framework remained a confusing and contentious issue.

In the absence of any agreement on the applicability of international treaties signed and ratified by Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, UNMIK Regulations 1999/1 and 1999/24 created a legal void with regard to the direct applicability of international human rights standards in Kosovo (Inglis and Marshall 2003, p.116). With the promulgation of the 'Constitutional Framework' in May 2001, UNMIK Regulation 2001/9 introduced the direct applicability of internationally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms in Kosovo (UNMIK 2001a). On this point, Inglis and Marshall have observed that although the provisional Constitutional Framework clarified the direct applicability of international human rights standards in Kosovo, it did not address human rights protections vis-à-vis UNMIK (Inglis and Marshall 2003, p. 102).

The introduction of the 'direct applicability' clause reinforced the ambiguous position of international human rights law within the regional legal framework. The original wording of Regulation 2001/9 referred to 'direct applicability' rather than 'incorporation' into the existing legal framework, providing no further detail as to how the 'direct applica-

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47 The only 'enforcement' clause included into the Kosovo 'Constitutional Framework' is a legally vague requirement for the PISG to '...observe and ensure internationally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms' (UNMIK 2001a, art 3.2).
The Constitutional Framework provides no further details regarding the relationship between the 'treaty law', or set of rights safeguarded by international human rights conventions enlisted in Regulation 2001/9, and existing Kosovo legal system. The International Bill of Human Rights consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN 1948), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN 1966a), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its two Optional Protocols (UNHCR 2005).

See Chinkin and Paradine (1999, pp. 158-164) analysing the inadequacy of the legal mechanism provided by the European Convention to guarantee the full scope of women's rights.

The somewhat selective nature of the inclusion of international human rights standards in Regulations 1999/24 and 2001/9 raises further questions regarding the preparedness of UNMIK and PISG to fully uphold their commitments under Resolution 1244 to protect and promote human rights (UN 1999a, par. 11J) and ensure that '...all persons in Kosovo...enjoy without discrimination on any ground and in full equality, human rights and fundamental freedoms' (UNMIK 2001a, par. 3.1). Regulation 1999/24 enlists key international human rights treaties, without establishing their status vis-à-vis regional law. These treaties include:

- International Bill of Human Rights\(^{(49)}\)
- The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination [hereinafter Racial Discrimination Convention] (UN 1966b);
- The Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women [hereinafter CEDAW] (UN 1979);
- The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment [hereinafter Convention Against Torture] (UN 1984a), and

Nearly year and a half later, the 'Constitutional Framework' for Kosovo drafted by UNMIK's international advisers - without meaningful local consultation (Bieber 2004, pp. 122-123; Brand 2003, pp. 31-32; Williams 2003, p. 412) - legitimised a new list of key international treaties. Their direct applicability was established as the backbone of PISG's commitments to protecting the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all 'inhabitants...'

\(^{48}\) The Constitutional Framework provides no further details regarding the relationship between the 'treaty law', or set of rights safeguarded by international human rights conventions enlisted in Regulation 2001/9, and existing Kosovo legal system.

\(^{49}\) The International Bill of Human Rights consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN 1948), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN 1966a), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its two Optional Protocols (UNHCR 2005).

\(^{50}\) See Chinkin and Paradine (1999, pp. 158-164) analysing the inadequacy of the legal mechanism provided by the European Convention to guarantee the full scope of women's rights.
Legal institution of 'citizenship' is incompatible with the unresolved political status of Kosovo; therefore the Constitutional Framework defines those who would otherwise be legally proclaimed as 'citizens' as 'inhabitants' or 'people of Kosovo'.

Three key conventions were, however, left out: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN 1966a), Convention Against Torture (UN 1984a) and Racial Discrimination Convention (UN 1966b). All three conventions corresponded to the three areas of UNMIK's responsibility that had received the bulk of criticism from international human rights observers, local non-governmental organisations and, increasingly, local political entities. Chesterman has noted on this that:

In the best tradition of autocracies, the international missions in Bosnia and Kosovo subscribed to the vast majority of human rights treaties and then discovered *raisons d’État* that required these to be abrogated.

(Chesterman 2003, p. 7)

Instead, two additional 'minority instruments' were introduced: the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (Council of Europe 1992a) and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995a). Both of these are generally regarded as non-enforceable legal instruments with extremely weak implementation mechanisms (Malksoo 2000). One of the fundamental characteristics of international human rights law is its enforceability through a number of complaint procedures allowing individuals to make claims against states for violations of their human rights (Kaplan 2004; Weiss et al. 2002). Within the United Nations system, four international treaties give individuals or groups of individuals the right to complain about violations of their protected rights: the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel and Inhuman Punishment, and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Bynes 1999, pp. 79-118). The new list of international treaties made directly applicable in Kosovo, endorsed by Regulation 2001/9, cast further doubt on UNMIK's commitments to uphold the idea of the supremacy of human rights by excluding two fundamental human rights conventions allowing individual complaints to be brought against the state – the Convention Against Torture (UN 1984a) and Racial Discrimination Convention (UN 1966b). The European Convention and CEDAW were however granted a 'direct applicability' status.

Article 34 of the European Convention allows 'any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the

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31 Legal institution of 'citizenship' is incompatible with the unresolved political status of Kosovo, therefore the Constitutional Framework defines those who would otherwise be legally proclaimed as 'citizens' as 'inhabitants' or 'people of Kosovo'.

High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in this Convention' to lodge a complaint with the Court limiting its jurisdiction to the States Parties, members of the Council of Europe (Council of Europe 1950, art. 34). Article 1 of the CEDAW defines discrimination as 'any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex...in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil, or any other field' (UN 1979, art. 1), requiring States Parties to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organisation, or enterprise. McCabe has observed in this respect:

This provision makes CEDAW a unique form of international law because... international human rights law is generally limited to governing the conduct of the State or its agencies.

(McCabe 2000, p. 431)

Article 2 of the Optional Protocol to CEDAW provides a Communication Procedure, which allows individuals or groups of individuals to submit individual complaints to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ('the Committee'). Article 1 establishes that states, parties to the optional protocol, recognise the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications under the protocol. Importantly, neither UNMIK, despite its extensive legislative and executive authority in Kosovo, nor the PSIG are considered to bear a sufficient degree of 'sovereignty', described by Roth as the '...legal attribute of a territorially bounded political community enjoying full membership in the international system' (Roth 2004). In this light, there are no prospects for any of the human rights treaties endorsed by the PSIG or UNMIK to avail the power of conventional human rights enforcement mechanisms for the protection of human rights in Kosovo. At the same time, the role of international human rights law as a normative framework for emerging self-government institutions should not be under-estimated.

The location of UNMIK itself within the loosely defined legal and political context of the region should be considered in the light of the enforceability of international human rights on UNMIK itself, and the nature and scope of privileges and immunities granted to UNMIK's international staff. The practice of UNMIK applying human rights standards based on its status, rather than function, has proved to have serious implications for the implementation of its 'nation-building' mandate. There exists a substantial void in evaluating the performance of the mission, including its senior leadership. Meanwhile, the legal regime established by UNMIK has come under criticism from many levels, including Kosovo Ombudsperson Institution (Ombudsman Institution in Kosovo 2001a, 2001b.

32 For more on CEDAW, including country reports, historical outlook and legal analysis see special CEDAW section of the UN Division for the Advancement of Women web-site at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw.
2001c). In his special reports, the Ombudsman for Kosovo has regularly pointed to the many inconsistencies between UNMIK regulations and international human rights standards; poor administration of justice; wide-spread abuses of power legitimised by the absolute or nearly absolute (described as 'functional') immunity afforded to UNMIK and KFOR which has included cases of arbitrary detentions; non-judicial mechanisms of justice; and discrimination against women and minorities (ibid).

The immunity of the UN and its personnel

The immunity of United Nations personnel is enshrined in the UN Charter (UN 1945) and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (UN 1946). The UN Charter sets out the basic proposition wherein UN representatives and officials ‘...shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes’ (UN 1945, art. 105). The legal principle of ‘intentionalism’, applied in the process of legal interpretation, suggests that the meaning or proper application of written law is determined by certain historical facts and the intentions of those who made the law at the time they did so. It is hardly possible that the drafters of the UN Charter could foresee the broadening of the UN mandate to incorporate extensive ‘nation-building’ projects (Ansah 2003) – an improbable concept given the post Second World War ideas of sovereignty and territorial integrity:

The founders of the United Nations did not intend that the privileges and immunities of officials and experts on mission should constitute a shield from national criminal prosecution for crimes committed in a State hosting a United Nations operation.

(UN 2005c, p. 6)

Analysing the question of immunity and accountability within the context of UN peacekeeping operations, Rawski has explained why immunity for transitional administrations holds cardinally different meanings from that endorsed by the UN Charter and elaborated by the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Rawski 2002, p. 123). Rawski explained that traditional justifications for diplomatic immunity – protection against intervention by the host State and reciprocal respect for the integrity of a sending state’s representative – become irrelevant in circumstances where the UN itself has sovereign power over the territory, therefore annulling the concept of functional necessity. In this light, unconditional immunity violates the right to a remedy in circumstances where a

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53 Mank defines ‘intentionalism’ as looking ‘...beyond the legislature's original intent’ and seeking ‘...to understand a statute’s broad purposes, especially if a court must apply a statute to a situation that was unforeseeable by the enacting legislature’ (Mank 2002, pp. 818-819).
quasi-legal obligation exists for the mission personnel to observe international human rights norms, but there is no state actor to press for a negotiated settlement.

UNMIK’s Regulation On the Status, Privileges and Immunities of KFOR and UNMIK and their Personnel in Kosovo (UNMIK 2000c), promulgated in August 2000, outlined several basic ‘tiers’ of immunity for KFOR and UNMIK personnel. It granted ‘functional’ immunity to the ‘locally recruited’ KFOR personnel, and absolute immunity to the international KFOR personnel. Similarly, absolute immunity was given to the high-ranking UNMIK officials and functional immunity to the rest of the UNMIK personnel, ensuring a blanket protection from any form of arrest or detention (UNMIK 2000c, Sections 2-3). The fundamental question of which privileges and immunities were necessary for the fulfilment of the ‘nation-building’ mandate was never asked, while UNMIK’s failure to perform to its own standards was never challenged (Bougiorno 2002; HRW 2004; ICG 2004a; Ingimundarson 2004):

The promulgation and exercise of such expansive immunity is in violation of international human rights standards and has rendered nonexistent the right of Kosovars to seek a remedy for violations of their fundamental rights.  

(Inglis and Marshall 2003, p. 120)

UNMIK’s ‘Immunities Regulation’ does provide a mechanism wherein the UN Secretary-General can authorise a ‘waiver of immunity’ in any case where the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the interests of UNMIK (UNMIK 2001c, par. 6.1). The right to waive jurisdiction over KFOR personnel is given to the respective commander of the national contingents. In its recent report on trafficking in women and girls in Kosovo, Amnesty International (2004) documented the links between the rapid growth of sex-industry based trafficking of women and girls, and the international presence.54 According to information provided by UNMIK’s Police Trafficking and Prostitution Unit from January 2002 to July 2003, between 22 and 27 KFOR troops were suspected of offences related to trafficking (ibid). However, only two waivers of immunity were requested and granted in 2002 and 2003, enabling the prosecution of two police officers. In its official response to these accusations, UNMIK officials confirmed that no cases of a waiver of immunity were requested or granted for UNMIK personnel involved trafficking or any other related offence (UNMIK 2004e, p. 18). Commenting on the

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54 The Report states that ‘In 1999-2000 it was estimated that internationals comprised 80 percent of the clients of trafficked women and girls. In 2002 the figure decreased to around 30 per cent, but at the same time the internationals generated some 80 percent of the industry income. Today an estimated 20 per cent of the client-base come from the international community, which constitutes only about two percent of the population in Kosovo’ (Amnesty International 2004).
incompatibility of the statutory grant of immunity secured by Regulation 2000/47 (UNMIK 2001c) with international human rights standards, Marek Antoni Nowicki noted that

...the fundamental precept of the rule of law is that the executive and legislative authorities are bound by the law and are not above it.

(Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo 2001a, p.8)

The issue of enforcing international law on UN serving personnel has been dominating international political and legal discussion since the foundation of the UN in 1945. Indeed, directly following the inception of the principle in the UN Charter, intense debates emerged on whether the UN (and, more generally, other international organisations) should be considered as having a certain degree of legal personality and therefore regarded as the ‘subject’ of international law (Engle 2004; Hobe 2002). Meanwhile, the post-Westphalian legal order, rooted in broader frameworks of globalisation and transnationalism, has triggered dramatic transformations of the international legal system. At the same time, the long-term involvement of international organisations in transitional administration and ‘nation-building’ has led to a heated conceptual debate: under which legal frameworks should these organisations operate in the absence of traditional governing and legal structures? (Abraham 2003, p. 1298). In this light, the question of whether the UN is bound by the norms of UN-endorsed international law when performing the role of a surrogate state deserves particular consideration. It also allows us to shed more light on the trajectory of UNMIK gender-mainstreaming policies.

**International law vs. UNMIK: the limits of enforceability**

Generally, the UN ‘nation-building’ mandates are loosely based on the fact that the UN is thought to possess ‘rights and obligations’ and ‘a large measure of international personality and the capacity to operate upon an international plane’ (ICJ 1949), viewed in the light of the ‘extended functional necessity’ concept. The latter has served to legitimise an increasing range of activities that were not expressly authorised by the UN Charter or any other constituent instrument (Klabbers 2002). UN peacekeeping, Bongiorno has argued, is based solely on the principle of functionality, as there are no UN Charter provisions directly authorising peacekeeping activities in their present form (Bongiorno 2002, p. 642).

On this basis, the legality of the UN project of ‘nation-building’ in Kosovo has been described by many observers as resting flawed premises. Epaminontas Triantafillou, commenting on the status of UNMIK under international law, directly challenged the legal grounds on which UNMIK’s mandate is based:
...although the case for the presence of the UNMIK in Kosovo is strong, it does not derive sufficient legitimacy from international law, since the actions of the Security Council with respect to Kosovo deviate in significant respects from officially (or traditionally) established Charter interpretations and peacekeeping procedures.

(Triantafilou 2004, p. 367)

Even in the absence of consistent legal foundations, the UN’s powers have been significantly expanded on the basis of ‘functional necessity’. This expansion, however, has not been matched by the creation of adequate mechanisms to ensure the accountability of the UN for performing these tasks (Murray 2003, Wellens 2003). In mirroring the functions of a State, the UN does possess a certain degree of legal personality. However, it remains out of the scope and touch of international treaties to which States are parties: it is argued that treaties apply only to states, and international servants are exempt from state jurisdictions (Carey 2001, p. 61). Recent commitments of the UN to gender mainstreaming, supported by the international women’s and human rights activists, have rested on a number of fundamental human rights treaties, including the International Bill of Rights and CEDAW (UN 1979). However, most recent developments have originated from the highest level – the UN Security Council, one of the most powerful bodies of the United Nations, entrusted with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security (Charlesworth and Wood 2001, p. 313). In this light, the question of the UN’s accountability to the standards it creates and seeks to promote is crucial. Criticising the inability of the UN to comply with the normative framework it itself creates, Abraham has observed:

Because of these expanding functions, the UN should be held accountable to the human rights standards it helped to create and universalise, even though it is not a signatory to these conventions.

(Abraham 2003, p. 1232)

Resolution 1325 emphasises the importance of the active involvement of women in all aspects of post-conflict reconstruction (Cohn 2004; UN 2000a). However, the experiences of UNMIK and UNTAET/UNMISET point to the obvious lack of commitment to the full implementation of the ‘women, peace and security’ agenda within UN-administered nation-building contexts. Charlesworth and Wood, analysing the UN gender mainstreaming policies in East Timor, have argued that

The case of East Timor indicates that the U.N. policy of mainstreaming gender into its peace and security operations is being implemented in a rather superficial and inadequate manner.

(Charlesworth and Wood 2001, p. 314)
No international agreement exists on whether the UN-endorsed legal pronouncements, including Security Council resolutions binding the UN Member States, have the same binding power on the UN itself and its subsidiaries. Considering the issue of extending the binding nature of international human rights instruments on the UN, Abraham has concluded that traditional human rights conventions and treaties, to which States are beholden, are not legally enforceable on international organisations (Abraham 2003). She also outlined a conceptual framework accommodating the assumption that human rights law should be applied to any international organisation assuming the role of a State (Abraham 2003, pp. 1294-1295). Firstly, the UN’s obligation to promote human rights stems from its founding document—the UN Charter (UN 1945). Secondly, the UDHR (UN 1948, art. 30) and ICCPR (UN 1966c) recognise that such obligations may be attached to non-state actors. Inglis and Marshall also point to the specific obligation of UNMIK, attached to its ‘occupying force’ status in Kosovo:

Bound by the human rights provisions of the Charter on which it was found the UN itself is acting as a governing power. More formalistic positions on this issue were based on the fact that the FRY was a signatory to the ICCPR, among other human rights documents, and the United Nations, as an ‘occupying’ force within the FRY, was obligated to ensure those rights.

(Inglis and Marshall 2003, p. 104)

At the same time, the inherently weak nature of the international human rights system means binding the various actors of the globalised post-September 11 world (including non-state actors such as international organisations, transnational corporations, warring factions, terrorist networks and other groups) requires an explicit recognition of its binding nature on organisations acting as sovereign governments (Bongiorno 2002, p. 636). Some international jurists argue that the only sources of international human rights law that may bind the UN in its peacekeeping capacity are ‘...customary law and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’ (Bongiorno, p. 640). Yet the lack of clear monitoring mechanisms and institutional accountability puts a serious limitation on extending these two sources of international law into the UN ‘nation-building’ context. More specific limitations arise in relation to the rights of women and gender mainstreaming. Seen in the context of the history of women’s liberation and rights movements, gender equality has a long way to go before gaining the status of ‘jus congres’. In this light, the conceptual foundation for gender-mainstreaming policies remains within the obligations of international human rights treaties. However, in order to be effective, such treaties require clearly established monitoring and enforcement mechanisms (Sharapov 2005).
UNMIK: lack of accountability and institutional checks

Resolution 1244 (UN 1999) granted UNMIK full executive and legislative authority to implement human rights norms and policies originating from within the UN. However, no clear mechanisms were provided to scrutinise the compliance and adherence of the organisation to these norms (Inglis and Marshall 2003; Sharapov 2005; Wilde 2000). The only monitoring procedure set out in Resolution 1244 is a request for the Secretary General to report to the Security Council at regular intervals on the implementation of the resolution, including, *inter alia*, on the progress in ‘protecting and promoting human rights’ (UN 1999a, art. 11 (J), 20). Criticising the lack of any mechanism of ‘checks and balances’, Abraham has noted:

In effect, the [UNMIK] SRSG became the centre of authority with no one but the Security Council and the Secretary-General as his check.

(Abraham 2003, pp. 1322-1323)

Viewed from feminist and human rights perspectives, this reporting procedure should mention the progress to date in achieving gender equality and empowerment of Kosovo women brought by the existing UN gender mainstreaming policies. However, a longitudinal analysis of the Secretary General’s reports on UNMIK and Kosovo submitted between July 1999 and July 2004 reveals a rather incomplete and pessimistic picture in this regard. None of the reports provides a comprehensive account of gender mainstreaming policies; nor do they include qualitative or quantitative evaluation of such policies’ effectiveness (UNSC 1999-2004). In circumstances where the only legitimate authorities higher than UNMIK’s SRSG are the Security Council and the Secretary-General, such an omission effectively impedes any possible measures that could be initiated by the Security Council to address current gender mainstreaming setbacks in Kosovo.

Since 2001, the focus of the international community, including state-supported development and funding agencies and the international media, has shifted towards the all-absorbing ‘War on Terror’ and events in the Middle East and Afghanistan. In this light, the ‘sensational’ (by 1999-2000 standards) Report by Amnesty International on trafficking and sexual exploitation of women and girls in Kosovo, pointing to the direct involvement of UNMIK/KFOR personnel on par with local criminal groups (Amnesty International 2004), only resulted in a letter from UNMIK’s SRSG denying all the accusations (UNMIK 2004e). No independent inquiry or official investigation has ever been launched. Abraham summarised her analysis of UNMIK’s accountability by observing that

With no systems in place to check the U.N.’s behaviour, the harbinger of human rights had now become its leading defaulter: immune and unaccountable.

(Abraham 2003, p. 1293)
At the same time, the newly created PISG lacks legitimacy, authority and experience to establish and enforce a more sophisticated system of checks and balances. However, despite the continuous (and mostly negative) impact of the ambiguous legal authority and position of UNMIK within the contexts of regional reconstruction and United Nations peacekeeping, the contribution of UNMIK towards the creation of a new legal system in politically and socially volatile Kosovo has been significant. The following sections review the main pieces of regional legislation adopted by UNMIK over the several years since the withdrawal of the Serbian Army in 1999, focusing in particular on gender/women-specific provisions. It also includes brief thematic overviews of the most pressing concerns facing Kosovo Albanian women and men in post-1999 Kosovo.

As noted previously, UNMIK’s authority and responsibility for running the Kosovo interim government are delineated by Resolution 1244 (UN 1991a) – the only internationally agreed document setting out the parameters of the UN protectorate of the region, which in legal terms, remains a part of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro. Deemed void by UNMIK Regulations (UNMIK 1999c), the Constitution of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro has no legal force in Kosovo, and will not until its status is resolved by the internationally mediated negotiations. Until then, Kosovo is governed in accordance with Resolution 1244 and the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government, promulgated by UNMIK in 2001 (UNMIK 2001a). The latter, however, is not a constitution in the usual sense of the word, denoting a legally enforceable source of individual rights (Council of Europe 2001; Fitzpatrick 2004). Rather, it was enacted as a framework setting out the structure and functions of the PISG. In this light, there is no substantive, legally binding and enforceable constitutional definition of and foundation for gender equality in Kosovo. Therefore, the manner in which the principles of gender equality and non-discrimination have been incorporated by UNMIK into the post-conflict regional legislation (mainly in the form of legally binding UNMIK regulations and UNMIK-endorsed acts of the Assembly of Kosovo) should be viewed through the prism of the vaguely formulated commitment to human rights provided by Resolution 1244 (UN 1999a).

**Gender equality and ‘social welfare’ legislation in Kosovo**

Regulation 2000/66, ‘On Benefits for War Invalids of Kosovo and for the Next of Kin of those Who Died as a Result of the Armed Conflict in Kosovo’ was one of the first ‘social welfare’ regulations promulgated by UNMIK (2000d). It established a special fund to provide benefits to the eligible war invalids and the next of kin of those who died as a result of the armed conflict in Kosovo. The degree of gender sensitivity and long-term consequences of this Regulation should be considered through the lens of gender analysis, reject-
ing a militarised situation-based approach to defining the beginning and end of war in strictly military terms (Cockburn and Zarkov 2002a; Enloe 2002; Meintjes 2002). For many Kosovo residents, the war became reality long before February 1998 – officially recognised as the beginning of the armed conflict – culminating in the loss of life, property and massive physical and psychological devastation during the active military phase of 1998 – 1999 and unfolding in reverse direction after the withdrawal of Serbian army.

However, Regulation 2000/66 fails to acknowledge and afford any official status of ‘victim of the armed conflict’ to those who were killed or injured before February 1999 (Sverrisson 2004, p. 4). A special provision was included to have special cases considered by the SRSG on the recommendation of the Administrative Department of Health and Social Welfare (UNMIK 2000d, par. 4.6). However, as described by a Kosovo Albanian woman interviewee, the idea of going through the circles of UNMIK’s bureaucracy was like ‘stepping bare into hell’ (Interview with JA, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March – April 2004, Kosovo). No specific provisions were included to acknowledge the specific needs and concerns of women bearing the burden of caring for others, let alone the most vulnerable – young mothers, widows and elderly women. In fact, Regulation 2000/66 contains no non-discrimination or gender-sensitive provisions whatsoever, pointing to the original lack of gender expertise within UNMIK and the lack of willingness to involve local expertise in drafting key pieces of legislation.

In October 2001, Regulation 2001/27 ‘On Essential Labour Law in Kosovo’ was promulgated (UNMIK 2001f). Its overriding objective was to end the ‘labour mayhem’ in the absence of the unified code of labour laws in the region. The urgency in creating legal space for employer-employee dialogue was predicated on the legacy of state-endorsed discrimination against Kosovo Albanians fostered by the Milosevic regime, the unprecedented scale of immediate humanitarian and development projects due to the massive displacements of the population, the post-war devastation, the dramatic expansion of the unofficial, or ‘shadow’, labour markets, and the arrival of many international development agencies with varying employment policies. The new ‘labour law’ explicitly prohibited all kinds of discrimination in employment and occupation, enumerating a standard set of grounds, including, *inter alia*, sex, family status and sexual orientation (ibid, Section 2). It also required equal remuneration to be paid to women and men for work of equal value. However, the situation on the ground required more concerted effort in addressing persistent gender inequalities in employment and labour relations. According to the 2004 SIDA review of the situation of women in Kosovo, differentials by sex in employment continued to be extremely high, with almost 70% of women unemployed in 2002 and a female unemployment rate about twice as high that of men in both urban and rural areas (SIDA 2004,
The 2003 study by the UNDP in Kosovo revealed an even more worrying picture, with only 10% of female interviewees declaring themselves as ‘working’, in comparison with 37% of their male counterparts (UNDP in Kosovo 2003, Tables Q1u-D19). Despite being rather quantitative in its approach and methodology, the UNDP study represents a certain pattern evident in both local and international perceptions of traditional female and male occupations and roles. 67% of the female interviewees described their occupation as ‘housewife’, reducing the overall ‘Unemployed’ percentage for women to 12% (ibid). The figures for male ‘housewife’ option remained steadily at 0% with the overall ‘Unemployed’ male percentage at 44%.\textsuperscript{55} Importantly, the wording of the UNDP questionnaire signified an obvious lack of a gender- and culturally-sensitive approach to conducting and administering the survey: the given choice between ‘Unemployed’ and ‘Housewife’ predetermined the potential output from male interviewees. Despite the UNDP’s approach to considering women engaged into household activities as ‘working’, no relevant provisions covering economic activities within the ‘informal sector’ can be found in existing Kosovo legislation on labour and social security. This creates a legal void for nearly 70% of Kosovo women, whose ‘...employment and economic activities are underrecognized, undervalued and largely unpaid or underpaid’ (SIDA 2004, p. 6).

Regulation 2001/27 also includes specific provisions setting out the treatment of female employees. It limited the length of paid maternity leave to 12 weeks, requiring employers to pay no more than two-thirds of women’s earnings in this period. This decision was widely criticised by local women’s groups as unsubstantiated and detached from Kosovo’s social and economic reality.\textsuperscript{56} The lack of child-care facilities, the deplorable state of the healthcare system, high birth-rates and escalating unemployment have resulted in a situation where the most feasible solution for a working woman at the end of her 12-week paid maternity leave is to leave employment and become dependent on her male partner or family. No paternity leave provisions were included. Coupled with the lack of any provision authorising positive discrimination measures in the areas where women were traditionally under-represented, this regulation reinforced a male-oriented labour pattern in Kosovo, devaluing women’s contributions to the economy and individual households.

Regulation 2001/27 also prohibited the employment of underage people (those under the age of 18) in ‘work, which by its nature, or the circumstances on which it is carried out, is likely to jeopardize the health, safety or morals of a young person’ (UNMIK 2001d).

\textsuperscript{55} For inter-relation between understandings and ideas about men and women, and how they shape their experiences in institutions, nations and social processes and visa versa see Sandra Whitworth’s analysis of the ‘peacekeeping narratives’ (Whitworth 2004, Chapter 2).

\textsuperscript{56} Kosovo Trade Union supported increasing maternity leave to at least 6 months (Institute for Development Research 2003, p. 37).
However, the 2004 Amnesty International study into trafficking in women and girls in Kosovo pointed to only one case in which this Regulation was used to justify a bar closure on the suspicion that girls working in that bar may have been trafficked into forced prostitution, or could be at risk of being trafficked (Amnesty International 2004, Chapter 3).

UNMIK’s ‘Labour Regulation’ promulgated in December 2001 (UNMIK 2001g) established a legal framework for the pension system in Kosovo. This regulation includes a special provision safeguarding pension recipients from disadvantageous treatment on the grounds of health, gender, race, religion, nationality or any other similar criteria (UNMIK 2001g, art. 12.10). However, the position of the elderly in Kosovo should be considered in the light of their virtual absence from ‘mainstream’ development discourses. The 2004 Kosovo HDR for example fails to explicitly acknowledge the elderly as the ‘...least powerful members of society, who often have little time to exercise their political rights in their struggle to survive in daily life’ (UNDP in Kosovo 2004, p. 75). Thus instead, the report’s chapter focusing on ‘vulnerable’ groups is dedicated to ‘...women, unemployed youth, subsistence farmers, and minorities’ (ibid). It provides a comprehensive analysis of the socio-economic status of various groups residing in Kosovo. However, it overlooks the vulnerability of the nearly 6.2% (estimated to be 117,000 people) of the Kosovo population over the age of 64 (SOK 2004, p. 9).\(^{57}\) No special provision was included to address the socio-economic vulnerabilities of various groups of elderly women (widowed, separated, disabled and other groups). No gender-disaggregated statistics is available on the distribution and value of pension payments. According to the USAID newsletter:

> For three years after the devastating armed conflict in Kosovo in 1999, no pensions were available for retired Kosovars. Even after the pension system was reinstated in mid-2002, citizens over age 65 receive just 35 euros per month.

(USAID 2004)

A recent study of unemployment in Kosovo noted that in 2002 pension payments were provided for 90,000 pensioners in Kosovo,\(^{58}\) with 78 million Euro from the Consolidated budget of Kosovo directed towards these payments (Institute for Development Research 2003, pp. 36-37).

The re-establishment of the education system in Kosovo at primary, secondary and higher levels was sanctioned by two pieces of legislation approved by the Assembly of Kosovo in 2002 and later promulgated by SRSG: Law 2002/3 ‘On Higher Education in Kosovo’ (UNMIK 2003d) and Law 2002/2 ‘On Primary and Secondary Education in

\(^{57}\) Current Kosovo demographic structure is characterised by predominance of young people with as much as 32.8% being under the age of fourteen and 61% between 15 and 64 years old (SOK 2004, p. 9).

\(^{58}\) If correlated with the estimate number of population over the age of 64, an estimate 27,000 pensioners did not get their pensions in the year 2002.
Kosovo (UNMIK 2002c). The Law on Higher Education prohibits any form of discrimination by licensed providers of higher education in Kosovo based on ‘actual or presumed’ grounds, such as (amongst others) sex, sexual orientation and marital status (UNMIK 2003d, art. 3.1). It also protects staff and already accepted students from discrimination on the basis of sex and sexual orientation (ibid). The Law on Primary and Secondary Education requires promotion of equality of sexes as part of the curriculum in primary and secondary education (UNMIK 2002c, art. 4.1). It also prohibits any discrimination in access and progression in the system of primary and secondary education based on any ‘real or presumed’ ground, including sex, sexual orientation and marital status (ibid). The law also outlaws any discrimination based on gender, sexual orientation or marital status in making appointments in secondary and primary education (ibid). However, neither of these laws provides for the mandatory introduction of specific courses or training programmes dealing with gender issues. No provision exists for the introduction of enrolment quotas or any other measures suited to accommodate specific contexts influenced by a number of factors (including urban/rural and ethnic divides) aimed at higher female dropout rates and various disparities between male and female students. According to the 2004 Statistical Study ‘Kosovo in Figures’, women and girls remained under-represented throughout the whole spectrum of the Kosovo education system in 2003 as Table 4.1 below demonstrates.

Table 4.1: School and University Attendance in Kosovo, 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
<td></td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14</td>
<td></td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td></td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td></td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>15%</td>
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<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td></td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The statistical data for school and university attendance in 2003 demonstrates that sex differentials in accessing secondary and higher education in Kosovo exist at all ages, while the gender gap widens as education progresses. The relative disparity of men over women at the age of 10-14 is only 2%; it increases at the age of 15-19 to 31% and reaches its maximum of nearly 50% at the highest level of education at the age of 25-29. Vjollca Krasniqi, from the Kosovo Women’s Initiative, cited in the 2004 Kosovo HDR, pointed to the main factors predicating girls’ attendance rates in primary and secondary school: ethnicity and geographical location, with non-Albanian, non-Serbs and girls living in rural areas being in most disadvantaged positions (UNDP in Kosovo 2004, p. 28). The Governmental report on gender mainstreaming within the government of Kosovo has acknowl-
edged the ‘...sharp fall of proportion of female attendants as we go higher from elementary to high schools and college education’ attributing it to the tradition of early marriages (Kosovo PISG 2000, p.1).

The Law on Social Assistance Scheme in Kosovo, promulgated by UNMIK in 2003, does not contain any specific gender-related provisions (UNMIK 2003f). However, it provides a rather broad and all-inclusive non-discriminatory definition of ‘family’ and ‘household’, extending it to include spouses and co-habiting partners. It could be suggested that the original intention was to address the rather complex social organisation of Kosovo society, with extensive several-generation family units residing in the same household.

Practical issues of the law’s applicability and enforcement have not been tested yet with regards to same-sex partners or un-registered partners residing in, for example, rural areas. According to the study on the Labour Market and Unemployment in Kosovo, 28.8 million Euro from the Kosovo Consolidated budget was provided towards the social assistance scheme covering 51,000 families (with an average monthly payment of 47 Euros) (Institute for Development Research 2003, p. 36).

The Law on Occupational Safety, Health and the Working Environment, promulgated by UNMIK in 2003 (UNMIK 2003g), was adopted to supplement the existing UNMIK Regulation on Essential Labour Law in Kosovo. It provides a somewhat more sophisticated approach to the safety and health standards provided in work environments. It outlines specific measures for the protection of pregnant women in the workplace in the absence of a codified labour code in Kosovo. The law sets out that pregnant women, along with employees under 18 years and disabled persons, should not be assigned to ‘...particularly hard manual work, work beyond working hours and night work’ (ibid, Section 4). However, in the absence of a unified labour code defining in normative terms ‘working hours and night work’, ‘hard manual work’ and its difference from ‘particularly hard manual work’, Regulation 2003/33 fits well in the Kosovo-wide ‘cacophony of legislative initiatives’, described by the HDR as one of the setbacks obstructing democratic governance in Kosovo (UNDP in Kosovo 2004, p. 65).

Gender equality and 'security' legislation in Kosovo
The detailed analysis of 'security' legislation and its impact on women's security (viewed in a broader sense) in Kosovo falls outside the scope of the chapter. However, it is important to consider to what extent such legislation addresses and challenges culturally and traditionally legitimised dichotomies of public vs. private, state security vs. human security, trafficking in human beings vs. trafficking in drugs and weapons, and whether this new
'post-war' legislation encourages '...a fundamental rethinking of what [peace-building] seek to accomplish, how [it is] conducted, [and] by whom' (Whitworth 2004, p. 139).

Regulation 2001/4, 'On the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons in Kosovo' (UNMIK 2001h) was promulgated in January 2001 in response to the dramatic increase in the numbers of people (mainly women and girls for the purposes of sexual exploitation) trafficked into and out of Kosovo (Amnesty International 2004, Corrin 2004a). Regulation 2001/4 adopts the definition of trafficking provided in the Trafficking Protocol (UN 2000g) to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN 2000k). The Protocol defines trafficking as:

...recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons... by improper means, such as force, abduction, fraud or coercion, for an improper purpose, like forced or coerced labour, servitude, slavery or sexual exploitation.

(UN 2000g, art. 3)

Countries ratifying this protocol are obliged to enact domestic laws making these activities criminal offences, if such laws are not already in place (ibid). According to the recent Amnesty International study on trafficking in Kosovo:

Less than three months after the deployment of international forces and police officers to Kosovo, trafficking had been identified as a problem by OSCE; and by January 2000, UNMIK's Gender Advisor had acknowledged, but not yet acted, on the problem.

(Amnesty International 2004, p. 5)

The UNMIK Regulation, specifically addressing the complexity of trafficking in the unique Kosovo context, was only promulgated in January 2001 - nearly two years after the first 'official' warning by the OMIK. According to the AI Report, until January 2001, prosecutions in trafficking cases were conducted under the prostitution-related articles of the Criminal Code of the former FRY, the Serbian Criminal Code (including Article 251 covering 'intimidation in the exercise of prostitution'), and Kosovo Law on Public Peace and Order, '...which creates a minor offence out of the act of mediating in or forcing another into prostitution; women were convicted of prostitution under the same law' (Amnesty International 2004, Introduction). The Trafficking Regulation introduced the maximum sentence of 20 years' imprisonment for organising trafficking (UNMIK 2001h, Sec-
It also introduced a number of measures to protect the rights of trafficked persons and assist victims of trafficking, including free interpreting services, free legal counsel in relation to trafficking issues, temporary safe housing, psychological, medical and social welfare assistance and other services (ibid, art. 10). However, the AI research concluded that the lack of consultation with local prosecutors and judiciary during the drafting of the Trafficking Regulation, and the failure to ensure training of all members of the judiciary have resulted in problems in both interpretation and the implementation of this law.

( Amnesty International 2004, Chapter 3)

The study also provided detailed evidence that despite the promulgation of the Trafficking Regulation, neither UNMIK Police nor Kosovo Police Service/Judiciary were fully informed of its provisions and failed to implement it, including its measures for the protection of trafficked women (ibid).

Regulation 2003/12, ‘On Protection against Domestic Violence’ (UNMIK 2003b) was promulgated only in May 2003, nearly four years after the arrival of UNMIK. Until then, the outdated provisions of pre-1999 Kosovo and Serbian laws were applied to address the sweeping wave of physical, emotional and economic violence, which was traditionally seen as a ‘private’ or family ‘business’. Most of the Kosovo Albanian women interviewed in spring 2004 mentioned that most of such cases remained unreported to the police, as many women lacked confidence in the justice system and remained reluctant to report attacks for fear of being victimised again by the system or the perpetrator. Illiterate women and women living in rural areas remain at a distinct disadvantage (IHFHR 2000, p. 516).

In a special investigation into the prevalence of domestic violence in post-conflict Kosovo conducted by UNFEM in 2000, 23% of the 213 respondents (mostly Kosovo Albanian women) reported experiencing domestic violence, and 18% disclosed rape within a relationship, including by their husband or partner (Wareham 2000, p. 15). According to the Yearbook on Violence Against Women and Children in Kosovo, published annually by the Kosovo Centre for Protection of Women and Children, 5361 cases of violence were identified in the regions where the organisation was active in the year 2002: \(^{60}1485\) were

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\(^{60}\) Centre for Protection of Women and Children, founded in 1993, is represented by a number of municipal Centres throughout Kosovo. The data provided in its third yearbook on violence against women and children could be extended to the 10 regional centres and, while representing persistent pattern of increasing incidence of domestic violence against women and children in Kosovo, should not be regarded as a quantitatively representative of all Kosovo municipalities and regions (CPWC 2003b, p. 24).
acts of domestic violence;\textsuperscript{61} 1327 were cases of external violence and 2549 were cases of violations of civil rights by various institutions (CPWC 2003b, p. 24-25). The 2002 OMIK report on the gender situation in Kosovo noted that

In keeping with tradition, domestic violence is traditionally regarded as a private matter, within the applicable law there remains no provision for marital rape. Within the medical community likewise there is little or no recognition of the fact that a woman can be sexually active outside marriage.

(OMIK 2002, p. 3)

Regulation 2003/12 provided a rather broad and inclusive definition of domestic violence and domestic relationship. Various types of protection orders (including ‘emergency protection orders’) were introduced as a protective mechanism for victims of abuse (UNMIK 2003b, Section 15-16). Violations of protection orders, crimes of light bodily injury and damaging the property of another in a domestic relationship are to be automatically prosecuted (ibid). Victims of domestic violence are provided with an opportunity to be referred to the Social and Welfare Centres, and the network of shelters for victims of domestic violence (SIDA 2004, p. 12). By 2004, local women’s NGOs created and were operating five shelters for victims and were in the process of being trained (by OMIK) how to run SOS help lines (OMiK 2004d). Unfortunately, no research has ever been conducted on the impact of on-going socio-economic and political transformations on the nature of attitudes towards domestic violence in Kosovo.

The entry into force of the Provisional Criminal Procedure (UNMIK 2003i) and Provisional Criminal Codes (UNMIK 2003h) of Kosovo in 2004 was described by UNMIK’s SRSG as a ‘...crucial milestone for the inhabitants of Kosovo and UNMIK efforts to establish the rule of law in Kosovo’ (UNMIK 2004f). However, neither the rules of criminal procedure, nor the substantial provisions of the Criminal Code provide any references to gender, overlooking the fundamental requirement for the administration for justice to be free of any form of discrimination, including discrimination on the basis of gender and sexual orientation. The Criminal Procedure Code does include a number of specific gender-related provisions, for example, requiring authorities to keep arrested or detained men and women in separate rooms, and conduct criminal proceedings bearing in mind the special needs of vulnerable groups, including victims of sexual or gender-related violence (UNMIK 2003i, art. 217, 219). The Criminal Code also contains a number of gender-sensitive provisions in defining the types of crimes and respective sentences. These in-

\textsuperscript{61} Including 1 homicide, 4 attempt murders, 10 cases of incest, 10 sexual rapes, 474 cases of physical violence, 474 cases of psychological violence, 20 bodily injuries, 282 cases of conjugal violence, 75 cases of parental violence, 135 cases of violence by other family members (CPWC 2003b, p. 24-25).
clude: crimes against humanity, including a wide range of gender-based crimes if they constitute part of a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population (UNMIK 2003h, art. 177); crimes against moveable property, providing for harsher measures if such crime is motivated by bias relating to gender and sexual orientation (among other grounds) (ibid, art. 260); violation of rights in labour relations, including inadequate protection of women (ibid, art. 182);\(^{62}\) aggravated murder (including deprivation of the life of a female person knowing that she is pregnant); offences against sexual integrity (ibid, Chapter XIX); and curtailment of personal freedoms and rights on the basis of a difference of sex, social status or other personal characteristics (among other grounds) (ibid, art. 158).

The Criminal Code also sets out the uniform age of consent for females and males at 16.

**Support-legislation for gender mainstreaming**

Regulation 1999/22, 'On the Registration and Operation of Non-Governmental Organizations in Kosovo' (UNMIK 1999a) was one of the first UNMIK regulations contributing (albeit indirectly) towards the 'institutionalisation' of gender in Kosovo. It was promulgated to regulate certain aspects of the activities of foreign and national NGOs in Kosovo, including their registration, legal status, internal governance and tax benefits. Promulgated several months after UNMIK's arrival, Regulation 1999/22 sought to create a framework, within which an increasing number of NGOs, spurred by the influx of international humanitarian and development funds, would operate as a foundation element of the post-war civil society and viable alternative to the existing parallel institutions unwanted by UNMIK. In doing this, it established a straightforward registration procedure, imposing no specific gender-related requirements and setting no limitations on human rights / gender-related activities.

UNMIK Regulation 2000/38 was promulgated in June 2000 (UNMIK 2000e). It established an independent Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo responsible for promoting and protecting the rights and freedoms of individuals and legal entities, ensuring that all persons in Kosovo are able to exercise human rights and fundamental freedoms safeguarded by international human rights standards (ibid, par. 1.1). The regulation granted the Ombudsperson, appointed by UNMIK's SRSG, authority to provide accessible and timely mechanisms for the review and redress of actions constituting an abuse of authority by the interim civil administration or any emerging central or local institutions. However, incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols as a benchmark for evaluating the ability of all persons in Kosovo to exercise effectively their human rights

\(^{62}\) However, in the absence of codified Labour law, the meaning and scope of this Article remain undefined and therefore hardly enforceable.
and fundamental freedoms, Regulation 2000/38 contributed to the existing uncertainty regarding the laws governing the reconstruction of the region. The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Council of Europe 1950) was drawn up within the Council of Europe, a European intergovernmental organisation grouping together 45 Member States (to which Kosovo had never been and could never be a party as a territorial unit within Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (later Serbia and Montenegro)). Given that the post-1989 law of Serbia and Montenegro has been rendered inapplicable in UNMIK-administrated Kosovo, Serbian commitments to the implementation of the ECHR, reaffirmed by its ratification in March 2004, are devoid of any legal authority in Kosovo.

ECHR lays down an extensive catalogue of civil and political rights and freedoms, supplemented by a number of additional Protocols (Jacobs and White 1996). It also establishes a mechanism for the enforcement of the States Parties' obligations, providing for the right of individual complaint to the European Court of Human Rights. The European Court of Human Rights was set up in 1959. Since then, the Convention's human rights protection mechanisms have been substantially expanded by the subject matter of the Court's decisions, including a number of landmark decisions on gender and non-discrimination issues. In this light, the UNMIK decision to entrust the Kosovo Ombudsperson with the right to integrate the subject matter of the Convention, its Protocols and European Court rulings into the process of reviewing and redressing human rights violations in Kosovo should be viewed as devoid of any transformative potential, especially in the area of gender equality.

UNMIK Regulation 2001/14, 'On the Establishment of the Kosovo Statistical Office' (UNMIK 20011) established the Kosovo Statistical Office as responsible for the overall management of matters relating to statistical data collection, its analysis, compilation, processing, dissemination and archiving. In the light of the requirements set out by Resolution 1325, any statistical machinery established in the post-war context should incorporate the collation of gender-disaggregated statistics. Developing gender research capacities should be treated as a management tool for understanding the different situations, needs and concerns of women and men. In her comprehensive review of the impact of the South-East Europe reconstruction programmes on Kosovo women, Chris Corrin has pointed out that

Sex- and age-disaggregated statistics are not a priority even though such statistical work is a vital ingredient to the integration of women and girls in all economic, social and political concerns.

For more analysis regarding states' 'positive' obligation under the European Convention see Mowbray (2004).
Corrin also recommended age- and sex-disaggregated statistics be:

...generated within UNMIK structures and throughout the data collection and citizen identification process that is currently underway in Kosovo.

However, Regulation 2001/14, promulgated a year after Corrin's study had been widely disseminated within policy-making circles, only mentions gender on one occasion, where it sets out the Office's employment policies and obliges the Co-Heads of the Office to 'endeavour to ensure equitable gender balance in all areas and levels within the Office' (UNMIK 20011, Section 6(e)). Therefore, one of the avenues to institutionalise gender through systematic analysis and dissemination of gender-disaggregated data was left out by UNMIK, notwithstanding various calls and recommendations coming from various levels, including local women's groups to institutionalise such initiatives.

'Statutory' mechanisms for gender equality

The Law on Gender Equality in Kosovo was promulgated by the SRSG in June 2004, following months of controversial arguments between the Assembly of Kosovo, local women's groups and UNMIK on the delineation of gender mainstreaming responsibilities (Assembly of Kosovo 2004a). The Assembly of Kosovo adopted the law in October 2003. While presenting this draft law, Melihate Termkolli (LDK), chairwoman of the Gender Equality Committee, pointed out that this was the first law initiated from within the Assembly as well as the first piece of legislation in Kosovo dealing with gender issues (Assembly of Kosovo 2003, p. 15).

The law established gender equality as a fundamental value for the democratic development of Kosovo society in political, socio-economic, cultural and other fields of social life (ibid, art. 1.1). It acknowledges the disadvantaged position of women in Kosovo society, calling for the '...improvement of the females' status, so they are entitled to authority in the family and society'.\(^{64}\) The law, referring to the principles of 'equal behaviour' and equal opportunity, envisages translating gender equality policies into practice by employing a range of positive measures and gender equality awareness policies (ibid, art. 1.4), setting out responsible authorities and their relevant competencies.

Section 2 of the law provides a number of definitions, including on direct and indirect discrimination; special and general measures in achieving gender equality; and une-
equal representation. The law set the benchmark for equal gender participation at the level of 40% and obliges central and local governmental bodies to observe this principle when appointing public servants (ibid, par. 3.2-3.4), and when naming institutions, public undertakings and roads. No mechanism was provided to assess compliance with the law in the process of naming institutions, public undertakings and roads. No reservation has been included to reconcile cultural, religious or gender-specific implications of certain names of public institutions and social events. These shortfalls could considerably undermine the acceptance of the law by the male-dominated decision-making institutions, especially at the municipal level.

The Assembly of Kosovo, the government and ministries, and local government bodies were established as directly responsible for the achievement of gender equality (ibid, Section 4). The Law obliges the Assembly of Kosovo to observe the principle of equal representation in establishing its working groups and delegation. However, the main responsibility of the law is linked to the Kosovo Programme for Gender Equality, where the Assembly is required to approve a respective resolution, and review and approve the Government’s report on the implementation of the Programme every two years (ibid, art. 4.1-4.2).

The Government of Kosovo has been entrusted with the tasks of drafting and implementing the Kosovo Programme for Gender Equality; establishing an inter-ministerial council comprised of Gender Affairs Officers of the ministries; and complying with the provisions of the law when drafting regulations, programmes and draft laws. The law also established the institution of the ministerial Gender Affairs Officers, responsible for the implementation of gender equality strategies within the framework of ministry’s competences (ibid, par. 4.13). The law does not provide for any specific budgetary allocations or explicitly grant executive authority to the ministries with regards to their gender mainstreaming mandates.

In accordance with Section 3 of the law, local government bodies should promote and establish equal opportunities and draft their policies accordingly. The law also mandates the establishment of Gender Affair Officers in municipalities, responsible for reviewing "...every decision taken by the local government prior to the endorsement" (ibid, par. 4.15-4.17). Similarly to the grant of gender mainstreaming authority to the government, no budgetary or explicit executive authority provisions have been included for the municipal level of self-governance.

The Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government specifies that the Assembly’s resolutions have a power of non-binding declarations (UNMIK 2001a).
However, the law also provides for the establishment of a specialised gender mainstreaming governmental body—the Office for Gender Equality—granting it a broad range of responsibilities, including: implementation of existing regional and international legislation on gender equality; monitoring the implementation of the Kosovo Programme on Gender Equality; and coordinating the activities of the various organisations and actors, including non-governmental organisations, involved in gender mainstreaming (ibid, Section 5). The funding for the activities of the office should be allocated from the Kosovo Consolidated Budget.

The original draft of the law provided for the establishment of a Gender Equality Attorney to supervise the implementation of gender equality legislation and review all cases of the violation of gender rules and discrimination. This prompted immediate criticism from the Ombudsmen Institution in Kosovo and UNMIK’s SRSG, pointing to the overlap of functions between the proposed Gender Equality Attorney and the existing Ombudsperson, which they suggested would ‘create confusion for persons seeking redress for incidents of alleged discrimination’ (UNMIK 2004h). On this basis, the relevant provisions were found to be not in compliance with UNMIK Regulation 2000/38 on the Establishment of the Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, and consequently were deleted from the law entirely (UNMIK 2004i).

The law includes a provision requiring all ‘Institutions of Kosovo’ to present all statistical and non-statistical information ‘according to gender structure’ (Assembly of Kosovo 2004a, Section 9). However, it fails to set out enforcement mechanisms or specify in which particular contexts such gender-disaggregated information would not be necessary. The law further provides detailed mechanisms for ensuring gender equality in employment (Section 13), access to education (Section 14), media (Section 15) and in the area of gender equality and civil rights (Section 16). The provisions in the area of gender equality and civil rights endeavour to compensate for the lack of codified law on family relations, establishing a rather fragmented framework geared towards the legal abolition of certain cultural practices predominant in certain areas in Kosovo. For example, paragraph 16.5 prohibits conditional and forced marriages; paragraph 16.10 provides that in case of divorce, the common property is to be equally divided (Assembly of Kosovo 2004a, par.16-10, 16-15).

The Law on Gender Equality in Kosovo was later supplemented and reinforced by the Anti-Discrimination Law promulgated by the SRSG in August 2004 (UNMIK 2004k). This law prohibits direct or indirect discrimination based on, *inter alia*, sex, gender or sexual orientation (ibid, art. 2). With this, the negative duty not to discriminate was complemented with the opportunity to take positive action to prevent or compensate for gender-
based disadvantages (ibid, art. 5). The law generally serves three purposes: it consolidates currently existing law on discrimination in Kosovo; it promotes uniformity in the adjudication of a variety of forms of discrimination; and it provides for judicial and administrative remedies for the victims of any form of discrimination.

Taken together, these two pieces of legislation represent an important step in setting up a legal foundation for the institutionalisation of gender equality at various levels of regional self-governance. The cross-sectoral collaboration of many local actors envisaged by this legislation affords considerable capacity to dismantle socially accepted ideologies of male supremacy and male privilege in Kosovo society. However, considered from the merely legalistic point of view, these two laws can be described as two over-stretched pieces of legislation not sufficiently backed up by enforcement mechanisms or budgetary support. Inglis and Marshall, reflecting on the ‘legislative’ process in Kosovo, have argued that

The lack of an appropriate legislative process has led to the creation and promulgation of legislation that cannot be applied effectively or at all, undermining the development of consistency and transparency in the application of the law.

(Inglis and Marshall 2003, p. 119)

The considerable over-reliance of this legislation on existing provisional institutions of self-government and the somewhat unrealistic expectations of the immediate outcomes represents a major setback in securing a Kosovo-wide commitment to its implementation. It is further complicated by the lack of institutional experience, weak public administration mechanisms and flaws in budgetary processes; by missing constitutional mechanism for the issuance of secondary, or ‘implementing’ legislation; by the lack of legally-prescribed mechanisms to delegate the authority from ministerial to lower levels; and by the predominance of a ‘confused and obstructed’ approach to decision-making and policy-implementation in Kosovo (UNDP in Kosovo 2004, pp. 64-65).

Conclusion

This chapter has presented historical and anthropological perspectives on 20th century Kosovo, examining how history, culture and tradition have intertwined in setting the stage for the dramatic events of the 1980s and 1990s. It has also introduced the main pieces of post-1999 regional legislation, dealing with the issues of gender equality and women’s status within the context of post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo. This chapter, intended to be mostly descriptive, has set the stage for further analysis of Kosovo Albanian

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66 For more analysis see Chirizzi (2004), Koster (2003).
women's political participation in regional reconstruction processes in later chapters. In reviewing the status of Kosovo Albanian women after decades of oppression centred around ethnicity, this chapter has pointed to the complex linkages between the re-emergence and strengthening of oppressive features of cultural traditions, promoting ideals of female submissiveness, and nationalist rhetoric, targeting the very core and essence of what it is to be a 'Kosovo Albanian'. The historical overview demonstrated the trajectory of Kosovo Albanian women's short-lived 'liberation': the empowerment of one gender or one nation virtually always occurs at the expense and dismemberment of the other (Mayer, 2000; Yuval-Davis 1997).

The unique situation of post-conflict reconstruction Kosovo lies in the nature of the post-war governance arrangements. The responsibility for re-establishment of political and legal systems was given to the most influential international norm-making institution, the UN, rather than expropriated by one of the parties to the conflict at the expense of the other. Initially, this was perceived as a guarantee of political inclusiveness and dialogue with all local parties involved, including women's groups. However, as the review of legal developments in the first three years of UNMIK administration has demonstrated, although gender had been included as a standard precept in legal acts, women have remained largely excluded from post-conflict law-making in Kosovo.

The inclusion of equality and non-discrimination clauses in existing legislation and the adoption of specific laws are unlikely to be sufficient to challenge existing inequalities and repressive customs and traditions rooted in Kosovo Albanian history and culture. However, the importance of adopting and enforcing gender-sensitive rules lies in their potential to provide a framework within which change can be expected to happen. The increasing number of female parliamentarians in Kosovo is a clear manifestation of the immediate 'quantitative' impacts of the UNMIK-sponsored legal reform. However, qualitative changes take longer to become apparent. The nature of this qualitative transformation is twofold: it results from the changes in thinking and it further challenges the seemingly unquestionable 'male norm'. In most of rural Kosovo, tradition often takes precedence over statutory law and women have no apparent 'rights'. As this chapter has demonstrated, official law has recognised the right of women to own, inherit, decide on abortion and keep custody of children, yet customary law has not.

The UNMIK-sponsored adoption of gender-sensitive legislation was largely organised as a 'one-off' initiative, not supported by engagement with various groups of local men and women. In the light of persistent legal illiteracy in the region, the enforcement of new laws has become problematic. This was especially the case with pieces of legislation addressing what have traditionally been perceived as 'private matters', including women's
right to inheritance, divorce and abortion. In a context where tradition and custom have played crucial roles in the nation’s survival, customary law sidelines statutory law. ‘UN-MIK’s law’ becomes ‘foreign invention’, imposed and morally corrupt and therefore not worth abiding.

This chapter has also demonstrated the need for broader international law reforms capable of addressing the ad hoc nature of UN ‘nation-building’ and matching the concept of ‘functional necessity’ with the extended responsibilities taken on by the UN when it acts on behalf of a state. This includes the need for extending the applicability of international human rights treaties to include international organisations, and the need for greater accountability of UN personnel acting as governors and law-makers on behalf of the international community.
Chapter 5: Institutional Framework for Gender Mainstreaming in Kosovo

Introduction

In considering the historical development and current location of the institutional framework for gender mainstreaming in Kosovo, this chapter follows the well-established principle that though institutions do not exclusively determine outcomes, institutional choices can noticeably improve or weaken the opportunities for women to gain access to political power (Matland and Montgomery 2003, p. x). Firstly, this chapter touches on recent developments in international thinking that have led to the recognition that national gender mainstreaming machineries can serve as unique mechanisms to promote equality between women and men, to mainstream gender, and to monitor the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action (UN 1995a) and CEDAW (UN 1979). This chapter then provides a background to the current political situation in Kosovo. It acknowledges the impact of current political agendas in the region on the manner in which the institutional framework for gender mainstreaming has been developed. After setting out the international and local contexts, the chapter then turns to the current structure and functions of the institutional framework in Kosovo. It focuses on various gender-mainstreaming institutions located at the central and municipal levels of regional self-government. Following this chapter's setting of the background and explanation of the processes leading to the emergence of gender mainstreaming machinery in Kosovo, chapters 6 and 7 will examine in greater detail the dynamics of local capacities, looking at how the existing and emerging institutional arrangements differently affect and are affected by various groups of Kosovo men and women.

Institutional framework for gender mainstreaming: international context

Gender mainstreaming is conducted by, and occurs within, institutions (Acuner and Kar-dam 2003; Rai 2003b). It is important, therefore, to explore the relations between the institutions involved in gender mainstreaming at different levels and in various capacities. Such examination should include institutional objectives, goals and procedures, allowing the understanding of how institutions contribute towards or obstruct the achievement of the ultimate goal of gender mainstreaming -- gender equality.

The role and importance of establishing national machineries promoting the status of women gained its formal international recognition and endorsement nearly thirty years ago, at the First World Conference of the International Women’s Year in Mexico City in
1975, followed by the United Nations World Decade for women from 1976 to 1985 (Randriamaro 2004; UN 1975; UN 2001b, pp. 149-168). Continuous efforts by many institutional and individual constituencies around the world (Braunmuhl 2002, p. 57) ensure that today, as Shirin Rai has noted:

National machineries for the advancement of women are regarded as appropriate institutional mechanisms for ensuring that gender mainstreaming agendas are implemented and issues of gender equality remain in focus in public policy.

(Rai 2003b, p. 15)

By the end of 1985, responding to the UN-endorsed appeals voiced during two other World Conferences on Women (held in Copenhagen in 1980 (UN 1980a) and Nairobi in 1985 (UN 1985a)), 127 UN Member states had established some form of national gender mainstreaming machinery (Acuner and Kardam, p. 96). By the end of 2004, the number had increased to 165 (UN DAW 2004a, p. 2). However, many critics have perceived such rapid and overwhelming commitment of national states to the advancement of women's interests as a worrying symptom of a formalistic problem-solving approach (Goetz 2003, p. 91). Since 1948, when the UDHR (UN 1948) proclaimed and recognised the inalienability and universal nature of human rights, no other form of inequality, based on class, ethnicity, religion or any other ground, has produced such a massive response from the international community and national governments. Even so, as of today, the CEDAW (UN 1979) remains the only comprehensive international treaty guaranteeing women's human rights and preventing discrimination against women. As of October 2004, 179 countries had ratified the CEDAW. However, its enforcement mechanisms are weak, while many state-parties are relieved from implementing its core provisions by making corresponding reservations (Byrnes 1994; Cook 1994; Riddle 2002). 'No government or bureaucracy feels it has anything to fear from women', points out Goetz (2003, p.19), commenting that women, despite the existence of legal and institutional machineries, often lack the political clout to make their concerns heard and addressed.

Under pressure from international feminist and human rights campaigns, the United Nations' 'add-women-and-stir' approaches have started to change towards the accommodation of all-inclusive notions of gender and empowerment (McCLean 2000; Momsen 2003). The moral appeals of the early 1970s to integrate women into selected policies have transformed into powerful calls for gender to be embedded in all policies (Staudt 2003, p. 40). The Platform for Action, adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995, set out the task for national machineries to 'support government-wide mainstreaming of a gender-equality perspective in all policy areas' (UN 1995a, par 201). However, a number of recent documents, including reports by the UN Secretary-General
on the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action, have revealed that a lot more
needs to be done to challenge inequalities between men and women (Sprenger and Sym-
ington 2004, p. 3).

The inconsistent approach adopted by the UN to implementing its own gender
mainstreaming commitments (UN 1994a; 2003b), and the lack of progress in implementing
obligations under binding human rights and women’s rights treaties by UN member states
(UN 2001b), signifies an overall failure of the ‘international community’ to embed gender
equality as a political, social and cultural goal. As Chinkin and Paradine noted, the very
idea of ‘international community’ encapsulates the ‘...liberal version of the ideal man of
law and politics...an abstract white, middle-class, heterosexual, and able-bodied male’
(Chinkin and Paradine 2001, p. 128). However, recent efforts to integrate gender into the
concept of human development have produced many strategic gains. Above all, according
to Goetz, ‘...they have legitimised a place for gender issues in development’ (Goetz 2003,
p. 90).

Institutional framework for gender mainstreaming: theoretical foundations

The unique nature of the UN-sponsored post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo and the
continuous struggle of Kosovo women for full citizenship rights have led to the creation of
specific gender-mainstreaming institutions and, meanwhile, brought about responses from
existing ones. Existing institutions have responded with mostly ‘add-women-and-stir’ ap-
proaches, whereby women have been ‘added’ to already existing and often male-centred
institutional arrangements and policies:

I do not think they [UNMIK and PISG] care – I think they just used the banner of
‘gender equality’ to make their sexist institutions just a little bit more ‘gender-
friendly’. It is like: a bit of gender policy here, a bit here, a bit there -- and ‘Hur-
ray!!!’ – we have a policy, we could report it to the UN, to the EU; how it affects
our lives, how it affects lives of women in remote villages they do not seem to
care. Every time I go to there to get an appointment I could just feel the attitude:
Look at this vile woman! Here again to disturb our tick-based policy-making! They
do not want my expertise or knowledge!

(Interview with JS, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group,
March – April 2004, Kosovo)

Until June 2004, when UNMIK’s SRSG promulgated the Kosovo Law on Gender
Equality (Assembly of Kosovo 2004a), no clear and consistent legal framework existed
setting out roles and responsibilities for gender mainstreaming for already existing institu-
tions. This included the Inter-ministerial Group for Achieving Gender Equality and the Kosovo-wide network of Gender Municipal Officers. Their mandates, responsibilities and relation to each other remained unrecognised and unspecified for nearly four years following the establishment of UNMIK. Meanwhile, lacking legal recognition, these institutions remained under-staffed and under-resourced. Both UNMIK and OMIK have overlooked the need to locate mainstreaming machineries at the core of government policy-making and implementation, supported by adequate budgetary provisions and human resources (Rai 2003b). While Kosovo women’s rights groups have sought to make sense of the overwhelming socio-economic and political transformations of the past few years, a complicated picture of the regional gender mainstreaming machinery has emerged, as shown in Figure 5.1, fraught with overlapping responsibilities and conflicting objectives:

At times, I think: where does it all go? How many more institutions are they going to create? There is no certainty, there is no distribution of responsibility, nobody knows how this machinery is funded and will be funded when the PISG assumes all powers...It is very confusing. I think it is another extreme - in comparison to other countries where there is nothing like this. But we have all of the mainstreaming institutions but how effective they are - nobody knows.

(Interview with JD, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

The outcome document of the 23rd Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UN 2000d), convened to review the progress in implementation of the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women and the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, pointed to a number of factors hindering the activities of national machineries in many countries. These included: inadequate financial and human resources, lack of political will and commitment at the highest level, insufficient understanding of gender equality and mainstreaming amongst government structures, unclear mandates, and structural and communications problems within and among government agencies (UN 2000d, pp. 15-16). This chapter demonstrates that many, if not all of these factors, have influenced the development of institutional mechanisms in Kosovo.
Figure 5.1: Institutional Framework for Gender Mainstreaming in Kosovo (as of July 2004)

Central Level
- UNMIK
- UNMIK Office for Gender Affairs (OGBA)
- Kosovo Assembly
- Office of the Prime Minister
- Ministries
- Ministerial Gender Affairs Officers
- Office for Gender Equality
- Office for Good Governance
- Inter-Ministerial Group for Achieving Gender Equality

Municipal Level
- Municipal Committees for Gender Equality
- Gender Municipal Officers

Legend: — fragmentary/non-existent or indirect connection; — direct connection

Law on Gender Equality
- Regulation 2000/45 on Self-Government of Municipalities in Kosovo
- Regulation No 2001/19 on the Executive Branch of the PSIG in Kosovo
- UN SC Resolution 1244
- UN SC Resolution 1325
- Regulation No 2000/38 On the Establishment of the Ombudsman Institution
- Regulation No 2000/ Constitutional Framework
An efficient institutional framework is often regarded as an essential element in setting the basis for the implementation of gender mainstreaming policies based on recent UN targeted interventions (Hannan 2003) in the area of women, peace and security. The Kosovo Centre for the Protection of Women and Children and Motrat Qiriazi were among the first Kosovo Albanian women’s organisations (Clark 2000; Corrin 2000, 2002; Mertus 1999). Established in the early 1990s, and respected and viewed by many Kosovo Albanian women as champions of the women’s movement in Kosovo, they remain largely excluded from the ‘official’ reconstruction effort in post-1999 Kosovo: no matter how capable and dedicated, individual commitments cannot live up to their potential if institutional arrangements are insufficient:

We are very good at what we are doing locally – helping local women to get over all sorts of things; we are very good at managing to do all of this with miniscule budgets; we listen to women and men, we ask what they want and how we could help them and this is what we do. But nobody ‘up there’ seems to be interested in us -- we have much to offer -- dedication, skills and knowledge but when our [international] funding stops – we could be just left out!

(Interview with JF, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

Likewise, the example of the OGA demonstrates that even officially legitimised institutions vested with political and financial autonomy cannot fulfil their mandates if their designated role is inappropriate, their place within the overall framework of institutions is unclear, and if their relationships with other institutions are weak.

A number of commentators analysing the reconstruction policies of UNMIK have suggested that the obstacles to the implementation of the nation-building mandate of Resolution 1244 and the ‘Standards before Status’ objectives (Steiner 2002) have more often been institutional rather than technical in nature (ICG 2003a, 2004a, 2005a). The March 2004 outbreak of interethnic violence in Kosovo re-fuelled the debates about UNMIK’s failure to ‘institutionalise’ and embed ‘exported’ ideas of democracy, human rights and self-governance (ICG 2004a, HRW 2004). In this, where it is relatively easy to develop policies and to assess and train personnel, it is more difficult to set up, assess and strengthen the institutions required to translate policies into real life. Shirin Rai, analysing the processes of democratisation and the location of gender in these processes, has noted that the messages of participation, representation, accountability and equality in citizenship
are very imperfectly translated into political practice, in part due to socio-economic and cultural systems, or due to the functioning of political elites within those historical and structural contexts.

(Rai 2000a, p. 2)

Evaluating the effectiveness of existing institutional framework represents another challenge. Such evaluation should include a robust assessment of how institutions interconnect, which institutions are accountable for what, between whom communication occurs, and how and by whom decisions are taken and implemented. Gender issues do not exist as an independent domain; gender equality cannot be achieved as a result of discrete policy undertakings however well funded or organised they could be. Gender, viewed as a socially and politically constructed phenomenon (Connell 2002), stipulates a very complex and cross-sectoral landscape, in which no single agency or body can possibly address gender issues alone. On the institutional level, it leads to the need for shared responsibility for gender mainstreaming among civil society, state bodies and political actors (Rai 2003d, p. 7).

Post-conflict reconstruction contexts often provide 'windows of opportunity' for national machineries to strengthen their positions (Rai 2003b, p. 28). However, in order to take advantage of such opportunities, there has to be a realistic and coordinated redistribution of responsibilities and authority between central authorities, regional authorities and the non-governmental sector. Feminist accounts of gender mainstreaming in many countries of the Global North and Global South have demonstrated that a host of problems, including institutional and personal agendas, funding requirements and limitations, and human resources availability shape and affect gender mainstreaming frameworks within individual national contexts, making coordination challenging (Kerr et al. 2004). A key task for national governments is not only to develop and implement gender mainstreaming policies, but to oversee the effective coordination of the various governmental and non-governmental agencies involved in the process. Effective coordination implies that all vital tasks are implemented in a timely manner by appropriate institutions:

I think there is a true need for coordination if we want to achieve anything: there are no links between various institutions within the PSIG, between the PSIG and UNMIK, between women's NGOs, between Pristina and the rest of Kosovo. If there is effective coordination – we could all work together. But I also think we could run into danger of creating a very top-down structure with someone sitting on the top and pulling the strings – people would be unhappy, they want to do things as they want. Maybe it is an evolutionary process, where working relations are established in the process of doing things.
The impact of the international women's movement and its quest for gender equality and justice, was undoubtedly one of the hallmarks of the twenties century (Deepa 2004, p. 80). As Kardam and Acuner have observed, "...global discourse on democratisation and human rights has further encouraged the institutionalisation of gender equality" (Acuner and Kardam 2003, p. 99), resulting in a proliferation of national public and private constituencies dealing with gender issues and, subsequently, creating even greater (and often unmet) need for coordination. A number of case studies drawing on specific experiences of national machineries within various contexts demonstrates a considerable degree of diversity exists in the types of national machineries (Rai 2003c). Referring to the survey conducted by the UN's DAW in 1996, Shirin Rai has noted that two-thirds of all national machineries were located in government, while one-third were either non-governmental or had a mixed structure. Of those within the government, more than 50% were part of a ministry, one-third were located in the office of the head of state and the rest were free-standing machineries (Rai 2003b, p. 26). Joj Kwesiga has suggested that whatever approach a government chooses to coordinate and mobilise resources to strengthen gender mainstreaming, it is imperative that the institutional frameworks incorporate meaningful and legally prescribed linkages with other governmental agencies, including ministries and local governmental structures to avoid "...being either too inclusive or too isolationist" (Kwesiga 2003, p. 219).

The following analysis of Kosovo institutions for gender mainstreaming reveals a rather chaotic and continuously changing picture of the regional institutional framework. In this it remains overwhelmed and overburdened with a number of weakly coordinated departments, commissions, officers and gender-focal points located at central and municipal levels of self-government. A lack of well-coordinated and funded mainstreaming machinery represents the absence of a clear governmental gender-mainstreaming doctrine suited to respond to specific local contexts where discrimination against women takes a variety of forms and requires a carefully developed approach. In her overview of institutional mechanisms for the advancement of women, Shirin Rai has posed a number of issues crucial to the existence and functioning of gender-mainstreaming institutions (Rai 2003b, pp. 15-39). She first questioned if national machineries as state institutions are 'the most appropriate instruments for furthering women's interests'. Secondly, as Rai argued, it must be recognised that the viability of national machineries as bodies promoting gender equality is interlinked with the issues of resources available to these machineries to transform gender rhetoric into doable and realistic policies and projects (ibid). Substantial damage to socio-
economic infrastructure, large-scale displacements of population, protracted economic and social crises usually fit into the 'humanitarian emergencies' frame of international thinking, which calls for immediate fixes and one-off gender-blind projects. Even when the humanitarian community recognises the specific needs of women, the gap between ideology and practice remains significant (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002, p. 5). Perceived as 'soft' and secondary, women's specific issues and gender mainstreaming are generally pushed to the margins of humanitarian responses and afterwards, to the margins of post-conflict reconstruction agendas (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002, UN 2000b). Thirdly, gender mainstreaming should be located within wider structural and cultural contexts, defined by gender-biased systems of oppression and dominant patterns of masculinity (Rai 2003b, p. 16).

In her feminist critique of women's human rights discourse, Joanna Kerr has suggested that despite various efforts to 'institutionalise' gender, changes to already established organisations have manifested little positive change because underlying cultural and political norms within them have not been tackled (Kerr 2004, p. 28). In this light it is important to place the analysis of gender mainstreaming institutions in Kosovo within a particular political and socio-economic environment within which they have been developed and function now. Rai identified five crucial elements relevant to all gender mainstreaming institutions, including location within the decision-making hierarchy and authority to influence government policy; clarity of mandate and functional responsibility; links with civil society groups supportive of the advancement of women's rights; human and financial resources; and accountability of the national machinery itself (Rai 2003b, p. 26). These elements will be incorporated into the evaluation model employed to analyse the current location of gender mainstreaming machinery in the context of post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo.

**Gender mainstreaming institutions in Kosovo: Resolution 1244 and Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government**

Analysing gendered meanings of the concepts of democracy, citizenship and human rights in the context of the Dayton Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chinkin and Paradine have pointed to the crucial questions of whether Western ideas of democracy can be transplanted to areas where there is no culture or history of democracy, and how such a transplant can be attempted (Chinkin and Paradine 2001, p. 148). Before considering how gender issues have been institutionalised in the context of post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo, this section reviews and acknowledges the influence of the complex political and bureaucratic policy-making contexts in Kosovo.
The United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo was established soon after the 78-day NATO-led bombing campaign of Yugoslavia forced Milosevic’s nationalist regime to accept an agreement outlining a timetable for Yugoslav troops to leave Kosovo (NATO 1999). United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) designated the Rambouillet Peace Accords as a platform for the final solution of the Kosovo crisis (Bieber 2004, pp. 120-122; UN 1999e). Analysing the early phase of UNMIK administration, Lyth has commented that

The virtual absence of women in the peace-negotiations in Rambouillet perpetuated and institutionalised marginalisation of women in the political process after the conflict.

(KfK Foundation 2001, p. 8)

The lack of gender perspectives in Resolution 1244 (UN 1999a), adopted a year before Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security (UN 2000a), has been noted by many commentators. Its general unsuitability to govern the processes of post-conflict reconstruction in the region has also been criticised (UNDP in Kosovo 2004, p. 64). In this, criticism has been directed at the disorganised and chaotic ‘institutionalisation of democracy’ and public administration in Kosovo (Ernst 2002, pp. 335-366; ICG reports; UNDP in Kosovo 2002, 2004). A recent study by the UNDP in Kosovo has suggested that Kosovo Albanians were, indeed, unready and were not awaiting ‘democracy’ – they were, instead, striving for freedom. The lack of local capacities to understand and operationalise the concepts of democratic governance and participation manifested themselves in numerous setbacks in post-conflict reconstruction. The initial processes of ‘Kosovoization’, which included the transfer of authority from the interim JIAS structure to the newly created Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, became entangled in political controversies rooted in the historic and politic legacy of the region. Llamazares and Levy have commented on this:

As the immediate effects of the 1998-1999 conflict were repaired, longer-term legacies began to surface, i.e. large-scale smuggling and other organised crime activities, and it became clear that parallelism, patronage and patriarchy were still strongly entrenched in both the Serbian and Albanian political systems.

(Levy and Llamazares 2003, p. 9)

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Setting up a specific ministry or department for gender affairs has been an issue of controversy for many feminists and gender practitioners in Kosovo and internationally. Interviewed in March and April 2004, many Kosovo women involved in the local self-government were divided according to their opinion of whether there was a need for a special women’s ministry in Kosovo:

I do not really see the point for a ministry – gender is not a separate domain like ‘agriculture’ – it runs through everything, there has to be a commitment within each ministry to address these issues.

(Interview with JH, female, Kosovo Albanian, PISG, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

If you compare gender with, for example, finances – every ministry deals with money – they need it in order to function; it does not mean however that there is no need for a separate ministry dealing with finances. There should be a ministry for social and gender affairs – an executive ministry. It should coordinate gender work across the board.

(Interview with JJ, female, Kosovo Albanian, PISG, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

This division echoed one of the earlier splits within the Kosovo women’s movement noted by Brand in his overview of the JIAS (Brand 2003, p. 21). No agreement was ever reached between members of the Women’s Forum of the Rugova-led LDK, independent women’s rights activists, and the alliance of women’s NGOs over the issue of a separate Administrative Department for Women’s Affairs (Brand 2003, p. 21). The LDK Women’s Forum lobbied for the establishment of an additional department tasked to deal specifically with women’s issues. Members of the women’s groups opposed this, arguing that creating a dedicated structure would lead to the eventual marginalisation of women’s issues and their total exclusion from other departments’ agendas. This split, as noted by Brand, gave UNMIK a good reason not to establish any executive structure to deal with the issues of gender mainstreaming.

The Kosovo Constitutional Framework introduced in May 2001 by UNMIK Regulation 2001/9 established a somewhat inconsistent system of self-government in Kosovo (Bieber 2004, p. 118) and laid out a rather flawed foundation for gender mainstreaming machinery. A recent study by the UNDP in Kosovo has concluded that the current constitutional formula provided by the Framework failed to produce a majority capable of governing on its own in circumstances when political representation was heavily skewed along lines of ethnicity and political affiliation (UNDP in Kosovo, p. 64). The Kosovo Assembly’s women quota was not included in the constitutional formula. Instead, an ad hoc
mechanism was adopted with the UNMIK SRSG issuing separate regulations setting out the procedural framework for the two Kosovo assembly elections in 2001 and 2004. In such circumstances, the constitutional failure to secure a mechanism for the formation of a parliamentary majority effectively ruled out any prospects for the elected women representatives (affiliated with the three major opposition parties) to unite and contribute to the formation of gender-aware majority capable of lobbying for gender-sensitive parliamentary agenda. The fact that the Law on Gender Equality (Assembly of Kosovo 2004a) was only adopted by the Assembly in February 2004 and promulgated by the SRSG in June 2004 is one of the symptoms of the rather complex relationship that existed between women’s representation in the parliament and prominence of gender on parliamentary agendas (Chinkin 2003; Phillips 1995; White 1996):

The fact that there are more women in the Assembly now does not mean that there is any more weight or recognition given to women and women’s issues.

(Interview with JK, female, Kosovo Albanian, PISG, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

The Constitutional Framework delineates legislative duties to the Assembly of Kosovo. However, in an atmosphere of increasing ethnicisation and militarisation of political dialogue in Kosovo (Blumi 2001, ICG 2005a), the role of the Kosovo Assembly has become somewhat inconsistent and perhaps contradictory to its mandate. A 2005 ICG report noted that the Kosovo Assembly had spent most of its time making symbolic declarations rather than patiently assembling the laws a new state would need (ICG 2005a, p. 8-9). In addition, the Constitutional Framework contains no specific provisions to ensure the implementation of laws adopted by the Assembly through the issuance of secondary legislation. It also fails to set out regulatory powers for the government (UNDP in Kosovo 2004, p. 64). The ‘law-implementation’ constitutional limbo led to the situation where ‘paper-dragon’ legislative commitments were used to set out generalised policies with no effective mechanisms available to the government to implement them. This is especially true in the case of so-called ‘framework legislation’, including the Law on Gender Equality (Assembly of Kosovo 2004a). Adopted in 2004, it sets out a number of general policies, yet through the wording of its main provisions, it relies heavily on ‘implementation’ legislation to follow (Cadle 2004, p. 12).

**Delegation of authority and political participation in Kosovo**

As the provisional institutions of self-government in Kosovo develop, the question of autonomy for women’s organisations and gender mainstreaming departments has become ever more timely. Despite recent movements towards de-centralisation and delegating
authority to municipalities and local communities, the Kosovo PISG remains highly centralised with a few men at the centre of UNMIK and PSIG making the most important decisions (UNDP in Kosovo 2004, p. 64). A lack of legitimate de-centralisation mechanisms has had -- and will continue to have -- a significant impact on the implementation of socially-oriented legislation, where more expansive vertical and horizontal involvement is required at both central and municipal levels:

I do not understand how someone who sits at the very top in his nice office in Pristina would know how to help a woman whose family disappeared, who has no income and relies on what she could grow in her garden and help from local women's groups. They need to give authority to local people, men and women.

(Interview with JL, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women's group, March - April 2004, Kosovo)

A political rivalry existent between individual ministries has been argued to be significantly undermining the overall performance of the government (ICG 2004a, p. 37). In this, a lack of clear mechanisms to delegate responsibility and authority amongst the existing ministries and the Office of the Prime Minister has created difficulties in coordinating policy formation and implementation at the governmental level. According to UNMIK Regulation on the Executive Branch of Provisional Self-Government, the Office of the Prime Minister functions as a single Ministry (UNMIK 2001d), perceived by other ministries as lacking authority to coordinate and monitor their work and implement the legislative agenda (UNDP in Kosovo 2004, p. 65).

Placed within the Office of the Prime Minister, the Advisory Office on Good Governance, Human Rights, Equal Opportunity and Gender has been given broad advisory capacities in the areas of human rights and gender (UNMIK 2001d). This remit had the potential to be translated into sound policy-undertakings in all areas of ministerial activities. However, one of the major consequences of the 'confused and obstructed' approach to decision-making and policy-implementation in Kosovo has been a persistent pattern in which '...decisions on...critical issues [have] generally [been] taken on an ad hoc basis, without thorough research, stake-holder targeting or extensive participation' (UNDP in Kosovo 2004, p. 65). Commenting on the existing mechanisms for wider political participation, a UNDP study has concluded that the PISG critically lacks the ability to 'attract initiatives, or properly channel input to central authorities' participation' (UNDP in Kosovo 2004, p. 65). A campaign organised by a group of local NGOs in spring 2004 aimed at changing electoral law in order to enhance geographical representation and establish clear mechanisms of accountability, exposed the absence of legitimate avenues allowing civil groups to
bring ‘initiatives’ up and influence decision-making at the central level. One of the interviewees, a Gender Affairs officer representing one of the municipalities, noted that.

There are no established mechanisms whatsoever to tell about our problems, our needs and concerns, to bring them to the attention of central authorities. I do not know who to contact and even if I contact the right person, there is no guarantee that this right person has enough power to address this problem.

(Interview with JZ, female, Kosovo Albanian, PISG, March - April 2004, Kosovo)

Since the establishment of UNMIK in 1999, Kosovo women’s groups have voiced their concerns about being excluded and ignored by UNMIK authorities, about the gender-insensitivity of UNMIK policies, and about the overall exclusion of women from decision-making in Kosovo. In her analysis of the non-linear nature of UNMIK’s involvement in the reconstruction of Kosovo, Husanovic has noted that UNMIK quite purposefully ignored the opportunity to start a fruitful process of local empowerment, relying on existing political capacities. The reluctance of the UNMIK leadership to make a mistake by strengthening the ‘wrong forces’ in Kosovo crystallised in the principle of ‘active non-activity’, holding back and preserving the status quo (Husanovic 2001, p. 272). Following the emergence of widespread disappointment in UNMIK and the ‘internationals’, the nature of Kosovo women’s groups’ appeals changed. In this, the emerging male-dominated Kosovo provisional institutions remained pre-occupied with the issue of political status, ignoring existing capacities and gender expertise. However, the Kosovo women’s movement perceived them as at least having more credibility for being local ‘good-for-Kosovo’ constituencies rather than ‘not-anymore-welcomed’ internationals:

It seems that there is this tendency to attribute lack of progress in achieving gender equality to UNMIK which to me sounds quite odd. It is true that UNMIK did not involve local women and local expertise when they arrived; but they did a good job in terms of introducing gender-sensitive laws and regulations. Instead of making these laws work here, instead of attacking Kosovo Albanian men for being sexist and macho, some of the local women’s groups continue to attack UNMIK – there is a lot of anger in the air here and it does not help.

(Interview with JX, female, international, international non-governmental organisation, April – March 2004, Kosovo)

The Preamble to the 2004 Law on Gender Equality does provide an extensive list of stakeholders involved in Kosovo-wide consultations. However, this inclusion, according to the majority of women groups’ activists interviewed in March-April 2004, should be
generally considered as a concession to the pressing demands of local women's groups to be included, rather than a rule or established practice.

**UNMIK: Gender Mainstreaming Profile**

At a September 2004 Conference on Gender Equality Mechanisms in Kosovo, Charles Brayshaw, the Principal Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General to Kosovo (PDSRSG), acknowledged that

Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security is our cornerstone document on gender equality... [while UNMIK]... fosters gender equality under the principles of SC Resolution 1325 through the Office of Gender Affairs... [which]... advises on gender issues and works to integrate a gender-based approach into our peacekeeping mission for full equality in Kosovo.

(UNMIK 2004d)

Special thanks from the PDSRSG went to Maddalena Pezzoti, head of the OGA, and Mr. Habit Hajredini, head of the Office for Good Governance, Human Rights, Equal Opportunities and Gender Issues. However, interviews with representatives of the Kosovo women's movement in spring 2004 revealed rather different — and mostly negative — attitudes towards the OGA and its international leadership:

We do not have any relations with the OGA. They steal our ideas, write reports without doing anything and get the credit. There are no local people working in the office. They do not even bother to leave the [UN] building.

(Interview with JC, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women's group, March - April 2004, Kosovo)

Interviewing Habit Hajredini in March 2004 exposed his rather sketchy knowledge of Resolution 1325 and its relevance to the reconstruction context in Kosovo. While gender has never become a functional 'real-action' dimension of the post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo, the gender-insensitivity of many of UNMIK's policies has not been put under international scrutiny either (Sharapov 2005). The first official acknowledgement of UNMIK's poor gender mainstreaming record was made only in July 2004, in the Secretary General's report to the Security Council (UN 2004b, par. 23, p. 7). The conflict in Kosovo was profoundly centred along ethnic lines, including significant use of gender-based violence, including rape, sexual abuse, domestic violence and trafficking for sexual exploitation. What this means is that the fact that ethnicity has been designated as a dominant social and political marker in the process of post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo under Resolution 1244 has legitimised women's exclusion from virtually all aspects of the reconstruction process. A number of factors have contributed to the situation where the UNMIK-
managed gender mainstreaming process '...has been reduced to activities at the margins of core policies and programmes' (UN 2004b, par. 23, p.7):

1. The gender perspective was not included in the original mandate of the Mission – Resolution 1244 – despite the UN SG’s remark that ‘The incorporation of gender perspectives from the inception of a mandate has proven to be crucial’ (UN 2004e, par. 33). The October 2003 Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council enlisted key priorities of the Mission in the light of the PISG’s development and the gradual democratisation of the region. However, it failed to incorporate a gender dimension, despite the fact that in adopting Resolution 1325 in October 2000, the Security Council expressed its willingness to ensure that all missions mandated by the Council took into account gender considerations (UN 2004e, par. 7).

2. Kosovo women were excluded from the Rambouillet Negotiations and Agreement in 1999 (UNIFEM 2005). The agreement, later incorporated into Resolution 1244, contains no reference to women or gender. The Kosovo ‘peace-talks’ process followed the traditional pattern of internationally brokered peace agreements, excluding people from negotiations who lived through the conflict, including local women and women’s groups (Chinkin and Paradine 2001, p. 149).

3. More than half a decade into the era of post-conflict reconstruction, Kosovo women are still viewed as a vulnerable group in need of protection and special remedial measures of humanitarian nature (Holst-Roness 2004, p. 1). In June 2003, the Secretary General noted, for example, that ‘There are still no comprehensive figures for the participation of vulnerable groups, minorities and women in the civil service’ (UN 2003a, p. 4);

4. The UN itself, including the Department for Peacekeeping Operations, and the UN peacekeeping contingents, remain gender-biased institutions. As of June 2004, women constituted only 1% of military personnel and 5% of civilian police personnel assigned by the Member States to serve in UN peacekeeping operations. These figures have remained unchanged since 2002. Chinkin has noted on this that

   …it is extremely difficult to urge gender equality in national institution building if the international bodies implementing the agreement conspicuously fail to adopt such standards in their own operations

   (Chinkin 2003, p. 878).

In circumstances where there were no normative or procedural gender mainstreaming frameworks binding UNMIK’s senior leadership (Sharapov 2005), gender mainstreaming became hostage to individual understandings of gender issues and
the senior leadership's willingness to commit human and financial resources to these issues (KtK 2001; Söderberg 2001, par. 4.3).

5. A field trip to Kosovo in spring 2004, preceded and followed up by extensive email communication with the research participants, including representatives of UNMIK and the PISG, revealed that gender remained a 'non-communicado' topic for the UNMIK authorities. The Secretary General's quarterly progress reports to the Security Council have remained the only monitoring implements available to the general public. The following table, based on the reports submitted by the Secretary-General from July 1999 up to November 2004, reveals a rather incomplete manner of gender mainstreaming reporting.

Table 5.1: Inclusion of gender issues in the UNSG's reports to the United Nations Security Council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of the Report</th>
<th>Reference to gender or women issues</th>
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<tr>
<td>July 1999</td>
<td>Outlines plans to create a special gender advisory unit tasked to provide guidance on how to 'mainstream gender issues into the mandate and activities of various components' (UN 1999b).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1999</td>
<td>No gender/women-related references (UN 1999c).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1999</td>
<td>No gender/women-related references (UN 1999d).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2000</td>
<td>Acknowledges the SRSG's efforts to place women in positions of leadership within the JIAS both at central and municipal levels (UN 2000e). However, in her audit of reconstruction programmes in South Eastern Europe (published in June 2000), Corrin noted that, '...of the 20 [JIAS] government departments only 2 are headed by Kosovo women' (Corrin 2000, p. 12); for the first time, the issue of trafficking in women is acknowledged (UN 2000e, par 61, p. 14).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2000</td>
<td>Accepts that violence against women and girls in Kosovo is a significant concern (UN 2000f, par. 9, p.2). Acknowledges UNMIK's commitments to promote institutional mechanisms for the advancement of women in Kosovo; no further details are provided. Acknowledges the role of the OGA in making 'significant progress in mainstreaming gender issues throughout UNMIK, including JIAS, as well as within the local community and municipal structures' (UN 2000f, par. 29, p.5). However, in May 2001 Memorandum, Kosovo Women's Network accuses the OGA of disregarding local capacities: 'instead of listening to our voice, [they] wanted to shut down our voice...they wanted to show power on us, instead of giving power to us' (KWN 2001b).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2000</td>
<td>No gender/women-related references (UN 2000g);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2000</td>
<td>Information about special seminars for female candidates held throughout Kosovo in which nearly 500 women participated. The seminar series sought to strengthen women's understanding of municipal governance and electoral campaigning (UN 2000h);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2001</td>
<td>No gender/women-related references (UN 2001e);</td>
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## Table 5.1

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>June 2001</td>
<td>Acknowledges the leading role of the OGA in developing Kosovo Action Plan for the Advancement of Women (UN 2001c, par. 15, p. 5). However, Kosovo women's groups accused the OGA of stealing ideas and presenting them as their own. In its Memo, dated 22 May 2001, the Kosovo Women's Network claims ownership of the plan (KWN 2001b).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2001</td>
<td>Provides a vaguely phrased description of far-reaching OGA activities; fails to mention if any local expertise and knowledge has been incorporated (UN 2001d).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2002</td>
<td>No gender/women-related references; No gender-disaggregated results of the election to the Assembly of Kosovo; results disaggregated only by political parties (UN 2002a).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2002</td>
<td>No gender/women-related references (UN 2002b).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2002</td>
<td>Provides gender disaggregated statistics on the Kosovo Police Service (UN 2002c).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2003</td>
<td>Acknowledges substantial improvement in women's representation in new Municipal Assemblies due to the specific gender requirement in electoral legislation (UN 2003c, par. 21, p. 6).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2003</td>
<td>Attributes progress in gender mainstreaming to the establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Working Group on Gender and seven Gender Equality Committees in municipalities (UN 2003a, par. 15, pp. 4-5); provides data on female/male ratio of judges and prosecutors (UN 2003a, par. 23, p. 6).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2003</td>
<td>Acknowledges the improvement in representation of women at the professional level in the public sector, establishment of Municipal Gender Officers in each of the 30 municipalities and the Inter-Ministerial Working Group on Gender Equality (UN 2003d, par. 14, p. 4).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2004</td>
<td>Acknowledges the poor record of the PSIG in placing women in high-level and managerial positions but provides no suggestions as to how this could be rectified (UN 2004c, par. 25, p. 8).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2004</td>
<td>No gender/women-related references (UN 2004d).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2004</td>
<td>Encourages the adoption of the Law on Gender Equality; criticises (for the first time since 1999) existing mechanisms for gender equality including municipal gender officers and ministerial gender affairs officers (UN 2004b, par. 23, p. 7).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2004</td>
<td>No gender/women-related references. In his October 2004 report on the implementation of SC Resolution 1325 (2000), the UN Secretary General calls to '...routinely incorporate gender perspectives in all thematic and country reports to the Security Council and continue to monitor the progress made' (UN 2004e, par. 112, p. 23).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1 illustrates that the first fifteen quarterly reports submitted by the UN Secretary General (from July 1999 to October 2003) remained either silent or complimentary on the progress of the mission's gender mainstreaming activities. Despite the growing criticism of UNMIK's unresponsiveness to local expertise and knowledge, the July 2000 Report mentioned significant progress in mainstreaming gender at all levels of regional self-governance. The OGA, discredited and ignored by local women's groups, was praised in several reports for its role in securing women's representation within the emerging Pub-
lic Service and governmental structures. The first acknowledgement of the under-representation of women in various roles in Kosovo was made only in January 2004, where the full responsibility for the failure to place women in high-level and managerial positions was attributed to the locally-staffed PISG.

In light of the rather limited commitment by UNMIK to adequately fund the locally-supported gender mainstreaming activities, the initial conditions for the development of an effective and sustainable institutional framework for gender mainstreaming in Kosovo were lacking. In their gender analysis of the socio-economic and political contexts within which national machineries for women’s advancement are established, Acuner and Kardam have pointed to the utmost importance of collaboration with women’s NGOs, without which such institutions cannot be effective or legitimate (Acuner and Kardam 2003, p. 107). However, in Kosovo the lack of local ownership of the reconstruction processes (Corrin 2002a; 2003a) has been enhanced by the fear of destabilising the fragile political equilibrium in the region. The unique form of local civil organising and its transformation after the post-1999 ‘liberation’ of Kosovo, described in chapter 4, have also played a significant part.68 Accusations of a ‘democratic deficit and traditionalism in Kosovo’ have promptly entered UNMIK rhetoric in order to justify the lack of trust and respect towards local capacities and expertise, which have for the most part been ignored by international administrators. A number of Kosovo women’s groups and international commentators have responded with sharp criticism of UNMIK and its policies, accusing it of ‘Western multicultural neo-colonialism’ (Buckley 2000). Against this however, a number of sociological inquiries, focusing on historical developments of civil society in Kosovo, have concluded that the oppressive nature of Milosevic’s regime, followed by the years of peaceful resistance structured along the lines of ethnic exclusion, resulted in a wide gap of distrust and suspicion between official governmental structures and civil groups (Clark 2000; Levy and Llamazares 2003; Reineck 1991; 1993). Levy and Llamazares have noted:

...the political culture that existed in Kosovo prior to the war has also shaped L NGOs [local NGOs], and these patterns of clientelism, fear of controversial advocacy, mistrust of government and state structures, lack of inter-ethnic cooperation, and so on, continue to hamper the ability of local agencies to contribute to a stable, multi-ethnic, democratic future for the region. International approaches to partnership have in effect reinforced these legacies and created a pattern of exclusive cli-

68 See, for example, UNDP report concluding, ‘Despite considerable progress since 1999, Kosovo faces a stagnant ‘democracy deficit’ today, undermining the legitimacy of its young institutions. Each day reaffirms that without a broadening of the channels for more meaningful dialogue and governance, more March 2004 tragedies could occur, and Kosovans will suffer severe development setbacks’ (UNDP in Kosovo, p. 3).
According to recent ICG report: '...the events of mid-March 2004 demonstrated, the PISG represents and enjoys the trust of Kosovo Albanian society only to a limited extent. The modest array of governing competencies UNMIK has transferred to it, and its own weaknesses - limited ability, myopic vision, and alleged venality - leave it vulnerable to being perceived by that society as a quisling, corrupt elite' (ICG 2004a, p. 2).

'...patron relationships that have, in some cases, reduced the vibrancy of Kosovo civil society. (Levy and Llamazares 2003, p.22)

Accordingly, it is important to locate the institutional framework for gender mainstreaming within the context of the changing institutional arrangements ushered in by the gradual transfer of responsibilities from UNMIK to provisional institutions of self-government at central and local levels. In doing this, two aspects are worth in-depth consideration: whether the lost (or, as Llamazares and Levy have argued, non-existing) trust in official governmental structures has been restored/created following the increasing pace of 'kosovarization' and, secondly, whether the emerging gender-mainstreaming institutions prioritise the establishment of co-operative working relationships with the existing civil group networks, and build on gender expertise and experience available within these networks.

Provisional Institutions of Self-Government: Background

The Kosovo Constitutional Framework for provisional self-government was drafted mainly by international experts and approved by the SRSG of UNMIK in May 2001. It sought to fill the local-power vacuum by establishing the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government through free and fair democratic elections. The first elections for a new Assembly of Kosovo, comprised of 120 seats, were held in November 2001. A President of Kosovo was later elected by the Assembly members to represent the unity of the people of Kosovo and guarantee the democratic functioning of the PISG. For a schematic representation of the PISG structure, see Figure 5.2.

The Inter-Ministerial Group (Council) for Achieving Gender Equality and the Ministerial Gender Affairs Officers

The Inter-Ministerial Group for Achieving Gender Equality (IMG) is a governmental division established under the coordination of the Office of the Prime Minister in 2003 with the purpose of '...achieving gender equalities and equal opportunities in all flows of life' (Government of Kosovo 2003; UN 2003d, p. 4). Despite its placement within the executive branch of the provisional institutions, the group remains legally devoid of any formal advisory or executive powers. It was not included in Regulation 2001/19, which set out the structure and responsibilities of the governmental executive branch (UNMIK 2001d).

According to recent ICG report: '...the events of mid-March 2004 demonstrated, the PISG represents and enjoys the trust of Kosovo Albanian society only to a limited extent. The modest array of governing competencies UNMIK has transferred to it, and its own weaknesses - limited ability, myopic vision, and alleged venality - leave it vulnerable to being perceived by that society as a quisling, corrupt elite' (ICG 2004a, p. 2).
Figure 5.2: The Structure of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (as of December 2002)

Legislature

Assembly of Kosovo
120 seats (100 open for all parties; 20 reserved for minorities)

Assembly Committees
Committees review draft laws and make recommendations as appropriate
11 committees including Committee for Judicial, Legislative Matters and Constitutional Framework with sub-committees for Gender Equality, Petitions and Public Complaints and Missing Persons

Government: Prime Minister and Ministers
The Assembly endorses and instructs the Government
The Government may propose draft laws

Office of the Prime Minister
Incorporates Advisory Office for Good Governance, Human Rights, Equal Opportunities and Gender Equality

Ministries:
Trade, Industry  Labor, Social Welfare
Culture, Youth, Sports  Environment, Planning
Agriculture, Forestry, Rural  Health
Finance, Economy  Public Services
Transport, Post, Telecommunications  Education Science, Technology

Inter-Ministerial Group (Council) for Achieving Gender Equality and Ministerial Gender Affairs Officers

In this, Regulation 2001/19 defines the structure of the Prime Minister’s Office (providing for the Office for Good Governance, Human Rights, Equal Opportunities and Gender Issues), sets out responsibilities and functions of the nine (later ten) ministries, and limits the number of executive agencies. However, it leaves no space for any additional structures vested with executive or advisory power at the central level (UNMIK 2001d, art 2.2 and 3.1).

The existence of the IMG was legitimised in 2004 following the adoption of the Law on Gender Equality in Kosovo (Assembly of Kosovo 2004a). The law provides for the establishment of the ‘inter-ministerial council comprised of Gender Affairs Officers of the ministries’ and leaves the authority to define specific tasks and responsibilities of such a council to the Government of Kosovo (Assembly of Kosovo 2004a, art. 4.9). In this light, the mandate of the council and its functionality and degree of influence over the formulation and implementation of gender-mainstreaming policies should be assessed against its quasi-executive status and somewhat secondary position in relation to the Office for Gender Equality and the Advisory Office of Good Governance, Human Rights, Equal Opportunity and Gender.

The original structure of the council sought to incorporate representatives from the OGG, each of the ten ministries, the Office of Gender Affairs, and the involvement of the NGOs and agencies working in the field of gender. The administrative regulations outlining the structure and functions of the council reduced the participation of local civil groups to merely advisory functions. Given the fact that no restrictions on the composition and authority of the council were imposed by UNMIK, a decision to disfranchise women’s groups from the very outset, providing no decision-making authority therein, considerably undermined the Council’s credibility in the eyes of local women’s activists:

Yes, I know there is such a Council. But I do now know what it does and how it functions. We are not invited.

(Interview with JV, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

The council does not have any power or influence. It was conceived as a forum for all ministries to come together and see what they are doing and what could be done to mainstream gender. But because there is no experience or expertise, a ministry of agriculture, for example, would say ‘What has gender to do with agriculture? We have nothing to talk about at this Council!’ Of course, I know and you know that how women manage their households and how they participate in agriculture and so on – is all about gender, but there is an overwhelming lack of awareness.
The original mandate of the council included three main areas of responsibility: policy and strategy development, coordination and overseeing, and networking. The administrative regulation establishing the council, issued by the Office of the Prime Minister in 2003, provided a somewhat idealistic and extensive list of functions, including the formulation and implementation of the Kosovo-wide gender policies and the Kosovo Action Plan,70 which was perhaps the most ambitious and impracticable. At the same time, the administrative regulation failed to provide any accountability mechanisms, setting out no benchmarks against which the effectiveness and viability of the council’s work could be measured and assessed. Taken together with the fact that no specific budgetary provisions were been made in order to overcome the council’s lack of institutional and representational legitimacy, the organ can justly be perceived as a formal bureaucratic unit devoid of any agency or operational recognition. It cannot exist or endure outside of the inter-ministerial bureaucratic webs and is greatly dependent on the individual will of its members – ministerial representatives – and their readiness to commit ministerial resources towards implementing the far-reaching objectives set out in its founding document.

The problem, nevertheless, lies not only in the diffuse nature of the authority and the lack of any accountability mechanisms within the council. The inherently unknowable outcomes of any policy initiative in a complex re-construction context, provisional (by definition) and with an ever-changing variety of emerging government structures, with internal competition amongst ministries and civil groups for scarce financial and technical resources, with unpredictable budgeting processes, and with shifting imperatives of democratisation and security dictated from New York and Brussels (ICG 2004a; 2005a, UNDP in Kosovo 2004) all contribute to instability and a lack of direction amongst the council’s activities, and an inability to give gender mainstreaming the priority it requires.

The Law on Gender Equality in Kosovo also provides for the position of the Ministerial Gender Affairs Officers (MGAO) representing their ministries at the Inter-Ministerial Council for Achieving Gender Equality. Originally, this position was established by the formal request of the Prime Minister in order to ensure the efficient integration of gender issues into the work of each Ministry. The purpose of the Gender Officers is twofold: to integrate gender into the policies, programmes and activities of the Ministry, and to pro-

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70 The National Action Plan on the Achievement of Gender Equality in Kosovo was endorsed by the Kosovo government in April 2004. The Action Plan was developed during 2002-2003 with the involvement of governmental and non-governmental organisations under UNIFEM’s lead. It assesses six critical areas of concern (education, economy, politics, health and social welfare, human rights and violence against women and children and culture) and offers recommendations to address gender disparity in Kosovo (UNIFEM 2005).
mote projects and actions that would enhance the position of women. In order to fulfil these objectives, the law outlines an extensive list of Gender Officers’ responsibilities, including the collection and analysis of gender disaggregated data, the development and implementation of gender mainstreaming policies, the provision and facilitation of training courses and capacity building. A closer examination of the Law on Gender Equality reveals a surprising ‘institution-making’ logic of the law-drafters: the more ‘gender mainstreaming’ institutions – the better. However, without a sufficient share of executive authority and legally prescribed budget allocations, many of the newly created institutions, including the Inter-Ministerial Council and its Officers, inherited the ‘pre-Law’ stigma of an inability to translate policy into practice. Indeed, criticism of the Council came from the highest level – the UN Secretary General:

Despite the formal request made by the Prime Minister’s Office to the permanent secretaries, gender affairs officers were appointed only in 4 ministries out of 10.

(UN 2004b, par. 23, p. 7)

One of the interviewees also commented that

If you ask me whether I know what the Inter-Ministerial Council did or achieved – I would say ‘Nothing’. I could have replied ‘I do not know’, but because I do – I would say ‘Nothing that could have helped to place gender on ministerial agendas’

(Interview with JN, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

The document establishing the duties and responsibilities of the MGAO, outlines broad range of vaguely formulated commitments which, after a second reading, seem to be devoid of any coherent operational value. One of the paragraphs, for example, obliges the ministerial officers to ‘...ensure the introduction and proper application of appropriate gender and development principles and strategies and integrate them with ongoing practices of various sections’. A number of questions surround the meaning of ‘proper’ and ‘improper’ application, ‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’ principles and ‘ongoing practices of various sections’, exposing the remarkable superficiality of the governmental commitment to gender mainstreaming through its ministerial machineries.

Advisory Office for Good Governance, Human Rights, Equal Opportunities and Gender Equality

The Advisory Office for Good Governance, Human Rights, Equal Opportunities and Gender Equality at the Office of the Prime Minister (OGG) was set up in 2002 as a part of the

As outlined in the ‘Terms of Reference’ for the Ministerial Gender Officers issues by the Office of Prime Minister in 2004 (on file with author).

An internal governmental document, on file with the author.
PISG and as a successor to the OSCE-established Administrative Department for Democratic Government and Civil Society (Marshall and Inglis 2003, p. 139). A decision to extend the new office’s mandate by including a ‘gender’ component signified the commitment of the institution-building pillar to institutionalise gender within the emerging governance structures following the growing pressure from the UN Headquarters, including Resolution 1325 appeals, to include more women in formal decision-making mechanisms (UN 2000a). Currently, the OGG is still being supported by the OMiK, advising the Office of Prime Minister on the issues of ‘...human rights compliance, reviewing draft legislation from gender equality perspective, and facilitating the development of gender sensitive policies’ (OMIK 2004e, p. 3).

Generally, the OGG is mandated to carry out its functions at two broad levels. At the ministerial level, it is tasked to oversee and advise the Ministries in the areas of good governance, human rights, equal opportunity and gender; develop policies and issue guidelines in these areas; and review the executive branch policies, procedures, practices and draft legislation of the PISG for compliance with applicable standards and practices of good governance and equal opportunity (UNMIK 2001f, Annex 1, par C, art (i) – (iv)). At the community level, it is authorised to assist in developing and implementing public information campaigns, launch consultations with community representatives and develop consultative bodies as needed to encourage public participation in governance (UNMIK 2001f, Annex 1, par C, art (v) – (xii)). Therefore, the OGG rightly falls into the category of what Goetz has described as a typical ‘advocacy’ or ‘advisory’ unit ‘...responsible for promoting attention to gender issues and giving advice to various government units’ (Goetz 2003, p. 72).

The recent HDR for Kosovo has revealed a rather inconsistent attitude on the behalf of the office towards the implementation of its advisory mandate. According to Cyne Mahmutaj, responsible for the OGG’s gender ‘component’, the Office for Good Governance ought to be engaged in a range of policies and strategies assuming executive, rather than legally prescribed advisory capacities, including:

- Establishing civil administration and services, at the local and central level, based on international standards;
- Institutionalising gender issues and gender equality in Kosovo;
- Designing policy promoting gender equality in the civil administration;
- Improving the role and furthering the position of women in decision-making processes; and
- Creating more successful cooperation between local institutions and civil society (UNDP in Kosovo 2004, Box 5.1).
The quasi-executive/advisory role of the office has been substantially weakened by its lack of accountability mechanisms. Once the OGG proposes something or recommends changes to existing policies, there are no legally prescribed mechanisms to enforce its recommendations or to receive an explanation from ministries or respective authorities regarding how particular recommendations were or were not followed. The law does not oblige individual ministries to consult the OGG in implementing their policies; therefore the burden of monitoring each of the ten ministries tends to fall to the understaffed OGG:

It is very difficult for us to make sure our recommendations are implemented: not only do we not have such powers — to insist on implementation, we do not have sufficient resources and funds.

(Interview with Cyme Mahmutaj, female, Kosovo Albanian, OGG, Spring 2004, Kosovo)

Mandated to actively involve local civil groups and community representatives in the main areas of its concern, the OGG, according to the Pristina-based women’s groups, has been unable to develop effective mechanisms of communication and inclusion (Interviews with women’s groups representatives, Spring 2004, Kosovo). Understaffing, underfunding and a lack of decision-making powers have drastically undermined the authority of the Office and its efforts to implement its expansive mandate. In such circumstances, the involvement of existing women’s groups and gender expertise would have seemed a much better policy. Instead, since its inception in 2002, the OGG has focused on the delivery of various training initiatives, including special training programmes for the members of the women’s civil groups rather than on involving them in result-oriented gender mainstreaming initiatives. The impact of various awareness campaigns and training projects is indeed hard to measure. As one of the women’s rights activist has commented:

We do cooperate with the OGG — mostly as training partners. But there is not real policy implementation. There is no political clout behind gender initiatives and this office cannot or would not help us to gain this clout. And it is hard to see where we go with these training programmes. Gender is something easy to talk about, but it is virtually impossible to measure it.

(Interview with JN, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March – April 2004, Kosovo).

The number of training sessions conducted in Kosovo and, accordingly, the amount of money allocated by various international donors for these purposes have been increasing steadily over the past three to four years. ‘They turn Kosovo into an academy’ noted Sevdjie Ahmeti, a prominent women’s rights Pristina-based activist, commenting on the growing number of training initiatives (Interview with Sevdjie Ahmeti, March – April 2004, Kosovo).
Kosovo). The impact of these protracted region-wide training exercises, measured in terms of how knowledge is used and disseminated throughout the region, how it is translated and how it is employed to empower various groups of women has, however, never been measured or evaluated.

Notwithstanding the rather sceptical attitudes of local male politicians towards gender mainstreaming — in which it is usually perceived as a whim of local feminists funded by ‘the internationals’ — the ‘sale value’ of having governmental gender mainstreaming machinery has not been ignored. Goetz has commented on the potential gains at both international and domestic levels resulting from top-level rhetoric espousing gender equality without any actual commitment to implementing these promises. Many governments have nothing to fear from women and face no serious risks of being held accountable for their ‘failure to implement’ (Goetz 2003, p. 91). Following this logic, the Kosovo OGG swiftly proclaimed its adherence to the CEDAW, prepared an official overview of the available gender mainstreaming institutions (UNDP in Kosovo 2004, Box 5.1) and participated in many international conferences and exchange programmes. The existence of gender-mainstreaming machinery has been also perceived as a factor contributing to the implementation of the standards set out in the ‘Standards for Kosovo’, paving the way towards the long-awaited independence from Serbia and the unwanted international presence: 

Gender in Kosovo is a speech-making exercise. Everyone is making speeches. They are properly recorded, transcribed and disseminated. The UNMIK is talking about gender to demonstrate how compliant it is with whatever is required from the UN in New York. Local politicians like gender because it one of the requirements for ‘Standards’ and for the political status — it is a very juicy subject but somehow women are left out.

(Interview with JM, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

Staffed by mostly Kosovo Albanians, the OGG has been perceived by the Pristina-based women’s groups as relatively friendly towards the local women’s interests. As with the Kosovo Women’s Network, the OGG is thought to have established links downwards to the municipal level and horizontally to the PISG at the central level. These relations are usually based on political affiliation and unifying legacy of ‘resistance’:

Sometimes you have to belong to the ‘right’ party to get things moving — depends on who is sitting at the top and whose party he belongs to.

(Interview with QW, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March – April 2004, Kosovo)
However, as has been noted by many interviewees, the institutions for gender mainstreaming in Kosovo lack mechanisms for formulating, coordinating and implementing gender mainstreaming policies in close co-operation with each other. A lack of measurable results in implementing its advisory and self-assumed executive mandate could nevertheless lead to a swift local disappointment in the effectiveness of this office, withdrawal of any support from the Kosovo women’s movement and its gradual marginalisation.

UNMIK Office of Gender Affairs
The central element of UNMIK’s gender mainstreaming efforts, the Office of Gender Affairs, is located within the Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General of Civil Administration. It was established in March 2000 as the successor to the Gender Advisory Unit, an interim body, which, despite its rather short existence, was part of the SRSG’s office with direct access to the Head of Mission (Söderberg 2001, par 3.5.2.1). As Whitworth commented, ‘...the downgrading of the office signalled a downgrading of gender as a priority issue, with less direct access to the chief of mission’ (Whitworth 2004, p. 131). In September 2001, when UNMIK issued Regulation 2001/19 transferring a range of its governing responsibilities to the PSIG, the Office of Gender Affairs remained part of UNMIK as a formalised commitment to ensure the overall gender-sensitivity of the mission (UNMIK 2001d). The importance of incorporating gender units and advisers in peacekeeping operations has recently been re-affirmed by the UN Secretary-General in his Report on the full implementation of Resolution 1325 (2000) (UN 2004e, par. 31, p. 7).

Initially, the Office of Gender Affairs focused on the following three priorities: increasing the representation of women in decision-making authorities, addressing violence against women, and integrating women into the economic recovery of Kosovo (Corrin 2000, p. 9). Valur Ingimundarson, analysing whether UNMIK’s presence had any lasting impact on the empowerment of Kosovo women, has noted that although the OGA’s goals are worthy, ‘...the record is decidedly mixed’ (Ingimundarson 2003, p. 5). A number of Pristina-based Kosovo Albanian women’s groups have fiercely criticised the OGA for its failure to include local expertise and its disregard for potential alliances and opportunities for joint action. The website of the Kosovo Women’s Network73 provides a chronology of the network’s attempts to be heard by the OGA (staffed, in the words, of the KWN’s leaderships with ‘arrogant internationals’):

73 www.womencennetwork.org
...they [OGA] ignored us, they never consult us, never ask, never invite – I do not understand why it is called ‘Office for Gender Affairs’. I think it should be called ‘Office for Personal Affairs’ of those who work there.

(Interview with QQ, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

However, instead of re-thinking its policies and creating avenues for channelling the experiences and solidarity of Kosovo women, the OGA favoured the stance of ignorance and dis-attachment, where ‘...consultation with women’s organizations has been almost insultingly cursory, showing an astonishing degree of condescension and disregard for women’s perspectives on public policy’ (Goetz 2003, p. 88). Whitworth has noted in this respect that

Gender units yet again reveal the apparently inconsistent treatment that the United Nations makes of its own commitments to mainstream gender in peace operations. On the one hand, their creation seems to signal greater commitment on the part of the UN to mainstream gender issues on peace operations, but on the other hand, the UN provides very few resources to achieve their mandate...At the same time, though systematic analysis of the impact of gender units has not yet been conducted, existing reports from consultations with local people, and local women, indicate the units have had serious problems in consulting widely with local women’s groups, one of their chief mandates.

(Whitworth 2004, p. 132)

In order to fulfil its mandate of integrating a gender-based approach into the substantive work of UNMIK and, in doing so, ‘...contribute to the promotion of gender equality in Kosovo society’ (UNMIK OGA 2003, p.1), the OGA, in its own words, was given ‘...an overarching mandate that covers all the mission horizontally and plays a catalytic role’ (UNMIK OGA 2003, p.1). The degree of horizontal ‘stretch’ was, however, never clarified and the virtual absence of the OGA from official SG’s reports on UNMIK points to the very low level of ‘horizontality’ and the lack of any vertical influence held by the office.

The core functions of the office have been structured around advocacy, capacity building, the development of a comprehensive knowledge base on local gender gaps, and the promotion of minority women’s specific needs and interest. To these ends, the office, according to its annual report for 2003, participated in a number of different projects. These projects crystallised in the many self-acclaimed achievements of the OGA, summarised in Table 5.2. This table is based on two documents issued by the OGA for internal circulation: the 2003 Annual Report (UNMIK OGA 2003) and an October 2004 internal
memo, named 'UNMIK OGA places gender concerns at the top of the peacekeeping political agenda in Kosovo' (UNMIK OGA 2004). In this regard, the words of Harald Schenker, analysing the political trajectory of the March 2004 interethnic violence in Kosovo, are particularly relevant:

The impression, not only of Kosovo’s public opinion, but also of many analysts is that UNMIK is operating in a world of its own, where the hope prevails that reports about progress would generate progress.

(Schenker 2004, p. 5)

It should be noted that the process of transparent public reporting has been obstructed by internal orders classifying such reports as internal documents with restricted access; reports by senior gender advisers from peacekeeping operations in East Timor and Kosovo have not been made available in any public format (Raven-Roberts 2005, p. 58).

However, the following table, summarising the OGA’s self-proclaimed successes in mainstreaming gender, provides an insight into the persuasive lack of coordination and institutional cooperation in addressing gender inequality in Kosovo.

### Table 5.2: Evaluation of OGA’s gender mainstreaming commitments in 2003-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OGA Achievement</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frontline support to the Gender Equality Committee of the Kosovo Assembly to conceptualise and draft the Law on Gender Equality.</td>
<td>The Kosovo Law on Gender Equality was promulgated in June 2004; in the memo attached to the law submitted for the review and approval by the Assembly of Kosovo, the OGA’s secondary role is mentioned along with many other contributors to the process (Assembly of Kosovo 2004a);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in the regional conference on ‘Gender Equality Acts in the South Eastern Region’.</td>
<td>OGA presented an overview of gender-equality acts and mechanisms in Kosovo detailing contributions made by UNMIK in their establishment and consolidation. No report has been made available for general circulation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provided ‘...crucial input’ to the drafting and approval of UNMIK Regulation 2003/1 on Protection Against Domestic Violence and acted as a catalyst for the structuring of an inter-institutional public awareness campaign on gender-based violence.</td>
<td>OSCE took a lead in coordinating a domestic violence/rape awareness campaign in November – December 2003 in partnership with the KWN (OMiK 2004e); OMIK also drafted two relevant regulations: Regulation 2003/1 Amending Applicable Law on Crimes Related to Sexual Violence (UNMIK 2003c) and Regulation 2003/12 On Protection against Domestic Violence (UNMIK 2003b). OGA’s contribution to campaign against domestic violence was never acknowledged in the report, by the interviewees in March – April 2004.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OGA initiated the establishment of the Advisory Working Group on Discrimination and Harassment to investigate alleged cases of discrimination mission-wide.</td>
<td>No further details were made available; none of the interviewees was aware of this group and no information as to the results of any investigation was made public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OGA contributed to formalisation of the position of Gender Officers in ministries.</td>
<td>Recent SG report acknowledges the role of the Prime Minister’s Office in formalising this position. OGA’s contribution was not acknowledged (UN 2004b, par. 23, p. 7).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OGA established ‘UNMIK Ministerial Gender Focal Points Network’.</td>
<td>The name of the network loosely fits current political organisation of the provisional institutions in Kosovo with Ministries operating under UNMIK Regulation 2001/19, On the Executive Branch of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in Kosovo. Inter-Ministerial Group for Achieving Gender Equality (IMG) was set up as a governmental division under the coordination of the Office of the Prime Minister in 2003 and later transformed into Inter-Ministerial Council for Achieving Gender Equality. The location and authority of the OGA’s Ministerial Network is not clear; no further information on this unit was issued publicly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OGA defined and set up the Ministerial Gender Officers programme ‘...as a fundamental piece of the gender mainstreaming system in Kosovo’.</td>
<td>In launching this programme, the OGA unilaterally extended its advisory mandate, making itself responsible for setting up and, at the same time, evaluating the performance of the programme. Recent report by the UN SG have suggested that ‘...municipal gender officers have not been able to introduce gender concerns in the municipal agendas and have had limited interaction with decision makers and civil society’ (UN 2004b, par. 23, p. 7).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OGA sponsored and managed the statistical research ‘Women and Men in Kosovo’.</td>
<td>The publication of the report was announced in June 2004. No electronic copies have been made available since then (as of January 2005) via either UNMIK’s web-page (<a href="http://www.unmikonline.org">www.unmikonline.org</a>), or the web-page of the Statistical Office of Kosovo (<a href="http://www.sok-kosovo.org">www.sok-kosovo.org</a>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution towards inclusion of gender equality goals in the Standards for Kosovo (2003) and the Standards Implementation Plan (2004).</td>
<td>Neither of the two documents includes a comprehensive programme on how gender equality goals would be integrated. However, the OGA claimed that this rather fragmented incorporation of gender perspectives constituted ‘...crucial achievement for the advancement of gender equality agenda in Kosovo and a historical improvement from the previous benchmarks’ (UNMIK OGA 2003).</td>
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</table>
OGA elaborated the ‘UNMIK Implementation Plan of UNSCR 1325 for 2004-2005’

The plan was never circulated publicly. According to the OGA, the 1325 Implementation Plan seeks to translate ‘...into action the notion of gender mainstreaming as a collective responsibility for which the entire Mission is going to be held accountable’. The document fails to further elaborate on the meaning of ‘collective responsibility’ and measures to hold the entire Mission accountable for the failure to implement its gender mainstreaming agenda. In doing this, OGA, nevertheless, perceives itself as fulfilling its own ‘raison d’être managing to place UNSCR 1325 at the heart of policy making though streamlined strategies. Interestingly, the document ‘UNMIK OGA places gender concerns at the Top of the Peacekeeping Political Agenda in Kosovo’ (UNMIK OGA 2004) is written like an ode full of passionate and enthusiastic exclamations and vague terms like ‘streamlined strategies’, ‘support for the initiated dynamics’ and ‘...to reinforce synergies in the light of the gender equality related challenges deriving from the current political scenario’. At the same time, it fails to enlist concrete steps and, importantly, any means to measure the effect of the OGA’s ‘streamlined strategies’ on the position of Kosovo women within the reconstruction context.


The mandate and executive leverage of the OGA are expected to decline further with the promulgation of the Kosovo Law on Gender Equality in July 2004 and the continuing transfer of responsibilities to the local institutions of self-government. In this, the Law on Gender Equality in Kosovo authorised the establishment of a dedicated gender main-streaming machinery, creating an additional governmental agency tasked with advancing gender equality in Kosovo. The Office for Gender Equality, as a separate governmental institution, is tasked to implement and monitor the provisions of the Gender Equality law and, by this definition, exercise both executive and advisory power (Assembly of Kosovo 2004a, Section 5). However, the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo (UNMIK 2001a) contains no provisions allowing the creation of additional executive departments within the existing PSIG. In this light, the lack of support, scepticism and mistrust towards the new ‘women’s’ institution demonstrated by the male-dominated PSIG has resulted in various obstacles and barriers being erected blocking the establishment and operation of this office. By the end of 2004 (when the reference point for this study terminates), the office had not been established, resulting in a criticism offered by the UN Secretary-General in his quarterly update on Kosovo to the Security Council (UN 2005b, par. 13, p.9).
Gender Mainstreaming Machinery within the Municipal System of Self-Governance

UNMIK Regulation 2000/45, 'On Self-Government of Municipalities in Kosovo' (UNMIK 2000b) sets out that local self-government in Kosovo is mainly carried out by elected representative bodies, local Municipal Assemblies, elected by the people of the concerned municipality for a term of four years (the first term of office was set to be 2 years) on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot. There is only a one-tier system of local assemblies in Kosovo. The region is divided into 30 municipalities, where the highest-ranking local organs of authority are the Municipal Assemblies. Each municipality is considered to be a single, multi-member electoral district and Assembly members are elected based on a system of proportional representation (UNMIK 2002a, art. 5). UNMIK Regulations 2000/39 (UNMIK 2000a, Section 4) and 2002/11 (UNMIK 2002a, art. 5.5), on Municipal Elections in Kosovo obliged certified political entities to have at least 30% female candidates on their candidate lists, with at least one candidate of each gender included in each group of three candidates counting from the first candidate on the list.

The rights and duties of the local Municipal Assemblies are defined by UNMIK Regulation 2000/45; it vests municipalities with all powers not expressly reserved to the Central Authority (UNMIK). However, it fails to clearly define the nature of the relationship between the central and municipal levels of self-government (UNMIK 2000b, Section 2, article 2.1). Each Municipal Assembly is required to appoint three mandatory committees: Policy and Finance, Communities, and Mediation, with an option to appoint additional committees and decide on their competency and activities (UNMIK 2000b, Section 21).

The range of responsibilities afforded to the Municipal Assemblies is extensive. Each municipality should coordinate functions of the entire local self-government system; fulfil public, economic and social-cultural construction within the framework of their authorities, and take care of natural resources, public property and the environment. All these tasks are mandatory (UNMIK 2000b, art 3.1). Any decision of a municipality conflicting with Resolution 1244 (1999) can be rescinded by the SRSG or referred to the SRSG by UNMIK's Municipal Administrators exercising their reserved powers.

UNMIK Regulation 2000/45 does not provide any mechanisms to mainstream gender at the municipal level. In order to comply with the (nominal) commitments to promote gender equality, Regulation 2000/45 includes a standard 'non-discrimination' clause. At the same time, the law fails to conceptualise the susceptibility of local constituencies to gender mainstreaming efforts at familial and community levels; it also fails to acknowledge the role and influence of cultural and traditional practices in reinforcing discrimina-
tory gender-biased practices and customs. Reflecting on the lack of gender awareness and sensitivity at the municipal level, the 2002 OMiK Report pointed to the absence of gender-mainstreaming commitment and concluded that the gender breakdown in the Municipal Assemblies remained unsatisfactory (OMiK 2002, p. 5).

Responding to pressure from the Office of the Prime Minister, Kosovo women’s groups and the local UNIFEM office, municipal gender machinery was institutionalised through the establishment of Gender Municipal Officers, supervised by the UNMIK Office of Gender Affairs, and Committees for Gender Equality within Municipal Assemblies. The inherently weak institutional position of these machineries was conditioned by a somewhat ‘back-door’ approach to their establishment. Still within the limits of the legislative framework for self-government of municipalities in Kosovo, neither of these provisions were legitimised by UNMIK through the issuance of a specific Regulation. This, in turn, significantly undermined their authority in the eyes of local counterparts, who perceived these institutions as auxiliary and devoid of any influence as opposed to the ‘hard-core’ Committees for Policy and Finance, Communities and Mediation:

You cannot really expect local men to treat gender as they treat the issues of money or ethnic relations. It was added up and it is perceived as something that some local women, who, as they [local men] say have too much free time, will be busy with. But it is of secondary importance.

(Interview with QR, female, Kosovo Albanian, PISG, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

As of April 2004, Municipal Committees for Gender Equality (MCGE) were established in fourteen municipalities and the target was set to achieve Kosovo-wide involvement by the end of 2005 (Interview with C.M., March 2004, Kosovo). Nevertheless, the functioning of the existing committees was hampered by a number of administrative and financial setbacks. The Kosovo Consolidated Budget did not include any dedicated budget lines, and most of the municipalities lacked qualified local candidates:

We have a committee in place, we have an officer and we even managed to secure some support from the Executive office but what could we do when we have no funding? The municipal budget is tight and, in a way, local women’s groups would probably get more support from international donors. But this support is only temporary and we must think of developing a culture of gender inclusiveness. Unfortunately, this will not happen without material support.

(Interview with QT, female, Kosovo Albanian, PISG, March – April 2004, Kosovo)
Gradually, the MCGEs were forced to the margins of the Municipal Assemblies' structures, reinforcing local perceptions of gender issues as a separate, involuntarily imposed and mostly women-related domain. The MCGEs were forced to operate within male-dominated municipal environments which were often perceived by the local branches of the three main political parties '...as an arena for political manoeuvring and partisan confrontation' (Everts 2002, p. 4). The influence of informal but persuasive hierarchies dating back to the pre-1999 KLA-based lines of authority was reinforced by cultural and religious beliefs traditionally strong at the municipal level. This placed mostly female members of the committees in a situation where the very rationale for the establishment of the committee required fierce defence and explanation. The virtual non-existence of communication and support from the central level and the lack of an articulated policy framework setting the parameters of communication and collaboration with the Gender Municipal Officers contributed to the further institutional isolation of the MCGEs.

Introduced in September 2002, the Municipal Gender Officers (MGO) were expected to compensate for the previous failures of UNMIK to take advantage of the immediate post-conflict 'window of opportunity' in setting up efficient Kosovo-wide mechanisms for gender mainstreaming at both central and municipal levels. Reported by the UN Secretary General in his quarterly report to the Security Council in October 2003, the establishment of the GMO positions at the senior level of the Kosovo public service was linked with the overall regional progress in gender mainstreaming (UN 2003d, p. 4).

Initiated in 1999 by the OGA, the process of setting up Gender Focal Points (GFP) has been widely criticised for its auxiliary nature. Staffed with 'internationals' with often little previous involvement in gender issues, Gender Focal Points were perceived as an additional burdensome volunteer responsibility for international staff who were often forcefully appointed by the mere virtue of their involvement in areas of social welfare, health or education at the municipal level. The lack of a clearly defined strategy, objectives and funding, the frail cooperation with local women's groups and the lack of gender expertise on both strategic and implementation levels has resulted in disillusionment and a rejection of the GFP programme by local counterparts. This, in turn, has further damaged the already undermined reputation of the OGA in the light of the overall mission-wide disregard for the requirements set out in Resolution 1325 (2000) regarding women's involvement in post-conflict reconstruction (UN 2000a).

The introduction of the GMOs shaped and, at the same time, reflected the emerging notion of gender mainstreaming in Kosovo. It also signified a change in the policy, where the OGA responded to the growing criticism that it was non-responsive and disrespectful of local contexts and that there was a lack of visible and measurable results emerging from
the project of gender mainstreaming in Kosovo. Instead of issuing a dedicated UNMIK Regulation or amending existing legislation to legitimise the GMOs within the existing municipal structures, a decision was taken to introduce the GMOs on the basis of the existing UNMIK Regulation on municipal self-government. The OGA (acting on behalf of Pillar II for Civil Administration) and the Department of Local Administration in the Ministry of Public Services were identified as ‘implementing’ agencies tasked with ‘ensuring mandatory implementation and continuity’ of the project (UNMIK OGA 2002, p. 2). The responsibilities of the OGA (acting in its advisory, rather than executive capacity) were extended to ensure the provision of regular training, information, resources, management, guidance and supervision of the work of the MGOs. However, such a broad range of responsibilities brought wide-spread criticism, from both the PISG and the Kosovo women’s groups. The arguments put forward by the PISG and the OGG in particular, with its ‘constitutionally’ legitimised power to mainstream gender in Kosovo, concentrated on the broad range of executive powers granted to the OGA and the lack of any involvement of the provisional governmental structures. According to a high-ranking official from the OGG, this organisation was actively engaged in re-designing a Kosovo-wide Gender Focal Points programme, initially introduced by Pillar II and criticised for its local ‘insensitivity’, seeking to employ local counterparts and ensure their proximity to municipality-based civil groups:

The OGA just stepped over our efforts and I do not even think they have a mandate for this. I think they just took a chance to ‘heal’ the wound of mistrust but I believe it is too late. They have only alienated more people.

(Interview with QY, female, Kosovo Albanian, PISG, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

The OGA was also entrusted with the overall evaluation of the programme. This created a situation in which the same body was responsible for the management and evaluation of the same project, effectively depriving the PISG of its constitutional capacities, exacerbating the divide between local and international counterparts, and legitimising duplication of authority over gender mainstreaming at the regional level. The expropriation of the MGO programme by the OGA contributed to the widening of the divide between Kosovo women’s civil groups and UNMIK. In this, the programme was perceived by the Pristina-based Kosovo Women’s Network as another manifestation of UNMIK’s disregard for local capacities:

They set it up without our advice and consultation and it’s their ‘baby’. I do not think it will go down well locally as it is still perceived as ‘international’.
As with the OGG, the leadership of the Kosovo Women’s Network was routinely ignored by the OGA throughout the process of developing and setting up the MGO project. Ignored and disappointed, Pristina-based women’s groups interpreted this as yet another personal ‘insult’ overshadowing the possible positive contributions the project may have made towards gender mainstreaming at the local level. At the same time, the MGOs found more support at the municipal level, from the local women’s groups who remained in the shadow of the Pristina-based power-battles. The changes introduced by the MGOs were perceived as holding the promise of putting women’s needs and concerns forward to decision-makers.

The positive impact of the MGOs at the municipal level rests in the policy-shift mandated by the OGA in establishing this programme. The OGA sought to employ exclusively local staff, both men and women, to ensure a greater level of sustainability of the project through the direct participation of local personnel whose ‘...experience, knowledge and commitment is rooted in the local community’ (UNMIK OGA 2002, p. 2). The initial focus of the project was on establishing viable networks inclusive of local women’s groups and providing them with a legitimised avenue to reach decision-makers at both regional and central levels. The MGO project was expected to gradually reach across municipalities impacting the lives of entire communities. To this end, the MGOs were placed under the day-to-day supervision of the municipal CEO. However, the UNMIK Regulation on local self-government did not set out any clear mechanisms of supervision or power-sharing between Municipal Assembly CEOs and additional structures not explicitly authorised by the Regulation (UNMIK 2000b).

In order to overcome the accusations of ignorance of local capacities and a lack of gender expertise in managing its previous programmes, the OGA initiated a special recruitment procedure for the position of MGOs. A detailed job description referred to Resolution 1325, and required candidates to hail from Kosovo, have a diploma/qualification in the relevant areas and have a minimum of two years experience in project management. The recruitment process was completed over a period of two months and twenty-five MGOs started work on 2 January 2003. According to Cyme Mahmutaj, responsible for gender mainstreaming at the Office of Good Governance, as of March 2004:

Looking at gendered practices of political participation, Chris Corrin notes, ‘For some women, local rather than regional or central government had seemed more conducive, with policies more directly affecting women’s lives’ (Corrin 1999a, p. 175)
...30 officers were recruited and deployed in each municipality including twenty-nine women and one man.

(Interview with CM, March - April 2004, Kosovo).

Of the thirty appointed Officers, twenty-six were Albanian and four were Serbs

(US Department of State 2004, Section 5).

Dedicated budget lines for gender-mainstreaming initiatives have always been regarded as an essential condition for the sustainability and continuation of such undertakings (Goetz 2003; Rai 2003b, Staudt 2003). The GMO was the first institution allocated a specialised fund from the municipal service budget designated solely for gender affairs. As noted by the UN Secretary General in his 2004 quarterly report on the situation in Kosovo:

The inclusion of the position of Municipal Gender Officer within the Kosovo consolidated budget represents a positive step in the creation of mechanisms to promote gender mainstreaming in local governance.

(UN 2004b, par. 23, p. 7).

However, the overall implementation of the project was compromised to a certain degree by organisational and structural difficulties following the OGA’s lack of progress in placing the GMOs within the broader framework of regional gender mainstreaming. Seen as a discrete undertaking (no matter how well organised or funded) not linked to the emerging system of self-governance and Kosovo women’s groups, the GMO programme stumbled on issues of credibility, operational freedom and accountability. The programme’s mandate did envisage a broad range of responsibilities, placing GMOs in a unique position on the ‘transmission belt’ between local civil groups, local men and women, and municipal and central authorities. However, no agency or governmental structure was designated as responsible for addressing these concerns or trusted with executive powers to address them. The GMOs were only given advisory and consultative powers. This compromised their standing and position within the predominantly male municipal assemblies, where gender-biased discriminatory attitudes were beginning to take root with the re-emergence of Kosovo Albanian traditionalism (Reineck 1991; UNDP in Kosovo 2004). The fact that the position of women throughout Kosovo’s municipalities is often defined by discriminatory practices and customs means that the lack of established and workable gender-neutral rules and procedures has largely been overlooked. Two years after the launch of the programme, bitter criticism came from the highest level of authority – the UN Secretary General – suggesting that:

...municipal gender officers have not been able to introduce gender concerns in the municipal agendas and have had limited interaction with decision makers and civil society.
Commenting on proliferation of various governmental bodies with overlapping responsibilities and vaguely defined mandates, 'Kosovo Mosaic', a UNDP study into perceptions of local government and public services in Kosovo, pointed to the significant level of confusion that currently appears to exist in the public mind about which part of government is responsible for which service in Kosovo (UNDP in Kosovo 2003, Preface).

The need to institutionalise gender mainstreaming machinery and place existing institutions within a single framework governed by a long-term policy formulated and agreed to by all the major actors involved in gender-mainstreaming, and backed by adequate financial and human resources was embodied in the Law on Gender Equality in Kosovo (Assembly of Kosovo 2004a). Section 4 of this Law, 'Responsible Bodies for the Achievement of Gender equality and Their Competences' outlines institutional structures for gender mainstreaming in Kosovo at both central and local levels. Paragraphs 4.14 through 4.17 deal with local government bodies. While paragraph 4.14 sets the general obligations of the local government to promote and establish equal opportunities, paragraph 4.15 provides an outline for the gender mainstreaming machinery at the local level (Assembly of Kosovo 2004a, par. 4.14-4.17). It requires local governments to establish a special Gender Affairs Office and appoint a Gender Affairs Officer in each municipality. The law broadly defines the main responsibility of the Gender Affairs Officer as to review '...every decision taken by the local government prior to the endorsement' and, also, obliges the Department of Local Administration in the Ministry of Public Services to draft a special regulation specifying the required competencies of the Gender Affairs Officers.

Importantly however, the law is silent regarding the role, authority and responsibility of the Office of Gender Affairs. The only time the law mentions this institution is the paragraph mandating its establishment. The decision of the law drafters not to build upon existing institutions, including the Municipal Gender Officers and the Municipal Gender Committees undermines the legitimacy of the latter and further damages the perception of gender mainstreaming amongst the municipal strongholds of patriarchy.\(^75\)

**Conclusion**

The above picture of the institutional framework for gender mainstreaming in Kosovo conveys a very complex story, one full of question marks and lacking in full stops. The overall framework, initially seen as a foundation for weaving gender-equitable relations into the fabric of post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo, has so far been unable to deliver its promise. Rejected by the local women's groups as an extension of male-dominated political agendas, marginalised within political parties, and not understood and supported by the majority of the population, the institutional framework has started to show the first signs of

\(^{75}\) Commenting on proliferation of various governmental bodies with overlapping responsibilities and vaguely defined mandates, 'Kosovo Mosaic', a UNDP study into perceptions of local government and public services in Kosovo, pointed to the significant level of confusion that currently appears to exist in the public mind about which part of government is responsible for which service in Kosovo (UNDP in Kosovo 2003, Preface).
mutation into the nominal governmental structure, unable to implement transformative visions of gender equality.

With the unclear institutional and organisational links between the numerous gender mainstreaming machineries at the central and local levels of the provisional self-government, there is also a considerable lack of communication between governmental institutions and Kosovo grassroots women's groups. Some closer cooperation occurred in the run-up to the 2004 Kosovo Assembly election and as part of the Gender Equality Law consultation process, particularly at the municipal level. However, such cooperation is usually confined to isolated events, such as seminars or training sessions, usually sponsored by external donors and dedicated to specific issues.

The recently created local institutions for gender mainstreaming have often been perceived as a continuation of UNMIK's OGA agenda—and hence not adjusted to local realities and disrespectful of the local grassroots expertise. Under-resourced and understaffed, Kosovo gender mainstreaming institutions follow the general pattern of national machineries for mainstreaming gender—bureaucratic and weak compared with other institutions in terms of resources and political clout (Acuner and Kardam 2003; Rai 2003b). In this light, 'gender mainstreaming' in Kosovo has been conceptualised as a strategy of creating specific institutions—commissions, offices, focal points and bureaus—filled with mainly female staff and charged with vague gender mainstreaming mandates. As this chapter has demonstrated, legislative measures aimed at establishing complex institutional frameworks are not sufficient if not supported by sustainable implementation strategies capable of 'fueling' newly created institutions. In this light, the effectiveness and future of the regional gender mainstreaming machinery remains uncertain. The UNMIK-initiated 'institutionalisation' of gender in Kosovo remains significantly compromised by the lack of democratic processes and the lack of a culture of debate in Kosovo (UNDP in Kosovo 2004, p. 45), by the prevalence of discriminatory attitudes towards women, and by the fragmentation of civil society dominated by internationally-funded NGOs.
Chapter 6: Participation of Kosovo Albanian Women in Formal Political Institutions

Introduction

Four key areas, as suggested by Corrin (1999a, p. 192), are included as part of the overall assessment of Kosovo Albanian women's inclusion and integration into regional politics: the position of women within Kosovo Albanian political parties, women's participation in the regional electoral process, women's position within the Assembly of Kosovo and municipal assemblies, and women's movement politics. In addressing the first three issues, this chapter builds on the combination of existing statistical data on women's participation in official decision-making in Kosovo and qualitative data obtained for this study through interviews with key regional stakeholders, including members of Kosovo Albanian women's groups and Kosovo's Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. The chapter also explores the nature and impact of complex socio-economic, cultural and political contexts, setting out the boundaries and implicit limitations on various forms of women's participation in circumstances where the achievement of gender equality is recognised and legitimised as a development priority. Chapter 7, in turn, builds on this by examining the complexities of women's movement politics in Kosovo from a qualitative perspective, placing this issue within the frames of the pervasive militarisation and ethnicisation of political discourses in Kosovo.

Democracy and representation: feminist perspectives

Viewed through the prism of gender equality and taking various forms of individual authority and autonomy into account, the question of whether a democracy in which the elected representatives fall short, for various reasons, of representing the diversity of gender, ethnic and other forms of identity, can be considered a 'democracy' in the full sense of the word becomes relevant (Gabor 1999, p.8; Montgomery 2003, p.3; Haavio-Mannila 1985). As many feminist scholars have suggested, such representation requires not only the numeric inclusion of men's and women's voices and perspectives, but their inclusion in more substantive, or qualitative forms (Aseskog 2003, p. 148).

Recent debates on democratic representation, especially in the context of the 'new democracies', have mainly focused on its quantitative dimensions, drawing on the concept of 'critical mass' and often overlooking substantive representation. In this light, the achievement of 'gender equality' is limited to securing a level of women's representation at 30 - 50% of the assembly (Dahlerup 2001; Howell 2005; Mansbridge 1999). However,
the issue of qualitative or substantive representation has begun to generate a variety of opinions and views within feminist scholarship. Questions such as whether able-bodied women can represent disabled women, whether women belonging to a dominant ethnic group can act on behalf of women belonging to historically marginalised ethnic communities, or whether formalised political processes require the participation of relevant perspectives reflecting the proportion of those perspectives in the population, have been asked by feminist scholars. In this they have begun to challenge the assumption that ‘being one of us’ necessitates the promotion of ‘our’ interests (Childs 2004; Htun 2004; Mansbridge 1999, p. 529; Phillips 1995). While no ‘universal truth’ exists on the nature of representation, feminist scholarship has come to agree that having more women involved in official decision-making makes governmental policies more responsive to the interests of most, if not all, women (Dahlerup 1988; Childs 2004; Lovenduski 1999; Lovenduski 2005; Phillips 1995).

Another conceptual issue fuelling contemporary feminist debates has been the focus on the principal causes of women’s under-representation in positions of power and decision-making. Such under representation is usually linked to the unequal status of women in various societies and women’s disadvantaged positions in relation to men, which, as Sarah Bracke (2004) has noted, ‘...perpetuates that position’. The example of post-conflict political developments in Kosovo demonstrates that the UNMIK-sponsored imposition of ‘representational concessions’ (such as gender quotas or reserved seats for ethnic minorities) as a means of fostering regional ‘democratisation’, was reluctantly accepted by local ethnicity-centred male-dominated political leadership. As a result, limited ‘zones of inclusion’ for the groups in question emerged at all levels of self-governance in Kosovo (ICG 2004a; ICG 2005a; ICG 2005b; UNDP in Kosovo 2004). According to many international and some regional observers, the attitude of ‘you have your gender quota and gender equality law now’ and ‘you have your reserved seats but you preferred to boycott the election’ (interviews with JR, JS, JI, Pristina, Kosovo, March-April 2004) prevails. This happens instead of careful reflection on the factors behind the continuing deterioration of the socio-economic situation in the region, which is disproportionately affecting women and weakening women’s political participation, notwithstanding the recent introduction of gender-sensitive legislation and UNMIK’s insistence on engendering the reconstruction policies.

**Why women need to be included: arguments**

One of the questions generating debates within feminist scholarship is why women should be represented or included in official decision-making processes. Theorising inclusion as
political (and, therefore, 'constructed' as opposed to 'natural'), broadens its nature from the process of filling political vacuums with female, or, generally, under-represented candidates, to challenging a variety of socio-economic and political factors, which exclude various groups of women numerically but at the same time include them qualitatively as voiceless (or 'being acted upon', or 'silently represented') subjects of gender-biased politics (Corrin 1999; Klausen et al. 2000). Women are political in many unheralded ways and, as Kathleen Montgomery (2003, p. 3) has noted, their '...informal political activity may produce tectonic changes in attitudes towards gender roles'. However, political power and authority in democratic systems are usually implanted in formal institutions. This is especially the case in 'nation-building' contexts, where legitimate political systems and civil society are seen as corrective and development factors within the post-conflict framework of reconstruction.

Since 1999, UNMIK, fulfilling the objectives set out in Resolution 1244, has been working to organise and oversee the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government in Kosovo (UN 1999a). In this, the 'institution-building' record of UNMIK has varied, attracting criticism for its failure to meaningfully involve local capacities, for its lack of political direction, for the ethnicisation of political and economic policies, and for weak commitments to addressing the issue of Kosovo's political status (Brand 2001; Boon et al. 2001; ICG 2004a, 2005a, 2005b). Despite recent progress in formalising institutional arrangements for mainstreaming gender within the Kosovo PISG, the lack of trust and the dissipation of loyalty towards the official gender mainstreaming institutions on the part of the wider feminist and women’s rights community is pervasive: the participation of women within the official political institutions remains low throughout Kosovo, women’s groups remain largely excluded (and, increasingly, exclude themselves) from official decision-making, while the Gender Equality Office, established by the Law on Gender Equality as a special unit in charge of gender mainstreaming at the regional level, has remained inoperative nine months after the promulgation of the law. However, the content analysis of the interviewees’ accounts also reveals that against a backdrop of low levels of trust and confidence in the PISG and the international administration generally, Kosovo women perceive women’s inclusion in official decision-making: 1. As a matter of justice: women constitute half of the population in Kosovo. Therefore, they are entitled to half of the seats at all levels of public service and decision-making. This form of political 'justice' could also bring 'more legitimacy' to the PISG in Kosovo:

We are not a minority, there are more women than men in Kosovo now, whatever our education, age, social status, ethnicity is – it is our right to be represented. I refuse to give it to a macho man who only wants power.
2. As a matter of unique contribution and diversity: most of the interviewees observed that women and men had different and unique values because of their different social positions, different experiences of war, because ‘women are more peaceful’, ‘because women are better negotiators’, ‘women are better at doing things’, and because ‘women can compromise’ (interviews with Kosovo Albanian women in March – April 2004).

3. As a matter of substantive representation: women and men have different interests because of their unique social and biological roles. Accordingly, men are not capable of representing diverse groups of women. This argument relies largely on the assumption that women in official decision-making will necessarily act in women’s interests:

   Women know better what other women need. Especially in Kosovo – women and men cope and suffer with personal and social upheavals differently, women need one thing, men – the other. So it is only natural that we should have women thinking about women, men – thinking about men, and men and women together – thinking about bright future for Kosovo.

   (Interview with QO, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

Against this however, Anne Marie Goetz, analysing the role of state-based institutions in promoting gender equality, has noted that female politicians cannot be assumed to automatically to work in women’s interests; she also argued that a number of organisational and ideological pressures might limit women’s possibilities for developing sensitivity to, and acting in, women’s interests (Goetz 2003, p. 84).

4. As a matter of changing public perceptions of politics: many of the interviewees believed that increasing women’s presence at all levels of decision-making could significantly broaden social perspectives on the nature of the ‘political’. Issues such as domestic violence or arranged marriages could gain enough ‘political’ weight to be of ‘public concern’, while other issues, generally perceived as ‘public’, for example environmental degradation, become private and personal, affecting individual economic and social interests and leading to a greater public scrutiny of various governmental policies (Corrin 1996; Corrin 1999; Moore 2004).

The question of whether inclusion in political processes automatically leads to the empowerment and participation of those included and those who they represent lies at the heart of current debates on gender equality in Kosovo. Corrin (1999, p. 174), considering the issue of political participation, has noted that ‘Participation involves being heard and having what you say respected and taken into account’. Most of the interviewees in this
study voiced their concerns regarding the nature of women's representation in central and municipal assemblies. They pointed to (a) the lack of a unified voice of women capable of competing with other items on regional political agendas and (b) the limited capability of female MPs to represent and advocate for women's interests. One of the interviewees—a female Kosovo Albanian women's rights activist— noted:

Now, with all these quotas and reserved seats, we have to fight against the invisibility of women—we have to go and challenge men who just do not seem to notice us—even if there are women around. We have to fight with those women who do get elected but do not have enough courage to advocate for women's rights or find it convenient to just sit there and be silent.

(Interview with QP, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women's group, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

On the other side, while Kosovo women's groups have been excluded from official decision-making, they are believed to have considerable influence over local women and some (albeit limited) influence in areas of official decision-making. However, the content analysis of the interviewees' accounts reveals the predominance of a somewhat limited understanding of gender mainstreaming by the charismatic leaders of some of the women's groups in Kosovo, wherein 'gender mainstreaming' is perceived as a mechanism to ensure that local women of a certain 'quality' are elected or appointed to act on behalf of women and pursue a women-specific agenda. One of the main 'matriarchs' of the Kosovo Albanian women's movement commented:

It is time for us, women who have always been here—campaigning, organising, boycotting, resisting—it is time for us to organise. We have to elect 'quality' women into our assemblies—they must know what we need, what women need...we will support them but they must act for women—this is what gender mainstreaming is all about.

(Interview with JA, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women's group, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

Table 6.1 represents wider Kosovo Albanian women's opinions on women's political participation in Kosovo (Kosovar Gender Studies Center, 2005), pointing to the predominance of this rather limited definition of 'gender mainstreaming': only 36% of female respondents in this study firmly disagreed with the statement that women did not have the necessary confidence for politics, while 66% agreed that for women family life was more important than politics.
Table 6.1: Opinions Regarding the Under-Representation of Women in Politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In general, women are discriminated against in public life</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A women candidate will cost the party votes</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For women, the family is more important than a career in politics</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women do not have the necessary confidence for politics</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women do not have the necessary experience for politics</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women are not interested in politics</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties do not offer women the opportunity to get involved in politics</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsocial hours which are required in politics suit a man more than a woman</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only a man can adequately represent citizens' interests</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In general, things would be much better if there were more women in politics</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kosovar Gender Studies Center 2005, p. 41.

A significant share of respondents in this study demonstrated either a lack of awareness of the relevant issues or a degree of indecisiveness in answering the questions asked. The combined percentages for 'neither agree nor disagree' and 'do not know' answers range from 19% for the question about the unsocial hours required in politics, to 42% for the question about 'things getting much better' if there were more women in politics. Only 30.3% of women agreed that things would get better if there were more women involved; while 65.8% agreed that for women the family is more important than a career in politics. Overall, the study demonstrates the prevalence of traditional views regarding gender roles amongst Kosovo women. While nearly 50% of respondents disagreed with the statement that women are not interested in politics and that only men can adequately represent citizens' interests, only a small proportion of women saw themselves in positions of power or decision-making, expecting instead to bear the main responsibility for domestic duties and childrearing.

The issue of women’s participation within various development contexts has been attracting increasing attention from the proponents of both WID and GID analytical frame-
frameworks: being ‘represented’ does not necessarily mean being ‘heard’ and ‘listened
to’, while ‘participation’ does not always amount to ‘influence’ or ‘authority’ (Graham and
Regulska 1994). However, despite numerous differences in analytical perspectives and ap­
proaches, there is a consensus within feminist scholarship that women’s ‘invisibility’ can­
not be separated from broader interlocking systems of socio-economic and political op­
pression. Such oppression takes the form of gender inequalities, making the trajectory of
gender mainstreaming and women’s resistance to exclusion interlinked with volatile socio­
economic and political development contexts. In this light, the combination of socio­
economic, political and cultural factors affecting women’s access to formal and informal
forms of participation is unique in its complexity, structure and impact on various groups
of women and men. As a result, it remains almost impossible, analytically and methodol­
ogically, to evaluate and quantify the impact of individual factors on various groups of
men and women. What follows below is an overview of the factors in each of these broad
categories, identified by the interviewees as primary and decisive in influencing the posi­
tion of Kosovo Albanian women within the spectrum of various forms of decision-making
in Kosovo.

Women’s political inclusion: economic factors
The scale of economic problems facing post-war Kosovo has been generally identified as
one of the major detriments of the political mobilisation of women and their involvement
in official decision-making (UNDP in Kosovo 2004). Reflecting on the systematic nature
of obstacles to the participation of women in elected legislatures, Shvedova (1998, p. 30)
has distinguished between the following groups of economic factors: poverty and unem­
ployment; lack of adequate financial resources; illiteracy and limited access to education
and choice of profession; and the dual burden of domestic tasks and professional obliga­
tions.

In the last few decades, the feminisation of poverty and economic vulnerability in
Kosovo has followed the cycles of social and political oppression of Kosovo Albanians
(Bieber et al. 2003; Clark 2000; Mertus 1999). As a result, for the majority of Kosovo Al­
banians, Serbian political ‘oppression’ started to serve the role of ultimate scapegoat,
whereby the lack of economic security in Kosovo was linked to the lack of political inde­
pendence (from Serbia). The complex social processes of self-victimisation in Kosovo Al­
banian society (Mertus 1999, Reineck 1991) continue to linger in post-war Kosovo: lon­
gitudinal ‘early warning’ monitoring of public opinion and perception in Kosovo has recog­
nised that the majority of ‘Kosovars’, regardless of their ethnicity, still see the international
administration as primarily responsible for present political and economic crises, attribut-
ing only nominal levels of responsibility to the locally elected PISG and local communities (UNDP in Kosovo, 2005). Similarly, as is evident in Reineck’s study (Reineck 1991), the lack of political and personal authority of Kosovo women, and the Kosovo-wide prevalence of repressive culturally-based attitudes towards women’s roles in society and within families are often linked to the continuing economic crisis. A female interviewee, representing one of the oldest women’s groups in Kosovo, noted that

For the majority of Kosovo women – life is about survival. Not about politics. It is about how to feed the family for less than a euro per day; it’s also about a violent husband…the easiest way to fight with patriarchal traditions is to empower women economically. If she knows she could sustain – feed herself – there would be no violence, she will just go away.

(Interview with QS, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

However, experiences from other development contexts have shown that the relationship between economic, social and political empowerment is not straightforward (O’Connell 1996; Sweetman 2001, 2002). The most critical socio-economic concerns, identified by all interviewees in this study, include: the fact that increasing levels of unemployment are having a disproportionate impact on women; and the lack of social and economic infrastructure, including affordable education and healthcare systems, community centres, reliable food-suppliers and public transport. All respondents ranked the lack of employment opportunities for women as the most pressing problem in post-war Kosovo (KWN et al. 2004; UNDP in Kosovo 2004). The deteriorating economic situation has greatly limited employment opportunities available to both men and women. However, most of the interviewees commented that should any employment opportunity arise, it is a man who will win the position thanks to his position as ‘male-breadwinner’, securing control over his wife and gaining his respect and recognition from the local community. A study of the gendered nature of Kosovo employment has also identified the increasing pay gap between Kosovo men and women (DFID and UNIFEM, 2000). The lack of economic prospects, the soaring unemployment and widespread poverty have forced many women in Kosovo to enter the informal sector, accepting low pay and poor working conditions in addition to their unpaid work in the household and community. Unable to achieve economic and po-

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76 According to summer 2005 Early Warning Report (UNDP in Kosovo 2005), levels of economic and ‘subjective welfare’ pessimism among people of Kosovo stand at the levels of 70% and 85% respectively.

77 According to ‘How do women in Kosovo vote’ (Kosovar Gender Studies Center 2005, pp. 31-33) (research sample included 1005 women residing in Kosovo), only 30% of the interviewees disagreed with the statement ‘If a company must lay off some of its workers, it is better to lay off married women than men’, while 44% of the interviewees disagreed with the statement ‘It is the husband’s duty to earn money, and the wife’s duty to look after the family and household tasks’.
Political autonomy, the majority of women in Kosovo have remained excluded from the male-dominated public sphere: "...the patriarchal culture in which they live discourages them from being involved in politics" (Antic 1992, p. 177).

The first concern for everyone would be to survive: food, clothes and a roof above one's head would take priority. I am sure everyone understands that we need right political decisions and political leaders but individually women think about material things.

(Interview with QD, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women's group, March - April 2004, Kosovo)

A recent study of the political awareness of Kosovo women identified that 71% of female interviewees were concerned with the 'unsocial' hours required in politics. At the same time, no policies were put in place to introduce gender-sensitive internal procedures at the Assembly of Kosovo and municipal assemblies, for example, assemblies' sitting hours reflecting a more regular professional schedule, enabling women and men with family commitments to be able to enjoy a private life which would not be compromised by late night sittings and long-distance travel (Ross 2001, 2002).

Greater levels of women's involvement in the informal economy are correlated with the reported growing participation of Kosovo Albanian women in family-based economic activities, such as sale of the produce grown on private land-plots, running family-based grocery shops, hair-dressing salons and beauty-shops. The 2000 DFID and UNIFEM report on the economic situation and opportunities for women in Kosovo optimistically concluded that 'Contrary to previous research, women are engaged in business ventures at all levels' (DFID and UNIFEM 2000, p. xiii). However, in considering the 'economic empowerment' of women living in Kosovo, this study overlooked the crucial issue of women's access to ownership and control over land and property, credit, inheritance and natural resources, and women's role in the households' economic decision-making. Having full control of certain activities, for example, the production and sale of garments, gives woman certain degrees of economic independence - one of the decisive factors in fostering political and social activism. However, if a woman is only involved in one stage of the family-run business, such as running a grocery-shop, where premises are part of the paternal household and senior men in the family remain in charge of making financial decisions, such a separation of work and financial authority leaves woman economically dependent and powerless. This scenario of women's participation in family-run businesses is prevalent in Kosovo, leaving women economically and politically disempowered despite the growing visibility of their economic participation.
Since 1999, a number of UNMIK regulations have been adopted that have 
aimed to normalise labour relations in the region. These include provisions to tackle direct 
and indirect gender-based discrimination. However, women in Kosovo continue to face 
persistent inequality in all areas of local labour markets, making them unable to compete 
with men who are usually perceived as more skilled, mobile and flexible. UNMIK’s labour 
legislation grants women certain benefits, such as paid maternity leave and paid vacation to 
attend to sick children, which have tended to make prospective employers more reluctant 
to employ women except for jobs traditionally perceived as ‘women’s’. Besides this, 
regardless of their employer’s policies, many women are likely to withdraw voluntarily if 
they are not able to secure child-care arrangements – affordable state-subsidised kindergar­
tens are largely absent throughout Kosovo, and looking after children is traditionally per­
ceived as women’s ‘traditional’ occupation. In the context of increasing unemployment 
and the continuing economic crisis, a commonly held mindset has emerged, defending the 
right of men to work before that of women, employing a continuation of the simplistic di­
chotomy of ‘real’ men (breadwinners) and ‘real’ women (devoted housewives and moth­
ers):

    You do not expect a man in Kosovo to give up his employment and look after kids 
    – this is a joke! Maybe even some men would prefer this – they normally would not 
do it. It is considered to be each woman’s responsibility to have kids and to look af­
ter them.

    (Interview with QF, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, 
March – April 2004, Kosovo)

The situation is expected to deteriorate further due to the continuing economic cri­
sis and the unique demographic structure of Kosovo, with an excess of young unqualified 
labour supply. Accordingly, a number of issues concerning the economic status of women 
in Kosovo require urgent gender-sensitive, well-funded and monitored intervention, in­
cluding, above all, access and availability of employment, non-discriminatory labour prac­
tices and availability of child-care facilities.

Women’s political inclusion: the influence of Kosovo Albanian ‘tradi­
tionalism’

Another set of factors usually identified as decisive in affecting opportunities for women’s 
access to decision-making includes individually or communally shared perceptions of 
women’s and men’s roles in society and family, the influence of customary law, and public 
attitudes towards legitimate political power structures. Reflecting on the position of 
Kosovo women within the context of post-conflict reconstruction, Arne Piel Christensen
has pointed to the unique ‘cultural’ context and its influence on the political activism of women in Kosovo:

Balkan tradition and male dominance has so far prevented women gaining the positions they deserve and should fill in the political scene.

(Christensen 2000, p. 125)

In her comparative analysis of the factors affecting women’s access to decision-making within various national contexts, Shvedova (1998, p. 32) identified a group of ‘universal’ ideological and physiological hindrances for women entering elected legislatures, including (a) gender ideology and cultural patterns; (b) pre-determined social roles assigned to women and men; (c) women’s lack of confidence to run for elections; (d) women’s perception of politics as a ‘dirty’ game; and (e) the way in which women are portrayed in the mass media (Bouta 2004; Busby et al. 2002; Klatch 2000; Shvedova 1998). The prevalence of gender-biased traditions and views, by which most of the women in Kosovo are regarded as subordinate to men (Reineck 1991), has negatively affected women’s participation in ‘public’ life, including political and social activism. A recent study of the impact of post-war developments on Kosovo women’s political autonomy concluded that

In conditions of foreign rule, the Kosovan society developed and strengthened its tribal structure. This structure is characterised by strong ties between families tied in it, to such an extent that it often serves as a ‘fuse’ for the marriage.

(CPWC 2004, p. 12)

The mindset prevails amongst the majority of Kosovo Albanian men and, also, many Kosovo Albanian women that certain family-related conditions and responsibilities, such as pregnancy and looking after children, the sick and elderly, justify women’s absence from politics: 66% of the female respondents in a recent study of political participation of women in Kosovo agreed that for women family life was more important than politics (Kosovar Gender Studies Center 2005, p. 41). Women’s participation in economic and social life is directly shaped and affected by the demands of family, community and, as is often the case in the context of ethnicity-centred conflicts, nationalistic and militarised political discourses (Cockburn 2004; Yuval-Davis 1997).

In her anthropological study of Kosovo Albanian family life, Janet Reineck analysed Kosovo Albanian women’s close associations with the inner, closed family domains, where female and male roles ‘...are specifically [and traditionally] assigned’ (Reineck 1991, p. 26). A recent study of the voting behaviour of women in Kosovo concluded that the majority of women ‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree somewhat’ with the statement that ‘most housework is naturally the job of the woman’ (KWN et al. 2004, p.6). The prevalence of
gender-biased beliefs and practices pre-determines the range of choices available to women, including those in employment, education and professional development — some of the decisive factors influencing women’s decisions to become actively involved in formal decision-making. Mirie Rushani, analysing women’s political participation within the cultural context of the Balkans, has argued that

We should not forget that our political culture still lives on prejudice and on the patriarchal policies of the Balkans. This will not be changed except by positive acts and clear declarations of intent, and, most importantly, through a long process of socialisation aimed at building a new identity for women from the traditional role of ‘the nice bride’ and the housewife.

(Rushani 2000, p. 50)

The low socio-economic status of many Kosovo Albanian women is directly linked to the growing burden of domestic responsibilities seen as a ‘natural’ continuation of ‘traditional’ sex roles, blending together women’s ‘voluntary choice’ and ‘natural’ sex differences. The large size of a typical Kosovo Albanian family places additional burdens on women who have to work longer and harder to supply their families with their daily needs. With several generations often living under the same roof, a traditional Kosovo Albanian family is, according to Reineck, based on patrilocal residence, where a man remains in his father’s house and patriarchal authority is exercised on the basis of gender and seniority (Reineck 1991, 1993). This leaves most of the women with little or no authority to decide on their own lives within the family. Kosovo Albanian women’s ‘inherent inferiority’ serves as a justification for control. Girls are often brought up to obey elders (mostly men or, in rarer cases, older women) submitting to the authority of older family members. Reineck described a traditional rural Kosovo Albanian family, in which girls and young women are expected to stay within the confines of the house when not attending school or being engaged in some other ‘legitimate’ activity (Reineck 1991, 1993):

Yes, I could say that traditions are very strong among Kosovo Albanians. But this is not something to be ashamed of and ridiculed for. Instead of ridiculing us and reporting on the number of blood-feuds, they [UNMIK] should help us to neutralise traditions which are harmful and discriminatory and develop traditions which hold communities together. Finding the balance is difficult but they should involve local women and men; they should go out and consult.

(Interview with QJ, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

The chastity of women is highly valued and is an essential part of the traditional marriage, which is often seen as a family and communal affair, especially in times of eco-
nomic hardship, rather than an individual life-choice. The practice of arranged marriages and endogamy (marriage within the same village or community) is still widespread among Kosovo Albanians, especially in rural areas.

**Women’s political inclusion: political factors**

The third group of factors concerns institutional mechanisms and arrangements legitimising and encouraging certain types of political participation, such as the electoral system, political parties’ organisation and the availability of gender-specific mechanisms, including gender-based positive discrimination (in the form of quotas or reserved seats) (Shvedova 1998). The unique nature of the current political context in Kosovo, dominated by its unresolved political status, adds an additional dimension to the complex dynamics of various economic, cultural and political factors influencing Kosovo Albanian women’s entry into the political sphere. One of the interviewees in this study commented on the ‘double layers’ of exclusion:

Women in Kosovo are ‘the excluded within the excluded’: excluded as women from male-dominated politics, and excluded as Kosovo Albanians from UNMIK-dominated Kosovo governance.

(Interview with QK, female, Kosovo Albanian, PISG, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

As many commentators have observed, the positive impact of democratic governance, justice and respect for human rights – the development priorities for Kosovo brought in by the international administration – has been compromised by the inability of UNMIK to meaningfully involve local capacities and indigenous structures in the process of post-conflict reconstruction (Corrin 2000; Husanovic 2001, p. 271). What follows is a brief overview of the evaluation model used by Studlar and McAllister in their comparative analysis of women’s legislative representation in various national contexts (McAllister and Studlar 2002). This sets the stage for gender analysis of the emerging electoral system in Kosovo with regards to women’s political participation in official decision-making at central and municipal levels of regional self-governance.

In their evaluation model, designed to scrutinise the concept of ‘critical mass’, Studlar and McAllister included the following factors influencing women’s participation in 20 national legislatures over the course of 50 years (McAllister and Studlar 2002, pp. 239-246):

- The influence of institutional rules on the proportion of women who become elected, accounting, for example, for the favourable impact of party list propor-
tional representation system, or the fact that women are elected in greater numbers where there is less competition for seats;

- The existence of an egalitarian political culture, measured by the period of time since women were first enfranchised and the period of time since the first woman became presiding officer of women's political advancement;

- Efforts by political parties to promote women; and

- The degree of economic development, with the latter believed to positively affect women's representation.

Having evaluated a total of 1020 elections in 20 countries over the period between 1950 and 2000, Studlar and McAllister (2002, p. 243) concluded that there was '...no prima facie evidence across all of the countries that there is a critical mass'. However, they identified three major factors affecting women's representation in elected legislatures (McAllister and Studlar, pp. 245-247):

- Electoral system: compared to the systems based on electoral party lists, women's representation decreases with the use of any of the other three types of electoral systems;

- Electorate's turnout: each percentage reduction in turnout reduces women's representation by 0.14 percent net of other factors; and

- Existence of egalitarian political culture: has a strong political influence on increasing women's representation.

However, before analysing the political factors hindering Kosovo Albanian women's entry into formalised decision-making, the concept of 'critical mass', challenged by Studlar and McAllister (2002), must be analysed in relation to gender mainstreaming policies set forth in the UNMIK-brokered regional legislation.

The concept of 'Critical mass'

The content analysis of the interviewees' accounts reveals that the majority of Kosovo women's groups' representatives perceived the achievement of 'target levels' of women's representation, set out by the electoral legislation in Kosovo, to be a secondary priority to having a 'critical mass' of 'real' women – 'who are women and work for women' – in the assembly (Interview with QG, female, Kosovo Albanian, March-April 2004, Kosovo):

You can have 30% of women in the Assembly but it does not mean that they would work for women, that they would fight and push and struggle for women's rights. But you could have 15-20% of dedicated skilled women politicians and they would make bigger difference – 'critical mass' is not about numbers, it about the quality of women.
The concept of ‘critical mass’ (Dahlerup 1988; McAllister and Studlar 2002; Lovenduski and Norris 1996; Phillips 1995; Thomas 1994; Thomson 1999) requires the minimum level of women’s participation to be at least 30-35%, enabling ‘...a minority to influence the culture of the group and the outcome of discussion’ and ‘...bring substantive differences into decision-making in terms of content and priorities, as well as style and working climate’ (Gierycz 2001, p. 25). The notion of critical mass is interlinked with the analytical framework, emphasising the change in the ‘style’ of politics resulting from women’s increased representation. Viewed in this light, women parliamentarians are often expected to act in the interests of women, taking a pro-feminist stance and drawing on the ‘unique’ qualities of birthing and nurturing, responsibility, commitment, resilience and sensitivity. Rebutting this argument, Salla has challenged the ‘inherent’ pacifism of women:

The observation stemming from the discussion of pacifism and relational thinking is that women policy-makers are just as capable as their male peers of making decisions concerning the use of force, and that they resort to a variety of ethical and political justifications for doing so. Thus, it does not seem likely that merely achieving a ‘critical mass’ of women in institutional decision-making processes will be sufficient to exclude the organized use of force in resolving international conflict.

(Salla 2001, p. 78)

Sarah Childs has critically examined the widely held contention that women practice politics in ways different from those of men, rejecting confrontation and adversarial politics in favour of a co-operative and consensual style (Childs 2004, p. 180). Geared towards the essentialist understanding of gender and sex differences (Smith 2001), such expectations place a double burden on women entering male-dominated official decision-making (Mansbridge 1999, p. 637). In addition to fulfilling the same responsibilities as those of male parliamentarians (so as to avoid being labelled as ‘women’s representatives’ dealing with ‘women’s affairs’), women MPs are also expected to prove their ‘worthiness’ meeting the expectations of voters who trusted them to ‘remedy’ gender inequality and empower women. Such expectations and promises – that women would make such a difference – impose a burden on women that is not imposed on men (Miller 2001, p. 102). The concept of critical mass has often been criticised for downplaying the significance of women’s behaviour and attitudes, and the influence of environments within which women are expected to ‘make a difference’. Sarah Childs noted that critical mass arguably hides more than it reveals, failing to acknowledge that women representatives are forced to oper-
ate within gendered contexts and that their ability to effect change may well depend upon the political environment they inhabit (Childs 2004, pp. 25-26). McAllister and Studlar concluded that the concept of ‘critical mass’ had a vague and shifting meaning, as well as a surprising paucity of empirical support, ‘suffering’ from

...the individualistic fallacy – namely, the assumption that mere numbers of women, no matter what their political or ideological views, will affect legislative behaviour and public policy.

(McAllister and Studlar 2002, pp. 238, 248)

For many of the advocates of the women’s rights (Charlesworth 1994; Mandhane 2004; Schneider 1986) calling for the equal representation of men and women within all forms of decision-making, the notion of critical mass becomes somewhat obsolete in the light of the ultimate goal of achieving substantive equality. The latter is seen as a matter of universal and inalienable human rights, rather than relating to supposed ‘inherent’ positive or negative qualities differentiating men and women (Obando 2004; Olsen 1995). A recent Kosovo-wide campaign by Reforma 2004, a coalition of more than 250 Kosovo NGOs, called for the overhaul of the electoral system in Kosovo to ensure geographical representation and individual accountability of the elected representatives; this campaign focused, in one of the interviewees’ words, on ‘the quality of women in the Assembly’ (Interview with ZM, female, Kosovo Albanian, OMID, March-April 2004, Kosovo). However, the ‘quality rather than quantity’ argument, failing to scrutinise the ‘quality’ of male representatives and, broadly, challenge the underlying systems of gender-based oppression, overlooks the complex nature of political and social change. The presence of female politicians does not guarantee that the whole spectrum of women’s interests will be represented and pursued (Howell 2005, p. 24). However, the higher the proportion of women in politics, the more gender-biased conventions will be challenged. Dahlerup (2001, p. 111) concluded on this that it is not possible to precisely identify a special turning point, or critical mass, however numbers do count, even if the politicians and the public may not be aware of it.

The anti-discrimination and gender equality legislation in Kosovo guarantees gender-equitable numerical participation at all levels of self-governance and public service, and seeks to ensure the gender sensitivity of all governmental policies and programmes (Assembly of Kosovo 2004a, 2004b; UNIFEM 2003). Meanwhile, new legal mechanisms are being developed to address gender-based discrimination ‘in private’; this includes the introduction of thematic legislation, including the recently promulgated Criminal Code, the Law on Inheritance in Kosovo and other pieces of legislation. In this light, women’s representation in the Assembly of Kosovo, municipal assemblies, and the Kosovo public service should reflect the minimum legal requirements, while the energy of local women’s groups
must be directed at empowering and preparing women throughout Kosovo for taking advantage of the existing legal mechanisms, including gender-sensitive electoral rules.

**Gender-based electoral quotas**

In recent years, gender quotas have been increasingly incorporated in various forms (IDEA 2005) by various political entities throughout the world, including the so-called ‘new democracies’ – such as East Timor, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, (Ballington and Dahlerup 2005) – where persistent under-representation of women stems from the complex interplay of structural factors which require a targeted remedial approach (OMiK 2002, p. 4). Quotas for women remain one of the most efficient tools for improving women’s representation in political decision-making if such systems are properly and wisely implemented (Dahlerup 2001, p. 119). However, the main argument in support of gender-quotas – a greater presence of women in legislatures and public service that would not have occurred without special measures – is usually offset by claims that the very nature of quotas runs contradictory to the principles of equality and non-discrimination (Goetz 2003, pp. 85-86).

**Analysing the impact of the introduction of gender-based quotas in various political contexts**, Dahlerup (1998, 2005) has revealed both negative and positive results. The positive effect of quotas reveals itself through: (a) compensating for actual barriers that prevent women from political participation; (b) signifying women’s right to equal representation; (c) addressing the need for women’s experiences in political life; (d) confirming that democratic election is about representation and not educational qualifications; and (d) confronting the fact that political parties are responsible for controlling nominations and not the voters who decide who gets elected (Dahlerup 1998, pp. 94-95). However, the alleged incompatibility of quotas with the principle of equal opportunity and democratic participation is seen as its ‘negative’ dimension: (a) only voters should be able to decide who is elected; (b) politicians should not be elected because of their gender but qualification; (c) some women might not want to be elected just because they are women (Dahlerup 1998, pp. 94-95). Another argument often voiced by women’s rights activists against including specific quota-provisions into electoral legislation is that quotas can be used as a medium by which those holding power:

...could consolidate their position by forming coalitions with women from disadvantaged groups, thus fracturing the solidarity of those groups and further marginalizing the men of those disadvantaged groups. Should the latter succeed in displacing the former, then a backlash against women could be expected.

(Miller 2001, p. 102)
The content analysis of the accounts of the Kosovo Albanian women reveals a rather negative perception of the effectiveness of quotas at both central and municipal levels. In particular, the following arguments were put forward:

1. Gender quotas tend to limit rather than expand women’s participation. The majority of male politicians in Kosovo perceive the gender-based quotas imposed by UNMIK as ‘the maximum of what could be done’. In this light, the 25-30% women’s representation is considered to be an upper limit, and ideas of ‘real equality’, i.e. 50/50 representation:

   …are replaced with the imposed ‘gender rule’. If there is a limit of 30% – it will stay there. Women [politicians] would know that they would get elected anyway, while male MPs would try to push though their agendas within their 70% majority.

   (Interview with QZ, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

2. Women elected on quota-based electoral lists are often perceived and treated as ‘women’s representatives’, dealing with ‘secondary women’s affairs’ (for which there is no place in Kosovo politics until the ‘status issue’ has been successfully resolved) and, apart from some charismatic and widely respected women parliamentarians, such as Flora Brovina or Mëllihate Tërmbolli, they remain excluded from the ‘hard-core male’ politics (Interviews with JB, JF, JV, JM, Kosovo, March-April 2004);

3. Quotas intensify hostility from male politicians at various levels: within the Assembly for making it ‘weaker’; outside the Assembly from those whose seats were ‘taken’ by women, and, also, from those men who see politically active women as threatening to tradition and patriarchy (Interviews with JB, JF, JV, JM, Kosovo, March-April 2004):

   You have to understand the economic context in Kosovo: with all this international attention and funding, politics becomes a place to be for Kosovo men. Of course, some of them are not happy that 30% of the potential access to their ‘feeding ground’ is taken by women.

   (Interview with QX, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

4. Democratic parliaments and governments should be formed on the basis of merit rather than affirmative action – it is ‘…quality rather than quantity that matters’ (Interview with AJ, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March-April 2004, Kosovo).

   Despite the fact that gender-rule has been introduced in each round of municipal and assembly elections in Kosovo since 1999 – resulting in continuous debates at various levels – a broader view of the quota mechanism and its benefits has not yet entered the governmental and non-governmental discourses in Kosovo. The UNMIK-mandated introduction of gender quotas was not supported by continuous educational and awareness-
raising efforts directed at potential women candidates and male-dominated political circles. The overwhelming hostility towards what was perceived as ‘another foreign import’ undermined the legitimacy of quotas in public view. If women fail to deliver performances matching those of their male counterparts or meet the expectations of their voters and political supporters, it is usually ‘the quality of women’ to be questioned, not the ‘quality’ of men. Most of the interviewees, representing women’s groups in Kosovo, questioned the ‘quality’ of female parliamentarians, leaving male MPs and their commitment to gender equality without corresponding scrutiny:

I am surprised that women from the movement often blame ‘Assembly dolls’ for not doing anything. This is a very interesting understanding of gender – women are supposed to work for women, men for men? May be then they need to advocate for women-only parliament?

(Interview with QB, female, Kosovo Albanian, PISG, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

In considering the impact of quotas on women’s political participation, Corrin has argued that for quotas to be effective, the political atmosphere must be inclined towards the equality of men and women – not only within the women’s movement or in the parties – but within society as a whole (Corrin 1999b, p. 3).

The legitimacy of gender quotas is significantly compromised when various groups of women join their male counterparts in criticised their effectiveness and ‘fairness’. In these circumstances, female MPs who would have had less chance being elected if there was no quota provision, face a ‘double pressure’: from their male colleagues for ‘taking up’ their space, and from their female colleagues opposing the quota system at various levels. Women representing the non-governmental sector might not support quotas because of their ‘limiting’ effect, or because of the elected women’s ‘failure’ to fulfil certain expectations regarding what a ‘real woman’ could achieve in politics:

...they just sit there [in the parliament] as mannequins...useless and passive. What could they do for women in Kosovo? I’ll tell you! Nothing!

(Interview with QN, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

The content analysis of the interviewees’ accounts reveals that politically active Kosovo Albanian women remained divided along political, party and ideological lines. The absence of active co-operation and mutual efforts among women’s civil groups and women MPs at both central and municipal levels weakens the position of all groups. As noted earlier, the tandem of ‘critical mass’ and gender-based quota provision is often thought of in terms of the changes that women’s participation is capable of bringing to the male-
dominated politics. However, as Sarah Childs noted in her analysis of women's representation in Westminster:

Not all women accept gendered analysis; neither are all women representatives feminists (and feminism has multiple interpretations anyway). It is important, therefore, not to elide the substantive representation of women by feminist women representatives; women's bodies must not be confused with feminist minds.

(Childs 2004, p. 25)

Childs also calls for a more nuanced understanding of gender identity, one that is not based on a feminist/non-feminist dichotomy but incorporates the multiplicity of identities, including gender, ethnicity, sexuality, age and religion. The task of 'quantifying' the predominance or influence of one 'layer' of identity over another is challenging (Mansbridge 1999); so too is the task of quantifying substantive 'representation'. There is a growing body of literature challenging the assumptions regarding 'women participating and necessarily representing' (Chinkin, 2003; Goetz 2003; Mansbridge 1999; Rai 2003; White, 1996). Achieving descriptive representation in terms of gender by introducing gender quotas does not address the complex nature of the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation, nor does it necessarily challenge gender-biased environments in which women representatives are expected to 'represent'.

Despite the inclusion of quota provisions in regional electoral law, the criticism of Kosovo Albanian women-parliamentarians by Kosovo women's groups and the lack of clear progress in implementing the Action Plan for the Achievement of Gender Equality (UNIFEM 2003) indicates that electoral quotas are yet to contribute to engendering the reconstruction processes in Kosovo. However, this should not give the green light to the outright accusations of being 'of bad quality' or of 'a Western import we do not need here' (Interviews with representatives of Kosovo women's groups, Pristina, April 2004). It suggests that the concern with quantitative goal-setting and accountability may have detracted from the qualitative changes in political environment and patterns of thinking that must come about if the ambitious agenda of achieving gender equality in Kosovo is ever to be achieved.

**Electoral system in Kosovo: overview**

The electoral system in Kosovo is a product of the complex political manoeuvring by the international administration and local political actors seeking to maintain a fragile post-conflict interethnic accommodation while attempting to build democracy 'from the ground up' (Bieber and Sokolovic 2001; Chapman, 1991; ICG 2000, 2001; Rudolph 2004). Under the current system established by a series of UNMIK Regulations (UNMIK 2000a, 2001a,
seats in the Assembly of Kosovo and Kosovo municipal assemblies are allocated by proportional representation (PR). For the 2001 and 2004 Assembly elections, Kosovo was considered as a single, multi-member electoral district in which seats were allocated on a proportional basis (UNMIK 2004a). According to the OMiK/CEC guidelines, a special procedure, known as the Sainte-Laguë allocation formula, generally thought to increase the chances of smaller parties, was used to decide the order in which political parties were awarded seats in the Assembly (Farrell 2001; Birch 2003; Drton and Schwingenschlögl 2004; Ludwikowski 1998). The Assembly, according to the Constitutional Framework (UNMIK 2001a, par. 9.1.2 – 9.1.3), has a total of 120 members elected by secret ballot, with 100 of 120 seats distributed amongst all parties, coalitions, citizens’ initiatives and independent candidates in proportion to the number of valid votes received by them in the election. The remaining 20 seats are reserved for the additional representation of non-Albanian communities of Kosovo (Bieber 2004). They are allocated in excess of any additional seats that any ethnic group might win out of the 100 seats determined through the votes of all electors (UNMIK 2001a, par 9.1.3).

In the November 2001 and October 2004 elections to the Assembly of Kosovo, and the October 2002 Municipal elections, a system of closed party lists was used, wherein political parties determined the order in which their candidates were listed and elected, and voters cast their votes for the political party as a whole. The October 2000 Municipal election used an open list system, wherein voters expressed a preference for particular candidates, not just parties. The electoral rules for all Kosovo elections required that women comprised one-third of the candidates listed for each party, or that every third candidate on a political party list (whether closed or open) was a woman. This, combined with the existing institutional machinery for mainstreaming gender at the central and municipal levels, has placed Kosovo (descriptively) among the most gender and women-friendly regions in South Eastern Europe: Table 6.2 provides an overview of the regional ‘gender landscape’.

The electoral system in Kosovo is primarily based on the premise that a certain form of proportional representation (including introduction of closed parties’ lists, reserved seats for minorities and gender-specific requirements) increases participation, reaches out to minorities and facilitates the representation of women, therefore contributing to the democratisation of volatile political and ethnic contexts in Kosovo (Matland 1998). However, the quality of decision-making, or its ability to address the diverse socio-economic and political interests of all groups represented in the elected legislatures (including groups unrepresented by virtue of their limited influence, size, political agenda or electoral system shortcomings), does not always and solely depend on the quantity of the representatives, but also on the qualitative aspect of representation.
Table 6.2: Gender Landscape in South Eastern Europe (as of July 2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEE Countries – territories</th>
<th>Ratified Optional protocol to CEDAW</th>
<th>Equal Opportunity Act or Anti-Discrimination Law enacted</th>
<th>Gender Quota Rules</th>
<th>National Gender Equality Mechanisms</th>
<th>Ombudsmen for Gender Equality</th>
<th>Women in Decision Making Positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Enacted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYR of Macedonia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro/Serbia</td>
<td>No 78</td>
<td>No 79</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro/Kosovo</td>
<td>No 78</td>
<td>No 79</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

78 As part of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro, Kosovo has no authority to sign and ratify international treaties.
79 The Kosovo Law on Gender Equality and Anti-Discrimination Law have been promulgated by the SRSQ in 2004.
80 The establishment of a separate Ombudsperson for Gender Equality contravenes the existing legislation in Kosovo.
As Table 6.2 demonstrates, the availability of gender equality quotas at national and local levels is not a standard legislative inclusion among the countries of South Eastern Europe. In most cases, gender quotas represent an externally-imposed 'democratisation' requirement; for example, the passing of a gender quota in the electoral legislation in FYR of Macedonia was facilitated through the Stability Pact Gender Task Force. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, electoral quotas were introduced in the 1998 Electoral Law both on national and local levels following increasing pressure from local women and support from the OSCE. Table 7.2 demonstrates that the availability of gender quotas and national gender equality mechanisms at various levels of national (regional) self-governance are positively correlated with the representation of women in decision-making positions.

The introduction of electoral quotas for women at central and municipal levels has placed Kosovo ahead of many countries with long-established traditions of democratic elections in terms of gender representation (IDEA 2005). However, the lack of systematic gender-specific and gender-sensitive interventions and commitments on the part of the Assembly of Kosovo has resulted in a gradual alienation and withdrawal of support for female parliamentarians and public servants by many of Kosovo women’s groups, who have expected women representatives to act in narrowly defined ‘women’s interests’. Analysing recent developments within the women’s movement in Serbia and Montenegro, Andjelka Milić (2004, p. 81) has pointed to the persisting mutual distrust and a lack of knowledge and understanding in the relations between ‘...women activists and women’s groups as social actors on one side, and other individual and collective political actors on the local level, on the other’. Similarly, despite the existence of legally prescribed mechanisms to ensure the representation of Serbs within the PISG, their continuous boycotting of UNMIK initiatives designed to include them in regional self-governance has undermined international efforts to promote multiethnic cooperation and reconciliation, antagonising Kosovo Albanian communities throughout the region.\(^{81}\) However, as many observers have commented, an electoral system, if set up and managed properly, has proved to be an effective mechanism of increasing women’s representation in official decision-making (Dahlerup 2005; Matland 1998). In his analysis of the suitability of various electoral systems for advancing women’s representation, Matland has distinguished between the three barriers women need to overcome: (a) they need to select themselves to stand for elections; (b) they need to get selected as candidates of parties; and (c) they need to get selected by the voters

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\(^{81}\) See, for example, UN Secretary-General observing in his report to the Security Council (UN 2005a, par 11): ‘...participation by the Kosovo Serb representatives in the work of the Assembly remains uncertain; the Serbian List for Kosovo and Metohija has so far boycotted it. Kosovo Serbs have not taken up either of the two ministerial positions reserved for and offered to them, or the deputy ministerial portfolios and political advisory positions offered’.
Electoral system in Kosovo: ‘getting women in’

The system of closed party lists combined with a mandatory requirement of the inclusion of women in the political parties’ electoral lists effectively addressed two of the three potential barriers suggested by Matland to be facing Kosovo Albanian women. The prevalence of traditional gender-biased expectations for ‘real’ men and women has been partially reconciled by restricting voters’ authority to vote for individual party members. Despite the increased presence of women on parties’ lists in the 2000 Municipal elections however, only 8% of those elected were women. This points to the significant influence of traditional images of femininity and motherhood, and the Kosovo-wide lack of trust in women’s authority and political ability. The poor representation of women also demonstrates that women-voters do not always and necessarily vote for women-candidates. While no disaggregated data on the voting patterns was collected in the 2000 Municipal elections, the low levels of women’s representation points to the fact that less than 8% of female voters (based on an assumption that some male voters could cast their votes for female candidates) supported women’s candidates. Among the minority of Kosovo women who did support women’ candidates, many expected female MPs to act, as one of the interviewees described it: ‘...as a woman for women’ (Interview with JU, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March-April 2004).

The 2002 Municipal elections and the 2004 Assembly elections were conducted according to a ‘closed list’ system. However, the lack of a longitudinal perspective and the introduction of closed lists have made it problematic to evaluate the extent of change in Kosovo Albanian women’s perceptions of politics following the series of awareness campaigns organised by local women’s groups, international organisations and UNMIK. However, a recent study investigating the voting patterns and preferences of women in Kosovo has demonstrated a significant lack of political awareness exists among women in Kosovo (KWN et al. 2004; Kosovar Gender Studies Center 2005).

Delegating full authority to nominate candidates for their inclusion on closed electoral lists to the male-dominated leadership of the Kosovo political parties could prove rather detrimental in the light of the long-term impact of militarisation, ethnicisation and gender-biased attitudes. Instead, the OMiK introduced mandatory gender-specific rule, requiring political parties to include at least 33 percent of male and female candidates in the first 67 percent of candidates, distributed evenly to ensure the even representation of men.
and women. The benefits of introducing the quota system into the new political system include the relative lack of backlash against female candidates—most seats are not yet "occupied" by male "old-timers" and not guarded by the "men's club" rules and traditions (Dahlerup 1998, p. 98).

Another factor favouring the increase in the representation of Kosovo women in the Assembly of Kosovo in 2001 and 2004 was the fact that for the purposes of both elections Kosovo was treated as a single, multi-member electoral district. Analysing the advantages of various electoral systems, Matland (1998, p. 34) has noted that "The optimal system for women is likely to be when the whole country is one district". With only one electoral district—Kosovo—the number of seats assigned to this district equals the number of seats in the Assembly. In this situation, women are relieved of the task of competing with men to win the only seat in a district (as often happens in almost all majoritarian systems) or, similarly, for a limited number of seats in PR systems with several electoral districts. However, treating Kosovo as one electoral district has led to some criticism. According to "Reform 2004"—a coalition representing 250 non-governmental organisations from across Kosovo—treating Kosovo as a single, multi-member electoral district compromised the principle of geographic representation, leading to the concentration of political power in Pristina and preventing legitimate regional interests from entering the Assembly agenda (Farnsworth 2004). Interviewed in March 2004, a prominent Kosovo Albanian female activist noted:

Under the current system, some of the municipalities, despite voting like others in a general [Assembly of Kosovo] election, remain not represented at all—they have no representatives in the Assembly. Their candidates remain at the bottom of the parties' closed lists favouring high-profile candidates from Pristina.

(Interview with AQ, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women's group, March-April 2004, Kosovo)

The lack of a "rural perspective" has been quoted as a factor diminishing the legitimacy of the Assembly. However, a number of studies have also demonstrated that women tend to win more seats in urban areas than they do in rural areas (Matland 1998, pp. 84-85). If implemented, the "Reform 2004" suggestion to re-divide Kosovo into seven electoral districts and introduce PR system with open lists could significantly reduce the number of women elected to the Assembly. Furthermore, the Coalition's suggestion to re-divide Kosovo into seven electoral districts as a means to guarantee geographical representation could result in an increase in calls to re-define exiting municipal borders, possibly separating Kosovo Serb communities into mono-ethnic enclaves. Given the volatility of inter-ethnic relations in the region, this could potentially provoke another outbreak of inter-ethnic hostility, halting the on-going review of the "Standards for Kosovo" implementation.
The lack of census data and the unreliability of existing statistics make it difficult to
design a new district-based electoral system capable of reflecting post-1999 demographic
changes and tendencies:

It is quite upsetting to know that our [OMIK’s] efforts to advance Kosovo’s future
are not appreciated. By organising this election we have to meet the Standards for
Kosovo requirements: we cannot re-divide Kosovo and have another inter-ethnic
violence outbreak; we need to represent everyone and in given circumstances this
system is the most optimal. I do not understand women’s groups hostility: we are
trying to bring more women in and we are getting denounced for it.

(Interview with AW, female, Kosovo Albanian, OMIK, March – April
2004, Kosovo)

Criticising the lack of geographic representation, Reform 2004 (2004) also referred
to problems of increased hierarchy within parties, a lack of personal accountability and the
‘...selection of candidates according to the criteria of party loyalty and not based on the
quality or their electoral base’ as serious drawbacks perpetuated by the existing electoral
system. The failure to ‘uphold democracy’ was attributed solely to the international ad­
ministration, while the regional civil society took its habitual stance of victimhood – stig­
matised, ignored and rejected (Anastasijevic 2004; Mertus 1999; Reineck 1991):

During the media campaign, citizens publicly accused international governing insti­
tutions of failing to uphold democracy in Kosovo. ‘We are offended,’ Rogova\(^2\)
said. ‘We thought that this was a democracy. This just shows who really runs this
country.

(Reform 2004)

The documents issued by ‘Reform 2004’ contained no reflection on or acknow­
ledgement of the re-emerging systems of parallelism, patronage and patriarchy strongly
entrenched in both the Serbian and Albanian political systems (Levy and Llamazares 2003,
p. 8). Reflecting on the activism of Reform 2004, an ICG report has concluded that imple­
menting the suggested electoral reform could merely change the flow of client-patron rela­
tions, from centralised to regional hierarchies (ICG 2004a, p. 34). Most of the political par­
ties in Kosovo remain poorly organised, with limited membership, limited political expert­
tise and limited financial resources. They are perceived as elitist and patriarchal formations
with strong leaders and internal cliques developed around personalities rather than ideas or
political programmes (UNDP in Kosovo 2004, p. 62).

\(^2\) Igballe Rogova - Executive Director of KWN – ‘Kosova Women’s Network’
(http://www.womensnetwork.org/).
In addition to large electoral magnitudes, electoral thresholds also influence women's prospects of being elected to central and municipal legislatures (Matland 1998, p. 80). The electoral thresholds reflect the minimum percentage of votes that any party must accumulate in the election before they are eligible to win a seat (OSCE ODIHR 2004, p. 22). As a rule, higher electoral thresholds are advantageous to women's representation, as they ensure that fewer electoral votes (and consequently seats) are dispersed among smaller parties having one or two male candidates (Ballington and Matland 2004, p. 6).

However, a decision was taken by UNMIK not to introduce electoral thresholds to enable smaller political groupings (usually formed by ethnic minority groups) to secure seats in the Assembly. In the run-up to the Assembly election of 2004, three Kosovo Albanian parties dominated the political landscape – the LDK (the single most popular party amongst Albanian voters in Kosovo), the PDK and the AAK. The greatest surprise of the October 2004 elections was the 6.2% electoral gain of the new citizens' list, ORA (Zeqiri 2004, p. 2). The Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosovo gained 1.8% of electoral votes, which translated into two seats; five other parties gained one seat each. Accordingly, 93 of the 100 seats contestable in the election went to the four Kosovo Albanian political parties, which, in the absence of electoral thresholds, contributed to the enhanced quantitative representation of women in the Assembly of Kosovo.

Another factor significant in advancing women's representation in elected representative bodies is ensuring that women feel competent and capable to nominate themselves to stand in elections. The introduction of mandatory gender-based quotas occurred when most of the existing political parties in Kosovo had far fewer female party members than would have been needed to meet the quota requirement. In his analysis of the 'electoral journey' of a female candidate, Matland has observed that the first stage consists of a person deciding that she wants to run for elected office. One of the most important factors in increasing the number of women who consider running for office is the support they gain from women's groups and organisations. They provide women with experience in public settings, help build self-confidence and provide a support base for female candidates (Matland 1998, pp. 66 - 67).

In circumstances where political parties were legally required to ensure the quantitative inclusion of women in their electoral plans, the main focus became for the local women's movement and supporting international institutions to identify, mobilise and prepare prospective female candidates. Distinct from many other post-conflict contexts, the energies of the women's movement in Kosovo did not have to be dispersed on securing legitimate channels for political inclusion. These channels were provided by UNMIK by introducing gender-sensitive electoral legislation. Four pre-electoral cycles of awareness
and training campaigns were organised by various groups, including the Kosovo Women’s Network, UNIFEM, OMIK, and political parties. The Kosovo-wide advocacy campaign ‘Political Parties Work for Women’, led by the Kosovo Women’s Network, funded by OMIK and technically assisted by the STAR network and UNIFEM, sought to

...ensure that the political parties’ electoral programmes for the fall 2004 general elections take in consideration women’s concerns and perspectives in important issues that affect their lives and that of their community.

(KWN 2004)

The campaign was implemented in all 30 municipalities of Kosovo and was conducted in four phases. According to the Final Report (KWN 2004), the campaign was successfully implemented in all municipalities and included the following ‘main achievements and lessons learned’: campaign meetings took place throughout Kosovo; 1160 women and men participated in these meetings; 30 women’s advocacy groups were established; and relations between women politicians and women from the NGO sector were strengthened (KWN 2004, pp. 5-6). However, the review of political platforms of the entities running in October 2004 elections revealed an obvious lack of gender perspectives in all of the key areas highlighted in the programme overviews: youth and education, economic development, health and social issues, rights and interests of communities, and return of refugees. The emphasis was placed on ‘strategic issues’: the economic and ethnic survival of the ‘nation’, and the establishment of statehood independent of Serbia and UNMIK.

Commenting on the gender-sensitivity of political parties’ platforms, Kathleen Montgomery has argued that male dominated party hierarchies often reduce women’s issues and concerns to a set of consumer demands. Women are encouraged to wait for a winning party to improve women’s economic standing and relieve their dual burdens with a wider availability of consumer goods (Montgomery 2003, p. 4).

The majority of female interviewees in this study perceived the economic recovery of Kosovo as a key factor in securing women’s economic, social and political rights. However, the economic survival of Kosovo, in the eyes of the Kosovo Albanian majority, hinges on the termination of the international protectorate and full independence from Serbia. ‘Making Kosovo independent’ permeated agendas and programmes of nearly all political parties in Kosovo, however only few have developed party programmes on Kosovo’s extensive economic and socio-political programmes (Corrin 2002, p. 102).

83 Commenting on political parties in Kosovo, Kim and Woehrel (2003, p. 7) note, ‘Most of the parties running in the election differed little from each other on ideological grounds, and are based more on personal loyalties and clan and regional affiliations’.
‘Making life better for women in Kosovo’ became contingent on securing full independence for Kosovo – a condition for which Kosovo Albanian women were once mobilised to support the struggle of many Kosovo Albanian men against Serbian oppression. However, with the establishment of UNMIK, the very movements and political constituencies that were once strengthened by women marginalised women’s issues as soon as the men who had led the anti-Serbian resistance movement assumed ‘legitimate’ positions of power recognised by the UN and the international community. With the wider projects of ‘democracy-building’ and securing independence for Kosovo managed by the male-dominated political elites supported by UNMIK, Kosovo Albanian women were mostly left out and expected to reassume their ‘natural’ responsibility for the private sphere.

Political programmes of the 32 entities intending to take part in the October 2004 Assembly elections were published by OMiK to help voters make well-informed decisions (OMiK 2004). Table 6.3 provides a comparative analysis of the ‘gender sensitivity’ of the political programmes in the 2001 and 2004 Assembly elections. Of the 26 political entities included in the 2001 electoral ballots, only ten (or 38%) included gender or women-specific statements in their political programmes. Of these ten entities, only 5 (or 50%) secured representation in the Assembly of Kosovo, winning 38 seats in total. These included two of the four electoral ‘leaders’ – the AAK, advocating for a ‘bigger role for women in the society’ gained 8 seats, and the PDK, advocating for the ‘emancipation of women’, gained 26 seats. In the 2004 Assembly Elections, only eleven of the 33 registered political entities (or 33%) included gender or women-specific statements in their political programmes. In addition, promises of a ‘stable family’ and a ‘fight against prostitution’ were included in the programmes of the AAK and another independent candidate. Of the eleven ‘gender-friendly’ entities, only four gained representation in the 2004 Assembly of Kosovo, securing four seats in total. None of the four electoral leaders, who won the majority of Assembly seats (AAK, LDK, PDK and ORA – who together won 93 seats in total) prioritised gender or a women-specific agenda in their political programmes. Interestingly, the promise for a ‘bigger role for women in the society’ of the AAK’s 2001 political agenda was replaced with a promise of a ‘stable family’, while the ‘emancipation of women’ ceased to be a political priority for the Democratic Party of Kosovo; this party secured increased representation in the 2004 Assembly (from 26 seats in 2001 to 30 seats in 2004).

You will be able to see subtle differences in political programmes. Now, when parties are getting more and more stable and established, they do not need to prove to UNMIK that they are supporting gender and women’s emancipation. They cannot be stopped from taking part in the election just because instead of emancipation
they are looking to 're-establish family values'. However, one has to ask what
the family values among Kosovo Albanians are and if they are emancipatory?

(Interview with AR, female, Kosovo Albanian, OMIK, March – April 2004,
Kosovo)

The gender balance of political leadership reflects the general under-representation
of women in elected office and political parties in Kosovo. Of the 26 political entities in­
cluded in the 2001 electoral ballots only one – Coalition ‘Return’ – was lead by a women;
in the 2004 Elections there was again a single female leader – the leader of the Democratic
Alternative of Kosovo – a political group which did not manage to secure any representa­
tion. However, the overall percentage decreased from 3.8% in 2001 to 3.1% in 2004 due to
the larger pool of political entities nominated for the 2004 Election.
### Table 6.3: Political Parties in 2001 and 2004 Elections to the Assembly of Kosovo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the Party</th>
<th>2001 Assembly Election</th>
<th>2004 Assembly Election (100 'regular seats')</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender/Woman-specific provisions</td>
<td>Gender of the leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAK (Alliance for the Future of Kosovo)</td>
<td>'Bigger role for women in the society'</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADK (Democratic Alternative of Kosovo)</td>
<td>Founded in 2004</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belal Rate (Independent Candidate)</td>
<td>Did not participate</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BK (National Front)</td>
<td>'Respecting family as a pillar of the development of the nation'</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSHAK (Bosnian Party of Democratic Action of Kosovo)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition ‘VAKAT’</td>
<td>Founded in 2004</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition ‘Vatan’</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition Return</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fund Ramiqi (Independent Candidate)</td>
<td>Did not participate</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIG (Citizens Initiative Gora)</td>
<td>Political party since 2002</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIS (Citizens Initiative ‘Serbia’)</td>
<td>Established in 2000 in Serbia, registered for the Assembly election in 2004</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IQSKD (Citizens’ Initiative Democratic National Front)</td>
<td>Did not participate</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IQK (Citizen’s Initiative of Kosovo)</td>
<td>'Brings together citizens irrespective of gender'</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table provides an overview of the political parties in Kosovo during the 2001 and 2004 elections, detailing their gender-specific provisions, the gender of the leader, and their performance in terms of seats. Some parties did not participate in the elections.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>2001 Assembly Election</th>
<th>2004 Assembly Election (100 regular seats)</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LDK (Democratic League of Kosovo)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KS (Kosovo-Serbia Movement)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPK (People's Movement of Kosovo)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPA (Citizens List)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDK (Democratic Ashkali Party)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>rocks in educational systems*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDK (Democratic Party of Kosovo)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDASR (Ashkali Democratic Party of Kosovo)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDK (Citizens' Party of Kosovo)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGK (The Green Party of Kosovo)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLP (Liberal Party of Kosovo)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNL (National Democratic Party)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNL (National Liberal Party of Kosovo)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP (New Party of Kosovo)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Equal opportunities, illegal trafficking, development of the industrial sector, especially of women's rights.

- Did not participate
- Male
- Female
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/Individual</th>
<th>2001 Assembly Election</th>
<th>2004 Assembly Election (100 ‘regular seats’)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PSDK (Social Democratic Party of Kosovo)</td>
<td>Male 0</td>
<td>Female 0.31 Male 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSHDK (Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosovo)</td>
<td>Male 1 No</td>
<td>Male 1.80 Male 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramë Dreshaj (Independent Candidate)</td>
<td>Did not participate</td>
<td>‘Fighting prostitution’ Male 0.04 Male 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riza Ljuka (Independent Candidate)</td>
<td>Did not participate</td>
<td>No Male 0.09 No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDA (Party of Democratic Action)</td>
<td>Participated within ‘Vatan’ coalition</td>
<td>‘Equal rights regardless of gender’ Male 0.37 Male 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLKM (Serbian List for Kosovo and Metohija)</td>
<td>Did not participate</td>
<td>No Male 0.20 No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UD (Democratic Union)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Male 0.39 Male 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIKOMB (Albanian Party of National Unity)</td>
<td>Gainful 1 seat as a part of AAK</td>
<td>No Male 0.38 No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xhevdet Rexhaj (Independent Candidate)</td>
<td>‘Everyone treated equally regardless of gender’ Male 0 No</td>
<td>Male 0.16 No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xim Cetta (Independent Candidate)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Male 0 Did not participate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by Kiril Sharapov based on the information available from Central Election Commission of Kosovo, OMiK and Statistical Office of Kosovo.
Einhorn and Sever (2003) have commented that the needs arising under different political regimes and social and historical contexts are different, as are the political identities assumed in order to address them. While many Kosovo Albanian women voluntarily preferred to move away from official politics, the overall marginalisation of women’s issues by the main political parties in Kosovo appears also linked to the compulsory introduction of gender quotas and UNMIK’s gender mainstreaming rhetoric. As one of the female interviewees representing the Kosovo PISG commented:

...attitudes like ‘you have gender quotas now, you have your laws [gender and anti-discrimination] now. What else?’ started to prevail.

(Interview with AT, female, Kosovo Albanian, PISG, March – April 2004, Kosovo).

With the introduction of gender-specific electoral provisions and a closed list PR system of voting, women gained 35 of the 120 seats (29%) in the 2004 Kosovo Assembly election. However, local women’s groups continued to criticise UNMIK for the imposition of a ‘westernised’ electoral system as ‘insensitive to the local needs and concerns’, and women MPs for ‘ignoring women’s needs and concerns’ (Interview with JW, JF, JD, Kosovo, March – April 2004). Content analysis of the interviewees’ accounts and recent research into voting behaviour of Kosovo women (KWN et al. 2004, Kosovo Gender Studies Center 2005) reveals a certain degree of reluctance on the part of the women’s movement and its leadership to evaluate and assess its own commitment to the process of gendering official decision-making in Kosovo, so that gender mainstreaming through all areas of democratic governance does not become an exclusive responsibility of the international administration and women MPs, but also of the Kosovo Albanian male politicians and the women’s movement itself. Commenting on the impact of ‘institutional advantages’ provided by certain electoral structures, Matland has underlined the importance of women within individual parties and within society as a whole becoming active and effective voices; if the forces interested in women’s participation and representation are not effectively organised, the electoral system will have only limited effect (Matland 1998, p. 85).

The presence of UNMIK as a lead agency in organising and managing the processes of post-conflict reconstruction in the region has significantly contributed to the legitimacy of ‘gender mainstreaming’ as a development priority. Not always translated into inclusive and effective mainstreaming policies, it has nonetheless resulted in the prompt

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84 In this light, gender mainstreaming should not be confused with pursuing exclusively women’s or feminist agenda, while ‘women’s movement’ should not be understand as a limited group of Pristina-based women’s organisations.
introduction of various institutional mechanisms, including a gender-sensitive electoral system. In this light, the question should not so much be ‘Why does gender inequality prevail in post-war Kosovo?’ but rather ‘To what extent were Kosovo Albanian men and women (not only women’s groups and activists) ready, willing and organised to translate the ideas of gender equality into emerging political and socio-economic institutions?’ The conclusions drawn in recent studies conducted by Kosovo Albanian women’s organisations have demonstrated that the majority of Kosovo Albanian women either preferred or were forced to stay away from ‘political life’, despite existing electoral mechanisms supplemented by a number of awareness and training campaigns (KWN et al. 2004, Kosovo Gender Studies Center 2005). Therefore, it is essential for local women’s groups to direct their expertise and experience towards the more active engagement of women, especially in rural areas, into political activism. This cannot be achieved, however, without educating and involving local and ‘international’ men both as trainers and as target audiences, challenging existing gender-biased stereotypes and attitudes.

**Women’s representation: the Assembly of Kosovo and the central level of self-governance in Kosovo**

In the 2004 Assembly election, 35 women were elected to the 120-seat Assembly of Kosovo following the re-introduction of the ‘gender requirement’ for all political parties to include an equal share of male and female candidates (at least 33%) in the first 67% of the candidates on the parties’ electoral lists. Table 6.4 provides a comparative perspective on gender-representation in the 2001 and 2004 elections to the Assembly of Kosovo.\(^\text{85}\)

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>The Assembly of Kosovo Elections 2004</th>
<th>The Assembly of Kosovo Elections 2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of seats</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAK (Alliance for the Future of Kosovo)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSKDAK (Bosniak Party for Democratic Action of Kosovo)</td>
<td>Did not participate / did not gain any seats</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition ‘VAKAT’</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition ‘Vatan’</td>
<td>Did not participate / did not gain any seats</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIIG (Citizens Initiative Goraji)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIDS (Citizens Initiative ‘Serbia’)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRDK (New Democratic Initiative of Kosovo)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDTP (Kosovo Democratic Turkish Party)</td>
<td>Did not participate / did not gain any seats</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KP (Coalition ‘Return’)</td>
<td>Did not participate / did not gain any seats</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDK (Democratic League of Kosovo)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LKCK (National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo)</td>
<td>Did not participate / did not gain any seats</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPK (People’s Movement of Kosovo)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORA (Citizens’ List)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD (Justice Party)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDAK (Democratic Ashkali Party of Kosovo)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDAK (Democratic Ashkali Democratic Party of Kosovo)</td>
<td>Did not participate / did not gain any seats</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDK (Democratic Party of Kosovo)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLK (Liberal Party of Kosovo)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREBK (United Roma Party of Kosovo)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSHDK (Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosovo)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDA (Party of Democratic Action)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJKM (Serbian List for Kosovo and Metohija)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by Kiril Sharapov based on the information available from CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION 2004; OMiK 2004b;
The main "contributor" towards women's representation in both 2001 and 2004 elections was one of the three main Kosovo Albanian political parties – the Democratic League of Kosovo. In 2001 and 2004, the party won 45.4% of the popular vote, or 47 out of the 100 non-reserved seats in the Assembly of Kosovo; 15 of these 47 seats were won by the female candidates. The Democratic Party of Kosovo, the second largest political party in Kosovo, won 28.9% of the popular vote, securing representation for 10 female candidates – a two-seat increase from their result in the 2001 Elections, when their overall number of seats stood at 26, with 8 won by female candidates. The Alliance for the Future of Kosovo secured 9 seats overall, with 3 seats won by their female members. Overall, the three major Kosovo Albanian political parties secured 84 out of the 100 non-reserved seats, including 28 seats won by female candidates; this compares to 81 out of the 100 non-reserved seats in the 2001 election, when female representatives of these three parties won 25 seats. The total number of women, including those of smaller political parties and those elected as part of the 20 seats reserved for ethnic minorities, increased from 34 in 2001 to 35 in the 2004 elections. These results reflect the overarching impact of the gender quota requirement, wherein steady levels of women's representation are legislatively secured and do not reflect the overall "quota-free" voting preferences of Kosovo Albanian electorate:

It is hard for us to judge how many people in Kosovo really support women's candidates. We only had two elections to the Assembly and both had a gender-quota provision. So it is not possible to analyse the profile: how many men and women and in which municipalities would have supported women even without the quota requirement.

(Interview with AY, female, Kosovo Albanian, OMIK, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

The high nominal levels of the inclusion of women in Kosovo's decision-making bodies have had a positive influence on a number of quantitative 'development indices', including the regional 'gender empowerment measure', or GEM. This is a composite index used by the UN's Development Programme to measure gender inequality in three basic dimensions of empowerment – economic participation and decision-making, political participation and decision-making, and power over economic resources (UNDP 2004, pp. 314-317). The current GEM of Kosovo (0.465) places it in the high human development category for this indicator, just above Romania, ranked 53rd, and below Chile, ranked 52nd (UNDP in Kosovo 2004, p. 20). However, apart from the percentage of parliamentary seats allocated to women in Kosovo, all other components of the GEM are worse than those in Chile and Romania (ibid).
The somewhat restrictive nature of a quantitative aggregate-based approach can be partially reconciled by introducing additional sets of corresponding quantitative indices, or quantitative disaggregating, as suggested by the HDR. However, the major qualitative forces behind gender inequality and various forms of gender-based disempowerment, such as the volatile political situation and the militarisation and ethnicisation of the society are often treated as a logical continuation -- rather than a contributing factor -- to the low levels of women's economic and political participation (Whitworth 2004). Kathleen Staudt has noted in this respect:

...these quantitative scores [human development, from sex dis-aggregation to empowerment (the GDI and GEM)] still leave us with gaps in understanding gender inequality in ways that are difficult to reduce to numbers.

(Staudt 2003, p. 41)

In the light of the mandatory nature of electoral rule, making political parties' 'electoral eligibility' contingent upon their ability to attract a certain number of female candidates, a further qualitative analysis of motivations and 'political journeys' of female candidates who ran for office in 2001 and 2004 becomes challenging. However, the increased representation of women within the elected Assembly of Kosovo must be considered in the context of women's persistent under-representation within internal structures of regional political parties. A recent study of the voting patterns of Kosovo women reveals that only 7.4% of female respondents claimed to be members of a political party (Kosovar Gender Studies Center 2005, p. 23). Valur Ingimundarson (2003), in his overview of Kosovo women's political participation in the immediate aftermath of the NATO-campaign, noted that the number of female members in political parties rarely exceeds 15-20%, while in some cases it may drop to 3-5%. The 2000 Report by the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHFHR 2000, p. 514) noted that only five women in Kosovo held leading positions in political parties in 1999-2000. The 2004 HDR for Kosovo acknowledged that the predominance of men within the internal structures of the three largest political parties in Kosovo was also evident. The LDK and AAK had around 20% of women within their leadership, while the PDK had only 10%. No women held any top posts in any party represented in the 2004 Assembly (UNDP in Kosovo 2004, p. 63). In the 'parallel' 1998 Kosovo parliament (not recognised by the Serbian authorities), women gained only 8 seats of the available 180 (or 4.4%) (Troebst 1998), making up '...only a handful of those in power-wielding positions in Kosovo' (Brown 1998, p. 3). Editah Tahiri, a female MP from Kosovo, commented in October 2000 that of approximately 30 political parties in Kosovo only two leaders were women, while the participation of women 'in boards of political parties' was minimal (Tahiri 2000, p. 26).
The presence of women in all legislative bodies in Kosovo, including the Assemblies of Kosovo elected in 2001 and 2004, and the municipal assemblies of 2000 and 2002, has reflected only the minimum legal requirements for gender representation in electoral lists. Such requirements were introduced by OMIK in order to prevent a significant blow to Kosovo women’s political activism during the early stages of post-conflict reconstruction and to politically engage women at the municipal level, generally perceived as more ‘women-friendly’ than the ‘higher echelons’ of Pristina-based politics. Following the rather disappointing (in terms of the representation of women), results of the 2000 Municipal Elections, the Election Department of OMIK introduced a ‘closed lists’ rule in addition to the gender-requirement (without consulting local opinion). Satisfied with the increased levels of representation gained by women in the 2001 Kosovo Assembly Elections, OMIK adopted the ‘closed lists gender requirement’ scheme as a preferred model for the upcoming 2002 Municipal Elections. The OMIK report ‘On the gender situation in Kosovo’, published in 2002, noted that the combination of a gender requirement with a closed list ballot resulted in a total of 28% of seats being won by women in the 2001 Kosovo-wide election (OMiK 2002, p. 5). This enabled the OMIK to adopt a closed list ballot in the 2002 Municipal Election to ‘... garner the fullest benefits of gender requirement’ (OMiK 2002, p. 5).

Another electoral rule introduced by OMIK in 2001, in order to negate some of the hostile attitudes expressed by many Kosovo Albanian male politicians regarding their ‘loss’ of parliamentary seats to women, was a requirement that any seat vacated by a woman be filled by a female replacement. This policy was adopted in response to the 2000 Municipal Election experience, in which a number of women resigned their seats post-election in favour of their male colleagues. However, the male-dominated leaderships of all the major political parties complained that OMiK’s ‘engendered’ electoral system significantly compromised the very ‘democratic latitude’ of the political process, and that the gender quota was a standard imposed by international officials which was not applied in Western democracies and for which Kosovo was unready (ICG 2001, p. 5). At resent, the representation of Kosovo Albanian women in decision-making structures is generally linked to the ‘gender requirement’, where female politicians are largely perceived as mere numbers rather than influential policy-makers. A common maxim of Albanian culture—that ‘Women have long hair, and short minds’—encapsulates the traditional view of women held by many Kosovo Albanian men and women (UNDP in Kosovo 2004, p. 62).

Female MPs in Kosovo remain largely ‘invisible’, lacking influence within the regional political arenas. A recent study of the voting patterns of women in Kosovo has revealed that only 22.1% of the female respondents were aware of the current levels of women’s representation in the Assembly of Kosovo; 19.7% claimed that women com-
prised only 15% of parliamentarians – the lowest percentage offered on the question-
naire (Kosovar Gender Studies Center, 2005, p. 28). According to the same study, the main
source of information for women in Kosovo was the television (79.3%), followed by family
conversations (8.4%), the radio (4.4%), discussions outside the family (3.1%) and
newspapers (2.6%) (Kosovar Gender Studies Center, 2005, p. 25). No reliable research has
been conducted examining the role of the media in influencing public opinion on the role
of women in post-conflict Kosovo. However, the UNDP in Kosovo has pointed to a persist­
tent gender bias in pre-election media coverage: in the run-up to the 2002 municipal elec­
tions, only 24 newspaper articles out of a total of 3,238 published in 10 daily and weekly
papers in Kosovo focused exclusively on the activities of women politicians (UNDP in
Kosovo, p. 62):

I have never seen more satellite dishes in my life before coming to Pristina. Every­
one has them and it seems that TV does play a role in people’s lives. Even in re­
move areas, many families have a TV bought with the remittances from abroad.
However, it is not used as a medium to raise awareness. Instead of soap operas
even on local channals, they should screen documentaries about women, local re­
ports about locals taking authority in their hands. I do not understand why it is not
happening.

(Interview with AU, female, international, OMIK, March – April 2004,
Kosovo)

The lack of visibility of female politicians in the media in Kosovo echoes women’s
under-representation within the leadership of the parliamentary committees. As Table 6.5
suggests, of the 130 positions in the 11 Assembly committees, 94 (or 72%) are filled by
men and 36 (or 28%) are filled by women (some women sit on several committees, there­
fore ‘committee positions’ rather than individuals were included into the analysis). Such a
ratio generally reflects the overall gender balance of the 2004 Assembly – 71% male and
29% female. However, the situation changes within the leadership of the committees: of
the 32 chairperson/vice-chairpersons of the 11 existing Assembly committees, 25 (or 78%)
are filled with men and only 7 (or 22%) with women, occupying predominantly ‘vice­
chairperson’ positions. The only chairperson positions occupied by women are those of the
Committee for Health, Work and Social Welfare and the Committee for Public Services,
Local Administration and Media.
Table 6.5: Assembly of Kosovo Committees: gender representation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assembly Committees</th>
<th>Committee</th>
<th>Committee</th>
<th>Committee members</th>
<th>Total for the Committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td>1st Vice</td>
<td>2nd Vice</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee for Budget and Finance</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee for Community Rights and Interests and for Return</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee for Judicial, Legislative Matters and Constitutional Framework with sub committees for Gender Equality, Petitions and Public Complaints and Missing Persons</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee for International Cooperation and EU Integration</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee for Education, Science, Technology, Culture, Youth and Sports</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee for Economy, Trade, Industry, Electricity, Transport and Telecommunication</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee for Agriculture, Forestry, Rural Development, Environment and Spatial Planning</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee for Health, Work and Social Welfare</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee for Public Services, Local Administration and Media</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee for Preparedness and Emergency</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee for the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, committee positions</td>
<td>9 (m)/ 2 (f)</td>
<td>9 (m)/ 2 (f)</td>
<td>7 (m)/3 (f)</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by Kiril Sharapov based on the information available from the web-site of the Assembly of Kosovo [http://www.assembly-kosova.org](http://www.assembly-kosova.org)
In terms of their functional roles, women comprise the majority of the ‘traditionally female’ Committee for Health, Work and Social Welfare, including the Chairperson and the Vice-Chairperson, and remain least represented within the ‘traditionally male’ Committees for the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, Agriculture and International Cooperation.

The representation of women weakens significantly outside the safe ‘gender-quota’ zones, namely within the provisional government and public service, as Table 6.6 demonstrates. No comprehensive data has been made available by UNMIK on the involvement of local and ‘international’ women within UNMIK’s ‘pillars’, or within the civilian police and KFOR’s military contingents. Further attempts to obtain gender-disaggregated employment data from UNMIK have been unsuccessful, with the most common excuse being that that data was not available or was classified. The 2003 Report by the UN Secretary General acknowledged the lack of comprehensive data on the participation of women in the civil service (UN 2003a, par 14, p. 3). The only available data are information on gender balance within the Kosovo Police Service, where women comprise about 16% of the total staff. However, Fitzsimmons (2005, p. 192) has noted in this respect that despite the KPS target ratio being 20% women, the international community has ‘...neglected to institutionalise any mechanisms that would protect women officers from being sidelined into the low-status policing areas of personnel, traffic, and administration’. The table below demonstrates an apparent under-representation of women within the decision-making structures in Kosovo, ranging from 3% at the level of regional mayors to the 22% and 29% gender-quota secured representation within the municipal and Kosovo assemblies respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>number of</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>number of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent Secretaries</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of Parliament</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chair of parliamentary committees</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayors</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of Municipal Assemblies</td>
<td>1172</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>910</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The 2004 Kosovo HDR concluded that the quantitative data available points to the fact that the political environment in Kosovo is dominated by men. Although this does not mean that local women lack leadership capacities, Kosovo Albanian culture and mentalities favour men in most social issues, and especially in politics. Despite the existence of ‘positive action’ political mechanisms, women continue to face challenges and difficulties
entering the political sphere due to traditional, historical and cultural biases (UNDP in Kosovo 2004, p. 63). The continuous reform of the justice system in Kosovo has not resulted in increased representation of women in the regional prosecution and judiciary. Most of the staff were appointed between 1999 and 2001, and remain persons who practised in Kosovo before 1989. Of the 186 judges in Kosovo, only 34 (or 18%) were women as of 2002 (OMiK 2002, p. 4).

In many Kosovo municipalities the judiciary remains dominated by men. Of the 27 municipalities for which data on judicial appointments is available, only 23 had municipality-based judges, out of which only 11 (less than 50%) had female judges. Table 6.7 summarises the position of Kosovo women within the provincial decision-making and judiciary. The highest number of female judges is registered for Mitrovica / Mitrovicë (12 men and 5 women), Leposavic / Leposaviq (no men and 2 women) and Vushtrri / Vučitrn (5 men, 4 women). The May 2005 Report of the UN Secretary General on UNMIK confirmed that women constituted only 26.5% of judges and 16.5% of prosecutors in Kosovo, despite a vigorous outreach and educational effort by the international administration and local groups (2005b, par. 26).

Women's representation: municipal assemblies and municipal level of self-governance in Kosovo

The municipalities in Kosovo were the first to embrace the legislative requirement to have a percentage of women in electoral lists, marking this in the run-up to the Municipal election in 2001. In the immediate aftermath of the NATO-campaign and the arrival of UNMIK, no legitimate local governance structures existed at the municipal level. This offered an opportunity to introduce gender mainstreaming as one of the founding principles integral to the development of the newly established institutions at the level of municipal governance. In this, research has shown that women tend to be more interested in and feel more empowered by local democracy, while men are more interested in national politics and tend to identify with broader political issues (Andersen and Siim 2004, p. 12). The recent UNDP study of public perceptions of local government and public services in Kosovo underlined the importance of bringing local government closer to the people in order to ensure that services respond more readily to local needs (UNDP in Kosovo 2003, p. 4). However, the majority of the Kosovo Albanian electorate did not recognise the 2000 and 2002 Municipal Assembly elections as offering an opportunity to ‘vote in democracy and for democracy as understood and imposed by “the internationals”’ (Interview with RI, female, Kosovo Albanian, OMiK, March – April 2004, Kosovo). The overarching aim of the Kosovo Albanian liberation movement – heavily supported by local support networks –
was above all, 'freedom', perceived largely as meaning independence from Serbia.\textsuperscript{86} Elisabeth Rehn has noted that in the context of the 2000 Municipal elections, the most important issue for many candidates and the electorate was the independence of Kosovo – a question that would not be decided by the municipal assemblies (Rehn 2000, p. 17). Nonetheless, despite the overwhelming politicisation of municipal agendas in Kosovo, especially in ethnically heterogeneous municipalities, the 2003 UNDP study revealed that ‘...almost two-thirds of Kosovans indicated a high degree of confidence in their municipal authorities’ (UNDP in Kosovo 2003, p. 1).

As noted earlier, OMiK, using its mandate to organise and oversee elections in Kosovo, introduced a gender quota and an open list system of proportional representation for the 2000 Municipal Elections. However, critical of the lack of meaningful local involvement and consultation, the Kosovo Albanian women’s groups became increasingly engaged in political activism focusing, as prominent female politician Edita Tahiri has observed, on the:

\begin{quote}
...promotion of the role of women in politics and on promotion of the candidates. This campaign, which occurred for the first time in freedom, was supported by different international and national activities: encouraging seminars, media promotions, round tables of candidates, etc.

(Tahiri 2000, p. 27)
\end{quote}

Most of the local and international organs involved in pre-election campaigns promoting women’s representation overlooked the essential need to involve Kosovo Albanian male politicians and focus on ‘ordinary’ men in raising awareness of the right of women to equally participation in all forms of decision-making. In her Gender Audit of the reconstruction programmes in South Eastern Europe, Corrin mentioned a number of concerns expressed by women regarding issues related to democratisation and, more specifically, the 2000 Municipal elections. These included the likelihood that the elections would result in ‘male political parties’ using the votes of women to their own benefit, and the lack of attention given to understanding and overcoming the obstacles to women’s participation (Corrin 2000, p. 10).

Despite the high expectations and the democratic ‘glow’ surrounding the October 2000 Municipal Elections, the final results came as a sobering revelation for many local and international politicians. In a move aimed at preventing the separation of Kosovo from Serbia, Kosovo Serbs boycotted the registration and voting process, despite ‘...the huge

\textsuperscript{86} Duska Anastasijevic (2004, p. 105), for example, commenting on the challenging nature of political situation in Kosovo, notes, ‘With the ‘terror of territory’ still unresolved, inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo will continue to be marred by the fact that Resolution 1244 inflates expectations of both sides with respect to the future status of Kosovo’.\
effort expended to include displaced and enclave-bound minority communities in this process" (Levy and Llamazares 2003, p. 8). The pioneering of the 30% gender quota resulted in a disappointing representation of 8.6% women within the newly elected municipal assemblies. No comprehensive analysis of the voting preferences and electoral participation in the 2000 and 2002 municipal elections is currently available, yet a number of opinions have been voiced on the low level of women’s representation despite the high levels of turnout and enforced quota provisions. 'A lack of understanding' of electoral processes and quota provisions amongst Kosovo Albanian women was cited as one of the reasons; yet this has been declared by some as ‘...a rather weak excuse' (Ingimundarson 2003, p. 5). Recent research on the voting patterns of Kosovo Albanian women has revealed however a general lack of comprehensive understanding of some important electoral issues, such as distinction between closed and open electoral lists (Kosovar Gender Studies Centre, Pristina 2005, p. 24). The 'traditionality of Kosovo Albanian women' voting for Kosovo Albanian men along patrilineal lines has been noted by some UNMIK officials in an unofficial capacity:

There are some practices, traditions and beliefs that we cannot just erase or undo from their [local women’s] minds and everyday behaviour. You cannot just remove cultural legacy by enacting laws however effective they might be. Public attitudes sometimes invalidate such laws and it would take quite a few years to develop certain type of consciousness focused on gender or ethnic equality.

(Interview with AP, female, Kosovo Albanian, OMIK, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

The study ‘How Do women in Kosovo Vote’ (Kosovar Gender Studies Center, Pristina 2005, p. 21) found that for 8.3% of the female interviewees, ‘Family ties with party activists’ was one of the main reasons influencing their choice; for 48.9% of the women in this study it was the ‘Party leader’. On this however, most of the Kosovo Albanian women’s groups have argued that the failure to secure a solid number of women within the municipal assemblies emerged thanks to UNMIK’s ‘double-standards’, suggesting that the failure of UNMIK to involve local women in the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) ran contradictory to UNMIK’s ‘gender mainstreaming’ policies and the gender-based electoral quota in particular. A string of resignations of women from the elected assemblies and the Kosovo public service followed. Some commentators pointed to the voluntary nature of these resignations: women resigned because they felt that the quota system was an instrument imposed by the ‘international community’ and that it did not guarantee ‘quality’ (Ingimundarson 2003, pp. 5-6). However, the political intimidation and inherent ‘unfriendliness’ of the political environments within the elected municipal assem-
blies throughout Kosovo, where the majority of women were seen as ‘numbers’ and their electoral success attributed to the mere existence of quota provisions, were overlooked by many of the agencies working towards the ‘democratisation’ of Kosovo. As one of the interviewees noted:

There are so many barriers for women within assemblies – angry and upset men, late sittings, lack of support and trust in women; some women hardly trust in their own capacities. Adopting laws [introducing the gender quota] is easy, but helping women to take advantage of these laws, to persuade men or limit their biased and sexist attitudes – this is the most challenging task. I think there should be more cooperation – everyone should be involved: NGOs, male and female politicians, UNMIK, OMIK and PISG.

(Interview with AA, member of the municipal assembly, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo, March – April 2004)

In the October 2002 municipal elections, the quota system was matched with closed electoral lists rule, securing 28.5% (262 of 920) of the available seats for women within the municipal assemblies – a sharp increase from the previous 8.8% of the seats. However, as many commentators observed, despite the ‘quantitative’ presence, when it came to empowerment and exerting political influence, Kosovo women continued to be marginalised and excluded. A recent report by the SIDA concluded that in many ways political decision-making remained the domain of the Kosovo men. The report argued that women in Kosovo have had limited and unequal access to power, and that the existing political systems served to enforce the patriarchal system (SIDA 2004, p. 13). In the ten municipalities studied by the Pristina-based Centre for Protection of Women and Children (CPWC 2003), out of 900 high ranking posts only 106 (or 11.7%) were held by women at the end of 2003. Table 6.7 illustrates the position of Kosovo women within the municipal legislative, executive and judiciary structures.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Municipal Assemblies' members</th>
<th>Municipal Committees</th>
<th>Chief executive offices, Board of Directors and Municipal Departments Employees</th>
<th>Leaders of Municipal Political Entities (local branches)</th>
<th>Local NGOs focusing on women/gender issues</th>
<th>Judges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men (%)</td>
<td>Women (%)</td>
<td>Number of additional committees</td>
<td>Chairpersons (all committees) men/women</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dečan / Dočani</td>
<td>23 (74%)</td>
<td>8 (26%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30 men/20 women</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gjakovë / Dekaçia</td>
<td>30 (73%)</td>
<td>11 (27%)</td>
<td>3 including Gender Equality</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glogovë / Glogovaç</td>
<td>22 (71%)</td>
<td>9 (29%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gjiroka / Gjirokaç</td>
<td>31 (78%)</td>
<td>10 (24%)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10/1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dragash / Drahash</td>
<td>17 (71%)</td>
<td>4 (19%)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istok / Isëk</td>
<td>22 (71%)</td>
<td>9 (29%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30 men</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaçanik / Kaçanik</td>
<td>23 (74%)</td>
<td>8 (26%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klina / Klina</td>
<td>22 (71%)</td>
<td>9 (29%)</td>
<td>2 including Gender Equality</td>
<td>3/2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fushë Kosovë / Kosovë Polje</td>
<td>17 (81%)</td>
<td>4 (19%)</td>
<td>2 including Gender Equality</td>
<td>3/2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamennice / Kamennica</td>
<td>23 (74%)</td>
<td>8 (26%)</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitrovica / Mitrovica</td>
<td>33 (80%)</td>
<td>8 (20%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30 men</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leposaviç / Leposaviç</td>
<td>13 (78%)</td>
<td>4 (24%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7 men/3 women</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lipjan / Lipjan</td>
<td>22 (71%)</td>
<td>9 (29%)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>G</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevoberđe / Novo Brdo</td>
<td>12 (71%)</td>
<td>5 (29%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2/1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obilić / Obilić</td>
<td>16 (76%)</td>
<td>5 (24%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rahovec / Orasnice</td>
<td>23 (74%)</td>
<td>8 (26%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3/0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peć / Peć</td>
<td>30 (73%)</td>
<td>11 (27%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Gender Equality</td>
<td>4/0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podujevo / Podujevo</td>
<td>19 (62%)</td>
<td>12 (39%)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3/0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priština / Priština</td>
<td>35 (68%)</td>
<td>16 (32%)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11/2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prizren / Prizren</td>
<td>30 (73%)</td>
<td>11 (27%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3/0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skenderaj / Srbica</td>
<td>26 (84%)</td>
<td>5 (16%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3/0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shitrrë / Shitër</td>
<td>16 (76%)</td>
<td>5 (24%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3/0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shtëpia / Shtëpia</td>
<td>14 (82%)</td>
<td>3 (18%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4/0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shkodër / Suva Reka</td>
<td>30 (73%)</td>
<td>11 (27%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5/0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fier / Fier</td>
<td>18 (58%)</td>
<td>13 (42%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3/0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vlora / Vlora</td>
<td>23 (74%)</td>
<td>8 (26%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3/0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vushtrria / Veshtrinj</td>
<td>24 (77%)</td>
<td>7 (23%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3/0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zubin Potok</td>
<td>13 (82%)</td>
<td>4 (18%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3/1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zvecan / Zveçan</td>
<td>13 (76%)</td>
<td>4 (24%)</td>
<td>2 including Gender Equality</td>
<td>2/3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malishevë / Malishevë</td>
<td>22 (71%)</td>
<td>9 (29%)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6/0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total as of October 2005: 662 (74%) / 238 (26%) / 98 (88%) / 14 (12%) in 25 Municipalities / 302 (92%) / 25 (8%) / 315 (95%) / 16 (5%) in all Municipalities / 151 (88%) / 20 (12%) in 27 Municipalities

Source: Compiled by Kiril Sharapov based on the information available from thirty OSCE Municipal profiles (as of October 2003)
As of October 2003, only 5 municipalities had established an additional Committee for Gender Equality:

If it [gender equality committee] was mandatory — there would have been a committee, policy, some resources, paper-filling and so on. But because it’s not mandatory and nobody is really pushing for it — it’s not on the agenda. It does not mean that you have to push to establish a committee. In a neighbouring municipality, they have 3 additional committees but gender is not a priority for local men and politicians.

(Interview with AS, female, Kosovo Albanian, municipal assembly, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

Importantly, a significant decrease occurs between the representation of women in assemblies and the representation of women at the level of institutions responsible for the implementation of policy, including chief executive officers, boards of directors and municipal departments. Overall, women represent only 8% of these posts, while in many cases the leadership of executive departments remains totally male-dominated. The leadership of the municipal political entities reflects the overall trend of women’s absence from the areas not affected by quota provisions: of 331 leaders, women comprise only 16 or 5%. There is a slight increase in the gender balance of municipal judges, where women comprise 12% of all municipal judges; however as one of the interviewees pointed out:

I think it is due to the Yugoslav legacy, when women were emancipated and encouraged into higher education. To be a judge you need experience and knowledge — you are not elected on a wave of cheap populism as some male politicians [are]. So, there are some women who went through the Socialist legal system and they now serve as judges, but I think in the future their number could decrease; I do not think there are enough local girls in legal education now; and there is a gap when there was no education at all.

(Interview with AD, female, Kosovo Albanian, OMIK, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

Content analysis of the interviews conducted with the women representing various institutional segments in Kosovo, including the municipal government reveals that ‘family responsibilities’ was the main ‘blanket’ factor perceived as impeding women’s participation in local self-governance structures. A female interviewee, representing one of the thirty municipal assemblies, noted that

For a woman, it is much easier to be a teacher. you work 4 -5 hours a day and have the rest of the day to yourself, family and children. Working in the Municipality —
you are underpaid, you work full-day and you need to fight all the time with the system. Not every woman would go for it – it is easier for women to be quiet.

(Interview with AF, female, Kosovo Albanian, municipal assembly, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

Another interviewee noted that the most common and socially accepted reason for a woman to leave the Public Service was ‘to quit [the] tough business – politics – to perform the ‘natural’ role’, as perceived by the majority – child-bearing and child-caring (Interview with JL, Kosovo March-April 2004). Indeed, the newly formed local authorities and international decision-makers have only recently acknowledged a serious lack of reliable and affordable social infrastructure in Kosovo, including childcare and healthcare facilities.

However, the re-establishment of the social infrastructure has not been perceived as a reconstruction priority supported by sustainable investments of financial and human resources. Such an ‘oversight’ is largely rooted in local memories of practices developed in the face of the Milosevic regime waging a war of destruction and expulsion on the Kosovo Albanian majority. Kosovo Albanian women were denied adequate healthcare, education and employment, and relied on private ‘parallel’ networks providing basic services ‘in the backs of our own yards and in underground cellars’ (Interview with AG, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March – April 2004).

Table 6.7 demonstrates that following the October 2002 Municipal Elections, the level of women’s representation within the municipal assemblies throughout Kosovo varied from 16% to 42%, with an average representation of 26%. The lower level of representation of women in Pristina can be explained by the larger numbers of individual candidates (usually male politicians having high public profiles) automatically exempt from the gender-quota rule. In the municipalities with a high level of representation of women, such as Peć/Peja and Prizren/Kosovo Polje, the majority of candidates gained their seats through political parties’ electoral lists subject to the mandatory gender-quota requirement.

Further analysis of women’s locations in the various levels of local self-governance reveals that despite the increasing levels of representation of women within the municipal assemblies, women have remained largely excluded from positions of leadership and influence. Of the 112 municipal committee chairpersons in 25 Kosovo municipalities (as of October 2003), women constituted only 12%, with 17 municipalities having no chairwomen at all.

The overall representation of women decreases significantly at the level of municipal departments excluded from the application of any affirmative action or gender-based quotas. As of October 2003, women constituted only 8% of the 327 municipal public service employees, including chief executive officers, municipal boards of directors and mu-
municipal departments’ workers. A further decline in representation is evident within the leadership of the municipal political entities, where women constitute only 5%, or 16 out of the 331 heads of the local branches of the main political parties. The recent ‘Report on Human Rights Practices’ by the US State Department has noted that despite a lack of legal impediments, only a few women managed to obtain upper-level management positions in commerce or government. The report argued that traditional social attitudes have fuelled much of the direct and indirect discrimination against women in Kosovo. Female unemployment remains high (at around 70%) and only very few women have risen to senior levels, including of the KPS and other governmental organisations (US Department of State 2005). The available quantitative data on Kosovo women’s participation in official decision-making structures reveals a significant male bias despite a number of interventions aimed at enhancing women’s representation within the emerging institutions of self-governance in Kosovo.

Importantly however, women’s under-representation within the municipal governance should not be considered in exclusively ‘quantitative’ terms. A broader perspective is required, wherein various forms of empowerment and participation are viewed through the lens of gender analysis, accentuating the contents of democratic governance rather than its form and quantitative dimensions. Perceived as pointing to UNMIK’s failure to mainstream gender within municipal structures, these figures merely indicate the prevalence of other forms of political participation empowering women at the level of community networks and extended families. In this case, the failure or success of gender mainstreaming must be assessed against the extent to which existing community-based networks and women’s activism have been legitimised, encouraged and re-introduced within the post-conflict municipal structures. At the same time, this form of political activism, as will be further discussed in chapter 7, is significantly influenced by economic, social and cultural contexts, making some forms of social and political participation more ‘legitimate’ – or socially and economically acceptable – than others. In this the 2004 KWN report noted extremely low levels of ‘institutional participation’ amongst women in Kosovo (KWN et al. 2004, p.13), yet it placed their level of civic engagement at slightly higher levels, pointing to the complexity of the term ‘participation’ and the variety of forms in which ‘participation’ might take place. The following chapter will expand on this, considering the unique nature of the ‘unofficial’ political participation of Kosovo Albanian women.

Conclusion

Drawing on current feminist understandings of the diverse nature of women’s political participation, this chapter has presented a critical analysis of the institutional responses to the
increasing demands put forward by Kosovo Albanian women to be meaningfully included within the emerging institutions of self-governance in Kosovo. The legitimacy of these demands stems from a number of sources, including: (a) local women's unique understandings of justice and substantive representation; (b) acknowledgement of women's diversity and resulting contributions; and (c) changing public attitudes towards women's political participation. Years of oppression and war did not fundamentally alter gender relations in Kosovo. Many Kosovo Albanian women were indeed influential in moves towards peace and ethnic reconciliation, yet their participation in such initiatives was generally behind the scenes. In post-war Kosovo, patriarchal relations remain dominant, though rearranged and adapted.

The unique 'nation-building' mandate of UNMIK has allowed the introduction of a gender mainstreaming agenda within the gender-biased post-conflict contexts in Kosovo, emphasising the role and potential contributions of democratically elected women representatives. Less than a year after its arrival in Kosovo, the international administration introduced an electoral system considered to be most effective in increasing the representation of women. However, following the four cycles of municipal and 'general' elections in the region, Kosovo Albanian women's political clout remains dispersed and muted, demonstrating that the formalised quota-based political inclusion does not necessarily amount to empowerment, seen as the right to have and determine choices. The divergences in understanding the nature and purpose of women's political inclusion between various groups of men and women in Kosovo remain acute. The lack of political and economic stability, persistent ethnicisation and militarisation of the region make ethnic and gender identities potential contributors to numerous internal conflicts within Kosovo Albanian political movements. In this light, the under-representation of Kosovo Albanian women outside of the quota-guaranteed zones of political inclusion remains significant. Despite the availability of mechanisms to ensure women's numerical representation (enshrined in the 2004 Law on Gender Equality in Kosovo), women remain excluded from positions of leadership and influence at all levels of the regional self-governance.

The unpreparedness of international administrators to demarcate the qualitative aspects of local political participation has conditioned the widely-criticised lack of commitment on the part of UNMIK to include politically active Kosovo Albanian women in decision-making processes from the very outset of the reconstruction effort. The withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo legitimised paramilitary KLA-structures in the eyes of the local population. However, this legitimacy was insufficient for recognising KLA commanders as successors to the failed Serbian government. Despite the significant contributions of
Kosovo Albanian women towards the structures of resistance, they have remained largely absent from the male-dominated Kosovo Albanian ruling ‘elites’. In order to remedy the under-representation of women, UNMIK’s policy-makers have focused on the quantitative aspect of representation, assuming that increased levels of participation of women within the emerging institutions of self-government would allow women to influence policy making and challenge existing inequalities. However, this strategy was discredited by the majority of Kosovo Albanian women’s groups, where it was argued that the imposition of gender quotas advanced the political careers of only a few non-feminist women who failed to represent and act on behalf of Kosovo Albanian women.

The controversial nature of women’s political participation within the formal institutions of self-government in Kosovo is apparent. The issues of gender equality and the right of women to influence the course of the post-conflict reconstruction are poorly understood not only by Kosovo Albanian men, but also by many women in the region. Following the UNMIK-sponsored introduction of dedicated gender mainstreaming machinery and gender-sensitive legislation, ‘gender mainstreaming’ in Kosovo has largely been perceived as an interference by the ‘internationals’ or an attempt to undermine the fabric of Kosovo Albanian society. There is no evidence to suggest that the increased representation of women within the Assembly of Kosovo and municipal assemblies has led to the formation of a ‘critical mass’ of women allowing the ‘engendering’ of policy agendas. The UNMIK-sponsored imposition of gender quotas, supplemented by education campaigns directed at various groups of women, provided a window of opportunity for many Kosovo Albanian women to enter formal institutions of decision-making. However, for many the window remained only ‘half-open’. The ultimate decisions on political engagement were determined by a combination of factors, such as which ethnic group women belonged to, their social and familial status, which area (urban or rural) they lived in, and the history of their previous engagement with the parallel institutions of resistance.

As feminist and human rights thinkers have suggested, gender thinking – involving a long process of challenging prevailing cultural, political and social gender-biased and women-biased mindsets – has been poorly conceptualised by the international administrators in Kosovo and by society in Kosovo in general. The adoption of gender-sensitive legislation and the setting up of institutional machinery for gender mainstreaming in Kosovo were not accompanied by a concerted effort to challenge the underlying power relations privileging masculine values and diminishing women’s political capacities to influence the post-war reconstruction in Kosovo.
Chapter 7: Kosovo Albanian women’s movement

Introduction
One of the most striking demographic characteristics of post-war Kosovo is the predominance of women and children: young people (those younger than 15) make up a considerable portion of the Kosovo’s population (about 33 percent), and almost 50% of the population is under 25 years of age (IOM Kosovo 2000; UNFPA Kosovo 2003). Meanwhile, there are on average 105 women for every 100 men, with a more pronounced difference between the male and female population in the age group between 20-49 years old, where there are only 100 men for every 118 women (ibid). Importantly however, despite the fact that young women substantially outnumber men in Kosovo, the position of women remains, throughout Kosovo society and in both public and private realms, secondary to that of men.

Over the last decade, the issue of women’s participation in post-conflict reconstruction has developed into a field under increasing empirical and theoretical investigation. The active involvement of various groups of women in rebuilding political and economic institutions in situations where post-conflict contexts have weakened traditional gender roles and presented a number of 'windows of opportunity', is believed to have the potential to contribute towards engendering the processes of reconstruction at various levels. Generally, two broad avenues – namely access to and participation in formal and informal decision-making processes – are beginning to be seen as incorporating a diversity of mechanisms through which individual women and women’s groups can influence the course of post-war reconstruction. When available and accessible, these avenues present women with the opportunity to become active subjects and owners of reconstruction processes, rather than passive objects of male-dominated gender-biased policies.

This chapter considers the nature, availability and accessibility of informal avenues for decision-making to Kosovo Albanian women after the withdrawal of Serbian troops from Kosovo in June 1999. It considers how these avenues have been influenced by the history of women’s involvement in running the ‘parallel society’ in Kosovo; how they have been influenced by the re-emergence of Kosovo Albanian traditionalism; and how they have been influenced by the pervasive militarisation and ethnicisation of virtually all spheres of life in Kosovo. This chapter also considers the divisions with the Kosovo women’s movement grounded in the hierarchies of political, social and ideological belonging, where the processes of inclusion and exclusion do not only operate along the male-female dyad but at many other levels, all influenced by the complex post-war context.
Kosovo Albanian men and women: ‘levels’ of identity

In December 2003, the UN Security Council endorsed the concept of ‘Standards before Status’ as an evaluation framework\(^7\) to assess the progress achieved by the regional institutions of self-government towards the internationally-mediated review of Kosovo status scheduled to take place in 2005-2006. Since then, a broad range of questions have emerged regarding the scope, content and inclusiveness of the political processes in the region. In this, the political representation and participation of ethnic minorities and women have been prioritised, following the issuance of the Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan (UNMIK 2004c).\(^8\) Similarly, a number of gender-specific legislative and policy-making initiatives have followed, including the promulgation of the Law on Gender Equality (Assembly of Kosovo 2004a) and the Anti-Discrimination Law (Assembly of Kosovo 2004b); governmental endorsement of the Kosovo Action Plan for the Achievement of Gender Equality (UNIFEM 2003); and gender quota provisions for the 2004 Kosovo Assembly elections (UNMIK 2004b). In this light, the question of how well women have been represented within the emerging political landscape in Kosovo is relevant and important. However, besides this question, it must also be asked ‘Which women?’, ‘Represented at which level?’ and ‘Who was trusted, or assigned, to represent them?’

The recent movement from the ‘WID’ analytical framework to more all-inclusive gender and development discourses (Tuft 2001, p.156; Visvanathan et al. 1996) has accentuated the need to distinguish between the diverse identities, needs and concerns of men and women, pointing to the methodological (Potocky-Tripodi and Rodgers-Farmer 2001, p. 449), ethical and, indeed, political importance of locating each group within unique socio-economic, political and cultural landscapes of development (OXFAM 2004). Exploring the intersections of gender and nationhood, Nira Yuval-Davis (1997) has argued that ethnic, racial, class, age and other (often ambiguous) social, economic and cultural ‘positionings’ are found in the continuous process of interaction and mutual re-definition of gender identities.\(^9\) She noted that ‘women’ and ‘men’ never constitute homogeneous categories as either social agents or social objects (Yuval-Davis 1997, p. 116).

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\(^7\) The eight standards include: functioning democratic institutions; the rule of law; freedom of movement; returns and reintegration; economy; property rights; dialogue with Belgrade; and the Kosovo Protection Corps (UNMIK 2003a).

\(^8\) Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan: 120-page document outlining comprehensive gender equality implementation policies; it contains 69 explicit references to ‘gender’; 19 references to ‘gender equality’ and 25 references to ‘women’.

\(^9\) Isa Blumi (2001, p.3) in her overview of ethnicity politics in Kosovo, defines ‘identities’ as ‘...precarious sociological moments, vulnerable to a variety of transformative elements contingent to both environmental and ideological factors’.
A number of feminist scholars have pointed to the varying impact of gender-insensitive re-construction and development programmes on various categories of men and women, erroneously conceptualised as homogeneous and uniform (Cockburn 2004; Mazurana 2005; Miller 2001; Smith 2001). Chris Corrin, analysing women’s experiences of change in countries of Central and Eastern Europe, has observed that the party and state systems in these countries systematically produced policies based on specific collective identities – ‘men’ and ‘women’ (Corrin 1992, p. 3). Viewed in this light, content analysis of the interviews conducted for this study reveals how socio-economic, political and cultural diversities, bound by the explicit ‘real men’-‘real women’ dichotomy, were simplified and banded into larger groupings by respondents belonging to various institutional segments. In this respect Cynthia Enloe has observed that each of the groupings reveals a great deal about political workings of masculinity and femininity; each

...dampens our curiosity about where women are and where men are, about who put women there and men here, about who benefits from women being there and not someplace else, about what women themselves think about being there and what they do with those thoughts when they try to relate to men and to other women.

(Enloe 2004, p. 4)

The table below presents the categories, or ‘identifiers’, assigned to Kosovar men and women by the interviewees representing five institutional segments included in the overall methodological framework of the study (see chapter 3: Methodological Framework). Highlighted in bold and italics are resumptive categories for the variables in each group, representing tangible and intangible lines of division accepted or, otherwise, tolerated by the majority of the interviewees representing various institutional segments.

### Table 7.1: Categories and ‘Identifiers’ employed in included/excluded identity framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Groups in Kosovo</th>
<th>Identifying various groups of women as:</th>
<th>Identifying various groups of men as:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Groups in Kosovo</td>
<td>- ‘Albanian women’90, ‘Serbian women’, ‘Roma women’, ‘other women’: <em>ethnicity</em>; - ‘Rural women’, ‘women from the cities’, ‘rural women who moved to the urban areas’: <em>urban/rural divide</em>; - Poor women (no binary opposition, such as ‘wealthy women’ or ‘rich</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

90 In her recent analysis of Cypriot women political and social activism spanning across many lines of division, Cynthia Cockburn underlines the political nature of ‘fitting’ men and women into convenient manipulative categories (2004, p. 25). She notes ‘...ethnic names - ‘Serb’, ‘Chechen’, ‘Welsh’ – can never be taken at face value. Ideally, they should be written with quote marks around them’.
**PISG in Kosovo: central level**

- 'NGO women', 'active/passive women': *political activity*;
- 'Local women', 'international UNMIK women': *insider/outsider status*;
- 'Poor women': *economic standing*;
- 'Urban/rural women': *urban/rural divide*;
- 'Women MPs', 'women in public service': *institutional affiliation*.

**PISG in Kosovo: local level**

- 'Local NGO women', 'Pristina-NGO women': *urban/rural women*: *levels of political activity*; *urban/rural divide*;
- 'Feminist/non-feminist women': *political activity*;
- 'Kosovo Assembly women MPs', 'Local Assembly women MPs': *levels of political activity*; *urban/rural divide*;

**OSCE mission in Kosovo**

- 'Albanian women', 'Minority women': *ethnicity*;
- 'Employed women', 'Unemployed women': *employment*;
- 'Educated women', 'Uneducated women': *education*;
- 'Women MPs', 'Women in public service', 'Politically active women': *institutional affiliation, political activity*;
- 'Feminist/non-feminist women': *political activity*;
- 'Urban/rural women': *urban/rural divide*;
- 'Women survivors of violence'

**UN family**

- 'Urban/rural women': *urban/rural divide*;

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**Note:**

- 'Feminist/non-feminist women': *political activity*;
- 'Urban/rural women': *urban/rural divide*;
These apparent divisions demonstrate that gender identities, viewed through the theoretical prism of social constructionism, are indeed a product of entangled historical experiences, discourses, relationships and everyday practices of social life (Burr 1995; Cockburn 2004, p. 25; Holland and Ramazanoglu 2002; Skjelsbaek, 2001). The degree of political and social acceptance conferred on the various ‘elements’ of the politically and socially constructed ‘manhood’/‘womanhood’ binaries ultimately depends on which political discourse is perceived as legitimately generating socially acceptable, ‘politically correct’ images of ‘real’ women and men (Cockburn 2004, p. 26; Corrin 1992, p. 22). The in-depth interviewing of the respondents representing various institutional segments reveals that Kosovo women’s socio-economic and political recognition, including their access to the newly established gender-mainstreaming machinery and active participation in the women’s groups movement (as opposed to the status of a ‘passive service beneficiary’), is contingent on their ethnicity, origin, urban or rural residence, affiliation with dominant or subordinate political groups and their individual status as defined by dichotomous categories such as ‘educated/uneducated’, ‘disabled/able-bodied’, ‘widowed/singe/married’ (Andersen and Siim 2004; Hobson 2000; Lister 2003; Yuval-Davis 1997). The analysis of the group responses conveyed a rather sophisticated system based on many socio-economic, political and cultural ‘identifiers’, pointing to the complex workings of patriarchal power and ideology in Kosovo society. These categories of difference, however, did not significantly affect women’s ability to advance their interests within male-dominated post-conflict politics. In this regard, Shirin Rai (2003, pp. 226-227), analysing the complexity of identity discourse in India, has noted that ‘In no social category have women been more able to participate in political life than men’. The negative and positive connotations assigned to various ‘categories’ by groups members included in the sample reveals particularly complex intra- and inter-group dynamics. These will be analysed later in this chapter. The content analysis of the interviewees’ accounts also reveals that Kosovo Albanian men’s political and social recognition was primarily contingent on their status of ‘insiders’ (non-Serb and non-‘international’) boosted by the previous involvement in peaceful resistance or the KLA-led ‘liberation’ campaign and cemented by their formal or informal political activism geared towards securing the independence of Kosovo. Other factors, such as level of education, employment status, marital status, urban/rural belonging seemed to
play only secondary and descriptive roles in relation to their opportunities for engaging in formal or informal politics in Kosovo:

Men are faring better in Kosovo. It does not mean to say that there are no poor men; they also face economic and social problems, but there are more opportunities available: freedom of movement — they could be part of an extended family and they would be only encouraged to move somewhere looking for better life or work; even if they are married. They could become active in politics and it gives them more chances. It is a very men-oriented society; being a [Kosovo] Albanian man might seem a less problematic status to be for many women in Kosovo.

(Interview with AJ, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women's group, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

Hierarchies of belonging and oppression within the women's movement in Kosovo

With gender and ethnic identity at the core, it is hardly possible to define the “hierarchy of Kosovo Albanian women's belonging” and structure various ‘levels of identity’ in a coherent and hierarchical order. None of the five groups included into the sample, identified the prevalence of a certain ‘level’ over any other. This does not mean, however, that the interviewees assigned no particular importance or connotations (negative or positive) to some of the ‘identifiers’ and that such ‘assignments’ did not ultimately translate themselves into local institutional policies, and formal and informal processes of inclusion and exclusion.

On the other hand, representatives of the women’s groups and the PISG at both municipal and central levels voiced concerns regarding varying exclusionary criteria applied by other “institutional segments” towards women failing to ‘attend’ to some form of identity ‘expectation’ or, indeed, ‘condition’ established (often implicitly) by various institutions in Kosovo. A female Kosovo human rights activist, for example, described some Pristina-based women activists, well known in Kosovo, as ‘self-appointed ‘gate-keepers’ — arrogant and self-important’:

If you do not agree with them — you are out. If they have a degree from abroad or funded [by an international organisation] — they want to become a President — formal or informal. They want power too. If you have no degree or if you took a risk to somehow criticise or upset them — you are not in their privileged ‘club’.

(Interview with AK, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women's group, March – April 2004, Kosovo)
Another interviewee, working for the municipal branch of the PISG, complained about the top-down attitude of the Pristina-based women groups and female members of the Kosovo Assembly towards rural women, perceived by them as '...still traditional and not able to take their own decisions' (Interview with AL, female, Kosovo Albanian, PISG, March – April 2004). One of the interviewees, representing a Pristina-based women’s group, while making no explicit ‘exclusionary’ statements, referred to the ‘rural women coming to live and living in the city’ (Interview with AZ, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s movement, March – April 2004). Noticeably, these women were still considered as ‘rural’, which often, especially in Kosovo, amounts to ‘traditional’ and not yet ‘fit enough’ to be engaged in capital-based politics. However, rural women deserve to be ‘represented’ and ‘fought for’ by their more ‘experienced’ colleagues (well-know Pristina-based women activists), whose authority and experience remain unquestioned – largely on the basis of their previous involvement in the anti-Milosevic resistance campaign and their ‘knowledge’ of the ‘homogenised’ Kosovo Albanian needs and concerns:

We are here to fight for women – for all women. We know what they need and what they want – we went through the hell on Earth with them. Who do you think would know better? Who would care for them?

(Interview with AX, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

The rural/urban divide among women attracted many criticisms from the ‘feminist Kosovo women’ towards their ‘non-feminist’ counterparts, often viewed as ‘apolitical’ and ‘passive’. Generally, the issue of women’s movement inclusiveness and representation has been attracting increasing attention from feminist scholars (Adeleye-Fayemi, 2004; Baines 2005). Bisi Adeleye-Fayemi (2004, p. 45), for example, reflecting on the traditions of African feminism, has noted that: ‘...rural grassroots women who have no gender analysis...are not able to represent women’s strategic interests’. Having acknowledged the multiplicity of factors impeding the access of rural women to politics and decision-making in the context of post-conflict reconstruction, it is nevertheless essential to critically access whether ‘women at the forefront’ – local feminists or women politically active at various institutional and political levels -- are able to represent the ‘immediate’ needs of rural women, such as restoring basic infrastructure, including roads, sewage and water-supply

9In her gender analysis of UNMIK and initial stages of post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo, Lyth Anette (Kvinna Till Kvinna 2001, p. 36) notes, ‘...women in Kosovo were living and continue to live under very different circumstances depending on where they live, what kind of education they have and which family they come from. Although a generalising statement, it can nevertheless be said that a modern, more westernised woman could be found in the cities, whereas the situation for women was more traditional in the countryside’. See also 2004 UNDP Kosovo Human Development Report (UNDP in Kosovo 2004, p.36) pointing to the disadvantaged and deteriorating position of rural women in Kosovo in comparison to urban women and rural men.
systems, housing, and medical care facilities. A review of the diverse literature touching on various aspects of political representation amongst Kosovo Albanian women points to the continuing "immunity" of the predominantly Pristina-based women's groups from critical scrutiny of their contributions towards representing and advocating for rural or non-Pristina women's interests. Baines (2005) has observed the same phenomenon in the context of reconstruction in Rwanda, where many rural women NGOs have remained disconnected and lack sustainable support from women's organisations in the city. She noted that in addition to ethnic differences which often become a basis of privilege in access to resources and political power, women's organisation are also positioned differently according to a rural/urban divide (Baines 2005, 230-231).

Similarly, content analysis of the interviewees' accounts reveals the existence and influence of another hierarchy - a 'hierarchy of oppression' - especially among women representing Kosovo non-governmental organisations. Gayle Letherby has defined a 'hierarchy of belonging' as:

...the view that the more oppressed or more disadvantaged group has the greatest potential for knowledge [which] implies that the greater the oppression the broader or more inclusive one's potential knowledge.

(Letherby 2003, p. 47)

The post-conflict women's movement in Kosovo is seemingly led by a group of charismatic Pristina-based women activists - courageous women who emerged as grassroots leaders resisting Serbian oppression and mobilising Albanian women through the years of peaceful resistance, war and post-conflict havoc (Clark 2000; Corrin 2000; Mertus 1999). However, interviewing Kosovo Albanian women in March-April 2004 reveals rather conflicting attitudes towards the 'charismatic leadership' of the women's movement. In a 'tape recorder turned off' setting, a number of women, representing some of the groups of the Kosovo Women's Network and the PISG revealed that some of the 'long-term' diaspora women returning to Kosovo or women who did not take an openly feminist or, otherwise, 'anti-traditional' stance during the times of resistance and war\(^2\) could face an informal and invisible "glass wall" within the movement for 'not going through what we did'. This confirms the obvious working of the 'insider/outsider' identifier revealed through the content analysis of the interviewees' accounts. While this finding does not in itself support any assumption about the nature of the women's movement in Kosovo and its leadership, it nevertheless points to the complexity of the movement's internal dynam-

\(^2\) Isa Blumi (2001, p. 3) in her anthropological review of ethnicity politics in Kosovo points out that individualism has been subdued by the burden of the 'collective struggle'. She notes, that 'Albanians' have been collectivized so crudely that... it is impossible for individual identities to surface in historical or journalistic narratives that ultimately claim their voices'.
ics, highlighting two main issues. Firstly, the existence of a strong politically active umbrella organisation, represented internationally and locally and seeking legitimacy though the number of member organisations and the strength of its unified voice, such as the Kosovo Women’s Network, does not necessarily mean that there are no internal contradictions and rifts, or that all the member groups are included and stand on equal footings politically or financially. This, in turn, leads to another conclusion that some of the women’s groups or interests might remain unrepresented, subdued or less visible, despite the high visibility of the women’s movement and organisations and individuals that claim to represent Kosovo Albanian women.93

As demonstrated in the exploration of the dynamics of institutional and legal frameworks for gender mainstreaming in Kosovo in chapters 4 and 5, both UNMIK and gender-specific institutions in Kosovo have continuously failed to acknowledge and act on the multiplicity of women’s groups, often treating them as one homogeneous entity. Gender mainstreaming has been conceptualised by UNMIK and, later, the PISG as an equivalent to targeted equality-focused interventions – a simple and straightforward strategy designed to reconcile the dichotomy of ‘homogeneously subjugated Kosovo women’ vs. ‘homogeneously superior Kosovo men’.94 No gender expertise has been employed to analyse the impact of any planned action on the various groups of men and women in Kosovo (Ward 2002, p. 97), the essence of gender mainstreaming as defined by the UN’s ECOSOC (UN 2004b, p.4). Accordingly, regional human rights and equality advocates were forced into a situation with a vaguely defined gender mainstreaming ‘target group’ – ‘women’. In this respect, the experience in Kosovo replicates the conceptual limitation of the UN gender, peace and security discourse, which was described by Tarja Vayrynen as lacking primary gender identity in its capacity as a platform for action and politics. Instead, Vayrynen suggested, there are constructions of femininity and masculinity that are bound to become hegemonic forms within zones of ambiguity where neither of these prevails or where mixed variations of them come to the fore (Vayrynen 2004, p. 139).

The inability of UNMIK and the local government to approach these zones of ambiguity in a gender-sensitive way departing from the two hegemonic forms of ‘one masculinity’ and ‘one femininity’ has led to the situation where gender-sensitised and, often,

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93Shirin Rai (2003, p. 266) notes that the legitimacy of national machineries, including civil society, is ‘...also bound up with how far they are able to and are seen to represent the interests of the majority of women...It is important in multi-ethnic and -cultural societies and in political contexts where established democracies are not yet operating, in all these contexts the interests of some groups are more readily visible than those of others’.

94Angela King (2002, p. vi), a Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Gender issues and Advancement of Women, analysing the evolution of gender mainstreaming within the context of peace-support operation, notes, ‘The lack of understanding of “HOW” gender perspectives can be identified and addressed remains one of the most serious constraints’.
gender-specific policies have failed to deliver the anticipated outcomes thanks to the lack of consideration of the specific socio-economic and political contexts of those who these policies were designed for. For example, a female interviewee working for the Pristina-based UNICEF office pointed out that some of the domestic violence counsellors in Kosovo were men who used to work as social workers in the ‘old times’. Some of them remained heavily influenced by outdated legacies of the old communist and ‘traditional’ systems, emphasising reconciliation as the solution in domestic violence cases, despite the availability of gender-sensitised legal procedures put in place by UNMIK.

Identity politics and Women’s Representation in Kosovo

The identity exclusion/inclusion analysis also sets the ground for further investigation of the relationship between identity politics and women’s representation within representative bodies in Kosovo. In his study of women’s under-representation in parliaments in liberal democracies, Errol Miller established three interlocking and intersecting continua in which gender equality is likely to be accorded priority and therefore influence the dynamics of female participation (Miller 2001, pp 80-103). Figure 7.1 provides a schematic analysis locating Kosovo on the interaction of Miller’s three continua.

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Figure 7.1: Gender Solidarity and Politics Continua: the Case of Kosovo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Continuum</th>
<th>Continuum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Little or no diversity (in which the nation and society are organised), filters of ethnicity/race/religion/class and the like are virtually non-existent.</td>
<td>Great diversity in social composition; filters of ethnicity/race/religion/class block transmission in the face of inter-group conflicts.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The degree of diversity that marks the civil society that constitutes the nation.

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Criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deeply-held common identity historically shared among all members of the society.</th>
<th>Recently constructed common identity among formerly disparate groups.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The depth of the sense of shared identity across groups comprising the nation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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95 Interview with JS, March - April 2004, Kosovo.
Criteria

| Material resources and social distribution. | Great affluence in material resources equitably distributed across social groups in society | Limited material resources inequitably distributed in society |

In acknowledging the rather schematic nature of this model in the light of regional and contextual variations, Miller (2001, p. 99) noted that generally, women are least represented in formal and informal politics in nations where there is a great diversity in social composition, a recently constructed common identity, and unequally distributed limited material resources. In such circumstances, Miller (2001, p. 99) suggested, patriarchal patterns prevail at all levels of the political apparatus as group solidarity and loyalty stifle notions of gender equality. The importance of 'belonging' attributed to Kosovo women by all of the interviewees in this study; the almost universal social recognition, or inclusion, attributed to Kosovo Albanian men; the increasing ‘ethnicisation’ of political and socio-economic discourses in the region; the widespread discrimination against and failures to integrate ethnic minorities (ICG 2003a; ICG 2004a; Institute for War and Peace Reporting 2004); and the deteriorating economic situation in Kosovo all push the region to the extreme pole of Miller's model. This, in turn, suggests that increasing levels of gender inequality in Kosovo originate from rather complex gender-based divisions of power, rooted in highly ethnicised and militarised patriarchy.

The majority of women groups’ representatives, interviewed in March and April 2004, identified the following factors as contributing to the disadvantaged position of Kosovo Albanian women: (a) the lack of cultural and gender sensitivity on the part of UNMIK/KFOR and international peacekeeping contingents; (b) the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989; and, (c) the long-lasting impact of the oppressive Communist Yugoslav legacy. There has been substantial criticism recently regarding the inclination of many Kosovo Albanian people to invoke the convenient images of self-victimisation and liminality. For example, the ICG report (2004a) analysing the March 2004 events noted that 'This was a society in denial, clinging desperately to its own sense of victimisation and the heady days when it was briefly the world’s darling'; Janet Reineck has concluded that Kosovo Albanians use the past to elevate ethnic, regional and personal identities in the face of political, social, economic and ethnic stigmatisation, perceiving themselves as a marginalised people on different levels (Reineck 1993). Julie Mertus has pointed to the impact of this self-inflicted self-victimisation:
All problems lead in one direction, to the oppressive Serbian state. When village women remain illiterate, girls turn to prostitution, and women throughout Kosovo suffer from lack of medical care, the reaction becomes: 'Look what they [Serbs] are doing to us'.

(Mertus 1999, p. 172)

A number of studies have pointed to the importance of considering the impact of historical developments in Kosovo and the lack of preparedness of UNMIK to address the complex gender dynamics of the post-war context in Kosovo (Antic 1992; Corrin 1999b; Corrin 2000, Mazurana 2005). However, any further analysis should occur within a broader frame of militarised patriarchy and shared social responsibility for persistent gender-bias in the processes of regional reconstruction and development. In this, Michael Salla has called for:

...more expansive conception of responsibility where societal ills are ascribed to all, rather than being a consequence of mistaken institutional policies. All members of society therefore need to claim responsibility for the task of reforming power networks, and that makes the notion of historic victims problematic. This leads to the view expressed by Gerd Lerner, that women are ‘not victims but actors in history’.

(Salla 2001, p. 78)

Miller’s model emphasises three broad areas relevant to the processes of post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo: economic development, ethnic reconciliation and diversity of socially accepted identities. The content analysis of the interviewees’ accounts and recent research on the status of women in Kosovo (Kosovar Gender Studies Center 2005; KWN et al. 2004) highlight (a) the prevalence of rather limited perspectives on reasons for the under-representation of women in emerging political structures, (b) the lack of general interest in public participation, (c) the prevalence of traditional gender-biased attitudes towards men’s and women’s roles, and (d) the lack of a political commitment to gender mainstreaming at all levels of regional self-governance. The deteriorating economic situation in the region is generally perceived as the main contributing factor, while the impact of the militarisation and ethnicisation of political and socio-economic discourses (including the lack of progress in ethnic reconciliation) are usually overlooked and linked to the unresolved political status. The following analysis, addressing the issues of ‘identity filters’ and the lack of shared identity (manifesting itself in increasing militarisation and ethnic intolerance in Kosovo), calls for a re-assessment of the main factors hindering gender mainstreaming in Kosovo and women’s access to formal and informal decision-making.
The current position of women and men in Kosovo should be considered from a broader perspective including understanding of the volatile economic and political situation in the region (issues dominated by the unresolved political status), escalating competition amongst the major political parties (ICG 2005b) and the ambiguous position of ethnic minority groups within the regional post-conflict reconstruction processes (ICG 2004a; 2005a). The question of whether the lives of Kosovo people have improved since 1999 is indeed a difficult one. The conflict affected various groups of men and women differently; so too, the impact of the internationally-sponsored post-conflict reconstruction has not been straightforward. The Kosovo Early Warning System Project, a local UNDP initiative, has continuously pointed to growing levels of political, economic and ‘subjective welfare’ pessimism amongst the local population, coupled with falling levels of satisfaction with the institutional performance (UNDP in Kosovo 2004b, 2005). The recent HDR for Kosovo has provided a list of indicators demonstrating increasing levels of discontent amongst the people of Kosovo with the decision-making processes, including decreasing voter turnout, decreasing satisfaction with political and economic trends, low percentages of people feeling empowered to influence decision-making processes in their municipalities and throughout the region, declining satisfaction with the main governmental structures, and, as a manifestation of these trends, the violent events of March 17-19, 2004 (UNDP in Kosovo 2004, p.57).

While the economic stagnation in Kosovo has disproportionally limited the economic choices available to women and girls, the energies of the local government and civil society, including women’s groups, should be directed towards the expansion of educational opportunities available for the women of Kosovo at all levels. What follows is an overview of the impact that major political changes have had on Kosovo women, and how these changes have affected women’s choice to become politically active. In doing so, it is also acknowledged that there is no one true way of being a ‘real’ feminist or non-feminist, neither could there be a definite criterion of being politically ‘active’ or ‘passive’ (Yuval-Davis 1997, p. 91).

** Tradition: Limits and Constraints**

It has been acknowledged by many feminist scholars that percentage-oriented sectoral ‘add women and stir’ approaches are not sufficient to stimulate a transformative change towards the re-definition of access to political power by various groups of men and women (Andersen and Simn 2004; Corrin 1999a; Ross 2002; Tint 2004). Recent accounts of post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo have demonstrated the impact of significant restraints placed upon UNMIK and the PISG by the processes of ethnicisation of political discourses in the
region (Blumi 2001; ICG 2003a; 2004a; 2005a; 2005b). Such processes of ethnicisation have tended to generate inherently unequal and gender-biased systems of belonging and inclusion. Lacking continuous and consistent international and local support to confront these, gender mainstreaming in Kosovo has been gradually losing its transformative potential, mutating into a ‘Western and locally unsuitable’ concept rejected by many local counterparts.

The ‘unsuitability’ of gender mainstreaming is usually linked to the predominance of customary laws and gender-biased practices in Kosovo. The lack of research uncovering the links between post-conflict political and social transformations and the changing nature of Kosovo Albanian traditions and customs calls for a more detailed anthropological analysis in this area. A number of feminist scholars have however analysed the processes of resurrection of traditional gender-biased values and attitudes in the wake of socio-economic and political instability (Bouta 2004; Cockburn 2004; Enloe 2002, 2004; Mazurana 2005a, 2005b). Reflecting on recent changes in ‘gender regimes’ in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Einhorn and Sever have observed that the disproportionately high female share of unemployment coupled with a revival of nationalist and traditional ideologies have relegated women once again to the domestic sphere, leading to their growing desocialisation (Einhorn and Sever 2005, p. 23).

The on-the-surface ‘public liberation’ of Kosovo Albanian women is mostly visible in Pristina, with its bustling social life and women wearing make-up and mini-skirts without provoking public outrage. The incidence of blood feuds and vendettas, as manifestations of deeply-rooted traditions, has also decreased. This does not mean, however, that the centuries-old mindsets privileging masculinities and keeping men in power have disappeared. Indeed, the role of custom and tradition in the lives of Kosovo Albanian men and women has recently become a contentious issue for various commentators, including UNMIK and international personnel working in the region, local and international scholars, and Kosovo women and men:

Everyone is talking about tradition: UNMIK to justify lack of success in implementing its policies; local men – to usurp more power; local women – to use it as an excuse or as an argument in gaining more authority. There is so much going

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96 A recent study into Kosovo women’s lives, drawing on women’s own words and views in the context of wider social changes, conducted by local women organisations, highlights the prevalence of traditional attitudes affecting Kosovo women on the whole spectrum of ‘public-private’ continuum. It mentions ‘... the dual pressures that women face between their desire for a more modern and equal society and the traditional roles they are expected to play’ (KWN et al. 2004, p. 2).

97 See, for example, recent report by the Coalition for International Justice (2005) reflecting on current situation in Kosovo and noting that ‘... intimidation and blood feuds still dominate’. 
around that it is quite difficult to be certain – which traditions they are talking about? But obviously, it is becoming a very valuable political currency.

(Interview with AV, female, Kosovo Albanian, OMIK, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

The continuing debates revolving around the ‘traditionality’ of Kosovo Albanian society has fed into the culture-based discourses often invoked as an integral part of various ‘nationalist projects’. Analysing the intersections of masculinity and Serbian nationalism in Kosovo, Wendy Bracewell has observed that nationalist projects are usually structured with reference to ideals of masculinity, to the specific political and cultural contexts influencing these processes, and with consequent implications for gender relations (Bracewell 2000, p. 571).

As of today, the only authoritative anthropological study that can be seen as relevant to the events unfolding in Kosovo in the second half of the 20th century is Janet Reineck’s research on the intersections of gender, migration and ideology amongst Kosovo Albanians (Reineck 1991, 1993). Completed in late 1980s – early 1990s, it was later enhanced by Julie Mertus’s research into the intersections of gender and nationalism in Kosovo (Mertus 1999). Reflecting on post-conflict developments in Kosovo, Mertus has noted that despite the existence of formal legal protections, cultural practices continue to weigh heavily against women and girls: motherhood remains the defining role of womanhood, and reported incidents of domestic violence have increased, reflecting a widespread culture of violence and general backlash against women (Mertus 2003, p. 544).

What follows is a brief overview of recent debates surrounding the issue of Kosovo Albanian ‘traditionality’. These tend to revolve around a dualistic discourse of ‘the good’ (‘Albanians’ or ‘Internationals’) vs. ‘the bad’ (read ‘Internationals’ or ‘Albanians’) – a common feature of nationalistic gender-biased discourses (Corrin 1999d, pp. 65-66). At the same time, applying a broader perspective and analysing Kosovo within the context of the ‘socio-economic, political, military and educational heritage of the Balkans’ will not automatically make good bad or vice versa. Instead, it leads to the understanding that there are no definite end-conditions with bad or good traditions; there is a great variety of customs and culturally-based expectations and attitudes that affect various groups of men and women differently. In this light, the task of the development community in Kosovo, including local actors, is to identify positive and negative influences amongst these traditions and devise appropriate strategies to take advantage of their positive impacts and lessen the negative. This, in turn, points to the need for a Kosovo-wide anthropological research of the nature and influence of customary laws and traditions amongst all ethnic groups living in Kosovo, including Kosovo Serbs.
One of the earliest reports reviewing the gender dynamics of post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo, published in 2001 by KtK, acknowledged the existence of traditions in Kosovo Albanian society working against the emancipation of women; most of these traditions had ‘distant roots’ in the customary law of Leke Dukagjini (KtK 2001, p. 10). At the same time, without any further analysis of the impact of these traditions on various groups of men and women in Kosovo, KtK openly criticised the ‘international community’ for stressing the backwardness of Kosovo Albanians. The report described a scene with a male UN official referring to Leke Dukagjini as the prevailing law in the region and a young Kosovo female lawyer rejecting its relevance in modern Kosovo (KtK 2001, p. 12). The institutionalisation of modern laws under the socialist system was unproblematically considered by KtK as the main driving force in eroding the pre-eminence of customary laws in Kosovo (KtK 2001, p. 12). However, Chinkin and Paradine, in their analysis of the complex intersections between gender and nationalism in the disintegrating FRY, concluded that the communist ideology had not displaced deep-rooted gender cultures, which, while differing between urban and rural areas, remained patriarchal everywhere (Chinkin and Paradine 2001, p. 147).

The fact that the widely-distributed KtK report was published in 2001, during the second year of UNMIK’s presence in Kosovo and when the eyes of the ‘international community’ were still on Kosovo, contributed to the creation of a mindset amongst many human rights activists of ‘bad internationals treating Kosovo Albanians who are only interested in democracy and human rights as dark and traditional’ (Interview with LJ, female, Kosovo Albanian, PISG, March-April 2004, Kosovo). While UNMIK has been justly criticised for its somewhat ‘neo-colonial’ nation-building policies – including its oversight of local expertise – the re-emergence of Kosovo Albanian traditionalism (Reineck 1991, 1993) and militarisation of the post-conflict society has had an overwhelming impact on the course of post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo. Howard Clark, analysing the trajectory of the Kosovo Albanian struggle for liberation, from peaceful demonstrations to the KLA’s move to take up arms supports Reineck’s argument that oral customary law has remained primary in Kosovo, while the population has preferred to ignore written law and avoid contact with the legislative authorities (Clark 2000, p. 32).

All of the interviewees in this study agreed that a number of gender-biased Kosovo Albanian traditions and customs were impeding women’s access to formal and informal

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98 For more details on the Canon of Leke Dukagjin refer to Chapter 3.
99 It should be noted that in the conditions of a large-scale ‘reversed exodus’ of refugees from Kosovo in Autumn 1999 – Winter 2000, where stabilising security situation on the ground and preparing for forthcoming winter were the priority areas for both UNMIK and KFOR, involving ‘local expertise’ on a large scale would almost automatically have meant involving male-dominated political leadership of Kosovo Albanians, including some of the KLA-commanders later indicted by the ICTY.
decision-making. Despite the UNMIK-sponsored overhaul of the domestic violence legislation (UNMIK 2003b) and the Kosovo-wide campaign organised by the Kosovo Women's Network and supported by UNIFEM (Hejzyk 2004, pp. 11-12; IHFHR 2000, p. 516; UNIFEM 2000), domestic violence is still seen as a private matter (Hejzyk 2004, pp. 11-12) in the prevalent frame of mind (Corrin 1992c, pp. 72-73). However, most of the interviewees were unable to outline a strategy regarding how to combat the influence of traditional views of femininity and masculinity. The prevalence of discriminatory attitudes towards women was linked with the deteriorating economic situation in the region. The majority of the interviewees suggested that economic independence was essential in allowing women to break away from abusive and patriarchal relations. This finding has been echoed in other reports, in particular 'The Voice of the Women' (KWN et al. 2004) and 'How do Women in Kosova vote?' (Kosovar Gender Studies Center 2005), suggesting that the poor economic situation is one of the primary underlying causes of domestic violence (KWN et al. 2004, p. 9). Most of the respondents identified a strong linkage between economic independence and women's ability and willingness to participate in 'public' life. One of the women's activists noted:

In the year 2002, according to the World Bank study, 52% of people in Kosovo were poor, 12% were starving. Now situation is even worse. How would you empower women from rural areas if they basically have no shoes to walk and vote?

(Interview with AB, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women's group, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

However, the relationship between women's or men's economic standing and their willingness to be politically engaged (providing that the channels for political engagement remain relatively open and available) is far from being straightforward. In her analysis of institutional mechanisms for gender mainstreaming, Rai concluded that there was no straightforward positive correlation between economic indicators and the influential presence of women in the public arena (Rai 2003b, p. 20). The impact of the militarisation and ethnicisation of communities in Kosovo on the processes of political and economic empowerment of disenfranchised groups (women and ethnic minorities) remains largely ignored and not acted upon by local constituencies, including women's civil groups. 'Participation' remains traditionally limited to a selected group of individuals — men and women — singled out by their identity-based inclusion in various interest groups, including male-dominated political parties and female-dominated Pristina-based NGO-sector. According to the recent UNDP study on volunteerism in Kosovo, the willingness of Kosovo inhabitants to engage in what has been described as '…an expression of people's willingness and capacity to freely help others and improve society' (UNDP in Kosovo 2004b, p. 3)
has noticeably declined since the late 1990s, especially amongst the Kosovo Albanian majority. The main reasons, according to the study, were:

- Changing conditions of life (joining Kosovo Liberation Army, for example – considered as socially beneficial volunteerism by the majority of Kosovo Albanians interviewed for the study – had been ruled out as unnecessary in the new political circumstances);

- Low understanding of volunteerism;

- Low institutional and social appreciation for volunteer work. Since most of the population face significant challenges making a living, they never think about voluntary activities (UNDP in Kosovo 2004b, p. 14).

Another large-scale representative survey conducted by the UNDP in Kosovo one year earlier, in March 2003, focused on local perceptions of the effectiveness of various mechanisms for public participation at the municipal level, and respondents’ willingness to work voluntarily in various spheres of public life. It identified ‘... a rather low willingness across Kosovo to engage in public life’ (UNDP in Kosovo 2003, p. 23). Respondents were asked to indicate their willingness to volunteer within various fields, such as crime prevention, healthcare, women’s rights, environmental protection, and ethnic tolerance. The highest percentages were recorded for the care of the disabled, crime prevention, healthcare, and education (UNDP in Kosovo 2003, p. 23). Responses, disaggregated by gender, are provided in Table 7.2.

Table 7.2: Respondents’ willingness to engage in voluntary activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BASE: all respondents, number of people</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in Care for disabled persons</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in Crime prevention</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in Healthcare</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in Education</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in Economic Development</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in Women's Rights</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in Charity</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in Sport</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in Local Infrastructure</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in Culture</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in Ecology</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in Professional Qualification</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in Ethnic Tolerance</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in Customer’s Rights</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in Other Spheres</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would not work voluntarily</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDP in Kosovo 2004b.
Disaggregated by gender, the results point to the visible prevalence of gender-based stereotypes influencing the decision of men and women to engage in voluntarily activities. While the most attractive field of volunteerism for women was women's rights (38%), only 8% of men saw it as deserving their time and attention. Some areas, traditionally perceived as ‘masculine’ and ‘manly’, received the majority of male voices (19% for sport, 31% for economic development, 14% for local infrastructure) and minority of female voices (4%, 16% and 6% respectively). Table 7.3 below lists the most attractive areas of voluntarism for men and women compared to the general trends identified by this study.

**Table 7.3: Priority given to various volunteer activities by gender**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories (descending from left to right)</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Crime Prevention</th>
<th>Healthcare</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Economic Development</th>
<th>Women's Rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Women's Rights</td>
<td>Healthcare</td>
<td>Care for Disabled</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Crime Prevention</td>
<td>Charity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Care for Disabled</td>
<td>Crime Prevention</td>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Healthcare</td>
<td>Sport</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the fact that ‘Women’s Rights’ remain a priority area of volunteerism for Kosovo women, only 38% of women expressed their willingness to participate in such activities. Compared to the combined level of 31% of men and women willing to work on any of the issues, it points to the relatively low confidence of Kosovo women in public participation mechanisms and the general unwillingness amongst the men and women of Kosovo to contribute towards improving their communities by volunteering. The further analysis of regional (municipal) variations in responses points to another important conclusion: the highest level of interest amongst both men and women in volunteering in the field of ‘women’s rights’ was recorded for Gllogovc / Gllogovac municipality (approximately 43%), the lowest level for Leposaviq / Leposavic municipality (approximately 10%), while in Pristina, the home-base for the majority of the women’s civil groups, only 23% of respondents expressed their interest in these activities. While no assumptions can be made regarding any direct linkage between the proximity to and availability of women’s groups and the level of interest in volunteering in these areas, a suggestion can be made that the general lack of role-models and positive images of activism and voluntarism affect general beliefs in the efficiency of public activities. The recent HDR for Kosovo (UNDP in Kosovo 2004, p. 50) concluded that Kosovo Albanians appeared less inclined to participate in any voluntary activities where the benefits were not as tangible and immediate:

It is very difficult I think to be accurate when estimating whether women are interested to go and do things in the community and what should be called ‘voluntarism’ and how to distinguish it from women’s daily life. In a situation when 70-80% of women are unemployed, their day-to-day activities – looking after livestock, plants,
agriculture, going to the market – could be described as voluntary. Women do get together, they do help each other, they do socialise – does it count as voluntarism?

(Interview with AN, female, Kosovo Albanian, OMIK, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

While the lack of tangible and immediate results from public participation might be one of the reasons for the passive inward looking stance taken by many men and women in Kosovo, a number of other significant factors continue to limit the ability of women in Kosovo to gain decision-making authority in all spheres of political and social life in Kosovo.

The Impact of Unresolved Political Status and Militarisation of Kosovo

The socio-political and economic oppression of Kosovo Albanians by the Milosevic regime – combined with constant threats or actual use of violence – forced many Kosovo Albanians to develop a unique system of community self-governance, responding to the regime challenges through peaceful non-violent resistance in the early 1990s (Bieber and Daskalovski 2003; Clark 2000). New political and social spaces were opened at the grassroots level, holding communities together in the face of the increasing Serbian repression. However, the emergence of these parallel structures was not just a manifestation of the discontent with Serbian policies, nor was it the process of ‘adjusting’ existing structures to the new circumstances. It was, above all, a complex political and social process leading to the formation of new power-sharing mechanisms based on existing male-dominated community structures and values (Mazurana 2005b, p. 34). According to many observers, the presence and influence of these community-based male-dominated militarised power-sharing structures has never been fully acknowledged by UNMIK. Isa Blumi has observed that from the very start, the grounds were set for serious confrontation as old networks were attacked as archaic, while the new ones only imposed a stronger sense of marginality, causing greater political divisions within Kosovo political life (Blumi 2001, p. 8). This initial disenfranchisement not only complicated the processes of establishing and making operational ‘interim’ and later ‘provisional’ institutions of self-governance, it also affected the trajectory of gender mainstreaming in the region. The issues of equality and women’s political participation remained largely affected by the legacy, in Chinkin and Paradine words (2001, at 147), of ‘intolerant nationalism’ and the galvanising burden of the unresolved political status.

The inclusion of gender-sensitive provisions in the emerging regional legal framework (see chapter 4) and the establishment of institutional machinery for gender main-
streaming at both central and municipal levels (see chapter 5) indicated that Kosovo women were officially recognised as a homogenous group possessing certain political and socio-economic interests within the processes of post-conflict reconstruction:

There was this sort of collective dehumanising labelling ‘Kosovo women’ and a ‘mantra’ that something needed to be done for ‘Kosovo women’: nobody asked us, Kosovo women, what needed to be done.

(Interview with AM, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

Mainstreaming ‘women’ along with Kosovo Serbs and ‘other’ minority groups became a sort of political currency for both UNMIK and local institutions of self-government. In this, UNMIK has often been referred to as a ‘best practice example’ of mainstreaming gender in post-conflict reconstruction contexts, due largely to the presence of a dedicated gender unit (OGA); meanwhile, ‘having one of the women-friendliest parliaments in Europe’ is often cited as one of the Kosovo PISG’s achievements towards the implementation of the ‘Standards for Kosovo’. However, the unresolved political status, a ‘bigger’ issue dominating political agendas in Kosovo, has largely subsumed ‘practical’, as opposed to ‘conceptual’, gender mainstreaming. The introduction of gender-based electoral quotas, the relative visibility of the internationally-funded women’s civil groups, and the establishment of loosely coordinated and often ineffective institutional framework for gender mainstreaming – these measures were perceived by UNMIK and the politicians in Kosovo as a significant achievement in placing women on an equal basis with local men. It was for women themselves to decide whether to take advantage of these ‘concessions’. In one of the interviewees’ words, the attitude ‘You’ve got your quota, you’ve got your law – what else do you want?’ started to prevail (Interview with OJ, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March–April 2004, Kosovo). Reflecting on the gendered nature of the impacts caused by political regime changes, Jude Howell has concluded that the consequences of adopting ‘democracy’ for women are not always predictable, nor necessarily conducive to changing gender relations in a way that would benefit women (Howell 2005, p. 243). Viewed in this light, the 1999 regime change in Kosovo indeed contributed to the opening up of political and social spaces for some groups of women in Kosovo; for others it opened a new spectrum of violent situations in politics, economy and their private lives.

Conflicting accounts exist regarding the nature of Kosovo Albanian women’s participation and political activism in Kosovo peaceful resistance and the KLA-led liberation
campaign. Melihate Termkolli, the first female representative in the ethnic Albanian assembly elected in a clandestine poll in March 1998, noted that

...there is no feminist movement here [in Kosovo] because we are endangered as a nation and our activities are conducted as member of the nation...I feel myself as an activist, not as a femi-activist.

(Quoted in Brown 1998, p. 3)

Interestingly, the mention of this quote in the course of interviewing in March-April 2004 provoked a range of responses clearly divided along institutional lines. The name of Melihate Termkolli, now a member of the Assembly of Kosovo, provoked damning criticism on the part of leadership of the women’s civil groups for ‘failing Kosovo women’ and being ‘not enough [of a] feminist’, and neutral or positive reactions from the female members of the PISG at both central and municipal levels. This reflected the rather mixed views held by Kosovo Albanian women on the nature of activism and their pre-1999 political involvement. Only a small percentage of interviewees (about 15%) openly acknowledged that activism was driven by almost purely national concerns and not on behalf of women’s and human rights; 75% agreed that it was the combination of both seen as inseparable — a sign of overwhelming solidarity over the issues of independence and women’s rights. However, Julie Mertus, analysing the role of ethnic identity in shaping femininities and masculinities in Kosovo concluded on this that

...the call for solidarity among Kosovar Albanians is so strong, and the cost of breaking rank so high, that most Albanian women cannot choose to emphasize their gender identity over their Albanian identity. And, unlike Serbs, they need not do so, as ‘Kosovar Albanian’ is not equated with aggressor but with suffering victim.

(Mertus 1999, p. 172)

The 2001 KtK report acknowledged that a number of women’s NGOs existed throughout the almost 10-year long Kosovo resistance campaign, including the Centre for the Protection of Women and Children, and Motrat Qiriazi (KtK 2001). However, the Report plays down the overtly feminist nature of this organising, pointing out that despite having political agendas aimed at improving the status of women in society, most of these organisations were mainly engaged in humanitarian assistance (KtK 2001, p. 10). Chris Corrin, in her series of articles, has presented a longitudinal gender analysis of women’s activism in Kosovo, providing background information on pre-1999 developments (Corrin 2000; 2002; 2002a; 2003a). She has also called for more research into the links between the terms on which women participated in civil resistance and the transformation of gender

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109 Personal profile of Ms Termkolli is available from Kosovo Assembly web-site http://www.assembly-kosova.org/flrane=deputet&depid=392&lang=en [accessed 7 February 2005].
politics after independence was achieved (Corrin 1999a, p. 186). The lack of previous research on the activism of Kosovo women between 1980 and 1999 and, also, the ‘post-war’ focus of this chapter restricts the scope of analysis here. However, the under-representation (and often absence) of Kosovo women from decision-making positions, especially in the first years of the UNMIK administration (Corrin 2000), tends to suggest that the participation of women in the civil resistance movement was not necessarily empowering or emancipatory. Most of the Kosovo Albanian women who were included acted primarily in a functional manner – as workers in the parallel education and healthcare systems\textsuperscript{101} and as mothers destined to keep the nation ‘alive’ against the Serbian threat. In terms of ‘breaking away’ from tradition and custom, Kosovo Albanian women were undoubtedly transformed by a paradoxical combination of tragedy and opportunity and given a chance to challenge traditional settings of dependency and subordination (Fagen and Yudelman 2001, pp. 90-91), yet, as Corrin has noted, such situations should not be interpreted in a straightforward manner. Indeed, they pose important theoretical and practical issues in terms of the differences between emancipation and liberation:

\begin{quote}
...there are important theoretical issues here in terms of differences between emancipation – equality on men’s terms and within a male-oriented and dominated framework – and liberation – which includes a concern with the expansion of social space to the benefit of women, men and children, so that this is an extended notion of equality that can liberate people from limited expectation about what people can and cannot do.

(Corrin 1992b, pp. 248-249)
\end{quote}

The analysis of various conflicts around the world demonstrates that most of the women mobilised within liberation struggles (in various roles, including participation in combat operations) are not perceived as participants with a claim to self-determination, political independence and responsibility for their own lives (Kumar 2001c; Rahn and Sirleaf 2002; Skjelsbæk and Smith 2001). This, in turn, profoundly affects women’s position when the conflict ends. Nira Yuval-Davis has argued that a reversal in the nature of women’s participation in the military after a national crisis is not uncommon (Yuval-Davis 1997, p. 47). Karame, meanwhile, has argued that there is no apparent connection between women’s political agency during conflict and their participation in national post-conflict decision-making processes (Karame 1999, Boutu and Frerks 2002, Bob 2001, Kumar 2001c, El-Bushra et al. 2002). Chinkin connects this phenomenon with the exclusion of

\textsuperscript{101} Extended rural families and traditionally strong intra-familial links were an ideal base for setting up and sustaining parallel education, healthcare and taxation systems funded by remittances sent from abroad. For more background information, including ‘pre-war’ tradition to invest migrant remittances into community development see Reineck (1999).
women from ‘peace processes’ and negotiations, where the main parameters of post-conflict reconstruction are usually defined (Chinkin 2003, p. 871).

In her analysis of structural obstacles to improving the status of women in the wake of war, Julie Mertus has described a glimpse of Kosovo Albanian women’s war-time experiences: in a burnt-out village, witnessing their menfolk killed, these women were forced to assume decision-making authority, learning how to drive, use tractors and run farms (Mertus 2003, p. 543). Responding to the argument about emancipation and liberation, Mertus concluded that ‘learning to use tractors’ is a good example of the short-terms gains women might experience in wartime; however, wartime shifts in power relations are likely to be superficial and short lived (Mertus 2003, p. 543-544). The existence of the women’s movement throughout the Kosovo liberation campaign and within the post-conflict reconstruction processes has been well documented. What needs to be examined is whether the short-lived prominence of this movement was a consequence of the changing attitudes amongst Kosovo Albanian men, reinforced by admirable activism of local women activists, or the product of the women activists alone.

The in-depth interviewing of the members of the Pristina-based women’s groups reveals that the image of an inclusive and unified women’s movement, which emerged as an integral part of the civil resistance campaign and evolved into a viable and efficient post-conflict women’s movement, seems to be a comforting idea for some in the leadership of these groups. Their reluctance to openly acknowledge that women were incorporated in the civil liberation struggle predominantly as ‘...a symbol of the national culture and tradition which is to be reclaimed’ (Yuval-Davis 1997, p. 47) seems to be having a curtailing impact on the strategies used in addressing various manifestations of gender inequality in post-conflict Kosovo, including the lack of clear strategies to meaningfully include various groups of local men and non-active ‘non-feminist’ women in formal or informal decision-making processes. However, the latter should be considered within the overall context of civic participation in the region. That is, women are, according to the Kosovo HDR, affected by a number of structural obstacles impeding their positive contribution towards inclusive and transparent democratic processes in Kosovo:

As a result of an authoritarian and, at times, violent past, lack of democratic processes and a culture of debate, dissatisfaction and impatience with international efforts to foster greater self-governance, widespread poverty, and the perception that governing institutions are unresponsive, civic participation in Kosovo has yet to evolve much beyond intermittent street demonstrations.

(UNDP in Kosovo 2004, p. 45)
Relatively little research has been conducted on the nature and impact of militarism in post-conflict Kosovo, despite the alarming evidence that ethnic and gender-based violence became, in Haleh Afshar’s words, ‘the crisis of every day life’ in Kosovo (Afshar 2003, p. 181). Before considering the impact of militarism in post-war Kosovo, it is important to broaden the conventional ‘static’ definition of ‘militarism’. Cynthia Enloe, for example, has explored the nature of militarisation by viewing it as a step-by-step process by which a person comes to be controlled by the military or comes to depend for their well being on militaristic ideas:

The more militarization transforms an individual or a society, the more that individual or society comes to imagine military needs and militaristic presumptions to be not only normal but valuable.

(Enloe 2000, p. 3)

Mazurana and other feminist scholars have pointed to the damaging effects of ‘hegemonic militarisation’, where humanitarianism is equated with military interventions, so much so that military and humanitarian agendas become indistinguishable (Jacobson 2005, p. 141; Hammer 2003, p. 231; Mazurana 2005, p.37). The March 2004 outbreak of inter-ethnic violence in Kosovo (ICG 2004a; HRW 2004), continuous discrimination of ethnic minorities and ethnicisation of political discourses in Kosovo (Bloemi 2004; ICG reports 2000-2005), increasing levels of domestic violence and the growing problem of trafficking in women and children (Amnesty International 2004) – should all be seen as symptoms\textsuperscript{102} showing the prevalence of masculinities emphasising violence, confrontation and domination. Chris Corrin has linked militarist systems with patriarchy, observing that patriarchal systems depend on the use of power, while militarist systems are based on violence and its threat – the ’intermeshing’ becomes clear in the systemic uses of power (Corrin 1999d, p. 72).

The UNMIK-sponsored demilitarisation of the region was largely institutional in its nature, seeking to transform the paramilitary KLA into a national guard-style Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and Kosovo Police Service (KPS) (ICG 2004a). However, the multiple paths through which militarisation has progressed in Kosovo, both in public and private spheres, have largely remained below the surface of public discussion and formal decision-making (Enloe 2002, pp. 22-32). The degree of ‘normality’ linked with the prefix ‘post’ in ‘post-conflict’ or ‘post-war’ life in Kosovo has little relevance to the many Kosovo women, given their experiences of militarisation and the violence associated with

\textsuperscript{102} Other symptoms, according to Sarah Archer, include smuggling, bribery, extortion, theft, money laundering, huge grey and black markets, the failure to collect taxes, import duties and tariffs and the growing presence of organised crime undermining legitimate economic development in Kosovo (Archer 2003, p. 56).
it. Militarisation, seen as a long-term process affecting a wide range of socio-economic and political transactions ‘... can move forward before the guns start firing and continue to do so after they have fallen (mostly) silent’ (Enloe 2002, p. 31). As one of the interviewees commented:

Not much has changed for Kosovo women since the end of the war – the violence did not go away. It just changed its form.

(Interview with ZQ, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

The nature of militarism and its impact on relationships between various groups of men and women has long been a subject of feminist inquiry (Elshtain and Tobias 1990). In her recent analysis of the linkages between gender hierarchy and political power, Cynthia Cockburn has observed that militarism scorches the gender line particularly deep. In a relatively unmilitarised society, a statesman or even a writer might be one of the heroic men; while for militarism the ideal value of manhood is courage and the heroic masculinity of a soldier (Cockburn 2004, p. 113). The overwhelming support of Ramush Haradinaj, a former senior KLA commander who was elected as Prime Minister of Kosovo in December 2004 (BBC news 2005) and later indicted by the ICTY for crimes against humanity and violations of the laws and customs of war (ICTFY 2005), points to the continuing prevalence of militarised heroic masculinities in Kosovo, where the rules of ‘making peace’ are still ‘...the rules of the man’s game of mutual confirmation or destruction of maleness’ (Leeuw 2002, p. 180).

Viewed from a historical perspective, the failure of the international community to avert the militarisation of the region is obvious. First of all, the insufficient attention given to the impact of the oppressive policies of the Milosevic regime and the lack of international political support to the peaceful resistance campaign led by Ibrahim Rugova contributed heavily to the emergence of the KLA as an organised movement in 1996 (Booth 2001; Clark 2000; Nelles 2005). Meanwhile, the Kosovo-wide contributions of women to peaceful resistance were largely ignored by the international community, and, in some cases, treated as suspicious by Kosovo Albanian men. The literature review conducted for this study reveals a substantial gap in knowledge regarding the structure and mechanisms of financing and functioning of the KLA. However, there is a direct indication of the extensive involvement of the KLA in larger regional networks implicated in trafficking in human beings, drugs, small arms and light weapons. Little research exists on the involvement of the former-KLA soldiers in post-war trafficking in drugs, weapons and human beings. However, Mazurana has noted in this respect that the routes used by the KLA to smuggle weapons and fighters during the war are now used to move illegal weapons, drugs and for
human trafficking; the mafias and organised crimes involved in sex trade in Kosovo often have links to the former KLA (Mazurana 2005, p. 35).

The question of Kosovo Albanian women's direct or indirect involvement in human trafficking has never been researched; indeed, if such questions were asked, they would probably be labelled as heresy by the local and some of the international women's groups and activists. In a region with soaring levels of unemployment (exceeding, according to some estimates, 65-70%), where much of the social and economic life centres around close-knit communities dominated by the legacy of ‘parallelism’ and militarism, in one of the interviewees' words:

Everyone knows what happens, when and where – especially in villages. Many families have no money to live on. I mean: no money at all. Some of the men, usually former KLA-soldiers, are known or believed to be involved in trafficking. Many people will know who they are. Their wives and family would know that they are involved into something. Something bad. But what could they do? They need to survive and there are not that many options left. It is easier to be silent. It is safer...

(Interview with ZW, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women's group, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

Difficult questions, such as whether ‘knowing or suspecting but tolerating’ amounts to indirect involvement, and the extent to which Kosovo Albanian men and women are involved in shadow and illegal economies have never been asked or researched.

Secondly, seen by many commentators and analysts as poorly justified and premature, the NATO-bombing campaign contributed to the legitimisation of force in the eyes of many Kosovo Albanians as a valid alternative to negotiation and political settlement. Commenting on the March 2004 outbreak of inter-ethnic violence in Kosovo, triggered by an isolated episode which rapidly turned into a Kosovo-wide protest fuelled by the discontent of many Kosovo Albanians with UNMIK and its policies, the ICG report concluded that

103 Santopadre, for example, commented, ‘...the Kosovo war must be judged by its overall impact on the long-term protection of human rights and its effect on the stability of international affairs. The NATO bombing of the FRY did little to advance the human rights of those living in Kosovo and in fact caused massive destruction and the death of many civilians. The Kosovo precedent also seriously undermined the legitimacy of the United Nations by setting a new standard whereby states can resort to force outside the UN in an ad hoc, unprincipled manner’ (Santopadre 2003, p. 370); see also Judah 2000; Nelles 2002.

104 Analyzing UN ‘nation-building’ in Kosovo, Michael Ignatieff concluded, ‘Kosovars also set another kind of precedent. They have proved that violence in a self-determination struggle does pay’ (Ignatieff 2003, p. 76).
...for some who are practised in armed resistance a continuation of the methods of 1998-1999 [it] is the only way forward, and they see the present situation through the lens of that war.

(ICG 2005a, p. 10)

Kosovo Albanian and Serb women were virtually excluded from the Rambouillet negotiations. No women were involved in taking decisions regarding the NATO intervention or UNMIK mission in Kosovo. Instead, Kosovo women were feminised as victims of rape and torture (Zotto 2002, p. 145). As ‘patriarchal militaries need feminised military wives and feminised military prostitutes’ (Cynthia 2004, p. 6), patriarchal peacekeeping needs its feminised rape-survivors – devoid of political agency and decision-making authority. However, a key lesson emerging from a number of ‘positive action’ initiatives within post-conflict settings is that attending a meeting or ‘sitting on a council’ – while an important first step – does not always amount to ‘active participation’. There are also conflicting views with regards to whether women and men who have substantial experience in informal processes (which, arguably, gives them a solid basis for entering formalised political processes) are necessarily ready to apply these experiences in formal institutional settings and whether these experiences are necessarily applicable and relevant (Bouta 2005, p. 60). Examining the trajectory of women’s participation in El Salvador’s post-conflict developments, Bouta has observed that it should not be unreservedly assumed that women’s presence in the peace process would guarantee the inclusion of gender equality issues on the agenda (Bouta et al. 2004, at 53).

The third aspect, often overlooked within peace and security studies, is, in Sandra Whitworth’s words, ‘...any sustained analysis of the overwhelming reliance on soldiers to conduct peacekeeping operations’ (Whitworth 2004, p. 12). It evokes the questions of whether peacekeeping, conducted by military-trained peacekeepers, is actually able to fulfil its purpose – ‘to keep peace’ and to dismantle the militarised and often ethnicised systems which led to the conflict in the first instance. In her gender analysis of modern peacekeeping Whitworth has concluded that there is a fundamental contradiction of using individuals – mostly men – trained for combat warfare to conduct peace missions (Whitworth 2004, p. 184).

Although no systematic research has been conducted on the militarisation of Kosovo society, the prevalence of domestic violence in the region, the alleged large-scale involvement of Kosovo Albanian men and international personnel (Amnesty International 2004) in trafficking in women and girls, the disproportionate budgetary expenditures on
KFOR forces\(^{105}\) indicates that UNMIK and KFOR are yet to contribute to creating alternative visions of peaceful and tolerant masculinity (Connell 1995). A number of factors have contributed to the ongoing militarisation of the region, largely drawing on the collective sense of insecurity of the Kosovo Albanians (Reineck 1991; 1993).\(^{106}\) The ethnicisation of political discourses in Kosovo has created a situation in which Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs were legitimately perceived as two distinctive groups with, according to Isa Blumi, ‘...separate but equal facilities to conduct daily life’ (Blumi 2001, p. 14).\(^{107}\) Brendan O'Shea, a former European Union Monitor researching developments in the Balkans since 1995, has noted that today's Kosovo is both an economic and political failure, continuing to be the most unstable region in the Balkans; ‘...a perpetual hothouse of racial hatred, ethnic violence, and organized crime, where the ultimate political solution will almost certainly involve partition (O'Shea 2005, pp. 61-62). The reluctance of the international community to pursue any partition scenario in Kosovo has resulted in a situation where one of the fundamental problems facing UNMIK is how to reconcile the obligation of Resolution 1244 to respect the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and the seemingly non-negotiable pro-independence sentiments of many Kosovo Albanians. On the other side, the suspension of Kosovo's final status and the resulting failure to end the war – as opposed to freezing it – has preserved the political dominance of political forces which either draw their authority from their KLA's wartime exploits or rely on nationalist myths and independence rhetoric (ICG 2004a, p. 8).

'Social militarisation', as a process by which ideas of militarism and society became interrelated, has affected nearly all facets of life in Kosovo. The March 2004 inter-ethnic riots in the region revealed that the scale and social impact of this inter-relationship seems to be poorly understood by the major skate-holders in Kosovo, including local women's groups. The outbreak of violence coincided with the fifth anniversary of the beginning of the NATO bombing. An ad hoc group of local NGOs, including women's groups, called a demonstration in the centre of Pristina, laying flowers for the NATO soldiers as a clear sign of their appreciation for what had been done – 'freed' and 'liberated'.

\(^{105}\) According to the Kosovo General Budget 2003, total annual expenditures in Kosovo in 2003 came to 3,086 million Euro, including estimated 2,000 million Euro spent on KFOR, 368 million Euro on UNMIK and only 438 million Euro included into Kosovo consolidated budget (Kosovo PSIG 2003).

\(^{106}\) See also Michael Ignatieff commenting: 'The Kosovars' collective sense of themselves as intended victims of genocide helps to explain the lack of affect with which they tell you, for example, that there had been Serbs in their apartment blocks in Pristina but they were all in Serbia now – except, of course, the old lady who had been thrown into her bathtub in her clothes and drowned by a young Albanian couple looking to take over her two rooms. Of course, people regret this crime, even feel shame for it, but there is something else in their eyes as well: indifference' (Ignatieff 2003, p. 68).

\(^{107}\) See Isa Blumi also observing that ‘...UNMIK... mobilizes a rhetoric of liberal democracy through institutions which operate on the grounds of those ethnic divisions... The very institutionalisation of “ethnic” difference implicitly accepts the racist pretext...’ (Blumi 2001, p. 14) distinguishing ‘Albanians’ from ‘Serbs’ and vice versa.
Kosovo. No one suggested or dared to campaign against the long-term psychological, economical and environmental consequences of the bombing campaign. Neither the local government, nor local civil society had managed to create an avenue for mobilisation in opposition to the ideas of violence—‘Say it with flowers’ has failed to displace ‘say it with murder’ (ICG 2004a, p. 28). In her recent analysis of the gendered nature of peacekeeping, Mazurana took the risk to question ‘the unquestionable’—the very nature of women’s organising for ‘peace’, suggesting it is important to transpose the feminist critique of ‘homogenising’ women into understanding what women do. The impact of—and the contribution towards—social militarisation by Kosovo women’s groups has never been questioned. Almost automatically assumed to be ‘peace-loving’ and ‘peace-making’, ‘maybe a bit radical at times’ (interview with WJ, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March—April 2004, Kosovo), these groups have never been considered to be agents or participants in the processes of social militarisation. As Mazurana has argued however,

...it is not inevitable that one’s own understanding, agenda, or goals become militarized...these temptations may be especially strong for international and local actors engaged in issues of gender and peacekeeping because militarizing one’s agenda, even slightly, may offer promises of a voice in important matters such as ‘security’, and access to ‘first-class citizenship’, ‘equality’, resources, and some of the most powerful institutions and bodies.

(Mazurana 2005, p. 38)

Having failed to openly criticise local institutions of self-government and the authoritative Kosovo Albanian men within these institutions for their somewhat inadequate response to the riots—and the local media for the sensationalist reporting of the ‘renewed’ backlash against Kosovo Albanians—the Kosovo Women’s Network chose to condemn violence in general terms, laying flowers to NATO-soldiers instead.108 This demonstrated that having access to resources and ‘first-class citizenship in Kosovo is indeed based upon the allegiances to local ‘patriarchs’ or, in one of the interviewees’ words:

...one’s ability to manoeuvre and be seen as not necessarily ‘loyal’ but not critical or too unsympathetic.

(Interview with ZR, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March—April 2004, Kosovo)

Most of the interviewees acknowledged that the March 2004 events should be perceived as the warning indicator signifying the extent to which ideas of militarism have be-

108 Cynthia Enloe notes in this respect: ‘Militarization is a sneaky sort of transformative process. Sometimes it is only in the pursuit of demilitarisation that we become aware of just how far down the road of complete militarization we’ve gone’ (Enloe 2004, p. 145).
come prevalent in transitional Kosovo. Much concern was expressed over the danger of over-simplifying the cause of the riots, which, according to one of the interviewees, would be portrayed by the western media as ‘... yet another sign of Albanian’s ‘barbaric nature’’ (Interview with PJ, female, Kosovo Albanian, PISG, March –April 2004, Kosovo). This, according to the majority of interviewees, would overshadow the ‘real’ reason: overall discontent with UNMIK policies and the drastic economic situation of the region. Alexandra Gheciu, in her recent analysis of the UNMIK administration and its response to the March 2004 ethnic rioting, has criticised the rather simplistic interpretation of the causes put forward by UNMIK. However, as an alternative, she unproblematically appealed to the convenient image of Kosovo Albanians, described by Reineck (1991; 1993) and Mertus (2001): oppressed and frustrated victims. She criticised the international administrators failure to ‘capture the broader causes of violence’ resulting from Kosovo Albanians’ frustration over the unresolved status of Kosovo and ‘UNMIK’s inability to kick-start the economy’ (Gheciu 2005, at 130).

The recent UNDP study of regional voluntarism has revealed that the majority of Kosovo Albanians considered membership of the KLA as a form of voluntarism (UNDP in Kosovo 2004c, p. 8). Another study, completed by Jennifer Brown in 1998, pointed to the growing prevalence of militarised femininities amongst some Kosovo Albanian women: ‘I’d take up a gun myself if I weren’t so skinny,’ says 19-year old Adelina Ismajli, Miss Kosovo 1997’ (Brown 1998). For some Albanian women, Queen Teuta (the most famous Albanian matriarch) and heroic female warriors Shote Galica and Ganimete Terbeshi fighting alongside their husbands during Balkan wars, became timely role-models (Brown 1998, p. 2). More research is needed to fully understand the role of Kosovo women in the ongoing processes of militarisation and de-militarisation within the region, challenging the limits of essentialist Peaceful Women/Violent Men discourse (Skjelsbæk 2001, pp. 64-65).

It was a common view shared by most of the interviewees that bringing more women into formal decision-making would almost certainly contribute to, as one of the interviewed women put it, ‘social trauma healing’ and social, as opposed to institutional, de-militarisation. Yet feminist analyses of increasing women’s presence within male-dominated environments has demonstrated that bringing more women into male-dominated decision-making arenas does not necessarily challenge the prevalence of militarised masculinities (Connell 2000; 2002; DeGroot 2001, Smith 2001). Mira Chenoy and Achin Vanaik have observed that women can be as effective in conflict resolution as they can be in promoting militarism and conflict. The closing of the gender gap cannot in itself be expected to address the conflict and violence associated with it (Chenoy and Vanaik 2001, p. 133). Therefore, one of the essential tasks for all actors engaged in post-conflict recon-
struction in Kosovo is to facilitate and support a reconciliatory approach to addressing the root causes of regional militarisation. In doing this, the role of the media, education and civil society is paramount. A deliberate and conscious effort is required to overcome a simplistic presumption regarding straightforward relations between economic development, or personal well-being, increasing levels of women’s representation and the demilitarisation of Kosovo society.

Kosovo: broadening ‘gender’ to include men

The need for gender analyses and gender mainstreaming to include various groups of men and women and shift from an exclusive focus on perspectives of a single group of women has recently become a focal point of feminist and human rights discourses (Charlesworth 1999; Connell 2000; Erlulk 2004; Gierycz, 2001; Hannan 2003). Dorota Gierycz, for example, has pointed to the breadth of men’s experiences, including those from alternative non-governmental movements (Gierycz 2001, p. 28); Ruth Jacobson has criticised the widespread equation of gender with women (and women with mothers), which puts an examination of men and masculinity out to bounds, making it difficult, if not impossible, to grasp the structures of gendered power relationships that have permeated the lives of women and men in conflict (Jacobson 2005, p. 143). At the same time, achieving gender equality should not be perceived as the unconditional process of taking power away from ‘men’ and re-distributing it to ‘women’: ‘Empowerment should not be seen as a zero-sum game where gains for women automatically imply losses for men’ (Hannan 2003, p. 2). Ideas of masculinity should not be simply countered with ideas of femininity based on the essentialist vision of inherently ‘peaceful women’ and ‘violent, war-prone men’. Despite the existence of evidence pointing to the systematic nature of gender-based violence against Kosovo Albanian men (including rape), this has never been widely accepted by the local women’s groups and the wider donor community: ‘In rare instances men also reported having been sexually assaulted’ (Ward 2002, p. 93).

Content analysis of the interviewees’ accounts and a longitudinal analysis of the gender mainstreaming policies in Kosovo reveals the prevalence of a limited ‘either-or’ understanding of gender amongst Kosovo Albanian men and women. According to this, gender mainstreaming is largely perceived as a tool for advancing women’s rights and responding to the interests of women in Kosovo. While the majority of Kosovo Albanian men seem rather indifferent towards gender equality and women’s interests (largely enjoying the benefits of what Cockburn has labelled the ‘patriarchal dividend’109) the Kosovo

109 Cockburn defines ‘patriarchal benefit’ as ‘...the advantage that accrues to men, as individuals and as a collectivity, from a gender order in which men and masculinity are dominant’ (Cockburn, p. 34).
Albanian women’s movement has developed strategies for making economic and political discourses ‘gender-sensitive’, without the active involvement of their male counterparts. All of the women interviewed in March-April 2004 responded positively to questions regarding the importance of involving local men in gender mainstreaming activities, yet none of the respondents could identify a clear strategy for developing partnerships with men for eradicating sexism and militarism in institutional and individual mind-sets. Currently, no systematic strategy exists at any level for involving Kosovo Albanian men in any of the available gender-specific programmes. A number of isolated training workshops and education campaigns have, however, been launched over the last few years. One of them, a gender awareness workshop in which several men participated, was organised by the Gender Training and Research Centre in Pristina. Reporting on this occasion, the OMiK newsletter noted that

Fifty-four Ashkali, Kosovo Serb and Kosovo Albanian community members participated in the workshop that provided training on women’s issues such as gender and sex, gender needs and mainstreaming gender in civil society.

(Hoffmann 2003, p. 2)

It is evident from OMIK’s publication that the prevalent view amongst international and local communities in Kosovo (including many women’s groups) is that gender is equated with ‘women’s issues such as gender and sex’ even if the event or initiative involves men and boys. The uneasy relationship between ‘feminist’ and ‘non-feminist’ Kosovo Albanian women has translated into varying views on the role of Kosovo Albanian men in the gender mainstreaming project. On the one hand, Kosovo Albanian women involved in official decision-making at various levels have criticised ‘Kosovo NGO-women’ for being ‘overtly feminist’, ‘not willing to negotiate’, ‘pursuing their own agenda’, ‘being marionettes dependent on international funding’. On the other hand, Kosovo Albanian NGO women’ have criticised the women involved in official decision-making for being either ‘men in skirts’ or ‘voiceless parliamentary dolls’ accommodating male authority and promoting patriarchy. Nearly all of the respondents (90%) criticised UNMIK and its male leadership for their failure to promote ideas of equality and human rights and ignoring local expertise. At the same time, none of the interviewees cast any criticism on the male-dominated PISG and, more generally, Kosovo Albanian men. A member of an international donor-organisation, providing funds to a number of women’s NGOs throughout Kosovo, commented that

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110 Based on interviews with women from Kosovo PISG, including female Kosovo Assembly members - March-April 2004, Kosovo.
Instead of attacking and criticising UNMIK and internationals, local women should scrutinise their own men, their own government. They should also stop for a second and see what the problem is with the women’s movement itself. And actually, there are quite a few.

(Interview with ZU, female, international, international organisation, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

The influence of tradition, the deteriorating economic situation, increasing levels of domestic violence and an exclusion of women from formal decision-making were referred to as the main factors affecting the lives of Kosovo Albanian women. Yet none of the interviewees directly attributed this phenomenon to the prevalence of militarised masculinities amongst Kosovo Albanian men. Content analysis of the interviewees’ accounts reveals that Kosovo Albanian women neither directly associate the lack of gender equality with the predominance of patriarchal attitudes perpetuated by Kosovo Albanian men, nor do they perceive Kosovo Albanian men as possible partners in challenging the ideas of gender inequality. Yet the challenge of en-gendering the processes of post-conflict reconstruction depends, in Connell words, on ‘re-shaping gender’, which would allow a diversity of masculinities and femininities to grow (Connell 2000, p. 21-33). None of the female interviewees in this study could provide an alternative to the processes of ‘taking men’s power away’ which seemed to be integral to their personal translations of the idea of achieving gender equality into institutional practices and strategies. The divide between politically and socially active Kosovo Albanian women and the majority of Kosovo Albanian men often turns into a visible confrontation between urban women activists and rural Kosovo Albanian men:

They see us as urban, Western-educated, Western-influenced. Feminists. Witches. Less of their ‘real’ woman. They think we are out of touch with local traditions and customs, respected by the majority and therefore we have no moral or political authority to influence how things are and will be in Kosovo.

(Interview with ZI, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

Another interviewee, representing a women’s civil group, noted that

I don’t believe we could change men. To start a men-specific programme – would be to divert money from women’s budget – we could probably educate ten or fifteen men without any guarantee that they would not return home and beat their wives. For the same money we could help thirty women – psychologically, legally, fund her stay in the shelter.
On the other side of the divide are the Kosovo Albanian and UNMIK male politicians, who have acknowledged the prevalence of gender-based violence, widespread gender-based discrimination and a deteriorating socio-economic status of Kosovo women, but have failed to meaningfully integrate sustainable and sufficiently funded mechanisms for achieving gender-equality into the regional reconstruction and development effort. Interviewed in March 2004, a male head of the governmental department responsible for mainstreaming gender within the PISG responded to a question regarding the relevance of UN SC Resolution 1325:

I am not quite sure. I do not know. We already have one Resolution [1244], so the second one would only complicate things in here.

(HH, male, Kosovo Albanian, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

Interestingly, when confronted with the fact that the head of the governmental department tasked with gender mainstreaming was unaware of Resolution 1325 (seen by many women’s rights activists as a tool to build momentum for change starting from the very foundations of the women’s movement – individual women’s groups and NGOs), a senior leader of the Kosovo Women’s Network did not hesitate to blame UNMIK’s Office for Gender Affairs for failing to educate Kosovo politicians on the UN’s commitments to gender equality. The convenient image of a suffering victim (now the victim of the UNMIK-sponsored ‘conspiracy’ to keep the women’s movement and Kosovo Albanians generally uninformed) came into play again. Some of the female interviewees acknowledged that any opposition to the gender-blind governmental policy would almost certainly be interpreted by male politicians as a threat to the existing status-quo. Meanwhile, mobilisation of the women’s groups, especially in the run-up to assembly or municipal elections in Kosovo, has been often seen as political and ‘feminist’, and therefore, threatening. Without diminishing the role of the Kosovo women’s movement in raising awareness on the issues of domestic violence, women’s political participation, equality and human rights, it is possible to conclude that the need to change perceptions and attitudes of local men, and to theorise and practice such change has not yet been conceptualised by the women’s movement in Kosovo as a strategic priority.

Post-1999 Women’s groups in Kosovo: factors and obstacles
The nature of the post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo has provided Kosovo women with a number of entry points into the predominantly male-dominated realm of politics. This does not necessarily mean that the availability of such points made the entry unproblematic
(Andersen and Sim 2004; Matland and Montgomery 2003), yet the fact that the large-scale UN-involvement in regional reconstruction created certain conditions not always available in other post-conflict contexts must be acknowledged.

Firstly, the UNMIK-managed interim and later provisional institutions of self-government in Kosovo were conceived as a medium to facilitate the inclusion of Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo minority groups into the process of democratic self-governance (UN 1999a). The provisional institutions of self-government were set up to be governed by a set of formalised rules originating from UNMIK, drawing upon a combination of international human rights standards placed within a neoliberal political framework and ensuring the promulgation of gender-sensitive legislation, including electoral gender-based quota provisions (Kardam 2004, Klausen and Maier 2001). Also important was the international support to fractured and fragmented post-war civil society in Kosovo, where women-led and women-oriented non-governmental organisations assumed a leading role in providing social services to women and children, particularly those affected by the conflict (Baker and Haug 2002; Corrin 2000). The women's movement and issues of gender-equality have been gradually brought into the public arena thanks to the increasing publicisation of issues, the use of media and communication networks, and UNMIK's pressure to introduce gender into regional legislative and political frameworks as an integral part of the civil and political rights' discourse.

Cynthia Cockburn, analysing women's inclusion in the UN-sponsored reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina, identified five central 'themes' important in the process of shifting emerging post-conflict democracy towards what she calls 'gender democracy'. These include economic independence (income-generating projects, skills-training, micro-credit schemes); action against violence against women (SOS phone lines, shelter projects); legal advice (resolution of housing disputes, legal advice on divorce, alimony, inheritance and other perennial problems made more urgent and more complex by war); reconciliation work; and getting women more involved in politics (educational seminars, encouraging women to register and use their vote in elections, calling politicians to account) (Cockburn 2002, pp. 71-72). To a greater or lesser degree, all of these themes are being addressed and acted upon by various actors involved in the post-conflict reconstruction of Kosovo (Baker and Haug 2002; Corrin 2000; KfK 2001; SIDA 2004). However, despite the availability of various initiatives seeking to empower Kosovo women politically and economically, their evaluation and assessment have remained grey areas for all of the constituencies involved in gender mainstreaming and women's advocacy. According to a Kosovo Albanian interviewee:
The opening of a SOS-line for the victims of domestic violence, for example, becomes some sort of political currency for the male-dominated municipal authorities – especially if funded from the municipal budget. They would not bother to assess how many women called, how many women knew but did not call and would not call; why this happens and how we could help those women.

(Interview with ZP, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

Despite the growing number of training initiatives and NGO projects throughout Kosovo, the awareness of gender equality issues amongst men and women, women’s rights and the existing legal mechanisms and remedies for addressing the violation of these rights remains low. The numerous press releases on the launches of the training initiatives have rarely addressed three basic questions: Who participated and who didn’t? Why? and What are the consequences? According to the study conducted in January – February 2005, women in Kosovo ‘...possess little information regarding their legal and constitutional rights’ (Kosovo Gender Studies Centre 2005, p. 6). Equally, attending a seminar on women’s empowerment does not necessarily make women empowered if the seminar is not accompanied by processes at various levels opening women-friendly political spaces.

A recent example of the Kosovo Women’s Network’s involvement in a large-scale public campaign on changing the electoral law in Kosovo invokes, in Enloe’s words, a ‘feminist curiosity’: if women’s views are ‘represented’ – are they really represented? Dissatisfied with, in the network leader’s words, the ‘quality of women in the Assembly’ (Interview with FJ, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March - April 2004, Kosovo) and, generally, men elected into the Assembly of Kosovo under the system of closed electoral lists, the Kosovo Women’s Network in cooperation with a number of other NGOs advocated for changes in electoral regulations, calling for an end to political protectorates and manipulation, in favour of ‘accountable political figures no matter men or women’ (ibid) elected through open electoral lists and enhanced geographical representation. Acting on behalf of Kosovo women, Pristina-based organisations staged a number of demonstrations, distributed leaflets and posters, and sent a number of petitions to the SRSG of UNMIK and the Head of OMIK, demanding to re-consider the electoral framework. However, according to a recent Kosovo-wide study by the ‘Kosovar Gender Studies Center’ on the voting preferences of women in Kosovo, only 14.2% of respondents understood the difference between open and closed electoral part lists; 11.6% gave the wrong

[^111]: According to the OMIK representative commenting on the calls for re-division of Kosovo into electoral districts, or constituencies, to ensure better geographical representation, such decision would inevitably lead to dramatic deterioration of inter-ethnic relations in ethnically-divided Kosovo municipalities (Interview with JW, March - April 2004, Kosovo).
answer and 54.6% did not know the difference (Kosovo Gender Studies Centre 2005, p. 24). In this light, the KWN's claims of ‘representing the views of Kosovo women’ in campaigning for changes in electoral law seems to be unsubstantiated and points to the apparent diversion of women’s groups energies towards opportunistic political campaigning.

The March 2004 inter-ethnic rioting in Kosovo has demonstrated that Kosovo civil society remains dangerously weak and fragmented:

Kosovo’s thin layer of civil society is inadequate to absorb and dissipate shocks, instead, such shocks are liable to transmit immediately into violence. Much of civil society is urban, international donor-driven and unable to make a real grassroots impact.

(ICG 2004a, p. 33)

Monica Llamazares and Laina Reynolds Levy have commented that the local NGOs were seen as having a unique capacity to positively contribute to peace-building processes in Kosovo, yet the nature and impact of this capacity needed to be critically explored (Levy and Llamazares 2003, p. 1). Analysis of the interviewees’ responses to the question about the weakness of the women’s movement in Kosovo points to the three main reasons. All of the interviewees acknowledged the courage and dedication of the first women’s groups who dared to challenge traditional views on women’s roles and capacities. Yet, they were not able to sustain this change, and involve and ‘...convert more and more women’ (Interview with TJ, female, Kosovo Albanian, OMIK, March - April 2004, Kosovo). Secondly, most of the interviewees acknowledged that having a trusting relationship with local community leaders and politicians does not necessarily mean that women’s groups are capable of winning their trust and support, and engaging them effectively in both political and socio-economic activism:

As women, we could all come together, have tea and a nice chat... but it does not mean we could all easily agree and then act as a team on many issues.

(Interview with ZA female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

Thirdly, most of the interviewees acknowledged that there was less ‘we-ness’ amongst Kosovo Albanian women than existed during the time of peaceful resistance.

On the other side, analysis of the interviewees’ accounts also reveals a number of positive characteristics, including the independence of many women’s organisations from the major political parties, and political independence of the women’s movement in general from the PISG and UNMIK thanks to the financial independence afforded by external international sponsorship, selling of publications and crafts, and donations from individuals.
The respondents also identified four main challenges facing the post-1999 women’s movement in Kosovo:

1. **Social and Cultural Factors**: women’s groups in Kosovo are forced to constantly challenge ‘traditional’ views about the place of women in the society held by both men and women in Kosovo;

2. **Political Factors**: the majority of the interviewees believed that opportunities for realistic engagement with political power at central and municipal levels were lacking. All of the interviewees acknowledged that women were participating in the public sphere on a larger scale thanks to the post-conflict legislative and institutional developments, but men remained in control of the region and were responsible for making key policy decisions. All of the interviewees expressed concerns about the prevalence of nationalism and ethnicity-based politics, dominated by the issue of political status. The latter, according to one of the interviewees, was ‘...like a red blindfold on a bull’s eyes’ for the majority of Kosovo politicians. The damaging influence of the ‘top-down’ decision-making, the lack of tolerance for individuals daring to challenge the hegemonic discourses of those in power, and the prevalence of corruption, clientelism and patron-client networks were also mentioned.

3. **Dependence on international donors’ support**: most of the interviewees acknowledged that Kosovo women’s groups were dependent on international funding.

4. **Problems of effective self-management and cooperation**: content analysis of the interviewees’ accounts reveals that nearly all respondents, either directly (mostly interviewees from the ‘outside’ of the active women’s groups) or indirectly (mostly interviewees active within the Kosovo Women’s Network) acknowledged the increasing fragmentation of the movement, a lack of unity and a dispersion of energies on over-duplicated programmes and competition to obtain funding support.

Analysis of the interviewees’ accounts also reveals some rather dubious relationships existent between the regional government and women’s groups in Kosovo. Interviewing the representatives of the Kosovo women’s movement reveals a serious lack of trust and confidence in the PSIG in circumstances where institutionalisation of political

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112 One of the conclusions from the recent study into voting preferences of women in Kosovo is that ‘With regard to the role of women in the family and society, the Kosovar woman tends to identify with traditional rather than modern ideas’ (Kosovo Gender Studies Centre 2005, p. 30).
power through legitimate institutions of self-government was a clearly stated priority and strategy of UNMIK and the international community in Kosovo. ¹³

Most of the interviewees representing women's groups strongly criticised female parliamentarians for 'lacking the understanding of women's problems', for 'not doing enough for Kosovo women' and for 'being of bad quality'. Another set of conflicting views was expressed by some of the senior women activists regarding UNMIK and, to a lesser extent, the PISG: 'we lost our trust', 'the government is male-dominated, gender-blind and gender-biased'. This points to the complexities of a 'love-hate' relationship existing between the women groups and UNMIK/PISG. ¹⁴ Interestingly, some members of the women's groups did not approve of the emerging institutional machinery for gender mainstreaming. All of them acknowledged the fact that certain institutions existed at both municipal and central levels, yet only a few women provided positive comments about their possible contributions towards the empowerment of women and achieving gender equality. ¹⁵ This finding coincides with an opinion voiced in the 2000 Report on the situation of women in politics in Kosovo:

NGO women are reluctant to support the establishment of governmental gender equality machinery. They are afraid of the possibility that this machinery will kill their initiative in the civil society, as was the case in the past.

(Gender Task Force 2000)

Levy and Llamazares have concluded on this issue that the legacy of distrust towards the state has '...meant that Kosovo Albanian civil society developed a tradition of not communicating or cooperating with governmental structures' (Levy and Llamazares 2003, p. 3). While it is true that neither UNMIK nor the PISG were prepared to recognise and act on the legitimacy of Kosovo women's advocacy, it is equally true that the women's movement in Kosovo did not fully acknowledge their role in influencing the governmental agenda by targeting their activism.

¹³ See, for example, ICG report pointing to the prevalence of distrust towards official governmental institutions in Kosovo 'Kosovo's society has a residual addiction to the clandestine — a preference for focusing on shadow rather than daylight and upon the hidden agenda' (ICG 2003b, p.4).

¹⁴ This situation is not unique to Kosovo. Kardam and Acuner Selma described the same nature of relationship between the state institutions and women's NGOs in Turkey in their analysis of the national machineries for gender mainstreaming (Kardam and Acuner 2003, p. 103).

¹⁵ Analysing the gendered nature of citizenship in the context of democratisation and economic reform in East Central Europe, Einhorn and Sever discussed the 'civil society gap'...whereby linkages between women's grassroots activity and state-level institutions are either non-existent or inadequate' (Einhorn and Sever 2005, p. 39).
Kosovo Women groups: divisions within and between

Most of the Kosovo Albanian women's groups are affiliated with one (or sometimes several) of the women's networks, including the largest 'Kosova Women's Network', the 'Kosovo Women's Initiative', the Businesswomen's network, the Roma and Ashkali Women's network, and the Kosovar Network of Serbian Women's NGOs, founded in 2003 (KWN 2003a).

The Kosovo Women's Initiative (KWI), a continuation of a rather controversial 1999-2000 programme funded by the US State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration and administered by the UNHCR and its implementing partners, currently works through a collection of regional Women's Councils. These councils include representatives of various local groups and organisations. The KWI programme aims to contribute to the overall improvement of the position of women, minorities and returnees in Kosovo through the development of political, social and economic self-sufficiency and enhanced advocacy.

The Kosova Women's Network (KWN) is an umbrella organisation of Kosovo Albanian women's groups working towards the inclusion of women in the processes of post-conflict reconstruction, providing a variety of community services to vulnerable groups, such as training, advocacy and psychological support, and special ethnic re-conciliation initiatives for Roma and Serbian women. It was founded in 2000 and now consists of seventy-seven groups active throughout Kosovo. In this, the influx of international funding (Baker and Haug 2002; Corrin 2000) combined with a non-restrictive UNMIK Regulation (UNMIK 1999a) led to the 'mushrooming' of NGOs in Kosovo. Accordingly, the yearly increases in the membership of the KWN are often presented by the leaders of the movement at both international and local arenas as a demonstration of their strength and success. However, critical questions regarding the efficiency and capacity of the women's organisations to go beyond their differences in policies, values and objectives, and link their specific local issues to struggles at the regional level (Randriamaro 2004) have never entered the official rhetoric of the leadership of the movement. The variations in size, resources, capacities and scope of activities amongst the member-groups can be attributed in part to their longevity and geographical location. For example, two of the oldest NGOs - the Cen-
centre for the Protection of Women and Children and Motrat Qirazi – are also among the strongest institutionally. Meanwhile, forty-three of the seventy-seven NGOs are located in Pristina and Prizren – Kosovo’s two largest cities – which also host UNMIK, international NGOs and donor agencies. While located in Prizren or Pristina or other municipal centres, most of the organisations stretch their activities to include surrounding villages, or have municipal offices throughout the region. Most of the organisations were established in 1999-2000 in the atmosphere of optimism and hope following the expulsion of Serbian security forces, and the gradual opening of political space for Kosovo Albanian men and women. Generous international assistance also became available during this period for civil-society organisations, leading to the previously mentioned ‘NGOization of feminism’ (Lang 2000, pp. 290 – 304).

The currently existing organisations can be classified into three broad categories. Organisations belonging to the first group, such as ‘Aureola’ and ‘Women in Action’, provide economic and income support to various groups of women, including vocational training in income-generating activities and adult education. While these efforts cannot be expected to overcome the widespread poverty, they should be perceived as providing an important contribution towards the much-needed structural change in traditional perceptions of femininity and masculinity:

We do not give out money to women. We are trying to develop skills that could help them to earn money; we are trying to challenge their beliefs that business is not a ‘women’s business’. We are also trying to heal their psychological traumas by bringing them together, so even if it is an ‘economic’ project on the books, we are trying to achieve so much more.

(Interview with ZS, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

However, some of these organisations have been criticised for reinforcing widespread stereotypes and misconceptions regarding gender roles, by organising gender-stereotyped programs such as sewing and hairdressing courses and offering training in non-marketable skills (Baker and Haug, 2002; Ingimundarson, 2003).

Some Kosovo women’s organisations, such as the ‘Centre for the Protection of Women and Children’ and the ‘One to One Centre for the Counselling of Women, Children, and Families’, have also been active in social fields, working against domestic violence and the trafficking in women and girls, and providing psychological support. In addition to organising awareness campaigns on the issue, some of these organisations also provide direct support to victims of domestic violence, providing housing, psychological counselling, legal assistance and vocational training. Meanwhile, the local women’s or-
ganisations were amongst the first to raise awareness of the issues of forced prostitution and the trafficking in women and children (Amnesty International 2004).

Several women's organisations actively support democracy and human rights and work towards the promotion of women’s participation in the public arena. In this, Motrat Qiriazi and Kallabria were among the first to organise voter-education programmes for the Municipal Election in October 2000. Supported by UNIFEM and OMiK, they organised meetings, workshops and printed literature to encourage both men and women to vote. In doing this, women’s groups have been more successful at the municipal level, significantly increasing the support given by local communities to female members of the municipal assemblies. Some of these groups remain closely affiliated with political parties, some operate on an independent non-partisan basis, and others rely on the international agencies’ support, acting as their implementing partners. This diversity represents the variety of local capacities and, in a long-term perspective, how they can shape the future prospects for peace building and social reconciliation.

Political divisions between the various women’s groups in Kosovo is visible at various levels (such as between urban and rural groups), and in various shapes (such as between ‘quality’ and ‘non-quality’ women). As noted by many Kosovo Albanian women activists, the lines of division and non-communication between the various groups of women in Kosovo reflects the lines of the major re-negotiation of power and ethnicity

and financial flows within and between the communities:

I think behind this mask of one all-inclusive women’s movement in Kosovo hides the whole range of little movements. I think in a way this is normal: women from Pristina cooperate with women from Pristina, women from villages come together, Serbian women would prefer to come together with Serbian women if they have a choice – we have to be realistic about it. The problem, I think, that there is no genuine effort to cooperate. I think we should be honest and acknowledge the differences and then work together.

(Interview with ZD, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women’s group, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

In addition, a simple lack of technical capacities, such as telephone lines and a reliable postal system, and a lack of security (including freedom to move freely) and social infrastructure were among the problems mentioned by the majority of the interviewees:

When we started, the [telephone] lines were so bad so we could not even talk, now we have mobile phones; but still sometimes we need to get together and talk about

125 In March 2004, each of the three ‘main’ ethnic groups in Kosovo had its own women’s network.
things; many women in rural Kosovo have no mobile phones and no money
even for a bus fare — so there is a problem of access to resources...

(Interview with ZF, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women's group,
March - April 2004, Kosovo)

Some women activists, taking a particularly strong anti-UNMIK stance, suggested
that the international administration was deliberately obstructing the lines of communica-
tion in an attempt to usurp their transformative potential. However, the lack of co-
operation and obvious divisions between and within the various women's groups in
Kosovo cannot be explained without looking into the root causes of the current political
and social instability in the region. The political and socio-economic reconstruction proc-
esses in Kosovo, as noted earlier, are firmly embedded in complex frameworks of identity
relations that shape the way Kosovo Albanians and Serbs see themselves and each other. In
her 1993 article on the changing visions of 'Self' and 'Nation' amongst Kosovo Albanians,
Janet Reineck questioned whether the obsession with conservative ideals, the culturally-
based familism and the notions of gender stratification shared by many Kosovo Albanians
would ever be transformed into socially accepted ideas of justice and egalitarian practice
(Reineck 1993). While considering the same issue from a 'post-conflict' perspective, an
ICG report concluded that

Kosovo Albanians have not produced political leadership able to unify them around
a transforming vision. Broadly the society looks backwards, viewing the future
through grievances about past injustice and present security worries, rather than
taking a problem-solving attitude toward the Serb minority, Belgrade, and neigh-
bouring states.

(ICG 2005a, p. 8)

Content analysis of the interviewees' accounts and the existing literature, including
publications produced by various women's groups in Kosovo, reveals that there is a lack of
organisational links between the diverse groups of Kosovo Albanian women and a near
total absence of cooperation between the women's groups and Kosovo Albanian men.
What follows is an overview of the most apparent lines of division between the various
groups of the Kosovo Albanian women's movement. Importantly, acknowledging the exis-
tence of internal divisions within the women's movement does not undermine the contribu-
tion of the various women's groups to the construction of a sane and safe society in
Kosovo. Indeed, thinking in strictly 'good' or 'bad' terms limits what we allow ourselves
to see and act upon. It also must be recognised that more research is required on the nature
of these divisions. While some of them are functional in nature and essential for the func-
tioning of the larger systems of power-sharing they belong to (such as the 'Government' -
'Civil Society' divide), others are clearly political in their nature, created and sustained alongside and within communities to justify often inconspicuous and invisible discursive practices of privilege and exclusion (Bouta 2004, p. 75).

A particularly deep line of division runs through the women’s movement itself, separating it from the larger group of Kosovo Albanian women in general and fragmenting the movement as a whole. Some of the interviewees – members of the Pristina-based women’s groups – mentioned that quite often Kosovo Albanian women employed by internationally funded NGOs were criticised by local unemployed ‘non-NGO’ women for having access to paid employment, international travel and other benefits.

I could understand why some women are getting upset. Lack of economic security, lack of jobs and widespread poverty make working for an internationally-funded NGO a good option... well... for many women it seems like a good option. Some women are trying to get in, others cannot because of their domestic responsibilities or family, others criticise but would not even consider joining but there is certainly a certain degree of anger and mistrust, maybe jealousy – it is very difficult to generalise.

(Interview with ZG, female, Kosovo Albanian, OMIK, March – April 2004, Kosovo)

None of the respondents, however, questioned whether this growing alienation of women’s communities from politically active women’s groups was a consequence of the larger processes within the movement itself. Recent research into the ‘voices of Kosovo women’ conducted by Kosovo-based organisations and researchers, asking ‘...a broad cross-section of ordinary Kosovan women what they think’ (KWN 2005a) found a growing sense of dissatisfaction with the quality of life in Kosovo, a growing feeling of disempowerment and low levels of civil participation amongst the women of Kosovo (Kosovar Gender Studies Center 2005; KWN et al. 2004). However, neither of these reports offered any critical appraisal of the movement’s role and contribution towards empowering Kosovo women since the opening of political spaces for women’s groups in 1999. Instead, both reports favoured hard-line criticism of the provisional institutions, UNMIK and women MPs. In this respect, the words of Caroline Ramazanoglu and Janet Holland ring especially true:

It seems difficult for those who are privileged (for example, by class or material advantage, racism, heterosexism, being able-bodied) to recognize their own contri-
butions to the maintenance and reproduction of relevant discourses and institutionalised power relations in their everyday practices.

(Holland and Ramazanoglu 2002, p. 112).

The relations between the Pristina-based leadership of the KWN, other groups in the network and individual women activists ranges from mutual support and cooperation to open mistrust and confrontation. From a review of the existing literature\(^2\) and content analysis of the interviewees' accounts it is clear that the Kosovo Albanian women's movement has been dominated by a relatively small number of 'NGO matriarchs' or 'gatekeepers' — women perceived and actively (self-) promoted as wiser and more knowledgeable than their contemporaries (Walsh 2001). Reluctant to delegate decision-making authority to lower levels, the charismatic leaders have tended to monopolise power, yet visibly remaining the advocates of participatory approaches and team-work (Baldwin and Kumar 2001, p. 141). Deepa Dhanraj, reflecting on the many challenges facing woman's movements around the globe, has urged women's activists to close the gaps caused by complex asymmetries of power within the movement. In this she calls for a closing of the gaps between 'thinkers' and 'doers', between non-English speakers and English speakers, and between web-surfers and others (Dhanraj 2004, pp. 94-95). It remains to be seen to what extent these recommendations will be acted upon by the women's groups in Kosovo in the near future, especially when the issue of the region's political status is resolved and the women's organisations are likely to acquire the more hefty status of 'national' organisations.

**Intersections between gender, ethnicity and class in Kosovo Albanian society**

When considering the direction of post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo, the emerging legal and institutional systems for gender equality should be viewed as legitimate vehicles for political and social engagement of various groups of women and men in political and socio-economic recovery of the region. However, the impact of post-conflict reconstruction policies varies - Kosovo Albanian women and men, usually defined as a homogenised group, 'Kosovo Albanians', in opposition to homogenised 'Kosovo Serbs', live in very different situations and conditions based on gender, ethnicity, age, sexuality, migratory status, social class, political affiliation and/or religion. By homogenising experiences

\(^2\) The post-1999 developments within Kosovo women's movement are regularly covered in the KWN's newsletter published since 2001. Spring 2005 issue, for example, contains an article 'Thousands of Women gather for Beijing+10' on Kosovo women's delegation activities in New York in connection with the Beijing+10 Conference, organised by the UN Commission on the Status of Women. Kosovo delegation included Luljeta Vuniqi, Igballe Rogova and Sedie Alimeti - three charismatic leaders of the Kosovo Albanian women's movement who speaking on behalf of Kosovo Albanian women (KWN 2005a, p. 4).
and expectations of 'Kosovo women', the international administration has increased existing and, arguably, created new divisions, not only between 'men' and 'women' of Kosovo, but also between various groups of Kosovo Albanian women in access to social, economic and political power.

The formation of a new 'class system' in post-1999 Kosovo Albanian society has yet to be fully documented and researched. However, as this Study demonstrated, the post-conflict developments in Kosovo have dramatically altered pre-war patterns of social organisation in the region, where familial allegiance and belonging formed the basis of privilege in access to resources and political power. Changes in the very nature of political power and resources have promoted a new post-1999 'class system' to emerge. Individual economic status in Kosovo is no longer based on a number of relatives emigrating to labour abroad and sending remittances back home. Instead, an individual proximity to various international funding schemes - as a main source of income generation in economically impoverished Kosovo - became a significant, if not defining, factor; while the political authority became a product of political opportunism and one's ability and preparedness to take advantage of the new UNMIK-sponsored routes to power - either through hastily organised 'democratic' elections or by taking advantage of the 'right' employment opportunity with UNMIK or the PISG. Unconditional and complete dedication to clandestine political struggle and willingness to risk life in the name of the 'nation' became relics of the not-so-distant past, when being a 'politician' was not considered a profession and did not pay back in convertible Euros:

...to become important when the 'internationals' arrived - not as important as 'internationals' but certainly more important than other Kosovo Albanians - you just had to fill in the right application form; you had to know how to fill it and where and when to submit it...

(Interview with VA, female, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo women's group, March - April 2004, Kosovo)

'Western education', knowledge of English and ability to fill in endless forms became important factors in defining individual locations vis-à-vis the new governor - UNMIK - reluctant to 'go local' and expecting 'the locals to come forward'. The re-configuration of political 'clientilism' in Kosovo (Levy and Llamazares 2003; UNDP in Kosovo 2004) suggests that some individuals or organisations with strong connections to 'where the money is' - UNMIK or higher echelons of the PISG' are more likely than others to be granted exclusive access to resources or funding. The access to financial resources, paid employment and political decision-making became contingent not only on the fact of
who you are' and 'who you are loyal to' but also on 'where you are', exacerbating the existing divides between urban and rural Kosovo.

As this Study has demonstrated, the ethnic and post-1999 class differences and divisions among Kosovo Albanians, including Kosovo Albanian women inside and outside the Kosovo women's movement, became a basis of access to resources and political power. Such divisions along ethnic and class lines compromised the ability of many organisations representing various (geographically and 'class'-based) groups of women to come together to define and work towards a unified mandate taking advantage of the available legal and institutional opportunities. The quota provisions in central and municipal elections and the UNMIK-sponsored introduction of gender mainstreaming machinery at all levels of self-governance placed Kosovo politicians, including politically active Kosovo Albanian women, under pressure to address a range of requirements put forward by the 'internationals' as a pre-condition for the well-anticipated 'status-issue' negotiations. No space was left for step-by-step processes of political, ethnic and social reconciliation and for working through difference. The achievement of gender equality in Kosovo has been organised along a simplistic dichotomy of 'privileged men' vs. 'unprivileged women', wherein the purpose of gender mainstreaming was to elevate the social, economic and political statuses of Kosovo Albanian women to those of men as if all Kosovo Albanian women were unequal in relation to men but equal to each other, and they were and are not. The Kosovo Albanian women's movement in Kosovo, taking its anti-intemational and anti-'men in power' stance, is noticeably falling short of acknowledging the widening differences, cultural, social, and economic gaps among women, inside and outside the movement and, in the light of these differences, lack of common goals and strategies.

The existing policies, including the ambitious 'Kosovo Action Plan for the Achievement of Gender Equality', do not acknowledge differences and relations between women on the basis of age, ethnicity, class, educational background, or geographical location. There has been no mapping of the relationships between UNMIK, women's groups, women within governmental institutions to determine the prevalence and impact of clientelism:

Gender mainstreaming in Kosovo has been appropriated by educated local elites who have access to the funds and information. There are numerous trainings, workshops and seminars for these groups but not much reaches women in the province or women who are in the real grassroots

(Interview with VC, female, international, international donor agency, March - April 2004, Kosovo)
The message sent by the international administration and taken up as a homogenising agenda by the women’s movement in Kosovo is empowering and forward-looking: ‘Kosovo women have a role to play in the future of Kosovo on equal footing with Kosovo men’: it challenges traditional hierarchies and expectations emphasising women’s right to political participation and decision-making. However, the policies and strategies to achieve such ‘equal footing’, introduced by UNMIK and adopted by the local women’s groups, male and female politicians, have largely failed to acknowledge the widening divisions among various groups of women exclusively along the lines of gender, ethnicity, age, urban/rural origin, education and political loyalties. In this light, the gender mainstreaming policies in Kosovo should move from its focus on ‘women’ to the questions of ‘which women’, ‘which women are privileged; how and why?’ recognising the subtle ways in which gender interacts with ethnicity, socio-economic status, social and cultural identity, to influence access to various forms of decision-making. Kosovo women’s groups find themselves struggling between (a) the desire to respect diversity of specific locations, interests, perspectives that lead to the risk of fragmentation and of not achieving a consensus necessary to respond to challenges; and (b) trends towards homogenisation by focusing on one or a few common objectives and identities and thus risk losing sight of the broader picture.

Social transformation of exclusive and militarised society in Kosovo could only occur when it is demanded by large segments of local populations, including both men and women; but such demand could only come about when a large majority of women are empowered economically and politically.

The pre-1999 Kosovo Albanian women’s organising has all the features of, in Korac (2006) words, ‘anti-essentialist and democratic feminism’ – inclusive of women differently situated in urban/rural, class and other structures. However, as this Study demonstrates, the way in which access to political and financial resources was institutionalised by the international administration failed to ‘immunize’ Kosovo Albanian women’s movement against repressive constructions of ethnic, class, and national identity. A number of women groups in Kosovo continue opposing the politics of exclusion and separation based on ethnicity by advocating ‘civil’ rather than ethnic politics and political engagement; however, they remain marginalised within the ‘mainstream’ or male-dominated political initiatives in the region. When the threat of ethnicity-based genocidal cleansing and sexual violence had been removed by the means of military intervention (the 24th of March – the beginning of NATO bombing campaign against Serbia – is still celebrated in Kosovo, with Kosovo Albanian women delivering flowers to KFOR soldiers stationed in the region), the re-conciliation process between Albanian and Serbian women started, however the very rationale for ethnic re-conciliation in Kosovo is ambiguous: the majority of Kosovo Alba-
nians could only see their future independent of Serbia and ‘anything Serbian’ (Interview with PM, female, Kosovo Albanian, March 2004, Kosovo). The ‘politics of everyday life’ (Korac 2006) in post-1999 Kosovo have mutated into a politics of negotiating access to extremely scarce economic resources, where Kosovo Albanian women and men – most of them poor and unemployed – are positioned in incompatible and mismatched ways; while spaces for constructive political engagement remain limited.

Conclusion
In analysing the nature and content of the political participation of Kosovo Albanian women in unofficial or informal decision-making channels, this chapter has uncovered an inherent contradiction between the two approaches to political participation favoured and practiced by the international administration and the PSIG on one side, and the local women’s movement on the other. In fulfilling the institution-building mandate provided by Resolution 1244, the international administration in Kosovo has followed a formalistic ‘institutional’ route, focusing on the establishment of institutional and legal machinery. This machinery has included specific gender mainstreaming departments and laws, guaranteeing the ‘quantitative’ inclusion of Kosovo Albanian women. In essence, the institutions and laws were created for women with those institutions and laws – and not the empowerment of women -- in mind. This formalistic approach has contributed to the precarious situation (particularly given the unresolved political status and overwhelming militarisation and ethnicisation of the region), where ‘institutionalised’ gender mainstreaming efforts remain ill suited to address the problems of gender and ethnic inequalities in Kosovo.

On the other side, another approach to the political inclusion of women has been developed by the Kosovo Albanian women’s movement. The movement behind this approach, capitalising on the political gains achieved in supporting the clandestine Kosovo Albanian liberation, has claimed that the mechanisms allowing the political participation of women were already available and needed only further development involving the local expertise of local women. Meanwhile, the overtly negative stance taken by the local women’s movement in response to UNMIK’s institutionalisation of gender mainstreaming efforts, including their rejection of the electoral quota mechanisms, significantly undermined the credibility of the movement in the eyes of local men and many women.

The analysis of the involvement of Kosovo Albanian women in informal political processes has demonstrated the importance of challenging homogenised imagery of a unified women’s movement. In criticising UNMIK’s neo-colonial approaches to post-conflict reconstruction, the ‘gate-keeping’ Pristina-based women’s organisations have managed to achieve international recognition as the organised representative of all women in Kosovo.
fighting the international hegemony. However, as this and other research has demonstrated (Kosovar Gender Studies Center 2005; KWN et al. 2004), the years of post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo have witnessed a deepening of the rifts and divisions within the women's movement along political, ethnic, institutional, urban/rural and a number of other lines. In this light, the 'women's movement in Kosovo', as it is known internationally and locally, cannot be considered as representative of the women of Kosovo. In this, many groups of Kosovo women, such as parliamentarians and women working within the PSIG and others, are often left out of analysis. In this light, a gap in our understanding of the complex intra- and inter-group dynamics has been identified which warrants further research and investigation.

It has also been identified (matching the findings of recent investigations on Kosovo women’s political participation (Kosovar Gender Studies Center 2005)) that many Kosovo Albanian women prefer to stay out of both formal and informal politics, not taking advantage of the available mechanisms for political participation. A number of factors influencing women’s choosing to be politically inactive have been identified, including the deteriorating economic situation in the region; the re-emergence of traditional attitudes towards the ‘natural roles’ of men and women; and the ethnicisation and militarisation of political and socio-economic discourses. However, further investigation is required regarding the complex interaction of these factors within varying socio-economic and political contexts. In this light, access to decision-making (whether formal or informal) should be treated not as a fact secured by the availability of certain access-mechanisms, but as a process of making informed decisions with regards to participation. Accordingly, the project of political reconstruction must look at the behaviour and attitudes of women and men to uncover what has political meaning and what works for them in particular contexts.
Chapter 8: Conclusion

Introduction
In considering the trajectory of gender mainstreaming in the context of the post-conflict reconstruction occurring in Kosovo between 1999 and 2004, this research has incorporated the concept of a post-conflict ‘window of opportunity’ as a criteria against which to assess the impact of UNMIK’s policies and local women’s groups’ activities aimed at gender mainstreaming. The so-called ‘window of opportunity’ emerged in the context of the UN-managed post-conflict reconstruction, and presented a variety of actors in Kosovo (including the international administration, the local institutions of self-government and local women’s groups) with an opportunity not only to ‘feminise’ regional politics, political practice and political institutions, but to ‘engender’ the post-conflict reconstruction of the region.

However, the immediate and intermediate outcomes of these processes have been compromised by the short-lived political and social nature of the post-conflict ‘window of opportunity’ and the practical difficulties of incorporating and capitalising on the variety of experiences of war and peace of local men and women. Influenced by the inadequate manner in which gender has been mainstreamed by UNMIK, and the unpreparedness of many local women and men to re-define gender relations both ‘in public’ (driven by the ‘status-issue’ requirements imposed by the international community) and ‘in private’, the gendered experiences of local men and some local women became more legitimate than those of others, fuelling complex dynamics of inclusion and exclusion.

The swift re-emergence in Kosovo Albanian society of traditional practices and attitudes towards gender took place in a climate of overwhelming militarisation and ethnification, intensified by the unresolved political status and continuously deteriorating economic situation of the region. The interconnectedness and interdependence of these processes, and the relatively short time-span in which social and political changes have occurred makes analysis and theorising in this area challenging. In this light, these complex socio-economic and political processes were considered within the broader context of the changing nature of contemporary conflict, informed by the blurring of the demarcation between war and peace, the complex interaction of ethnic and gender identities, and the context-specific nature of international responses to the changing dynamics of war. This research has demonstrated the relevance of recent theories on the consent-based/neocOLONIAL models of UN nationbuilding, pointing to the lack of local ownership of the re-construction processes in Kosovo and its detrimental impact on regional gender mainstreaming policies.
By demonstrating the difficulties faced by UNMIK in 'integrating in' and 'integrating with' diverse local political and social constituencies, this research has uncovered the challenges of integrating the breadth of both local and international views on gender mainstreaming into decision-making processes within the regional context. By pointing to the diversity of actors involved in gender mainstreaming in Kosovo, this study has demonstrated that as there can be no one unified category of 'women' in war and peace, there can be no one unified group of 'men', 'peacekeepers' or 'policy-makers'. It has also demonstrated that against a backdrop of local and international criticism, the UN interim administration in Kosovo has established legal and institutional frameworks conducive to increasing the presence and role of local women in the continuing processes of post-conflict reconstruction and development, particularly within the context of the anticipated resolution of the political status of the region.

UN Peacekeeping

Critical accounts of the unpreparedness of UN peacekeepers for modern peacekeeping – a form characterised by exceedingly complex gender and cross-cultural dynamics – started to appear in the early 1990s in response to the increasing number of UN-managed peacekeeping operations. In this, the nearly total exclusion of women and girls from the male-dominated 'peacekeeping business' was one of the main lines of criticism. However, by the end of the twentieth century, the lack of women within national peacekeeping contingents and at 'peacekeeping' negotiating tables took the form of a 'visible invisibility'. This included the 'political appropriation' of gender-related discourses by male-dominated (and increasingly globalised) political and economic elites. Indeed, in the realm of male-dominated and militarised peacekeeping, a distinct tendency has emerged over the last five years, following the adoption of Resolution 1325, to 'fit' or 'compartmentalise' 'womenandchildren' (Enloe 1990) into numerous projects and policies, usually designed without the meaningful involvement of women. This process has been described by some feminists as the 'ghettoization' of women in peacekeeping. Meanwhile, the 'NGO-ization' of the women's movement in Kosovo appears to be limiting the potential socio-economic and political sites in which transformative change might occur.

At the same time, the international women's movement campaign to raising awareness of Resolution 1325 has led to the advent of another generalised perception. In contrast to the conventional imagery of women as victims and rape-survivors, a new ideological construct has emerged (supported by charismatic local women activists and international women's networks) of women as agents of change and grassroots organisers working for peace, opposed to men who are held as perpetrators or 'rather useless and irrelevant figures
who leach [women's] energies and resources' (IDS, p. 21). Accordingly, the diversity of women (and men), their roles, opinions on and position within the diverse and chaotic conflict environments have often remained overshadowed by the politics of recent international feminist campaigns. By analysing the dynamics of the involvement / exclusion of Kosovo women's groups in the processes of post-conflict reconstruction, this research has demonstrated the negative impact of these two ideological constructs, calling for more nuanced analysis of the forms of political participation of men and women and their contributions to conflict-resolution in Kosovo.

**Legal Framework**

Post-conflict nation-building contexts provide a clear opportunity for the comprehensive reform of national legal systems. In Kosovo, two major factors have determined the nature and opportunities provided by this 'window of opportunity'. In this, the post-conflict 'nationbuilding' project in Kosovo has been managed and supervised by the UN - an international norm-setting and consensus-building multilateral institution. In addition, the majority of the Kosovo Albanian population have openly rejected the pre-war ‘Serb’ law, offering UNMIK an opportunity to re-install the entire legal system in the region, incorporating the principles of gender equality and non-discrimination at its foundation. However, in both their design and enforcement, all new laws must be not only gender-sensitive but also adjusted to the local cultural context.

This study has analysed the four main areas of legislation in which gender-specific provisions have been introduced by UNMIK. These areas include: 'social welfare' and 'security' legislation, support-legislation for gender mainstreaming, and 'statutory' mechanisms for gender equality. This study has demonstrated that the adoption of gender-sensitive legislation has largely occurred through an unsystematic 'one-off' movement, resulting in poorly coordinated and largely unenforceable pieces of legislation. Despite the general availability of substantive legal norms capable of addressing many, if not all, gender-related issues in all four areas, the implementation mechanisms were not adjusted to the chaotic post-conflict realities on the ground; realities heavily influenced by the re-emergence of traditional attitudes towards gender roles and identities, by the ethnicisation and militarisation of political discourses in the region, and by the lack of local traditions of democratic governance. In the light of the overwhelming legal illiteracy in the region and the lack of region-wide legal awareness-rising initiatives, customary law has started to sideline UNMIK's 'statutory law', particularly in rural areas. The official 'UNMIK law' has increasingly become considered a 'foreign invention', imposed and morally corrupt
(especially its prescriptive gender/women-related provisions) and therefore not worth abiding.

The absence of a nationally/regionally agreed to 'Constitution' embodying the nation’s collective principles and beliefs has contributed to the ‘legal’ marginalisation of gender in the eyes of local male-dominated decision-making elites. The field-work undertaken in Kosovo has demonstrated that the formal commitments of UNMIK and the PISG to gender mainstreaming, including the provision of maternity leave, inheritance rights, protection from domestic violence and forced marriages have not been vigorously applied (through education, enforcement and impact evaluation) to challenge the inherently patriarchal social organisation of the region. Rather, they have been deployed for various instrumental reasons, such as meeting the ‘Standards for Kosovo’ or as formalistic responses to the persisting international criticism of the two bodies for their failure to curb the trafficking of women and girls and domestic violence.

It is generally accepted that gender-sensitised national legal frameworks can effectively perform the role of the solid and vital foundation on which any further activities towards achieving gender equality must be based. However, in the context of the undefined political and legal status of Kosovo, the very notion of ‘national’ is politically and socially contested. By the end of 2004, the year in which the Law of Gender Equality in Kosovo was adopted, a substantive, legally binding and enforceable constitutional definition of gender equality in Kosovo remained lacking. In the absence of a conventional Constitution containing a legally enforceable charter of fundamental rights, the Law on Gender Equality established gender equality as a fundamental value for the democratic development of Kosovo. The Gender Equality and Anti-discrimination laws were drafted by international legal experts with the involvement of local stakeholders. Entirely reasonable, ‘implementable’ and capable of delivering anticipated outcomes if applied within the context of Western democratic systems, these laws attained the status of ‘framework legislation’ in Kosovo thanks to weak regional traditions of democratic self-governance, a lack of institutional experience, weak public administration mechanisms and flaws in budgetary processes.

In this light, it is reasonable to conclude that the international administration in Kosovo has managed to create a diverse body of gender-specific and time-specific provisional ‘legislation’ using the established legal principles of guaranteeing gender equality in law. While this legislation remains time- and context-specific thanks to the unresolved legal and political status of Kosovo, it has set the basis for further law-making processes by the democratically and locally elected Assembly of Kosovo. In considering the development of a legal regime for gender equality and gender mainstreaming in post-conflict
Kosovo, this study has demonstrated that the availability of gender-sensitised legislation did not necessarily result in gender-sensitised policies and practices, pointing to the significant influence of other factors, including the prevalence of discriminatory gender-biased attitudes, a lack of democratic processes, and the militarisation and ethnicisation of political discourses in the region.

Institutional Framework for Gender Mainstreaming

Based on field-research in Kosovo and the available literature on the development of the PISG, this study has identified a significant lack of political will at the highest levels of the PISG to ensure that gender equality is made explicit at all levels of policy formulation and resource allocation. The institutional frameworks governing the post-conflict reconstruction of the region remain largely non-conducive to gender equality, despite the existence of a dedicated gender mainstreaming machinery at all levels of governance. As of December 2004, the main elements of this machinery include: (a) the Inter-Ministerial Group (Council) for Achieving Gender Equality and Ministerial Gender Affairs Officers, (b) the Advisory Office for Good Governance, Human Rights, Equal Opportunities and Gender Equality, (c) the UNMIK Office of Gender Affairs, and (d) dedicated Gender Mainstreaming Machinery at the municipal level. However, this system remains under-funded, alienated, devoid of executive authority and largely unsupported by local communities and women’s groups. The establishment of a dedicated gender mainstreaming machinery at the early stages of post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo was indisputably a positive development. However, its implementation powers were seriously undermined by the lack of an overarching legal foundation delineating the responsibilities, decision-making powers and funding mechanisms for each of the elements. This significantly damaged its credibility in the eyes of the local male-dominated political leadership. In this light, ‘gender mainstreaming’ in Kosovo has been conceptualised by the international administration as a strategy to create gender-specific institutions – commissions, offices, focal points and bureaus – filled with mainly female staff and charged with vague gender mainstreaming mandates.

By considering the main elements of the existing machinery, this study has identified three types of institutional arrangements, including (a) regional women’s groups and networks exclusively focusing on women’s issues, (b) gender-specific governmental departments and agencies seeking to pursue a broader gender mainstreaming mandate, and (c) political institutions not entrusted with explicit gender-specific mandates but included in various roles and capacities in the gender mainstreaming machinery, such as the Statistical Office of Kosovo. The post-1999 experiences of two Kosovo Albanian women’s organisations – the Centre for the Protection of Women and Children and Motrat Qiriazi –
represent a situation where 'indigenous' organisations with a history of grass-roots organising, expertise and local knowledge remain excluded from the 'official' post-conflict reconstruction effort. This demonstrates that no matter how capable and dedicated, individual commitments cannot live up to their potential if institutional arrangements are insufficient. The examples of UNMIK’s Office of Gender Affairs and the Inter-Ministerial Group for Achieving Gender Equality demonstrate that even officially legitimised institutions endowed with a certain degree of political and financial autonomy and influence cannot fulfil their mandate if their designated role is inappropriate, if their place within the overall framework of the institution is unclear, and if their relations with other institutions are weak. The example of the Assembly of Kosovo uncovers an arrangement where women have gained certain (legally and internationally imposed) representation within a patriarchal male-dominated institution, yet the influence of traditional images of femininity and gender prejudice remains overwhelming. In such circumstances, the presence of a 'critical mass of women' is not sufficient to change the gender-biased dynamics; this study found no evidence to suggest that the increased representation of women within the Assembly of Kosovo and municipal assemblies has led to the 'engendering' of existing policy agendas.

Reflecting on the unclear institutional and organisational links between numerous gender mainstreaming machineries at central and local levels of provisional self-government, it is clear that there is a considerable lack of communication between governmental institutions and Kosovo civil society, including women’s groups and networks. Rejected by the local women’s groups as an extension of the male-dominated political agenda, marginalised within the political parties and not understood and supported by the majority of local population, the institutional machinery has started to show the first signs of mutation into a nominal governmental structure, unable to implement the transformative visions of equality set out in the ambitious Action Plan for the Achievement of Gender Equality. In this, the recently created local institutions for mainstreaming gender are often perceived as a continuation of UNMIK’s ‘Western-imposed’ agenda – not adjusted to local realities and disrespectful of local opinions and expertise. It is important therefore for all components of the emerging institutional framework to define gender issues in their own language and devise their own methodology; otherwise the theory and practice of gender equality in Kosovo are doomed to remain a foreign import.

Gender Mainstreaming in Kosovo: The Way Forward
The mandate of UNMIK predated Security Council Resolution 1325 and does not make any direct references to gender. This has had a negative impact on the allocation of human
and financial resources available for gender mainstreaming in Kosovo. The need for dedicated gender mainstreaming funding has recently been acknowledged by the Assembly of Kosovo, which introduced specific budget mechanisms in the 2004 Law on Gender Equality in Kosovo. However, despite valid criticism of UNMIK's insensitivity to local understandings of gender and gender equality, UNMIK in cooperation with the JIAS and the PISG of Kosovo has made a significant overall contribution towards mainstreaming gender both inside and outside its structures since 1999. The approach of these institutions towards gender mainstreaming largely relied on targeted institutional interventions as opposed to any holistic strategy which could have enabled UNMIK to realise its full potential in gender work in Kosovo. Developing institutions were prioritised at the expense of developing human capital; this, in turn, has constrained the effectiveness of established institutions. Making gender equality work requires time, patience and continuous engagement in efforts for short and long-term change. Local men and women must be involved throughout the cycle of gender mainstreaming. However, in addressing the unequal status of women in Kosovo Albanian society, the UNMIK applied the model of external peace-building interventions, where communities affected by conflict are assumed to be parties to the conflict and therefore unable to build peace and work towards reconciliation on their own.

The on-going transfer of responsibilities from 'central authority', represented by UNMIK, to local post-conflict institutions of self-government, has resulted in gradual diffusion of authority and decentralisation providing an appropriate framework for the adoption of a holistic approach towards gender mainstreaming. However, many opportunities and channels available for gender mainstreaming have not been used to a full extent. Dialogue among the government, other local bodies, community leaders, civil society groups, including women groups' remains fractured, while newly established democratic structures have been developed but not made clearly visible and accessible for various local constituencies.

This study has identified a need to revisit guiding conceptual frameworks and explores unique understandings of what gender equality means for different organisations, communities and individuals involved in gender mainstreaming at various levels. These different understandings inform a range of policy decisions and actions. The agreeing on context-specific definitions should form the basis for a unifying strategy, which could provide clearer directions for future work. It should be recognised by all constituencies involved in gender mainstreaming at various levels, that inequalities of social, economic, and educational backgrounds affect understandings and perspectives of what gender equality means and how it could be achieved not necessarily invalidating them. A bottom-up proc-
ness of debate and discussion is required in order to adjust 'gender mainstreaming' to the unique cultural and geographical locations, to transform gender mainstreaming equated with institutional and legal reform into a range of 'gender mainstreamings' – a combination of coordinated and funded strategies aimed at ensuring that interests of all groups are accounted for, studied and addressed. This would help to overcome the expectation widely held within Kosovo Albanian society that separation and partition is a way forward. 'Equality in diversity' should become an organising principle for women's groups, the government and local communities. Such an approach should intend to mainstream age, gender and diversity as linked components. The nearly 5-year span of gender mainstreaming activities in Kosovo makes another approach, the 'cluster approach' relevant. In this approach, relevant constituencies cooperatively focus on a set of identified areas, or “clusters”, that have been identified as gaps, sharing expertise and accountability for gender mainstreaming in these areas. This Study has identified a number of such areas, including the insufficiency of support networks for women in rural areas, which could enable them to influence decision-making processes at the level of communities and municipalities.

The institutional structure and gender mainstreaming tools applied by each agency in Kosovo vary considerably. In some cases this is necessary given their differing mandates and institutional cultures. Some of the constituencies have been and remain more active in mainstreaming gender than others. However, it should not be used as a weakness but as a strength. There are numerous ways in which gender-work can be improved through closer attention to information sharing, coordination and collaboration between the PISG agencies at municipal and central levels, Pristina-based and rural women's groups and organisations, and UNMIK and international agencies. Agencies should learn and benefit from each other's approaches to mainstreaming and foster greater collaboration: PISG and UNMIK should continue developing stronger partnerships with the KWN to promote and implement the Kosovo Gender Action plan. However, in order for this to happen, the number of gender-related posts and dedicated gender mainstreaming funding should be proportionate to the size of the organisation and the complexity of gender challenges.

Work should continue towards raising awareness of gender issues. Greater knowledge will encourage more women to come forward to report gender-based violence and to challenge discriminatory norms and practices. Dismantling stereotypes and fear is a process and it should be adequately funded and supported. A special effort is required to sensitise local men in positions of power, at central and municipal levels; it should be balanced with programmes sensitising large numbers of gender-blind UNMIK international staff and NATO troops who will eventually leave the country. Programmes should be developed
focuses on local men and boys; they should be actively involved in gender work, not only as beneficiaries of gender training but also as active agents and facilitators. Gender training should not be voluntary but mandatory for all staff within UNMIK and the PISG including senior management. A special effort is required to continue raising public awareness about gender issues through means such as radio programmes, audio-visual productions, printed materials, special events, and exhibits. So far, local public information channels have not been fully used for the dissemination of relevant information. Information about gender should be disseminated throughout Kosovo in a simple language and in local dialects that could be easily understood.

Reporting is a key element of ensuring accountability, awareness on gender issues and monitoring the impact of policy implementation. This Study demonstrated that in some cases, available information, including gender-disaggregated data, might not be sufficiently incorporated into institutional reporting procedures; it may also go through the chain of ‘gatekeepers’. The reporting procedures by various institutional agencies also vary in terms of depth and quality of what is submitted. As a means to overcoming this problem, the relevant gender mainstreaming agencies should standardise reporting processes and information-sharing procedures.

In conclusion, the example of Kosovo demonstrates that gender mainstreaming should not be understood as fiscal and administrative reforms but as a set of strategies adjusted to specific contexts that explicitly deal with power dynamics and cultural change, challenging relational and material hierarchies (Rao and Kelleher 2005). Despite existing difficulties and ongoing institutional mismatches between various constituencies involved in gender mainstreaming at various levels in Kosovo, the contribution of UNMIK in making gender considerations a valid factor in legal and institutional reform, and the contribution of the Kosovo women’s movement in making gender mainstreaming a political component of post-conflict reconstruction agenda are invaluable. In the light of anticipated withdrawal of UNMIK from Kosovo, it is important to use the power of international authority to ensure that gender considerations are not left out of the ‘changing rules of game’ when the stated and un-stated rules, determining who gets what, who does what and who decides, change again. What needs to be done by various constituencies for a gender momentum generated by the international administration and women’s movement to not disappear when the independence of Kosovo is officially proclaimed in one form or another, deserves particular consideration and further investigation. The four years of post-conflict gender mainstreaming in Kosovo have contributed to the formation of formal institutions and formal policies, thus setting the ground for further work. The latter should bring local constituencies together, including politically active men and women, to con-
continue working towards (a) improving women’s economic and social conditions of life, including access to economic resources, health services and safety; (b) challenging gender-biased informal norms, including cultural and religious practices; and (c) mobilising men and women to gain new political skills, knowledge, and consciousness to enable them to contribute towards the re-building of a new Kosovo—where equality in diversity becomes not only a social value, but also a guiding principle of socio-economic and political development.

Women’s Participation and Representation in Official Decision-Making

Considering the participation of Kosovo Albanian women in formal political institutions, this study has demonstrated that gender and ethnic ‘concessions’ (such as gender quotas or reserved seats for ethnic minorities) designed to remedy existing disadvantages have been only reluctantly accepted by the local male-dominated Kosovo Albanian political leadership. This has resulted in the emergence of limited legally sanctioned ‘zones of inclusion’ for women and minorities. The under-representation of Kosovo Albanian women outside of the quota-guaranteed zones of political inclusion remains significant. Despite the availability of mechanisms to ensure women’s numerical representation (enshrined in the 2004 Law on Gender equality in Kosovo), women remain excluded from positions of leadership and influence at all levels of regional self-governance.

Despite recent progress in formalising institutional arrangements for gender mainstreaming within the provisional institutions for self-governance, a lack of trust and a dissipation of loyalty shown towards the official gender mainstreaming institutions on the part of the wider feminist and women’s rights community is pervasive; the political participation of women remains low throughout Kosovo, and women’s groups remain largely excluded and, increasingly, exclude themselves from official decision-making. Meanwhile, the Gender Equality Office, established by the Law on Gender Equality as a special unit in charge of gender mainstreaming at the regional level, remained inoperative nine months after the promulgation of the Law. However, content analysis of the interviewees’ accounts reveals that against a backdrop of low levels of trust and confidence in the PISG and the international administration in general, Kosovo women have perceived the inclusion of women in the official decision-making processes as a matter of justice; as relating to women’s unique contribution and diversity; as important for substantive representation; and as crucial in changing public perceptions of politics. However, most of the interviewees have voiced concerns about the nature of women’s representation in central and municipal assemblies, pointing to the lack of a unified women’s voice that could compete
with other items on the political agenda and the limited capability of female MPs to represent and advocate for women's interests.

Content analysis of the interviewees' accounts reveals the predominance of a somewhat limited understanding of gender mainstreaming amongst the Kosovo Albanian women activists, wherein 'gender mainstreaming' in the context of the political transition in Kosovo has been perceived as a mechanism to ensure that local women of certain 'quality' were elected or appointed within the official decision-making organs to act on behalf of women. This understanding of gender equality runs contrary to the one developed by UNMIK, which has focused on establishing a loosely coordinated network of institutions at central and local levels of self-governance tasked with vague 'mainstreaming' mandates. The analysis of the interviewees' accounts in this study, complemented by the analysis of recent research on the voting behaviour of Kosovo women, reveals a certain degree of reluctance on the part of the Kosovo Albanian women's movement to critically assess its commitment to re-gendering the official decision-making organs in Kosovo.

Another limited understanding of gender mainstreaming has emerged throughout the general population in Kosovo. The controversial nature of women's political participation within the formal institutions of self-government in Kosovo is apparent. The issues of gender equality and women's right to define the course of post-conflict reconstruction are poorly understood by the general population, including the majority of Kosovo Albanian women and men. Following the UNMIK-sponsored introduction of gender mainstreaming machinery and gender-sensitive legislation, 'gender mainstreaming' in Kosovo has largely come to be perceived as an interference by the 'internationals', an attempt to undermine the fabric of traditional Kosovo Albanian society. The majority of Kosovo Albanian men remain rather indifferent to ideas of gender equality and women's interests, enjoying the benefits of what Cockburn has labelled the 'patriarchal dividend'. At the same time, the Kosovo Albanian women's movement has developed strategies for making economic and political discourses 'gender-sensitive' without the active involvement of their male counterparts. Currently, no systematic strategy exists at any level for involving Kosovo Albanian men in gender-specific programmes. Content analysis of the interviewees' accounts reveals that Kosovo Albanian women neither directly associate the lack of gender equality with the patriarchy perpetuated by Kosovo Albanian men, nor do they perceive Kosovo Albanian men as possible partners in challenging ideas of gender inequality. In this light, the analytical and practical disjoint in the understanding of what gender equality and gender mainstreaming mean in Kosovo (and the impacts of those divergences) merit further investigation. Nevertheless, gender equality had been officially legitimised as a development priority owing to the unique role of the UN in the reconstruction of the region. This
situation differs from that seen in other recent post-conflict situations, such as Somalia or Liberia, where the main parameters of post-conflict reconstruction or protracted civil wars have been defined by warring factions paying no attention to the issues of gender and women’s empowerment and rights. Though not always translated into inclusive and viable mainstreaming policies, UNMIK’s gender mainstreaming policies have nevertheless resulted in the introduction of various institutional mechanisms, including a gender-sensitive quota-based electoral system. Despite this however, after four cycles of municipal and ‘general’ elections in the region, the political clout of Kosovo Albanian women remains dispersed and muted, suggesting that formal quota-based political inclusion does not necessarily amount to empowerment to have and determine choices.

Content analysis of the accounts of Kosovo Albanian women reveals a rather negative perception of the effectiveness of the quotas at both central and municipal levels. In particular, the following arguments were put forward: gender quotas tend to limit rather than expand women’s participation; women, included into the electoral lists through quota provisions, are often perceived and treated as ‘women’s representatives’ dealing with ‘secondary women’s affairs’; quotas intensify hostility from male politicians at various levels; and democratic parliament and government should be formed on the basis of merit rather than affirmative action. The introduction of gender quotas was not supported by the continuous efforts to challenge the old value systems (influenced by the years of resistance campaigning) and saw hostility from the male-dominated political environments. This significantly undermined the legitimacy of the quotas in public view. The legitimacy of gender quotas was also seriously compromised by the criticism, from visible and active local Kosovo Albanian women’s groups, that the ‘quality of women’ rather than their ‘mere quantity’ was important. These ‘grass-roots’ criticisms suggest that the concern with quantitative goal-setting and accountability may have detracted from the qualitative changes in political environment and patterns of thinking that must come about if the ambitious agenda of achieving gender equality is ever to be achieved.

The scale of economic problems facing post-war Kosovo has been generally identified as one of the major causes of the political mobilisation of women and their involvement in official decision-making, echoing the universal patterns of women’s economic disempowerment and its rather complex inter-dependence with women’s political exclusion. Among the other factors identified by the majority of women groups’ representatives interviewed for this study, were: the lack of cultural and gender sensitivity on the part of UNMIK/KFOR and the international peacekeeping contingents; the revocation of the autonomy of Kosovo in 1989; and, generally, the long-lasting impact of the Communist Yugoslav legacy. However, the experiences of other development contexts demonstrates that the
relationship between economic, social and political empowerment is not straightforward (O'Connell 1996; Sweetman 2001, 2002). In this light, this study also examined the influence of re-emerging Kosovo Albanians' traditionalism and militarisation of the region.

**Women's political inclusion: the influence of Kosovo Albanians' 'traditionalism'**

Another structural barrier to the successful attainment of gender equality in the context of post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo is the lack of recognition of complex local and cultural contexts on the part of the international administration and local policy-makers, including some of the Kosovo Albanian women's groups. Having triangulated the existing post-conflict research accounts of political participation of Kosovo Albanian men and women, statistical data on post-conflict political participation in Kosovo, and 'pre-conflict' anthropological studies on the prevalence of tradition amongst Kosovo Albanian society, this study has discovered the prevalence of traditional attitudes by which the women in Kosovo have been regarded as subordinate to men or stereotyped into traditional 'feminised' roles. These processes have significantly diminished the participation of Kosovo Albanian women in 'public' life, including political and social activism.

The mindset prevails amongst the majority of Kosovo Albanian men and, also, many Kosovo Albanian women, that certain family-related conditions and responsibilities, such as pregnancy, and looking after children, the sick and elderly, justify the absence of women from politics. The prevalence of traditional discriminatory attitudes affects the range of choices available to women, including, for example, employment, education and professional development -- some of the decisive factors influencing women's choice to become actively involved in formal decision-making. The 'unsuitability' of gender mainstreaming is, in the general view, linked to the predominance of customary law and tradition in Kosovo and the precariousness position of Kosovo Albanian women within the local web of social and cultural expectations. The lack of anthropological research on the relation between the post-1999 transformation and the changing nature of Kosovo traditions and customs (including in rural and urban areas throughout Kosovo) requires redress.

All of the interviewees interviewed for this study agreed that traditions and custom, including increasing levels of domestic violence, were impeding the access of Kosovo women to formal and informal decision-making. However, none of the interviewees could outline a clear strategy regarding how to combat the various forms of gender-biased traditionalism. Most of them linked the prevalence of traditional attitudes towards women with the deteriorating economic situation in the region, suggesting that first and foremost, eco-
onomic independence was required to allow women to break away from abusive and patriarchal relations. The militarisation and ethnicisation of communities in Kosovo remained largely ignored and not acted upon by the local actors, including women's civil groups. Relatively little research exists on the nature and impact of militarism in post-conflict Kosovo, despite the alarming evidence that ethnic and gender-based violence has become 'the crisis of every day life' in Kosovo.

**Kosovo Albanian Women's Movement Politics of Identity and Inclusion**

The UNMIK-sponsored imposition of the gender-quota electoral requirement, coupled with the continuous education campaigns on elections and political participation directed at various groups of women in Kosovo, has provided a window of opportunity for many Kosovo Albanian women to enter the formal institutions of decision-making. However, for many the window has remained 'half-open'. The ultimate decisions on political engagement remain determined by a combination of factors: which ethnic group women belong to, their social and familial status, which area (urban or rural) they live in, and the history of their previous engagement with the parallel structures of governance. The in-depth interviewing of the respondents representing various institutional segments in this study has revealed that Kosovo women's socio-economic and political recognition, including their access to the now formalised gender-mainstreaming machinery and active inclusion in the women's groups movement (as opposed to those who have the status of 'passive service beneficiary'), is contingent upon their ethnicity, origin, residence, affiliation with dominant or subordinate political groups and their individual status defined by dichotomous categories such as 'educated/uneducated', 'disabled/able-bodied', 'widowed / single / married' and many others.

Content analysis of the interviewees' responses reveals a rather sophisticated system based on many socio-economic, political and cultural 'identifiers', pointing to the complex workings of patriarchal power and ideology in Kosovo society. It was also found that Kosovo Albanian men's political and social recognition has primarily been contingent upon their status as 'insiders' (non-Serb and non-'international') boosted by their previous involvement in peaceful resistance or the KLA-led 'liberation' campaign, and cemented by their formal or informal political activism geared towards the independence of Kosovo. Other factors, such as level of education, employment status, marital status, urban/rural belonging seemed to play only secondary and descriptive roles in relation to their opportunities to engage in formal or informal politics in Kosovo. Similar to the 'hierarchy of belonging', content analysis revealed the existence and certain influence of another hierarchy — a 'hierarchy of oppression' — amongst women representing Kosovo's non-governmental
political fora. While this finding does not in itself support any assumption regarding the nature of the women’s movement in Kosovo and its leadership, it nevertheless points to the complexity of the movement’s internal dynamics, highlighting two main issues. Firstly, the existence of a strong politically active umbrella organisation, represented internationally and locally, and drawing legitimacy from the number of its member organisations and the strength of its united voice (as is seen in the Kosovo Women’s Network), does not necessarily mean that there are no internal contradictions and rifts within the movement, or that all the member groups are included and stand on an equal political or financial footing. This, in turn, suggests that some of the women’s groups or interests might remain unrepresented or subdued despite the high visibility of the women’s movement more generally. Meanwhile, politically active Kosovo Albanian women remain divided along political, party and ideological lines. The absence of active co-operation amongst the women’s civil groups and with women MPs at both central and municipal levels weakens the position of all groups, not only women in the parliament but also the women engaged in ‘unofficial’ politics at the grassroots level.

Political divisions between the women’s groups in Kosovo has become more pronounced at various levels (such as between urban and rural groups), and in various shapes (such as between ‘quality’ and ‘non-quality’ women). According to many Kosovo Albanian women activists, the lines of division and non-communication between various groups of women in Kosovo reflects the lines of the major re-negotiation of power, ethnicity and financial flows within and between communities.

Content analysis of the interviewees’ accounts and the existing literature, including publications produced by various women’s groups in Kosovo, reveals the lack of organisational links between the diverse groups of Kosovo Albanian women and the near total absence of cooperation between women’s groups and Kosovo Albanian men.

A particularly deep line of division runs through the women’s movement itself, separating it from Kosovo Albanian women in general and fragmenting the movement as a whole. Many women who are now part of the Pristina-based women’s movement still strongly identify with the traditional way of life in their communities. They advocate for liberating women within the existing cultural and traditional frameworks without necessarily changing them dramatically. The way that the women’s movement operates in Kosovo demonstrates that inclusion and exclusion are not mutually exclusive – they can coexist and do not necessarily follow the binary of women-men; the interplay of exclusion and inclusion is apparent within the women’s movement itself. The Kosovo Albanian women’s movement has been dominated by a relatively small number of ‘NGO matriarchs’ or ‘gatekeepers’ – women perceived and actively (self)promoted as wiser and more knowledgeable
than their contemporaries. In many ways, some of the women's groups in Kosovo and, on a larger scale, the Kosova Women's Network, reflect the traditional Kosovo model of social organisation: a hierarchical structure with several charismatic leaders and certain tendencies for patron-client relationships. Reluctant to delegate decision-making authority to lower levels, the charismatic leaders tend to monopolise power, yet outwardly remain the advocates of participatory approaches and team-work.

Conclusion
In analysing the nature and content of the political participation of Kosovo Albanian women, this study has uncovered an inherent contradiction between the two approaches favoured and practiced by the international administration and the PSIG on one side, and the local women's movement on the other. In fulfilling the institution-building mandate provided by Resolution 1244, the international administration in Kosovo has followed the formalistic 'institutional' route, focusing on the establishment of institutional and legal machinery for gender mainstreaming. This has included specific gender-mainstreaming departments and laws, guaranteeing the 'quantitative' inclusion of Kosovo Albanian women. In essence, the institutions and laws were created for women with institutions and laws themselves – and not the empowerment of women – in mind.

On the other side, another approach to the political inclusion of women has been developed by the Kosovo Albanian women's movement. The latter, capitalising on the political gains achieved in supporting the clandestine Kosovo Albanian liberation movement, has claimed that the mechanisms allowing the political participation of local women were already available and needed only further development with the active involvement of local expertise and local women.

The analysis of the involvement of Kosovo Albanian women in informal political processes has also demonstrated the importance of challenging the homogenised imagery of a unified women's movement. In this light, the 'women's movement in Kosovo', as it is known internationally and locally, cannot be considered as unproblematically representative of the women of Kosovo. In this it has been identified that many groups of women in Kosovo, such as Kosovo women parliamentarians and women working within the PSIG and other institutions, have regularly been left out of analysis. In this light, a gap in our knowledge of the complex intra- and inter-group dynamics has been identified; this warrants further research and investigation.

This research has identified that many Kosovo Albanian women tend to stay out of both formal and informal forms of politics, not taking advantage of the available mechanisms for political participation in both the 'traditional' 'male' sphere and the 'non-
traditional sphere provided by the Kosovo Albanian Women’s movement. While a number of factors influencing the choice of women regarding their level of political activity have been identified (including the deteriorating economic situation in the region; the re-emergence of traditional attitudes towards the ‘natural roles’ of men and women; and the ethnicisation and militarisation of political and socio-economic discourses), further investigation is required on the complex interaction of these factors within varying socio-economic and political contexts. In this light, the access of women to decision-making (whether formal or informal) should be treated not as a fact secured by the availability of certain access-mechanisms, but as a process of making informed decisions with regard to participation. The project of political reconstruction must look at the behaviour and attitudes of women and men in order to uncover what has political meaning for various groups of men and women, and what best represents their interests in particular contexts over time. It must be recognised that such interests can at times be contradictory, and must be examined as part of the complex mosaic of people’s everyday lives.

This research has brought together analysis, expertise and data on gender mainstreaming in the context of peace-support operations in an attempt to understand the factors behind the uneven progress of recent UN gender mainstreaming interventions. It has also identified areas where further research might be of benefit. The empirical results of the study call forth critical questions regarding the constitution of United Nations peacekeeping: for militaries, for international institutions and for nation-states. The presence of women within the United Nations and its formal initiatives is gaining greater visibility, but critical issues of militarised masculinities, misogyny, homophobia and racism – gendered and shaped by patriarchy but not entirely limited by it – remain as invisible as ever. To this end, a promising line for future research lies in investigating how peacekeeping is gendered from within, to what extent the United Nations is prepared to deliver post-Cold War visions of peace and security to people trapped in the midst of conflicts. Equally significant will be research seeking to ascertain whether or not bringing more women into peacekeeping, without fundamental reform of the United Nations as an institution, will make a difference and what impact it might have on ‘peacekeeping recipients’. Finally, it must be asked how the delivery of such peace and security might affect the peacekeepers themselves in the light of broader issues of gender relations and strategies of change.
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Appendix 1: Map of Kosovo

Source: http://www.cry.org.uk/img/kosovo/Kosovo_map.gif
Appendix 2: Post-1999 Kosovo: Key Socio-Economic Indicators

Population
Total Population 1 900 000 (est.);
Population density 175 p/sq. km;
Ethnic groups: Kosovo Albanians (88%), Kosovo Serbs (7%), other ethnic groups (5%).
Age distribution: 0-14 years 33%; 15-64 years 61%; 65 and older 6%.

Geographical data
Small and landlocked territory in the centre of the Balkan Peninsula;
Borders: Macedonia (FYROM), Albania, Serbia and Montenegro;
Total area is 10 877 sq. km. (about one third of Belgium);
Divided into 30 municipalities;
Climate: continental with warm summers and cold winters.

Some economic indicators
Public Sector Expenditures 2000-2003
Table A.1: Public sector: total annual expenditures in Kosovo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,262</td>
<td>5,251</td>
<td>4,066</td>
<td>3,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KGB (Kosovo General Budget)*</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which: Own revenue</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor grants</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIP/NGOs</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public enterprises and SOEs</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KGB own revenue share in total</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Estimated Kosovo General Budget in 2003: 438 million Euro or approximately 504 million US$ (1.15 average USD/Euro rate). This roughly equals 26.6% of the US expenditure on 78 days NATO air-campaign against FRY (US$1.89 billion) (Kim and Woehrel 2003, p. 18) or approximately 22% of the estimated expenditure on KFOR in 2003 (PSIG 2003, p. 13).

Gross Domestic Product
Table A.2: Gross Domestic Product

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP in million Euro</td>
<td>1,328</td>
<td>1,536</td>
<td>1,569</td>
<td>1,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (%)</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita in Euro</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>826</td>
<td>848</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

123 Source: SOK 2004a.
124 Source: SOK 2004a.
Disparities between men and women in Kosovo with selected indicators, including labour force participation, literacy rate, life expectancy

Table A.3: Disparities between men and women in Kosovo with selected indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Earned income per month, Euro</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>135.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour force participation,%</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>75.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean years of schooling</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined enrolment in education,%</td>
<td>87.4</td>
<td>89.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult illiteracy rate,%</td>
<td>91.3</td>
<td>97.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth, years</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>67.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Socio-Economic Indicators related to the quality of life in Kosovo

Table A.4. Socio-Economic Indicators related to the quality of life in Kosovo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of population not expected to survive to age 40</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of population not expected to survive to age 60</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of adult who are illiterate</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of persons without access to safe water</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>27.4*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of people without access to health services</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (%)</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of moderately and severely underweight children</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of people living under decent standard of living</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of persons living on $2 a day</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of unemployed people of age 15-64</td>
<td>50-55</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*In 2003, the percentage of people without piped water was calculated and this did not include bottled water or water tanks, thus the percentage is higher than 2001.
### Appendix 3: Election Results

#### Table A.5: Municipal and Assembly Elections in Kosovo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proportional, open lists, gender quota</td>
<td>Proportional, closed lists, gender quota</td>
<td>Proportional, closed lists, gender quota</td>
<td>Proportional, closed lists, gender quota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electorate, voters</td>
<td>913 179</td>
<td>1.32 million</td>
<td>1 249 987</td>
<td>1 412 680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnout, voters (%)</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of parties</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAK, % of votes</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDK, % of votes</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDK, % of votes</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other parties, % of votes</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women elected (%)</td>
<td>76 out of 920 (8.26%)</td>
<td>262 out of 920 (28.5%)</td>
<td>34 out of 120 (28%)</td>
<td>35 out of 120 (29%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: various reports, including OMIK electoral reports; UN Secretary-General reports on UNMIK; reports by Statistical Office of Kosovo and Central Electoral Commission of Kosovo.
Appendix 4: Kosovo Field Study Questionnaire: Women’s Groups
(In English)

Research on Gender Aspects of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development in Kosovo: Women’s Access to Decision-Making
University of Glasgow, Department of Politics
March 2004

UNIVERSITY
of
GLASGOW

Researcher: Kiril Sharapov
Supervisor: Chris Corrin

Contact Details:
Department of Politics, Adam Smith Building, University of Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8RT, Scotland, UK Phone: 44 141 330 8476 E: 0205897S@udcf.gla.ac.uk

Thank you very much for your help in conducting this research. You can choose not to answer any of these questions. Please feel free to provide/attach any comments, notes, documents, references that you think might be useful or to support your position (use another sheet if needed). You are welcome to get in touch with me using contact information above if you have any further questions/comments/suggestions. Thank you.

1. Name of the organisation, location, when it was founded:
2. Do you work with specific group(s) of women/men? Which groups?
3. Are you aware of UN Security Council Resolution 1325?
   Yes / No / If yes, how do you think it could be applied to the current situation in Kosovo?
4. Are you supported by any of the international organizations or UN agencies?
   Yes / No / If yes, what kind of support (educational, administrative, financial)?
5. Do you think there is a need to involve more local men into gender mainstreaming?
   Yes / No / Do not know / If no – Why? / If yes, what could be done to involve more local men (at formal and informal levels)?
6. Do local cultural and religious traditions support women’s autonomy and authority and participation in formal decision-making?
   Yes / No / Do not know / If yes, please, give details:
7. Are you aware of any specific UNMIK/ governmental/ municipal programmes to promote and increase women’s participation in decision-making?
   Yes / No / Do not know / If yes, please, give details:
   UNMIK (central/ municipal level)
   OSCE (central/ municipal level)
   Government (central/ municipal level)
8. What do you think shall be done to involve more women/enhance women’s access to decision-making at municipal level, especially in rural areas?
9. Are you aware of any programmes implemented by the UNMIK’s Office of Gender Affairs?
   Yes / No / Do not know / If yes, please state what they are and whether they address local women’s needs and concerns?
10. Are you aware if any potential women leaders were asked to stand for office by UNMIK, local governments or political parties?
    Yes / No / Do not know / If yes, please, give details:
11. Are there any achievements of the UN in Kosovo in promoting women’s rights, their access to decision-making and gender-mainstreaming generally?  
   Yes / No / Do not know / If yes - what are they?

12. In your opinion, what are the main reasons for the UNMIK and OSCE failure to involve Kosova women into decision-making /mainstream gender through their programmes and policies?
   Yes / No / Do not know / Please give reasons for your views

13. Do you think having more women as peacekeepers/members of international staff within UNMIK/OSCE could/can make a difference?
   Yes / No / Do not know / Please give reasons for your views

14. Do you think there is a need for special Ministry on Gender/Women’s Affairs in Kosovo?
   Yes / No / Do not know / Please give reasons why.

15. Are you aware of any efforts/programmes by UNMIK/ government aimed at getting more women elected to the Kosovo Assembly/ Municipal Assemblies? What is your opinion on recent UNMIK decision on closed lists/ single electoral constituency?
   Yes / No / Do not know / If possible, please give more details:

16. Are there any political parties in Kosovo actively supporting women and working towards gender equality?
   Yes / No / Do not know / Please, give details about whether/what type of parties:

17. Are you aware of any training programmes run/supported by UNMIK/government/ any international agency for existing women’s groups in communication, organisational, leadership skills?
   Yes / No / Do not know / If possible please give details of types of training programmes:

18. In your opinion, at which level - central or municipal- women are better represented at decision-making? Is it formal (members of the assembly, government, etc) or informal level (for example, through active involvement of women’s groups)? Why do you think so? Please, provide some examples.

19. What do you think of Municipal Gender Officers institution? To which extent are they effective in promoting women’s rights at municipal level? What makes you think so?
   Aware of Municipal Gender Officers institution
   Not aware of Municipal Gender Officers institution
Appendix 5: Kosovo Field Study Questionnaire: Women's Groups
(in Albanian)

Nje studim i detajuar mbi aspektet gjinore te pas –
konfliktit te Rindertimit dhe Zhvillimit ne Kosove
Pjesmarrja e Grave ne Marrjen e Vendimit
Universiteti i Glasgout, Departamenti i Politikes
March 2004

Studjuesit: Kiril Sharapov
Supervizori: Chris Corrin

1. Emri i organizates, zones, kur ajo u gjend:
2. A punoni ju me grup ose grupe specifike te grave/apo burrave? Cilin grup?
3. A jeni njohur me Rezoluten e Keshillit Sigurimit te Kombeve te Bashkuara te
   1325?
   Po/Jo/Ne qoftes se Po, si mendoni ju ajo mund te jetet aplikuar ne situat-
   aten e koheve te fundit ne Kosove?
4. A jeni mbeshtetur ju nga ndonje nga organizatatnderkombetare ose agjensite e
   Kombete te Bashkuara?
   Po/Jo/Ne qoftes se Po, cfare iloj mbeshtetje (edukative, administrative
   financiare)?
5. A mendoni ju se ka nevoje te perfshihen me shumne burra lokale ne menyren e
   jeteses gjinore?
   Po/Jo/Nuk e di/ne qoftes se Jo - Perse? /Ne qoftes se Po, cfare mund te
   behet te perfshihen me shumne burra lokale?
6. A mbeshtesin traditrat kulturore dhe fetare autonombie dhe autoritetin e grave si dhe
   pjesemarrjen ne marjen e vendimit formal?
   Po/Jo/Nuk e di /Ne qoftes se Po, te lutem jep detajet:
7. A jeni ju i nderejgjishem qe ndonje program te ngrijen qytetet / qeverite/ UN-
   MIK specifike te zhvilloje ose te risi pjesemarrjen e grave ne marjen e vendi-
   meve?
   Po/Jo/Nuk e di /Ne qoftes se Po, te lutem jep detajet:
8. A jeni ne dijeni te ndonje programit te zbatuar nga Zyra e UNMIK-ut e
   cestijeve civile?
   Po/Jo/Nuk e di /Ne qoftes se Po, te lutem shpreh cfare ato jane dhe nese
   ato adresojne nevoja dhe shqetesime te grave lokale?
9. A keni ju dijeni qe ndonje nga udheheqet e grave me potence jane kerkuar te
   ngrinjen per zyra nga UNMIK- u, qeverite lokale ose partite politike?
   Po/Jo/Nuk e di / Ne qoftes se Po, te lutem jep detajet.
10. A ka ndonje arritje te Kombeve te Bashkuara ne Kosove ne zhvillimin e te drejtave te grave , pjesmarrjen e tyre ne marrjen e vendimeve dhe ne pergjithesin e menyren e jeteses se gjinive?
   Po/Jo/Nuk e di / Ne qoft se Po - cilat jane ato?

11. A mendoni ju se te kesa me shume gria si pajturajteze (duka perfshehe Policine Civile) do te perberen ndonje ndryshim?
   Po/Jo/Nuk e di /Te lutem jep areseyet per pikemajtjet e tua:

12. A keni dijeni ju per ndonje nga programet qeveritare speciale e synuar te mbeshitesi grate ne zivolet qytetare dhe kombetare?
   Po/Jo/Nuk e di /Te lutem jep me shume detaje:

13. A menoni ju se eshte nje nevoje per Ministri speciale mbi Ceshtjet e Grave/Gjinive ne Kosove?
   Po/Jo/Nuk e di /Te lutem jep areseyet per pikepamjet e tua:

14. A keni dijeni per ndonje perpjekje / proqrmet nga UNMIK-u / qeveria qe synon ne marrjen e me shume grave te zgjedhura ne Asamblene e Kosoves /Asamblete qytetare?
   Po/Jo/Nuk e di /Ne qoft se eshte e mundur , te lutem jep me shume detaje:

15. A keni ju dijeni per ndonje mbeshtetje speciale per grupet e grave te Kosoves dhe kandidatet per zgjedhjet e asambleve / apo qytetare nga UNMIK-u / OSCE?
   Po/Jo/Nuk e di /Te lutem, jep me shume detaje nese / ose cfare lloji mbeshtetje eshte e vlefshme:

16. A ndodhen ndonje parti politike ne Kosove qe mbeshtet aktivisht grade dhe punojne drejt cilesise se gjinive?
   Po/Jo/Nuk e di /Te lutem , jep detaje nese / cfare tipi partish:

17. A keni dijeni per ndonje program treinimi eshte zhviluar / mbeshtetur nga UNMIK - u /qeveria / ndonje agjenci nderkombetare per grupe ekzistuese te grave ne afisete e komunikimit , organizativ ,udheheqes?
   Po/Jo/Nuk e di / Ne qoft se eshte e mundur jep detaje te tipave te programeve te treinimit.
Appendix 6: Kosovo Field Study Questionnaire: Municipal Assemblies and Municipal Gender Officers (in English)

UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW

Research on Gender Aspects of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development in Kosovo: Women's Access to Decision-Making
University of Glasgow, Department of Politics
March 2004

Researcher: Kiril Sharapov
Supervisor: Chris Corrin

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Phone: 44 141 330 8476 Fax: 44 141 330 5071 E: 02058978g@udcf.gla.ac.uk

Thank you very much for your help in conducting this research. You can choose not to answer any of these questions. Please feel free to provide/attach any comments, notes, documents, references that you think might be useful or to support your position (use another sheet if needed). You are welcome to get in touch with me using contact information above if you have any further questions/comments/suggestions. Thank you.

1) Municipality:
2) When did you assume your position?
3) How would you personally define gender-mainstreaming?
4) Have you previously been involved in working with local women’s groups before assuming your position?
   Yes/No/If yes, please give some details
5) Have you received any training on gender/gender mainstreaming and/or human rights in the last year?
   Yes/No/If yes – when, where and who organised it?
6) Do you think you need more training on gender mainstreaming?
   Yes/No/If yes, please, specify which areas you are most interested in (gender mainstreaming, communication skills, etc)?
7) In your opinion, what is your main objective in this position?
8) Please evaluate (and provide examples where possible) your progress in
   a) Establishing networks with local women’s organisations?
   b) Providing ‘gateway’ at the local level for individual, groups and networks of women to gain access to the administration in order that their concerns and needs can be carried forward to decision-makers?
   c) Integrating gender mainstreaming into all plans, programmes, projects and activities of the municipality?
9) Please, give examples of any particular project you have managed to implement recently?
10) In your opinion, what are the main obstacles in involving more local women into decision-making at:
    a) Formal Level (through municipal assembly, for example)
    b) Informal Level (local women’s groups and main difficulties they are facing)
    c) Municipal Level
    d) Central (national) Level
11) How do you see these obstacles could be overcome?
a) Formal Level:
b) Informal Level:
c) Municipal Level
d) Central Level:

12) Your gender:
13) Your age
   a) 18-25
   b) 26-34
   c) 34-45
   d) 45-65
Appendix 7: Kosovo Field Study Questionnaire: UNMIK and International Organisations (in English)

Research on Gender Aspects of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development in Kosovo: Women’s Access to Decision-Making
University of Glasgow, Department of Politics
March 2004

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Thank you very much for your help in conducting this research. You can choose not to answer any of these questions. Please feel free to provide/attach any comments, notes, documents, references that you think might be useful or to support your position (use another sheet if needed). You are welcome to get in touch with me using contact information above if you have any further questions/comments/suggestions. Thank you.

1. Name of the Organisation/Agency, when did it start its activities in Kosovo?
2. How would you personally define gender mainstreaming?
3. Are you directly involved into any gender mainstreaming projects/programmes in Kosovo?
   Yes / No / Do not know / If yes, please, give details:
4. Do you have any ‘gender mainstreaming/gender equality’ policy within your organisation?
   Yes / No / Do not know / Please, give details:
5. Are you familiar with the UN Security Council Resolution 1325?
   Yes / No / If yes, how do you think it could be applied to the current situation in Kosovo and do you use it in your activities?
6. Do you think there is a need to involve more men within the mission/at the local level into gender mainstreaming?
   Yes / No / Do not know / If no – Why? / If yes, what could be done to involve more local men/men within the mission?
7. Do local cultural and religious traditions support women’s autonomy and authority and participation in formal decision-making?
   Yes / No / Do not know / If yes, please, give details:
8. Are you aware of any specific programmes to promote and increase women’s participation in decision-making by launched and managed by UNMIK/UN agencies/PISG/your organization?
   Yes / No / Do not know / If yes, please state what they are and whether they address local women’s needs and concerns?
9. Are you aware of any programmes implemented by the UNMIK’s Office of Gender Affairs?
   Yes / No / Do not know / If yes, please state what they are and whether they address local women’s needs and concerns?
10. Are you aware if any potential women leaders were asked to stand for office by UNMIK, local governments or political parties?
11. Are there any achievements of the UN in Kosovo in promoting women’s rights,
their access to decision-making and gender-mainstreaming generally?
Yes / No / Do not know / If yes - what are they?

12. Do you think having more women as peacekeepers (including Civilian Police)
would make a difference?
Yes / No / Do not know / Please give reasons for your views

13. Are you aware of any special governmental programmes aimed to support
women at national/municipal levels?
Yes / No / Do not know / Please, give more details.

14. Do you think there is a need for special Ministry on Gender/Women’s Affairs in
Kosovo?
Yes / No / Do not know / Please give reasons why.

15. Are you aware of or does your agency take part in any efforts/programmes aimed
at getting more women elected to the Kosovo Assembly/ Municipal Assemblies?
Yes / No / Do not know / If possible, please give more details:

16. Are you aware of any special support to Kosovo women’s groups and candidates
for the municipal/assembly elections provided by UNMIK/OSCE?
Yes / No / Do not know / Please, give more details of
whether/what type of support available:

17. Are there any political parties in Kosovo actively supporting women and working
towards gender equality?
Yes / No / Do not know / Please, give details about whether/what
type of parties:

18. Are you aware of or does your agency take part in any training programmes for
existing women’s groups in communication, organisational, leadership skills?
Yes / No / Do not know / If possible please give details of types
of training programmes: