



<https://theses.gla.ac.uk/>

Theses Digitisation:

<https://www.gla.ac.uk/myglasgow/research/enlighten/theses/digitisation/>

This is a digitised version of the original print thesis.

Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author

A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge

This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author

The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author

When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given

Enlighten: Theses

<https://theses.gla.ac.uk/>
research-enlighten@glasgow.ac.uk

**The 'Greening' of Ukraine: An Assessment of the
Political Significance of the Ukrainian Green Movement**

Ase Berit Grodland

Vol. 1 (2)

Presented for the Degree of Ph.D.

**University of Glasgow
Institute of Russian and East European Studies**

July 1996

© Ase Berit Grodland

ProQuest Number: 10391262

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



ProQuest 10391262

Published by ProQuest LLC (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.

All rights reserved.

This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 – 1346

Ther.
10628
Cpg 2
Vol 1



**To the memory of my father,
to my mother,
to Dimos.**

Abstract

This thesis analyses the emergence, development and political significance of the Ukrainian Green Movement - *Zelenyi Svit* - and the Green Party of Ukraine - *Partiia Zelenykh Ukrainy (PZU)* - in the Soviet/post-Soviet context of political change. The emergence of the Ukrainian Greens is studied in relation to Soviet eco-culture, rooted in pre-Revolutionary thinking on the environment and which continued to exist as a sub-culture during the Soviet period. It is argued that this eco-culture not only contributed to the emergence of the Ukrainian Green Movement, but that it also provided it with a theoretical framework and with already experienced activists. However, having not only a positive impact on the emergence of the movement, this current of thought also facilitated *Zelenyi Svit's* split into two groups in December 1994. All the same, this thesis suggests that eco-culture may play a significant role in creating awareness of the environment in Ukraine, as it is not perceived with the same amount of scepticism and suspicion as 'imported' thinking on the environment generated in the West. Besides, there is an enormous interest in Ukraine in the past. The Greens could benefit from this interest by highlighting the environmental traditions of the past, while combining them with contemporary international environmental thought, rather than focusing entirely on the latter.

The study of *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU* more generally is combined with an in-depth analysis of the campaign against expansion of the South-Ukrainian Energy Complex, conducted by the Nikolaev oblast *Zelenyi Mir* starting in 1988 and continuing to this day. This thesis covers the period 1988 to 1994. Research on *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU* was conducted through in-depth interviewing, observation, archival research and a survey of several Ukrainian newspapers during three field-trips to Ukraine. A survey was also conducted among district and regional groups of *Zelenyi Svit* in June 1994. This thesis represents the first attempt at studying the Ukrainian Greens in-depth. Most of the sources and information appearing in Chapters Three, Four, Five, Six and Seven are therefore new.

Some attention is also given to the similarities/differences between the Ukrainian Greens and similar movements in the West. It is argued that although in some respects similar to the latter in that they opposed the existing economic and political system of their country (i.e. the USSR) as being anti-environmental from relatively early on in their campaign, there were also similarities with Green Movements in developed countries, which tend to campaign for the livelihood of their local communities and thus the very existence of their people. In Ukraine, the Chernobyl accident, nuclear power and extensive chemical pollution were seen as threats not only to the country's environment but also to the very existence of the people inhabiting this environment. Thus, to the Greens their campaigns were not only aimed at reducing pollution, but were also presented as a struggle for survival.

Although the emphasis of this thesis is on the emergence of and internal developments within *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU*, the interaction between the two and on their campaigns, considerable attention is also given to the Ukrainian Communist Party and its changing attitude towards the environment in general and nuclear power in particular. The relationship between the CPU and the Greens is also studied in-depth. By referring extensively to correspondence between the CPU and the CPSU now available in the Ukrainian State Archives for Public Movements and not yet published, it is argued that the CPU relatively shortly after the Chernobyl accident started to voice its concern over and opposition to the CPSU's plans to expand nuclear power in Ukraine, providing a number of arguments for not doing so. It is commonly argued that the Greens successfully pressurised the CPU and the CPSU into making concessions on the nuclear power issue. In reality, the situation was far more complex: although the CPU could not openly side with the Greens and did not want to be seen as 'giving in' to too many of their demands, it was able to exploit widespread support for the Greens to support its requests vis-à-vis 'Moscow'. Thus, it seems more plausible to conclude that the two benefited mutually from one another.

List of Contents

Abstract	1
List of Contents	2
List of Tables	9
Introduction	11
1 Political Participation in the USSR and the Emergence of Independent Green Movements	22
1.0 Introduction	22
1.1 The Emergence of Green Groups and Movements under Gorbachev (1986-88)	24
1.2 Political Participation and Environmental Issues in the USSR	36
1.2.1 Voluntary Societies and Environmental Groups	40
The Societies for Nature Protection - <i>VOOP</i>	43
<i>MOIP</i> and <i>KluBZ</i>	52
The Student Nature Guards - <i>DOP</i>	54
1.2.2 The Scientists	66
The Conservation Movement (the Biologists)	66
The Economists	71
The Writers	72
1.2.3 The Relationship between Writers and Experts	78
1.2.4 The Thinkers on the Environment	79
The Biologists	80
The Philosophers	82
1.2.5 The People	86
1.2.6 'Environmental Interest Group'	87
1.3 Soviet Eco-Culture as a Complementary Factor by which to Explain the Emergence of the Greens	93
1.3.1 Was there an Eco-Culture in the USSR?	103
Slav Orthodoxy	106
Russian Literature	109
1.4 Conclusion	111
2 Soviet Environmental Policies	114
2.0 Introduction	114
2.1 Environmental Problems in the USSR (1917-85)	114
2.1.1 Ideology and the Environment	115
2.1.2 The Soviet Economic System and the Environment	122
2.1.3 The Administrative Command System and the Environment	126
2.1.4 Legislation on the Environment and its Implementation	129
Economic Reasons	133
Ideological Reasons	135
Administrative Reasons	137
2.2 Environmental Reform under Gorbachev (1985-1991)	140

2.2.1	Changes in Ideology	140
2.2.2	Structural Change	141
2.2.3	The Union-Republics and the Environment	148
2.2.4	Assessment of Gorbachev's Environmental Reforms	150
	Administrative Changes	151
	Economic Changes	154
	Legal Changes	156
2.3	Environmental Reform in the USSR: The Case of Ukraine	159
2.3.1	The CPU and the Environment	161
2.3.2	State of the Environment	171
2.3.3	Health and the Environment	176
2.3.4	Verkhovna Rada: Environmental Session, February 1990	182
	The Ukrainian Government's Position on the Environment	183
	Criticism of the Government: The Standing Commissions of the Parliament	186
	Eco-Culture as a Precondition for Improving the Environment	188
	Chernobyl and the Issue of Nuclear Power	190
	General Environmental Problems in Ukraine	200
	East Ukraine	201
	South Ukraine	204
	West Ukraine	206
	Kiev, Central and North Ukraine	207
	Relationship between USSR and Ukraine	208
	The Decree on Ecology	213
2.3.5	The Ukrainian Law on the Protection of the Environment (25 June 1991)	215
2.4	Conclusion	222
3	Building the Green Movement (May 1986-October 1989)	223
3.0	Introduction	223
3.1	Origins	225
3.1.1	Initiating the Green Movement	226
	The Role of Ukrainian Writers	227
	The Role of the Scientists	231
	The Role of Moscow	232
	The Role of Young Members of the Intelligentsia	232
3.1.2	Joining Forces: The Role of the Ukrainian Peace Committee	233
3.2	Building and Developing an all-Ukrainian Green Movement	238
3.2.1	Developing a Strategy and Setting an Agenda	238
	Narrow Expert Group or Broad Grassroots Movement?	239
	The Building of an all-Ukrainian Association	240
	Gathering Information and making the Association known to the General Public	244
3.2.2	Campaigns (1987-89)	249
	Non-Nuclear Issues	250
	Nuclear Power	254
	Chyhyryn Nuclear Power Station	260
	Chernobyl	270
3.2.3	Further Organisational Developments	270
	March 1989 Elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies	271

Founding Conference, Kiev, 26 April 1989	275
Relationship to Derzhkompriroda, <i>UTOP</i> and <i>DOP</i>	281
Other Green Groups - Relationship to <i>Zelenyi Svît</i>	285
3.2.4 Founding Congress of <i>Zelenyi Svît</i> (Kiev, 28-29 October 1989)	287
Criticism of <i>Derzhkompriroda</i>	288
Morality	290
Programme and Statute	291
Other Resolutions	292
Politics and the Environment: The Need for a Green Party	293
Independence	294
Future Tasks - <i>Zelenyi Svît</i>	296
3.3 Official Response towards <i>Zelenyi Svît</i>	297
3.3.1 CPU: Support and Control	297
3.3.2 Local Authorities and the Greens	306
3.4 Politicisation and Discord	308
3.4.1 Local Elections/Elections to <i>Verkhovna Rada</i> (4 March 1990)	308
3.4.2 The Emergence of the Green Party of Ukraine	312
3.4.3 Preparing for the Second Congress (March 1991)	313
The Report of the Control Revision Commission	314
The Secretariat's Response to the Control Revision	
Commission's Report	319
Press Coverage	321
<i>Zelenyi Svît's</i> Response to the Press Coverage	324
Assessment	328
Choice of Place for the Congress	330
3.4.4 The Second Congress, Ivano-Frankivsk (March 1991)	334
The Leadership Issue	345
3.4.5 Zelena Rada (March 1991)	348
3.4.6 Independence	349
3.5 Conclusion	349
 4 Conflict and Decline: The Green Movement under Ukrainian Independence	 351
4.0 Introduction	351
4.1 Leadership Struggle and Discord	351
4.1.1 Green Minister of the Environment	351
4.1.2 Pretext to the Third Congress	358
4.1.3 The Third Congress (30-31 May 1992)	365
4.1.4 Leadership Struggle and Further Discord	381
4.1.5 Fourth Congress (February 1993)	386
Green Strategy	392
4.2 Green Support	402
4.2.1 Parliamentary and Local Elections (March and June 1994)	402
4.2.2 Membership Trends in the Ukrainian Green Movement	408
4.3 Regional Differences	412
4.3.1 Regional and Other Cleavages within the Green Movement	412
4.3.2 The Fifth Congresses (December 1994)	421
4.4 The Future of the Green Movement	427
4.4.1 <i>EkoMisija</i>	435
4.5 Conclusion	441

5 The Green Party of Ukraine (PZU)	443
5.0 Introduction	443
5.1 The Emergence and Development of PZU (1989-1991)	444
5.1.1 Establishing the Green Party	444
Preparations and Debate	447
Drafting a Statute	449
Drafting a Programme	452
Inaugural Congress (28-30 September 1990)	459
Strategy and Tactics	469
CPU Response to the Formation of PZU	471
5.1.2 Registering PZU	472
5.1.3 Early Party Activities	476
Environmental Actions	476
Relationship with the International Green Movement	480
Alternative PZU: Chukche	483
Political Alliances	385
5.2 Strategy, Tactics and Political Participation (1991-93)	489
5.2.1 Presentation of Strategy and Tactics	489
Second Congress (Ternopil, 1-2 June 1991)	489
5.2.2 Political Participation	492
Participation in Official Structures	492
Green President? - The Presidential Elections (December 1991)	493
5.2.3 Internal Party Developments	495
Party Funding	495
Party Structure - a Reassessment	496
Third Congress (9-10 October 1992) and Fractions	497
Membership Developments	504
Party Structure and Related Problems	507
Relationship to <i>Zelenyi Svit</i>	507
5.2.4 PZU as an Opposition Party	512
5.3 Public Support and Elections (1993-1994)	513
5.3.1 Public Support	513
PZU's Supporters	520
5.3.2 Parliamentary Elections (March 1994)	521
Pretext to Parliamentary Elections	521
Fourth Congress (Kiev, 17-18 December 1993)	524
Nominations and Election Campaign	526
Assessment of PZU and the 1994 Parliamentary Elections	531
5.3.3 Local Elections (June 1994)	535
5.4 Placing PZU in the Ukrainian Political Landscape	538
5.4.1 Left-Right Continuum and Ukrainian Politics	538
5.4.2 Issues Determining PZU's Placement on the Continuum	541
Ukrainian Independence	541
The Relationship to Russia and the CIS	549
Ukraine as an Anti-Nuclear and Anti-Military State	552
Democracy and Human Rights	558
Economic Issues	561
Ecological Issues	564
5.4.3 Placing PZU on the Left-Right Continuum	567
5.5 Conclusion	571

6 The Campaign to Save the South Bug River (I)	573
6.0 Introduction	573
6.1 Background	574
6.1.1 The South Ukraine Energy Complex (SU EK)	574
6.1.2 The CPU and Nuclear Safety	579
6.2 Campaign (January-August 1988)	589
6.2.1 Emergence of the Green Movement: Strategy and Mobilisation	589
6.2.2 Letter-Writing Campaign, Petitioning and Meetings	597
6.2.3 Dialogue: Pro-Environment vs. Pro-Nuclear Lobbies	600
6.2.4 Response from the Authorities	622
6.3 Decision-Making (November 1988-August 1989)	629
6.3.1 Re-assessing Stage Two of the South Ukraine Energy Complex	630
6.3.2 Reaction towards, and Debate on the Report of the Expert Commission	636
6.3.3 The Adoption of Resolution No. 647	648
6.4 Conclusion	655
 7 The Campaign to Save the South Bug River (II)	 655
7.0 Introduction	655
7.1 Policing and the Presentation of Alternatives (August 1989-December 1991)	656
7.1.1 Politicisation of <i>Zelenyi Mir</i>	656
7.1.2 Campaigns and Issues	659
The Aleksandrov Water Reservoir/the Tashlyk Hydro-electric Power Station	659
7.1.3 Actors involved in the Campaign	665
The Authorities	665
The Pro-Nuclear Lobby	666
The Media	669
7.1.4 Clash of Interests between Ukraine and Soviet Authorities	671
7.1.5 Implications: The Tashlyk Hydro-electric Power Station	672
7.2 The Campaign 'Защитим детей от радиации' and Nuclear Safety	677
7.2.1 Response to the Campaign	682
7.2.2 The Need to Clean the Tashlyk Cooling Pond	685
7.2.3 Changing Political Circumstances	687
The Putsch	687
<i>Zelenyi Mir</i> and the Question of Ukrainian Independence	689
7.3 Ukrainian Independence: Adaptation and Continued Campaigning (August 1991-June 1994)	690
7.3.1 Institutional Changes	691
7.3.2 Energy Situation in Ukraine following the Collapse of the USSR	691
7.3.3 Campaigns and Issues	692
The Aleksandrov Water Reservoir and the Tashlyk Hydro-Electric Power Station	692
Assessment of the Revised Project	701
7.3.4 Nuclear Safety and Implications for Health	704
Nuclear Safety	704
Nuclear Safety and Health	714
7.3.5 Cleaning the Tashlyk Cooling Pond	717
The Public and the Issue of Cleaning the Cooling Pond	721

The Pro-Environmental Lobby and the Issue of Cleaning the Cooling Pond	724
Decision: Go-ahead for Cleaning the Cooling Pond	731
7.3.6 Alternatives: Enhanced Safety and Improved Environmentability	738
Structural Reforms as a Means of Enhancing Nuclear Safety	738
Safety-Enhancing Measures at the Nuclear Power Station (Pro-Nuclear Lobby)	740
Alternative Energy (Pro-Environment Lobby)	744
7.4 Conclusion	755
8 The Ukrainian Greens in a Comparative Perspective	756
8.0 Introduction	756
8.1 A Comparison of Theoretical Framework and Policies	757
8.1.1 Classifying Western Thinking on the Environment	758
8.1.2 The Theoretical Framework of the Ukrainian Green Movement/Party	762
8.1.3 Classification of the Ukrainian Greens' Theoretical Framework	780
8.2 Does Inglehart's Hypothesis of the Greens being a Result of 'Post-Materialist Value Change' hold true in the Case of Ukraine?	784
8.2.1 Theory of 'Post-Materialist Value Change'	784
8.2.2 'Post-Materialist Value Change' and the Emergence of the Ukrainian Greens	786
'Basic Needs' vs. 'Higher Order Needs'	787
Stable Value Systems	790
The Scarcity Hypothesis	795
Assessment	798
8.3 Different Political Context, Different Issues: The Ukrainian Greens' Struggle for Survival	798
8.3.1 The Greens and the Issue of Ukrainian Independence	799
The National Question and the Environment - The Green Perspective	802
Justification: the Principle of Decentralisation	805
Independence and the Minority Issue	806
Independence and the Relationship to Neighbouring States	807
Are the Ukrainian Greens Nationalist or Globalist in Outlook?	808
8.4 Green Potential as a Combination of Political Opportunity Structures and Mobilisation Potential: the Case of Ukraine	808
8.4.1 The Green Electorate in the West	812
8.4.2 The Green Electorate in Ukraine	814
8.4.3 Political Opportunity Structures	821
8.5. Conclusion	826
9 Conclusion: Assessing the Ukrainian Greens	828
9.0 Introduction	828
9.1 Assessing the Ukrainian Green Movement (1986-95)	828
9.1.1 <i>Zelenyi Svit</i>	828
General Political and Organisational Factors	829

Particular Factors: The Case of the Nikolaev Greens: An Assessment	833
9.1.2 <i>PZU</i>	841
9.1.3 The Relationship between <i>Zelenyi Svit</i> and <i>PZU</i>	843
9.1.4 The Decline of the Ukrainian Greens: Part of an International Phenomenon?	846
9.2 Is the Ukrainian Future Green?	848
9.2.1 Closer Relations between <i>Zelenyi Svit</i> and <i>PZU</i>	849
9.2.2 Equal Relations between <i>Zelenyi Svit</i> and <i>PZU</i>	851
9.2.3 An overall Weakening of the Ukrainian Greens	853
9.3 The Importance of Ecological Education in Strengthening the Green Movement in Ukraine	855
9.4 Conclusion	860
Appendix	862
Survey Questionnaire	863
Maps	871
Bibliography	874

List of Tables

1.1	Number of druzhiny in the USSR	55
1.2	Views on the Environment in the 15 Republics of the Former USSR	100
1.3	Views on the Environment in 9 Ukrainian Cities	100
2.1	Growth of Industrial and Agricultural Production in the USSR in the 1920s	123
2.2	Economic Growth in the USSR in the 1930s	123
2.3	Environmental Pollution in the USSR	151
2.4	Average Annual Growth Rates for the Major Indicators of the Socio-Economic Development of the USSR	155
2.5	Emission of Air Pollutants in Ukrainian Cities	172
2.6	Highest Recorded Levels of Major Air Pollutants in Ukrainian Cities	172
2.7	Air Pollution in Ukrainian Cities, 1990	173
3.1	Agreement/Disagreement that Writers played a Role in Facilitating the Ukrainian Green Movement	245
3.2	Familiarity with Environmental Campaigns conducted by Ukrainian Writers	246
3.3	CPU's Attitude towards the Greens	303
3.4	Local Authorities' Attitude towards the Greens	307
4.1	Support for Greens in Kiev during 1990	355
4.2	Support for Greens in Ukraine during 1990	356
4.3	Attitudes to the Ukrainian Public Movements and Political Parties among the Ukrainian Population	357
4.4	Green Strategies/Methods	394
4.5	Change of Methods	396
4.6	Methods and their Efficiency	397
4.7	Methods not the Best, but not Possible to Change them	398
4.8	Most Efficient Means by which to Campaign at Present	399
4.9	Comparison of Working Conditions in the USSR and in Independent Ukraine	400
4.10	Ideas about how to Improve the State of the Environment in Ukraine	402
4.11	Assessment of Green Deputies	404
4.12	Total Membership: Break-down by Sex	408
4.13	Age Break-down (I)	410
4.14	Age Break-down (II)	410
4.15	Membership Development	411
4.16	Assistance from <i>Zelenyi Svit's</i> Kiev Office	417
4.17	How to Improve <i>Zelenyi Svit's</i> Kiev Office	418
4.18	Desired Organisational Structure, <i>Zelenyi Svit</i>	419
4.19	Assessment of Present <i>Zelenyi Svit</i> Structure	420
4.20	Is the Ukrainian Green Movement in Crisis?	430
4.21	Attitude towards Foreign Sponsors	434
4.22	Fund-raising	434
4.23	How to improve <i>Zelenyi Svit's</i> Financial Situation	435
4.24	Knowledge of <i>EkoMislii</i>	438

4.25 Attitudes towards <i>EkoMisiia</i>	438
5.1 Membership Figures, <i>PZU</i> Oblast Groups	505
5.2 Party Membership in Ukraine	506
5.3 Desired Relationship between <i>PZU</i> and <i>ZS</i>	509
5.4 <i>PZU</i> members who are also members of <i>ZS</i>	511
5.5 <i>PZU</i> as Political Wing of <i>ZS</i>	511
5.6 Party/Movement Support in Kiev throughout 1990	515
5.7 Party/Movement Support in Kiev, 1991	515
5.8 Assessment of Ukrainian Political Movements and Parties, January 1992	516
5.9 Popularity of Political Parties and Movements in Kiev, 1992-93	517
5.10 Party and Movement Support in Ukraine in August 1993	518
5.11 Party Support, 1992-1993	519
5.12 Party Support, December 1993	519
5.13 Party Support, March 1994	519
5.14 Support for Greens by Profession	521
5.15 Support for Party Leaders, October 1991	534
8.1 Issues causing the most Concern among People	792
8.2 The most important Issue of Concern among People	792
8.3 The single Issue that needs to be solved most urgently	792
8.4 Concern with the Environment and Age	793
8.5 Party Preference, January and July 1990	809
8.6 Party Preference, 1990	809
8.7 Party Preference, Kiev, October 1991	810
8.8 Party and Movement Support, January 1992	811
8.9 Party Preference, Autumn 1993	814
8.10 Geographical Support for the Greens	815
8.11 Green Support by Sex	815
8.12 Green Support by Age	816
8.13 Green Support in Rural/Urban Areas	816
8.14 Green Support by Profession	816
8.15 Green Support and Attitude to Unemployment	817
8.16 Green Support and Attitude towards the Market Economy	817
8.17 Green Support and Placement of Greens on a Left-Right Scale	818
8.18 Classification of Greens on a Left-Right Scale by Ukrainian Members of Parliament, 1994	818
8.19 Green Support and Attitudes towards Communism	818
8.20 Green Support and Belief in Communism	819
8.21 Green Support and Worst Feature of Communism	819
8.22 Green Support Best Feature of Communism	819
8.23 Green Support and Best Soviet Era	820
8.24 Green Support and Interest in Politics	820
8.25 Green Support and Participation in the Political Debate	820
8.26 Green Support and Policies/Personality Preference	823
8.27 Attitude towards Greens among the General Population/Members of Verkhovna Rada	824
9.1 Oblast and Environmental Concern	856

List of Figures

1.1 Public Organisations in the USSR	42
2.1 Numbers of Births pr. 1,000 Inhabitants (1970-88)	177
2.2 Population Growth (1970-88)	178
2.3 Working People becoming Invalids (1970-88)	179
2.4 Temporary Loss of Working Capability due to Illness (1970-88)	180
3.1 Zelenyi Svit's Organisational Structure	278
5.1 Ukraine and the CIS	567
5.2 The Territorial Structure of Ukraine	568
5.3 Degree of Centralisation of Ukrainian Political Structures	569
5.4 Economic Strategy	570
5.5 Military-Political Doctrine	571
6.1 The South Ukrainian Energy Complex	576
6.2 Water Circulation Scheme for the South Ukrainian Energy Complex	577
8.1 Classification Scheme for Green Political Thought	759

Maps

Map 1 Nuclear Power Stations in Ukraine	871
Map 2 Ukraine	872
Map 3 Nikolaev oblast	873

Introduction

The aim of this thesis is to study political actors in the Soviet/post-Soviet context of political change and to assess their impact on political decision-making within this context. I will focus on Ukraine and look at the emergence, development and political significance of the Green Movement of Ukraine, *Zelenyi Svit* (Green World) and of the Ukrainian Green Party, *Partiia Zelenykh Ukrainy* (PZU).

Ukraine has been chosen as the geographical focus of the thesis for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is the third largest of the former Soviet republics, with a territory and population the size of France. Ukraine's geographical and strategic location makes it a particularly important country to Western Europe. Its efforts to join Europe and its potential role as a bridge-builder between the former East and the West are in themselves reasons good enough to start a study of the area.

Secondly, for a long time Ukraine was considered to be one of the most conservative of the former Soviet republics. Political reform was introduced much more reluctantly and with greater difficulty than was the case in for instance the Baltic Republics. As such, research on Ukrainian politics is important for comparative purposes. Unlike the Baltic States, which were the most focused upon immediately prior to and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, much of Ukraine has been a part of the Soviet Union almost from its very beginning. The Western parts of Ukraine, however, were incorporated into the Soviet Union only in 1939. Unlike the rest of the country, the Western areas have been considerably influenced by Western Europe - a substantial proportion of the population is Catholic - and they also have a democratic tradition - albeit a short one. Ukraine is thus also interesting as it provides us with an opportunity to conduct a comparative analysis within one single territorial unit.

Thirdly, Ukraine has been chosen as the focus of this thesis is 'green politics'. Chernobyl is located in Ukraine, and although Belorussia suffered the most from the nuclear fall-out in the aftermath of the accident in 1986, Ukraine was also badly affected. Altogether there are five nuclear power stations on Ukrainian soil and these have been (and still are) a source of dispute since the Chernobyl accident. Further, Ukraine accounted for not only 25% of the Soviet Union's industry output, but also 25% of its total pollution. Moreover, Ukraine was also affected by transboundary pollution emanating primarily from Poland and the former Czechoslovakia. Extensive pollution of the air, rivers and soil was beginning to take its toll by the late 1980s and issues such as nuclear safety and the environment ranked high on the Ukrainian political agenda during the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Finally, *Zelenyi Svit* was among the very first independent political movements to emerge not only in Ukraine, but also in the former Soviet Union. The environment was at least initially

considered a relatively harmless (i.e. non-political) issue and environmentalists were keen on stressing that the movements/groups they set up were non-political and as such posed no threat to the CPSU. It soon became clear, however, that the environment and politics were inextricably linked with one another, and as the boundaries of glasnost and democratisation were pushed out further and further, the Green Movements, not only in Ukraine but also in the other former Soviet republics, became more and more politicised. By linking environmental pollution to people's health, the Greens, headed by well-known figures such as the writers Serhii Plachynda and Iurii Shcherbak, succeeded in mobilising the public behind their cause and achieved substantial concessions from the Ukrainian authorities, particularly in the period 1988-1990. Members and sympathisers of *Zelenyi Svit* were elected to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in 1989 and also to local and district councils throughout Ukraine in 1990. What was more, in 1991 the second leader of *Zelenyi Svit*, Iurii Shcherbak, was appointed Ukrainian Minister of the Environment. A year later, he was sent to Israel as Ukrainian ambassador. His predecessor as leader of *Zelenyi Svit*, Leontyi Sanduliak, was appointed Ukrainian ambassador to Romania the same year. Thus, the Greens were able to influence the Ukrainian political process both through ad-hoc activities and through established political channels.

Comparative studies are popular among observers of Green politics¹. Although some attention is given to the differences/similarities between the Ukrainian Green Movement and similar movements in Western Europe, the emphasis is on the former. I have consciously chosen a very detailed approach, studying *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU* in depth, as their history has not yet been written. It is my view that we need a solid understanding of the Ukrainian Greens themselves before we can endeavour to make a proper cross-country analysis. To do both in one thesis is unfortunately not possible due to limited space, budget and time constraints. Due to an enormous amount of previously unpublished and until recently non-accessible information, the length of this thesis is above average. In my view this is justifiable as very little has so far been published on the Ukrainian Green Movement and it is therefore not possible to refer the reader to books and articles providing him/her with a background to the topic covered in this thesis. Moreover, the few works that have so far appeared on the subject are to some extent misleading as they do not cover the topic in depth and are not backed up with factual evidence².

Outline of Hypothesis/Presentation of Chapters

In Chapter One I try to develop a framework within which to explain and study the emergence of the Ukrainian Greens. I first look at their emergence within the context of Gorbachev's political

¹ For an overview, see Philip D. Lowe and Wolfgang Rüdig, 'Review Article: Political Ecology and the Social Sciences - the State of the Art', *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 16, pp. 513-50.

² See Chapter Three for details.

reforms but argue that this in itself is not sufficient to explain their emergence. I then look at political participation and the environment prior to 1985, arguing that the student *druzhyny* (student nature guards) and members of the creative intelligentsia, who opposed environmentally harmful objects prior to glasnost and democratisation, paved the way for and took an active part in setting up green movements not only in Ukraine, but also in other Soviet republics during 1986 and 1987. Whereas the Soviet doctrine at this time can be condensed as follows: 'Nature is merely a tool to serve the purposes of Man', an alternative current of thought (Man is an intrinsic part of Nature and Nature has intrinsic value), whose roots can be traced back to pre-Revolutionary Russia and Ukraine, existed as a sub-culture during the Soviet pre-Gorbachev era, providing a philosophical framework and the skills needed to establish a Green Movement. Thus, the emergence of the Greens was not simply a spontaneous reaction to glasnost and democratisation, but the result of a long process that can be traced back to the pre-Soviet period. I also argue that this 'eco-culture', as I have chosen to call it, influenced the arguments used by the Greens in their campaigns to save the Ukrainian environment and have an important role to play in the Greens' future work. Combining this 'eco-culture' with green thinking on the environment as developed in the West might prove a more fruitful approach than blindly adopting Western theoretical frameworks while ignoring the rich philosophical, cultural and religious environmental legacy of the Slavs.

In Chapter Two I first try to identify the reasons why the Soviet Union suffered such extensive environmental problems - in spite of strict legislation to reduce pollution to a minimum and arguments to the effect that for ideological reasons the Soviet system was by far more environmental than that of the capitalist West. I then look at environmental reform under Gorbachev and assess its significance. Finally, I look at environmental problems in Ukraine and the link between pollution and health, as well as policy changes that took place in this area during the late 1980s/early 1990s. The position of the CPU is examined with materials from the Ukrainian State Archives for Public Movements, and I also make extensive use of the transcript of the environmental session of the Ukrainian Parliament, which took place in February 1990.

Chapters Three and Four account for the emergence and development of *Zelenyi Svit*, from 1987, when it was founded, until December 1994 when it effectively split into two movements. Firstly, I look at the emergence of the Green Movement, linking this process to the concept of Slav eco-culture, arguing that there are two currents of thought within the Movement; one 'Ukrainian', which seeks inspiration from Ukrainian/Russian science, literature and culture, and one smaller, 'globalist', which is more preoccupied with the international green movement and its political framework. These two currents clashed on numerous occasions, eventually facilitating the split of the movement. Considerable attention is also given to the interaction between the greens and the

CPU and the development of this relationship over time. As the thesis includes a case-study of the campaign against the Iuzhnoukrainsk Energy Complex, the emphasis of this chapter is on internal developments within *Zelenyi Svit*. The following topics are covered: membership composition, policies, strategy, public support, political representation, discord within the movement, links to the international green movement and *Zelenyi Svit*'s political impact.

The emergence and development of the Green Party is analysed in relation to general developments in *Zelenyi Svit* in Chapter Five. At its first congress in October 1989, *Zelenyi Svit* passed a resolution stating its intent to set up a Green Party once this became politically possible. In February 1990 the CPSU changed article 6 of the Soviet Constitution, thus opening up opportunities for political parties other than the CPSU. The Green Party of Ukraine was founded in April 1990 as the 'political wing' of *Zelenyi Svit*. As the green movement was composed of people of very different political beliefs, however, disagreement soon arose as to what exactly should be the relationship between the two. Special emphasis is therefore given to the relationship between the movement and the party. I also look at the history, theoretical framework, policies and strategies, resources and political significance of the Green Party. The chapter also addresses the mobilisation potential and public support of the Green Party, political representation and its relationship to other political parties. Finally, I try to place the Green Party in the Ukrainian political landscape, arguing that the Party has failed to utilise its potential due to a lack of clarity on political issues and due to poor leadership.

Chapters Six and Seven focus on the Iuzhnoukrainsk Energy Complex (Nikolaev oblast) and the campaign organised by the green movement in the region to prevent further expansion of this station. I look at how the Greens mobilised broad public support against such expansion, how they developed arguments against it and alternatives to it and how they interacted with the relevant political decision makers at a local, regional, Ukrainian and (prior to the collapse of the USSR in December 1991) Soviet level, with an emphasis on relations between the CPU and the Greens and on relations between Greens in Nikolaev oblast and in Kiev. I also look at how general political and economic change in the USSR/Ukraine affected the campaign and the way in which it was conducted.

Chapter Eight relates the emergence and the significance of the Ukrainian Greens to those in Western Europe. I first look at the theoretical framework of *Zelenyi Svit/PZU*, contrasting this to green political thought in the West. Although there are similarities, there are also differences. These differences, shaped in part by Slav 'eco-culture', as well as the very different political framework within which the Ukrainian Greens operate, has shaped their agenda and made it in some respects different from that of the West European Greens. A close examination of the Greens and the issue of Ukrainian independence is conducted to show that while different, the

Ukrainian Greens are still committed to the international green device of 'act locally, think globally'.

A second issue addressed in this chapter is Inglehart's concept of post-material value change and its relevance as a means by which to explain the emergence of green movements/parties in the Ukrainian case. I argue that this concept is not very useful as an explanation in the case of the former USSR. However, there are also significant similarities between Greens in the West and Ukraine (educational level of members, types and means of campaigning), making it difficult to liken the emergence of the green movement in Ukraine to that of similar movements in developing countries - although the aspect of survival has very much in common with third world movements. Whereas in the latter case locals sometimes organise campaigns to protect their livelihood (forest, land, etc.), in the Ukrainian case the Greens are fighting against the degeneration of an entire nation, caused by radiation and chemical pollution of the drinking water, air, soil and food products to a level where genetic defects on a large scale are feared.

Green activists are highly educated and initially, like Greens in the West, many of them opposed the dominant political doctrine ('state socialism' in the USSR, 'capitalism' in the West) as being anti-environmental. In that sense also *Zelenyi Svit* was an 'alternative' movement. But whereas the Green Movement in the West emerged gradually in response to growing disillusion with the existing political/economic system and the pollution it generated, in the USSR it emerged spontaneously - as a mass movement - uniting a less homogeneous group of people, not all of whom shared the same commitment to alternative thinking as was the case in the West.

Finally, in Chapter Nine, I discuss the significance of Slav eco-culture in shaping the Ukrainian Green Movement. I specifically look at how arguments used in the campaign against further expansion of the Iuzhnoukrainsk Energy Complex were linked to this concept and how this made the campaign different from similar campaigns undertaken by greens in Western Europe. Similarly, I look at the significance of eco-culture in fuelling the conflict between members of the Green Party and *Zelenyi Svit*, the argument being that the latter are more committed to this concept than the former.

I ask whether or not the Ukrainian Green Movement has a future, given serious conflicts within the movement and given the political and economic situation in Ukraine at the present time. Prior to the declaration of Ukrainian independence the Greens argued that once independence had been established, adequate measures to protect the environment could be taken. However, recent political decisions indicate that concern for the environment has been replaced by the need to assert Ukrainian independence. Thus a moratorium on the construction of new nuclear reactors passed by the Ukrainian parliament in September 1990 was overturned by presidential decree in March 1994 on the grounds that Ukraine needed nuclear power to avoid dependence on Russia in

the energy sector. Similarly, despite protests from Greens, a decision was made in late 1994 to allow for the construction of an oil terminal not far from Odessa. Due to financial hardship and growing disillusionment with politics generally, the public is now, unlike what was the case before 1991, very difficult to mobilise. A number of possible scenarios regarding the future of the greens are identified with this in mind, as is the potential role of eco-culture and assistance from the Greens in the West for each one of these.

Methodology/Approach

The research for this thesis was carried out during three field trips to Ukraine in 1991 (August), 1992 (June-August) and 1994 (March- June). Information about the emergence and development of *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU* were obtained through extensive interviewing of and numerous conversations and discussions with key members of the movement/party as well as from *Zelenyi Svit*'s archives. I also rely on hand-written accounts of *Zelenyi Svit/PZU* meetings supplied by individual members. During my visits to Ukraine I was allowed to sit in on internal meetings of *Zelenyi Svit/PZU* and also accompanied a group of *PZU* supporters from Kiev to Zakarpattia in April 1994. Liubov Karavanska, a member of *PZU*, made it to the second round of the parliamentary elections in the Irshava district, and Kiev Greens went there to conduct a short pre-election campaign and also to observe the elections themselves. During the spring of 1994 I was able to access CPU documents on the Greens and on nuclear power in Ukraine in the Ukrainian Archives of Public Movements (Kiev), which shed new light on the CPU's attitude towards the Greens and also revealed substantial opposition within CPU towards plans to expand nuclear power on Ukrainian territory. I was actively encouraged to access and photocopy as many documents as possible - an 'agitator' was even provided for this purpose - as the archives were short of funding!

Most of the information used for this thesis was collected in Kiev and through extensive interviewing of Kiev activists. Although I was able to talk to activists from the various regions during organisational meetings of *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU* in Kiev, a questionnaire was distributed to all the regional groups in June 1994. Although the sample of my survey was rather small (see appendix for details) thus preventing me from generalising too much, it is still valid as expressing the opinion of regional leaders on a number of issues. It is particularly important to know how Greens in the regions think about various issues, as *Zelenyi Svit* defines itself as a grassroots movement. I have also benefited from SSEES' collection of Ukrainian newspapers and journals and from the Ukrainian Press Agency's collection of press releases and newspapers from Ukraine, which Taras Kuzio gave me access to in 1991. Martin Dewhirst took out a subscription of Ukraine

Today (Ukrainian Media Digest compiled by Radio Liberty in Munich), which gave me access to transcripts from Ukrainian radio/TV as well as other relevant information.

The case-study on the campaign against expansion of the Iuzhnoukrainsk Energy Complex in Nikolaev oblast was carried out in June 1994. Extensive talks with members of the Nikolaev oblast Green Movement and with Viktor Bilodid of Iuzhnoukrainsk were combined with archival work and access to Anatolii Zolotukhin's personal archive and correspondence. The Nikolaev oblast state archives have a substantial collection of materials (letters, petitions, fact sheets, reports and newspaper cuttings) on this campaign donated to it by Nikolaev *Zelenyi Mir*, and in the Kiev State Archives for Public Movements I came across CPU documents and reports on the Iuzhnoukrainsk Energy Complex that complemented the former. Staff of the Nikolaev newspaper *Radianske Pribuzhzhia* were also very helpful in providing me with newspaper cuttings, as were the staff of the Nikolaev State Library. Ala Korzheva, a reporter at the oblast TV station, kindly allowed me to watch reports she had made on the Iuzhnoukrainsk Energy Complex, and Viktor Bilodid showed me the areas in Iuzhnoukrainsk that would have been flooded had plans to expand the Energy Complex gone ahead.

In my thesis I have done one in-depth case study of the campaign against expansion of the Iuzhnoukrainsk Energy Complex. Similar campaigns were conducted by Greens against expansion of the Rivne, Khmelnytskyi and Zaporizhzhia nuclear power stations. A massive campaign to prevent the Crimean nuclear power station on the Kerch Peninsula from being completed and attached to the power grid was also organised by the Crimean Greens, and the Kiev Greens together with locals in Chyhyryn prevented the Chyhyryn nuclear power station from being built. Whereas I would have liked to conduct a comparative study of all these campaigns, this was simply not feasible due to a limited budget and time constraints.

The advantage of doing one in-depth case study, however, in my opinion outweighs its limitations. A large amount of archival materials on nuclear power is available in the Ukrainian State Archives on Public Movements (Kiev), and studying it allowed me to gain a better understanding of how the nuclear issue developed and how it was handled by the CPU in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident. It is commonly argued that the Green Movement influenced and shaped the CPU's stand on this issue. Official documents from the time, however, reveal that the situation was much more complex. The CPU's opposition to further expansion of nuclear power in Ukraine emerged gradually before *Zelenyi Svit* was founded in December 1987, and it seems that the CPU then used *Zelenyi Svit*'s and the public's concern to justify its own position, which became increasingly radicalised vis-à-vis the CPSU during the late 1980s and early 1990s. On the eve of his death in 1989 Shcherbitskii is even alleged to have apologised for allowing the 1 May Day parade to go ahead following the accident at Chernobyl. As will be seen in Chapter Six,

the views of CPSU officials and Greens clearly coincided on the issue of the Iuzhnoukrainsk Energy Complex from the very beginning of this campaign.

In the summer of 1991 I carried out a three month research trip to the Baltic States, Russia, Belorussia, Ukraine and Moldavia for the Ecological Studies Institute (London), for whom I was working as a Soviet Consultant at the time. This not only greatly enhanced my understanding of the ins and outs of the Soviet system, but allowed me to gain insight into environmental issues also in areas of the Soviet Union other than Ukraine. During this trip I had meetings and talks with members of the green movements, members of parliaments and officials of the Ministries/Departments on the Environment in each of these republics.

An article called The Ukrainian Green Movement: Nationalist or Internationalist? derived from Chapter Eight of this thesis was published by Avebury Studies in Green Research in Perspectives on the Environment 2, in 1995. Parts of Chapters One (introduction on the Greens) and Two (Soviet Environmental Policies) form part of a report written for the Ecological Studies Institute (A Report on a Trip to the Soviet Union, London 1992) and a paper on nuclear safety in Ukraine, based on archival research in Kiev, was presented at a seminar at CICERO, Oslo, as part of a job interview in January 1996.

As can be seen below, I have not translated quotes in Russian and Ukrainian into English. This has been done deliberately, to avoid any inaccuracies in translation and to give the reader a chance to see the original wording of the documents quoted. Aadne Aasland created precedent on this issue in 1994, when he submitted a thesis with quotes in Russian left untranslated. I have made extensive use of quotes, rather than summaries, to highlight the original sources maximally. Ukrainian/Russian names, names of journals/newspapers and places referred to in the main text have been transliterated for consistency. I have used the Library of Congress transliteration scheme, with the omission of diacritics for both Russian and Ukrainian. Geographical areas known abroad by their Russian names (e.g. Kiev instead of Kyiv, Dnicpr instead of Dniipro) or English names (e.g. South Bug instead of Ukrainian: Pivdennyi Buh and Russian: Iuzhnii Bug) are referred to by their Russian/English names. As regards footnotes, first references are written out in full. Where the same source is referred to more than once, only the author's name, year of publication and page number(s) are listed.

Funding for this thesis was obtained from the Norwegian Student Bank, the ORS Scheme (1991/92, 1992/93) and Glasgow University [(the Glasgow Postgraduate Award (1992/93))]. The 1994 field trip to Ukraine was funded with a grant from BASEES and support from the Politics Department of Glasgow University.

Acknowledgements:

I would like to thank both my supervisors, Professor Stephen White and Mr. Martin Dewhirst, for their advice and support during my studies. I am very grateful to Stephen White for his valuable comments and suggestions and to Martin Dewhirst for all the materials he has provided me with and the people he has put me in touch with during my studies. Thanks are also due to both of them for correcting my English.

I would also like to thank Professor Bill Miller for allowing me to use cross-tabulated data from the project *Public Opinion and Democratic Consolidation in Russia and East Europe*, directed by him, Stephen White and Paul Heywood. These data (from December 1993) complemented my own data and helped me gain insight into who the Green voters in Ukraine are and what characteristics they share. I was also given data regarding the attitude of the members of parliament elected in 1994 towards the Greens. Thanks are also due to John Barry, who while himself a PhD student in Glasgow read and made very useful comments on the first chapters of this thesis. I would moreover like to thank Taras Kuzio of the former Ukrainian Press Agency in London, for giving me access to his newspaper archives and relevant press releases covering the Green Movement's early days. Peter Duncan and Jonathan Aves of SSEES were also very helpful and gave me access to their archive on informal movements in the former Soviet Union. In addition, I would like to thank the librarians at SSEES, who provided me with stacks of Ukrainian newspapers stored in the basement of Senate House and who were generally very helpful. Finally, special thanks are due to Aadne Aasland for not only being a very good friend but also for reading and commenting on parts of this thesis, to Weon-Ki Yoo, for being there for me after my father died, to Dimos Fragopoulos for explaining the technical aspects of the South Ukrainian Energy Complex to me, and last, but not least, to my mother, who kept me financially afloat during the last year of my studies.

I would also like to thank all the members of *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU* who took the time to talk with me about the Ukrainian Greens, gave me access to relevant materials and encouraged me to pursue my research from the very beginning. Special thanks are due to Oleksii Kabyka (Greenpeace Ukraine), who not only discussed green issues with me, but also sent me newspapers from Kiev and helped me find a flat for my last field trip to Ukraine. Thanks are also due to Andrii and Tania Demydenko for their hospitality and helpfulness, to Anatolii Panov, who gave me access to *Zelenyi Svit*'s archives while director of the Green Office in Kiev, and who also helped me collect most issues of the Green Movement's newspaper, *Zelenyi svit*. Andrii Hlazonyi and Serhii Kurykin were not only very helpful, but also very knowledgeable and inspiring discussants. I would also like to thank Ihor Kirilchuk, Ihor Dzeverin and Sviatoslav Dudko for all their help and in-depth discussions and - in alphabetical order - Mykhailo Androsov, Aleksandr

Bagin, Evhen Bal, Mykhailo Boiko, Iryna Borysova, Michael Calderbank, Evheniia Derkach, Serhii Fedorinchuk, Iryna Haniukova, Ihor Havrylov, Hryhoriy Honcharenko, Serhii Hrabovskiy, Volodymyr Hrekov, Volodymyr Hrisiuk, Olena Hulika, Valentin Iankovskii, Olena Iavorska, Liubov Karavanska, Viktor Khazan, Klavdia Kholiavenko, Vitalii Kononov, Evhen Korbetskyi, Ihor Listopad, David MacTaggart, Mikhalko, Serhii Mykhailov, Viacheslav Oleshenko, Andrii Orlov, Serhii Plachynda, Natalia Preobrazhenska, Mykhailo Prilutskyi, Nadia Rim, Iurii Samiilenko and his secretary Tamara, Iurii Shcherbak, Svetlana Shmelova, Anna Siomina, Ihor Storozhuk, Oleh Sydorkin, Hanna Tsvetkova, Volodymyr Tykhyi, Volodymyr Tymonin, Iryna and Rostislav Tverdostup, Zhenia, Kostiantyn Zarubitskyi and Borys Zrezartsev. I would also like to thank activists passing through the Green Office in Kiev for sharing their views on the Green Movement with me. Finally, I would like to thank Natalia Makovska and the other members of staff at the Kiev State Archives for Public Movements for their help and advice during my work in the archives, and the Norwegian Ambassador to Kiev, Øivind Nordsletten and his wife for their hospitality.

Special thanks are due to Anatolii Zolotukhin, who not only arranged accommodation for me in Nikolaev, but gave me access to his personal archives, got permission for me to use the files on the Green Movement in the Nikolaev State Archives, put me in contact with others and allowed me to attend a pre-election meeting of *Zelenyi Mir*. Without his invaluable help and assistance, it would not have been possible for me to carry out my case study. I would also like to express my gratitude to Viktor Bilodid and his family in Iuzhnoukrainsk, who showed me the places that would have been flooded had the Second Stage of the South Ukrainian Energy Complex not been stopped, and who also took the time to talk to me in depth about the emergence of the Green Movement in Nikolaev oblast. I would also like to thank Sergei Shapovalov, who in addition to willingly answering questions about the Greens, took us out on the South Bug river in his sailing boat, to Lidiia Suslova of the oblast soviet (and a member of *Zelenyi Mir*) for providing me with information and also practical assistance, to Alla Korzheva of the oblast TV station, who let me watch and tape TV coverage on the campaign against expansion of the South Ukraine Energy Complex, to Anatolii Kolesnik and Ala of *Radianske Pribuzhzhia*, for letting me go through their newspaper archives and, finally, to Nellia Shamilevna and other staff of the Nikolaev State Library for letting me access its newspaper collection and for providing me with photocopying facilities. Without their generous help and support it would have been very difficult to complete the case study for this thesis on time.

Finally, I would like to thank Mimi Turnbull for making me aware of Soviet environmental problems and Iurii Shcherbak and Volodymyr Tykhyi for initial information about the Ukrainian Green Movement. Iurii Shcherbak presented a paper on Ukrainian Environmental Problems and

Zelenyi Svit at a conference on the environment and nationalism at the Marjorie Mayrock Centre for Soviet and East European Research, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, in January 1991, and Volodymyr Tykhyi did a general outline of Ukrainian environmental problems and showed of *Mikro-fon* (the first unofficial film on the impact of the Chernobyl accident) to a group of tourists I was accompanying to Kiev in 1990. Their presentations triggered my interest in the Ukrainian Green Movement and through Tykhyi I established contacts with other members of *Zelenyi Svit*.

Although some people were sceptical of my work, an equal number of people were both encouraging and helpful. The Greens are keen that their history be written down. As an outside observer and a non-Ukrainian, who has not been able to observe developments within the Green Movement at close range all the time, my analysis might have missed out or ignored things that others would stress. However, the Greens have done their best to give me enough insight into the activities of *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU* to do this as accurately as possible. For this I am greatly indebted to all of them, and I would like to stress that any inaccuracies that might occur in my thesis are my responsibility alone.

1 Political Participation in the USSR and the Emergence of Independent Green Movements

1.0 Introduction

The emergence of Green groups and movements in the former Soviet Union is largely referred to as a phenomenon of the late 1980s. Even though voices critical of Soviet environmental policies - or rather the lack of such policies - can be traced back to the 1920s¹, these united only a handful of individuals and were in most cases loose constellations, not organised groups. The type of movements and groups that started to emerge from 1986 and onwards was unprecedented.

At the time of their emergence, no proper framework existed within which to analyse them. A number of different approaches were therefore chosen by researchers in the field. Some political scientists have chosen to apply Western models of political science as a tool enabling them to get a better understanding of the new groups; thus Fish (1991) for instance, related the emergence of informal groups to theories of civil society. Others, such as Pye (1990) have elaborated theories of political change to explain the changes that took place in the Soviet Union after Gorbachev came to power, culminating in the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Yet others [White (1991), Sakwa (1990), Hosking/Aves/Duncan (1992)], rather than approaching their subject through theoretical models, have explained the emergence of informal groups in general in the former Soviet Union with reference to political and economic developments under Gorbachev. Studies focusing more specifically on the Greens in the former Soviet Union [Ivanitskii (1990, 1991, 1992¹, 1992², 1994), Dawson (1990, 1995)] tend to explain the emergence and/or development of such groups within the context of sociological models developed outwith the former USSR and for the study of similar movements in the West.

In my view, although the general political and economic changes that took place in the Soviet Union following Gorbachev's ascent to power explain how it became possible to set up independent political groups such as the Greens, a more thorough understanding of the factors underlying their emergence can be found only by looking to the past. Whereas Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and democratisation triggered the formation of Green independent movements, the people initiating these movements had in most cases been working actively on environmental issues prior to Gorbachev. Some had participated in the student *druzhiny* (Nature Guards) for

¹ See Дуглас Вайнер (Уинер), Экология в Советской России. Архипелаг свободы. Заповедники и охрана природы (Москва: Прогресс, 1991) for a detailed history of environmental activism in the USSR in the 1920s and 1930s.

Nature protection, others (writers and scientists) had been involved in the loosely organised campaign to protect Lake Baikal and/or the more tightly structured campaign against plans to redirect the flow of the Siberian rivers to the South, which culminated in this controversial project being abandoned by the Soviet Government in February 1986. These people - already possessing the knowledge and organisational skills required to successfully set up Green groups, many of whom were also well known and respected among the Soviet population - not only added weight and credibility to the emerging groups and movements, but were also highly successful in mobilising the population behind the demands raised by them.

Soviet official thinking on the environment, as will be seen below, was rooted in the idea that Nature was there for the benefit of Man - to serve Man, so to speak - and had no intrinsic value in itself. Those people who were actively trying to protect the environment prior to Gorbachev, however, did not share this view. Often their views on the environment were shaped by the ideas of pre-Revolutionary thinkers, scientists, writers and philosophers as well as Slav cultural and religious traditions, which I have chosen to refer to as 'eco-culture' and which during the Soviet period co-existed with the official doctrine as a sub-culture. Thus, once it became possible to establish independent Green movements, not only were their founders and key activists experienced 'campaigners' and/or well-known public figures; they also already had a theoretical framework within which to operate.

Below, I will first outline the emergence of key Green groups and movements in the former Soviet Union, relating this to Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and democratisation. I will then look at political participation on the environment in the Soviet Union prior to the emergence of Gorbachev, arguing that whereas political participation in the USSR more generally took place within carefully set and narrow limits, a higher degree of autonomy and less stringent limits were in place for the 'environmentalists'. Finally, I will present my hypothesis with regard to 'eco-culture', arguing that 'eco-culture' is not only helpful for understanding the emergence and development of the Ukrainian Greens; it also has an important role to play in the Greens' future attempts at creating awareness of and imbuing people with respect for the environment - which, in turn, holds the clue to the future of the Greens themselves.

1.1 The Emergence of Green Groups and Movements under Gorbachev (1986-88)

Although Gorbachev's policies of *perestroika* and *uskorenie* (acceleration) were primarily aimed at improving the state of the economy in the USSR², they provided people with opportunities for more active participation in Soviet political life. In order for the economy to be successfully reformed, constructive criticism of flaws in the economic system were encouraged. *Glasnost* (openness) and *demokratisatsiia* (democratisation) were encouraged to gain the support of the intelligentsia, and after some time informal groups in support of perestroika began to appear, their aim being to discuss how best to improve the performance of the Soviet economy and to support Gorbachev's policies of reform.

Whereas the emphasis was initially on the economy, it soon became clear that many other spheres of life, including the state of the environment, were directly linked to and affected by the ailing Soviet economic system. Moreover, Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and democratisation soon gained a momentum of their own, gradually expanding and redefining the boundaries within which they were conducted and the issues which could be addressed.

The first informal Green groups came into being during 1986. Most of them consisted of only a handful people and were concerned with the cultural as well as the material/physical local environment. In Moscow, for instance, a group emerged to save a 300-year-old oak tree on Prospekt Kalinina from being uprooted. Other groups were set up to protect and restore historical-cultural monuments and buildings. In Leningrad a *Council for Cultural Ecology* (Sovet po ekologii kultury) emerged towards the end of 1986, as did the group *Spasenie* (Salvation). In Ukraine, the *Culturological Club* and other similar groups were established in early 1987 (see Chapter Three). Such groups appeared also in other republics.

Possibly the oldest of these groups, *Vizes Aizsargs Klub (VAK)*, emerged in Latvia in 1980. Initially, VAK united people restoring architectural monuments, predominantly old and abandoned churches. Once the churches had been repaired, guitar concerts and other entertainment were organised in their premises. In 1984 VAK joined forces with the *Centre to Protect Monuments*. Members of the latter were studying Latvian folklore and forgotten and banned writers and gradually expanded its activities to include also environmental issues³. What VAK and similar groups elsewhere had in common was that they were conservationist rather than political and as such did not pose a direct threat to the official authorities. To a great extent the leaders of these

² Åse Berit Grødeland, *An Assessment of the Political Significance of Gorbachev's Leadership*, M.Phil dissertation, Glasgow, 1990.

³ Институт массовых политических движений, *Экологические организации на территории бывшего СССР. Справочник*, (Москва: Издательство "РАУ-Пресс", 1992), с. 52.

groups stressed that in no way were they to be considered political groups. With the emergence of *glasnost* they were viewed as a good example of how constructive groups should operate. They were therefore allowed to operate relatively freely.

Gradually, however, the culturological groups started to get politicised and new, more radical groups, emerged. The Leningrad City Soviet's decision to pull down the Hotel Angleterre just off St. Isaak's Square on 16-18 March 1987 caused one of the first confrontations between official authorities and Greens. *Spasenie*, which emerged in 1986 following efforts to prevent the house of the Russian poet A. Delvig from being torn down, took an active part in organising pickets and meetings to save Hotel Angleterre from demolition. One of Russia's most famous poets, Sergei Esenin, committed suicide in the hotel in the 1920s, and it was thus considered by many to be a building of national significance. It is also interesting to note that Esenin belonged to the so-called 'countryside' writers, of whose poetry Nature and the link between Nature and Man was the central theme. These meetings were attended by several hundred people and were given extensive TV coverage.

Two political events that took place in 1986 contributed to the radicalisation of the Green Movement. In the winter of that year the CPSU Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued a decree suspending the river-reversal project which had been adopted in 1982. The idea of the project was to turn the flow of several Siberian rivers from the North to the South and use the water to irrigate the dry lands of Soviet Central Asia, increasing agricultural and cotton production there. A large number of Soviet writers and scientists had campaigned fiercely against this project, and the suspension of it no doubt greatly boosted their morale. Moreover, it signalled a change in official policies towards people critical of decisions on the environment. Earlier loosely organised campaigns such as the one to save Lake Baikal - although visible to the public - did not succeed in having official decisions overturned. The river-reversal 'campaign' turned this trend, indicating that given valid arguments and perseverance, environmental campaigns could be successful. Not surprisingly, therefore, scientists and writers who fought against the river reversal project decided to formally join forces. The association *Ekologiya i Mir* (Ecology and Peace) which was set up in Moscow in 1987 under the leadership of Sergei Zalygin⁴, emerged at the initiative of people involved in this campaign.

The second incident, possibly even more crucial than that of the river-reversal project, was the accident at Chernobyl which took place on 26 April, 1986. The accident, and all the secrecy with which it was surrounded, demonstrated clearly the need for more *glasnost* - not only on the environment, but in Soviet society as such. Besides, the authority of the Communist Party received a serious blow, due to its inability to protect its people against such disasters and its

⁴ Sergei Zalygin was a well-known writer and also editor of the literary journal *Novyi Mir*.

failure to take the measures required to minimise the impact of the accident on the population living in contaminated areas, as well as on the environment. The accident also highlighted the helplessness of individual republics faced with environmental disasters inflicted upon them by 'Moscow' through industrial and energy policies upon which they could exert only minimal influence.

Related to this, the importance of environmental protection was stressed officially in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident (see Chapter Two). *Novoe myshlenie* (new thinking) in Soviet foreign policy came to be a major component of perestroika. Soviet doctrine changed from 'mutual coexistence' to 'mutual interdependence'. On a number of occasions Gorbachev referred to environmental problems together with the struggle for disarmament - both global issues which illustrated interdependence and which could be solved only through international co-operation.

Finally, as a result of glasnost, statistical materials which had earlier been classified started to appear in scientific journals and the general press. Access to medical data made it possible to estimate the impact of pollution on health, and a large number of articles on concrete sources of pollution and the danger they posed to people's health appeared in newspapers all over the Soviet Union. People generally became more aware of problems of pollution and the dangers they posed not only to the environment in which they were living but also to themselves. Larger, umbrella movements, co-ordinating the efforts of numerous local and regional groups, emerged in most republics during 1987. These movements were for the reasons given above and also due to people's rapidly emerging interest in politics more generally, highly successful in appealing to ordinary people for support. Significant campaigns to prevent further environmental destruction and to improve the state of the environment were undertaken in most of the Soviet republics during the late 1980s. Although most of the groups organising these campaigns claimed to be non-political, it very soon became clear that ecology and politics were inextricably linked.

A series of industrial and energy-generating projects was initiated in the Soviet republics in and after 1986. In Latvia, plans were made to build a hydroelectric power station on the Daugava River running through the capital, Riga. If built, considerable areas of arable land would be flooded and several villages would have to be abandoned. VAK organised a petition to halt such plans and in the autumn of 1986 managed to collect 30,000 signatures. The Greens also succeeded in winning the Latvian authorities over to their side and the project was eventually abandoned⁵.

⁵ Geoffrey A. Hosking, Jonathan Aves, Peter J.S. Duncan, The Road to Post-Communism. Independent Political Movements in the Soviet Union, 1985-1991 (London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1992), p. 10.

The real break-through of the Latvian Green Movement came a year later, in 1987, when VAK activists organised several demonstrations in Riga against the construction of a metro⁶. The first demonstration was banned by the authorities, but a march through the old city still took place. This issue united people, and VAK was formally set up as the Latvian Green Movement in Riga in the autumn of 1987. Among the initiators of the Green Movement were two journalists, one of whom was Dainis Ivans, later to become vice-president of Latvia. He was elected the first president of VAK. VAK was shortly afterwards officially registered, as one of the first NGOs in Latvia. Attempts to prevent the Riga metro from being built continued throughout the first months of 1988. A big meeting attended by some 5,000 people was organised on 3 May that year and shortly after, the project was cancelled⁷.

The metro issue became to the Latvians an issue of national significance, as building the metro would not only cause economic and social problems - in addition to spoiling the appearance of the old city - but also unwelcome demographic changes - an estimated 200,000 people would have to be brought in from other republics to do the construction work. The issue was therefore also picked up by the National Front, which was founded in the autumn of 1987 and probably inspired its environmental programme. A large number of Greens were involved in setting up the Popular Front⁸.

During 1988 VAK successfully organised and carried out several other campaigns - against the Sloka pulp and paper combine, which was polluting the holiday resort of Iurmala, and against nuclear energy. VAK also organised pickets of military installations; in 1990 such a picket took place in the Saldus region, where an old cemetery was being used as a testing site for bombs and where graves were being destroyed as a result⁹. Local groups were set up in Ventspils to campaign against a huge ammonia combine and in Vidzeme to protect the area along the Gauja river. Environmentalists in Liepaia also founded a Green group to address local environmental problems.

In Lithuania, two major Green groups formed in Vilnius (*Zhemina*) and Kaunas (*Atgaja*) respectively during 1988. In early August 1988 representatives of both movements met, and it was decided to set up a Lithuanian Green Movement. The Kaunas group, like VAK, emerged as a culturological group. In the early years (1986-88) *Atgaja* put all its efforts into protecting the Holy Gertruda Catholic Church (17th century). It also restored and opened a museum in an 18th century

⁶ Valdis Abols, Environmental Problems and the Environmental Movement in Latvia, VAK America Open Letter # 12, Environmental Protection Club of Latvia, 7.3.1991.

⁷ Институт массовых политических движений (1992), с. 52.

⁸ Åse Berit Grødeland, Report on a Visit to the USSR, Summer 1991 (London: The Ecological Studies Institute, 1992), p. 33.

⁹ Институт массовых политических движений (1992), с. 52.

house which had once belonged to a famous Lithuanian linguist. By 1988 the focus of attention changed towards more environmental issues, and a survey of the river Neris was carried out to establish the state of the environment and monuments along the river. Starting this year, *Atgaja* took part in annual campaigns to save the Baltic Sea, and in the early autumn of 1989 it successfully campaigned against military installations. Together with *Zhemina*, *Atgaja* succeeded in preventing three blocks of the Kaishiadorsk hydro nuclear power station from being built (1988-89), and shortly afterwards the two groups successfully campaigned against expansion of the Ignalina nuclear power station¹⁰.

Ziemina was established by scientists from the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences' Ecological Institute. Aware of the extent of environmental damage in Lithuania, they decided to set up a movement which would tackle environmental problems such as the Ignalina nuclear power station and the Baltic Sea. Its first meeting took place in late 1987 and environmental problems and possible solutions were discussed at length. Shortly afterwards, on 11 February 1988, *Ziemina* was registered under the auspices of the *Komsomol* and the Academy of Sciences, and on 1 May 1988 the movement's statute and programme were endorsed at its first congress. Within less than a year, *Ziemina* had established itself as a political force in Lithuania.

The Lithuanian Green Movement gained overwhelming support from the general public in its struggle to prevent further expansion and to improve the safety of the Ignalina nuclear power station. Although *Ziemina* had among its ranks nuclear physicists such as Zigmas Vaisvila, gathering information about Ignalina proved difficult as most of the information was classified. In addition, newspapers were wary of printing such information supplied by the Greens, fearing repercussions for leaking classified information. As a result, *Ziemina* eventually set up two laboratories with help from abroad, so that official information could be verified. The movement called for an international commission to be set up to examine the station, as according to scientists it was unsafe and there were indications that the surrounding environment was suffering from radioactivity. Although the demand for an international commission was unsuccessful, plans to construct a third nuclear reactor were cancelled, a number of improvements were made, and one reactor was finally closed down. Military issues were also addressed by the Lithuanian Greens, who in July 1990 organised the first peace march in the country, calling for disarmament and the closure of Soviet military bases on Lithuanian territory. In addition, the movement set up an *Eco-centre* to compile a database on the state of the environment in Lithuania.

The first Green group to emerge on Estonian territory was the *Society for the Protection of Monuments of Old Estonia*, in late 1986. This group was, however, banned as several dissidents

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 54-56.

joined its ranks¹¹. The *Estonian Green Movement* was initiated in early 1987, following an announcement from Moscow in February that year to the effect that a new deposit of phosphorite was to be opened for excavation in 1997-98¹². The opening of the new deposit would increase phosphorite mining considerably and was likely to cause extensive environmental damage. North-East Estonia accounted for nearly the entire phosphorite deposits of the USSR. Immediately after the announcement Estonian journalists confronted representatives of the company in charge of excavation and Estonian authorities with the information disseminated from the Soviet capital. Once confirmed, these plans caused an emotional response among Estonians: were these plans go ahead, Estonia's best pastures would be lost and the level of the groundwater was expected to drop by up to 100 meters. In addition there was the danger that Estonia might be polluted by fertilisers, heavy metals and radioactive substances. Air pollution would surge, due to large emissions of sulphur dioxide, and the largest lake in Estonia, Lake Peipsi, and the Baltic Sea were likely to be affected. If the project went ahead, it would also cause a large increase in the number of Russian worker immigrants in the already Russian dominated North-East.

The annual meeting of the Writers' Union in November 1986 provided the starting point for the campaign against phosphorite mining in Estonia. The issue was brought to the attention of Gorbachev during his visit to the republic in February 1987. However, on 25 February 1987 the head of the all-union geochemical institute, Iurii Jampol, announced on Estonian TV that mining was about to start and that it would be extensive. In the following weeks Estonian newspapers carried numerous articles against mining. The journalists were supported by lawyers claiming that mining conflicted with the Estonian constitution. The Estonian Academy of Sciences opposed mining as it found the preliminary research inadequate. Even the *Komsomol* opposed Moscow on this issue. A flow of protests followed during the next few months. Eventually the Estonian Government had to succumb to public pressure and came down against the project¹³.

In Moldavia there was no such issue of national significance behind which the people of the republic could unite, although extensive use of pesticides and herbicides in Moldavia's agriculture was having severe effects on people's health and on the state of the environment. The Moldavian Green Movement - *Aktsumda Verde* - however, dates back to 1983, when a group known as *Green Action* was established under the auspices of the Moldavian Journalists' Union in Kishinev. Initially this group consisted of some 30 intellectuals who appealed to the public through petitions and articles in the Moldavian cultural press and alerted the authorities to the environmental degradation that was taking place in the republic. The group was especially concerned with the

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

¹² For a detailed report on such mining, see Ulo Ignats, *Ett hot mot livsmiljön i Estland och Östersjön*, Göteborg: M.H. Publishing, 1988).

¹³ Grødeland (1992), pp. 29-30.

growing pollution of the rivers Dniestr and Prut, which had become a much debated issue at the time. In November 1988, the group rearranged itself and appeared as *Avia*. The group continued to call for change in what was called 'forced industrialisation' and the 'indiscriminate chemicalisation of agriculture', as well as in access to basic data on the state of the environment in Moldavia.

In 1989 *Avia* held its inaugural conference and six months later it was officially registered. By this time the Green Movement was gathering pace. The Greens had now been joined by Moldavia's cultural and scientific establishment, strongly critical of the government's perceived failure to address the republic's ecological problems. The Movement was also co-operating closely with the *Moldavian Democratic Movement in Support of Perestroika* and the *Alexei Mateevici Cultural Club*.

In early 1989 the Green Movement tried to establish itself as a public organisation by calling a constitutive conference in Kishinev on 25 February, which was sponsored by the Moldavian Writers' Union, film-makers and journalists. At the last minute, journalists withdrew their sponsorship following pressure from the authorities. Despite this, some 200 active supporters turned up at the meetings, along with a Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee Secretary, Vladislav Semenov, and a Kishinev city official, who declared the meeting illegal. The movement was informed that a meeting could be authorised at a later date if they changed the composition of their steering committee and joined the government-controlled society for the protection of Nature. Finally, the conference was forced to adjourn. The movement did, however, continue its work. A *Public Committee to Save the Prut River* was established, headed by Valeriu Ropot of the Biochemistry Institute of the Moldavian Academy of Sciences¹⁴.

In December 1989, *AVIA* participated in a meeting held in Moscow by *USSR Goskompriroda* for the leaders of informal Green organisations where the leader of the *Society* insisted that it was imperative for *AVIA* and the official *Society for Environmental Protection (MOOP)* to join forces. Moldavia could not afford to have two Green movements, he argued. By co-ordinating their efforts to improve the state of the environment in the republic, the Greens could actually be more effective. The government was thinking of closing the *Society* down on the grounds that it was inefficient, and rumours circulated to the effect that its finances would be confiscated. The merger was therefore considered by many to be of considerable significance. The two groups worked on the merger for some months and in November 1990, *AVIA* and the *Moldavian Society for Environmental Protection* reappeared as *Aktsiunda Verde* - the Moldavian Green Movement. Not everybody was happy with this arrangement. In particular *AVIA* supporters were sceptical, fearing

¹⁴ See Vladimir Socor, *An Independent Ecological Association in the Moldavian SSR*, *Radio Free Europe Research*, RAD Background Report/39 (USSR), 7.3.1989, p. 2.

that a merge would discredit this group and turn it into a part of the establishment. Supporters of the merger, on the other hand, argued that whereas the *Society* had premises, equipment and money, *AVIA* enjoyed widespread popular support. A merger was therefore likely to strengthen, rather than weaken, the Green Movement¹⁵.

In Belarussia the foundation of the Green movement was made in 1986 when people concerned with the high level of chemical pollution in Minsk launched a series of protests. Many of these people found their way into the *National Front*, which from the very beginning had a strong commitment to environmental issues in general and Chernobyl in particular. After some time those people most concerned with environmental issues left the Front to set up a separate Green movement. During 1988 several Green initiative groups were formed in various parts of Belorussia. One of these was based in Minsk and headed by the writer Vasil Iakavenka. Another was organised by the Architects' Union of the Belorussian Academy of Sciences. The Belorussian Writers' Union and Minsk State University were also involved in the preparations, and in 1989 the founding conference of the *Belorussian Ecological Union* (BES) took place in Minsk. Vasil Iakavenka was elected BES's first president. At the BES Inaugural Congress, which took place in Minsk in July 1989, he was replaced by Boris Zavitskii, professor of Homel University and from 1990 a deputy of the Belorussian parliament. A committee to help children who had fallen ill from nuclear fall-out after the Chernobyl accident - *Children of Chernobyl* - was also established.

Unlike Greens in the Baltic States, the Belorussian Greens failed to unite behind an issue of national significance. As pointed out to the author by Irina Holetska, a Minsk activist, whereas Chernobyl was one of the major issues on the agenda of the Belorussian Popular Front, it was not given the same significance by BES. The movement insisted instead on adopting a broader approach to the environment since, after the Chernobyl accident, many other aspects of environmental protection were being neglected. Another reason for this, claimed Holetska, was Zavitskii's evasive attitude towards Chernobyl. This might seem incomprehensible to an outsider, as Zavitskii was himself from the Homel district, which was seriously affected by radioactive fall-out from Chernobyl. While in Minsk it was pointed out to me that Zavitskii adopted a cautious approach towards the Belorussian authorities as he was a party member and as a communist was subject to party discipline¹⁶. Zavitskii's alleged refusal to let BES activists commemorate the Chernobyl accident together with the National Front in 1990, for instance, caused considerable dissatisfaction among rank-and-file members of BES, and the order was disobeyed by Minsk activists. Moreover, Vasil Iakavenka together with a large group of people's deputies from the USSR Congress of People's Deputies requested the USSR Procurator General and the Belorussian

¹⁵ Grødeland (1992), p. 40.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 42-45.

Procurator General to begin criminal proceedings against those responsible for exposing the people of Belorussia to nuclear fall-out from Chernobyl. Their anger was not just directed at republican leaders. There was also a growing sense that Moscow had betrayed Belorussia. Not only had Moscow actively covered up the accident; ministerial bureaucrats in Moscow had also ignored or rejected the findings of Belorussia scientists¹⁷ alarmed by their findings. Although BES activists did do quite a lot of work on Chernobyl, BES failed to unite those concerned with the effects of Chernobyl.

Without the backing of a strong movement uniting the efforts of the 90 or so Chernobyl societies and groups that emerged in Belorussia following the accident in 1986, and with a public reluctant to take part in those actions initiated by BES, these scientists and activists had limited scope for influence. Activists frequently expressed the view that the Ukrainian Greens were in a much better position not only as they were better organised, but also as Ukrainian authorities had adopted a more critical approach towards Moscow than did the Belorussian ones.

In Armenia an ecological group - *Goiabakar* (Struggle for Survival) emerged in 1987, out of concern with chemical pollution in the republic. On 17 October 1987, a demonstration directed against chemical enterprises and plans to build a nuclear power station took place in Erevan and gathered some 2,000 people. Banners reading 'Save Armenia from chemical and radioactive genocide!' were carried by some of those present at the meeting. A petition later sent to the USSR Supreme Soviet carried some 1,500 signatures¹⁸. In February 1988 Greens demonstrated against a chemical enterprise in Abovian, and in December 1989 a picket of the Nairit chemical combine was organised. Half a year later, this combine was closed down¹⁹. The Greens also campaigned against the Medzamor nuclear power station, not far from Erevan. This nuclear power station was closed down in 1988, following the Armenian earthquake, which caused worries regarding its abilities to withstand an earthquake²⁰. The Armenian Green Movement later became involved in the Nagorno Karabakh movement and its leader, Kh. Stamboltsian, at one point conducted a hunger strike in support of the people of Nagorno Karabakh²¹.

¹⁷ One of these was Volkov, a former high-ranking officer of the Soviet Army, who in the immediate aftermath of the Chernobyl accident was involved in drafting maps showing the exact concentrations of radioactivity in the most affected parts of Belorussia. These findings were simply filed by the Ministry of Defense and those people who had been involved were forbidden to speak about their findings. Volkov, who was later elected a member of the Belorussian parliament from Pinsk, and who was working actively through the parliament's Chernobyl committee, was, when I talked with him in 1991, busy trying to organise a factory that could produce clean baby food in his home district.

¹⁸ Hosking, Aves, Duncan (1992), p. 10.

¹⁹ Институт массовых политических движений (1992), с. 32.

²⁰ Jane L. Dawson, *Anti-Nuclear Activism in the USSR and Its Successor States: A Surrogate for Nationalism?*, *Environmental Politics*, vol. 4, no. 3, Autumn 1995, p. 451.

²¹ Институт массовых политических движений (1992), с. 32.

The Georgian Green Movement (the Ecological Association under the Auspices of the Rustaveli Society) appeared in April 1988 under the leadership of Grigol Tumanishvili, a professor and corresponding member of the Georgian Academy of Sciences. By the autumn of 1988 the movement had successfully campaigned against the construction of the Caucasus mountain railway and prevented the construction of the Khudon high-altitude dam. It also succeeded in preventing a cascade of artificial dams on the river Enguri and the construction of a water reservoir in Kakhetia. The Georgian Greens also opposed tree felling on Georgia's mountains, particularly in Svanetia²². Whereas the Armenian Green Movement succeeded in uniting the people behind two issues of national significance - namely that of the Nairit chemical combine and the Metsamor nuclear power station²³ - it appears that the Georgians failed to unite around the environment as an issue. Other issues, such as giving Georgian status as the national language of the republic and the future status of Georgia itself within the Soviet Union, were considered more important.

In Kazakhstan, on the other hand, the dying Aral Sea and the issue of nuclear testing in Semipalatinsk, on the border with Russia (Omsk district) proved a powerful incentive for the establishment of a Green Movement. From the very beginning several Central Asian writers took an active part in this process: Chingiz Aitmatov, a Kirgiz by birth and an ardent supporter of perestroika, in the novel *Plakha* and other works depicted traditional Central-Asian life, in which people lived in harmony with Nature. This life style was then contrasted with Soviet life and its impact on the environment and Man. In November 1987 a Kazakh poet, Mukhtar Shakhanov²⁴, initiated a Committee on the Aral Sea, which was established by the Kazakh Writers' Union. The following year this committee expanded its activities to include also Balkhash and environmental problems in Kazakhstan more generally. The Aral Sea Committee was set up with the blessing of the authorities. This manifested itself in its membership, approximately 100 of whom were high-ranking officials. Following an accident at Dzhambakum in 1988 and Shakhanov's sharp criticism

²² *Ibid.*, p. 38.

²³ The reason why the Armenian Green Movement so early on expressed views highly critical of all-union authorities may also be explained in historical terms. Throughout history the Armenians have been attacked and fought wars frequently with the Azeris, Turks and others. In 1915 and 1916, for instance, the Turks killed some 1 million people in what became known as the 'Armenian genocide' [for details see *Большая Советская Энциклопедия* (1950), 2-ое изд., т. 1, с. 65. For a more thorough analysis, see *The Armenian Genocide* (München: Institut für Armenische Fragen, 1987), vol. 1 and 2.], and there is a strong sense of Armenia as a victim among Armenians. Thus, they could easily see the symbolism in chemical pollution imposed on Armenia from 'Moscow' and destroying people's health, and also the potential dangers posed by the Metsamor nuclear power station should an earthquake occur, and perceive them as yet another threat to the existence of the Armenian people.

²⁴ Shakhanov visited Glasgow in 1990 and gave a talk at ISEES on Kazakhstan. During his visit I was able to discuss the fate of the Aral Sea with him. In 1989 Shakhanov was elected a USSR People's Deputy.

of the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Melioration and the oblast soviet, these officials abandoned the committee and demanded that it be dissolved.

Around this time another Kazakh poet, Olzhas Suleimenov, the Chairman of the Kazakh Writers' Union and from 1989 a USSR People's Deputy, initiated the Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement, which called for the dismantling of all nuclear testing facilities on the territory of Kazakhstan. The pretext for Suleimenov's initiative was an emission of radioactive substances during nuclear testing in February 1989. Two days later a meeting attended by some 2,000 people took place on the premises of the Writers' Union, and less than two weeks later the group had been registered by the Almaty executive committee. The Movement collected signatures against further testing and also organised a conference on the effect of nuclear testing on people living in the Semipalatinsk area. Following intensive campaigning, President Nursultan Nazarbaev closed down the Semipalatinsk testing site in 1991. The movement has in later years received considerable financial support from the Kazakh Peace Committee²⁵.

In Russia several environmental movements and groups emerged in response to numerous problems of local, regional and national significance. Some of these movements claimed to be all-union (and after the collapse of the USSR - all-republican), aspiring to co-ordinate the efforts of similar groups throughout Russia and also in other (ex)-Soviet republics. As seen above, in 1987 scientists and experts involved in the campaign against the Siberian and European Rivers Diversion Project between 1983 and 1986 set up one of Russia's most well-known environmental groups, *Ekologiya i Mir* (Ecology and Peace), which from the very beginning received the support of the Soviet Peace Committee, and the publicity around which inspired similar movements not only in Russia but also elsewhere, including Ukraine (see Chapter Three).

Ekologiya i Mir's first chairman, Sergei Zalygin, a writer and the editor-in-chief of *Novyi Mir* and other members, primarily from the USSR Academy of Sciences (A. Iablokov, G. Golitsyn, M. Lemeshev) were all well-known and respected public figures in the Soviet Union, and several of them were elected USSR People's Deputies in 1989.

Among the issues covered by *Ekologiya i Mir* were not only Russian ones, such as the Volga-Chograi canal and the Bashkir water reservoir; its scientists were also involved in campaigns against the Volga-Don 2 canal and the Danube-Dniepr canal. These projects were eventually stopped due to pressure from members of the association. In 1988 *Ekologiya i Mir* members conducted a joint expedition of writers and scientists to the Aral Sea (Aral-88). A conference on ecology and agriculture also took place the same year, the materials of which were published and used as the basis for a report from the Russian Supreme Soviet's Committee on the Environment.

²⁵ Институт массовых политических движений (1992), с. 40-42.

In 1990 a conference on the findings of an independent environmental impact assessment of the Leningrad dike took place, and *Ekologiya i Mir* also organised an impact assessment of the Katun valley water project and the Tehri dam project. The former project was abandoned by the Russian Supreme Soviet's Ecological Committee, following the presentation of *Ekologiya i Mir's* findings.

Another key movement was (and is) the all-Russian *Socio-Ecological Union (SES)*, which unites 148 Russian Green groups, as well as similar groups in other former Soviet republics²⁶. Unlike *Ekologiya i Mir*, whose major activity is environmental impact assessments and other scientific work, SES is more of a grassroots movement. Although SES members undertake scientific work, too, the emphasis is on active campaigning and lobbying of the authorities. There are close links between SES and *Ekologiya i Mir*; Svet Zabelin, the leader of the former, has for a long time acted as assistant to Professor Iablokov, President Eltsin's adviser on the environment.

SES was officially established in Moscow on 24-26 December 1988 by university people who had been active in the students' ecological movement; the *druzhiny* (Nature guards), since they emerged in the early 1960s (for details, see below). The initiative to set up the new union was taken at the third meeting of graduate Nature guard members in the Caucasus on 6 August 1987, and became known to people during the spring of 1988 when, together with the *druzhina* movement, it engaged in a public discussion of the yet to be published draft resolution by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on 'Measures to Accelerate the Development of Hydro-Energy in the Soviet Union between the Year 1990 and the Year 2000'. The resolution announced the construction of more than 90 large hydroelectric power stations in Siberia, the Far East and other regions and met with fierce opposition in Green circles.

SES has been and still is involved in numerous activities. It organised an all-union protest against the construction of the Volga-Chograi canal (activists from more than 100 towns participated), organised a campaign against the construction of vitamin factories (BVK) and also established a committee to provide information for the environmental impact assessment of the Katun Hydroelectric Power Station project. SES has also set up a working group to address the web of problems connected to the nuclear energy complex in the former USSR. Furthermore, it has established a commission to analyse the network of Nature reserves (together with the Ministry of Environmental Protection) and started work on an information programme and the making of equipment to monitor the state of the environment. SES has concluded an agreement with the publishing house Progress on a publication called *Ecofact* which will appear annually, containing information on the state of the environment in Russia.

The SES Centre for Co-ordination and Information provided the Environment Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet with regular information on the environment. SES also lobbied for

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

legislation and programmes related to the environment. The *Green World Club* and the *Nature Guard* in Kazan organised the first historical-ecological camp, an expedition for school children near the Volga. SES has also been involved with campaigning against five huge petrochemical complexes in Western Siberia (Tiumen region: Tobolsk, Nizhnevartovsk, Surgut, Novy Urengoy, Uvat) and has been involved in campaigning against similar projects in the Tengiz reservoir in the Gurev region of Kazakhstan.

Finally, in Ukraine *Zelenyi Svit* (Green World) was initiated by writers, scientists and young activists concerned with Chernobyl and nuclear power as well as extensive industrial pollution in the republic. As this movement is analysed in detail in Chapters Three, Four, Five, Six and Seven, I will not dwell on this movement here, suffice it to say that the Greens in Ukraine, like Greens in the Baltics, Armenia and Kazakhstan, succeeded in uniting people behind an issue of national significance, namely that of nuclear power, and were successful in stopping plans to expand the capacity of the nuclear power stations in Iuzhnoukrainsk, Rivne, Khmelnytskyi, Zaporizhzhia and Chernobyl. They also campaigned against plans to build a nuclear power station at Chyhyryn and succeeded in closing down the Crimean nuclear power station on the Kerch peninsula before its Number One reactor was attached to the power grid. Similarly, they managed to have plans to build nuclear thermal power stations in Odessa and Kharkiv abandoned.

Above I have given a rough outline of the emergence and major achievements of key Green movements in several of the former Soviet republics. It is of course impossible to do justice to these movements and to numerous other movements in the former Soviet republics on just a few pages²⁷. It is still possible, however, to make some generalisations regarding the emergence of the Greens across the USSR: whereas the earliest movements that were set up in 1986 were primarily concerned with ecology and culture, political changes in 1987 and 1988 radicalised society and facilitated the emergence of Green groups with political agendas advocating policies very different from those of the Soviet authorities. Below I will look at the predecessors of these groups.

1.2 Political Participation and Environmental Issues in the USSR.

During the Cold War the totalitarian model was considered the most appropriate for the study of the USSR. The Soviet Union was considered a static society in which political decisions were made by the Communist Party only, and where the USSR Supreme Soviet and its Presidium as

²⁷ Readers are referred to the following works for a more general analysis of these groups: Ianitskii (1990, 1991, 1992¹, 1992², 1994), Ziegler (1990), Marples (1991), Institute of Political Mass Movements (1992), Grødeland (1992), Murray & Feshbach (1992), Pryde (1992), Massey Stewart (1992), Dawson (1990, 1995), Feshbach (1995) and Manning (1995).

well as the Soviet Council of Ministers simply paid lip-service to the CPSU. Supporters of the authoritarian model claimed that to the extent mass political participation in the USSR did serve a purpose, it served to legitimise the policies of the CPSU and to demonstrate to the outer world the regime's ability to mobilise large masses of the population in support of the regime²⁸. Thus, political participation in the USSR was not 'real', but rather 'coerced':

Communist governments are mobilisation regimes. Such forms of political involvement as are open to the public are controlled and manipulated from above - that is, by the Communist Party. Within this kind of setting, the individual loses his autonomy, and participation much of its meaning. The latter is reduced to ceremonial or support functions, where citizens 'take part' by expressing support for the government by marching in parades, by working hard in development projects, by participating in youth groups organized by the government, or by voting in ceremonial elections²⁹.

In the early 1960s, however, the approach of the Soviet Union as a totalitarian system gradually started to give way to more complex approaches. Not only was the definition of political participation presupposed by the authoritarian model questioned³⁰, but it also became increasingly popular among Western scholars to talk about interest groups in Soviet politics.

²⁸ Jeffrey W. Hahn, Soviet Grassroots. Citizen Participation in Local Soviet Government (London: Tauris, 1988), p. 30. This view was expressed by Sharlet, who argued that political participation in general and in elections in particular merely served the purpose of legitimising the CPSU and its policies. In this sense political participation was meaningless to the ordinary citizen, in that it was just a ritual that had to be conducted and no political impact, in that it did not influence political decisions. Schultz contested this idea, claiming that one should not put too much emphasis on elections. In the Soviet Union government decisions affected a much wider range of public activities than was the case in the West. Implementing decisions was thus of vital importance politically. The high proportion of decisions taken but not implemented in the USSR could therefore be taken as an indication not only of these decisions being unrealistic, but also to some extent as an indication of opposition to the regime. For a more thorough discussion of authoritarianism, see H. Gordon Skilling & Franklyn Griffiths, Interest Groups in Soviet Politics, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 3-7. A more in-depth discussion of 'totalitarianism' and the study of the Soviet Union can be found in T.H. Rigby, The Changing Soviet System. Mono-Organisational Socialism from its origins to Gorbachev's Restructuring (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1990), Chap.6: "'Totalitarianism' and Change in Communist Systems", pp. 130-154. For an overview, see also A. C. Janos, Social Science, Communism and the Dynamics of Political Change, *World Politics*, vol. 44, no. 1, October 1991, pp. 81-110.

²⁹ Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, Political Participation, in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (eds.) - Handbook of Political Science (Reading [Massachusetts], London: Addison-Wesley, 1975), IV, p. 2.

³⁰ Those Sovietologists opposed to the authoritarian model claimed that political participation in the USSR was qualitatively different from that of other societies. Comparing the function of political participation in Western democracies with that in Communist states was thus not very fruitful as, rather than identify possible channels of influence for the ordinary Soviet citizen, specialists dismissed the possibility of people influencing politics altogether. A basic difference between Western and Soviet-type societies, it was suggested, was that whereas, in the former, participation was primarily associated with the 'input' process - to use the terminology of Easton - in Soviet-type societies people were more likely to have a say on the 'output' (i.e. implementation) process. Some scholars also disputed the view that voters in democratic societies necessarily influence politics by voting in elections

According to Almond and Coleman³¹ the aggregation and articulation of different interests did take place within the framework of the CPSU, and scholars such as Gordon Skilling (1971), Linden (1963)³², Rigby (1962)³³, Aspaturian³⁴, Allison (Cuba crisis)³⁵ and Valenta³⁶ (the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia 1968, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 1979), to mention but a few, identified several interest groups - i.e. loose constellations of people and organisations sharing the same goals - in the political decision making process of the USSR: each defending and promoting its own views and interests. As pointed out by Gordon Skilling, 'under Khrushchev a new element, in the form of a greatly expanded participation in decision-making by experts and specialists in their respective fields, made itself evident'³⁷. Whereas many Sovietologists held the view that 'mass as differentiated from elite participation in Communist systems tends to be more relevant for the policy-implementation process, for the outputs rather than the inputs of the political systems'³⁸, these studies indicated that decisions were preceded by some kind of debate. This view was backed up by other scholars, stressing social change (especially demographic change) in the Soviet polity, urging sovietologists to bear in mind that a new, relatively large segment of highly educated people had developed by the 1960s and that the Brezhnev regime considered scientific knowledge important in the decision-making process, thus allowing scientists some scope for influencing this process by providing the premises for it.

Whereas Aspaturian, Allison and Valenta concentrated on decisions made at the central level and identified policy actors such as the Military-Industrial Complex (MIK), the domestic policy decision makers and the foreign policy decision makers, Jerry Hough³⁹ and Richard Little⁴⁰ in 1976 published two studies of Soviet grassroots participation, challenging the view that the Soviet

[Donald Schulz and Jan S. Adams (eds.), *Political Participation in Communist Systems* (Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon Press, 1989), p. 3]].

³¹ Almond and Coleman, *An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems*, *World Politics*, vol. IX (April 1957), pp. 40-41, referred to in Skilling & Griffiths (1971), p. 8.

³² Carl Linden, 'Khrushchev and the Party Battle', *Problems of Communism*, vol. XII, no. 5 (September-October 1963), pp. 27-35.

³³ Rigby, 'How Strong is the Leader?', *Problems of Communism*, vol. XI (September-October 1962), pp. 1-8.

³⁴ Vernon V. Aspaturian, *The Union Republics in Soviet Diplomacy: A Study of Soviet Federalism in the Service of Soviet Foreign Policy* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984).

³⁵ Graham Allison, 'Conceptual Models and the Cuban Crisis', *American Political Science Review*, no. 3, 1969, pp. 689-718.

³⁶ Jiri Valenta, *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision* (Baltimore, London: John Hopkins University Press, 1991).

³⁷ Gordon Skilling & Griffiths (1971), p. 10.

³⁸ Robert S. Sharlet, *Concept Formation in Political Science and Communist Studies: Conceptualizing Political Participation*, in Frederic J. Fluron Jr. (ed.), *Communist Studies and the Social Sciences: Essays on Methodology and Empirical Theory* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co, 1969), p. 247.

³⁹ Jerry Hough, 'Political Participation in the Soviet Union', *Soviet Studies*, vol. 28, no. 1, January 1976, pp. 3-20.

⁴⁰ D. Richard Little, 'Mass Political Participation in the US and USSR: A Conceptual Analysis', *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 8, no. 1, January 1976, pp. 437-60.

system was not very responsive to public opinion and also questioning the notion that political participation in the USSR was confined to the 'out-put'⁴¹ process only:

While we do not really know how effective this involvement is in terms of its actual impact on political decisions, there is growing evidence that the system is far more responsive to citizen demands today than it was 20 years ago, certainly it is more responsive than it was in the late Stalin era⁴².

Hough and Hahn criticised earlier works written on this issue for being rooted in a formalist-legal approach and for not being backed up by empirical evidence. As a matter of fact those few empirical studies which had been conducted, indicated that political participation in the USSR was a much more complex process than originally thought⁴³. They also questioned the basic assumptions of the authoritarian model that the communist system was not responsive to citizens' demands, that there was no basis for individual initiative in communist political life and that the idea of individual efficacy as a defining characteristic for political participation was irrelevant to the USSR. Sharlet, on the other hand, pointed out that political participation in the USSR was qualitatively different from that in the West, and that rather than discard it as undemocratic, it ought to be studied in its own right⁴⁴.

Lampert (1990) identified five types of political participation in the USSR:

- 1) Elections - This was the major formal political activity in the former Soviet Union. More than one million deputies were elected in central and local elections. In addition, a large number of people were also mobilised to take actively part in the election process (agitators, election commissions, etc.)
- 2) Party membership - Almost 10% of the adult Soviet population were members of the CPSU. Party membership was a key to opportunities for advancement at work and thus also a key mechanism for control over managers and administrators. Further, it provided an ideological and material link between the working class and the regime. Also it provided a large number of activists to manage the primary party organisations and to supervise and contribute to all Soviet social organisations.
- 3) Control organs - During the Brezhnev era a number of control bodies run by the people were set up. The idea behind these bodies was for the people to control higher administrative organs so as to prevent abuse of power. The People's Control Committees, which were introduced in 1965, had as their main function to investigate inefficiency and waste. In 1980 a total of 10 million people participated in these committees, 7, 667 of whom were full-time officers. Volunteer Courts and the people's militia (*druzhiny*) also served the purpose of public control. Comrade Courts were located at workplaces and in residential areas. By 1980 there were 2.6 million residential committees in the Soviet Union.

⁴¹ See Jeffrey W. Hahn, Soviet Grassroots. Citizen Participation in Local Soviet Government (London: 1988), chap. 2: 'The Study of Political Participation in Communist Countries', pp. 26-43. This view was also propagated by Schultz. See Schulz/Adams (1981), p. 17.

⁴² Jerry Hough (1976), p. 11. See also Jerry Hough, The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1977), chap. 4: 'Political Participation in the Soviet Union', pp. 109-24.

⁴³ See for instance Theodore Friedgut, Political Participation in the USSR (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979).

⁴⁴ Sharlet (1969), p. 247.

4) Petitioning - There were two major channels for petition: through the Party and through the press. In 1978 the CPSU Central Committee set up a Letters' Department to deal with complaints and suggestions made by party members and/or other Soviet citizens. Similar departments were established in the newspapers. Some letters appeared in print, whereas others were sent to other instances for reference/comments⁴⁵.

5) Social organisations - A number of social organisations were established in various areas of life. The trade union was perhaps the biggest, but also cultural societies were established. The social organisations were characterised by a high degree of control from above and hardly ever contested decisions made from above. According to Lampert, mass membership of social and voluntary organisations 'allowed for the co-optation and reward of loyal citizens, but criticism from below had become a toothless affair, as the nomenklatura gained an unprecedented degree of security under the Brezhnev leadership. The political and administrative elite was beyond criticism. Political participation through social organisations was guided participation, since it kept all social initiative in the hands of the leadership and encouraged a spreading apathy and cynicism about official values⁴⁶.

Although there was no earlier Green Movement similar to the one that emerged in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, it is possible to identify individuals representing not necessarily themselves only, but also a certain profession or interest group speaking up for the protection of the environment. The majority of these critical voices started to make themselves heard from the second half of the 1960s, but as shown in the section below, as early as the 1940s people critical of the policies on forestry protection voiced their concerns, and, according to Troepolskii, villagers already in the 1930s protested at the grandiose hydroelectric power plant schemes and the negative effect they had on rural life⁴⁷. Below, I will look at public participation in relation to the environment.

1.2.1 Voluntary Societies⁴⁸ and Environmental Groups

Social or voluntary societies, as they were referred to in the former Soviet Union existed already before the revolution. Numerous other societies emerged in the immediate aftermath of the revolution⁴⁹. After 1917 societies that did not actively oppose the Party, and whose activities were

⁴⁵ For a detailed study of petitions and letters to the Soviet Press, see Stephen White, 'Political Communications in the USSR: Letters to Party, State and Press', *Political Studies*, XXXI, 1983, pp. 43-60.

⁴⁶ For an outline of the major social organisations in the USSR, see Д.А. Керимов, Г.В. Малышев, И.П. Ильинский. Демократизация советского общества (Москва: Мысль, 1989).

⁴⁷ Г. Троепольский, 'О реках, почвах и проблем', *Новый Мир*, no. 1, 1965, с. 188.

⁴⁸ Добровольные общества.

⁴⁹ Д.В. Ольшанский, Неформалы: Групповой портрет в интерьере (Москва: Педагогика, 1990), с. 10. According to A. Gromov and O. Kusun [А.В. Громов, О.С. Кусин, Неформалы. Кто есть кто? (Москва: Мысль, 1990), с. 11-17] those societies, clubs and associations that were established in Russia prior to the revolution were characterised by voluntary participation, and most of them had a limited number of members, often with the same professional background. In contrast, most groups

not directly political were accepted. However, as the banned Russian political parties (the Cadets, the Esery and the Mensheviks) tried to exert political influence via some of these societies, the Party at its 12th Party Conference in 1922 decided to take a firmer stand on such societies. On 3 August 1922 a decree was issued on the registration of societies and unions 'not seeking economic gain' and on the surveillance of them. Although the decree significantly increased the level of control over the societies, as well as limited their scope of activities, there were still 4,480 voluntary societies on 1 January 1928. Most of these societies had their own newspapers or journals. However, due to infighting in the Communist Party, the collectivisation campaign and, as a result, the harsh centralisation of power in the Soviet Union, the development of the societies was further limited. Finally, Stalin's view on a united leadership undermined the position of the societies even more.

In 1932 a decree⁵⁰ on voluntary societies and unions was endorsed. The decree made it clear that voluntary societies and unions had to actively support the Communist Party through their activities:

Добровольные общества и их союзы, являясь организациями общественной самодеятельности трудящихся масс города и деревни, ставят своей задачей активное участие в социалистическом строительстве Союза ССР, а также содействие укреплению обороны страны⁵¹.

Of particular importance to environmental groups, as will be seen below, was a paragraph in the decree that ordered social movements conducting scientific work to base such work on the Marxist-Leninist method⁵². Further, all groups for children and youth required a go-ahead from the *the Komsomol* (art. 5). All societies were required to establish close links with the soviets, enterprises, sovkhozy and kolkhozy, trade unions and other public organisations as well as educational establishments (art. 6). Within a month from the day of their foundation, the relevant state body had to endorse the new society. State bodies received wide-ranging powers according to the law; whether or not the society was endorsed depended on its expediency, statute and personal composition - state bodies had the power to expel members of the initiative group of

formed after the revolution, such as the society to fight illiteracy, literary clubs, etc. were primarily aimed at including the masses in building a socialist society.

⁵⁰ Положение о добровольных обществах и их союзах. Постановление ВЦИК и СНК от 10 июля 1932 г. For the full text of this decree, see Социально-Экологический Союз, Вся наша жизнь. Сборник статей Социально-Экологического Союза (Москва: Издательство Прометей, 1990), с. 31-36.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁵² To jump ahead a bit, this meant that biologists active in the all-union Society for the Protection of Nature would have to follow Lysenko and Prezent's ideas, which took hold of Soviet biology and genetics during the 1930s.

whom they did not approve (art. 12). Once a society had been registered, it was under constant supervision and control of the state body under whose auspices it had been registered (art. 17). The state body had unlimited access to all documents and meetings of the society and could also give the society instructions and orders. The societies, on the other hand, had to account for their activities to the state bodies by which they had been registered. Should the activities of a society not be to the liking of the latter, they could dissolve the societies altogether. The decree further limited the scope of activities acceptable to the regime and in practice meant that the state took control over the societies⁵³. Most of the societies - especially during the Brezhnev era - thus were active in the social-cultural sphere, which was less prone to be regulated by the Party. The decree was still in use in 1990.

A book on the Democratisation of Soviet society, published by the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee in 1989⁵⁴, defined public organisations as follows⁵⁵:

Fig. 1.1 Public Organisations in the USSR

КПСС: высшая форма общественно-политической организации, ядро политической системы, руководящая и направляющая сила советского общества.	<p>А. Общественные организации и союзы:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - массовые общественно-политические организации: профсоюз, комсомол, кооперативные организации - добровольные общества⁵⁶ - творческие союзы. <p>Б. Органы массовых общественных движений.</p> <p>В. Органы общественной самодеятельности: самодеятельные органы населения</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - самодеятельные органы трудовых коллективов. - общественные органы и комиссии в Советах народных депутатов, аппарате государственного управления - общественные советы при культурно-просветительных и медицинских учреждениях. <p>Г. Неформальные объединения.</p>
--	---

⁵³ Б.И. Сергеев, 'Законодательство о добровольных обществах: вчера, сегодня, завтра', in Д.А. Керимов (ред.), Новое политическое мышление в процессе демократизации (Москва: Наука, 1990), с. 42.

⁵⁴ Д.А. Керимов, Г.В. Малышев, И.П. Ильинский, Демократизация советского общества (Москва: Мысль, 1989).

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 179.

⁵⁶ These were defined as follows: 'Под добровольным обществом обычно понимают основанный на индивидуальном или коллективном членстве вид общественных организаций, включающий в себя объединения (общества, союзы обществ, ассоциации), создаваемые в целях удовлетворения многообразных личных и общественных интересов, развития политической активности и самодеятельности трудящихся, вовлечения их в различные формы социальной жизни, культуры, научное и техническое творчество, оборону страны и укрепление сотрудничества и дружбы с народами зарубежных стран'. *Ibid.*, pp. 197.

As regarded the function of the societies, this was defined as follows:

Выполняя свои функции, все общественные организации призваны вносить все больший вклад в осуществление политики партии, заботиться о наиболее полном выражении и проведении в жизнь интересов объединенных ими трудящихся, об усилении гражданской инициативы и ответственности советских людей⁵⁷.

The Societies for Nature Protection - VOOP

As seen above, Nature protection societies existed on the territory of the (former) Soviet Union prior to the 1917 revolution⁵⁸. Some of these continued to exist also in the aftermath of the revolution, others disappeared and yet others emerged⁵⁹. Most of the older societies had a limited membership, consisting mainly of biologists, zoologists and other experts in the field. In late March 1923, however, an all-Russian conference on the Study of Natural Production Forces concluded that for environmental protection efforts to become effective, the general public had to be activated:

При обширной территории России проведение фактической охраны природы не может быть осуществлено в сколько-нибудь серьезном масштабе без широкого привлечения к сознательному участию всех слоев населения.

A year later, in 1924, the All-Russian Society for the Protection of Nature (Vserossiiskoe obshchestvo okhrany prirody - VOOP) was set up to unite scientists and members of the public concerned with the state of the environment. According to VOOP's statute, it would 'develop scientific questions, spread information and raise interest among the general public on environmental issues'⁶⁰. The society was long headed by V. Komarov and V. Vinogradov, both well-known academicians. During the 1920s and 1930s, VOOP provided assistance on the rational

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 178.

⁵⁸ According to Dr. P. Florenskii, the pre-revolutionary environmentalists were inspired by the Pushkin lyceum and also by the Brotherhood of St. Petersburg University at the end of the 1880s. The latter sought unity (edinenie) with Nature and with the people and later initiated the Cadet Party. It was the members of this Brotherhood, first of all Vladimir Vernadskii, who developed the idea of the Biosphere and later also the Noosphere as the Biosphere, under the control of the enlightened, humanist intellect of Man. See I.B. Егорова (ред.), *Эко-отклик 8* (Москва: Молодая гвардия, 1990), с. 27-28.

⁵⁹ For a summary of these societies and groups, see Philip R. Pryde, *Environmental Management in the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 248-49.

⁶⁰ А.Г. Тарнавский. *Охрана природы и общественные организации: правовые вопросы*. (Москва: Наука, 1990), с. 9. Among VOOP's major tasks were the organisation of public meetings and debates, excursions, laboratories, field stations, museums, libraries, congresses and university courses. VOOP also took part in monitoring environmental changes and the implementation of conservation laws, and was also involved with drafting new legislation (Pryde, p. 248, referring to Weiner (1988), pp. 47, 263).

use of Nature resources and conducted a series of practical activities directed towards the protection of Nature. Among these were developing programmes for sustainable agriculture and the Greening of Soviet cities and villages. The major contribution of *VOOP* in this period, however, was the establishment of several *zapovedniki* (Nature reserves).

Initially *VOOP's* membership was relatively small. In the early 30s this changed and the stress was now on mass participation (through mass membership). A new statute, approved in 1933, started a process of formalisation within *VOOP* that was to culminate in the mid 1960s⁶¹. From 1933/34 collective membership was introduced and, as a result, several official organisations joined the society, eroding the relative independence the society had so far enjoyed. *VOOP* became financially dependent upon the establishment, receiving subsidies from governmental agencies and public institutions and also started to take part in the activities of the environmental sections of official institutions such as the Russian State Planning Committee, the State Committee on the Environment and the All-Union Congress of Botanists, Zoologists and Hunters. Similar societies emerged in the other Soviet republics from the mid-1940s until the end of the 1960s. The societies were given different names and their tasks differed slightly from republic to republic.

The Ukrainian Society for the Protection of Nature (Ukrainske Tovarystvo Okhorony Prirody - *UTOP*) was founded in April 1945 by scientists, representatives of the *Komsomol* and the Ukrainian Ministry of Education⁶². *UTOP* was described in the following way:

Общества являются массовыми общественными организациями, цель которых заключается в оказании активного содействия мероприятиям партии и правительства по охране, рациональному использованию и воспроизводству природных богатств⁶³.

As for its tasks,

В Украинской ССР общество охраны природы осуществляет общественный контроль за соблюдением природоохранного законодательства через общественных инспекторов, права и обязанности которых определяются Положением об общественном контроле общества, утверждаемым президиумом республиканского совета Украинского общества охраны природы⁶⁴.

Units of the Societies were set up at all enterprises, factories, *kolkhozy* and *sovkhozy*, as well as in other institutions, and soon the All-Union Society for Environmental Protection (*VOOP*) had

⁶¹ For a detailed study of the early history of *VOOP*, see Дуглас Вайнер (1991).

⁶² Тарнавский (1990), с. 16.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

some 60 million members, of whom 40 million belonged to the Russian Society⁶⁵. In comparison, *UTOP* had 19 million members (total population of Ukraine: 52 million) - in Donetsk oblast every third citizen turned out to be a member of *UTOP*, but most of these were members only on paper. As it turned out, even those directly harming the environment were often members of *VOOP*, paying their membership fees regularly. Much of the Society's efforts was linked with the collection of membership fees. Fees were simply deducted from people's salaries without their permission - hence the large membership figure⁶⁶.

The increase in membership figures was accompanied by a continuous growth in *VOOP*'s apparatus and a formalisation of its tasks. There was a shift from working on its own initiative towards following public directives in setting and conducting its activities. Whereas the Societies were initially headed by well-known scientists, this changed in 1955, when, as Weiner puts it, '*VOOP* became colonialised by Communist bureaucrats...(This) ended almost three decades of spirited resistance of the Society to Stalin's attempts to effect a "great transformation of Nature" and to quash all forms of citizen autonomy and initiative'. Representatives of state organs took over not only centrally, but also at the local level; at various times the Society was headed by the chairmen of the Presidiums of the republican Supreme Soviets, CPSU Central Committee secretaries, deputy ministers of the Council of Ministers and other high-ranking party and public officials. The awarding of the Order of the Red Banner to *VOOP* in 1974 at its 50th anniversary underlined the Society's status as an official public organisation.

From being a relatively autonomous society, *VOOP* now aimed at 'actively support(ing) the activities of the party and the government on the protection and the rational use of natural riches'. The Russian Law on the Environment instructed the *RSFSR Gosplan* and the various ministries and departments to involve *VOOP* in the assessment of plans for the use and transformation of Nature as well as large construction projects, affecting the protection of Nature. To assist with this task, some 1,000 academicians, doctors and candidates of science were attached to the Society. Although the Society did succeed in affecting legislation on the environment, the effect of this legislation was, as will be seen in Chapter Two, more or less non-existent.

The new leadership of *VOOP* was badly regarded by long-time members of *VOOP*, who opposed the take-over of the Society. In 1957 one such member, Vsevolod Lakoshchenkov, in a letter to Viacheslav Molotov and Nikolai Bulganin accused the new leadership of corruption and abuse of power. Although the matter was looked into by *Literaturnaia gazeta*, no measures were taken and shortly after, Lakoshchenkov was expelled from the Society.

⁶⁵ С.Г. Макевич, А.А. Вакулин, *Охрана природы* (Москва: ВО Агропромиздат, 1991), с. 116.

⁶⁶ Marshall I. Goldman, 'Pollution in the Soviet Union: The Growth of Environmentalism and Its Consequences', in Anthony Jones, Walter D. Connor, David E. Powell (eds.), *Soviet Social Problems* (Westview Press, 1991), p. 40.

Although official apparachiks took over the day-to-day running of *VOOP*, old members of the Society created history by succeeding in having Mikhail Bochkarev - head of the Russian Republic's Main Administration for the Timber Industry and President of *VOOP* - removed as President - for poaching! This incident is thoroughly described by Weiner⁶⁷, but deserves some closer attention here due to its political implications. The incident took place on 22 August 1964, when Professor Vladimir Geptner - Professor at Moscow State University, a field zoologist and also a *VOOP* 'citizen's inspector for Nature protection' - was having an outing on the Oka River in Riazan' oblast' together with his family. Spotting two fishing boats fishing illegally with a home-made drift net (drift nets were banned from all Soviet rivers), Geptner approached the boat and found that one of the three fishermen was Mikhail Bochkarev. When approached by Geptner, Bochkarev allegedly said that he had permission to fish. Such permission had been given orally by a fishing inspector, whose name Bochkarev did not know. Geptner, however, ordered Bochkarev to pull in the net, which the latter did. Geptner also made sure he photographed the incident and sent a legal complaint to the Riazan oblast fishing inspectorate.

On 13 October 1964 the party fraction of the Presidium of the Executive Council of *VOOP* met to discuss the incident. Both Geptner and Bochkarev testified at the meeting - Bochkarev claiming his innocence. Apparently he had been on a business trip and at one point decided to go swimming in the Oka river. On the shore he met some fishermen, who claimed they had permission to fish and out of curiosity Bochkarev decided to go with them. When approached by Geptner, Bochkarev claimed to have said 'there is permission to fish' rather than 'I have permission to fish'. Requesting to see the permit, Bochkarev found that there was none. At this stage he allegedly instructed the fishermen to inform the Fishing Inspection. Other members of the Presidium claimed that it simply was not possible that Bochkarev had been fishing illegally. Geptner was accused of running a personal vendetta against Bochkarev, and some of those present also expressed concern that the incident might damage the Society. Evidence, in the form of two letters from the Fishing Inspectorate, was produced to prove Bochkarev's innocence. According to these letters, a local - Andrei Frolov - was responsible for the illegal fishing. His net had been confiscated and civil punishment had been meted out. Geptner, however, had kept the copy of the Fishing Directorate's response to his letter of 22 August in which the Inspectorate denied that Bochkarev had been given oral permission to fish and acknowledging that an investigation had been started upon receiving Geptner's complaint. The party fraction eventually ruled that Bochkarev, being 'excessively trusting', had been caught in an act of 'accidental' unlawful fishing. The full Presidium, which met shortly afterwards, endorsed the ruling by the party fraction,

⁶⁷ Douglas Weiner, 'Three Men in a Boat: The All-Russian Society for the Protection of Nature (*VOOP*) in the Early 1960s', *The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review*, vol. 20, nos. 2-3, 1993, pp. 195-212.

blaming Bochkarev for 'carelessness' and criticising Geptner for failing to turn evidence of the incident over to the Presidium and go through the normal channels.

The story would probably have ended here had not Geptner decided to proceed with the case. Geptner, who had been very outspoken in the 1950s when Soviet biologists clashed with A. Malinovskii, the all-Union Nature protection chairman, responsible for the first liquidation of Soviet Nature reserves in 1951, contacted *Krokodil*, which on 10 January 1965 ran a satirical article exposing Bochkarev as a poacher. The text exposed to the full the bureaucracy of *VOOP*. Emotions were mixed within the Society following *Krokodil's* revelations. Some accused Geptner of betrayal, whereas others were worried about the effect the story might have on the Society. Several letters critical of Bochkarev appeared in *Literaturnaia gazeta* ('Nature and us'). A member of *VOOP's* presidium, Vladimir Chivilikhin, revealed that Bochkarev was responsible for putting an end to an idealistic attempt in 1957-60 to manage the cedar forests of the Altai region in Siberia (Kedrograd). Another long-time member of *VOOP*, sitting on the Society's Council, wrote that Bochkarev had been the only member of the Council to 'categorically reject' a proposal that a ministry-level State Committee for Nature Protection be established in Russia, as had been the case in the other Soviet republics. As it turned out, Bochkarev also had a very poor conservation record in forestry. A letter signed by members of *VOOP* and printed in *Literaturnaia gazeta*, thus concluded that 'Under these circumstances the only correct course of action acceptable to broad public opinion is to remove comrade Bochkarev as president and to publish that decision in the press'. Reforms were required within *VOOP* so as to turn it into 'an authentic defender of natural resources in the interests of both the present and future generations'. Other letters pointed out that the 'operational style of the society had changed', that its activities were characterised by a 'bureaucratic flavour' and that there was 'a tendency to be cut off from scientific public opinion'. 'Scientists well known for their scientific activism in conservation continue this work in complete isolation from the Society and it is precisely these folks that created the Society to begin with. The initiative for the break began with the society and not with these scientists'. Others appealed to 'Soviet democracy'.

On 24 February 1965 the Presidium of *VOOP* once again convened. Its first vice president, Nikolai Ovsiannikov, presided over the meeting. It was decided that *VOOP* would stick to Bochkarev's version of events. However, some action had to be taken, and two members of the oversight commission of the Central Executive Council, V. Zharikov (president) and A. Kasparson (vice-president), demanded that an extraordinary session of the Central Executive Council be called to settle the issue. Meanwhile Geptner wrote a letter to the Fishing Inspector pointing out that Bochkarev was actually holding the net. How could this be if he had ordered Frolov to stop fishing? He ended his letter urging that the Fishing Directorate 'certainly (cannot) accept those

kinds of "conclusions" that exculpate Bochkarev' and that the identity of the other six poachers involved be revealed and proper punishment distributed. Geptner won the support of the Moscow State University *druzhina* (see below), which at a two-day conference held on 15-16 March 1965 was shown 10 photographs of Bochkarev. The Riazan Fishing Inspectorate was condemned for dishonourable complicity and Bochkarev was condemned for 'gross abuses of his social role', for 'amoral' actions and 'a contemptuous attitude towards those who gave him a position of trust'. The incident was finally brought to an end on 20 July 1965 when the *VOOP* Central Executive Committee gathered in Moscow for a plenary meeting. Acting president N. Ovsiannikov - deputy leader of *VOOP* and First Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Management of the RSFSR - announced that Bochkarev had 'resigned' on 13 April 1965. Ovsiannikov was unanimously elected as *VOOP*'s new president.

Following the Bochkarev affair, however, *VOOP* started to more actively interact with state organs and became increasingly formalised. Goldman is very negative in his assessment of the Society, arguing that '...the Society for the Protection of Nature tended to focus more on providing outings for its members than on halting or preventing pollution. In fact it is hard to find any instance where it sought to prevent, much less succeeded in preventing, any industrial pollution. The society simply did not serve as a gadfly or watchdog the way environmental groups do in the outside world'⁶⁸. At the VIII Congress of *VOOP*'s Central Committee in 1986, this was acknowledged by the delegates:

Пока, к сожалению, за огромными цифрами наших пропагандистских показателей кроются порой формальные или, хуже..., просто не существующие события и факты⁶⁹.

In late 1986/early 1987 the Belorussian Society followed suit, arguing that

..Массовой характер общественной охраны природы решает проблему экологического воспитания граждан, обеспечит их вовлечение в проведение практических природоохранных мероприятий и тем самым значительно облегчит государственным органам выполнение этой работы. Массовость общественной природоохранной организации рассматривалась, видимо, как наиболее рациональный путь к улучшению положения в области охраны природы⁷⁰.

⁶⁸ Goldman (1991), p. 40.

⁶⁹ Тарнопский (1991), с. 19.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

However, not all aspects of *VOOP's* activities were criticised. S. Freedman, for instance, held the view that the Society played a pivotal role in putting the environment on the political agenda in the USSR:

Огромная заслуга общества состояла в том, что "оно первое начало это дело, до того, как зашевелились государственные организации, и сделало на этом фронте исторически много для такой маленькой организации, с крохотными средствами, фактически при отсутствии аппарата". (Оно) практически единственным добровольным объединением, занимавшимся пропагандой идей охраны природы⁷¹.

Tarnavskii pointed out the impact of the Society at the local and regional level:

Нельзя не обратить внимание на то, что многие природоохранные меры, особенно на местах, предпринимаются лишь по инициативе и усилиями членов республиканских обществ, которые обычно работают в тесном контакте с должностными лицами⁷².

A quarter of the poachers caught hunting illegally in the Russian Republic, for instance, were caught by public inspectors organised by *VOOP*. Considerable results were also achieved by the Ukrainian Society. In 1981, encouraged by the public, three oblast newspapers, *Kyivska pravda*, *Vinnytska pravda* and *Cherkaska pravda*, organised an expedition along the river Ros together with Kiev *UTOP*. The latter provided transport and equipment. The aim of the expedition was to study the ecological situation of the river and the results of the study were published by the papers. Following the expedition it was proposed to create an inter-oblast committee on Ros as well as a specialised organisation which could produce cleansing facilities. A system of sanctions for violating the rules for water protective areas was also initiated. Thanks to the expedition, argued a member of *UTOP*, Volodymyr Boreiko, 207 hectares of land were planted and another 184 hectares drained, along the river in the southern part of Kiev oblast. Moreover, the Belotserkov production trust, producing tyres and rubber-asbestos products, considerably reduced emissions of oil-products into the river. The expedition also provoked a great response from the general public - letters appearing on the pages of the above-mentioned newspapers requested information regarding measures taken, information about new incidents of the unenvironmental use of the water in Ros and also suggested new themes for the future.

UTOP put much effort into recreating the old tradition of making artificial nests for the white stork. Between 1985 and 1987 the Kiev oblast branch of *UTOP*, the student *druzhina* of Kiev

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 24.

University and the Department of Zoology of Kiev University conducted a campaign under the name 'Leleka' in Kiev oblast. People were encouraged to build artificial nests to save the stork from extinction, and more than 100 articles on the issue were published. Participation in the event was high, and Kiev oblast *UTOP* received more than 120 letters from people who had either heard about or taken part in the campaign⁷³. This led *UTOP* to believe that co-operation with newspapers, scientists, workers in Nature protection bodies, teachers and youth was particularly important. *UTOP* also encouraged the revival of national traditions in its efforts to save threatened species of animals and birds from extinction and took part in organising annual campaigns to protect rare birds. An important element of such campaigns was the

„Возбуждения романтического интереса к исчезающим видам, с его помощью привлечения общественности к охране редких животных”⁷⁴.

This was done by publishing elements of national culture, such as national habits, traditions, beliefs and superstitions. *UTOP* also revived Ukrainian legends, stories, proverbs, sayings, rumours, symbols and heraldry⁷⁵. The Slavs were neutrally oriented towards birds of prey generally and positively inclined towards eagles and falcons in particular. In the 1930s and 1950s, however, a campaign to shoot such birds was undertaken, which

Почти полностью перечеркнула жившее в народе нейтрально положительное отношение к хищным птицам, и значительно способствовала занесению ряда видов на страницы Красной Книги. Были забыты многие положительные традиции, приметы, обычаи по отношению к пернатым хищникам, и наоборот, появились отрицательные⁷⁶.

As a result, old traditions deserved to be revived, while at the same time introducing new ones.

Вообще, народная нравственность всегда была гуманна. Недаром раньше на Украине считали, что всякая птица сама по себе безгрешна, вследствие чего она ходит босою⁷⁷. В начале двадцатых годов в стране широко проводились школьные экологические праздники (субботники). (Also widespread were) День птиц и День леса, направленные на охрану и воспроизводство животного и

⁷³ A poll revealed that 80% had heard about the campaign from newspapers; 49% of these through regional newspapers, 15% through city and oblast newspapers, 3% from republican newspapers, 7% from oblast radio, 3% from TV and 6% from fact sheets put in their mailboxes.

⁷⁴ Владимир Борейко, Украинское Общество Охраны Природы, (Киев, Тип. УРСРС, 1987), с. 20.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

растительного мира. К сожалению, они практически исчезли к концу 70-х годов. Их погубил дух штампованности, формализма, превратив детские праздники труда в докучливую обязанность⁷⁸.

In Lviv national elements were introduced in *UTOPs* activities as early as 1983 with very good results. Four thousand people took part in *UTOPs* 'zelena tolochka' (Green mill) festival that year. *VOOPs* greatest achievement was, in Weiner's view, however, not environmental but rather political; the Bochkarev case 'was a virtually unique episode in Soviet history. "Public opinion" emanating from outside Party ranks and supported by the press, evidently acting on its own authority, successfully forced the removal of a sitting bureaucratic head of state or state-sponsored institution'⁷⁹. Besides, the State Forestry Committee was a very important ministry. How was this possible?

Weiner argued that people following Khrushchev's removal in mid-October 1964 were under the impression that Brezhnev and Kosygin would continue his policies of liberalisation. Moreover, Lysenko was removed in the late autumn of 1964 and calls made for the rehabilitation of classical genetics. This, in Weiner's view, emboldened reform elements in the press (*Krokodil*, *Komsomolskaia pravda*, *Literaturnaia gazeta*) and the *druzhinniki* at Moscow State University. Rather than continuing in Khrushchev's path, however, Brezhnev put an abrupt end to cultural and environmental 'liberalism'. *Literaturnaia gazeta's* 'Nature and Us' column, which had been active both on Baikal and on Bochkarev, was closed down, and the apparachiks gained a solid hold of *VOOP*. As for the conservation movement itself, although it lost out in the short term, it gained in the long term. As argued by Weiner, 'a band of elite biologists and followers in educated society and the student population came to realise that they were almost unique in representing a truly autonomous, cohesive, self-actualised movement of a portion of the citizenry in opposition to central economic policies pursued by the regime'. Moreover, the Bochkarev affair facilitated 'a gradual growth of insight by conservation activists into the real workings of the system and the game-like quality of Soviet justice, where, to legitimise the embezzlement, corruption and black marketeering that was so indispensable for the maintenance of economic performance and delivery of products, another set of bureaucrats - themselves dialectically dependent on this corruption to justify their jobs - provided the theater of investigation and auditing. The incident revealed also that within the press there were reform elements, that, given the proper conditions, might come to their assistance':

The experiences of the 1950s and the early 1960s proved to be a university for conservationists in the praxis of activism. Faced with the

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁷⁹ Weiner (1993), p. 209.

expropriation by the regime of their society, *VOOP* activists found alternative, safe institutional protection in the Moscow Society of Naturalists, immune from direct regime pressure or interest, and then used those bases to expand their influence into the crucial student community in 1958-60. They learned to use the press and to exploit the moral victory of Bochkarev's resignation as a central element of activist folklore: memory of that symbolic victory was passed down as late as the 1980s! From leading politicians such as N. Vorontsov and Aleksei Iablokov to thousands of local-level activist-graduates of student brigades, the lessons of the 1950s and 1960s percolated throughout Soviet society. The failure of Soviet bureaucrats to look at what was happening at the margins of their society ultimately contributed to their undoing⁸⁰.

Although highly bureaucratised and formalised, *VOOP* conducted concrete environmental work among Soviet youth. Numerous 'Green patrols' were set up at schools to teach school children how to plant greenery and take care of trees and shrubs. Members of these patrols also collected herbs and seeds and learnt to set up nests for birds. Similarly, 'blue patrols', aimed at monitoring Soviet rivers and lakes, were set up under the auspices of *VOOP*. These patrols were fighting poachers and measuring the water quality in Soviet rivers and lakes. Environmental education was also provided through the so-called Young Nature Lovers' Movement and in the Pioneer Camps⁸¹.

MOIP and KluBZ

Two other societies also played an important role following the formalisation of *VOOP* in the 1930s. Many *VOOP* veterans, well-known Soviet biologists, 'migrated to the shelter of the less exposed Moscow Society of Naturalists (*MOIP*)'⁸². This society was founded in 1805 and was Russia's oldest scientific society. As for the significance of this society in the Soviet period, Weiner concludes as follows:

From that redoubt these older activists nurtured an emerging student movement, the *druzhiny po okhrane prirody* (student Nature protection brigades), which soon expanded from Moscow and Tartu state universities to over one hundred institutions of higher learning by the 1970s. Additionally, *MOIP* and its Commission on Nature Protection was instrumental in organising a series of conferences aimed at restoring the once impressive network of Nature reserves, now almost entirely parcelled out to collective farms and state logging plantations, to their original purposes. Finally, *MOIP* took the lead in the struggle against

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 211-12.

⁸¹ Alexander Arbatov, Sergei Bogolyubov, Leonid Sobolev, *Ecology* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1989), pp. 78-79.

⁸² Weiner (1993), p. 195.

biology tsar Trofim Denisovich Lysenko and his 'Michurinist biology' with a battery of courageous essays, book reviews and public seminars.

Another society, which also served as an inspiration to the student *druzhiny*, was the Circle of Young Biologists of the Zoo (Kruzhok iunikh biologov zooparka - KИuBZ), established by the biologist and scientist P. Manteifel in 1924. The initiative to set up a youth group was made by the director of Moscow zoo and Professor at the Moscow State University, M. Zavadovskii. He wanted to turn the zoo into a scientific-educational establishment and use it as a base on which to enlighten the general public. M. Zavadovskii elaborated a project by which to achieve this aim, but of all the points on his project, only the idea of creating a youth group survived. Zavadovskii was defamed during the campaign against the USSR's geneticists, headed by Lysenko, and his works were banned⁸³. This society nurtured future biologists and opposed the ideas of Lysenko. As a result, some of its members perished in the 1930s. However, the society flourished and was described by the Russian phenologist A. Strizhev as the 'nesting ground of our country's biologists'. Not only the USSR's leading biologists, but also well-known writers and journalists had at one point been members of KИuBZ and Florenskii and Shumova were full of praise for it:

В детском кружке сложился коллектив единомышленников со своими демократическими структурами, самоуправляемостью, преемственностью поколений, тут выковались принципы правственности, традиции дружбы, создание единства с природой и необходимости вечного диалога с ней. Большая юннатская жизнь была живой альтернативой сухой бюрократизированной школе, хиревшим пионерской и комсомольской организациям. Будучи сами в детстве и юности членами этого шумного молодого сообщества, до сих пор чувствуем, что еще тогда присягнули верности в дружбе и верности природе⁸⁴.

Later, when the children who joined KИuBZ became students, they, together with the VOOP's youth group, headed by P. Smolin became involved with more concrete activities (see below). Nikolai Vorontsov, who in 1989 became the first non-party member of the Soviet government when he was appointed USSR Minister of the Environment, was also a former member of KИuBZ.

⁸³ Флоренский. Шумова (1990), с. 730.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 731.

The Student Nature Guards⁸⁵ - DOP

As will be seen in Chapter Two, renewed attention was given to the environment under Khrushchev's rule, and several laws to protect the environment were passed during the late 1950s and early 1960s. The combination of political liberalisation and increased awareness on environmental issues (as will be seen below, economists started arguing in favour of costs to be applied to the use of Nature resources, and writers, such as Leonov, had even in Stalin's day started to speak out against the destruction of the country's forests, rivers and villages) made it possible to set up groups focusing on this issue:

Как только экологическая проблема стала осознаваться официальной общественностью (а это произошло в период "оттепели" 1953-1964 гг.), "партия и правительство" предприняли ряд шагов по усилению контроля за частью нарушений экологических стандартов (прежде всего со стороны частных граждан). Была легализована и общественная активность, направленная против этих нарушений, но не затрагивающая политических аспектов⁸⁶.

Unlike other groups and associations existing in the USSR, the *druzhiny* appeared 'from below' at the initiative of people engaged in Nature conservation and concerned with the deteriorating state of the Soviet environment. In the spring of 1958 students and staff from Tartu University, the Estonian Academy of Agriculture and Tartu Medical Institute set up a so-called *kruzhok po okhrane prirody* to address environmental issues and activate young people in the protection of the environment. Two years later, on 13 December 1960, Zhenia Slavskii, Slava Konchin and Valia Lapin of MGUs biological faculty initiated a similar group there and this group became the first university *druzhina* in the USSR⁸⁷. Initially, *druzhiny* were set up at the faculties of natural sciences throughout the USSR, and later others followed suit⁸⁸.

In Ukraine the first *druzhina* was set up by the biological faculty of Odessa University in early 1965 at the initiative of students and a natural historian, Professor I. Puzanov. Later groups emerged also at Kharkiv and Kiev Universities and at Kharkiv Pedagogical Institute. The Kiev

⁸⁵ ДОП: Союз Общественных Добровольных Самодеятельных Организаций и Объединений Молодежи".

⁸⁶ Институт массовых политических движений. (1992), с. 5.

⁸⁷ Экоотклики (8) (Москва: Молодая гвардия, 1990), с. 29. The pretext for setting up the first *druzhina* was the passing of the Russian Law on Environmental Protection in 1960. For thorough accounts of the *druzhiny*, see Tarnavskii (1991), Florenskii/Shumova (1990), pp. 731-33 and Arbatov, Bogolyubov, Sobolev (1989), pp. 29-30.

⁸⁸ Институт массовых политических движений (1992), с.5.

group was organised in the spring of 1969 by the dean of the biological faculty, A. Korneev⁸⁹. In Lviv and Dnipropetrovsk biology students and students of the Ukrainian Academy of Agriculture initiated similar groups⁹⁰.

The student Nature guards expanded, despite the backlash on the environmental front during Brezhnev's rule, under the auspices of *VOOP* - which they were entitled to join as collective members⁹¹, and between 1968 to 1972, from being a few loosely connected informal unions, the *druzhiny* were transformed into a system covering all the Soviet republics⁹². New groups continued to emerge well into the 1980s. By 1972 there were some 40 *druzhiny* in the USSR, and the number of *druzhiny* grew steadily, from 1 in 1960 to 121 in 1987:

Table 1.1 Number of *druzhiny* in the USSR⁹³

1960	1970	1978	1985	1987
1	11	57	96	121

The major direction of their activities in the early 1970s was the struggle against poachers. The police started setting up brigades to help it enforce law and order. Among these brigades were 'Christmas-tree brigades' aimed at preventing the illegal felling of trees. Students of MGU's Faculty of Biology joined these brigades and were so successful that - having caught high-ranking police officials and members of the nomenklatura - the Moscow oblast office of the Ministry of the Interior issued a decree banning student patrols from the city's railway stations⁹⁴. The Moscow student *druzhina* also organised raids on the Kliazma and Volga rivers and similar raids were organised in other parts of the country⁹⁵.

According to an estimate made by E. Schwarts of the Socio-Ecological Union, every tenth poacher turned out to be a party, soviet or the *Komsomol* official. Another 10% were militiamen, criminal investigators, local KGB men and procurators⁹⁶. Not surprisingly, therefore, the activities of the *druzhiny* were not always supported by local authorities, environmental protection bodies

⁸⁹ Олег Листопад, Киевская городская организация УТОП. Дружина выходит в рейд. Лауреат премии комсомола Украины им. Н. Островского - дружина охраны природы "Ленинский дозор" Киевского государственного университета им. Т.Г. Шевченко. (Киев: Тип. УРСРС, 1989).

⁹⁰ Олег Листопад (Украинское общество охраны природы), Природу охраняют молодые. Из опыта работы студенческих природоохранных дружин республики. (Киев: Реклама, 1986).

⁹¹ Тарнавский (1990), с. 61.

⁹² Институт массовых политических движений (1992), с. 5.

⁹³ Д.В. Олимпиацкий, Неформалы: Групповой портрет в интерьере (Москва: Педагогика, 1990), с. 67.

⁹⁴ Экотклики (1990) с. 29.

⁹⁵ В.П. Флоренский, Р.А. Шумова (1990), с. 732.

⁹⁶ Е.А. Шварц, Вся наша жизнь (Москва: Прометей, 1990), р. 21, 26.

and the leadership of the institutions where the students were studying. Pressure 'from above' often made life difficult for many groups⁹⁷. The struggle against poachers was also fraught with dangers for those involved - forest and river inspectors were on several occasions injured and in some instances even killed by poachers caught in the act. Between 1970 and 1972 four *druzhinniki* were killed during raids⁹⁸.

In the course of the 1970s, the *druzhiny* were mainly preoccupied with the struggle against poachers. Starting in 1974⁹⁹ they also voiced restraint against the most glaring examples of industrial expansion. As pointed out in its statute, *DOP* was a strictly voluntary organisation and unlike the officially sanctioned *VOOP* did not aim at mass-membership. The emphasis was on commitment rather than numbers and on individual responsibility and individual participation. Responsibility for Nature became a personal, rather than a collective, issue for the citizen, and this was reflected in the device of *DOP*: 'if not I, then who?'¹⁰⁰

Although formally the *druzhiny* were subordinated to the *Komsomol* at the institution within which it operated, as well as to the local chapter of *VOOP* (in Moscow, the *druzhina* was also subordinate to the Youth Council of MGU¹⁰¹), the relative autonomy of the groups and the concrete activities they conducted appealed to the liberal-minded scientific intelligentsia, for whom, following Khrushchev's thaw, the environmental movement became a refuge, 'in the first instance for the youth, which within *DOP* and *VOOP*'s inspections found an opportunity to serve society on the outside of public (state) structures, in relatively autonomous and not very bureaucratised groups'¹⁰². The ethical principle of the movement - 'Our task is ecology (*Nashe delo - ekologiia*)' excluded the politicisation of the group and probably also contributed to its relative autonomy.

DOP's first all-union seminar took place in Moscow on 21-27 Sept. 1972 and was attended by 28 delegations from 22 different cities. The seminar adopted a loose structure giving full self-rule to the local groups. The choice of activities was made locally, rather than centrally, and it was up to the local groups themselves to plan these activities. Permanent contact was maintained with other groups, and participation in inter-*druzhiny* programmes and actions was decided locally, taking into consideration the interests of the group's members as well as the group's capacity and

⁹⁷ Тарнавский (1990), с. 62.

⁹⁸ Институт массовых политических движений (1992), с. 15. Florenskii and Shumova (1990) claim that three people were killed. These were Viktor Voloshin, Viktor Moiseenko and Evgenii Semukhin (p. 733).

⁹⁹ Тарнавский (1990), с. 60.

¹⁰⁰ В.П. Флоренский. Р.А. (1990), с. 733.

¹⁰¹ Тарнавский (1990), с. 61.

¹⁰² Институт массовых политических движений (1992), с. 5.

expertise¹⁰³. The formal structure of *DOP* matched the principle of local autonomy. An all-union conference met no less than once every two years to confirm the statute and other movement documents, set the membership rules, endorse and exclude members (membership of *DOP* was collective - i.e. groups, rather than individuals were taken in as members) and, finally, to elect the Soviet, *DOP*'s executive-representative body. Decisions made by the Conference and the Soviet were not compulsory for the local groups¹⁰⁴. Locally, the *druzhiny* were headed by a commander (komandir), who presided over a staff (shtab), which set the tasks of the group. Raids were headed by a commissar (komissar).

In Ukraine, each *druzhina* was headed by a general meeting (obshchee sobranie), which was called by the staff (shtab). The general meeting could make decisions if more than 50% of the members of the *druzhina* were present. The general meeting listened to the commander's (komandir) account, assessed the work of the staff and made decisions regarding the future work of the *druzhina*. Moreover, it elected the staff and the commander and also provided full membership to candidate members. The staff, on the other hand, organised the practical work of the *druzhina*, represented *DOP* in official institutions and took care of the *druzhina*'s correspondence and finances. The meetings of the staff were headed by the commander¹⁰⁵.

From the early 1970s seminars and conferences were arranged every 1-2 years. In addition to poaching and environmental protection, *DOP* also indulged in scientific work (see below). In 1976 a seminar was called in Kirov. At the seminar, the first complex programme for the struggle against poaching as a social phenomenon was discussed. This programme was known as 'Vystrel'(Shot). Students taking part in raids against poachers were given lectures and information on social psychology, legislation, criminology and operative work by ministries and state committees in charge of executing legislation on poaching, as well as by *VOOP*, the various inspectorates, police and the Procurator's office. In 1976 and 1977 inter-*druzhina* programmes aimed at catching poachers, such as 'El' - Fur tree - (against illegal felling of Christmas trees), 'Vystrel' and 'Fauna', to mention but a few, were carried out. In the late 1970s a Co-ordinating Council, to ease the interaction of local groups participating in these programmes, was established. Sviatoslav Zabelin, then commander of the MGU *druzhina* and currently leader of the *Socio-Ecological Union*, was elected the first president of this soviet. *DOP* as a movement reached its

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, c. 15.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ Киевская областная организация украинского общества охраны природы. Киевский государственный университет им. Т. Г. Шевченко. Координационно методический совет студенческих дружин по охране природы при Президиуме УООП. Киевский обком комсомола, Организация и работы студенческих дружин по охране природы (Методические рекомендации). (Киев: Гортитопрография, 1985) с. 6.

peak between 1972 and 1979, when high-profile activists such as Nikolai Kraev, S. Mukhachev (Kazan) and D. Kavtoradze were active in the movement.

By the beginning of the 1980s, *DOP* found itself in a critical situation¹⁰⁶. Its membership started to drop, and elements of formalism were emerging within some local groups. In many educational institutions, local groups existed only in reports of the *Komsomol* or as semi-formal organisations. With the turn of the decade, argued Schwarts, a new generation of leaders, who in exchange for a business trip abroad were ready to play the tune of YCL officials, was replacing the older and firmly committed leaders¹⁰⁷. This was, however, not the case everywhere - in Ukraine, for instance, the *druzhyny* were very active during the early 1980s. Kharkiv had a very active *druzhina*, and the Kiev University *druzhina* (named 'Leninskii dozor'), which had gone through a series of active and not so active periods since its beginning in 1969, became more high-profile from 1983 onwards, when it was joined by activists such as S. Motornyi, A. Kostiuk, V. Domoshlinets, T. Fedorik, V. Hryshchenko and V. Brinikh. The Kiev group developed and became the all-union co-ordinator of 'Tribune' - a programme aimed at increasing awareness of environmental problems among the general public - and 'Fauna' - a programme to save endangered plants from extinction. Moreover, the Kiev *druzhina* was co-ordinating 'Vystrel' - the campaign against poachers - within Ukraine¹⁰⁸. In 1985 there were three *druzhyny* in Kiev - the University *druzhina*, as well as one at the Ukrainian Academy of Agriculture and one at the Delotserkov Institute of Agriculture¹⁰⁹.

Volodymyr Boreiko, an active member of *UTOP*, claimed that a reason for the success of the Ukrainian *druzhyny* could be attributed to *UTOP*'s presidium, which in December 1983 created a coordinating-methodological council to unite the efforts of *druzhyny*, environmental groups and individuals involved in Nature protection. Previously these groups had been somewhat disorganised. The new council served as a forum for the exchange of experience, the organisation and conducting of common tasks as well as providing assistance to recently created *druzhyny*. Finally, the council spread information about the achievements and activities of new groups, thus making them known to a wider audience. Thanks to the efforts of the council, claimed Boreiko, six new student *druzhyny* were created in the course of one year. During 1986 action groups were set up in Krivyi Rih and Voroshilovhrad pedagogical institutes as well as at the Faculty of Geography at Kiev University. Whereas initially the *druzhyny* were set up predominantly by

¹⁰⁶ Институт массовых политических движений (1992), с. 15.

¹⁰⁷ Шварц (1990), р. 22.

¹⁰⁸ Листопад (1989).

¹⁰⁹ Организация и работа студенческих дружин по охране природы (1985), с. 3.

biologists, by the mid 1980s chemists, mechanical engineers and other professions were following suit. By the end of 1986 there were 26 student *druzhiny* throughout Ukraine¹¹⁰.

The Ukrainian *druzhiny* also focused their activities on fighting poachers. Campaigns against the illegal felling and sale of Christmas trees ('operation EI') and the sale of wild spring flowers ('operation 'Pervotsvet') enjoyed considerable success and were planned and executed under the auspices of *UTOP*. The Kharkiv *druzhiny* had been conducting such campaigns since the second half of the 1970s, carrying out raids in fur plantations in Kharkiv and Merefiansk forestry sites. The Kiev university *druzhina* was also taking an active part in the campaign. During operation 'EI' *druzhiniki* in Kiev patrolled suburban trains and also two or three GAI (traffic police) posts on the outskirts of Kiev, checking cars and if they came across any felled Christmas trees, also permits for felling. If permission had not been given, the trees were confiscated and fines issued. These fines, however, were dismally low (10 rubles or less), so even though a significant number of poachers were exposed (some days up to 50 poachers were caught) and trees were confiscated (during 10 days in December 1988, 699 fur and pine trees were confiscated), this did not in itself automatically bring a reduction in illegal tree felling. The *druzhiniki* therefore reached the conclusion that for their work to have a real impact, people needed to be properly informed of the harm such felling was causing to the Ukrainian forests. In Kharkiv and Kiev exhibitions and campaigns to promote fur bouquets and winter bouquets of fir twigs as alternatives to real Christmas trees were thus undertaken - allegedly with some success. polls from Kharkiv indicated that some 50% of the citizens were in favour of such alternatives, following intensive campaigning from the Kharkiv *druzhina*¹¹¹.

From 1985 the Kiev *druzhina* tried to involve the press directly in operation 'EI'. The editorial boards of *Moloda hvardia* was approached and its editor T. Malkov requested to take part in that year's raid. Together they organised a round-table attended by *UTOP*, the oblast and city inspectorates for environmental protection, the militia, Ukrainian Ministry of Trade, the Kiev city committee of the *Komsomol*, the oblast forestry directorate and the *druzhina* from the Ukrainian Academy of Agriculture. Shortly after this round-table an operational staff for operation 'EI' was created by the Kiev city inspectorate for environmental protection. Kiev oblispolkom and Kiev gorispolkom issued an order on additional measures to protect coniferous forests before the new year, and the recycling of Christmas trees for use in the furniture industry was initiated and undertaken by 'Kievtara', a local furniture manufacturer and the press was printing information and feed-back received from the public to the campaign. Most of the hard work for this campaign was conducted by the *druzhiny* and it marked the birth of a new system: 'newspaper-student *druzhina*'.

¹¹⁰ Листопад (1986).

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

In acknowledgement of the need to gain the support of the media, *druzhinniki* from Vinnytsia pedagogical institute and Donetsk University underwent courses at the faculties of journalism. Close contacts were also established between the *druzhinniki* of Vinnytsia and the oblast newspaper the *Komsomolskoe plemia*, which started covering every raid undertaken by the *druzhinniki*¹¹². Thus,

Обладающей новыми широкими возможностями ведения природоохранной пропаганды, к каждому критическому выступлению добиваться ответственности, развитие организаторской функции печати: благодаря поддержке общественности, молодежная газета из агитатора и пропагандиста превратилась в активного и авторитетного организатора сложной кампании¹¹³.

As for operation 'Pervotsvet' (Primrose), raids were organised at the markets, railway stations, metro stations and pedestrian tunnels to prevent the sale of illegally gathered spring flowers. Some of these flowers were included in the Red book. In Kiev the sale of all wild plants was banned, and in Odessa oblast there were restrictions on the sale of rare medical herbs found in the countryside. The *druzhinniki* also carried out such campaigns with good results: in the spring of 1987, for instance, a salesman from Chernihiv had 450 bouquets of glades confiscated, and during 1985 more than 10,000 flowers were confiscated. In Lviv, *druzhinniki* from the Biological Faculty of Lviv University confiscated more than 5,000 bouquets of snowbells, lilies of the valley and crocuses. Although Boreika claimed that as a result of their work, the sale of spring flowers was considerably reduced in some cities¹¹⁴, once again the fines were very small thus not really encouraging poachers to stop their activities.

Towards the end of 1985 *DOP* together with *Komsomolskoe znamia* organised a round-table attended by various ministries, departments, botanists and members of the *druzhyny* in Kiev, Kharkiv and Donetsk to discuss the issue of how to secure a real reduction in the collection of spring flowers. The participants reached the conclusion that more emphasis must be put on prophylactic measures during operation 'Pervotsvet'. Acknowledging this, the *druzhyny* the same year developed a concept for how to improve environmental propaganda among the population. This concept, included in the programme 'Tribuna', was later endorsed by *DOP*, and a nation-wide awareness campaign started shortly after. As part of the campaign, the Ukrainian newspaper *Moloda hvardia* started up a special eco-page in its newspaper¹¹⁵.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵ Листопад (1989).

Numerous raids against poachers hunting or fishing illegally were also organised: during 1985, for instance, 400 raids took place. Some of these were aimed against pollution in agriculture. Altogether 300 charge-sheets were written, more than 700 illegal fishing nets were confiscated and a republican campaign against poaching organised, in which the *druzhinniki* made TV and radio appearances, gave a series of public lectures, and published a large number of letters and articles in the local, regional and republican press to draw people's attention to the problem. The following year some 70 raids were organised and conducted by groups of 6-10 people under the leadership of the commander. These groups caught 350 poachers and confiscated 15 weapons and 70 fishing nets. One hundred and forty reports of illegal fishing and hunting were handed over to the hunting and fishing inspectorates¹¹⁶.

As the struggle against poachers hunting illegally was fraught with dangers for those taking part in the raids, each *druzhinnik* had to have some training prior to being allowed on a team. Such instruction included the use of arms, hunting and fishing rules, how to recognise equipment used by poachers, boating, photography, how to write protocols, how to check documents, etc. Further, all *druzhiny* conducting raids were obliged to establish and maintain regular contact with the environmental inspectorate, *VOOP* and the police. Raids had to be cleared with these bodies beforehand (equipment for the raids was often provided by local branches of *VOOP*), and to secure the safety of those students taking part in the raids, it was recommended that the group be accompanied by a representative of the police or environmental inspectorate.

The groups normally consisted of from four to six people, and the leader of the group was obliged to carry an inspector's uniform, whereas his assistants carried certification and red arm-bands. A clear division of tasks was rehearsed before the raid started, and politeness during encounters with poachers was a must. Most raids were carried out in the autumn before the first snow fell and immediately before the hunting season started. *Druzhinniki* were instructed never to show fear, as this could put their lives in danger during encounters with threatening poachers, nor to give in to psychological pressure. As pointed out in a booklet¹¹⁷ containing recommendations and instructions to guide the *druzhiny* in their work, the poachers often tried to exert psychological pressure on the members of the raid, naming their friends and acquaintances holding high posts, whom they would complain to about the activities of the *druzhiny*¹¹⁸.

¹¹⁶ Листопад (1986).

¹¹⁷ Министерство высшего и среднего специального образования РСФСР. Банкирский государственный университет имени 40-летия октября. Сводная дружина по охране природы БАССР. Браконьерство: Рекомендации студенческим дружинам по охране природы для борьбы с браконьерством. (Уфа: 1987), с. 13-14.

¹¹⁸ Государственный комитет УССР по охране природы. Министерство лесного хозяйства УССР. Министерство внутренних дел УССР. Республиканский совет украинского общества

From the early 1980s onwards, raids to expose irregularities in agriculture became increasingly common, and recommendations as to how to conduct these raids were provided by the Ukrainian *UTOP*. Such raids could be carried out at any time on farms and food factories to reveal careless storage of fertilisers and chemicals, emissions of polluting substances into rivers and lakes, etc.), and no special knowledge was required. Neither was special equipment, since violations could be detected visually and the sites were accessible to everyone. *Druzhinniki* were encouraged to look out for violations during expeditions against poachers and special expeditions along rivers. Information could also be gathered from regional newspapers, *UTOP*, and from buses and suburban trains. These instructions, compared with similar instructions to be applied against poachers, were not very thorough, thus indicating that agricultural pollution was not to be a priority issue of *UTOP*¹¹⁹.

Poaching was not the only activity of the Ukrainian *druzhyny*. The Kharkiv Pedagogical Institute *druzhina*, for instance, early on took an interest in working with school children to spread awareness of and fondness for Nature at an early age. A school 'sector' and later also a kindergarten 'sector' were organised by this *druzhina* and the emphasis was on practical work, such as teaching the children to make houses for birds, how to grow and collect medical herbs and also to enable them to take part in operation 'Pervotsvet'.

Druzhinniki from Donetsk State University focused on research, discovering and studying the habitat of rare animals and birds. The Donetsk *druzhina* took part in setting up two ornithological game reserves - the Krivokossk estuary and Martinenkovo marshes, where the biggest flocks of grey heron in Donetsk oblast were found. They also examined some unknown caves and geological outcrops. The *druzhina* of Zaporizhzhia Institute of Industry, on the other hand, was more concerned with curtailing industrial pollution, elaborating a special manual enabling them to establish the efficiency of air and water cleansing facilities and providing a plan of action.

Boreiko claimed that from the early to mid 1980s there was a tendency towards more differentiation and variety in the work of the Ukrainian student *druzhyny*. Complex programmes such as 'Fauna', 'Vystrel', 'Tribuna' and 'Rekreatsiia', combining scientific and propaganda work with the capacity of each individual *druzhina*, was becoming increasingly common, and the end aim of 'Fauna', which the Donetsk *druzhina* was taking an active part in, also had a concrete result, in that it aimed towards the creation of new game preserves¹²⁰.

охотников и рыболовов. Для служебного пользования. Методическое пособие по борьбе с браконьерством. (Киев: 1987).

¹¹⁹ Организация и работа студенческих дружин по охране природы (1985).

¹²⁰ Листопад (1986).

Acknowledging the success of the *druzhiny* and also the increasing emphasis on environmental policies in official Soviet policies, the *Komsomol* at its XIX Congress announced its intention to take participate actively in this work:

Долг комсомольских организаций - воспитание хозяйского отношения и любви к родной природе. И в этом деле свое место должны найти и пионерские "зеленые" и "голубые" патрули, и школьные лесничества, и студенческие природоохранные дружины, и молодые ученые. Через несколько лет сегодняшние студенты станут производителями, хозяевами природных ресурсов нашей страны. Поэтому так важно, чтобы еще в вузах они получили закалку, необходимый объем знаний и достаточный опыт по охране природы, а главное - прониклись убежденностью в необходимости защищать ее. Природу охраняют молодые¹²¹.

The Ukrainian *Komsomol* also committed itself to actively promote a more careful attitude towards the environment and praised the *druzhiny* for the considerable place they occupied in the 'Communist upbringing of youth' as well as in the education of future specialists¹²². However, whereas the *Komsomol* did not make any concrete suggestions as to how its aim would be achieved, *DOP*'s statute very clearly spelled out concrete measures to be taken towards this end:

Решение актуальных проблем охраны природы и окружающей среды и воспитание на основе практической природоохранной деятельности специалистов-практиков, способных решать такие проблемы "...главным... является практическая природоохранная деятельность. Для него недопустимо превращение этой работы в модное развлечение или политическую приманку (из манифеста Движения ДОП). Основные направления: выявление, проектирование и организация охраняемых природных территорий, охрана заповедников и мест нереста красной рыбы, борьба с браконьерством, земельное проектирование, охрана малых рек, борьба с промышленными сельскохозяйственными загрязнениями, экологическая пропаганда¹²³.

The work of the *druzhiny* had to be co-ordinated with the university the *Komsomol* group as well as with *UTOP*¹²⁴. As seen above, *UTOP* and *VOOP* were increasingly characterised by formalisation and bureaucratisation from the late 1960s onwards. However, as pointed out by Oleksii Kabyka, the previous commander of the Kiev University *druzhina*, not everybody in *UTOP* was a bureaucrat. Some of them tried to do something and sometimes funded expeditions

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Организация и работа студенческих дружин по охране природы (1985).

¹²³ Институт массовых политических движений (1992), с. 15.

¹²⁴ Организация и работа студенческих дружин по охране природы (1985), с. 4.

to far-away places such as Kamchatka. Trade unions and the *Komsomol*, on the other hand, provided the groups with boats, binoculars and other equipment to allow them to carry out the raids¹²⁵.

Following the establishment of informal environmental organisations, some *druzhiny* dissolved themselves, whereas others joined the new groups as collective members (e.g.: the Kiev *druzhina* in Ukraine joined *Zelenyi Svit* as a collective member in 1989). This contributed to the gradual reduction in membership numbers, and by mid-1991 there were some 5,000 *druzhinniki* working within 156 groups throughout the Soviet Union. Most of these were students, but there were also graduates from institutes of higher education, and schoolchildren were active within the movement¹²⁶.

Although, as noted above, *DOP* - despite its relative autonomy - did not escape elements of formalisation, most environmentalists make a positive assessment of *DOP* as a movement. As pointed out in the RAU report, the

Романтика ДОПов контрастировала с "упорядоченностью" "развитого социализма", давала возможность временного бегства из всеохватывающей индустриальной системы. В то же время государство получило возможность канализировать эту общественную активность в нужном ему направлении. Тем не менее накопление опыта институционализированного природоохранного движения позволило постепенно приходить к выводу о невозможности решать масштабные экологические проблемы в рамках официальных структур. Этому осознанию способствовало и резкое нарастание экологических проблем во второй половине 70-х - начале 80-х гг. Попытка справиться с этой волной нарушений, вызванных объективными экономическими и социальными причинами, "грехами системы", привела к росту числа столкновений природоохранного движения с влиятельными звеньями системы - начиная от чиновных браконьеров и кончая министерствами с инициативой "перевоски северных рек"¹²⁷.

Schwartz argued similarly, stressing that the *druzhiny*, and to a lesser extent, clubs of bards (Vysotskii, Rozenbaum, Okudzhava, Dolskii) remained practically the only informal organisations which managed to retain their original character¹²⁸: 'The movement of *druzhiny* managed to survive during the Brezhnev period by basing its work on embryos of the legal state brought about by Khrushchev's thaw or, to be more precise, on by-laws adopted at that time on different inspectorates on Nature preservation. Some *druzhiny*, however, had to struggle with 'corrupt and

¹²⁵ Interview with Oleksii Kabyka, August 1992.

¹²⁶ Институт массовых политических движений (1992), с. 15.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

¹²⁸ Шварц (1990), с. 22.

actually impotent ministerial Nature protection departments and also representatives from official societies for Nature conservation (*VOOP*), 'which are modal and completely dependent upon the party'¹²⁹.

Although the issues addressed by the *druzhiny* were relatively 'harmless', in that they focused on Nature conservation and poaching rather than on environmental problems whose impact on the Soviet Union was far more serious, the *druzhiny* were operating highly successfully within the rather limited number of areas/issues they were allowed to address. The most significant legacy of the *druzhiny*, however, was not so much the record it left behind on Nature conservation, but rather the role it played in facilitating the current environmental movement in many of the Soviet republics.

The *druzhiny* provided budding scientists with a base for meeting and talking about the environment, and it is interesting to note that many of the present-day environmental groups in the former Soviet Union are run by former *druzhiny*-activists or have a substantial proportion of them amongst their ranks. One such, Svet Zabelin, the leader of the *Socio-Ecological Union*, enjoys high respect amongst Greens in a number of republics, and the prominent writer Zalygin has given a positive assessment of Zabelin's activities.

Support for the *druzhiny* dropped substantially after Gorbachev came to power. This was a result of prominent leaders leaving the *druzhiny* as it became possible to set up different-style movements. The loss of members was also caused by changing priorities. As more information on the state of the environment in the USSR became accessible, the hunt for poachers was no longer so important. Setting an alternative agenda was considered more urgent and, as a result, purely environmental groups were formed.

From 1985, various ecological and ecological-political groups and organisations started emerging on the basis of *DOP*. *DOP* also kept in close contact with other informal environmental groups emerging independently of the *druzhiny*. In Moscow, Svet Zabelin and other members of the Moscow University *druzhina* used their links with environmentalists throughout the Soviet Union to set up the Socio-Ecological Union in August 1987 - uniting informal environmental groups in several of the Soviet republics. In Ukraine, the Kiev *druzhina* joined *Zelenyi Svit* as its 'Youth Wing', and Oleksii Kabyka, its last commander, later joined Greenpeace Ukraine as a campaigner. Volodymyr Boreiko, a previous *druzhinnik* and *UTOP* activist, besides working actively within *Zelenyi Svit* also for a while worked in the State Committee for Environmental Protection and the Rational Use of Nature Resources. Towards the end of 1989, the *druzhina* and *Zelenoe miloserdie* together with the newspaper the *Komsomolskii prozhektor* organised the first Ukrainian (republican) raid to measure nitrates in food products. Special indicators were obtained

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

from ecologists in Moldavia, and reports were handed in to the sanitary station. Together with another informal group, *Nebaiduzhi*, the *druzhina* took an active part in Iurii Shcherbak's election campaign to the Congress of People's Deputies, putting up posters and spreading information to the general public¹³⁰. The *druzhinniki* were able to draw on their knowledge of and interaction with official structures in charge of environmental protection and conservation, as well as on their connections with the press to successfully organise environmental campaigns as soon as this became politically possible following the start of Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and democratisation.

1.2.2 The Scientists

The Conservation Movement (the Biologists)

As pointed out above, in the 1920s and 1930s the pre-revolutionary scientific establishment called for the establishment of *zapovedniki* (nature reserves)¹³¹. Later, when Stalin initiated their elimination, these scientists argued fiercely against such a policy. Douglas Weiner has provided a thorough account of this struggle, which I have summarised below.

Whereas during the second half of the 19th century, Russian and Ukrainian scientists, writers and philosophers argued that Nature consisted of several interconnected elements - the Biosphere - at the beginning of the 20th century and after the Russian revolution, many leading Russian ecologists/biologists propagated a completely opposite view, namely that Nature was made up of closed self-regulating communities that had two distinctive features: firstly, a total, holistic interdependence could be observed between its components, and secondly, such communities tended to reach a state of equilibrium¹³². Developed in the 1890s, this concept of 'biocenoses' formed the basis of another concept - the 'etalon' - developed by the Russian zoologist Grigorii Kozhevnikov in 1908, and used to justify the creation of *zapovedniki*:

The *zapovedniki*...(would be) dedicated to the study of the biocenoses, or ecological communities, which they were intended to incorporate. In addition to serving as centers for ecological research, *zapovedniki* were to serve as etalony, or models of 'healthy', 'primordial' Nature. Because economic activities required the alteration of virgin Nature, causing

¹³⁰ Листопад (1989).

¹³¹ *VOOP* and *KluBZ* took an active part in efforts to set up and later protect the *zapovedniki*, but as the 'campaign' was primarily undertaken by biologists as 'experts', I have chosen to address this issue separately from the above sections on *VOOP* and *KluBZ*.

¹³² Weiner (1990), pp. 1-2.

'pathological' changes, Kozhevnikov argued that society needed to know how to reverse that process and recreate a natural equilibrium, as an antidote to a potentially fatal dose of progress. The pristine zapovednik-etalon could serve as a reference point, preserving parcels of healthy Nature as models for the rehabilitation of degraded lands. Moreover, on the basis of their knowledge about the ecological carrying capacities of different types of biocenoses, ecologists could offer useful expert advice on appropriate land use and other questions of economic development¹³³

The concept of the 'etalon' was in itself controversial and was early on attacked by other scholars as being misleading or even directly harmful. Yet the idea was persistently defended until the late 1970s. Weiner in a paper to the Harrogate Conference (July 1990) sought to explain why this was the case and reached the conclusion that 'this ecological belief was embraced in good part because it provided a scientific rationale for a conservation program hostile to rapid development and supportive of wilderness preservation. In particular, such a programme was aimed at providing tangible and symbolic islands of autonomy from the state - under the control of the scientific community - while at the same time it propounded the view that scientists, because of their ecological expertise, should play a central role in economic planning and resource management'¹³⁴.

Whereas the number of zapovedniki increased during the 1920s, in the mid-1930s the People's Commissariat of Agriculture aimed at having them transferred into its own zapovedniki department on the grounds that the former were pursuing 'science for science's sake'. The zapovedniki of the Commissariat 'pursued the more narrowly utilitarian goals of maximising the propagation of selected, economically valuable species of wild animals'¹³⁵. Isai Prezent, dean at the Faculties of Biology of Moscow and Leningrad Universities and also a staunch supporter of T. Lysenko, criticised the zapovedniki on political grounds, arguing that they were 'leading a counter-revolutionary resistance to such key economic programmes as collectivisation and acclimatisation (introduction of exotic animals and plants) under the cover of scientific argument'¹³⁶. Further, 'holistic ecological doctrines that asserted limits to humans' ability safely to transform Nature were now to be regarded not only as flawed, but as doctrines devised by the 'class enemies' of Soviet socialism'¹³⁷. As a result, work in this area was stopped and scientists involved were arrested.

Although new zapovedniki were created during the 1930s and until the early 1950s, the aim of these changed and they were used as the 'basis for the very radical transformation of Nature

¹³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

their establishment originally had sought to prevent¹³⁸. 'Biotechnics', aimed at creating more economically beneficial plants and animals, became the norm, and the conservation movement (*VOOP*) had its membership reduced from 15,000 in 1932 to only 2,553 by 1939¹³⁹. 'By the late 1930s and 1940s the great transformation of Nature was simply accepted as a given, with no attempt at theoretical justification'. Theorists such as Ramenskii and Stsanchinskii criticised the concept of biocenosis as inadequate. In the view of the latter, 'migratory animals and birds participate in multiple systems precluding absolute closure'. The political climate during the second half of the 1930s and the early 1940s, however, prevented any proper discussion of the issue.

Vasilii Makarov, the deputy director of the *Main Administration for Zapovedniki*, had been responsible for the expansion of the zapovedniki. Aleksander Malinovskii - former leader of the State Forest Inspectorate - who was appointed leader of the *Main Administration* in the late 1940s -, however, put forward a proposal to eliminate 85% of the Soviet Union's protected (i.e. zapovedniki) territory. Eleven million hectares of this land would be transferred to the Ministry of Timber Industry and to state farms, as 'those institutions would be able to exploit the areas more intensively than his own small agency'¹⁴⁰. In return, the *Main Administration* would be upgraded to an all-Union State Committee, presiding over the remaining 28 zapovedniki¹⁴¹. Despite opposition from the biological community, these changes were passed on 29 August 1951, followed by 'mass dismissals of the old ecologist-activists' and threatening the very existence of the 'ecologist-conservation activist tradition'.

However, the scientific community mobilised all its efforts to recover at least some of the zapovedniki. On 28 March 1952 a Commission for Zapovedniki was created by the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Through this Commission, the defenders of the zapovedniki tried to challenge the decision made in 1951. A year later, organisational changes occurred in the structures responsible for the running of the zapovedniki. The recently created State Committee was downgraded to the *Main Administration for Zapovedniki and Hunting (Glavpriroda)* by the USSR Ministry of Agriculture and Supplies. Further, 18 of the remaining 28 zapovedniki were subordinated to the USSR Academy of Sciences¹⁴². Following Stalin's death and the first attacks on Lysenko, the conservation activists, temporarily silenced under Stalin, mobilised their efforts and in May 1954 called a conference on zapovedniki. The conference, which took place in Moscow, was organised by the Moscow Society for Naturalists, the Geographical Society, the All-

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*

Russian Conservation Society (*VOOP*), the USSR Academy of Sciences and *Glavpriroda*. Demands were made for the return of the zapovedniki to 'fundamental ecological research' and the meeting was described by observers as 'an arena of uncompromising struggle by scientific public opinion for the restoration of the zapovedniki' '...the old academic ethos, emphasising the right of scientists to be able to determine their fundamental research agendas independent of state meddling, had lost little of its former vigour despite the prior two decades of intermittent pressure and terror'¹⁴³.

Four months later, the USSR Academy of Sciences reorganised its commission into a Conservation Commission, which elaborated a programme for the restoration and expansion of the zapovedniki. This programme was presented in 1957 and, based on this plan, the number of zapovedniki increased from 40 in 1952 to 93 by 1961 - under the auspices of *Glavokhota*¹⁴⁴. The struggle between those who wanted the zapovedniki to operate as etalony and those who wanted to make them available for research not only of a preservationist, but also economic character, however, continued; the USSR Agriculture Ministry's *Glavpriroda* once again tried to incorporate these zapovedniki into its own network. In the end, however, the zapovedniki remained under the auspices of *Glavokhota*.

Weiner has identified three reasons for why the etalon principle (see above) was defended so eagerly by conservationists in the USSR for so long: firstly, it 'enabled them to present themselves as the only true guardians of the ecological health of the country on the basis of their expertise in the arcane matters'. Secondly, 'it gave them a network of research bases and a certain degree of professional autonomy', and thirdly, 'it offered powerful scientific justifications both for an anti-industrial stance and for the preservation of pockets of "pristine" Nature - islands of diversity (including aesthetic diversity) in a sea of sameness'.

In Weiner's view, 'it is no accident that in the late 1920s, ecological arguments were mobilised against collectivisation and construction of grandiose hydroelectric projects, and that then, as now, many conservationists were in the front lines of the struggle to preserve the cultural and architectural heritage of Russia as well. Zapovedniki provided a different model of Nature - and of life - from that of Soviet reality and constituted tangible islands of inner emigration and professional autonomy. As long as no better means were available to promote these values, the etalon concept retained its hold on the mind of Soviet biologists and their allies. It was even able to survive the Prezent-Lysenko episode, and got a second wind during the thaw and the peaking of Soviet interest into the Biosphere Reserves Program...'¹⁴⁵.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.

The lesson to be learnt from this 'campaign' was that 'where the Soviet experience emerges as distinctive is that ecology there also became a standard-bearer for science and academe generally in their common struggle with an intrusive and repressive state...(This struggle) can only be understood in the protracted struggle of the Soviet Union's creative intellectual elite for autonomy and a restoration of its 'rightful' status in the running of the nation's affairs'¹⁴⁶.

Poaching and recreation did, however, pose a threat to the 'untouched' state of the zapovedniki - so although the scientists had won the struggle regarding their status, this state was gradually being eroded by ministerial and other interests - as pointed out by the Russian artist Mikhail Zotov¹⁴⁷, at the beginning of the 1960s the Zhiguly zapovednik in the Volga basin had its status overturned as ministerial interests wanted to use it for commercial purposes. Other zapovedniki suffered a similar fate.

However, people stood up for the zapovedniki - exercising independent political participation and sowing the early seeds of the informal Green movements that were later to appear. Mikhail Zotov, for instance, in a newspaper article described his own, lonely struggle to save the Zhigulevski heights from destruction in the early 1960s. Despite the warnings of friends and acquaintances, Zotov wrote and distributed a letter entitled 'Zhtob vnuki nas ne kliali' (So that our grandchildren will not curse us) and sent this to local, oblast and central newspapers. He either received no reply or his letters were passed on to the editorial boards of the Kuibyshev obkom newspapers. Eventually, the obkom got tired of receiving Zotov's letters and called the editor of the Toliatti newspaper *Za kommunizm*, A. Takhautdinov, with the following order:

Вызовите Зотова и скажите ему, что писать он может, вот пусть и пишет о хороших вещах, тогда его и публиковать будут! Нечего ему смотреть на Жигулях, да еще сквозь черные очки!

Zotov allegedly replied to this proposition by arguing that as long as such misdeeds were carried out he would not be able to write about 'good' things and questioned the editor's 'grazhdanstvennost', arguing that

Каждый день - это новые и новые куски красивейших мест Жигулей, превращенных в щебень! Если в обкоме засели идиоты, либо враги России, то вы-то!...

The struggle continued, and the editor eventually - despite instructions from the obkom, - printed Zotov's letter on 6 July 1966. The response was very favourable to Zotov - people

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

¹⁴⁷ *Русская мысль*, 22.5.1987, с. 5-7.

supported his views and Zhiguli had its status as zapovednik partly restored at least on paper - although, following official reassurances that the Mochutov mountains and Iablonii ravine would be saved 'for future generations', exploitation of these areas as well as in the village of Bogatyr continued.

Although the result of Zotov's campaign was limited, it was politically significant in that it showed that an ordinary citizen, with the help of a newspaper and public opinion, was able to exert independent political pressure despite numerous obstacles for them to do so. Although, as shown below, Brezhnev restricted the debate on the environment, the experience it gave the 'activists' proved useful when they continued the struggle for the environment once Gorbachev initiated his policies of 'glasnost' and 'demokratizatsiia'.

The Economists

In 1974 Ivan Volgyes, in his book 'Environmental Deterioration in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe', wrote that some of the younger economists and city planners had begun to question the utility of headlong industrialisation. Furthermore, 'primitive ecological interest group articulation' had 'begun to be noticeable...within the Soviet economic elite'¹⁴⁸. Hohman/Seidenstreich/Vajna have identified some of these economists: '...prominent economists like N. Fedorenko, a Member of the Academy of Sciences and Director of the Central Economic-Mathematical Institute of the Academy, and A. Birman, Doctor of Economic Sciences and Professor...' took part in the debate on the environment¹⁴⁹. On the other hand Mnatsakanian has argued that even at the end of the 1970s professors still maintained 'that ecological crisis in the planned and regulated socialist economy is impossible'¹⁵⁰. However, as pointed out by Gofman and Fedorenko:

...Отдельные представители экономической науки в 60-х и последующих годах неоднократно выступали в защиту природы. В ЦЕМИ, например, была создана первая в стране лаборатория экономики природопользования. Кроме того, здесь же возникла идея разработки Комплексной программы научно-технического прогресса, содержавшей крупный раздел по природопользованию и охране окружающей среды.

¹⁴⁸ Ivan Volgyes (ed.), Environmental Deterioration in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (New York, Washington, London: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 6.

¹⁴⁹ Hans Hermann Höhmann, Gertraud Seidenstreich, Thomas Vajna, Umweltschutz und ökonomisches System in Osteuropa (Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln, Mainz: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1973), s. 29.

¹⁵⁰ Ruben Mnatsakanian, Environmental Legacy of the Former Soviet Republics (Edinburgh: Centre for Human Ecology, 1992), p. viii.

Слегка было немало. Но далеко не все новое принималось планово-хозяйственными органами с восторгом, чаще затевалась многолетняя волокита с подготовленными рекомендациями и проектами методик, были и прямые конфликты. Все это потому, что в них содержались предложения ввести плату за ресурсы, а это противоречило канонам политической экономии, утверждавшим бесплатность природных ресурсов как неизменный закон социализма¹⁵¹.

The idea that enterprises should pay for their use of Nature resources to optimise plans from an environmental point of view emerged as early as at the end of the 1950s/early 1960s. Research on linear programming was carried out by the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Economy. The thrust of this research was that all parts used in production must be valued according to their contribution in the increase of the criteria of optimisation of the economic system, evaluated at one given moment. A category of optimal or objectively conditioned prices, introduced to Soviet economic science by Academician L. V. Kantorovich, who was awarded the Nobel price in economics for his ideas, took 20 years to gain acceptance in the USSR¹⁵².

The Writers

Rural life and closeness to Nature in sharp contrast to the morally decadent urban life had been set up as an ideal by a number of Russian writers. Tolstoi, for instance, propagated this view in his short story Tri smerti (Three Deaths) and his essay O tom (About that). Similar views can be seen in the works of Pushkin, Lermontov, Gogol, Dostoevskii and Chekhov, to mention but a few.

Immediately after the revolution, the main task was to mould the New Man, to help to build a communist society in the Soviet Union. To help to achieve this goal, the concept of socialist realism was introduced into Soviet art and literature. Writings should reflect people's enthusiasm for developing the country, for setting up factories and producing steel and bricks. A large number of so-called production novels appeared. To the extent that Nature played a part in these novels, it was as a challenge/obstacle to Man which in the end was overcome¹⁵³.

During and after the Second World War patriotic feelings were prevalent in the Soviet population, and, as noted by Brown, 'the emotional attraction for Russians of the "Motherland" was sufficiently strong for Stalin to find it expedient to reinstate the word and concept of

¹⁵¹ К. Гофман, Н. Федоренко, 'Экономическая защита природы', *Коммунист*, no. 5, 1989, с. 33.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 33.

¹⁵³ See for instance О. Чайковская, 'Природа и время', *Новый мир*, no. 10, 1965, с. 202.

Motherland'¹⁵⁴. The words narod (people, nation), rodina (Motherland) and priroda (Nature) all have the same etymological root in the Russian language. By letting people speak about the Rodina, Stalin thus made it easier to use other words of similar origin - thus giving people concerned with the state of the environment some leeway for bringing up the topic.

It was in this context that during the years 1950-53 Leonid Leonov wrote his famous novel Russkii les (The Russian Forest). The book consists of several 'stories'/themes, the central one being the fate of not only the Russian, but also of the Soviet forests after the October Revolution. Although several legislative and control measures to protect the Russian forests from over-felling had been taken as early as during the reign of Peter the Great, the forests provided Russia with hard currency from the West and were severely overused even before the revolution. Several Russian writers, among them Pushkin, Turgenev, and even Dostoevskii, who in his Dnevnik pisatel'ia (Diary of a Writer), called for measures to be taken against the destruction of the Russian forests. Particularly vociferous was Tolstoi in Anna Karenina¹⁵⁵. However, the writers, together with specialists in forestry, wrote and argued to little avail.

The abuse of Russian forests continued during the Soviet industrialisation programme, even though an edict signed by Lenin and Sverdlov on 27 May 1918 called for the principle of the continuous rehabilitation of forested areas, i.e., new planting at the same pace as felling. In the 1930s this principle was branded as a 'bourgeois idea' and viewed as an obstacle to the implementation of the 5-year plans. However, supporters of the forests continued to write and argue their case.

The discussion between the pro- and anti-foresters flared up again in 1946 in polemics in two scientific journals *Les* and *Lesnaia promyshlennost'*¹⁵⁶. Leonov, who was approached by the pro-forest grouping the following year, published the article V zashchitu druga (In the Defence of a Friend), which was his first publication in defence of the forests. His views were further developed in Russkii les. The defence of forestry (the forest) in Russkii les is developed in a lecture presented to his students by Professor Vikhrov. Harjan has summarised it as follows: 'it is a technical, highly specialised discourse on forests as well as a historical account. The lecture raises ethical and moral problems':

The Forest was our home, and perhaps no other element of Nature has set so strong a stamp upon the morals and manners of our ancestors. The tree is raw material fit for immediate use, and any piece of sharpened iron set on a handle converted it into a valuable item of primitive existence. A better way of expressing its role is to say that the forest

¹⁵⁴ Archie Brown, 'Introduction', p. 7, in Archie Brown & Jack Gray, Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States (London: Macmillan, 1977).

¹⁵⁵ Harjan (1979), p. 168.

¹⁵⁶ See В. Чивилихин (ред.), О Ленове (Москва: Современник, 1979), с. 12-14.

greeted the Russian at his birth and attended him through all the stages of his life - with the cradle of the infant and the first boots, with the nut and the wild strawberry, with the peg-top, the steam-bath switch and the balalaika, the splinter that did service for a lamp in the peasant's hut, and the painted shaft-bows at weddings, with the wild honey and the beaver, the fisherman's boat and the naval barque, the mushroom and incense, the staff of the wanderer, the coffin hollowed out of a log, and lastly, the wooden cross on the grave decorated with fir branches¹⁵⁷.

Professor Vikhrov stresses the function of the forest as a producer of oxygen and condemns its destruction not only in pre-revolutionary Russia and the Soviet Union but also in the West. In the end, however, he is optimistic:

But we have all the prior experience of history to tell us that the bright thousand-named hero of folk legend always conquered the monster who lay guarding the source of human happiness¹⁵⁸.

This led Harjan to conclude that 'the novel is deeply rooted in Russian history and culture'¹⁵⁹. Russkii les 'paved the way for the literature of the 60s and the 70s, for so-called "village-prose", combining the lyrical memory of Russia's past with a presentation of burning moral and ecological (my underlining) issues of the day'¹⁶⁰.

In the early 1960s, the writer V.A. Chivilikhin initiated an experiment which was given the name 'Kedrograd'. Whereas the emphasis in the late 1950s/early 1960s was on organised mass enthusiasm for BAM, the virgin lands in Kazakhstan and 'constructions of the century', an alternative in the form of individualised and small groups - the so-called *desanty* - also emerged at this time, propagating sustainable development of the country's natural resources.

A student at Leningrad Academy of Forestry put forward a theoretical alternative to the unrestricted felling of cedar trees in Siberia which was initiated in the late 1920s and 1930s, and which continued during the Second World War. He based his ideas of sustainable cedar forestry on ideas originally developed by the Russian foresters Turskii and Bolotov. Their ideas were firmly rooted in the Russian tradition of reverence for the forests (see above), which can be summarised as follows:

Истари пользование тайгой подчинилось неписаным, но и непоколебимым законам, нарушение которых жестоко каралось. Никто не посмел бы шишковать, точить живицу, рубить, брать зверя, бить птицу без ведома сельского схода и припоселковых

¹⁵⁷ Harjan (1979), p. 173.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 180.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

кудровниках или борах, навечно закрепленных за Петром или Иваном и их потомками. Луканин бор, бор остоя Таиша – Таинский, Висарионов бор – дошедшая до нас топонимика таежного уклада сибирской жизни¹⁶¹.

These ideas contrasted sharply with the Communists' attitude towards the forest:

Лес России станет разменной и разменной монетой. Павка Корчагин рубил лес – пустить паровоз, у которого остановка в коммуне. Василий Губанов из фильма "Коммунист" палил лес – осветить бараки и коммуналки, куда скучили согнанных из изб крестьян. В страшные годы Великого голода вместе с зерном русский лес рекой потек за рубеж. Рекой – в буквальном смысле слова – по рекам молевым сыпанком¹⁶².

In 1960 graduates from the Academy went to Gornyi Altai, to the village of Iogach, where they were given a large piece of land for their experiment. Through the writings of Chivilikhin and by word of mouth, young enthusiasts from all across the Soviet Union heard about Kedrograd and went there to join the Leningraders. From the very beginning, however, the initiative met with fierce opposition from the administrative apparatus, and in its third year it came to an end. Research from this period, however, survived and inspired a similar experiment on sustainability in the deserts of Tajikistan in the mid-1980s¹⁶³.

In 1965 another Soviet writer and publicist, G. Troepolskii, published an article in defence of the environment in the literary journal *Novyi mir*. Under the heading *Dnevnik pisatel'ia* (Diary of a Writer), he wrote 'O rekakh, pochvakh i problemakh' (On the Rivers, Soil and Problems). His concern is with the diversion of rivers that started in the Soviet Union in the second half of the 1930s. Troepolskii writes that he was approached by *Izvestiia* to write about the campaign to save the Tikhaya Sosna river (Voronezh oblast) from being completely drained. The campaign, which resulted in more than 200 signatures on a letter sent to various bureaucratic offices, was started by the local historian Valentin Ivanov. Troepolskii, in support of the villagers' demands, makes literary and historic references to justify the existence of the river; 150 years ago the poet and Decembrist Ryleev mentioned Tikhaya Sosna in a poem. And it was at the mouth of this river that Peter the Great met Mazepa¹⁶⁴. The importance of the river in rural life is also stressed – in other words, traditional ways of interacting with Nature are being set up as an ideal.

¹⁶¹ Флоренский, Шумова (1990), с. 734.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 736.

¹⁶⁴ Г. Тропольский. 'О реках, почвах и проблемах', *Новый мир*, no. 1, 1965, с. 185-212.

The same references to the past are made by the 'village-writers' in their works¹⁶⁵. Valentin Rasputin, one of the central writers in this tradition, depicts peasants living in close interaction with Nature. There is an 'untrennbare Einheit von Mensch und Natur' in Rasputin's works. 'Die Menschen fühlen sich organisch eingebunden in die sie umgebenden Naturvorgänge, in der ewigen Kreislauf von Werden und Vergehen, der sichtbar vor ihren Augen verläuft'¹⁶⁶. Two of his works, Farewell to Matura (Proshchaniye s Matoroi) and Conflagration (Pozhar), deal with environmental destruction in particular.

The theme of the former novella is the flooding of an island on the Angara River in connection with the building of a hydroelectric dam. This happened frequently as a result of the electrification of the Soviet Union. According to Wust, the flooding of the village and the land that the village people had cultivated for generations and the destruction of the cemetery where their ancestors were buried are for the villagers 'nicht nur ein Abschied von der gewohnten Umgebung, von der mit Erinnerungen und Traditionen behafteten Erde der Vater, der Trauer und Schmerz hervorruft, sondern er zerreit den inneren Lebenszusammenhang der Helden und scheidet sie ab von dem geistigen und moralischen Fundament ihres Lebens'¹⁶⁷.

Whereas Rasputin focuses on the impact of environmental destruction on people, other 'village-writers' like Abramov, Astafev, Belov, Mozhaev and Zalygin focus more explicitly on the concrete reasons for environmental destruction. Similarly, the film director Nikita Mikhalkov in his film *Sibiriada* (1979), also dealing with the flooding of a village in Siberia, pays considerable attention to the political aspects of the decision.

The dispute about Lake Baikal¹⁶⁸ which reached a peak in the late 1960s also attracted the attention of Soviet writers, amongst whom was Rasputin. The appeals made to save the lake continued the tradition of emotional references to the history and culture of the Russian people. Similar action was taken by Soviet writers against the River Reversal Project¹⁶⁹, the Volga

¹⁶⁵ For an analysis of the Russian village writers, see Stephen K. Carter, *Russian Nationalism. Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), Chapter 7: 'The Brezhnev Years II: "The Countryside Writers"', pp. 89-102.

¹⁶⁶ See Renate Schäper, *Die Prosa V.G. Rasputins*. (München: Verlag Otto Sagner in Kommission, 1985), *Darstellung und Funktion der Natur*, pp. 142-162.

¹⁶⁷ Heide Wust, *Tradition und Innovation in der Sowjetrussischen Dorfprosa der sechziger und siebziger Jahre: zu Funktion, Darstellung und Gehalt des dorlichen Heiden bei Vasilij Suksin und Valentin Rasputin* (München: O. Sagner, 1984).

¹⁶⁸ For an in-depth study of the controversy around Lake Baikal, see Craig ZumBrunnen, 'The Lake Baikal Controversy: A Serious Water Pollution Threat or a Turning Point in Soviet Environmental Consciousness', pp. 80-122, in Volgyes (1974). This issue is also covered in Marshall I. Goldman, *Environmental Pollution in the Soviet Union. The Spoils of Progress* (Cambridge, MA., London: MIT Press, 1972), chap. 6: *The Pollution of Lake Baikal*, pp. 177-210.

¹⁶⁹ See Nicolai N. Petro, 'The Project of the Century': A Case Study of Russian National Dissent', *Studies in Comparative Communism*, vol. XX, nos 3/4, Autumn/Winter 1987, pp. 234-52. The 'campaign' against the river reversal project started in July 1982, at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, when three Russian writers, Zalygin, Rasputin and Belov, questioned its necessity and environmental soundness and culminated

Chograi Canal, the building of hydro-electric power stations along the Dniepr River (see Chapter Three) and the Danube-Dniepr Canal (see Chapter Three). Ukrainian writers such as Serhiy Plachynda and Oles Honchar were actively involved in the campaigns against the latter two.

Writers have traditionally had an educational and socialising function in Russian and Ukrainian society. It has been widely documented that this function was maintained under the Soviet regime. Scientists can reach only a few readers through their specialist journals and conferences. Writers and cinema directors (cf. Mikhalkov - *Sibiriada* and the film version of *Proshchanie s Materoi*) can reach many more, not only through their fiction and films, but also in their *ocherki* on more specific issues. So although some authors like Rasputin complained that writers did not know enough, they were still fairly successful in making people aware of the environment (cf. letters from kolkhoz-farmers and students to Leonov). What was more, they could write between the lines more easily than could scientists, and thus find a way through the censorship.

In many cases issues relating to the environment were put on the agenda after writers had dealt with them in fiction or prose, when attempts at putting these same issues on the agenda had been made earlier but failed (cf. Troepolskii). Once a writer had addressed an issue it probably became easier for others to discuss it and for scientists to support or reject the writer's views (cf. debate between scientists and writers in the aftermath of *Russkii les*). Marshall Goldman has argued that protests like the one over Baikal 'are, of necessity, protests by one government agency against the actions of another government agency'¹⁷⁰. Whereas disputes at the top level over environmental issues - although caused by other concerns - may make it easier for e.g. writers to publish on the issue, there is no reason to believe that the handful of writers did not genuinely want to protect Baikal and were not genuinely patriotic in doing so. The fact that so-called public committees in some cases emerged to protect specific areas/Nature objects from pollution can be taken in support of this view: starting in the second half of the 1960s, public committees, groups and sections emerged to fight harmful enterprises by either having them closed altogether or having them restructured. The first public committee was set up in 1967 to protect Lake Baikal, and its membership consisted primarily of members of the creative intelligentsia. The Committee was headed by the Russian writer Valentin Rasputin¹⁷¹. The struggle to save Baikal has been well documented elsewhere, suffice it here to say that due to the campaign conducted by this committee and arguments put forward by scientists, in 1986 the USSR Council of Ministers and the CPSU Central Committee passed a resolution on the protection and the rational use of Nature resources

on 14 August 1986, when the project was abandoned [see Юрий Черниченко, *Земли, экология, перестройка* (Москва: Книга, 1989), с. 26.

¹⁷⁰ See Goldman (1972), p. 185.

¹⁷¹ А.В. Громов, О.С. Кузип, *Неформалы. Кто есть кто?* (Москва: Мысль, 1990), с. 94.

in the Baikal Basin, which envisaged the instalment of cleansing facilities at all enterprises in this basin. Similarly, groups of people joining forces with Soviet writers succeeded in collecting hundreds of thousands of signatures against the river reversal project, which, as seen above, was also cancelled in 1986.

The Relationship between Writers and Experts

Experts (i.e. scientists) actively took part in the debates on the environment in the USSR. In the case of Lake Baikal, for instance, Galyzii - head of the Limnological Institute at Baikal - was a key actor. He managed to supply data that were incompatible with those referred to by party and state officials in favour of the two cellulose plants at Baikal¹⁷². In connection with the writing of Leonov's novel *Russkii les*, information about the forests and about forest conservation prior to the revolution was supplied by pro-forest experts - as a matter of fact, Leonov was approached by scientists urging him to write on the forest issue, as people would listen to a writer of his high standing.

Zalygin has, however, expressed severe criticism against scientists for not doing enough to protect the environment¹⁷³. He has argued that in many cases the writers were alone in their fight to save the environment. Rasputin has argued similarly¹⁷⁴. Furthermore, he argued that the writers basically became involved in the hydroelectric power plant construction project issue due to what they saw, not due to what they were told by scientists.

Based on materials available on the scientists' role in protecting the environment it is clear that there were two groups of scientists, the pro-environmentalists and the pro-developmentalists. Often their views clashed seriously, as was the case in the aftermath of *Russkii les*. The novel was discussed by writers and scientists at a conference in the Writers' Union of the USSR in 1954 and was heavily criticised by some as being anti-socialist¹⁷⁵.

It might very well be, though, that it was not always a question of scientists being passive, but rather a question of them not being heard. Troepolskii, for instance, refers to frustrated scientists who warned that the consequences of the gigantic hydroelectric power stations on the environment had not been sufficiently examined and that their objections were not taken into account¹⁷⁶. And even if their views were heard, in most cases they could be debated relatively freely only in the

¹⁷² Thane Gustafson, *Reform in Soviet Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), Chap. 3: 'Environmental Issues rise to Official Legitimacy'.

¹⁷³ See for instance Сергей Залыгин, 'Разумный союз с природой', *Наш современник*, no. 1, 1987, с. 113-20.

¹⁷⁴ See Валентин Распутин, 'В поисках нужной цифры', *Наш современник*, no. 1, 1987, с. 138-39.

¹⁷⁵ В. Чидилихин (1979), с. 12-14.

¹⁷⁶ Троепольский (1965), с. 187-88.

specialised scientific press - which meant that facts were less available to the general public. Besides, much information regarding the environment was stamped confidential and as such could not be used as counter arguments in cases of environmental destruction.

It is also important to note that, as mentioned above, although some scientists came out against a project they considered harmful to the environment, this does not mean that the motivation of their defiance was necessarily environmental. Agriculture interests opposed energy interests because the latter made it increasingly difficult to reach plan targets. Similarly, financial interests probably came out against some of the most costly projects for economic reasons. In sum, therefore, they can be regarded as supportive of the environment.

If one looks at the period as a whole contacts between scientists and writers in particular have become more frequent, and we have reason to believe that the successful halt to the river-diversion project was to a great extent a result of the close co-operation between scientists and writers - where scientists provided the facts and the writers made these facts easily accessible. One should, on the other hand, not forget that this case was special, in that it threatened to change the climate of the northern hemisphere and consequently resulted in pressure from the international community on the Soviet Union to have the project reversed. This pressure might in the end have facilitated the change in attitude of the Soviet leadership, together with the fact that the project would have been very costly. Given the poor shape of the Soviet economy in 1986 when the project was suspended, this could have provided just as much an incentive for the Soviet Union to halt the project as did purely environmental concerns - although in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident it is not unreasonable to assume that such considerations also played a role.

1.2.4 The Thinkers on the Environment

Although officially, as will be seen in Chapter Two, the Soviet Union claimed that environmental problems were a phenomenon of Western capitalist countries and that Nature was there for Man to use, without having intrinsic value in itself, during the 1960s and 1970s some Soviet philosophers and thinkers started questioning this view¹⁷⁷. A discussion took place on two fronts; on the one hand, biologists discussed the relationship between Man and Nature, trying to assess whether Man's actions were harmful to the environment. On the other hand, theorists, historians, geographers and others tried to determine whether or not environmental problems were a cultural, rather than a political-economic, phenomenon.

¹⁷⁷ I will address pre-Revolutionary thinking on the Environment in 2.3: Was there a Soviet Eco-Culture? - see below.

The Biologists.

The biologists clashed over values. S. Schwartz, co-founder of *Ekologiya* (Ecology) - a journal covering environmental and conservation issues - had already in the 1950s criticised the 'conservationists' (see above) and in the early 1970s became a spokesman for drawing a clear line between conservation on the one hand, and ecology, on the other. Ecology, in his view, had a role to play in addressing current environmental problems, but only on 'scientific grounds', not influenced by idealist thinking and values. Schwartz very much opposed the values of the 'conservationists', arguing in 1974 that 'their assertions are illegitimate...discussions about the 'exhaustion of Nature'...sow doubt about the powers of Man...There is a wise aphorism: 'a resource deficit is simply...a deficit of knowledge'¹⁷⁸. For Schwartz, the aim was to find some way to 'direct natural processes', and on this ground he propagated a general theory of ecological engineering, rather than seeking to re-create some kind of harmony in Nature. Man was in the process of transforming the world, and this process needed to be conducted with the needs of Man in mind. Establishing these needs and setting the tasks of science were therefore political, rather than scientific, issues, he argued¹⁷⁹.

This view was strongly contested by a conservation activist, writer and member of *VOOP*, Boris Riabinin, who disagreed with Schwartz's view that pre-human 'pristine' wild Nature no longer existed. A second point of contention was that the value of ecosystems had to be calculated in the context of its use-value to human society rather than by 'some abstract principle of diversity and harmony'¹⁸⁰. Schwartz had many supporters - the Head of the Ministry of Agriculture's *Glavpriroda*, A. Borodin, and O. Gusev, for instance, accused the conservationists of 'losing their objectivity' and 'idealising Nature'. Their theory of 'natural equilibrium' was described as the 'philosophical equivalent of a Divine Plan'. Discussing the role of the predators, Gusev argued as follows:

The crux is this, that with the elimination of predators their place will be taken by other factors of selection, including human beings, whom the entire course of evolution on Earth prepared for a decisive role in the evolution of the Biosphere¹⁸¹.

Schwartz spoke at length of the 'fated role for humans as the new chiefs of evolution', arguing that all species would come under the management and stewardship of humans and that 'this is

¹⁷⁸ Weiner (1990), p. 14.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

nothing to fear (as) Nature in the future would be better suited to human aspirations and needs'. Riabinin, on the other hand, claimed that 'industrialisation and urbanisation were leading to the 'impoverishment of Nature'. His understanding of 'impoverishment' differed greatly from that of Schwartz, who responded that one could not talk about impoverishment in an aesthetic, ethical or emotional sense, but only in the 'quantifiable, professional sense', i.e. reduced biological productivity. Riabinin's response came in the form of a warning that 'blind faith in science is one of the modern varieties of ignorance'. He dismissed Schwartz's argument on the grounds that 'there must not and cannot be easy and quick solutions'. Schwartz, on the other hand, retorted that the 'alarmists' slogan 'Back to Nature' was not only 'reactionary', but also 'anti-scientific' as 'Man cannot return to the caves'¹⁸².

From the mid-1970s the idea of bioscenosis came under heavy criticism - also among those who had until then supported the idea - and alternatives such as 'Biosphere studies' and 'island biogeography' attracted more and more research. V. Vernadskii's idea about the Biosphere as a single system rose to prominence in the 1960s when ecological problems reached the global level¹⁸³. A supporter of the concept of the Biosphere, Nikolai Reimers, argued that 'one can benefit through reshaping Nature in some region of the Biosphere only by losing out in another area'. With regard to ecological engineering, Reimers was critical, seeing this as the source of many of the USSR's current ecological problems¹⁸⁴. Reimers could therefore describe the transformation of the Biosphere into the technosphere as a 'folly'¹⁸⁵.

The island bio-geographers, of whom Iablokov was a propagator, rejected the idea of closed off eco-systems, studying instead 'those conditions which affected the viability of populations of individual species living in a particular area, considered an island'¹⁸⁶. Recreational geography also took off as people living in the cities started visiting the zapovedniki for recreational purposes and encouraging the creation of 'national parks' to be accessible not only to scientists but also to the broader public. Calls for diversity and acceptance that Nature also had aesthetic value were made by Reimers and also Feliks Shtilmark in the latter half of the 1970s. The Russian botanist and conservation leader Valerian Taliev made similar calls:

The Virgin forest, the unplowed virgin steppe attracts the contemporary mature individual not only with the prospect of clean air, wide open spaces and freedom from the confines of everyday life. They are also sources of experiences of a higher order. They speak to us!...For our worldview Nature is not only something outside of us, but it forms

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 19.

¹⁸³ For a more thorough outline of Vernadskii's ideas, cf. Chapter Seven.

¹⁸⁴ Weiner (1990), p. 23.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

together with us an integral whole; we ourselves are only a small unit within the one great organism of Nature. To learn how to penetrate to this unity, to feel around oneself the beating of the unbroken pulse of life, means to create a positive foundation for spiritual development, to incorporate into the developing soul a powerful counterweight to the narrow practical 'I', and to develop the ability to appreciate the world in an artistic and aesthetic way¹⁸⁷.

The Philosophers

As pointed out by DeBardeleben, 'official Soviet doctrine does not claim to have resolved all scientific and theoretical problems, but rather to provide a methodology (dialectical materialism) and a perspective (the interests of the working population) for their analysis...Reading Marx, Engels and Lenin provides no ready-made solutions to the approaching environmental crisis. Many Soviet scholars are strikingly aware of this theoretical lacuna in the ecological area and have set themselves the task of addressing the ethical, scientific, and practical problems that have arisen'¹⁸⁸.

Whereas Western thinkers blame the ecological crisis on Western culture and religion, officially Soviet authorities have argued that environmental problems are a phenomenon of capitalist societies. To the extent such problems existed in the USSR, this was blamed as a left-over from capitalism, which would eventually be eradicated. Some Soviet philosophers did, however, - albeit cautiously - contest this view in journals such as *Voprosy filosofii*, *Priroda* and the weekly *Literaturnaia gazeta*. Lynn White sees 'Western culture, which regards Nature as an instrument to serve human ends, and the Judaeo-Christian tradition from which it emanates that holds that Nature is in opposition to humanity, thus sanctioning human mastery of it' - as the root of the problem: 'marxism, at least as practised in the Soviet Union, is firmly entrenched in this anthropocentric Western cultural tradition'. A similar view is propagated by John Passmore, arguing that 'whatever the claims of Marx and Engels, the Soviet Union certainly has shared, in this respect, the ideology of capitalism...in its ignorant and greedy concern with short-term benefits at the expense of Nature'¹⁸⁹.

As culture in Marxist-Leninist thinking is considered an epiphenomenon, 'reflecting underlying material forces', most Soviet theorists rejected the cultural hypothesis on the grounds that the explanation for environmental problems had to be sought at a deeper (i.e. the economic) level and also on the grounds that religion was subordinate to the material forces of history¹⁹⁰.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

¹⁸⁸ Joan DeBardeleben, 'Optimists and Pessimists: The Ecology Debate in the USSR', in *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, vol. XXVI, nos 2-3, June/Sept. 1984, p. 127.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

Some scholars, such as the biologist/geneticist Iurii Rychkov, the historian A. Arutiunov and G. Tsaregorodtsev, however, expressed themselves more favourably regarding the cultural hypothesis, thus implying that 'a common source for ecological problems in the capitalist and socialist worlds (exists) and (that there is) a common need for a fundamental transformation of values'¹⁹¹.

Rychkov, while contending that in the Western European/Euro-American culture Man is perceived as the 'crown of creation' and 'development...has always proceeded on the principle of denying equilibrium with the environment', argued that the impact of these two elements ('the surging of the economy, science and culture' and the 'situation we are discussing as catastrophe' - i.e. the environmental crisis) is not a phenomenon of capitalism per se, but rather of the culture prevailing in these countries. His warning to the effect that the USSR may also be confronted with an environmental crisis of the same scale is by DeBardeleben interpreted as an acknowledgement that the Soviet/East European culture is similar to that of the West:

However, developed countries with a socialist societal organization may find themselves facing a similar ecological crisis if the scientific basis and philosophical interpretation of the relationship between Nature and society lag behind the rate of cultural-economic development¹⁹².

Although Rychkov retorted to official rhetoric arguing that the time margin was greater in the USSR and also that the socialist experience indicated that 'a more harmonious society-Nature relationship' might be created, between the lines he implied 'the lack of a comprehensive approach in socialist countries ("trial and error"); a similarity in cultural type between socialist and capitalist countries; and the predominant role played by culture. In addition he clearly (suggested) the need for a new philosophical interpretation of the Nature-society relationship'¹⁹³.

Similar views were expressed by S. Arutiunov, suggesting that 'ritual-prestige' consumption was responsible for large, potentially unlimited, expenditures of energy and material, 'the rapid growth of which has become one of the direct causes of crisis phenomena in the environment'. Because prestige was a necessary component of a fulfilling human life, society had to find ways of fulfilling this need that were labour-intensive and did not involve the 'wasting' of Nature which was so characteristic of virtually all past and present societies. Arutiunov therefore advocated ethnic studies 'to discover which cultural patterns are ecologically sound. The future requires

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Ibid., p. 132.

human self-knowledge, rather than continued concentration on rebuilding and adapting Nature to human ends'¹⁹⁴.

G. Tsaregorodtsev went even further, advocating that the 'mastery of Nature' mentality should be replaced by that of a 'return to Nature', 'because of the deleterious effects of pollution on human health'. Such challenges to the 'mastery of Nature' mentality were understandably politically weak in the USSR, but by some they were viewed as dangerously widespread. For example, the scientists M. Rutkevich and S. Shvarts complained that these 'pessimists' appeal to emotion, they set their attention 'only on the undesirable changes in living Nature, and they have already drawn broad conclusions from them'. 'Thus, argues DeBardeleben, 'while such attacks may be directed against a wide range of environmental advocates, they reflect alarm over the extensive support for a more cautious attitude towards Nature transformation'¹⁹⁵.

Having analysed the writings of several Soviet scientists, philosophers and writers addressing the issue of the environment in the 1970s, DeBardeleben reaches the following conclusion:

The clear consensus among most scientists is that the self-regulating process of Nature must be protected and optimized, assuring a condition of dynamic equilibrium. In other words, temporary or minimal disequilibria are necessary for change, but not to the point where Nature's cyclical processes of self-regulation are irreparably damaged. Human beings should not consider themselves above Nature, but part of it, regulating it to increase its productivity, its capacity for self-regeneration, and its internally balanced biological cycles. In fact, however, ever more Soviet scholars fear that damage done to the environment is already extensive and irreversible¹⁹⁶.

As seen above, Shvarts held the view that Man should use Nature for his own ends. Shvarts, together with Kalesnik and Davitaia, were "ecological optimists": 'Shvarts gives particular importance to a high level of productivity in Nature and asserts that human influence on the environment can already be positively assessed, since an increased level of energy exchange in the ecosystem may accelerate the evolutionary process. Likewise, Kalesnik and Davitaia argue that pollution of the environment (specifically, Lake Baikal) is necessary up to a point, for it 'helps insure the flowering of life and, through it, helps purify the environment itself'¹⁹⁷.

The 'ecologically cautious' scholars, such as Novik, Rychkov, Kamshilov and Zharikov, however, contested these views. 'Zharikov specifically warned that 'in these conditions it is better to be overcautious in determining objects of Nature protection and to include as great an amount

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 137-38.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 139.

as possible'. Likewise, Novik advocated the exploitation of energy sources such as solar power, wind, and ocean waves that did not disturb the ecosystem, and he warned against activities with unknown long-term consequences; for example he questioned the advantages of electric cars, pointing out that their impact on the electric field of the city had not yet been assessed. Like Rychkov and Tsaregorodtsev, Novik also questioned the genetic adaptability of human beings. Echoing their sentiments, Medunin proceeds to an unusually critical analysis of the potential dangers of nuclear power¹⁹⁸.

In the 1980s, the aesthetic value of Nature also became a theme for Soviet philosophers, led by Ivan Frolov, the editor of the CPSU's ideological journal *Kommunist*, and Viktor Los of the Soviet Academy of Sciences' Institute of Philosophy¹⁹⁹. The two contended that as society got more and more urbanised, the 'aesthetic attraction of Nature increases in importance'. Following from this 'it would be a mistake to conceive of the Biosphere merely as a source of resources or a "disposer" of wastes'²⁰⁰. It was therefore necessary to 'reintegrate both aesthetics and values into our way of relating to the world and ...into our science!'. Nature was not inexhaustible and the assumption that Man had a right, or even a chance to, dominate Nature was questioned by the two philosophers.

As argued by them, 'under the influence of the crisis Nature of the developing socio-ecological situation Man is gradually moving away from the illusion of anthropocentrism and rejecting the traditional hegemonistic relationship to Nature. His thinking has ceased to limit itself to notions centring around needs and designs of him and him alone. His activity is acquiring an ever broader Biosphere orientation, and his thinking is drawn to "biocentrism"...Biospherocentrism assumes an orientation of human activity and thinking in directions that consider his interests both as subject and as object, as Man and Nature'²⁰¹. Man and Nature, argued Frolov and Los, 'are both parts of a single, dialectically interactive whole. We act on "Nature" both as subject and object; when we alter our environment, we often create dislocation and dangers for ourselves'²⁰².

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 139-40.

¹⁹⁹ Weiner (1990), p. 25.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 27.

1.2.5 The People

I have now identified and discussed the role of some environmentalists so far as it can be discerned from the debates on environmental issues in the USSR. The question now is: how much support did they enjoy among the population at large? It is of course next to impossible to measure support in quantitative terms, as no published accessible survey materials exist in this area prior to 1985. Bush (1974), addressing public attitudes towards the environment, argues that 'most Russians (and other national groups in the USSR) are at best apathetic (holding the view that) the Earth is big enough to take care of everyone...From time immortal, the inhabitants of Russia have been accustomed to thinking that the expanse of their homeland is infinite and that its riches are inexhaustible'. Bush also justified his view by referring to contemporary Soviet society, glorifying 'heroic engineers, prospectors and tractor drivers' and portraying the environment as an obstacle to industrialisation that had to be conquered²⁰³. Ziegler (1987) was somewhat more cautious: 'we can little but speculate about the general attitude of the Soviet public towards environmental matters, for survey data on environmental perceptions are not systematically collected, or at least not disseminated. Nor do environmental (independent) groups exist, through which average citizens could voice their concerns and demands'²⁰⁴. The reason for this was that active participation in pro-environmental actions was unlikely to be sanctioned. Therefore, the chances that people would organise demonstrations were also slight.

We do, however, know that people who were directly affected by decisions made at a high Party/State level did protest²⁰⁵. Often this was done through the writing and signing of petitions/collective letters, which were then sent to newspapers, party organisations, ministries and the like. Letters were also written to writers when issues had been raised by them (e.g. Leonov's *Russkii les*) and could as such be used in support of the writers' views (cf. the meeting of Writers' Union in 1954 - Leonov cited letters from the public in support of his view when defending himself against pro-development scientists). In the cases of Tikhiaia Sosna (Troepolskii) and (the nature reserve Zhiguly (Zotov) we also know that the campaigns to save Tikhiaia Sosna and Zhiguly were initiated by locals and received substantial support from the public.

The campaign to save the Tikhiaia Sosna was moreover carried out by a person whose special interest was local history, and who had on his own even created a local museum devoted to the history of his village. Given also that the people in the village had taken action to prevent the river from drying out in the 1930s and that they were not successful in doing so, it seems as though the issue of values (the interrelationship between River and Man) and the historic importance of the

²⁰³ Bush (1974), p. 25.

²⁰⁴ Ziegler (1987), p. 37.

²⁰⁵ cf. Трополюский (1965). ZumBrunnen (1974).

river had been central in facilitating the protest, although it can of course not be excluded that the kolkhoz leadership was involved in the protest as well, as draining the river would be detrimental to its interests.

It is also possible that people had to a certain extent able to exert some influence through voting. Leonov, for instance, was elected a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet after the publication of *Russkii les*, and Zalygin, together with other writers, used their positions as deputies of the Russian Supreme Soviet to launch the campaign against the river-diversion project. We do not, however, have enough evidence to generalise from these two incidents. We still do not know to what extent discussions between candidates for parliamentary elections and, later, deputies of the Parliament and their voters addressed environmental issues and, if they did, to what extent deputies were able to speak up successfully in favour of the environment.

The great popularity of writers like Sholokhov, Leonov, Rasputin and Astafev does however indicate that people were imbued with a love for Nature in part through reading their works, as well as through the works of the great Russian writers before them. It is my view that a few writers thus helped pave the ground for the modern Green movement that came into existence as a result of glasnost and perestroika²⁰⁶.

1.2.6 'Environmental Interest Group'

Some sovietologists²⁰⁷ (e.g. Ziegler) have taken the existence of 'interest groups' in Soviet politics to support the view that the Soviet Union was essentially a corporatist state. This view was


²⁰⁶ Ziegler (1987) does not rule out that the writers might have influenced people's thinking on environmental issues: 'writers may exert considerable influence over public opinion by publishing plays, novels, short stories, or poems that contain environmental messages' (p. 69).

²⁰⁷ Two other writers on the Soviet environment, DeBardleben and Ianitskii talk about pro-environmental constellations: DeBardleben makes use of a continuum with pro-environment at the one end and pro-development at the other. At the former end she places the following actors: agencies with more 'pure' environmental regulatory functions, scientists and experts, the cultural intelligentsia (journalists and writers) and dissident environmental groups. At the other end we find industrial enterprises and their responsible ministries, the party and government, whereas other actors, such as agencies with Nature use and protection functions, local party and state officials, the public at large and official conservation groups, are somewhere in between. She also distinguishes between more powerful and less powerful levels, the pro-development actors being more powerful than the pro-environment actors. This approach in my view resembles reality in the former USSR much more closely than the notion of state corporatism applied by Ziegler, although DeBardleben's model is somewhat misleading in that it classifies scientists, experts and the cultural intelligentsia as 'pro-environment', although members of these groups could be found across the line. Similarly, agencies with more 'pure' environmental regulatory functions were not necessarily pro-environment. This was clearly demonstrated by Volodymyr Boreiko, a member of Zelenyi Svit and a former employee of the Ukrainian Derzhkompriroda, which was set up in the 1960s (for details, see Chapters Two and Three). Ianitskii, on the other hand, has developed what he calls 'a system of guideposts of the activity of social subjects', consisting of four quadrants grouped along two axes, the first representing a continuum with an orientation towards people (Nature conservation) at the one end and orientation towards production

outlined in some detail by Charles Ziegler in his well-known work 'Soviet Environmental Policies'²⁰⁸. His argument was rooted in the debate - albeit limited - that did take place on Soviet environmental policies, or rather the lack of such policies, particularly from the late 1960s onwards. Ziegler concluded that 'the interest representation process in Soviet environmental policy (was) accurately depicted by the state corporatist model', his main argument being that

Attention to the issue of environmental protection did not develop as a result of interest group initiatives. It emerged out of the overall economic and political context of the late 1950s and early 1960s. Official campaigns promoting conservation to maximize economic growth and efficiency legitimized discussion of broader 'environmental' issues by specialists concerned about environmental degradation. The range of proposals advanced was nominally related to the narrow conservationist goals of the leadership, but in many cases bold

for its own sake at the other. The second continuum has got orientation towards conserving the existing situation at the one end and orientation towards social change at the other:



Quadrant 3 represents the administrative-command system and quadrant I the ecologists/environmentalists.

For the former, Nature is 'only a means for securing the existence of the system, whereas for the latter it is an object to be protected and reproduced'. Further, for the administrative-command system human relations are 'organisational' in that they are rooted in hierarchical subordination and role interaction. The ecologists, on the other hand, adhere to values such as altruism and concern for 'outsiders', such as neighbours and future generations. A series of other qualities distinguishing the two are also identified in Ianitskii's work. Quadrant II is made up of the 'workers', whereas the fourth quadrant consists of 'inhabitants'. People can simultaneously belong to both quadrants in their different roles. As a rule, however, the former tend to be rationalists and technocrats, whereas the latter take measures to protect and reproduce the environment which the former use as a means of production. Thus, their values are different. People belonging to the former group are primarily employed in industries or are rural immigrants, whereas the latter tend to be children, young people and mothers, invalids and pensioners, as well as people occupied in the service sector, education and culture. Ianitskii's model is also useful as a starting point, although, as will be seen in Chapters Six and Seven, reality is somewhat more complex. Suffice it to say that workers' collectives actively and successfully took part in gathering signatures and writing letters against the expansion of the South Ukrainian Energy Complex and also in other environmental campaigns in Ukraine during the late 1980s. It is also difficult for a number of reasons, to place scientific institutions opposed to nuclear power into Ianitskii's classification scheme.

²⁰⁸ Charles E. Ziegler, *Environmental Policy in the USSR* (London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1987).

individuals moved beyond these functional parameters to suggest innovative approaches to environmental questions²⁰⁹.

As seen above, though, specialists concerned with the state of the environment in the USSR voiced their alternative views as early as the 1920s - and precisely because industrialisation and official thinking on the environment from the late 1920s clashed with their values and ideas, not because such views were encouraged by the party. Moreover, 'environmentalists' were able to exploit Stalin's focus on the Motherland during and immediately after the Second World War to speak up for the environment (see below). As will be seen in Chapter Two, although the Soviet authorities introduced far-reaching legislation on the environment, this did not in itself express a commitment to environmental values but seemed to be more an extension of the idea that socialist society was superior to capitalist society in all spheres - including the environment. Khrushchev's policies of ploughing the virgin lands of Kazakhstan and his giant maize planting scheme did enormous damage to the environment, and harmful industrialisation continued. Brezhnev, on the other hand, following the outcry over Lake Baikal, took steps to curb environmental debates in the press (cf. Zotov - above), and attempts by enterprise managers to reduce pollution at their enterprises by installing pollution-cleansing facilities were in some cases branded 'anti-socialist' (cf. Chapter Two). Thus, it seems somewhat misleading to attribute the debate on the environment to the Communist Party.

As regards the notion of state corporations, it presupposes segments consisting of not only policy actors but also of 'ordinary people' organised at a lower level and linked with each other. In the case of those concerned with the environment, one would thus have to establish some kind of a pro-environmental segment including pro-environmentalist units within the bureaucratic apparatus, pro-environmentalists within the Communist Party, writers, scientists, economists - also including the officially sanctioned Societies for Nature Protection and university *druzhiny* that started emerging in the 1960s and whose major concern was to identify and punish poachers.

Although in many respects the concerns of these groups were identical, there is no evidence that they co-ordinated their activities. Furthermore, it seems that the motivations for taking part in the environmental 'debate' were qualitatively different. Whereas a few writers, scientists and enthusiasts took part in the discussions primarily due to their convictions on the interaction between Man and Nature based on age-old values and ethical norms, what may be referred to as 'agricultural interests' opposed the 'energy section' probably not so much out of a concern for the environment as such, but more because the flooding of agricultural land in connection with the construction of hydro-electric power stations reduced the level of arable land and thus made it

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 73-74.

more difficult to keep up with steadily increasing plan-targets. Some economists - although, it should be stressed, a few of them were genuinely committed to the environment - were probably motivated primarily by the potential costs of projects that would incidentally also be damaging to the environment rather than environmental damage in itself²¹⁰. And as seen above, some philosophers writing on the environment were concerned with finding a theoretical solution to the existence of environmental problems in socialist society, as this clashed with the views held by Marx and to some extent also Engels - and not with pollution being a bad thing in itself.

Further, a corporatist segment presupposes the existence of special bodies or agencies whose major task it is to represent a certain interest. Although a number of Soviet ministries and departments did have offices for environmental protection, no separate all-union Ministry or Department of Environmental Protection existed prior to the coming to power of Gorbachev. Paradoxically, as will be seen in Chapter Two, the polluters themselves were also in charge of protecting the environment. There is no reason to believe that the view prevalent in the 1930s - first we industrialise, then we can think about the environment - was less prevalent in the power structures in the 1960s and 1970s. The very existence of taut plans can in itself be taken as proof of disregard for the environment, as rapid economic growth outweighed concern for the environment. Installing expensive pollution reducing devices at enterprises would be extremely costly, as funding would have to be earmarked for research into that area. Buying equipment from Western countries, on the other hand, was ruled out until the early 1980s as the official view that there were no environmental problems in the Soviet Union was prevalent in official Soviet writings (cf. Chapter Two).

It therefore seems more likely that, although there were 'groupings' involved in protecting the environment, they were by no means united, and the motivations they had for lobbying for the protection of the environment differed widely. Nonetheless, writers, some scientists, the university *druzhiny* and various other societies consistently favoured an alternative approach to the environment and were, through the experience they gained through their environmental activities, well-equipped and well-trained to set up Green political movements once this became politically feasible. As many of them had prior to their environmental activities already established themselves as well-known and respected public figures in their own right, people trusted them as leaders of the emerging Green groups and listened to their appeals on behalf of the environment. Thus, embryos of a Green movement, created before Gorbachev's ascendance to power, developed over a relatively short period of time into nation-wide Green movements succeeding in overturning environmentally harmful decisions made by the Soviet authorities.

²¹⁰ See for instance Goldman (1972), Chap. 2: 'The Economic and Political Propensity to Pollute - Reality', pp. 43-76.

As seen above, environmentalists stood their ground during the Soviet period, even though their activities were fraught with numerous set-backs and limitations. Were public activities in the area of the environment thus more 'radical' than in other areas of Soviet life? Weiner, referring to the zapovedniki movement, claimed at a lecture at the Kennan Institute on 22 February 1996 that 'while by no means anti-Soviet or a centre of opposition, the community of Soviet-era ecologists acted repeatedly to influence Soviet policy on issues of Nature protection'. This view was disputed by Valery Soyfer, professor at the George Mason University, who argued that 'the actions of these individuals cannot be interpreted as an expression of independence - other explanations for their behaviour must exist'.

The explanation put forward by Soyfer was that 'rumours of the declining popularity of Lysenko and his "scientific" justifications for despoiling the environment were widespread in party circles by early 1947. These rumors were proven in March 1948 when Iurii Zhdanov, Chairman of the Scientific Division of the Central Committee, delivered a lecture criticizing Lysenko to propagandists from all over the Soviet Union...rather than reflecting true independence (the ecologists' criticisms) merely echoed views supported by the party'. Soyfer was also highly sceptical of the Nature *druzhiny*, arguing that 'one of their main activities was to camp in the woods at Christmas time and make sure nobody cut down Christmas trees'²¹¹.

Whereas it is true that criticism of Lysenko voiced by the Greens coincided with a centrally orchestrated campaign against Lysenko, it is also equally true that some Soviet biologists opposed Lysenko's ideas from the very beginning and undertook a well-organised campaign to protect the zapovedniki while Lysenko was still in Stalin's good books. Further, the example of how Bochkarev lost his position within *VOOP* and the fact that the *druzhinniki* were not only highly successful in catching poachers but that there were also casualties indicates that the environmentalists were not merely paying lip-service to official policies, but had defended values and ideas of their own. Whether or not the activities of the environmentalists can be labelled 'acts of independence' is a different matter and, in my view, not the major issue. Of more importance is the impact expressions of opposition towards official environmental policies prior to Gorbachev had on informal Green movements that started to emerge as a result of glasnost and democratisation.

The environment provides an interesting approach to the study of interest articulation in a Soviet political context for a variety of reasons. On the one hand, as argued above, the environment is a potentially explosive issue. As seen in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident, it can indirectly serve as an instrument by which to question the legitimacy of a regime, while on

²¹¹ Joseph Dresen, *Soviet-Era Ecologists: Beginnings of a Civil Society? Meeting. Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies*, vol. XIII, no. 13, 1996.

the other hand it can serve a legitimising purpose. Writers like Leonov and Sholokhov, for instance, continually linked the concept of Nature (*Priroda*) with the Motherland (*Rodina*) and the Nation (*Narod*). Calling for the protection of Nature thus became an act of patriotism. Stalin allowed and encouraged Russian/Soviet patriotism prior to, during and immediately after the Second World War, to unite people against an outside threat and to discourage them from turning to the enemy for help in toppling the Soviet regime.

Furthermore, and maybe all the more paradoxically, letting people voice their concerns on the environment could serve a useful purpose for the Party. In the case of the building of hydro-electric dams, for instance, this was no doubt a priority issue for the Soviet regime. By letting people who would be affected by flooding or drainage speak their mind, the impression could easily be created that the bureaucrats were the bad ones and that the Party, which gave people the opportunity to speak their mind, was not necessarily to blame. In other words, anger could be channelled in a different and not so potentially dangerous direction. Although there were limits to the environmental debate, such a debate - as long as it did not challenge the authority of the Party - was allowed to take place relatively freely.

Prominent dissidents did argue the case of the environment in samizdat publications - environmental problems, for instance, were mentioned as one of the issues that ought to be given priority in an appeal made by Sakharov, Turchin and Zh. Medvedev²¹² to the Communist Party in 1970 and *Khronika tekushchikh sobytii* published a detailed study of environmental pollution in the USSR in the 1970s. Still, it was not amongst the most important issues of the dissident movement. An explanation for this is to be found in the thrust of the debate on the environment itself. Dissidents speaking up on behalf of the environment were not very likely to be heard. Besides, it was an issue less politically 'dangerous' than, for instance, human rights - the major focus of the dissidents. The issue of the environment, unlike many other issues, however, had the 'advantage' that it affected a relatively large number of people directly (cf. flooding and drainage). The mixture of values and direct interests (cf. Rasputin: *Proshchanie s Materoi*) therefore made it easier to mobilise people.

Troepolskii in his article about Tikhia Sosna mentioned a petition signed by more than 100 people in the nearby villages. Petitions were often used to protest about decisions which had a negative effect on the environment²¹³. Stephen White has argued that Soviet people were less

²¹² Bush (1974), p. 28: Bush notes that 'growing attention is being devoted to environmental disruption...in samizdat writings'. As examples he refers to Sakharov's *Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom*, Sakharov, Turchin and Medvedev, *Appeal to the Soviet Leadership*, Maksimov, *Seven Days of Creation* and *Khronika tekushchikh sobytii*, in 1974 available at Radio Liberty in Munich (see Bush for reference numbers).

²¹³ Троепольский (1965).

likely to suffer sanctions by signing a joint petition than they were by writing a letter of controversial content only on behalf of themselves²¹⁴. What was more, the involvement of famous writers, speaking up on other people's behalf (Troepolskii - Tikhaja Sosna, Sholokhov - the river Don, Rasputin - Lake Baikal, Zalygin - the river-diversion project), probably to some extent served to encourage involvement. Surely, if famous writers could talk about the environment, then ordinary people could do the same?

Below, I will look at the values which those actively propagating environmental issues adhered to and which, in my view, were also adopted as the framework of the current Green movements in the Slav regions of the former USSR today.

1.3 Soviet Eco-Culture as a Complementary Factor by which to Explain the Emergence of the Greens

Above I have tried to explain the emergence of the Green Movement and later also of the Green Parties in the former USSR by linking them to a number of events taking place in the country after Gorbachev came to power in 1985. However, are the factors mentioned above sufficient in themselves to explain the emergence of the Greens, or should we seek more deep-rooted explanations?

The Soviet sociologist Ianitskii has argued that Soviet sociology had no tools (i.e., no theoretical framework, no concepts) with which to explain the emergence of informal movements such as the Greens:

Unfortunately our sociology has proven to be practically without its own tools in the face of the burgeoning field of civic initiatives and protest actions: there exists no developed conception of collective action under socialism, particularly a theory of new mass movements²¹⁵.

Stephen Fish²¹⁶ gives an explanation for this in a review of socialist and Soviet thinking on the question of associations. Karl Marx, he argues, opposed the very notion of associations because the 'universality of the proletariat' was to be found in its 'capacity to transcend the realm of particularistic "interest" and to unite state and society'. Therefore Marx did not simply neglect

²¹⁴ Stephen White, 'Political Communications in the USSR: Letters to Party, State and Press', *Political Studies*, vol. XXXI, pp. 43-60.

²¹⁵ O.N. Ianitskii, 'The Environmental Movement', *Soviet Sociology*, November/December 1990, pp. 39-40.

²¹⁶ Steven Fish, 'The Emergence of Independent Associations and the Transformation of Russian Political Society', *The Journal of Communist Studies*, vol. 7, no. 3, September 1991, pp. 299-334.

issues such as individuality, free association and self-organisation, but produced a negative critique of 'civil society'. Marx's views were challenged by Eduard Bernstein, who argued that the 'diversity of interests in a complex society was inevitable and even desirable'. Associations such as independent trade unions, political parties, productive associations and co-operative retail shops were 'essential and permanent building blocks of socialist society'. Bernstein warned that attempts at destroying civil society 'engendered a dangerous authoritarian impulse'. However, he received little support among other socialists for these views.

The Russian socialists endorsed Marx's ideas, and Lenin argued that since the division between state and society was simply meaningless in post-revolutionary society, there was no need for associations. By Fish he is described as having been 'generally contemptuous of particularistic aspirations of social groups'. Even Bukharin, who held divergent views on economic issues, was against the idea of (independent) associations, although he did not object to the creation of organisations per se:

Bukharin favoured 'an unprecedented flourishing of possible organizations of the working class and the labouring masses' involving 'all kinds of workers' and peasants' organizations, press correspondents, and voluntary societies and associations'. Yet he held the view that these formations, 'together with Soviet power, in fact, form a single system which embraces, enlightens and reforms the broad strata of toilers'.²¹⁷

Although Lenin opposed the formation of associations and took steps during to secure the party's control over political life in addition to expanding and deepening Soviet power in rural areas, he was not against the development of peasant co-operatives 'as an evolutionary alternative to sudden imposition of revolutionary power in the countryside'. He also 'countenanced exchange and market societies only indirectly subject to state control'. Thus, the Soviet socialists in the 1920s seemed to follow a middle path between Marx's rejection of associations and Bernstein's wholehearted support of them. The organisations that emerged at this time were looked upon as 'intermediary in the sense that they were largely self-constituted, if not fully self-governing, allowed for some organised social initiative "from below" and lay outside the formal structure of the state'. These organisations served the purpose of acting as a 'link' between state and society as well as a means by which the peasant masses could overcome their isolation.

Lenin's rather pragmatic approach quickly came to an end with Stalin's ascent to power following Lenin's death. Fish has summarised Stalin's approach to associations as follows: 'destruction of non-state social activity of every type (was to Stalin) crucial - indeed the crucial -

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 300.

revolutionary imperative of the Soviet state'. With the introduction of the 1932 Law on Associations (see above) and the 1936 Constitution the principles of intermediation and free association vanished, in Fish's view, and from 1953 to 1985 a 'purely statist theory and practice on questions of associations persisted'. The 1977 Constitution made it clear that all organised activity must conform with the goals of the state. Thus, during Brezhnev's rule permissible organised activities equalled activities taking place within the confines of state institutions²¹⁸.

A somewhat different interpretation is offered by Geoffrey A. Hosking²¹⁹, who holds the view that Stalin's 1936 Constitution actually lay the foundation for 'civil society' by guaranteeing - albeit only at a formal level - numerous civil freedoms. These freedoms were referred to by dissidents against whom the Soviet authorities pressed charges of unauthorised behaviour. Together with the Soviet Union's ratification of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the human rights section of the agreement on European Security and Co-operation in 1975, the Stalin Constitution provided dissidents with an incentive to set up human rights groups and also conduct other independent activities. Although they were cut off from society at large and were severely punished for their activities, many of these people (particularly in Ukraine) were later to become key figures in setting up political movements and parties under perestroika²²⁰. Ianitskii, while in his early works suggesting that one turn to Western sociology for tools with which to analyse the birth of the Greens²²¹, in later works makes use of his own models, based on the Soviet 'experience'.

While agreeing that Western sociological models such as mobilisation and resource theory might be of some use in approaching the subject, it is my view that the history, culture and political and economic structures of the former Soviet Union were so different that this in itself justifies an alternative approach. I hold the opinion that one should seek the explanation for the emergence of the Green Movements in particular and informal groups more generally in Soviet society itself - prior to the coming to power of Gorbachev, even prior to the emergence of the Soviet Union as a state. Such an approach can then be complemented by/contrasted with studies applying theories used to explain similar phenomena in a Western political context.

I have decided to approach my topic through the study of what will be referred to as 'Soviet ecological culture'. By 'Soviet ecological culture' I mean the set of beliefs, attitudes and values

²¹⁸ Ibid., p. 302.

²¹⁹ Hosking, Aves, Duncan (1992), pp. 2-3.

²²⁰ In Ukraine, Levko Lukianenko, one of the founders of the Helsinki movement, became the leader of the Ukrainian Republican Party. RUKH's leader, Viacheslav Chornovil, is also a former dissident, as are Stepan Khmara (Conservative Republican Party) and others. The father of Volodymyr Tykhyi, a prominent member of *Zelenyi Svit* in its early days, died in Siberia where he was sent for his dissident activities.

²²¹ Ianitskii, (1990), p. 30.

held by the Soviet population about ecology, as well as actions taken by the Soviet people to protect the ecological environment. This ecological culture is an integral part of the wider Soviet political culture, which can be defined as the attitudinal and behavioural matrix within which the political system is located²²².

It is often claimed that the reason why the level of environmental destruction and pollution was so high in the Soviet Union, is that people lacked awareness of the importance of environmental protection²²³. If this was the case, however, then it is difficult to explain various loosely organised campaigns to protect the Russian forests, to protect Lake Baikal, and later to have the river-reversal project cancelled - given that Marxist-Leninist ideology generally holds that problems of pollution occur only in capitalist societies. Traditionally, Nature has had a central place in not only Russian but Slav culture²²⁴. Both the Orthodox Church and Russian literature have stressed the close relationship between Man and Nature, viewing the former as an integral part of the latter. Nature thus has value not only as something for people to use in order to improve their lives. It has intrinsic value, i.e., is valuable in its own right.

Socialism, on the contrary, has stressed that Nature, like labour, is merely an input into the process of production. In capitalist societies both Nature and labour are exploited by capitalists whose only aim is to enrich themselves. As there is no fundamental antagonism in communist or even socialist society, by definition there can also be no pollution. However, the rapid industrialisation that took place in the Soviet Union under the first 5-year plan and the stress on increased production which provided the thrust for consecutive 5-year plans completely disregarded the environment.

Stephen White in his book on Soviet Political Culture argues that

Insofar as the Soviet regime has been successful in shaping the belief system of the Soviet peoples, especially the Russians, and to a considerably lesser degree that of the non-Russian republics, this has been largely due to the high degree of compatibility between traditional Russian beliefs and practices and important Bolshevik goals²²⁵.

²²² The definition I use is a modification of 'political culture' as used by Stephen White (1979), p. 1: 'Political culture may be defined as the attitudinal and behavioural matrix within which the political system is located'.

²²³ Such a view was expressed by several members of the Ukrainian Green Movement - cf. Chapter Three.

²²⁴ For more details on this issue, see М. Забылин, Русский народ. Его обычаи, обряды, предания, суеверия и поэзия (Москва: Совместное советско-канадское предприятие "Книга принтшоп", 1990), В. І. Нагулько (кер.), Культура і побут населення України (Київ: Либідь, 1993), Дмитро Антонович, Українська культура (Київ: Либідь, 1993).

²²⁵ White (1979), p. 36.

As will be shown below, however, as far as fundamental views and beliefs on Man's relation to Nature are concerned, socialist views constituted a major break with traditional Russian values. Brown has argued that 'values are more resistant to change than are attitudes and even some important political beliefs...values are not subject to falsification'²²⁶. The countryside has traditionally been portrayed as the preserver of traditional moral values²²⁷. Only 15 per cent of the Russian population lived in towns in 1913, according to the census, and a large proportion of the urban population retained close links with the countryside and its rural economy²²⁸. The situation was not very different in Ukraine, although Ukrainian peasants, unlike their Russian counterparts, tended to own their own land rather than belong to collectives such as the Russian *mir*²²⁹. By the time the Communist Party came to power in 1917, it thus seems reasonable to argue that traditional values relating to Man's relation to Nature were strong.

However, collectivisation and rapid industrialisation aimed at changing the socio-economic structure of the Soviet Union - combined with socialisation to create the New Man (*novyi chelovek*), clashed with these traditionally held beliefs and values. As will be shown in Chapter Two, the Communist Party did adopt a number of laws and issue decrees on Nature conservation in the first years of its tenure. Similar laws and decrees were passed throughout the 60s and the 70s - also regarding pollution. These laws and decrees were frequently referred to by the pro-environmentalists, but were in most cases disregarded by the Soviet leadership and industrial managers.

Some people were no doubt influenced by the reckless attitude to the environment shown by the Communist Party. Also, as hardly any information existed on pollution and the link between pollution and health - and as there was high social mobility in the Soviet Union from the countryside into the towns of people who had minimal knowledge of such things as pollution, and in general were almost illiterate, awareness of pollution and its effects was bound to be low. I still think that the old values regarding Nature and Environment survived, although to a large extent in

²²⁶ Archie Brown, 'Ideology and Political Culture', in Seweryn Bialer (ed.), Politics, Society and Nationality inside Gorbachev's Russia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), p. 24.

²²⁷ It has also been argued that the *mir* in Russia (see Lazar Volin, A Century of Russian Agriculture. From Alexander II to Khrushchev (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 77-86 and Stephen White (1979), pp. 56-58, served an environmental purpose: the *mir* facilitated the sustainable use of the land through crop rotation, respect for the environment (reinforced by the authority of the Church and its teachings on the relationship between Man and Nature - fused with national traditions) and a sense of community and communal responsibility for the land. Moreover, the limits of the *mir* counteracted the endlessness of the Russian plains and the idea that Russia's resources were abundant and inexhaustible [See Николай Бердяев, Истоки и смысл русского коммунизма (Москва: Наука, 1990), с. 8].

²²⁸ White (1979), p. 55.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

a subdued way, and that these values - as reflected not only in Russian but also in Soviet literature - laid the foundations for the Green Movement that emerged in the latter half of the 1980s.

The leadership of the Green Movement and to some extent also of the Green Party stresses the importance of ecological education and has singled it out as one of their priority issues. It is being argued that it is difficult to change old attitudes and beliefs inculcated into the older generations and that it will be possible to change policies towards the environment only when people become more aware of the dangers they are faced with. Surveys on the environment, however, indicate that the Green Parties are held in high regard by a relatively large percentage of the former Soviet population. In Ukraine, for instance, the Green Party has scored high in opinion polls²³⁰, preceded only by one or two parties. Moreover, the Green Movements are highly valued by many people as movements not only talking about, but actually doing something for, the common good. Finally, polls also show that the environmental issue is the one issue which needs to be solved urgently²³¹.

Whereas the Green Movement initially enjoyed widespread practical support in the Soviet population, it has now become increasingly difficult to make people take an active part in its activities. Moreover, Greens complain that factory workers sometimes adopt a hostile attitude to them on the grounds that the Greens call for the closing of enterprises and factories considered dangerous to the environment. This has been taken by some observers of Soviet environmental policies as evidence of support for the view that there is no ecological culture in the former Soviet Union.

It is my opinion, however, that the situation is much more complex. People can have fundamental opinions on the positive value of the environment, but when they face a choice between losing their job and - to take the argument to its logical extreme - starving to death in the immediate future, or dying from pollution in the distant future, most would go for option one. The lack of active support of the Greens might also reflect a more deep-rooted lack of faith in the political system in which the Green Movement and the Green Party operate - as well as in the Green Party and politics in general. Turn-out at elections to the republican parliaments have fallen considerably over the last few years - during by-elections in Ukraine for the Ukrainian Parliament in 1993 the turn-out in Kiev was not higher than 8%! During parliamentary elections in 1994 the Greens fared badly and several deputies of local and regional parliaments failed to be re-elected in the June 1994 local elections²³². However, their poor showing in these elections is not only a reflection of weak party organization at the local level, limited means for conducting a successful

²³⁰ See Chapters Three and Four.

²³¹ See Chapter Three.

²³² See Chapter Three.

campaign and the absence of a coherent party program, but also a result of a general polarisation of Ukrainian society²³³. The results ought, however, not to be taken as proof that the Ukrainian people is not concerned with environmental issues. In order to gain a proper understanding of the problems the Greens face at present, and also to make more general statements about their political sustainability, we need to know more about ecological culture. Although ecological culture is not the focus of this thesis, I will therefore give it some attention in this chapter.

In my view, two factors are important in explaining the emergence of the Green Movement. The existence of semi-official movements and well-known and respected individuals speaking up on behalf of the environment, the existence of a theoretical framework elaborated prior to the Russian revolution, from which these movements and individuals derived their values, together with the extent of environmental damage in the USSR and its impact on people's health are all important factors in this respect. On the other hand, we need to know more about attitudes towards the environment.

For people to become interested in the environment, and also to take an active part in politics to facilitate the improvement of the environment, they must be conscious of the problems related to the environment and the importance of participation. In the Soviet Union attitudes amongst the population to the environment become all the more important as a factor by which to explain the Green Movement's emergence, as political participation prior to 1987 did not necessarily have a political impact. Also, propagating views different from the general political line of the CPSU could result in a number of sanctions against the individual in question. Given the right circumstances, however, these views could manifest themselves through political participation and thus influence (alternative) political decisions.

Opinion polls conducted in the USSR during the late 1980s and early 1990s indicate a high level of awareness of and concern about the environment²³⁴. A nation-wide survey conducted by *USSR Goskomstat* (the USSR State Committee on Statistics) in 1990 and 1991²³⁵ produced the following figures:

²³³ Cf. Marko Bojcin, 'The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections in March-April 1994', *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 47, no. 2, 1995, pp. 229-49.

²³⁴ For more survey data, see Chapter Three.

²³⁵ Data from this survey are presented by J.P. Cole in *Environmental Pollution in the Former USSR in the Late 1980s* (Nottingham: University of Nottingham Department of Geography, Working Paper 19, December 1992), pp. 9-19.

Table 1.2 Views on the Environment in the 15 Soviet Socialist Republics of the former USSR (in %)

Republic	City		Republic		Air		Water	
	bad	don't know	bad	don't know	bad	getting worse	bad	getting worse
USSR	54	18	43	43	81	66	73	62
RSFSR	54	17	37	50	81	65	73	65
Ukraine	55	24	57	34	78	76	71	69
Lithuania	41	10	32	19	88	49	86	52
Latvia	40	6	46	15	75	47	72	60
Estonia	53	6	37	22	81	48	76	53
Georgia	77	7	59	29	87	55	71	27
Azerbaijan	75	9	56	33	85	65	86	28
Armenia	79	4	69	22	89	72	56	34
Uzbekistan	48	21	35	47	80	58	70	42
Kirgizstan	45	13	33	35	81	56	63	47
Tadzhikistan	31	29	25	56	72	49	63	19
Turkmenia	44	13	21	64	50	47	52	26
Kazakhstan	53	26	41	48	83	68	68	55
Belorussia	64	8	72	17	88	72	81	56
Moldavia	52	6	49	17	88	63	85	59

Source: Goskomstat (1991), Cols. 1-4, pp. 9-11; Cols. 5,7, pp. 29-44; Cols. 6,8, pp. 163-70 in Cole (1992)

As seen from the table, Ukraine and Belorussia score high. This can be explained by the Chernobyl accident in particular - which affected Belorussia especially badly - and, for Ukraine, also by serious environmental pollution in general (see Chapter Two). A further break-down of Ukrainian cities also revealed high levels of concern with the state of the environment:

Table 1.3 Views on the Environment in 9 Ukrainian cities (in %)

	City		Republic		Air		Water	
	bad	don't know	bad	don't know	bad	don't know	bad	don't know
Kharkiv	44	31	53	36	78	75	70	74
Lozovaia	20	31	39	46	66	58	74	56
Vinnitsia	64	27	72	23	87	83	91	68
Kyiv	64	23	63	28	87	80	78	72
Bilotsirskiv	42	31	45	40	71	77	70	63
Lviv	57	25	66	29	85	81	80	69
Simferopol	10	42	50	43	30	89	29	63
Mykolaiv	52	8	64	20	91	69	90	73
Odessa	57	22	60	26	79	85	84	58

Source: Goskomstat (1991), Cols. 1-4, pp. 12-28; Cols. 5,7, pp. 45-145; Cols. 6,8, pp. 171-204 in Cole (1992)

Although Cole (1992) calls for a careful interpretation of these data²³⁶, and although they are contradictory in that in areas where concern for the environment is around 50%, these figures are much higher as far as water and air quality are concerned, they still indicate that there was concern for the environment in the USSR. Other polls conducted at approximately the same time support this view. Thus, in a survey conducted by *VTsIOM* in 1989, concern for the environment came fourth on a list of the most pressing concerns, after shortage of consumer goods and food products and the widespread use of bribes. When asked to single out the most serious problem in the USSR, pollution was preceded only by the housing problem and low wages/high prices. When asked which problem must be solved first, the environment climbed to the top of the list, with a score of 87 percent²³⁷.

While most of these surveys do not reveal how the respondent's awareness was created, interviews with leaders of the Green Movement of Ukraine, as well as the questionnaire circulated for this thesis, reveal that most activists were familiar with works written by Russian and Ukrainian writers on the issue, campaigns in which the writers were involved and also the ideas of Russian and Soviet scientists such as Vladimir Vernadskii - ideas based on alternative values from those of the Soviet regime²³⁸. Ukrainian/Russian culture and 'environmental' traditions²³⁹ also inspired some, whereas others²⁴⁰ were influenced by West European Green Movements. Besides, it was the literary journals - at least initially - that provided people with information on the environment:

In the early part of the last decade, it was primarily the literary journals that aroused public awareness of the callous lack of foresight and concern for other consumers and interests evidenced by ministries, administrations, and local officials, but of late (1974) the cause has been taken up by many of the nation's daily newspapers.²⁴¹

In my view, and as will be shown in Chapter Three, awareness on the environment - at least among Green activists - did not come about solely as a result of increased information due to glasnost and more opportunities for (independent) political participation. The availability of such information, combined with easier access to a political system which was now open to alternative

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

²³⁷ A. Соромонов, А. Толстых, 'О наших зборах', *Коммунист*, no. 9, 1989, с. 74-75.

²³⁸ See Chapter Three for details.

²³⁹ Volodymyr Boreiko tried to revive old Ukrainian traditions in the work of the Greens, whereas Anatolii Zolotukhin, an ethnic Russian and the leader of the Nikolaev oblast Zelenyi Mir, as a former member of the Soviet Culture Fund and currently the leader of the Pushkin Club in Nikolaev, argued that all the great Russian writers were 'environmentalists'.

²⁴⁰ See Chapters Three and Four.

²⁴¹ Bush (1974), p. 17.

views, triggered people into action. However, as my survey and interviews indicate, a majority of the Green activists were well aware of the environment before such opportunities emerged.

Did people genuinely believe that environmental problems were a product of capitalism and consequently non-existent in socialist political systems, or did they acknowledge that the problem existed also in their own country? Did they share the official view that Nature existed for Man - as a means by which to improve life? Or did they on the contrary view Man as an organic part of Nature, Nature thus having intrinsic value? Did people consider environmental pollution morally unacceptable, or could it be justified as a means by which to facilitate a morally higher good - the creation of a communist society and equality for everyone?

It is particularly difficult to measure public opinion on environmental issues in the Soviet Union before 1985 due to a number of flaws in the sociological research conducted²⁴². Further, no proper sociological research was done into this area until very recently. The first comprehensive analysis dealing with the topic appeared only in 1990²⁴³. Ecological culture, or the lack of it, is however of vital importance when explaining the emergence and support of the Green Movement and also when trying to assess its sustainability. It is my belief that it is possible to establish a rough picture of beliefs and attitudes towards the environment by examining the role of Nature as depicted in Russian/Soviet literature and philosophy, Slav culture, Orthodox Christianity and Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Nature has traditionally played a central part in the life of the Slav people - through religion and through customs and traditions emanating from its animist, heathen beliefs (as will be shown below). Further, Nature was given much attention by Russian writers and poets of the last century. Russian and Ukrainian thinkers have also centred on the link between Man and Nature in their works. The view of Nature offered by Marxism-Leninism differed substantially from the one prevalent in the Slav countries prior to the revolution.

The question of whether the campaign to create the New Soviet Man managed to destroy the old ecological culture, or to what extent it tried to co-opt the traditional Russian love for Nature and thus for its Motherland into the new political culture is very important. I will try to find out to what extent arguments rooted in pre-Revolutionary traditions were used by 'environmental activists' prior to the emergence of the Green Movement and to what extent Greens belonging to the perestroika era used this old Green culture in arguing their case to the Soviet people.

²⁴² For an outline of such flaws in Soviet surveys from the late 1980s, see John P. Willerton and Lee Sigelman, 'Public Opinion Research in the USSR: Opportunities and Pitfalls', *The Journal of Communist Studies*, vol. 7, no. 2, June 1991, pp. 224-32. Such flaws can also be found in earlier surveys conducted.

²⁴³ Ю.П. Ожергов, Е.В. Никонорова, Экологический импульс. Проблемы формирования экологической культуры молодежи (Москва: Молодая гвардия, 1990).

1.3.1 Was there an Eco-Culture in the USSR?

During the second half of the 19th century a frame of mind referred to as Russian Cosmism emerged in Russia. Among its adherents were famous Russian philosophers and writers such as Vladimir Solovev, Nikolai Fedorov, Petr Florenskii, Nikolai Losskii, Lev Tolstoi and Fedor Dostoevskii, to mention but a few. In the words of academician Nikita Moiseev, Cosmism was popular among a wide circle of Russian democrats, and its major idea was as follows:

Человек – составная часть Природы; Человека и Природу не следует противопоставлять друг другу, а рассматривать их надо в единстве; Человек и все, что его окружает, – это частицы единого, Вселенной. И в этом контексте не так уж важно то, что у одних это Бог, а других – Вселенная. Поэтому не случайно, что к течению русского космизма были близки многие естествоиспытатели и ученые (К. Циолковский, Д. Менделеев, И. Сеченов и др.)²⁴⁴.

Out of this thinking came the idea that contradictions were bound to emerge between Intellect and Nature and that Man had a responsibility to solve these contradictions before they became so great that they would bring mankind to catastrophe. To achieve this purpose a qualitatively new type of morality was required, as was some kind of legal 'world order':

Новый правопорядок и новая моральная основа человеческого общества – необходимые условия дальнейшего развития цивилизации, всего человеческого рода. И наиболее ярко об этом сказал, вероятно, Ф. Достоевский²⁴⁵.

Dostoevskii, like many of his contemporaries, was wary of modern society (i.e. growing technologies and urbanisation) and saw that a moral crisis was drawing closer. To counteract this crisis, a new morality was required, based on respect towards fellow Men as well as Nature and also on interaction between different nations. Nikolai Fedorov's warning about civilised society sounds amazingly similar to warnings raised by today's environmentalists - in the West as well as in the East:

Итак, мир идет к концу, а человек своей деятельностью даже способствует приближению конца, ибо цивилизация эксплуатирующая, а не восстанавливающая, не может иметь иного результата, кроме ускорения конца²⁴⁶.

²⁴⁴ Г.П. Аксенов (составитель), Владимир Вернадский. Жизнеописание. Избранные труды. Воспоминания современников. Суждения потомков. (Москва: Современник, 1993), с. 9.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

²⁴⁶ Федоров, Н. Соч. М., 1982. с. 301, in *ibid.*, p. 10.

Rather than seeking to rule Nature, from which nothing good would result, Man should strive towards the co-evolution of the Biosphere and Man - co-evolution meaning mutual development rather than subordination. New knowledge but also new morals were prerequisites for this aim. Unlike some contemporary Western thinkers on the environment, who hold the view that Man is in some respects Nature's worse enemy, the Cosmists saw no antagonism between Man and Nature as such:

...Мысль, сознание – такая же принадлежность Природы, как и
"звезды, галактика, микробы, камни..."²⁴⁷.

In Moiseev's view the Cosmists' idea that everything was inter-linked facilitated a close relationship between science and philosophy in Russia at the time. I. Sechenova, for instance, argued that Man had to be studied not only through his physical properties and ideas, but also in relation to the natural environment of which he was an integral part. Similarly, V. Dokuchaev, through his studies of the soil, concluded that it was the one element which united the entire Biosphere into one entity. Vernadskii, by using the concept of the Noosphere, united the study of inanimate matter, animate substances, Man and society, at the beginning of the 20th century. Through the study of geo-chemistry, Vernadskii became one of the first scientists to realise that the surface of the Earth, its landscapes, the chemistry of the oceans and the structure of the atmosphere, facilitated life on Earth. As the Earth was a cosmic creation, so, argued Vernadskii, was life. Life, in his view, was not accidental, but was a closely linked result of evolution. Thus,

Жизнь – "буфером" между космосом и "косным", то есть неживым, веществом Земли, буфером, способным использовать космическую энергию для преобразования планетарного вещества. Таким образом, жизнь становится катализатором процесса развития!²⁴⁸

By developing a new science, namely that of biogeochemistry, Vernadskii explored the history of the development of the Biosphere, i.e. the interaction between the inanimate and the animate on the Earth's surface. Cosmos and the Earth were, in Vernadskii's view

...Единая система, в которой жизнь, живое вещество связывает в единое целое процессы, протекающие на Земле, с процессами космического происхождения²⁴⁹.

²⁴⁷ Аксенов (1993), с. 10-11.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

As a result of these processes, Man - the carrier of the intellect - emerged, speeding up those processes taking place on Earth in many different ways. Through biogeochemistry, Vernadskii tried to find an answer to the question of what Man's place in the general planetary development was. He reached the following answer:

„Воздействие Человека на окружающую Природу растет столь быстро, что не за горами то время, когда он превратится в основную геологообразующую силу. И, как следствие, он необходимо должен будет принять на себя ответственность за будущее развитие Природы. Развитие окружающей среды и общества сделаются неразрывными. Биосфера перейдет однажды в сферу разума – в ноосферу. Произойдет великое объединение, в результате которого развитие планеты сделается направленным – направленным силой Разума²⁵⁰.

As pointed out by Ihor Dzeverin²⁵¹, and also by Moiseev, the term 'Noosphere' was open to interpretation. Thus, some scientists came to regard the shift from the Biosphere towards the Noosphere simply as Man's gradual 'mastering' of Nature. In Moiseev's view, however, such an understanding of the Noosphere was alien to the thinking of Vernadskii:

В. Вернадский не раз писал о том, что согласованное с Природой развитие общества, ответственность и за Природу, и за ее будущее потребуют специальной организации общества, создания специальных структур, которые будут способны обеспечить это совместное согласованное развитие. Значит, ноосфера – это такое состояние биосферы, когда ее развитие происходит целенаправленно, когда Разум имеет возможность направлять развитие биосферы в интересах Человека, его будущего²⁵².

Why did Russian scientists, writers and philosophers hold such advanced views on the relationship between Man and Nature at the end of the last century, when in Western societies scientists were very much into development and progress?²⁵³

In my view, the answer is largely to be found in the Slav culture and Russian Orthodoxy, which both endorsed the idea of a harmonious relationship between Man and Nature. I will explain this in greater detail below. Also of importance, in my view, is the influence of Slavophilism in Russian thinking. For many Russian philosophers, Nature constituted an

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

²⁵¹ И.И. Дзеверин. Концепция ноосферы и некоторые закономерности эволюции. Undated paper given to me by the author in Kiev, May 1994.

²⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 14.

²⁵³ There were of course also thinkers in the West concerned with the relationship between Man and Nature. However, they did not develop their ideas into a coherent system anywhere near that of Vernadskii.

important element, serving as a key factor distinguishing the Slavophiles from the so-called Westerners. The Slavophiles tended to idealise Russian rural life and Russian Orthodoxy, and their philosophy was fused with a naturalistic attachment to the land. Their counterparts, the Westerners, favoured progress and industrialisation according to the Western model and detested what they considered to be the backwardness of Russia. Vernadskii's greatness is that he pointed out the limits to human progress, while yet not discarding progress per se, thus building a bridge between Slavophilism and 'Westernism'.

Slav Orthodoxy²⁵⁴

In Slav cultures the relationship between the nation (the ethnic group and the land on which it lives) and Nature is closely linked, not only emotionally as reflected in their literatures and cultural traditions - but also etymologically. It is interesting to note that the words in Russian for Motherland, People (nation) and Nature all have the same etymological root, namely *rod*, which can be translated as birth, origin: *rodina*, *narod* and *priroda*. The equivalent in the Ukrainian language is *rid/rod*, which can be translated as lineage, descent and/or origin. *Ridni krai* (one's native land, motherland), *narid/narod* and *priroda* in Ukrainian correspond to the Russian words quoted above. In addition, the Ukrainian word for family/kin is *rodyna*. This link finds its expression in the following quote by the Russian writer, Mikhail Prishvin: *liubit rodinu, znachit berech prirodu!* (To love the Motherland is to protect Nature!)²⁵⁵.

Also the Orthodox Church emphasises the close relationship between Man and Nature to a much greater extent than the Protestant and Catholic churches do²⁵⁶. In his standard work on the Orthodox Church, Sergius Bulgakov (1935) has expressed this relationship as follows:

²⁵⁴ Throughout Ukraine, with the exception of Western Ukraine (minus Bukovina), where the Greek-Catholic (Ukrainian Autocephalous Church) was the major denomination, the main faith was Orthodoxy (see С.Р. Голошко (глав. ред.). *Культура і побут населення України* (Київ: Либідь, 1993). с. 243.

²⁵⁵ Quoted in Ожеров, Пиконорова (1991), с. 146.

²⁵⁶ As pointed out by Weiner (1988), 'Eastern Orthodoxy did not encourage mastery over Nature as protestant Christianity did in Western Europe' (pp. 6-7). Lynn White's work entitled *Man's Dominion and the Judaeo-Christian Heritage* echoes the view that (Protestant) Christianity has had a negative effect on the environment: 'the historical roots of our ecological crisis are to be located in the Judaic and Christian doctrine of creation. More specifically, they lie in the belief that Man was made in God's image and shares in God's transcendence of Nature, and that the whole natural order was created for the sake of humanity' (pp. 20-21). This view has later been contested by some Protestant priests, who have endeavoured to revive rituals of the church linked to the cycles of Nature, such as thanksgiving and others. As for the Catholic Church, Catholic environmentalists often argue that the first Catholic environmentalist can be traced back to the Holy St. Francis of Assisi. More recently, the pope included Nature conservation as part of his message for Lent, the 40-day period before Easter traditionally used by Roman Catholics for reflection and penance: 'the Bible allows people to use Nature, but demands that it be done carefully. The scripture acknowledges humans' 'privileged position' on the Earth, but this is not authority to lord over it, even less to devastate it'. The pope called for 'a profound lesson to respect the environment', arguing that 'among the negative outcomes of this culture of domination is a

The Holy Spirit is extended by the Church over all Nature. The destiny of Nature is allied to that of Man; corrupted because of Man, she awaits with him her healing. Our Lord, having taken on himself the humanity, has joined his life to all of Nature. He walked on this Earth, he looked at its flowers and its plants, its birds, its fish, its animals. He ate of its fruits, he was baptized in the water of Jordan, he walked on its waters, he rested in the womb of the Earth, and there is nothing in all his creation (outside of evil and sin) which remains to his humanity. So the Church blesses all creation...²⁵⁷

More recent writings on Slav Orthodoxy support the view expressed by Bulgakov 61 years ago. Foma Khopko, for instance, in his work on the founding principles of Orthodoxy argues, quoting the Bible, that people should

...Стремитесь полюбить истину, полюбить друг друга и все творение Божье, потому что оно "хорошо весьма" (Быт. 1.31)²⁵⁸.

Orthodoxy rejects the dualism found in Protestantism and Catholicism:

В православном христианстве не существует дуализма, что "дух" и "небеса" – добро, а "материя" и "земля" – зло. Бог любит все Свое творение вешней любовью...Все Богом сотворенное: небеса, земля, растения, животные и сам человек – добро зло (т.е. совершенно, без изъяна) и предназначено жить Божественным "дыханием жизни", приобщаясь Его нетварному бытию (Быт. 1.30, 2.7)²⁵⁹

Rooted in the pantheist relationship between God and all creation of Russian Orthodoxy, Foma Khopko advocates Man's stewardship over Nature, based on harmony and respect:

distorted use of Nature that disfigures its (i.e. Nature's) face and jeopardizes its equilibrium. And it does not slow even with the threat of ecological disaster'. According to the pope, 'the teaching is to use but not to abuse and utilize things in a sympathetic but not egotistical way - seeing that the rewards are not just for now but for the future' (*Associated Press*, 17:19 EST VO100: 'Pope: don't abuse Nature', found on Compuserve's daily newsbulletin). The pope's message, however, fails to mention that Nature has intrinsic value and an intrinsic right not to be destroyed. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that the Orthodox Church in general, and, as will be seen below, Russian Orthodoxy in particular, had a more respectful attitude towards Nature than did its Protestant and Catholic counterparts - although there were (and are) of course both Protestant and Catholic individuals who from their reading of the Bible reach the conclusion that it calls for human 'stewardship' rather than domination of Nature. Here, however, we are more interested in how the Church as a whole related to the Environment through its doctrine.

²⁵⁷ Sergius Bulgakov, *The Orthodox Church* (London: The Centenary Press, 1935), pp. 157-58. Bulgakov expanded on this: 'One portrait of the Orthodox office must be noted particularly - that is the cosmic quality. It is addressed not only to the human soul but to all creation, and it sanctifies the latter. This sanctification of the elements of Nature and of different objects expresses the idea that the sanctifying action of the Holy Spirit is extended by the Church over all Nature'.

²⁵⁸ Прот. Фома Хопко. *Основы православия* (Вильнюс, 1991), с. 8.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

Если Бог является Владыкой и Творцом, правящим всем мирозданием, то и люди, сотворенные по Его образу и подобию, должны управлять всем миром. Если Бог утверждает Свою власть не угнетением, но милосердием и служением, то и Его твари должны поступать так же. И, наконец, если Бог всегда существует в вечной жизни, никогда не умирая, то всегда пребывая в совершенной гармонии со всем творением, то и люди были созданы для вечной жизни в том же гармоничном общении с Богом и всем мирозданием (my underlining)²⁶⁰.

The pantheism of the Orthodox Church matched that of pre-Christian Slav culture²⁶¹, the essence of which was

...Одухотворение всей природы — земли, воды, огня, почитание растений и животных, проявляющиеся в виде анимизма, фетишизма и других форм первобытной религии, свойственных всем народам на определенных фазах их общественного развития²⁶².

Not surprisingly, therefore, as will be seen below, features of Russian popular pagan beliefs can still be found in Slav Orthodoxy²⁶³. The cult of the Saints, which occupies a significant place in the Orthodox Church, also has an 'eco-cultural' side to it. The Saints are considered to be Man's friends, praying with him and protecting not only Man, but also the cattle from wild animals (the Holy Vlas and Modest). Horses are protected by Saint Georgiy, whereas Kuzma and Demian care for the hens, and farmers can turn to the Holy Ilia for rain, thus securing a good harvest²⁶⁴. In village churches these Saints are often portrayed on icons. Further, a tradition of blessing fields, trees and cattle has survived.

Finally, the close relationship between religion and Nature is reflected in a large number of religious feasts celebrated by the Slav Orthodox Church, directly linked with the cycles of Nature. These are observed not only in the countryside, but also by churches in big cities like Kiev. Best known is 'Troitsa' (Trinity), celebrated on the seventh Sunday after Easter and marking the beginning of spring.

In Slav religion, the cult of the tree had a central place:

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

²⁶¹ Митрополит Іларіон. Дохристиянські вірування українського народу (Київ: Акціонере товариство Обереги, 1994), с. 13.

²⁶² Г.А. Нозова, Язычество в православии (Москва: Издательство Наука, 1975), с. 7.

²⁶³ *Ibid.* As an example, Nosova refers to the cult of 'Mother Earth' (mat zemli). Metropolitan Ilarion argues that 'dvoeverie' is deeply ingrained in the Ukrainian faith. Such features can be found in the Ukrainian language, and he cites numerous examples (pp. 315-16). Moreover, in Northern Ukraine the icons are often referred to as gods and the iconostas as 'bozhnik' (p. 319).

²⁶⁴ Нозова (1975), с. 78, referred to in Åse Berit Grødeland, 'The Ukrainian Green Movement: Nationalist or Internationalist?' in Elworthy, Anderson, Coates, Stephens, Stroh (eds.) - Perspectives on the Environment 2. (Aldershot: Avebury Studies in Green Research, 1995), p. 83.

Der Baumkult bei den Slaven gab eine Vorstellung von Lebens-, Schicksals- und Schutzbaum, der mit dem Leben und Gedühen einer menschlichen Gemeinschaft, einer Familie oder eines Dorfes, in Verbindung gebracht wird²⁶⁵.

Similarly, Harjan argues that 'the forest has always been part of Russian life, Russian character and Russian civilisation. The forest is there at Man's birth and accompanies him to the grave'²⁶⁶. As pointed out above, the Orthodox Church adopted the Slav cult of the tree by introducing the blessing of trees²⁶⁷. An ancient oak, killed by the Chernobyl accident but still standing, became a symbol of Chernobyl for many people (pictures of this oak were circulated in the aftermath of the accident) and, as seen in the previous section, an issue of great concern to pre-Revolutionary writers as well as to Leonid Leonov, was the excessive felling of trees in (Soviet) Russia.

Russian Literature

It is not possible to do justice to Russian/Ukrainian writers and the role of Nature in their writings on just a few pages. As Ukrainian writers are dealt with at length in Chapter Eight, I will focus here on key Russian writers, well-known and widely read throughout the (former) Soviet Union. The Ukrainian landscape, however, was often portrayed not only by Ukrainian, but also by Russian writers due to its beauty:

Die Ukraine (an erster Stelle die Poltavaer Landschaft) wird in der russischen, ukrainischen und polnischen Literatur des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts immer wieder als ein schönes und idyllisches Land gepriesen, als das Land der Lieder und der üppig-schönen Natur. Auch in der Dichtung Skorovodas leben die Erinnerungen an diese schöne Landschaft fort²⁶⁸.

Gogol - himself a Ukrainian by birth - for instance, vividly portrayed Ukrainian scenery and Ukrainian rural life in 'Evenings on a Farmstead near Dikanka'.

The description of Nature and of Russian folklore features frequently in the works of Russian writers and poets during the 18th and 19th centuries. It was customary for children from well-off

²⁶⁵ Wilhelm Lettbauer, Russische Literaturgeschichte, (Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz, 1958), p. 76: 'Der Baumkult bei den Slaven'.

²⁶⁶ Harjan (1979), p. 173.

²⁶⁷ Big trees, especially the oak, beech and linden, were held in reverence by the Slavs as the Gods loved these trees and lived in them. A series of rituals were observed in front of the holy trees during the year [Митрополит Іларіон (1993), с. 53].

²⁶⁸ Dmitri Tschizewskij, Skorovoda - Dichter, Denker, Mystiker (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag - Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies, vol. 18, 1974), p. 12.

backgrounds to have nannies from the countryside during childhood, and Pushkin, for instance, learnt about Russian traditions and folklore from his nanny Arina Rodionovna. Nature, to Russian poets and writers did not simply act as background to a more important plot, but was very often the major element of the story/poem. This is particularly clear in Fedor Tjutchev's poem Ne to, chto mnite vy, priroda (Nature is not what it seems to you), written in 1836:

Не то, что мните вы, природа:
Не слепок, не бездушный лик –
В ней есть душа, в ней есть свобода,
В ней есть любовь, в ней есть язык...²⁶⁹

Rural life and closeness to Nature, contrasted to the morally decadent urban life, has been set up as an ideal by a number of Russian and also Ukrainian writers. Tolstoi, especially in his late life, went so far as to abandon and denounce the upper-class life he had until then lived, stating that the 'good life' removes Man from Nature and makes him fear death. The link between Man and Nature thus needed to be restored. For this to happen, Man must return to the simple life of the countryside, where life is viewed as a cycle, interacting with death (birth-ripening-decay/decline-death). Tolstoi denounced all his previous writings and started writing educational pamphlets and short stories advocating various moral principles²⁷⁰. Societies were later founded both in Russia and abroad (especially Canada) by Tolstoi's adherents, who tried to live in harmony with Nature and in accordance with Tolstoi's teachings. Tolstoi himself adopted a simple life-style, wearing Russian peasant clothes and tilling the land.

Dostoevskii also criticised 'progress' and the implications it had for human morals and the environment:

Раз человечество отречется поголовно от Бога (а я верю, что этот период параллельно геологическим периодам свершится), то само собою...падает все прежнее мировоззрение и, главное, вся прежняя нравственность, и наступит все новое. Люди совокупятся, чтобы взять от жизни все, что она может дать, но непременно для счастья и радости в одном только здешнем мире. Человек возвеличится духом божеской, титанической гордости, и явится человеко-бог. Ежечасно побеждая уже без границ природу волею своею и наукой, человек тем самым ежечасно будет опущать наслаждение столь высокое, что оно заменит ему все упования наслаждений небесных. Всякий узнает, что он смертен весь, без воскресенья, и примет смерть гордо и спокойно, как бог. Но так как виду закоренелой глупости человеческой это, пожалуй, еще и в тысячу лет не устроится, то всякому, сознающему уже и

²⁶⁹ Ф. И. Тютчев, Стихотворения (Москва: Художественная литература, 1985), с. 148. The poem is given in full on pp. 148-49.

²⁷⁰ Geir Kjetsaa, Dostoevskij og Tolstoj: Essays (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1977).

теперь истину, позволивательно устроится совершенно как ему
угодно, на новых началах²⁷¹.

Chekhov, too, looks at the relationship between the 'old' and the 'new' world. In Vishnevyyi sad (the Cherry Orchard) this is not only reflected in the opposites of countryside vs. town, but also symbolised by the cherry orchard - which is eventually chopped down by the merchant Lopatin who buys it from its previous owners - a victim of progress like the main characters in Tri sestry (Three Sisters), who dream about Moscow but never succeed in going back there. Although this is interpreted by many critics as the old intelligentsia's failure to adapt to the changing times, the destruction of the cherry orchard (environmental destruction) shows the negative coin of 'progress'.

The tradition of portraying Man as an organic component of Nature was immensely popular in Russia at the beginning of this century, and continued during the early years of the USSR. The most famous representative of the so-called *derevenshchiki* was Sergei Esenin. He grew up in the Riazan district and dressed in peasant clothes cited poetry in the literary salons of St. Petersburg/Petrograd and Moscow with great success. Esenin, however, found it very difficult to adapt to the life of 'developed society'. At the beginning of the 1920s he married the famous American dancer Isadora Duncan and went to live with her in the United States. The marriage broke up and Esenin returned to Russia. Disillusioned with the new society emerging in the aftermath of the revolution and its emphasis on industrialisation and development, Esenin finally committed suicide in 1925. His popularity, however, continued. Even today people gather regularly at his grave at the Vagankovskoe cemetery in Moscow to recite and discuss his poetry.

1.4 Conclusion

Above, I have outlined pre-Revolutionary thought on the environment in Russian philosophy, science, religion and literature. There seems to be a clear line between such thought and the views propagated by some of the 'environmentalists' during the Soviet era. However, scientists, the *druzhiny* and other alternative groups addressing environmental issues had a small following. The writers, on the other hand, could reach a much wider audience and could present environmental issues in a comprehensible manner to the non-specialist. Moreover, they were regarded as the 'conscious of the people' by many (see Chapter Three) and their word thus carried considerable

²⁷¹ Dostoevskii as quoted in P.K. Баландин. 'Природа, личность, культура', in М.Я. Леммис (ред.) – Экологическая альтернатива (Москва: Прогресс, 1990), сс. 19–20.

weight. The public's response to their 'campaigns' is in itself an indication that they were being heard. It is therefore not surprising that Soviet literature in the 1980s has been described as 'the single most influential variety of Soviet cultural and intellectual production. Indeed, literature is often the source that produces material for television and the cinema, more so in the USSR than elsewhere...Literature serves as a transmission belt to ordinary citizens for policy decisions already arrived at by the party and government'²⁷². Similar conclusions were reached by the *VTsIOM* researchers, who based on the results of their survey 'On our Concerns', concluded that

Общественное мнение находится под влиянием прессы, телевидения, радио, явлю идущих в рост движений в защиту окружающей среды, что, естественно, способствует процессу "взросления" экологического сознания населения²⁷³.

Ozhegov and Nikonorova asked their respondents to rank a list of themes relating to the environment according to preference. Some 27.2 percent chose 'the problem of Man and Nature in Literature and Art'. Another 27.8 percent chose 'Ecological Problems in a Religious Outlook on the World'²⁷⁴. As many as 56 percent of those who discussed literature and art with their friends and acquaintances said that the environment would come up as an issue in these discussions. When asked where they obtained information about the state of the environment in the USSR, 14 percent answered that 'well-known Soviet scientists, writers and artists' were the most important factor shaping their attitude towards the environment (putting it in fourth place out of a total of 14)²⁷⁵. Although there is no other survey data to compare these figures to, they do in themselves indicate that those writers and scientists who stood up for the environment (see section two) were successful in spreading their views and arousing awareness of environmental issues - although such awareness did not materialise in active public participation in environmental work until after Gorbachev came to power.

As seen in section one, writers and scientists were instrumental in setting up Green groups in several of the former Soviet republics, and they quickly gained a large following. In this thesis I will try to establish to what extent 'eco-culture' was of importance in establishing the Ukrainian Green Movement and if it influenced its theoretical framework. I will also discuss the significance of Slav eco-culture in the campaign undertaken by the Nikolaev Greens to save the South Buh

²⁷²

p. 61.

²⁷³ А. Согомонов, А. Толстых 'Социологическое обозрение. О наших заботах', *Коммунист*, No. 9, 1989, с. 75.

²⁷⁴ Ю.П. Ожегов, Е.В. Никонорова (1990), с. 40.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

river. My hypothesis will be that eco-culture did play a part in this process and that *Zelenyi Svir* and *PZU* might benefit more from actively using elements of this eco-culture together with the general principles of the international Green movement, rather than trying to copy the framework and style of similar movements and parties in Western Europe.

2 Soviet Environmental Policies

2.0 Introduction

In order to explain the emergence of not only the Ukrainian Green Movement, but also the Soviet Green Movement more generally, it is not sufficient to examine concepts like 'political participation' and 'ecological culture' alone. We also need a more thorough understanding of the extent of environmental damage and the policies conducted by Soviet official authorities in the area of the environment at the time. It is also useful for our purposes to take a closer look at the relationship between the political centre, 'Moscow', and the republics (in this case Ukraine), given that an argument often used by the Greens was that pollution had been imposed upon the republics by the all-union capital.

In this chapter I first look at Marxist-Leninist thinking on the environment and the way in which Soviet authorities used quotes from Marx, Engels and Lenin in support of the view that environmental problems were predominantly a phenomenon of capitalist societies. I then ask why - despite the official position that there were no serious environmental problems in the USSR and despite environmental legislation in no way inferior to that of Western countries - the Soviet environment fared so badly. I have adopted a broad approach, paying special attention to the Soviet economic and political system - the framework, so to speak, within which Soviet environmental policies were conducted.

I then proceed to examine Gorbachev's new thinking in the sphere of the environment and assess new legislation and structural changes introduced during his tenure. These changes are linked to the general political and economic changes introduced during Gorbachev's leadership. Considerable attention is also given to the changing relationship between 'Moscow' and the republics (with an emphasis on Ukraine) in the sphere of the environment in the late 1980s/early 1990s. As will be seen below, changes in this area took place in parallel with more general political and economic changes.

I look at the state of the environment in Ukraine, its implications on health and institutional/policy changes introduced after 1985 to improve the environment in the republic. Finally, I try to assess the impact of the environment as an issue on relations between 'Moscow' and Kiev at the official level by the help of a transcript of the environmental session of the Verkhovna Rada in February 1990.

2.1 Environmental Problems in the USSR (1917-85)

As seen in the previous chapter, opposition to official thinking on the environment and its implications was expressed from early on by Soviet writers, scientists and the country's cultural

establishment. Characteristic of such opposition, however, was that it was limited to a handful of individuals and, for the most part, took place on the pages of scientific journals not easily accessible to a wider audience. Moreover, such opposition did not question the legitimacy of the Soviet regime per se. Officially, Soviet authorities claimed that there were either only a few, or no, environmental problems in the USSR.

2.1.1 Ideology and the Environment

Although, as will be seen below, Soviet officials frequently referred to Marx, Engels and Lenin to back up their view that the Soviet system was more favourable to the environment than were capitalist countries, neither Marx, Engels or Lenin developed a coherent theoretical approach towards the environment. As pointed out by DeBardeleben¹, 'if Marx and Lenin spoke to our concerns about the environment, they did so indirectly, through their general theories and through the assumptions and concepts underlying them - through assumptions about scarcity, about the potential of science and technology, and through analysis of capitalist overproduction or of the international division of labor. Possible interpretations of Marx's, Engels', or Lenin's ecological views are therefore just about as diverse and divergent as are possible interpretations of their theories in general'². Thus, 'the writings of neither Marx, Engels nor Lenin prepared the present leaders of the Soviet bloc for the possibility that environmental pollution and depletion of natural resources might themselves become global processes, threatening both socialist and capitalist society alike and placing in question the prospect of universal material abundance in a non-exploitative world economic system'³. For this reason, quotations on the environment taken from the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin must be used with care and seen in their proper context.

Goldman reached much the same conclusion as DeBardeleben, having read Marx, Engels and Lenin: 'It is hard to provide an objective answer (to what they had to say about pollution). The three were so prolific that if the scholar digs deep enough, he is bound to find something that appears relevant to today's concerns. The only difficulty is determining exactly how relevant such citations were at the time. After all, when they wrote, the sharing of social wealth and the fruits of economic development were the matters that were most important to them'⁴. Ziegler attributed this to the time at which their works appeared: 'Marx and Engels were attempting first and foremost to change the injustices of society, of man's inhumanity to man, rather than man's inhumanity to nature'⁵.

¹ Joan DeBardeleben, The Environment and Marxism-Leninism (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985).

² *Ibid.*, p. 10.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁵ Charles E. Ziegler, Environmental Policy in the USSR (London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1987).

Goldman and Ziegler do, however, draw different conclusions from this. Goldman, on the one hand, illustrates the dilemma of using quotes out of context by citing Marx, who said that 'Even a whole society, a nation, or even all simultaneously existing societies taken together, are not the owners of the globe. They are only its possessors, its usufructuaries, and like *boni patres familias*, they must hand it down to succeeding generations in an improved condition' (Marx 1959b, p. 762). Marx also argued that if the soil is properly treated, its productivity increases all the time (Marx 1959b, p. 762). However, '...all of this is offered in the context of a long discussion of how land rent is determined and has little to do with ecology or conservation. In other words, Marx is saying that if the earth is not maintained, rent values will fall. This would hardly qualify him for membership in the Sierra Club or Friends of the Earth'. This was also the case with other isolated and out-of-context remarks.

Ziegler, on the other hand, argued that 'Marxism attempts throughout to explain the consequences of human interaction with the natural environment':

Marx viewed humankind's historical relationship to nature as curvilinear. Prior to the evolution of human beings into producers, they existed in simple harmony with the environment, like any wild animal. The development of human productive capacities stimulated a variety of social systems which forced humankind further and further from the original state of interdependence with nature. This separation reached its apogee under capitalism, when humanity was totally alienated from nature, just as humans were alienated from themselves as producing beings. They might use the land and its resources, but the system of private ownership dictated that people-nature relationships would necessarily be exploitative. According to Marx, the system of private ownership of inanimate objects originated with the expropriation of land during the feudal period. Private property was the basis of estranged labor, and estranged labor alienated people from themselves and from nature⁶.

To illustrate his point, Ziegler quoted Marx:

Nature is man's inorganic body - nature is, insofar as it is not itself the human body. Man lives on nature - means that nature is his body, with which he must remain in continuous intercourse if he is not to die. That man's physical and spiritual life is linked to nature means simply that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of nature.

In estranging from man (1) nature and (2) himself, his own active functions, his life-activity, estranged labor estranges the species from man. It turns for him the life of the species into a means of individual life.

Estranged labor turns...man's species being, both nature and spiritual species property, into a being alien to him, into a means to his individual existence. It estranges man's own body from him as it does external nature and his spiritual essence, his human being.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

Communism...is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature, and between man and man - the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species⁷.

Goldman and Ziegler did, however, agree that Engels was more concerned than Marx with and also elaborated a more consistent position on, the state of the environment. Engels's position was elaborated in *Dialectics of Nature* and in *Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy*. Like Marx, Engels was concerned with production in his works. The dialectics of nature 'involves the struggle and symbiosis of plants, animals, and social classes in their environments...Human effort (is) distinct in that it (rises) above the animal struggle for existence to the struggle for production. Under socialism humans (can) pursue this struggle rationally, since the irrational social contradictions of a class society would be eliminated'⁸. There were, however, limits to what Man could do:

Let us not, however, be very hopeful about our human conquest over nature. For each such victory, nature manages to take her revenge. Each of these victories, it is true, has in the first place the consequences on which we counted. But in the second and third phase (secondary and tertiary effects) there are quite different, unforeseen effects which only too often cancel out the significance of the first...

The people who in Mesopotamia, Greece, Asia Minor, and elsewhere destroyed the forests to obtain cultivable land, never dreamed that they were laying the basis for the present devastated condition of these countries, by removing along with the forest, the collecting centres and reservoirs of moisture. When, on the southern slopes of the mountains, the Italians of the Alps used up the pine forests so carefully cherished on the northern slopes, they had no inkling that by doing so they were thereby depriving their mountain springs of water for the greater part of the year, with the effect that these would be able to pour still more furious flood torrents on the plains during the rainy seasons...Thus at every step we are reminded that we by no means rule over nature like a conqueror over a foreign people, like someone standing outside nature - but that we, with flesh, blood and brain, belong to nature, and exist in its midst, and that our mastery of it consists in the fact that we have the advantage over all other beings of being able to know and correctly apply its laws (Engels 1940, pp. 291-292; Engels 1955, pp. 140-41.)

Although it is interesting to discuss whether or not Marx, Lenin and Engels had an environmental element in their writings, of more relevance to our purpose is how quotations from their works were used in Soviet official writings to support the view that socialist societies, by definition, either had no environmental problems at all, or at least had significantly less pollution than capitalist societies.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

The official Soviet doctrine on the environment - in any case to the outside world⁹ - was that environmental problems were a feature of capitalist societies only, due to the antagonism between the interests of capital and the overall interests of society. With references to Lenin, it was argued that

Социализм с его общественной собственностью на средства производства, плановым характером хозяйства и гуманистической системой общественных целей создает наиболее благоприятные возможности и условия для разумного и рачительного отношения к природе, рационального использования ее ресурсов, целенаправленного и благоприятного для человека преобразования среды его обитания. Природа социализма исключает антагонизм между целями производства и сохранением качества окружающей человека среды. Это, разумеется, не означает, что преимущества социализма в сфере природопользования реализуются сами собой, без приложения усилий вне всякой зависимости от каких бы то ни было внутренних и внешних конкретных исторических, экономических и политических факторов и обстоятельств¹⁰.

In capitalist societies, on the other hand, the anarchy of capitalist production as well as the drive for profit and colonialism led directly to ecological problems¹¹.

Lenin had, however, admitted that the advantages of socialism in this sphere were not being fully realised by themselves. To some extent, socialist societies also depended on external and internal specific historical, economic and political factors and circumstances. The impact of such factors, however, would be less than in capitalist societies as 'any conflicts between society and nature are determined according to the interests of Society and thus all its members'. The Soviet philosopher I.T. Frolov therefore argued as follows:

Поскольку экологический кризис является порождением капиталистического мира, — для устранения экологической угрозы необходимо существенно перестроить капиталистическую систему...В странах, где существует общественная собственность на средства производства, ухудшение окружающей среды может быть только случайным явлением¹².

Official Soviet writings during the 1970s and 1980s quoted Marx and Engels in support of the view that ecological problems were problems inherent in capitalist societies only. Marx - arguing that there was only one real science, namely that of history - suggested that history could

⁹ It is common to distinguish between an official doctrine for 'external' use - i.e. towards the international community - and a modified 'internal' doctrine, for the Soviet Union, in Soviet politics.

¹⁰ Проблема окружающей среды в мировой экономике и международных отношениях (Москва, "Мысль", 1976), с. 164.

¹¹ See for instance Арч Паддингтон, 'Экологические проблемы восточного блока', *Проблемы Восточной Европы*, no. 17-18, 1986, с. 97.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 97.

be grouped into the history of nature and the history of Man. Both these sides of history were linked to one another; as long as Man existed the history of Nature and the history of Man would mutually condition each other¹³. Man was in a position to rule over Nature and in reality extend his rule over it, while at the same time remaining an integral part of it. But this rule was of a particular nature; it could not be based on Man's tyranny in his relationship with Nature. As pointed out by Engels,

Все наше господство над ней (т.е. природой) состоит в том, что мы, в отличие от всех других существ, умеем познавать ее законы и правильно их применять.

И мы, в самом деле, с каждым днем научаемся все более правильно понимать ее законы и познавать как более близкие, так и более отдаленные последствия нашего активного вмешательства в ее естественный ход. Особенно со времени огромных успехов естествознания в нашем столетии мы становимся все более и более способными к тому, чтобы уметь учитывать также и более отдаленные естественные последствия по крайней мере наиболее обычных из наших действий в области производства и тем самым господствовать над ними. А чем в большей мере это станет фактом, тем в большей мере люди снова будут не только чувствовать, но и сознавать свое единство с природой...¹⁴

Adapting Marx's and Engels's theory to Russian conditions, Lenin also paid some attention to the relationship between Man and Nature, arguing that

Пока мы не знаем закона природы, он, существуя и действуя помимо, вне нашего познания, делает нас рабами "слепой необходимости". Раз мы узнали этот закон, действующий (как тысячи раз повторял Маркс) *независимо* от нашей воли и от нашего сознания, — мы господа природы¹⁵.

Frolov, in line with these theoretical premises, argued that the contemporary Marxist-Leninist concept of the interaction between Man and Nature

...Утверждает позиции разумного реализма, основывается на понимании социального происхождения и сущности экологической проблемы и видит поэтому реальные пути ее решения в комплексе фундаментальных социальных и культурных изменений, включающих научно-технический прогресс¹⁶.

¹³ К. Маркс и Ф. Энгельс, Сочинения, (Москва: Государственное издательство Политической Литературы, 1955), т. 3, с. 19.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, т. 20, с. 496.

¹⁵ В.И. Ленин, Полное собрание сочинений (Москва: Государственное издательство Политической Литературы, 1961), т. 18, с. 198.

¹⁶ Иван Фролов, ‘Угрожает ли миру экологический кризис?’, *Правда*, 16.8.1974 (н.р.).

Whereas on a theoretical level environmental problems in socialist societies were not discarded outright, at a political level Soviet officials in the early 1970s on some occasions claimed that the Soviet socialist system had brought an end to pollution altogether. As pointed out by Goldman, 'pollution was seen as a natural consequence of capitalist greed, and since there was no such thing as private ownership of the means of production in the Soviet Union, there was no such thing as pollution. The way to abolish the private- and social-cost dichotomy was to do away with social costs'¹⁷. 'The tolerance, if not adulation, of private greed makes it all but certain that industrialists will pursue their own interests without regard for the public good. Since it is unlikely to increase their profits, most businessmen and their stockholders are thought to oppose expenditures for pollution control. If by chance a state-owned institution in the Soviet Union is caught polluting, Soviet authorities usually explain it away as a legacy of the capitalist system or a consequence of the destruction suffered in World War II. Supposedly, it will be only a matter of time before the inexorable logic and the institutions of public ownership induce the Soviet manager to act in a more selfless, less destructive manner'¹⁸. Environmental problems in the former USSR were also sometimes referred to as a 'knock-on effect' from capitalist countries, caused not only by transboundary pollution (i.e. export of pollution to the former USSR by capitalist countries surrounding it) but also by the arms race, which tied up resources that could otherwise have been used to address environmental problems¹⁹.

Although this was the official Soviet position on the environment towards the outside world for several decades, signs that at least on the domestic scene the situation was changing appeared in the late 1960s/early 1970s. Brezhnev in his speech on the 50th anniversary of the Russian revolution in 1967, for instance, although not admitting that there was an environmental problem in the USSR, did stress the need for protecting the environment. And he refrained from referring to environmental protection as a feature of capitalist societies only:

Бурный рост науки и техники делает особенно актуальной вечную проблему отношений между человеком и природой. Еще первые социалисты считали, что важной чертой общества будущего является сближение человека с природой. С тех пор прошли века. Построив новое общество, мы воплотили в жизнь многое из того, о чем могли лишь мечтать предшественники научного социализма. Но природа не утратила для нас своей огромной ценности и как первоисточник материальных благ, и как неиссякаемый источник здоровья, радости, любви к жизни и духовного богатства каждого человека.

Обо всем этом хочется напомнить, чтобы подчеркнуть, как важно беречь природу, охранять и приумножать ее богатства. Хозяйское, рачительное использование естественных ресурсов, забота о земле, о

¹⁷ Marshall I. Goldman, 'Pollution in the Soviet Union: The Growth of Environmentalism and Its Consequences', in Anthony Jones, Walter D. Connor and David E. Powell (eds.), Soviet Social Problems (Westview Press, 1991), p. 39

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ DeBardleben (1985), pp. 50-51.

лесе, о реках и чистом воздухе, о растительном и животном мире — все это наше кровное коммунистическое дело. Мы должны сохранить и украсить нашу землю для нынешних и будущих поколений советских людей.

Чем разумнее мы будем использовать богатства природы, чем больших успехов добьются промышленность, сельское хозяйство, наука, чем выше станет производительность общественного труда, тем богаче, краше и культурнее будет жизнь советских людей²⁰.

At the 25th CPSU Congress in 1976 it was announced that environmental protection would be a priority issue for the Soviet Communist Party in the years to come. Once again, however, no specific mention was made of environmental problems in the USSR — rather, it was the global implications of environmental pollution that caught the attention of the Central Committee's address to the Congress:

Уже сегодня достаточно важны и актуальны такие глобальные проблемы, как сырьевая или энергетическая, ликвидация наиболее опасных и распространенных заболеваний и охрана окружающей среды, освоение космоса и использование ресурсов Мирового океана. В перспективе они будут оказывать все более заметное влияние на жизнь каждого народа, на всю систему международных отношений. Наша страна, как и другие страны социализма, не может стоять в стороне от решения этих проблем, затрагивающих интересы всего человечества²¹.

Since the beginning of the 1970s a large number of books addressing environmental problems in the USSR have been written by Western scholars. These include Fox (1971), Pryde (1972), Goldman (1972), Volgyes (1974), Singleton (1976), Shabad and Mote (1977), Jackson (1978), DeBardeleben (1985), Ziegler (1987), Jancar (1987), Weiner (1988), Turnbull (1991), Pryde (1991), Murray & Feshbach (1992), John Massey Stewart (ed.) (1992) and Feshbach (1995). A critical assessment of the state of the environment in the Soviet Union was written by Zeev Wolfson under the pseudonym Boris Komarov in 1978 and sent to the West, where it was published the same year. Similarly, several works emerged in the USSR on issues such as environmental management (Blagosklonov, Inozemtsev and Tikhomirov, 1967; Vorontsov and Kharitonova; 1977, Milanova and Ryabchikov, 1979; Nikitin and Novikov, 1986) and environmental law and theory (Frolov, 1983, Gerasimov, 1983, Kollbasov 1983, 1987, Astanin and Blagosklonov, 1983, Maksakovsky, 1983 and others). These works cover early environmental problems in the Soviet Union such as Lake Baikal (1960s), the Aral Sea and others. By scrutinising official sources and relying on first-hand experience (Komarov), the authors of these works were able to demonstrate that environmental problems in the USSR were not only

²⁰ Л.И. Брежнев, Ленинским курсом. Речь и статьи. т. 2 (Москва: Политиздат, 1970), с. 103-104.

²¹ Материалы XXV съезда КПСС (Москва: Политиздат, 1976), с. 56.

significant, but also that the scale of these problems was more serious than indicated in official statements and writings.

For reasons of space and also as this thesis focuses on Ukraine and the Ukrainian Green Movement rather than on the Soviet Union and Soviet environmental problems, I will merely look at the source of environmental problems in the Soviet Union and why measures to address the deteriorating environment did not work as intended. This is important for the following, as a major argument used by the Ukrainian Green Movement was that as the Soviet economic and political system with its strong centralisation was inherently 'unenvironmental', no real improvement of the Ukrainian environment could take place before these structures were demolished and replaced with a decentralised structure. The reader is referred to the works above for a more general treatment of Soviet environmental problems.

2.1.2 The Soviet Economic System and the Environment

As pointed out by the Russian economist Lemeshev²², the Soviet economy emphasised economic growth. Initially this emphasis was justified in terms of catching up with the capitalist West. As the world's first socialist country, surrounded by hostile capitalist societies, the USSR had to create its own, separate industrial basis. Thus 'the industrial drive was largely prompted by the need to strengthen (the USSR's) defence capability and to assure its economic independence from the external world, and primarily from German and Japanese militarism. Having rather limited material and financial resources, scientific and technical personnel, the USSR was compelled to use the same cheap and nature-despoiling industrial technologies as the capitalist countries'²³. The rapid industrialisation was accompanied by the slogan 'let's overtake and outstrip the capitalist countries in industrial production!'²⁴. Environmental concerns not surprisingly therefore

Did not constitute a major concern during the Stalinist period. Far from it. Stalin's program of rapid, forced industrialisation defined progress almost exclusively in terms of quantitative economic indicators that had to be achieved in the least possible time. These demands created a mindset that was, at best, indifferent to the conservation of natural resources and the preservation of the environment. The canons of Stalinist Orthodoxy formulated in the 1930s glorified socialism's ability to radically remould the natural environment. In literature and the arts, socialist realism dictated an extreme anthropocentric approach toward the relationship between mankind and the environment. Extraordinarily wasteful projects, such as the White Sea-Baltic Canal, were undertaken at the personal whim of the great dictator. All other considerations were

²² Mikhail Lemeshev¹, Bureaucrats in Power - Ecological Collapse (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1990), p. 57.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

subordinate to the pre-eminent goal of fulfilling and over fulfilling the monthly, yearly, and five-year plans²⁵.

This policy paid off in terms of industrial output: As seen from the tables below, economic growth was substantial during the 1920s and 1930s. Lemeshev noted that such growth was achieved extensively, by increasing the number of low-paid workers. Agricultural production fell considerably in the first half of the 1930s as a result of forced collectivisation and also due to migration from the countryside to the cities.

Table 2.1 Growth of Industrial and Agricultural Production in the USSR in the 1920s (%)

	1913	1920	1925	1928
Industrial production	100	22	73	132
Agricultural production	100	67	112	124

Source: Lemeshev (1990), p. 50.

Table 2.2 Economic Growth (in %) in the USSR in the 1930s (1928=1)

Indicators	1932	1937	1940
New fixed assets put into use	4.2	5.4	7.5
Industrial production	2.0	4.5	6.5
Labour productivity in industry	1.3	2.4	3.1
Agricultural production	0.9	1.1	1.3
Labour productivity in agriculture	1.1	1.6	1.7

Source: Lemeshev, (1990), p. 51.

Thus, Lemeshev noted,

With all this high-pressure growth of Soviet industry and with the nation's limited resources, industrial enterprises were built with total disregard for ecological requirements. Actually no such requirements were officially spelled out, much less made mandatory. Most of the technologies used in those days were cheap, waste-producing and contaminating the environment over large areas. Industrial operations were carried out on a comparatively small scale, whereas any ecological information at public disposal in those days was very limited. Therefore the giant smokestacks towering over factories and plants, and the long plumes of belching smoke were presented as symbols of progress and technical might²⁶.

In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, a large share of the USSR's factories, enterprises, coal mines, cities and towns were destroyed and nobody had time for nature conservation and environmental protection when the priority was to rebuild what had been destroyed as quickly as possible:

Forests were cut where they could be obtained easier, without any mechanised facilities - along railways and on river banks. Hundreds upon

²⁵ Ziegler (1986), pp. 3-4.

²⁶ Lemeshev (1990¹), p. 52.

hundreds of plants and factories were built with high-waste and even ecologically dangerous production technologies. And all that was done for industrial growth, for creating the 'foundation' of our future well-being²⁷.

The problem was compounded by a rigid interpretation of the Marxist-Leninist concept of preemptive growth of the means of production over the growth of consumer goods as a mandatory prerequisite for extended reproduction interpreted by Soviet planners and economists to the effect that this was an absolute 'must'. Thus, in the period 1928 to 1940, production of means of production (division 'A' industries) grew 10 times over, whereas production of consumer goods (division 'B' industries) increased by 4.2 times. From 1940 to 1987 the gap between production of the means of production and of consumer goods increased, leading to a shortage of consumer goods. Whereas consumer goods accounted for 2/5 of the total production in 1940, this share had fallen to less than 1/4 by 1987. The development of heavy industry was accompanied by a growing anthropogenic pressure upon nature, as the growth of heavy industries was linked with increased use of natural resources and, due to poor technologies, also with increased pollution²⁸. The emphasis on extensive economic growth meant that socio-economic and ecological concerns became secondary to production and the introduction of the so-called 'residual' principle resulted in funds and technology for nature protection being allocated only after all other expenses had been covered²⁹.

Taut plans, stressing extensive, rather than intensive, economic growth, did not allow much space for innovation in general, and the introduction of environmentally friendly technologies in particular³⁰. What was more, the Soviet Union did not have an industry keeping up with the latest inventions in the area and producing up-to-date equipment for the country's enterprises and factories. The plans required annual increases in output - the allocation of resources for long-term research and production of environmental technologies thus suffered, as the installation of such equipment in the country's heavy industry - much of which was 40-50 years old and very harmful to the environment - would require a halt in production of production equipment, steel and coal on which the Soviet economy depended heavily.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

³⁰ Alec Nove has identified seven factors discouraging innovation at Soviet enterprises: Firstly, innovation would disrupt production, which would in turn interrupt plan-fulfillment, upon which the employees' income depended. Secondly, risk was not rewarded in the Soviet economic system and all innovation carries a certain risk. Thirdly, plans incorporating innovation would be as difficult to fulfill as plans not including innovation - with the added disadvantage of containing risk. Fourthly, even if the plan was not formally adjusted to take innovation into account, plan targets were likely to be increased or norms for payments into incentive funds likely to be reduced. Fifthly, as plan-fulfillment was itself standing in the way of improved quality (and thus innovation), it would be difficult to obtain quality input for equipment designed to make production more efficient. Sixthly, innovation was seldom rewarded and finally, the producer had little control over his own production. See Alec Nove, *The Soviet Economic System*, Third Edition (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1986), pp. 161-62.

Pryde pointed out that Marxism in some cases - although 'implicit development priorities' were generally of more importance for nature resource conservation than ideology - was acting as a break on nature conservation. This seemed to be the case regarding 'the assumption that improper natural resource exploitation is the result of the capitalist mode of production, and that a socialist economy necessarily pursues the wisest possible use of natural resources'. Certain elements of Marxism, combined with rapid industrialisation, were not well suited to preventing environmental problems. Moreover, 'Marxist ideology very definitely suggests that "technological" solutions exist to all environmental problems...'³¹.

A related issue linked not only with the extensive growth strategy but also with ideology, was the allocation of free natural resources to Soviet industry. As pointed out by Gofman and Fedorenko³², whereas various productive resources and consumer goods (blaga) were priced in the USSR, an exemption had been made for natural resources. This could be explained, as

Конечно, надо признать исключительную сложность природных богатств как объекта оценки, по все же это не главное. Главное - в непонимании опасностей, талящихся в "бесплатности" природных ресурсов, самого значения рационализации природопользования как фактора повышения эффективности общественного производства и улучшения качества жизни человека³³.

Although Soviet economists had called for the pricing of natural resources as early as in the 1950s (see Chapter One), they were not instructed to work out a methodology and take practical measures towards this end until 1972. The negative impact access to free resources had on the environment, though, seemed obvious:

О каких экономических стимулах к природосбережению может ныне идти речь, если плата за использование лесных богатств составляет сейчас в среднем примерно один рубль в расчете на гектар лесных земель, плата за воду их поверхностных и подземных источников - одна копейка за кубометр расходуемой воды, а сельскохозяйственные, городские земли, поля для оросительных пужд, использование окружающей среды для размещения вредных отходов ныне вообще бесплатны для предприятий?³⁴

Goldman reached the same conclusion, having examined the role of external costs in socialist economies:

³¹ Philip R. Pryde, *Conservation in the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 136, 165, referred to in Joan DeBardleben (1985), p. 16.

³² К. Говман, Н. Федоренко, 'Экономическая защита природы', in *Коммунист*, no. 5, 1989.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

Because the state in a socialist society owns all the means of production, sooner or later the state must bear all the social costs. Thus, in theory, there should be no such thing in the USSR as pushing social costs onto someone else. Despite the difficulty of assigning responsibility to each factory for its precise social costs, it should be in the interest of the USSR to make each factory pay for the social costs it generates. If each factory was held accountable for both the direct and social costs of its operations, much of the pollution would be treated within the confines of the plant before it could be pushed onto the population as a whole...In practice, however, almost no effort is made in the USSR to assign such social costs. Consequently, the Russian factory manager has no economic incentive to clean up his pollution himself. In fact, the difficulty of dealing with externalities is actually compounded in a country like the USSR. This is because the environmental authorities must contend not only with the uncertain consequences of technology and the lack of precise cost measurements that exist in non socialist countries but also with Marxist ideology. It would be very difficult ideologically for the Russians to impose a charge on air and water³⁵.

2.1.3 The Administrative Command System and the Environment

The lack of concern for the environment was partly caused and partly enhanced by the Soviet administrative-command system, which Lemeshev labelled 'the enemy of nature'. Lemeshev blamed the environmental disruption in the USSR upon the 'emergence, rapid diffusion and subsequent consolidation of the sectoral, departmental, bureaucratic methods of administration of the social and economic development of the country'. Whereas the Soviet Constitution declared (art. 2) that 'all power in the USSR belongs to the people'³⁶, the people's power exercised through the soviets had gradually been replaced by the power of ministries and departments, with the result that by the 1980s real power was in the hands of the executive bodies of state, such as the USSR Council of Ministers, the ministries and departments of the union, union-republican and republican competence, as well as other governmental departments. This metamorphosis had come about as a result of the deformation of property relations in Soviet society:

...In its article 10 (the Soviet Constitution says) that 'The foundation of the economic system of the USSR is socialist ownership of the means of production in the form of state property (belonging to all the people), and collective farm-and-co-operative property'. It is precisely this foundation

³⁵ Marshall I. Goldman (1972), pp. 46-47.

³⁶ Article 2 of the Soviet Constitution read as follows: All power in the USSR belongs to the people. The people exercise state power through the Soviets of People's Deputies, which constitute the political foundation of the USSR. All other state bodies are under the control of, and accountable to, the Soviets of People's Deputies. See Конституция СССР и развитие советского законодательства (Москва: Юридическая литература, 1983), с. 20. The Soviet Constitution also contained a paragraph on environmental protection (art. 18), which read as follows: 'В интересах настоящего и будущих поколений в СССР принимаются необходимые меры для охраны и научно обоснованного рационального использования земли и ее недр, водных ресурсов, растительного и животного мира, для сохранения в чистоте воздуха и воды, обеспечения воспроизводства природных богатств и улучшения окружающей человека среды' (*Ibid.*, с. 31).

that was loosened and undermined. At a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in January 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev gave an exhaustive evaluation of the abnormal situation that had taken shape in our country. This is what he said: 'Special mention should be made of socialist property. The control of who is really in charge of it, and how, has seriously weakened. Socialist property has often been eroded by parochialism and departmentalism. Gradually a situation has emerged where socialist property no longer belongs to anybody. Property no longer 'costs' anything, it has no real owner either, and has in many cases been used for extracting unearned income'³⁷.

How had this shift of power taken place, and how come it had been sustained for so long? The reason, argued Lemeshev, was to be found in the Soviet Constitution, which had effectively made the USSR Council of Ministers both the executive and the administrative body of state authority (art. 128). Further, according to article 131 of the Constitution the Council of Ministers was given the right to decide all questions of state authority. Thus the Soviet government, supported by a system of ministries and departments, was running the national economy, working out short-term and long-term plans for economic and social development and taking measures for their implementation. The ministries and departments had obtained the right to control financial and material resources (capital investments, production assets and raw materials) and, as a result, 'all these resources, which *de jure* belong to all the people, to the whole nation, have actually become the property of ministries and departments which run them as their full masters, at their discretion and in their own narrowly departmental interests'.

Due to the taut plans (see above), which emphasised output and external economic growth, the ministries and departments asked for more and more resources to enhance the performance of the industries under their authority and also to compensate for the artificial shortage of all goods manufactured by Soviet industry. Supplying agencies, on the other hand, were in a position to cut a request for resources, but not to go against it, due to the plan - the targets of which had to be fulfilled by law. Thus, a process of excessive use of natural resources causing waste and pollution was embarked upon, in which

Most of the resources are 'wangled' by those of the ministries and departments which promise the most, especially those that succeed in ramming a decision through the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on speeding up and expanding the development of their respective industries. Much assistance in this struggle for obtaining free natural resources by sectoral departments comes from relevant sectoral subdivisions in the State Planning Committee of the USSR, at the Council of Ministers of the USSR and at the Central Committee of the CPSU. The tighter the like-minded officials of the different departments close ranks, the more chance they have of success. To get a sweeping plan through means larger investments, more material resources, more workers, greater wage funds and bonus allocations, also more foreign currency, greater prestige and benefits.

³⁷ Lemeshev (1990), p. 266.

Thus public and national interests are replaced by departmental and personal mercenary interests³⁸.

To illustrate his point, Lemeshev showed the tremendous expansion that had taken place of the bureaucratic apparatus from 1917 and up until 1986: In 1917, immediately after the formation of the RSFSR, there were 10 all-union people's commissariats. By 1936, the number had risen to 18, in 1956 there were 52 and in 1979, 64 ministries of all-union competence. Fifty-five of these, in addition to some multi-sectoral committees, were situated in Moscow. If state bodies for the administration of spheres other than industry were added to this figure (64 ministries), 115 all-union governmental departments could be identified! In addition, every Soviet republic had on average 30 ministries, 15 state committees and 20 other departments of republican competence. In 1986 the USSR had some 650,000 independent administrative bodies (state administration, economic and social affairs). Each administrative body controlled about four enterprises and organisations. The combined staff of all these administrative bodies was 32.6 million people (2.5 workers and engineers per administrator. In industry and on the state farms the figure was 1.5 per one official, and in the construction industry the figure was even lower!).

As the Soviets of People's Deputies had no access to natural resources, they were in effect deprived of real economic power and became dependent on the very ministries and departments in theory subordinate to them, as the latter controlled the resources and were therefore masters not only in their respective industries, but indeed in all parts of the country where they conducted their economic activity³⁹. With regard to the use of natural resources, the following situation was identified by Gofman and Fedorenko:

...Рассточительное природопользование – это не только следствие, но и условие, источник существования и, если угодно, жизнеспособности административно-командной системы хозяйствования. Неспособная пробудить тигу людей к творчеству, к созданию и использованию нового в науке и технике, административная система может добиваться экономического роста только экстенсивным путем вовлечения в общественное производство все большего количества новых и новых ресурсов, прежде всего взятых у природы. Эта система может существовать лишь разрушая едва ли не все, накопленное предыдущими поколениями – не только людей, но и всего живого. Она порождает ложную дилемму: или экономическое развитие, или сохранение природы – третьего не дано⁴⁰.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 269-70.

³⁹ For examples, see *ibid.*, pp. 270-94. Further examples can be found in Chapters Five, Six and Seven of this thesis.

⁴⁰ Говман, Федоренко (1989), с. 31.

2.1.4 Legislation on the Environment and its Implementation

Although the Soviet Union officially until the early 1970s claimed that there were either no, or only minor, environmental problems in the country and that such problems were a feature of capitalist societies, writers on the environment took great pride in the fact that environmental legislation had been passed as early as 1917. Thus a book on the issue argued that

В Советском Союзе...с первых лет существования интенсивно развивается природоохранительное законодательство [так, были приняты декрет "О земле" (1917г.); декрет "О социализации земли" (1918г.); постановление ВЦИК "О социалистическом землеустройстве и о мерах перехода к социалистическому земледелию" (1919г.); декрет "О лесах" (1918г.); декрет "О недрах земли" (1920г.) и другие]. Это развитие в начале было тесно связано с именем В.И. Ленина, который проявил глубокую заинтересованность в установлении научно обоснованного правопорядка в деле использования природных условий для народа. В. И. Ленин принимал активное участие в подготовке всех вышеперечисленных декретов и постановлений, а декрет "О земле" был им лично подготовлен и предложен на рассмотрение съезда Советов⁴¹.

Goldman has questioned Lenin's commitment to environmental protection, backing up his position with references to Zile (1970). Although several laws of a conservationist nature were passed under Lenin, it is very difficult to prove whether he was himself initiating these laws or just acting as an automatic approver. Thus, as 'Lenin's signature was affixed to all laws and decrees...this is (today) taken as proof that these were Lenin's laws. Undoubtedly some of them were; but logically the bulk of them originated at lower levels (Zile 1970a, pp. 11,21,22,24).⁴². Moreover, Lenin also signed laws and regulations counteracting environmental legislation. As pointed out by Zile, Lenin approved the wholesale destruction of many forests to provide needed supplies of fuel and timber for export. This led Goldman to the conclusion that 'as long as conservation did not stand in the way of economic need, it was a laudable goal. Unfortunately, the definition of economic need is not rigidly fixed, and therefore it was shaped to meet the convenience of the parties involved even if it came at the expense of nature. Furthermore, in an era of political and economic unrest, conservation regulations, along with almost all laws at the time, were ignored as often as they were honored⁴³. Finally, as a factor that seemed to support this view, Goldman noted that, until the mid 1960s, no reference was made to Lenin in the debate on the environment⁴⁴.

⁴² Goldman (1972), p. 27.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

From Lenin's death in 1924 until the mid-1950s very few laws were passed on the environment. Of those that were passed, one resolution was issued on fishing; a law establishing sanitary protection zones around drinking reservoirs was also passed, as was a regulation for health resorts⁴⁵. In October 1948 a scheme for the creation of eight tree shelter belts in areas suffering from draught and erosion was endorsed, but none of these seemed to be observed. Of greater importance was a resolution on air pollution passed a year later, in 1949, by the USSR Council of Ministers. The resolution created the Chief Administration for Sanitary Epidemiological Supervision, which in the following decades was responsible for monitoring emissions of harmful substances into the atmosphere, following its creation, an improvement in the quality of urban air did take place:

The air pollution resolution in 1949 was the first hint that environmental questions would eventually have to be taken seriously. Because of the rapid rate of industrial growth, such a transformation was only a matter of time. Nevertheless, almost another decade passed before legislative concern took on serious proportions (Kolbasov, 1965, p. 213). Even then, however, the typical response to repeated assaults on the country's natural resources was to pass another law, a phenomenon not unique to the USSR. As a result, beginning on June 7, 1957, with the passage of the law 'For the Protection of Nature' in the Republic of Estonia, until Khrushchev's ouster in the fall of 1964, enough laws on the environment were passed to satisfy the most insatiable lawyer. By March 26, 1963, all fifteen Soviet republics had laws 'For the Protection of Nature' on their books...If one were to judge purely on the basis of the number of relevant laws and decrees that had been issued, it would be Khrushchev..., not Lenin, who would be memorialized as the father-guardian of conservation in the USSR⁴⁶.

Between 1956 and 1960 some 19 decrees on conservation and 10 articles in the Criminal Code on conservationist matters were adopted in the Russian Federation alone (Zile, 1970b, p. 5). As pointed out by Goldman, though, initially the emphasis was on laws on the use and protection of certain types of natural resources, rather than on laws covering all resources (p. 28). Thus, a law 'For the Protection of Nature' issued in 1960 by the Parliament of the RSFSR was fairly vague, identifying those resources that would be controlled and ordering all enterprises and factories to install purification equipment, as it would be illegal to discharge untreated sewage into the atmosphere or the republic's rivers⁴⁷:

The plethora of Soviet laws passed in the late 1950s and in the 1960s demonstrates that the accepted approach to the solution of environmental disruption in the USSR seemed to be, if the first law does not work, pass

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

47

another one. Often it seemed as if the second law differed only slightly, if at all, from the original one already on the statute books⁴⁸.

By the late 1960s, however, voices critical of the way these laws were implemented started to make themselves heard. Thus, for instance, in 1967 Iurii Efremov argued in *Literaturnaia gazeta* that there was a need for an all-union law on the environment, as local measures tended to be overridden by Moscow:

Даже строжайшие из местных запретов действительны лишь в ограниченном объеме. Их способна парализовать и скромная отраслевая инструкция, если она издана в Москве. Вот почему разработка единого общесоюзного закона об охране природы становится важной задачей⁴⁹.

Not until 1972 was the first step made towards an all-union law on the environment. In September that year the USSR Supreme Soviet issued a decree 'On Measures for the Further Improvement of Nature Conservation and the Rational Use of Natural Resources', in which environmental protection was referred to as an integral part of the national economy. The decree also revealed that there were problems with the implementation of previous legislation on the environment:

На многих предприятиях и в ряде городов отсутствуют необходимые сооружения по очистке сточных вод, медленно идет их строительство, а средства, выделяемые на эти цели, используются не полностью. Не обеспечивается также должная очистка промышленных выбросов в атмосферу, недостаточно производится газоочистных и пылеулавливающих устройств и установок⁵⁰.

Starting in 1972, the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers passed resolutions on the strengthening of environmental protection almost every year, and resolutions were passed on the protection of Baikal, the Volga basin and the Urals, the Azov and Black Seas, the Baltic Sea, Lake Ladoga, industrial cities in the Kuzbass and Donbass as well as Moscow, Leningrad and the Arctic Coast⁵¹. From 1975 onwards, environmental protection measures were spelled out in the annual and five-year plans, thus earmarking funds to prevent pollution. This was done to encourage enterprises and factories to install pollution reducing devices, as the policy of

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁴⁹ *Литературная газета*, 13.9.1967, quoted in W. Von Schlippe, 'Problems of Ecology in the Soviet Union', *Journal of Russian Studies*, no. 45, 1983, p. 3.

⁵⁰ *Советская Россия*, 21.9.1972, quoted in *Ibid.*

⁵¹ Михаил Я. Лемешев², 'Разрушительный поступь "ускорения"', in М.Я. Лемешев (обш. ред.), *Экологическая альтернатива* (Москва: Прогресс, 1990), с. 199-200.

encouraging them to use money from their basic investment funds for pollution control devices had proved highly unsuccessful⁵².

The new Soviet Constitution passed in 1977 contained several references to the environment, and in June 1980, the USSR Supreme Soviet passed several laws regarding the rational use of natural resources and the protection of the environment. Finally, in June 1985 the USSR Supreme Soviet issued a resolution 'On the Observance of the Requirements of the Legislation on the Protection of the Environment and the Rational Use of Natural Resources'. This resolution was issued as the laws passed during the 1970s and 1980s remained on paper only:

Министерства и ведомства их попросту игнорировали, ссылаясь на нехватку средств, а главное — на "железную" необходимость выполнения планов любой ценой.

This resolution marked the first step towards environmental reform, as people's health would be given priority in the future development of the Soviet economy:

При решении проблем развития народного хозяйства исходить из приоритета охраны здоровья настоящего и будущих поколений советских людей, создания наилучших условий для их жизни, нацелить на это научно-технический прогресс, обеспечить переход на ресурсосберегающие технологии, наиболее полно и бережно использовать природные богатства, полученные из них сырье, материалы и продукцию⁵³.

Thus,

Приоритет здоровья и благополучия населения в сравнении с другими целями природопользования и охраны природы означает, что никакое использование природных ресурсов, каким бы оно ни было выгодным с экономической точки зрения, не может осуществляться, если оно влечет за собой реальную угрозу жизни, здоровью и благополучию людей. Этот принцип органически вытекает из общей гуманистической концепции социализма, согласно которой социализм представляет собой такой тип общества, в котором все сущее подчинено интересам народа, все делается для человека и во имя человека⁵⁴.

The protection of the environment under socialism was viewed as a 'prophylactic guarantee of healthcare'. And, clearly expressing Marxist-Leninist sentiments, 'nature would be exploited in such a way that it would be *improved* for future generations'.

⁵² Ziegler (1986), p. 5.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

⁵⁴ p. 35.

Although numerous laws regarding the environment were passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet from the late 1950s onwards, emissions of harmful substances into the air and waters of the Soviet Union increased in parallel with the introduction of new laws. Goldman (1972) argued that increasing pollution could not be explained by a lack of legal provisions to combat pollution, as there had been a heavy reliance on legal restraint and good intentions. In fact, eager to prove the supremacy of socialist environmental legislation to that of capitalist legislation, the USSR as the first country in the world introduced maximum permissible levels of harmful substances in the air and also adopted stricter limits for emissions of pollutants into the air and waters than most other countries, including the United States⁵⁵. As it turned out, however, many of these limits were simply impossible to observe and thus contributed to the many violations of Soviet environmental legislation. As will be seen below, the emphasis on economic growth in the Soviet Union also had to take much of the blame for enterprises' and factories' disregard for environmental legislation. Finally, there was no unified administrative body to secure the implementation of environmental legislation and execute sanctions against those failing to comply.

Economic Reasons

Although Soviet legislation entailed provisions allowing for serious offenders to be prosecuted, in practice, emissions of harmful pollutants into the air and water normally resulted in nothing more than a fine - normally this fine was from 5 to 50 rubles. In more serious cases it was raised to 100 rubles. Thus, the size of the fine did not in itself serve as a deterrent to the country's most polluting enterprises and factories. Besides, fines were not paid by individuals but by the enterprise fund. Funds earmarked for the payment of fines were often included in the financial plan of the enterprises at the beginning of the year, so that instead of temporarily stopping production to install or repair pollution control facilities, the enterprises could immediately pay the fine and continue production. The enterprises themselves suffered no financial loss from this practice, as money were allocated for this purpose from the central ministries. Why did such a practice come about?

As seen above, failure to fulfil the plan had serious consequences not only for the enterprise or factory in question, but also for the local authorities in the area where it was located and for the ministry or department to which it was subordinated. Failure to reach one's plan targets was not only a criminal offence - the five year and annual plans were passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet as laws - but also resulted in the loss of bonuses and high salary premiums, which affected the enterprise/factory leadership as well as all its workers directly. Premiums were paid only if plan targets had been 100% fulfilled. Bonuses were increased progressively with the size of output. Pollution control was a non-productive expense, which usually resulted neither in increased

⁵⁵ Goldman (1972), pp. 23-24.

production nor in increased profit for the enterprise/factory - on the contrary, as production either had to be temporarily reduced or stopped altogether while pollution reducing devices were installed, such measures were likely to interrupt the enterprise's ability to fulfil its plan targets.

Although Soviet legislation on the environment allowed for the closure of enterprises and factories which refused to install proper treatment facilities, this measure was used sparingly, as 'the product of the factory is very necessary and the plan cannot be disrupted'. The reason for this was the strong centralisation of the Soviet economy, which facilitated the construction of large enterprises producing one or two items for the entire Soviet Union. Consequently, if such an enterprise was closed down, not only would the item(s) it produced disappear from the shelves of shops throughout the country, but worse - if the enterprise was producing some key product used by several other enterprises in their production, then closing the enterprise would trigger a domino effect, making plan-targets not only impossible to fulfil at one, but at several enterprises. Closures were only carried out when the physical health of Soviet citizens had been directly affected⁵⁶.

In an effort to reduce pollution in Soviet industry, special funds for pollution control were set up centrally. The money allocated to these funds, however, was seldom used in full, and there was a reluctance among directors of Soviet enterprises to request such funds. When such funds were requested, it was often viewed in negative terms by the ministries and departments in charge of the enterprise in question. An example from Ukraine illustrates this situation very well. The director of the Makeevka factory in the Donbass wanted to install a water treatment facility at his factory and requested funds for this purpose. The Ukrainian Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy, however, accused him of having the wrong attitude towards state funds. By the time the money finally arrived, the Makeevka factory had already caused considerable damage to the local environment⁵⁷.

As for local authorities, they were not in a position to oppose local polluting enterprises and factories for two reasons. Firstly, until January 1962 and also later fees collected for the violation of environmental legislation were channelled into the local budgets and in some cases used to fund local hospitals and other facilities. Secondly, local government officials had a personal interest in having local enterprises meet their plan targets, as 'the most important criterion for any government official who seeks promotion or recognition is how much his production has increased in his region, *not* to what extent his rivers have been cleaned up this year. It follows that few government officials are likely to be particularly sympathetic to those who threaten the attainment of new production records. As Zile puts it, this is one of the hazards of being both the police and the policed' (Zile, 1970a, p. 9)⁵⁸. Finally, challenging polluting enterprises was a complicated affair, in which local authorities had to seek recourse to higher party organs and/or the responsible

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 70-71.

ministry⁵⁹. Such efforts could easily be branded as undermining plan-fulfilment and could have some repercussions for those involved.

According to Lemeshev, none of the resolutions issued on particular areas from 1972 onwards, nor any of the laws on environmental protection adapted during the 1970s and 1980s, was implemented. The ministries and departments simply ignored them, arguing that there was a lack of resources and, more importantly, that the plan had to be fulfilled no matter what the cost⁶⁰.

Ideological Reasons

Beskrovnykh (1990) holds the view that a major reason for the poor state of the environment in the USSR can be found in the introduction of Marxist ideas into Soviet biology. The ideologisation of the country's biology in the 1930s had a negative effect on the environment for the following reason:

Идеологизация биологии в те годы привела к формированию предельно идеологизированной теории и практике определения степени опасности отходов производства для окружающей среды и человека в ней. Теория эта, естественно, противопоставлялась западной и объявлялась завоеванием социализма. Невероятно, но эта теория, неизбежно ведущая к истреблению живого в окружающей среде, дожила не только неизменной и не тронутой критиками, но сегодня является "научным" основанием дела охраны природы и нас в ней⁶¹.

Two axioms derived from this theory and practice proved particularly harmful to the environment and to people's health, in Beskrovnykh's view. Firstly, the notion that the danger or lack of danger of any substance could be established only in an experimental manner, i.e. by exposing animals to these substances (materialist and scientific). Thus:

Из этой аксиомы вытекает одно очень важное для нас следствие: она начисто отменяет все иные, кроме определяемых в эксперименте, показатели неблагополучия среды для человека, даже такие очевидные, как рост заболеваемости и смертности населения после начала эксплуатации того или иного предприятия и связанных с его деятельностью токсических выбросов⁶².

⁵⁹ DeBardeleben (1985), p. 69.

⁶⁰ Лемешев (1990), с. 200.

⁶¹ Виктор Бескровный, Экологический кризис в СССР. Причины. Следствия. Поиск выхода, *Грани*, 158, 1990, с. 245.

⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 245-46.

As an example, Beskrovnykh referred to the vitamin-proteine combine at Kirishi in Leningrad oblast, where following its opening in 1975 people started falling seriously ill with allergies. However, as it could not be proven experimentally that there was a connection between pollution emanating from the enterprise and people's deteriorating health, and as no proper methodology had been elaborated for working with statistics, the enterprise manager could sleep quietly.

A second axiom was that various substances become dangerous only after they reach a certain threshold; if below this threshold, they are completely harmless. The threshold Beskrovnykh was talking about was the so-called maximum permissible concentrations - PDK:

В самом деле, кому, кроме специалистов, видна разница между, скажем, 3 или 7 ПДК? Это много или мало? Если "много", то чего "много"? Вещества — да, много, в данном случае в 300 раз больше некой исходной величины. Но в сколько же раз возрастает *опасность*? Тоже в 300 раз? Конечно же нет — во много раз больше.

...Понятие "допустимой" ПДК, т.е. "безопасной", постепенно, но неизбежно сместилось на практике в сторону "допустимой", т.е. "разрешенной", и теперь уже открыто сдвигается в любую сторону, в зависимости от спроса основного пользователя понятием — предприятия, загрязняющего окружающую среду⁶³.

As 'the most rigid' norms in the world were simply not implementable, a practice of using 'temporary' norms, not listed in any reference book, and not accessible to the general population, emerged. Besides, measurements were bound to be inadequate, as they were made outside the sanitary zone of an enterprise, and not close to its source, as was common practice elsewhere. The implications of such a practice were seen in the case of Chernobyl:

Около 600 тысяч человек прошли через особую зону Чернобыля. Они там не отдыхали — занимались важнейшей для нас работой. Теперь эти сотни тысяч больны и очень серьезно, многие уже ушли из жизни. Но специалисты-радиологи не находят у них заболеваний, связанных с облучением. *Нельзя находить* — их пациенты не набрали дозу выше допустимой. А "допустимой", как известно, до катастрофы была доза 25 БЭР, во время катастрофы она с легкой руки Ильина мигом выросла до 75, теперь остановилась на 35 БЭР.

For comparison, the analogous figure for Germany was three ber. The use of maximum permissible concentrations by the country's enterprises was also highly controversial. In the case of Lake Ladoga in Russia, for instance, enterprises were allowed to emit any substance into the

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 247.

lake as long as the quantities did not exceed the maximum permissible level. Consequently, the water in the lake was considered 'safe'. Thus, concluded Beskrovnykh,

„Если мы растворим в стакане воды 3–4 десятка разных ядов, концентрация каждого из которых не слишком опасна, то стакан этот можно без вреда выпить...⁶⁴

Beskrovnykh was also highly sceptical about the way in which the maximum permissible levels were deduced, as this was done by the very ministries that produced the pollution (see below). Their institutes and laboratories developed, passed and changed the permissible levels whenever this was required, and the way in which this was done was far from acceptable:

Определяют, как уже было сказано, экспериментально и на редкость бесхитростно. Берут дюжину лабораторных крыс и в течение 4–х месяцев, а теперь, с развитием математики —, мыши дышат эти крысы воздухом с добавкой яда и, если не подыхают, не обнаруживают при вскрытии сколь-либо значительных повреждений органов, то найденную концентрацию уменьшают для надежности в 10 раз и объявляют безопасной *для человека*.

Thus, the major problem was not inadequate legislation and regulations in themselves, but the very way in which permissible levels were determined and the way they were frequently adjusted to each individual enterprise to allow for excess pollution to continue. There was also a disregard for safety and pollution within the decision-making bodies with authority over the environment. This could be traced back to the use of official slogans such as Michurin's 'we should not wait for bounties from nature. Our task is to take them from nature' (*nam ne nado zhdai milostei ot prirody. Bziat ikh u nee - nasha zadacha*) and the notion that the Soviet Union was so vast that pollution posed no serious threat.

Administrative Reasons

Prior to Gorbachev's environmental reforms in early 1988, a wide range of ministries and departments were responsible for the protection and rational use of natural resources. These were USSR *Gosagroprom*, USSR *Gosleskhoz*, USSR *Minvodka*, USSR *Minrybkh*, USSR *Goskomgidromet*, USSR *Minzdrav*, USSR *Mingeo*, USSR *Gosgortekhnadzor* and *Gai MVD* USSR. These bodies were primarily responsible for the control of the environment⁶⁵.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 249.

⁶⁵ Государственный комитет СССР по охране природы, *Состояние природной среды в СССР в 1988 году* (Москва: Лесная промышленность, 1990), с. 140-41.

Most of these ministries and departments, however, were not only given the task of controlling the state of the environment, but were also major users of natural resources. Thus, to give an example, the USSR Ministry of Agriculture was not only the major user of agricultural land, but at the same time exerted state control over the activities of all land-users⁶⁶. Similarly, the Ministry of Fisheries was in charge of both the harvesting of fish according to plan directives, and of the conservation of commercial and recreational fish stocks. The State Committee for Forestry regulated both the cutting and the replanting of forests, and all other aspects of timber procurement⁶⁷. Not surprisingly, therefore, the environment came out as the major loser. The Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources was in charge of controlling water and soil pollution, while at the same time funding big water construction projects such as the river diversion project stopped in 1986, and monitored serious sources of ecological disruption⁶⁸. Environmental planning was conducted by a number of state committees, the major one being the State Committee for Science and Technology. The responsibilities of these state committees often overlapped, and as pointed out by Pryde, 'given that Soviet bureaucracies jealously guard their own empires, the potential for counter-productive squabbling and lack of co-operative efforts is immense'⁶⁹.

From the late 1960s, state committees on the protection of the environment and the rational use of natural resources were set up in all the European republics of the USSR with the exception of the Russian Federation. In Ukraine, *Derzhkompriroda* emerged in 1967. According to the assistant to the chairman of this committee, Serhii Mykhailiv, the committee was not very efficient and achieved little in its first 20 years of existence. This, he claimed, was very much due to pressure from the USSR and Ukrainian Councils of Ministers, seeking to implement the country's annual and 5-year plans. *Derzhkompriroda* did, however, help stabilise the situation, co-ordinating the efforts of some 10 ministries and departments also endowed with environmental functions. Following the accident at Chernobyl in 1986, *Derzhkompriroda* was strengthened with the employment of additional specialists. However, these did not approach the environment in an integrated way, focusing instead entirely on water, soil or air⁷⁰.

In 1978, in an attempt to streamline the apparatus responsible for the protection and the rational use of natural resources, the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers passed a resolution upgrading the Hydrometeorological Service of the Ministry of Health to an independent State Committee on Hydrometeorology and Environmental Control⁷¹. The new

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

⁶⁷ Philip R. Pryde, *Environmental Management in the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 9.

⁶⁸ Joan DeBardeleben, 'The New Politics in the USSR: the Case of the Environment', in John Massey Stewart (ed.), *The Soviet Environment. Problems, Policies, Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 68-69.

⁶⁹ Pryde (1991), p. 9.

⁷⁰ Interview with Serhii Mikhailov, Kiev, August 1991.

⁷¹ Charles E. Ziegler, *Environmental Protection in the Soviet Union* (Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für sozialforschung - Forschungsschwerpunkt Umweltpolitik IIUG, 1986), p. 5.

committee, headed by Dr Iurii Izrael, was made responsible for monitoring the quality of air and water throughout the USSR, with a special emphasis on critical areas. Moreover, *Goskomgidromet* would inspect enterprises and construction sites, as well as assessing the degree of compliance with environmental regulations and standards. Those enterprises that did not comply with these could be permanently or temporarily shut down. However, upgrading the hydrometeorological service proved insufficient, partly for the reasons mentioned above, partly as the new committee focused primarily on controlling water and air pollution (not soil pollution, radioactive pollution, chemical waste disposal, etc.). Finally, *Gidromet* was given only limited enforcement powers - most of these functions were retained by the ministries and departments causing the pollution in the first instance⁷².

Signalling increasing concern with the state of the environment in the USSR, a department for environmental protection was created within the USSR *Gosplan* in 1981. Further, a Commission on Environmental Protection was established under the auspices of the USSR Council of Ministers the same year. However, neither of these was given proper enforcement powers, and no significant improvement could be observed following their creation⁷³. Ziegler (1990), points out that 'agencies specifically charged with environmental protection missions did not have the financial resources, legal authority, or political support of the Party to combat pollution effectively'⁷⁴. Administrative changes proved just as ineffective as the large number of laws and regulations passed throughout the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s:

Опыт последних 20 лет, которые были рекордными по количеству административных мер, направленных на улучшение природопользования, а также рекордными по количеству реальных и потенциально созревших экологических проблем, показал, что этот механизм не может быть только административно-управленческим. Это должен быть прежде всего экономический механизм. Жесткая административно-командная регламентация должна быть заменена регламентацией нормативной (экономической и экологической), которая придаст самостоятельность всем иерархическим структурам и позволит им учесть многообразие местных природных и хозяйственных условий⁷⁵.

Thus, following the Chernobyl accident, and with Gorbachev's glasnost revealing the true picture of ecological damage done to the Soviet environment over the previous 70 years, the need for real environmental reform became more pressing.

⁷² Pryde (1991), p. 9.

⁷³ Charles E. Ziegler, *Environmental Policy and Politics under Gorbachev* (Paper presented at the Fourth World Congress of Soviet and East European Studies, Harrogate, England, 21-26 July 1990), p. 13.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁷⁵ В.И.Каракин, А.С. Шейнгауз, 'К новому природопользованию', in М. Лемешев (ред.), *Экологическая альтернатива* (Москва: Прогресс, 1990), с. 638.

2.2 Environmental Reform under Gorbachev (1985-91)

2.2.1 Changes in Ideology

Gorbachev mentioned the need to improve the state of the environment already in 1979. In a speech on scientific and technical progress, he stated that the scientific-technical revolution and the intensive utilisation of natural resources would make the problem of environmental protection ever more relevant⁷⁶.

Following his appointment as CPSU General Secretary in March 1985, Gorbachev on a number of occasions also brought up the issue of environmental protection. This was, however, done in fairly general terms - in the sense that Gorbachev acknowledged the existing problems and the need to solve them. And he fell short of offering concrete solutions. In some cases, he even resorted to the old paraphrase that 'we do have problems, but we have introduced certain measures to do away with them and we will soon reach our goals'. At the 26th Party Congress in February 1986, for example, Gorbachev said that 'ahead of us stands the important issue of environmental protection and the rational use of nature's resources. Socialism, with its planned organisation of production and humanitarian world view, is capable of bringing harmony into the relationship between society and the environment. We are already implementing a number of measures in this direction, we are releasing significant means and have achieved quite a few results already'⁷⁷.

The Chernobyl accident, Gorbachev's thinking in Soviet foreign policy and the introduction of glasnost as a means by which to facilitate economic reform highlighted attention on environmental problems. In foreign policy Soviet doctrine changed from one of mutual coexistence to that of mutual interdependence. On a number of occasions, Gorbachev referred to environmental problems together with the struggle for disarmament - both global issues that could be solved only through international co-operation. The thrust of Gorbachev's new thinking in Soviet foreign policy was that we live in a world of interdependence. The possibility of a nuclear war or the depletion of the world's natural resources due to intensive industrial production threaten mankind with possible extinction. These 'threats' can be liquidated only through joint efforts, and consequently, they call for international co-operation rather than competition (class struggle), because the major aim of capitalist as well as socialist states is survival. The nuclear accident at Chernobyl served as an illustration to this dilemma, as the radioactive fall-out affected most countries in Europe, demonstrating how vulnerable countries are to pollution emanating from beyond their borders.

The Chernobyl accident and the secrecy by which it was accompanied also clearly demonstrated the need for improving structures responsible for the environment - not only at an

⁷⁶ М.С. Горбачев, Избранные речи и статьи, том 1 (Москва: Издательство политической литературы, 1987), с. 222.

⁷⁷ М.С. Горбачев (1987). том 3, с. 230.

all-union level, but even more so in the republics. In most cases pollution in the republics emanated from all-union enterprises run by Moscow, upon which the former had no or very little influence. Decisions were made above people's heads, and the lack of official statistics, particularly health data, made it very difficult for the republics to decide to what extent pollution had had a negative effect on people's health.

The need for environmental reform was also brought to the surface by the debate on economic reform. The Stalinist command-administrative economic system aimed at maximising economic growth. By stressing quantity (output), hardly any room was left for quality (innovation), thus encouraging inefficient use of natural resources, resulting in waste and pollution. The centralist character of the Soviet economy further aggravated the environmental costs of industrial production.

Gorbachev's policy of economic 'acceleration' (*uskorenie*) also had an environmental side attached to it. The State Programme on the Protection of the Environment and the Rational Use of Natural Resources which was adopted in 1990 stressed this link between the economy and the state of the environment. According to the programme, the economic and social development of a country was to a large extent connected to the state of the environment and the level of utilisation of natural resources. Therefore, questions regarding environmental protection and the use of natural resources were given priority. The economic loss due to environmental pollution in the Soviet Union was estimated at some 200 million roubles for 1989⁷⁸.

As a way out, Gorbachev suggested economic, legal and educational measures. He called for a long-term (perspective) program on the environment and stressed the need to implement already existing programs and plans. Local authorities should actively take part in this process.

2.2.2 Structural Change

To facilitate the implementation of a new environmental policy, structural changes were required. In July 1986, the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet issued a decree announcing that all union republics would establish their own state committees for the protection of the environment and the rational use of natural resources. These state committees were to be in charge of environmental protection in the republics, something that had previously been shared by a number of different bodies. However, as the organisational structures did not change at the all-union level, and as a large percentage of republican industries was controlled by all-union ministries showing little concern for the environment, nothing much changed.

⁷⁸ Национальный доклад о состоянии природной среды в СССР, *Слет.* no. 12, 1990, с. 21-23, 41-43 and 55-71.

Gorbachev admitted that central ministries did not always consider the environmental impact of their activities. Calls for a unified body to be put in charge of environmental protection and the rational use of natural resources had been made since the 1970s, and acknowledging this demand, *Gosgidromet* (the State Committee on Meteorology) in late 1987 dropped 'and the environment' from its title and returned to its previous function as a scientific organisation⁷⁹. To strengthen and streamline the apparatus in charge of protecting the environment, a USSR State Committee on the Environment and the Rational Use of Natural Resources (*USSR Goskompriroda*) was set up in January 1988. The new committee's Moscow office had a staff of around 400. Staff was recruited from other ministries and departments. Whereas the Moscow office would be in charge of elaborating policies, the implementation of environmental regulations and legislation would be through parallel committees in the union republics, oblasts and at local levels⁸⁰.

The tasks and responsibilities of *Goskompriroda* were outlined in the Decree on Radical Perestroika in the Field of Environmental Protection in the Country issued by the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers and the USSR Supreme Soviet on 7 January 1988. According to the resolution, the new committee would be responsible for comprehensive environmental protection activities, environmental monitoring, long-term environmental planning, the elaboration of norms and standards for the use of natural resources and emissions of pollutants, and the overseeing of the design, location and construction of environmentally sensitive facilities. Moreover, *Goskompriroda* would issue waste-disposal permits, manage nature preserves, endangered species and control hunting, as well as promoting ecological education and being responsible for international co-operation and co-ordination. These functions would be passed over to the new committee by the myriad of ministries and departments which had so far been in charge of these tasks⁸¹.

Two councils - the Public Council and the Scientific-Technical Council - were attached to *Goskompriroda* in an advisory capacity. The former, which had 100-150 members covering a broad range of backgrounds, was responsible for maintaining links with the public and also making recommendations to the committee. Meeting twice a year, a bureau was established (some 30 members) to manage its day-to-day activities. Six members of the bureau were deputies of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, thus providing a direct link to parliament. Several working commissions were set up within the framework of the Public Council. The Scientific Council was smaller, consisting of 30 members, and sent recommendations to the committee on issues of scientific significance.

The chairman of *Goskompriroda* had a board, consisting of five divisions, to support his work. The five divisions covered issues such as the economics and organisation of nature use,

⁷⁹ Pryde (1991), p. 10.

⁸⁰ Ziegler (1990), p. 13.

⁸¹ Pryde, (1991), p. 11.

science and ecological normatives, monitoring, management of the propagation of ecological knowledge and, finally, environmental impact assessments⁸².

Fedor Morgun, former Party First Secretary of the Poltava district in Ukraine and a soil conservation expert, was appointed the first chairman of the committee. This appointment was criticised by some, as Morgun was perceived as an apparachik, not thought sufficiently devoted to real reform. Morgun had, however, conducted an experiment in Poltava making use of tilling methods more friendly to the soil, and on numerous occasions expressed the view that Soviet agriculture needed a major overhaul in the way it managed the land. Fedor Morgun was given the task of setting up the new committee and developing a long-term programme on the state of the Soviet environment⁸³. In August 1989 Morgun was replaced by Nikolai Vorontsov, a biologist and former director of the Academy of Sciences' Far Eastern Institute of Biology and Soils. From 1988 he was chief scientist at the Koltsov Institute of Evolution Biology. Vorontsov became the first non-party member to chair a state committee. In March 1989 Vorontsov was elected a member of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies on a platform of 'Diversity and Stability'. Vorontov called for not only biological, but also cultural and ethnic diversity⁸⁴. *Goskompriroda* was given ministerial status in 1991.

The January 1988 decree, establishing *Goskompriroda*, stated that the issue of environmental protection would in the future be one of the most important in Soviet political life. It stressed that the final aim of issuing the decree was not only to protect natural resources, but also to improve the state of the Soviet environment. Somewhat later, in 1990, a *Long-Term State Programme on Environmental Protection and the Rational Use of Natural Resources in the USSR* gave an outline of priority tasks up to the year 2005 necessary to stabilise and eventually improve the state of the environment in the Soviet Union. It also envisaged a more rational and non-impoverishing use of natural resources to secure the balanced and stable socio-economic development of the country. The programme called for a total investment in this area of between 240 and 335 billion rubles in the coming years.

The programme signalled a shift in Soviet economic policies from extensive towards intensive growth. For instance, the extraction of raw materials was to be stabilised at the 1990 level. Economisation would be introduced in Soviet energy policies, and the expansion of power-generating facilities would be stopped as of 1995. New measures of resource conservation and low-waste technologies would be introduced at Soviet enterprises. Further, the programme announced the creation of a unified system of environmental legislation, standards and norms for industrial activities and the environment in the country. State 'environmental impact assessments'

⁸² DeBardleben (1992), p. 70.

⁸³ Åse B. Grødeland, (1992), p. 9.

⁸⁴ Ziegler (1990), pp. 13, 14.

would in the future be conducted on all new industrial projects in order to assess the soundness of the project from the point of view of the environment⁸⁵.

Expanding on the 1988 decree, the state programme included a list of measures to be worked out and implemented by *Goskompriroda*. The State Committee was given the right to ban the construction, reconstruction and expansion of any enterprise or project failing to obtain a positive environmental impact assessment. It could levy fines for violations of legislation on the environment, and in more severe cases, it could initiate legal action against individuals and enterprises, requiring a halt in production. *Goskompriroda* was also to collect payments for the use of natural resources.

Section 5 of the state programme on the environment gave an outline of the means available to *Goskompriroda* in fulfilling the targets of the programme. These were (1) environmental legislation, (2) norms, (3) economic instruments, (4) state environmental impact assessments, (5) state control and (6) environmental education.

Environmental Legislation

According to the programme, a number of laws would be drafted during 1990. Such laws included the USSR Law on Environmental Protection, the USSR Law on Territories of Particular Protection, the USSR Law on the Protection and the Rational Use of Vegetation, and the USSR Law on the Use of Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Safety. Legislative work was to be continued in the period 1991-95. Existing legal acts would be revised and in some cases replaced with new laws. Legal responsibility for concealing information about environmental disasters, as well as responsibility for accidents with an environmental impact, would be defined. Finally, punishment for failing to comply with environmental legislation would be made more severe.

Norms

One of *Goskompriroda's* major tasks was to develop a unified system of scientifically based norms to create a framework for the regulation of environmental protection activities and the rational use of natural resources. This work would be conducted in close co-operation with central economic bodies and research institutions. By 1993 basic norms would be elaborated on the basis of the revision of already existing norms. Local and regional branches of *Goskompriroda* would in addition develop regional norms for maximum permissible emissions, noise limits, etc.⁸⁶. Finally, indicators of environmental capacity would be developed in order to establish maximum technological strain, the impact of extraction of natural resources on other factors, which, if increased, could cause permanent changes to the environment.

⁸⁵ Государственная программа охраны окружающей среды и рационального использования природных ресурсов СССР на 1991-1995 годы и на перспективу до 2005 года, (Проект), *Правительственный вестник. Досье*. 1989 (n.d.).

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

Economic Means

A system of payments and fines was foreseen to facilitate structural reform of the Soviet Union's economy based on saving natural resources, introducing low-waste technologies and increasing efficiency. The introduction of payments for the use of natural resources should also stimulate environmental protection activities at enterprises. Qualitative, rather than quantitative, growth was to be the norm.

The system would include (a) payment for the right to use natural resources, (b) payment for the extraction and the protection of natural resources, (c) compensation for the removal of natural resources from ordinary use or the worsening of their quality, caused by the activities of a certain enterprise, (d) payments for emissions of polluting substances into the environment, (e) fines and other economic sanctions for violating rules and norms for the rational use of natural resources, and (f) preferential terms for taxing enterprise income.

Payment for the use of natural resources would be decided in accordance with the requirements of the USSR Law on Local Self-Government and the Local Economy and also in other legal acts of the union, union-republics and autonomous republics. The payments for the extraction and protection of natural resources were established on the basis of necessary expenses to fulfil all-union, republican and local programmes on nature protection and the rational use of natural resources, and of implementing a system of control and monitoring of the state of the environment. The size of these payments was set in accordance with republican laws. The size of payments for emissions within the established limits was determined on the basis of what it would cost to reduce the damage caused to the environment as calculated by republican and local environmental protection programmes.

Money collected as payment for the use of natural resources, fines for polluting the environment and non-rational use of natural resources and other violations of environmental legislation were included in local budget and non-budget funds. Tax incentives would be used for enterprises installing devices to reduce pollution and for enterprises producing equipment for monitoring the environment.

Various state and regional/local funds would be established during the 1990s to make use of fines and payments collected from enterprises for pollution for the mis-use of natural resources. The use of these means was to be controlled by USSR *Goskompriroda* and the republican/regional committees. The territorial funds would be formed by payments for emissions, fines, the income from the production of environmentally friendly devices, subsidies from budgets, local taxes, voluntary contributions and interest on credits granted to improve the state of the environment. The distribution of money from the territorial funds between local, republican and all-union budgets was to be conducted through agreements. The territorial funds would be used to fund the establishment and reconstruction of regional environmental installations, on means to improve the state of the environment and the use of natural resources, and on the funding of enterprise outlays to reduce their emissions in accordance with the tasks of the programme.

A fund for environmental security was to be formed through special taxes on environmentally hazardous technologies and dangerous installations, the insurance of natural resources and objects in case of loss due to accidents and natural catastrophes, and also centralisation of a part of amortisation assignments on environmental objects. This fund would be used to finance the surveying, alleviation and elimination of natural disasters and accidents and to secure economic assistance for individual republics and regions to solve environmental tasks.

The republics were to be in charge of funding and implementing projects of environmental protection and the rational use of natural resources, whereas the all-union organs would implement scientific programmes and work of all-union importance, and implement national programmes and programmes connected to the fulfilment of international agreements. Major environmental activities of all-union and international importance (Chernobyl, the Aral Sea and others) would be funded primarily from Moscow. Central funds were allocated after a competition of projects and were channelled to republican/local environmental protection bodies⁸⁷.

State Environmental Impact Assessments

Any plan to open an enterprise or make changes in production at an enterprise could not be realised until it had been 'cleared' by a state environmental impact assessment, which was conducted by *Goskompriroda*. The experts in this department assessed the aim and the necessity of the proposed project, the means by which it could be implemented, alternatives to the project, the character and level of interaction on the environment, including possible accidents, possibilities of reducing negative impact on the environment, etc. The assessments made were available to the general public. In many cases plans were referred back to their makers for requested changes. Once changed, the environmental experts were obliged to reassess the project.

State Control

State control over the environment and the rational use of natural resources was conducted by the Soviets of People's Deputies and organs with special powers. The major task of the State Control on the Environment and the Rational Use of Natural Resources was to keep an eye on the activities of ministries, state committees and institutions, enterprises, organisations, etc., independently of departmental subordination. The idea was that such control would reveal violations of environmental legislation, norms and rules on the rational use of natural resources, and secure the 'perfection' of forms and methods of state control. It would also predict regional, inter-republican and international environmental conflicts.

The former USSR Supreme Soviet as well as the Supreme Soviets of the now independent republics had their own committees on the environment. During the elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies (March 1989), most of the candidates had a green platform. A large proportion of them were elected as a result of their commitment to environmental reform, or

⁸⁷ *Ibid.* p. 11.

rather, it became impossible to be elected without one. The same trend was observed during elections to the republican Congresses of People's Deputies.

On 24 May 1989, immediately prior to the opening of the first Congress of People's Deputies, the weekly newspaper *Literaturnaia gazeta* published an appeal, 'The Fatherland in Environmental Danger', signed by a number of leading writers and scientists and addressed to the Congress. It urged the deputies actively to work to improve the state of the Soviet environment. A group of deputies followed up the appeal by urging the Congress to endorse as one of its resolutions a Declaration on the Environmental State of the USSR. Such a resolution was not endorsed, but the Congress passed the document on to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Still, environmental issues were focused upon during the sitting of the Congress. According to Aleksei Iablokov, every third deputy mentioned the environment in his/her speech and even the Prime Minister called for a 'greener' government.

The Committee on Environmental Issues and the Rational Use of Natural Resources (Komitet po voprosam ekologii i ratsionalnogo ispolzovaniia prirodnnykh resursov) was created at the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. K.S. Salykov from Karakalpakia was elected its president. The Committee had 50 members and was thus the biggest of a total of 22 committees and commissions. Twenty five of its members were also members of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the other 25 were people's deputies. Iablokov, however, expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that some 20 specialists on the environment were not included in the Committee. As the character of environmental problems varied greatly, nine subcommittees were established.

During the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Committee tried to put the environmental state of the USSR on the agenda on a number of occasions. Only at the second session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, however, was the environment tabled for discussion, and it was not among the priority issues. On 27 November 1989 a resolution on the 'urgent measures to improve the state of the environment in the country' was endorsed. Iablokov labelled this resolution a 'big, step forward on a matter of principal importance' to solving the problems of the environment as far as legislative powers were concerned. The resolution introduced concepts such as 'environmental passportisation of enterprise, objects and territories', 'environmental maps', 'environmental protection prosecutor's office', 'environmental violation of legislation', etc. for the first time. The USSR Council of Ministers was ordered to give the assistance required to environmental disaster areas and to develop instructions on how to stimulate economically the use of environmentally safe technologies. It also listed the most seriously damaged territories and contained a list of priority issues to be sorted out by 1995 (see above).

At the Second Congress of the USSR People's Deputies in December 1989 a standing environmental group of deputies (EDG - Ekologicheskaiia Deputatskaia Gruppya) was formed. At the end of 1990 it had some 260 members. By the beginning of 1991, Iablokov concluded that it had not been as active as one would have expected. This, he said, was to a large extent caused by the lack of technical equipment. After it was established in 1989, the Committee on the

environment took an active part in the activities of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet. However, it was criticised by many, including Sergei Zalygin, for not being active enough. Its leader, K. Zalykov, was also accused of incompetence. Iablokov, on the other hand, was more positive about the results achieved, although he admitted that there had been many obstacles.

Already in the first months of its existence, the Committee established itself as a 'disturbing' element within the Parliament. During the discussion on candidates to the Council of Ministers (each candidate first had to be endorsed by all the committees and commissions before they could be suggested to the USSR Supreme Soviet) eight out of 55 were not approved, four of them rejected by the Committee on the Environment on environmental grounds. Informally, it refused to accept several possible candidates for the post of president of USSR *Goskomprroda*. It also took an active part in finding a suitable new chairman. Nikolai Vorontsov was eventually endorsed for this post.

During the debate on the state budget for 1990, the Committee consulted a number of experts on the 'environmentability' of the proposed project. The Committee found that if endorsed, the USSR would pollute more in 1990 than it had done in 1985. The Committee was therefore unable to endorse the budget. However, as only two other committees agreed with it, it was overruled.

As for legislation, the Committee on the Environment succeeded in including environmental requirements in a number of laws. For example, the Committee introduced a ban on environmentally dangerous technology obtained from abroad. It also introduced and frequently made use of so-called parliamentary hearings. These were chaired by the subcommittees. All members of the Committee were allowed to attend these. In addition, any people's deputy as well as experts from outside the parliament were free to join. The first hearing was held in the summer of 1989 by the subcommittee on nuclear ecology, and it dealt with the nuclear accident in the South Urals in 1957.

In March 1990 Gorbachev set up a Presidential Council. Two Soviet writers and ardent defenders of the environment, Valentin Rasputin and Chingiz Aitmatov, were appointed to the council, and Ziegler (1990) expressed hopes that they might be able to influence the country's environmental policies through the Council⁸⁸.

2.2.3 The Union-Republics and the Environment

Gorbachev's strong global commitment to environmental issues was reflected in his attitude to the republics' demands for economic autonomy. From the point of view of the republics, the only way in which local environmental problems could be overcome would be for the republics themselves

⁸⁸ Ziegler (1990), p. 14.

to control the use of natural resources situated on their territories. Gorbachev, on the other hand, considered it impossible to solve environmental problems in the republics without the involvement of all-union organs. This, as 'ecological problems in our time demand complex solutions, and not only within the framework of separate countries, but in the framework of continents, even the world as such'. Gorbachev thus refuted the argument used by Greens and other political groupings in the republics opting for independence: namely that independence (and hence a republic's control over its natural resources and industries located on its territory) was the only solution to solving the serious environmental problems of the Soviet republics. Success in the field of the environment could, in Gorbachev's opinion, be reached only 'when central organs of nature protection together with organs of people's power and self-governing bodies locally as well as the broad public pull together'. The possibility of the republics taking control of their own resources was ruled out, as this would also give them a monopoly over 'unique natural resources' and, in turn, 'would lead to a differentiation in living standards'. However, political developments in the former USSR paved the way for economic autonomy (Baltic states, 1989) and eventually political sovereignty and independence.

During the late 1980s and early 1990s a number of laws and regulations on the environment were adopted. A long-term State Programme on Environmental Protection and the Rational Utilisation of Natural Resources of the USSR for the 13th Five-Year Plan (1991-95) and for the Period up to the Year 2005 was adopted in the late 1980s and, together with the USSR Supreme Soviet's Regulation On Urgent Measures for the Normalisation of the Ecological Situation in the Country, adopted on 27 November 1989, formed the basis of Soviet environmental policies.

To strengthen the implementation of these policies, the USSR State Committee on the Environment (*Goskompriroda*) was given ministerial status in June 1991. Paradoxically, though, as attempts were made centrally at strengthening the powers of *Goskompriroda* (after June 1991, *Minpriroda*), the republics chose to establish direct links between environmental authorities on their territories so as to avoid interference from Moscow.

An Interrepublican Agreement on Environmental Protection and the Rational Use of Natural Resources had been adopted in early 1991, and the republics agreed to co-ordinate their efforts through an Interrepublican Ecological Soviet, which had come into existence in late 1990 on the initiative of the Environmental Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet. As for relations between the republics and the USSR Ministry of Environmental Protection, Minister Nikolai Vorontsov during an official visit to Britain in late November 1991 at a meeting with this author stated that although the USSR was disintegrating, the environmental problems of the USSR remained. Environmental disasters like Chernobyl, the Aral Sea and the Caspian Sea, just to mention a few, affected a number of republics. Vorontsov's idea was therefore that the Ministry could mediate between the republics on how to deal with these problems. In the event of a dispute, the USSR Ministry could also conduct ecological impact assessments of industrial projects bound to affect a number of republics. The republics, however, preferred to address these problems directly

amongst themselves. A series of bilateral agreements on the environment were adopted during 1991, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the CIS members - with the exception of Ukraine - signed a CIS Agreement on Environmental Protection and the Use of Natural Resources on 8 February 1992.

The CIS Agreement closely resembled the Interrepublican Agreement and envisaged the co-ordination of environmental policies through the Interrepublican Ecological Council. An Ecological Fund was set up to finance clean-up projects affecting more than one republic. No CIS implementing bodies were established. Decisions made by the Council were to be carried out by the Departments and Ministries of Environmental Protection of the CIS republics. During 1991 and early 1992, the new states concluded a series of bilateral agreements on environmental protection. Laws on the environment were also drafted and adopted by each state at this time.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the CIS was considered by many people to be a negative development from the point of view of the environment. The priority of the republics at the time was to consolidate their independence. Environmental issues, it was argued, would be addressed once independence had been secured. In this sense the break-up of the USSR was bad news as far as the environment was concerned. However, smaller territorial units would undoubtedly make environmental management easier. The greatest problem the new states were faced with, also from the viewpoint of the environment, was the constant shortage of hard currency with which to obtain equipment required to modernise industries and install pollution-reducing devices at existing industrial plants.

2.2.4 Assessment of Gorbachev's Environmental Reforms

As seen above, a number of measures were implemented to improve the state of the environment in the Soviet Union during Gorbachev's leadership. However, pollution in the USSR increased at the same time. The national income of the USSR from 1985 to 1988 increased by 8.5%, while the loss of natural resources, pollution of nature and nature destruction over the same period went up from 16 to 80% - even though more money was allocated for environmental protection in this period. In 1985 the Soviet government allocated 2.5 billion rubles for this purpose. In 1988 3.1 billion rubles were spent on environmental protection.

Table 2.3 Environmental Pollution in the USSR⁸⁹

Loss and pollution	1985	1988	1988 in % compared to 1985
water collection from sources (bill. m ³)	329.8	333.7	101
loss of water during transportation (bill. m ³)	43.6	50.6	116
emissions of polluted water (bill. m ³)	15.9	28.6	180
including into Baikal (mill. m ³)	124	191	154
into Ladoga (mill. m ³)	271	392	145
Loss of gas during transportation (bill. m ³)	12.9	15.1	117
arable land suffering from erosion (mill. ha)	133	133	164

Source: Lemeshev (1990²), p. 201.

Below, I will endeavour to identify some of the reasons why Gorbachev's environmental reforms did not work.

Administrative Changes

In an interview with *Planovoe khoziaistvo* in early 1989 Fedor Morgun stated that 'so far, (*Goskompriroda*'s) structure and working bodies are (still) being formed, so it has not yet managed to launch active work'. He expressed similar ideas later, arguing that 'the agency is still in the process of completing its structural outlines, recruiting personnel. Actual environmental work has not yet begun'⁹⁰. A similar view was expressed by Morgun's predecessor, the biologist Nikolai Vorontsov, who also had problems with organising the new committee. In an interview with *Who's Who in the Soviet Government* (Moscow: Novosti, 1990), he admitted that the 'agency (is) still in the throes of organisation. Major improvements in the environment cannot be expected in the immediate future'⁹¹. A factor contributing to what might be called 'administrative stalemate' was the lack of clarity with regard to *Goskompriroda*'s authority and also with regard to which divisions and departments currently under the auspices of other ministries, departments and state committees would be transferred to the new committee. Thus, as pointed out by Karakin and Sheingaus:

(2 года после создания Госкомприроды) по психе краях и областях возникла одна и та же картина: львиная доля энергии тратится на споры, в которые втягиваются и высшие сферы, какая часть из каких ведомств передается или каков не передается Госкомприроде, что передается, какие помещения и какие фонды передаются, т.е.

⁸⁹ Table taken from M.Y. Lemeshev (1990), c. 201.

⁹⁰ Ziegler (1990), p. 13.

⁹¹ Referred to in *ibid.*, p. 14.

все опять превратилось в организационные игры...Эту идею каждый трактует по своему, и сегодня познывает опасность, что мы получим еще одну ведомство, еще один этаж контроля⁹².

As an example, they referred to *Primor'rybvod* - the Primorsk regional branch of *Minryb* (the Ministry of Fisheries)'s inspectorate - which eventually allocated 10% of its inspection corps to the Primorsk territorial committee for nature protection, instructing it to control the quality of used water resources in the same way as it did. After the creation of *Goskompriroda*, monitoring continued to be conducted by several entities (for instance, *Sanepidemstantsiia* - the Epidemiological Service of the USSR Ministry of Health, monitoring industrial pollution as it related to health and during the 1980s primarily in charge of water quality, whereas *Gosgidromet* conducted monitoring of air quality), thus making the creation of a unified data-base difficult⁹³.

Moreover, as *Goskompriroda* was subordinate to the USSR Council of Ministers, it was consistently outvoted by other ministries⁹⁴. *Goskompriroda* might have benefited from direct subordination to the Soviet Parliament. In some republics local branches of *Goskompriroda* were faced with dual subordination. On the one hand they were subordinate to the Ministry/Committee centrally. On the other, they were to a considerable extent dependent on local government for funding to cover salaries and administrative costs. In cases of disagreement between local government and central environmental authorities, the local government usually had the upper hand. In other cases, local environmental protection bodies were faced with difficulties executing environmental policies, as the USSR Council of Ministers wanted to increase environmentally harmful production to maximise hard-currency earnings. This problem was reported in Tiumen oblast, where large areas in the Mari autonomous republic were suffering from oil pollution, but where efforts to modernise equipment (pipes for transport) were opposed by the USSR Council of Ministers, which demanded increased output of oil.

Similar situations were reported elsewhere: in order to maximise hard-currency earnings or meet the targets of *goszakaz*, enterprises were forced to produce at full capacity. Installing pollution-reducing devices would require a slow-down in production which simply could not be afforded. Officials in the Department of Environmental Protection in Latvia in interviews during 1991 also concluded that environmental protection was at the bottom of government priorities. Similar concerns were expressed by officials in Lithuania and Moldova⁹⁵.

Another problem was identified by Lemeshev, who argued that *Goskompriroda* was given very modest functions and authority. Moreover, its resources were very limited⁹⁶. *Goskompriroda* also had problems in finding well-qualified people to work in the new committee.

⁹² Каракин, Шейнгаус (1990), с. 637.

⁹³ Pryde (1991), p. 11.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ Such views were expressed in conversations I had and interviews I took with officials in these republics during the summer of 1991 as a consultant for the Ecological Studies Institute (London).

⁹⁶ М.Я. Лемешев (1990), с. 200.

Iurii Sheherbak, in 1991 appointed Ukrainian Minister of the Environment, argued that the staff of his ministry was largely composed of people who had previously worked in other ministries. These were professional bureaucrats, unable to think untraditionally and to some extent still loyal to their previous employers. The problem was compounded by the fact that the government resisted attempts at getting rid of them. Further, scholars were as reluctant to become bureaucrats as were highly educated and qualified members of the Green Movement. There was also a shortage of qualified environmental scientists. Only recently had this type of education been introduced and courses to re-educate ministerial staff were very often unsatisfactory. As many units were understaffed, it proved very difficult for them to send people to training courses, seminars, etc. Finally, it was difficult to attract well-qualified young people to the ministry, as in most cases they preferred to pursue a scientific or professional career. Ministry wages were quite low, and so was the status of ministerial posts⁹⁷.

A lack of and inadequate equipment for monitoring the state of the environment was also a big problem. In Lithuania, for example, there was a shortage of laboratory facilities. As a rule the environmental district committees did not possess their own equipment, and therefore relied on inspectors from Vilnius to assist them. That complicated local inspectors' responsibility for conducting unannounced, on-the-spot analyses. In all republics I was told that monitoring was restricted by military bases: although inspectors had access to these areas, military personnel were reluctant to let them conduct their own tests and instead established their own system of monitoring. Lack of computer facilities was a particularly big problem for regional committees. Arkhangelsk *Goskompriroda*, for instance, had only two computers, insufficient even to create a proper database. Maintenance of such equipment, where available, also proved to be a problem⁹⁸.

Goskompriroda's main function was to control the state of the environment, not to control the use of natural resources. Thus, although an improvement in the state of the environment had been registered at the republican level, it was doubtful whether the creation of USSR *Goskompriroda* would change much at the all-union level:

Несколько повышает эффективность природоохранной деятельности, но природопользовательская ситуация, а следовательно, и охрана природы кардинально не меняются, ибо в основу деятельности комитетов положена контрольно-инспекционная работа и они не имеют рычагов, чтобы управлять в полной мере природопользованием⁹⁹.

A related problem was the centralised character of *Goskompriroda's* inspection service:

⁹⁷ Grødeland (1992), pp. 15,16. A similar situation was expressed by the ministries and state departments in the Baltic States, Moldova, Belorussia and Russia, also visited in 1991.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁹⁹ Каракин, Шейнгаус (1990), с. 638.

Инспекционно-контрольная база деятельности этих госкомитетов заставит их выставить жестко централизованную командную систему управления, что не соответствует ни общим процессам развития местной инициативы и самостоятельности, ни необходимости зонально-географического подхода к проблемам рационального природопользования и охраны природы¹⁰⁰.

Economic Changes

Mikhail Lemeshev (1990) holds the view that the major reason why Gorbachev's environmental reform failed to work as intended was that it was accompanied by a sharp extensive economic growth. A major component in Gorbachev's reform package was economic reform through the 'acceleration' of economic production. Thus, Nikolai Ryzhkov's speech to the 27th Party Congress in February 1986 did not indicate any major changes in the economic structures of the USSR:

Вопрос о темпах всегда был и остается одним из центральных в экономической политике партии¹⁰¹.

Gorbachev's policy of *uskorenie* ('acceleration') was taken by those in charge of the country's economic planning as an endorsement of the policies of extensive economic growth:

В практике планирования и управления народным хозяйством стратегии ускорения социально-экономического развития ведомствами понимается традиционно, как и в период застоя и экстенсивного развития производства. Понятие ускорения социально-экономического развития, по существу, выхолащивается. Оно по-прежнему трактуется как повышение темпов роста материального производства, главным образом сырья, машин и образования¹⁰².

Gorbachev's policy of 'acceleration' was highly 'successful' in that it produced a four percent increase in economic growth between 1986 and 1988.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Материалы XXVII съезда КПСС (Об основных направлениях экономического и социального развития СССР на 1986–1990 годы и на период до 2000 года). (Москва 1986, с. 228), in Лемешев (1990), с. 195.

¹⁰² Ibid.

Table 2.4 Average Annual Growth Rates for the Major Indicators of the Socio-Economic Development of the USSR (in %)¹⁰³

	1981-1985	1986-1988
Industrial production	3.6	4.0
Of these:	3.6	4.0
Group 'A'		
Group 'B'	3.9	4.0
Agricultural production	1.0	3.0
Size of cargo freights	0.6	2.6
Capital investments	3.7	7.1
National income	3.2	2.8
Real income of population	1.8	1.4

Source: Lemeshev (1990²), p. 196.

As indicated in Table 2.2, although there was continued economic growth in the USSR from 1981 to 1988, efficiency of investments dropped by one third between 1986 and 1988. Most of the growth registered took place in the extracting and heavy industries, thus facilitating the continued (and increased) inefficient use of natural resources and increased pollution. Increased investments to reduce the level of pollution in the country were inefficient, as

...Природоохранные мероприятия ориентируются на борьбу со следствием иррационального, сугубо экстенсивного роста производства, а не на его интенсификацию, техническое совершенствование и изменение его природоразрушительной структуры. А такая стратегия в принципе бесперспективна и не может привести к заметному оздоровлению окружающей среды¹⁰⁴.

As Lemeshev saw it, there was only one way in which to improve the state of the environment in the USSR; the country's economic structures had to be changed - at the expense of the manufacturing of production means. Moreover, the size of production and the use of natural resources such as iron ore, oil, gas, forests, water and ploughed land, had to be reduced. Limited material and financial resources should be used not for environmentally dubious works such as the construction of nuclear power stations, giant reservoirs and canals, but rather for the introduction and use of resource-saving technologies and ecologically clean production. Then,

В условиях экстенсивного роста производства, базирующегося на ресурсоемких, природоразрушающих и загрязняющих технологиях, задача охраны природы неразрешима в принципе, какие бы большие средства ни направлялись на осуществление природоохранных мероприятий. Более того, без изменения структуры общественного производства, без его интенсификации, стабилизации роста, а затем сокращения количественных объемов производства сырья и промежуточных продуктов, без освоения ресурсосберегающих, экологически чистых технологий, рост затрат труда на охрану

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 196.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 201.

природы будет представлять не что иное, как рост экономического ущерба для народного хозяйства и благосостояния общества¹⁰⁵.

Lemeshev's views were echoed by Karakin and Sheingaus, who also saw the problem of environmental reform in the economic and administrative structures of the USSR. As a matter of fact, Gorbachev's policies of *samofinansirovanie* (self-financing) and *khozraschet* (cost accounting) were aggravating the situation:

„В сочетании с переходом производящих отраслей на самофинансирование и хозрасчет, при задержке введения платы за природные ресурсы, и при том, что все-таки пока идет ослабление (количественное и качественное) контрольного аппарата, мы можем получить в стране пик природоохранных проблем¹⁰⁶.

To improve the situation, they recommended the introduction of economic measures elaborated actively by Soviet economists from the mid-1950s, such as leasing (*rentnyi podkhod*) and the pricing of natural-resources. A shift away from the strong centralisation of the Soviet economic system, towards a more deflated, regional structure, was also required.

Legal Changes

Although the USSR Supreme Soviet and the parliaments in the republics adopted a number of laws on the environment, these laws did not, as seen above, produce any significant improvement in the environment of the former Soviet Union. Partly the legislators were to blame for this, as the laws were insufficient. More seriously, however, existing law enforcement bodies were not granted sufficient powers to see to it that the laws were actually implemented. This function was by and large carried out by overworked state inspectors working in the ministries/departments of environmental protection. They were too few and lacked the equipment necessary to undertake their monitoring responsibilities properly. An excessive amount of time was furthermore spent on paper-work.

If breaches of environmental legislation and rules were revealed, action could be taken, through a system of fines and payments for emissions exceeding the permissible levels. The ministries/departments of environmental protection in the republics were responsible for collecting these from the enterprises. In a number of cases, though, enterprises refused to pay their fines, or were very slow in doing so, or disputed the evidence produced by environmental authorities. In such cases the enterprises and/or ministries/departments of environmental protection could turn to

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 205.

¹⁰⁶ Каракин, Шейнгаус (1990), с. 637.

the arbitration courts for a legal settlement of the dispute. If the breach of legislation was more severe, the Prosecutor's Office decided whether or not to take legal action. Should the Prosecutor decide to take such action, an investigation into the case would be organised. Investigation was closely co-ordinated with the Ministry/Department of Environmental Protection, which supplied the former with documents and other information on the case. The relationship between the two bodies was outlined in an instruction issued by the USSR's Prosecutor's Office on 11 June 1990.

In 1989 over 500,000 administrative cases of non-compliance with existing legislation and regulations on the environment were registered. Compared to the previous year there was a reduction in the number of cases. Administrative proceedings were instituted against 479,000 people, of whom 414,000 were fined. The average fine, however, was only 28 rubles per person. Investigation was started against some 4,000 poachers for criminal offences. The total sum of fines collected in 1989 was 11.4 million rubles. Money collected from enterprises for damages caused to the environment totalled 100 million rubles. The total loss due to damages to the environment, however, was estimated by *Goskompriroda* at more than 200 million rubles. To some extent this could be explained by cases not being discovered and fines being set too low. However, a proper investigation was often not launched, even when the evidence was there.

The June 1990 Instruction issued by the USSR Prosecutor's Office stated that excess emissions of pollutants in most cases had no impact on enterprise activities. Sufficient measures were taken only occasionally in response to violations of environmental regulations. The violators were rarely put on trial (in some cases the investigation was dropped) because the Prosecutor's Office was not provided with the documents it needed. In many cases, however, the Prosecutor's Office was itself to blame for this situation, as it was reluctant to prosecute people, even if there was enough evidence available to take action. To some extent this was due to a lack of expertise on environmental legislation in the Prosecutor's Office, and to understaffing.

The Prosecutor's Office was prevented from taking individuals to court for environmental crimes as it had either not been able to obtain materials necessary to conduct a proper investigation (they were labelled confidential) or it was politically impossible to organise a trial. This was well illustrated in the case of Chernobyl. Immediately after the accident the people in charge of operating the nuclear power station were charged and sentenced to long terms in jail. Others, who were responsible for flaws in construction of the nuclear power station and inadequacies in the clean-up operation and in assessing the extent of the accident, were not investigated for political reasons. Only in the early 1990s did such investigations become possible.

In order to improve the situation, the June 1990 instruction called for regular contacts between environmental authorities and the Prosecutor's Office, in order to secure a prompt exchange of information on a regular basis. Documents regarding violations of environmental legislation had to be passed on to the Prosecutor's Office within 10 days of their discovery. If the violation was very serious, copies of the documents were sent to republican environmental protection bodies as well as to the republican prosecutor's office. The two organs were obliged to

plan and carry out joint inspections to see to it that enterprises observed regulations on the environment. Furthermore, from June 1990 prosecutors were entitled to consult environmental experts in the Ministries/Departments of Environmental Protection on difficult technical matters. Environmental authorities, on the other hand, were instructed to provide the Prosecutor's Office with general materials on pollution/environmental protection to serve an educational purpose. The Prosecutors were obliged to inform environmental authorities on measures taken by them. Once a year the latter would compile documentation on breaches of environmental legislation for the Prosecutor's Office. The Prosecutor's Office was also in charge of controlling the environmental authorities and thus seeing to it that their activities were within the framework of the instructions, rules and laws within which they operated. This caused some tension between the two.

As seen above, several of the laws passed went much further than previous laws passed in an effort to improve the state of the environment in the USSR. This, however, was not the case for all the laws. Lemeshev referred to the draft Law on the Use of Nuclear Energy to illustrate this. This law, in his view, expressed narrow, departmental interests, ignoring the opinion of the Soviet public and also recent international trends. Moreover, it contradicted the Law on Property, according to which natural resources, including the soil, water and minerals, were in the possession of the republican and local soviets. The draft law proposed that

Компетенция союзных республик распространяется лишь на "регулирование отношений, связанных с охраной здоровья и имущества населения, а также защитой окружающей среды от возможных негативных воздействий радиации"¹⁰⁷.

Whereas the construction and maintenance of all nuclear power stations would be the function of all-union bodies, the law postulated that the

Ликвидация последствий негативного воздействия атомной энергетики на природу, экономику и общество — это забота союзных республик и местных органов.

As for nuclear safety norms, these would in practice be determined by the very ministries in charge of developing nuclear power in the USSR, as they would have to be passed by the Soviet Council of Ministers. The draft law in Lemeshev's opinion also contradicted a resolution issued by the USSR Supreme Soviet 'On Urgent Measures for the Improvement of the Ecological Situation in the Country', which called for wider use of non-departmental and public environmental impact assessments. He was also highly sceptical of article 41 of the draft law, according to which a maximum limit of 500 million rubles was set as compensation from those ministries and departments in charge of nuclear power in the USSR should an accident take place.

¹⁰⁷ М.Я. Лемешев (1990), с. 213.

If a higher loss was incurred, only the USSR Council of Ministers could raise this limit; the union republics would have to take the brunt of any accident 'imposed' on them by Moscow. Consequently, there was not only a problem with legislation enforcement, but also with the very laws that were passed. As long as the ministries and departments retained their power (and monopoly), it would be very difficult to introduce real environmental reform.

2.3 Environmental Reform in the USSR - the Case of Ukraine

As seen above, the 27th Party Congress became the starting point of Gorbachev's 'new thinking' on the environment. In its aftermath this change was reflected in a series of Ukrainian official writings. In 1987 Ukrainian *Goskomprroda* issued a leaflet¹⁰⁸ and a longer report¹⁰⁹ addressing environmental issues intended for the general public. Reiterating the words of Gorbachev, the leaflet pointed out that one of the most important tasks standing before mankind was how to 'protect the valuable living environment and to secure the rational use of the planet's resources'¹¹⁰. Similarly, the *Goskomprroda* report stated that 'the interaction between Man, Society and Nature, the protection of the environment surrounding us all, is one of the most urgent and topical problems of our time, which will decide the future of all Mankind'¹¹¹.

Ukraine, like the other Soviet republics, would take all the necessary measures to protect the environment:

В Украинской ССР, как и во всем Советском Союзе, охрана природы является делом первостепенной государственной важности, она носит всенародный характер. Сохранение чистоты водоемов и воздушного бассейна, плодородия почв, растительного и животного мира, улучшение экологической обстановки городов, многие другие проблемы охраны природы решаются в республике в едином комплексе социальных и народнохозяйственных задач. Их успешное решение является одним из важнейших рычагов в создании наиболее благоприятных условий для максимального полного удовлетворения материальных и духовных запросов советского человека, гармоничного взаимодействия общества и природы¹¹².

'Considerable attention' was being paid to this issue in an attempt to streamline the structure and organisation of those institutions that were in charge of the environment. *Goskomprroda*

¹⁰⁸ Охрана природы в Украинской ССР. Environment Control in the Ukrainian SSR (Киев: "Реклама", 1987).

¹⁰⁹ Государственный комитет Украинской ССР по охране природы, Охрана природы — задача всенародная (Киев: Издательство политической литературы Украины, 1987).

¹¹⁰ Охрана природы в Украинской ССР (1987), с. 3.

¹¹¹ Охрана природы — задача всенародная (1987), с. 7.

¹¹² Охрана природы в Украинской ССР (1987), с. 3.

adapted a positive approach to the country's environmental problems, arguing that the conditions needed to make improvements in this area were already in place:

Есть что беречь на земле украинской. Есть и все необходимые условия для решения задач охраны природы: общенародная собственность на природные ресурсы, плановый характер развития экономики, солидная научная база, стремление населения республики сохранить и приумножить природные богатства¹¹³.

The official view that socialism, with its planned economy and humanist outlook on the world, was better suited than capitalism to successfully address environmental problems, was reiterated¹¹⁴. Already, considerable achievements had been made in this area: for instance, measures introduced in the 11th 5-Year Plan to implement complex environmental protection programmes had been highly effective. Investments in the area were growing steadily, and the results during 1986 were promising. Although industrial production had increased, emissions of sewage had been reduced by six percent and harmful emissions into the atmosphere had declined by three percent. Moreover, Donetsk, one of the most industrialised cities in the USSR, had been declared to be one of the cleanest and greenest industrial cities in the world by UNESCO¹¹⁵.

Goskompriroda's report - unlike the leaflet - did, however, acknowledge that the environmental situation in certain regions of Ukraine, particularly in heavily industrialised areas, remained 'difficult'. Funds earmarked for investments in environmental technologies were not utilised in full due to the absence of such technologies within the USSR or due to a lack of concern for the environment at the administrative level of the enterprise itself. Moreover, the steadily increasing industrial output was also to some extent hampering attempts at improving the environment. Problems were also caused by inefficient irrigation systems and extensive pollution from transport¹¹⁶.

As seen above, the USSR *Goskompriroda* was established in 1988 to co-ordinate efforts to control and improve the state of the environment in the country. In all the republics, however, with the exception of the Russian Federation, such committees were set up much earlier. In Ukraine, *Derzhkompriroda* was founded in 1967 to control the observance of the 'Ukrainian Law on the Environment' and other measures taken by the Communist Party and Parliament to protect the environment. Besides, the Committee was responsible for co-ordinating such work with other ministries and departments. Decisions made by *Derzhkompriroda* were compulsory for the various ministries, departments and enterprises and for the general public itself. Plans to improve the state of the environment were coordinated with the Ukrainian *Derzhplan* and the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, as well as with the relevant ministries and departments. *Derzhkompriroda*

¹¹³ *Ibid.* p. 4.

¹¹⁴ *Охрана природы - задача всенародная* (1987), с. 3.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4 and *Охрана природы в Украинской ССР* (1987), с. 6.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.* p. 4.

worked closely with *Derzhkomhidromet* (Ukrainian Agency for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Control) as well as with departments of the Ukrainian Ministry of Health. *Derzhkompriroda* was, in addition to being responsible for environmental protection and the rational use of natural resources, also in charge of the republic's nature reserves and national parks. Finally, the Committee was responsible for educating the general public on these issues through the press, radio and television¹¹⁷. With the establishment of the USSR *Goskompriroda*, *Derzhkompriroda* was subordinated to Moscow.

2.3.1 The CPU and the Environment

Although Ukraine thus had not only a structure but also legislation to secure the protection of the environment and the rational use of natural resources, *Derzhkompriroda*, according to Serhii Mihailov - advisor to the Ukrainian Minister of the Environment - achieved little prior to Gorbachev's reforms in 1987/1988. This, he claimed, was due to a combination of a lack of professionalism among those heading the Committee, as well as to heavy pressure from the Ukrainian Council of Ministers and ministries such as *Minrybkhkh* and *Minvodkhoz*¹¹⁸. Official documents also reveal growing concern with the state of the environment in Ukraine during the second half of the 1980s. A report presented to the CPU Central Committee 'On the Required Measures to Improve the Ecological Situation in the Republic' revealed that although a number of measures such as increased investments and the introduction of environmental technologies had been taken, the ecological situation in Ukraine remained 'very difficult and tense'. In several industrial centres and towns emissions into the air and water 'considerably exceeded the maximum permissible concentrations'. This situation was further compounded by the Chernobyl accident, which caused a 'serious deterioration of the ecological situation..and the pollution of a part of the republic's territory with long-lived radionuclides'.

A major reason given for this was the poor implementation of legal acts to protect the environment, such as the 'Resolution on Additional Measures to Avert the Pollution of the Air of Cities and other Populated Areas and Industrial Centres' (6 December 1984):

...Своевременно и в полном объеме в республике не выполнено практически ни одно из них. Не чувствуется здесь и координирующей, направляющей роли Президиума (Верховного Совета), заместителей Председателя Совмина УССР, а также Госплана УССР. Осуществляемые мероприятия сплошь и рядом носят разрозненный характер, ограничиваются ведомственными интересами. Слабо используются достижения научно-технического прогресса. Сохраняется порочная практика "остаточного" принципа

¹¹⁷ *Охрана природы - задача всенародная* (1987), с. 18-19 and *Охрана природы в Украинской ССР* (1987), с. 7.

¹¹⁸ Interview with Serhii Mikhailov, Kiev, August 1991.

выделения материальных и финансовых ресурсов на реализацию назревших природоохранных проблем¹¹⁹.

Although the ministries and departments were much to blame for this, the report admitted that some responsibility also had to be taken by the CPU, for failing to secure that the required measures were implemented:

Некоторые обкомы, многие горкомы и райкомы партии, первичные партийные организации не предъявляют должного спроса к руководителям министерств, ведомств, объединений и предприятий за своевременное и полное выполнение решений Партии и Правительства по вопросам охраны окружающей среды¹²⁰.

By May 1988 a number of actions aimed at reducing harmful emissions from Ukrainian enterprises had been organised by the public. The report stated that public concern for the environment was justified:

Все это вызывает справедливое возмущение трудящихся, порождает их многочисленные жалобы и обращения в партийные и советские органы, а в гг. Черкассах и Кременчуге привело к выступлениям населения против загрязнения окружающей среды. Откровенно отрицательным стало отношение людей к строительству новых, технически сложных производств, в первую очередь атомных электростанций и химических предприятий¹²¹.

The report is interesting reading in that it does not try to push the issue under the carpet, but rather provides a frank and seemingly fair analysis of the current state of affairs. The draft 'Resolution on the Required Measures to Improve the Ecological Situation in the Republic', which it accompanied, reiterated the views reflected in the report. During 1986 and 1987 3.8 billion rubles had been spent on measures to protect the environment. Some 850 million of these had been invested in devices to reduce emissions of harmful substances into the air and water. However, the situation remained difficult: the level of air pollution in several towns and cities in the Donbass region and Pridneprovie and harmful substances emitted into the Dniepr, Ingulets, Samara and North Donets rivers, exceeded legal norms. Another problem was the flooding and swamping of agricultural areas and the pollution of ground water used for drinking purposes.

¹¹⁹ Секретно. ЦК Компартии Украины, О неотложных мерах по улучшению экологической обстановки в республике, signed by B. Kachura, I. Mozgovoi, S. Hurenko and V. Kriuchkov and found in фонд No 1, опис No 11, справо No 1864, арк. 21-25. Арк. 22.

¹²⁰ Ibid., арк. 25.

¹²¹ Ibid.

Erosion and salinisation of the ground was a growing problem, as was pollution of waters, rivers and water reservoirs. The accident at Chernobyl further complicated the situation¹²².

It is worth noting that whereas the report submitted to the CPU Central Committee together with the draft resolution contained criticism of the party for failing to exert enough pressure on the ministries and departments involved, no such criticism was raised in the draft resolution:

Из-за безответственного отношения некоторых министерств и ведомств, беспринципности органов, призванных осуществлять контроль за состоянием охраны окружающей среды, не обеспечивается своевременное выполнение многих заданий, предусмотренных постановлениями ЦК КПСС и Совета Министров СССР, ЦК Компартии Украины и Совета Министров УССР по этим вопросам¹²³.

The draft resolution contained criticism of other bodies for the failure to adequately address environmental problems in the Black Sea and Azov Sea basins: 'great inertia' had been revealed in the implementation of decisions taken by the Party and the Government in this area; funds allocated for this purpose were not being used, and the time schedules set for introducing new environmental technologies were not kept. Poor organisation of environmental measures were also observed in the metallurgy, energy and chemical industries, in transport and communal services. Considerable amounts of water polluted with mineral fertilisers and pesticides were entering the rivers and seas through the irrigation systems, particularly from the rice fields in the Crimean and Kherson regions. Not only a lack of concern, but also the ministries' and departments' inefficiency were to blame:

Недостаточно эффективно осуществляют координацию природоохранной деятельности министерств, ведомств, исполкомов местных Советов народных депутатов, не всегда своевременно и глубоко вникают в существо назревших экологических проблем Президиум, заместители Председателя Совета Министров УССР. Серьезно недорабатывает в этом важном деле Госплан УССР. Не нашли пока своего места в работе по оздоровлению окружающей среды многие профсоюзные комитеты.

As for CPU officials, some of them also had to take some of the blame, as they

Не предъявляют высокой требовательности к руководителям министерств, ведомств, объединений и предприятий за неукоснительное выполнение решений Партии и Правительства по вопросам охраны окружающей среды некоторые обкомы, горкомы и

¹²² Секретно. Проект. О неотложных мерах по улучшению экологической обстановки в республике, signed by V. Shcherbitskii on 20.5.1988 and found in фонд No. 1, опис No. 11, справо No. 1864, арк. 14-20. *Ibid.*, арк. 14.

¹²³ *Ibid.*

райкомы партии, первичные партийные организации. В условиях возросшей заинтересованности всех слоев населения в улучшении охраны окружающей среды отдельные партийные комитеты, исполкомы местных Советов народных депутатов не сумели правильно оценить сложившуюся экологическую обстановку, направить на ее оздоровление необходимые силы и средства, заняли в этом деле пассивную позицию. Не уделяется должного внимания пропаганде природоохранных знаний, повышению экологической культуры населения.

The resolution ordered the local and regional party committees, the executive committees of the local soviets, ministries, departments and the leadership of enterprises, kolkhozy and sovkhozy within 'the shortest time frame' to do away with the situation outlined and to secure the unconditional implementation of all tasks sanctioned by the Soviet authorities to improve the state of the environment. More importantly, the resolution also linked the environment with the economy and sought to increase its significance as an issue:

Рассматривать своевременное и комплексное решение актуальных экологических проблем как первоочередную задачу, общенародное дело, имеющее большое экономическое, социальное и политическое значение¹²⁴.

An investigation was ordered into the delay in construction of water and dust cleansing facilities as well as in the search for labour, material, and financial resources to secure the implementation of all environmental measures outlined in the 5 Year Plan by the end of the 5th year. The CPU, with this resolution, initiated measures to improve the ecological situation in Kiev and other polluted cities such as Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Odessa, Dniprodzerzhinsk, Krivyi Rih and Zhdanov. Enterprises were ordered to make proper use of pollution-reducing devices already installed, and the ministries and departments were encouraged to co-operate and co-ordinate their efforts better. The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences would in the future play a more significant role in finding solutions to Ukraine's environmental problems. Local authorities were ordered to take the environment into account when drafting plans for the economic and social development of their regions, and deputies were encouraged to activate the public in the solving of environmental problems locally.

Protecting the interests of the environment was to become one of the major tasks of the prosecutor's offices as well as of the leadership of Ukraine's industries. The Presidium of *UTOP* was ordered to improve its work in spreading awareness of the need to protect the environment.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.* apk. 16.

As for the CPU Central Committee and local and regional party committees, these were instructed to strengthen their control over the ministries, departments, enterprises, kolkhozy and sovkhozy to secure the implementation of the required measures and the protection of the environment.

Although the resolution was published by Ukrainian central and regional newspapers, it was initially stamped 'entirely secret'¹²⁵. It was this secrecy that the Greens were to criticise so strongly on the grounds that it was detrimental to improving the state of the environment. Judging by comments added and changes made in handwriting by Shcherbitskii on a copy of 'On the Urgent Measures for the Improvement of the Ecological Situation in the Republic', Shcherbitskii was well aware of the deteriorating state of the environment in Ukraine. As an illustration, I will present a few of his annotations below. Commenting on the significance of environmental problems, the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party reiterated the fact that not only had these problems attained 'significant public importance', but, moreover, had already worsened. As examples he referred to Kremenchuk and Cherkassy, where manifestations of environmental protest had already been recorded. The situation, although some positive results would no doubt be recorded in the future, would continue to deteriorate. As a result,

Необходимо резко (replacing "в полном смысле") ужесточить контроль и требовательность в вопросах охраны окружающей среды буквально всем — и партийным, и советским, и хозяйственным органам, общественным организациям¹²⁶.

However, despite the need to improve the environment, few results had been recorded by January 1989. In a speech to the CPSU Central Committee, Shcherbitskii indirectly accepted the party's part of the blame:

Надо признать, что в республике длительное время не уделялось должного внимания осуществлению мер по охране окружающей среды¹²⁷.

As a result of this lax attitude, air pollution in several industrial centres and cities had reached levels well above those permissible, and river pollution was becoming a considerable problem. The accident at Chernobyl had contributed to a serious deterioration of the ecological situation in Ukraine, and there seemed to be a link between deteriorating health and pollution in the republic:

¹²⁵ Совершенно секретно. Постановление Политбюро ЦК Компартии Украины от 17.V.1988 г., протокол No. 65, Paragraph 1, in фонд No. 1, опис No. 11, спр. No. 1863, арк. 2-8.

¹²⁶ Фонд No. 1, опис No. 11, спр. No. 1864, арк. 35.

¹²⁷ Центральный Комитет КПСС. К No П 1693, фонд No. 1, опис No. 32, спр. No. 291, арк. 1-3, Ibid., арк. 1.

По данным Минздрава СССР, нарастают инфекционные заболевания населения, особенно детей, что в значительной мере обусловлено неудовлетворительным состоянием окружающей среды.

For this reason, the question of improving the ecological situation in Ukraine had become a priority issue in the social development of the republic, argued Shcherbitskii. Although a number of measures had been taken since the beginning of the 11th 5-Year Plan in 1986, the state of the environment remained 'very difficult and tense'. As the limits of glasnost were widened, the serious environmental situation became a source of great concern among Ukraine's population:

...В условиях расширяющейся гласности (это) отрицательно сказалось на общественном мнении по поводу дальнейшего развития атомной энергетики на Украине. Изучение показывает, что для настороженности широкой общественности основания есть.¹²⁸

Shcherbitskii's speech revealed the increasing concern of the Ukrainian authorities regarding the advisability of expanding nuclear power in Ukraine. As pointed out by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, 90% of the republic's territory was unfavourable for the construction of nuclear power stations and the storage of nuclear waste. Moreover, large areas of Ukraine's Western and Southern territories were prone to earthquakes, measuring up to eight, and in the case of the Crimea up to nine points on the Soviet scale. The undesirability of building more reactors on Ukrainian territory was further compounded by the generally limited water resources in the republic. Besides, as admitted by the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, 'Not one of the sites of the Ukrainian nuclear power stations fulfilled all points of the "Requirements for the Location of Nuclear Power Stations", passed by the USSR Council of Ministers...' (see Chapter Six for further details).

Shcherbitskii hinted that plans to expand nuclear power in Ukraine were continued despite the opposition to such plans by Ukrainian institutions on objective grounds:

В 1988 году заинтересованные министерства и ведомства республики не согласовали большинство технико-экономических обоснований на расширение Ровенской, Хмельницкой и Южно-Украинской АЭС из-за имеющихся существенных замечаний в части водообеспечения, отчуждения земель, радиоактивного загрязнения и других факторов. По этим же причинам Совет Министров СССР направил в союзные органы просьбу о прекращении строительства Чигиринской АЭС.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 2.

Public protests, argued Shcherbitskii, could have been significantly fewer had Soviet ministries (*Gosplan, GKNT, Gosstro, Minatomenergo, Minenergo, USSR Academy of Sciences, Gosatomnadzor, USSR Council of Ministers*) implemented tasks regarding the construction of nuclear power stations up to the year 2000 and the modified Soviet Energy Programme. Shcherbitskii noted that plans to expand nuclear power in Ukraine were directed towards the further extensive development of heavy industry in the republic, which, he argued, would inevitably lead to the further deterioration of the ecological situation in Ukraine. The CPU, on the other hand, favoured structural changes in the Ukrainian economy, which would help to reduce pollution in the future:

Кошеними розвитку енергетики, в том числі і атомної, по нашому
мненню, должна строиться в тесной увязке с изменением структуры
экономики, конкретными мерами по энергосбережению, внедрению
прогрессивных технологий и высокоэффективных материалов, с
учетом социальных и экологических факторов¹²⁹.

Western experience showed that by utilising technical innovations and combining this with strict rules for the use of natural resources it was possible practically without increasing energy production to double the national income. Such a path, rather than the continued construction of nuclear power, was favoured by the Ukrainian authorities.

I will return to the issue of nuclear power in subsequent chapters, suffice it here to say that there was growing discord between Soviet and Ukrainian authorities on this issue by the end of the 1980s. As for measures to improve the state of the environment, subsequent reports produced by the CPU indicated that little progress was being made - fuelling arguments by Greens that given the centralised structure of the USSR both economically and politically, the only way in which the environment in Ukraine could be improved, would be for the republic first to gain control over all industry located on its territory (95% of such industries were controlled by all-Union ministries and departments) as well as over its natural resources.

A resolution passed by the CPU Secretariat on 11 August 1989 ('On the Course of the Implementation of the CPU Central Committee's Resolution of 17 May 1988 'On the Necessary Measures to Improve the Ecological Situation in the Republic' gave little reason for optimism:

Відзначити, що незважаючи на деякі позитивні зрушення в
організації управління природоохоронною діяльністю і розв'язанні
конкретних екологічних проблем, у цілому ця робота в республіці
проводиться ще незадовільно. Окремі заходи і доручення, що
передбачені постановою ЦК Компартії України від 17 травня 1988
року з цього питання, залишаються невиконаними¹³⁰.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹³⁰ Фонд No. 1, опис No. 11, спр. No. 2130, арк. 6.

The various ministries and departments as well as the executive committees of the local soviets had no understanding of the political importance of environmental protection, and the people of Ukraine still did not feel personally responsible for protecting the environment. The volume of polluted waters emitted into Ukrainian water reserves remained very high: 516 million m³ of untreated waste was emitted annually. Emissions into the air had increased over the previous year and the deputy leaders of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers were sharply criticised for failing to put pressure on ministries, departments and executive committees to comply with existing regulations and legislation. Further, several ministries had failed to utilise funds allocated to reduce harmful emissions into the air and water, thus facilitating the further deterioration of the state of Ukraine's environment. In 1988 34.5 million rubles worth of investments were never placed, and for the first years of the 11th 5- Year Plan this figure reached 131 million rubles. Plan targets for the installation of filters at chemical enterprises during 1988 had been fulfilled only by 47%, and in Poltava, Zaporizhzhia and Odessa only by 9-14%!

Not only the ministries controlling the industries were to blame for this situation:

Повільно перебудовують свою роботу у справі охорони природи і здоров'я людей Держкомприроди УРСР, Міністерство охорони здоров'я УРСР, Укргідромет. Комітетом мало вноситься пропозицій щодо комплексного вирішення екологічних проблем, організації раціонального використання і відтворення природних ресурсів, не проводиться систематична робота по підвищенню екологічної культури населення.

The Prosecutor's Office was proving highly inefficient in cases involving legislation on the environment, and in some districts (Voroshilovhrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Crimea, Odessa and Poltava) paid no attention to such cases at all. It was thus understandable that the public was getting impatient:

Споживацьке ставлення до природи з боку міністерств, відомств, об'єднань і підприємств, неухвалене ставлення до звернень трудящих, нехтування громадського думкою, численні порушення природоохоронного законодавства викликають справедливе обурення людей, однак, це не стало центром уваги партійних комітетів і організацій.

In the hope that matters would improve, the CPU Secretariat ordered local and regional party committees to hold people responsible before the party for failing to implement measures to improve the state of the environment. The requirements demanded from communists in charge of enterprises and collective farms had to be raised. Further, the Prosecutor's Office and the Ministry of Health were encouraged to take directors of enterprises or collective farms to court for violating environmental regulations and legislation.

While it is true that various ministries and departments were reluctant to introduce measures to improve the environment, this did not necessarily stem from a lack of concern for the environment per se. As seen above, the emphasis of the annual and five-year plans was on output, and as the punishment for failing to meet production targets was much more severe than for failing to comply with environmental regulations, the enterprise manager very often had no choice but to concentrate on the output side. Moreover, as extensive rather than intensive growth was favoured until Gorbachev introduced his economic reforms in the mid 1980s, the Soviet economic system was simply unable to produce many of the technologically advanced devices needed to reduce harmful emissions in the country's industries. To illustrate this problem, I will take a look at the case of the Verkhnedneprovsk starch-producing combine.

The Verkhnedneprovsk starch-producing combine, which was built in 1963, was one of the biggest food-producing enterprises in Ukraine. It supplied bakeries and chocolate factories in Ukraine, Moscow, Leningrad, Riga and elsewhere with caramel treacle, and all Soviet chemists received medical glucose from Verkhnedneprovsk. Maize extract and green syrup were delivered to enterprises producing medicine and vitamin factories received maize butter used in baby food¹³¹. In late 1989 letters and articles started to appear in the local press, voicing the concern of locals regarding severe pollution not only from this combine but also from others in the area. V. Tsikunova, sanitary inspector in the area, revealed that five big combines were causing considerable pollution of the air in Verkhnedneprovsk: 1,363 types of harmful substances were emitted into the atmosphere and only 54% of these emissions were filtered (for the combine the figure was as low as 30%). During 1988 some 8,630 tons of harmful substances were emitted. In the sanitary zone of the furfural-hydrolysis unit of the combine there were even flats and a playground for children. Most of the emissions exceeded the maximum permissible levels. The directors of six enterprises had been punished for high emissions, but things did not improve as a result, and there was serious concern about the health of the workers at the combine, who fell ill at regular intervals. Moreover, the local population was voicing concern for their children's health.

In 1987 the regional parliament had passed a resolution 'On the State and Measures to Secure the Environmental Protection of the Water and Air Basins and the Complex Utilisation of Natural Resources in the Verkhnedneprovsk region'. By February 1989, however, this resolution had yet to be implemented¹³². L. Nita, an inspector of the Verkhnedneprovsk inter-regional committee for environmental protection, called for the closing of the combine on the grounds that *agrymus* - the waste from the furfural-hydrolysis unit - covered 10 hectares of land and posed a threat to people's health. Over the previous 6-10 years illnesses of the respiratory organs had increased 3.5 times. Moreover, it was polluting the ground water in the area and was being spread

¹³¹ See letter No. 10/3562 of 31.12.1989, Верхнеднепровский крахмалопаточный комбинат имени 60-летия Великой октябрьской социалистической революции Первому секретарю Центрального Комитета Компартии Украины тов. Ивашко, В.А., г. Киев, in фонд No. 1, опис No. 32, стр. No. 243, арх. 67.

¹³² *Придніпровський комунар*, 11.2.1989, с. 2.

with the wind. Only a minor part of the *agrymus* was being processed or used. The committee had ordered the administration of the combine to find a solution to the problem by January 1990¹³³. In a letter to the local newspaper 24 local residents complained that in Nikolaev Street in Dniprovsk village all buildings, trees and surfaces were covered with brown dust and they demanded an explanation from the top management of the enterprise. The enterprise directors acknowledged and agreed with the concern of the locals and gave their approval when it was decided to set up a special commission to examine ways in which to reduce emissions from the combine.

In October 1989 the leader of the *STK*, A. Bukalo, the director of the combine, E. Bondar, the secretary of the party committee, A. Chuiko, the chairman of the trade union, I. Fedenko, the apparatchik¹³⁴ V. Polynko and the operator N. Khulevskii wrote a letter to the First Secretary of the CPU Central Committee, V. Ivashko, presenting him with the situation in Verkhnedneprovsk. In the letter they pointed out that in 1963, when the combine was built,

Исходя из явно ошибочных соображений на промышленном комбинате построен совершенно неблагоприятный в экологическом отношении, отрицательно влияющий на технологию выработки пищевой и медицинской глюкозы гидролизно-фурфурольный завод.

Thus, they argued, every year the unused waste was occupying more and more territory, closing in on the Dniprodzerzhinsk reservoir, which was the major source of drinking water on the right bank of the Dnipropetrovsk region. To make the enterprise environmentally safer, enormous investments were required. Besides, nobody in the region was able to utilise the waste. On this basis, the following request was made:

Просим Вас создать специальную комиссию, которая рассмотрела бы возможность закрытия ГФЗ или изыскания средств и подрядчика для его реконструкции, а также строительства завода по переработке его отходов и строительства нового микрорайона для создания санитарной зоны.

В случае закрытия ГФЗ коллектив комбината примет меры по соответствующему увеличению выработки крайне дефицитной пищевой и медицинской продукции¹³⁵.

Two months later, in December 1989, the Ministry of Agriculture presented the outcome of a close examination of the combine, which had been conducted in co-operation with

¹³³ Фонд No. 1, опис No. 32, спр. No. 243, арк. 71.

¹³⁴ Apparatchik was put down as Polynko's profession in the letter.

¹³⁵ Letter No. 10/3562 of 31.10.1989, Верхнеднепровский крахмалопаточный комбинат имени 60-летия Великой октябрьской социалистической революции Первому секретарю Центрального Комитета Компартии Украины тов. Иванко, В.А., г. Киев, in фонд No. 1, опис No. 32, спр. No. 243, арк. 68.

Derzhkompriroda, the Verkhnedneprovsk regional executive committee and sanitary station, the top executives of the combine and the public. The Commission reached the conclusion that the furfural-hydrolysis unit should be closed from 1 January 1991¹³⁶. Thus, it was not always the case that the top leadership of polluting enterprises were not environmentally minded, but rather that a lack of environmental concern at the time that the most environmentally harmful enterprises were built - in addition to the factors listed above - prevented the enterprises from successfully implementing measures to reduce harmful emissions into the environment.

2.3.2 State of the Environment

As pointed out above, a number of works on the state of the environment in the USSR have appeared in the West since the early 1970s. Less has been written - at least in the West - on the state of the environment in Ukraine. David Marples addressed this issue in *Perestroika in Ukraine. Ecology, Economics and the Workers' Revolt* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991) and *EKOLOS/Zelenyi Svit* produced a substantial report on the issue in 1990 (*Zelenyi Svit* also produced a separate report on the military and pollution in 1993), but other than that we have only fragmentary information - apart, of course, from official statistical materials produced by *Derzhkompriroda* and *Minzdrav*. For reasons of space, I will limit the discussion to Ukraine. Moreover, I will not look at environmental protest and the data produced as evidence and counter-evidence by the various actors taking part in such protests¹³⁷. Rather, I will simply present and discuss data gathered from official sources and *Ekolos/Zelenyi Svit* to illustrate the extent of the problem.

The first report on the State of the Environment produced by *USSR Goskompriroda* in 1990 and covering the year 1988¹³⁸ stated that prior to 1987 official, open information on the ecological situation and the level of illness in the Soviet population was practically non-existent. Thus, *Goskompriroda* ran into problems gathering the information required for its report, and at the time of publication of the report there was still a shortage of contemporary, objective and official ecological information. The report did, however, contain an impressive amount of data. A list of the 68 most polluted cities (air pollution) in the USSR¹³⁹ revealed that 16 (i.e. every fourth) were situated in Ukraine. Most of these were concentrated in the Donetsk-Pridniestrovie region - the

¹³⁶ Государственный агропромышленный комитет Украинской ССР. No. 31/49 of 6.12.1989 in reply to No 2339/168 of 10.11.1989. ЦК Компартии Украины. О письме Верхнеднепровского крахмалопаточного комбината, in фонд No. 1, опис No. 32, сир. No. 243, арк. 75.

¹³⁷ For more information, see Marples.(1991).

¹³⁸ Государственный комитет СССР по охране природы. *Состояние природной среды в СССР в 1988 году*. (Москва: "Лесная промышленность", 1990 г.), с. 11.

¹³⁹ Some 40 million people lived in these cities, or every fifth city dweller in the USSR. Source: Госкомстат СССР. *Охрана окружающей среды и рациональное использование природных ресурсов в СССР. Статистический сборник*. (Москва: "Финансы и статистика", 1989 г.), с. 31.

centre of Ukraine's heavy industry. Moreover, Ukraine's rivers (South Buh, Dniestr, Danube) were among the dirtiest in the USSR¹⁴⁰. A report compiled by USSR *Goskomgidromet* (the State Committee on Hydrometeorology) in 1990¹⁴¹ covered Ukraine in more detail; according to this report, concentrations of dust, carbon monoxide and nitrogen dioxide were higher than the Soviet average. Twelve of the cities with the highest excessive emissions of pollutants in the USSR were Ukrainian:

Table 2.5 Emission of Air Pollutants in Ukrainian Cities

Substance	Cities
dust	Konstantinovka (5 PDK)
sulphur dioxide	Severodonetsk, Lisichansk, Rubezhnoe (3-4 PDK)
nitrogen dioxide	Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kommunar'sk, Chernihiv (2 PDK)
phenol	Severodonetsk, Lisichansk, Gorlovka, Dniprodzerzhinsk (3-4 PDK)
formaldehyde	Severodonetsk, Lisichansk, Odessa (7-10 PDK)
fluoric hydrogen	Mariupol, Odessa (2 PDK)
ammonia	Cherkassy, Dniprodzerzhinsk (3-5 PDK)
carbon bisulphide	Cherkassy (3 PDK)
benzapi'ren	Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Mariupol (7-8 PDK)

Source: *Goskomgidromet* (1990).

The highest emissions monitored in Ukraine were as follows¹⁴²:

Table 2.6 Highest Recorded Levels of Major Air Pollutants in Ukrainian Cities

Substance	Cities
dust	Kramatorsk (15 PDK)
sulphur dioxide	Lisichansk (4 PDK)
nitrogen dioxide	Kramatorsk (17 PDK)
hydrogen sulphide	Kommunar'sk, Gorlovka, Makeevka (9-11 PDK)
phenol	Lisichansk, Donetsk (15 PDK)
carbon bisulphide	Cherkassy, Makeevka (4-5 PDK)
fluoric hydrogen	Armiansk (10 PDK)
chlorous hydrogen	Krasnoperekopsk (25 PDK)
formaldehyde	Lutsk (16 PDK)
ammonia	Cherkassy (12 PDK)
chlorine	Kiev (7 PDK)

Source: *Goskomgidromet* (1990).

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

¹⁴¹ Государственный комитет СССР по гидрометеорологии. Академия наук СССР. Лаборатория мониторинга природной среды и климата. Обзор состояния окружающей природной среды в СССР (по материалам наблюдений 1988-1989 гг.). (Москва: Московское отделение Гидрометеоздта, 1990 г.)

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 38.

In August 1990 *Derzhkompriroda* and the Ukrainian *Minzdrav* launched an information bulletin covering the state of the environment in Ukraine¹⁴³. The Ukrainian government also issued a resolution on the publication of ecological information, including data regarding the Chernobyl accident and about people's health:

Теперь уже на основании этого директивного документа министерства, ведомства, научные учреждения не только могут, но и обязаны систематически информировать народ Украины о воздухе, которым он дышит, в общей сложности по 30 параметрам. Возглавляют работу Госкомитет СССР по экологии и рациональному природопользованию и Министерство здравоохранения республики.

The report covered air and water pollution, pollution of the soil and radioactive pollution. As for air pollution, although emissions had been reduced during 1989 (it was claimed that this had been possible due to the use of sanctions - in the course of the year *Derzhkompriroda* had issued 219 resolutions to stop production at enterprises that failed to meet environmental standards. Moreover, more than 2,000 people had been held administratively responsible for violations of these standards), the situation was still grim. The level of air pollution in most Ukrainian cities exceeded sanitary norms and in the 15 most polluted cities in Ukraine, permissible levels of emissions were permanently exceeded¹⁴⁴ (see next page):

Table 2.7 Air Pollution in Ukrainian Cities, 1990 (See next page)

¹⁴³ Государственный комитет СССР по охране природы. Министерство здравоохранения СССР. Информационный бюллетень (Киев, 1990).

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

<u>Cities</u>	<u>Polluting substance</u>	<u>Exceeding PDK by</u>
Donetsk	dust	2.8-2.4
	nitrogen dioxide	2.7
	phenol	2.3-2.0
	ammonia	3.5-3.0
	benzapien	8.7-6.5
Odessa	dust	2.2
	nitrogen dioxide	2.5-2.0
	phenol	2.3-2.0
	fluoric hydrogen	2.6
	formaldehyde	7.0
Krivyi Rih	dust	2.8-2.4
	nitrogen dioxide	2.5-2.0
	phenol	2.3
	ammonia	3.5-3.0
	formaldehyde	5.6
Makeevka	benzapien	8.7-6.5
	dust	4.2
	nitrogen dioxide	2.5-2.0
	phenol	2.3-2.0
	benzapien	2.3-2.0
Slaviansk	nitrogen dioxide	2.5-2.0
	phenol	3.0
	benzapien	5.7-5.1
Kommunarsk	sulphur dioxide	1.4-1.22
	carbon oxide	1.3
	nitrogen dioxide	2.5-2.0
Kramatorsk	benzapien	5.7-5.1
	phenol	2.3-2.0
	fluoric hydrogen	1.4-1.2
	benzapien	5.7-5.1
Dniprodzerzhinsk	dust	2.8-2.4
	phenol	1.6-1.3
	ammonia	5.2
	formaldehyde	4.6-3.0
	benzapien	4.2-2.0
Dnipropetrovsk	benzapien	5.7-5.1
	fluoric hydrogen	1.6
Luhansk	benzapien	5.7-5.1
	sulphur dioxide	1.4-1.2
Gorlovka	nitrogen dioxide	2.5-2.0
	phenol	6.3
	nitrogen dioxide	2.5-2.0
	phenol	2.3-2.0
	formaldehyde	2.3-2.0
Zaporizhzhia	benzapien	4.2-2.0
	ammonia	2.2-2.0
Lisichansk	formaldehyde	6.3
	phenol	2.3-2.0
Severodonetsk	ammonia	2.2-2.0
	formaldehyde	6.3
Mariupol	phenol	2.3-2.0
	ammonia	2.2-2.0
	formaldehyde	7.0
	phenol	1.3
	fluoric hydrogen	2.6
	ammonia	2.2-2.0
	formaldehyde	4.6-3.0

Emissions from Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts accounted for 27% and 23% of total emissions in Ukraine respectively. Krivyi Rih (1,234,000 tons) and Mariupol (781,000 tons) were also badly affected. The major polluters were the energy industry (29.3%) and metallurgy (35%). Vehicles were responsible for another 37% of Ukraine's air pollution.

Storage of toxic waste from some 1,500 enterprises, most of which were located in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv oblasts, constituted a potential danger to the Ukrainian environment as most of the waste, in violation of sanitary norms and rules, was stored at inadequate dumps for domestic waste or was simply scattered on the territory of the enterprises, often poured into reservoirs, narrow gorges and so on. Special storage sites could usually just take one or two types of waste, and several of these still did not comply with existing regulations. What was more, Ukraine lacked the technology to process and utilise toxic substances¹⁴⁵.

Another major pollutant was agriculture¹⁴⁶. Although the use of pesticides had been steadily reduced between 1986 and 1989, its use was still high (2.4 kg per hectare in 1989), and this, combined with inadequate storage of the pesticides, caused 'great harm' to the environment. There was a shortage of storage facilities (only 65% coverage), and a quarter of these did not comply with sanitary and environmental regulations. The situation was particularly serious in Khmelnytskyi, Poltava, Kirovohrad and Odessa oblasts - Poltava, by the way, being one of the major agricultural regions of Ukraine. Due to high levels of pesticides and heavy metals in the soil, as well as poor farming methods, it was becoming increasingly difficult to provide the Ukrainian population with 'clean' and high-quality food products. Thus, in Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Crimea, Zakarpatia, Poltava and Chernihiv oblasts, food products contained excessive amounts of various polluting substances. No proper analysis of the soil quality in Ukraine's agricultural areas had so far taken place, and this could not but cause concern. However, a scheme to chart these areas and implement measures to reduce and control pollution of their soil had recently been started and would hopefully help to improve the situation in the future.

As a result of the use of pesticides in the agricultural sector, ground water in 16 of Ukraine's 25 oblasts contained levels of pesticides above the maximum permissible levels. The state of the ground water in Nikolaev oblast and Crimea caused particular concern, as 90% contained a cocktail of various pesticides. The situation in Kherson, Luhansk, Dnipropetrovsk, Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts was described as 'difficult' in the report. The mixture of various types of pesticides gave particular cause for concern, as little was still known about their combined effect on the human organism¹⁴⁷.

The report revealed only a little information regarding the levels of radioactivity in Ukraine. It did, however, claim that levels of caesium-134 and -137 as well as strontium-90 were

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

¹⁴⁶ Some 70.3% of Ukraine's territory is used for agriculture. Ukraine accounted for some 25% of the USSR's total agricultural production. See Україна на грані екологічної катастрофи. Довідник. ЕКОЛОС/Київське товариство прихильників Руху (Торонто: 1990.) с. 6.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

comfortably within the permissible levels in the republic's reservoirs and rivers. Excessive levels of radioactivity could be found only in still waters in the Chernobyl area and in the ground water of the area of the 'red forest', where the level of strontium-90 was considerable (down to a depth of 1-1.5 meters). The amount of radio nuclides entering the Kiev reservoir from the river Pripjat' was 160 curies (caesium-137). The figure for Dniepr was 200 curies. For strontium-90 the figures were 210 and 90 curies respectively, which was 1.1 and 2.2 times less than in 1987. Although the silt layer at the bottom of the Kiev reservoir contained some 2-2,500 curies of caesium-137, this did not constitute any particular danger as the radioactive particles were 'tied' to the silt and thus were not spread with the water¹⁴⁸.

Figures from the Ministry of Forestry gave greater cause for concern, as caesium-137 had been detected in firewood, mushrooms, berries and medical plants in areas more than 100 km away from the Chernobyl nuclear station. Although the levels of radioactivity in the ground were within the limits (2-3 curies per square km), the total content of caesium-137 and -134 in plants exceeded permissible levels. In areas where the radioactivity was below 2 curies per square km, however, people had unrestricted access and were free to collect mushrooms and berries for consumption¹⁴⁹.

Ekolos and *Zelenyi Svit* were much more critical in their assessment of the state of the Ukrainian environment. Their report, which also looked at the relationship between the Soviet Union and Ukraine, revealed that the major polluters in Ukraine were all-union enterprises (metallurgy, energy, coal). Levels of pollutants in the air were within the permissible limits in only four of Ukraine's 45 biggest cities. In 21 cities air pollution exceeded permissible levels by 15 times. Twenty-two percent of the republic's population lived in these areas. Altogether Ukrainian enterprises emitted some 17 million tons of harmful substances into the air - the equivalent of 300 kg per head¹⁵⁰.

2.3.3 Health and the Environment

Health statistics were, until 1990, hard to obtain in Ukraine. To the extent that such statistics were accessible, it was difficult to utilise them due to poor methodology. Following the introduction of glasnost, information about the serious environmental situation in the country started appearing on the pages of local and regional newspapers with increasing frequency. It did not take long for journalists and members of the public to link pollution with poor health, thus raising the concern of locals, who in turn initiated local campaigns against enterprises and other sites thought to have a harmful effect on the environment¹⁵¹.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 5.


¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁵¹ For examples of such writings and campaigns, see Marples.(1991)...

Although there were good reasons to assume that environmentally harmful establishments had a negative impact on people's health, this was difficult to prove. In early 1990, however, on the eve of the 12th (and last) session of the Ukrainian Parliament, which focused on environmental issues, the Ukrainian Ministry of Health issued a report, 'The Medical Aspects of the Ecological Situation in Ukraine'¹⁵². The preface to this report explicitly stated that there was a correlation between pollution and bad health - as a matter of fact, environmental pollution ranked second as a cause of the deterioration of people's health (after lifestyle).

Fig. 2.1 Number of Births pr. 1000 Inhabitants (1970-88)




source: *Medychni aspekty ekolohichnoi sytuatsii v Ukr. RCR (1990)*, c. 5.

Population growth in Ukraine was three times lower than in the USSR as a whole. As seen from table 1, the number of births declined sharply from 1986 - the year of the Chernobyl accident - to 1988. Five districts (Vinnytsia, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkassy and Chernihiv) had negative population growth,

¹⁵² Матеріали до дванадцятій сесії Верховної Ради Української РСР. Медичні аспекти екологічної ситуації в Українській РСР (збірок статистичних показників). (Київ, 1990).

Fig. 2.2 Population Growth, 1970-88.




Source: *Medychni aspekty ekolohichnoi sytuatsii v Ukr. RCR (1990), c.9.*

Moreover, the average life span for a Ukrainian was six years lower than that in more developed countries. The pace of change in general sickness was up by 35% since 1986 and invalidisation had doubled. Pollution in Ukraine had reached a critical level, argued the report; one quarter of 190 areas regularly measured for pollutants by *Sanepidemstantsiia* suffered from air-pollution exceeding permissible levels from five to 20 times. More than one third of Ukraine's enterprises were not surrounded by sanitary zones and up to a third of emissions from these enterprises were not filtered prior to being emitted into the rivers. Thus, between 20% and 40% of Ukrainian rivers were badly polluted. Besides, food products were polluted with pesticides and nitrates.

The number of working people becoming invalids (i.e. so ill that they were no longer able to work) increased sharply from 18,1% to 36,2% per 100,000 between 1980 and 1988:

Fig. 2.3 Working People becoming Invalids (1970-88)




source: *Medychni aspekty ekolohichnoi sytuatsii v Ukr. RCR (1990), c. 16.*

There was also a steady (and in some cases sharp) increase for all illnesses covered by the report over the period from 1980 to 1990¹⁵³. Temporary loss of working capability due to illness rose sharply from 120 to 200 days between 1987 and 1988:

¹⁵³ This was the case for cancers (p. 16), untreatable cancers (p. 18), diseases of the lungs (p. 20), asthma (p. 22), heart attacks (p. 24), other heart diseases (p. 28), strokes (p. 32) and intestinal diseases (p. 36). Anemia among children (p. 56) had also become more frequent. Only hepatitis had dropped steadily so had kidney problems, although the latter showed a small increase from 1987 to 1988 (last year of data).

Fig. 2.4 Temporary Loss of Working Capability due to Illness (1970-88)



source: *Medychni aspekty ekolohichnoi sytuatsii v Ukr. RCR (1990), c.46.*

Was pollution to blame for the sharp increase in illnesses recorded by Ukrainian *Minzdrav*? A paper presented by a chief expert of the USSR *Minzdrav*, Dr Zemlianskii, at a meeting of the Presidium of the board of *URO SDF* on 29 June 1990¹⁵⁴ disclosed information similar to that of *Minzdrav*'s report. From 1988 to 1989 the number of births dropped from 14.5 to 13.3 per 1,000 inhabitants. With a mortality rate of 11.6, the population growth was thus only 1.7¹⁵⁵ (down from 2.8) per 1,000 people, this was not even enough to secure the simple reproduction of Ukraine's population. Infant mortality, although slightly reduced compared to 1988, was more than twice that of Japan and Sweden and a third above the US. Zemlianskii saw a direct link between his findings and the ecological situation in Ukraine:

¹⁵⁴ О состоянии здоровья детского населения Украины в связи с создавшейся экологической обстановки (сообщение специального доверенного врача СДФ им. В.И. Ленина – главного специалиста Минздрава СССР т. Землянского на заседании Президиума правления УРО СДФ им. В.И. Ленина на 29 июня 1990 г.)

¹⁵⁵ Ukraine had the lowest population growth of all the Soviet republics. See ЕКОЛОС/Кападське товариство прихильників Руху (1990), с. 4.

Все это, несомненно, является следствием влияния комплекса негативных социально-экономических факторов, среди которых не последнюю роль играет ухудшение экологической обстановки. В подавляющем большинстве регионов республики она приобретает порой характер национальной катастрофы¹⁵⁶.

To illustrate his point, Zemlianskii referred to the sharp increase in illnesses in Ukraine over the previous 5 years (i.e. from 1985 to 1990). Various types of cancer had increased by 15.6%, and the figures for ulcers and intestinal diseases were + 12% and 32% respectively. The increase had taken place primarily in Ukraine's industrial centres. In Dniprodzerzhinsk, for instance, pathological changes in the blood of children and grown ups were 2.2-3 times more frequent than the Ukrainian average. Similarly, heart diseases and intestinal problems were 3.7 and 2.6 times more common. In the town of Rubezhnoe (Luhansk oblast) the situation was even more serious: children were falling ill with cancer 6-8 times more often than on average in Ukraine, and in Kremenchuk blood diseases were 5-7 times more frequently.

Pollution was not only causing health problems among the Ukrainian population, but also posed a threat to reproduction:

Уже явно прослеживается ряд экологически зависимых заболеваний у беременных женщин, кормящих матерей, детей младших возрастов. Число спонтанных абортон выросло за последнее 10 лет в 4-6 раз, общая заболеваемость детей раннего возраста – в 2 раза.

Тревожит пагубное влияние промышленных вредных факторов на репродуктивную функцию женщин, треть которых нуждается в медицинской коррекции. Под влиянием комплекса химических и физических факторов заметно ухудшились показатели сперматогенеза у мужчин. По данным специалистов число способных к оплодотворению сперматозоидов снизилось с 70 проц. в 1966 году до 30 проц. в 1986 году¹⁵⁷.

Research into the gene fund of the population in Zaporizhzhia and Mariupol revealed that the chemical pollution of the environment had reached a 'genetically dangerous level for Man'. For instance, the number of spontaneous abortions due to mutations in Zaporizhzhia was five times that of Simferopol, which had a reasonably clean atmosphere. Moreover, the frequency of infants born with deformities was two times higher. As calculated by Professor Evhenii Antipenko of the Kiev Hygienic Centre, some 4,000 kg of cancerous substances per inhabitant were emitted from Mariupol's enterprises. This was equivalent to the exposure of 180 ber of radioactivity over a 30-year period. The figure for Zaporizhzhia was 80 ber. Large areas of Ukraine's territory were suffering from the combined effect of radiation and chemical pollution,

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

following the accident at Chernobyl. In the northern districts, for instance, the soil, in addition to radio nuclides, contained lead, chrome, nickel, copper, zirconium, barium and boron (also emitted from the nuclear power station). The combined effect of these and the radioactivity 'might increase the effect of the radiation'¹⁵⁸.

A report elaborated by *EKOLOS* and *Zelenyi Svit* based on official writings on the environment in the Ukrainian press indicated that 12% of Ukrainian couples were, for reasons of severe pollution, unable to reproduce. Ninety-two percent of Ukrainian women worked outside the home. Of these, 80% were doing hard physical labour. The difficult ecological and physical conditions of their workplaces were causing medical problems during pregnancy: heart diseases had doubled, spontaneous abortions were four to six times more frequent and the number of mentally handicapped children being born was three times higher than 10 years previously (i.e. 1980). The number of children weighing less than 1,500 grams at birth had increased five times. In ecological disaster areas such as Zaporizhzhia, Dniprodzerzhinsk, Rubizhne, Kremenchuk and Mariupol two to four times more children than the Ukrainian average were ill at birth, and the number of children ill with leukaemia was five to eight times the average for Ukraine¹⁵⁹.

2.3.4 Verkhovna Rada: Environmental Session, February 1990

As seen above, the environment turned out to be a key issue at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and at the proceedings of the Supreme Soviet. In Ukraine the environment took a prominent place in the pre-election campaign to the Verkhovna Rada during January and February 1990. The outgoing parliament, however, did not address this issue at length until its 12th and last session on 16-17 February 1990. In addition to the deputies, the Ukrainian deputies of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, representatives from various ministries and departments, the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and environmental organisations, including *Zelenyi Svit*, attended the extended session. Those present heard Prime Minister Vitalii Masol's speech 'On the Ecological Situation in the Republic and Measures for its Radical Improvement' and also discussed environmental issues in depth.

Below I will first summarise the major points of Masol's speech and then have a look at the various views and concerns expressed by those present at the session. This is of particular interest as not only does it give a wider picture of the state of the environment in Ukraine, but it also allows me to shed some light on the changing relationship between Ukraine and 'Moscow', using the environment as a test case. As the basis for this section I will use the stenographic account of the 12th session¹⁶⁰.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁵⁹ *Ойкумена*, "Всесвіт", no. 4, 1990, c. 225.

¹⁶⁰ Двенадцатая сессия Верховного Совета Украинской ССР (одиннадцатый созыв). 16-17 февраля 1990 года. Стенографический отчет (Киев: Политиздат Украины, 1990 г.).

The Ukrainian Government's Position on the Environment

Masol started his speech by admitting that the ecological situation in Ukraine was 'tense' and in some regions 'close to catastrophic'. Due to deep concern among Ukrainian deputies as well as the population in general, it had been decided to call a special session of the parliament to address the issue.

Attempting to explain how the state of the environment had deteriorated so badly in Ukraine, Masol identified several factors which had contributed to this result. The most obvious factor was the priority given to heavy industries in the republic. Besides, in the post-war years, a quick reconstruction of the republic's industries had been required to provide coal, electricity, metals, etc., and the environment had been largely ignored in the process. Lack of innovation, the use of old and outdated production techniques and equipment as well as a failure to see the link between the economy and the environment were also to blame for the serious situation. Finally, much of the USSR's heavy industry was concentrated in Ukraine (although the country covered only three percent of the USSR's total territory, it accounted for one fifth of the USSR's production). As for many decades environmental data had been kept secret, it was only over the last few years that it had become clear how badly affected Ukraine was from environmental pollution. The emphasis on gross output (*val*¹⁶¹) and the monopoly of all-union ministries and departments further aggravated the situation; what was more, the Ukrainian authorities were not really in control of industry located on its own territory:

Передко строительство экологически вредных предприятий осуществлялось ими даже без согласия республиканских органов, без должного учета местных потребностей и экологических последствий.

Такова, как говорят, историческая правда. Именно она свидетельствует, что на Украине десятилетиями длилась чрезмерная нагрузка на природную среду, были допущены недостатки в организации комплексного использования природных ресурсов. Крайне осложнила ситуацию и нарушила экологическое равновесие авария на Чернобыльской атомной электростанции¹⁶².

The time had come to give a thorough assessment of the ecological situation in the country and to identify measures by which to improve it. Masol did not look at the state of the environment itself, but proceeded to familiarise those present with a list of several measures already taken by the government to secure more efficient use of natural resources. With the introduction of so-called environmental impact assessments of all new industrial projects (if these were found to be harmful for the environment, the Ministry of Environmental Protection would

¹⁶¹ The emphasis on '*val*', or output in the Soviet economy led one writer on the environment, Oleksandr Hlushko, to rewrite one of the 10 Commandments as follows: Немає Бога, крім плану. І вал -- його уособлення на землі (Олександр Глущко. *'Бунт моря'*, *Вітчизна*, no. 5, 1991, c. 139).

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

send them back to the planners to incorporate specifications and changes), the attitude towards environmentally harmful objects had radically changed, claimed Masol. Every third project was now being returned for 'improvements', and this would no doubt have a positive effect on the environment in the future¹⁶³.

The Ukrainian government had also stopped construction of the Dniepr-Bug water engineering scheme and had abandoned planning of the Danube-Dniepr canal - both thought by environmentalists to be hazardous to the environment. Finally, the government had initiated a reduction in the number of nuclear reactors to be built in Ukraine and banned the further construction of industrial enterprises in the Crimea. Over the last four years some eight billion rubles had been spent on measures to improve the state of the environment in Ukraine. Measures had been taken to recultivate damaged soil, and air filters and cleansing systems for sewage had been installed at a number of enterprises throughout the country. Local integrated environmental programmes had been developed in several of Ukraine's most polluted cities, such as Dniprodzerzhinsk, Krivyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk oblast and several recreational areas in the Crimea. Masol did, however, acknowledge that these measures had been 'far from sufficient' - the current ecological situation in Ukraine gave evidence of this. In order to improve the situation, time, considerable sums of money and much new technical equipment were required.

A major cause of concern was severe air pollution: more than 10 million tons of harmful substances were emitted from Ukraine's metallurgy, chemical, petrochemical, coal and energy industries, and cities like Mariupol, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Dniprodzerzhinsk, Komunarsk, Krivyi Rih and Makeevka were particularly badly affected. Only 30-40% (in the petrochemical industry the figure was only 20%) of these industries were fitted with cleansing facilities and air filters; moreover, those facilities and filters already in use were low in efficiency. Car traffic was a major polluter in many areas of Ukraine, accounting for approximately a third of the total air pollution (in Kiev, Lviv, Poltava and many towns along the Crimean coast the figure reached more than 70%).

A precondition for doing away with this dismal state of affairs, argued Masol, was to develop an ecologically sound strategy for the development of the Ukrainian economy. The development of heavy industries, for instance, would be effected by restructuring and installing modern technologies at already existing facilities. The republic's thermal power stations would also be restructured. More important, though, was the need to change people's thinking on the environment, imbuing them not only with awareness of the environment but also with a sense of responsibility for its protection. Emissions from cars would be reduced in the future by the fitting of catalysts and also by the conversion of cars running on petrol to running on gas. An

¹⁶³ Although the introduction of 'ecological expert assessment' was no doubt an important measure, it did not reduce pollution in Ukraine, as the major polluters (heavy industry in the East of Ukraine and the energy sector) emerged at a time before such expert assessments were made. At best such assessments would contribute to the stabilisation of environmental pollution in Ukraine, by taking measures to limit future emissions of harmful substances into the country's air, soil and water.

environmental programme covering the period until the year 2005 would be elaborated with the intention of reducing emissions into the air.

As for the state of Ukraine's water resources, this was also serious. During 1989 2.5 billion m³ of sewage was emitted into Ukraine's rivers and waters. Again the major culprits were the metallurgy, coal and chemical industries, in addition to emissions from the agricultural sector and domestic waste. The installation of filters and cleansing facilities was proceeding at an unacceptably low tempo, and this had contributed to very serious problems for the country's small rivers. The Black and Azov seas were in a poor state, and the quality of Ukraine's drinking water supplies was deteriorating rapidly. The state of the soil was causing 'deep concern', and Masol admitted that numerous mistakes had been made during the planning and use of the country's irrigation systems. As a result, close to 50,000 hectares of arable land had been flooded. The Ukrainian government would therefore initiate the reconstruction of already existing irrigation systems and seek to recultivate some 185,000 hectares of damaged land.

The creation of an ecological strategy for the development of Ukraine's economy was identified as a key issue by the government. Further, it would seek to reduce construction of new resource and energy-intensive enterprises. Environmentally harmful industries would be reconstructed, and more money would be earmarked for the installation of cleansing facilities and environmental technologies. Finally, measures would be taken to heighten awareness of the environment amongst Ukraine's industrial managers.

With regard to the victims of the Chernobyl accident, the government would continue to evacuate people from the worst affected areas. As of 16 February 1990 some 93,000 people had been evacuated, and this work would continue. The government also claimed to have implemented a series of measures to protect the population of Kiev in the immediate aftermath of the accident. Following the accident, scientists predicted that the Dniepr would be affected. Thirty-five million people got their drinking water from the Dniepr, and the Ukrainian government had immediately taken measures to provide all cities along the river with drinking water from ground water sources. The picture painted by Masol regarding the way in which the Ukrainian authorities had handled the accident at Chernobyl was very different from that identified by people such as Ala Iaroshinska (a journalist from the north of Ukraine), Iurii Shcherbak and others, who indicated that Masol's reassessment of the ecological situation in the country still underestimated the seriousness of the problem.

On the issue of the future development of nuclear power in Ukraine, however, the government's position remained firm:

Наши позиции здесь четкие — мы стоим за минимально
необходимое количество атомных реакторов на украинской земле.
Именно исходя из этого и опираясь на широкую поддержку
общественности и ученых, Совет Министров УССР вместе с ЦК

Компартии Украины уже добились ограничения развития атомной энергетики в республике¹⁶⁴.

Chernobyl was a special case, but the Ukrainian government was in favour of closing it down and would initiate the elaboration of a programme to facilitate this. To compensate for the loss of energy the closing of Chernobyl would cause, the government envisaged a combination of energy saving, alternative energy resources and more efficient technology at existing thermal power stations.

An efficient structure for the management and the control of the environment was an important prerequisite for successful environmental reform. In this connection the government advocated the reorganisation of *Derzhkomprroda*, with the creation of similar structures at the local and regional levels. An environmental unit had been set up in the governmental administration, and the governmental commission on emergencies would incorporate environmental issues in its work. Improved environmental legislation as well as economic reforms, encouraging the rational use of natural resources through the payment for raw materials and fines for harmful emissions, were high on the government's list of required measures, as were improved control systems to monitor their implementation. Other measures to be introduced were the creation of environmental courts, improved ecological information and research on the environment. It was hoped that military conversion would have a positive effect on the state of the environment; the government had high hopes for its 'conversion-ecology' programme. Finally, measures would be taken to change people's attitudes towards the environment:

Без преувеличения можно сказать, что вся дальнейшая деятельность по коренной перестройке дела охраны природы просто невозможна без глубокой заинтересованности в этом всего общества, без экологизации всего нашего мышления, без существенного повышения уровня экологической культуры (my emphasis)¹⁶⁵.

Criticism of the Government: The Standing Commissions of the Parliament.

The permanent commissions of the Ukrainian parliament also prepared a paper for the deputies. It emphasised the impact the serious state of the environment was having on people's health and also criticised the government for inconsistency in its environmental policies. Over the previous 10 years the illness rate in Ukraine had increased by one third and the average life span had been reduced by 5-8 years. Population growth in Ukraine was four times lower than the Soviet average and

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

Более распространенными стали желудочно-кишечные, сердечно-сосудистые и другие заболевания населения, которые непосредственно связаны с влиянием на организм человека вредных промышленных выбросов¹⁶⁶.

Violations of environmental legislation and compromises were frequently recorded at the local level as local soviets, in the hope that their regions would receive at least some funding for the social development of the area, would agree to the construction of environmentally harmful projects. This was the case for instance in Dniprodzerzhinsk, where *Minmetallurgii* and *Minkhimnefteprom* had been given the go-ahead for expanding the capacity of the city's metallurgical combine and of an enterprise producing electrical machinery, despite the fact that the environmental situation in Dniprodzerzhinsk had reached a critical level. *Derzhkompriroda*, *Derzhahroprom*, *Minvodkhoz*, *Minleskhoz*, *Minzdrav* and other institutions in charge of the environment were often just passive onlookers, not making use of their powers to stop environmentally harmful projects from going ahead. The government had adopted a double standard in regard to the environment, on the one hand issuing laws and regulations to protect the environment, on the other hand blatantly violating them:

В мае прошлого года Совет Министров УССР принимает постановление "О некоторых мерах по улучшению экологической обстановки в республике". И одновременно соглашается с предложениями Минхимнефтепрома о строительстве новых мощностей на Лисичанском нефтеперерабатывающем заводе. И это при крайне неудовлетворительной ситуации как в регионе, так и на самом заводе, в противоречие принятым постановлениям и категорическим возражениям советских и природоохранных органов области. Такая позиция Правительства является циничной¹⁶⁷.

A major reason for the environmental deterioration that was taking place in Ukraine was the poor implementation of existing laws and regulations. Few of the annual resolutions 'on the improvement of the protection of water resources' passed by the government had, for instance, been implemented, and as a result rivers such as the Dniestr, Ros and Desna were degrading by the day. Pollution of North Donets, South Bug, Inhulets and Samara had reached 'threatening' levels and it could not but cause concern that 50% of the sewage was emitted into the Dniepr - providing water to 50 Ukrainian cities, 34 million people, 10,000 enterprises and 1,5 million hectares of land. Several times the commissions had demanded from the government that something be done, but so far unsuccessfully. Neither was the Prosecutor's office being very helpful, having adopted a 'neutral' position on environmental issues. This was particularly worrying as, compared with other parts of the USSR, every unit of Ukrainian territory was on average seven times more

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

polluted. Moreover, in 43 cities, in which a third of the republic's population resided, air quality was 'very bad'. A precondition for improving the state of the environment would, in the view of the parliament, be to subordinate *Derzhkompriroda* to the Verkhovna Rada instead of to the government. Another precondition was to strengthen discipline in the executive bodies at all levels and to improve environmental legislation.

The Ukrainian government was also criticised for the way in which it dealt with the Chernobyl accident - measures taken had been slow and inadequate, and Ukraine did not have the required technology to clean up Pripiat, which posed a real threat to the water quality of the Dniepr. The government should lobby all-union organs to secure funding for buying such equipment abroad. Moreover, the commissions recommended the immediate closure of Chernobyl and labelled expansion of the Khmel'nitskyi and Rivne nuclear power stations 'inadmissible'. The experimental reactor in Kiev ought to be closed down.

Eco-Culture as a Precondition for Improving the Environment

Interest among the deputies was enormous - some 80 deputies asked for access to the rostrum - and most speeches expressed concern about the state of the environment in various parts of Ukraine as well as dismay about the lack of measures being taken to improve the situation. Considerable attention was also given to nuclear power. Finally, a number of deputies called for a reassessment of the relationship between Man and Nature and for the strengthening of eco-culture among the Ukrainian population. V. Kukhar, vice-president of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, made a critical assessment of the prevailing attitude towards nature in the USSR/Ukraine, arguing as follows:

...Мы в нашей стране и в нашей республике опоздали с осознанием того, что человек может жить и действовать только как неотъемлемая составная (часть) всей природы, что человек должен кротко и бережно относиться к своему родному великому дому, имя которому - Земля. Непонимание и игнорирование этого привели к тому, что техногенная деятельность стала могущественным фактором быстрого изменения и ухудшения экологического состояния окружающей среды, подорвала его природную стабильность. Настало время снять оранжевые очки и пересмотреть наши взгляды на неисчерпаемость природных ресурсов, о способности нашей природы к самовоспроизводству, о всегда чистом воздухе, прозрачной воде и плодородной земле...Десятилетиями в республике формировалась структура общественного производства, основу которой составляют ресурсо- и энергоемкие отрасли промышленности...Указанные структуры, технократия, гигантомания и подведомственность обусловили чрезвычайно высокую антропогенную нагрузку на природу республики как в целом, так и особенно отдельных ее регионов. Этому отрицательному процессу способствовала также наша низкая экологическая культура.

Although access to ecological information had been limited until recently, this did not mean that people were not aware of the harmful effect of Ukrainian industry on the environment earlier:

...Целый ряд отрицательных экологических последствий нашей хозяйственной деятельности, которые сейчас проявились, ученые республики предусмотрели еще 15-20 лет назад. В частности, еще в 60-е годы было четко высказано их негативное отношение к проекту строительства каскада днепровских водохранилищ и прогнозировались отрицательные последствия его реализации, свидетелями которых мы являемся сегодня¹⁶⁸.

Ivan Pliushch (Kiev), a high-ranking official of the Ukrainian Communist Party, also brought up the issue of eco-culture in his address to parliament. Increasingly often, he argued,

Приходится отвечать, почему так случилось, что наша, воспеваемая в легендах и песнях, цветущая украинская земля находится в запущенном состоянии, на пределе экологического кризиса. А старинный Киев - "мать городов русских", который еще не так давно был одним из наиболее зеленых и чистейших, уже попал в число наиболее загрязненных городов страны¹⁶⁹.

Referring to the accident at Chernobyl and the way in which it was handled by the Soviet authorities, Pliushch argued that the accident was effectively brought about by short-sighted decisions made by Moscow regarding its location. And what was more, the impact of the accident was being compounded by Moscow's unwillingness to take responsibility for the clean-up process. In order to do away with its environmental problems Ukraine needed more glasnost and democratisation. Economic reform was also needed¹⁷⁰.

A. Matvienko, first secretary of the Ukrainian *Komsomol's* Central Committee, was not happy with the way some deputies, including Pliushch, tried to identify scapegoats for the environmental crisis in Ukraine. In his view, everybody was to blame for the current state of affairs, for

...Живем так, насколько мы культурная и образованная нация. А поэтому считаю, что одной из главных причин экологического кризиса, в который мы попали, является наше собственное духовное, интеллектуальное убожество и пренебрежительное отношение к природе. Необходимо возвращение каждого из нас к истокам народной мудрости - истории, культурным традициям, к возрождению забытых сел, хуторов, экологических поселений. Особенно важно это для молодого поколения. Нам необходимо

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 51-53.

иметь республиканский кодекс экологической этики, единые критерии цивилизованного отношения к природе¹⁷¹.

It is interesting that such a high-ranking representative of the *Komsomol* would advocate a revival of old values and habits as a means by which to raise awareness and protect the environment. This view was, as will be seen in Chapter Three, shared by members of the Green Movement, and was a controversial idea also within *PZU*. Deputy Syntsov of Ivano-Frankivsk oblast shared Matvienko's view that a lack of culture was largely to blame for the environmental crisis in Ukraine. This crisis, however, was not unique to Ukraine as such, but was much more wide-reaching:

Проблемы экологии природы – это часть глобальной экологии человеческой морали и культуры. Ведь немало катаклизмов, неприятностей от наплевательского отношения к природоохранительному законодательству – это результат нашей несовершенной системы воспитания населения, низкого уровня экологической культуры руководителей советских, партийных, хозяйственных организаций. И сегодня мы расплачиваемся за наше бескультурье, за нашу административно-командную систему управления даже этой самой святой сферой общественной жизни, физической и моральной болью миллионов людей, неисправимым вредом здоровью нации¹⁷².

Syntsov urged the Prime Minister to exert more control over the deputies, who in his opinion often facilitated the spread of ecological 'unculturedness' and vandalism, also in the sphere of protecting the natural and cultural heritage of Ukraine. In the longer perspective, this lack of culture could only be broken by imbuing children with respect for nature and a sense of responsibility for it from an early age. Then, as pointed out by T. Luchaninova of Sumy, 'to solve the ...ecological problems, concrete work is required of those who not only in words, but through action love their country (rodina), their region and town where they were born and grew up'¹⁷³.

Chernobyl and the Issue of Nuclear Power

Although the deputies of the Ukrainian Parliament highlighted a wide range of environmental issues, the matter causing most concern was Chernobyl and the future of nuclear power in Ukraine. Almost every speech touched on the Chernobyl accident and the implications it had on the deputy's region, the worries it caused among the local population due to food contamination and its impact on people's health. Not only independent (i.e. non-party) deputies, but also

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 134-35.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 173.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 284.

members of the CPU, the *Komsomol* and Ukraine's scientific establishment expressed a wish to gradually phase out Chernobyl and to prohibit further expansion at the republic's remaining nuclear power stations.

From a scientific point of view, V. Kukhar, vice-president of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, argued that although a number of problems regarding the dismantling of big nuclear power stations would have to be solved prior to closing down Chernobyl, the Academy held the view that it must be closed. Kukhar criticised the Ukrainian authorities for having failed to evacuate people from contaminated areas. Although one could discuss various alternatives for the contaminated areas, calculations made in offices often did not correspond to the real situation locally. As for the funding of the clean-up operation, funds allocated centrally for this purpose ought in his view to be handed over to the republic, which in turn ought to establish a body coordinated by the Ukrainian Parliament to oversee their use. Finally, on the issue of expanding the capacity of the republic's nuclear power stations, the Academy of Sciences recommended no further expansion and proposed that future energy needs be covered from natural gas and energy conservation¹⁷⁴. B. Paton, the President of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, expanded on this:

...Нам надо на Украине пойти по пути так называемой газовой паузы и строить экономичные парогазовые электростанции, прекратив на это время строительство атомных станций, пока будут созданы действительно надежные и безопасные современные реакторы. Хотелось бы, чтобы наша сессия выразила свое отношение к этому вопросу¹⁷⁵.

N. Umanets, the director of the Chernobyl nuclear power station, on the other hand, argued that the station was safe and that there was no reason to close it down. Following the accident, a number of technical improvements had been made, the personnel had been tested and had their qualifications improved. More importantly, whereas staff prior to the accident were responsible for energy output, they now answered only for safety. Safety control had also been considerably improved. From an economic point of view it would not necessarily be such a good idea to close Chernobyl; in 1989, for instance, 9.9% of Ukraine's electricity output was generated there, and the station had earned 240 million rubles, 70 million of which formed a surplus. Twelve percent of the surplus had been channelled into the local budget for 1990. The station itself was worth some 1.2 billion rubles. Should Chernobyl be closed, the site of the station as well as the town of Pripjat would become dependent on mazut and electricity from elsewhere. Dismantling the station would not only be technically difficult and time-consuming, but also very expensive. Although he acknowledged the nuclear lobby's guilt for the accident at Chernobyl, Umanets still advocated the continued operation of the Chernobyl nuclear power station:

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

Товарищи депутаты! Мы знаем и, поверьте, с болью ощущаем на себе гнев общественного мнения. С этой трибуны мы, атомщики, еще раз признаем свою вину перед народом. И мы, как умеем, искупаем эту вину. Хочу, чтобы вы знали, что через Чернобыль прошли почти все профессионалы-атомщики. Мы и сегодня не имеем отказа в случаях, когда нам нужна помощь. Именно это обстоятельство позволило нам в два года сформировать стабильный коллектив.

Закрытие ЧАЭС — это не частность, это не певолыное или преднамеренное наступление на атомную энергетику, без которой, по моему глубокому убеждению, через 20–25 лет мы войдем в полосу энергетического кризиса. Именно на такой срок хватит у нас газа, который кстати надо еще заполучить из районов Каспия или Ямала. При этом поставить надежность энергоснабжения в зависимости от технического состояния газопроводов, которые и резервировать бессмысленно, так как резерв коридирует с такой же скоростью¹⁷⁶.

The Soviet Minister of Nuclear Energy and the Nuclear Industry, V. Konovalov, also tried to convince the deputies that no harm would be done should the nuclear programme continue unchanged. Comparing Ukraine to Norway, which produced 23,000 kWh of electricity per person per annum, Konovalov argued that people in Ukraine, where the figure was 5,800 kWh per person, deserved something better. While holding the view that safety had to be put before expansion of nuclear power, the Soviet minister argued that increased electricity output ought to be achieved through such an expansion, as nuclear energy was cleaner from an ecological point of view. If all the nuclear power stations in Ukraine were replaced by thermal power stations using coal, in the course of a year they would emit more than 87 million tons of carbon dioxide, 1.3 million tons of nitrogen dioxide, more than 2.2 million tons of sulphurous gas and close to 200,000 tons of volatile ashes, in addition to numerous other chemical substances, including radioactive ones, into the atmosphere¹⁷⁷. Emissions of inert radioactive gases from the Ukrainian nuclear power stations were allegedly some 100 times lower than the norm, and the IAEA had satisfied itself that safety was the priority issue in Ukraine at the moment. Konovalov also addressed the clean-up work at Chernobyl, but failed to say anything about the implications of the accident on people's health, focusing entirely on the technical details.

The deputies, however, were not impressed by Umanets's or Konovalov's speeches - none of them advocated the continued operation of Chernobyl and in general concern was also voiced about the future of Ukraine's at the other nuclear power stations. The mood at the session reflected the frustration among the Ukrainians of inadequate measures being taken in the aftermath of the accident, at the slow pace of implementation¹⁷⁸ and also of 'Moscow's' seeming lack of

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

¹⁷⁸ See for instance V. Fedorov from Volynia, *ibid.*, pp. 78–79 for more details.

understanding for the needs of the locals. Information from Moscow that money gathered throughout the USSR and deposited in a Chernobyl fund had been given to the USSR *Minatomenergo* was met with disbelief and anger by a majority of the deputies. Money from this fund had been collected among ordinary people and was intended to help the victims of the Chernobyl accident with evacuation, housing, medical care, etc. A telegram from the USSR Council of Ministers on this matter read as follows:

...В связи с вопросом, который возник у Вас, сообщая, что Совет Министров СССР в июле 1987 года принял решение о дополнительном выделении на 1987 год Минатомэнерго СССР 213 млн. рублей на финансирование работ, связанных с ликвидацией последствий аварии на Чернобыльской АЭС, в том числе 67 млн. рублей за счет неиспользованного на то время остатка средств, поступивших на счет № 904810 в Госбанке СССР. Указанные средства полностью использованы по назначению.¹⁷⁹

Social justice, or rather the lack of it, was brought up by many deputies addressing the issue of Chernobyl. S. Kraminskaia of Kharkiv oblast, for instance, drew to the attention of her fellow deputies the fate of the so-called 'liquidators' (the people who took part in the clean-up operation at the Chernobyl nuclear station after the accident). At a meeting with members of the Chernobyl society, she had been informed that the liquidators were not receiving the benefits to which they were entitled. When trying to bring some clarity to the issue of what the liquidators were entitled to, Kraminskaia, herself a member of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada, failed to obtain any documents that proving their status. The military identification documents of soldiers sent to Chernobyl stated their rights, referring to a resolution passed by the USSR Council of Ministers, but locally few, if any, knew the details of this resolution, nor how to get it implemented. The Chernobyl victims were unanimous in their response:

Когда мы были нужны, нас нашли, а теперь мы предоставлены самим себе. Мы никому уже не верим — ни обещаниям правительства, ни местной власти.

Kraminskaia herself concluded as follows:

Произошла чудовищная несправедливость. Люди, выполнив свой долг перед Родиной и оставив свое здоровье там, у стен разрушенного реактора, оказались как бы ненужными обществу.¹⁸⁰

Related to the issue of the 'liquidators' was the health of those living in the contaminated areas. I. Lavrukhin (Kiev) made a reference to the 24,000 people who had been evacuated from

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

the Chernobyl area to Kiev (7,000 of these were children). Another 10,000 people living in Kiev had taken part in the clean-up operation after the accident. Since the accident 980 children had been born to these families, and medical examinations during 1989 showed that the sickness rate in this group had doubled in grown-ups and risen 1.5 times in children. Regular examinations were also required in the affected territories, but due to a lack of adequate equipment it was difficult to organise them. The Fourth directorate of the Republican Centre for the Mother and Child, whose task it was to co-ordinate work with children and mothers from the evacuated areas, had not yet started to function properly - as a matter of fact it was providing care for children from parts of the country that had not been affected by the Chernobyl accident at all. This led Lavrukhin to make the following criticism:

Нам непонятно, почему Минатомэнерго и лечебные учреждения Третьего Главного управления Минздрава СССР не проводят надлежащую работу по охране здоровья тех, кто живет в Киеве и трудится сейчас на ЧАЭС, их детей, а также бывших ее работников. Судьба пенсионеров, уволенных с ЧАЭС, их не интересует¹⁸¹.

The First Secretary of the Polissia regional party committee (Kiev oblast), B. Priimachenko (USSR People's Deputy) told the parliament in an impassioned speech that the frequency of people falling ill in the region was on the rise - particularly among children. Close to 2,000 children had fallen ill with disorders of the thyroid glands and many were losing their eyesight. Changes were also taking place in their blood. Numerous medical commissions had visited the region, and at first the locals had put their trust in them. However, they were not drawing any official conclusions regarding the inadmissibility of living in contaminated areas, although in talks with the parents of ill children they advised them to leave Polissia¹⁸². Priimachenko urged those scientists in charge of making decisions on the issue to take a look at the faces of mothers in Polissia and Ivankovo, to see their tears and to feel their pain. For 'people have lost their faith once and for all'. The people of Polissia were demanding that all families, and in the first instance families with children, be evacuated and resettled during 1990 and that each family be provided

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

¹⁸² Another deputy, K. Synik from Dnipropetrovsk, recalled an incident that occurred during preparations for the 12th session of the Ukrainian Parliament: 'Там также: давайте поручим Президиуму Верховного Совета, давайте поручим правительству. А наша сессия ничего не хочет принимать. Почему? Мы же верховная власть республики! Например, отселить людей из Полесья. Александр Павлович, вы не дадите соврать, в 1986 году на комиссии я лично сказал - Полесье надо немедленно отселить. Тогда было известно, что там обстановка очень плохая. Нет, говорят. Ну, во-первых, улыбнулись, что, мол, вообще, что ты говоришь. Ну правда, Александр Павлович сказал, что Рыжков этого не поддержит. А всем было известно, что это надо было делать. Так давайте сегодня спокойно сейчас примем решение об отселении - и немедленное. Убежден: Правительство найдет возможность это сделать, абсолютно убежден. Только давайте поручим ему это, обяжем, и оно сделает'. See *ibid.*, p. 176.

with housing and work elsewhere. Should the authorities fail to fulfil this demand, the locals would organise strikes and take other, more extreme, measures. They had the support of the local party organisation:

Ведь по плотности радиационного загрязнения, которое в несколько раз превышает все допустимые нормы, район Пolesское с его 13-тысячным населением – единственный в республике населенный пункт с такой крайне опасной для здоровья и жизни людей радиационной обстановкой. Так разве не может наша республика с ее 50-миллионным населением и значительным экономическим потенциалом найти возможность для немедленного отселения людей, по судьбам которых жестоко прошла черныбыльская трагедия и теперь продолжает оказывать на них свое пагубное влияние.

И сегодня непонятно, почему в этой беде мы остались одни, почему все мы должны выпрашивать, почему Правительство республики и Правительство Союза не смогли за четыре года применить кардинальные меры по сохранению здоровья населения?

..Почему министерства и ведомства республики не тревожат судьба подведомственных им трудовых коллективов, расположенных в зоне жесткого радиационного контроля?

..Вместе со своими избирателями я осуждаю 35-бэрную концепцию, как антигуманную, как такую, которая не имеет достаточного научного обоснования. Люди сегодня проявляют недоверие автору этой концепции товарищу Ильину, И.А.¹⁸³.

Deputy Budko (First Secretary of Narodichi district CPU Committee) of Zhytomyr oblast was also highly sceptical of Ilin's concept:

Наша страна, кстати, – единственная в мире, где Министерство здравоохранения разработало концепцию проживания людей на загрязненной территории. А совсем недавно, 12 февраля, на встрече "Чернобыль – модернизация или ликвидация" заместитель Ильина заявил, что концепция 35 бэр – не столько медицинская, сколько экономическая. Чего же тогда стоит лозунги, что наивысшая ценность государства – это жизнь человека? Возникает вопрос действия этих ученых – разве это не преступление?¹⁸⁴.

Narodichi, which had also been seriously affected by the Chernobyl accident, observed a 'sharp increase' in children's illnesses - especially of the blood, thyroid glands and breathing organs. Most children were also suffering from sharply reduced vision, and the increase of cancers was obvious. Local doctors held the view that these illnesses were a direct result of radiation. Children had not been evacuated from Narodichi until 7 June (the accident took place on 26 April), and by then they had received a critical dose of radiation to their thyroid glands.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 104, 105.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

Despite recommendations from scientists, the region had not succeeded in growing clean food products:

Наиболее загрязненными являются молоко и мясо. С каждым годом увеличивается загрязненность олопей. Позвольте спросить вас, уважаемые депутаты, для чего и для кого мы вырабатываем эту продукцию, на чей стол она идет? Неужели это нужно для того, чтобы чем-то запить людей? Это аморально как со стороны того, кто доводит нам планы, так и со стороны того, кто их выполняет, то есть с нашей¹⁸⁵.

The health of people in Narodichi had reached a critical level, as was the case also in neighbouring Ovruch, Korostensk, Luhinsk and Malinsk regions. Budko had brought with him an official document that the doctors of the regional hospital had handed over to the regional party committee. The document stated that, based on medical indicators, 1,698 families were in need of immediate evacuation. Budko drew the following conclusion:

Учитывая то, что это официальный документ, подписанный органами, отвечающими за здоровье людей и особенно детей, оригинал передаю председательствующему, копию – в Прокуратуру республики и еще одну копию – средствам массовой информации для контроля за его решением¹⁸⁶.

More health statistics were provided by S. Hurenko, Second Secretary of the CPU Central Committee. In areas contaminated by the Chernobyl accident, children were receiving a poor diet, there were not enough 'clean' (i.e. uncontaminated) food-products and there was a shortage of vitamins. In Polissia alone some 43% of the children were suffering from swollen thyroid glands and 17% from nasopharynx. Twelve percent were ill with intestinal and gastric diseases. In the Ivankov region 45% of the children were experiencing changes to the endocrine system¹⁸⁷. Hurenko demanded that radiological tests be conducted on every Ukrainian and that the results be published.

Rivne oblast was also affected by the radioactive fallout from the Chernobyl accident. By early 1990 some 10% of the population in the oblast had accumulated doses of caesium higher than the norm and close to 50% of its territory had been affected. High levels of radioactivity had been detected in food products, and the number of people falling ill with stomach problems had increased considerably. A high proportion of children and pregnant women were suffering from anaemia¹⁸⁸.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 118-119.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

The new Minister of Health, Iurii Spizhenko, confirmed that Chernobyl had had a direct impact on people's health. Approximately one million people were living in radioactive areas - 250,000 of these were children. During 1986, 5,800 children and 7,000 grown-ups were exposed to very high levels of radiation (considered dangerous to their thyroid glands). Some 20,000 'liquidators' living in Ukraine were in need of constant medical observation. As for the general health in the affected areas, Spizhenko said the following:

Взрослые и дети, проживающие на радиоактивно загрязненных территориях, болеют чаще, их психофизическое состояние ухудшилось. Дети, которых коснулось черное крыло аварии, значительно отличаются своим психическим состоянием. До 90 процентов опрошенных считают, что у них нет будущего. На 1000 детей-киевлян - только 2-3 прооперированы. Я не хотел бы, да и вряд ли смог бы сегодня четко определить, какая роль радиации, а какая других аспектов аварии в этих изменениях. Но тяжелые последствия для здоровья, в широком понимании этого слова, а не только с позиции непосредственно радиационного влияния для меня, как для врача, неоспоримы¹⁸⁹.

As Ukrainian Minister of Health, Spizhenko did not have any information regarding radiation on the territory of the republic's nuclear power stations. Such data were in the hands of the Third Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Health. This Department ought, in Spizhenko's view, to be subordinated to the Ukrainian Ministry of Health. The situation was illustrated clearly by A. Matvienko, a deputy representing the *Komsomol*, who referred to a very commonly asked question at meetings with his electorate in Vinnytsia oblast:

...Меня спрашивают: "Почему нет реальной картины радиоактивного загрязнения? Специалисты приезжают, делают замеры и ... молчат. Надо сказать людям правду, какой бы она ни была"¹⁹⁰.

S. Kirilchikova (Kiev) was highly critical of Ilin and suggested that he be stripped of his positions and titles:

Он все еще остается вице-президентом, главным радиобиологом страны. Я была ошеломлена, когда прочитала, что он еще и Герой Социалистического Труда за ликвидацию последствий чернобыльской аварии...Поэтому я все-таки прошу поставить вопрос, чтобы главным радиобиологом страны он не был, вице-президентом Академии медицинских наук не был, и если он Герой Социалистического Труда, то чтобы был поставлен вопрос о лишении его этого звания¹⁹¹.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

The chairman of USSR *Goskomgidromet*, Iurii Izrael, and the vice-president of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, Leonid Ilin, had both been invited to attend the session, but declined the request. Judging by the mood of the deputies, they were probably better off not attending.

Also criticised were the Ukrainian authorities and the 'centre' (i.e. Moscow) for failing to address the issue of Chernobyl properly. Deputy Iavorivskii (Writers Union), a keen campaigner for more glasnost on Chernobyl, saw the accident as brought about by 'the energy empire' of all-union ministries and departments, 'promising us heaven and golden mountains, but instead inflicting upon us the bleeding wound of Chernobyl'. The only way in which Ukraine could avoid similar incidents in the future was by becoming truly sovereign, and thus in charge of its own territory. The Ukrainian deputies to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies had tried to address the issue of Chernobyl, but without much success, as their attempt was being blocked by the Soviet Prime Minister, Ryzhkov:

Здесь товарищ Федоров говорил о том, что народные депутаты в Москве молчат. Не молчим, товарищ Федоров. Я должен сказать вам, что уже на первом Съезде народных депутатов мы, 40, подписали запрос к товарищу Рыжкову. Я уважаю этого человека. Но ответа никакого не было. На втором Съезде Ярошницкая предлагает показать кинофильм о Чернобыле. Мы снова пишем запрос Рыжкову. Ответа нет. Как хотите, так и воспринимайте. Я воспринимаю это так, что мы с этой бедой никому больше не нужны. Мы остались с нею один на один¹⁹².

As seen above, Prime Minister Masol in his speech to the parliament stressed that the Ukrainian government opposed any further expansion of nuclear power in Ukraine. This view was also endorsed by the Central Committee of the Ukrainian *Komsomol*, whose position was outlined as follows by deputy A. Matvienko:

Центральный Комитет комсомола Украины поддерживает требование о прекращении строительства новых блоков, закрытии Чернобыльской атомной электростанции, выступает за государственную программу спасения здоровья детей, уточнения сел, нуждающихся в переселении. Мы — за немедленное отселение молодых семей из всей зоны контроля¹⁹³.

The mood¹⁹⁴ of the deputies was generally in favour of closing the Chernobyl nuclear power station - only one deputy, I. Manenkin of Donetsk¹⁹⁵, proposed that a commission be established

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 114.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

¹⁹⁴ See for instance *ibid.*, p. 89, pp.96-97, p. 117, pp. 160-62, pp. 175-77, pp. 184-85, pp. 192-93, p.194, for the arguments used in this connection.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

to determine whether or not it was necessary to close the station down. M. Malevianik of Zakarpatia wanted those people responsible for the accident at Chernobyl to be judged and sentenced as a step towards avoiding similar accidents in the future¹⁹⁶. With regard to Ukraine's other nuclear power stations, several deputies expressed concern with plans to expand their capacity. I. Zahorulko of Rivne oblast raised the following point:

В связи с близким расположением Ровенской и Хмельницкой атомных электростанций на Ровенщине сложилась чрезвычайно напряженная обстановка. Жители пораженных территорий обозлились, молодые семьи и квалифицированная молодежь выезжают за пределы области и республики. Моральное состояние населения ухудшилось, люди не желают строиться, иметь собственный скот, птицу, повсеместно сокращают свои хозяйства. У ровенчан и наших соседей мысль одна – немедленно прекратить дальнейшее развитие и строительство АЭС. Если у кого-то есть сомнения, давайте проведем референдум. Хорошо выступил тут министр Кошовалов, но совсем умолчал об ответственности¹⁹⁷.

As for the Rivne and Khmelnytskyi nuclear power stations, these were causing considerable damage to the local environment with their present capacity. The Rivne nuclear power station, for example, was emitting 25,000 m³ of contaminated water per day, bringing temperatures up to 30 degrees Celsius. The existence of Khmelnytskyi nuclear power station had reduced the water level in the river Horyn by 40%. Discussions surrounding plans to rebuild the Khrennytske water reservoir to serve the Khmelnytskyi nuclear power station with cooling water for its reactor were fiercely opposed by the local communities, as this reservoir was considered to be the 'pearl of Rivne, Volynia and Lviv oblasts'. A deputy from Volynia also expressed concern regarding the Rivne nuclear power station. It was

...Построена на карстовых породах, в неблагоприятных климатогеографических условиях. Согласно выводам институтов общей и коммунальной гигиены Министерства здравоохранения СССР, Ленинградского научно-исследовательского института радиационной гигиены, в полесской зоне Волынской области еще до строительства Ровенской АЭС и чернобыльской аварии отмечалась повышенная миграция цезия-137 в звене почва-растения, что ведет к концентрации его в продуктах, в частности в молоке, в 9-20 раз больше в сравнении со средними республиканскими показателями. Эти процессы продолжают усложняться. Теперь всем ясно, что Ровенская атомная станция не должна была в этом районе располагаться, но раз она уже действует, то необходимо сделать все, чтобы люди, которые проживают в зоне ее влияния, постоянно ощущали заботу о своей жизни и здоровье¹⁹⁸.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 100-101.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 160-61.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

A deputy from Crimea expressed concern that despite a resolution issued by the Council of Ministers to reprofile the Crimean Nuclear Power Station, so far no measures had been taken in this direction. An interview with Academician Velikhov printed in *Komsomolskoe znanie* had suggested that the station be converted into a nuclear polygon or a training facility for personnel working in nuclear power stations:

Нас это не устраивает. Мы, здоровая сила Крыма, требуем демонтировать атомный реактор и вывезти его, плотиину уничтожить и уровень озера довести до первичного, чтобы не подтоплять села, колхозы и зем.и.¹⁹⁹

Crimean scientists had elaborated a project on alternative energy which would utilise energy from the sun and the wind. This could be used to generate the amount of energy originally envisaged at the Crimean nuclear power station.

A. Nedria was concerned that, while the deputies were worried about the nuclear power stations at Rivne and Khmelnytskyi, little had been said about the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station:

В данный период уже работает пять энергоблоков атомной станции, и на этом пятачке работает рядом и тепловая станция. И какой вред она приносит -- никто сказал об этом. Поэтому предлагаю...запретить строительство новых энергоблоков на Украине и уменьшить мощность действующих станций до трех энергоблоков одновременного действия²⁰⁰.

USSR People's Deputy V. Chelyshev proposed to the session that it ban any further construction work on reactor six at Zaporizhzhia until a full ecological expert assessment had been conducted. The reactor was due to be connected to the electricity grid in April 1990²⁰¹. A similar view was expressed by V. Pilipenko (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), who wanted the Academy of Sciences and *Derzhkompriroda* to conduct a joint complex scientific and ecological assessment of the Zaporizhzhia energy complex (the nuclear power station and the thermal power station) to decide whether to expand or to conserve it at its present capacity²⁰².

General Environmental Problems in Ukraine

Although the focus of the deputies was on nuclear power, other environmental problems were also addressed in the course of the session. USSR Minister of the Environment Nikolai Vorontsov

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 174.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 214.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 228.

provided the deputies with a general overview of the state of the environment in Ukraine. Although covering no more than three percent of the Soviet Union's total territory, between 20 and 25% of the country's total pollution was generated in the republic, primarily from the Left Bank of the Dniepr and the Dniepr-Donetsk industrial region. Eleven million tons of harmful substances were emitted into the atmosphere every year - three times less than in the Russian Federation, whose territory was 30 times that of Ukraine. One in five²⁰³ of the Soviet Union's most polluted cities (air pollution) were located in Ukraine, and the Donetsk-Pridneprovsk region was one of the most polluted areas in the Soviet Union. Sickness rates in this region were the highest in the country, and no improvements were expected in the immediate future.

Some 19 km³ of sewage was emitted into Ukraine's rivers and waters annually, and 41% of this was not filtered or cleaned. Forty percent of the Dniepr's annual water flow was collected for domestic and industrial use. Although there was a shortage of clean drinking water in Ukraine, seven percent of its water reserves were used for industrial purposes. Enormous amounts of domestic and industrial effluents were emitted uncleansed by big cities such as Zaporizhzhia, Poltava and Sevastopol. The Black Sea was in a poor state and the Azov Sea on the verge of ecological catastrophe. Extremely high levels of pollution by sewage had been detected at cattle-breeding complexes and poultry 'factories'. Ukraine was particularly badly affected, especially Kirovohrad, Odessa and Cherkassy oblasts. Large quantities of organic manure were emitted directly into the rivers causing serious pollution of small rivers and waters. Levels of pesticides, nitrites and nitrates in food products were alarmingly high. Large investments were required to stabilise and then improve the situation:

Согласно мировым оценкам, для того, чтобы страна могла обеспечить стабильный уровень охраны окружающей среды, для этого должно направляться от 3 до 5 проц. валового национального продукта. Если страна тратит менее чем 3 проц. на охрану природы, то эти деньги фактически идут на поддержание уже существующих контрольных и других природоохранных структур. Лишь в том случае, если страна тратит на охрану природы выше 5 проц., можно приступить к ликвидации районов экологического бедствия, таких, как Чернобыль, или таких территорий, как Левобережная Украина²⁰⁴.

East Ukraine

Given that most of Ukraine's (heavy) industries were located in the east of Ukraine, it was not surprising that this area was among the issues most frequently addressed by the deputies. In Voroshilovhrad oblast the most heavily polluted area was the Lisichansk-Rubezhanskii industrial

²⁰³ These cities were Dniprodzerzhinsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Krivyi Rih, Konmunarsk, Kiev, Lisichansk, Makeevka, Mariupol, Odessa and Severodonetsk.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

region. Lisichansk, Rubezhnoe and Severodonetsk, which were all situated in this area, were on the list of the USSR's 68 most heavily polluted cities (1988)²⁰⁵.

Lisichansk was in a critical state, with its many chemical enterprises and close proximity to Rubezhnoe and Severodonetsk. Some one million tons of harmful substances were emitted per citizen annually. Some 80 different substances had been detected in the air basin over Lisichansk and Rubezhnoe, and 20 of these were among the most harmful substances known to human health. Control measures were inadequate, but the steady decline in people's health clearly indicated that the emissions were having a negative effect. The sickness rate for the area was 20% higher than for the oblast as such; illnesses of the lungs and bronchial asthma were 1.2 times higher, and people were twice as likely to fall ill from blood-related diseases. Infant mortality was 1.5 times higher and the number of deformed babies born was three times higher than for Ukraine as a whole. As for cancers, Lisichansk ranked seventh in Ukraine²⁰⁶. In industrial centres such as Rubezhnoe, Mariupol, Zaporizhzhia and Krivyi Rih, the number of children born with various defects, mutilations and inherited diseases had gone up 2-4 times. Even those children who were labelled 'clinically healthy' at birth had disturbances in their hormone balance and immune systems, which in turn caused a large number of children to fall ill with allergies, cancers, blood diseases and asthma. This gave reason for concern, as pointed out by deputy Novitskaia-Usenko of Dnipropetrovsk:

Вы только подумайте, в медицине появился новый термин — "промышленный синдром плода", за которым стоит в будущем искалеченный ребенок. Как видим, новорожденные сегодня являются самым чутким индикатором экологического неблагополучия²⁰⁷.

Another major polluter was Dniprodzerzhinsk, emitting some 315,000 tons of harmful substances into the atmosphere - the Makeevskii metallurgical combine alone was responsible for the emission of 178,000 tons!²⁰⁸ Another heavily polluted town in the region, Kommunarisk, was on the verge of catastrophe, emitting an average of two tons of harmful substances into the air per citizen. The only recreational facility in the area, the Isakov reservoir, had been completely destroyed by water from mines being emitted into the reservoir. The number of cancers, stomach and intestine problems and other diseases were on the rise²⁰⁹.

In neighbouring Donetsk oblast the situation was equally serious. More than 200 factories and combines were situated in Donetsk city (mining, metallurgical and chemical industries as well

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 57 (deputy Zinkovskii, Voroshilovhrad oblast).

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 98-99 (deputy Ermakov, Voroshilovhrad oblast).

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 292 (unread speech of deputy Merzlenko, Voroshilovhrad oblast).

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 335 (unread speech of deputy Iakimenko, director of the Kommunarisk metallurgical combine, Voroshilovhrad oblast).

as enterprises producing construction materials), which covered an area of 358 km² and had a population of 1,149,000 (3,190 inhabitants per square km - the Ukrainian average was 83). Some 320 kg of harmful substances were emitted per citizen, and levels of dust, phenols, oxides, nitrogen and sulphurous anhydride exceeded the maximum permissible levels. The river Kalnius, providing Donetsk with drinking water, and other rivers and reservoirs in the area were seriously polluted by 40 enterprises emitting more than 186,000 m³ of sewage into the river daily - 2,000 m³ of which did not comply with sanitary norms. Silt in the river Hruzskaiia had been labelled 'extremely harmful' for people's health. Eight smelting ovens at the Donetsk metallurgical plant, situated in the very heart of Donetsk, had not been fitted with filters, although a decision to reconstruct them had been made as early as in the 1970s. The mines in Donetsk were also causing substantial pollution (17 mill. tons of rocks and also considerable radiation)²¹⁰.

Deputy H. Hutovskii from Dnipropetrovsk²¹¹ gave the deputies an indication of how serious the ecological situation was in his home town by referring to the 'steel heart of the Soviet Union' as a 'crematorium' and 'gas chamber'. The Ministry of Metallurgy was the major polluter in the area, emitting some 60 million m³ of polluted water and turning the local river Saksahan into a sewer. The river Inhulets was being destroyed by water from the mines containing large quantities of salts. One of Dnipropetrovsk's major polluters, the Petrovsk enterprise, had used the same blast-furnace ovens for 36 years (instead of the maximum 25) and the open-hearth furnace ovens for 40 years (instead of the maximum 20). The enterprise, which was situated in a densely populated part of town, was having a negative impact on people's health; for instance, six times more children in this area were falling ill with respiratory diseases compared to the relatively clean Zhovten region, and allergies and blood diseases were 2-3 times more frequent. For the grown-up population heart diseases and cancers were 1.5-2 times more common²¹².

Krivyĭ Rih ranked among the highest in terms of emissions of gas and dust into the atmosphere. More than 10,000 of Krivih Rih's citizens lived next to its metallurgical plants and combines - the air of the entire region by the Iuzhnii and Novokrivorozhsk combines was permanently polluted. Two regions with 140,000 inhabitants in the close proximity of 'Krivorozhstal' and a coke and chemical enterprise were also in a serious state and people's frustrations were growing:

Недовольство общественности города возрастает, поскольку никаких сдвигов на лучшее не предвидится. Люди потеряли веру в планы и обещания защитить природу, потому что видят постоянное и нарастающее ее уничтожение на каждом шагу. Они ставят под сомнение силу Советской власти, потому что она не в состоянии защитить их от засилья министерств, от отравления, от болезней²¹³.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 108-11 (deputy Manenkin, Donetsk oblast).

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 114-16.

²¹² *Ibid.*, p. 306 (unread speech of deputy V. Pilipenko, Dnipropetrovsk oblast).

²¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

Жители города (требует) дать городу статус города республиканского подчинения, решительно закрывать все морально устаревшие предприятия, создать во всех больших городах независимые, хорошо оснащенные вневедомственные лаборатории, республиканскую экологическую прокуратуру.²¹⁴

V. Popov from Zaporizhzhia oblast gave a depressing account of the ecological situation in Zaporizhzhia town, which was no better than elsewhere in East Ukraine. Every year 19,677 sources emitted 1,062,000 tons of pollutants into the atmosphere. Harmful substances such as carbon, nitrogen and sulphur were emitted practically uncleaned, and 49% of the sources had no cleansing facilities. Sixty percent of Zaporizhzhia's air pollution was caused by Zaporizhstal and enterprises working under its direction. In terms of air pollution, Zaporizhzhia ranked fourth in Ukraine and 20th in the USSR. Every day the town of Zaporizhzhia emitted 767,000 m³ of industrial/domestic water into the Dniepr. Only 41.8% of this had been properly cleansed. The pollution of the Dniepr as well as the accumulation of radio nuclides in its silt was causing particular concern in Zaporizhzhia, as it was one of two Ukrainian cities whose drinking water was supplied directly from the Dniepr. The close proximity of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station (five reactors) and the Zaporizhzhia DRES (combined hydroelectric and thermal power station) gave additional cause for concern. The impact this had on health was obvious for anyone to see; illnesses among children and grown-ups were 45% and 21% more frequent than on average in Ukraine, and in the 20-30 year age group, the figure was 4.6 times higher than of the Ukrainian average²¹⁵.

South Ukraine

Environmental problems were rife also in Ukraine's southern oblasts. V. Stadnichenko (Odessa oblast) brought up the issue of Lake Sasik, which from being a recreational area was being turned into a still-water lake, filled with a cocktail of harmful chemical substances. The fish were dying, and the concentration of harmful substances in the fish was up to 50 or more times above the maximum permissible levels. The situation at Lake Sasik, argued Stadnichenko, was indicative of the situation in the oblast at large. The Danube-Dniestr irrigation system could only be labelled an 'ecological disaster'²¹⁶. Lake Ialpuh was in the process of dying due to excessive pollution and would soon leave 100,000 people of the Bolshrad region without drinking water. Due to the poor water quality in the sea, this region occupied the first place in terms of intestinal diseases.

Deputy V. Plekhanov pointed out that Odessa city was in a 'terrible state'. The lower parts of the Dniestr and the Dniestr bay could only be referred to as 'catastrophic', and as a result

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 178-79.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

Odessa's drinking water was so poor that it put not only people's health, but also their lives, in danger. Plekhanov moreover warned against the Priport enterprise, which he characterised as a 'time bomb'. This enterprise could cause a disaster even worse than the accident at Chernobyl and should be closed immediately²¹⁷.

The Priport enterprise (OTP) and the port of Iuzhnii had four underground storage facilities, each with a capacity of 30,000 tons of concentrated ammonia. According to the enterprise's administration, the durability of the walls would be checked once every 10 years. However, in the period 1987-89 alone, 70 accidents had taken place at the OTP. As for the dangers, V. Simonenko gave the following information:

При аварийном разрыве 100 тыс. тонн аммиака глубина смертельной концентрации составит 30 км. поражающей 100 км. В зону поражения попадут площади с населением свыше 4 млн. человек. Среда обитания человека на юге Украины будет уничтожена полностью.

This was not the only source of concern, however: in the near future the USSR Ministry of Fertilisers was planning to build a complex for the loading of calcium chloride for export, for the manufacture of granulated sulphur and also to start dispatching akrilonitrilovie acids. Emissions of various substances were expected to reach 1,800 tons per year. These plans had been finalized despite the fact that a complex for the loading of phosphates had for the time being been placed on hold after pressure from the public²¹⁸.

The Black Sea coast was also in a poor state. The Black Sea itself was being destroyed by chemical, bacteriological and radioactive pollution, and the layer of dead water saturated with hydrogen sulphide was increasing. Rivers flowing into the Black Sea, such as the Danube, Dniestr, Dniepr and South Bug, were being exposed to increasing levels of pollution, and recreational zones along the Black Sea Coast were being closed for swimming during the summer due to excessive pollution in the area. The trend could be reversed only if a ban on the construction of industrial objects closer than 30 km to the coast was introduced. A commission that had assessed the state of the environment in the oblast had concluded as follows:

В области сформировалась кризисная экологическая ситуация, представляющая угрозу для здоровья и жизни населения и создавшая возможность потери уникальных рекреационных ресурсов, обеспечивания созданного рекреационного хозяйства²¹⁹.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 215.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 319 (unread speech by deputy V. Simonenko, Odessa oblast).

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 168-69.

West Ukraine

M. Malevnik from Zakarpatia brought to the attention of his fellow deputies the state of the Carpathes, one of Ukraine's major recreational resorts. The Carpathes, he argued, were threatened by extinction. Excessive felling of trees, harmful introduction of agriculture on steep slopes, numerous high voltage electricity lines and big oil pipes had caused serious erosion of the soil. The senseless use of mineral fertilisers and chemicals in farming further aggravated the situation. Three wood chemistry combines, all of which were more than 100 years old and which made use of outdated technologies, were operating without pollution-reducing devices, and as a result a large number of phenols and formaldehydes were entering the rivers and being emitted into the air. In Mukachevo a radar station and a military airport were causing concern, as was the excessive secrecy surrounding them. The river Tisa was being seriously polluted by water containing mineral fertilisers from Chop railway station - hundreds of thousands of cubic meters of contaminated water were being emitted into the river annually. A decision by the oblast soviet to extend the territory of the Carpathian nature reserve by 8,000 hectares was being blocked by Ukrainian ministries²²⁰.

Thus, the Carpathians were badly polluted like most other parts of Ukraine. In terms of air pollution the region ranked 4th in the USSR - emitting 647,700 tons of harmful substances into the air in 1988 - or 46.5 tons per km². The Dniestr, Prut and other rivers in the area annually received 48 million m³ of inadequately cleansed sewage and 15 million m³ of uncleansed sewage. Wild animals living in the Carpathian forests were also polluted; concentrations of lead exceeding the maximum permissible levels by 67 times had been found in the internal organs of wild boars. In Kalush (Ivano-Frankivsk oblast) seriously ill new-born babies were twice as frequent as in Ukraine as a whole and new-born babies with abnormalities of various kinds were also common. Arnold Hammer, who had helped to fund chemical enterprises in Prikarpatia and Kalush, had to take the blame for this state of affairs, as enterprises he was not allowed to set up in Western countries were simply built in Ukraine instead²²¹.

In Rivne, a major source of pollution were the Rivne and Khmelnytskyi nuclear power stations in addition to radioactive fall-out from the Chernobyl accident (see above). However, there were also other problems, one of which was toxic waste. As observed by I. Zahorulko, every year enterprises in the region produced more than 190 tons of solid and 1,330 tons of liquid highly toxic waste. However, the oblast did not have any special facilities for storing this waste, and this was causing concern from an ecological point of view²²². According to *Severukrgeologiya*, Rivne oblast did not have any suitable land for such a storage facility due to its deep carst layers²²³.

Khmelnytskyi oblast, although it did not have any metallurgical, chemical, petrochemical or other harmful enterprises, was also beginning to see the first signs of environmental catastrophe.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 100-104.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 170-74 (speech by V. Sintsov, Ivano-Frankivsk oblast).

²²² *Ibid.*, pp. 162-63.

²²³ *Ibid.*, p. 279.

A ban had been issued on swimming in the river South Buh, as concentrations of various chemicals exceeded maximum permissible levels by tens and sometimes hundreds of times. Green areas were slowly dying, and the soil was gradually being poisoned with chemicals, losing its fertile layer of humus. Seven regional centres in the oblast had no cleansing facilities at all²²⁴.

Kiev, Central and North Ukraine

Kiev was (and still is) one of Ukraine's most polluted cities. Some 300,000 tons of harmful substances were emitted into the atmosphere annually - some 240,000 tons, or 70%, were exhaust gases from car traffic. Several thermal power stations and smaller boilers also caused substantial pollution. As in Rivne, toxic waste was also causing environmental problems in Kiev, due to a lack of proper storage facilities. More than 50,000 tons of toxic waste were being produced in the capital every year. One of the major areas of concern among the Kiev deputies was how to provide the citizens of Kiev with clean drinking water. The city was getting its drinking water from the rivers Desna and Dniepr, both of which were in a critical state from an environmental point of view. N. Lavrukhin voiced concern that ground water sources providing Kiev with drinking water might be contaminated with various pollutants²²⁵. N. Havrylenko of Lviv oblast, revealed that samples of soil from kindergartens and schools in Kiev contained concentrations of heavy metals several times above the permissible levels. A similar situation had been identified in other Ukrainian cities²²⁶.

In Vinnytsia oblast, environmental problems were predominantly caused by the use of outdated farming techniques, causing erosion, and the excessive use of pesticides and mineral fertilisers. As a result, nitrates (levels exceeding the permissible levels by up to 15%) had been found in wells in the countryside. In the hope that something would be done to improve the situation, the oblast authorities on numerous occasions had contacted *Derzhplan* and *Derzhahroprom*, but had so far not been heard. Vinnytsia oblast did not have proper storage facilities for mineral fertilisers, and as a result these fertilisers were polluting the soil in the places where they were kept and eventually entering the ground water.

In the town of Ladyzhin an enormous thermal hydroelectric power station and various other enterprises annually emitted more than 130,000 tons of harmful substances into the atmosphere. The town was not self-sufficient in drinking water. In spite of the very difficult environmental situation in Ladyzhin, the USSR Council of Ministers and USSR *Minmedprom* decided, without informing the oblast, that a facility for producing substances to be used in detergents be built by the production unit *Enzim*. Some forty thousand tons of synthetic cleansing facilities were to be

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 320-22 (unread speech by deputy L. Skrynychuk, Khmel'nitskii oblast).

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 95-96.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

produced and in order to comply with this decision the oblast authorities would have to renege on its 1990-1992 plans 2,250 flats, hospitals, etc. that it intended to build. N. Didyk thus asked

Спрашивается, до каких пор Правительство Союза будет провозглашать лозунг о расширении прав местных Советов, а действовать в противоположном направлении, игнорируя местные Советы народных депутатов²²⁷.

As for the Northern oblasts, these were suffering from the same problems as Vinnytsia and other predominantly agricultural areas, in addition to radioactive fall-out from Chernobyl.

Relationship between USSR and Ukraine

Several of the deputies complained that proposals made locally were not 'heard' by the USSR Council of Ministers and various ministries/departments in Moscow. Others expressed anger that decisions made locally were overruled by 'Moscow'. The revelation of such incidents fuelled demands for 'real' Ukrainian sovereignty, so as to gain control over the republic's industries and thus to put the republic's authorities in a position to effectively reduce pollution on its territory. Before I look at the discussion on Ukrainian sovereignty that took place at the 12th session of the Ukrainian parliament, I will refer to some cases in which local and central interests clashed.

Deputy Pilypenko argued that the issue was not only one of Ukraine vs. the USSR, but also one of Man vs. Indifference:

Настала пора остановиться, оглянуться, все хорошо подсчитать и внести и только потом принимать решения, каким путем нам двигаться дальше – к Человеку, к его нуждам, его благосостоянию или процветанию диктата тех или иных министерств и ведомств, диктата безразличия. Мы уже не можем слушать демагогические лозунги – "стране нужен металл", "стране нужен уголь" и тому подобное, выдуманные союзными министерствами. Нам нужен Человек – здоровый, творческий, активный, а таким он может быть только в здоровой естественной окружающей среде²²⁸.

Indifference was exactly the response the Zaporizhzhia city soviet was met with when it put forward several proposals to the USSR Ministry of Metallurgy that would reduce pollution from the city's enterprises. The city soviet requested from the Ministry that *goszakazy* (state commissions) for its enterprises be set no higher than 80%, so that the remaining 20% could be used to improve the social situation - the environment included - in Zaporizhzhia. This request

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 275.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 308.

was ignored, and goszakazy were fixed at 95%, thus leaving the enterprise with only 9% of its income for local needs. This, argued Popov, was unacceptable:

Если лозунг "Вся власть – Советам!", который вот уже в третий раз в истории страны становится злободневным, действительно реализуется, то Запорожский горсовет не должен выступать перед Министерством металлургии СССР в роли просителя, а скорее, наоборот. Хозяин в городе – Совет, а Минметаллургии – исполнитель. Поэтому все требования горсовета Минметаллургии должно принять к безусловному выполнению²²⁹.

Deputy Stezhko (Dnipropetrovsk) in his speech, which was not presented to the session, revealed a very similar situation in his oblast:

Учитывая, что продукция, выпускаемая нашими предприятиями, во многом обеспечивает экспортные поставки страны, мы требуем от Министерства металлургии СССР решить проблему приобретения импортного эффективного оборудования по очистке газов и сточных вод, а также привлечения к его монтажу и реконструкции металлургических предприятий. Мы просим Минметаллургию СССР потому, что вся валюта осталась в центре, а закона о местном самоуправлении, который бы позволил нам решать эти вопросы самым, пока нет. В противном случае мы вынуждены будем закрывать вредные производства, так как другого пути спасти людей у нас нет²³⁰.

V. Budko expressed dissatisfaction that all-union ministries and departments had a monopoly on information on the Chernobyl accident and that this information had not been made accessible to the Ukrainian authorities:

Надо сказать четко, что монополия на информацию была у государственной комиссии, у союзных ведомств. Их руки в основном держали крышу над черныбыльским котлом. Другое дело, что у руководства могучей суверенной республики не хватало мужества, чувства ответственности перед своим народом напомнить о своих правах. И если бы не выплеснулся гнев людей, если бы не средства массовой информации, народные депутаты и просто честные люди, вряд ли нам удалось бы до этих пор пробить стену отчуждения наших проблем²³¹.

There were also complaints that all-union ministries such as the Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of Health were blocking the implementation of resolutions issued on Chernobyl²³², and

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 323.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 117-18.

²³² *Ibid.*, p. 215 (this issue was raised by USSR People's Deputy B. Krishevich).

V. Cherniak had the support of many deputies when he urged the Ukrainian parliament to take control over its own territory and its own resources:

...Должна идти речь о делегировании функций не сверху вниз, а снизу вверх. И нам не надо ждать, пока в Москве это будет решаться, а решать у себя, здесь, на Украине...Верховный Совет СССР провозглашает суверенитет республики в решении вопросов размещения новых производств и расширения действующих мощностей²³³.

This view was shared by D. Pavlychko, USSR People's Deputy from Ukraine:

Пока народ Украины не будет суверенным над природными богатствами республики, добиться заметных изменений в экологическом положении на Украине невозможно²³⁴.

Another deputy, V. Krishevych, held the view that the time had come for Ukraine to stop 'begging' Moscow for assistance to solve its environmental, and for that matter, other problems:

...Вспомнить, что Украина — это независимое, суверенное государство, а не просить с протянутой рукой где-то на папертях Москвы²³⁵.

Stanislav Hurenko, USSR People's Deputy and Second Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, in principle endorsed calls for Ukrainian sovereignty, albeit choosing his words somewhat more carefully than other deputies:

Я думаю, что нам следует высказаться так, что мы в принципе за экономический и политический суверенитет Украины в составе обновленной федерации и поручаем нашим преемникам или просим наших преемников, или Правительство Украины подготовить такие предложения для всенародного обсуждения²³⁶.

The session did, however, reveal that there was some disagreement within the CPU on how far to go on the issue of Ukrainian sovereignty. Borys Oliinyk, a Ukrainian writer and poet who actively campaigned for the Ukrainian environment at the XIX CPSU Party Conference in Moscow in 1988, held the view that only when Ukraine was fully in control of its own territory and resources would it be possible to make any changes for the better in the sphere of the environment:

²³³ *Ibid.*, p. 207.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 217.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

...Наши души настолько обмелели, что по ним вброд можно дойти к ручке дверей, за которыми уже экологическая пропасть. Но все наши разговоры, на каком бы уровне они не продолжались, и дискуссии будут оставаться лишь разговорами, если мы, конечно, не наполним суверенитет, провозглашенный с центра, реальным его наполнением. И поэтому я думаю, что и Юрий Михайлович, и Щербак, и Дмитрий Васильевич Павлычко имеют основание: когда мы сами не наведем порядок в своей светлице-избе, то никто нам сверху его не наведет. Итак, пора уже приступить к реализации своего суверенитета²³⁷.

Not everybody called for Ukrainian sovereignty. However, the general mood was that of increasing impatience with Moscow's wrong (as perceived from Ukraine) or slow decisions on issues regarding the state of the environment in Ukraine. Thus, S. Riabchenko urged Ukraine not to wait for the Union to pass a decision on environmental taxes, but to introduce such a tax to those enterprises polluting the Ukrainian environment. The money gathered through this tax could then be given to the local soviets, which would in turn spend the money on solving ecological problems²³⁸. S. Stezhko advocated that Ukraine keep some of the hard-currency earnings of its enterprises to improve their 'environmentability':

Я вношу предложение Совету Министров республики поставить вопрос в Совете Министров СССР: не менее 50 проц. валютных поступлений в страну, которые наша республика обеспечивает, оставить в республике для закупки оборудования и приглашения иностранных фирм для монтажа оборудования и решения наших экологических проблем. Тогда можно что-то решить²³⁹.

With regard to Chernobyl, Iavorivskii proposed to the parliament that it demand from all-union bodies that they fund those measures required to eliminate the impact of the Chernobyl accident²⁴⁰. Deputy A. Nedria urged the deputies not to 'request', 'order' or 'demand' anything from the USSR, as they were legislators, not 'beggars'²⁴¹. A USSR People's Deputy from Donbass, Iu. Burykh, proposed to the session that it pass a set of propositions on the revival of the Donbass as a whole. He had put forward the same propositions to the USSR Supreme Soviet, but without any success²⁴².

The clash of interests between the USSR and Ukraine on the environment was clearly reflected in the debate on whether or not to put the all-union scientific centre for radiation

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 206.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 219.

²³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 222.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 211.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 223.

medicine under Ukrainian jurisdiction. This proposition was put forward by the USSR People's Deputy O. Sozinov and endorsed by several of the delegates. S. Riabchenko, for instance, argued that the centre be subordinated to the Ukrainian Ministry of Health on the following grounds:

Теперь о Всесоюзном центре радиационной медицины. Передать ее украинскому... (апплодисменты). Так товарищи, я считаю ваши аплодисменты за поддержку предложения передать Всесоюзный центр радиационной медицины Министерству здравоохранения СССР. Ибо этим центром руководит Ильин, а вы слышали о политике Ильина. Хотите, чтобы снова эта политика продолжалась?²⁴³

Ilin was, as seen above, responsible for the highly controversial concept of 35 ber (a person could through 70 years of life receive a dose of radiation equal to 35 ber), and some deputies had as a result expressed a lack of confidence in him. Some, however, like A. Hordienko from Nikolaev, were slightly sceptical. Hordienko defended his position as follows:

Народный депутат СССР Созинов О.О. внес предложение поставить перед Правительством СССР вопрос о передаче в республиканское подчинение Всесоюзного научного центра радиационной медицины и Украинского филиала Всесоюзного научно-исследовательского института сельскохозяйственной радиологии. Однако, как известно, Всесоюзный центр радиационной медицины подчинен третьему управлению Министерства здравоохранения СССР. Его деятельность распространяется на все три республики, которые пострадали от аварии на Чернобыльской АЭС.

Therefore, this issue ought to be discussed by the Ukrainian government before any proposal be put forward to the USSR Council of Ministers²⁴⁴. The chairman of the session also called for caution, arguing that

...Действительно был поднят важный вопрос о Всесоюзном центре радиационной медицины. Конечно, сформулировать в такой редакции, так сказать, об экспроприации, мы не можем. Если же формулировать так, мы считаем, что целесообразно изъять центр с подчинения АМН и передать его Министерству здравоохранения республики, то, наверное, такое предложение было бы правильным²⁴⁵.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 219.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 194.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 220.

Eventually, however, the session endorsed the need to elaborate legislation stating Ukraine's political and economic sovereignty:

Сессии Верховного Совета высказывается за первоочередную необходимость разработки законов о политическом и экономическом суверенитете Украины в составе обновленной федерации советских республик²⁴⁶.

The Decree on Ecology

The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet eventually adopted a decree 'Concerning the Ecological Situation in the Republic and Measures for its Radical Improvement'. The decree was, however, characterised by vagueness and contained no clear-cut policy on the environment. This was to many a disappointment, as the debate proceeding the passing of the decree, was characterised by detail and deep concern. A preamble summarised the present state of the Ukrainian environment as being 'on the verge of ecological crisis'. Areas particularly badly affected were the Dniepr region, Donbass, Krivyi Rih, Northern Crimea, the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. Attention was also given to the Chernobyl accident and its impact on Ukraine. Reiterating the criticism raised by Verkhovna Rada's standing commissions towards the Ukrainian Council of Ministers and various all-union ministries and departments, the decree stated the former's lack of persistence and failure to make decisions to improve the state of the environment. All-union ministries and departments were criticised for failing to comply with environmental legislation, thus aggravating the poor state of the environment in the republic.

The decree ordered the Ukrainian Council of Ministers to draft a plan for the economic development of Ukraine, taking into consideration the environment. Such a plan would provide for a more efficient use of raw materials, energy and industries affecting Ukraine's water supplies. New industries that would not directly benefit the public would be halted in big cities and the importance of fulfilling targets to protect the environment would be strengthened in the future. So-called 'economic methods' (payment for the use of natural resources, limits on emissions and fines for emissions exceeding the limits) would be introduced to encourage enterprises to utilise natural resources more efficiently and to become more 'environmental'. A Ukrainian Programme for the Rational Use of Natural resources and the Protection of the Environment was to be drafted by the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, the oblast executive committees and the city soviets of Kiev and Sevastopol by 1991. Between 1990 and 1991 emissions of harmful substances would be reduced to permitted levels (as seen above, emissions exceeding permissible levels were the norm, rather than the exception in most parts of the republic). Purification facilities for water would be installed in all Ukrainian cities by 1996 and from the year 2000 emitting poisonous substances into

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

the rivers Dniepr, Dniestr, Desna and South Bug, would no longer be permitted. As for Chernobyl, urgent evacuations would be completed by 1991. A 'Children of Chernobyl Program' to secure the fast evacuation of children under the age of 14 and pregnant women from contaminated areas would be set up during 1990. The decree also stated that the Chernobyl nuclear power station would be closed down by 1995 and that no new reactors be built at the Rivne and Khmelnytskyi nuclear power stations. An experimental reactor run by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences would be closed down. *Derzhahroprom* would be put in charge of providing uncontaminated and nutritious food to children and all Ukrainian enterprises and factories would be assessed for their impact on the environment by the end of 1991. A number of laws would be drafted by 1991, including a Law for the Protection of Nature, a Law on the Protection of Nature Reserves and a Law on Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Safety.

With regard to the relationship between Ukraine and the USSR, the decree demanded, as called for by several deputies attending the 12th session of Verkhovna Rada, that the Ukrainian government transfer institutions subordinate to the Third Department of the USSR Ministry of Health located in Ukraine to the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian Ministry of Health. Various all-union ministries, however, were requested to comply with the decision made by Verkhovna Rada and outlined in the decree. The USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification, for instance, was requested to make available equipment to scrub acid-forming substances from fumes during the 1991-95 plan, and investment from Moscow would be required to allow the USSR Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy and Coal to cleanse waters high in minerals in Western Donbass and Krivyi Rih. The USSR State Construction Committee was urged to make arrangements for the burial of toxic waste in Ukraine, and as for Chernobyl, neither Verkhovna Rada nor the Ukrainian Government had the authority to make decisions regarding the town of Slavutich, housing staff of the Chernobyl nuclear power station.

David Marples, in an assessment of the decree, while positive to its aims such as 'educating the public on the environment', questioned its efficacy. This, he argued, would largely depend on the future course of economic reform in Ukraine (which areas of the economy would be controlled by Kiev as opposed to Moscow) and the all-union ministries' and departments' willingness to comply with the tasks set out in the decree. With regard to nuclear power, Ukraine was not really in a position to make decisions on its future, as the nuclear industry was subordinate to all-union ministries and departments. Marples also questioned the effectiveness of measures to elevate the impact of Chernobyl, as the decree did not establish an overall programme for those areas affected by nuclear fall-out. Moreover, it was questionable whether *Derzhkompriroda* would be able to fulfil the role assigned to it by the decree (that of co-ordinator and major executor of decisions on the environment) given that its structure was in the process of being reformed and its general shortcomings (cf. USSR *Goskompriroda* above). Marples concluded that 'many of the points descend into bureaucratic rhetoric that reduces the program for action to a statement of good

intentions that testify only to the fact that the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet acknowledges that there is a problem with the ecology of Ukraine²⁴⁷.

During 1991, however, the Ukrainian Parliament issued a resolution 'On the Responsibility for the Violation of the Requirements for Radiation Safety (Nuclear Safety), the Preparation, Processing and Disposal of Contaminated Food Products'²⁴⁸ and shortly after, in June 1991, a Law on the Protection of the Environment. Below, I will take a closer look at the law and its implementation.

2.3.5 The Ukrainian Law on the Protection of the Environment (25 June 1991)

Slightly more than a year after the 12th session of Verkhovna Rada, the new parliament, elected in March 1990, passed the Law on the Protection of the Environment, stipulated in the February 1990 decree²⁴⁹. The law stated that the protection of the environment was an integral part of Ukraine's economic and social development. The aim of the law, as stated in the preamble, would be to

...Збереження безпечного для існування живої і неживої природи навколишнього середовища, захисту життя і здоров'я населення від негативного впливу, зумовленого забрудненням навколишнього природного середовища, досягнення гармонійної взаємодії суспільства і природи, охорону, раціональне використання і відтворення природних ресурсів²⁵⁰.

The new law on the environment introduced concepts such as 'ecological standards', 'normatives' and 'limits' to secure the rational use of natural resources and to limit emissions of harmful substances into the environment. 'Normatives' for the use of natural resources and 'limits' on emissions would be introduced as guidelines for the enterprises and factories and economic mechanisms (payment for the use of natural resources and fines for emissions exceeding the limits) were to be introduced in parallel so as to provide them with an economic incentive to comply with the new law. Enterprises interested in obtaining and installing pollution-reducing devices, would be exempted from various payments while these were installed and bonuses would be available for enterprises reducing their emissions. Money obtained from payments and fines

²⁴⁷ David Marples, Decree on Ecology Adopted in Ukraine (Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR, 6.4.1990), p. 16.

²⁴⁸ Указ Президиума Верховного Совета Украинской ССР об ответственности за нарушение требований режима радиационной безопасности, заготовку, переработку и сбыт радиоактивных загрязненных продуктов питания, in *Правда Украины*, 2.2.1991, с. 3.

²⁴⁹ Закон Української радянської соціалістичної республіки про охорону навколишнього природного середовища (Київ, видавництво "Україна", 1991).

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

for pollution would be put into special funds, earmarked for environmental protection purposes to be managed by local and regional parliaments, the Ukrainian parliament and the Ukrainian Council of Ministers.

Environmental impact assessments would be compulsory for all activities in the areas of legislation, investment, administration, economic and other activities, which were related to the state of the environment. Construction of enterprises and factories, houses and other objects that had not been given a positive assessment would be illegal. The public could initiate alternative, public environmental impact assessments, but it would be up to local authorities whether or not to take their recommendations into account. The councils of people's deputies, Ukrainian *Minpriroda* and its local and regional branches were put in charge of the control with the state of the environment. Any violation of the Law on the Protection of the Environment would be dealt with by the Prosecutor's office. The law - in line with the Ukrainian Declaration of Sovereignty - stated that all natural resources on Ukrainian territory belonged to the Ukrainian people and would be managed by the republic's parliament:

Природні ресурси Української РСР є власністю народу України, який має право на володіння, використання та розпорядження природними багатствами республіки. Повноваження народу України в галузі охорони навколишнього природного середовища та використання природних ресурсів реалізується на основі Конституції Української РСР як безпосередньо, шляхом проведення референдумів, так і через республіканські органи державної влади відповідно до законодавства Української РСР. Від імені народу України право розпорядження природними ресурсами здійснює Верховна Рада Української РСР²⁵¹.

Decisions made by *Minpriroda* were to be compulsory to all enterprises, factories and organisations. A failure to comply with decisions made by *Minpriroda* would result in legal procedures being instigated. A monitoring system would be created by the Ministry to facilitate accurate information about the state of the environment and on the implementation of decisions made by the Ministry.

Although the law outlined the framework for Ukrainian environmental policies it failed to provide a mechanism with which to implement the intentions of the law and what was more, it was not supported by other laws, which might strengthen its implementation. Thus,

„Зараз мова йде як про вдосконалення самого закону, так і про прийняття інших законодавчих актів, а також входження України у міжнародний правовий екологічний простір шляхом ратифікації існуючих угод і конвенцій, щоб створити в

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6 (article 4).

державі нормальну базу для правового вирішення проблем природокористування та охорони природи²⁵².

Poor implementation of the law as well as a lack of sanctions against those violating the law, posed great obstacles to combatting pollution. V. Shehtur, prosecutor of Zaporizhzhia oblast, in an article in *Pravda Ukrainy*²⁵³ argued that in many cases the prosecutor's office was helpless in cases of environmental crimes partly due to poor legislation and partly as there was simply no methodology for measuring the loss caused by such crimes:

Основаи уголовного законодательства Союза ССР и союзных республик, принятые в конце пятидесятих годов, ныне безнадежно устарели. Ведь об экологии тогда просто не думали. Несколько природоохранных статей разбросаны по главам и разделам республиканских уголовных кодексов. Системного характера эти статьи не носят. Многие из содержащихся в них норм не действуют, поскольку не отлажен механизм их реализации.

Thus, although everybody would agree that there was a need to protect the air from pollutants, this proved very difficult in actual practice as

...По сей день отсутствует официально утвержденная методика исчисления ущерба, причиненного нарушением законодательства об охране атмосферного воздуха. В результате уже годы бездействует статья 27 соответствующего Закона...Или возьмем ст. 228 УК УССР. Она предусматривает уголовную ответственность только в случае превышения в атмосфере предельно допустимых концентраций (ПДК) вредных веществ.

В десятках городов Украины эти ПДК превышаются многократно. Но количество уголовных дел на загрязнителей атмосферы, заведенных за год, можно буквально по пальцам перечесть. Из десяти дел, этой категории, возбужденных по Запорожской области за последние три года, в суд, направлено только одно!

The reason for this was the following:

...Даже при таком большом скоплении предприятий, как в Запорожье, при сходном содержании в их выбросах пыли и газа – никаких методик определения этих выбросов не дают специалисты органов санитарного надзора и Комитета по охране природы. То есть, нет возможности определять ущерб, нанесенный каждым конкретным предприятием. И ни Министерство здравоохранения

²⁵² *Урядовий кур'єр*, 27.12.1994, с. 8.

²⁵³ *Правда Украины*, 31.1.1991, с. 2.

УССР, ни Госкомтет УССР по охране природы этот вопрос не решают.

Fines imposed for the 'thoughtless' use of pesticides and fertilisers in agriculture and emissions of harmful substances into Ukraine's rivers were very small and more recently, one had stopped imposing fines altogether; instead people were given a warning. The prosecutor's office in Zaporizhzhia oblast had examined the activities of the administration of several regional executive committees in the oblast and had detected a large number of violations. For instance, the chairman of the kolkhoz 'Peremoha' (Orekhovskiy region), A. Nosenko, together with the chief agronomist, V. Maslak, had in May 1989 organised the burial of three tons of chemical weed- and pest-killers on the outskirts of the village Mala Tokmachka. Another incident, organised by workers at the wholesale base *Ukrtorhstroimaterialy*, was also clearly in breach with existing legislation. However,

„В связи с отсутствием в Уголовном кодексе статьи об ответственности за загрязнение земли следователи вынуждены были вынести постановления о прекращении обоих уголовных дел — "за отсутствием состава преступления". Виновные отделались сторублевыми штрафами, которые наложили административные комиссии.

Shchur in this connection called for a special section to be added to the Ukrainian Criminal Code (crimes against the natural environment), which would make people legally responsible for polluting or in any other way harming the environment. Further, he considered it necessary that fines imposed for environmental crimes be raised to a level reflecting the actual damage caused. Shchur did, however, admit that the problem rested not only with inadequate legislation, but also with sometimes poor investigation:

Объективности ради надо сказать, что есть много недостатков и в надзоре органов прокуратуры за исполнением законов об охране природы. Ныне в областной прокуратуре образован отдел по надзору за соблюдением этих законов. Создана Запорожская природоохранительная межрайонная прокуратура.

However, by the end of 1992, no real change for the better had taken place. A meeting by the Collegium of the Ukrainian General Prosecutor, attended by representatives of various ministries and departments, revealed that there were still major difficulties with implementing environmental legislation. As pointed out by Dmytro Vasiliev, General Prosecutor of Ukraine,

„Вони (Міністерство охорони навколишнього природного середовища, органі служб Міністерства охорони здоров'я.

спеціально створена інспекція державної по охороні Азовського і Чорного морів, рибінспекції і тому подібних) виглядають не так, як хотілося б. Не виявляють вони екологічних злочинів, як і заповдіють великої шкоди державі, не розглядають матеріали ... не направляють ці матеріали в органи прокуратури, згідно з законом про охорону навколишнього природного середовища...На жаль, закони не застосовуються тими ж самими контролюючими органами перш за все²⁵⁴.

Attempts at improving the situation were, however, made throughout Ukraine. In Dnipropetrovsk oblast, for instance, a working group, composed of Ukrainian People's Deputies and specialists was set up to examine the issue²⁵⁵ and from October 1991 an ecological police force was created to investigate environmental crimes and prosecute those responsible for such crimes²⁵⁶. In Kharkiv a brigade for urgent ecological assistance was established in the summer of 1992²⁵⁷. Additional legislation to reinforce the Law on the Environment was introduced during 1992. In August, for instance, the Cabinet of Ministers passed a resolution on the responsibility for damage inflicted upon the country's forests and vegetation. To discourage people from violating the legislation, fines were increased by 25 times²⁵⁸. In November the same year, a procedure for the restriction, temporary and permanent closure of enterprises, factories and organisations violating environmental legislation was issued by the Ukrainian Parliament²⁵⁹. Enterprises systematically exceeding those limits for use of natural resources, violating ecological norms and standards, would in the future be closed, whereas enterprises where such violations were registered from time to time would be temporarily closed until the necessary technical changes had been made.

Although the legislative side was being improved, the structures which were supposed to enforce existing legislation did not follow suit. In July 1992 the Ukrainian Minister of the Environment, Iurii Shcherbak, made it clear that structural changes started to transform *Derzhkomprroda* into a Ministry of Environmental Protection, such as changes in personnel, ecological schemes, involvement in legal aspects of environmental protection, ecological monitoring, environmental impact assessments and international co-operation, were only in the beginning stage. The Ministry's achievements so far were modest:

Сьогодні Мінприроди...нагадує будівельний майданчик, на якому завершують цульовий цикл. Результати роботи міністерства...невтішні"...Не вдалося запровадити економічні

²⁵⁴ УР-І 19.12. 17:00 "Телерадіокавал "Право", (transcribed in *Ukraine Today, Ukrainian Media Digest*, 21.12.1992, no. 376, p. 12.

²⁵⁵ УТ-І, 28.11.92. "Дніпро", 21:00, transliterated in *Ukraine Today, Ukrainian Media Digest*, 30.11.1992, no. 352, p. 33.

²⁵⁶ *Радянська Україна*, 4.10.1991, с. 2.

²⁵⁷ *РГ*, 13.6.1992, с. 2.

²⁵⁸ *Демократична Україна*, 13.8.1992, с. 1.

²⁵⁹ *Голос України*, 10.11.1992, с. 7.

важелі паливу в природоохоронній діяльності. Цьому, крім усього іншого, завдає ще й загальна економічна невизначеність. Задумана колись група оперативного реагування існує тільки на папері²⁶⁰.

Shcherbak also pointed out that the Ministry did not receive the necessary back-up from the legal apparatus. For this reason, the Law on the Irreversability of Retribution was not being implemented. The employees of the Ministry too easily agreed not to close down enterprises and as for the Law on the Environment itself, Shcherbak assessed it in the following way:

„Настав час оцінити хід впровадження Закону про охорону навколишнього природного середовища, алже його окремі статті досі не виконуються, а деякі й не можуть бути виконані. Стій також посилює вплив на формування бюджету з метою здійснення закладених у законі принципів. Доконечно потрібне "екологічне" узгодження законів, що їх приймають. На приклад, існують істотні розбіжності в законах про охорону навколишнього природного середовища, про місцеві Ради та місцеве самоврядування і про податкову систему...

„Апарат міністерства не став стратегічним штабом управління навколишнім середовищем, а обласні управління не змогли посилити контрольну діяльність, через що нерідко доводилось задовольнятися роллю спостерігача і не вдалося перейти від глухого захисту до наступу на руйнівників природи.

An ecological information service run by the Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry of Health was also not working as intended²⁶¹.

Neither the sanitary service was fulfilling its functions. V. Trach, the chief state sanitary inspector of Donetsk oblast, in a lengthy article in *Uriadovyi kurier*²⁶² linked the deteriorating state of the environment in the oblast with people's health:

Хочеться нам того чи ні, але протягом останніх десятиріч у житті суспільства сталися зміни специфіки захворювань. Якщо на початку століття інфекційні хвороби займали провідне місце в їх структурі, то нині вони складають лише два відсоки від загальної кількості. Нині переважають техногенні фактори.

²⁶⁰ *Голос України*, 29.7.1992, с. 16.

²⁶¹ A resolution (law) giving the public access to all ecological information was passed in 1990 and the two ministries created a 'hot telephone' at the Kiev Center of Health, where people could consult experts on issues of a medical and environmental character. A 'hot telephone' was also set up in *Minpriroda's* press-center, but neither this service was working properly. See *Урядовий кур'єр*, no. 20, май, 1992, с. 2, for more details.

²⁶² *Урядовий кур'єр*, 10.7.1993, с. 6.

The importance of the sanitary service was increasing in parallel with the increase in pollution. However, due to outdated directives - the service was primarily oriented towards prophylactic work following the outbreak of epidemics, lack of (adequate) staffing, and poor instructions - the sanitary service was rather helpless in combating pollution:

Звичайно, санітарна служба живе й працює, керуючись визначеними державними документами. Але якими? Досі чинні деякі інструкції, прийняті ще у 20-ті роки, та й "Положення про державний санітарний нагляд в СРСР" від 31 травня 1973 року № 361. СРСР як держава помер, а положення безсмертне.

In order to 'save the nation' a permanent, unified co-ordinating body, with the prerogatives of a state committee ought in his view be established. This was the only way, argued Trach, in which the scenario predicted by V. Polishchuk (he predicted that by the year 2040 the Ukrainian ethnos would disappear completely) might be avoided. A Law on the Protection of Health could be delayed no further. There was also a need to do away with the powers of the bureaucrat (chinovnik):

Кажуть, що США досягли розквіту завдяки тому, що там керує Закон. У нас Закон не керує. Керує чиновник, який у душі своїй залишається глибоким пігілістом.

As an example, Trach referred to the trust 'Dzerzhinskuvuhillia', which produced raw material for making coke, of which there was a deficit in Ukraine. Working conditions at 'Dzerzhinskuvuhillia' could only be described as 'anti-human' - contents of coal dust exceeded 400 milligrams per m³ of air, and in the period 1989-1992 alone, 223,000 work hours were lost due to poor health among the workers. The economic loss was estimated at 2.9 billion coupons. The sanitary service, however, could do very little to improve the situation:

А що може в нинішній ситуації той же головний державний санітарний лікар міста Держинська, щоб вплинути на обстановку? Він може оштрафувати директора шахти аж на 500 карбованців або написати йому чергове суворе попередження. Здоровий глузд підказує: тут потрібна ціла система економічних дійових заходів, яка ставить здоров'я народу вище виробничих та особистих інтересів будь-якого колективу. Як же, окрім підвищення правового статусу санітарного нагляду, можна впливати на техногенний безум в Україні?

2.4 Conclusion

The environmental problems Ukraine was faced with in the late 1980s/early 1990s were extensive and as it turned out, had a negative impact on people's health. There was a growing sense - not only among Greens as will be seen in following chapters, but also among people with different (political) views, including members of CPU - that these problems, compounded by the accident at Chernobyl, were imposed upon the republic by 'Moscow' and that 'Kiev' could do little to change the situation for the better unless it gained real influence over its natural resources and industries. There was also considerable scepticism among members of the political opposition regarding Ukrainian authorities' commitment to environmental reform, as measures taken proved to have little or no effect. Moreover, it became clear to many that environmental reform could only be successful if accompanied by radical reforms of the Soviet Union's economic and political structures.

Frustration with the lack of real environmental reform and also a sense that Ukraine was helpless in dealing with its environmental problems as long as decisions were made by powerful all-union ministries in Moscow, facilitated the emergence of a Green Movement in Ukraine - a movement keen on finding real solutions to real problems. Sovereignty and later independence, was seen as a necessary means by which to achieve this goal and also as desirable in itself, as the Soviet Union was perceived of as a restrictive and undemocratic empire, harmful not only to the environment, but also to the culture, language and traditions of the Ukrainian nation. Although, as will be seen below, the relationship between the Greens and the CPU was at times strained, the Greens also came to benefit from growing concern over the deteriorating state of the environment within the ranks of the CPU. As the data above indicate, such concern was well-founded. The struggle to prevent further environmental deterioration in Ukraine is the topic of the following chapters.

3 Building the Green Movement (May 1986-October 1989)

3.0 Introduction

In Ukraine, as in the other former Soviet republics, there was an official Society for Protecting the Environment as well as student *druzhyny*, based at universities and institutes, prior to Gorbachev's introduction of glasnost and democratisation. Although, as seen in Chapter One, the Society to some extent and the *druzhyny* to a larger extent were able to operate somewhat freely, the Chernobyl accident and the secrecy by which it was surrounded - clearly demonstrating the limits of glasnost - caused various sections of Ukrainian society to acknowledge the need for an independent environmental organisation, which not only would object to anti-environmental decisions made by political decision making bodies in Ukraine and the USSR, but would also provide environmentally sound alternatives to such decisions. Out of this need emerged *Zelenyi Svit* (Green World) in 1987.

In this and following chapters I will analyse the emergence and the development of *Zelenyi Svit* at the background of the general political changes that took place in Ukraine after the association emerged in 1987 until it split into two movements in December 1994. This chapter covers the period from 1986 until mid-1991 (the Soviet Period) and consists of three sub-sections. In the first one, *Origins*, I look at how *Zelenyi Svit* was initiated and eventually formally established under the auspices of the Ukrainian Peace Committee in December 1987. The second section covers the period from January 1987 until October 1989, when the association's Inaugural Congress took place in Kiev. The emphasis is on building an all-Ukrainian Green Movement, uniting and initiating local green groups throughout Ukraine. Attention is also given to the early campaigns of *Zelenyi Svit*. Finally, in the third section, I look at policies and internal developments within the Green Movement, until mid-1991.

To a large extent information for this chapter and the following chapter was obtained through a series of interviews with those involved with setting up the Green Movement. Such interviews were conducted throughout the summers of 1990, 1991, 1992 and the spring/summer of 1994 - in Kiev, Nikolaev, Iuzhnoukrainsk and Poltavshchina. The Green Movement's archives in Kiev¹ as well as private archives were also consulted, as were the State Archives on Public Movements

¹ While in Kiev in the summer of 1992, I was able to access a scroll of photocopied newspaper articles about *Zelenyi Svit* - some of which were local. Unfortunately the references contained no page number, only title of the newspaper the articles were taken from and the date when they were published. References that contain no page numbers are taken from this scroll and may be viewed at *Zelenyi Svit*'s office in Kiev.

(Kiev). In the latter, CPU documents, outlining the Ukrainian Communist Party's policies towards the Greens were found, and these documents form the basis of the analysis of relations between the two. A survey² conducted amongst local and regional branches of *Zelenyi Svit* during a meeting of the Green Council in early June 1994 also forms a significant part of the analysis - although the data are used only tentatively, to indicate rather than to draw firm conclusions, as the number of responses was not big enough to be representative for the entire movement as such. However, the opinions and views expressed in the survey are valid as representing the views of fourteen local and regional branches of *Zelenyi Svit*. Combined with similar views expressed by other groups in interviews and through observation³, it is my belief that this survey gives a good indication of opinions at the local level, as opposed to those views expressed by the leadership of *Zelenyi Svit* and activists based in Kiev. Finally, all issues of the newspaper *Zelenyi Svit* from April 1990 onwards have been consulted.

In some cases written sources used contradict each other. In other cases, information given is incorrect. A mistake commonly made by writers on the Ukrainian Green Movement is that Plachynda's leadership of *Zelenyi Svit* (1988-89) is not acknowledged. Thus Iurii Shcherbak is referred to as the first leader of *Zelenyi Svit*, when in actual fact he was its second leader (from January 1989)⁴. A second mistake made is the claim that *Zelenyi Svit* was founded by the Ukrainian Writers' Union and the Ukrainian Union of Cinematographers.⁵ Although representatives of these unions were involved in the setting up of *Zelenyi Svit*, scientists and young enthusiasts were also taking part and the association was registered as an independent environmental association by the Ukrainian Peace Committee, not as an integral part of the Writers' Union. I have therefore chosen to rely on oral accounts given by those people who were involved in setting up and later working within *Zelenyi Svit* where written accounts produced by Western scholars contradict the former.

² For further details about this survey, see Appendix.

³ During my visits to Kiev and Nikolaev, I was allowed to attend meetings of the Mala Rada and Zelena Rada (Kiev) and a pre-election meeting (Nikolaev). I also spent some time working with archive materials in *Zelenyi Svit*'s office at Podol in Kiev and was thus able to see for myself how the movement works from within.

⁴ See for instance David Marples, 'Ecology: The Green World', p 160, in Ukraine Under Perestroika. Ecology, Economics and the Workers' Revolt (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), Ukrainian Press Service. News from the USSR. See also The Ukrainian Press Agency, 'The last generation to have seen nature' - Greens form in Kiev' (London: April 1988), p. 9.

⁵ See press release referred to in above footnote and also Jane L. Dawson, The Emergence of the Anti-Nuclear Power Movement in the USSR (Berkeley: Univ. of California, 1990), p. 5. This error was also made by David Marples in his early writings on the Ukrainian Green Movement (See Marples, 1991).

3.1 Origins

Amongst Kiev activists who took part in creating *Zelenyi Svit* there is general consensus that the need to establish a Ukrainian independent Green Movement was a direct result of the Chernobyl accident on 26 April 1986. Andrii Demydenko, for instance, refers to *Zelenyi Svit* primarily as an anti-nuclear association⁶ and Serhii Kurykin has also stressed that Chernobyl more than anything else facilitated its emergence⁷.

This view has been contested by representatives of local groups (collective members of *Zelenyi Svit*), who refer to local environmental problems as being the direct reason for establishing their particular group. *Mukachevo Zelenyi Svit*, for instance, quoted the construction of Pristialivsk radar station close to Mukachevo as the major factor. Similarly, *Bukovina Zelenyi Svit* emerged out of concern about children falling ill from alopecia in Chernivtsi in late 1989. Some 130 children had to be sent to Kiev and Moscow for hospitalisation and the cause of the accident is thought to be thallium poisoning, although officially no reason has yet been given. The Dnipropetrovsk Greens also refer to child illness as the factor which triggered their movement into being, whereas Horlivka *Zelenyi Svit* in Donetsk oblast emerged due to chemical pollution from local enterprises. In Lutsk, Greens were concerned with agricultural pollution, whereas in Uman concern about a biochemical enterprise facilitated the local green movement. The Nikolaev Greens united to protect South Bug and later against further construction of the Iuzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station and in Kherson people were concerned with pollution of the Black Sea⁸. In several areas, like for instance Vinnytsia, Ternopil and Dnipropetrovsk, Green groups were established prior to the Chernobyl accident and with non-nuclear agendas.

As seen in Chapter Two, the accident at Chernobyl not only came to constitute an element of 'new thinking' in Soviet foreign policy, but also probably contributed to the emphasis on environmental reform from 1987 onwards. In addition it became an important element in broadening and radicalising the concept of 'glasnost', by exposing the shortcomings of the Soviet political and economic system as such. Thus, although in a number of local cases the Chernobyl accident was not in itself the direct reason for setting up Green groups, the general politicisation of society that followed in its aftermath facilitated, or rather paved the way for, Green groups not only in Ukraine but also elsewhere in the former USSR.

Moreover, Chernobyl was not only a terrible accident in terms of damage done to the environment and to people's health - it also became a symbol of a more general environmental

⁶ Andriy O. Demidenko, *Chornobyl Accident and Development of Anti-Nuclear Movement in Ukraine*. This paper was presented at a seminar in the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies, University of Glasgow, in November 1990.

⁷ Interview with Serhii Kurykin, Kiev, May.1994.

⁸ Cf. question 4 in *Questionnaire*.

crisis in Ukraine and elsewhere⁹. As argued by Shcherbak, Chernobyl was not only a technological, but also a psychological and environmental catastrophe, cracking the myth of the infallibility of science and the blind faith in technology and facilitating the opposition towards further expansion of nuclear power in Ukraine¹⁰ and, one may add, towards other technologies considered to be environmentally harmful, thus causing pollution. Chernobyl also highlighted the defects of Stalin-Brezhnev socialism, which had facilitated bureaucratisation, incompetent leadership and deception of the people to mention but a few. From this exposure emerged public loss of faith in governmental institutions¹¹.

3.1.1 Initiating the Green Movement

Jane Dawson in an essay on the anti-nuclear movement in the Soviet Union¹² claims that prior to Chernobyl it was an official myth that Soviet nuclear power was absolutely safe. Vocal opposition to nuclear power amongst the scientific community and society at large prior to the Chernobyl accident was 'almost non-existent...the bulk of society had neither the interest nor the opportunity to form a mass social movement opposing nuclear power in the USSR'¹³.

The official response to the accident was to blame human error rather than technical flaws for causing the accident and to focus on the global implications of nuclear disasters in general, linking this issue to Soviet efforts at facilitating disarmament. No immediate changes were made to the Soviet nuclear programme and in Ukraine eighteen new nuclear reactors were to be built at existing or new nuclear power stations between 1986 and 1990¹⁴.

Dawson scrutinised the official Soviet press to find articles dealing with general concerns about nuclear safety and the future of the Soviet nuclear power programme after the Chernobyl accident. She found that there was an almost unbroken silence on this issue¹⁵. The Ukrainian Writer and Physician Iurii Shcherbak, who was amongst *Zelenyi Svit's* initiators, explained this silence in the following way in an article about the Ukrainian Green Movement printed in *FORUM* No 22/1990:

⁹ See *Зелений Світ – шанс для нашого спільного майбутнього* – an appeal distributed to workers' collectives to gain their moral and financial support (1992).

¹⁰ *Літературна Україна*, 26.1.1989, с. 2.

¹¹ *Літературна Україна*, 15.3.1990 (n.p.).

¹² Dawson (1990).

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

¹⁴ See report to the CPU Central Committee labelled 'secret' and signed by B. Kachura and S. Hurenko on 3.5.1988, in *фонд No. 1, опис No. 25, спр. No. 3347, арж. 17*.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

Сначала был шок 1986 г. - была боль, был страх, но осознание причин пришло позже, где-то через год. Люди стали понимать, что с ними произошло не только что-то страшное и неистовое, но и недопустимое¹⁶.

The Role of Ukrainian Writers

As pointed out in Chapter One, writers in the Russian empire and later, in the USSR, have performed two functions: on the one hand, they have been used as a tool to promote change and once achieved, to secure that things remain that way (cf. socialist realism). On the other hand, writers have a long tradition of voicing opposition to political authorities at times when such opposition could not easily be voiced. Thus they have sometimes been referred to as 'the people's conscience' (sovest naroda)¹⁷.

Prior to the Soviet Writers' Congress in June 1986, Gorbachev signalled a shift away from highlighting the supreme role of the working class as an ideological vanguard of Soviet society and elevated the intelligentsia at its expense¹⁸. The term 'intelligentsia' as Sakwa has pointed out, is wider than the corresponding English word 'intellectual', not being limited to people with higher education, but rather being associated with notions of independent thinking and moral integrity. Thus, by elevating the intelligentsia, Gorbachev initiated the transition from conformity towards diversity. This policy was stated very clearly in a speech at a closed session on 19 June 1986 on the eve of the Soviet Writers' Congress. Gorbachev said that 'society is ripe for a change. If we step away, the society will not agree to return. The process must be made irreversible. If not us, then who? If not now, when?...If we don't involve the people, nothing will come of it. All our plans depend on influencing the people'¹⁹. As is now well known, however, Soviet writers and later also journalists, did not necessarily present to the people those ideas favoured by the CPSU. This would soon become obvious also in Ukraine.

¹⁶ Юрий Щербак, 'Строить, а не уничтожить', *ДОКУМ*, no. 22/1990, с. 31.

¹⁷ Such claims/references have been made on a number of occasions - for instance the Ukrainian Writer Borys Oliynyk in a speech at a meeting of the Ukrainian Writers' Union in honour of Oles Honchar, who had been put forward as a candidate for the elections of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies by the Writers' Union, reminded the audience that 'it is said that the writers are the conscience of the people'. Similarly, the scientific secretary of the Shevchenko Institute of Literature, M. Naienko, claimed that '...the literature has always been the conscience and the voice of the people; the people expressed its most imminent worries through the lips of the writers, its most treasured thoughts and feelings, defending its right to freedom and immortality. In addition, the voice of the writers is gaining strength in times of change...' (*Літературна Україна*, 9.3.1989, с. 3).

¹⁸ Oles Honchar referred to this shift in official policy in his speech to the Writers' Union on the eve of the elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, arguing that the CPSU put high hope in the writers. This hope was reflected in talks Gorbachev held at a meeting in the CPSU Central Committee with representatives of national literatures. (*Ibid.*)

¹⁹ Richard Sakwa, *Gorbachev and his Reforms 1985-1990* (Hertfordshire: Philip Allan, 1990), pp. 72-73.

Iurii Shcherbak, who as will be seen below, played a key role in the emergence of *Zelenyi Svit*, when talking about the role of the writers made a reference to the Russian revolution, arguing that all writers in one way or the other took part in the revolutionary process. Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and democratisation also constituted a revolution and it was therefore only natural that the writers would take actively part in this process²⁰.

The first unofficial Ukrainian reactions to the Chernobyl accident and its implications on nuclear power in general were therefore not surprisingly voiced by Ukrainian writers. Already in May 1986, at an International Writers' Conference in Leningrad, Oles Honchar - prominent Ukrainian writer and also Chairman of the Ukrainian branch of the Soviet Peace Committee (*Komitet Zashchity Mira*) - in a speech addressed the accident at Chernobyl, arguing that the Soviet government was responsible for the accident²¹. The same month, Honchar also expressed criticism with regard to the Chernobyl accident on Ukrainian radio. As a result, the journalist who interviewed him lost his job. Only after Honchar had complained about this directly to the CPU First Secretary, Sheherbitskii, arguing that since he was the one who voiced the criticism, any pretensions should be directed towards his person and not towards the journalist, was the journalist reinstated²².

Shortly afterwards, at the June 1986 Congress of Soviet Writers, which took place in Moscow, the Ukrainian delegates denounced the nuclear power industry for its indifference to public opinion and blamed the same central authorities for russification and the construction of a large number of nuclear reactors in Ukraine²³. In conjunction with the Congress, 20 of the most prominent Soviet writers, amongst them Oles Honchar, were invited to a meeting with Gorbachev in the Kremlin. Honchar asked Gorbachev why he was hiding the truth about the accident at Chernobyl and made the following demand: 'we have a right to correct information'. Gorbachev then replied - reiterating Boris Shcherbina - that nuclear power was a relatively new science and that 'science demands sacrifices'. Honchar then allegedly replied as follows:

Боги тоже требовали жертв, а мы перестали делать им жертвы,
хотя их уважали и в них верили.

²⁰ Interview with Iurii Shcherbak, 23.12.1988 (*Откровенный разговор*), transcribed by Radio Liberty Monitoring in *USSR Today. Soviet Media Actualities* on 23.12.1988, no. F, 585, p. 10.

²¹ Interview with Borys Zrezatsev of the Ukrainian Peace Committee, Kiev, on 12.5.1994.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ukrainian Reporter*, vol. 1, no. 8, April 1991.

The point Honchar was trying to put across to Gorbachev was that a science that demanded sacrifices of the level of the Chernobyl accident, simply was not needed²⁴.

Serhii Plachynda - another prominent Ukrainian writer and the first Chairman of *Zelenyi Svit* - claimed that shortly after the Chernobyl accident, members of the Ukrainian Writers' Union started discussing the possibility of setting up an alternative (independent) organisation to the official *Ukrainske Tovarystvo Okhorony Prirody (UTOP)*²⁵. Concern for the environment amongst Ukrainian writers was in no way a new phenomenon. As early as 1961, *Literaturna Ukraina* - the newspaper of the Writers' Union - started printing materials on Nature and the Environment. These materials were usually printed under the heading 'Dazhbog v opasnosti' or simply 'Dazhbog'. Similar materials did not start appearing in *Literaturnaia gazeta* (Moscow) until 1969, so in a sense, Ukrainian writers were well ahead of their Soviet colleagues in this field.

However, Plachynda claimed that it was more difficult for Ukrainian writers to have materials published on the environment than was the case for Russian writers as censorship was much stricter in Ukraine than in Russia. *Glavlit* checked all materials for nationalism, whereas the CPU checked them for anti-sovietism. Occasionally, however, due to the limitations of people working on censorship, critical materials would occur and then there would be a scandal. In 1969 Plachynda wrote 'Hrivuchi' - an ecological novel on the river Dnepr and related environmental problems. This book did not make it through the censorship and was not published until 23 years later, when a controversial hydro-electrical power station had already been built.

In October 1987 Oles Honchar again attacked the use of nuclear power in Ukraine at an all-union creative conference in Leningrad. He criticised the building of new nuclear reactors and stations, asking rhetorically 'Who will say that each of these atomic power stations, built or planned, does not conceal another potential Chernobyl?' The speech was rounded off by a call for a Chernobyl Forum to be held so as to discuss the implications of the Chernobyl accident²⁶.

Starting from 1987 a number of critical articles regarding the controversial Danube-Dnepr Canal, the ecological state of the Dnepr river and the accident at Chernobyl - to mention but a few - started appearing in the Ukrainian press. *Literaturna Ukraina* was in the forefront of this ecological crusade. In the autumn of 1987 the Chernobyl theme also entered Ukrainian literature in a number of different genres and, as pointed out by Larissa M.L. Zaleska Onyshkevych, in a

²⁴ Interview with Borys Zrezartsev, Kiev, 12.5.1994. As Honchar himself was ill at that time and thus not available for comment, it was not possible to have this information confirmed from him directly. However, all members of *Zelenyi Svit* to whom I spoke - regardless of their political views - had only good things to say about Honchar and stressed the important role he personally played in facilitating the emergence and registration of *Zelenyi Svit* in December 1987. Kurykin also pointed out that Honchar always had a 'democratic attitude' and that he had earlier published several books which official authorities did not like. 'He used', said Kurykin, 'his influence to help us'.

²⁵ Interview with Serhii Plachynda, Ukrainian Writers' Union, Kiev, 23.5.1994.

²⁶ *Ukrainian Reporter*, vol. 1, no. 8, April 1991.

manner almost typical of the development of genres in old Ukrainian literature: first folklore and chronicles, then poems and epic poems, followed by novels²⁷. Iurii Shcherbak's story Chernobyl - a documentary novel - is best known amongst the chronicles. Poems were written by Dmytro Pavlychko ('The Cranes flew to Chernobyl'), Borys Oliinyk (The Road to Chernobyl) Ivan Drach (Chernobyl Madonna) and Viktor Kordun (A letter from Home and The Zone) to mention but a few.

Common to all these works is that they address not only technical aspects of the accident, but more so the moral ones. Kordun, for instance, puts the following question: 'have we not betrayed our own soil?' and goes on to ask for the land's forgiveness. Another writer, Mykhailenko, has argued similarly, pointing out that 'Our guilt before the ruined earth is unforgivable, and inexcusable...' Other works link the accident to the history of Ukraine and/or to the fate of Ukraine as a nation. Aleksandr Tkachenko, for instance, sees the accident as yet another disaster imposed upon Ukraine from the outside - just like the suffering caused by the Tartar hordes, Stalin and the Nazis. This leads Onyshkevych to conclude as follows:

It is as if Ukrainians see themselves as a nation guilty of the specific sin of trusting others and *allowing* the nuclear station to be built, of having people risk the experiment at the plant and perform similar misdeeds - as well as a multitude of other real and alleged sins. It is as if Ukrainians see themselves as historically guilty. Also morally guilty - at the threshold of the twenty-first century and at the threshold of a new civilisation, for allowing this to happen in Ukraine - and thus reaching the bottom of an existential and moral pit²⁸.

Generalised references to the 'decent, ethical, and moral values' of the past are made to hint at a way out of this pit, accompanying, as will be seen both below and in other chapters, calls for an ecological, cultural and national revival as a means by which to secure the survival of Ukraine and everything living on its land.

Another group of people who got 'involved' with the Chernobyl accident at an early stage were the cinematographers. The Ukrainian film director Volodymyr Shevchenko, who went to Chernobyl to film, was amongst the first casualties together with six fire-fighters²⁹. Other cinematographers were also either concerned or directly involved with the Chernobyl accident and it was therefore only natural that the Ukrainian Union of Cinematographers joined forces with the writers. Iurii Tkachenko of the Union was amongst the founders of *Zelenyi Svit*, and another

²⁷ See Larissa M.L. Zaleska Onyshkevych, 'Echoes of Glasnost: Chornobyl in Soviet Ukrainian Literature', in Romana Bahry (ed.), *Echoes of Glasnost in Soviet Ukraine* (Ontario, CA: Captus University Publishers, 1989), p. 152.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 158. Borys Oliinyk, for instance, mentioned Shevchenko in his poem 'Sim' (Seven).

cinematographer, H. Shkliarevskii, shot 'Mi-kro-fon' in early 1989 - one of the first accounts of the real impact of the Chernobyl accident in the Narodichi region not far away from Chernobyl itself. Rumours about child illnesses and deformed animals being born occurred in late 1988. Shkliarevskii showed his documentary to *Zelenyi Svit* members from the Institute of Nuclear Research in 1989 and as a result, they went to Narodichi, which had not been evacuated, with their own dosimeters, recording levels of radiation much higher than those considered safe for habitation³⁰.

The writers and cinematographers thus at an early stage chronicled and asked critical questions about the Chernobyl accident, making people aware of the seriousness of the accident and its environmental, health and also political implications. They thus came to play a two-tiered role in Ukrainian debate at the time - on the one hand being the vanguards of glasnost in Ukraine, while at the same time increasingly frequently voicing criticism of the very political regime which had bestowed upon them this vanguard role.

The Role of the Scientists

It was around this time - in October 1987 - that Serhii Plachynda was approached by Sviatoslav Dudko - a professional ecologist working at the Ukrainian Branch of the Academy of Sciences³¹. Dudko had access to information labelled 'secret' or 'for official purposes only' (dlia sluzhebnogo polzovania) concerning the state of the environment in Ukraine in a professional capacity. Such information also arrived in connection with the Chernobyl accident and Dudko soon came to realise that the scope of the accident was much bigger than admitted by the Communist Party. The problem was, however, that the information he had was classified, and therefore could not be passed on to others.

In May 1986 Dudko discussed this dilemma with a close friend, Vladimir Sakhacv, an economist and a political prisoner for 24 years. The two of them decided to set up a public ecological group - a club - to address these issues, but did not know exactly how to go about it. Therefore Dudko decided to contact writers and scientists whom he knew personally, to establish a core group. In that connection he was asked a number of questions, such as what kind of group he wanted to set up and where it would be registered. When people were told that he wanted to set up a group independently of official authorities, many declined to join. Plachynda and some others, however, agreed.

³⁰ Demydenko (1990), pp. 1-2.

³¹ Interview with Sviatoslav Dudko, Kiev, 14.5.1994. This was confirmed by Plachynda in interview on 23 May the same year.

The Role of Moscow

The first organisation to be contacted about the new initiative was *UTOP*. The response was not very positive. Dudko was told that since an organisation to protect the environment already did exist (*UTOP*), there was no need to set up another one. Dina Protsenko, the Chairman of *Derzhkomprroda*, the Ukrainian State Committee on the Environment, was also very much against the idea, arguing that there was no need for such an organisation.

Somewhat later, the initiative group heard that Sergei Zalygin - Russian writer and editor-in-chief of the Soviet literary journal *Novyi Mir* - had set up a Green group; *Zelenyi Mir*, in Moscow. *Zelenyi Mir* was registered as an all-union environmental association under the auspices of the Soviet Peace Committee. Therefore, Dudko's initiative group headed by himself, Plachynda and Academician Hrodzinskyi, made contact with the Ukrainian Peace Committee and were introduced to its Chairman, Oles Honchar, and to Deputy Chairman Borys Zrczartsev.

During the summer of 1987, Nikolai Reimers of the Soviet Peace Committee (Moscow) visited Kiev and Dudko met with Reimers to discuss the initiative group he had set up. Reimers expressed himself in positive terms about the new initiative and suggested that it should be subordinated to Moscow - i.e. the group would operate as a relatively autonomous unit but formally be a part of the all-union *Zelenyi Mir*. Dudko replied that at that time he was not in a position to discuss organisational issues, as first the organisation would have to be set up and only then would it be possible to decide what should be its relationship to other organisations.

The Role of Young Members of the Intelligentsia

Somewhat later, in the autumn of 1987³², the Green initiative group, which by then counted some 20-25 members, was contacted by a smaller group made up of young people (students, members of the Kiev State University *druzhina*, and a journalist). The group, which had been initiated by Serhii Kurykin (a history teacher) and Andrii Hlazovyi (a journalist on *Uchitelskaia Gazeta*), got the idea to set up an initiative group to *Zelenyi Mir* in Kiev after having seen an interview with Sergei Zalygin on Ukrainian TV on 5 June 1987. Hlazovyi and Kurykin, who had earlier studied together at the Pedagogical Institute, had already been thinking of setting up a Green group for some time, considering themselves to be Green by conviction and adhering to the ideas of the new left in Western Europe. They had heard about die Grünen in Germany but did not know how to go about things in Ukraine - until Zalygin appeared on TV. They wrote a letter to Zalygin and also contacted Zrczartsev of the Ukrainian Peace Committee, introducing themselves as representatives of the Kiev initiative group to *Zelenyi Mir* and with a request that they be given access to any

³² Interview with Serhii Kurykin, Kiev, 28.4.1994.

information the Peace Committee may receive from Moscow. Zrezartsev promised this, but the summer went by with no such information being passed on and also with no reply from Zalygin.

In September 1987³³ the Hlazovyi/Kurykin group held a meeting in Kiev. Altogether six people were present at this meeting. Towards the end of the same month, Oleh Listopad - a member of the Kiev University *druzhina* and a journalist - was contacted. Initially he was sceptical of the initiative, but eventually joined. It was decided that the group go to Moscow to see representatives of the Soviet Peace Committee in the hope that they might be more helpful. The group was received by Nikolai Reimers. He made it clear that anyone could set up Green groups, but only under the auspices of Moscow. Moreover, he told them that an initiative group already existed in Kiev, under the leadership of Sviatoslav Dudko. He provided them with Dudko's telephone number and in October the Hlazovyi/Kurykin group made contact with the 'Dudko/Plachynda' group.

3.1.2 Joining Forces: Role of the Ukrainian Peace Committee

In November 1987 an informal meeting was held in the premises of the Peace Committee. The meeting was attended by both initiative groups, and altogether some 26-27 people were present, amongst them writers Boris Oliinyk (CPU) and Ivan Drach - who later became First Vice President of *RUKH*. Other well-known people like Academicians Hrodzinskyi and Polishuk and the film director Tkachenko, who made unofficial films about Chernobyl after the accident, were also part of Dudko's group. Thus, whereas the group around Kurykin and Hlazovyi was young and enthusiastic, those around Dudko had the expertise (scientists) and the name/credibility (writers) needed to set up and make the new movement politically acceptable. It also proved an advantage that Hlazovyi was a journalist in the sense that he had access to the press and was thus able to spread information about *Zelenyi Svit* and about the issues with which the association was concerned.

Looking back, Dudko now thinks that Sergei Zalygin's group was initiated by Soviet authorities to control the Greens following the accident at Chernobyl. This view is shared also by Ihor Dzeverin, a *Zelenyi Svit* activist, who holds the view that it was official policy sanctioned from above to gain control of the Green Movement to prevent it from becoming too radical. Prior to the Chernobyl accident and to the broadening of glasnost which it facilitated, the environment was not such a politicised issue. Some environmental groups existed in various parts of the Soviet Union, but these were not republican movements (i.e. with membership structures in all oblasts of the respective republics), nor were they mass movements (in most cases they had only a handful of

³³ Interview with Andrii Hlazovyi, Kiev, 30.4.1994.

members) and finally, they were preoccupied primarily with nature conservation, the preservation of cultural monuments and buildings, and old trees (see Chapter One). Loose groupings of scientists and writers, as seen in chapter one, were campaigning at all-Union level against pollution of Baikal, against plans to redirect the flow of the Siberian rivers from the North to the South and against melioration - but these groupings focused on particular issues without questioning the leading role of the CPSU as such.

This situation changed after the Chernobyl accident. As seen above, Ukrainian writers started to question not only the way in which 'Moscow' handled the accident, but also the very policy of building nuclear power stations on Ukrainian territory in the first place. It is not unlikely, therefore, that Moscow was interested in trying to control the Green Movement in Ukraine to avoid a radicalisation similar to that of the Estonian Greens and, ultimately, the questioning of Moscow's authority to make decisions regarding the economic development of the country on the territory of the entire Soviet Union. Zalygin was well known not only as a writer, but also as a campaigner on the environment. Thus, he had the potential to gather people around his movement. In the Soviet Union, the leaders of official groups and movements were normally just public figureheads, whose only role was to gain good publicity for and provide the movement with credibility. The actual work was normally conducted by the deputy leader(s) and activists on the ground. Thus, although no one would be able to question Zalygin's sincerity on the issue, it cannot be ruled out that attempts were made at controlling the emerging Green movements through him.

A number of famous scientists joined Zalygin's initiative (see Chapter One). These scientists conducted alternative ecological expert assessments and voiced criticism of projects thought to be non-environmental, but they were concerned with the state of the environment in the entire Soviet Union, not only with the territory of one republic in particular. Besides, they were not likely to encourage national sentiments. Consequently, one united Soviet Green movement led by Zalygin would be a lesser evil to official authorities than republican movements led by locals. The structure of *Zelenyi Mir* was tight and centralised - not a loose grassroots movement like the *Socio-Ecological Union (SES)* which emerged later - and thus allowed for some control of republican, regional and local units. Even if no attempt would be made officially to influence the agenda of the movement, this agenda may not have been considered so potentially explosive as that of independent republican movements. What was more, the link between peace and ecology reflected in the close links between *Zelenyi Mir* and the Soviet Peace Committee - which, by the way, had branches in all republics and most oblasts, thus providing a parallel structure with the potential to influence local chapters of *Zelenyi Mir* - matched Gorbachev's words to the effect that

peace and ecology were inextricably linked (see previous chapter). Finally, the fact that the emergence of Zalygin's group was so well publicised also appears to strengthen this view.

Borys Zrezartsev of the Ukrainian Peace Committee, who in 1987 was the deputy leader of the Committee, however, refutes such allegations. The Peace Committee neither received any orders from Moscow to set up a Green movement, nor did it initiate *Zelenyi Svit* itself. Rather it was the other way round; people would contact Honchar and himself and tell them that Chernobyl and the environment were closely linked issues. It was actually a deputy leader of *Zelenyi Svit*, the film director Iurii Tkachenko, who linked the issues of peace and ecology, arguing that 'to protect the environment is to protect peace'³⁴. And when asked whether or not it was chance that made the Peace Committee the founder of *Zelenyi Svit*, Academician Hrodzinskyi replied that to him it was perfectly natural that the Committee supported *Zelenyi Svit*, then peace can only be achieved when one protects also the environment³⁵.

Ecology and environmental protection were hardly paid any attention at all by representatives of the Peace Committee prior to the Chernobyl accident, and as seen above, Honchar in various speeches focused solely on the Chernobyl accident and did not make more general references to the state of the environment in Ukraine prior to the emergence of *Zelenyi Svit*. Had the Peace Committee been acting on orders from Moscow, such references would no doubt have been made. It is interesting to note in this connection that Kurykin and his group in the spring of 1987 contacted the Peace Committee with a request that they be given a chance to participate in the all-union Green action 'Zelena volna' (Green Wave) but received no support whatsoever.

Although the Peace Committee was an official organisation with limited scope for independent action, Dudko claims that as a result of Honchar's leadership it gained relative autonomy - i.e. it could allow itself more than had it been chaired by somebody else.. Zrezartsev made similar claims, arguing that the Ukrainian Committee was relatively autonomous due to Honchar's skill and to the fact that he did not fear the authorities. With regard to relations with Moscow, the Ukrainian Committee only had to make accounts to Moscow from 1957 to 1959. However all money collected in Ukraine had to be handed over to Moscow. Then the Ukrainian Committee submitted proposals requesting funding to Moscow. To give an example, in 1985 the Committee collected 75 million roubles. It then requested that 15 of these be returned from Moscow, but was eventually only given one per cent of the money collected. Zrezartsev expressed dissatisfaction with this state of affairs, arguing that relations with Moscow were not so good during the leadership of Borovik and the cosmonaut Grechko in the 1980s. Economically, Kiev was dependent upon Moscow, whereas in other respects it had more autonomy - although the

³⁴ *Вечірній Київ*, 27.10.1989.

³⁵ *Советская Украина* (n.d.)

members of the Peace Committee monitored Gorbachev's speeches closely and adjusted ('we must study what the leader says') its policies accordingly³⁶.

Officially Gorbachev tried, as pointed out in Chapter Two, to link the issues of nuclear disarmament and the peaceful atom. Honchar's comments on Chernobyl, however, not only expressed concern about the impact of the accident, but also criticism of the way in which the accident was handled by the CPSU as well as criticism of the Soviet nuclear power programme in general and the possible implications it may have on Ukraine in particular. To illustrate this, Zrezartsev referred to a meeting that took place of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Peace Committee in May 1987. At this meeting Honchar argued that had Ukraine been an independent country it would have had no money to build nuclear power stations. 'This money', he said, 'should rather have been given to our enemies. That would have been less dangerous'. The fact that Honchar as the leader of an official organisation could make such statements is in itself an indication that the Ukrainian Peace Committee was not merely implementing political directives from Moscow when eventually registering *Zelenyi Svit* under the auspices of the Peace Committee in December 1987.

Kurykin does not rule out the possibility of the Soviet Peace Committee having some kind of hidden agenda with regard to *Zelenyi Mir*. However, as will be seen below, the path that was eventually chosen regarding the registration of *Zelenyi Svit* in Ukraine, did not coincide with the path preferred by the Peace Committee in Moscow. Initially, the Kurykin/Hlazovyi group suggested to register *Zelenyi Svit* by the Ukrainian Peace Committee as a branch of Zalygin's *Zelenyi Mir*. After some discussion, however, the following idea emerged: *Zelenyi Svit* ought to be registered as an independent, i.e. Ukrainian, ecological organisation. Reimers of the Soviet Peace Committee, as seen above, favoured the former. The Ukrainian Peace Committee, on the other hand, did not find the suggestion that *Zelenyi Svit* be registered as a Ukrainian organisation unreasonable and at a meeting of the Presidium on 28 December 1987 - attended by representatives of the initiative group - Honchar proposed that *Zelenyi Svit* be registered with the Committee on these terms. There were several issues to be discussed at the meeting, and the question as to whether or not to register *Zelenyi Svit* was the last on the agenda and was addressed only after some three hours when people were tired and just wanted to end the meeting. Honchar's suggestion that the Peace Committee register and cooperate with *Zelenyi Svit* was met with the following comment by Academician Sitnik: 'why is this necessary?' Not all the members of the

³⁶ Interview with Borys Zrezartsev, Kiev, 12.5.1994. Zrezartsev told me that although the Peace Committee would adjust itself to Gorbachev's new policies, it did not always agree with these. For instance there was opposition within the Committee to his plans for revolutionary change (L'Hunanite - 1987) as revolutionary change was incompatible with stability. The Ukrainian Peace Committee held the view that first the CPSU had to be reorganised and then one could start making changes.

Presidium were present, but it was sufficient for a quorum and the proposition was endorsed. At the time of registration, *Zelenyi Svit* had just 27 members³⁷ most of whom were Kiev intellectuals - writers, cinematographers, scientists, journalists and other well-educated people.

Following the decision of the Presidium a scandal broke out. In 1987 it was still difficult to spread information through the newspapers. Hlazovyi, however, contacted people he knew in the agricultural department of *Robitnychna Hazeta* - this department, by the way, was in charge of environmental issues. On 6 January 1988 a short note was published, listing names of prominent members of *Zelenyi Svit* to make it appear as a solid organisation, and information about the organisation as such. However, *Robitnychna hazeta* was the organ of the CPU Central Committee and the newspaper had worked closely with Ukrainian *Derzhkompryroda* for the 20 years or so it had existed. Dina Protsenko, who was also a member of the Peace Committee's Presidium, and as seen above, did not favour the setting up of *Zelenyi Svit*, was not present at the December 28 meeting. According to Hlazovyi, Protsenko contacted the paper and said: 'what kind of *Zelenyi Svit* can there be, once we have a State Committee for Environmental Protection?' The editor of *Robitnychna hazeta*, Shibok, then contacted Elchenko (second secretary of the CPU Central Committee) who was a friend of Protsenko. He said that 'we cannot have such non-governmental organisations'. An explanation was required, and eventually Zalygin had to be contacted. Once he had given his comment, everyone calmed down and the issue was closed.

Zrezartsev confirmed that Protsenko objected to registering *Zelenyi Svit* - as did others in the Peace Committee. However, he cannot recall that Elchenko at any point contacted the Peace Committee regarding the note in *Robitnychna hazeta*. The Ukrainian Council of Ministers, however, did, asking the Committee if it really needed this, i.e. *Zelenyi Svit*. The Committee then argued that 'you are a state structure, this, i.e. *Zelenyi Svit*, is a public organisation.' The Peace Committee was also requested to provide a list of *Zelenyi Svit* members, indicating whom of these were party members³⁸. Zrezartsev claims that the CPU was careful about *Zelenyi Svit*. *UTOP* initially considered *Zelenyi Svit* something of a threat, but in Zrezartsev's opinion that was understandable, given that *UTOP* was part of the state structure.

To conclude then, to the extent 'Moscow' was trying to control Green movements in the USSR by trying to control already existing movements and initiating new movements through the Soviet Peace Committee, this strategy failed in the case of Ukraine - partly as those activists who

³⁷ *Зелений світ*, no. 4/1991, c. 1.

³⁸ Dudko claimed that shortly after *Zelenyi Svit* he was called up by Zrezartsev, who wanted to see him in person about a matter he could not discuss over the telephone. Once Dudko arrived at the Peace Committee he was asked how many members of *Zelenyi Svit* were party members. Dudko's reply was that he did not know as they did not make biographies on each individual member. However as addresses and telephones were provided, he argued that the 'organs' could find out that themselves, as that was what they were paid to do.

initiated *Zelenyi Svit* were firmly committed to creating an independent Ukrainian Green Movement, and partly due to the Ukrainian Peace Committee's respect of and support for this commitment - not only through the registration of *Zelenyi Svit* as a Ukrainian association in December 1987, but also through a policy of non-interference in setting the agenda for the association, while yet providing financial and technical support for its work.

3.2 Building and Developing an all-Ukrainian Green Movement

3.2.1 Developing a Strategy and Setting an Agenda

At the time of registration, a list of 24 *Zelenyi Svit* members had been compiled³⁹. None of these were women⁴⁰ and they all had higher education: four were writers (Plachynda, Shcherbak, Ivan Drach who later became deputy leader of RUKH and one Kniazhuk). Another two were journalists, one was a teacher, another one a film director, one was in charge of a department of the Ternopil Pedagogical Institute and the rest were experts and academicians (altogether 10, of whom seven were members of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences). Age-wise most of the members were in their forties or fifties - only one of the members of the initiative group was a student, Oleh Listopad. To give the association an image towards the general public, Archbishop Makaryi of Ivano-Frankivsk and Kolomka was included on the list, as was the Ukrainian Cosmonaut Oleksandr Viktorenko.

Throughout 1988, *Zelenyi Svit* met regularly at the Peace Committee - at the busiest, meetings were held every Thursday at 5 p.m. There was much disagreement regarding what kind of organisation *Zelenyi Svit* should be etc. and meetings often lasted until eleven or twelve o'clock. More and more people joined in - some were invited by members to join, others heard about *Zelenyi Svit* and joined at their own initiative - and it was soon decided that one should go out in the streets and gather people.

³⁹ Список членів ініціативної групи української асоціації "Зелений Світ". This list, containing the names and work titles of all the initiative members was given to me by Dudko in Kiev, 1994.

⁴⁰ The name of one woman, Vika Pinnik, was included on the list, but crossed out with blue ink. She was linked to the CPU Central Committee.

Narrow Expert Group or Broad Grassroots Movement?

Once *Zelenyi Svit*'s relationship to Moscow had been settled, the question as to what kind of association it should be soon surfaced. The two initiative groups consisted, as seen above, of on the one hand well-known experts and writers (Dudko/Sakhaev group) and on the other hand young members of the intelligentsia (Hlazovyi/Kurykin group). These groupings had different ideas about what organisational structure to choose for *Zelenyi Svit*.

Dudko envisaged *Zelenyi Svit* as a club consisting of experts, writers (with a name and reputation), journalists and ordinary people. Experts were needed to produce alternative information and thus oppose public decisions on environmental issues on technical grounds. The writers were needed to give *Zelenyi Svit* a name, the journalists to spread information about the association and those issues with which it was concerned, and finally there was a need for ordinary people to mobilise the population⁴¹. Hlazovyi, on the other hand, favoured a grassroots movement open to everyone - including non-experts, and opposed Dudko's vision of *Zelenyi Svit* - in his words Dudko wanted to turn the association into a discussion club for experts - on the grounds that it was being 'elitist'. Dudko summarised this conflict in the following way: 'I was asked: do you want to create a branch of the Academy of Sciences? This is a public organisation. The leaders and members should be ordinary people'.

The disagreement between the two groupings was also reflected in different preferences with regard to who should be the leader of the association. In early January 1988 the first leader of *Zelenyi Svit* was to be elected and there were two candidates - Plachynda and Shcherbak. Plachynda was backed by Dudko and Sakhaev, whereas Shcherbak was favoured by Hlazovyi and Kurykin. Shcherbak, according to Kurykin, supported the view that *Zelenyi Svit* ought to be a political grassroots organisation, linking up a number of groups locally. Shcherbak, however, declined the offer to run for Chairman and Plachynda was eventually elected⁴².

Hlazovyi and Kurykin were opposed to Plachynda's leadership not simply because he was Dudko's candidate, but rather as in their eyes, he was an 'eco-nationalist' and not 'Green'. Plachynda remained a controversial figure with certain groupings within *Zelenyi Svit* throughout his leadership, which lasted until January 1989, when Iurii Shcherbak took over, although he did much to promote the association through a series of articles addressing environmental issues in the Ukrainian press⁴³.

Towards the end of 1988 a conflict broke out due to an article Plachynda published in *Vechirnyi Kyiv* about the writer Bulgakov. In the article he claimed to have interviewed people

⁴¹ Interview with Sviatoslav Dudko, Kiev, 14.5.1994.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Interview with Borys Zrezartsev, Kiev, 12.5.1994.

who could confirm (as witnesses) that the famous writer had taken part in an incident in 1915, in which Menshevik students were being shot at. As a result of these 'revelations' vandals attacked the Bulgakov museum on Andriivskyi Spusk and removed a memorial plaque from the building. A sculpture was also destroyed. Hlazonyi and Kurykin reacted very strongly to this article. In their view, Plachynda was discrediting *Zelenyi Svit* by publicising it, even if it was written by him in his capacity as a writer and not as the leader of *Zelenyi Svit*. Plachynda took this criticism to his heart and resigned as the leader of *Zelenyi Svit* shortly after. On 7 January 1989, at the first annual meeting of the organisation, Iurii Shcherbak was elected the new leader. A Co-ordinating Committee, consisting of some 14 to 15 members was also set up, a bank account was opened and the group started to work more systematically.

Although Plachynda was the official leader figure in *Zelenyi Svit* during 1988, Dudko, who was elected executive secretary, was in actual fact running the organisation. Dudko claimed that a major reason for this was that people were generally scared of sticking out, as at the time it was not completely without risks to work on the environment - in other words, many adopted a 'wait-and-see' attitude. Anatoliy Panov, another *Zelenyi Svit* member who has been active in the association since the very beginning, has confirmed this: 'it is right that many were scared in the beginning. Perestroika was taking place in Moscow, not in Kiev, and it was difficult for us to predict the consequences of our actions'⁴⁴. I will return to this question below.

The Building of an all-Ukrainian Association

During 1988, the primary task of *Zelenyi Svit* was to set up local chapters of *Zelenyi Svit*. As *Zelenyi Svit* had been registered as a national Ukrainian organisation, it had to be represented locally. In this connection Dudko spent much time travelling around the country either initiating or asking existing groups to join. Some Green groups existed prior to the emergence of *Zelenyi Svit*: in Ternopil, for instance, the first ecological groups emerged already in 1980. The very first one evolved from the Esperanto club⁴⁵ of the enterprise 'Vatra' - this group was later called 'Espeko' (Esperanto Ecology) - under the leadership of Ihor Pushkar. Esperanto clubs were amongst the first informal groups to appear in Ukraine and its members were being harassed by the KGB and in other ways intimidated. Inspired by the Law on Small Rivers, the ecological group of the 'Vatra' enterprise was primarily concerned with the protection of small rivers and in 1982 organised a 160 km long expedition along the river Stripa - an expedition that was attended

⁴⁴ Interview with Anatoliy Panov, Kiev, 16.5.1994.

⁴⁵ The first esperanto club in Ternopil was established in 1978 (Interview with Rostyslav Tverdostup, Sosnovyi Bir, 20.5.1994).

also by Esperanto members from 'Aniketso' - another Ternopil Esperanto group - biologists from the Ternopil Pedagogical Institute, the Khmelnytskyi Institute of Domestic Economy and esperantists from Khmelnytskyi. Such expeditions became an annual event, and later a similar expedition was conducted on the Dniestr river⁴⁶. These groups later joined up in 'Noosfera' and joined *Zelenyi Svit* as a collective member.

Local groups also emerged at an early stage in East Ukraine. In Dnipropetrovsk, for instance, Viktor Khazan organised an ecological seminar by the *Komsomol* as early as 1975 in response to the high incidence of child disease in the area. Seminars on resource use were organised and received official approval initially, but later met with official resistance due to the materials and topics used/discussed and were therefore closed.

In 1983 Khazan in his capacity as a physicist got to hear about physical problems related to nuclear reactors. Three years later, in the immediate aftermath of the Chernobyl accident on 28 April, he was visited by a physicist from Kiev. Together they measured radioactivity in Dnipropetrovsk. They were told not to tell anybody about the readings, but information about radiation levels and prophylactic measures were somehow passed on to others and more than one thousand people allegedly followed their recommendations. No First of May Day Parade was held in Dnipropetrovsk due to high levels of radiation. At this point it became clear to Khazan and others that an alternative to *UTOP* was needed. *UTOP* was primarily an organisation for children, planting trees and running courses at schools, but without a strategy on the use of resources. Khazan read about *Zelenyi Svit* in the newspapers, established contacts with *Zelenyi Svit* in Kiev and joined the First Congress in 1989. In neighbouring Donetsk oblast, a group was set up in Horlivka in October 1988 (not registered until September 1989) in response to environmental problems in the area. This group received an invitation from Kiev to attend the Congress in 1989.

A Green group emerged early also in Luhansk - one of the dirtiest oblasts in Europe. This group was initiated by Kostiantyn Zarubitskyi in 1987. Zarubitskyi was writing his post-graduate thesis on technology and morals on the background of socio-economic relations and through his work became aware of the need to protect the environment. He contacted friends and acquaintances and set up an initiative group. The Luhansk Greens emerged within the *Komsomol* structure (Zarubitskyi was a member of the *Komsomol* and eventually also joined the CPU). Still, however, it took seven months to get the statute registered. The group held its first meeting in November 1988 and was registered as the municipal ecological club 'Luhan'. Its first meeting was announced in the press/radio and was attended by some 50 people. Amongst these were the deputy leaders of Luhansk CPU, *Derzhkomprroda* and other official figures. According to

⁴⁶ Ростислав Твердоступ. - Розвиток екологічного руху на Закарпатті України, given to me by the author. Additional information given in Sosnoviy Bir, 20.5.1994.

Zarubitskyi these joined the movement to 'watch it'. Some people accused Zarubitskyi of simply being a puppet to official authorities, but even so he was put under quite a lot of pressure by the secretary of the municipal *Komsomol* and the secretary of the municipal party committee. They told him that he answered for whatever the group did with his party ticket. He also had to justify the group's actions to these groups. The Luhansk Greens planted trees and measured nitrites and nitrates in food. All food products were to be issued with proper certification, but this was hardly ever done. Contacts with *Zelenyi Svit* in Kiev were established through Hlazovyi, whom Zarubitskyi contacted via friends in the capital. Zarubitskyi's group took part in preparing the Founding Congress of *Zelenyi Svit* in October 1989.

In Vinnytsia groups were formed as early as between 1980 and 1985. Members of these groups heard about *Zelenyi Svit* through the media and sent a delegation to the first congress in October 1989. Local groups later joined together in an oblast organisation on 1 December 1989. 'Dzarylgach' - a Green group in the town of Skarovsk (Kherson oblast) was founded on 12 December 1988. This group had heard about *Zelenyi Svit* and sought contact with Kiev through *Derzhkompriroda*, before *Zelenyi Svit* was officially registered with the Peace Council. Bukovina *Zelenyi Svit* also emerged prior to the official registration of *Zelenyi Svit* (November 1988) in response to the incident of thallium poisoning in Chernivtsi in which 120 children suddenly went bald. In Mukachevo (Zakarpattia oblast) a local group emerged in opposition to the Pristialivsk radar station. The group was not initiated by *Zelenyi Svit*, but later joined up with it at its own initiative. Strong groups emerged in Nikolaev oblast (*Zelenyi Mir*) and at the Crimea (*Ekologiya i Mir*) in opposition to the Iuzhnoukrainsk and the Crimean nuclear power stations respectively. The Crimean group was founded by Sergei Shuvainikov, who is currently the leader of the Russian Party of Crimea, and he later made contacts with Kiev and joined *Zelenyi Svit*. *Ekologiya i Mir* maintained contacts with Zalygin in Moscow in the form of information exchange⁴⁷. Also in Cherkassy and Dniprodzhershinsk did Green groups come into existence prior to the emergence of *Zelenyi Svit*. In Lutsk, on the other hand, the group was initiated by *Zelenyi Svit* centrally, which also provided practical assistance in setting the group up⁴⁸.

Other groups were either founded by people who read about *Zelenyi Svit* in the newspapers or were set up with the help of the Peace Council. According to Zrezartsev, the Peace Council had an established structure in all the 25 Ukrainian oblasts. The oblast groups were by Kiev ordered to mobilise people and establish a Green structure. In this way, groups were founded in Poltava, Cherkassy, Odessa, Rivne and Zakarpattia. By the time of the First Congress in October 1989,

⁴⁷ Interview with Adrei Orlov (Simferopol), Sosnovyi Bir, 20.5.1994.

⁴⁸ For question text, see Questionnaire.

Zelenyi Svit united some 300 local groups with a total membership of some 500,000 people. Later another 100 or so groups also joined the *Zelenyi Svit* structure⁴⁹.

Some groups emerged spontaneously in response to local environmental problems and the general broadening of glasnost and democratisation after the emergence of *Zelenyi Svit*, and later joined forces with Kiev. Mukachevo *Zelenyi Svit* in Zakarpatia oblast, for instance, was set up in the summer of 1989 as the ecological section of the Mitrak Society by locals concerned primarily with the Pristialevsk radar station and a military airport in the close vicinity of Mukachevo, but also with an asphalt-bitumen factory, the need for a Green zone in the town and people's health in Mukachevo. The first ecological meeting in Zakarpatia was organised by these people on 16 September and at this meeting all the issues mentioned above, were discussed. Prior to the Founding Congress of *Zelenyi Svit* members of the Mukachevo Green Movement contacted Kiev and as a result, it was represented at the Congress⁵⁰.

Not all ecological groups chose to join ranks of *Zelenyi Svit*. *Tovarystvo Lev* from Lviv, for instance, joined just for a short while, whereas Kharkiv activists (most of them were professional ecologists, economists, psychologists, medical doctors etc.) of the *Ecoforum* Association (established in 1987⁵¹), while maintaining contacts with *Zelenyi Svit* chapters in Kiev and elsewhere, chose to cooperate with official authorities to solve local ecological problems. As a result of such co-operation, a number of laws to protect the environment were adopted.

To get an idea as to how aware those who joined the Green groups locally were about the environmental issue prior to the Chernobyl accident and (in most cases) the emergence of their groups, I asked the respondents of my survey this question. All answered in the affirmative. Bagin, of Horlivka *Zelenyi Svit* (Donetsk oblast) qualified his answer by referring to one of the dominant devices of the CPSU:

Человек - царь природы. Покорим природе и поставим ее на службу человечеству.

This, he argued, was a very dangerous aim, then it is simply not possible to subjugate nature. The result of such a policy could only be its destruction. In Horlivka the problem was aggravated by high levels of child disease caused by pollution. In Mariupol, Evhen Bal became concerned with the environment as he saw the water quality of the Azov Sea deteriorate. Concern through observation was also given as a reason for environmental concern prior to Chernobyl by the

⁴⁹ Conversations with Hlazovyi and Panov, Kiev, summer 1994.

⁵⁰ Information taken from Evheniia Derkach's election platform, Parliamentary Elections, March 1994.

⁵¹ Vladimir Butenko, 'Green Perestroika in Kharkov', *Environmental Policy Review*, vol. 6, no. 1, Spring 1992, pp. 28-29.

Ternopil and Mukachevo Greens as well as the Lutsk Greens. The head of the Lutsk chapter of *Zelenyi Svit*, by the way, is a writer, and he wrote essays about environmental issues⁵² as well as voicing his concern about the Rivne nuclear power station, built on karst ground, prior to Chernobyl. Others developed an interest in environmental issues through *DOP* (Kherson Ecocentre) and through the youth section of *UTOP* (Vinnytsia) and classes at school⁵³ as well as through personal contacts with ecologists at Kiev University. Those respondents who took either only minor or no interest in environmental issues prior to Chernobyl all mentioned the lack of information as the major reason (Mukachevo, Dnipropetrovsk, Nikolaev, Odessa)⁵⁴.

To conclude, then, the answers I obtained seem to support the view that Green groups emerged not only as a result of democratisation, but also very much so as a result of glasnost, which facilitated the spread of information about the state of the environment and the impact of pollution on the environment and on people's health.

Gathering information and making the Association known to the General Public

In order to establish local chapters in all the twenty five Ukrainian oblasts, it was of vital importance that information about *Zelenyi Svit* was being properly distributed. In 1987 it was still not easy to have information about informal groups spread through the press, but *Zelenyi Svit* benefited greatly from personal contacts and also from its close relationship to the Peace Committee. Not only did the latter provide it with premises and office support. It also made funding available (100,000 roubles) and put its activists in contact with Greens abroad.

Furthermore, *Zelenyi Svit* benefited from Honchar's and Zrezartsev's access to the media as representatives of the Peace Committee. The press and Ukrainian TV covered the meetings of the Committee. Besides, the president of *Gosteleradio* happened to be a member of the Peace Committee's Presidium. He was on good terms with Zrezartsev and this link proved useful to the Greens. Zrezartsev also had experience as a journalist and maintained links with the press. From time to time he would include information about *Zelenyi Svit* in his reports on the Peace Committee. Such reports were submitted quarterly to *RATAU* (currently *Ukrinform*) and all newspapers, including the regional ones, were obliged to publish them. Finally, every Sunday morning Zrezartsev did a three minute chronicle on radio, following the news. He often took the opportunity to say a few words about the Greens while on the air.

⁵² Щацькі озера", "Сині очі Волині".

⁵³ These courses were entitled 'Воспитание ленинского отношения к природе'.

⁵⁴ See Questionnaire.

Another important factor was that it was impossible to ignore people like Plachynda, Hrodzinskiy and Shcherbak. From late 1987 onwards, Plachynda, Shcherbak and other writers wrote articles, poetry, short stories and novels with a reference to the Ukrainian environment. Iurii Tkachenko of the Ukrainian Union of Cinematographers has stressed the role of the writers as follows:

Милосердие к природе - это не роскошь, а главное условие самоохранения. Эту истину вдохнула в нас Киевская организация Союза Писателей СССР, под крышей которого в буквальном смысле слова наша уютная ассоциация "Зеленый Свет".⁵⁵

The role of the writers was also acknowledged by the respondents. A majority agreed that the writers were instrumental in facilitating the Ukrainian Green Movement:

Table 3.1 Agreement/Disagreement that Writers played a Role in Facilitating the Ukrainian Green Movement

Group	Agree	Do not agree
Ternopil oblast ZS	X	
Mukachevo ZS	X	
Bukovina ZS	X	
Lutsk ZS	X	
Dnipropetrovsk oblast ZS		X
Horlivka ZS		X
Mariupol ZS	X	
Vinnitsia oblast ZS	X	
Uman ZS		
Nikolaev oblast ZS	X	
Dzharylgach (Kherson)	X	
Ecocentre (Kherson)		X
Odessa Greens	X	

As seen from the table above, the Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk Greens do not agree that the writers involvement on the environment played a role in the emergence of the Ukrainian Green Movement. There may be several reasons for this - a major one could be that the Ukrainian writers wrote on 'Ukrainian' issues, whereas in Eastern Ukraine - particularly in the Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk oblasts - there is a large ethnic Russian population. It may thus very well be that these writers did not appeal to the Russian speaking people of Eastern Ukraine. Another - related - reason may be that those Ukrainian writers who did write on environmental issues did so from the point of view of 'Ridna Ukraina' thus appealing to national sentiments

⁵⁵ *Вечерний Киев*, 27.10.1989 (n.p.).

which the Russians did not share. If this was the case, though, one would expect also the South Ukrainian Greens - where there is a large Russian population - to voice similar views and this was not the case. A more plausible explanation for this geographical difference may therefore be that the Ukrainian writers wrote on issues not related to Eastern Ukraine⁵⁶. And those who did - like Plachynda, who focused on the fate of the Dniepr river - did so from a national point of view, thus alienating rather than appealing to those living in the area.

The answers I received to the question of whether or not Greens locally were familiar with Ukrainian/Soviet writers concerned with environmental issues prior to the emergence of *Zelenyi Svit* seem to support this view. Bagin of Horlivka *Zelenyi Svit* was not familiar with any Ukrainian writers, although he had heard of Russian writers' struggle against turning the flow of the Northern (Siberian) rivers and against the Volga-Chorgai Canal. Khazan of Dnipropetrovsk *Zelenyi Svit* listed three poets - the Russian poet Rylskii and the Ukrainian poets Drach and Vinhrakovskii, but not writers like Plachynda and Shcherbak. An interesting picture emerged when the respondents were asked whether or not they were familiar with environmental campaigns conducted by Ukrainian writers⁵⁷:

Table. 3.2 Familiarity with Environmental Actions conducted by Ukrainian Writers.

Group	Familiar with	Not familiar with
Ternopil oblast ZS	X	
Mukachevo ZS	X	
Bukovina ZS		
Lutsk ZS	X	
Dnipropetrovsk oblast ZS		X
Horlivka ZS		X
Mariupol Greens		X
Vinnitsia oblast ZS	X	
Uman ZS		
Nikolaev oblast ZS	X	
Dzharylgach (Kherson)	X	
Ecocentre (Kherson)		
Odessa Greens	X	

⁵⁶ In Nikolaev, for instance, the Writers' Union and the oblast branch of the Culture Fund took part in the campaign against expansion of the Iuzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station. A local writer, V. Boiko, was for some time co-chairman of *Zelenyi Mir* together with Anatolii Zolotukhin (who, by the way, is Russian by nationality). Moreover, the planned Danube-Dniepr Canal was opposed by well-known Ukrainian writers in a campaign that ended successfully in 1987. Thus, people were aware of the role played by writers on environmental issues. Similarly, in Odessa, which has a large Russian and also Jewish population, writers were involved in campaigning against the Odessa nuclear thermal station.

⁵⁷ By environmental actions I mean actions similar to and on the scale of the Russian writers' struggle against turning the flow of the Siberian rivers and against the Canal Volga-Chorgai in particular, and melioration more generally.

Whereas a majority of those who answered in the affirmative had heard about the campaign against the Danube-Dniepr Canal, and about Plachynda's crusade against water reservoirs on and pollution of the Dniepr and Shcherbak's writings on Chernobyl, none of the Eastern Ukrainian Green groups were familiar with these campaigns. All the respondents - including those from Eastern Ukraine - were, however, familiar with similar campaigns conducted by the Russian writers, thus supporting the view that Ukrainian writers do not appeal to the Russian speaking community of East Ukraine.

When asked what was the merit of the writers, I got a number of different answers: the Ternopil Greens acknowledged Honchar's involvement in setting up *Zelenyi Svit* as 'enormous' and also gave credit to Plachynda and Shcherbak for 'telling people the truth about the state of the environment'. It was also pointed out that the writers played a major role in widening the limits to glasnost (Mukachevo *Zelenyi Svit*), and in spreading ecological knowledge as well as imbuing people with a love for Nature (Bukovina *Zelenyi Svit*). The Mariupol Greens pointed out that the writers were better able than anybody else to formulate their thoughts - also on the environment, whereas the Nikolaev Greens stressed that the merit of the writers consisted of one thing: that 'conscience had not yet died in people'. The Kherson Greens, on the other hand, pointed out that the writers influenced people's awareness and public opinion (i.e. awoke its awareness, or rather revived it). Finally, the Odessa Greens stressed that the writers explained things to the public and appealed to people to join in the fight for survival.

The writers, on the other hand, acknowledged the scientists' role in providing them with information that the writers could then translate into a language that could be understood by the general public. Iurii Shcherbak, for instance, acknowledged this relationship in an article published in *FORUM*:

В организации движения сыграли большую роль ученые из института Госплана республики, который называется Советом производителей сил Украины. Они располагали достоверной информацией, для большинства эта информация была недоступной. И это была инициатива этой группы, которую мы поддерживали. Получилось так: их знания и наша возможность быть рупором с выходом на массовые каналы. Слово писателей и авторитет ученых все это объединили⁵⁸.

Dudko also acknowledged the link between the scientists and the writers/journalists, referring in this connection to Hlazovyi, who was working as a journalist in *Robitnychna Gazeta* and whom Dudko and other scientists fed with information that he could then use as a base upon which to write articles explaining technical things in an understandable language to the general public.

⁵⁸ Юрий Щербак, *ФОРУМ*, 22/1990, с. 30-31.

Moreover, a newspaper article could reach a much bigger audience than could a scientific article on the same subject⁵⁹. Thus, *Zelenyi Svit* was able - also through its own channels - to spread information about its activities. Finally, the Peace Council provided *Zelenyi Svit* activists with a cover vis-à-vis the authorities, as did prominent members of the association.

During 1988 a major focus of attention in *Zelenyi Svit* was on organisational issues. The question as to what should be the relationship to *Zelenyi Mir* in Moscow had to be finalised and a decision had to be reached on structure (horizontal vs. vertical) and issues (Chernobyl/nuclear power vs. others) to be addressed by the organisation. Finally, the most important question of what should be *Zelenyi Svit*'s relationship towards the general public had to be solved.

As regards the first issue, *Zelenyi Svit*'s relationship with Moscow was finalised on 29 March 1988 during its first conference (one of four arranged prior to the First Congress) which took place in Kiev's Cinema House (Dom Kino)⁶⁰. Nikolai Reimers attended this conference, and Dudko took the opportunity to bring up *Zelenyi Svit*'s relationship with *Zelenyi Mir* in Moscow. The former, he said, was a Ukrainian independent organisation, willing to co-operate with Moscow - even to the point of conducting joint campaigns - but not in any way willing to become part of the latter's structure. Reimers did not respond to Dudko's announcement, but after this conference, the relationship between *Zelenyi Svit* and 'Moscow' cooled considerably⁶¹.

At the conference a general strategy for *Zelenyi Svit*'s future activities was for the first time articulated and a plan of action endorsed. The concept 'think globally, act locally' was adapted as a cornerstone in *Zelenyi Svit*'s work and 5 June was declared 'Environmental Protection Day'. In this connection the Greens called for a large demonstration to be held in Kiev on that day. The Greens furthermore declared that 'we do not want to be the last generation to have seen nature in its existent form'⁶². References were made to general pollution in Ukraine, but the major concern of the conference was with Chernobyl and the lack of openness by which it was surrounded. Iurii Shcherbak informed the overcrowded hall that the nuclear fall-out had also affected areas as far as 300 km into Belorussia, from where the population should be evacuated. Moreover, radiation

⁵⁹ Interview with Sviatoslav Dudko, Kiev, 14.5.1994.

⁶⁰ A brief account of this conference appeared in a press release from the Ukrainian Press Agency in London (no. 83, 31.5.1988). The press release refers to the conference as the founding conference of *Zelenyi Svit*. Representatives of *Zelenyi Svit* themselves, however, refer to a conference which took place in April 1989 as the founding conference of *Zelenyi Svit* as a programme was endorsed and a preliminary statute endorsed. As regards the location of the April 1988 conference, whereas the Press Agency claims that it took place in the Writers' Union House, Dudko told me that it took place in the Cinema House. This is of less importance, however. Still, since in cases where written information contradicts information obtained through interviews, I have chosen to rely on the latter, I refer to the location of the meeting as the Cinema House. A more detailed press release appeared in the April 1988 issue of the Ukrainian Press Service's 'News from the USSR' under the heading 'The last generation to have seen nature' - 'Greens' form in Kiev', pp. 9-10.

⁶¹ Information provided by Dudko in interview, Kiev, 14.5.1994.

⁶² *Ukrainian Press Service*, The last generation to have seen nature - 'Greens' form in Kiev, pp. 9-10.

levels in the Poltava and Zhitomyr regions were said to be higher than at Chernobyl itself. The Ukrainian authorities were criticised for failing to evacuate the local population immediately after the accident and for withholding information surrounding the accident.

A series of demands were listed in a declaration endorsed by the meeting: official authorities were urged to repeal the 'glasnost prohibition on information about the state of the environment and the pollution of food supplies. Doctors were requested to tell the truth about illnesses caused by radiation. The government was urged to publish textbooks on ecology, a Ukrainian ecological newspaper and to commission scientific research and questionnaires about the construction or completion of new nuclear power stations. Finally, the declaration expressed anger that nuclear power stations were still being built and demanded that referenda be held prior to the construction of new nuclear power stations⁶³.

3.2.2 Campaigns (1987-89)

Zelenyi Svit as an all-Ukrainian association came into being in response to the Chernobyl accident, and it was therefore not surprising that the dominant issue during 1988 was not only Chernobyl in particular, but nuclear power in Ukraine in general. Only three to four days after *Zelenyi Svit* had been registered by the Peace Committee, a campaign was launched against plans to construct a nuclear power in the town of Chyhyryn by the Dniepr. This campaign was followed by similar campaigns against a nuclear power station planned on the Kerch Peninsula on the Crimea, and against further expansion of nuclear power stations in Khmelnytskyi, Rivne and Iuzhnoukrainsk.

Other issues, addressed simultaneously, had an environmental as well as a cultural aspect to them. This was the case with the campaign to prevent a bridge being built over the Dniepr to the island of Khortytsa, which was not only a nature preserve, but also an important historical site for the Ukrainians. The historical and cultural significance of areas in danger of being destroyed was, as will be seen below, not simply confined to non-nuclear issues, but was also linked to the potential damage nuclear power stations could cause. Thus not only the need for a revival of the Ukrainian natural environment was voiced, but also the need to protect the people of Ukraine, its culture and historical tradition from destruction. (This is an issue to which I will return in more detail below).

For reasons of space I cannot go into too much detail about each particular issue addressed by *Zelenyi Svit* on a national and local level. A more detailed study of one particular campaign is provided in Chapters Six and Seven (Iuzhnoukrainsk). I will, however, briefly look at issues and

⁶³ Ibid.

means of campaigning to illustrate how campaigning changed and how, from initially being primarily conducted by experts in the form of expert assessments, the general public and means like collecting signatures and demonstrating, gradually became more common.

Non-Nuclear Issues

One of the first campaigns initiated and conducted by *Zelenyi Svit* was a campaign to prevent a bridge from being built over the Dnepr river from the mainland to the island of Khortytsa in early 1988. An activist from Zaporizhzhia - he was alone - contacted *Zelenyi Svit* regarding plans to build this bridge. The island, which is the largest island situated in the Dniepr river, had been a protected historical and cultural heritage preserve since 1965. In order to accommodate the new bridge, a part of the island which was part of a nature reserve (zapovednik) would have to be destroyed - and possibly with it a 700 year old oak tree⁶⁴. Dudko in an interview with *NFU* pointed out that although the status of Khortytsa had been discussed for decades, no protective measures had so far been taken. To illustrate this point, he gave an example: the Research and Production Institute of Mechanisation and Electrification of Cattle Breeding was occupying about 40% of the island despite its status as a nature preserve. Were the plans to build a bridge to go ahead, this would ruin the island as a historical preserve. What was more, it would also threaten some one thousand species of wild life with extinction. *Zelenyi Svit* would therefore try to persuade the Zaporizhzhia City Executive Committee to overturn its decision. Should this fail, they would appeal to the Ukrainian government or even to Soviet authorities⁶⁵.

Apart from being a nature resort, Khortytsa to many Ukrainians symbolised something far more. It was there the Cossacks in their time fought the Tartars and protected Christianity against Islam. In many regards Khortytsa thus proved a tricky issue as *Zelenyi Svit* could be accused of being 'national democrats'. There was reluctance amongst *Zelenyi Svit* members to go to Zaporizhzhia, so in the end Dudko ended up going himself. He was seen by the raikom, the major constructor of Zaporizhzhia and others. The problem, however, was that they did not want to show him the project, as he represented *Zelenyi Svit*. Once back in Kiev, he contacted the projectors in his capacity as a member of the Academy of Sciences. Together with other experts he prepared two alternative projects, including cost calculations. These projects were presented to the general public at a conference organised by *Zelenyi Svit*, and which took place in the Ukrainian

⁶⁴ Interview with Plachynda, Kiev, 23.5.1994. This issue is also addressed by Dudko in an interview with *NFU* (no. 18/88). The reference to the oak tree was made in *Zelenyi Svit*'s general appeal to Ukrainian workers' collectives: Зелений Світ - Шанс для нашого спільного майбутнього. Трудовому колективу (n.d.).

⁶⁵ Interview with Sviatoslav Dudko in *NFU* no. 18/1988.

Academy of Sciences Conference Hall at vul. Hruzhevskaya 4⁶⁶. One of these projects was eventually acknowledged as a better alternative and rather than building a new bridge, the old one was being improved.

Another issue, which was high up on the priority list of *Zelenyi Svit* was the fate of the Dniepr river. Serhii Plachynda had already for two decades been concerned with the state of the Dniepr river and in November 1987, he published an article on this issue ('Who will become the master of the Dniepr river?'⁶⁷). A number of articles were to follow. Concern was expressed about the fact that the speed of the river flow had decreased by 5-6 times and that all the water reservoirs which had been built on the river were damaging its biological regime⁶⁸. Concern was also voiced over radioactive contamination of Dniepr via the Pripiat river - one of its estuaries - which was severely contaminated by fall-out from the Chernobyl accident and with radioactive contamination of the Kakhovsk water reservoir, which simultaneously served as a drinking source for the local population as well as the cooling pond of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station. An active campaign to prevent pollution of the Dniestr river was also conducted by *Zelenyi Svit*.

A third issue which received much attention from *Zelenyi Svit* was chemical pollution. Like Russia (e.g. Kirishi close to Leningrad), also Ukraine had a vitamin factory whose pollution constituted a direct threat to peoples' health. Further, *Zelenyi Svit* took part in a campaign against the vitamin factory in the Uman district (Cherkassy oblast). Dudko addressed this issue in *NFU* (no. 18/88): 'Uman Vitamin Plant is constantly spewing out pollutants into the environment, thus doing irreparable damage to the 'Sofyivka' forest park preserve'. As the vitamin factory was subordinated to Moscow, Moscow was also involved and it became clear to the Green activists how difficult it was to solve environmental problems in Ukraine against Moscow's will. The efforts of *Zelenyi Svit* were, however, crowned with success: in 1989 the industrial set-up producing nicotinic acid was dismantled and the plant switched to the packing of medicines. Similarly, a factory producing polyurethane in Svalaia (Zakarpattia) was eventually stopped due to pressure from the Greens⁶⁹.

A high-profile campaign was also started to prevent the construction of industrial facilities and the felling of trees in Holosiivskiy forest and in the village of Feofania - both of which were parts of a national park and nature preserve area. The Kiev gorispolkom had issued a resolution forbidding any industrial construction there. Thus, when it became clear that the Soviet Academy of Sciences intended to build an Institute of Chemistry in Feofania, these plans were naturally opposed by Greens and by locals living in the area.

⁶⁶ Interview with Serhii Plachynda, Kiev, 23.5.1994.

⁶⁷ *Кто станет хозяином Днепра?*

⁶⁸ *Правда Украины*, 19.3.1988, с. 3.

⁶⁹ *News from Ukraine*, no. 18, 1988, p. 2.

The Institute of Chemistry would be a very expensive project, the costs of the first stage of which were estimated at some 22 million roubles. When felling of trees started on the building site, the local population started to voice its opposition to the project. Together with the Greens, they organised pickets and a number of public meetings which were attended by USSR People's Deputies and representatives of party organisations and authorities. In July 1989 they succeeded in gaining the attention of Ukrainian radio and some newspapers and the project was eventually cancelled⁷⁰. Demands were made to leave Feofania in peace and for an independent ecological expert assessment to be made of the project.

Zelenyi Svit set up a joint commission with the Ukrainian Writers' Union to look into the issue of chemical giants being built in natural preserves. A meeting on the issue was organised in the Writers' House in Kiev and attended by people from the town of Irpen outside Kiev. Harsh words were used against official authorities for allowing such construction. The poet Mykola Tkach, for instance, stated bluntly that 'the construction of chemical giants in protected areas is a crime against the people!'. Plachynda, who opened the meeting said that the issue had long been ignored by official authorities and that a letter should be formulated by the meeting to Prime Minister Vitalii Masol, bringing to his attention the fact that the ecological situation in the Irpen zone was deteriorating due to a cluster of chemical enterprises spewing out a dangerous cocktail of pollutants. According to the Chief Doctor one chemical enterprise alone emitted some 1,605 tons of harmful substances annually. In the Irpen zone there were close to 30 sanatoriums (rest homes) and 40 pioneer camps. To secure the health of people visiting these facilities as well as the health of local residents, the meeting came out against further construction of chemical enterprises and in favour of installing pollution reducing devices and eventually close existing ones. Some success had already been achieved: one of the departments of the Machine Building Enterprise had already been closed at the request of the Sanitary Inspectorate. But new chemical units were under planning.

An Irpen resident, the translator Dmytro Palavarchuk, voiced the concern of the residents in the following way:

Ж треба винести за межі Ірпеня усі всі хімічно пкідливі
пехи. Ми не враховуємо то, що в Ірпені з'їжджаються зо
всього Радянського Союзу. І всі повинні дихати тою хімією..

Palavarchuk finished off his speech by calling it a crime against people to build chemical enterprises in protected areas. This was greeted with applause by those present. Calls were made

⁷⁰ *Робоча газета*, 4.8.1989 (n.p.).

to establish harmony between Man and Nature, then 'our souls are like the air we breathe'. Moreover, one should return to old popular traditions and ancient knowledge on Man and oneself. It was accepted that modern society cannot get by without scientific achievements, but only in as much as the safety of the people and nature can be guaranteed, taking into consideration the assessment of scientists, ecologists and public opinion. A draft letter to Masol was approved by the meeting⁷¹.

Another industrial project to which *Zelenyi Svit* was opposed, was that of a paint factory, which the Swiss company Sandus wanted to build on the Crimean Peninsula. Dudko provided Hlazovyi with all the information he had and sent him to the Crimea to investigate - in his capacity as a journalist with *Robitnychna hazeta*. A feature story resulted from this visit, which in turn triggered off a story in *Krokodil* - the satirical Soviet biweekly magazine. Various Moscow-based newspapers were also involved. After a month an agreement was reached with the Ministry in charge and Sandus pulled out of the project.

From the very start of its existence, *Zelenyi Svit* got involved with alternative energy in general and with bioenergy in particular. An excursion to a bioenergy facility by the river Desna was organised. The site contained six windstations. In China and Poland bioenergy was widely used, but it never really caught on in Ukraine. Thus, Plachynda amongst others, took an interest in trying to promote the use of bioenergy - with modest results, however. This issue has later been picked up by activists who left *Zelenyi Svit* and set up *ProSvita*, whose leader is currently Serhii Kurykin. This group has bought a farm and is in the process of setting up alternative energy facilities on its premises to demonstrate how to make use of them. A seminar on alternative energy was held with the support of Green groups in Sweden⁷².

Zelenyi Svit also succeeded in having the planned construction of a railroad station in the South of Kiev cancelled. The planned railroad station required the destruction of 250 hectares of forest in the Bykovina region, at a site where thousands of local residents were executed by the NKVD in the 1930s. Protecting the site was thus not only an issue of ecological, but also of historical concern.

The Greens were also involved in a campaign to halt the construction of the planned Danube-Dniepr canal in South Ukraine (see Chapter Six) and early on also got involved with military issues. In the vicinity of Mukachevo in Zakarpattia, a military airport and a radar station (Pristialivsk) caused not only considerable environmental pollution but also inconvenienced locals with noise. The issue was first addressed in the summer of 1989 and a public meeting was

⁷¹ K-3, 23:00, 26.1.1989, transcribed in *Ukraine Today - Ukrainian Media Digest* - compiled by Radio Liberty Monitoring, 27.1.1989, no. U-016, pp. 18-19.

⁷² Interview with Serhii Plachynda in Kiev, 23.5.1994 and information provided by Jan Høystad of the Swedish Campaign against Acid Rain per email.

held on 16 September. On 2 November a picket of the RADAR STATION was attended by 13 people, but soon interrupted by the police and KGB. Shortly after, on 9 November, a similar picket gathered 150 participants and when it was repeated on 16 November more than one thousand people were present. Starting with these pickets emerged a big public protest. One of the initiators, Evheniia Derkach, got in trouble with the authorities due to her campaigning, and was on a number of occasions called in to the procurator's office and the KGB. She was also hassled by the administration where she worked.

As military issues were the prerogative of all-union ministries, Derkach and some 120 other demonstrators went to Moscow in early February 1990 to picket the last meeting of the old Supreme Soviet. The demonstrators demanded that construction of the RADAR STATION be stopped. A local referendum in Zakarpattia supported the claims and together with 42 local activists, Derkach once again went to Moscow to present the result of the referendum to official authorities there. The presence of foreign correspondents prevented her from being arrested and she was eventually seen by the then Minister of Defence, Marshal Iasov. Shortly after, he sent a dispatch to Zakarpattia ordering a halt to construction. However, this dispatch did not solve all the problems surrounding the RADAR STATION. Radioactive grounds from the station still have not been removed and military aircraft is still flying over Mukachevo. Every now and then the issue is brought up with authorities in Kiev - so far without a final decision being made on how to deal with these issues in the future. The issue still serves as an example of how Ukrainian Greens were successful in influencing official authorities, which in turn made decisions in line with demands made by the Greens against environmentally unsound projects⁷³.

Nuclear Power

In December 1987 a round table of writers, academics and scientists took place in Kiev. The round table, entitled 'Scientific-Technological Programmes and Morality', revealed that 90% of Ukrainian territory was unsuitable for nuclear power. At approximately the same time the third bloc at the Chernobyl nuclear power station was restarted and two reactors at Zaporizhzhia and Khmelnytskyi nuclear power stations went into operation again.⁷⁴ The idea that not only Chernobyl nuclear power station but also other such stations were possibly not so safe thus caught hold of the environmentalists and resulted in a campaign against nuclear power in Ukraine which has continued up until the present.

⁷³ For further details, see Derkach' election platform, March 1994.

⁷⁴ *Ukrainian Reporter*, vol. 1, no. 8, April 1991.

The first public meeting to commemorate the Chernobyl accident was arranged in Kiev by the Writers' Union on 26 April 1988⁷⁵. Although information about the meeting was not generally distributed beforehand, several hundred people turned up and the room was overcrowded. The meeting was chaired by Iurii Shcherbak, who shared the platform with Iurii Chernyuchenko, a Moscow writer specialising in environmental and agricultural themes, three officials from the Ukrainian nuclear power industry and some elderly people who had been evacuated from Pripjat following the accident. The meeting opened with a minute of silence in memory of the victims of Chernobyl and a telegram from the Armenian writer Silva Kaputikian expressing solidarity with the Ukrainians was read out to those present.

The meeting addressed not only the technical aspects of the accident at Chernobyl, but also made references to its political aspects. For instance, Chernyuchenko is quoted as saying that 'here in the heart of Salvador, two years before the millennium of Christianity, the Chernobyl disaster showed clearly the evils of bureaucratism, Stalinism, totalitarianism, call it what you will. The crowds parading in Kiev on 1 May that year had no idea of the danger threatening them from the air, because the bureaucrats deliberately kept them in the dark (loud applause from the audience). This is no less terrible than the H-bomb in the hands of the imperialists. Indeed, we continued to manufacture and deploy medium-range nuclear missiles even while the British workers were demonstrating against Cruise and Pershing (again applause). So glasnost and democracy are vital to our very survival as the human race'⁷⁶.

The audience was able to ask questions to the representatives of the nuclear industry, and although mostly polite, those attending the meeting were sceptical of what they were told. The officials were asked questions about radioactive dust, the topsoil and the state of the rivers. Iurii Andreev, when asked about the advisability of siting the Chernobyl nuclear power station so close to the river Dnepr and within such a short distance of Kiev, admitted that it was not a sensible location, the planners had made a mistake at the expense of gaining access to cheap cooling water for the reactors. Still, nuclear power was essential to the USSR and the problem could not be solved at the level of Ukraine alone, but only at an all-union level. At this time everyone was talking and shouting. Shcherbak pointed out that the Ukrainian Writers' Union had organised a campaign on this issue and had obtained the cancellation of the planned Chyhyryn nuclear power station. Further results could be achieved through energy saving.

The evacuees told their stories to the meeting and complaints were made about evacuation being delayed for up to a week after the accident. A young woman claimed that she and her

⁷⁵ Geoffrey Hosking from SSEES attended this meeting, and his written account of the event ('Glasnost in Kiev') is used as a reference with regard to this meeting.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

friends had tried to organise a reunion of Chernobyl victims on October Revolution Square in Kiev on the first anniversary of the accident, but were prevented in doing so by the KGB, which warned that there may be a provocation from the West. This year they were not forbidden to assemble, but it proved impossible to gain access to the Square as it was cordoned off by police and occupied by a May Day rehearsal. However, an unsanctioned demonstration did take place earlier that day. Oles Shevchenko - a member of the Culturological Club and of the Helsinki Union at the time - gave an account of this demonstration in an interview with David Marples in December 1988⁷⁷. Members of the Culturological Club and of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union carried banners about ecology and demanding a nuclear-free Ukraine at the demonstration. Police used force to break it up and some 50 protesters were detained. Shevchenko himself, received a 15 day prison sentence. This incidence thus clearly demonstrates that there were limits to what kind of activities official authorities were willing to tolerate. The woman who provided this information to the meeting urged the writers - referring to them as the 'conscience of the people' - to help those detained. Her request met with a mixed response by the audience whereupon Shcherbak moved on to the next topic on the agenda.

Finally, Iurii Samiilenko had to answer questions about the sarcophagus erected onto the damaged reactor at Chernobyl. His claims to the effect that water could not penetrate this sarcophagus for 300,000 years were met with disbelief and roars of laughter by those present at the meeting. The idea that any question regarding nuclear power should be decided by the public through referendum was put forward by Kovalenko, Borys Oliynyk read a poem and after that the meeting came to an end without a final speech or a resolution. Hosking found the meeting somewhat disorganised; it did, however, represent a beginning to something that would soon become a normal event in Kiev and elsewhere in Ukraine: public meetings on issues not only concerning the environment but also human rights and Ukraine's status in the Soviet Union, to mention but a few.

The first (officially sanctioned) public meeting arranged by *Zelenyi Svit* in Kiev took place on 5 June 1988 - on 'Environmental Protection Day' as declared by *Zelenyi Svit* - on 29 March. This was a tactical move: it would be difficult to justify denying the Greens the opportunity to stage a public meeting on a day dedicated to environmental protection. Local authorities did, however, make two demands in connection with the meeting: firstly, it would have to be a precondition that *UTOP* be allowed to participate. Secondly, a list of the topics intended to be covered had to be produced as well as the names of those who would address the meeting. Dudko said anyone who wanted to join the meeting was welcome to do so. He also produced the list requested by the

⁷⁷ David Marples (RLPRD), 'USSR - A Visit to the Soviet Union: Part II. Some Interviews', Munich, 20.12.1988, F-566.

gorispolkom. Shortly afterwards, he was called to a meeting with the leader of gorispolkom, Zgurtsev, and several other representatives. They all objected to the last issue on the agenda: alternatives to nuclear power. Several expert-members of *Zelenyi Svit* had worked on a statement and it had been agreed beforehand that Anatoliy Panov would read this statement during the meeting. Gorispolkom made the meeting conditional upon this statement being scrapped. In 'return' *Zelenyi Svit* was promised publicity in the newspapers. Gorispolkom also decided the place for the meeting - the Arch memorial for the Russian-Ukrainian pact of 1654, off Khreshchatyk. This was acceptable to Dudko as the meeting took place during the week-end - at a time when there would normally be quite a few people there.

The meeting, which was led by Dudko and attended by some 5-6,000 people, thus took place. The idea was that the whole initiative group would be present to represent *Zelenyi Svit*, but according to Dudko, several failed to show up. Many were, as acknowledged by Panov, frightened. Amongst the issues addressed were melioration and the need to protect forests from destruction⁷⁸. Towards the end of the meeting, Dudko took the opportunity to say a few words about *Zelenyi Svit*, mentioning that the association had elaborated its own programme on nuclear power, whereupon he stepped away from the microphone. People then demanded that this programme be read and eventually this was done - by Dudko. After this incident Dudko was again called in to the gorispolkom. He was accused of having broken his promise and told that if *Zelenyi Svit* later asked permission to stage a meeting, this would be turned down. Dudko had, however, never given a written promise and the newspapers all the same never printed any information about the meeting before it actually took place. Members of *Zelenyi Svit* themselves put up notes on news boards and lamp posts. Information was also spread by word.

On 13 November 1988 *Zelenyi Svit* activists - together with the cultural group *Spadshchyna* (Heritage), *Hromada*, and the independent ecological association *Noosfera* - organised the biggest and first publicised political meeting in Kiev so far. Estimates as to how many people attended the meeting at the Republican Stadium vary, from 40,000 to 10,000 (more conservative ones). Addressing the meeting were writers like Iurii Shcherbak, Volodymyr Iavorivskii and Dmytro Pavlychko as well as Oles Shevchenko and Ivan Makar - a poet from Lviv - representing the Ukrainian Helsinki Union. The Green Movements of Latvia and Lithuania were also represented, as was the poet Rostyslav Bratun from *Tovarystva Leva* (Lviv) and the Russian Academician Fadei Shipunov. The meeting was permitted on the condition that it address only ecological issues. However, the meeting represented, as noted by David Marples, one of the first occasions when transition from ecology to politics took place. It became the first significant set toward

⁷⁸ Interview with Serhii Plachynda, Kiev, 23.5.1994.

strengthening the Popular Movement to Support Perestroika (RUKH) - which eventually entered the Ukrainian political scene in 1989⁷⁹.

A detailed account based on a tape of the demonstration provided by a Canadian student, Chrystina Freeland, has been given in David Marples' book Ukraine under Perestroika. Ecology, Economics and the Workers' Revolt⁸⁰. Readers who would like a more detailed account of the demonstration are referred to this book. Considerable attention was given to Chernobyl and to nuclear power by those present at the meeting and below I will briefly summarise those demands that were made and the new information about Ukrainian nuclear power provided by those present. Dmytro Pavlychko, for instance, demanded a stop to construction work at Chyhyryn nuclear power station, whereas Shcherbak provided new information on Chernobyl. Academician Shipunov in his capacity as Head of a Laboratory at the Scientific Council on Questions of the Biosphere with the USSR Academy of Sciences in Moscow bluntly voiced serious criticism of the Soviet nuclear power programme, arguing that Ukraine was on the way to an ecological catastrophe. Soviet nuclear power stations, he argued, were emitting some 350% more tritium into the atmosphere than was the case elsewhere. Dams that had been constructed on the Volga and Dniepr rivers were causing environmental damage estimated at some 25 billion roubles annually. The atmosphere over Kiev was described as 'dead' and a dangerous reduction in ozone levels had been detected by space craft over a number of Ukrainian cities. Finally, Shipunov called for extensive agricultural reform, encouraging an extensive overhaul of the existing ministerial structure and a shift from co-operative to family-based farming of the land. Rostyslav Bratun, chairman of the Lviv branch of *Zelenyi Svit* criticised the construction of the Rivne nuclear power station on karst ground and also expressed concern about the construction of chemical enterprises in Drohobych, Ivano-Frankivsk and Kalush. Bratun demanded that the people be allowed to voice their opinion and that decisions be made bearing in mind local opinion.

As had been the case at the 5 June meeting, official representatives also attended this meeting. Following a series of public speeches critical of Soviet environmental policies generally and their impact on Ukraine in particular, a representative of *Derzhkompriroda* addressed the meeting. It was acknowledged that the state of the environment in Ukraine was complex, but, said the speaker, some improvements had been made. Water pollution had been reduced considerably over the last two years and measures were being taken to improve water quality in the basins of the Black and Azov seas. What was more, local and regional branches of *Derzhkompriroda* were in the process of being set up and these would help cut pollution further.

⁷⁹ Marples (1991), pp. 138-44.

⁸⁰ For a detailed account of the demonstration, see *ibid.*, pp. 138-144.

This speech was followed by a new round of highly critical speeches. Iurii Vysotskii of the Cherkasy *Ekolohiia* society, for instance, addressed construction of the Chyhyryn nuclear power station and other environmental problems in the region. S. Dorohuntsov, Chairman of the Council for the Study of the Productive Forces of Ukraine, brought it to the attention of those present that although the Chyhyryn nuclear power station would apparently not be built, the construction workers have not been ordered to halt construction. Dorohuntsov also used the opportunity to criticise construction projects such as the Dniepr-Bug estuary and expansion-schemes for chemical industries in Ukraine (see above). Most of the other speeches focused on nuclear power.

The meeting, which was scheduled to last for some four hours, came to an abrupt end when Ivan Makar, a representative of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union was to give a speech. Makar had just recently been released from prison, where he had been for attending a demonstration in early August, and as soon as he started his speech the microphone was switched off by security officials. Rather than stop talking, however, Makar shouted out his speech. In his view, ecology should be closer linked to socio-political issues, one of which was sovereignty and the right to secede from the Soviet Union. Makar encouraged the emergence of a popular front to work closely with similar fronts in the Baltic States. Only then would public demonstrations and meetings have an effect on First Secretary of the CPU, Volodymyr Shcherbitskii and on the Minister of Health, Anatolii Romanenko.

A series of resolutions were endorsed by the meeting and later cited in *Robitnycha hazeta*. These came to form the basis of a petition that was eventually passed on to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. It was pointed out that the ecological situation not only in Ukraine, but also elsewhere was serious and needed to be addressed seriously. Still the full picture was not known about Chernobyl and Ukrainian official authorities were still clinging to the 'myth' that no alternatives existed to nuclear power. The meeting demanded that construction of nuclear reactors at the Crimean and Chyhyryn nuclear power stations be stopped. Similarly, expansion of existing nuclear power stations should be halted and the Chernobyl nuclear power station be closed down immediately. Existing nuclear reactors should be properly examined so as to establish whether or not they complied with international safety standards. Similarly, other industrial complexes that were harmful to the environment should be closed down and further construction be stopped. More specific demands were made with regard to the South Ukraine Energy complex (SU EK): the meeting demanded that no further construction be undertaken prior to the assessment of the project by an ecological expert committee. As for ecological glasnost, the meeting demanded that ecological information be made available without any restrictions. The meeting also called for public opinion to be taken into consideration when deciding the fate of projects potentially harmful to the environment - in the form of referenda. Finally, more politicised demands were

made in that the petition claimed that the party apparatus in Ukraine did not represent the interests of the Ukrainian people and had thoughtlessly exploited natural resources.

What then was the significance of this November 1988 meeting? As pointed out by David Marples, the meeting brought together people from different parts of Ukraine with different political views in opposition to industrial/energy projects harmful to the local environment of which central ministries in Kiev and Moscow were in charge: 'it had become evident that in making plans for the expansion of industry in Ukraine, the authorities had spared no zone, no city in considerations of nature protection or historical preservation. Moreover, it was also clear that in many cases the local party and government associations concurred with the public's anxieties over the environment: at the least, they declared this to be the case. The result was a gathering of local forces in open opposition to centrally based ministries that were more concerned about fulfilling plans'.⁸¹

One of the first actions to gather information on the situation in areas affected by fall-out from the Chernobyl accident, was undertaken by *Zelenyi Svit* activists in early 1989. As pointed out above, H. Shkliarevskii went to Narodichi and shot a documentary following rumours of ill children and deformed animals that started circulating in Kiev during the autumn of 1989. The documentary, which was given the title '*Mi-kro-fon*' (fon in Russian is the term used to describe background radiation levels), was shown in private screenings to *Zelenyi Svit* activists working at the Institute of Nuclear Research in Kiev. They then went to Narodichi with their own dosimeters and measured radiation levels in seven villages that had not yet been evacuated. Their readings showed levels far exceeding the safety limits.

The information about Narodichi caused a public outcry and official authorities were forced to act on public pressure. Following Narodichi the silence on Chernobyl was once and for all broken. This issue surfaced at the same time as the anti-nuclear campaign took on in other parts of Ukraine and transformed *Zelenyi Svit* into a broad anti-nuclear mass movement.

Chyhyryn Nuclear Power Station

One of the first issues with which *Zelenyi Svit* got involved, was the construction of the Chyhyryn nuclear power station⁸². The first opposition to the construction of the Chyhyryn nuclear power

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

⁸² Construction at Rivne started in 1971. Originally plans were made to build the largest regional electric power station (ДРЕС - державна районна електростанція) in Europe - to operate on liquid fuel. However, as there was a lack of such fuel, it was later decided that the power station operate on solid fuel. As such fuel was also insufficient, it was eventually decided to turn the power station into a nuclear power station. As work went on for such a long time, enormous costs were incalculated.

station emerged in the summer of 1987. On 6 August a letter written by several writers from Cherkassy entitled 'Tryvohy Chyhyryna' appeared in *Literaturna Ukraina*⁸³. The writers expressed concern not only with the possible dangers associated with the nuclear power station, but also with the fate of Chyhyryn, which carried historical significance to Ukraine:

Це ще й десятки гектарів невикористаних родючих земель, заведбані сади, ставки, багатющі запаси мінеральних вод, майбутні бальнеологічні курорти й санаторії типу Миргородського і Трускавецького (власне, під самого АЕС).

People must be given control with their own fate and the fate of their land, argued the writers. Besides, Chyhyryn also held historical significance for the Ukrainians. They were supported by scientists, in favouring the discontinuation of construction of the nuclear power station for technical/geological reasons. Amongst the signatories of the letter (total of 11) were three people's deputies⁸⁴

Розуміючи свою відповідальність за результати діяльності трудових колективів на території нашого району, ми, депутати місцевих Рад народних депутатів, не маємо можливості внести радикальні зміни щодо будівництва цього об'єкта атомної енергетики. Вважаємо, що в умовах перебудови, демократії і гласності така невизначеність у будівництві Чигиринської АЕС далі тривати не повинна. Тому просимо врахувати нашу думку і дати конкретні відповіді на запитання: хто і яку поніс відповідальність за помилки при проектуванні електростанцій у Чигирині за змарновані в результаті цього мільони карбованців народних коштів?

In May 1988, *Literaturna Ukraina* published a series of public responses to this letter. As will be seen below, arguments against completing construction at Chyhyryn could be put into three groups: firstly, argued the opponents, the project was ecologically dangerous, as cooling water for the nuclear reactors would have to be provided from the Dniepr river, which was already drawn on to capacity. Secondly, construction had started without necessary inspection and without contacting local residents and finally, the location chosen for the nuclear power station was a well-known historical landmark, being the headquarters of the former Hetman state.

Shortly after the founding of *Zelenyj Svit*, Anatolyi Panov managed to get hold of a small bus and it was arranged that a journalist and a photographer accompany a group of Kiev activists to Chyhyryn to gather more information on the issue. Once again, however, people were scared and

⁸³ *Літературна Україна*, 6.8.1987 (n.p.).

⁸⁴ These deputies were I. Briukhovetskyi (deputy of the regional council), I. Kryvenko (deputy of *Verkhovna Rada*) and I. Zakharchenko (deputy of the village council).

in the end Dudko ended up travelling to Chyhyryn alone together with the journalist and the photographer. The group - although much smaller than expected - was well received (meetings with the leadership of the nuclear power station had been arranged beforehand), but all the time kept under observation to prevent it from contacting people. Various cultural arrangements were proposed to the group, as were drinks, coffee and tea. One morning, however, the three activists got up at the break of dawn and went to the construction site unaccompanied. Since those in charge of construction knew about the presence of the group, it was allowed in. The workers, most of whom had been brought in from Russia, were ready to lynch the activists, because if they had their way the construction workers would be made redundant. The leadership of the construction team did not know how to handle the situation as it was not prepared for such a confrontation.

Local residents, with whom the Greens succeeded in making contact, were more forthcoming. Only few years earlier, during construction of the Kakhovsk water reservoir on the Dniepr river they had been forced to abandon their homes and now it seemed likely to happen again. Moreover, compensation offered to them for the loss of their homes was set ridiculously low. Thus they welcomed opposition to the nuclear power station and asked the Greens to help them⁸⁵. Back in Kiev, Dudko initiated yet another alternative independent expert assessment as had been done of the planned bridge over the Dniepr river to the island of Khortytsa. As a result, a second official expert assessment took place a month later. The official assessment concluded that the project should be abandoned altogether.

Meanwhile, in Cherkassy, members of the local green group *Ekolohiia*, headed by Iurii Vysochyn, gathered 7,500 signatures in support of a telegram addressed to the USSR Supreme Soviet, expressing broad concern regarding the construction of the Chyhyryn nuclear power station. The text was composed at a big public meeting on ecology. A month later, in April 1988, the Greens received an answer - from USSR *Minatomenergo*, which was considered deeply disappointing. Apart from being vague, the letter made it clear that it was not up to the public to decide questions of state significance. Moreover, said the writer of the letter, Iurii Ignatenko, at present there was no reason to reconsider the decision on the construction of the Chyhyryn nuclear power station. However, argued Viktor Hrabovskyi, *Literaturna Ukraina's* correspondent who reported the case, after the 19th Party Conference people thought that they had the right to decide questions of state significance when such decisions affected their lives. Moreover, radio, TV and the Ukrainian press talked about the possibility of halting construction⁸⁶.

⁸⁵ Interview with Sviatoslav Dudko, 14.5.1994.

⁸⁶ *Літературна Україна*, 18.8.1988, с. 1,3.

In the spring and summer of 1988, Ukrainian newspapers published numerous letters and public complaints about the project. *Literaturna Ukraina*, for instance, reported that the public response to the appeal by Ukrainian writers to discontinue construction at Chyhyryn had been overwhelming: people made phone calls, wrote letters and stopped by at the redaction. These people were not only Ukrainians, but also people living in other republics. A major point of concern amongst the general public, was the historical significance of Chyhyryn, not only for Ukraine, but also for the USSR: eight writers from Lviv, for instance argued that Chyhyryn was one of the most sacred historical landmarks of Ukraine and should therefore be protected:

Самі слова Чигирин, Суботів, Холодний Яр, які приходять до кожної людини в юності з рядками Т.Г. Шевченка, символізують найважливіше в нашій історичній пам'яті. І не тільки для українців. Чигиринська земля є джерелом патхвення постійних роздумів про долю братерства українського, російського та білоруського народів.

Similar views were expressed by five readers from Kirovohradshchyna, M. Sukhov, P. Fedorov, V. Makarenko, M. Surozhok and O. Dofya:

Хто ж це додумався серед квітучого саду, в самому епіцентрі народної пам'яті будувати атомну електростанцію? Хіба ж Дніпро розрахований на таку силу атомних та інших станцій?!

A biologist, I. Cherniavenko, produced a letter signed by 97 people in support of discontinuing construction at Chyhyryn. Children from the 13th middle school in Rivne oblast gathered signatures against further construction. One doctor V. Ostapchuk attacked the bureaucracy, arguing that as long as nobody was responsible for anything, nothing would change. The deputy leader of *Derzhplan*, V. Nikitenko, revealed that Ukrainian institutions were opposed to the project when it was elaborated:

Проект будівництва Чигиринської АЕС, виконаний Київським відділенням інституту "Атоменергопроект" на основі пилі діючого уніфікованого проекту, розглядався торік усіма зацікавленими організаціями республіки і з більшістю їх не узгоджений. Цікаво, що основним мотивом відмови стала відсутність у проекті "детальної балансової розробки питань водоспоживання з р. Дніпро, що є основною питною артерією республіки, впливу АЕС на екологічну обстановку регіону й інших факторів".

He announced that the project was currently being reworked, in connection with a resolution by all-union directive bodies and existing rules and norms recommended by the IAEA. New

elaborations made based on the analysis of the Chernobyl accident were also taken into account, as was a resolution (No 533) passed by the USSR Council of Ministers on 26 May 1987⁸⁷. Also *Literaturna Ukraina* came out against further construction.

Some months after the letter of the Cherkassy writers (August 1987), Ukrainian TV broadcast a program called 'Hrani Piznannia'. The programme was attended by well-known Ukrainian scientists and then vice-president of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, V. Kukhar. The latter voiced the view that the Chyhyryn nuclear power station should and would not be completed on the following grounds:

Про зведення Чигиринської АЕС сьогодні питання взагалі не стоїть. За два тижні опісля на запитання "Актуальної Камери" - заступник Міністра Атомної Енергетики СРСР, О.Л. Лапшин, враховуючи, що республіка (саме так і сказав - "республіка") вийшла з пропозицією припинити будівництво Чигиринської атомної, мінатоменерго розглядає ймовірність розташування чигиринських потужностей на інших атомних станціях на Україні.

Other programmes were also broadcast - like 'Chyhyryn nuclear power station - for and against' (Chyhyrynska AES - za i proti). Altogether there were three such programmes and they were all sceptical to further construction of the nuclear power station. In addition, numerous publications appeared in the press. They were accompanied by public activity and by a campaign conducted by *Zelenyj Svit*. Thus, public opinion came down firmly against the Chyhyryn nuclear power station - a view which was shared by the Ukrainian scientific community.

Throughout 1988 and 1989, opposition towards the Chyhyryn nuclear power station continued to appear on the pages of the Ukrainian press. Local residents from Lutsk in Volynia oblast, expressed anger against building a nuclear power station in Chyhyryn - 'the heart of Ukraine, one of the pearl of our history. To build a nuclear power station in this place is, in our view, pure vandalism'⁸⁸. Allures to the greatness of Chyhyryn in the past were made again in *Literaturna Ukraina* in an article covering the visit of the Russian writer, Viktor Astafev to Chyhyryn: Poruch, where the nuclear power station was being built, was a memorial to the renown warrior Ivan Rzhevskii, colonel Iakov Korobtsy and other 'Orthodox god-loving warriors', who were caught in battle defending Chyhyryn in 1678 when it came under attack from a 120,000 strong Turkish-tartar horde. Moreover, overlooking Chyhyryn was Bohdanova hora, with a memorial to Bohdan Khmelnytskyi. After construction started, the landscape was being destroyed:

⁸⁷ Про посилення ролі експертизи проєктів на будівництво крупних народногосподарських об'єктів з метою попередження негативних екологічних наслідків.

⁸⁸ *Радянська Україна*, 27.9.1989 (п.р.).

Ця земля - не стартовий майданчик. Це і колиска, і життя, і здоров'я дитяче. Це слава дідовська, це все майбутнє їхнього роду і народу. Як же можна винити його своїми руками?!

People were told about the blessings of the nuclear power station, but, argued the author:

Не треба благ! Треба життя, здоров'я фізичного і духовного. На адресу провідних письменників пішли листи з Дніпрових берегів: сім тисяч громадян підписали лист на XIX партконференцію, який і доставив за адресою її делегат Борис Олійник. З трибуни ленінградської Восвітньої конференції про чигиринський синдром говорив Олександр Гомар.

Concern was also expressed with the possible implications the nuclear power station would have on public health. The general ecological situation in Cherkassy was bad due to several chemical enterprises. Besides, the drinking water was already polluted. It was feared that the nuclear power station would further raise levels of pollution in the area. Besides, it was likely to harm the environment close to the site. The site, by the way, was situated in a local nature preserve where construction of any enterprise was banned in the first place.

More technical/scientific evidence against continuing construction at Chyhyryn also surfaced: an article in *Radianska Ukraina*⁸⁹, for instance, pointed out that once completed, the reactors of Chyhyryn nuclear power stations would operate below the level of the Kremenchuk water reservoir. In other words if the water reservoir for some reason burst its banks, the nuclear power station would be flooded. Moreover, the reactors were being built on unstable sand ground. Although this was not karst, as was the case on the site of the Rivne nuclear power station, it could still cause sliding of the ground below the reactors.

The Greens, for their part, published a six point appeal in *Vechirnyi Kyiv* on 26 December 1988, arguing for the abandoning of three nuclear power stations; the Crimean and Chyhyryn stations, and also the South Ukraine Energy Complex. More specifically, on the Chyhyryn nuclear power station, the association called for an immediate stop in construction pending the judgement of independent experts.

Due to pressure from the public and resistance to the project from the Ukrainian scientific community, construction at Chyhyryn was temporarily halted while the project was being re-examined based on stricter rules for the construction and location of nuclear power stations that had emerged in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident. There were, however, reports from Cherkasschyna that construction continued at full speed. This was confirmed by M. Bilokur,

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

deputy in charge of the construction workers. He said that 'already for two years now we are building the nuclear power station, but we do not know what will come out of it'⁹⁰.

Not everybody was against continuing construction, though. The general director of the nuclear power station V. Sapronov, and its leadership generally, favoured further construction on the grounds that so much money had already been spent on the site that there was no way back: the only way to write off 95 million rubles that had been spent at the construction site since 1 January 1988 was to complete construction⁹¹. With regard to reports that construction was continuing, he argued that equipment work of the nuclear power station itself was being stopped, but that a factory to make installations for the nuclear power industry was being set up. This information did not go well down with greens and others opposed to the nuclear power station: the opponents argued that every nuclear power station had its own factory to provide installations. Consequently there was no need for the factory that was being built at the Chyhyryn site. A driver, living seven km away from the site of the nuclear power station, when asked by Astafev what was his attitude towards the station, argued that he did not really care as it was not being built in his area. But, as Astafev replied, it is not a question of kilometres should an accident take place. It would affect everyone - not only in Ukraine but also elsewhere.

First Secretary of the party raikom, V. Bratik, expressed the view of the local party organisation, arguing that the primary issue of concern was not so much with whether or not the nuclear power station would be built but more with the future of Chyhyryn. If the nuclear power station was eventually abandoned, then *Minenergo* should set up some alternative enterprise/facility:

І що б там не було - чи буде атомна станція, чи якась інше підприємство міністерства енергетики, все одню питання вже вирішене...Ми біді не бачимо - чи буде атомна станція, чи не буде. Ми бачимо, що перспектива за Чигирином, за його розвитком...А що тут буде прив'язано, які об'єкти, нас це сьогодні навіть і не турбує.

First secretary of Cherkassy party obkom, Oleksandr Ruzhitskyi, shortly after informed that there had been no resolution to halt construction of the Chyhyryn nuclear power station.

In the meantime the Ministry of Energy continued its assessment of the original nuclear power station project. Eventually it was proposed that a thermal electrical station replace the nuclear power station. This suggestion was well received by local authorities. In a letter to CPU

⁹⁰ *Література України*, 19.5.1988, с. 7.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

General Secretary, Shcherbitskii, Ruzhitskyi and the leader of the oblast soviet executive committee, V. Shapoval, expressed the following view:

Общественностью все острее ставится вопрос о прекращении строительства АЭС и размещении на строительной площадке безопасных в экологическом отношении предприятий.

Обком партии и облисполком в целом положительно относятся к предложениям Минэнерго СССР, и Минатомэнерго УССР о строительстве на существующей площадке теплоэлектростанции на базе парогазовых установок (ПГУ), тепличного комплекса и ряда экологически чистых производств, связанных главным образом с выпуском товаров народного потребления⁹².

Ruzhitskyi and Shapoval requested that their view be taken into consideration when deciding the future use of the site. Their suggestion would, they argued, improve supplies of electric power in Central Ukraine as well as make more efficient use of the construction workers provided by USSR *Minatomenergo* as they could switch from building the nuclear power station to building the gas station, housing, a proper infrastructure, various enterprises planned for construction. Moreover, their suggestion would provide proper heating of houses in surrounding villages as well as secure measures initiated by the Ukrainian government to protect and develop nature preserves on the territory of the Chyhyryn region.

A hand-written note attached to the letter, and written by Volodymyr Shcherbitskii on 17 May 1989 to B. Kachura of the Ukrainian Central Committee, supports the propositions made by Ruzhitskyi and Shapoval: 'I think it makes sense to follow this suggestion. Talk it over with comrade V.D. Hladush and V.O. Masol'⁹³. Shortly after, on 19 May 1989, the USSR Council of Ministers passed a resolution permanently abandoning the Chyhyryn nuclear power station and converting it into an 'ecologically clean enterprise'⁹⁴.

Although the outcome of the campaign to stop construction of the nuclear power station at Chyhyryn ended positively from the point of view of the Greens and others who shared their concern, there was still something to be said about the autonomy of all-union ministries and departments that made decisions ignoring what would be in the best interests of those who would be affected by these decisions. Borys Oliinyk, addressing the first USSR Congress of People's Deputies on 25 May 1989 thus made a fierce attack on Soviet bureaucracy generally and its decisions with regard to nuclear power in Ukraine in particular:

⁹² Letter No. 124/2, of 12.5.1989 in фонд No. 1, опис No. 32, стр. No. 233, арх. 20,21.

⁹³ К документу No. 964/140, in фонд No. 1, опис No. 32, стр. No. 233, арх. 18.

⁹⁴ Радянська Україна, 24.5.1989 (n.p.).

В прямой связи с укреплением суверенитета республик - проблемы сохранения среды обитания, защита ее от нашествия центральных ведомств, которые безнаказанно внедряют АЭС, химические монстры, всевозможные каналы, где им издается. А поскольку свои "кукушкины дары" ведомства, как правило, подбрасывают в обжитые места, очеловеченные культурно-исторические центры, как-то: Киев, Чигирин, Капел, Запорожье, Ровно, Хмельницкий, поскольку эти мины подсовывались не только под национальные союзы, но и под всю республику, борьба против появившихся промышленных захватчиков выходит уже на первый план. И вправду, еще один-два Чернобыля, не приведи господи, и уже не с кем и некому будет сражаться ни за язык, ни за культуру вообще⁹⁵.

However, he proceeded, the first victory over this seemingly uncontrollable bureaucracy had already been won. The decision to stop construction of the Chyhyryn nuclear power station was a prime example. A similar decision ought, however, to be made also with regard to the nuclear power station on the Crimea, because not anywhere else in the world were nuclear power stations being built in an area that was so potentially dangerous due to several geophysical conditions (see Chapter Six).

Oliinyk's views were very much shared by Valentina Shevchenko, chairman of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. Members of *Zelenyj Svit* accused her of hiding information in the immediate aftermath of the Chernobyl accident. Her address to the Congress of People's Deputies, though, was very much in line with CPU's general attitude towards expanding nuclear power in Ukraine at the time (I will return to the CPU and nuclear power in more detail in Chapter Six). Almost one third of the Soviet nuclear power industry was located on Ukrainian territory as were a considerable part of the country's metallurgical and chemical enterprises - despite of Ukraine being one of the most fertile areas in the USSR, accounting for roughly a quarter of its agricultural produce. Her attitude towards 'Moscow', however, was less confrontational than that of Oliinyk:

Нало сказать, что союзное правительство во многом пошло республике навстречу. По настоятельным нашим просьбам приняты решения о консервации строительства Одесской и Харьковской АТЭС. Прекращено сооружение новых энергоблогов на Чернобыльской станции и Чигиринской АЭС, проведена экологическая экспертиза Южно-Украинского энергокомплекса и рассматривается вопрос его дальнейшего развития.

⁹⁵ Первый съезд народных депутатов СССР, 25 мая - 9 июня 1989 г., stenographic report, том II (Москва: издание Верховного Совета СССР, 1990 г.), с. 37. Borys Oliinik was elected from the CPSU list. He is a poet and at the time secretary of the board of the Ukrainian Writers' Union.

This, however, did not mean that everything was fine and well: decisions to stop construction of the Crimean nuclear power station and of new reactors at the Khmelnytskyi and Rivne nuclear power stations were dragging out in time. This, argued Shevchenko, agitated the public and had brought about a tense political climate in the republic. With regard to nuclear power there was obviously a need for it also in the future. However, no further expansion was admissible on Ukrainian territory due to a number of objective factors that had so far not been taken adequately into consideration:

Мы понимаем, что без атомных электростанций и предприятий тяжелой промышленности не обойтись, но и развивать их дальше у нас некуда. Не хватает ни водных, ни трудовых ресурсов, накалена до предела экологическая обстановка.

To compensate, new technologies that would not only be energy-saving, but also less harmful to the environment should be implemented⁹⁶.

Yet another deputy of the Congress of People's Deputies and later also of the USSR Supreme Soviet, V. Romanenko - director of the Institute of Hydrobiology of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences - brought up technical evidence to prove that the decision to abandon construction at Chyhyryn was correct:

...Площадка Чигиринской атомной электростанции, а ее предполагалось строить у Кременчугского водохранилища, ни по экологическим, ни по экономическим показателям не подходит. Почему? Потому, что Кременчугское водохранилище - это водораспределительное водохранилище. Из него питается водой 30 миллионов человек и промышленность⁹⁷.

The Greens were thus able to mobilise support against the construction of the Chyhyryn nuclear power station not only from experts, but also within CPU circles. Their arguments in turn made the CPSU abandon plans to build a nuclear power station in Chyhyryn.

⁹⁶ Первый съезд народных депутатов СССР, 12-24 декабря 1989 г., stenographic report, vol. VI (Moscow: edition of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 1990 g.), p. 449. Shevchenko's speech was not presented to the Congress, but handed over to the Secretariat of the Congress for publication.

⁹⁷ Первая сессия Верховного Совета СССР, stenographic report, part III, 13-17 июня 1989 г. (Moscow: edition of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 1990 g.), p. 178.

Chernobyl

As for Chernobyl, *Zelenyi Svit* undertook several campaigns and actions against this nuclear power station both before and after the association's First Congress⁹⁸. To give but a few examples, vitamins obtained from charities abroad were distributed to those areas most affected by Chernobyl by *Zelenyi Svit* activists. What was more, Greenpeace in Germany gave a tox-rad lab to *Zelenyi Svit* to enable the association to conduct alternative analysis of the soil and the water in areas affected by radiation. This lab was run by Volodymyr Tykhyi, a radiobiologist by profession. An organisation to help victims of the Chernobyl accident, *Vriatuvannia*, was established as a collective member of *Zelenyi Svit*. This organisation is currently headed by Evhen Korbetskyi, himself a nuclear physicist. Another organisation, *MAMA-86*, consisting primarily of mothers whose children were born after the Chernobyl accident, was also set up within the framework of *Zelenyi Svit* to send children affected by radiation on holidays to places free from radiation.

3.2.3 Further Organisational Developments

On 7 January 1989, the first annual meeting of *Zelenyi Svit* took place in Kiev. At this meeting Iurii Shcherbak was elected new leader of the association and a co-ordinating committee consisting of some 14-15 members was set up. *Zelenyi Svit* opened its own bank account and was generally made more mobile. Plachynda, explaining his reason for leaving *Zelenyi Svit*, argued that 'people with personal interests and a cosmopolitan outlook had joined the movement. These people were young and wanted some benefits. They asked me to send them to Poland and to London to attend a symposium. I told them I would not let them go. We had enough problems to solve within Ukraine's own borders and I held the view that we should spend our financial means and our energy on this - not on trips to foreign countries. Therefore, we gave priority to expeditions'⁹⁹. He maintained that he was not opposed to Western Green groups as such: *Zelenyi Svit* received journals and visits from Western Europe and he was not against learning from their experiences. However, money was scarce and therefore foreign trips could not be justified.

⁹⁸ Above I have given some attention to Chernobyl and its significance in relation to the Green Movement. I will, however, not go into the long and complex discussion surrounding this issue for two reasons: Firstly, it is impossible to address this issue properly on just a few pages. Secondly, there is a substantial literature on Chernobyl, whereas information about other anti-nuclear campaigns is much more sparse. I have given some attention to the nuclear power station at Chyhyryn as this was one of the very first campaigns initiated by the Greens and thus important in organisational terms. For a detailed account of one particular campaign, see Chapters Six and Seven.

⁹⁹ Interview with Serhii Plachynda, Kiev, 23.5.1994.

Plachynda's opposition to travelling abroad was linked to a broader debate within *Zelenyi Svit* as to where its priorities should lie and what exactly should be the relationship to Green groups and organisations in the West. It would eventually turn into a debate on equipment and hard currency and end in bitter personal conflicts - a situation which reached a peak at *Zelenyi Svit*'s second Congress, which took place in Ivano-Frankivsk in late March 1990. I will return to this issue below, suffice it here to say that this issue, possibly even more than other factors such as a general depolitisation of the Ukrainian public, a drop in support due to the deteriorating economic situation in Ukraine has been the most damaging cause of dispute within the Green Movement itself.

Plachynda's exit from *Zelenyi Svit* also facilitated a broader exodus of people who held more radical views on the national issue. Plachynda is known for his radical views, and in an interview with the author complained that during Shcherbak's leadership of *Zelenyi Svit* links were made with commercial structures to channel funds to the association. This, he said, could be explained by the fact that Shcherbak was a Jew¹⁰⁰. Whether or not Shcherbak is a Jew or a Ukrainian is beside the point. Judging by his speeches, Shcherbak is as patriotic as Plachynda in linking ecological revival to the revival of Ukraine - but whereas the former include all people living in Ukraine in this revival, Plachynda stressed the ecological revival of the Ukrainian people in particular¹⁰¹. In addition to electing a leader and three deputy leaders: Dmytro Hrodzinskyi (corresponding member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences), V. Sakhaev (a doctor of economic sciences) and Iurii Tkachenko (film director), the annual meeting also elected a co-ordinating committee - *Zelena Rada* - and a secretariat¹⁰².

March 1989 Elections to USSR Congress of People's Deputies

1988 had seen an increased politicisation not only of society in general, but also of so-called informal movements and groups in the USSR. This politicisation caught on in the aftermath of the XIX Party Conference (June 1988) and demands in the Baltic States for economic and later also political sovereignty. In Ukraine radical groups such as the *Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU)* and the *Culturological Group*, which to a large extent were composed of former political prisoners

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ As for the commercial links in question, I have been told by members of *Zelenyi Svit* who do not wish to be named, that a bank - Narodnyi Bank - was set up with capital from rich Israelis and that members of *Zelenyi Svit* were involved with setting up this bank. Iurii Samoilenko, since December 1994 the leader of *Zelenyi Svit*, was at that time sitting on the board of the Narodnyi Bank. The dire financial situation *Zelenyi Svit* is currently in - its office in Kiev was at the end of 1994 temporarily closed due to a lack of funds and due to disputes within the movement - seems to suggest that there is no direct financial link between the two.

¹⁰² *Радянська Україна*, 18.7.1989 (n.p.).

released in an amnesty in 1987, were amongst the first to emerge on the political scene. *Zelenyi Svit*, though, from the very beginning claimed that it was a non-political movement whose policy was that of consolidation and co-operation, not confrontation.

It soon became clear, however, that the environment was in fact a highly politicised issue. This was acknowledged by Academician Hrodzinskyi, a prominent member of *Zelenyi Svit*. When asked to explain this state of affairs, he argued as follows:

„Тому, що політика дуже пов'язана з економікою, а економіка тісно переплітається з екологією. У зв'язку з цим розв'язання екологічних проблем завжди супроводжується рішеннями екологічного характеру, а все це зачіпає й політичні питання урядового масштабу. Тому мені зрозуміло, чому ті, хто був серед "зелених", прагнув увійти до складу нашого парламенту. Та й виборці здебільшого підтримували їх ідеї, які вони відстоювали, знаходячи відлуння в думках усіх людей¹⁰³.

The link Hrodzinskyi had in mind, was that of economic and political structures and policies. Ukraine suffered from a cocktail of pollutants emitted into the air and water by close to one thousand chemical enterprises and other factories and five nuclear power stations. Only five percent of the Ukrainian industry was controlled by Ukrainian ministries and departments - the remaining 95% were controlled by all-union ministries and departments. Since 1976 Ukrainian agriculture had been centralised, too. What was more, all the Ukrainian nuclear power stations, including Chernobyl, were controlled from 'Moscow' by *Minatomenergo* (the Soviet Ministry of Nuclear Power). A feeling of helplessness and of anger was brought about by campaigns to have the most seriously polluting enterprises closed and campaigns to reduce the impact of nuclear power in Ukraine being hampered by 'Moscow'. This archaic centralised structure of the economy was not only inefficient in that it encouraged output at the expense of quality and thus also maximal use of natural resources (created waste), but it was also highly undemocratic and dangerous to the environment in the sense that the people inhabiting a physical territory had no control of industries on this territory and consequently also no control of the amount of pollution they had to suffer as a result. Then as pointed out by Oles Honchar

Наднаціональні відомства, такі як Мінатоменерго, Мінводгос, хімічні концерни, інші супергіганти, не завжди хочуть рахуватися з інтересами народу й держави, це вони поділи країну мовби на якісь відомчі емірати і нещадно півечать землю, виникають на вітер народні мільярди. А скільки завдало шкоди навколишньому середовищу, ґрунтам, річкам¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ *Радянська Україна* (n.d.).

¹⁰⁴ *Література України*, 9.3.1989, с. 3.

Iurii Shcherbak and other members of *Zelenyi Svit* had on numerous occasions expressed their discontent with the economic and political system for its lack of glasnost on environmental issues, for the secrecy surrounding the Chernobyl accident in particular and nuclear power in general and also for the authority of the departments ranking higher than that of well qualified scientists¹⁰⁵. It therefore came as no big surprise that some 20 enterprises and scientific institutions representing practically all the electoral districts of Kiev suggested Shcherbak's candidacy. He was eventually formally put forward as a candidate in the Shevchenko electoral district to compete with several other candidates and an election which he won.

Shcherbak presented his electoral platform to the general public in *Literaturna Ukraina* on 16 March¹⁰⁶. To Shcherbak the ultimate measure was Man and his well-being. Therefore, he did not favour the 'quantity of steel per capita, but rather the health of the people and its children'. Relations between people must be humanised, he argued, the device no longer being 'he who is not with us, is against us', but rather 'he who is not against us, is with us' - thus reversing official doctrine. 'To protect Man from the 'system'', he called for the adoption of a Law on Human Rights.

In the economic sphere Shcherbak called for stabilisation (fight against inflation) arguing that this was a prerequisite for improving the ecological situation in Ukraine. There was also a need for changing priorities, reducing spending on defence and on what he referred to as 'the expensive and ambitious projects of *Minvodgosp*, *Minatomenergo* and other departments/bureaucratic structures'. Shcherbak also called for an overhaul of economic structures, replacing the command-administrative system with more self-rule and with a number of means of ownership.

On the issue of deflation, Shcherbak sought justification in the writings of Lenin, arguing in favour of a

Відновлення лєнінських принципів національної політики.
...всебічне розширення прав союзних республік, областей, районів,
перехід їх на госпрозрахунок та реальне
самоврядування залишків сталінщини та брежнєвщини в усіх
сферах народного життя.

Shcherbak was in favour of strengthening the national consciousness of the Ukrainian people through increasing the importance of language, culture, history, and its national peculiarities. In this connection the Ukrainian language should be declared the official language of Ukraine, while at the same time full rights should be given to other languages spoken on the territory of the republic. Negative aspects such as national nihilism, chauvinism and ethnic conflicts should be fought energetically.

¹⁰⁵ See interview with Iurii Shcherbak in *Літературна Україна*, 26.1.1989, с. 2.

¹⁰⁶ *Літературна Україна*, 16.3.1989, с. 2-3.

As for ecological issues, Shcherbak suggested that an article securing the right of every citizen to live in an environmentally clean environment be incorporated into the Soviet Constitution as one of the basic human rights. Furthermore, as a first step to combat pollution and the health problems it caused, Shcherbak wanted full glasnost on data linking health problems to pollution, including data on Chernobyl. With regard to nuclear power, he favoured a halt to construction of new nuclear reactors in Ukraine and a radical solution to the problems - technical as well as others - that emerged as a result of the Chernobyl accident. The people should have its say on issues such as the construction of new nuclear power stations and/or enterprises that would have a negative impact on the environment. This should be done by means of referenda. Another way to secure the improvement of the Ukrainian environment was to expand the Green movement and to create independent (public) research institutes and laboratories to be used for conducting environmental impact assessments.

Finally, Shcherbak called for realism, arguing that he was in no position to promise the electorate manna from heaven as he did not have the financial means, nor the power, the administrative apparatus or the possibility of building houses, kindergartens and hospitals in his electoral district. He could, however, promise those who would vote for him that he would do everything within his powers to execute his programme and to secure the rebirth of Ukraine through the USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

The Green Movement took an active part in the election campaign by supporting candidates whose programmes were acceptable to them from an ecological point of view. As pointed out by Iablukov, the Russian biologist and environmentalist, it was next to impossible for any candidate to the Congress of People's Deputies to be elected without having included in their programme a section on the environment. There were, however, varying degrees of commitment to the environment amongst the candidates and *Zelenyi Svit* thus urged people to vote for those candidates who had a clear and concise programme suggesting how to combat pollution in Ukraine:

Громадяни, хай наш мітинг буде початком всенародного екологічного руху. Народ через референдум, через своїх депутатів повинен взяти контроль екологічної ситуації в свої руки. Проблеми екологічної безпеки України мають вирішувати не десь, а на Україні, і вирішувати їх не комусь, а нам. Висувайте кандидатами в депутати тих, хто має чітку екологічну програму дій. Створюйте депутатських екологічних групи і вимагайте від них звітності. Маємо надію, що демократизація суспільства - це і нові можливості в боротьбі

за збереження навколишнього середовища і гарантія успіху боротьби¹⁰⁷.

Judging by the election result, people seemed to follow *Zelenyi Svit's* advice: a number of those writers who either supported or worked within *Zelenyi Svit* stood for election - among them were also Oles Honchar and Professor of Chernivtsi University, Leontyi Sanduliak - and altogether seven of these were elected people's deputies. Shcherbak was at the Congress of People's Deputies elected a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet and a member of its subcommittee on nuclear ecology¹⁰⁸. As a deputy he was entitled to his own office in Kiev. Personally Shcherbak did not need this office, and he therefore gave the one-room office he was allocated in Hostynnyi Dvir in Podil to the association. Being on good terms with Ivan Saliy, then first secretary of the Podil party raikom, Shcherbak through the latter managed to obtain a bigger office (two small rooms and a larger meeting room) shortly after, and this office is still being used as *Zelenyi Svit's* headquarters¹⁰⁹.

Founding Conference, Kiev, 26 April 1989

The elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies not only highlighted the environment as an issue, it also greatly improved *Zelenyi Svit's* potential to succeed in its campaigns through its own deputies and through deputies who were sympathetic to its case. Boosted by the elections and generally optimistic about the future, the Greens came together in Kiev a month later to discuss organisational issues and to pass a provisional statute, according to which *Zelenyi Svit* would base its work prior to the Congress scheduled for the autumn.

The statute described *Zelenyi Svit* as being a voluntary public organisation, created to unite the forces of organisations and the public in Ukraine to secure ecological equilibrium in Ukraine as a condition for a healthy existence of both Man and the environment. The founder of *Zelenyi Svit* is the Ukrainian Peace Committee.

As regarded the organisational structure of *Zelenyi Svit*, it was horizontal. The association united and co-ordinated the activities of local and primary groups, but at the same time collective members of *Zelenyi Svit* retained the right to their own structure as well as having organisational and financial autonomy. There would be no membership fees nor would there be any membership lists. With regard to official authorities and the CPU, the statute made it clear that *Zelenyi Svit's*

¹⁰⁷ Звернення представників "зеленого руху" до громадян України - Дорогі співвітчизники, громадяни України.

¹⁰⁸ *Рабочая газета*, 26.7.1989 (п.р.).

¹⁰⁹ Interview with Andrii Hlazovyi, Kiev, 30.4.1994.

activities would be based on interaction with Soviet, (republican) state and party organs, enterprises, co-operatives, scientific institutions and public organisations, including other informal organisations. *Zelenyi Svit* would also co-operate with international ecological organisations.

The major task of *Zelenyi Svit* would be to activate the people of Ukraine to take directly part in the solving of ecological problems in Ukraine and to organise broad public control of the implementation of environmental legislation. *Zelenyi Svit* would try to secure the right of the people of Ukraine to live in an environmentally clean environment.

Point six of the statute listed the major aims of the association: first of all, it would form an ecological outlook on the world and create ecological awareness amongst the people of Ukraine. Secondly, it would spread information about prominent ideas and achievements in the field of environmental protection and the rational use of natural resources. To improve the state of the environment, *Zelenyi Svit* intended to set up an information bank on the ecological situation in Ukraine and elaborate ecologically sound programmes for the development of industries, energy, transport and agriculture in addition to composing alternative programmes to officially endorsed decisions and projects. Alternative ecological expert assessments would be made in connection with the construction or reconstruction of industrial facilities, energy-producing objects, transport and agriculture. Experts and the media would be included in this work. *Zelenyi Svit* would also initiate legal acts to protect the environment as well as press for glasnost on matters regarding the state of the environment. In cases of violation of environmental legislation, the Greens would bring this to the attention of the legal system for adequate measures to be taken. Finally, the statute called for a discussion of problems and ideas relating to the interaction between man and the environment and for broad international co-operation with ecological and anti-military organisations aiming at protecting man from environmental pollution and from nuclear war. To facilitate the latter, *Zelenyi Svit* would take active part in the Ukrainian Peace Committee's work to promote peace and a clean environment.

The statute was very liberal on the issue of who could join *Zelenyi Svit* as individual or collective members. Anyone accepting its statute and willing to take actively part in protecting the environment was welcome to join - including Green groups, state enterprises, co-operatives, public organisations and scientific and establishments. No membership fee would be requested. Members had the right to obtain information from *Zelenyi Svit* and to bring to the attention of the association issues they would like the association to address. Collective members could conduct campaigns on their own, independently of *Zelenyi Svit*. However, only elected organs had the right to speak on behalf of *Zelenyi Svit* as a Ukrainian association. As will be seen below, *Zelenyi Svit* would provide local and regional organisations with some legitimacy and protection from harassment and/or prosecution as it was a Ukrainian association and had many well-known people

amongst its ranks. This situation was reflected in the statute, which made it clear that *Zelenyi Svit* would provide its members with protection from 'unlawful intimidation and persecution' as a result of their environmental activities¹¹⁰.

Zelenyi Svit's structure would be as simple as possible, according to the statute. A congress would be called once every two years. The delegates would endorse the statute and a programme, elect a leader and deputy leaders, a secretariat, Green Council (*Zelena Rada*) and a control-revision commission. Between congresses, *Zelena Rada*¹¹¹ would co-ordinate *Zelenyi Svit*'s activities. The Council would meet no less than twice a year and would be composed of *Zelenyi Svit*'s leader, deputy leaders, members of the secretariat, representatives of the collective members, scientists and other experts. Day-to-day activities would be carried out by the association's secretariat. Finally, the control-revision commission would see to it that there would be no violations of the statute and secure the implementation of decisions made by the congress as well as keep an eye with *Zelenyi Svit*'s finances. The latter would be composed by voluntary donations and sponsor money in addition to money earned for public lectures, concerts and other fund-raising activities, such as the sale of badges. This was curiously similar to that of the CPSU. As a voluntary public organisation, *Zelenyi Svit* would be exempted from paying taxes. *Zelenyi Svit*'s structure is graphically depicted on the following page.

The statute was published in the newspaper *Radianska Ukraina* on 18 July 1989 - as the only Ukrainian newspaper that printed the temporary statute and organised a public discussion around it. The response to the draft statute was very good. The editorial board referred to a letter from one V. Samiilenko of Severodonesk, who had requested a copy of the statute from the newspaper. Many similar letters had been received and the journalists had at their own initiative distributed 300 copies of the newspaper with the statute in it to public activists. Unfortunately it was unable to keep up this service, so anyone interested was requested to contact public libraries and read it there¹¹². A public discussion of the statute in the form of readers' letters was printed in *Radianska Ukraina* on 18 and 30 of July, 19 August and 2 September 1989. Public response varied. F. Polishchuk from the village of Krupets in Khmelnytska oblast, for instance, was unhappy with the distinction between individual and collective members. He also did not approve of registering local groups of *Zelenyi Svit* locally, with local organs. In his view, these should be registered only in Kiev, then in his own experience it proved very difficult to create local groups of *Zelenyi Svit*. All attempts at registering such a group in his own area ended with officials shouting at him 'what


¹¹⁰ Point III, p. 7.

¹¹¹ As seen above, the first *Zelena Rada* was elected at the January 1989 conference in Kiev and consisted of some 15 *Zelenyi Svit* representatives.

¹¹² Valentin Smaha in *Радянська Україна* (n.d.).

do you think you are?' This seemed to be a common problem to local organisations all over Ukraine.

Figure 1.1 Zelenyi Svit's Organisational Structure



Comments to the statute emerged also in other papers. Danylo Kulyinak, a member of the Soviet Writers' Union and head of the Kiev *Derzhrybinspektsiia*'s Public Council to Protect Fish wrote in a letter to *Radianska Ukraina* that his feeling after having read the statute was that he had been reading a copy of that of the Ukrainian Society for Nature Protection, *UTOP*. Consequently, he asked rather rhetorically, 'do we need to create yet another *UTOP*?'. He suggested a few improvements to the statute, including a clause that public control be exerted over the activities and cadre policies of *Derzhkompryroda* and to arrange for *Zelenyi Svit*'s best qualified people to work within its structure. He also favoured referendums to be held with regard to the most

important ecological problems and for the public to be able to veto controversial decisions with an environmental side to them¹¹³.

Zelenyi Svit was not formally registered by the state, although it was founded under the auspices of the Ukrainian Peace Committee. The Founding Conference therefore decided to contact *Derzhkompriroda* to have the statute registered with the committee. Following this request, a heated debate took place in the Collegium of the state committee. As seen above, *Derzhkompriroda* had so far had a very arrogant attitude towards *Zelenyi Svit*, holding the opinion that there was no need for an independent environmental organisation in Ukraine as there was already a state committee, which was the only body 'which did the right thing'. Not surprisingly, therefore, sceptical questions like 'why do we need this creation? We are a state institution and they are informals. Thus we will be held accountable for them', surfaced. In the end, however, the committee decided to register the statute, keeping in line with Prime Minister Ryzhkov's words to the effect that 'we must all become green'¹¹⁴.

A resolution¹¹⁵ was passed on 25 July, stating that *Derzhkompriroda* registered the temporary statute and saying that all branches of *Derzhkompriroda* had been instructed to maintain permanent contacts with *Zelenyi Svit*. The resolution also referred to the expressed agreement of the *Zelenyi Svit*'s secretariat to rework the statute bearing in mind comments made by *Derzhkompriroda*, *Minfin*, *Minjust*, *Derzhkompratsy* and *Derzhkomvidavu*. These comments were attached to the copy of the resolution I was given by the Adviser to the Parliament on Environmental Issues, V. Oleshchenko. Altogether there were three pages of comments.

Most of the changes suggested by the various ministries were related to technical aspects of the statute - for instance, the Ministry of Justice wanted the reference to the Peace Committee removed. As an independent organisation, *Zelenyi Svit* was not subordinated to anyone. Similarly, the Ministry of Finance wanted to add a clause on what to do with the assets of *Zelenyi Svit* should the association dissolve itself and Ministry of Employment (*Derzhkompratsy*) wanted a clarification on what exactly would be the responsibilities of the leader, deputy leaders, secretariat and control-revision commission. There were, however, also attempts at changing the contents of the statute for more overtly political reasons. The Ministry of Justice, for instance, suggested that the idea to set up an information bank be scrapped altogether, as this simply was not realistic.

¹¹³ *Советская Украина*, (n.d.), с. 4.

¹¹⁴ *Правда України*, 28.7.1989, с. 3.

¹¹⁵ Постанова від 25.07.1989г. № 19 "про реєстрацію Статуту Української екологічної асоціації "Зелений Світ", signed by First Deputy Leader of *Derzhkompriroda*, I. Liakh.

Moreover, *Zelenyi Svit* was recommended to remove a preamble to the statute as 'there is no need for such an emotional preamble'¹¹⁶.

F. Polishchuk did, as seen above, complain about opposition from the side of local authorities towards attempts at creating local Green groups. This should, according to *Radianska Ukraina*, not repeat itself in the future, as *Derzhkompriroda* had sent its resolution 'down the system' and moreover, as the resolution ordered regional and local units of *Derzhkompriroda* to co-operate with *Zelenyi Svit*. This did, however, not mean that the relationship between *Derzhkompriroda* and *Zelenyi Svit* automatically improved. As will be seen below, especially the youth wing of the latter was sceptical of the commitment of *Derzhkompriroda* to reform.

Why did it take *Zelenyi Svit* so long to adopt a statute? Academician Hrodzinskyi tried to answer this question in an interview with *Sovetskaia Ukraina*, arguing that some kind of system was needed to unite groups when they started emerging. Those people who initiated *Zelenyi Svit* wanted the most democratic form possible for this purpose and were against a vertical structure and a bureaucratic-centralistic approach. United by common ideas, and a yearning to find the best methods by which to solve the environmental problems in Ukraine, the Greens needed time 'so that life itself' could teach them how best to find a path worth following¹¹⁷.

Another question frequently asked with regard to the statute of *Zelenyi Svit*, was why there was no membership fee. This could be explained, argued Hrodzinskyi, as when fees were gathered, there was an element of obligation which constituted one step on the path towards bureaucratisation. As *Zelenyi Svit* united people with a commitment of conscience membership fees would therefore make no sense. Expenses incurred in connection with congresses and other activities would rather be covered by earnings from activities such as concerts, public lectures, voluntary donations, and film viewings¹¹⁸. Membership lists were not to be kept - members would only be issued with a card stating that they were members of *Zelenyi Svit* and with a badge. This was understandable given the general political climate under which *Zelenyi Svit* emerged. As pointed out by Zrezartsev above, the Peace Council had to submit a list of the initiators to *Zelenyi Svit* and it was also requested to provide information of a personal character about these people. I have also noted how people locally were being harassed by the authorities in connection with their environmental activities. Thus, not having a membership list could serve two purposes - on the one hand it would make it more difficult for authorities to pinpoint members of *Zelenyi Svit* to implement sanctions against them, on the other hand it could attract potential members who were wary of the consequences of membership in an informal organisation and therefore would

¹¹⁶ See *Зуваження до Статуту Української екологічної асоціації "Зелений Світ"*, attached to *Derzhkompriroda*'s resolution (see footnote above).

¹¹⁷ *Радянська Україна* (n.d.)

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

otherwise not have joined. Besides, this created a sense of informality and equality very different from the bureaucracy of public organisations and may in itself have served as an attraction to the general public.

Relationship to Derzhkompriroda, UTOP and DQP

As seen above, Dina Protsenko, the Chairman of *Derzhkompriroda*, was not very happy with the emergence of *Zelenyi Svit*. As her committee was in charge of addressing environmental issues in Ukraine, there was no need for any other organisation to do the same. Academician Hrodzinskyi in an interview with *Radianska Ukraina* gave an evaluation of *Derzhkompriroda*'s work from the point of view of *Zelenyi Svit*:

(Держкомприрода) благодарна, гуманітична організація, яка прагне робити багато в цьому напрямі для народу. Та які її можливості? Район або місто має аж одного-двох чоловік, що займаються цими справами. Що ці кілька чоловік на область можуть зробити, крім того, щоб здійснювати поверхневу контролюючу функцію¹¹⁹.

Thus, Hrodzinskyi held the opinion that *Derzhkompriroda* was not sufficiently equipped and staffed to address environmental problems in Ukraine in an adequate manner. *Zelenyi Svit* would therefore not simply duplicate the work of the committee but rather support and strengthen it, by pooling its own expertise in the field.

A similar view was expressed by Dudko: when asked whether *Zelenyi Svit* would not simply duplicate the work of the Committee he replied as follows: 'indeed, it is this committee that should be paying attention to the ecological situation in the republic, which, according to M. Gorbachev, has taken us by the throat. Regrettably the work of the State Nature Protection Committee is ineffective. Is not this the reason why the Committee was against our association's foundation because we meant the end of its quiet life? Nature cannot wait until the committee reorganises its activity. Nor can we sit on our hands. Because it is concrete and useful activity that makes it'¹²⁰.

Evidence towards the alleged inefficiency of *Derzhkompriroda* was provided in a lengthy article written by Volodymyr Boreiko - activist in *Zelenyi Svit* and inspector of *Derzhkompriroda* - which was published in *Literaturna Ukraina*¹²¹ on the eve of the Founding Congress of *Zelenyi Svit*. In the article, Boreiko explained his reason for leaving the committee by referring to several

¹¹⁹ *Радянська Україна*, 31.10.1989 (n.p.).

¹²⁰ *News from Ukraine*, no. 18/1988 (n.p.).

¹²¹ *Літературна Україна*, 19.10.1989, с. 3.

examples of neglect and politically motivated anti-environmental activities under the leadership of Protsenko. I will return to this article below.

As for *UTOP* (Society for Nature Protection), there was, as pointed out above, initially opposition to the creation of an independent ecological association under the auspices of the Peace Committee. Dudko in an interview with *NFU* claimed that the Society regarded *Zelenyi Svit* as rivals in the first place, but claimed that relations had improved and that the two organisations had found a common language as they pursued the same object¹²². Moreover, whereas the Society was primarily concerned with ecological education and information, *Zelenyi Svit* 'emphasised practical efforts to rectify previous mistakes and avert new ones'. Thus, there were no grounds for competition between the two organisations whatsoever. The Society had even participated in financing *Zelenyi Svit*'s expedition along the Dniepr, so relations were good.

It soon became clear, however, that *Zelenyi Svit* had a much broader appeal to the general public and was much more efficient than was the Society, and attitudes towards *Zelenyi Svit* therefore changed within *UTOP*. As seen in Chapter One, in Moldova, the Society for Environmental Protection decided to merge with the Moldovan independent Green movement - *AVIA* - and in November 1990, the Moldovan Green Movement (*MEM*) emerged out of this decision¹²³. A similar initiative was proposed by members of *UTOP*: three activists from Cherkassy suggested that since *Zelenyi Svit*'s aims coincided with those of the Society, it would be a good idea to merge the two organisations. The authors of the article, which appeared in print in *Radianska Ukraina* - the CPU's official organ - acknowledged that the Society to some extent suffered from formalism. This, they argued, was a feature common to most political organisations which had been active prior to Gorbachev's new policies of glasnost and democratisation. However, *Zelenyi Svit*'s statute did not state clearly in which way the association differed from the Society. Thus, a situation of potential competition arose, and this, argued the authors, was not needed. Given the severity of the ecological crisis in Ukraine, everybody should rather pull together to stop it. The local activists were even willing to adopt the name of *Zelenyi Svit* as part of a merger and would like to know what would be the position of the Presidium of the Society's attitude to the prospect of a merger¹²⁴.

Another letter from V. Ivantsev - former public inspector of *UTOP* - printed in the same issue of *Radianska Ukraina*¹²⁵ expressed severe criticism towards *UTOP*, suggesting that currently the only organisation which could secure real change in the sphere of the environment, was *Zelenyi*

¹²² *News from Ukraine*, no. 18/1988, p. 2.

¹²³ Åse B. Grødeland, *Report on a Visit to USSR* (London: The Ecological Studies Institute, Summer 1991), p. 38.

¹²⁴ *Радиська Україна*, 30.7.1989, с. 4.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

Svit, not *UTOP*. The latter, which was established in 1946, initially did much good. Amongst its early members were well-known scientists, writers, journalists and film-directors and at one point *UTOP* even contacted Stalin to save the Kiev nature preserve Horysta from being flooded. However, during the time of stagnation, *UTOP* fell prey to bureaucratisation and the positions held by the leadership of *UTOP* came to match those of various ministries and departments. Following the introduction of glasnost and democratisation it would be reasonable to expect changes to take place also within *UTOP*. However, no changes had so far taken place. In this connection Ivantsev referred to the composition of *UTOP*'s Presidium. Of a total of 15 members, 14 were functionaries of various ministries and departments. Not one single member was a well-known ecologist, writer, journalist or representative of youth or informal ecological organisations. The Republican Council of *UTOP* neither counted one single youth, although more than half the total membership of *UTOP* was made up of students and pupils. Some 90% of the Council representatives were working in ministries like *Agroprom*, *Minvodgosp*, *Minlisp* and other ministries polluting the environment. The Section to Protect the Forests was normally headed by a representative of *Lispz* and the Section to Protect the Soil by someone from the Ministry of Agriculture.

Some officials generally sympathetic towards *UTOP* however, held the view that this close link between the society and various enterprises and ministries were not necessarily such a bad thing. Viacheslav Oleshchenko, who in 1992 worked as the environmental advisor to the Ukrainian Parliament, claimed that since many directors of industrial enterprises were members of the society and as the deputy prime minister was the leader of *UTOP* effective pressure could be exerted on the directors to improve the state of affairs. Should a member be excluded from *UTOP*, this would mark him as an unworthy member of society - a bad person - and this, according to Oleshchenko, had some effect¹²⁶.

As regards local branches of *UTOP* and their attitude/relation to the emerging independent Green groups, I asked the respondents how they viewed this relationship. The Ternopil Greens expressed the following view:

(other than *Zelenyi Svit*) всеческие другие общества никто в серьез не воспринимал, в том числе и общество охраны природы. Общество охраны природы не могло выступить с активной

¹²⁶ Interview with Viacheslav Oleshchenko, *Verkhovna Rada*, Summer 1992. The general impression I got during the interview was that Oleshchenko felt resentment towards the Greens for being so successful in such a relative short period of time, whereas people like him, who had for decades worked on environmental issues, had achieved a lot less. In any case, he provided me with materials expressing a negative attitude towards *Zelenyi Svit* due to internal disputes at the time. This is an issue to which I will return in part two of this chapter.

позицией, так как ее руководители боялись за место работы и вообще за свою дальнейшую судьбу.

The Mukachevo Greens had a mixed, but predominantly negative relationship to *UTOP*, whereas Bukovina *Zelenyi Svit* said they co-operated with *UTOP* on a number of issues. The Dnipropetrovsk Greens stressed that their aims were very different from *UTOP*, which was described in the following way:

Руководство "Общества Охраны Природы" состояло из пенсионеров и неудачников армии, КГБ, парторганов, и ставило своей задачей проведение бесед в школах о том, как беречь социалистические деревья там, где они росли по плану и не предполагались для социалистической вырубки.

In Horlivka, *UTOP* did not co-operate with *Zelenyi Svit*, whereas in Lutsk relations between the two organisations were described as friendly and tolerant. In Vinnytsia a large group of young activists from *UTOP* took out membership in *Zelenyi Svit* as they were dissatisfied with existing limitations on work in *UTOP*. The initial objections of 'the old leaders of *UTOP* (referred to as 'starikov') were overcome in a few months' time and replaced with dialogue and co-operation. The Uman Greens described their relations to *UTOP* as 'pragmatic', whereas no relations were established between *Zelenyi Mir* and *UTOP* in Nikolaev, then

Общество Охраны Природы было создано сверху, компартией, в отличие от ассоциации, которая создавалась снизу, сама, по своей инициативе. Общество Охраны Природы финансировалось компартией, экологическая ассоциация никем не финансируется.

Finally, in Kherson oblast *Dzharylgach* was co-ordinating its activities with *UTOP*.

As regards *DOP*, the members of the Kiev State University *druzhina* 'Leninskii dozor' discussed what should be the relationship between *Zelenyi Svit* and *DOP*. *UTOP* and *DOP* co-operated closely in the sense that the former would provide funding for actions undertaken by the latter. Often such action was aimed against poachers. Assistance was also given to the *druzhiny* by trade unions and by the *Komsomol*. The issue of what should be the *druzhiny*'s relationship towards *Zelenyi Svit* was discussed at a conference attended by all the Ukrainian *druzhiny*. Some activists held the view that *Zelenyi Svit* was becoming an influential organisation and shared the goals of the *druzhiny*. Co-operation was therefore to be encouraged. Others were more sceptical, arguing that *Zelenyi Svit* wanted to control everybody and that a more cautious approach was therefore required. Eventually, it was decided that the Kiev *druzhina*, together with individual

young environmentalists join *Zelenyi Svit* as its youth wing - *molodizhne kryto*. As will be seen below, this youth wing was active in the initial stage¹²⁷.

All groups asked about their relationship to *DOP* expressed this relationship in positive words. In Vinnytsia, for instance, two *druzhyny* even joined *Zelenyi Svit* as collective members. In Horlivka and Dnipropetrovsk, however, the *druzhyny* were either non-existent (Horlivka) or their work was hardly visible (Dnipropetrovsk).

Other Green Groups - Relationship to *Zelenyi Svit*

The *Zelenyi Svit* structure was not the only Green group to emerge in Ukraine at this time. A number of informal movements (*neformaly*) started to emerge during 1987 as clubs and single issue campaigns. The freeing of political prisoners from December 1986 onwards was one of the key factors that facilitated these movements - particularly so in Ukraine¹²⁸. Taras Kuzio has made a very thorough study of informal groups in Ukraine between 1985 and 1989¹²⁹. The first groups to emerge were concerned primarily with human rights and cultural issues. Culture, however, is as seen in Chapter One, very closely linked with the environment. A culture can be preserved and developed only within a reasonably healthy environment. A damaged natural environment will inevitably pose a threat not only to areas of cultural significance (cf. Acropolis in Greece - air pollution from cars are threatening to destroy it. Pollution is also a serious problem for Krakow's listed buildings), but also to the health of people living in this environment. It is thus understandable that the informal groups that emerged in Ukraine to promote Ukrainian culture also took a keen interest in preserving the natural environment.

The *Ukrainian Culturological Club* which was set up in Kiev in August 1987 was primarily concerned with those aspects of Ukrainian Culture which also had a nationalist aspect¹³⁰. Nuclear power and the environment were thus linked to the survival not only of Ukrainian culture but also of Ukraine as a nation. On 26 April 1988, on the second anniversary of the Chernobyl accident, members of the Culturological Club organised a demonstration in Kiev, at which statements like 'No more Chornobyls', 'Turn Ukraine into a Nuclear-Free Ukraine' and 'The Ukrainian Culturological Club is Against Nuclear Death' were made¹³¹.

¹²⁷ Interview with Oleksyi Kabyka, Kiev, August 1992.

¹²⁸ Hosking (1988), p. 4, Taras Kuzio, 'Restructuring from Below: Informal Groups in Ukraine under Gorbachev, 1985-1989', in Bohdan Krawchenko (ed.), *Ukrainian Past, Ukrainian Present* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992).

¹²⁹ In 1990 Kuzio gave me a longer version of Restructuring from Below: Informal Groups in Ukraine under Gorbachev, 1985-1989 (before it was printed). As this version contains more references to groups involved with ecology and culture in 1987-88, I will in the following refer to this version of the paper.

¹³⁰ Kuzio (1990), p. 4.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

In the spring of 1987 *Tovarystvo Lev* (The Lion Society) was set up in Lviv. The link between culture and the environment was stated even more directly by this society, which described itself as an 'independent, community eco-cultural youth organisation...'¹³² The Society was organised around four sections: historical, ethnographic, ecological and socio-political'. In addition to opposing nuclear power plants, the Society also organised an ecological expedition in May 1988 entitled 'Dniestr-88' to raise public awareness of the pollution of the river¹³³.

In the spring of 1988 an independent student organisation - *Hromada* - was set up at Kiev University. The students, were strongly opposed to nuclear power. A similar position was adopted by the *Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU)* and also by *RUKH*, which was set up in 1989. At the initiative of most informal Green groups in Ukraine, the environment became an important issue.

As seen above, the *Culturological Club*, for instance, adopted a much more radical/confrontational approach towards official authorities than did *Zelenyi Svit*. *Zelenyi Svit*, on the other hand, while pursuing policies that got increasingly more radical, did not opt for a confrontation. Its representatives were careful to stress that *Zelenyi Svit* should in no way be seen as a movement in opposition to official authorities, but purely as an environmental organisation, committed to improving the state of the environment in Ukraine. Consequently, although *Zelenyi Svit* retained the right to co-operate with any like-minded individuals, a low-key approach was adopted towards the more radical groups. There may have been several reasons for this. On the one hand, the political climate in Ukraine was much more dogmatic than in many other Soviet republics. As seen above, the *Zelenyi Svit* statute thus provided legal protection to its members against harassment due to environmental activities. There was therefore, understandably, fear amongst *Zelenyi Svit* members regarding possible sanctions from official authorities against members, whose campaigns official authorities may not approve of. Equally important were strategic considerations. It was probably thought that by being less radical, but keep a high profile by providing sound alternatives to non-environmental official projects and by spreading information to the general public, more could be achieved than by 'alienating' the organisation from the general public by adopting a confrontational approach, which could easily be hampered with or discredited by the authorities.

¹³² *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

3.2.4 Founding Congress of *Zelenyi Svit* (Kiev, 28-29 October 1989)

By October 1989, when the Founding Congress of *Zelenyi Svit* took place in the Artists' House (Budynok Khudozhnikov) in Kiev, *Zelenyi Svit* had united some 300 regional and local groups in all oblasts of Ukraine, with an estimated membership of approximately 500,000¹³⁴. All these groups were represented at the Congress on 28-29 October 1989, which was attended by some 600 people, of whom 301 were delegates (49 delegates failed to attend). Seventy five of these delegates were under 30 years of age and 237 had higher education - 62 held university degrees. Although a majority of those present were Ukrainians, there were also a considerable number of Russians, Belorussians, Jews, Rumanians and Armenians present. The delegation from Kiev formed the largest group at the Congress¹³⁵. Some 50 Soviet and foreign journalists covered the Congress and more than 100 observers from the West (Greenpeace Great Britain, Dutch, Swedish, Canadian and American groups) and Eastern Europe (Czechoslovakia) were present¹³⁶.

Given the size of the Congress and also the fact that all oblasts were represented, it not only came to serve the purpose of bringing together most of the Ukrainian Green groups that had either joined or had been initiated by *Zelenyi Svit*, but also as a forum at which information could be exchanged about environmental problems/campaigns in the regions. A majority of the speeches thus focused on environmental problems throughout Ukraine.

With regard to policies and organisational issues, although there was less time for debating these, two tendencies could be identified within the movement. On the one hand, there were the moderates, who favoured a policy of co-operation, rather than confrontation with official authorities. On the other, there was a group of radicals, who preferred a less co-operative approach. These groups, or rather currents, clashed on a number of issues, suffice it here to say

¹³⁴ *Література Україна*, 15.2.1990 (n.p.). Only an estimate of the total membership of *Zelenyi Svit* can be given as the association had no formal membership - see above. Not only local and regional Green groups could become collective members of *Zelenyi Svit*, but so could enterprises, trade unions and other independent organisations/associations. Thus the number of workers at such enterprises/trade unions would be included in the calculation as to how many members the association had. In some cases Greens themselves argued that anyone taking part in meetings and other activities organised by the Greens were actually members of the Green Movement (put in reference). Consequently, the figure of 500,000 members must be treated with some care. As will be seen below the Green Movement did enjoy widespread public support - particularly in its campaign to prevent any further expansion of nuclear power in Ukraine. If one adds the number of people who in one way or the other took part in these campaigns the figure easily exceeds 500,000 (in the case of the Iuzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station alone, 250,000 signatures were collected). The average number of activists per local/regional group was in 1994 between 20-60. Even if we made a very generous estimate of 200 activists per group and multiplied this by 300 groups, we would come up with a total number of not more than 6,000 members throughout Ukraine. The figure of 500,000 is, however, one frequently used by representatives of *Zelenyi Svit* - although it is being contested by some members sceptical of its size and no breakdown of this figure into local/regional groups has ever been shown to me by *Zelenyi Svit*'s leadership.

¹³⁵ *Вечірній Київ*, 30.10.1989 (n.p.).

¹³⁶ *Вечірній Київ*, 5.11.1989 (n.p.).

Zelenyi Svit strategy, the question of Ukrainian independence, whether or not there was a need for a Green Party, and on the association's attitude towards *Derzhkompriroda*.

Criticism of Derzhkompriroda

The issue which caused the most heated debate was the question as to what exactly should be *Zelenyi Svit*'s relationship to *Derzhkompriroda*. As seen above, the Committee - chaired by Dina Protsenko - was not very happy with the emergence of *Zelenyi Svit* in the first place. Opinions were divided over *Derzhkompriroda* within *Zelenyi Svit* not so much for this reason, but rather due to the fact that a large proportion of the association's members felt that the committee did not tackle environmental problems in an adequate manner. Whereas some, like Hrodzinskyi, put this down to inadequate resources and staffing, others, like Volodymyr Boreiko - who had previously worked as an inspector with *Derzhkompriroda*, but resigned in 1989 - were less understanding. In an article published in *Literaturna Ukraina* on the eve of the Founding Congress of *Zelenyi Svit*, Boreiko attacked his former employer for a lack of will to address environmental issues and for political nepotism. A draft resolution - one of a total of 22 resolutions eventually passed by the Congress - expressing serious dissatisfaction with the Committee thus caused a prolonged debate. The radicals, represented by Boreiko, who had earlier also been a member of *DOP*, and other young people, who had joined *Zelenyi Svit* in their capacity as members of predominantly the Kiev University *druzhina*, fought to pass the resolution, whereas the moderates (scientists, writers) wanted to soften its edge - and to adopt a more constructive approach.

Moloda Hvardia on 18 November 1989¹³⁷ published the draft resolution on *Derzhkompriroda* presented to the Congress by *Zelenyi Svit*'s Youth Wing, which included the Kiev University *druzhina* 'Lenynskiy dozor'. The resolution stated that despite resolutions passed by the USSR and Ukrainian Councils of Ministers, so far no unified service for environmental protection had been created. *Derzhkompriroda* in its present form was dependent upon various departments, deprived of rights to technical and financial support and lacked qualified specialists. Moreover, the Resolution on Ukrainian *Derzhkompriroda* had not yet been ratified. Furthermore, the resolution expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that the person who had been appointed Chairman of *Derzhkompriroda* was an engineer by profession, thus, in the view of the Youth Wing not qualified for the job. Moreover, it was argued that he had been hired against the will of public opinion. Similar situations were identified in oblast, local and regional committees. *Derzhkompriroda* was staffed with officials who had compromised themselves during the period of stagnation by their incapability to protect the environment at the time. Little had also been done

¹³⁷ *Молода гвардия*, 18.11.1989, с. 2.

to provide glasnost into the activities of *Derzhkompriroda*. In its present form, argued the Youth Section, the committee was not able to protect the environment from further destruction.

Others were less critical, possibly due to the fact that *Zelenyi Svit*'s statute had been registered officially through *Derzhkompriroda*¹³⁸, possibly because they realised that rather than antagonise the committee, it would be more beneficial to enter a dialogue with it and try to pull together in areas of great concern to the association. Shcherbak thus stressed the need to co-operate with official environmental protection bodies¹³⁹. Yet, the Congress did acknowledge that *Derzhkompriroda* still was not working 100% efficiently and suggested how an improvement could be achieved in the resolution eventually passed by the Congress: firstly, it was argued that a unified state environmental protection body be created, under which all inspection be subordinated.

Secondly, the Committee should be subordinated to Parliament rather than to the Council of Ministers as this would make it independent of various ministries and departments¹⁴⁰. The Committee should also be given the right to veto and check any facility - including military ones - situated on the territory of Ukraine. The Chairman of *Derzhkompriroda* should be accountable to the Parliament and provide reports of the Committee's activities to *Verkhovna Rada* on a regular basis. Chairmen on all levels of the Committee should be elected on their merit, taking into consideration public opinion. Furthermore, total glasnost on all activities of the Committee must be introduced. Decisions made by the Public Council of *Derzhkompriroda* (this Council¹⁴¹ was proposed by *Derzhkompriroda* prior to the *Zelenyi Svit* Congress, and would be attended by representatives of the Green Movement and other public organisations) should be made compulsory for the apparatus of the Committee to implement. The resolution also called for the creation of an independent institute for environmental protection and ecology (Ukraine) and for a public investigation into actions sanctioned by the former head of the Committee, Dina Protsenko.

Finally, the resolution called for the reconsideration of the hiring of V. Filoneko as Head of the Committee and also of the Deputies I. Liakh and V. Kubrak, who according to *Zelenyi Svit* bore responsibility for the passivity of the Committee. As an example of how public institutions and informal organisations concerned with environmental protection ought to co-operate, the resolution referred to the Lviv Committee, praising work conducted on the Striiske water reservoir and Radekhiv biochemical enterprise¹⁴².

¹³⁸ *Радянська Україна*, 16.2.1990 (n.p.).

¹³⁹ *Радянська Україна* (n.d., n.p.).

¹⁴⁰ This was the case in Latvia, Lithuania and Moldova.

¹⁴¹ Shortly after the Congress *Robitnychna hazeta* announced that *Derzhkompriroda* was setting up the 'advertised' Public council.

¹⁴² *Молода гвардія*, 18.11.1989, с. 2.

Zelenyi Svit thus remained faithful to its own principle on what should be the relationship to official authorities and to other political organisations: ecology ranks higher than economy and politics. Thus the Greens will co-operate with anyone, whose aims coincide with those of *Zelenyi Svit* on environmental issues (cf. Shcherbak's address to the Congress). Moreover, *Zelenyi Svit* would be open to everyone - regardless of nationality and political beliefs - who acknowledged the statute and programme of the association and who were willing to work towards improving the state of the environment - in other words, *Zelenyi Svit* would be an inclusive, rather than an exclusive movement. In this respect it differed from for instance the Estonian Green Movement. As an illustration of this, it is sufficient to refer to strong, predominantly Russian chapters of *Zelenyi Svit* existing in Nikolaev and the Crimea in the South and in Dnipropetrovsk and Dniprodzherzhinsk in the East. I will return to this issue in Chapter Eight.

Morality

Like Greens elsewhere, also the Ukrainian Green Movement was critical of industrialism, blaming the blind faith in progress for many of the ills of the Ukrainian environment. Academician Hrodzinskiy in an interview with the daily *Sovetskaia Ukraina* prior to the Congress called for a return to pre-industrial values, holding Nature in high regard and seeing it as something holy. Such values were common to all historical societies and are still deeply rooted in Ukrainian pre-Revolutionary culture:

Ставлення до природи як до чогось святого було притаманне всім попереднім людським суспільствам. Технологічний же вік призвів до того, що ми, вочевидь, засліплені своєю могутністю, починаємо руйнувати живу природу, серед якої людина формувалась як вид протягом сотень тисяч років, на тлі якої відбувалось формування людської свідомості, філософії, психіки, зрештою, світосприймання.

Zelenyi Svit's theoretical framework will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven, suffice it here to say that the elaboration of a philosophical and a moral alternative to the Marxist-Leninist notion of Nature serving merely as a tool to human progress was an important aspect of the more general process of building the Green Movement in the late 1980s. The Congress endorsed a resolution on morality (see Chapters Six and Seven) and many of the Congress speakers addressed the issue of moral responsibility towards future generations in terms of maintaining rather than destroying Nature. The issue of Man's rights vs. Nature's rights were discussed as was the crisis of Mankind, facilitated by the present environmental crisis. The device of *Zelenyi Svit* - Survival, democracy, humanism - neatly sums up the problem as seen by the Greens. The prime aim of the movement was to secure the survival of Nature and of Man

(including the attributes of the area in which he lives - i.e. culture, language and nation). To facilitate the implementation of policies aimed at doing minimal harm to the physical environment and to the people inhabiting this environment, full-fledged democracy with a set of democratic control mechanisms is required. Another precondition for making society a better place for everyone to live, is the harmonisation in human relations - thus the commitment to humanism. A starting point would therefore be to develop a new morality towards Nature and in human relations more generally.

Programme and Statute

Although the adoption of a programme and statute were high on the agenda of the *Zelenyi Svit* Congress, these were eventually adopted in a hurry and without much debate towards the end of the Congress. *Vechirnyi Kyiv* reported that the discussion of these two major documents started just three to four hours before the end of the last day, thus not leaving much room for amendments¹⁴³. This was to cause problems within the Movement later, as will be seen below. As for the Statute, it was endorsed in a slightly changed form from the temporary statute adopted by the March conference, incorporating most of the changes of a purely technical character suggested by the various ministries and *Derzhkomprroda*. As regards the programme, Academician Hrodzinskiy summarised it as follows:

Програма складатиметься з двох частин. У першій знайдуть відродження ґрунтів України, створення екологічного чистого сільського господарства, оновлення лісів, створення безпечного водного середовища, чистого повітряного басейну. Інакше кажучи, суть програми, кінцева мета нашої діяльності - гарантування тієї якості життя людини, за якої різко зростатиме і тривалість життя, і полішуватиметься генофонд самої людської популяції. Друга частина програми перелічує магістральні напрями наукового забезпечення рішення всіх цих питань. Чи не найголовніше тут створення динамічного інформаційного банку даних про те, що відбувається в природі нашої республіки¹⁴⁴.

Zelenyi Svit's programme is primarily concerned with practical issues. One of its sections lists the reasons why the Ukrainian environment is in such a bad state. Another section outlines the goals of the movement, while a third deals with tactics - i.e. the means by which to achieve

¹⁴³ *Вечірний Київ*, 4.11.1989 (n.p.).

¹⁴⁴ *Радянська Україна* (n.d., n.p.).

these goals. The programme also contains a theoretical framework. A detailed discussion of this framework is provided in Chapter Eight. I will therefore focus on the practical aspects of the programme in this chapter - although the reasons listed as the cause of Ukraine's environmental problems form a critique of the command-administrative system founded by the CPSU and rest on a set of values rejected by the Greens as unsound, and are therefore linked to the alternative theoretical basis elaborated by the Greens.

There was some debate on how to allow collective members into *Zelenyi Svit*. The Youth faction suggested that this be done only by the Congress, which would take place no less often than once every two years. This suggestion was, however, not endorsed. Thus *Zelena Rada* would be responsible for endorsing new members as outlined in the statute¹⁴⁵. As for funding *Zelenyi Svit*'s activities, it was decided not to collect membership fees. Shcherbak pointed out to the Congress that the association had sponsors who supported its work materially. *Golovrichflot*, for instance, had provided *Zelenyi Svit* with a boat to use for expeditions and this boat was in the process of being equipped with a scientific-investigative lab. *Zakarpatis* intended to fund the association's future newspaper and *Kiev Miskisistemotekhnika* had apparently agreed to contribute towards the costs of running *Zelenyi Svit*¹⁴⁶. As seen above, *Zelenyi Svit* also received financial support from the Peace Committee. Donations in the form of hard currency and technical equipment were made by Western environmental organisations. At the time of the First Congress of *Zelenyi Svit* inflation was running low and costs were not too high. Compared to what would be the situation just one year later, *Zelenyi Svit*'s financial situation was thus reasonably good.

Other Resolutions

The Congress, in addition to passing a programme and a statute, also passed a total of 22 resolutions covering a wide range of topics. A resolution on the Chernobyl accident called for a 'Chernobyl Nuremberg Tribunal' to sentence those guilty of the accident. Similarly resolutions on the elections with an appeal to create a bloc of democratic forces, on ecology and local council, on the Earth and many more were endorsed by the Congress. At the initiative of a Poltavshchina delegate, Mykola Kutsenko, a critical address to Arnold Hammer was also endorsed, raising the issue of his dealings 'with the bureaucratic apparatus of the Soviet and Ukrainian governments behind the back of multinational Ukraine' - resulting in pollution. The address requested Hammer

¹⁴⁵ *Вечірній Київ*, 4.11.1989 (n.p.).

¹⁴⁶ *Радіська Україна*, 31.10.1989 (n.p.).

to 'stop (his) amoral actions on Ukrainian territory' (the Greens referred to a chemical enterprise on the Crimea)¹⁴⁷.

As pointed out above, age-wise the average member of *Zelenyi Svit* was in his late thirties/early forties. To increase the number of younger members, the Congress passed a resolution on work with the youth. The resolution expressed its support of the ecological course taken by the new leadership of the *Komsomol* and urged editorial boards of the *Komsomol* and *pioneer* newspapers/journals, the leadership of the publishers 'Molod' and 'Veselka' to look at problems of ecological education of young people. The setting up of the 'youth wing' of *Zelenyi Svit* was endorsed and a call made to local groups to actively involve youth environmental groups, *druzhyny*, ecological clubs and centres in their work. Previous attempts by *Derzhkompriroda* to influence the work of the *druzhyny* was criticised as was the politicisation of children's education and military courses in higher educational establishments. Student *druzhyny*, ecological centres founded under the auspices of the *Komsomol* and others were encouraged to join *Zelenyi Svit* and pull together to secure the protection of Nature and Mankind¹⁴⁸.

Politics and the Environment: the Need for a Green Party

Campaigning throughout 1988 and 1989 had made it clear to *Zelenyi Svit* activists that environmental issues were also political issues - in that their successful solution depended on the right political decisions being made. Shcherbak in his address to the Congress (or article published prior to Congress?) tried to identify the best way by which the Greens could maximise their impact on such decision-making. On the one hand, the path of *Zelenyi Svit* could be maintained also in the future. The Greens could also seemingly conditionally follow the course of Greenpeace, conducting 'courageous actions' to protect the environment. The path of Greenpeace, argued Shcherbak, was a tested path amongst Greens who did not wish to become integrated with any political structures. However, also a third path existed:

„Створення Партії Зелених України. Шлях цей - конституційно законний і вписується в параметри правової плюралістської держави, в політику перебудови. Для того, щоб не створювати конфлікту з Комуністичною партією, можна було б передбачити подвійне членство в ПЗУ, оскільки партія ця не сповідувала б якусь ідеологічну доктрину, стоячи цілком на ґрунті захисту життя в усіх його виявах¹⁴⁹.

¹⁴⁷ Ukrainian Press Agency Release.

¹⁴⁸ *Молода гвардія*, 1.11.1989 (n.p.).

¹⁴⁹ *Молода гвардія*, 18.11.1989, с. 2.

A Green Party was needed for the following reasons:

...Для боротьби за прийняття політичних рішень, за якими стоять екологічні проблеми. Потребна вона і для того, щоб нове екологічне мислення з допомогою "зелених" депутатів мало помітну вагу від Верховної Ради до сільської, стало нормою нашого суспільства¹⁵⁰.

In addition, the power of the Greens could be greatly enhanced through a Green political party. What was more, although Shcherbak - in order not to clash with official political authorities on this issue - did not rule out CPSU membership in combination with membership of a Green Party, Marples interpreted this to the effect that 'by its attacks on the bureaucracy and on the nature of industrial decision making in Ukraine and by its unceasing opposition to nuclear power plants, *Zelenyi Svit* has in fact adopted a political stance that divorces it from Party Ideology (though not from the views of RUKH)¹⁵¹. It therefore came as no big surprise - although from a political point of view it was a risky step to take as Article Six of the Soviet (and Ukrainian) Constitution, ruling that the CPSU was the leading political force in the country implying that its authority may not be challenged by any other political force had not yet been abolished - that some delegates attending the Congress encouraged the creation of an initiative group to set up a Ukrainian Green Party (PZU)¹⁵².

Independence

During campaigning at local and regional levels, as well as campaigning on nuclear power in Ukraine, members of *Zelenyi Svit* had encountered numerous difficulties in having industrial projects thought to be environmentally unsound reversed, and polluting enterprises closed. A major reason for this, was not only a resistance from Ukrainian political authorities, but also due to the fact that a number of these were subordinated to the Centre and any decisions regarding their future therefore had to be settled in Moscow. To some extent this was not only bad, as initially, Ukrainian political authorities were more dogmatic and orthodox than were Soviet authorities. Thus, appealing to 'Moscow' in some cases proved a fruitful way of bypassing the Ukrainian authorities. In other cases, though, it proved a great obstacle, in that it made campaigning a lot more difficult. A general mood of dissatisfaction with this state of affairs emerged and the idea that Ukraine could only improve the state of the environment in the republic if it gained control of

¹⁵⁰ *Радянська Україна*, 16.2.1990 (n.p.).

¹⁵¹ *Radio Liberty Report* no. 104/90, 9.2.1990, p. 20.

¹⁵² *Вечірній Київ*, 5.11.1989 (n.p.).

its own territory and its own enterprises had firmly taken hold amongst *Zelenyi Svit* members by the time its First Congress took place.

Iurii Shcherbak addressed the issue of Ukrainian sovereignty at length in his speech to the Congress, arguing that an overhaul of existing economic structures was required as was a thorough reform of the enterprises themselves, to make them more environmental. Only by gaining economic sovereignty could Ukraine gain control of its own natural resources and of industries located on Ukrainian territory. However, the need for Ukrainian sovereignty was listed as one out of a total of four measures required to improve the ecological situation in Ukraine: this also required the inclusion in the Ukrainian Constitution of an article on the right of Ukrainian citizens to live in an environmentally safe environment, increasing the percentage of the gross national product spent on environmental issues from 1.2 to 3 percent and full glasnost on data regarding the state of the environment¹⁵³.

Several of the Congress delegates called for *Zelenyi Svit* to be represented in the Ukrainian Parliament, *Verkhovna Rada*. Elections to parliament were scheduled for March 1990 and it is thus understandable that those Greens who favoured a Green Party were in a hurry to create one. The good results the Greens had fielded for the March 1989 elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies no doubt also encouraged such calls. Nine USSR People's Deputies from Ukraine attended the *Zelenyi Svit* Congress and some of these - Oliynyk, Sanduliak, Bratun, Burykh and Kutsenko, in addition to Shcherbak - addressed the participants of the Congress¹⁵⁴.

While getting a more political movement, *Zelenyi Svit* called - as its representatives had done on numerous previous occasions - for uniting everyone, regardless of social, national or political status, to act uncompromisingly and responsibly to protect 'Mother Earth':

Нам усім - робітникам, селянам, інтелігенції, працівникам партійних організацій і рад, представникам громадських організацій необхідно об'єднатись, спільно діяти в ім'я врятування життя на планеті¹⁵⁵.

Despite its somewhat critical attitude towards *Derzhkompryroda* and towards CPU policies on the environment, *Zelenyi Svit* succeeded in opening a broad dialogue on the environment, in which party members and CPU representatives took part. *Vechirnyi Kyiv* also registered a change in approach by *Zelenyi Svit*: one could already feel that meetings, which to some extent were still

¹⁵³ *Молода гвардія*, 18.11.1989 (п.р.), *Вечірній Київ*, 4.11.1989 (п.р.).

¹⁵⁴ *Вечірній Київ*, 5.11.1989 (п.р.).

¹⁵⁵ *Вечерняя Одесса*, 3.11.1989 (звернення - учасників мітингу "Чорнобиль": даймо їй передосторога до верховної ради і ради міністрів Української РСР).

dominated by slogans, were moving towards reflection, and directed towards concrete actions¹⁵⁶.

The Congress reelected Iurii Shcherbak as leader of *Zelenyi Svit*. Four deputy leaders were also elected: academician Dmytro Hrodzynskyi, film director Iurii Tkachenko, Anatoliy Panov and Andrii Hlazovyi. The latter was proposed by the Youth Section. Mikhail Prilutskyi - a journalist of *Literaturna Ukraina* - was elected editor of *Zelenyi Svit's* future newspaper - also that called *Zelenyi svit*. Whereas Shcherbak was unanimously reelected as leader of *Zelenyi Svit*, the deputy leaders were only elected following what *Vechirnyi Kyiv* referred to as a 'sharp democratic struggle'¹⁵⁷. Sviatoslav Dudko, who had until the Congress served as executive secretary of the association failed to be formally elected to any position and was less active in *Zelenyi Svit* following the Congress. A *Zelena Rada* consisting of 71 members - a majority of whom represented Kiev - and a secretariat of 20 were also elected by the Congress.

Future Tasks - Zelenyi Svit

Iurii Tkachenko listed three key tasks that *Zelenyi Svit* would pursue in the future. Firstly, not substituting state organs, the Greens would

Наступать "слева" на инертность, косность тех инстанций для которых честь ведомственного мушкетера превыше общечеловеческих интересов, интересов природы.

Secondly, *Zelenyi Svit* would continue to make alternative real suggestions as to how best to solve environmental problems. In order to do so, the association would organise independent ecological expert assessments of official political projects considered harmful to the environment. Thirdly, priority would be given to influencing public opinion¹⁵⁸.

Immediately after the Congress a sanctioned meeting took place outside the Republican Stadium. Several thousand people attended the meeting and a number of slogans were promoted, such as: 'there is no peaceful atom', 'remove nuclear power stations from Ukraine. People from areas affected by radiation brought the following slogans: 'we want our children to be healthy', 'we want immediate evacuation (from those areas affected by radioactive fall-out)¹⁵⁹. Other slogans included the following: 'no to ecocide!', 'yes to the Green Party!' and 'it is time for a Chernobyl Nuremberg (trial)!¹⁶⁰. One boy was arrested by police for raising the Ukrainian blue

¹⁵⁶ *Вечірній Київ*, 4.11.1989 (n.p.).

¹⁵⁷ *Вечірній Київ*, 30.10.1989 (n.p.).

¹⁵⁸ *Вечірній Київ*, 27.10.1989 (n.p.).

¹⁵⁹ *Ukrainian Press Agency Release*.

¹⁶⁰ *Вечірній Київ*, 5.11.1989 (n.p.).

and yellow flag, but people attending the meeting were informed of this and he was released shortly after they contacted the police demanding that he be set free. The meeting lasted for about two and a half hours. Most of the speakers addressed the nuclear threat hanging over Ukraine.

3.3 Official Response towards *Zelenyi Svit*

3.3.1 CPU: Support and Control

As pointed out in the introduction to this thesis, the issue of the environment was initially not considered a 'dangerous' issue by the CPSU. The first independent environmental groups that emerged were concerned with culture and the environment, restoring monuments considered to be of cultural significance and protecting old trees and forests from destruction. Throughout 1987 and 1988, however, the political side of the environmental question became more obvious as following the broadening of glasnost, more information became available on the state of the environment and on environmental pollution's impact on people's health. In Ukraine the issue of Chernobyl made the environmental movement potentially more threatening as a political force given the secrecy by which it was surrounded and the notion that Chernobyl and other environmental disasters were inflicted upon Ukraine from 'Moscow' - thus threatening to fuel nationalist sentiments, particularly in the Western parts of Ukraine.

As seen in Section One, *Zelenyi Svit* almost did not get registered with the Peace Committee due to opposition from the CPU. Similarly, attempts were made at merging *Zelenyi Svit* with *UTOP* - attempts that failed due to the lack of enthusiasm from within the ranks of *Zelenyi Svit* itself. On the other hand, by being registered under the auspices of the Ukrainian Branch of the Peace Committee under the leadership of Oles Honchar, the Greens gained a certain degree of 'semi officiality' given that the Peace Committee was a Soviet official organisation and that Gorbachev had himself linked the issues of peace and the environment in several speeches made during 1987 and 1988. What was more, USSR Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov had in a speech to the Congress of People's Deputies argued that 'we must all go Green'. Finally, Sergei Zalygin - the editor of *Novyi Mir* and head of the USSR Peace Council - had set up *Zelenyi Mir* in Moscow, thus creating precedence for such a movement to be set up also in other republics.

The CPU Social-Economic Department was present both at the first republican conference of *Zelenyi Svit* held on 25-26 April 1989 in Kiev and at the Founding Congress held on 28-29 October of the same year. Assessments of these two events were produced for the CPU Central Committee by A. Savchenko - Head of the Social-Economic Department of the CPU Central Committee. Both reports contain generally detailed information about the proceedings themselves

and address demands to form a movement in support of perestroika (*RUKH*) - in April - and *RUKH*'s attitude towards *Zelenyi Svit* in particular. Considerable attention is also given to criticisms of the CPU made by *Zelenyi Svit* activists - in the second document a recommendation as to what should be official CPU policies towards *Zelenyi Svit* was also provided, thus clearly indicating that *Zelenyi Svit* was by the Communist Party considered to be a political force that would have to be reckoned with in the future.

CPU's attitude towards *Zelenyi Svit* was rather complex - as noted by Savchenko, amongst the members of *Zelenyi Svit* were also CPSU members. And, as it turned out, these were just as critical of official environmental policies as were non-party members:

В основном выступления содержали критический анализ экологической ситуации в отдельных областях и республике в целом, изложение опыта и трудностей в практической работе самостоятельных экологических объединений на местах. Резкой критике за невнимательное отношение к проблемам экологии подверглась Кременчугский, Николаевский, Ивановский, Славутичский, Шепетовский горисполкомы и горкомы партий¹⁶¹.

However, not all criticism against official authorities was welcome - according to Savchenko many of the speakers made

Некорректные высказывания, обвинения, делались провокационные заявления и выпады в адрес партийных, советских и государственных органов¹⁶².

Comments made by guests from other republics towards the CPU were 'highly extremist politically...'. E. Kibaidze from Georgia allegedly accused party workers of being against the environment, whereas the writer and leader of the Belorussian Green Movement V. Iakovenko argued that the accident at Chernobyl opened a wide range of crimes committed by party and state organs and that the Ukrainian 'party hierarchy' on the second day after the accident evacuated its children. One Iu. Anorik was reported to have said that 'the existing system brought our country to a crisis. The entire system must be reshuffled', and he called for the foundation of an ecological union of all countries as an alternative to the USSR Council of Ministers, insisting that this union should have its own independent press.

Judging by Savchenko's report, however, not all those present voiced such 'extremist' views. Attempts at making *Zelenyi Svit* a member of *RUKH*¹⁶³ failed, and N. Kalugin's (First Deputy of

¹⁶¹ Фонд No. 1, опис No. 32, стр. No. 243, арх. 41.

¹⁶² Ibid., арх. 42.

the CPU Central Committee's Social-Economic Department) address to the Conference, in which he listed measures taken by the CPU to improve the state of the environment

В целом папца поддержку у конструктивно настроенной части делегатов и большинства членов секретариата. Репительно выступили против действий экстремистов члены секретариата ассоциации Ю.В. Мищенко, А.П. Глазовый.

Due to attempts by nationalist/anti-Soviet sentiments to gain the upper hand within *Zelenyi Svit* (direct mention was made of V. Chornovil of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union) - which was referred to as a 'workers' ecological movement', Savchenko made the following recommendation:

Это требует от партийных, советских и хозяйственных органов внимательного изучения общественного мнения, безотлагательной организации практического решения острых вопросов, обоснованно поставленных трудящимися на состоявшихся экологических митингах и других собраниях, инициативных и своевременных действий в связи с проведением таких мероприятий впредь.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶³ No exact figure for how many members of *Zelenyi Svit* were simultaneously also members of *RUKH*, exist. However, *Zelenyi Svit* as a movement was favourable to the initiative to create a movement in support of perestroika and conducted several joint actions together with *RUKH* following the emergence of the latter. A breakdown of delegates to the Second Congress of *RUKH* by membership of civil and political organisations (see *Ukrainian Reporter*, vol.1, no. 1, 1991, p. 5) produced the following figures:

Civil and Political Organisation	Percentage of Delegates
RUKH	98.02
Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society	25.36
Ukrainian Republican Party	12.66
Democratic Party of Ukraine	6.15
Memorial	4.90
<i>Zelenyi Svit</i>	1.82
CPSU	1.30
SNUM (Ukr. Student Society)	1.04
Spadshyna	0.73
Democratic Platform of CPSU	0.68
Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party	0.47
Peasants Democratic Party	0.42
<i>Komsomol</i>	0.21

The figure in this table indicates how many *delegates* were also members of *Zelenyi Svit*. The number of rank-and-file members of both organisations was likely to be higher. There were also *Zelenyi Svit* members who sympathized with *RUKH* without actually being members of it. Moreover, the Second *RUKH* Congress took place in 1990, when the political situation in Ukraine was a lot more polarized than was the case in 1989, prior to the formation of political parties and prior to the Declaration of Ukrainian Sovereignty. Thus, support of *RUKH* was probably higher in 1989 than in 1990. Despite such support, however, the Green Movement was initially as we have seen above, cautious not to create conflict with the CPU. Such concern, together with a wish to be completely independent, seem to have brought about the decision made at the *Zelenyi Svit* Conference.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, apk. 44.

The *Zelenyi Svit* Conference had proved, argued Savchenko, that the CPU could control the movement if

Партийные комитеты, первичные парторганизации при активной и умелой работе могут проводить свою линию, добиваться поддержки большинства, успешно противостоять экстремистски настроенным неформальным объединениям и группам, давать отпор их лидерам, не допустить проникновения в руководящие органы этого движения функционеров из НДУ, УКК, УХС, УПДЛ.

To secure that this would be the case also in the future, it was recommended that party officials and representatives from various ministries be present at future meetings of *Zelenyi Svit* to present official views and gain support for them. To control the 'opposition' within the movement, a suggestion was put forward that whenever necessary, the CPU should

Дать отпор экстремистам, демагогам, клеветникам и авантюристам. В ряде случаев было бы целесообразно присутствие на массовых мероприятиях и лиц прокурорского надзора, которые могли бы дать пояснения по фактам нарушения Конституции СССР, советских законов¹⁶⁵.

Local party committees were ordered to strengthen party influence over independent ecological groups and to speed up decisions regarding the environment and people's health. In other words a two tier approach was elaborated where, on the one hand, the CPU would actively seek to control the Green Movement from within, while at the same time attempt to appease the more extremist groupings by actively seeking to improve the state of the environment and - should it be required - take legal action against these groupings to keep them 'on the carpet' - i.e. not to voice 'extremist' views on the national issue.

It is understandable that the CPU was keen on keeping nationalist sentiments under control given that these could cause problems in CPU's relations to the CPSU in Moscow. At the time this report was written, the CPU leadership probably thought that environmental questions could either be solved in Ukraine alone, or that it would prove not too difficult to get the support of 'Moscow' to solve these issues.

Towards the end of 1989, however, when the Founding Congress of *Zelenyi Svit* took place in Kiev, the political situation in Ukraine had become more radicalised. This also reflected itself in the speeches that were made at the Congress, where *RUKII* representatives suggested the elaboration of a joint ecological platform and where calls were made for a Green Party to be set

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, apk. 45.

up. Despite this, however, Savchenko noted a more constructive approach towards the CPU than earlier:

На з'їзді виявилась більш конструктивна ніж раніше позиція "Зеленого Світу" щодо взаємодії з Компартією. В складі делегатів було чимало членів КПРС, у тому числі перший секретар Московського райкому партії м. Києва В.І. Дроботун, зав. ідеологічним відділом Миколаївського обкому партії А.Д. Коваль. Про тісні контакти з партійними органами розповідали в своїх виступах делегати з Миколаївської і Кримської областей¹⁶⁶.

Speeches by party delegates were well received, argued Savchenko, and he also pointed out as a positive aspect of *Zelenyi Svit*-CPU relations that attempts by some delegates to prohibit party workers from joining the Green Movement were not endorsed by the Congress. Savchenko's report also claimed that overall the programme and the statute of *Zelenyi Svit* were supportive of the party line on social-economic and environmental issues. To the extent criticism was raised, it had to be admitted that several of these criticisms were well founded. On these grounds, a series of changes in Ukrainian environmental policies were recommended to make sure that an image of the CPU as that of an environmental reformist was created¹⁶⁷. Moreover, to balance the popularity of *Zelenyi Svit* it was recommended that the Society for Environmental Protection be given a thorough overhaul, putting its structure and activities more in line with those of *Zelenyi Svit*.

It may seem, from the above that the CPU responded well to *Zelenyi Svit*'s propositions on the grounds that these were sound from an environmental point of view. To some extent this may have been the case. On the other hand, however, orders were given from Moscow to strengthen efforts to improve the state of the environment in the republics from 1987 onwards. Most of those

¹⁶⁶ Фонд №. 1, опис №. 32, спр. №. 243, арк. 102.

¹⁶⁷ Amongst these measures were the following: 1) to increase control with the implementation of resolution No. 357 of the Ukrainian CPU and the Ukrainian Council of Ministers of 18 November 1988 "Про докорінну перебудову справи охорони природи в республіці", and also the enforcement of several resolutions of the CPU Central Committee on the Improvement of the Environment. 2) recommend that the Collegium of *Derzhkompriroda* examine the materials of the Congress and take into account constructive criticisms raised by *Zelenyi Svit*. Strengthen the influence of the CPU on the coordination of environmental groups and of *Zelenyi Svit*. 3) Recommend that the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and *Derzhkompriroda* conduct a sociological study of public opinion with regard to the most urgent environmental issues in Ukraine 4) consider the possibility of *Derzhkompriroda* issuing a monthly environmental journal 5) to speed up the passing of a Resolution on Improving Environmental Safety in Ukraine in the Ukrainian Parliament. Recommend to the Presidium that it examine the suggestion of subordinating *Derzhkompriroda* to the Parliament. 6) Recommend to the Presidium of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers that it spread information about the state of the environment, speed up the ratification of the Resolution on *Derzhkompriroda* and examine the possibilities of setting up a modern scientific-methodological center attached to USSR *Goskompriroda* and a similar center by the USSR Academy of Sciences.

measures suggested by Savchenko were measures that had already been initiated from Moscow and which would merely be speeded up in response to the emergence of *Zelenyi Svit*. As seen in Chapter Two and as will be seen in the Case Study below, however, local party organisations in particularly polluted areas increasingly came to voice dissatisfaction with the state of the environment in their areas and the lack of measures taken centrally - in Kiev and in Moscow - to address them properly.

As regards *Zelenyi Svit*, there was some disagreement regarding policies towards the CPU. On the one hand, the view was expressed that *Zelenyi Svit* must be completely independent from party and state structures. Consequently no party members must be allowed to join *Zelenyi Svit*. On the other hand - and this was a view commonly held by *Zelenyi Svit*'s leadership - the Green Movement ought to be open to everyone - regardless of personal political views - who wanted to actively contribute towards the improvement of the Ukrainian environment. For tactical reasons it would also pay off not to antagonise the CPU too much as this would only lead to confrontation and restrictions being imposed on the activities of the Greens. Thus, although *Zelenyi Svit* did become increasingly radicalised as the limits of glasnost were being pushed and as the association gained massive public support for its campaigns, initially it was wary of expressing any overt political views and care was taken not to associate *Zelenyi Svit* with any particular political movement/grouping (e.g. *RUKH*, *URP*).

I have now examined official CPU policies towards the Greens as defined centrally, in Kiev. How did local and oblast party organisations respond to the Greens? This question will be addressed in greater detail in the case study, suffice it here to say that in the case of the Nikolaev Greens, the Party's attitude was ambivalent - on the one hand taking part in the activities of the Greens, on the other hand trying to keep it under control so that its campaign would not get out of hand. This also seems to have been the case in the Crimea, where a massive campaign to prevent the construction of a nuclear power station at the Kerch Peninsula was launched in the late 1980s. V. Drobotun - first secretary of the Moscow raikom party organisation - in Kiev in an interview published in *Literaturna Ukraina* argued that it was perfectly natural for the raikom to become a collective member of *Zelenyi Svit* given that the Moscow region was one of the most polluted areas of Kiev. Moreover, several members of the intelligentsia living in the region were concerned with the state of the environment and had already over a longer period of time and efficiently worked within *Zelenyi Svit*. Drobotun characterised them as 'like-minded' and therefore it made sense to work together within one organisation to facilitate an improvement in the state of the environment. The Moscow raikom decided to join *Zelenyi Svit* in the autumn of 1989 and was admitted as a collective member in December the same year. Joining forces with

Zelenyi Svit had, according to Drobotun had a positive effect on the local environment, although it would be wrong to say that it had improved significantly¹⁶⁸.

It seems that several factors were decisive in determining local and regional party organisations' attitude towards the emerging Green Movement. To some extent this had to do with the type of activities the Greens engaged in - nuclear power and military issues were obviously politically more sensitive issues than say, pollution from local transport, ecological education and concern about high levels of nitrates in food products. Moreover, calls for access to data linking environmental pollution with health (previously such information was not available to the general public) also did not please local party organisations. In Western regions, where the link between pollution imposed on Ukraine by an indifferent 'Moscow' and environmental and health degradation was soon established, local party organs objected to what they perceived of as outbursts of 'nationalism' and 'extremism'.

I got the following response, when asking the respondents of my survey to describe the CPU's attitude towards them and their activities:

Table 3.3 CPU Attitude towards the Greens

Group	Positive	Didn't disturb our work	Disturbed our work	Negative
Ternopil obl. ZS			X	
Mukachevo ZS			X	X
Bukovina ZS			X	X
Lutsk ZS			X	
Dnipropetrovsk obl. ZS			X	
Horlivka ZS			X	X
Mariupol ZS	X			
Vinnytsia obl. ZS				X
Uman ZS		X		
Nikolaev obl. ZS				X
Dzarylgach (Kherson)			X	
Ecocentre (Kherson)				X
Odessa Greens		X		

Judging from the survey, their response was predominantly negative. In terms of geographical location, there is also not much difference: the four first groups represent West Ukraine, the three following ones are East Ukrainian, Vinnytsia and Uman represent Central Ukraine and the four latter ones are South Ukrainian. To the extent there is a difference in party

¹⁶⁸ *Література України*, 1.3.1990, с. 4.

attitude this has to do with the founding date of the movement. As pointed out by the Mariupol Greens (the Committee to Protect the Aral Sea, which was set up in 1989), 'the leadership of the party gorkom joined the committee as a member. This was very fashionable at the time'.

When asked how local and regional party organisations interfered with the work of the Greens, I got various replies. In Ternopil, for instance, following the first mass environmental meeting, organised by the 'Noosphere' club, reprisals against its leadership took place. Ihor Pushkar, the most active leader, was sacked from his job. Similar repressions were not only initiated against Greens, but also against leaders of other independent groups and movements. The Mukachevo Greens, who were campaigning actively against a military radar station alleged that they were victimised at work, were being monitored by the KGB, the police and the procurator's office, and that local authorities were reluctant to register their group, which was set up prior to the emergence of *Zelenyi Svit* as an all-Ukrainian environmental association in October 1989. As seen above, Green-minded people in Dnipropetrovsk organised an ecological seminar under the auspices of the *Komsomol* long before Gorbachev came to power in the USSR. Initially they had no problems with the local party organisation:

Организационные структуры вначале не придавали значение деятельности семинара, тем более, он был в рамках официальной политучебы. Я даже получал грамоты и почетные знаки за умение организовать молодежь. Потом появилось раздражение, что мы интересуемся не тем, чем надо. Семинар официально закрыли. Органы безопасности интересовались некоторыми программами работы.

Bagin of the Horlivka *Zelenyi Svit* (Donetsk) expressed the view that the Greens were ideological enemies of the Communist Party as they demanded access to information that had so far been kept away from the general public and labelled 'state secret'. In Vinnytsia the Greens were being characterised as a 'destructive force' in the local mass media and also in speeches made by party and other officials. The collection of signatures against the construction of new reactors at South Ukraine and Khmelnytskyi nuclear power stations were condemned in particular. In Nikolaev, the CPU representatives allegedly adopted a positive attitude towards the Greens on the surface, but restricted their work through the KGB. In Kherson Greens were also met with hostility:

Мы были первой общественной организацией в городе, районе и в области. Наша деятельность не укладывалась им в наши известные рамки, стала сумятицу в умах. Самым "страшным" было то, что нас понимал народ. Политика началась с движения зеленых...

Local party organisations, on the other hand, passed their grievances about the Greens on to the CPU Central Committee, and a selection of these letters can be found in the State Archives in Kiev. The participants of the XXIV Kirovohrad regional party conference (Kirovohrad oblast) 'with pain in their hearts' informed the Central Committee about an incident that had taken place on 22 April (Earth Day) in Kiev during an ecological meeting to commemorate the Chernobyl accident:

Комуністи, всі трудящі району заслужують дії екстремістски настроєних елементів та хуліганствующих молодчиків, які з винятковим цинізмом наплюжили пам'ять В. І. Леніна, державні символи СРСР, виступали з нападками на КПРС та Радянський уряд¹⁶⁹.

The indignant party members urged that the organisers of the meeting be severely punished for this act of vandalism. A similar complaint about the same meeting was received from party veterans from Kiev. The complaint was signed by the presidents of nine regional party veteran councils and brought to the attention of the CPU Central Committee that several *SNUM*¹⁷⁰ activists had shouted slogans against Lenin and in other ways try to discredit Lenin at the 120th anniversary of his birthday. Thus, they asked:

И это называется экологической демонстрацией, и это называется демократией? Странно и то, что этих фашиствующих молодчиков не ошаровали шедшие в колонне представители Народного Руху Украины, общественных организаций "Зеленый свет", "Мемориал" и др. Да и неудивительно. Ведь уже на митинге, который вел паролный депутат СССР В. Яворивский, эти настроения были подогреты откровенными нападками на КПСС, Компартию Украины, правительство республики¹⁷¹.

The signatories urged that measures be taken so as not only to avoid a future Chernobyl but also to avoid a similar expression of 'extremist-nationalist' sentiments - which in their view was just as dangerous. Another letter was sent from the Secretary of the Chernihiv oblast party committee regarding a 'culturological' action - "Dzvin-90" - where 'nationalist' and 'extremist' views were voiced¹⁷². Common to all these complaints, however, is that no *Zelenyi Svit* activists are being criticised for unacceptable behaviour per se. And as will be shown in Chapter Eight,

¹⁶⁹ Фонд No. 1, опис No. 32, спр. No. 369, арк. 20.

¹⁷⁰ *SNUM* was one of the most powerful student groups in Kiev at the time and among those that organised the hunger strike against Prime Minister Fokin's government in November 1990.

¹⁷¹ Фонд No. 1, опис No. 32, спр. No. 369, арк. 63.

¹⁷² Фонд No. 1, опис No. 32, спр. No. 369, арк. 120-23.

Zelenyi Svit and later also *PZU* went to a great effort to curb nationalist (as opposed to national) sentiments within the Green Movement.

3.3.2 Local Authorities and the Greens

Local authorities - in the same way as the CPU - responded in a number of different ways to the emergence of Green groups in their areas and to their activities. As seen above, activists in Dniprodzherzhinsk complained that local authorities made it very difficult to register groups locally. Local administrations in some instances also tried to prevent various campaigns from going ahead. A good example is the planned anti-nuclear walk between Netyshyn and Kiev (through Narodichi). The walk should have started in parallel with the First Congress of *Zelenyi Svit* on 27 October 1989 and was scheduled to finish on 3 November. However, local administrations forbid it on the grounds that it was anti-nuclear power station. The *Zelenyi Svit* Congress then appealed to party organs and local council in Khmelnytskyi oblast as well as to deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet to allow the walk to go ahead as planned¹⁷³. The walk, which was organised together with RUKH 'for a more objective examination of the situation in those places where the nuclear power stations were located, the heightening of people's ecological culture and the development of a packet of propositions on improving environmental legislation'¹⁷⁴, was eventually allowed to go ahead, following the route Slavuta, Shepetovka, Novohrad-Volynskiy, Korosten, Ovruch, Narodichi, Polesskoe, Ivankov and Vyshhorod. The walk was ended with a meeting in Kiev.

The deputy leader of Kiev gorispolkom, V. N. Kocherga, on the other hand, was positive towards *Zelenyi Svit* in general, making the following assessment of the Inaugural Congress:

Выступления писателя Олеса Гончара и других ораторов были конструктивными, они призывали к единению, ведь мы только сообща можем отодвинуть зловещую тень Чернобыля. Весьма интересна мысль о праве каждого на проживание в экологически чистой среде¹⁷⁵.

In the survey local groups were asked how they were treated by local authorities in the aftermath of their emergence. I obtained the following results:

¹⁷³ *Вечірній Київ*, 5.11.1989 (п.р.).

¹⁷⁴ *Вечірній Київ*, 27.10.1989 (п.р.).

¹⁷⁵ *Вечірній Київ*, 4.11.1989 (п.р.).

Table 3.4 Local Authorities' Attitudes towards the Greens

Group	Disturbed us	Did not disturb us	Other
Ternopil oblast ZS	X		
Mukachevo ZS	X		
Bukovina ZS	X		
Lutsk ZS	X		
Dnipropetrovsk oblast ZS			X
Donetsk ZS		X	
Mariupol Greens		X	
Vinnitsia oblast ZS			X
Uman ZS		X	
Nikolaev oblast ZS	X		
Dzharylgach (Kherson)	X		
Ecocentre (Kherson)			X
Odessa Greens	X		

Bukovina *Zelenyi Svit* noticed a change in local authorities' attitudes towards the Greens, arguing that of late the latter had initiated a dialogue with them. The Dnipropetrovsk Greens claimed that since local authorities only worked with official organisations, they only turned to local authorities as individuals. On some occasions such contacts were successful and resulted in local problems being solved. In Horlivka, local authorities left the Greens in peace - i.e. did not disturb them - and in Mariupol relations were very good. This may be explained by the fact that the Committee to Save the Azov Sea was set up with the blessing and the participation of local authorities/the local party organisation and it appeared at a later stage than most of the other respondents. The Uman Greens described relations with local authorities as 'pragmatic', whereas the Nikolaev Greens voiced the view that local authorities responded to them in exactly the same way as did the local party organisation in that the former was subordinated to the latter. In Kherson oblast relations to local authorities were 'very difficult', although over time they did improve. Such relations were also difficult in Odessa, whereas the Eco-centre - which is also a relatively new organisation - described relations as 'normal'.

It is again interesting to note that whereas all the West-Ukrainian respondents argued that local authorities tried to interfere with their work, not one of the East-Ukrainian groups thought that local authorities tried to interfere in their work. This may be explained in terms of stronger political discord in the West-Ukrainian oblasts as well as by the fact that the Green groups were stronger in the Western areas in terms of membership and turnout at meeting and pickets. In that sense, the activities of the Greens who voiced generally more radical views and demands than those of the East, posed more of a 'threat' to local authorities than was the case in the East.

As will be seen in the case study (Chapters Six and Seven) in the case of the Nikolaev Greens, however, although initially local authorities were somewhat cautious of their activities, they soon became a powerful ally of the Greens in passing resolutions undermining decisions made in 'Moscow' to expand the SB EK. Similar situations may also have occurred elsewhere. It is therefore not possible to talk about a coherent policy towards the Greens common to local authorities throughout Ukraine. Rather such policies - in many cases it was not even possible to identify a clear policy, but rather a set of ad-hoc responses to actions undertaken by the Greens - were determined by a number of factors such as *Zelenyi Svit*'s policies, its support among the local population, the issues in question and the time period, during which these issues were addressed. Plachynda expressed the view that the Communist Party was entirely negative towards the Green Movement: 'CPU had a bad relationship towards us. When we held our first meetings, police was present but it did not know how to relate to us as it had no instructions. We marched down Khreshchatyk while they stood by looking, not knowing what to do with us. Then instructions appeared. For instance, we had to pay for meetings'¹⁷⁶. However, as will be seen in Chapters Six and Seven, the CPU's relationship with the Greens was somewhat more complex.

3.4 Politicisation and Discord

3.4.1 Local Elections/Elections to *Verkhovna Rada* (4 March 1990)

Although an initiative group had been set up to form a Green Party, the *Partiia Zelenykh Ukrainy (PZU)* was not formally established until April 1990. It was therefore not surprising that the Green Movement, following its success in the elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies a year earlier, put forward its own candidates for both local and national elections in March 1990. Nomination for the 450 seats in the parliament¹⁷⁷ started on 3 November 1989 and candidates had to be approved by a Central Electoral Commission (CEC) numbering 31 members, and 450 District Electoral Commissions (DEC). A meeting of *Zelena Rada* was called in December 1989, at which a list of candidates to *Verkhovna Rada* and the local councils was set up¹⁷⁸.

¹⁷⁶ Interview with Serhii Plachynda, Kiev, 23.5.1994.

¹⁷⁷ Ukraine chose to do without a Congress of People's Deputies and elect a unicameral Parliament - *Verkhovna Rada* - directly.

¹⁷⁸ *Молода гвардія*, 16.3.1990 (n.p.).

Registering these people officially as candidates, however, proved a difficult task. Although the Electoral Law eventually passed by the Ukrainian parliament was rather liberal - for instance it rejected the election of deputies based on quotas allocated to the CPU and other official public organisations, and the only requirement for nominating a candidate was that he/she be endorsed by a majority vote at a meeting attended by 200 or more electors¹⁷⁹ - it soon became clear that the DEC's did not follow the Electoral Law to the letter. Potichnyj argues that the reason for this might have been that the DEC's were created by the oblast executive committees and the executive committees of the local councils, most of which were controlled by arch-conservative forces¹⁸⁰. A number of infringements of the Electoral Law were recorded by the press and by the informals themselves. Informal organisations were most likely to suffer from these. The *Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society* and *Zelenyi Svit* were particularly hard hit by bureaucracy, arbitrary regulations and blunt violations of the law. *RUKH*, on the other hand, was refused registration by the Ministry of Justice until February 1990, which effectively prevented it from participating in the elections as the deadline for nominations was 4 February.

In the case of the *Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society*, DEC's in some cases refused to register its candidacies on the grounds that the Central Election Commission had not certified the Society's status as a legal organisation. The chairman of the latter, V. Boiko, on the other hand claimed that there was no need for this as the Society was officially registered on 20 May 1989. Those DEC's which refused to register candidates from the Language Society were ordered to reverse their decisions by the Central Election Commission. This order was ignored by DEC's in Kharkiv, Ternopil, Rivne and Nikolaev¹⁸¹.

As for the Greens, in Kiev they were allowed to register by some regional councils (e.g. Pechersk region), whereas in other regions their candidacies were turned down. To give but one example, in the Vatuhinskyi region Greens were only registered if they were put forward as candidates by workers' collectives and thus officially did not stand as *Zelenyi Svit* representatives¹⁸². Eight candidates failed to register due to obstacles put in their way by the DEC's; nomination meetings were sometimes held at an inconvenient time, or the time was changed on a very short notice with only a few 'reliable' people being notified about the change. In some instances permission for holding meetings was not granted and the decision was not given in writing, which effectively prevented the Greens from making an appeal¹⁸³.

¹⁷⁹ Peter J. Potichnyj, 'The March 1990 Elections in Ukraine', Bohdan Krawchenko (ed.), *Ukrainian Past, Ukrainian Present* (London: Macmillan, 1993), p. 123.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

¹⁸¹ *Культура и життя* 11.12.1989 (n.p.).

¹⁸² *Молода гвардія*, 23.2.1990 (n.p.).

¹⁸³ *Молод України*, 1.2.1990 (n.p.).

Similar problems were encountered in other parts of Ukraine. In the South, for instance, Viktor Bilodid, an engineer working at the South Ukrainian nuclear power station and the initiator of the campaign against further expansion of the South Ukrainian Energy Complex, was put forward as a candidate by the local Green movement in electoral district No 288. His candidacy, however, was refused by the Arbusinka electoral district election committee on the grounds that the General Director of the Energy Complex, Volodymyr Fuks, had been put forward as a candidate in the very same district. Besides, it was argued, the Iuzhnoukrainsk Green Movement did not have its own statute. Consequently Bilodid's candidacy could not be approved. Although the electoral committee sought to justify its decision by referring to the electoral law, its interpretation of this law was open to question. It was true that the Green Movement in Iuzhnoukrainsk did not have its own statute. However, it was a collective member of the Nikolaev oblast association *Zelenyi Mir*, whose statute had been registered. Thus the refusal to register Bilodid as a candidate seemed to be motivated more by political than legal considerations¹⁸⁴.

The obstacles encountered during the election campaign by the *Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society* and by *Zelenyi Svit* prompted D. Pavlyehko and Iu. Shcherbak - both USSR People's Deputies - to lodge a formal complaint regarding violations of the Electoral Law during the registration of candidates, with *Verkhovna Rada*. Shcherbak had himself been put forward as a candidate in one of the Kiev electoral districts¹⁸⁵. Their complaint was passed on to the Central Electoral Commission on the basis of point 15, article 22 of the Electoral Law to clarify the facts provided by the two deputies and to examine them in line with existing legislation. If necessary, the Central Election Commission would refer the case to *Verkhovna Rada* for clarification of the Electoral Law¹⁸⁶. There was, however, not much chance of the complaint being successful. The Secretary of the Central Election Commission, M. Lytvyn, admitted that a large number of protests had been lodged with the commission. However, most complaints were ignored. Boiko dismissed accusations to the effect that the District Election Commissions had erected 'artificial obstacles' to prevent candidates from informal groups being registered, as 'groundless attempts to discredit democratically elected electoral organisations'. Sixty eight of 120 appeals were reviewed. Of these, 42 were upheld and only 16 reverted. Four of the latter concerned candidates from the Shevchenko Society and *Zelenyi Svit*¹⁸⁷. Rallies and meetings were held in several cities and towns throughout Ukraine to challenge the rulings of the DEC's¹⁸⁸. Critical articles regarding individual candidates also appeared in the Ukrainian press during the election campaign.

¹⁸⁴ *Радянська Україна*, 30.1.1990 (n.p.).

¹⁸⁵ *Зелений світ*, no. 12, 1990, c. 1.

¹⁸⁶ *Літературна Україна*, 15.2.1990 (n.p.).

¹⁸⁷ *Радянська Україна*, 4.2.1990 (n.p.).

¹⁸⁸ For an account of such meetings in Nikolaev, see Chapters Six and Seven.

Despite the obstacles put in *Zelenyi Svit's* way, Rostyslav Tverdostup, leader of the Ternopil oblast branch of *Zelenyi Svit*, concluded that the Greens had achieved 'considerable success' in the elections. Although dozens of candidates were denied even the right of registration¹⁸⁹ altogether 43 candidates from the following oblasts were elected to the oblast councils: Voroshilovhrad (2), Lviv (2), Chernihiv (2), Khmelnytskyi (2), Ternopil (2), Ivano-Frankivsk (1), Zhytomyr (1), Odessa (8), Vinnytsia (4), Sumy (1), Dnipropetrovsk (1), Volynia (2), Zaporizhzhia (1), Cherkassy (2), Nikolaev (11), Chernivtsi (1) and the Crimea (1). There had also been significant success in elections to local councils, but *Zelenyi Svit* did not have any exact figure for how many people were elected¹⁹⁰. There was no breakdown regarding how many people were elected as *Zelenyi Svit* representatives and how many made it as 'independents', but the article noted that several of the Green candidates 'passed' as a result of support from local enterprises, institutions and assemblies. *Zelena Rada* had given its support to three candidates from Kiev to *Verkhovna Rada*: O. Kotsibua, E. Proniuk and V. Shovkoshitnyi. These and seven other candidates supported by *Zelenyi Svit* were elected to the Ukrainian Parliament¹⁹¹.

Despite the obstacles that were put in *Zelenyi Svit's* way during the election campaign, the Green Movement's political impact by early 1990 was significant. As noted in Chapter Two, in February 1990 a special session of *Verkhovna Rada* was called to discuss ecological issues and to pass a Law on Environmental Protection. The fact that three members of *Zelenyi Svit* from Kiev (Nataliia Preobrazhenska, Anatoliy Panov and Evhen Korbetskyi) were invited to attend the session is in itself an indication that the authorities took the organisation seriously as well as it having become so powerful due to a number of successful campaigns that it could not easily be overlooked or ignored.

¹⁸⁹ Твердоступ (n.d.), с. 3.

¹⁹⁰ Zolotukhin was approached for a rough estimate. Having consulted with other Greens he suggested that roughly 1% of the total number of deputies were Greens. His estimate was made on the following basis: The highest number of Green deputies to oblast and local council were found in Nikolaev: 10 out of 120 deputies in the oblast Soviet were Greens, as were seven of 90 city soviet deputies and another three (of 50-60 deputies) in the regional (raion) councils. Bearing in mind that there are 25 oblasts in Ukraine, it is reasonable to assume that the number of Greens to oblast and local council did not exceed 500 of a total of approximately 75,000, i.e. roughly 1% of the total number. Zolotukhin's estimate is a maximum estimate (20 deputies per oblast). The real figure, judging by the response I got from my survey, is likely to be considerably less - somewhere between 200 and 250. It is, however, not easy to give an accurate estimate, as many people sympathetic towards the Greens were elected as independents. Thus, although they might vote with the Greens, they cannot technically be defined as Greens. Similarly, some deputies who were elected as 'Greens' changed their allegiances once elected.

¹⁹¹ *Молода гвардія*, 16.3.1990 (n.p.).

3.4.2 The Emergence of the Green Party of Ukraine

On 26 April 1990 - on the fourth anniversary of the Chernobyl accident - the Green Party of Ukraine was founded. Shortly afterwards, it was officially registered as the third political party in Ukraine (after *URP* and the Democratic Peasants' Party). As *PZU* is considered in Chapter Five, I will not go into detail about the emergence and development of the Green Party here. The emergence of the Green Party and also of other political parties did, however, have a considerable impact on the Green Movement. Some explanation regarding how *Zelenyi Svit* was affected is thus required in order to get a firmer understanding of later developments in the Movement itself.

According to the Soviet Constitution, the *CPSU* was the leading force in Soviet society. In practice this meant that the Communist Party was the only legitimate party and that no other political parties could be set up to challenge its power. In February 1990 the *CPSU* Central Committee, following big demonstrations attended by several hundred thousand people in Moscow and elsewhere, changed Article Six of the Constitution, thus opening the way for the establishment of other political parties, although it was not until the following October that they were specifically legalised. In Ukraine, the first political party to appear was the *Ukrainian Republican Party (URP)*, which was founded on the base of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union - a group promoting human rights in Ukraine which emerged after the signing of the Helsinki Accord (1975) and which was composed primarily by dissidents. Shortly afterwards, the Democratic Agrarian Party, headed by Serhii Plachynda, former leader of *Zelenyi Svit*, emerged on the political scene, followed by *PZU* and a large number of other parties.

As pointed out above, the Ukrainian Green Movement was not a homogenous movement; people of different political orientations, ages and backgrounds joined its ranks - some because they were generally concerned about the deteriorating state of the Ukrainian environment, others because they wished to take part in the political process and there were not so many movements to choose between. Once it became possible to set up more radical movements and even parties several activists left the Greens and joined other political forces. A substantial number of the most visible activists within *Zelenyi Svit* either left the movement altogether or shifted their attention towards the Green Party. As the members of *Zelenyi Svit* were not united behind a common 'Green' ideology, a struggle to gain control with the movement broke out between the various factions. Similarly, conflicts also emerged between those who held the view that *PZU* had a 'natural right' to control the Green Movement since it was its 'political wing', and those who did not approve of *PZU* and certainly did not condone the idea of any natural or close relationship between the two ('*Zelenyi Svit* must be completely independent').

By 1991 *Zelenyi Svit* had reached a peak in terms of achievements and political influence. Not only had it succeeded in stopping the construction of new and the expansion of existing

nuclear power stations through a series of successful campaigns which culminated in the passing of a moratorium on nuclear power adopted by the Ukrainian parliament in September 1990; it also managed to put an end to a number of environmentally harmful industrial and military projects throughout Ukraine. In terms of results, much of what the Greens aimed for had been achieved. Moreover, with the radicalisation of Soviet and Ukrainian society, the political focus shifted from environmental issues to their underlying factors such as extensive economic reform, economic and political autonomy and from late 1990 political independence. As the initial public enthusiasm for political reform started to wear off and as inflation took off, people became more introverted, focusing their attention on how to get by under changing economic conditions. Gradually it became more difficult for the Greens to mobilise people and take to the streets to draw attention to environmental issues and possibly as a result, those activists left within the movement rather than uniting to develop new strategies to tackle environmental problems under changing conditions started fighting amongst themselves for positions within the movement. Iurii Shcherbak had since 1989 managed to contain various currents and groupings. Following his departure for Moscow as a deputy to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and later as a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the first signs of conflict became visible. They continued to build up on the eve of the Second Congress of *Zelenyi Svit* which took place in Ivano-Frankivsk in March 1991.

3.4.3 Preparing for the Second Congress (March 1991)

As seen above, two groupings could be identified within *Zelenyi Svit* in the early days - the 'Ukrainians' (i.e. those who held the opinion that the Green Movement must focus on solving environmental problems in Ukraine at the expense of cultivating and expanding links with Greens abroad) and the 'globalists', who argued that the Ukrainian Green Movement was part of a larger, world-wide movement and that the two tasks must therefore be addressed in parallel. With the resignation of Plachynda in 1989, the latter gained the upper hand within the movement. Links were established with a number of Green groups in Europe and also in Canada and the United States: *BUND* and *WWF* (Germany), *Milieucontact* and *EYFA* (Holland), *Friends of the Earth* (Britain) and *Greenpeace*, to mention but a few. As a result of such contacts, Greens were invited to and travelled abroad representing the Ukrainian Green Movement at conferences and meetings. Similarly, Greens from other countries were received by *Zelenyi Svit* and introduced to the problems with which the Ukrainian Greens were faced. The international Green community on a number of occasions presented *Zelenyi Svit* with equipment (computers, fax machines, tape recorders and video cameras), as well as financial and other assistance. Accusations of nepotism, greed and irregularities therefore soon emerged within the association. It was argued that only a

limited circle of Greens from Kiev were allowed to travel and that they benefited personally from these trips by not handing over to *Zelenyi Svit* equipment intended for the association. Some people also felt that the association was suffering from extensive foreign travel among its leadership. Those towards whom such accusations were made responded by arguing that these accusations were rooted in jealousy, a lack of talent and a lack of understanding of 'Green' ideas.

The Report of the Control Revision Commission

On the background of this *Zelena Rada* on 14 July 1990 decided to sort this conflict out. It was decided that a revision of *Zelenyi Svit*'s organisational and financial activities during the first six months of 1990 would be conducted by the Control Revision Commission over the summer and that a report would be produced shortly after the conclusion of its work on 1 September. The report was handed over to the Secretariat by the three members of the Control Revision Commission (O. Dupak, O. Izotenko and M. Malyshko) on 12 December 1990, following a request made by the latter on 5 December¹⁹².

The report exposed a number of irregularities and sharply criticised the Secretariat for being responsible for most of these. Firstly, the Secretariat had exceeded its powers by employing three additional members of staff for the Podil office and seven members of the editorial board of the newspaper *Zelenyi Svit* without the consent of *Zelena Rada*. The First Congress had decided to hire staff to run the Green office on a daily basis and *Zelena Rada* had shortly afterwards - on 16 December 1989 - confirmed the appointment of four people (a chief secretary, a reader, an accountant and a secretary-cashier). No permission was given by *Zelena Rada* to hire additional staff. The issue was further aggravated by the fact that the three people appointed to the office were all members of the Secretariat! Thus Iurii Myshchenko (Kiev) became secretary, Nataliia Preobrazhenska (Kiev) was appointed a reader and Volodymyr Tikhyi (Kiev) was made chief secretary of *Zelenyi Svit*'s Expert Collegium. The latter post was later taken over by Serhii Fedorinchuk (Kiev). Another member of the Secretariat, Andrii Hlazovyi (Kiev) was made departmental editor of *Zelenyi svit*. This, wrote the Control Revision Commission, constituted a gross violation of the statute, which ruled that it was the prerogative of *Zelena Rada* to set the number and compose the list of *Zelenyi Svit*'s full-time employees.

Secondly, the Secretariat was criticised for its emphasis on international activities. The report argued that such work was given priority at the expense of practical environmental work within Ukraine itself:

¹⁹² Рішення секретаріату асоціації "Зелений Світ" від 15.12.90 р. з приводу акту контрольно-ревізійної комісії.

Основним напрямком діяльності і повсякденних турбот членів Секретаріату стали міжнародні зв'язки, поїздки за кордон і відповідні прийоми закордонних гостей. Причому монополізація цієї діяльності групою членів Секретаріату (Демищенко, Панов, Міщенко, Глазовий, Тихий, Курикін) без залучення фахівців - членів "Зеленого Світу", "зелених депутатів", обласних, міських організацій, екологічних громадських об'єднань "Зеленого Світу" всієї України приносить велику шкоду авторитетові асоціації і всьому екологічному рухові. І ці контакти все більше приймають приватний характер, хоча діють вони від імені "Зеленого Світу"¹⁹³.

Although the Secretariat had appointed additional staff to run the *Zelenyi Svit* headquarters, no improvement could be seen in the way the Secretariat conducted its affairs. Poor organisation and arbitrariness was rife; the Secretariat's meetings were seldom planned and little or no information was passed on to its members beforehand. Key issues such as the activities of local and regional groups and the results of public expert assessments of environmentally harmful projects were ignored as was the question of how best to co-ordinate and provide methodological assistance to local organisations. Crucial financial issues were not addressed adequately, nor were proper time frames set for the implementation of decisions made not only by the Secretariat but also by the Congress and *Zelena Rada*. Implementation was further complicated by poor delegation of responsibilities within the Secretariat and by a lack of feedback on performance¹⁹⁴.

The shortcomings of the Secretariat were further aggravated by poor attendance at its weekly meetings. Throughout 1990, it met 45 times. On average these meetings were attended by no more than six-seven - of a total of 21 - members. Thus, in most cases decisions were made without a quorum by a group of Kiev activists. It was also a problem that those who were simultaneously appointed members of the Secretariat while at the same time holding positions in *Zelenyi Svit*'s staff were amongst those who attended these meetings on a regular basis:

...Наявність постійної більшості штатних працівників-членів Секретаріату серед присутніх на засіданнях визначає характер рішень, що приймалися, знижує вимогливість до роботи штатного апарату. Не випадково, що не затверджено регламент роботи Секретаріату і розподіл обов'язків між членами Секретаріату і штатними працівниками¹⁹⁵.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

¹⁹⁴ The report concluded that the Secretariat had failed to implement several decisions made by the Congress. For instance, the Expert Commission had not yet started to function. Similarly, a Legal Commission had yet to be established. Protocols were not compiled properly and no list containing the names of *Zelena Rada*'s and the Secretariat's members had so far been published in *Zelenyi svit*.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

Thirdly, the revision also revealed that there was insufficient accountability for funds in *Zelenyi Svit*. Only Shcherbak, as the leader of *Zelenyi Svit*, and Anatolyi Panov, as director of the Podil office, had the right to sign documents on the use of the association's funds. However, as a rule rather than the exception, such documents were signed by other people. Furthermore, large sums that were spent on various projects and other activities were not broken down for costs.

Gifts in the form of money or equipment from foreign Green Groups were also not sufficiently accounted for. Members of *Zelenyi Svit* were often presented with such gifts when representing the association abroad. *Zelena Rada* and also the Control Revision Commission had long recommended that a member of the Secretariat be made responsible for the registration and keeping of such gifts. Although the issue had been addressed by the Secretariat more than once it failed to appoint anyone for this task. The Commission complained that it had only received an incomplete list of funds or equipment kept by individual members of the Secretariat on behalf of the association¹⁹⁶. Thus, argued the report, the Secretariat had ignored the recommendation of *Zelena Rada* and individual members of *Zelenyi Svit* that such equipment be registered through the book-keeping and be temporarily kept by the founders of *Zelenyi Svit*: the Peace Committee or *Derzhkompriroda*¹⁹⁷. Alternatively, it could be kept in the Green Office so that the entire association may benefit from it, or be given to regional branches which were generally very poorly equipped - not in private homes, accessible only to a selected few.

As for hard currency, the Commission noted that several members of the Secretariat were also keeping hard currency donations at their homes¹⁹⁸. This was understandable, as the leadership of *Zelenyi Svit* had not opened a hard currency account with the Ukrainian branch of *Zovnishnoekonomichnyi bank SSSR*. It had also been established that some members of the

¹⁹⁶ Spectrometer and other equipment to a total value of more than 6,000 US dollars. Hlazovyi kept goods worth 6,500 DM (computer, printing facilities, electronic telephone and disks). Panov was responsible for goods worth more than 2,000 US dollars (videomachine, three dictaphones, portable player, two cameras, three radiometres, audio and videotapes), and Demydenko had goods worth more than 5,000 US dollars (IBM PC, software, copymachine 'Canon', PC-201, fax machine, telephone with answering machine, electric typing machine, dictaphone, beta-gamma monitor, video and audio tapes). Similarly, Tykhyi kept a tape recorder, videoplayer with tapes, fax machine with paper, videocamera with tapes, dictaphone, radiometer B-20 and equipment to measure gamma radiation with. Hlazovyi sent a letter to Dupak - a member of the Control Revision Commission - in response to a request of 7.12.1990 regarding equipment that was not accounted for. Contrary to rumors, nobody had given the association a laboratory. However, on 11.9.1990, *Zelenyi Svit* had received a large number of technical equipment from Germany. All the equipment was set up and ready for work (20.11.1990) and Tikhyi, in whose name the gifts were handed over, was responsible for its keeping. During the period November-September tests had been conducted of milk, contaminated territories surrounding Kiev, and also of gamma radiation in houses. The results of these tests could be obtained from the secretariat.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

¹⁹⁸ As examples, the report referred to Tikhyi (200 US dollars, 500 Swiss francs), Panov (100 US dollars) and Demydenko (103 US dollars and other).

association's leadership had opened accounts in foreign banks in their own name¹⁹⁹. The Control Revision Commission was unable to establish how many accounts had been opened and how much money there was in each of them. As for the implications of this, the report concluded as follows:

Дехто може зазначити, що це не протиічить закону, але на засіданнях Секретаріату ці питання не розглядалися і протокольно не оформлювалися.

To gain full insight into the matter the report recommended that international organisations and sponsors be asked how much money they had donated to *Zelenyi Svit*. The report generally also called for more openness and accountability within the association on issues regarding equipment and hard currency funds²⁰⁰. Not only hard currency and equipment was not being properly accounted for: *Zelenyi Svit* was co-founder of several small enterprises, cooperatives and centres. No information existed on these and no financial accounts had been discussed by any elected body of the association. Almost the entire income of *Zelenyi Svit* originated from donations made by various enterprises and organisations. A number of the former were polluting enterprises simply making tax-free contributions to social organisations. Hardly any personal donations were made during the same period. This, suggested the report, indicated that *Zelenyi Svit*'s authority was dropping²⁰¹. Finally, the report identified irregularities in the handling of humanitarian aid to Chernobyl victims. To give but one example, medicines earmarked for Chernobyl victims had allegedly been sold²⁰².

The Control Revision Commission made severe criticism of *Zelenyi Svit*'s staff, which it claimed was characterised by poor work discipline. To substantiate its claims, the Commission referred to Iurii Myshchenko, the chief secretary, who was absent for two and a half months while

¹⁹⁹ For instance, Anatolyi Panov had opened an account with Deutsche Bank, and it was also known that Andrii Demydenko and Iurii Mishchenko had opened accounts in the name of local branches of *Zelenyi Svit* abroad. (відомо про відкриття рахунків осередками "ЗС" за кордоном).

²⁰⁰ Members of *Zelenyi Svit* heard that the association received equipment worth 200,000 DM and that Tikhyy had this equipment. None of it had passed through the accountant at the office and no person had officially been appointed to look after it. Besides, *Zelena Rada* had not looked into the issue of utilizing hard currency provided by the Soros Fund to set up an independent ecological laboratory in Ukraine. Tikhyy was in charge of this programme but he was moving over to Greenpeace.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

²⁰² Vitamins from Switzerland (1 ton), medicines and 10,000 single use syringes, were given free of charge to hospitals No. 2 and 14 in Kiev, a child hospital in Zhytomyr and a hospital in Slavutich, but the documentation was not properly processed. Moreover, as stated in the Control Revision Commission's protocol of 15 December 1990, some of the medicines passed on to the Greens through Volodymyr Ivanov - a member of PZU's leadership - had been sold to wives of *Zelenyi Svit* members, the payment for which had been used for some charitable aims, from which the PZU was alleged to have benefitted.

visiting the US and Canada together with the director of the Green Office, Anatolyi Panov. The report noted that rather than sacking him for failing to fulfil his duties, the Secretariat praised Myshchenko for his international activities. However, asked the Commission, 'what kind of regular work of the Secretariat can one talk about when the leadership of the association is continuously absent?'

With regard to the 132-member *Zelena Rada* things were somewhat better. During its five meetings since the First Congress, a number of important questions had been discussed such as the registration of collective members, *Zelenyi Svit's* participation in the 1990 elections, the creation of the Green Party (April 1990) and the endorsement of the statute of an Eco Fund (July 1990). However, poor attendance was also causing problems for *Zelena Rada*: more than half of its members failed to show up at all its meetings. Consequently, there was no quorum and decisions made were not legally binding. The Secretariat was given some of the blame for this, as it had apparently failed to notify members about time and place of them. Shcherbak had only attended one of the meetings (and five of the meetings in the Secretariat). Consequently, the association was in actual fact not headed by Shcherbak, *Zelena Rada* and the Secretariat, all elected by Congress, but by a small group within the Secretariat - namely Panov, Hlazovyi, Myshchenko, Preobrazhenska, Tykhyi and Demydenko. This situation posed a threat to inter-movement democracy should the Congress fail to come up with a solution.

Although the report was largely critical of the work of elected bodies and the administration of *Zelenyi Svit* it noted that local and regional groups (groups in Odessa, Cherkassy, Nikopol, Nikolaev, Kiev, Ivano-Frankivsk and others) as well as issue-oriented groups such as *Spilka Vriativannia* and the Committee in Defence of the Dniepr had achieved much during 1990. The radar station in Zakarpattia had been stopped, as had the Berezivsk chemical combine in Odessa oblast. Similarly, expansion of a chemical complex in Kalush (Ivano-Frankivsk oblast) had been cancelled. Campaigns were ongoing to protect and 'revive' Syvash, the Black and Azov Seas, Dniepr and small rivers throughout Ukraine.

The newspaper *Zelenyi svit* had also achieved a great deal and dues should be given to those who established the newspaper. As for the contents of the paper, though, things could have been better: articles were generally not directed towards solving pressing environmental problems in Ukraine. There was also a lack of information about foreign visits of association members. The newspaper predominantly printed articles written by members of the Secretariat and the editorial board, not from rank-and-file members.

In conclusion then, the Control Revision Commission passed a positive judgement on the activities of local and regional groups and also with a majority of members of *Zelena Rada*. With regard to the Secretariat, however, it recommended that the Congress declare its work

'unsatisfactory'. Moreover, it recommended that Hlazovyi, Demydenko, Myshchenko, Panov, Preobrazhenska and Tykhyi be barred from taking up elected positions in *Zelenyi Svit* as they were incapable of organising the work of the association. General dissatisfaction was voiced with the entire membership of the secretariat. None of them should be allowed to be elected to leading positions or appointed as staff within the association. Finally, the report recommended that a renewed *Zelena Rada* analyse the findings of the Commission and put all its efforts into use so as to mobilise the people of Ukraine to do away with the ecological crisis in the republic. The report was signed by only two members of the Commission. Malyshko did not sign as he was not present at most of the Commission's meetings.

The Secretariat's Response to the Control Revision Commission's Report

Upon request, the Control Revision Commission's report was handed over to the Secretariat on 12 December 1990. Shortly after, on 15 December, the secretariat came together to discuss the findings of the report. Needless to say, its response was negative. In a statement²⁰³ passed by the meeting, criticism was voiced with the Commission for delaying the report - work on the report was completed on 1 September, but the report was only handed over three and a half months later - and also for allowing some members of the Secretariat - in particular, V. Cherinko - to take part in its work as consultants:

До участі в ревізії роботи секретаріату залучилися як перевіряючі окремі члени секретаріату (зокрема - В. Черинько). Такі методи об'єктивно ведуть до розколу і вони дійсно завдали великої шкоди роботі секретаріату.

This, argued the Secretariat, was a good example of how the methods used by the Control Revision Commission were directed towards schism and discord. As for Cherinko, the Secretariat strongly criticised his person in its statement: not only had he presented the report of the Commission at the Green Party Founding Congress in September 1990 - but he also conducted his own personal campaign against those members of the Secretariat who were criticised in the report. As a part of this campaign, he had handed the report over to the press before it had even been signed by the members of the Commission:

Розповсюджував ще у вересні 1990 року акт ревізії в кулуарах з'їзду ІЗУ, посилався у своїх виступах на з'їзді на бунімото доведені зловживання окремих членів секретаріату, агітуючи

²⁰³ Рішення секретаріату асоціації "Зелений Світ" від 15.12.90 р. з приводу акту контрольно-ревізійної комісії.

проти їх обрання на керівні посади в НЗУ (при цьому сам активно домагався цих посад). Більше того, невідомий і неоплачений офіційно акт ревізії потрапив у засоби масової інформації. Згідно з письмовим поясненням, які дали з цього приводу КРК, відповідальність за розповсюдження акту ревізії лежить на В. Черінко.

The Secretariat acknowledged that the report contained several appropriate suggestions for improvement in the work of the Secretariat. Financial information should periodically be published in *Zelenyi svit* and the working procedures of the Secretariat could definitely be improved. Delegation of tasks to individual members of the Secretariat should also be considered. Similarly, the Secretariat admitted that the planning of its work and the control of the implementation of its decisions had been badly conducted and that Iurii Myshchenko was to blame for this. As for the Expert Collegium, for which Panov and Pertseva were responsible, *Zelena Rada* had not yet confirmed its composition, although the Scientific Secretary of the Collegium had been confirmed. With regard to the Secretariat's international activities as well as staff appointments, however, the Secretariat chose to remain silent.

However, emotions were running high, dividing people into two groups; those who supported and those who objected to the Control Revision Commission's report. The general atmosphere within *Zelenyi Svit* was such that some people wanted to go to the procurator's office with these documents. Others, like Evhen Korbetskyi, a harsh critic of Anatoliy Panov, who was executive director of the Podil office at the time, found this unnecessary. If one person was being made legally responsible then several innocent people would be pulled into the conflict. His opinion was therefore that there was sufficient evidence to make the office leadership administratively accountable, but within the framework of *Zelenyi Svit* - not in court. Neither Iurii Shcherbak was happy with the prospect of a court-case. According to Korbetskyi, Shcherbak feared the publicity it would cause as it was likely to damage not only the image of *Zelenyi Svit*, but possibly also his own reputation. When the documents were still handed over to the Procurator's Office, Shcherbak handed in a written resignation, stating that he was stepping down as leader of *Zelenyi Svit*. The resignation was withdrawn approximately one and a half months later and prior to the Congress, when it became apparent that there would be no court case. The findings of the Control Revision Commission were, however, considered sufficiently serious to call an extraordinary congress to address the matter.

In Korbetskyi's view, the underlying cause of the problem was the First Congress' decision to elect an administrative apparatus to run the association on a day-to-day basis. Generally, 'the

executors must be independent of the legislative, otherwise a struggle for power will break out²⁰⁴. It was exactly this that had happened within *Zelenyi Svit*.

Press Coverage

So far the conflict between the Control Revision Commission and the Secretariat had been an internal matter. On 30 January 1991, however, a full-page article written by a previous member of the Green Movement, Masaryk, and entitled 'Scandal in a Noble Family'²⁰⁵ appeared in *Robitnychai hazeta*. The article argued that *Zelenyi Svit* was not such a humanistic and noble organisation as it would like people to think. The Control Revision Commission's report, the Secretariat's response to it and also the impression left in the aftermath of the Founding Congress of *PZU* gave evidence to this. Moreover, as a result of *Zelenyi Svit*'s 'thoughtless' actions several pharmaceutical enterprises had been closed, making it virtually impossible to obtain vital medicines. People were generally tired of environmental issues and were getting headaches from hearing about them. What was more, *Zelenyi Svit* was not a non-political association as it claimed to be: on a number of occasions it had taken part in meetings under the yellow and blue flag²⁰⁶. Even worse, members of the Secretariat had signed several declarations together with other movements and political parties ignoring the opinion of rank-and-file members. Campaigning conducted by *Zelenyi Svit* was characterised by extremism - for instance, Greens had 'terrorised' personnel at Khmelnytskyi nuclear power station, thus not exactly contributing to the enhancement of nuclear safety. Masaryk also noted that a series of seminars and round table discussions had taken place, but with little result as they were all of a declarative nature. As for 'so-called' successes, these were questionable - for instance, the campaign against the Crimean nuclear power station had been conducted primarily by the Crimean Greens themselves. Only afterwards did they join *Zelenyi Svit* as a collective member. And as for the often cited 500,000 members, this was nothing compared to *UTOP*, whose membership counted several million people.

The report produced by the Control Revision Commission clearly indicated that *Zelenyi Svit* may not be such a noble organisation after all: for instance, *Zelenyi Svit* activists had sold 1,200 badges for two roubles each. Shortly after their sale, however, a report from staff at Podil claimed that they had actually been handed out for free. Besides, and a lot more seriously, not one of the

²⁰⁴ Interview with Yevhen Korbetskyi, Sosnovyi Bir, 20.5.1994.

²⁰⁵ Скандал у благородному сімействі.

²⁰⁶ The yellow and blue flag, which is now the official flag of Ukraine, was used by nationalists and others favouring Ukrainian independence at a time when it was still banned and only the Soviet Ukrainian flag was legal. To those opposing the idea of breaking up the Soviet Union, the yellow and blue flag thus came to symbolise extremism and nationalism at its worst.

four deputy leaders of *Zelenyi Svit* was able to explain how much, where and how money donated to the association had been spent.

Zelenyi Svit also suffered from nepotism, argued Masaryk, referring to two incidents which he claimed confirmed this: to create its own symbol *Zelenyi Svit* had arranged a competition. Amongst those receiving prizes was the wife of one of the deputy leaders of the movement. The woman in question was an artist by profession. Of course she should be allowed to take part in the competition. However, in such cases great care should be taken and one should act with clean hands. Otherwise a situation similar to that which had recently arisen in *MAMA-86* might take place:

Суть її, з одного боку, благородна: об'єднати молодих мам, у яких діти з'явилися після аварії в Чорнобилі. Вони, об'єднались, звернулися в різні міжнародні організації з проханням про гуманітарну допомогу. І дійсно таку допомогу одержали. І розподілили між собою, родичами і знайомими. В тому числі - й вищезгадана "керівна" дружина. Тож один факт з дружиною може бути випадковим. Два - не симптоматично.

As for the Control Revision Commission's critical remarks regarding foreign travel, Masaryk had the following to say: all members of the Secretariat had been abroad - some once, others up to several times. As a matter of fact, establishing contacts with foreign groups was the only real result achieved by *Zelenyi Svit* more recently. So active was the movement in this area that one could sometimes get the impression that *Zelenyi Svit* had turned into a branch of *Intourist*! International travel and receiving delegations from abroad accounted for a major share of *Zelenyi Svit*'s budget. However, what benefit for Ukraine could there possibly be in sending 16 Germans to Crimea, Odessa, Lviv and West-Ukraine? And how did one improve the ecological situation in Ukraine by spending a month in the United States or in Canada? Given that there was so much sleaze within the association regarding its international involvement, was it then not hypocritical of *Zelenyi Svit* to criticise the CPU nomenklatura for its excesses?:

Хіба не "ЗС" на всіх перехрестях лає на всі заставки злочинну партійну номенклатуру, яка безсоромно використовує своє службове становище? І водночас породжує свою (замість чотирьох штатних працівників, затверджених з'їздом "ЗС", тут уже працює вісім, причому всі ставки розібрали члени секретаріату, тобто органу виборного), котра ніяк не стежить за тим, щоб не підпустити чужого до новоствореної родівниці.

As for *Zelenyi Svit*'s claims to be a non-political association this was nothing but a joke, because

Водночас дієсно благородний рух, покликаний об'єднати людей з різними політичними і релігійними поглядами, керівництво "ЗС" перетворює на вкрай політизований. Причому одноосібно, не питаючи і не радячись у своїх діях з рядовими членами, з яких далеко не всі вкрай "ліві". Такий виходить нлпоралізм.

The Secretariat's response to the Control Revision Commission's report further served as an illustration of the lack of democracy within the association: first the members of the Commission had been told that there was nothing for them to examine. Afterwards, once the report had been compiled, its members were accused of acting like a procurator. As for the Secretary's statement that the activities of the Commission were directed towards splitting up the Green movement, Masaryk noted that such statements had a familiar sound. However, ought not the Secretariat rather bear in mind that the Control Revision Commission was elected by the Congress and subordinated only to the Congress? References to the 'splitting up' of the Green movement were not really that appropriate, as such a split had taken place a long time ago. Local organisations and grass-root democracy had been pushed away by a new-founded nomenklatura which believed it had the right to act in the name of all Greens on any issue.

Although there were honest people within the movement who did try to do something, these were being side-stepped by those who did not. Worse than what was happening within the movement, however, was the damage recent events would do to people who believed in the Greens:

Бо найстрашніше те, що люди поки що вірять у "зелених", іноді як в останню надію. Боюсь одного: розгартування буде швидко і гірким.

Zelena Rada had dutifully passed decisions to 'indicate', 'draw to the attention' and 'concentrate efforts', thus leaving too much space to the apparatus. Which measures to take to deal with the situation would be up to the Congress to decide. Masaryk noted, however, that Sheherbak, having made himself familiar with the conclusions of the Control Revision Commission, had declared them 'predominantly correct'. And not awaiting the Congress, he had handed in his resignation.

Zelenyi Svit's Response to the Press Coverage

Zelenyi Svit's leadership responded negatively to the criticism raised in Masaryk's article. Rather than refuting allegations made in *Robitnychna hazeta*, however, the article was referred to in *Molod Ukrainy* and *Komsomolskoe znamia* respectively. The first one published an interview with Serhii Kurykin, whereas the latter published Shcherbak's reaction to Masaryk's allegations.

*Molod Ukrainy*²⁰⁷ gave a very favourable impression of Kurykin, whom it claimed suffered from 'pathological modesty' and moral integrity. Most of the article covered various actions undertaken by *Zelenyi Svit* recently, a majority of which focused on Chernobyl, and special attention was given to alternative energy - an issue with which Kurykin was particularly concerned. The issue of funding also came up during the interview and Kurykin pointed out that we 'cannot work without sponsors these days'. A considerable number of these sponsors were foreign and Greens were therefore concerned that *Intourist* had increased its rates, making it very expensive for *Zelenyi Svit* to cover accommodation costs for foreign visitors.

With regard to Masaryk's claim that establishing contacts with foreigners was the only real result of *Zelenyi Svit's* activities and that sometimes one got the impression that the association was turning into a branch of *Intourist*, Kurykin had the following to say:

Я розумію цю статтю, як складову частину загальної кампанії по дискредитації нових громадських рухів. Той факт, що публікацію побудовано на суміші справжніх і уявних гріхів "Зеленого Світу" з партійними справами, свідчить про намагання скомпрометувати "зелених" України загалом, затапувати їх як суспільне явище. Читачів хочуть перекопати, що на Україні була, є і буде лише одна загальновідома "здорова" суспільна сила. Один визначний пропагандист колись зауважив, що напівправа завжди перекопана за явищу брехня - очевидно, ним принципом і послуговуються²⁰⁸.

Not only the leadership of *Zelenyi Svit* took part in the debate that followed the publication of Masaryk's article. The editorial board of *Robitnychna hazeta* expressed surprise that the leadership of *Zelenyi Svit* did not turn to its pages in order to refute Masaryk's allegations, but rather chose to express its dismay through other newspapers. Referring to Kurykin's and Shcherbak's responses, the newspaper argued that neither convincingly succeeded in refuting Masaryk's claims - as a matter of fact, not a single fact was refuted. Rather the two *Zelenyi Svit* representatives chose to attack Masaryk's person, accusing him of 'attacking democratic forces' and for 'slander', but not substantiating their claims. The newspaper reminded its readers that the article was based on the

²⁰⁷ *Молода Україна*, 13.2.1990, с. 1-2.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

findings of the Control Revision Commission and that letters arriving from members of *Zelenyi Svit* went to show that not everything was well within the association. One such letter, or rather an article, under the heading 'A short memory is a poor advisor', appeared in the same issue of *Robitnychna hazeta*.

V. Cherinko, who in addition to being secretary of *Zelenyi Svit* was also a people's deputy of the Kiev City Council - Kievrada - tried to explain why Masaryk's article had caused such a strong reaction: this time the newspaper had not simply attacked the CPU, KGB or any other official structure as it had become so common to do. But rather it had attacked a 'holy cow' - 'perestroika's democratic child' - the association *Zelenyi Svit*. As a member of *Zelenyi Svit*, Cherinko made it clear that he did not read the article without sorrow. However, as the association's secretary he was forced to admit that what Masaryk wrote was unfortunately true. In actual fact the situation was considerably worse:

Уже давно нет ни борьбы за экологию, ни демократии. Практически администрация "Зеленого світу" подминает под себя актив, а давно пошатнувшийся авторитет пытается укрепить вербовкой сторонников, прибегая ко всевозможным посулам и обещаниям. При этом, разбрасывая вокруг порой целые политические заявления, теша свое воспаленное самолюбие. Не потому ли многие из тех, кто стоял у истоков "Зеленого світу" и действительно мог существенно помочь в улучшении экологического положения республики именно в рамках ассоциации, покинули ее.

Such people included Dr. of Biology, V. Polyshechuk and Dr. of Technology and Chair of the Department of Industrial Ecology at the Kiev Polytechnic Institute, Professor A. Shutko, to mention but a few. To them it had become an impossible luxury to waste time on putting together proclamations issued by the movement, calling for the world to be turned upside-down. As an example of the inability of the movement to make quick and sound decisions, Cherinko referred to the last meeting of *Zelena Rada* which took place on 2 March and which was attended by only 56 of the 120 members. The poor turnout, argued Cherinko, was indeed a question of democracy: Shcherbak made such an effort to persuade those present to declare the meeting competent that in the end only one question was addressed - namely that of where to conduct the upcoming Congress.

Although an extraordinary Congress was being called to address the crisis in the Green Movement, *Zelenyi Svit*'s future looked bleak in Cherinko's view. The association lacked individuals who could generate new ideas. What was more, Shcherbak had long ago lost his influence within the Green movement. There were several reasons for this, the most obvious being his work as a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, as a result of which he was in effect

permanently based in Moscow. Consequently, he knew practically nothing or very little about the Green movement in Ukraine. At small meetings of the Secretariat the following views were heard with increasing frequency:

Шербак нам нужен пока что как знамя, а еще больше — его депутатские бланки и подписи, с которыми можно у кого-то выпросить.

The tragedy of the situation, argued Cherinko, was that Shcherbak did not understand this. A second reason, was Shcherbak's poor memory. He was elected a USSR People's Deputy as a candidate for the Greens. And

И пока он пребывал в ворзельском Доме творчества, тут предвыборную кампанию вел его штаб, в котором пришлось работать и мне. Как видите, забывчивость — плохая помощница.

As concerned the report of the Control Revision Commission, Cherinko held the view that the report should be handed over to the Procurator's office. He also hit out at Kurykin and Shcherbak for the way in which they handled Masaryk's article: Kurykin, argued Cherinko, in *Molod Ukrainy* encouraged everybody to join PZU although he had himself (earlier) expressed his unwillingness to do the same due to a lack of faith in the decency of its leadership. Thus Kurykin's appeal was in itself an issue of decency. As for Shcherbak, his criticism was even more out of place. Whereas Kurykin, as seen above, criticised the article as an 'attack on democracy', Shcherbak focused entirely on Masaryk's person:

Огорчает же то, что в таком благородном движении, как "ЗС", появились свои бюрократы, раскольники, оппозиционеры и даже клеветники. Конкретно имею в виду статью в "Рабочей газете" — "Скандал в благородном семействе" моего бывшего помощника Владимира Масарыка, от услуг которого пришлось отказаться из-за его беспроектной лени.

Once again, argued Cherinko, Shcherbak's memory was playing tricks with him. Then was it not the same Masaryk who during the election campaign had supported Shcherbak's campaign through his publications? Following Shcherbak's successful election to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies Masaryk was appointed assistant to Shcherbak in Moscow. When Shcherbak was abroad it was Masaryk who had to do all the deputy work. Prior to being elected a deputy of Kievrada Cherinko had been assistant to USSR's People's Deputy Iavorivskii in Moscow, thus

having experienced for himself how much hard work this involved. Moreover, he had often met Masaryk in his capacity as Shcherbak's assistant. How, asked Cherinko, could Shcherbak speak in such a derogatory manner of his former assistant? But coming to think about it, maybe it was not so strange after all, then Shcherbak had changed assistants three to four times already.

As for claims that the article slandered the Green Movement, Cherinko had the following to say:

Но в чем тогда заключается клевета, если сам Юрий Николаевич признает и акт ревизионной комиссии, и то, что появились уже свои бюрократы? Это к вопросу о благородстве и клевете. Напрасны потуги "аппаратчиков" от "зеленых" обвинить оппозицию в стремлении расколоть или даже уничтожить "зеленое" движение. Единственное стремление "зеленого" аппарата - удержаться на плаву. Наша же цель - возродить, деидеологизировать истинно демократическое движение "зеленых", конечная цель которого - спасение родной земли. Как раз об этой цели в нынешнем "Зеленом світі" и забыли. А короткая память - плохой помощник.

A second letter, written by one L. Lysak, a deputy of the Zaliznychnyi regional council in Kiev and a member of its permanent commission on ecology and environmental protection, appeared next to that of Cherinko. Lysak criticised the *Zelenyi Svit* chapter in his part of Kiev for being 'inactive'. To illustrate his point, Lysak referred to plans to build a four-lane road in the region. This was considered inadmissible as air pollution already exceeded maximum limits in this area. Besides, the road would pass a hospital and other health institutions nearby. To get not only moral but also practical support attempts had been made to establish contact with the leader of the local *Zelenyi Svit* chapter, V. Tymonin - but with no result:

Напрасно мы, депутаты райсовета, призывали на помощь наш "Зеленый Світ". Как видно, такая "мелочь" его не интересует. Что ж, справились своими силами: дороги здесь не будет. Жаль только, что в Протасовом яру уже успели вырубить около тысячи деревьев ценных пород.

Another example was linked to a housing co-operative - 'Aviator' - which intended to set up houses in one of the region's Green spots. Rather than opposing construction, Tymonin did the following:

Он занял "принципиальную" позицию, всячески поддерживал заместителя председателя райсовета Зарицкого, который сам был членом кооператива "Авиатор", и уничтожении зеленых "легких" района.

During the election campaign, argued the author, the Greens had stirred up a lot of fuss to protest the fact that their candidates were not registered. However, many 'non-Green' deputies now wanted to establish contacts with the Green movement but got no response:

Как видно, ЗС интересовала не настоящая борьба за здоровье окружающей среды, а именно свое пребывание в органах управления. Тогда - с какой целью?

As for results, the author was unable to identify many concrete results of *Zelenyi Svit*'s work - although there was not a lack of promises. For instance where was the much advertised international centre for child radiology, promised already a year earlier by Shcherbak? Did it maybe prove too difficult for the Greens to fulfil their promises?

Знаю одно: выступать на митингах и давать интервью - труда много не надо. А вот делать дело - уже посложнее. Не потому ли люди разуверились в "зеленых", уходят от них. Знаю, например, что у наших соседей в Жовтневом районе первичная организация уже практически прекратила существование. Люди устали от болтовни. А вот вместо нее пока никто ничего не предложил.

Assessment

I have now looked at the background to and the debate that took place following the report of the Control Revision Commission. How just were the accusations made against *Zelenyi Svit*, how well did *Zelenyi Svit*'s leadership deal with these accusations and to what extent was the Control Revision Commission right to criticise the Secretariat?

As for the allegations that *Zelenyi Svit* was being turned into a branch of *Intourist*, i.e. that too much emphasis was made on establishing and maintaining international contacts, *Zelenyi Svit*'s budget for 1990²⁰⁹ did indicate that foreign travel and covering expenses for foreign visitors constituted a substantial share of the association's spendings. In 1990, *Zelenyi Svit* spent a total of 31,112 roubles. Salaries accounted for about a third of this sum (11,584 roubles). Altogether 4,882 roubles were spent on foreign travel²¹⁰. Another 3,188 roubles were spent on covering expenses incurred by foreign groups and delegations visiting Ukraine at the initiative of *Zelenyi Svit*. Thus a total of 8,070 roubles (25.9% of total spendings) went towards international relations.

²⁰⁹ Фінансово-господарський звіт за 1990 рік республіканської асоціації "Зелений Світ" на 1990 рік по асоціації і експертній колекції затверджено штат в кількості 7 (сім) одиниць з місячним фондом заробітної плати 1500 (одна тисяча п'ятисот) карбованців.

²¹⁰ Panov and Myshchenko travelled to Canada and US, Demydenko, Plekhov and Fedorinchyk went to Czechoslovakia and Tikhvi to Switzerland.

Travel expenses within the USSR accounted for 366 roubles (Moscow, Leningrad), and travelling within Ukraine for another 607 roubles (Khmelnitskyi, Kiev, Dnipropetrovsk) - together thus 3.1% of the association's expenses. It can of course be argued that given the big difference in costs of travelling abroad and travelling within the USSR at the time, these figures in no way reflect the ratio of international and domestic travel. For an association with limited funds it is, however, significant that close to a quarter of its expenses went towards maintaining international contacts. On the other hand the Green movement in Ukraine was part of a world-wide movement which was getting increasingly interconnected. It is therefore not surprising that attention and money were put towards establishing and maintaining such contacts. Equally understandable are the concerns of some members to the effect that too much money went towards maintaining an apparatus and international contacts, which together accounted for two thirds (58.9%) of *Zelenyi Svit's* budget.

As for the issue of who benefited from *Zelenyi Svit's* international contacts - i.e. the Green Movement or individuals claiming to represent it - that is a different story. As seen above, *Zelenyi Svit* obtained equipment worth several hundred thousand DM and thousands of US dollars from foreign organisations. Moreover, those who did go abroad not only obtained information about the history of the international Green movement²¹¹ and practical knowledge of how this movement was run - they also spread information about the environmental situation in Ukraine, thus bringing to the attention of the outside world the environmental legacy of the Soviet Union. As an example, a number of publications (newspaper articles) appeared in the American press following Preobrazhenska's visit which focused on Chernobyl. Similarly, Demydenko gave a talk about the Ukrainian Green Movement at ISEES, University of Glasgow in November 1990. He also showed films on Chernobyl and provided more general information about *Zelenyi Svit* at a big Conference on Local Non-Nuclear Zones that took place in Glasgow at the time and which he attended. Similarly, both Demydenko and Preobrazhenska - visiting Glasgow in 1991 - took part in a broad discussion on Chernobyl arranged by the Glasgow City Council.

However, as seen above, there seemed to be no clear criteria for selecting people to represent *Zelenyi Svit* abroad. All the people whose names were referred to in the report of the Control Revision Commission were Kiev residents and members of the Secretariat. Moreover, established procedures were not followed in releasing funds for these travels. What was more, no proper mechanism existed for how to register donations and equipment made to the Ukrainian Green Movement. In some cases disputes even arose as to what were personal gifts and what were gifts given to *Zelenyi Svit* as an association. Needless to say, it was not possible for *Zelenyi Svit* to prove that certain items were intended for the association if those who received them said otherwise. It was also next to impossible for other *Zelenyi Svit* representatives to clarify this

²¹¹ Articles on this topic written by Hluzovyi and Demydenko were published in *Zelenyi Svit*.

question with the organisations/individuals involved abroad - partly due to poor and expensive communications and partly also as such investigations would put the Ukrainian Green Movement in a poor light. From the sound of the report the Secretariat was mainly to blame for the lack of clear-cut procedures on these matters. This was unfortunate not only as *Zelenyi Svit* as an association was in some cases denied access to equipment from which it could no doubt have benefited, but also as it lay the ground for a number of personal conflicts and fall-outs within *Zelenyi Svit*, which in turn led not only to the loss of high-profile activists such as Demydenko, Tikhyi and Hlazovyi, but also of others who got fed up with endless quarrels and clashes on this issue.

To conclude, then, the links with foreign Green groups proved both a blessing and a curse to the Ukrainian Greens: a blessing in the sense that equipment and other assistance was obtained as a result, but also a curse in the sense that they unleashed a conflict that would eventually bring the movement down (I will return to this issue below). The conflict over *Zelenyi Svit's* international activities also reinforced disagreement on other issues and facilitated personal animosities within leading bodies of the movement that could not easily be overcome. Had the Secretariat been better organised and had a clear set of priorities been set from the very start, the right balance could have been struck between national and global commitment. Moreover, had proper procedures for registering donations been established and followed, the entire movement could have benefited from technical and other assistance received from abroad.

Choice of Place for the Congress

The views expressed in the Control Revision Commission's report that relations between 'Kiev' and the regions had suffered at the expense of *Zelenyi Svit's* international activities was shared by many local organisations throughout Ukraine. In the Western regions there was increasing dissatisfaction with what was perceived as Kiev representatives' attempt at running the association single-handedly through the Green Office in Podil. Greens in the South and East were angered not only by Kiev's wish to run the movement but also by the fact that *Zelenyi Svit's* leadership spent so much time establishing contacts with the international Green Movement when there were so many unresolved problems in Ukraine that needed urgent attention. Smaller groups also complained that Kiev did little to assist them in their work. Whereas big and well-established groups such as the Nikolaev and Ternopil chapters did not depend on or even need such assistance - in the case of the former, it was conducting its own campaign independently of Kiev and also very successfully; in the latter, international contacts were established directly - smaller groups

whose activists were being harassed by the authorities and that needed help to become 'workable', did suffer from the lack of attention from Kiev.

The diverging views between *Zelenyi Svit*'s grassroots and the Kiev organisation also caused disagreement regarding the choice of place for the Second Congress. The Kiev group sent a letter to all members of *Zelenyi Svit* on the eve of the convening of *Zelena Rada* (2 March 1991), which would decide this question, arguing vehemently in favour of Kiev being chosen for this purpose²¹². The Ivano-Frankivsk group had suggested that the Congress be held there on 29-30 March. The Kiev group, however, held the view that the Ivano-Frankivsk group was not up to the task. Besides, it disagreed over the motivation behind choosing Ivano-Frankivsk: it was true that the ecological situation in the area was difficult and that there was a need to activate the work of *Zelenyi Svit* and its collective members locally. However, justifying the choice of Ivano-Frankivsk based on the ecological situation there, was difficult as also a number of other places in Ukraine suffered from equally or even more difficult conditions. Besides, it could be questioned whether the Ivano-Frankivsk group would be able to provide accommodation for the expected 150-200 delegates - although it claimed this would be no big problem:

Однако, на наш взгляд, эти аргументы не являются достаточными и не учитывают интересы всего экологического движения Украины "Зеленый Світ".

1. Практически вся Украина находится в зоне экологического бедствия, а многие районы республики на грани экологической катастрофы или эту грань переступили. Поэтому давать предпочтение из этих соображений какому-то городу как месту проведения съезда считаем нецелесообразным, тем более что выездные заседания с рассмотрением конкретных экологических проблем следовало бы проводить чаще и планировать в будущем на уровне Зеленой Рады, Секретариата ассоциации. Экспертной коллегии и других исполнительных органов ассоциации.

2. Инициаторы предложения о проведении II съезда ЗС вне Киева недостаточно четко представляют себе в комплексе организационные проблемы подготовки и проведения съезда и объективно сужают круг заинтересованных лиц, которые хотели бы принять участие в работе съезда. Кроме того, удельный вес "зеленых" из Киева является доминирующим во всех исполнительных органах ассоциации "Зеленый світ", поэтому организаторско-отчетная работа, естественно, должна в основном лечь на них.

Moreover, as both *Zelena Rada* and the Secretariat were accountable to the Congress, all members of the two bodies (almost 150 people) must attend. As a large proportion of them lived

²¹² По вопросу о месте и времени проведения II съезда Украинской экологической ассоциации "Зеленый Світ".

in Kiev, it was clear that *Zelenyi Svit* simply could not afford to cover travel expenses for so many people to Ivano-Frankivsk from Kiev. It would also cause problems to attract experts and people's deputies to the Congress as a number of these were Kiev-based and not likely to travel all the way to Ivano-Frankivsk. Most areas in Ukraine had reasonably good connections with Kiev, whereas it might prove rather complicated to travel to Ivano-Frankivsk. Besides, the Congress was likely to get more publicity if it was held in Kiev. *Zelenyi Svit*'s Founding Congress, which took place in Kiev in October 1989, however, passed a decision that consecutive congresses be held in the regions so as to raise the association's prestige locally²¹³. Despite the objections voiced by 'Kiev', *Zelena Rada* in the end therefore decided to hold the Congress in Ivano-Frankivsk as originally proposed.

Anatolyi Zolotukhin claims that the reasons for Kiev activists wanting to hold the Congress in Kiev and not in Ivano-Frankivsk were not so much motivated by objective factors such as those mentioned above, but rather by a wish to expose existing and prepare the ground for new conflicts in the Green Movement:

Конечно, подлинной причиной желания этих сил проводить съезд в Киеве не было необходимости пригласить журналистов, депутатов, экспертов итд., скорее наоборот, была необходимость в привлечении сил, стремящихся к разрушению изнутри Зеленого Свита²¹⁴.

By forces seeking to destroy *Zelenyi Svit* from inside, Zolotukhin had in mind primarily Kiev representatives who had joined or supported *PZU* and whose aim was to gain control with the association. These people, he claimed, had the backing of the authorities. The latter would just be too happy to see *Zelenyi Svit* torn apart by intrigues and conflicts as the association had a great deal of support among the Ukrainian people²¹⁵. Although many Greens find Zolotukhin's conspiracy theory too far-fetched, many agreed with him that the problems which had surfaced in *Zelenyi Svit* during the previous year were very much the making of Kiev-representatives who did not actually do much of the work achieved by *Zelenyi Svit* - this work was done primarily by local and regional organisations with no or little assistance from Kiev - and who were preoccupied with fighting for positions and personal gain. Finally, in the former USSR there was a big 'distance' between city and countryside and between capital and regions. Thus some people representing the local and regional branches of *Zelenyi Svit* felt that Kiev wanted to direct them and give them instructions for what to do and how to do it, when locals were far more knowledgeable about the

²¹³ Information provided by Anatolyi Zolotukhin by email, 27.5.1995.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*

issues they were campaigning on anyway. As one Green put it: 'in Kiev there are only bosses'. Some locals also felt that Kiev focused almost solely on Chernobyl and nuclear power at the expense of other equally important local issues.

From Kiev's point of view, however, the situation looked somewhat different. Those activists who initiated *Zelenyi Svit* and who had done much to proliferate the movement and worked on campaigns such as the ones to protect Khortytsa, Chyhyryn and Holosiivskyi lis, naturally found such criticism unfair. Preobrazhenska and Panov, for instance, had put much time and effort into lobbying *Verkhovna Rada* and as a result attended its special session on the environment (February 1990) as representatives of the Green Movement. Moreover, although there were objective reasons for criticising Kiev for poor leadership, international contacts from which the Greens in Ukraine had benefited, were established. And finally, with regard to the Green Party, the Green Movement had itself decided that such a party be established and that it act as the *Zelenyi Svit*'s political wing.

The way Kiev activists saw it, it was definitely a problem to run the association on a day-to-day basis as the organs that were to give the guidelines and directives for how this should be done, continuously failed to come up with a quorum as it proved difficult to gather people representing the districts in Kiev to attend meetings of *Zelena Rada* and the Secretariat. Thus, in their view, there was no alternative than to make decisions without a quorum. What was more, it was only natural that a majority of members elected to representative organs were from Kiev, as - due to poor communications and transport - it was expensive and time-consuming for the districts to continuously travel to Kiev and it was simply too difficult to run *Zelenyi Svit* as a true grass-root organisation within the Ukrainian context of the early 1990s.

At this stage, therefore, it was possible to understand the grievances expressed by both 'groups' (Kiev vs. regional groups). Having said that, though, the movement as such, by not facing up to the conclusions drawn by the Control Revision Committee's report, rather than removing the growing tension within the movement further intensified it: those annoyed by the discoveries of the report grew increasingly hostile towards 'Kiev'.

Most of the Greens regardless of their views on developments within *Zelenyi Svit* were unhappy with Cherinko's part in exposing these to the general public. In Zolotukhin's view, Cherinko's article in *Robitnycha hazeta* represented the first attempt at trying to break *Zelenyi Svit* by attacking its leader, Iurii Shcherbak. Shortly before the Second Congress started, *Zelena Rada* met in Kiev. It gathered in order to prepare the Congress, but as Cherinko was present at the meeting, his article and his person were also given considerable attention. Many of those present were in favour of telling him to leave the meeting. However, Shcherbak assured everyone that he would take Cherinko to court and left it at that. It would be up to the Congress to make a final

decision on how to deal with Cherinko and also whether or not to follow the recommendations of the Control Revision Commission²¹⁶

Thus the stage was set for a battle at the upcoming congress between those who endorsed and those who did not approve of the report supported by the Control Revision Commission, and between 'Kiev' and the regions.

3.4.4 The Second Congress, Ivano-Frankivsk, March 1991

The Control Revision Commission's report was officially not an issue to be discussed by the Congress²¹⁷, but reluctance in Green circles to talk about the Congress and incomplete files clearly indicate that feelings were running high in Ivano-Frankivsk: transcripts of all congresses are kept at the Green Office in Podil. However, the file on the Second Congress only contain some resolutions and technical documents.

As pointed out by Iurii Tkachenko one year later at the Third Congress, however, the Second Congress was both filmed and recorded on tape. According to some members of *Zelenyi Svit* the transcript was removed from the Kiev office by people who were strongly criticised at the Congress so as to avoid unwanted publicity. A slightly different explanation was given by Iurii Samiilenko, who in 1994 was deputy chairman of *Zelenyi Svit*. According to him, the transcript was kept by the Greens in Chernivtsi and in my presence he telephoned Chernivtsi requesting that the documents be sent to Kiev. However, I did not get a chance to access these documents. Bits and pieces of information will therefore have to be patched together so as to gain some insight into what exactly happened in Ivano-Frankivsk.

Shcherbak's opening address to the 237 delegates who had gathered in Ivano-Frankivsk was generally positive, outlining *Zelenyi Svit's* achievements since October 1989: looking back, the Greens had come a long way, he pointed out. In the beginning the association had nothing - its members only shared a wish to work towards improving the environment in Ukraine. Despite all the obstacles they initially encountered, *Zelenyi Svit* started working and had over the last one and a half years solved quite a few organisational issues not to mention a string of environmental issues. The Greens now had their own premises, their own bank account, in which there was close to 100,000 roubles, and their own symbol - a yellow sunflower set against a Green background. All this had been achieved thanks to the enthusiasm of rank-and-file members of the association.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*

²¹⁷ Officially, however, the agenda of the Second Congress made no mention of the Control Revision Commission. The agenda contained the following five tasks: 1) a general account of the movement's activities to be given by Shcherbak, 2) discussion of statute and programme, 3) election of executive bodies, 4) discussion of resolutions and finally, 5) an ecological meeting.

The two most important tasks identified by the First Congress in 1989, namely to create a 'Green' newspaper and a Green Party, had both been implemented: the newspaper *Zelenyi Svit* was set up in April 1990 with a circulation of 30,000 copies issued twice a month. PZU was founded the same month.

In terms of practical environmental work much had been achieved - particularly on issues such as Chernobyl and nuclear power. The Greens had successfully lobbied *Verkhovna Rada* into passing a moratorium on any further construction of nuclear reactors on Ukrainian soil and also a decision to close down the nuclear power station at Chernobyl. A radiological laboratory had recently been opened and as a result of *Zelenyi Svit's* international activities foreign organisations were beginning to take an interest in Ukrainian environmental problems. Greenpeace, for instance, had opened an office in Kiev and also set up a diagnostic centre in Pushchi-Vodytsa. Medicine and vitamins for Chernobyl victims were received from abroad for distribution through *Zelenyi Svit* and children who had suffered from Chernobyl were being sent to Switzerland, Holland, France and Israel to recover. Chernobyl had been put on the agenda and was being debated by the United Nations and UNESCO and links were being established between the Ukrainian Greens and Greens elsewhere.

In contrast to the Control Revision Commission, Shcherbak's assessment of the Secretariat and its achievements was predominantly positive: the Secretariat had resolved a number of organisational issues and also planned and carried out several actions, meetings and conferences, as well as seminars and round-tables. As examples, Shcherbak listed a round table on Chernobyl in January 1990 at which the future of the nuclear power station had been debated. The Ukrainian government, *Verkhovna Rada* and the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences had attended this round table and it proved decisive in the parliament's later decision to close the Chernobyl nuclear power station. Two months later, in March, a round table on drinking water in Ukraine was conducted and in April moral aspects of the Chernobyl accident were discussed at yet another conference - also organised by the Secretariat. A conference on the ecological crisis in Ukraine took place in May 1990 and in September the same year the Greens had arranged a seminar on the state of Dniepr. Similarly, *Zelenyi Svit* had made contacts with the IAEA, UNESCO, *Derzhkompriroda* and Ukrainian/USSR *Minzdrav*, as well as the Procurator's office, various women's and youth organisations and finally, ecological and legal organisations in both Ukraine and abroad. The Greens had also engaged in a number of cultural activities, such as the music festival *Chervona Ruta* (Chernivtsi) and an exhibition of Green art (Kiev). *Zelenyi Svit* had co-founded the *Vidrodzhennia Fund*²¹⁸ and conducted a number of lectures and meetings on environmental topics in Donetsk, Rivne, Zakarpatia, Khmelnytskyi, Kiev, Odessa, Chernihiv and Kharkiv oblasts.

²¹⁸ A society set up to help the so-called 'liquidators' and other victims of the Chernobyl accident.

Finally, hundreds of articles, resolutions and appeals had been written and issued, as had a substantial number of interviews on radio and TV. Press conferences were held frequently²¹⁹.

Shcherbak also expressed satisfaction with the work of *Zelena Rada*, which had discussed several important issues at its four meetings since the First Congress: such issues were the ecological session of *Verkhovna Rada* in February 1990 and the Greens' participation in it, elections to *Verkhovna Rada* and to local assemblies (councils) in March 1990, the creation of the Green Party, the newspaper, the Eco Fund and regional groups, as well as the fourth and fifth anniversaries of the Chernobyl accident. *Zelena Rada* had also registered several new collective members over the past one and a half years.

Zelenyi Svit's political impact had also been considerable: a major achievement of the Greens in 1990 was the successful lobbying of *Verkhovna Rada* which in February 1990 passed a resolution to close the Chernobyl nuclear power station and to halt construction of the radar station in Mukachevo. Moreover, the parliament decided to release information that had been classified regarding the ecological situation in Ukraine and the results of the Chernobyl accident. The Greens were furthermore involved in facilitating the moratorium passed by parliament in September 1990 on the construction of nuclear reactors in Ukraine and in facilitating a concept of who was living in contaminated areas, and the status of contaminated areas, and the citizens who suffered as a result of the Chernobyl accident.

Whereas at the First Congress of *Zelenyi Svit* Shcherbak had made it clear that the association was non-political, committed only to the improvement of the environment in Ukraine, he now pointed out that

"Зелений Світ" живе за законами своєї власної програми і вважає себе невід'ємною складовою частиною демократичних сил України, яка проголосила незалежність. Зелені стояли в рядах тих, хто з'єднав живий ланцюгом Львів і Київ живим ланцюгом злуки, були поряд з голодуючими студентами на майдані незалежності і Софіївському майдані у Києві, Львові, Запоріжжі, Мукачеві, Харкові, Хмельницькому, Рівному, інших містах і селах²²⁰.

In March 1990 three meetings had been held on Independence Square in Kiev protesting the decision of the election commission not to register candidates from *Zelenyi Svit*. A Green column had been forced on the First of May and throughout 1990 Greens took part in a number of meetings conducted by the so-called 'democratic forces'. In September 1990 *Verkhovna Rada* was once again picketed and in October 1990, *Zelenyi Svit* gave not only moral but also financial support to students on hunger strike to remove the government of Prime Minister Masol, who was

²¹⁹ Shcherbak's address to the Congress, p. 2.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

becoming increasingly unpopular with the Ukrainian people²²¹. *Zelenyi Svit* also took part in the creation of democratic organisations in various parts of Ukraine - for instance *Demkonhres* in Kharkiv and *Demokratychna Ukraina* in Kiev.

Other members of *Zelenyi Svit* publicly voiced the political aspects of its work. Anatoliy Panov, for instance, stated that '*Zelenyi Svit* works together with *RUKH* and new political parties to achieve real state independence for Ukraine'. Other participants at the Congress argued that in a climate of political reaction orchestrated by the CPSU, *Zelenyi Svit* must stand firmly on its democratic, anti-imperial position²²². This position provoked accusations in Western Green circles to the effect that the Ukrainian Green Movement was 'nationalist'. As this issue is discussed in depth in Chapter Seven, the national question and the Greens will not be addressed here. It must, however, be pointed out that all informal political movements and later also parties that emerged in Ukraine stood united on this issue. Although the aim coincided, the reasons for favouring Ukrainian independence varied. For the Greens this commitment was rooted in a wish to protect the environment - a wish that could only be achieved once Ukraine gained control over its own natural resources and with industries on Ukrainian territory.

Given that the Green Party was intended to be the political wing of the Green Movement it can of course be argued that *Zelenyi Svit* should have avoided overtly political involvement. However, during the late 1980s/early 1990s it was simply not possible for any informal movement not to take a stand on issues regarding the future relationship between Ukraine and the Soviet Union and to make a stand on issues such as democracy, economic reform and others. The ground was therefore set for a battle between currents within *Zelenyi Svit* supporting the *PZU*, *RUKH*, the Communists and other political forces (those with other political agendas). This added to the level of conflict in the movement and once again a distinction could be made between the 'internationalists', who held a low profile on the national question and the 'republicans', whose position was very clear cut on this issue.

Although Shcherbak's address to the Congress was over-all positive, others were less satisfied with recent developments. Sviatoslav Dudko, whom Shcherbak had personally asked to participate at the Congress, raised a warning finger to those who thought everything was good and well within the movement. *Zelenyi Svit* was in crisis - the Congress in itself bore evidence to that effect. Whereas initially, the Greens had been successful in annulling or putting a stop to several environmentally harmful projects, over the last year the association had moved away from actions towards declarations:

²²¹ *Zelenyi Svit's* budget for 1990, showed that the association gave 1,000 rubles in support of the hungerstriking students.

²²² *Оновлений Зелений Світ*, reprinted in *Ukraine Today, Ukrainian Media Digest*, RFE/RL Research Institute, 13.6.1991, no. UF-214, p. 24.

Так, активістами "Зеленого Світу" зроблено чимало, але снад практичної природоохоронної діяльності спричинив відхід з рядів асоціації значної кількості вчених, фахівців, професіоналів-екологів, змищення акцентів в напрямках роботи вилилось в зниженні професійного рівня заходів проведених асоціацією. В більшості воли посяг декларативний характер і мало вирішують насушли проблеми.

To amend the difficult situation *Zelenyi Svit* was in, Dudko recommended that a set of priority issues be identified and that work be focused on these tasks. First of all, there was a need for a concept of ecological relief in Ukraine, given that no such concept existed. Secondly, structural economic reform was needed as were proposals on legislation affecting the environment. Thirdly, more ecological expert assessment must be made by better utilised by involving Ukraine's scientific community in this process.

Neither Dudko could avoid looking into the revelations made by the Control Revision Commission prior to the Congress. Whereas he did not express dissatisfaction with the establishment of links with like-minded groups and organisations abroad, Dudko was highly critical of the way in which people were selected to represent *Zelenyi Svit* internationally:

В акті контрольно-ревізійної комісії було заторкнuto міжнародне співробітництво. Цей напрям діяльності асоціації піданий критичній оцінці в статтях "Скандал в благородному сімействі" у "Робітничій газеті" та інших. Впевнений, що він повинен залишитись і активізуватись, а не бути монополією вузького кола осіб. Кількість повинна бути розширена за рахунок спеціалістів, представників регіонів, яким є про цю сказати на міжнародному рівні.

Although critical of members of *Zelenyi Svit's* leadership, Dudko finished his speech by calling for unity within the movement. The association was composed of people whose political views were different. These differences must not be allowed to overshadow the common aim that should unite every member of *Zelenyi Svit*, namely the idea of survival. Should the Greens fail to unite behind this idea, then their future was likely to be bleak. Only by acting as a united movement would the Greens be able to execute their political, economic and social programmes:

Тому сумно, що в боротьбу з "агентами інакодумства", за крилатим висловом лідера російських комуністів Полозкова, втягнувся цілий ряд теперішніх функціонерів "Зеленого світу", а це може спричинитися до посилення конфронтації і розвадку асоціації. Такі тенденції вже простежуються. Для їх подолання і припинення слід було б внести більш суттєві зміни з статут асоціації, виробити механізм унеможливлення зловживань посадовими особами.

Шановні делегати з'їзду. Доброго дня. Ми повинні усвідомити, що сьогодні стоїть питання наскільки асоціація буде дієвою. Тому від рішень з'їзду залежить її подальший поступ, та значення в суспільному житті України²²³.

A number of other delegates also criticised the central organs of *Zelenyi Svit*, which, it was claimed, did not function properly - particularly the organisation of independent expert assessments was unsatisfactory.

A considerable number of propositions as to how to improve the work of *Zelenyi Svit* were made prior to the convening of the Congress. The Kiev group, for instance, recommended that the suggestions of the Control Revision Commission be taken into account and that measures be taken to prevent people from holding elected posts in the leading organs of the association while at the same time being employees of *Zelenyi Svit*'s administrative apparatus²²⁴.

The Nikolaev oblast group following a meeting on 23 March 1991 at which it had examined the work of the association over the last years and discussed future tasks, recommended that candidate members be appointed to *Zelena Rada*. Should members for some reason not be able to attend, candidate members could step in for them and that way there would always be a quorum. Such a practice had been introduced at oblast level with a positive result²²⁵. The group also pointed out that there was a need to improve *Zelena Rada* as firstly, it did not pay sufficient attention to the issue of the Dniepr being contaminated with radionuclides from Chernobyl, and secondly, did not facilitate co-ordination and interaction between local chapters of the association on this issue. This was particularly regrettable as a majority of the Ukrainian population had no choice but to drink such water.

Following the row over *Zelenyi Svit*'s international activities and the shortcomings in the way it conducted its financial affairs, Nikolaev *Zelenyi Mir* recommended that the resolution passed by the First Congress 'On Morals and Morality' be incorporated into the statute and made compulsory for all members of *Zelenyi Svit*. Finally, a clearer leadership structure was proposed, consisting of the chairman and four vice chairmen. Each vice-chairman would be responsible for the work of two commissions each²²⁶. I will return to changes to *Zelenyi Svit*'s structure below.

²²³ Dudko's speech, p. 3.

²²⁴ This proposal was laid out in a project - decision of *Zelena Rada*, dated Kiev, 2.3.1991 and prepared by the initiative group of Kiev *Zelenyi Svit* (p. 2).

²²⁵ This proposition was put forward in a letter to Iurii Shcherbak dated 26.3.1991 (No. 39) and signed by Anatoli Zolotukhin.

²²⁶ The vice-chairmen would be responsible for the following areas:

- 1) Екофонд и Научно-исследовательский центр Зеленого Свита.
- 2) по взаимодействию с органами власти, госучреждениями и по взаимодействию с общественными организациями и партиями.

As for the Control Revision Commission's report, several members of *Zelenyi Svit* stressed the need to improve the atmosphere within the association. However, when the time came to vote on the report of the Control Revision Commission, an overwhelming majority (156 to 18 with 12 abstentions) chose not to endorse the report, expressing instead dissatisfaction with the work of the Commission, which failed to agree the position of its members.²²⁷ Instead, the Congress passed a resolution stressing *Zelenyi Svit's* intention to sort out its problems. The resolution (On the Constructiveness of Our Actions) referred to internal conflicts within the movement in the following way:

„Ми не можемо так само філософски ставитися до деструктивних дій усередині асоціації. Ми не можемо визнати нормою скарби окремих наших членів перевести роботу з єдиної, конструктивної фази у фазу з'ясування стосунків напівтанця особистих обрид, маніпуляцій навколо справи замість того, щоб робити саму справу. Кому вигідні дії взаємної немовчання? На кого об'єктивно працюють такі люди? - На тих, хто прагне нашого розвалу. На тих, кому ми, як добродійна політична сім'я, завасемо²²⁸.

Looking back, the resolution claimed that the Greens had been so successful since their beginnings and that protecting the environment had become such a high-profile issue that official authorities and various ministries and departments could no longer openly work against *Zelenyi Svit*. Therefore their tactics had now changed and attempts were being made at destroying the association from within. As part of this 'campaign' against the Greens, the Ukrainian press was misinforming the public about the Greens, discrediting their leaders and activists. *Zelenyi Svit* adopted a philosophical approach towards those standing behind this campaign. If they 'hated (the Greens), then that showed that they feared (them)'. A small group of Kiev activists were accused of acting out this campaign by attempting to break the movement from within:

Для розпалювання цього використовуються всі засоби, в тому числі і спроби розколу під гаслами "деполітизації" з боку невеликої групи членів Київської міської організації. Втім, ця кампанія свідчить перш за все про те, що Зелений Світ досяг впливу настільки, що становить серйозну опозиційну силу. Для того й пускаються у хід фальшиві чутки²²⁹.

3) по взаимодействию с областными ассоциациями и по взаимодействию с зелеными других республик и стран.

4) информационная с газетой "ЗС", и секретариат с орготделом.

²²⁷ See Оновлений "Зелений Світ", reprinted in Ukraine Today, RFE/RL Research Institute, Ukrainian Media Digest, no. UF-214, 13.6.1991, p. 24.

²²⁸ 30 березня 1991 р. Резолюція 2-го з'їзду УЕА "Зелений Світ" Про конструктивність наших дій.

²²⁹ *Зелений світ*, no 5, 1991, с. 1.

It is difficult to establish whether these Kiev Greens were acting on behalf of others or whether their actions were motivated by genuine concern with what they perceived of as irregularities and abuse of positions among the leadership of *Zelenyi Svit*. However, uniting against a perceived outside 'enemy' or 'threat' may also have been a convenient way of deflecting attention, then there were flaws in the way *Zelenyi Svit* functioned. This was acknowledged by the newspaper *Zelenyi Svit*, which in an article covering the Congress admitted that there had been discussions about 'serious errors' in the work of central organs such as poor co-ordination, particularly of independent ecological expert assessments and ecological programmes. The staff of the Green Office had also committed numerous mistakes.

Anatolyi Zolotukhin in a private conversation with Iurii Shcherbak during the Congress (the two of them were both in the Congress Presidium) expressed the view that *Zelenyi Svit* must be guided by moral principles even if this meant making unpleasant decisions then pretending as though nothing had happened would be equal to sanctioning a lack of morality and even become an accomplice. Zolotukhin thus favoured harsh measures to be taken against those people criticised by the Control Revision Commission²³⁰.

The Congress, however, rather than punishing any particular individuals for mismanagement, chose a different approach: to deal with the situation the Congress decided that the only possible principle on which to base the association's activities was mutual respect and agreement on the basis of pluralism of opinion and peaceful constructive criticism and self-criticism. Any 'destructive actions' facilitated by members of *Zelenyi Svit* should be addressed by *Zelena Rada*. The Congress recommended that disorder, the telling of lies or unfounded accusations and slander of other members, should that kind of behaviour occur, be punished by expulsion and that this be made known to the general public through the newspaper *Zelenyi Svit*. Any attempt at fuelling personal conflicts at the expense of practical work to protect the public and the children, was deemed amoral. Finally, the Congress urged all members to respect the resolution on morality and morals endorsed by the First Congress in 1989²³¹. *Zelenyi Svit* thus concluded that despite numerous attempts at breaking up the movement both from the outside and from within, *Zelenyi Svit* continued to develop as a true grassroots (basis democracy) movement, which rested on the initiative of numerous local groups and organisations all over Ukraine²³².

²³⁰ Information provided by Anatolyi Zolotukhin by email, 27 August 1995.

²³¹ This resolution, which is referred to in greater detail in Chapter Six, made it clear that personal disputes be addressed in an orderly manner and that all members regardless of political, religious or other beliefs unite behind what they all had in common despite these difficulties - namely to protect the environment.

²³² *Зелений світ*, no. 5, 1991, c. 1.

It is of course possible that individual members of the Green Movement such as Cherinko were either used or chose to take part in an officially orchestrated campaign against *Zelenyi Svit*. The association was as seen above very successful in campaigning against chemical enterprises, nuclear power and other sources of pollution since it was founded in 1987. However, criticism of *Zelenyi Svit* raised publicly was taken from the report of the Control Revision Commission and was not really refuted by neither Sheherbak nor Kurykin. For some, referring to official authorities as standing behind a campaign against the Greens, thus may have been a convenient way of defusing criticism. Moreover, as so many prominent members of *Zelenyi Svit* were being criticised, excluding them would not have solved the problem but rather destroyed the movement. Following the establishment of PZU and with the emergence of numerous new political movements and parties several prominent members had left the Green movement. Thus, it simply could not afford to lose any more. And in terms of image, expelling several of the most visible Greens in Kiev would not have been such a good idea. Weighing the pros and the cons, it therefore seemed that *Zelenyi Svit* while acknowledging that there was a problem, chose to focus on how to avoid further mismanagement rather than punish anyone responsible for this management. Instead, the Congress joined force against those Greens who, by openly criticising their own movement through the press, had 'betrayed' *Zelenyi Svit* and by appearing as a united movement towards the general public. In doing so, a (potentially) damaging conflict was avoided in the short run. However, this proved a bad policy in the longer run as personal conflicts which surfaced following the publication of the report remained and with time grew more severe, eventually bringing the movement down.

A number of resolutions were adopted by the Congress outlining *Zelenyi Svit*'s position not only on environmental issues, but also attempting to define its policies more generally. Leading members of *Zelenyi Svit*'s leadership voiced their positions on issues such as the future status of Ukraine and the market in interviews with the media during the Congress. Anatolyi Panov, for instance, discussing the market, argued that the question of the market was a complicated issue:

І для нас ЗЕЛЕНИХ також може бути небезпечним. Ми за те, щоб був ринок. Ми за те, щоб розвивалася демократія, свобода, ініціатива людей. Але ж некерований ринок може бути ще більш зрубним для нашого багатостраждального краю. Тому ми в подальших умовах повинні визначити: Що нам робити, як нам виступати. Ми за те, щоб виробити такі закони, такі вимоги, щоб природа України була для всіх. Ми закликаємо всіх небайдужих людей не піддаватися шогорденним економічним вигодам, які обіцяє ринок. А пам'ятати, що природа України на краю загибелі.²³³

²³³ K-3. 1:00, 31.3.1991, transcribed in *Ukraine Today, Ukrainian Media Digest*, compiled by Radio Liberty Monitoring, no. UF-114, 31.3.1991, p. 3.

Panov expanded on *Zelenyi Svit's* attitude towards the market in a note²³⁴ published on the eve of the Congress. The Greens were not against market relations as the market provided opportunities for developing democracy, freedom and individual choice. However, an unregulated market could be harmful to the environment. If the market was not subordinated to the environment (and not the other way round) it could be even more harmful than the administrative-command system to the Ukrainian environment. To secure this, the Greens should work to facilitate the implementation of environmental legislation and the setting up of structures and mechanisms to protect Nature and Man. The Greens therefore urged the Ukrainian people not to succumb to immediate economic gains, promised by the market, but to remember that the environment was on the verge of destruction.

The Congress - bearing this in mind - issued a resolution on agricultural reform²³⁵. The resolution expressed concern that those who would implement new legislation on land reform (the Law on Land and Soviet Presidential decree of 5 January 1991 'On the Priority Tasks for the Implementation of the Land Reform', as well as programmes on the development of farming - private and leased property) might choose the easy path of allotting plots of land that had not yet been cultivated, thus opening for a wave of extensive farming (the ploughing-up of virgin soil). Such farming was not likely to have any real socio-economic effect but would be harmful to the environment. Referring to Ukrainian state and economic sovereignty, the Greens recommended that a moratorium on the cultivation of virgin soil be adopted.

The sharp and increasing politicisation of Ukrainian society in particular and of the USSR more generally, caused a bit of a problem for the Greens. On the one hand, it became easier to be an independent movement and work on environmental issues. On the other hand, the politicisation also affected the members of *Zelenyi Svit*, 'dehomogenising' its membership mass. As Shcherbak pointed out, the (political) situation in Ukraine was becoming tenser. The social situation was very uncertain and discussion on the national question intensified as plans were made to hold a national referendum on this issue. This did of course also affect the Greens. It would be impossible for *Zelenyi Svit* to isolate itself from political problems, argued Shcherbak, as these very problems would determine how the natural environment would be preserved²³⁶ in the future.

²³⁴ Зелені ідеї життя!

²³⁵ Резолюція III з'їзду Української екологічної асоціації "Зелений Світ". Слово до співгромадян. The resolution was signed by the members of the initiative group to create a National Ecological Center in Ukraine: Iurii Shcherbak and Leontyi Sanduliak (USSR people's deputies), Academician Iurii Hleb, Iurii Sheliakh-Sosonko, M. Holubets, Iurii Kostenko and Iurii Akimov (Ukrainian people's deputies).

²³⁶ K-3, 22:30, 31.3.1991, transcribed in *Ukraine Today, Ukrainian Media Digest*, compiled by Radio Liberty Monitoring, no. UF-114, 31.3.1991, p. 5.

Initially, when the association was set up, people were united behind the desire to improve the state of the environment. By March 1991, however, when a number of serious battles had already been won and other issues such as Ukraine's future role in the Soviet Union and what economic model to follow became more prominent, a number of different positions emerged within *Zelenyi Svit*. As political parties began to emerge, some members joined *PZU*, whereas others preferred *RUKH*, and yet others looked to CPU for guidance. As a movement *Zelenyi Svit* therefore had to tread very carefully, facing the dilemma of having to make a stand on current crucial issues such as Ukraine and the market, while at the same time trying to find common ground that could unite rather than cause a split between the various currents within the movement. It also had to define the role of *Zelenyi Svit* vis-à-vis the Green Party. I will return to this issue in greater detail below, suffice it here to say that with the emergence of *PZU* as the political wing of the Green Movement the political struggle intensified within *Zelenyi Svit*. Thus, although Anatoliy Panov was right to point out that the delegates gathered for the Congress - in spite of holding membership in a number of political movements and parties - were able to unite behind the common aim to save Ukraine, which was on the verge of ecological catastrophe²³⁷, these personal political allegiances with increasing frequency would cloud this common aim at the expense of the struggle to gain the upper hand within the movement.

Shcherbak in his speech to the Congress tried to assess political events in Ukraine following the Founding Congress of *Zelenyi Svit* in 1989 and define its political role in a climate of radical political and economic change. In the summer of 1990 the Ukrainian parliament had adopted a Declaration of Sovereignty. During the spring of 1991 the 'communist empire' crumbled, the Ukrainian economy collapsed and tensions between the people of the Soviet Union and the CPSU reached a peak with the latter threatening to restore 'order' with the help of army units, special agents and OMON.

Thus, while attacking the Soviet Union as an empire and describing Ukraine as a nation which had to put up with a lot of suffering as a part of it and therefore fully supporting Ukrainian independence, *Zelenyi Svit* was much vaguer on issues such as what an independent Ukraine should be like. General concepts such as 'democracy', 'human rights' and 'market economy' were used but no proper attempt was made at defining these. A resolution issued to *Verkhovna Rada*, for instance, stated that

Вся історія СРСР є безперервною безкомпромісною війною державного тоталітаризму проти власного народу. Колись вона велася багнетами і шовдами, потім голодомором і гулагом, депортаціями і стіцієюм, зараз - Чорнобилем і новими АЕС.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*

Although the very same system was now trying to reform itself, the essence on which its power rested remained 'anti-human', according to the Greens: 'for the soulless communist leadership, the people was a means, not an end'. The environmental legacy of the regime also counted against it:

Союзному урядові мало було знищити тисячі річок і озер, наїради...землі, ліси з цілком новітнім повітрям, перетворити моря у каналізаційні відстійники, отруїти пані тіла найстрахотливою хімічною, а душі - ідеологічною отрутою. Він зазіхнув на наше майбутнє численими АЕС. Вони будуються, мовляв, не "блага народів". АЕС належать "Центру" і Ігнатівська АЕС вже показала зразок диктату "бунтівникам" Литви.

На Україні понад 95% всієї промисловості належить "Центру". Будь-якої миті "Центр" може вдатися до економічної блокади України припинивши постачання електроенергії, тепла, води, тракторів, автомобілів, заблокувавши транспорт і зв'язок, засоби масової інформації.

To free Ukraine from this situation, the Greens requested that the Ukrainian government immediately nationalise all nuclear power stations and all industries located on Ukrainian territory. Furthermore, they demanded that it implement the decision made by the parliament in 1990 to close down Chernobyl. As stated in the Declaration of Ukrainian Sovereignty, Ukraine should be made non-nuclear and neutral. Finally, a Ukrainian constitution should be adopted as quickly as possible - with a programme to resolve the republic's ecological and economic crisis²³⁸.

A majority of those present at the Congress were positive to *Zelenyi Svit's* policy and its joint activities with *RUKH* and the emerging new political parties to secure real state independence for Ukraine. It was argued that in the present situation of political reaction, the Greens must step forward with their own position in union with other democratic forces.

The Leadership Issue

The Congress not surprisingly reelected Iurii Sheherbak as leader and also elected five deputy leaders - an increase by one from previously. Iurii Tkachenko was re-elected, whereas the other four deputy leaders elected represented the regional branches of *Zelenyi Svit*: Oleksandr Bagin (Donetsk oblast), Anatoliy Zolotukhin (Nikolaev oblast), Leontyi Sanduliak (Chernivtsi oblast)

²³⁸ Резолюція ІІ з'їзду республіканської екологічної асоціації "Зелений Світ, addressed to *Verkhovna Rada* and signed by Nikolaev PZU. The resolution was written by hand but numbered (no. 12) and filed with other Congress documents.

and Roman Stepaniak (the Western oblasts). Serhii Plachynda, the previous leader of *Zelenyi Svit* became an honorary member of the association.

In an effort to streamline *Zelena Rada*, membership was reduced from 120 to 62 people. The Congress hoped that this would make the council a more 'manageable' institution and also contribute towards the reduction of costs as it proved rather expensive to cover travel expenses for so many people whenever the council convened. The new *Zelena Rada* was composed of the association's leadership (Shcherbak, Plachynda - who in addition to being the chairman of the Committee to save Dniepr was also made an honorary member of *Zelenyi Svit*, the five deputy leaders, eight representatives of all-Ukrainian issue-oriented organisations such as the *Eco-Fund*, the Ukrainian Peace Committee and the Green Party, as well as representatives from *Spilka Vriativannia*, the Committee in Defence of Dniepr, *Zelenyi Svit*'s Legal and Expert Commissions and the newspaper *Zelenyi svit*. The remaining seats were taken up by representatives of the oblast organisations²³⁹ and by people who were elected directly by the Congress. A majority of the latter were Kiev representatives. Of the 62 members of *Zelena Rada*, only seven (11.3%) were women. Although this represented an increase compared with the previous *Zelena Rada*, it was still far away from the number of women active at a high level in the Green Movements of West European countries. The membership list also revealed a lack of young people - a majority were men in their 40s or 50s. Attracting young people to *Zelenyi Svit* has proved a problem up until present. There are various reasons for this and I will return to these below.

As for the Co-ordinating Committee, which in effect would replace the Secretariat in running the movement on a regular basis, it was composed of 20 people, of whom three were women and 14 from Kiev. The members of the Co-ordinating Committee were all proposed by Iurii Shcherbak and confirmed by *Zelena Rada*. It is interesting that Panov, Ilazovyi, Demydenko, Tikhyi, Kurykin and Preobrazhenska who were all criticised in the Control Revision Commission's report, were re-elected in spite of the report's recommendation that they be banned from election to *Zelenyi Svit*'s representative bodies. The Control Revision Commission, however, was completely changed and also enlarged. Three of its five members represented Kiev and the other two came from Mukachevo and Ternopil (West-Ukraine) and were also women.

A number of changes were made to *Zelenyi Svit*'s structure. For instance personal membership would no longer be accepted. People would in the future only be able to join *Zelenyi Svit* as collective members - i.e. as members of a local group. This was done as a number of individuals often spoke on behalf of *Zelenyi Svit* at their own initiative, thus putting the movement

²³⁹ Altogether 24 oblasts were represented (Vinnytsia, Volynia, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zakarpatia, Zaporizhzhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kiev, Kiev oblast, Crimea, Lviv, Luhansk, Nikolaeiv, Odessa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkassy, Chernivtsi, Chernihiv)

as such in a bad light. Most of the amendments made to the statute and the programme, however, were cosmetic, adjusting the two to the recently adopted Declaration of Ukrainian Sovereignty.

Prior to the Second Congress a Commission was set up to look into how to make *Zelenyi Svit* a more efficient organisation. The Commission, which was composed primarily of Kiev Greens²⁴⁰ endorsed most of the recommendations made by the Control Revision Commission, urging that specific tasks be delegated to each member of staff at the Green Office in Podil so as to avoid confusion and make sure these tasks were implemented. It was also recommended that protocols be kept on incoming and outgoing mail, that book-keeping be improved and that journals be kept of meetings in *Mala* and *Zelena Rada* so as to keep record of what decisions were made by these bodies and who was in charge of them. So far no lists containing names, addresses and telephone numbers of the members of these two bodies had been made. This should be done as soon as possible, to ease contact between members of *Zelenyi Svit* and their elected representatives.

To improve links between the 'legislative' and 'executive' bodies of the association and the office, the Working Group suggested that readers be appointed amongst staff in the Green Office to work with *Zelena* and *Mala Rada*. A reader was also required to deal with international contacts. To keep an eye with the two councils, it was recommended that the Analytical Commission look at the implementation of decisions made by them. With regard to *Zelenyi Svit's* Commissions, their work could be improved by working out a time-schedule and clearer specifications as to what exactly their responsibilities would be. Information on the Commissions could then be put up in the Podil office.

Although the Working Group aimed at improving the efficacy of *Zelenyi Svit*, some of the suggestions put forward could easily produce the opposite result - namely increased bureaucratisation. For instance, the suggestion that one person be put in charge of the correspondence and mail, one person in charge of photocopying, etc. could bring about a situation where permission would have to be requested and given for collecting mail, sending mail and so on. Other suggestions were more likely to give a positive result: to avoid any future disputes on *Zelenyi Svit's* property, an inventarisation of its material goods ought to be conducted. A commission could be set up for this purpose. In the financial sphere, the Working Group recommended that the right to sign financial documents be the sole responsibility of the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of *Zelenyi Svit*. To avoid hiring of additional staff not sanctioned by the Congress, the report urged that staff be appointed on merit by a special commission composed of *Zelenyi Svit's* Chairman and his deputies. To increase the prestige of staff the Group

²⁴⁰ Sviatoslav Dudko was appointed chairman of the Working Group and was assisted by I. Berkashkevych, I. Havrylov, S. Kurykin, S. Fedorynychuk, K. Kholiavenko and V. Shevchenko.

recommended that salaries be raised. As for representative functions, these should be the prerogative of the Chairman, Deputy Chairmen and heads of the commissions.

Finally, to improve links with the public, the Working Group suggested that a 'Green telephone', operative 24 hours a day, be established. People would then be able to at any time contact the Greens about urgent issues relating to the environment so that these could be followed up by *Zelenyi Svit* activists. Attempts should also be made at getting regular access to TV and radio on a monthly basis. Information about the state of the Ukrainian environment could then be passed on to a broader audience. Through the mass media the Greens could also establish a dialogue with state organs working on the environment.

3.4.5 Zelena Rada (March 1991)

After the Congress was over, *Zelena Rada* met on 31 March²⁴¹ to endorse an executive committee that would be in charge of the Podil office until the next congress. The discussion on this issue was chaired by Iurii Shcherbak. He proposed that Anatoliy Panov be appointed *Zelenyi Svit*'s executive director and that he be included in the Co-ordination Committee. Panov's candidacy was also supported by Iurii Tkachenko and was then endorsed by *Zelena Rada* (38 in favour, three abstentions).

Zelena Rada also confirmed the members of the Co-ordinating Committee. Bearing in mind the recommendations of the Analytical Commission, each of its 20 members was put in charge of one particular task in the hope that this would do away with previous mismanagement and unclear division of tasks. In order to secure a quorum at the meetings of the Committee, Demydenko (Kiev) suggested that the quorum be set by the number of Kiev representatives on the Committee. This proposal was not endorsed by *Zelena Rada* as it would simply give Kiev control with the Committee. Also the deputy chairmen of *Zelenyi Svit* were given specific responsibilities; for instance, Bagin was put in charge of a commission on relations to strike committees in Ukraine, Sanduliak became leader of the Scientific Council, Stepaniak was made co-ordinator of the Western region and Zolotukhin put in charge of the Methodology Commission. Finally, it was decided that members of the Control Revision Commission were free to attend meetings of *Zelena Rada* in the future.

Bearing in mind the personal conflicts and tensions within *Zelenyi Svit*, Iurii Tkachenko appealed to everybody to be less aggressive and join forces behind what united the members of the movement rather than what divided them. Shcherbak stressed that the most important thing was to

²⁴¹ Протокол №1, засідання зеленої ради УЕА "Зелений Світ", 31 березня 1991 р.

work and to pay less attention to those features and characteristics of individual members of the association that one did not like. During the latter half of 1991, however, the question of Ukrainian independence somewhat overshadowed developments within *Zelenyi Svit*.

3.4.6 Independence

Zelenyi Svit published a number of articles on Ukrainian independence during 1991. Several of these were written by Andrii Hrabovskyi, one of the Green Movement's 'ideologists'. He argued very clearly in favour of Ukrainian independence on various grounds, one of the most important ones being the environment.

Once it was decided that a referendum would be held on this issue in conjunction with the upcoming presidential election in December 1991 *Zelenyi Svit*, like most other independent groups and political parties, started campaigning actively in favour of independence. The issue was debated at length by *Zelena Rada* in September 1991 and a statement outlining the position of the Greens on the matter was printed in *Zelenyi svit* shortly after. In the statement the Greens argued that the decision to hold a referendum on the future status of Ukraine was illegal from the point of view of international law, in that it violated the right of all people to independence. However, taking into account the current situation, *Zelena Rada* had made the following decision:

Вважати питання проведення Всеукраїнського референдуму і групи пр. найважливішим в діяльності асоціації "Зелений Світ". Закликати всі організації та їх членів в час, що залишився до референдуму, спільно з іншими демократичними силами зробити все від них залежне для пропаганди ідеї незалежності України, забезпечення її демократичного розвитку²⁴².

3.5 Conclusion

By 1991 *Zelenyi Svit* had reached a peak in terms of achievements and political influence. Not only had it succeeded in stopping the construction of new and the expansion of existing nuclear power stations through a series of successful campaigns which culminated with the passing of a moratorium on nuclear power adopted by the Ukrainian parliament in September 1990; it also managed to put an end to a number of environmentally harmful industrial and military projects throughout Ukraine. In terms of results, much of what the Greens aimed for had been achieved.

²⁴² *Зелений світ*, no. 15, 1991, c. 1.

With the radicalisation of Soviet and Ukrainian society, the political focus shifted from environmental issues to their underlying factors such as economic reform, economic and political autonomy and from late 1990 also political independence. As the initial public enthusiasm for political reform started to wear off and as inflation took off, people became more introverted, focusing their attention on how to get by under increasingly difficult economic conditions. Gradually it became harder for Greens to mobilise people and take to the streets to draw attention to environmental issues. Possibly as a result, those activists left within the movement rather than uniting to develop new strategies to tackle environmental problems and keep public interest high, started fighting amongst themselves for positions within the movement. As seen above, Iurii Shcherbak had since *Zelenyi Svit's* early days managed to contain the various currents and groupings. Following his departure for Moscow as a deputy of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and later as a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the first signs of conflict became visible. They continued, as seen above, to build up on the eve of the Second Congress of *Zelenyi Svit* and despite the reconciliatory tone of Shcherbak's address to the Congress, were not at all resolved. The effect such conflicts had on the movement is a central theme in the following chapter, 'Conflict and Decline: The Green Movement under Ukrainian Independence'.

4 Conflict and Decline: The Green Movement under Ukrainian Independence

4.0 Introduction

The Second Congress in many ways became a turning point for *Zelenyi Svit*. Not only did it reveal that conflicts were building up within the Green Movement, but it also revealed Shcherbak's enormous authority within the Movement. It was largely to his credit that the Congress managed to unite people with very different opinions behind a resolution condemning attempts at splitting up *Zelenyi Svit* from within. When Shcherbak was offered a seat in the Ukrainian government as Minister of the Environment, Greens were not only concerned with the impact this might have on the Movement in terms of popular support, but possibly even more so on how this would affect internal developments within *Zelenyi Svit*. The conflicts that erupted prior to the Second Congress in Ivano-Frankivsk were further compounded by the emergence of the Green Party of Ukraine (see next chapter) and differences in opinion on what the relationship between movement and party should be. On top of this, it was becoming increasingly difficult to mobilise people in support of campaigns initiated by the Green Movement. It was precisely such campaigns and Shcherbak's skillful leadership that had served as the 'glue' holding the movement together.

Below, I will focus on internal developments in *Zelenyi Svit* and relate these to regional and political factors that might help explain why the Green Movement started to disintegrate in the early 1990s. I will also take a close look at the parliamentary and local elections of 1994, trying to explain why support for the Greens dropped, compared to the previous 1990 elections. Finally, the so-called 'philosophical alternative' to *Zelenyi Svit* - *EkoMisiia* - is discussed and its potential role as a new umbrella organisation, uniting Greens frustrated with the state of affairs within *Zelenyi Svit*, is assessed. The chapter is divided into four sub-sections: 'Leadership Struggle and Discord', 'Green Support', 'Regional Differences', and 'The Future of the Green Movement'.

4.1 Leadership Struggle and Discord

4.1.1. Green Minister of the Environment

Zelenyi Svit activists had, as seen above, since the second half of 1989 fought a campaign to remove V. Filonenko from the post of chairman of *Derzhkompriroda*, arguing that he was not a professional ecologist (by education, he was an engineer) and therefore not adequately qualified

for the job. Moreover, claimed the Greens, despite the 1988 resolution on *Goskompriroda* passed by the Soviet government, few changes for the better had taken place within the Ukrainian State Committee¹.

Although it was true that *Derzhkompriroda* faced harsh opposition from more powerful ministries and departments such as *Minatomenergoprom*, *Minkhimprom* and *Minchormet*, it was equally true that it under Filonenko's leadership was being unacceptably passive. Industrial projects for the Bukivna forest (Kiev) had been stopped early on by the Greens, for instance, and not by the Ministry. For almost half a year the Greens had been fighting against the creation of garden plots in a water protection area in the Koncha-Zaspa region. Filonenko had four months previously categorically come out against such construction at a meeting of *Derzhkompriroda*'s Public Council attended also by *Zelenyi Svit* representatives. However, work to convert the site had already started². Frustration over *Derzhkompriroda*'s poor performance was shared with Greens also in other parts of Ukraine³. Filonenko was not removed from office, but the election of a new chairman to *Derzhkompriroda* and the passing of a Ukrainian Law on Environmental Protection were put on the agenda of *Verkhovna Rada*'s Second Session scheduled for 1991. *Zelenyi Svit* proposed Leontiy Sanduliak as its candidate for this job⁴.

Sanduliak's credentials were impressive. Not only was he the leader of *Bukovina Zelenyi Svit*; he was also a USSR People's Deputy and a member of the Ukrainian Parliament. Moreover, being a professor of Medicine at Chernivtsy University he was well qualified for the job from a professional point of view. However, Sanduliak was also an active member of *RUKH* - he was a member of *RUKHs Velika Rada* - and this no doubt made him less suitable for the job from the point of view of the authorities.

For the authorities, however, it would not necessarily be such a bad idea to put a representative of the Green Movement in charge of *Minpriroda*: on the one hand, once the Greens were themselves in control of the Ministry, criticism of the Ukrainian authorities for poor performance on the environment might be softened. Moreover, given that the achievements of *Derzhkompriroda* so far were poor, continued poor performance under the leadership of a *Zelenyi Svit* representative might weaken the favourable image of the Green Movement vis-à-vis the general public. Political and economic changes were taking place in Ukraine in 1990 but these were to a large extent cosmetic. The bureaucratic structures remained largely intact and resistant to change. A Green Minister of the Environment would therefore only have limited scope for manoeuvring and not be in a position to rock the boat off balance. It is not unreasonable therefore

¹ *Derzhkompriroda* was given ministerial status in 1991.

² *Зелений світ*, no. 2, May 1990, c. 3.

³ See Chapters Six and Seven for details.

⁴ See *Зелений світ*, no. 8, August 1990, c. 1,2 and also *Зелений світ*, no. 13, October 1990, c. 7.

to assume that circles within the government and the CPU who were unhappy with *Zelenyi Svit*'s achievements so far (for example the pro-nuclear lobby) would be more than happy to weaken its popularity among the general public and thus also its political impact. So although appointing a member of *Zelenyi Svit* as chairman of *Minpriroda* could be seen as an acknowledgement of *Zelenyi Svit*, the motives might have been less honourable.

Although *Zelenyi Svit* had proposed that Sanduliak be appointed for this post, some were less happy when Prime Minister Vitold Fokin offered the Ministry to Iurii Shcherbak. As seen above, by early 1991 it was clear that *Zelenyi Svit* was not such a unified association as it would like the public to think. Shcherbak was possibly the only - or at least one of the very few - person who had the authority to contain these conflicts and seek their solution. The Green Movement could therefore ill afford to lose him as its leader. Following his election as chairman of *PZU* in April 1991 some members of *Zelenyi Svit* had expressed the view that Shcherbak ought to resign as chairman of *Zelenyi Svit*. However, these members had so far been in a minority. When the issue of the ministerial post came up, such demands increased in frequency.

Opinions were divided as to what Shcherbak might achieve as a member of the government. Fokin's government was coming under increasing criticism in the summer of 1991 due to increasing inflation and also as he was considered a rather dogmatic and inflexible leader by the 'democratic opposition' in Ukraine. Joining Fokin's government was therefore very much a gamble for the Greens. On the one hand, there was the possibility that Shcherbak would succeed in reforming and securing wider powers for *Minpriroda*. However, should he fail to achieve this, the damage could be substantial not only to Shcherbak personally, but possibly more so to the Green Movement.

Those opposed to Shcherbak taking over the Ministry of the Environment argued that as long as the political and economic structures in Ukraine remained unchanged, one minister could do little or nothing to improve things. Once people realised that having a Green Minister of the Environment made no big difference, they would lose faith in the Greens and its authority would drop. Besides, asked some, would it not be better for the Green Movement to remain completely independent from the state structures, thus allowing it to freely criticise the authorities?

Despite disagreement within *Zelenyi Svit* (and also as will be seen in the following chapter, within *PZU*) Shcherbak decided to accept Fokin's offer. It took two rounds of voting in *Verkhovna Rada* before Shcherbak's candidacy was eventually endorsed. Although he was considered competent for the job, many CPU deputies were sceptical to his political attitudes. However, Fokin insisted that Shcherbak be given the job and put him forward as his candidate also for the second round. Some CPU raikom first secretaries eventually vouched for Shcherbak,

urging the deputies to think in an 'up-to-date' manner and he was eventually elected with 254 votes⁵.

Shortly after he was appointed Ukrainian Minister of the Environment, Shcherbak resigned as chairman of *Zelenyi Svit*. His deputy, Iurii Tkachenko, took over as interim leader of the association until a new leader could be found. Shcherbak did, however, retain the leadership of *PZU* and the stakes were thus higher for the Green Party, where opposition to Shcherbak's appointment was also more substantial.

As for the Ministry, Shcherbak tried to reorganise it by firing people who were not up to the job and by replacing them with members of the Green Movement. His attempts, however, proved much more difficult than he had originally envisaged. During a conversation with Shcherbak in Kiev in August 1991, I was told that he had been given a limit by the government as to how many people he could actually sack. Besides, Greens were cautious about taking up jobs in the ministry. Volodymyr Tikhyi (Kiev), for instance, turned down such an offer and chose to work through *Greenpeace*, which opened an office in Kiev the same year. Andriy Demydenko was also highly sceptical, although he was eventually persuaded to take on the job as head of the Ministry's International Department.

Shcherbak also sought changes more generally. In early October 1991, for instance, he claimed that Ukraine was the most polluted country in Europe and that there was a need for an ecological security council, subordinated to the Ukrainian President, to address these issues⁶. Such a council was, however, not created. Later, *Zelenyi Svit* criticised President Kravchuk for failing to include someone with expertise in this area on the State Duma subordinated to him. Besides, Green dissatisfaction with the Ministry's performance remained.

As will be seen in Chapters Six and Seven, Zolotukhin of Nikolaev *Zelenyi Mir* grew so frustrated with the way deputy minister Liakh handled the issue on whether or not to expand the South Ukrainian Energy Complex, and the way in which the local branch of the Ministry handled environmental problems generally in the oblast, that he wrote a letter to Shcherbak drawing to his attention these matters. As Shcherbak was 'Green' he hoped some good would come out of his complaint. Although Shcherbak acknowledged that in some cases the Ministry could have performed better, he did not find this circumstance sufficient to justify the dismissal of any particular individuals - including Liakh.

Shcherbak's reply caused disbelief in Nikolaev. Although some people were of the opinion that Zolotukhin had taken things a bit too far, others were disappointed with Shcherbak, who it was alleged had 'sold out' to official authorities rather than fighting the bureaucratic structures he

⁵ M-1, 09:00, printed in *RFE/RL Research Institute, Soviet Media News Budget*, 20.6.1991, no. 516, p. 24.

⁶ *Мисля Українці*, 2.10.1991 (n.p.).

had himself earlier criticised. Shcherbak's departure from *Zelenyi Svit* also had a negative impact on the association. As pointed out by Serhyi Hrabovskyi, Shcherbak's resignation unleashed conflicts within *Zelenyi Svit* which he had managed to keep under control. Iurii Tkachenko, the deputy chairman of *Zelenyi Svit* and interim chairman until a new leader was elected, did not have the same authority among *Zelenyi Svit* as Shcherbak had, and was thus unable to prevent these conflicts from erupting. A struggle for power between supporters of *PZU*, *RUKH*, people with leftist sympathies and the politically independent started shortly after and with it the decline of *Zelenyi Svit*.

In terms of public support, however, *Zelenyi Svit* had by 1991 established itself as a highly popular and authoritative informal organisation, capable of mobilising up to 15 percent support in opinion polls. In polls conducted during 1990 and 1991, the Greens ranked among the four most popular political organisations and parties, thus clearly indicating that although discord was beginning to emerge within the Green Movement - in the same way as was the case in other organisations and parties - the Greens were still a significant force in Ukrainian political life. I will return to this issue in more detail in Chapter Five. To illustrate my point, however, I include two polls printed in *Zelenyi Svit* and the *Ukrainian Reporter*. These are representative of several polls conducted during this period.

Table 4.1 Support for Greens in Kiev during 1990 (% of electorate)⁷

Org./Party	January	February	June	November
RUKH	25.3	29.0	45.8	53.6
<i>Zelenyi Svit</i> /PZU	13.4	15.3	13.3	12.5
CPU	19.5	18.4	10.1	10.0
<i>Komsomol</i>	4.1	4.7	1.3	0.4
Ukrainian Republican Party	1.0	0.9	2.4	1.3
Democratic Platform of the CPSU	---	---	6.3	1.1
Ukrainian Student Society	---	---	---	2.8
Ukrainian Democratic Party	---	---	---	1.0
Others	17.1	17.2	11.9	2.3
Person more important than org./party affiliation	19.9	14.2	8.9	15.0

Similar results were found by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Philosophy, which polled the electorate on political support in January and July 1991:

⁷ *Зелений світ*, no. 7-8, 1991, c. 3.

Table 4.2: Support of Greens (in %) in Ukraine during 1990⁸

Group	January	July
RUKH	27	46
Greens	13	13
CPU	20	10
Nationalists	3	7

As seen from both surveys, the Greens maintained a relatively stable support base throughout 1991, ranking second only to *RUKH*. *RUKH*'s broader appeal to some extent no doubt was connected with its demands for Ukrainian independence at a time when other political movements and parties - including the Greens - were more cautious on this issue. Besides, several of *RUKH*'s leaders were well known and respected members of the creative intelligentsia, who appealed not only to environmentalists, but also to others.

Following the Ukrainian Declaration of Sovereignty in June 1990, Ukrainian society became increasingly politicised and a differentiation occurred in terms of party/organisational support. *URP*, the most radical party, was composed primarily of former prisoners of conscience, who lacked popular appeal and whose support base was limited to the West. *RUKH*, on the other hand, had among its members also (former) members of the *CPSU* and a much broader appeal throughout Ukraine. Although the gap in support between *RUKH* and the Greens was considerable and on the increase, it is still significant that the Greens polled higher than the *CPU*. By 1990 *Zelenyi Svit* had established itself as a highly efficient organisation which had won a number of 'victories' in the field of the environment. This, more than anything else, secured its high ranking in the polls; people had heard about *Zelenyi Svit* (being the first informal mass organisation to appear in Ukraine as a result of glasnost and democratisation) and they knew that the Greens not only talked, but did what they said they would do.

The Greens managed to keep this support and even increase it vis-a-vis other political movements and parties throughout 1991 - a poll printed by *Zelenyi Svit* in January 1992 gave a clear indication in that respect:

⁸ *Ukrainian Reporter*, vol. 1, no. 2, 1991, p. 3. This survey was conducted by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Philosophy.

Table 4.3 Attitudes to the Ukrainian Public Movements and Political Parties among the Ukrainian Population (in %)⁹

Political organisation/party	Not familiar with	actively support	support	positive towards	do not support	negative towards	Rating
<i>Zelenyi Svit</i>	32.3	14.8	27.3	17.1	5.9	2.6	0.06
RUKH	17.8	12.3	21.3	20.4	16.7	11.4	- 0.5
Ukr. Student Society	39.6	10.7	14.7	21.5	8.9	4.6	- 0.11
PZU	44.8	7.0	14.9	20.8	9.1	3.4	- 0.14
SNUM	38.1	8.4	14.4	21.1	11.8	6.3	- 0.16
PDVU	45.4	5.4	14.5	23.1	8.0	3.6	- 0.19
DPVU	44.4	3.4	11.6	25.4	11.7	3.5	- 0.23
UKhDP	50.2	4.0	9.0	13.3	10.4	3.3	- 0.24
URP	37.8	2.9	11.4	25.4	14.8	7.6	- 0.25
UNDP	47.8	2.3	10.4	24.7	11.7	3.1	0.26
NPU	45.2	3.0	10.0	25.0	12.3	4.6	- 0.26
<i>Komsomol</i>	37.9	4.9	11.2	21.2	15.2	9.7	- 0.26
SDPU	52.3	3.2	8.0	23.2	10.6	4.3	- 0.31
OSDPV	57.1	2.1	5.0	22.2	10.3	3.4	- 0.32
LDPV	54.9	1.9	5.1	23.4	11.0	3.8	- 0.32
UNP	52.7	2.4	5.2	23.3	11.3	5.2	- 0.32
CPU Coalition	23.7	2.3	8.1	23.4	23.6	19.0	- 0.37

As seen from the table, the electorate was not very well familiar with most of the political parties which emerged during 1990 and 1991. Almost one third of those polled had not heard about *Zelenyi Svit*. However, only *RUKH* and the coalition founded on the base of the *CPU* once the Communist Party was banned in Ukraine after the unsuccessful coup in August 1991, were better known by those polled than were the Greens - even *Komsomol* could not beat the Greens in terms of its awareness among the general public! As for support, *Zelenyi Svit* ranked higher than both *RUKH* and the Society of Ukrainian Students - the latter rose to fame during the student hungerstrikes in Independence Square in October 1990 - and it was twice as popular as the Green Party, which was also considerably less known by the general public.

Judging by the results of this survey, the Greens did not seem to have lost any support throughout 1991 despite infighting and the loss of Shecherbak as a leader. This situation, however, would change in the next few years, partly due to increasing disillusionment with politics among the Ukrainian electorate, partly due to a shift of focus from environmental issues to economic problems and statebuilding among political decision-makers in Ukraine, and finally also due to problems within the Green Movement itself.

⁹ *Zelenyi Svit*, no. 1, 1992, c. 3.

4.1.2 Pretext to the Third Congress

The most important task for the Greens following its active campaigning for Ukrainian independence and involvement in collecting 100,000 signatures in support for Shcherbak's candidacy for the presidential elections in 1991, was to elect a new leader. Thus, a major reason - although not the only one - for once again calling an extraordinary congress was to sort out the leadership issue. *Svit*. Another important reason was the collapse of the USSR in December 1991.

Independent Ukraine was in the process of consolidating itself and there was a need to adjust strategy and tactics to new political and economic circumstances. Public interest in environmental issues was dropping in parallel with the worsening of the economic situation. *Verkhovna Rada*, although it had passed several 'progressive' decisions on the environment, was not characterised by a high level of ecological awareness. President Kravchuk's pre-election programme did not contain one single word about the environment. It was therefore difficult to tell whether the new centralised structure of leadership through presidential representatives would conduct an active environmental policy.

Shcherbak's Ministry of Environmental Protection was facing numerous problems - although there had been some successes. *Zelenyi Svit* therefore had to define its role in independent Ukraine and also establish which forms of public activity would be most efficient in the future. The decision was made by *Zelena Rada* at a meeting in Kiev on 15 March 1992 and preparations started shortly afterwards¹⁰.

As seen above, the Second Congress did take a number of steps to improve the way in which *Zelenyi Svit* was run. However, no immediate change for the better was registered. Besides, the focus shifted from organisational to political issues during the second half of 1991 as *Zelenyi Svit* was busy preparing for the referendum and also the presidential election coming up on 1 December, for which Shcherbak had been put forward as a candidate for *PZU*. At the grassroots level, however, the dissatisfaction remained. In November 1991 V. Sandul - the leader of Nikopol *Zelenyi Svit* - which was conducting a campaign against further expansion of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station in a letter to *Zelenyi Svit* voiced criticism with the way the Green Movement was run:

Необхідно підняти рівень роботи в центрі, зв'язок з державними природоохоронними органами. В опозиції було краще, а зараз треба працювати більше. Де координуюча роль "ЗС", в межах Республіки? Давайте обговоримо стан справ в "ЗС", не чекаючи, поки це зробить "Робітнича газета". Або поки республіканська асоціація перетвориться в Київську¹¹.

¹⁰ *Зелений світ*, no. 7, 1992, c. 1.

¹¹ *Зелений світ*, no. 17-18, 1991, c. 3.

Sandul's fear that *Robitnycha hazeta* would once again launch a veritable attack on *Zelenyi Svit* turned out to be unfounded. However, as had been the case prior to the Second Congress the Ukrainian press also this time published information to the effect that things were not so well within the Green Movement. An article attacking its growing bureaucracy written by Andrii Hlazovyi, one of the founding members of the association, appeared in print in the weekly *Visti z Ukrainy*¹².

Hlazovyi, who was at that time working as a journalist in the newspaper *Zelenyi Svit* had approached its editor, Myhailoo Prilutskyi, with a request that his article be published, but was rejected. Through another member of *Zelenyi Svit*, Serhyi Hrabovskyi, who was working as a member of the editorial board of *Visti z Ukrainy*, he arranged to have his article published there instead, much to the embarrassment and anger of those who did not share his views.

The article, which was entitled 'The Koba Syndrome - A point of View' (Sindrom Kobychky), pointed out that although the official reason for calling a Congress was to make changes to the already outdated programme and statute of *Zelenyi Svit*, it was more important for the delegates to seriously consider the future of the Green Movement.

When *Zelenyi Svit* emerged in 1987 it had a democratic, inflated structure rooted in 'basis democracy', the organisational principle of Greens world-wide. There were no 'elites', no 'functionaries' or 'statists'. Initially, there was also no paid staff and no membership fees. All necessary work was conducted by volunteers, of whom there was no shortage. This could be explained by the fact that

Може тому, що у програмних документах не було ні жорсткої "ідеологічної витриманості", ні надмірної заполітизованості. От і працювали пліч-о-пліч люди з дуже різною влачею та уподобаннями так, що здобули заслужене визнання в Україні та за її межами.

However, the situation had changed:

Час схищав. Ситуація мінлася. Стрімко зростала кількість активістів "зеленого" руху. З'явилися такі-сякі кошти, сучасне електронне обладнання, офіси. Запрацювали сталі міжнародні контакти. Тодій виникла необхідність створити апарат. Щось подібне, до речі, відбувалося і в інших рухах та цювстворених партіях. Кожна значна організація повинна мати органи управління, це - нормальню. Але того ж дня з'являються і перші зловісні симптоми "синдрому Коби".

¹² *Visti z Ukrainy* (n.d., n.p.).

Things were such that drawing a comparison to Stalin was not out of place. For Stalin, or Koba, as he was called by friends, the climb to power started with the obtaining of a modest secretarial post as 'chief clerk' of the Bolshevik party. The usurping of power from modest positions, argued Hlazovyi, was a feature common to societies during times of social upheaval or revolutions, bringing about the creation of a new statehood. And, he added, it was even more familiar to post-totalitarian societies, populated by people who were raised in the spirit of a centralised, anti-democratic ideology:

Дуже багато сюжетів виникає, коли до рук потрапляють керівний портфель або важелі управління - не має значення, державних структур чи громадських організацій. Особливо гострої форми синдром набуває, коли до портфеля уявив, а важелі управління декоративні і до жодного механізму не принаповані. Бурхливо ростуть симптоми: дедалі більше прагнення "керувати", як Бог на душу поклав, далі - комплекс неюгрішності, і, нарешті, поділ оточення на "наших" і "ваших". Функціонер починає про себе самого думати і говорити виключно у множині, як давні монархи: "Ми вирішили...", "Ми вважаємо..."

Having an administrative apparatus of its own would not necessarily be so bad had it, as is common in all 'civilised' countries been paid to serve the organisation and implement required technical work necessary to keep it going. However, in the former USSR, the apparatus worked for itself and not for the organisation. This turned out to be the case also in *Zelenyi Svit* and Hlazovyi gave an example to illustrate the situation:

Иногда виникають напіванекдотичні ситуації, коли обрані з'їздом координуючі органи "Зеленого Світу" ухвалюють падати матеріальну підтримку якомусь конкретному проекту (наприклад так було зі спілкою "Врятування", коли їй були потрібні нові дозиметри), а потрібні кошти блокуються апаратом - мовляв "нічим годувати людей" (тобто - платних функціонерів).

Vryatuvannia eventually found money elsewhere to buy the dosimeters it required. The question that had to be answered, however, was if this situation was acceptable in an organisation whose major aim was to protect the environment. The organisation committee of *Zelenyi Svit*'s Third Congress had received several suggestions to changes in the statute, most of which regarded the role and influence of the apparatus. To improve the state of affairs, Hlazovyi suggested that *Zelenyi Svit* return to its origins, where there were no paid 'generals' or 'professional leaders'. In addition, provisions should be made to secure that no more than 10-15 percent of the association's budget be spent on maintaining an apparatus. *Zelenyi Svit* had gained its authority through real

action. This authority, concluded Hlazovyi, must not be lost as a result of the 'apparatus syndrome'¹³.

In Hlazovyi's view Prilutskyi refused to print his article as it indirectly criticised Anatolii Panov, the executive director of the Green Office, for his administrative style. Prilutskyi and Panov were good friends and it was at Panov's initiative that Prilutskyi, who used to work as a journalist of *Literaturna Ukraina* and who had arranged for Panov to publish articles on the environment in this newspaper, was invited by *Zelenyi Svit* to become editor of *Zelenyi svit*. After the Second Congress in Ivano-Frankivsk it was decided that *Zelenyi Svit* would no longer have an executive director. Instead there would be three readers, each in charge of strictly defined tasks, and each of whom would be subordinated to one of the association's three deputy leaders. The readers would be appointed on merit. This decision was made on the initiative of Evhen Korbetskyi, one of *Zelenyi Svit*'s deputy leaders at the time, and was opposed by Anatolii Panov.

As seen above, the new statute which was adopted by the Second Congress and was to be presented to the Ministry of Justice for registration, was changed prior to registration. This caused considerable dissatisfaction and anger among activists in the association and many thought, although this could not be proved, that Panov had been involved with changing the statute. Thus, Hlazovyi was under the impression that Prilutskyi was collaborating with Panov to keep away from the pages of *Zelenyi Svit* any article which directly or indirectly criticised the state of affairs in the Green Movement¹⁴. Apparently also an article written by Serhii Hrabovskyi was turned down. Following this decision the collegium of the newspaper collected signatures in support of printing Hlazovyi's and Hrabovskyi's articles. When their request was again turned down, they collectively walked out of the newspaper.

Although many people agreed with Hlazovyi that *Zelenyi Svit* was suffering from 'verticalisation' (i.e. a pyramid structure), not everybody approved of the way in which he criticised staff at the Green Office. Ihor Kirilchuk (Kiev), for instance, found it unfair to criticise people simply for being concerned about the salaries of those people working at the office. The

¹³ A number of *Zelenyi Svit* members have voiced dissatisfaction with the way in which the office at Podil was run under the leadership of Anatolii Panov. Andrii Demydenko, for instance, complained that he had turned the association into an inefficient and bureaucratic structure. Faxes and letters were left lying about in the office unread and little concrete work was conducted from the office (interview in Kiev, 30.8.1982). Similar complaints were voiced by Hlazovyi (interview in Kiev, 18.8.1992), who claimed that Panov wanted to decide everything once he became executive director, controlling letters and faxes. Kurykin, who was in 1992 working as a liaison officer for Friends of the Earth and Hlazovyi, who performed the same function for *Milieucontact Oosteuropa*, did not receive faxes until weeks after they arrived and had personal mail intercepted. Some letters regarding funding for projects carried Shcherbak's false signature. Korobko (interview in Kiev, 22.4.1994) added to the list of complaints by arguing that Panov left the office in a mess and that local groups allegedly associated with *Zelenyi Svit* could not be traced. Documents about these groups were found in the office.

¹⁴ Interview with Andrii Hlazovyi, Kiev, 18.8.1982.

Green Movement wanted to have an office and a staff. Rent, labour and communications were not free, they cost money. Making phone calls out of Kiev was expensive, but necessary for the association to function properly. Having said that, though, Kirilchuk did not approve of Prilutskyi's decision not to print Hlazovyi's article. In his view it should have been printed together with a reply from the association to the points raised¹⁵.

The conflict between the editor of *Zelenyi svit*, Mykhailo Prilutskyi, and newspaper staff, one of whom was Hlazovyi, had been building up over some time. The two groups had very different views on what the newspaper should look like. To Greens committed to the international Green Movement, such as Hlazovyi and Kurykin, Prilutskyi was not fundamentally 'Green'. He shunned politics and preferred to print 'uncontroversial' materials exploring ecological traditions in Ukraine, cultural issues and alternative medicine, whereas Hlazovyi wanted more materials on the international Green Movement, environmental problems in Ukraine and discussions around *Zelenyi Svit*.

The aims of *Zelenyi svit* were spelled out in print shortly after it had been registered with the Ukrainian State Committee on the Press in 1990: The newspaper would 'objectively look into Ukrainian ecological problems and also address related political, social, economic, moral-ethic, philosophical and medical aspects'. It would also 'introduce (its readers) to the activities of the Greens not only in Ukraine, but also in other parts of the USSR as well as in other countries' and finally, educate people to think ecologically, 'through the revival of the ecology of the human soul'¹⁶. Given limited space it was therefore not surprising that differences arose on what to publish.

Although the two groups clashed over Hlazovyi's article it was two other issues that triggered open confrontation: firstly, attempts to privatise *Zelenyi svit* and secondly, Prilutskyi's firing of members of staff¹⁷. According to staff the editor of the newspaper had no right to either hire or fire people as this was the prerogative of *Zelenyi Svit's* Congress. Prilutskyi, for instance, had been endorsed by the Second Congress, although there had been irregularities in the appointment of the editorial board. On the other hand, it could of course be argued that given that the newspaper had joined *Zelenyi Svit* as a collective member it was up to the newspaper itself to sort out editorial and staff issues - as was the case for other collective members. The editorial board of *Zelenyi Svit* challenged Prilutskyi's firing of a computer technician by taking him to court¹⁸. While investigations were being conducted, the newspaper did not appear in print.

¹⁵ Interview with Ihor Kirilchuk, Kiev, 12.5.1994.

¹⁶ *ЗЕЛЕНИЙ СВІТ*, no. 12, 1990, c. 1.

¹⁷ Interview with Serhii Kurykin, Kiev, Summer 1992.

¹⁸ According to Hlazovyi, the firing was a result of a trip made to Germany. One of the computers' harddisk collapsed and it was decided to send someone from the newspaper to Germany to get it fixed.

This caused concern in both camps. Kurykin, for instance, complained that other newspapers no longer wanted to print information about the Greens as it was getting increasingly expensive to publish. Besides, newspapers were becoming more commercialised and political subjects were being replaced by more speculative materials. Access to the media was therefore restricted. The attention of the Greens thus in 1992 shifted from the press to the radio. Links had also been established with Ukrainian TV - although these contacts were made by *PZU* activists. The struggle to control *Zelenyi Svit* was therefore all the more understandable.

The computer technician's case eventually came before the court. The judge sided with the technician and awarded him compensation in the form of two months' salary (1,300 kpoons). Conflict arose again on whether the newspaper should pay or whether Prilutskyi, having fired the technician illegally, should pay.

Prilutskyi's interpretation of events, however, was very different. The way he saw it, Hlazovyi and his supporters on the editorial board tried to gain control with the newspaper by trying to privatise it. In a letter to *Zelenyi Svit's* Co-ordination Committee he wrote the following:

Внаслідок таких, зумисне спрямованих протиправних, протизаконних обманних дій з боку працівників редакції А. П. Глазового, Е.А. Коцюбняка, А.Т. Мозгового, співзасновниками газети стали з одного боку Асоціація, а з другого - вищезгадані приватні особи, а не колектив редакції, як зазначалося у рішенні зборів та в похвалі Зеленої Ради¹⁹.

In an interview in the summer of 1992, Hlazovyi maintained that formally not only *Zelenyi Svit* but also its staff were the founders of *Zelenyi Svit*. Thus staff therefore had a say on whether or not to privatise the newspaper. However, he continued, who would want to privatise something as economically unviable as *Zelenyi Svit* anyway? To substantiate his claims, he argued that in the early days the Green newspaper had a circulation of 30,000 copies. By the time he and other members of staff walked out on Prilutskyi circulation was down to 14,000 copies. For two and a half months during the summer of 1992 the newspaper did not appear and financially it was surviving on 2,000 US dollars given by foreign sponsors. After the walk-out only the editor and two members of staff remained and none of these, argued Hlazovyi, were capable of producing a newspaper²⁰.

A slightly different version of events was given by Ihor Kirilchuk: The conflict which arose in the newspaper *Zelenyi Svit* broke as the newspaper had to be re-registered. The statute of

Apparently Prilutskyi urged them to go (this conversation, claimed Hlazovyi, was taped), whereas later on he denied this.

¹⁹ *Молод України*, 3.7.1992 (n.p.).

²⁰ Interview with Andrii Hlazovyi, Kiev, 18.8.1992.

the newspaper read that it was the editorial board's collective property. However, as only one name was written down on behalf of the editorial board, the newspaper automatically became Hlazovyi's property. Hlazovyi and his supporters within the newspaper were threatened with a court case if they did not back down, and eventually they left the newspaper voluntarily so as to avoid a scandal²¹.

A third version was given by Anatolii Zolotukhin, who saw the conflict within *Zelenyi Svit* as yet another attempt by the authorities to gain control with the Green Movement:

По поводу конфликта в газете скажу одно, что в любом событии нужно всегда различать главные и второстепенные мотивы. Главным для всей нашей истории была и есть борьба с властью и не потому, что именно мы этого хотим, а потому что власть, будучи бессовестной по своей природе, всегда будет стремиться сделать и нас такими...Отцом нашей газеты является Михаил Прилуцкий...(Наша газета) на много привлекательней (других газет) по меньшей мере по форме. Что касается содержания, то это всегда было предметом особой заботы властей, пока ее люди не захватили газету. Конечно заветной мечтой власти всегда было удалить из газеты ее отца — Прилуцкого, но и до этого дня им пока это не удается²².

Prilutskyi, as the 'father' of the newspaper *Zelenyi svit*, would not want to see the newspaper crushed by conflicts - his commitment to the Green cause, particularly by reimbuing people with respect and love for the environment, was simply too deep for this:

Прилуцкий безусловно честный и талантливый человек (он пишет замечательные стихи), но он или не принимает или не хочет понимать, что первыми в его братство вступят самые безнравственные люди и не для собственного очищения, а для того, чтобы в который уже раз доказать, что все такие же, как они.

Thus, whereas to Hlazovyi, the conflict arose as a result of lack of democracy within the newspaper and a lack of commitment to 'thinking globally' at the expense of 'acting locally' - i.e. focusing on Ukraine and on cultural rather than political aspects of the environment -, to Zolotukhin the newspaper fell prey to a power struggle between on the one hand, those who were committed to the environment (Prilutskyi) and those who were just interested in strengthening their own position at the former's expense. In my view, however, mistakes were made by both sides. I have no reason to question the commitment to protecting the environment of neither

²¹ Interview with Ihor Kirilchuk, Kiev, 12.5.1994.

²² Email from Anatolii Zolotukhin, Nikolaev, 18.10.1995.

Prilutskyi nor Hlazovyi. Both of them were working hard for the common cause although their approaches were very different. Even though it has been impossible to get a complete picture of what exactly happened within the newspaper *Zelenyi Svit* prior to the Third Congress - many rank-and-file members do not know themselves - it seems that the conflict, although it eventually turned into a power-struggle - at least initially reflected differences in approach more than a wish for power per se. Had there been more tolerance and agreement within *Zelenyi Svit* that all views on the future development of the movement had the right to be voiced prior to the Congress, this conflict could have been avoided and people like Hlazovyi and Kurykin might not have left the Green Movement.

As pointed out by Zolotukhin, the split of the Green Movement became very clear on the eve of the Third Congress when *Zelena Rada* addressed the conflict within the newspaper. Prilutskyi, trying to find a way to solve the conflict, proposed that the newspaper be registered not as an organ of *Zelenyi Svit*, but as the organ of the editorial board. This proposition was not endorsed by *Zelena Rada*, according to whom the newspaper was the property of the Green Movement. Eventually, a vote was made over whether or not to discuss the conflict at the upcoming Congress. Only some 20 people were present at the meeting and 11 of these voted against bringing this issue up at the Congress. Thus, the issue was effectively closed. To those who preferred to talk this issue over at the Congress, however, the decision was in itself undemocratic as sixty members of *Zelena Rada* were needed for a quorum.

4.1.3 The Third Congress (30-31 May 1992)

The third congress was called in a relative hurry and several Greens therefore complained that it was unstructured and poorly planned²³.

The Congress opened with a priest blessing those present, followed by a more general address to the delegates. The priest expressed the view that there was a great need for a Green Movement in contemporary Ukraine, then

"Зелений Світ" - це гармонія екології і гармонія людської душі і гармонія усього створеного на землі. І ви є саме тим звеном, котре дасть хороші добрі паростки для майбутнього покоління. Ми сьогодні в суєті, а апостол Павел писав: "Усе мені можна, але не все корисно. Втрачаю почуття гармонії в душах людей. Важливо усього найкращого у націй роботі на благо України!
Христос воскрес! Христос воскрес! Христос воскрес! Амінь"²⁴.

²³ Interview with Volodymyr Hrekov, 24.4.1994.

²⁴ Стенограма III-го з'їзду асоціації "Зелений Світ", 30 травня 1992 року, м. Київ, с. 1.

The address was followed by the national anthem being sung by all the delegates and a speech by the temporary chairman of *Zelenyi Svit*, Iurii Tkachenko. He called for unity, reminding those present that Ukraine was threatened by a catastrophe and that the Congress had to think about how to escape this catastrophe. This could only be achieved if people

„Думати тільки про те, що нас об'єднує, про нашу роботу. Усі люди мають право на повагу. Будемо працювати, плануючи один одного”²⁵.

It soon became clear, however, that the Congress would be dominated by discord rather than unity: Iurii Tkachenko's speech to the Congress, for which he had been allocated 15 minutes and not 25 as he had requested, was continuously interrupted by critical questions and his words on morality and amorality did not go down well with many people:

Затем с мест посыпались не учтенные регламентом реплики и вопросы: дескать, куда делись 100 долларов США, исчезновение которых обнаружилось еще на прошлом съезде: почему не пронумерован и не прошнурован журнал учета денежных поступлений: на что, собственно, расходуются “деньги партии”: понес ли наказание акт Малышко, потерявший документы прошлого съезда и прочая, и прочая”²⁶.

Shortly after Tkachenko's appeal open conflict broke out. More than half the time of the Congress was taken up by clarifying relations between the Kiev delegation and delegations from other oblasts, between members of the Kiev delegation itself and finally, within the leadership of *Zelenyi Svit*. *Molod Ukrainy* referred to the latter as a ‘striptease of ambitions’ performed in front of the 200 delegates and guests attending the Congress. Much time was also wasted over procedural questions such as the composition of the Presidium of the Congress and the quotas allocated for the various regional groups by the Mandate Commission. I will return to these issues below.

An article which appeared in *Molod Ukrainy* shortly after the Congress argued that *Zelenyi Svit* could no longer be considered a ‘Green’ movement, as it seemed to have forgotten about the environment altogether! Those who wanted to talk about environmental protection and what their groups had achieved so far were simply not given access to the floor. As a matter of fact, it was argued, they might just as well never have shown up! Even the Control Revision Commission's

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1-2.

²⁶ *Республика*, no. 1, 1992 (n.p.).

report bluntly stated that 'ecological work has not been the main task in the activities of *Zelena Rada*'. But was the latter not the reason for creating *Zelenyi Svit* in the first place? Seen at the background of all the personal conflicts, the newspaper argued that temporary leader Iurii Tkachenko's speech of self-appraisal could at best be seen as a bad joke. Firstly, his claims to the effect that *Zelenyi Svit* was the first environmental movement in Ukraine was simply not true, as the university *druzhyny* and *UTOP* already existed at the time. Besides, to say that the *Zelenyi Svit* had been the first to declare its commitment to the principle of decency sounded nothing but funny on the background of the struggles of the Congress. What the movement really needed was constructive action not just nice words²⁷.

Still, the Greens were good at praising themselves. Nataliia Preobrazhenska allegedly towards the end of the Congress complained that she and the leadership of *Zelenyi Svit* as well as members of staff were not able to inform the delegates about 'how much they had done for Ukraine'. To this Danylo Kulyniak, *Molod Ukrainy*'s observer at the Congress, wrote that it was possible they had done much - but in terms of travelling abroad as had been clearly pointed out in the Control Revision Commission's report, presented to the Congress by its head, Shulga. According to this report, Preobrazhenska (Kiev) in the course of one year had been abroad four times, visiting the United States and Britain. Similarly, Panov, Zhovnirenko, Kurykin and Hlazonvi (all Kiev) had several times visited the United States, France, Austria, Britain and other countries. 'If this could be called "work for Ukraine", then they definitely heroically protected our environment and a happy future in New York, Paris, London and Vienna...'²⁸.

Andrii Demydenko, who had worked as a coordinator on international contacts prior to the Third Congress prepared a report on *Zelenyi Svit*'s hard currency assets, anticipating that this issue would cause debate at this Congress as it had done at the previous one in Ivano-Frankivsk. The report²⁹, which was addressed to the Control Revision Commission, pointed out that as some members of the Coordinating Committee of *Zelenyi Svit* kept bringing up his name in connection with the association's hard currency assets. He therefore found it necessary to produce the report to set things straight and in the hope of possibly avoiding clashes over this issue at the Congress, then

Вважаю, що саме таємниця (яка покриває безладдя) фінансових і господарських справ ЗЕЛЕНОГО СВІТУ та постійне гальмування апаратом спроб їх ревізії, є головною причиною виникнення тої атмосфери постійних звинувачень і скандалів, що супроводжує останнім часом засідання. Така атмосфера вигідна тим, хто в

²⁷ *Молод України*, 3.7.1992.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Звіт про валютні надходження та витрати, Київ, 20.5.1992.

каламутній воді хотів би приховати спосіб зловживання чи невміння працювати не на себе, а на користь справі.

Having given a detailed account of hard-currency earnings and the way in which they were spent, he urged the Revision Commission not to delay its work but to get to the bottom of matters so that the issue could be closed and enable *Zelenyi Svit* to move on. Although during the first couple of hours delegates raised issues regarding hard currency and foreign travel, the matter was settled without any major confrontations.

The issue that caused the most controversy, however, was not the international aspects of *Zelenyi Svit's* activities, but rather demands by the Kiev delegation to the effect that it be allocated more delegates to the Congress. Such claims were not received well by representatives of local and regional branches of the association and caused a sharp exchange of words between these and the Kiev representatives as well as among the Kiev representatives themselves:

Представители столицы требовали, по мнению организаторов, больше положенного "посадочных" мест", чтобы проташить выгодные для себя решения. Скандал разгорался не на шутку³⁰.

This issue kept resurfacing throughout the Congress. Kiev representatives argued that there was a proposition to allow two representatives from each of Kiev's 25 regions as well as the leader of the Kiev organisation votes at the Congress³¹. Natalia Preobrazhenska (Kiev), who was the leader of the Mandate Commission, briefed the Congress on the issue. Apparently the Kiev group had requested two mandates for each region of Kiev, eight mandates for its leadership and one mandate per collective member of the city organisation. A list of 21 names from the regions had been provided for this purpose. The Kiev delegation's proposal had been passed on to the Organisation Committee and was debated by *Zelena Rada* the day before. *Zelena Rada* refused to add an additional 11 mandates to the 10 originally allocated for Kiev. The Kiev delegation then turned to the Congress with a request that it still be granted another 11 mandates. The Mandate Commission with a vote of three to one endorsed the ruling of *Zelena Rada* on this matter³².

However, questions were being raised from the floor as to why Kiev had been given 10 delegates in the first place. To this, Preobrazhenska responded as follows:

³⁰

³¹ Стенограма ІІІ-го з'їзду асоціації "Зелений Світ", 30 травня 1992 року, м. Київ, с. 3-1.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 15-1, 15-2.

Організаційний комітет був обраний Зеленою Радою. Це робочий з'їзд, багато людей не було. Відповідно до областей, до міст була надана така квота³³.

Shalimova of the Kiev delegation, however, argued that as there was no quorum at the Congress there was no reason to deny Kiev the 11 seats it requested. Prior to voting taking place all delegates should be formally registered, then according to the statute only registered delegates were eligible to vote. After registration the number of delegates with a right to vote would drop from 166 to some 120 delegates. Consequently, there would be no reason to deny Kiev the 11 seats it requested.

Stepaniak from Ivano-Frankivsk reacted sharply to Shalimova's calculations and protested on behalf of his oblast organisation. Many people had contacted him following the Organisation Committee's decision to grant the oblast only seven seats at the Congress. Those people, he argued, worked just as hard as the Kiev representatives and had the same right to be represented at the Congress. Also Sidorkin of Uman *Zelenyi Svit* was irritated with the Kiev delegation. Since it had no intention to formally register, the issue of whether to let it remain a member of *Zelenyi Svit* ought to be addressed. Secondly, he recommended that the Kiev delegates be taken off the lists of delegates. Then there would be quorum and no more fuss.

Others, like Popova, expressed surprise with the device chosen for the Congress 'Agreement in the Name of Survival', when those present proved so unable to live up to this very device. Members of the Kiev delegation not only picketed but also tried to bloc the Congress. From the floor one delegate went so far as to liken the Kiev delegation with a Fifth Column - all the fuss was aimed at gaining an advantage in terms of mandates vis-a-vis the oblast groups - demanding that it be expelled from the auditorium. Bagin from Donetsk oblast then joined in, arguing that expelling the Kiev delegates was not even necessary as they themselves declined to take any further part in the Congress:

Только что было зачитано заявление киевской организации о пикетировании съезда. В этом заявлении четко сказано, что они отказываются от участия в съезде. Поэтому и прощу поставить на голосование - удовлетворить их заявление и требования и лишить их квоты. Тогда на эту квоту уменьшится количество делегатов съезда³⁴.

Honcharenko, himself from Kiev, finally put an end to the debate by arguing that there were many ways in which the number of delegates to the Congress could be determined. For instance,

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 16-1.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 17-2.

one could follow the example of Khrushchev, who had once gathered 12,000 kolkhoz representatives in Kiev and who took three hours to address those present. After that plans were that each oblast be allowed to address the forum. In the end, however, it was decided that 150 *Zelenyi Svit* representatives be allowed to attend the Congress. Thus the Kiev delegation had no reason to be dissatisfied with its 10 mandates. Ten mandates accounted for six percent of the total number of delegates, whereas the population of Kiev made up only three percent of Ukraine's total population. As for the registration of the Kiev organisation, Honcharenko suggested the following:

Можна зареєструвати Київську організацію згідно з кворумом і воно співпадає з документальним оформленням, як членів екологічної асоціації Зелений Світ³⁵.

The dispute erupted again on the second day of the Congress, regarding Samilenko's, Shamilova's, Preobrazhenska's and Honcharenko's (all from Kiev) mandates. Once again the dispute took place between Preobrazhenska on the one hand, and Shamilova on the other. The latter referred to the arbitrariness of the organisational committee, allocating seven delegates to the biggest oblast organisation, Ivano-Frankivsk, while at the same time giving Borispol region of Kiev oblast the same quota:

Вот это о том, как работали наш оргкомитет и как соблюдается квота и уважение к нашим областным организациям. Делегатами от этой районной организации были выбраны Преображенская и Гончаренко, которые не являются членами этой районной организации. Гончаренко на сегодня является председателем Киевской организации. Вот это вам к сведению³⁶.

Preobrazhenska replied that although Borispol region had been given seven delegates, Kiev oblast as such had received a total of 12, which was not unreasonable, given the size of the population in the oblast. Shamilova, however, argued that *Zelenyi Svit* had no proper criteria for allocating the delegates. Relations to laws and legal procedures within *Zelenyi Svit* clearly reflected the lack of respect for laws and procedures which were so typical in Soviet society. As had been the case in the CPSU, a 'privatisation' was taking place also within the Green Movement.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 18-1.

³⁶ Українська екологічна асоціація "Зелений Світ". Стенограма ІІІ-го з'їзду асоціації "Зелений Світ", 31 травня 1992 року, м. Київ, с. 11-1.

The regions were not only dissatisfied with the quota Kiev had been given but even more so with the amount of time lost for clarifying relations between the Kiev delegates. Shamilova's and Preobrazhenska's exchange of accusations therefore caused angry comments from regional representatives - some even demanded that those who interrupted the work of the Congress be expelled. One unnamed delegate stated that he had travelled to Kiev to attend a republican congress, not a forum of the Kiev organisation³⁷.

Finally, the Kiev representatives caused outrage due to some comments made by Cherinko to the effect that the environmental problems in Ukraine were caused by Jewish Communists ('zhidokommunisty') and called for the Greens to fight them. V. Tymonin, a Kiev delegate, said he was appalled at this suggestion. This view was later reiterated in an article written by Cherinko and another Kiev Green published in the local newspaper *Khreshchatyk*, and as a result they were expelled from *Zelenyi Svit* in the autumn of 1992³⁸.

After a noisy debate, the Kiev delegation got its way to the dismay of delegations from other oblasts. However, not all the Kiev delegates were happy with the number of delegates Kiev was eventually allocated. V. Tymonin, for instance, could fully understand that the Kiev delegation was appalled with receiving only nine after having requested 21 seats at the Congress. Nine seats was little for a city with a population of almost three million. The delegation should in Tymonin's view have been given at least 15 seats - one for each region in Kiev and one for the leader of the Kiev organisation.

The Second Day of the Congress focused on organisational issues. In addition to electing a new leadership of *Zelenyi Svit* those present debated a draft programme as well as proposed changes to the statute. Besides, the leadership issue took up a considerable part of day two of the Congress. The new statute that the delegates had just endorsed, ruled that *Zelenyi Svit* be headed by a chairman and three deputy chairmen. Similarly, the Congress would appoint the editor of the newspaper *Zelenyi Svit* at the recommendation of *Zelena Rada*, which in turn would confer with the newspaper staff prior to choosing a candidate for the post. With regard to the office at Podil, the executive director would be chosen on merit and appointed by a special commission set up for this purpose. It was the prerogative of the executive director to hire staff to assist him in the office, the number of staff being determined by the Congress (or *Zelena Rada*). Each deputy chairman would work in close contact with a reader appointed to work on the issues for which the deputy chairman was responsible.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 5-1.

³⁸ Åse Berit Grødeland, 'The Ukrainian Green movement: Nationalist or internationalist?', in Elworthy, Anderson, Coates, Stephens and Stroh (eds.), *Perspectives on the Environment 2* (Aldershot: Avebury 1995), p. 87.

Five candidacies were put forward for the chairmanship. These were Leontiy Sanduliak of the Chernivtsi *Zelenyi Svit* - a professor of Medicine at Chernivtsi University and also a USSR People's Deputy. Iurii Tkachenko, who had acted as chairman after Shcherbak's departure from *Zelenyi Svit* but whose authority in the association, at least judging by the reactions to and during his opening address to the Congress, was not very high, was also put forward as a candidate. The other three candidates were Korbetskyi and Honcharenko, both from Kiev, and Primak (not indicated where from). Prior to the vote, the delegates again got caught up in procedural deliberations. For instance should the current leadership resign prior to the vote, or should it automatically step down after the Congress had elected new leaders? Moreover, should the Congress make some kind of assessment of the outgoing leadership prior to voting over the new leaders?³⁹ In the end it was decided simply to go ahead with the vote.

Sanduliak was elected with a clear majority (83 of 116 votes). In his speech to the Congress following the vote, he called for unity within *Zelenyi Svit* and as a gesture of reconciliation towards the Kiev delegation expressed the view that one of his deputies⁴⁰ be a Kiev representative. Sanduliak was satisfied that the leadership of *Zelenyi Svit* had been passed on to the regions, but as he would not spend much time in Kiev, he needed a deputy who would be permanently based in the capital and who could sign documents on his behalf. His own choice for the deputy chairmanship was Iurii Tkachenko, who he claimed was a tolerant person - and tolerance was a quality badly needed in *Zelenyi Svit* at the time. Sanduliak's suggestion, however, did not go well with all those present. A comment from the floor was far from tolerant on the matter: Tkachenko had allegedly likened the Third Congress of *Zelenyi Svit* to the putsch (August 1991) and this could not easily be forgiven. Sanduliak's argument to the effect that whoever be elected for the post must have authority not only in Kiev but among other chapters of *Zelenyi Svit* as it would depend on him/her if the association would put disputes aside for the sake of constructive work, also did not come out in favour of Tkachenko. Again a reply was made from the floor to the effect that Tkachenko did not believe that *Zelenyi Svit* would change and therefore was not the right person for the job. Alternative propositions were therefore made. These were Korbetskyi and Honcharenko from Kiev and one Tokarev (not indicated where from)⁴¹.

Tkachenko only got 29 votes in support for his candidacy and thus failed to be elected. Honcharenko was vigorously supported by the Kiev delegation as being an ecologist by profession he was well qualified for the job. However, it was held against him that he was a poor organiser.

³⁹ Українська екологічна асоціація "Зелений Світ". Стенограма III-го з'їзду асоціації "Зелений Світ", 31 травня 1992 року, м. Київ, с. 27-1.

⁴⁰ According to *Zelenyi Svit*'s statute, the three deputy leaders be in charge of one region each (i.e. West, South and East).

⁴¹ Стенограма III-го з'їзду асоціації "Зелений Світ", 31 травня 1992 року, м. Київ, с. 29-1.

The behaviour of the Kiev delegation bore witness to this, argued Shalimova, an outsider from Kiev. Panov suggested that Volodymyr Boreiko, a former member of the student *druzhyny*, to hold this post as there was a need for new blood in *Zelenyi Svit's* leadership. Boreiko, however, declined to stand for election putting his support behind Honcharenko. In the end, Honcharenko got 52 votes, Korbetskyi 57 and Tokarev 17. A second vote was then made between Honcharenko and Korbetskyi, which the latter won. Korbetskyi was thus elected first deputy chairman from Kiev⁴². Zolotukhin from Nikolaev and Stepaniak from Ivano-Frankivsk were put forward as candidates for the two other posts. Stepaniak was easily elected with a vote of 78. Zolotukhin's candidacy was more controversial - at least with the Kiev delegation. He was elected, but not with a majority, and the result was therefore contested from the floor. Representatives from the Southern oblasts of Nikolaev, Odessa and Kherson launched a counter-attack on the Kiev delegation arguing that it was largely thanks to Zolotukhin that reactor No. 4 of the South-Ukrainian nuclear power station had not been built and that expansion of the Energy Complex in Iuzhnoukrainsk had been endorsed in a limited version. The exchange of opinions that took place between 'Kiev' and 'the South' is interesting in that it reveals the tension that did and still to some extent exists within *Zelenyi Svit* between Kiev and the regions. I have therefore chosen to include them below:

Із залу: Товарищи киевляне! Какие у вас есть претензии к Золотухину, выскажите.

г. Золотухин: Сьогодні вже зрозуміло, чому кияни добивались, щоб їм надали 11 голосів, бо люди, які приїхали з регіонів, вже від'їжджають. Я приїхав на день раніше, зібрав спеціалістів, дав їм завдання, щоб була зроблена енергетична програма. І я не напрошуюся бути заступником. Це мені нічого не дасть.

Із залу: Одесская делегация, Херсонская, кто против Золотухина? Это наш регион, и мы голосуем за Золотухина.

Із залу: Товарищи! Благодаря Золотухину на Южной атомной не случилось Чернобыля. А в Киеве, благодаря тому, что плохо работали "зеленые", случился Чернобыль.

Голова: Золотухин - освічена людина, він фахівець. Ішов він на цю роботу в власній ініціативі.

п. Корбелький: Южный регион ни одного слова против Золотухина не сказал. Второе: выборы уже закончились, мы их подтвердили. Недоверия мы не высказали отчетной комиссии, поэтому давайте продолжать работать⁴³.

So although the second day of the Congress was more constructive than day one, personal conflicts lingered on, slowing things down.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 30-1 and 31-1.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 35-1.

There were three proposed versions of the statute - one was to make some changes to the existing statute formally registered with the Ministry of Justice after the Second Congress. The other was a revised version of Korbetskyi's statute, which was endorsed by the Second Congress but to which amendments were made prior to its official registration (see above).

Amendments and changes to the statute had been discussed by one of the sections the previous day - 17 people had taken part in this discussion and Korbetskyi presented the Congress with proposed amendments as well as informing those present about parts of the statute that were controversial and upon which no agreement had been reached. The thrust of Korbetskyi's version of the statute was the systematisation of the association. *Zelenyi Svit* functioned as an umbrella organisation uniting groups whose membership varied from two or three up to 1,000 people. There was a need to specify relations between these groups as well as making the organisational structure of *Zelenyi Svit* clearer. The Congress noted that *Zelenyi Svit* was in the process of stagnating. The main reason for this, it was argued, was the imperfection of the statute.

The issue that caused the most heated debate was whether or not to allow for individual membership in *Zelenyi Svit*. Those favouring individual membership argued that in some areas of Ukraine there was no local branch of the Green Movement. Besides, an individual may not want to join the existing branch of *Zelenyi Svit* in his/her region for personal or other reasons. As *Zelenyi Svit* aimed at uniting Greens throughout Ukraine, these people must not be barred from joining the association on an individual basis.

This argument, however, met with strong opposition. Korbetskyi, for instance, argued that all members of *Zelenyi Svit* were individual members who had joined forces in a local or regional group. A danger with allowing for individual membership, it was argued from the floor, was that individual members working in the oblasts and regions, had in the past made errors and discredited the movement. An element of old Soviet thinking in the form of 'kto kogo' was also used against individual membership:

Я вважаю, що ніякого персонального не може бути. На благо України може бути тільки з нами.

Sanduliak held the view that if there was no established group in a region then *Zelenyi Svit*'s task should be to establish such a group rather than push away individual members. According to the statute three people could technically organise a local group. The suggestion to keep individual membership failed to get enough votes during balloting and was therefore dropped from the statute.

As for the programme, the Third Congress failed to pass a new programme. Instead it endorsed the old one (i.e. the one adopted by the Second Congress) with a few changes. The programme was criticised by *Molod Ukrainy*'s correspondent for lacking in concrete plans and for being of a declarative character:

У проекті програми УЕА "Зелений Світ" було багато красивих слів, навіть фраза про захист прав сексуальних меншин, але годі шукати там щось про конкретну природоохорончу роботу в Україні, поденну, щоденну, непомітну і важку. Чому б, наприклад, не створити громадську інспекцію охорони природи "Зеленого світу".

From what has been written above, one might easily get the impression that nothing positive came out of the Third Congress. However, work in the various sections was constructive and a number of resolutions elaborated by these were eventually endorsed. The Greens were far from impressed with Ukrainian authorities' handling of the environmental crisis the country was in generally and the issue of nuclear power in particular:

Нова державна влада, як і стара комуністична, демонструє небажність захистити своїх громадян від атомної чуми. Але народ України, що постраждав більше за всіх від Чорнобильського лиха, не допустить повторення цієї безглуздої політики⁴⁴.

The Ukrainian Declaration of Sovereignty, passed in June 1990, stated Ukraine's intention to be nuclear-free and this intention was widely supported by the Ukrainian people. However, the Military-Industrial Complex did not halt its efforts to push Ukraine into further developing its nuclear energy industry. The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers and the Presidential Administration under pressure from *Atomenergoprom* intended to win the Ukrainian people over on its side by threatening an energy crisis should nuclear power be abandoned altogether. However, Kravchuk, arguing that there was no alternative to nuclear energy forgot about Chernobyl and numerous accidents at other nuclear power stations in Ukraine. He was forgetting that the international community considered not only RBMK-reactors but also VVER-reactors inherently unsafe. Following German reunification five VVER-reactors built with Soviet technology were closed due to poor safety. Kravchuk also forgot that Ukraine was ranked one of the poorest within the CIS on water supplies and that increasing capacity at the nuclear power stations would exhaust these

⁴⁴ *Зелений світ*, no. 10, 1992, с. 6.

supplies. Finally, he was ignoring the recommendations of *Minenergo* and leading Ukrainian scientists that alternatives did exist. The Greens therefore urged Ukrainians to demand from the government and the president that Chernobyl be closed, that no revision of the existing moratorium on the construction of nuclear reactors be allowed, that a ban be made on the construction of reprocessing facilities for nuclear fuel in the Chernobyl zone, and, finally, that maximum effort be made at providing people with the opportunity to live in an ecologically clean environment.

Another resolution was addressed to President Kravchuk. *Zelenyi Svit* reminded him that the ecological situation in Ukraine had become so severe that its population was beginning to drop. To improve efforts to solve the ecological crisis the Greens requested that a specialist on ecology be appointed to the Duma to make sure that environmental problems be addressed in parallel with economic and state-building issues. The Greens put forward the name of Academician Myhailo Holubets - a botanist - for such a post.

A number of propositions to facilitate the solution of the ecological crisis were made to *Verkhovna Rada* to save the river Dniestr from dying. Dniestr provided drinking water for 10 million people in Ukraine and Moldova. Its water was also used by enterprises in Prikarpatia and Karpatia. As a result, its water flow had been halved. In 1983, following the burst of a dam at Stebnykivsk potassium combine, a large stretch of the river was left virtually dead. To save the river, the Greens recommended that a special commission be set up. There was also a need to protect small rivers from destruction. Twenty thousand small rivers were destroyed in Ukraine during the Soviet period, and of the 70,000 small rivers that were left, only 1,700 had a normal river bed. The resolution also recommended that the Carpathians (Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Zakarpattia oblasts) be given status as a recreational zone. Finally, *Zelenyi Svit* called for the creation of an ecological police force to safeguard the environment until people grew sufficiently aware of their own dependence of a protective and sensible approach to the environment.

The Congress ended, as it had started, in seeming unity. Delegates gathered around the Blue Pond (Since ozero), an artesian spring on the outskirts of Kiev, where priests from the two Ukrainian Orthodox Churches (the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church) blessed the pond and also nearby kindergartens and schools. Those who had gathered to watch the blessing held lit candles, a choir sang and, noted the correspondent from *Respublika*, the atmosphere seemed to have a calming effect on people who had only a few hours previously been at each other's throats. A woman from the region spoke to those present, reminding them about their obligation to protect the environment and that 'Cosmos is watching us now'. This caused a little dispute with the priests present, who thought God was more important than Cosmos:

Люди! Слушайте меня, люди! вскинув перст и небу, вскричал православный священник. То, что вам сейчас говорили про философию, про Космос - это слушайте в другом месте, и в иное время. Это никакого отношения к нам не имеет! Мы молимся Господу нашему Иисусу Христу! И сейчас пойдем вперед с Господом!

Generally, press coverage of the Congress was far from favourable. The Kiev newspaper *Khreshchatyk*⁴⁵, for instance, pointed out that *Zelenyi Svit* had failed to conduct its Congress in accordance with the device chosen for it, namely 'Unity in the Name of Survival'. An example of how bad things really were, the weekly *Respublika*'s⁴⁶ correspondent Marina Koroleva reported a number of incidents where emotions had been running high. A woman, angry at being cut off by the Presidium of the Congress, shouted that it was violating *Zelenyi Svit*'s statute and promised that she would inform the United Nations and UNICEF about what was happening! Tkachenko's attempts to keep order during the Congress fell flat, and she concluded that *Zelenyi Svit* was close to a split:

И. о. председателя Христом Богом просил зля утомониться. Менее пажожные делегаты просили его заткнуться и обзывают провокатором. От массовых беспорядков с мордобоем спас делегат в вышитой сорочке, выскочивший к трибуне и попросивший коллег "облегчиться и поговорить про обед". После трапезы съезд, девизом которого был лозунг "Согласие во имя выживания", продолжил свою работу...

Neither *Molod Ukrainy*'s correspondent seemed to believe that *Zelenyi Svit* had a future, questioning its very right to call itself an environmental organisation as environmental work no longer seemed to be a priority issue. Had *Zelenyi Svit* simply been transformed into a travel agency for a selected group of people who had given themselves the right to speak on behalf of all Greens in Ukraine and to represent them internationally? Or had it become a means by which a chosen few could make political careers? Could *Zelenyi Svit* any longer be seen as an association uniting all forces working towards the protection of the Ukrainian environment?

If this was the case, there were few signs of this at the Congress. As a matter of fact, quite the opposite seemed to be the case. Not only did the Congress abolish individual membership in *Zelenyi Svit* despite the fact that there were many individuals who were not organised and who did not belong to any local or regional chapter of the association for this or the other reason, but who

⁴⁵ *Хрещатик*, 14.6.1992, с. 7.

⁴⁶ *Республика*, no. 1, 1992 (n.p.).

would still like to be affiliated with *Zelenyi Svit*; it also did not appear particularly concerned with work conducted by local and regional groups, where quite a few achievements had been made⁴⁷.

I have now had a look at how *Zelenyi Svit*'s Congress was perceived by people from the 'outside'. But what reflections did the Greens themselves make after what could at best be described as a stormy event? Iu. Herbytskyi, Professor of Medicine from Dnipropetrovsk, stressed as positive that although there had been clashes over a number of issues, unity prevailed in the end:

Хорошо то, что съезд не раскололся и что мы сумели избрать нового лидера. Причем почти единогласно. Было три кандидата, но Л.И. Сандуляк проиел с первого раза. И это псвизрая на то, что часть киевской делегации вела себя крайне деструктивно, по сути блокировала работу и пыталась сорвать съезд. Были неимоверно высокие амбиции, жажда лидерства, власти. (То, что Сандуляк избран с первого захода)...вселяет определенные надежды на то, что в дальнейшем он сумеет сплотить отчасти расколотое движение "зеленых". Хорошо и то, что основная часть не пошла за киевскими бунтарями, что делегаты сумели плодотворно потрудиться в рабочих комиссиях и спокойно, без политических маневров, выработать стратегию "зеленого" движения.

Although at the national level *Zelenyi Svit* was riddled with conflicts, this was not the case locally. As a matter of fact the Greens' rating in East Ukraine remained high. Not so long ago a survey had been conducted among students in Dnipropetrovsk on support for informal movements. The result of this survey showed that the Greens in terms of popularity were way ahead of other political public organisations and movements.

Iu. Vysochin, an engineer from Cherkassy, was less positive when passing judgement. He was worried about travelling in general among the leadership of *Zelenyi Svit* and held the view that the priorities of the association had yet to be set right:

А может, есть смысл меньше ездить за передовым опытом, но больше читать о нем в специальной литературе? А сэкономленную за счет этого валюту пускать на приобретение дефицитной западной аппаратуры. У нас одни думают о своих политических амбициях, другие о путешествиях. Но кто-то же должен думать об Украине!

There was no shortage of issues that needed to be urgently addressed - for instance the use of chemicals in agriculture. Their use could only be described as barbaric. Not only was it depleting the layer of fertile humus in the soil⁴⁸; it was also posing a serious danger to people's health:

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

„Влияние ядохимикатов на общее и психическое здоровье человека. Общеизвестно, что земли Молдовы отравлены и там наблюдается всплеск насилия. На Кавказе, в Средней Азии земли отравлены...Вы думаете, и в Украине парварства может произойти? Там, где химия, яды проникли в кровь, а мозг человека - вполне.

Serhii Hrabovskyi, the Green Movement's philosopher, tried to explain the root of the conflicts that were tearing *Zelenyi Svit* apart:

Существует небольшая группа политических борцов среди "зеленых", им всегда надо кого-то клеймить, разоблачать. Вчера они боролись с КПСС, сегодня с карьеристами в "Зеленому світі" и с "жидокоммунистами". Однако съезд за этими "энтузиастами" не пошел, чем проявил свою мудрость.

Another reason for all the quarrels was no doubt the departure of Iurii Shcherbak as the association's leader. Many others left with him and as a result the intellectual level among its membership had dropped. Deputies of *Verkhovna Rada* and well-known scientists were virtually absent from the Congress grounds and this was in itself revealing, according to Hrabovskyi. And those outsiders who did show up out of curiosity were completely put off by the tense atmosphere among the delegates. A Dnipropetrovsk delegate, for instance, had been accompanied to the Congress by the deputy chairman of the gorispolkom on ecology, science and technology. The latter left after one and a half hours, arguing that there was not a working atmosphere at the Congress. Hrabovskyi was saddened by the discord in the movement, but still hoped that it be able to sort out the differences and once again get down to constructive work:

Живая атмосфера на политическом съезде. Оживленные выкрики "Вы провокатор!, Вы провокатор!" - Вы улыбаетесь, а мне грустно видеть, до чего мы дошли. Хотя в целом съезд все-таки сделал ряд полезных дел. Удалось избрать руководство. Это очень хорошо. „Будем надеяться, этот деловой дух возобладает в нашем движении.

Zelenyi Svit's new leader, Leontii Sanduliak was also fairly optimistic regarding the future: While acknowledging that there were conflicts within the Green Movement, he claimed that this was only natural given its democratic structure and the fact that it united people with very different views on most things:

⁴⁸ Humus forms very slowly - it takes 100 years for 1 cm to build up. Over the last 50 years Ukraine had lost more than 90% of its humus and further losses could be expected if the chemicalisation of agriculture continued unchanged.

Однозначно з'їзд дійсно оцінити не можна. Справа у тому, що "зелені" об'єднують людей різних уподобань; "Зелений Світ" - це одна з найстаріших демократичних організацій, незалежних від КПРС. В організації можуть бути люди з найрізноманітнішими поглядами. Так що одностайність на з'їзді була б просто дивною і неприродною. Вважаю, що організації, де все вирішується одностайно и одногласно дуже небезпечні, бо є посіями тоталітарного духу. А у "зелених" представлені дуже різні і за фахом, і за віком, і за політичними поглядами люди: тому и були дуже різні виступи⁴⁹.

Sanduliak did, however, admit that there were problems at the Congress:

Загалом було протистояння між людьми, які хотіли продовжувати кращі традиції організації - і тими, хто хотів докорінних змін з метою захоплення керівних посад. Дійсно, на пленарних засіданнях було багато галасу, постійно ставилися питання регламенту тощо, тобто відчувалися спроби бюрократизувати з'їзд.

As regarded the Kiev group, Tkachenko expressed understanding towards it: As people of the capital they wanted to represent *Zelenyi Svit* to the outside world. This, in his view, was the underlying reason for all the discussions regarding the reglament and every point of the statute. However, although there were conflicts within the Green Movement, conflicts were also frequent in other political movements:

У всіх нових демократичних організаціях паявні подібні ситуації. Не випадково ж кажуть -- де три українці, там чотири партії і п'ять думок. Ця доля не оминула і Зелений Світ. Але вже ж мене радує, що на секційних засіданнях, де обговорювалися конкретні питання дій зелених сил, йшла ділова робота.

Zelenyi Svit would, however, survive despite this big number of opinions, then unlike what was the case in for instance Belorussia and Moldova where there were a number of Green groups, Ukraine had only one such group - *Zelenyi Svit*. Sanduliak hoped that things would stay that way.

Andriy Hlazovyi, however, was far from satisfied with the Congress, arguing that the Green Movement was in serious trouble not only due to a number of objective reasons, such as the economic crisis, disillusionment with the authorities' incapability and with the 'predatory' policies of the Fokin administration. Subjective reasons, such as the lack of co-ordination between 'Kiev' and the local organisations, the bureaucratisation and poor efficiency of the association as well as

⁴⁹ *Зелений світ*, no. 11, 1992, c. 2.

some leading figures' detachment from real life had taken their toll. As a result of mismanagement many well-known activists simply did not wish to attend the congress. Due to poor management the new version of the programme was not ready in time for the Congress. Moreover, a number of issues listed on the agenda of the Congress were passed by in silence. Tkachenko, whose speech was full of elegant sentences, romantic recollections, compliments and angry philippics, failed to even acknowledge that *Zelenyi Svit* was going through the most dramatic stage throughout its entire existence.

However, the Congress had given *Zelenyi Svit* a second breath. The new statute considerably reduced the powers of the apparatus, cut the number of people in the co-ordinating bodies and abolished individual membership, from which the association could only benefit. Hlazovyi put much hope in the election of Korbetskyi as one of the new deputy leaders. Korbetskyi was critical to the current state of affairs within the central organs of *Zelenyi Svit* and had his own views on how to organise their work. This gave hope for changes for the better. The commissions had worked well and future tactics for how to act on nuclear power, alternative energy, protection of health and water had been staked out. Compared to many other political movements *Zelenyi Svit* had therefore done well:

Маємо на Україні сумну традицію: третій з'їзд мало не кожної громадської організації несе вибуховий заряд. Мало не розколовся на З-ьому з'їзді РУХ, відбулися розкол в УРП та соціал-демократів. На своєму третьому з'їзді Зелений Світ ризикував, за влучним висловом одного колеги-журналіста, перетворитися на "романтичні руїни". Нівроку, пижили. І маємо надію на краще⁵⁰.

4.1.4 Leadership Struggle and Further Discord

Hlazovyi's optimism received a serious blow when only a month after he was elected chairman of *Zelenyi Svit*, Sanduliak was appointed Ukrainian ambassador to Romania. Korbetskyi, Zolotukhin and Stepaniak thus had to work as interim leaders until a new leader could be found. Competition and disagreements between the three deputy leaders soon became a strain for *Zelenyi Svit*. An article in *Zelenyi svit* likened the interim leadership to a three-headed snake:

Бо залишилися з заступники голови, які згодом призначили себе снівголовами і почали активно "діяти"⁵¹.

⁵⁰ *Зелений світ*, no. 9, 1992, c. 3.

⁵¹ *Зелений світ*, no. 3, 1993, c. 7.

Zolotukhin, for instance, independently developed an Energy Programme for Ukraine, not consulting with anybody else, and started pressing it upon the government. The programme proposed that all nuclear and thermal power stations be replaced with gas turbines used by military ship and aircraft. This, argued the author of the article, was incompatible with the Green Movement's opposition to the Military-Industrial Complex⁵². Zolotukhin was also accused of acting single-handedly when signing a document on behalf of *Zelenyi Svit* stating the latter's entry into the *Anti-Communist and Anti-Imperialist Front* (*Antikommunistichnyi ta antiimperskii front - AAF*).

A scandal broke following an article in *Literaturna Ukraina* on 25 February⁵³. The article, accompanying the declaration of the *Anti-Communist, Anti-Imperialist Front* claimed that *Zelenyi Svit* supported the Front. There were, however, diverging views on the desirability to be associated with this front amongst members of *Zelenyi Svit*. As mentioned before, some of its members were affiliated with the Communist Party. These people would naturally want to have nothing to do with the front. Others were politically independent, holding the view that *Zelenyi Svit* should avoid taking sides in the evolving political struggle in Ukraine and rather concentrate on environmental activities and they were all unhappy with the way in which the decision to support the Front had been made: Ihor Dzeverin shortly after, at a meeting of *Mala Rada*, strongly criticised membership in the Front, his main argument being that it was up to the Congress to make such a decision. Eventually it was decided that *Zelenyi Svit* should opt for observer status with the Front. Dzeverin and others with him were therefore dismayed to find Zolotukhin sitting in its presidium. One of the initiators to the Front was a member of Kiev *PZU*, V. Tymonin. The leader of *PZU* at the time, Vitalii Kononov, was not happy with the Front either, arguing that 'Green' participation in the work of the Front would put the Ukrainian Greens in an awkward position vis-à-vis the West European Greens. The lack of clarity on this issue thus further served to fuel conflicts within the Green Movement.

Given the political situation in Ukraine and the politicised nature of the environment in itself, it was, as pointed out above, difficult for the Greens to remain above politics. Leontii Sanduliak had, however, stressed that the Green Movement must retain its independence, avoiding any direct involvement with other political groups:

⁵² Although it is true that gas turbines already used in aircraft and ships would be utilised, the technology accompanying their use was new and elaborated by two Nikolaev scientists, Borysenko and Hryhorenko. By making better use of fuel and by utilising waste, harmful emissions could be reduced to a minimum. Thus, not only would this be an environmentally more friendly alternative to nuclear and thermal power, but also much cheaper than further expansion of nuclear power in Ukraine.

⁵³ *Літературна Україна*, 25.2.1993, с. 3.

„Екологічні зусилля демократичних партій час об'єднати. Але зелений рух повинен лишатися незалежним, він повинен мати своє власне забарвлення. Ви подумайте: більшість людей не знає напівт, про хороші екологічні програми демократичних партій, – але з самих назв "Зелений Світ". Партія Зелених широкий загаль розуміє, що перед ним – екологічні організації. З цієї точки зору, мабуть, той, хто вважає себе справжнім екологом, логічно повинен стати членом Зеленого Світу. І партія, якщо вони справді дбають про екологію, повинні виступати колективними членами до Зелений Світ. А не навпаки. Це стосується і "Нової України", членство "зелених" в якій зараз обговорюється. Якщо не партія підприємців – Зелений Світ буде до неї у довгій опозиції. Отже, якщо якісь партії заявляють про своє колективне членство у Зеленого Світу, то від цього вони лише виграють. Якщо Зелений Світ зіллється з кимось: то програють усі⁵⁴.

All political, economic and environmental questions were closely linked in Sanduliak's view. Trying to solve one of these without taking into consideration the other two would simply not be possible. *Zelenyi Svit* therefore needed a political tinge. However, this tinge should be 'Green'. Enterprises must be controlled, especially during the transition to the market, to make sure emissions were within set limits. On the issues of statehood and independence *Zelenyi Svit* had to voice its position as they were closely related to the environment. The problem, of course, remained how to avoid upsetting members of the Green Movement in the process, as so many diverging views existed regarding the political aspects of its activities.

The internal personal conflicts in *Zelenyi Svit* intensified following an article published in *Kievskie vedomosti* on 3 February 1993. The article, which was labelled 'the Greens sell out to the Pro-Nuclear Lobby. So far only by Retail, and only at the Highest Level'⁵⁵ claimed that the editorial board of *Kievskie vedomosti* had received information about Korbetskyi's participation in the work of the commission of the Scientific-Technical Union of Power Engineering Specialists and Electrical Engineers in the summer of 1992 (Nuclear Energy up to the year 2000), which had reached the following conclusion:

Поставить на Ривенской и Запорожской АЭС, по одному блоку, а на Хмельницкой – целых три, активно готовить кадры для "мирного атома", закупить импортное оборудование, увеличить инвестиции...А специально для придиричивых экологов и природоохранителей создать особую службу по удовлетворению "объективных и субъективных требований общественности".

⁵⁴ *Зелений світ*, no. 11, 1992, c. 2.

⁵⁵ *Киевские ведомости*, 3.2.1993, c. 9.

Not only had Korbetskyi taken part in preparing the report; the final draft had been received by the vice-president of the Scientific-Technical Union Power Engineering Specialists and Electrical Engineers, A. Dupak, who had not too long ago been Chairman of *Zelenyi Svit's* Revision Commission!

Kievskie vedomosti disagreed with the recommendations of the report and the attempt by the pro-nuclear lobby to push its ideas through prior to the passing of the Law on Nuclear Energy. It also questioned the integrity of *Zelenyi Svit*. Then was it not rather strange that on the one hand members of the association, including Korbetskyi, were totally opposed to nuclear power, while on the other they were actually condoning it:

Активисты Украинской Экологической Ассоциации "Зеленый Світ" настроены решительно. Их документы предполагают вообще закрыть дорогу "мирному атому". Сопредседатель "Зеленого Світу" Е. Корбетский считает, что программа-максимум – закрытие АЭС. О каком-либо расширении сети атомных электростанций не может быть и речи до полной ликвидации последствий чернобыльской аварии. По мнению Е. Корбетского, там работы хватит на целый век.

Not surprisingly, the article caused a sharp reaction amongst the activists of *Zelenyi Svit*. Korbetskyi was labelled a 'traitor' and calls were made to exclude him from the ranks of *Zelenyi Svit*. Preparations of the Congress suffered under this issue. Nobody worked; everybody talked about the newspaper article. *Zelenyi Svit* as an association did not favour the improvement of nuclear power but was against nuclear power on principle. Although Korbetskyi voted against the majority of the commission in question this was not taken note of. Therefore it looked as if Korbetskyi was in favour of nuclear power. His mistake was that he did not inform *Zelenyi Svit* that he was on this commission. An article in *Zelenyi Svit*⁵⁶ claimed that nobody in the association were aware of this programme and that it was discovered by chance, as one of its authors left behind his copy in *Zelenyi Svit's* office during a meeting with Korbetskyi. Korbetskyi refuted the views presented in the *Kievskie vedomosti* article in an article headed 'Two Aspects' (published in *Nova MG* on 27 February 1993), but the incident all the same did great damage to his image within *Zelenyi Svit*.

A third issue of disagreement within *Zelenyi Svit* was linked to the statute endorsed by the Third Congress. Evhen Korbetskyi told me that he presented his own version of a new statute to the Congress. Initially people were against his draft, but after more than two hours of discussion the Congress agreed to endorse it. Shortly after the Congress, however, the documents

⁵⁶ *Зелений світ*, no. 3, 1993, с. 7.

disappeared. Korbetskyi suspected that they were removed by Anatoliy Panov⁵⁷, as he was strongly criticised by the Congress in his capacity as director of the Podil office. Panov, as executive director of the Green Office, and Korbetskyi, as one of *Zelenyi Svit*'s deputy leaders, were put in charge of registering the new statute with *Miniust* (the Ministry of Justice). Alterations were made in the text of the statute before it was registered and Korbetskyi blamed Panov for single-handedly having edited the statute. Different interpretations of what happened to the statute were given by other members of the association. In any case, due to increasing pressure, Panov resigned as executive director of the Green Office in December 1992.

The decision to call yet another congress to solve the leadership issue following Sanduliak's departure from *Zelenyi Svit* was not a direct result of Zolotukhin's and Korbetskyi's activities, but was made in mid-December 1992 by *Zelena Rada*. At this meeting, Korbetskyi criticised *Zelenyi Svit* for poor and inefficient work. This was received badly as Korbetskyi was 'only' one of three deputy leaders. It was decided that a new leader had to be found so that one could criticise freely without this being ill-perceived.

Not everybody approved of convening a new Congress on this pretext itself, though. Ihor Dzeverin, for instance, when recommended by Korbetskyi for the organisation committee that would prepare the Congress, expressed the view that prior to convening the Congress new issues ought to be identified for discussion. In principle he was against a Congress as it was likely to be overshadowed by personal conflicts and a leadership struggle rather than constructive work. This seemed a likely scenario, in his view, as Korbetskyi and Panov, who were both power engineering specialists had a habit of criticising one another, putting in doubt the professional integrity of the other. The view that a Congress was needed did in the end prevail and the Congress was scheduled for early 1993.

The leadership issue came up at the last meeting of *Zelena Rada* prior to the Congress. A minority decided to support Korbetskyi's candidacy despite his chances now being rather slim. Others favoured Korobko, who in their opinion would be an ideal candidate as he was not only a people's deputy of Ukraine but also represented the periphery, coming from Kryvyi Rih. Another factor that further strengthened his candidacy was that Korobko was considered an honest person, having declined both a house and a car, which the Ukrainian MPs had awarded themselves. As there was still disagreement on the need to call a congress - the PZU faction and those supporting Panov favoured a Congress, whereas Zolotukhin led a group of people opposing it - a vote was made on the issue. A majority voted in favour.

⁵⁷ Panov was a member of the Congress' secretariat and was thus partly in charge of all documents endorsed by the Congress. He was also a member of the Editorial Commission, whose task it was to suggest and recommend changes to the statute and the programme of *Zelenyi Svit* - as was Korbetskyi.

Attempts were made at building a bridge between Korobko and Korbetskyi to avoid open conflict. These attempts, however, failed. Towards the end of the meeting everybody was quarrelling with everybody. Panov was criticised for having changed the statute of the association, whereas Korbetskyi was accused of having betrayed the Greens. Following a break, compromise was reached - the Congress must go ahead. The *PZU* fraction and those supporting Panov favoured a Congress, whereas Zolotukhin led a group of people opposed to holding the Congress. Zolotukhin supported Korbetskyi's candidacy as new leader of *Zelenyi Svit*. Others, including younger members of the movement, abstained.

A few days before the Congress convened, Oleksii Kabyka, a former *Zelenyi Svit* activist, currently working with *Greenpeace Ukraine* noted that

Чем дальше, тем хуже. Постоянные непрекращающиеся скандалы и драки за власть и теплые места, деньги. Никакой работы. Я уже особо не жду ничего от них⁵⁸.

4.1.5 Fourth Congress (February 1993)

As seen above, critical remarks were made on *Zelenyi Svit*'s structure prior to the Congress both in written (cf. Hlazovyi's article) and spoken form. This criticism was to some extent taken into account by the association's leadership and prior to the Congress a commission was set up to look into possible ways of improving the efficacy of the Green Office in Kiev as well as of the elected organs of the Green Movement. Due to all the criticism that had been raised against him, Panov on the first day of the Congress asked the delegates that he be relieved from his duties as executive director of the Green office, after having presented the Congress with an account of the office's activities between 1991 and 1993. This request was granted. In an interview with *Vechirnyi Kyiv* some time after the Congress, Panov expanded on his decision to step down as executive director of the Podil office:

Хочу піти из своєї посади, оскільки протягом тривалого часу "тягнув лямку" і скоріні за все просто стомився. Стомився не від роботи, а від постійних конфліктних ситуацій, суперечок, породжених нездоровими амбіціями. Своєму наступникові хочу побажати успіхів і міцних нервів. За постійної війни честолюбств наших лідерів дуже важко робити справу⁵⁹.

⁵⁸ Letter from Oleksii Kabyka, Kiev, 24.2.1993.

⁵⁹ *Вечірній Київ*, 16.3.1993, с. 2.

This problem was compounded by the politicisation of the Green Movement generally and the intrigues among *Zelenyi Svit* leaders in particular.

Following Panov's account, the leaders of *Zelenyi Svit*'s commissions were given a chance to inform the Congress about the activities of each commission. However, half the commissions had been non-functioning so this did not really serve much purpose. Only a few of the commission leaders actually took the opportunity to present the delegates with such an account. Fedorinchyk, head of the legal commission, urged the Congress to pass a statute. He suggested that the text from the statute endorsed by the Third Congress be re-endorsed and registered by the Ministry of Justice. Should the Congress fail to do so, future work would prove difficult. He won support for his proposition from other delegates, amongst them Ihor Dzeverin.

With regard to the leadership issue, a number of delegates raised sharp criticism against Sanduliak - some even went so far as to call him a 'traitor' for having taken advantage of the Green Movement to create a name for himself. Some people thought Sanduliak already on the eve of the Third Congress had been asked and accepted the post of Ukrainian ambassador to Romania and that by accepting the leadership of *Zelenyi Svit* he had let the movement down, further preparing the ground for much of the infighting that had taken place within the movement since.

The sense of betrayal was sharpened in that many members of the Green Movement also felt let down by Iurii Shcherbak, who they suspected of having made a name through the movement and simply used it as a springboard to climb the career ladder. Others, although they did not blame Shcherbak for 'moving on' - after all it was very much due to his effort that the Green Movement had become so popular and well-respected - admitted that losing two well-known leader figures over such a short time had left the Green Movement in something of a limbo, opening up for conflicts and infighting between individuals that Shcherbak and Sanduliak had managed to contain by uniting the Movement behind them.

The three deputy leaders, Korbetskyi, Stepaniak and Zolotukhin each made a speech at the beginning of the Congress. Korbetskyi took the opportunity to address organisational issues and suggested that the statute be improved. He also criticised Panov for having performed poorly as the executive director of the Green Office. Stepaniak, on the other hand, focused on regional issues and made an attempt at uniting the delegates. Eventually Zolotukhin produced a speech against Korbetskyi and against *Zelenyi Svit*'s involvement with the *Anti-Communist, Anti-Imperialist Front*.

The first day of the Congress was taken up by accounts and general speeches - the Minister of the Environment, Iurii Kostenko, for instance addressed the delegates providing them with an account of the environmental situation in Ukraine. Kostenko's speech was emotional and yet factual. Research conducted by geneticists found that every eight out of 10 new-horns would be

deformed. Following Chernobyl, a Damocles' sword was hanging over Ukrainian children. Kostenko dreamed of the time when *Zelenyi Svit* would be out of work as all ecological problems in Ukraine would have been resolved⁶⁰.

Some of the speeches focused on environmental issues, others were of a more 'exotic' character: Iryna Kalynets, a delegate from Lviv, reported how in Lviv a book on conception and child birth had caused a scandal. Apparently Kalynets found the book too explicit and felt it should be banned. She made her request to the Prosecutor's office, but rather than having the book banned, she was eventually taken to court and sentenced for defamation and fined. At the time of the Congress she was in the process of appealing. This incident is revealing in that it clearly shows how diverse members of the Green Movement in Ukraine were - the Movement serving as a common ground for moral conservatives as well as liberals and uniting people with very different (political) beliefs.

Ihor Dzeverin has identified four 'alliances' within *Zelenyi Svit* that were fighting for power prior to the Fourth Congress: the Greens from Zakarpatia, a substantial proportion of whom were also members of the Green Party, were closely linked with the Green Party faction of *Zelenyi Svit* (The Green Party was a collective member of *Zelenyi Svit*). This faction was headed by the leader of the Green Party, Vitalii Kononov. A second constellation was formed by the Vinnytsia Greens, Korbetskyi and his supporters⁶¹. The Greens from Ivano-Frankivsk had so far united behind Panov, whereas the Lviv Greens formed a fourth 'alliance'. As far as the Kiev organisation was concerned, it had two 'camps' - one more and one less nationalist. The Kiev Green Nationalists were headed by Viktor Cherinko. He was accused of being a fascist, following statements to the effect that the environmental problems in Ukraine were the making of Jews⁶² and expelled in the autumn of 1992 before the Fourth Congress took place. The national question was, as will be seen in Chapter Eight, a sensitive issue for the Ukrainian Green Movement. Panov, for instance, claimed that Cherinko and those sharing his views were not really 'Green' but tried to use the Green Movement to promote views and ideas alien to Green thinking:

Люди, які не мали нічого спільного з екологією, використовували гасла "зелених" заради власного популізму, приховували ними свої націоналістичні виступи. Вони були у керівних органах столичного відділку до жовтня минулого року, а після виключення із асоціації заснували "національно-патріотичну" організацію "Зелений Світ". Природно, націоналістичні провокації групи Черінька ніякого відношення

⁶⁰ *Вечірній Київ*, 11.3.1993, с. 3.

⁶¹ Fedorinchuk supported Korbetskyi. He had good links with local groups in East Ukraine (Donetsk) and Southern Ukraine (Nikolaev) which later united behind Korobko's candidacy for new leader of the association.

⁶² This issue is addressed in detail in Chapter Eight.

до "Зеленого Світу" не мають. Пикро, що "зелені" не застраховані від таких сюрпризів. До роботи в асоціації залучали всіх тих, хто голосно вдав про своє бажання боротися за охорону природи. Таким чином у наших лавах опинилися і вульгарні кар'єристи, яким не дають спокою лаври Шербака і Сандуліака⁶³.

Cherinko was, following his expulsion, replaced as the radical wing of the Kiev organisation by representatives from the right who took on his position and his methods. The attitude of the Kiev group was and still is basically that Kiev is the capital of Ukraine and that Kiev should therefore hold the leadership of *Zelenyi Svit*. This view was contested by regional and local groups, the dominant view of which was that 'Kiev knows (and does) nothing'. Given the vacuum that had emerged at the higher echelons in *Zelenyi Svit* following Sanduliak's departure for Romania, the Fourth Congress came to serve as a battleground between these groups to gain the upper hand within the Green Movement.

One of the 'highlights' of the Congress was the leadership election. It was decided that voting by rating be used and that people vote by raising their hands. Initially there were 10 candidates for the job, but several declined to stand, amongst them Anatolii Panov. The first vote produced no clear winner: Korobko was in the lead, followed by Samiilenko of *PZU*, Honcharenko of Kiev *Zelenyi Svit* and Iryna Kalynets from Lviv. The second vote was then held between Korobko and Samiilenko⁶⁴. This vote was secret - each delegate voted with his/her mandate, in front of the Presidium. The vote dragged on and many people left in the course of it. After the votes had been counted, Korobko held a small majority of two votes. However, disagreement broke out as to whether or not he had absolute majority. Eventually, all the *PZU* representatives got up and walked out of the Congress in protest of Korobko's election. To avoid splitting the Congress on this issue, Dzeverin and Iavorska, from the Vinnytsia organisation, had a word with Korobko and requested that he suggest Samiilenko as his first deputy (according to the rules, it was up to the leader of *Zelenyi Svit* to name his deputies). This suggestion did not go well with people who were opposed to the Green Party. In the end, however, the Congress managed to unite behind Korobko and Samiilenko as chairman and vice-chairman respectively.

Korobko was a relatively new face in *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU* members did not like the fact that he was a former member of *RUKH*, which they suspected of trying to gain the upper hand in the association. Besides, he was accused of not being 'Green': Panov put it in the following way: 'he is not "our" man - he is a stranger, and it is obvious that he is not green'⁶⁵. Volodymyr Hrekov, a

⁶³ *Вечірній Київ*, 16.3.1993, с. 2.

⁶⁴ Samiilenko was chairman of the Green Party's secretariat.

⁶⁵ Interview with Anatolii Panov, Kiev, 16.5.1994.

member of *PZU* from Lviv oblast, made similar claims: 'Korobko was unknown to us. We knew little about him. He appeared at the Congress by chance and was elected illegally as there was no quorum when the leadership question was decided'. However, as nobody wanted a big conflict, Korobko's candidacy was eventually accepted by all factions in the hope that this would improve the current situation in *Zelenyi Svit*⁶⁶.

Four new deputy leaders were also elected. These were Honcharenko (Kiev), Zolotukhin (Nikolaev), Bagin (Donetsk) and Simus (Lviv) and they were responsible for the Central, Southern, Eastern and Western regions respectively. Serhii Fedorinchuk was appointed new leader of the Green Office in Kiev at the initiative of Korobko. His candidacy was opposed by many due to his alleged bad temper and also by the *PZU*-fraction as Fedorinchuk was negative towards the Green Party. Given that he was not a member of *PZU*, however, he was considered to be 'neutral' and an acceptable compromise figure for the directorship following Panov's request that he be relieved of his duties. It also counted to Fedorinchuk's advantage that he was a skillful and hard-working activist (he had taken part in the preparation of the legal assessment of the Chernobyl accident conducted by the Green Movement and by independent lawyers). His computing degree further increased his suitability for the job as the office had received computers from foreign sponsors and the majority of the association's members were computer-illiterate. Finally, Fedorinchuk had proved himself an efficient fund-raiser by obtaining money from the *Vidrodzhennia Fund* to purchase additional computers for the movement.

Although *Zelenyi Svit* had initiated the Green Party at its First Congress, those members of the association who were sceptical of *PZU* argued that *Zelenyi Svit* was a non-political organisation and therefore did not want to become a part of the Green Party. The activities of *PZU* members within *Zelenyi Svit* were by some perceived as an attempt at gaining control of the association.

As the Third Congress did not elect a new Revision Commission, the Lviv organisation raised this issue with the Congress as the one that was elected by the Second Congress had no authority. During the debate that followed, it was decided that all elected organs be operative for two years. As the Second Congress took place in March 1991 and the Fourth in February 1993, the old Revision Commission retained its powers for another month. The idea was that the Congress elect a Mini-Congress which would then convene and elect a new commission. The Congress, however, failed to do this, again proving *Zelenyi Svit*'s inability to stick to its own statute.

The second day of the Congress was devoted to discussing and editing *Zelenyi Svit*'s programme. A special commission had been set up to edit the programme and it spent some two hours on this task. The most important changes compared to the previous programme were as

⁶⁶ Interview with Volodymyr Hrekov, Kiev, 24.4.1994.

follows: *Zelenyi Svit* would not join any political bloc which was not ecological and it was stressed that ecological considerations should be placed above any economic considerations. The ultimate goal of the Green Movement was to defend Nature. This implied controlling the State, which in turn controlled the economy, which in turn determined the state of the environment. Some discussion took place within the commission on what should be *Zelenyi Svit*'s position on nuclear power. Panov made it clear that the Green Movement must say 'no' on principle to nuclear power, whereas Dzeverin held the view that the Greens say 'no' to nuclear power at present, but that this view might be changed later. Panov agreed with this, but added that 'if we are in favour of nuclear power, then we are not Green'. In the final draft, *Zelenyi Svit* came out against nuclear power. The discussion that followed the presentation of the programme to the Congress revealed that most of the delegates opposed to it. A question was raised as to what was the difference between a programme and a declaration, Preobrazhenska commented on the point on nuclear power and made a short speech on Chernobyl. She also repeated that Korbetskyi be held responsible for having acted against the ideas of *Zelenyi Svit*.

Another issue that caused considerable controversy was a point included in the new programme defending sexual minorities (homosexuals). The former USSR is morally very conservative, and homosexuality was for decades a taboo. To the extent it was talked about, homosexuals were branded as abnormals who ought to be severely punished for their unnatural behaviour. Not unexpectedly, therefore, many people were against including such a point in the programme of *Zelenyi Svit* and eventually it had to be taken out of the programme altogether. There was general consensus that the draft programme was poor - Tarasiuk, for instance, labelled it incompetent. Rather than spending time trying to improve the draft programme presented to the Congress, some people suggested that an alternative programme, elaborated by Academician Hrodzinskyi, be endorsed instead. The vote, which took place towards the end of the Congress, was only made by 60 (out of a total of 110) delegates. Of these 27 voted in favour of the draft programme and 30 people against.

Complaints to the effect that once again the regions were ignored at the expense of conflicts in *Zelenyi Svit*'s leadership surfaced both during and after the Congress. A. Petrenko, for instance, raised a scathing attack on this situation in *Zelenyi Svit*:

Сьогодні все більшою силою набирає розбрат, розподіл влади, невміння і небажання конструктивно працювати, політичний авантюризм.

Люди з'їхалися зо всієї України на цей з'їзд, щоб розповісти про свої проблеми, щоб знайти підтримку в своїй боротьбі на місцях через столичну пресу і столичні інститути влади. Адже ж знову не знайшлося часу для виступів тих, що шукає шляхів

вирішення екологічних проблем. Щось б'ється в інших нових структурах...⁶⁷

However, *Zelenyi Svit* might manage to overcome all its problems - if local and regional organisations were able to keep up their good work and make their own initiatives also in the future:

Будем сподіватись, що організації "Зеленого світу" в містах і селах України, які за статутом мають право на власні ініціативи, будуть і далі робити свою справу, незважаючи на організаційні проблеми в центрі.⁶⁸

Petrenko's hopes, however, would prove in vain. Rather than resolving any of the major conflicts in the association, the Congress reinforced them. During the spring, however, which saw the lifting by secret presidential decree of *Verkhovna Rada's* moratorium on the construction of new nuclear reactors in Ukraine, and the parliamentary elections, the Greens, in an effort to overturn the former and do well in the latter, temporarily buried their differences.

I have now looked at conflicts within the Green Movement. It ought not, however, to be forgotten that *Zelenyi Svit* was a highly efficient and successful association, which enjoyed a great deal of support among the Ukrainian population during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Was there a properly thought out strategy behind the campaigns launched by the Ukrainian Green Movement or were they simply spontaneous and not so well planned? I will try to answer this question below.

Green Strategy

The Green Movement in Ukraine emerged as an independent (i.e. non-governmental) movement, whose major aim was to prevent further deterioration to the physical environment and thus also damage to people's health. As seen above, a large number of campaigns were launched in various parts of the country, ranging from huge actions against further expansion of nuclear power, via campaigns to prevent pollution emanating from military bases to small-scale actions such as planting trees and preventing local polluting enterprises from being built.

In pursuing their goals, the Greens had a spectrum of means and strategies which it could make use of to reach these goals. They could, for instance, try to work inside the system; working in a polluting company to make it cleaner, working in a state structure such as the Ministry of Environmental Protection or going into politics. Or they could work outside the system, by means

⁶⁷ *Зелений світ*, no. 3, 1993, c. 7.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

of ecotage⁶⁹, blockades and symbolic actions and happenings. In between these two extremes are a number of means which can be applied both on the outside and inside of the system, like ecological education, petitions, lobbying and ecological research, as well as working in an environmental company.

When the Ukrainian Green Movement emerged in December 1987 there were still limits to what its activists could do: meetings had to be sanctioned beforehand and were in some cases not allowed to take place. Staging demonstrations was still risky in that it could have repercussions for those attending. And some activists were, as seen above, harassed for their involvement in the Green Movement. Choice of methods depend on a number of factors: opportunity structures (i.e. the political and economic framework within which the movement operates, responsiveness among the general public and access to decision makers), group and personal resources (size and aims of movement, access to equipment, funding, qualifications among members).

In the former USSR where opportunity structures were scarce and where the movement had to be built from scratch, one would expect non-violent, 'responsible' actions as these were less likely to be crushed and thus more likely to be visible to the public, to which the Greens appealed. Moreover, actions that would appeal to a wider audience were needed; scientists and writers had for several decades 'campaigned' for the environment, but on a limited number of issues and at an expert level, only rarely receiving mass support. Secondly, one might expect a degree of co-operation/lobbying with the authorities given that public participation in 1987 was almost non-existent and results therefore difficult to achieve without some support from 'above'. Thirdly, alternative information was required to contest official data of which there was a general shortage in the first place. To summarise, then, a combination of public pressure, non-violent action and alternative information thus seemed likely to yield the optimal result.

I have looked at means and strategies in detail in Chapter Six and Seven. To compare means used by the anti-nuclear lobby with those used by other groups I therefore asked the respondents what methods their movements made use of and how these methods had changed over time. When asked which methods had been used, I obtained the following result:

⁶⁹ By 'ecotage' I mean ecological sabotage, which involves the violation of existing legislation and regulation, such as stopping production at a polluting enterprise through sabotage, as opposed to a blockade.

Table 4.4 Green Strategy/Methods

Group	picketing	meetings, demonstrations	collecting signatures in support of petitions	news - paper and journal articles	TV/ radio appearances	conferences/ round-tables	work with dep./ state organs (Min-priroda)	deputy work	illegal actions (eco-sabotage)	other
Ternopil obl.				X	X	X	X			X
Mukachevo	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Bukovina	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Dnipropetrovsk	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X
Horlivka	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Lutsk	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Mariupol	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Vinnitsia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Uman	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Nikolaev	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Dzharylgach	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Ecocentre										X
Odesa Greens	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		

Other actions used were ecological education through schools, institutes and universities (Ternopil, Ecocentre - Kherson), scientific work (Ternopil, Uman, Nikolaev), summer camps, cultural activities and expeditions (Dnipropetrovsk), hunger strikes (Horlivka), gathering of information, analytical work, problem-solution (Uman), expert assessments of ecologically harmful projects so as to obtain a state/official expert assessment (Nikolaev). As expected, all groups gathered and spread information and mobilised the general public in support of their demands through demonstrations, meetings and the collection of signatures.

Work with local authorities and the Ministry of Environmental Protection was also on their priority lists. These means all had in common that they were cheap, more likely to be successful (from 1987 until 1991 there was an enormous interest in politics generally in Soviet society and it was therefore relatively easy to mobilise people to attend meetings and demonstrations out of curiosity; once information was spread, people could then be mobilised by appealing to their genuine concern for children's health, and also the environment), likely to be palatable to the authorities and eventually, have an impact - due to hard facts and widespread public support.

Not more than two groups - Horlivka *Zelenyi Svit* and Ternopil oblast *Zelenyi Svit* - used ecotage as a means of campaigning. Ecotage was not likely to go down well with the general public in a country like Ukraine and the implications for those involved could, as I have already pointed out, be severe. Only recently has ecotage been used, and then primarily by *Greenpeace* activists. Although members of *Zelenyi Svit* have expressed admiration towards *Greenpeace*, they have not started making use of the same methods - partly as it requires proper funding and certain skills and also because there are so few young people left in the association (*Greenpeace*'s activists are young people). Neither the conflicts within the Green Movement facilitate ecotage, as this requires a disciplined and united organisation.

With the liberalisation of the political climate in Ukraine, ecotage and more radical action could be expected - but on the other hand, widespread political apathy and economic hardship, by which it was accompanied, impoverished the Green Movement and eroded its support base. Besides, many of the more innovative and inventive members of the Movement left to join other political movements, political parties or to set up more specialised Green groups with links to the West European Greens. Also of significance was the fact that by 1991 when Ukraine declared itself independent, a number of major battles (the fight against the expansion of nuclear power, campaigns against chemical and other polluting enterprises) had already been won and the Green Movement started to decline. With the introduction of independence, however, many of the issues which had already been won, re-surfaced - the argument now being that Ukraine had to assert its new-won independence by freeing itself from the dependence on Russia for energy, fuel and various industrial products. Thus, old issues were opened and old and tested methods once again applied by the Greens. It is therefore not surprising that only about half of the respondents reported a change in methods used:

Table 4.5 Change of Methods

Group	Methods Changed	Methods Unchanged
Ternopil obl. ZS	X	
Mukachevo ZS		X
Bukovina ZS	X	
Dnipropetrovsk obl. ZS	X	
Horlivka ZS	X	
Luts'k ZS		X
Mariupol Greens		X
Vinnitsia obl. ZS		X
Uman ZS		X (але удосконалились)
Nikolaev obl. ZS	X	
Dzharylgach (Kherson)		X
Ecocentre (Kherson)		X
Odessa Greens	X	

When asked how their methods had changed, the respondents came up with a variety of answers. Ternopil *Zelenyi Svit*, for instance, explained the changes in terms of political and economic events, which had led to a fall in public activity and made the movement more low-profile:

После подъема общественной активности в 1991 г. в 1992 г. началось ее ослабление. То же самое касается и зеленого движения. Экономическая ситуация усугубила это состояние. С более активных форм деятельность перешла в более спокойное русло. Раньше практиковались: никетирование, митинги, демонстрации, сборы подписей, экосаботаж.

The Dnipropetrovsk Greens, on the other hand, argued that there were less meetings in 1994 than what had been the case earlier, but more constructive work:

Переход к выработке конструктивной стратегии природопользования, работе с детьми и молодежью, использование масс-медиа, обращение к проблемам здоровья – меньше митингов – больше ежедневной "чертовой" работы.

In Horlivka the Greens' work was less extremist than had been the case before. This could be explained in terms of political and economic change more generally, which had changed awareness among the political leadership locally and their attitude towards environmental problems. Zolotukhin of Nikolaev *Zelenyi Mir* pointed out that his organisation had shifted its attention from the general public to the councils:

Сегодня очень сложно организовать и получить конкретную поддержку населения, занятого выживанием в условиях обнищания, поэтому основной упор нужно делать на работу с депутатским корпусом и учеными, работать как теневому кабинету с публикацией его результатов.

Also in Odessa more work was undertaken together with scientists and various organisations and activists who supported the movement. Finally, in Bukovina the authorities were now sometimes moving towards the Green Movement - which was a change from before.

Those groups which had not changed their methods justified this in a number of ways. The Mariupol Greens argued that it was simply not able to change its methods as it had neither the financial means to do so, nor could it draw on the same level of activity as previously. The Vinnytsia Greens, on the other hand, claimed that they were in the process of improving its methods, which were of different kinds and one may add, which had proved effective. Finally, the Ecocentre claimed that the same methods were being used simply because they were effective and needed to protect the environment. This brings us on to the efficiency of those methods used and the Greens' assessment of their own methods:

Table 4.6 Methods and their Efficiency

Group	Efficient	Inefficient	Don't know
Ternopil obl. ZS		X	
Mukachevo ZS	X		
Bukovina ZS	X		
Dnipropetrovsk obl. ZS			X
Horlivka ZS	X		
Lutsk ZS	X		
Mariupol Greens		X	
Vinnytsia obl. ZS		X	
Uman ZS	X		
Nikolaev obl. ZS	X		
Dzharylgach (Kherson)	X		
Ecocentre (Kherson)	X		
Odessa Greens	X		

Although a clear majority felt that their methods were effective, several of the respondents qualified their 'yes', by arguing that the methods were not always effective (Bukovina, Horlivka). The Kherson Greens argued that some methods were effective, whereas others were less so and the Ecocentre, although claiming to use effective methods, argued that these methods could still be improved. Finally, Vinnytsia oblast *Zelenyi Svit* held the view that although the methods were effective themselves, the problem was that their range was insignificant in facilitating major changes in public awareness. To the extent existing methods were not the best, they proved

difficult to change not only due to general political and economic change in Ukraine, but also due to internal organisational matters, such as a lack of funds, lack of activists, equipment, expertise and poor communications:

Table 4.7 Methods not the Best, but not Possible to Change them

Group	insufficient funds	lack of activists	lack of adequate equipment	poor communications	other reasons
Ternopil obl. ZS	X	X	X	X	lack of experience and expertise.
Mukachevo ZS	no funds		no equipment.		
Bukovina ZS			lack of laboratory facilities and expertise.		
Dnipropetrovsk obl. ZS	X	X	X		
Horlivka ZS	X		X	X	passivity and impoverishment of population.
Lutsk ZS	X	X	X	X	
Mariupol Greens	X				
Vinnytsia obl. ZS					
Uman ZS	X				
Nikolaev obl. ZS	X	X	X		
Dzharylgach	X		X		
Ecocentre	X			X	
Odessa Greens	X	X			

When asking which means were most efficient for current campaigns - regardless of financial obstacles and other deficiencies within *Zelenyi Svit* I got the following result:

Table 4.8 *Most Efficient Means by which to Campaign at Present*

Group	Picketing	Meetings/ demonstrations	Collect signatures for petitions	Articles in newspapers/ journals	TV/ radio appearances	Conferences/ round tables	working with deputies	deputy work	eco-sabotage	other means
Ternopil obl. ZS										X
Mukachevo ZS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Bukovina ZS	X		X	X		X				
Dnipropetrovsk obl. ZS				X	X	X	X	X		X
Horlivka ZS				X	X	X	X	X		
Lutsk ZS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Mariupol Greens									X	X
Vinnitsia ZS					X	X	X			
Uman ZS										X
Nikolaev obl. ZS							X	X		X
Dzharlygach Eco-centre			X	X	X	X	X	X		
Odessa Greens	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	

As seen from the table above, a shift has taken place away from picketing and meetings/demonstrations towards the production and spreading of information and deputy work. The Ukrainian Greens' attitude towards eco-sabotage remained virtually unchanged, however, thus indicating that the Green Movement was largely law-abiding.

The Ternopil Greens found it difficult to pinpoint one or two methods which were more efficient than others, as each region had adopted their own methods, which proved useful to some, but not to others. However, ecological education was very important to Ukraine as a whole. The Uman Greens favoured a mix of various methods as they were all efficient, depending on the

situation. The Ecocentre also favoured a multiple approach, whereas in Dnipropetrovsk cultural activities were being used with success. Less positive were the respondents from Mariupol and Nikolaev. The former argued that no means were really efficient until harsh environmental legislation and proper monitoring facilities had been established to secure their implementation. The latter argued that as long as a 'dictatorship of the executive' existed, it was impossible to achieve anything.

Although there was a need for some new methods, a majority of the respondents did not seem to think that there was any major difference between working within the Soviet Union and in independent Ukraine. To some extent the problems they were facing in 1994 were different from the ones which they faced some years earlier. Other problems were brought to life again as a result of the new-won independence. A comparison of working conditions in the USSR and Independent Ukraine thus gave the following result:

Table 4.9 Comparison of Working Conditions in the USSR and Independent Ukraine

Group	Easier in the USSR	Easier in Independent Ukraine	No difference: difficult then, difficult now	Difficult to tell
Ternopil obl. ZS			X	
Mukachevo ZS			X	
Bukovina ZS			X	
Dnipropetrovsk obl. ZS		X		
Horlivka ZS			X	
Lutsk ZS			X	
Mariupol Greens	X			
Vinnitsia obl. ZS			X	
Uman ZS				
Nikolaev obl. ZS			X	
Dzharylgach			X	
Ecocentre			X	
Odessa Greens		X		

Thus, although the problems were different, it had not become easier to work under Ukrainian independence - although, prior to the collapse of the USSR, the Greens had argued that independence was a pre-condition for improving the state of the environment in the republic. As seen above, the explanation was to be found in the republics' of the former USSR struggle to gain real independence - in Ukraine's case from Russia, upon whom it depended for fuel. Consequently, the pro-nuclear lobby gained a powerful card on its hand, claiming that Ukraine could only cut its dependence on Russia by creating a full nuclear cycle on its own territory - i.e. by producing, storing and reprocessing its own fuel and by expanding the existing capacity to generate electric power. It was as a result of such arguments that President Kravchuk in February

1994 issued a secret decree overturning *Verkhovna Rada*'s moratorium on nuclear reactors and giving the go-ahead for the creation of a full nuclear cycle on Ukrainian territory. It was also such considerations that made the Ukrainian government sanction the construction of an oil-terminal by Odessa, through which oil could be received from the Gulf states and other countries so as to reduce dependence on Russia for oil and gas.

Problems that were successfully solved by claiming that Moscow was polluting Ukraine, thus resurfaced as 'necessities' required to protect Ukrainian independence. Although, with Western technology and equipment their safety may be enhanced, their potential to cause wide-spread pollution should an accident occur, thus remains. So although in the longer term, Ukraine may benefit from its independence in terms of environmental safety, the short term outcome may be less impressive - especially as the Green Movement has emerged as a weakened actor on the political scene in Independent Ukraine and as the general public is less concerned with environmental issues now than just a few years ago. As Tverdostup (Ternopil) put it:

Раньше тяжело было психологически, теперь тяжело бороться со всеобщей апатией, экономическими трудностями.

Bagin (Horlivka) agreed, arguing that at present people were only concerned with material and technical problems, not with environmental issues. Apathy and a lack of faith among the general public had become a serious obstacle (Odessa, Mukachevo) as had the lack of concern on the part of the authorities:

Во времена СССР проблемы не решали, но делали вид, что принимают близко к сердцу и пытаются решить. Сегодня власти не делают даже этого. (Bal - Mariupol).

Still, there was general agreement among the Greens that the ecological situation in Ukraine would only improve once the Ukrainians retained a sense of being in control of and responsible for their own land (i.e. through political independence and privatisation of the land):

Table 4.10 Ideas about how to Improve the Ecological Situation in Ukraine

Group	only through politics	primarily by influencing political decisions	primarily through the revival of Ukr. culture	only through the revival of Ukr. culture	through the revival of pride in the Ukr. nation	only when Man feels in control of his own land	don't know how best to achieve this
Ternopil obl. ZS						X	
Mukachevo ZS		X					
Bukovina ZS	X						
Dnipropetrovsk obl. ZS						X	
Horlivka ZS						X	
Lutsk ZS						X	
Mariupol Greens						X	
Vinnitsia obl. ZS			X				
Uman ZS							
Nikolaev obl. ZS			X		X	X	
Dzharylgach						X	
Eco-centre				X			
Odessa Greens						X	

It thus seems that the long-term solution to Ukraine's environmental problems is to be found in spreading awareness among the general public on the environment and the need to protect it, as well as in the establishment of a direct link between the land and the people, imbuing the latter with a sense of responsibility towards its protection.

4.2 Green Support

4.2.1 Parliamentary and Local Elections (March and June 1994)

As seen above, the Greens from the very start emphasised the need to take actively part in the preparations of and debates on environmental legislation and environmental policies through elected organs such as *Verkhovna Rada* and local and regional councils.

Preparations for the parliamentary elections scheduled for 24 March started shortly after the Congress closed. Candidates were put forward in a number of oblasts and in Kiev. Due to the electoral law, however, which made it easier to launch a candidacy through one's work place or place of residence than through a public organisation, several of these candidates balloted as independents. No 'Green' candidates managed to get directly elected to parliament and only two Greens made it to the second round of the elections.

Although the Greens failed to win any seats in *Verkhovna Rada* during the March 1994 parliamentary elections it was hoped that they would fare better during the local elections, which were coming up in June. In my survey I included questions not only regarding the Greens' experience in local and regional parliaments, but also about their strategy for the local elections.

All groups polled either had their own deputies or the support of deputies in the local and oblast parliaments. The Ternopil oblast organisation, however, complained that those deputies who were elected on a 'Green' platform soon forgot about their commitment to the environment once 'in position':

Большинство депутатов, выдвинутых от Зеленого Світа в
последствии почти никакой экологической деятельности не
проводили, помощи Зеленому Світу не давал ни один из них.

There was an explanation for this:

Все это из-за несовершенства избирательного законодательства, из-
за потребительской психологии людей и депутатов в том числе.
Если бы были выборы по партийным спискам таких депутатов
можно было бы отозвать. Некоторые из них пошли и возглавили
экологические комиссии.

Mukachevo *Zelenyi Svit* had two deputies in the oblast soviet and two deputies in the town soviet. Bukovina replied that they had very few delegates, without specifying the number, whereas Horlivka *Zelenyi Svit* had four deputies in the town soviet and another three in regional councils. The Dnipropetrovsk Greens did not put forward their own candidates during the 1990 elections, but several members of *Zelenyi Svit* were elected either as independents or affiliated with other organisations to various city council throughout the oblast. The Committee to Protect the Azov Sea had its own deputies, and the committee was taking part in elaborating draft resolutions and decisions that would eventually be passed by the council to which these deputies had been elected. Finally, Vinnytsia and Nikolaev oblast organisations - among the biggest

chapters of *Zelenyi Svit* - announced that they had six and 10 deputies in the oblast council respectively. The Vinnytsia organisation had another eight deputies in regional and town council.

Several ecological issues had been lobbied through these deputies and other deputies sharing their views. In Nikolaev the 10 deputies backed up by *Zelenyi Mir* had forced a group of 'radical-democratic action' in the oblast council. In the city council there were five deputies representing *Zelenyi Mir*. Green deputies at all levels had joined commissions on the environment and thanks to this the Green Movement had considerably influenced the work of the oblast and city council. This is an issue to which I will return in Chapters Five and Six. Finally, the Odessa Greens had seven deputies, in conjunction with whom they were preparing issues to be debated at sessions and by the presidiums and also controlling the implementation of decisions made by the council.

A majority of the respondents (Ternopil oblast, Bukovina, Horlivka, Mariupol, Nikolaev oblast, Ecocentre and Odessa) reported that they co-operated with deputies who did not represent *Zelenyi Svit* but who shared their views on various issues with implications for the environment.

I have now shown that most Green groups either had or were able to co-operate with deputies in the town/city and oblast council. How efficient were these 'Green' deputies and how satisfied were the Greens with the result of their work? The survey gave the following result:

Table 4.11 *Assessment of Green Deputies*

Group	Satisfied	Mostly satisfied	Satisfied and unsatisfied	Not very satisfied	Mostly unsatisfied	Unsatisfied
Ternopil obl. ZS					X	
Mukachevo ZS	X					
Bukovina ZS	X					
Dnipropetrovsk obl. ZS						X
Horlivka ZS				X		
Lutsk ZS					X	
Mariupol Greens					X	
Vinnytsia obl. ZS		X				
Uman ZS			X			
Nikolaev obl. ZS						
Dzharylgach						
Ecocentre		X	X			
Odessa Greens						

As can be seen from the table the Greens are divided by territorial lines in their assessment of the deputies. Whereas the East (Dnipropetrovsk, Horlivka and Mariupol) are not very positive in their assessment, the West (with the exception of Ternopil oblast) and the South are predominantly positive. This difference may, to some extent be explained by the fact that local, regional and oblast councils in the East were traditionally more conservative (even dogmatic) than what was the

case in the West. In the South, moreover, the Greens were fighting very specific projects such as the South Ukrainian nuclear power station (Nikolaev) and various chemical enterprises and an oil terminal (Odessa), against which there was broad local opposition. In the West, people were united against military pollution considered to be imposed on the local communities by Moscow (thallium poisoning of children in Chernivtsy and radioactive pollution from the Pristialivsk radar station in Mukachevo). Given their implications and the fact that the Western parts of Ukraine were a stronghold of national sentiments, it would therefore be easier for the Green deputies to argue their case in the oblast, local and regional councils. Another factor by which to explain this difference is the number of deputies each group have. As seen above, those groups positive in their assessment of deputies are also the groups whose number of deputies is the highest - thus enabling them to form an efficient Green lobby within the councils.

The Ternopil group, does, however, not fit in with this explanation. It is one of the biggest local branches of *Zelenyi Svit* in Ukraine and had some highly active (and visible) deputies in both the oblast and local councils⁷⁰. The most plausible explanation seems to be that whereas other West Ukrainian Green deputies were united behind one or two key issues, there was no one issue which stood out in Ternopil. Moreover, West Ukraine was more politicised during the early 1990s than other parts of Ukraine - thus the focus shifted from the environment to more urgent issues such as independence, economic and political reform. As pointed out elsewhere it was virtually impossible to be elected to the USSR Congress of Deputies in 1989 without a Green platform. Similar tendencies were seen in 1990. This commitment did, however, for a number of deputies just last during the election campaign and faded shortly after. It seems that Green deputies in Ternopil belonged to this category.

West European Greens still debate whether or not it is necessary or even desirable for the Greens to be represented in legislative bodies - the argument of those negative to such representation being that the Greens are opposed to the very system of which these bodies are a part. Consequently, this system must be fought by extra-parliamentary means - i.e. from the outside. If one is to follow the popular distinction between 'shallow' and 'deep' ecologists or, to use the German terminology, 'realists' and 'fundamentalists', it becomes rather obvious that the Ukrainian Greens are indeed among the former⁷¹. Prior to the June elections, Academician Hrodzinskyi was asked if there was a need for Greens in parliament. He answered in the affirmative:

⁷⁰ The deputy M. Melnychuk, for instance, headed the ecological commission of the town administration and another deputy, A. Znarko, was working actively in the town soviet - see *Вперед* (1992), c. 3.

⁷¹ This is a question which has been further explored in Chapter Eight.

Річ у тім, що зараз поступово змінюється пріоритет людських цінностей. Тривалий час велими актуальною була тема прав людини. Але зараз суспільство ледаті більше усвідомлює, що право на безпечне навколишнє середовище - найголовніше. Наступне тисячоліття, на мій погляд, буде тисячоліттям екології - тобто найголовнішою стане проблема виживання у вкрай зруйнованому техногенним впливом навколишньому середовищі. "Зелені" обстоюють ідеї екологізму, стоять, так би мовити, понад політикою. Тому в усіх європейських парламентах вони є міцною консолідуючою силою. В нашому українському парламенті потрібні перш за все не "зелені" балакуни, а "зелені" фахівці - серйозні, порятунні та обізнані люди⁷².

Most of the local and oblast branches of *Zelenyi Svit* would take part in the local elections - although, at the time the survey was conducted, not all of them had put forward a list of candidates. As for those groups that had already endorsed such lists, Ternopil oblast had nominated two candidates and also initiated the creation of a youth election-campaign association, *Moloda Heneratsiia* (Young Generation). Horlivka *Zelenyi Svit* put forward five candidates to the town soviet. Emphasis was put on the town soviet and not on the oblast soviet as the latter did not exert any particular influence on life in Horlivka and the surrounding region:

Делаем ставку на городской (совет). А областной Совет поскольку не существует, особенно влияния на жизнь города и региона не оказывает, только палаты собирает и тратит на свое содержание.

In Vinnytsia the Greens would ballot within the framework of the electoral bloc 'Centre'. No candidates were put forward directly from *Zelenyi Svit*:

Как и на предыдущих выборах использовали поддержку наших активистов в трудовых коллективах, отдельных микрорайонах.

Zelenyi Mir in Nikolaev put forward 15 candidates for the 60-seat oblast rada. Thirty five candidates would ballot for 75 seats in the city council. The strategy followed by the Nikolaev Greens was by its leader, Anatolii Zolotukhin, described as follows:

Стратегия заключается в том, чтобы после выборов создать внепартийный, центристский, демократический клуб избирателей "экос" - экология, культура, образование, собственность, в котором объединить все силы, что создалось вне государственных структур и попытаться оказать профессиональную поддержку

⁷² *Вечірній Київ*, 26.4.94, с. 2.

вновь избранным депутатам. В клубе, объединить все
внепартийные организации типа "Просвіти", "Зеленого Світу",
ассоциации учителей, творческие союзы и предприниматели.

The Odessa Greens planned to put forward 20 candidates. In Dnipropetrovsk no candidate would be put forward directly from *Zelenyi Svit*, but Greens would still take part in the elections. A similar situation existed in Bukovina: in all democratic organisations and parties there were members of *Zelenyi Svit* and they would ballot for the local as well as oblast councils. Mukachevo had so far only registered one candidate.

In Mariupol, however, the Committee to Defend the Azov Sea would not take part in the ballot. Evhen Bal explained this decision in the following way:

(Не будем участвовать) так как термин "СОВЕТСКАЯ ВЛАСТЬ"
расшифровывается так: "СОВЕТОВ МНОГО - ВЛАСТИ МАЛО".

Neither would the Ecocentre. In the latter case, however, this decision was understandable in that the Ecocentre was an expert organisation working on research and concrete projects, not a campaign organisation. The Mariupol decision was more surprising, as there were Green deputies in the outgoing councils. Bal was however not satisfied with their achievements and might have felt that the organisation could gain more through extra-parliamentary activities. Besides, it cost money to take part in the elections and most of the Green groups were short of money. If they expected to do poorly, it might have been considered a better idea not to take part at all.

To conclude then, the Green Movement as a whole had gained a more realistic understanding of what it could achieve through the local and regional councils. Disappointment with deputy performance and high election campaign costs therefore prevented some groups from putting forward their own candidates. And those groups which did, had fewer people elected to the new councils than during the previous (1990) local and regional elections. The Greens therefore emerged from the elections with less potential for influence than before. This, together with the difficulties they had in mobilising the general public, financial problems and conflicts within the Movement, did not make the future prospects for *Zelenyi Svit* look promising and also caused considerable disillusionment among those activists who remained in the movement. Below I will look at the impact all these factors have had on *Zelenyi Svit*'s membership.

4.2.2 Membership Trends in the Ukrainian Green Movement

As noted earlier, the Ukrainian Green Movement did not introduce formal membership when it was founded in 1987. There were a number of reasons for this; one being that *Zelenyi Svit* was meant to be an alternative to officially sanctioned movements. Secondly, it was thought that people's moral commitment to the movement was more important than their formal affiliation and thirdly, formal membership was avoided so as to reduce to a minimum the chances of sanctions being imposed on members by the authorities. In later years, however, some chapters of *Zelenyi Svit* have introduced formal membership and the ones which have not followed suit, are reasonably small groups and are therefore able to provide data on those people who are actively taking part in their activities.

In the survey I included questions on age, sex, educational background and membership development so as to establish who the Ukrainian Green Activist is and also to enable us to compare him/her to Green activists in Western Europe.

Table 4.12 Total Membership: Breakdown by Gender

Organisation	Total Membership (N=)	Gender (in %)	
		Male	Female
Ternopil oblast ZS	200	60	40
Mukachevo ZS	not fixed	20	80
Bukovina ZS	1,400	35	65
Dnipropetrovsk oblast ZS	250	50	50
Horlivka ZS	approx. 70 (collective members; 7-8,000 people)	37	63
Lutsk ZS			
Mariupol Greens	160	70	30
Vinnitsia oblast ZS	350 (not fixed)	40	60
Uman ZS	not fixed - up to 500 participate in actions organised by ZS	50	50
Nikolaev oblast ZS	90-100	60	40
Dzharylgach (Kherson obl.)	approx. 110	80	20
Ecocentre (Kherson obl.)	15	70	30
Odessa Greens	36	82	18

As seen from the table, membership varied from 70 to 500. Most of the local movements, however, each had a core of activists which was much smaller (between 15 and 40) and which ran the movement, organising campaigns, lobbying and being involved with fund-raising. Ordinary members and people sympathetic towards the movement were then mobilised to take part in specific campaigns or drop in on meetings irregularly.

A majority of the groups surveyed had a male dominance in membership composition. In some groups there was a disproportionately large male membership, whereas others had a small female majority. This was the case in Mukachevo, where the movement was initiated by a woman

- Evheniia Derkach - who opposed plans to build a military radio station (Pristialivsk radar station) in the region and who wanted a military airport on the outskirts of Mukachevo to be closed down. Another member of this group, Liubov Karavanska, balloted, as seen above, in the March 1994 parliamentary elections for the *PZU*. Female representation was high also in Bukovina and Horlivka, where concern for children's health seemed to be a key factor. In Chernivtsy (Bukovina), for instance, the Green Movement emerged out of concern for children falling ill with alopecia and in Horlivka children were not healthy at birth due to serious industrial pollution. Vinnytsia oblast *Zelenyi Svit* focused on eco-culture and education, which might have been regarded as 'soft' topics and also had a female leader, Iavorska.

As a rule, men are politically more active than women in Ukraine and in political groups and movements men are generally better represented than women. It would therefore be more interesting to compare the female ratio in *Zelenyi Svit* with that of other organisations to see if there are more women in this association than is the case elsewhere. Unfortunately, however, no data is available to do this. As regards female representation within *Zelenyi Svit*'s elected organs, which as seen above indicate that they are under-represented compared to their total number, this can be explained in the following way: The rules of representation gives only one person per collective member of *Zelenyi Svit* (i.e. local and regional groups) access to the *Mala Rada* and *Zelena Rada*. As the leaders of most of these groups are men, this explains why they are better represented in these bodies.

With regard to age, I found a concentration of members in the 35-55 cohort for a majority of the groups. This is a feature common to Green groups also in other former Soviet republics and a feature that makes *Zelenyi Svit* distinctively different from the similar groups in Western Europe, whose majority of members is below 35 years of age. The explanation for this phenomenon is to be found in the Soviet system itself. Those people who are now in their late 40s/early 50s were in their teens during the Khrushchev era and grew up in a relatively liberal political atmosphere with the thaw and denouncement of Stalin. When Gorbachev introduced glasnost and democratisation these people in particular became involved in public and political movements. Another reason, frequently mentioned by members of *Zelenyi Svit* themselves, is that people belonging to this generation had grown-up children, were financially better off and had more spare time than the younger generation. Members of *Zelenyi Svit* told me that many of its younger activists left as they found the endless conflicts within the association frustrating and restrictive. Finally, young people in the former USSR were less concerned with politics than the older generation. With economic liberalisation this trend was reinforced in that young people got involved in buying and selling commodities as a fast way of making money, thus not having the time for politics.

The age break-down of members of *Zelenyi Svit* are depicted in table 4.13 below:

Table 4.13 Age Break-Down (I)

Group	under 20	20-25	25-35	35-45	45-55	over 55
Ternopil obl. ZS	10	40	40	10	3	2
Mukachevo ZS	5	10	25	35	20	5
Bukovina ZS	40	5	7	15	20	13
	(pupils)					
Dnipropetrovsk obl. ZS	40	25	15	6	12	2
Horlivka ZS	7	14	26	37	11	5
Lutsk ZS	---	---	---	---	---	---
Mariupol Greens	---	5	10	20	40	25
Vinnitsia obl. ZS	20	7	13	48	6	2
Uman ZS	---	equal	equal	equal	equal	none
Nikolaev obl. ZS	10	15	20	25	20	10
Dzharylgach	25	30	---	27	22	5
Ecocentre	2	3	5	4	1	none
Odessa Greens	---	4	8	12	6	6

This phenomenon becomes even clearer when merging the groups in the following way:

Table 4.14 Age Break-Down (II)

Group	under 25	25-45	45-55	over 55
Ternopil obl. ZS	50	50	3	2
Mukachevo ZS	15	60	20	5
Bukovina ZS	45	22	20	13
Dnipropetrovsk obl. ZS	65	21	12	2
Horlivka ZS	21	63	11	5
Lutsk ZS	---	---	---	---
Mariupol Greens	5	30	40	25
Vinnitsia obl. ZS	27	61	6	2
Uman ZS	none under 20, otherwise equal for all groups, except over 55 (none)			
Nikolaev obl. ZS	25	45	20	10
Dzharylgach	---	27 (none between 25 and 35)	22	5
Ecocentre	5	9	1	none
Odessa Greens	4 (none under 20)	20	6	6

In terms of membership development, I expected a general decline, then as pointed out above, many people left *Zelenyi Svit* to join other political groups and parties, because the issues on which they were campaigning were solved or because they got fed up with the numerous conflicts within the association. The result from the survey confirmed this, although some groups reported an increase in membership over the last few years:

Table 4.15 Membership Development

Group	Increased	Unchanged	Declined
Ternopil oblast ZS			X
Mukachevo ZS			X
Bukovina ZS	X		
Dnipropetrovsk obl. ZS	X		
Horlivka ZS			X
Lutsk ZS		X	
Mariupol Greens		X (officially, nobody has left)	
Vinnitsia oblast ZS	X	number of active members increased	
Uman ZS			
Nikolaev oblast ZS			X
Dzharylgach		X	
Ecocentre		X	
Odessa Greens			X

Each group was asked to qualify their answers. Those groups whose membership mass had been reduced, argued that the reduction was a result of difficult economic conditions in Ukraine: The state was unable to provide people with food and inadequate salaries. People therefore had to work extra and spend time growing their own food (potatoes and vegetables) at their allotments. 'The question right now is of biological, not ecological survival' (Ternopil). The Mukachevo Greens added that there was no longer any pressing problems in the region. Moreover, people had lost faith that something could be done given the poor implementation of existing legislation and lack of boundaries. Horlivka, Mariupol, Nikolaev, Kherson and Odessa agreed with Ternopil: in Mariupol the level of activity had dropped as a result of the impoverishment of the population. People no longer had time for ecology as all their energy was spent on finding food to feed their families. Similarly, Zolotukhin argued that 'the people had become so impoverished that it had to occupy itself with concerns of elementary. Finally, the Kherson Greens answered that not only had people lost faith in their own and the Green Movement's ability to change something, but due to the material difficulties they faced, they no longer had the physical strength or the nerve potential for public work: 'People are weak: Everybody thinks about cabbage leaves for their own profit'.

Some groups, however, managed to increase their membership despite the deteriorating social and economic conditions in the country. Bukovina had expanded as teachers and school children as well as the Pedagogical Institute and *Soiuz Ukrainok Bukoviny* had joined the Greens as collective members. Dnipropetrovsk oblast *Zelenyi Svit* explained its increase by a deliberate attempt on the part of the Greens to activate the young and also as a result of the intellectualisation of the Movement, which had facilitated a clearer presentation of ideas and perspectives to the

general public. Vinnytsia had expanded as every group it united was working on one concrete problem and the public could see results of their work - for instance they had managed to obtain new (game) reserves, independent information on radiation levels in the oblast, the state of the ozone layer, etc. Finally, Uman *Zelenyi Svit* had benefited from increased awareness and activation of the intelligentsia in the area.

The answers I got thus seem to confirm that groups working on concrete issues and also groups that manage to sort out their finances can survive and even expand under harsh economic conditions. The problem for *Zelenyi Svit* as an all-Ukrainian association, however, is that conflicts and the struggle for positions within the movement have overshadowed the issues it was created to solve, thus limiting the Greens' impact and doing damage to *Zelenyi Svit*'s favourable image with the general public. I will return to this issue below.

4.3 Regional Differences

4.3.1 Regional and other Cleavages within the Green Movement

As seen in the beginning of this chapter, local groups emerged either at the initiative of locals concerned with the impact of a deteriorating environment on people's health and by pollution in itself, or they were initiated by *Zelenyi Svit* activists in Kiev. A figure often quoted by the Greens themselves, is 300 local and regional groups joined together in *Zelenyi Svit*. However, the number of active local organisations has been reduced since 1991, when the Green Movement reached its peak in Ukraine. There are a number of reasons for the decline which has taken place in *Zelenyi Svit*, suffice it here to say that it has been difficult for them to communicate with the 'centre', i.e. Kiev.

According to Hlazovyi local groups have been offered little or no assistance due to bureaucratisation of the Green Office in Kiev and due to a weakened economy within the movement. It should all have been so different. The central organisation was intended to assist the member groups with information, advise, equipment and funding, rather than facilitating a one-way communication.

Several local groups allegedly said prior to the Third Congress in 1992 that they were thinking of leaving *Zelenyi Svit* as they had no use for Kiev whatsoever. On the contrary, being a member proved an expense as travelling costs had to be covered to attend meetings of the *Mala* and *Zelena Rada* as well as the Congresses. Besides, Kiev was accused of taking no interest in what was happening locally. As the conflict grew into outright war between 'Kiev' and the

regions, the association's statute proved a useful 'tool' to Kiev: it could be used to manipulate and gain control over the Green Movement by calling extraordinary meetings of the *Mala Rada* and *Zelena Rada* so often that eventually locals would not be able to attend and thus unable to influence decisions made on key issues. It was also a problem for the local groups that 'Kiev' did not always inform them when and where these meetings would take place. Some groups, such as Vinnytsia, solved this problem by delegating powers to Kiev-member Ihor Dzeverin, who shared many of its views and concerns. Others, however, did not like the idea of being represented by Kiev-members very much.

Fed up with all the quarrels and the time they took up at meetings of *Mala* and *Zelena Rada* and not in need of assistance from Kiev anyway, the Ternopil oblast group - one of the biggest and strongest of the collective members of *Zelenyi Svit* - planned to leave the association in 1992. In terms of achievements, Greens in Ternopil had managed to do a lot. The Kiev organisation, however, was in the view of Ternopil *Zelenyi Svit* not very skilful. Besides, 'Kiev' had no money and expected the local groups to contribute to its budget. The whole structure of the Green Movement could, in the view of one Ternopil representative, be likened to that of the former CPSU, where local organisations were supporting the 'centre', but getting very little in return⁷³. In the end, however, Ternopil decided to stay. That did not mean that dissatisfaction was any less than before.

In 1994, West Ukrainian Greens once again threatened to leave *Zelenyi Svit*. Such an intent was voiced prior to the convening of *Zelena Rada* in May that year, by the leader of the Ivano-Frankivsk Greens, Stepaniak, who showed up in the newspaper *Zelenyi svit* informing its editorial board that unless the conflicts that proved so damaging to the association were solved, Ivano-Frankivsk oblast organisation would 'walk out'. In that case, it was likely to be followed by Lviv and Ternopil oblast organisations.

Volodymyr Hrekov⁷⁴ outlined the strategy of the West Ukrainian Greens as follows: Once the announcement of Ivano-Frankivsk's intentions had been published a new Congress would have to be called. Such a move would be supported by the Volynia, Rivne, Khmelnytskyi and Cherkassy Greens, and then *Zelenyi Svit* would rid itself of the East Ukrainian Greens (i.e. the Donetsk oblast Greens), who had joined *Zelenyi Svit* at a later stage, but who demanded that people like Samiilenko, Preobrazhenska and Panov, who had been active in Kiev *Zelenyi Svit* since the very start, be excluded from the association.

Thus a conflict started to build up between local groups and 'Kiev'. Similarly, tensions surfaced between local groups: *Zelenyi Svit* was strongest in West Ukraine. In the Eastern oblast

⁷³ Interview with Andrii Hlazovyi, Kiev, 18.8.1992.

⁷⁴ Hrekov is a member of the Lviv *Zelenyi Svit* group and also a leading figure in PZU.

of Donetsk, for instance, there were two local groups (with the exception of the Committee to Save the Azov Sea, which is an all-Ukrainian association) in the spring of 1994. In West Ukraine, on the other hand, Galicia (Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Ternopil oblasts) and Zakarpattia there were 1,000 Greens altogether. Ternopil oblast alone had almost 40 groups with 370 members.

On numerous occasions during the spring of 1994, members of the latter and also Kiev Greens supporting *PZU*, would criticise Bagin from Horlivka *Zelenyi Svit* for not doing enough to facilitate the emergence of new and the expansion of already existing branches of *Zelenyi Svit* in the oblast. Hrekov, for instance, argued that (Bagin) the Donetsk Greens allowed the Communists to win the elections (parliamentary elections) and that they were not 'Green'.⁷⁵ Iryna Haniukova (Kiev) was appalled at what she saw as 'favouritism' towards the Donetsk Greens when five computers were being allocated to local groups to create and equip five regional offices of *Zelenyi Svit*. She claimed that although there were only 20 members of *Zelenyi Svit* throughout Donetsk oblast it was still given a computer, whereas the Lviv oblast organisation, which counted 860 members, got none. Haniukova also found it strange that there were so few members of the Green Movement in Donetsk oblast given that the ecological situation there was far worse than in Lviv oblast.⁷⁶

Bagin tried to answer Haniukova's question at the meeting of *Zelena Rada* in Kiev in late May 1994: Two or three years ago there were 10 local groups of *Zelenyi Svit* in Donetsk oblast. Now, however, only three groups remained. Two local groups in Makiev and Donetsk city were in the process of being established, but expanding the Green Movement proved very difficult. An important reason for the decline, he argued, was the general economic situation in the oblast. Most of the factories were idle and the workers were sent on unpaid leave. The Green Movement in Donetsk oblast was more practically oriented than in many other parts of Ukraine - operating at factories with concrete problems. Now they were being met with the following argument: (Since the factories were standing idle) 'Here everything is clean. There is nothing to do'. They were also told that the Greens were a nuisance. The miners' problems, the lack of funds, etc. were looked upon as far more important by the local population. The Donetsk organisation therefore needed assistance from *Zelenyi Svit* in Kiev to address a number of issues in the oblast that needed to be solved urgently, such as the Shevchenko Mercury Combine⁷⁷ and others. The combine was not only a local problem and not even only a Ukrainian problem - the Russian authorities had made contact with the Ukrainian government requesting that something be done to reduce

⁷⁵ Interview with Volodymyr Hrekov, Kiev, 24.4.1994.

⁷⁶ Interview with Iryna Haniukova, Kiev, 30.5.1994.

⁷⁷ Mercury was being removed from surface pits (i.e. not closed pits underground). Thus soil over a large area needed to be recultivated. Emissions containing 10-15 times maximum permissible levels were also contaminating the air over a large territory.

emissions from the combine. The Donetsk Greens wanted to develop an ecological programme for the combine, but did not itself have all the necessary resources for it⁷⁸.

Tensions between 'Kiev' and the regions intensified following the Third Congress. A good example is a regular meeting of *Mala Rada*, which took place on 4 May 1994 in Kiev. The issue of the local elections came up and there was much talk about which candidates *Zelenyi Svit* would support in Kiev. This did not go down well with Mykola Korobko, *Zelenyi Svit*'s chairman: 'Now we are talking about whom to support/not support in Kiev. But what about for instance Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv?' Moreover, was it really the prerogative of *Mala Rada* to discuss these issues - was it not up to *Zelena Rada* to determine the association's position as an all-Ukrainian organisation? Finally, Korobko urged *Mala Rada* to not only discuss things that were being done in Kiev. Priority should be given to the spreading of information and co-ordination between local groups. *Zelenyi Svit* had an average of three to four local groups per oblast and it was important that these be properly included in the association's activities⁷⁹.

The meeting ended, however, with a veritable clash between Haniukova (Kiev) and Bagin (Donetsk), in which the former refused to speak to the latter unless he spoke in Ukrainian, which, she reminded him, was the official language of Ukraine. Emotions were running high and there was also a sharp exchange of words between Preobrazhenska (Kiev) and Zolotukhin (Nikolaev). At the end, everyone was shouting or arguing with everyone, and the issues on the agenda seemed to be completely forgotten. It was a sad sight, illustrating to the full how *Zelenyi Svit* was destroying itself from within by falling prey to personal conflicts, rooted in regional and political differences.

To gain a clearer picture of relations between 'Kiev' and the regions I asked my respondents what actions they had undertaken jointly with 'Kiev', what kind of assistance they had received from the Green Office at Podil and how they thought the Green Office could be made more efficient.

With regard to joint actions, the Ternopil oblast group had co-operated with 'Kiev' while protesting the planned expansion of Khmelnytskyi nuclear power station in Netishyn and had also received assistance in the picketing of the Pristrialivsk radar station. Similarly, the Mukachevo Greens co-operated with Kiev on the RLS as well as on the military airport by Mukachevo. The Bukovina Greens received assistance in the organising of meetings, trips and marches and in writing letters in protest about incidents of alopecia among children thought to be a result of thallium poisoning. In Vinnytsia, Kiev assisted in the planting of trees in protected river zones and also helped organise a scientific-practical conference on problems related to the South Bug

⁷⁸ Own notes from *Zelena Rada*, Kiev, 28-29 May 1994.

⁷⁹ Own notes from *Mala Rada*, Kiev, 4.5.1994.

river. Nikolaev had co-operated with Kiev on the Chernobyl days, Earth Day and other manifestations, as well as in the organising of meetings and pickets. The Kherson Greens, on the other hand, said they had only been given 'good advice', but no practical help. Horlivka had so far received no assistance whatsoever, whereas the Mariupol Greens stated bluntly that 'Kiev' was not really interested in local problems: "'Kiev", in our opinion, only took an interest in Chernobyl, and did not wish to see anything else'.

As for practical and technical assistance, only Uman *Zelenyi Svit* claimed to have received none. The Ternopil Greens had received an old computer and a printer, which it proved difficult to use under existing conditions. A former employee of *Zelenyi Svit*, Iurii Mishchenko, had been helpful more generally and assistance was also given through personal contacts. Pickets organised by the Greens in Mukachevo were in some cases reinforced by activists sent from Kiev. Moreover, Iurii Shcherbak had raised the issue of the Pistrilivska RLS at the USSR Supreme Soviet, for which the local Greens were grateful. Bukovina *Zelenyi Svit*, without specifying exactly how, claimed to receive assistance rather frequently, particularly as of more recently. In Dnipropetrovsk Greens received information about conferences and other events, but on a somewhat irregular basis. Humanitarian aid in the form of vitamins had been distributed in the oblast by *Zelenyi Svit* via the oblast organisations. Finally, support had been rendered in obtaining a computer and a dictaphone through the Soros Fund in Kiev. Horlivka *Zelenyi Svit* had on a number of occasions turned to Kiev for assistance, but although its requests were not turned down, the organisation received no help either. Under the directorship of Serhii Fedorinchyk, a photocopy machine had been provided. Lutsk *Zelenyi Svit* received humanitarian aid, but nothing more. Vinnytsia oblast *Zelenyi Svit* received financial support to plant trees within the framework of a campaign organised under the auspices of the Ukrainian Ecocentre labelled 'Ukraine's Green Nimbus' (*Zelenyi nimb Ukrainy*). The Nikolaev Greens until 1994 got virtually no help. Recently, a computer and a dictaphone were provided. The Uman Greens received no help from Kiev, whereas the Mariupol Greens claimed to have turned to *Zelenyi Svit* with suggestions for joint action, to which they never even got a reply. In Odessa the Greens received moral support, but no material assistance was ever rendered.

The result came out somewhat differently when the Greens polled were asked to indicate on a fixed form exactly what assistance they had received from the Green Office in Podil:

Table 4.16 Assistance from Zelenyi Svit's Kiev Office

Group	access to info	connections to other organisations	advice	equipment/ access to equipment	office support	financial assistance	lobbying	no assistance at all
Ternopil obl. ZS								X
Mukachevo ZS								X
Bukovina ZS	X		X	X				
Dnipropetrovsk obl. ZS	X	X		X				
Horlivka ZS		X		X				
Lutsk ZS								X
Mariupol Greens								X
Vinnitsia obl. ZS	X	X		X		X	X	
Uman ZS								X (not needed so far)
Nikolaev obl. ZS	X	X		X				
Dzharylgach Ecocentre			X					
Odessa Greens	X	X	X				X	

A majority of the local organisations polled received assistance from Kiev in the form of access to information, help to establish connections with other organisations, advice and access to equipment. Only Vinnitsia oblast *Zelenyi Svit* claimed to have received financial support and help in lobbying through 'Kiev'. This is an interesting result in that I would expect 'Kiev' to lobby not only national, but also local and regional issues with the Ukrainian parliament and various ministries and departments in the Ukrainian capital (and prior to the collapse of the USSR, also in Moscow).

Although many local Green groups were pre-occupied with problems that did not carry national significance, others tried to fight enterprises, nuclear power stations and other issues of a national or even Soviet significance: In Mukachevo and Bukovina the Greens attacked the military (i.e. the Soviet Army) and in Nikolaev the Greens conducted a successful campaign against further expansion of the South Ukrainian nuclear power station. People locally, however, were resourceful and conducted their own campaigns at several administrative levels at the same time. Thus it might also have been a case of local/regional organisations not requesting such assistance in the first place (see Chapters Six and Seven).

Although some assistance had been provided, none of those organisations polled were satisfied with the way in which the Green Office in Kiev was run. I therefore asked how the office could be improved and got the following answers:

Table 4.17 How to Improve Zelenyi Svit's Kiev Office

Group	Better contacts with local org.	More personnel	More equipment	More money	Other
Ternopil obl. ZS	X	X		X	
Mukachevo ZS	X			X	change leader and executive director
Bukovina ZS	X		X		
Dnipropetrovsk obl. ZS	X				The Kiev 'board' must serve the org., not run it.
Horlivka ZS			X	X	we also need well equipped regional centres
Lutsk ZS	X	X	X	X	
Mariupol Greens	X				
Vinnitsia obl. ZS	X			X	more 'even' work of office.
Uman ZS					better qualified staff
Nikolaev obl. ZS	X		X	X	
Dzharylgach					less 'civil war'
Ekocentre	X				
Odessa Greens	X		X	X	must earmark funds and find the best group of executives

Thus, as seen from the table, although the lack of equipment and financial resources constituted a major problem for *Zelenyi Svit*, Greens considered the poor relationship between the central and local/regional organisations more harmful to the association as such. This relationship would determine the 'workability' of the Green Movement and upon this relationship rested the issue of whether or not the movement would survive in its present form. To find out what was local groups' position on the matter, I asked the respondents if they preferred a vertical or horizontal organisational structure and obtained the following result:

Table 4.18 *Desired Organisational Structure, Zelenyi Svit*

Group	Vertical	Horizontal
Ternopil obl. ZS		X
Mukachevo ZS		X
Bukovina ZS		
Dnipropetrovsk obl. ZS		X
Horlivka ZS		X
Lutsk ZS		X
Mariupol ZS		X
Vinnysia obl. ZS		X
Uman ZS		X
Nikolaev obl. ZS	X	
Dzharylgach	X	X
Ecocentre		X
Odessa Greens	X	X

Most of the respondents qualified their answers. The Ternopil Greens justified a horizontal structure pleading adherence to a key principle of the international Green movement, namely to 'act locally, think globally'. Moreover, nobody knew better than the locals which problems were most important and which methods were required to solve them. Dnipropetrovsk *Zelenyi Svit* opposed a vertical structure on the grounds that it tended to produce administrators, who more than anything tried to gain power over others. However, good coordination between the local groups was definitely needed.

In Vinnysia, Greens favoured a horizontal structure as it allowed for initiative, as well as better take into account natural and other particular features of each region. However, most of the regional groups were not ready to make direct contact with the International Green Movement and had limited access to communications and information. A centre of some kind was therefore required. Even more importantly, a horizontal structure helped overcome the stereotypes of imperial thinking and the syndrome of 'provinces'. Finally, a horizontal structure was preferred by the Bukovina Greens as it would allow regional organisations to help each other directly, without having to go via Kiev to facilitate such links.

The Odessa Greens favoured a two-tier structure, in which relations between Kiev and the oblasts were organised vertically, whereas local and regional groups were linked horizontally. A similar attitude was predominant in Kherson oblast and also in Horlivka. The latter argued that there was a need for a unified centre, through which work could be conducted more efficiently on inter-regional and all-Ukrainian environmental problems. Kherson wanted a centre, but in the form of a co-ordinator, which could give consultations, moral support, facilitate access to lab facilities and interpretation of data and expert assessments. The Ecocentre also thought there was a need for a co-ordinator at national level. Only one group; that of Nikolaev oblast, preferred a vertical structure, but claimed that attempts at creating an efficient vertical structure within *Zelenyi*

Svit were being obstructed by *PZU* representatives, backed up by the Ukrainian authorities. A strong centre was needed 'like air' to withstand the 'dictatorship of the executive'.

A reason for wanting a tight organisational structure may have been rooted in poor communication facilities and peculiarities specific to the Post-Soviet Union. Besides, organisations and political parties with a tight organisational structure were better capable of dealing with opposition within their structures, thus allowing them to operate more efficiently. It may very well be that Zolotukhin's position reflected growing frustration with in-fighting and conflicts in *Zelenyi Svit* rather than a wish to be controlled and told what to do by Kiev, then as will be seen in the case study, Nikolaev oblast conducted a successful campaign against expansion of the South Ukrainian Energy Complex without any assistance from Kiev.

As for *Zelenyi Svit*'s present structure opinions were divided:

Table 4.19 Assessment of Present *Zelenyi Svit* Structure

Group	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory
Ternopil obl. ZS	X	
Mukachevo ZS		X
Bukovina ZS	X	
Dnipropetrovsk obl. ZS		X
Horlivka ZS	X	
Lutsk ZS		X
Mariupol Greens		X
Vinnytsia obl. ZS	X	
Uman ZS	X	
Nikolaev obl. ZS		X
Dzharylgach		X
Ecocentre		
Odessa Greens	X	

Tverdostup of the Ternopil Greens said he was satisfied with *Zelenyi Svit*'s structure, holding the view that it had emerged and developed historically. However, more decentralisation was required, then one should act on the principle 'when there is a problem there is also a (local) group to solve it'. The Greens in Bukovina were also happy with the current state of affairs. The only drawback was that *Zelenyi Svit* was suffering from a lack of discipline. Greens in Vinnytsia and Odessa were also predominantly satisfied.

Others, like the Greens in Mukachevo, held a different opinion. In their view *Zelenyi Svit* was not productive as a movement as it had no real leader (Korobko was considered too weak for the job). In Dnipropetrovsk there was dissatisfaction that so much depended on who was in charge in 'Kiev' (i.e. the office at Podil). Greens from Lutsk did not like the lack of agreement and ambitions, which in turn resulted in the settling of accounts between members of the association. Zolotukhin (Nikolaev) was unhappy about the composition of *Zelena Rada*, calling for barring any

member of a political party be it *PZU* or any other from its ranks so as to avoid it being turned into an organ for empty political struggle. Finally, neither the Kherson Greens were very happy with the existing structure - but not so much because it was wrong per se; rather the chronic lack of funding, which again made travelling difficult, was to blame.

4.3.2 The Fifth Congresses (December 1994)

Personal disagreements and conflicts in *Zelenyi Svit* were highly visible at the May 1994 meeting of *Zelena Rada*. The meeting had to appoint the executive director of the Green office in Podil and there were two candidates - Serhiy Fedorinchyk, who was already holding this post, and Ihor Kirilchuk, a centrist, whose aim was to build bridges between the various factions of the Green Movement and try to unite them behind concrete plans and actions. As seen above, Fedorinchyk held the support of a number of regional groups (e.g. Donetsk, Nikolaev and Netishyn). He was also supported by people positive to RUKH and those sceptical to the Green Party.

Kirilchuk, on the other hand, as leader of the Youth Wing of *Zelenyi Svit* was supported by younger members of the association, who felt that bickering and quarrelling between older members of *Zelenyi Svit* was preventing the organisation from functioning properly. He also had the backing of Greens who felt the movement had to freshen up its image in order to attract young people to the movement. Although not a member of *PZU*, Kirilchuk was well-liked by most *PZU* supporters within *Zelenyi Svit*. He had also established links with *EkoMisiia* - a loose horizontal network of small and specialised Green groups, primarily from Kiev, and set up by people who had earlier left *Zelenyi Svit*, disillusioned with what they perceived as its increasing bureaucratisation and stagnation. Finally, Kirilchuk had the support of a group of Greens who were sceptical to Fedorinchyk due to what they referred to as his bad temper.

Korobko was on good terms with Kirilchuk - the latter spent much time working in the Green Office together with Fedorinchyk, whom he respected although he did not share his dislike for *PZU* - but Fedorinchyk was Korobko's protégé. The two groups mobilised as many members as possible prior to *Zelena Rada*'s meeting in Kiev and intense lobbying took place in the meeting hall prior to the convening of a special commission to appoint the new director. It was a close race, but in the end Korobko and Fedorinchyk's group was defeated.

Following this appointment, the conflict between the two groupings intensified. Attempts at trying to reconcile the various currents in the movement failed and in December 1994 two Congresses took place - one in Kiev, which was attended by representatives of three quarters of the *Zelenyi Svit* members, and one in Donetsk (attended by one third). The latter was attended by the grouping favourable to Korobko and Fedorinchyk. Formally, the Kiev Congress was called in

order to re-elect the representative organs of *Zelenyi Svit*. The leadership issue had long been discussed by local chapters of *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU* supporters in the aftermath of the Fourth Congress, still held the view that Korobko had not been properly elected due to the lack of a quorum during the vote. Another issue of dispute concerned the collective property of the association and the lack of ability of certain leaders to master complicated processes within the Green Movement, thus blocking its further development⁸⁰.

The Congress eventually took place in Kiev on 3-4 December 1994 despite the protestations of members of the leadership of the association (as seen above, it was decided that every two congresses be held locally and not in Kiev). Altogether 134 delegates attended the Congress from all oblasts except Sumy, Luhansk and Nikolaev. The Luhansk chapter of *Zelenyi Svit* had dissolved itself prior to the Congress - a new green group emerged on its base. The Sumy group had withered away, whereas *Zelenyi Mir* of Nikolaev failed to attend in protest with what was thought to be an illegitimate Congress, staged by *PZU* activists to take control over the Green Movement. There were sharp discussions regarding the future of *Zelenyi Svit* rooted in different understandings among the delegates as to how best to solve the ecological problems in Ukraine. Despite this, however, the delegates were united on the need to take firm action so as to protect the Ukrainian environment. This was reflected in the slogan of the Congress: 'A Green Light for the President's Reforms'.

The Congress was very much dominated by members and supporters of *PZU*. Not surprisingly, therefore, Iurii Samiilenko was elected chairman of *Zelenyi Svit*. A total of six deputy leaders (compared to the previous four), each with certain responsibilities were also elected: Viktor Khazan from Dnipropetrovsk was elected First Deputy Chairman and co-ordinator for East Ukraine (Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Crimea and Sevastopol). Hryhoriy Honcharenko was put in charge of the Northern regions (Kiev, Zhitomyr, Chernihiv, Sumy, Poltava and Kharkiv oblasts), Oleh Sydorkin was responsible for the Central Region (Cherkassy, Vinnytsia, Kirovohrad, Odessa, Nikolaev and Kherson oblasts), Mykola Symus was put in charge of the Western regions (Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Zakarpatia and Lviv oblasts), whereas Tetiana Matiunina was to keep an eye on the Podil-Dnistrovskii regions (Volynia, Rivne, Khmelnytskyi and Ternopil oblasts). Iryna Haniukova was to take care of organisational and administrative matters. Finally, Oleh Listopad, a journalist of *Zelenyi Svit* would take care of work with youth. *Mala Rada* was streamlined and would in the future be composed of the Chairman, deputy chairmen and leaders of 20 commissions also appointed by the Congress. *Mala Rada* would - unlike what had been the case in the past - be an executive organ that would

⁸⁰ *ЕКОЛОГІЯ І ЗДОРОВ'Я*, no. 30-31, 1995, с. 1.

implement decisions and policies as laid out by the Congress and *Zelena Rada*. *Zelena Rada*, or *Velika Rada*, as it was also called, was to be made up by *Mala Rada*, representatives of all oblast organisations and collective members of *Zelenyi Svit*⁸¹.

As a majority of the commission leaders were from Kiev, Kiev thus had a majority of the members of *Mala Rada*. This was no doubt practical from an operational point of view, in that experience showed that representatives from the regions failed to attend its meetings on a regular basis due to the travelling involved as these meetings took place in Kiev every week (or two weeks). Thus, a larger number of people would be likely to show up and decisions easier be made with a quorum. On the other hand, should *Mala Rada* continue to function not only as an implementing but also as a decision-making body, the view that Kiev was trying to control the movement at the expense of regional groups may well arise again. A number of commissions were set up⁸². Three of these (Commission on Health, Ethics and the Analytical Commission) were headed by women - two from Kiev and one from Vinnytsia⁸³.

The Congress also passed several resolutions, the most interesting of which was the one on the non-political status of *Zelenyi Svit* and on the Construction of the Oil Terminal by Odessa. The first made it clear that being politically independent, *Zelenyi Svit* would cooperate with political parties and organisations on environmental issues. However, it would not join any political blocs or associations with a non-ecological profile:

Про незалежний статус "Зеленого Світу": Будучи незалежним неполітичним неурядовим об'єднанням громадських екологічних організацій, "Зелений Світ" (Українська екологічна асоціація) є відкритою до співпраці з усіх напрямків своєї діяльності з політичними партіями та іншими організаціями, які небайдужі до подолання екологічної кризи в Україні. УЕА "ЗС" утримується від вступу до будь-яких об'єднань і блоків неекологічного спрямування.

It is significant that *Zelenyi Svit* publicly declared its willingness to cooperate with political parties whose aims in the sphere of the environment coincided with those of the movement. The implication of this statement, was that it indirectly legitimised a close relationship between *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU*. Similarly, the resolution could be used by *PZU* activists within the movement to try to break the affiliations between *RUKH* and *Zelenyi Svit* as it could well be argued that whereas

⁸¹ *Зелений світ*, no. 2, 1995, c. 2.

⁸² Commissions were established on the Protection and Rational Use of Land, on Water, Forests, Nature Preserves, Scientific Problems and Independent Ecological Expert Assessments, Health, Monitoring, Ecological Education, Legal Issues, Analytical Issues, Anti-Military Issues, Anti-Nuclear Issues, Chernobyl, Mass Media, Information, Youth, Energy, Ecological Enterprises, Market Reform and Ethical Questions.

⁸³ *Зелений світ*, no. 3, 1995, c. 2.

PZU was primarily an environmental party, the same could not be said of *RUKH*. This statement could not have been passed so easily had the supporters of Korobko, who also happened to be highly sceptical of *PZU*, been present at the Congress.

A resolution on the Construction of the Oil Terminal by Odessa, was by some members of *Zelenyi Svit* interpreted as a sign of the Movement moving away from being a purely environmental organisation to becoming increasingly politicised. The Resolution argued that construction was possible as long as international norms and regulations for oil terminals were being observed. However, the Greens in Odessa had put up a vigorous fight against this terminal on the grounds that it would be harmful to the environment. When *Verkhovna Rada* eventually sanctioned the terminal, it did so arguing that Ukraine needed its own oil terminal so as to break its dependence on Russia for fuel - in other words to achieve real Ukrainian independence. Thus some people felt that *Zelenyi Svit* had betrayed its very own purpose - that the environment stood above both politics and the economy.

Survival was still high on the Green Movement's priority list: A resolution 'On the Adaptation and Survival of the Ukrainian People in Conditions of Ecological Crisis' noted that the population growth had dropped progressively following the Chernobyl accident and that low level background radiation and food contaminated with chemicals and radioactive substances posed a real threat to the survival of the Ukrainian nation. The President and the Ukrainian Government were therefore urged to create a programme to secure that children and pregnant women be supplied with ecologically clean food and for the pharmacological industry to produce devices protecting against radiation and sorbents, that would absorb radionuclides. A priority issue for *Zelenyi Svit* would be to establish the cause of growth in mortality, illness and birth figures and to solve problems regarding drinking water and environmentally clean food products for children and women throughout Ukraine. In this connection, *Zelenyi Svit* endorsed a programme for the 'Adaptation of the Ukrainian People to Conditions of Ecological Crisis', developed by the Institute of Medical Ecology (Dnipropetrovsk State University).

The Congress also expressed concern that land privatisation was as a rule conducted without taking into account environmental concerns and disregarding the historical and cultural significance of the land in question. It therefore requested that measures be taken to protect the national heritage of Ukraine during privatisation. Finally, it was acknowledged that communication between 'Kiev' and local branches of *Zelenyi Svit* was poor. There was also a lack of regular information on the activities of local and regional groups. To improve this state of affairs, it was proposed that regional groups once every six months and local organisations no less than once a year make reports on their activities available to the elected organs of the association

as well as to the newspaper *Zelenyi Svit* and the media more generally. The overall goal of *Zelenyi Svit* was to activate the ecological and the anti-nuclear movements in Ukraine⁸⁴.

The delegates of the Fifth Congress expressed high hopes for *Zelenyi Svit* in the future:

Члени "ЗС" сподіваються, що V з'їзд асоціації консолідує їх зусилля і відкриє реальний шлях для впливу на екологічну свідомість народу України, а відтак - і на стан її довкілля.⁸⁵

However, this hope was crushed shortly afterwards, when the remaining one third of *Zelenyi Svit* convened an alternative Fifth Congress in Donetsk. Little is known about the Congress in Donetsk other than that it re-elected Mykola Korobko as Chairman of the association. As pointed out by Dzeverin two competing organisations both claiming the name and the property of *Zelenyi Svit* thus existed side by side after the alternative Fifth Congress. And just like he predicted, both organisations would in the foreseeable future spend all their efforts trying to gain control over the property, stamp and other attributes of the Green Movement⁸⁶. According to Dzeverin, the 'Kiev' group was formally in the right, but mistakes had been made on both sides. Anatolii Zolotukhin, on the other hand, claimed that 'Kiev' was in the wrong. By early March those who attended the Donetsk Congress had sent a letter backed up by 70 documents, which allegedly gave evidence to 'the criminally punishable actions' of the *PZU* leadership. Although the authorities were on *PZU*'s side, the Donetsk Congress would get out of this situation with dignity, as the truth was on its side⁸⁷.

It has proved difficult to get the full picture as to what exactly happened within *Zelenyi Svit* from May 1994 and up to the two Congresses which took place in December the same year. It does appear that the key issue of dispute was *PZU*'s influence within *Zelenyi Svit* and what should be the relationship between the Green Movement and the Party in the future. Korobko and those people supporting him, were negative to *PZU*. The *PZU* activists within *Zelenyi Svit*, on the other hand, were very much opposed to *RUKH*, of which Korobko had been a member until it transformed itself into a political party and which Fedorinchuk supported. To some extent it is therefore correct to say that a struggle was taking place between *PZU* and *RUKH* supporters in coalition with independents and those opposed to *PZU* on principle, for the upper hand in the Green Movement. The level of strength between those supportive of and those negative towards

⁸⁴ *Зелений світ*, no. 2, 1995, с. 2.

⁸⁵ *Екологія и здоров'я*, no. 30-31, 1995, с. 1.

⁸⁶ Letter from Ihor Dzeverin, dated Kiev, 15.1.1995.

⁸⁷ Letter from Anatolii Zolotukhin, 15.3.1995.

the Green Party was reflected in the level of attendance at the two Congresses. As seen above, three quarters attended the former, whereas one third attended the latter.

The fact that a minority broke with 'Kiev' and arranged its own Congress may be taken as an indication that *Zelenyi Svit* as an organisation will consolidate itself and emerge strengthened and united from the 'ordeal'. Anatolii Panov, for instance, claimed that the situation within *Zelenyi Svit* had somewhat improved following the Kiev Congress:

...Избавились от некоторых людей, что мешали нормально работать. Таких, как С. Федоринчик, П. Коробко и других. Избрали, наконец, Юру Самойленко председателем, а директором остался Игорь Кирильчук. Работа стала более конкретной, но все равно нелегко. Нет денег, нечего содержать офис. Правда, Федоринчик не успокоился и намеренается доказать, что наш съезд был неправомочный. Он в свою очередь с Коробко провел другой съезд в Донецке, и обратился в Министерство юстиции, чтобы доказать его правомочность. Так что наличие раскола, как это случилось с Рухом и с Республиканской партией (УРП)...

Still Panov held the view that 'Kiev' had acted properly in that it had 'freed' itself of what he referred to as 'several demagogues and slaves to routine' like Korobko. Panov never considered Korobko to be 'Green' and he argued that Korobko - since he failed to be re-elected to *Verkhovna Rada* was simply clinging on to *Zelenyi Svit* for personal reasons. He had also managed to get a foot inside the leadership of *Demokratychna Ukraina* - an organisation dominated by *RUKH*-members and supporters. In the same way as Korobko had destroyed *Zelenyi Svit*, he would damage *Demokratychna Ukraina*. Panov did, however, express regret that Fedorinchyk and Zolotukhin had broken with the Movement. Fedorinchyk had been a member of *Zelenyi Svit* from the very beginning and Zolotukhin had done much for the movement. However, Fedorinchyk supported *RUKH* and as the Green Movement had its own ideology, *Zelenyi Svit* should side with neither the 'national-democrats' nor with the 'communists/socialists'. The overall effect for the Movement could therefore be only positive, although a struggle with the 'break-away Greens' was to be expected⁸⁸.

Ihor Dzeverin, considering himself a Communist, questioned *Zelenyi Svit*'s alleged non-political stand, by arguing that compared to the Donetsk Congress the one held in Kiev was highly politicised. The Donetsk Congress was less nationalistic than the Kiev Congress. As evidence, he referred to the former's resolution on the Odessa oil terminal, which in his view was motivated by

⁸⁸ Letter from Anatolii Panov, Kiev, 3.2.1995.

political rather than environmental concerns⁸⁹. Although this situation was regrettable, there was an explanation:

... Видимо, это было практически неизбежным в тех условиях, когда "зеленые" считают себя участниками националистического (так называемого, "демократического") движения, а необходимость построения институтов правового общества и обеспечения гарантий плюрализма (т.е. собственно демократические задачи) мало кого заботят.

This situation and the split which took place in *Zelenyi Svit* in December 1994 gave cause for pessimism regarding the future of the Ukrainian Green Movement:

Боюсь, что начинается очень скучный период в истории ЗС. Прежде всего, потому, что экологические приоритеты теперь явно уйдут на второй или третий план. Я имею в виду не то, что ЗС не будет заниматься охраной природы, эта работа, возможно, даже интенсифицируется, учитывая бесспорные деловые качества новых лидеров). Просто вопросы о том, какие шаги предпринимать, какие силы поддерживать, а какие осуждать, какие акции организовывать и т.п. будут решаться на основании не экологических, а совсем других принципов, связанных с политическими, хозяйственными и прочими расчетами.

4.4 The Future of the Green Movement

Conflicts and infighting have been a common feature to the Ukrainian Green Movement since its Second Congress in 1991. If one compares the Ukrainian Greens with for instance die Grünen in Germany or, for that matter, the French and Belgian Greens, one finds that also these movements have fallen prey to infighting and personal animosity. To some extent an explanation might be found in the traditionally loose structure of the Green Movements, which allows for diverging views to clash rather than being kept under control by a strong vertical leadership structure. The conflicts which arose in the Ukrainian Green Movement, however, were of a different character to those of the West European Greens and did much more damage than what was been the case in e.g. Germany.

A reason often given by Greens themselves is that the Green Movement emerged as one of the first independent (political) movements in Ukraine, thus bringing together people of different political views, different ages and backgrounds - who did not necessarily share a common

⁸⁹ Letter from Ihor Dzeverin, dated Kiev, 15.1.1995.

commitment to Green ideology. Whereas in the West the Greens emerged in a 'saturated' society where people had both the time and the money to take actively part in political life, in the former USSR the Green Movement emerged as a 'spontaneous' phenomenon. Green ideology was not a central and uniting element. In Ukraine it might be more correct to refer to the Greens as a 'partisan Green movement': In the East, for instance, people are not 'Green' by nature. But rather as their children are dying of pollution they have no other alternative. Being Green is for them a means of survival rather than a means to an end⁹⁰.

Another reason can be found in the political structure of the USSR prior to the collapse of communism. Evhen Korbetskyi has pointed out that most members of *Zelenyi Svit* suffer from a Bolshevik attitude - i.e. they were brought up to take part in a political struggle and will for that reason fight any view slightly different from their own⁹¹. Ihor Dzeverin also resorted to psychological factors: 'When people live under a totalitarian regime they become aggressive and behave like children'. This phenomenon he refers to as 'Soviet psychology'. As a result, 'we are not well-balanced and relaxed as people are in the West'.

A further complication arose due to the politicisation not only of the Green Movement as such but of Ukrainian society generally, where the extremes ruled the ground (cf. election result to *Verkhovna Rada*: communists and nationalists did well). None of these groups was likely to give in but would carry the struggle to the bitter end. As seen above, it culminated with the splitting up of *Zelenyi Svit* in December 1994.

Volodymyr Hrekov also looked to the past to explain the conflicts in *Zelenyi Svit*: People in Ukraine, he claimed, were generally good-natured, but they had not seen much good in life and all along their most important aim had been to survive. Therefore people got aggressive and vented their anger at each other. 'All the time we think who is against whom ('kto kogo') and see enemies everywhere'. Ideally, however, the Greens should be people of a high moral standing, raising themselves above such concerns⁹²: 'as long as Shcherbak was in charge of the movement conflicts were contained. Shcherbak was a great personality who succeeded in raising above petty conflicts and had the ability and the authority to control the "trouble-makers". His predecessors, on the other hand, were not people of a similar standing and with the same degree of authority'⁹³.

It was also been pointed out that ordinary people do not get involved with public movements - only 'personalities' do. Some people are slow to understand things, others pick them up easily. Some are good at talking but do little, others do the opposite. As *Zelenyi Svit* was a loose organisation it had to accommodate all these differences and a variety of political views. There

⁹⁰ Interview with Andrii Ilazovyi, Kiev, May 1994.

⁹¹ Interview with Evhen Korbetskyi, Sosnovyi Bir, 20.5.1994.

⁹² Interview with Volodymyr Hrekov, Kiev, 24.4.1994.

⁹³ Interview with Zhenia (surname not known), April 1994.

were also big differences in age and a general lack of tolerance towards others. If someone did not understand something, he/she may be labelled a fool, then contest this view ('you are such a fool'. 'What do you mean I am such a fool', etc.) and another conflict would be born. Ihor Kirilchuk has pointed out that people in the Green Movement have a very long memory; things that were said years before keep re-surfacing, leaving people as permanent enemies and unable to unite around constructive work.

Not surprisingly, there are divergent views amongst the Greens as to how best to achieve the Movement's aims. Preobrazhenska, for instance, is an emotional person who holds the opinion that nuclear power can only be fought successfully through the media. Korbetskyi, on the other hand, wants to achieve the same but works at a scientific level. The mistake of *Zelenyi Svit*, argued Kirilchuk, was that it failed to acknowledge that the best results are achieved when one works on several fronts simultaneously, not only on one: 'We need various people in order to work constructively: *RUKH* people, nationalists, West Ukrainian Greens and East Ukrainian Greens. We cannot simply exclude people because they are different'⁹⁴.

I have now looked at personal and socio-political factors explaining the conflicts within *Zelenyi Svit*. It is, however, not possible to give a full picture of the background to the infighting unless one also takes into account political allegiances and currents within the Green Movement. There are several ways in which to classify members of *Zelenyi Svit* at such a level. Put crudely, the conflicts reflect a struggle between those who do and those who do not approve of the Green Party. The former hold the view that the movement and the party should be closer knit and that the movement should be loyal to the party. The latter, among which are *RUKH* and *URP* supporters and also communists and socialists, hold the opinion that the movement should remain completely independent, thus not siding with one political party in particular.

Another cleavage can be identified between, on the one hand, the 'nationalists' and 'anti-Communists'⁹⁵ and on the other 'socialists' and 'communists'. The 'nationalists', according to Dzeverin, support the *Anti-Imperialist, Anti-Communist Front* and they are also against one-sided disarmament (i.e. nuclear disarmament with the war-heads being sent to Russia for dismantling)⁹⁶. In between these two groups are the centrists and as all three groups are of approximately the same size, it is difficult for any one of them to gain the upper hand in the movement.

⁹⁴ Interview with Ihor Kirilchuk, 12.5.1994.

⁹⁵ This distinction was made by Ihor Dzeverin, himself a communist, and sceptical of people favouring an independent Ukraine and being negative towards communism. Those people labelled 'nationalists' by the communists, object to being branded 'nationalists' as they perceive of themselves either as 'democrats' or as 'patriots', supporting a democratic and independent Ukraine.

⁹⁶ Interview with Ihor Dzeverin, April 1994.

Finally, it is possible to classify the various currents within *Zelenyi Svit* in the following way: a group of older people, referring to themselves as 'patriots' (i.e. the West is still the enemy) come together in *Zelenyi Svit* primarily to chat - whereas nominally they work for the Greens. A second group is composed of younger people from the former university *druzhyny*, the third group is composed of people supporting *PZU* and finally, there is a fourth group, gathering people who are against *PZU* - some of whom support *RUKH* or other political parties/movements.

By the end of 1994 the Ukrainian Green Movement found itself in a deep crisis and it still remains a question whether or not *Zelenyi Svit* will survive as an organisation. To find out how regional and local groups perceived the fighting within the movement, I asked in my survey if the Green Movement was in a crisis. I obtained the following result:

Table 4.20 *Is the Ukrainian Green Movement in Crisis?*

Group	In crisis	Not in crisis	Difficult to tell
Ternopil obl. ZS	X		
Mukachevo ZS			
Bukovina ZS	X		
Dnipropetrovsk obl. ZS		X	
Horlivka ZS		X	
Lutsk ZS			X
Mariupol Greens	X		
Vinnitsia obl. ZS	X		
Uman ZS			
Nikolaev obl. ZS	X		
Dzharylgach	X		
Ecocentre			X
Odessa Greens		X	

As can be seen from the table, a majority of the groups polled answered the question as to whether or not the Green Movement was in a crisis in the affirmative. And Horlivka *Zelenyi Svit* - although claiming not to be in a crisis, acknowledged that there were problems. The Dnipropetrovsk oblast branch of *Zelenyi Svit* is amongst the strongest branches of the association, having its own office and expanding its membership mass. In private, however, Viktor Khazan acknowledged that *Zelenyi Svit* was suffering from infighting and poor decision-making. Thus the Greens were aware of their problems, but disagreed on how best to solve them.

The Ternopil and Vinnitsia chapters thought the key to getting the Green Movement out of its crisis was to attract new people with new ideas to the Movement. Iavorska of the Vinnitsia organisation saw the crisis as a natural process of generation change:

Еще не ушли те лидеры, которые сформировались на волне
массовых протестов, привыкшие объединяться "против", а не вокруг

идей. Формирование в молодежном крыле группы практиков, владеющих навыками организаторов, их поддержка в регионах - начало нового этапа в работе "Зеленого Світа".

Tverdostup, the leader of Ternopil *Zelenyi Svit*, thought that the solution to the crisis was to be found in the education of activists and in bringing people with new ideas into the movement. It would also help if the Western Greens organised an aid programme to assist those Green groups still existing in Ukraine. Bukovina *Zelenyi Svit* held the view that ecological propaganda and work with school children was the best way to get through the crisis - by imbuing people with a genuine concern for and a wish to act in order to save the environment. Horlivka *Zelenyi Svit* believed in good examples, and argued that everything depended on how successful regional centres would be in implementing ecological projects as well as on Kiev's ability to provide the regional groups with the assistance they needed in order to achieve this. The Nikolaev Greens thought only permanent funding, independent of state funds, could save the Green Movement from sinking deeper into its crisis. It would also help if the Green Office was relocated from Kiev as then one would avoid all the conflicts around the Kiev office. Finally, all members of *PZU* should be taken off *Zelena Rada*. *Zelenyi Svit* could gain a lot from organising its activities along the lines of Greenpeace. Only the Mariupol Greens thought the future of the Green Movement was closely linked with that of Ukraine - arguing that Ukraine must get out of its financial crisis before the Green Movement can again prosper.

Although the Greens came up with several possible ways by which to stem up the crisis in which it found itself, this did not mean to say that they were convinced that *Zelenyi Svit* would survive the crisis. There were diverging views among members of the Ukrainian Green Movement as to what the future of the movement would hold. Sviatoslav Dudko, for instance, held the view that political movements and possibly also political parties, go through three stages: birth (rozhdzenie), maturing (zrelenie) and decay (raspad/vymiranie). *Zelenyi Svit*, in his view, had by mid-1994 entered the last stage. A similar fate may also await the Green Party. The decay started in 1990 when Shcherbak stepped down as leader of *Zelenyi Svit* and was gathered with time.

Several reasons - objective as well as subjective - can be identified as facilitating the decline of *Zelenyi Svit*. Panov explains the decline by referring to general economic factors: Due to the difficult economic situation in Ukraine people do not have the energy or the time to actively participate in public/political activities. Similarly, the Green Movement is suffering from a lack of money and from poor organisation. However, the Green Movement in the West is also not so strong. Success followed by decline might, in Panov's view, be a stage *Zelenyi Svit* has to go

through.⁹⁷ As pointed out by Iurii Mishchenko, *Zelenyi Svit* was the first informal organisation to emerge on Ukrainian soil⁹⁸. Expanding on this, Serhii Kurykin has argued that there is also a political explanation for the weakening of the Green Movement: *Zelenyi Svit* was primarily an opposition movement. Following the collapse of communism it lost its political significance as uniting the (democratic) opposition. By 1992, however, this had still not been accepted by its members. Besides, the movement had no proper apparatus, but was run rather by a mixture of functionaries and elected representatives. Due to infighting to gain access to the leadership of *Zelenyi Svit* the association had lost influence over the political process in the country and had entered a destructive stage, destroying what had been built up⁹⁹.

Hlazonyi blamed political ambition for the decline that had taken place since 1991: 'Both *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU* will fizzle out. We are faced with a cleansing of ideas. I may be too radical, but I hold the opinion that both of them (i.e. *ZS* and *PZU*) should abolish themselves. They are two monsters needed by nobody. When they emerged the social environment was unprepared. The potential of the Greens in Ukraine is enormous'. One has to be a very poor politician to 'abuse' this potential the way the Greens have done. One of the problems is that the Green Movement as well as the Green Party are seen as a favourable 'thing' - through which one can make a career, without seriously committing oneself to their ideas'. Some people, like Volodymyr Tikhyi, even questioned the ideas of the Ukrainian Green Movement, claiming that *Zelenyi Svit* had no clear programme of action.

Others, were more positive, arguing that *Zelenyi Svit* would get through the crisis: Zhenia (one of the Kiev group's young activists), for instance, argued that after Fedorinchuk took over as executive director at Podil things were happening. Whereas previously the office had been involved in disputes regarding foreign travel and equipment, Fedorinchuk had succeeded in obtaining computers through *ISAR* (and *Fond Vidrodzhennia*) to equip five regional offices. Moreover, the Green Movement was in the process of cleansing itself and would survive. Ihor Dzeverin was less optimistic, arguing that it might well be that *Zelenyi Svit* would not survive as a movement. However, the Greens would make a strong comeback once it became so dangerous to live in Ukraine that something simply had to be done to improve the state of the environment. Andrii Hlazonyi, on the other hand, argued that the future belonged to the small movements like

⁹⁷ Anatolii Panov on bus to Zakarpatia, April 1994.

⁹⁸ This description is somewhat inaccurate, as the Ukrainian Helsinki Union and several other small groups, such as the Culturological Club, were founded prior to *Zelenyi Svit*. The Green Movement, however, can be described as the first mass political movement in Ukraine (RUKH was founded the following year). For Mishchenko view, see *Zelenyi Svit*, no. 3, 1990, c. 5.

⁹⁹ Interview with Serhii Kurykin, Kiev, 1992.

MAMA-86 and the *Ecocentre*, which received material support from the West¹⁰⁰. In Hlazovyi's opinion, the only way in which the Ukrainian Greens could survive, was by receiving support from abroad. This created a certain discomfort for them as it was correct to say that the West thus effectively sets the agenda of the Ukrainian Greens (due to competition for grants). But it would take at least another four to five years before real Ukrainian sponsors would emerge.

Another problem is of course that people in Ukraine are generally sceptical of foreign organisations. *Greenpeace*, for instance, has in certain sections of Ukrainian society an 'image' as an organisation which works for foreign money. Yet other problems arise as the problems Western Greens face are so different from those of the former USSR. Hlazovyi thus found it difficult to explain to the 'West' when it wanted the Ukrainian Greens to join a campaign against an international motorway to Kiev through the Carpathes that such a campaign would stand no chance in Ukraine as people wanted good roads. It could also be argued that the old roads were bad from an ecological point of view - far worse than a new, modern motorway. Having said that, though, he argued that one must distinguish between various countries when talking about the 'West': 'The Americans do not understand the Ukrainian Greens very well. The West Europeans, on the other hand, have a far better understanding, especially the Dutch, German and Scandinavians'¹⁰¹.

Others, like Sidorkin of Uman *Zelenyi Svit* were less willing to ask money from Greens in the West, holding the view that there were ways in which the Ukrainian Greens could work and earn their own money rather than having to ask or beg for them from foreign groups. Uman *Zelenyi Svit* developed a concept for how to achieve this and got involved in so-called 'environmental enterprises'. Such fund-raising methods have, however, also been criticised from within the Green Movement.

Overall, though, *Zelenyi Svit* was positive towards Western organisations offering grants, although ideally, the sponsors should have been Ukrainian:

¹⁰⁰ This view has, needless to say, been contested by Serhii Plachynda, who holds the opinion that rather than setting up new groups, one must rather strengthen the one (i.e. *Zelenyi Svit*) that already exists.

¹⁰¹ Interview with Andrii Hlazovyi, Kiev, 30.4.1994.

Table 4.21 Attitude towards Foreign Sponsors

Group	Positive	Primarily positive, but danger that might become dependent upon them	Desirable to obtain grants from Ukrainian sponsors	Negative
Ternopil obl. ZS	X			
Mukachevo ZS				
Bukovina ZS	X			
Dnipropetrovsk obl. ZS	X			
Horlivka ZS	X	X		
Lutsk ZS	X	X		
Mariupol Greens	X			
Vinnitsia obl. ZS	X			
Uman ZS				
Nikolaev obl. ZS	X	X		
Dzarylgach	X	X		
Ecocentre	X			
Odessa Greens	X	X		

Most regional and local branches of *Zelenyi Svit* were in desperate need of some kind of funding, then activities organised to raise money by the chapters themselves were inadequate to cover costs incurred. Asked how funds were raised, the Greens replied as follows:

Table 4.22 Fund-raising

Group	Member-ship fees	Financial activities	Sale of symbols etc.	Grants	No funding available. This is a big problem.
Ternopil obl. ZS		X			
Mukachevo ZS					
Bukovina ZS	X				
Dnipropetrovsk obl. ZS				X	
Horlivka ZS				under planning (from charitable support of enterprises)	
Lutsk ZS					X
Mariupol Greens					X
Vinnitsia obl. ZS				support from local commercial structures and grants.	
Uman ZS					
Nikolaev obl. ZS					X
Dzharylgach					X
Ecocentre					X
Odessa Greens		X		X	

A majority of the groups thought they could improve their financial situation by applying for grants from international organisations and by getting involved in financial activities such as small enterprises and by identifying possible sponsors. Nikolaev oblast *Zelenyi Svit* also suggested the creation of ecological funds and of a holding-centre, through which the Green Movement benefit from the distribution of investments. The association also had its own 'know-how' on ecologically clean energy, which could be used as a source of income if only funding could be obtained for project work. Small enterprises could be created, argued Horlivka *Zelenyi Svit*, to re-use secondary raw materials.

Table 4.23 How to Improve Zelenyi Svit's Financial Situation.

Group	Grants and sponsors	Small enterprises and other financial activities	Other
Ternopil obl. ZS	X	X	
Mukachevo ZS			
Bukovina ZS			
Dnipropetrovsk obl. ZS	X		
Horlivka ZS	X	X	
Lutsk ZS			
Mariupol Greens	X		
Vinnitsia obl. ZS		X	
Uman ZS		X	
Nikolaev obl. ZS			
Dzharylgach			
Ecocentre	X		
Odessa Greens	X	X	

It seems likely that the Green groups which will survive are those that are either successful in obtaining grants and sponsor agreements with international organisations/Green groups and/or those groups which succeed in raising their own money through financial activities. One of these groups, or rather 'networks', is *EkoMisiia*.

4.4.1 *EkoMisiia*

On 20-22 May 1994 a Conference on the Problems of Co-operation and the Priorities in the Activities of Environmental NGOs took place at the sanatorium 'Sosnovyi Bir' in Kiev. The conference was initiated by *EkoMisiia* - a loose network of Ukrainian environmental groups based primarily in Kiev and was attended by 47 people, including myself, representing Greens in Kiev,

Lviv, Kharkiv, Ternopil, Dnipropetrovsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Mariupol and the Crimea¹⁰². Also the Ukrainian Ministry of Environmental Protection was present, as were representatives of *Greenpeace Ukraine*, *Milieukontakt Oosteuropa* (Holland), *BUND* and *WWF* (Germany), the *Green Federation* (Poland), *ISAR* (USA) and the Dutch Embassy in Kiev. The groups presented themselves and discussed problems arising from their work. A memorandum in which reasons why NGOs were not operating well in the current political and economic conditions as well as ways to amend this situation were laid out, was endorsed by the participants of the Conference:

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), including environmental ones, are an indivisible part of the democratic system. In today's Ukraine, however, they are unable to play their positive role to the full extent, as society has not yet been completely reformed. The lack of a legal base to regulate NGO activities, the absence of instruments, with which NGOs can exert influence on the decision making process and public ignorance on issues regarding existing ecological legislation, considerably decrease the possibilities of efficient work. The potential of the Ukrainian Green Movement cannot be fully utilised also due to the absence of sufficient means of co-operation between the respective organisations as well as the information-link between them. A considerable number of environmental NGOs does not even have the technical equipment they need to function normally. The creation of a co-ordinating body and the provision of material and technical support to facilitate fruitful co-operation, is an important means by which to preserve the environmental movement as such and also by which to facilitate its continued activation. From the viewpoint of various environmental groups the most efficient means by which to interact is a horizontal network based on the principle of parity between its members. Such a system was created with the agreement of the conference by means of extending an existing network of environmental NGOs 'EkoMisia' to the national level. Foreigners and international organisations take part in 'EkoMisia' as observers.

TV coverage of the conference was provided and *EkoMisia* was pronounced an all-Ukrainian network, which Green groups were encouraged to join. Through *EkoMisia* Greens would be able to take part in a continuous exchange of information and in the future they would gain access to a database containing information on the state of the environment in Ukraine, environmental legislation, global ecological transformations and problems regarding sustainable development. The network encouraged co-operation directly between local and regional groups and would also

¹⁰² These groups were: *EkoPravo* (Lviv, Kharkiv, Kiev), *Zelenyi Svit* (Ternopil, Kiev, Dnipropetrovsk), *Dytyna i Dovkillia* (Kiev), *MAMA-86* (Kiev), *Ekho-Vostok* (Kiev), *Ekologiya i Mir* (Crimea), *Spilka 'Vriatuvannia'* (Kiev), *Ecological Cultural Center* (Luhansk), *Tsenter z informatsionnykh problem terytorii* (Lviv), *NFM 'Ekolis'* (Kharkiv), *Ecocentre* (Kherson), *Committee to Save the Azov Sea* (Mariupol), *Aqua Vitae* (Kiev), *Medical Non-Governmental Fund 'Za radiatsiinu ta ekologichu bezpeku'* (Kiev), *PROSITA* (Kiev), *Unicorn* (Kiev), *EkoMisia* (Kiev), *Eletronna merezha dlia NUO* (Kiev), *Greenpeace-Ukraine* (Kiev).

organise seminars and conferences on relevant topics. Finally, it would facilitate lobbying on environmentally important issues at various levels and publish and distribute ecological literature and periodicals. Strategy and priority issues would be decided at regular conferences by way of consensus. In order for the network to operate as smoothly as possible, an information service would be created on the base of the environmental publishing house *Unicorn*, where Hlazovyi worked. As priority issues *EkoMisiia* identified the following: environmental enlightenment, the selection and expansion of ecologically significant information, propagating the idea of sustainable development, work against further expansion of the nuclear industry and finally, the introduction of environmentally friendly technologies in the energy sector, industry and agriculture. *EkoMisiia* was committed to non-violent methods and to the idea of peace and co-operation.

The Conference issued a resolution at the eve of the Congress, denouncing Presidential Decree No. 64 of 23 February 1994 and demand the 'closure of the Chernobyl nuclear power station'. Moreover,

Стратегія енергозабезпечення України має базуватися на
раціональному використанні і модернізації існуючих
потужностей, енергозбереженні, широкому запровадженні
технологій альтернативної енергетики.

To get an idea about how well known *EkoMisiia* was among local and regional chapters of *Zelenyi Svit* and what their attitude towards this initiative was, I included questions about the new network in the survey, which was conducted only a few days after *EkoMisiia*'s Founding Conference. The Conference received publicity through TV and newspapers and the organisers of the conference, who were former members of *Zelenyi Svit*, had invited some local and regional groups to join the network. It was therefore possible to assume that Hlazovyi's and Kurykin's intentions were known at least in certain circles within *Zelenyi Svit*. The result from the survey confirmed this:

Table 4.24 Knowledge of *EkoMisiia*

Group	Heard about <i>EkoMisiia</i>	Not heard about <i>EkoMisiia</i>
Ternopil oblast ZS	X	
Mukachevo ZS		X
Bukovina ZS	X	
Dnipropetrovsk oblast ZS	X	
Horlivka ZS	X	
Lutsk ZS		X
Mariupol Greens	X	
Vinnytsia oblast ZS	X	
Uman ZS	X	
Nikolaev oblast ZS	X	
Dzharylgach	X	
Ecocentre	X	
Odessa Greens	X	

Only two groups - Mukachevo and Lutsk - had not heard about *EkoMisiia*. Four of the respondents - Ternopil oblast, Dnipropetrovsk oblast, Mariupol and the Ecocentre - attended the Founding Conference and joined the network. I was therefore interested in finding out what attitude those groups that did not join *EkoMisiia* had of it: Was it considered a competitor or were they positively inclined towards the new initiative? As the table below shows, the response was largely positive - none of the respondents expressed disapproval of *EkoMisiia*:

Table 4.25 Attitudes towards *EkoMisiia*

Group	Positive	Neutral	Negative
Ternopil oblast ZS	X		
Mukachevo ZS			
Bukovina ZS	X		
Dnipropetrovsk oblast ZS	X		
Horlivka ZS	X		
Lutsk ZS			
Mariupol Greens	X		
Vinnytsia oblast ZS		X	
Uman ZS		X	
Nikolaev oblast ZS	X		
Dzharylgach	X		
Ecocentre	X		
Odessa Greens	X		

Thus, should the majority and minority *Zelenyi Svit* fail to reach some agreement regarding the association's name, office, stamp, bank account etc. it may be an option for local groups frustrated with the situation to either leave *Zelenyi Svit* altogether and join up with *EkoMisiia* or to establish some form of contact with groups working within this network. In December 1994 when research for this thesis was completed, the majority of *EkoMisiia*'s members were Kiev

organisations. Some local groups - with numerous clashes between Kiev and the districts within *Zelenyi Svit* fresh in mind - may for this reason be sceptical to the network. Others might not like the fact that Serhii Kurykin, deputy leader of PZU, initiated *EkoMisiia* together with another veteran of the Ukrainian Green Movement, Andrii Hlazovyi. However, *EkoMisiia* has already established itself as a serious network, setting up communications in the form of access to email and the Internet for local organisations and facilitating contacts with international sponsors and similar organisations abroad. If *EkoMisiia* succeeds in uniting a majority of local and regional groups throughout Ukraine and if infighting can be avoided, it might prove to be the 'life jacket' the Greens in Ukraine need right now - to help them through the current political and economic crisis in the country.

As for the Greens themselves, opinions are divided on the potential of *EkoMisiia* and of the relatively small and specialised groups it unites. Ihor Kirilchuk, for instance, holds the view that *EkoMisiia* does not share *Zelenyi Svit*'s difficulties in making decisions. As it unites and has the support of small groups, composed of people with shared views, members and participants are interested in constructive work, not in quarrels and infighting. *EkoMisiia* can also draw on its own Ecocentre and publishing house.

Ihor Dzeverin, on the other hand, was more reserved in passing predictions: As *EkoMisiia* and many of the groups that have joined the network were founded primarily by people who left *Zelenyi Svit* due to conflicts, they are likely to after some time become victims of such conflicts. Therefore the network will remain small and relatively unknown. When asked if the fact that these groups are relatively well off financially due to their international contacts and possibly so content that conflicts may not necessarily arise, Dzeverin replied that this is of course possible. But on the other hand, the 'nationalists' are not happy about receiving funding from abroad, and this may cause conflict in the future. In terms of funding, though, the Greens may not have any real alternative - at least in Hlazovyi's view: 'We cannot survive without assistance from abroad. We need money and equipment and we do not have a properly developed network - it is easier for the Dutch, for instance, to spread our information. It is the groups with international contacts that survive' and it is these groups that *EkoMisiia* unites. *MAMA-86*, for instance, received advanced equipment to measure radioactivity from abroad. Its readings are so accurate that *Minzdrav* (Ukrainian Ministry of Health) requests information from the organisation. The image this has earned the group as a credible source of information has opened doors to the media and to the political decision makers.

As for relations to *Zelenyi Svit*, Hlazovyi maintained that *EkoMisiia* wants to be a 'philosophical alternative' to *Zelenyi Svit*, not a competitor trying to replace it. Many local and regional chapters of *Zelenyi Svit* which have left it have kept the name as it is well-known

throughout Ukraine. Some of the strongest chapters of *Zelenyi Svit* from Lviv (Tovarystvo Leva - alternative energy), Vinnytsia (eco-education), Bukovina (small rivers), and Kiev (the Youth League) have joined *EkoMisiia* as have the ecological publishing house *Unicorn* and a group of environmental lawyers (*Ekojuristy*). Meetings take place in Kiev once a week and if the topics to be discussed interest people then they will turn up. Funding is provided by *Milieucontact Oosteuropa*.

In Hlazonyi's view it is often the ones who organise contacts with abroad and do something concrete who are being criticised for it. Others do nothing but create discord and scandals: 'now we have several organisations working on specific problems. We are moving away from a model with co-ordination. If someone gets a salary from an organisation in our country, they automatically think they have the right to control everyone and everybody. We think that is wrong. A loose structure is much better. Korbetskyi tried to modernise and reform *Zelenyi Svit* from within but he failed. We created *EkoMisiia* after the Fourth Congress as we realised that *Zelenyi Svit* was unable to do anything. Those left in *Zelenyi Svit* as of today are not capable of doing much'.

Others were more restrained in their assessment of *EkoMisiia*. Oleksii Kabyka of *Greenpeace Ukraine* and a former member of *Zelenyi Svit*, holds the view that while many of the new movements do their work - Hlazonyi, for instance, through *Unicorn* prints and distributes 500 copies of *WISE*¹⁰³ - their influence is still limited. Other groups, like *ProSvita* and *MAMA-86* he was less familiar with. However, in order to have influence and be efficient there must be more of these groups. If there were 1,000 of them throughout Ukraine, then it would be possible to talk about real influence. If there is only a hand-full, it is a weak movement. Kabyka thinks it unlikely that *EkoMisiia* will strengthen the Green Movement as such - at least in the short term - arguing that the first signs of centralisation have occurred also within the network ('Kiev' trying to take control). It is, however, this network international organisations have chosen to cooperate with - it was not a coincidence that *Milieucontact Oosteuropa*, *ISAR*, *BUND* and *WWF* attended its founding conference, which, by the way was also attended by *Greenpeace Ukraine*.

In terms of grants, grass root organisations which are members of *EkoMisiia* seem more likely to obtain access to these than do local branches of *Zelenyi Svit*. There are a number of reasons for this.

Firstly, Andrii Hlazonyi and Serhii Kurykin, at whose initiative *EkoMisiia*¹⁰⁴ was set up and later expanded from a Kiev-based to an all-Ukrainian network, both have established close links with several foreign organisations (such as *ISAR*, *Milieucontact Oosteuropa*, *BUND* and *WWF*).

¹⁰³ A newsletter on the environment issued by *Milieucontact Oosteuropa* and other green groups.

¹⁰⁴ See section below.

Moreover, *EkoMisiia* has established contact with the International Department of the Ukrainian Ministry of the Environment, thus enabling it to further expand its international contacts. Secondly, due to the conflicts in *Zelenyi Svit* and the effect these conflicts have had on the activities of the association, Western organisations are less likely to provide the latter with grants¹⁰⁵.

Finally, communication with local and regional groups is easier through *EkoMisiia* as this network is technically much better equipped than *Zelenyi Svit*. Unless things improve internally for *Zelenyi Svit* regional and local groups will be left with the following options: Either they can join *EkoMisiia* and seek support from abroad or they can get involved in economic activities (small enterprises, funds) locally, thus becoming self-financing. A third option is to seek support in the form of grants and sponsor deals directly with international organisations. This will become easier once local groups get access to computers and email (as seen above, *Zelenyi Svit* obtained computers for five regional offices through *ISAR* and *Fond Vydrodzhennia*). The two latter options might prove the most attractive for those who organised the alternative congress of *Zelenyi Svit* in Donetsk as Kurykin (*EkoMisiia*) is deputy leader of *PZU* and they are negative to the Green Party.

4.5 Conclusion

As seen above, *Zelenyi Svit* collapsed as an all-Ukrainian association in December 1994. However, individual groups on both sides of the conflict remain relatively strong - especially the West Ukrainian groups, *Zelenyi Mir* in Nikolaev and Dnipropetrovsk *Zelenyi Svit*. It might therefore be more correct to talk about a restructuring of the Green Movement rather than about its total collapse. Still one should not underestimate the damage the Green Movement has suffered from conflicts and disagreements over the last few years. Such conflicts are sometimes associated more with personalities and generations than with issues, and might in the end topple attempts at building new structures, such as *EkoMisiia*.

Possible scenarios for the further development of the Ukrainian Green Movement are explored in Chapter Nine, suffice it here to say that the future of the Ukrainian Green Movement will depend on some compromise being reached on the relationship between party and movement and also on issues. If these hurdles can be overcome, it might once again be possible to unite Greens in Ukraine - although the approach to environmental problems will inevitably change as the economic and political situation in Ukraine at present is very different from the one in which it

¹⁰⁵ A report produced by Dag Arne Høystad for the Swedish organisation 'Försumningssekretariatet' concluded that 'starting a project under the auspices of *Zelenyi Svit*'s Kiev office cannot be recommended as it would not be possible to prevent it from being pulled into internal disagreements within the association'. Report obtained from Dag Arne Høystad on email, 5.7.1995.

emerged. Should they not be overcome, it seems likely that the Ukrainian Green Movement will remain fragmented and weak until either a serious environmental disaster once again hits the country, bringing people together through necessity, or the economic situation improves so that people will again have the time and energy to engage in environmental and political activities.

GLASGOW UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

The copyright of this thesis belongs to the author. Use made of it must be properly acknowledged, and in particular any quotation from it in published work requires the author's prior written consent.

Readers must sign their name legibly below to indicate that they accept these conditions, and must add their permanent address and the name of the institution or organisation to which they belong.

[illegible]

**The 'Greening' of Ukraine: An Assessment of the
Political Significance of the Ukrainian Green Movement**

Ase Berit Grodland

Vol. 2 (2)

Presented for the Degree of Ph.D.

**University of Glasgow
Institute of Russian and East European Studies**

July 1996

© Ase Berit Grodland

Herli
10628
Copy 2
Vol 2

UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW

THESIS ACCESS DECLARATION

Candidate's Name ÅSE BERIT GRØDELAND
(BLOCK CAPITALS)

Thesis Title THE 'GREENING' OF UKRAINE : AN ASSESSMENT OF THE
POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE UKRAINIAN GREEN MOVEMENT

I understand that in the interests of good scholarship, theses of the University are normally made freely available for consultation in the University Library, or within another Library, immediately after deposit but that a candidate may stipulate a period of either one or three years after deposit during which his or her written consent must be sought before such access is given. (A candidate is usually advised by the supervisor if commercial or patent reasons make this restriction desirable).

I therefor agree to grant access and to permit copies to be made for other libraries or individuals without my specific authorisation:

*A. Immediately on deposit OR

*B One year after deposit OR

☒ *C Three years after deposit.

I further accept that candidates who stipulate written consent but from whom no reply has been received within three months of request from the University Library posted to their last known address will be assumed to have ceded this power to the Library Committee, to be exercised in consultation with the Higher Degrees Committee of the Faculty.

Signed Åse B. Grøder

Date 19 July 1996

* PLEASE CIRCLE A OR B OR C

List of Contents

5 The Green Party of Ukraine (PZU)	443
5.0 Introduction	443
5.1 The Emergence and Development of PZU (1989-1991)	444
5.1.1 Establishing the Green Party	444
Preparations and Debate	447
Drafting a Statute	449
Drafting a Programme	452
Inaugural Congress (28-30 September 1990)	459
Strategy and Tactics	469
CPU Response to the Formation of PZU	471
5.1.2 Registering PZU	472
5.1.3 Early Party Activities	476
Environmental Actions	476
Relationship with the International Green Movement	480
Alternative PZU: Chukche	483
Political Alliances	385
5.2 Strategy, Tactics and Political Participation (1991-93)	489
5.2.1 Presentation of Strategy and Tactics	489
Second Congress (Ternopil, 1-2 June 1991)	489
5.2.2 Political Participation	492
Participation in Official Structures	492
Green President? - The Presidential Elections (December 1991)	493
5.2.3 Internal Party Developments	495
Party Funding	495
Party Structure - a Reassessment	496
Third Congress (9-10 October 1992) and Fractions	497
Membership Developments	504
Party Structure and Related Problems	507
Relationship to <i>Zelenyi Svit</i>	507
5.2.4 PZU as an Opposition Party	512
5.3 Public Support and Elections (1993-1994)	513
5.3.1 Public Support	513
PZU's Supporters	520
5.3.2 Parliamentary Elections (March 1994)	521
Pretext to Parliamentary Elections	521
Fourth Congress (Kiev, 17-18 December 1993)	524
Nominations and Election Campaign	526
Assessment of PZU and the 1994 Parliamentary Elections	531
5.3.3 Local Elections (June 1994)	535
5.4 Placing PZU in the Ukrainian Political Landscape	538
5.4.1 Left-Right Continuum and Ukrainian Politics	538
5.4.2 Issues Determining PZU's Placement on the Continuum	541
Ukrainian Independence	541
The Relationship to Russia and the CIS	549
Ukraine as an Anti-Nuclear and Anti-Military State	552
Democracy and Human Rights	558
Economic Issues	561
Ecological Issues	564
5.4.3 Placing PZU on the Left-Right Continuum	567

5.5 Conclusion	571
6 The Campaign to Save the South Bug River (I)	573
6.0 Introduction	573
6.1 Background	574
6.1.1 The South Ukraine Energy Complex (SU EK)	574
6.1.2 The CPU and Nuclear Safety	579
6.2 Campaign (January-August 1988)	589
6.2.1 Emergence of the Green Movement: Strategy and Mobilisation	589
6.2.2 Letter-Writing Campaign, Petitioning and Meetings	597
6.2.3 Dialogue: Pro-Environment vs. Pro-Nuclear Lobbies	600
6.2.4 Response from the Authorities	622
6.3 Decision-Making (November 1988-August 1989)	629
6.3.1 Re-assessing Stage Two of the South Ukraine Energy Complex	630
6.3.2 Reaction towards, and Debate on the Report of the Expert Commission	636
6.3.3 The Adoption of Resolution No. 647	648
6.4 Conclusion	655
 7 The Campaign to Save the South Bug River (II)	 655
7.0 Introduction	655
7.1 Policing and the Presentation of Alternatives (August 1989-December 1991)	656
7.1.1 Politicisation of <i>Zelenyi Mir</i>	656
7.1.2 Campaigns and Issues	659
The Aleksandrov Water Reservoir/the Tashlyk Hydro-electric Power Station	659
7.1.3 Actors involved in the Campaign	665
The Authorities	665
The Pro-Nuclear Lobby	666
The Media	669
7.1.4 Clash of Interests between Ukraine and Soviet Authorities	671
7.1.5 Implications: The Tashlyk Hydro-electric Power Station	672
7.2 The Campaign 'Защитим детей от радиации' and Nuclear Safety	677
7.2.1 Response to the Campaign	682
7.2.2 The Need to Clean the Tashlyk Cooling Pond	685
7.2.3 Changing Political Circumstances	687
The Putsch	687
<i>Zelenyi Mir</i> and the Question of Ukrainian Independence	689
7.3 Ukrainian Independence: Adaptation and Continued Campaigning (August 1991-June 1994)	690
7.3.1 Institutional Changes	691
7.3.2 Energy Situation in Ukraine following the Collapse of the USSR	691
7.3.3 Campaigns and Issues	692
The Aleksandrov Water Reservoir and the Tashlyk Hydro-Electric Power Station	692
Assessment of the Revised Project	701
7.3.4 Nuclear Safety and Implications for Health	704
Nuclear Safety	704

Nuclear Safety and Health	714
7.3.5 Cleaning the Tashlyk Cooling Pond	717
The Public and the Issue of Cleaning the Cooling Pond	721
The Pro-Environmental Lobby and the Issue of Cleaning the Cooling Pond	724
Decision: Go-ahead for Cleaning the Cooling Pond	731
7.3.6 Alternatives: Enhanced Safety and Improved Environmentability	738
Structural Reforms as a Means of Enhancing Nuclear Safety	738
Safety-Enhancing Measures at the Nuclear Power Station (Pro-Nuclear Lobby)	740
Alternative Energy (Pro-Environment Lobby)	744
7.4 Conclusion	755
 8 The Ukrainian Greens in a Comparative Perspective	 756
8.0 Introduction	756
8.1 A Comparison of Theoretical Framework and Policies	757
8.1.1 Classifying Western Thinking on the Environment	758
8.1.2 The Theoretical Framework of the Ukrainian Green Movement/Party	762
8.1.3 Classification of the Ukrainian Greens' Theoretical Framework	780
8.2 Does Inglehart's Hypothesis of the Greens being a Result of 'Post-Materialist Value Change' hold true in the Case of Ukraine?	784
8.2.1 Theory of 'Post-Materialist Value Change'	784
8.2.2 'Post-Materialist Value Change' and the Emergence of the Ukrainian Greens	786
'Basic Needs' vs. 'Higher Order Needs'	787
Stable Value Systems	790
The Scarcity Hypothesis	795
Assessment	798
8.3 Different Political Context, Different Issues: The Ukrainian Greens' Struggle for Survival	798
8.3.1 The Greens and the Issue of Ukrainian Independence	799
The National Question and the Environment - The Green Perspective	802
Justification: the Principle of Decentralisation	805
Independence and the Minority Issue	806
Independence and the Relationship to Neighbouring States	807
Are the Ukrainian Greens Nationalist or Globalist in Outlook?	808
8.4 Green Potential as a Combination of Political Opportunity Structures and Mobilisation Potential: the Case of Ukraine	808
8.4.1 The Green Electorate in the West	812
8.4.2 The Green Electorate in Ukraine	814
8.4.3 Political Opportunity Structures	821
8.5. Conclusion	826
 9 Conclusion: Assessing the Ukrainian Greens	 828
9.0 Introduction	828

9.1 Assessing the Ukrainian Green Movement (1986-95)	828
9.1.1 <i>Zelenyi Svit</i>	828
General Political and Organisational Factors	829
Particular Factors: The Case of the Nikolaev Greens: An Assessment	833
9.1.2 <i>PZU</i>	841
9.1.3 The Relationship between <i>Zelenyi Svit</i> and <i>PZU</i>	843
9.1.4 The Decline of the Ukrainian Greens: Part of an International Phenomenon?	846
9.2 Is the Ukrainian Future Green?	848
9.2.1 Closer Relations between <i>Zelenyi Svit</i> and <i>PZU</i>	849
9.2.2 Equal Relations between <i>Zelenyi Svit</i> and <i>PZU</i>	851
9.2.3 An overall Weakening of the Ukrainian Greens	853
9.3 The Importance of Ecological Education in Strengthening the Green Movement in Ukraine	855
9.4 Conclusion	860
Appendix	862
Survey Questionnaire	863
Maps	871
Bibliography	874

List of Tables

5.1	Membership Figures, <i>PZU</i> Oblast Groups	505
5.2	Party Membership in Ukraine	506
5.3	Desired Relationship between <i>PZU</i> and <i>ZS</i>	509
5.4	<i>PZU</i> members who are also members of <i>ZS</i>	511
5.5	<i>PZU</i> as Political Wing of <i>ZS</i>	511
5.6	Party/Movement Support in Kiev throughout 1990	515
5.7	Party/Movement Support in Kiev, 1991	515
5.8	Assessment of Ukrainian Political Movements and Parties, January 1992	516
5.9	Popularity of Political Parties and Movements in Kiev, 1992-93	517
5.10	Party and Movement Support in Ukraine in August 1993	518
5.11	Party Support, 1992-1993	519
5.12	Party Support, December 1993	519
5.13	Party Support, March 1994	519
5.14	Support for Greens by Profession	521
5.15	Support for Party Leaders, October 1991	534
8.1	Issues causing the most Concern among People	792
8.2	The most important Issue of Concern among People	792
8.3	The single Issue that needs to be solved most urgently	792
8.4	Concern with the Environment and Age	793
8.5	Party Preference, January and July 1990	809
8.6	Party Preference, 1990	809
8.7	Party Preference, Kiev, October 1991	810
8.8	Party and Movement Support, January 1992	811
8.9	Party Preference, Autumn 1993	814
8.10	Geographical Support for the Greens	815
8.11	Green Support by Sex	815
8.12	Green Support by Age	816
8.13	Green Support in Rural/Urban Areas	816
8.14	Green Support by Profession	816
8.15	Green Support and Attitude to Unemployment	817
8.16	Green Support and Attitude towards the Market Economy	817
8.17	Green Support and Placement of Greens on a Left-Right Scale	818
8.18	Classification of Greens on a Left-Right Scale by Ukrainian Members of Parliament, 1994	818
8.19	Green Support and Attitudes towards Communism	818
8.20	Green Support and Belief in Communism	819
8.21	Green Support and Worst Feature of Communism	819
8.22	Green Support Best Feature of Communism	819
8.23	Green Support and Best Soviet Era	820
8.24	Green Support and Interest in Politics	820
8.25	Green Support and Participation in the Political Debate	820
8.26	Green Support and Policies/Personality Preference	823
8.27	Attitude towards Greens among the General Population/Members of Verkhovna Rada	824
9.1	Oblast and Environmental Concern	856

List of Figures

5.1	Ukraine and the CIS	567
5.2	The Territorial Structure of Ukraine	568
5.3	Degree of Centralisation of Ukrainian Political Structures	569
5.4	Economic Strategy	570
5.5	Military-Political Doctrine	571
6.1	The South Ukrainian Energy Complex	576
6.2	Water Circulation Scheme for the South Ukrainian Energy Complex	577
8.1	Classification Scheme for Green Political Thought	759

Maps

Map 1	Nuclear Power Stations in Ukraine	871
Map 2	Ukraine	872
Map 3	Nikolaev oblast	873

5 The Green Party of Ukraine (PZU)

5.0 Introduction

Although the focus of this thesis is on the Ukrainian Green Movement, the emergence of and development of the Green Party of Ukraine (*Partiia Zelenykh Ukrainy - PZU*) has had a profound impact on *Zelenyi Svit*. It is therefore appropriate to take a closer look also at *PZU* in order to gain a better understanding of the interaction between these two political forces.

When the idea of setting up a Green Party was first launched in 1989, it was argued that whereas *Zelenyi Svit*'s campaigning against environmentally harmful projects by mobilising the general public into action had been highly successful, the time had come to move 'away from the streets' and exert influence on political decisions through the very forums where these decisions were made - i.e. through local, regional and the national parliaments.

The Initiative Group to *PZU* envisaged a division of tasks between, on the one hand, *Zelenyi Svit*, which would campaign at a general level, disclosing and raising public awareness of environmental problems as a mass movement, and on the other hand, *PZU*, which would operate as the 'political wing' of *Zelenyi Svit*, so to speak.

In this chapter I will assess *PZU* with this division of tasks in mind, pursuing the argument from the previous chapter, that as the relationship between *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU* was never clearly defined, party and movement, rather than complementing each other, have had a negative impact on one another and on the whole, contributed towards the weakening of the Green Movement of Ukraine. Their relationship was complicated by the fact that the Green Party was generally more oriented towards the West (the international green movement) than *Zelenyi Svit*, where people were more sceptical to the Western Green Movement and more concerned with national traditions. Many of those people who were criticised within the movement for seeking close links with the international green community at the expense of environmental problems at home became key figures within *PZU*. Thus, the conflict between the 'globalists' and the 'nationalists' developed from being simply an inter-movement issue into becoming a party-movement issue.

Secondly, I will look at public support for *PZU* within the general context of Ukrainian politics, attempting to explain the discrepancy between the generally high green score in public opinion polls and the party's poor election results. Finally, I try to place *PZU* in the Ukrainian political landscape, arguing that the political strategy followed by the leadership of the Green Party of Ukraine has been a contributing factor to the party's poor results in elections.

5.1 The Emergence and Development of PZU (1989-91)

5.1.1 Establishing the Green Party

The Ukrainian Greens early on acknowledged that environmental issues and politics were closely linked and that in order to solve environmental issues, one had to put pressure on the political decision-makers. The successful election of prominent Greens such as Iurii Shcherbak (Kiev) and Leontiy Sanduliak (Chernivtsi) to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in March 1989 strengthened the view of some *Zelenyi Svit* members that there was a need for a Green Party to complement *Zelenyi Svit*, the idea being that whereas the former mobilised the public in big campaigns, the latter would lobby the very same issues from within the political decision-making bodies to secure an optimal result. The 'globalists' (see Chapters Three and Four) furthermore saw it as a necessity to set up a Green Party as this had been done by Green Movements in most West-European countries and as the Ukrainian Greens were a part of the broader, international Green Movement.

The CPSU did not change Article Six of the Soviet Constitution, according to which the Communist Party was the leading force in society (whose powers could not be challenged by any other political party or force) until February 1990. However, this did not stop people within *Zelenyi Svit* from raising the issue of setting up a Green Party, in public. At *Zelenyi Svit's* Inaugural Congress in October 1989 Andrii Hlazonyi initiated a debate around this issue. Many people were against it but he won the support of Iurii Shcherbak¹.

Those who opposed the initiative had various reasons for doing so; as pointed out in the previous chapter, the members of *Zelenyi Svit* by no means constituted a homogenous group - but rather a mix of 'globalists', 'Ukrainians' (or 'patriots'), socialists, *RUKH*-supporters and others. The socialists were naturally opposed to the idea of a Green Party as this was seen as a challenge to the CPSU. Others, such as the politically independent and supporters of other political movements, including *RUKH*, feared that a Green Party would seek to make *Zelenyi Svit* work for its purposes. There was also fear that too close links between movement and party might damage the credibility of the Greens among a population suspicious of the very notion of political parties.

Trying to accommodate these diverging views and reassure the CPU, Shcherbak at the *Zelenyi Svit's* Founding Congress focused on the issue of form, arguing that the kind of Green Party envisaged by Green activists in Ukraine differed in principle from traditional West European Green opposition parties à la die Grünen in Germany:

¹ Interview with Andrii Hlazonyi, Kiev, 30.4.1994.

...Эта партия не боролась бы за власть, она не будет конфронтироваться с коммунистической партией. Более того, коммунисты могли бы стать членами партии "зеленых"².

The Green Party would rather represent the interests of the environment at the political level:

A Green Party...is required in order to make decisions taking into account the environment. It is also required so as to spread ecological thinking through 'green deputies' not only at a national but also at a local level.

Others, such as Kononov, wanted to establish a Green party to conduct green politics for the very reason that there were many communists and ex-communists in *Zelenyi Svit*, making it difficult to conduct 'green' politics through the association.

Although the Congress in the end endorsed the idea to set up a Green Party, many people remained highly sceptical. A frequently used objection was that the Green Movement was not yet ready for such a step. Thus, not few agreed with Iavoryvsky, who argued as follows:

Назваться партией малю. Необходими еще качества, присущие партии: последовательность в действиях, дисциплина, идеологическая платформа, отмежевание как от левых, так и от правых течений. А асоциация пока что состоит их розрозненых групп и перечисленными качествами не обладает³.

In the aftermath of the Congress, considerable efforts were made to appease and convince those sceptical to the idea that a Green Party would in no way be a threat to *Zelenyi Svit*. Andrii Hlazovyi, for instance, in an interview with *News from Ukraine*⁴ said the following:

This does not mean in any way that the association sets itself the aim to become a party...The would-be party will, most probably, enter the association as one of the collective members. The matter is that we feel the time has come to set up a party on the grounds of ideology common for all the Greens in different countries of the world to more effectively work for the implementation of our principles into everyday life.

Others like Iurii Myshchenko, for instance, had a slightly different understanding of what relationship there should be between movement and party, voicing the opinion that *Zelenyi Svit* would transform itself into a political party, but that this would happen gradually, over time:

² *Комсомольское знамя*, 5.11.1989.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *News from Ukraine*, no. 45, 1989.

In principle the idea of transforming (my underlining) *Zelenyi Svit* into a Green Party was broadly accepted (by the Congress). However, we are still a young organisation. Though *Zelenyi Svit* has united many Green groups, in organisational and financial terms, we are not yet fully prepared to form such a party⁵.

Details of the new party were still vague and although an initiative committee was being established to prepare a plan of action, a key figure at the Congress told *The Ukrainian Weekly* that it may take some time before a Ukrainian Green Party would become a reality. Even after organisational work had started to establish *PZU* objections were raised at the speed by which this work was proceeding: Serhii Fedorinchuk, for instance, at a meeting of the Kiev *PZU* Initiative Group on 18 June 1990, argued that it was too early to set up a Green Party. However, once the time was right, it ought to operate through *Zelenyi Svit*⁶.

While preparations to form *PZU* started, further attempts were made to define the future relationship between movement and party and to justify the need for a Green Party. R. Stopaniak, one of the members of the *PZU* Initiative Group, the head of Ivano-Frankivsk oblast *Zelenyi Svit* and deputy of Ivano-Frankivsk oblast soviet put it the following way:

"Зелений Світ" утворившись на хвилі небувалої активізації громадського інтересу до проблем екології, які стали головними проблемами нації, може зробити багато, і для розвитку нового екологічного мислення, і для ліквідації наслідків тих деформацій у розвитку економіки, які призвели до загрозливого екологічного становина, коли питання вже стоїть так: виживає чи під рід людський? Але асоціація "Зелений Світ" – не лише своєрідний екологічний громадський фронт. У його широкій масовості не тільки сила, а й слабкість, оскільки масовість неминує призводити до розмивання основних принципів теорії і практики власне руху "зелених" – однієї з провідних ідеологічних і політичних сил сучасного світу. Ідеологія цього руху ґрунтується на стрункій, чітко визначеній соціальній, економічній, політичній та культурній концепції і користується масовою підтримкою перш за все інтелігенції та освічених виробничиків. Завдяки цьому "зелені" особливо у Західній Європі, проявили себе як сильний, впливовий і в той же час конструктивний, зважений рух ліводемократичного напрямку⁷.

Anatoliy Panov argued similarly in an article published in *Zelenyi svit*⁸:

⁵ *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 3 12.1989, p. 3.

⁶ Протокол зборів ініціативної групи ПЗУ, Київ, 18.06.1990.

⁷ *Прикарпатська правда*, 17.3.1990 (п.р.).

⁸ *Зелений світ*, no. 6, 1990, с. 4.

Але ж умови нашого політичного життя такі, що окрім масової непартійної організації, якою є "Зелений світ", виникає необхідність мати громадське ядро, певну політичну силу з чіткою ідеологією і конкретним політичним спрямуванням. Такою силою має стати Партія Зелених України.

This view was endorsed by Haran (1991), who explained the need for a Green Party as follows: 'in order to protect the environment one needs "green" politics. And this, in turn, requires not only a mass organisation like *Zelenyi Svit*, but also a party'⁹.

Preparations and Debate

On 23 March 1990, the Initiative Group to the Creation of *PZU* gathered in Kiev. The meeting, which was attended by Greens from various parts of Ukraine, listened to and discussed draft statutes and programmes as well as a political declaration. A co-ordinating committee and three commissions (editorial, organisational and information commission) were set up. A resolution, in which the Initiative Group solemnly declared that the formation of *PZU* had started, was adopted by the meeting. Preparatory work was to be completed by 26 April 1990 at the fourth anniversary of the accident at Chernobyl and the founding congress was scheduled for the autumn. Members of the general public were encouraged to join the new party:

Усіх, хто хоче взяти участь у створенні ПЗУ, кому небайдужа доля України, запрошуємо до активної участі у створенні нашої партії: звертайтеся до місцевих організацій "Зеленого світу"¹⁰.

Local and regional branches of *Zelenyi Svit* were crucial in setting up party groups throughout Ukraine. The resolution passed by the Kiev meeting therefore sought to quell any potential conflicts between supporters and opponents of *PZU* within *Zelenyi Svit* from the very start:

Створення партії Зелених України не передбачає трансформації Зеленого світу у партію. Хоча програмні цілі і мети екологічного порятунку України у Зеленого Світу (як асоціації) і ПЗУ (як партії) схожі, але методи і форми їх діяльності різні. У партії вони суто політично-парламентські, а у асоціації – громадські, що ґрунтуються на залученні до природоохоронної діяльності найширших верств суспільства, стурбованих станом довкілля і здоров'я народу.

⁹ О. В. Гарань, 'Багатопартійність на Україні: формування, проблеми, перспективи' in В. Вікторенко (ред), *Україна багатопартійна* (Київ: МП "Пам'ятки України", 1991), с. 26.

¹⁰ Резолюція зборів ініціативної групи по створенню Партії Зелених України (ПЗУ).

The resolution was signed by 31 people, three of whom were women. All of them, except for V. Masaryk, who was listed as 'assistant secretary to USSR People's Deputy, Iurii Shcherbak', were rank-and-file members of *Zelenyi Svit* and a majority of them held high positions in the movement: two were deputy leaders (Panov and Hlazovyi), nine were members of *Zelena Rada* and six sat on *Zelenyi Svit*'s secretariat. A majority of the signatories were from Kiev (17). Other regions represented were Ivano-Frankivsk (4), Zhytomyr (2), Chernivtsi (1), Cherkasy (1) and the Crimea (1). A number of these people were already members of political institutions: two were USSR People's Deputies (Shcherbak and Sanduliak), one - a member from the Crimean oblast soviet, one from Ivano-Frankivsk oblast and local soviets as well as a number of deputies from local soviets in Kiev (6), Ivano-Frankivsk (1) and Cherkasy (1). Thus *PZU* already from the very beginning had a substantial deputy group. This was needless to say very important for a party which saw political power as the most important means by which to improve the state of the environment in Ukraine. Finally, a majority of those who endorsed the resolution had higher education and were in their late 30s or early to mid 40s (i.e. slightly younger than the members of *Zelenyi Svit*).

Although the Green Party would be concerned with the environment, this would not be its primary task. Vitalii Kononov in an interview on Ukrainian radio on 10 April 1990 said that

На перше місце, певне, все ж таки увійде політична боротьба.
І я повинен сказати, що екологія буде на другому місці¹¹.

A similar view was voiced by Andrii Hlazovyi in *Kultura i zhyttia*¹²: 'the new political organisation will not limit itself to (addressing) ecological questions only'. Its major concern would be to demolish the centralised economic and administrative system and build a free and open society.

People who were interested in joining *PZU* were encouraged to contact local chapters of the Green Movement for assistance in setting up local party groups along territorial or professional lines, which would then later combine into regional groups - the idea being that regional party groups would be united at the national level during the autumn 1990 Congress¹³. *Zelenyi Svit* and other informal environmental organisations were also taking actively part in discussing the draft programme and declaration of *PZU*¹⁴.

¹¹ K-2, 21:00, 10.4.1990, transcribed in *Ukraine Today*, Ukrainian Media Digest compiled by Radio Liberty Monitoring, 10.4.1990, no. UF-108, p. 11.

¹² *Культура і життя*, no. 14, 1990, с. 2.

¹³ *Зелений світ*, no. 1, 1990, с. 6-7 and *Зелений світ*, no. 3, 1990, с. 1.

¹⁴ *Культура і життя*, no. 14, 1990, с. 2.

The two most active local initiative groups were Kiev and Ternopil. Both groups, independently of one another, started working on the party documents in early 1990. As seen above, no Ternopil Greens attended the Kiev meeting of the PZU Initiative Group in March 1990. However, talks about setting up a Green Party started there already in February the same year. Rostyslav Tverdostup, currently leader of Ternopil oblast *Zelenyi Svit* and a pacifist by conviction, wanted to create an anti-militaristic party. He confided in a fellow member of the Green Movement, Iryna Lasar, who suggested he contact Serhii Khlebas, a Ternopil scientist, who was actively involved in environmental work. In the spring of 1990 these two - independently of one another - drafted a statute. The statutes turned out to be almost identical. A third statute was then developed on the basis of the two already made. A poster containing three points for the formation of an initiative group followed shortly after, and finally, a conference of Ternopil oblast *Zelenyi Svit* convened, at which the initiative group was set up.

Drafting a Statute

In May 1990, the newspaper *Zelenyi svit* printed a draft statute proposed by Anatolii Panov (Kiev). Panov favoured a hierarchical (and in the view of some fellow-Greens, totalitarian) movement structure. Tverdostup and Khlebas having read it, decided it was inappropriate. Joined by Andrii Olenchuk - also from Ternopil - they re-edited their own statute. Unlike Panov, the three Ternopil Greens wanted a more anarchistic party structure. Their revised draft statute did not allow for the exclusion of members. One could, however, dissolve a party club and rid the party of individual members who had failed to take part in the work of a club for the previous three months. It would be difficult to join the party, but once a member, there should be 'limitless' democracy.

Not all members of the Ternopil Initiative Group, however, shared Tverdostup/Khlebas/Olenchuk's ideas: whereas one half of the members supported their statute another half favoured that of Panov. Among the latter was Ihor Pushkar, a prominent figure in the Ternopil oblast *Zelenyi Svit*. As seen in the previous chapter, he organised the Esperanto group at the Vatra enterprise and later also *Noosfera*, Ternopil's first green group. Pushkar strongly opposed the admission of former CPSU members to the Green Party. When the leader of the oblast *Zelenyi Svit* organisation, Volodymyr Vydaiko, a former CPSU member, expressed a wish to join PZU, Pushkar was very much against this, although Vydaiko had been working actively in *Zelenyi Svit* for some time. Pushkar's draft statute, based on Panov's version, not surprisingly therefore, did not allow for former CPSU members to hold any positions in PZU..

In August 1990, a West-Ukrainian Green Party Conference convened. The leader of the Ivano-Frankivsk Greens, Stepaniak, attended as did people from Netyzhyn and Lviv. At this conference three versions of the statute were debated:

- 1) Panov's.
- 2) Pushkar and Kulyshnyk's
- 3) Khlebas, Tverdostup and Olenchuk's.

In the end, the third version was favoured. The Ternopil draft statute was to be printed locally so that it could be brought to Kiev by those attending the Founding Congress of *PZU* to be held in Kiev towards the end of October 1990. Five days prior to the Congress, however, Tverdostup and his associates discovered that *Rovesnik*, the local newspaper which had taken on this job, was going to print Pushkar's statute! They tracked down Pushkar and put him with the following ultimatum: either he support their (i.e. Tverdostup, Khlebas, Olenchuk) statute, or he leave *PZU*. Before the newspaper could be printed, the print workers thus had to re-set the types. One point (aim: eco-socialist society) had been removed from this statute following the West-Ukrainian Party Conference, but otherwise it remained unchanged.

Prior to the *PZU* Congress the Ternopil Greens had attended two consultative meetings on the creation of *PZU* in Kiev. At these two meetings they allegedly received a rather cool welcome, being perceived of by the Kiev activists as the 'provincialists' from Ternopil¹⁵, although the group formed by Tverdostup in May 1990 as the 'Party Club of Green Esperantos' became the first¹⁶ party organisation not only in Ternopil oblast, but in Ukraine as such. A second party club, *Aspekt*, headed by Khlebas, also emerged prior to the *PZU* Congress.

In Kiev there were also diverging views as to what structure to choose for the new party. Like Tverdostup/Khlebas/Olenchuk, the 'Internationalists' also wanted as much inter-party freedom as possible. Panov did, however, have support also in Kiev: At a meeting in Kiev on 18 June 1990, Shulga referred to the success of *Zelenyi Svit*, which was largely attributed to the tight structure of the association, arguing that similarly, *PZU* could be successful only if it had a well-organised apparatus:

Зелений світ функціонує чітко, так же має функціонувати і організаційний комітет Зеленої партії¹⁷.

¹⁵ Interview with Rostyslav Tverdostup, Kiev, 20.5.1994.

¹⁶ As of May 1994 there were five *PZU* clubs in Ternopil (Information provided by Rostyslav Tverdostup, Sosnovyi Bir, 20.5.1994).

¹⁷ Протокол зборів ініціативної групи ПЗУ, Київ, 18.06.1990 р.

In this connection it is interesting to note that whereas those who favoured a tight party structure (Panov, Pushkar) belonged to the older generation (late 40s/early 50s), their counterparts were younger (early 30s) and had good knowledge of the Western Green Movement (the Ternopil activists through the Esperanto groups and direct contacts to Polish Greens and West-European Greens, the Kiev activists to West-European Greens through *Zelenyi Svit*).

A number of meetings took place by the Kiev Initiative Group during the spring and summer of 1990, and the issue of structure took up a substantial part of the discussion. Many of those present emphasised that one had to prevent *PZU* from becoming a patchwork of authoritarian structures, like the CPSU and also a group of informal political organisations such as *URP*. At the same time care should be taken so as not to create merely a 'party-club' for political discussion, of which there was also an abundance¹⁸.

The Ternopil statute was discussed by Kiev Greens for the first time at a meeting of *PZU* initiative groups from all over Ukraine, which took place in Kiev on 10 August 1990. The major aim of the meeting was to prepare the founding conferences of regional party organisations as well as to continue the discussion of the draft statutes and programme principles for the national party. At the meeting, Khlebas repeated Ternopil's wish for a unitary structure from below up, warning that otherwise the Greens would simply repeat what was referred to as the 'mistake' made by the communists: i.e. create a pyramid of power. Rank-and-file party members must be given extensive rights and internal democracy was a 'must'. Hlazovyi supported Khlebas, arguing that a horizontal structure was classic for Green Parties. Aleksandr Bagin (Donetsk) also favoured the Ternopil statute on the grounds that the official (i.e. Panov's) version simply was a copy of the CPSU's statute.

Rather than making those present choose one of the statutes, Sheherbak, who presided over the meeting, sought a compromise:

Статут Тернопільчан – демократичний, а варіант Києва –
більшовитський...Створити робочу групу по роботі над статутом.
Робоча група об'єднає 2-а статути. Парламентарів не вводити
в орг. структури партії¹⁹.

Khlebas was elected head of the editorial commission, whereas Panov was made co-leader, as the author of the Kiev version of the statute. Other members of the commission were later appointed on a regional basis.

¹⁸ *Зелений світ*, no. 3, 1990, c. 1: meeting of Kiev *PZU* Organisational Committee, 16.5.1990.

¹⁹ *Народа ПЗУ України*. Київ, 10.08.1990 р.

One of the issues the editorial commission would have to consider, was whether *PZU* should be a mass organisation or whether a limited party membership was preferable. Many people shared Pushkar's fears that former CPSU members might seek to infiltrate the Green Party so as to exert influence from within. In order to avoid this, some (Samiilenko, Malytskyi) suggested that people wanting to join the party go through a test period of two years as candidate members prior to being adopted as fully-fledged members. This was surprisingly similar to the practice already followed by the CPSU. With regard to party size, Serhii Fedorinchuk (Kiev) at a meeting in June 1990 warned that *PZU* might become a mass party, which in his opinion, was not the best option²⁰. Similar views were held by M. Butsyn (also Kiev), who two months later at a meeting in Kiev argued as follows:

Открытие формы не годится и не братство. Я абсолютно
несогласен, что можно всех принимать, каждый²¹.

Others, like Iurii Babinin from Nikopol (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), referring to the US Republican Party, argued that *PZU* ought to be open to anybody wishing to join, the criterion being a wish to cooperate with the party.

As members of the Kiev Initiative Committee were preoccupied with making arrangements for setting up the Green Party at the national level, the Kiev party group did not emerge until 17 September 1990. Preparations for setting up the group, however, started after the Green Party had been officially proclaimed on 22 April 1990 - the International Earth Day. One of the first meetings of the Kiev party club, which took place in Kiev on 16 May 1990, was rather disorganised and there was considerable confusion and disagreement among those present as to what approach to follow. A meeting held about a month later, on 18 June, proved more constructive: on the agenda were the Kiev *PZU* Conference, the election of head, organisational committee and composition of commission as well as time and place for the conference and representation of groups. Three co-organisers were elected: Havrylov, Ivanov and Svyryda.

Drafting a Programme

The people who initiated *PZU* were motivated not only by what was perceived as a need for a political party to maintain the interests of the environment at the political level, but also by the success of Green Parties in Western Europe. Close links were established between leading figures in die Grünen and members of *Zelenyi Svit* (Hlazonyi and Kurykin) during Christmas of 1989 when the latter were visiting Germany and it was thought that the Ukrainian Greens needed a Party

²⁰ Протокол зборів ініціативної групи ПЗУ, Київ, 18.06.1990 р.

²¹ Народа ПЗУ України, Київ, 10.08.1990 р.

also as a means by which to give them an equal position within the International Green Movement. Having developed a sound knowledge of Western Green Politics, Andrii Hlazovyi, who elaborated one of the draft programmes discussed at the Inaugural Congress of *PZU*, used this knowledge as a starting point when writing the programme: 'I had access to the programme of *die Grünen* and took approximately 65 per cent from there, simply translating it into Ukrainian. My version of the programme was therefore characterised by Green orthodoxy'²². Greens in West Ukraine (Tverdostup, Khlebas and a person from Khmelnytskyi who later left the party) were also well acquainted with the ideas of the West European Greens and included some of these in their version of the programme, which was much shorter than Hlazovyi's version, but otherwise rather similar.

During the spring and summer of 1990 some of these ideas were presented in the Ukrainian press as the ideas of *PZU*. Stepaniak from Ivano-Frankivsk, outlined the basic ideas of the Ternopil programme in an article in *Prikarpat'ska pravda* on 17 March 1990. A major difference, he argued, between *PZU* and other political parties, was that to the former, the ecological issue was seen as an 'absolute and indisputable priority'. *PZU* would seek to build an 'eco-socialist' or 'solidaric' society, whose basic principle was as follows:

Вона не суперечить ідеям наукового соціалізму, але до вирішення багатьох суспільно-політичних питань "зелені" підходять інакше, по-іншому вони розуміють і роль загальнонародної держави, її соціально-економічні принципи.

At the same time, however, *PZU* was not against national independence. Economic, political and cultural sovereignty was seen as essential to facilitate an improved state of the environment in Ukraine. The interests of the nation ranked higher than those of the state, but people's interests (those of the ethnically largest group as well as those of the minorities) ranked above anything else. This principle, argued Stepaniak, was the essence of Green Humanism. To the initiators of *PZU*, the Green Ideology was seen as a logical step towards the development of an international democratic tradition, paving the way for a new, post-industrial epoch in the history of civilisation, 'a symbiosis of global humanism, democracy, morality and independent individuals, rooted in

²² Interview with Andrii Hlazovyi, Kiev, 30.4.1994. Kononov in an interview on Ukrainian Radio claimed that not only the programme of *die Grünen*, but also of the Slovak and Scandinavian Green Parties had been thoroughly studied by the initiative group. The best elements of these programmes, which were applicable to the Ukrainian context were used. However, as the situation in Ukraine was very different from that of Western Europe, *PZU* would become perhaps a completely new kind of party. (K-3, 21:00, 10.4.1990), transcribed in *Ukraine Today*, Ukrainian Media Digest, Radio Liberty Monitoring, no. UF-108, p. 11).

different doctrines, from Christ to Marx, from Buddha to Gandhi, expressed at different ages and times, but very harmoniously inter-linked'.

According to Stepaniak, Greens were not absolutists, but rather pragmatists with original solutions to problems common to different societies: 'the Greens are filling the same role in politics as the avant-garde does in culture'. Politically, the Greens did not occupy a position in the traditional sense to the left or right, but were moving 'in the front' of traditional parties. *PZU* would not seek to become a mass party, but wanted active people in its ranks. Its attitude towards technology was characterised by realism and a pragmatic approach: the Greens, although not against technology per se, were

За такий науково-технічний прогрес, який би гармонізував з інтересами природи і людини.

The best recipe for solving the current international ecological crisis was to put an end to monopoly (capitalist as well as pseudo-socialist), aiming towards the decentralisation of society and equal rights for everyone.

The state should, by the standards of the Greens, be a 'federation of independent citizens, united in organisations by conviction and interests. That as it was a ladder where the highest and lowest step were equally important'. *PZU* was not only a green party, but also an anti-military party: one of its major aims would be to destroy all types of weapons (nuclear, chemical and biological) as these were regarded amoral and destructive. Furthermore, the party wanted to dissolve all military blocks. Although members of the *PZU* were pacifists, they acknowledged that the time had not yet come for complete disarmament by means of dissolving national armies. Rather than armies based on the drafting of conscripts, however, *PZU* favoured professional, small armies. Institutions such as the KGB, Ministry of the Interior and the Ukrainian Army ought, in the opinion of the Greens, to be subordinated to *Verkhovna Rada*.

'Ukrainians' vs. 'Internationalists'

As pointed out by Hlazonyi²³, few members of *PZU* were familiar with international green ideology - not even among the party's leadership. Whereas a few highly visible and active members of the initiative group thus sought a dialogue with Greens abroad, others were critical of their approach, arguing that they were too blindly adopting the views and ideas of the West-European Greens. Many of the criticisms voiced in the discussion of the party programmes preceding Congress in September 1990 focused on the differences between East and West.

²³ Ibid.

Volodymyr Ivanov²⁴, argued that as Ukrainian conditions were different from those of Western Europe, the programme must reflect these differences:

Як на мене, йому притаманний "зелений класицизм", тобто орієнтація на принципи "класичних" зелених партій Західної Європи, дещо механічно спроектовані на нашу дійсність.

Concepts such as 'capitalism' and 'socialism' carried different meanings in the East and West, and this needed to be stated clearly by PZU:

Терміни - "соціалізм", "капіталізм" мають у нас за сімдесят років вже скільки завгодно тлумачень, окрім тих, що поширені у Швеції, Франції чи Західній Німеччині. Але й західні "зелені" вже багато чого втратили через "недалі романи" з комуністами чи соціал-демократами.

Ivanov was not at all happy with the term 'eco-socialism'. He advised that 'those people who are in a position to allow themselves to play those games'. The Ukrainian Greens should avoid playing with such concepts in their programme, even more so as they were of a declarative character. Instead, they should seek to revive and make use of Ukraine's own traditions (what I have referred to as 'eco-culture' in Chapter One):

...Екологічна свідомість закладена у традиційну національну свідомість України. І ці екологічні традиції треба відобразити у вступі.

Витоки свідомо екологічного ставлення до середовища існуючих людини маємо на усіх етапах духовної історії України. Живий розвиток ідеї гармонії людини та світу йде від давніх слов'ян до "отців чернецтва" прендобних Антонія та Феодосія Петерських, що заклали підвалини духовної теорії, економічної та аграрної практики монастирів. Далі цю ідею підхоплюють та розливають діячі Києво-Могилянської Академії, позбавивши через ідеологічну відкритість та широку практику міжнародних культурних контактів українську свідомість регіональної обмеженості. За тих часів Україна усвідомила себе частиною Європи.

У "могилянському" середовищі згодом виріс Григорій Сковорода. Через гармонійну етику "мікро- та макрокосмосів", центром якої знову стала конкретна людська особистість, через педагогіку "сродної праці" він знов повернув "християнську Україну" обличчям до людини.

Новий "космічний злет" надала екологічній ідеї на Україні теорія академіка Вернадського, яка й створила оазис для

²⁴ *Зелений світ*, no. 6, 1990, с. 3.

As part of this revival of past attitudes towards the environment, Ivanov recommended that the role of religion be emphasised in *PZU*'s programme. In this connection he suggested the following change to the party's 'political principles': 'Greens hold the view that religion is one of the highest forms of conceptions of the world, which incorporated the principles of global ecology'. The believers should be given back their churches, not only as an act of historic justice, but also as a step towards the revival of ecological harmony in Ukraine. *PZU* should express its readiness to work with believers of any confession for this purpose. In stressing the importance of religion in imbuing people with ecological awareness and in stressing the importance of Ukrainian traditions and thought, Ivanov established himself in opposition to key figures in the Initiative Group. However, he won considerable support at the grass-root level.

Leonyd Talko, head of Zhovtnevo regional organisation of *RUKH* in Dnipropetrovsk, expressed similar views to those of Ivanov in a letter published in *Zelenyi svit*. He saw the emergence of a Green Party as one of the first political parties in Ukraine as very natural due to the serious state of the republic's environment and as *Zelenyi Svit* was a politically non-homogenous movement. However, a Green Party would only gain political influence if it succeeded in creating national consciousness as a step towards the creation of ecological consciousness. Talko justified his position by arguing that firstly, the general public lacked an understanding of the ecological 'wholeness'. There was also a lack of understanding of the inter-dependence of the many regions of Ukraine, which had led to indifference to other people's misfortune ('Thank God, not here!'). Secondly, there was a lack of responsibility among people for their 'own historical fatherland'. This carelessness was a result of low national consciousness among all (my emphasis) ethnic groups living in the republic, especially among the Ukrainians. However,

Тільки через усвідомлення всіма етнічними групами України як
власне Батьківщини, рідної землі прийде й почуття
відповідальності за її майбутнє.

Thus *PZU*'s programme should not only propagate the ecological unity of Ukraine, but also seek to imbue people with national awareness. But, argued Tkalko, 'unfortunately not all members of the Greens see the need for this'. He finished off his letter by calling for a round-table on ecological problems and spirituality to get a debate going on the issue.

Others, arguing for a more 'Ukrainian' approach, made it an issue of national pride, raising the following question: 'why copy the West, why not develop a Ukrainian alternative instead?' S.

Liakh²⁵, a worker of the enterprise DVO 'Azot', and sitting on the council of the association *Social-Ecological Initiative* - a collective member of *Zelenyi Svit* - was unhappy with the name chosen for the party

Це гарна назва для неофіційної назви. Мені можуть заперечити, що у всьому світі партії захисту навколишнього середовища та людини від екологічної катастрофи, називаються саме партіями "зелених". Але хіба треба у всьому копіювати Захід? Хіба не маємо права на власне обличчя?

Liakh suggested that the new party be called *Ekologichna partiia Ukrainy* (the Ecological Party of Ukraine). With such a name the programme of *PZU* could be considerably expanded. The new party should also allow for fractions. As there were both supporters of Ukrainian independence (against a union treaty) and a confederative union, among the Greens, fractions such as 'Independence' and 'Union' could be set up within the party. Another name proposed by one Nikolaichuk of Dniprodzherzhinsk²⁶, was *Partiia ekologistiv* (The Ecologist Party).

One would expect that representatives from the nationally more conscious West Ukraine would be the most ardent supporters of Ukrainian independence, wishing to stress this in the party documents. However, this turned out not to be the case. The 'nationalists' had their stronghold in Kiev and surprisingly also in the East of Ukraine, whereas Greens from the West were the loudest opponents of turning *PZU* into a nationally oriented party. Following the distribution of Oleksandr Svyryda's (Kiev) alternative, national programme and criticism of the 'international' dominance of the two official draft programmes (Ternopil and Kiev), Ihor Pushkar (Ternopil) at the gathering of regional *PZU* Initiative Groups in Kiev on 10 August 1990²⁷, warned that *PZU* must not be turned into a national party:

Якщо ми хочемо назвати ПЗУ партія нового типу, зелені повинні взяти всі ноосферівський принципи, не націю. До нас підуть люди, якщо ПЗУ не буде зацикля на наш питаньх.

The West, he argued, was Green and would join the Democratic Block. However, as argued by Ivanov, the more nationalist-minded members of the Initiative Group did not call for a nationalist party per se, but rather for a revival of pre-revolutionary environmental traditions. And they favoured the dismantling of a transnational monopoly (the USSR), not a struggle against any individual countries, nations or ethnic minorities as such. The struggle against monopolies, by the

²⁵ *Зелений світ*, no. 11, 1990, c. 5.

²⁶ Народа ПЗУ України, Київ, 10.8.1990 р.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

way, was pointed out as one of the key aims of PZU in the Ternopil version of the programme, which was firmly rooted in Western Green thinking.

For 'globalists' as well as 'nationalists', the primacy of ecology over economy and politics was a key issue. And even the 'globalists' favoured Ukrainian sovereignty. Pushkar justified this position at the Kiev meeting by arguing that experience had clearly proved that transnational monopolies were a 'most cynical and damaging force to the environment'. Therefore, given that ecology was a key to survival, state sovereignty was by the Greens perceived as the only 'ecological guarantee'. Thus, the issue of disagreement was not so much the question of Ukrainian sovereignty (and later also independence), but more on whether to emphasise Western Green thinking in the programme, or draw on Ukrainian ecological thinking and traditions.

Another feature of PZU's programme which caused some debate during the summer of 1990 was the concept of the state. K. Maleev²⁸, a political scientist by profession, was far from happy with what he thought was a rather vaguely defined concept. In his view, the Greens had chosen a rather one-sided approach towards the state and its future functions. This, he argued, was especially strange as ecological problems, in all their seriousness, 'showed an inherent unsuitability of traditional state types to solve these problems':

Я передусім маю на увазі те, що в загальній концепції тез закладено уявлення про державу як єдину інстанцію, що регулює життєдіяльність тієї чи іншої громади, і хоча в першому розділі є твердження, що "держави - як драбини, де найвищий і найнижчий шабелі однаково потрібні і різні", але це скоріше виняток.

The third part of the programme, which carried the heading 'state politics', called for the 'encouragement of small and middle-sized farms'. Also 'the stimulation of the production of quality-, primarily ecologically clean food products and industrial goods'. However, no mention was made of how this would be achieved, and at which level. Who should work with these issues, asked Malieiev: - the Soviet government? Every republic? Local councils, or some international ecological council?

In an article labelled 'Any danger of eco-bolshevism?', Serhii Hrabovskyyi, one of the thinkers of the Ukrainian Greens alongside people like Hlazovyi and the Ternopil Greens, made an attempt at defining the future role of the state from a green perspective²⁹.

Finally, Valerii Tsybryk³⁰, who represented the association *Zdorovyi sposib zhyttia (Healthy Lifestyle)*, criticised the lack of commitment to health in the programme theses - as a matter of

²⁸ *Зелений світ*, no. 6, 1990, с. 4.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

fact, no mention at all was made of this important issue. He therefore suggested that the following statement be included: 'health is the highest value of Mankind'. *PZU* should commit itself to supplying health programmes for the Ukrainian people at the state level. Furthermore, tax exemptions for donations towards health care ought to be a green issue. As part of its commitment to health, *PZU* must create clubs and groups occupied with various healing techniques, organise summer and winter camps and facilitate research on health-related issues.

Inaugural Congress (28-30 September 1990)

The members of the Initiative Group not only differed in approach to programme, structure and name of the party. There was also disagreement as to where *PZU*'s Inaugural Congress should be held. This issue was discussed at the meeting of *PZU*'s Co-ordinating Council in Kiev on 10 August 1990, and those present were divided on whether to gather in Kiev or Ternopil. Kiev was favoured by the Kiev representatives as well as the Khaniv representative and Iurii Babinin (Nikopol), whereas the West Ukrainians as well as Bagin (Donetsk) and Varpiak (Pavlohrad) preferred Ternopil. Malyskyi from Nikolaev suggested the Congress be held in Narodichi - one of the areas most seriously affected by the Chernobyl accident. There was also some debate regarding the timing of the congress. Several of those present were in favour of calling the Congress in October, as this had been recommended by astrologers, and in the end it was decided that it be held in Kiev from 28 to 30 October 1990.

The Congress convened in the theatre hall of Hotel *Turist*³¹ and was attended by 106 delegates from 20³² of Ukraine's 25 oblasts - three of whom were USSR People's Deputies: Shcherbak (Kiev), Sanduliak (Chernivtsi) and Honcharov (Enakievo). Geographically, the Kiev delegation was the biggest (18 people), followed by Ivano-Frankivsk (10), Ternopil (9) and Chernivtsi (8). The delegates to the Congress officially became the first members of *PZU* as a national party³³. Guests from the Green Party of Czechoslovakia and scholars from the United States were also present³⁴.

The Congress started with Lysenko's prayer 'Great God, Preserve Unified Ukraine for us' (Bozhe velykyi, iedynyi nam Ukrainu khrany) in a hall decorated with the Ukrainian national flag (yellow and blue), party banner and portraits of Shevchenko and Vernadskii - the theoretical

³⁰ At meeting in Kiev on 14.7.1990, attended by regional *PZU* initiative groups. See *Зелений світ*, no. 8, 1990, c.2.

³¹ *Ukrainska agencja prasowa*, *Повідомлення* no. 250, 30.9.1990.

³² *Вісти з України*, no. 42, 1990.

³³ ЦК Компартії України. *Про установчий з'їзд Партії зелених України*. Консультант ідеологічного відділу ЦК Компартії України, В. Андриєнко. 3.10.90.

³⁴ *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 11.11.90, pp. 2,14.

inspirators of the Ukrainian Green Movement. Somebody had also put a blessed icon from the Second World War on the rostrum.

After the prayer, Shcherbak requested a minute's silence for Ihor Lytvyn, a 25-year-old who had stated his wish to join *PZU* but who died of leukaemia shortly before the Congress convened. As a token of respect, the first party ticket was written out in his name. A minute's silence was also observed for the victims of Babyni Iar (Babyi Iar³⁵), who were commemorated on that very same day in Kiev. After Iurii Shcherbak's opening speech, the Congress was addressed by Iurii Myshchenko and Andrii Hlazovyi³⁶. Telegrams were sent to the meeting commemorating the victims of Babyni Iar and to the conference of the *Tovarystvo Ukrainskoi Mowy* (The Ukrainian Language Society), which were both taking place the same day. Similarly, *PZU* received congratulatory telegrams from already existing Ukrainian parties and movements³⁷. Most of the second half of the first day was taken up by discussions in commissions³⁸.

Iurii Shcherbak, addressing the Congress, tried to define the Green Party in terms of policies and theoretical framework:

Ми зібралися тут, щоб засвідчити свою волю до ствердження політичної організації, яка буде підпорядкована лише інтересам суспільства, народу, нашої вітчизни – України. Головною метою нашої партії, стане боротьба за виживання України, усіх її силів і дочок, боротьба за відродження краю – фізичне і духовне, екологічне, соціальне і економічне. Наша філософія не має нічого спільного з людянонепатристичними "теоріями" і практикою більшовизму, соціалізму, тоталітаризму. Вчення Христа, погляди Вернадського про Ноосферу, філософія Скороводи і подум'яне слово Шевченка – ось ідейні основи нашого світогляду, які диктують конкретну тактику боротьби, побудовану на принципах пацифізму, активних громадянських дій, ненасильства та прямої демократії³⁹.

According to this 'definition', *PZU* shared its theoretical framework with *Zelenyi Svit*, the difference being that whereas the latter was a movement, *PZU* intended to establish itself as an independent, democratic political party. Shcherbak's emphasis on the national Ukrainian

³⁵ During the Second World War a large number of Jews were killed by the Germans in Babyi Iar, a ravine on the outskirts of Kiev. Until 1990 Soviet authorities played down the extent of this incident, putting up a monument to the Soviet victims of the incident, without any mention of the fact that those who were killed at Babyi Iar were predominantly Jews. Babyi Iar has been made famous through Evgenii Ecvtushenko's poem 'Babyi Iar' and also through Anatoliy Rybakov's book 'Heavy Sand'.

³⁶ Handwritten three-page summary of the Congress written by Vitalii Kononov.

³⁷ *Зелений світ*, no. 12, 1990, c. 3.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ukrainska agencja prasowa: Повідомлення* no. 250, Warsaw, 30.9.1990.

tradition, however, was, as has been seen, controversial within the *PZU* Initiative Group and became the key issue of dispute during the later discussion of the party programme.

The members of the *PZU* Initiative Group failed to unite behind any one of the programme proposals discussed prior to the Congress. The delegates therefore had to debate all of them, and this took up a considerable amount of time. Two versions were put forward by Kiev Greens, whereas the third originated from Ternopil:

- 1) Programme elaborated by Hlazovyi, Hrabovskyi and Demydenko (Kiev), favouring a Ukrainian Green Party similar to those of Western Europe.
- 2) Programme elaborated by Oleksandr Sviryda (Kiev), characterised by a nationalist approach.
- 3) Programme elaborated by Khlebas and Tverdostup (Ternopil), which was more anarchistic than that of Hlazovyi, Hrabovskyi and Demydenko.

Programmes one and three were in many ways similar to each other, but differed in structure and style⁴⁰.

An attempt at seeking a compromise programme prior to the Congress was made by the Ternopil delegates on the eve of the Congress. They abandoned Sviryda's programme on the grounds that it was too nationalist, but took out the essence from all programmes. The point originally included in the Ternopil programme on an eco-solidaric society was removed, as that was considered an ideal in the same way as communism and might be perceived as a threat by some. The elaborated Ternopil programme included an anti-militaristic point and was one page long. The two Kiev proposals were much longer (some 10 pages).

The Ternopil delegates then set off to Kiev, bringing along the revised programme and their own proposal of the congress rules. The latter was endorsed by the Congress. As for the programme itself, Hlazovyi, Khlebas and Tverdostup succeeded in merging their two programmes, keeping the key ideas of both intact⁴¹. Guests from other political parties attending the Congress as observers and guests found it somewhat surprising that there were so many versions of the programme. To the Greens, however, this was considered normal, *PZU* being a party which not only declared the protection of Nature and Mankind as its basic principles, but also adhered to the principle of basis (grass-roots) democracy, whose decisions could only be made on the basis of alternatives.

Much attention was given to the very concept of a Green Party:

Йшлося про саму концепцію партії "зелених" – неградянської
навіть за сьогоденних умов. Партія радикально-
демократичного напрямку, "найненароднішої партії", як назвали

⁴⁰ *Літературна Україна*, 15.11.1990, с.2.

⁴¹ Interview with Rostyslav Tverdostup, Kiev, 20.5.1994.

"зелених" Петра Келті, одна із засновниць партії "Зелених" ФРГ. Партії захисту не просто природи, а її життя – життя планети і людини, захисту знедолених і дискримінованих верств суспільства, захисту в найширшому розумінні: жінок, дітей, старих, інвалідів⁴².

However, not everybody shared Hlazovyi's enthusiasm for a 'classic' Green Party (i.e. a party rooted in the West European Green Tradition). The sharp polemical debate that took place on the programme reflected the division between the supporters of the 'united programme' (Hrabovskyi, Demydenko and Pushkar), which was characterised by European fundamentalist features, and those who favoured Svyryda's programme for national revival⁴³. Deputy of Kievrada, Viktor Cherinko, suggested that the following statement be included in *PZU*'s programme:

Партія зелених спрямовує свою діяльність на консолідацію національно-демократичних сил України.

And Svyryda put forward a proposal that the new party be called *Spilka 'Vidrodzhennia Ukrainy'* (The Union for Ukrainian Revival).

Cherinko's and Svyryda's positions met with fierce opposition from those who held the view that the environmental problems of Ukraine were not simply a national problem, but part of a wider, international problem. A majority of the delegates represented West Ukraine, where national sentiments were stronger than in other parts of the country. Although the Zakarpathian delegation expressed the view that 'Zakarpattia never belonged to Ukraine' and wanted *PZU* to commit itself to a future independent, federal Ukraine, the majority did not support Svyryda's ideas. Ihor Pushkar (Ternopil) warned of the dangers linked with establishing a party of the type envisaged by Svyryda, arguing that

Якщо висунути на перший план не екологію, а національне відродження, тоді легше вже приєднатися до будь-якої з існуючих партій і немає сенсу створювати нову, "зелену"...

А чи не здається вам, товариство, що програмний оборот щодо того, що партія має право взяти владу в свої руки, трохи пахне екстремізмом авангардного політичного руху, а нам потрібна партія саме парламентського типу, нам потрібна не масовість задля марного членства, а лояльна людина, їх підтримка наших передвиборчих позицій...

⁴² Hlazovyi in *Літературна Україна*, 15.11.1990, с. 2.

⁴³ Vitalii Kononov: Undated three pages handwritten summary of the Congress.

The differences in opinion were so considerable that observers present at the Congress for a while thought they might cause a split⁴⁴. Initially the two groups were so uncompromising towards each other that it seemed that even the efforts of a 'reconciliation commission' headed by Leontiy Sanduliak would prove in vain. The 'Kiev team' (Hlazonyi, Hrabovskyi and Demydenko) and the Ternopil group (Khlebas and Tverdostup) did, however, reveal readiness to compromise. Although their programmes differed in construction, they were equally committed to the same Green ideas. The only 'major' difference between the two was that the Ternopil programme had a tighter structure, was shorter (two pages) and more elegant. The Kiev programme, on the other hand

Київський проект – нащадок першого варіанту, навпаки, був досить громіздким і ледо перевищеним, але ширше охолював проблематику.

The majority voted in favour of the 'merged' programme, whereas Syvryda's programme, which *Zelenyi svit* described as being more like the programme of a right-liberal party, did not gain much support. It was, however, acknowledged that Syvryda's draft contained several interesting ideas and good formulas, which deserved to be incorporated in the final version of the programme. This was done by the reconciliation commission⁴⁵. However, a compromise was eventually found and the Congress endorsed the Hrabovskyi/Demydenko/Pushkar programme as a basis for *PZU's* programme and on the following day, incorporated the best elements from the other document. This programme was then endorsed by the Congress⁴⁶.

The programme finally endorsed by the Congress was thus a compromise between the two groups: its similarity to the programme of *die Grünen* confirmed *PZU's* commitment to and place within a larger, international Green context, while it was still acknowledged that Ukrainian political and economic conditions were very different from those of West-European countries, requiring an 'unorthodox' approach. Thus, on the issue of independence, the Congress came up with a new term, namely that of 'progressive nationalism', which, it was argued, did not contradict the traditionally anti-nationalist approach of the International Green Movement and was in line with its commitment to 'democracy', 'decentralisation' and 'diversity':

„Умови виникнення різних політичних течій і напрямків в Україні надто специфічні, різняться од загальноприйнятих в світовій практиці, тому хай не викликає них подиву поєднання національних та зелених ідей, зміцнення понять правди, рівності

⁴⁴ Геннадий Киридясов, *Народжена в суперечках*.

⁴⁵ *Зелений світ*, no. 12, 1990, c. 3.

⁴⁶ Vitalii Kononov: Undated three pages handwritten summary of the Congress.

ітні. В наших умовах могутній національний рух, що спочатку не отримав свого розвитку був нещадно придушений і похований на протязі десятиліть в безсумнівно прогресивним, бо спрямований не проти іншої нації, а проти імперії, останньої на нашої Землі. Тому він не може не бути підтриманий зеленими, хоч у розвинених, демократичних суспільствах подібне поєднання не є можливим.

Although a compromise was reached on the programme, feelings were still running high in both the 'national' and the 'international' camp. An incident that took place after the delegates had sung the hymn 'Shehe ne vmerla Ukraina' clearly illustrated the gap between the two: a young man from Odessa, referred to as Mr Kheifets, made his way to the rostrum and accused the delegates of nationalism. The 'nationalists' reacted sharply to the incident, referring to him as a 'comrade' in a derogatory manner and requesting that he immediately be excluded from the party. The request was supported by the person presiding over the congress at that time. Shcherbak, however, urged the delegates to show restraint and tolerance rather than falling prey to emotions⁴⁷. As pointed out by Hennadiy Kuryndiasov, attending the Congress as an observer, it was a paradox that

У статуті - спеціальний пункт про дозвілене ставлення до фракцій, з трибуни - палкі слова про інтерналізм, а насправді - репресивна нетерпимість до чужої думки, що притаманно менш популярним партіям. Утім, чому б не створити спеціальний, екологічний гімн партії...

It ought, however, to be said that a lack of tolerance towards views other than one's own was not a feature limited to *PZU*, but frequently occurred also in other political parties and movements (see discussion on 'kto kogo' in Chapter Three). Although the Congress succeeded in building a bridge between 'nationalists' and 'internationalists' as far as the programme was concerned, the issue on national vs. global commitment did by no means simply disappear, eventually forcing the leadership of *PZU* to call a conference on nationalism in order to discuss the question at length (this issue is discussed in Chapter Eight). However, an address to the people of Ukraine read out by Shcherbak at a meeting on 30 September indicated that *PZU* acknowledged the need for a balance between the two:

Ми поділяємо основні принципи політики екологічних партій, які існують у світі: боротьба за чистоту навколишнього середовища і здоров'я людини; за соціальну справедливість, демократію і ненасильництво. Будемо боротися за відродження

⁴⁷ See Геннадій Кирилясов and ЦК Компартії України. Про установчий з'їзд Партії зелених України, 3.10.90.

природи України, за її національно-культурну і духовну спадщину. Висновки, що вирішення екологічних проблем України неможливе в разі збереження залишків тоталітарно-бюрократичного режиму і колоніального статусу рідного Краю⁴⁸.

PZU would be a party for the survival of people and for a worthy future. All Ukrainians, regardless of nationality, age and religious beliefs were encouraged to support the Green Party and its aims. *PZU* was against attaching Ukraine to the central-imperial union treaty and in favour of establishing a sovereign state of Ukraine in a peaceful, democratic way. If not, a new dictatorship was likely to take over. Shcherbak therefore called for maximum interaction with all democratic forces in Ukraine in the struggle for an independent, democratic and ecologically clean Ukraine.

The delegates' position on *PZU*'s programme also reflected their position as to where on the political scale *PZU* ought to be. Whereas Svyryda had in mind a rightist liberal party, the large majority held the view that the Green Party ought to be somewhere in the centre. Shcherbak in his opening speech to the Congress labelled *PZU* a party of the left-radical centre (*partiiia livoradikalnoho tsentru*)⁴⁹, which represented a development from ecological politics (*Zelenyi Svit*) towards political ecology (*PZU*). However, the Green Party would not only address the political aspects of ecology; like other political parties belonging to the democratic block, it would seek to prevent the return of a communist dictatorship and oppose a new imperial yoke, which under the cover of a 'union treaty' would seek to direct the Ukrainian people by the 'corrupted CPU'.

Although Shcherbak on several occasions prior to the Congress had tried to reassure the CPU by arguing that *PZU* would not compete with the Communist Party for political power, and by also suggesting that dual membership be allowed, speeches at the Congress did little to endorse this effort:

Поки не буде демонтовано систему насильства і корупції, монополічної влади однієї партії, яка привела країну до повного краху, доти не буде ніякого довіря до будь-яких державних структур⁵⁰.

⁴⁸ Звернення установчого з'їзду ПЗУ до громадян України. Народ України! Брати і сестри! printed in *Зелений світ*, no. 12.10.1990, с. 3.

⁴⁹ *Ukrainska agencja prasowa, Повідомлення*, no. 250, Warsaw, 30.9.1990.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

Andrii Hlazovyĭ, commenting on the Congress in *Literaturna Ukraina*⁵¹, however, argued that *PZU* was a party to the left of the centre (*livotsentristska partiia*), justifying his position in the following way:

Ох і невелико бути лівими у країні, де КПРС українськомірометувала саме це поняття – не будучи при цьому ніколи ні лівого, ані партією – скоріше політично-адміністративним орденом, що існував у "четвертому вимірі", поза цвалінійною політичною шкалою.

Yet another definition was used in an article published by *Visti z Ukrainy*⁵², according to which *PZU* was a party of democratic orientation (*partiia demokratychnoho spriamuvannia*), seeking real state independence for Ukraine through the implementation of the declaration of state sovereignty passed by *Verkhovna Rada* in the summer of 1990. Another aim, closely linked to the first, was to build a legal state by non-violent means (political struggle), pickets, meetings, demonstrations, strikes and if necessary also public disobedience.

Thus, the placement of *PZU* in the Ukrainian political landscape differed slightly from person to person, although everybody agreed that the Green Party would be a party of the political centre. This made *PZU* different from Green Parties in the West – *die Grünen*, for instance, often being classified as a radical party to the far left on the political scale – where Green Parties are in opposition to the very structure of the society in which they operate, opting for radical solutions. The very notion of 'left' and 'right' in the Ukrainian political context, however, is very different from the way these concepts are used in Western Europe. I will return to this issue in more depth below, suffice it here to say that whereas the 'right' is associated with the CPU and an attempt at preserving existing political and economic structures (i.e. political conservatism), the left is occupied by extreme nationalist parties such as *UNA-UNSO*, none of whom the Greens wish to identify themselves. Thus, *PZU* chose a place in the centre, although it could of course have defined itself as a 'radical party of the right', choosing more radical solutions to the environmental crisis in Ukraine.

Andrii Hlazovyĭ⁵³, in the aftermath of the Congress, sought to explain the major differences between *PZU* and Green Parties in the West. The major point of departure, he argued, was *PZU*'s demand for total and real Ukrainian independence. This demand was natural for a people living in the 'last remaining European colony':

⁵¹ *Літературна Україна*, 15.11.1990, с. 2.

⁵² *Вісти з України*, no. 42, 1990 (n.p.).

⁵³ *Літературна Україна*, 15.11.1990, с. 2.

Не лише з позиції елементарного патріотизму, а й з практичного погляду: про яку ефективність захисту довкілля, про яку політику соціального захисту, інтелектуального відродження (не одне важливе програмне положення ПЗУ), відродження культури і освіти може йтися за умов існування імперії-монополії?

The major aim of *PZU* was to achieve economic, political and spiritual revival/rebirth of Ukraine and secure its survival through the rebirth and protection of the natural environment and the people living in this environment from the damaging effects of pollution. A ban on nuclear energy and the re-proliferation of Ukraine as a non-nuclear zone were preconditions for this.

As far as political means were concerned, *PZU* wanted to solve Ukraine's ecological and general democratic problems by means of political methods. A hierarchy was envisaged, in which ecology would take precedence over the economy, politics and ideology, and where individual rights were more important than the rights of the state. *PZU* would emphasise the 'protection of the right of man to live in an ecologically clean environment and attainment of a harmonious relationship between man and nature'. Further, 'the highest value for Greens is the life of the planet and the man who inhabits it. In the name of life, it is essential to immediately stop ominous processes that violate the balance of nature, degradation of the environment, militarisation, spiritual impoverishment, cultural and national degeneration. A consumer orientation cannot give a man good fortune or attainment of his life's goals...Chernobyl - atomic, chemical, spiritual, political - continues. We must stop it'⁵⁴.

The unified programme eventually endorsed by the Congress outlined *PZU*'s future policies in the political, economic and social sphere. Whereas it indicated what were the major aims of the new party, the programme failed to spell out how these aims would be achieved. A key element was demonopolisation and decentralisation in all areas of society, including the industry. The Green Party also opted for privatisation of parts of it, the equality of all ownership forms and the creation of mechanisms for national and regional programmes in the area of agriculture. It also sought the revival of private farming.

Individual rights and freedom is emphasised by most Green Parties. Not surprisingly, therefore, *PZU* advocated a wide range of rights for the individual towards official institutions as well as religious freedom and the equality of all confessions. On a wider scale, the Greens advocated the revival of spirituality of the Ukrainian people. Its wish to favour the strengthening of the family and affirm the cult of motherhood, however, were rather different from those of other Green Parties, to which alternative lifestyles are supported at the expense of traditional institutions such as the family⁵⁵.

⁵⁴ *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 11.11.90, pp. 2, 14.

⁵⁵ *Вісник з України*, no. 42, 1990 (n.p.).

Whereas much of the Congress' time was taken up by the discussion of the programme, the passing of the party statute went relatively quickly and smoothly. This could be explained, as the Ternopil version of the statute had already been discussed at the Kiev PZU Conference, which took place a week earlier. Consequently, people were familiar with its contents⁵⁶. Altogether the delegates had to discuss three draft statutes - two from Kiev (Panov's and Svyryda's) and the one from Ternopil. The Ternopil version was adopted as the basis for the final statute, which contained elements from all three drafts⁵⁷.

As seen above, PZU from the very start opted for a deflated structure - as a matter of fact the party was created from below by local initiative groups (Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kiev), which later linked up. The two Galician and the Kiev groups had even adopted different statutes and programmes as the basis for their activities!⁵⁸ This, in addition to the fact that Green Parties elsewhere were all committed to maximum internal democracy, hardly made it surprising that the structure opted for by the Greens was horizontal, with minimal powers delegated to the central organs, giving wide autonomy to the regional organisations. The structure chosen was based on the so-called territorial-club principle - i.e. party clubs were formed along territory or professional lines⁵⁹, granting clubs the right to unite into fractions on political platforms not contradicting the major principles of the party programme. The statute also encouraged the creation of regional and local co-ordinating committees and other super-club structures. Clubs, moreover, had the right to join public organisations whose programmes did not contradict that of PZU as collective members.

PZU gave priority to the consolidation of all 'democratic forces' in Ukraine and also with the international green community. Members of the party were given extensive rights: for instance they were not obliged to implement party decisions with which they did not agree. What was more, the regional party organisations could speak on behalf of the party without prior consultation with the party leadership. This was, in addition to being a democratic gesture also an allowance motivated by practical considerations, as the nine co-leaders eventually elected were hard to gather so as to co-ordinate their activities as they were spread all over Ukraine⁶⁰. However, there were some limitations; a person working in state institutions, for instance, could not hold elected party posts⁶¹.

At the national level, PZU would be represented by its leader, the nine co-leaders and a Central Co-ordinating Council (*Tsentralna Koordynatsiina Rada*). The party's headquarters would

⁵⁶ Vitalii Kononov: Hand-written three pages summary of Congress.

⁵⁷ *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 11.11.90 (n.p.) and interview with Andrii Hlazonyi, Kiev, 30.4.1994.

⁵⁸ *Зелений світ*, no. 12, 1990, с. 3.

⁵⁹ *Вісник з України*, no. 42, 1990 (n.p.).

⁶⁰ Interview with Andrii Hlazonyi, Kiev, 30.4.1994.

⁶¹ ЦК Компартії України. Про установчий з'їзд Партії зелених України. 3.10.90, арк. 27.

be in Kiev. Shcherbak in his speech to the Congress indicated how the party would seek to implement its policies in the future as follows⁶²:

(ПЗУ) насамперед організація політичних клубів партії в усіх кутках України, визначення конкретної стратегії дій. Це означає, що на всіх рівнях - від місцевих Рад і до Верховної Ради УРСР - ми будемо виступати із законодавчими пропозиціями щодо поліпшення екологічного стану в різних регіонах України.

Strategy and Tactics

Once the party programme and statute had been endorsed, the issue of strategy and tactics came up: how was *PZU* going to implement its programme? As there was simply not enough time to discuss this issue at length, it was decided to call a new congress in Ternopil sometime in April 1991 to address the strategy and tactics of the party. Whereas the party programme endorsed by the Congress was fairly general, the regional party organisations were in the process of elaborating their own local action programmes. A similar national programme (10-15 year plan) would be written to cover problems common to several regions. One of the issues to be covered in such a programme would be military-related issues - the Kiev, Zakarpattia, Crimea and Ternopil regional party groups were all concerned with such issues and it was suggested that the first *PZU* campaigns ought to address these issues. The Ternopil group, for instance, was worried about the situation surrounding the nature reserve Medobory. After a long struggle, the army had agreed to return it for civilian use. Earlier it had been used for the testing of bombs. Similarly, the Black Sea Fleet was causing concern among the Crimean Greens, being one of the major polluters of Ukraine's territorial waters and shores, and in Zakarpattia campaigns were being conducted to stop the Pristialivsk radar station and also a military airport in the close vicinity of Mukachevo⁶³.

In the morning of 29 September - at the second day of the Congress - the delegates took a break from their proceedings and gathered in the Shevchenko Park, where they buried a paper image of Chernobyl and planted a young oak tree. The oak tree was to symbolise the birth and development of the Green Movement and also the triumph of reason over folly and good over evil⁶⁴. Hryhoriy Honcharenko, a Kiev delegate, then read a letter from Taras Shevchenko written to Br. Zalinskii in 1857, out loud to those present⁶⁵:

⁶² *Вісти з України*, no. 42, 1990 (n.p.).

⁶³ *Зелений світ*, no. 13, 1990, с. 5.

⁶⁴ Vitalii Kononov: Three pages hand-written summary of Congress.

⁶⁵ Геннадий Кириллович (n.d.)

Без розумного розуміння краси людина не побачить снільного
бога у маленькому листочку найменшої рослини. Ботаніці і
зоології потрібен захват, інакше ботаніка і зоологія буде
мертвим трупом поміж людьми. А захват здобувається тільки
глибоким розумінням краси, симетрії і гармонії у природі.

Elections of the leader and the nine co-leaders took place on the last day of the Congress. Iurii Shcherbak was, not surprisingly, elected leader of the party, although other candidates were nominated for this post: Hlazovyi (Kiev), Hrabovskiy (Kiev) and Pushkar (Ternopil). Adding a humorous touch to the elections were proposals to elect Academician Vernadskii or Hryhoriy Skorovoda - whose ideas had shaped the framework of the Ukrainian Green Movement, but who were both long gone - as party leader⁶⁶. As co-leaders the Congress elected Oleh Sydorkin (Uman, Cherkassy oblast), Vitalii Kononov and Oleksandr Svyryda (Kiev), Valentyn Iankivskiy (Odessa), Ihor Pushkar (Ternopil), Leontiy Sanduliak (Chernivtsi), Aleksandr Bagin (Donetsk) and Nikolai Kudin (Poltava). The choice of the Kiev co-leaders is interesting in that both Ivanov and Svyryda favoured a national rather than a global emphasis in the party programme. Finally, the Congress elected an auditing committee, composed by Volodymyr Timonyn (Kiev), Ihor Havrylov (Kiev) and Andrii Olenchuk (Terebovlia) as well as a treasurer - Klavdia Khaliavenko (Kiev)⁶⁷ - and an editor of a planned future newspaper (Andrii Hlazovyi). As for the Central Co-ordinating Council, the Congress decided that it would be composed of the leaders of the regional (oblast) organisations. Its final composition would be revealed later⁶⁸.

Several resolutions endorsed by the Congress were not made publicly known. Instead they would be discussed by the Central Co-ordinating Council at its first meeting. Iurii Shcherbak officially declared the new party at a meeting on 30 September. The very same day, a meeting against the union-treaty took place in Kiev. Congress delegates also demonstrated against the union treaty. Expectations to the new party were high among the Greens themselves. However, Hlazovyi, commenting on the event, worded himself cautiously: 'whether or not PZU becomes a leading force in Ukrainian society remains to be seen. Most importantly, though, a new party with a democratic orientation has emerged on the political scene'⁶⁹.

⁶⁶ *Зелений світ*, no. 12, 1990, с. 3.

⁶⁷ *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 11.11.90, pp. 2, 14.

⁶⁸ ЦК Компартії України. Про установчий з'їзд Партії зелених України. 3.10.90, арж. 27, 28.

⁶⁹ *Літературна Україна*, 15.11.90, с. 2.

CPU Response to the formation of PZU

Among the many observers at the Congress was V. Andriienko, a consultant of the Ideology Department of the CPU Central Committee. Shortly after the Congress was over, he produced a report⁷⁰ to the Central Committee. Most of the report simply referred to what had happened at the Congress and identified key principles in PZU's programme and statute. Considerable attention was also given to the political implications of the newly founded party:

Відомо, на яких політичних союзників було розраховувати керівництво ПЗУ. Активісти асоціації "Зелений світ", члени оргкомітету по підготовці з'їзду були серед тих, хто підтримував Спілку демократичних сил України, закликав до проведення всеукраїнського політичного страйку 1 жовтня. Правда, підпис ПЗУ під закликом до страйку з головними вимогами не був погоджений з Ю. Щербак.

Although the Congress did not explicitly define its future relationship to the CPSU and the CPU, Andriienko pointed out that certain groupings within the party were hostile towards the Communist Party. Moreover, Sheherbak's statement to the effect that PZU's philosophy had nothing in common with Bolshevism and Communist dictatorship could be interpreted as opposition to the ruling party:

Та зміст Програми і Маніфесту ПЗУ (виголошений Ю. Щербак 22 квітня 1990 р. на мітингу, присвяченому Дню землі), окремі аргументи, тези, репліки, висловлювання учасників з'їзду, серед яких було і декілька комуністичних членів КПРС, свідчать про словесну непримиренність частини ПЗУ. Так, Ю. Щербак у вступному слові підкреслював, що "наша філософія не має нічого спільного з неадекватною ідеологією більшовизму, націонал-соціалізму...", що є сили, які прагнуть до воєнного перевороту, комуністичної диктатури...", що ми "кинемо виклик тим хижим силам, які хочуть знищити народ".

Andriienko held the view that PZU's future role in Ukrainian politics was likely to be of some significance, justifying his position in the following way:

Загострене ставлення людей до екологічних проблем, позиції екологів у Радах народних депутатів, падіння досить широких автономних прав партійним структурам, безперечно, обумовлюють перспективи Партії зелених України.

⁷⁰ ЦК Компартії України. Про установчий з'їзд Партії зелених України, 3.10.90.

With this in mind, Andriienko recommended that local party committees in their dealings with *PZU* bear in mind its negative attitude towards the Communist Party:

Партійні комітети повинні виходити з того, що негативне в цілому ставлення ПЗУ до КПРС і Компартії України, її певне відхилення від соціалістичних орієнтирів створюють значні труднощі в пошуках шляхів розв'язування спільних проблем, конструктивного діалогу.

Although Andriienko's report was given as information⁷¹, members of *PZU* shortly after obtained a copy of a report signed by the Kiev city party committee secretary, M. Horovenko, and passed on to the secretaries of the regional party committees 'for implementation in practical work'.

The report, signed by Horovenko, of the XXX which was published in full by *Zelenyi svit*⁷² turned out to be an edited copy of Andriienko's report. It was accompanied by a comment from the Greens. The Greens thanked for the publicity, on the grounds that it could not be ruled out that some people, having read the information, would decide to change their red party ticket for a green one. As far as facts were concerned, everything in the report was correct. However, *PZU* did not agree with the last column, then what deviation from socialist orientations was Horovenko talking about? Had the Greens really at any time been inclined towards those orientations? Besides, what exactly did the CPU mean by 'socialist orientations'? Then in many countries socialdemocrats were working closely with the Greens. However,

...Ці соціалісти (і зелені) не співпрацюють з комуністами більшовицького типу. Їх орієнтири "руководящей и направляющей" зроду-віку соціалістичними не були. А лише тоталітарно-комуністичними. Так що не плутайте Божий дар з лещенню...

From this statement and similar comments made elsewhere it becomes clear that the 'peaceful coexistence' Shcherbak had opted for between *PZU* and *CPU* was gradually being replaced by a more confrontational approach as glasnost gained momentum and democratic reform began to take hold.

5.1.2 Registering *PZU*

Initially, the Green Party adopted a membership policy very similar to that of the Communist Party. Only after a close screening would people be allowed to enter the party as full members.

⁷¹ Фонд № 1, опис № 32, слр. № 372.

⁷² *Зелений світ*, no. 16, 1990, с. 3.

Quality was emphasized at the expense of quantity. This was done to avoid 'infiltration' of former Communists and others not necessarily committed to the principles of *PZU*. Shortly after the Inaugural Congress in October 1990, a Law on the Registration of Political Parties was passed by *Verkhovna Rada*. The law ruled that each party to be formally registered submit a list containing the names of 3,000 members to the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice together with its formal application. It soon became clear that it would be impossible for *PZU* to reach this number adopting the rigorous screening procedure endorsed by the Congress.

To get an idea of how many members the party had, Vitalii Kononov in early December 1990 contacted local party groups requesting information about membership figures. Although most of the groups reported an increase in membership and requested more membership forms, most groups had less than 10 members each. In Nikolaev (Lviv oblast) 40 applications for membership had been received through the local ecological club 'Dniestr' but as of 24 November 1990 the party club had only three members and 10 candidate members. The latter were in the process of being assessed for full membership. Pylypchuk, the leader of the party club, was, however, optimistic, arguing that 'the future belongs to our party'⁷³.

The president of Crimean *Zelenyi Svit*, Sergei Shuvainikov, was far less optimistic. His letter⁷⁴ revealed a problem not only facing party activists in the Crimea, but also elsewhere:

В настоящий момент в Крымской области вести работу по созданию партийного клуба ПЗУ практически невозможно. Большая часть участников экологического движения, в том числе Крымского "ЗС", высказались против политизации общественного зеленого движения и предпочитают оставаться просто членами общественной, не политической, организации.

Those in favour of setting up a Green political party wanted to set up the Ecological Party of Crimea, which might, in the future become part of *PZU*'s organisational structure.

In the late spring of 1991 Ihor Pushkar sent a letter to all the local party groups informing them about recent events and outlining the issues the party had to settle at the upcoming Second Congress. The Congress should have taken place during the spring of 1991, but was postponed due to difficulties in making people join the Green Party to gather the necessary figure to officially register the party with the Ministry of Justice. Besides, the Ternopil Greens were busy preparing *Zelenyi Svit*'s Second Congress, which also took place in Ternopil.

The main task facing the Congress was to register the party. For this purpose all the local party clubs were requested to make a list of their members. Those clubs which provided such

⁷³ Протокол No. 1, засідання екологічного клубу "Дністр", 24.11.1990.

⁷⁴ Letter from Sergei Shuvainikov to Vitalii Kononov, dated 12.12.1990.

information by 20 May 1991 would have the right to be represented at the Congress. The Ternopil oblast party club had some 400 members, but Pushkar pointed out that the situation was very different in many other oblasts, where there was only a handful of *PZU* members. In Donetsk, for instance, people were joining *URP* as the republicans worked actively, whereas the *PZU* activists there were simply passively waiting for people to contact them. This, argued Pushkar, was the wrong approach: 'one must go to the people, to each single individual, and explain and convince'.

According to *PZU*'s statute it was difficult to become a member of the party⁷⁵, as when it was endorsed, nobody knew that an edict would be passed, according to which each party should have at least 3,000 members before it could be registered by the Ministry of Justice. Therefore the Central Co-ordinating Council passed a special decision regarding people joining the party in April-May 1991 - the so-called Chernobyl call⁷⁶. People wishing to join *PZU* during this period did not have to produce a recommendation letter or pay any membership fee. In Ternopil and Kiev work had already started to increase the membership numbers. Activists were attending political meetings, issuing membership cards next to *RUKH*'s stands, contacting enterprises, organisations and schools, explaining to people the importance of 'green' politics and encouraging them to join the Green party⁷⁷.

The issue of membership and registration was addressed at length by the Central Co-ordinating Council on 18 May 1991 at its regular meeting in Kiev⁷⁸. Kononov informed those present that as of this date, the party had 1,800 members. So far only two parties had been registered: *URP* and Plachynda's *USDP* (*Ukrainska Setiansko-Demokratychna Partia*). Ihor Pushkar presented the meeting with a list of a further 450 members, bringing the total up to 2,250 members. Shcherbak stressed the importance of registering *PZU* as elections were coming up later the same year and should the party fail to register in time, it would be prevented from taking part in these elections:

⁷⁵ The Ukrainian Green Party initially adopted a membership policy very similar to that of the CPSU: first a person wishing to join, had to be recommended by somebody who was already a member of the Green Party. Then, if this recommendation was accepted, the person would be admitted as a candidate member until he/she was thought to be ready to join the *PZU*. This strict procedure would be followed to make sure that only those committed to the Green cause and no politically suspicious individuals would enter the ranks of the newly found party.

⁷⁶ Ihor Pushkar expanded on the Chernobyl call in an article in *Rovesnik* (no. 13, 24-30 March 1991, p. 5), encouraging all democratic parties in Ukraine to join *PZU* without having to go through the full procedures in connection with the fifth anniversary of the Chernobyl accident. This, he argued, was necessary to as quickly as possible register democratic parties and in the quickest span possible be ready for democratic elections on a multi-party basis.

⁷⁷ Letter from Ihor Pushkar to all *PZU* local party clubs.

⁷⁸ The following discussion is based on information provided in Протокол засідання ЦКР ПЗУ, м. Київ, вуль. Кірова 5А, 18 травня 1991 р.

Дуже важливе, може так статися, що на Україні будуть тільки дві партії: КПУ та УРП. Я думаю, восени буде проведено вибори президента та парламенту. Кравчук з яким я поговорив певально не прекрасно розуміє, ДПУ, ПДВ, СД, РУХ, УРП хочуть створити незалежну демократичну Україну. Нам потрібно визначитися відносно Демократичної України. ЦДВУ вирішила об'єднатися з робітним рухом. Зараз рейтинг Зелених 30%, а КПУС - 6-7%.

Shcherbak therefore urged that everything be done to register *PZU* as quickly as possible. In this connection he revealed that the leader of the Presidium of *Verkhovna Rada*, Leonid Kravchuk, had called Boiko (Ministry of Justice) and asked him not to put any obstacles in the way for the registration of the Green Party.

Party representatives from various regions of the republic informed the meeting what had so far been done to increase the membership of their clubs and of the obstacles they faced in the process. Tymonin said that the Kiev group had made the 'not easy decision' to actively seek new members in the city's squares, at meetings and demonstrations. This strategy had paid off; in January 1991 there were only 100 party members in Kiev. By May that year a total of 1,000 had been reached. Holub, however, insisted that people be admitted to the party only upon recommendation. Shcherbak agreed with Holub that the party did not need any 'dead souls', however, this problem could be avoided by providing people with proper and adequate information about the party and what it stood for.

In Ternopil people had to write 'declarations of awareness' before being admitted to the party. Bagin from Donetsk argued that the political situation was very difficult in his region. Besides, there was the added problem of translating the party documents into Russian and getting them printed. A party club was in the process of being established at the Institute of Ecology. So far nine party members had been registered and in Horlivka people were approached in the factories with a request to join the Green Party. Sydorkin informed the meeting that in Cherkassy there were 96 members of *PZU*. In Zhytomyr, however, there were only five. There was clearly a need to travel to the regions and spread information about the party, but for economic reasons, this was proving difficult. In Nikolaev things were easier as the town was already highly politicised. In the course of a week, following actions outside the police headquarters, two clubs had been established. Zakarpattia *PZU* had 29 members and activists intended to recruit new members at the university. Lviv oblast had 139 members and in Kharkiv there were 12 full members and 19 candidate members. The latter would be admitted as full members within the next two months. People in the settlements of Liubotiano and Kukhiansk had been very carefully screened prior to admission. Kiev oblast had 75 members and in Ivano-Frankivsk oblast four clubs had been set up,

of which three were officially registered. As part of the membership campaign, it was decided to actively seek new members through the association *Zelenyi Svit*.

PZU was officially registered on 24 May 1991 as the third political party of the republic⁷⁹. A list of some 5,000 members was submitted with the application⁸⁰. Of these the Ministry of Justice registered 3,421 (at the time of registration, *PZU* claimed that it had 10,000 members)⁸¹. In the spring and summer of 1991 a series of presentations took place in various parts of Ukraine to make the public and also other political parties and movements familiar with the policies and ideas of the Green Party⁸². Local party clubs continued to be formed throughout 1991 - in Kharkiv, for instance, the oblast club was founded on 14 December 1991. Thirty seven people attended the founding conference, which elected six delegates to the up-coming *PZU* Congress and a leader, V. Shylo⁸³.

5.1.3 Early Party Activities

Environmental Actions

The first nation-wide campaign organised by *PZU* was not surprisingly anti-nuclear. On 7 November 1990, in a symbolic action to unite the politically divided East and West, the Kiev branch of the party took their banners and walked to Netishyn, where Greens from all over Ukraine had gathered to protest against the operation of the Khmelnytskyi nuclear power station (see appendix for details). This action marked the start of *PZU*'s anti-nuclear campaign for the fifth anniversary of the Chernobyl accident. Numerous similar actions would be organised at other nuclear power stations before 26 April 1991 and the Green Party also decided to organise a 'Chernobyl-Nuremberg' public process in Kiev. An initiative group would be set up shortly to prepare for the Chernobyl anniversary. Other political parties and movements were encouraged to join forces with *PZU* on this issue⁸⁴.

PZU continued to focus on nuclear power also after the fifth Chernobyl anniversary. In 1991, the IAEA sent a group of experts to Belarus and Ukraine to analyse samples of the soil and make

⁷⁹ *Зелений світ*, no. 1, 1991, с. 3.

⁸⁰ Interview with Andrii Hlazonyi, Kiev, 18.8.1992.

⁸¹ *Політична думка/Political Thought*, no. 1, 1993, с. 125-26.

⁸² These presentations, labelled 'Dniakh narodzhennia PZU', which were attended by other political parties such as the CPU, took place in Mukachevo, Uzhhorod and Chortkova (Ternopil oblast) and Ivano-Frankivsk. The deputy leaders of *PZU*, Leontyi Sanduliak, Oleh Iankivskii, Aleksandr Bagin and Vitalii Kononov, arranged similar presentations in Chernivtsi, Odessa, Horlivka and Kiev.

⁸³ Протокол № 1, учредительного собрания Харьковского областного клуба партии зеленых Украины, г. Харьков, 14 декабря 1991 г.

⁸⁴ See *Зелений світ*, no. 15, 1990, с. 1, and *Зелений світ*, no. 16, 1990, с. 2, for details.

recommendations regarding the radioactive fall-out on their territories. Whereas the international press referred to the objectivity and independence of the IAEA report which emerged in May 1991, Greens in Ukraine and elsewhere disputed its objectivity at a conference they organised on 21-24 May. They sharply criticised the IAEA, referring to it as 'an organisation that exists on money donated by the nuclear monopolies and ministries of various countries, including the USSR *Minatomenergoprom*'⁸⁵.

At approximately the same time, three members of *RUKH* and two members of *PZU* went on a hunger strike at the Lenin Square in Khmelnytskyi to protest the regional council's decision to continue construction of the second reactor at Khmelnytskyi nuclear station, thus violating the moratorium on nuclear reactors passed by *Verkhovna Rada* in September 1990. The hunger strikers were fined for having put up tents, but continued their protest all the same. By the seventh day of the hunger strike, two of the demonstrators had to be sent for reanimation. Shortly after, the regional council granted the demands of the hunger strikers⁸⁶.

The Ukrainian Greens had called for Ukraine to adopt an anti-nuclear status since the late 1980s. The Ukrainian Declaration of Sovereignty, which was passed by *Verkhovna Rada* on 16 July 1990, contained a clause stating Ukraine's commitment to becoming a non-nuclear state⁸⁷, which was welcomed by the Greens at the time. Not surprisingly, therefore, *PZU* (and also *Zelenyi Svit*) greeted and supported the initiative to one-sidedly disarm as a first step towards the 'reorganisation of the entire system of international relations towards a new, humanist foundation'. In the view of the Greens, this did not contradict Ukraine's national interests and interruptions of the shipping to Russia of nuclear warheads could not but concern *PZU*⁸⁸:

Нас, також, стурбовало оголошене Президентом "тимчасове припинення" вивезення за межі країни тактичної ядерної зброї, що можна розглядати як свідчення можливої військово-політичної переорієнтації... "ядерний шит" є не захистом, а страшним тягарем для українського народу.

⁸⁵ *Зелений світ*, no. 9, 1991, c. 1.

⁸⁶ *Ukraine Today*, Ukrainian Media Digest, Compiled by Radio Liberty Monitoring, 29.3.1991, no. UF-112, p. 11.

⁸⁷ Point IX. External and Internal Security reads as follows: 'The Ukrainian S.S.R. solemnly declares its intention of becoming, in the future, a permanently neutral state that does not participate in military blocks and adheres to three nuclear-free principles: not to accept, not to produce and not to acquire nuclear weapons'. Under the heading VII. Environmental Safety, the declaration stated that 'The Ukrainian S.S.R. has the right to ban the construction and to halt the operation of any enterprises, institutions, organizations and other entities that constitute a threat to environmental safety'. With this in mind, the Ukrainian Greens argued that going 'non-nuclear' meant that not only nuclear weapons but also nuclear power stations had to be removed from Ukrainian territory. Quotes taken from pp. 10 and 9 respectively of Декларація про державний суверенітет України. Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Ukraine (Верховна Рада Української РСР/The Supreme Rada of the Ukrainian S.S.R., Київ. 16 липня 1990 - Kiev. July 16, 1990).

⁸⁸ *Зелений світ*, no. 7, 1992, c. 2.

The presence of nuclear arms on Ukrainian soil had a destabilising effect on the region that might well tie Ukraine to some military-political union, which in turn would make it increasingly difficult to disarm in the future:

Збереження ядерної зброї змусить Україну увійти в блок із якимиś іншими ядерними державами для координування політичних курсів. Необхідність дотримуватись блокової дисципліни підвищить ризик втягування у глобальні конфлікти, може суттєво обмежити суверенітет. Якщо ж Україна не приєднається до жодного з існуючих і майбутніх міжнародних військово-політичних об'єднань, зберігаючи ядерний статус, вона розкритиметься світовим сутовариством як фактор дестабілізації, непередбачуваність її дій викликати загрози ініціативи з боку інших держав, підвищувати напруженість у стосунках.

A number of points against Ukraine remaining a nuclear power were also put forward: Ukraine, for instance, lacked technological facilities for the production and testing of nuclear weapons on its own territory. Moreover, a lack of storing facilities for nuclear waste from reactors working for military purposes would leave Ukraine with no option but to pursue close links with Russia in the future. To preserve parity within such an alliance would simply not be possible in the view of *PZU*. If Ukraine's nuclear status was to be maintained, conversion would have to stop, the military industries would have to be modernised and the army would have to grow. All spheres of life would then be subordinated to the military-industrial complex:

Удар по Україні економічно-екологічним "бумерангом" повернеться до агресора. Агресія з боку будь-якої держави проти розташованої в центрі Європи України матиме незрівнянні наслідки навіть із Чорнобилем масштабу...Нейтральна неядерна Україна знижуватиме напруженість в серії континенту, що відповідає інтересам всіх без винятку європейських країн.

All deputies of *Verkhovna Rada* were encouraged to follow this line⁸⁹. *PZU* used some of the same arguments against expansion of nuclear power in Ukraine: not only would it cost a lot, but ordinary people would have to pay for it. The Communists and Socialists, argued Serhii Kurykin, were in favour of closer links with Russia and nuclear power was a means by which to achieve this. In his view, the Military-Industrial Complex was standing behind the nuclear power programme and people like Bohdan Krawchenko (in 1994 Canadian advisor to the government on economic issues) were damaging the Greens' cause by saying that all countries wishing to be

⁸⁹ Statement made on 14.3.1991 by *PZU*'s Political Council.

taken seriously must have their own nuclear industry. His words were grasped by both sides (i.e. both the nationalists and the socialists/communists) and would have a damaging impact on Ukraine from an environmental point of view⁹⁰.

The line adopted by the *PZU* was that Ukraine would not become more independent if it based its energy sector on nuclear power. Ukraine received fuel for the reactors from Russia and also depended on its technology. Besides, there was a considerable safety-risk involved; even Ukraine's nuclear-lobby, generally positive towards nuclear power, admitted that the Ukrainian reactors and the condition they were in, made them dangerous. From a political point of view, Andrii Hlazovyi found it interesting to see how other political parties were changing their position on nuclear power: initially, everybody was against nuclear power for safety-reasons, whereas by 1994 it was seen as a necessity. Simultaneously, it was becoming increasingly difficult for the Greens to gather people against nuclear power. *ProSvita* (Kurykin's organisation) organised a demonstration against Chernobyl, but this was only attended by 12-14 people. Such demonstrations put the Greens in a poor light, thus causing prominent members of the movement to conclude that it was better not to demonstrate, but rather work through existing political channels⁹¹.

The Soviet Army was one of the biggest polluters in Ukraine. As seen in the previous chapter *Zelenyi Svit* in Mukachevo was particularly concerned with military issues, successfully organising a campaign against the Pristialivsk radio-compass station and also a military airport in its vicinity. Concerned with military installations like those in Mukachevo and also by environmental pollution caused by the Black Sea Fleet, *Zelenyi Svit* set up an 'Anti-Militaristic Commission' to investigate the impact of the army on the environment. *PZU* worked closely with this commission and also paid considerable attention to the situation in Mukachevo as the leaders of that movement, Liubov Karavanska and Envhenia Derkach, were both active members of *PZU*. A national environmental conference in Mukachevo on 21-24 December 1990, which was attended by several *PZU* activists turned into a demonstration of solidarity with the Greens of Zakarpattia⁹².

Although *PZU* intended to influence decisions regarding the environment by working within the forums where such decisions were made, it also made use of actions and demonstrations to further its cause. In July 1991 it initiated a nation-wide campaign against air-pollution. *Zelenyi svit* could only confirm that this campaign took place in Kiev, where the most polluted places, such as the Leningrad square and the cross-roads of Dorohozhytska, and Khreshchatyk, were picketed. The newly appointed Minister of the Environment, Iurii Shcherbak, academician

⁹⁰ Serhii Kurykin, Kiev, summer 1994.

⁹¹ Andrii Hlazovyi, Kiev, summer 1994.

⁹² *Зелений світ*, no. 1, 1991, c. 3.

Dmytro Hrodzynskiy and deputies of local councils took part in the action as did Kiev road police, which assisted the picketeers. Most pedestrians supported the initiative, although some reacted in a traditional manner, arguing 'dont you have anything to do? Or are you being paid to do this?'⁹³

PZU also proliferated itself as a party strongly committed to democracy and human rights. In connection with the stripping of the parliamentary immunity and arrest of *URP*-member Stepan Khmara in late 1990, *PZU* issued a statement referring to the incident as a 'provocative act', aimed at creating a precedent for the renewal of the 'totalitarian-repressive regime'. Khmara should be released immediately and a commission set up to investigate the case⁹⁴.

Somewhat later, the Greens came out firmly against the death penalty for the coup makers of August 1991. An appeal issued by Amnesty International and the European Radical Party and signed by the leader of the Green Fraction in the European Parliament, Adelaida Alietti, was signed by Serhii Hrabovskyi of *PZU*'s Political Commission⁹⁵.

Relationship with the International Green Movement

As pointed out above, contacts were established between members of *Zelenyi Svit* and Greens in several West European countries in 1988/89. Similarly, *PZU* not only sought inspiration from but also sought to establish and develop closer links with Green Parties in other countries. Close links were established also with Green Parties elsewhere in the Soviet Union - especially with the Estonian and Georgian Green Parties.

Greens in West and South Ukraine had at an early stage established international contacts through their Esperanto connections. The international Esperanto society had early on recommended its members to join green groups in their respective countries. The Ukrainian Esperanto society had, before *Zelenyi Svit* was established, organised voluntary ecology courses in schools and in Western Ukraine (Ternopil oblast) the first Green groups to emerge evolved around the Esperanto societies; the first Green group to emerge in Ternopil was called 'Esperanto and Ecology' and one of the Ternopil party clubs was called 'Esperanto'. *PZU* had several Esperanto-speaking members such as M. Heller (Nikolaev, Lviv oblast), T. Auderska (Odessa) and M. Vashchysyna (Lviv) as well as I. Pushkar (Ternopil). Through these *PZU* had established contact

⁹³ *ЗЕЛЕНІЙ СВІТ*, no. , 1991 (n.p.).

⁹⁴ *ЗЕЛЕНІЙ СВІТ*, no. 16, 1990, c. 1.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 3. This resolution was also signed by other Ukrainian parties, such as the *United Social-Democratic Party (OSDP)*, deputy of *Verkhovna Rada* Volodymyr Moskovka, head of the *Constitutional-Democratic party (KDPE)* Volodymyr Zolotraiov and head of the *Liberal-Democratic Party (LDPU)* Volodymyr Klymchuk. Several prominent Russians, such as Iurii Afanasiev, Oleg Kalugin, Arkadii Murashov, philosopher Leonid Bakhtin, writer Boris Strugatskii, Volodimir Bukovskii and other members of the cultural intelligentsia and political circles also signed the appeal.

with the French Esperanto society and decided to work together. It was also significant that many Greens in Europe were using Esperanto as a means of communication⁹⁶. Pushkar encouraged international contacts, arguing that *PZU* needed to break its national isolation and establish itself as an authoritative party not only in Ukraine but also outwith its borders.

Links between Greens in the West and the (former) USSR would not only be beneficial to the latter, but possibly also to the former. Kononov, for instance, expressed the view that the Greens in the (former) USSR had something to 'teach' the West; their experience had given them a different outlook of the world and were in the process of creating their own 'new' philosophy. The Ukrainian Greens and others might therefore contribute to the widening and improvement of the philosophy of the international green movement⁹⁷.

On 2 April 1991 the Fourth Congress of *Los Verdes* (the Spanish Green Party) convened in Madrid⁹⁸. The Ukrainian Green Party attended this Congress as observers, as did *die Grünen*, Greens from Mexico and the leadership of the European Greens - a network uniting Green Parties from several European countries. While in Madrid, *PZU* formally handed its application of entry to the political secretary of the European Greens, Leo Cox. This, argued Hlazovyi, was an important step not only for *PZU*, but also for Ukraine, then if membership was granted, that would be an international recognition not only of *PZU* but also of Ukraine as an independent subject of international law. A reply was expected sometime during the autumn of 1991, following a meeting of the European Greens, at which *PZU*'s statute would be discussed. Only after an initial assessment could *PZU* become 'an equal among equals' with the Greens of Germany, France, Holland and Sweden. The Green Parties of Estonia and Georgia had already been granted membership. The European Greens worked fast, however, and already on 18 May 1991 at a regular Central Co-ordinating Council, V. Ivanov, announced that the European Greens had accepted *PZU* as a member of the association⁹⁹.

In Madrid it was agreed that the Ukrainian Greens, together with the Estonian, Georgian and Catalan Green Parties would take part in a joint programme - 'Ethno-ecology', which would open new perspectives from a theoretical point of view. A conference on the topic 'Kiev-Madrid: post-totalitarianism' was scheduled to take place in Kiev in October 1991. It would be a joint venture between *PZU* and the Madrid Federation of Greens. *PZU* was also invited to attend the Seventh Congress of the European Greens in Zürich later that year. This was an important step towards *PZU*'s integration into the European political process. Hlazovyi pointed out that *PZU*, as the only Ukrainian political party, was using the flag of United Europe (blue with golden stars) in

⁹⁶ Letter from Ihor Pushkar to all *PZU* local clubs on the eve of the Second Congress, May 1991.

⁹⁷ Interview with Vitalii Kononov, Kiev, August 1991.

⁹⁸ *Зелений світ*, no. 10, 1991, с. 6.

⁹⁹ Протокол засідання ЦКР ЦЗУ, м. Київ, вул. Кірова 5А, 18.05.1991 р.

its actions. The Greens, he stated, 'will do everything so that independent Ukraine will be part of it (i.e. United Europe)'.

Serhii Kurykin, who attended the Seventh Congress of the European Greens on 1-2 June 1991, gave an account of it in the same issue of *Zelenyi svit*. The East European Greens were very active during the Congress, trying to define the difference between 'reactionary elements' and the movement for independence, the latter seeking the right to chose its own future. *PZU* and other East European Green Parties agreed to meet in Slovenia to exchange opinions regarding the activities of the Greens in countries deprived of their statehood.

The newspaper *Zelenyi svit*¹⁰⁰ printed quite a lot of information about the Greens in Germany and also an article on non-violence. These articles were written by Andrii Demydenko, Andrii Hlazovyi and Serhii Kurykin - all three of whom had established an extensive network of contacts abroad. Knowledge of Green political theory and of the Greens in the West was, however, limited among the rank-and-file membership of *PZU*. Even at leadership level there was a need for more information, argued Hlazovyi, who was unhappy that Vitalii Kononov, who took over as leader of the Party following the resignation of Iurii Shcherbak in 1992, was not very familiar with green politics.

The organisation the European Greens was founded in 1984 and by June 1993 united 23 Green Parties throughout Europe. At a meeting in Helsinki on 18-20 June that year, the European Greens transformed itself into the Federation of European Greens. It was also decided that its headquarters be moved from Brussels to Vienna. During the meeting discussions continued between the East and West European Greens regarding the special conditions of post-totalitarian societies facing the former. Considerable attention was also given to environmental problems in these societies and the possibilities for solving military conflicts in East and Central Europe¹⁰¹.

As part of the dialogue between Greens in the East and West a so-called 'East-West Dialogue', attended by 35 delegates representing 18 Green Parties from East, Central and Western Europe¹⁰² took place in Irpen (Ukraine) in early December 1993. The 'Green East-West Dialogue' functions as a forum for the exchange of opinions between Greens in the East and West and although it is not a decision-making body, it can make recommendations to the European Federation of Green Parties¹⁰³. The meeting¹⁰⁴ in Ukraine was co-organised by *PZU* and the

¹⁰⁰ See for instance *Зелений світ*, June 1991, c. 4.

¹⁰¹ *Прес-папіз ПЗУ*, 24.6.1993 p.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ See Introduction in *The Green East-West Dialogue. Discussion Paper. Central and Eastern Europe: An Ecological Disaster Area. The need for an action programme of Greens for ecological reconstruction in Central and Eastern Europe* (Kiev, Ukraine, December 3-5, 1993), p. 1.

¹⁰⁴ This meeting was the third of the Green East West Dialogue. Earlier, meetings had taken place in Bratislava, Slovakia (1991, 1992).

secretary of the European Federation of Greens, Anne de Boer, and received organisational and financial support from the Ukrainian authorities¹⁰⁵. Much attention was given to elections in post-totalitarian societies. Strategy and tactics were discussed as well as the forthcoming elections to the Ukrainian parliament. The delegates met with representatives of the presidential administration and were given an orientation on the Ukrainian energy programme and political aspects regarding the ratification of the START-I Treaty. During a meeting with Minister of the Environment, Iurii Kostenko, issues such as environmental protection and nuclear power were thoroughly discussed.

The 'East-West Dialogue' was important for *PZU* not only as it represented a recognition of the party, but more so as it provided the Ukrainian Greens with an opportunity to familiarise Greens from elsewhere with the environmental problems Ukraine was suffering from and thus to generate interest and eventually also secure various forms of assistance from elsewhere. An example of a joint campaign was the appeal issued by the Federation of European Greens together with environmental and anti-nuclear groups on 21 October 1993¹⁰⁶. The appeal, commenting on the recent lifting of the moratorium on nuclear power and the continued operation of Chernobyl, argued that 'Europe is too small for the use of RBMK reactors'. Although the appeal in itself changed nothing, it became a starting point for an international campaign against the use of RBMK reactors in the former Soviet Union.

Alternative *PZU* - Chukche¹⁰⁷

Green Parties in the West in general and *die Grünen* in particular, can be distinguished from more traditional political parties not only through their policies, but also in the way they present their policies (e.g. *die Grünen*). The Ukrainian Green Party, although in terms of policies it does differ from other political parties, is not very different or 'alternative' in form. In *PZU*'s early days, however, some activists based in Kiev, tried to ridicule Ukraine's political past by means of 'staged actions' and 'happenings'. An avant-garde sculpturer, Volodymyr Ivanov, who was one of the pioneers of the Kiev rock music environment (in the past he worked as a producer and manager) organised such actions together with a youth group referring to itself as Youth Liberal-Revolutionary Union 'Luchy chukche'. ('Chukche' is a term that was used by Kim Il Sung in North Korea, signifying his policies of 'self-reliance'.) Throughout 1990 and 1991, this group

¹⁰⁵ Agreement was reached on such support at a meeting between Vitalii Kononov and President Leonid Kravchuk in October 1992 (see YP-1, 7.10.92, 20:00. "Новини", transcribed in *Ukraine Today*, 8.10.1992, no. 312, p. 3).

¹⁰⁶ *Прес-реліз*, no. 20-10, 25.10.1993.

¹⁰⁷ Another name used for this group was MPPC: Молодежний республіканський революційний союз.

staged a number of 'performances' in Kiev to ridicule the existing 'communist' system. This was done by a number of 'red' happenings, so 'red' that they made official events such as the First of May-day parade and the 7 November parade look pink in comparison.

The idea was to make people laugh of themselves and their political system by means of irony. Only when people were able to confront their rather painful past would they be able to put it behind and to start something new. 'Maybe', argued a member of Chukche, who referred to himself as Oleksandr Chiche, 'Karl Marx was right in saying that the people must take farewell with their past in a laughing manner. Laughter, as shown by psychiatrists, is not a poor provision against incidents of paranoia'¹⁰⁸. By means of irony Chukche activists also hoped that they could open people's eyes to the meaninglessness of existing political and economic structures.

On 7 November 1991, Luchy Chukche held its most well-known manifestation: in front of the official parade, with a compaternic banner and riding on a horse, dressed in a fur coat, rode Roman Maiorchuk, who, according to one of his 'adherents', would soon gather larger crowds than the leader of the Ukrainian Socialist Party, Oleksandr Moroz, on TV. Behind him followed a machine-gun wagon and eventually, the chukchisty, armed to their teeth. Slogans such as

"Слава ІКЧП. "Павлов з нами". "Ленін, партія, комсомол". "Наша
цель - коммунизм!". "Позор Буцу!". "Работать надо!"

were carried by those attending the parade. The parade made it down Khreshchatyk (Kiev's main street) and vulitsa Chervonoarmiiska and, according to a Chukche supporter covering the incident in an article written for *Zelenyi svit*, 'increased the revolutionary spirit of the Kiev citizens'. Some uninformed onlookers burst out laughing at the sight, but the 'chukchisty walked proudly and convinced of their international historical mission'¹⁰⁹. On another occasion, the theme of their happening was how to save the 'reds' (i.e. the CPU) from being included in the red book of threatened plants and species¹¹⁰.

The chukchisty also made fun of other political forces. At one point, for instance, they made an offer to Vladimir Zhirinovskii through Ukrainian radio, to put him forward as presidential candidate for Ukraine. Somehow Zhirinovskii was notified of this offer, and he shortly after issued a statement in which he thanked for and took Chukche up on the offer!¹¹¹ On the occasion of the December 1991 referendum on the status of Ukraine, the Politburo of 'Luchi Chukche' issued a resolution, signed by by M. Polishchuk (commissar of the union) in which all voters were

¹⁰⁸ *Зелений світ*, no. 19-20, 1991, с. 3.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰ *Зелений світ*, no. 9, 1990, с. 3.

¹¹¹ Vladimir Zhirinovskii was at this time still a relatively unknown political figure.

requested to write the following on their referendum bulletins: '10,000 years of life for comrade Kim Il Sung!' In this manner Chukhche would finally be able to establish how many supporters it had in Ukraine!¹¹²

These and other actions amused the leadership of PZU, although some high-ranking members of the party like, for instance, Andrii Demydenko, expressed concern that the party might be better off distancing itself from the initiative as some people failed to see the irony in the 'happenings' and 'actions' organised by Chukhche and the group might therefore have a negative impact on the party.

Political Alliances

From late 1990 the priority in Soviet politics became to keep the Soviet Union together. Following the Lithuanian declaration of independence, German reunification and the 'revolutions' of Eastern Europe, Gorbachev lined up with the hard-liners within the CPSU. Rapid economic reforms were rejected, a moratorium was proposed on glasnost and Vadim Bakatin, who was considered a liberal, was replaced by the conservative Boris Pugo as Minister of the Interior. Eduard Shevardnadze resigned as Minister of Foreign Affairs in December 1990 warning of the danger of dictatorship and in January 1991 security forces clashed with democrats in Vilnius and Riga, resulting in many people being killed. TV programmes like 'Vzgliad' and 'TSN', which had given an objective picture of events in the Baltics were banned and in March 1991 there would be a referendum on the preservation of the USSR¹¹³.

Worried about current political events and concerned about the up-coming referendum, democratic parties from several of the Soviet republics decided to join forces in their struggle for political and economic reform. The *Democratic Congress* held its founding congress in Kharkiv on 26-27 January 1991 and was attended by both PZU and *Zelenyi Svit*, which by the way were the only Soviet Greens to attend the Congress. Other parties and movements included *Saiudis*, *RUKH*, the *Democratic Party of Russia* (Travkin's party), the Latvian and the Lithuanian *Democratic Party of Labour*, the *Social Democratic Party of Azerbaijan*, the *Belorussian National Front*, several trade unions and a number of Russian and Ukrainian political parties¹¹⁴.

¹¹²

¹¹³ Geoffrey A. Hosking, Jonathan Aves, Peter J.S. Duncan (1992), p. 99.

¹¹⁴ The declaration of the creation of the Democratic Congress was signed by 30 parties and movements: The Lithuanian Democratic Party of Labour, the Social Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, the Latvian Democratic Party of Labour, the Latvian Socialist Party, *PDVU*, the Ukrainian Liberal-Democratic Union, the United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine, the United Democratic Party of Belorussia, the movement 'Democratic Russia', the Russian Republican Party, the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine, the Trade Union of Kuzbass, the Ukrainian Student Union, the Russian Social Democratic Party, PZU, the Social Democratic Party of Kazakhstan, *Zelenyi Svit*, the Lithuanian Social D, *Saiudis*, *RUKH*, the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party, the Democratic *emocratic Party* Platform of Tajikistan, the Party

The declaration on the creation of the Democratic Congress stated that it was necessary to consolidate the democratic forces and liquidate the 'totalitarian regime' in a civilised manner. 'Imperial unitary structures' had to be replaced by sovereign, democratic states. The *Democratic Congress*, which united 'parties and movements of a social-democratic, liberal, general democratic and national democratic orientation' would interact on political and economic issues and would defend democracy and the republics' right to self-rule. The Congress opposed a renewal of the union treaty, wishing instead to build relations between sovereign republics based on parity. Rather than signing a new union treaty, the Congress favoured a 'Commonwealth of Sovereign States', where each state would conduct its own internal and foreign policy and would have the right of free entry and exit.

As for the environment, the Congress favoured close co-operation between the membership states in this area:

Согласование усилий в деле охраны и восстановления окружающей среды на территории государств-участников, включая разработку и осуществление общих экологических норм и программ, оказание помощи государствам-участникам при чрезвычайных обстоятельствах¹¹⁵.

The document also opted for nuclear-free zones in Ukraine and Belorussia, an issue which was high on *PZU*'s agenda.

The Democratic Congress opposed the referendum on the continuation of the union treaty not only as it opposed this treaty in itself, but also as the treaty, signed in 1922, was between union republics and not citizens. Consequently, it was not up to the citizens of the Soviet Union to decide the future fate of the treaty through a referendum. The status of each republic had to be decided by the free will of their own citizens and by nobody else. The Congress favoured 'a coalition of states...not a new state or a super-state'¹¹⁶. Finally, the *Democratic Congress* also condemned the crack-down in the Baltics, demanded the retirement of Gorbachev, Prime Minister Vladimir Pavlov, Iurii Kriuchkov (KGB), Pugo (Minister of the Interior), Iazov (Minister of Defence) and Kravchenko. It also issued a resolution in support of the Ukrainian People's Deputy

of Constitutional Democrats (Ukraine), the Ukrainian Democratic Party, Solidaric Trade Unions of Ukraine, the Free Democratic Party of Russia, the Belorussian National Front, the Armenian Party of National and Social Justice, the Lithuanian Democratic Party and the Lithuanian Workers' Union.

Source: Заявление о создании Демократического Конгресса (n.d.)

¹¹⁵ Совместная декларация политических партий, организаций и движений участников "Демократического Конгресса" (n.d.).

¹¹⁶ Заявление участников-учредителей Демоконгресса о союзном договоре и референдуме(n.d.).

Stepan Khmara, who had been arrested and stripped of his parliamentary immunity following an incident thought to have been provoked by the authorities, in Kiev¹¹⁷.

The Ukrainian Communist Party was not at all happy with the emergence of the Democratic Congress. In a critical comment printed in the CPU's official organ, *Radianska Ukraina*, V. Pavlenko criticised the initiative for being 'deceptive' and sharply condemned the use of phrases such as 'the communist crocodile' and 'monster' in references to the CPSU¹¹⁸.

Initiatives to unite Ukrainian political parties and movements in a similar block followed. In March 1991 Ihor Pushkar in an article in *Rovesnik* urged democratic minded people to as quickly as possible found political parties of a general socialist, national-democratic and liberal orientation and unite these in a bloc of democratic parties. The political forces of Ukraine could in Pushkar's view be classified in two groups - the communists and the democrats. Whereas CPU had close to two million members, the democratic parties had no more than 20,000 members altogether. The Communists were in the process of rearranging themselves, becoming familiar with and endorsing the major achievements of the national-democratic forces, encouraging the revival of national traditions and religion. The democratic forces, however,

Роблять основну опору на власні сили і на своїх лідерів. Уже давно настала пора створити крайову консультативну раду блоку демократичних партій на основі рівного і рівноправного представництва партій виходячи із спільної мети - побудови незалежної Української держави.

Such a council (rada) could on a temporary basis adopt a minimum programme, based on three 'no's, around which all democratic parties could unite:

- 1) No to the one-party unitary communist system.
- 2) No to a union existing above the states.
- 3) No to the pro-Communist Ukrainian parliament.

A Union of Democratic Parties should not be lead by any party or political leader in particular, but promote ideas common to all its members.

Another task of equal importance, was to establish political parties based on ideas and not individuals. There was a tendency to create parties along the Asian model - i.e. the creation of idol leaders, who people wanted to believe in like gods, and whose parties became one's religion. This, argued Pushkar, was the wrong approach:

¹¹⁷ *Ukraine Today*. Ukrainian Media Digest, compiled by Radio Liberty Monitoring, 20.2.1991, no. UF-070, p. 21.

¹¹⁸ *Радянська Україна*, 30.1.1991, с. 2.

Політична партія - не релігія, а тимчасове добровільне об'єднання частини населення, група людей, котра виробляє, підтримує, або погоджується з певною політичною програмою розвитку і перебудови суспільства. Політична партія - це інструмент...

Although ideas were no doubt important, it was, however, equally or perhaps even more important to have a visible leader for the emerging new political parties - especially as their number grew and political apathy started to take hold in society. Opinion polls (see below) clearly demonstrated that *PZU* had a much higher rating under the leadership of Iurii Shcherbak then later under Vitalii Kononov. Although it can be argued that there were a number of objective reasons for this - for instance a general fall in the rating of all political parties in Ukraine, a loss of interest in environmental issues, coinciding with increasing financial difficulties, it would be wrong to claim that the change of leadership within *PZU* had no significance at all.

Puslukar's appeal to all democratic parties to unite struck a chord within *PZU*, although the party wished to be an independent political force and an alternative to other established political parties (this wish was partly rooted in the generally high rating of *PZU* at the time), the party leadership acknowledged that the democratic parties had to unite against the CPU and in favour of Ukrainian independence in order to have an impact on Ukrainian politics.

A coalition of Ukrainian democratic parties was being established in parallel with the Democratic Congress. The new initiative, which was named *Demokratychna Ukraina*, was recognised by *PZU* and at a meeting of the Central Co-ordinating Council on 18 May 1991 it was decided that Kononov and Samiilenko would represent *PZU* vis-à-vis this coalition¹¹⁹.

In December 1992 yet another attempt at building a coalition of democratic parties took place in Kiev. The coalition, which was called *Konhres Natsionalno-Demokratychnykh Sil Ukrainy*, was initiated by *URP* to defend Ukrainian statehood and independence. A declaration passed at its constitutional meeting in Kiev warned against reactionary forces in Russia that were trying to turn CIS into a new empire. Signing the CIS statute whatever its form, would amount to a betrayal of the Ukrainian people. The Council of the *Konhres* therefore appealed to 'all democratic parties and public organisations, trade unions, national-cultural societies and creative circles to unite in a unitary, anti-imperialistic democratic front'¹²⁰. The coalition had the blessing of President Leonid Kravchuk, whose policies it endorsed on the grounds that they were necessary to secure Ukrainian independence. *PZU* representatives attended the inaugural meeting of the Congress but decided against joining it as it was considered an authoritarian organisation, dominated by *URP* and

¹¹⁹ Протокол засідання ЦКР ПЗУ, м. Київ, вул. Кєрова 5А, 18.05.1991 р.

¹²⁰ УГ-1, 25.12.92. УГН, 16:00, 19:00: "Діалог" 21:00 in *Ukraine Today*, Ukrainian Media Digest compiled by Radio Liberty Monitoring, no. 386, 28.12.1992, p. 17.

nationalist elements within *RUKH* and making allowances for democratic infringements (institution of presidential representatives - see below) in the name of Ukrainian independence.

A challenge facing all democratic parties was the increase in support for the socialists registered from 1992 onwards. As noted by Shcherbak, the socialists had an enormous advantage due to the economic crisis the country was in. This crisis was caused by a government that was not ready to introduce economic liberalisation and which had failed to predict Ukrainian independence. Every enterprise on Ukrainian territory was linked with 50-60 enterprises in other of the former Soviet republics. Radical reform was desperately needed, but with the current government in charge these were not likely to be introduced.

Acknowledging the need for economic reform, Shcherbak had been among the initiators to an opposition movement uniting Ukraine's 'left-of-centre' political forces. The new movement, which was named *Nova Ukraina* (New Ukraine) had endorsed *PZU*'s programme. By January 1992, however, the new movement counted only individuals such as Hrynev, Iemets, Filenko, Pylypchyk, Lanovyi, Shcherbak, Riabchenko and representatives of Ukrainian industry and trade unions.

5.2 Strategy, Tactics and Political Participation (1991-93)

5.2.1 Presentation of Strategy and Tactics

Second Congress (Ternopil, 1-2 June 1991)

The major aim of *PZU*'s Second Congress was to adapt a political strategy for the future. The First Congress failed to do this as it was preoccupied with party structure and other, more organisational issues. Other issues on the agenda were the official registration of *PZU*, changes to the structure and programme and the elaboration of the party's political platform.

The Congress discussed the aims and tasks of *PZU* and there was general agreement that the Green Party would be a party of the parliamentary type, basing its activities on non-violent methods and joining efforts with all other parties of a democratic orientation. The Green Party was for those who

Хочє відвести від себе і своїх дітей зловісну тїнь Чорнобиля,
хімічної та радіоактивної смерті, хто прагне бачити Україну

зеленою, квітучою, повноводною, повнопілляною суверенною державою в шістнадцятому європейському домі¹²¹.

PZU's political strategy was outlined in a resolution issued by the delegates towards the end of the Congress. According to the resolution, *PZU* would conduct independent politics, 'co-operating with all democratic parties, whose ideology, principles and common practices do not violate the principles and aims of *PZU*':

Діючи спільно із політичними союзниками у справі досягнення стратегічної мети – здобуття Україною державної незалежності і створення правової держави. ПЗУ водночас підкреслює пріоритетність для її політичної діяльності таких проблем, як захисту довкілля, здоров'я людей і соціального захисту, розвитку громадського самоврядування, як бази демократичного суспільства¹²².

PZU would give priority to the campaign for a nuclear-free Ukraine: free from nuclear weapons and nuclear power stations and for a full demilitarisation of the country. 'Only a nuclear-free, peace-loving and demilitarised Ukraine can join the European and international concord', which was one of the major political aims of the Ukrainian Greens.

The resolutions passed by the Congress also addressed other political issues, such as the IAEA-report referred to above, the political status of Ukraine and health. As for the IAEA Chernobyl report, *PZU* held the view that it had exceeded its own statute when, after having examined only seven inhabited areas in the Chernobyl-zone, it drew generalised conclusions for the population of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia to the effect that the fall-out from the accident posed no health threat to the people living in contaminated areas. This, argued the Greens, proved that the IAEA, instead of being an agency to control the proliferation of radioactive materials, had been transformed into an agency advertising nuclear power for political purposes. *PZU* demanded of the Ukrainian government that its grievances be made known through the United Nations. What was more, the Green Party demanded that the non-nuclear principles stated in the declaration of Ukrainian sovereignty be implemented: 'Ukraine must be free from not only nuclear weapons but also from nuclear energy and nuclear industries (except for the medical)'. Finally, *PZU* urged the government to observe *Verkhovna Rada's* moratorium on nuclear power. Related to this, *PZU* favoured the close-down of all nuclear power stations in Ukraine during 1991 in parallel with the removal of all nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory.

¹²¹ *За впливу України*, 18.6.1991, с. 2.

¹²² Про політичну стратегію ПЗУ (n.d.).

After the Chernobyl accident the health of children in Ukraine deteriorated. To stop this trend, *PZU* recommended that pregnant women and children be provided with 'safe' (i.e. environmentally clean) food products. To create ecological awareness, it was suggested that ecological courses be provided from the level of kindergarten to college and that ecology faculties be created at all universities. *Verkhovna Rada* ought to set up a commission to monitor the impact of Chernobyl on children's health in all contaminated areas of Ukraine, including Kiev. There was an urgent need for a complex programme on health care for children affected by the Chernobyl accident. A part of such a complex programme would be the 'rehabilitation' of children through stays in sanatoriums and holiday resorts in non-contaminated parts of Ukraine. Moreover, food products should also be reinforced with vitamins to ensure a nutritious diet for the young¹²³.

By stating its commitment to one-sided nuclear disarmament, *PZU* presented itself as not only an environmental, but also an anti-military party (I will return to this issue below). Other political parties, while sharing *PZU*'s concern for the environment, did at the time not pay much attention to Ukraine's nuclear weapons. Their major concern was to secure not only Ukrainian real sovereignty but also independence. Ukraine could only preserve its independence from Russia through strength and this, needless to say, necessitated some military capability. Nuclear-free zones were an important element of *PZU*'s nuclear policies; as seen in Chapter Three, Andrii Demydenko, for instance, attended an international conference on local governments and nuclear-free zones in Glasgow in November 1991 and *PZU* members of *Kievrada* (the Kiev city council) gave priority to this issue. *PZU*'s anti-military commitment was supported by the anti-military commission of *Zelenyi Svit*, which was uncovering evidence of grave environmental damage, caused by military units scattered around Ukraine. The evidence provided by *Zelenyi Svit* could then be used as policy-input by *PZU*.

Whereas the Green Party was able to outline its policies, it did not really have a concept for how to mobilise support for and later implement its policies. *PZU* had no deputies in *Verkhovna Rada*. The number of deputies in local and regional parliaments who were elected either as *Zelenyi Svit* representatives or with the backing of *Zelenyi Svit* during the 1990 elections were quite a few. However, only a few of these pledged their support of *PZU*. Moreover, *PZU* found it increasingly hard to mobilise the general public in support of its policies. Finally, problems emerged within the Green Party due to disagreements over policies, the emergence of fractions and the lack of a party apparatus that could take care of day-to-day activities and funding to build such an apparatus. Thus, in the early days of *PZU* the major focus of attention was with internal

¹²³ *Зелений світ*, no. 9, 1991, с. 6. Resolutions passed on 2.6.1991.

affairs, whereas declarations and resolutions were sent to the press and press-conferences organised on a regular basis to make the Green Party's policies known to the general public.

As for changes in the statute, the Congress decided to reduce the age limit for joining *PZU* from 18 to 17 years, so that young men could join the party before going to the army. The Congress also endorsed a decision to join the movement *Nezalezhna Demokratichna Ukraina* (Independent Democratic Ukraine).

5.2.2 Political Participation

Participation in Official Structures

The initiative to Shcherbak joining the Ukrainian government was, as seen in Chapter Three, made by Prime Minister Vytold Fokin. In an attempt to fend off demands that he resign from his position, he initiated a broad coalition government for reform. In this connection, Vitalii Kononov wrote a letter to Leonid Kravchuk, who was at the time president of *Verkhovna Rada*. In the letter he expressed the view that *PZU*, taking into account 'the highest interests of the people of Ukraine'

Пішла назустріч намаганням прем'єрміністра п. Фокіна сформувати Уряд народної довіри, погодилися прийняти участь в ньому в особі лідера партії п. Щербака, в новій мірі усвідомлюючи всю хискість і небезпеку для репоне політика в період нестабільності і економічної кризи взяти на себе відповідальність за таку важливу сферу, як охорона довкілля.

Unfortunately, however, the parliament had 'failed to understand the situation' and demonstrated a lack of respect for a person who was internationally known and who had become a symbol of the fight against Chernobyl, by not electing him for the post of Ukrainian Minister of the Environment during the vote in parliament. This, in Kononov's opinion, represented a lost opportunity to consolidate the constructive forces in Ukraine 'for the revival of the fatherland'.

As seen in Chapter Three Shcherbak's candidacy was eventually endorsed by parliament in the summer of 1991. Half a year later, at the meeting of *PZU*'s Central Co-ordinating Council on 11 January 1992, Shcherbak accounted for his work in the ministry so far. As a minister he had gained access to a wealth of information and had initiated a reform of the ministry's structures. A directorate to control military pollution had been set up and the Law of Environmental Protection had been passed. However, the ministry needed assistance as it proved difficult to change staff (30% of staff in the regional administrations had been replaced and so had 50% of ministerial

staff). *Verkhovna Rada* had put obstacles in the way for the ministry by introducing a resolution prohibiting the closure of enterprises without the consent of the parliament. Moreover, the ministry lacked proper laboratory facilities. The doors to the ministry were open to everybody and Shcherbak urged the party not to raise itself above the country's ecological problems.

Pushkar, however, was critical of Shcherbak's efforts so far, complaining that little had been done to protect the river Dniestr. Androsov (Sumy) was sceptical to what Shcherbak might achieve, referring to Kravchuk, who had allegedly stated that as long as the economic situation in Ukraine did not improve, there would be no ecology¹²⁴.

Green President? - The Presidential Elections (December 1991).

Following the successful local elections in 1990, during which a number of Greens were elected in several of Ukraine's districts, and Shcherbak's successful election to the post of Ukrainian Minister of the Environment, some members of *PZU* wanted to put forward Shcherbak's candidacy for the up-coming December 1991 Presidential Elections. Shcherbak was a well-known and respected public figure in Ukraine and opinion polls during 1991 indicated that the Green Movement (i.e. *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU*) had considerable support among the country's electorate (cf. Chapter Three). Others voiced their support for Shcherbak's candidacy while simultaneously expressing concern that his election as Ukrainian Minister of the Environment might eventually discredit the Green Movement for the reasons mentioned in Chapter Three. If Shcherbak would succeed in being elected Ukrainian President, he would step down as Minister of the Environment before he could be accused of having failed to implement changes in the ministry and measures to stabilise the deterioration of the republic's environment.

There was, however, also considerable opposition within the Green Party to putting forward Shcherbak's candidacy. Should he take part in the elections, party activists would be tied up in campaigning work at a time when it was deemed more expedient to build a more solid organisational and material basis for the party. Moreover, *PZU* did not really have the financial resources to back up a presidential campaign. Yet others were worried that should Shcherbak fail to be elected, this would have a negative effect not only on the image of the new party but also on morale (within the party).

Shcherbak himself in an interview with *Literaturna Ukraina*¹²⁵ expressed the view that he found it very difficult to decide whether or not to run for president. As a newly appointed Minister of the Environment he had hardly had any time to restructure the ministry. Moreover, if elected

¹²⁴ Протокол №1, засідання ЦКР ПЗУ (n.d.).

¹²⁵ *Літературна Україна*, с. 1, 7.

president, he would have to start practically from scratch, building up an independent Ukrainian state. When PZU approached him on this matter he was therefore very hesitant. Until 19 August he declined the offer. In interviews given prior to this date Shcherbak supported Kravchuk's candidacy for the post, seeing in him the most appropriate candidate and also the person with the highest chances of being elected. In Shcherbak's view Kravchuk seemed one of the most level-headed politicians Ukraine had. The coup, however, changed things: it provided other candidates, including Shcherbak, with an opportunity to sharply criticise Kravchuk for his wavering during the coup and as a person who emerged from the Communist Party apparatus. Shcherbak therefore decided to accept the offer to stand as a presidential candidate. On the issue of the campaign itself, he had the following to say:

Вважаю, кожен кандидат повинен не обливати брудом свого суперника, не намагатися набрати очки у дрібній сварці, а привернути увагу народу України до своєї програми, до тих заходів, які міг би здійснити як майбутній Президент України...Я терпляче вирішив висунути свою кандидатуру (точніше, як уже мовилося, не я висунув, а партія) для того, щоб представити свою програму, свої погляди (и не лише свої): це ціла філософія Партії зелених України, це філософія гуманізму, виживання, демократії, братання людей – усіх, хто живе на території України.

Having registered as a candidate, Shcherbak refused to outline his electoral platform, arguing that his priority issue was to gather the required 100,000 signatures needed to enter the actual elections. It would, in Shcherbak's view, not be easy to collect these:

Не розумію, як можна ставити на одну дошку кандидатів, висунутих легальними, зареєстрованими партіями, и так званих самовисуванців. Парламентська практика і система, що існує на Заході, відкидають таку можливість.

Although Shcherbak would only start a proper election campaign if he succeeded in collecting the required number of signatures, he revealed that a key element in his campaign would be the physical and spiritual rebirth of the Ukrainian people, which was finding itself in a state of ecological and demographic catastrophe:

Не секрет, що почалося вимирання нашого народу. Особливу тривожу викликає ситуація в сільських місцевостях, де постаріння населення вже набуло розмірів національного катастрофи: відплив молоді з села у місто створює величезні проблеми для нас як нації традиційно аграрної. Таким чином, буде висунута цілісна програма екологічного і демографічного відродження України.

Shcherbak also favoured uniting people rather than causing discord. Should this fail, a situation in Ukraine similar to that of Yugoslavia could not be excluded. The president should therefore raise himself above politics and be a president of everyone living in Ukraine:

Президент повинен стояти на дуже розв'язливих, поміркованих, центристських позиціях; мені на цій високій посаді бачиться людина, яка задовольнила б і українців, котрі хочуть будувати суверенну, незалежну державу, і росіян, що також хочуть жити в розвиненій, цивілізованій Україні.

Should he fail to collect enough signatures, Shcherbak would support another candidate possessing the qualities outlined above. He also expressed himself in favour of reforming state institutions. With regard to the presidency, a 'total' presidential power had yet to be created. There was also a need for a concept for building an independent Ukraine. The sooner such a system could be developed, the more likely Ukraine would be to avoid ethnically motivated conflicts. Shcherbak also favoured an active Ukrainian foreign policy, a priority issue of which would be the creation of correct and friendly relations with Poland. A more long-term goal in Ukrainian foreign policy would be for Ukraine to become a member of the European Community, thus bringing Ukraine back into Europe. Good links with the Ukrainian Diaspora and Israel were also desirable.

Finally, Shcherbak emphasised his commitment to the environment and disarmament, calling for Ukraine to take part in talks on what to do with the 120 SS-19 and other rockets stored on Ukrainian territory. Ukraine, he argued, was surrounded by several non-nuclear powers. Ukraine should therefore declare its intent to achieve a non-nuclear status as stated in its Declaration of Sovereignty:

Україна житиме безпечніше й заможніше, якщо не матиме ядерної зброї. Це аксіома.

5.2.3 Internal Party Developments

Party Funding

The issue of funding came up at the Central Co-ordinating Committee's January 1992 meeting¹²⁶. Kononov noted in his opening address to the meeting that not only was there a need to raise the authority of PZU as a party, but also of its members as politicians. A prerequisite for doing this

¹²⁶ Протокол №1, засідання ЦКР ПЗУ (n.d.).

was to secure funding for the party. Sydorkin (Uman), who was in charge of the party's finances, argued that since *PZU* as a party was not allowed to conduct industrial activities, the party would have to finance its work from gifts and donations. In West Ukraine members of *PZU* (Pushkar) were earning money for the party by participating in ecological expert assessments and related activities.

Ivanov (Kiev) suggested that *PZU* could also collect money through campaigns, whereas Holub suggested that *PZU* should operate through *Zelenyi Svit*, using the association as an 'economic base', so to speak. Yet others, like Stepaniak (Ivano-Frankivsk) held the view that party activities ought to be funded by membership fees. The size of the fee could be set at 1% of one's income. In the end, however, local organisations were recommended to put the membership fees as low as possible and fund their activities through concrete environmental work (expert assessments) and campaign collections. Eventually it was decided to organise work jointly between *PZU* and *Zelenyi Svit* locally. Pushkar and Samilenko were put in charge of negotiating with *Zelenyi Svit* centrally about co-operation in Kiev and at the national level¹²⁷.

Party Structure - a Reassessment

The issue of structure was also debated by the Central Co-ordinating Council in January 1992. Shulga (Kiev) complained that there were too many co-leaders and that the party organisation was not working properly. To give an example, he referred to the August 1991 coup when only one of the nine co-leaders (Sydorkin, who at the time happened to be in Kiev) spoke up on behalf of the Green Party. Sydorkin endorsed Shulga's view, arguing that the institution of co-leaders had outlived itself. Instead there was a need for a Political Council and a Secretariat. Whereas the former would discuss current political issues, the latter would be in charge of the party organisation and also of links with other political organisations and parties. A temporary resolution was endorsed by the meeting, creating these two institutions. The Political Council was composed by all members of the Central Co-ordinating Council and eight non-members. As its speaker, the Council elected Vitalii Kononov. Ihor Pushkar was elected head of the secretariat¹²⁸,

¹²⁷ Виписка із протоколу №1 засідання ЦКР ПЗУ 11 січня 1992 р. м. Київ, с. 2.

¹²⁸ Plans regarding the structure of the secretariat were highly ambitious; apart from a leader and deputy leader, the secretariat would be composed of four units (Organisational-financial, Press and information, Theoretic-analytical and Propaganda-redaction). The secretariat would also be responsible for implementing decisions made by the Congress, coordinate activities at the oblast level and keep control with the party's material base (source: Засідання центральної координаційної ради партії зелених України. Положення про секретаріат партії зелених України). However, as finances were a big problem within the party, the secretariat, rather than being a big and well-organised unit, could only cope with basic tasks. In August 1992 at another meeting of the Central Coordinating Council, Ihor Pushkar was criticised for not having done enough as a secretary. He refuted such allegations by saying that it was not as simple as to just give him a paper file and say that he was the

whereas Kurykin was put in charge of international questions and links and Kholiavenko was made responsible for organisational issues¹²⁹.

As for party activities so far, Kononov and Shecherbak were highly critical of these:

Партія не витримала істини на своє існування. Це не тільки виборча кампанія, але ПЗУ не чуло на політичній арені, вона не реагує на політичні події.

There were both subjective and objective reasons for this; lack of funding and a general drop in interests among the Ukrainian population for environmental issues. Still, the party needed to develop its own positions on current issues such as the army and Ukraine's nuclear weapons and against 'Russia's chauvinism'. *PZU* had to establish itself firmly (and behave) like a political party, not as a movement.

Third Congress (9-10 October 1992) and Fractions

The third congress of *PZU* gathered in Kiev in October 1992 to discuss tactics, changes and additions to the programme and statute. There was general agreement in the Green Party that the party structure had to be tightened up and there was also a need to define the tasks of the Central Co-ordinating Council, the Political Council and the Secretariat. A lack of regulations had caused problems with how to deal with votes cast and there had also been some problems in defining what the relationship between the Central Co-ordinating Council and the Political Council should be.

The decision to call a Congress was made by the Central Co-ordinating Council at a meeting in Kiev on 23 August the same year and was attended by 97 delegates - 28 of whom were women and 69 men - from 16 oblasts of Ukraine and Kiev¹³⁰. It was a relatively young and very well-educated group of people that gathered in Kiev: some 40 of the delegates were younger than 30 years old, another 50 were between 30 and 50 years of age, whereas only seven were older than 50 years. One of the delegates was a member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, six held PhD degrees, whereas another 74 had higher education. The remaining 16 had middle specialised education¹³¹.

secretariat. Information, funding and a clear division of tasks were also needed. A vote over whether to keep Pushkar as the secretary of *PZU* was made and whereas six voted in favour of Pushkar, 11 voted against and five abstained. Pushkar was replaced by Iurii Samiilenko (source: own notes from meeting of Central Coordinating Council, Kiev, 23.8.1992).

¹²⁹ Вилінська із протоколу №1, засідання ЦКР ПЗУ 11 січня 1992 р., м. Київ, с. 2.

¹³⁰ The oblasts represented were Vinnytsia, Dnipropetrovsk, Zakarpattia, Zaporizhzhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kiev, Lviv, Nikolaev, Odessa, Sumy, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Kherson, Cherkasy, Chernivtsi and Chernihiv.

¹³¹ Лічилниця комісія. Протокол №2 (10.10.92) Список делегатів.

The Congress was opened by Vitalii Kononov, who had been appointed temporary leader after Shcherbak resigned from this post following his successful election as Ukrainian Minister of the Environment. A children's choir then sang the national anthem (*Sheh ne vmerla Ukraina*) and a religious hymn (*Bozhe velykyi, edynyi*). Greetings then followed from the deputy leader of *URP*, *KDPU* and *Nova Ukraina*.

Considerable attention was given to Ihor Pushkar, from Ternopil, who had organised a 'radical fraction' within the Green Party. Pushkar justified the existence of the fraction by arguing that 'the party must be workable and united around its aims, although the tactics may vary'.

The 'radical fraction' saw national revival as the major task of *PZU*. It also favoured close co-operation with green organisations. *PZU*'s Political Council had rejected such co-operation. As the fraction was opposed by quite a few members of the party, Pushkar accused a part of the party's rank and file membership of being 'red-brown'. This did not go down well with those opposed to Pushkar's fraction; Evhenia Derkach, from Mukachevo, for instance sharply attacked allegations to the effect that this made her 'brown' in political terms. Others, like Symus (Lviv) were more interested in the Radical Fraction's platform. Did it have any principal divergences or had it simply chosen to work on some concrete issues? If the latter was the case, then the fraction could not really be classified as a fraction. Olinchuk from Ternopil objected to the registration of the fraction in the first place: in his opinion registering the fraction shortly before the Congress contradicted *PZU*'s statute. The most logical and also correct from a legal point of view, would be to first create clubs, then register them and only afterwards gather them into a fraction.

Despite the disagreements, however, Sviatoslav Dudko, who was attending the Congress as a guest, thus not automatically having the right to address the Congress from the rostrum, was given the podium at Pushkar's request to read the fraction's propositions regarding the party programme. Pushkar then read out the political platform of the radical fraction to those present. Most of the propositions went down well with those present and Samilenko proposed that all of these, except for a suggestion that the party express a lack of confidence in Iurii Shcherbak, be incorporated into the Congress' resolutions. One of the propositions, however, facilitated a sharp discussion on the last day of the Congress: Pushkar proposed that the following point be included in the statute:

Член ПЗУ з числа керівників партіоменклатури не допускається до керівних (виборних) посад у партії.

Klavdia Khaliavenko (Kiev) wrote a letter to the Congress, supported by Heller, Babinin (Nikopol) and Bondarenko (Lviv) in which she stated that should Pushkar's proposition be endorsed,

Порушаєм основні принципи зелених: гуманізм і демократія. Крім того, одна із прийнятих статей суперечить чинному законодавству (порушує рівність прав людей а також іншій прийнятій статті).

A majority voted in favour of Pushkar's proposal, but it failed to be passed, as to change the statute a 2/3 majority was required. Thus, although 51 voted in favour of the proposal (29 against and seven abstained), this was still short of the 65 votes needed for the vote to be passed¹³². Pushkar apparently also tried to register another fraction - the social fraction - composed of delegates with many children, at a meeting of the Central Co-ordinating Council on the eve of the Congress (the day before), but this attempt failed.

As was the case in *Zelenyi Svit*, there was also some conflict between the Kiev members of the Green Party and those from elsewhere. Valentyn Iankovskii from Odessa *PZU* in a letter to the central party leadership a month after the Congress argued that it might be necessary to set up a liberal fraction for South Ukraine, then although he did not really favour this option:

Я цього не бажаю, але також не бажаю працювати з такими документами, котрі не ураховують специфіку регіону та не допомагають працювати¹³³.

A deputy from Kharkiv, Shylo, reminded the delegates that the most important thing for *PZU* at the moment was unity. The party should rid itself of personal ambitions and work together. Not everything was well within the party; Hrysiuk (Kaharlyk) called for more attention to be paid to organisational work. Too much attention had been focused on establishing a party organisation (all-Ukrainian) in Kiev, at the expense of local party clubs. Sydorkin (Uman) pointed out that this could be explained by the party's general lack of funds; in order to organise party clubs locally, it was necessary to travel to the regions. In the Uman district small villages had two or three *PZU* members each. More important, though, than focusing on numbers was the need to organise the party and come up with funding for it. In Uman the Greens therefore focused on the organisation of 'ecological' enterprises. A programme of self-financing had been elaborated and so far Uman had handed over some 20,000 karbovantsy to the party leadership.

Khudin (South-East), co-ordinating *PZU* activities in the Eastern oblasts of Poltava, Kharkiv and Sumy, informed the Congress that the situation regarding local clubs was very difficult in his oblast. No party clubs had so far been set up as he and other Greens had spent most of their time

¹³² Протокол №1 лічильної комісії ІІІ з'їзду Партії Зелених України під 11 жовтня 1992 року, с. 2.

¹³³ Letter/note dated 26.11.1992.

working for *Zelenyi Svit*. In Kharkiv oblast the situation was somewhat better, thanks to the efforts of Shylo. In Sumy, however, things were worse. Melnyk (Ivano-Frankivsk) favoured a strategy to more actively convince members of the intelligentsia to join the party. Hrytskaniuk (Lviv oblast) complained that *PZU* had failed to prepare beforehand the theoretical justification on issues to be discussed at the Congress. The party's general failure to stake out a clear policy was in his view the major reason why the Green Party had started to do badly at ratings. A clear strategy was needed for future parliamentary elections (provisions regarding elections were needed in the party structure) and a tight structure was required to make the party organisation functional with the elections in mind.

Bevz (Kiev) complained that *PZU* was not being active enough on the political scene. The party should analyse the political situation and make prognoses for the future. Besides, it had to make a stand on whom to support for prime minister and other posts in the government. There were two real candidacies for a new Ukrainian Prime Minister, Symonenko and Kuchma. The former, who was the outgoing Prime Minister, had declined to fund an ecological programme elaborated by the Ministry of the Environment and estimated to cost 15 million karbovantsy to implement. Consequently, Bevz drew the conclusion that *PZU* should support Kuchma's candidacy.

Another Kiev delegate, Moskvyn, argued that the Kiev Co-ordinating Club of *PZU* had suggested that the party support Iurii Kostenko (*RUKH*) for the post of Minister of the Environment to take over after Shcherbak, who had been appointed ambassador to Israel shortly before the Third Congress. He urged the Congress to make a stand on this issue; 'Too often *PZU* is being identified with *Zelenyi Svit*'. It should, however, be remembered that as party and movement the two must approach things differently. *PZU*'s problem was that it was not thinking politically. This, argued Moskvyn, was a challenge the party had to take on.

The delegates were given a brief orientation by the speaker of the Political Council, Serhii Kurykin, regarding proposed changes in the programme. Delegates from Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Kiev oblasts wanted to add a preamble to the programme, defining *PZU* as a parliamentary party, 'functioning under the establishment of Ukrainian independence and within a context of deep economic and ecological crisis'. The three major directions in the party's activities should be to secure an ecologically safe economy, to demilitarise Ukraine and Ukrainian society and to be a defender of human rights.

The preamble and other amendments were made to the programme without any major discussions and with a large majority: for instance a clause on ecological education and for a programme to be made for how to achieve this was incorporated into the section on 'the Ecological and Economical Spheres'. Similarly, statements to the effect that Ukrainian troops

could only operate on other countries' territory as part of a UN-force and for civil service to be offered as an alternative to military service were included. The revised programme also stated as one of *PZU*'s goals that the state must guarantee the ecological safety of its citizens.

Whereas no significant changes were made to the programme, the statute underwent considerable re-organisation. As far as the party structure was concerned, instead of having nine co-leaders, *PZU* would in the future be headed by one leader, Vitalii Kononov (he was elected temporary leader of *PZU* after Iurii Shcherbak resigned, following his appointment as Ukrainian Minister of the Environment). Although earlier the local party groups had been more or less autonomous, party discipline would be strengthened in the future. To co-ordinate work locally, the five co-leaders elected by the Congress were each put in charge of the major directions in *PZU*'s activities.

There were two contenders for the party leadership - Kononov and Pushkar -, the latter whom put forward his own candidacy. The vote between the two is therefore interesting as it gives an indication of the level of support for the Radical Fraction¹³⁴ within the Green Party. If we are to go by the number of votes Pushkar gathered, the fraction was not particularly strong: Pushkar got only 11 votes (66 against, eight abstained), whereas Kononov got 82 votes (four against and two abstained). People unhappy about the Radical Fraction initiated a vote on their exclusion from the party for 'inaction'. Fifty delegates voted in favour of exclusion, whereas 26 voted against and 10 abstained. The vote was declared invalid as only 86 of the delegates took part in the vote. It did, however, in effect damage Pushkar's reputation within the party¹³⁵ and shortly after, he broke with *PZU*.

Four deputy leaders were elected: Sykorkin (economical questions), Tverdostup (ecological questions), Karavanska (social issues) and Kurykin (political links). The secretariat, composed by 11 representatives from the oblasts, was to be headed by Iurii Samiilenko (Kiev). A considerably reduced (size-wise) Central Co-ordinating Committee, consisting of nine members, was also elected.

¹³⁴ According to Протокол рішень конференції радикальної фракції ПЗУ Тернопільської області (n.d.). This conference took place on the eve of *PZU*'s Third Congress. Some 12 groups in Ternopil oblast supported the radical fraction. Representatives from these groups met to decide the issue of whom to send to Kiev to attend the Congress. It was suggested that each group send one delegate, but in the end only five names were put forward for this purpose (Kliuvan, Kobliuk, Pushkar, Shtuka and Sokol).

¹³⁵ The controversy around Pushkar started long before the Third Congress took place in Kiev. Shortly after *PZU* was founded, Pushkar was appointed party secretary. Some people thought he was not being active enough for the job, and at a meeting of the Central Coordinating Council in Kiev in the summer of 1991 he was replaced. The founding of the Radical Fraction further harmed Pushkar's position within the party, as this was seen by those negative to Pushkar in the first place, as an attempt at gaining the upper hand within the party and as harmful to the party itself, given that it was still young and weak.

Shortly after the Congress a press-conference was held at which party representatives stressed that *PZU* was a political party and not an environmental organisation. As a party, *PZU* would not limit itself to the solving of strictly ecological problems. This claim was enhanced by the fact that five of the nine resolutions passed by the Congress were political rather than environmental. *PZU* sharply criticised *Verkhovna Rada* for failing to bring the Ukrainian society out of the economic crisis it was in. A draft constitution was proposed. Finally, a positive assessment was made of what the Green Party had so far achieved:

ПЗУ вважає, що за умов підтримки з боку прихильників партія вона незабаром рішуче заявить про себе. Порушуючи важливі соціально-політичні проблеми і тих, хто їх створює, ПЗУ матиме значні шанси під час виборів до парламенту на багатопартійній основі.¹³⁶

It can be argued that this assessment was slightly optimistic given that the Green Party had still not produced a coherent political programme to present to the electorate, but rather issued statements and press-releases on various issues as they came up. On the other hand, judging by the polls, *PZU* had a high rating among the Ukrainian electorate. The mistake of the party's leadership was perhaps that it relied too much on the results of opinion polls at a time when the methodology for how to conduct polls was still weak and the electorate volatile in that opinions changed quickly. Moreover, conflicts were building up within *PZU*: Pushkar and his group (the radical fraction) were excluded at the third congress (personal conflicts) and afterwards some people expressed their dissatisfaction with Kononov for having allowed this to happen¹³⁷. Then, in the autumn of 1992, a new scandal broke with the Kiev organisation of *PZU*.

Sharp criticism of the Congress and of the Green Party more generally was voiced in *News from Ukraine*¹³⁸ shortly after the Congress - by people within the party. Volodymyr Tymonin (Kiev), for instance, criticised *PZU* for opting for self-isolation at a time when the Green Party should be actively taking part in building the Ukrainian state: according to one of the resolutions passed by the Congress, *PZU* would continue to be an independent political force in the process of state building and in the social life of the country.

In fact, it is self-isolation of the party amid a considerable drop in the party's membership - from 7,000 to 2,000. All this might lead to its complete failure at the elections. It looks like a small pocket party is being formed now, as before, just to suit its leader (earlier it was Yuri Shcherbak, now it is Vitaly Kononov).

¹³⁶ *Зелений світ*, no. 13, 1992, c. 1.

¹³⁷ Interview with Serhii Hrabovskyi, Kiev, May 1994.

¹³⁸ *News from Ukraine*, no. 46, 1992, p. 5.

Tymonin also complained that *PZU* was run in an authoritarian manner and that the delegates at the congress were generally passive, simply endorsing documents and resolution without any debate. Those who did try to address the Congress were often pressed by the presidium by comments such as 'you weren't given the floor. Sit down!', although to some extent this was understandable as the presidium had lots of problems with Ihor Pushkar's radical fraction.

Sviatoslav Dudko - the co-ordinator of the radical fraction - was also critical, arguing that the policy chosen by the party would eventually lead to collapse. The mere fact that membership figures had dropped so sharply was a clear indication to this effect. In Dudko's view there were two major reasons for the heavy loss of members: firstly, party life was over-organised, leaving little leeway for manoeuvring, and secondly, *PZU*'s leaders were pursuing their own personal interests rather than party-goals. The presidium of the Congress, he argued, had clearly infringed the party's statute when it had refused Dudko a mandate due to his radical stands. Instead, he had been 'awarded' status at a guest, which meant that he had no right to speak from the rostrum. Furthermore, the organisation committee had refused to register clubs making up the party's radical fraction. The reason given for this was that it would lead to the splitting up of *PZU*. However, the statute contained no paragraph or clause preventing clubs from forming on the eve of the Congress. Dudko therefore drew the conclusion that the party leadership chose to infringe its own statute whenever this suited it. The heavy-handed manner in which the Congress was conducted, resulted in outbreaks of disapproval against the party leadership; several delegates protested by tearing up their party membership cards and mandates.

Overall, though, Dudko claimed that the Radical Fraction had succeeded in making public its political platform and in winning support for some of its propositions regarding changes to the programme and statute. Three of these, however, failed to win the congress' support: the Congress did not accept that compensation for ecological damage caused to Ukrainian territory by the USSR should be sought from Russia on the grounds that Russia had proclaimed itself the successor to the Soviet Union. Neither were the delegates willing to support a vote of no-confidence in Iurii Sheherbak in connection with his appointment as Ukrainian Ambassador to Israel. The Radical Fraction was not confident that he would represent Ukraine's interests in Israel. And finally, as seen above, the Radical Fraction failed to mobilise a sufficient number of members in support of preventing former Communist Party functionaries from holding elected posts within the Green Party. Dudko finished off his article by suggesting that *PZU* spend more time on practical environmental work and encouraging all party members to work for the environment and not for their own careers.

A third assessment of the Congress was provided by Oleksandr Shulga (former member of *Zelenyi Svit*'s Revision Commission). Like Tymonin, Shulga held the view that the party

leadership was not doing enough to implement its own motto 'To work for a safe natural environment for Ukraine's population'. This motto, he claimed, remained only on paper. *PZU*'s leadership was wrong in rejecting the offer to be part of a new Cabinet of Ministers by refusing to propose its own candidates for a ministerial post. This could be interpreted to the effect that the Green Party wanted to avoid responsibility. Further, Shulga thought the party was being too passive towards the general public: *PZU* had amongst its ranks and supporters specialists of world calibre in the areas of nuclear power and nuclear biology. These were in a position to explain to the public the dangers of Chernobyl on people's lives and health. Even though the Ukrainian government had long ago started publishing maps on pollution of Ukraine's territory, which greatly facilitated the task of the Greens, no attempts had so far been made at explaining these maps to people. Shulga in this connection referred to Andrii Demydenko, who had allegedly said the following: 'why should we explain if nobody is interested in the information?' Shulga's reply was that people would hardly be afraid of things they did not understand.

Membership Developments

As seen above, a sharp decline in membership figures had taken place within *PZU* since the party was registered in 1991. This, together with discord within some of the party organisations¹³⁹, was worrying not only as it could be taken as a weakening of the party (some people, however, saw it as a healthy development: many of those who joined *PZU* during its membership campaign were neither particularly Green or interested in party work), but also as the Green Party needed to re-register itself with the Ministry of Justice, following the passing of the 'Law on Public Organisations'. Although for the purpose of re-registration there was no requirement that the party must have at least 3,000 members, things still did not look good.

Kononov in his letter¹⁴⁰ to the Ministry of Justice claimed that *PZU* had 100 registered party clubs with 1,863 members. The following breakdown was also provided:

¹³⁹ Discord was reported in the Chernivtsi oblast organisation of *PZU* on the eve of the Third Congress. Apparently there was disagreement on how to implement the tasks outlined in the party programme and a leadership struggle had broken out as a result. Further problems arose when delegates for the Congress had to be elected. However, the Central Coordinating Council decided to deal with the situation at its first meeting after the Congress and in the meantime allow both sides access to the Congress. Problems were also reported within the Kiev Coordinating Council, where Tymonin was being ostracised for not being sufficiently 'green'.

¹⁴⁰ Letter no. 28, dated 7.12.1992 to the Chairman of the Department for Public Movements of the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice, N. Lukashov.

Table 5.1 Membership Figures, PZU Oblast Groups

Oblast	Number of members	Number of clubs
Ternopil	402	21
Ivano-Frankivsk	332	18
Kiev	287	17
Lviv	209	12
Zakarpattia	170	9
Chernivtsi	108	6
Kharkiv	97	5
Rivne	52	2
Vinnitsia	45	2
Cherkasy	34	2
Volynia	30	2
Republic of Crimea	27	1
Odessa	27	1
Chernihiv	25	1
Dnipropetrovsk	18	1

When first registered on 24 May 1991, the Ministry of Justice had registered 3,421 members of *PZU*. According to data on political parties registered by the Ministry of Justice (April 1993), *PZU* at the time claimed to have 10,000 members on its membership list. The highest figure mentioned by members of *PZU* themselves, though, was 7,000. It is therefore not unlikely that the number of members was somewhat exaggerated to boost the strength of the party vis-a-vis the authorities. In 1991 the political situation was still difficult for new political parties and one of *PZU*'s members, Hrisiuk from Kaharlyk, when asked how many members his local organisation had, refused to reveal this information, arguing that it would not be in the interests of the party to reveal such information as it could be used against it by its political opponents.

Compared with other political parties in terms of registered membership, though, *PZU* was not doing badly at all. Then judging by data provided by the Ministry of Justice¹⁴¹, only few political parties had more than 3,000 members in the first place. In September 1991 the number of members required to register political parties was reduced from 3,000 to 300 as only five parties had met that target:

¹⁴¹ *Політична думка/Political Thought*, no. 1, 1993, с. 125-26.

Table 5.2 Party Membership, Ukraine

Party Name	Date of registration	Registered membership	Membership according to party list
URP	05.11.90	12,000	12,000
Ukr. Peasants' Democratic Party	15.01.91	3,193	4,300
PZU	24.05.91	3,421	10,000
DPU	28.06.91	2,753	3,000
People's Party of Ukraine	20.08.91	3,671	4,000
PDVU	27.09.91	2,451	1,800
LPU	10.10.91	400	40,000
SDPU	04.03.93	---	3,200
Ukr. Christian-Dem. Party	14.11.91	350	7,000
SPU	15.11.91	1,305	28,000
Peasants' Party	03.03.92	1,640	---
LDPU	17.07.92	309	1,000
Ukr. Conservative-Republican Party	21.07.92	612	3,000
Ukr. National Conservative Party	30.10.92	1,000	---
RUKH	01.02.93	---	53,000
Christian Dem. Party of Ukraine	23.11.92	1,704	10,000
Party of Labour	27.01.93	321	---
Ukr. Party of Justice	09.02.93	---	5,000
Party of Economic Renaissance for Crimea	11.03.93	---	---

Commenting on party membership in *Holos Ukrainy* in February 1993, Kononov claimed that PZU had some 2,000 members altogether, but that formal membership was not really that important to the Greens. The Green Party was a parliamentary party and it was therefore more important to mobilise the electorate in support of the party to build a powerful parliamentary base. Kononov assessed PZU's chances as good, arguing that despite increasing apathy amongst the electorate, the Green Party was among the parties with the highest rating. There were two major reasons for this: firstly, everybody saw the need to protect the environment on the grounds that one had no right to risk the health of future generations for short-term economic gain. Secondly, the message presented to the electorate by the Greens was understandable to the average citizen. So although a shift in priorities was taking place at the decision-making level, Kononov remained optimistic about PZU's future¹⁴².

¹⁴² *Голос України*, 6.2.1993, с. 4.

Party Structure and Related Problems

The new party structure and the composition of *PZU*'s leading bodies was confirmed by the Central Co-ordinating Council at a meeting on 21 November 1992¹⁴³. The new structure would be as follows: the party would be headed by its leader (Kononov) and five deputy leaders, the Co-ordinating Council, Political Council, Secretariat (11 people), a Statute Commission (four people) and a Revision Commission (five members). Each member of the secretariat would be responsible for co-ordinating activities in their respective regions¹⁴⁴. The Political Council was made smaller, with only 10 members. Apart from party leader Vitalii Kononov and speaker Serhii Kurykin (he took over this post at the Third Congress when Kononov was elected leader of the Green Party), eight members - most of whom were from Kiev - were also elected¹⁴⁵. Although West Ukraine lost influence within the party by having only one representative on the Political Council, which shaped *PZU* policies on a day-to-day basis, Ternopil was very well represented on the commission in charge of changes and amendments to the party statute; three of four members were from Ternopil and as the party had its stronghold in the Western oblasts (Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Zakarpattia), West Ukraine still had some leeway for bargaining.

Relationship to *Zelenyi Svit*

As seen above, attempts were made at defining the relationship between *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU* even before the Green Party emerged on Ukraine's political scene. During 1990 and 1991, however, confusion and disagreement as to what exactly should be the relationship between the two continued. An article printed in *Zelenyi svit* in the summer of 1991¹⁴⁶ tried to settle this 'dispute' once and for all: whereas Green groups, including those which were not members of *Zelenyi Svit*, exerted public control with the implementation of decisions made by state bodies, public ecological expert assessments and monitoring in addition to conducting educational activities, and also acted as a go-between in areas such as exchange of experience and the introduction of new technologies, *PZU* focused on the creation of a state structure, which would allow the public (not only the Greens) to facilitate the best possible relations between the general public and state institutions so as to give them a real impact on the development of the country, i.e. the democratisation of society. The strategic task of *PZU* was to achieve Ukrainian sovereignty.

¹⁴³ Протокол по. I засідання ЦКР Партії Зелених України від 21 листопада 1992 року.

¹⁴⁴ A. Olenchuk (Ternopil), R. Stepaniak (Ivano-Frankivsk), E. Derkach (Zakarpattia), D. Sahaidak (Kiev oblast), V. Shylo (Kharkiv), M. Pylypchuk (Lviv), O. Varfolomeeva (Dnipropetrovsk), V. Hosiuk (Crimea), M. Holub (Cherkassy), V. Iankivskii (Odessa) and V. Voitovych (Vinnytsia).

¹⁴⁵ I. Havrylov, A. Demydenko, O. Melnykov, I. Samilenko, A. Siomina, Chunaev (Kiev), Shylo (Kharkiv) and Khlebas (Ternopil).

¹⁴⁶ *Зелений світ*, no. 10, 1991, c. 6.

This in itself would not solve the ecological and other problems Ukraine was faced with, but would create the right conditions for solving them. As for the relationship between *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU*, this could be described as follows:

...Можемо говорити про певний розподіл функцій між громадським рухом – "Зеленим Світом" і партією. Вони діють як незалежні партнери, самостійні юридичні особи (хоча знаменитий природоохоронець тов. Чернінко В.К. і скаржився кореспондентові "Метанюїс-Експрес" бунівито партійного "ієрархією" думать громадську структуру).

This statement simply reiterated a resolution passed by the initiative group to create *PZU* on 23 March 1990. The resolution made it clear that *Zelenyi Svit* was not to be transformed into a political party:

Створення Партії Зелених України не передбачає трансформації Зеленого Світу у партію. Хоча програмні цілі і мета екологічного порятунку України у Зеленому Світу (як асоціації) і ПЗУ (як партії) схожі, але методи і форми їх діяльності різні. У партії вони суто політичні-парламентські, а у асоціації – громадські, що ґрунтуються на залученні до природоохоронної діяльності найширших верств суспільства, стурбованих станом довкілля і здоров'я народу.

Statements made by both members of *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU*, however, indicated that four years on (1994) there was a conflict between the two. According to Viktor Khazan of Dnipropetrovsk *Zelenyi Svit*, there were subjective reasons for this. The Green Party was dominated by careerists who were Kiev-based. Locally, he argued, there were often not more than two or three members of *PZU*. In his opinion there was for this reason never a need to create *PZU* in the first place. By law the Green Party was prohibited from receiving hard currency from abroad. The party thus needed *Zelenyi Svit* as a link to gain access to hard currency. As for the party itself, it was highly inefficient in Khazan's view: the party leadership had no time to work with the regions and there were no proper organisations locally. Moreover, there was considerable disagreement within the party regarding its political ideas¹⁴⁷.

As for *Zelenyi Svit* activists' claims that *PZU* sought to take over the leadership of their association, divergent views were heard within *PZU*'s leadership. Iurii Samilenko, for instance, argued that if *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU* pulled together, they might gain some influence. According to Samilenko, it did not take long for *Zelenyi Svit* to figure out that ecological problems must be

¹⁴⁷ Interview with Viktor Khazan, Kiev, May 1994.

solved politically. Little could generally be achieved without politics. In order to gain real influence, the association had reached the following conclusion: 'we must try to influence the funding (i.e. the budget) and the setting of priorities. In the long run it does not pay off to be "bawlers" (national-democrats, nationalists)'. Given that some 15% of the electorate supported the Greens, there was a potential that the Greens had to make use of and activate. This could only be done if the Greens pulled together. Should they fail to do so, they would only achieve discrediting the Green ideals¹⁴⁸.

To find out what the general sentiments towards *PZU* were within *Zelenyi Svit*, I included a number of questions regarding the relationship between the two in my questionnaire. I expected to find a divided movement on the issue and was surprised to find that an overwhelming majority favoured close relations between the two:

Table 5.3 *Desired relationship between Zelenyi Svit and PZU*

Group	Close relationship	Neutral relationship	Minimal relationship
Ternopil obl. ZS	X		
Mukachevo ZS	X		
Bukovina ZS	X		
Dnipropetrovsk obl. ZS		X	
Horlivka ZS	X		
Lutsk ZS	X		
Mariupol Greens	X		
Vinnitsia obl. ZS		X	
Uman ZS			
Nikolaev obl. ZS			X
Dzharylgach	X		
Ecocentre	X		
Odessa Greens	X		

The result can, however, be explained. Firstly, as only one person per group filled in the questionnaire, his/her attitude on this issue would not necessarily reflect that of the entire group. Moreover, at the local and regional level relations between the movement and party might be more amicable than at the top level. It might well also be that *Zelenyi Svit* members favoured a close link between movement and party although they did not approve of the way the two were currently interacting. Uman *Zelenyi Svit*, for instance, referred to movement and party as one whole, but with different functions. It seems that dissatisfaction with *PZU* and *Zelenyi Svit* resulted from poor definition of these tasks and a feeling of the former trying to control the latter.

¹⁴⁸ Interview with Iurii Samilenko, Kiev, 6.5.1994. As for *RUKH* seeking to influence *Zelenyi Svit*, Samilenko held the view that *RUKH* wanted to control the Green Movement in the hope that its members would then vote for *RUKH*. This, he argued, was a miscalculation, as most of the association's members would most likely vote socialist/communist.

As a control question I asked the respondents how they would assess *PZU*'s activities vis-à-vis *Zelenyi Svit*. As expected, I got a much more varied set of answers to this question than the previous one. Only four groups were positive, whereas the others were critical or negative. Vinnytsia *Zelenyi Svit* complained that the party was often exerting excessive pressure, attempting to subordinate practical work to some political aims. Nikolaev oblast *Zelenyi Mir* was 'exceptionally negative', holding the view that *PZU* 'is trying to destroy from within *Zelenyi Svit*'s constructive work'. Dnipropetrovsk oblast and Horlivka *Zelenyi Svit* judged *PZU*'s efforts as 'non-constructive' and 'at presently negative'. Those who were neither positive nor negative said they were unable to answer the question as *PZU* was so weak in their regions that it did not really exert any influence at all. Tverdstup from the Ternopil oblast association claimed that the conflict between *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU* could be traced back in time to Shcherbak's departure as Ukrainian ambassador to Israel in 1992. After Shcherbak left the movement a 'demarcation' took place between party and movement; whereas earlier they had worked independently of one another, their relationship became more blurred and this caused problems, particularly during the election campaign.

With regard to *PZU*'s political significance, none of the respondents found this to be significant. Although several groups were positively inclined towards the Green Party, they acknowledged that it did not really have an impact on Ukrainian politics. As argued by Horlivka *Zelenyi Svit*, the party's rating had dropped continuously after Shcherbak left the party. Vinnytsia oblast *Zelenyi Svit* pointed out that the activity and authority of the party had fallen sharply as the democratic party club structure of *PZU* was unable to withstand the growing authoritarian tendencies in Ukrainian society. Nikolaev oblast *Zelenyi Mir*, on the other hand, was negatively inclined towards the party on the grounds that it was working too closely with the authorities and thus damaging the image of the Green Movement.

Finally, the respondents were asked how large a proportion of their members were also members of *PZU*. We obtained the following result:

Table 5.4 *PZU members who are also members of Zelenyi Svit*

Group	PZU members (in percent of tot. membership)
Ternopil obl. ZS	appr. 70
Mukachevo ZS	67
Bukovina ZS	50
Dnipropetrovsk obl. ZS	5
Horlivka ZS	appr. 17
Lutsk ZS	---
Mariupol Greens	appr. 10
Vynnytsia obl. ZS	appr. 6
Uman ZS	100
Nikolaev obl. ZS	2
Dzharylgach	none
Ecocentre	none
Odessa Greens	appr. 60

As seen from the table, there are considerable variations between the different regions; whereas the West Ukrainian groups have a large portion of overlapping membership, the figure is lower for the Central and Eastern areas. If one compares table 4.4 with the other tables, one finds a positive correlation between overlapping membership and assessment of *PZU*; the higher the number of *PZU* members in the green group, the less conflict there is between movement and party and the more positive the assessment of the party is.

When asked if there was a need for a Green Party in Ukraine all groups, with the exception of Nikolaev oblast *Zelenyi Mir*, answered in the affirmative. The Nikolaev reply was qualified in the following way: 'in the form that *PZU* exists today, it is not needed as it is harmful to the Green Movement'. With regard to whether or not *PZU* should function as the political wing of *Zelenyi Svit*, however, the respondents were more divided:

Fig. 5.5 *PZU as Political Wing of ZS*

Group	Yes	No
Ternopil obl. ZS	X	
Mukachevo ZS	X	
Bukovina ZS		
Dnipropetrovsk obl. ZS	X	X
Horlivka ZS		X
Lutsk ZS	X	
Mariupol Greens	X	
Vynnytsia obl. ZS		
Uman ZS	X	
Nikolaev obl. ZS		X
Dzharylgach		X
Ecocentre	X	
Odessa Greens	X	

As for the relationship between *PZU* and *RUKH*, the two held different views on key issues such as the state and Ukraine's nuclear weapons. *RUKH* viewed Ukraine's nuclear potential as a means by which to secure Ukraine's place in the international community. *RUKH* favoured strong structures as in France and Britain. *PZU*, on the other hand, held the view that it would be a mistake to introduce such structures in Ukraine. First reforms were required. Ukraine must earn money itself rather than simply ask for them. Most parties in Ukraine were funded by strong group interests: Iavorivskii's party, for instance, was supported by the oil complex. The Liberal Party could draw on market forces, whereas *URP* and *RUKH* were actively supported by the Ukrainian diaspora. Deputies elected during the parliamentary elections for *RUKH* were supported from abroad as the Diaspora viewed them as a possible key to securing licenses and other advantages on the Ukrainian market. *URP* had many of its people highly placed in the state apparatus. These positions were given to them in return for supporting President Kravchuk. Whereas *PZU* did not necessarily look upon it as something negative that the parties, while still weak, gained experience by being represented in the state structures, it had itself experienced, through Shcherbak's position as Ukrainian Minister of Environment, that such experience could damage it. *RUKH*'s position on Ukraine's nuclear weapons clashed with that of *PZU*. It was therefore natural that the two - given that *Zelenyi Svit* had members sympathetic to both of them - tried to gain the upper hand within the association.

Vitalii Kononov admitted that it was correct that *PZU* wanted to 'take over' *Zelenyi Svit* at its last congress: '*PZU* emerged from the movement, but *Zelenyi Svit* is now in the process of being taken over by *RUKH*. Both Korobko and Fedorinchik are *RUKH* representatives. We are of the opinion that *Zelenyi Svit* should be closer associated with *PZU* as also *Zelenyi Svit* is involved with politics (putting forward candidates for the elections, etc.)'. *PZU* wanted the head of its Secretariat, Iurii Samilenko, as *Zelenyi Svit*'s leader. When this strategy failed, the party chose to have minimal contact with *Zelenyi Svit* as relations were restrained between Serhii Fedorinchik, the leader of the office at Podil, and the party leadership¹⁴⁹.

5.2.4 *PZU* as an Opposition Party

As an opposition party, *PZU* criticised official authorities on a number of occasions; it was, for instance, the first political organisation in Ukraine to make a negative assessment of the institute of presidential representatives, arguing that it contradicted general democratic principles and constituted a first step towards the building of authoritarian powers. The Green Party opposed the

¹⁴⁹ Interview with Vitalii Kononov, Kiev, April 1994.

centralisation of political powers and called for the creation of a Constitutional Court to prevent this. Rather than appointing presidential representatives, oblast governors, mayors of cities and the heads of local councils must be elected by direct, secret ballot. Any violation of this principle caused disruption of the social, economic and ecological balance in the country. This view was supported by the *OSDPU* and also some regional organisations of the *PDVU*, *RUKH* and the Ukrainian Cadets. Several meetings were held throughout Ukraine in protest against the authorities' failure to take into account candidacies (for the posts of presidential representatives) proposed by local democratic organs and councils¹⁵⁰.

In August the same year, sharp criticism of *Verkhovna Rada* was voiced in a statement prepared by *PZU*'s political council. The statement claimed that the parliament had exhausted its legislative and state-building potential, having been elected under political conditions very different from the current ones. *PZU* therefore supported *PDVU*'s initiative to conduct a national referendum on whether or not to dissolve *Verkhovna Rada* and to prepare extraordinary elections on a multi-party basis¹⁵¹.

5.3 Public Support and Elections (1993-94)

5.3.1 Public Support

Possibly as a result of *PZU*'s initial high score on the public opinion polls, other political parties during 1991 started voicing criticism against the Green Party. On 10 October 1991, during *Verkhovna Rada*'s discussion of the draft Law on Public Organisations and Parties, the founder of the Socialist Party, Oleksandr Moroz claimed that the Ukrainian Peace Fund had funded the creation of *PZU* with money 'earned by workers' collectives'¹⁵². Moroz' claims were met with initial disbelief and then anger by the leadership of *PZU*. In a comment printed in *Zelenyi svit*, Volodymyr Tymonin (head of *PZU*'s revision commission and deputy of Zhovtneva regional council in Kiev) refuted the allegation, stating that *PZU* was founded on 30 March 1990 and officially registered on 24 May 1991 by the Ministry of Justice. The party had received no donations or offerings from the Peace Fund. It could be easily established that *PZU* was living 'off its own': 'unlike *RUKH*, *URP* and the former *CPU*, *PZU* does not have any employees, no premises of its own, no newspaper or even its own group in parliament. The only thing the party has is the support of potential voters and the energy of a few activists'.

¹⁵⁰ *Зелений світ*, no. 7, 1992, c. 2.

¹⁵¹ *Зелений світ*, no. 10, 1992, c. 1.

¹⁵² *Зелений світ*, no. 17-18, 1991, c. 5.

A slightly different kind of 'criticism' was voiced by the deputy leader of *URP*, O. Demydenko. In his view, as all the Ukrainian political parties were committed to the environment, there was no real need for a Green Party per se. In an interview with the author in 1991, Demydenko said he was against a green party on the grounds that Greenpeace and other environmental groups could defend the environment in a much more efficient way than a party. Not all states, he argued, had a green party and he had never seen a green party stopping tanks and defending a state's political independence. Moreover, Greens were traditionally anti-something, at a time when Ukraine was desperately in need of building up something new. As for ecological problems, these could only be solved once a state had been formed. This would take at least five years.

PZU activists, however, refuted such views on two grounds. Firstly, as economy, ecology and politics were so closely linked and as the ecological situation in Ukraine had reached a critical level, concerns for the environment had to be taken into account already when building the state and not simply be postponed until later. At a time when many political parties were pushing the environment as an issue down on the list of topics on their agendas, Ukraine needed a party committed to both the building of the state and the environment. Secondly, sour remarks by other political parties regarding *PZU* were taken as political jealousy as the Green Party was doing well in the polls and thus being looked upon as a competitor by political parties such as for instance *URP* and later also *RUKH*.

Most of the survey materials available, cover the Kiev region but not other parts of Ukraine. The data can therefore not be used to make statements for the level of support of the Green Party throughout Ukraine. A poll conducted by the Central Ukrainian Division of *VTsIOM* in July 1991¹⁵³ indicated that support for the Greens was higher in Kiev than in other parts of the country; whereas 12% of those polled in Kiev supported *PZU*, similar figures for oblast centres and other cities were 4.5% and 5.3% respectively. In the country-side support was slightly lower, at four percent.

During 1990, support for the Greens had been high. Throughout 1989 and 1990, the Greens conducted a series of successful anti-nuclear campaigns, culminating with the introduction of a moratorium on nuclear reactors passed by *Verkhovna Rada* in September 1990. These campaigns had received extensive coverage in the press and people were therefore aware of *Zelenyi Svitt*. *PZU* also received some publicity as it was among the first new political parties to be created in Ukraine and also as people could easily associate the name of the party with the environment. Results of polling in Kiev during 1990 indicated that the Greens were the second most popular political force in Ukraine and that its support remained relatively stable over the year:

¹⁵³ *Ibid.* c. 3.

Table 5.6 Party/movement support (in %) in Kiev throughout 1990¹⁵⁴

Party/org	January	February	June	November
RUKH	23.5	29.0	45.8	53.6
ZS/PZU	13.4	15.3	13.3	12.5
CPU	19.5	18.4	10.1	10.0
LKMSU (MDS)	4.1	4.7	1.3	0.4
URP	1.0	0.9	2.4	1.3
Dem. Platform	---	---	6.3	1.1
Ukr. stud. spilka	---	---	---	2.8
Dem. Party	---	---	---	1.0
Others	17.1	17.2	11.9	2.3
Person more important	19.9	14.2	8.9	15.0

A survey conducted by sociologists of the Ukrainian *Komsomol* Central Committee's scientific research centre in Kiev in January 1991 confirmed this trend, revealing that *RUKH* and *PZU* ranked highest and were far ahead of other political parties and organisations. The Communist Party had fallen from fourth to ninth place, bypassed by the Ukrainian Student Society, *URP*, *SNUM* (Independent Youth Society) and others¹⁵⁵.

Little change could be observed during the first six months of 1991¹⁵⁶; *RUKH* and the Greens were still ahead of other political parties and movements in terms of popular support:

Table 5.7 Party/movement support (in %) in Kiev, 1991.

Party/organisation	January	July
RUKH	27	46
Greens (PZU, ZS)	13	13
CPU	20	10
Nationalists	3	7

Source: Ukrainian Academy of Sciences - Institute of Philosophy

A poll conducted in January 1992¹⁵⁷ showed that *Zelenyi Svit* was more well-known to the electorate and also more popular than *PZU*. As pointed out above, this could be explained by the fact that *Zelenyi Svit* was more visible to the electorate than the Green Party. Moreover, the association had concrete results to refer to, whereas the party had not achieved anything concrete by early 1992. Moreover, as pointed out by opinion poll experts, Ukrainian political movements tended to generally poll higher than political parties. People knew less about the country's political parties and they also trusted them less than the movements.

¹⁵⁴ *Зелений світ*, no. 7-8, 1991, c. 3.

¹⁵⁵ *Ukraine Today*, Ukrainian Media Digest compiled by Radio Liberty Monitoring, 23.1.1991, no. UF-034, p. 5.

¹⁵⁶ *Ukrainian Reporter*, vol. 1, no. 2, 1991, p. 3.

¹⁵⁷ *Зелений світ*, no. 1, 1992, c. 3.

Table 5.8 Assessment of Ukrainian political movements and parties, January 1992.

Pol. party/org.	don't know	actively support	support	positive towards	don't support	dislike	rating
Zelenyi Svit	32.3	14.8	27.3	17.1	5.9	2.6	0.06
RUKH	17.8	12.3	21.3	20.4	16.7	11.4	-0.5
Ukr. Student Society	39.6	10.7	14.7	21.5	8.9	4.6	-0.11
PZU	44.8	7.0	14.9	20.8	9.1	3.4	-0.14
SNUM	38.1	8.4	14.4	21.1	11.8	6.3	-0.16
PDVU	45.4	5.4	14.5	23.1	8.0	3.6	-0.19
DPU	44.4	3.4	11.6	25.4	11.7	3.5	-0.23
Ukr. Christian-Dem. Party	50.2	4.0	9.0	13.3	10.4	3.3	-0.24
URP	37.8	2.9	11.4	25.4	14.8	7.6	-0.25
UNDP	47.8	2.3	10.4	24.7	11.7	3.1	-0.26
NPU	45.2	3.0	10.0	25.0	12.3	4.6	-0.26
LKSM	37.9	4.9	11.2	21.2	15.2	9.7	-0.26
SeLDPU	52.3	3.2	8.0	23.2	10.6	4.3	-0.31
OSDPU	57.1	2.1	5.0	22.2	10.3	3.4	-0.32
LDPU	54.9	1.9	5.1	23.4	11.0	3.8	-0.32
UNP	52.7	2.4	5.2	23.3	11.3	5.2	-0.32
CPU	23.7	2.3	8.1	23.4	23.6	19.0	-0.37

During 1992, however, *PZU's* support began to decrease. The general trend was for all political parties to lose support at the expense of independent candidates. *PZU's* decline in support was, however, more marked than that of other political parties. Generally, the electorate was becoming increasingly disillusioned with politics. Despite promises by the country's leadership that things would get better, the economic situation for the average Ukrainian was getting worse. High inflation and large price jumps made life harder for most people and the initial surge in interest for political issues that took place in the late 1980s was beginning to wear off. As life got harder, people were pre-occupied with how to make ends meet and no longer had the time to worry about the environment.

Similarly, following the declaration of Ukrainian independence, not only Ukrainian authorities, but also other political parties became pre-occupied with issues such as state building and economic reform, whereas the environment became a secondary issue to be solved once the economy had been stabilised and once the building of a Ukrainian state had been completed. Thus, the very issues that concerned the Greens were suddenly no longer all that important to the electorate. This what one may call 'crisis of agenda' was compounded by the fact that *PZU* was struggling with internal problems and financial difficulties. On top of this, its membership basis

was being eroded by people leaving the party. Over eight months, *PZU* support dropped significantly:

Table 5.9 Popularity of political parties and movements (in %) in Kiev, 1992-93¹⁵⁸

Party preference	May 1992	September 1992	January 1993
<i>РУКХ</i>	7.5	7.2	6.8
Socialist Party	12.8	6.1	3.0
<i>PZU</i>	9.7	5.0	1.6
<i>URP</i>	7.4	4.2	2.6
Democratic Party	3.2	2.8	4.8
<i>PDVU</i>	6.2	4.2	1.9
Nova Ukraina	1.9	7.0	1.9
Other parties and organisations	9.6	3.0	1.6
Independents	17.8	9.6	20.3
Concrete person irrespective of whether independent or belong to a party	23.8	49.1	55.5

This poll indicates that the number of people wishing to vote for a particular movement or political party had dropped by more than twice from May 1992 to January 1993. The personality of the candidate was more important to the electorate than his/her political affiliations.

A poll conducted by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Sociology in August 1993 confirmed the Kiev trends on a nation-wide scale¹⁵⁹. *PZU* was still ranking high compared with other political parties, but the level of party support was clearly on the decline:

¹⁵⁸ *Республика*, no. 2/93, 27.2.-5.3.1993, с. 3. This survey was conducted by the independent Ukraine Sociological Service.

¹⁵⁹ Information was gathered at 160 sampling points through 1,197 face-to-face interviews. For details, see *Незалежний тижень*, 17.8.1993.

Table 5.10 Party and Movement Support (in %) in August 1993.

Party, organisation, person	Support
<i>RUKH</i>	5.70
Democratic Party of Ukraine	4.48
<i>PZU</i>	3.88
Party of Justice	3.26
Socialist Party	3.26
Party of Labour	3.26
<i>URP</i>	2.58
People's Party of Ukraine	2.58
<i>PDVU</i>	2.17
Ukr. Agrarian Democratic Party	1.98
Social Democratic Party	1.90
Beer-lovers' Party	1.09
Ukr. Agrarian Party	0.95
Ukr. National Conservative Party	0.54
Christian Democratic Party of Ukraine	0.54
Ukr. Conservative Republican Party	0.27
United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine	0.27
Liberal Party of Ukraine	0.41
Ukr. Christian-Democratic Party	0.14
Liberal Democratic Party of Ukraine	0.14
Vote for person, not party	22.52
Would not vote	2.04
Don't have the right to vote	0.95
No answer	6.11
Don't know	29.17

A poll presented in *Uriadovyi kurier*¹⁶⁰ provided *PZU* with a very high rating for 1993, putting the Greens ahead of *RUKH* and the Democratic Party, which generally tended to get a higher rating in polls than *PZU*. As the size of the sample for this survey is not known, nor the way in which the data was processed, I am inclined to see this result as sample-based, rather than as an indication of a real surge in support for the Green Party.

¹⁶⁰ *Урядовий кур'єр*, 14.10.1993, с. 5.

Table 5.11 Party support (in %), 1992-1993.

Party	1992	1993
PZU	10	16
RUKH	7	8
Socialist Party	3	6
Democratic Party	3	5
URP	3	5
Ukr. Justice Party		3
Worker Party (partiiia pratsy)		3
Agrarian-Democratic Party		3

A poll conducted in December 1993 by the Independent Centre 'Democratic Initiatives' in co-operation with the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Sociology¹⁶¹, seems to confirm my suspicion, pushing PZU down the list with 4% support.

Table 5.12 Party Support (in %), December 1993

Party	Support
Democratic Party	14.3
RUKH	8.4
CPU	4.1
PZU	4.0
URP	3.2

Party support seemed to have stabilised between one and six percent by March 1994¹⁶², on the eve of elections to *Verkhovna Rada*. PZU's support, however, had fallen even more, to only 1.3%. This did not look promising for the Greens, as locally, the party organisations were rather weak. The party's stronghold was the West Ukrainian oblasts and Kiev, and members of PZU thought their party might loose ground to the national parties in the West, thus leaving it with a chance of representation only in Kiev.

Table 5.13 Party Support (in %), March 1994.

Party	Support
RUKH	6.5
Dem. party	4.8
CPU	4.7
Socialist Party	4.3
Agrarian Party	1.6
PDVU	1.4
PZU	1.3
URP	1.3
Agrarian Democratic Party	1.2
Partiia pratsi	1.2

¹⁶¹ *Голос України*, 1.12.1993, с. 2.

¹⁶² This survey was conducted by Centre for Democratic Initiatives and Academy of Sciences' Institute of Sociology.

Judging by the surveys, *PZU* had significant support in 1991. This support, however, dropped during the next three years. As observed by Serhii Hrabovskiy in 1994, *PZU* lost its influence and its potential: whereas the party had 15% support in late 1991, this figure had dropped to one percent by the summer of 1994. Less than two percent support for a political party creates a bad impression. *PZU* could, in Hrabovskiy's view have at least two percent irrespective of political system. In his opinion the Green Party started its decline after Shcherbak stepped down as its leader¹⁶³.

A contributing factor to the decline was identified by Serhii Hlazoniy, who claimed that people's attitudes towards politics changed since the early 1990s. People had become indifferent to politics. Religion and politics had become mixed and everybody was expecting miracles from a strong leader. Kravchuk was such a strong leader. The Ukrainian declaration of independence was looked upon as a miracle and people thought that once independence had been achieved, everything would be OK. They were not ready to do anything themselves, but were rather shouting for a strong leader. In 1992, one year on, they were disillusioned. Some of the blame for this rested with the parties themselves. The purpose of many of them was to 'bake their own cake'. There was a certain fright for Kravchuk and the communists and very few honest political leaders. *PZU*, in Hlazoniy's opinion, had one of the highest intellectual levels, but people like Shcherbak and academician Hrodzinskiy left the party early on and conflicts soon broke out in *PZU* as they did in other political parties¹⁶⁴.

PZU's Supporters

Green Parties in the former Soviet Union have been accused of being 'nationalist' (separatists) by observers in the West. The *VTsIOM* poll, however, revealed that nationality was of little significance in terms of support for the Greens (5.1% of Ukrainians support them, whereas 4.3% of Russians and 6.5% of other nationalities do the same). The issue of nationalism is addressed in Chapter Eight. The fact that there is so little difference in support between the different nationalities, however, seem to indicate that the Greens, rather than instigating discord between the Ukrainians on the one hand, and other nationalities on the other, succeeded in appealing for people to protect their environment regardless of national or ethnic origins.

In terms of education, the poll results showed that the higher a person's education, the more likely he/she is to support the Greens (7.2% - higher education, 4.4% - middle education, 3% - uncompleted education).

¹⁶³ Interview with Serhii Hrabovskii, Kiev, Summer 1994.

¹⁶⁴ Interview with Andrii Hlazoniy, Kiev, 18.8.1992.

Table 5.14 Support for Greens by Profession (in %)

Profession	Support for Greens
Cultural workers, scientists, environmental workers	7.0
Economic leaders	6.3
Engineers, people with technical education	4.8
Students and school pupils	5.2
Kolkhoz workers	1.9

5.3.2 Parliamentary Elections (March 1994)

Pretext to Parliamentary Elections

In the autumn of 1993 President Kravchuk and *Verkhovna Rada* agreed to hold parliamentary elections on 27 March 1994 - a year before the term of the old parliament expired. The pretext for holding early elections was to deflect demands for a referendum on confidence/no-confidence in Ukrainian leaders following a threat of a general strike by workers in Donbass in the autumn of 1993¹⁶⁵. Shortly after it had been decided that elections be held, the parliament passed an election law, outlining the procedures for the up-coming elections. Four hundred and fifty deputies would be chosen by the single-mandate system. To be elected a candidate needed to receive more than 50% of the votes in the first round. Runoff elections between the two candidates who gained most votes would take place within two weeks in constituencies where no candidate got more than 50% of the vote. Further complicating the procedure was a clause in the law, according to which a candidate had to get the support of 25% of the eligible voters in his/her constituency to be elected (i.e. 50% of 50% of registered voters). Candidates could be put forward by groups of voters, workers' collectives and political parties. Political parties, wishing to put forward candidates had to call regional conferences, attended by no fewer than 50 party members. As most parties neither had well-organised regional groups nor enough members to organise regional conferences, it was easier for them to field candidates as independents. Not surprisingly, therefore, the law came under heavy criticism from Ukraine's political parties.

Verkhovna Rada's decision to preserve the majoritarian system caused the most dissatisfaction, the argument being that rather than promoting democratisation and the emergence of a multi-party system, the majoritarian system favoured regionalism and effectively turned the country's political parties into 'decorative attributes of pseudo-democracy'. A proportional election system had the advantage of not only paving the way for strong, nation-wide political

¹⁶⁵ Staff Report No AL 62 CC (94) 2, North Atlantic Assembly Mission to Monitor Elections to the Ukraine Supreme Rada, March - April 1994, International Secretariat, April 1994, p. 2.

parties, but would also make the deputies more responsible as they would not only be answerable to their electorate but also to the party:

Відбувається змагання ідей, а не місцевих керівників, які навипередки обіцяють виборцям те, що й без депутатського мандату мають робити як посадові особи¹⁶⁶.

Should no compromise be reached regarding the law, Ukrainian political parties would be left with no option but to use 'all legitimate forms of protest' to secure the immediate dissolution of *Verkhovna Rada* and the convening of a Constitutional Assembly to pass a Ukrainian Constitution.

This resolution was passed by a meeting of the Political Parties' Club (*Klub politichnykh partiï*) - a consultative body uniting a considerable part of Ukrainian political organisations. The club was set up in April 1993 as a forum within which to discuss political issues. On 1 October 1993 the club met in the headquarters of the *UPS* to discuss the election law passed by parliament and the development of a multi-party system in Ukraine¹⁶⁷. The resolution passed by the Club was proposed by *PZU* and endorsed by another four political parties: *UPS*, *URP*, *SDPU* and *PDVU*.

Throughout November 1993, *PZU* and other political parties continued their campaign to have the election law reversed. It was argued that the law in its original form was insufficient to facilitate democratic changes and secure a more efficient future parliament. A press release issued by *PZU* towards the end of the month went so far as to characterise the law as 'one of the most reactionary laws passed in the post-totalitarian world'. The possible implications of the law were outlined in the following manner:

Змагання ідей, партійних платформ підмінюється боротьбою особистостей. Відсутність партійних списків, як національних, так і регіональних, розпорошує потенціал партій, ставить зорієнтовані на забезпечення загальнонаціональних інтересів організації в залежність від місцевої кон'юнктури¹⁶⁸.

The Ukrainian political parties, claimed the Greens, were weak for objective reasons and the law would hinder their further development. As a result of the election law, the political parties would in effect be cut off from the political process as deputies would represent regional and corporate interests. Finally, *PZU* demanded that a Constitutional Assembly be elected in parallel with the parliamentary elections on 27 March 1994. Alternatively, a referendum could be held on

¹⁶⁶ Заява політичних партій України, 1 жовтня 1993 року.

¹⁶⁷ Прес-реліз по. 14-10, 5.10.1993.

¹⁶⁸ Прес-реліз "до питання про новий виборчий закон та вибори до Верховної Ради України", 25.11.93, р.

the need for such an assembly to convene. Details about the election and the tasks of such an assembly had been elaborated by a working group consisting of representatives from *UNKP*, *PZU*, *URP*, *DemPU*, the *Social Democrats*, *Liberal Democrats* and the *Constitutional Democrats* already in the spring of 1993.

Demands for a constitution were fuelled by events in Russia, where President Eltsin in October 1993 ordered the parliament to be dissolved. The lack of a constitutionally designated balance between the president and the legislative powers in addition to extensive presidential powers and poor legislative work of the deputy group was in itself a destabilising element in Ukrainian politics. A constitution in which the relationship between the legislative and the executive powers was clearly specified as well as a parliament elected through democratic multi-party elections were, in the view of most democratic-oriented parties in Ukraine, a pre-requisite for stability and the building of democratic political structures in the country.

A letter on the issue of a new constitution, signed by 11 political parties (including *PZU*) and addressed to the Ukrainian President, was printed in *Pravda Ukrainy* on 29 June 1993¹⁶⁹. The parties made it clear that although they had different views on why Ukraine found itself in a 'deep political and economic crisis' and how best to get out of the crisis, they all agreed on some basic demands essential to achieve the latter: a referendum should be held on 26 September 1993 regarding the convening of a constitutional assembly. A meeting attended by all parties favouring such an approach as well as other interested parties should be called to discuss how to pass a new Ukrainian constitution. The tasks of such a constitutional assembly were outlined in the 'Act on the Election of a Constitutional Assembly', passed by the initiative group. In addition to passing a new constitution, the Constitutional Assembly must also pass three constitutional acts regulating the relationship between the legislative, executive and judicial powers. A new election law and the fixing of a date for new parliamentary elections must also be passed by the Assembly as well as electing the Constitutional Court, passing temporary laws to be operative until the Constitution would become operative, and finally, set the date for the Constitution to become operative. Elections to the Assembly should be held no longer than three months after the referendum in multiple constituencies and proportionally in agreement by a resolution on the election of a Constitutional Assembly to be passed by the Ukrainian President. To secure the passing of a Constitution maintaining the country's interests, the initiative group wanted to exclude

¹⁶⁹ *Правда України*, 29.6.1993, с. 1. The parties that signed this obrashchenie were *DPU* (the Democratic Party of Ukraine), *URP* (the Republican Party of Ukraine), *SDPU* (the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine), *PDVU* (the Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine), *KDP* (the Constitutional-Democratic Party), *LPU* (Liberal Party of Ukraine), *PS* (the Justice Party), *LDPU* (the Liberal Democratic Party of Ukraine), *NKPU* (the National-Constitutional Party of Ukraine), *UPPP* (the Ukrainian Party of Beer Lovers) and *PZU*.

representatives of the executive at all administrative levels from election to the Assembly. Similarly, the members of the Constitutional Assembly would be barred from seeking election to the new parliament. The *Verkhovna Rada*, in the view of the initiative group, was not in a position to pass a new constitution as it had been elected 'as an organ of the colonial administration (i.e. the USSR)'¹⁷⁰.

No constitutional assembly was, however, elected, nor was the election law changed and eventually, *PZU* decided to take part in the elections anyway, on the grounds that the Greens had no right to avoid seeking political power at a time when so much legislation affecting the state of the country's environment was being drafted and passed by the Ukrainian parliament. Already in October 1993 *PZU* put forward its candidate to the Central Election Committee¹⁷¹ and in December its Fourth Congress convened to discuss the party's approach and strategy for the upcoming elections.

Fourth Congress (Kiev, 17-18 December 1993)

The agenda of the Congress was set by the Central Co-ordinating Council at a meeting on 30 September 1993. In addition to discussing and passing the party's election platform the Congress would also pass changes and amendments to the party statute and ratify the founding documents of the Federation of European Green Parties¹⁷².

With regard to the up-coming elections, the Congress decided that *PZU* would not field any candidates for the elections from the party as the election law was perceived of as discriminatory towards political parties. Instead, the Greens would nominate candidates through workers' collectives and groups of the electorate. Should any of these candidates be elected to *Verkhovna Rada*, they would form a green fraction according to the clause on deputy fractions in the party statute. The election platform endorsed by the Congress would be used by candidates representing the party as a basis for their own election platforms¹⁷³.

The Fourth Congress also changed the party structure. Whereas this had been very loose, giving local and regional party clubs virtual autonomy, the experience over the previous years had shown that this was not necessarily the most efficient approach. At a press conference in Kiev on 27 April 1994, the Kievrada deputy Orest Melnykov stated that the problem with autonomous party clubs was that they were difficult to gather so as to organise joint actions: 'too much

¹⁷⁰ Заява партії-ініціаторів скликання конституційних зборів (n.d.).

¹⁷¹ Letter no. 17-10 of 20.10.1993 to the Central Election Commission. *PZU* put forwards Klavdia Kholiavenko, a member of the party's secretariat, for this post.

¹⁷² Прес-реліз no. 12-09, 1.10.1993.

¹⁷³ Прес-реліз no. 0/51-12, 20.12.1993.

democracy is also harmful. What we are doing now, is to gather individuals and local clubs in a structure which will hopefully work better. We hope that this will help us to act as a united front'.

The party structure had long been an issue of some debate within *PZU*. Iryna Haniukova, a member of the *PZU* Secretariat, already in 1992 pointed out the advantages and disadvantages with a loose as opposed to a tight party structure: 'when the Soviet Union existed, people got used to the idea that the party did everything for you. If you had a water leakage in your house you would call the regional party committee. If a marriage was experiencing difficulties the party would get involved. Now we have to decide what kind of parties we want and redefine political parties as a concept. As far as structure is concerned, the Republicans (*URP*) hold the view that the Communist Party can only be fought by parties choosing a similar (i.e. tight) structure. The *URP* is therefore highly centralised. Directives from the central party organisation have to be followed by local and regional party clubs. The *URP* has also built up strong local clubs, thus providing itself with a strong base, on which to conduct election campaigns. The Green Party has chosen a different approach: Kononov holds the view that it is more important to have a central organisation that can issue statements and organise protests. This is no doubt necessary, but I think it is also important to strengthen the local clubs and build up an apparatus that can be mobilised during election campaigns. The relationship between the local level and the central party organs in *PZU* is difficult. Many of our local organisations do little themselves, awaiting instructions from Kiev¹⁷⁴.

Yet others, one may add, acted on their own while claiming to represent the party. This sometimes caused conflicts. An incident which took place in the summer of 1992 clearly illustrates this dilemma: Mikhalko, a member of Kiev *PZU*, who regularly organised demonstrations to protect the Holosiivskyi forest from illegal log felling got into trouble at a non-sanctioned demonstration that had not been endorsed by the party leadership before hand. He was arrested and fined. Demands that the party pay his fine caused some controversy within the party leadership, as it had not been consulted beforehand and some people therefore thought Mikhalko should pay the fine himself.

By late 1993 *PZU* acknowledged the view held by Haniukova that some party discipline was needed for the party to successfully organise its election campaign nation-wide. Whereas the major focus of attention of the Congress was the elections, other issues, such as nuclear power and imports of toxic waste were also addressed¹⁷⁵.

¹⁷⁴ Interview with Iryna Haniukova, Kiev, August 1992.

¹⁷⁵ Прес-реліз No. 0-92/12, 21.12.1993.

Nominations and Election Campaign

The Congress issued a press-release in which it stated that candidates to the elections would not be put forward by *PZU* as a party, but rather by workers' collectives and groups of the electorate. The release repeated demands that the political parties be allowed to field candidates for the elections without having to convene regional conferences, collect additional signatures and secure funding¹⁷⁶. *PZU* put forward 44 candidates for the parliamentary elections, six of whom would stand in Kiev.

Prior to the elections several political parties sought to establish coalitions of unions to provide a maximum result for the democratic parties, the idea being that if they shared the constituencies amongst themselves, putting forward only the one or two candidates who stood the highest chances of being elected (this would be established through local polls and surveys), then the democratic vote would not be split thus increasing the chances of beating the communists/socialists in these constituencies. This idea was first launched by Levko Lukianenko, the leader of *URP*, who initiated *Narada Demokratychnykh Partii i Orhanizatsii Ukrainy* (the Conference of Ukrainian Democratic Parties and Organisations). The Central Co-ordinating Council of *PZU* in April 1993 decided the party's position on political coalitions and unions, recommending local and regional clubs to unite with other political parties and organisations as long as this did not involve the signing of written documents similar to a statute or programme.¹⁷⁷ Not surprisingly, therefore Vitalii Kononov signed a petition by the Conference for all democratic parties to unite and co-ordinate their election campaigns. The petition, which was signed by 16 political parties and movements¹⁷⁸, stated that the major aim of the parties endorsing the *Narada* was to secure maximal representation of democratic deputies in the new *Verkhovna Rada*. Only candidates committed to political and economic reform would be backed up by the *Narada* as only reforms could improve the material and spiritual situation for the Ukrainian people. Privatisation and the passing of democratic legislation were essential for this aim to be achieved as was a competent and uncorrupted government of reformers to secure their proper implementation.

The leaders of the parties and organisations that signed the petition committed themselves to meeting no less than once every two weeks and their work would be ruled by the device 'the

¹⁷⁶ Прес-реліз no. 0-52/12, 21.12.1993.

¹⁷⁷ Протокол засідання ЦКР ПЗУ від 24 квітня 1993 р.

¹⁷⁸ These parties and organisations were as follows: *DPU* (Democratic Party of Ukraine), *RUKH*, *URP* (the Ukrainian Republican Party), *PDVU* (Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine), *PZU*, *USDP* (Ukrainian Democratic Agrarian Party), *UNKP* (Ukrainian National Conservative Party), the All-Ukrainian Society for Political Prisoners and the Repressed, The Committee 'Crimea with Ukraine - Sobornist', the Organisation of Soldiers' Mothers, the Ukrainian Writers' Union, the Ukrainian Composers' Society, The Officers' Union, the Union of Ukrainian Youth, the Ukrainian Students' Union and the Ukrainian Cossacks.

interests of Ukraine are above party interests'. To facilitate the co-ordination of practical work prior to the elections an Executive Election Committee (*Vykonavchyi Vyborchyi Komitet - VVK*) under the leadership of Levko Lukianenko and Serhii Odarych was set up. Parties and organisations that had joined the Narada would delegate one representative each to the VVK for full-time work until the elections on 27 March 1994¹⁷⁹.

Although initially there was agreement to cooperate on the issue of nominations, this unity was soon broken by *RUKH*, which decided to put forward its own candidates in as many constituencies as possible. *RUKH*'s decision in turn caused other political parties to opt for the same and as a result, Green candidates had to ballot against a considerable number of other candidates in the constituencies they were running in.

A report prepared by the North Atlantic Assembly Mission to Monitor Elections to the Ukrainian *Verkhovna Rada*¹⁸⁰ disclosed a number of weaknesses in the electoral law regarding the election campaign: these were insufficient provisions for the funding of each candidate's election campaign (candidates were not entitled to spend more than six million karbovansy - less than \$ 200 - on their campaign although one minute on TV cost up to four million karbovansy and a page in a newspaper was priced at 200 million karbovansy) thus leaving candidates with no other option than to seek other sources of funding 'often on the margin of legality', and 'the almost total omission of any provision in the electoral law for campaign financing and access to the media for the second round'¹⁸¹.

A major problem for the Green Party was therefore how to fund the election campaign. The party was generally short of funds and was thus not able to provide each of its candidates with the necessary funds for the campaign. This being said, though, some of its candidates, as for instance the party leader, Vitalii Kononov (14th electoral district, Kiev), conducted well-organised and expensive campaigns. Kononov, and also other members of *PZU*, provided the electorate with attributes such as small calendars with their photos on the front and small diaries containing useful telephone numbers and addresses. They also put up posters to proliferate their candidacies. Vitalii Kononov's poster (A-3 format) contained a green photo of him and next to it his name and the inscription 'Vitalii Kononov. The Greens are bringing a political spring'. Humour was also a part of this campaign; a drawing (A-4 format) of Kononov as an otaman (cossack chieftan) and all aspects of life originating from him read as follows: 'Kononov is the otaman of the Greens. He knows what to do'. Kononov also organised a free rock concert and other activities to draw

¹⁷⁹ *Українська думка*, 27.1.1994, с. 5.

¹⁸⁰ Staff Report No. AL 62 CC (94) 2, March - April 1994.

¹⁸¹ See page 3 for a more detailed list.

attention to his campaign. His budget greatly exceeded that stipulated in the election law and left him with a 220 million karbovantsy debt¹⁸².

As for the party programme, this was a lot shorter and more specific than the programme used in early 1992 during the elections of some vacant seats to *Verkhovna Rada*. PZU fielded candidates for those elections, one of whom was Vitalii Kononov. Kononov balloted in election district No. 7, which had been represented in parliament by General Dukhov¹⁸³. For the sake of comparison, I will first take a short look at the programme used in 1992 and then move on to the 1994 election platform.

Kononov in 1992 issued leaflets which clearly stated that his programme was also the programme of the Ukrainian Greens¹⁸⁴. Although the Greens had warned about 'regionalism' as a result of the election law, the first point on Kononov's election platform was that if elected, his major aim would be to represent the interests of his constituency and generally meet up with his electorate. Secondly, he would seek to make the parliament pass a resolution giving Kiev status as a victim of the Chernobyl accident. In his view it was very unfair that Kiev, having itself suffered from the fall-out, had to subsidise other areas that were in the same situation while getting no benefits itself. Protecting the environment and the weak (i.e. children, mothers, invalids, pensioners) during the transition towards a market economy was also high up on Kononov's list of priorities as was local self-rule. Kononov was in favour of a market economy with mixed ownership forms and based on the understanding that only that which is ecologically safe is economically beneficial. Environmental pollution, he argued, was a violation of human rights. As for the state, the right of the individual ranked higher than the rights of the state. Similarly, the interests of the environment ranked higher than those of the economy, politics and ideology. A true democracy would not be achieved unless a real multi-party political system was introduced. Finally, Kononov wished to solve the question of the Ukrainian army (i.e. what size it should be, the question of alternative, civilian service, the question of the Black Sea Fleet and disarmament).

The officially printed election programme¹⁸⁵ used by PZU in 1992 was somewhat shorter, but contained basically the same points, except for a clause on the relationship between Man and Nature, which stated that Nature could not indefinitely 'await any kindness from Man'. Should the living environment continue to degrade, Nature would eventually be forced, for the sake of

¹⁸² Interview with Vitalii Kononov, Kiev, April 1994.

¹⁸³ *Молодь України*, 28.2.1992.

¹⁸⁴ Програма В. Кононова – це програма "зелених" України. Передвиборча програма кандидата в депутати Верховної Ради України по 7-ому, Західничному, виборчому округу м. Києва. Основні принципи і тези.

¹⁸⁵ І березня. Вибори народних депутатів України. Кононов, Віталій Миколайович. Кандидат у народні депутати України по Західничному виборчому округу № 7 міста Києва. Передвиборча програма (n.d.).

self-preservation, to rid itself of Mankind. Symptoms indicating that things were moving in this direction were listed as AIDS, Chernobyl and global (nature) catastrophies.

In 1994 Kononov used not only the officially sponsored pre-election leaflets, but also a special almanac, containing the programme besides useful telephone numbers, addresses and a short introduction. The almanac, which was 18 pages long, was highly environmental as only one page of paper had been used to produce it. During the election campaign, Kononov wrote, tens of tons of paper were wasted (hundreds of hectares of forest) and the Greens were therefore consciously trying to keep their paper-use as limited as possible. Kononov also appealed to those people who thought the environment had become a secondary issue to be solved sometime in the future:

В цей неслучайний час коли всі ми змушені боротись зі виживанням проблеми збереження довкілля здаються нам другорядними – але не так, пройде зовсім небагато часу і нагаразли з питною водою, чистим повітрям, екологічно чистими продуктами стануть, не гострими. Тому давайте будемо обачними!¹⁸⁶

The programme was also printed in a special issue of *Vashe zdorovia*¹⁸⁷ (the Ukrainian Medical Newspaper). The programme, a photograph and a biography covered the entire first page. An article justifying the Greens' need for a tribune (i.e. the parliament) took up most of the space on page two. *PZU*, argued Kononov, had made use of the entire spectre of political action, such as pickets, demonstrations, meetings, mass planting of trees, the cleansing of small rivers, organisation of culturological and sport actions such as 'Musicians against drug abuse and alcoholism', and the bicycle race 'SOS - Black Sea'. Now the party was running for elections so as to protect the 'sacred right of Man to life' and to protect the environment and the health of future generations, the party needed a tribune and this tribune was the parliament.

As for the programme, Kononov stated as his major aim the creation of a legal base for which to secure such priority issues as law and order, prosperity and the right to live a healthy and long life. The state was for the people and not the other way around for the realisation of such issues as reform of the political power structure, the economy and laws on the environment. Kononov favoured a parliament-presidential republic of Ukraine, Ukraine being a unitary state and the Crimea being a part of this state. A market economy would be the best thing for Ukraine and

¹⁸⁶ На згадку про вибори-94, м. Київ (Київ: Києво-Свят. друк. 1994). с. 2. This almanach was printed in 2,647 copies.

¹⁸⁷ Ваше здоров'я. Українська медична газета. Спеціальний випуск. Віталій Кононов – кандидат у народні депутати Верховної Ради України по Галицькому виборчому округу № 3, міста Києва. The special issue is undated and consists of only two pages.

reforms should be introduced quickly, 'but without the shock'. Privatisation of housing, the land, small and middle-sized enterprises were necessary prerequisites for economic reform, as well as turning large enterprises into stock companies. The aim of economic reform should be to secure the well-being of the Ukrainian people. However, the Greens did not favour an unrestrained market: social guarantees had to be given to pensioners, invalids and people with a low income. Similarly, children and women had to be protected - the latter by a ban on women working in harmful industry. A ban was also required on advertising of tobacco products on TV and radio. In the field of the environment, *PZU* wanted the parliament to pass a series of laws on ecological safety and protection from radiation, on the banning of imports of toxic waste and on giving the population of Kiev status as victims of the Chernobyl accident.

Kononov's programme was an attempt at merging issues important to the Greens with issues that concerned large segments of the population, such as law and order (this issue ranked high in the polls). One of the leaflets distributed during the election campaign thus presented Kononov as a defender of 'welfare, law and order and a clean environment'. A slightly different approach was favoured by Serhii Kurykin, the speaker of *Politrada*, who balloted in Kiev's electoral district No. 22 during repeated elections to *Verkhovna Rada* on 24 July 1994¹⁸⁸. His platform focused more on the environment and the link between the environment and the economy than that of Kononov.

The section on the economy focused on the link between the economy and the environment; for instance a prerequisite for a more efficient and cleaner industry was structural change. Only a revamped industry could secure a sustainable economic development rooted in the device that 'only what is ecologically safe is economically beneficial'. This could be achieved through tax reform. The introduction of a national currency was also required as was a structural reform of the energy complex to facilitate energy saving, modernise thermal power stations and stimulate the creation of decentralised energy systems based on renewable energy sources rather than expansion of nuclear power. Kurykin furthermore wanted a permanent moratorium on the construction of new nuclear reactors as well as closure of Chernobyl already in 1994.

The programme also contained headings such as 'human rights', 'social issues' and 'international relations and safety'. All Ukrainian legislation must be in line with the International Declaration of Human Rights, the rights of national minorities must be observed and public organisations/political parties must be given legal guarantees. Military service should be reduced

¹⁸⁸ Such elections were held in constituencies where no candidate was elected during the second round as the turn-out was less than 50% and also in constituencies where the elections were declared invalid. According to the election law, people who had unsuccessfully balloted in the March elections could not register as candidates for repeated elections in the same constituency or in any other constituency. Kononov and other party members were thus prevented from balloting in July, whereas Kurykin, who had not run for *Verkhovna Rada* in March, was able to do so.

and alternative service introduced for those who, for reasons of personal conviction, did not wish to serve in the army. A gradual 'professionalisation' of the army was also required. As Ukraine was a neutral state, no foreign troops should be allowed on Ukrainian territory. Relations with Russia should be based on parity and Ukrainian foreign policy should give priority to developing close links with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Black Sea countries. Ukraine should aim towards a more significant role in international organisations¹⁸⁹.

Assessment of PZU and the 1994 Parliamentary Elections

Of the 44 candidates put forward by *PZU*¹⁹⁰, two made it to the second round (Karavanska in Mukachevo, Ternopil and another woman in Zhazkov, Cherkassy), but failed to be elected. Prior to the elections the spirit was high in the Green camp - judging by the polls, *PZU* would get several of its candidates voted into parliament. Following the disastrous result, however, the Greens did some soulsearching to find the reasons why they fared so badly.

A major problem, which had a negative impact not only on *PZU* but also on other political parties, was the split democratic vote. According to Serhii Hrabovskyi, *PZU* made a mistake by not reaching agreement with *RUKH* or others to distribute electoral districts amongst themselves. Kononov might have been elected had this been done. As it turned out, the democrats stole votes from each other. To give an example, in the Rusalivka electoral district in Kiev, the well-known reform economist Volodymyr Lanovyi balloted against Ihor Havrylov of *PZU*. Several members of *PZU*, even though they were Green, decided to vote for Lanovyi as competent economists were needed in parliament. Indirectly this was also a Green argument: only if the economic situation in Ukraine improved could something be done about the environment.

Samiilenko held the view that *PZU* lost the elections as the party failed to reach agreement with the democratic/centre-oriented parties: 'we had some chances, but *RUKH* ruined them by putting forward its own candidates in every single constituency. Other parties later followed suit. (*PZU* was earlier a member of *RUKH* - when the latter was still an organisation and not a party). Prior to the parliamentary elections an attempt was made to gather the centre parties. 'Even though we had done maximally to gain support, we could not have beaten the system. We could, however, have exerted more opposition and gained real influence. Now the centre parties are represented in parliament, but they have little influence. *RUKH*'s populism does not result in anything other than imbuing people with a lack of faith in market reform'¹⁹¹.

¹⁸⁹ 24 липня повторні вибори до Верховної Ради України. Кандидат у депутати Верховної Ради України по Центральному виборчому округу № 22, м. Києва, Курикін Сергій Іванович.

¹⁹⁰ Iurii Samiilenko at press-conference of *PZU*, Kiev, 27.4.1994. A slightly smaller number - 31 - was referred to in a Green Factsheet on Eastern Europe, Amsterdam, 26.4.1994, p. 1.

¹⁹¹ Interview with Iurii Samiilenko, Kiev, 6.5.1994.

Prior to the elections, *PZU* assumed that the 'centre' would win the elections. Kononov cited this as *PZU*'s biggest mistake: 'our biggest mistake was that we assumed the centre would win the elections. Therefore we adopted a moderate position. But people chose extreme solutions for extreme conditions. Maybe we should have moved towards *RUKH* prior to the elections. Internationally, however, we are very radical compared to other green parties. Besides, we have a tight party structure. The latter is a 'must' under circumstances like ours, in order for us to successfully compete with other political parties'. Kononov did, however, maintain that the elections proved a good experience for the Greens even though they lost: 'now we know what we did wrong and will not repeat our mistakes'.

Myhailo Pashkov, a writer on the Ukrainian elections, came to a similar conclusion, pointing out that the few centrist parties (*PZU*, *UPS*, *UPSS*, *TKU*, *LDPU*, *KDP*, *LDVU*, *UPShP* and *PP*) were particularly hard hit by the election law as they all had few and weak regional party organisations (As observed by Artur Bilous, for instance, one third of *PZU*'s members were concentrated in West Ukraine). Thus these parties were unable to gather the 100 people required to convene regional conferences and nominate party candidates for the elections. It was also a problem that many regional party structures were not formally registered and thus not in a position to field candidates in the first place. Moreover, Pashkov observed that if a party was not well known in an electoral district its candidates, when these were well known to the electorate, preferred to stand as independents¹⁹².

Samiilenko, on the other hand, was somewhat less critical with regard to *PZU*'s choice of strategy: when added together, the vote for the centrist parties was not all that bad, he claimed. Thus the centrists did not 'lose' the elections per se, but failed to be represented due to their failure to cooperate¹⁹³.

Kononov argued that *PZU* lost the elections for economic reasons. Although Kononov's election campaign was well organised and expensive, other *PZU* candidates had less money to spend and found it much more difficult to keep a high profile during the campaign. Two female candidates - Haniukova and Rudenko who both ran for elections in Kiev - informed Kononov that they would have won had they had more money to spend on the election campaign. With a budget of two million karbovantsy Rudenko could only afford to print a very limited number of small notes - listovki - which were distributed to five blocks of flats. In her electoral district there were 31 candidates, some of these were businessmen and others, argued Kononov, belonged to the Mafia. These could afford to spend much larger sums on their campaigns. Rudenko got a total of 900 votes in an electoral district of 100,000 voters and complained that as her 'listovki' had a

¹⁹² Михайло Пашков, *Правді, діві і "псевдонезалежні"*, *Вісн.* no. 2, 1994, с. 105.

¹⁹³ *PZU* Press Conference, Kiev, 27.4.1994.

drawing of her face instead of a photo (she could not afford to print a proper campaign sheet) many people simply did not recognise her and were later surprised to find that she had been a candidate.

Another problem, identified by Kononov, was that not all those balloting for *PZU* were 'Green'. As an example he referred to Rudenko. In his view she was a revolutionary with a poor perception of what it meant to be 'Green'. Consequently, she did not mention *PZU* in her election campaign. Had she done so, she might have benefited from it.

Following the initial disappointment of the first round of the elections in March 1994, Kononov urged *PZU*'s members to support the two candidates in West and Central Ukraine who made it to the second round. *Chervona Ruta*, the travel company where Kononov worked, found a bus and Samiilenko provided petrol, the intention being to send *PZU* activists to Zakarpattia to take part in Karavanska's campaign and then to keep an eye on the elections themselves. It did, however, prove rather difficult to gather people. Everybody wanted the election to go well, but few were willing to travel all the way to Zakarpattia to support Karavanska themselves.

The election system also had to take some of the blame for *PZU*'s poor performance. Hlazonvi pointed out that Kononov's election campaign was covered by the press, and that his poor result could not be explained by democrats stealing votes from each other alone (Lukianenko, by the way, wanted to establish a block of all parties). Obstacles were also put in the way for the political parties through the electoral law which made it difficult for political parties to nominate candidates. In order to do so, it would have to gather 50 people to attend an regional or district conference. It was easier for *PZU* to gather 10 people to back up an independent candidate. Therefore, *PZU* did not nominate any candidates. Instead its candidates registered as independents. Altogether 30 'Green' candidates were registered in this way. The local elections, argued Kurykin, would be easier for the Green Party. A Kiev party organisation would be created for this purpose to register candidates for Kiev. Enterprises and groups of residents wishing to put forward their own candidates would have to gather 300 people at a conference, whereas the procedure for political parties was much simpler. However, some Greens were hesitant to nominate candidates for the local elections on the grounds that it could not be ruled out that the local elections would not take place¹⁹⁴.

Serhii Kurykin, the speaker of *PZU*'s Political Council, saw the Green Party's lack of success as a problem of image. In his view, *PZU* was too often being identified with ecological problems and was by many perceived of as an environmental organisation rather than as a political party.

¹⁹⁴ The reason for thinking so was that in the late spring of 1994 there was some doubt whether the presidential elections, also scheduled for June, would actually go ahead as planned. Should these be postponed, then the same fate was likely to hit the local elections.

People failed to see the link between ecological problems and general political and economic developments. Samiilenko argued that *PZU* lost out as it had very few concrete political actions to refer to. Simply arguing that *PZU* is a party in the political centre is not sufficient to gain the support of the electorate¹⁹⁵.

Another reason, related to *PZU*'s image, was the party's lack of well-known and highly respected politicians such as Iurii Shcherbak. Four polls conducted by Sosis-Gallup between August 1993 and January 1994 showed the popularity ratings of Ukraine's political leaders. Of the 25 politicians those polled were asked to rate, Kononov ranked 23rd, with a general rating of only 0,32% (Kuchma and Kravchuk received the highest scores with 2.22 and 2.12 respectively). As pointed out in a comment by Lyudmyla Korol, the politicians who headed the list were in the lead in terms of their level of visibility and popularity¹⁹⁶. A similar poll conducted in 1991, when Shcherbak was still leader of *PZU* gave a very different result:

*Table 5.15 Support (in %) for party leaders, October 1991*¹⁹⁷

Party leader	Support
CPU (when existed)	10.51
<i>PZU</i>	10.28
<i>PDVU</i>	4.44
People's Party of Ukraine	4.21
Christian Democratic Party of Ukraine	1.17
Constitutional Democratic Party of Ukraine	0.93
Social Democratic Party of Ukraine	0.93
People's Democratic Party of Ukraine	0.93
United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine	0.47
Agrarian Democratic Party of Ukraine	0.47

A poll conducted in Kiev by *NDISEP* in Kiev a week before the elections indicated that whereas only 12% of those under 30 years of age had decided who they were going to vote for, a third of those over 60 had made up their minds. Other polls indicate that older people are politically more active than the younger generation and more prone to vote for the socialists/communists. The young, on the other hand, were less interested in politics, prompting one observer to conclude as follows 'molod obyraie pepsi' (the young vote for pepsi)! Given that *PZU* saw as one of its major groups of support the young and the women, this, no doubt, was bad news for the Green Party. Poor knowledge of candidates, furthermore, made it difficult for the Greens to draw attention to their candidates: only 11% of those polled said they knew almost all the candidates in their constituency. 29% knew some of the candidates whereas as many as 25%

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁶ *Ukrainian Weekly*, 20.3.1994.

¹⁹⁷ *Зелений світ*, no. 16, 1991, c. 3.

claimed to have no knowledge whatsoever of their candidates. Sixty seven percent intended to take part in the elections, 15% were still undecided and 18% would not take part. The latter category was composed predominantly of people under 30 years of age (people serving in the army, working at enterprises and in the social sector)¹⁹⁸.

Finally, the one-man constituencies contributed to the Green Party's lack of success in the elections. Kononov pointed out that had the elections been proportional with a four percent barrier for parties to enter the parliament, *PZU* would have made it to *Verkhovna Rada*¹⁹⁹.

The West Ukrainian Greens followed a different line from that of Kiev, which proved more successful. According to Rostyslav Tverdostup of Ternopil *PZU*, his organisation supported five candidates for the elections. Four of these made it to parliament. They were all members of *Fond moia Ukraina*, which is a business organisation. The Greens in Ternopil run two small enterprises: *ELF Ltd.* and *Ekotern Ltd.* The latter is run by Iryna Tverdostup and was one of the founders of *Fond moia Ukraina*. This Fund supported reformers (60s generation) who were new to politics and completely independent (i.e. had not worked in party/local administration under the communists). The campaign was headed by Andrii Olinchuk, who was also responsible for its election programme, being the 'ideologist' of the Fund. Via him, the Ternopil Greens had an outlet to TV. *Fond moia Ukraina* also distributed a free paper, *Zapovid* (after Shevchenko), which printed its general political programme. Thus, although none of those elected to *Verkhovna Rada* from Ternopil were actually members of *PZU*, they had the support of the Greens and have provided these with an opportunity to lobby decisions concerning the environment in parliament. The alternative approach of co-operation rather than balloting alone thus paid off²⁰⁰.

Although, understandably, there was considerable disappointment within *PZU* regarding the result of the parliamentary elections, Kurykin argued that the outcome might not be all that bad: 'perhaps we will gain politically from not being associated with the new parliament as it will be difficult to make decisions there. It is therefore possible that we will do well at the next elections'.

5.3.3 Local Elections (June 1994)

Following the poor results of the parliamentary elections, there was some disagreement among *PZU* members as to whether or not the party ought to take part in the upcoming local elections. Iryna Haniukova in May 1994 argued that it was uncertain whether *PZU* ought to take part in the local elections: those who participated in the first round and failed to get elected, were not

¹⁹⁸ *Вечірній Київ*, 25.3.1994, с. 1.

¹⁹⁹ The Constituting Conference of the Kiev *PZU* Organisation, Kiev, 14.1.1994.

²⁰⁰ Interview with Rostyslav Tverdostup, Kiev, 20.5.1994.

allowed to put forward their candidacies in areas where new elections were required. Thus the entire leadership of *PZU* was barred from standing for parliament until the next parliamentary elections.

Following the parliamentary elections, *PZU* proposed that local and presidential elections be postponed at least until the autumn of 1994 and that, on 26 June 1994, a Constitutional Assembly be elected. With no Constitution the Greens did not find it advisable to elect the leader of the state, then 'local and presidential elections without a constitution are dangerous; we risk building what we do not want to build, facilitating the reanimation of the Soviet Union'²⁰¹. The Constitutional Assembly could have 450 members; 225 of the deputies already elected to *Verkhovna Rada* and another 225 whom should be elected on party-lists. However, the Greens would not boycott either local, nor presidential elections should these take place as planned. According to Kononov, *PZU* was a 'law-abiding party. We cannot allow ourselves to voluntarily distance ourselves from the political process of the country'²⁰².

As for the local elections, there was a possibility that these would be declared invalid as it was summer and people might fail to show up. In Haniukova's view it might therefore be better if the Greens campaigned against other candidates so that the elections would be declared invalid. Samiilenko, on the other hand, thought the local elections should be held as people would definitely elect a president. Therefore, *PZU* ought to take part²⁰³.

Eventually it was decided that *PZU* would take part in the elections. The local elections, argued Kononov, were particularly important to the Greens partly as *PZU* was a 'municipal' party, closer to the local than to the central level, partly as there was an urgent need to change people's attitudes towards the environment. The latter could only be achieved through concrete action locally and by showing people that their local problems were closely linked to global questions²⁰⁴. *PZU* had few concrete results to refer to nationally, argued Melnykov, as the party had so far not had a chance to work through the national parliament. The path to representation in the future was to gain the trust of the Ukrainian people and this could only be done by promoting promises made during the election campaign. In Kiev some of these promises might be implemented. The fact that Kiev was affected by radioactive fall-out from the Chernobyl accident increased the party's chances of doing this. A prerequisite, however, was an improved organisational structure. At the press conference that took place in Kiev on 27 April 1994, Orest Melnykov stated that the reorganisation of *PZU*'s structure was to continue prior to the local elections: 'earlier we had a

²⁰¹ Vitalii Kononov at *PZU* Press Conference, Kiev, 27.4.1994.

²⁰² *Київський вестник*, 30.4.1994, с. 3.

²⁰³ Interview with Iryna Haniukova, Kiev, 17.5.1994.

²⁰⁴ Vitalii Kononov at *PZU* Press Conference, Kiev, 27.4.1994 and at Founding Conference of Kiev *PZU*, Kiev, 14.4.1994.

loose structure of independent party clubs. Now we are in the process of tightening our structure, organising party clubs at town and city level as the CPSU did in its time...'. Kononov also pointed out that attempts were being made at tightening co-operation between the local clubs and the central organs of *PZU*²⁰⁵.

In Kiev this was to be achieved by uniting and co-ordinating the activities of *PZU* members through a unified Kiev party organisation, which would be the only *PZU* organisation to field candidates to the Kievrada. On 14 April 1994 its founding conference took place in the Kiev local administration headquarters. The conference was attended by 49 of the city's 62 party members. Regional party clubs already existed in Kiev (33 regions in Kiev), but no unified Kiev party club had so far been registered. The meeting elected a leader, deputy leader, a secretary and two members. The leader was given the task of registering the club with the Ministry of Justice. This had to be done urgently as only when the club had been formally registered would it be entitled to put forward candidates for the local elections. Registration of candidates would be stopped already on 12 May, so the sooner the club was registered, the better. Kievrada consisted of 75 members and Kononov suggested that *PZU* should nominate at least 50 candidates.

The Kiev party organisation convened again on 5 May 1994, one day before it was formally registered by the Ministry of Justice²⁰⁶ to nominate candidates for the party list. Kononov informed those present that *PZU* had been approached by other parties with a request that their candidates be allowed to seek election on *PZU*'s Kiev list. Independent candidates had made similar requests. *PZU*'s Political Council had already discussed the issue and decided that independents may be supported by the party if they support *PZU*'s programme and sign a document committing themselves to work within the green fraction if elected. Members of other political parties could naturally not be allowed to seek election through *PZU*'s party list. *PZU* deputies leaving the green fraction would automatically be excluded from the party. As for independent candidates elected with the support of *PZU*, these would be excluded from the green fraction should they not follow the party rules. A list of 18 candidates to Kievrada was presented to the meeting. Five of these were women. The candidacies of several independents were also discussed. There was some dispute over some of these, but most were endorsed by the meeting. Finally, Kononov told every member to give the Kiev organisation 80 karbovantsy within a week to cover costs in connection with registration, stamp and office as *PZU* as a party was prevented from getting involved in commercial activities. Those candidates put forward by the meeting

²⁰⁵ *УКРАЇНСЬКІ ВІСТІ*. 1.5.1994, с. 1.

²⁰⁶ See Міністерство юстиції України. Свідчення про реєстрацію, no. 234.

would come together at a later stage to discuss the election campaign and how to fund this campaign²⁰⁷.

With regard to the financial side, Samiilenko argued that the Green deputies and their supporters were market democrats in a position to render the local election campaign financial support. Optimists within the party suggested that *PZU* might gain 25-30% of the vote in the local elections. This, argued Samiilenko, was not real. Ten per cent would be more realistic. Prior to the elections *PZU* had three deputies in Kievrada (Samiilenko, Kononov and Melnikov). These constituted a *PZU* fraction, which had the support of independent deputies on a number of issues. In some cases the *PZU* deputies managed to gather 30 deputies. Some 20 members of Kievrada requested that their names be put on *PZU*'s lists as independent candidates with the support of *PZU*²⁰⁸.

5.4 Placing PZU in the Ukrainian Political Landscape

5.4.1 Left-Right Continuum and Ukrainian Politics

The Ukrainian Green Party has defined itself as a party to the left of the political centre. In a Western political context on the left-right continuum this would imply that *PZU* would be leaning towards a socialist orientation. However, as pointed out by McLaren²⁰⁹, the meaning of 'left' and 'right' might take on a different meaning when used in a non-western political context. McLaren argues the point that people's attitudes towards democratic values and level of support for democratic institutions, support for or resistance to a market economy and support for freeing the union republics and Eastern Europe from Soviet control determine where people and political parties place themselves on the left-right continuum. Thus, the 'left' signifies a high level of support for change, whereas the 'right' signifies opposition towards such reforms. Thus, although the 'right' in the West have welcomed the kind of changes the 'left' in the former USSR have been the most ardent supporters of, at an abstract level the terms 'left' and 'right' distinguish those who favour economic and political reform and those who do not.

Several Ukrainian political analysts have also tried to apply the 'left-right' continuum to their political context. Haran, for instance, defined 'left' and 'right' in the following way:

²⁰⁷ Meeting of the Kiev party organisation, Kiev, 5.5.1994.

²⁰⁸ Interview with Iurii Samiilenko, Kiev, 6.5.1994.

²⁰⁹ Lauren McLaren, *Ideology in the Former Soviet Union: Defining Left and Right in a Non-Western Context* (Houston: Department of Political Science, University of Houston, 1995).

...Коли йдеться про праві, консервативні сили, мається на увазі консервативне крило в партіях, а під лівими, радикальними силами розуміють тих, хто виступає проти тоталітаризму, за докорінну демократизацію²¹⁰.

Vovk and Mustafin²¹¹, on the other hand, apply 'left' and 'right' in the traditional meaning on the Ukrainian political context, classifying anti-Communist parties as the 'right' and the communists/socialists as the 'left'. Acknowledging the fact that the former favour change, whereas the latter oppose change, they introduce a new term, namely that of the 'radical right'. Konchuk²¹² classifies Ukrainian political parties as 'left', 'right', 'centrist', 'left of centre' and 'right of centre', although he fails to specify which parties can be classified as such.

Wilson and Yakushik²¹³ in a paper submitted to the journal *Slovo* try to prove that both these approaches are fraught with problems. For instance, by labelling parties according to their stands on questions such as the nature of the economic and social system, or of the relative importance of freedom, authority, order and the state, one runs into the following problems: firstly, party attitudes towards these questions tend to disrupt the traditional 'left-right' continuum. As an example, they refer to the Ukrainian National Party, which, while favouring a market economy is an authoritarian party as far as values and organisation are concerned. Secondly, Wilson and Yakushik argue that it is extremely difficult to classify political parties in terms of their attitudes to an economic system which does not yet exist and which for this reason has not brought about the existence of social systems providing the traditional support bases for Western European party systems. They therefore end up with classifying the Ukrainian political parties in the same way as Haran: 'either attitudes to the desirability of reform are reversed, so that the Communists who wish to preserve the existing structure of economy and polity become conservatives and free market enthusiasts become radical reformers, or strange paradoxes result'²¹⁴.

Another problem linked with the usage of the traditional 'left-right' classification scheme is that 'the fault-lines separating one political ideology from another often fall within, rather than between, political parties'. As examples, Wilson and Yakushik refer to the CPU, which contained old-style state socialists, authoritarian populists and genuine free-marketers. Similarly, the Ukrainian Republican Party united neo-liberalists, populists and Christian democrats as well as a hard-line nationalist minority. Finally, it was a problem that even within West European party systems many parties escape the classification scheme. In Ukraine parties not falling within the

²¹⁰ О.В. Гарань (1991), с. 11.

²¹¹ Виктор Вовк, Алексей Мустафин. *Неизвестная Украина* in *Новое время*, no. 5, 1991, с. 18-19.

²¹² П. Кончук. *Е такі партії*, in *Урядовий кур'єр*, 31.7.1992, с. 5.

²¹³ Andrew Wilson, Valentin Yakushik, *The Developing Ukrainian Party System* (London/Kiev, 1991).

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

classification scheme were *PZU* and the *Confederation of Anarcho-Syndicalists*. On this basis they drew the following conclusion:

In short, then, Western European labels can easily be found, but have to be interpreted in their specifically Ukrainian context. It has to be remembered that Ukrainian parties are reviving traditions from their own political history, and not just adopting Western European conventions. While it is true that an important part of the Ukrainian tradition has been the desire to be a more integral part of the European mainstream (as part of the defining difference between Ukrainian and Russian political culture), Ukraine has strong indigenous varieties of romantic Christian populism, Western-leaning constitutionalism, utopian socialism, integral nationalism and, for want of a better term, 'hetmanism' (a hetman being a Cossack leader and messianic authority figure). Most such traditions are currently being revived, as all fulfil the function of allowing Ukrainians to reach back to a more 'authentic' national past, untainted with the failings of the soviet era, but only those which meet the needs of the future, and develop something of a social base, will prosper²¹⁵.

A slightly different classification scheme was introduced by Wilson and Belous²¹⁶ in 1993: They distinguish between 'ultra-nationalist', 'national-democratic', 'liberal-democratic', 'state-bureaucratic' and 'socialist' parties. The 'ultra-nationalist' or 'ultra-right' represent the priority of the interests of the nation and the building of a strong state with powerful armed forces. The 'national-democrats' while supporting national statehood favour supporting private property and a market economy. The 'liberal-democrats' favour an independent Ukraine, but with good relations to Russia, a social market economy and democratic political structures. The 'state-bureaucratic bloc' wants to slow down economic and political reform and also favours Ukrainian membership in the CIS. Finally, the 'socialists' are against market reform, in favour of state control and wishing to retain the Soviet Union.

Classifying political parties along a 'left-right' continuum is, however, useful if one keeps the points identified above in mind and account for the peculiarities of the Ukrainian political context. Various classification schemes for sorting the Ukrainian political parties on the 'left-right' continuum have been offered. Potichnyi²¹⁷, for instance, uses a number of variables similar to those of McLaren. Firstly, there is the issue of statehood for Ukraine, which produces three general categories; the federalists, the confederalists and the proponents of independence. The second issue is the parties' stand on the future economic system of Ukraine (categories: liberal, social-democratic or communist) and finally, there is the issue of political system (three

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

²¹⁶ Andrew Wilson & Artur Bilous, 'Political Parties in Ukraine', *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 45, no. 4, 1993, p. 697.

²¹⁷ Peter J. Potichnyi, *The Multi-Party System in Ukraine* (Bonn: Berichte des Bundesinstituts für Ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien), no. 3-1992.

categories: liberal, social-democrat and communist)²¹⁸. Bilous²¹⁹ uses Sartori's diagram to classify Ukrainian political parties on a 'left-right' axis according to their position on five political issues:

1. The international position of Ukraine and the attitude towards CIS.
2. The territorial principle.
3. The organisation of power and degree of local self-determination/self-rule.
4. The economic strategy.
5. The military-political doctrine.

Issues two and three correspond to what McLaren refers to as 'democratic values and level of support for democratic institutions', issue one refers to her category 'Soviet control' and issue four corresponds to her 'attitude towards the market economy'. The fifth category has become increasingly important in Ukraine as the discussion of the future of the country's nuclear weapons and nuclear power stations intensified following the collapse of the USSR. Although there might be some variations from party to party with regard to their placement in Sartori's diagram on each of these issues, these variations are not great and thus gives a good basis by which to classify the parties on the 'left-right' continuum.

5.4.2 Issues Determining PZU's Placement on the Left-Right Continuum

Ukrainian Independence

As seen above, *PZU* from the very start defined itself as a member of the larger, international green community. Although *PZU* shared the major goals of Green Parties elsewhere, the party also had to take into account circumstances specific to Ukraine as well as a considerable 'national' wing within the party. One of the first issues on which *PZU* had to make a stand, was the issue of a union treaty versus Ukrainian independence. In the aftermath of the First Congress this was an issue which came to overshadow other issues. On 30 September (the last day of the Congress) a big demonstration took place in Kiev against a union treaty and several of the delegates joined in. Related to this issue was the question of whether or not Fokin's government was competent enough to get the best possible deal for Ukraine on this matter, and also whether or not it was competent enough to reform the Ukrainian economy.

Iurii Sheherbak spoke at length on this issue in a speech to the Ukrainian parliament in late October 1990²²⁰, which was also one of his first public appearances as leader of the *PZU*.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 7-13.

²¹⁹ А. О. Білос, Політичні об'єднання України (Київ: Видавництво "Україна", 1993).

²²⁰ *Література України*, 25.10.1990, с. 1

Shcherbak produced a critical assessment of the Ukrainian political leadership and made alternative proposals on how to stabilise the ailing Ukrainian economy. As for the government's economic stabilisation programme, Shcherbak reminded the deputies that the voting on this programme had already started - by the hungerstriking students in Independence Square (1990). It was not the students who should starve, but those who brought Ukraine to the point of catastrophe in the first place. Everything should be done to save the lives and health of the students, as they 'are the conscience and future of our people'. The future of the government was less important; other, more crucial issues ought to be given priority:

И всем нам — левым, правым, радикалам, консерваторам — надо понять, что спасать сегодня нужно не отдельных должностных лиц, не отдельную партию, не отдельное правительство, и даже не безнадежно устаревшую форму государства, а народ, его детей. Нужно бороться за биологическое и духовное выживание миллионов людей. И именно этого стратегического направления недостает правительственной программе.

As for the economic programme itself, Shcherbak was against passing it in its present form on the grounds that, while outlining the state of the economy, it failed to make a proper analysis as to the cause of the problems. The major problem, in the view of the Greens, was that the Ukrainian economy was geared towards the Military Industrial Complex (MIK). The Greens were not in any way to blame for Ukraine's ailing economy:

И не нужно обвинять "зеленых" в том, что они закрыли несколько предприятий, мыловаренные заводы. Не в этом дело, а в том, что мы не производим товаров, нужных людям.

Shcherbak's recommendations regarding how to improve the state of the economy are interesting in that they can be taken as not only Shcherbak's personal position on the issue, but also the position of *PZU*. Rather than a few cosmetic changes to stop the decline in the economy in the short term, Shcherbak argued in favour of clear, strategic programmes for structural change of the industry, energy sector and the agricultural complex. As illustrations of countries where structural change had worked he referred to South Korea and Malaysia. There were great opportunities for Ukraine in the area of microelectronics and other science-oriented areas. Ukraine was still a producer of raw materials. This had to change. The Ukrainian government's hesitation was a result not only of professional incompetence, but also revealed a lack of will to change things. Any government, argued Shcherbak, interested in the creation of a sovereign state, would request that the parliament as quickly as possible pass a law on the nationalisation of Ukraine's property and financial resources and would insist on a constitutional basis to support the

declaration of sovereignty passed in July 1990. Shecherbak then listed the following five points as crucial to establish real Ukrainian sovereignty:

- 1) The Prime Minister as head of the Ukrainian government must step down.
- 2) The structure of the government must be changed in line with the Declaration of Sovereignty and the change towards a market economy.
- 3) A coalition mass-party government of public trust (national salvation) must be formed.
- 4) An anti-crisis committee with wide-ranging powers must be established to elaborate a programme for providing children with environmentally clean food.
- 5) Assistance must be sought from banks such as the EBRD and the IMF to pave the way for a fully convertible Ukrainian currency

Thus, *PZU* like all other members of the *Democratic Bloc*, favoured Ukrainian independence. However, groupings within the Green Party were concerned that this issue might overshadow their concern for the environment. Thus Hlazovyi²²¹ emphasised that the environment must not be forgotten in the struggle for independence: 'in our conditions there is a risk that in the zeal of the political struggle currently brewing and the ruling coalitions, the young opposition may also forget the interests of the environment, as well as social and deeply humanist concerns. Although the strong and correct social policies of new administrations in West Ukraine give hope that such a scenario is avoidable, we should give priority to the ecology over the economy and put broad democratic freedoms above the interests of the state. Unlimited market forces can damage our environment just as much as the communist system did. We must therefore not poeticise the market so much. We are far away from a welfare state, capable of taking care of the unemployed and the poor'. Having said that, though, the Greens had come to the conclusion that an independent Ukraine was a prerequisite for establishing an environmentally clean and free, humanist society.

As seen above, there was disagreement within *PZU* on what the party's position should be on the national question. To get a proper discussion on this issue and to carve out a platform on which agreement could be reached between 'globalists' and 'nationalists' (i.e. decide *PZU*'s position on what place the Ukrainian nation should have in Ukraine), *PZU* arranged a conference on nationalism in Kiev in January 1991²²². Specialists on the national question such as Dziuba, Popovych, Lisovyi and Skorativskiy were invited to address the conference, enabling *PZU* to address the issue in an as professional as possible manner.

Not surprisingly, Svyryda reiterated the position of the 'nationalists', arguing that

Крім проблем довкілля, першою проблемою на Україні є
проблема української нації, яка сьогодні вимирає. Українська

²²¹ *Література України*, 15.11.1990, с. 2.

²²² K-3, 22:30, 19.1.1991: *Ukraine Today*, Ukrainian Media Digest, compiled by RI Monitoring, no. UF-028, p. 9, 20.1.1991.

нація не відчуває себе господарем цієї землі. І вона із своєї України дозволила зробити смітник. Українська нація задушила відчуття тієї межі, за якою іде вже вимирання нації.

The link between national consciousness and concern for the environment was acknowledged by those who attended the Conference. Towards the end of the conference, *PZU's* stand on the issue was revealed:

...Без відродження національної свідомості неможливо відродити український народ в поточній катастрофічній екологічній ситуації, яка склалася в республіці.

However, the Green Party at least officially adopted a cautious attitude on the issue of a new union treaty. In an interview towards the end of 1990²²³ Iurii Shcherbak expressed his dissatisfaction with the very notion of a union treaty, which in his view was rather odious. The Greens wanted other forms of co-operation between the republics of the Soviet Union and at a meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet Shcherbak had suggested that a flexible decentralised system of collective security in the areas of the military, ecology, energy and space be formed. However, this system should be polycentric, and not a monopolist, super-state system. Moreover, it should be up to the republics to decide whether or not they wished to join. If they decided in favour, they should unite as sovereign states. As of December 1990, the ecological committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet was conducting negotiations with representatives of the various republics regarding the signing of a special ecological treaty (see Chapter Two) to address environmental problems in the USSR at an inter-republican level. This was necessary, then the problems were on such a scale that none of the republics - including Russia - could successfully solve them alone:

Каждый понимает, что есть такие проблемы, которые нужно решать сообща. Скажем, проблема Чернобыля. Никогда Украина одна не решит²²⁴ этой проблемы. Точно так же и Белоруссия, и Россия. Тем более, что не Украина подрывала эту АЭС, а Минатомэнерго СССР.

However, a 'centre' was not necessary and if a centre was to emerge, it did not automatically have to be based in Moscow. Minsk or any other republican capital was possible. To secure the implementation of decisions made within this framework, should agreement be reached between

²²³ К-3, 1:30, 13.12.90 - radio - in *USSR Today*, Soviet Media News and Information Digest, 13.12.90, no. 1054, p. 2.

²²⁴ p. 3.

the republics on the need for a treaty, a co-ordinating body composed of representatives from all the republics could be set up. Another possibility was to establish a centre for fighting a new ecological catastrophe of global proportions, namely that of the Aral Sea.

When asked if he favoured absolute independence for Ukraine, Shcherbak was somewhat evasive, arguing that a declaration of sovereignty, expressing the highest wish of the Ukrainian people already existed. However, 'thousands of problems' would have to be solved during the period of transition to secure real independence:

Да и разве можно закрыть глаза на дело, погрузиться в песок и сказать: мы независимы. И крутим мы голые, босые и мы не знаем, что и как и где нам пофть брать... Политический суверенитет – это одно дело, а экономический – это проблема свободного развития экономики и предприятий... Нужно дать свободу нашим предприятиям, нужно создавать новый рынок. Нужно только, чтобы это происходило не на принципах грабежа, а на принципах взаимовыгодных... (стр. 3) Украина является государством, и она должна войти в европейский процесс.

Real independence would not be achieved simply by issuing declarations; actions were required. As a first step, the union system, consisting of 56 ministries and super-monopolies, controlling the entire USSR, would have to be fully dismantled and replaced by new structures. Only to replace the Prime Minister (Ryzhkov) would change nothing. Deep structural changes, taking account of the sovereign will of the republics were needed to achieve real change.

Shcherbak expanded on his position in an article written in *Oikumena* in early 1991²²⁵, arguing that

Між республіками має бути рівноправна угода з проблем екології, і ні в якому разі не договір, вигідний лише для Центру, бо спроби протравити такий документ уже були. Екологічні проблеми, зокрема чорнобильська, мають глобальний характер. Подолання їх потребує спільних зусиль, наявності органів для координації дія, централізованого виділення коштів, створення Союзного фонду допомоги.

Disasters such as Chernobyl and the Aral Sea could only be solved with the help of the international community. Union funds should be created on a voluntary basis and Lithuania, which had already left the union, should be allowed to join if it wished to do so. Nobody, except for the republics involved, should have access to the funds and co-ordinating bodies should

²²⁵ Юрий Шербак, 'Між республіками має бути рівноправна угода з проблем екології', *Ойкумена* 2/91, с. 92-98.

implement the programmes endorsed. These bodies did not necessarily have to be situated in Moscow, but could be in Minsk, Kiev, Alma Ata or elsewhere. Scientific communities in all the republics should unite to find the best solutions to each problem. However, as long as the USSR existed, the 'centre' (i.e. Moscow) should pay for such programmes to be implemented. As for sovereignty,

Без реального суверенітету, свободи в укладанні угод, у створенні фондів, довгострокової діяльності нації екологічні біди подолати неможливо. Тільки суверенна країна може здійснювати ефективний екологічний контроль над своєю територією²²⁶.

In the early months of 1991, several political parties and movements in Ukraine were demanding a popular referendum on the issue of independence, to help them pursue this issue vis-à-vis Ukrainian authorities. Shcherbak, however, was not happy with such a request, arguing that a referendum would be politically not advisable and socially impossible. Rather than solving any problems, a referendum would sharpen already existing contradictions among those who requested the referendum.

Although Shcherbak was sceptical to a referendum, other prominent members of *PZU* were more positive. Serhii Hrabovskyi (Kiev) tried to justify Ukrainian Independence from a Green point of view in an interview with Ukrainian Radio a month later²²⁷, criticising those in the West who were sceptical to Ukraine's and other republics' wish to secede from the USSR:

Нам часто говорят: Европа объединяется, а вы хотите растащить великий Союз по национальным квартирам. Во-первых, я не вижу ничего плохого в том, что и народы, и люди хотят жить в отдельных квартирах, как говорится, со всеми удобствами. Довольно с нас коммуналок. Европа объединена как раз на уровне национальных квартир. И второе. Предложенный вариант Союзного договора, по моему мнению, не имеет ничего общего с принципами объединения цивилизованных стран. Европейское содружество как-то живет и собирается вполне жить без всевластного центра. Ныне, в конце 20-го столетия, отполь не размеры определяют место страны в мире²²⁸.

The Ukrainian Greens were against the continued existence of a 'renewed empire'. Instead they favoured co-operation between sovereign states, where each state would decide which

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

²²⁷ K-2, 22:15, 19.2.91 in *USSR Today*, Soviet Media News and Information Digest, Compiled by RL Monitoring, no. NF-170, 25.2.91, p. 37.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*

relations it wanted with its neighbours. Hrabvoskyi had argued in favour of co-operation between the Soviet republics on such terms since the spring of 1990 and his view was in line with a decision made by the *Demokratichnyi konfres* in Kharkiv (I will return to this below), which carried Shcherbak's signature on it. Taking part in a union of the (former) Soviet republics would prevent Ukraine from joining the Common European Home - one of *PZU*'s aims - by artificially linking it with Kirgizia instead of, for instance Czechoslovakia, which would be considerably better for Ukraine.

The discussion continued right up until the coup in August 1991. The coup left the Greens, like most other Ukrainian politicians, in a state of shock. Once the initial surprise had worn off, however, the democratic forces joined together in a massive show of strength against the coup-leaders in Moscow. The official Ukrainian reaction to the coup was cautious. The Communist majority in parliament hesitated to make a decision either way and the speaker of the parliament, Leonid Kravchuk, on 19 August issued a statement to the effect that the parliament would wait until the morning before taking sides - in other words awaiting the situation in Moscow so as to make sure to support the 'right' side. It was *RUKH*'s Narodna Rada and practically all Ukrainian parties and movements that first came out clearly and categorically against the coup. A number of meetings took place in Kiev and students gathered in Khreshchatyk and outside *Verkhovna Rada*. As for the Greens, *Zelenyi Svit*'s and *PZU*'s co-ordinating bodies had joint sittings. These meetings were attended by everybody who happened to be in Kiev at the time. A resolution was passed, in which the coup makers were referred to as a 'junta' and the putsch referred to as a 'putsch'. This resolution was read at meetings and handed over to the speaker of the parliament, Leonid Kravchuk. *PZU*'s leader, Vitalii Kononov, also signed a joint statement against the putsch issued by the democratic forces.

Andrii Hlazovyi described the Greens' involvement in the anti-coup movement in Kiev during the putsch in a detailed manner in an article published in *Zelenyi svit*²²⁹: a new issue of the newspaper was due on 20 August. However, instead of printing the paper, the newspaper staff printed bulletins and other important material against the coup:

На деякий час ми припиняємо друк саморобних листівок із звелєннями повин, почутих по зарубіжному радіо. За дві години до виходу вручну вклеюємо у першу полосу текст заяви протесту зелених. І коли стає відомо, що номер пішов у друк: розбираємо і пакуємо редакційну техніку, дотовляємося наступного ранку вивезти її на приватну квартиру і готувати черговий номер там...Тим часом на першій полосі "Прадвы України" адмірал Хронопуло-Чорноморське гаряче підтримує від імені флоту комбандитів з ГКЧП. "Рабочая газета" передруковує "тарсівку" з одою заколотникам. "Радянська

²²⁹ *Zelenyi svit*, no. 15, 1991, c. 2.

Україна" гнівно таврує нехороших депутатів Народної Ради, які неправильно себе поведуть по відношенню до "совєтського керівництва"²³⁰.

Hlazovyi severely criticised Ukrainian authorities for failing to distance themselves from events in Moscow: it was actually a paradox that one of the tanks that defended the White House in Moscow carried the Ukrainian blue and yellow flag whereas in Kiev they were 'waiting for the morning' - a morning which might not come. This was, argued Hlazovyi, very political, but not very moral. However, when it became clear that the putsch had failed, the chairman of *Verkhovna Rada* and the CPU suddenly came out in a more decisive and certain way:

„Коли путч провалився, на Україні раніше починаються чудеса героїзму і національної самосвідомості з боку...більшості Верховної Ради. Дружно й фантастичною більністю голосується Акт Незалежності. З чим і вітаємо співвітчизників.

Suddenly the communist majority in parliament voted in favour of what it had so long been against: the Ukrainian yellow and blue flag was raised outside the parliament and they all sang the Ukrainian hymn 'Sheche ne vmerla Ukraina'. However, the implications of this sudden change of attitude would not necessarily be desired:

І якщо дати їм волю, будуть створювати Самостійну Бананову Республіку Україну - бананову, бо владу в ній буде закорочено телефонними дротами на все тій же старій олігархії, яка лише поміняє крісла в обкомах та райкомах на крісла нових господарів життя - директорів та керуючих - як бувало неодноразово в країнах третього світу. Не вірите? Але навіть у Польщі та Болгарії колишні комуністичні боси контролюють більші половини банків та підприємств...

The CPSU had not died, although Eltsin had declared the party illegal. The 'party Mafia' had everything it needed for survival and influence: close links with those in power, the courts and the economic structures. With this in mind, Hlazovyi argued that it would be naive to think that such a 'monster' could be crushed with ease. Ukrainian independence could only be safeguarded if the Ukrainian people did not believe in those for whom independence was just a means by which to secure their own positions. If this was achieved, there could be real independence and not what could be labelled 'banana independence'.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

As prerequisites to achieve real independence, *PZU* favoured a consolidation of the democratic forces and a dialogue including all forces in Ukraine. In a statement to *Verkhovna Rada*, *Zelenyi Svit*, *PZU*, the Constitutional-Democratic Party of Ukraine, the Liberal-Democratic Party of Ukraine, the United Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine and Solidaric Trade Unions of Ukraine called for an end of what was referred to as 'the civil war, which has lasted - in various forms - since 1914'. Public peace could be strengthened with a national symbol in the form of a monument to all those Ukrainians who perished between 1914 and 1991 as victims of political struggle²³¹.

However, rather than a consolidation of Ukrainian political forces, a crystallisation took place - at least within *Verkhovna Rada*: the 'Group 239' survived and gave birth to several political parties such as *SPTU*, *SPU* and 'Ednist'. The socialist leader Oleksandr Moroz even argued that 'without the 'Great October' there would have been no Ukraine; thanks to the Revolution, Ukraine had emerged as a state'²³². This caused a sharp reaction in Green circles:

...Але все ж таки 1991 рік - не 1919 і навіть не 1990-й. Тому під червоними прапорами йшло дось тисячу-дві клінічних більшовиків. Тому тепер, після знайомства з правдою історії, повірити, що без ВОСП не було б України, може лише той, хто вважає, що без революції та керівної ролі КПРС не було б Тихого океану, Мисли і міста Житомира. Щоправда, одного точно не було б: Чорнобиль. Так по у словах тов. Мороза є правда: ТАКА державність, яка була за часів Постигієва-Калашовича-Щербинського і втілюлася в атомній трагедії, без керівної та спрямовуючої ролі комуністичної партії не виникає.

The Relationship to Russia and the CIS

PZU's attitude towards Russia was very much determined by the country's attempt at forging a tight relationship between the former Soviet republics through the CIS and also by Russia's claim to be the successor to the Soviet Union thus being entitled to military installations in other republics as well as to property abroad and hard-currency deposits. Yet another factor complicating the relationship between Ukraine and Russia were claims by some Russian members of parliament to the effect that the Crimea was Russian territory and that Ukraine was not really a separate country but an integral part of Russia; Malorossia (Little Russia).

For *PZU*, highly sceptical to any attempts at reviving the Soviet Union, moves to replace the USSR with the CIS caused concern. When the issue of signing the CIS-treaty came up in the

²³¹ Звернення, signed 2.9.1991.

²³² *Зелений світ*, no. 19-20, 1991, с. 3.

beginning of December 1993, *PZU* urged the Ukrainian President not to sign the treaty on the grounds that signing it would institutionalise the CIS and turn it into something more than a co-ordinating body between independent republics:

З вищим рівнем залежності. Це об'єктивно підсилює позиції прихильників конфедерації серед членів СНД²³³.

Further, regardless of the contents of the CIS treaty, signing this treaty would take the

Співдружності в нову якість – структуровану організацію із вищим рівнем пов'язаності її учасників²³⁴.

One year had passed since the referendum on 1 December 1991 in which the majority of the electorate supported Ukrainian independence and *PZU* claimed that the lack of a conceptual basis for Ukrainian domestic and foreign policy had discredited the very idea of Ukrainian independence. The CIS had had a stabilising effect during state building in the former Soviet republics, but Ukraine and any other republic that might sign the treaty would in actual fact be giving up their right to self-determination to the CIS thus destroying any prospective for developing their national economies and leaving them with less influence in international politics.

It would be better for the republics, in the view of the Greens, to build bilateral links between them and co-ordinate the introduction of structural changes in the national economies, rather than institutionalise the CIS, which in terms of the economy would make the conservation of Soviet economic structures more likely. These structures were dominated by the Military-Industrial Complex, used natural resources very inefficiently with outdated technologies and linked the republics to one another. None of the former Soviet republics, including Ukraine, would be able to retain parity with Russia in a tight, inter-state alliance. The CIS was already to some extent blocking Ukraine's international potential and signing the statute would further reduce the country's significance.

From a peace point of view, joining the CIS on a permanent basis would increase the likelihood of Ukraine getting pulled into global and regional conflicts as it would transform the CIS into a confederal state not unlike that of the former Soviet Union. Ukraine had no reason to join the CIS as

Бо не має таких економічних і політичних переваг чи палбач, що не могли б бути забезпечені для України сумою просторових угод та участю в діяльності існуючих міжнародних організацій²³⁵.

²³³ Звернення ПЗУ до президента и уряду України. 7.12.92.

²³⁴ Коментар до заяви ПЗУ від 7 грудня 1992 року (n.d.).

²³⁵ *Ibid.*

The Green Party's activities to prevent Ukraine from signing the CIS treaty continued into 1993. In a comment to the January 1993 meeting in Minsk, *PZU* described the meeting as the 'continuation of the process of separating the republics of the former USSR in a civilised manner'²³⁶. To add weight to its position, *PZU* joined forces with other political parties and movements including *KUN* (Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists), whose activities the Green Party remained highly sceptical of and in some cases even condemned. In an open letter to the Ukrainian President signed by representatives of *PZU*, *KUN*, *DPU* and *URP*, Ukrainian membership in the CIS was strongly opposed on the ground that

СНД трансформується в замкнуте економічне співтовариство, яке в недалекому майбутньому остаточно оформиться як Євро-Азійське ЄС з яскравим політичним забарвленням²³⁷.

Ukraine, they argued, had to make a choice: it could either become one of the founders of such a union, as it had been in 1922, or it could seek integration with countries in Eastern Europe and sometime in the future become part of a united Europe.

With regard to the division of Soviet assets between the former Soviet republics, the Greens were highly sceptical of Russia's position on the issue. Declaring itself the successor to the USSR, Russia lay claim to all Soviet property abroad and to the hard-currency assets of USSR in return for taking on the USSR's foreign debts. *PZU* held the view that property and assets, in the same way as the Soviet debt, ought to be divided proportionally between the former Soviet republics. As the value of Ukraine's share of the property and assets (16.7%) would probably exceed that of the debts (16.5 billion US dollar), provided that assets were properly invested, they could grow and thus cover the foreign debts²³⁸. As an independent country, Ukraine, like Russia, needed property abroad to house its embassies and consulates.

During 1993 and 1994 *PZU* in many ways became a watchdog on issues related to the status and the future of the CIS. Any attempt at widening its powers and more actively involve Ukraine in its activities were ardently opposed by the Green Party on the grounds that this would not only infringe on the country's sovereignty but also ultimately limit the freedom of its citizens. Political freedom, democracy and human rights are as important to the Ukrainian Greens as to Greens elsewhere - perhaps more so as such freedoms and rights can more easily be infringed in countries

²³⁶ УТ-1, 21.01.93 УТН 16:00, 21:00.

²³⁷ *Українські вісти*, 5.9.1990, с. 1.

²³⁸ No. 0-7, 24.8.1993 р. Прес-реліз щодо питання про розподіл майна та активів СРСР. Foreign experts estimated Soviet property and assets abroad at some 150 billion US dollars. Ukraine's share of this (16.5%) would thus be worth 24.75 billion US dollars - i.e. 8.25 billion US dollars more than the debts.

which are in transition from one political system to another. *PZU*'s commitment extended beyond the territory of Ukraine. Thus, during the war in Georgia, *PZU* issued a statement urging 'democratic forces' in Ukraine to show solidarity with the Georgian republic, which was 'forced to withstand expansionist pressure (read Russian expansion)'. The slogan 'For Our and Your Freedom' had again become real²³⁹ and in October 1993 *PZU* initiated a money collection campaign for the victims of the war in Georgia²⁴⁰. Further, the Ukrainian Greens encouraged Ukrainian authorities to take actively part in finding a peaceful solution to the conflict in Pridnistrovie (Moldova).

PZU also opposed Ukrainian involvement in foreign wars. Thus, in the very beginning of the Gulf War in 1990, the party issued a statement expressing concern with attempts by 'chauvinist' forces in the USSR to set up units of volunteers to fight on the Iraqi side during the war. The party was also worried that due to the Friendship Treaty between the USSR and Iraq, Ukrainian soldiers might be sent to the Gulf to fight and committed itself to do everything it could to prevent this from happening²⁴¹.

Ukraine as an Anti-Nuclear and Anti-Military State

As seen above *PZU* at an early stage declared itself an anti-militaristic party. At the Second Congress in Ternopil a proposition was passed that the Ukrainian Carpathes be demilitarised. The Carpathes were not only a particularly valuable area for recreation but was also a military and strategic forpost, 'useful not only for Eastern troops but also for the West in case of war'. The presence of troops in the region was 'firstly a military threat to the Ukrainian democracy and secondly, caused suspicion from the point of view of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and other neighbouring states'. Bearing this in mind, *PZU* recommended that the authorities stop deploying military units in the region and that troops already deployed be pulled out of the area.

The initiative group to setting up *PZU* declared that as an anti-militaristic party *PZU* was committed to eliminating nuclear-, chemical- and biological weapons as these were amoral and destructive. Further, the party would seek to dissolve military blocks and remove all forms of militarism from public life (education and upbringing)²⁴². Although the party members were pacifists, they acknowledged that the time had not yet come for complete disarmament and dissolving the army. Rather than having a conscript army *PZU* proposed to create a smaller,

²³⁹ Замка ПЗУ, no. 11-09, 30.9.1993.

²⁴⁰ Звернення до громадян України, 12.10.93.

²⁴¹ Резолюція конференції ПЗУ, що відбулась 20 січня 1990 р. в м. Києві, щодо подій в Перській Затоці.

²⁴² К-3 22:30 7.9.1991, transcribed in *USSR Today*, 8.9.1991, no. 763, p. 64.

stream-lined professional army. The army, KGB and the Ministry of the Interior furthermore should be made subordinate to the parliament to make them more controllable²⁴³. The presence of a Ukrainian army was acceptable to the Greens as such an army would pose no threat to any other state since Ukraine had no territorial pretensions towards any of its neighbouring states. A national Ukrainian army would thus only serve the purpose of defending Ukraine from potential aggressors²⁴⁴.

Official plans to increase the size of the Ukrainian army by the beginning of 1995 did therefore not go down well with the Greens:

Армія необхідна країні, проте країна не може подати запитання додатком до армії. ПЗУ продовжує обстоювати ідею демілітаризації суспільства, що означає усунення військових або воєнізованих складників із тих сфер і структур, що не пов'язані безпосередньо із обороною, конверсію більшої частини підприємств ВПК, скорочення Збройних Сил до рівня оборонної достатності²⁴⁵ із постійним переходом до їхнього функціонування на професійних засадах, тобто²⁴⁶.

With regard to nuclear weapons stored on Ukrainian territory, *PZU* was in favour of withdrawing these and having them destroyed. This was justified in the following way: with the collapse of the USSR and the political changes that had taken place in Eastern Europe the polarisation and confrontation between the East and West which had justified the deployment of nuclear weapons in the first place, had disappeared. This had paved the way for stabilising relations between the two and also for negotiations regarding the removal and destruction of these weapons. This view was supported by Greens in Armenia, Georgia, Lithuania and Estonia. By removing nuclear weapons from Ukrainian soil and by making no claims on these arms Ukraine would reduce the likelihood of a confrontation with any other country. Moreover, being in possession of these weapons in the first place did not pose any real threat towards any potential aggressor as the threat of total destruction was the same on the other side. Besides, should a conflict break out between Ukraine and a neighbouring country the conflict would be likely to spread, thus destabilising the political situation on the entire European continent. Ukraine was as a matter of fact due to its large number of nuclear power stations and its high population density not well suited even for conventional weapons, not to mention nuclear arms. The Greens saw Ukraine's future outside any military block as a neutral country. The size of the army should be

²⁴³ *Прикарпатська правда*, 17.3.1990 (n.p.).

²⁴⁴ *Залпа ПЗУ* (n.d.).

²⁴⁵ The term 'розумна достатність' was also used (see for instance Kononov in *Голос України*, 6.2.1993, с. 4).

²⁴⁶ *Прес-реліз*, no. 26-11, 21.11.93.

set with defensive purposes in mind - i.e. just big enough to be able to defend the country in case of war. Joining a common defence system with the other former Soviet republics would be a mistake as this would open for outside pressure and interference in Ukrainian internal affairs in the future²⁴⁷.

The Ukrainian Greens welcomed the initiative to transport Ukrainian nuclear weapons to Russia for dismantling, justifying their view as follows:

Ми вітаємо безпрецедентну в світовій історії ініціативу української держави - відмову від ядерної зброї - факт, що закарбується як приклад для наслідування на шляху повного роззброєння країн, що хизуються своїми демократичними інституціями; як приклад доброї волі, що свідчить про відсутність у молодій держави будь-яких імперіалістських амбіцій.

There were also more practical and environmental reasons for giving up the Ukrainian nuclear weapons. In an open letter to *Verkhovna Rada*, *PZU* urged the deputies not to reconsider Ukraine's commitment to a nuclear-free status²⁴⁸, arguing that if Ukraine remained militarised, the country would inevitably be pulled into military-political alliances and allowing the Military-Industrial Complex to control the shaping of Ukrainian society. By preserving the country's nuclear capability and expanding nuclear power, Ukraine would put itself in a position where it could be put under pressure from other countries and also putting the environment and the country's social programmes at risk. The presence of nuclear installations - including weapons - posed a real hazard to the environment and given the costs of maintaining and developing these installations, social programmes might be abandoned as a result²⁴⁹. Furthermore, Ukraine could, in the view of *PZU*, not sustain its own nuclear weapons as it had no facilities for the production of such weapons, no testing facilities and also suffered from a lack of storage facilities. As a

²⁴⁷ Заявлення Партии Зеленых Украины касяющиеся оборонных вопросов. Киев, 4.9.1991 г. This document is handwritten.

²⁴⁸ This possibility was brought up by the pro-nuclear lobby shortly after Ukraine declared itself independent in 1991 due to problems with obtaining oil and gas from Russia. Russia immediately after the collapse of the USSR introduced world prices on fuel and as Ukraine did not have the hard currency by which to pay, supplies were frequently interrupted in 1991 and 1992. This factor, combined with Ukraine's dependence on Russia for fuel, led many members of parliament to revise their stand on nuclear power, not excluding the possibility of lifting the moratorium on expansion of nuclear power in Ukraine they had themselves introduced in September 1990. The Ukrainian Green Party formally protested against plans to restart construction of conserved nuclear reactors following talks between the Ukrainian president and those ministries and departments in charge of the country's nuclear power installations in mid-1992 (for details, see *Українська думка*, 16.7.1992, с. 4).

²⁴⁹ УР-1, 25.12.92 17:00 "Година пік", transcribed in *Ukraine Today*, Ukrainian Media Digest, 28.12.1992, no. 386, p. 6.

prerequisite for maintaining its nuclear arsenal, Ukraine would have no option but to seek closer ties with Russia and this was not desirable given the present political situation²⁵⁰.

Holding the view that Ukraine's nuclear weapons did not provide the country with added security but rather proved a heavy burden on its finances, the Green Party welcomed talks regarding their removal from Ukrainian territory and destruction in Russia following a consultative meeting in Kiev between the Ukrainian and American presidents on 12 January 1994. In addition to seeking some material compensation for the withdrawal of these weapons the Greens urged that security guarantees be requested from Russia and the United States. Such guarantees might include the following:

Поставити перед ООН питання про постіве членство без'ядерної України, як першої в світі держави, що відмовляється від ядерної зброї в Раді Безпеки ООН із надбанням нею відповідних повноважень²⁵¹.

Furthermore, the demilitarisation should include the Black Sea Fleet:

ПЗУ вважає принципово важливою умовою ядерного роззброєння розподіл Чорноморського флоту із передислокацією підпорядкованих Росії військових частин за межі України. В теперішньому стані база ЧМФ являє собою форпост сусідньої ядерної наддержави і за певних політичних умов може перетворитися на плацдарм зовнішньої експансії.

No foreign military troops should be allowed on Ukrainian territory and this issue ought, in the opinion of the Greens, to be included in the three-country talks in Moscow²⁵². This was in line with a decision made by *PZU* earlier, to the effect that all military units on Ukrainian territory be subordinated to *Verkhovna Rada* and that all military installations be made Ukrainian property²⁵³.

The Black Sea Fleet was the source of considerable pollution of the Black Sea and of the territory on which its bases were located. Emissions of oil products and of untreated water from the industry was polluting nature reserves. The storage of warheads were also causing problems and as *PZU* and *Zelenyi Svit* had come to experience, it was practically impossible to obtain accurate information from the fleet itself as it was under the jurisdiction of the army, which was particularly secretive with regard to such information. Pollution from radar stations were having a

²⁵⁰ Відкритий лист Політичної Ради ПЗУ до Верховної Ради і громадян України щодо питань ядерного роззброєння. м Київ, 14.3.1992 р.

²⁵¹ Undated address to *Verkhovna Rada* signed by Kononov and Kurykin.

²⁵² Заява Політради ПЗУ, no. 2/14, 13 січня 1994 р.

²⁵³ К-3, 22:30, 7.9.1991 transcribed in *USSR Today*, 8.9.1991, no. 763, p. 64.

colossal negative effect on people's health. The Black Sea Fleet Command must immediately change its attitude towards pollution and environmental problems and take part in the ecological rehabilitation of the Black Sea area (Prichernomorie). According to the Greens it would cost an estimated 17 billion dollars to solve problems caused by the military. In 3-5 years time it might be too late, regardless of the size of financial input, to successfully address this problem²⁵⁴.

Once it became known that Ukraine would be compensated for its nuclear weapons with nuclear fuel for its nuclear reactors, *PZU* immediately condemned this move as it would be detrimental to reducing the number of nuclear stations on Ukrainian soil. The Greens favoured a restructuring of the fuel-energy complex and as part of such a restructuring Chernobyl ought to be closed down during the current year²⁵⁵.

An important element in *PZU*'s policy of disarmament was the establishment of nuclear-free zones²⁵⁶ - as a matter of fact it was a priority issue for the party. In an article on *PZU* and nuclear-free zones, Andrii Demydenko pointed out that it would not be possible to transform the entire country to a nuclear-free zone straight away. Establishing local nuclear-free zones, though, would be a step in this direction and the Kiev region had the best potential for becoming nuclear-free. The Greens gathered more than 250,000 signatures²⁵⁷ in support for turning Kiev into a nuclear-free zone in the city alone and through *PZU*'s three deputies in Kievrada, Vitalii Kononov, Orest Melnykov and Iurii Samilenko, the idea of Kiev as a nuclear-free zone was successfully promoted and at a session on 13 October 1992 Kievrada declared Kiev a nuclear-free zone²⁵⁸, thus creating a legal base for removing all nuclear objects, with the exception of radioactive isotopes used in medicine, from the city's boundaries²⁵⁹. According to information gathered by a working commission set up by Kievrada to chart nuclear installations in Kiev, there were 240 enterprises sorting under the Military-Industrial Complex, that used radioactive isotopes in their production. What was more, analyses had shown that the city's waste tips were contaminated with tritium exceeding permissible levels by 2,5 times²⁶⁰. In addition, *PZU* also initiated a joint Ukrainian-

²⁵⁴ *Київський вісник*, 31.5.1994, с. 1.

²⁵⁵ Прес-реліз до підписання тристоронньої домовленості про ліквідацію ядерної зброї в Україні, №. 3/1, 19 січня 1994 р.

²⁵⁶ *Zeleni Svit* and *PZU* became members of the Movement of Local Governments for Nuclear-Free Zones in 1990, when Demydenko attended its fifth international conference in Glasgow. The movement, which has been given status as a non-governmental organisation (NGO) by the United Nations was set up in 1984, in Manchester and emerged out of the movement of local governments. At the Glasgow conference Ukraine's efforts to establish itself as a neutral and nuclear-free country were welcomed by those present.

²⁵⁷ Протокол №. 001, засідання представників регіонів ПЗУ, м. Київ, від 23.11.93 р.

²⁵⁸ 147 deputies voted in favour, 1 voted against and 1 abstained. Source: Прес-реліз Партії Зелених України щодо проголошення Києва без'ядерною зоною, 23.10.92 р.

²⁵⁹ УР-І. 23.10.92. 17:00, *Голос півк*.

²⁶⁰ *Українські вісті*, 16.5.1993, с. 6.

American conference in Kiev and Odessa with the participation of anti-nuclear and peace movements from Chicago and Baltimore. Deputies from local parliaments in various Ukrainian cities were also invited to attend²⁶¹.

Finally, *PZU* launched the idea of a nuclear-free Black Sea. This initiative coincided with the worsening of Russian-Ukrainian relations over the Black Sea Fleet. The Central Co-ordinating Council passed a resolution arguing that while Ukraine had a right to its own defence (army), including a fleet, the militarisation of Russia could not but cause worry as Russia had no intention of reducing its number of tactical nuclear weapons. Rather than becoming an area of conflict, the Black Sea should be turned into a zone of peace, free from nuclear weapons. To achieve this aim, *PZU* urged the Black Sea countries to unite efforts.

The moratorium on nuclear power was lifted by the Ukrainian parliament in the autumn of 1993. In February 1994 President Kravchuk issued a secret edict²⁶² allowing for the completion and construction of at least six nuclear reactors over the coming few years. Furthermore, the edict paved the way for the creation of a full nuclear cycle - i.e. the production of fuel and long-term storage of nuclear waste. The Greens sharply criticised this edict, arguing that it would facilitate the impoverishment of the Ukrainian people and fuel hyperinflation as electricity prices would be correlated in advance. What was more, *Derzhkomatom* would be ready to export up to 20% of the electricity generated at the country's nuclear power stations in order to cover the hard-currency needs of the industry and of establishing a full nuclear cycle. As Ukraine depended on Russia for nuclear fuel supplies, the country's dependence on Russia would increase rather than decrease. Expanding nuclear power in Ukraine would furthermore gravely complicate the social and economic situation of the country as well as pose a danger to the country's natural environment and people's health²⁶³.

There was also a legal case for opposing the edict as it contradicted the concept of state regulation of the safety and administration of the nuclear industry, passed by *Verkhovna Rada* and also the laws 'on the protection of nature', 'on information' and 'on the protection of the rights of the consumer'. The Green Party repeated earlier demands for the rehabilitation of traditional sources of energy, energy saving measures and the modernisation of thermal power plants in the country²⁶⁴.

²⁶¹ УР-1, 25.10.92 11:00, "Новини".

²⁶² Указ о неотложных мерах по развитию атомной энергетики и созданию ядерно-топливного комплекса в Украине, no. 64/94 of 23.2.1994.

²⁶³ Statement of the Ukrainian Green Party's Political Council on Kravchuk's edict on nuclear power. Statement undated.

²⁶⁴ *Киевский вестник*, 30.3.1994, с. 4.

Democracy and Human Rights

The Ukrainian Green Party had an ambivalent attitude towards the authorities: on the one hand, as will be seen below, it was highly critical of official policies, whereas on the other, it was represented in the Ukrainian government through Iurii Shcherbak and in official political and economic structures. Under the leadership of Vitalii Kononov, active dialogue was sought with President Leonid Kravchuk and also with representatives of the government.

At a meeting with Foreign Minister Zlenko in January 1993, Kononov praised Zlenko for his firm position on the issue of nuclear free status for Ukraine. Agreement was reached with regard to possible co-operation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Greens and Zlenko promised his Ministry's support in the organisation of an international green congress in Kiev (see section on International Greens)²⁶⁵. In a similar manner, Kononov and Ivan Dziuba, Ukrainian Minister of Culture, reached agreement regarding co-operation on a campaign labelled 'Musicians against drugs and alcoholism' in early 1993²⁶⁶.

Kononov's approach was to gain maximum Green influence on the political process. This could in his view only be achieved by maintaining close links with those making the political decisions, which was of particular importance to *PZU* as it was not represented in parliament. It was also hoped that such an approach would expose *PZU* to the general public as a 'serious' political party and enhance the image of Kononov among the electorate. As pointed out above, Kononov was much less known throughout Ukraine than Shcherbak had been.

Such an approach was opposed by others, who feared that the party might compromise itself by forging too close links with the authorities. Some people, like Hlazovyi, held the view that *PZU* should forever remain a party in opposition and avoid too close links with the authorities. Others thought Kononov was putting himself in a ridiculous position by forging close links with President Kravchuk. Although *PZU* was ranked highly in public opinion polls, the party lacked the political weight and resources needed to exert real influence upon the president. Moreover, Kravchuk did not need the support of the Greens. Thus, in their view, all Kononov would achieve by such an approach, would be to discredit the Greens in the eyes of the electorate.

If one looks at the contents of various statements and press releases made by the Green Party on a number of issues, however, a majority of these are highly critical of official policies. *PZU* was particularly wary of attempts at strengthening the powers of the executive at the expense of the legislative and thus strongly opposed attempts at creating a strong presidency with extensive powers on the French model. In March 1993 the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers was preparing a

²⁶⁵ *Вечірній Київ*, 26.1.1993, с. 1.

²⁶⁶ *Вечірній Київ*, 10.3.1993, с. 1.

Law on Presidential Representatives and a Resolution on Local State Administration. *PZU* in two comments argued against this system on the following grounds:

Представник президента суміняє ключові елементи представницької, виконавчої, прокурорської і судової влади. Його розпорядження в межах дуже широких повноважень є обов'язковими для виконання як органами місцевого самоврядування, так і підприємствами, громадськими об'єднаннями і окремими громадянами...Так зване реформування державної влади має бути зупинене²⁶⁷.

Instead, the Greens favoured the creation of a system offering efficient counter-weight to what was perceived as a

Тенденція до концентрації влади в одних руках шляхом створення конституційного Суду, запровадження посад обласних губернаторів, мерів міст і голів місцевої влади, які обиратимуться прямим таємним голосуванням.

This position was not only motivated by a general commitment to democracy, but also out of concern for the environment. Any attempt at strengthening the powers of the executive were considered detrimental to the state of the environment. In the view of the Greens, the extensive powers of the command-administrative system had made this obvious to everyone. Thus,

На нашу думку, громада починається з людини, а держава починається з громади. Порушення цього принципу веде за собою порушення соціальної, економічної й екологічної рівноваги.

Greens throughout Ukraine were encouraged not to take part in setting up the new administrative system as it contradicted *PZU*'s programme and broke with the principle of division of power between the legislative, executive and judicial. This would not only have negative effects in Ukraine itself, but might also discredit the country in the eyes of the international community. *PZU* proposed that regional governors, mayors of cities and heads of local authorities be elected in direct and secret elections. It also urged that a constitutional court be created²⁶⁸.

Although Iurii Sheherbak was Minister of the Environment in Fokin's government from the summer of 1991 until the summer of 1992 this did not prevent *PZU* from criticising the government for a lack of commitment to the environment. Such criticism was also directed

²⁶⁷ Заява Політичної Ради Партії Зелених України, 13.3.92 р.

²⁶⁸ *Свобода*, 17.3.1992, с. 1.

towards the Ukrainian parliament. In June 1992, for instance, a statement issued by the Political Council claimed that *Verkhovna Rada* had exhausted its legislative and state-building potential: a 'reactionary majority' supported the 'anti-social' and 'anti-environmental' policies of Fokin's government directed towards the 'transformation of Ukraine into an authoritarian state'. *PZU* thus supported a referendum on the dissolving of *Verkhovna Rada*, including a question of the future of nuclear power in Ukraine²⁶⁹.

In October 1992, Fokin stepped down as Ukrainian Prime Minister following wide protests and a hunger strike by students in Kiev to have him removed. He was replaced by Leonid Kuchma, who, in an effort to unite the various political currents, opened the door to the cabinet for Ukrainian political parties and movements. Such an offer was also extended to *PZU*. In a statement the Political Council of *PZU* saw it as an 'act of goodwill' that the Prime Minister was ready to consult with the country's political parties on the composition of the government. However, as Kuchma 'belongs to the upper echelons of the 'Military Industrial Complex'', this prevents the Greens from taking symbolically part in forming a new government²⁷⁰.

It did not take long from the government was formed until the Greens started voicing their criticism of the new prime minister. Remarks by Kuchma to the effect that the economic destabilisation of Ukraine were caused by the activities of political parties, were flatly refuted. The parties' political activities, on the contrary, were not the cause but the effect of the economic destabilisation that was taking hold of Ukrainian society and the government's failure to adequately address the state of affairs. Besides, attempts at strengthening the executive at the expense of the legislative powers posed 'a threat to the future of the democratic process'. The Greens were also dismayed to find that Kuchma in his speech to parliament failed to address environmental issues. The link between the economy and the environment was simply ignored and there was no mention of conversion of the Military Industrial Complex. However, *PZU* wished Kuchma's government good luck in its attempts to solve Ukraine's economic crisis, expressing the hope that

Що лише з балансований розвиток із опорою на демократичні інститути виведе Україну на гідні політичні та економічні позиції в світовому співтоваристві²⁷¹.

²⁶⁹ Заява Політичної Ради Партії Зелених України, Радіо Україна, 21.10.25.6.92 transcribed in *Ukraine Today*, Ukrainian Media News and Features Digest, compiled by the RFE/RL Research Institute Monitoring Unit, 25.6.1992, no. UF-255, p. 6.

²⁷⁰ Заява Політичної Ради Партії Зелених України щодо формування нового Кабінету Міністрів, 22.10.92.

²⁷¹ Заява ПЗУ щодо спрямованості дій Кабінету Міністрів України, 3.12.92.

Economic Issues

The programme adopted by *PZU*'s Inaugural Congress in 1990 outlined the party's stand on issues such as the economy and social policies. Statements were, however, vague and no coherent plan of action was provided. Throughout 1991 and 1992 the Green Party on a number of occasions issued statements and resolutions regarding certain aspects of official economic policies. By patching together these, a more coherent position on the economy appears.

As seen above, a priority issue for the Greens was the dismantling of the economic, political and administrative structures of the former Soviet Union. These structures not only restricted the possibility of environmental control on the territory of each republic (in Ukraine, for instance, 95% of the industry was controlled by Moscow-based ministries and departments), but also facilitated environmental pollution due to the lack of accountability on the part of the administrative apparatus. To avoid a situation similar to the one in Lithuania, which, after it declared itself independent in 1990 was put under considerable economic pressure from Moscow to return to the Soviet fold, *PZU* already in early 1991 urged that all Ukrainian industries be nationalised - i.e. declared property of Ukraine²⁷².

PZU had already in October 1990, at the First Party Congress, predicted that the most important task in the sphere of the economy was to monopolise and decentralise the economy and then to privatise a large share of it. The Ukrainian economist Volodymyr Lanovyi (Ukraine's equivalent to Grigorii Iavlinskii in Russia) in 1991 presented the Ukrainian government with a coherent programme of economic reform, including the passing of a law on the privatisation of state enterprises, a law on the privatisation of small state enterprises and on shares. The government's failure to adopt the measures proposed by Lanovyi and its general failure to change its monetary policies were in the view of *PZU* to blame for the high inflation and stagnation of the country's economy. On these grounds *PZU* urged the Council of Ministers to elaborate a privatisation scheme for 1992, order local authorities to do the same for communal property and to privatise a considerable number of Ukrainian enterprises by the end of the year. The income generated by the privatisation scheme could then be put towards the introduction of a national currency in Ukraine²⁷³.

A major cause of the economic crisis, argued the Greens, was the fact that those people who were in charge prior to the collapse of the USSR remained in high positions, actively opposing any attempt to introduce required changes:

²⁷² Резолюція конференції Партії Зелених України з питань націоналізації всіх підприємств на території України, 20.1.1991.

²⁷³ Заява ПЗУ щодо питань приватизації державних підприємств. До Верховної Ради України, 27.1.1992.

Ті, що вчора займалися соціалістичним плануванням і розробляли п'ятирічні плани, сьогодні розробляють за такою ж схемою "імплякативні плани - прогнози", посилаючись на Францію...І гальмують всі радикальні елементи реформи, безнадійно відстаючи від Росії та країн Східної Європи²⁷⁴.

An extensive critical assessment of official economic policies was provided by the economists S. Moskvina and V. Tymonin, both active members of Kiev *PZU*. In their view Ukraine had to choose between giving priority to the state over the individual or to the individual over the state. National-democratic forces in the country favoured the former, favouring some kind of state capitalism similar to Southeast Asia, Latin America, Israel and other countries. Such a model offered higher living standards than state socialism, but as the experience of Sweden and also Greece had shown, it sooner or later would trigger economic problems due to high public expenditures. State monopoly hindered economic competition and facilitated stagnation of the economy. Another problem was caused by civil servants fulfilling the function of enterprise managers. As they were not personally responsible for the enterprise, they would not seek maximum turn-over for the industries. Similarly, investment policies would be less efficient than if the enterprises would be free to decide where and when to invest. Finally, regulations of economic freedoms would reduce the size of the national income²⁷⁵.

The problem with the Ukrainian economy, argued the two economists, was that although the government was in the process of reforming the economy, little or no attention was given to structural reform. To the extent such reform was envisaged, it would not be conducted through the mechanism of stock exchange, but rather through state investments and credits in and to big state-run concerns, associations, corporations and state enterprises. The development of Ukraine's heavy industry, energy sector, metallurgy, coal-, chemical- and petrochemical industries was therefore given priority. As a result, suggestions had been made to lift the moratorium on the construction of nuclear reactors in the country. Thus, concluded the authors, 'the heavy and polluting structures of the economy should be reshaped in the future'²⁷⁶.

Moskvina and Tymonin were also highly critical of the government's attempts at privatising property and demonopolise state enterprises. Irregularities were observed in the privatisation

²⁷⁴ Чому зрешті Україна не згодні з урядом. Document signed by two economist members of *PZU*, S. Moskvina and V. Tymonin and undated.

²⁷⁵ This is a somewhat black-and-white assessment of how the mixed economy works. Although the Swedish economy is riddled with problems at the moment, it still remains one of the strongest economies in Western Europe. The same can be said of the Norwegian economy, which although a mixed economy, is among the strongest economies in the world. The negative aspects of a state-regulated economy that Moskvina and Tymonin identify can be reduced by adopting a set of measures to enhance personal responsibility at the administrative level and to provide state enterprises with a number of freedoms, such as the right to invest part of their turn-over the way their leadership sees fit.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

process and the demonopolisation process simply did not work as the state retained the majority of shares in those enterprises that had so far been privatised. The state also continued to regulate the food market through only cosmetic reforms of the agricultural sector. As for foreign investments these were being hampered by a large number of regulations and control mechanisms that made foreign investors reluctant to put their money into Ukrainian ventures. Attempts at liberalising prices when the state had monopoly on production of industrial and agricultural goods simply made no sense in the view of the Greens, as it would not lead to increased production, but rather cause production to drop as prices would simply be increased. Finally, something had to be done about the country's social policies. In 1992 it paid off for people to wait for the state to help instead of trusting one's own initiative:

Соціальний захист здійснюється у формі нових грошових виплат.
Не в кінці кінців не захищає населення, а не посилення
інфляції, яка обертається проти населення²⁷⁷.

The market could only be introduced once certain rights and freedoms were installed. These included

- 1) The right to set up private companies and enterprises.
- 2) The right to earn and invest surplus according to one's own judgement.
- 3) The right to own the land, buildings, means of production, value papers and hard currency.
- 4) The right to choose production, amount of production and the appropriate technologies.
- 5) The right to enter contracts and form partnerships.
- 6) The right to fix prices.

In a condensed form *PZU* favoured the demonopolisation and decentralisation of the Ukrainian economy and the privatisation of most of the country's enterprises. The creation of a market economy was seen as a precondition for improving the state of the economy. Only an economy that accounted for the environment was, in the view of the Greens, financially viable and efficient. As a first step towards this goal *PZU* called for the following measures to be introduced:

- 1) Equal rights to different types of ownership.
- 2) Equal and free economic partners.
- 3) A mechanism to protect the poorest, children, youth, the elderly and invalids.
- 4) Agricultural reform: the creation of national and regional agricultural programmes (the farmers, not the state must feed the people)²⁷⁸.

From what has been said above, one might get the impression that the Greens had turned into market liberalists, opposed to any kind of state regulation or control on the grounds that such

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

regulation was harmful to the environment. *PZU* did, however, from the very beginning emphasise its commitment to the weak groups in society. In January 1991, for instance, a conference 'on the protection of the life quality of the poor groups of the Ukrainian population' was held. A resolution passed by this conference stated that the economic policies conducted by the authorities was impoverishing the people and reducing average living standards. Expressing its support of the Federation of Ukrainian Trade Unions, *PZU* urged that prices on necessary items not be raised until a programme to protect the financially worse off had been elaborated. Should the government fail to do so, the Greens would claim the right to protect these people through political and other means as outlined in the party statute²⁷⁹. Thus, it is right to say that the Greens favoured a market economy with a 'human face' - i.e. with proper mechanisms in place to protect the poor and disadvantaged.

Ecological Issues

Apart from its opposition to nuclear power and commitment to the introduction of nuclear free zones, *PZU* - although claiming not to be an 'ecological party' (i.e. working on environmental issues only) has been involved in protecting nature reserves and forests and has also argued vehemently against the import of toxic waste from West European countries. Moreover, it has provided practical, financial and other support to *Zelenyi Svit's* Anti-Military Commission, which, over the past few years has revealed military sources of pollution in Ukraine. Below I will take a brief look at some of these issues.

PZU expressed concern with the future of the national parks and preserves from an early stage arguing that their existence was under threat following the transition towards a market economy. Ukraine's 15 nature reserves and three national parks had come under heavy pressure from local authorities and economic departments, and there was clearly a need for streamlining the administration of all protected areas:

Так місцеві райради бажують відібрати частину землі у Карпатського заповідника, у заповіднику Дунайські плавні господарюють рибколгоспи Кримський - використовується як місце відпочинку, декілька пожеж трапилося в асканійському заповідному степу.

To improve the situation, *PZU* urged the government to take immediate action and to implement *Verkhovna Rada's* resolution of 16 February 1992, which had so far not been executed.

²⁷⁹ Конференція про захист якості життя малозабезпечених верств населення України, 20.1.1991.

Toxic waste is an issue that Greenpeace Ukraine has been working on for several years now. In late October 1993 Greenpeace issued a press release, stating that the ship 'S.S. United States' had been located eight miles off the Crimean coast. The ship would be dismantled in Sevastopol and Greenpeace argued against dismantling it on the grounds that it carried large amounts of cancerogenic asbestos, which would pose a threat to the health of the many thousand people living in the area. The very difficult ecological situation in the areas where the Black Sea Fleet was based might thus be further aggravated. *PZU*, reiterating Greenpeace's concern, argued that Ukraine was in the process of being turned into a waste bin for toxic and other dangerous materials from the industrialised countries in Western Europe and America. To prevent such a scenario the Green Party had proposed that a law banning the import of toxic waste be passed by *Verkhovna Rada*. This initiative, however, like numerous other initiatives on the environment, were being ignored by the government, argued Kononov²⁸⁰.

A meeting in early November 1993 between Vitalii Kononov and Valerii Hubenko - the head of the State Committee on the Protection of Ukraine's National Borders - proved more fruitful. The two agreed on the need to prevent toxic waste from other countries to be imported to Ukraine and agreed to exchange information on such matters. Kononov also thanked the Committee for having provided information on the 'SS United States' and strongly condemned the practice of dumping toxic waste in Ukraine:

Ремонт американського корабля на Севастопольському ремонтному заводі в 250 разів дешевше, ніж в Сполучених Штатах, тобто життя середньостатистичного американця коштує в 250 разів дорожче, ніж у нас. Гірка правда!²⁸¹

Kononov also met with the leader of the Ukrainian Customs Committee, Eduard Miroshnychenko and the two agreed that there was a need to set up control measures to prevent toxic waste from entering Ukrainian territory. Although exchange of information between Western and Ukrainian environmental groups would make this task somewhat easier, it was a big problem that Ukraine lacked special equipment and sufficiently advanced lab facilities for this purpose²⁸². Thus, unless the Ukrainian government and parliament would introduce measures to ban the imports of such waste and to create the sufficient legal and control basis for this purpose, the Greens could do little but try to track down the presence and origin of such waste in Ukraine.

²⁸⁰ Прес-реліз No 22-10, 29.10.93.

²⁸¹ Прес-реліз no. 23/10, 3.11.93.

²⁸² Прес-реліз no. 24/18 (10?), 16.11.93.

The issue continued to be among *PZU*'s priority issues also in 1994. Blaming the dismal state of affairs on inefficient environmental legislation, Kononov stated that the

Боротьба за створення надійної перешкоди намаганням західних
діячів, користуючись економічною слабкістю України,
вирішити свої екологічні проблеми²⁸³.

PZU's position on a range of environmental issues were either identical or very similar to those of *Zelenyi Svit*, Greenpeace Ukraine and other environmental groups. However, whereas for instance *Zelenyi Svit* at least in the first years of its existence conducted campaigns and organised various actions on these issues, *PZU* in most cases issued statements and did not have enough political influence to push these issues through the decision-making process. Partly due to a shared commitment, partly to raise the profile of the party, *PZU* on several occasions pulled together with *Zelenyi Svit*, organising joint press conferences (e.g. campaign against presidential decree on the development of nuclear power in Ukraine, 1994), actions (anti-nuclear demonstrations in Kiev and Khmelnytskyi) or rendering assistance to Green activists. The latter was the case with *Zelenyi Svit*'s Anti-Militaristic Commission, to which *PZU* provided practical assistance in getting its findings published. A joint press conference was also organised in February 1994 to present and discuss the findings of the commission²⁸⁴.

Following Shcherbak's departure for Israel, a member of *RUKH*, Iurii Kostenko, was appointed Ukrainian Minister of the Environment. Relations between *RUKH* and *PZU* were, as seen above, not the best and some Greens were sceptical to Kostenko as he was not negative to nuclear power as such²⁸⁵. Others complained that as soon as Shcherbak left the ministry it became a lot more difficult for the Greens to work with it on certain issues. Whereas relations between the Ministry of the Environment and *Zelenyi Svit* were good, much as a result of the association being lead by former *RUKH* activists Korobko and Fedorinchyk, relations between *PZU* and the Ministry were more complex. A letter from V. Iankovskii (Odessa *PZU*) regarding the quality of the water in the Black Sea criticised Kostenko as whereas along the Russian coast water quality was stabilising, it was deteriorating along the Ukrainian coast. This, he argued, was very much a result of poor structures. What was needed was an overhaul allowing for more decisions to be

²⁸³ Прес-реліз No. 28/1, 28.2.94.

²⁸⁴ Прес-реліз No. 39-02, 23.2.94.


²⁸⁵ Kononov, who by February 1993 had still to meet Kostenko, argued that as Kostenko favoured retaining Ukrainian nuclear weapons, a conflict between the party and the ministry was likely to occur. See *Голос України*, 6.2.1993, с. 4, for details.

made locally and for a more complex approach to environmental problems to be elaborated centrally. Kostenko, as the man in charge, ought in Iankovskii's view to look into this issue²⁸⁶.

5.4.3 Placing *PZU* on the Right-Left Continuum

Above I have outlined *PZU*'s policies on all these issues. Bilous' figures allow one to assess - taking the Green Party's policies into account - whether or not *PZU* can be placed as a party 'to the left of the centre' and how we are to interpret this with regard to the traditional 'left-right' classification scheme. Bilous' placement of the Green Party is somewhat inaccurate and where I do not agree, I have indicated with an arrow where I think the party ought to be located.

Fig. 5.1 Ukraine and CIS




This figure was elaborated in 1993 and as can be seen above, *PZU* has been placed in the lower upper left quadrangle. As seen in part 4.2, however, *PZU* was against the signing of a new union treaty and favoured friendly links with the former Soviet states on a bilateral basis. The party also warned against the building of a super-national state similar to the USSR on the basis of CIS. Although in 1991, *PZU* and other Ukrainian political parties that joined the *Democratic Congress* favoured some kind of cooperation between the former Soviet republics, this idea was

²⁸⁶ Letter No. 12-11, 24.12.1992 from V.L. Iankovskii to I.I. Kostenko.

abandoned shortly after the USSR collapsed, as the CIS was seen as Russian hegemony in disguise. Thus, it is probably more correct to place *PZU* somewhere next to *RUKH* on this issue.

As regards the issue of Ukraine's territorial structure, the position of *PZU* has changed over the years. Initially, *PZU* favoured a federal state with extensive rights for the regions, while opposing any attempt to break the unity of the Ukrainian state. Zakarpattia's wish to secede from Ukraine on the grounds that its territories had traditionally never belonged to Ukraine, did not go down well with *PZU*'s leadership and as relations between Russia and Ukraine soured, the party leadership abandoned the idea of a federal Ukraine on the grounds that this might have a stabilising effect on the country at a time when the country had to stand its ground against a much more powerful Russia. Greens from Ternopil, however, in 1994 revealed that they were still committed to a federal Ukraine, but that for political reasons this idea had to be temporarily put on ice. Thus, *PZU*'s position should be closer to the left-right axis, i.e. somewhere between b) and v).


Fig. 5.2 The territorial structure of Ukraine.



As regards the issue of local self-determination and a strong vs. weaker presidency, Bilous' placement of *PZU* is more successful. As seen above, *PZU* opposed the introduction of a strong presidency and a strong executive based on the French system, favouring instead a parliamentary system alongside a president having more limited powers. When the institution of presidential representatives was introduced, the *PZU* strongly objected on the grounds that these would limit

the powers of local authorities. The Greens were also in favour of a special law regulating the relationship between the legislative, executive and judicial organs, rooted in a new Ukrainian constitution to be passed by a specially elected constitutional assembly. While not successful in this regard, *PZU* was firmly committed to decentralisation and political accountability.


Fig. 5.3 Degree of Centralisation of Ukrainian Political Structures



Classifying *PZU* according to its economic strategy is somewhat difficult as the party is vague on this point. The guiding principle of *PZU* in the economic sphere is that 'only that which is ecologically safe, is economically profitable'. Based on this, the Green Party favours a regulated market economy which provides social protection for the weaker groups in society (children, mothers, students, unemployed and pensioners), and with efficient environmental legislation to protect the environment. A centralised state-run economy of the Soviet type is considered more harmful to the environment than is the market. Hence, the economic strategy of *PZU* has much in common with that of social-democratic parties in Western Europe. A group of *PZU* supporters working actively within *Nova Ukraina* favour a more liberal-economic market approach, but with a strong commitment to the weak and to the environment. As regards economic relations with Russia, Shcherbak on several occasions stressed that while Ukraine was a European state for which it made more sense to have economic relations with the East European countries than for instance the Central Asian republics, he also acknowledged the close economic and political links the country had with Russia, arguing that it would be a political mistake and also economically destabilising to cut these. Thus, Ukraine could benefit more from friendly and


stable relations with its neighbour than from discord and severing of economic links. While in favour of a socially oriented market economy, the Greens were strongly opposed to the Military-Industrial Complex on the grounds that it favoured continued militarisation of Ukrainian society and that it was one of the major polluters in Ukraine. Thus, *PZU* does not fit into any of the given categories. Placing the party somewhere closer to the *SDPU* probably better reflects the party's economic strategy.

Fig. 5.4 Economic Strategy



As seen above, *PZU* refers to itself as an anti-militarist party. Thus, it favours the removal of all nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory and an army whose size reflects that of defence-purposes. *PZU* is also opposed to Ukraine entering any military blocs or alliances. Thus, its placement in Bilous' scheme correctly reflects the party's policy on this issue.

Fig. 5.5 *Military-political Doctrine*



There is, however, one major problem with the approach used by Bilous: whereas *PZU* refers to itself as a party 'to the left of the centre', it has also referred to itself as one of the most radical parties in Ukraine in terms of its commitment to political change. Thus, classifying *PZU* close to the centre of the 'left-right' continuum is somewhat misleading as concerns the party's commitment to traditional democratic values such as a parliamentary rather than a presidential system and to individual liberties. This is a clear indication of the weaknesses with using a traditional 'left-right' continuum on the post-Soviet political context. Bearing this in mind, though, Sartori's diagram is a useful means by which to classify the Ukrainian political parties, correctly placing the various parties according to their stands on various political and economic issues.

5.5 Conclusion

From what has been written above, it is clear that *PZU*, like *Zelenyi Svit*, is in decline. Part of the reason for this can be found in the close relationship the Green Party tried to forge with *Zelenyi Svit*. This proved damaging not only to the Movement, but also to the party, as all the conflicts within the Green Movement were time-consuming to its *PZU*-members. Moreover, the Ukrainian Green Party, like most Ukrainian political parties, is suffering financial problems. In addition, the party has found it difficult to establish local and regional party units in parts of Ukraine other than the West and in Kiev. Finally, the Green Party is finding it hard to mobilise the general public in

support of its policies due to political apathy among the general population. To some extent, however, the lack of support for the Green Party reflects the weaknesses of the party itself. A lack of concepts and concrete programs is making it difficult to distinguish *PZU* from other political parties. The absence of visions and numerous press-releases in response to this or that event in Ukraine is turning the party into an 'office-party' existing on the newspaper pages only. This would maybe have been acceptable had the leadership of the party been well-known. However, whereas most Ukrainians were familiar with Iurii Shcherbak, very few people - even in Kiev - know who Kononov and his deputy leaders are. Personalities are very important in Ukrainian politics - maybe even more so than policies. Thus, the Green Party needs either to proliferate its 'old' leadership better, or to attract new, charismatic leaders who can do this for it. Neither seem likely to happen in the immediate future and *PZU*'s role in Ukrainian politics thus appears uncertain.

6 The Campaign to Save the South Bug River (I)

6.0 Introduction

In the previous chapters I have analysed the Ukrainian Green Movement and the Green Party in general. I will now proceed to conduct a case study, so as to examine how the 'Greens' interact with other political actors at various administrative levels and to assess their 'efficacy'. The case chosen for this chapter is the struggle conducted by the Green Movement of Nikolaev oblast in South Ukraine against the expansion of the **South Ukrainian Energy Complex (SU EK)**¹ - so as to save the South Bug river from destruction.

As seen in Chapter Two, Ukraine is suffering from a cocktail of dangerous pollutants, most of which have been opposed energetically by Greens throughout the country. The priority issue of the Green Movement, and also of the Green Party, however, has been the struggle against the expansion of existing and the construction of new nuclear power stations. Serhii Kurykin, the deputy leader of the Green Party, has gone so far as to characterise the Ukrainian Green Movement as primarily an anti-nuclear movement, the aim of which is to improve safety at existing nuclear stations and to prevent new nuclear reactors from being constructed in Ukraine in general. This view has been contested by local activists in areas of severe industrial pollution especially in Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk in the East of Ukraine. However, it is the struggle against nuclear power that has given the Ukrainian Green Movement the most publicity and been considered its greatest achievement. It is therefore reasonable, for a case study, to focus on one of the Ukrainian nuclear power stations and the opposition with which it was faced.

From a political point of view it also makes sense to undertake a case study of a nuclear power station, as all nuclear power stations in the former USSR operated under the auspices of all-union ministries and departments. This allows us to study not only the interaction between Greens and political authorities at the local, oblast and republican level, but also at the Soviet (Union) level. Moreover, the advantage of examining the struggle against expanding the SU EK is that this struggle started during the Soviet period and has still not been fought to the end, thus providing us

¹ In Ukrainian the name of the South Bug river is Pivdennii Buh (in Russian: Iuzhnyi Bug). Thus, the South Ukrainian Energy Complex becomes Pivdenoukrainskii (Iuzhnoukrainskii) energokompleks (PU EK/IuU EK). As previous works addressing this issue and published in the West (See Marples - 1991) refer to the river as South Bug, I have chosen to do the same to avoid confusion. In the quotes, however, the Russian and Ukrainian names are being used.

with an opportunity to assess the performance and the strategy of the Greens during a period of transition and, eventually, of Ukrainian independence.

6.1 Background

6.1.1 The South Ukrainian Energy Complex (SU EK)

A resolution 'On the Choice of Site for the Construction of an Energy Complex in the South of Ukraine' issued by the Ukrainian CPU Central Committee and the Ukrainian Council of Ministers on 2 December 1971 announced that on the recommendation of the USSR Ministry of Energy and of a special commission created by resolution No. 347 on 3 May, 1969, it had been decided to build an energy complex with a capacity of 5,420,000 kW on the bank on the South Bug river by the village of Konstantinovka in the Arbuzinka region of Nikolaev oblast. The complex would consist of a nuclear power station equipped with four reactors of one million kW each, the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station (370,000 kW) and the Konstantinov hydro-atomic power station (1,050,000 kW)².

Construction of the SU EK started in April 1976³ and the First Stage, endorsed by the USSR Council of Ministers in 1981, consisting of a nuclear power station (two water-water power reactors - VVER-1000⁴ with a capacity of one million kW each and an adjacent cooling pond - the Tashlyk reservoir⁵ - was completed by January 1985. A town for personnel working at the SU EK - Iuzhnoukrainsk⁶ - was constructed some 1,8 km away from the nuclear power station. Its population is currently estimated at 40,000. The Second Stage, against which the Green Movement protested, was elaborated in 1985 with the consent of *Gosplan* (the USSR State Planning Committee) and *Gosstroï* (the USSR Construction Committee). Once the second stage was completed, the Energy Complex would consist of four nuclear reactors, each of one million kW, the Tashlyk hydro-atomic energy station (Tashlykska hydro-atomna elektrostantsiia), the

² Додаток No. 1, ориєнт. No. 10, стр. 939, арк. 63.

³ See *The South Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plant* - an information leaflet issued by the Visitor Centre of the nuclear power plant.

⁴ This is a different type of reactor from the one used at Chernobyl: the RBMK-1000 reactors (RBMK stands for reactors of the high-power boiling channel type) were moderated by graphite, whereas the VVER-1000 reactors are water-moderated, which is supposed to make them more stable and thus safer.

⁵ In Ukrainian the water reservoir is referred to as Tashlykske vodokhovyshche and in Russian as Tashlykskoe vodokhranilishche (cf. quotes).

⁶ Both the Ukrainian and Russian name for this town is Iuzhnoukrainsk (Ukrainian: Южноукраїнськ, Russian: Южноукраинск), not Pivdennoukrainsk and Iuzhnoukrainsk respectively as one might expect. Following Marples' example, the town is in the main text referred to as Iuzhnoukrainsk.

Konstantinov hydro-electric station (Konstantinovska hydro-atomna elektrostantsiia) and the Aleksandrov hydro-electric station (Aleksandrovska hydro-elektrostantsiia). Another two reservoirs (the Konstantinov and Aleksandrov reservoirs) were to be built on the South Bug river to provide enough water for the hydro-electric stations and to provide a stable supply of water for irrigation purposes in an area generally short of water in the summer season⁷. Also a third stage was envisaged, the purpose of which was to extend the capacity of the nuclear power station by increasing the number of reactors first to six and eventually to eight⁸.

The SU EK is depicted in *Figure 6.1* (See next page). As can be seen from this figure, the Tashlyk reservoir is linked to the nuclear power station. Cold water from the reservoir is pumped into tubes surrounding the reactors at the nuclear power station. As the reactor is very warm, the cold water, by absorbing the heat, serves as a coolant. The hot water is then pumped back into the reservoir, where some of it evaporates and the rest is cooled down before being pumped back to the reactors. The Tashlyk reservoir was designed to serve only the two reactors built as part of the First Stage of the SU EK. It was too small to cool the third and the fourth reactors (Second Stage) under construction in the second half of the 1980s. Another two reservoirs were therefore planned, so as to secure a continuous flow of cold water and simultaneously a continuous removal of hot water from the reservoir. Hydro-electric power stations would be built near the reservoirs so that extra electricity could be generated at peak hours and when reactors were shut down for repairs. The flow of the water and the capacity of the hydro-electric power stations as envisaged in the original project are depicted in *Figure 6.2*⁹ (see page 477).

By creating a continuous flow of water between the three reservoirs, in addition to generating electrical power from the hydroelectric power stations, salinisation problems could be reduced for the Tashlyk reservoir in that the water would circulate and salts thus be more easily diluted.

It would, however, also cause radionuclides (high levels of tritium and caesium have been detected in the Tashlyk reservoir) to move with the water. If the three reservoirs had formed a closed unit this problem might not have caused so much concern. Originally, though, water from the Konstantinov reservoir was intended to serve irrigation purposes as well as to provide people in the region with drinking water, of which there was an acute shortage. Since the Konstantinov


⁷ Теперь, слово за Сомнионом... (n.d.)

⁸ Новые проблемы Южного Буга (n.d.).

⁹ *Figure 6.1* is a copy of the original drawing of the SU EK given to me by the Committee on the Environment of the Nikolaev oblast Soviet. *Figure 6.2* can be found in Дона №. 1, опус №. 32, стр. 233, арк. 49.

ЮЖНО-УКРАИНСКИЙ ЭЛЕКТРОМІЛІТЕНС

1. Атомна електростанція / 1. Атомна електростанція
2. ТЕС-132 / 2. ТЕС-132
3. ТЕС-132 / 3. ТЕС-132
4. ТЕС-132 / 4. ТЕС-132
5. ТЕС-132 / 5. ТЕС-132
6. ТЕС-132 / 6. ТЕС-132
7. ТЕС-132 / 7. ТЕС-132
8. ТЕС-132 / 8. ТЕС-132
9. ТЕС-132 / 9. ТЕС-132
10. ТЕС-132 / 10. ТЕС-132
11. ТЕС-132 / 11. ТЕС-132
12. ТЕС-132 / 12. ТЕС-132
13. ТЕС-132 / 13. ТЕС-132
14. ТЕС-132 / 14. ТЕС-132
15. ТЕС-132 / 15. ТЕС-132
16. ТЕС-132 / 16. ТЕС-132



/в сутки/

С И Е М А
пиртуации воды Дно-Укринского
энергокомплекса /по первоначальному проекту/




Fig. 6.2 Water Flow, the South Ukrainian Energy Complex.

reservoir would be built directly on the South Bug river, radionuclides and salts would eventually enter the river system and spread further.

As was the case at Chernobyl, the South Ukrainian nuclear power station was also riddled with delays, inadequate and poor construction¹⁰. Initially, however, it was not so much concern for nuclear safety that caused *public* opposition to the Second Stage of the SU EK, launched in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident: rather opposition was fuelled by concern regarding the impact the reservoirs would have on the South Bug river. The campaign against the Danube-Dniepr Canal successfully came to an end in 1987, and, as will be seen below, some of the arguments used against this project by its opponents (predominantly writers and other members of the creative intelligentsia) were also used against expanding the SU EK. The public campaign was initiated by Viktor Bilodid, an engineer working at the nuclear power station, in early 1988.

Following the nuclear accident at Chernobyl in 1986, the Ukrainian Communist Party started a covert 'campaign' directed at the CPSU to improve safety at existing nuclear power stations and to prevent the construction of new nuclear reactors on Ukrainian territory. Unlike the public campaigns against nuclear power in Ukraine, this 'campaign' was not fought in the press: that would have been 'subversive', or 'nationalist' - contradicting the principles of 'democratic centralism' and 'internationalism'. Rather it was expressed in a number of letters addressed to and speeches presented at the CPSU Central Committee and in the USSR Ministry of Nuclear Energy. The letters and the speeches, which can be accessed in the Ukrainian State Archives, are labelled either 'secret' (sekretno) or 'top secret' (sovershenno sekretno) and they reveal that disagreement on the issue of nuclear power in Ukraine caused friction between Kiev and Moscow.

¹⁰ See David Marples, Ukraine under Perestroika. Ecology, Economics and the Workers' Revolt., Chapter 4: 'Ecology: Irrigation and Nuclear Power Projects', pp 129-131, for more details. David Marples cites *Literaturna Ukraina*, the Ukrainian Writers' Union's weekly newspaper, revealing shortages of materials, unskilled workers, etc. Documents now available in the Ukrainian State Archives in Kiev give insight into these problems from the point of view of the CPU. Minutes of a meeting at the USSR Council of Ministers which took place on 1-2 February 1982 (No. A-428) 'Questions regarding the Construction of the South Ukrainian Nuclear Power Station', set the deadline for bringing the first reactor 'on line' in October 1982, three years after the original deadline. Despite the assertion of the Director of the Energy Complex, V. Fuks, that this target could be reached, the protocol stated that there was still much work to be done prior to its completion (Доку. No. 1, опис. No. 25, арх. No. 2414, апк. 4,5). The reactor was eventually connected to the electrical grid in December 1982. The second reactor, scheduled for 1984, caused Shcherbitskii to write a letter to Tikhonov (No. 2/1, 23 January 1984), expressing 'serious concern' at the interruptions in supplies to the construction sites. He referred to delays of up to nine months and listed a number of supplies needed to meet plan targets, urging Tikhonov to order the relevant ministries to provide supplies on time. (Доку. No. 1, опис. No. 25, арх. No. 2735, апк. 27). Detailed orders regarding supplies were issued by the Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers on 24.1.1984 (No. A-195, *ibid.* апк. 28-29).

Although this chapter aims at analysing the public campaign against expanding the SU EK, the Ukrainian Communist Party's attitude to nuclear power in Ukraine in general as well as to the South Ukrainian Nuclear Power Station in particular, is of vital importance when assessing the relationship between the Greens and the CPU. A separate discussion on the CPU and nuclear safety thus precedes that of the SU EK. The latter has been broken down into three sub-sections: Emergence, Strategy and Mobilisation, Campaign and Decision-Making. The three sub-sections are rather descriptive. This has been done on purpose to illustrate properly how the campaign was conducted, since it differed considerably from the 'typical' campaign against nuclear power, where the arguments are primarily related to nuclear safety¹¹. A short discussion can be found in the chapter's Conclusion.

For reasons of convenience, the case study has been broken down into two chapters. The first covers the period January 1988 to 1989 and emphasises the emergence of and the campaign conducted by the Green Movement in Nikolaev up to late August 1989, when the USSR Council of Ministers decided to partly abandon Stage Two. The second chapter (i.e., Chapter Seven) examines the Greens' performance from September 1989 until June 1994, focusing on their adaptability and continued campaigning during a period of great political change.

6.1.2 The CPU and Nuclear Safety

Following the accident at Chernobyl, the CPSU did take measures to increase safety at other Soviet nuclear power stations. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the RBMK-reactor was to be improved and better security systems were to be installed. But the Communist Party's trust in nuclear power remained unchanged. An ambitious nuclear power scheme was to continue as planned, and the Chernobyl nuclear power station was expected to operate normally again within a few months.

The implications of the accident and of Soviet plans for nuclear power on Ukraine were outlined by First Secretary of the CPU, V. Shcherbitskii, in a speech presented to the CPSU Central Committee on 6 June, 1986. Due to the Chernobyl accident, 12 billion kW hours had been 'lost',

¹¹ See for instance Dorothy Nelkin and Michael Pollak, *The Atom Besieged. Extraparliamentary Dissent in France and Germany* (Cambridge MA, London: The MIT Press, 1981). During the first years of the campaign against expansion of the South Ukrainian Energy Complex, the Greens pointed out numerous violations of existing legislation and various resolutions. The focus was on preserving the river South Bug more than on nuclear power and nuclear safety as such. Only later, during the campaign, did the focus shifted and nuclear safety became the major concern of the Greens (see Chapter Seven).

and it was the CPU's task to make sure that somehow these hours were made up. Given general shortages of energy created by the Soviet economic system itself, this would not be an easy task. However, the production targets for coal extraction had been raised and more coal was being produced. This was also the case with the production of oil and natural gas. Finally, efforts were being made to speed up oil and gas production in Western Siberia - the sites of which were constructed by Ukrainian brigades.

The capacity of existing nuclear power stations in Ukraine would be expanded by 4,4 million kW in 1986: four reactors, each with a capacity of one million kW, were to be connected to the electric grid at the Rivne (September), Zaporizhzhia (October), Khmelnytskyi and Chernobyl nuclear power stations. In order to have the reactor at Khmelnytskyi ready at the end of the year, Shcherbitskii announced that speed of assembly- and construction work was to be 'no less than doubled'. A detailed outline of work to be carried out by USSR *Minenergo* (Ministry of Energy) was then given to the CPSU Central Committee. The CPU, Shcherbitskii said, wanted to stress that it was 'doing everything to facilitate the fulfilment of the Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers to prepare the economy for the winter'¹².

However, despite Shcherbitskii's assurances, the Central Committee of the CPU soon began to express its concern about the state of affairs at Ukrainian nuclear power stations. On the surface, the CPU remained confident that they were safe, but correspondence between Kiev and Moscow reveals a Ukrainian party leadership getting increasingly worried about safety at existing nuclear power stations in the republic. Such worries had, according to Vitalii Vrublevskii, been expressed also prior to the accident at Chernobyl. In his biography of the former First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, Vladimir Shcherbitskii, an entire chapter is devoted to the Chernobyl accident. Vrublevskii quotes from a letter written by Shcherbitskii to the CPSU Central Committee as early as 1983. The letter reported that 'a series of major accidents, resulting in increased levels of radiation and serious interruptions to energy supplies' had taken place. The reasons were incomplete project calculations, the poor quality of equipment used and the inadequate qualifications of the staff'. The letter gave a detailed account of a serious accident at Chernobyl which had taken place on 9 September, 1982, at reactor No 1, resulting in a six months' shut-down, and complained that the Ministry of Nuclear Energy had failed to respond quickly to the accident. Serious problems had arisen at the Rivne nuclear power station due to karst under the site. Unless serious efforts were made to stabilise the karst, safety could not be guaranteed. According to Shcherbitskii, the USSR *Minatomenergo* and the trust *Soiuzatomenergo* were to

¹² Додаток № 1, опись № 25, стор. № 3084, арк. 60-66.

blame for this state of affairs, as they had not taken the necessary measures to secure the safe and smooth operation of these nuclear power stations. Even in the aftermath of accidents, 'they are unacceptably slow'¹³.

The Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party repeatedly urged the CPSU to make sure 'urgent measures' were taken to secure the safety of the Ukrainian nuclear power stations but, according to Vrublevskii, to no avail, as in the spring of 1983 a power struggle was taking place in the Kremlin following the death of Andropov (died in February 1994), and consequently no one took an interest in Ukrainian matters. This worried Shcherbitskii, and in the early 1980s a strategy to introduce energy-saving technologies in Ukrainian industries was being worked out by the Ukrainian Central Committee and the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

Vrublevskii's book aims at giving a positive image of Vladimir Shcherbitskii. It is therefore natural that the author tries to show the Party in as favourable a light as possible when addressing the Chernobyl catastrophe. Thus, Shcherbitskii is reported to have called the head of the Politburo's Chernobyl Commission, Boris Shcherbina, a 'monster' in response to his comment on the accident to the effect that 'science demands its casualties'. What is more, when Shcherbitskii allegedly tried to stop the 1 May parade in Kiev from taking place, Gorbachev allegedly threatened to expel him from the Communist Party if the parade did not go ahead as planned. It is impossible to verify these statements. There is, however, no reason to doubt the authenticity of the letter quoted, since the same issues were addressed by the CPU shortly after the Chernobyl accident.

In a letter of 29 October 1986, labelled 'secret', and addressed to M. Lukonin, Soviet Minister of Nuclear Energy, CC Secretary B. Kachura addressed the issue of safety at Ukrainian nuclear power stations in depth: 'It cannot but cause worry that the operation of many existing and the construction of new nuclear power stations continue in the presence of a number of project-construction defects and even errors (miscalculations), the poor quality of parts of the equipment and units, the poor quality of their manufacture and also of construction-assembly and maintenance work, which might become the causes of various accidents at the nuclear power stations'¹⁴.

Kachura proceeded to criticise the USSR *Minenergo* (Ministry of Energy), the USSR *Minshredmash* (Ministry of Medium Engineering), the USSR *Minenergomash* (Ministry of Energy Construction), the USSR *Minelektrotekhprom* (Ministry of Electrical and Technical Engineering)

¹³ Виталий Врублевский. Владимир Шчербитский. Правда и вымыслы, (Киев: Фірма "Довіра", 1993), с. 204-05.

¹⁴ Фонд. No. 1, опис. No. 25, сир. No. 43-б, арк. 1.

and the USSR *Minpribor* (Ministry of Instrument Making) for failing to introduce measures to improve safety at nuclear power stations despite the fact that the CPSU Central Committee had ordered them to do so three years previously in response to a letter from the CPU Central Committee. Concern was expressed that experts and party officials visiting nuclear power stations reported defects increasingly frequently. These defects and flaws were found not only at RBMK-reactors, but also at the VVER-reactors considered to be generally safer than the former. At all nuclear power stations equipped with such reactors, 'inadmissible vibrating of the main steam valves and (other) installations' were taking place. Only 10% of 120 items of new equipment for the VVER-1000 reactors had been properly tested. Defects in equipment delivered by *Minergomash* to the South-Ukrainian nuclear power station, for instance, required 540,000 work-hours to be repaired¹⁵.

In the immediate aftermath of the Chernobyl accident, the Soviet authorities claimed that the accident had been caused primarily by human error. Kachura in his letter, however, claimed that more than 50% of the accidents at Soviet nuclear power stations were caused by construction flaws and poor equipment quality. A list of such equipment was provided. Blurred responsibility aggravated the situation, since the main constructor, the scientific leader and general designer of nuclear power stations belonged to different ministries, thus making co-ordination difficult. Finally, Kachura pointed out that geological conditions in Ukraine had not been properly taken into consideration when choosing the site of nuclear power stations. No measures had been taken to strengthen the reactors, despite the seismic situation in Ukraine. Taking the necessary measures would not be cheap.

Kachura also criticised the poor qualifications of the station personnel, lack of discipline and lack of adequate operating instructions. Moreover, due to poor housing and the lack of other social facilities, there was also a high turn-over of personnel, which caused additional reason for concern.

The solution offered by Kachura was to create special control procedures for equipment designated for nuclear power stations and to develop a set of rules and instructions regarding the production of such equipment. Finally, proper housing should be offered to operators at nuclear power stations as part of the job-package.

Given the high degree of centralisation of the Soviet power structure, the CPU was in no position to give orders to the USSR *Minatomenergo*. Instead, Kachura expressed 'hope that the remarks and suggestions made would be considered by Minenergo' when addressing the issue of

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, apc. 3.

how to improve nuclear safety. Still, it is remarkable that Kachura made such a detailed criticism of Soviet nuclear energy policies as he did, given that the Ukrainian Communist Party was considered to be amongst the most dogmatic in the USSR under Shcherbitskii's rule. His letter is also the best known detailed account of safety at Soviet nuclear power stations shortly after the Chernobyl accident. Articles in the press and official statements prior to 1988 stressed that the accident was caused by human error, not by technical flaws or inadequacies.

Lukonin, in his response¹⁶, admitted that the problems mentioned by Kachura did indeed exist. The Ministry, which was 'recreated' after the Chernobyl accident¹⁷, had already started working out safety measures, and further efforts would be made.¹⁸

Lukonin's response, however, did not convince the CPU that nuclear power would become safe enough to justify the continued expansion of existing and the construction of new nuclear power stations in Ukraine. In a comment on Resolution No. 886, addressed to the Central Committee of the CPSU and labelled 'top secret', Shcherbitskii expressed serious concern at plans to increase the capacity of existing nuclear power stations in Ukraine by 11 million kW between 1987 and 1990, in addition to constructing another 12 reactors of one million kW each at new locations. The total output of Ukrainian nuclear power stations would then reach almost 33 million kW. The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, the Ukrainian *Minvodkhoz* (Ministry of Water Resources) and the Ukrainian *Mingeo* (Ukrainian Ministry of Geology), however, held the view that nuclear capability in Ukraine should not exceed 25-26 million kW, as the impact on the territory of Ukraine was reaching a critical level. Besides, Shcherbitskii pointed out, water resources in Ukraine were very limited - especially in the Dniepr basin, the water of which was used for drinking purposes by some 35 million people. The deficit of water in waterless years was expected to increase from four to seven billion cubic metres. Still, all new nuclear power stations planned for construction in Ukraine were to use water from the Dniepr for cooling. Further, according to the Ukrainian Ministry of Geology, almost 90% of the republic's territory was, for geological and hydrological reasons, 'extremely unfavourable' for the construction and safe operation of nuclear power stations. Shcherbitskii also warned of the combined impact of radioactive, chemical and thermal pollution in Ukraine. Finally, he called for a revision of plans to build the Crimean nuclear power station (on the Kerch peninsula), the Chyhyryn nuclear power

¹⁶ No. MA-1352-5c., 29.12.1986.

¹⁷ This Ministry was created in July 1986 and it took over all the functions related to nuclear power stations previously exercised by the Ministry of Power and Electrification and other ministries and state committees. For more details, see Zhores Medvedev, *The Legacy of Chernobyl* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p 23.

¹⁸ *Доля* No. 1, *опис* No. 25, *сир.* No. 43-б, *арк.* 1.

station and the Kharkiv nuclear thermal power station as well as for more balanced energy schemes in Ukraine in the future¹⁹.

In early 1987 Kachura again contacted the USSR Minister of Nuclear Power, N. Lukonin. The letter (No. 4/11) stated that 'the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party is seriously concerned with the current state of affairs regarding the safeguarding of nuclear power stations in the republic'. Keeping in mind that the CPU could not openly disagree with decisions made by the CPSU regarding nuclear power, this is indeed a very strongly worded statement - expressing genuine worry about the existing situation. Kachura proceeded to point out that not at one single Ukrainian nuclear power station had all projected safety measures been implemented: 'The locations of the reactor units...are not marked by signalisation and TV monitoring. Nor have the safety devices of outside objects been fitted with TV monitoring'. The large number of organisations and people taking part in the last stage of construction at nuclear power stations also gave reason for concern. Practically nothing was being done to fit ITsOs (safety devices) on new reactors at the South Ukrainian and the Crimean nuclear power stations, which were scheduled to begin operation in 1988. Furthermore, experts on nuclear power stations and the USSR Ministry of the Interior had expressed the view that existing safety systems were inefficient, as outdated technical principles and facilities were being used. This situation, concluded Kachura, was fraught with serious consequences. On this basis he urged Lukonin to take the necessary measures to improve the situation²⁰. Lukonin's reply was that special measures had been taken to secure the safety of the Crimean nuclear power station²¹.

Whereas Kachura put pressure on the Ministry of Nuclear Energy to maximise safety at the Ukrainian nuclear stations, Sheherbitskii continued arguing the case before the CPSU Central Committee that Ukraine was ill-suited for further expansion of its nuclear capability. In a second letter (No. 12/207), of 13 June 1987 labelled 'top secret', he referred to his previous letter in which he had asked for plans to expand nuclear energy capacity in Ukraine to be revised. He again listed the arguments used to justify a revision of the project of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers' resolution 'Regarding the Clarification of Tasks on the Development of Nuclear Energy in the 12th Five Year Plan and regarding additional Measures on the Facilitating of Security at Nuclear Power Stations'. In addition, Sheherbitskii questioned the advisability of constructing two new reactors (Nos 5 and 6) at Chernobyl. Although Sheherbitskii

¹⁹ Фонд No. 1, опись No. 25, сир. No. 179, арх. 1.2. For further information on arguments against nuclear power in Ukraine, see letter from the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences to the CPU Central Committee, dated 22.5.1987 (No. 11/1344с) in Фонд No. 1, опись No. 25, сир. No. 3147, арх. 8,9,10.

²⁰ Фонд No. 1, опись No. 25, сир. No. 179, арх. 1.2.

²¹ Letter No. MA-1213-5с, of 16.11.87 in Фонд No. 1, опись No. 25, сир. No. 179, арх. 1.

did express views very different from those of the CPSU on this issue, the wording is again very cautious. He does not demand, but rather 'would consider it indispensable'²².

Shcherbitskii's letter was presented to the June 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, and it was forwarded to the USSR *Gosplan* (the State Planning Committee) for further examination. The reply, addressed to Shcherbitskii personally and labelled 'secret', was dated 26 October 1987 (No. 7067c). *Gosplan* announced that as a consequence of the accident at Chernobyl and taking into consideration requests and suggestions made by various ministries, departments and the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, Resolution No 999-233 of 21 September 1984 regarding the further development of nuclear power in the Soviet Union up until 1990 had been modified. A new resolution had thus been passed by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on 1 July 1987 (No. 722-162). According to this new resolution, six nuclear reactors were dropped from the Ukrainian nuclear power plan (the Odessa nuclear thermal electric station - Odesska ATETs), Chernobyl No. 2, reduced capacity at the Crimean nuclear power station). However, *Gosplan* would soon start work on the Soviet Energy Programme up to the year 2005, and since gas and oil extraction was expected to stabilise, increased energy output would be possible only through the expansion of already existing nuclear power stations and the construction of new nuclear power stations. In the case of Ukraine, *Gosplan's* expert commission would examine in detail Ukraine's suitability for nuclear energy.

Given the prognosis for economic growth in Ukraine, energy output would have to increase. In order to avoid the construction of new nuclear power stations in Ukraine, it was suggested that the capacity of existing nuclear power stations could be expanded to between six and eight million kW (i.e. between six and eight nuclear reactors at each station). Thus in the period up to the year 2000, *Gosplan* envisaged the construction of 18-19 new VVER-1000 reactors. Increased security measures would make them safe.

At the time of writing, two nuclear reactors (one at Khmelnytskyi and one at South Ukraine) were under construction with the assistance of other *COMECON* countries. These reactors would produce energy for export 'to fulfil the USSR's obligations' towards them. As a means by which to minimise the further construction of nuclear reactors in Ukraine, *Gosplan* suggested that reactors designed for export would in the future be constructed on Russian territory.

Although the letter made it clear that it was for Moscow to decide how many reactors would be built on Ukrainian territory, Ukraine would be given a say as to where these reactors would be constructed, then, according to existing regulations, nuclear power station projects and where to

²² Фонд No. 1, опис No. 25, сир. No. 179, арх. 1,2.

allocate them would have to be agreed with republican and local organisations...'. A. Lalaiants, Deputy Chairman of the USSR *Gosplan* ended the four-page long letter with an appeal to Shcherbitskii to cooperate in implementing the outlined programme so as to secure reliable energy supplies in the future²³.

In a letter to the Ukrainian Central Committee, Central Committee Secretaries Kachura and Hurenko compared *Gosplan*'s estimated increased energy output in Ukraine with that projected by the CPU Central Committee. Although *Gosplan* agreed with the planned nuclear power capacity in the current Five Year Plan and with total energy production figures for 1990 and 2005, it reduced the planned output at thermal power stations by 105 billion kW hours compared with republican schemes (i.e., by 44%) and increased the planned output at nuclear power stations by 87,7 billion kW hours (46,5%). 'In this case, the capacity of nuclear power stations towards the end of the period must be increased to 40-44 million kW, with which it is impossible to agree (my emphasis)²⁴. To avoid such a scenario, the two secretaries called for the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, with the assistance of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and various ministries and departments, to prepare and send to the USSR *Gosplan* and the USSR Council of Ministers' Bureau on the Fuel and Energy Complex concrete suggestions on the future development of electric energy in the republic in the hope that these would be incorporated into the Resolution on the increased growth in electrical energy output to the year 1995, currently in the process of being drafted by *Gosplan* and the Biuro and to be finished by November 1988.

In its assessment of the USSR *Gosplan*'s scheme for increasing the nuclear energy capacity in Ukraine, the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences provided a series of arguments against the continued growth of nuclear energy in the republic and suggested a more balanced investment so as to also allow for energy-saving measures to be introduced in the industry and for alternative energy sources to be developed. It was furthermore suggested that payment for natural resources would reduce energy consumption and thus the need to build more nuclear reactors. The Academy's major concerns remained the same: Ukraine was too heavily industrialised and already excessively polluted. Besides, water supplies were limited and 90% of the republic's territory unsuitable for nuclear reactors due to difficult geological and hydrogeological conditions.

The Academy of Sciences also pointed out that 'Requirements regarding the Location of Nuclear Power Stations', endorsed by the USSR Council of Ministers' Biuro on Energy were not only not distributed to the nuclear power stations, but that none of the existing stations fully

²³ Фонд No. 1, опис. No. 25, стр. No. 179, арх. 1-4.

²⁴ Фонд No. 1, опис. No. 25, стр. No. 3347, арх. 18.

complied with these requirements, which in turn constituted an obstacle to expanding their capacity. Should any of the existing nuclear power stations in Ukraine suffer an accident similar to the ones at Three Mile Island or Chernobyl, the most important industrial and agricultural areas, including the Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Cherkassy, Kirovohrad and Kiev regions, would fare badly²⁵.

Further materials on the formation of a concept for energy development in Ukraine until the year 2005 were provided by the Academy of Sciences in early January 1989 (No. 4f/26-2). The starting point was the proposal from the Soviet fuel and energy complex to increase energy output in Ukraine by building new nuclear power stations, increasing the number of nuclear reactors (each with a capacity of one million kW) to 44 by the year 2005. At a meeting with the Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, B. Shcherbina, on 1 June 1988, representatives of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, the Ukrainian *Gosplan* and the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, the Ukrainians justified their reluctance to build more nuclear reactors by referring to what was labelled 'objective reasons' (karst and seismologically active areas, lack of fresh water) and insisted that by the year 2005 there ought to be no more than 28 nuclear reactors in Ukraine. The report gave further evidence to support this stand: a lack of security measures for planned nuclear reactors, the uncertain future of nuclear energy world-wide and the availability of alternatives, which would not only be considerably cheaper than nuclear reactors, but which would also cause less pollution (thermo-electric power stations run on natural gas)²⁶.

The concept developed by the Academy of Sciences can be summarised as follows:

- 1) to stop the construction of new nuclear reactors in Ukraine prior to the year 2005 until a new generation of nuclear reactors with greatly enhanced safety had been introduced.
- 2) to increase electricity output at the expense of thermo-electric power stations run on natural gas. Old thermo-electric power stations to be converted to run on gas.
- 3) to introduce the use of energy-saving technologies in Ukrainian industries.
- 4) to develop low-energy industries.
- 5) to develop alternative energy sources.

Despite repeated requests from the CPU to the Ministry of Nuclear Energy that reactor safety be improved, Shcherbitskii in a letter to the CPSU Central Committee (No. 1/25) of 21 June 1989 noted that measures to improve safety were being implemented 'unacceptably slowly'. Ten reactors were under construction in Ukraine, but due to popular opposition to nuclear power it had become increasingly difficult to defend such construction: 'after the Chernobyl accident...the attitude towards nuclear power amongst the population, amongst the intelligentsia and scientists,

²⁵ Фонд No. 1, опис No. 25, сир. No. 3347, арк. 21-28.

²⁶ Фонд No. 1, опис No. 32, сир. No. 407 (I), арк. 1-4.

deteriorated sharply. A large proportion of the population is deeply concerned and a movement against the construction of new nuclear power stations is being organised. This year meetings attended by several thousand people have taken place in Kiev, Lviv, Zhytomyr and Nikolaev. Several hundred thousand signatures have been collected against the construction of the Crimean and the Chyhyryn nuclear power stations²⁷.

To try to avert this wave of protest, the CPU had undertaken propaganda work, but this had not been very successful, according to Shcherbitskii. Rather than blame the way in which the propaganda was conducted, the Party blamed the safety of existing nuclear power stations for the lack of results. The large number of accidents, caused by faulty construction, poor quality equipment and poorly trained personnel, had led to reactor close-downs 319 times in three years and caused 11 accidents in Ukraine alone! The CPU also had other grievances and blamed the USSR *Minatomenenergo* and the USSR *Minenergo* for failing to take the required measures. Again it was pointed out that numerous requests from the CPU in 1986 to these Ministries had been without results. Moreover, the Resolution of 1 July 1987 regarding 'Measures to Enhance Safety in Nuclear Energy' was being implemented inadequately and too slowly. The only solution would be to improve the control of and the monitoring at nuclear power stations.

Shcherbitskii finally stated very clearly that the CPU, given the grievances it had regarding safety at nuclear power stations, was opposed to the idea of constructing new nuclear power stations in Ukraine prior to the emergence of a new generation of nuclear power stations with enhanced safety: 'The solution of long-term tasks regarding energy supplies in the republic has been orientated towards the development of nuclear energy. In this connection the construction of nuclear reactors at the Rivne, Zaporizhzhia, South Ukraine and Khmelnytskyi nuclear power stations should be completed by the deadlines set...At the same time, taking into account the real situation, we hold the view that prior to the invention of equipment of a new generation and the cardinal improvement of its quality, it is not desirable to construct new nuclear power stations or to increase capacity at existing nuclear power stations beyond the capacity envisaged for these stations in the original plans...In addition, clear decisions must be made in the nearest future to reprofile the Crimean nuclear power station'.

Rather than expanding nuclear power capacity, the CPU favoured the development of thermal and hydraulic energy plants in Ukraine by the year 2005, as well as gas driven power stations, which could be bought in Italy²⁸.

²⁷ Фонд No. 1, опис. No. 32, спр. No. 407 (I), арк. 1-2.

²⁸ Фонд No. 1, опис. No. 32, спр. No. 407 (I), арк. 1-4.

From what has been written above, it seems clear that the CPU opposed the expansion of nuclear power in Ukraine on objective grounds. The CPSU seemed more reluctant to revise the Ukrainian nuclear programme, as Ukraine was the key republic in Soviet nuclear power plans. The CPU, although outwardly complying with policies decided in Moscow, used public opposition against nuclear energy to back up its own position. Evidence of this will be given in the following section. The CPSU, however, hit back later, by issuing a resolution offering material rewards to the regions in which the nuclear power stations were situated, so as to create alliances with local authorities and thus be able to go ahead with the original plans despite public opposition and party reluctance at other administrative levels. This is also an issue which will be addressed below. To summarise, though, it would be too simple to argue that the Green Movement faced active resistance from the Communist Party on the issue of nuclear power, although certain restrictions and obstacles were put in their way (I will return to this issue below). It is probably more correct to conclude that they both benefited from the other: on the one hand, from 1988 and onwards the CPU was able to add weight to its opposition to nuclear power by referring to massive public opposition. Towards the Greens they could argue that they agreed with their cause, although not necessarily with their methods, but that unfortunately decisions were made in Moscow. This, in turn, would fuel the Greens' claim that every important decision regarding the environment was made in Moscow and that the republic could not exert much influence on such decisions, thus fuelling demands for sovereignty and eventually independence.

6.2 Campaign (January - August 1988)

6.2.1 Emergence of the Green Movement: Strategy and Mobilisation

The first person to voice opposition to the Second Stage of the South Ukrainian Energy Complex was Viktor Bilodid, an engineer working at the nuclear power station and a resident of Iuzhnoukrainsk. On 14 October 1988 the newspaper *Robitnycha hazeta* published an article written by him in which he expressed serious concern regarding the impact the Second Stage of the SU EK would have on the South Bug river and on plant and animal life in the region. An ecological movement had already emerged in the oblast, voicing its concern about the Dniepr-Bug hydroelectric scheme, but it was more a loose alliance of like-minded people than an informal organisation. Preparations to set up a Green group, had already started at the beginning of the year. Members of the so-called *Turistklub* (Tourist Club) in Iuzhnoukrainsk - a club uniting rock-climbers, rafters and hill walkers (the river-bank in the vicinity of Iuzhnoukrainsk was rocky and

steep, providing excellent conditions for such activities) -, were worried that the river bank would be flooded and the river destroyed as a result of the building of the two reservoirs. Therefore they started writing letters expressing their concern. Bilodid was not a member of the *Turistklub*, but a keen outdoor man. He undertook an analysis of the legality of the project, which he was familiar with through his work, and by chance got in contact with the *Turistklub*. Together they set up *Zelenyi Mir (Green World)* in Iuzhnoukrainsk, following the example of the Russian writer, Sergei Zalygin, who the previous year had set up such a group in Moscow and which they had read about in the journal *Nauka i zhizn*. A movement against the expansion of the nuclear power station and the building of the Aleksandrov and Konstantinov reservoirs was also founded in Pervomajsk in early 1988. Bilodid has stressed that *Zelenyi Mir* was not founded in response to the Chernobyl accident, but rather as a result of extended glasnost and perestroika, making it possible to establish informal groups²⁹.

In his analysis of the Second stage of the SU EK Bilodid revealed as many as 40 violations of existing Ukrainian and Soviet legislation (the Ukrainian Water Code and Legislation on Rare Birds and Animals). In February 1988 he contacted the oblast Communist Party newspaper *Iuzhnaia pravda* and sent his analysis to the editor. Shortly after, the newspaper published information to the effect that someone had made an estimate of the impact of the Second Stage of the EK on the environment. However, the paper fell short of publishing the analysis itself. Bilodid immediately started looking for someone who could publish it. The Ukrainian writer Serhii Plachynda was contacted, but nothing came of this.

The assessment was eventually sent to the journal *Ribolov* (The Fisherman) since fishing would suffer from the Second Stage of the SU EK. *Ribolov* passed Bilodid's assessment to Ukrainian *Glavvodresursov*, Ukrainian *Minvodkhoz* (Ministry of Water Resources) and the oblast procurator's office to get their comments. All three agreed that Bilodid's conclusions were correct. In a letter³⁰ addressed to the deputy editor of *Iuzhnaia pravda*, the head of *Glavvodresursov*, O. A. Rusinov wrote that '*Glavvodresursov* shares engineer Viktor Bilodid's concern...' He also revealed that on a number of occasions the Ukrainian *Minvodkhoz* had analysed the development of nuclear energy in Ukraine and pointed out to the USSR *Minatomenergo* that the failure to implement measures to utilise rationally and protect water resources would aggravate the ecological situation. Rusinov also complained that the technical project for the SU EK had been endorsed by the USSR Ministry of Nuclear Energy without the consent of the republic. Moreover, building and using the Konstantinov reservoir as a cooling

²⁹ Interview with Bilodid in Iuzhnoukrainsk, June 1994.

³⁰ No. 101-rr, 15.3.1988.

pond for the nuclear power station constituted a violation of Soviet and Ukrainian legislation on water resources. No assessment had been made of the possible impact water from the Tashlyk reservoir would have on water quality in the other two reservoirs. Neither had any calculations been made on possible changes in water temperature and the chemical composition of the water in the Aleksandrov and Konstantinov reservoirs if utilised for cooling purposes. Due to sharp fluctuations in the water level in the reservoirs (4.7 m in the Aleksandrov reservoir, 4.5 m in the Tashlyk reservoir and 2.5 m in the Konstantinov reservoir), all life in the South Bug river would disappear over a 100 km long stretch. Finally, Rusinov pointed out that the nuclear power station was short of water supplies. In the year 2000 the deficit would reach an estimated 220 million cubic meters. USSR *Minatomenergo* had proposed to close this deficit by withdrawing 26,000 hectares of land from the irrigation system in Nikolaev oblast. This constituted a violation of the Ukrainian Water Codex, which stated that in that oblast agriculture was to be given priority, not industry. Therefore, the USSR *Minatomenergo*'s proposals had to be labelled 'unfounded'.

Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Water Resources, V. Strilets, in a letter commenting on Bilodid's assessment and addressed to the Ukrainian *Gosplan*³¹, reached the same conclusion. Not only had the SU EK been endorsed by the USSR *Minatomenergo* without the consent of the republic: the plans to use the Konstantinov reservoir as a cooling pond for the nuclear power station violated the Sanitary Norms and Rules 2.04-03-85 (point 3.12) and Requirements for the Location of Nuclear Power Stations (points 2.1.5 and 2.1.6). Other legislation ('Requirements for the Protection of Surface Waters from Pollution by Sewage') demanded that the water temperature after water escapes must not exceed the last 10 years' average temperature during the hottest month by more than three degrees Centigrade. No calculations had been undertaken in this respect, nor had any assessment been made as to what would be the chemical impact on the water in the reservoirs following water escapes from the cooling pond (the Tashlyk reservoir). The anticipated high flux of water levels in the reservoirs (see previous paragraph) would violate point 2.3.1.5 of 'Requirements for the Location of Nuclear Power Stations', as would the shortage of water to cool the nuclear power station (point 2.3.1.6). Finally, the Deputy Minister could not agree with *Minatomenergo* that additional water could be taken from the irrigation project.

Minvodkhoz' opposition to the SU EK was by no means new. Already in 1979, when the decision was in the making, it had voiced its concern³². Its arguments were aimed against the planned Aleksandrov and Konstantinov reservoirs, which would reduce the annual water flow of the South Bug river by half, increase water salinisation by 200%, destroy 80% of the area's

³¹ БС/21-203, 17.3.1988.

³² №. 3-1/3288, 5.11.1979 and №. 3-1/3670, 20.12.1979.

spawning places and reduce the fish stock in the river (by 3,000 tons annually for commercial fish). *Minvodkhoz* bluntly pointed out that the consequences of the planned Reactors 5 and 6 at the SU EK would be 'unpredictable'. In 1985, the Nikolaev obkom of the CPU had also expressed concern about adding another two reactors, arguing that they would be 'dangerous' to the oblast.

The Ukrainian *Goskompriroda* also came down on the side of the 'pro-environment' lobby. Answering a letter from T. Doroshina of Iuzhnoukrainsk, the Deputy Chairman of *Goskompriroda*, I. Liakh, confirmed that the State Committee on the Construction of the SU EK Hydroelectric Objects had sent a letter to the Ukrainian *Gosplan* requesting that the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and the Ukrainian *Minzdrav* (Ministry of Health) on the basis of current environmental and sanitary requirements assess the possible impact of the Second Stage of the EK and that attempts be made to minimise the environmental consequences of the project. To facilitate this, *Goskompriroda* suggested that the question of cooling the nuclear reactors with water cooling towers, rather than constructing the Aleksandrov and Konstantinov reservoirs for this purpose, be considered³³.

In its response to Bilodid's assessment the Procurator's Office confirmed that 'his (i.e. Bilodid's) conclusions are substantiated'³⁴. However, as the project for the Second Stage of the SU EK had been developed and endorsed by organs not under the control of the oblast procurator's office, nothing could be done at the oblast level. The Procurator's evaluation of Bilodid's assessment had therefore been sent to the Ukrainian Procurator's Office in Kiev, with a recommendation that it be thoroughly examined. The Deputy Procurator, E. Hula, further reported that the USSR *Gossannadzor* (State Sanitary Inspectorate) had rejected the Third Stage of the SU EK.

A letter from the Editor of *Rybolov* shortly after briefed Bilodid on the action that had been taken as a result of his communication. Support of Bilodid's views had also been received from *Zapcherrybvod* (The Western Black Sea Coast Fishing Department), which claimed that the opinion and the findings of *Tsuren* (the Central Administration for Fishing Expert assessment and Normatives on the Protection and Use of Fish Stocks) were being ignored³⁵.

Factual evidence strengthening the opinion that the Second Stage of the SU EK be at least re-examined, appeared throughout the summer and autumn of 1988: *Ukrzemproekt*, for instance, issued a memorandum to the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, stating that more than 2,000 hectares of high quality arable chernozem had been removed from the kolkhoz 'October Revolution' (Arbusinka region) as a result of the construction of the nuclear power station. The soil removed

³³ No. 9-5-65-KO.

³⁴ No. 7/75-88, 14.4.1988.

³⁵ No. 2528, 19.4.1988.

constituted part of the 'national wealth' of the Soviet Union, Ukraine and the oblast. Another 410 hectares would be lost in order to build the Konstantinov and Aleksandrov reservoirs³⁶.

A petition organised by *Zelenyi Mir* in Iuzhnoukrainsk during the summer of 1988 summarised Bilodid's points as well as those referred to above: in his assessment of the legality of the plans to expand the SU EK Bilodid focused on the implications these would have on the South Bug river. He referred to the Resolution adopted in January 1988 by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers 'On Priority Measures to Improve the use of Water Resources in the Country'. This Resolution had been adopted because severe violations of existing regulations and laws in a number of projects regarding reservoirs had been disclosed. Bilodid then linked this Resolution to the SU EK, arguing that such violations were also taking place in Iuzhnoukrainsk. The SU EK-project, which was endorsed by the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers in 1979, violated the Ukrainian Water Code and several other normative documents. This had been acknowledged even by the planners, who in the project referred to the EK as an 'exception enterprise' (*predpriatie iskliuchenie*). Bilodid revealed that the project violated both the 'Sanitary Norms and Rules for the Projecting, Construction and the Use of Reservoirs' and the 'Requirements regarding the Location of Nuclear Power Stations'. For instance, using a reservoir for reactor-cooling purposes was inadmissible (point 2.5.1). Also, water from the cooling pond must under no circumstances enter other reservoirs (point 5.6), and the temperature in the cooling pond must not exceed 28 degrees C in the summer (point 5.8). Furthermore, the water flow of the South Bug river was inadequate to maintain normal water supplies for four reactors at Iuzhnoukrainsk (point 2.3.1.5), and the anticipated frequent swings of the water level in the reservoirs would damage their lining (point 2.3.2.3). Altogether, some 40 violations were recorded³⁷.

The petition also pointed out that recreation near the reservoirs would be impossible, given the big daily fluctuations in water levels. Once the Aleksandrov and Konstantinov reservoirs were built, a 60 km long stretch of the South Bug river would be transformed into a 'technical' reservoir with increased water temperatures. The unique Canyon of the South Bug would be destroyed, and with it 30 types of insects, 10 types of plants and nine birds species, all featuring in the Soviet Red Book of rare and endangered species. Ten rare Ukrainian plants would also disappear. In the event of an accident, or of a failure to comply with operating instructions at the nuclear power station, radionuclides would find their way into the South Bug river and pollute the only source of water in the Nikolaev oblast.

³⁶ No. 05-14-2444 M, 5.8.1988.

³⁷ See petition В Верховный Совет Украинской и Союз ССР, containing 85 signatures (Bilodid showed me a whole box filled with such petitions) gathered in June 1988 in Iuzhnoukrainsk.

The signatories of the petition appealed to the Ukrainian and Soviet parliaments to stop the project from going ahead, on the grounds that it was being implemented through inertia, as a result of Soviet 'gigantomania', as had been the case with the projects to redirect the flow of the Siberian rivers to the Central Asian republics, the Danube-Dniepr Canal and the dam in the Gulf of Finland, to mention but a few such cases. The time had come to stop pouring millions of rubles into doubtful projects, and rather make a thorough scientific assessment of the project prior to implementing it. As for the energy, savings could be made through better use of existing energy sources, through energy-saving technologies, reconstruction of old enterprises and alternative energy. All these elements ought to be part of the economic perestroika of the USSR. Rather than building two new reservoirs (Aleksandrov and Konstantinov), water cooling towers could be attached to the nuclear reactors. SU EK Stage Two was labelled 'morally outdated', and despite reassurances that the necessary means would be taken to protect the environment, they could be expected to have a considerable negative impact on the environment. It would be immoral to destroy the South Bug river for short-term benefits - it was already badly polluted with oil products, etc.: building the reservoirs would destroy it completely. Calls were therefore made not to go ahead with construction until the project had been assessed by an independent scientific expert commission, and local authorities were urged to facilitate a broad public debate of the project in the spirit of glasnost and democratisation.

By the end of the summer *Zelenyi Mir* had succeeded in collecting 40,000 signatures in support of these points. The signatures were collected primarily in Iuzhnoukrainsk and nearby Pervomaisk. Amongst the contributors were several engineers and other personnel of the nuclear power station: even the wife of the person in charge of the (personnel) shifts at the reactor units, signed the petition. Some not only put their name to the petition, but even added personal comments: one V. Shibka wrote that 'Anyone can destroy nature and people, but nobody has learnt how to restore them'. Defektoskopist Sverdeianko referred to Lake Baikal: 'remember what the construction of the cellulose plant resulted in!'³⁸. So although Bilodid was labelled a traitor by many, others supported him: to this day he claims to be on good terms with those who work in the reactor department - they call him the 'green bandit' but not in a pejorative sense³⁹. The leadership of the nuclear power station, headed by General Director Fuks, would, as will be seen below, argue fiercely against the Greens, claiming to speak on behalf of all the personnel at Iuzhnoukrainsk. A minority of the top staff, though, would openly disagree with them, thus

³⁸ *ibid.*

³⁹ Interview with Bilodid in Iuzhnoukrainsk, June 1994.

making it clear that there was no unified nuclear lobby at the South Ukrainian nuclear power station. This was no doubt a factor which served to strengthen the credibility of the campaign.

Via party channels, Mikhail Pitushkin, who worked as a deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers in Moscow, was informed about the petition organised by Bilodid. Pitushkin had a summer house in Pervomaisk and there he received representatives of *Zelenyi Mir*, who handed him the signatures. Pitushkin had a vested interest in preventing the reservoirs from being built, as Pervomaisk would be directly affected. He took the signatures to Moscow and arranged a meeting between CPSU officials and representatives of *Zelenyi Mir*. The meeting took place in early October 1988. Bilodid recalls that the delegation was received as if its members had been party officials. During a four hour long meeting they were able to present their views, and Pitushkin later put their case before the USSR Council of Ministers.

Pitushkin, who was also a Deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, then sent a letter to the Deputy Manager of the department responsible for the work of its permanent commissions, L. Zlomanov⁴⁰. As a deputy of constituency No. 498 in Pervomaisk, he had been contacted by a number of people urging him to do something to prevent the Second Stage of the SU EK from going ahead, on the grounds that the project was outdated and violated legislation on the environment and other regulations. Sharing their concern, Pitushkin requested that the issue be examined by the relevant commissions of the Supreme Soviet.

A Green Group also emerged in Nikolaev - the oblast centre - in the summer of 1988. In an interview with the author, Anatolii Zolotukhin, its current chairman, recalled the peculiar way in which the group came into being. Following the XIX Party Conference in June/July 1988, oblast party First Secretary Leonid Sharaev addressed a meeting in the House of Political Education (Dom Politizveshchenia), stating that: 'I am not in a position to save our river'. Ukrainian Party representatives, amongst whom was Boris Oliinyk, a Ukrainian writer, had expressed concern about plans to continue the construction of nuclear reactors in Ukraine after the Chernobyl accident - to little avail. Shortly after the Party Conference the Soviet Deputy Minister of Nuclear Energy travelled to Nikolaev and informed the oblast leadership that a decision had been made to go ahead with Stage Three of the SU EK (reactors 5 and 6), following the completion of Stage Two, and that this decision was final⁴¹. According to Bilodid, the obkom of the CPU had already in the summer of 1985, shortly after plans for the Second Stage of the SU EK were elaborated,

⁴⁰ No. 1-3/4, 8.9.1988.

⁴¹ See Suslova's speech at meeting in Nikolaev on 25.12.1988 in Панца 66: Тексты выступлений по телевидению, докладов членов ЦА, письма трудящихся в защиту природы и разумного развития атомной энергетики, available in the Nikolaev state archives.

tried to convince the Soviet authorities that four nuclear reactors represented the absolute limit of what the oblast could handle, thus arguing against the construction of reactors No. 5 and 6. In his view, though, they failed due to the poor way in which the case was argued.

The Nikolaev oblast *Zelenyi Mir* was initiated in July 1988 when an initiative group was established under the auspices of the Nikolaev branches of the Soviet Culture Fund (Sovetskii Fond Kultury) and the Ukrainian Writers' Union. The group numbered 25 people, amongst whom were representatives of the Museum of Local Lore, the Nikolaev Shipbuilding Institute (NKI), the Nikolaev Pedagogical Institute, the oblast Environmental Inspectorate, the Ministry of Health's *Sanepidemstantsia*, the local radio and TV, as well as the oblast CPU. It is peculiar that the CPU was on the list of initiators. As shown in Chapter Three, Greens in various parts of Ukraine agree that the CPU was not entirely positive about the emerging green groups. In Nikolaev, though, care was taken not to irritate the CPU in any way. In order to avoid trouble, oblast CPU First Secretary Leonid Sharaev was informed in due course that *Zelenyi Mir* was in the making. As a result, Gennadii Lepikov of the obkom propaganda department attended the founding meeting on 22 September 1988. Greens from Pervomaïsk, Voznesensk and Iuzhnoukrainsk, with whom contacts had been established during the summer of 1988, were also represented. The writer Vladimir Boiko and Anatolii Zolotukhin, representing the Culture Fund, were elected joint leaders⁴², and a programme and statute were endorsed. The founders of *Zelenyi Mir* justified the emergence of their group by referring to Lenin, according to whom

Массы должны знать все, обо всем судить и на все идти сознательно.

Zelenyi Mir's motto: 'the ideas of ecology to the masses, was also derived from Lenin. Some 181 members were registered on 22 September⁴³.

The Greens of Pervomaïsk, Voznesensk and Iuzhnoukrainsk joined forces with Nikolaev, and the Nikolaev group received the status of oblast group, of which the others were local branches. The organisational structure was very loose, though, facilitating co-operation rather than subordination. Local groups had and have a great deal of autonomy, and links between the oblast and the local groups are characterised by an exchange of information rather than by orders.

In interviews Zolotukhin has confirmed that at the initial stage they had little contact with Greens in Kiev. This is partially explained by the fact that *Zelenyi Mir* in Iuzhnoukrainsk was

⁴² See resolution from ecological meeting in Nikolaev (25.12.1988) addressed to the oblast TV.

⁴³ See summary of Учредительное собрание, 22.9.1988, and Протокол собрания экологического общества, No. 1, 22.9.1988.

registered as early as in December 1988 - 10 months prior to the First Congress of *Zelenyi Svit*. *Zelenyi Mir* in Nikolaev was also registered early. Contacts had, however, already been established with Anatolii Panov (see Chapter Three) in 1988. Bilodid was put in touch with him through Valentin Smaha - a journalist on *Robitnyehna hazeta*, who, together with another journalist, Anatolii Kolesnik of *Iuzhnata pravda*, had actively taken part in the campaign against the proposed Danube-Dniepr Canal. No closer co-operation was, however, initiated until early 1989, when Bilodid stood for elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet, standing against First Secretary of the CPU obkom Leonid Sharaev. In order to take part in the elections as a representative of *Zelenyi Mir* in Iuzhnoukrainsk, the organisation had to be registered as part of an all-Ukrainian organisation. Kiev was then contacted, and *Zelenyi Mir* became a collective member of *Zelenyj Svit*. Apart from being a formal member, there was little contact between Kiev and the Nikolaev oblast until after the First Congress in October 1989, when Zolotukhin was elected to the leadership of *Zelenyi Svit*. As will be seen below, the local Greens themselves obtained relevant information for their campaign, and were not provided with such information by the Greens in Kiev.

The strategy of the Greens in the initial stage of the campaign can be summarised as follows: first, valid arguments against further expansion of the SU EK had to be collected. Then these had to be circulated to the general public so as to gain mass support for the cause, and, finally, these arguments had to be presented to the political authorities in charge of decision-making.

A major argument used by the Greens at this stage was that the project for expanding the SU EK in its present form constituted a violation of a number of Ukrainian laws, in addition to failing to comply with more recent (i.e. post-Chernobyl) standards for protecting the environment and securing nuclear safety. Thus the demands made by the environmentalists for the project to be re-examined and assessed against stricter requirements than had been applied when the project was originally drafted. Reactor No. 3 at Iuzhnoukrainsk was already under construction, so the Greens chose - for tactical reasons - to leave this reactor out of their campaign and rather focus on preventing the rest of the Second Stage of the SU EK from being implemented⁴⁴.

6.2.2 Letter-Writing Campaign, Petitioning and Meetings.

Following the signature campaign conducted in Iuzhnoukrainsk and other areas in the vicinity of the nuclear power station and increasing publicity around the SU EK, various ministries started

⁴⁴ Zolotukhin has later expressed regret that Reactor No. 3 was not included in the campaign, but at the time the Greens concluded that in order to be successful they would have to bargain - thus 'giving' up the reactor so as to prevent the rest of the project from going ahead.

receiving letters from concerned locals. On the basis of these letters, *Derzhkompriroda* made it clear that plans to build the Konstantinov and Aleksandrov reservoirs for cooling purposes violated the 'Sanitary Rules and Norms 3907-85'. Furthermore, as the SU EK was situated in a region generally short of water, the water deficit would increase. Fish stock in the South Bug river would suffer as a result. There was also the possibility that engineering and geological conditions in the area of the nuclear power station itself might deteriorate as a result of the construction of the Konstantinov reservoir. On the basis of such evidence, the Chairman of *Derzhkompriroda*, Dina Protsenko, recommended that a re-examination of the project be conducted⁴⁵.

In response to all the letters received from locals in the vicinity of the nuclear power station, the Ukrainian Council of Ministers ordered the USSR *Gosplan* together with Ukrainian *Minvodka*, *Derzhkompriroda*, the Academy of Sciences and the Nikolaev oblispolkom to examine the issues addressed in these letters. In a letter to Bilodid the Deputy Chairman of *Gosplan*, V. Antonov, summed up the findings of this examination: 'several republican ministries and departments have concluded that it would be desirable to conduct a repeated experts' examination of the EK project, taking into account current norms and rules'. The Ukrainian *Gosplan*⁴⁶ had therefore 'requested' the USSR Ministry of Nuclear Energy to examine the questions raised in letters from worried citizens of Iuzhnoukrainsk and provide Ukrainian *Gosplan* with suggestions based on the 'Requirements for the Location of Nuclear Power Stations' and the Resolution on Urgent Measures to improve the use of Water Resources in the country⁴⁷.

The Green Movement was, as mentioned above, registered through the Culture Fund and the Writers' Union. It was therefore natural that cultural aspects of the SU EK were given proper attention. The Greens thus received positive replies from the Academy of Sciences' Institute of Archaeology supporting their concern about the Second Stage of the SU EK. A report forwarded to *Zelenyi Mir* by the Deputy Director, S. Kryzhinskii⁴⁸, stated that an archaeological expedition consisting of experts from the Academy of Sciences had examined the area where the Aleksandrov and the Konstantinov reservoirs were to be built, in 1969, and that 98 ancient cites from various historical epochs had been found. Of these 47 had been partially excavated. These findings were of particular value as they were located in one of the archaeologically most interesting and significant areas of Ukraine: the Central part of the Northern Black Sea Coast (Severnoe Prichernomore), situated between the ancient cultures of the Balkan-Danube and the steppes of Eurasia. This area had been densely populated for tens of thousands of years. The Battle of

⁴⁵ No. 9-7-463, 10.8.1988.

⁴⁶ No. 29-7/109, 15.7.1988.

⁴⁷ No. 25-50/119 of 5.8.1988.

⁴⁸ Letter of 5.11.1988 in response to No. 36 of 26.9.1988.

Zaporizhzhia took place there, which served as the forepost of the Zaporizhzhia Cossacks. The Institute of Archaeology therefore held the opinion that the building of the two reservoirs would cause 'irreplaceable damage not only to the archaeology and the history of the ancient peoples of Ukraine and to Ukraine' but would also destroy some of the most significant archaeological sites which could provide insights into how the ancient civilisations of the Old World had developed.

The Nikolaev Museum of local lore, history and economy expressed similar views⁴⁹. In an article in *Leninske plemia* one of its representatives, V. Hrebennikov, in an article printed in *Leninske plemia* voiced concern with the future of 37 unique archaeological monuments, most of which were of all-Soviet significance, and most of which had not yet been examined. On this basis, he recommended that the reservoirs not be built. In a follow-up, printed as a letter in *Iuzhnaia pravda* ('Sokhranim Iuzhnyi Bug')⁵⁰, Hrebennikov focused on the archaeological work that had so far been conducted in the area. Due to a lack of experts, inadequate funding and technical means and tight time-schedules, the unique settlement of Tashlyk-I and several other sites had been flooded without having been properly examined. Sites located in the areas designated for the Aleksandrov and Konstantinov reservoirs were threatened by the same fate, as construction work was already scheduled for July 1989.

The zoologists were not positive either about the two planned reservoirs⁵¹. According to S. Tarashuk of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Zoology, up to 50 species of flora and fauna included in the Ukrainian Red Book of rare species (44 of which were also listed in the Soviet Red Book) had been sighted in the area to be flooded. To recreate their habitat elsewhere would be impossible. Not only would the flora and the fauna disappear, but so also would the entire environment of the Pobuzhzhia granite-steppe, with the loss of the river's only rapids.

The Soviet and Ukrainian Ministries of Geology also expressed serious concerns about the expansion of the South Ukrainian nuclear power station. *GlavKGU Ukrgeologia* held the opinion that such an expansion was inadmissible, given the heightened seismicity in the area and big changes in engineering-geological conditions. Moreover, the site chosen for the nuclear power station did not fully comply with the 'Requirements for the Location of Nuclear Power Stations', as there was a high natural level of ground water (points 2.3, 2.6) and also highly developed irrigated farming in the area, which contributed to (unacceptable) changes in the ground water regime (point 2.2.3). With regard to the possibility of earthquakes, the seismicity had been estimated at five points on the Soviet scale during planning and construction of the First Stage of the nuclear power station. During the last two centuries, though, more than 20 severe earthquakes

⁴⁹ В. Гребенников, 'Скарби идуть під воду', *Ленінське плем'я*, 1.10.1988, с. 1.

⁵⁰ *Южняя правда*, 4.1.1989, с. 4.

⁵¹ *Южная Правда*, 13.10.1988, с. 3.

had taken place, of which the most serious ones had occurred in 1802 (7.5 on the Richter scale) and 1940 (7.4 on the Richter scale). The seismicity of the South Ukrainian nuclear power station should therefore be raised to between six and seven on Richter's scale. What was more, the nuclear power station was located in an anomalous mantle zone of the North-Eastern extension, which in turn was dynamically linked to the earthquake zone of the Rumanian Vrancea mountains. Earthquakes of more than seven points could thus not be excluded.

From a geological-engineering point of view, the area was also not very well suited for a nuclear power station. The area was prone to landslides and erosion as well as flooding. Due to the extensive construction work that had been carried out in the area zones were created causing the warming of the ground. Another factor contributing to this problem would be the backwater (head of water) of the South Bug river and the fluctuations of the water in the river and of the ground water caused by the (dynamic) operation of the reservoirs.

Due to these factors, another one or two points on the Richter scale would have to be added to the projected seismicity. Serious negative and irreversible changes of the regional geological environment could also be predicted. Based on this, the USSR Ministry of Geology recommended that the reliability of construction work already carried out at the nuclear power station be reassessed⁵².

Similar views were held by the Soviet Academy of Sciences, arguing that 'the SU EK is situated at the junction of the break of the North-Eastern and North-Western extensions, and Reactor No. 2 is situated in the middle of the seismologically active break of the Rumanian Vrancea-zone, which increases the seismicity of the area to at least seven or eight points on the Richter scale'⁵³.

6.2.3 Dialogue: Pro-Environment vs. Pro-Nuclear Lobbies.

As will be shown below, *Zelenyi Mir* won support for its claims of legal violations and received new arguments in support of its cause from several institutions: the Ukrainian *Glavvodresursoy* (Main Water Resources Directorate), *Minvodkhoz* (Ministry of Water Resources), *Ukrzemproekt* (Ukrainian Soil Project Directorate), the Ukrainian *Goskompriroda*, *Ukrgeologia* (Ukrainian Ministry of Geology) and three institutes within the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences: the Institutes

⁵² See letter from Украинское Главное Координационное Геологическое Управление 'Укргеология' of 11.5.1989 (No. 16/3-LCN) labelled 'Для служебного пользования' to the CC of the Ukrainian Communist Party in response to No. 5/681 of 19.4.1989 Предложения к заключению на расширение Южно-Украинской АЭС.

⁵³ *Южная правда*, 27.7.1989, с. 2-3.

of Archaeology, Zoology and Ecology. Trade unions and workers' collectives also favoured a re-examination of the plans for the Second Stage of the SU EK, as did a substantial proportion of the people of the Nikolaev oblast. I will refer to these institutions and the Greens as the pro-environment lobby.

The pro-environment lobby was opposed by what will be referred to as the pro-nuclear lobby. This lobby was composed of the leadership of the nuclear power station (General Director Fuks), the Ukrainian *Minatomenergo* (Ministry of Nuclear Energy), the Ukrainian *Minenergo* (Ministry of Energy), the *Gosatom* (the State Committee on Nuclear Energy), the *Gidroproekt* Institute (Kharkiv), the *Atomenergoproekt* Institute (Moscow), the Institute of Nuclear Energy and a majority of the staff of the nuclear power station.

These two lobbies appealed both to the public and to party-and decision-making bodies at four administrative levels: local, oblast, republic and Soviet. Below, I will first look at the process of coalition-building and the debate that took place between the two lobbies. Then I will examine their interaction with party and other political organs and the outcome of these dealings.

Much of the debate that followed the emergence of the Green Movement took place in the local press. In late 1987 *Iuzhmaia pravda* started a column called 'the Nuclear Power Station and us'. The man in charge of this column was V. Kolesnik (referred to above), a journalist who had earlier been a leading figure in the campaign against the Danube-Dniepr Canal. Although initially the newspaper was somewhat cautious about what to print, this changed as the Greens won the support of the Academy of Sciences, various ministries and departments and were able to refer to these. The petition organised in the summer of 1988 also helped in this respect, as did the fact that members of the cultural elite of Nikolaev joined the Green Movement. After the XIX Party Conference at the end of June 1988, glasnost expanded and it became easier to publish controversial materials. Local newspapers like *Vechernii Nikolaev*, *Korablestroitel*, *Energetik* (Iuzhnoukrainsk), and *Pribuzhskii Kommunar* (Pervomaik) also started to publish information about the actions organised by the Greens. Letters and articles written by Green Movement members and other opponents of plans to expand the SU EK were printed, as well as those of supporters of these plans.

The first information about *Zelenyi Mir* in Iuzhnoukrainsk started to appear in the summer of 1988. On 2 June, the local newspaper *Energetik* published an article by Tatiana Dorozhina under the headline, 'Ecology and us'. Dorozhina quoted Academician Borys Sokolov of the Department of Geology, Geophysics, Technology and Mining Sciences of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, who held the view that there was no ecological culture either in Ukraine or elsewhere in the USSR. Thanks to glasnost, however, information about the destructive attitude of Man towards nature was

being made accessible. The article proceeded to examine the Second Stage of the SU EK and the impact the construction of the two new reservoirs would have on the river and its habitat:

Первая очередь Южно-Украинской АЭС работает на охлажденной воде Ташлыкского водохранилища. Для пуска второй очереди этой воды не хватит. Возникает необходимость строительства новых технических водосмоков. Это изменит режим реки. 45 км Константиновского водохранилища, покрывает все лесные берега реки, исчезнет часть уникального альпийского ландшафта с его неповторимым растительным и животным миром. Вблизи города Южноукраинск должен появиться еще один технический водосмек, куда будут попадать сбросы промышленных предприятий с верховьев реки. Поднимается уровень грунтовых вод. Изменение режима реки, количества воды, повышение температуры, могут привести к тяжёлым последствиям. Поэтому всем нам надо серьезно задуматься, как сохранить существующую экологическую обстановку⁵⁴.

Dorozhina then informed her readers that in order to save the environment for future generations an ecological committee was in the process of being set up in Iuzhnoukrainsk. Any person wishing to take part in the work of the committee could become a member.

Given that *Energetik* was the newspaper of the workers at the SU EK and thus had a pro-nuclear bent, it is amazing that such outspoken criticism of the Second Stage of the EK was allowed to appear in print at all. It can be explained by recalling the context in which the Green group emerged: namely as an initiative of people working at the nuclear power plant who were not opposed to nuclear power itself but rather worried about the negative consequences that flooding parts of the valley of the river at Iuzhnoukrainsk would have. That, however, did not mean that Bilodid and his initiative group, which united nine people, had the support of the top management of the nuclear power station or of the local communist party leadership.

Although the Greens were treated sympathetically by representatives of the media, this did not mean that they had unrestricted access to these. A bulletin - *Biulletin* - was launched in the autumn to inform members of what was happening within the movement and around the SU EK. The first bulletin carried evidence of such restrictions. On 10 October, for instance, the propaganda unit of the oblast TV had planned to air a programme about the SU EK. In the end, however, the programme was held back. Instead, a programme about new technologies was broadcast. Ala Korzheva, who reported on nuclear power and the South Ukrainian nuclear power station, revealed in interviews with the author that she had several fights with her boss over her reports, as he was reluctant to broadcast them. A similar situation occurred in Iuzhnoukrainsk two

⁵⁴ *Энергетик*, 2.6.1988, с 4.

days later, when the oblast radio did a report on the SU EK. At exactly 6:30 p.m., when the report started, the feeder in Iuzhnoukrainsk was reported to have short-circuited. Towards the end of the report, at 7 p.m., the feeder was 'restored'. This was interpreted by the Greens as no coincidence⁵⁵.

The Greens approached this situation in two ways: on the one hand they appealed to the general public and to workers' collectives for vocal and practical support. On the other, when their access to the media was being restricted, they referred to the 19th Party Conference and to the resolution on *glasnost*, arguing that restrictions imposed upon them contradicted these. All information regarding the SU EK should be made available, as the Party Conference had decided that

Теперь задача состоит в том, чтобы все дела в стране ренались
народом и его полномочными представителями, находились под его
полным действительным контролем⁵⁶.

On another occasion it was argued that the 19th Party Conference had clearly expressed itself in favour of the immediate solution of such an important task as the protection of the environment by the Communist Party and informal groups working together⁵⁷. Members of the public were urged to participate actively in the fight to save the South Bug river on the grounds that perestroika provided them with a chance, equipped with the Law on Local Self-government, to protect their children from radiation and to defend their right to a future⁵⁸.

To justify the campaign and to gain support for their cause, the Greens frequently made references to the new policies of glasnost and democratisation. In the First Bulletin of the *Iuzhnyi Front Zelenykh*, for instance, appeals were made to people to implement perestroika through their deeds:

Даем перестройку на деле! Даешь подлинную гласность!
Экологические бедствия сотрясают нашу планету, ставшую
слишком тесной! Воды! Воздуха! Чистого неба!⁵⁹

⁵⁵ Бюллетень No. 1 'Южный Фронт Зеленых', с. 1.

⁵⁶ This is a quote from the 19th Party Conference, cited by Vladimir Boiko at an ecological meeting in Nikolaev on 25.12.1988.

⁵⁷ See Воззвание за Николаевской области Обращение к делегатам областных и районных отчетно-выборных партийных конференций, April 1989.

⁵⁸ *Южная правда*, 27.7.1989, с. 3.

⁵⁹ See Бюллетень No. 1, 'Южный Фронт Зеленых'.

In the initial stage of the campaign, the Greens and their supporters found it somewhat difficult to voice their concerns through the newspaper *Iuzhnaia pravda*. The workers' collective of *Ekvator*, for instance, found that controversial parts of a letter written to the paper had been omitted in the published version. A second letter, in which the workers' collective urged the paper to print the text in full, later appeared 'uncensored' in the paper. The workers expressed concern that editing the letter without their consent contradicted point 5 of the 'Resolution on Glasnost', endorsed by the 19th Party Conference. More glasnost was urged in the case of Iuzhnoukrainsk. The conditions for *glasnost* had been facilitated by the Party Conference:

Не можем сказать, что дискуссии совсем не ведутся, но все же в этом вопросе газета действует менее активно, чем, например, по вопросам Днепро-Бугского гидроузла⁶⁰.

Glasnost and democratisation very much gained their own momentum in Soviet politics from late 1987 onwards. This was the case also in Nikolaev oblast, where the Greens and other activists used these two concepts to justify and to broaden the debate on the Second Stage of the SU EK.

Anatolii Zolotukhin, who worked as an engineer at the *Ekvator* enterprise, managed to activate his fellow employees prior to *Zelenyi Mir* being formally established. On 11 August 1988 *Iuzhnaia pravda* published an open letter signed by 1,412 workers and carrying the heading 'No to Further Construction!' The workers stated their support for the Greens, arguing that the Second Stage of the SU EK was inadmissible on a number of grounds: firstly, as the region was already suffering from an acute shortage of water, the South Bug river was unable to provide any more water for the nuclear power station for reactor cooling purposes. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that high summer temperatures in the area caused considerable evaporation from the cooling pond, thus requiring more water. Secondly, due to salinisation, it would be impossible to use water from the Aleksandrov reservoir for irrigation. Thirdly, there were serious moral aspects connected to the expansion plans: according to the Soviet Minister of Nuclear Energy, N. Lukonin, the nuclear power station would operate for roughly another 30-40 years. But would not destroying the South Bug in exchange for 30-40 years of electricity supplies be too high a price to pay? Besides, the death of the South Bug would also be the death of the history of the area (*nashego rodnogo kraia* - my emphasis), as dozens of archaeological sites of global significance would be lost. The same fate awaited the 'national pride of the Ukrainian people', the

⁶⁰ See 'О расширении гласности. Второе открытое письмо работников ПО *Экватор* редакции газеты *Южной правды*', in *Южная правда*, 13.9.1988, с. 1.

Mihail cliffs, with which the history of the Cossacks and the Haidamaka movement⁶¹, as well as the legend of the hoard of the native defender Cossack Mamai, captured on the island, were connected.

The petition called for a national park to be set up in the area. On the territory of the national park, archaeological, historical and tourist bases should be created. The Konstantinov and Aleksandrov reservoirs must under no circumstance be built. Public surveys should be conducted to check people's attitudes towards plans to expand the EK and a special session of the oblast soviet should be called, the decision of which should be sent to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. Finally, the workers of *Ekvator* appealed to the people of Kherson, Odessa, Kirovohrad and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts for support⁶².

Although *Iuzhnaia pravda* published the letter, controversial parts were omitted. The workers of *Ekvator* were unhappy with the fact that their letter was not printed in full, and sent a second letter to the editor, relating their experience to glasnost. The letter appeared in print on 13 September under the heading 'On the widening of glasnost'. The workers pointed out that by editing the letter without their consent, the editors of *Iuzhnaia pravda* violated point 5 of the Resolution on Glasnost, endorsed by the XIX Party Conference. More glasnost was urged on the South Ukrainian nuclear power station, the conditions for which had been facilitated by the Party Conference:

Не можем сказать, что дискуссия совсем не ведется, но все же в этом вопросе газета действует менее активно, чем, например, по вопросам Днепро-Бугского гидроустья⁶³.

The editorial board of *Iuzhnaia pravda*, in a note commenting on the case, wrote that it was a class lesson for the editorial board. Gratitude was expressed towards the workers of *Ekvator* for pointing out this infringement of glasnost and people were invited to take part in an open discussion about the SU EK so that all the points in favour and against could be properly aired.

⁶¹ The Haidamaka movement refers to groups of people organised by the Zaporizhzhia Cossacks which instigated popular uprisings against the Polish regime, in control of the Ukrainian right-bank in the 18th century. The pretext for these uprisings were numerous obligations imposed upon ordinary people by Polish magnates, nobles and Jewish stewards, and also their abuse of power. Dissatisfaction grew among common people, serfs, peasants and impoverished Cossacks, artisans, petty burghers and agricultural colonists, who fled from their oppressors into the Steppes and forests. They moved swiftly from one area to another, attacking the enemy and disappearing into the wild. They won the general support of the Ukrainian people and also of Orthodox monks and priests, prevented from free exercise of their faith. For more details, see Volodymyr Kubijovyc (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 1988), vol. II, pp. 111-112.

⁶² *Южная правда*, 11.8.1988, с. 2.

⁶³ See 'О расширении гласности - Второе открытое письмо работников ПО "Экватор" редакции газеты *Южной Правды*', *Южная правда*, 13.9.1988, с. 1.

The points omitted in the first letter from *Ekvator* were disclosed: the building of a third and fourth reactor at SU EK caused doubts as to whether or not the Tashlyk cooling pond would be adequate for cooling all the reactors. The time had come to introduce economic self-rule in Nikolaev oblast. Only then could giants as *Minvudkhoz* (the Ministry of Water Resources), *Minatomenergo* (Ministry of Nuclear Energy) and *Mintsvetmet* (Ministry of Metallurgy) be stopped so that local interests could be fully secured. The letter was signed by 28 members of the council of the workers' collective⁶⁴.

To emphasise its commitment to *glasnost*, *Iuzhnaia pravda* printed an open letter from the workers at the nuclear power station next to that of the workers of *Ekvator*. The workers claimed that the public did not possess enough information about the development of nuclear energy and its global position. This, they claimed, had resulted in a biased approach towards the nuclear power station in Iuzhnoukrainsk. The newspaper was accused of contributing to this biased approach by not passing on facts, but rather interpretations of what would be the impact of the Second Stage of the SU EK. To set the record straight, it was argued that most countries were continuing their nuclear power schemes following the accident at Chernobyl, maximising nuclear safety. This was also the case in the Soviet Union, where reactor output had been delayed due to stricter safety measures. As a matter of fact, several countries had stopped building thermal power stations as a result of the harm these caused the environment. The site for the SU EK was considered the optimal choice on the basis of several factors, such as proximity to the energy consumers, geological factors, atmospheric conditions, and others. The site had been approved by a complex commission. To be on the safe side, a State Expert Commission had examined the Second Stage of the SU EK in 1985 and sanctioned it. On this basis, the workers recommended that Reactors No. 3 and 4 be completed and attached to the electrical grid as originally planned. Finally, productivity was linked to the availability of electricity; it was not a coincidence that America, which had the highest output of electricity per capita, also ranked highest in terms of productivity in industry. Industrial output could only be improved in the Soviet Union by means of expanding the country's nuclear capacity. The readers of *Iuzhnaia pravda* were urged to discuss SU EK not based on emotions, but based on facts and realities. The letter was signed by seven high-ranking officials at the nuclear power station, amongst whom was the chairman of the trade union, V. Podbudnyi⁶⁵.

The letter triggered off an indignant response - from workers at the nuclear power station! In an open letter sent to the workers of *Ekvator* and to the editorial board of *Iuzhnaia pravda*, and

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ See 'На основе объективных реальностей', *Южная правда*, 13.9.1988, с. 1.

signed by 61 people, amongst them V. Belosheikin, whose name had been put on it which appeared in print in *Iuzhnaia pravda* just shortly before, the view that the letter represented the opinion of the workers at Iuzhnoukrainsk was challenged. Most people at the nuclear power station favoured an independent ecological expert assessment of the Second Stage, and it therefore seemed unlikely that many workers would have signed the letter. As a matter of fact, rather than risking a poor response by collecting signatures, the leadership appeared once again to have used the old method of presenting the views of some leaders as the collective view. Which right did V. Podbudnyi have to sign the letter on behalf of all the workers? And how come that V. Belosheikin, whose signature was attached to the letter, saw it for the first time when he read the front page of *Iuzhnaia pravda*?

As for the Second Stage itself, there had been disagreement as far back as 1979, when the project was examined. However, in those days it was impossible to dissent, so in the end 'agreement' prevailed. The signatories pointed out that it was people in Iuzhnoukrainsk and Pervomaïsk who had appealed to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet with a request to conduct an expert inquiry on the project, and that, as a result, the Ukrainian *Gosplan* had sent a letter to the USSR *Minatomenergo* on 15 July asking it to set the dates and the extent of such an expert assessment. *Minatomenergo*, though, was in no hurry, as it was more concerned with catching up with the United States in terms of energy output. The letter printed in *Iuzhnaia pravda* should probably be taken as a sign of the bureaucracy trying to operate within the new boundaries set by glasnost and democratisation.

Discussions in the various units at the nuclear power station revealed clearly that people were dismayed with the letter. Protocol No. 21 of a meeting of the party members in reactor unit No 1 on 2 September 1988, at which a draft letter to the Ukrainian Council of Ministers regarding the re-examination of the SU EK, was discussed, serves as a good example: the heads of the unit shifts, the chief engineers and the heads of the reactor shifts did not approve of the letter. The meeting decided to lobby the party committee and the leadership of the nuclear power station into writing a letter to the Ukrainian Council of Minister requesting that the Second Stage be re-examined with the aim of not building the two reservoirs and to implement alternative cooling systems at the nuclear power station so as to not use so much water. The meeting would not object to the Second and Third Stages on the condition that the South Bug river remained untouched. Finally, the meeting decided to request *Goskompriroda* to establish a nature reserve along the river in the area of Pervomaïsk and Voznesensk⁶⁶.

⁶⁶ See 'От имени коллектива или история одной публикации', 31.10.1988. This letter was sent to a number of workers collectives in the oblast, so as to make the contents widely known in case the newspaper refused to print it.

The response from the 61 workers, however, did not discourage the leadership at the nuclear power station from using collective letters as a means by which to challenge the view of the Greens and the public. On 8 December *Iuzhnaia pravda* again printed an open letter from the workers at Iuzhnoukrainsk. The letter complained that the public was being exposed to a misinformation campaign. This campaign apparently also had an effect on the workers at the SU EK, then

Имеющая место дезинформация общественного мнения вносит первосность и раздраженность в коллективы и строительных кадров Южно-Украинского Энергокомплекса - важного народнохозяйственного объекта. Такая обстановка не может способствовать мобилизации коллективов на выполнение своих обязательств по обеспечению надежной работы комплекса...

No matter which parameters were used, nuclear and hydroelectric energy remained safer and environmentally much cleaner than other methods of generating electricity. Between 1980-85 the SU EK project had undergone a series of examinations. However, the USSR Council of Ministers had decided to conduct a new expert assessment of the Second Stage and it was the prerogative of the Council of Ministers to do so. Still, the workers felt that the discussion around the SU EK was not very precise, especially in terms of technical details, creating some kind of a scare scenario for what would be the consequences of the Aleksandrov and the Konstantinov reservoirs. By writing the letter, the workers hoped to contribute with some clarity to the debate⁶⁷.

A majority was against further expansion, however. The workers at *Ekvator* inspired workers elsewhere to follow their example, and in the next few weeks a number of similar letters and petitions emerged on the pages of *Iuzhnaia pravda*. For instance, 1,696 signatures were collected in the course of three days at the enterprise 'the 60th anniversary of the USSR'. T. Kashinkova of the Biuro of Esthetics, who signed the letter on their behalf, claimed that nobody remained indifferent to *Ekvator's* appeal. She and her fellow workers demanded that the oblast soviet as soon as possible call a special session with the participation of scientists, environmentalists and power engineering specialists to discuss the future of SU EK. The letter finished with an emotional outburst:

Хватить нас за нос водить, товарищи ученые и энергетики!

⁶⁷ *Iuzhnaia pravda*, 8.12.1988, с. 1,4.

Throughout the late summer of 1988, letters and articles critical to the forthcoming expansion of the SU EK continued to emerge on the pages of the local newspapers. Aleksandr Fomin, chief engineer at the Nikolaev Institute of Shipbuilding and also a member of the Presidium of the oblast Tourist Federation⁶⁸, the Iuzhnoukrainsk branch of which was one of the initiators to the Iuzhnoukrainsk *Zelenyi Mir*, made an emotional appeal to save the South Bug river, 100 km of which would be destroyed were the reservoirs to be built. Fomin also addressed the impact of pollution in the republic more widely:

Почему при антропогенной нагрузке в республике в 10 раз более высокой, чем по стране, 40% действующих в стране АЭС находится на Украине? Почему при острейшем дефиците на Юге Украины воды для орошения - она идет для охлаждения реакторов АЭС?⁶⁹

Some 1,000 employees of the All-Union Project Institute *Gidrosudmash* sent a telegram to General Secretary of the CPSU, Gorbachev, USSR Prime Minister Ryzhkov, USSR Chairman of USSR *Goskomprirroda*, Morhun and to Marchuk and Trefilov of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences expressing their opposition to the Second Stage of the SU EK from going ahead prior to the re-examination of the project by an independent ecological expert assessment body. A more emotional appeal was sent to Gorbachev from the workers collective of the *Leninskii Komsomol* enterprise: 'please save South Bug! In just a few days it will be destroyed forever for the sake of the Iuzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station!'⁷⁰ A driver from Voznesensk, V. Vinichenko, asked the pro-nuclear lobby the following question: 'is not the river necessary to us? Are we really going to sacrifice it? This river is our life, four reactors, two stages - that is already much'. Ilya Shostak, who added 'worker' to his name in a letter which appeared in *Iuzhnaia pravda* in early June 1989, was less diplomatic:

А вообще у меня есть конкретное предложение к работникам Минатомэнергетики СССР: вице ведомство должно находиться ближе к атомным электростанциям. Почему бы Минатомэнерго не перевести в 30-км зону Чернобыля, это была бы лучшая реклама выпускаемой вами продукции.

The residents of houses No. 2 and 4 at the Tikhaya Street and house No. 76a of Odessa Street sent a letter signed by 202 residents in response to an article published in *Pribuzhskii Kommunar*

⁶⁸ The word tourism (туризм) in Russian has a wider use than in English. In this case, the Tourist Federation was a group uniting people interested in mountaineering, boating and hiking.

⁶⁹ *Южная правда*, 22.7.1988, с. 3.

⁷⁰ Text available in the archives of the Nikolaev Green Movement.

on 5 July 1989, demanding that the government listen to the voice of the people and stop the expansion of the nuclear power station at Iuzhnoukrainsk - bearing in mind the latter's interests, their health and taking into account the alternative project presented by a group of young engineers at the nuclear power station. The letter complained that Ukraine already accommodated 40% of the Soviet nuclear reactors. Given the fertile chernozem this was inadmissible:

Кому пужа будет електроенергия Южно-Української АЕС, если люди, живущие вдоль Южного Буга будут обречены на медленное умирание? Мы, старшее поколение, прошли через многие испытания: и голодом и войнами, и разрухой и здоровьем своим похвастаться не можем, но мы не хотим, чтобы наши дети, внуки, правнуки были лишены возможности пить чистую воду нашего Буга: не хотим, чтобы они с детства были обречены на медленное увядание. А к этому идет, т.к. Южный Буг уже сейчас далеко не тот, каким был в недалеком прошлом⁷¹.

Most of the letters and articles which appeared in the press and on TV throughout 1988 and 1989 were negative to the Second Stage of the SU EK. Those in favour of the SU EK published their information primarily in *Energetik*, and as the Greens gained increasing support from the general public, the attacks on key members in the *Zelenyi Mir* gradually became more vicious. Once the arguments given in support of the SU EK failed to win people over to the pro-nuclear lobby, discrediting individuals (I will return to this below) became increasingly frequent. It seems that the leadership of the Iuzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station initially thought that discrediting the Greens would not be very difficult. Then in their view, what characterised Greens was dedication fuelled by emotions rather than by rational argument. It soon became clear, however, that the Greens not only had emotional commitment but also rational arguments to support their case. As a matter of fact, the leadership of the Nikolayev *Zelenyi Mir* was even capable of justifying its emotional approach in terms of ideology: quoting Lenin, Boiko argued that

Истина - в эмоциях. Безэмоционально может быть только преданность к ведомству⁷².

Attempts were also made to dispute the Greens' knowledge about nuclear power. During the autumn of 1988, many members of *Zelenyi Svit* and others, opposed to the expansion of the

⁷¹ See undated telegram in Пилка 65: образження, воззвання екологічної асоціації, телеграми от жителів і колективів підприємств. Николаєвщини об угрозе уничтожения Южного Буга, строительства 4-6 блоков Южноукраїнської АЕС и др., 1988-90, kept in the oblast public archives, Nikolaev.

⁷² See *Без права на ошибку*, shown on oblast TV, 1989 (n.d.).

Iuzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station, quoted the Soviet journal *Selskaia molodezh* (No. 6) to justify their point of view. The journal claimed that world-wide fever and fever nuclear power stations were being commissioned. So why was the Soviet Union expanding its nuclear power scheme? General Director of Iuzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station commented on the issue in a rather arrogant manner:

Ну вот, попали на что ссылаться журнал Сельская Молодежь!
Пользуйтесь более солидными источниками!⁷³

The slandering got worse, the more successful the Greens were. *Zelenyi Mir*, as will be shown below, offered alternatives to the Second Stage of the SU EK. These alternatives were developed by experts from the Nikolaev Shipbuilding Institute (NKI) and by members of the movement with a technical/engineering background and their proposals could not easily be disregarded. So attempts were made at ridiculing individuals to deflect attention. *Energetik* thus published a four-column long article tearing Zolotukhin's credibility as an engineer apart. And at a meeting in Moscow, which they both attended, General Director Fuks allegedly threatened Zolotukhin, telling him that he would disappear as (people did) in 1937 and nobody would take any notice⁷⁴. Zolotukhin later wrote a letter of protest to local authorities about this incident.

Not all the people favouring more nuclear power were that arrogant, though. Academician V. Bariakhtar of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, for instance, did not endorse demands to prohibit the reservoirs and Reactor No. 4 from being built. To prohibit was the simplest approach, he argued, and as a rule such demands were made by representatives of the creative intelligentsia and by people living in the close vicinity of nuclear power stations. However, energy was perceived as the base of the economy. How would it be possible to cope without it?⁷⁵

Bariakhtar further claimed that the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences favoured the continued development of nuclear energy in Ukraine. However, simultaneously efforts should be made to implement energy-saving technologies in the industry. Efforts should be made to see to it that people working in the nuclear industry be properly trained, and control significantly tightened. Attempts should also be made at recruiting personnel locally since locals were emotionally attached to the area and would not want to cause it any harm. Also, there was a need for more openness in the nuclear industry. Having said this, though, Bariakhtar claimed that no technical or environmental reasons had been found for rejecting the Third Stage of the SU EK.

⁷³ *Южная правда*, 22.9.1988, с. 1.

⁷⁴ I was told this story by Bilodid in Iuzhnoukrainsk during an interview in June 1994.

⁷⁵ See 'Энергетика сегодня и завтра', in *Южная правда*, 22.9.1988, с. 1-2.

Academician Ligachev of the Institute of Nuclear Energy was also quoted:

Атомная энергетика в 1.500 раз безопаснее тепловых энергетик.
Чернобыльская авария не очень значима по своим последствиям. В
случае любой катастрофы на АЭС опасность людям не грозит⁷⁶.

Most of the people living in the vicinity of the nuclear power station and people whose lives would be affected in connection with the construction of the Aleksandrov and Konstantinov reservoirs, however, were of a different opinion, although few were opposed to any further expansion. A few who argued that if the SU EK was not expanded, economic growth in the area would cease. Some of the delegates to the Arbuzinka region party conference thus came out in favour of expansion. When asked by a TV reporter whether or not they favoured the construction of Reactors 5 and 6, Aleksandr Riazanov - secretary of the party organisation in the railway department - answered as follows:

Я считаю, что для того, чтобы развивался наш город, мы должны
решить вопрос строительства 5-го и 6-го блоков и
энергокомплекса на Буге. Иначе города не будет!

Valerii Samoilov, secretary of the party organisation at the Konstantinov assembly board, also favoured the Third Stage, provided that the ecological problems linked to it could be solved and the South Bug river could be saved, then

Что мы будем делать, если прекратится строительство третьей
очереди АЭС? Куда денутся наши люди? Ведь мы уже потеряли
его! Очень много специалистов ушло после окончания
строительства первой очереди⁷⁷.

It was not until the autumn of 1988, though, that *Zelenyi Mir* started organising meetings, demonstrations and other related activities. The first meeting was held in Nikolaev on 10 September and it was officially sanctioned by the oblispolkom. The meeting was organised by the Nikolaev Tourist Club, which was contacted by *Zelenyi Mir* in Iuzhnoukrainsk. A few hundred people attended the meeting, which was the first public meeting to be arranged by an informal organisation in Nikolaev, and the topic of which was the forthcoming construction of the

⁷⁶ *Кораблестроитель*, 23.9.1988, с. 2.

⁷⁷ See 'Коммунисты 80-х', December 1988 (transcript from TV programme), available in Папка No. 66: Тексты выступлений по телевидению, докладов членов ЭА, письма трудящихся в защиту природы и разумного развития атомной энергетики, in the oblast archives, Nikolaev.

Aleksandrov and Konstantinov reservoirs. The meeting took place in front of the Constructors' House of Culture. Information and facts as to what would be the ecological consequences of the Second Stage of the SU EK were passed on to those present, as was information about the meeting Bilodid and others of *Zelenyi Mir* of Iuzhnoukrainsk had with representatives of the USSR Council of Ministers in Moscow, following the collection of signatures in favour of a re-examination of the Second Stage of the SU EK. In the course of the meeting it became known that representatives of *Minenergetika* (the Ministry of Energy) had attended talks with the CPU obkom in Nikolaev. Calls were made for more glasnost and for the contents of these talks to be made public. The meeting adopted a resolution, the major points of which were the following: construction works on Reactor No. 4 at Iuzhnoukrainsk must cease immediately; no further work must be carried out on the Konstantinov and Aleksandrov reservoirs and on the adjacent hydroelectric stations until they have been properly examined by an independent ecological expert assessment commission; an extraordinary session of the oblast soviet must be called by the end of September to make a decision to halt work at the SU EK prior to the report of the ecological expert assessment; the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences must be requested to produce alternatives to the SU EK to be discussed in public, and a national park should be created in the canyon of the South Bug river. Should construction work continue, the meeting ruled, a camp would be set up in the area to prevent such construction from going ahead. An appeal was made to *Iuzhmaia pravda* to publish the resolution of the meeting. This was eventually done and it resulted in a large response from the general public⁷⁸. Six workers of *Iuzhnoe Proizvodstvenno-tehnicheskoe predpriatie*, for instance, declared their support for the resolution adopted by the meeting.

A second big meeting was held on 22 September 1988 in connection with the Founding meeting of the Nikolaev *Zelenyi Svit*, addressed above. At both these meetings signatures were collected in support of demands that the Second Stage of SU EK be subject to the assessment of an ecological expert assessment commission. Similarly, the Greens in Iuzhnoukrainsk organised a meeting on 5 October. Organising this meeting was not easy, and Bilodid had to persuade his friends and acquaintances to attend. Small notes were put up in Iuzhnoukrainsk to attract a wider audience:

ОБЪЯВЛЕНИЕ

8 октября 1988 г. в 17 часов на берегу Южного Буга у подножия скалы (Пугач, в 300 м. ниже профилактория ЮУ АЭС)

⁷⁸ Information provided in interviews with Zolotukhin, from the archives of *Zelenyi Svit* (written account of the meeting), and from a letter addressed to the editors of *Vzgliad* (a TV programme which became very popular in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s for addressing politically controversial issues), from *Zelenyi Mir* giving information about the meeting and the Green Movement, urging them to do a report on the SU EK.

состоится митинг по экологическим проблемам Южно-Украинского энергокомплекса.
Ассоциация Зеленый Мир

The 280 people who attended the meeting adopted a resolution very similar to the one adopted in Nikolaev a few weeks earlier:

Митинг констатирует неудовлетворенное выполнение природоохранных мероприятий при строительстве Ташлыкского и Александровского водохранилищах, такой подход стал системой. Митинг считает, что такая же судьба ожидает и Константиновское водохранилище.

Митинг протестует против превращения Южного Буга в технический водоем Милатомэнерго. Требуем немедленно приостановить работы по сооружению Константиновского и Александровского водохранилищах до проведения всеведомственной экологической экспертизы проекта, составленного и согласованного в лучших традициях эпохи застоя.

Проект Южноукраинского Энергокомплекса на всенародное обсуждение наряду с альтернативными вариантами охлаждения АЭС! Требуем народовластия! Митинг призывает Южноукраинский городской и Николаевский областной советы народных депутатов решительно отстаивать мнение трудящихся перед лицом министерств и ведомств.

Нет — строительству Александровского и Константиновского водохранилищах!

Amongst the people present were not only locals but also sportsmen from Vorozhilovgrad, Odessa, Nikolaev and even Kazakhstan. They all appealed for the canyon of the South Bug river to be preserved. The resolution adopted was sent to the Iuzhnoukrainsk gorispolkom and to Nikolaev oblispolkom⁷⁹.

Whereas the demands made by the Greens were such that they totally opposed the Second Stage of the SU EK, especially the Nikolaev group of *Zelenyi Mir* made an effort to appease its opponents and create consensus. A meeting held on 5 October, for instance, explained *Zelenyi Mir's* general attitude towards nuclear power as follows:

Ассоциация (Зеленый Мир) реально оценивает необходимость разумного развития атомной энергетики, как возможный вариант для покрытия дефицита электроэнергии наряду с передовыми энергосберегающими технологиями, перевода промышленности на 3-х сменный график работы и развития нетрадиционных источников

⁷⁹ See resolution adopted by meeting and article in *Ленінське плем'я*, 15.10.1988, с. 1.

энергии. Самым приоритетным из перечисленных направлений, по нашему мнению, должны стать энергосберегающие технологии⁸⁰.

According to official figures used, Nikolaev oblast obtained only between six and 12% of the energy generated at the Iuzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station. One article published in *Iuzhmaia pravda* claimed that 88% of the energy was exported to Romania and some passed on to Odessa oblast. The nuclear power station, on the other hand, took 25% of the oblast's capacity in terms of water and land resources. Oblast Soviet Deputy, L. Chudaikina, claimed that the energy received from the nuclear power station (her figure was only six percent) could easily be gained through energy saving, so why keep the nuclear power station running at all?⁸¹

Suslova expressed the position of the Green Movement on nuclear power even clearer at a meeting in Nikolaev some months later, by saying that 'we are not against nuclear energy', but why develop it in Ukraine, whose soil was the most fertile in the Soviet Union?⁸² Given the general shortage of water, it could be used in a better way than cooling nuclear reactors; whereas Ukraine accounted for three percent of the Soviet territory, it produced a quarter of its food. To grow 50 metric centners of wheat on one hectare of land, an average of 1,500 cubic metres of water was required. In comparison, one nuclear reactor of the VVER-1000 type needed 30 million cubic meters of water a year for cooling purposes. Maybe priorities ought to change!⁸³

Far from just demanding that the SU EK be closed, the Greens made suggestions as to how it could be made more friendly towards the environment. The key issue was how to cool the reactors. There were two ways of doing this⁸⁴: either, one could have a so-called 'circulating evaporative system', which was being used at Iuzhnoukrainsk. Or one could install a circulating system using water towers and taking up far less space than the former system, which required reservoirs. Although the money already invested in the EK would be lost, should the Greens' proposal be followed, the advantages were obvious: firstly, it would require much less water from South Bug. It would require no flooding, thus saving the environment, and there would be no evaporation, which in turn would have a positive effect on the climate in the area. Due to the Tashlyk reservoir, there was so much evaporation during the winter time, that the town of

⁸⁰ See letter from public meeting on 5.10.1988 on 'Отношение к Южноукраинской АЭС', addressed to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet.

⁸¹ See *Южная правда*, 27.7.1988, с. 2-3, and *Ленінське плем'я*, 15.10.1988, с. 1.

⁸² See Suslova's speech at meeting in Nikolaev on 25.12.1988 in Папка 66: Тексты выступлений по телевидению, докладов членов ЭА, письма трудящихся в защиту природы и разумного развития атомной энергетики, available in the Nikolaev State Archives.

⁸³ *Южная правда*, 25.12.1988, с. 2.

⁸⁴ See for instance *Южная правда*, 18.3.1989, с. 3: 'Сохраним природу для будущих поколений', the resolution adopted at a meeting in Iuzhnoukrainsk on 8.10.1988, and *Кораблестроитель*, 27.1.1989, с. 1.

Iuzhnoukrainsk would always be covered in mist. As a result people were more prone to colds and flus.

As for peak hours, extra electricity could be made by gas turbine stations. Local scientists had developed a particularly efficient gas turbine, which would utilise the gas much better than those commonly in use at various enterprises in the area. Besides, they would be cheap in use and they could be produced in the oblast. From an environmental point of view, the gas turbine suggested was thus clean. Sergei Shapovalov of *Zelenyi Mir* and his colleague from NKI had in addition developed methods to clean the water of the Tashlyk reservoir without having to pump dirty water into the South Bug river.

A thorough assessment of these alternatives was made in a report which was sent to various political decision-makers and the alternatives were taken seriously. Having read the report, oblast Party First Secretary L. Sharaev proposed that Reactors No. 3 and 4⁸⁵, which were under construction be redesigned so that they could be cooled by water towers. Somewhat later oblispolkom arranged a presentation where B. Borysenko, who had worked on gas turbines for a long time, was allowed to introduce his ideas to representatives of local enterprises. The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was also positive. The pro-nuclear lobby, though, was not so pleased.

Its arrogance prevailed, but in vain: on 23 September 1988 representatives of *Zelenyi Mir* confronted the leadership of the nuclear power station and representatives from the planning bodies directly at what turned into a key event for the former. The meeting took place in Nikolaev. A large audience had showed up, and both the oblast TV and the local press provided extensive cover of an event the pro-nuclear lobby had hoped would win people over to its side. According to Bilodid, the leadership of the nuclear power station was confident that the answers and explanations provided by its experts would convince the general public that in order to meet demands for electricity the second stage of SU EK had to go ahead unchanged.

Leonid Levitskii, chief engineer of the South Ukrainian hydrocomplex, representing the *Gidroproekt* Institute (Kharkiv), stressed the environmental soundness of the solution chosen for the Second Stage at Iuzhnoukrainsk. Given the acute deficit of electricity and water resources in the area, the Second Stage was designed to meet both these shortages. Firstly, the 55 million cubic metres of water which would circulate between the three reservoirs on a daily basis would perform two functions: having cooled the reactors of the nuclear power station it would be emitted into the Tashlyk and Aleksandrov reservoirs, causing the turbines to move and thus produce electricity.

⁸⁵ Letter No. 85, 19.4.1989, from Sharaev to Shcherbitskii in *Доля* No. 1, *опис* No. 32, *спр.* No 243, *арк.* 39.

This, said Levitskii, was a striking example of water-saving technology. Secondly, the reservoirs were designed so as to avoid thermal pollution of the environment. Should it be necessary, the water flow from the Tashlyk to the Aleksandrov reservoir could be closed within five to seven minutes, thus preventing it from entering the South Bug river. Thirdly, given that five oblasts along the river already made use of its water (3,750 water collecting ponds had been built), the average water flow was down to 11 cubic metres per second. If the Konstantinov reservoir was not built by the year 2,000, Nikolaev oblast would end up without any water at all. Only nine percent of its water was intended for the energy sector. To illustrate how serious the situation was, Levitskii compared water use in the Nikolaev oblast with that of the United States. Whereas the inhabitants of the Nikolaev district would have 800 cubic metres of water at their disposal in 1990, the average American would be able to use 6,800 cubic metres of water.

Chief engineer Viktor Kondratev of the same institute argued that the Konstantinov reservoir was actually required to save the South Bug river, since in years of little water, the flow would be 900 million cubic metres, whereas demand would be 850 million cubic metres. Once the reservoir had been built and water could be extracted from it, the strain on the river's water flow would not reach a critical level.

Viktor Tatarnikov of the Institute *Atomenergoproekt* (Moscow) explained the difference between RBMK-reactors (used at Chernobyl) and VVER-reactors (used at Iuzhnoukrainsk). He emphasised that the latter were considered much safer than the former and that an accident similar to the one at Chernobyl would simply be impossible.

The Greens, on the other hand, were well represented by activists from Nikolaev, Iuzhnoukrainsk and Pervomaisk. Also present were scientists, invited by the Greens to give comments to the views presented by the pro-nuclear lobby. The questions asked were critical but relevant and rather than give people the impression that they did not really know what they were talking about they showed the audience that the Greens could not simply be discarded as a group of emotional activists with little knowledge of nuclear energy. Most of the questions raised were related to safety. A couple of days before two airplanes had crashed in West Germany and one of them fell down on the territory of a nuclear power station. 'Was the nuclear power station in Iuzhnoukrainsk designed to withstand the impact of an airplane crashing into it?' Tatarnikov replied that it was strong enough to withstand a light sports plane. And what about emissions of radionuclides from the nuclear power station? Had radionuclides been emitted from Iuzhnoukrainsk before, and in case how big had the emissions been? Tatarnikov's reply was far from convincing:

В принципе аварии на станциях имеют право быть... The displeased reaction his response caused, made him add: нет-нет, погодите возмущаться. То, что я сказал, не означает, что мы их предусматриваем проектом. Нет. По проекту я берусь вам математически, логически доказать, что аварии быть не может. Но мы исходим из того, что можем ошибаться.

In case of even the most serious possible accident, though, emissions would not exceed 30 ber within a 30 km zone surrounding the nuclear power station.

V. P. Fuks, the General Director of the nuclear power station addressed the issue of safety. Not in any case, he said, could an accident of the proportions of Chernobyl happen in Iuzhnoukrainsk. As for how much of the electricity produced at the nuclear power station was used in the Nikolaev oblast, Fuks answered that 350 megawatts were produced annually. The station provided not only Nikolaev oblast, but also the surrounding oblasts - Odessa, Kirovohrad, Khmelnytskyi and the Crimea with electricity. But how come then, somebody asked, that the newspaper *Energetik* claimed that Romania received electricity from Iuzhnoukrainsk? Evgenii Ignatenko's (head of USSR *Minatomenergo*'s main scientific-technical unit) answer was as follows:

Подумайте сами: ну, как можно в единой энергосистеме отделить электроэнергию, выработанную на Южноукраинской АЭС, от прочей? Разложить ее на электроны, протоны, что ли?

Questions were also raised by the Greens regarding the ecological soundness of combined nuclear and hydroelectric power stations. Whereas the planners were forced to admit that green algae and the like tended to increase in the adjacent reservoirs, this could not be blamed on the energy-industry, but rather was a result of industrial pollution and fertilisers from agriculture entering the water flow. In any case, this would not be a problem at Iuzhnoukrainsk since the water would circulate continuously, thus not allowing for still water and algae growth. Arguments to the effect that zooplankton in the water (up to 95-98% according to an article in the journal *Chelovek i priroda*) would die as a result of the water being utilised for generating electricity, Kondratyev used the Kiev reservoir as an example to prove that this would not happen. Then if there was no zooplankton for the fish to eat, why were there so many fishermen out there catching taran (local fish-type)? Levitskii did, however, admit that the Konstantinov and Aleksandrov reservoirs were not intended for fishing purposes. Water from the Konstantinov reservoir would be safe to drink, though, after being purified.

As pointed out above, nuclear power stations in the West do not use open reservoirs or cooling ponds to cool their reactors. Rather, closed water towers are used for this purpose.

Tatarnikov, when asked if other options than that of using open reservoirs were considered for Iuzhnoukrainsk, said that water towers had been considered, however:

„Градири, к сожалению, получаются дорогие - у нас алюминия не хватает. Конечно тут прозвучало справедливое замечание о том, что с водой мы не церемонимся, поскольку она у нас в стране ничего не стоит. Это так. Но, как бы то ни было, в ближайшие 10--20 лет мы будем вынуждены расходовать воду на энергетику. Других решений нет. На ветре мы с вами не проживем.

A heating physicist, Borys Redkozub, who attended the discussions as a guest of the Greens, added that the use of open reservoirs to cool the reactors was primitive, inefficient and wasteful.

„У меня есть простые расчеты: если поставить на Таплыкском водохранилище градири (вентиляционные), то его воды в этом случае хватило бы для того, чтобы охлаждать блоки. Практически не прибегая к использованию воды из Буга.

Redkozub also contested the figures presented by the planners on annual water flows. They were attempting to make 10.6 cubic metres per second the norm, although such a low water flow had only occurred once, in the summer of 1959, which had been particularly dry. The average water flow in dry years was much higher, namely 31.1 cubic metres per second. Should the reservoirs be built the water flow would therefore be reduced by three times the average, thus turning the river into a sewage!

As for recreation and the preservation of rare species, despite the high planned fluctuation levels of the water, special zones would be created, where swimming would be possible. Plants would be carefully removed and replanted elsewhere. The latter view was contested by a zoologist of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Serhii Tarashuk, who claimed that it would be impossible to recreate the special habitat found in the valley of the South Bug river.

Bilodid in his speech focused on the moral degradation that had taken place in Soviet science over the last decades and related this to nuclear power, quoting Legasov, and the flaws he had come across, inspecting construction work at nuclear power stations around the country. Concern with what was happening at Iuzhnoukrainsk was not fuelled only by the Chernobyl accident and the glasnost following in its path:

Дело еще в том, что все больше людей начинают понимать: при том уровне трудовой "морали" распространяющейся безответственности, недисциплинированности, расхлябанности, которые мы имеем в результате предшествовавших застойных годов, - иметь дело с атомными станциями для общества может

быть самоубийственно опасно. И вопрос следовало бы, мне кажется, перевести из плоскости "строить или не строить АЭС?" в несколько иную. Как перестраивать общество и его членов, чтобы научно-технический прогресс соответствовал нравственному, духовному, профессиональному росту людей?

The planners agreed with the Greens that SU EK should not affect the environment negatively. They considered it a right step for a public commission to be set up to examine the environmental soundness of the Third Stage of the Energy Complex, but did not acknowledge the need for such an examination to be conducted on the Second Stage, as it was judged to be environmentally sound in its present form.

This meeting was of extreme importance for the Greens not only since they argued very well and convincingly against the pro-nuclear lobby; it was important also due to the wide publicity it got, thus presenting the Green movement to a broader public as competent and well-behaved, not as a group of villains. Moreover, the Greens won support from both Evgenii Puchkov of *Iuzhnaia pravda* and of Ala Korzheva of the oblast TV, thus scoring a media victory over their opponents⁸⁶.

Bilodid had made it clear that the issue of whether or not the SU EK ought to be expanded was a matter of principle. A number of arguments were, as seen above, presented against any such expansion. For the Greens this was not only a matter of ecological concern, but also a moral issue. Present generations had no right to destroy the area and thus deny future generations access to them. Neither did they have a right to sever the link with the past that the area represented in terms of archaeological findings. In addition to destroying the natural environment, the SU EK also posed an example of Soviet 'gigantomania', which could no longer be tolerated, as it posed a threat to the very existence of future generations inhabiting the territory of Ukraine:

Южно-Украинский энергокомплекс морально устаревший проект...Южно-Украинский энергокомплекс морально трагизирует население...нам всем необходимо осознать, что мы уже сегодня стоим на грани гибели и что судьбы будущих поколений решаются сейчас, в эту минуту!...ни водные ресурсы, ни земли, ни тем более здоровье населения не имеют цены!...ныне живущее поколение николаевцев не имеет никакого морального права оставлять своим детям и будущим поколениям в дополнение к уже уничтоженному Диспру - еще и уничтоженные Южного Буга, плодородные черноземы и горы радиоактивных отходов с вековой опасностью превращения их в новый Чернобыль.⁸⁷

⁸⁶ See for instance, the whole page coverage (*Противостояние*) published in *Южная правда* on 13.10.1988, с. 3.

⁸⁷ See 'Обращение в ВС СССР и СССР', г. Южноукраинск, июнь 1988, 'Воззвание Николаевской областной экологической организации "Зеленый Мир" 'Николаевцы, земляки!', in Папка 65: Обращения, воззвания, экологической ассоциации, телеграммы от жителей и коллективов предприятий Николаевщины об угрозе уничтожения Южного Буга, строительства 4-6 блоков

The entire Soviet society was pictured not only as a society on the verge of ecological collapse, but also very much as a society on the brink of moral collapse. This moral crisis, or vacuum, had been created due to (Soviet) Man's attempt at conquering nature rather than seeing himself as an organic part of it. The moral degradation thus caused could only be stopped through a harmonisation of the relationship between Man and Nature. The first step for such a harmonisation to occur required a more holistic approach towards the environment and long-term complex planning rather than planning for the sake of short-term gains. Man had put himself above nature (hubris). A reconciliation could only be reached through recognition of the damage this had caused and the shaping of a new direction (catharsis). It was therefore natural for *Zelenyi Mir* to include a Resolution on Morality and Ethics in its programme as the ecological crisis was not the cause, but rather the result of a deeper crisis in society itself. The resolution was drafted by Zolotukhin and was endorsed by the First Congress of *Zelenyi Svit* in Kiev, October 1988.

The thrust of the moral crisis was described in the following words:

...Сегодня нашим обществом правит двойная мораль. Именно двойная мораль привела народ к беспамятству, беспринципности, бескультурии. Народ, забывающий своих делов и прадедов, свой родной язык, свои традиции, культуру, теряющий веру во все святое, припелеб, в конце концов, Природой, а значит, своим будущем.

The aims of perestroika, namely the building of a legal state (*pravovoe gosudarstvo*), would be impossible unless accompanied by a moral perestroika, as the physical existence of a state would be impossible without a high moral standard within society. The Greens should set an example by imposing on themselves a high standard of moral conduct:

Нам нужно возродить в обществе принципы порядочности, совестливости, обязательности, чувства долга и ответственности перед обществом... всем, без исключения (i.e. the members of *Zelenyi Mir*) необходимо исповедывать эти принципы, по которым не должно быть места в нашем обществе (i.e. in *Zelenyi Mir*) лживым и лицемерным... Сегодня нам, как никогда, необходимо объединиться всем вокруг общего дела спасения себя, окружающей среды и подчинить этому святому делу все наши взаимоотношения. Все наши разногласия должны решаться на основе принципа: на первом месте всегда должно стоять дело и только на втором – взаимоотношения⁸⁸.

Южно-Украинской АЭС и другие, 1988-90, available in the Nikolaev state archives. Also see *Южная Правда*, 27.7.1988, с. 2-3: 'Нашим детям и внукам -- чистую воду, землю, небо'.

⁸⁸ See 'О морали и правдивости', in Сохраним природу для будущих поколений!, г. Николаев, 1990).

Zolotukhin later expanded his thinking on Man and Nature and published several articles in the local press on this issue. Not all of his ideas, however, were endorsed by *Zelenyi Svit* representatives in Kiev or for that matter in Nikolaev. The editor of the newspaper *Zelenyi Svit*, Mikhail Prilutskii, and former director, currently correspondent of the newspaper, Anatolii Panov think Zolotukhin goes to far by linking Nature to religion (he has, for instance, rewritten the ten Commandments from an ecological point of view). The fact remains, however, that within the Nikolaev Green Movement there is consensus on this issue, and Zolotukhin has considerable authority within the movement.

Although *Zelenyi Svit* was trying to prevent the Iuzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station from expanding, this in itself was not the ultimate aim. Rather:

Целью деятельности ассоциации является гармоничное взаимодействие человека с окружающей средой в интересах настоящего и будущих поколений⁸⁹.

In arguing that the South Bug river be preserved for future generations to see and enjoy, the Nikolaev Greens are very much in line with Greens in the West. The link between the people (*narod*) and nature (*priroda*), however, is much more direct. If the former is destroyed, then the second will also be ruined. And that is why the question of saving the environment becomes so important, then Mankind is facing a catastrophe which threatens its own very existence:

Природа не потерпит грубого, некультурного отношения к себе! В конце концов, она может поставить нас перед биологическим фактором исчезновения и самого человека, как биологического вида, достойного имени "Homo Sapiens" - человека разумного⁹⁰.

6.2.4 Response from Official Authorities

Official authorities adopted, as seen in Chapter Three, a two-tier approach to the green groups emerging in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident: in some cases, attempts were made at controlling them from within. If this strategy seemed likely to fail, then alternative groups were in certain cases established, to weaken the impact of the groups. In Iuzhnoukrainsk, the latter seemed to be the case. Following Bilodid's successful signature campaign throughout the summer of 1988, during which some 40,000 signatures were collected for the petition to conduct an independent ecological expert assessment of Stage Two, *Energetik* on 1 September announced that

⁸⁹ *Южная правда*, 18.3.1989, с. 3.

⁹⁰ *Панка* 65.

a branch of the Ukrainian Society for Nature Protection had been set up at the nuclear power station. Referring to Gorbachev, who at the 27th CPSU Congress had stated that 'all of us living today are answering for nature to our descendants and to history', people were encouraged to actively take part in protecting the environment. No mention, however, was made of the nuclear power station and the potential hazard it posed to the surrounding environment⁹¹.

The Ukrainian Society for Nature Protection was very much considered to be a society controlled by official authorities, more concerned with bird-watching and ecological education than politically controversial decisions and their impact on the environment. In the case of the SU EK, though, members of the Society living in areas that would be directly affected by the flooding found it necessary to speak up. Thus, the executive secretary of the Pervomaisk branch, Oleh Lysenko, in a letter published in *Iuzhmaia pravda* brought to the attention of the readers that already the nuclear power station had a negative impact on its surroundings. The water of the Tashlyk cooling pond, for instance, did not freeze during the winter. Consequently, Iuzhnoukrainsk was covered in a damp mist which had a negative impact on people's health. Moreover, the skeletons of fish caught in the cooling pond were deformed. This was explained by the fact that the water in the pond was warmer than normal thus causing the fish to grow quicker. The impact of another two reservoirs could not be described as anything but harmful. There was also a more emotional aspect to the Second Stage of the SU EK:

Члены Первоманской городской организации Общества охраны природы крайне обеспокоены предстоящим затоплением таких жемчужин края, как Дубовая роща, урочище Куричино, Мигиевские пороги, Зеленый остров (он имеет уникальную растительность, объявлен памятником природы)⁹².

As far as the campaign against the Second Stage of the SU EK was concerned, though, it was *Zelenyi Mir* that took the lead. At oblast and national levels only an insignificant number of writings officially sanctioned by the Society were published. It would therefore no doubt have been an advantage for the pro-nuclear lobby had the Society managed to gain the upper hand in Iuzhnoukrainsk.

Whereas the Greens from the start demanded an independent ecological expert assessment to be conducted on the SU EK, local authorities were more 'modest', at least initially. A letter dated 12 July 1988⁹³ addressed to the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences from the Chairman of the

⁹¹ *Энергетик*, 1.9.1988, с. 4.

⁹² *Южная правда*, 25.7.1988, с. 4.

⁹³ No. 05/7-1167/11 'О строительстве Южноукраинского энергокомлекса'.

oblispolkom, V. Ilin, warned that the consequences of Reactors 5 and 6 at Iuzhnoukrainsk were 'unpredictable'. The Academy of Sciences was requested to have a look at the ecological soundness of the Second Stage of the SU EK on the background of recent legislation and normatives. It was recommended that such an examination be given priority, then:

Считаем этот вопрос для Николаевской области и Юга Украины
чрезвычайным по возможности проблемы и срочности ее
разрешения.

The Greens were not happy with the state of affairs - then they had reason to believe that the oblast party committee wanted to use the Aleksandrov reservoir for irrigation purposes. Besides, they were sceptical of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences conducting the expert assessment on its own. An appeal was made to Zalygin in Moscow to lobby their case with the Soviet Academy of Sciences in the hope that it would take it on. If the political authorities of the oblast were somewhat restrained, though, this was far from the case locally, in the areas that would be directly affected by the expansion of the SU EK.

In September 1988⁹⁴ *Iuzhnaia pravda* published a report on Pervomaïsk, where the fourth session of the gorsovet had passed a resolution to contact the executive committee of the oblast soviet and the Ukrainian *Goskompriroda* with a request to petition for the Second Stage of the SU EK to be properly examined by an independent ecological expert assessment commission in order to possibly abandon plans to build the Konstantinov reservoir and to stop funding for the project until it had been properly examined. According to the paper, the gorsovet had addressed environmental issues due to repeated requests by the general public to the soviet's executive committee to raise these questions at a session. A number of letters from concerned citizens were published in the local newspaper *Pribuzhskii kommunar*, expressing worry about the Konstantinov reservoir. The plans to destroy the Mihlia cliffs and other beautiful parts of the valley of South Bug were not welcomed by many and the executive committee was requested to take radical measures against them. Some 17,000 people had signed Bilodid's petition and a letter was being drafted to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and to the Ukrainian *Goskompriroda*.

A month later, the executive committee of the Aleksandrov settlement council prohibited blasthole drilling as part of the preparations of the bedding of the Aleksandrov reservoir.⁹⁵ The reservoir was to be completed by the spring of 1989. One and a half months earlier, the Aleksandrov executive committee had gathered all the organisations involved in the construction

⁹⁴ *Южная правда*, 17.9.1988, с. 3.

⁹⁵ *Decision No. 94*, 25.10.1988.

works to co-ordinate their activities. The constructors asked for permission to do 45 blasts, one of which would be carried out every two days. During the following weeks, houses would have to be periodically evacuated due to the power of the blasts. The head of the executive committee, Dina Nikulova, felt unable to give the constructors such a permission prior to having consulted the locals. She therefore visited all the households. The general mood was negative. During the summer some blasts had taken place - with for some people disastrous results. For instance, H. Kushir, 92 years old and a member of the CPSU for more than 50 years, had his house partially destroyed when a wall collapsed. As a result, he initiated a group against the construction of the Aleksandrov reservoir. Nina Pereveznyak had her house destroyed by a granite block, which fell onto her roof and landed half a metre away from the bed on which her husband was taking a nap. Nina Voznyan had just moved into her new brick house, when the blasts took place. As a result, the house crumbled. In compensation, she was offered a place in a 12 m² house - much smaller than her own. The people of Aleksandrov expressed worry that the whole village might be destroyed should the blasts go ahead, and refused to evacuate their homes. Some 56 families, whose houses were located in the area that would be flooded, had already been resettled. Due to the widespread opposition amongst the villagers, the executive committee decided that it could not allow the blasts to go ahead. An old man's dismay at the prospect of South Bug being flooded, said it all:

Все можно пережить, только не безводье. Пускай сейчас не хватает сахара - проживем. Будет мало топлива - топить будем кисяками. Но без воды? Своего священного права на чистую воду мы не отдадим⁹⁶.

All the publicity around the SU EK, not only at a local and oblast level, but also at a national level (see Sharaev's letter to *Robitnychna hazeta* and also Borys Oliinyk's speech at the XIX Party Conference, as well as letter from members of the intelligentsia to the XIX Party Conference⁹⁷), in addition to a request from the Ukrainian Council of Ministers to the USSR Council of Ministers dated 3 November to conduct an ecological expert assessment on the Second Stage prior to its implementation, did bear fruit. The USSR Council of Ministers adopted a decree on 18 November signed by the first deputy chairman, V. Murakhovskii, which ordered USSR *Goskomprroda* under its Ukrainian Chairman, Fedir Morhun, in co-operation with the Ukrainian Council of Ministers and Ukrainian *Goskomprroda* to set up an expert commission. The commission was given three

⁹⁶ *Южная правда*, 19.11.1988, с. 3.

⁹⁷ See *Робітнична газета*, (n.d.). Oliinyk's speech printed in *Южная правда*, 10.11.1988, с. 3, and 'Обращение к XIX Партиконференции', *Літературна Україна*, 23.5.1988(n.p.).

months to produce a report on the SU EK, and USSR *Minatomenergo* and *Minenergo* were ordered to supply all necessary documents to the commission within two weeks of the date of the decree⁹⁸.

This, however, did not pacify the eighth session of the Nikolaev oblast soviet, which met on 22 November. Although the Second Stage of the SU EK would be examined by an expert commission, construction continued at the site in Iuzhnoukrainsk: as a matter of fact it was in the process of being speeded up, with three shifts being introduced instead of the previous two. As for the request from the Pervomaisk soviet, the oblast soviet endorsed it. The permanent commission on the environment made a proposal to freeze funding of construction works at SU EK until the expert commission had produced its report on the environmental soundness of the project. This proposal was eventually endorsed, and as a result, funding of construction works at the Konstantinov reservoir was cut off on the grounds that prior to the ruling of the ecological expert assessment, such work would be illegal. Finally, a request was made to the USSR Supreme Soviet and to USSR *Gosplan* to speed up the ecological expert assessment.⁹⁹

Eduard Shorin, first deputy to the Chairman of the oblast executive committee, on oblast TV¹⁰⁰ explained the attitude of the oblast soviet as follows:

Облсполком, как и всех жителей области, особенно пастораживает некачественные проекты строительства станции, значительные количества нарушений и отступлений даже от этих, далеко не совершенных проектов. Мы вынуждены с ходатайством перед Совмином республики о проведении глубокой квалифицированной, а главное незадуманной экспертизы и проекта и самой стройки. А пока решено прекратить обвалочные работы по подготовке ложа Константиновского водохранилища.

Reading the statement above, one could easily be led to believe that local authorities and the Greens were in full agreement. The former, although they were also concerned with the SU EK, were initially, however, somewhat cautious of the latter. Although they authorised and even participated in several meetings and rallies organised by the Greens, there were times when they also posed an obstacle to the Greens. When asked to authorise a meeting in Nikolaev on 10 October 1988, the Nikolaev executive committee and the CPU gorispolkom refused, arguing that such a meeting was non-expedient, since a similar meeting had taken place a month earlier.

⁹⁸ *Южная правда*, 8.12.1988, с. 1.

⁹⁹ See *Бюллетень Экологической Ассоциации*, No. 2.

¹⁰⁰ See 'Сессия областного ради народных депутатов' - a 30-minute long report made by O. Kutuzov and shown on oblast TV 24.11.1988.

Besides, according to an edict passed by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in August¹⁰¹, announcements regarding meetings and demonstrations must be made no less than 15 days beforehand. The president of the city executive committee, A. F. Molchanov, therefore declined to sanction the meeting¹⁰².

Initially, the CPU was wary of any movement and group openly expressing dissent towards the political authorities. In the case of *Zelenyi Mir*, although their concerns were similar to those of the local authorities, the latter, i.e. the city and oblast soviets and the local party organisations in particular, had to follow a more cautious line than the former so as to not cause upset higher up in the political hierarchy. Although the XIX Party Conference had called for ordinary people to get more involved in the decision making process, local authorities did not want to create the impression that they were directed by the informals as this would have implications for their own status. Within the CPSU, the doctrine of 'democratic centralism' still had to be followed, and Ukrainian party organs, as seen above, had to thread very carefully not to be accused of nationalism or deviation. Shorin's assessment of the Green Movement as presented on local TV in November embodies both local authorities' approval of its work, as well as concern that it might be too outspoken:

Эти люди делают большое и крайне нужное дело. Они активны, напористы, последовательны и очень принципиальны. Хотелось бы только, чтобы к их характеристике можно было бы добавить еще по меньшей мере две черточки. Во-первых, поменьше категоричности в своих требованиях. А то у меня сложилось впечатление, что на свете есть только два мнения: то, которое принадлежит им и - неправильное. Думается, что это - детская болезнь движения. И оно от этой хвори быстро избавится. И - второе. Громкие декларации, демонстрации, требования запретить, приостановить дело, конечно пущное и пахучее. Но вот только ГЛАВНОЕ ли это дело? Защита окружающей среды требует все-таки в первую очередь рывковой, трудной, похлещеной и чисто незаметной работы руками. Впрочем, члены ассоциации с этим, кажется, согласны. А сессия облсовета и сформулировала это в своем решении. Все, что планировалось на 1989 год предстоит делать нам. Всем. Без единого исключения. Тогда успех - обеспечен¹⁰³.

¹⁰¹ See 'Указ Президиума Верховного Совета СССР о порядке организации и проведения собраний, митингов, уличных шествий и демонстраций в СССР', published in *Южная правда*, 2.8.1988, с. 3.

¹⁰² See letter from Molchanov to Zolotukhin, No. 1768-1 of 5.10.1988 in response to letter No. 38 of 28.9.1988.

¹⁰³ See 'Сессия областной рады народных депутатов', broadcast on oblast TV, 24.11.1988.

The Party's attitude to *Zelenyi Mir* also found its expression in a letter to Shcherbitskii from L. Sharaev. Sharaev in the letter admitted that for two years large groups of workers, influenced by *Zelenyi Mir* had been voicing their concern about the Second Stage of the SU EK. As a result of this situation, i.e. because of the Green Movement, the party ispolkom and the obkom had contacted the Ukrainian and Soviet Councils of Ministers a number of times requesting that plans to build Reactors 5 and 6 at Iuzhnoukrainsk be abandoned and that the Second Stage be submitted to an ecological expert assessment. Due to opposition from USSR *Minatomenergo* and *Minenergo* the expert assessment dragged on. This had a negative effect on the general climate in the oblast:

Участились митинги, нездоровые высказывания в адрес партийных и государственных органов, отдельных лиц.

Sharaev hoped that Shcherbitskii be able to intervene and speed up the work of the commission.

Although materials about the undesirability of the Second Stage of the SU EK appeared with increasing frequency during the first half of 1988, it was not until Bilodid's article 'The new problems of South Bug' was printed in *Robitnychna hazeta* on 14 October 1988 that a proper debate took place on the pages of the oblast newspaper of the CPU, *Iuzhnaia pravda*. Bilodid explained this in the following way: although the oblast CPU was unhappy about the prospect of expanding the SU EK, it was still cautious about criticism being raised on the matter. However, as *Robitnychna hazeta* was an official organ of the CPU and it published critical materials on the SU EK, then the issue deserved to be treated seriously and not simply be dismissed as 'talk'.

Bilodid's article triggered off a sour response from the pro-nuclear lobby. V. Osadchuk, the Director of *Gidroproekt* (the Ukrainian branch of the all-union Institute for the Design of Hydroelectric Power Stations) and L. Levitskii, the chief engineer of the project, had apparently sent a 20 page long reply to *Robitnychna hazeta*, but the paper, which they accused of siding with the pro-environment lobby, published it in a shortened form. The main argument used by the planners was that Nikolaev oblast suffered from serious water shortages and electricity shortages. The Aleksandrov reservoir would secure stable water supplies to the region. Moreover, run-off waters from the reactors would not enter the South Bug river as they would be located in a special circulation system.

On 11 November, another letter expressing concern with the Second Stage of the SU EK emerged on the pages of *Robitnychna hazeta*. First Secretary of the Nikolaev Oblast Party Committee, Leonid Sharaev, stated that there was widespread concern about the building of reactors 3 and 4 and opposition to the third stage - the construction of another two reactors (5 and 6):

Мы неоднократно обращались в Совет Министров СССР, Совет Министров УССР, в АН УССР с изложением мнения о нецелесообразности строительства третьей очереди, с просьбами рассмотреть все аспекты строительства второй очереди комплекса в свою очередь исполком областного совета народных депутатов обратиться в госкомитет по науке и технике СССР с просьбой дать заключение о возможности отказа при эксплуатации второй очереди от сооружения Константиновского и Александровского водохранилищ.

Bilodid's arguments that the project in its present form violated a number of laws and regulations for the construction and operation of nuclear power stations as well as the Water Code were denied by Levitskii and Osadchuk. The cooling system of Iuzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station did not violate the new rules on the Location of Nuclear Power Stations, approved by the USSR Council of Ministers in October 1987, they argued. These allowed for a direct-flow cooling system. It was also suggested that the Second Stage had been approved in 1984-84 after thorough investigations. As for animal and plant life, the reservoirs would pose no threat to these. They would simply be transplanted to elsewhere. The fact that it had taken some 10 years (1975-85) to develop the SU EK was cited as proof that the plans had been properly examined and that any flaws had been eliminated¹⁰⁴.

At the end of the day, though, the Greens and those who agreed with them got their way. After repeated requests from local, oblast and republican authorities and from workers' collectives and locals, the USSR Council of Ministers decided to conduct an ecological expert assessment of the Second Stage of the SU EK.

6.3 Decision-Making (November 1988 - August 1989)

Although the decision to conduct an ecological expert assessment on the Second Stage of the SU EK was a preliminary success for the Greens, they continued to actively campaign for the South Bug river to be saved. A number of meetings were held, petitions, articles and letters were printed in the press, correspondence with various official and academic institutions continued as did the signature campaign.

The initiative group of the Voznesensk Greens expressed its concern in *Radianska pravda* that as the deadline for the Aleksandrov reservoir to be completed moved closer (work was to be completed by the spring of 1989), construction work intensified in the area. Should construction

¹⁰⁴ *Робітничя газета*, 18.12.1988 (н.р.).

work be speeded further up and the work of the expert commission be delayed or dragged out in time, it might very well be that the river would be destroyed before the expert assessment commission finished its work. Representatives from the nuclear power station, on the other hand, claimed that they were right to continue construction, as they were doing this in accordance with the State Plan for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1988, which was passed as a law and they were legally bound to follow¹⁰⁵.

This, by the way, was a common phenomenon in the former Soviet Union in the latter half of the 1980s. A project would be stopped on ecological grounds, but construction work would continue. Once a project had been completed, the constructors and those favouring the project would claim that so much money had been spent that it would be impossible just to abandon it. To prevent this from happening in the case of the South Bug, people were encouraged to write letters to the USSR and Ukrainian Councils of Ministers and to the Academy of Sciences under the heading 'No to the Construction of the Aleksandrov and Konstantinov water reservoirs!' and 'No to the Construction of Reactor No. 4 at the South Ukrainian Nuclear Power Station!'

6.3.1 Re-assessing Stage Two of the South Ukrainian Energy Complex

On 25 November 1988, the commission which would conduct the ecological expert assessment of the Second Stage of the SU EK was set up. The commission would be headed by the Chairman of USSR *Goskompriroda*, Fedir Morhun.

A conference on the problems of South Bug was held in Nikolaev on 26 November 1988. Representatives of Green groups in all oblasts through which the river passed, attended the conference and a joint statement was made¹⁰⁶. The following day, a meeting attended by some 300-400 people took place. Demands were made to ban the construction of the reservoirs and the expansion of the SU EK.

The Greens protested in a number of different ways, to attract as much attention and as many potential supporters as possible. In Nikolaev, for instance, an exhibition started on 28 November, the theme of which was 'ecology, the living environment and us'. Local artists contributed with paintings from the area of the SU EK. Some of the paintings bore black ribbons. Those were the ones portraying scenery already lost due to the SU EK. Labels attached to others read 'this will soon not be', as the scenery would be destroyed should the reservoirs and the hydroelectric power

¹⁰⁵ *Южная правда*, 8.12.1988, с. 1: 'Продиктовано жизнью'.

¹⁰⁶ *Бюллетень Экологической Ассоциации* No. 3, 30.11.1988.

stations be built. The exhibition lasted for two weeks and was brought to an end by a seminar about art and ecology¹⁰⁷.

The campaigning of the Greens paid off. On the 20 December 1988, the Nikolaev oblast *Goskompriroda* sent a letter to the Chairman of the oblast branch of the USSR *Zhilsotsbank*, and USSR *Promstroibank*, General Director of the Iuzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station, the Head of the oblispolkom biuro of capital construction and the oblast procurator, pointing out that construction work at the site of the SU EK was continuing in violation of environmental legislation and that soil was not removed from the site of the reservoirs under construction, which was a gross violation of the Land Codex of Ukraine¹⁰⁸. The two banks were requested to immediately cut funding for the Konstantinov reservoir and *Goskompriroda* on the very same day adopted a resolution freezing all work at the Konstantinov reservoir awaiting the conclusions of the expert commission on the SU EK¹⁰⁹.

Yet another meeting was held in Nikolaev on 25 December 1988¹¹⁰. The meeting addressed a number of issues related to the work of the ecological expert assessment commission. The meeting was arranged by *Zelenyi Mir* in co-operation with the Nikolaev branches of the Writers' Union and the Culture Fund and the oblast committee of the Shipbuilders' Union.

Attending the meeting were representatives of the Iuzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station, the oblast executive committee, the Communist Party city committee, the oblast *Goskompriroda*, *UTOP* and others. Altogether some 400 people had gathered outside the Culture House of the Construction Works. Those attending the meeting were informed that the Ukrainian *Promstroibank* had stopped funding of construction work at the site of the Aleksandrov and the Konstantinov reservoirs, awaiting the conclusions of the ecological expert assessment commission.

Evidence that the SU EK constituted a violation of several laws and regulations was given and once again opposition to the Second Stage expressed. The meeting welcomed the ecological expert assessment commission, which in the view of those present had been set up as a result of co-operation between the public of the Nikolaev oblast and oblast and republican party bodies and soviets. It was hoped that the commission would work in accordance with the principle of broad glasnost and that the opinion of the locals would be taken into account. Representatives of *Zelenyi*

¹⁰⁷ *Южная правда*: 'Слученные краски', 15.12.1988, с. 4.

¹⁰⁸ See appeal by Nikolai Vlasenko, the Chairman of the Voznesensk Greens ('Крик души мой').

¹⁰⁹ *Южная правда*, 27.12.1988, с. 3.

¹¹⁰ For more information about this meeting, see Резолюция митинга-протеста жителей Николаевской области против строительства Александровского и Константиновского водохранилищ на Южном Буге, расширения мощностей Южноукраинской АЭС и строительства Березовского химкомбината, г. Николаев 26 декабря 1988 г.

Mir announced that they had so far collected 192,000 signatures against construction of the two reservoirs and the Reactor No. 4 at the nuclear power station. Criticism was raised against the leadership of the SU EK, as work at the Aleksandrov reservoir continued at the expense of various nature protection devices at the complex. In this connection, the decision of the Aleksandrov soviet to halt construction at the Aleksandrov reservoir prior to the report of the expert assessment commission was welcomed. An appeal was made to the construction workers at the SU EK to make sure that ecological considerations were followed during construction. Local authorities were encouraged to take legal action against those who violated environmental and other legislation at the site of the SU EK and the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences' proposal to establish a nature reserve in the canyon of the South Bug river was welcomed. The resolution adopted by the meeting was sent to the Soviet and Ukrainian Soviets of People's Deputies as well as to the Councils of Ministers, to TV and to the journal *Ogonek*, amongst others.

Volodymyr Boiko in an emotional speech told the meeting that not for one single day could they take a rest in the struggle to save South Bug. Even if they would succeed in saving the river from the reservoirs, no nuclear power station is 100% safe. Thus, the river would remain under threat. An almost apocalyptic view of the future of Ukraine in regard to nuclear power was given, through the words of the writer Ivan Drach, who later came to play a prominent role in *RUKH*:

На горле Украины – атомная петля. Каждый непредубежденный понимает это. На Украине понимают это разумом обреченного. Вот и стоит она с петлем на шее, и только ждет, когда государственные ведомства атомным сапогом вышибут из-под ее ног табурет¹¹¹.

Also oblast authorities appealed to Moscow to take into consideration the views of the people in Nikolaev oblast when a decision regarding the SU EK was made. These views were, according to the Chairman of the oblast executive committee, Ilin, that the Third Stage be abandoned and that the Second Stage be redrafted so that Reactors No. 3 and 4 be cooled by water towers rather than by cooling ponds. Ilin in a letter to Soviet Prime Minister Ryzhkov requested that he instruct the ecological expert assessment commission to conduct its examination of the EK in view of these recommendations.¹¹²

¹¹¹ See Boiko's speech, available in Папка 66: Тексты выступлений по телевидению, докладов членов ЗА, письма трудящихся в защиту природы и разумного развития атомной энергетики, available in the Nikolaev state archives.

¹¹² See 'Сохраним Южный Буг!' in *Южная правда*, 4.1.1989, с. 4.

Iuzhnaia pravda on 21 December¹¹³ carried detailed information as to who the members of the ecological expert assessment commission were. USSR *Goskompriroda* passed a resolution regarding this matter on 15 December, following a four-hour long meeting, which was attended by representatives of all ministries and departments involved with the SU EK. The composition of the commission was accepted by the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, the Soviet *Goskomgidromet* and other ministries and departments prior to being formally announced. The commission was to be headed by the Deputy Chairman of *Goskompriroda*, Evgenii Minaev. Leonid Belashov of *Gosplan* was appointed his deputy. Six sub-commissions were set up to address various aspects of the SU EK. These would look at economic issues; water resources; water protection and water ecosystems; radioecology; engineering and ecological safety; and finally, for the protection of the flora and fauna of the South Bug. Out of a total of 50 members 19 were Ukrainians and four of these were from Nikolaev oblast: V. Dobrovolskii of the Nikolaev Shipbuilding Institute, V. Bilodid, Iu. Tomilin of Nikolaev oblast *Samepidemstantsia* and L. Hodza from the Nikolaev oblast *Goskompriroda*. All the Nikolaev representatives were opposed to the Second Stage of the SU EK. The number of Ukrainians was highest in the sub-commission on the protection of the flora and fauna of South Bug (four of six) and lowest in the one on water resources (two of seven). Not in one single group, though, were the Ukrainians in a majority. When the members were classified as 'pro-environment' and 'pro-nuclear', I found the following: USSR *Minenergo* and USSR *Gosstroi*, which were the Ministries in favour of the Second Stage, held eight seats in the commission. Those opposed to the Second Stage (USSR *Minvudkhoz*, USSR and Ukrainian *Goskompriroda*, Ukrainian Institute of Hydrobiology, USSR *Goskomgidromet*, the Geography Department of the Moscow State University, the Institute of Geology of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, the Ukrainian Institute of Geology, Professor Iablokov and the four representatives from Nikolaev oblast) accounted for 21 of the 50 members. As for the rest of the commission, some were in favour, others were against.

The positions of the Nikolaev representatives were presented in detail in *Iuzhnaia pravda* a few days later. Kolesnik was reporting directly from Moscow where the initial talks of the commission were taking place, and he sent back to Nikolaev speeches presented by its members. Dobrovolskii's major concern was the short-term effects of expanding the SU EK compared with the long-term irreparable damage it would cause the environment. In some 20 or 30 years time the technology used in Iuzhnoukrainsk would become obsolete. Safer reactors and safer cooling systems would take over, but once the South Bug river had been destroyed, it could never be restored in its present form. Therefore he recommended that the development of the nuclear

¹¹³ *Южная правда*, 21.12.1988, с. 2.

power station in Iuzhnoukrainsk should only take place based on the Tashlyk reservoir as the cooling pond and for Tashlyk to be completely sealed off from the South Bug river.

Tkachenko of the Nikolaev *Oblvodkhoz* was particularly concerned with the water deficit in the area and its impact on agriculture and general water supplies. After the nuclear power station and the Tashlyk reservoir were built, the area had suffered a chronic shortage of water, especially during the summer months. At present, no figures for how much water could reasonably be taken from the river were available, as the Kharkiv branch of *Gidroproekt* refused to give such figures. Due to the summer shortages, though, several thousands of hectares of land were left without irrigation. Taking water from the Tashlyk reservoir would be no solution, as the water quality was such that *Sanepidemsluzhba* did not recommend the water to be used for neither irrigation nor as drinking water. Still there was a continuous flow of water from the Tashlyk reservoir into the South Bug river - up to two cubic metres per second, not to mention the emissions of larger quantities of water in one go (*produvka*). Five regions, however, used water from the lower reaches of the river (i.e. below the emission point) for irrigation!

Hodza pointed out the numerous violations of environmental legislation taking place in connection with the construction of the reservoir, whereas Bilodid answered questions about the damage the two reservoirs would inflict upon the South Bug river. According to Kolesnik, this 'sympathetic young man' (Bilodid) did very well, giving competent answers to the questions put forward by professionals in the field.

Kalinovskii, from Ukrainian *Goskompriroda*, referred to a recent conference held in Kiev with the participation of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (Institutes of Zoology and Botany) and the Nikolaev Pedagogical Institute. The topic of this conference was the effect the second stage of the SU EK would have on flora and fauna in the region. More than 350 types of plant and animal life would be lost should the two reservoirs be built. Thirteen types of plants would disappear completely from Ukraine, three of them also from the Soviet fauna. The number of insects in the area would fall drastically and this would have a negative effect on agriculture output. Scientists, Kalinovskii informed, were lobbying Soviet and Ukrainian organs to prohibit the two reservoirs from being built.

Bobina, the Chairman of the Pervomaik gorispolkom acknowledged the need for increased energy output so as to speed up economic growth in Ukraine. However, in this case the price to pay would be too high. The people living along the South Bug river and who would be directly affected by the Second Stage of the SU EK should decide whether or not the two reservoirs should be built, not those who failed to consider the economic value of the land which

would be flooded as a result. Kolesnik, finishing off his report, wrote as follows: 'it is clear to everyone that there are many advantages with this problem, but even more disadvantages'¹¹⁴.

On 5 January 1989 the chairmen of the six sub-commissions of the ecological expert assessment commission met in the Conference Room of USSR Goskomprirada to discuss the group reports. According to the Chairman of the Expert Commission, Evgenii Minacv, most of the members of the commission were opposed to the Second Stage of the SU EK:

Прекратить Южный Буг – нельзя, соорудить Александровское и Константиновское водохранилища – нельзя, парализовать мощности энергокомплекса – нельзя!¹¹⁵

Some days later, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet discussed ecological questions at its session in relation to the plan for social and economic development for 1989. The session came out against the Crimean nuclear power station, in support of the expert assessment being conducted on the SU EK and it was announced that the Ukrainian Council of Ministers had contacted all-union (i.e. Soviet) organs with a request that the construction of the Chyhyryn nuclear power station be stopped¹¹⁶. In view of the Supreme Soviet session and the general mood of the members of the ecological expert assessment commission, Dobrovolskii tried to explain why there now seemed to be doubts about the project:

Здесь прежде всего видна практическая реализация идеи перестройки – люди получили возможность выразить отношение к стройке, и правительство не может не реагировать на мнение общественности и местных властей¹¹⁷.

In order to become familiar with all arguments involved in the debate, the commission visited Kiev, Nikolaev and Iuzhnoukrainsk and held talks with a number of people not only there but also in Moscow. The ecological expert assessment commission finished its work on 8 February 1989 and its report¹¹⁸ concluded that the Second Stage of the SU EK violated a number of laws and regulations regarding environmental protection and nuclear power stations: several articles of the Ukrainian Water Code and of the SanPin 3907-65 were violated. Besides, the Aleksandrov

¹¹⁴ Южная правда, 27.12.1988, с. 3.

¹¹⁵ Южная правда, 8.1.1989, с. 4.

¹¹⁶ Южная правда, 17.1.1989, с. 3.

¹¹⁷ Южная правда, 22.1.1989, (п.р.)

¹¹⁸ Заключение экспертной комиссии Главной государственной экологической экспертизы Госкомприроды СССР по основным проектным решениям Южно-Украинского Энергокомплекса и ТЭО на расширение Южно-Украинской АЭС.

reservoir had not been planned in accordance with the rules for temperatures in a reservoir. For this reason, construction could not continue.

USSR *Goskomprirroda* shared the conclusions of the commission, and publicly announced that the Aleksandrov and Konstantinov reservoirs would have a 'highly negative' effect on the South Bug river. Of the two, the Konstantinov reservoir would cause the greater damage, due to its size (covering more than 26 square kilometres) and its depth (58.5 metres). The commission therefore recommended that the Konstantinov reservoir not be built, and that the Aleksandrov reservoir be completed only after proper archaeological excavations had been carried out. The commission also came out against further expansion of the nuclear station. The third reactor could be completed only provided that a water cooling tower be built to serve it. The fourth, fifth and sixth reactors were undesirable.

6.3.2 Reaction towards and Debate on the Report of the Expert Commission

The conclusions of the expert commission were supported by the Chairmen of the town executive committees of seven regions surrounding the SU EK. The Ukrainian Communist Party and the oblast party committee also came out in favour, as did a number of workers' collectives and the 210,000 people (every sixth person in the oblast) who signed *Zelenyi Svit's* petition throughout 1988 and early 1989. Sharaev wrote a letter in support of the conclusions drawn in the commission's report. Dated 24 March 1989 and addressed to the USSR Council of Ministers the letter outlined the obkom's position on the SU EK. The letter accredited the decision to conduct an ecological expert assessment on the SU EK to the fact that this issue had been brought up in the oblast soviet, where a majority was against expansion of the SU EK, and to the fact that the party oblast committee, the oblast executive committee and the Ukrainian Council of Ministers had requested that such an expert assessment be carried out. Further, Sharaev made it clear that the public and the workers' collectives in the oblast were waging a campaign against expansion of the SU EK and that their attitude was understandable, then the nuclear power station had so far had a negative ecological and sanitary impact on the South Bug river, the major source of water in the region. Besides, the cooling system envisaged for the third and fourth reactors caused reason for concern as they violated the Ukrainian Water Codex. Therefore:

Поддерживая требования населения и трудовых коллективов области против расширения Южно-Украинского энергокомплекса, строительства водохранилища на реке Южный Буг, за создание национального парка "Гранитное побережье Побужья" обком Компартии Украины и исполком областного Совета народных депутатов просят ускорить принятие решения по выводам и

предложениям экспертной комиссии Главной экологической экспертизы Госкомприроды СССР¹¹⁹.

USSR *Minatomenergo* and *Minenergo* were not pleased, however, and neither was the leadership of the nuclear power station. The latter sent a 44-page long letter to the oblast *Goskompriroda* arguing against the views of the commission. The former sent a joint assessment of the expert commission's report to the Chairman of USSR *Goskomrpriroda*, Fedir Morhun¹²⁰.

The two ministers, N. Lukonin and A. Maiorets argued that the SU EK was intended to close the increasing deficit of electricity in the area and to provide the region with sufficient water supplies through the Konstantinov reservoir. By 20 March, the third reactor was in the process of being completed, the first part of the Tashlyk hydroelectric station was in the making and the Aleksandrov reservoir was close to completion. As of 1 January 1989, these objects were 80% completed. Due to the already difficult energy situation in Ukraine, they must be finished. What was more, according to the 'Plan for the Development of Electricity in Ukraine up to the year 2005', the electricity deficit would continue to increase, reaching 6.5 million kW tons even if the Second and the Third Stage at SU EK went ahead! Thus, even though some energy could be 'imported' to Ukraine from the Russian Federation, economic development and growth in Ukraine would slow down should construction be stopped.

Furthermore, the commission failed to attack the methods used in the Project for the SU EK in assessing the impact the SU EK would have on the environment. Therefore, the report's conclusion that the Konstantinov reservoir would have a negative effect on the environment was unfounded. What was more, the estimates made in the project were elaborated by distinguished scientists and experts from various ministries and departments. The claim that the Konstantinov reservoir would not destroy, but rather save the South Bug river, were repeated. Given the low water flow of the river, pollution would destroy it should the reservoir not be built.

As for rare plants and animals, Lukonin and Maiorets argued that only an insignificant number of species would suffer from the flooding as only a small part of the territory of the granite-steppe *Pobuzhe* would be affected. There was more reason for concern for animal and plant life in the area outside the area to be flooded, as nothing had so far been done to protect them, and the area was deteriorating from pollution. The original plans, which had been supported at the time of drafting by Kiev University, envisaged a national park to be set up in the area to protect the rare flora and fauna of South Bug, alongside the reservoirs. As a matter of fact, special

¹¹⁹ See 'Теперь слово за Совмином...', in *Южная правда* (n.d.).

¹²⁰ See *МА СССР N 01-555/M* and *СССР N AM-2172*, 20.3.1989 in *Фонд No. 1, опис. No. 3, сир. No. 233, арх. 4-9*.

care to protect endangered species had been taken since 1982 and the Nikolaev Pedagogical Institute was involved in such work. The reservoirs themselves would

Только повысить туристско-рекреационную ценность этого региона, значительно расширить возможности использования его для этих целей¹²¹.

Archaeology-wise, the construction of the reservoirs did not pose any obstacle, as excavations were taking place in accordance with the time-schedules set in a resolution passed by the Ukrainian Council of Ministers on 30 October 1985 (No. 393). The concerns raised by the expert commission regarding the possible loss of archaeological monuments were thus unfounded.

The experts were also wrong, argued the report, in concluding that the technological scheme of the work at the SU EK would not be in accordance with normative requirements and that there would be violations of the temperature regime in the Aleksandrov reservoir. Then according to article 19 of the Ukrainian Water Code, only those enterprises which could be reconstructed so as to recycle and utilise its own water emissions, should be changed. This was not possible at the SU EK, therefore the article did not apply. A number of experiments had been conducted and judging by these the predicted temperatures for the Aleksandrov reservoir were within the 'Rules for the Protection of Surface Waters from Pollution by Sewage'. Besides, the water temperature could be regulated by reducing the capacity of the nuclear power station in extremely hot periods. Given the energy deficit, though, it would not seem likely that the leadership of the nuclear power station would reduce electricity-output for the sake of keeping the water temperature in the reservoirs within limits. Electricity-output plan targets would probably prevent that from happening.

As for the commission's arguments that the SU EK constituted a violation of the 'Sanitary Rules for the Projecting, Construction and Exploitation of Reservoirs' (*SanPiN 3907-85*), which were adopted in 1985 also did not hold true, then in 1987 the USSR Council of Ministers had passed 'Requirements to the Location of Nuclear Power Stations' according to which (point 2.1.5) direct water cooling could be allowed at nuclear power stations. Point 1.1, furthermore, made it clear that any regulations on nuclear power stations would have to be adapted to the 'Requirements'. Therefore, when the two normatives contradicted each other, the latter, not the former, should be followed.

Figures were given to prove that nuclear emissions from the nuclear power station were within the limits adopted by the USSR *Minzdrav* (Ministry of Health) in 1987. This had been confirmed by the tests made by the expert commission, which had problems detecting caesium-

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, app. 6.

137 due to its very low levels. And it was taken as proof that USSR *Minatomenergo* took its responsibilities seriously. Still further measures were envisaged to make sure that emissions remained within the limits. Particularly safe VVER-1000 reactors were to be introduced for the Third Stage of the SU EK.

The letter finished off to identify the Ministries' attitude towards the expansion of the SU EK:

На основании вышеизложенного Минэнерго СССР и Минатомэнерго СССР считают, что строительство Южно-Украинского энергокомплекса следует завершить в полном объеме по утвержденному проекту и закончить согласование ТЭО III очереди АЭС.

Минэнерго СССР и Минатомэнерго СССР продолжают исследования по дальнейшей минимизации ущерба окружающей среде, в том числе и по латурным проверкам разработанных прогнозов, результаты которых будут безусловно учтены при сооружении и эксплуатации энергокомплекса¹²².

USSR *Goskompriroda* discussed the points made by USSR *Minatomenergo* and *Minenergo* at joint meetings with representatives of the Ukrainian *Goskompriroda* and the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. Following a request from USSR *Goskompriroda*, the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, together with *Ukrgeologia* (Ministry of Geology) *Ukrgidromet* (Committee on Hydrometeorology) and the representatives from the expert assessment commission produced a written evaluation of the points raised by the pro-nuclear lobby. Its conclusions were sent to *Goskompriroda* on 6 April 1989¹²³. Attached to the covering letter was a three pages long evaluation, addressed to the Chairman of the expert commission, Evgenii Minaev from the Deputy Chairman of the Expert Commission of the USSR *Goskompriroda* and a member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Evgenii Sobotovich, dated 5 April 1989.

The letter sums up the results of a three-day long evaluation of the comments and questions raised by various institutions regarding the report of the ecological expert assessment commission. According to Sobotovich, none of the objections raised revealed any new information relevant to the outcome of the commission's report. The experts who assessed these were unanimous in their verdict. Contrary to what the nuclear lobby claimed to be the case, the Konstantinov reservoir was needed for cooling purposes only, not for irrigation and drinking water. This view was backed up by documents from Ukrainian *Minvudkhov*, Nikolaev oblispolkom and *SOPS* of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. Despite the fact that it had taken 15 years to develop the plans for the SU

¹²² *Ibid.*, арк. 9.

¹²³ See No. 4a/61-тр (Черн.), 6.4.1989, in response to No. 06-11-91, 31.3.1989 in *Фонд* No. 1, *опись* No. 3, *спр.* No. 233, арк. 96-99.

EK, those involved in planning it had discovered that it was a 'complete ecological failure'. References to ecological measures developed by leading scientific and research institutions were juggled as none of these institutions had made any overall ecological assessment of the project. Besides, some of the private works commissioned - amongst them the one made by Kiev University, to which Maiorets and Lukonin referred,

Не могут считаться достаточно научно обоснованными, т.к. для проведения исследований выбраны далеко не ведущие в данных областях научные организации¹²⁴.

Although the methodology might not be right, this could in no way justify avoiding to make any prognoses regarding the environmental impact of the SU EK until the decommissioning of the nuclear power station and after. The project did not contain an examination of biological, hydrometeorological, geological and engineering-hydrogeological factors just to mention a few. As for the claims that the reactor cooling method chosen did not violate any rules, the commission refuted these:

Вопрос об оборотном водоснабжении АЭС не рассматривался и обоснование прямоточной системы представляет собой отписку, т.к. например, жергблоки АЭС могут работать на сухих градирнях.

The experts were against a direct cooling system. The figures for radioactive emissions quoted, were emissions as they were under a regular regime, but not as they would be if the regular regime was violated. More important was the fact that the SU EK project did not contain any estimates of how high emissions would be in case of an accident. It therefore remained a fact that the SU EK was not ecologically sound:

Приведенные в материалах ссылки на будущие мероприятия по охране окружающей среды по замечаниям экспертной комиссии по существу не изменяют суть проекта. Таким образом, ни в проектных, ни в дополнительных материалах, представленных экспертной комиссией, нет экологических обоснований расширения мощности ЮУ АЭС, что препятствует согласованию строительства Южно-Украинского энергокомплекса в полном объеме по старому проекту и тем более странным выглядит требование согласования ТЭО 3-й очереди АЭС. Экспертная комиссия считает, что эти требования экологически совершенно неприемлемы. Проблема "минимизации ущерба окружающей среде" в условиях ЮУ АЭС должна решаться для

¹²⁴ Ibid., app. 97.

максимум трех энергоблоков. Ни о каком расширении ЮУ АЭС в принципе, не может быть и речи¹²⁵.

On 21 April 1989 L. Sharaev and the First Deputy Chairman of the oblispolkom, E. Shorin, sent another letter regarding the ecological expert assessment of the SU EK. The letter was addressed to the President of the USSR State Committee on Science and Technology, B. Tolstikh, the President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, H. Marchuk and the Chairman of the USSR *Goskompriroda*, F. Morhun. In the letter Sharaev and Shorin expressed concern that since the expert assessment had been delayed, construction work had continued at the site of the SU EK. The letter requested that the ecological impact of this work be taken into consideration when the issue was debated in the USSR Council of Ministers. The chairman of the Nikolaev oblast *Goskompriroda* confirmed that construction work had continued, despite the fact that the USSR *Promstroibank* had stopped the funding of the SU EK awaiting the result of the ecological commission. This had been possible as means earmarked for the social development of Iuzhnoukrainsk (i.e. for the building of houses) had been used for these purposes¹²⁶.

Also the First Secretary of the oblast party organisation, L. Sharaev, was concerned that the expert assessment commission's work was delayed due to opposition from the pro-nuclear lobby. In a letter to Shcherbitskii, which also revealed his attitude to *Zelenyi Mir*, Sharaev admitted that for two years large groups of workers, influenced by *Zelenyi Mir*, were voicing their concern about the Second Stage of the SU EK. As a result of this situation, i.e. because of the Green Movement, the party ispolkom and the party obkom had contacted the Ukrainian and Soviet Council of Ministers a number of times urging that plans to build another two nuclear reactors at Iuzhnoukrainsk be abandoned and that the Second Stage be submitted to an ecological expert assessment commission. Due to opposition from USSR *Minatomenergo* and *Minenergo* the expert assessment dragged on. This had a negative effect on the general climate in the oblast:

Участились митинги, нездоровые высказывания в адрес партийных и государственных органов, отдельных лиц.

Sharaev hoped that Shcherbitskii would be able to intervene and speed up the work of the commission. Maybe he tried, but the conclusions of the commission were as disputed a month later as they had been before - so all one could do was to wait for USSR *Minatomenergo* and *Minenergo* to raise all their objections to the commission's conclusions.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, арк. 98-99.

¹²⁶ See 'Теперь слово за Совмином...', in *Южная правда* (n.d.).

In May 1989¹²⁷ the Ukrainian Communist Party received a letter from *Ukrgeologia* regarding expansion of the SU EK. The letter, signed by its Chairman, N. Havrylenko, argued strongly against further expansion due to increased seismicity and great changes in engineering and geological conditions. Rather than building new installations on the site, those already there ought to be re-examined for seismicity. The general position of the Ukrainian Communist Party on nuclear power, as seen in Chapter Two, became more and more critical following the Chernobyl accident. Its general stand and all the arguments produced against further expansion of the SU EK made the CPU come out against USSR *Minatomenergo* and *Minenergo*'s plans. Not only the Nikolaev oblast CPU, but also the CPU played a crucial role in facilitating the ecological expert assessment of the SU EK.

USSR *Goskompriroda* sent a report to the USSR Council of Ministers on 23 May 1989. The report was meant to be handed over earlier, but due to the delay caused by the dispute with USSR *Minatomenergo* and *Minenergo*, the deadlines had to be stretched. A Report on the Environmental Impact Assessment of the Basic Project Decisions of the Iuzhnoukrainsk Energy Complex', was produced by the First Deputy Chairman of *Goskompriroda*, P. Poletaev. Attached to the report were three letters: one from the Main Co-ordination Directorate of *Ukrgeologia*, a second one from the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and a third from the Ukrainian *Goskompriroda*. The summary conclusions of the expert commission were, however, for some reason not passed on to the Council of Ministers.

Iuzhmaia pravda reported the contents of the report and the letters in detail. Poletaev opposed the Konstantinov reservoir, expressing concern that seven types of plants not found anywhere else in the world would disappear, as would several plants from the Ukrainian and Soviet Red Books of Rare and Endangered Species, should the Second Stage of the SU EK continue unchanged. The historical and recreational value of the area would also be reduced. To compensate for these losses would be next to impossible. Moreover, whereas in 1974, the reservoir had been planned for irrigation and drinking water purposes, at present there would be no need for this. Ukrainian *Gosagroprom*, *Minvodkhoz* and Nikolaev oblispolkom intended to develop irrigation in the northern parts of the oblast with water from other sources. Besides, the irrigation systems would undergo thorough repairs so that they would become more efficient and require less quantities of water. Furthermore, when the project was drafted, supplies of water for drinking purposes were

¹²⁷ Letter from Министерство Геологии СССР, - Украинское главное координационно-геологическое управление "Укргеология" No. 16103-ДСГ to ЦК Компартии Украины (предложения к заключению на расширение Южно-Украинской АЭС), dated 11.5.1989 and marked 'Для служебного пользования'. This document can be found in Фонд No. 1, опись No. 32, сир. No. 233, арк. 11-13.

not calculated in connection with water saving and rationalisation. The USSR *Goskompriroda*, based on the information given above, therefore came out against the Konstantinov reservoir and the Konstantinov hydroelectric power station.

As for the Aleksandrov reservoir, it should only be filled with water on the condition that thorough archaeological excavations be carried out first and that protective devices be put up for the fish. In accordance with demands made by local authorities, the general public of Nikolaev oblast and the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and *Goskompriroda*, USSR *Goskompriroda* also favoured the creation of a national park in the valley of the South Bug river.

Supplying water for and cooling the turbine condensators of the nuclear power station through a direct connection between the already existing Tashlyk reservoir to reservoirs established directly onto the South Bug river, through the system of hydroelectric power stations planned on these reservoirs, contradicted the Ukrainian Water Code (article 19) and the 'Sanitary Norms for the Projecting, Construction and Exploitation of Reservoirs, *SanPiN 3907-85* (points 5.6, 5.7). There should be no direct connection between the Tashlyk reservoir and the South Bug river and the Tashlyk hydroelectric power station would have to be reduced to three or four aggregates, instead of 10 as outlined in the project.

USSR *Goskompriroda* was, unlike the expert commission, not against reactor No. 4 at the nuclear power station. However, it recommended that water cooling towers be constructed for reactors No. 3 and 4, so as to minimise the loss of water through evaporation from the Tashlyk cooling pond. For reactor No. 4 it was also recommended that a safer version of the VVER-1000 reactor be installed. As for the Third Stage (reactors No. 5 and 6) this could under no circumstance be recommended due to the sharp deficit of water in the area.

The construction of reservoirs on the South Bug river might contribute to further polluting its waters, which were already exceeding limits for pollutants due to industrial waste emitted into the water. Was dirty water from the reservoirs to enter the water flow of the river, the consequences would be serious. Control over emissions as well as measures to protect the environment would therefore have to be stringently enforced.

As for seismicity, *Ukrgeologia* had pointed out that the seismicity of the site of the SU EK should be estimated at no less than seven or eight points on the Richter scale. As has been shown above, the nuclear power station had been built to endure earthquakes of no more than 6 points on the scale. *Goskompriroda* therefore recommended that *Minatomenergo* conduct detailed testing in the area of the nuclear power station and to estimate the strength of the equipment and buildings used, to withstand earthquakes of this scale.

To summarise, then, *Goskompriroda* based on the report of the expert commission and the objections raised against it, recommended that:

Мощность Южно-Украинской АЭС должна быть ограничена 4 миллионами киловатт, прекращено строительство Константиновского гидроузла с ГЭС--ГАЭС, исключена гидравлическая связь существующего Ташликского водоема-охладителя с создаваемым Александровским водохранилищем и переработан проект Ташликской ГАЭС¹²⁸.

The letter from the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences attached, is the same letter that has been referred to above. The Ukrainian *Goskompriroda* (letter from the First Deputy Chairman, I. Liakh) came out not only against the Konstantinov, but also the Aleksandrov reservoir due to the biological, historical and aesthetic damage they would both cause. To back up its views, the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences Institute of Biology was referred to:

Это единственный на Правобережье Украины редчайший рефугиум как уникальных ландшафтов степной зоны, так и наименее генофонда флоры и фауны. Отделением общей биологии АН УССР рекомендуется отклонить проект строительства Южно-Украинского энергетического комплекса, как экологически неприемлемый¹²⁹.

Ukrainian *Goskompriroda*, unlike USSR *Goskompriroda*, recommended that the number of reactors at the Iuzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station be limited to no more than three. Any more reactors would be ecologically unfounded, as it would pose a serious threat to the environment in the area.

The fact that the report of the expert commission was never even passed on to the USSR Council of Ministers caused anger and disbelief in Nikolaev. Oblast Soviet Deputy, L. Chudaikina, and A. Zolotukhin wrote a letter to the Vice President of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, V. Kuhar and to the Deputy Chairman of Ukrainian *Goskompriroda*, I. Liakh, bringing to their attention the following fact:

Указанный документ (имеется в виду доклад Совету Министров СССР) собственно говоря, не является заключением экспертной комиссии, так как составлен аппаратом Госкомприроды СССР произвольно, с исключением альтернативных мнений, высказанных большинством экспертов, с отсутствием серьезных выводов по материалам, представленным АН УССР и Госкомприроды УССР... Доклад Совмину СССР не что иное, как стремление Госкомприроды СССР пойти на компромисс с Минатомэнерго и

¹²⁸ See 'Учесть все факторы', in *Южная правда*, 8.7.1989.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

Минэнерго СССР целью сохранения и ввода в строй гидрообъектов в которых уже вложены значительные средства¹³⁰.

The Greens were furthermore concerned about the fact that the Tashlyk hydroelectric power station would not be able to operate without a direct connection to the South Bug river. Therefore, should the station be allowed to operate on reduced capacity (three or four aggregates), a new reservoir - Tashlyk-2 - would have to be built. USSR *Goskompriroda's* report said nothing about this.

Also the oblast Communist Party leadership was concerned. In a letter¹³¹ to the Soviet Premier Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov, Sharaev and Ilin argued that the report produced by USSR *Goskompriroda* contradicted decisions made by the oblast Soviet as well as the opinion of the public of the Nikolaev oblast:

Обком Компартии Украины и исполком областного Совета народных депутатов глубоко заинтересованы в объективном решении проблемы обеспечения экологической безопасности Южно-Украинского энергокомплекса. Обращаем ваше внимание на то, что в представленном заключении Госкомприроды СССР не учтены решения 10-й сессии 20-ого созыва Николаевского областного Совета народных депутатов от 12.05.89 и мнение общественности области.

The Council of Ministers had not been presented with the report of the expert commission, signed on 10 April 1989 by 49 of its 50 members.

Выводы Госкомприроды СССР по ряду принципиальных вопросов не соответствующих заключению экспертной комиссии, мнению Академии Наук УССР, Главного координационно-геологического управления "Укргеология" Мингео СССР, Госкомприроды УССР. В частности, большинство членов экспертной комиссии Госкомприроды СССР, Академии наук и Госкомприроды УССР считают необходимым ограничить мощности Южно-Украинской АЭС тремя энергоблоками.

Sharaev and Ilin expressed the view that the SU EK had not been assessed as a total entity. Moreover, the recommendation to preserve a part of the EK (the Tashlyk hydroelectric power station, Aleksandrov reservoir) was from an ecological and economic point of view unfounded.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Letter No. 130 of 6.6.1989.

This recommendation was not based on an estimate as to what would be the long term ecological effects of the Aleksandrov reservoir. These were listed in the letter

Обком Компартии Украины и исполком областного Совета народных депутатов в связи с изложенным просит Вас при принятии решения Советом Министров СССР по Южно-Украинскому энергокомплексу учесть все факторы отрицательного воздействия энергокомплекса на окружающую среду, ограничить мощности Южно-Украинской АЭС тремя блоками, не строить Константиновского и Александровского водохранилищ либо поручить Госкомприроды СССР провести повторную экспертизу проекта. До принятия окончательного решения Советом Министров СССР с целью сохранения государственных средств и в дополнение к депутатскому запросу группы народных депутатов СССР от Николаевской области, переданному Съезду народных депутатов СССР, просим приостановить финансирование работ на строительстве гидрообъектов энергокомплекса Южно-Украинской АЭС на реке Южный Буг и 4-го энергоблока АЭС.

A deputy from the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, V. Pogorelov (Nikolaev oblast) even sent a telegram to the USSR Supreme Soviet, requesting that the candidate to the post of Minister of Energy and Electrification be asked what would happen to the SU EK in the future. On 15 June, Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov in an announcement to the Nikolaev oblispolkom said that the SU EK would be considered at a meeting of the Council of Ministers in July.

Some 65 people, amongst which were two People's Deputies of the USSR, members of the cultural intelligentsia and workers, sent a letter to Prime Minister Ryzhkov on 14 April 1989, urging him to block any attempts at expanding the SU EK. A similar letter had been sent shortly before by the Chairmen of seven region and two town executive committees:

От имени более 400 тысяч жителей девяти районов и городов, расположенных вблизи Южно-Украинской АЭС, обращаемся с просьбой одобрить решение экологической экспертизы Госкомприроды СССР по Южно-Украинскому энергокомплексу¹³².

The decision of the USSR Council of Ministers on the SU EK was further delayed, and in the meantime construction continued at the site of the Energy Complex. This prompted Ilin and Sharaev to write a second letter to the USSR Council of Ministers requesting that funding be cut until the fate of the EK had been finally decided. They also used the opportunity to express their views on the SU EK, arguing that the capacity of the nuclear power station should not exceed three

¹³² See 'Защитим природу родного края!' and 'Мощности АЭС необходимо ограничить...', in *Южная правда* (n.d.)

reactors and that these should be cooled by the Tashlyk reservoir, which in turn should be completely cut off from the South Bug river. This was necessary to prevent an ecological catastrophe and to preserve the river as the major source of drinking water and water for irrigation in the area. Sharaev and Ilin made it clear to Ryzhkov that the delay on the SU EK had social and political repercussions in the oblast:

Затягивание рассмотрения вопроса о прекращении работ по расширению АЭС и строительству гидрокомплекса вызывает острую социальную напряженность, угрозы объявить забастовки, призывы выразить недоверие руководству области и т.д. Заключение Госкомприроды СССР, представленное в Совет Министров СССР (письмо от 23.05.89 № Пр. 02-П-296), вместе с конструктивными мыслями о недопустимости строительства Константиновского водохранилища, исключении прямой гидравлической связи Ташлыкского водохранилища с рекой Южный Буг и др. содержит экологически и экономически обоснованное предложение создать часть объектов гидрокомплекса (Александровское водохранилище и Ташлыкскую ГАЭС).

Finally, the letter suggested that the ecological impact of the energy complex be properly examined prior to any go-ahead for the Tashlyk hydroelectric power station and the Aleksandrov reservoir. A request was made that the question of the SU EK be considered in July as Ryzhkov had promised, given the unrest it might cause in the Nikolaev oblast should the decision once again be delayed¹³³.

Throughout the spring of 1989, the Greens arranged a series of meetings in support of the ecological expert assessment commission and its conclusions. A meeting in Nikolaev on 14 April was attended by some 2,000 people. Zolotukhin in his speech informed those present that *Minatomenergo* was trying to disprove the conclusions made by the expert assessment commission. This caused a stormy reaction. However, the final word was with the USSR Council of Ministers and everything should be done to make sure that the views of the people of Nikolaev oblast were heard and taken into consideration. Bilodid informed people that work at the Aleksandrov reservoir was still progressing as preparations were made for filling it.

Secretary of the CPU obkom, A. Potapenko, who attended the meeting, confirmed that the position of the public on the SU EK was identical to the position of the Party. Therefore, there were reasons for being optimistic: 'this gives a right to hope for a positive solution of the question and, I think, we will succeed, with joint efforts, to put the ecological situation under control'. The

¹³³ See 'Об ускорении принятия решения по дальнейшему развитию Южно-Украинского энергокомплекса', in *Южная правда*, 22.7.1989.

Greens, however, ought to extend their activities and pay more attention to soil and water degradation in the oblast¹³⁴. It was decided that the meeting would sign a petition and send it to Prime Minister Ryzhkov on behalf of the public of Nikolaev oblast.

Similarly, a meeting was held to commemorate the anniversary of the Chernobyl accident on 26 April. Some 2,000 people, amongst whom were representatives of the obkom and gorkom of the CPU, deputies from the oblast and city Soviet, representatives of workers' collectives, informal groups and Green activists were present. The meeting demanded that a special session of the oblast Soviet be held to consider the future of the SU EK. Such a decision was made shortly after the meeting, and *Iuzhnaia pravda* on 4 May announced that the session was scheduled for 12 May and that the topic of debate would be the conclusions of the expert commission and how to implement these conclusions. First Secretary of Nikolaev *gorkom* of the CPU V. Matveev, told the meeting that an information board would be put up in the city centre, indicating levels of background radiation in Nikolaev. The ecological situation in Nikolaev was debated at length and A. Molchanov - the Chairman of the *gorispolkom* - urged the Greens to adopt a broader approach to the environmental problems of Nikolaev and not focus only on the SU EK. He also called for more co-operation between the Greens and those responsible for the environment at a political level in Nikolayev¹³⁵.

6.3.3 The Adoption of Resolution No. 647.

Prior to the USSR Council of Ministers making a decision on the SU EK, one of Ryzhkov's deputies, Lev Riabev, travelled to the Iuzhnonkrainsk nuclear power station. Riabev had only two weeks earlier been appointed Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers in charge of the Fuel and Energy Complex by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. Due to the many letters and requests that had been sent to the Council of Ministers by the people of Nikolaev oblast, Ryzhkov ordered Riabev to visit the area (17-18 July) to get first-hand information about the case of the SU EK and become familiar with all the different views regarding the ecological expert assessment just completed. A round table meeting was therefore organised in Voznesensk, at which representatives from the nuclear power station, official authorities, ministerial representatives, Greens and the general public were present.

Riabev - at his own request - first heard the Ukrainian Deputy Minister on Energy give an outline of the present situation in Ukraine regarding energy supplies. V. Semeniuk claimed that

¹³⁴ See 'Занитим Южный Буг', in *Южная правда*, 20.4.1989, с. 2.

¹³⁵ See *Южная правда*, 4.5.1989, с. 4.

Ukraine was currently suffering from a 3.2-3.5 million kW hour deficit. This situation would be slightly improved by 1990 as new energy generating facilities would be taken into use. By 1995, however, the deficit would increase to an estimated eight million kW hours. T. Dotsenko of *Gidroproekt* proceeded to give an account of how the SU EK would work. E. Minaev presented the findings of the ecological expert assessment commission. The commission came out against Stage Three, and a majority of its members did not approve of the fourth reactor to be built in Iuzhnoukrainsk. The report presented by USSR *Goskompriroda* to the USSR Council of Ministers, however, gave permission for the reactor to be completed and put on line. A number of points presented above were raised regarding the Aleksandrov reservoir, which *Goskompriroda* had approved. The long term effects of the reservoir had not been examined. Neither had the overall ecological impact of the SU EK seen in total. Zolotukhin, for instance, argued that *Goskompriroda's* decision to approve of parts of the Second Stage (Tashlyk hydroelectric power station and the Aleksandrov reservoir) could only be described as an attempt to white-wash an ecologically dangerous project. Zolotukhin gave Riabev several collective letters from workers' collectives opposed to the Second Stage of the SU EK. A number of ordinary people were also allowed to express their views on the issue in question. Riabev, on the other hand, tried to justify the delay in making a decision on the SU EK by arguing that in April preparations to elect new government were being made. Much time had also been taken up by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, which met for the first time in the summer¹³⁶.

A protocol was made of the meeting in Voznesensk on 17 July. The protocol's presentation of events did not coincide with what had happened at the meeting and as a result, several letters of protest were sent to Riabev with clarifications and questions as to why this had happened. A. Hordienko, Secretary of the CPU obkom, and O. Ilin, Chairman of the Nikolaev oblast executive committee presented:

Свои замечания и предложения в части первой "Перспективы развития ЮУ ЭК", в связи с тем, что ряд пунктов противоречит поручениям, данным на совещании, и выводам и предложениям экологической комиссии Госкомприроды...

В заключение просим принять во внимание протесты общественности, участвовавшей в обсуждении проблемы дальнейшего строительства ЮУ энергокомплекса, чье мнение было фактически не учтено, так как представители от общественных и местных органов власти не привлекались к составлению рассматриваемого протокола.

¹³⁶ See 'Не терпит отлагательства', in *Южная правда*, 22.7.1989.

Also *Zelenyi Mir* sent a letter to Riabev¹³⁷ regarding the protocol *LR-381*. The protocol did not present the actual sequence of events and it was biased in that views critical to a partial implementation of Stage Two were left out from the protocol altogether:

Мы понимаем, что протокол №. ЛР-381 был подготовлен Вашим аппаратом. Но почему Вы при его подписании не потребовали согласования его с Николаевскими партийными, советскими органами и общественностью, принимавшими, как нам хочется верить, равноправное участие в совещании. Нам представляется, что в период перестройки и демократизации нашего общества решение по жизненно-важным вопросам не должны приниматься без учета мнения тех, чья судьба целиком зависит от этих решений.

Zolotukhin, Zhuk (Voznesensk Greens) and Stepura (Aleksandrovka Greens) also pointed out what information that had been left out of the protocol¹³⁸.

A complaint was also made by three USSR People's Deputies from Nikolaev oblast: D. Lisnichii, V. Lisitskii and V. Opolinskii. They had been present at the meeting and complained that alternative views and opinions had been left out from the protocol. Moreover, Riabev had failed to keep his promise that the protocol would be discussed with those present prior to being passed as an official document. Such a one-sided approach to such a complex problem could lead to a wave of protest amongst the population of Nikolaev oblast and break the trust of the people and deputies to Riabov, which emerged out of his visit to Iuzhnoukrainsk and Voznesensk on 17 July:

В связи с изложенным, требуем впредь все принимаемые Вами решения по ЮУ ЭК, затрагивающие жизненно важные интересы населения, согласовывать с местными, партийными, советскими органами власти и общественность¹³⁹.

A second meeting, at which Zolotukhin, Zhuk, Ilin, Hodza, Pitushkin, Dobrovolskii, Lisitskii and Lisnitchii attended from Nikolaev oblast, was held in Riabev's office on 4 August 1989. At

¹³⁷ No. 100, 3.8.1989.

¹³⁸ The protocol failed to acknowledge the fact that the leadership of the nuclear power station had been given three days to make their suggestions regarding the conservation of the fourth reactor, currently under construction, regarding the Tashlyk hydro-electrical power station and the transfer of people from these objects to construction of housing, social and ecological objects. The protocol also failed to mention that 400 conscripts had been recalled from construction work at the SU EK, as well as of the fact that a suggestion from the public, which was backed up by the decision of the oblast soviet's 10 session, 20th convocation (12.5.1989) to set up a public scientific-co-ordinating committee to monitor the ecological effects of the Iuzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station. The protocol finally failed to give the oblast's as well as the expert assessment commission's views on the future of the SU EK.

¹³⁹ No. 30, 4.8.1989.

the meeting it was decided to set up a working group, composed of representatives from the Council of Minister's Biuro on the Fuel and Energy Complex, the USSR *Minatomenergoprom*, *Minenergo*, the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, USSR People's Deputies and the public of Nikolaev, to draft the Council of Ministers' Resolution on the SU EK. This could be seen as an acknowledgement of the grievances put forward by the Nikolaev representatives following the meeting in Voznesensk. The meeting also decided to investigate alternative energy sources and to draft a plan for energy conservation in Nikolaev oblast towards the year 2006. This decision was made at the initiative of the Nikolaev representatives. USSR *Minenergo*, *Minatomenergoprom*, *Minsudprom*, *Gosplan* and *Mintyazhmash* were ordered to examine the use of gas turbines produced in the oblast as an alternative energy source and its future potential from a scientific point of view by 1 December 1989. If possible, such turbines could be installed at the SU EK to generate electricity at peak hours, removing the need to go ahead with the Tashlyk hydroelectric power station. The Nikolaev oblispolkom was given one month to prepare all necessary documents on this matter. The USSR Academy of Sciences was requested to examine various membranes that could be used to clean the water emitted into the river during major emissions (*produvki*). A safety check of all the objects at the nuclear power station was also commissioned. The leadership of the nuclear power station was finally ordered to be more open about what was happening at the nuclear power station and to report regularly to the newly created 'Public Scientific Coordination Committee for the Observance of Ecological Cleanness and Safe Operation of the Nuclear Station (*Obshchestvennyi nauchno-koordinatsionnyi komitet nabludeniia za ekologicheskoi chistotoi i bezopasnoi rabotoi atomnoi stantsii*)'¹⁴⁰.

Neither the Greens nor the political leadership of Nikolaev oblast were 100% happy with the draft resolution the working group came up with. Zolotukhin, Zhuk, Stepura and Lisnichii wrote a statement in which they criticised the fact that the resolution failed to express the USSR Council of Ministers' attitude towards the suggestions of the expert assessment commission. They were also against the decision to go ahead with the Aleksandrov reservoir and the Tashlyk hydroelectric power station prior to a reworking of their project, arguing that

Сегодня ситуация не должна повториться в будущем, нельзя вкладывать народные средства в то, что потом может отказаться экологически вредным и экономически убыточным.

Therefore, construction at the fourth reactor, the Tashlyk hydroelectric power station and the Aleksandrov reservoir should stop while they were being redesigned and they had been passed by

¹⁴⁰ Протокол совещания у зампредседателя Совмина СССР тов. Рябев, Л. Д. от 4 августа 1989 г.

an economic-ecological expert assessment group. They also reminded Riabev that most of the members of the expert commission were in favour of a maximum of three nuclear reactors at Iuzhnoukrainsk. Before any discussion regarding the fourth reactor could start, the expert commission wanted the ecological problems relating to the cooling system of the third reactor to be sorted out. Moreover, geological, hydrological and radiological analyses were required to estimate what the possible outcome would be of an accident at the nuclear power station. The expert commission had also recommended that the Tashlyk hydroelectric power station be run on reduced capacity provided that direct contact between the water of the Tashlyk reservoir and the South Bug river could be avoided. The latter view had been repeated by USSR *Goskompriroda* in its letter to the USSR Council of Ministers. Moreover, the authors of the letter demanded that once the project of the Tashlyk hydroelectric power station had been redrafted, it should be assessed against the alternative option of introducing gas turbines in its place.

The Aleksandrov reservoir would have nothing but negative effects. Then according to the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences it would worsen the engineering-hydrological conditions for running the nuclear power station. Besides, it would damage the water quality of the South Bug, as the water flow of the river would be reduced. This would in turn result in water seeping in from the firth of South Bug, the salinisation of ground water and the destruction of the river. Therefore the Tashlyk hydroelectric power station would have to undergo repeated ecological expert tests prior to being made operative. The contribution of the Tashlyk station during peak hours would be minimal and it therefore seemed to the authors that the reason for the pro-nuclear lobby to be so keen on the station and the Aleksandrov reservoir seemed to be a different one. Probably the Aleksandrov reservoir was intended as an emergency cooling pond in case of a crisis at the nuclear power station, and the hydroelectric power station would be equipped with pumps which would make it easier to shift water quickly from the Tashlyk to the Aleksandrov reservoir. The letter finished off by saying that

Мы согласны с немедленной консервацией этих объектов, проведением переработки проектов, дополнительных исследований и экологической экспертизы с тем, чтобы принять по этим объектам еще более обоснованные решения о том, что их невыгодно строить ни с экономической, ни с экологической точек зрения¹⁴¹.

A joint letter was sent to the USSR Council of Ministers from Ilin, Zolotukhin, Zhuk, Stepura and Lisnichij on 7 August 1989. They suggested certain changes to the draft resolution, mainly of

¹⁴¹ Основание к проекту постановления Совмина СССР "О дальнейшем строительстве объектов ЮУ ЭК" (n.d.).

a lexical character. For instance, they would like to see the word 'suspend' (priostanovit) replaced by 'stop' (ostanovit) in the case of construction of the fourth reactor at Iuzhnoukrainsk, awaiting the results of thorough investigations. This as the former would make it possible to use up money still left for construction, whereas the former would not allow for any construction work to take place. Instead of 'clarification' (utochnenie) of the construction project, they favoured 'redrafting'. The Nikolaev representatives also wanted the resolution to be clear on the future of the Tashlyk hydroelectric power station and the Aleksandrov reservoir:

Изменить редакцию пункта (3) на следующую: остановить строительство Александровского гидроузла, Ташлыкской ГАЭС и переработать проект ГАЭС на работу с тремя агрегатами при отсутствии гидравлической связи паводного бассейна ГАЭС с Ташлыкским водохранилищем и с учетом альтернативных предложений, а также результатов исследований по геологии, гидрогеологии и водного баланса реки Южного Буга. Окончательное решение о строительстве ГАЭС и Александровского водохранилища принять по результатам экспертизы Госкомциролы СССР переработанного проекта.

The letter also made it clear that it was not desirable for the Tashlyk hydroelectric power station and the Aleksandrov reservoir to be subordinated to Ukrainian authorities as the nuclear power station was run by Soviet ministries and directories. Consequently, the republic would have to consult with the Soviet authorities on any matter which would make it difficult to operate the two installations properly. Finally, the authors wanted more of the expert assessment commission's conclusions to be included in the final document¹⁴².

Resolution No. 647 was passed by the USSR Council of Ministers on 16 August 1989. Although the Nikolaev representatives failed to win support for their objections to the Aleksandrov reservoir and the Tashlyk hydroelectric power station, the Council of Ministers rejected the Konstantinov reservoir and Reactor No. 4 of the nuclear power station. As for the Third Stage of the SU EK this was also turned down. Lexically, the Council of Ministers bowed to demands from Nikolaev to replace the word 'suspend' with 'stop' with regard to Reactor No. 4. This was a major concession, in that the Council of Ministers acknowledged that construction work had continued despite officially being stopped, and took measures to try to prevent such a scenario in the nearest future. The Nikolaev delegation had no luck, however, in arguing the case that not the oblast, but rather Soviet authorities ought to be in charge of the Tashlyk hydroelectric

¹⁴² Замечания к проекту постановления Совмина СССР "Вопросы строительства объектов ЮУ ЭК" от 7 августа 1989 г. (n.d.).

station and the Aleksandrov reservoir. This responsibility was promptly delegated to oblast authorities, reluctant to take it on due to the opposition to these two objects in the oblast.

If one compares Resolution No. 647 with *Goskompriroda's* report to the Council of Ministers and the recommendations of the expert assessment commission, one finds that the Council of Ministers went further than what was recommended by *Goskompriroda* as far as expanding the capacity of the nuclear power station was concerned. As shown above, *Goskompriroda*, unlike the expert assessment commission, recommended that the capacity of the nuclear power station be limited to four reactors. The commission put the limit at three reactors, and the Council of Ministers seems to have listened to the commission and the general public on this matter.

Although the resolution had finally been passed, some questions remained. For instance, the Council of Ministers gave the go-ahead for three aggregates to be completed at the Tashlyk hydroelectric power station. However, only on the condition that water from the Tashlyk reservoir would under no circumstances enter the South Bug river. As indicated above, the Greens argued that in such a case a new reservoir, Tashlyk-2, would have to be created. The Resolution made no mention of this, thus paving the way for another round of campaigning to clear the question. As for the Aleksandrov reservoir, it could not be filled until proper archaeological excavation had taken place. The Greens and the oblast leadership therefore, although they did not win the argument with the Soviet government, at least won time to continue their campaign to abandon the Aleksandrov reservoir.

Although the USSR Council of Ministers had only partially given in to demands from the Nikolaev oblast to abandon the Second Stage of the SU EK altogether, *Iuzhnaia pravda* still referred to the Resolution as a 'victory'. The Resolution itself was given much less attention than the 'struggle' itself. The author of the article, V. Puchkov, praised everyone involved for their co-operation on the issue, arguing that this was the major reason for the campaign to succeed:

С завидным единством и упорством эту борьбу вели все - обком партии и облисполком, трудовые и учебные коллективы, местные партийные и советские органы, самостоятельные природоохранные объединения энтузиастов - "зеленых", родившиеся в ходе перестройки, во главе с Николаевской экологической ассоциацией. Ученые и домохозяйки, пионеры и пенсионеры, мелики и народные депутаты, инженеры и писатели...

The Greens were not entirely satisfied with the outcome, but they were happy that at least parts of the Second Stage would not be built. Zolotukhin's conclusion echoed that of the political authorities:

Главный урок, который мы вынесли из этой борьбы: залог успеха - в консолидации сил, объединении усилий руководства и общественности, "формалов" и "неформалов". „Результат возможен тогда, когда вместе делают дело, а не выясняют отношения“¹⁴³.

6.4 Conclusion

A natural question to ask in view of what has been discussed above, is whether or not the ecological expert assessment came about as a result of the Greens' efforts. As Zolotukhin concluded in 1989, *Zelenyi Mir* could not have achieved this on its own. Without the support of various ministries, departments, workers' collectives and the public, no or little attention would probably have been given to the Green campaign. Still one should not underestimate the enormous amount of time and work put into the campaign against further expansion of the South Ukraine Energy Complex by local activists such as Bilodid, Zolotukhin, Zhuk, Shapovalov, Suslova and others. It was very much due to their efforts that the issue was put on the political agenda. By obtaining and spreading arguments questioning the soundness of further expansion of the Energy Complex, they succeeded in creating awareness of the 'problem' and to unite those opposing further expansion. Had it not been for the Greens, a re-assessment of the Second Stage and its impact on the environment might never have taken place, or with a very different outcome.

One might think that, following the passing of Resolution No. 647 the Greens had 'won' and their campaign had come to an end. According to recent legislation on the environment, the rulings of environmental impact assessment commissions were compulsory. As seen above, though, work continued at the construction site even after orders were given for it to stop, pending the outcome of the environmental impact assessment. Consequently, the Greens were faced with a new problem, once the resolution had been passed: would the instructions of the commission be followed, or would they be ignored? This issue and also growing concerns among Greens about safety at the South Ukraine nuclear power station, are the topics of the following chapter.

¹⁴³ Фонд. №. 1, опис. №. 32, справа №. 233, арх. 49-51.

7 The Campaign to Save the South Bug River (II)

7.0 Introduction

Although the Green Movement to some extent won a victory when the USSR Council of Ministers passed Resolution No. 647 on 16 August 1989, the struggle to save the South Bug river from destruction was by no means over. As stated by the resolution, the Tashlyk hydro-electric power plant would be completed at reduced capacity (three aggregates instead of 10) and the Aleksandrov water reservoir would be completed following archaeological excavations on site. The resolution, although ordering a halt to construction of the fourth reactor at the nuclear power station prior to proper geological and safety considerations, was not prohibiting it from being built in the future. It was only the Kostiantynov water reservoir and Stage Three of the SB EK (reactors No. 5 and No. 6) that were scrapped with the passing of Resolution No. 647.

The Greens thus viewed their task as policing the implementation of the Resolution - making sure that the original project of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station was properly redrafted prior to resuming construction work and to see to it that the site of the nuclear power station was properly assessed for seismicity and safety more generally. To minimise the impact of the revised project, as presented in the resolution, the Greens also developed and offered alternatives to the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station, which would secure a similar output of electricity but with much lesser harm to the environment. The campaign against the Aleksandrov water reservoir continued, as it was argued that the resolution was contradictory on this issue, and that the environmental impact would be much more severe than envisaged by the USSR Council of Ministers.

In the second half of 1990 another issue of dispute between the pro-nuclear lobby and the environmentalists emerged; due to high concentrations of salts and minerals in the Tashlyk cooling pond, the leadership of the nuclear power station sought permission to emit polluted water into the South Bug river, while pumping in fresh water from higher up the river. Unless this was done, it argued, the salts would cause serious damage to the cooling pipes of the nuclear reactors, which needless to say, would have implications for safety at the power station. The pro-environment lobby argued fiercely against this, as emissions would not only contain salts and other pollutants, but also radionuclides (caesium-137 and tritium), the levels of which were higher in the cooling pond than in the river. Given that water from South Bug was used for irrigation and as drinking water this state of affairs was unacceptable.

The row over these issues has continued up until the present. Coalitions and allegiances within the pro-environment and pro-nuclear lobbies, however, have changed, due to the general

political changes that have taken place in Ukraine since 1989. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, decisions regarding the SB EK have become a purely Ukrainian matter. Whereas prior to Ukrainian independence, Ukrainian authorities in most cases joined forces with the pro-environment lobby against Moscow, now Kiev has taken on Moscow's tasks and in many ways also its views. Of importance also is the fact that as the economic situation of Ukraine has deteriorated, the general interest of the public in politics has worn off and been replaced by what may be labelled 'political apathy'. There is a sense of gloom and nostalgia for the old days of Communism, when if nothing else, there was stability and no need to worry about how to survive the next week or month. As a result, people spend more time trying to make ends meet than taking actively part in politics and this has affected *Zelenyi Mir* in a negative way - although not prevented them from continuing the campaign to save South Bug.

In many areas of the former USSR Greens have found this transition-period hard to cope with in that the few activists who remained in the movement got increasingly disillusioned with their cause ('it does not matter to anyone anymore') and also started fighting each other rather than uniting behind a common cause. In Nikolaev, although members of *Zelenyi Mir* are to some extent disillusioned, this transition has been easier due to the high level of expertise possessed by the movement and also due to the fact that seven of its members were elected deputies of the oblast soviet in 1990, where they have done a tremendous job to save the South Bug river. The much used argument that 'the times of taking to the streets to make our points are gone. Now we must get down to working' has thus not proved so difficult for the Nikolaev Greens to adjust to, as it has for *Zelenyi Svit* as an all-Ukrainian association. This is an issue to which I will return below.

This chapter consists of two major sections. In the first I examine the continued Green campaign to save the South Bug river from August 1989 until the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991. In the latter half I follow the Green struggle during Ukrainian independence from December 1991 until June 1994.

7.1 Policing and the Presentation of Alternatives (August 1989-December 1991)

7.1.1 Politicisation of *Zelenyi Mir*

Following the passing of Resolution No. 647 by the USSR Council of Ministers, *Zelenyi Mir* in addition to continuing its campaign also engaged in organisational matters. The oblast leadership requested its local member groups to make an account of its members and to introduce formal

membership as a means of streamlining the association. Lists were sent to Nikolaev towards the end of 1989 and early 1990 of members, addresses and telephone-numbers. Vlasenko, the leader of the Voznesensk group, informed Zolotukhin that his group counted 24 people, of which 14 were men and nine, women. The Bratsk group was slightly smaller, consisting of 22 members. Radetskii, its leader, did however add in his letter to Zolotukhin dated 10 December 1989, that the Greens in the Bratsk district were not properly organised. Although 5,000 people had signed a petition to USSR Prime Minister Ryzhkov regarding the fate of the SB EK, Radetskii claimed that 'I am the Bratsk Greens'. In response to Zolotukhin's request, Radetskii promised to set up a district group, elect a president (chairman) and form a council. A potential leader had already been found; Vadim Tadeush. He was young and had many good ideas. The young people should be elected, claimed Radetskii, pointing out that he himself was 64 years old.

Radetskii worked fast. A month later, on 21 January 1990, he informed Zolotukhin that membership was up to 50 and that he was trying to gather even more people. Radetskii, as a candidate to the raisovet (elections would take place in March), enjoyed free transport in the district and could therefore travel to the villages to set up green groups there. Such groups had already been set up in Sergeevka, Novoaleksandrovka and Nikolsk.

As has been seen in Chapter Three, *Zelenyi Svit* in its initial stage made great effort to accommodate diverging political views within the movement. As glasnost and democratisation caught on, though, more and more people came out in opposition towards the Communist Party. The situation in Nikolaev *Zelenyi Mir* was somewhat similar. It is therefore interesting to note that a substantial number of the people on the Bratsk membership list were members of the CPSU. Radetskii gave the reason for this in his letter:

Я беспартийный. Но я коммунист по духу, по убеждениям. И дело построения коммунизма - это мое святое и кровное дело. Поэтому, Анатолий Иванович, я против Руха. Не знаю, как Вы, Белюда и Сергей Жук - за Рух. Я - нет. С ними я контакту, как с "Зелеными", остальные их дела меня не касаются. Но сам я - нет, не переполну этих трезубов, желто-синих стягов, мазенинчумы, балдеронины, петлюровщины. Я красный, как и все рожденные и искавшие братане. И "зеленый" только с красных, с коммунистических позиций. Ибо высокая экология и коммунизм должны быть неразделимы. И поэтому в моей группе "зеленых" больше половины - члены КПСС.

A reason for tightening the structure of the Green Movement was the forthcoming elections to the *Verkhovna Rada* and to the local soviets in March 1990. To organise a proper election campaign to the extent this was possible, and also to ease the work of the movement on a day to day basis, member lists with addresses and telephone numbers were required.

In Chapter Three I discussed the Ukrainian Greens and the elections in detail. As shown, *Zelenyi Svit* and the Ukrainian Language Society *Prosvita* were prevented from putting forward candidates in a number of constituencies. This was also the case in Nikolaev, where Bilodid had to withdraw his candidacy after the local CPU refused to sanction it. Even *Iuzhnaia pravda* acknowledged it. In an article published in February following an election rally in Nikolaev on 11 February, the newspaper concluded that

Партаппарат, монополизировав власть, допустил к регистрации лишь угодных кандидатов, отказав в регистрации тем, кого выдвинул народ.

As examples the paper referred amongst others to the case of Bilodid. He made an attempt at getting registered as a candidate in the Bratsk region, but this failed¹.

Radetskii supported the candidacy of Bilodid, despite the fact that the former, who is deeply religious, was not positive to the communists. As a member of the Green Movement, however, he was widely respected. In the letter referred to above, Radetskii gave Zolotukhin a vivid account of the problems Bilodid and he faced with the leadership of the Bratsk regional party organisation while trying to get its support for the former's candidacy. This was crucial, then as mentioned above, the party organisation was able to block any candidacy of which it did not approve.

Белодеда я всеми силами проталкивал в Верховный Совет УССР. Но первый секретарь В. Батовский был категорически против. И меня 2 часа уговаривал не содействовать Белодеду. Но это бесполезно. На меня его "авторитет" не действует. Батовский - антиперестройщик, приверженец компартио-бюрократических методов, диктаторства. Я таких "наполовинчиков" не люблю. И еще долго в секретарях не быть, потурим с кресла. Но Белодеда они срезали. Попали на льжи, нарушения закона о выборах. И выдвижения не допустили. В. Белодед и сам виноват. Он бесхитроен. Пало было пойти к этому Батовскому, спросить его согласия, пообещать побольше, заручиться согласием "хозяина" района, а потом уже идти к массам, ко мне. Неприятеля надо уметь перехитривать. Политика - это война. А у Виктора ни солдатского, ни политического опыта. Ну, у него еще всепереди. Батовский и его аппарат вообще-то боятся любых неформалов, даже таких мирных, как "зеленые". Это все ленивая и бездарная братия... Больно видеть, как упал авторитет районной парторганизации в районе. Для успеха перестройки надо бы на две трети поменять, обновить главные руководящие кадры. Но не умеи работать: за портфели они цепляются просто. Ставки же высокие, теперь.

¹ *Южная правда*, 14.2.1990, с. 3.

Although the Greens did not succeed in having any of its representatives elected to *Verkhovna Rada*, they did well in the local elections and as pointed out in Chapter Six, had seven people elected deputies of the oblast soviet. Three of these, L. Suslova, S. Shapovalov and Dobrovolskii, ended up in the Commission on Ecology and have done a tremendous job to protect South Bug. Suslova, in addition to being a deputy, also worked in the oblast administration for the ecology commission, and was thus able to give the Greens inside information as well as pulling strings when necessary. Shapovalov had previously on a number of occasions spoken on behalf of the Green Movement. Since he had a higher university degree and was familiar with the issues on debate regarding the SB EK, the Iuzhnoukrainsk Greens provided him with information as his word would carry weight. Bilodid in an interview in the summer of 1994, praised Suslova, Shapovalov and Dobrovolskii for their work: 'to do more than they have done would simply not be possible'.

7.1.2 Campaigns and Issues

The Aleksandrov Water Reservoir/the Tashlyk Hydro-electric Power Station

Zelenyi Mir elaborated a new strategy at a gathering held to hear reports and elect new representatives, on 15 October 1990. The gathering, which was attended by 170 Greens from Voznesensk (Vlasenko), Pervomaisk (Sosnovskii), Iuzhnoukrainsk (Bilodid) and Nikolaev (Zolotukhin), reelected Zolotukhin as Chairman of the oblast organisation (until then he had held this post jointly with the local writer, Boiko) and also elected delegates to represent Nikolaev at the First Congress of *Zelenyi Svit*, due to take place in Kiev at the end of the month. At the same day, an inter-oblast meeting was held in Nikolaev on the future of the South Bug river. The meeting issued a statement, saying that

Одобрям, как 1-ый шаг, направленный на спасение реки Южный Буг Постановление Совета Министров СССР от 16.8.89г No. 647. Любопытность решения в отношении продолжения строительства Александровского водохранилища и 3 агрегатов Ташлыкского ГАЭС... их сооружение и эксплуатация создадут угрозу существованию реки Южный Буг, ведут к нерациональному использованию народных средств.

As a first step to monitor the implementation of the Resolution, the Greens called for an inter-oblast public scientific coordination soviet to protect the South Bug river². In addition to the task

² Межобластной общественный научно-координационный совет по спасению реки Южный Буг.

of monitoring construction works at the site carefully, the soviet would also elaborate a scientific programme for the continued development of the SB EK. Scientists were encouraged to develop an alternative to the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station and the Aleksandrov water reservoir, and an initiative was made to transfer construction workers from the SB EK to housing construction for which there was a chronic shortage in Juzhnoukrainsk as well as devices aimed at protecting the environment in the area. Workers in the oblast were generally encouraged to demand that pollution-reducing devices be installed at their enterprises to protect the rivers South Bug and Ingul from further damage, and local authorities were requested - hand in hand with the general public - to see to it that no violations of Resolution No. 647 were allowed at the construction site.

Whereas the pro-nuclear lobby during the environmental impact assessment had argued the case that the local communities would benefit from the Aleksandrov water reservoir in that it would be used as a source of irrigation and drinking water, the Greens claimed that this was far from the case. To gain support for their suspicions, a letter was sent to *oblvodkhoz* (the oblast water inspectorate) with a request that a report indicating what exactly would be the purpose of the water reservoir, be produced. In its letter of reply dated 3 October 1989, *oblvodkhoz* made it very clear that the water reservoir was intended 'solely for the purposes of power engineering'. Besides, due to its small radius, much water would be lost due to evaporation, thus putting further strain on the water flow of the South Bug river. *Oblvodkhoz* therefore came out against the construction of the Aleksandrov water reservoir³.

Local authorities were also unhappy about the USSR Council of Ministers' decision to go ahead with construction of the Aleksandrov water reservoir. The Aleksandrov settlement soviet in a decision made at its session on 26 September 1989 (No. 77) 'On the Protection of the South Bug river' made it clear that it found the filling up of the Aleksandrov water reservoir inexpedient as it would cause a deterioration of water quality in the river, destroy its aerohydrobiological filter, which in turn would further worsen water quality, destroy the habitat for rare plant and animal species, destroy landscapes of historical and recreational value; make it impossible to create a nature reserve; destroy 30 archaeological monuments of international significance; increase seismicity at the site of the SB nuclear power station; reduce the water flow of the river, thus resulting in an influx of saline water from the Firth of Bug, salinising ground water sources. It was also argued that the costs of constructing the water reservoir in connection with the three aggregates of the Tashlyk water reservoir would far outweigh the benefits of the additional energy which could thus be produced. Moreover, chernozem would be lost and in its place there would

³ No. 01-488, of 5.10.1989 in reply to a request of 3.10.1989, signed by the Chairman of *Oblvodkhoz*, H. Tkachenko.

emerge a water reservoir with extensive organic growth as a result of overheating and evaporation. The water reservoir would also destroy spawning areas of various kinds of fish and raise ground water levels by 6-7 metres. On the basis of this the *possovet* decided that the South Bug river was to flow uninterrupted in the area of the village Aleksandrovka⁴.

Shortly afterwards, the executive committee of the Voznesensk regional soviet of people's deputies issued a decision in support of the Aleksandrov settlement soviet. A request was made to the Nikolaev oblast executive committee to consider the suggestions of the Aleksandrov settlement soviet during the hearing of the plan for the economic and social development of the oblast for 1990⁵.

In the meanwhile, Shapovalov and Suslova of *Zelenyi Mir* conducted an assessment of Resolution No. 647, which concluded that it was filled with contradictions and vagueness. These contradictions were presented and alternative solutions put forth in a report, which, accompanied by a covering letter, was sent to the leadership of the USSR and the Ukrainian republic⁶. The two greens argued that although Resolution No. 647 delegated responsibility for and control of water levels in the Aleksandrov water reservoir to local authorities, it would be beyond their control to regulate water levels as the water reservoir would serve the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station, which would operate under the auspices of Soviet authorities. For the three planned aggregates to operate normally, the water level could be no lower than 20.7 metres, as envisaged in the original draft.

The authors also referred to the decision⁷ made following the meetings which took place in Riabev's office in Moscow on 4 and 8 August 1989, to create a nature reserve in the part of South

⁴ See Александровский поселковый Совет народных депутатов, Вознесенский район, Николаевская область, Исполнительный комитет, Решение от 26.09.1989 г. No 77. "О защите реки Южный Буг", signed by the Chairman of the executive committee, N. Andrievskiy and the secretary, L. Senchina.

⁵ See Вознесенский районный совет народных депутатов Николаевской области, Исполнительный комитет, Решение от 29.09.1989 г. No. 173 "О решении исполкома Александровского поселкового Совета от 20.09.89 No. 77 О защите реки Южный Буг", signed by the Chairman of the executive committee M. Fedorov and secretary Shvets.

⁶ See letter to Председателю Верховного Совета СССР тов. Горбачеву М.С., Председателю Комитета Верховного Совета СССР по строительству и архитектуре тов. Ельцину Б.Н., Председателю Госкомприроды СССР тов. Воронцову Н.Н., Заместителю председателя Комитета Верховного Совета СССР по вопросам экологии тов. Яблокову А.В., Председателю плановой и бюджетно-финансовой комиссии Совета Союза тов. Кучеренко В.Г., Председателю Совета Министров СССР тов. Рыжкову Н.И., Первому секретарю ЦК КПУ тов. Ивашко В.А., Председателю Совета Министров УССР тов. Масол В.А. от Зам. председателя Николаевской экологической ассоциации при фонде культуры С.В. Шапоvalov, in фонд No. 1, опис No. 32, сир. No. 243, арк. 79-90.

⁷ Протокол No. ЛР-596.

Bug filled with rapids. This would be impossible, they argued, as the area in question would be flooded once the Aleksandrov water reservoir had been completed.

A pre-condition set for the Aleksandrov water reservoir to be built, was that there would be no direct link between it and the Tashlyk cooling pond. This, argued Shapovalov and Suslova, would be impossible, given that once the third reactor at the nuclear power station was completed, the cooling pond would not contain enough water to cool all the reactors during the summer time. Consequently, the planners were faced with two options: they could either build a new pond, adjacent to the Tashlyk cooling pond, to service the three aggregates of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station (a part of the cooling pond could not be 'cut off' from the rest of the pond to serve the hydroelectric power station, only as the pond was in itself not big enough to serve the three reactors), or they could direct water to the power station via the Tashlyk cooling pond from the Aleksandrov water reservoir. As the second option would be much less costly and also less time-consuming in that it required less construction-works than the first one, the Greens had no doubt that this would be the final result. The fact that construction at the site of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station continued unchanged before this question had been settled, fuelled their suspicion all the more. Not only the nuclear lobby, but also the USSR Council of Ministers was to blame for this, as Resolution No. 647 was so vague that it allowed for interpretation, thus providing the constructors with a possibility to eventually complete the power station with 10 aggregates. The first three ones would be launched according to the original plan, whereas the compartment of the remaining seven would be completed and preserved, thus making it easy at a later stage to argue that due to large sums already invested in the project, it would be a waste of money not to complete it.

To make sure that the hydro-electric power station would be fitted with no more than three aggregates, and to avoid any further expansion of the station, the Greens suggested that the turbines be run by water from water towers, so as to eliminate the need for either a new water reservoir to be built, or for the Aleksandrov water reservoir to be completed simply to serve the power station. Since only 0.18% of the total energy output at the SB EK would be generated by the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station, the Greens proposed to scrap this part of the project altogether, as it would cause much less damage from an environmental point of view. This was promptly rejected by the leadership of the nuclear power station.

Finally, the Greens could not accept that areas which according to Resolution No. 647 would be incorporated into the nature preserve to be established in the valley of the South Bug river would be flooded as a result of the high water level required in the Aleksandrov water reservoir in order to run the three aggregates of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station.

Shapovalov and Suslova accused the *USSR Minatomenergo* of obstructing the revising of the project prior to its completion. According to Resolution No. 647 this work was to be conducted based on data on the water balance of the South Bug river. Such data had been taken over by *Minatomenergo* in the early 1980s, when the project for the nuclear power station was being redrafted. *Oblvodkhoz* had therefore hired *Gidroproekt* (Kharkiv) to provide the required information, but had so far not been presented with any data. The fact still remained, though, that Nikolaev oblast was generally short of water, and that water resources available would be better used for irrigating the chernozem than cooling nuclear reactors.

Geological and hydro-geological research (required according to Resolution No. 647) conducted by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences indicated that both the second reactor of the nuclear power station and the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station were situated directly on the seismologically active break of the Vranich zone (Chapter Six), which not only had safety implications, but also complicated construction a great deal. As a matter of fact, there had been an accident in connection with the construction of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station due to this circumstance. Due to movement of the break, a construction had collapsed. Luckily there were no fatalities as the workers were away for their lunch break. To stabilise the construction site, large quantities of concrete and liquid glass had been pumped into the ground underneath. This, however, did not seem likely to protect the construction should an earthquake occur, then according to *Ukrgeologia*

„РАЭС, ЮВАЭС, ХАЭС находятся в узлах пересечения региональных зон деформаций..., а по данным морфологического анализа они расположены в сквозных зонах современных движений коры, при этом имеют место различные скорости движения блоков...”⁸

Thus, the question should not be so much about expanding the nuclear power station, but rather about how to make the existing three reactors safe in case of an earthquake or surface movement. Shapovalov and Suslova asked what other arguments were needed to say a definite no to any further reactors and to the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station and the Aleksandrov water reservoir.

As for the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station, this would use more energy than it would create. During the day-time it was intended to produce energy for the peak hours. However, the hydroaccumulating station would require 1.2-1.4 times more energy at night than it would itself generate throughout the day. In addition to being environmentally unfriendly, it would therefore

⁸ *Фонд* No. 1, *опис* No. 32, *сир.* No. 243, *арк.* 86. The three nuclear power stations referred to are the Rivne nuclear power station, Juzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station and the Khmelnytskyi nuclear power station.

also be uneconomic. So as to avoid peaks in energy use and energy going to waste during the night, it would be a better solution to provide the users with incentives to use more energy in the late hours. A number of other solutions were also offered to secure a more balanced use of energy.

Finally, a number of reasons were given as to why the Aleksandrov water reservoir must not be completed. These arguments more or less coincided with those listed by the Aleksandrov settlement soviet (possovet). It was also argued that the water reservoir would be short-lived (approximately five to seven years) due to extensive build-up of silt. There would also be a build-up of silt on the bed of the South Bug river as the presence of the water reservoir would slow down the flow of the river and in addition reduce water levels. This would cause problems for the ship wharfs in Nikolaev and increase costs in ship construction.

Shapovalov's and Suslova's letter concluded that neither from an economic nor from a moral point of view would the construction of the Aleksandrov hydro-complex or the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station be desirable. Consequently, they demanded that construction be halted immediately. As a matter of fact, the extensive construction of nuclear power stations in Ukraine could only be characterised as

Преступлением, направленным, как против населения республики, так и против решения продовольственной программы страны в целом⁹.

With regard to the leadership of the nuclear power station, Suslova and Shapovalov claimed that it was falsifying data and misinforming the constructors and the general public. As evidence, they referred to the session of the oblast soviet in May 1990 when the General Director of the SB nuclear power station, V. Fuks claimed that the Aleksandrov water reservoir was practically completed and that for this reason it would make no sense to discuss the question of whether to stop construction works. At a meeting at the Council of Ministers in August the same year, Fuks announced that the Aleksandrov water reservoir was 95% completed and that it was not needed by the 'atom-mongers'. As soon as it had been completed it would be put under the auspices of the oblast authorities. However, as pointed out above, the oblast could not be in charge of any energy object. Furthermore, as of 1 September the Aleksandrov water reservoir was only 50% completed. Only 14,4 million roubles out of a total 28,8 million had been used and construction had yet not started at the Aleksandrov hydro-electric power station. Finally, the pro-nuclear lobby had allegedly 'arranged' a letter from the people of the village Kostiantynovka in support of the water reservoir. In Voznesensk a potentially critical situation was created when the people there were

⁹ *Ibid.*, апк. 88.

advised to sort out their grievances with the constructors directly, since most of the construction workers were not locals and since they enjoyed higher salaries and better food supplies than the local population, whom they were depriving of the drinking water. Such conflicts were in the interests of the pro-nuclear lobby as they would give it time to complete construction works at the SB EK.

The position of *Zelenyi Mir* was thus very clear on this matter: due to its vagueness and the lack of clarification of major points, Resolution No. 647 ought to be reassessed prior to its implementation.

7.1.3 Actors involved in the Campaign

The Authorities

Shapovalov and Suslova received a reply to their letter from Riabev of the USSR Council of Ministers on 24 November 1989. Sankovskii, Deputy Chairman of the Socio-Economic Department of the party obkom conveyed to them that USSR *Goskompriroda* together with USSR *Minatomenergoprom* and USSR *Minenergo* had been ordered to examine the questions raised in their letter and would in due course inform the authors about the outcome of this examination¹⁰.

Oblast and local authorities, however, shared the concerns of the Greens. The 14th session of the oblast soviet, which convened in December 1989, passed a resolution to lobby the USSR Council of Ministers into re-examining Resolution No. 647 and to stop all construction work at the SB EK until its revised project had been assessed by the State Environmental impact assessment Commission¹¹.

Furthermore, an extended meeting on the SB EK was held by the oblast *Goskompriroda* on 30 January 1990. The meeting was attended by *Goskompriroda* officials, representatives of the SB nuclear power station and Greens from all regions of the oblast. A. Albul, the Chairman of the Committee, in an interview with *Iuzhnaia pravda* expressed concern that despite Resolution No. 647, orders made by USSR *Minatomenergoprom*, USSR *Minatomenergo* and two decisions of the oblast soviet, the constructors and the projectors had so far failed to revise the SB EK project. In the meanwhile, construction continued unchanged, based on the old, unrevised project - despite the fact that no permission on special use of water had been given by *Derzhkompriroda*.

¹⁰ Справка к документам №. 2403/152 от 13 ноября 1989 года, №. 2581/145 от 1 декабря 1989 года, от Инструктора социально-экономического отдела ЦК Компартии Украины В. Зубцов, 12.12.1989. This document is available in фонд №. 1, опис. №. 32, спр. №. 233, арх. 100.

¹¹ *Южная правда*, 3.2.1990, с. 3.

Therefore, all work related to hydro-electric objects and the South Bug river constituted a violation of current legislation.

The oblast *Derzhkompriroda* passed a resolution ordering construction work to be stopped at the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station and the Aleksandrov hydro-electric power station and water reservoir from 10 February 1990, as such construction violated not only the Ukrainian Water Code and other environmental legislation, but also the recently adopted Resolution issued by the USSR Supreme Soviet 'On the Immediate Measures for the Ecological Revival of the Country'¹². Point Three of this Resolution said that funding for all industrial projects for 1990 would only be given in those cases where the projects had been examined by and passed by a State Environmental impact assessment Group.

Given that the project had not been updated and sent to *Goskompriroda* for re-examination, the continued construction work was clearly violating the Supreme Soviet's Resolution, which in turn illustrated the legal dilemma the Soviet Union had faced also prior to the introduction of *glasnost* and *perestroika*: although the laws and resolutions existed, they were in most cases either implemented only half-heartedly or not at all. This was possible as there were either no special bodies which could monitor their implementation and the laws and regulations were vague, thus allowing for interpretation, or because those in charge of monitoring were understaffed, making it physically very difficult to conduct such a task.

The Greens frequently faced this dilemma: on the one hand, their campaign would result in resolutions being passed at local, oblast, republican or the Soviet level. On the other hand, these resolutions were vague and very often ignored by the pro-nuclear lobby (See Chapter Six). The Greens thus formed a coalition with concerned local and oblast authorities to put pressure on Soviet decision-making bodies to secure the implementation of their own resolutions and laws.

The Pro-Nuclear Lobby

The leadership of the SB nuclear power station and the workers' collective of the Building-site Trust. *Atomgidroenergostroi* called a meeting in Iuzhnoukrainsk on 13 February to discuss the decision made by the oblast *Goskompriroda*. The major argument of the constructors, was that if construction was halted at the site, 4,000 workers and engineers would be made redundant. The person in charge of the trust, V. Preobrazhenskii, asked the 2,000 people present in the auditorium what these people and their families would then do. A number of those present had brought along posters carrying the following text:

¹² *Ibid.*

"Кто лишил меня права на работу?", "Зеленый Мир ведет страну к
лучине", "Прекратить травлю энергостроителей!", "Емории, уступите
место разуму!".

Deputy Director G. Sazonov of the SB nuclear power station argued that the decision made by the oblast *Goskompriroda* was in fact illegal, as Resolution No. 647 envisaged the completion of the Aleksandrov water reservoir and three generators of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station. Any decision or action aimed at preventing the construction workers from carrying out the Resolution should for this reason not be implemented.

A. Hodza, the Deputy Chairman of the oblast *Goskompriroda* who attended the meeting to explain the decision made on 30 January, was booed at by those present when he explained and defended the legal aspects of the decision as well as expressed concerns that as a consequence

Существует опасение в том, что в дальнейшем, пользуясь
половинчатостью решения Совмина, энергостроители добьются
таких разрешений сооружать 4-ый блок АЭС и всех 10 блоков
ГАЭС. По крайней мере, в слухах содержатся такие призывы. В
этой ситуации мнение Госкомприроды УССР — искать
компромиссное решение.

Hodza was able to speak with weight as his views were supported by the general public of Nikolaev oblast as well as by the *Derzhkompriroda*, which in a letter¹³ agreed with the decision made on 30 January. The Deputy Chairman of the *oblispolkom* urged the constructors to await the ruling of the environmental impact assessment commission and to think about what they would do once the SB EK had been completed. He made it clear that there were a number of construction sites in the oblast and suggested a new work front to deal with these.

Locals were also booed at when they expressed their concerns about the Second Stage of the SB EK: N. Derzhavets (Leader of the Mechanical Department of *Dniprobukhstroï*) won little support from the construction workers when arguing that

У них-де (i.e. the people of the surrounding villages) нет уверенности,
что в результате деятельности энергостроителей и
эксплуатационников вода из Танликовского водохранилища не
попадет в Южный Буг, из которого они потребляют свою
жизнеспособную влагу.

Possibly in an attempt to create general good will towards the leadership of the nuclear power station in Iuzhnoukrainsk itself (i.e. from the construction workers and the locals in

¹³ No. 7-1-1-162/9.

Iuzhnoukrainsk, many of whom were waiting in a queue for flats), Fuks, the Chairman of Iuzhnoukrainsk *gorispolkom*, E. Vychalkovskii, and the Leader of the Board for the Construction of the SB nuclear power station, N. Stulin, sent a letter to the CPU Central Committee urging the party to pay more attention to the severe housing problems that had emerged in Iuzhnoukrainsk due to its rapid expansion. The authors called for more territory to be provided for purposes of expanding the city, as the population was anticipated to grow beyond 50,000 - a maximum limit, given shortage of territory¹⁴. The letter made no mention of the fact that the housing crisis might, to some extent, be caused by the priorities of the leadership of the nuclear power station itself. The Greens had for a long time (see Chapter Six) argued that money earmarked for social and environmental purposes were put towards construction work at the SB EK when funding for the latter was frozen.

The construction workers present at the meeting in Iuzhnoukrainsk, though, did not bring up this issue, but rather unanimously expressed their anger towards the Greens and those supporting them. A resolution expressing a lack of confidence in the oblast *Derzhkompriroda* and *Iuznaia pravda*, was passed by the meeting with the following wording:

...Требовать безусловного выполнения постановления Совмина СССР No. 647 от 16.8.1989г., постановления Совмина УССР от 26.10.1989г.; выразить недоверие облисполкомиту охраны природы, его председателю А.А. Албулю...; ...требовать от облисполкома трудоустроить безработное население Южноукраинска, решить в правительстве вопрос о выплате пособий по безработице...принять решение о строительстве экологически чистых предприятий, обеспечивающих в ближайшее время необходимое количество рабочих мест...настоящее решение опубликовать в печати, облисполкому и обкому партии дать ответ по нему до 25 февраля с.г. В противном случае провести предупредительную забастовку коллективов строителей и эксплуатационников энергокомплекса¹⁵.

Although the leadership of the SB nuclear power station and the construction workers expressed a willingness to enter a constructive dialogue with the general public and with *Zelenyi Mir* with the aim of finding an 'optimal solution to the further development of society', rather than paving the way for such a dialogue, the meeting in Iuzhnoukrainsk resulted in a sharpening of the conflict between pro-environment and pro-nuclear forces.

In a letter to the Chairman of the USSR *Goskompriroda*, N. Vorontsov, *Zelenyi Mir* criticised the pro-nuclear lobby for deliberately continuing construction of the SB EK at the expense of measures to safeguard the environment, also mentioned in Resolution No. 647! What the Greens

¹⁴ Фонд No. 1. опис. No. 32, сир. No. 233, арх. 80-81.

¹⁵ *Южная правда*, 20.2.1990, с. 4.

were in effect saying, was that the leadership of the nuclear power station had deliberately facilitated tension between construction workers and the Greens by not transferring workers to other tasks, thus making it look as though the Greens were after the construction workers per se. This despite the fact that Suslova and Shapovalov in their assessment of Resolution No. 647 had suggested that construction workers be transferred to road construction, for which there was an acute shortage in the oblast! Vorontsov was urged to order USSR *Minatomenergoprom* and USSR *Minenergo* to obey Soviet legislation and thus bring construction works to a halt, awaiting the redrafting of the SB EK project and its assessment by an environmental impact assessment commission¹⁶.

The Media

The resolution adopted at the meeting in Iuzhnoukrainsk also criticised the Editor-in-Chief of *Iuzhnaia pravda*, A. Samoilenko, for premeditated distortion of documented facts. To the pro-nuclear lobby the newspaper came out too openly in support of the Greens and their demands.

Neither the Greens were 100% pleased with *Iuzhnaia pravda*'s handling of the SB EK. At the election rally which took place in Nikolaev on 11 February, a group of people had gathered behind a poster accusing the paper of 'stagnation'. When asked by *Iuzhnaia Pravda*'s reporter Iu. Demchenko why they thought so, the reply was that

Считаем так, потому что газета занимает одностороннюю позицию в вопросе развития АЭС, предоставляя слово только заинтересованным в расширении строительства южноукраинцам. Мнение же "зеленых" она не учитывает¹⁷.

To argue that the newspaper was one-sidedly pro-environment or pro-nuclear would be unfair. As seen in the previous chapter, the editor took the liberty to edit the first letter from *Ekvator* prior to its publication. It did, however, print its second letter in full shortly afterwards, and kept printing letters, articles and documents in favour of an environmental impact assessment to be conducted on the Second Stage of the SB EK. On the other hand, it has to be said that the newspaper adopted a cautious position, trying not to openly side with either of the participants in the debate. As the organ of the party obkom it could not side too uncritically with the Greens, nor could it too openly oppose the nuclear lobby, as that would be equal to opposing central authorities in Moscow, which as seen in Chapter Six, the CPU preferred to do not on the pages of the press

¹⁶ See letter to Nikolai Vorontsov 'О Южно-Украинском энергокомплексе'.

¹⁷ *Южная правда*, 20.2.1990, с. 4.

for a number of reasons. On balance, though, the newspaper allowed both sides to express their views. Moreover, as glasnost and democratisation took hold and gained a momentum of their own, *Iuzhnaia pravda* made increasingly critical remarks of its own.

To some extent, critical voices on either side may have suffered from the famous syndrome that 'if you are not with us, then you are against us' - or, as one would say in Russian - 'not our man' (ne nash chelovek). Having said that, though, the leadership of *Zelenyi Mir* was on good terms with the newspaper, and particularly so with A. Kolesnik, the reporter primarily in charge of the covering of the SB EK. Those expressing a critical view of *Iuzhnaia pravda* at the meeting in Nikolaev did therefore not necessarily represent the entire movement.

On the issue of the SB EK, though, there was no room for compromise for the Greens. *Kommunarets* illustrated this well, quoting a clash between oblast soviet deputy L. Suslova and N. Stulin of *Minatomeenergoprom* which took place at a session of the oblast soviet in mid-August. The issue on debate was the continued construction work that was taking place on the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station. A. Albul, Chairman of the oblast *Derzhkompriroda* had confirmed the illegality of such construction works and Suslova was trying to get an answer out of Stulin as to why this was happening.

Stulin claimed that despite the critical remark the constructors had received from *Goskompriroda*, they intended only to complete three aggregates of the power station, whereupon the following dialogue took place:

Суслова: Но я видела другое. Скажите, почему монтируется улитка 4-го агрегата? А теперь устанавливаются еще закладные детали на 5-ом и 6-ом агрегатах?

Стулин: Ну, можно так до бесконечности допихать друг друга вопросами... В самое ближайшее время мы по ним постараемся ответить квалифицированно - почему мы ставим улитку 4-го агрегата, итд.

Суслова: В приказе по вашему министерству записано: "В ближайшее время представить программу работ на все десять агрегатов".

Стулин: Вы, наверное, имете в виду приказ другого министерства, Минэнерго СССР...

Суслова: Вы меня извините, это просто обман, причем на всех уровнях...

Zolotukhin joined in the debate and criticised the oblast soviet for just watching construction works continue without doing anything to stop these. I. Hrytsai called for restraint, arguing that rather than falling foul of emotions, this situation would have to be thoroughly examined prior to

making a decision. If the Greens were right, then a decision would be made to stop construction of the fourth and fifth aggregates¹⁸.

With regard to the pro-nuclear lobby, its representatives were never denied access to the pages of *Iuzhnaia pravda*. Unlike what had been the case before, though, their view was no longer the only one presented to the readers. The opposition towards the Second Stage of the SB EK must have initially taken the leadership of the SB nuclear power station by surprise and then, as it caused them increasing difficulties with having their way, caused much anger and resentment. On balance, though, it seems fair to say that *Iuzhnaia pravda* throughout 1988 and 1989 adopted a policy of airing the different views to the extent this was possible, given the restraints the political system put on the press.

7.1.4 Clash of Interests between Ukraine and Soviet authorities

The growing opposition towards nuclear power in Ukraine worried not only the pro-nuclear lobby but also the Soviet government in Moscow. On 19 January 1991, the Cabinet of Ministers passed a Resolution to counteract such opposition¹⁹. A number of incentives were offered to the people living within a 30 km radius of the nuclear power stations. Some 10% of the budget to expand existing or build new nuclear power stations would be earmarked for social purposes such as housing. Investments would be made in accordance with the wishes of local authorities. Heating of villages and towns would be provided by the nuclear power station if technically possible and ecologically sound. Electricity would be provided to the locals at half the normal price and the government also offered to insure people against nuclear accidents, so that everyone would get proper medical care and financial compensation in case of an accident. Taxes payable by the nuclear power stations to the Soviet budget would be limited to 30%. A large sum of taxes payable to the republics would be channelled into the oblast, regional and local budgets to be used in the areas surrounding the nuclear power stations. Finally, the government promised to set up information points where locals could obtain information about the nuclear power station and to provide the local Sanitary-Epidemic Station, *Sanepidemstantsii*, with proper equipment to measure radioactivity in the areas adjacent to the power stations.

The Greens responded angrily to the Government's attempt at dividing the pro-environment lobby with its propositions. A long reply was printed in the Soviet paper *Vsem* in May 1991.

¹⁸ *Коммунар*, 16.8.1990 (п.р.).

¹⁹ Постановление No. 1 от 19.1.1991 г. 'О мерах по повышению заинтересованности местных органов и населения в размещении на их территории объектов атомной энергетики'. This resolution was signed by Prime Minister V. Pavlov. I obtained a copy from *Zelenyi Mir*.

What the Government and *Minatomenergoprom* were willing to give those surrounded by nuclear power stations in return for what they were taking was nothing but crumbs, then

Мелкие подачки в виде уменьшения платы за электроэнергию или строительства детских санаториев в зоне, отобрав при этом незаменимые и потому бесценные, жизненноважные ресурсы, такие, как земля и вода, а с ними и здоровье²⁰.

could not be said to be a fair exchange. As will be seen below not everyone agreed with the Greens, though.

7.1.5 Implications: The Tashlyk Hydro-electric Power Station

Throughout the spring and summer of 1991 a series of meetings were held on the construction works at the SB EK²¹. The first meeting, which took place in early May and which was attended by a number of ministries and departments in addition able to the leadership of the nuclear power station and oblast and local authorities, discussed the implementation of Resolution No. 647 and Resolution 271 passed by the Ukrainian Council of Ministers on 26 October 1989. The leadership of the nuclear power station announced that due to interruptions and delays in construction works, caused by USSR *Minfin* (Ministry of Finance)'s decision to freeze funding for the SB EK from 1 January 1991 following requests by local and oblast authorities, as the project had not been redrafted nor been passed by the environmental impact assessment, the energy shortage in Ukraine was increasing. The participants unanimously agreed to resume funding so that the project could be redrafted and ecological aspects be properly examined. An ecological assessment of a *produvka* of the Tashlyk water reservoir was also being delayed due to the lack of funds being supplied, as were works on nuclear safety at the SB nuclear power station.

A majority of those present²² held the opinion that construction works be completed in accordance with the two resolutions so that the Aleksandrov water reservoir and hydro-electric power station and the three aggregates of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station be launched and for the socio-economic development of the region to continue. Nikolaev *oblispolkom* and *Zelenyi Mir* objected to this, arguing that construction works may not resume until Ukrainian

²⁰ *Всесоюзная газета "Всем"*, no. 2, май 1991 г., с. 6.

²¹ The first meeting took place on 6 May, the second one, which lasted for several days, between 13 and 17 May.

²² The Iuzhnoukrainsk city Soviet, the leadership of the SB nuclear power station, Ukrainian *Derzhkompryroda*, Ukrainian *Gosplan*, Ukrainian *Minenergo*, USSR *Minatomenergoprom*, the Ukrainian Council of Ministers and the USSR Cabinet of Minister's Biuro on the Fuel and Energy Complex.

Goskompriroda had assessed the redrafted version of the project for the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station, thus keeping in line with Point Three of Resolution No. 647²³.

It was decided that the leadership of the SB nuclear power station and the *Iuzhnoukrainsk gorispolkom* in co-operation with a number of scientific institutions prepare a redrafted version of the SB EK project by 5 June 1991 and that this be presented to the oblast Soviet for discussion in June. Nikolaev *oblispolkom* and the leadership of the SB nuclear power station were instructed to contact the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, the USSR Cabinet of Minister's Biuro on the Fuel and Energy Complex and the USSR *Minfin* with a request to resume funding for the SB EK in preparation for *produvka* of the Tashlyk cooling pond and for the uncompleted objects at the construction site to be preserved in a safe manner, in addition for environmental activities to continue. Social development of the area could then also proceed, in addition to the redrafting of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station project. Prior to a decision being made regarding continued funding from Moscow, the nuclear power station was ordered to look for funds so that the redrafting of the Tashlyk station could start as soon as possible.

Whereas the first meetings were primarily informative, examining the implementation of the governmental decisions on the SB EK, the last meeting, which took place in Iuzhnoukrainsk on 10 June, and which was attended by representatives of the executive committees of all the regions adjacent to the nuclear power station in addition to the leadership of the nuclear power station, *Ukvgidroproekt*, *Atomenergoproekt* (Kharkiv branch) and *Atomgidroenergostroi*, a more precise version of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station project as well as socio-economic issues of the regions were debated at length. The meeting agreed to ask the oblast soviet to speed up the debate on the preliminary documents on the clarification of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station. The participants further endorsed the revamped project for the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station and recommended the constructors and the regional executive committees to produce figures for housing, social and cultural purposes to be included in the project²⁴. Individual agreements between the leadership of the nuclear power station and the regions involved were also signed. The draft agreement between General Director V. Fuks and the Chairman of the Arbuzinka regional Soviet A. Gorbach, for instance, stated very clearly that in return for the funding of social objects in the Arbuzinka region and in the small-town settlement of Arbuzinka, permission had to be granted by the Arbuzinka regional Soviet to continue construction of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station and the Fourth reactor of the SB nuclear power station (my

²³ Протокол совещания по вопросам финансирования работ в 1991 г. по Южно-Украинскому энергокомплексу, 6.5.1991.

²⁴ Протокол совещания по вопросам строительства объектов Южно-Украинского энергокомплекса, г. Южноукраинск, 10.6.1991.

underlining) based on the redrafted projects, having undergone the ecological-economic expert and been confirmed by the relevant authorities! A total of 98,740,000 roubles would be spent on social projects in the region. The breakdown of this sum showed, however, that only 34,840,000 roubles would be shared with regional organisations²⁵. Furthermore, the regional Soviet committed itself to deciding jointly with the leadership of the nuclear power station what this money would be spent on, thus limiting the former's ability to control investment on its own territory. Besides, contracts would be signed between the leadership of the nuclear power station and the construction organisations involved only - the regional Soviet would only be given status as an observer when these contracts were signed. The 'deal' thus turned out to be a lot less favourable towards the regions than envisaged initially²⁶. According to the protocol of a meeting held on 9 August 1991, this agreement and similar agreements between the leadership of the nuclear power station and the Voznesensk and Domonevsk regions were to be signed by 30 October²⁷.

The decision to include housing, social and cultural programmes in the revamped project, was in line with the Resolution that had been passed by the Soviet government in January 1991. The newspaper *Radianske Prihuzhzhia* reported that the sum earmarked for these purposes would amount to approximately 150 million roubles. As a result, officials from the regions within the 30 km zone had adopted a positive attitude to the project and eventually gave their consent to complete construction of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station with three aggregates. Their decision constituted a 180 degree turn-around from the position they had adopted three years previously, when the seven Chairmen of the regional Soviets had categorically rejected any further expansion of the SB EK. When asked to explain this sudden turn-around, Barbunov, the deputy chairman of the Aleksandrov small-town soviet, gave the following reason:

Раньше строили, не взирая на мнение местного населения. Даже это обстоятельство могло стать причиной конфликта. Сейчас обстановка изменилась. Рядом с поселком практически построен мощный гидроузел в составе основных сооружений...Много средств вложено в это строительство, как все это, не принося малейшей пользы, ржавеет, приходит в негодность. Народные деньги пропадают. Сейчас в Александровке сложилась такое мнение, что нам будет больше пользы от построенного объекта, чем от заброшенной, забытой всеми стройки. Мы ничего не теряем.

²⁵ Some 5,900,000 roubles would be spent on the project to conserve the Kostiantynov water reservoir, 35 million roubles would go towards the revamped project for the Tashlyk hydro-electrical power station and another 33 million towards the redrafted project for Reactor No. 4 of the SB nuclear power station.

²⁶ Проект, Договор № от "...1991 г. (as this was a draft project, no number and date were filled in on the copy I obtained in Nikolaev).

²⁷ Протокол совещания "экологические и социальные аспекты в уточненном проекте Ташлыкской ГЭС", г. Южноукраинск, 9.8.1991.

ведь уровень заполнения водохранилища будет зависеть и от нашего решения. А еще волнует социальное развитие села. В последнее время все сложнее строить новые объекты²⁸.

I. Burdin of the Voznesensk regional Soviet expressed a similar view, arguing that the opinion of the Soviet had probably changed as a result of the realities of life. The inhabitants of Voznesensk needed to see the social development of the region in a perspective, although far from everyone had agreed to allow the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station from being completed.

Iu. Landau, the Chief Engineer of the project for the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station, tried to justify the completion of the station on rational grounds. In an article labelled 'Problems of the Tashlyk Hydro-Electric Power Station', he argued that the three aggregates were needed to supply additional electricity to the power grid during peak hours. Since the station had been 90% completed, it would from an economic point of view make no sense to install an alternative gas turbine station as this would cost millions of roubles and would require gas, of which there was already a deficit in Ukraine. In addition there were the ecologically negative side-effects from using gas, caused by emissions into the atmosphere.

Following the decision of the Nikolaev oblast Soviet in October 1990, the project for the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station had been reworked and measures taken to reduce its impact on the environment to a minimum. The most serious environmental side-effect of the project would be that 300 hectares of land would be flooded for the Aleksandrov water reservoir. Those rare plants found on this land would however be reallocated to the adjacent nature reserve the Granite-Steppe Pobuzhe. Prognoses undertaken indicated that the water quality of the Aleksandrov water reservoir would not deteriorate as quickly as the Greens argued it would, given that there would be a continuous circulation of the water in it. Since the Aleksandrov water reservoir would not be connected to the South Bug river, the river would not suffer any further pollution. Archaeological research would finish in 1993 and flooding was therefore planned for the spring of 1994, when the water level in the river would reach its annual peak, thus reducing the impact on the river. The oblast could only benefit from the Aleksandrov water reservoir as it would provide a surplus during periods of poor water levels in the South Bug river²⁹.

The Greens, however, were not ready to compromise on this issue. S. Kolesnikov of the Voznesensk Greens were of the opinion that the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station would only do harm to the environment. Zolotukhin in a lengthy article accused the Soviets of Arbuzinka, Voznesensk and Domanevsk of falling prey to the new tactics of the pro-nuclear lobby. The

²⁸ *Радянське прибування*, 25.7.1991, с. 3.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

arguments against further expansion of the SB EK remained as strong now as before. But in addition to feeding the people with half truths and accusing its opponents of incompetence and 'emotions', the pro-nuclear lobby had discovered that it could

...Купить (подей), ориентируясь на пишегу, в котором оно пребывает вследствие ограбления его союзными ведомствами, т.е. вернуть народу часть изъятых у него денег.

The hard currency earned from exporting electricity from the Iuzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station still went straight into the pocket of the USSR *Minenergo* and *Minatomenergoprom*, bypassing the Ukrainian republic and the oblast. To pay off peoples' fears concerning nuclear power, a mere 10% of the budget would be returned. The resolution passed by the Soviet government in January 1991 could be labelled nothing but 'amoral', as after the reunification of Germany all the East German nuclear power stations were closed and decommissioning started, thus clearly illustrating their inherent lack of safety! Whereas the attitude of the Soviets involved was understandable, it could in no way be justified as it endangered not only the health of those living in the three regions concerned, but also of the inhabitants of the entire oblast.

Regarding social investments, Resolution No. 647 envisaged substantial sums to be used for such purposes. The money had been provided, but rather than be used for the intended purpose, the leadership of the nuclear power station had put this money towards the construction of six rather than three aggregates at the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station! As for the argument that the power station had almost been completed and that leaving it idle would mean that large sums of money would go to waste, this was unreasonable, given that construction had continued despite the ruling of the oblast Soviet to stop it until the project had been reworked and reassessed. The only reason why the hydro-electric power station was needed by the pro-nuclear lobby, said the Greens, was for the Tashlyk cooling pond and the Aleksandrov water reservoir to be connected. The pro-nuclear lobby had admitted that the 'Tashlyk cooling pond was not big enough to cool three reactors. The negative effects of the Aleksandrov water reservoir were well known from previous articles published in the press and from assessments made by various ministries and departments in addition to the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

The pro-nuclear lobby arrogantly continued to defy Ukrainian legislation, not only in the case of the SB EK, but also at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station, where reactor No. 6 was in the process of being completed, despite the moratorium on nuclear power passed by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. Similarly, ignoring Resolution No. 647 and the ban declared by the third session of the Nikolaev oblast Soviet on 16 October 1990, the nuclear lobby was trying to launch the first

aggregate of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station and to force through a *prodivka* of the Tashlyk cooling pond into the South Bug river³⁰.

Zolotukhin likened the pro-nuclear lobby's strategy on the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station to a Trojan horse, ready to make its entrance at the upcoming session of the oblast soviet, deceiving the local population and violating environmental legislation which ruled that any construction projects prior to being implemented had to be passed by an environmental impact assessment commission. So

Так неужели, понимая, ЧТО с нами делают, отпраздновав первую годовщину государственной независимости Украины, не за страх, а за совесть, мы не отстоим свою землю от посягательств союзного ведомства и позволим ему – без разработки проекта и без проведения его экологической экспертизы – строить Ташлыкскую ГАЭС?³¹

Zolotukhin in pure frustration with the current state of affairs, where the pro-nuclear lobby violated existing resolutions and Ukrainian legislation on the environment by continuing construction prior to a reworked project being passed by the environmental impact assessment commission and against the wishes of the local population and decisions made by the oblast Soviet, concluded that the Ukrainian writer S. Plachynda was right in pointing out that 'the path to survival is for Ukraine to obtain real independence and sovereignty'. Soviet nuclear power stations could best be likened to cancer lumps, which for centuries

Будут держать в объятиях метастаз радиоактивности все новые и новые поколения народа Украины, напоминая им о роковых болезнях тоталитарного режима, о халатности и бездушии³².

7.2 The Campaign "Защитим Детей от Радиации" and Nuclear Safety

Whereas *Zelenyi Mir* enjoyed the support of large segments of the population on the issue of the SB EK, it proved more difficult to mobilise people in support of other, related, green issues. In the spring of 1990 a campaign was undertaken in Voznesensk to strengthen the bank of the river Iuzhnoukrainsk. While people were willing to write letters and sign petitions and it was still possible to get them out on the streets to attend meetings and rallies, it proved more difficult to gain their support of the work of the Green Movement practically and financially. Iuzhnoukrainsk

³⁰ Велерий Николаен, 28.5.1991, с. 2.

³¹ Ibid., p 6.

³² Взм, no. 2/1991, с. 6.

Zelenyi Mir's Bulletin for April-May 1990 (No. 14), provided evidence for this. Whereas the Greens in Voznesensk succeeded in getting people to take part in their campaign, the situation was very different in the village of Semenovka, where an ecological *subbotnik* to clean the river bank was announced on the village radio. Only one woman (total population 2,000) showed up to assist the greens in their work!³³

In Iuzhnoukrainsk the Greens established an ecological fund in February 1990. In the course of two months Bilodid reported that not a single kopek had entered the fund's bank account. The conclusion to be drawn by this situation was obvious. As Bilodid wrote in his appeal to the citizens of Iuzhnoukrainsk to make contributions to the fund

Это еще раз доказывает, насколько безразличны вам экологические проблемы, что может пробудить вас от сначки: неужели новый Чернобыль?

This did not, however, 'put the Greens off'. The work against the Aleksandrov water reservoir, the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station and to secure Reactor No. 4 of the nuclear power station from ever being completed, continued with unchanged intensity during the spring and summer of 1990.

To commemorate the anniversary of the Chernobyl accident on 26 April, meetings were held in Nikolaev and elsewhere in the oblast. In Iuzhnoukrainsk, for instance, the Greens organised a picket in front of the entry to the nuclear power station from 5 to 6 o'clock in the evening. Bilodid's account of the picket was printed in *Biulleten* No. 14:

Первыми на место пикета прибыли стражами демократии с резиновыми дубинками. Четыре пикетчика с противогАЗах и с плакатами прибыли позже. Далее приехал мэр города, а также и ст. лейтенант милиции с задачей проверить содержание плакатов на "соответствие". Появился уазик с вневедомственной охраны АЭС, о целях и масштабах акции заранее по телефону оспедомились органы КГБ.

Тем не менее, пикетирование началось, позже прибыли еще три пикетчика из Братского со своими плакатами. Проезжающим по Николаевской трассе и едущим с работы со стройплощадки АЭС хорошо были видны плакаты: "Нет – второму Чернобылю", "Руки прочь от Южного Буга", "Южному Бугу – статус национального парка", "Выражаем недоверие руководству АЭС", "долю АЭС и КПСС".

В знак солидарности водителей с пикетчиками звучали автомобильные сирены³⁴.

³³ Информационный Бюллетень N 14, ЭА "Зеленый Мир", г. Южноукраинск, апрель-май 1990, с.4.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

In Nikolaev the whole day was used to mark the anniversary, which the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet had declared the 'Day of the Chernobyl Tragedy' through an edict issued on 29 March the same year. A rally took place in the afternoon.

Smaller meetings continued during the summer. One of these was held in the regional centre of Veselinovo (organised by the region Nature Protection Society, the Ukrainian Language Society and local members of *RUKH*). Although the topic of the meeting was the state of the general environment in the region, most attention was given to the SB nuclear power station. A Podolskii, who worked at the local hospital, urged that a real moratorium on the expansion of the SB nuclear power station be adopted and that hard currency earned through export of electricity from Iuzhnoukrainsk be included in the budget of the region so that monitoring and medical equipment to protect the health of the people living in the vicinity of the nuclear power station could be purchased³⁵.

The Greens had valid arguments against both the Aleksandrov water reservoir and the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station. They had the support of the oblast soviet, the oblast *Goskompriroda* and they were able to claim the support of one sixth (210,000 people) of the population of the oblast, who had signed their petition the previous year in support of an environmental impact assessment of the Second Stage of the SB EK. To give credibility to their campaign against Resolution No. 647, *Zelenyi Mir* once again chose to mobilise the general public through a signature campaign.

The campaign started with the publication of an open letter signed by 30 informal groups and organisations, amongst them *Zelenyi Mir*, *RUKH*, the Ukrainian Language Society, the Nature Protection Society, the oblast trade union council and Memorial in *Iuzhmaia pravda* on 27 July 1990. The letter, which covered more than half a page, in addition to summarising all the arguments so far used against further expansion of the SB EK, addressed the issue of nuclear safety.

As a starting point for this debate, the authors quoted the Academician N. Dubinin, who claimed that 'any increase in radiation makes an impact on the human genes, corresponding to the radiation dose'. Thus the nuclear power station posed a real threat to the health not only of present, but also of future generations. In addition, Nikolaev city got its drinking water from the river Dniepr, which was not only contaminated with radionuclides following the accident at Chernobyl, but into which radioactive cooling water from the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station was frequently emitted. This water also entered the Ingulets irrigation system, thus contaminating crops and soil throughout the oblast. To illustrate the seriousness of the situation, data provided

³⁵ *Южная правда*, 24.6.1990, с. 3.

by the oblast *Sanepidemstantsia* was cited: compared to 1985, the level of strontium-90 in the drinking water had increased by an average of 47 times. Caesium-134/137 concentrations had gone up 67 times. And although these levels were still below the maximum levels permitted, it still gave cause for concern. Moreover, no map had so far been made to show how the oblast was affected by the fall-out from Chernobyl. As for the Tashlyk cooling pond, its water was contaminated with tritium and other radioactive substances. Still, emissions were made from the cooling pond into the South Bug river, and fish from the pond was being sold to the population of the Nikolaev oblast. Radioactive food products were still delivered to the oblast from areas contaminated after the Chernobyl accident. No proper control had been established to monitor levels of radioactivity in food products. The enterprise *Oktiabr*, which produced cheap dosimeters for this purpose did not get a go-ahead from the Nikolaev raisspolkom, under whose auspices it worked.

The worst threat of all, though, was the continued expansion of the SB nuclear power station. Despite the fact that the oblast *Goskompriroda* had passed a decision to stop construction of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station and the Aleksandrov water reservoir and hydro-electric power station from 10 February 1990, pending the reassessment of the project and a second state environmental impact assessment, construction work continued in the name of securing safety at the nuclear power station. As for direct measures to secure safety at the nuclear power station, including testing of seismicity, the leadership of the nuclear power station failed to find money for this. An appeal was made to people's deputies at all levels to put an end to any further construction at the site:

„Мы хотим спросить у народных депутатов всех уровней Советов - не пора ли решением областного Совета остановить это преступное хозяйствование союзного ведомства на нашей земле? Не пора ли предъявить конкретный счет Минатомэнергопрому СССР за весь нанесенный нашей земле непоправимый экологический урон и на этом основании, по примеру Ростовского областного Совета, в районных, городских и областной сессиях Советов принять решение не только о прекращении всякого строительства, в том числе и консервации ненужных объектов, но и о поэтапном введении из работы всех блоков АЭС?

As for safety at the existing reactors of the nuclear power station, the letter revealed that Reactor No. 1 had a higher incidence rate than was allowed. The protective shields of both reactors No. 1 and 2 were emitting more radioactivity than permitted. Moreover, control with the running of the reactors themselves was incomplete, and the nuclear power station was not constructed so as to withstand earthquakes reaching seven to eight points on the Richter scale.

Further complicating the situation was the recent decision made by the Russian Supreme Soviet no longer to accept radioactive waste from other republics. In other words, radioactive materials which had earlier been transported to Krasnoyarsk in Siberia for processing and storage, would now have to be stored at the SB nuclear power station itself.

Should a serious accident take place, the impact may be even more serious on the area than the Chernobyl accident was, given that within a 40 km radius of the nuclear power station there are 45 habitations with a population of more than 350,000 people - seven times more than at Chernobyl.

Since the Nikolaev oblast only received 12% of the electricity produced at the nuclear power station (most of the electricity was exported to Romania and to Odessa oblast), the authors of the letter asked if the price was not too high to pay for 'hosting' the nuclear power station on the territory of the oblast. What was more, from 1983 to 1989, the SB nuclear power station had utilised 25% of the oblast's capacity in terms of water and soil resources. In the opinion of the public, no sum of money could compensate for the loss of water, soil and possibly also people's health - as these were in themselves invaluable. Those receiving the electricity produced at the nuclear power station should also take a proportionate amount of the radioactive waste for storage - thus paying the real price for this electricity.

The conclusion of the data given above could only be one - namely to close down the nuclear power station and to develop alternative sources of energy to replace it. Such alternatives existed, and they were not only a few:

И пусть после этого никто нас не упрекает в местничестве, ибо не существует общегосударственных интересов без учета и тем более во вред местным интересам!

The letter ended with the following appeal:

Уважаемые николаевцы, перестройка дает нам шанс, опираясь на Закон о местном самоуправлении, защитить наших детей от радиации и отстоять право на будущее! Мы обращаемся ко всем жителям Николаевской области с просьбой поддержать действия общественности и наших депутатов всех уровней Советов в этом направлении, для чего развернуть повсюду сбор подписей под настоящим обращением (кроме подписей, обязательно укажите фамилию, имя, отчество, домашний адрес или место работы) и пересылать их по адресу: 327001, г. Николаев, ул. Розы Люксембург, 54, Фонд Культуры, для экологической ассоциации - это и будет нашим референдумом!

An appeal was made to the Chairman of the oblast soviet of people's deputies, I. Hrytsai, to immediately set up an emergency commission on the SB EK - with the participation of the general public - to elaborate concrete solutions to the questions raised in the letter and to put forward suggestions to the Second Session of the oblast and other soviets. The authors of the letter demanded that these decisions be made public in the press. A list of seven questions this commission should discuss was provided³⁶.

7.2.1 Response to the Campaign

The letter produced an enormous response. A number of letters and decisions made by workers' collectives were published in *Iuzhnaia pravda* and *Zelenyi Mir* received a large amount of mail, following their appeal. Special forms were distributed amongst informal groups, which these used for collecting signatures.

Some 309 signatures were collected at the Nikolaev *Spetsavtopredpriatie*-1405, and the director, the chairman of the trade union committee and STK wrote that

Прочитав обращение общественных организаций "Защитим детей от радиации!" работники НСАТП-1405 сочли своим долгом откликнуться на это обращение. На предприятии работает 400 человек. Обращение подписали 309, остальные находятся в отпусках, в командировках и на больничных, но они так же, мы уверены, подписали бы это обращение. "НАМ, НАШИМ ДЕТЯМ И ВПУКАМ — ЧИСТУЮ ВОДУ, ЗЕМЛЮ, НЕБО!"³⁷.

³⁶ The issues to be discussed by the emergency commission were the following:

- 1) to immediately stop irrigation in the Snihirevsk and the Zhovten regions with water from the Ingulets irrigation system and in the Arbusinka region - with water from the Tashlyk cooling pond. A ban must also be made on commercial fishing in the Tashlyk water reservoir.
- 2) all kindergartens and schools in the oblast must be provided with clean drinking water and children should be put on a diet containing added calcium and calium, which would replace radionuclides already absorbed by their bodies. Proper control must be introduced for food-products to make sure that they were not radioactive when sold to the population of the oblast.
- 3) Nikolaev city must be provided with drinking water from the South Bug river and from ground water sources. Water from the Dniepr should only be used following a cleansing process to rid it of radionuclides.
- 4) Assistance must be provided to the enterprise *Oktiabr* and other enterprises producing radiation monitoring equipment. Beginning from the third quarter of 1990, all households should be provided with dosimeters.
- 5) A radiological map must be made of Nikolaev oblast.
- 6) Construction at the SB EK must be stopped immediately, including reactor No. 4 at the SB nuclear power station.
- 7) Reactors No. 1,2 and 3 must gradually be taken out of use.

³⁷ 'Фонду Культуры для экологической ассоциации от работников НСАТП-1405', available in Панка 30: Резолюции митингов, собраний жителей, коллективов предприятий, общественных организаций о запрещении строительства Ташлыкского и Александровского водохранилищ, 4-5 блоков ЮУ АЭС и др.

A similar letter, signed by 5,000 people, was sent from the NHZ trade union conference on 9 August:

Участники профсоюзной конференции НГЗ решительно поддерживают обращение общественных организаций опубликованное в газете "Южная Правда" от 27 июля 90 г. под названием "Защитим детей от радиации". Требуем рассмотреть поднятое в обращении вопросы на очередной сессии депутатов областного совета с обеспечением прямой трансляции и опубликовании стенограмм и результатов поименного голосования депутатов в газете "Южная Правда".

The letter was signed by the Chairman of the trade union, V. Buriak³⁸.

The trade union of *Ekvator* had collected 4,000 signatures toward the end of September, the enterprise *Zaria* sent 12,000 signatures over to *Zelenyi Mir* and on 15 October the Chairman of the oblast *sovprof* (Soviet trade union) V. Linnikov presented the Greens with very good news:

В трудовых коллективах области на профсоюзных собраниях 106 тыс. трудящихся одобрили открытое обращение общественных организаций "Защитим детей от радиации". В полном составе за подписание этого обращения проголосовали медработники, рабочие и ИТР местной промышленности и коммунально-бытовых предприятий. Николаевского трансформаторного завода, активно поддерживали обращение судостроители, сваялисты, работники культуры³⁹.

Altogether, the Greens succeeded in collecting approximately 250,000 signatures in support of the campaign and much attention was given to the case of nuclear safety in the oblast following the campaign, thus giving the Greens a boost. Also local authorities expressed their support for the campaign. On 21 September, for instance, the Voznesensk regional soviet of people's deputies passed a decision regarding the campaign, in which it expressed its support. The deputies of the oblast soviet were encouraged to make concrete decisions on those questions raised in the collective letter printed in *Iuzhnaia pravda*⁴⁰.

Not everybody was happy with the campaign launched in *Iuzhnaia pravda*, though. Bilodid in a letter to Zolotukhin dated 6 August passed on extracts from letters received by the Iuzhnoukrainsk party *gorkom* from people throughout the oblast, in which the Greens were criticised:

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ No. 07-19/712, in Папка 30, ibid.

⁴⁰ Вознесенский районный совет народных депутатов, III сессия XXIII созыва, решение от 21 сентября 1990 г., signed by the Chairman of the regional soviet, M. Moskalenko.

После затяжного кризиса пытается заявить о себе Николаевская э.а. Причем, ее руководитель, Золотухин А.И., пытался возложить на себя функции "объединителя" неформальных движений, старается найти такую проблему, которая бы заинтересовала всех. На последнем заседании э.а. такая проблема нашла и получила название "Защитим детей от радиации"...Обращение было рассмотрено на координационном совете содействии перестройке. Каким будет их заключение - не известно. Но обращение подписано и может получить широкий резонанс. Сегодня пока удалось сгладить крайние формулировки и требования обращения, но гарантировать то, что сторонники УРП, РУХА и др...не попытаются перевести предложения экологов на митинговый язык, мы не можем. Поэтому общественность должна знать, что на обращение будет соответствующее решение Обласовета и обкома КПУ...Нельзя не заметить, что нынешний всплеск политической активности Николаевской э.а. совпал по времени с обсуждением в республике идеи преобразования э.а. в ПЗУ. Об этом свидетельствует хотя бы общественное мнение в последнем номере печатного органа ассоциации "ЗС".

Bilodid urged Zolotukhin to adopt a very cautious approach towards those members of *Zelenyi Mir* who were also members of the CPSU as such judgements were made first and foremost by them. Throughout 1988 and 1989 Zolotukhin had tried to consolidate different political currents behind the campaign against further expansion of the SB EK. As seen above, the Pervomaisk Greens were predominantly members of the CPSU. Bilodid had all along been sceptical of the communists and as he said:

Я давно просил вас не заигрывать с ними. Это может плохо кончиться. Информую вас, что по нашим сведениям, именно работники ЮУ горкома КПУ срывают с наших щитов всякую не устраивающую их информацию.

Finally, Bilodid pointed out that the petition did not gain much support in Iuzhnoukrainsk, as a matter of fact it had put the Greens there in a rather difficult position⁴¹.

As glasnost and democratisation took hold it became possible to express increasingly freely attitudes critical to those of the Communist Party and official authorities generally. An increasing number of informal groups with very different political agendas emerged, and as pointed out in Chapter Four, the Greens lost quite a large number of its members to these, and later to political parties. Moreover, the Green Movement, like any other informal organisation, became increasingly politicised in the sense that people with different political beliefs tried to pull their views through as being representative of the movement. From a democratic point of view, this could be seen as positive. From an organisational point of view the same was not necessarily the

⁴¹ See letter from Bilodid to Zolotukhin of 6.8.1990.

case. There was a lack of political culture, or rather a 'culture of discussion', in the former USSR and emotional clashes rather than organised factions promoting their views within the movement characterised *Zelenyi Svit* throughout the latter half of 1989/early 1990. Given the difficult task *Zelenyi Mir* faced, it would not be in the interests of the Green Movement to lose track of its aims due to political in-fighting in the movement. Zolotukhin was therefore faced with the rather difficult task of keeping the movement united and at the same time not annihilate other political actors, such as the oblast CPU, since although preferred methods differed, the party organisation had more or less the same goals as the Greens in the case of the SB EK.

7.2.2 The Need to Clean the Tashlyk Cooling Pond

Towards the end of 1990, the pro-nuclear lobby once again provoked the anger and concern of not only the Greens but also of local and oblast authorities. The leadership of the SB nuclear power station claimed that for reasons of safety, it had become expedient to clean the water of the Tashlyk water reservoir, by emitting dirty water into the South Bug river while simultaneously pumping in clean water from higher up the river (*produvka*). This was absolutely necessary as the salts, whose level in the cooling pond had reached a critical level, might corrode the cooling pipes surrounding the reactors, which might in turn trigger off a serious accident.

On 16-17 October the question was debated by the oblast soviet. I.Hrytsai expressed serious concern about the new situation, calling for full openness regarding time-schedules and frequency of the proposed *produvki*. He also called for alternatives to *produvka*, given that the water contained in the Tashlyk water reservoir contained radioactive substances. During 1991, he said, all households in the oblast should have access to cheap dosimeters for personal use. Hrytsai also expressed his concern about the way in which the leadership of the SB nuclear power station was implementing Resolution No. 647. Despite the USSR Council of Ministers' demand that the project be reassessed and examined by the environmental impact assessment commission prior to any further construction, the old project was being followed unchanged. What was more, USSR *Minatomenergo* was planning to conduct testing of the two main aggregates of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station in 1990-91, i.e. prior to the development of a new project, based on the revaluation of the original project⁴².

Suslova, Chudaikina (also a people's deputy of the oblast soviet) and Zolotukhin - the latter attended the session in his capacity as leader of *Zelenyi Mir* - pointed out that the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences had stated very clearly its dislike for a *produvka*. Besides, it was not the case that there were no alternatives. Already three years earlier, the Green Movement had

⁴² *Енергетик*, 25.10.1990, с. 2.

proposed other methods for cleaning the water in the Tashlyk water reservoir. Also the Kharkiv branch of *Atomenergoproekt* had offered to develop water cleansing facilities for the cooling pond⁴³. Why, then, was it so important for the leadership of the nuclear power station to obtain permission to emit contaminated water directly into the South Bug river?

The answer was found in an assessment of *prodavka* produced by Shapovalov of the oblast soviet's Committee on the Environment⁴⁴. The report indicated that there were two ways of cleansing the water in the cooling pond for salts (natural salts and radioactive substances were concentrated in the cooling pond due to excessive evaporation caused by large quantities of heated water entering the pond from the nuclear power station): on the one hand, contaminated water could be emitted directly into the South Bug river. Or cleansing devices could be installed close by the cooling pond, removing the salts and the radionuclides, which would later be buried in safe containers.

Whereas the second option would be safer, given that concentrations of radionuclides in the cooling pond were higher than in the river, and given that radionuclides were known to migrate, the first option was no doubt a lot cheaper, and therefore favoured by the leadership of the nuclear power station. The leadership of the nuclear power station even claimed that there were no particular dangers involved with *prodavka*, as the levels of radioactive substances such as tritium and caesium 134/137 were well within the acceptable limits. Shapovalov's report contested this view, arguing that the concentration of radioactive substances in the bottom silt layer in the Tashlyk cooling pond had not been examined. This was, however, likely to be higher at the bottom than in the surface waters. Besides, it was known from the Chernobyl accident that silt actively accumulated radioactivity. Finally, it was highly relevant as in case of a *prodavka*, water would be emitted through pipes located at the bottom of the water reservoir. Silt would therefore also be emitted into the South Bug river.

Having debated the issue at length, the oblast soviet ruled against *prodavka*. A decision⁴⁵ was passed on 15 October banning *prodavka* without the consent of the oblast soviet and simultaneously ordering the director of the SB nuclear power station, V. Fuks, to take the required measures to bring the water quality of the cooling pond in line with the requirements for the

⁴³ No. 22146/227-1483, of 7.12.1989, in which *Atomenergoproekt* in line with Resolution No. 647's recommendation that cleansing devices be used rather than *prodavka* when cleaning the water of the Tashlyk cooling pond, suggested the SB nuclear power station to develop such devices.

⁴⁴ Обоснование к решению сессии областного Совета народных депутатов о необходимости продувки Ташлыкского водохранилища в реку Южный Буг, signed by S. Shapovalov.

⁴⁵ Никопольский областной совет народных депутатов. Решение от 16.10.90. 3-сессии 21-созыва, г. Николаев "О запрещении продувки Ташлыкского водохранилища в реку Южный Буг", signed by the Chairman of the oblast Soviet, I. Hrytsai.

exploitation of nuclear power stations. The decision did in effect require the nuclear power station to install cleansing devices by the Tashlyk water reservoir.

The response from the pro-nuclear lobby was as expected not particularly favourable towards the Greens. Whereas the former could agree with the Greens that there was a need to protect nature from destruction, it did not approve of their methods:

Но категорические требования "зеленых" закрыть, запретить то или иное вредное производство объективно толкают страну к бедности. Не хотим же мы жить завтра хуже, чем сегодня? Поэтому должна быть определена сбалансированная программа, решающая вопросы энергии, продовольствия и экологии. Нашим детям и внукам недостаточно оставить только чистые воду, землю, и небо. Им еще нужны сла, свет и тепло⁴⁶.

The Greens throughout the latter half of 1990 and early 1990 continued their struggle to prevent any further expansion of the SB EK and to prevent a *prodivka* from the Tashlyk water reservoir. In doing so they were in line with the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet's Resolution 'On the Ecological Situation in the Republic and Measures for its Fundamental Improvement', which was adopted by its 12th session in February 1990. The resolution called for the gradual realisation of measures to improve the ecological state of the Ukrainian rivers, amongst which were the Dniepr and South Bug and also for any further expansion of the capacity of Ukrainian nuclear power stations to be banned⁴⁷.

7.2.3 Changing Political Circumstances

The Putsch

Zelenyi Mir in Nikolaev was the first informal organisation in the oblast to publicly protest the Putsch which took place in Moscow on 19 August 1991. A telegram was sent to the Speaker of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Lukianov and two people's deputies from the oblast, Lisnitskii and Opolinskii, as well as to the Speaker of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, Kravchuk, on 20 August. In the telegram⁴⁸, *Zelenyi Mir* voiced its protest against the Putsch:

Протестуем против антиконституционного захвата власти.
Требуем предоставить возможность выступить перед народом

⁴⁶ *Энергетик*, 25.10.1990, с. 2.

⁴⁷ Двенадцатая сессия Верховного Совета Украинской ССР (одиннадцатый созыв) 16-17 февраля 1990 года. Стенографический отчет (Киев: 'Политиздат Украины', издательство 'Политической Литературы Украины', 1990 г.), с. 254-55.

⁴⁸ Copy of telegram text was given to me by Zolotukhin in June 1994.

законно избранному президенту СССР, М. Горбачеву. Президиуму Верховного Совета Украины просим поддерживать наше требование.

The telegram was signed on behalf of the Greens by Zolotukhin.

The leadership of the SB nuclear power station at an early stage of the Putsch voiced its support of those responsible for it. This was easily understandable, as all Soviet nuclear power stations were run by Soviet ministries and departments, rather than by republican ones. The introduction of glasnost and democratisation in the USSR had as far as the administrations of the nuclear power stations were concerned, brought with it nothing but interference in their affairs by Greens and others, sceptical of nuclear power. Promises to return to the discipline and order of the Soviet Union of the past, were by the leadership of the SB nuclear power station not seen as a bad thing at all.

However, on this matter, as on environmental issues related to the work of the nuclear power station, Fuks and his administration failed to get the support of all personnel in Iuzhnoukrainsk. On 22 August, he was handed a letter signed by 34 members of staff, with the following content:

КОЛЛЕКТИВНОЕ ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ

В связи с тем, что за прошедшую неделю на АЭС приняты раз приказы и распоряжений, ужесточающий режим и ограничительный существовавший ранее распорядок (приказ N 376, распоряжение NN 132, 464) оперативный персонал АЭС заявляет:

1. Данные приказы и распоряжения приняты в период правления страшной хунты во исполнение ее постановлений. Хунту поддерживал ВПК, частью которого является Средмаш. Коллектив МАЭП, направившая на ЮУ АЭС телекс 06-97 от 19.8.91 также фактически поддерживал лунтистов.

2. Мы считаем, что данные приказы и распоряжения приняты под "надуманными предлогами типа "усиления качества и эффективности обходов" и "индивидуальной работы с людьми" и т.д. и направленных против "угрозы безопасности АЭС". Никаких объективных причин для этого нет.

3. Со своей стороны мы всегда считали и считаем безопасность и надежность работы АЭС своим профессиональным долгом. Требуем отмены приказов и распоряжений, принятых в период государственного переворота и направленных на ограничение прав и свобод персонала АЭС.

4. Оперативный персонал АЭС решительно осуждает хунту и поддерживавших ее деятелей МКЧП. Требуем разбирательства руководителями, оказавшимися неспособными оценить действия вышестоящих инстанций с правовой точки зрения⁴⁹.

⁴⁹ Copy of this letter (hand-written) was given to me by Bilodid in June 1994.

This letter confirmed what I have said earlier (see Chapter Six) that the staff of the SB nuclear power station was not a homogenous group, which in everything supported its leadership. There were different views as to how best to secure the safety of the nuclear station and one important element in such a strategy as reflected by those who signed the above quoted letter, must be the legal commitment and openness on matters concerning nuclear power.

Zelenyi Mir and the Question of Ukrainian Independence

Following the Putsch, *Zelenyi Mir* intensified its demands for Ukrainian independence. The environmental legacy of the USSR was stressed in general, as was the particular damage caused to Ukraine:

Все республики без исключения пострадали от старого Союза, но Украина особенно: Чернобыль, химизация сельского хозяйства, уничтожение Днепра, Черного и Азовского морей. Только в колонии можно было на лучших черноземах посадить 35 крупных металлургических комбинатов, 19 блоков АЭС без воды для охлаждения, в сейсмоопасных районах. В результате союзного "хозяйствования" Украины в экологическом отношении оказалась в наихудшем состоянии из всех государств мира. Сегодня смертность на Украине превышает рождаемость, а средняя продолжительность жизни одна из самых низких в Европе. Фактически это дает основание говорить о геноциде против Украинского народа⁵⁰.

Great care should be taken to destroy the old economic and political structures which had caused so much harm to the environment, prior to any new alliance or union being set up between the former Soviet republics:

Не получится ли так, что подобное вхождение законсервирует существующую экономическую и экологическую ситуацию? В самом деле дальнейшее функционирование существующих металлургических предприятий, АЭС, ГЭС не улучшит экологической обстановки. Геноцид народа будет продолжен.

Concern was raised at the prospect of conservation of *Minatomenergoprom* and any attempt at continuing the construction of nuclear power stations on Ukrainian territory to serve the energy needs of any other former Soviet republic.

The Greens' view of Ukrainian independence was further elaborated over the following months. In an article, which appeared in *Radianske Pribuzhzhia* in August 1993⁵¹, Zolotukhin

⁵⁰ *Радянське Прибужжя*, 30.11.1991, с. 2.

⁵¹ *Радянське Прибужжя*, 19.8.1993, с. 2.

claimed that any state should be 'environmentally independent' - i.e. be in control of its natural resources and be able to regulate the emission of dangerous pollutants on its own territory. The emergence of the CIS should be seen not as a permanent solution for the former republics of the USSR, but rather as a step towards full environmental independence, for which political and economic independence were necessary prerequisites:

...Право на існування мають білі природні утворення, ніж штучні або примусові. Якщо дотримуватися цього принципу у державотворенні, то ніяких проблем не буде. СНД буде доти штучним утворенням, доки кожна держава, котра до її не входить, не стане природно незалежною. Так само для України природно мати державною мовою українську мову. Пройшло досить часу, щоб можна було переконатися у штучності створення як комунізму, так і переважної більшості членів Верховної Ради, і тому можна впевнено сказати ресурс довіри до них народом вичерпано.

7.3 Ukrainian Independence - Adaptation and Continued Campaigning (August 1991-June 1994)

Ever since it emerged in 1988, members of *Zelenyi Svit* claimed that the only way in which the state of the environment in Ukraine could be improved was by gaining control of its natural resources and industries, including the nuclear power stations located on Ukrainian territory. This was necessary as the interests of 'Moscow' and of the republic were not matched in the area of the environment. Ukraine's political and economic 'subordination' to Moscow thus posed an obstacle to environmental reform.

Below, I will examine the continued struggle to save the South Bug river following the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991. The key issues remained the same: on the one hand, the issue of how better to clean the water of the Tashlyk cooling pond had to be settled. On the other hand, a decision had to be reached on the future of the SB EK. The decision-making process was initially somewhat delayed by institutional changes required as the responsibility for the nuclear power industry in Ukraine was passed over from former Soviet to Ukrainian institutions.

7.3.1 Institutional Changes

In December a new concern - *Ukratomenergoprom* (The Ukrainian Atomic Energy Industry Concern) - was established in Kiev to take over the tasks of the former USSR *Minenergetiki*. The concern would be in charge of the five Ukrainian nuclear power stations (Iuzhnoukrainsk, Rivne, Khmelnytskyi, Zaporizhzhia and Chernobyl) as well as the industry and the scientific institutions supporting these, and would be an independent entity. The major tasks of the new concern, were:

- 1) to secure the reliable operation of the nuclear power stations
- 2) to increase safety (my emphasis) at the nuclear power stations and
- 3) to voice the social concerns of the workers' collectives at the nuclear power stations⁵².

Ukratomenergoprom would be directly subordinated to the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers, and although it was to operate as an independent entity, would to some extent depend on the *Minekonomiki* (Ministry of Economy), which would fix electricity prices based on a set of indicators for fuel- and production costs. With regard to the nuclear power stations themselves, though, the Concern was legally independent.

Ukratomenergoprom was to be run by its Chairman and a Council, the members of which would be appointed on the recommendation of the Cabinet of Ministers. Mikhail Umanets (the General Director of the Chernobyl nuclear power station during the clean-up following the accident there) was appointed Chairman of the Concern, whereas the General Director of the SB nuclear power station, Volodymyr Fuks, became Chairman of the Council.

Volodymyr Fuks expressed the priorities of the Concern to the newspaper of the Nikolaev oblast soviet, *Radianske Pribuzhzhia*, as follows:

Главное для нас - безопасная и надежная работа всех коллективов по обеспечению потребителей электроэнергией. Справиться с этой задачей для нас — дело чести⁵³.

7.3.2 Energy Situation in Ukraine following the Collapse of the USSR

Unlike Russia, Ukraine was not blessed with large oil or gas deposits. Oil, gas and mazut for the thermal power stations were imported from Russia, whereas electricity from the nuclear power stations was exported partly to the European part of Russia, partly to Moldova and abroad. The collapse of the USSR and Russian demands that the former Soviet republics pay for its oil and gas

⁵² *Радянське Прибузжжя*, 30.1.1992, с. 2.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

in hard currency, facilitated an energy crisis in Ukraine, in the sense that it was politically and economically undesirable to remain dependent on Russian fuel. Moreover, for security reasons, the Ukrainian government would prefer to be supplied with oil and gas from other countries than Russia.

Fuks, praising the advantages of nuclear power, referred to this crisis: whereas Ukraine was short of fuel for its thermal power stations, and water in the water reservoirs, which provided the input of the hydroelectric power stations was scarce, the nuclear power stations worked in a stable manner, producing a quarter of the total energy output in the country. Besides, hard currency generated from exporting nuclear power would now be controlled by the republic. The only problem related to nuclear power, as seen by Fuks, was that the nuclear fuel would have to be obtained from Russia, and that current prices as compared to Soviet ones had increased by eight to nine times. This was, however, a minor problem. The emphasis should therefore be on nuclear power and on energy saving, by making the customers pay a realistic price for the fuel supplied to them. So far, neither individuals nor industrial units had had any incentives to do so, as electricity prices were set ridiculously low. In the case of certain enterprises, for instance, the price on energy were several times below the cost of production.

As for the possibility of expanding the existing capacity of the Ukrainian nuclear power stations, this was non-existent, given that the *Verkhovna Rada* in February 1990 had adopted a moratorium on the continued construction of nuclear reactors at existing nuclear power stations, and the establishment of new nuclear reactors. This, however, did not prevent the pro-nuclear lobby from lobbying the parliament (*Verkhovna Rada*) and the government to have the moratorium lifted on the grounds that only nuclear power could solve the energy crisis in Ukraine. The struggle primarily against nuclear power and secondarily for a status quo, which the Greens had so successfully fought throughout the latter half of the 1980s and which culminated in *Verkhovna Rada's* adopting of the moratorium, was therefore revitalised. *Zelenyi Mir*, as will be seen below, consequently intensified its alternative energy campaign, in addition to continuing the struggle against *produvka* and any further expansion of the SB EK.

7.3.3 Campaigns and Issues

The Aleksandrov Water Reservoir and the Tashlyk Hydro-Electric Power Station

As seen in the first section, despite restrictions on capacity, attempts were made at constructing for full capacity, i.e. in accordance with the original plans. The Greens tried to stop this as well as arguing the case that the Aleksandrov water reservoir was not strictly needed. Water towers could

replace the Tashlyk cooling pond and excess electricity for peak hours could be generated by gas-powered turbines rather than by a hydro-electric power station.

Although construction continued at the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station and at the Aleksandrov water reservoir - where local opposition had been swept away with the adoption of Resolution No. 1 by the Soviet Government in January 1991 - Green pressure to have the original projects revised did eventually pay off. In October 1991 *Zelenyi Mir* received a letter from *Derzhkompriroda*, informing the Greens that the original project for the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station had been revised by the planners⁵⁴. The revised project, which also contained an impact analysis on the environment, had been sent over to the leadership of the nuclear power station. Prior to submitting the revised project to USSR *Goskompriroda* for an environmental impact assessment assessment, the project would be made accessible at oblast level for discussion. A final decision would then be made by the government, taking into account the result of the environmental impact assessment and the opinion of those living in the area of the SB hydroelectric complex. The economic interests of sovereign Ukraine would also have to be considered.

The Greens' position regarding the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station was presented in a detailed assessment made by Zhuk and Bilodid and dated 16 October. The two Greens referred to Resolution No. 647 and to the decision of the oblast Soviet of one year before (16 October 1990), which prohibited any continuation of the construction and funding of the Tashlyk station as of 1 January 1991. The Greens' position remained firm: there was no need for the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station and to the extent the extra electricity would be needed, this could be achieved at a considerably lower economic and environmental cost by setting up gas-driven turbines at the nuclear power station.

The very idea of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station was outdated as far as the Greens were concerned, given that in the original plans it was projected to cover for peak-hours for six operating nuclear reactors - not for three, as was the case in the autumn of 1991. The Tashlyk station would generate electricity during the night, which would be stored and fed onto the electricity grid when needed. Excess electricity from the nuclear power station would power the turbo generators of the Tashlyk hydro-electric station during such night hours, as a drop in energy consumption at night-time was envisaged in the project. However, according to information provided by the dispatcher at the nuclear power station and *Odessaenergo* at the time of the

⁵⁴ This work was conducted by the Ukrainian Branch of the Institute *Gidroproekt*. The letter referred to is No. 6/2-10/3-32 of 11.10.1991 "Про будівництво Ташликської ГАЕС і Олександрівського водосховища", written in reply to letter No. 70 of 17.9.1991, and signed by First Deputy Chairman of *Goskompriroda*, V. Ribachuk.

writing of the assessment, no such drop in consumption had been registered. Rather, there was a general energy deficit. Consequently, the economic efficiency of the hydro-electric station would be dramatically reduced and would be problematic even if electricity prices would be doubled or tripled. Moreover, the energy output at the Tashlyk station would be insignificant compared to the size of the required economic investments. As a matter of fact, no such analysis had yet been conducted by *Goskompriroda*, only by USSR and Ukrainian *Gosplan*. The economic benefits of the nuclear power station itself were indeed questionable in the opinion of Zhuk and Bilodid:

Чистий ефект від експлуатації пуск склада 20 млн. крб. на рік. "Цей ефект одержаний при умові, що в проекті вартість АЕС не включена вартість всього атомно-енергетичного циклу, включаючи захоронення реакторних блоків після закінчення строку їх експлуатації", навіть і далі: "цей ефект стає від'ємним, якщо врахувати економічні оцінки втрат за рахунок вилучення земель від промислового будівництва".

A second, no less valid reason for not going ahead with the hydro-electric power station, they argued, was that the project envisaged the separation of the deepest part (depth close to 50 m) of the Tashlyk cooling pond by a dam so as to supply the Tashlyk station with water (to run the latter's upper hydraulic pump). In this way water from the cooling pond would get into direct contact with the South Bug river. Given that water quality in the cooling pond did not comply with sanitary norms for a number of substances and that tritium and other radionuclides were accumulating in it, this was inadmissible from an ecological point of view. Furthermore, cutting off the deepest part of the cooling pond would greatly reduce its reactor cooling capacity. Consequently, new cooling facilities would have to be created (sprinkle ponds), which in turn would require further investments. Such a solution was not logical and could only be explained as an attempt, on the side of the leadership of the nuclear power station, towards the complete implementation of the original project for the SB EK.

Zhuk and Bilodid could also not see how the Aleksandrov water reservoir could be justified. From an ecological point of view it was clear that it would cause great damage to the South Bug river. The ecosystem of the river was already almost completely destroyed as a result of severe pollution. Existing cleansing facilities were in a pitiful state and the flow of the river was greatly reduced by more than 3,500 ponds built on the river, some of which were attached to small hydro-electric power stations. Should the rapids of the river be flooded the unique natural aerohydrodynamic filter of the river would be considerably reduced. No artificial enrichment of the river water with oxygen would be able to replace this. Flooding the river would therefore be a

crime in the opinion of *Zelenyi Mir*. The whole point of creating a nature reserve (*Granitno-Stepnoe Pribuzhe*) would thus fall apart.

Due to its reduced water flow, the water temperature in the South Bug river was already reaching critical levels during the summer months (28 degrees had been measured, whereas the absolute temperature limit was 28.2 degrees). It seemed obvious that the presence of two big water reservoirs on the river (the Aleksandrov and part of the Tashlyk) could only contribute to a further temperature increase due to the continued slowing-down of the river's water flow. As noted previously, there were also archaeological and aesthetic reasons for not building the two water reservoirs: far from all the registered archaeologically interesting sites had been examined yet, and the destruction of some of the most beautiful and significant parts of the river could be defended neither from an ecological, nor from a moral point of view. Besides, South Bug remained the only river in Ukraine of a considerable size not to have been destroyed by 'artificial oceans' or rather by 'stinking marshes'. For this reason alone, it should be protected for future generations to enjoy.

Finally, Zhuk and Bilodid drew the following conclusion:

Таким чином напрашується висновок: затрати, пов'язані з техногенною дією комплексу і непередбаченими довгостроковими наслідками його експлуатації настільки значні, що перекреслюють ті економічні вигоди, які республіка матиме з додаткового виробництва електроенергії.

All the objects of the SB EK ought to be transferred to local authorities for them to put them into other use⁵⁵.

The issue of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station and the Aleksandrov water reservoir was debated at length during the Fifth oblast meeting of *Zelenyi Mir* in December 1991. The meeting issued a resolution in which, once again, concern was expressed that construction work at the site of the hydro-electric power station continued unchanged. On the basis of the conclusions provided by the environmental impact assessment commission of the SB EK in 1989 and recent information made available, *Zelenyi Mir* recommended that construction of the Tashlyk station and the Aleksandrov water reservoir be prohibited⁵⁶.

The campaign to stop construction at the site of the SB EK continued throughout 1992. More arguments were provided by *Zelenyi Mir* in *Radianske Pribuzhzhia* on 18 January 1992⁵⁷. The

⁵⁵ See Ташлицька ГЕС-ГАЕС, signed by Zhuk and Bilodid on 16.10.1991. Document provided by Bilodid.

⁵⁶ Решение 5-го областного собрания Николаевской областной экологической ассоциации "Зеленый Мир", 22 декабря 1991 г., г. Николаев, Point 3, p. 3 and point 2.7, p. 4.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 2.

request of the leadership of the SB nuclear power station⁵⁸ that the revised project be submitted to an environmental impact assessment commission so that construction works could be continued, contradicted Resolution No. 258 passed by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers on 14 October 1991, which introduced a moratorium on further construction at the SB EK. The Green Movement therefore found it necessary to bring up these points.

Not only had the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station been designed to supply additional energy for six reactors, whereas in actual fact there were only three reactors operative at the SB nuclear power station; there was also a general energy deficit in the oblast. Consequently, there was no nightly surplus of electricity available, to feed the turbo-generators at this time. To create such a capacity by creating an independent water reservoir, by sealing off a part of the Tashlyk cooling pond was, in the view of the Greens, absurd, given that it could cool three reactors only during the winter season, but proved unable to do so during the summer months, due to extensive evaporation. Should the Aleksandrov water reservoir be completed, some 2,000 hectares of arable land would be flooded as would the village Bremenchug and parts of Buskoe and Aleksandrovka. The water in the reservoir would be polluted, due to the already serious pollution of the South Bug river, not only threatening the quality of irrigation and drinking water, but also threatening to pollute the ground water. This would be the case as the pressure created by the water reservoir once filled, would cause the ground water to raise and thus possibly mix with water from the reservoir.

Other factors also ruled against the two objects: while the project for the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station was being reworked, all funding, including that for research, was also frozen, thus preventing geological, hydrogeological and seismic research from being completed, such research was vital to establish the characteristics of the site of the SB EK and according to Resolution No. 647, the go-ahead for the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station and the Aleksandrov water reservoir, was made conditional, pending the outcome of such research. Such work should have been completed in 1989-90.

As for the promises of economic benefits given by the leadership of the SB nuclear power station to the local Soviets to 'buy' concessions to build parts of the SB EK on the territory of their villages and regions, they could no longer be said to be valid, given that the Soviet Union had ceased to exist and USSR *Minatomenergoprom*, which was supposed to pay for these concessions, was no longer existent:

Не ликвидирована и продолжает действовать система дезинформации и обмана населения. (Within the 40 km zone of the

⁵⁸ No. 06-0/1181-5437 of 24.10.1991 addressed to *Derzhkomprirada*.

nuclear power station people were promised) объектов социальности, дорог, газификация сел при условии их согласия на дальнейшее развитие ЮУ АЭС и строительство энергокомплекса. В проекте включены все предложения пяти районов 40 км зоны в объеме 295,2 млн. рублей, на которых 81,5 млн. рублей - сумма долевого участия районов и области. Около 143 миллионов рублей - получить из централизованных источников, в том числе 70 млн. рублей на развитие г. Южноукраинск. Населению 40-км зоны судят все им необходимое без реальных возможностей выполнения обещаний и без указания сроков, требуя за это немедленного согласия на окончание строительства гидроэнергокомплекса, а также на проектирование и строительство 4-го реактора ЮУ АЭС.

On the basis of the information given above, *Zelenyi Mir* accused the leadership of the SB nuclear power station and the Minister of Nuclear Energy, V. Gladush, of adopting an immoral approach to the solving of the energy problems with which the republic was faced. The Ukrainian energy programme should also include a section on energy saving technologies, the cutting of energy-demanding enterprises belonging to the military industrial complex and the closing of other environmentally harmful enterprises. Finally, the Greens supported the decision of the third session of the oblast Soviet as well as the decisions made by the Voznesensk regional and Aleksandrov small-town soviets not to allow flooding above the natural water level of the South Bug river (i.e. eight metres) so as to protect the river.

The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences supported *Zelenyi Mir* in its claims that further research surrounding the ecological 'soundness' of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station was required prior to allowing further construction. General Director Fuks had been informed about this following his request that the Academy of Sciences give the reworked project a positive assessment. Only after such research had been carried out, could the project be submitted to an ecological-economic expert commission to work under the auspices of *Minpriroda*⁵⁹.

The pro-environment lobby's opposition towards an expert assessment of the revised project for the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station did not, however, prevent the pro-nuclear lobby from trying to organise such an environmental impact assessment. Although the Ukrainian Law on the Protection of the Environment ruled that no environmental impact assessment could be undertaken prior to the agreement of local authorities (Ukrainian Minister of the Environment, Iurii Shcherbak, had also made it clear that without such consent there would be no point in asking him for an environmental impact assessment), the administration of the SB nuclear power station still requested such an assessment to be conducted. The oblast Soviet saw no reason for conducting an

⁵⁹ No. 9g/50-12 of 24.1.1992, addressed to Zolotukhin and signed by the Vice President of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, I. Lukinov.

environmental impact assessment as the environmental impact of the revised project was so obviously negative. However, through a connection in *Minpriroda* (former Deputy-Minister V. Lipinskii), the pro-nuclear lobby in secret managed to obtain an order for an impact assessment to be conducted.

When information of this reached the ears of the oblast Soviet, it sent representatives to Iuzhnoukrainsk to clarify the situation. There they were told that an impact assessment consisting of employees of a scientific institute in Kharkiv had been set up already the previous year! Such a gross violation of existing environmental legislation had not even taken place during the Soviet period, argued Zhuk in *Visti Voznesenshchiny*⁶⁰. To some extent Zhuk conceded that the nuclear lobby had got away with foul play due to the weakening of the Green Movement:

На жаль доводиться констатувати, що ці неолобства "атомного лоббі" свідчать про нашу погану роботу. Але, якщо відверто, то про яку активну діяльність "зелених" може йти мова без моральної та матеріальної підтримки населення? Стався свід громадської активності населення і це автоматично відбилося на силі активності "зелених". Неприємно це констатувати, але факт є факт.

Still, the Greens had conducted a considerable campaign against any further construction of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station together with the oblast Soviet. Nikolaev oblast had made its own propositions and suggestions to Kiev (see report signed by Bilodid and Zhuk referred to above), and local authorities and activists could not be blamed for the 'inertia' and the 'corruptness' of Kiev in reaching a decision on the issue.

A joint meeting held in Nikolaev by *Soiuz Chernobyl* and *Zelenyi Mir* to commemorate the Sixth anniversary of the Chernobyl accident on 25 April 1992 reiterated the concerns expressed a few months earlier. The situation was portrayed as a tug of war between the Ukrainian Government and local authorities, where the former completely ignored the opinion of and overruled the decisions of the latter:

Правительство Украины против воли населения Николаевской области, решений областного и районных советов народных депутатов продолжает финансирование работ по проектированию и выводу в действие Ташлыкского ГАЭС, грозящей уничтожением реки Южный Буг. При этом же финансируются работы по созданию газотурбогенераторов Николаевским "Машпроектom", альтернативных ГАЭС и АЭС. Безправственно действовало правительство, когда значительно повысило оклады администрации АЭС из фонда, пострадавших от Чернобыля. (my emphasis)

⁶⁰ 27.2.1992, p 2.

The meeting demanded that funding for the drafting, construction and conservation of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station be stopped and that the question of how to reprofile its equipment and buildings be solved. Finally, funding for the elaboration of the gas turbogenerator should be provided to the Nikolaev *Mashproekt*⁶¹. This is an issue to which I will return below.

During 1992 the pro-environment and pro-nuclear lobbies fought primarily over whether or not to allow a *produvka* of the Tashlyk cooling pond to go ahead. From early 1993, though, the focus again turned towards the EK. In early February the oblast *ispolkom* received a telegram from *Minpriroda* informing that experts from *Minpriroda* would visit Iuzhnoukrainsk between 8-9 February. No officials from Nikolaev oblast knew about the expert commission referred to above, prior to the arrival of the telegram. What was more, no experts from the oblast had been included in the commission. This naturally caused anger in the oblast and on 4 March the Voznesensk branch of *Zelenyi Mir* sent a telegram to the Ukrainian Minister of the Environment, Iu. Kostenko, arguing the view that 'the commission is incompetent. Such an impact assessment will not remove the emotions with regard to the nuclear power station'⁶². The Chairman of the oblast Soviet, I. Hrytsai, also voiced the protest of the oblast Soviet in a telegram dated 7 February:

Облрада и держадміністрації висловили своє негативне ставлення до переробленого проекту Ташлицької ГЕС та вказали на неможливість її будівництва, а також просили прийняти організацію всієї роботи, спрямованої в обхід рішень, прийнятих місцевими органами та мораторію Кабінету Міністрів".

Following the meeting in Iuzhnoukrainsk, Zhuk, Zolotukhin and Hryhorenko went to Kiev to argue the case against an environmental impact assessment of the SB EK. They attended a meeting with the Minister of the Environment, Iurii Kostenko, and told him that in the view of the Greens it was so blatantly obvious that the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station would have a negative impact on the surrounding environment that no assessment was required. Besides, as pointed out in several rulings by the oblast and local Soviets, it would simply be impossible to operate the power station without the Aleksandrov water reservoir first being completed, which contradicted decisions made by the oblast soviet and the Voznesensk regional soviet as well as local soviets. To separate a part of the Tashlyk cooling pond to provide water for the hydro-electric power station would in turn require new cooling systems to be installed for the nuclear power station, thus considerably increasing costs for the hydro-electric power station. However,

⁶¹ Решение собрания обществественности Николаевской области, посвященное шестой годовщине Чернобыльской катастрофы, г. Николаев, 25 апреля 1992 года, с. 2.

⁶² See 'Руки геть від Південному Бугу!', *Радянське Прибужжя*, 23.2.1993.

to the Greens the most weighty argument was that as a result they would lose their only own source of precious water.

Kostenko agreed with the Greens and promised that Hryhorenko's alternative gas turbine facilities would be properly examined at a meeting in the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers as a real alternative to hydro-electric power stations 'attached' to nuclear power stations⁶³. Zhuk gave a positive assessment of the meeting with Kostenko praising him for his unorthodox and business-like approach to the issue. For the first time when attending meetings in Kiev the Greens were not just told that the situation was 'non-state' (nederzhavna).

While local and central authorities negotiated over the environmental impact assessment commission, construction work continued. This provoked an angry outcry from *Zelenyi Mir* in April 1993⁶⁴, then

Пока где-то пытаются хоть что-то спасти, у нас по инерции попутительства строят. Управление "Укргеология" живило односторонно: Южный Буг — регионального дрена подземных вод. Александровское водохранилище поднимет их уровень, нарушит экосистему реки. А гидро-химическое состояние Южного Буга уже сейчас очень тревожное, донные отложения его отравлены.

One deputy of the oblast Soviet, Iu. Halat, commented that by continuing construction despite the moratorium, the leadership of the nuclear power station risked losing the last little bit of trust the local population still had in it. Such trust was particularly important for the pro-nuclear lobby in 1993.

The pro-nuclear lobby, however, once again argued its case on legal grounds, turning every little loophole in the relevant legislation to its advantage. The Aleksandrov water reservoir and the hydro-electric power station could, it argued, be completed without violating the moratorium on further construction at the SB EK. In the words of the General Director V. Denisov,

Тот гидроузел, дескать, вообще объект как бы сам по себе, и он не входит в звено гидрокомплекса, на который наложен мораторий...А значит, строить можно.

⁶³ Решение собрания общности Николаевской области, посвященное шестой годовщине Чернобыльской катастрофы, г. Николаев, 25 апреля 1992 года, с. 2.

⁶⁴ *Радянське Прибужжя*, 13.4.1993, с. 3. The Greens also argued that the continued construction of the Aleksandrov water reservoir and hydro-electrical power station constituted a violation of the Resolution passed by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers on 14 January 1991, which had ruled that construction cease at the site the previous year, as well as decisions made by the Aleksandrov poselkovy Soviet, and the Voznesensk raioviet, which had in September 1989 decided that the Aleksandrov water reservoir not be filled. Finally, a decision made by the Nikolaev oblast Soviet in October 1990 to prohibit the construction of the Tashlyk hydro-electrical power station was being violated.

Besides, finishing the Aleksandrov complex could be justified by referring to a deal struck earlier between local authorities and the pro-nuclear lobby. The President of *Goskomiatom*, Umanets, thus argued that there could be no talk about the preservation of the complex, given that

В свое время облисполком дал добро на достройку Александровского ГЭС — это сулило области новый мост, связывающий Вознесенский и Доманевский районы, гарантированное снабжение водой поливное земледелие прилегающих к реке хозяйств...Госкоматом Украины считает необходимым завершить в этом году строительство гидроузла и ввести его в эксплуатационный режим, согласованный с местной администрацией.

The Greens were unbendable in their views, however, arguing that what was happening at the site of the Aleksandrov water reservoir and hydro-electric power station was a gross violation of existing legislation and political decisions made. Zhuk concluded that

...Ні державні органи влади, ні населення ще не прониклися розумінням того, що екологічна ситуація просто вимагає дотримуватися законів і прийнятих рішень на всіх рівнях зупинитися на конкретних фактах...Допускаються порушення на О ГЕС. З рішення представника президента А. Кінаха про припинення незаконного будівництва можна тільки вітати⁶⁵.

Assessment of the revised Project

Two Commissions were set up during the first half of 1993 to assess the Aleksandrov complex and the revised SB EK project respectively. The first one, of which Iu. Halat, the man in charge of the ecology department at the oblast administration, was appointed Chairman was to decide the list and the extent of work to be conducted for the construction of the dam in connection with the Aleksandrov hydro-electric station. The dam was to be erected in the form of a bridge crossing over the South Bug river in the Domanevsk and Voznesensk regions. The Commission was ordered to hand in its assessment to the President's representative in the Nikolaev oblast, A. Kinakh, by 7 June 1993⁶⁶.

⁶⁵ *Вести Вознесенщини*, 17.4.1993, с. 2.

⁶⁶ Николаевская областная государственная администрация, Распоряжение представителя президента Украины о создании комиссии по определению перечня и объемов работ по сооружению плотины Александровского гидроузла в варианте мостового перехода, signed by the representative of the President in the Nikolaev oblast, A. Kinakh on 23.4.1993, No. 194. The Commission counted 19 members, of which four were members of *Zelenyi Mir* (Suslova, Shapovalov, Zolotukhin and Zhuk).

As for the second Commission, which had been set up by *Minpriroda* without the consent of oblast authorities and to the great anger of *Zelenyi Mir*, oblast authorities in the end were left with no option but to endorse it, given that it was not dissolved and since construction continued at the site of the SB EK and the only way in which it may be stopped, was for this commission to rule against it. In return for its endorsement, the oblast Soviet demanded that experts from the oblast be included in the commission. It then endorsed a list of Nikolaev experts to be included in the commission, amongst whom was Zhuk. In an angry letter to *Vesnik Voznesenshchiny*⁶⁷, Zhuk complained that although he could see no reason for the expert commission to assess the project, he was forced to participate in its work, since his name was on the list of oblast representatives sanctioned by the oblast leadership! In his view it was

Суттєвий абсурд розглядати проект, який відхилений органами влади і не може бути реалізований, бо існує заборона заповнення Олександрівського водосховища, без якого ГЕС-ГАЕС працювати не може.

The only explanation for the Cabinet of Ministers to insist on an expert assessment could only be that experts from Kiev and Kharkiv held completely different views regarding the hydro-electric power station than did the Nikolaev experts, thus possibly hoping that the conclusions drawn by its members would be in the Greens' favour.

The difference between the Kiev and Kharkiv specialists and those from Nikolaev was fundamental. The former favoured the completion of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station with three hydroaggregates and wanted to fill up the Aleksandrov water reservoir with 16 m of water. The Nikolaev group, as expected, came out categorically against both objects, as although from an economic point of view they were considered inexpedient, they would cause serious environmental damage. The Chairman of the Commission justified the Tashlyk water reservoir by arguing that it made sense to complete construction as, 'bearing in mind the economic situation in Ukraine...it is inadmissible to let go of the enormous sums invested in the construction, and time to gain (from them)'. In other words the Greens seemed to be right in that once something had been almost completed despite official decisions to bring such construction to a halt, it would be very difficult to justify construction from not being completed. In other words, attempts would be made at sneaking a project into use through the backdoor.

The revised project assessed by the Commission had been completed by early 1993. The difference between the original project and the revised one was that the number of hydroaggregates had been reduced from ten to three (First Stage) and six (Second Stage). A

⁶⁷ *Вестник Вознесенщины*, 5.6.1993, с. 2.

number of other modifications had also been made to safeguard the environment in the area. A Kuzin, the Deputy Director of the Ukrainian Scientific Centre for the Protection of Water, which operated under the auspices of *Minpriroda*, was appointed Chairman of the Commission. Between 25 and 26 May 1993 the members of the Commission gathered at the SB nuclear power station to discuss materials provided by scientific and project institutes, laboratories and the laboratory of the nuclear power station itself. The controversial objects were viewed and expert opinions provided by experts representing *Ukrgidroproekt*, which had revised the project for the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station.

A report prepared by a working group within the Commission was also debated at length, and 16 out of 39 pages were agreed by the members of the Commission. The Nikolaev representatives also signed the summary conclusions, although they prepared their own addendum, which was included in the final report presented to *Minpriroda*. The final decision regarding the future of the SB EK was with the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers.

The Nikolaev group - composed by 18 experts, among whom were Greens and sympathisers of the Greens like Bilodid, Hryhorenko, Dobrovolskii, Zhuk, Zolotukhin, Suslova, Shapovalov, Tarashuk and Shehlov - prepared a substantial alternative report, setting out their case⁶⁸. The addendum ('a special view') suggested that the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station be redesigned for other purposes, to be decided jointly by local authorities and the administration at the SB nuclear power station. The same conclusion was reached by an expert group on economics and the environment set up by the oblast Soviet. This group, which consisted of leading scientists from Nikolaev, was established in May 1993 to examine the revised Tashlyk project. Shortly afterwards, the oblast Soviet passed a decision to support its own expert group and to give its agreement to the addendum prepared by the Nikolaev delegation within the Commission set up by *Minpriroda*⁶⁹.

Although the oblast had been negative to the commission and although the majority of the commission's members came out in favour of completing the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station and the Aleksandrov water reservoir, *Minpriroda* examined the Commission's report carefully and in the end decided to support the opinion of the Nikolaev group. On 9 September it passed a decision not to endorse the revised project for the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station on the grounds that it was environmentally unsound. The ecological and other inadequacies of the

⁶⁸ *Родная природа*, no. 6, June 1993, p. 2.

⁶⁹ Решение Президиума Николаевского областного совета №. 17-П от 7 июня 1993 г. "О заключении представителей Николаевской области, членов экспертной комиссии для проведения государственной экологической экспертизы уточненного проекта Ташлыкского ГАЭС".

revised project were summarised by Iu. Tomin, a member of the Ukrainian Ecological Academy of Sciences in *Rodnaia priroda*⁷⁰:

Анализ материалов проекта выявил его значительные недостатки. Прежде всего обнаружилась экономическая необоснованность предлагаемого решения. Занижение многих отрицательных последствий проекта и завышение положительных, отсутствие обоснования нормативной базы, несовершенство использованной методологии, недоучет многих важных факторов – вот неполный перечень замечаний, сделанных экспертами – экономистами. (Finally, there was also an) отсутствие в проекте обоснованного прогноза влияния Ташлыкской ГАЭС на санитарно-гигиеническую и радиологическую обстановку в регионе.

On the basis of *Minpriroda*'s decision and previous decisions made by the oblast Soviet, the 18th session of the oblast Soviet, which commenced on 13 October 1993 passed a decision to redesignate the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station for other use⁷¹. The decision recommended to the regional soviets of Arbuzinka, Voznesensk and Domanevsk that they withdraw the permission for flooding in connection with the filling of the Aleksandrov water reservoir and for the construction of objects of the SB EK on their territory. The Soviet also wrote a letter to President Kravchuk with a request that funds be made available for the redesignating of the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station for other purposes. The letter was signed by Chairman of the oblast Soviet, I. Hrytsai.

Shortly after the decision of the oblast Soviet was made public in the press, the *Verkhovna Rada* lifted its moratorium on the construction of nuclear power stations, thus in theory undermining the argument of the greens that given the total capacity of the SB nuclear power station (three reactors instead of the six envisaged in the project) it would make no sense to go ahead with the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station. The position of the oblast Soviet, however, remained firm: Not under any circumstances would the decision referred to above be changed.

7.3.4 Nuclear Safety and Implications for Health

Nuclear Safety

Whereas initially, the Greens aimed at limiting the size of the SB EK, the 1990s brought the issue of nuclear safety on top of *Zelenyi Mir*'s agenda. The change in focus was caused by a number of close-downs at the SB nuclear power station and increased fears that *produvka* and poor

⁷⁰ No. 10, October 1993, p 3.

⁷¹ 'Решение ХМШ сессии областного совета 21 созыва No. 33 "О перепрофилировании объектов Ташлыкской ГЭС-ГАЭС", *Родная природа*, No. 11, November 1993, p 2.

maintainance in combination with the unfavourable location of the nuclear power station (see Chapter Six) would have a negative impact not only on the environment but also on peoples' health in terms of exposure to radiation.

As seen above, the Greens were outraged by Moscow's Resolution No. 1 to provide local authorities with incentives in return for allowing nuclear facilities on their territory. Following the collapse of the USSR there was no longer a centre - Moscow - to provide these financial incentives. Still, the pro-nuclear lobby stuck to the original offers made. Zhuk and Bilodid, however, questioned its ability to pay for the bargain and the conditions under which they would be made:

„Попередній союзний уряд (а фактично Мінатоменергопром), прийняв постанову N1 від 19 січня 1991 р. про заходи заохочення місцевих органів влади до розташування на їх території об'єктів атомної енергетики, цією постановою шперше передбачається виділення якихось коштів для 30-км зони навколо АЕС. Але ж які умови висуваються при цьому! Кошти виділяються тільки під нові енергетичні об'єкти, тобто по старій схемі: будуються нові блоки - фінансується зона. Пропорція 10 до 1-го. Наслідком такої політики, як неважко передбачити, будуть нові енергетичні об'єкти, а в навколишній зоні - фундаменти чергового долгобуду. Результат цілком протилежний тому, який декларувався спочатку - матимемо новий привід для загострення соціальної обстановки⁷².

Given the fact that Ukraine had adopted a moratorium on the construction of new nuclear reactors (see Chapter Two) these conditions could no longer be considered valid. Regardless of any expansion, the nuclear power station should take on responsibility for the economic development of the 30-km zone surrounding it. Since there were no longer any upper limits for electricity prices, cost calculations ought to include expenses in connection with the development of the 30-km zone, too. As for the size of such investments, Zhuk and Bilodid found it reasonable that the total sum ought also to include a coefficient for the deductions of the total sum of investments already undertaken at the site of the SB EK. It also made sense to make available money for future investments towards the upkeep of the zone. Such investments might include communications, fuel, roads, a proper monitoring system for radioactivity, a proper information service, proper health service facilities etc. Certain measures to protect the environment should also be paid for by the nuclear power station⁷³.

⁷² Доповідна записка. Пропозиції екологічної асоціації Миколаївської області по 30-км зоні навколо АЕС, signed by Zhuk and Bilodid on 16.10.1991.

⁷³ Ibid.

As regards safety at the SB nuclear power station, this was questioned by the pro-environmental lobby following a series of technical problems which in turn resulted in un-planned reactor shut-downs throughout 1991⁷⁴ and 1992⁷⁵. Following an accident at Chernobyl in late 1991, the cause of which was a defective cable line, an article published in *Radianske Pribuzhzhia*⁷⁶, drew the readers' attention to the fact that similar problems had been detected in the reserve cables of Reactors 1 and 2 at Iuzhnoukrainsk, however no measures had been taken to resolve with the situation:

У нас на ЮУ АЭС на 1-м и 2-м блоке со дня их пуска резервные кабели силового питания и управления, находящиеся на отметке -4 и 6 метров подвержены воздействию сточных промышленных вод так, что стойки их проржавели. Руководство об этом знает, но мер не принимает, видно, ждет, когда случится авария.

This, and other weaknesses regarding the construction of the nuclear power station were addressed at the fifth annual meeting of *Zelenyi Mir*, which took place in Nikolaev in December 1991:

Дальнейшая работа ЮУ АЭС по-прежнему тит в себе угрозу аварии: по-причине защищенности блоков всего лишь от легкого спортивного самолета, их низкой сейсмостойкости, из-за отсутствия сквозной поверки приборов от датчика до измерителя системы контроля внутриреакторных процессов, из-за затопления технической водой помещений на отметке -4 -6 м. 1-го и 2-го блоков, через которые проходят кабели резервного силового питания и управления реакторов⁷⁷.

Zelenyi Mir demanded that the cable problems be sorted out immediately, and that measures also be taken to secure the normal function of the Public Scientific Co-ordination Soviet on Monitoring the Environment and Safety at the SB Nuclear Power Station (established by Resolution No. 647). Regional offices should be opened, and the Soviet should inform the people of Nikolaev oblast of any mishaps at the nuclear power station. To give the Soviet teeth, representatives of the oblast Prosecutor's office and of *Radianske Pribuzhzhia* should be directly involved in the work of the Soviet.

⁷⁴ See for instance *SV*, 29.3.1991, p.1 or *Izvestia* of the same day, p. 1.

⁷⁵ 'Остановка блоков на Южно-Украинской АЭС' (Ukrinform/TASS), 29.5.1992, published in *Ukraine Today* (Radio Liberty), 29.5.1992, p. 12, 'Події на Південно-Українській АЕС', *УР-1* 18.08.92, 17:00 'Година пік', *Ukraine Today* (Radio Liberty), 20.8.1992, p.7.

⁷⁶ 30.11.1991, p. 2.

⁷⁷ Решение 5-го областного собрания Николаевской областной экологической ассоциации "Зеленый Мир", г. Николаев, 22 декабря 1991г.

An issue related to the one above, and brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union and with which the pro-environment lobby got increasingly concerned, was the storage of nuclear waste from the SB nuclear power station. During the Soviet era, such waste had been shipped off to Krasnoiarsk in Siberia, where it was reprocessed and stored at the Maiak facility. With Russian independence Greens and the people of Krasnoiarsk, however, had voiced their opposition towards the Maiak facility and raised demands to the effect that no waste be accepted in the future. In the Resolution referred to above, the Greens thus questioned the future of waste produced at Iuzhnoukrainsk, as they had strong reasons to believe that no proper facilities for the storage of such waste existed there.

Their concerns prompted the pro-nuclear lobby to respond through an article in *Radianske Pribuzhzhia* on 25 February⁷⁸: whereas it was correct that public pressure had forced through a decision by the local authorities to limit the admission of nuclear fuel from all nuclear power stations, including the Russian ones, there were no objective reasons for this, as the Maiak facility was in an excellent condition and bound to loose billions of roubles should the decision be implemented. What was more, the employees of the facility had not even been consulted prior to the decision being made. The facility would be able to handle nuclear waste for another 15 years and this was not an issue of dispute with the general public. Its concern had primarily come about in a response to poor food supplies to Krasnoiarsk. A Ukrainian delegation had solved this problem by offering food supplies in return for continued admission of nuclear fuel from Ukrainian nuclear power stations.

As for the SB nuclear power station itself, it had own facilities for the short-term storage of nuclear waste and could store its own waste until the end of 1992. As a matter of fact, the waste was shipped to Krasnoiarsk only after having been kept at Iuzhnoukrainsk for three years to cool down in special cooling facilities. The cassettes containing used nuclear fuel were then put into special iron railroad containers for long-term storage in Siberia. Avoiding the issue of whether or not such a long transportation of nuclear waste was in itself safe, the SB EK administration admitted that Ukraine would in the coming few years not be able to provide such a facility on Ukrainian territory, not to mention local storage facilities. According to experts, Ukraine would not be able to provide proper long-term storing facilities for nuclear waste until the beginning of the 21st century⁷⁹. Thus an argument frequently used by the pro-nuclear lobby to the effect that nuclear power was the only reliable *independent* energy alternative for Ukraine (gas and oil were imported from Russia and it was therefore argued that Ukraine would become dependent on Russia for its fuel supplies), was undermined. Whereas oil and gas could be obtained from

⁷⁸ *Радянське Прибужжя*, 25.2.1992, с. 1.

⁷⁹ *Радянське Прибужжя*, 6.8.1992, с. 2.

elsewhere should Russia fail to deliver or cut off supplies, it would prove a lot more difficult to negotiate delivery of nuclear fuel to other countries, where opposition towards reprocessing facilities was much more fierce.

The debate on nuclear safety peaked in early 1992, when it became known that there had been a fire at the SB nuclear power station. Not so much the fire in itself, which was considered relatively harmless, but more so the poor manner in which it was handled, angered not only the Greens but also local authorities. The accident, which took place during the loading of fuel at one of the reactors was followed by silence from the leadership of the nuclear power station and in an inquiry at the 11th session of the oblast Soviet, deputies Shapovalov, Suslova, Tolstikh, Ignatenko and Iakubenko demanded that operative and objective information regarding the circumstances surrounding and the extent of the accident be made available. Shorin responded that only a cable line had short-circuited, so that one could not really talk about a proper fire. The oblast Soviet still adopted tougher measures regarding information following accidents or emergency reactor shut-downs at the SB nuclear power station. For instance, the administration of the SB nuclear power station were ordered to provide the mass media with systematic information regarding its safety. The press, on the other hand, was ordered to publish such information.

The decision of the oblast Soviet came about as a result of numerous rumours which emerged following the accident on 27 January and the lack of information regarding the accident. Due to the fire reactor No. 1 was shut down for 52 hours as repairs were conducted. The Greens linked this accident with a number of previous accidents - altogether there had been 15 emergency shut-downs at Iuzhnoukrainsk during 1991! References were in this connection made to an article which had appeared on the pages of *Izvestia* and which claimed that there had been a record high number of shut-downs at nuclear power stations on the territory of the former USSR during 1991⁸⁰. The situation would get even worse for 1992, were one to go by the fact that during January alone, there had been as many as four shut-downs at the SB nuclear power station! Normal average figures for shut-downs were one per reactor during the course of two months. Three out of the four shut-downs in January had taken place at reactor No. 1 and this clearly was not normal. What was more, pollution levels (i.e. emissions into the air of radionuclides) increased with the shut-down and start-up of the reactors. Although the cable fire could be classified as a minor incident, it revealed a disregard on the part of the leadership of the nuclear power station, to take seriously warnings regarding safety, since the Greens had already warned them about the danger of fire breaking out in the cables following two such fires at the Chernobyl nuclear power station. Even not the fire served as a proper warning to the leadership because the

⁸⁰ *Izvestia*, 11.3.1992, (n.p.).

reactor was not examined properly afterwards, which in turn led to another three incidents during March 1992:

...В начале марта сл. на том же злополучном первом блоке по не выясненным причинам пролился радиоактивная вода так, что уровень радиоактивного фона повысился чуть ли не в 100 раз! Будем помнить, что от привычки ожидания аварий до большой беды - всего один шаг...⁸¹

As for the ability of the nuclear power station's own information centre to provide reliable information regarding the January accident, a deputy of the oblast Soviet, A. Sheglov, questioned this. An analysis of the incident provided by *Atomnadzor* was qualitatively different from the one provided by the Info service at the nuclear power station:

Не приводятся факты халатности и некомпетентности персонала, допустившего систематическое попадание пара на изоляцию кабеля, и другие нарушения. С точки зрения инспекции Атомнадзора совершенно очевидны причины аварии, виновники нарушения, допущенные персоналом при ликвидации этой аварии...Совершенно очевидно, что информация в печати должна распространяться с подачи независимых компетентных источников, а не ведомственных служб.⁸²

During 1992 more evidence appeared about accidents at the SB nuclear power station, thus discrediting the view of its administration to the effect that there was no reason to worry about safety. *Holos Ukrainy* was able to reveal that during the first 10 months of 1992 there had been 24 incidents in Iuzhnoukrainsk - an increase of nine compared to the previous year.⁸³ Seven of these had occurred as a result of breaches of safety instructions. At all the other Ukrainian nuclear power stations only three incidents were caused by such breaches, thus putting the leadership of the SB nuclear power station in a poor light. Moreover, it turned out that the nuclear power station generally failed to inform about incidents or it gave incomplete information about them. A report produced by the State Nuclear Inspectorate of Ukraine (*DANU*), gave a sad picture of the state of affairs:

Незважаючи на вимоги ДАНУ, звіт про порушення не оформлено, або порушення не розслідувано, докорінну причину порушення не встановлено тощо. Досить часто заходи для усунення порушень вживають лише після наполегливих вимог Держатомагляду. Та

⁸¹ *Радниське Приблужжя*, 17.3.1992, с. 3. This information was provided by Zolotukhin.

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ *Голос України*, 8.12.1992, с. 7.

й самих порушень пібито не помічають, доки їх не надібають інспектори.

As an example, the article referred to an incident which occurred in March, when radioactive substances were emitted from reactor No. 1 and spread over an area of 200 square metres. The leadership at the nuclear power station tried to hide this and failed to inform the Inspectorate. Tests, which were conducted at the initiative of the Inspectorate, were not conducted properly and no plausible explanation for the incident had so far been established. Despite this, everything was done to maintain work at the Reactor, which in turn was only possible through the violation of rules for the operation of the SB nuclear power station.

In July Reactor No. 2 was started up irregardless of flaws in the seismicity control system. Three weeks later, when the Reactor was inspected by the *DANU*, the flaw had still not been eradicated. The electricity targets were obviously more important than safety - in other words the situation remained as it had been during the Soviet era. And more importantly, the general attitude towards safety at nuclear power stations did not seem to have been changed following the Chernobyl accident.

On 15 October, during a planned control of the safety system of the hermetical zone, surrounding the reactor, close to 80 tonnes of solvent boracic acid were spilled. Although the leadership of the SB nuclear power station had received a warning beforehand to check the hermetical zone, it had ignored the *Derzhatomnagliad*'s advice to shut down the reactor for testing. After the accident, orders were given to continue operation of the reactor. A commission to investigate the accident was only set up following pressure from *Derzhatomnagliad*. Even after this, the Greens claimed that Reactors No. 1 and two were not hermetically sealed⁸⁴. They based their claim on the report produced by the environmental impact assessment commission from 1989. Claims were also made to the effect that the safety cooling system was flawed.

Finally, a rather serious incident occurred on 8 November, during the loading of reactor fuel into the reactors. One of the fuel cassettes got stuck on a foreign object, which turned out to be a piece of wire. The wire was pulled out and loading continued, without a proper check for more foreign objects being carried out. When, at the insistence of the *Derzhatomnagliad* a proper check was eventually conducted, another piece of wire was found inside the reactor!

The circumstances examined above support the Greens' claims that the production of electricity was given a higher priority than that of safety at the nuclear power station, thus

⁸⁴ *Радянське Прибужжя*, 12.1.1993, с. 3. See also *Радянське Прибужжя*, 28.9.1993, с. 2.

justifying their position that the leadership of the nuclear power station simply was not reliable in securing safety. General Director Fuks' statement to the effect that

Опрокинуть идею атомной энергетики нельзя, как бесполезно было когда-то отвергать паровую машину...Следует не отрицать АЭС, а сделать их более надежными, создать условия их безопасной эксплуатации (my emphasis)⁸⁵.

thus seemed a bit out of place to put it mildly! Whereas the Greens fully agreed that something had to be done to improve safety at Iuzhnoukrainsk, they did not want to leave the responsibility with the leadership of the nuclear power station but rather would prefer clear orders to be introduced and an independent monitoring system to be set up.

Meanwhile the incidents continued to occur at the nuclear power station: on 27 January 1993 an electric cable in the transformer of the second safety system at reactor No. 2 short-circuited and as a result of falling pressure due to the short-circuit the system was put on manual control instead of being on automatic control. During the investigation into this incident, the valve in the level regulator for the first steamgenerator turned itself off,

Сигнал на закрытие которого сформировался из-за наличия непроектной перемычки в шкафу управления. Технологической защитой по снижению уровня в парогенераторе отключился первый главный циркуляционный насос и мощность энергоблока No. 2 отключилась от энергосистемы.

The incident reached Point One on the International Seven-point scale for nuclear incidents, caused by human error⁸⁶. A similar incident occurred in mid-February⁸⁷.

At its Sixth session⁸⁸, in early April 1993, seven deputies (Shapovalov, Suslova, Kuzovov, Tolstykh, Drobilko, Podhurenko and Sheblov) claimed that the major reason for the recent incidents was the lax attitude towards safety depicted by staff⁸⁹ and raised the question of the responsibility of the leadership for these incidents. Following the session, the oblast Soviet contacted *Derzhatomenergogonagliad* with a request that it assess the incidents and the actions of staff and the administration at the nuclear power station.

The lax attitude towards nuclear safety at Iuzhnoukrainsk could not but worry, particularly after the *Verkhovna Rada* lifted the ban on the construction of nuclear reactors in October 1993,

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ *Радянське Прибужжя*, 2.2.1993, с. 1.

⁸⁷ *Радянське Прибужжя*, 25.2.1993, с. 1.

⁸⁸ *Родная природа*, No. 4, April 1993, с. 1.

⁸⁹ The deputies backed up their claim by information published by 'Financial Times' on 1.12.92.

thus opening up for a possible expansion of the nuclear capacity also in Nikolaev oblast. The position of the oblast Soviet, however, remained firm: no expansion could be accepted at the SB nuclear power station, even the lifting of the moratorium could not change that. When the issue of whether to build reactor No. 4 at Iuzhnoukrainsk came up again in the spring of 1993, both the oblast Soviet and the Presidential Representative in Nikolaev oblast, A. Kinakh, strongly opposed this. They referred to the decision reached by the expert commission in 1989, and which was supported by *Ukrgeologia*, that it was undesirable to build reactor No. 4. This was reiterated by the Ukrainian Council of Ministers on 26 October 1989 (Resolution No. 271). Besides the people of Nikolaev oblast were opposed to any expansion of the nuclear power station. Having examined the Presidential Decree 'On the Urgent Preparations regarding the Development of Nuclear Energy and the Formation of a Nuclear Fuel Cycle in Ukraine' (No. 64/94 of 23 February 1994, point 2) and also the 'Protocol of the Council of Ministers' Meeting of 27 April 1994 regarding the Construction of reactor No. 4 at the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Station and the Hydrocomplex on the South Bug', the oblast authorities found it impossible to give their consent to expand the Energy Complex⁹⁰.

The issue of safety at the SB nuclear power station had been discussed by *Derzhatomnagliad's* Collegium at the end of 1992 (see section above). On 11 November 1992 additional checks were conducted of the safety system at Reactor No. 2. Although this incident in no way matched the accident at Chernobyl in extent and seriousness, *Derzhatomnagliad* was not satisfied with the administration of the nuclear power station:

„Колегія Держатомнагляду України, розглянувши роботу станції в цілому, визнала діяльність адміністрації ВО "ПУ АЕС" по організації безпечної роботи станції незадовільною і попередила її, що в разі несприйняття конкретних заходів по підвищенню безпеки експлуатації ПУ АЕС, Держатомнагляд буде змушений прийняти рішення про зупинку експлуатації її блоків⁹¹.

At the end of December 1992, Ukrainian radio reported that personnel from Chernobyl, Zaporizhzhia and Iuzhnoukrainsk nuclear power stations had been invited to train in Japan as part of an international programme to enhance safety at nuclear power stations⁹². The Spanish company *Unidad Electrica S.A.* also got involved in this work, by means of providing the

⁹⁰ Letter from Kinakh to the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers (First Deputy Leader Zvyagilskii) written sometime in April - copy of letter obtained from Zelenyi Mir in Nikolaev. Date not on copy.

⁹¹ *Радянське Прибужжя*, 8.4.1993, с. 1.

⁹² *УТ-1*, 22.12.92. „Дніпро”, 21:00, printed in *Ukraine Today*, 23.12.1992, p. 13.

Iuzhnoukrainsk nuclear power plant with proper equipment⁹³. Although these measures were a step in the right direction, in themselves they were not sufficient to solve the problem of poor safety at the nuclear power station.

Throughout 1992 and early 1993 the newspapers of Nikolaev oblast continued to print letters written by concerned locals with regard to safety at the nuclear power station. As noted in a feature article in *Radianske Pribuzhzhia*, a majority of these letters expressed a negative attitude towards the nuclear power station, thus indicating that the information campaign conducted by the leadership of the nuclear power station to convince people that nuclear power could not be avoided given the difficult economic situation and the general shortage of energy in Ukraine, did not have the intended effect on people. Every now and then, though, the odd letter in support of the station emerged. Iu. Panachev, a doctor by profession, for instance, voiced his support in the following way:

(Я) полностью поддерживаю деятельность ассоциации ЭС в деле охраны природы. Принимаю активное участие в ее и я. Да, АЭС не должна оставаться без внимания природоохранных органов и общественности, но и настоящее вредители природы не должны быть обделены вниманием. По тому я предлагаю: давайте отбросим всякие домысли о возможных взрывах на АЭС и радиоактивных загрязнениях. Я, как врач-гигиенист, считаю: тот страх, который внедряется в людские души, приносит страданий человеку больше, нежели АЭС⁹⁴.

The campaign, nonetheless continued. In December 1992, the press-centre of the Iuzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station released an anniversary issue of its information bulletin *Press-Fakt* in celebration of the 10th anniversary of the power station⁹⁵. The bulletin featured several articles praising the achievements of the nuclear power station, whereas no mention was made of the numerous incidents and violations of safety procedures which had taken place over these years:

Помнишь, товарищ, декабрь 1982 года! Месяц всеобщего подъема и радости от причастности к великим делам страны...Пресса захлебывалась от восторга...Сейчас наша станция - это мощное энергетическое предприятие, дающее независимой Украине очень нужную энергию... энергия наших сердец вливается в мощный энергетический поток Южно-Украинской АЭС...⁹⁶

⁹³ *Українські вісти*, 8.8.1993, с. 1.

⁹⁴ *Радянське прибузжжя*, 29.4.1993, с. 1.

⁹⁵ *Пресс-Факт*, no. 24-25, December 1992 (n.p.).

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

The bulletin also carried information regarding the advantages the nuclear power station brought with it not only for Ukraine as such, but particularly for the local population in areas adjacent to the nuclear power station. Only one small column out of eight pages dealt with safety at the power station. Some faulty equipment had been detected during November 1992, but did not cause any major problems at the site - only slightly reducing the capacity during shorter periods of time⁹⁷.

To gain public support for their cause, the administration of the Iuzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station encouraged people to visit Iuzhnoukrainsk. In the June issue of *Rodnaia priroda*, for instance, free excursions to the information centre were offered. Experts from the nuclear power station would explain, with the help of models, how the nuclear power station worked, and a list of telephone numbers were provided to which questions regarding radiation, safety and health could be directed⁹⁸. Judging by the overall response to nuclear power in Nikolaev oblast, however, it seems clear that the Greens clearly won the 'propaganda war' - not purely as a result of their knowledge and campaign skills, but also due to the SB administration's unwillingness to address issues such as poor safety and the lax attitude towards safety at the nuclear power station, thus providing the Greens with evidence to the effect that Iuzhnoukrainsk was not safe.

Nuclear Safety and Health

As seen in previous sections of this chapter, there was growing concern amongst the local population regarding the impact the SB nuclear power station might have on their health. Several letters published in the local press alleged that people were falling ill with increasing frequency and that this should be accredited to the presence of the nuclear power station. The Trade Union Committee of the *sovkhoz* 'Akm. Stavki' voiced its concern in a letter sent to *Zelenyi Mir*⁹⁹, arguing that

Жители сел Октябрьское, Саловое, Паска, Прибужье - Акметского сельского совета ЮУ АЭС по берегу Южного Буга ощутили воздействие АЭС еще до Чернобыльской аварии, а особенно в последующие 2 года. Из красивого, чистого Южного Буга осталось грязная лужа, где описаются даже дети купаться. Воздействие АЭС и вытекающие заболевания известны даже маленьким детям. Население живет в постоянном страхе - живет сегодня, сием днем, многие все бросают и уезжают. Много

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁹⁸ *Rodnaia priroda*, no. 6, June 1993, c. 2.

⁹⁹ See letter stamped Профком совхоза "Акм. Сташки", No. 35, 8.8.1990.

населения болеют, особенно дети. Отсутствует информация об остановках блоков, о радиационном фоне. Если бы была наша воля - АЭС не существовала.

Просьба всего населения нашего сельского совета не прекращать борьбу за полную ликвидацию ЮУ АЭС.

Given the poor safety at Iuzhnoukrainsk it was natural for *Zelenyi Mir* to be concerned with the possible health implications this may have. In late July 1992, Zolotukhin thus contacted the Nikolaev *Zdravookhranenie* with a request that he be given access to data on the demographic situation as well as health statistics for the 30-km zone surrounding the nuclear power station.

In a covering letter, sent to Zolotukhin together with the requested information, A. Stadnichenko, the chairman of the Health Department of Nikolaev oblast, wrote that the data had been compiled from statistical accounts provided by hospitals and profylactic insitutions as well as from the oblast department of statistics. However, 'data on some of the areas in the given regions are not available to the department'¹⁰⁰.

Following the Chernobyl accident there was a continued growth in mortality figures for the oblast as such. Statistics on the cause of death showed a marked increase in deaths caused by illnesses of the blood and lymph systems in grown-ups (no figures were provided for children) between 1984 and 1988 (no data was provided for 1986 - the year of the Chernobyl accident). A further break-down into regions and areas showed an overall slow, but not marked growth in mortality rates in the 30 km zone. Mortality rates in Iuzhnoukrainsk itself were distinctly lower than elsewhere and no comparative data was given from 1980 to 1987. This may be due to special procedures for recording deaths and to the high turn-over of personnel (see Chapter Six), as well as the relatively young population of Iuzhnoukrainsk compared to the surrounding villages and towns. As for blood-related illnesses, the figures for most of the areas almost doubled between 1988 and 1990 for grown-ups and increases were registered of up to more than 400% in children, for instance in Pervomaisk! In Pervomaisk, Voznesensk, Vradievskii and Elanetskii regions, a further doubling was registered from 1990 to 1991 for grown-ups. Data for Iuzhnoukrainsk was only provided for 1991. For the oblast as such, the number of blood-related illnesses registered doubled for both grown-ups and children between 1988 and 1991. If the data provided by *Minzdrav* are reliable, there is a clear indication that such illnesses were more frequent in the regions surrounding the nuclear power station than for the oblast as a whole.

There was a noticable increase in deaths from cancers in the period 1988 to 1991 in all the regions. This was also the case for cancers being treated. Figures for the oblast were once again lower than in most of the regions adjacent to the SB nuclear power station. Since no information

¹⁰⁰ No. 85/02, of 19.8.1992.

was provided regarding types of cancers recorded, it is not possible to indicate a direct link between certain types of radionuclides and types of cancer. Tritium is known to affect the blood system, though, and it is therefore not unthinkable that the sharp rise in blood-related diseases may be contributed to emissions of tritium (see above). Statistics provided for tritium readings also show a marked increase between 1989 and 1992, thus suggesting a correlation between blood-related diseases and tritium emissions.

Relying on data obtained from the oblast *Minzdrav*, Zolotukhin in April 1993 claimed that there had been an increase of child leukaemia in Nikolaev of 359% and that the number of cancers was generally on the increase. Within the 30 km zone, there were 1.5 times more cancers than in the oblast as such¹⁰¹. Following the publication of these claims in *Radianske Pribuzhzhia*, the Info Centre of the SB nuclear power station decided to conduct its own investigation into the matter. Its findings were published in *Rodnaia priroda* in September the same year¹⁰². The Health Department of the oblast administration was consulted, and the oblast paediatrician, O. Kozhushchenko, expressed surprise with the figures presented by Zolotukhin. He promised to provide an objective report within ten days on the number of leukaemia and cancer cases in the zone and oblast following the launch of the SB nuclear power station in...One and a half months later, however, no such report had been produced and the Information Centre contacted the regional and town health departments. It was told that

В настоящее время в Южноукраинске случаев заболеваний детей лейкозией не установлено. Противоречивая информация получена по районам тридцатикилометровой зоны. Провести сравнительную характеристику по этой проблеме "до" и "после" пуска АЭС без данных областного архива не представляется возможным.

Figures for cancer during 1991, did, however, show a higher frequency within the zone, with the exception of Iuzhnoukrainsk itself, where the figure was more than 50% lower than for the rest of the oblast. Compared with figures for 1985, there had been an increase in some areas within the zone, but a decrease in others. Still, it was right to say that the number of cancers was considerably higher than for the rest of the oblast. This, however, could not be contributed to the presence of the nuclear power station, argued the pro-nuclear lobby, but rather 'independently of the nuclear power station, due to natural causes'. The article did not clarify what these may be. Still, the Information Centre maintained that the difference was not 1.5 higher for the zone, as claimed by Zolotukhin.

¹⁰¹ *Радянське Прибужжя*, 21.4.1993 (п.р.).

¹⁰² *Родная природа*, no. 5, September 1993, c. 1.

Knowledge about the impact of radiation on health was, however, restricted by poor monitoring facilities, as acknowledged in a letter from A. Bobicheva - deputy Chief State Sanitary Doctor of Ukraine - in a letter to the President of the Ukrainian State Committee on the Utilisation of Nuclear Energy, M. Umanets:

Учитывая отсутствие возможности организации и осуществления мониторинга за влиянием АЭС на состояние здоровья населения (отсутствие научно-медицинского обеспечения, материально-финансовых трудностей Минздрава Украины) разработал проект государственной программы медико-санитарного обеспечения объектов атомной энергетики и промышленности, при реализации которого были бы решены конкретные вопросы, касающиеся оценки возможностей безопасной работы атомных станций и предотвращения влияния на состояние здоровья населения, проживающего в регионах размещения АЭС¹⁰³.

Although it could not be proved directly that the nuclear power station had a negative effect on people's health, the statistical data analysed above do indicate that there was a link, thus supporting demands made by *Zelenyi Mir* that the relationship between the two be properly examined by indicating that their worries might well be founded.

7.3.5 Cleaning the Tashlyk Cooling Pond

The fight to prevent salinated radioactive water of the Tashlyk cooling pond from being emitted into the South Bug river continued unchanged following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Whereas both the pro-nuclear and the pro-environment lobbies agreed that for reasons of safety the water of the cooling pond had to be cleaned, there were, as seen below, major differences regarding how best to achieve this goal whilst causing minor harm to the surrounding environment. The pro-nuclear lobby continued to put pressure on official authorities, local as well as central ones, for permission to emit water from the pond on the grounds that was this not done in the near future, the implications for safety at the nuclear power station could be disastrous - whereas the Greens further developed their alternatives.

In support of its position, the pro-nuclear lobby referred to the recommendation of Ukrainian *Goskompriroda* that a *produvka* be allowed on safety grounds, thus completely ignoring the various alternatives suggested by *Zelenyi Mir*. One of these was to keep only two of the reactors operating on a continuous basis, and keep the third reactor available for particular needs. At first hand, this may seem like a recipe for reducing electricity output at the nuclear power station. Data

¹⁰³ No. исх. 7.11/74, of 24.2.1993.

available from the nuclear power station did, however, indicate that running two reactors continuously compared with running three reactors, each of which was being frequently shut down for repairs or in emergency, gave the same energy output. Thus there was no reason to believe that there would be any real improvement in energy output given that the third reactor had been put on line. Since the Tashlyk cooling pond had been designed to cool no more than two reactors, the first solution was obviously preferable to the second. As a matter of fact, the whole nuclear industry ought to be given a proper overhaul. Rather than emphasising expansion, more attention should be given to the modernisation of equipment, bringing Ukrainian reactors up to international safety standards where possible. Increased output could be achieved through the introduction of computers and more efficiency in the production process itself¹⁰⁴.

The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences supported the view presented by the Greens earlier (see above) that it would be possible to clean the Tashlyk cooling pond without a produvka. In a letter to Zolotukhin in the summer of 1992¹⁰⁵, the Vice President of the Academy, Academician V. Bariakhtar, claimed that although emitting salinated and radioactive water into the South Bug river was an option, it required a substantial technical and economic justification. Assessing the impact of such a produvka on the total radiation dose to which the population of the oblast was exposed, was required. In doing this, it ought to be kept in mind that according to the International Commission on Radiation Protection (1990), the share of this dose emanating from any technical installations was not to exceed 10% of the background radiation from the natural surroundings. Besides, a proper examination must be conducted at the South Ukrainian nuclear power station itself, so as to establish which technical objects emitted what levels of radiation. The impact of radiation emanating from the nuclear power station should then be related to health data of the local population to determine its impact. Information so far obtained from the leadership of the nuclear power station was insufficient for working out concrete suggestions, but the Academy of Sciences still held the view that the Tashlyk water reservoir could be used as a closed unit cooling pond.

A meeting held two days prior to the Chernobyl anniversary in April 1992 demanded that the Academy of Sciences work out alternatives to produvka, so that in the future, there would be no secret and illegal, nor any legal emissions of water from the Tashlyk cooling pond into the South Bug river. *Zolotukhin* claimed that, given that there had been no demands for a produvka from the leadership of the nuclear power station previously, this in itself indicated that emissions had earlier

¹⁰⁴ Ташлицька ГЕС-ГАЕС, signed by S. Zhuk and V. Bilodid on 16.10.1991.

¹⁰⁵ №. Черн/112 of 15.7.1992.

been made in secret¹⁰⁶. To find the best possible solution for cleaning up the Tashlyk cooling pond, the Greens suggested that an environmental impact assessment commission be established and consulted.

As for *Minpriroda*'s recommendation that a *produvka* be allowed for safety reasons, the Greens expressed their dismay at the meeting in April, by demanding that I. Liakh, its Deputy Chairman, be sacked from his post on the grounds that *Derzhkompriroda* by recommending a *produvka* not only completely ignored the opinions of the public in Nikolaev oblast, but also violated the Law on the Protection of the Environment. The State Committee had already broken this law by allowing a *produvka* at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station. Water from the cooling pond there had been emitted into the Kahovsk water reservoir on the Dniepr river, which supplied the area with drinking water and water for irrigation purposes¹⁰⁷. The relationship between the Greens and the Ministry generally deteriorated, as will be seen below, dramatically throughout the latter half of 1991 and early 1992. What was more, the confrontation between pro-environment and pro-nuclear forces sharpened considerably, following Zolotukhin's allegations that *produvki* had been conducted in secret.

In an interview in *Radianske Pribuzhzhia* in January 1993, Zolotukhin claimed that he possessed information to the effect that eight such secret *produvki* had taken place so far¹⁰⁸. The leadership of the nuclear power station responded angrily to these allegations in an article printed in *Press-Fakt*, the nuclear power station's own news bulletin. The article, which carried the headline 'Do not believe Zolotukhin', questioned Zolotukhin's right to be taken seriously as an opponent by arguing that secret *produvki* were simply not possible, given that this would affect water levels in the cooling pond, which were measured on a daily basis, and recorded in a special log book. The authors of the article, Iu. Ruban (Head of the OTiTB-Department) and V. Semenov (Head of the Environmental Protection Department) claimed that only two *produvki* had taken place during the ten years the South Ukrainian nuclear power station had been operative. The first emission occurred in 1985, whereas another one was undertaken in 1988. Both of these had been sanctioned by Ukrainian *Minvodka*. Since 1988 no *produvka* had taken place.

Zolotukhin's allegations were nothing but

Чистейшей поды дезинформация о положении дел на Южноукраинской АЭС. Не впервые экологическая ассоциация "Зеленый Мир" в лице своего председателя Золотухина А.И.

¹⁰⁶ Решение 5-го областного собрания Николаевской областной экологической ассоциации "Зеленый Мир".

¹⁰⁷ Решение собрания общности Николаевской области, посвященное шестой годовщине Чернобыльской катастрофы, г. Николаев.

¹⁰⁸ *Радянське Прибужжя*, 12.1.1993, с. 3.

пытается ввести в заблуждение общественное мнение и запугать население региона угрозой катастрофы. При этом не стесняются откровенной клеветы и полтасовки факты¹⁰⁹.

A. Harashuk of the SB nuclear power station added to the criticism in a lengthy article published in *Iuzhmaia pravda*¹¹⁰. He tried to ridicule Zolotukhin, by questioning his integrity as an engineer. Then pumping dirty water from the Tashlyk cooling pond into the South Bug river and then pumping clean water back, he argued, would simply not be possible, given the big height difference between the two (approximately 90 metres)¹¹¹. The article rhetorically put the following two questions to Zolotukhin:

- 1) как поднять воду Ташлыкского водохранилища с отметки 25 м на отметку 122-125 м (самую высокую точку полораздела)..., чтобы вода из водохранилища попала в реку?
- 2) как защитить насосы насосной станции от поднятого столба высотой более 100-110 метров?

Zolotukhin's reply appeared in *Ukrainskii Pivden* on 27 January 1994¹¹². The reason for the delay in replying, claimed Zolotukhin, was the unwillingness of *Iuzhmaia pravda*'s editor, A. Samoilenko, to publish his reply. Such a reply had been presented to Samoilenko a week after Harashuk's letter appeared in print. Twice - one month later and then two months later - Samoilenko had personally promised Zolotukhin to ensure that his reply would appear in the paper. When this still did not happen (Zolotukhin claimed that the SB EK leadership had 'bought' *Iuzhmaia pravda*, by being one of its major sponsors¹¹³), Zolotukhin was left with no other option but to publish his reply elsewhere, thus making sure that the pro-nuclear lobby could not accredit the lack of reply to the Greens being dumbstuck by Harashuk's claim and having no arguments by which to respond.

As for the fact that secret produvki had taken place, Zolotukhin referred to a soon-to-be-published report produced for the oblast Soviet's Presidium by an expert group¹¹⁴ (the president of which had been appointed Dobrovolskii of the NKI). The report concluded that

¹⁰⁹ 'Не верьте Золотухину', *Пресс-Факт*, February 1993 (n. p.).

¹¹⁰ А. Гаращук, 'Хотя идея и заманива...', *Южная правда*, September 1993.

¹¹¹ This point was also made by A. Novak, the leader of the nuclear power station's own inspectorate, in an article published by *Энергетик*, 21.1.1994, с. 2.

¹¹² *Український Південь*, 27.1.1994, с. 7.

¹¹³ From 1992 onwards, the Greens fell out with the editorial board of *Iuzhmaia Pravda*, and started cooperating closely with *Radianske Pribuzhzhia* instead. I still do not know the exact reason as to why this happened.

¹¹⁴ This group was set up as a result of a decision made by the Nikolaev oblast Soviet (No 17-II) on 7 June 1993, following Zolotukhin's continued claims that hidden produvki had taken place at the SB nuclear power station. See decision, printed in *Родная природа*, no. 7, July 1993, p 1.

Специалисты ЮУ АЭС, вопреки публичным заявлениям, расчетных доказательств отсутствия продувок Ташлыкского пруда-охладителя не представили. По расчетным данным соленость воды в пруде-охладителе должна значительно превосходить фактическую. Полученное расхождение не может быть полностью отнесено на несовершенство расчета, более вероятной причиной является рассоление воды, в частности, за счет продувки водохранилища.

The allegations that it would be impossible to pump water from the South Bug river to the Tashlyk water reservoir given the big difference in height, were also refuted by Zolotukhin

Перелипаючи бензин из бака через верхнее отверстие в канистру, вставляя один конец вглубь бензина или воду ртом, направить в канистру, важно, чтобы она была ниже бака. Точно также работает насосная станция. Как только насосы перестают качать воду из реки вверх, в Ташлыкское водохранилище, столб воды в трубах под тяжестью скатывается вниз из водохранилища и это будет продолжаться до тех пор, пока заглубленная в водохранилище труба не откроется для доступа в нее воздуха, а чтобы до этого не доводить (не уменьшать уровень воды в водохранилище), достаточно в районе верхнего перелома труб устроить открывающееся отверстие, чтобы через него запустить воздух и тогда вся вода из труб скатится вниз, в реку, и часть - в водохранилище. Для того, чтобы снова повторить продувку, нужно закрыть отверстие для доступа воздуха (иначе через него зря будет вытекать вода), начать закачивать воду в водохранилище, а после выключения насосов продувка снова повторится до тех пор, пока не будет открыт доступ воздуха....

To argue that technically it would be impossible to conduct a hidden *produvka* in Zolotukhin's opinion thus did simply not hold. Within the Green Movement, though, there was not complete agreement that secret emissions of water from the Tashlyk cooling pond had actually taken place. Bilodid, when asked by the author in Iuzhnoukrainsk, whether it was likely that such emissions were carried out, expressed scepticism to Zolotukhin's allegations. Whereas Zolotukhin could not actually prove that hidden *produvki* had taken place (a number of factors supported his suspicions), the leadership of the nuclear power station could not disprove it. What everything thus boiled down to was who one wanted to believe in and support: Zolotukhin and the Green Movement or the pro-nuclear lobby, represented by the leadership of the nuclear power station.

The Public and the Issue of Cleaning the Cooling Pond

A number of war veterans from Iuzhnoukrainsk had no doubt as to where their allegiance lay. In an open letter labelled 'to trust one another' and which appeared in print in *Iuzhmaia pravda* on 10

June 1993¹¹⁵, they expressed their concern that attempts were being made at discrediting the leadership of the nuclear power station and causing a rift between those working there and the local population. Given the difficult energy situation in Ukraine, the nuclear power industry needed all the support it could get, not further division and upset.

As for the safety issue, the pensioners argued that the people of Iuzhnoukrainsk, like any other person living in the vicinity of the nuclear power station wanted it to be as safe as possible. However, unlike the activists of *Zelenyi Mir*, they had no doubt that the nuclear power station was safe. Was it really true, they asked, that those placed in offices in Nikolaev could see better what was happening at the nuclear power station than those living and working there?

With regard to the Tashlyk cooling pond, those signing the letter held the following opinion:

Не будем вдаваться в подробности, здесь лучше послушать экспертов Минздрава, Минприроды. Но надо учитывать и то, что многие из нас не прочь провести несколько часов с удочкой на берегу водохранилища. Иногда воду берем из Ташлика для полива огородов. И как видите, ничего с нами не случилось. Наши внуки тоже полюбили водохранилище. Отдыхают здесь и занимаются спортом.

A rowing club had even had its base at the Tashlyk cooling pond for several years!

Not everyone in the close vicinity of the nuclear power station shared the views expressed in this letter, though. Forty one teachers from the neighbouring village of Kostiantynovka expressed their deep concern regarding the safety of the SB nuclear power station and its in their view damaging impact on peoples' health in a letter published in *Radianske Pribuzhzhia* a few days later¹¹⁶. The teachers were categorically against any prodivka of the Tashlyk cooling pond on the grounds that it would pollute the South Bug river, from which they collected their drinking water and which was used for recreational purposes. The effects of radioactivity from the nuclear power station were felt daily, as headaches and feebleness. Besides, the number of people falling ill with cancer had risen dramatically. The conclusion could only be one, the SB nuclear power station must be closed down, then

Дійсно, не так - ми заложника цієї станції і чекаємо весь час чогось страшного. Що чека наших дітей і внуків? Хто занігував нас, хто радівся з нами, коли її будували? Піліг нам ніяких. За світло платимо, як і всі, продукти дорогі, тому що атомники одержують зарплату більшу і на базарі рівняються на них.

¹¹⁵ *Южная правда*, 10.6.1993, с. 2.

¹¹⁶ *Радянське прибузжя*, 29.6.1993, с. 3.

M. Dzudzelo from Arbuzinka, held similar views, arguing that the attitude of locals towards nuclear power had changed in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident; whereas previous to the accident they were positive to the SB nuclear power station, they were now getting increasingly concerned about safety at the site and their own personal safety. Moreover, they had reasons to believe that their health was affected in a negative manner:

Як не дивно, ми, селяни, вірили, що з пробуванням атомної електростанції на півдні України у нашому регіоні справді буде краще жити...А з страхотливою катастрофою на ЧАЕС ти зрозуміли, що живемо поря з атомним драконом, який приховує від широкого загалу певидиму смерть...А у людей все частіше - голоюна біль, слабкість, сонливість, шитовидка лає про себе знати тривалим канчем і не про тому, що радіаційний фон не перевищує допустимих норм. Які же допустимі норми - ніхто досконало, мабуть і не знає¹¹⁷.

Both the letter from Iuzhnoukrainsk and Dzudzelo's letters triggered off indignant responses from the Greens and the administration at the nuclear power station respectively. Suslova, Shapovalov and Zolotukhin replied to the first letter in *Iuzhnaia pravda* on 26 July 1993¹¹⁸. Refuting the allegations that the Greens were trying to cause division between the people of Iuzhnoukrainsk and others living in the area, they expressed concern with the seemingly blind faith the authors had in the pro-nuclear lobby's arguments that the SB nuclear power station was safe. Despite the fact that Fuks, the General Director of the SB nuclear power station, frequently used words like 'lack of faith in the specialists', 'attacks on the collective' and 'the circulation of incorrect information', and similar phrases to describe the activities of the Green movement, it remained a fact that the leadership of the nuclear power station had not only several times publicly deceived the people of the oblast, but also on a number of occasions actually violated Ukrainian legislation. The authors dwelt on nuclear safety, but considerable space was also given to the alleged 'safety' of the Tashlyk cooling pond. Although the levels of radioactive substances measured in the cooling pond were within the limits of the 'highest permissible levels' (PDK), these levels were from two to 15 times those of the natural background radiation. Moreover, high levels of tritium had been detected in the cooling pond - up to 400-700 times higher than those in the river Arbuzinka! The effect of continuous low-dose radiation on peoples' health would be long term - cancer, for instance, takes years to develop, so naturally, not everyone would fall ill immediately. Therefore, rather than blindly believing in anything being said by the leadership of the nuclear power station, people should check any information prior to believing in it.

¹¹⁷ *Родная природа*, no. 12 (46), 1993, с. 2.

¹¹⁸ *Южная правда*, 26.7.1993, с. 2.

The leadership of the nuclear power station also favoured properly checked and sanctioned information as a basis for any discussion regarding safety at the nuclear power station - only it claimed to have such knowledge and information, *not* the Greens and definitely not Dzudzelo, whom it accused of 'dilettantism'. Such 'dilettantism' and downright misinformation could only harm the nuclear power industry, and it was therefore demanded from the newspaper that these allegations be withdrawn with an official apology, to be printed by the paper:

Некорректные, дилетантские заявления относительно ЮУ АЭС по и
явный вымысел, дезинформация читателей. В настоящее время,
когда Украина испытывает энергетический кризис, стабильная и
безопасная для окружающей среды работа Украинских АЭС
обеспечивает более 30% необходимых энергопотребностей. ЮУ АЭС
также вносит свой значительный вклад а порой и клеветнические
материалы наносят моральный ущерб как коллективу ПО "ЮУ
АЭС" так и читателям Николаевской области. Для восстановления
истины по поднятым автором Дзудзело вопросам просим
опубликовать в вашей газете в виде опровержения официальные
данные компетентных специалистов, подготовленные в ответ на
письмо "В объёмах мирного атома"¹¹⁹.

The Pro-Environment Lobby and the Issue of Cleaning the Cooling Pond

Not only the Greens, but also various ministries and departments as well as local authorities came out against a *produvka*. *Minzdrav* (the Ministry of Health), for instance, having examined the Project on the *Produvka* of the cooling ponds of the Zaporizhzhia, Iuzhnoukrainsk and Khmelnytskyi nuclear power stations prepared for the Ukrainian Government by the State Committee on the Use of Nuclear Energy, found it could not put its support behind the project as it had no possibility of organising and conducting a survey of the impact of the nuclear power station on peoples' health due to a lack of scientific-medical facilities at the nuclear power stations¹²⁰.

The oblast soviet also had strong reservations against a *produvka*. Its Chairman, I. Hrytsai, in a letter to Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk informed the President that the oblast Soviet had made a decision to transform the SB nuclear power station into a non-*produvka* regime¹²¹ and that the

¹¹⁹ The letter was signed by Iu. Novak and S. Kliashko - Head of the Monitoring Service and the Information Centre at the SB nuclear power station, respectively. The letter appeared in *Радянське Прибужжя*, 13.1.1994, с. 2, in response to Dzudzelo's letter, which appeared in the same newspaper on 4.12.1993.

¹²⁰ No. *исх.7.11/74* of 24.2.1993, signed by O. Bobyleva and addressed to the President of the Ukrainian State Committee on the Use of Nuclear Power, M. Umanets.

¹²¹ The decision referred to, No. 26, ('О решении третьей сессии 21-созыва по вопросу *продувки Таптыкского водохранилища*') was adopted on 7.7.1992 by the 13th session of the 21st convocation and stated that the issue of a *produvka* would be further considered at the October session of the oblast Soviet 'при условии предоставления ПО ЮУ АЭС официально оформленных документов ведомства о введении в перспективе беспродувочного режима работы атомной станции с указанием сроков

leadership of the nuclear power station had been instructed to introduce measures to cleanse the Tashlyk cooling pond for salinity and radioactive substances as well as replacing condensators. Despite this, and despite the fact that the environmental impact assessment commission had written in its report that: 'from the point of view of water protection, the existing project's scheme for cooling of the nuclear power station by circulating water...was inadmissible', the leadership of the nuclear power station tried to introduce and legalise permanent *produvka* of the Tashlyk water reservoir into the South Bug river. To facilitate this, testing of a so-called 'high water spillway facility' (*pavodkoe vodosbrosnoe ustroistvo*) commenced. This facility could emit not only the 'active water of the water reservoir, but also a two meter thick layer of its so-called 'dead water', due to the high speed by which it emitted the water (two cubic metres per second).

Following a request by the leadership of the SB nuclear power station in June 1992 to allow for a *produvka* to take place, the oblast Soviet contacted the Ukrainian President with a request to conduct an independent environmental impact assessment under the leadership of Academician Hrodzinskyi (one of the few remaining scientists to be trusted by the general public). On the orders of the President such a commission was established and the first step of work had already been conducted. However, despite the fact that also the Deputy Prime Minister, Iu. Ioffe, had expressed the need for this expert to be conducted/completed, work had been stopped, as the leadership of the nuclear power station refused to take part in the funding of the work of the expert. The oblast Soviet simply had no funds available to put towards the work of the expert commission and such work had therefore been halted.

A complete environmental impact assessment re-examination of the nuclear power station was required also as the environmental impact assessment conducted by USSR *Goskompriroda* in 1989 had concluded that reactors No. 1 and 2 be reconstructed due to cracks in the protection shields of the reactors. Besides, reactor No. 2 was situated directly onto a seismically active seam, connected to the Vraunch zone. The oblast Soviet therefore urged the President to provide funding for a thorough ecological assessment to take place.

выполнения работ по замене конденсаторов, расширению обессоливающих установок второго контура, проведения расчистки и рассоления Ташлыкского пруда-охладителя, источников финансирования этих работ, а также данных о проведении независимой компетентной организацией дополнительных исследований донных отложений ила в пруде-охладителе и влияния на экологическую систему Южный Буг как *produvki* Ташлыкского водосема, так и стоков очистных сооружений в реку Арбузинка и Ташлыкское водохранилище бытовой и промышленной канализации г. Южноукраинска'.

It was also decided to request the Academy of Sciences to provide an official assessment regarding the question of *produvka* of the Tashlyk cooling pond. The decision was signed by Chairman of the Soviet, I. Hrytsai. A similar decision had been made at the oblast Soviet's third session in October 1990, which prohibited a *produvka* of the Tashlyk water reservoir on the grounds that the former Soviet *Minatomenergoprom* had failed to take adequate measures to find alternatives to a *produvka* as a means by which to desalinise the water of the Tashlyk cooling pond. (See *Родная природа*, no. 5, September 1992, с. 1.

The leadership of the nuclear power station, however, continued its campaign to gain acceptance for the need to conduct a *produvka* at the central political level in Kiev. Not only did it challenge the data *Zelenyi Mir* provided the members of *Minpriroda's* expert commission with, when it carried out an in-depth analysis of the state of the Tashlyk cooling pond and its impact on safety at the SB nuclear power station in May 1992¹²²; the April 1993 issue of *Press-Fakt*, the nuclear power station's information bulletin, was addressed to the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers and carried the following headline, 'The *produvka* of the water reservoir is a precondition for the nuclear power station's stable¹²³'. The pro-nuclear lobby also referred to Iu. Ioffe to justify its claims that a *produvka* of the Tashlyk water reservoir was required. At a meeting at his office which took place on 14 April 1993 and which was attended by representatives of *Minpriroda*, *Gosatom*, *Gosvodkhoz*, *Minzdrav*, oblast soviets, the state administration of the Nikolaev and Zaporizhzhia oblasts and the leadership of the SB and Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plants, it was stated very clearly that the state of the water in the cooling ponds at both nuclear power stations had deteriorated considerably and that this would have implications for safety at the two nuclear power plants unless something was done to improve water quality. The situation also had economic implications in that less energy was produced (due to safety considerations) and that the environment would suffer irretrievably as a result. Unless a solution was found quickly, both nuclear power stations would have to be closed towards the end of 1993/early 1994 for security reasons. It would be impossible to replace the energy generated at these nuclear power stations from any other sources.

The meeting, after careful considerations, allowed a *produvka* at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station and ordered thorough investigations to be started into the possibilities of conducting a similar *produvka* at SB. The commission which was set up, was composed of representatives from *Minpriroda*, *Minzdrav*, *Gosvodkhoz*, *Gosatom* and the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. Iu. Ruban - the Deputy Minister of *Minpriroda* - was appointed Chairman of the commission. The commission was instructed to examine the ecological and the economic implications of a *produvka* of the Tashlyk water reservoir.

Academician Hrodzinskiyi had earlier put forth alternatives to *produvka* for the SB nuclear power station and these would be examined by the State Committee on Science and Technology. Hrodzinskiyi had suggested that the water in the Tashlyk cooling pond be cleaned with water plants, membranes and other facilities.

¹²² See 'Сколько же раз "выжирили" Ташлык?', *Родная природа*, сентябрь 1992, с. 2.

¹²³ *Пресс-Факт*, (информационный бюллетень пресс-центра ПО "Южно-Украинская АЭС"), No. 29, апрель, 1993 год, с. 1-2.

The working group concluded that due to the high mineralisation of the water in the cooling pond

Приводит к частым нарушениям водо-химического режима второго контура и, как следствие, является одним из основных причин выхода из строя основного оборудования на ЮУ АЭС¹²⁴.

As a result, *Gosatomnadzor* demanded that water quality in the Tashlyk cooling pond be improved immediately. In the opinion of the pro-nuclear lobby this could only be achieved by a *produvka*. The leadership of the nuclear power station was allowed to start testing of equipment used for such a *produvka*. Should the results of this testing be positive, then the working group would contact the oblast Soviet to have the ban on *produvka* lifted. During testing, the water quality would be regularly monitored by those in charge of water quality in Ukraine.

The water quality of the Tashlyk cooling pond was thoroughly checked by the working group and the findings were not reassuring: the average registered concentrations of salts for 1992 was 1,646 mg/l, which could in itself (again in the opinion of the pro-nuclear lobby) be taken as a confirmation that the cooling pond was actually a closed water pond. As a result of evaporation, the level of salinisation in the cooling pond would continue to rise. Yet the concentration of heavy metals was lower in the cooling pond than in the South Bug river and the values for radioactive substances were well within the upper permissible limits¹²⁵. Besides, according to the leadership of the nuclear power station, most of the pollution in the South Bug river stemmed from industrial and agricultural sources, not from the nuclear power station.

The emission devices which had been put up at the Tashlyk water reservoir in 1992 to facilitate the *produvka* were, in the opinion of the pro-nuclear lobby, environmentally sound, in that they would emit surface water, rather than bottom water containing radioactive silt, at a depth of 27 m into the South Bug river, thus reducing to a minimum any negative impact on the environment. Moreover, the water, prior to entering South Bug, would first pass through a filter and then through two drains. The water would be emitted into the bottom layers of the river at a rate of two cubic metres per second (see above). Substantiating and supporting this view, the leadership of the SB nuclear power station referred to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station,

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

¹²⁵ Concentrations of salts from heavy metals were 1.7 times lower, various chemical nitric substances were eight times lower and various oil substances six times lower. The level of strontium-90 was 46 times lower than the upper permissible levels and 1.1 times lower than in the South Bug river. As for caesium-137 the levels were 1,400 times and 1.5 times lower respectively, and for tritium 3,500 times lower than the maximum permissible levels. The maximum permissible levels for various radioactive substances were, however, justified following the Chernobyl accident, so the given values therefore say little about the potential impact they may have on the South Bug river and on the local population. The same data was also presented in *Мирный атом*, 9.6.1993.

where a *produvka* had taken place in March 1992, and where no significant negative impact had been registered in the Kahovsk water reservoir afterwards¹²⁶.

The Greens, on the other hand, remained firmly opposed to *produvka*. Firstly, they were opposed to it for legal reasons (given that the oblast Soviet had decided against *produvka*, it was not acceptable for the pro-nuclear lobby to try to push Ukrainian central authorities (Cabinet of Ministers) into overruling the decision of the oblast political authorities. Serbii Zhuk of the Voznesensk *Zelenyi Mir* also expressed the following view in a local newspaper when asked what his position on the prospect of a *produvka* of the Tashlyk cooling pond:

Проводить продувку в нитне подоймине? Відповіді нема і по сьогодні¹²⁷.

The oblast Soviet acknowledged that it would have to chose between cleaning the water of the cooling pond or close the nuclear power station altogether for reasons of safety. The latter option was not desirable, given that the oblast obtained 90% of its energy from the nuclear power station. There was still overwhelming support for Suslova's proposition not to allow *produvka* of the Tashlyk cooling pond, thus reiterating the decision of the oblast Soviet already made twice. Fuks, the General Director of the SB nuclear power station, stated that the personnel of the nuclear power station would follow any decision made by the authorities, whereas Hrytsai (Chairman of the oblast Soviet) made it clear that it would be preferable not to have to chose between either of the two options but rather find alternative solutions. Should no acceptable alternatives be found, though, the nuclear power station would have to be sacrificed¹²⁸.

Radianske Pribuzhzhia in early May 1993 carried a feature article on *produvka*¹²⁹, seeking out different opinions on the issue, following the round table that the oblast Soviet had held on the matter on 29 April that year. The basic positions of the pro-environment and pro-nuclear lobbies remained unchanged: Whereas the former argued that there were other, more environmentally friendly ways of cleansing the water of the Tashlyk cooling pond than a *produvka*, the latter held the view that there was a choice between a) a *produvka* and b) closing the nuclear power station altogether. Few new elements were added in the article.

The pro-nuclear lobby argued that since 95% of the energy consumed by Nikolaev oblast was generated at the SB Energy Complex and in the neighbouring oblasts (Odessa, Kherson), it would be an economic disaster to close the nuclear power station. Besides, more than 2,500 specialists

¹²⁶ 'Продувка на Запоріжжя', in *Родная природа*, сентябрь, 1992, с. 4.

¹²⁷ *Вести Вознесенщины*, 17.4.1993, с. 2.

¹²⁸ *Радийське Прибужжя*, 29.4.1993, с. 1.

¹²⁹ *Радийське Прибужжя*, 4.5.1993, с. 3.

working there would lose their jobs should it be closed down, and the 40,000 inhabitants of Iuzhnoukrainsk would face a bleak future. Zhuk's position that people in the oblast received their drinking water from the South Bug river was also refuted. Drinking water was primarily provided from the Dniepr river. This view, was however challenged by the Chief Doctor of the oblast *Sanepidemstantsia*, who claimed that some 200,000 people depended on water from South Bug for drinking and other purposes.

Given that a choice had to be made between cleaning the Tashlyk cooling pond or closing down the SB nuclear power station altogether, the Greens - when they failed to win support at the central political level for alternative ways of cleaning the pond thus avoiding a *produvka* - once again emphasised the alternatives to nuclear power suggested to them earlier. This is an issue to which I will return below. Suffice it here to say that gas turbines could replace nuclear energy in the Nikolaev oblast over a relatively short period of time, as all the equipment needed could be produced in the oblast itself.

At the round table on 29 April 1993, it was suggested to conduct a referendum on the future of the SB nuclear power station prior to making a decision regarding *produvka* or a close down. Readers of *Radianske Pribuzhzhia* were encouraged to write letters to the paper, expressing their opinions on this issue. The demand of the leadership at the SB nuclear power station that a *produvka* be conducted, continued to be met with widespread disapproval. Four deputies of the oblast Soviet, A. Ignatenko, A. Tolstykh, Iu. Drobilko and A. Shcheglov found it very difficult to agree with the leadership of the nuclear power station that it was ecologically clean and that a *produvka* would have no significant negative impact on the South Bug river. Then, according to data available to the oblast Soviet, cleansing facilities used to treat sewage and other emissions from the nuclear power station and from the town Iuzhnoukrainsk were not inefficient. Such emissions were made into the river Arbuzinka and as a result had polluted the river. The concentration of caesium-137 therefore remained systematically higher than the control value for this nuclear substance for the river Arbuzinka. Thus, caesium and other radioactive substances had been concentrated in the silt layers of the rivers Arbuzinka, Mertvovod, the Trikratskoe and the Taborovskoe water reservoirs. The concentrations of these radioactive substances did not exceed the maximum limits in the sewage emitted. Given that water from the water reservoirs were used for irrigation, radioactive substances would eventually enter the food chain and affect peoples' health. This negative impact on peoples' health would be further aggravated should a *produvka* go ahead¹³⁰.

¹³⁰ *Радянське Прибужжя*, 22.4.1993, с. 1: 'поскольку очистка канализационных и промышленных стоков остается в прежнем качестве, то переброска стоков в Ташлыкское водохранилище ухудшает состояние рек Арбузика, Мертвовод, водохранилищ и поливной воды в этих

In June 1993 rumours were spread to the effect that the leadership of the SB nuclear power station had installed equipment to facilitate a *produvka*¹³¹. It turned out to be impossible to verify whether or not this was the case. The oblast Soviet, however, was very clear on the issue of a *produvka*. As long as the leadership of the nuclear power station failed to carry out those preparations requested by the oblast Soviet there would be none.

Radianske Pribuzhzhia reported that on 3 June a high-water emission of water from the Tashlyk cooling pond into the South Bug river had taken place. With regard to the legality of this emission, the oblast Prosecutor, Iu. Bondar, could inform the readers that the emission was illegal and did not only pose a threat to the life and health of people in the vicinity of the nuclear power station but also put state interests at risk¹³².

Emissions from the nuclear power station started already in late May. Between the 26 and 30 May the emission facilities which had been set up in accordance with the Working Group instructions (see Protocol No. 114/149 of 26 April the same year) were tested. Whereas the working group had given the clear for two cubic metres of water per second to be emitted, the nuclear power station had emitted between 2.22-2.35 cubic metres per second - a clear violation of existing test programmes¹³³. The emissions continued during the 27 and 28 May despite the fact that increased concentrations of magnesium salts were found in the test samples taken from the water being emitted (the maximum permissible level of such salts was 50 mg per litre, whereas the emitted water contained between 51-53 mg per litre)¹³⁴ - which could be taken as proof that the emission facilities had not been properly installed prior to their use. Furthermore, test samples were then collected in the absence of the oblast *Sanepidemstantsia* inspectorate¹³⁵ and those in charge of the tests failed to take samples of the water from the main water collection point, which was located below the control range. This was of importance, as the main water collection point was down-river from the emission point¹³⁶.

районах, однако ухудшает состояние Ташлыкского подлоема-охладителя и усугубляет проблему его продувки в реку Южный Буг".

¹³¹ *Родная природа*, no. 6, June 1993, p. 1.

¹³² See Article 51 of the Ukrainian Law on Environmental Protection, according to which 'в процессе эксплуатации действующих предприятий, сооружений и объектов обеспечивается экологическая безопасность людей, рациональное использование природных ресурсов, соблюдение нормативов вредных воздействий на окружающую природную среду'. (quoted in *Радянське Прибужжя*, 5.7.1993, с. 1).

¹³³ See point 4.1 in 'Програми комплексних іспитаній...'. Altogether, according to the leadership of the nuclear power station, 544,947 cubic metres of water were emitted from the Tashlyk cooling pond into the South Bug river in *Радянське Прибужжя*, 23.9.1993, с. 2.

¹³⁴ This constituted a further violation of the programmes referred to in the footnote above (point 4.2).

¹³⁵ This violated point 6.2 of the same programmes.

¹³⁶ *Радянське Прибужжя*, 23.9.1993, с. 2.

On 23 May increased levels of sulphates had been detected in water samples taken from this point¹³⁷. The leadership of the nuclear power station should have followed up this data, but that was never done. A number of further violations on rules and legislation for water emissions were also registered. On this basis, the oblast Prosecutor recommended that no further emissions be conducted from the Tashlyk cooling pond until the violations referred to above had been properly investigated and until the leadership of the nuclear power station had committed itself to conducting the emissions in strict accordance with current rules and legislation and with proper monitoring taking place. The oblast Soviet followed this recommendation, when on 7 June 1993 it passed a decision (No. 170II) which suggested the Nikolaev branch of *Minpriroda* and the oblast *Sanepidemstantsia* to examine the experimental emission facilities at the nuclear power station closely to make sure that they met the requirements of the programmes referred to above¹³⁸.

For the Green Movement, the Procurator's 'verdict' just confirmed what they had claimed all along: that the leadership of the nuclear power station was not trustworthy and that a *produvka* would have a negative impact on the state of the South Bug river as well as carry with it a possible damage to the health and well-being of the people of Nikolaev oblast. The leadership of the SB nuclear power station, however, was not at all happy with the criticism raised against it for failing to follow existing programmes and procedures for *produvki*.

Repeated test emissions were carried out on 15 September 1993. Oblast authorities did, however, remain sceptical of the prospect of a proper *produvka*, following the results of the experimental emissions. At its 18th session in October, it was once again decided to contact President Kravchuk with a request that a proper ecological assessment be carried out on the SB nuclear power station in general and the Tashlyk cooling pond in particular, so as to decide from a technical point of view how to operate the nuclear power station without *produvki* and also to assess the future prospects of the nuclear power station itself¹³⁹.

Decision: Go-ahead for produvka

Given the critical content of salts in the Tashlyk cooling pond a decision had to be made quickly. On 23 March 1994, the Republican Commission on Emergency Situations in Ukraine held a meeting in Kiev. The meeting was headed by General Kapustin - the Commander-in-Chief of the

¹³⁷ 126.3 mg per litre: maximum permissible levels were 100 mg per litre. Normally levels of between 50-70 mg per litre were found at the control point.

¹³⁸ 'Решение No. 17-II от 7 июня 1993', *Родная природа*, No. 7, июль 1993.

¹³⁹ Рішення 18 сесії 21-скликання от 13 октября 1993, No. 32 'О решении третьей и тринадцатой сессий 21-созыва по вопросу продувки Ташлыкского водоема-охладителя ЮУ АЭС'.

Ukrainian Civil Defence. The Commission discussed arguments in favour of and against a *produvka* and finally agreed to allow a *produvka* to go ahead.

The decision was met with anger and disbelief in Nikolaev. Sergei Shapovalov, representing the oblast soviet, in a comment stressed that tests of the water quality in the Tashlyk cooling pond clearly indicated that the levels of various salts, chemicals and radioactive substances were much higher in the pond than in the South Bug river. He further referred to the decisions previously made by the oblast Soviet against a *produvka* for these very circumstances, which the decision made in Kiev arrogantly overruled:

Но правительству Украины нужна энергия любой ценой. И вот Комиссия по чрезвычайным обстоятельствам превращается в Чрезвычайную комиссию. В нарушение законов Украины Комиссия предписывает своим решением 25.03.94 г. ЮВ АЭС пачать *продукку* водоема-охладителя, игнорируя или отменяя таким образом решение сессии Николаевского областного Совета народных депутатов, защищающее интересы жителей области. Комиссия Кабинета Министров не вправе отменить решение сессии областного Совета народных депутатов и Совет опротестует ее решение, но будет ли вовремя остановлена *продукка*.¹⁴⁰

Zelenyi Mir also protested the decision made by Kiev in harsh words. A lengthy article signed by Suslova and Shapovalov appeared in *Radianske Pribuzhzhia* on 8 April 1993. The article was written after it was brought to the attention of the two deputies of the oblast Soviet that the Representative of the President in Nikolaev oblast and the Chairman of the oblast Soviet had given in to intense pressure from the leadership of the SB nuclear power station and made a request to the Chairman of the Commission on Nuclear Policies operating under the auspices of the Ukrainian President B. Bariakhtar and (former) Premier Minister L. Kuchma to include the question of an experimental *produvka* of the Tashlyk water reservoir on the agenda of the forthcoming meeting of the Commission. It was also requested that the Commission on Emergency Situations by the Cabinet of Ministers consider the question¹⁴¹. Thus, the leadership of the oblast had turned against the oblast Soviet and come down in favour of a *produvka* despite fact that the oblast *Sanepidemstantsia* could not give its support and despite the fact that the levels of several chemical and radioactive substances in the cooling pond exceeded maximum permissible levels¹⁴². Thus, a long process, which started in 1990, when the question to allow a

¹⁴⁰ See Незаконное решение правительства (n.d.).

¹⁴¹ This article was either written prior to the decision made by the latter or prior to the decision of the commission becoming known to the two deputies - i.e. sometime in late March.

¹⁴² 'По нефтепродуктам - в 20 раз, по содержанию железа - в 7 раз и др., концентрация радионуклидов по цезию-137 - в 10 раз, а по тритию - в 50 раз превышают такие же показатели в реке Южный Буг', *Радянське Прибужжя*, 8.4.1994.

third produvka (as mentioned above, such produvki had taken place in 1984-85 and 1986-87) surfaced, had come to a preliminary end.

The cause of the problem - the critical levels of salinisation of the cooling pond - had, however, occurred due to a flaw in the project of the SB nuclear power station. The project, which envisaged that the condensators of the nuclear power station be cooled by running water from the river with a salinisation of 0.5-0.7 grammes per liter, had failed to take into account that the South Bug river was a major source of drinking water and irrigation for a majority of the people of Nikolaev oblast. The project had therefore turned the river into a technical water reservoir for the nuclear power station and

Поскольку Ташлыкское водохранилище пополнялось водой минерализованного ручья Ташлык и водоем-охладитель не был русловым, проточным, при наличии интенсивного испарения соленость пруда-охладителя с первых дней работы АЭС была выше предусмотренной проектом. Таким образом повышенная минерализация пруда-охладителя - это ошибка проекта АЭС...

As for produvka in itself, this was not the only way in which the salts in the cooling pond could be removed. As a matter of fact, most nuclear power stations were situated along the sea, using salt water to cool its reactors (salt content: 26-29 g/litre). Also nuclear submarines made use of salt water. In such cases higher quality rust-free steel or titanium was used for the condensators. By using cheaper steel the leadership of the nuclear power station wanted to solve the subsequent problems at the expense of the environment and the health of the local population. What was more, judging by the results of the two previous produvki, they did not reduce, but only stabilised the salt levels in the pond¹⁴³.

As in 1990, the oblast Soviet also in June 1992 said no to a produvka and ordered work to be undertaken to facilitate the operation of the nuclear power station without produvki. The leadership of the nuclear power station had already in 1990 been instructed to develop measures towards such a transition. The report handed over to the oblast Soviet in 1992, however, did not envisage any such measures before 1998¹⁴⁴, when water towers would be introduced as an alternative to the open cooling pond. The pro-nuclear lobby focused all its attention on the need for a produvka, which according to Chief Engineer of the SB nuclear power station, B. Koriagin, would last for 22 months! Confronted by scientists and deputies present at the 13th session of the

¹⁴³ По данным ПО "ЮУ АЭС", за все годы эксплуатации АЭС произошло повышение солености воды в пруде охладителе к 1992 году до величины 1,62 г/литр и за 1993 год до 1,77 г/литр.

¹⁴⁴ Перечень мероприятий, необходимых для ведения беспroduвочного режима работы ЮУ АЭС, signed by the Deputy Leader of the PO SB AES, V. M. Gurko on 10.6.1992.

oblast Soviet that a *produvka* would not really solve the problem of salinisation of the cooling pond, he was unable to provide an adequate response. What a *produvka* would do, though, was to violate the Ukrainian Water Code. Besides the expert commission set up by USSR *Goskompriroda* had said 'no' to *produvka* already in 1990.

The 13th session of the oblast Soviet decided to consider *produvka* only when the pro-nuclear lobby had developed a plan to introduce other cooling methods in the perspective, with a detailed outline of dates and equipment to be installed, costs, funding etc., as well as found alternative methods for cleansing the saline water of the cooling pond¹⁴⁵.

On the request of the oblast Soviet, the Ukrainian President in the summer of 1992 set up an expert group composed of members of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences to find an acceptable solution to the problem of how to cleanse the saline waters of the Tashlyk cooling pond. The independent expert group (headed by Academician D. Hrodzinskiyi) was, however, due to a lack of funding unable to complete its work. Some 10 million roubles were needed. Such money could be found at *Minatorenergoprom* but it did not want to allocate any funds for the work of the expert commission. However,

Строят без государственного финансирования, за свои средства
Александровский гидроузел, так как заполнение Александровского
водохранилища - это залог дальнейшего увеличения мощности ЮУ
АЭС¹⁴⁶.

On the basis of this, Suslova and Shapovalov could not accept a *produvka*, because any *produvka*, be it a short experimental one or a full-blown, would have a harmful effect on the South Bug river, the surrounding environment and the population of the oblast. Moreover, the experimental *produvka* which had been suggested by the leadership of the nuclear power station constituted a violation of the decisions made by the third and 13th sessions of the oblast Soviet

¹⁴⁵ The decision of the 13th session of the oblast Soviet read as follows: 'вопрос о продувке Ташлыкского водохранилища рассмотреть дополнительно при условии предоставления ПО ЮУ АЭС официально оформленных документов ведомства о введении в перспективе беспродувочного режима работы атомной станции с указанием сроков работ по замене конденсаторов, расширению обессоливающих установок второго контура, проведения расчистки и рассоления Ташлыкского пруда охладителя, источников финансирования этих работ, а также данных о проведении независимой компетентной организацией дополнительных исследований донных отложений ила в пруде-охладителе, влиянии на экологическую систему реки Южный Буг как продувки Ташлыкского водоема, так и стоков очистных сооружений бытовой и промышленной канализации Южпоукраински в реку Арбузинка и Ташлыкское водохранилище. Просить Академию Наук дать официальное обоснованное заключение по вопросу продувки пруда-охладителя', quoted in *Радянське Прибужжя*, 8.4.1994.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

(21st convocation). The authors encouraged people to voice their protest and to come forward with their views on the SB nuclear power station generally.

Suslova's and Shapovalov's article triggered off a sour response from the SB nuclear power station. A reply by V. Denisov, its Deputy General Director, was published in *Radianske Pribuzhzhia* on 1 July 1993 under the heading '(It) does not correspond with reality'. In his reply, Denisov argued that the figures given by Shapovalov and Suslova were not real. He refuted them by quoting his own¹⁴⁷. Contrary to what Shapovalov and Suslova had argued, the levels of caesium-137 and tritium in the upper flows of the South Bug river were 1.8 and 1.7 times higher than in the Tashlyk cooling pond respectively. The conclusion must therefore be that

Що розповсюдження подібних свідчень в пресі, не відповідає дійсності, порочить честь і достоїнство підприємства, неправильно формує громадське мнение громадян по вопросу безпеки роботи ЮУ АЕС, впливає на оточуючу природу і здоров'я місцевого населення. На основанні викладеного і стаття 37 Закону України "О средствах массовой информации (преси) в Україні" вимагаємо визнати розповсюдження свідчень в статті "Опять о продукції Ташликського водохранилища" (автори С. Шаповалов і Л. Суслова "Радіське Прибузжя" № 40 от 8 апреля 1993 года) порочащими честь і достоїнство ПО "Южно-Українська АЕС" і не соответствующими дійсності і опублікувати настояще офіційне опроверження.

Shapovalov and Suslova's response was printed in the same issue of *Radianske Pribuzhzhie*. As for the figures they had used, these were official figures, collected by a number of laboratories, amongst which were the oblast *Sanepidemstantsia*. Levels of caesium-137 and tritium in the cooling pond were compared with levels in the South Bug river. Although the latter did not exceed the maximum permissible levels (this had not been argued by the authors in their previous article), they were closer to levels registered in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident than to those found prior to the accident. It should be obvious to anyone that these levels would be further increased should a *prudvka* take place. With regard to levels measured in the Tashlyk cooling

¹⁴⁷ A radiological control of the water in the Tashlyk cooling pond in 1992 gave the following results: 'средняя величина содержания радионуклидов по цезию-137 составляет в Ташлыкском водохранилище 0.25 микроКюри/л, по тритию -- 2.43 микроКюри/л. В реке Южный Буг выше по течению от АЭС средняя величина радионуклидов по цезию-137 составляет 0.45 микроКюри/л, а по тритию - 1.37 микроКюри/л; ниже по течению по цезию-137 - 0.15 микроКюри/л, по тритию - 0.96 микроКюри/л. Данные по тритию представлены Украинским научным центром экологии моря Одессы, а по цезию-137 взяты из отчета областной СЭС (письмо главврача В. Базырева №. 1026/6-6 от 10.08.92 года к ИСЛ СЭС СМСН-2). Таким образом, фактические значения концентрации цезия-137 и трития - не превышают установленных значений для Ташлыкского водохранилища'.

pond, these varied greatly. Whereas Denisov used the lowest levels measured as the basis for his article, Suslova and Shapovalov based their arguments on the maximum levels registered. The maximum levels had been registered by the oblast *Sanepidemstantsia* and presented to the oblast Soviet's commission on the environment, of which both Suslova and Shapovalov were members. According to the data presented by the oblast *Sanepidemstantsia* the levels of caesium-137 were 10 times higher in the Tashlyk cooling pond than they were in the South Bug river. Other test data gave similar results. Although more testing was needed, it was unacceptable to use the minimum levels found as the leadership of the SB nuclear power station did.

As for tritium, all test results, including those measured by the Odessa *OGOI*, indicated that the Tashlyk cooling pond was polluted with this radioactive substance. Whereas the average level found in the South Bug river was between four and six bequerels per litre, the tritium contents in the biological pond, which directly received sewage from the nuclear power station, were from 700-1,000 bequerels per litre. As a result, the Trikratskoe water reservoir, which supplied the irrigation system with water contained levels of tritium from 650 to 1,180 becquerels per litre, as did the Taborovskoe water reservoir (between 220-240 bequerels per litre). Levels measured in the Tashlyk cooling pond itself were between 50 and 140 bequerels per litre. Where the sewage from the nuclear power station to be redirected from the river Arbuzinka to the Tashlyk cooling pond, this was likely to reduce the levels of radionuclides in the rivers Arbuzinka, Mertvovod and the two water reservoirs, but would no doubt worsen the situation in the Tashlyk cooling pond considerably. Therefore the authors demanded that the issue of a *produvka* be properly examined by the independent commission set up on the orders of the Ukrainian President and composed of experts from the Academy of Sciences.

With regard to the honour of the SB nuclear power station, Shapovalov and Suslova suggested the following:

Предлагаем ПО "ЮУ АЭС" морально и материально поддержать работу группы ученых под руководством Д.М. Гродзинского, авторитетное заключение которых, как и рекомендации для населения, примем и признаем все вместе и будем ими руководствоваться.
В том числе будет обоснованно решена проблема возможности или невозможности использования Ташлыкского водосма-охладителя для детского спорта и полива полей (см. статью в "ЮП" No. 102 от 10.06.93 "Доверять друг другу").

Suslova and Shapovalov finally reminded the readers that the so-called experimental *produvka* which had taken place towards the end of May 1993 (see above) was in actual fact a proper *produvka* and constituted a violation of existing regulations and legislation. Even worse, it was

conducted when the fish in the South Bug river were spawning. And it violated decisions made by the oblast Soviet regarding *produvka*:

„Без какого-либо официального разрешения, без необходимого контроля не только со стороны общественности, но и государственных контрольных органов и проведения ими замеров, даже при наличии протеста обл.ЭС. Такие действия администрации АЭС недопустимы и должны быть наказаны.

The leadership of the SB nuclear power station, though, was by no means happy with such accusations and with the unwillingness of *Radianske Pribuzhzhia* to apologise for having printed the first article signed by Shapovalov and Suslova. Consequently, it sued the Editor-in-Chief, E. Hutsenko, Suslova and Shapovalov for having discredited the honour and reputation of the nuclear power station. The statement of claim ('on the Defense of the Honour, Dignity and Professional Reputation of the Enterprise') reiterated the data quoted by Denisov in his article to prove Shapovalov and Suslova wrong in arguing that the levels of caesium-137 and tritium in the cooling pond were 10 and 50 times higher respectively than in the South Bug river.

According to Article 37 of the Ukrainian Law 'On the Mass Media in Ukraine', Denisov's letter should have been printed in the same size of type as the article to which it responded. Besides, it should have been printed under the headline 'Refutation'. However, it was printed in small letters and not given such a prominent place in the paper. Moreover, no such headline had been provided. Rather, an impression of the exchange of opinions was created, as below Denisov's article, a reply by Suslova and Shapovalov was published. Thus, the newspaper contributed to the spreading of wrong information about the nuclear power station.

The three pages long justification for taking the newspaper (considered to be pro-environmental) and *Zelenyi Mir* (although Shapovalov and Suslova had written the two articles in their capacity as Chairman and Secretary of the oblast Soviet's Commission on the Environment respectively, they were Green Deputies and amongst the most fierce opponents with which the pro-nuclear lobby was faced. If the nuclear power station could have them sentenced for spreading disinformation about the nuclear power station, this would no doubt contribute to the discrediting of *Zelenyi Mir* and thus also to the weakening of the pro-environment lobby) to court concluded as follows:

ПО "ЮУ АЭС" считает, что редакция газеты "Радянське Прибужжя" своими действиями способствует неправильному формированию общественного мнения граждан по вопросу безопасной работы АЭС, влиянию ее на окружающую природу и здоровье местного населения.

На основании изложенного и статей: 7 Гражданского кодекса Украины, 47 Закона Украины "Об информации", 37, 41 Закона

Украины "О печатных средствах массовой информации (печати) в Украине".

ПРОШУ:

1. Признать распространенные сведения в статье "Опыт о продувке Ташлыкского водохранилища", порочащими честь, достоинство и деловую репутацию Производственного объединения "Южно-Украинская АЭС" и не соответствующими действительности.
2. Запретить дальнейшее их распространение.
3. обязать редакцию газеты "Радиське Прибужжя" опровергнуть порочащие ПО "ЮУ АЭС" сведения, в печати.
4. Компенсировать ПО "ЮУ АЭС" причиненный моральный ущерб.
5. Взыскать с ответчиков понесенные по делу судебные расходы¹⁴⁸.

Although no sum was mentioned in the claim which was presented to Suslova and Shapovalov, informally they were informed that the nuclear power station would sue them for 500 million karbovantsy¹⁴⁹. To get this confirmed in writing, Zolotukhin contacted the court in Nikolaev and was told by a court secretary that a new claim, including the sum, would be issued to them. The new claim, however, also failed to mention in writing any sum. This was by the Greens interpreted to the effect that the leadership of the nuclear power station wanted to safeguard itself, should it not win the court case. Since it would be difficult to prove the nuclear power station wrong on figures - So many and diverging figures regarding the levels of radioactivity in the South Bug river and the Tashlyk cooling pond were available - Suslova and Shapovalov issued a counter-claim to the effect that the leadership of the nuclear power station prove them wrong, which would be equally difficult and which put the burden of providing evidence on the complainants. Thus Denisov, representing the pro-nuclear lobby, could no longer so easily assume that he would win the case. A number of court meetings to clarify figures and levels referred to had been held by the autumn of 1994, but the actual court case had not yet started.

7.3.6 Alternatives: Enhanced Safety and Improved Environmentability

Structural Reforms as a Means of Enhancing Nuclear Safety

Rodnaia priroda also carried an article submitted by *Minpriroda*, which addressed the concept of nuclear and radiation safety elaborated by the Ministry. The starting point, as seen by *Minpriroda*,

¹⁴⁸ See Исковое заявление о защите чести, достоинства и деловой репутации предприятия, signed on behalf of the Deputy General Director of the SB nuclear power station by V. Bykov and addressed to Народный Суд Центрального района г. Николаева. Copy given to me by Zolotukhin.

¹⁴⁹ Чорнобиль - роздіття України, *Радиське Прибужжя*, 26.4.1994, с. 4.

was that ecological reform must be linked to a more general economic reform and that nuclear safety must form a key element of ecological reform. The existing system for nuclear and radiation safety did not meet international standards and Ukraine was therefore not guaranteed from future accidents similar to the one which took place in Chernobyl. Following the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine suddenly found itself in charge of 30% of the nuclear power capacity of the USSR, as well as considerable areas of territory contaminated by radionuclides, nuclear waste and the sarcophagus at Chernobyl.

The Ukrainian nuclear power stations were riddled with problems and a substantial number of these were rooted in poor or faulty planning. The sites chosen to accommodate the stations were in most cases made based on political rather than geological and technical considerations. Thus, the Iuzhnoukrainsk, Rivne and Khmelnytskyi nuclear power stations were situated in areas with a water deficit. What was more, the Rivne station was as seen in Chapter Six, standing on karst ground. Moreover, the VVER-440 reactors at Rive did not have hermetical covers.

Minpriroda recommended that the reactors at Chernobyl be shut down as they would not even be considered safe were they to be reconstructed. The *Verkhovna Rada* had already passed a Resolution ('On the Urgent Measures regarding the Closure of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station') to close down Chernobyl. A problem common to all the nuclear power stations was the poor state of equipment crucial to safety¹⁵⁰. Safety problems, particularly at the RBMK and the VVER-440 reactors of the first generation, were frequent and the anxiety of the Ukrainian people about nuclear power was therefore fully understandable.

Another problem related to nuclear power was the lack of a concept on what to do with nuclear waste from the power stations. As a result, the storage facilities at the nuclear power stations were almost completely full and something would have to be done quickly to sort this problem out. The collapse of the Soviet Union, at least from the point of view of safety at nuclear power stations, had not improved the situation for Ukraine, but rather worsened it:

Особливо треба наголосити на тому, що після розпаду СРСР і переорієнтації Міністерства енергетики на Росію українській АЕС й інші підприємства цієї галузі залишилися без органу державного управління, а також без науково-технічної і проектно-конструкторської підтримки (організації головного конструктора, наукового керівника і генерального проєктуанта залишилися в Росії)¹⁵¹.

¹⁵⁰ These were listed as follows: 'парогенератори, автоматизовані системи управління технологічними процесами, запірно-регулююча арматура тощо.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

There was also no clear structure for the regulation of the utilisation of nuclear energy, as the concern *Ukratomenergoprom* was not responsible for the exploitation of nuclear power, thus putting the administrations of the nuclear power stations in charge of this. They, on the other hand, were ill prepared for this. In most countries making use of nuclear power, one Ministry or Department would not be in charge of both the production and the safety of nuclear power. What was more, in most countries the Ministry of the Environment would be responsible for monitoring safety at the nuclear power stations - which again, was not the case in Ukraine.

To put the situation right, *Minpriroda* recommended that a concept of nuclear safety be elaborated, involving various Ministries, the Parliament, scientific establishment and public and political organisations. The parliamentary commission on Chernobyl could co-ordinate such work. Until a proper concept had been developed, it would make sense to trust the State Committee on the Utilization of Nuclear Energy with the provision of scientific and technical as well as project and construction support to enterprises serving the nuclear industry. In addition, the new committee would be responsible for finding solutions to problems regarding the utilization of radioactive waste and the decommissioning of nuclear power stations. *Derzhatomnahliad*, on the other hand, should be given responsibility for 'on-site' inspection, thus making sure that rules and regulations were being adhered to. *Minpriroda*, on the other hand, should be put in charge of the state regulation of nuclear safety as a part of ecological safety in Ukraine. Unwillingness to incorporate nuclear safety into a wider environmental reform could only aggravate the situation, until finally, another accident would take place.

Safety-Enhancing Measures at the Nuclear Power Station (Pro-Nuclear Lobby)

The pro-nuclear lobby could not easily overlook the fact that a number of incidents had taken place at Iuzhnoukrainsk over the previous few years. They therefore based their agenda on the energy problems Ukraine was faced with, arguing that there were not really any alternatives to nuclear power in the nearest future. As for safety, it was emphasised that a number of measures were being taken to improve safety at the nuclear power station.

Why was there no real alternative to nuclear power? In an article published in *Mirnyi atom*¹⁵², the administration at the Iuzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station argued that due to the high prices on Russian natural gas, the Iuzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station, which provided not only the Nikolaev oblast, but also the Kherson, Odessa, parts of Kirovohrad oblast and the Crimean peninsula with electricity, would remain the major energy source for the South of Ukraine. To

¹⁵² *Мирный атом*, 5.3.1993, с. 2.

'prove' their point, the article pointed out that during 1992, 18 billion kW hours of electricity had been generated at Iuzhnoukrainsk. This equalled six million tons of oil, which would have to be bought from Russia at world prices. Due to the fact that Russia now charged world prices (in hard currency) both for its oil and gas, the administration of the nuclear power station claimed that at present nuclear power was two to three times cheaper than power generated from oil or gas. Prices on nuclear energy would have to be raised following the introduction of new, safety-enhancing measures, but at least Ukraine would not have to depend so heavily on Russia for energy. Given the tensions in the relationship between Russia and Ukraine this would no doubt be to Ukraine's benefit. Besides, exports of nuclear power would also give Ukraine highly needed hard currency.

The article also mentioned the need for regular *produvki* to be carried out so as to limit contents of salt in the Tashlyk cooling pond. Salt levels in the South Bug river would, according to the authors of the article, not be affected if a limit of two cubic metres of water were emitted per second. To make the nuclear power station work efficiently, this exercise would have to be conducted regularly. The salts emitted from the cooling pond would be flushed straight into the Black Sea (South Bug emitted 2,9 billion cubic metres of water annually into the Black Sea).

As for safety, no proper rules had been worked out so far, but this did not mean that they would not be elaborated in the future. Safety and the future of ones' grandchildren were no doubt important factors to keep in mind. However, one should also keep in mind that during the past nine years, 13 superheaters had been taken out of use. These were made in Russia and cost millions of roubles. Simply switching from nuclear energy to gas stations, as favoured by the Greens, did thus not necessarily make such a lot of sense from an economic point of view.

A more lengthy justification of nuclear power emerged in *Energetik* on 13 March 1994¹⁵³. In an open letter from the collective of the Iuzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station to the people, official authorities and the press of the Nikolaev oblast, the amount of energy generated at Iuzhnoukrainsk and how the oblast had benefited from this, was once again emphasised: following the start-up of the third reactor at the nuclear power station, more than 127 billion KW hours of electricity had been produced, which equalled the burning of approximately 30 million tons of oil at thermal power stations!

The pro-nuclear lobby's commitment to safety was once again reiterated;

Коллектив атомной станции всегда обеспечивал выполнение государственного заказа на выработку и отпуск электрической и тепловой энергии, безопасную эксплуатацию энергетических установок, соблюдение природоохранных нормативов, постоянно

¹⁵³ *Energetik*, 13.3.1994, с. 3.

принимая меры для повышения надежности работы оборудования. В настоящее время продолжаются работы по реконструкции и модернизации, что позволит по уровню надежности оборудования соответствовать международным требованиям.

Furthermore, the pro-nuclear lobby raised harsh criticism towards certain public organisations (i.e. the Green Movement) for putting the nuclear industry in a negative light at a time when the industry needed all the support it could get, due to the difficult energy situation in Ukraine:

Мы не можем согласиться с тем отрицательным образом энергетика-атомника, который пытаются создать в сознании жителей Украины отдельные общественные движения, некоторые депутаты Николаевского областного Совета, средства массовой информации. Уверены, что попытки противостояния, запугивания обстановки, запугивания населения угрозой катастроф используют в своих целях люди, которые на том строят свои программы. Многие из них проходной балл, позволяющий завоевать доверие населения области, получили за счет запугивания антиядерных настроений в постчернобыльский период. Их отдельные высказывания на митингах и собраниях, в газетах, радио- и телепередачах иногда противоречат здравому смыслу и созданной обстановке.

To balance this 'negative criticism', the pro-nuclear lobby found it necessary to draw to everybody's attention certain points which ought to be properly considered once a final decision was made with regard to the Iuzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station. There were six such points. Firstly, it should be remembered that the nuclear power station was the major energy source for South Ukraine. Its task was to provide individual consumers as well as the industries of the region with energy. Consequently, its work was far too important to be decided on by meetings and rallies and in certain cases, also by local Soviets (my emphasis). The latter is particularly interesting as the pro-nuclear lobby earlier committed itself to following any decisions made by the oblast Soviet. The workers' collective made an appeal to, amongst others, the local authorities, only to denounce their right to make decisions regarding the power station a few paragraphs into the text. This may explain why so many decisions made by local authorities (see above) were completely ignored. And it also is a good indicator regarding the work of the Green Movement. Whereas Greens in the West once they manage to have a decision made or altered, in most cases can rely on these decisions to be implemented, in the former Soviet Union a decision, however good it might be, would in most cases not be implemented as no apparatus existed to see to it that it would actually be executed. Thus, to have a favourable decision made was only half the work done. Then there was the long process of having it implemented, fighting the inertia which had developed over the last 70 years, and which it has proved to be very difficult to get rid of.

The second point on the pro-nuclear lobby's list was safety at the nuclear station. This, it admitted, was closely linked with the qualifications of those working there. Given the bad publicity in the press and the campaign fought against them by the Green Movement, the prestige of the nuclear power workers was on the decline, thus facilitating a high turnover and in turn less safety. Some of the workers were allegedly losing faith in what they were doing and could no longer see the point in nuclear power. The fact that the administration of the nuclear power station itself ignored orders and suggestions made by *Atomnahliad* was not mentioned in the letter, nor was any mention made of the numerous breaches and violations of rules and regulations for how to operate the nuclear power station safely. If the letter was to be taken at face value, the most appropriate conclusion to draw would be not to ban any debate around the issue of nuclear power, but rather to close the station down as quickly as possible, given that the issue of safety was directly related to negative publicity, which has surrounded the industry internationally from its very beginning, and which does not seem to be a security problem in any other country than Ukraine.

The workers of SB nuclear power station also called for demands made by the Greens that the station be closed down or that capacity be reduced to be ignored when making decisions regarding nuclear power. The only reason why the Greens made such demands was that they hoped to benefit politically from spreading anti-nuclear sentiments amongst the population of the oblast. What one should remember was rather that 30% of all electricity made in Ukraine was generated by nuclear power stations. Furthermore, 90% of the energy consumption in Southern Ukraine was covered by the SB nuclear power station. Should capacity be reduced at the existing nuclear power stations, Ukrainian industries would suffer badly and the social consequences would be unpredictable.

The pro-nuclear lobby was happy to inform the people of Nikolaev oblast that systematic monitoring was being carried out to make sure that both the environment and people's health were not being harmed by the nuclear power station. According to the letter, the state monitoring services were able to confirm that the environment was not suffering from the nuclear power station. Again, the letter conveniently failed to make mention of all the criticism raised with regard to the incidents at the nuclear power station generally, and the fact that 100 square metres were covered with radioactive substances following an accident in the early 1980s. The increase in the sickness rates for the oblast and for certain regions could not be explained as a result of the nuclear power station's work. As a matter of fact, it was argued, the fact that the workers at the station did themselves live in Iuzhnoukrainsk should be taken as a guarantee that operation was safe.

Fifthly, the leadership of the nuclear power station did everything it could to make sure that the equipment used was in excellent condition and that only highly qualified personnel was taken on. Thus:

Техническое оснащение станции, уровень подготовки ее персонала дают основания гарантировать безопасную и надежную работу всего энергетического оборудования.

The letter also stressed the need for a *produvka* and reiterated that such a *produvka* would not pose any dangers in terms of radiation. Finally, Zolotukhin's allegations that secret *produvki* had taken place were once again categorically dismissed as nothing but the results of his own vivid imagination and technically unfounded. As for the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station construction work to properly conserve the construction site was required, due to cracks on already completed objects and corrosion. With regard to the Aleksandrov hydro-complex, construction was currently being undertaken - in agreement with the oblast Soviet - to provide a bridge over the South Bug river.

On the basis of this, the pro-nuclear lobby urged constraint in the decision making-process regarding the future of the SB nuclear power station and requested that decisions be made only following thorough examinations of all arguments raised. The decisions made should not only reflect the interests of the people of the oblast, but also Ukrainian state interests.

Alternative Energy (Pro-Environment Lobby)

The approach adopted by the Greens already from an early stage differed markedly from that of the pro-nuclear lobby. Given the dangers of nuclear power and the extensive implications it had not only on the surrounding environment but also on people's health, the Greens favoured a gradual move from nuclear power towards safer, environmentally cleaner, cheaper and equally efficient alternatives. Whereas we have presented some of the alternatives offered by the Greens above, below we will examine the gas turbine project more in detail and also look at the way in which *Zelenyi Mir* tried to 'sell' its alternative package.

The first mention of an alternative to continued expansion of the SB EK was made in a report *Zelenyi Mir* produced following the information that Stage Three of the SB EK had been agreed. The report¹⁵⁴ covered the history of the energy complex, an assessment of the environmental

¹⁵⁴ Обоснование целесообразности строительства 4-го энергоблока Южноукраинской АЭС и гидроэнергокомплекса на реке Южный Буг

implications should the Third Stage be implemented unchanged (this assessment made references to expert opinions received by the Greens from various ministries, departments and scientific institutions at the initial stage of the campaign) and finally, an alternative approach. The report was produced by *Zelenyi Mir* in co-operation with scientists of Nikolaev oblast and was eventually co-signed by local authorities. The latter also produced a report with similar conclusions, although this report did not elaborate any alternatives.

During the summer of 1992, Zolotukhin contacted President Kravchuk as well as various ministries to get their views on the alternative programme the Greens had developed. Following the Ukrainian declaration of Independence in 1991, the issue of nuclear power once again came to the forefront in Ukraine. On the one hand the Greens and Ukrainian authorities had, in the late 1980s, protested against Moscow's decision to continue the nuclear power programme unchanged, thus extending nuclear capacity on Ukrainian territory. On the other hand, there was serious concern regarding the alternatives Ukraine was faced with given its newly gained independence. Whereas nuclear power in itself was not so desirable from an environmental point of view, from the point of view of independence it was a better alternative than expensive gas and oil imports from Russia - particularly given the strained relations between the two countries due to the issues of Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet. Thus, Ukrainian authorities in Kiev were changing their attitudes towards nuclear energy, revising plans for expansion.

The Greens, however, argued that the situation was far from 'black and white'. Whereas it was not desirable to become independent on Russia in the energy sector, nuclear power was also not the only means by which to become more or less self-sufficient on energy. Thus, Ukraine had a historical chance to become a leading nation in the development of alternative energy.

The official response to the project launched by the Greens varied. Whereas local authorities welcomed it with open arms (see. TV-programme), central authorities were far more sceptical. *Ukratomenergoprom*, replying to the letter presented to President Kravchuk, rejected the Greens' proposals as being unrealistic¹⁵⁵. To restructure the energy industry of Ukraine would take a very long time, and given the difficult economic situation Ukraine was currently faced with, there were no alternatives to nuclear power, as the existing nuclear power stations just about covered demand in Ukraine:

Перестройка структуры энергетики потребует длительного времени - примерно 30 лет, а кроме того - значительных материальных ресурсов, которых сейчас просто нет.

¹⁵⁵ No. 331/3, 3.6.1992, signed by *Ukratomenergoprom*'s President, M. Umanets.

Ukratomenergoprom did, however, admit, that vapour gas facilities¹⁵⁶ did have several positive qualities:

Сюру нет – ПГУ обладают рядом достоинств – это высокий кпд, это их экологическая чистота и т.д. Но, вопреки утверждению Шаповалова, у нас нет промышленных серийных блоков ПГУ...

To create such blocks, a whole industry would have to be developed. This would not only take time, but also cost money, of which Ukraine was generally short. Besides, Ukraine did not possess its own gas deposits. Therefore, gas would have to be bought abroad, which would in turn require gas pipes and gas-compressing stations. What was more, according to experts of *MIREK* from the beginning of the 21st century oil and gas extraction would start to decline. Consequently, prices would rise and it would therefore be impossible to predict the future of gas-generated vapour energy in Ukraine in 30 years' time. Given that

Запасы органического топлива ограничены, а энергетический потенциал возобновляемых источников мал, исходя из современных знаний, только атомная энергетика способна в будущем обеспечить потребности человечества. Поэтому отказ от атомной энергетики сегодня превратит, что и послужит с развитием атомной энергетики недопустима (хотя мы считали и считаем необходимым и экономически выгодным пуск современных безопасных энергоблоков №. 6 Запорожской, №. 4 Ровенской, №. 2 Хмельницкой АЭС).

Whereas the need to develop alternative energy was acknowledged, it was more important to build storage facilities for nuclear waste.

Minekonomiki (the Ministry of Economy) was more favourable to *Zelenyi Mir*'s suggestions, given that it had no vested interest in nuclear power. The Deputy Minister, Iu. Nechaev, also responding to the letter presented to Kravchuk, informed Zolotukhin that a group of experts from various ministries and departments was being set up to work out a national fuel and energy programme. During its work, the group would discuss alternative energy as well as a concept for the further development of nuclear energy in Ukraine. A lifting of the moratorium on the building of nuclear reactors made by *Verkhovna Rada* in February 1990 could not be excluded. As for Shapovalov's ideas, these were known to *Minekonomia*'s specialists and would be discussed by the group¹⁵⁷.

¹⁵⁶ Парогазовые установки (ПГУ).

¹⁵⁷ No. 15-66/584, 17.6.1992.

Following the elaboration of the energy programme referred to above (and officially labelled 'Energetika') *Zelenyi Svit's* Commission on Nuclear Power Stations and Alternative Energy, headed by Zolotukhin, produced a report containing a thorough analysis of the programme and providing an alternative approach. The energy programme envisaged a reconstruction and further development of traditional energy sources, like nuclear power, thermal power and hydro-electric power. As for energy saving and gas-generated steam power stations (parohazovye stantsii) these would constitute 16.5 and 7.25% respectively of total energy production. To replace the three reactors at the Chernobyl nuclear power station, the programme envisaged the construction of one VVER-1000 reactor at the Rivne, Khmelnytskyi and Zaporizhzhia nuclear power stations respectively. Between 1994 and 2006 all VVER-reactors would be reconstructed. In this connection, each of them would be closed for an average of three years. Reconstruction would be costly. The total cost was estimated at three billion roubles.

Zelenyi Svit's report criticised the official programme for failing to take into consideration the Chernobyl accident and construction flaws in the VVER-reactors when planning the future energy situation in Ukraine. As a result of the accident at Chernobyl, Ukraine could not under any circumstances 'afford' yet another accident. Even if the VVER-reactors were reconstructed, they could never be 100% safe. In Germany, for instance, eight VVER-reactors in the former GDR were decommissioned as there would be no point in reconstructing them. Costs of reconstruction, furthermore, equalled the price of one new reactor. Thus, from an economic point of view, such reconstruction would be a very expensive solution.

What was more, nuclear power stations, thermal and hydro-electric power stations were to a large extent to blame for the environmental crisis in Ukraine. To further expand their use thus made no sense also from an environmental point of view. The costs of implementing the programme would, according to calculations made by *Zelenyi Svit* equal the cost of three Chernobyls, thus leaving little if no means by which to research alternative energy sources.

Arguments to the effect that nuclear energy was a precondition for Ukrainian independence, said the report, were deceptive, then the

Реконструкція і для АЕС в умовах відсутності власних ядерної промисловості, паливного циклу, сховищ радіоактивних відходів, позбавляє на значний час незалежності України. Будівництво ядерного комплексу потребує значних коштів, яких ніколи не буде повернено, бо для АЕС економічно збуткова у всіх країнах світу.

Only the loss of valuable water resources to serve the nuclear power stations equalled the value of the electricity generated by them. Besides, costs of radioactive substances and radiation as well as

proper storage facilities remained to be calculated. According to data provided by Greenpeace, it would cost some 30 billion American dollars to decommission one reactor. Thus, the three reactors envisaged to be built in the programme, would only be able to 'earn' one sixth of total construction and decommissioning costs and make it a very costly alternative.

The Greens suggested that an international commission be set up to calculate the likelihood of accidents at the existing VVER-reactors by international standards. Prior to the full eradication of nuclear contamination caused by the Chernobyl accident and prior to the solving of the issue of radioactive waste, a moratorium should be introduced on the construction of any new nuclear reactors on Ukrainian territory. The programme should not be adopted in its present form prior to a referendum on nuclear power having taken place. Should the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers fail to make any changes to the programme, *Zelenyi Svit*, together with other political organisations and parties would have no choice but to collect signatures in support of a referendum on nuclear power. Should a referendum take place, people should also be asked about their attitudes towards alternative energy.

As for alternatives to nuclear power, *Zelenyi Svit's* report revealed that Ukraine was one out of five countries in the world which possessed current up-to-date gas turbine technology. Based on this, the Greens could offer the following alternative:

Пропонується на базі конвертованих авіаційних та корабельних серийно вироблених газових турбін розробити Поліенергетичні газотурбінні електростанції (ПЕГТС)¹⁵⁸, які, окрім електроенергії будуть виробляти: гарячі воду й повітря, холод, пар, стисле повітря, кисень, азот, поду з повітряної вологи та інше. Для своєї роботи, крім газу, ПЕГТС може вживати: нафту, газифіковане вугілля, біомасу, вихлопні гази усіх видів виробництва і навіть сонячну енергію. ПЕГТС може бути наближена до споживачів, екологічно чиста, економічно вигідна (має 1-й роки окупності), маневрова, утилізує вихлоп, не потребує, а виробляє поду з повітряної вологи, не потребує капітальної будівлі для себе. Підготовка до випуску ПЕГТС займе 1-2 роки, завдяки випуску ПЕГТС Україна може щорічно вводити 7 млн. кВт електричних і 22 млн. кВт теплових потужностей. Коефіцієнт використання палива в ПЕГТС більше 90%. (Point 4.4.)

Пропонується на підставах вводу ПЕГТС до 1997 року зупинити усі великі ТЕС, ГЕС, ГАЕС і перевести енергетику України на рентабельний режим роботи. До 2010 року довести використання ПЕГТС до 54%, АЕС на поповнюваних джерелах до 16%, енергозбереження до 25-35%, за рахунок цього перейти від ОЕС до регіональних енергосистем. При цьому використання органічного палива буде скорочене проти офіційної програми, навіть з врахуванням дії АЕС. Завдяки прибутків та продажу

¹⁵⁸ Polyenergy gas turbine station.

ПВЕТС за кордон, як по-хач, можна буде приступити до демонтажу великих АЕС, ТЕС, ГЕС та ГАЕС. (Point 4.5.)

The proposals made by the Green Movement, consisted of two parts, both produced by the Nikolaev Greens. The first part, 'Programme for the Development of Energy without Nuclear Power Stations in Ukraine', was written by Zolotukhin, whereas V. Hryhorenko (Senior Lecturer at the *MKBI* (Nikolaev Shipbuilding Institute) was responsible for the second; 'Polyenergy Gas Turbine Facilities as the Basis of Ukraine's Future Power Engineering'. The report was submitted to the First Deputy Prime Minister, I. Lukhnovskii, in January 1993¹⁵⁹.

A detailed list¹⁶⁰ of suggestions regarding the 'Power Engineering'-programme was produced by the same *Zelenyi Svit* Commission in March the same year, to complement the report of January 1993. The list contained four main priorities, which the Greens thought the official programme ought to reflect. According to this list, the programme should:

- 1) Prevent any repetition of global catastrophes (of the scale of the Chernobyl accident)
- 2) Secure the moral and physical health of both the people and the environment of Ukraine.
- 3) Facilitate profitable energy production in Ukraine, taking into account care for the environment, the reprocessing of waste and the removal of old facilities and soil recultivation. None of these priorities had been included in the official programme, as far as the Greens could see, given that the government's aim was to expand the 'unified energy system' - i.e. a combination of nuclear power, thermal power and hydro-electric power, in the future.

The list also addressed alternative energy options more thoroughly than the report quoted from above. Due to conversion of aviation, ship (Zaporizhzhia, Nikolaev and Krivyi Rih) and industrial (Kharkiv) *GTU* (gas turbine facilities), it would be possible to produce seven million kW hours of electrical and 22 million kW hours of thermal power annually, within the next one or two years. In comparison it would take 15-20 twenty years to build between seven and 10 nuclear reactors and the costs would be much higher.

The propositions made by *Zelenyi Svit* directly to the then Prime Minister, Leonid Kuchma, and the propositions made to the programme 'Ukraine's Power Engineering to the Year 2010' were examined by *Minenergo* and a written reply was given to *Zelenyi Mir* in May 1993¹⁶¹. The Ministry expressed interest in the alternative programme developed by Hryhorenko and was ready to take on all its 'rational elements'. With regard to the suggestion that nuclear, thermal and hydro-electric power stations, accounting for 90% of the total energy production in Ukraine, be replaced with *PEGTS*, the response was rather negative:

¹⁵⁹ *Енергетика України*, 19.1.1993.

¹⁶⁰ Пропозиції до комплексної програми "Енергетика", signed by Zolotukhin, 17.3.1993.

¹⁶¹ No. 02/32-367, 13.5.1993.

Вопрос...хоть и имеет право на рассмотрение однако в ближайшие 10-15 лет реализация этой идеи в требуемом масштабе маловероятна, по объемам инвестиций, степени готовности промышленности к выпуску оборудования и обеспечению столь широкого фронта энергетического строительства национальными ресурсами.

As seen above, it is clear that neither *Minenergo*, nor *Ukratomenergo* were able to refute the *PEGTS* project in itself, but rather rejected it based on the time-scale and costs - although cost-calculations made by the Greens indicated that it would be much cheaper than to expand the capacity and enhance safety at the existing nuclear power stations. Moreover, the time-scale estimated by *Minenergo* differed markedly from that of Hryhorenko and *Zelenyi Svit*, the latter of whom was more familiar with the possible production sites for the *PEGTS* than was probably the Ministry. It thus seems that the objections to the *PEGTS* raised in Kiev were rooted more in inertia and a lack of willingness to radically change the energy structure of Ukraine, than in objective reasons for not introducing the *PEGTS*. This was later to make the situation rather difficult for *Zelenyi Svit* and local authorities who favoured the Greens' idea, but who depended upon *Minenergo* for funding, which the Ministry was unwilling to release. Zolotukhin drew the following conclusion following *Minenergo*'s and others' hesitant response:

Отже альтернатива існує, потрібна лише добра воля людей, позбавлених синдрому аморальності, винним підсумком якого став Чорнобиль. Якось В. Гого висловив: "Пам'ятати-це означає передбачати!" Тому пам'ятаймо, що період пірропаду Чорнобилю ще триває і скоротити його ми маємо лише через піднесення нашої моральності і завдяки власної волі...¹⁶²

It was, however, the pro-nuclear lobby which succeeded in shaping Ukrainian energy policies centrally. On 18 June 1993 *Verkhovna Rada* lifted the moratorium on construction of nuclear reactors¹⁶³, and Umanets claimed that it would not be possible to close Chernobyl down in 1993, as Ukraine was short of energy and the three reactors at Chernobyl could not immediately be replaced by any other energy-producing facility. The Parliament even learnt that its moratorium had not been followed, as construction on nuclear reactors had continued during the period it covered. Coinciding with the session of *Verkhovna Rada*, an international conference on Strategies for the Development of the Fuel and Energy Complex in Ukraine, organised by the World Bank and the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers took place in Kiev. The World Bank offered

¹⁶² Анатолій Золотухин, *Період пірропаду Чорнобиля*, 22.5.1993, с. 4.

¹⁶³ *Радянське Прибужжя*, 20.7.1993, с. 3. For further details regarding the *PEGTS*, see also *Радянське Прибужжя*, 21.12.1993, с. 3, and 23.12.1993, с. 4.

funding to close the Chernobyl nuclear power station and 400 million American dollars towards the construction of new reactors (six were envisaged in the Ukrainian Energy Programme). In order to secure this arrangement, Umanets, even prior to the lifting of the moratorium by *Verkhovna Rada*, assured the World Bank representatives that once an agreement was reached, the moratorium would be lifted!

Zelenyi Mir, however, continued its campaign in favour of *PEGTS*. Given that industrial production, according to figures produced by the World Bank, would continue to drop until 1996, when energy consumption would have fallen by 30-35% compared to 1990, it would not cause an energy crisis to dismantle all the Ukrainian nuclear power stations and introduce alternative energy sources. Besides, Russia was under an obligation to stop deliveries of fresh nuclear fuel to Ukraine since Ukraine had not yet signed the non-proliferation treaty. Secondly, in accordance with the Law on Environmental Protection adopted in 1992, Russia would no longer accept radioactive waste from Ukrainian nuclear power stations, and Ukraine had yet not developed its own storing and reprocessing facility. The introduction of the full nuclear cycle in Ukraine would cost much more than the use of any organic fuel. Fourthly, Ukraine's own uranium deposits would only last for another 25 years or so. These arguments, combined with poor safety at the Ukrainian nuclear power stations as well as the fall-out from the accident in Chernobyl, from which the people and the environment of Ukraine were still suffering, should be a sufficiently good reason to switch from nuclear power to alternative energy, in the opinion of the Greens. By introducing various conservation measures, experts estimated that 50% of the electricity currently being used could be saved.

Given that Ukraine was self-supplied with gas turbine engines and could produce a large quantity of these annually¹⁶⁴, it made sense to set up a number of the poluenergy gasturbine stations¹⁶⁵ - based on Hryhorenko's ideas¹⁶⁶, in combination with a method developed by Borysenko to burn fuel in units filled with heated steam (which at that time allowed for 30% of fuel to be replaced by water at the thermal power stations), which also resulted in virtually no pollution. Moreover, *PEGTS* made much better use of its fuel (the coefficient for the utilisation of fuel, KPD, was 90-94% for the *PEGTS*, as compared with 20% for the Unified Energy System - *OES*). Thus, with the same amount of fuel, the *PEGTS* could produce up to four times more energy, than could a traditional thermal power station. As for the nuclear power stations, the KPD

¹⁶⁴ Gas turbine facilities were produced by the IuTZ 'Zaria', diesel generators in Pervomaisk (zavod im. '25 Oktiabria) as were boilers (at ChSZ), that could be utilized in the production of electricity and heat. The Greens suggested that an oblast fuel and energy company be established and given the name 'NOTEK', *Радянська Прибужжя*, 23.9.1993, с. 4.

¹⁶⁵ For a more detailed, technical account on how the *PEGTS* works, see Екологічна програма "Сигнал", obtainable from the Nikolaev oblast TV station.

¹⁶⁶ These ideas were based on the so-called 'карпотизованный термодинамический цикл'.

was slightly higher, at 31%¹⁶⁷. Given this circumstance, it was fully realistic to renew virtually all the facilities within the Unified Energy System with *PEGTS* by the year 2000 - or at least replace the nuclear power stations and the outdated thermal power stations by that time. Unlike the *PGU*, which *Minenergo* was currently considering, the *PEGTS* also had the advantage that it required neither steam turbines or water, both of which there was a shortage in Ukraine. The water needed during the burning of fuel, could be made from moisture in the air, thus protecting the rivers of Ukraine. What was more, since small *PEGTS* were just as efficient as bigger *PEGTS*, loss of energy due to long-distance transportation could be avoided, thus making it a very efficient source of electricity.

The pro-nuclear lobby had raised two objections to the *PEGTS*; one - that Ukraine did not have any gas deposits and two - that the *PEGTS* could never become a basic facility, like the nuclear power stations. Zolotukhin refuted both these objections, arguing that gas, like nuclear fuel, would have to be obtained from somewhere. However, whereas nuclear fuel could only be obtained from Russia, Ukraine could choose between three to four different suppliers as far as the gas was concerned. Secondly, calculations indicated that the gas Ukraine was already importing for its thermal power stations would be sufficient to replace not only all the nuclear power stations but also more than half of the thermal power stations. Finally, gas hydrates (*gazogidraty*) had been located in the Black Sea. If the estimates were correct, these deposits were much larger than any other energy source on Ukrainian territory (estimated deposits: 20-25 trillion cubic metres).

As an indication that *Zelenyi Svit* was a serious force in the alternative energy debate, Zolotukhin informed the readers that its suggestions had been discussed and approved by a general meeting at the Academy of Sciences on 22 March 1993. *Goskomitet po nauke i tekhnologii*am (the State Committee on Science and Technology), *Minpriroda*, *Minmashprom* (Ministry of Mechanical Engineering), *Minenergo* and *Verkhovna Rada*'s Ecology Commission (2 June 1993) had also approved of the suggestions. After the two Deputy Prime Ministers I. Iukhnovskii and Iu. Ioffe were urged to do the same, they left their posts. This was by Zolotukhin interpreted to the effect that they refused to support the alternative position of the Greens. Zolotukhin demanded that *Zelenyi Svit*'s propositions be included in the Ukrainian Energy Programme and that the moratorium not be lifted until an environmental impact assessment group had examined the existing nuclear power stations.

The Greens were unable to prevent the deputies of *Verkhovna Rada* from voting in favour of lifting the moratorium on construction of nuclear reactors and in favour of reopening the Chernobyl nuclear power station on 21 October. In an Appeal made the following day, *Zelenyi*

¹⁶⁷ *Радянське Прибужжя*, 25.9.1993, с. 3.

Svit criticised the decision in harsh words, arguing that it was illegal, since there was no quorum in the parliament when the decision was made. Besides, the vote was secret, whereas the Greens claimed it should have been open, given the importance of the issue. Local and oblast Soviets were encouraged to refuse any expansion of nuclear power stations located on their territory and to demand that the oblasts were given their fair share of the income from sales of electricity to other countries. The Appeal also demanded that the income of the nuclear power stations be put under public control¹⁶⁸. Those who voted in favour of lifting the moratorium should be banned from standing for elections to the *Verkhovna Rada* in the future and finally, it demanded from all the people's deputies that they gather signatures in their constituencies in favour of conducting a referendum simultaneously with new parliamentary elections on the future of nuclear power in Ukraine. As for the implications of the vote in *Verkhovna Rada* on the future of the PEGTS, *Zelenyi Svit* could do nothing but express its disapproval:

Саме керівництво Міненерго, побачивши, що держава дозволяє не рахуватися з громадською думкою, відкинуло конкретні, обгрунтовані пропозиції "Зеленого Світу", незважаючи на те, що вони були підтримані Академією наук, ДКНТ, Мінприроди, Мінмашпромом, щодо швидкого, ніж для АЕС, розвитку і швидкої окупності, чого зовсім не може бути в АЕС, маючі середньопотужних поліенергетичних газотурбінних станцій¹⁶⁹.

The pro-nuclear lobby in Nikolaev oblast tried to ridicule *Zelenyi Svit's* alternative by arguing that it was merely a set of ideas. Zolotukhin could, however, confirm that gas turbine stations already existed in the United States, producing 63 million kW hours of electricity annually. Also Ukraine made use of such gas turbines. If one were to compare the costs of running a gas turbine station compared to the costs of a nuclear power station, the former was 10 times lower! What was more, fuel could be bought for hard currency earned from exports of electricity produced at the very same PEGTS!¹⁷⁰ The argument so often used by the pro-nuclear lobby to the effect that big cities and towns could only exist based on a powerful and stable energy source, the source being nuclear power stations and thermal power stations, simply did not hold true. Then from an environmental point of view

Именно большой мощности АЭС, ГЭС и ТЭС, исчерпав экологические емкости регионов их размещения, привели Украину

¹⁶⁸ Figures were not released. This demand was made again by a meeting of the Nikolaev *Zelenyi Mir* on 17 November 1993

¹⁶⁹ *Український південь*, 19.11.1993, с. 3: Звернення УБА "ЗС" до народу України з приводу скасування Верховною Радою мораторія на будівництво АЕС та продовження дії ЧАЕС.

¹⁷⁰ *Радянське Прибужжя*, 26.4.1994, с. 4.

к экологической катастрофе, породили растратное потребление электроэнергии благодаря чему "выгоднее" стало отапливать дома электричеством, чем котельными¹⁷¹.

Following the elections to the *Verkhovna Rada* in March/April 1994, Zolotukhin met with the new deputies from Nikolaev oblast, demanding that they seek to reintroduce the moratorium on the construction of nuclear reactors in Ukraine, as well as that they initiate the closing of the Chernobyl nuclear power station. Finally, the deputies were urged to bring *Zelenyi Svit's* proposals regarding *PEGTS* up in parliament for discussion. Locally, at the oblast level, the Greens had the support of official authorities for its alternative energy programme. The President's Representative in the Nikolaev oblast, Kinakh, in a letter to the First Deputy Prime Minister, Zviahytskyi, following the lifting of the moratorium referred to above, referred to decisions previously made by the oblast Soviet and claimed that the oblast was categorically against the completion of the fourth reactor at Iuzhnoukrainsk. To secure stable energy supplies in the future, Kinakh recommended

Використати промисловий потенціал нашої області по виборництву газотурбінних електростанцій, не потребуючих для своєї роботи води. Практично безпечних, екологічно чистіших, більш економічних, більш танцювальних, термін будівлі яких утричі коротший, ніж АЕС.

As seen above, then, the Greens offered a real, cheap and environmentally friendly alternative to nuclear power and to thermal power. Due to the strong influence of the pro-nuclear lobby on the decision-making process centrally, in Kiev, and also due to a lack of flexibility and a wish to try something new, the *PEGTS* was not even introduced as a pilot project in the Nikolaev oblast despite the interest local authorities had taken in such a project. Zolotukhin in an interview with the author in Nikolaev in June 1994 requested that information about the *PEGTS* be passed on to anyone interested in alternative energy abroad, in the hope that a sponsor might be found so that a test station could be set up. Once the feasibility of Hryhorenko's and Borysenko's project has been proven, it will be much easier for the Greens and local authorities to get financial support from Kiev and to put pressure on the Ukrainian government to shut down the Iuzhnoukrainsk nuclear power station, which, as has been shown above, is far from safe.

¹⁷¹ *Український тиждень*, 27.1.1994, с. 7.

7.4 Conclusion

Although the campaign to save the Iuzhnyi Bug River was successful in that a decision was taken not to go ahead with the third stage and to implement the second stage of the SB EK in only a limited version, it is hard to say whether or not the Greens have in the end been successful. Whereas *Zelenyi Mir* succeeded in lobbying and pushing local and regional authorities into passing resolutions and decisions to prevent the original project from going ahead, these have been undermined by the pro-nuclear lobby, which has simply not implemented them, or disputed them so as to win time. The closer an object is to being completed, the easier it is to argue that it is economically unacceptable to abandon it. Earlier local and regional authorities were on the side of the Greens. If this 'alliance' will last also in the future remains to be seen. The economic difficulties of Ukraine have hit the regions particularly hard and various incentives as well as pressure from 'Kiev' may therefore be hard to ignore. What is more, the Greens are tired: It takes time and effort to maintain the campaign and there are growing signs of disillusion that despite the effort and despite the achievements, the expansion of the South Ukrainian Energy Complex has still not been halted.

Last year, Zhuk, a prominent member of the Voznesensk branch of *Zelenyi Mir* was killed in a car accident. Zolotukhin argued that this was not simply an accident, indicating that the pro-nuclear lobby might be behind it. It is of course impossible to verify his allegations. What seems clear, though, is that although Nikolaev *Zelenyi Mir* compared to other Ukrainian Green Movements is a big and strong group, it is losing members. In Nikolaev, as in other parts of Ukraine, it is becoming increasingly difficult to mobilise the population and to organise campaigns. As seen above, the Nikolaev Greens have successfully lobbied local and regional authorities for their cause. Compared to other Greens they managed the transition from pressure group to lobby group very well - much thanks to the skills and qualifications of those people working actively within *Zelenyi Mir*. Paradoxically, though, it now appears that a return from lobbying to campaigning and mass actions is needed to secure the implementation of those decisions made and to keep an eye on the site of the Energy Complex in the future. Whether or not Zolotukhin and his fellow Greens will succeed in achieving this, remains to be seen.

8 The Ukrainian Greens in a Comparative Perspective

8.0 Introduction

Whereas there is no doubt a need for more thorough studies of the Green movements which emerged in the former USSR following the introduction of concepts like 'glasnost' and 'democratisation' in the late 1980s, it is of equal importance to place these Green movements in a broader, international perspective. The comparative study of Green Parties and Green Movements in Western Europe is already a well-established discipline and is therefore appropriate to include the Soviet Greens into the overall analysis. At the practical level, though, this poses a number of problems.

Firstly, comparative analyses are in most cases based on surveys (attitudinal data), which have been conducted in a number of countries at approximately the same time. The aim of these surveys is to establish for instance whether or not Inglehart's hypothesis that the Greens were a post-industrial phenomenon, who the Green voters are and what characterises them¹. To extend such research to the former USSR presents a number of difficulties. In order to establish trends, one needs data collected over a relatively long period of time (say, over a period of minimum four to five years). Surveys containing an identical set of questions should therefore be distributed in the given area at least on an annual basis and closely resemble those of similar surveys conducted elsewhere to be valid for comparative purposes.

In the case of Ukraine (as holds true also for the other former Soviet republics) such surveys have only started to be conducted recently. Opinion polls to establish what are people's attitudes to various political movements and parties, political preferences, etc. have been conducted since the late 1980s. However, as these polls rarely cover the entire country but only parts of it, samples are small and methodologies sometimes poor (not random samples and/or leading questions) such surveys cannot be used as a basis for hypothesising on the national level. Surveys conducted at the early stage are also often unreliable as a data source given that people viewed them with general scepticism, not always wanting to reveal their real opinion or trying to figure out how the surveyors wanted them to respond and give answers accordingly. During the Soviet period opinions other than those matching official views were better left unspoken and 70 years of totalitarian rule left its imprint on the general public making people cautious with regard to revealing political attitudes to strangers. Finally, opinions change quickly in the former Soviet Union. Polls therefore tend to quickly get outdated.

¹ For a detailed list of such studies, see Philip D. Lowe and Wolfgang Rüdig, 'Review Article: Political Ecology and the Social Sciences - the State of the Art', *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 16, pp. 513-50.

Secondly, comparative research is complicated by the fact that the Green Movement in the former USSR is much younger than its counterparts in Western Europe and the United States, in addition to having emerged under political and economic conditions very different from those in the latter. The planned economy of the USSR was, as seen in Chapter Two, like the capitalist economies of Western Europe highly industrialised, but yet riddled with shortages and deficiencies due to its emphasis on economic growth (output). Heavy industry was given priority over light industry and there were fewer consumer goods available to the general public than in the West. Although people were not poor, materially they were not as well off as people in the West, where living standards were much higher. Moreover, the Soviet economy had started to stagnate before the beginning of Gorbachev's tenure as general secretary of the CPSU².

Despite of the methodological and practical difficulties involved - a comparative study incorporating the Ukrainian Greens is desirable, as the Green Movement has since the late 1970s grown into a world-wide movement. Revealing the differences and similarities between the various movements and demonstrating how cultural factors as well as unequal political and economical structures have contributed to these differences, is thus useful.

In this chapter I will examine three fundamental elements of the Ukrainian Green Movement, determining its major features. First, I will look at its theoretical framework, link it to the concept of eco-culture outlined in Chapter One, and relate it to Green political theory in Western Europe. I will then try to establish how this framework manifests itself through the formation of Green policies. Secondly, I will discuss the validity of explaining the emergence of Green Movements/Parties in industrialised societies as a result of 'post-materialist value change'. This notion, which was first introduced by Inglehart has become a popular - though controversial - starting point for analysing Greens in the West. In the Soviet context, however, as will be shown below, it does not easily 'fit'. Thirdly, I will look at how a different theoretical framework and different political context has shaped a Green political agenda somewhat different from that of similar Green Movements/Parties in Western Europe. Finally, I will examine the support basis of the Ukrainian Greens and also try to establish whether the Ukrainian political system is restricting the Greens' access to the country's political arena.

8.1 A Comparison of Theoretical Frameworks and Policies.

In Chapter One I outlined a Slav eco-culture, which existed in pre-Revolutionary Russia and then was kept alive as a sub-culture during the Soviet period. I argued that the roots to the present Green

² See for instance Alec Nove, The Soviet Economic System (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987) and Anders Aslund, Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform (London: Pinter Publishers, 1989).

Movement of Ukraine could be found in this sub-culture, providing a useful tool for explaining the emergence of *Zelenyi Svit*, in addition, of course to the general political changes which took place in the USSR following the coming to power of Gorbachev.

In this section, I will look at the theoretical framework of *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU*, and the link between this framework and Slav eco-culture. I will then contrast this framework with various theories on the environment developed by Greens in the West, and try to establish what they have in common and in which ways they differ.

8.1.1 Classifying Western Thinking on the Environment

Greens are often classified along a practical, as well as along a theoretical scale. In the latter case, a distinction is made between eco-socialists, eco-liberals and eco-conservatives. Another distinction frequently used is that between 'deep' and 'shallow' ecologists, or between 'pragmatic' and 'dogmatic' Greens (in Germany the two groups are referred to as 'realos' - realists - and 'fundis' - fundamentalists).

Robyn Eckersley³ classifies various currents of green political thought along a continuum moving from *anthropocentrism* on the one end, towards *ecocentrism* on the other end. Her classification scheme is more suitable for my purposes and below, I will look at where to place the Ukrainian Greens (i.e. *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU*) on this continuum - theoretically as well as practically. First, however, I will give a brief outline of the currents included on this continuum (see next page).

³ Robyn Eckersley, *Environmentalism and Political Theory. Towards an Ecocentric Approach* (London: UCL Press Ltd., 1992).

Fig. 8.1 Classification scheme for Green Political Thought




Figure derived from Eckersley's classification scheme (1992)

Resource Conservationists have an anthropocentric outlook on Nature in that they regard it primarily as a factor of production. Their aim is to improve economic productivity by achieving a maximum sustainable yield of natural resources. Thus, waste and depletion of natural resources are undesirable elements of modern production. By aiming for minimal waste, they therefore seek to conserve nature for development and to maximise economic growth. This current can be traced back to the last century and to Gifford Pinchot, the first chief of the US Forest Service, although its origins are much older, dating back to Plato, Mencius, Cicero and the Bible, getting a boost by the rise of modern science in the 16th century. Eckersley sees this movement as the first step away from what is labelled 'the unrestrained development' approach.

Human Welfare Ecology emerged only recently, in the second half of this century, in response to numerous environmental problems following the end of the Second World War and as a result of the emergence of the 'post-materialist' values of the so-called 'new middle class'. The major focus of this current is environmental quality, which can be achieved by sustainable development, i.e. sustaining the natural resource base for human production and reproduction. Not only are the physical limits to economic growth, but also 'soft' limits - in terms of health, amenity, recreational

and psychological needs of human beings. Human Welfare Ecologists are critical not only of economic growth, but also of the notion that science and technology alone can do away with the present environmental crisis. As Man is very much seen as being in charge of Nature, a new stewardship ethic is called for - biological support systems must be protected and nurtured not because they have intrinsic value in themselves, but because we depend on them for our living. This new stewardship ethic should include appropriate technology, 'soft' energy paths, organic agriculture, alternative medicine, public transport, recycling, re-evaluation of human needs and more ecologically benign lifestyles. 'We must look after nature because she looks after us. We must do this "for our children", "our future generations", "for our health and amenity"'. The German 'die Grünen' can be placed within this current. When criticised for not adopting a more radical, ecocentric approach, human welfare ecologists respond that there is no reason to challenge the public and lose the support of politicians with 'radical' or 'utopian' ideas like 'nature for its own sake', when the same as what the ecocentrists want, can be achieved by adopting a more moderate approach.

Preservationists, like resource conservationists, want to preserve nature from destruction. But rather than preserving it for development, they want to preserve it from development. For them, nature is a subject of reverence and enlightenment in addition to representing a set of threatened values. Wilderness is worth preserving in the sense of the aesthetic and spiritual attributes it holds. Also the preservationists are predominantly anthropocentric in that they justify preserving selected parts of Nature due to the aesthetic and spiritual experiences they give Man, not because they are worth preserving for their own sake. Fox distinguishes between nine kinds of arguments in favour of preserving wilderness⁴. The preservation movement can be traced back to the latter half of the 19th century and to the opening of the Yellowstone National Park in 1872. This movement has been criticised by ecocentrists for not being a 'total' approach. To them it makes no sense to preserve small areas of wilderness as sooner or later environmental degradation will also affect these. However, Eckersley draws the conclusion that 'in its most radical form Preservationism should be valued not only for its instrumental value to us but also for its own sake. In this respect it can be seen as a predecessor to ecocentrism'⁵.

Animal Liberationists hold the opinion that all sentient beings should be considered equals regardless of what kind of species they are. Any living being capable of feeling pain and joy is considered to have interests in the same way as human beings have. Thus, adherents of animal

⁴ 'The life support', 'early warning system', 'laboratory' (i.e. scientific study), 'silo' (i.e. stockpile of genetic diversity), 'gymnasium' (i.e. recreational), 'art gallery' (i.e. aesthetic), 'cathedral' (i.e. spiritual), 'monument' (i.e. symbolic) and 'psychogenetic' (i.e. psychological health and maturity). See Eckersley (1992), p. 41.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

liberation are opposed to 'speciesism' or anthropocentrism and they advocate a ban on hunting and slaughtering of all sentient beings, prohibition of vivisection and factory farming. Animal liberation is as its name suggests an emancipatory movement in that it calls for the liberation of all sentient beings. The animal liberation movement dates back to the 18th and 19th centuries and the societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals and represents a revival of the arguments developed by the modern utilitarian school of moral philosophy founded by Jeremy Bentham. A number of criticisms have been raised against this current by the ecocentrists. To mention but one, animal liberationists have been criticised for their failure to give any value to non-sentient beings. Thus the animal liberationists simply replace 'homocentrist rationalism' with 'zoocentrist sentientism'⁶.

Ecocentrism is concerned with protecting 'threatened populations, species, habitats and ecosystems wherever they are situated and irrespective of their use or importance to human beings, in other words it is a more wide-ranging and more ecologically informed variant of Preservationism that builds on the insights of the other streams of environmentalism'⁷ outlined above. In addition to recognising the full range of human interests in the non-human world, ecocentrism also recognises the interests of the nonhuman community and of future generations of humans as well as non-humans. Finally, ecocentrism adopts a holistic rather than atomistic perspective. Within the Western tradition of ecocentric approach it is possible to distinguish between three different types of ecocentrism. These are: *autopoietic intrinsic value theory*, *transpersonal ecology* and *ecofeminism*. Since ecofeminism is not an issue either for *Zelenyi Svit* or for *PZU*, I will focus on the two former types.

Autopoietic Intrinsic Value Theory attributes intrinsic value to all entities that display the property of autopoiesis (i.e. 'self-production'/'self-renewal'), i.e. to entities that are 'primarily' and continuously concerned with the regeneration of their own organisational activity and structure. Since these entities can be seen as ends in themselves, which is also the definition of intrinsic value, they can be said to have intrinsic value⁸.

Transpersonal Ecology is more concerned with cosmological and psychological aspects of ecocentrism. Transpersonal ecologists emphasise the way in which we understand and experience the world. Their primary concern is the cultivation of a wider sense of self through the common or everyday psychological process of identification with others. The transpersonal ecology approach is cosmological in that it regards all living phenomena on Earth as leaves on a 'tree of life'. Whereas such an approach may help us identify with other living beings, however, it fails to address the non-

⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 42-45.

⁷ See *ibid.*, pp. 45-47.

⁸ See *ibid.*, pp. 60-61.

living phenomena which also help sustain life (for instance rain, warmth/heat and minerals), and in addition, it fails to place the Earth in a larger picture, namely that of Cosmos in a wider sense⁹.

Above I have outlined the major currents of environmental thought in a 'Western' context. I shall now proceed to examine the theoretical framework of *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU* within this context. Robyn Eckersley views the ecological crisis as an 'unexamined flip side of our Western (my emphasis) humanist heritage. In the face of accelerated environmental degradation and species extinction, environmental philosophers are now asking: are we humans the *only* beings of value in the world? Does the world exist only for *our* benefit?'¹⁰

As pointed out in Chapter One, these questions were being addressed in the Russian empire already in the second half of the 19th century by the 'Cosmologists'. Moreover, there is in Slav cultures and in Slav Orthodox Christianity a more closely knit relationship between Nature and Man than what is the case in West European cultures. This relationship not surprisingly, is also reflected in the theoretical framework of the Ukrainian Green Movement.

8.1.2 The Theoretical Framework of the Ukrainian Green Movement/Party

In the *Zelenyi Svit* office in Kiev there are two portraits on the wall. One is that of the Ukrainian national poet, Taras Shevchenko, the other that of the scientist Volodymyr Vernadskii. When asked what is the theoretical framework on which the Greens base their work, people point to Shevchenko and Vernadskii¹¹, stating that they are the fathers of the Green Movement in Ukraine. Others also include the Ukrainian philosopher Skorovoda, and some members of *Zelenyi Svit* at one point tried to set up classes for children to teach them the learnings of Ivanov, an ascetic living in Eastern Ukraine who taught people how to get back into contact with Nature. No names of Western Green thinkers have ever been mentioned by Ukrainian Greens as having influenced their movement, although Andrii Hlazovyi, who has since left *Zelenyi Svit*, at one point admitted that the idea to set up a Green Party emerged partially as a result of hearing about the German Greens and the success they had¹².

To begin with Vernadskii, he is in Soviet/post-Soviet science often referred to as the father of the 'noosphere'. I will return to this concept below, but will first give a brief account of Vernadskii's life. Vladimir Vernadskii was born in 1863 in St.Petersburg as the second son to the famous

⁹ See *ibid.*, pp. 61-63.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹¹ Also *Zelenyi Svit*'s programme [*Зелений Світ. Програма* (Київ, октябрь, 1989)] explicitly states the commitment of the Greens to the ideas of Vernadskii: *Point 7, section 1*, reads as follows: 'дії "Зеленого світу" повинні спиратися на цілісну систему сучасних екологічних знань, вчення В. І. Вернадського про ноосферу та на прагнення забезпечити у майбутньому автономність планетарних проєктів людської діяльності' (see p. 5).

¹² Interview with Hlazovyi in Kiev, Summer 1992.

professor and economist Ivan Vernadskii, a Ukrainian by descent. When Vernadskii was still a child, his family moved to Kharkiv, where his father was appointed director of the local branch of the (Russian) State Bank. During childhood, Vernadskii spent much time with and was greatly influenced by his grandfather. Through him he developed an interest in the natural sciences. Having completed the Classical Gymnasium in St. Petersburg, to where his family returned when he was 14, Vernadskii decided to study at the department of natural sciences at the Faculty of Physics and Mathematics of the University of St. Petersburg. There he became a student of Mendeleev and Dokuchaev, studying geology and mineralogy. Vernadskii took an interest also in other subjects and read extensively. Upon completing his Masters degree in 1885, he was given a job at the Mineralogical Cabinet of the University, set up by Dokuchaev.

In 1890 Vernadskii went to Moscow, where he was appointed a lecturer at the university. Having been awarded his doctorate in 1895, he soon established himself as a prominent scientist in both Russia and Ukraine. Vernadskii specialised in crystallogy and mineralogy, and he was the first to discover that the composition of minerals is not simply a question of chemical reactions, but a question of the specifics of the atoms, of which they consisted. To do so, he had to draw on three until then separate branches of science - geology, chemistry and physics. After some ten years of research, Vernadskii introduced a new scientific discipline - that of geochemistry - to the 12th Congress of Russian Natural Scientists and Doctors in 1904.

The following years Vernadskii continued his research on geochemistry and the evolution of the crust of the Earth. He then proceeded to study the role of living creatures in the development of the surface of the Earth and the biosphere, which resulted in a second new scientific branch being introduced, namely that of biogeochemistry. Based on his findings, Vernadskii in 1922 re-defined the concept of the 'biosphere' as defined by the Austrian geologist Zjuss. To Zjuss the biosphere could be defined as the plant and animal life on the Earth's surface. Vernadskii, the only one to accept this terminology, specified the definition: by the 'biosphere' he understood the 'naturally determined organisation of the movement of matter and energy under the influence of living matter'¹³. Man, through his work and his conscious relationship to his surroundings, reshapes the crust of the Earth - the geological part of life - the biosphere, thus leaving it in a different geological shape¹⁴. To Vernadskii the implication of this thought was that

Человек, несомненно, неразрывно связан с живым веществом, с совокупностью организмов, одновременно с ним существующих или

¹³ See Г.П. Аксенов (ред.), Владимир Вернадский, открытия и судьбы, (Москва: "Современник", 1993), с. 156.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 428.

существовавших до него. Прежде всего, он связан с ними своим происхождением¹⁵.

To illustrate his point, Vernadskii distinguished between two types of life - 'avtotropnost' and 'geterotropnost'. Whereas the former could sustain life on its own, without the use of other species, the latter depended on others to sustain itself. Man thus falls into the second category. Man was in Vernadskii's view different from all other species in that he possessed reason (intellect). This could be used both in a constructive and in a destructive way. Thus

В геологической истории биосферы перед человечеством открывается огромное будущее, если он поймет это и не будет употреблять свой разум и свой труд на самоистребление¹⁶.

When Mankind came to realise this, it would enter the so-called 'noosphere', which Vernadskii defined as

Согласованное с Природой развитие общества, ответственность и за Природу, и за ее будущее требуют специальной организации общества, создания специальных структур, которые будут способны обеспечить это совместное согласованное развитие. Значит, ноосфера - это такое состояние биосферы, когда ее развитие происходит целенаправленно, когда разум имеет возможность направлять развитие биосферы в интересах Человека, его будущего¹⁷.

The 'noosphere' would not be reached automatically, but involved a long and painful process, including the elaboration of new principles to agree one's actions and new principles for human behaviour - in other words, a new morality¹⁸.

In Western green political thought, Man's intellect and reason are often seen as something negative in that it has so often been used to destroy rather than consolidate. Vernadskii differs considerably on this point. Given that Cosmos not only consists of matter and energy but also of life, he drew the following conclusion:

Космос без материи и без энергетики не может существовать. Но достаточно ли материи и энергии - без проявления жизни - для построения космоса, той вселенной, которая доступна человеческому разуму, т.е. научно построяема? Есть ли живое и

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p 463.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p 514.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p 14.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

жизнь, частное явление в истории материи и энергии, появляющееся
временами, и столь же бесследно исчезающее?¹⁹

Critics of Vernadskii have raised two major points against his idea of the 'noosphere'. Firstly, it has been argued that behind the idea of the 'noosphere' lies an anthropocentric attitude to Nature in that Man is given the role of controlling its surroundings rather than place himself as an equal to all other species/living beings, as seen in the above quote. However, Vernadskii's theory is more complex than such. He sees the human intellect as a composite part of Cosmos in the same way as matter, energy and life. For Man to make use of his/her intellect thus does not have to be a negative thing, but rather a natural one - provided that it is not used to destroy Nature and other forms of Life. By acknowledging that Man is dependent on other species to sustain life, Vernadskii thus explicitly acknowledges that there are limits to the use of the human intellect. A second argument, linked with the first one, is that Vernadskii through his positive view on science actually encourages the destruction of the environment, as it is science that has created for instance nuclear power and other sources of pollution. If one reads Vernadskii's works with care, it seems clear that Vernadskii favoured neither capitalism nor communism, as to him they were both incompatible with his ideas:

Мне чужд капиталистический строй, но чужд и земный.
Царство моих идей впереди...²⁰

Vernadskii disagreed with the socialists' focus on Man and its failure to place Man in a wider context:

Нельзя отложить заботу о великом и вечном на то время, когда
будет достигнута для всех возможность удовлетворения своих
элементарных нужд. Иначе будет поздно. Мы дадим
материальные блага в руки людей, идеалом которых будет -
"хлеба и зрелищ". Есть, пить, ничего не делать, наслаждаться
любовью. Хорошо жить во имя чего? Надо искать более
высоких идеалов. "Любовь к человечеству" - малосильный идеал,
когда живешь в Космосе²¹.

In this connection, he criticised Engels for having failed to understand the natural sciences. In Engels' works he could see a philosopher and a humanist, but Engels particularly failed to understand comparative natural science and the concrete observing sciences on Nature. Having read Engels' work 'The Dialectics of Nature', Vernadskii concluded as follows:

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

²⁰ Quote from Vernadskii's diary of 1931, cited in *ibid.* p. 298.

²¹ Vernadskii wrote this in his diary in 1918! The quote is referred to in *ibid.* p 171, and the original can be found in the Архив АН СССР, ф. 518.

Есть кое-что интересное, а в общем в XX веке класть в основу мышления, особенно научного, такую "книгу" — совершенное сумасшествие. Люди закрывают глаза на окружающее и живут в своем мирке²².

He also maintained that Communism was incompatible with the 'democratic nature of science'.

For Vernadskii a precondition for creating the 'noosphere' was for Man to unite as a species. The idea of different races and nationalities as separate entities were foreign to him:

Первой является единство и равенство по существу, в принципе всех людей, всех рас. Биологически это выражается в геологическом процессе всех людей как единого целого по отношению к остальному живому населению планеты²³.

Vernadskii envisaged a 'future, towards which we will all strive - towards peaceful coexistence between the people'²⁴.

Whereas Vernadskii adopted a global approach towards Nature, Taras Shevchenko, on the other hand, represents *Zelenyi Svit's* link to Ukrainian culture and traditions. Most countries have a national poet, and Taras Shevchenko is to Ukraine what Pushkin is to Russia and Goethe to Germany. What is more, he has come to symbolise 'Ukrainianness' in a very unique way to most Ukrainians. George S.N. Luckyj holds the view that without Shevchenko, there would not have been a Ukraine: 'he is not only a great literary genius, whose poetry possesses unsurpassed beauty, but a national prophet who definitively expressed the quintessence of Ukraine's existence as a nation. In fact it may be said that he created modern Ukraine, for without Shevchenko it might still be what it had been earlier - Little Russia'²⁵.

Taras Shevchenko was born in the South Ukrainian village of Kherlivka in 1814. As the son of a serf, he had to work for the Russian magnate Vasili Engelhardt, who owned one town and 12 villages with 8,500 serfs in the Zvenyhorod district²⁶. Although Shevchenko's family was poor, his father was literate and well known as a good wheel-whrigt. It soon became clear that Shevchenko was a bright and curious child, and his father's reading loud from religious books and his grandfather's stories about a peasant rebellion, in which he had taken part, encouraged him to take an interest in life beyond the village and issues beyond serfdom. Having completed the village school he assisted the

²² Quote from Vernadskii's diary of 25.3.1938, cited in *ibid.*, p 236.

²³ *Ibid.*, p 494.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p 192.

²⁵ See 'Introduction', Pavlo Zaitsev, *Taras Shevchenko* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1988), p. vii.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

Cantor in fulfilling religious rites and also did all kinds of odd jobs for the landowner. As he showed great talent in drawing, Shevchenko was chosen to accompany Engelhardt first to Poland and then to St.Petersburg, where the latter spent much of his time. There he was given limited possibility to paint, but did not get a chance to learn painting properly, until he became a free man in 1838. The poet Vasilii Zhukovskii and the famous Russian painter Karl Briullov, who both realised how talented Shevchenko was, raised 2,500 rubles by selling lottery tickets for a painting Briullov did of Zhukovski for this particular cause. Tickets for the lottery were bought by the imperial family and the tsarina eventually obtained the painting²⁷.

Shevchenko was awarded a scholarship by the Society for the Promotion of Artists to study at the Academy of Fine Arts, and spent much time with Karl Briullov, his major teacher. Through Briullov and other artists and writers, Shevchenko soon became a well-known figure in artistic circles in the Russian capital. In 1837 he started writing poetry and it is primarily as a poet and not as a painter he is famous, although he continued to paint and receive praise for his paintings until the day he died. It was also earnings from the sale of paintings that kept him afloat when money was tight. Some of Shevchenko's paintings are exhibited in the National Gallery in Kiev. Shevchenko, whose native tongue was Ukrainian, and who had to learn Russian once in St.Petersburg, wrote his poetry in Ukrainian. For this he was scorned by Belinskii, the famous literary critic, who claimed that 'Little-Russian' (i.e. Ukrainian) was merely a dialect of Russian and a language of the peasants, not to be used for literary purposes. Serfdom, works on the history of Ukraine prior to the pact signed between Russia and Ukraine by Bohdan Khmelnytskyi in 1654, and a longing for and pride in Ukraine and everything Ukrainian seems to have fuelled Shevchenko's writing of poetry. He felt that the Ukrainian upper classes had betrayed their country by adopting Russian and abandoning their native Ukrainian language as something inferior. Through his poetry Shevchenko became the founder of modern Ukrainian literature.

Shevchenko's dislike for the Russian empire and his hate towards serfdom appealed to Ukrainian nationalists, not only in the last century, but also in our own times. It was precisely for his close links with members of the Brotherhood of St.Cyril and Methodus, which envisaged an independent Ukraine, that Shevchenko was arrested and exiled to the Urals for ten years (1848-58). Shortly afterwards, in 1863 (Shevchenko died in 1861) the Russian Minister of the Interior, Piotr Valuev, issued a secret circular claiming that the Ukrainian language had never existed, did not exist, and never would exist. In 1876 Tsar Aleksandr II then issued a decree branding the publishing of Ukrainian books as a state crime. The edict also defined the production of plays and concerts in Ukrainian as well as any form of instruction in the Ukrainian language as state crimes. Shevchenko and other Ukrainians' writings and ideas about Ukraine facilitated this change of attitude towards the

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

Ukrainian language from what 'a few years before had seemed to the government like a more or less interesting ethnic experiment', but which had turned into 'something considerably more threatening, more difficult to understand and therefore to control'. The threat in this case, was to the unity of the Russian empire.

Although Shevchenko himself made no direct demand for Ukrainian secession from the Russian empire, Bohdan Rubchak holds the view that Shevchenko, although he did not symbolise the 'conflagration' of the Ukrainian spirit in the decades following his death, he was certainly its 'spark'²⁸: 'His life and work raised many Ukrainians' awareness of their place in their nation and their responsibilities towards it: the old-fashioned patronising attitude towards Ukrainian culture among older Ukrainian writers like Kotliarevskyi - writers who, as it were, experimented with the "alternative possibilities" of Ukrainian - was no longer morally viable. Although the way towards the rebirth of Ukrainian consciousness had been indicated vaguely by the early romantics, Shevchenko's own radical choices forced many of his compatriots into crucial decisions about their own lives'.

It is possible to find a pantheistic notion of God in Shevchenko's writings (i.e. God embodied in the beautiful Ukrainian scenery - Nature), but the Greens, like most other political movements and parties in Ukraine, consider Shevchenko one of their major inspirations primarily due to his thinking on Ukraine, and for making people take pride in their country and in their language. For my purposes, it is thus important to take a closer look at Shevchenko's 'nationalism' since, as will be shown below, the Ukrainian Greens have been accused of Greens in the West for being 'nationalist' and the former find such a criticism unjust.

Due to the claims made on Shevchenko and his works not only by the 'nationalist' camp, but also by the 'socialists' (whereas the former claimed that Shevchenko was a 'champion of Ukrainian interests across the social strata of his nation, i.e. a Ukrainian emancipator', the latter saw Shevchenko as a 'defender of the oppressed across national borders'). Thus, F. Priyma in the introduction to his work 'Shevchenko and Russian Literature in the XIX Century' (1961) could claim that Shevchenko was a 'revolutionary', who 'sympathised with all the people who were suppressed by Russian autocracy, in their struggle for freedom. In his literary and revolutionary activities he expressed and popularised the idea of Ukrainian friendship and also friendship of other people with Russia and the great Russian people'²⁹.

The Ukrainian literary critic Borys Hrinchenko in 1892 wrote an article with the title 'What were Shevchenko's National Ideals?'. Hrinchenko claimed that Shevchenko during his entire literary

²⁸ Bohdan Rubchak, 'Introduction', in George S.N. Luckyi (ed.), *Shevchenko and the Critics 1861-1980* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), p. 11.

²⁹ Ф.Я. Прийма, *Шевченко и русская литература XIX века* (Москва-Ленинград: Издательства Академии Наук СССР, 1961), с. 3.

career addressed one basic question: 'who has taken Ukraine's freedom?'. The answer to this question triggered off his 'antagonism to the Tsar' and 'genuine Ukrainian patriotism'³⁰. Shevchenko held the Cossacks and the *hetmanshchyna* in high regard. Once the Cossacks, the hetmans and the freedom of Ukraine was gone, Ukraine, 'like a ragged orphan, weeps beside the Dniepr'³¹. Bohdan Khmelnytskyi's agreement with Moscow was by Shevchenko seen as a betrayal of his country. Well read on the history of Ukraine, '...Shevchenko's national awareness made him a genius, and his immeasurable importance in the national rebirth of his country made him a phenomenon unique, perhaps, in the entire world. At a time when his predecessors hardly dared mention Ukrainian independence in their work, and if they did, understood the notion not as a national independence but as the very limited independence of a part of the "united and indivisible Russian people", an independence contingent upon the good grace of that "united" nation, that "elder brother", Shevchenko in his work clearly presented our independence as a nation'³².

Shevchenko was a Pan-Slavist in that he regarded all Slavic peoples as a family. However, he also held the view that each Slav people had a right to complete national independence, and he stressed the Ukrainian people's right to such independence: 'he fiercely defended this independence against interference from either the Russian or the Polish side and the spectre of the "one and indivisible" people did not hold him back in any way. He began as a supporter of Pan-Slavist unity and brotherhood but soon perceived that unity with one brother, the Muscovite, would be not brotherhood but slavery'³³.

Shevchenko opposed simple-minded patriotism, and recognised the rights also of people other than the Ukrainians: 'Shevchenko had a completely original conception of (national independence)...As he understood it, a nation was a family of brothers endowed with equal rights and only when all (and not only a few) are truly free can their nation also be free'³⁴. Thus, the Ukraine Shevchenko envisaged would have no masters and no serfs. Ukrainian national independence would only be possible if the people were free. A wide-ranging reform of social relations was thus also required. As such, Shevchenko's ideas were neither chauvinist nor provincial patriot:

Throughout, Shevchenko saw the Ukrainian people as an independent nation and he demanded for them the rights that belong to every nation as a matter of course. His independence and hatred of slavery made him despise it everywhere he saw it, even when his enemies were enslaved. Shevchenko harboured no hostility towards the Muscovites as a nation, nor to the Poles as such. He rebelled against Muscovite oppression but not against the Muscovite nation. He rebelled against Polish oppression

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 117.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

in the past but not against the Polish nation...Shevchenko was the first to express clearly the idea of Ukraine's complete independence as a nation, and along with this he maintained a consistent tolerance of other nations; he expressed something completely new and previously unheard-of in the Ukrainian writers who preceded him. The poet dispersed the tissue of lies which until then had obscured the issue of national independence. He was the first Ukrainian with a real national awareness and no one assisted as he did in the creation of a healthy Ukrainian national outlook...Ukrainian literature will surely produce many more writers as talented as Shevchenko but never again will there be one as significant for the national renaissance; there will be other great writers but never again a prophet³⁵.

The third person to have influenced the theoretical framework of *Zelenyi Svit* is the Ukrainian philosopher Hryhoryi Skorovoda. He was born in the Poltava province in 1722. After studying at the Kiev Academy he was taken to Russia to sing in the choir of Empress Elizaveta (1740-60). Two years later he returned to Ukraine, where he studied for another six years. Not having completed the Kiev Academy, he went to Hungary, where for the next two and a half years he was in charge of the Russian winefields. Upon the return to Ukraine, Skorovoda was hired to teach poetry at the theological seminar in Pereiaslav. He did, however, not get on with the bishop there due to his idea of women being equal to men, and was forced to resign. Skorovoda then took up a post as a house teacher with a rich family of landowners. After a few months, however, he also lost this post. In 1754 he therefore went to Moscow for a while to see friends, whereupon he returned to Pereiaslav, and was reinstalled as a house teacher - a job he held for the following four years. In 1759 Skorovoda stopped teaching, but was persuaded to teach poetry at the Kharkiv Collegium. In Kharkiv he also taught Greek. After a brief visit to Kiev, Skorovoda returned to Kharkiv. For a while he was forced to teach ethics at the 'School for the Young Nobles'. Besides teaching, however, Skorovoda devoted his time to writing poetry and philosophy. For days and even weeks on end, he would be walking - either in the forest or to visit friends (he once walked as far as to Taganrog by the Azov Sea). From 1769 until he died in 1794, Skorovoda spent all his time walking and developing his philosophical ideas, which had a starkly natural touch to them.

Skorovoda's philosophy and poetry is permeated by two major currents: firstly, his love for his native Ukraine, and secondly his closeness to and fondness for the Ukrainian nature. Dmitri Tschizhevskij in his biography on Skorovoda explains the latter's love for Ukraine in the following way:

Skorovoda lebte in der Ukraine und hielt hartnäckig an seinem heimatlichen Boden fest. Die Ukraine wird aber gerade in der Zeit seines Wirkens aus ihrer Stellung als Vasallenstaat Russlands zu einer bloßen

³⁵ Borys Ufrinchenko, 'What were Shevchenko's National Ideas?', in George S.N. Luckyi (1980), pp. 126-27.

Provinz des russischen Reiches herabgewürdigt...Petersburg zieht im Laufe des 18. Jahrhunderts alle lebendigen Kräfte aus dem ganzen Reiche in sich hinein; so entsteht in der Provinz eine geistige Leere, die auch nicht durch die Schaffung lokaler Kulturzentren aufgehoben werden konnte. Und so versichert der Strom der von Skorovoda ausgelosten geistigen Bewegung in der Unheimlichen geistigen Sandwüste des immer mehr und mehr provinzialisierten Landes...³⁶

Ukraine, and particularly the Poltava district, where also the writer Nikolai Gogol and the Ukrainian/Russian philosopher Vladimir Solovev were born, were in Russian, Ukrainian and also Polish literature throughout the 18th and 19th centuries often referred to as 'ein schönes und idyllisches Land', as 'das Land der Lieder und der üppig-schönen Natur. Auch in der Dichtung Skorovodas leben die Erinnerungen an diese schöne Landschaft an'³⁷. Although Skorovoda, unlike Vernadskii, had a religious faith, his pantheistic interpretation of God to the extent that every living thing was imbued with God and that all God's creations had equal worth through God, precedes Vernadskii's idea of the interconnectedness between all living things. Skorovoda often referred to God as 'Nature', justifying this in the following way:

In der Bibel heißt Gott Feuer, Wasser, Wind, Eisen, Stein, und wird mit anderen unzähligen Namen bezeichnet. Warum darf man nicht Natur (Natura) nennen? Was meine Meinung betrifft, so finde ich, daß man keinen besseren und passenderen Namen für Gott finden kann als diesen. Natura ist ein lateinischs Wort. In unserer Sprache: Natur oder Wesen. Mit diesem Wort wird alles das bezeichnet, was in der ganzen Maschine dieser Welt geboren wird, auch dasjenige, was nicht geboren wird, wie z.B. Feuer...Gott ist überall, durchdringt und halt die ganze Kreatur³⁸.

This idea reflects itself in Skovoroda's great respect for Nature and his ideas as to what should be the relationship between Man and Nature:

Wenn die weise und selige Natur alles baut, ist dann nicht sie allein es, die lehrt und verbessert? Jede Sache reift, wenn sie es leitet. Verhindere sie nur nicht, und wenn du kannst, so beseitige die Hindernisse und ebne der Weg: wahrlich wird sie selbst alles rein und glücklich vollziehen. Eine Kugel wird von selbst vom Berge herunterrollen: nimm nur den hinderen Stein des Anstoßes weg. lehre sie nicht zu rollen, hilf nur. Lehre nicht ein Apfelbaum Apfel tragen: die Natur selbst hat ihn gelehrt. Schütze ihn nur vor Schweinen, schneide die wilden Zweige weg, saubere ihn von den Raupen, leite das schmutzige Wasser, das auf die Wurzeln fließt, weg usf. Lehrer und Arzt sind nicht Lehrer und Arzt,

³⁶ Dmitri Tschizhewskij, *Skovoroda - Dichter, Denker, Mystiker* (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag - Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies, vol. 18, 1974), p. 9.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 96, 99.

sondern nur Diener der Natur, die die einzige und alleinige Ärztin und Lehrerin ist...³⁹

Tschizhevskij interprets Skorovoda's idea to the effect that the Ukrainian rich and beautiful nature to him was so wonderfully structured in itself that it did not need to be improved upon, but rather assisted. Thus, the task of agriculture, as understood by Skorovoda, was more to help Nature, rather than improve it, change or harm it. Put in a wider context, it thus seems reasonable to argue that Skorovoda, like Vernadskii, would see Man as part of Nature, having no right to inflict harm upon it. But whereas Vernadskii did not necessarily see any harm in improving Nature, provided that this was done with care and could be justified morally, to Skorovoda Nature as God's creation was perfect enough in itself and should therefore not be improved, but only assisted for its own benefit as to the benefit of Man. In this sense, Skorovoda preached the idea of Man's stewardship over Nature, rooted in the teachings of Christianity.

Nationalists in Ukraine hold Skorovoda in high regard as to them he is one of the first nationalists, committed to Ukraine rather than playing up to what they see as Russian imperialism. Skorovoda was, however, far from a nationalist in a narrow political sense. His 'nationalism' was more fuelled by a fondness for the Ukrainian Nature than by any political aspirations towards Ukrainian secession from the Russian Empire per se. His understanding of Nature and the relationship between Nature and Man, exemplifies the traditional Slav outlook on Nature and also the Russian Cosmism current in Russian philosophy and literature during the second half of the last century (see Chapter One). As such, he is worthy of being referred to as one of the inspirational sources of the Ukrainian Green Movement.

Another philosopher who has also inspired some members of *Zelenyi Svit* is the Teacher Ivanov (uchitel Ivanov). Porfirii Ivanov, as his real name was, was born in the Russian village of Orekhovka in the Luhansk oblast in 1898 in a miner's family. He only attended the wandering church school for four years, but continued to educate himself. He held a number of different professions to make ends meet, as a miner, loader and cleaning steam engines to mention but a few. Until the age of 35, Ivanov lived like any other person. But, in his own words 'in the spring of 1935 Nature imbued me with consciousness and I started thinking seriously on why man lives on Earth'. The answer Ivanov came up with, was that the meaning of human life could only be found in the unity with Nature, or to be more precise, with the 'three living bodies' - the air, the water and the soil, which can give Man energy for life in Nature independently of such things as food, clothing and housing.

Civilised life - or the 'warm' life, as he also called it - not only made Man comfortable, but also weaker and more likely to fall ill. It was Ivanov's idea that rather than trying to fight Nature and fear

³⁹ Ibid., p. 182

its harsher sides, Man ought to go out and welcome Nature and become one with it. Man could overcome the negative aspect of Nature, namely death and illness, by re-establishing the direct link between himself and Nature and receive energy from her rather than trying to control her.

Ivanov therefore decided to live in Nature, following 12 simple rules⁴⁰ for how to keep in good health and live simply with only a minimum of needs. For this he came into conflict with official Soviet authorities and spent 12 years in prison and in psychiatric wards⁴¹. The psychiatrists diagnosed him as schizophrenic. Consequently, in addition to being deprived of the right to work, he was also not allowed to serve in the Red Army during the Second World War. In 1942, the Gestapo held Ivanov for 27 days. On the night of 22 November, they undressed him and put him into the side-wagon of a motorbike, driving at high speed through Dnipropetrovsk. Ivanov did not fall ill and after this the Germans referred to him as the 'Russian God'⁴².

The Soviet journal *Raduga* in an article which appeared in the autumn of 1989 described him in the following way:

...Это философ со своим знанием жизни, с другой – человек легенда, обладавший необыкновенными возможностями. Пятьдесят лет Иванов ходил в одних трусах, босиком, каждый день обливался холодной водой, голодал четыре дня в неделю. Мог обходиться без еды сто с лишним дней, из них пятьдесят – без воды, около недели бродить по зимнему лесу с голым торсом, босиком: долго находиться без дыхания под водой. Увидев это впервые, испытал ощущение, будто меня ошпарило огнем, – такая мощь исходила от этого человека. Оказалось, что он обладает беспредельной любовью ко всему живому, кропотливостью, способностью к самопожертвованию...⁴³

Although one of the aims of Ivanov was to overcome disease by following a strict set of rules and this in particular appealed to several of the large group of followers he eventually attracted – some even referred to him as the 'Conqueror of Nature' – it in no way meant that he wanted to gain the upper hand over Nature. What he wanted to reach beyond was death and human destruction – but only by striking a balance with Nature and by living in harmony with her:

Мы должны добиться от Природы и получить силы для борьбы с болезнями. Она, Природа – самое главное, и все делается по ее

⁴⁰ The 12 rules formed a system called 'Detka', or 'child' and were intended to be followed from an early age, providing children with instructions for how to live a healthy life. These rules can be found in Дмитро Липченко. "Система Иванова", *Наш час*, 29.4.1994, с. 3.

⁴¹ See pp. 3-4 in Жизнь в единении с природой: система естественного оздоровления учителя Иванова (Кисв, 1991).

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁴³ *Raduga*, no. 9, 1989, cited in *ibid.*, p. 3.

законом, а мы являемся частью самой Природы и живем тоже по ее законам, и те же самые силы действуют и внутри нас⁴⁴.

An important part of Ivanov's teachings was therefore also to take care of and protect Nature:

Особое внимание обращается на бережное отношение к природной среде и формирование вежливости ко всему живому вокруг. Экология чувств с детского возраста не даст развитию потребительского отношения к природе⁴⁵.

Love and compassion towards other fellow human beings and a desire to do good things for others was also an important element of Ivanov's teachings. He can thus also be described as a great humanist. Towards the end of his life, his teachings were finally accepted by the CPU, and the first officially printed booklet on his teachings appeared in 1990 under the auspices of the Luhansk raikom⁴⁶. Ivanov's ideas are gaining increasing popularity not only in Ukraine but also in Russia and other parts of the former USSR. In *Zelenyi Svit's* Kiev group there are several adherents of Ivanov, and some of them have started classes for children to make them familiar with his teachings.

Another source of inspiration in the theoretical aspect of *Zelenyi Svit* is the Orthodox Church⁴⁷. Although many Greens would not characterise themselves as Christian and some have reservations against the Orthodox Church, the Green Movement, like most other political movements and parties, invited representatives of the Church to conduct masses at their Congresses and to bless their office in Kiev, prior to moving in. One non-believer explained this to the author by saying that it had become 'politically incorrect' to keep the Church at a distance, given that it had become part of the 'independence' parcel. This, however, has not prevented *Zelenyi Svit* from bringing old nature-centred rites of the Church back into use. In the spring of 1994, for instance, the Greens initiated the blessing of one of the oldest trees in Kiev, thus continuing an old tradition of blessing trees. The blessing of the fields prior to laying the seeds and prior to harvesting were also initiated by the Greens and is common in many smaller villages throughout Ukraine.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 3.

⁴⁵ Введение в практику природного оздоровления учителя Иванова, методические рекомендации по системе духовного и физического совершенствования человека силами природы. (Луганск, 1990), с. 20. The booklet was prepared by the voluntary society 'Istoki' im. Ivanova, the scientific laboratory 'Zdorove' and the Kuibyshev pedagogical institute and reviewed by a lecturer at the Kuibyshev pedagogical institute as well as by the person in charge of the ideology section of the Luhansk party raikom.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ As seen in Chapter One, the Orthodox Church advocates a close relationship between Man and Nature. Although the main reason why the Green Movement endorsed the church was as much political as religious, the Greens tried to revive old religious rituals such as blessing old trees and fields, on the grounds that these combined environmentalism with ancient cultural traditions.

Although *Zelenyi Svit*'s programme only makes direct reference to Vernadskii, it is, as will be seen below, permeated by the ideas of all four philosophers referred to above and also to the Church. With regard to political ideology, as pointed out in Chapter Three, the Greens do not condemn socialism/communism as such, but criticise 'industrialism' for causing disharmony between Man and Nature, which, in turn resulted in an exploitative approach to the environment. The Ukrainian Academician Dmytro Hrodzinskyi, one of the founders of *Zelenyi Svit*, in an interview with *Sovetskaia Ukraina* put it this way:

Мир збережемо лише тоді, коли збережемо, а подекуди й відновимо природу. На щастя, тепер це починають розуміти й робити більше людей. Ставлення до природи як до чогось святого було притаманне всім попереднім людським суспільствам. Технологічний же вік призвів до того, що ми, пошевеливши, засліплені своєю могутністю, починаємо руйнувати живу природу, серед якої людина формувалась як вид протягом сотень тисяч років, на тлі якої відбувалось формування людської свідомості, філософії, психіки, зрештою, світосприйняття⁴⁸.

The causes of this 'break' or disharmony between Man and Nature are explained as a result of the Soviet economic system, which was not friendly towards the environment, and which due to its strong centralisation and thus lack of sovereignty to Ukraine facilitated the 'plundering of the natural resources of Ukraine by all-union and republican ministries and departments'. Technocracy and the low technological and production culture which was prevalent in the USSR stressed industrial output at the expense of a sound use of natural resources. The 'dehumanisation' of society and the deformation of the value system brought about 'an excessive "industrial" life style'. As a result of this approach, Ukraine is on the verge of catastrophe, facilitated by the increasing gap between 'general cultural level, the moral state of the population and the growing technologization of life'. The state of the environment was therefore nothing but a mirrored image of the current cultural state of the nation, its spirituality and its economy.

To improve this sad state of affairs, the Greens called for a revival of traditional Ukrainian values - i.e. a moral rebirth (cf. Vernadskii's idea of a new morals), and thus, towards a harmonisation of the relationship between Man and Nature⁴⁹. The very essence of the Slav eco-cultural heritage outlined in Chapter One, was what needed to be re-established - Academician Hrodzinskyi, for instance, called for the revival of ecological morality:

⁴⁸ *Советская Украина* (n.d.) found in file containing documents from *Zelenyi Svit*'s Inaugural Congress in the Green Office in Kiev.

⁴⁹ *Зелений Світ*, Програма (Київ, октябрь, 1989), с. 4.

Кожному треба переглянути свою систему цінностей, віддавши перевагу пошані до природи, свободі самовираження, справжній моральності, що ґрунтується на істинно народних святостях – любові до землі, до всього живого і суцього. Наша свідомість, наша воля повинні змінити закони суспільства, для яких призвели до нинішнього катастрофічного стану природне середовище⁵⁰.

Only those, who love Nature and who are not indifferent towards their children, their people (narod) can bring the environmental destruction to an end⁵¹. To achieve this aim, *Zelenyi Svit* committed itself to the 'revival of folk traditions (narodni traditsii), songs and rites, containing the moral basis of compassion and a 'cautious' attitude towards Nature (priroda), in which there is a sense of unity with all the living and to the unbroken chain of the generations'⁵². Compassion towards one another and towards Nature thus are the core values of *Zelenyi Svit*. As the Orthodox Church preaches both of these, *Zelenyi Svit* in its programme expressed its support of the Church's work to re imbue people with such values⁵³.

Although, as will be seen below, *Zelenyi Svit* is humanist in outlook - some of the ideas expressed in its programme come close to being anthropocentric - its 'vision of a society in which Man lives in harmony with Nature goes beyond shallow anthropocentrism. Nature should not only be protected for the sake of Man, as Man by not taking properly care of Nature would warrant his own destruction, but because it has intrinsic value in itself. Not only the human *gene fund*, but also that of the flora and fauna must be fully preserved⁵⁴. Industrialisation and economic development must be permitted only in cases where they will not have a damaging effect on the ecosystem. As a matter of fact, the very notion of love towards Nature is logically incompatible with wishing to destroy it, as one wishes to nurture and protect those and that which one loves.

That *Zelenyi Svit*'s programme focuses on the implications of environmental destruction on Man, is understandable as the Chernobyl accident took place on Ukrainian soil and thus in a dramatic way revealed how vulnerable Man is to the side-effects of his own industrial creation⁵⁵. In the worst case, an apocalypses could take place, in which case Mankind would become distinct. Consequently, environmental protection is not only about protecting Nature for the well-being and happiness of Man, but is also an essential prerequisite for his and Nature's physical survival.

Although, as will be seen below, *Zelenyi Svit* activists have generally used anthropocentric arguments in their campaigns, they are still deeply committed to a more ecocentric approach towards

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

Nature. When addressing the First Congress of *Zelenyi Svit* in October 1989, Shcherbak explicitly underlined the association's commitment to Vernadskii and his concept of the 'noosphere':

Наша філософія – це філософія ноосфери, сформульована нашим великим співвітчизником академіком Вернадським⁵⁶.

In Nikolaev, the leader of the oblast *Zelenyi Mir*, Anatolii Zolotukhin, rewrote the Ten Commandments, replacing God with Nature, thus stressing the importance of radically changing our attitude towards her. Rather than thinking that she is there for Man to use, Zolotukhin encouraged people to look upon Nature as something more, with a spiritual value of its own, worthy of worship⁵⁷. References to a new 'green' morality were made Chapter Five. Academician Hrodzinskyi also called for the 'revival of ecological morality'. This was a prerequisite for improving the state of the environment and it put the Greens in line with Vernadskii's thinking on the 'noosphere' - for which a new morality was a precondition⁵⁸. Although Zolotukhin's approach has been criticised within the Green Movement for being blasphemous, there is still widespread support for the new relationship with Nature that he calls for, indicating that *Zelenyi Svit* is not entirely anthropocentric in its outlook.

In Chapter One, I introduced the concept of 'eco-culture'. It is interesting to note that *Zelenyi Svit* has chosen to incorporate into its theoretical framework elements of this eco-culture which are firmly rooted in pre-Revolutionary eco-culture (the ideas of Skorovoda, Shevchenko and Vernadskii) and derivations of this which existed as a sub eco-culture during the Soviet period (Vernadskii and Ivanov). The theoretical framework of the Ukrainian Greens is thus much older than some of the ideas and concepts on which their West European and American sister movements base their work - which in most cases have been developed over the last thirty years as a point of departure from traditional growth-oriented ideas viewed as being incompatible with protecting Nature. Given the interest in Ukrainian culture that surfaced in Ukraine following the collapse of the USSR and the ideological vacuum that it created, the Greens have an enormous potential for recreating the ecoculture that existed in Ukraine prior to the introduction of Bolshevism and which was partially destroyed during the Soviet era, but whose roots remained. Such an approach may strike a more positive chord with the general public, than simply importing 'Green' ideas from the West, given that there is considerable scepticism and suspicion to Western ideas among people.

As regards *PZU*, both the party programme and statements made by spokesmen of the party, are pulling in different directions, on the one hand indicating that the party is committed to the environment due to the effects pollution has on human health and happiness, and on the other, that

⁵⁶ *Літературна Україна*, 14.12.1989, с. 2.

⁵⁷ Conversation with Zolotukhin, Nikolaev, June 1994.

⁵⁸ *Советская Украина* (n.d.).

the party is not purely anthropocentric but ecocentric in its approach. The party programme, which was endorsed by the First Congress in 1990, states that the *PZU* is:

„Політичний союз одиномислів, об'єднаних спільною з Україною долею і справою забезпечення кожній людині права на здоров'я, довголіття та життя в екологічно здоровому середовищі”⁵⁹.

Anyone ‘loving the native Nature’ may become a member of the *PZU*. Man is by the party seen as ‘God’s creation and the most responsible part of Nature’, thus indirectly bearing the responsibility for its future and serving as steward of Nature. Nature is also seen as a creation of God, and must therefore be preserved not only for the sake and the well-being of Man, but because it has value in itself:

Бажаючи покласти край остаточному винищенню рідної української природи – палях степів та гір, річок та лісів, нашої культурної та історичної спадщини – усього того, що є ніковичим, заповіданим нам Богом, рідним волінням українського народу⁶⁰.

This quote explicitly says what has been argued elsewhere in this thesis, namely that for the Slav people, the three concepts of *rodina*, *narod* and *priroda* are interlinked. To the Greens there can be no nation and no native people if the environment in which these two exist has been destroyed. To seek the survival of a single one of these notions thus explicitly also implies the survival and protection of the others. The idea of the *PZU* programme, ‘THE SURVIVAL of mankind, of the (Ukrainian) people and the ecological protection of our future⁶¹ must be a priority issue’, therefore implies ‘the harmonic unification of Man’s interests with the highest biospheric laws of Nature’⁶². Life on the Planet and the people living on it is an absolute value for the Greens⁶³. *PZU* in other words explicitly voice the idea of Vernadskii’s ‘noosphere’, where the conscious and intelligent Man seeks development which does not clash with the limits of the biosphere. This commitment to Vernadskii’s concept of the ‘noosphere’ is stated on page three in the party programme. Also Shcherbak, addressing the First Congress of *Zelenyi Svit* mentioned the ecocentric approach of the Greens:

⁵⁹ See Програма партії зелених України, прийнята установчим з’їздом ЦЗУ, 28-30 1990, с. 3.

⁶⁰ Маніфест партії зелених України, adopted at the First Party Congress in 1990.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 2.

⁶² See Урочисто проголошуємо створення партії зелених України.

⁶³ Програма партії зелених України, прийнята установчим з’їздом ЦЗУ, 28-30 1990, с. 7.

Екологія мусить бути вища за економіку, вища за всі ідеологічні та політичні догми і міфи, бо священний дар життя є найвищою цінністю на землі, найпершим для всіх урядів і політичних партій⁶⁴.

Although *PZU* in its programme states its commitment to improving the environment in Ukraine not simply due to its impact on Man but also as it is considered to have intrinsic value, statements made towards the general public stress the anthropocentric side of this commitment. Whereas Green activist, Andrii Demydenko, in an interview with the *Ukrainian Weekly*⁶⁵ stated that 'the Green Party of Ukraine recognises that ecology takes precedence over the economy, politics and ideology, and that individual rights are more important than the rights of the state'. And Kononov on the pages of *Holos Ukrainy* made it clear that 'we have no right to risk the health of future generations' and that for this reason, '(one must) save the environment and form new attitudes in people (providing them with) a new consciousness'⁶⁶. Similarly, Kononov in his programme for the local elections in 1992 made it clear that the most important task of the *PZU* was to protect people's right to life and the quality of life. Environmental pollution constituted a violation of human rights, then everyone has the right to a clean environment. Andrii Hlavovyi explained *PZU*'s commitment to Life in the following way:

ПЗУ...партія радикально-демократичного напрямку. Найнепартійнішої партії", як назвала "зелених" Петра Келлі...Партії захисту не просто природи, а й життя – життя планети і людини, захисту знедолених і дискримінованих верств суспільства, захисту в найширшому розумінні жінок, дітей, старих, інвалідів...⁶⁷

Should attempts at protecting the environment fail, the future of Man as a species would be endangered, then

Природа не зможе нескінченно довго "чекати милостей" від людей. Якщо життєве середовище продовжуватиме деградувати, природа змунена буде заради самозбереження звільнитись від людства⁶⁸.

As regards the Green Party, it was initiated and is still dominated by Greens in the Kiev-area and in the Western parts of Ukraine. These people are better informed about the green movement abroad

⁶⁴ *Література України*, 14.12.1989, с. 2.

⁶⁵ *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 11.11.1990 (n.p.).

⁶⁶ *Голос України*, 6.2.1993, с. 4.

⁶⁷ *Література України*, 15.11.1990, с. 2.

⁶⁸ See Kononov's election programme, 1992.

than is the case in *Zelenyi Svit*, they are younger than the average member of *Zelenyi Svit* and more leftist than *Zelenyi Svit*. Both *PZU* and *Zelenyi Svit*, however, are deeply committed to Ukrainian independence and to the revival of the Ukrainian cultural heritage. Whereas, initially, *PZU* basically copied its programme from that of *die Grünen* in Germany, several members expressed their reservations about such an approach, arguing that the situation they were faced with, differed radically from that of the German Greens. The programme has therefore, as seen in Chapter Five, since been considerably changed.

As pointed out in Chapter One, there has since the beginning of the last century in Russia/Ukraine been two currents of political thought: on the one hand, there were the Westerners, who endorsed Western political thinking as more 'progressive' than the thinking rooted in the Eastern or Slav tradition. The adherents of this current viewed the Western humanism and enlightenment as preferable to Slavophilism, whose key idea was that the Slav countries may be industrially and economically backwards compared to the West, but that this had been compensated for through vision and purity, and that the Slav countries should therefore save the 'decadent' West from its own destruction. It is interesting to note that the very same questions that Western philosophers and political theorists have only recently begun to address were raised by Russian and Ukrainian philosophers and natural scientists more than a century ago. It may of course be argued that thinkers also in the Western tradition (for instance St Thomas Aquinas) developed similar ideas. Still, in Russia towards the end of the last century, a whole new school of thought - 'Cosmos' (cf. Chapter One) - emerged to address the issue of relations between Man and Nature in parallel with the emergence of Socialist and Communist ideas which were imported from the West at this time. To Vernadskii, both Capitalism and Socialism were 'ideas preoccupied with human concerns'. His idea of the 'noosphere' went beyond both of these 'isms' and would, he firmly believed, be the only acceptable idea to follow in the future. When related to Western ecocentrist thought, the Slavophile notion that Russian thought would save the world thus holds true in the sense that it preceded ecocentrism with 50-60 years. However, it did not influence ecophilosophers in the West directly, as they simply did not know Vernadskii's ideas to begin with.

8.1.3 Classification of the Ukrainian Greens' Theoretical Framework

Vernadskii's ideas quite obviously fall within the Western ecocentrist approach and yet it goes beyond it, in that Vernadskii does not confine his concept to the Earth (or *Gaia*) as such, but looks upon the Earth and all physical entities (animate/inanimate) as parts of a much larger context, namely that of the entire Cosmos itself. Like the ecocentrists, however, also Vernadskii stresses the interrelatedness of all organisms not only amongst themselves but also with their environments. But

he is also concerned with the way in which the Earth and all animate and nonanimate entities interact with Cosmos, by which we are surrounded and of which we are a part. With regard to human relations, Vernadskii's theory stresses that which humans have in common as a species (*homo sapiens*), rather than the aspects in which they differ. Thus, Vernadskii's idea of the 'noosphere' is also emancipatory in that it stresses the unity of the races and takes a stand against racism.

Both Vernadskii and the ecocentrists have a positive outlook on science. Eckersley points out that 'ecocentric theorists have also pointed out how new scientific discoveries have served to challenge long standing anthropocentric prejudices' and that 'in modern times the credibility of any Western philosophical worldview is seriously compromised if not at least cognisant of, and broadly consistent with, current scientific knowledge'. 'Premises of ecocentrism (i.e. the model of internal relations) are actually more consistent with modern science than the premises of anthropocentrism, which posit humans as either separate from and above the rest of nature (or if not separate from the rest of nature then nonetheless the acme of evolution). In this respect, ecocentrist theorists, far from being anti-science, often enlist science to help undermine deeply ingrained anthropocentric assumptions that have found their way into many branches of the social sciences and humanities, including modern political theory'⁶⁹. Vernadskii used the same argument against both capitalism and socialism. Neither of the two, in his view, had a sufficiently thorough understanding of Man's interrelatedness with Nature and his surroundings and they were both too concerned with the welfare of Man at the expense of Nature. Moreover, in the case of socialism, it did not allow for freedom of thought. Without far-reaching democracy in the scientific sphere there could be no progress - and not progress defined as economic development, but progress in the sense of getting closer to discovering the essence of Cosmos and the role of life in it.

Vernadskii's strong faith in science may be mistaken for anthropocentrism in the sense that he marvels the human intellect. To Vernadskii, however, the human intellect was a tool with a potential to be used both in a constructive and a destructive way. Used in a positive way, it could allow Man to improve the geophysical surface of the Earth. Such an improvement is to Vernadskii not a bad thing as long as it takes place within the framework of sustainability. Human beings like all other species have equal worth. Human beings have been equipped with intellect and to Vernadskii the intellect thus also has intrinsic value and a purpose, which is to create the 'noosphere', which means the sustainable development of the biosphere and the aim of unravelling the secrets of the Cosmos and Man's place in it. Human history, however, clearly illustrates how capable the human mind is of inflicting destruction not only upon Man but also upon Nature. Thus, Vernadskii envisaged some kind of international scientific board which would stake out a series of guidelines within which science should be conducted. Generally, he also envisaged more international co-operation as Man

⁶⁹ Eckersley (1992), pp. 50-51.

would realise that only by acting as one, united species would it be able to secure the survival of Earth, and with it, Man's own survival.

Vernadskii did not develop a political theory to accompany his concept of the 'noosphere'. This question was neither addressed by Russian philosophers of the 'Cosmist' tradition, as they were more concerned with Man's place in Nature than the political aspects of sustainable society. As pointed out in Chapter One, though, the *mir* of the Russian countryside was very much a small-scale sustainable community which coopted Man and Nature without the former doing damage to the latter. One of the things Vernadskii found hardest to accept after the Bolshevik Revolution was the destruction of the farmers and the culture of the *mir*. Skorovoda also did, as seen above, stress that Man should assist rather than improve Nature. From Vernadskii's point of view, information and free thought were prerequisites for securing a sustainable development. Both of them would require some kind of democracy where consensus would play a significant role. It was Vernadskii's belief that once Man reached the "noosphere" (reaching it would be a difficult process and take possibly decades or even centuries), then Man would himself realise that only by building a sustainable society would he be able to move closer to understanding Cosmos. This, however, leaves room for different interpretations of how best to achieve this aim and thus for potential political conflict, particularly on the international arena. What seems clear, however, is that in Vernadskii's view, the social sciences - and particularly political theory - would have to adjust to the hard sciences so as to avoid becoming overtly anthropocentrist.

Eckersley claims that there is 'much greater elective affinity and hence a much greater potential for theoretical synthesis between ecocentrism and communitarian and socialist political philosophies than there is between ecocentrism and individualistic political philosophies such as liberalism'⁷⁰. As seen above, Vernadskii considers both liberalism and socialism incompatible with the concept of the "noosphere" as they are both too preoccupied with Man and centred around the idea of happiness for Man, thus failing to see beyond him. The very notion of socialism/communism in the Soviet experience has discredited itself as a system of thought capable of accommodating the interests of the environment. The environmental legacy of the USSR can best be described as a disaster. An 'eco-socialist' approach may be successful (as indeed it has been in Germany) in the West where the political context is different and where socialism and its relation to the environment has been under revision for some time. In Ukraine, however, the collapse of the USSR (and socialism the way it was practised in the USSR) has brought about a moral vacuum. Although elements within the Green Movement familiar with the Western Green Movements and their theoretical frameworks (Hlazovyi, Kurykin) are positive to 'eco-socialism' as an idea, the majority of *Zelenyi Svir's* members are opposed to this concept. Rather than trying to modify socialism, the Ukrainian Greens have

⁷⁰ *Ibid.* p. 52.

therefore adopted the eco-cultural legacy of the past as an alternative to the socialist notion of economic growth at all costs and capitalism without limits.

As seen from Chapters Three, Four and Five, though, *Zelenyi Svit* and particularly *PZU* have not utilised the ideas of Vernadskii to the full. This is to some extent understandable in a society in the process of being transformed from socialism to capitalism and where the notion of capitalism to many has fairy-tale properties. To others, who live on the brink of extinction due to the collapse of the Ukrainian economy, ideas of Man and his relations to Nature or for that matter Cosmos, are of little use when they are struggling to get by and to feed their families. Thus, the Greens have generally adopted a more pragmatic approach, which can be placed somewhere between *human welfare ecology* and *preservationism*.

As seen in previous chapters (particularly in the case study on the campaign to save South Bug), the arguments used by *Zelenyi Mir* to save the river can be put in two categories: on the one hand, there are what may be called the *anthropocentric* arguments. South Bug and the canyon must be saved 'for our children's sake', 'for our future generations'. Nuclear power must be replaced because it poses a threat to 'the population of Nikolaev oblast', to the 'gene fund' and to 'Ukraine' as a nation. To the Nikolaev Greens it was also important to save landscapes of an aesthetic, historical and recreational value (cf. the Canyon of South Bug again) for Man's sake, thus placing them firmly within the Ukrainian/Russian conservation movement.

However, it is possible to identify also what I will call *moral* arguments in the campaign conducted by the Nikolaev Greens. The actions of the pro-nuclear lobby are frequently being referred to as 'amoral' and 'dishonest', revealing a lack of respect not only to the people living in the vicinity of the nuclear power station and to future generations, but also a lack of understanding and respect for Nature. Zolotukhin's rewriting of the Ten Commandments is not motivated out of anthropocentric concerns, but reflects a new thinking on Nature itself (I will return to this issue in more detail in Chapter Nine).

Is Green ecocentrism in Ukraine different from that of the Western world? It seems reasonable to argue that in many ways it is different - although there are also similarities - because it draws on a consistent cultural, religious and philosophical framework developed in parallel with Western 'industrialism' (socialism and capitalism) but with a very different understanding of the relationship between Man and Nature. Where the Western Greens try to develop new theoretical concepts of Nature and constructing complex critiques of capitalism as an idea, the Ukrainian Greens - although there are of course exceptions - look to the past and try to revive those ideas and traditions that had an ecological side to them. In terms of offering political solutions to the environmental crisis, the Western Greens are more 'advanced' than those of Ukraine. A big thing in Western Green thinking

at present is the concept of democracy and what democracy should look like in an ecological society (cf. John Barry). 'The Greens are also trying to develop a 'Green' economy at a theoretical level.

In Ukraine, on the other hand, the Greens claim commitment to democracy as an idea, although failing to specify what such 'democracy' should entail. Similarly, their ideas on the economy are vague and unstructured. While responding fast to political events in their country, *PZU* has failed to provide a wider concept for how society should develop. And while remaining firmly committed to Vernadskii's ideas, the Greens have yet to come up with a more specific programme for how they envisage the 'noosphere' to be brought about. Initially, there were people with visions and ideas in the Green Movement (Hlazonyi and the political scientist and philosopher Serhii Hrabovskyi belonged to these). Due to infighting both of them left the movement in the early 1990s. In order to turn the trend and regain at least some of the support they have lost, the Greens must try to attract people with visions and ideas to the movement. Otherwise *PZU* could be in danger of becoming a permanent 'resolution-issuing' party only.

8.2 Does Inglehart's Hypothesis of the Greens being a Result of 'Post-Materialism' hold true in the Case of Ukraine?

8.2.1 Theory of Post-Materialist Value Change

A substantial amount of research on the Green Movements/Parties as a phenomenon has either assumed or tried to prove that the Greens have emerged as a result of 'post-materialism'. This concept was first introduced by Ronald Inglehart (1971, 1977, 1981), who in his research found a 'widespread shift away from the unquestioned predominance of economic and basic security values towards an increasing emphasis upon what Maslow had characterised as 'higher order' needs'⁷¹. This phenomenon could in Inglehart's view be explained as a 'post-materialist value change' and rested on two key propositions: firstly, basic needs have to be met before non-material needs can play any role, and secondly, value systems are acquired in the formative years of childhood and youth and tend to remain relatively stable thereafter. A third assumption, 'the scarcity hypothesis', which Inglehart introduced later (1979, 1981), proclaimed that people give a higher priority to whatever needs are least met.

Inglehart did not initially link the emergence of the Green Movement to his theory of 'post-materialist value change'. The first to do so were Hildebrandt and Dalton (1977). Their study was followed by others - for instance that of Barnes and Kaase et al. (1979), who focused on

⁷¹ Lowe and Rüdiger. 'Review Article: Political Ecology and the Social Sciences', *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 16, p. 515.

'unconventional political participation'. Inglehart then incorporated this idea in later papers (1979, 1981, 1983), arguing that post-materialists 'furnish the ideologues and core support for the environmental, zero-growth and anti-nuclear movements; and their opposition to those who give top priority to re-industrialisation and re-armament constitutes a distinctive and persistent dimension of political cleavage'⁷².

Lowe and Rüdig list several works that emphasise the 'post-materialist value change' as a major explanatory factor for the emergence of Green Movements, although not all uncritically accept Inglehart's concept wholeheartedly (see for instance, Watts 1979; Watts and Wandesforde-Smith 1981; Müller-Rommel and Wilke 1981; Handley and Watts 1981; Müller-Rommel 1982a, 1983b). Survey data compiled by these authors suggest that 'post-materialists' are more likely than 'materialists' to:

- support environmental protection measures;
- be opposed to nuclear energy and 'stronger military defence efforts'
- have a high opinion of the environmental movement (Inglehart 1981, 1983a)
- support actively the ecological, anti-nuclear energy and peace movements (Müller-Rommel 1984a, 1985);
- vote for a green party (Müller-Rommel and Wilke 1981; Müller-Rommel 1983b, 1984b; Schmidt 1984)⁷³

Watts and Wandesforde-Smith (1981), however, distinguish between various expressions of environmentalism similar to that of Eckersley, arguing that only the more radical expression of environmentalism can be classified as 'post-materialist':

The ideological shift characteristic of post-materialists is not found among all environmentalists, some of whom are quite comfortable with the dominant values of the system. The overlap is rather between post-materialism and those recently developing elements of the environmental movement that have begun to articulate a critique of the techno-scientific rationale of industrial society⁷⁴.

Others (Dunlap and Catton 1980; O'Riordan 1981; Dunlap and Van Liere 1978b; Cotgrove 1982) have identified radical environmentalism as 'being motivated by a distinct world view, termed the New Ecological (or Environmental) Paradigm, at odds with many of the core values of industrial society, such as economic growth, material progress and technological optimism'⁷⁵. Lowe and Rüdig also identify a move away from what was originally labelled 'post-materialism', such as 'protecting

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 515-16.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 516.

⁷⁴ N. Watts, G. Wandesforde-Smith (1981), 'Post-Material Values and Environmental Policy Change', in D. E. Mann (ed.), *Environmental Policy Formation* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1981), cited by Lowe and Rüdig (B.J.Pol.S., vol. 16), p. 516.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

freedom of speech and giving people more say in the decisions of government over the protection of order in the nation and the fighting of prices' (Inglehart 1971) towards a tool with which to characterise a 'generic set of values and attitudes which include environmental ones' (Fietkau 1982a; Fietkau et al. 1982b)⁷⁶.

Inglehart has been attacked on two fronts: on the one hand, a number of weaknesses and flaws have been detected in his theoretical framework, on the other, empirical studies conducted in Western Europe do not necessarily back up his assumptions⁷⁷. On these grounds, Lowe and Rüdig conclude that 'it appears questionable to make Inglehart's theory of value change the basis of environmental sociology'⁷⁸. It is their view that this model in addition takes little or no account of other explanatory factors of equal or possibly greater significance in explaining the Green phenomenon, such as ecological problems, people's relationship to their surrounding environment, the education system, the media, historical ideas and cultural tastes.

Below I will examine to which extent the Green Movement/Green Party of Ukraine fit in the framework of 'post-materialist value change' and identify other factors, which may be of more significance in this connection. I will then proceed to discuss whether or not these factors match those mentioned by Lowe and Rüdig and also, which of them is more significant.

8.2.2 Post-Materialist Value Change and the Emergence of the Ukrainian Greens

Prior to beginning the analysis of the Ukrainian Greens and post-material value change it should be pointed out that Inglehart's theory was developed to explain political developments in a Western political context. Writers who used this theory as a tool by which to explain the Greens, tried to explain the emergence and the peculiarities of environmental groups and parties as a phenomenon in affluent capitalist societies. As these writers did not state clearly, however, that their analysis was restricted to a certain geographical area (Western Europe, and in some cases also the US, Canada and Japan) and to a certain type of society (capitalism), and since the theory of post-materialist value

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 517.

⁷⁷ Three major arguments have been raised on a theoretical level: Firstly, Maslow's hierarchy of needs, or Inglehart's use of it, is far from universally accepted (Herz 1979; Fietkau 1982a; Flanagan 1982). Secondly, the assumption that values acquired during adolescent socialization remain relatively stable throughout life has been seriously questioned (Lafferty 1976; Herz 1979; Lehner 1979). Finally, some see a contradiction in Inglehart's combining of the hierarchy of needs/scarcity hypothesis with the socialization hypothesis; the former assumes that people change their values according to the relative fulfilment of different needs, whereas the latter proclaims the stability of a value system once it has been acquired. As for empirical studies, they have shown that worsening economic conditions led to dramatic swings in value orientations among all age cohorts during the late 1970s (Bolten and Jagodzinski 1985; Van Deth 1983). *Ibid.*, p. 517.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 517.

change has gained some popularity as a means by which to explain the emergence of the Greens more generally, it is therefore justifiable to apply Ingelhart's theory also to Ukraine so as to determine whether or not it is valid also in the Soviet/post-Soviet case.

Basic Needs vs. 'Higher Order' Needs.

At first sight, it seems that the Greens in the East do not differ that much from their counterparts in the West. The Ukrainian Greens, like the Greens elsewhere, stress issues like more democracy (grassroots democracy), and deflation of political power. *PZU*, moreover, has on a number of occasions emphasised its place in the larger, global green movement and the issues (political and economic) on the latter's agenda. The context within which these demands are made, though, is very different. The Greens in the former USSR emerged in a socialist/communist society in transition and now have to find their place and define their issues in a post-Soviet/post-totalitarian environment. This in turn, affects their agenda, bringing in a number of issues which are not addressed by similar movements in, for instance, Western Europe.

Socialism and communism, like capitalism, can be said to be materialist in outlook. Both emphasise industrial production and economic growth and both types of society referred to themselves as 'developed' societies. In terms of living standards, though, the citizen of capitalist societies like Germany, France or Britain was clearly much better off than was the average Russian or Ukrainian. Whereas the former could also be referred to as a consumer society, producing a wide range of consumer products for the individual (thus emphasising light industries and quality), the latter emphasised industrialisation and heavy industries, the aim being to catch up with the more affluent and capitalist West, which was seen as a major competitor.

At the time of the coming to power of Gorbachev, it had become clear that the Soviet economy was in a decline and that, unless a thorough overhaul was carried out, problems would soon reach crisis proportions. Adding to this situation was President Reagan's introduction of the so-called Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), in the 1980s, which would be able to destroy incoming missiles before they reached US territory. This project, which has later been referred to as a hoax, aimed at pushing the Soviet Union into accepting a stop to the arms race, would be so expensive to match that the Soviet economy simply would not be strong enough to carry the cost. To concentrate on internal economic reform, Gorbachev thus in the aftermath launched a series of proposals for arms reductions to the Americans.

In terms of environmental pollution, the Soviet Union was much worse off than the capitalist countries of Western Europe. As pointed out in Chapter One, although legislation to curb pollution did exist, no proper enforcement procedures were in place. Besides, the system favoured quantity rather than quality, which in turn encouraged industrial waste and pollution. It was, however,

realised that the economy and the environment were closely linked to one another and that economic reform would also have to take account of the environmental legacy of the USSR.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the economic situation in the former Soviet republics, including Ukraine, deteriorated sharply. The number of unemployed is soaring, and due to high inflation the average Ukrainian is now economically much worse off than (s)he was during the Soviet era. Although people were, in terms of Western standards, materially not that well off (a much higher percentage of people's salary was used to cover basic needs such as food, and it was difficult for people to afford clothes and other material goods, of which there was an acute shortage anyway and whose quality could not match that of Western products), they were at least able to feed themselves.

Thus, although in terms of living standards, people in the West were materially better off than were people in the East, both countries in the capitalist West and the socialist East shared one common feature: they were both highly industrialised. Russia was prior to the October Revolution much less industrialised than the West, but in the 1930s, Stalin launched an ambitious industrialisation campaign intended to catch up with the West as quickly as possible. Although the Soviet economy was centred around the heavy industry and economic growth was given priority rather than innovation and quality, (the latter were emphasised in the West and resulted in a shift from heavy to light industry), both societies favoured economic growth. As such, they both fit into the wider notion of 'industrialism'.

In both societies, the negative effect of industrialism - namely environmental disruption - became more visible during the 1970s and 1980s - especially in the USSR, where a lack of innovation and old production facilities led to serious environmental pollution. Although, as pointed out in Chapter One, criticism was raised regarding this matter by writers and scientists, protest remained limited and limited information about the scope of such pollution was available to the general public. The Chernobyl accident dramatically changed this situation as did glasnost, which for the first time revealed the full extent of environmental pollution and its impact on public health.

It is worth noting that the Chernobyl accident triggered off a value change and an accompanying policy change in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev's new thinking in Soviet foreign policy resulted in a change of Soviet doctrine from 'mutual coexistence' to 'mutual interdependence' - the thrust of which was that the class struggle between capitalism and socialism had, following the Chernobyl accident, become secondary to the issue of Man's survival as a species. The accident had clearly illustrated how small the world had become and how vulnerable one country was to events taking place in another. The Chernobyl accident also clearly illustrated how even the 'peaceful atom' could be harmful to Man. Following the launch in the United States of the Strategic Defence Initiative, the Soviet Union felt it could no longer sustain the enormous costs of the arms race. Tactical concerns,

but probably also a genuine concern for the potentially damaging effects of environmental pollution, thus made Gorbachev state on a number of occasions that environmental problems and the struggle for disarmament were both global issues which illustrated interdependence and which could be solved only through international co-operation (see Chapter Two)⁷⁹. Thus, at least on a theoretical level, Gorbachev acknowledged Man's existence as a part of Nature, thus moving away from traditional communist thinking on the environment (cf. Chapter One) which held that Nature was there to be used by Man, towards the idea that Man, by destroying Nature may ultimately also destroy himself. This shift in Soviet policy and the Chernobyl accident, in addition to information revealed following the introduction of glasnost, proved crucial in shaping the general public's attitudes on the environment. Whereas in the West, such attitudes changed gradually over a relatively long period of time, in the Soviet Union it came about as a result of one major catastrophe and several smaller ones. The environment eventually contributed to the fall of the Soviet leadership.

Although some measures were introduced to stop the negative general trend in the sphere of the environment, these were, as shown in Chapter Two, far from sufficient. As a result of frustration and anger with a political leadership that failed to address the problems of the Chernobyl accident and environmental problems more generally, a number of informal groups emerged, addressing these issues. They received broad public support. Initially, they called for a more radical overhaul of the economic and political system than proposed by the official authorities. Soon, however, many realised that the system was beyond change and that the only way in which matters could improve was to replace the old system with a new one, where bureaucratic control would be replaced by decentralisation and democratisation.

Thus, it seems that a widespread value change took place in the Soviet Union following the introduction of glasnost and democratisation - although due to economic hardship there was a shift towards the socialists in later elections in Russia and to a lesser extent in Ukraine. This change did, however, come about on premises very different from those underpinning post-materialist value change in Western Europe. People reacted against a regime that had discredited itself in the way it handled Chernobyl, and in favour of more openness and individual political (democratic) rights. They also reacted against an inefficient economic system in need of radical changes not to stagnate completely and the environmental legacy brought about by this system.

The environment became a key component in the larger struggle for survival - at the individual, environmental, local and national level. As the state of the environment in the USSR had reached crisis proportions it posed a direct threat to peoples' health and surroundings. As such environmental improvement became a prerequisite for a basic need in Maslow's hierarchy of needs - namely that of

⁷⁹ It was thus natural that the Ukrainian Peace Fund actively assisted *Zelenyi Svit* (see Chapter Three) in the early stage of its development.

physical survival - and not a 'higher order' need, as generally assumed (explicitly) by adherents of the theory of post-materialist value change. Consequently, one of the two major assumptions upon which this theory rests, does not apply to the Ukrainian (Soviet) context⁸⁰. To illustrate this point, I will examine *Zelenyi Svit*'s and *PZU*'s position on the issue of survival, which clearly indicates that the basic need of survival (human as well as non-human) is closely linked with the higher order need of democratisation/Ukrainian independence, which by the Greens were considered a prerequisite to stop environmental degradation in Ukraine and to improve the state of the environment in the future. First, however, we will have a look at Inglehart's second assumption, namely that value systems are required in early childhood and remain relatively stable throughout a person's life.

Stable Value Systems

As pointed out in Chapter One, official Soviet thinking did not completely eradicate pre-Communist thinking on the environment. Rather, what I referred to as 'traditional eco-culture' continued to exist as a sub-culture. It was upon this culture the first 'environmentalists' arguments rested. Although the Soviet education system tried to socialise the children already in the kindergartens, many families preferred not to send their children there, but rather let the grandparents take care of them. Often, they were religious and would take their grandchildren to church and familiarise them with alternative values. Although these were not necessarily adopted by the children, at least they were aware of their existence. Furthermore, during the Soviet era, pre-Revolutionary literature was highly popular and people were generally well-read. Russian literary works in many cases depicted the environment in a way very different from the official Soviet view that Nature had no value in itself but was a means by which Man could improve his lot - in other words, it was there for Man to use.

Kelley et al. (1976), claim that 'general public awareness of environmental problems has been limited both by restrictions imposed until recently on discussion of the question and widely held attitudes which de-emphasise environmental concerns. Although early polls show that workers living near polluting industries were clearly aware of the problem, wide-scale public attention was not focused on the deteriorating quality of the environment until the 1960's (Kaliuzhnyj, 1961: 102-114)'. However, 'deeply held public attitudes on man's relationship to nature and the pressing desire to enjoy the consumer benefits of industrialisation have also dulled the environmental awareness of the average Russian. The view that nature's wealth is virtually inexhaustible and that it is man's fate to conquer and reshape nature is widely held. Moreover, the average citizen undoubtedly places the

⁸⁰ Tor Bjørklund of the Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, reached a similar conclusion having studied the Estonian Green Movement. See The Green Orientation among Estonians Compared with Scandinavians (Paper presented for Presentation at WAPOR Regional Seminar: Eastern Europe, Tallinn, Estonia, June 11.-12. 1993), p. 1.

satisfaction of his own material desires well above environmental considerations in ordering his personal priorities; in a work-now, consume-later economy, the argument that increased production, especially of consumer goods, must be even further delayed in the interests of environmental quality is destined to be unpopular⁸¹.

Although Kelley et al. are no doubt right in saying that there were restrictions on discussions on this issue, it is the case that the environment as an issue faced fewer restrictions than were other issues, as it did not constitute a threat to the authority of the CPSU (see for instance DeBardeleben, 1985). As regards people's general attitudes towards the environment, it is virtually impossible to argue that they were positive or negative, given, as we argued in the introduction to this chapter, that we do not have sufficient or reliable data on this issue. To the extent people were not aware of the state of the environment, this can be explained very simply: there just was not enough information about the harmful effects of pollution for people to become aware of the dangers it posed to their health. And, if they were aware of the negative effects of pollution, it was difficult to do something about it as there were limitations on political participation in the USSR. With the introduction of glasnost in 1986, the link between environmental pollution and health (primarily on average life spans) suddenly became a key issue in the press. The accident at Chernobyl and the failure of official authorities to address its impact adequately as well as their failure to do something with other environmental disaster areas caused a public uproar. Whereas the early environmental protests were largely NIMBY-actions (not in my backyard-campaigns), in the republics they also became a symbol of the threat the current regime posed to the nation as such.

The media and political reform, making political participation less restricted, thus both facilitated a radical change in public perceptions of the environment and their readiness to actively take part in actions to save the environment. Disillusionment with the CPSU and a wealth of information about the past (the Stalinist purges in the 1930s) as well as the real state of the economy and the environment made people question dominant values of the Soviet system and eventually to reject this. When even Gorbachev distanced himself from the CPSU and its legacy banning the CPSU following his return from the Crimea in the aftermath of the coup in August 1991, the last bastion of communism crumbled and created a vacuum. People started searching for new values and new beliefs, and as a result - not only out of curiosity - many turned to the church for moral guidance and to the past for alternative ideas.

Several polls conducted in the latter half of the 1980s and the early 1990s show that the environment either ranked first or among the first issues on a list of most important issues/questions to be addressed, amongst the Soviet public. A study conducted by *VTsIOM* (the All-Union Centre for

⁸¹ See D.R. Kelley et al., The Economic Superpowers and the Environment, the United States, Soviet Union and Japan (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1976), pp. 134-135.

the Study of Public Opinion) in 66 towns and 34 rural centres in seven regions of the former USSR (West and East Siberia, North-West of the European part of the USSR, the Moscow oblast, Kazakhstan, the Urals and North Caucasus) produced the following results in response to the question about which issues were the most pressing in the USSR:

Table 8.1 Issues causing the most Concern among People

Issue	Percent
poor supplies of industrial goods and their poor quality	55
lack of and poor quality of food products	51
widespread use of bribes, unfair distribution of goods	49
low incomes, high prices	47
environmental pollution	47
housing problem	35
poor health care	31
dependence on civil servants to solve (all) questions of life	27
low level of training and education of the younger generation	24
inadequate concern about the elderly	22

Source: VTsIOM (1989)

When asked which single issue was the most pressing in the USSR the ranking of issues changed, placing the environment third, after the housing problem and low incomes/high prices:

Table 8.2 The most important Issue of Concern among People

Issue	Percent
Housing problems	17
Low incomes, high prices	16
Environmental pollution	14

Source: VTsIOM (1989)

With regard to the question of which problems must be solved immediately and which problems may be addressed later, the following pattern emerged:

Table 8.3 The Single Issue that needs to be solved most urgently

Issue	Percent
Environmental Pollution	87
Shortage and poor quality of food products	82
Housing problem	79
Poor supplies of industrial goods and their poor quality	74
Widespread use of bribes and unfair distribution of goods	73
Low incomes and high prices	67
Low level of education and upbringing of the young generation	63
Poor health care	63
Inadequate concern about the elderly	61
Dependence upon civil servants in the solving of (all) questions of life	56

Source: VTsIOM (1989)

The fact that the environment ranked highest could be explained, as

Общественное мнение находится под влиянием прессы, телевидения, радио, явлю идущих в рост движений в защиту окружающей среды, что, естественно, способствует процессу "взросления" экологического сознания населения⁸².

Possibly the most thorough survey of environmental attitudes at this time (1990) was conducted by Ozhegov and Nikonorova, who looked at such attitudes amongst Soviet youth. The survey was conducted with the support of the *Komsomol* committees over a period of two years (1988-89) in seven regions of the USSR (Moscow and the Moscow oblast, Astrakhan, Irkutsk and Tula oblasts, Magnitogorsk, the Chernivtsy oblast in Ukraine and the Karakalpak autonomous republic in Uzbekistan). All these areas are heavily polluted. Some 2,500 young people were surveyed and the results compared to results from a similar survey conducted in 1984 in Moscow, Irkutsk and Tula oblasts, Georgia, Latvia, Tadzhikistan and Ukraine with a sample of 2,800 young people⁸³. When asked what place the environment had in their lives, more than 86% answered 'important'. When broken down into very important and fairly important, the answers were 49.1% and 37.2% accordingly. Only 3.1% claimed that the state of the environment was unimportant to them and 2.5% - rather unimportant. 0.6% thought the environment was not at all important⁸⁴.

The survey also revealed that concern with the environment increased with age:

Table 8.4 Concern for the Environment and Age (in %)

Up to 17	17-19	20-22	23-25	26-28	Older than 28
46.9	51.1	55.0	58.1	63.9	70.2

Source: Ozhegov/Nikonorova (1990)

Furthermore, Ozhegov and Nikonorova found that those adults who consciously perceived of Nature as a part of their lives showed a particularly concern for the environment and first of all for the state of the environment in their own area⁸⁵.

The response was predominantly positive when asked whether or not information with regard to the protection of the environment had become more accessible during the last two-three years and whether their interest in environmental issues had increased during the same period. Some 53.4% and 66.6% respectively answered in the affirmative⁸⁶. A majority - 45.2 percent - answered that the

⁸² Ф. Согомонов, А. Толстых, - "О наших заботах", *Коммунист*, No. 9, 1989, с. 74-75.

⁸³ Ю.П. Ожегов, Е.В. Никонорова, - *Экологический импульс. Проблемы формирования экологической культуры молодежи* (Москва: Молодая Гвардия, 1990), с. 16.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

one single factor which had influenced their ecological consciousness was the real ecological state of the environment where they lived⁸⁷.

Another survey, conducted by the Department of Ideology of the CPU Central Committee⁸⁸ in various parts of Ukraine to test public opinion on the environment in the country. This survey was carried out shortly before the collapse of the USSR and motivated by the high importance given to improve the state of the environment by the CPU⁸⁹. Unfortunately, only chosen parts of the survey are referred to, thus making it difficult to get a full picture of public opinion and the environment. However, it seems clear that a large percent of the population is concerned with the dismal state of the Ukrainian environment. For instance, 64.9% of those interviewed supported a statement to the fact that 'we must sacrifice economic growth to preserve and protect the environment'. As many as 57.3 percent of the city respondents did not favour the construction of ecologically 'clean' enterprises needed to improve living standards, in their area. The percentage in rural areas was even higher - 69.0%. On the other hand a majority of the respondents expressed the view that the construction of housing, the provision of food, industrial goods, improvement in health care and public transport were issues that must be given priority. Stepiko explained this in the following way:

З одного боку, небажанням і неготовністю частини населення до копіткої роботи по зведенню до мінімуму шкідливого впливу людини на навколишнє середовище, вірою в можливість вирішити весь комплекс складних екологічних проблем "одним махом" (як поткляд - "епідемія" закриття ряду виробництв та підприємств Місмедбіопрому), з другого, прагненням перевести негативний вплив виробництва кудись далеко від себе⁹⁰.

Amongst the more interesting findings of the CPU survey is the data on nuclear power. 60.6% of the respondents were negative to the construction of more nuclear power stations in Ukraine. As many as 43.6% favoured the closure or reorientation of existing nuclear power stations. Attitudes on nuclear power practically did not differ amongst members and non-members of the CPU, nor amongst social or professional groupings. The survey also indicated that the CPU was losing authority due to its failure to adequately address environmental issues: 69.7% were not satisfied with the work of the party obkoms in this area. Similarly, dissatisfaction was expressed with local and regional party committees, although the percentage was slightly less - thus supporting the view that

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

⁸⁸ Група по вивченню громадської думки ідеологічного відділу та сектором екології соціально-економічного відділу ЦК КПУ.

⁸⁹ See Михайло Степико, Громадська думка про екологічні проблеми республіки, (1992), given to me by Verkhovna Rada's advisor on the environment, Viacheslav Oleshchenko.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

the CPSU was not only responsible for the environmental problems of Ukraine due to its economical and political policies, but also to be blamed for the failure to solve these problems.

A survey referred to in *Zelenyi Svit*⁹¹ and which was carried out in Kiev by a group of sociologists produced similar results: 41% were against construction of new and favoured the closure of existing nuclear power stations, 32% favoured a gradual close-down of existing nuclear power stations, 17% wanted to ban nuclear power in Ukraine. Only 3% were positive to the further development of nuclear power. Female respondents were generally more sceptical to nuclear power than were men.

As seen above, people expressed serious concern with the state of the environment in the USSR/Ukraine in the late 1980s/early 1990s. Consequently, if we assume that the large majority of the Soviet people were brought up to perceive of the environment as vast and inexhaustible, neither Inglehart's second assumption applies in the Soviet case. What is more, the Ukrainian Greens as well as a majority of the public do not criticise industrialism and technologies as such. The economic policies of the PZU come close to those of the social-democrats in the West, and it is thought that the market - with some restrictions - is better suited to address the environmental problems of the former USSR than a socialist economy. Many people also believe that only the market economy can cover the material needs of the population.

The 'Scarcity Hypothesis'

As regards Inglehart's third assumption, added later, that there is increased attention to securing basic needs, this assumption seems to hold true in the case of the former USSR in general and Ukraine in particular. Following the collapse of the USSR the economies of the former Soviet republics stagnated, as links between republics were severed and the struggle for economic and political reform started. The dismantling of the Soviet-type economic system met with fierce opposition, as did the introduction of the market economy. Moreover, demands from the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development that certain requirements be met prior to the allocation of loans and economic support, resulted in harsh monetary policy means, of which the general public had to bear the brunt. Soaring inflation rates, unemployment and reduction of social benefits made the physical/economic obstacles to survival more urgent than the environmental problems. When faced with the choice of whether to eat tomorrow or fall ill with cancer from radiated food products contaminated with pesticides and herbicides in the future, people chose immediate survival. Moreover, as the struggle to make ends meet take precedence, the fight for the environment becomes secondary.

⁹¹ *Зелений світ*, no. 7-8, 1991, c. 3.

Economic figures for 1993 and 1994 illustrate the problem: In 1993, industrial production dropped by close to 20 percent. It deteriorated by another 30 percent in 1994. High inflation quickly reduced the spending power of people's salaries and savings: during the last six months of 1993, inflation was 100 percent per month and in 1994, inflation reached 400 percent⁹². Faced with severe financial problems, taking actively part in protecting the environment simply became a luxury activity for most people.

A survey published in *Visti z Ukrainy* in June 1993⁹³ indicated that the environment was being pushed down on the list of urgent tasks to be addressed at the expense of the most elementary needs of physical survival, such as law and order, higher salaries and reduction in price increases and the provision of food products, thus reflecting the deteriorating economic situation and its impact on the general public in Ukraine. Whereas 73-79% of the respondents considered material issues to be urgent, the percent for ecology, housing, industrial goods, transport etc. was down to 40-60%. The survey, conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences also revealed that a majority of the respondents held the opinion that their living standards were dropping (In January/February 1993 75% said that their material conditions had deteriorated during 1992, 13 percent said they remained unchanged, whereas 6% thought they had improved). Figures for May 1993 showed little difference: 75% said they were worse off, 14% that their situation remained unchanged and 6% thought they were better off than before. Results for June indicated an overall deterioration in living standards, following the price increases of May: 83% now thought they were worse off, compared with 10% unchanged and 3% improved). Consequently 4/5 of the population were not satisfied with their financial situation.

However, a survey conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and the company *Sotsis-Gellup* in 1994⁹⁴ showed that there was still widespread concern for the environment: as many as 84.7% of the respondents held the view that 'every citizen in our country must be particularly aware of the environment and take actively part in solving environmental issues'. As far as nuclear power was concerned, though, people were less inclined to favour a closure of nuclear power stations than before. This could in the opinion of the newspaper be explained as a result of the 'catastrophic state of the energy transmitters and from the fact that people had understood that the closure of the Chernobyl nuclear power station would not solve the vast number of problems caused by the accident'.

⁹² See Nikolay Churilov and Tatyana Koshechikina, 'Public Attitudes in Ukraine', in Richard Smoke (ed.), *Perceptions of Security. Public Opinion and Expert Assessments in Europe's New Democracies* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 190.

⁹³ *Вісти з України*, no. 26, 24-30.6.1993, с. 3.

⁹⁴ *Голос України*, 2.2.1994, с. 8.

Although there are of course also political reasons for moving the environment down as an issue on the national agenda - in political circles in Ukraine there is widespread consensus that prior to addressing the environmental problems the country is faced with, Ukrainian statehood must be secured and a stable economy and a stable political system built - the worsening of the general public's material lot during economic reform seems to have affected their immediate priorities, shifting the emphasis from the environment to issues related to their financial situation.

All political parties in Ukraine are committed to the environment and this is fully understandable given that most of them emerged directly or indirectly as a result of the Chernobyl accident. *РУКН*, for instance, in its programme has a separate section on the environment. This section is very similar to the programme of the green movement. It calls for a state programme of measures for ecological safety and considers it essential that constitutional and other judicial guarantees be developed for the protection of a sound environment for the people of Ukraine. *РУКН* calls for a fundamental review of energy policy in the republic and demands that the construction of new units at existing nuclear stations be halted. Chernobyl must be dismantled and alternative, ecologically safe technologies for utilising energy sources should be introduced together with an expansion of a network of 'secondary energy sources'. The entire population of Ukraine should be medically examined to determine its state of health after the Chernobyl disaster. Long-term monitoring must be set up and foreign equipment obtained for this purpose. A programme of rehabilitation should be set up for the population suffering from the effects of the disaster. Full compensation should be given to people for losses caused by the disaster. Agriculture must be 'ecological', new nature conservation zones introduced, and finally, the regular publication on data should be initiated. Environmental education, states the programme, is essential⁹⁵.

A similar programme was developed by the Ukrainian Republican Party. Whereas all political parties are in favour of and supportive to the Green Movement, there is some scepticism as to the need for a Green Party. An official representative of the Republican Party, for instance, in an interview with the author claimed that there was no need for it as all parties have committed themselves to the environment. This view should be taken as a statement that the Green Party enjoys considerable support in the Ukrainian society and thus poses a threat to other parties⁹⁶. Unlike some other political parties, which hold the view that the environmental problems can only be properly addressed within an economically and politically stable framework, *PZU* emphasises that the building

⁹⁵ The Popular Movement in Ukraine for Restructuring - *РУКН: Program and Charter* (Kiev: 1989), pp. 25-26.

⁹⁶ Українська Республіканська Партія, - *Програмні документи* (Київ, 1991), see section *Щодо охорони навколишнього середовища*, с. 5-6. The same view was expressed by the leader of the URP secretariat at the time, O. Demydenko, in interview with the author, Kiev, August 1991.

of the Ukrainian state must take place within the limits set by Nature - i.e. economic development is acceptable only to the extent it is sustainable.

Assessment

To conclude, although a change of values has definitely taken place with regard to the environment in Ukraine/the former USSR, this change cannot be explained by the theory of post-material value change. As shown above, other factors, such as political developments within the USSR and the role of the media, facilitated the emergence of the Green Movement and public awareness of the environment, thus lending support to critics of the post-industrial value change theory. Thus it cannot be stressed often enough that models aiming to have universal application must be treated with the utmost care. Local differences are very important in explaining political phenomena in geographical areas whose political, economic and cultural/historical traditions differ and, as attempts at fitting Soviet reality into political/sociological models developed in the West for a Western political context, indicate, by applying such models one often risks overlooking factors crucial to a proper understanding and/or explanation of a phenomenon. So although the former USSR and the capitalist West both have environmental problems in common, the extent and seriousness of these problems differ substantially, and the factors which triggered the Green Movements into existence very different.

8.3 Different Political Context - Different Issues: The Ukrainian Greens' Struggle for Survival.

Having discarded Inglehart's theory of post-material value change as non-applicable to the case of the Ukrainian Greens, I will now proceed to discuss *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU*'s campaign for survival to illustrate how a different theoretical framework, different history, culture and values as well as a different political and economic context have influenced the agenda in Ukraine - making the Greens there look rather different from their West European counterparts. Yet, as regards core issues of the global green movement - e.g. decentralisation, diversity, democratisation, the Ukrainian Greens do not differ much from other Greens. The peculiarities of the national context have, in my view, not only by political analysts (e.g. Goldman), but also by Greens in other countries, been misread and misinterpreted.

8.3.1 The Greens and the Issue of Ukrainian Independence

In a paper presented at a conference on the Soviet Environment at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in early January 1990, Marshall Goldman argued that whereas the Greens in the West are 'internationalist', the Green Movements emerging in the Soviet Union were 'separatist' (nationalist) in character: 'inside the Soviet Union environmentalists tend to be separatists...In contrast, the environmental issue in most of the rest of the world tends to be anti-nationalistic, almost 'one world' in outlook'⁹⁷. Representatives of green circles in the West have also expressed views similar to those of Goldman. The Greens in the former Soviet Union, though, are not at all happy with being referred to as 'nationalists', and have on numerous occasions stated their commitment to the principle of 'thinking globally and acting locally'.

In an interview with the Ukrainian weekly *Molod Ukrainy* in February 1992 Vitalii Kononov, currently the leader of the Green Party of Ukraine, voiced his dissatisfaction with this situation, stating that 'the Greens in the West do not perceive of us in the way we would have liked them to. We are being accused of nationalism'⁹⁸.

Below I will demonstrate that the situation is much more complex than argued by Goldman and that, although the national question is an issue on which the Green Movements have been forced to make a stand, the motivation behind what will be referred to as 'national sentiments' amongst the Greens in Ukraine, is qualitatively different from nationalism in its negative sense (i.e. territorial expansion and the primacy of one ethnic group over another). It is argued that 'national sentiments' have been adopted by the Greens only in as far as they are required to stabilise and improve the state of the environment and that, like their sister movements/parties in the West, the (former) Soviet Greens, too, are deeply committed to the principles of the international green movement. The attitudes of *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU* on the national question are backed up by those reflected in a statement issued on nationalism by the Green Parties of Georgia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Estonia and the Armenian Green Movement - indicating that the Ukrainian Greens are in line with the view of the Greens in other parts of the (former) Soviet Union in their perceptions of this issue.

As seen in Chapter Three, *Zelenyi Svit* initially stated that it was a non-political movement whose only concern was with the environment. Rather than divide people along ideological lines, it would seek to unite people for a higher course, namely that of bringing an end to environmental destruction in Ukraine. However, the Greens were soon forced to realise that the environment and politics were inextricably linked with one another. As a result, they recognised that the Greens had to

⁹⁷ Marshall Goldman, 'Environmentalism and Nationalism: an unlikely Twist in an unlikely Direction', in John Massey Stewart (ed.): *The Soviet Environment: Problems, Policies, and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1-10.

⁹⁸ Интервью перед выборами: Зеленые проблемы для этого общества, *Молод України*, 28.2.1992 (n.p.).

take an active part in the political process to influence the decision-making process directly, in addition to putting pressure on the decision-makers through ad-hoc activities. It was therefore decided to set up a Green Party as the 'political wing' of *Zelenyi Svit*. The Green Party in its early days was also very cautious. Iurii Sheherbak claimed, as seen in Chapter Five, at one point even that the *PZU* should not be considered an opposition party in the traditional sense, as 'we cannot possibly talk about a confrontation with the Communist Party'. Besides, the Green Party initially allowed for dual membership (i.e. membership of both the CPSU and the Green Party).

To reiterate what has been said in previous chapters, the political implications of environmental reform were brought to the surface by the debate on economic reform. The Stalinist command-administrative economic system aimed at maximising economic growth. By stressing quantity (output), hardly any room was left for quality (innovation), thus facilitating the inefficient use of natural resources and, consequently, causing pollution. The centralist character of the Soviet economy further aggravated the environmental costs of industrial pollution.

As noted in Chapter One, most sources of pollution in the republics were controlled by ministries and departments in Moscow. These were not particularly concerned with the environmental aspect of their activities as fines for pollution were set ridiculously low and control of emissions was poor. Their major concern was to fulfil production targets set in their annual production plans. A failure to reach these targets had serious consequences through a loss of bonuses.

The Chernobyl accident on 26 April 1986 and the secrecy by which it was surrounded highlighted the need for more glasnost not only on the environment but in Soviet society as such. Besides, the authority of the Communist Party dropped considerably, due to its inability to take the measures required to minimize the impact of nuclear fall-out on the population and on the environment. The accident created a more general awareness in the Soviet population of the link between environmental pollution and health and it also demonstrated the helplessness of individual republics faced with environmental disasters inflicted upon them by Moscow through industrial and energy policies upon which they could exert little or no influence (see Chapter Two). Furthermore, they were given only restricted access to data (kept in Moscow) revealing the extent of the accident - in terms of contamination of the soil as well as in terms of the direct impact on people's health. Besides, it was difficult to uncover the full impact of the accident, given that information was gathered by a large number of bodies and not collated afterwards. In Ukraine, and also in other former Soviet republics, the question of environmental protection eventually became a question of physical survival not only of the people living there, but also of the land on which they lived and of the cultures that had been developed by these people on this land over the centuries. Terms like 'genocide' and 'national destruction' were used to describe the ultimate effect of Moscow's (non-

environmental) policies towards the republics. Ecological reform was linked to economic and political reform more generally, the argument being that a healthy environment was a prerequisite, accompanied by the restoration of national languages as official languages in each republic and the rebirth of national culture and alternative values, for national survival.

As seen in Chapter One, in Slav cultures the relationship between the nation (the ethnic group and the land on which it lives) and nature is closely linked, not only emotionally as reflected in their literatures and cultural traditions - but also etymologically. Above, we saw that the words in Russian for Motherland, People (nation) and Nature all have the same etymological root, namely rod, which means birth, origin: rodina, narod and priroda. The equivalent in the Ukrainian language is rid/rod, which can be translated as lineage, descent, origin. Ridni krai (one's native land, motherland), narid/narod, and priroda in Ukrainian correspond to the Russian words quoted above. In addition, the Ukrainian word for family/kin is rodina. This link finds its expression in the following quote by the Russian writer, Mikhail Prishvin: *liubit' rodinu, znachit berech' prirodu!* (To love the Motherland is to protect Nature!)⁹⁹.

Also the Orthodox Church emphasises, as seen in Chapter One, the close relationship between Man and Nature to a much greater extent than the Protestant and the Catholic churches do. The link between nation and environment, then, was not a result purely of the political situation in the Soviet Union. It was triggered off by it, but it is also deeply rooted in Slav culture. One should also remember that the first informal groups to emerge in the former Soviet Union were concerned with eco-cultural issues.

As shown in Chapter Three, the first informal groups to emerge in Ukraine were also concerned primarily with culture and the environment. It was argued that culture is very closely linked to the environment: A culture can be preserved and developed only within a healthy natural environment. If this environment is damaged, it will inevitably pose a threat not only to areas of cultural significance, but also to the people living in this environment. It is understandable, therefore, that groups to promote Ukrainian culture also took a keen interest in preserving the natural environment.

In the spring of 1987, *Tovarystvo Lev* (the Lion Society) was set up in Lviv. It described itself as an 'independent, community eco-cultural youth organisation'¹⁰⁰. The Ukrainian Culturological Club, which was formed in August 1987 in Kiev, was primarily concerned with those aspects of Ukrainian culture which also had a national aspect.¹⁰¹ Nuclear power and the environment were thus linked to the survival not only of Ukrainian culture but also to the survival of Ukraine as a nation¹⁰².

⁹⁹ Quoted in Ю.П. Ожергов, Е.В. Николорова, *ЭКОЛОГИЧЕСКИЙ ИМИДЖ* (Москва: Наука, 1991), с. 146.

¹⁰⁰ Taras Kuzio, *Restructuring from below. Informal Groups in Ukraine under Gorbachev, 1985-90* (London: Ukrainian Press Agency, 1990), p. 6..

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 5.

The nationalist movement (*RUKH*) was also concerned with the link between ecology and national survival. Mykhailo Horyn, the chairman of *RUKH*'s Secretariat, addressing the National Endowment for Democracy in Washington DC in 1990, expressed this concern in the following way: 'ecological consciousness became part of our national consciousness...demonstrations against nuclear power were part of the larger protest against the (Soviet) empire itself'¹⁰³. However, whereas independence for the nationalist movement was a goal in itself, for the Greens it was primarily, as will be seen below, a means by which to facilitate an improvement in the state of the environment in Ukraine.

The National Question and the Environment - The Green Perspective

The Greens, like virtually every political movement and party in Ukraine in the late 1980s/early 1990s, called for Ukrainian sovereignty or independence. Their stand on the national question was developed through a series of steps: first, they tried to identify the sources of environmental pollution in the USSR. Secondly, they examined the impact of this pollution, and thirdly, they offered a solution to the problem: namely economic and political independence.

Section Two of *Zelenyi Svit*'s programme (endorsed by the Inaugural Congress in 1989) addressed the causes of environmental degradation. It stated that the centralist character of the Soviet economic system as well as its stress on economic growth, facilitated a criminal exploitation, a plundering of nature by all-union and republican bureaucratic structures. The ecological crisis had reached catastrophic proportions and threatened not only Nature but also Ukraine with extinction - not only the territory of Ukraine, but Ukraine as a nation¹⁰⁴. In this connection, several references were made to the historic and eco-cultural legacy of Ukraine. *Zelenyi Svit* stated that its major priority is 'the native Ukraine, the Fatherland of the peoples who inhabited this ancient Slavonic land'. Nature - the steppes, forests and mountains - were described as 'the beauty and the pride of Ukraine'.

Shcherbak, when addressing *Zelenyi Svit*'s First Congress on 28 October 1989, spoke about the environmental destruction of Ukraine in very emotional terms:

Україна в зоні екологічної катастрофи! Колись квітучий і багатий край чарівної природи, оспіваної поколіннями наших предків. Україна впритул наблизилася до екологічного Апокаліпсису. Треба бити на сполох, треба збирати всі здорові

¹⁰³ Cited in Feshbach & Friendly Jr., *Ecocide in the USSR: Health and Nature under Siege* (London: Aurum Press, 1992), pp. 232-33.

¹⁰⁴ *Зелений Світ: Програма* (Київ, октябрь, 1989), section 2

силі нації на боротьбу за ВИЖИВАННЯ. Стратегія виживання
сьогодні – єдино можлива стратегія дій¹⁰⁵.

He finished his speech with the following words: 'Ukraina bula! Ye! Bude! Narod zhytyme. Na svoii zemli. Vichno'. (Ukraine was! Ukraine is! Ukraine will be! The people is alive. On its own Land. Forever)¹⁰⁶.

This link between Nation and Nature has been further developed on later occasions¹⁰⁷. The thrust of this issue is that when a nation no longer feels that it is the master of its own land the sense of responsibility for this land is lost, and the result is, amongst others, environmental degradation. Only by reimbuing people with a love for their historical-cultural heritage and for their native land is it possible to save not only the nation but also the physical territory it occupies.

The Greens thus acknowledged Ukraine's right of existence as a nation. Compared to nationalist forces which demanded outright independence, though, the Greens were initially more cautious when discussing this issue. In a speech recorded in *Zelenyi Svit* (the newspaper) of May 1990¹⁰⁸, Shcherbak drew a restrained conclusion from the view presented above, stating that the only way in which Ukraine could successfully fight for survival was to be given direct responsibility for its natural resources:

Думаю, що вже сьогодні доцільно було б прийняти, якщо не закон, то принаймні декларацію про суверенітет України в усіх його виявах – міжнародно-правовому, економічному, політичному, екологічному, фінансовому та інших. Не вирішивши проблему суверенного контролю з боку Української республіки над промисловими об'єктами, не можна й думати про якість покращення екологічної ситуації¹⁰⁹.

After the Declaration of Sovereignty was endorsed by the Ukrainian parliament in June 1990, Shcherbak discussed the implications of Ukrainian sovereignty in an interview with Ukrainian radio¹¹⁰. When asked whether the Greens now favoured self-rule, he responded that there could no longer be any doubt on this issue as there already existed a Ukrainian declaration of sovereignty (1990), expressing the wish of the Ukrainian people. However, he went on, at a session of the USSR

¹⁰⁵ Юрий Щербак. "Боже врятуй Україну". *Зелений світ*, no. 1, 1990, с. 2.

¹⁰⁶ Юрий Щербак. *Жити...* *Зелений світ*, 28.12.1989, с. 2.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Oleksandr Svirida in interview with Ukrainian Radio (K-3, 22:30, 19.1.1991) or see 'Суверенітет: Екологія и політика. Зелених за виживання', *Вісти з України*, 12.3.1991.

¹⁰⁸ Уроцисто проголосуємо створення Партії Зелених України. Манифест ПЗУ. *Зелений світ*, no. 2, 1990, с. 2.

¹⁰⁹ *Зелений світ*, квітень 1990., с. 2.

¹¹⁰ K-3, 1:30, 13.10.1990.

Supreme Soviet he had suggested the creation of a system of collective security in the military, ecology, and energy fields set up horizontally between sovereign states (former Soviet republics).

On numerous occasions representatives of *Zelenyi Svit* stressed that a prerequisite for improving the state of the environment in Ukraine was the right of control of its own resources. However, the extent and severity of environmental damage on the (former) Soviet territory was such that it could be addressed successfully only by all the republics together. Initially, at least, a loose federation of former Soviet republics was thus favoured by the leadership of *Zelenyi Svit* and the *PZU*.

As can be seen from the quotes above, officially the Greens went to great length to justify their position on Ukrainian sovereignty in terms of care of the environment. This, however, does not mean that *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU* were completely devoid of nationalist elements, using the green cause to advance other political goals. It is possible to identify two nationalist currents amongst the Greens: a Ukrainian one and a Russian one. The first manifested itself in the draft programme of the *PZU* developed by Oleksandr Sviryda from Kiev. The programme was discussed at the First Party Congress, but was eventually rejected. The second one was prevalent amongst the Crimean Greens, a substantial proportion of whom seek Crimean reunification with Russia. These elements were promptly excluded from *Zelenyi Svit*, though, and do not enjoy much support amongst its members. The central leadership of the *PZU* rejected the arguments used by these groupings, maintaining that the views of extremist activists were in no way representative of the general mood within the *PZU*.

However, nationalist sentiments within the Green Party created considerable problems for the party leadership in the sense that it has had to make an effort to achieve consensus on the national question. This question was debated at length during the First Party Congress in Kiev. A summary of the Congress, given to me by Kononov, suggests that 'a large majority' of the delegates from the Western oblasts of Ukraine (Ternopil, Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk) supported the idea of a federal Ukraine, acknowledging the substantial historical and cultural differences between the various parts of Ukraine. The Carpathian delegation even went so far as to state that Carpathia 'never belonged to Ukraine'. A conciliation committee headed by a USSR People's Deputy, Leontyi Sanduliak, was given the task of mediating between the 'nationalists' and the 'globalists'. In the end the following view prevailed: If one gives priority to national revival/rebirth, rather than ecology, then it is easier to join up with one of the already existing parties and senseless to create a new, green one...¹¹¹ Consequently the Green Party is not hostile to nationalist sentiments, but only in as far as these can be utilised in a positive manner to secure the protection, and in the long run also the improvement, of the natural (Ukrainian) environment.

Although a compromise was reached, the national question remained an issue of some dispute within the Party. A Conference on National Policies was therefore held shortly afterwards, in Kiev,

¹¹¹ Summary of First Party Congress, given to me by Kononov (n.d.).

on 20 January 1991. The Conference adopted a resolution which synthesises the national ethos with the survival of Man and indirectly therefore also the survival of the natural environment. The idea of Ukrainian federalism, favoured by the West Ukrainians, was also endorsed: 'the PZU holds the opinion that the stable future of Mankind and the renewal of a harmonious coexistence between Man and Nature are possible only provided that the uniqueness and the ecological value of any ethos of a nation, the preservation of all its diversity and the granting to each nation the right of independence, are recognised. It is possible to attain all this on the territory of the USSR only provided that authority is decentralised and a complex of democratic reforms implemented in the colonial empire. We think that the first and essential step in this direction is the building of a sovereign Ukraine's real statehood...the PZU favours the renewal of a future federate Ukraine, which will guarantee the harmonious development of all its regions'¹¹².

Justification: the Principle of Decentralisation

The Ukrainian Greens tried to justify their position on the national question to the international green community also by referring to traditional green concepts. They claimed that their views were in line with the green principles of decentralisation and diversity. Moreover, it was argued that, rather than violating the principle of 'think globally, act locally', this was exactly the principle they were following, by calling for Ukrainian independence.

For the Greens the (Ukrainian) nationalist movement - at least in its early stage, - 'is doubtless progressive' (bezumovno progresivnim) as it is aimed 'not against other nations, but against an empire, the last of its kind in our world...'¹¹³. The Soviet past is rejected as something horrid, forced upon the people of the USSR with devastating effects, particularly in terms of the environment: 'more than 70 years of totalitarian rule which was created on the ruins of the Russian empire - "the people's prison", and continuing its traditions, has put Ukraine on the verge of catastrophe. The ruin of the natural and cultural environment, which reached a peak with the Chernobyl accident, facilitated the popular democratic movement in the name of survival of Nature and Man'¹¹⁴. 'Therefore, the Greens cannot possibly not endorse this movement, although in developed, democratic societies similar coalitions are impossible'¹¹⁵. Moreover, the Ukrainian Greens were not against co-operation with Greens in other republics and between republics on environmental issues. PZU co-operates closely with the Green Parties of Georgia, Lithuania, Estonia and the Armenian

¹¹² Резолюция конференции ПЗУ з національної політики, 20.1.1991.

¹¹³ Summary from First Party Congress, given to me by Kononov (n.d.).

¹¹⁴ Програмні принципи ПЗУ, 15.7.1990.

¹¹⁵ Summary from First Congress given to me by Kononov.

Green Movement, and has on a number of occasions issued joint statements with them. Such a statement was made on the national question in September 1991. In it the Greens tried to conceptualise their stand on the national question in terms of ideology. 'The Greens' understanding of sovereignty follows naturally from the ethno-ecological principles of diversity, identity and the eco-system, expressing also the right to life and self-determination of ethnic groups and nations in order to carry out their ecological responsibility, to control their own destiny and to secure a green path of survival and development. The highest expression of sovereignty is state sovereignty and complete independence of the nation, this nation having its own historical community in the form of a culture, a language and a distinctive relationship with Nature and Life in the region it inhabits'¹¹⁶.

The declaration concluded that State sovereignty is an inalienable natural right and an expression of true human rights, to which the Greens are deeply committed. It is also the belief of the Greens that environmental problems affecting more than one republic can more effectively be addressed between national and state formations than between smaller units within an empire.

Independence and the Minority Issue

The Ukrainian Greens are deeply committed to the International Declaration of Human Rights and favour a democratic Ukraine, giving extensive rights to all ethnic groups living on its territory'¹¹⁷. It is made very clear that the majority must not harm any minority's rights. The *PZU* Manifesto emphasizes that the majority must not harm any minority's rights and also makes it known that the Greens are opposed to 'dividing Ukraine into separated societies, creating discord between those people who live on our land'. Rather, they seek to 'unite all peoples of Ukraine...behind the idea of the survival of Humanity, the nation, and ecological revival in the future'¹¹⁸.

Harmony is a key concept for the Greens, who eventually hope to create what they call an eco-solidaric community 'where the interests of the individual as well as the interests of every ethnic and social group and every nation unite with the highest (ultimate) laws of Nature'.¹¹⁹ To the extent that there is disagreement between political groups in society, consensus should be sought where possible.

¹¹⁶ Совместное заявление Партий Зеленых Грузии, Литвы, Украины, Эстонии и Движения Зеленых Армении, Тбилиси, сентябрь, 1991.

¹¹⁷ Суверенитет: Екологія і політика, *Вісти з України*, 12.3.1991, с. 1.

¹¹⁸ Манифест ПЗУ, in *Зелений світ*, май 1990, с. 2.

¹¹⁹ First Programme of Zelenyj Svit - endorsed by the First Congress in October 1989.

Independence and the Relationship to Neighbouring States

Ukraine has recognised all new independent states emerging from the former Soviet Union. It has also made it clear that it has no territorial claims either towards these countries or towards any of its neighbouring countries to the West. Ukraine favours extensive co-operation with the former Soviet republics - also on the environment - to make the transition towards capitalism smoother. However, there is considerable scepticism to the CIS, as this is thought to be a continuation of the former Soviet hegemony under Russian rule. Consequently, Ukraine has decided not to sign all agreements made within the framework of the CIS - including an agreement on environmental protection, signed on February 1992 - favouring agreements directly with the respective republics.

The Greens were against signing the CIS Agreement on the grounds that it allowed for Russian hegemony over the other former Soviet republics (see Chapter Five). The statute of the CIS, for instance, was labelled a 'diplomatic game of Russian politicians'¹²⁰ and was thus unacceptable. Ever since Ukraine joined, the PZU has called for the withdrawal of Ukraine from the CIS framework. The Ukrainian Greens have also expressed their anger towards Russia for claiming with some kind of natural right, that which belonged to the Soviet Union and which should be shared by all the former Soviet republics. There is also considerable fear of what has been referred to as 'Russian chauvinism'. In a statement issued to the Russian parliament in 1992 the Greens denounced the Russian claims to the Crimea as interference in internal Ukrainian affairs. They also rejected the Russian demand that it be given half the Black Sea Fleet with a right to operate it from the Ukrainian port of Sevastopol, as 'Ukraine has the right to possess everything which is located on its territory'¹²¹.

Although the Greens consider themselves to be 'anti-militant' (they have called for a withdrawal of troops from the Western parts of the republic on the grounds that neighbouring countries might perceive these as a threat. They have also called for the destruction of all nuclear weapons in Ukraine and a ban on the production of any kind of mass-destructive weapons) - they still favour a Ukrainian army, on the grounds that such an army will not pose a threat to anyone, given that Ukraine has not laid claims on any other state's territory¹²². Such an army is required to protect Ukraine from possible attacks from Russia and to deter Russia from ever considering such an attack. Given the tense relationship that has prevailed between Russia and Ukraine for some time, even Greens have

¹²⁰ UT-1, 21.1.1993, UTN, 16:00, 21:00, transcribed in Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe. *Ukraine Today* 21.1.1993. Fear that Ukraine will be turned into a Russian satellite in Заява ПЗУ: гиблина логіка дагомських домовленостей після додтягування України у вського-політичну орбіту Росії, *Радіо Україна*, 21:50, 7.7.1992.

¹²¹ Открытое письмо ПЗУ к Верховному Совету Российской Федерации (n.d.).

¹²² Заява ПЗУ в зв'язку з постійними спробами російської держави утвердити своє особливе право на армію колишнього СРСР та розв'язку засобами масової інформації анти-українську кампанію. See also Заявление ПЗУ, касающиеся оборонных вопросов (n.d.).

been sceptical about sending Ukrainian nuclear warheads to Russia to be dismantled. Russia is not considered to be reliable in its relationship to Ukraine.

Are the Ukrainian Greens Nationalist or Globalist in Outlook?

In sum, then - in so far as one chooses to refer to Green 'nationalism', this is a tolerant nationalism in that it allows for ethnic minorities and the granting of extensive rights to these minorities. It is a constructive nationalism in that it wants to rebuild what a 'dictatorial empire' has destroyed. It is anti-Russian only in as much as there is fear amongst Greens that Ukraine will develop into a Russian satellite¹²³.

The Greens' stand on Ukrainian independence was motivated primarily out of concern for the environment. Any nationalism that cannot be justified on Green grounds, is rejected by *Zelenyi Svit* as well as the *PZU* (against West-Ukrainian independence or Crimean re-unification with Russia). Territorial expansionism is denounced outright - on the occasion of the war in Yugoslavia, *PZU* issued a statement against Serb and Croat expansionism in Bosnia.

'Green nationalism' - deeply rooted in traditional Slav eco-culture - is as far as I can see perfectly compatible with a more global commitment. The fact that the *PZU* is a member of the European Greens and that they are working closely with Green Parties and groups in Western Europe, Canada and the United States gives further evidence of this commitment.

When referring to the (former) Soviet Greens as nationalists we should remember that the Western Greens emerged in stable democratic national states, which had existed for a long time and whose right of existence was never questioned. Greens in the West should acknowledge these differences. They should also realise that because the political context within which the (former) Soviet Greens operate is so different, views held by these 'Soviet Greens' may differ from their own, and yet be motivated by a commitment to the very same international green principles.

8.4 Green Potential as a Combination of Political Opportunity Structures and Mobilisation Potential - the Case of Ukraine.

A number of studies linking the popularity of the Greens in West European democracies with the degree to which existing political parties have incorporated environmental issues on their agenda (i.e. if existing political parties fail to take on such issues, then the Greens are more likely to score high on opinion polls and in elections, serving as an outlet for people who find that existing parties do not represent their views and interests) and on the political system within which they emerge. Greens

¹²³ Зоя ПЗУ: гибнша логіка лагомиських домовленостей веде до витягування України у віського-політичну орбіту Росії, *Радіо Україна*, 21:50, 7.7.1992.

have generally fared much better in multiple constituency elections (Germany, Sweden) than in single candidate constituencies elections (Britain).

In the Ukrainian case, the Greens tend to score high on public opinion polls. As seen in Chapter Four, in the first presumably free local elections in 1990, *Zelenyi Svit* had a number of people elected deputies to local and oblast soviets, whereas in the presidential elections of December 1991 and the parliamentary elections of March 1994 they fared less well (see Chapter Five). The Green vote in the June 1994 local elections dropped compared with the 1990 elections. In polls regarding attitudes to political parties and movements, the Greens still score high, though, and below I will try to explain this phenomenon using the political system of Ukraine and the general political and economic situation in Ukraine as a reference.

As seen above, a large proportion of the Ukrainian population is concerned with the state of the environment in their country. Not surprisingly, *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU* also score relatively high in polls conducted by Ukrainian newspapers since 1991. A survey conducted by the Institute of Philosophy attached to the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, for instance, found the following for January and July 1990¹²⁴.

Table 8.5: Party Preference, January 1990 (in %)

Party/Org.	January	July
RUKH	27	46
Greens	13	13
CPU	20	10
Nationalists	3	7

Source: *Ukrainian Reporter*, vol. 1, no. 2, 1991, p. 3.

Table 8.6: Party Preference, 1990 (in %)

Party/Org.	January	February	June	November
RUKH	23.5	29.0	45.8	53.6
Zelenyi Svit/Green Party	13.4	15.3	13.3	12.5
CPU	19.5	18.4	10.1	10.0
Komsomol	4.1	4.7	1.3	0.4
Republican Party	1.0	0.9	2.4	1.3
Democratic Platform of CPSU			6.3	1.1
Ukrainian Student Society				2.8
Democratic Party of Ukraine				1.0
Others	17.5	17.2	11.9	2.3
Person more important than party	19.9	14.2	8.9	15.0

Source: *Zelenyi Svit*, no. 7-8, 1991, p. 1.

¹²⁴ *Ukrainian Reporter*, vol. 1, no. 2, 1991, p. 3.

As seen from the table, whereas the support of other political parties was volatile, Green support seemed to have stabilised around 10-13%. A sociological survey conducted in Kiev in October 1991 showed similar results:

Table 8.7: Party Preference, 1991 (in %)

Party	%
CPU	10.5
Green Party	10.3
PDVU	4.4
RUKH	4.2
Christian Dem. Party	1.2
Constitutional Democratic par.	0.9
Social-dem. party	0.9
National-dem. party	0.9
United social-dem. party	0.5
Dem. farmer's party	0.5

Source: *Zelenyi Svit*, no. 16, 1991, p.3

This survey, however, also revealed that a large proportion of the people surveyed, would not take part in elections were they to be held in the near future (20.3%). An equally large group (36.7%) had not yet decided if they would take part were such elections to be held. Consequently, only around 50% of those polled would take part in elections, and of these, only 34.3% held a particular party preference. This could be explained, as indicated in Chapter Four, by the fact that the notion of 'political party' in Ukraine as well as in other parts of the former USSR carried a negative connotation. The CPSU was not a party in the West European sense, but rather an organisation regulating every sphere of a person's life. The CPSU had discredited itself by failing to address a series of important issues in the late 1980s/early 1990s and the low percent in support of CPU (before it was banned) can be taken as an indication of public dissatisfaction with the Communists.

Not only ambivalent feelings towards political parties, but also poor knowledge of what each of these parties actually stood for, can be attributed to the low percentage of support they scored in polls and surveys at this time. A poll published in *Zelenyi Svit* in January 1992¹²⁵ clearly gave an indication of this poor state of affairs:

¹²⁵ *Зелений світ*, no. 1, 1992, с. 3.

Table 8.8: Party Preference, January 1992 (in %)

Party/Org.	Don't know	Actively support	Support	Positive towards	Don't support	Negative towards	Rating
Zel. Svit	32.3	14.8	27.3	17.1	5.9	2.6	0.06
RUKH	17.8	12.3	21.3	20.4	16.7	11.4	-0.5
SUS	39.6	10.7	14.7	21.5	8.9	4.6	-0.11
Green party	44.8	7.0	14.9	20.8	9.1	3.4	-0.14
SNUM	38.1	8.4	14.4	21.1	11.8	6.3	-0.16
PDVU	45.4	5.4	14.5	23.1	8.0	3.6	-0.19
DPU	44.4	3.4	11.6	25.4	11.7	3.5	-0.23
UKhDP	50.2	4.0	9.0	13.3	10.4	3.3	-0.24
URP	37.8	2.9	11.4	25.4	14.8	7.6	-0.25
UNDP	47.8	2.3	10.4	24.7	11.7	3.1	-0.26
NPU	45.2	3.0	10.0	25.0	12.3	4.6	-0.26
LKSM	37.9	4.9	11.2	21.2	15.2	9.7	-0.26
SelDPU	52.3	3.2	8.0	23.2	10.6	4.3	-0.31
OSDPU	57.1	2.1	5.0	22.2	10.3	3.4	-0.32
LDPU	54.9	1.9	5.1	23.4	11.0	3.8	-0.32
UNP	52.7	2.4	5.2	23.3	11.3	5.2	-0.32
Kolitsia KPU	23.7	2.3	8.1	23.4	23.6	19.0	-0.37

Source: *Zelenyi svit*, no. 1, 1992, p. 3.

Although about a third of those polled appeared to have no knowledge of *Zelenyi Svit*, the movement scored higher than the other parties and movements for support and lower than the others on disapproval. Compared with the latter, relatively more people had heard about *Zelenyi Svit* than of the other political parties and movements - only *RUKH* and the Communist Party scored higher on this variable, thus clearly indicating that the general public was aware of environmental issues and *Zelenyi Svit* as being an actor in the struggle to improve the state of the environment. The fact that fewer people had heard about the Green Party, although, as mentioned in Chapter Four, it was the third political party to be registered in Ukraine after the CPSU agreed to reformulate Article Six of the Soviet Constitution in February 1990 (thus allowing for other political parties to be set up and compete with the CPSU), can be explained by the fact that the Green Party tried to somewhat distance itself from campaigning and direct action and focus on influencing decision makers through political channels. Another reason may be that the local units of the *PZU*, except for those in West Ukraine, one of the party's strongholds apart from Kiev, were and still are generally weak, thus not enabling them to attract as much public attention as they may wish at local level. Besides, as indicated by a poll referred to in *Ukraine Today*¹²⁶, knowledge about political parties seems to be poor in the districts - in Nikolaev, for instance, about 60% of the respondents to a sociological survey did not know which political parties operated in their city. A similar survey conducted almost a year

¹²⁶ *Ukraine Today*, 23.3.1993, p. 6.

before¹²⁷ showed that those respondents who had heard about the political parties in Ukraine (a quarter did not know most of these) found it difficult to assess them and also decide whether or not they trusted these parties. The survey, moreover, revealed that the public knew more about the non-political movements than about the political parties, thus explaining why *Zelenyi Svit* generally scores higher in surveys than *PZU*.

To summarise then, the public has limited knowledge about the political movements and parties in Ukraine for reasons referred to above and for other reasons, to which we will return below. Relatively speaking, though, more people have heard about the Greens than about most other movements and parties, and a higher proportion of those polled are more sympathetic to the Greens than to the others. The question thus remains as follows: who are these 'Green sympathisers'? Until recently, we had limited knowledge about this, as only small surveys had been conducted with this in mind. Some information appeared on the pages of *Zelenyi Svit*, some data was gathered by the CPU (cf. survey referred to above). In 1993 a survey on public opinion in the former USSR (Russia, Ukraine) and East Europe (Hungary, Czech Republic) was conducted by the Politics Department of Glasgow University. SOCIS (Kiev) carried out the actual survey in Ukraine. Professor Bill Miller, who, together with Professor Stephen White and Paul Heywood were responsible for this project, cross-tabulated the various variables with those who expressed a preference for the Greens in the survey and allowed me to use the data for this thesis. The results of this survey, and of a similar survey conducted amongst Ukrainian MPs in late 1994, combined with the data referred to above, thus form the basis for my attempt to establish who the Green supporters are.

8.4.1 The Green Electorate in the West

A number of studies conducted by Western scholars have tried to establish who the Green electorate is and what are the differences and similarities between different West European countries. Thus, Wilhelm Bürklin (1987) found that the Green electorate in (West) Germany is:

1. Young (about 50% of the Green electorate is below 35 years of age, compared with a quarter of the electorate of traditional parties) and non-established.
2. Located within the better educated of the middle and upper middle class.
3. To the left of centre in the political landscape (a large majority of roughly 75% report a social-democratic partisan identification and another 15-20% identify with the Christian Democrats and Liberals).
4. Male (there is more Green support from the male than from the female electorate).
5. Unable to identify the Green party on a traditional left to right continuum, as are also the Greens themselves.
6. Have post-materialist value orientations.

¹²⁷ *Зелений світ*, no. 16, 1991, c. 3.

Bürklin does, however, see the Green vote as primarily a 'transient protest vote, basically by the new educated classes'¹²⁸. Flanagan (1982, 1987) argues that the typical green voter belongs to 'the younger generation of highly educated middle class respondents, whose families have traditionally supported the Right for economic reasons...(who) may now be induced to voting Left as a result of their socialisation into libertarian-postmaterialist values'. Betz (1990), on the other hand, disagrees with Flanagan on what motivates the Green vote. He questions the assumption that educational attainment is strongly correlated with affluence and thus social background and position, and vice versa, hypothesising that highly educated young West Germans support the Greens more for economic reasons than for a commitment to post-materialist values. To back up his view, he presents data according to which, in 1986 more than half of the Green electorate was without gainful employment. Abandoning the commonly held view that the Green electorate is a homogenous bloc (the new middle class) Betz identifies three major groups of green voters, which he classifies as follows:

1. Highly educated men and women between 31 and 38 who live in material security.
2. Young men/women with middle-level degrees, but materially insecure.
3. Highly educated young men/women who are between 18 and 30 and whose material circumstances are bleak¹²⁹.

Betz is supported by Alber (1989), who has come up with similar results: 'the bulk of green party support comes from students and other groups outside the labour force. In Germany, about two thirds of the green followers are not economically active. Roughly one third are students, almost another third are either unemployed or do not belong to the labour force...the majority of green party supporters may thus be characterised as groups living in social distance to the routine of everyday economic life'¹³⁰. The percent of unemployed academics voting Green turned out to be seven times higher than for the population as such. Alber also found that the propensity to vote green diminishes with increasing age. With regard to issues, two basic demands motivated the Green vote: equality of opportunity and quality of life. Poguntke's (1989) work reveals similar results as far as motivation is concerned: 'younger age groups, and particularly those with higher education and a new middle class background amongst them have been socialised in a way which makes them emphasise social and self-actualisation needs - like less impersonal society, participation at the workplace and in political

¹²⁸ Wilhelm Bürklin, 'Governing Left Parties frustrating the Radical Non-established Left: the Rise and Inevitable Decline of the Greens', *European Sociological Review*, vol. 3, no. 2, September 1987, p. 109.

¹²⁹ Hans-Georg Betz, 'Value Change and Post-Materialist Politics - the Case of West-Germany', *Comparative Political Studies*, July 1990, p. 245.

¹³⁰ Jens Alber, 'Modernization, cleavage structures, and the rise of Green Parties and Lists in Europe', in Ferdinand Müller-Rommel (ed.), *New Politics in Western Europe - the Rise and Success of Green Parties and Alternative Lists* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), p.124.

decision-making, freedom of expression, beautiful environment and the appreciation of creativity¹³¹. Jahn (1991) found that most green voters lived in big cities¹³².

8.4.2 The Green Electorate in Ukraine

As has already been established, the Ukrainian Greens cannot be labelled a 'post-materialist phenomenon' with the same ease as this category has been applied to the West European Greens. It thus follows that the potential Green electorate in Ukraine may differ from capitalist countries in the West. Although the survey conducted by Glasgow University's Politics Department aimed at studying political opinions more generally, the respondents favourable to the Greens formed a big enough sample to use as a basis for cross-tabulation.

In the case of party support, the Greens scored high in this survey as they had done in previous Ukrainian surveys:

Table 8.9: Party Preference, 1993 (in %)

Party	%	N=
None	30.7	304
RUKH	9.4	93
Comm.party	5.5	54
Democratic party	4.6	45
Greens	2.6	26
Party of Justice	2.5	25
Socialist party	2.4	24
Republican party	1.8	18
Party of Labour	1.4	13
People's Party	1.3	13
Peasant's Party	1.3	12
Party of Crimean Tartars	1.2	12
Peasant Democratic Party	1.2	12
Constitutional Republican Party	1.1	11
Liberal party	0.7	7
Party of Democratic Revival	0.4	4
Party of National Democrats	0.4	4
Party of Free Peasants	0.3	3
Free Beer Party	0.3	3
Ukr. Christian Party	0.3	3
Social-Democratic Party	0.2	2
Liberal Democratic Party	0.2	2
Constitutional Dem. Party	0.2	2
National Conservative Party	0.1	1
Party of Solidarity	0.1	1
Hromadskyi kongres	0.1	1

¹³¹ Poguntke in Ferdinand Müller-Rommel (1989), p. 177.

¹³² Detlef Jahn, *New Politics and the Greens in Sweden and Germany: Resource Dependence and New Social Cleavages* (Paderborn: University of Paderborn, 1991).

Workers' Congress	0.1	1
Other	1.0	10
Vote for candidate rather than party	5.4	54
Dont' know	23.2	230
Column total	100 (%)	989

Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993)

However, party support in Ukraine remains small and this holds true even for the biggest political parties like *RUKH* and the Communist Party. (It seems to be the case that the more political parties that emerge, the more support for political parties in general, dwindles - with the exception of the 5-6 biggest parties, amongst which is the Green Party, and whose support has dropped since they appeared in 1990, but now seems to be in the process of stabilising).

With regard to geographical area, the Greens has the highest support in the Kiev, Western and Central areas, whereas support is lower in the North, East and the South:

Table 8.10: Geographical Support for the Greens (in %)

	West	Kiev	North	Central	South	East	Crimea	Row Total
Favour.	46	47	22	39	25	36	38	356 (36)
Neither	52	47	74	55	67	48	54	543 (55)
Unfav.	2	6	4	6	8	17	8	90 (9)
Col.Tot.	167 (17)	42 (4)	82 (8)	139 (14)	139 (14)	347 (35)	74 (7)	989 (100)

Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993)

As regards sex, there is little difference between men and women favouring the Greens:

Table 8.11: Green Support by Gender (in %)

	Male	Female	Row Total
Favourable	37	35	356 (36)
Neither	54	56	543 (55)
Unfavourable	9	9	90 (9)
Column Total	458 (46)	531 (54)	989 (100)

Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993)

Age-wise, though, the highest level of support for the Greens was expressed by people in their 40s and 50s. This is in line with what I found when talking with and attending meetings in the Green Movement and Green Party in Ukraine. One explanation is that the generation currently in its 40s experienced the thaw under Khrushchev and thus was more eager to participate in politics once this became possible. Another explanation frequently referred to by Greens themselves is that whereas younger people are busy establishing themselves, slightly older people tend to have grown up

children, a job and more sparetime for taking part in politics. This explanation remains feasible although participation has generally fallen as inflation and financial hardship has increased.

Table 8.12: Green Support by Age (in %)

	20s	30s	40s	50s	60s	Row Total
Favour.	30	37	43	45	30	355 (36)
Neither	56	55	48	49	61	539 (55)
Unfavour.	14	8	10	6	9	90 (9)
Col.Total	126 (13)	220 (22)	185 (19)	149 (15)	305 (31)	984 (100)

Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993)

People favourable to the Greens in Ukraine, as in Western Europe, tend to come from urban areas. Support in rural areas is considerably lower:

Table 8.13: Green Support in Rural/Urban Areas (in %)

	City	Town	Rural	Row Total
Favour.	39	37	34	356 (36)
Neither	48	58	58	543 (55)
Unfavour.	13	5	9	90 (9)
Col. Total	269 (27)	255 (26)	465 (47)	989 (100)

Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993)

As for class identification, there was much higher support for the Greens amongst intellectuals than was the case amongst workers and farmers:

Table 8.14: Green Support by Profession (in %)

	Workers	Farmers	Intel-lectuals	Managers	Business people	Others	DK	Row Total
Favour.	34	25	48	56	25	35	25	356 (36)
Neither	55	69	45	32	75	56	65	543 (55)
Unfav.	10	7	8	12		10	10	90 (9)
Col. Tot.	513 (52)	142 (14)	199 (20)	39 (4)	17 (2)	51 (5)	28 (3)	989 (100)

Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993).

These results coincide with data for Western Europe, where the Green electorate is predominantly intellectuals/people with a higher education. As for unemployment, though, as pointed out, most of those active in the Green movement are highly educated and employed. Although I do not have any data on this variable and attitude towards the Greens, the fact that most of their supporters seem to be in their late 30s, 40s and 50s indicates that also those supporting the

Greens are in employment. With regard to their attitude to unemployment, a high proportion of those positive towards the Greens hold the opinion that unemployment is not necessarily such a bad thing:

Table 8.15: Green Support and Attitude towards Unemployment (in %)

	Unacceptable	Unavoidable	Necessary	DK	Row Total
Favourable	31	67	55	62	211 (54)
Neither	47	26	38		136 (35)
Unfavourable	22	8	7	38	46 (12)
Col.Total	98 (25)	149 (38)	137 (35)	10 (3)	393 (100)

Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993)

Although I do not know whether the respondents holding the opinion that unemployment is necessary are talking about structural or long-term unemployment, this result is consistent with the respondents' attitude towards the market economy. Whereas the majority of those to the left in the Ukrainian political landscape tend to be against the market, a majority of those favouring the Greens came out in favour of the market economy:

Table 8.16: Green Support and Attitude towards the Market Economy (in %)

	Right	Wrong	DK	Row Total
Favourable	49	23	23	356 (36)
Neither	45	63	69	543 (55)
Unfavourable	6	15	8	90 (9)
Col. Total	498 (50)	291 (29)	201 (20)	989 (100)

Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993)

The fact that most supporters of the Greens favour the market economy is perhaps the clearest evidence that it would be inappropriate to label the Ukrainian Greens a 'post-materialist' phenomenon. However, one should be careful not to interpret such a result to the effect that the electorate of the Greens is 'materialistic'. As seen above, the Greens hold the view that the socialist command-administrative system was inherently anti-environmental. Thus, the market economy is to the Greens a means of breaking the structures of the old system and generally a better system for curtailing environmental problems, although they are perfectly aware that also the market has its weaknesses with regard to the environment. As seen from the theoretical framework of the Green Movement, its thinking on the environment is largely ecocentric. Given the serious environmental problems of Ukraine and the importance of exerting direct influence on the drafting of legislation and passing of decisions likely to effect the environment as these are being made, the Greens cannot afford not to be pragmatic. To call for some model which is beyond both capitalism and socialism would not go well down with the electorate and may therefore prove more harmful to the environment than a pragmatic attitude.

The Green Party has defined itself as 'to the left of the centre'. Results from the survey conducted in December 1993 seem to confirm that this is also how the Green supporters view the party:

Table 8.17: Green Support and Placement of Greens on Left-Right Scale (in %)

	Left	Centre	Right	Don't know	Row Total
Favourable	56	49	38	25	356 (36)
Neither	35	40	51	67	543 (55)
Unfavourable	9	11	11	8	90 (9)
Col.Total	104 (11)	286 (29)	70 (7)	529 (53)	989 (100)

Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993)

When asked the same question in the autumn of 1994, a majority of MPs favourable to the Greens classified *PZU* as a centre or a rightist party. This may partially be a result of a change in policy from the left of centre towards the centre in the months between the two surveys. It is probably also a result of the composition of parliament. Given that most MPs represent either the left or sympathise with the left, they are less likely to classify the Greens as a party of the left:

Table 8.18: Classification of Greens on Left-Right Scale by Ukr. Mps (in %)

	Left	Centre	Right	Don't know	Row Total
Favourable	29	61	76	100	211 (54)
Neither	51	29	24		136 (35)
Unfavourable	20	10			46 (12)
Col.Total	122 (31)	209 (53)	59 (15)		393 (100)

Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1994)

When asked whether or not they believe in the ideals of communism a relatively large proportion of those favourable to the Greens answered in the affirmative, thus confirming a commitment to social justice.

Table 8.19: Green Support and Attitudes towards Communism (in %)

	Yes	No	Don't know	Row Total
Favourable	36	39	18	356 (36)
Neither	51	53	75	543 (55)
Unfavourable	13	9	7	90 (9)
Col. Total	141 (14)	732 (74)	117 (12)	989 (100)

Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993)

It is interesting to note that the proportion of the Green electorate which did (and did not) believe in Communism has not changed much following the collapse of the USSR. When asked if they did believe in communism the following result emerged:

Table 8.20: Green Support and Belief in Communism (in %)

	Yes	No	Don't know	Row Total
Favourable	36	40	15	356 (36)
Neither	54	52	77	543 (55)
Unfavourable	11	8	8	90 (9)
Col. Total	457 (46)	453 (46)	79 (8)	989 (100)

Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993)

Somewhat surprisingly, when asked what was the worst feature of Communism, pollution came long down on the list amongst those who were favourable to the Greens:

Table 8.21: Green Support and Worst Feature of Communism

	Pollution	Bureau- cracy	Stagnation	Corruption	Oppressed Rights	None	Don't know	Row Total
Favour.	30	41	60	26	43	24	26	356 (36)
Neither	58	54	33	58	52	65	55	543 (55)
Unfav.	11	5	7	16	5	11	19	90 (9)
Col.Tot.	104 (11)	275 (28)	63 (6)	162 (16)	206 (21)	137 (14)	43 (4)	989 (100)

Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993)

As for the best feature of Communism those favourable to the Greens scored low on all accounts, although somewhat higher for 'no ethnic conflict' and 'job security'. The fact that 'no ethnic conflict' is mentioned as a good feature of Communism by people supporting the Greens, reflects the Party and Movement's strong views on the national question: As seen above, while favouring Ukrainian independence, the Greens were wary of the (possible) negative aspects of independence, such as limited rights of minorities and aspirations towards the territory of other former Soviet republics.

Table 8.22: Green Support and Best Feature of Communism (in %)

	Equality	No ethnic conflict	Stable economy	Law and order	Job security	None	Don't know	Row Total
Favour.	31	42	31	19	37	62	21	356 (36)
Neither	63	48	58	72	54	36	65	543 (55)
Unfav.	6	10	11	10	9	2	14	90 (9)
Col.Tot.	73 (7)	182 (18)	310 (31)	77 (8)	246 (25)	81 (8)	20 (2)	989 (100)

Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993)

When asked in polls which time was the best for the country, a majority of respondents tended to answer the Brezhnev era. It is therefore interesting to note that those favourable to the Greens scored highest on the 'now'-category:

Table 8.23: Green Support and Best Soviet Era (in %)

	Tsars	Stalin	Brezhnev	Gorbachev	New	Don't know	Row Total
Favour.	45	10	33	36	64	34	356 (36)
Neither	48	54	57	55	36	62	543 (55)
Unfav.	8	36	10	9		4	90 (9)
Col.Tot.	67 (7)	34 (3)	678 (69)	21 (2)	94 (9)	106 (11)	989 (100)

Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993)

Although this survey was conducted in December 1993 and as the economic situation in Ukraine has worsened and nostalgia for the stability of the past has increased, these results are still significant. Combined with the data on market economy and unemployment they give an indication that the Green support group favours economic and political change and seem to accept the hardship by which they are accompanied, as a better alternative to improving the environment than returning to the past. Those supporting the Greens are also very interested in politics, as the tables below indicate:

Table 8.24: Green Support and Interest in Politics (in %)

	Very interested	Quite interested	A little interested	Not at all interested	Don't know	Row Total
Favour.	60	46	32	20	51	356 (36)
Neither	34	45	59	73	39	543 (55)
Unfav.	6	10	10	7	11	90 (9)
Col.Tot.	84 (9)	249 (25)	504 (51)	147 (15)	5 (1)	989 (100)

Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993)

Table 8.25: Green Support and Participation in Political Debate (in %)

	Very often	Quite often	Occasionally	Not at all	Don't know	Row Total
Favour.	57	45	33	22		356 (36)
Neither	31	45	58	70	100	543 (55)
Unfav.	12	10	10	8		90 (9)
Col.Tot.	91 (9)	218 (22)	517 (52)	161 (16)		989 (100)

Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993)

To summarise, then, the Green supporters in Ukraine are predominantly intellectuals in their late 30s, 40s and 50s, they live in the West of Ukraine or in Kiev, in cities and towns rather than in the countryside, they are positive towards the market economy, highly interested in politics and think the present period is better than any other period since tsarism. Although the data above must be treated with care, given that we do not have similar surveys to compare it with for trends over a period of time, it serves as a useful starting point for such studies in the future and allows us to conclude that the Green Party in Ukraine as is the case in Western Europe seems to be a party for the intellectuals and the city dwellers. Unlike what has been done in the West, though, the Green Party in Ukraine

cannot be labelled 'post-materialist', but emerged rather as a response to the very serious state the Ukrainian environment was in following the Chernobyl accident in 1986 and the failure of the existing political system to successfully address this issue through established channels. However, the Greens were part of a larger protest wave, which culminated with the collapse of the Soviet Union and following Ukrainian independence, became one of several alternatives to the legacy of the Soviet past. And although the Greens favour sustainable development, they want to achieve this by following a centrist/left of centre policy, not calling for a complete overhaul of the emerging political system, but rather for modifications to make the system more democratic. In doing so, though, they are not alone, but in line with demands made by most of the other political parties of the so-called 'democratic opposition'.

8.4.3 Political Opportunity Structures

This takes us to the next issue of this section, namely that of political opportunity structures - or access to the political arena. A number of studies by sociologists and political scientists in the West have used the political system as a variable to explain why the Greens are either radical or moderate in single countries. Jahn (1991), for instance, has argued that whereas in Germany, where the Communist Party was banned following the establishment of East Germany, the radical left had no outlet for their political aspirations and therefore channelled their efforts through the Green Party, once this was established, thus radicalising it considerably, in Sweden where access was easier and where already established political parties incorporated the environment in their programmes as an issue, the Greens were less radical and had less support among the Swedish people.

In the case of the Ukrainian Greens, as seen above, they have had relatively high and stable support in the population since 1990. In the local elections of 1990, the Greens did not do too badly (cf. Chapters Three and Four) and gained deputies in areas where there were serious environmental problems and where the Greens had actively (and successfully) mounted campaigns to solve these problems. This gave reason for the leadership of the *PZU* to be optimistic before the elections to the Ukrainian parliament in March 1994. The leader of the Green Party, Vitalii Kononov, conducted an expensive and original campaign in Kiev, printing leaflets, posters and even small calendars carrying his photo on the front. A rock concert, for which entrance was free, was also organised. Several people from the leadership of the *PZU* balloted in Kiev and numerous candidates were produced elsewhere to contest the elections. The result, however, was as seen in Chapter Four, dismal.

When asked why the Green Party fared so badly, the Greens blamed the electoral law. Although as many as up to 30 people would contest seats in the parliament in one single constituency, only one person was elected from each electoral district. If one single candidate gained more than 50% of the

votes cast (a minimum of 50% of those on the election lists had to vote for the election to be declared valid), he/she would automatically be elected. Should none of the candidates win an outright majority, the two candidates with the most votes would go to a second round, where the person with the most votes would be elected, again provided that 50% of the electorate turned up for the elections.

Iryna Haniukova of *PZU* (Kiev) who stood in these elections herself, argued that the large number of candidates in the capital's constituencies clearly made it more difficult for a candidate to be elected, as more money would have to be spent on the election campaign to be heard and seen - money that neither the Green Party nor most of the other political parties had. Unlike the case in some West European countries, for instance West Germany, the political parties contesting elections do not receive any funding for the campaign from the state. Moreover, during the campaign there was a lot of dirty campaigning going on; Haniukova claimed that in her constituency the deputy attorney who also stood for elections had paid campaigners to remove the materials of the other candidates from peoples' mail boxes once these had been distributed.

Although the international observers monitoring the March 1994 elections and the second round which took place in early April, claimed that the elections were predominantly democratic and fair, some violations of the electoral law did take place. As an unofficial election observer in Irshava I myself registered several violations of the law, such as multiple voting (i.e. voting for the whole family, not only for oneself), failure to cross people out of the electorate list once the ballot had been handed out and repeated voting by the same person. As seen in Chapter Five, Karavanska balloted against Ustich of the regional administration. When confronted with facts, the head of the election committee made no attempt at denying that violations did take place. He willingly admitted that everything was not done by the book, but that it took a long time to change people's habits and that everyone knew each other anyway, so that there was no need to cross out people's names from the lists once they had voted or to deny one member of a family the right to vote for the entire family. Only in Kiev and in bigger cities where this would be impossible would the new election law be relevant, he said.

It seems obvious that a party of *PZU*'s size, and for that matter most of the Ukrainian parties, as they are all very small by West European standards, do not benefit from the present electoral law (see Chapter Five). All these parties would fare better if elections were proportional. What is more, as no state subsidies are given to those political parties or candidates contesting the elections and as it is illegal for Ukrainian political parties to receive any kind of funding from abroad, parties like *RUKH* and the block of socialists/communists who enjoy high support and who are able to raise money for their campaign with relative ease, or who are so well-known that they do not need to conduct expensive election campaigns for people to become familiar with them, the smaller parties have no

other options but to either conduct amateurish campaigns or to risk breaking their necks on borrowing money in the hope that this will allow them to conduct a campaign successfully. Rudenko, who stood for the Green Party in Kiev, told me that she had to borrow money for her campaign and still she could only afford photocopying an A5-size machine typed leaflet summarising her election platform and with a drawing of her face. Being a teacher she later met former pupils of her constituency who were unaware of her efforts as the leaflets had either been removed from their mail boxes or they did not recognise her from the drawing. Others also ran up personal debts and were worried about how to pay them back.

PZU did get some money for its election campaign from local businesses and from *Chervona Ruta*, a travel agent operating a cruise ship on the Dniepr River and the Black Sea serving foreign tourists. However, although Kononov spent a lot of money on his campaign he failed to be elected. The survey conducted in Ukraine in December 1993 indicate that a combination of policy and person is decisive when choosing for whom to vote:

Table 8.26: Green Support and Policies/Personality Preference

	policies	personality	other	don't know	row total
favour.	40.5	42.9	33.9	16.8	356 (36.0)
neither	48.7	46.0	59.1	78.0	543 (54.9)
unfav.	10.8	11.1	7.0	5.2	90 (9.1)
col.tot.	361 (36.5)	241 (24.4)	243 (24.5)	145 (14.7)	989 (100.0)

Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993)

A clear illustration of this is the second ballot which took place in Irshava on 10 April 1994 between Karavanska and Ustich, the candidate of the oblast administration. Whereas Ustich was generally well-known to the farmers in the area and the people of Irshava, Karavanska originally came from neighbouring Mukacheva and she was a woman. In the former Soviet Union female politicians are generally viewed with some scepticism. The fact that Karavanska was an artist and twice married did not make matters better. A number of vicious rumours were spread about her personal life¹³³. Whereas her programme focused primarily on the environment and on social equality, Ustich - himself a former member of the Ukrainian Communist Party - promised to build a new church in Irshava should he be elected. This offer had wide appeal in Irshava, where people are generally very religious and where the local church had become too small to locate all the

¹³³ Some of these rumors were revealed to me while driving between Irshava and local polling stations to collect observers from these stations. The driver, who was a RUKH-election observer, took up some hitchhikers, two of whom were workers from a local factory, and who wanted to know from the driver if the rumors about Karavanska circulated at their factory were true. These rumors included information that Karavanska was opposed to the church.

parishioners. As a result of Ustich's promise, the local priest - who himself stood for elections in the first round - encouraged his parishioners to vote for Ustich. He even accompanied some of them to the ballot box after the Sunday morning prayer. Most of those who failed to make it to the second round of the elections in Irshava chose to put their support behind Ustich, and the local newspaper, which was run by the regional/local administration chose also to support Ustich. Faced with such odds, and with a big electoral district to cover, Karavanska did not stand much of a chance and lost. Consequently, a mixture of personality and policies facilitated her defeat.

The Greens are not represented in the present parliament, nor was the outcome for the Greens at the 1994 local elections as good as that of 1990. As regards the parliament, though, *PZU* is held in high regard by the MPs elected in 1994. The surveys conducted in 1993 and 1994 respectively found the following:

Table 8.27: Attitude towards Greens among General Population/Ukrainian MPs (in %)

	General Public	MPs	Row Total
Very Favourable	8	3	88 (6)
Favourable	28	51	479 (35)
Neither	33	30	447 (32)
Unfavourable	5	12	96 (7)
Very unfavourable	4		41 (3)
Don't know	22	3	228 (17)
Other		1	5 (0)
Column Total	989 (72)	393 (28)	1382 (100)

Source: Miller, White, Heywood (1993, 1994)

Although the Greens are not represented in parliament, MPs seem to be generally sympathetic towards them. Thus, *PZU* may thus be able to exert some influence on the decision-making process through lobbying. Although, having said that, as the economy and the process of statebuilding continues, environmental issues are likely to drop further down on the priority list of the parliament and the public in general. Being sympathetic towards the Greens and agreeing with the points they rise thus does not necessarily mean that other parties and groupings are willing to act on their behalf where the environment may be at stake.

Given that it has been relatively difficult for the Green Party, and for that matter other small political parties, to access the political arena through elections, why is the Ukrainian Green Party not more radical? As pointed out above, there are objective reasons for this. What is more, one has to be very careful with how to use the term 'radical' when talking about Green Parties. In the West, radical has become synonymous with 'red' (socialist-green) and the German Greens have been referred to as the prime example of such radicalism. In the Ukrainian case the Greens were not red, but indeed very radical when they founded *PZU* in March 1990. Ukrainian independence soon became an issue

on their agenda, and this was still several months prior to the collapse of the USSR. The Greens also at an early stage demanded that the old administrative-command system be demolished and replaced by a market economy. Within the Ukrainian political context, these demands were close to revolutionary, though shared by large segments of the politically active population of the country. Although, as has been seen from the case-study on the SB EK, some members of the Green Movement never denounced their membership of the CPU and remained firmly convinced that the environmental problems had to be addressed within a socialist framework, these were in a minority. Most members of *Zelenyi Svit* and later also of *PZU* felt that only by providing an alternative political setting could these problems be successfully addressed.

As for *PZU*'s lack of radicalism vis-à-vis other political parties, this can also be explained. In the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident all political movements and parties as soon as they emerged declared their commitment to the environment and against expanding nuclear power on Ukrainian territory. Thus the primary issue of the Green Party was coopted into other parties' political programmes. Some people therefore felt that there was no need for a Green Party, partly as everyone claimed to be environmental, partly as they were of the opinion that the state of the environment in Ukraine was so bad that there could be no compromise, and compromises would have to be made by a political party. In these peoples' view it would be far more efficient to concentrate all efforts to protect the environment through *Zelenyi Svit* and ad-hoc, issue-specific activities. However, whereas the nationalist parties and also the socialists have moved away from their initial position on the environment, arguing that only once Ukrainian statehood has been firmly established and the economy put in order will it be possible to address Ukraine's environmental problems, *PZU* remains firm on this issue: Ukraine's political and economic problems must be solved together with rather than separately from the environmental problems for such reforms to be successful. As the parliament has backtracked on its own moratorium on the construction of nuclear reactors at Ukraine's nuclear power stations and as the oil terminal in Odessa, which environmentalists and the local population have opposed for environmental reasons, can now be justified on the grounds that it will make Ukraine independent of Russia as far as oil is concerned, *PZU*'s principal stand on the environment remains firm. It may therefore be possible to say that the Green Party is becoming more radicalised vis-à-vis other political parties by ways of sticking to its original policies of a sustainable economic development, within the limits set by Nature herself, rather than abandoning this commitment to the environment at the expense of securing Ukrainian statehood.

Some members of the Green Party admitted that the emphasis on the environment at the expense of issues perceived of as more urgent by the general public may have contributed to the poor election performance of the Green Party. Whereas this may be the effect in the short term of the Greens' political strategy, it may pay off in terms of political support in the long run. It will take time to

transform the Ukrainian economy from a command to a market economy. The environmental problems will not go away by themselves and as people grow increasingly disillusioned with the promises of those parties represented in parliament, the Greens may benefit from a political comeback for the next elections - particularly if they succeed in having the current election law changed so as to introduce proportional representation. This, however, will depend on how successful the Greens will be in projecting themselves as the green alternative. So far it is the Green Movement - *Zelenyi Svit* - and increasingly often *Greenpeace Ukraine* which highlights environmental concerns, whereas *PZU* has very much, as pointed out in previous chapters, turned into a press-release organisation.

8.5 Conclusion

As seen above, the emergence of the Ukrainian Green Movement cannot easily be explained by Inglehart's model of post-materialist value change. Environmental protection in the former USSR became a 'basic' need, rather than a 'higher order' need: environmental destruction (which, by the way, was far more extensive than in the capitalist West), compounded by the Chernobyl accident, was in Ukraine perceived as a threat to the very existence of its people, culture and natural environment. As seen above, Green support for Ukrainian independence, was rooted in the idea that the Soviet political and economic structures were by definition anti-environmental, and that the only way to secure Ukrainian survival from environmental destruction, was to gain control over its territory and its resources.

Secondly, it is not possible to talk about 'stable values' on the environment in Ukraine. Access to information about the deteriorating state of the environment and its impact on human health, caused large segments of Ukrainian society to change their attitude and values on this issue (I will return to this in Chapter Nine). The Greens, drawing on pre-Revolutionary thinking on the environment, provided a theoretical framework within which people could redefine their values and thinking on the environment. Inglehart's 'scarcity hypothesis', however, seems to fit better with the Ukrainian experience. During the last one and a half years, the Soviet economy went into decline. This trend continued in Ukraine following the collapse of the USSR, pushing the environment down on the list of basic needs: How to feed one's family became a more urgent problem to solve, than how to protect one's health from pollution.

Although the Ukrainian Green Movement in many ways differ from similar movements elsewhere, there are also similarities: the potentially Green voters in Ukraine share several common features with Western Green voters. This is particularly interesting, given that those people who originally joined the Ukrainian Green Movement came from very different backgrounds and had very different ideas about how to solve environmental problems. As more and more political parties have emerged in Ukraine, it seems that the potential Green vote has stabilised, and that whereas the Greens earlier

picked up a general 'protest' vote, the supporters of the Green Party are now found among a relatively small group of people firmly committed to environmental reform. These people might be more open to the theoretical framework of the Greens, outlined in the first part of this chapter, than the general public. So far *PZU* has very much been a main-stream party. Although committed to environmental reform, its policies - as expressed in programme and statements and press releases - have not differed very much from those of other political parties. It might well be that the Green Party, by adopting policies different from those of other parties - a Green alternative - so to speak, might benefit from this in the long run. The future of the Ukrainian Green Movement is among the issues addressed in the following chapter of this thesis.

9 Conclusion

9.0 Introduction

As seen above, in the Ukrainian parliamentary elections of March 1994, the Green Party of Ukraine did not get a single representative elected to the Verkhovna Rada despite scoring high in opinion polls conducted during the months prior to the elections. Only later - in December 1994 - *Zelenyi Svit* split in two. The majority *Zelenyi Svit* supporting close links with the Green Party, the minority accusing *PZU* of trying to take over the movement so that the party could benefit from its office facilities, equipment and expertise. So far no accommodation has been reached by the two groups, which are at present fighting each other to retain the right to the name and the equipment of *Zelenyi Svit*. What is more, as seen above, environmental issues have been pushed down on the political agenda of Ukraine to be replaced with other issues, such as the economy and nation building. A natural question to ask is thus the following: Where does this leave the Ukrainian Green Movement? Have *Zelenyi Svit* and the *PZU* outplayed their role in Ukrainian politics or do they still have a role to play? What went wrong for the Greens and how - if at all - can they make a comeback onto the political arena?

Below I will try to assess the Green Movement (*Zelenyi Svit*) and *PZU* based on the information given in the chapters above. First, I will look at the period 1986-94, scrutinising general political and inter-movement developments in an attempt to determine how successful the Greens have been so far and why over the past nine years the Green Movement has lost its momentum. Secondly, I will look towards the future and try to identify various possible scenarios for *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU*. Finally, I will conduct a brief discussion on the concept of eco-culture introduced in Chapter One and try to assess the potential future role of this concept in creating awareness of environmental issues amongst the Ukrainian population - a factor which in turn will determine not only the future state of the environment in Ukraine but also, I believe, the future of the Green Movement itself.

9.1 Assessing the Ukrainian Green Movement (1986-95)

9.1.1 *Zelenyi Svit*

Anatolii Panov, the former Director of *Zelenyi Svit*'s Kiev office has summarised the activities of the association since it was founded as follows:

За час існування Зелений Світ організував сотні акцій - демонстрацій, мітингів, пікетів, конференцій і відіграв значну роль у припиненні екологічно небезпечних об'єктів. Проти спорудження Кримської АЕС місцевим відділенням зелених було зібрано 330 тисяч підписів, що змусило уряд прийняти рішення про закриття цієї майже побудованої електростанції. За підмогою зелених Миколаївщини Академія Наук України провела експертизу на Південно-Українській АЕС, яка показала, що подальше будівництво цієї станції екологічно необґрунтоване. Масові демонстрації протесту проходили в районах Рівенської, Хмельницької та Запорізької АЕС, на яких люди активно виступали проти розширення цих станцій¹.

In addition to these actions, the Ukrainian Greens were also successful in having the third and fourth stages of expanding the Chernobyl nuclear power station scrapped (1987), in having the planned Danube-Dniepr Canal stopped (1987), in banning the Odessa and Kharkiv nuclear power stations (1987), chemical plants in Crimea and Zakarpattia (1988), a bridge over Dniepr to the nature reserve island Khortytsa (1988), and the Crimean and Chyhyryn nuclear power stations (1989). At meetings which took place in Kiev in November 1988 and April 1989, more than 100,000 people protested against a decision to build another 15-17 nuclear reactors on Ukrainian territory (see Chapter Two) and demanded that a referendum be organised on the future of nuclear power in Ukraine. These demonstrations, together with the anti-nuclear campaigns organised by local chapters of *Zelenyi Svit*, helped facilitate the moratorium on nuclear reactors adopted by the Verkhovna Rada in September 1990, following a session to which representatives of *Zelenyi Svit* were invited (see Chapter Two). This list could be extended. The Greens' success in attracting the support of the general public manifested itself not only in mass mobilisation against environmentally harmful projects, but also in poll results. Since such polls were introduced in the late 1980s, the Greens have consistently polled very high (see Chapters Three and Four).

Why were the Greens at the initial stage (1987-90) so successful in pursuing environmental issues? To answer this question I will point out general political and organisational factors as well as take a closer look at the case study on South Bug.

General Political and Organisational Factors

As pointed out in previous chapters, the Greens were initially able to benefit from widespread anxieties regarding the Chernobyl accident and its potential impact on people's health as well as

¹ See Анатолій Паюнов, - *Зелений Рух в Україні*, с. 2. This document is not dated, but was written in 1992 and may be obtained from *Zelenyi Svit*'s office in Kiev upon request.

the natural environment. Although the CPU was considered one of the most dogmatic republican party organisations in the USSR and the introduction of glasnost and democratisation was slower and more cautious in Ukraine than in for instance the Baltic Republics, leading public figures - writers and academicians - addressed Chernobyl as an issue and by linking up with other groups who felt the need for setting up some kind of environmental organisation, were able to form *Zelenyi Svit*. Another factor, which no doubt made the birth of *Zelenyi Svit* easier, was the Peace Committee's decision to take the movement under its auspices, thus not only providing the Greens with some legitimacy vis-à-vis the CPU, but at the same time providing resources such as premises, office equipment and funding to the activists of the movement.

In the early days of *Zelenyi Svit*'s existence, members of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences who were affiliated with the Green Movement (Dudko, Hrodzynskyi and others) organised independent ecological expert assessments of controversial projects such as the plans to build a bridge from the mainland to the island of Khortytsa and the Chyhyryn nuclear power station. In this sense, the Ukrainian Green Movement was not purely a protest organisation, objecting to officially sanctioned projects, but also a highly constructive organisation, providing serious alternatives that could not simply be ignored. By presenting the authorities and the general public with a mixture of well-founded arguments fused with references to the cultural and national heritage of Ukraine and the need to preserve this heritage, the Greens were able to mobilise large segments of the Ukrainian population and exert real influence on the Ukrainian decision making process.

Of importance in this connection was the fact that once the initial clashes with the police and fear caused by the early demonstrations were over, people were generally curious to find out more about *Zelenyi Svit* and the other politicised movements which emerged from 1987/88 onwards. There was also a sense of optimism and a belief that ordinary people could influence politics in the country - particularly at local and regional level, where campaigns to reduce the extent of nuclear power in Ukraine were highly successful. Another factor of some importance in this respect was the changing attitude of the CPU to nuclear power more generally. I will return to this factor below, suffice it here to say that although the CPU was wary about keeping the Greens under its control, it to some extent shared the aims of the movement to restrict future development of nuclear power in Ukraine.

However, towards the end of the 1980s the Greens paradoxically became victims of their own success. As the Green Movement was amongst the first informal groups to emerge on the Ukrainian political arena - the environment was initially considered to be a non-political issue as opposed to the national issue - many people who wanted to take part in the political process did so using the Green Movement as a 'cover'. Once it became politically possible to set up other, more

overtly political groups and from February 1989 onwards also political parties - several activists left and became leading figures elsewhere. Yet others left to pursue their own careers. It also soon became clear that there were as many different opinions on what should be the tasks of the movement and how it should be run, as there were members of the movement. While Shcherbak was the leader of *Zelenyi Svit* the conflicts that emerged from these disagreements were more or less contained. Shcherbak was an authoritative figure not only within the movement but also in Ukraine as such and was held in high regard for his work on Chernobyl after the accident - trying to establish why the accident took place and what its real impact had been.

Once Shcherbak resigned as Chairman of *Zelenyi Svit* following his appointment as Ukrainian Minister of the Environment (1990), the situation could no longer be contained. Leontyi Sanduliak, who replaced him, did not remain in office for long as he was appointed Ukrainian Ambassador to Romania and then a power struggle was unavoidable. The establishment of *PZU* further sharpened the conflict within *Zelenyi Svit*, as will be seen below. As a result of these conflicts, which dominated the agenda of meetings in *Mala Rada* and *Zelena Rada*, scientists and other experts left the movement as they felt it became increasingly difficult to work with environmental issues from within the movement. Many high-profile activists also left to concentrate their efforts on the Green Party and those who remained found it increasingly difficult to keep it together as local chapters left, the general public became increasingly disillusioned about politics in general and the days of meetings and demonstrations came to an end. What was more, as the economy went into a decline and inflation started to soar, the economic situation of the movement worsened. Disputes also broke out over equipment obtained from abroad.

It was thus a weakened *Zelenyi Svit* that welcomed the Declaration of Ukrainian Independence on 24 August 1991 - and the decline continued throughout the 1990s with more people leaving the movement and conflicts intensifying. Furthermore, once Ukraine gained its independence, the environmental issue suddenly was not considered that important any more. It could only be adequately and successfully addressed, it was argued, once the country had built a stable political and economic system and not, as argued by the Greens, as part of this stabilisation. A grim example of politics and economics clashing with the need to protect the environment was the Presidential Decree signed by Leonid Kravchuk in the spring of 1994, paving the way for further construction of nuclear reactors in Ukraine and preparing for nine such reactors to be completed at existing nuclear power stations - thus undermining most of the Greens' achievements in this field. An attempt was made by Greenpeace Ukraine together with *Zelenyi Svit*, *PZU* and other Green groups to have this decree annulled - as it was not issued properly in a legal sense. However, this attempt failed. The political leadership of Ukraine maintained its position that Ukraine needed to expand its nuclear power industry for two reasons: Firstly so as to not become

dependent upon Russia for gas and fuel supplies, and secondly, so as to earn more hard currency from exporting electricity generated by nuclear power stations to other countries. Similarly, plans to build an oil terminal in Odessa, which had been opposed for a long time by Greens and locals in the area, got the all-clear from the Ukrainian parliament as well as the vocal support of nationalist-minded forces, in late 1994 - the justification being that once an oil terminal was built, Ukraine could buy oil from other countries than Russia, thus further reducing its dependency on its powerful neighbour.

Still, I think it would be wrong to say that the impact of the Green Movement due to changes within the movement and political and economic changes in Ukraine more generally has come to nothing. *Zelenyi Svit*, as shown above, was highly successful in pursuing its agenda in the late 1980s both through its activists and through its deputies in local and regional parliaments. What is more, the Greens managed to influence public opinion to the effect that something had to be done to improve the state of the environment in Ukraine. Although the Greens find it harder to mobilise the public into action now than in the late 1980s, the Movement is still held in high regard by the general public - at least if one is to believe the opinion polls, according to which the Green rating is high, compared to other political parties and movements. This potential support proved difficult to mobilise into votes during the local elections in June 1994 - but this was not only due to the Greens, but also to the electoral law and the democratic parties and movements' lack of ability to agree on one candidate in various constituencies, thus politically killing each other and public indifference towards politics.

If one is to draw any conclusions as to what has been the greatest achievement of the Green Movement in Ukraine during the last nine years, it is not only the fact that it managed to successfully put the environment onto the political agenda in the late 1980s, but maybe even more so that in doing this, it contributed to the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union through its defiance of policies initiated in Moscow with little regard to the potentially damaging impact they may have on the republic. Another not less impressive achievement is the impact *Zelenyi Svit* has made on the general public of Ukraine, which gives it a stable 10% in opinion polls, thus making the Greens one of the most popular political movements (and parties) in the country. Moreover, *Zelenyi Svit* has succeeded in creating public awareness of environmental issues and this awareness can be turned into action if and when the political and economic situation in Ukraine stabilises. Finally, *Zelenyi Svit* has played a very important role in Ukrainian politics as a political school for its own members as well as for other political movements and parties. The experience gained by these people constitutes a great potential for further action in the future - provided that personal scores can be settled within the movement and provided that the Green Movement, which

by now has become rather fragmented, will again join behind a strong leader and concentrate on what it was established to do - namely to protect the environment.

Particular Factors: The Case of the Nikolaev Greens - An Assessment.

As seen in Chapter Six, the activists of *Zelenyj Mir* from the very beginning aimed at creating as broad an alliance as possible against expansion of the SB EK. By writing letters to various ministries, departments as well as the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and getting their support for the Green cause, they gained what would soon turn into a key asset - namely credibility and weight. Whereas those favouring continued construction at the Iuzhnoukrainsk site would be in a position easily to discard the views of a handful of unknown activists, it would be a lot more difficult to refute the views of official bodies and Ukrainian scientists, possessing expert knowledge of the case. Being able to claim the support of official institutions also made access to the media much easier, as once official views - and not merely the views of activists belonging to informal groups - were involved, these would easier be acceptable to official authorities and less likely to be met with criticism or punishment from 'above'.

The Greens no doubt also benefited from the fact that the campaign to stop expansion at the SB EK was not presented as a campaign against nuclear power, but as a campaign to save the river South Bug. Thus this campaign could be portrayed as a continuation of the campaign to save the Siberian rivers (see Chapter One) and the Ukrainian campaign against the Danube-Dniepr Canal, which had been successfully concluded only shortly prior to the launch of the South Bug campaign, and in which activists in Nikolaev had actively taken part. In addition to being a relatively 'safe' issue, those involved in the latter campaign were also able to benefit from the campaign skills and access to the media obtained from the Danube-Dniepr campaigners. The journalist Kolesnyk of *Iuzhnaia Pravda*, for instance, had taken active part in that campaign. The Greens also at an early stage established links with the regional TV - Alla Korzheva, one of its journalists, became a member of the initiative group of *Zelenyj Mir* and later made a series of critical reports on the SB EK, which were broadcast locally. Finally, the initiators of the SB EK campaign must have been encouraged to believe that also their battle could be won given the positive outcome of the Danube-Dniepr campaign.

To add more weight to the campaign and thus also the arguments presented in the debate that followed, the Greens sought not only support from the masses (people of Nikolaev oblast and the workers' collectives), but also from the official authorities. As shown in Chapter Six, the oblast CPU party committee was informed about the intention to set up a Green Movement in Nikolaev from an early stage, and the obkom propaganda secretary was even made a member of the initiative group!

The relationship between *Zelenyj Mir* and the CPU was ambivalent, however. On the one hand, as seen above, the party obkom had strong reservations with regard to the third stage of the SB EK, and was not very happy with the second stage either. Its concerns had been expressed as early as 1985, but in very mild terms and with no result. The attitude of the CPU as such towards nuclear power changed, as seen in Chapter Six, following the accident at Chernobyl on 26 April 1986. Whereas the CPU had fully endorsed the CPSU's ambitious nuclear power programme prior to the accident, it became increasingly sceptical in its aftermath, eventually voicing its outright opposition to Moscow's plans. This opposition was never expressed in public - all letters changing hands between Moscow and Kiev on this matter were either labelled 'secret' or 'entirely secret'. Playing up to Moscow in general and on such an important issue as nuclear power in particular was a gamble from Kiev's point of view, even with the expansion of glasnost and democratisation, as any attempt at challenging the authority of the CPSU from below, could easily be branded 'nationalist' or 'deviationist' and have repercussions for those people involved (cf. conversation between Shcherbitskii and Gorbachev referred to in Chapter Six). Thus, the CPU could use the public fear of nuclear power which followed the Chernobyl accident to back up its views: i.e. claiming to speak on behalf of the people, and thus avoid being branded 'nationalist'. On the other hand, the CPU had to be careful so as to avoid a situation where the Green Movement would gain the upper hand and put the party in a position where it could be seen as merely responding to a powerful Green Movement. As the campaign took on, it became clear that *Zelenyj Mir* was efficient in making known its views and gaining public support for its demands. It would therefore be in the interests of the CPU to keep the Movement under some control, so as to avoid a 'spill-over' effect from purely environmental to politically more 'sensitive' issues (for instance, challenging the supremacy of the CPSU and demanding Ukrainian independence).

The Greens, on the other hand, could do with the approval and in some cases also the support of the oblast CPU. If the obkom was positive to the case made by *Zelenyj Mir* it would be less likely to interfere in its activities and more likely to sanction meetings and rallies as well as providing the Greens with premises and other necessary facilities. Besides, playing on the same team as the party would no doubt make it easier for the Greens to voice their concerns to Ukrainian and Soviet authorities. On the other hand, it would not be in the interests of the Green Movement to be too closely associated with the CPU as glasnost and democratisation gained momentum and the political climate became more radicalised.

As seen in Chapter Six, although in Iuzhnoukrainsk attempts were made at weakening the Greens by setting up a local branch of the Ukrainian Society for Environmental Protection, and although the Greens had applications for meetings to be sanctioned turned down, the oblast and local branches of the CPU and *Zelenyj Mir* benefited from each other in the initial stage of the

campaign. Pitushkin proved to be a very useful contact for the Greens to present their case directly to party and official authorities in Moscow, and the party obkom - together with the oblast Soviet - took the demands of the pro-environmental lobby into consideration when making decisions on the SB EK.

Also of great significance to the Greens was the expert knowledge possessed by the activists of *Zelenyj Mir*. Whereas Bilodid, as an engineer employed at the SB nuclear power station, possessed first hand knowledge of the situation there and was in a position to provide his fellow members of *Zelenyj Mir* with valid arguments, there were also a number of highly skilled engineers and scientists amongst the ranks of the movement. Zolotukhin, as the head of the Nikolaev branch of the Soviet Culture Fund and as an engineer of the enterprise *Ekvator* not only gave credibility to the movement through his cultural links, but also proved vital in the Greens' campaign to gain the support of the general public and workers of Nikolaev in particular - as he succeeded in getting the support of his co-employees and through them, in reaching out to other workers' collectives. Soviet authorities claimed to make decisions in the interests of the workers. By claiming their support the Greens no doubt had a trump card, which they played well by appealing to local authorities that they take the workers' opinion into consideration before making decisions on the SB EK (see Chapter Six). In doing so, *Zelenyj Mir* differed from *Zelenyi Svit*, which produced a number of letters and appeals signed by prominent members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in support of its case.

Zolotukhin's tireless commitment to the movement resulted in numerous articles and letters regarding the SB EK appearing on the pages of local newspapers. He also maintained an impressive correspondence with a number of ministries, departments and scientific institutions. Although criticised by some for being rather authoritarian, he succeeded in keeping the movement unified and issue-oriented rather than falling prey to infighting and divisions as did *Zelenyi Svit* in Kiev, and which has almost destroyed the organisation. Support from keen activists locally, who would be directly affected by the second stage of the SB EK, should it go ahead, turned *Zelenyi Mir* into a highly efficient organisation. Unlike what was the case with *Zelenyi Svit*, *Zelenyi Mir* succeeded in keeping scientists and experts in the movement, avoiding the mass exit which took place in Kiev and which no doubt weakened the Ukrainian Greens as such.

Zelenyj Mir also from an early stage showed considerable political skill in pushing the limits of glasnost and democratisation and widening the agenda of the Green Movement. Quotations from Lenin's works and frequent references to the Resolutions of the XIX Party Conference were made to justify the views and the means used by the pro-environmental lobby as well as to ensure the publication of controversial materials (cf. for instance the 'row' over the second collective letter from the workers' collective of *Ekvator*, Chapter Six). Thus the Greens adapted themselves

to the changing political situation rather than seeking a confrontation, gradually expanding and radicalising their campaign. Whereas the radicalisation which took place of most political movements in the late 1980s proved a double-edged sword to particularly *Zelenyi Svit* (cf. Chapter Four) as the political differences between the members became more clear-cut and large numbers left the movement as a result, *Zelenyi Mir* to a much greater extent succeeded in reconciling these differences, emphasising the struggle to save South Bug as a uniting factor and downplaying personal political differences (see Chapter Six). It is in this connection interesting to note that the Nikolaev Greens were predominantly negative to the establishment of the Green Party of Ukraine (PZU in Nikolaev only has some nine members) and that Zolotukhin has put much effort into limiting the influence of PZU in *Zelenyi Svit* in Kiev. Although with time the general public support for *Zelenyi Mir* wore off to some extent, a dedicated group of activists remained, moving the campaign to save South Bug away from the streets and squares and into the offices and decision-making bodies to which the Greens succeeded in being elected in 1990 (seven deputies of the oblast Soviet were linked to *Zelenyi Mir*).

Above I have analysed *Zelenyi Mir*'s strategy and found it to be efficient given the political restraints within which the Greens operated. As for Resolution No. 647, though, only one of the demands made by the campaign to save the river South Bug was taken on: whereas the Konstantinov water reservoir would not be built, the Aleksandrov water reservoir was to be completed, although the proportions would be less than envisaged in the original project. Similarly, the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station was to be completed, although the capacity was significantly reduced from what had originally been envisaged. The planned fourth reactor at the nuclear power station would for the time being not be completed, pending the results of a re-examination of its project. The original projects for the Aleksandrov water reservoir and the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station were also to be redrafted and sanctioned by an ecological expertise group prior to construction works recommencing.

At first sight, the Greens seem to have gained little from Resolution No. 647 - given their demands, which were basically that the entire Second Stage of the SB EK be scrapped. However, when seen in connection with the general political situation in the Soviet Union in the summer of 1989, the fact that such a resolution was passed at all was in itself a major achievement. As seen in Chapter Six, there were a number of obstacles that had to be tackled in the process and *Zelenyi Mir* was successful in bypassing these as well as in limiting the 'damage' done to the original report of the expert commission prior to USSR *Goskomprirroda*'s modified version reaching the USSR Council of Ministers.

USSR *Goskomprirroda*'s reworked version is thought to be a result of its wish to reconcile the position of the pro-environment lobby with that of the pro-nuclear lobby - which, although it was

unable to match the Greens in gaining public support and the support of local and oblast authorities, remained very influential in decision-making circles in Kiev and Moscow. Securing a temporary status quo was therefore an achievement and a great challenge to *Zelenyj Mir*. As pointed out above, there was no proper apparatus to see to it that political decisions were being implemented in the former Soviet Union. Moreover, new laws in many cases contradicted already existing laws, and which laws one chose to go by depended on which side one belonged to in the environmental debate. Industrial projects which were either put on ice or banned on environmental grounds therefore very often continued unchanged. The challenge the Greens faced by August 1989 was thus complex: on the one hand, they had to police the implementation of Resolution No. 647; on the other, they continued their campaign to have the entire second stage eventually scrapped. Following the Ukrainian Declaration of Independence the situation was even more complicated by the introduction of a new issue, namely that of a *prodovka* of the Tashlyk water reservoir and structural, political and economic changes more generally. On top of this, the early 1990s saw a general decline in public interest in politics in general, which also affected the Green Movement.

Following the adoption of Resolution No. 647, *Zelenyj Mir* succeeded in making local and oblast authorities adopt a number of decisions and resolutions against the Aleksandrov water reservoir and to secure that only three aggregates be installed at the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station. The Soviet Law on Local Government, which was introduced in 1987, allowed for more decisions to be made locally. Soviet authorities, which remained committed to the nuclear power programme adopted in the late 1980s, were thus faced with the dilemma of how to bypass local opposition to the SB EK. As seen in Chapter Seven, the problem was solved when Pavlov's government introduced a law providing local authorities with incentives to accommodate nuclear or other installations linked with nuclear power stations on their territory. The new law worked, thus weakening the Greens' campaign and also clearly illustrating the limits of Soviet democracy - Moscow was still in a position to override decisions made locally simply by adopting a law to bypass them or to put local authorities in a position where they simply could not afford not to follow its directives. Given the generally difficult economic situation in Ukraine, which was felt strongly in areas close to the SB nuclear power station, economic incentives replaced coercion with the same outcome.

Ukrainian independence did not prove to be the solution to the environmental problems in the Nikolaev oblast and in Ukraine per se as the Greens had hoped. As pointed out above, given the difficult energy situation in Ukraine in the aftermath of the declaration of independence, the pro-nuclear lobby succeeded in convincing the central authorities in Kiev that Ukraine had no alternative but to pursue nuclear power to avoid an energy crisis and a hard currency deficit of

large proportions. So whereas the 'centre' - Moscow - was gone, Kiev simply replaced it, thus leaving the Greens faced with the same opposition as before. As seen in Chapter Seven, whereas *Zelenyj Mir* was largely successful at the local and regional levels, its activists banged their heads against the wall in the case of Kiev. And Kiev was in a position to override decisions made locally, just as Moscow had done before. The moratorium on nuclear reactors which had been adopted by the Ukrainian parliament in February 1990, was, as seen above, revoked in 1993, thus increasing the likelihood that reactor No 4 would be completed and possibly a further one or two reactors at a later stage. From a strictly political point of view, the Ukrainian independence brought with it something of a setback to *Zelenyj Mir*'s campaign - although it could, of course, conduct its campaign much more freely than had been the case during the Soviet period.

In terms of providing good arguments for their cause and in terms of providing alternatives, the pro-environment lobby did a very good job in the 1990s: it not only proved that the Aleksandrov water reservoir even with limited proportions and the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station fitted with no more than three aggregates would have a severely negative impact on the environment. Moreover, the Greens succeeded in getting authoritative support for the view that a *produvka* of the Tashlyk water reservoir would be harmful to the environment and possibly also to people's health. As for nuclear safety, the administration of the YU nuclear power station failed to refute the Greens' arguments to the effect that the reactors at Iuzhnoukrainsk had become unsafe due to poor safety standards and failure to follow safety instructions on site. Finally, it got recognition for its alternative gas turbine technology from the scientific establishment of Ukraine and from a number of ministries, including *Minenergo*. Decisions made locally on the SB EK clearly reflected the views of the Green Movement, for which the Green deputies in the oblast soviet were largely to thank, due to the tremendous job they did in the soviet. Local authorities also favoured tests with gas turbines, but had no money to start such tests. Kiev refused to provide funding for them and also gave the clear for a number of experimental *produvki* to go ahead. Result-wise, it is thus probably correct to say that the Greens were successful in arguing their case and in influencing decision-making in Nikolaev oblast, but that the pro-nuclear lobby got the upper hand in Kiev, which became possible primarily due to the very difficult political and economic situation Ukraine has suffered since independence in 1991. Possibly as a result of the changing political and economic situation, the pro-nuclear lobby decided to try to crush opposition in Nikolaev oblast once and for all by taking Suslova and Shapovalov to court and having them pay compensation for slandering its reputation. They were, however, not successful, in the end coming to a settlement with the Greens to conduct an ecological expertise on water quality in the Tashlyk water reservoir, to be funded by the SB EK. All claims for compensation from the Greens were dropped.

By the summer of 1994 the Greens were faced with the following situation: The leadership of *Zelenyj Mir* had fallen out with two of its allies - *Iuzhnaia pravda* and oblast *Minpriroda*. The former was accused of adopting a pro-nuclear profile in return for economic assistance rendered to it by the leadership of the SB nuclear power station. It is generally known that the newspapers in Ukraine as in the other former Soviet republics ran into difficulties in the 1990s as prices for paper, ink etc. rocketed and stocks went down due to lower demand, which again reflected the generally difficult economic situation in the country. As seen above, *Zelenyj Mir* found it difficult to publish its writings in the newspaper as a result. This was not such a big problem, though, as Kolenyuk, who moved on to *Radianske Pribuzhzhia*, and other journalists in the same newspaper adopted a favourable position towards the pro-environment lobby. Probably more harmful to *Zelenyj Mir* was the conflict which developed vis-à-vis the oblast *Minpriroda*. Its Chairman, A. Albul, was accused of failing to make the appropriate decisions in connection with illegal construction at the SB EK and for violating environmental legislation on a number of occasions by not prohibiting environmentally harmful projects from going ahead. Zolotukhin in a letter to Ukrainian *Minpriroda* demanded that his report be properly investigated and that Albul be removed from his position. *Minpriroda* did admit that there had been some mishaps, but did not find this sufficient to remove Albul. At the time of the complaint Shcherbak was Minister of the Environment and Zolotukhin probably counted on his siding with his own movement on this matter. Zolotukhin's allegations did, however, trigger off a very negative response at oblast level, and much criticism against Zolotukhin followed from employees of the oblast *Minpriroda* who attacked him for his authoritarian leadership style, and for acting as though he himself was the Green Movement and not 'merely' its representative.

Albul, however, was not only criticised by the Greens, but also by the pro-nuclear lobby (see Page 12). As for the conflict which emerged between the Greens and *Minpriroda*, from a strategic point of view it might better have been avoided. Given the present very difficult political and economic situation the Greens are faced with, they can ill afford to lose allies in their struggle to protect South Bug. On the other hand, *Zelenyj Mir* is a movement committed to high moral standards and to principle. As far as the environment is concerned, there can be no compromise. The state of the environment in Ukraine is on the verge of disaster and must be protected by any means. Needless to say, those who fail to comply with this aim will have to put up with the criticism resulting from it. Having said that, though, there were not only subjective, but also a number of objective reasons as to why the oblast *Minpriroda* at times failed to comply with instructions and rules according to which it based its activities, suffice it here to mention poor staffing, inadequate facilities and lack of money. The sharp exchange of accusations should be

taken as a sign of the sharpening of the conflict and the increasingly 'personal' and to some extent also 'dirtier' campaign which emerged as a result.

If one compares the campaign to save the river South Bug and to avoid expansion of the SB EK with campaigns against nuclear power in the West, it becomes obvious that there are numerous differences. Firstly, whereas campaigners in Western Europe and in America have the advantage of operating within stable democracies, the Nikolaev Greens have since their campaign started in 1988 had to deal with changing political and economic conditions in addition to addressing their own agenda to save South Bug. This has limited the results of their campaigning in a number of ways: continuously having to adopt to a changing framework takes energy and time. Besides, such changes are often followed by confusion as to who is in charge of what and to general delays. There is also the legacy from the Soviet period of poor implementation of political decisions made. Another effect of the unstable political and economic situation is that people have less time and money to put into political activism, thus putting an enormous burden on a relatively small number of activists.

Secondly, due to the old fashioned technology and the gigantomania which characterised Soviet industries, the issues surrounding the SB EK have been somewhat different from the core issue of anti-nuclear campaigns in the West - namely that of safety and health implications. In Nikolaev there were the added issues of environmental damage, due to the projected water reservoirs and the Tashlyk hydro-electric power station, of radioactive contamination as a result of *produvka* and finally, of potential accidents due to the poor safety at the nuclear power station. The issue of nuclear power thus links up with the wider issue of ecological culture and the need to protect Ukraine, its people, environment, history and culture from destruction. The campaign fought in Nikolaev oblast can thus be seen as a continuation of opposition in Russia to flooding in connection with hydro-electric power stations and the water reservoirs created to serve them (cf. Rasputin and Mikhalkov - Chapter One) and is an ethical and moral struggle just as much as it is an environmental one.

In conclusion, it thus seems fair to say that the Greens conducted a largely successful campaign to save the river South Bug but that the political and economic framework within which they operated and still operate put several obstacles in their way, thus limiting the outcome of their campaign. Given the general political apathy and the fact that the number of deputies in the oblast Soviet was reduced, it seems likely that the Greens will continue to struggle unless some kind of support with equipment can be obtained from Ukrainian /foreign sponsors. More helpful than anything, though, would be funding for the gas turbine project from which the entire former USSR as well as Western countries could benefit and which would give *Zelenyj Mir* a powerful card to play in its future struggle to save the South Bug river.

9.1.2 PZU (1990-94) - An Assessment

When the First Congress of *Zelenyi Svit* voted to establish a Green Party as the political wing of the Green Movement it probably could not have predicted that this decision would eventually break up the very movement on whose behalf *PZU* was supposed to act. As described in greater detail in Chapter Four, there was some controversy regarding the party issue, but in the end the view that not only a strong extraparliamentary movement was required to set the record straight on the environment, but also a party that could work from within the decision making structures was required. Has the Green Party lived up to the expectations its founders had in 1990 and in case not - why?

As shown in Chapter Five, local branches of the Green Party were set up prior to the First all-Ukrainian Congress of the *PZU*. These local organisations were largely responsible for preparing the party documents and organising the congress. However, whereas the Kiev and West Ukrainian local groups were large and strong, this was not the case in other areas of Ukraine - i.e. in the East, South and the North. This somewhat limited *PZU* in the parliamentary elections of March 1994, and later in the local elections in June the same year. (Greens did not contest local/Ukrainian elections in 1990) In some areas it was difficult to put forward candidates, in others there was no party organisation to back up those candidates put forward. Moreover, the electoral law, as shown in Chapter Eight, did not favour the small democratic parties of Ukraine - for a candidate to be put forward by a political party locally a party conference attended by at least fifty local party members had to be held to approve of such a candidate. Given the size of the local party organisations this proved very difficult, and most of the people who stood for election and represented the Green Party thus stood as independents. Having put forward candidates, campaigning proved difficult for economic reasons (limited funds, large electoral districts.) and for lack of unity amongst the democrats. Besides, many of the candidates were not well known to the electorate and dirty election campaigns thus complicated their campaigns. The Greens also failed to pay enough attention to the economic problems of Ukraine as well as issues such as crime. Large segments of the electorate were concerned with these issues, and the leadership of the *PZU* later acknowledged that the party had failed to come up with a comprehensive election platform.

Another weakness was the high level of trust the Green Party put in results from polls conducted prior to the elections. *PZU* polled high on these and the party leadership may thus - at least in Kiev - have taken it for granted that people would vote Green. As pointed out above, however, there is a high degree of scepticism amongst people in Ukraine towards political parties and little trust in politicians per se. Although the Green Party, compared to other political parties, polled high in the months leading up to the elections, the share of people expressing their

preference for independent candidates constituted around two thirds of those polled. Besides, expressing sympathy to the Greens in polls does not automatically mean that one would also cast one's vote in favour of the Greens. The Green Party does not have strong local party organisations and was also not in a position to fund election campaigns locally. Moreover, *PZU* tended to put forward candidates in those constituencies which already had several other candidates from the democratic opposition. Compared to parties like *RUKH* and *URP*, *PZU* does not have well-known leaders like Chornoyil or Horyn. To the extent Kononov is known amongst the electorate, he is not considered to be as solid as these two. Thus, *PZU*'s candidates would not necessarily be favoured due to their party affiliation, but due to their personalities - who they were, so to speak.

In the two constituencies where *PZU* did make it to the second ballot, the candidates had problems covering huge electoral districts and had the added disadvantage of being women running against apparatchiki. Although a bus load of Green activists was sent to Zakarpattia to campaign and watch over the elections for Karavanska, they were sent there too late to influence the outcome of the vote. Besides, the Kiev activists did not speak the language of the village-people they met with. The division between countryside and town in Ukraine is much bigger than in most West European countries. Telling people to vote for Karavanska and distributing paper for locals to smoke tobacco in just was not enough to make them change their mind. To be of some help, these activists should have been sent to Zakarpattia straight after the first round of the elections in March 1994 and the party leadership (Kononov, Kurykin etc.) should have joined in. Besides, they should have gone to Zakarpattia with some kind of campaign strategy. In April the party leadership was busy attending an international conference in Lviv, when where it should have been, was Zakarpattia. To some extent it may be unfair to criticise the party leaders for not joining in with Karavanska for her continued campaign. *PZU* spent lots of money and effort on their initial campaign and not succeeding in Kiev, where the *PZU* is quite strong, must have been an enormous disappointment to its leadership. Besides, travelling in Ukraine is still much more complicated than elsewhere. To get to Mukachevo/Irshava the Kiev activists spent some 15 hours on a bus each way. Thus, it would be very difficult for the party leadership to get back to Kiev quickly and this of course complicated matters.

In 1990, the Green Party had the advantage not only of having a well-known leader, Iurii Shcherbak, but also of having several sound political analysts and strategists among its ranks. People like Andrii Hlazovyi and Serhii Hrabovskyi had visions and a sound understanding of green politics and of the Ukrainian political context within which *PZU* operated. The two balanced each other well as Hlazovyi wanted to build a Green Party similar to that of West Germany, was well read on green politics generally and had contacts abroad. Hrabovskyi, on the other hand, was a political scientist and could see things from the Ukrainian point of view. The

West Ukrainian Greens were also innovative: Puskhkar, for instance, suggested that various political fractions be set up in the party. This, however, was opposed by the Kiev leadership. At present *PZU* is in a situation where it has a charismatic, outgoing leader, Vitalii Kononov, who does not have a deep understanding of the theoretical side to Green Politics, and an 'ideologist' deputy leader, Serhii Kurykin, who is not very charismatic but somewhat withdrawn and who seems to have a monopoly on shaping party policies. What the *PZU* really needs is - as pointed out in Chapter Five - a front figure who can combine these two qualities and a broad infra-party debate on what should be the policies of *PZU* and which strategy to apply for the future.

9.1.3 The Relationship between *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU*

The idea that a movement needs a political wing to speak on its behalf where the political decisions are made is not new. In most European countries labour parties emerged from the trade union environment to maintain the interests of the labour movement in parliament. In Norway, for instance, *Landsorganisasjonen (LO)* has until present maintained close links with *Arbeiderpartiet (AP)* - the Labour Party - supporting the party economically in return for MPs or governmental ministers representing the trade unions. On a number of important issues, LO and AP have consultations prior to AP deciding its future policies. This close relationship between LO and AP remained firm for several decades until the late 1980s when the membership figures of LO started to decline, as other trade unions were established to represent those segments of the employers who would not necessarily feel any loyalty towards the Labour Party. Moreover, from within LO critical voices began to question the traditional relationship between LO and AP, arguing that they neither voted for the Labour Party, nor did they automatically want to become members of the Labour Party through their membership of the LO. Similarly, some members of the Labour Party felt that the Party ought to change its name and image, as in terms of policies, it was more a Social Democratic Party than a Labour Party. To capture votes from the political centre, it was thought that the Party might gain from loosening its ties with LO.

To some extent the conflict which has emerged between *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU* has similarities to the conflict mentioned above in that the movement, which is comprised of several 'groups' - the nationalist-democrats, the left, environmentalists and members of *PZU* - have diverging views with regard to the *PZU*. Some people do not approve of *PZU* for political reasons. This is the case for a small group of communists/socialists, whose allegiance is with the Socialist/Communist Party. Others, like the national-democrats, whose political allegiances are with parties like *RUKH*, *URP* and others (as seen in Chapters Three and Eight, even more extreme party allegiances could be found within *Zelenyi Svit*: members supporting *KUN* and *OUN* were later expelled for their

extremist views) and some people, while committed to the environment, do not necessarily approve of a Green Party (the environmentalists).

Those members of *Zelenyi Svit* which are opposed to *PZU* claim that the Party is trying to take control with the movement so as to make it act in a way with which the Party will approve - i.e. as a back-up and support group to *PZU*. This, they say, is required as the Party is poor and does not have a proper party organisation. *Zelenyi Svit*, on the other hand, has a big office and meeting room at Podil, it has an executive director and a number of volunteers running a by Ukrainian standards well equipped office, and it has international connections from which the Party hopes to benefit.

Party representatives, on the other hand, are ambiguous in their assessment of this conflict. Vitalii Kononov, for instance, says that *PZU* never has, nor will it ever, try to gain control of *Zelenyi Svit*. *PZU* has its own equipment, its own international contacts and its own source of income. It does not need *Zelenyi Svit*, which as an organisation has exhausted itself through internal bickering and quarrels. To prove this point, Serhii Kurykin and Andrii Ilazovyi, both former members of *Zelenyi Svit*, in 1994 initiated *EkoMistiia* - a loose association of environmental NGOs, which do not subordinate themselves to a centralised structure and leadership, but which exchange information and, whenever required, meet to organise joint action. A conference formally establishing *EkoMistiia* was arranged near Kiev in May 1994 and was attended by green NGOs from West Ukraine, Dnipropetrovsk, the Crimea and Kiev. Also present were representatives from NGOs in the West. The NGOs which joined *EkoMistiia* are advanced from a technical point of view (have access to email, various green networks and fax machines) as well as connections in the West. The fact that *ISAR* and *Milieukontakt Oosteuropa*, which are offering grants and other technical/organisational/financial support to NGOs in the former USSR, as well as representatives from the Ukrainian Ministry of Environmental Protection, were present at the May 1994 Conference, may be interpreted as a shift in power within the environmental movement of Ukraine - from what remains of *Zelenyi Svit* to those organisations that have either left *Zelenyi Svit* or are no longer very active within it.

Other members of *PZU*, though, such as Iurii Samiilenko, head of *PZU*'s Secretariat, has stated bluntly that *Zelenyi Svit* has become an inefficient association with little impact on the environmental scene in Ukraine. Samiilenko, Haniukova, Hrekov, Panov and Preobrazhenska (all prominent members/supporters of *PZU*) have all been involved in heavy infighting with the nationalist wing of *Zelenyi Svit* - a fight which culminated in the effective split of *Zelenyi Svit* in December 1994, when Samiilenko replaced Korobko (former deputy of Verkhovna Rada representing *RUKH*) as its Chairman and those supporting the latter (small Kiev group, Nikolaev,

Donetsk, Netyzhyn) broke with the Samiilenko supporters (large Kiev group, Western groups) and held their own *Zelenyi Svit* Congress in Donetsk.

It is not for me to judge what should be the link between *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU*. To a large extent *Zelenyi Svit* has facilitated this conflict itself, by on the one hand declaring at its First Congress in October 1989 that its intention was to set up a Green Party as the political wing of the Green Movement, while on the other hand being a largely non-homogenous group of environmentalists as far as political allegiances are concerned. In the end, however, both *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU* have lost out from this struggle. To the extent the Green Movement needed a political wing to voice its concerns within the legislative bodies, it is equally true that the Green Party needed a strong green movement to conduct ad-hoc activities and gain public support for the very same issues that the party intended to address away from the streets and squares. The Green Party also needed a strong green movement to provide it with the necessary data and information to successfully address these issues within the parliaments (although much insight was gained through deputies - cf. Nikolaev).

From the outset the distinction between *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU* has been blurred. As noted above, *PZU* - unlike parties like *RUKH*, *URP*, *the Socialists* and *the Communists* - does not have strong local party groups, nor does it have strong party discipline or a good economy. Consequently, not only *PZU*, but also *Zelenyi Svit* came to act as a political wing of the Green Movement, represented in local and regional parliaments through its own deputies. During local elections in 1990, *Zelenyi Svit* gained 37 deputies throughout Ukraine whereas *PZU* formally gained none (some of those deputies elected were either sympathetic to or even members of the Green Party) as *PZU* was not formally registered until 24 May 1991 - with a membership of 3,193². What was more, due to the 1994 Election Law not favouring small, democratic political parties for reasons mentioned above, it was easier for *Zelenyi Svit* as an association to put forward candidates than it was for *PZU* as a party. Thus, all candidates who were members of *PZU* and who stood for the parliamentary elections ran as independents - although their campaign leaflets mentioned that they were members of the Green Party. Following the disastrous result of these elections (neither *PZU* nor *Zelenyi Svit* succeeded in having any of their candidates elected), *PZU* decided to change its policies and prior to the local elections in June set up a Kiev party group and nominated candidates for most of the Kiev constituencies, hoping that this would make them more successful. On the whole, though, the Green vote declined in the local elections of 1994 as compared to those of 1990. I have myself sat through meetings of the *Mala Rada*, which have

² See *Політична думка*, no. 1/93, c. 25.

gone on for up to five-six hours, and where any attempt at discussing environmental issues and *Zelenyi Svit*'s agenda have turned into nasty personal disputes.

A high level of disagreements and disputes seem to be a common feature of Green Movements and parties also in Western Europe and are therefore not so surprising in themselves. The issue of dispute in Ukraine, however, is very different from that of say, Die Grünen in Germany. In Germany the question of whether or not a Green Party is required has been contested within the Green Party by the fundis (fundamentalists) and the realos (realists), whereas in Ukraine, this debate has taken place within the wider Green Movement. This can be partially explained from the fact that in Germany, political parties represented in parliament get funding from the state and also access to national TV and other publicity. Thus, although the deep ecologists who oppose the state as an anti-environmental institution do not necessarily favour the idea of a Green Party in that it becomes institutionalised into the very system they are against, through its political activities - the realists are able to argue that the Green Movement as such can only benefit from its existence, in that it provides funding for environmental projects (deputies give 9/10ths of their salary to the Party). The Green Movement of Germany - although not all environmental NGOs are formally linked to die Grünen - thus benefits economically from a party that is better off economically and enjoys the same - or maybe even a higher - level of public support than the movement does itself.

In Ukraine, on the other hand, no state subsidies are given to political parties. The fighting within *Zelenyi Svit* between groups favourable or hostile towards *PZU* is thus not so much an issue of whether or not there is a need for a Green Party, but more one of finance and control - given that resources are scarce. Another feature typical to Ukraine, and which not only the Greens, but also other political movements and parties still to some extent suffer from, is a lack of understanding for tactics and coalition building. Everyone wants to be a leader and the idea that 'if you do not agree completely with me, then you are against me', is still prevalent. Personal ambitions maybe more than political ambitions are thus putting an additional strain on the Green Movement.

9.1.4 The Decline of the Ukrainian Greens: Part of an International Phenomenon?

Anna Bramwell (1994), in her book 'The Fading of the Greens'³, argues that Green political parties in the West are on the decline. She identifies two major reasons, by which to explain this

³ Anna Bramwell, *The Fading of the Greens* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1994).

phenomenon. Firstly, the Greens - at least in Germany - are not really 'Green', but rather a group of radicals more concerned with other issues. Secondly, a key component of the German Greens' theoretical framework - the so-called 'convergence theory', which postulated that capitalism and socialism as practised in the Soviet Union, would eventually converge, received a serious blow with the emergence of the Eastern Greens. Ill-prepared for the collapse of the USSR and highly critical of the Eastern 'solution' to environmental problems: namely to introduce elements of capitalism, compounded with the deaths of Petra Kelly and Gert Bastian, the German Greens went into decline and brought Greens elsewhere in Europe with them.

Although it is tempting to draw general conclusions about the Greens as an international movement in decline, the reasons for why the Greens at least in Ukraine are losing their support, are very different from those of West European Greens. I have identified these reasons above. Paradoxically, one might argue that the West European Greens in general and the German Greens in particular, have indirectly contributed to the decline of the Ukrainian Green Movement by influencing some members of *Zelenyi Svit* and thus causing conflicts with those favouring a more 'Ukrainian' approach to environmental problems. The West European Greens might also have fuelled conflicts between 'Ukrainians' and 'globalists' within the Ukrainian Green Movement by claiming to represent Green values and having monopoly on how to interpret the key concepts and principles of the international Green Movement. Initially, the Ukrainian Greens were accused of 'nationalism' and their solutions to Ukrainian environmental problems were not always endorsed in the West. Although this changed (as seen in Chapter Five, discussion groups were set up within the framework of the European Greens to discuss problems Greens in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were faced with), the damage within the Ukrainian Green Movement had already been done. A more understanding approach towards the Greens of the former Soviet Union and their problems immediately after they emerged, could maybe have if not prevented, then at least reduced the tension between those wishing to establish a Green Movement and Party firmly rooted in the international tradition and those favouring a more 'Ukrainian' approach.

Bramwell also argues that a major reason why the Greens are in decline in the West, is that other political parties have taken 'on-board' some of the environmental policies of the Greens, thus reducing the need for Green Parties in the first place. Green groups, such as Friends of the Earth, which have specialised in lobbying, on the other hand, are doing well. In Ukraine, however, such an explanation for the decline of the Green Movement does not easily fit. As seen above, there has been a shift away from environmental issues in Ukrainian politics, the argument being that the environmental problems can only successfully be solved within a stable economic and political system, which has yet to be built in Ukraine. Thus, instead of co-opting the ideas of the Greens, Ukrainian political parties have temporarily distanced themselves from these ideas,

arguing that Ukraine at the moment are faced with more urgent economic and political issues, justifying a delay in solving the country's environmental problems. *Zelenyi Svit* has not succeeded in making the transition from mass movement to lobbyist, partly due to conflicts within the movement, partly due to the absence of a clear set of priorities and a strategy. *Greenpeace Ukraine* has taken over as 'the' Green Movement in Ukraine, both in terms of campaigns and lobbying of Ukrainian authorities. The Green Party, rather than spending its time and resources lobbying - for which there seems to be some potential (cf. survey conducted among Ukrainian Members of Parliament in 1994 by Heywood, Miller and White) - are still in the process of defining its own policies and staking out a strategy. A priority issue so far has been to mobilise support for the party and to gain access to local, regional and the Ukrainian parliament where decisions are made. *PZUP*'s failure to do so, might indicate that a shift towards lobbying might yield more results at a time when political parties are generally not very popular among the Ukrainian public and the Green Party is short of resources. Lobbying - especially if successful - might give the party more attention by the media and help remove the 'press release' image it has acquired over the last few years, which, in turn, might also bring desperately needed votes to the Green camp.

9.2 Is the Ukrainian Future Green?

Having assessed the impact of the Green Movement so far, it is only natural to try to make some predictions for the future of the Greens. This future will depend not only on general political and economic developments, but also to a large extent on internal developments both within the Green Movement and the Green Party. At present, the economy of Ukraine is in a dire state. According to calculations made by the IMF/World Bank, it will take not years, but decades before the economy stabilises and begins to grow. In the foreseeable future, the Ukrainian population is thus likely to be preoccupied with financial worries. In the quest to bring new investments and industries to Ukraine, there is also the chance that violations of environmental legislation will be handed lightly and that requirements to install emission devices to curtail hazardous emissions may not be enforced as rigorously as intended. As seen above, consensus to secure Ukrainian independence (and thus weaken its dependence on Russia) has already facilitated a reassessment of Ukrainian nuclear power policies and a decision to build an oil terminal in Odessa - both issues opposed by the Greens since the late 1980s. To turn this trend and change the basic idea that environmental issues can only successfully be addressed within a stable political and economic context to the idea that political and economic reform can only succeed if accompanied by

environmental reform, a powerful and united Green Movement is required, not a weak and fragmented one.

Although the focus of this thesis has been *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU*, *EkoMisiia* must also be taken into account when trying to identify future scenarios for the Ukrainian Green Movement as such. As far as I can see, this future will depend on the interrelationship between these three entities, and having this in mind, it is possible to identify three future scenarios which will be discussed in some detail below. I do, however, wish to stress that given the many uncertainties regarding future political and economic developments in Ukraine, any future predictions must both be made and treated with great care.

9.2.1 Closer Relations between *PZU* and the Green Movement.

Judging from the events of 1994 on the Green scene, this may be the most likely scenario. Iurii Samiilenko, of the *PZU*, is now Chairman of *Zelenyi Svit*, or rather of what remains of *Zelenyi Svit* following the split in December 1994. Although *Zelenyi Svit* has no doubt been weakened by losing Anatolii Zolotukhin and the Nikolaev Greens as well as local groups also in the East of Ukraine (Donetsk), those groups that arranged an alternative Congress and now lay claim to the name and the equipment of *Zelenyi Svit* are in a minority. Their claims - which according to Zolotukhin have the law on their side - thus are not very likely to succeed. Effectively, *Zelenyi Svit* will therefore continue to exist as an association predominantly of West Ukrainian and Kiev Greens - although strong chapters still exist in Dnepropetrovsk and Nikopol (Zaporizhzhenska AES). This 'new' *Zelenyi Svit*, if one may call it so, will be generally more favourable towards *PZU* and will work much closer with the Party than has been the case so far.

Several members of *PZU* have expressed the view that *Zelenyi Svit* has no future - i.e. it served a purpose in the late 1980s, but from an organisational point of view it will soon become an association of the past. The future, they claim, lay in a loose network of local/regional NGOs, and this network has now been established through *EkoMisiia*. In my view, however, the relationship between *EkoMisiia* and *Zelenyi Svit* is much more complex than this. One must remember that whereas *EkoMisiia* was not even known amongst all the chapters of *Zelenyi Svit* that attended the meeting of *Zelena Rada* in Kiev in early June 1994 (cf. survey results, Chapters Three and Four), it is even less known amongst the general public. *Zelenyi Svit*, on the other hand, is well known through its string of successful campaigns in the late 1980s/early 1990s. In polls featuring both *Zelenyi Svit* and *PZU*, the former have consistently scored one or two points higher than the latter - thus reflecting to some extent the electorate's general scepticism towards political parties but also

its high level of trust in an association which has actually done something to save the environment in Ukraine.

At a time when people are less concerned with environmental issues and when there is consensus amongst those parties represented in parliament that environmental issues should be dealt with at a later stage, it would be politically short-sighted for the Greens to bury *Zelenyi Svit* at the expense of *EkoMisia*. *PZU* needs *Zelenyi Svit* not only for its equipment and Kiev office, but also to gain political credibility. *PZU* can gain votes by having a united Green Movement behind it - and a Movement which is more likely to support the idea of *PZU* putting forward candidates for elections, rather than *Zelenyi Svit* doing so: in other words, a movement which accepts the Party's claim to act as the political wing of the Green Movement. The take-over of *Zelenyi Svit* by *PZU*, however, may in the end prove to be a double-edged sword.

In Nikolaev, for instance, Zolotukhin wrote a lengthy article in *Radianske Prihuzhzhia* prior to the presidential elections in December 1990, supporting the candidacy of Iurii Shcherbak. Privately, he was against the idea of Shcherbak running for the presidency and he also did not like the idea that he was standing as a candidate of the *PZU*. Although the *PZU* in Nikolaev was never taken very seriously by the leadership of *Zelenyj Mir*, members of *PZU* did participate in the movement. Given the split-up of *Zelenyi Svit*, relations locally between *Zelenyi Svit*-activists and *PZU* members are likely to cool. This may affect the standing of *PZU* in these areas.

The *PZU* is generally weak in the areas represented by the 'breakaway' Greens. In these areas *Zelenyi Svit* activists are opposed to the Party since, as far as they are concerned, it is the Movement which has done the work and the Party which is trying to benefit from its efforts. Both Viktor Bilodid and Anatolii Zolotukhin in interviews with the author in 1994 stressed that the Greens locally did not really need *Zelenyi Svit* centrally for any other purpose than being able to put forward candidates to the local elections as only all-Ukrainian associations/organisations held this right. Thus, whereas the Nikolaev Greens did not need - nor got - any help from Kiev in conducting their campaign to save South Bug, *Zelenyi Svit* in Kiev frequently referred to the struggle to save South Bug as one of its major victories.

Zolotukhin has in later years held a key position within the Green Movement as the head of the Alternative Energy Commission. Although this position has later been taken over by Anatolii Panov, who has also played a key role on anti-nuclear issues within the Green Movement, it seems that *Zelenyj Svit* is likely to suffer from the loss of well-known activists, from whose resources it will no longer benefit. Whether or not the split with 'Kiev' will weaken those groups which left, remains to be seen. *Zelenyj Mir* in Nikolaev has existed as a rather autonomous movement within the movement since it was set up, so there is no reason to think that its day-to-day work will be affected by last year's events. The future for the Donetsk Greens, on the other hand, seems

somewhat more uncertain. If it can maintain working links with the other Green groups that left *Zelenyi Svit* no great damage may be done. If not, however, it may be difficult to maintain its work. Bagin's group is small and operates in an environment that is rather hostile to the Greens. Without the back-up from Kiev or technical support from *ISAR* via *Zelenyi Svit* in Kiev, it could be difficult to maintain the movement in its present form.

If the split that took place in *Zelenyi Svit* has put a stop to personal conflicts and rows inside the movement, then the potential is there for *Zelenyi Svit* to regain some of the strength it used to have. *ISAR*, *Milieucontact Oosteuropa* and other Western organisations offering grants and technical assistance are probably going to be more willing to support the work of *Zelenyi Svit* if it sticks to its issues rather than being unable to act due to personal strife. What is more, many young people that I spoke to while in Kiev had either left or were thinking of leaving *Zelenyi Svit* because they could no longer stand all the conflicts. Many of these people spent considerable time doing voluntary unpaid work in the association's Kiev office. To gain the support of younger people, young activists are a must. This can be seen from the case of *Greenpeace Ukraine*, whose activists are all young, and who manage to mobilise various youth groups for its campaigns. As shown above, the average age of *Zelenyi Svit*'s activists is between forty and fifty years old - which is considerably higher than for most Green Movements in Western Europe. Fresh ideas, enthusiasm and a dynamic approach is needed, to revitalise *Zelenyi Svit* and give it a higher profile.

9.2.2 Equal Relations between *PZU* and the Green Movement.

The second possible scenario is that of the Green Party and the Green Movement reaching mutual agreement on a relationship between themselves based on mutual respect and non-interference in each other's affairs. This is a scenario wanted originally by those groupings within *Zelenyi Svit* who were sceptical of *PZU* and also - at least officially - by *PZU* Chairman Vitalii Kononov. Judging by the *EkoMisia* Founding Conference, this view also seems to be predominant amongst those Greens who joined the new network. Such a relationship would be in line with that of Green Movements and Green Parties in the West. In cases where the *PZU* and the Green Movement have views that coincide, they would work together, whereas in other areas they would work independently of one another.

A prerequisite for harmonious relations between movement and party, however, is a strong party and a reasonably strong movement - financially as well as in terms of public support. As long as the Law on Political Parties in Ukraine put so many obstacles in the way for political

parties in terms of generating funds for their activities, the party is bound to seek the support of environmental groups and organisations. As long as these groups are favourably disposed towards the party (cf. *Mama-86*), this poses no big problem. If the movement is ambiguous, though, as has been the case with *Zelenyi Svit*, problems will inevitably arise.

Another factor which further complicates matters is, as seen above, the obstacles the 1994 Election Law puts in front of small political parties wishing to put forward their own candidates for national, regional and local elections. It is thus easier for political movements to put forward candidates than it is for the parties and this may of course cause potential conflicts if the Green Movement (i.e. *Zelenyi Svit*) chooses to put forward its own candidates in areas where *PZU* candidates are running either as independents or as party representatives. This potential conflict is likely to remain in place as long as there is disagreement within the Green Movement as to whether the party can legitimately claim to be the political wing of the Green Movement. With *Zelenyi Svit* now being run by Samiilenko and with the remaining activists being positively adjusted towards the *PZU* this conflict of perceived interests will no doubt be reduced. Whether or not it will be completely eradicated will depend on how the breakaway Greens will relate to *PZU* in the future.

Given the hostility expressed by these Greens towards *PZU* before and also after the split of *Zelenyi Svit* it does not seem likely that the relationship between them will get better in the short term. Whereas the conflict between *PZU* and groups within *Zelenyi Svit* earlier was confined to *Zelenyi Svit*, it now may become more visible to the general public as well, should the 'breakaway' Greens decide to attack *PZU* in public for the split of *Zelenyi Svit*. If this happens, it is likely to do quite a lot of damage to the movement and also - maybe more so - to *PZU*. One of the reasons why the Greens score so high in opinion polls is that people trust the Greens much more than other political movements and parties - for constructive action rather than political philandering. Should it become widely known that also the Greens have fallen prey to personal ambitions and power struggles, this may harm the Greens' standing with the general public.

I mentioned that an amicable relationship between the Green Movement and Green Party can only be built provided that both party and movement are strong. Due to current legislation, the Green Party is not likely to become any stronger in the near future. As pointed out by numerous observers of the Ukrainian political system, public support of political parties remains low - with only slightly under one third of the electorate expressing favourable attitudes towards the political parties and a majority favouring independent candidates. This is, as explained above, much due to the general lack of trust in parties and in politicians.

As for the Green Movement, the situation is somewhat more complex. Some of the groups linked together in *EkoMistia* although small, are quite resourceful (for instance *Mama-86*,

Unicorn) and have the potential to get further strengthened through assistance from *ISAR* and *Milieucontact*. These groups do not aim at mobilising large groups of people against any environmentally hazardous projects, but rather lobby policy makers with facts and figures. *Unicorn*, for instance, produces *WEISE Newsbulletin* on behalf of EYFA (Holland) - a bulletin which is being distributed free in political circles, the costs of which are covered by EYFA. In this respect, some of these groups are more similar to Western green groups, whose main function is lobbying.

Zelenyi Svit, on the other hand, is as of today a weak movement, which has not yet managed to readjust itself - at least as a national association - to the changing political and economic realities of today's Ukraine. There is no clear conception of how *Zelenyi Svit* should operate in the future and no strategy as to where money should come from. Unless some compromise can be found between *Zelenyi Svit* and breakaway *Zelenyi Svit* the struggle for the name and facilities of *Zelenyi Svit* will continue. The most likely outcome of this conflict is, as outlined in the section above, that the majority *Zelenyi Svit* will remain as *Zelenyi Svit*, whereas the breakaway movement will either try to organise itself as an alternative movement, trying to attract other environmental NGOs to themselves, or dissolve breakaway *Zelenyi Svit* and operate on their own, locally. It does, however, seem likely that *Zelenyi Svit* as an all-Ukrainian organisation will be further weakened by this struggle - in the sense that efforts to modernise the movement will be postponed prior to some kind of solution being found.

Thus, although this scenario is the most likely one in the longer term, it seems more likely that the first scenario is more probable in the near future - unless, as a result of the general political and economic situation (i.e. no amendments in legislation, no improvement in financial situation of Greens), *PZU*'s and the Green Movement's situation does not improve and the Greens do not manage to turn the trend away from environmental issues becoming a secondary issue towards a situation where the environment is treated on an equal footing with politics and the economy - in which case a general weakening of the Ukrainian Greens may take place.

9.2.3 An overall Weakening of the Ukrainian Greens.

This scenario - although not a pleasant one for either the Green Party or the Green Movement - cannot be excluded. Current trends would seem to support it, given that *PZU* has exhausted its financial resources from the election campaigns of 1994, was not successful in having any MPs elected to Verkhovna Rada, *Zelenyi Svit* has split and environmental issues are no longer perceived as being as important as they were only a few years ago.

However, there are ways in which this situation can be avoided. If *PZU* can gain access to office equipment, paper, etc. and if the data-bank on the environment, about which party representatives have spoken for quite some time, is eventually created, *PZU* could try to influence decision making in parliament through lobbying - by providing MPs with alternative data on issues being put on the parliament's agenda. As seen in Chapter Eight, the new MPs are generally positive towards the Greens. This could prove a useful starting point for *PZU* to make a political 'comeback'. While not being a part of the parliament they do not risk discrediting themselves in the face of the electorate, while at the same time being able to say - should they be successful in lobbying - that favourable decisions were passed by parliament due to external pressure from the Greens. The Greens have not been represented in parliament before but still influenced the political agenda in Ukraine through ad-hoc activities and lobbying. Even though it would have been desirable for the Greens to be represented in the present parliament in that so much legislation not directly dealing with environmental issues, but in one way or the other affecting the environment, is to be passed, this fact in itself does not have to be a disaster for the Green Party. There is also the prospect - although small it may seem - that the present parliament will change the Electoral Law and the Law on Political Parties, so that it will become easier to raise funds and easier to become elected (by means of proportional representation) at the next parliamentary elections. Besides, *PZU* is represented in local, regional and oblast parliaments, and this is a good starting point in terms of making politicians better known to the electorate, building stronger local party groups and generally mobilise for the next elections.

A major problem facing not only *PZU* but also *Zelenyi Svit* is how to spread information about themselves. The newspaper *Zelenyi svit* is still running - but with reduced staff and with a limited number of issues (see Chapter Four). It has become a problem for *PZU* to attract journalists to its numerous press conferences where the party's views on this or the other matter are presented. However, as was the case during the big Green mobilisation against President Kravchuk's decree on the future of Ukrainian nuclear power, when *PZU*, *Zelenyi Svit*, *Greenpeace* and other environmental groups pulled together (April 1994), a larger number of journalists as well as TV were present and the issue did get some coverage in the press the following days. Similarly, Ukrainian TV did a feature story of the founding of *EkoMistia* in May 1994. Thus, the potential to attract the attention of the media is there. However, a change of strategy may be required and this of course costs money. The press would be more likely to cover round-table conferences on environmental issues, educational presentations of the dangers of nuclear power, chemical pollution and the like, than it is to reiterate press releases and were not so well conducted press conferences staged by *PZU*. Such venues may be beyond *PZU*'s means at the moment, but may be used with some gain in the future, should its economic situation improve.

With regard to *Zelenyi Svit* the present situation may also be reversed. *ISAR* and *Milieucontact Oosteuropa* do not only support Kiev-based groups and organisations. Thus, the breakaway Greens may very well be able to exist in terms of financial arrangements through grants and various equipment provided from abroad. In Nikolaev, for instance, some success has also been made in terms of obtaining economic support from local benefactors (shareholder group). Similarly, the Kiev office of *Zelenyi Svit* may also fare better once the conflicts come to an end and activists can again concentrate their efforts around the environment. *Zelenyi Svit* has got the advantage of being well known and of having able activists, who have taken part in its work since the very beginning. A majority of those polled during the meeting of *Zelena Rada* in June 1994 stressed the importance of education in improving the state of the environment in Ukraine. Several environmental 'schools' and other educational establishments have been started and there are many people within *Zelenyi Svit* who have their own, highly original and interesting ideas on this issue.

EkoMisiia consists of small, relatively strong green NGOs, which have good contacts with Western Green organisations and who are not likely to become weaker in the near future. These groups - through the obtaining of grants - are able to pay their members for the work they do, and I was told that this made it a lot easier for activists to give time and effort to the movement, as they did not have to spend time worrying about their personal economic situation - unlike unpaid volunteers. Well-organised movements also find it easier to recruit new members than did for instance *Zelenyi Svit* when disputes and quarrels were at their worst. And even more importantly, these groups have been rather more successful in persuading young people join them. Thus, the situation is not as bleak as it might appear at first sight.

9.3 The Importance of Ecological Education in Strengthening the Green Movement in Ukraine.

I have now outlined three different possible future scenarios for the Green Movement of Ukraine. Which one of these - if any - will in the end materialise remains to be seen. There is potential for a revival and strengthening of the Green Movement if it succeeds in lobbying on environmental issues and for a second time mobilise the people against nuclear power, but there is also the chance that the Greens will fail to do so, in which case some kind of decline seems likely. To secure a long-term, strong and stable Green Movement, however, a long-term strategy of environmental education to win the younger generations over must be adopted. Older members of *Zelenyi Svit* have in private conversations said that their generation is a 'lost' generation in that it does not possess an environmental or ecological culture.

In Chapter Eight surveys were referred to in which the environment was pushed down the list of issues causing most concern among respondents, as the economic situation in Ukraine worsened. Polls covering only environmental issues do, however, show that there is considerable concern among people with regard to the environment. And there is more concern among people living in the close vicinity of nuclear power stations⁴ and in the industrialised East than in other parts of the country. Moreover, people living in Kiev are particularly concerned with the environment.

A survey⁵ published in *Narodnoe khoziastvo Ukrainskoi SSR v 1989 godu* (published in 1990), for instance, gave the following result:

Table 9.1 Oblast and Environmental Concern (in %)

⁴ See for instance, Woodstock Leasing Limited. Press Release: 10 Years after Chernobyl - Opinion of Ukrainian Elite. One in three think high chance of repeat, 2.4.1996, p. 2. The survey, conducted by the Ukrainian Surveys & Market Research (USM), indicate that concern is higher and more people are in favour of closing the Chernobyl nuclear power station in the Central region, where it is located, than elsewhere in Ukraine: Only 35% in the Central region think Chernobyl should continue to operate, whereas 56% in the South and 57% in the West hold the same view.

⁵ The survey referred to asked the respondents to rank a list of eight problems according to their seriousness. For Ukraine, the environment ranked third, after price increases and shortage of food products. In heavily industrialised and polluted areas such as Dnipropetrovsk and Kiev, the environment was considered the most important issue. This was the case also in Rivne, where there was considerable concern over the Rivne and Khmelnytskyi nuclear power stations - the former situated in the oblast and the latter, in neighbouring Khmelnytskyi oblast. In Khmelnytskyi and Odessa, where campaigns against the Khmelnytskyi nuclear power station and the Odessa Nuclear Thermal Power Station had taken place, the environment was ranked second, after price increases. In Nikolaev and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, where there were big nuclear power stations and the most active and successful Greens campaigning against nuclear power could be found, concern with the environment was not so high. The reason for this might be that at the time of the poll, resolution No. 647 had just been passed in Nikolaev, thus limiting expansion of the South Ukrainian Energy Complex. The Nikopol Greens were also campaigning successfully against further expansion of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station. In Chernivtsy, a large number of children fell ill with alopecia in 1989, thought to be caused by thallium poisoning (see Chapter Three). This no doubt explains the exceptionally high concern there with environmental pollution.

Oblast	Concern about the Environment
Ukraine	14.6
Dnipropetrovsk	18.8
Donetsk	12.4
Sumy	16.4
Luhansk	13.0
Poltava	11.9
Kharkiv	5.6
Zaporizhzhia	14.1
Zhytomyr	14.5
Chernihiv	13.2
Kiev oblast	13.1
Kiev	24.0
Vinnitsia	11.5
Cherkassy	19.7
Kirovohrad	8.9
Volynia	8.4
Lviv	12.7
Ivano-Frankivsk	13.3
Ternopil	19.0
Zakarpattia	7.2
Chernivtsy	39.6
Rivne	20.0
Khmelnitskyi	22.6
Nikolaev	11.5
Odessa	14.4
Kherson	18.6
Crinca	7.7

Based on data in Narodnoe khoziaistvo Ukrainskoi SSR v 1989 godu (Kiev, 1990), p. 14.

Moreover, a survey conducted in April 1990 by VTsIOM, revealed that 57.6% of the Soviet population was favourable to the environmental movements and would be ready to take part in their work. Only Societies protecting architectural and cultural monuments scored higher than the Greens, and the nationalist movements were well behind, with only 33.1% support. Only 1.3% of the respondents were negative to the Green Movement and only a small minority had not heard about the Greens (14.0%). Whereas only 1.7% of the respondents were members of Green groups, as many as 25.7% expressed readiness to participate in the activities of the Greens⁶.

More recently, SOCIS conducted a series of focus group discussions with the public regarding the environment and found that, although people are resigned to the fact that Ukraine simply cannot afford to close its nuclear power stations and does not have enough money to effectively address the country's environmental problems, the environment is an issue that causes concern.

⁶ Воссоединный Центр Изучения Общественного Мнения по Социально-Экономическим Вопросам при ВЦСПС и Госкомтруде СССР (ВЦИОМ), *Общественное мнение в цифрах. Информационное издание ВЦИОМ*, выпуск 9 (16), апрель 1990, с. 7.

People are particularly concerned about nuclear power and more so than in other European countries, partly due to the Chernobyl accident and partly due to nuclear waste being shipped from Western countries to Ukraine for storage. There is also considerable concern with chemical waste exported from the West to Ukraine⁷. The latter is an issue that *Greenpeace Ukraine* has campaigned successfully on since 1994. A survey conducted by the Ukrainian Surveys & Market Research in 1996 among members of the Ukrainian elite (Members of Parliament, the Ukrainian Government, top managers of Ukraine's most important enterprises and organisations, representatives of mass media, academia, cultural and religious organisations), found that high percentages feared another Chernobyl disaster. One third held the view that nuclear power stations are dangerous and that 'an accident can happen "any time, at any place"'⁸.

Thus, although economic problems are causing people the most concern at the moment, this does not mean that people are not worried about the state of the environment and about nuclear power in Ukraine. The challenge to the Greens is how to 'activate' and mobilise this concern and bring the environment back on the country's political agenda. As seen in the previous chapters, there is a set of thoughts about the environment both in the former USSR and in Ukraine, which together form an 'eco-culture' and which not only contributed to the emergence of the Green Movements in Ukraine, but also elsewhere (Russia and Belorussia), which was used as a point of reference by Greens during their campaign, and to which people responded positively and en masse (see Chapters Six and Seven). There is of course a large number of people who do not share this reverence for the natural environment and who fail to see Man's part in Nature as that of an equal to other species with which he interacts. But as the polls referred to above indicate, the general process of de-emphasising environmental issues which has taken place in Ukraine since 1991 should not be regarded as an abandoning act.

As shown in the previous chapter, referring to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, basic needs must be covered prior to people seeking to cover higher order needs. While Ukraine was still part of the USSR, the state of the environment was such a basic need, given that plans to expand nuclear power in Ukraine despite the accident at Chernobyl, as perceived by the Greens and large segments of the Ukrainian population, posed a threat to the very existence of Ukraine's territory and of the people living upon it. With Ukrainian independence and the possibility of buying safer nuclear reactors from the West (cf. Kendu-reactor scheme suggested by Kravchuk) and with economic problems soaring, day-to-day survival became more important to many people - one survey indicated that most Ukrainians could not even afford to eat a meal in their lunch breaks. As

⁷ Nikolay Churilov and Tatyana Koshechkina, 'Public Attitudes in Ukraine', in Richard Smoke (ed.), *Perceptions of Security. Public Opinion and Expert Assessments in Europe's New Democracies* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1996), pp. 191-92.

⁸ See *Ukrainian Elite. One in three think high chance of repeat*, 2.4.1996, p. 2.

seen above, however, the potential concern with environmental issues is still there. People are still keen that the physical environment be preserved for their children and grand children and they are worried about the link between environmental pollution and health.

Locally, for instance in Nikolaev, where people are still concerned with the future of the SB EK, *Zelenyj Mir* succeeded in having three of its representatives elected to the oblast parliament in June 1994. Although this is a reduction of six from the previous parliament, it is still - given the difficult economic situation - a reflection of people's concern. If PZU could develop a more comprehensive economic and political programme showing the link between the environment, the economy and politics more generally, and convince people that improving their economic situation is not incompatible with improving the state of the environment, but on the contrary, would enhance economic reform, support could improve.

In the long run, however, no strategy can beat the need for environmental education. There is still much ignorance concerning the direct links between pollutants, the natural environment and health in the population as such and although some steps have been taken to introduce the environment as a topic at local schools in Ukraine, an enormous job lies ahead. Various groups within *EkoMistia* and also *Zelenyi Svit* have started such work, approaching the issue in different ways. Whereas *Unicorn* and *Dytyna Dovkillia*, for instance are translating Western materials into Ukrainian and using them to teach children respect for the environment (*Milieukontakt Oosteuropa*, for instance, has developed an environmental education package that it provides free of charge to Ukrainian groups interested), often some *Zelenyi Svit* members are teaching children the thoughts of Ivanov. Younger members of *Zelenyi Svit* who used to be active in the *druzhyny* prior to the emergence of the latter and who are educated in the natural sciences have a firm understanding of the ideas of Vernadskii. As seen above, *Zelenyi Svit* is also in the process of introducing old environmental rites like blessing trees to re-establish a link to the past as concerns the environment and the newspaper *Zelenyi Svit* has its own environmental pages for children and grown-ups where old habits and ways of coexisting with the environment are being re-explored.

In my view, all these attempts at educating not only the children but also the older generation in the sphere of the environment are valuable. I do, however, particularly value attempts at rediscovering and passing on those elements of the past (philosophy, science, literature, religious rites and cultural habits) which have earlier been referred to as 'eco-culture'. The Green device is 'act locally, think globally'. As shown above, traditional Ukrainian thinking on the environment is in no way inferior to that of Western green thinkers - on the contrary - the ideas of Vernadskii on the 'Noosphere' in many ways preceded such thinking, which has only in the last three decades taken off in the West, and in scope actually goes beyond many of these theories. I therefore see in this Ukrainian eco-culture a great potential not only for creating environmental awareness amongst

the Ukrainian population, but also to fill the spiritual vacuum that the collapse of the USSR and the rejection of communism by which it was preceded, caused among large segments of not only the Ukrainian, but also other former Soviet population.

Traditional thinking on the environment is not only a limited set of thoughts teaching people to care about the state of their natural environment. It is also a thinking which preaches respect and understanding for other people and how to live in harmony with oneself and one's surroundings (i.e. a new lifestyle, based on a different outlook). Although the Orthodox Church and its attitude towards the environment is part of this eco-culture, its potential appeal also to non-believers is obvious. In addition to spreading materials on this eco-culture, organising round-tables, public lectures and classes, the Greens could work with schools, encourage the church to educate worshippers on the link between Man and Nature, and lobby the Ministry of Education to use these ideas as a basis for environmental education all over Ukraine. Western organisations like *ISAR* and *Milieucontact Oosteuropa* on the other hand, could possibly give grants for research to be conducted on topics like 'Traditional Ukrainian thinking on the Environment', research on Vernadskii's concept of the 'Noosphere', on Skorovoda's idea of the Micro and Macro Cosmos and Ivanov's ideas. In this way, not only would we as Westerners acknowledge the great environmental legacy of pre-Soviet Slav thinkers, but also enlighten ourselves by broadening the scope of green thinking in the West. This is not least important given that the Ukrainians are a proud people and many are not so happy with simply taking on ideas and receive assistance from the West.

9.4 Conclusion

In conclusion, then, although the political and economic situation in Ukraine makes things harder for the Greens, and although the Green Movement (*PZU, Zelenyi Svit*) is weaker now than it was just a few years ago, the Greens do have a role to play in Ukrainian society and there are prospects for strengthening the movement in the future. The key to improving not only the situation for the Greens, but also the state of the environment lies in ecological education, i.e. in making people more aware of their own place in Nature as well as the value of a clean environment in itself. Then, as pointed out by Vernadskii:

В гущи, в интенсивности и в сложности современной жизни человек практически забывает, что он сам и все человечество, от которого он не может быть отделен, неразрывно связаны с биосферой — с определенной частью планеты, на которой они

живут. Они геологически закономерно связаны с ее материально-энергетической структурой⁹.

⁹ Г.П. Акослов (составитель), - Владимир Вернадский. Открытия и судьбы (Москва. "Современник", с. 508.

Appendix

The questionnaire below was distributed to representatives of 24 district and regional branches of *Zelenyi Svit* during a meeting of *Zelena Rada* (the Green Council) on 28-29 May 1994. Fourteen questionnaires were completed and returned - a response rate of 58.3 percent. Approximately half of these were returned to me during the session of *Zelena Rada*, whereas the other half were sent to me in self-addressed and pre-stamped envelopes.

Although the response rate was not large enough to draw far-reaching conclusions about the Ukrainian Green Movement as such, those groups which did respond were among the most active within *Zelenyi Svit*. Geographically, the respondents can be categorised into four more or less equally sized groups: West, South, Central and East Ukraine¹, thus allowing for comparison not only between groups, but also between groups representing different geographical areas. As will be seen below, a majority of the questions included in the questionnaire were open-ended. The opinions expressed by the different groups can thus be taken to reflect the views of district and regional groups in Ukraine. I have made extensive use of quotations from my survey in Chapters Three and Four, contrasting and complementing these with opinions expressed by Greens in Kiev. Three of the respondents to this survey were women, whereas eleven were men. Although this is not a balanced sample, it reflects the leadership structure of the district and regional organisations (all those responding to the survey were leaders of the groups they represented) and is still valid. As concerns age, most respondents were in the age group 'late thirties through to mid-50s', again reflecting the age structure at leadership level of *Zelenyi Svit*.

To the best of my knowledge nobody has previously surveyed district and regional *Zelenyi Svit* groups. Moreover, those works that already do exist on the Ukrainian Green Movement tend to adopt a 'Kiev' focus of events. Thus, although the sample for this survey is rather small, it is still valid as expressing the opinions of Greens throughout Ukraine and can be used to back up tentative conclusions about differences between Greens in the West and the East of Ukraine. Attending several meetings of *Mala Rada* in Kiev gave me insight into the relationship between representatives of a number of regional groups. Informal conversations with Greens representing not only Kiev were also useful in this respect. Responses for the survey support my understanding of the relationship between groups from the various regions and I therefore think making as much use of them as I have done, is justifiable.

The data from this survey have not been processed by the use of computer software such as *SPSS* (quantitative analysis) or *QRS NUD IST* (qualitative analysis) as the sample is simply too small for any benefit to be derived from such an exercise. Several of the respondents' replies are quoted directly in the thesis, thus presenting the reader with unprocessed data, whereas other data is presented in tabular form.

¹ The following groups responded to my survey:

- 1) West Ukraine: Ternopil oblast *Zelenyi Svit*, Mukachevo *Zelenyi Svit* (Zakarpattia oblast), Bukovina *Zelenyi Svit* (Chernivtsi oblast), Lutsk *Zelenyi Svit* (Lutsk oblast).
- 2) East Ukraine: Dnipropetrovsk oblast *Zelenyi Svit*, Horlivka *Zelenyi Svit* (Donetsk oblast), The Committee to Save the Azov Sea (Mariupol - Donetsk oblast).
- 3) Central Ukraine: Vinnytsia oblast *Zelenyi Svit*, Uman *Zelenyi Svit* (Cherkasy oblast).
- 4) South Ukraine: Nikolaev oblast *Zelenyi Mir*, Dzarylgach (Skarovsk) and the Eco-Center (Kherson oblast), the Odessa Greens (Odessa oblast).

Survey Questionnaire

Данные об организации

1. Название вашей организации:
2. Контактный адрес, телефон, факс, электронная почта:
3. Когда и каким образом ваша организация была создана:
4. Почему вы решили ее создать (из-за Чернобыля или по другим причинам)?
5. Если ваша организация создавалась до регистрации Зеленого Свита, то каким образом вы вступили в контакт с (инициативной группой) Зеленым Свитом?
- 5а. Если ваша организация создавалась после регистрации Зеленого Свита, была ли она создана по инициативе Зеленого Свита? Получили ли вы какую-нибудь помощь для создания вашей организации?
6. Как относилась Коммунистическая Партия к созданию и деятельности вашей организации?
 - а. положительно
 - б. не мешала нам работать
 - в. мешала нам работать
 - г. негативно

По возможности, уточните пожалуйста свою позицию:

7. Какие у вас были отношения к местным властям, к обществу охраны природы, к ДООПу (дружинам)?

Членство

1. Сколько у вас членов?
2. По возможности, уточните, пожалуйста, сколько приблизительно (в процентах) из них
 - а. женщины
 - б. мужчины

3. Кто ваши члены по возрасту?

Возрасть

Количество в процентах

ниже 20

20-25

25-35

35-45

45-55

старше 55

4. Сколько членов вашей организации имеют

а. университетское образование

б. высшее образование

в. среднее и специальное образование

г. другое образование

5. Если сравнить количество членов вашей организации сегодня с самым началом, то

а. оно упало

б. осталось таким же

в. оно возросло

6. Почему, по нашему мнению, членство вашей организации упало/осталось таким же/возросло?

7. Каким образом вы можете привлечь к себе новых членов активистов?

Деятельность вашей организации

1. Какими вопросами интересуется ваша группа?

2. Какие акции вы провели после создания своей организации?

3. Проводили ли вы совместно с "Киевом" (т.е. с руководством Зеленого свита) какие-нибудь акции? В случае если да, то какие акции?

4. Получили ли вы когда-нибудь какую-нибудь поддержку или помощь из Киева?

Если да, то какую помощь и по чьей инициативе?

Если нет, обратились ли вы когда-нибудь в Киев с просьбой оказать вам помощь? В случае отказа, то какой ответ вы получили?

5. Сотрудничаете/сотрудничали ли вы когда-нибудь с другими (зелеными) организациями?

а. Да: С кем вы сотрудничаете/сотрудничали и по каким вопросам?

б. Нет: Почему вы ни с кем не сотрудничаете/сотрудничали?

6. С каким выражением вы более согласны:

а. Зеленый свит должен быть полностью независимым

б. Зеленый свит должен сотрудничать с теми организациями и с теми людьми, которые поддерживают его экологические цели независимо от их политических убеждений/взглядов.

- в. Зеленый свет должен близко сотрудничать с ПЗУ, так как ПЗУ является политическим крылом Зеленого света.
- г. Зеленый свет должен поддерживать национал-демократические силы, так как самое главное, это национальное и экологическое возрождение Украины.

Отношение ЗС к ПЗУ

1. Как члены вашей организации относились к созданию ПЗУ?
 - а. положительно
 - б. в основном положительно
 - в. некоторые были положительно настроены, другие были против
 - г. в основном отрицательно
 - д. отрицательно
2. Какие должны быть отношения между Зеленым Светом и ПЗУ?
 - а. близкие
 - б. нейтральные
 - в. минимальные
3. Считаете ли вы нужным или желательным существование Партии Зеленых?
4. Приблизительно сколько членов (в процентах) вашей организации являются одновременно членами ПЗУ?
5. Нуждается ли зеленое движение в политическом флаге в виде ПЗУ?
6. Как вы оцениваете работу ПЗУ по отношению к Зеленому Свету?
7. Как вы оцениваете деятельность ПЗУ в политической жизни Украины?

Стратегия и методы работы

1. Какие методы вы используете в своей деятельности?
 - а. пикетирование
 - б. митинги, демонстрации
 - в. сбор подписей
 - г. статьи в газетах и журналах
 - д. выступления по телевидению и радио
 - е. конференции и круглые столы
 - ж. работа с депутатами, государственными органами власти (например, Минприродой)
 - з. депутатская работа
 - и. противозаконные акции (так называемый экосаботаж), чтобы привлечь к себе внимание
 - й. другое (уточните, пожалуйста, именно какое):
2. Если сравнить сегодняшние методы вашей деятельности с теми методами, по которым вы работали в самом начале своей деятельности, то можно сказать, что они
 - а. изменились
 - б. остались такими же

Если ваш подход и ваши методы изменились, скажите пожалуйста почему и каким образом:

Если ваши методы не изменились, скажите пожалуйста почему:

5. Считаете ли вы, что ваши методы являются достаточно эффективными?

- а. да
- б. не знаю
- в. нет

6. Если вы считаете, что ваши методы не являются самыми эффективными, почему вы не начали работать по другим методам?

- а. средств не хватает для этого
- б. количество активистов недостаточно
- в. не хватает оборудования
- г. слабые связи
- д. другие причины (уточните, пожалуйста):

7. Какие методы работы более эффективны для решения экологических проблем в Украине сегодня?

- а. пикетирование
- б. митинги, демонстрации
- в. сбор подписей
- г. статьи в газетах и журналах
- д. выступления по телевизору и радио
- е. конференции и круглые столы
- ж. работа с депутатами и государственными органами
- и. депутатская работа
- й. экосаботаж
- к. другое (уточните, пожалуйста):

8. Какой должна быть структура у Зеленого Свита

- а. вертикальной
- б. горизонтальной

Уточните, пожалуйста, свою позицию:

9. Довольны ли вы сегодняшней структурой Зеленого Свита?

- а. да
- б. нет

Если вы недовольны, в чем недостатки этой структуры?

10. Есть мнение, что теперь Зеленый Свит, как "зонтик" экологических групп больше не нужен: чтобы работать эффективно, зеленые должны налаживать контакты друг с другом на прямую.

Вы

- а. согласны
- б. не согласны

Уточните, пожалуйста, свою позицию:

11. Слышали ли вы об Экомисии?

- а. да
- б. нет

Если вы о ней слышали, то как вы к этой инициативой относитесь?

- а. положительно
- б. нейтрально
- в. отрицательно

12. Чем офис Зеленого Свита в Киеве вам помогает?

- а. доступом к информации
- б. связями с другими организациями
- в. советами
- г. оборудованием/доступом к оборудованию
- д. канцелярской поддержкой
- ж. финансовой помощью
- з. лоббизмом
- и. ничем не помогает

13. Если вы не довольны работой офиса Зеленого Свита, то как, по вашему мнению, можно улучшить работу офиса?

- а. улучшение связей с местными организациями
- б. больше кадров
- в. больше оборудования
- г. больше денег
- д. другое (уточните, пожалуйста):

14. Какие вопросы являются самыми главными для Зеленого Свита сегодня? Укажите, пожалуйста, свои предпочтения, нумеруя их с 1 (самого главного) по 11.

- а. вопрос о ядерной энергетике
- б. загрязнение рек и озер
- в. загрязнение воздуха
- г. загрязнение почвы
- д. употребление пестицидов и ядохимикатов в сельском хозяйстве
- е. импорт токсичных веществ в Украину из других стран
- ж. экологическое воспитание детей
- з. общественная экологическая экспертиза
- и. правовые аспекты экологии
- й. обработка концепции сбалансированного развития Украины
- к. другое (уточните, пожалуйста):

15. Есть мнение, что зеленое движение в Украине находится в глубоком кризисе. Вы

- а. согласны
- б. не согласны
- в. затрудняйтесь ответить

16. Если зеленое движение находится в кризисном состоянии, то как можно выйти из этого положения?

Финансирование

1. Как вы финансируете свою деятельность?

- а. членские взносы
- б. финансовая деятельность (через малые предприятия итд.)
- в. продажа символов (наклейки, значки, плакаты, итд.)
- г. гранты
- д. никак: это большая проблема

2. Каким образом, по вашему мнению, можно улучшить финансовое положение вашей организации?

3. Как вы относитесь к тому, что в последнее время проявились иностранные организации (например, ИСАР, Фонд Сороса), которые готовы финансировать деятельность украинских зеленых, помочь с оборудованием, итд.?

- а. положительно
- б. в принципе положительно, хотя есть опасение в том, что мы станем зависимыми от них
- в. желательно получить гранты от украинских спонсоров, однако пока нет такой возможности
- г. отрицательно

Депутаты

1. Есть ли у вас зеленые депутаты в местной областной раде? Если есть, сколько их и как вы с ними сотрудничаете?

2. Если у вас нет своих депутатов, есть ли депутаты, с которыми вы можете сотрудничать?

3. Довольны ли вы работой зеленых в местной областной раде?

- а. да
- б. в основном доволен/довольна
- в. и доволен/довольна и не доволен/довольна
- г. не очень доволен/довольна
- д. в основном не доволен/недовольна
- е. нет

4. Будет ли ваша организация участвовать в местных выборах 26 июня? Если да, сколько у вас кандидатов в депутаты, какие у вас приоритеты и стратегии?

Экология и культура

1. Что вы понимаете под термином "экологическая культура"?
2. Включает ли термин "экологическая культура" такие понятия как национальная культура и народные традиции?
 - а. да
 - б. нет
 - в. трудно сказать
3. Какова была у вас позиция по идеи возрождения украинской культуры, традиций и украинской нации в первые годы деятельности вашей группы?
 - а. эта идея сыграла большую роль.
 - б. эта идея сыграла роль.
 - в. эта идея сыграла маленькую роль
 - г. эта идея сыграла минимальную роль
 - д. эта идея нам не казалась
4. Согласны ли вы со следующей точкой зрения: зеленое движение Украины возникло только из-за Чернобыля
 - а. согласен/согласна
 - б. не согласен/не согласнаУточните, пожалуйста, свою позицию:
5. Считаете ли вы, что улучшение экологической обстановки в Украине возможно:
 - а. только через политику
 - б. в основном через влияние на политические решения касающиеся экологии
 - в. в основном при экологическом воспитании и восстановлении украинской культуры
 - г. только при восстановлении украинской культуры
 - д. при восстановлении гордость к украинской нации
 - е. только тогда, когда человек чувствует себе хозяином своей земли
 - ж. не знаю, как это лучше сделать
6. До создания своей организации, читали ли вы когда нибудь произведения украинских советских писателей, где речь шла о бережном отношении к природе?
Если да, запишите, пожалуйста, названия этих произведений.
7. Слышали ли вы о борьбе русских писателей против проекта переброски северных рек или о борьбе против канала Волга-Чограй?
8. Слышали ли вы о подобных "акциях" творческой интеллигенции и ученых в Украине?
9. Считаете ли вы, что деятельность писателей в области охраны природы в какой-то степени способствовала созданию зеленого движения в Украине?
 - а. да
 - б. нет

Если да, то в чем их заслуга:

10. Думали ли вы об охране природы до аварии в Чернобыле?
11. Если вы интересовались природоохранными вопросами до Чернобыля, то по каким причинам? Имели ли вы доступ к какой-нибудь информации в этой области?
12. В чем ваши сегодняшние проблемы отличаются от проблем, с которыми вы сталкивались в своей деятельности в СССР?
13. Если сравнить вашу деятельность в СССР с деятельностью в независимой Украине, то где вам (было) легче работать?
- а. в СССР
 - б. в независимой Украине
 - в. нет разницы: так же сложно
 - г. затрудняюсь ответить

Bibliography

The bibliography below consists of two main sections - 'primary sources' and 'secondary sources'. For reasons of clarity, I have listed Russian, Ukrainian, English and German source materials separately from one another. Some of the documents and (newspaper) articles consulted for this thesis were either not dated and/or had no page number. No date is indicated as (n.d.), whereas no page number is indicated as (n.p.).

Primary Sources

Archival Materials

The following fonds were consulted in the Ukrainian State Archives for Public Movements in Kiev in the spring/summer of 1994:

Фонд No. 1, опис¹ no. 3, справо No. 233.

Фонд no. 1, опис No. 10, справо No. 939.
опись No.10, дело No. 1632.
опис No. 10, справо No. 2114.

Фонд No. 1, опис No. 25, справо No. 179.
справо No. 2414.
справо No. 2735.
справо No. 3084.
справо No. 3139.
справо No. 3147.
справо No. 3347.
справо No. 43-b.

Фонд No. 1, опис No. 32, справо No. 233.
справо No. 243.
справо No. 369.
справо No. 372.
справо No. 407 (I).

The following files were consulted in the Nikolaev oblast State Archives for Public Movements in June 1994:

¹ In Ukrainian 'opis' is written without the soft sign. Further, instead of 'delo', the Ukrainians use 'sprava'. Documents in the Archives in Kiev were partly in Ukrainian, partly in Russian. Where documents used appeared in Russian, they are referred to in the Russian terms.

Папка 30: Резолюции митингов, собраний жителей, коллективов предприятий, общественных организаций о запрещении строительства Тапликского и Александровского водохранилищ, 4-5 блоков ЮУ АЭС и др.

Папка 65: Обращения, воззвания экологической ассоциации, телеграммы от жителей и коллективов предприятий Николаевщины об угрозе уничтожения Южного Буга, строительства 4-6 блоков Южноукраинской АЭС и др., 1988-90.

Папка 66: Тексты выступлений по телевидению, докладов членов ЭА, письма трудящихся в защиту природы и разумного развития атомной энергетики.

Interviews

In 1990, 1991, 1992 and 1994 I conducted a series of interviews with activists of *Zelenyi Svit*, *PZU* and other individuals related to the Green Movement. The following interviews are referred to specifically in this thesis:

- Bal, Evhen, Sosnovyi Bir, May 1994.
Bilodid, Viktor, Iuzhnoukrainsk, June 1994.
Demydenko, O. Kiev, August 1991.
Dzeverin, Ihor, Kiev, April 1994.
Dudko, Sviatoslav, Kiev, 14 May 1994.
Haniukova, Iryna, Kiev, 17 May 1994.
30 May 1994.
Hlazovyi, Andrii, Kiev, 18 August 1982.
30 April 1994.
Hrabovskyi, Serhii, Kiev, May 1994.
Hrekov, Volodymyr, Kiev, 24 April 1994.
Kabyka, Oleksii, Kiev, August 1992.
Khazan, Viktor, Sosnovyi Bir, May 1994.
Kirilchuk, Ihor, Kiev, 12 May 1994.
Kolesnik, Anatolii, Nikolaev, June 1994.
Kononov, Vitalii, Kiev, August 1991.
April 1994.
Korbetskyi, Evhen, Sosnovyi Bir, 20 May 1994.
Korzheva, Alla, Nikolaev, June 1994.
Kurykin, Serhii, Kiev, Summer 1992.
28 April 1994.
6 May 1994.
McTaggart, David, Kiev, 22 August 1991.
Oleshchenko, Viacheslav, *Verkhovna Rada*, Kiev, summer 1992.
Orlov, Andrei, Sosnovyi Bir, 20 May 1994.
Panov, Anatolii, on bus to Zakarpattia, 9 April 1994.
Kiev, 16 May 1994.
Pilchuk, Nikolaev, 7 June 1994.
Plachynda, Serhii, Ukrainian Writers' Union, Kiev, 23 May 1994.
Samiilenko, Iurii, Kiev, 6 May 1994.
Shapovalov, Sergei, Nikolaev, June 1994.
Shcherbak, Iurii, Kiev, August 1991.

Suslova, Lidia, Nikolaev, June 1994.
Tverdostup, Rostyslav, Sosnovyi Bir, 20 May 1994.
Zolotukhin, Anatolii, Nikolaev, June 1994.
Zrezartsev, Borys, Ukrainian Peace Committee, Kiev, 12 May 1994.

Communications per letter/email referred to in thesis:

Letter from Ihor Dzeverin, Kiev, 15 January 1995.
“ “ Oleksii Kabyka, Kiev, 24 February 1993.
“ “ Anatolii Panov, Kiev, 3 February 1995.
“ “ Anatolii Zolotukhin, Nikolaev, 15 March 1995.

Email from Antatolii Zolotukhin, Nikolaev, 27 August 1995.
“ “ ” “ “ 18 October 1995.

Report from Dag Arne Høystad on email, 5 July 1995.

I had numerous informal conversations with the above mentioned people and those listed below during field-work in Ukraine:

Demydenko, Andrii
Demydenko, Tania
Havrylov, Ihor
Karavanska, Liubov
Mikhalko
Preobrazhenska, Natalia
Rim, Nadia
Siomina, Ania
Tikhyi, Volodymyr

Original Letters

I was given access to *Zelenyi Mir*'s correspondence with various ministries, departments and the Ukrainian and Soviet Academies of Sciences. References to those letters quoted or referred to in this thesis can be found in the respective chapters.

Official Resolutions/Transcripts, Laws and Reports of Official Meetings

Александровский поселковый совет народных депутатов, Вознесенский район.
Николаевская область, исполнительный комитет. Решение от 26.09.1989 г. №. 77. "О
защите реки Южный Буг".

Вознесенский районный совет народных депутатов, III сессия XXIII созыва, решение от 21
сентября 1990 г.

Двенадцатая сессия Верховного Совета Украинской ССР (однопалатный созыв). 16-17 февраля 1990 года. Стенографический отчет (Киев: Политиздат Украины, 1990).

Закон Української радянської соціалістичної республіки про охорону навколишнього природного середовища. (Київ: Видавництво "Україна", 1991).

Исковое заявление о защите чести, достоинства и деловой репутации предприятия (n.d.).

Николаевская областная государственная администрация, Распоряжение представителя президента Украины о создании комиссии по определению перечня и объемов работ по сооружению плотины Александровского гидроузла в варианте мостового перехода, 23.4.1993, №. 194.

Николаевский областной совет народных депутатов, Решение от 16.10.90, 3 сессии 21 созыва, г. Николаев "О запрещении продувки Ташлыкского водохранилища в реку Южный Буг.

"О решении третьей и тринадцатой сессий 21 созыва по вопросу продувки Ташлыкского водоема-охладителя ЮУ АЭС" (n.d.).

Основание к проекту постановления Совмина СССР "О дальнейшем строительстве объектов ЮУ ЭК" (n.d.).

Перечень мероприятий, необходимых для ведения беспродувочного режима работы ЮУ АЭС, 10.6.1992.

Протокол совещания у зампредседателя Совмина СССР тов. Рыбева, Л. Д. от 4 августа 1989 г.

Постанова Политбюро ЦК КПУ від 26.VII.1977 г., протокол №. 46, § 11 "Про перенесення площинки для будівництва атомної електростанції в Кримський області.

Постановление №. 1 от 19.1.1991 г. 'О мерах по повышению заинтересованности местных органов и населения в размещении на их территории объектов атомной энергетики'.

Протокол совещания 'экологические и социальные аспекты в уточненном проекте' (n.d.).

Протокол совещания по вопросам финансирования работ в 1991 г. по Южно-Украинскому энергокомплексу, 6.5.1991 г.

Протокол совещания по вопросам строительства объектов Южно-Украинского энергокомплекса, г. Южноукраинск, 10.6.1991 г.

Решение Президиума Николаевского областного совета №. 17-II от 7 июня 1993 г. "О заключении представителей Николаевской области, членов экспертной комиссии для проведения государственной экологической экспертизы уточненного проекта Ташлыкского ПАЭС".

Ташлыкской ГАЭС", г. Южноукраинск, 9.8.1991 г.

Указ о неотложных мерах по развитию атомной энергетики и созданию ядерно-топливного комплекса в Украине. No. 64/94, 23.2.1994.

Указ Президиума Верховного Совета Украинской ССР об ответственности за нарушение требований режима радиационной безопасности, заготовку, переработку и сбыт радиоактивных загрязненных продуктов питания. Правда Украины, 2.2.1991, с. 3.

Указ "Про невідкладні заходи щодо розвитку атомної енергетики та формування ядерно-паливного циклу в Україні", No. 64/94, reprinted by the News Agency 'Echo-Vostok' and handed out at a press conference organised by a number of green groups on the premises of the Ukrainian Peace Committee in Kiev, March 1994.

Original Documents and Resolutions - Zelenyi Svit²

Резолюція 2-го з'їзду УЕА "Зелений Світ" Про конструктивність наших дій, 30.3.1991.

Звіт про валютні надходження та витрати. Київ, 20.5.1992.

Зелена ідея житиме! (n.d.)

Протокол No. 1, засідання екологічного клубу "Дністр", 24.11.1990.

Протокол N1, засідання зеленої ради УЕА "Зелений Світ", 31.3.1991.

Резолюція II з'їзду Української екологічної асоціації "Зелений Світ". Словом до співгромадян. (n.d.)

Стенограма III-го з'їзду асоціації "Зелений Світ", 30.5.1992 року, м. Київ.

Українська екологічна асоціація "Зелений Світ". Стенограма III-го з'їзду асоціації "Зелений Світ", 31.5.1992 року, м. Київ.

Original Documents, Zelenyi Mir, Nikolaev³

Бюллетень Экологической Ассоциации No. 2. (n.d.)

² I was given access to numerous files and documents at Zelenyi Svit's office in Kiev. To list all of these documents is simply not possible for reasons of space. Below, I have listed those documents that are referred to in the text above.

³ Below I have listed those documents referred to in this thesis. Other documents also accessed are not listed due to limited space.

Бюллетень Экологической Ассоциации No. 3, 30.11.1988.

Доповідна записка. Пропозиції екологічної асоціації Миколаївської області по 30-
км зоні навколо АЕС, 16.10.1991.

Замечания к проекту постановления Совмина СССР "Вопросы строительства объектов ЮУ
ЭК" от 7 августа 1989 г.

Обоснование к решению сессии областного Совета народных депутатов о необходимости
продувки Ташликского водохранилища в реку Южный Буг (п.д.).

Період пірвознаму Чорнобиля, 22.5.1993.

Пропозиції до комплексної програми "Енергетика", 17.3.1993.

Резолюція ІІ з'їзду республіканської екологічної асоціації "Зелений Світ. (draft).
addressed to Verkhovna Rada and signed by Nikolaev PZU (п.д.).

Резолюция митинга-протеста жителей Николаевской области против строительства
Александровского и Константиновского водохранилищ на Южном Буге, расширения
мощностей Южноукраинской АЭС и строительства Березовского химкомбината, г.
Николаев, 26.12.1988.

Решение собрания общественности Николаевской области, посвященное шестой годовщине
Чернобыльской катастрофы, г. Николаев, 25.4.1992.

Решение 5-го областного собрания Николаевской областной экологической ассоциации
"Зеленый Мир", 22.12.1991.

'Сесія областної ради народних депутатів', (transcript) broadcast on oblast TV, 24.11.1988.

Ташликська ГЕС-ГАЕС, 16.10. 1991.

Original Documents and Resolutions - PZU⁴

Ваше здоров'я, Українська медична газета. Спеціальний випуск. Віталій Копонов –
кандидат у народні депутати Верховної Ради України по Гagarинському виборчому
округу No. 3, міста Києва (п.д.).

І березня. Вибори народних депутатів України. Копонов, Віталій Миколайович.
Кандидат у народні депутати України по Залізничному виборчому округу No. 7 міста
Києва. Передвиборна програма (п.д.).

Відкритий лист Політичної Ради ПЗУ до Верховної Ради і громадян України щодо
питань ядерного роззброєння, м Київ, 14.3.1992.

⁴ Only those documents referred to in this thesis are listed below.

Виписка із протоколу N1, засідання ЦКР ПЗУ, м. Київ, 11.1.1992.

Засідання центральної координаційної ради партії зелених України (n.d.).

Заява ПЗУ, No. 11-09, 30.9.1993.

Заява ПЗУ в зв'язку з настигами спробами російської держави утвердити своє особливе право на армію колишнього СРС та розв'язану засобами масової інформації антиукраїнську кампанію. (n.d.).

Заява ПЗУ: Глибинна логика дагомиських домовленостей веде до трігунства України у виського/політичну орбіту Росії. Радіо Україна, 21:50, 7.7.1992.

Заява ПЗУ щодо питань приватизації державних підприємств. До Верховної Ради України, 27.1.1992.

Заява ПЗУ щодо спрямованості дій Кабінету Міністрів України. 3.12.1992.

Заява Політичної Ради Партії Зелених України, 13.3.1992.

Заява Політичної Ради Партії Зелених України. Радіо Україна, 21:10, 25.6.1992.

Заява Політичної Ради Партії Зелених України щодо формування нового Кабінету Міністрів, 22.10.1992.

Заява політичних партій України, 1.10.1993.

Заява Політради ПЗУ No. 2/14, 13.1.1994.

Заявление Партии Зеленых Украины касательно оборонных вопросов, Киев, 4.9.1991

Звернення, 2.9.1991.

Звернення до громадян України, 12.10.93.

Звернення ПЗУ до президента и уряду України, 7.12.1992.

Коментар до заяви ПЗУ від 7 грудня 1992 року.

24 липня повторні вибори до Верховної Ради України. Кандидат у депутати Верховної Ради України по Центральному виборчому округу No. 22, м. Київ, Курикін Сергій Іванович (n.d.).

Конференція про захист якості життя малозабезпечених верств населення України, 20.1.1991.

Лічильна комісія, Протокол No. 2 (10.10.92) Список делегатів.

Маніфест Партії Зелених України, adopted at the First Party Congress in 1990.

Міністерство юстиції України. Свідчення про реєстрацію No. 234 (n.d.).

На згадку про вибори-94, м. Київ (Київ: Києво-Свят. друк. 1994).

Народа ПЗУ України, Київ, 10.08.1990.

Открытое письмо ПЗУ к Верховному Совету Российской Федерации (n.d.).

Положення про секретаріат партії зелених України (n.d.).

Програма В. Кононова – це програма "зелених" України. Передви. лярна програма кандидата в депутати Верховної Ради України по 7-ому, Залізничному, виборчому округу м. Києва. Основні принципи і тези (n.d.).

Програма Партії Зелених України, прийнята установчим з'їздом ПЗУ, 28-30. 1990.

Програмні принципи ПЗУ, 15.7.1990.

Про політичну стратегію ПЗУ (n.d.).

Протокол засідання ЦКР ПЗУ, м. Київ, вул. Кірова 5А, 18.5.1991.

Протокол зборів ініціативної групи ПЗУ, Київ, 18.6.1990.

Протокол No. 001, засідання представників регіонів ПЗУ, м. Київ, від 23.11.1993.

Протокол N1, засідання ЦКР ПЗУ (n.d.).

Протокол No. 1, засідання ЦКР Партії Зелених України від 21 листопада 1992 року.

Протокол засідання ЦКР ПЗУ від 24 квітня 1993 року.

Протокол засідання Центральної Координативної Ради ПЗУ, 12.6.1993, м. Київ.

Протокол No. 1 лічильної комісії III з'їзду Партії Зелених України від 11 жовтня 1992 року.

Протокол рішення конференції радикальної фракції ПЗУ Тернопільської області (n.d.).

Протокол No. 1, учредительного собрания Харьковского областного клуба партии зеленых Украины, г. Харьков, 1991.

Резолюція зборів ініціативної групи по створенню Партії Зелених України (ПЗУ) (n.d.).

Резолюція конференції ПЗУ з національної політики, м. Київ, 20.1.1991.

Резолюція конференції Партії Зелених України з питань націоналізації всіх підприємств на території України, 20.1.1991.

Резолюція конференції ПЗУ, що відбулась 20 січня 1990 р. в м. Києві, щодо подій в Перській Затоці.

Совместное заявление Партий Зеленых Грузии, Литвы, Украины, Эстонии и Движения Зеленых Армении (Тбилиси, сентябрь, 1991).

Суверенитет, Екологія и політика, ЗВУ, 12.3.1991.

Урочисто проголошуємо створення Партії Зелених України (n.d.)

Чому зелені України не згодні з урядом (n.d.).

I was able to access most of PZU's press releases for 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994. The following press releases are specifically referred to or cited in this thesis:

Прес-реліз ПЗУ, 24.6.1993.

Прес-реліз No. 12-09, 1.10.1993.

“ No. 14-10, 5.10.1993.

“ No. 20-10, 25.10.1993.

“ No. 22-10, 29.10.1993.

“ No. 23/10, 3.11.1993.

“ No. 24/18, 16.11.93.

“ No. 26-11, 21.11.93.

“ No. 0/51-12, 20.12.1993.

“ No. 0-52/12, 21.12.1993.

“ No. 0-92/12, 21.12.1993.

“ No. 39-02, 23.2.1994.

“ No. 28/1, 28.2.1994.

Прес-реліз Партії Зелених України щодо проголошення Києва без'ядерною зоною, 23.10.92.

Прес-реліз щодо питання про розподіл майна та активів СРСР, No. 0-7, 24.9.1993.

Прес-реліз "до питання про новий виборчий закон та вибори до Верховної Ради України", 25.11.1993.

Прес-реліз до підписання тристоронньої домовленості про ліквідацію ядерної зброї в Україні, No. 3/1, 19.1.1994.

Letter No. 17-10, 20.10.1993 to the Central Election Commission.

Russian Language Documents

Баркаръ А.А., Котяшъ И.А., Мельнейчук З.Ю., Яковлев В.Н. (составители). Экологическое законодательство союза ССР и Молдавской ССР (Кишинев: Картя Молдовеняскэ, 1989).

В Верховный Совет Украинской и Союза ССР, containing 85 signatures (Bilodid of Iuzhnoukrainsk Zelenyi Mir showed me a whole box filled with such petitions) gathered in June 1988 in Iuzhnoukrainsk.

Временное соглашение между Президентом Союза Советских Социалистических Республик и руководителями высших органов власти республик по экологическим проблемам, требующим согласованных действий, в том числе по предупреждению и ликвидации последствий экологических бедствий (проект) (n.d.).

Горбачев, М.С., Избранные речи и статьи (Москва: Издательство политической литературы, 1987), т. 1–7.

Госкомстат СССР, Охрана окружающей среды и рациональное использование природных ресурсов в СССР. Статистический сборник (Москва: Финансы и статистика, 1989).

Государственная программа охраны окружающей среды и рационального использования природных ресурсов СССР на 1991–1995 годы и на перспективу до 2005 года (проект), Правительственный вестник, Досье, с. 5–19.

Государственный комитет СССР по охране природы, Состояние природной среды в СССР в 1988 году (Москва: Лесная промышленность, 1990).

Государственный комитет УССР по охране природы, Министерство здравоохранения УССР, Информационный бюллетень (Киев: август, 1990).

Государственный комитет Украинской ССР по охране природы, Охрана природы в Украинской ССР (Киев: Реклама, 1987).

Государственный комитет Украинской ССР по охране природы, Охрана природы – задача всенародная (Киев: Издательство политической литературы Украины, 1987).

Двенадцатая сессия Верховного Совета Украинской ССР (одинадцатый созыв), 15–17 февраля 1990 года. Стенографический отчет (Киев: Политиздат Украины, 1990).

Заявление о создании Демократического Конгресса (n.d.).

Заявление участников–учредителей Демконгресса о союзном договоре и референдуме (n.d.).

Коммюнике о совещании представителей Комитетов и Комиссий Верховных Советов республик по вопросам экологии и рационального использования природных ресурсов, г. Кишинев, 20–21 февраля 1991г.

Концепция государственного регулирования безопасности и управления ядерной отраслью у Украины. Голос України, 23.3.1994, с. 4-5.

Национальный доклад о состоянии природной среды в СССР. Свет (Природа и человек). No. 12, 1990, с. 21-23, 41-43, 55-71.

Обзор состояния окружающей природной среды в СССР (Москва: Гидрометеоиздат, 1990).

О неотложных мерах экологического оздоровления страны (тезисы программы). Информационный бюллетень. Издание межрегиональной группы народных депутатов СССР, 15.9.1989, с. 27.

Охрана природы в Украинской ССР. Environmental Control in the Ukrainian SSR (Київ: Издательство политической литературы Украины, 1987).

Постановление Верховного Совета СССР. О неотложных мерах экологического оздоровления страны, Москва. Кремль. 27.11.1989.

Проект. Межгосударственное экологическое соглашение (n.d.).

Прокуратура Союза ССР. Указание No. 16/31, 11.6.90 о взаимодействии Прокуратуры СССР с органами Госкомприроды СССР и усилении контроля за разрешением материалов об уголовно наказуемых нарушениях природоохранного законодательства.

Протокол Собрания экологического общества, No. 1, 22.9. 1988.

Протокол четвертого заседания Межпарламентского Экологического Совета, состоявшегося 20-21 февраля 1991 года в г. Кишиневе.

Соглашение стран СНГ о взаимодействии в области экологии и охраны природы окружающей природной среды, transcribed in CIS Today. Media News and Features Digest. Compiled by the RFE/RL Research Institute Monitoring Unit, no. 136, 9.2.1992, pp. 33-38.

Совет Министров РСФСР. Постановление от 9 января 1991 г. No. 13, г. Москва. Об утверждении на 1991 год нормативов платы за выбросы загрязняющих веществ в природную среду и порядка их применения.

Совместная декларация политических партий, организаций и движений участников "Демократического Конгресса" (n.d.).

Українська Республіканська Партія. Програмні документи (Київ, 1991).

Учредительное собрание, 22.9.1988.

Характеристика Запорожской АЭС (из учета) - document provided by Hanna Tsvetkova of Greenpeace Ukraine (n.d.).

Ukrainian Language Documents

Декларація про державний суверенітет України (Washington, D.C.: Smoloskyp Publishers, 1990).

Закон Української Радянської Соціалістичної Республіки про охорону навколишнього природного середовища (Київ: Видавництво "Україна, 1991).

Заява партій-ініціаторів скликання конституційних зборів (n.d.).

Звернення Ініціативної групи Островського регіонального Товариства "Зелений Світ" з приводу дальшої розбудови Хмельницької Атомної Електростанції (n.d.).

Звернення представників "зеленого руху" до громадян України - Дорогі співвітчизники, громадяни України (n.d.).

Зелений Світ: Програма (Київ, жовтень 1989 р.).

Матеріали до дванадцятої сесії Верховної Ради Української РСР. Медичні аспекти екологічної ситуації в Українській РСР. Збірник статистичних показників (Київ: 1990).

Панов, А., Зелений Рух в Україні (n.d.).

По вопросу о месте и времени проведения II съезда Украинской экологической ассоциации "Зелений Світ" (n.d.).

Постанова від 25.7.1989 No. 19 "про реєстрацію Статуту Української екологічної асоціації "Зелений Світ.

Рішення секретаріату асоціації "Зелений Світ" від 15.12.1990 з приводу акту контрольно-ревізійної комісії.

Скандал у благородному сімействі (n.d.).

Список членів ініціативної групи української асоціації "Зелений Світ (n.d.).

Справка о степени влияния пруда-охладителя ЗАЭС на качество воды Каховского водохранилища, г. Никополь, 11-12 июня 1992 г.

Твердохостун, Р., Розвиток екологічного руху на Західній Україні (n.d.).

Фінансово-господарський звіт за 1990 рік республіканської асоціації "Зелений Світ" на 1990 рік (n.d.).

Щербак, Ю., Між республіками має бути рівноправна угода з проблем екології, *Ойкумена* 2/91, ст. 92-98.

English Language Documents

The Green East-West Dialogue. Discussion Paper. Central and Eastern Europe: An Ecological Disaster Area. The need for an action programme of greens for ecological reconstruction in Central and Eastern Europe (Kiyev, Ukraine, December 3-5, 1993).

The Guiding Principles of the European Federation of Green Parties, Masala, 20.6.1993.

The Popular Movement in Ukraine for Restructuring - *RUKH*: Program and Charter (Kiev: 1989).

Ukrainian Press Service. *News from the USSR*. 'The last generation to have seen nature' - Greens form in Kiev (London: April 1988).

Secondary Literature

Russian Language Sources

Аксенов, Г.П. (ред.). Владимир Вернадский, открытия и судьбы (Москва: Современник, 1993).

Альбан, Е., Министр природы, *Московские новости*, 12.11.1989, с. 16.

Баладин, Р.К., 'Природа, личность, культура', in Лемешев, М.Я. (ред.). Экологическая альтернатива (Москва: Прогресс, 1990), с. 17-41.

Бердяев, П.А., 'Истоки и смысл русского коммунизма' (Москва: Наука, 1990).

Бескровных, В., Экологический кризис в СССР. Причины. Следствия. Поиск выхода, *Грани*, 158, 1990, с. 242-79.

Большая Советская Энциклопедия (Москва: Из-во "Большая Советская Энциклопедия", 1950), 2-е изд., т. 1.

Брежнев, Л.И., Речи и статьи, т. 2 (Москва: Политиздат, 1970).

Вайнер (Уинер), Д., Экология в Советской России. Архипелаг свободы: заповедники и охрана природы (Москва: Прогресс, 1991).

Вдовенко, Л.Н., Альтернативное движение в поисках альтернатив (Москва: Мысль, 1988).

Владимиров А.М., Ляхин Ю.И., Матвеев Л.Т., Орлов В.Г., Охрана окружающей среды (Ленинград: Гидрометеиздат, 1991).

Вовк, В., Мустафин, А., 'Неизвестная Украина', in *Новое время*, No. 5, 1991.

Гусейнов, А.А. (отв. ред.). Этическая мысль. Научно-публицистические чтения 1991 (Москва: Издательство "Республики", 1992).

Воропцов, А.И., Щетинский, Е.А., Николимов, И.Д., Охрана природы (Москва: ВО "Агропромиздат", 1989).

Врублевский, В., Владимир Шербицкий. Правда и вымыслы. (Киев: Фірма "Довіра", 1993).

Всесоюзный центр изучения общественного мнения по Социально-Экономическим Вопросам при ВЦСПК и Госкомтруде СССР (ВЦИОМ). Общественное мнение в цифрах. Информационное издание ВЦИОМ, выпуск 9 (16), апрель 1990, с. 7.

Гиляров, А.М., 'Мифологическое в экологии', *Природа*, No. 2, 1992, с. 3-10.

Гирусов, Э.В., Долишый М.И., Бачинский Г.А., Вопросы социэкологии (Львов: Вільня Україна, 1987).

Глазычев, В.Л., 'Экологическая культура, рекреация, качество жизни', *СОЦИЗ*, No. 1, 1987, с. 124-6.

Головина, Е.В. (ред.), Вся наша жизнь. Сборник статей Социально-Экологического Союза (Москва: Издательство "Прометей", 1990).

Гончар, О., Собор (Москва: Советский писатель, 1988).

Горбачев, М.С., Избранные речи и статьи, т. 1-7 (Москва: Издательство политической литературы, 1987).

Государственный комитет УССР по охране природы. Министерство лесного хозяйства УССР. Министерство внутренних дел УССР. Республиканский совет украинского общества охотников и рыболовов. Для служебного пользования. Методическое пособие по борьбе с браконьерством (Киев: 1987).

Гофман К., Федоренко Н., 'Экономическая защита природы', *Коммунист*, No. 5, 1989, с. 31-39.

Громов А.В., Кузин О.С., Неформалы. Кто есть кто? (Москва: Мысль, 1990).

Джеверин, И.И., Концепция ноосферы и некоторые закономерности эпоморфоза (n.d.).

Добровольное общество "Истоки" им. П.К. Иванова. Научно-Исследовательская лаборатория "Здоровье" Куйбышевского педагогического института, Введение в практику природного оздоровления учителя Иванова (Луганск: Редакционно-издательский отдел облполиграфиздата, 1990).

Егорова, Л.В. (ред.), Экоотклик 8 (Москва: Молодая гвардия, 1990).

Жизнь в единении с природой - система естественного оздоровления учителя Иванюк (Киев, 1991).

Забьин, М. (собр.), Русский народ. Его обычаи, обряды, предания, суеверия и поэзия (Москва: Совместное советско-кавалское предприятие "Книга пригласит". 1990).

Залыгин, С., 'Разумный союз с природой', *Наш современник*, No. 1, 1987, с. 138-39.

Землянский, О. О состоянии здоровья детского населения Украины в связи с создавшейся экологической обстановкой (Сообщение специального доверенного врача СДФ им. В.И. Ленина, главного специалиста Минздрава СССР т. Землянского на заседании Президиума правления УРО СДФ им. В.И. Ленина на 29 июня 1990 г.).

Иванова, Г., В судьбе природы - наша судьба. Писатели об экологических проблемах. (Москва: Художественная литература, 1990).

Игнатенко, Е.И. (ред.), Чернобыль: События и уроки (Москва: Издательство политической литературы, 1989).

Иллен А.В., Пазыльников А.Е., Репортаж из Чернобыля. Записки очевидцев. Комментарии. Размышления (Москва: Мысль, 1988).

Институт массовых политических движений, Экологические организации на территории бывшего СССР. Справочник (Москва: Издательство "РАУ-пресс", 1992).

Канаева, К.К., 'Вокруг Щелькова (этика и экология)', in Гусейнов, А.А. (главред), Этическая мысль. Научно-публицистические чтения. 1991 (Москва: Издательство Республика, 1992), с. 288-307.

Каракин, В.П., Шейнгауз, 'К новому природопользованию', in Леменев (1990), с. 636-659.

Карчевцев, О.А., Носов, В.П., 'Формирование экологической культуры личности', in Борогоев, О. (ред.), Перестройка общественных отношений и личность (Ленинград: ЛГУ, 1988).

Катасонов, Валентин, Великая держава или экологическая колония? (Москва: Молодая гвардия, 1991).

Керимов, Д.А., Мальцев, Г.В., Ильинский, И.П., Демократизация советского общества (Москва: Мысль, 1989).

Киевская областная организация украинского общества охраны природы. Киевский государственный университет им. Т.Г. Шевченко. Координационно-методический совет студенческих дружин по охране природы при Президиуме УООП. Киевский обком комсомола, Организация и работа студенческих дружин по охране природы. Методические рекомендации. (Киев: Гортинотрафия, 1985).

Конституция СССР и развитие советского законодательства (Москва: Юридическая литература, 1983).

Корякин, Ю., ‘Так кто же, собственно, собственник?’, *Свободная мысль*, No. 2, январь 1992, с. 8-16.

Кофанова Е.Н., Кротов Н.И., Справочник. Экологические организации на территории бывшего СССР (Москва: Издательство "РАУ-Пресс", 1992).

Лемешев, М.Я., ‘Пока не поздно...Размышления экономиста-эколога’ (Москва: Молодая гвардия, 1991).

Лемешев, М.Я. (ред.), ‘Разрушительная поступь “ускорения”, in М. Я. Лемешев (1990), с.194–216.

Лемешев, М.Я. (ред.), Экологическая альтернатива (Москва: Прогресс, 1990).

Ленин, В.И., Полное собрание сочинений (Москва: Госполитиздат, 1958-65), т. 18.

Листопад, О., Киевская городская организация УТОП. Дружина выходит в рейд. Лауреат премии комсомола Украины им. Н. Островского – Дружина охраны природы “Медикский Дозор”. Киевского государственного университета им. Т.Г. Шевченко (Киев: Тип. УРСРС, 1989).

Листопад, О., Природу охраняют молодые. Из опыта работы студенческих природоохранных дружин республики (Киев: Реклама, 1986).

Лобанов, М., Роман Л. Леонова “Русский лес” (Москва: Советский писатель, 1958).

Макевич, С.Г., Вакупин, А.А., Охрана природы (Москва: ВО Агропромиздат, 1991).

Материалы XXV съезда КПСС (Москва: Политиздат, 1976).

Медведев, Г., Энергоблок (Москва: Советский писатель, 1991).

Мень, А., Православное богослужение. Таинство, слово и образ (Москва: Слово, 1991).

Министерство высшего и среднего специального образования РСФСР. Башкирский государственный университет имени 40-летия октября. Сводная дружина по охране природы БАССР. Браконьерство: Рекомендации студенческим дружинам по охране природы для борьбы с браконьерством (Уфа: 1987).

Моисеев, Н., Человек и ноосфера (Москва: Молодая гвардия, 1990).

Носова, Г.А., Язычество в православии (Москва: Издательство Наука, 1975).

Ольшанский, Д.В., Неформалы: групповой портрет в интерьере (Москва: Педагогика, 1990).

Ожегов, Ю.П. Никопорова, Е.В. Экологический импульс - Проблемы формирования экологической культуры молодежи (Москва: Молодая Гвардия, 1990)

‘Отставка...Почему? Беседа с председателем Госкомприроды Ф.Т.Моргунов’. *Комсомольская правда*, 18.7.1989, с. 1, 4.

Паддингтон, А. ‘Экологические проблемы восточного блока’. *Проблемы Восточной Европы*. No. 17-18, 1986, с. 97-114.

Печенева, В.А. ‘Неформалы: кто они? Куда зовут?’ (Москва: Издательство политической литературы, 1990).

Подлужная, Н.П. Экологические проблемы Украины: вопросы и ответы (Киев: Общество Знание, 1989).

Прийма, Ф.Я. Шевченко и русская литература XIX века (Москва-Ленинград: Издательства Академии Наук СССР, 1961).

‘Проблема окружающей среды в мировой экономике и международных отношениях’. (Москва: Мысль, 1976).

‘Проект соглашения по неотложным экологическим проблемам направлен в ВС республики’. *Малк*, 8:12, 14.3.91, transcribed in *USSR Today. Soviet Media News and Information Digest*, No. NF-231, 14.3.1991, p. 27.

Распутин, В. ‘В поисках нужной цифры’. *Наш современник*, No. 1, 1987, с. 138-39.

Рыжков, Н. Перестройка: История предательств (Москва: Новости, 1992). глава 7: ‘Испытание Чернобылем’. с. 133-52.

Самсонов, И. ‘Взаимоотношения человека с природой в русской религиозно-философской мысли и культуре’. *Журнал московской патриархии*, No. 10, 1990, с. 46-49.

Саппа, Н.Н., Мордовенко, Д.Н., Саппа, Д.Н. ‘Атомная энергетика глазами подростков’. *СОШЗ*. No. 6, 1993, с. 108-9.

Сергеев, Б.И. ‘Законодательство о добровольных обществах: вчера, сегодня, завтра’. in Керимов, Д.А. Новое политическое мышление и процесс демократизации (Москва: Издательство Наука. Москва 1990).

Согомонов, А., Толстых, А. ‘О наших заботах’. *Коммунист*. No. 9, 1989, с. 74-75.

Степико, М. Громадська думка про екологічні проблеми республіки (1992).

Сытник, К.М. (глав. ред.). Чтения академика Владимира Ивановича Вернадского (1991–1992). Сборник научных трудов (Киев: Наукова думка, 1994).

Тараканов, М. Особая зона (Киев: Военное издательство. Киевский филиал, 1991).

Тарнавский, А.Г., Охрана природы и общественные организации: правовые вопросы (Москва: Наука, 1990).

Тропоцкий, Г., 'О реках, почвах и проблемах', *Новый мир*, No. 1, 1965.

Тютчев, Ф.И., Стихотворения (Москва: Художественная литература, 1985).

Успенская, Н.В., 'Нужна полная экологическая гласность' Беседа с И.Н. Воронцовым, *Природа*, No. 11, 1989, с. 3-7.

Фадеев, Е.Т. (ред.), Взаимодействие общества и природы (Москва: Наука, 1986).

Фролов, И., 'Угрожает ли миру экологический кризис?', *Правда*, 16.8.1974 (п.р.).

Хопко, Ф., Основы православия (Вильнюс: Вильнюсское православное епархиальное управление, 1991).

Чалидзе, Ф., 'Закон на страже природы', *Внутренние противоречия*, No. 21, 1988, с. 126-56.

Чайковская, О., 'Природа и время. Заметки о пейзаже в современной литературе', *Новый мир*, No. 10, 1965, с.

Черпишско, Ю., Земля, экология, перестройка (Москва: Книга, 1989).

Чивилихин, В. (ред.), О Леопове (Москва: Современник, 1979).

Шварц, Е.А., Вся наша жизнь (Москва: Издательство Прометей, 1990).

Шевардиадзе, Э., Мой выбор. В защиту демократии и свободы (Москва: Новости, 1991), глава 9: 'Дни Чернобыля и "Покаяние". Я сделал выбор', с. 285-332.

Щербак, Ю., 'Строить, а не уничтожать', *ФОРУМ*, no. 22/1990, с. 31.

Щербак, Ю., Чернобыль (Москва: Советский писатель, 1991).

Щербак, Ю., 'Союз эмоций и разума', in Земля, экология, перестройка (Москва: Издательство Книга, 1989).

Яблоков, А., 'На краю экологической пропасти', *Советская юстиция*, No. 13, июль 1991, с. 1.

Ядов, В.А., Социология перестройки (Москва: Наука, 1990).

Яницкий, О.Н., Социальные движения. 100 интервью с лидерами (Москва: Московский рабочий, 1991).

Яницкий, О.Н., 'Развитие экологических движений на западе и востоке Европы', *СОЦИС*, No. 1, 1992, с. 32-80.

Яницкий, О.Н., ‘Экологическое движение и контекст становление гражданского общества в посттоталитарной среде’, *СОЦИС*, No. 12, 1992, с. 40-48.

Яницкий, О.Н., ‘Экологическая политика: роль движений и гражданских инициатив’, *СОЦИС*, No. 10, 1994, с. 10-20.

Ярошинская, А., Чернобыль. Совершенно секретно (Москва: Другие берега, 1992).

Ярошинская, А., Чернобыль с нами (Москва: Книга, 1991).

Ukrainian Language Sources

Антонович, Д., Українська культура. Лекції за редакцією Дмитра Антоновича (Київ: Либідь, 1993).

Білоус, А.О., Політичні об'єднання України (Київ: Видавництво "Україна", 1993).

Борейко, В., Українське Товариство Охорони Природи (Київ: Тип. УРСПС, 1987).

Гарань, О.В., ‘Багатопартійність на Україні: формування, проблеми, перспективи’, in В. Вікторенко (ред.), Україна багатопартійна (Київ: МП "Пам'ятки України", 1991)б с.

Глушко, О., ‘Бунт моря’, *Вітчизна*, No. 5, 1991, с. 139.

Головко, С.В. (гол. ред.), Культура і побут населення України (Київ: Либідь, 1993).

Дзюбанюк, Д., Нові політичні партії України. Результати анкетування (Київ, 1990).

Дмитренко, М., Народні повір'я (Київ: Бібліотека часопису "Народознавство", Київ, 1994).

Еколюс, Канадське товариство прихильників Руху, Україна на грані екологічної катастрофи. Довідник (Торонто, 1990).

Копончук, П., ‘Е такі партії’, *Урядовий кур'єр*, 31.7.1992, с. 5.

Корнієвський, О., Литвин, Володимир, ‘Перехідний етап. Чи робити ставку на політичні партії?’, *Вісн*, No. 3, 1994.

Кузьо, Т., ‘Монополія і опозиція. Скільки політичних партій потребує Україна?’, *За вільну Україну*, 4.6.1991, с. 2.

Литвин, В., ‘Центризм. Місце загоди змінити не можна’, *Вісн*, No. 1, 1994, с. 89-107.

Ляшенко, Д., ‘Система Івалова’, *Наш час*, 29.4.1994, с. 3.

Митрополит Іларіон., Дохристиянські вірування українського народу (Київ: Акціонерне товариство "Обереги", Київ, 1994).

Нагулко, В.І. (кер. ред.), Культура і побут населення України (Київ: Либідь, 1993).

Нечуй-Левицький, І., Світогляд українського народу. Ескіз української міфології (Київ: Акціонерне товариство "Обереги", 1993).

Носова, Г.А., Язычество в православии (Москва: Издательство Наука, 1975).

Пашков, М., 'Праві, ліві і "псевдонезалежні"', *Вісн.* No. 2, 1994, с. 105.

Політична Думка/Political Thought, No. 1, 1993.

Ратуєт за "диктат екології", *ТАСХ*, 13.9.91, transcribed in *USSR Today. Soviet Media News and Feature Digest*, 13.9.1991, No. 792, p. 10.

Фіалкова, Л., 'Чорнобильська катастрофа і фольклор', *Вісник Академії Наук України*, No. 1, 1993, с. 70-74.

Шемченко, Ф.П. (головний редактор), Українська культура. Лекції за редакцією Дмитра Антоновича (Київ: Либідь, 1993).

English Language Sources

Abols, V., 'Environmental Problems and the Environmental Movement in Latvia', *VAK America Open Letter* # 12 (Environmental Protection Club of Latvia), 7.3.1991.

Alber, J., 'Modernization, cleavage structures, and the rise of Green Parties and Lists in Europe', in Müller-Rommel (1989).

Allison, G., The Cuba Crisis

Altschuler I. I., Golubchikov I. N., 'Ecological Semi-Glasnost... On the Publication of the first three Official Documents on the State of the Environment in the USSR', *Environmental Policy Review*, pp. 1-12.

Arbatov A., Bogolyubov S., Sobolev L., Ecology (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1989).

Aslund, A., Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform (London: Pinter Publishers, 1989).

Aspaturian, V., The Union Republics in Soviet Diplomacy: A Study of Soviet Federalism in the Service of Soviet Foreign Policy (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984).

Bahro, R., Building the Green Movement (GMP Publishers Ltd., 1986).

Bahry, Donna, Silver, Brian D., 'Soviet Citizen Participation on the Eve of Democratization', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 84, no. 3, September 1990, pp. 821-47.

Beck, U., 'The Anthropological Shock: Chernobyl and the Contours of the Risk Society', *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, vol. 42, no. 1, March 1991, pp. 153-65.

Betz, H.G., 'Value Change and Post-Materialist Politics - the Case of West-Germany', *Comparative Political Studies*, July 1990, p. 245.

Bialer, S.(ed.), Politics, Society and Nationality inside Gorbachev's Russia (London, 1989).

Bjørklund, T., The Green Orientation among Estonians Compared with Scandinavians (Paper presented at WAPOR Regional Seminar: Eastern Europe, Tallinn, Estonia, 11-12 June 1993).

Bojcun, M., 'The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections in March-April 1994', *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 47, no. 2, 1995, pp. 229-49.

Bramwell, A., The Fading of the Greens. The Decline of Environmental Politics in the West (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1994).

Brown, A.; Gray, J., Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States (London: Macmillan, 1979).

Bulgakov, S., The Orthodox Church (London: The Centenary Press, 1935).

Burklin, W., 'Governing Left Parties frustrating the Radical Non-established Left: the Rise and Inevitable Decline of the Greens', *European Sociological Review*, vol. 3, no. 2, September 1987, p. 109.

Bush, K., 'The Soviet Response to Environmental Disruption', in Volgyes (1974), pp. 8-36.

Butenko, V., 'Green Perestroika in Kharkov', *Environmental Policy Review*, vol. 6, no.

Carpa, F., Turning Point (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982).

Carter, S.K., Russian Nationalism. Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990).

Churilov, N., Koshechkina, T., 'Public Attitudes in Ukraine', in Smoke, R. (ed.), Perceptions of Security. Public Opinion and Expert Assessments in Europe's New Democracies (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1996).

Cole, J.P., Environmental Pollution in the Former USSR in the Late 1980s, *Working Paper 19* (Nottingham: University of Nottingham, Department of Geography, 1992).

Dalton, R. Jr., Kuechler, M., Challenging the Political Order. New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990).

Davidson, C., 'Making Green Parties Succeed: What can be learned from the Experiences of Values and die Grünen?', *Political Science*, vol. 44, no. 2, December 1992, pp. 60-80.

Dawson, Jane L., 'Anti-nuclear Activism in the USSR and its Successor States: A Surrogate for Nationalism?', *Environmental Politics*, vol. 4, no. 3, 1995, pp. 441-66.

Dawson, Jane L., The Emergence of the Anti-Nuclear Power Movement in the USSR (Political Sociology Dept., University of California, Berkeley, 1990)

DeBardleben, J., 'The New Politics in the USSR: the Case of the Environment', in John Massey Stewart (ed.) - The Soviet Environment. Problems, Politics and Policies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 64-87.

DeBardleben, J., The Environment and Marxism-Leninism. The Soviet and East German Experience (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985).

DeBardleben, J., 'Optimists and Pessimists: The Ecology Debate in the USSR', *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, vol. XXVI, nos. 2-3, June/September 1984, pp. 127-40.

Demydenko, A., Chornobyl Accident and Development of Anti-Nuclear Movement in Ukraine. (This paper was presented at a seminar in the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies, University of Glasgow, in November 1990).

Dobson, A., Green Political Thought. An Introduction (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990).

Dresden, J., 'Soviet-Era Ecologists: Beginnings of a Civil Society?', *Meeting. Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies*, vol. XIII, no. 13, 1996.

Eckersley, R., Environmentalism and Political Theory . Towards an Ecocentric Approach (London: UCL Press Ltd., 1992).

Eklof, B., Soviet Briefing. Gorbachev and the Reform Period (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989).

Engels, F., Dialectics of Nature (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1946).

Erickson, J., Panslavism (London: Historical Association, 1964).

Feshbach, M., Ecological Disaster. Cleaning Up the Hidden Legacy of the Soviet Empire (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1995).

Feshbach, M. & Friendly, A. Jr., Ecocide in the USSR: Health and Nature under Siege (London: Aurum Press, 1992).

Fish, S., 'The Emergence of Independent Associations and the Transformation of Russian Political Society', *The Journal of Communist Studies*, vol. 7, no. 3, September 1991, pp. 299-334.

Fox, I.K. (ed.), Water Resources Law and Policy in the Soviet Union (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1971).

Friedgut, T., Political Participation in the USSR (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979).

Gamson, W.E., Modigliani, A., 'Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionalist Approach', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 95, no. 1, 1989, pp. 1-37.

Goldman, M.I., 'Environmentalism and Nationalism: an unlikely Twist in an unlikely

Direction, in Massey Stewart (ed.), The Soviet Environment: Problems, Policies, and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1-10.

Goldman, M.I., 'Pollution in the Soviet Union: The Growth of Environmentalism and Its Consequences', in Jones Anthony, Connor Walter D. and Powell, David E.(eds.), Soviet Social Problems (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1991).

Goldman, M. I., Environmental Pollution in the Soviet Union. The Spoils of Progress (Cambridge, MA., London: MIT Press, 1972).

Golitsyn, G.S., 'Ecological Problems in the CIS during the Transitional Period', *RFE/RI. Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 2, January 1993, pp. 33-42.

Goodwin, R.E., Green Political Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992).

Green Factsheet on Eastern Europe (Amsterdam, 26.4.1994).

Grødeland, Åse Berit, An Assessment of the Political Significance of Gorbachev's Leadership, M.Phil. dissertation, IREES, University of Glasgow, November 1990.

Grødeland, Åse Berit, 'The Ukrainian Green movement: Nationalist or internationalist?', in Elworthy, Anderson, Coates, Stephens and Stroh (eds.), Perspectives on the Environment 2 (Aldershot: Avebury 1995).

Grødeland, Å.B., Report on a Visit to USSR (London: Ecological Studies Institute, 1992).

Gustafson, T., Reform in Soviet Politics, chap. 8: 'The New Environmental Program: Do the Soviets really mean Business?' and chap. 3: 'Environmental Issues rise to Official Legitimacy' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

Gustafson, T., Crisis and Plenty. The Politics of Soviet Energy under Brezhnev and Gorbachev (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989).

Hahn, J.W., Soviet Grassroots. Citizen Participation in Local Soviet Government (London: Tauris, 1988)

Hammer, D.P., The USSR. The Politics of Oligarchy (Westview Press, 1990), chap. 4: 'Soviet Political Culture'

Harjan, G., Leonid Leonov - A Critical Study (Toronto: Arowhena Publishing Co., 1979).

Hewitt, P.G., Conceptual Physics (Harper Collins Publishers, 1989), part 7: 'Atomic and Nuclear Physics', pp. 577-634.

Holland, B., 'Goskompriroda: Saving the Environment', *Soviet Analyst*, vol. 17, no. 4, 24.2.1988, pp. 3-5.

Hosking, G.A., Aves, J., Duncan, P.J.S., The Road to Post-Communism. Independent Political Movements in the Soviet Union 1985-1991 (London: Pinter, 1992).

Hough, J., 'Political Participation in the Soviet Union', *Soviet Studies*, vol. 28, no. 1, January 1976.

- Hough, J. The Soviet Union and Political Science Theory (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1977), chap. 4: 'Political Participation in the Soviet Union', pp. 109-24.
- Hrinchenko, B., 'What were Shevchenko's National Ideas?', in Luckyi, G.S.N. (1980), pp. 115-27.
- Hulsberg, W., The German Greens. A Social and Political Profile. (London, New York: Verso, 1988).
- Ianitskii, O.N., 'The Environmental Movement', *Soviet Sociology*, November/December 1990, pp. 39-50.
- Inglehart, R., 'Post-Materialism in an Environment of Insecurity', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 75, pp. 880-900.
- Jackson, W.A.D. (ed.), Soviet Resource Management and the Environment (Columbus: AAASS, 1978).
- Jahn, D., New Politics and the Greens in Sweden and Germany: Resource Dependence and New Social Cleavages (Paderborn: University of Paderborn, August 1991).
- Jancar, B., 'Political Culture and Political Change (Review Article)', *Studies in Comparative Communism*, vol. XVII, no. 1, Spring 1984, pp. 69-82.
- Jancar, B., Environmental Management in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987).
- Janos, A.C., 'Social Science, Communism and the Dynamics of Political Change', *World Politics*, vol. 44, no. 1, October 1991, pp. 81-110.
- Joppke, C., 'Social Movements during Cycles of Issue Attention: The Decline of the Anti-Nuclear Energy Movements in West Germany and the USA', *BJS*, vol. 42, no. 1, March 1991, pp. 43-60.
- Jowitt, K., 'An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-Leninist Systems', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 68, pp. 1171-91.
- Kelley, D.R. et al., The Economic Superpowers and the Environment, the United States, Soviet Union and Japan (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1976).
- Kitschelt, H.P., 'Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies', *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 16, pp. 57-85.
- Koopmans, R., 'The Dynamics of Protest Waves: West Germany, 1965 to 1989', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 58, October 1993, pp. 637-58.
- Krawchenko, B. (ed.), Ukrainian Past, Ukrainian Present (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1993).
- Kriesi H., Saris W.E., Wille Anchrit, 'Mobilization Potential for Environmental Protest', *European Sociological Review*, vol. 9, no. 2, September 1993, pp. 155-71.
- Kuzio, T. and Wilson, A., Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994)

Kuzio, T., 'Restructuring from Below: Informal Groups in Ukraine under Gorbachev, 1985-89', in Bohdan Krawchenko (ed.), Ukrainian Past, Ukrainian Present (Macmillan, 1993)

Kuzio, T., Restructuring from below. Informal Groups in Ukraine under Gorbachev, 1985-90 (London: Ukrainian Press Agency, 1990).

Lampert, N., 'Patterns of Participation', in White, Pravda, Gitelman (eds.), Developments in Soviet Politics (London: Macmillan, 1990).

Logasov, V., The Lessons of Chernobyl are important for all (Moscow: Novosti, 1987).

Lemeshev, M., Bureaucrats in Power - Ecological Collapse (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1990).

Linden, C., 'Khrushchev and the Party Battle', *Problems of Communism*, vol. XI (September-October, 1962), pp. 27-35.

Little, R.D., 'Mass Political Participation in the US and USSR: A Conceptual Analysis', *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 8, no. 4, January 1976, pp. 437-60.

Liubomirskii, L., 'Another Look at the Reliability of Official Soviet Pollution Statistics', *Environmental Policy Review*, vol. 5, no. 1, January 1991, pp. 33-36.

Lowe, P.D. and Rüdig, W., 'Review Article: Political Ecology and the Social Sciences - the State of the Art', *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 16, pp. 513-50.

Luckyj, G.S.N., Shevchenko and the Critics, 1861-1980 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980).

Manning, N., Patterns of Environmental Movements in Eastern Europe (Paper to the BASEES Conference, March 25th - 27th 1995, Cambridge).

Maren-Grisebach, M., Philosophie der Grünen (München - Wien: Günter Olzog Verlag, 1982).

Marples, D.R., Ukraine Under Perestroika. Ecology, Economics and the Workers' Revolt (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991).

Marples, D., 'Decree on Ecology adopted in Ukraine', *RL/RFE Research Report*, 6.4.1990, pp. 15-16.

Marples, D., 'Ukraine in 1988: Economic and Ecological Issues', *RL/RFE Research Report*, 3.2.1989, pp. 29-31.

Marples, D., 'Industrial Pollution in Ukraine', *RL/RFE Research Report*, 24.3.1989, pp. 23-25.

Marples, D.R., The Social Impact of the Chernobyl Disaster (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988).

Marples, D., A Visit to the Soviet Union: Part II. Some Interviews, (Munich, 20.12.1988).

Martyniuk, J., 'Analysis: Demographics of Party Support in Ukraine', *The Ukrainian Weekly*, p. 3.

Massey Stewart, J.(ed.), The Soviet Environment: Problems, Policies and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

McLaren, L., Ideology in the Former Soviet Union: Defining Left and Right in a Non-Western Context (Houston: Department of Political Science, University of Houston, 1995).

Medvedev, Z., The Legacy of Chernobyl (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990).

Medvedev, Z., 'The Environmental Destruction of the Soviet Union', *The Ecologist*, vol. 20, no. 1, January/February 1990, pp. 24-29.

Mikhailisko, K., Ecology and the National Question in Belorussia (paper presented at Conference on Nationalism and the Environment in the USSR, Marjorie Mayrock Centre for Russian and East European Studies, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, January 1991).

Mnatsakanian, R., Environmental Legacy of the Former Soviet Republics (Edinburgh: Centre for Human Ecology, University of Edinburgh, 1992).

Müller-Rommel, F.(ed.), New Politics in Western Europe - The Rise and Success of Green Parties and Alternative Lists (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989).

Mussapi R., Steve, T., 'Improving Safety in Nuclear Power Generation in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: The Effectiveness of Current Initiatives', *PSBF Briefing*, no. 2, December 1994, pp. 1-6.

Nelkin, D. and Pollak, M., The Atom Besieged. Extraparliamentary Dissent in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA., London: The MIT Press, 1987).

Nichols, E., 'U.S. Nuclear Power and the Success of the American Anti-Nuclear Movement', *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*.

Nie, N.H., Verba, S., 'Political Participation', in Greenstein, Fred I. and Polsby, Nelson (eds.), Handbook of Political Science (Reading, Massachusetts, London: Addison-Wesley, 1975).

Nove, A., The Soviet Economic System (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987).

Opp, K-D, 'Soft Incentives and Collective Action: Participation in the Anti-Nuclear Movement', *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 16, pp. 87-112.

Paniotto, V., 'The Ukrainian Movement for Perestroika - 'Rukh': A Sociological Survey', *Soviet Studies*, vol. 43, no. 1, 1991, pp. 177-81.

Papadakis, E., The Green Movement in West Germany. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984).

Parkin, S., Green Parties. An International Guide (London: Heretic Books Ltd., 1989).

Peterson, D.J., The Environment in the Post-Soviet Era, *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 2, 8.1.1993, pp. 43-46.

Peterson, D.J., 'Environmental Protection and the State of the Union', *RL/RFE Research Report*, 22.3.1991, pp. 6-8.

Petro, N.N., "The Project of the Century": A Case Study of Russian National Dissent, *Studies in Comparative Communism*, vol. XX, nos. 3/4, autumn/winter 1987, pp. 234-52.

Pollock P.H. III, Lilie Stuart A., Elliot Vites M., 'Hard Issues, Core Values and Vertical Constraint: The Case of Nuclear Power', *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 23, pp. 29-50.

Porrit J., Winter David, The Coming of the Greens. (London: Fontana Collins, 1988).

Porrit, J., Seeing Green. The Politics of Ecology Explained (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984).

Potichnyi, P., 'The Multi-Party System in Ukraine', *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien*, no. 3-1992.

Potichnyj, P., 'The March 1990 Elections in Ukraine', in Krawchenko, Bohdan (ed.), Ukrainian Past, Ukrainian Present (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 123-34.

Pryde, P.R., Environmental Management in the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

Pryde, Philip R., The Environmental Basis for Ethnic Unrest in the Baltic Republics (San Diego State University, 1990).

Pryde, P.R., Conservation in the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

Rigby, Theodore H., The Changing Soviet System. Mono-Organisational Socialism from its Origins to Gorbachev's Restructuring. (London: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1990).

Rigby, Theodore H., 'How Strong is the Leader?', *Problems of Communism*, vol. XI (September-October 1962), pp. 1-8.

Rohrschneider, R., 'Environmental Belief Systems in Western Europe. A Hierarchical Model of Constraint', *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 26, no. 1, April 1993, pp. 3-29.

Rohrschneider, R., 'Citizens' Attitudes toward Environmental Issues. Selfish or Selfless?', *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 21, no. 3, October 1988, pp. 347-67.

Rootes, C., 'The Future of the 'New Politics': a European Perspective, *Social Alternatives*, vol. 8, no. 4, 1990, pp. 7-12.

Rubchak, B., 'Introduction', in Luckyi, G.S.N. (1980), pp. 3-54.

Rüdig, W., 'The Greens in Europe: Ecological Parties and the European Elections of 1984', *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. 38, no. 1, Winter 1985, pp. 56-72.

Rüdig, W., 'Nuclear Power: An International Comparison of Public Protest in the USA, Britain, France, and West Germany'.

Sakwa, R., Gorbachev and his Reforms 1985-1990 (Hertfordshire: Philip Allan, 1990).

Schultz, D. and Adams, J.S., Political Participation in Communist Systems (Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon Press, 1989).

Sergeyev, V. & Biryukov, N., Russia's Road to Democracy. (Vermont: Edward Elgar, 1993).

Shabad, T. and Mote, V., Gateway to Siberian Resources (the BAM). (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1977).

Sharlet, R.S., 'Concept Formation in Political Science and Communist Studies: Conceptualizing Political Participation', in Fleron, Frederic J. Jr., Communist Studies and the Social Sciences: Essays on Methodology and Empirical Theory (Chicago: Rand Mc Nally & Co., 1969).

Sheeny, A. and Voronitsyn, S., 'Ecological Protest in the USSR, 1986-88', *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 191/88, 11.5.1988.

Singleton, F. (ed.), Environmental Misuse in the Soviet Union (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976).

Skilling, H. G. & Griffiths, F., Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971).

Socor, V., 'An Independent Ecological Association in the Moldavian SSR', *Radio Free Europe Research*, RAD Background Report/39 (USSR), 7.3.1989.

Solchanyk, R.(ed.), Ukraine... From Chernobyl' to Sovereignty (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1992).

Spretnak C., Capra F., Green Politics. The Global Promise (London: Paladin Grafton Books, 1985).

Staff Report No. AL 62 CC (94) 2, North Atlantic Assembly Mission to Monitor Elections to the Ukraine Supreme Rada, March - April 1994, International Secretariat, April 1994, p. 2.

Starikova, E., Leonid Leonov. On Craftmanship (Moscow: Raduga, 1986).

The Armenian Genocide (München: Institut für Armenische Fragen, 1987), vol. 1 & 2.

The South Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plant . Information leaflet issued by the Visitor Centre of the nuclear power plant.

Tolz, V., Informal Groups in the USSR in 1988, *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 487/88, 30.10.1988.

Tucker, R.S., Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia - From Lenin to Gorbachev (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1987).

Valenta, J., Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia... 1968: Anatomy of a Decision (Baltimore, London: John Hopkins University Press, 1991).

Van Liere K.D., Dunlap R.E., 'The Social Bases of Environmental Concern: A Review of Hypotheses, Explanations and Empirical Evidence', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 44, no. 2, Summer 1980, pp. 181-97.

Volgyes, I.(ed.), Environmental Degradation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (New York, Washington, London: Praeger Publishers, 1974).

Volin, L., A Century of Russian Agriculture. From Alexander II to Khrushchev (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970).

Von Schlippe, W., 'Problems of Ecology in the Soviet Union', *Journal of Russian Studies*, no. 45, 1983, pp. 3-8.

Watts, N., Wandesforde-Smith, G., 'Post-Material Values and Environmental Policy Change', in Mann, D.E. (ed.), Environmental Policy Formation (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1981).

Weiner, D., 'Three Men in a Boat: The All-Russian Society for the Protection of Nature (VOOP) in the Early 1960s', *The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review*, vol. 20, nos. 2-3, 1993, pp. 195-212.

Weiner, D.R., Prometheus Rechained: Ecology and Conservation in the Soviet Union (Paper presented at Harrogate Conference, July 1990).

Weiner, D.R., Models of Nature: Ecology, Conservation, and Cultural Revolution in Soviet Russia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988).

White, S., Gorbachev and After (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

White, S., 'Political Communications in the USSR: Letters to Party, State and Press', *Political Studies*, vol. XXXI, pp. 43-60.

White, S., Political Culture and Soviet Politics (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1979).

Willerton, J.P., Patronage and Politics in the USSR (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

Willerton, J.P. and Sigelman, L., 'Public Opinion Research in the USSR: Opportunities and Pitfalls', *The Journal of Communist Studies*, vol. 7, no. 2, June 1991, pp. 224-32.

Wilson, A., Yakushik, V., The Developing Ukrainian Party System (London/Kiev, 1991).

Wilson, A. & Bilous, A., 'Political Parties in Ukraine', in *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 45, no. 4, 1993, p. 697.

Woodstock Leasor Limited Press Release, 10 Years after Chernobyl - Opinion of Ukrainian Elite: One in three think High Chance of Repeat, 2.4.1996.

Zaitsev, P., Taras Shevchenko (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1988)

Zaleska Onyshkevych, L.M.J., 'Echoes of Glasnost: Chernobyl in Soviet Ukrainian Literature', in Romana Bahry (ed.), Echoes of Glasnost in Soviet Ukraine (Ontario, CA: Captus University Publishers, 1989).

Ziegler, C.E., Environmental Policy and Politics under Gorbachev (paper presented at Harrogate Conference, July 1990).

Ziegler, C.E., Environmental Protection in the Soviet Union (Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, 1986).

Ziegler, C.E., Environmental Policy in the USSR (London: Frances Pinter, 1987)

Zile, S.L., 'Implementation of Environmental Law in the USSR', in G. Ginsburgs et. a. (eds.), Soviet Administrative Law: Theory and Policy (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), pp. 259-98.

ZumBrunnen, C., 'The Lake Baikal Controversy: A Serious Water Pollution Threat or a Turning Point in Soviet Environmental Consciousness', in Volgyes (1974).

German Language Sources

Förster, H., 'Umweltprobleme und Umweltpolitik in Osteuropa', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte - Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament*, B 10/91, 1 März 1991, s. 13-25.

Lettbauer, W., Russische Literaturgeschichte (Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz, 1958).

Schäper, R., Die Prosa V.G. Rasputins (München: Verlag Otto Sagner, 1985).

Tschizhewskij, D., Skovoroda - Dichter, Denker, Mystiker (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag - Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies, vol. 18, 1974).

Wust, H., Tradition und Innovation in der Sowjetrussischen Dorfprosa der sechziger und siebziger Jahre: zu Funktion, Darstellung und Gehalt des dortlichen Heiden bei Vasilij Suksin und Valentin Rasputin (München: Verlag Otto Sagner, 1984).

Weißburger, U., 'Die sowjetische Umweltpolitik unter Gorbatschow', *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien*, 1-1990.

Weißburger, U., 'Umweltprobleme und Umweltschutz in der Ukraine', *Osteuropa-Wirtschaft*, 39 Jhg., No. 4, 1994, s. 297-309.

Swedish Language Sources

Ignats, U., Ett hot mot livsmiljön i Estland och Östersjön (Göteborg: M.H. Publishing, 1988).

Norwegian Language Sources

Kjetsaa, G., Dostojevskij og Tolstoj. Essays (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1977)

Newspapers

The following newspapers were consulted for this thesis:

Russian and Ukrainian Language Newspapers

Вечерний Киев/Вечірній Київ. (1988-94).

Вісті з України (1990-93).

Голос України (1990-94).

Зелений світ (1988-94).
Киевские ведомости (1993-94).
Літературна Україна (1986-94).
Радянська Україна (1989-91).
Радянське Прибужжя (1991-94).
Республіка (1992-93).
Година природа (1992-93).
Урядовий кур'єр (1992-94).
Южная правда (1988-90).
RLE/RF Ukraine Today, Radio Liberty Media Digest (1990-94).

Newspapers referred to:

Бюллетені No. 1, No. 2, 'Южний Фронт Зелених'.

Восток Вознесіння, 17.4.1993.

Вестник інформаційного центру ЗАЕС, No. 9, 1992.
No. 1, 1994.

Вісник Одеса, 3.11.1989.

Вечерній Николаев, 28.5.1991.

Всесоюзная газета "Всем", No. 2, май 1991.

Екологія и здоров'я, No. 30-31, лютий 1995.

Енергетик, 2.6.1988.
1.9.1988.
25.10.1990.
21.1.1994.

За вільну Україну, 18.6.1991.

Известия, 26.3.1991.
11.3.1992.

Информационный Бюллетень N 14, ЭА "Зеленый Мир", г. Южноукраинск, апрель – май 1990.

Киевский вестник, 30.3.1994.
30.4.1994.
31.5.1994.

Комсомольское знамя, 5.11.1989.

Коммунар, 16.8.1990.

Кораблестроитель, 23.9.1988.
27.1.1989.

Культура і життя, 11.12.1989.
25.2.1990.

Ленинське плем'я, 1.10.1988.
15.10.1988.

Мирный атом, 9.6.1993.

Молода Україна, 2.10.1991.
28.2.1992.
3.7.1992.

Молода гвардія, 23.2.1990.

Народна гвардія, 16.3.1990.

Независимая газета, 17.8.1993.

Никопольская правда, 5.5.1994.

Огни Крима, 14.4.1989.

Південна зоря, 9.7.1991.

Правда України, 29.6.1993.

Пресс-Факт, інформаційний бюлетень пресс-центру ПО "Южно-Українська АЕС
December 1992, February 1993, April 1993.

Прикарпатська правда, 17.3.1990.

Радянська Україна, 4.2.1990.
30.1.1991.

Робітнича газета, 23.11.1988.
Робітнича газета, 18.12.1988.

Ровесник, 30.3.1991.

Спасение, No. 14, июнь, 1994.

СВ, 29.3.1991.

Свобода, 17.3.1992.

Українська думка, 16.7.1992.
27.1.1994.

Український південь, 19.11.1993.
27.1.1994.

Українські вісти, 5.9.1990.
16.5.1993.
8.8.1993
1.5.1994.

English Language Newspapers

FBIS-SOV-94-143, 26.7.1994.

Ukrainian Reporter (1991-92).

News from Ukraine, no. 18, 1988.
no. 45, 1989.
no. 46, 1992.

The Ukrainian Weekly, 3.12.1989.
11.11.1990.
20.3.1994.

Ukraine Today, 23.3.1993.