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TITLE

European Regional Elite Behaviour: A Comparative Study of
Political and Business Elites in the Strathclyde Region
of Scotland and Nomos Chanion in Crete

VOLUME I: Main Text Chapters 1-5

VOLUME II: Main Text Chapters 6-8
& Appendices

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December 1996

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ABSTRACT

In the framework of the European Communities and later the European Union a number of policies were devised for the European regions to facilitate their balanced economic development. An attempt to co-ordinate these policies can be linked to the fact that European regions are increasingly interdependent and European Union policies increasingly more relevant to this interdependence. Socio-economic and regional planning information between the Community regions is vital in this interdependent environment. The importance placed by the academic literature and by the European Commission on regional planners and their actions has to an extent obscured the importance of regional elites in this process. This thesis attempts to redress the balance, and does so by means of a series of interviews with business and political elites on the effects and prospects of further economic integration as well as administrative and political autonomy. I am comparing Western Scotland and the west of Crete focusing on the wider regional political and business elites within these regions. My assumption that the interaction of regional elites with each other can be, at least partly, responsible for competitiveness differentials between regions underlies most of this analysis. I attempt a comparison of elite attitudes within regions and between regions, giving particular attention to the effect aspirations to autonomy may have on elite perspectives. I have been able to discern and identify a relationship between regional elite attitudes on devolution and their perceptions of business prospects in a region. I have also identified a relationship between the attitudinal concordance among a region's elite groups and regional growth prospects. Furthermore, I have identified certain value groups for which attitudinal concordance appears significant to elite co-operation. Ensuing conclusions do not necessarily have predictive value but, by identifying attitudinal patterns among regional elites, can provide an insight into the transforming effect of European integration and modernity on European regional civil societies.

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Acknowledgements

The 'learning process' inherent in this research exercise has been extremely positive as it has led me to ever more refined, intricate and dare I say exciting investigations. This volume, as the product of that research exercise, I have to qualify with the acknowledgement of my accomplishment being at best modest. Awareness of the limitations, weakness and applicability restrictions of this research make for the frequent references to validity throughout this thesis.

The measure of my limited accomplishment does not reflect however on the incredible support I have received from my family, academic advisors, colleagues and friends.

I am also grateful to the John Latsis Group for providing me with generous financial assistance between 1989 and 1991.

Academically I have to primarily acknowledge the assistance of my supervisor Paul Heywood, who copiously and consistently provided me with support that extended well beyond the 'call of duty'. I would not have finished this thesis without his support.

Almost all of the academic and administrative staff at the Department of Politics have at some point provided me with encouragement and support. I owe a particular debt of gratitude to Stephen White for consistent academic and personal support and for providing me with an example of academic excellence to follow in my academic future. Bill Miller has also been instrumental for my academic development assisting on a number of problems of

methodology and providing me with a great number of refined insights on a number of intricate research questions.

James Kellas has been a source of priceless insights on the 'Scottish Political System' with a constant and tireless commentary on contemporary Scottish affairs. Richard Crook and John Peterson have also been a source of constant inspiration. While Christopher Mason was very helpful in facilitating contacts with the Strathclyde Regional Council and assisting me in my first year in Glasgow. They have all been very approachable and their suggestions I have valued greatly. I have also been privileged to take part in a number of academic debates led by Chris Berry and Michael Lessnoff that have furthered my conceptual understanding of a wide variety of issues on contemporary political thought.

I wish to also thank and acknowledge editorial and personal support from my colleague Stephen Herbert who was kind enough to review a large part of this thesis always making valuable suggestions. Ricardo Gomez, Linda Blanshay, Clare McManus and Ian Murray have also provided me with very helpful comments on sections of this thesis.

Before submitting the final version of this thesis I presented a number of papers, based on the data I gathered, in UK and international conferences. Comments and suggestions during those presentations proved very valuable during the final revisions and I would like to acknowledge comments by Michael Keating, Charlie Jeffery, Shari Garmise, Martin Bull, Peter Lynch, Elizabeth Bomberg, Hans van den Berg, Mark McAteer, Paul Heywood, Kleomenis Koutsoukis, Donatella DellaPorta, Martin Rhodes and Peter John.

Elspeth Shaw, Avril Johnstone and Jeanette Berry have also been extremely supportive and understanding providing impeccable secretarial support while I was conducting the elite survey and assisting me throughout my stay in Glasgow.

On a personal level I owe a debt of gratitude to my mother Sofianna and my father Christos for their unwavering emotional support and financial backing through the many years of this research. They have made my life choices so much easier for me by pointing-out that 'one can only fail to attain their potential'.

A great number of friends in Glasgow provided me with invaluable personal support and insights into local custom and tradition. I have to specifically mention George and Jane MacMillan of MacMillan, Christopher Vine, Patricia Craig, Russel Clark-Jones, Ursilla Brown and Nadine Carmichael. During my last year in Glasgow Clare McAllister has been a tireless reviewer and precious companion, I owe a lot to her support.

During the same period a great number of family and friends outside Glasgow provided me with personal support. My sister Ioanna Nicolaidou, my cousins John and Joseph McNelis, my uncle Edward McNelis. My friends Panagiotis Pollalis, Giorgos Giannis, Nicos Giannis, Vali Lerouni, Eleni Liakoura and Stelios Grigoriou.

Finally, I would like to thank all the participants in my survey for trusting me and sharing with me their opinions and perspective on a great number of potentially 'sensitive' issues, as well as all those administrators, executives and academics

whose interviews helped me orient my survey to the questions that mattered.

AUTHOR DECLARATION

Unattributed material presented here, in tables, graphs and verbatim has been collected by myself and is the result of work conducted and supervised while I have been a doctoral student at the Department of Politics of the University of Glasgow.

Small sections of this material have been recently presented in academic papers (during 1996) during conference proceedings and they have not been otherwise published or disseminated.

Chapter 1

Some Questions Arising from the Literature

A. Introduction: European Integration and Regional Actors' Behaviour¹

My interest in regional development within the context of European integration is linked to the possibility that an integrated European market can lead to economic agglomeration at core regions that would further hamper the competitiveness of the weakest peripheral regions; at the same time the sheer size of anticipated market transformations, could mean that any market changes will be very difficult to counteract once in place.² Regional inequality goes in tandem with the bleak possibility of

1. 'Regional behaviour' is taken here to refer to the behaviour of elite actors, at a regional level. In this paper I will proceed to gauge attitudes that are relevant to such presumably distinct behaviour.

2. For a concise case on the necessity of European regional policy see Tsoukalis (1991, ch.2 & ch.8).

great economic disparities that breed hardship and offend our perceptions of social equity, while it is characterised by a chronic under-utilisation of resources. It is not therefore surprising that the EU and the consisting national governments are so preoccupied with regional development and welfare.³ The understanding that Member States are, most of the times, too small or ill equipped for a comprehensive evaluation of regional problems and adoption of appropriate assisting measures, is one of the reasons behind the prominent position of European regional economics in current academic literature.⁴

³ . I am not suggesting that concern with regional development is on the ascendant in all member states. Regional development efforts in the UK have not been consistent since the beginning of the fourth Kondratieff cycle after W.W. II (Prestwich and Taylor, 1990), while since 1979 there has been an extensive drive to redefine the welfare state in Great Britain (Pierson, 1991), as the "Conservatives have stressed decreased intervention by central government and placed much more emphasis upon national economic growth" (Prestwich and Taylor, 1990, p.160).

⁴ . A seminal work on European Economics is by El-Agraa (1990) based on his work on *International Economic Integration* (El-Agraa, 1982). Specific problems of the European regional economy are covered by Despicht (1980), Pinder (1983), Molle and Cappelin (1988), Hardy et al (1995) and Vanhove and Klaasen (1987).

Furthermore, the increase of trade and the integration of world financial markets has made mutual interdependence a feature of policy planning. The abolition of state subsidies and the limitation of financial instruments available to member states is one more reason that regional policy has to emanate (or at least be co-ordinated) at the the European Union level. The trend towards globalisation of world production and distribution patterns, further affects inter-regional disparities in Europe.⁵ A final consideration is of European regions' integration into the European economic system, which means that (relevant to their degree of integration) any slumps in their performance become crucial for the rest of the EU.

The potential impact regional actors' behaviour can have, as a distinct factor of regional development and competitiveness, explains my preoccupation with attitudes of regional elites. Ideally, I would need to identify regional behaviour and attitudes as separate from those

⁵ . Economic Globalization has to be understood in a relative context. Krugman (1991 and 1995) has pointed to the limited extent of truly global trends of what Hutton (1996) has called 'globaloney'.

of other national or supranational elites, this although significant, would however require resources of a much grander project than the present one.

Comparing two distinct regional elites in the periphery of Europe (i.e. Strathclyde and Crete) appears adequate in order to detect the existence of an influence on regional performance by regional elite attitudes and elite interaction. I have, furthermore, given particular attention to the similarity or divergence of elite attitudes within regions. I have effectively hypothesised that the degree of 'concordance' between the business and political elite sub-groups could be directly correlated with past performance of a region. It is possible that a more exhaustive study could determine the degree to which regional elite concordance can be correlated with a measure of anticipated regional performance.

The role of regional elites as distinct and identifiable actors in European regions has not received particular attention in Social Science literature (recent exceptions include Leonardi and Garmise, 1992; Putnam, 1993; Dupoirier, 1994), although it is the case that certain

regional elites perceive their goals as distinctly different from those of national elites (Council of Europe, 1990; Morata, 1992; Newman, 1994). This could be viewed in tandem with the creation of a 'third level of governance' within European regions (Harvie, 1994), the emergence of a 'variable geometry state order' (Keating, 1992, p.60) or of 'multi-level governance' (Marks, 1993; Keating and Jones, 1995). The relevance and implications of these developments to a transformation of elite interaction in the regional level I will examine in the concluding chapter of this thesis.

I have surveyed three main topics in order to establish a theoretical background for my survey investigation and determine valid assumptions in the field. The first deals with the relationship between business and political behaviour with economic development in the European regions. The second deals with research on the relation between regional autonomy and economic development. And in the third I discuss basic economic arguments on the influence on growth by natural endowments and regional actors.

B. Regional Economic Development and the Behaviour of Regional Actors

1. The Relevance of Regional Actors

In the *First Periodic Report on the Regions of Europe* (Commission, 1981) the only section with any projections about the future is related to the labour market, signifying the importance given to the human factor by the researchers in the European Commission. In the *Second Periodic Report* as well (which is by itself a more "mature" approach to regional problems) again the main parameters investigated had to do with labour supply and demand while a reference is made to labour force qualifications (Commission, 1984).⁶ There is no apparent connection of business or political behaviour in the regions with regional development however. Admittedly

6. Subsequent periodic reports as is the Fourth (Commission, 1991b) take a different angle from the first two, shifting the emphasis to specific regional problems rather than giving a general viewpoint of the regional situation. For that reason it can not be reasonably expected that they will dwell on such issues as the importance of regional elites.

the Reports try to cover the 'social and economic situation of the regions of the Community' by giving an account of the major employment, productivity and regional product disparities. They are incomplete though -to the extent that they try to make policy suggestions- without considering the effects of entrepreneurial disposition. As I explain in part C of this chapter, infrastructure is not necessarily a sufficient precondition to guarantee private investment and consequent development. Of course, from the perspective of a civil servant, the periodic reports may be instrumental in identifying the problems, without however addressing the issue of regional actors importance.

Entrepreneurial ability and its significance is more openly discussed and given a centre stage by authors like Molle and Cappelin (Molle, 1988)⁷. Although their views are considered controversial they indicate an interest in

7. Molle & Cappelin (Molle, 1988) also argue that long term economic cycle is 'responsible' for total production and unemployment; at this result they come using the FLEUR model (which explains changes in time, of the share of each region of EC in the total European employment by sector) in an effort to interpret differentials in unemployment levels.

this particular field of research.⁸ Molle and Cappelin in particular expand on the impact of Community policies in Europe centred on the distribution and movement of Labour. As Economic Geographers their particular interest is with the distribution of employment effects across space. Their contention that long term economic cycles are responsible for total production levels leads them to the conclusion that the long term cycle is responsible for unemployment as well.⁹ This runs counter to the mainline economic principles of business cycles and employment levels. So, they believe that their focus on the long-term cycle and long-term trends of employment allows them not to abide by the restricted concept of short-term economic cycles. The authors particular perspective does not allow them to investigate

⁸ . An interesting point of view is expressed by French political economist Guy Sorman (1988), who suggests that Low Income Countries (LICs) experience adjustment problems to capitalist production because they try to duplicate Western models of development. Although he sees a direct connection of development with business and political ethics he does not codify his contentions nor does he identify a regional pattern.

⁹ . The long term Schumpeterian economic cycle as a process by which innovation breeds innovation (Schumpeter, 1939) is considered relevant not only to entrepreneurship (Jensen-Butler, 1996) but is also a force that facilitates greater interaction between the private and public sector (Dunford and Bencko, 1995).

interaction patterns within the work force or the influence of particular agents on unemployment levels.

Economists like Robson, Christiansen, El-Agraa and Pelkman touch upon the subject of relations between business with economic development and more rarely with the issue of politics and economic development, but they seem to avoid tackling the two issues together. At the same time they avoid expanding on the relevant analysis of agent influences that will take account of the behavioural perspective. Since they do not touch upon the subject at a national level I cannot expect them to cover it on a regional basis either. It should not be forgotten however that economists categorise business behaviour as a basically microeconomic issue and regional development as a macroeconomic one. Consequently most economists due to 'scientific conditioning' would avoid mixing both perspectives.

Robson, for instance, covers the impact and importance of Transnational Enterprises only from the perspective of resource allocation and equity considerations. His analysis on a regional level does not refer to the importance of a positive business climate for the

Transnationals to function efficiently (Robson, 1984, p.165-68).

Christiansen, on the other hand, makes a good study of location decisions on a regional level with business behaviour in perspective. His findings support the proposition that a major part of location decisions are made in the same way by regional actors in different countries. Although his study is limited in perspective he comes up with three rules on locational decisions:

- a. decisions are made on the highest level possible,
- b. small firms react more efficiently to changes in their locational environment and
- c. only very large firms use "rational" model-oriented procedures for selecting sites (Christiansen, 1981, p.224-25).

I believe these estimates by Christiansen to support my contention that there is a relationship between behaviour of regional actors and development. In particular it seems that locational decisions are determined by the perception the manager\ entrepreneur has of the economic space surrounding him or her. The ability of small firms to react better to changes in the locational environment

(see b. above) could be interpreted to mean that smaller firms have the advantage of a more agile decision making process; while the fact that large firms use 'rational' procedures (see c. above) must be associated with the ability of multinationals (or aspiring multinationals) to have a global perspective possessing relatively unbiased maps of opportunity. In other words, big corporations are mainly influenced by 'rational' return on investment rules, while entrepreneurs are bound by their maps of business opportunities and therefore biased. Effectively this bias could be a major competitive advantage of the regions, facilitating the development of small enterprises, and being an 'inexhaustible' source of entrepreneurial capital in the regions. Entrepreneurs unlike multinationals are more likely to have a permanent commitment to a region.

Disequilibrium theory assumes rational decisions by businessmen, investors and migrant workers who calculate opportunities and act accordingly. As David Pinder argues "businessmen and investors possess 'mental maps' of spatial opportunity that deviate markedly from reality" (Pinder, 1983 p.30). Pinder draws on theories developed by Hirschman, Myrdal and Friedmann in

explaining that entrepreneurs do not evaluate objectively growth regions, are biased towards advanced regions and overestimate the benefits in some growth regions. All these lead to a distortion of their views on available opportunities elsewhere. The media or proximity of entrepreneurial capital to development regions, or business associates are likely to bias the opinion of entrepreneurs.¹⁰

It has also been argued that much depends on the ability of decision makers to filter biased information and analyse it effectively (Gold, 1980; Gould and White, 1986). Thus indicating that balanced growth is directly relevant to attitudes of important actors toward particular regions. Pinder also contents that "strategies designed to improve international balance will be incomplete if they focus on economic considerations alone. Attention must also be given to

10. Pinder further suggests that "repeated exposure [to] particular features of the objective environment will however, increase the probability of their inclusion in the behavioural environment... [particularly] since people are most frequently exposed to those parts of the objective environment that are in the immediate vicinity" (Pinder, 1983,p.).

In other words entrepreneurs are influenced by what is closer to home than what is further away.

overcoming the psychological barriers to development in lagging areas" (Pinder, 1983 p.32).

I now turn to the effect those 'biased' regional actors can have on regional economies within Europe.

2. Actors in the European Regions

Nevin comes to recognise the importance of political actors in efforts of regional development by pointing to the need of politicians to alleviate regional problems in the short term. He does not however distinguish the effect of regional politicians nor does he see the possible importance of a positive business climate created by regional government. Furthermore, he sees as a reason of regional imbalance entrepreneurs who 'displace, the flexible prices and free markets of earlier stages of development, by administered prices', leading therefore to the market distortions responsible for regional inequality (Nevin, 1990, p.329). Although this is an admittedly negative view of entrepreneurial role it shows the preoccupation of the author with the role actors can play on the regional level. Furthermore,

this view can only be sustained for entrepreneurs that are able to monopolise a market, a development that can only seem possible if an entrepreneur has a big market share or acts in collusion with his competitors. In a world of small-medium sized enterprises and multiregional competition it is difficult to imagine such a development.

It is possible that economic analysts fail to take account of those characteristics that separate one region from another and which can be perceived to have an impact on the productive environment within a region. The perennial discussion of identity by political scientists could be what economists miss-out when they examine regional growth. For instance, in his analysis Nevin equates national problems in a customs union with regional problems within a nation (Nevin, 1990, p.335-41). This has the detrimental effect of altering the perspective of his exposition. He takes as given that national units (his new regions) will -or can- represent the interests of their own regions in the European Community. He, in other words, presupposes that analysing the behaviour of national Governments and industries at the community level is assimilable to an

analysis of regional behaviour. He does make one interesting remark in that context: "generalisations concerning the regional impact on existing enterprises are on shaky ground ...[because] the range of productive performance within any given country...is at least as great as that between countries" (Nevin, 1990 p.329). Effectively he recognises the limitations of economic analysis on a national level, to account fully account for their economic problems and provide solutions. He warns, that once a common market exists it is difficult to separate industry on a regional or national basis with no reference to basic distributional statistics for the industries best and worst performers. Generalisations will be meaningful (i.e. identifying an industry as labour or capital intensive) only on a very wide basis (i.e. European Union level). The importance of this realisation lies basically in interpretations of regional data and policies in aid of regions. A region demonstrating low productivity in one industry may have a thriving public and ailing private sectors. This being an unusual event it may not be immediately identified by a simple review of the data. This fact acts as a further impediment to meaningful analysis of regional integration by conventional economic analysis.

Pelkmans addresses the issue of regional policy conducted 'from above' which would have a negative influence on the 'supply of entrepreneurs'. He poses the question: "is the supply of entrepreneurs exogenously given, independent of the business climate?", to answer " a favourable business climate with sufficient freedom for new initiatives and new entry is likely to exert a strong positive effect on the supply of entrepreneurs" (Pelkmans, 1984, p.274). He goes on to attack over-involvement of the government for among other reasons that "political commitments may create an atmosphere where cost increases go unpunished", he believes that "neither Governments nor firms can 'pick winners' individually" therefore advocating a balanced involvement by both (Pelkmans, 1984, p.274). Pelkmans further suggests that regional policy is conducted on political arguments and for electoral reasons; they end-up distorting the market by compensating for locational disadvantage helping to maintain 'key' and 'essential' industries which would not have survived in free competition (Pelkmans, 1984, pp44-54 and 271-275).

There seems to exist a dichotomy of interest between political and economic goals of regional policy. This, I believe, is evident from the fact that it can be to the advantage of national politicians -who frequently have a short term perspective- to distort market operations to ameliorate regional problems, instead of promoting economic solutions that benefit the regions in the long term. In short, national politicians seem to favour the solutions with the least political cost. That is a good reason to investigate behaviour of regional politicians to whom -hopefully- regional welfare extends beyond the next elections. I believe regional politicians commitment 'evident' by the fact that it is a small percentage of them that will be able to pursue a political career on a national or supranational level. Therefore their 'bond' with local government should identify them more with their region. Furthermore, in regions with autonomous aspirations, politicians associated with that goal, will correlate a political career in the national arena with stronger representation of regional interests.

In the report on "The Economics of 1992" (Emerson, 1988), representing the semi-official view of the European

Commission on the direction of the European Common Market, the issue of business climate or managerial capacity is not tackled on a regional level. Naturally, an issue emerging as having paramount importance for further integration was the training of European managers. It is evident that managerial capacity and business initiative is considered essential but regional differences are omitted as one of the sources of regional variation. Furthermore, the entrepreneurial milieu and the relationship between business and political actors are not given adequate consideration.¹¹ So, although regional economic variations are considered one of the major policy arenas, posing a significant challenge to the competence of the EU, causes of regional disequilibrium are not fully gauged if the main reference to business actors in the regions relates to their training.

¹¹ . The concept of the 'entrepreneurial milieu' is comprehensively discussed by Jesper Rasmussen (1992) as it relates to entrepreneurs and their social networks in a locality. Camagni (1995) and Coffey and Bailly (1996) explore the concept of 'innovative milieu', while the relationship between entrepreneurship and regional development is examined by Sweeney (1987) and Bradley and Taylor (1995).

One of the latest research projects funded by the European Commission, tries to address the issues involved in regional competitiveness by surveying business elites in a European Community wide level (Nam, 1991a and Nam, 1991b). This research effort, although of invaluable assistance as an indicator of prevailing business attitudes in Europe does not attempt to present the point that regional business elites are in themselves important for regional competitiveness, nor does it attempt to identify regional elite's interaction as one of the reasons behind regional competitiveness. The focus of this survey, on industrial production firms, which are typically medium or large, further bias results towards large national or multinational operators.

3. Some Explanations of Regional Actor Involvement in Regional Development

Political scientists come to interesting conclusions when they try to tackle the issue of regional policy. It is more 'natural' for a political scientist to associate economic considerations with political motives. So Nigel Despicht asserts that "government policies toward regions

have been inspired by national problems" and "European regional policy is acceptable if European-scale action helps to solve national problems better" (Despicht, 1980 p.40). His perspective seems like a typical 'integration from above' exercise where significant regional actors are only those having 'aspirations for autonomy' such as the Basques or the Scots (Despicht, 1980).

It is possible that the visibility of other regional groups is less prominent but I contest the view that regional actors with less radical views than , say, the Basque separatists are less significant for their regions' economic development. On Despicht's defence regions or their integration were not very high on the political agenda of the 1970's and it was hard to foresee the importance they would assume in EC planning by the 1990's.

Another political scientist ,Barry Jones, demonstrates the importance of regional political actors focusing his discussion on regional groups of interest and their power to lobby effectively. He warns that:

"The regions are parts of highly developed,
integrated political systems. Regional interest

group attitudes and the procedures which they have evolved are conditioned by the fact that they operate within the constitutional framework of their respective states, according to the rules and conventions of their parliaments and the organisational structures of their national political parties and pressure groups" (Jones, 1985, p.243).

In other words, regional actors do not function autonomously of national political influence. In this work Jones does not determine the extent to which they divert from national, to support regional interests however.

Forecasting a possible future for the European Regions, Jones, believes that "the more the regional and other interests organise to lobby the Commission in Brussels" the more centralised the EC will become which will result in "regional and peripheral interests [to]... be subordinate to the needs of the Community as a whole" (Jones, 1985, p.245). So, Jones sees two forces namely the "proprietary interest expressed by the national Governments" and the "consolidation of power in the

Commission" (Jones, 1985, p.245) as seriously threatening the chances of European regions to autonomous decision making. His contentions seem consistent and point to subsequent developments in the European political scene that have taken a slightly different turn than what Jones predicted however. One of the possible scenarios for the development of Community institutions presupposes that regional autonomy and decision making will be enhanced, by the process of Community integration, so that this 'new third level' of government at the regional level will counteract centralised legislative and executive powers of the Community. Under this scenario the national units will be the only ones to suffer loss of sovereign power.¹²

12. Whether the shift of power to the regions is feasible or even desirable, is a theoretical question. It has been suggested for instance that "...relations between the central government and autonomous communities remains a central issue facing Spain, although one with potentially beneficial implications." (Heywood, 1991, p.64). On the run-up to the ratification of the Treaty of the European Union certain governments were reported to be hostile to the institutionalisation of the Committee of the Regions, which they perceived as potentially enhancing regional autonomy (The Economist, 1992).

The view has also been expressed that regional units become increasingly players on their own right, while regional politics and lobbying attain a different focus. According to Boisot "what we are witnessing in this evolution is a shift in the nature of regional strategy from one which could be described as a game against nature to one that is more appropriately labelled a game against adversaries" (1990,p.394). According to this perspective, regional authorities lobby Brussels directly, competing with other local authorities for ERDF or other funds and preferential treatment on regulations or allocation of resources. This would signify the emergence in Europe of regional players in their own right. Such a development would be more significant for regional authorities like Strathclyde that financed a representative office in Brussels, while it can be argued that by its mere existence such an office created a higher awareness about European issues among the Strathclyde local political elite.¹³

¹³ . Christopoulos and Herbert (1996) and Herbert (1997, forthcoming) examine the importance of awareness among the regional elite of Eu policy initiatives.

It can be of course counter-argued that the emergence of regional actors as players in the European arena is a chimera. The European Union budget is just over one percent of the GDP of the member states. Recent academic work detects only incremental effects of regions in EU policy making (Bomberg, 1994; Van der Knaap, 1994; Jeffery 1995). The concept of 'Europe of the Regions' has been derided while an alternative concept of 'Europe with the Regions' (Borras-Allomar et al, 1994; Hooghe, 1996) has been offered lately as a more accurate assessment of future relations of European institutions with regional government. It is also evident that lobbying in favour of a region is more effective with the intervention and collaboration of a 'home' nation state (Mazey and Richardson, 1993). Furthermore, it has been suggested that it is not the allocation of resources that drive regions to a European representation but the need for information and of a re-assertion of their regional identity (Marks et al, 1996).¹⁴

¹⁴ . In this work it is suggested by Gary Marks et al (1996), that "an office in Brussels is a form of insurance against the hazards of a notoriously unpredictable policy environment" (p.58), furthermore irrespective of whether regions harbour a "sense of distinctiveness [that] is party-political or cultural...regional governments are driven to Brussels to secure independent

The degree to which regions will proceed from being integral parts of nation-states to outright inter-regional competition with one another, is the subject of an ongoing academic debate (Hardy et al, 1995; Ohmae, 1995) which is still at its early stages.¹⁵

Finally, to produce a complete account of forces affecting European regionalisation it is important to mention those that support the 'emancipation' of regional units within national and European institutions as a political conviction. Most prominent is the Federalist Intergroup in the European Parliament. According to the Federalists, consolidation of political power in the EU cannot but get balanced with more autonomous decision making from the European Union regions.¹⁶ The question

representation" (p.60). It is finally concluded that "the only resource we find evidence for is that of associational culture, which presumably is linked to the entrepreneurialism of subnational decision-makers in pursuing opportunities for political communication and influence beyond their own region" (p.63).

¹⁵ . For a discussion of the competition between European urban centres see Lever (1993).

¹⁶. In an article on the institutional reforms of the EC in *The Federalist*, Antonio Padoa-Schioppa, expresses these federalist ambitions for Europe when he calls for the endorsement of a statement, in the then pending Maastricht Treaty, of "...the

then arises whether regional actors are able to benefit their region more effectively than actors at the national level.¹⁷

Obviously speaking about regions it has to be clarified, that it is very difficult to make a distinct separation of decision making on the regional level that is not directly related to the national or supranational level.¹⁸ Hence my interest on regional autonomy and its relation to business and political behaviour.

C. Regional Autonomy and Economic Development: A Link?

There would be a limited scope in discussing the relationship of autonomy to regional development if all

constitutional principles of subsidiarity, popular sovereignty and the balancing of powers..." (Padoa-Schioppa, 1991, p.72).

17. There have been suggestions that the policy of national governments, like the British one, have been consistent and that the control of European policy through the elimination of federalist overtones in European Treaties is a positive development (George, 1990).

18. It has been argued (Hadjimichalis, 1983) that there is a political and cultural subordination of the periphery within the countries of Southern Europe, that creates a core and periphery relationship similar to the North-South one. It is further argued that the developed agglomerations in the South derive their strength from the existence of such a periphery.

operations and decisions on growth and development were taken at a national or supranational level. On a cursory overview this would appear to be the case for both Scotland and Crete. It is my contention, however that regional elites are able to influence decisions at a national and supranational level,¹⁹ while policies devised at the national and supranational level are privy to lobbying from those regions with the strongest and most determined regional elites.

On the other hand in a free trade area, with transportation costs becoming marginal for most products²⁰, the concept of economic autonomy has an

¹⁹. See Marks et al (1996) for an account of the effectiveness of 'the mobilization of regions in the European Union'. It is further suggested that "the association between regional political autonomy and representation in Brussels is clear for several countries" (1996, p.59).

²⁰. In "The Region Is Dead! Long Live The Region" Neil Smith (1988) argues convincingly that the : a. internalisation of production, b. firm structure reorganisation, c. new labour practices that have increased productivity and d. transport costs that have become of minimal concern, are leading effectively to a 'space of flows' to substitute a 'space of places'. Additionally, the tertiary sector, the fastest growing sector in the capitalist economies, has very limited transportation costs and low locational disadvantages (Illeris, 1989). Furthermore, as regional economics contends (Burns, 1987 p.18), bearing an acute crisis on the downturn of the

inherently restricted meaning.²¹ Within the globalisation of production and consumption patterns, the EU regulatory framework becomes quintessential for regional competitiveness. I will argue further-on that one of the most important assets of a region's productive environment is the attitudinal concordance of elite actors.

I will also argue that, although the major fiscal and monetary decisions are taken in the centre ²² -be it Europe or Nation State- there exists an ability for manoeuvre of regional and local government. This power is often more than just an ability to bend rules and decisions taken at the centre. It is one of my hypotheses that regional government can create a

business cycle, transportation costs are relatively declining through time.

²¹. For a (philosophical) definition of autonomy in its relation to politics see Castoriadis (1991).

²². The traditional core -periphery arguments on their economic side will be developed in part D. Regional Scientists however (Agnew, 1988) argue that there is no political core and periphery today. It is also argued that regions no longer have "life-cycles" with rising and declining economies of scale and uneven development is not a pattern but a process. Effectively "Regions are not actors with common experiences" (Agnew, 1988 p.131).

conducive business environment,²³ and therefore be instrumental in creating the 'attitudes' that can be beneficial to the people of their locality.

It will, furthermore be interesting to examine whether the politicians of a region accommodate the businessmen of a region, within the process of 'policy networks' or the existence of neo-corporatist arrangements among local elites (Schmitter, 1979, 1982; Cawson, 1985, 1986; O'Sullivan 1988).²⁴ In the context of examining European regional prospects, it has also been suggested that the emergence of public-private partnerships in European

²³. In a very important document (Commission, 1981b) in which the Commission gives the new dimensions of Regional Policy, exploitation of indigenous development potential is directed among others to: "dormant business capacity (especially in small and medium-sized enterprises, crafts and rural tourism), which need support services in terms of information, research, technical assistance, market analysis etc.".

²⁴. Going back to the economic background of such an issue a quote from Verhoven & Klaassen I believe is enlightening to the trade-offs involved:

"The question can be raised whether South Wales has been better off with the combination of relatively high income for those employed, relatively heavy unemployment, and external aid, than it would have been if it could have devalued its 'currency' dispensing with aid, reducing the real earnings of those in work, but also reducing unemployment and probably accelerating growth" (1987, p.241).

cities and lagging regions can be associated with the 'generation of dynamic development strategies' in the 1980's which, however, cannot by themselves be a sufficient condition for development (ERECO, 1993, p.45-46).

At this point it is good to remember that it is still an open question whether businessman or politicians are in a better position to assess the economic predicament of a region better. "Policy-makers have presented themselves as possessing spatially unbiased views which give rise to an appreciation of the sub-optimal resource use characteristic of regional systems in disequilibrium"; in other words politicians in designing regional policy claim they can correct "the inaccurate mental maps possessed by industrial decision makers" (Pinder, 1983 p.66). In assessing the role of politicians it should be borne in mind that policy making for the regions cannot be considered separate from the seasonality of the political 'game' and the party political scene.

I assume that regional politicians (in contrast to national ones) could create the necessary equilibrium for two main reasons. First, they must feel more accountable

to their region, if only because of a smaller size of the electorate. Secondly, they must be more receptive and better aware of the needs of their region possessing a more accurate 'mental map' of their area.

The development of services in European regions can be a case in point. Sven Illeris (Illeris, 1989) argues that the service industry cannot operate without the existence of infrastructure but at the same time the existence of infrastructure alone is by no way a guarantee of the development of services. The two must go hand in hand. Obviously for the most promising sector of growth for the Community regions (Commission, 1984) the question does not become one of just providing the infrastructure funds but creating those attitudes that will make possible tapping into the latent human resourcefulness in every area.

The creation of new service firms depends decisively on the presence of entrepreneurs (Illeris, 1989, p.103). What is characterised as the "entrepreneurial type of human resources" (Illeris, 1989,p.104) is considered essential for innovation and firm creation. The frequency of creation and degree of success of new firms

depends to a great extent on the social and cultural background of the entrepreneurs. Local and regional authorities can therefore be instrumental in creating those conditions that will cultivate and encourage innovative skill and assist in the marketing of new products.²⁵

To go back into examining politicians and policy makers relevance to the development of a region it is relevant to examine possible effects of regional planning on a region. It has been suggested that the "competitive advantages of a region or firm are less determined by what happens to be their 'natural endowment' and are to a large extent the result of deliberate strategies reflected in investment in productivity ,people and R & D" (Emerson, 1988 p.180-1). European Commission

²⁵. As argued on the report *The Tourism Sector in the Community* (Commission, 1985) it is the approach peoples of different regions have towards tourism that make for the differences in growth of the sector. Italian tourism experienced a 'tired maturity' while Greek and British (and later Spanish) were experiencing a constant growth (Commission, 1985). This report accounts for the situation in late 70's and early 80's. Obviously there is no account of the Greek 'maturity' of the late '80's that followed or the blooming of the Spanish and later Turkish tourist markets in the Mediterranean basin.

researchers, in other words, believe that planning can be a sufficient counter balance for lack of endowments. Although 'investment in people' is a vague enough concept to include the creation of a positive innovation climate, I believe there exists a failure of elevating this concept to the importance it deserves.

Researchers in the Commission, in the same report on the effects of market integration believe as well that eventually there will be an even pattern of development "between dynamic centres and lethargic peripheral areas" (Emerson, 1988,p.181), seeing the latter as lagging in basic technological infrastructure and vocational training. Recent analysis suggests that globalisation of production will eventually lead to convergence of real incomes while core-periphery disparities will be eliminated in the long term (Krugman and Venables, 1994). This analysis is limited however, by an assumption of constantly diminishing transport costs.

On the other hand, it is generally accepted that distributive effects from infrastructure improvements are small, when they take place on all regions at the same speed (Rietveld, 1989); that as "US experience has shown

... public work projects, chiefly because of their long delays in implementation fare badly as economic stabilisation instruments" (Burns 1987,p.240); and that international capital investment is directed towards locations with already existing qualified labour. From these premises I conclude that it has to be indigenous investment efforts that can trigger an adequate process of development. As indigenous investors I also consider the institutional ones since "the structure of the region's 'production environment' may...be more decisive than the abilities of the entrepreneur" (Lambooy,1986, p.160) or as W. Stohr claims, a prerequisite for innovation in the regions is the interaction of among others "risk financing... and locally rooted decision making functions" (as quoted in Vanhove,1987,p.171). A need for decisive actions on the region can probably be better facilitated the more autonomous the decision making is. So, it can be concluded that international planners and politicians are an important but not sufficient element to regional development, while they appear inherently restricted in their ability to influence regional development.

I next turn to attitudes of business elites themselves. Characteristic of the perspective managers and Multinational Enterprises (MNLs) take towards an integrated market is the prevailing conviction that 'unifying the internal European market is a good idea' (Geroski, 1989). How good and how firms should respond to it is a matter open to debate. Quelch and Buzzell forecast homogeneity of consumer behaviour and call for single product campaigns and a pan-European strategy(Quelch, 1989). Gogel and Larreche however warn that 'it is important having a strategic perspective in order to avoid either immobilisation or overreaction' further suggesting that markets can be fragmented even after the mythical 1992(Gogel, 1989). On the other extreme from Quelch and Buzzell is Geroski who predicts "an increase in the diversity of goods and services offered to consumers" further arguing that "the challenge comes from those willing to sacrifice diversity in pursuit of efficiency gains that are likely to prove modest in scale"(Geroski, 1989,p.75).

To make the issue slightly more intriguing all three above mentioned business articles are basing their predictions on the same report of the European Commission

on the 'Economics of 1992'. The perspective of big corporations and managers suggests that they consider an internal market with uniform laws and similar consumer tastes as a prerequisite for the development of a Common Market. The importance of such a view is that they seem 'naturally' opposed to delegating power to regional authorities. If this is a correct assumption autonomy inspired regions will have to depend more on the small-medium sized companies and the new entrepreneurs for support on their aspirations to autonomy.²⁶

Multinationals could be seen as lobbying for more legislative power of central authorities as expressed by Quelch and Buzzell (1989), who suggest a move of multinational enterprises head offices to the centre of Europe and increased lobbying in Brussels.

It appears so, that regional politicians can claim that they are better equipped to devise a regional development strategy, while big corporations and multinationals are averse to any moves towards regional autonomy in decision

²⁶. This is evident in the warnings by the CBI to Scottish devolution or the latter day 'dealignment' of larger Quebecois industries from the nationalist camp (Keating, 1996).

making, that could create aberrations to an integrated market. Support for regional autonomy is more likely to lie with SMEs whose proprietors/managers are more likely to identify with a locality. To conclude this initial investigation I next examine whether local entrepreneurs could be considered as an asset of a region, in the same way that one can examine natural endowments.

D. Regional Growth and Regional Actors

On a qualitative evaluation of factors of growth one is tempted to consider that natural endowments play an increasingly diminishing role in the prosperity of a region. A commonplace example is the success of economies (in the course of the fourth Kondratieff cycle) with very limited indigenous resources other than the human resources (Japan, Hong-Kong, Taiwan etc).

Peter Robson (Robson, 1984) argues that disparities between regions cannot be explained in terms of differences in initial natural resource endowments. On an analysis of regional disequilibria it is apparent that

unequal development is connected with industrial activity. Disadvantaged regions can be further identified as having lower productivity growth rates for a series of business cycles.²⁷

Kenichi Ohmae (1995b) suggests that globalisation leads to the 'rise of regional economies'. His arguments although stemming from a correct premise and topical to this discussion are rather weak however. His vision of regional agglomerations (Ohmae, 1995a) that transcend national frontiers conveniently forgets all political institutions that will be pegged against any such moves. His prediction of the 'end of the nation state' seems at best premature. It is conceivable that the nation state will be challenged by stateless nations in Europe (Keating, 1996a) or that in the post-Westphalian state there will be "a new balance between subnational and other identities" (Linklater, 1996, p.98). It is hard to conceive the dissolution of the nation state however, based on economic expediency alone.

²⁷. On similar grounds is a frequently quoted statement by H. Girsch: "The creation of a monetary union transforms balance of payment problems into regional problems" (1949, pp. 87-97).

To examine the basic tenets of regional economics it would be beneficial to start with Gunar Myrdal and his classic book *Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions* (1957) in which he stresses that labour and capital will move to regions already developed so that in the next economic cycle the deprived regions are likely to be in an even worse position. In Myrdal's 'Cumulative Causation Theory' lies the beginning of much research and analyses like those of Hirschman, Kaldor, Klaassen and others (Molle, 1988).

On the other hand it has been amply demonstrated (Commission, 1984) that peripherality can be a factor of regional development.²⁸ In effect location can be considered a natural endowment as "it should also be mentioned that certain peripheral regions possess natural resources and advantages for the development of trade" (Commission, 1984 p.140). In other words, under certain

²⁸. Relevant to this debate is also the notion that the productive environment is determined by 'actions or behaviour' of economic actors in a locality. Baumol (1990) for instance argues that a legislative framework that promotes entrepreneurial incentives to innovate promotes 'productive entrepreneurship'. Lever (1992) gives an account of a successful local authority response in the West of Scotland, when the region met with the challenge of industrial decline.

conditions being in the periphery could be an advantageous position.²⁹ It does not seem however that research, so far, can convincingly identify the reasons of regional economic marginalisation. Peripherality is a measurement of a static condition which evaluates the effect past policies or rounds of capitalist accumulation have had on the development of a region. I do not believe it can be an effective tool in evaluating potential.³⁰

Eventually the question of the importance of regional actors has to be addressed. Beyond the questions of autonomy raised above, regional actors are obviously not going to divert significantly from what actors may do on a national or international level. The difference I see in the importance of regional actors has very much to do

²⁹. An exhaustive analysis of European regional prospects was recently completed by the European Economic Research and Advisory Consortium citing "the strengthening of regional identities within Europe [as] one identifiable pan-European movement which is likely to have consequences for regional economic change" (ERECO, 1993, p.3).

³⁰. The discussion on Regional Dynamics which follows is relevant to the questions of peripherality since it can be claimed that a regions' peripherality is temporal and that on the next business cycle it will be naturally led out of depression, a typical neo-classical economics argument.

with what Hirschman calls 'a special kind of boldness' (Pinder, 1983). Both entrepreneurs and politicians need such a boldness to succeed in what continuously will be a 'competition between communities' for capital (Smith, 1988) and while regional boundaries become less significant (Smith, 1988; Agnew, 1988). The local/regional context has become more significant as the emergence of an identifiably regional behaviour takes place. This can be the consequence of the reimagining of regional identity (Rosamond, 1995) and of the emergence of a 'multi-perspectival' polity (Ruggie, 1993) or of the 'invention of regions' (Keating, 1996a).

To turn back into regional economics it is relevant to note that with the phenomenon of fast and slow motions in urban and regional dynamics not fully chartered (Dendrinos, 1984) it is impossible to give relative weights to the importance of endowments *vis a vis* actors, it is obvious that both factors have to be present for economic development to occur. It is not possible, however, to predict the combination mix that can generate regional development. There is also difference of opinion on the development of regional dynamics. Some researchers believe that regional economic dynamics

follow a cyclical pattern while others believe that a linear process is more typical of regional development. Prominent in the first group is Leo Klaassen who divides regions into four different categories according to their level of prosperity. He finds there is a pattern of prosperity-recession-depression-recovery, with approximately five-year periods for each position shift. In an application of his research design, regions either remain in the same position or move to the next with no region moving to a previous position (Klaassen, 1987). Similar views are expressed by Berg, Burns and Klaassen who claim regions follow the cycles of industries comprising their economy where "vestiges of functional independence of regions appear to be rapidly disappearing as the world 'shrinks' and spatial units become more and more integrated" (Berg et al, 1987).³¹ A recent analysis that assumes linear regional development is the one by Krugman and Venables (1994) in which they theorise that globalisation of production unequivocally alters the economic relations between core and periphery.

³¹. An interesting evolution to this principle might be the idea that as an effect of "shrinkage" and economic interdependence regions experiencing a cyclical development process are much more liable to affect the delicately balanced world economy today than they once were.

So, can it be suggested that regional growth is influenced by the behaviour of regional actors more than the existence of natural endowments? The survey of the literature suggests that this question has to be considered more closely. At this stage a tenuous link can be made on the importance of regional actor behaviour as one of the endowments of a region.

Finally, note should be made of apparent limitations to the present investigation. Important actors on a regional level may have very little to do with a region's prosperity to the extent that regional policy is directed from the centre. I must therefore point to the fact that national actors can be considered presently more relevant than regional ones to a regions' level of development. This is particularly the case for the regions examined here. I have chosen in this research design to focus on an analysis of local businessman and politicians that I hypothesise are the most significant actors at the regional level not making the assumption that they are the most powerful or influential ones overall.

E. Issues Raised: A Critical Appraisal

An effort has been made in this chapter to investigate the literature published by the European Commission in conjunction with opinions held by academics on the importance placed on the behaviour of regional actors and the relevance it may have to regional economic development.

It is obvious that in most sources discussed there is a connection between a positive business climate with economic development, yet a great number of authors fail to identify the importance of regional political and business actors. Most also shy away from connectinig the local businessman/woman with the local politician as a factor of development of a region. This I believe is understandable since regions in the EU were not considered to possess significant political clout (compared with nation states), which appears to be the

case even in relatively autonomous and distinctly independent regions such as Bavaria or Cataluña.³²

From the US, the EU is perceived as having the characteristics of a regional federal state (Sandholtz, 1989) but this perspective 'demotes' national units which acquire the characteristics of these 'new regions' of the EU. So, political actor importance will be assumed to exist only in national parliaments or European institutions. This view fails to identify existing diversity, even among comparatively homogeneous nations such as Greece.³³ My belief in the importance of, hitherto comparatively marginalised actors, comes from my judgement that further consolidation of power to the EU centre, will inevitably free autonomous aspirations in the regions. A natural balance, to an empowered European

³² . Evidence for a 'Europe of the Regions' is at best weak.

Academics have rarely found any real evidence for a shift in power in European institutional structures in favour of the regions (Jones, 1995). A number of times as a result of regional tensions within member states a shift of power to the regions is evident. This at times gets blown out of proportion by journalists who declare the emergence of the 'age of the regions' (Klau, 1996).

³³ . There are many ways in which regional diversity in Greece can be demonstrated but I need only refer to the completely different social, political and economic background, between regions like Thrace in the North and Crete in the South of the country.

centre, could be created by segmenting the competencies of national units along the principles of subsidiarity.³⁴

In this chapter I have also attempted to identify whether regional actors may be considered instrumental in creating the most appropriate conditions for economic development. It appears that academic literature has not sufficiently explored the issue yet.³⁵ Restrictions arising from the 'relative political weight' and 'credibility' of regional political actors can be considered relevant to the attention to local actors. A synergistic relationship between business and policy planners can be perceived as one of the most promising development prospects for European regions.

Overall, in the academic discourse it has not been conclusively established whether regional autonomy favours regional development or hinders it, although there are indications that there exists a relationship between the two. Neo-classic economic theory would suggest that

³⁴ . Taking account of the vagueness of the meaning of subsidiarity as suggested by Peterson (1994).

³⁵ . While it appeared to only be scratching the surface when the present project commenced in 1989.

market segmentation leads to an increase in costs but local autonomy in regional development planning can conceivably lead to efficiency gains as well.

On the penultimate part of this analysis the question of endowments was considered in brief since the basic economic arguments about the relative importance of endowments is not a contested issue among the academic community. A discussion on how a region becomes peripheral and the possible hypotheses of whether regional actors can be a force in that process ties in with the rest of the theoretical considerations expressed here.

Finally, a discussion on regional dynamics and patterns of regional development has intended to show the importance of national (or regional) state intervention to ameliorate the effects of growth cycles.

Consequently, the relevance of operating state intervention mechanisms from the regional level (whether on a deconcentration, decentralisation or devolution principle) should be apparent.

I will proceed in this thesis with the formulation of a number of hypotheses pertaining to the issues already explored and the development of a relevant research design. The first step will include determining whether business and political elites are different and whether that difference relates to their regional identity. Then attitudes on regional devolution will be correlated to perceived business prospects for a region, while attitudinal concordance will be correlated with the economic performance of the regions examined.

I focus this investigation on elite attitudes, assuming elite behaviour to be congruent with those attitudes, while using both quantitative and qualitative techniques in the survey employed. It has to be stressed that although the main research design is based on hypothesis testing it is extensively supplemented from literature and observations that are predominantly centred on an *ex post facto* analysis.

In the concluding chapter of this work I return to those questions explored in this primary literature survey with issues that I have taken-up in my hypotheses. Findings from examining the hypotheses are compared with

propositions in the literature to provide an ultimate measure of construct validity on the points I argue. It is conceivable therefore to perceive the concluding chapter of this thesis as a continuation of the present one.

Chapter 2

Formulation of Hypotheses

A. Introduction

It becomes apparent from the examination of the literature that certain questions of elite interaction, on which the growth pattern of regions depend, are not satisfactorily covered in present academic discourse. Investigating some of these by conducting research on elite attitudes in European regions is a valid way for examining the impact on regions of elite interaction and how this interaction is (or could be) affected by European integration.

Issues investigated and analysed in the following chapters lend themselves to a cross-regional attitudinal study, as they are selected for their communality of significance across Europe (i.e. attitudes to the European Common Market). Choice of particular regions and elite groups is discussed in chapters three and four. In broad terms one industrially declining and one agricultural-industrialising region of the European Community are investigated, while the

local political and business elites are targeted for the survey.

Attitudinal data referring to the interaction patterns between the elite groups of each region as well as variations in replies between elite groups are employed to investigate the hypotheses constructed. It was anticipated that some of the hypotheses I set out to test would be dismissed in the course of this research. A brief description of those initially eliminated hypotheses is given in section E of the present chapter. These are mainly investigative hypotheses some of which had to be eliminated as non-testable with the means at my disposal.³⁸

Referring to limiting factors of this investigation I must point to the small size of the targeted population which restricted my options in selecting the interviewee sample.³⁹ A limit to resources further limited the time I could spend on the field collecting information and conducting interviews. As will be analysed in chapter four, the varying response rate and degree of co-operation among the different elite groups, -when requesting interviews-, restricted testable propositions further. A more thorough

³⁸ . The most important hindrance to collecting data were limitations pertaining to field research that are briefly covered in appendix I.
³⁹ . The terms 'interviewee' and 'respondent' are used interchangeably. The terms 'informant' and 'form filler' as used by Bateson (1984) were thought insufficient descriptives for the participants of this survey.

analysis of limiting conditions to this research is given at the end of this chapter in part F.

A major part of this survey consists of a qualitative element which is used in both the interpretation of results and the qualification of tests conducted. As with most elite, personal interview surveys, a great wealth of information becomes available to the interviewer. This information consists of interviewee qualifications in digressions from their replies, which was encouraged and recorded beyond their replies to the structured part of the questionnaire. It was felt that by recording these replies the questions they gave to the quantitative part of the questionnaire could be clarified. It was also felt that issues to which they reacted, could give an indication to issues to which they held strong opinions. It has been my goal thus to use respondents' qualifications as extensively as is feasible. To this end I employ a 'linked data analysis' technique which focuses on the qualitative content of elite surveys by using a quantitative basis as the structure from which all qualitative data are analysed.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ . The benefits of an integrated collection of both quantitative and qualitative data in a 'linked data' format is covered by Miles and Huberman (1994, pp.40-48). This technique can be considered as a form of data triangulation since data of two different types are analysed concurrently. The fact that this data originates in the same source and has been collected by the same medium in part limits the validity of the technique. For an excellent assesment of the triangulation of qualitative data see King, Keohane and Verba (1994).

Reference to comparable sources of research is not normally attempted concurrently with the analysis of data, but will supplement inferences made at the concluding chapter of this thesis.

B. A Methodological Framework for Surveying Regional Elites

An attempt is made to research attitudinal characteristics of two key elite groups in each region investigated.⁴¹ Attitudes from elite groups in this survey are juxtaposed in an effort to reveal inter and intra region (within and between) variances of elite perceptions. The use of regional elite groups, comparatively, in a cross-national survey is not tantamount to assuming that regional elite groups vary from national ones. A more extensive survey should include the national elites as a control for a presumed regional distinctiveness of regional elites, a feat which is not attempted here.⁴²

⁴¹ . This survey -from which the data stream emanates- investigates attitudinal responses. Behavioural patterns are not investigated as this survey does not attempt to construct complete belief systems for each interviewee. An analysis of the importance of 'belief systems' for political leaders is given in ch.7 of Kavanagh (1983).

⁴² . The distinctiveness of the political culture is a presumption based on the difference in the cultural heritage of the Scots and Cretans from their respective national cultures (Kellas, 1989; Midwinter et al, 1991; Allbauch, 1953; Herzfeld, 1985). Recent survey data analysis however, suggests that there are insignificant variations in the value systems (and by extension political culture) within the regions of Great Britain (Miller et al, 1996).

The number of factors that can influence attitudinal responses and the number of measurements relevant is vast. I have attempted a measurement of direction and intensity of attitudes in a thorough manner.⁴³ I have also tried to take account of issue salience, inconsistency of responses and degree of inclusiveness without however making them a central element in my analysis.⁴⁴ Certain important conditions that affect response patterns are taken into consideration although I have attempted to steer away from an extensive analysis based on behavioural psychology focusing instead on political behaviour.⁴⁵

The survey I conducted has a number of limitations relating to the size and the selected subsets of the particular elite populations, these could, in many respects, characterise this as a comparative rather than a pure survey analysis.⁴⁶

⁴³ . For a comprehensive analysis of attitudinal measures see chapters seven and eight of *Political Behaviour: Choices and Perspectives* by Dean Jaros and Lawrence Grant (1974).

⁴⁴ . Salience is taken to be the measurement of relative importance at a given time, inclusiveness to be the degree of complexity of an attitude and inconsistency to be the tendency to reply randomly. See Jaros and Grant (1974) p.248.

⁴⁵ . Certain important premises of social psychology had to be taken into account as are issues relating to the 'false consensus effect' raised by Ross, Greene and House (1977); while the analysis of problems in survey questions made by George Bishop (1987,1990) and William Belson (1981) created important considerations for my research briefly referred to in appendix I.

⁴⁶ . In the words of William Miller "As the number in the survey decreases there comes a point where the researcher is using a Comparative Method rather than a Survey Method" (Miller, 1983,p.5) which points inevitably to the limited scope of using quantitative methods of analysis when the sample size is small.

In selecting and defining type of questions that can be asked and elite groups that can be successfully approached I understood that "...the procedures still involve a considerable amount of ad hoc choice in order to cope with the complexities of the real world.." (Moyser,1987,p.15) which in turn make the use of elite interviewing techniques imperative in order to "...reveal information about underlying attitudes, interactions and intentions." (Moyser,1987,p.18).⁴⁷

I had initially aimed to attain a nomothetic explanation with this research, it became apparent early-on however that a number of restrictions, arising from sampling bias and the idiosyncrasies of the particular regions investigated limited the scope of generalisations and theorising.⁴⁸ This becomes apparent from the frequent inclusion of validity considerations, in the analysis and testing of most hypotheses. A more general and inclusive discussion of

⁴⁷ . A vast amount of research has been conducted on elite interviewing of which *Leaders and Elites* by William Welsh (1979) covers the methodological problems of survey research on elites. A number of surveys also tackle the different methodological issues that arise. In Business and Economic elite surveys interesting are the ones by Samuel Brittan (1973,1990), R.E. Pahl and J.T. Winkler (1974), John Winkler (1987) and Martin Rickets and Edward Shoesmith (1990). In political elite surveys methodological points are covered by Geoffrey Pridham (1987), Neil Nevitte and Roger Gibbins (1990), and J.H. Taggart (1993). Methodology on other European elites are covered by Helge Hveem (1972) and Ch.W. Nam, G.Nerb, and H.Russ (1990). This is by no means an exhaustive list, but one that refers to research relevant to my own.

⁴⁸ . See, de Vaus (1991) ch2 and ch3 for an analysis of limits to research design and scope.

validity considerations comprises part E of this chapter, while internal and external validation are covered in the concluding chapter.⁴⁹

Evidently this work cannot attempt a dynamic interpretation of possible relationships revealed.⁵⁰ The aim instead is to give, to the degree possible, a snap-shot picture of the regional elites investigated. Relationships revealed are used to test hypotheses.⁵¹ Tests attempted provide some evidence of trends in certain attitudes of regional elite groups. In the final stage of this research the proposition of whether elite interaction influences regional prospects is considered.⁵² However, the temporality of the data stream and limitations in the sample size, do not allow a genuinely predictive interpretation, but limit this work to an exploratory and predominantly inductive investigation.

⁴⁹ . Questions of validity in survey research are thoroughly covered by William Belson (1986).

⁵⁰ . Since the data collected have a temporal character they do not lend themselves for any kind of dynamic interpretations. See Tufte (1974) for a more thorough account of data analysis and research design. Mannheim and Rich (1991) also develop the limitations of using temporal data.

⁵¹ . A number of analytic strategies are covered by Miller (1983, pp42-46). Case analysis is used here although certain assumptions on the causal structure of the data is more extensively covered in part C, of this chapter.

⁵² . In the concluding chapter I am attempting an interpretative analysis of the data utilising a number of insights that could not be part of a causal analysis. Limitations apply however as analysed in ch2 and ch4 of Mannheim and Rich (1991) and ch 3 of de Vaus (1991). I have elsewhere attempted an investigation of the link between attitudes and regional prospects (Christopoulos, 1996b).

It must always be borne in mind that this is a cross-sectional survey of the particular regional samples. Attitudinal responses aid in elaborating an analysis of regional actors' attitudes, which with the aid of qualitative data can be used to partially determine their influence in the political and economic affairs of their region.⁵³ It can be deduced that the attitude measures I construct indicate elite value systems or what Van Deth and Scarbrough call 'underlying value orientations' when they suggest that we can "infer values from data about attitudes" (1995, p.37).⁵⁴ Although I am naturally interested in the value systems and orientations of the elite groups I investigate, particularly as these relate to their cultural background, I have not attempted here the construction of a 'values profile' further than the one that can be inferred from their attitudinal profile in chapter five (section F). However, by presuming that regional elites will be influenced by their different institutional and cultural backgrounds (their separate value systems), I expect to find variations in the attitude of individuals that are resonant

⁵³ . Survey research methodology is analysed in the "Handbook of Survey Research" (Rossi, 1983), "Surveys in Social Research" (de Vaus, 1991) and in "Empirical political Analysis: Research Methods in Political Science" (Mannheim, 1991).

⁵⁴ . A comprehensive study of the contemporary interrelationship between values and culture can be found in Inglehart who attempts an analysis of the "linkages that culture has with both politics and economics" (1990, p.15).

with their background when I compare samples from the two regions.⁵⁵

The use of a structured survey was employed to aid in the codification of a comparatively large number of elite interviews. I felt that failure to codify from the beginning would have resulted in a big loss of data or producing data particularly susceptible to interviewer and analysis bias. Codification itself however entails some loss of data particularly in the cases where data series have to be collapsed in order to create meaningful statistics.⁵⁶ An ultimate test of the hypotheses is given by juxtaposing standardised data with respondents' qualifications or explanations on issues raised by the questionnaire.⁵⁷ This alludes to what I have earlier called a 'linked data analysis' between quantitative and qualitative data. This technique can enable mutual confirmation or corroboration in my analysis of data, assist

⁵⁵ . William Miller also gives two other possible multi-national attitudinal survey goals further than the one used here. The first is "...to measure the influence of individual attitudes and behaviour upon political institutions..." and the second is "...to establish a degree of generality of a finding by showing how little it was affected by the social and political setting..." (1983, pp.163).

⁵⁶ . For a thorough analysis of data codification and analysis see

⁵⁷ Mannheim and Rich (1991) ch 15 and de Vaus (1991) chs 14-19.

. It has been suggested that responses of open and close ended question systems should not be combined as this can lead to problems of validity of the response distributions (Belson, 1986). In this thesis statistical analysis is limited to closed ended questions.

in elaborating the relevant themes and draw attention to paradoxes in the data.⁵⁸

In the analysis of the quantitative data I have used SPSS-PC and SPSS for Windows software, while in the analysis of qualitative data I have used comprehensive transcript briefs of each question to the questionnaire. In dealing with approximately one hundred interviews (seventy-six are part of the attitudinal analysis) I can bear witness to the limitations of qualitative research analysis. I anticipated using the QSR.NUD*IST software but it has eventually proven unnecessary.⁵⁹ I proceed next with an exposition of the hypotheses I am testing in chapters six and seven. I refer to dependent, independent and possible antecedent or intervening variables as well as the survey questions employed in testing each hypothesis and the relevant methodological considerations.

⁵⁸ . For a comprehensive exposition of reasons for linking quantitative with qualitative data see Miles and Huberman (1994).

⁵⁹ . A number of sources proved helpful in dealing with qualitative data. I have found Taylor (1983), Altheide and Johnson (1994) and Denzin and Lincoln (1994) particularly relevant. Qualitative data management and the use of specialist software such as QSR.NUD*IST are elucidated by Richards and Richards (1994) and Huberman and Miles (1994).

C. Hypotheses, Working Hypotheses and Intervening Variables

There is a progression from the specific to the general in the present research design. At the same time simpler hypotheses are tested first, while those more intricate are handled in the later stages of this thesis.

I begin by investigating the difference between the business and political elites in the two regions. This exercise is necessary in order to establish a degree of confidence in considering the political and business elites in each region as distinct and separate (non-interlocking). I test whether:

H I. Business and political elites' attitudes differ depending on their region of origin.

In this hypothesis the independent variable is businessmen and politicians' regional identity while the dependent variable is their attitude towards Europe.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ . Attitudes towards Europe are selected as a sufficiently universal and at the same time topical a subject, which has attracted attention at all European regions. Regional elites are expected to have a keen interest on the subject. See special pages and editorials on Europe in the "Glasgow Herald" and "The Scotsman" newspapers from January to December 1991. Special supplements on European regional policy in "To Vima tis Kyriakis" among national Greek newspapers. "Chaniotiki Eleftherotypia", "Chaniotika Nea" and "Kyrikas Chanion" local newspapers in Chania all carried extensive editorials on the impact of 1992 between January and September 1991.

I will not test for background variables such as party affiliation or level of representation for politicians (i.e. if local or regional Councillor, MP or MEP) as this will fragment relatively small sample sizes. Level of education was not part of the questionnaire because it was discovered in the exploratory interviews that elite respondents were getting defensive in replying to questions they perceived could comprise a measure of their ability. It was further feared that such questions could create the impression that the questionnaire was an aptitude test for which there were right and wrong answers.⁶¹ The background variable of age is believed relevant to investigations of the strength of regional identity through its possible influence of regional attitudes. Age cohorts have been employed widely in explaining variation in attitudes.⁶² I felt however, that introducing age to the testing and analysis of the hypotheses would side-track the investigation of the attitudes of the elites in this work and I have therefore excluded it as a factor of the final analysis. Issues of possible gender variance could not be addressed because of the very small number of women in the relevant elites and consequently the sample.⁶³

⁶¹ . The issues of 'correct' answers are covered in Belson (1981 p.370-387) where the possibility of distorting replies if a respondent feels it puts him into a 'poor light' are given consideration.

⁶² . For a recent example of the use of age cohorts see the treatment of 'Materialist-Postmaterialist Value Orientations' by Scarbrough (1995).

⁶³ . The small number of women in political elites is covered in the document published by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (1992) on "Women

I will consider the possible intervening variable of regional grievances towards the central government, which may have an effect on respondents' attitudes towards Europe. It will also be relevant at this level to consider the possibility that aspirations of the local elite to an autonomous rule for their region is influencing the pattern of their replies.

The tests for this hypothesis are explained in parts B and C of chapter six by testing for the following two working hypotheses.

First I test whether,

WH1: Businessmen have a different perception of the challenges of Europe than politicians.

In effect a test between response patterns of the political and business samples is attempted, for each region.

Recorded differences in attitude between the two elite groups form the basis for further investigations.

Consequently, the similarity or divergence of attitudinal patterns in the two regions will give an indication of the degree of difference between each region's local political and business elites.

and Political Power". Data on sampling and responses of female interviewees are available in chapters four and five.

Patterns of homogeneity of political and business elites are further tested by inquiring whether:

WH2: The occupational position of elites influences their perspective.

To test this working hypothesis answers from sections B (specific to business interviewees) and sections C (specific to political interviewees) of the questionnaire are used. Effectively the business and political elites from each region are tested with the equivalent elites of the other region. The attitudes of the Cretan compared with that of the Scottish elites will demonstrate whether the within-region difference in attitudes of elite groups is more significant than the between-region difference of the four elite groups.

In the second hypothesis I attempt to test for the intervening variable of 'development level' that was associated with **H I**. I test whether:

H II. The degree of accord between sub-national elite attitudes is related to a regions' development level.

Effectively a test with the independent variable of region of origin and dependent variable of elite attitudes being the same as in **H I**. The control is the intervening variable

of the different development level of the two regions in question. The group of questions used in WH1 will also be used to test WH3 and WH4. Hypothesis **H II** is developing the same theme that was investigated in **H I**. My analysis of dependent, independent, intervening and background variables remains the same here.

The identification of similarities and differences between the Cretan and Scottish business and political elites, is undertaken in parts D and E of chapter six with the following two working hypotheses. In an attempt to define and separate the attitudes of elite actors in each region, in relation to each regions level of economic development, I proceed to investigate whether,

WH3: Attitudes of regional elites can be identified as being different between a more and a less developed region.

The elementary assumption in the next working hypothesis is that economic development can be related to elite interaction. In particular, I test whether,

WH4: The more developed the regional economy the stronger the concordance of attitudes between elite groups in a region.

In both preceding working hypotheses there exists a high probability of multiple causation between the variables investigated. The degree of development of the respondents

region, which has been identified as H I's intervening variable, is tested here as an independent variable for the working hypotheses, while the dependent variable is interviewees' attitudes towards issues of regional importance. Regional grievance towards the central government and perceived differences from the rest of the nation is examined as intervening variables in this hypothesis.⁶⁴

In working hypothesis WH3 the tests attempt to show a difference of attitudes between regions, among elite groups investigated, while in working hypothesis WH4 the 'goodness of fit' between each regions' two elite groups is anticipated to be better in the more developed rather than in the less developed economy.

One of the basic assumptions in the two preceding working hypotheses is that elites exhibit different attitudes in different European regions. Drawn to its logical conclusion this would imply that elite behaviour on a regional level is a regional endowment. This argument I explore further in chapter eight.

⁶⁴ . Perceived difference from other people in their region, their national unit and Europe will be used as a composite measure of perceived differences from people in their region (Measure D in chapter 5.F.).

In chapter seven initially the attitudes of elites towards growth are investigated with the scope of identifying certain distinct characteristics between Scotland and Crete.

Hypothesis III inquires whether:

H III. Attitudes of regional political elites vary in accord with an elites' region of origin.

This hypothesis is in many respects similar to Hypothesis H I, the qualitative difference however is that the scope has been narrowed and the questions used are specific to either the political or the business elites. The independent variable here is elites' region of origin while the dependent variable is their attitude towards political elites. A background variable that could influence attitudes in this hypothesis is the respondents' political affiliation but, for the same reasons that I could not examine this potential influence in the preceding hypothesis, I am not going to consider it here either.

There are further, two possible intervening variables that can be related to the hypothesis. First is the level of development of the relevant regions and the consequent difference in the development experiences of the regional elites in question. Second is the possible aspirations to regional autonomy for the relevant elites investigated. Both those factors could influence the attitudes expressed

by the elite groups and will be considered when testing the hypothesis. Working hypotheses five and six are employed to provide a test of hypothesis H III.

The relationship of the regional political elites to growth is investigated, when testing whether

WH5: Businessmen perceive the regional political elites to be more receptive to them than the national political elites.

The independent variable in this working hypothesis is the level of representation of the political elites, i.e. whether they are elected at the regional or national level. The dependent variable is receptiveness to local business elites. Effectively I investigate possible differences in the perceived accessibility to local and national political elites.

The possibility of a high degree of interlockingness between the political and business sectors of regional elites is examined as a possible intervening variable in this working hypothesis. Another factor that could have an effect on the results of this investigation is the possibility of stronger clientelistic links between the regional business and regional political elites than links between regional business and national political elites.

The assumption that regional politicians possess a more accurate mental map of their locality than national ones stems from the supposition that the smaller the constituency the more accurate the mental map of the individual political representative (Gold, 1980; Gould and White, 1985). However, receptiveness of a local politician is not necessarily as obvious. Nevin (1985) argues that politicians have a very short term perspective. I suggest that politicians feel more accountable the lower the level of representation they are elected to. As Pinder (1983) claims, policy-makers believe they possess spatially unbiased views and can thus correct businessmen by designing corrective policy. It seems reasonable therefore, to make the conjecture that receptiveness of local politicians to local businessmen is related to the strength of their identification with their region.

Behaviour of politicians in the regions is also connected to economic policy,

WH6: Regional politicians will be perceived to favour long term economic policies in the region more than national politicians.

The independent variable in this working hypothesis is the level of representation/office held by political elites while the dependent variable is their perceived commitment to the long term welfare of their region.

A background variable that could influence the responses of interviewees in this and the next working hypothesis is their education level. Education could affect their understanding of particular questions asked in the questionnaire, to the extent that these can be considered technical. As with previous working hypotheses I choose not to control for this variable but note here what I believe will be a marginal bias in my results.

It is possible that an antecedent variable in the examination of this hypothesis is the perception that regional political elites are not relevant to long term or macro-economic planning as this is a sector preserved for the national or European political elites. The level of devolution of each regional authority is expected to have a role in such perceptions, as a more devolved regional government may be perceived to have more competence.

Arguments against my conceptualisation of this hypothesis are given by Pelkmans (1984, pp.25-39) who claims that political commitments let cost increases go unpunished, in effect suggesting a political clientele relationship which is more likely than not to be stronger the more devolved the political level of representation. On the other hand the same author suggests that regional policy is conducted on political arguments and for electoral reasons, inferring

that a national regional policy does not necessarily address regional needs. It seems thus reasonable to assume that regional politicians will have a longer term perspective.

I expect that regional politicians for a variety of reasons to have the interest of the region more at heart. My inquiry of course focuses on whether they are perceived to have the regional interests more at heart, which could arguably be an entirely different matter.

I continue my investigation by inquiring whether,

***H IV. Elite attitudes on devolution affect the
perceptions of business prospects in a region.***

In this hypothesis elite attitudes on devolution⁶⁵ is the independent variable, while their perception of business prospects for their region is the dependent variable.

The use of working hypotheses seven eight and nine are employed in exploring aspects of the relationship between business and political elites.

⁶⁵ . Devolution does not necessarily has the exact same meaning in Crete and Scotland. It does not necessarily mean the same thing in Scotland at different historic periods either. I refer more extensively to problems arising from political semantic differences in part Fiv of the present chapter.

Attitudes on the prospects of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are used in the next two working hypotheses to examine whether the level and aspirations of devolution affect perceptions of business prospects in a region. Attitudes on SMEs are used exclusively, because it is felt that they represent a common experience for both regions, as there are very few larger enterprises in Crete.⁶⁶ It is also the case that SMEs tend to be locally owned while ownership of bigger enterprises could more easily be perceived to lie outside a region. If such a perception was accurate it could act as a bias that I could not control for in my testing. I inquire thus whether,

WH7: The level of devolution in a region influences perceptions of SMEs importance among regional elite groups.

The independent variable in this working hypothesis is the level of devolution, while the dependent variable is the importance of SMEs to the regional economy.

The degree of regional autonomy is a difficult principle to define and it is beyond the scope of this work to create a criterion of devolution for measuring levels of autonomy of local government. From the analysis of regional government competencies in chapter three, it becomes obvious that in

⁶⁶ . An analysis of the company size outlook is given in chapter three which makes obvious the lack of large corporations in the Cretan economy. Robert Howard (1990) makes a very strong case for the support of SMEs as a growth vehicle in a local economy.

one of the regions investigated, local government has much greater resources and competence to intervene in the economic planning and aid of the regional business.⁶⁷ So, when the level of devolution is a relevant parameter, testing will be based on a comparative definition of devolution in which the one regional authority is more and the other less devolved from their respective national governments at the time of the survey. I naturally recognise that attitudes on devolution are biased by the perceived 'desirability' of autonomy by interviewees and in that respect perceptions of autonomy can be linked to the regional political debate. I accept this limitation as an unavoidable generalisation that can be associated with all comparative research.

I proceed with the next logical step of whether devolutionary aspirations are correlated with elite perceptions of SMEs importance by testing whether,

WH8: Those regional elites that aspire to more autonomous rule will be more positive on SMEs prospects in their region.

⁶⁷ . This study is based on a cross-sectional design which is centred around perceptions prevalent in 1991 and does not take account of later institutional changes of local government in both regions investigated. A brief account of the current institutional developments is given in chapter eight concurrent with the conclusions of this research.

In this working hypothesis the independent variable is the regional elites' devolutionary aspirations, while the dependent variable is the prospects they foresee for local SMEs. This is conceived as a measure of perceived SMEs importance among regional elites.

A highly contested issue, which largely depends on theoretical perspective, is the importance and relevance of SMEs to growth.⁶⁸ The hypothesis attempts to investigate the relationship between local elites perception of the role of SMEs in achieving regional autonomy, if indeed such a relationship exists. One of the suppositions behind the last two working hypotheses is that elites aspiring to more autonomy will tend to trust local entrepreneurs more than international conglomerates.⁶⁹

Concluding the examination of the relationship of regional autonomy and its relationship with the development and growth potential of regions I test whether,

WH9: Positive attitudes towards devolution in a region are related to a positive perception of business prospects for the region.

⁶⁸ . Benefits from the development of SMEs are covered extensively in a report by the European Commission (Commission of the EC, 1989c).

⁶⁹ . There is evidence from survey research that there exists some opposition, albeit weak, to investment from abroad in Scotland (Taggart, 1993); while this resentment is stronger within the Scottish National Party.

In this working hypothesis the independent variable will be the attitude of interviewees towards devolution, while the dependent variable will be their perceptions of SMEs importance. This relationship I assume to be valid across regions and irrespective of the origin of the elite groups. I anticipate that those respondents expressing a positive opinion on devolution will have a positive opinion of business potential as well.

Results from this final test I will compare with tests from working hypotheses WH7 and WH8 in order to test hypothesis HIV. There are two assumptions that led me to the formulation of hypothesis H IV that could be relevant to the investigation of intervening variables or spurious relationships in the working hypotheses as well. First I assume that aspirations of higher devolution are related to expectations of higher prosperity.⁷⁰ Second is my assumption that centralised control of the regional economy is linked with charges of inefficiency and grievances towards misallocation of funds by the central government.⁷¹

In the later part of chapter seven the tentative relationship between elite attitudes and regional growth is

⁷⁰ . Kellas (1989) often refers to arguments put forward by the SNP according to which there is a relationship between Scottish economic development and devolution.

⁷¹ . Relevant charges of misappropriation of funds and bad management can be found in all local newspapers in Chania in both the editorial and main story news items between September 1990 and September 1991.

investigated. In the knowledge that this relationship cannot be proven with the means employed this is an exploratory analysis.

I proceed to investigate the proposition that,

H V. The greater the similarity of attitudes among the political and business elite in a region the better the regional growth prospects.

In this hypothesis the independent variable is the similarity of attitudes between business and political elites. The dependent variable is the regional growth performance of a region. In regions in which the regional elites hold similar opinions, (and where I consequently expect them to have a singular sense of purpose along neo-corporatist interaction patterns), the local economy is performing better than in regions where the local elites seem to have disparate attitudes.⁷² There obviously exist a great number of antecedent and background variables that could affect the regional performance of regions as diverse as Strathclyde and Crete. It is also the case that the similarity of opinion between regional elites could be due to elite interlockingness or the adherence to publicly acceptable views in their replies. It is also impossible to discount the possibility of spuriousness in the relationship

⁷² . Regional statistics from Eurostat (ch7 D.) are used as an indication of recent regional performance.

I investigate, as homogeneity in elite responses cannot be proof of harmony between them.

Overall, I assume that the regions with better growth potential are those in which the business and political communities hold similar views on development requirements for their region. This constitutes the basic assumption of my investigation in hypothesis V.

In this hypothesis typical *ex post facto* theorising is employed as I only aim at formulating possible explanations for conditions identified. Or as de Vaus claims "the *ex post facto* explanation is conditional upon finding further key evidence. It is only a step in arriving at an explanation" (1991,p.303). In this vein I hope that my analysis could lead to the creation of new hypotheses and stimulate further research.

D. Eliminated Hypotheses

Hypotheses that I eliminated before the testing stage, were mainly those for which testing measures could not be devised with the available data. Their listing here separately is deemed expedient for three reasons. First, is the obvious need to maintain a complete account of the research process,

including its failings. Secondly, although irrelevant to the final tests, these hypotheses are indicative of the direction this investigation had initially. Finally, these eliminated hypotheses were constructed in order to address certain aspects of issues explored at the literature survey.

There is a number of hypotheses relating to business elites that could not be tested because of sample restrictions. The first three eliminated hypotheses belong to this category.

1. Multinational enterprises will be perceived to be more opposed to extended regional autonomy than they actually are.

To test this hypothesis I would need a larger sample of multinational companies' executives. Also, it is the case that while this hypothesis might be relevant to Scottish perceptions (Taggart, 1993), lack of a frame of reference does not make it necessarily relevant in the Cretan context. A cross-reference of results between the two regions would have been tenuous.

2. Bias of regional entrepreneurs due to distorted mental maps is a main advantage of regional business.

It became apparent from the initial stages of the design of the questionnaire that, I would need to devote a great number of questions to devise measures, to define successfully a distortion of the mental map of elite individuals. Successful proof for this hypothesis is not instrumental to tests of the rest of my research questions.

3. Entrepreneurs of a region demonstrate a bias in favour of their region compared to multinational executives.

This working hypothesis was an integral part of testing Hypothesis IV. This appears to be the case since one of the distinguishing features of regional entrepreneurs from multinational executives, is the presumed existence of a distorted/biased mental map of opportunity. The assumption made here is that individuals have more distorted mental maps from multinational corporations and not that corporations have impeccable maps of opportunity. Corporate decision making is based on information processed by committees that are expected to show detachment. Corporations also have the means to access information (because of size and quality of personnel) that the individual entrepreneur cannot. It is also possible that for reasons of sentimental attachment or cultural pride a regional entrepreneur may be biased in favour of his own region.

It has proven impossible to test this working hypothesis, however, since the actual number of executives surveyed in Chania is very small. There has also been a bias in the respondents' selection of belonging in the entrepreneur or executive category which is explained in the next section of the validity considerations. To test this hypothesis would require a different research design.

4. Politicians must be more receptive on a regional level possessing a more accurate mental map of their area.

For the same considerations as for the business elites the local political elites can be assumed to have a more accurate mental map of their region than the national political elites. It has been the case, however, that the sample of political interviewees did not contain an adequate number of national representatives to provide an adequate test for this working hypothesis.

5. National actors are more accountable than regional ones for a region's level of development.

As for the previous working hypothesis, lack of a large enough national political sample and national business sample makes a sound testing of this hypothesis impossible.

This research question was constructed based on the assumption that since a national government and business in the two regions investigated has more competencies than the local ones' the national business and political elites may be seen as more relevant to a regions' development. It has been the case however, that distinction of national and regional was not so straightforward in the case of Strathclyde, where a lot of respondents would have considered Scotland and not Britain to be their national background. On the other hand, in the case of Chania, a nation of Cretans has no reference in the public consciousness.

6. The region is considered less favoured than the nation the more regional elites think their nation is unprepared for Europe.

Again the lack of a national sample for this survey leads to the elimination of this hypothesis. As previously the perception of regional elites as marginalised, was anticipated to be accenuated by perceiving the national elite as incompetent.

7. The deeper the alienation of regional elites from the nation state ethnic identity, the higher their propensity to view Europe as an opportunity rather than a menace.

As a measure of alienation from the nation state unit I considered the support for nationalist movements. Since there is no such movement in Crete such a test could not be comparative. The small size of the sample made also the sub-group of those who where supportive of nationalism in Scotland too small a grouping for creating a sound test.

8. Regional attitudes by affecting confidence in regional business affect a region's growth prospects.

I hypothesised that attitudes on regional growth, being the independent variable, affect confidence in regional business, which would be the dependent variable.

Consequently a region's growth prospects may be affected by a positive or negative business climate. But at the same time the variable 'growth prospects' is not part of the causal model in this hypothesis as it is not the actual but the perceived prospects of a region I aimed to inquire about.

This hypothesis could not be tested as the degree of influence of an attitudinal predisposition on economic performance is a rather difficult relationship to measure. One of the assumptions behind this hypothesis was that regional actors' confidence in their own region affects a region's performance. I assumed that previous growth

pattern influence growth expectations.⁷³ A main limitation in such an investigation is the variety of variables that can be controlled by a limited scale elite survey. Furthermore, this survey effectively lacks a 'null hypothesis region', one that will be unquestionably stagnant and whose elite's behaviour can be compared with faster growing regions such as Strathclyde and Crete.

9. Indigenous investment efforts are perceived as more likely to trigger regional development.

The interaction of the political with the business elites was expected to influence investment. The independent variable in this eliminated hypothesis is the source of investment capital, while the dependent variable is elites perception of development potential. In the examination of this working hypothesis I was going to consider the possibility that grievances towards their national government and the attitude of the regional elites towards European integration could affect elite perspective in respect to the importance of local investment. It could also be true that respondents perceptions of a restricted

⁷³ . For a discussion of the causes of business cycles a standard text is by Samuelson (1980), who does not discount the possibility of psychological reasons behind the cyclical fluctuations in a market economy. Business confidence in the economy is routinely measured in all industrialised societies as an indication of an economies' growth prospects (see Eurostat), while there is extensive research that assumes this relationship to be true (see Nam, 1990a and 1990b).

mobility for indigenous entrepreneurs, or the significance of exogenous investment as a vehicle for technology transfers could also bias their replies.⁷⁴ As Christiansen (1981) affirms, small firms typically exhibit a more agile decision making procedure than multinationals, this is done however at the expense of optimal resource allocation. It can be assumed that, for lack of alternative information, local entrepreneurs would exhibit particular commitment to their own region.

Infrastructural investment projects are expected to be closer to political personalities experience at the national or European level. This made me anticipate a negative approach from regional political elites. Businessmen were expected to identify what Lambooy (1986,p.156) calls a region's 'production environment' as more significant for them and possibly therefore have a more positive attitude towards indigenous investment. As with previous cases, limits in available measures made testing of this hypothesis impossible.

⁷⁴ . Among others Lambooy (1986) explores the decision making of regional entrepreneurs while Sweeney asserts that "In regions dominated by large firms there is a lower level of entrepreneurial vitality..."(Sweeney 1987,p21). An interesting exposition of the role of multinational enterprises in regional economic development is given by Young, Hood and Peters(1993) while work by Yannopoulos and Dunning (1976) concentrates on controversies surrounding activities by multinationals.

E. Validity Considerations

Issues of validity are often mentioned throughout this work. There is a variety of reasons why this is the case. The need to maintain a high degree of credibility makes the frequent reference to validity considerations inevitable. As mentioned earlier a small sample coupled with a restricted population size are main limiting factors. A number of factors that could compromise the universality of the results are identified and listed below. For reasons of expediency the limiting factors have been grouped into six general categories.

i. **Differing Business Conditions** between the two regions surveyed is a factor limiting this research. Their divergent state of development was one of the criteria for selecting the two particular regions, but it also creates problems in the analyses and interpretation of data.

a. The possibility (indeed probability), that companies active in the locality are not registered there. This could be particularly relevant for the Scottish sample. The sampling process in Scotland, of approaching locally registered companies, might limit the representativeness of the elite sample, if a significant part of the local elite operates in non-locally registered premises. From empirical evidence -in the data collection stage-, I consider this

factor not to significantly distort the sampling as it is expected that most companies whose executives are active in the region have a registered office there as well.

b. The average respondent in the Strathclyde business sample could be identified as a comparatively successful operator, while unsuccessful or companies under liquidation were not likely to be part of the sample, as indeed none responded. This bias on successful companies and their executives was to some extent the case in Chania as well, since the two lists that were used to approach interviewees are of exporting companies and the commercial association's members list, which is safe to assume include relatively successful enterprises.⁷⁵ It could be argued that the unsuccessful or temporarily set-back members of the economic elite will be more disgruntled and negative towards their national government or other institutions they blame for theirs' or the markets' failings. There is no concrete indication however that this is the case and that the less successful members of the economic elite significantly diverge in attitude from their more successful counterparts, not to mention the obvious that a previous member of the economic elite that has lately been unsuccessful may not qualify to be considered a member of the local business elite.

⁷⁵ . It is a standard accusation of business surveys that their sample is biased by successful operators (Pahl, 1974). Some of the media has also made similar claims, with the Financial Times stating that CBI surveys are unreliable because they focus on successful operators (FT JUL 6-8, 1992).

c. Cretan businessmen perceive a dependence on resources to the mainland which may bias their answers to the effect that it would be inconceivable for them to express support for autonomy if it meant being cut-off from mainland resources. This I consider to be a psychological barrier to their thinking and it will be given attention in the analysis.

d. The most important limiting factor for comparing businessmen's attitudes is the diverging degree of development of the two regional economies. The maturity of the Strathclyde economy compared with the agriculture based Cretan economy is affecting the outlook of the respective elites.⁷⁶ Questions on local versus outside investment for example, are directly relevant to the perceived nature of those investments which relate to the degree of development of the local economy. This divergence, is however, part of the reason these questions are significant for a comparative study. In interpreting results this divergence has to be appreciated for the limits it imposes.

ii. **Differing Political Conditions** in the respective regions can have an effect as interviewees may have a different frame of reference and the analysis can be influenced if consideration is not taken of relevant deviations. Many of

⁷⁶ . The local economy outlook is analysed in chapter three, it is sufficient here to note that in 1983 Cretan Gross Regional Product (GRP) was standing at 43.5% of the European Union average, while Scottish GRP was standing at 100.3% of the EU average.

the limitations pertinent to the political interviewees are also relevant for the business ones and vice versa.

a. The Regional Council of Strathclyde was a local authority with an impressive track record, while its range of services to the local community is wide and varied. By comparison the Regional authority of Nomos Chanion in Crete was for all practical purposes an office of a government appointed prefect (nomarhis) with a mandate to oversee government policy. Local government comparisons had to be made between the Strathclyde Regional Council with Nomos Chanion and Glasgow City Council and the City Council of Chania. This reduces comparability of replies of the two elites. The Scottish one having the experience of interaction with a local authority which is very active on the regional level, the Greek one having considered the prefect (nomarhis) as an appendix to the government and the local politicians closely tied with the national political system.⁷⁷

b. With different competencies of the two countries local authorities, opinions on the fervour and effectiveness of the two groups are less compatible. This affects questions QB11 and QB12 which ask business elite respondents to rate the effectiveness and fervour of Councillors vis-a-vis MPs.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ . The system of local government analysed here is the one relevant during 1991. Changes in the local government structures are covered in chapter eight.

⁷⁸ . An analysis of the questions comprising the survey can be found in appendix Ic and Id, while the questionnaire is displayed in appendix II.

c. The different structure of local authorities in the two regions could also be 'responsible' for certain attitudes, for instance, institutional structures could be affecting approachability of local Councillors (QB9-QB13). This consideration may be relevant to Greece, where party politics and clientelism further erode direct approach to elected members.

d. Differences in the electoral systems of the two countries reduce the validity of certain comparisons. Particularly in the case of MEPs who are elected on regional constituencies in the UK, while they are elected on a nation wide party list in Greece. Question QB8 thus, is not directly applicable to the Greek sample, since MEPs do not have a regional electoral basis. The question is asked in the Greek business sample however, since a number of elected MEPs have their political roots in Crete.

e. To the degree that the state has an all-pervasive superstructure in Greece certain answers can be considered biased since any research, particularly from more senior elite members, may be linked consciously or sub-consciously with the maintenance of 'personal files' by the state.⁷⁹

f. The perceived dependence on-out-of region resources may bias results to questions relating to autonomy. This may be particularly the case for Crete where qualifications to the

⁷⁹ . The monitoring of political beliefs by the creation of 'files' was endemic in Greece during the Metaxas dictatorship, on the aftermath of the Civil War and at the time of the Colonels dictatorship.

quantitative part of the questionnaire suggest a strong perceived but limited real dependence on the mainland.⁸⁰

g. The difference in size of the relevant economies could support the argument that on the smaller Cretan economy a greater interlockingness of elite positions should be expected, as indeed is the case. This point should be taken into consideration when examining differences in the political culture of the two regions.

h. As with the business elite's bias of successful companies responding to this survey, in the case of the political elites there might exist a bias of getting responses from elected representatives of parties with a clear political agenda on European issues. It seems to be the case in Strathclyde, where pro-European Liberal Democrats, had a 75% response rate, far surpassing any other political group.

iii. **Sample size** related factors are given a more thorough exposition here. Statistical significance cannot be attained for most samples, although the population sizes are comparatively small. In the Strathclyde political sample the MEP population sub-group consists of three cases, this survey includes two of those which would have made it sufficiently significant, it is however the case for most

⁸⁰ . The Cretan Economy is comparatively self sufficient in that it is a net exporter of goods and services. Comprehensive data are analysed in chapter three.

other sub-groups that a 50% level of the population size is not attained.

a. Institute specific hypotheses (i.e. SRC, Glasgow City etc.) can not be tested since it would have meant further dividing already small sample sizes. Such questions can only be investigated in an exploratory fashion as part of the qualitative element of this research.

b. Party specific hypotheses can not be tested for the same reason as above. Again, those hypotheses that are instrumental in the research design will be investigated as part of the qualitative element.⁸¹

c. Female, ethnic or other special elite group variations cannot be tested for sample size limitations.

d. In both regions business samples, executives with ethnic roots outside the region constituted too small a sub-group to effectively test relating hypotheses. Their small overall number provides some evidence in support of some of the hypotheses relating to elite origin, but their small numbers also mean they cannot be used as a control group for the ethnic (i.e. Cretan or Scottish) participants. A similar case holds true for the Strathclyde political sample, where the non-Scottish interviewees are too few. In the Cretan political sample none of the respondents has out-of-region ethnic roots.

⁸¹ . It is obvious from the previous section that party political hypotheses have been eliminated from the analysis.

iv. **Attitudinal or Etymological variations** between the Greek and English version of the questionnaire are dependent on cultural differences between the two countries and semantic differences between the two languages. The extent of these is difficult to assess and every effort has been made to limit relevant bias.⁸²

a. Entrepreneurship has proved more controversial than initially anticipated. Admittance to being an entrepreneur seem to denote a special status which some respondents in the Strathclyde sample seemed to shun. In the Greek language the equivalent word 'epihirimatias' is close in meaning to the word for businessman but also carries a connotation of small operator. Larger company entrepreneurs would prefer been called executives, since this denotes a higher social status. The question asked: 'whether they consider themselves as entrepreneurs or executives' (QB10F) may have been too simplistic if one wanted to investigate the true nature of their perceived role. More than one questions would have been necessary to achieve that, which I feel lies beyond the scope of this research.

b. Remnants of an authoritarian state machine create problems in the relationship of the interviewer and interviewee in Greek surveys. One of these is the treatment of the survey as a test for which they try to give correct

⁸² . Among others Belson (1981) discusses the issues that arise out of the semantic interpretations of language in survey questions while Koutsiaras (1993) identifies some problems in the use of the Greek language in social science.

answers, which to some extent is true about Scottish interviewees as well.⁸³

c. When expressing an opinion about local Councillors or MPs, some of the evidence from cross-referencing replies suggests that respondents may refer to the institutions rather than the individuals.

d. Opinions on individual Councillors or MPs may also be affected by their grievance with the existing institutional structures (i.e. their belief in the need for greater autonomy might affect their perception or response to the existing local authority) and have nothing to do with the individual representatives.

e. A difference in the functions of the local political authorities means that the reference to the local political institutions have a differing significance for Strathclyde and Chania. These last three factors are partly an expected by-product of a cross-national survey, consideration should be given, nevertheless, of their ramifications when interpreting information comparing the two groups.

v. **Interpretation of Results** can be a limiting factor in the validity of the testing, particularly since this research is

⁸³ . Miller (1983) and Sheatsley (1983) analyse the dangers from misconceptions in the implementation of surveys, while McCrossan (1991) refers to the approaches the interviewer must take when initiating an interview. In this series of interviews, in order to limit any such bias, respondents were introduced to the interview by the assertion that there are no correct replies and their names would be protected in the publication of results.

based on a combination of qualitative and quantitative responses.

a. Standardisation of results is limiting the explanatory value of many of the hypotheses.

b. The mainly ordinal character of data from the quantitative part of the questionnaire limits both the applicability and the spread of possible testing.

c. The process of including qualitative replies to the explanation of the hypotheses testing is selective. The judgmental character of the process makes the possibility of error higher. Certain replies will have to be qualified by this factor.

vi. Questionnaire Construction and Survey Implementation

has affected the validity or applicability of certain of the hypotheses tested. An initial round of fact-finding exploratory interviews (thirteen) was conducted in 1989 in Scotland among officials in regional agencies which was not based on the questionnaire used in 1991 (seventy-six administered and analysed questionnaires). Resource and time considerations precluded the use of a pilot survey questionnaire. However, preceding as well as shortly after the main series of elite interviews I conducted a number of interviews with senior local government administrators, academics, national government bureaucrats and party activists in both Greece/Crete (sixteen interviews) and Scotland/Glasgow (eleven interviews). These were

unstructured 'informed subject' interviews that helped me identify issues pertinent to my investigation. In that respect they assisted me to orient the survey questions and direct my analysis. Validity considerations remain in that:

a. It has become apparent in certain occasions that the investigative tools are inadequate for a complete and thorough investigation of the hypotheses. For instance, there are no adequate measures to establish or refute a link of nationalism with xenophobia. Although this was of secondary importance to the survey, investigating such a link for this particular sample would have aided with the testing of other relevant hypotheses.

b. The order of the questions, although designed to produce a certain impact, may influence replies to certain questions in such a way that subsequent tests will be affected adversely.⁸⁴

c. Certain questions are not applicable to both countries, as the regions have differing socioeconomic conditions and institutional traditions. For instance question QD11, inquiring whether respondents in Chania believe there are great differences between people in their region and people in the rest of Europe, was only employed in the Greek sample.

d. Scottish business and political elite interviewees replied to a letter requesting an interview, which as

⁸⁴ . An account of the procedural issues and problems that arise out of the questionnaire formation are covered in appendix I.

mentioned above has the drawback of successful businessmen or favourably minded politicians taking part. In the Greek sample, lists from appropriate collective bodies were supplied (primary bias) and all those successfully contacted participated. This difference in the implementation of the questionnaire, creates problems with the applicability of certain hypotheses which assume the sample to be homogeneously (if not randomly) sampled.

e. Certain of the questions have to be practically eliminated from the testing of the hypotheses due to an unexpected 'optimism' in replies to certain questions. This is the case for question QD12, in which all members of the Greek business sample replied that they thought Europe represented a challenge for their region. This condition weakens the quantitative tests of some of the hypotheses.

F. Research Outline

Chapters three and four describe the regions and elites investigated, while in chapter five I have included a primary analysis of each sub-samples' profile. This could be considered as an attitudinal and socioeconomic profile of each elite, although, attitudinal measures constructed in chapter five section F, can be also considered relevant to respective elites' value systems.

Hypotheses **H I** and **H II** are tested in chapter six while **H III** and **H IV** are tested in chapter seven. An exploratory analysis of data in connection to hypotheses **H V** is attempted in section D of chapter seven. Conclusions from this research and inferences for further research are covered in chapter eight.

In chapter five, basic statistical tools are used, including cross-tabulations and percentage distributions. In chapters six and seven, tests employed include correlations and computations of the mean, although relevant techniques are necessarily limited by sample limitations. There is an extensive use of respondents' qualifications (the qualitative element) in order to interpret -or even question- statistical analysis. These qualifications, at times, provide the most intriguing insights this analysis has to offer.

Chapter 3

Choice of Regions

A. Overview: Systems of Local Government.

Initially, this research intended to cover the European regions⁸⁵ of Scotland, Catalonia, Sicily and Peloponnese. For lack of resources the Italian region was excluded as the least significant for a comparative study and the Spanish region had to be subsequently eliminated due to insufficient resources and time constraints.

Scotland was selected as a region/nation containing a number of declining industrial regions, it was subsequently thought more feasible to cover the Region of Strathclyde and focus in particular on the prominent city within that region, Glasgow.⁸⁶ Peloponnese was

⁸⁵. The definition of region accepted here is that of a territorially defined area used for purposes of statistical analysis. An account of the problems of definition for regions is given by Kimble (1951) who questions how meaningful it is to accept the regional concept and Gilbert (1960) who suggests integrating the physical and economic notions of the regional concept. Furthermore, in the case of Scotland it can be argued that the geographically defined region has the characteristics of a nation (Kellas, 1989). In the analysis that follows, unless otherwise defined, I refer to nation-states as nations and all their subdivisions as regions.

⁸⁶. In this work I accept the definition of a declining industrial region given by Padoa-Schioppa (1987, p.162-64), Scotland in this sense is considered a region, although it has been effectively argued that it has a distinct national identity (Kellas, 1989; Midwinter et al, 1991).


subsequently relinquished for the region of Crete (*Kriti*) which appears to have a more appropriate cultural and historic background for the research questions that I want to explore. A further, narrowing-down, to the prefecture of Chania was deemed necessary to facilitate a more in-depth study, while I focused on the city of Chania, which is the most prominent urban centre within the prefecture. Crete is considered a least -favoured region by European Community standards (Padoa-Schioppa, 1987). I have thus focused on two urban centres and their surrounding region. If there were no regional historical and particularly regional administrative boundaries, I could have defined my area of investigation as pertaining to Western Scotland and Western Crete.

This investigation has focused on one 'industrially declining' and one 'underdeveloped' region of the European Union. Both regions lie on the periphery. Scottish territory lies between the 30% and 20% peripherality contours (Commission of EC, 1984, p.136). This indicates a degree of peripherality similar to that of south-western France and the Iberian peninsula, a position markedly more central from that of Greece and particularly of Crete which lies outwith the 10% peripherality contour (see map 3.1).

The particular study cited here estimates accessibility in 1979, while a big effort has been made since, in

improving infrastructure and communications to ameliorate the situation.

Map 3.1 Peripherality Contours as a percentage of Highest Regional Accessibility in 1979



Source: Commission of the EC. *The Regions of the EC: Second Periodic Report*, Luxembourg:1984.

Both regions have very unique political cultures, aspects of which are considered in part E of this chapter. In an effort to attain a higher degree of understanding of the interaction between the political and business elites of

the two regions, I tried to narrow the targeted population in geographic terms. This narrowing down from Scotland to Strathclyde to Glasgow City and Crete to Chania to Chania City entails many limitations, more extensively covered in part F.

At this stage I should refer to the structure of regional government in the regions investigated at the time of this survey. In the UK system, under legislation in force in 1991, local government had two tiers in Scotland.⁸⁷ Immediately under the decentralised arm of the national bureaucracy (Scottish Office) were the Regional Councils, which contained a number of District Councils. There were 9 Regional and 53 District Councils. Strathclyde Regional Council was by far the largest regional council in Scotland with 2.3 million people in its territory, while Glasgow City Council was the biggest District Council in Strathclyde with 715 thousand people within the City boundaries.

Councillors in both chambers were elected by majority vote in single member wards and served for four years. Local Government in Scotland was financed by a Community Charge Tax, first introduced in 1989, which however was abandoned, as announced in March 1991, and replaced by a

⁸⁷. For the change of local authorities legislation and the political debate on the enactment of a single tier local authority system see the relevant documents by the Scottish Office (1991,1992) and the Strathclyde Regional Council (1993). For the relevant debate on the introduction of a single tier local government in Scotland see Padison (1995) and MacAteer (1996).

capital value property system introduced in 1993. Additionally, there was the Uniform Business Rate through which local business contributed to local government, while an amount of less than 40% of local government expenditure was met directly by central government. The funding structure has drastically changed under the new single tier authorities (MacAteer, 1996).

There have been numerous calls for reform of the local government system in Scotland and the UK. Overall, academic essays centred around the perceived failings of the existing system to provide efficient services (Gaster, 1991) or the fact that many local services are provided by non-elected bodies (Preston, 1992).⁸⁸

Strathclyde has been considered by some as a successful authority, in spite of its large size (Midwinter, 1985) or maybe because of it. The fear also has been expressed that such a large authority could not "...co-exist peacefully with the proposed Scottish Assembly..." (Midwinter, 1985, p.44). The City of Glasgow, however, which is the largest district within Strathclyde, has integrated well with the Region (Gordon, 1985) and does not consider the region to be an impediment in the services it provides.⁸⁹

⁸⁸. A comprehensive account of the theoretical debates in contemporary British local democracy is presented in a recent edited volume by King and Stoker (1996).

⁸⁹. Both the Leaders of the City Council and the Regional Council when interviewed, supported the idea that relationships between the two Councils are at a very good level and not at all competitive. Keating however, has argued that "it would not be true to say that the relationship between the tiers [of City and Region] are characterised by harmony and collaboration" (Keating,

Relations with central government have been cited as one of the reasons that local authorities have been hindered in providing a high level of services. "During the 1980s the relationships existing between central and local government in the UK have been characterised by much tension and at times open conflict." (Preston, 1992, p. 120). This tension is easily identified on most articles on local government in the national press throughout the 1980s. Some consider it as part of a policy by the British government, during the 1980s, to centralise governmental functions, while it has been suggested that in the question of subsidiarity for European funding, government ministers 'would vehemently agree for it to be applied to Brussels, but emphatically disagree for it to be applied to Westminster' (The Economist, 1992). In order to understand the relationship between local government in Strathclyde and central government it would also be useful to draw a distinction between relations with the Scottish Office (which are comparatively amicable) and attitudes towards Whitehall (characterised by mutual suspicion). It should also be noted that a degree of 'administrative devolution', by increasing the remit of the Scottish Office (Scottish Office, 1993) has not necessarily meant a decrease in the control of Whitehall on Scottish affairs. 'Administrative devolution' may be

1988, p. 73). Tensions, among other sectors, are reported on the development of the highway network. Distrust and internecine conflict between Strathclyde and the district councils is reported in the Stodart Report (1981).

a misnomer as what has really happened is 'administrative decentralisation'. Whitehall is, to some extent, still determining Scottish policy priorities based on UK criteria. As a result local government relations with the Scottish Office, although vital, can not be considered as a direct substitute to relations with Whitehall.

Both Strathclyde Regional Council and Glasgow City Council were Labour dominated in 1991. The Chairman and the Lord Provost were the figureheads, for the region and the city respectively, while the Leader of the Council and the Leader of the Majority were on top of the respective political party hierarchies and therefore responsible for decisions taken and policy made.⁹⁰

The Greek system of local government had only one level, whose autonomy is embedded in the constitution. There have been attempts to create a second tier, notably law 1622/86 of 1986 which introduces a second tier of local government with regionally elected councils to undertake some of the responsibilities currently vested on prefects.⁹¹ Prefectures (*Nome*) are the administrative

⁹⁰ . A major role in the development of the regions and districts is played by the respective local government bureaucracy the head of which is the Chief Executive, a non-political post. The importance they have in both implementing, but also advising on policy, gives them particular political significance.

⁹¹ . An account of the recent history of decentralisation and relevant legislation in Greece is provided by Verney and Papageorgiou (Verney, 1992) and Theodorou (1995). Laws 1622/86, 2218/94, 2240/94 and 2307/95 have introduced elected prefecture Councils, Regional Councils and Regional Development Funds for each Region. The changes were brought about by the requirement of the European

arms of government locally and there are 51 prefectures of approximately similar size. There are thirteen regions (currently, since the size and number of Greek administrative regions has varied with the periodic introduction of new statistical methods by the European Commission and Eurostat) of predominantly statistical significance at the time of this survey.

At the time of the survey government-appointed prefects were taking part in Regional Councils with consultative regional planning functions. These Regional Councils included some appointed political and business personalities of the region. The law on elected regional councils (1622/86) has been slow to enact for a number of reasons. One of these was a resistance from political parties to come to terms with the loss of power entailed in decentralisation (Verney, 1992).

The first (and only functioning at the time of the survey) tier of local government in Greece comprised of City and Local Councils (*Deme ke Kinotites*). There are 303 municipalities and 5,697 communes, while 83% of the latter have less than 1,000 inhabitants. City councils (*Deme*) are those who have over ten thousand inhabitants or had city status historically or are the seat of a prefecture. All other smaller communities have the

Union for local management of financing, together with the perceived need for decentralisation of the Greek state. The first prefecture/regional elections took place on the 16th of October 1994.

status of a Local Council (*kinotita*). They are funded through taxes on property and land, a beer tax and local charges. Central government collects these taxes for the smallest of these communities. Additionally they receive a percentage of inheritance tax, vehicle taxation and the duty on real property transfers. The government funded the local authorities through the prefecture as well, which in turn will oversee the legality of the actions of the local authority. Elections for local government are held every four years under the alternative vote system, which means that a ticket to be elected has to command an absolute majority. This one party-ticket will have the majority of seats in the council but there is usually greater room for opposition councillors to be elected than in a single ward first past the post system. Most city councils in Crete are Socialist or Socialist/Left coalition dominated. This was the case for the City of Chania as well in 1991.

The mayor, in the bigger city councils (*Deme*), is assisted by an executive committee of between 3 and 6 members. A mayors' role is executive, since the city council is responsible for making policy, fixing local taxes etc.

The role of local government, being rather marginal to regional development, is further diminished by the party political platform which usually characterises local elections. Holding the mayor's office in the three

biggest cities in Greece, (and to a lesser extent in the next ten biggest), is a political appointment, with national political appeal, which enhances influence within party structures and can lead to a seat in the national legislature.⁹² This relates to the political elites' perception that real political power exists only at the national parliament. The aspirations of influential local politicians are therefore directed towards the national parliament which is one of the reasons why they failed to lobby effectively for the creation of a second tier of regional government.⁹³

To establish the degree of comparability of the two different systems of regional government a useful aid will be the comparison of the competencies of local government under the two systems. In table 3.1 a list of functions is matched to the degree possible. There are a number of differences in the mandate of local authorities in the two countries that make direct comparisons at times tenuous. It is also the case that some of the alleged local authority functions are misleading. When

⁹² . Holding an elected position in National and local government is incompatible under Greek law. The impossibility of a '*cumule de mandats*' probably diminishes the influence of local government in the national legislature but could also be considered to increase local government independence.

⁹³ . Attempts at decentralisation in the contemporary Greek state culminated with law 3200/55 of 1955 which introduced advisory prefecture councils but was thwarted by the centralisation imposed by the 1967-74 dictatorship. An attempt at reform was introduced by law 1235/82 shortly after accession to the EEC and with the Socialist government of the day having a decentralisation platform which extended the role of prefecture councils but maintained their non-elected advisory capacity. Previously mentioned laws 1622/86 and 2218/94 were the first to introduce regional elected councils, while the first elections were held in October 1994.

'economic development' responsibilities are 'transferred' to a Greek local authority, their remit does not by any stretch of the imagination encroach upon the national ministries' work and would at best indicate a marginal role in regional or urban economic regeneration.

Comparison of functions in table 3.1 suggests a good degree of correspondence in competence between local authorities in the two regions. It must be stressed however, that Greek local authorities exhibit much less autonomy in decision-making than what their 'formal competence' might indicate.

Table 3.1: Local Authorities Functions and Responsibilities

Greek City and Community Councils	Scottish Regional Councils
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Water Supply • Roads • Sewerage • Waste Collection and Disposal • Lighting • Transport • Markets • Cemeteries • Parks and Recreation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ♦ Social Services ♦ Highways ♦ Personal Social Services ♦ Education ♦ Policing ♦ Fire Brigade ♦ Strategic Planning ♦ Transport (Strathclyde)
Some Local Authorities are also in Charge of	District Councils
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pre-School Education • Economic Development • Planning • Environmental Protection • Libraries and Museums • Tourism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ♦ Recreation ♦ Housing ♦ Local Planning ♦ Environmental Health ♦ Libraries ♦ Cemeteries/ Crematoria

Source: European Municipal Directory, 1991.

The Greek system of prefectures having been modelled after the French centralised system of government, appears comparatively monolithic in its centralisation.

The main consideration however, when this system was introduced, was to keep a very divergent country under a central authority and most importantly to cultivate allegiance to that centre.⁹⁴ The population of Greece was too small, it was feared, for allowing for the existence of autonomous entities that might eventually create centrifugal forces to the country's unity. Furthermore Greece's centralisation drive has been re-enforced by the country's nation building experience which involved a consolidation towards an outside threat (the Ottomans) and a subjugation of the many regional (and perceived parochial) to the one national (modernising) identity. It has been the almost unanimous view of all officials I interviewed, both in the survey and in the interviews that helped me plan the survey, that the time is ripe and the need urgent for the introduction of greater autonomy at least in the design and implementation of policy making.⁹⁵ The question naturally arises for the political scientist whether that is a call for decentralisation or devolution and whether this can be linked with a re-enforcement (or re-awakening) of regional identity.

⁹⁴. Diamandouros notes that after Greek independence "an ethos of pronounced localism and parochialism...[impeded] national integration by placing a premium on primordial sentiments, and by producing fierce and lasting local and regional attachments" (Diamandouros, 1983, p.46).

⁹⁵. The former Greek MEP Phillipos Pierros has remarked that 'the basic problem lies in the fact that different authorities have the implementation competence and different one's the supervision. To face the problem there must be a conjunction of the two competencies ...[and] ... a transfer of competencies to the periphery...'. (liberal translation from the Greek prototype) (Pierros, 15 August 1991, p.55). This criticism refers particularly to problems in the implementation of Regional Development and Integrated Mediterranean Programs.

B. Crete and Scotland in a comparative context.

Selection of the particular regions must be attributed, up to a point, to the availability of regional statistics. The European Commission has developed a system called NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) which effectively determines the way statistical information is gathered and processed. Scotland is a level I region (NUTS I) with Crete included in Eastern and Southern islands NUTS I (*Anatolika ke Notia Nisia*). Obviously to move to level II so that I could work with Crete I have to compare it with an equal level region in Scotland, in this case Dumfries-Galloway, Strathclyde. To further narrow the scope to NUTS III I am, when possible, supplementing this analysis with data on Nomos Chanion and the Strathclyde Region. From the official publications of the EC available in Glasgow University's European Documentation Centre, there is very little comparable evidence available prior to 1983 for level II regions. Even on Statistics for 1992 (latest available in June 1996) there are many gaps on the breakdown of regional data (for example fragmented data on Gross Value Added).

Scotland and Crete have an independent/autonomous past and are located on the periphery of Europe in geographical terms. This similarity is one of the reasons they constitute a valid pair for a comparative

study. Their divergent industrialisation and development experience, together with their different level of development is not just a limitation on validity. I consider their difference to enhance the comparative character of this work and allow me to assume a greater degree of universality from my conclusions.

As expected, Crete is found on the bottom of the ladder regarding Gross Domestic Product (GDP), with 34% of Community average in ECU's in 1981. The picture looks slightly better if converted to Purchasing Power Standard units, where Crete attains 45% for the same year. What is remarkable, is that by 1984 Crete has moved to 43% of ECU's and 54% PPS's. An increase of more than 1/4 in ECU's and 1/5 in PPS's in just three years. Although between 1983 and 1984 there is almost no growth from 1985 onwards GDP was expected to increase as a result of the implementation of the Mediterranean Integrated Program for the region.

Another very interesting feature is that between 1983 and 1984 Crete has altered its Gross value Added (GVA) composition by moving away from Industry and Services and into Agriculture. This has been an effect of out of season covered and greenhouse crops that were particularly favoured with accession to the Common Market (Commission, 1983). So between 1983 and 1984 agriculture increased from contributing 32.1% to 39.1% of regional

value added, industry declined from 19.8% to 18.1% while services fell from 48.4% to 42.8%.

Statistics for Strathclyde (including Dumfries-Galloway) are rather fragmented. There is no specific data for Strathclyde on GVA in the European Community publications and I therefore use statistical figures provided for Scotland, while on GDP data exist only after 1983.⁹⁶ Between 1983 and 1984 GDP in ECU's fell from 94% to 88% of Community average while in PPS from 95% to 91%. In the Scottish economy as a whole there is a move from industry to services. In 1981 industry accounted for 40.5% while services for 56.6% of GVA while in 1984 for 37% and 60.2% respectively.

Between 1986 and 1987 Crete had a fall in unemployment from 4% to 2.7%,⁹⁷ while Strathclyde a minor increase from 16.7% to 17% . From non-comprehensive latest data Strathclyde unemployment is currently down to 9.3% (Strathclyde Trends, No48, 1995). These figures indicate a major improvement in the rather bleak picture of the beginning of the 1980s.

⁹⁶ . There are extensive regional statistics provided by the Bureau of Statistics in the UK and the Strathclyde Regional Council. For reasons of comparability I try to arrive to most comparisons from Eurostat statistics supplementing with national ones only if necessary.

⁹⁷ . In a report prepared by the prefecture of Chania it transpires that during the winter months Nomos Chanion and Crete as a whole suffer from chronic winter labour shortages (Protopapadakis, 1987, p.69), while the active population unemployment figure they estimate at 3.3%

So, as the relevant statistics indicate I have used two distinctly different regions, in terms of composition of output, employment level and market orientation towards the future. Their common elements are their below EC average GDP (particularly as compared to their national average) and, as already mentioned, their peripherality and particular sense of regional identity (a theme upon which I will expound further on).

The fact that there is a regional identity that separates these regions from their respective national (i.e. nation-state) entities I trust that makes their study easier and at the same time more complicated. I am not able to use results from this research to generalise about national entities. I am however able to use my conclusions in relation to other regional units. Scotland and to a lesser extent Crete see themselves as the inheritors of a distinct ethnic identity.⁹⁸

This research could be relevant to the examination of actions of regional units; assuming they will develop independent patterns of behaviour consistent with sub-national actors in a supra-national arena. The choice of regions here targets assumed differences in 'mentality' (and therefore possibly value systems and attitudes)

⁹⁸. This trend however, as Juliet Lodge asserts, should be seen in the perspective of an emerging new 'European Order' where an increasing "Europeanisation of domestic issues" is the natural course of events (Lodge, 1989), this trend may be applied to regional actions as well but its universality remains to be proven.

between the two regions. Scotland has an industrial past and Scottish see themselves as northern Europeans with a Celtic and Nordic inheritance, distinctly different from the rest of the British. Cretans perceive themselves as a gifted ethnic group, different from the rest of Greece and in the process of transformation from a backward agricultural region, to a model developing region. Their centuries-old pride in their ethnic identity is reinforced by this success.⁹⁹

In this context a further difficulty has to do with the artificial division of territorial units into regions by government bodies for political reasons, which is why I have focused this study on the West of Scotland and West of Crete.¹⁰⁰ I have thus tried to take account of boundaries of identity (a sense of belonging to a region) rather than administrative boundaries. That has not meant that I have been willing to transcend the administrative boundaries when seeking interviews, but rather acknowledging that these administrative boundaries do not necessarily contain all those identified with the respective regions.

⁹⁹ . The social situation in Crete after WW II is analysed in socio-economic research by Allbaugh (1953), while a more contemporary anecdotal account is given by Hopkins (1977) and an anthropological account by Herzfeld (1985).

¹⁰⁰ . In the case of Scottish regional boundaries, the accusation has often been made, that regional or district borders are re-defined with a view to gerrymandering from the national government. A factor that has been coming to the fore in latter years, is the extent to which regional borders permit different localities to qualify for different types of regional aid, as in objective 5b (rural areas) or 2 (industrial decline) regions.

Finally, in order to proceed with an examination of the economic conditions in the two regions it has to be noted that, to the extent that this is a study of integration of regional units, "any analysis of the integration of regions risks being tautological for in a sense a region is defined by the extent of its integration" (Bernstein, 1970).

C. The Strathclyde economy: Focusing on Glasgow City.

In the next two sections I attempt both an analysis of the economic geography of the two regions and an account of the development prospects and expectations in Strathclyde and Crete at the time of my survey.

Scotland extends to an area of 77,080 sq. km, of which 73% is utilised for agriculture. There were 4.957 million people living in Scotland in 1991 according to that year's census. In 1991 5.1 million people were recorded resident (note the difference between being resident and being recorded in the census) in Scotland of which 2.25 million were resident in Strathclyde. In the same year 1,973 thousand people were employed in Scotland of which 30 thousand were employed in the primary, 591 thousand were employed in the secondary and 1,353 thousand in the tertiary sector, while there were 281 cars per thousand people (Central Statistical Office, 1992).

Table 3.2: Household economic situation in Strathclyde and Glasgow in 1991.

	Strathclyde	Glasgow
No of Households	903,339	289,855
% Privately Owned	47.1%	37.2%
% Central Heating	76.4%	62.7%
% Without Car	49.2%	65.5%

Source: General Register Office for Scotland, HMSO, 1993.

Unemployment as a percentage of the work-force was at 9.9% (1990) in Strathclyde while it reached a figure of 7.8% for the whole of Scotland. Overall, there seems to be a consistent 1-2% gap in the unemployment rate between Great Britain, Scotland and Strathclyde from 1977 to 1991, as Strathclyde maintains a persistently higher unemployment rate.¹⁰¹

Scottish Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at current prices was £5.756 per capita in 1987 which represented 94% of the UK average. Gross Regional Product (GRP) for Strathclyde stood at £5,419 per capita at current prices up from 3,281 in 1981.¹⁰²

In 1990 there were 59,054 companies registered in Scotland up from 32,978 in 1978. In 1979 domestic consumption of energy accounted for 1,389 million therms while industrial, transport and other consumers for 4,314 therms. By 1989 consumption of energy had dropped to

¹⁰¹ . This is readily apparent in Statistical and Graphic analysis of unemployment trends for Strathclyde, in *Strathclyde Economic Trends* (No32, October 1991, p.18).

¹⁰² . Contemporary economic statistics for Strathclyde and Scotland can be found in the *Scottish Economic Bulletin* published by HMSO. Issue no 43, of June 1991, pp 59-72 is referred to here.

1,326 from households and to 4,011 million therms from industrial, transport and other users. Energy consumption has maintained a 1/3 ratio between domestic and productive uses through this period.¹⁰³

Table 3.3: Population and employment by sector according to the 1991 Census for Strathclyde and Glasgow City.

IN THOUSANDS	Strathclyde		Glasgow	
Resident Population	2,249		663	
Total Employed	862		222	
Agric./Fishing	11	1.3%	0.3	0.1%
Mining	19	2.2%	2.3	1.0%
Manufacture	155	18.0%	35	16.0%
Construction	73	8.5%	19	8.5%

Source: General Register Office for Scotland, HMSO, 1993.

One interesting indicator for understanding the degree of entrepreneurial vitality in Scotland is the percentage of self employed in the work-force. Data for 1990 reveal this figure to be little over 10% for Scotland compared with the UK average which was 12.5%.¹⁰⁴

To understand the prevalent elite attitudes on Scottish business prospects I proceed with some data on the performance of the Scottish versus the UK economy.

The Scottish economy outperformed the UK economy achieving a 2% growth in 1990 compared with the UK average of 0.7%. The figures for the previous year are

¹⁰³. Ibid. *Scottish Economic Bulletin*, pp76-80.

¹⁰⁴. Ibid. *Scottish Economic Bulletin* p.52. Entrepreneurial vitality can be also related to growth of the number of SMEs or rate of business failures or by evaluating the 'entrepreneurial milieu' in a region.

even more impressive where Scotland achieved a 3.5% growth compared to 1.9% in UK. Similarly, unemployment change which is another indicator of the force of the recession across regions, showed a less marked increase in Scotland of 11% while in UK the change was 42% and in the South East unemployment grew by 80% . These figures agree with a number of surveys conducted during 1991, of which the one conducted by CBI indicates that the Scottish recession "has been both shorter and shallower than in the UK as a whole..." (*Scottish Economic Bulletin*, no43, p.9-10).

A forecast by Cambridge Econometrics was predicting a fall of 5.7% in manufacturing output in 1991 to be followed by 0.8% fall in 1992, which would induce a fall of employment in the sector. An export-led recovery was predicted to follow in the latter part of 1992. The Service industry was expected to fare better with output growth of 0.9% and 1.8% in 1991 and 1992 respectively. Tourism and leisure were expected to lead this revival although employment was expected to decline overall.¹⁰⁵

The most important factors that were likely to affect growth in the short term, according to the Scottish Office, was the lag in international trade growth, to be further aggravated by problems in the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations, as well as the US budget deficit and German costs of unification. Prospects for Scotland

¹⁰⁵ . Ibid., *Scottish Economic Bulletin*, p.11.

were considered uncertain in the medium term particularly because of higher inflation and unit costs of labour than its international and particularly its EC/EU competitors.¹⁰⁶

The overall performance of the Scottish Economy was naturally linked to the performance of the British economy as a whole. Furthermore, the relevant position of the UK economy within the European integrated market was considered of paramount importance. Problems that might evolve from a 'traditional' British reticence to further integration could hit the regions hardest. Some analysts believed that Britain has overall received a negative economic impact from accession to the Community (Bulmer,1992). Others believed that Britain has failed to make the best of opportunities, particularly in the regional development level, where the British Government refuses to accept the additionality principle in regional aid.¹⁰⁷

D. The Cretan Economy: Focusing on the Prefecture of Chania

The region of Crete is one of 13 regions into which the National Statistical office sub-divides Greece. The

¹⁰⁶. Ibid. *Scottish Economic Bulletin*, pp 11-12.

¹⁰⁷. A good analysis of the impact -or the lack of it- of European Regional Policy in British regions is given by Richard Harrington, who describes ERDF transfers as a "disguised rebate to the UK government" (Harrington, 1992, p.64).

number of inhabitants according to the 1981 census were 502 thousand; 188,560 declared being employed while 4,614 unemployed. The unemployment figure reached 10,942 by 1988. The disposable per-capita income was 163,296 drachmae in 1981.

Agricultural land was slightly reduced from 3,223 thousand *stremmata* to 3,177 thousand; in the rest of Greece this decline is more pronounced. The average agricultural property is 30 *stremmata* in size (30 thousand m²) and segregated in 8 lots. The average yearly temperature is 18.3 degrees Celsius and the average rainfall is 800 mm per year.¹⁰⁸

Industry and handicraft operations represent roughly 5% of the national total at 7,349 operating units (1984); use of units of electricity where the national ratio is 2/3 between domestic to industrial, is reversed in Crete to 7/2 ; obviously indicating small industrial units with limited use of industrial machinery (1988).

Other basic economic indicators (1988-1989) show two phones for every five people, one doctor for every 48 people , one teacher for every 12 pupils in high school, while the public finance indicators show declared income which is 75% of the national average per-capita. All of

¹⁰⁸. A good geographical analysis of the prefecture can be found in the 'Report to the School of National Defence' by the then prefect S.Tsirkas (1975).

the above figures are below the national average figures from between 10 to 35%.

Tourism is very important for the island with 71,634 beds and 7,929,097 overnight stays from foreigners in 1989. This represents almost a quarter of the national average. There are an estimated further 45,000 seasonal tourist beds available in the black economy for which there can only be assumptions on the overnight stays they provide. It is also estimated that approximately 30 thousand people or 19% of the work-force are employed in tourism.

The high peripherality of the island, as it is placed on the eastern Mediterranean and the southernmost tip of Europe, creates problems of accessibility that are aggravated by poor communication links. This is made worse by limited and at times poorly maintained infrastructure on the island itself. There is no road, as yet, traversing the east to west axis on the southern part of the island. A very limited length of existing roads qualify for the term carriageways and the plans for extending or upgrading the network are not conforming to a comprehensive feasibility; subsequently public works projects have a difficulty qualifying for EC grants.¹⁰⁹

The prefecture of Chania comprises the western-most part

¹⁰⁹ . In interviews with Chania prefecture economic specialists it was noted that although in individual infrastructural projects there is a requirement for a feasibility study there is no overall development plan linking smaller projects and assessing their collective impact (Chania, July 1990 and September 1991).

of Crete and it is one of four administrative sub-regions the island is divided into, having an area of 2,379,000 stemmata.

Table 3.4: Cretan land morphology

	Chania	Crete	Greece
plains	18.7%	23.4%	30.3%
semi-mountainous	19.1%	26.7%	27.1%
mountainous	62.2%	49.9%	42.6%

Source: Protopapadakis (1987).

Crete has a density of 53 inhabitants per sq. km compared with the national average being 75 and the EC average being 164 (Eurostat, statistical office of the European Communities, 1987). Employment figures show Agriculture to have the largest share with 42.82%, but only supplying 28.5% of the income (see table 3.5 below), employment in the primary sector show a drastic decline from the 1971 figure of 70.9% but it should be noted that people employed in the secondary and tertiary sectors are occasionally employed in the primary. Also unemployment levels are negligible but there is a serious problem of under-employment (Protopapadakis, 1987).

Table 3.5: Employment by sector in Chania, Greece and the EEC

	CHANIA (1981)		GREECE (1985)	EC (1985)
	employment	income generated	employment	employment
primary	42.8%	28.5%	28.9%	8.6%
secondary	19.1%	22.0%	27.4%	33.8%
tertiary	38.1%	49.5%	43.7%	57.6%

Source: Eurostat for Greece and EEC, Protopapadakis (1987) for Chania.

There was one industrial-park in existence but had proven quite inadequate, there were three more parks under construction and one at the planning stage. To the degree that these parks conform to national trends their operation does not necessarily indicate industrialisation as most enterprises would be small and geared towards handicraft. In total 51.7% of sold lots in industrial parks in Greece were for lots of between 2-5 thousand m² which indicates a strong orientation towards small-medium sized units; 88% of the sales were for lots of 15 thousand m² or less.¹¹⁰

Almost all established industries were related to agricultural production, which imposes restrictions on the possibility of alterations in existing production patterns.

Table 3.6: Existing Industries in Crete in 1987

- | |
|-------------------------------------|
| a. olive oil products |
| b. wine and spirits |
| c. raisins |
| d. concentrated juices |
| e. processing of sugarcane |
| f. milk, cheese, ice-cream |
| g. processing of leather |
| h. canning of agricultural products |
| i. silk weaving |
| j. textiles |

Source: Protopapadakis 1987.

¹¹⁰ . Statistics on industrial plant size are found in *Epilogi*, August 1991, pp.44-46.

The prefecture had set out a list of proposed industries' with the scope of inducing industrial development in Crete.

Table 3.7: Proposed Industries in Crete

- | |
|---|
| a. petrochemicals |
| b. cement and building materials |
| c. gypsum production |
| d. shipyards |
| e. construction of earth moving equipment |
| f. air-conditioning and solar power systems |
| g. fertilisers |
| h. electronics |
| i. textiles |
| j. tourist and silverware artefacts |
| k. irrigation and greenhouse equipment |

Source: Protopapadakis 1987.

As is evident, proposed industries could create an inducement to industrialisation of the island, while they would increase the region's autonomy from outside suppliers. The limited planning and environmental impact feasibilities, however, create concerns on the introduction of such industries on the local economy. Furthermore, although there seems to be a market for each of these products within Crete, proposed industries did not seem to be export oriented (Mavromatis, 1989).

All major urban centres are on the North side of the island where most of the cultivated lands exist as well. There are three major ports on the North side while there are no substantial port facilities on the south side. This uneven orientation is reflected in the development

of the island as an appendix of the Greek production system.

Future economic trends point to the need of 'autonomous' regional development and re-orientation of the island's economy to take advantage of its geographical position and production strengths. This realisation was manifest in local authority plans to establish a regional airline company to transfer tourists and agricultural produce directly to the European markets. Furthermore, the three major companies conducting the sea transportation from and to the island were about to merge, to become the biggest such carrier in Europe, with plans to expand their network to other direct destinations in Europe and eventually the Middle East.¹¹¹

Cretan businessmen seemed to aspire to the development achieved since the mid 1970's by Cyprus, an island of similar size, population and location. They understood that they could not depend on industry for their development, and seemed to concentrate their efforts on agriculture and services. Notably they had managed to increase both the quality of agricultural products and the productivity of land with covered or greenhouse cultivation, while between 1981 and 1990 they had almost doubled their capacity in tourist beds. Cretans believed

¹¹¹. An extensive analysis on the state of the tourist economy in Crete is given in a special section on 'Crete and Tourism' of *Tourismos ke Oikonomia* [Tourism and Economy Monthly], issue no 151, June 1991, pp.94-146.

in achieving self-sufficiency, as 'Crete makes an integrated economic unit, probably the most integrated in the country' a phrase coined by Manolikakis (1963) which was frequently quoted in academic research on Crete.

Crete had something to show for the attention it received recently in planning departments of the Greek ministries. Between 1970 and 1981 GNP for Greece rose in fixed 1970 prices from 100 to 161, Cretan GRP by comparison rose to 178 (Voloudakis, 1984).

The prefecture enjoyed many benefits from Greek accession to the EEC, that also created a number of problems relating to its peripheral nature and the problems of Greek economic integration to the Community. Regional development grants, aimed at agriculture and infrastructure and the Integrated Mediterranean Programs, had a positive effect on the income, productivity and standards of living particularly of the agricultural community (Protopapadakis, 1987). Negative effects included primarily those of the integration itself, which brought stagnation and high inflation to the Greek economy, while agricultural production had to face steep competition from similar products from the rest of Southern Europe. Additionally, the lack of a developed administrative mechanism to support agricultural production and the lack of complete information for taking advantage of Community programs, added to the

disadvantages the region experienced towards certain other regions.

It should be noted finally, that the economic condition and development of Crete is closely linked with that of mainland Greece. The main concern during the early 1980's was that the Greek economy could not undergo the structural adjustments necessary to successfully integrate in Europe.

The position of the Greek economy in the European integrated market is very relevant to the ability of the Greek regions (particularly the more remote ones) to attain sufficiently high levels of growth so that they can achieve convergence with the rest of Europe.¹¹² This is increasingly the case since evidence from recent research suggests that Greece has remained in the periphery of European growth during the 1980's and is under danger of being marginalised economically within the European Community (Commission, 1991).

¹¹² . A number of studies have been published on the impact of the Greek accession to the EC. Most of the early ones foresee difficulties but point to balance of payment benefits (Drakos, 1986), (Kefalas, 1986), (Manassakis, 1986), or see relatively limited effects (Tzoannos, 1986), (Van Prausum, 1986). More recent studies call for structural changes in the Greek economy or even suggest there is a need for "...the modernisation of political and institutional structures as a pre-condition for their successful participation in a new, more competitive environment..." (Tsoukalis, 1991, p.302).

E. A distinctive political culture?¹¹³

I assume there are a number of differences in the political culture of the two regions I have investigated both from their respective national units and between each other.¹¹⁴ Their respective civil societies differ not only due to the different culture and political experiences of the two regions, but also due to diverse civic cultures. This divergence manifests itself in the encouragement or discouragement of political participation, as well as citizens trust or distrust of political authority in the two regions.

In the case of Crete there is a general distrust of authority, bred through centuries of opposition and resistance to foreign rule, which influences all aspects of social life, including citizens perceived responsibilities and entitlements (Clogg, 1983a).¹¹⁵

¹¹³ . To discuss political culture it was deemed expedient to refer to Scottish and Cretan political cultures as encompassing the local political cultures of City of Glasgow/Strathclyde and the City of Chania/Nomos Chania. It is naturally recognised that the West of Scotland (Strathclyde) has a distinctive political culture that can be detected in the centrality of religion or the corporatist role of Labour 'bosses' in the area. Similarly in the West of Crete (Chania) there is a strong local identity that accentuates the 'non-conformist' and 'democratic' character of the West of Crete, as opposed to a perceived Athens-oriented and 'subservient' eastern part of the island. It is felt however that Scottish and Cretan identity, respectively, encompasses these more local distinct identities within the space of their concentric regional identities (Smith, 1996).

¹¹⁴ . I note here that "the danger of relying on political culture or national character to explain particular forms of behaviour is that they are self-referential and therefore static conceptions" (Heywood, 1994, p.5).

¹¹⁵ . For recent empirical quantitative research on clientelism see Kouvertaris and Dobratz (1984) and Sotiropoulos (1994).

The all-pervasive clientelistic political relationships are not just typical of Mediterranean political life but also a by-product of Ottoman rule, which by allowing three different (often conflicting) legal systems to run in parallel, cultivated distrust, as well as an evasive and suspicious attitude towards authority (Diamandouros, 1983; Hopkins, 1977). Nepotism, as well, has affected social relations, as it has been considered a legitimate facet of power in pre-modern Greece. This was due to the importance family relations had in the latter years of the declining Ottoman rule (Cambell, 1983b; Ward, 1963). The extended family "spread horizontally and vertically to fill up critical social space, [and] became the central mechanism of social integration and of organisation" (Diamandouros, 1983, p.45). The arbitrary character of power has led to a "profound distrust of all concentration of power outside one's own hands, and ... the simultaneous pursuit of power at all costs" (Diamandouros, 1983, p.46), while political socialisation was marked by a directive approach towards the 'lower classes' (Mouzelis, 1987).

Furthermore, the absence of voluntary associations that could act as agents of "secondary political socialisation is directly related to the weakness of civil society" (Diamandouros, 1983, p.58). This condition can also be associated with the imposition of institutions at the genesis of the modern Greek state that are the product of

capitalist social formations; these institutions applied to a pre-capitalist society eventually produced "a deeply alienative political culture" (Diamandouros, 1983, p. 48).¹¹⁶ This is exhibited in the failure to incorporate lower class representation, in the formative years of the modern Greek state, and which resulted in "alternating bourgeois regimes" (Giner, 1986, p.13). Alienating progressive elements in society led to oppression or a "fascistisant" (Giner, 1986, p.24) state more blatantly evident in the Metaxas (1936-1940) and Papadopoulos/Ioannides (1967-1974) dictatorships.¹¹⁷

Contemporary Cretans' disregard of authority is most vividly reported in anthropological accounts of their dealings with the state by Herzfeld (1985). An earlier study by Allbaugh (1953) gave an account of how all administrative and political elites on the island were appointed and paid for by Athens, presumably accentuating the alienation of the local population and elites with the modern Greek state and national elites.¹¹⁸ This

¹¹⁶ . Cretan civic culture was further alienated from national political culture as a result of the repression of the 1967-74 military dictatorship. The strict imposition of central control on local bureaucracies (Schwab, 1973) coupled with the need for rapid modernisation after the collapse of the dictatorship (Featherstone, 1987) could be seen to re-enforce divisions between centre and periphery in the Greek civil society.

¹¹⁷ . It has been further suggested that in Southern Europe there has been an "institutionalisation of the negotiated resolution of conflicts" (Giner, 1986, p. 43) related to neo-corporatism. For the relevance of corporatism to the post-1974 Greece see Schmitter (1986).

¹¹⁸ . In a recently presented paper I concluded suggesting there is little evidence of corruption in Western Crete (Christopoulos, 1996b). Heywood (1994) and Della Porta give authoritative comparative accounts of corruption in Southern Europe.

condition could be assumed to induce a distrust of any representatives of the state apparatus by the local community.¹¹⁹

To the degree that centre-periphery clientelism and patronage are retained in contemporary Mediterranean societies, it can be argued that they will propagate the alienation of local societies from their respective national centre by keeping them subservient.¹²⁰ This could also accentuate differences in regional civic and political culture.¹²¹ This condition could be reversed by the process of further integration of Greece in the European market (possibly by inducing industrialisation and economic development) if they facilitate modernisation of the political culture.

Campbell argues that the development of capitalist production patterns "may lead to some attenuation of

¹¹⁹ . The party political affiliations in Crete are considered liberal since the incorporation of the island to the modern Greek state (1913). Eleftherios Venizelos, the most influential politician of modern Greece, came from Chania. He is mentioned as an important influence in the modern political context. In the 1989 European Parliament elections 42.5% of voters in Chania voted for the Socialists (PASOK), 31% for the Conservatives (ND), 13.5% for the Communist-Left coalition and 7.2% for the Liberal Party. The Liberal Party is the original party constituted by Venizelos at the beginning of the century and still receiving substantial support in Crete alone.

¹²⁰ . Clientelism can also be seen as a guarantor of political order in the periphery "where the central state was weak, ... [and] regional brokers -caciques in Spain, mafiosi in Italy, comatarhis in Greece- mediated between centre and periphery on the basis of patronage networks which served as an important mechanism of social order" (Heywood, 1994, p.9).

¹²¹ . It should be noted that some attitudinal evidence reveals a negligible variation among regions in Greece (Errson and Janda, 1985), pointing to the possibility of a limited variance in the value systems accross Greek regions.

patronage relationships" (Campbell, 1983, p.204).

Gellner as well refers to the importance of economics in civic socialisation, further proposing that "it is plausible to suspect that patronage is only avoidable when relations are anonymous and specific, in a mass society; and that in an inevitably more intimate elite, where relations cannot be anonymous nor criteria universalistic, patronage must be endemic" (Gellner, 1977, p.6).

Overall, Cretan political culture assumes a high moral ground, in attitudes pertaining to civic responsibilities and the preservation of local, regional and national ideals while by contrast having a total disregard for authority and discipline (Herzfeld, 1985, pp.1-8). The remoteness of state authorities from the average citizen in the region discourages participation in the political process, while it enhances the sense of separate identity among the citizens of the region. Their idiosyncratic civic culture can be further witnessed in Cretans' strong sense of community and the all-pervasive role of the family in societal interactions.

Scottish political culture is characterised by a distinctly strong sense of a separate identity from the English political culture. The existence of Scottish sections of all major political parties (in preparation to voice Scottish interests in the proposed Scottish Parliament) can be interpreted as a recognition within

the British political establishment of a separate Scottish political identity.

This particular debate has characterised most of modern politics and has marked the political culture of the Scottish. Kellas (1989) has convincingly argued of the existence of a separate political system in Scotland which has a distinct legal, religious, bureaucratic, local government and educational tradition from the rest of Britain. Midwinter, Keating and Mitchell have argued that although they can not identify a separate political system Scotland "has never been fully assimilated [in the UK]. Distinctive civil institutions, issues, [and] political demands ...have been strengthened [through time]" (Midwinter, 1991, p.203).

The most obvious expression of this separate Scottish political identity is the existence of the Scottish National Party.¹²² The SNP is a persistent presence in Scottish political life, that has forced the political establishment in Scotland and Westminster to deal with the call for Scottish self-determination. Consequently, party political campaigns in Scotland have been, to a great extent, determined by the varying degree of devolution from the rest of the UK envisaged by different political parties. All major parties are obliged, by the

¹²². An excellent account of the *Strategies for Self-Government: The Campaigns for a Scottish Parliament* since 1885 is provided in Mitchell (1996), who also examines in detail the historical foundation and development of the political movement that led to the creation of the National Party (Mitchell, 1996, pp.172-254).

centrality of the issue, to have a policy on Scottish devolution.¹²³ The importance of the SNP in local political consciousness is apparent from the frequent opinion polls that show a consistently high rate of preference for devolution and the high electoral support for SNP among the Scottish population.¹²⁴

A note should be made of the (contentious among Scots) argument that Scotland historically never had a nationality inspired nationalism, as it was effectively integrated in the English empire before the age of nationalism (Anderson, 1991 pp.89-90). On a similar vein Smith argues that the Scottish movement for greater autonomy was led by a 'secular intelligentsia' which limited ethnic agitation "by the historic presence of a wider political identity [i.e. British] and by the possibility for democratic accommodation of ethnic grievances" (1995, pp.74-76). These accounts do not however provide a satisfactory explanation for the rise of Scottish nationalism. To claim that Hugh MacDiarmid, as part of an 'organic' (i.e. authoritarian, mystical but also democratic, liberal and moderate) type of

¹²³ . An excellent account of the history and role of the SNP is given by Kellas (1989), Midwinter et al. (1991) and Mitchell (1996). The views of the SNP are portrayed in their campaign documents on the European and national elections (SNP, 1984 and 1992).

¹²⁴ . The Scottish National Party's fortunes were on the ascendant following their September conference in 1995 as reported in a System Three poll according to which they held 30% of the electorate's favour (*The Herald*, 2 October 1995, p.1,3). It should also be noted here, that SNP electoral support can be related to support for independence and not necessarily with support for devolution as the latter is part of the political agenda of both the Liberal Democrats and Labour.

intellectual leader was the deciding element in the formation of Scottish 'neo-nationalism' (Smith, 1995, p.77, p.151) appears simplistic. For the purpose of this exposition it is sufficient to observe that both Anderson and Smith acknowledge the existence of Scottish nationalism, even if they do not directly identify its roots with Scottish identity. McCrone, on the other hand, has argued that "Scotland, like other societies, may be entering a post-nationalist age. The vehicle of that journey, ironically, seems to be nationalism itself" (1992, p.196). Whether, modernity can be perceived to lead to a post-nationalist political environment still remains to be seen as there is ample evidence to the resurgence of nationalism not only in former Eastern Europe but also often in the nationalist rhetoric of contemporary European and World leaders.

As a footnote to this discussion it will be interesting to examine the historic relationship between business and political elites in Scotland. It has been suggested that local political and business elites can only be considered as separate from one another in Scotland the last few decades. According to this argument, Scottish business leaders of the mid-19th to the mid-20th century held the strings to local political power, "local government was largely in the hands of these men" (Slaven, 1994, p.167).¹²⁵ If this legacy continued into

¹²⁵ . It is also the case that a number of other professional elites, that were protected under the Treaty of Union of 1707 were also

the latter part of this century, Scottish business elites would be expected to control or interlock with political elites. The high degree of Labour domination in both the regional as well as the Scottish level, should be an adequate indication of the improbability of such a scenario today. This past relationship can be considered significant, if it indicates a previous trend between the local political and business elites; in this sense it is relevant to present-day interactions between the two elite groups if it affects the respective political consciousness of elite interactions through such a historically generated bias (i.e. the political elite perceived as subservient or interlocking with the business elite). It can be juxtaposed that local political elites in 19th century Scotland did not mainly originate from within local government, as other elite groups held significant political power (i.e. powers of the Lord Advocate).

To examine and fully understand the political culture of the Scots it is important to have an understanding of the role of the British government in the administrative and political machine that rules Scotland. It has been argued that administration by the Scottish Office leads to a rather alienative political culture, since "the system of administrative devolution with no political devolution to accompany it does cut Scottish urban

relevant to the local political interaction including Legal, Judicial, Education and Finance elite groups.

politics off from England while producing within Scotland a curiously depoliticised society" (Keating, 1988, p.197). Kellas points to the workings of the Scottish Office (Kellas, 1989, pp.27-61) with its 'mini-cabinet' and comparative administrative autonomy. This is coupled, while the Conservatives have been in power (since 1979), with the elected government at Westminster consistently registering a minority of preference on national elections from the Scottish electorate. This difference between the local political institutions and the national, -come regional- bureaucracy is indicative of the alienative civil culture in the region and the depoliticisation of which Keating refers to.

Scottish civil society is thus characterised by a relative distrust of political authority, to the extent that it originates south of the Scottish Borders.¹²⁶ Political participation is encouraged particularly among the middle classes in Scotland, although the existence of a large 'underclass' of chronically unemployed citizens with minimal access to political power or institutions marred that picture at the time of my survey.

Finally, an important element of the Scottish civic culture is the expectation of an 'orderly' interaction in the political and social arena, which is characterised by comparatively rigid moral values and stern rules of

¹²⁶ . The campaign of civil disobedience for 'No Poll Tax' during 1989-1991 was based partly on a perceived remoteness of the Westminster government from the needs of the Scottish people.

political conduct that can be associated with the Protestant work ethic¹²⁷ or with the 'post-materialist' values of a 'post-industrial' society (McCrone, 1992). This creates in Scotland and Strathclyde, (as integral parts of the British political tradition), a political culture remarkably different from the one held by the local elites in Crete and Greece. At the same time both regions' peripherality and comparative alienation from their respective national centre is a shared experience that could possibly reflect on a similarity of aspects of their respective civil society and political culture.

It should be also noted that in any discussion of political culture a distinction has to be made between that of the general public and that of the elites. Concerned with the first type is the classic work by Almond and Verba (1963) on *Civic Culture*, while latest examples of a comparison between elite and public attitudes can be seen in Miller, Timpson and Lessnoff (1996).

A discussion of political culture in Scotland has to take account of the possibility that it is not remarkably different from that of Great Britain or indeed from that of the rest of Europe. The distinctiveness of Scottish culture based on what McCrone (1992) calls the

¹²⁷. The protestant ethic in the West of Scotland with its strong catholic tradition is examined in *The Social History of Religion in Scotland Since 1730* by Brown (1987). Relevant issues are also considered in Walker and Gallagher (1990) and Brown (1993), while the political dimension is examined by Kellas(1980).

'egalitarian myth' which determines a special 'social ethos' is not necessarily self evident. Miller et al give evidence that "there is not a huge difference in political culture between those who live in Scotland and those who live in England and Wales" (1996, p.373). They find furthermore that Scottish values "reflected a commitment to common Western values whose egalitarian aspects were more consistent with European or Scandinavian constitutions" (1996, p.373). It can be counter-argued, however that perceived difference in political culture for Scotland may be more important for the decision making options of a local political elite than actual difference in value orientations.

In conclusion it appears that the Scottish political culture can be identified as distinctly different from the rest of Britain for it bears a number of historical traditions and ethics that are unique. This I accept regardless of evidence that Scottish value systems do not remarkably differ from the rest of Britain. Similarly in Crete the political traditions are distinct, the existence of a local ethnic identity re-enforces that separateness although evidence from attitude surveys do not indicate significant variation among Greek regions. The pre-eminence of clientelism in political interaction is endemic in all of Greek society and could be considered one of the primary reasons that Cretan and Scottish political culture are distinctly different. The Weberian 'protestant ethic' of Scotland can be considered

one other factor of dissimilarity although the peripherality and 'subjugation' of both Scotland and Crete to their respective national centres would count as a common experience.

F. Limitations in Using the Particular Regions

The limitations posed with the particular regions are mainly twofold. By narrowing down the area investigated I am possibly reducing the applicability of findings to wider political or business elites. At the same time, local political elites are very closely associated (it could be argued that they are dependent) on national and supra-national elites. The local business elites, on the other hand, can be considered to be affected by wider inter-regional, international or even global business expediency and their attitudes and behaviour should be accordingly determined. So, in effect, limitations in the explanatory value of the regions I selected are important.

Further than these considerations, account must be taken of the peripherality of the respective regions, which by itself limits results as meaningful to regions of similarly peripheral character. On this subject however, I note that in indicators of peripherality, mentioned earlier in this chapter (Map 3.1), consideration is given

to the accessibility of particular regions to the rest of the European Communities. This approach presumes regions in the European Community to be more integrated than they probably are. Furthermore, it fails to take account of the fact that from the local point of view, often, a national or political centre is defined by one's position *vis a vis* that centre, while the focus of perceived interests does not take account of relations between the centre and the periphery (Gould, 1974). Particularly since this thesis is based on attitudinal data, this consideration should be taken into account when interpreting results.

Note should be taken as well of the difference in the political systems and respective governmental structures between the two regions. The particular institutional traditions are remarkably different. The British system is based on Common Law, with the Monarchy, the House of Lords and the House of Commons as the guarantors of stability and continuity in democratic institutions. The parallel existence of a separate Scottish legal and administrative system can be considered as a way the system has accommodated internal strains within it, which were expressed as calls for institutional reform and administrative devolution to Scotland.

By comparison, the Greek political system is relatively young, while under the latest Constitution (1975) the President of the Republic and the Parliament are the

ultimate guarantors of stability and continuity. The state is unitary with all powers of regional (prefecture) authorities emanating from the national government.¹²⁸

Crete may also be peculiar, in that regional economists differ on whether it should be considered an agriculturally dominated economy in the traditional sense or a semi-industrialised, agriculturally intensive economy. It is maybe convenient to categorise Crete as agricultural but the underlying dynamism of its economy could be rendering it unrepresentative of European backward agricultural regions.

There is further, a fallacy entailed in comparing Purchasing Power Units devised on national criteria to measure standard of living in regions, since household needs and subsequent demand in remote agricultural areas follow much different patterns than in urban areas, while the size of the 'black economy' is reputedly and notoriously high in Crete (some journalistic accounts make it as high as 30% of the GRP).

Some statistical problems in using Crete for comparative purposes centre around the unavailability or unreliability of data, particularly for the early 1980's; and on the fact that small business constitute a much

¹²⁸. With the exception of some limited rights of self determination for local communities (laws 1622/1986 and 2218/1994).

higher percentage of total business than in other regions of the Greece and the EU.¹²⁹

Both selected regions maintain an identity difference vis-a-vis their respective national entities. Although this was one of the main reasons for selecting the particular regions, the fact itself limits -to a degree- use of results to areas exhibiting similar socio-economic characteristics. Note as well should be made that at the time of interviewing, Cretan 'nationalism' in manifestations of the local ethnic identity, did not appear to be pronounced and politically significant, which was the case for Scottish nationalism.

¹²⁹ . For a comparison of company sizes in Crete and Scotland see chapter five.

Chapter 4

Elite Group Selection

A. Introduction

In this thesis I attempt to make inferences upon regional elite behaviour by focusing on regional elite attitudes.¹³⁰ As regional prospects can be assumed to be linked to elite actions and (by inference) to elite interaction, the behavioural pattern of regional elites become all the more important. My presumption of a 'sound' theoretical basis for interpreting elite relationships was an inducement for attempting an investigation of elite interaction. Theory, however, is far from settled on issues of elite interaction while it is apparent that investigating within-elite interaction (i.e. interaction between elite sub-groups in a region) is not tantamount to an investigation of power relationships. To complicate things further, attitudinal convergence or divergence (concordance or discordance)

¹³⁰. In the 'ecological fallacy theorem' and the 'individualistic fallacy theorem', Alker (1965, pp.102-5) points to possible misrepresentations that can arise out of an attempt to infer a relationship among individuals to hold for collectivities and vice versa. I have qualified all inferences made of attitudes in respective regions with validity limitations and have not attempted to infer a relationship between institutions from a presumed relationship among the individuals I examine.

cannot be equated, without caution, with a sharing of values, while a sharing of values between two elite groups does not necessarily imply that there will be higher interaction.¹³¹ Higher frequency of interaction, on the other hand, cannot be equated with more efficient or productive interaction, which leads to the problem of the 'quality' of interaction between elite groups. To avoid circular reasoning it is adequate for the purposes of this work to say that the 'quality' of elite interaction is tangential to my hypotheses and is mentioned here only so that my approach is further elucidated.¹³²

I begin with an exposition of certain aspects of the debate relating to the study of elites. I am particularly interested in definitions of elite functions and inter-elite interaction. Questions of whether elites exist as coherent groups, elite transformation as well as the mechanisms by which elites disseminate (distribute or share) power are some of the initial questions considered. Finally, theoretical issues of investigating

¹³¹ . Current empirical work on inter-elite interaction within the framework of policy networks by John and Cole (1996) points to a weak but significant correlation between a sharing of values among actors and frequency of network relations (networkability).

¹³² . 'Quality' of elite interaction is discussed here as a factor that can be distinguished from the frequency or effectiveness of that interaction. No theoretical definition of 'quality' can be offered here other than it is perceived to be relevant to elites sharing of values that presumably leads to a sharing of objectives, such as regional development. A discussion of the importance of 'core values' within a policy network framework by Wright (1991) points to their importance in determining agenda setting and network membership.

elites are also related to some methodological issues of elite surveys.

The latest work on European, and in particular, regional elites is related to the significance of some of the hypotheses I have set out to test. Some limitations, stemming from the evolving character of European civil society are also given consideration.

I then proceed with a discussion of difficulties in identification of the business and political elites in Strathclyde and Chania, the reason for selecting the particular elite sub-groups within each region, the particular method employed in contacting them and some problems in approaching them.

I finally give an appraisal of the response rate of each particular group and an estimate of the representativeness, and population size for each sample.

B. Defining Elites.

In order to establish a theoretical framework for this analysis, I had to take into consideration several problems related to regional elite identification in determining a sample. In particular: a. the comparative character of the research questions, b. that surveying

had to be intensive and cross-sectional rather than extensive and longitudinal and c. the ability to identify exclusively and interview successfully an elite sample. I proceed here with a rudimentary definition of regional elites that acted as a basis for identifying a sample.

A number of the references in the literature, analysed below, make it clear that it is almost impossible to have a watertight definition of who belongs to a regional political or business elite. A definition, to a degree arbitrary, had to be employed so that political and business elites could be selected. I use as a starting point theories by Pareto, Mosca and Lasswell.¹³³ Pareto's notion of a 'governing class' which shares the spoils of power with those who defend and sustain it (Finer, 1966, pp.77-81), ties in with the ideas of Mosca who attests that "in every political organism the existence and functioning of a ruling class is necessary" (Mosca, 1972, p.249). According to Mosca "in all societies...-two classes of people appear- a class that rules and a class that is ruled"¹³⁴ (Mosca, 1939, p.50) or in Meisel's analysis of Mosca "the history of all societies has been, is, and will be, the history of dominant minorities" (1962, p.v). So, in both Pareto's notion of clientelistic power sharing and Mosca's notion of

¹³³. An excellent comparative analysis of Pareto's and Mosca's work is edited by Meisel (1965).

¹³⁴. However, more sophisticated notions of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled have to be considered, as the demarcation line between the rulers and the ruled are not always clear and influence from one to the other can be considered interactive.

'dominant minorities' I can trace ideas that can be useful to the contextual setting of regional elites.

C. Wright Mills in his notion of 'power elites' incorporates 'local elites' as those "who possess more than do others of whatever there is locally to possess; [while] they hold the keys to local decision" (Mills, 1956, p.30). He sees their role as subservient to the power elite of the larger urban centres.¹³⁵

Lasswell, on the other hand, defines elites as the influential. "The influential are those who get the most of what there is to get...those who get the most are elite" (Lasswell, 1950,p.3). He further identified power elite participants to possess among other things, a sense of a territorial community (Lasswell, 1965). Territorial identity among regional elites is by definition exclusive and presumably acts as a cohesive force for regional elites distinguishing them 'against' all others, while it aligns their interests with those of their region of identification. This notion can be instrumental in understanding territorially identified and land-locked elites, such as the regional elites.¹³⁶ Lasswell's notion

¹³⁵. Beyond being dated, Mills study (1956) focuses on American elites, with subsequent limitations on references that can be made in the contemporary European context.

¹³⁶ . Certain regional elites' strife for administrative autonomy can be linked to what Harvie (1994) and Keating (1996b) term 'bourgeois regionalism', under which economically advanced regions propelled by a regional bourgeoisie, seek to create political and administrative structures that would favour economic development.

of 'influential' actors is employed here in the selection of regional elites.

I proceed to examine the power context within which regional elites operate as it is essential in understanding the limits of their actions and scope for interaction. From the multiplicity of local elite groups my interest has been with those most relevant to regional growth. I encountered a number of problems in identifying them not the least of which were theoretical. I had to take account of Ivor Crewe's opinion that approaches to elites "...suffer from trying to make reliable statements about elites without first formulating a satisfactory theory of power..." (Crewe, 1974, p.14). The exercise and dissemination of power by elites is a theoretical consideration with relevance to this research, as a frequent referral to clientelistic and patronage networks reveals. Articles by Clapham (1982) and Gellner (1977) cover the issues relating to the dissemination of power, particularly relevant to Mediterranean clientelism. I will in a number of occasions use clientelistic interpretations of elite interaction to explain findings that apply particularly to the Cretan elite groups. An interesting distinction between the elite groups in the two regions could be based in the existence of clientelistic networks in the case of Crete and patronage networks in the case of Strathclyde.

To further understand the notion of elite interaction it is interesting to examine notions of leadership developed by Wiatr and Fiedler which point to the change in the structure of modern society.¹³⁷ Wiatr (1973) refers to informal leadership which can be functional, differentiating it from the formal leadership of elites. He further argues, that political elites exist only when a minority has much greater power than the rest of the community and there is a barrier of entry to the political field by non-elite members. Fiedler (1971) refers to the effect that followers have on leaders, arguing that to a great extent situations form leaders, so that they are not independent of the will of their followers.

European elite interaction has received particular attention in the context of policy networks analysis and the existence of a multi-level governance (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992; Marks, 1993; Rosenau, 1992). The impressive volume of the relevant literature points to an expanding interest in the role of sub-national actors. This discussion has direct relevance to my approach as a result of the policy network context of an emerging 'variable geometry' in the European polity together with the increased significance of non-state actors, a result of a 'hollowing-out' of the state (Jessop, 1996). The limitations in applying a policy-network approach here

¹³⁷. An other important contribution to the understanding of leadership is the one by Riker (1986).

stem from the generality in the conception of policy networks that diminishes their explanatory value.¹³⁸ It can be argued that if you will look for policy networks you will find them.¹³⁹ So, although I will not use a 'policy network' approach in identifying the elites surveyed, a number of the interpretations that will be offered will derive directly from 'policy network' explanations.

My interpretation of elite interaction also takes account of the neo-corporatist perspective according to which "elites collude and collaborate rather than compete" (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987, p.143). It has been further argued that "state and economic elites are so interpenetrated by each others' concerns that no sensible boundary line or balance of influence can be drawn" (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987, p.185), while "political and economic elites ... have shared interests in managing their complex environments, which facilitates co-operative elite bargaining" (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987, p.197). Within this framework I also consider two very distinct possibilities. In the first instance "in Britain [and Greece] the unitary structure of the state

¹³⁸ . An effective proponent of policy network interpretations is Peterson (1995). The approach can be very helpful in examining EU policy-making and the interaction between a number of different policy arenas. It can also be effectively employed in the interpretation of decision-making patterns among elite actors, as demonstrated by John and Cole (1996).

¹³⁹ . And indeed has been suggested by Kassim (1994), Michael Keating and Charlie Jeffery in the context of the 1996 ESRC 'Policy Networks' workshop in Oslo that the concept can be used most effectively as a methodological tool rather than a theoretical paradigm.

and the extent to which local government functions have to be centrally handed down by statute...severely constrains the possibility of a viable local corporatism" (Cawson, 1985, p.146). Secondly, it has been argued that "countries locked into state corporatism at an earlier stage of development are likely to find it much more difficult to evolve toward ...a consensual solution" (Schmitter, 1979, p.41) which points to the possibility that in Crete state corporatism further inhibits the development of local corporatism. As is the case with the policy networks perspective some of the interpretations offered with the analysis of data in chapters six and seven are associated with the neo-corporatist paradigm.

There are various alternative elite definitions to the ones I have used, whose assumptions and simplifications do not lend themselves to my work but can however enhance our conceptual understanding of elite interaction.

Contemporary Marxist analysis of 'class fractions' I found both inadequate and without the explanatory value sought in a theoretical framework that is primarily concerned with elite attitudes and elite interaction.¹⁴⁰

¹⁴⁰. Poulantzas being one of the most prominent contemporary Marxists has provided an interpretation of Marx's writings dismissing aspects of the analysis by Mosca, Weber, Mills, Michels and Pareto. He argues that "certain distinct classes,..., often appear in the social formation dissolved and fused with other classes, as groups (autonomous or not) of other classes" (Poulantzas, 1973, p.77), these he calls 'fractions'. A systematic critique of Poulantzas arguments on 'class fractions' is given by Crewe (Crewe,1974).

An alternative theory that diverges from the basic 'elite theory framework', is that of 'technostructures' by J.K. Galbraith (1967). I find the arguments portrayed in this and later work by Galbraith relevant to contemporary elite structure, but lacking, again in explanatory power. It is indeed relevant to my hypotheses whether a technostructure has forced the entrepreneur to disappear, the business to be indifferent to which party is in office and whether ideological considerations -between Left and Right- have been made irrelevant.¹⁴¹

The extent to which there is a difference between industrialising economies and post-industrial economies and if indeed the technostructure influences the formulation of policy while at the same time remaining distant from political decisions and choice, are issues relevant but not instrumental to this analysis. However close to the theoretical framework of this work, Galbraith's approach cannot serve as a basis for this investigation, particularly since it can have a limited explanatory value in comparative studies of societies that are in different stages of development.¹⁴²

¹⁴¹ . The role of the Scottish Office, in the case of Strathclyde, may be a mediating factor on the effect of 'technostructures' in the region. Galbraith's model has more explanatory power in interpreting the role of entrepreneurial than of local government elites.

¹⁴² . A similar argument is put forward by Lasch (1995) in the *Revolt of the Elites* under which the managerial elites disengage from their societal obligations which leads to an intensification of social divisions. The prominence of multinational corporations and the internationalisation of world production patterns are to blame, while democratic institutions are weakened in the process. This is a view of disengaged and socially disinterested elites

And finally, an interesting element of the theoretical debate considers whether unitary elites actually exist in Western democracies. Focusing in particular on the process for change within elites, Burton and Higley (1987) attempt an investigation beyond the basic parameters of elite group identity¹⁴³ basing their arguments on Weber's concept of political actors. They also argue that present scholarly debates are characterised by a "'conceptual swamp' in which the elite concept has no agreed-upon meaning and no clearly perceived theoretical utility" (Burton, 1987, pp.237-238). This is an ongoing debate often based on issues of semantics, without a necessarily clear direction. A consideration of the process of elite change, that stems out of it, is relevant to attitudes I am investigating. But I also believe that such change, could only be gauged by a longitudinal analysis, which is clearly beyond the scope of this paper.

Overall, I am inclined to accept Lasswell's (1950) definition of elites as 'the influential' refined to include the influential within a region. It is apparent, however that there can be no concise definition of elites that can safely delineate who is and who is not influential, who holds and who does not hold functional

that does not apply to my assumption of regional elites as those caring most for their region.

¹⁴³. These basic parameters are the so called three C's and include elite group consciousness, cohesion and conspiracy.

eliteness. Primarily, it has not been possible to determine a characteristic of elite influence that could act as a uniform criterion for all elite groups I investigate. It is also the case that accessing a large enough sample of the positional elite in each group to create a representative sample is beyond the resources of this work. These are the main reasons why I have declared my approach to be primarily qualitative.

C. Elite Interaction : The European Context.

The most exciting recent development in the examination of European elites is an interest on regional elites. Work by Dupoirier (1994), Leonardi and Garmise (1992), Keating (1991,1995), Harvie (1994) and Putnam et al (1993) all point to the emergence of regional or sub-national elites in the framework of the European Communities and Union. In the long term, according to Keating, we will see the emergence of a "differentiated state order" as a result of a breakdown in the "tidy hierarchical order of continental, national, regional and local authorities" (Keating, 1992, p.60). The end result could be envisaged as a 'variable geometry state order'. Keating believes that civil society becomes important as "national governments have been weakened, so the powers they can lend subnational governments are less potent" (1992, p.56). It has also been argued that there

is a shift in identities from the national to the local and global.¹⁴⁴ "The post-Westphalian state creates a new balance between subnational and other identities within the state, traditional nation-state loyalties and the wider sphere of international obligations" (Linklater, 1996, p.98).¹⁴⁵ The transfer and re-orientation in identities from the nation state is examined by Keating (1996a) in his discussion of the 'invention of regions' and Smith (1996) in his discussion of the re-imagining of regional identities, that in his view, have to be considered as concentric. Christopoulos and Herbert (1996), drawing from Gould and White (1986) offer the idea that identity in contemporary European regions can be visualised as 'concentric and fluid', with identification at the local, regional, national or supra-national level overlapping and in constant flux.¹⁴⁶ The timing of this series of interviews, before the completion of the single Market and the Treaty of the European Union, partially alleviates the need to consider the influences of modernity on European regional identity (as covered by Rosamond, 1995).

¹⁴⁴ . A more comprehensive account of the interplay between the local and the global can be found in Sassen (1991), Swyngedow (1992) and Amin (1994).

¹⁴⁵ . I am considering the influences of modernity (post or radicalised) in my concluding chapter. According to Giddens modernity "would not be a world that 'collapses outward' into decentralised organisations but would no doubt interlace the local and global in a complex fashion" (1991,p.178).

¹⁴⁶ . This theme is more fully explored in the concluding chapter of this thesis, ch8.

In this framework, the hypothesis could be considered whether elite behaviour, normally influenced by an overlapping but hierarchical allegiance to different levels of the European civil society (local, regional, state and European), under the influence of modernity, will in the future disregard traditional territorial allegiances. Assuming that this is a valid hypothesis there would be a direct impact on elite 'consciousness' in Europe. In such a scenario regional elite behaviour should be re-evaluated. A case in point is if, for instance, local elites' allegiance does not follow a hierarchical pattern but, for instance, 'skips' a level. This would be exhibited if a Scottish nationalist identifies more with Europe than the UK.¹⁴⁷ It is also possible to consider elite identity 'separated' (not to use the term alienated) from their local community, as they may be active on a regional, national or international level without exhibiting allegiance or identifying with any level of polity.¹⁴⁸

D. Elites Selected.

Selecting the business and political elites as most appropriate for this attitude survey, is concurrent with

¹⁴⁷ . Which points to the inherent problems with campaigns for 'independence in Europe' as the one attempted by the SNP (1992).

¹⁴⁸ . The constant reference to 'eurocrats' in popular media points to an assumed allegiance of Commission bureaucrats to 'Europe' or to their own 'caste', in defiance of their national or ethnic background.

my preoccupation with regional growth. It was also important to investigate two elite groups in constant interaction and possible interdependence.¹⁴⁹ I further attempted to identify those groups most responsible for the successful implementation and dissemination of national and European regional policies. While having further assumed that the regional political elite will be aware -if it is not indeed the vehicle for- the aspirations of the regional population.¹⁵⁰ This is relevant to issues of autonomy and nationalism that comprise a substantial part of my survey questions. I also assume that the regional business elite will be -by their occupational position- more able to assess the prospects¹⁵¹ their region has, particularly in relation to European integration and the Single Market.¹⁵²

I have aimed at a survey of the wider business elite, without attempting to target the most powerful or those among them that would be considered 'business leaders' or

¹⁴⁹. The distribution of economic and political power as the sources of 'social order' and 'economic order' are analysed by Weber (Gerth, 1991).

¹⁵⁰. I assume higher 'representativeness' of local than national elites without however testing that particular hypothesis, although I refer extensively on the impact of regional identity on my concluding chapter.

¹⁵¹ Assessing business prospects is not considered tantamount to economic prospects in a region. Politicians could argue that having a wider (macro) perspective they are best able to judge economic prospects.

¹⁵² . There has been extensive work on the 'local entrepreneurial milieu' (Rasmussen, 1992), the 'innovative milieu' (Campagni, 1995), the 'local context' (Johanisson and Spilling, 1983). All this work explicitly or implicitly cite the significance of regional elite actor collaboration and identification with their region for regional development.

opinion formers.¹⁵³ As mentioned earlier I am interested in the functional/powerful/influential actors within an elite group but I have not attempted to identify them before requesting interviews as any such criterion of power or influence would introduce one more validity limitation to my analysis. The assumption is therefore initially made that elite and leadership relationships apply to the whole elite sample with similar effectiveness and as concisely as with business elites involved in the higher echelons of decision making.¹⁵⁴ In the case of the political elites I attempted to identify in the data analysis those among them with a 'reputational' or functional eliteness although positional eliteness was the deciding factor in selecting to interview them. So, the political samples contain both functional and positional elite members, since I applied no measure to exclude those that by their interview or reputation I could determine were not powerful.

¹⁵³ . The debate between the plausibility of using any senior businessman/woman, depending on the size of the business they control or assessing business attitudes by interviewing 'business leaders' or 'business representatives' is long. I do not believe that businesspeople elected in Chambers of Commerce represent the attitudes and business preoccupations of their electoral college more than any elected office holder or politician represents the attitudes of their electorate. For an alternative approach see work by Garmise (1996).

¹⁵⁴ . Samuel Brittan identifies reasons for difference in replies on an attitudinal survey of economists and politicians in that, "practical politicians find it more difficult to think in terms of assumptions and hypotheses" (Brittan, 1973, p.30). This consideration together with reservations expressed in later survey work (Brittan, 1990), (Rickets, 1990) has to be taken into account since they provide evidence that variance of attitudes among elites may be due to differences in perspective among elite groups.

To place my work within the European context, it is interesting to note that most expositions on the institutional workings of the European Community and Union, take account of elite attitudes as a determinant of their behaviour. I first take account of Holland's reservations with the functionalist school which "by stressing elite roles in the control of capital they neglect the extent to which 'elite perceptions' on political issues such as European integration can be contradicted by the class role which the same elites need to pursue" (Holland, 1980, p.98). It is indeed probable that this 'class role' of elites can be instrumental in understanding their attitude and behavioural patterns. A possible 'contradiction' between elite actions (as their class interest) and elite attitudes (as their beliefs) towards Europe comprises a limitation of any attitudinal approach to the understanding of European integration.

Issues of 'personnel circulation' and 'social circulation' could pertain to the selection of political elites surveyed but relevant data for the particular regions were unavailable.¹⁵⁵ The issue of

¹⁵⁵. I use definitions by Welsh (1979, pp.24-27) who defines 'personnel circulation' as the turnover rate in elite membership; 'social circulation' as the degree to which an elite's social background changes, 'representativeness' as the degree to which the elite represents attitudes of the general population and 'interlockingness' as the overlapping membership in high ranking bodies of the political and other societal organisations. Lasswell gives an explanation of interlockingness between elite groups according to which "forms of power and influence are

'representativeness' is only relevant to the sampling of the business elites further discussed at the methodological appendix. It is relevant to mention at this stage that issues arising out of the representativeness of samples are partly addressed by using a comparative approach.

A framework of analysis, based on methodological considerations of researching elites, is provided by Moyser and Wagstaffe (1987) who note that ad-hoc choices have to be made in choosing procedures, while a comprehensive approach to the study of elites is in the volume edited by Hertz and Imber (1995). Issues of 'elite autonomy' and the contrast between class and elite theory is covered by Etzioni-Halevy (1993). Theoretical considerations with empirical analyses of elite studies can also be found in Goldstone (1975) and Pahl and Winkler (1974), while a very interesting quantitative approach is taken by Ziegenhagen and Koutsoukis (1992).

More recently interest has been centred on viewing business and political elite relations within policy network analysis. In particular, the volume edited by Marsh and Rhodes (1992) on policy networks has been seminal, while important contributions on the analysis of social/political networks include Knoke (1990), Scott

agglutinative: those with some forms tend to acquire other forms also" (1952, p.97).

(1991) and Wasserman and Galaskiewicz (1994). A most interesting addition to this literature includes sociometrics in decision making network analysis (John and Cole, 1996). Policy network analysis will not be used in the testing of my hypotheses however, due to limitations imposed by the character of the survey, but as mentioned earlier will mainly supplement interpretations in the concluding chapter.¹⁵⁶

All these different methodological approaches to the study of elites I have considered in the analysis of results in chapters six and seven. The diversity of definitions and the difficulty in identifying and interviewing regional elites, suggest the necessity of using both quantitative and qualitative techniques in this investigation.¹⁵⁷

E. Approaching Political and Business Elites in Strathclyde and Chania.

Having the distinct task of identifying the business and political elite groups within their respective civil

¹⁵⁶ . A particular limitation of the policy network approach is that 'if you will look for it you will find it' in most elite interactions. This limits the interpretative value the approach has, by reducing it to a tool of investigation rather than a comprehensive theoretical instrument that can provide explanations.

¹⁵⁷ . To account for the need to integrate quantitative and qualitative approaches I have employed a questionnaire design that facilitate a 'linked data' technique to data gathering as explained earlier.

society, I had to deal with a number of considerations of research validity.

As mentioned already I share one of Welsh's concerns on political elites that could apply to business elites as well, "it seems dubious to assume that any individual who holds membership in a prominent decision-making body actually exercises influence on political outcomes. His colleagues may be influential, but it does not necessarily follow that he is..." (Welsh, 1979 p.166). I initially had to deal with the problem of an individual holding positional but not functional 'eliteness'. While the possibility exists as well, that "elites may occupy formal positions for non-functional reasons" (Welsh, 1979, p.166).¹⁵⁸

Beyond procedures and measures, analysed in the following section, a bias arises from the fact that personal judgement on who does or does not hold functional or reputational eliteness, partly influenced who I chose to approach for an interview in Crete although their positional eliteness was the decisive factor in attempting to interview. This is particularly relevant for most of the Cretan survey, where approaching interviewees was less structured and based more on a

¹⁵⁸ . Functional eliteness can be also linked to 'issue determination' or 'agenda setting' individuals within elite structures (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970).

'snow-balling' technique, which is fraught with reputational bias.¹⁵⁹

Equally, I recognise the possibility that a particular elite member is an extremist, a maverick who has no influence among his peers, society or over decision making structures. In this thesis admittedly, I could not resolve issues dealing with a 'reputational definition of eliteness', but I felt inclined to consider problems of identification of individuals in the 'elite proper' category.

In the business samples surveyed I attempted to "...limit our definition of economic elites to those exercising allocative control..." (Whitley ,1974, p.115). My effort to that end was of interviewing managing directors or owners-entrepreneurs in the companies approached. Failing to secure an appointment with the managing director I tried to interview one of the executive directors, never interviewing non-executive (or ceremonial) directors. The sampling method for the business sample identified suitable companies first (based on a number of criteria on size by number of employees and turnover) and their managing directors second. In the case of Strathclyde I used a register of companies out of which by random selection a letter was sent asking the company managing director for a forty minute

¹⁵⁹ . A very informative account on the 'ethnography of local community elites' is presented by Hunter (1995), while snowballing in the context of qualitative research is discussed by Devine (1995).

interview stating the cause of this research.¹⁶⁰ In the case of Chania I used a register of trading companies supplied by the local Chamber of Commerce together with a list of all registered companies from which a random sample of address and telephones was used to contact prospective interviewees.

The mailing in Chania produced no replies and so each company was approached individually by telephone.¹⁶¹ The character of the contact thus was much more impromptu and it could be argued that the Greek sample is biased by the personal response interaction to the interviewer. There seems no way I could eliminate that bias if it exists, impromptu surveying being the standard practice in Greece.¹⁶² After a series of phone calls an interview time and date was agreed which in many cases did not necessarily mean the individual in question would adhere to appointments in 'submitting' to an interview.¹⁶³

Overall, I typically eliminated companies with fewer than five employees in Greece and ten employees in UK from the

¹⁶⁰. Sample letters of approach to elite groups can be found in Appendix II. A register of companies used included a Regional Company Survey that provided comparative size and profitability data for companies in Western Scotland (ICC, 1989).

¹⁶¹. This does not constitute classic 'snow-balling' as most of the businessmen interviewed were selected from lists provided by the local chamber of commerce. The main bias exists in the reputational approval -or possibly disapproval- of my research that helped in securing interviews or could have been the cause of denials.

¹⁶². A recent example of an excellent elite survey that uses 'snow-balling', is the one by Sotiropoulos (1994) on the Greek bureaucracy.

¹⁶³. A brief reference to problems of research in Chania is attempted in appendix I.

sampling. Proprietors of such small companies usually falling within the self-employed category and with typically a very small chance of belonging to the local business elite.¹⁶⁴

For the political samples I targeted individuals in the local and national executives of elected officials in both countries. As mentioned above however, I could not secure any interviews from the Greek national executive. This fact is limiting the scope of this research and the consequent hypotheses that can be effectively tested. Furthermore, as is apparent in the profile of elites interviewed (developed in chapter five) in Crete most of the interviewees were entrepreneurs, while in Strathclyde most were executives.

In Strathclyde, political elite interviewees came from the following bodies:

- a the City Council of Glasgow,
- b. Strathclyde Regional Council,
- c. the UK Parliament (elected in Glasgow),
- d. the European Parliament (elected in Glasgow)
- e. political candidates or activists in above bodies.

¹⁶⁴ . I take the point made by a number of academics (see Garmise, 1996) that local business elites have to be part of 'policy networks' or be involved in 'governance'. It is however my conviction that business elite attitudes can be correctly gauged if one concentrates on the attitudes of the wider business elite (of those holding substantial portions of allocative power) instead of investigating a nexus of power of regional businessmen, or identifying those with most frequent interactions to the political elite or considering those in business representative organisations as most significant.

In the prefecture of Chania political elite interviewees came from:

- a. Local Community Councils (Presidents),
- b. small Town Councils (Mayors),
- c. Chania City Council (Mayor and Councillors) and
- d. political parties (influential activists in Chania).

My approach on the political sample was very similar to the one used on the business one. I used a mailing for arranging an interview in the case of the Scottish sample, while I came in touch with the local community liaison officer in the Chania City Hall who introduced me to a meeting of the local mayors. Additionally a list of elected officials provided from the office of the prefecture served as reference for approaching local community mayors. In this respect there are both elements of 'snow-balling' and random selection in the Cretan sample. Unsuccessful attempts to interview the Cretan Members of the Greek Parliament were made both by a mailing and by personal contact in the House of Parliament (*Vouli ton Ellinon*) in Athens.

In both samples interviewing activists and individuals with political importance were pursued after referrals to the particular individuals by some of the office bearing interviewees. In this sense their selection is not random and their replies have to be considered in this light.

Another issue that arose was that of interlockingness. In some cases I found interviewees to belong to both elite groups simultaneously. This likelihood was closely scrutinised. The inclusion of a question inquiring on politician's business links (QC14) is meant to explore precisely that possibility. To determine whether business respondents had an elite position in the political world I specifically asked whether they held an elected position to a public body.

In two cases in the Greek sample and in one in the Scottish sample I found political personalities that also had an influential function in the business world. In those cases they were asked to answer the whole of the survey (including both Business and Political sections). I hoped to be able to make particular inferences from their responses but opted instead for eliminating one from the business and the other from the political analysis in the Greek case (reasoning explained in chapter five) and keeping the Strathclyde respondent within the political sample. I further avoided in the business sample the inclusion of heads of governmental agencies or organisations, academics or consultants, as I believed this could spoil the 'purity' of the sample by introducing attitudes that were not of the actual decision makers.¹⁶⁵ I made a point of interviewing a

¹⁶⁵. In the Scottish political sample a senior bureaucrat was included as he has a very instrumental position in policy implementation. Two Regional councillors in Strathclyde are also

number of them (as a pilot and not as part of the survey) in both regions and found they provided me with a very good understanding of local culture and civil society. These groups obviously belong to the wider elite structure, but I have attempted here to narrow the sample to the absolutely necessary groups in order to increase the significance of my conclusions.¹⁶⁶

F. Response rate in approaching elites.

The diversity of cultures between Scotland and Crete also determined the approach I could employ to interview the respective elites. It became apparent very early on that the Greek samples had to be approached differently than what could be considered standard code of practice in Britain.

In the case of the Scottish political elite, all Glasgow MPs and MEPs were approached, together with a number of the local regional and City Councillors. Two MEPs (out of three) responded and were subsequently interviewed, while three out of eleven MPs responded and were

academics, they were expected however to express views under their political function.

¹⁶⁶. In a sample questionnaire on similar hypotheses with the present one which I constructed and implemented between April and October 1989 aiming particularly at consultants, heads of governmental agencies and union officials, results did not appear particularly conclusive and one of the reasons was obviously the heterogeneity of the elite groups surveyed.

subsequently interviewed. The Councillors contacted were selected randomly from the list of Councillors of the two bodies (City, Region). There are 66 elected Councillors in Glasgow City, while there were 103 Councillors in the Strathclyde Regional Council.¹⁶⁷ Regional representatives with a constituency outwith Glasgow I considered part of the local elite, since their decisions are bound to influence local affairs, and have not been therefore excluded from the sampling.

A rough estimate of the membership of the local political elite will include all those presently in office, together with those that could most seriously challenge them in the next election (the elite-in-waiting).¹⁶⁸ It will also include their most trusted advisors, and the senior bureaucracy of the Councils, the local arm of the national bureaucracy (i.e. the Scottish Office or the office of the Prefecture) and the Regional Development agencies.¹⁶⁹ Assuming a strong local political culture, I could also consider as members of the local political elite, editors of local political papers, senior

¹⁶⁷ . The number of SRC Councillors was nominally 104 (before the abolition of Strathclyde).

¹⁶⁸ . Although in the case of the SRC and Glasgow City, these 'challengers' would be expected to come not from other parties but from within the Labour Party.

¹⁶⁹ . I consider senior bureaucrats (of which one is interviewed) of the local authorities and the national executive to be members of the local political elite. Furthermore, all those that can influence decision making, could be considered as part of the political elite. These according to Lasswell (1965, p.16), include those 'adherents of a counter ideology that are influential with the established order', those that held office and still are influential, highly influential people such as advisers and close family members of elected officials.

political activists within party hierarchies and prominent intellectuals that influence or challenge political thought and concepts in the region.¹⁷⁰ Resource limitations did not permit the thorough investigation of all the parts of the local political elite. In my Strathclyde political sample I have interviewed 14 elected representatives out of the 182 holding office in the relevant political bodies (a 8% sample) and three from the non-elected regional elite, which my arbitrary estimate brings to 500 individuals.

There were a series of mailings to attain interviews for the Scottish business elite based on a catalogue of business based in Strathclyde and Glasgow (ICC, 1989), from which companies with the desired characteristics of number of employees (over 9) and turnover (over £100 thousand) were randomly selected. This means that business in both industry and services were selected.¹⁷¹ The mailing of letters requesting interviews was conducted in waves, while all positive responses were followed-up.¹⁷² There was a total of six batches with the first one in March and the last one in May of 1991. In total 139 letters were sent-out that led to 24

¹⁷⁰. A number of individuals belonging to what I could call 'tangential elite groups' (such as academics), can be considered relevant to regional political interaction, by affecting political consciousness on what is desirable, and what is politically feasible.

¹⁷¹. No enterprises exclusively occupied with agriculture were part of the random sample, although a number of industrial companies were engaged with processing of agricultural products.

¹⁷². Sample letters of approach can be found in appendix II.

interviews. That represents a response rate of 17.3% of those approached.¹⁷³

In the case of the Cretan political elite I have used a list of the local Mayors (7 cases), provided by the office of the prefecture, and presidents of local Communities which included 152 cases. Since MEPs are elected on a national, rather than a regional constituency, their relevance to regional political life can only be limited; so, I do not consider MEPs a part of the regional elite. There are 21 councillors elected in the Chania City Council, which is the largest and most influential local authority. There are further, four MPs elected to the national parliament from Nomos Chanion. This brings the local elected elite to 184 cases of which I have interviewed 12, or 7%. I have also interviewed two individuals belonging to the non-elected local political elite, which similar to all the regional elite categories described for the Strathclyde political elites, I speculate it consists of 300 individuals.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷³. According to European Commission (1990) statistics 9.91% of enterprises in the UK are SMEs or Large ones according to employment figures. There were approximately 2000 business in that category registered for VAT purposes and filing accounts (according to ICC, 1989), which suggests interviews here represent a 1.2% sample. A more recent publication puts the total number of VAT registered business in Glasgow at 12000 a 10.3% share of Scottish business (Glasgow Development Agency, 1995).

¹⁷⁴. My estimate of the local non-elected political elite in Chania is higher than that of Strathclyde, if the population of the respective regions is taken into account, but reflects my understanding of the high involvement with politics of the local elites (bearing a relevance to clientelism as well). I also believe that there is a 'minimum figure' in the constitution of a local political elite, i.e. there is a minimum number of individuals, even in the smallest regions, that comprise an active local body politic.

To identify the Greek business elite I used a list of members to the Chania Chamber of Commerce and Industry (*Emporiko Ke Viomihaniko Epimelitirio Chanion*) as well as from a list of members of the Crafts and local Trade Associations. I also used a list of 72 exporting companies from the region, targeting the managing Directors.¹⁷⁵ My sample of 21 cases represents 20% of that population. There were 2,551 registered enterprises in the prefecture,¹⁷⁶ which could only be an indication of entrepreneurship however, since Labour Statistics are notoriously unreliable in the Greek state. I consider the lists used to offer a close approximation to the size of the local business elite.

So, overall I have interviewed 8% of the Glasgow elected local elite and 7% of the one elected in Nomos Chanion. A token sample of the non-elected political elites was included for both regions. From business elites I have

¹⁷⁵. My initial attempt to use the register of companies resident in Nomos Chanion proved unsuccessful because, at the time of my research, this information was not part of a data bank, was not updated and contained no vital information on the registered companies. Consequently, a great number of companies were inactive while most were personal craft or trading enterprises. Similarly unsuccessful was my attempt to use a register of Limited Companies, Corporations and Co-operatives, provided by the local Labour Ministry Department (*Epitheorisi Ergasias*).

¹⁷⁶. Data existing for Greece (Commission, 1990) puts Micro enterprises (1-9 employees) at 92.8% of the total. Assuming that there are 2,500 active enterprises in the region (and not taking account of the probability that the average size of enterprises in Chania is bound to be smaller than that of the rest of Greece) I would expect to find 29 enterprises with over 10 employees in Chania. This is an indication that my estimate of 105 individuals comprising the local business elite must be close to the true figure.

interviewed an estimated 1.2% sample of directors and managers of Small, Medium and Large enterprises in Strathclyde and a 20% sample in Nomos Chanion. These samples, being relatively low, affect the inferential value of most statistics employed but by being closely focused on the elite groups identified earlier in this thesis present a fair picture of elite attitudes.

Chapter 5

Profile of the Participating Elite Samples

A. Introduction

The type of hypotheses investigated in this thesis make the use of a comparative approach essential. Before I proceed with a test of the hypotheses I present here an analysis of the aggregated data from the survey. Simple statistical tools and graphics will be used to give an attitudinal profile of interviewees on the four sub-samples that comprise the entire sample, namely: a. Strathclyde politicians, b. Strathclyde businessmen, c. Cretan politicians and d. Cretan businessmen. Evidence underpinning a number of assumptions employed in the testing of hypotheses are initially examined here.

To process the data of the forty-one strong Scottish sample and thirty-five strong Greek one, I used a standard statistical package.¹⁷⁷ Coding of results was employed for

¹⁷⁷. The main software used, for statistical operations and manipulation of data files is SPSS/PC+ and SPSS for Windows.

transforming raw data into computer programmable ones.¹⁷⁸ A code-book was constructed and was used in coding respondents replies.¹⁷⁹ Since the goal of this chapter is to provide an elementary profile of elite groups, cross-tabulations and other elementary analytical statistics are deemed adequate.¹⁸⁰

Analysis of the relevant attitudinal profiles of the elites sampled includes characteristics like: age, function within elite hierarchy, certain preferences (i.e. support for nationalism) and confidence in their region (as expressed in confidence in preparation for 1992). Relationships explored in this chapter will be mainly those where there is a strong indication of association between the variables investigated. Questions referred to will be noted by their abbreviated form (as used in the codebook in appendix II).

In part F of the present chapter I have constructed a number of measures using group statistics. These, in turn, will be used when testing the hypotheses in chapters six and seven.

¹⁷⁸ . One digit codes proved sufficient to cover most possible answers. In a very few cases, two digit codes were used. See appendix II.

¹⁷⁹ . Manheim (1991) and de Vaus (1991) provide an excellent account of statistical techniques as they are employed in statistical methodology.

¹⁸⁰ . Although statistical tools are used extensively in the next two chapters statistical results should be considered as a support of the qualitative element in this survey.

Interviews for this sample, were conducted in Strathclyde region, between March and November 1991 and Nomos Chanion between September and October 1991.¹⁸¹

B. The Strathclyde political elite

Three of the respondents were City Councillors, six were Regional Councillors, three were Members of Parliament at Westminster and two were Members of the European Parliament. Three of the respondents were not elected members of political bodies, of which, one was a senior administrator, in charge of economic policy for one of the Councils. He was (although in his bureaucratic capacity apolitical) considered to be directly related, if not responsible for many of the Council's policy initiatives and naturally directly involved in the Council's budget; one of the respondents was a candidate at the forthcoming parliamentary elections and one was a candidate in the last Regional Council elections. Both candidates were considered very close to the top of their respective party structures, were in their mid-thirties and although, not directly involved in policy decisions, one as Parliamentary assistant and both as

¹⁸¹ . A number of exploratory interviews preceded the survey ones' in both regions, from June 1989 to October 1991.

activists were very influential and rather close to the decision-making elite.

In this section of the sample I encountered the only two females of the Scottish section of this survey. One was an MP and the other an MEP. Their uniqueness within the sample makes it impossible to treat them as a sub-group with any significance in statistical tests. I therefore, incorporate the female cases in the samples treatment of the male cases.

Table 5.1: Respondents' age distribution.

	YEARS OF AGE			
	35 OR LESS	36-45	46-55	56 OR MORE
Strathclyde Politicians		5 29.4%	7 41.2%	5 29.4%
Strathclyde Businessmen	2 8.3%	7 29.2%	10 41.7%	5 20.8%
Cretan Politicians	1 7.1%	5 35.7%	5 35.7%	3 21.4%
Cretan Businessmen	5 23.8%	6 28.6%	7 33.3%	3 14.3%

The respondents age group structure is a normally distributed bell shaped curve, centred around the 46 to 55 years age group (Table 5.1). Respondents were predominantly Labour (thirteen out of seventeen), Liberal Democrats (three out of seventeen) and Scottish National Party (One

out of Seventeen). There were no Conservative or minority party representatives. As is explained on chapter three on the choice of the elite groups, the strong dominance of Labour is normal, since sampling was centred in the Glasgow area.¹⁸²

Table 5.2. Respondents' identification with their region.

	ROOTS IN REGION	ROOTS OUTSIDE REGION
Scottish politicians	12 70.6%	5 29.4%
Scottish businessmen	21 87.5%	3 12.5%
Cretan politicians	14 100%	
Cretan businessmen	17 85%	3 15%

Note: Question Q4: 'Are your family/ethnic roots in Scotland/Crete?'

Of the political respondents, 70% have their ethnic roots in Scotland (Q4), a figure noticeably lower than the business average for Scotland of 87.5% (Table 5.2). Much more unanimous than their business counterparts, 82.4% of the political sample believes that nationalist movements are 'definitely' not constructive in regional politics (Q3).

¹⁸² . Labour history and effective dominance in Glasgow is covered by Keating (1988, ch.2-3), while political life in Scotland is covered in Midwinter et. al. (1991, ch.1-3).

This result was expected, since the confrontation between the Scottish Nationalists and the Labour party has been most severe as they both vie for voters in the same section of the political spectrum. While Scottish businessmen favoured an economy controlled at the National centre, politicians favoured more regional rather than national control. The Regional Council was favoured by 47%, while 40% favoured the national institutions in macro-economic decision making (Q1).

I proceed by presenting an overview of interviewees' attitudes towards local entrepreneurs and politicians, local and multinational business as well as the state of the regional economy.

The perceived importance of the local political elite is put into serious question, since nine out of the seventeen politicians believed that MPs receive most of the lobbying for regional issues (QC1), 56% of which in turn, were in favour of macro-economics being controlled at the regional level (Q1).¹⁸³

Replies to questions comparing trust in local entrepreneurs (QC4) and respondents ethnic origin (Q4) are particularly

¹⁸³ . A Spearman correlation coefficient between Q1 and QC1 of .296 (sig. .266) indicates a moderately high association between their views on macro-economic control and lobbying of MPs.

interesting since 80% of those not born in Scotland believed that prosperity depended on local entrepreneurs and conversely, 60% of those with their roots in Scotland perceived multinationals to be more important.

A majority of two out of three of those that expressed a preference believed business would perceive autonomy positively (QD1), which points to a serious difference in attitude from Scottish businessmen, since 61% of those expressing an opinion answered negatively to the same question.

A crosstabulation between their perception of business being positive to autonomy (QD1) with politician's trust of local entrepreneurs or multinationals (QC4), reveals 35% of respondents to believe in local entrepreneurs and at the same time find that business see autonomy positively.¹⁸⁴

Politicians expect that 82% of small-medium sized enterprises (SMEs) will maintain operations in the region inspite of a recession (QC5), while 59% expect multinationals would shift operations to another region (QC7).¹⁸⁵ Fifty-eight percent of those expressing an

¹⁸⁴ . A Spearman correlation coefficient for QD1 and QC4 of .402 (sig. .109) points a high degree of association between the two variables.

¹⁸⁵ . The Spearman correlation coefficient between QC5 and QC7 is .571 (sig. .021) which points to a high level of association between the two

opinion said the economic future of the region depends on out of region capital investment, (QD2), while 29% of this sample had no view on whether the region will depend on indigenous or exogenous investment.

The image of MEPs appears very positive, 41% of respondents finding they have the longest term perspective among elected representatives (QC12). Councillors came second in preference with, 24% of the sample believing them to be economically far-sighted, while only one respondent supported the premise for MPs.

The large majority of respondents (71%) believe that MPs are not held accountable for decisions taken by regional authorities (QC2), at the same time the majority (53%) believed that MPs are accountable for regional development (QC3).¹⁸⁶

A possible inconsistency exists between answers to questions of whether future economic growth depends on local entrepreneurs (QD3), and whether the regions prosperity depends on local entrepreneurs (QC4).¹⁸⁷ Only 54% of those

variables. If respondents thought SMEs will maintain operations were very likely to think MNLs will maintain operations and vice versa.

¹⁸⁶ . A Spearman correlation coefficient of $-.085$ (sig. $.746$) points to no association in respondents replies between the two questions.

¹⁸⁷ . A Spearman correlation coefficient of $.336$ (sig. $.163$) points to a relatively high degree of association between the two variables however.

that believed in local entrepreneurs (QD3) answered similarly on whether their prosperity depended on local entrepreneurs (QC4). The difference may be explained by the time reference in each question. The first one (QD3) is inquiring about the future, so replies can be more 'optimistic', while the second one (QC4) is asking respondents about the present situation.

On the issue of whether MPs are receiving most of the lobbying for issues of mainly regional importance, the predominant attitude was that this was the case (QC1). A similar majority said that they have been on the receiving end of lobbying efforts (QC13).¹⁸⁸ A total of 56% of respondents that declare to have been lobbied themselves also believe MPs are lobbied for issues of regional importance. As apparent from the correlation coefficients however, these attitudes cannot be associated.

In correlating whether respondents support the proposition that Strathclyde Regional Council is either Dynamic, Active or an Anachronism (QD4) and identifying Councillors as possessing a more accurate mental map than MPs (QC9) I find a pattern showing a correlation of replies to the two

¹⁸⁸ . Respondents exhibit no consistency in their replies however, as a Spearman correlation between QC1 and QC13 of .054 (sig. .838) signifies.

questions.¹⁸⁹ Those that found Councillors possessing a more accurate mental map tended to find the Council more Dynamic compared to those that did not think Councillors had a more accurate mental map. Most of those who had a negative view on Councillors mental map tended to view the Regional Council as simply active.

Overall, in the whole Scottish political sample only 17.6% had a negative view of the Regional Council (QD4). The existing correlation points to a positive view of the Regional Council being linked with a positive view of Councillors. Correlating answers on whether Councillors' perceived accuracy of their own 'mental map' (QC9) with their perceived receptiveness to businessmen (QC10) exhibits indications of a relationship.¹⁹⁰ From those that find Councillors possessing a more accurate mental map 60% also find Councillors more receptive than MPs. From those that do not find Councillors having a more accurate mental map than MPs 67% do not believe that they are more receptive than MPs. There exists a consistency which point to the existence of two groups. One which strongly believes in Councillors ability and fervour and one which does not. Overall results on question QC10 on Councillors

¹⁸⁹ . The overall Spearman coefficient is modest however, at .159 (sig. .588).

¹⁹⁰ . There is a considerable correlation in respondents replies to the two questions with a Spearman coefficient of .463 (sig. .071).

receptiveness are rather negative with 47.1% of the sample taking a negative view.

In replies to questions on whether the British (QD5) and Scottish (QD6) economy are ready for 1992, I find a remarkable consistency in replies which tended to coincide between their answers for Scotland and Britain with very small variations.¹⁹¹ So, if respondents found the British economy ready for European competition, they thought the same for the Scottish economy and vice-versa. This signifies an identification of the region with the economic fortunes of the nation can be considered relevant to the position this sub-group takes towards nationalism and devolution.

When however they are asked whether Scotland is in a worse position than the rest of UK or not (QD7) the distribution of their replies is balanced between those that find Scotland slightly worse off with those that find it slightly better off than the rest of the UK. This suggests a diversity of opinion that only becomes apparent when this particular issue of the region vs. the nation becomes explicit (QD7). In replying to questions on the preparedness towards 1992 (QD5,QD6) they were not requested to draw a comparison between their region and the rest of

¹⁹¹ . A very high correlation coefficient of .817 (sig. .000) signifies a very strong association between QD5 and QD6.

Britain. When this is done in QD7, I assume that their replies become influenced by their political beliefs and ethnic background in showing a divergence from their initial replies in QD5 and QD6.

In an effort to further identify bias, if and when it exists, I cross-reference questions of those that find there is a difference between the people in their region and the rest of Scotland (QD9) or between their region and Britain (QD10), with the question that asks whether they believe the region's prosperity depends more on local entrepreneurs or multinationals (QC4). I find that 67% of those who believe there are great differences between people from Strathclyde and the rest of Britain also believed their region's prosperity to depend on local entrepreneurs. The only respondents who did not believe there are great differences between people from Strathclyde and other British, were found in the group that had answered in favour of multinationals on the regional prosperity question(QC4). So those that believe local entrepreneurs to be closely associated with the region's future also find the Scots to be different from the British, while a great number of the sample of Strathclyde politicians who find multinationals to hold more promise for the region's future also find the Scots and the British to be alike. There emerges a pattern, according to which those that think there is no difference among the Scottish and British tend to believe in the

importance of multinational enterprises, while those finding a difference among the Scottish and British tend to believe in the importance of local entrepreneurs for regional development.

I finally investigate the distribution of replies among those that believed autonomy will be perceived positively by business (QD1), 60% of which believed future prosperity lies with local entrepreneurs (QC4).¹⁹² Similarly 60% of those that gave an answer believing autonomy will be perceived negatively by business (QD1) also found that the future of the region lies with multinationals (QC4). The two groupings seem consistent with the assumption that supporters of local entrepreneurs will support autonomy as well, while supporters of multinationals will view autonomy negatively.

Overall, Strathclyde politicians believe that business would perceive autonomy positively, MEPs have the longest term perspective and the Regional Council is a dynamic institution. There is also a link between a perception of difference of the Scottish people from other British, a positive view of entrepreneurs and a positive view of autonomy.

¹⁹². The high Spearman correlation value of .402 (sig. .109) points to a strong association between the two questions.

C. The Scottish business elite

Most of the interviewees (21 out of 24) were Managing Directors, Chairmen or Board Directors of their respective companies. The three junior Managers I interviewed were : a company accountant, a sales manager and a personnel manager. Their junior status within their respective companies does not disqualify them from being considered as part of the elite group, since to a great extent they all had direct access to their companies' Managing Directors, while their position within the hierarchy was more relevant to their young age.¹⁹³

Their respective company profiles reveals most companies to be in the medium to large category with 46% having more than £20 million annual turnover and 71% having more than one hundred employees (Graph 5.3). This apparent bias towards larger companies is considered more extensively in the discussion of response rates in chapter four.

Concurrently with issues of representativeness of the sample, consideration has to be given to the level of interaction between business and political elites. This must be influenced by the size of the local economy and

¹⁹³ . All three were in their mid-thirties, one put himself in the less than 35 years old group and the other two in the 35 to 45 years old group.

respective average company size. I assume that where the average enterprise is larger, business elites will usually come from these larger enterprises. In this respect I trust that, Strathclyde (as well as Cretan) businessmen in this sample are close to being a representative sample of their respective elite.

Table 5.3: Size of Scottish business surveyed by annual turnover and number of employees.

	LESS THAN £5 m.	BETWEEN £5-20 m.	MORE THAN £20 m.	PERCENT TOTAL
21-100 Employees	4	3		29.2%
Over 100 Employees		6	11	70.8%
PERCENT TOTAL	16.7%	37.5%	45.8%	

On an intuitive analyses I can point to the fact that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the United Kingdom account for 46.8% of employment while large companies account for 30% and that comparatively "...more employment is provided by SMEs and large firms in the UK than in the Community" (Commission of the EC, 19909, p.6.8). Previous research on economic elites has employed similar methods for identifying company directors from companies with a large turnover.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹⁴ . Reference here is made to research conducted by R.E. Pahl and J.T. Winkler (Pahl,1974). The researchers studied companies whose turnover was £250,000 or greater. Indexing between 1974 and 1991 will produce a minimum turnover value close to the one I applied. Considerations of systematic bias were made in that survey as well, particularly to the degree that successful companies were more prone to participating. My discussion on validity in chapter two entails these considerations.

A noteworthy aspect of this sample is that 21% declared that they consider themselves entrepreneurs, while the rest said they consider themselves to be executives (QB10F). On occasion a chairman or managing director seemed hesitant deciding between entrepreneur and executive status. A good number were holders of a large part of equity in their respective companies and had been personally responsible for their company's growth. Without fail all those who were indecisive ended-up opting for the executive status answer.

A number of possible explanations can be offered for this attitude. One could be that entrepreneurship is associated with creativity and in that sense it would be like bestowing themselves with a compliment; alternatively, for some an entrepreneur may not command a very high status in society. Since this survey had to be limited to particular political hypotheses, this rather etymological and conceptual fine-point is beyond this paper.¹⁹⁵

Another note-worthy distinction between entrepreneurs and executives seems to be the former's support for a federal Europe and international control of macro-economic aspects

¹⁹⁵ . Respondents conceptual perception of entrepreneurship may effect their relevant responses to the questionnaire. This limitation, could be particularly relevant for comparisons between the two different national groups. A context of different understandings of entrepreneurship is often encountered in the book edited by Goffee and Scase (1987) on 'Entrepreneurship in Europe'.

of the economy (Q1,Q2). Executives seem to overwhelmingly support national macro-economic control while at the same time supporting a federal structure for Europe. This marks an oddity which if not relevant to sample restrictions, must point to entrepreneurs having a more internationalist attitude than executives. Sixty percent of entrepreneurs, but none of the executives, expressed support for international macro-economic control in their region (Q2).

Another unexpected result relates to the apparent contradiction between Federalist (Q2) and Nationalist (Q3) views of the executive sample.¹⁹⁶ Sixty percent of respondents that think a federal Europe is viable do not believe that nationalist movements are good, while of those that believe nationalist movements are good 55% believe a Federal Europe not to be viable. I have to assume that nationalism and federalism are incompatible values for this sample.

A high percentage of the companies in this survey were private, with their shareholders primarily Scottish (Table 5.4). This category accounted for 67% of the sample. Another 25% were public companies, primarily of UK origin outside Scotland while 8% were companies with an international parent. Again note should be made of the bias

¹⁹⁶ . Spearman correlation coefficients for both groups are negative. More so for the executives with a value of $-.368$ (sig. $.121$) than for the entrepreneurs with a value of $-.167$ (sig. $.789$).

which exists by approaching companies registered in Glasgow, since some -particularly large UK companies- might be operating in the area without necessarily being registered there. I expect this bias to be limited however, as executives from non-Glasgow registered companies I assume not to be very senior within their company and therefore unlikely to be part of the local business elite. It is also the case that defining the elite as the influential in the local setting I am not interested in those that cannot be seen as directly relevant to the locality.

Table 5.4. Ownership of companies surveyed.

	Regional Privately	Regional Publicly	National Publicly	International
Scottish Companies	16 66.7%	1 4.2%	5 20.8%	2 8.3%
Cretan Companies	16 76.2%	1 4.8%	3 14.3%	1 4.8%

Note: Region here refers to Scotland and Crete respectively, while nation refers to UK and Greece.

Half of this sample consists of companies exporting to more than two countries, reinforcing the probability that there is a bias of representation of the more successful companies (Table 5.5). Thirty three percent operated on a local-regional basis only, while 17% operated on a national basis exclusively.

Table 5.5: Area of operations of interviewees firm.

	LOCAL ONLY	REGION	NATIONAL	EXPORTS IN UP TO TWO COUNTRIES	EXPORTS TO MORE THAN TWO COUNT.
Strathclyde Business	1 4.2%	7 29.2%	4 16.7%		12 50%
Cretan Business	8 38.1%	5 23.8%	5 23.8%	2 9.5%	1 4.8%

From the business interviewees, 88% considered their ethnic origin to be Scottish which is slightly higher a percentage than the total sample average.

I will proceed by presenting an overview of interviewees attitudes towards nationalism and devolution, local government and local entrepreneurs as well as European integration.

Asked whether they think Strathclyde will benefit from an increase in the powers of the Strathclyde Regional Council (SRC) 54% answered negatively while 42% answered positively (QB1).¹⁹⁷ Subsequently, when asked if business would perceive regional autonomy favourably (QD1) 58% answer negatively. Interestingly, from those that viewed an increase in regional powers positively 30% view autonomy negatively. A relation seems to exist between a favourable

¹⁹⁷ . Discrepancies in percentage totals stem either from rounding or from respondents declining to express an opinion or expressing an individual opinion outside the options given. When answers diverged from the set options in significant numbers these new categories were also tabulated.

opinion for Strathclyde's increase in regional power (QB1) and a perception of constructive role for nationalist movements like the SNP (Q3). This was expressed as a majority of those favourable to nationalist movements supporting an increase in SRC powers (55%) and conversely those not supporting nationalist movements not supporting an increase in SRC powers (69%). This correlation becomes more pronounced when the question becomes one of their own business benefiting from an increase in the powers of the SRC (QB2).¹⁹⁸

There exists a strong link between those who responded positively on whether the region will benefit from an increase in the powers of the SRC (QB1) and those who believe their business would benefit from such a shift as well (QB2).¹⁹⁹

The number of those having ethnic Scottish roots (Q4) that did not think an increase in the powers to the SRC will be good for the region (QB1) was twelve, against nine who viewed such a development favourably²⁰⁰. This is in accord with the predominantly negative attitude towards an increase in SRC power but offers no support to one of my assumptions

¹⁹⁸ . Spearman correlation coefficients between Q3 and QB1 were .296 (sig. 160) while for Q3 with QB2 took a value of .497 (sig .014).

¹⁹⁹ . The Spearman correlation coefficient for QB1 with QB2 is .461 (sig .024) pointing to the strong relationship of the two variables.

²⁰⁰ . The Spearman correlation coefficient between Q4 and QB1 is -.062 (sig. .773) which points to the limited association of the two variables.

'strong ethnic identification with the region will relate positively with a positive view of increasing regional powers'.

For those of the respondents who find there are great differences between people in Strathclyde and the rest of Scotland (QD9), 40% are negative about the benefits to the region from an increase in the powers of the regional authority (QB1) and at the same time negative about nationalist movements in regional politics (Q3). So, those who find differences among their region and the rest of Scotland do not support nationalism and believe an increase in the powers of the SRC will be detrimental to their business.

For those who do not distinguish between people in their region and the rest of Scotland (QD9) there is a clear distinction towards either being positive on nationalist movements (Q3) and at the same time being positive towards SRC powers (QB1 and QB2) or being negative towards both.

I could simplistically identify three major attitudinal patterns in regard to this sample:

- a. The Scots are different, nationalism is bad, an increase in SRC powers is bad,
- b. The Scots are similar, nationalism is good, an increase in the powers of the SRC is good,

c. The Scots are similar, nationalism is bad, an increase in the powers of the SRC is bad.

Together these three categories account for 57% of cases. They point to a trend since for those who see nationalism as bad (a. and c.) so is an increase to SRC powers, while for those in the first group (a.) Scots are different from other Britons and those in the third group (c.) Scots are similar to other Britons. For those who see nationalism as good, so is an increase in the powers of the SRC while Scots are all similar (b.). This may point to a relationship between support for local government and nationalism.²⁰¹

Comparing the replies of those who consider their region to be in a worse or better position than the nation (QD7) with replies on whether Europe represents more opportunities or risks (QD13) I can identify two concentrations of replies.

There is a high degree of confidence in Strathclyde and its European future, particularly the latter, since the concentration around more opportunities (QD13) is the strongest. A number of respondents (13%) see more risks in Europe, while at the same time they believe their region to be worse off than the nation. The size of the sample does

²⁰¹ . As mentioned earlier, this survey was conducted long before the Scottish Constitutional Convention had presented any concrete plans for devolution from Westminster. Questions on nationalism and Scottish nationalism can be associated with sympathy for the SNP.

not permit investigating the hypothesis of whether Scottish 'euro-sceptics' at the same time feel their region to be underprivileged within the UK.

A possible discussion on 'euroscepticism' should not fail to take account of the replies to question QD12 which were overwhelmingly positive.²⁰² In this particular sample all respondents were positive, that Europe does represent a challenge for their region. In this light, even those who view their region's future in Europe negatively (QD13) claim that Europe represents a challenge (QD12).

Most respondents seemed pessimistic about the economy's preparedness, which was anticipated, given that interviews were conducted in the middle of a British and world recession. Sixteen of the respondents answered that the economy was not prepared at all or plainly unprepared, seven thought it was just prepared and only one took the view it was well prepared(QD5).

Little inference can be drawn from the primary analysis of the group of questions pertaining to how well businessmen know their political representatives. The two largest groups of six cases - twenty five percent of the sample -

²⁰² . Such was the unanimity of opinion on this question that it could act as a control to identifying possible "exceptional" respondents, (those who could give random replies or be negative by reaction to the interview).

are those who either know all of their local political representatives, Councillors, MPs and MEPs or none (QB6, QB7, QB8).²⁰³

In order of 'obscurity' fifteen did not know their City or Regional Councillor, thirteen did not know their MEP and nine did not know their MP. Eight out of nine businessmen that did not know their MP did not know their Councillor, while six did not know their MEP either. This points to a possible polarisation at the one end of which we have 'politically informed' and at the other 'politically uninformed' businessmen, which could be taken one step further in stating an obvious condition. Only some elite businessmen are politically active while some are politically indifferent or inactive.

Cross-tabulating data referring to questions on whether local representatives are better at promoting the economic interests of the region and more receptive to businessmen compared with MPs (QB11, QB12, QB13), with degree of acquaintance with office bearers (QB6, QB7), I find great similarities in the distribution of replies to these questions. Answers to QB11 and QB12 show that twelve and

²⁰³ . Spearman correlation coefficients for QB6 and QB7 is .422 (sig .040) point to a strong correlation between businessmen knowing their Councillor and MP. The coefficient for questions QB6 and QB8 has a value of .497 (sig .014) which points to a strong correlation between businessmen knowing their Councillor and MEP. The only weak correlation was between questions QB7 and QB8 at .194 (sig .363) pointing to a low association between businessmen's knowledge of their MP and MEP.

thirteen cases respectively support the statement that Councillors are much more or slightly more fervent and much more or slightly more effective than MPs. This is in spite of the fact that most do not know their local or regional Councillors. To illustrate, five out of seven businessmen who said Councillors are much more fervent than MPs did not know their local Councillor while, of the same group, five knew their local MP. I can make the assumption that they are plainly dissatisfied with the performance of their local MPs rather than happy with the effectiveness or fervour of their local Councillors.

Cross-tabulating questions on how fervent (QB11) with how effective (QB12) this sample finds Councillors compared to MPs I see the emergence of two distinct groups.²⁰⁴ The first is of those who find Councillors much less fervent and much less effective and the second is of those that find Councillors much more fervent and effective.

Another noteworthy observation is that for all three questions (QB11, QB12, QB13) those that had chosen the options of equally fervent, effective or receptive, -for Councillors' and MPs' performance- belong to either of the two groups of respondents who either know both or neither of their respective MPs and Councillors. Also in the case of

²⁰⁴ . A Spearman correlation coefficient between QB11 and QB12 of .666 (sig .001) points to the very strong correlation between the two concepts.

the question on receptiveness (QB13), -which is based on the assumption that councillors are more accessible and therefore, businessmen probably feel them to be more receptive than MPs- I found a fairly balanced response with five of the respondents believing Councillors much less or slightly less receptive, ten finding them equally receptive, and seven finding them slightly more or much more receptive. Overall response patterns to this group of questions are rather unexpected and against some of my initial assumptions of businessmen's perception of Councillors and MPs.

There are two possible interpretations for this discrepancy. The first interpretation is that respondents are not giving an evaluation of the respective Councillors and MPs individually but of the institutions they represent. So, fervour and effectiveness were related to the Glasgow City Council and the Strathclyde Regional Council respectively. This view is supported by the qualifications to responses I received which express a wide support, of the Regional Council particularly, among the business community. The second possible reason for this response could be the disaffection of the Scottish business elite with existing institutional structures. This view, although not expressed as strong support for nationalism, can never the less be perceived as strong support for federalism (Q2).

In respondents' expressed locational mobility, consideration must be given to the fact that the majority are executives (QB10F) and that only five are over 56 years of age. Of those who said they were prepared to do the same job in another region of UK (QB14), 57% said they were prepared to do the same job in another region of the European Communities as well (QB15). Ten in total were not prepared to move at all (QB14, QB15)²⁰⁵. These results seem consistent with expected relocational patterns of executives, since those that are prepared to move are maybe not prepared to move to Europe but those that are not prepared to move to another UK region are more unlikely to want to move to another European region. There seems to be no pattern in the distribution of replies pertaining to the willingness to work elsewhere in Great Britain (QB14) and their perception of difference between Scottish and British people (QD9).²⁰⁶

Respondents were unanimous in their confidence that local entrepreneurs could function in a different UK region than their own (QB16), while they were close to unanimity that they could function in a different European region outside

²⁰⁵ . There is a very strong correlation between respondents replies to questions QB14 and QB15 as a Spearman correlation coefficient of .598 (sig. .002) reveals.

²⁰⁶ . The Spearman correlation coefficient for QB14 and QD9 is .070 (sig .747) pointing to no association between the two variables. This runs contrary to the assumption that if respondents believed there were great differences among the Scottish (QD9: positive) they would not be prepared to work elsewhere in the UK (QB14: negative). I assumed that this could be an indication of prejudice towards the English.

UK (QB17). There was some dissent, however, on whether multinationals are detrimental to the performance of local entrepreneurs, with six claiming they would perform worse and sixteen that they would perform better in the presence of multinationals (QB18).²⁰⁷

Whether respondents see themselves as entrepreneurs or executives seems to mildly affect their views on SMEs growth. All of those declaring themselves to be entrepreneurs (QB10F) also believe there will be a growth in small-medium enterprises (QB3). Of those who see themselves as executives (QB10F) most but not all believe that there will be a growth in SMEs.

In conclusion, in the attitudes of Scottish businessmen in this sample I find an association between an increase in the powers of the Strathclyde Regional Council and support for nationalist movements, while there is a negative correlation of nationalism with European federalism. They are pessimistic about the regional economy's prospects and are more likely to know their local MP than their local Councillor.

²⁰⁷ . The weak association is also apparent from the relevant Spearman correlation coefficient for QB17 and QB18 of .049 (sig .825).

D. The Cretan political elite

Fourteen interviews are included in the analysis representing a number of political bodies.²⁰⁸ Most interviewees were aligned with or directly elected with the 'left' of the political spectrum representing either the Socialist (six cases) the Communists (one case) or a Socialist-Left coalition (one case). Three of the respondents declared belonging to the Centre of the political spectrum although two were elected with the Socialists and one with the Conservatives. Another two respondents were right-wing conservatives. Remarkable is the case of the respondent who declared allegiance to a political party which, for all practical purposes, was at the time defunct (*Enosis Kentrou*). It is possible that the party dealignment evident in the willingness of respondents to give and receive support from the two major political parties in contemporary Greek politics (*Nea Demokratia* and *PASOK*) has to do with the character of politics in Greece. The clientelistic and leader-centred political culture makes ideology almost irrelevant to political alignment and support of a party. Hence, the often opportunistic realignments and coalitions based on shifting patronage relationships.

²⁰⁸ . A distribution of respondents according to the elected position they hold is displayed in Table 7.2.

Table 5.6: Declared political affiliation of Cretan political interviewees.

PARTY AFFILIATION	CASES AND PERCENTAGE	
Communist-Left (Synaspismos-Aristera)	1	7%
Socialist-Left (Left-PASOK)	1	7%
Socialists (PASOK)	6	42%
Centre -Socialists (Centre-PASOK)	2	14%
Centre (Enosis Kentrou)	1	7%
Conservative (Centre)	1	7%
Conservatives (Nea Demokratia)	2	14%

The predominance of Socialist representatives in this sample is a fair reflection of the political map of local government in Chania. A strong sense of a democratic tradition, which people in Chania feel links them to the days of Eleftherios Venizelos, is probably indicative of the prevailing feeling in the political community at large. This attitude is important for the analysis, since it points to a tendency for consensus politics that may be uncharacteristic of other regions in Greece.²⁰⁹

Of the non-elected interviewees one was a senior influential figure in the local political scene, a labour leader or

²⁰⁹ . Cretan political customs are investigated by Hertzfeld (1985), while an insight into modern Greek political history is provided by Woodhouse (1968) and Clogg (1986).

'ergatopateras' (literally: 'father of workers'), he was also the editor of one of the local union publications and a person directly involved with the party political machine being very influential in the local political party scene. The other one was the publisher and editor of one of the most important local papers. He was affiliated with the Socialist party and was directly involved in the political power struggles of local politics. In both cases their involvement in the local political scene is deep and I believe qualifies them as members of the local political elite. One of the interviewees was a female, in this case similar to the Scottish sample, the size of the sub-sample does not allow any further testing relating to her gender.

The age group structure reveals a comparatively youthful sample with only 21% of the respondents on the 'over 56 years of age' category (Table 5.1). Forty three percent of the Cretan compared with 29% of the Scottish politicians were younger than 45 years of age.

Representation of certain political institutions -like the Greek Parliament or the European Parliament- could not be achieved as the political elites in those bodies refused to participate. I feel however that the loss of the respective institutions from the sample only limits the investigative search in as much as it eliminates certain hypotheses that

can be relevant to the respective political institutions and does not reduce the value of the results in any other way.

All of the respondents declared their roots to be Cretan which makes a contrast with all other sub-groups of this survey (Table 5.2). I believe this to be the case for all local MPs in the National Parliament as well. This fact is indicative of a larger national or regional trend in Greece could be relevant to the possible direction regional politics might take in the future. Since relevant statistics are unavailable for other regions in Greece however I cannot dwell on this topic further.

Respondents in this part of the sample found that macro-economic policies should be controlled at the regional level by 58% compared with the Scottish political sample where 47% of respondents held the same view (Q1). A big majority of 71% also believed that a federal structure for Europe can be viable (Q2). It did not come as a surprise that 85% of respondents found nationalist movements not to be constructive in regional politics (Q3). As explained concurrently with the testing of the hypotheses (chapters six and seven) Cretans are particularly wary of any talk of secession from the mainland. The threat of Turkey is

considered very real while for many Cretan respondents nationalism has an inherently negative meaning.²¹⁰

I find however a noteworthy comparison between their responses to the first group of questions in the questionnaire. By a great margin they seem to think macro-economics should be controlled at the region, while federalism is viable at a European level. Furthermore, they do not find nationalist movements constructive. It could be that existing nationalist movements or parties do not have the confidence of the elite. It is the case as well, that the semantic meaning of the equivalent Greek word for nationalism, '*ethnikismos*', can have negative connotations.

It is possible, however, that if this is indeed a contradiction not related to the measures employed, that Cretans could make the 'logical leap' of supporting a federal structure for their region.²¹¹ Naturally, I am not suggesting that nationalism is positively related to federalism.²¹² Interestingly in interviews with officials from the planning agency of the prefecture and the local

²¹⁰ . A characteristic remark was 'the lone sheep is eaten by the wolf'. There are no recent claims on Crete from Turkey, but for the sample interviewed the danger appeared very real. It could be explained in part from the long fight of the Cretans to free themselves from Turkish rule, which was only achieved in the latter part of the 19th century.

²¹¹ . Independence from Greece has never been a goal presented by any major political party in the regional or national level. It has been voiced however as a fringe movement of autonomy at various times.

²¹² . Indeed many federalists, Altiero Spinneli (1972a) among others, argue exactly the opposite.

chamber of commerce (not constituting part of the questionnaire), it was relayed that the local administrative elite was frustrated with the existing decision making structures and would hope and lobby for a regionally autonomous administration.²¹³

I proceed by analysing Cretan politicians' attitudes on nationalist movements, local entrepreneurs and multinationals, the regional economy and national parliamentarians, as well as the European Community.

A common opinion expressed, was that the Cretan economy is able to outperform the rest of Greece and would be probably better off without the burden of central Greek administration and taxes.²¹⁴

Significantly, all those who found nationalist movements constructive (Q3) claimed also that national policies for the region have failed (QD8).²¹⁵ Those that found nationalist movements not to be constructive were almost evenly split between those that thought nationalist policies

²¹³ . Note should be made that bureaucrats perspective could be closer to calls for deconcentration rather than decentralisation or devolution.

²¹⁴ . Details of estimates of net expenditure by the Greek state are given in chapter three analysing the economic conditions in Crete. The most important result of that analysis is that Crete is a net contributor to the state, although its Regional Per Capita Income is below the Greek average.

²¹⁵ . A weak Spearman correlation coefficient of .150 (sig. .609) points to the 'problematic' association between the two questions.

have failed and those that did not think that to be the case.

Eighty six percent of interviewees said MPs receive most of the lobbying (QC1), while 58% of them said that macro-economics should be controlled at the regional level (Q1).²¹⁶ In a country where political patronage is a facet of the state machine, it is considered natural to lobby at the state legislature, which is the highest decision making body. The dependence of local authorities on the central administration further explains this pattern. Of those who believed macro-economics should be controlled at the national level came the only two respondents to support the proposition that MPs do not receive most of the lobbying for issues with regional impact. If they represented a more significant part of this sample, I could deduce that such a group sees the national administration as the most competent agent for dealing with the regional economy and at the same time feel there exists a balance by lobbying for regional issues at the competent authorities for the region; such a group would obviously favour the status quo of affairs for the region.

In terms of trust of the local entrepreneurial skills, 64% of respondents believe their region's prosperity depends on

²¹⁶ . A comparatively strong Spearman correlation coefficient of .365 (sig. .243) points to the strong association between the two variables.

local entrepreneurs (QC4), while 71% believe future economic growth will depend mainly on local entrepreneurial skill (QD3).²¹⁷ A group of respondents representing 29% of the sample believed the economic future of the region lies in out of region capital (QD2) while at the same time the regions prosperity depends on companies with headquarters outside the region (QC4); this same group also believes future growth will depend on out of region entrepreneurial skill or have no opinion on the issue(QD3)²¹⁸. On the question of whether the capital resources for future growth will come from within or outside the region a total of 43% of the sample expect capital to come from outside the region (QD2).

The strong trust in local entrepreneurial skill is mirrored in replies of the business part of the Cretan sample. I find it indicative of the natural pride in their own ethnic identity. The big proportion of those that expect capital resources for their region's growth to come from outside the region shows, to some extent, the degree of their perceived dependence on such sources for growth.

²¹⁷ . The very high Spearman correlation of .837 (sig. .000) points to the very high association between the two facets of this issue for Cretan interviewees.

²¹⁸ . Question QD2 shows a higher Spearman correlation coefficient with QD3 at .519 (sig. .057), than with QC4 which is at .351 (sig. .218). This points to a higher correlation between sources of capital and skill than sources of capital and a companies base of operations.

A concentration of replies exists between those that perceive the future of the region to depend on local capital (QD2) and at the same time expecting SMEs to stay in the region (QC5).²¹⁹ Overall 93% of respondents expected SMEs to stay in the region in the case of a recession, while only 50% of respondents expected multinationals to stay in the region in a similar case (QC7).

In their views about multinationals' commitment to the region, compared with their views on local or international resources for their growth, I find two significant concentrations of replies. One was of those who believed the future of the region lies in out-of-region capital (QD2), 67% of which believed multinationals will stay in the case of a recession (QC7); while the second one was of those who believed the future depends on local capital resources, 57% of which believed multinationals would go in the case of a recession.²²⁰ These views show a degree of consistency in the opinions of this sample which, furthermore, seems divided between those who believe the region is dependent on foreign capital and multinationals for its future and those

²¹⁹ . The Spearman correlation coefficient between QD2 and QC5 being rather moderate at .230 (sig. .427) I have to assume that there is no overall association between the two variables..

²²⁰ . There is a strong negative association for QD2 and QC7, the relevant Spearman correlation coefficient takes a value of $-.382$ (sig. .178) supporting the assumption that multinationals are linked with support of out of region capital.

that do not trust multinationals and believe the future to lie with local resources and entrepreneurs.

It is noteworthy, as well, that although Crete is below the Greek average per-capita income, the political elite finds Crete to be better off than the rest of Greece. In replies to a question asking whether their region is in a worse position than the nation (QD7) 75% of those who replied to this question found Crete to be in a slightly better position, while 17% believed Crete to be in a much better position than the rest of Greece. At the same time 50% believed MPs to have a longer term perspective (QC12) while 42% believed MEPs to have a longer term perspective. All of those who believed their region to be much better off than the nation (QD7) believed that MPs have a longer term perspective.²²¹

It could be argued that Cretans perceive themselves in a better position than the nation, because of renewed interest in the region as the first one in Europe to have an Integrated Mediterranean Programme implemented.²²² Furthermore, the fast growth and increased prosperity due to

²²¹ . A Spearman correlation coefficient of $-.405$ (sig. $.192$) points to a strong association between preference for MPs and a belief that the region is better off than the nation.

²²² . The implementation problems of the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes in Greece are covered by Papageorgiou and Verney (Papageorgiou, 1992), while a general critique is given by Bianchi, (1992).

the increase of agricultural incomes and tourist revenue in the 1980's must be partly responsible for the optimistic outlook of the regional elites.

The connection between their belief in their prefecture being better off than the nation and their trust of national MPs economic foresight, indicates confidence in the region's growth at the same time regional politician's dependence on the centre. And although all respondents in this sub-sample belong to local political bodies, it is impressive that they demonstrate no trust to their own economic foresight. In that respect it would be interesting to examine whether calls for decentralisation and autonomy are led by a business elite that is driven by economic expediency and resisted by a political elite deeply embedded in the national clientelistic web.

So I examine how respondents see the relation of MPs with local authorities. Replying to a question on whether they think MPs are considered accountable for decisions taken by local authorities, 86% of respondents thought this not to be the case (QC2). On answering whether MPs are held more accountable for regional development than local Councillors, 57% declare this not to be the case, while 21.5% say this is the case and a similar proportion do not know (QC3). There

were no respondents who were positive on both questions while 50% of this sample was negative on both.²²³

It seems, thus, that MPs are held in high esteem (QC12), they are not considered accountable for decisions taken by regional authorities (QC2), and they are less accountable for regional development than Councillors (QC3).

On their replies to the question of whether Councillors are more receptive than MPs to pressure from businessmen (QC10) in their area 50% replied positively and 41.7% negatively.

Sixty seven percent of those that found Councillors more attentive than MPs (QC10) believed their regions' prosperity to depend on local entrepreneurs (QC4), while 60% of those that found Councillors less attentive than MPs believed the future of their area to lie with companies from outside the region.²²⁴ In this light appreciation of local government can be related with appreciation of local entrepreneurs while disaffection with local government could be linked with trust of an 'out of region entrepreneurial effort'.

²²³ . A Spearman correlation coefficient of $-.028$ (sig. $.923$) points to no association in the way respondents replied between the two questions.

²²⁴ . There is a mild statistical association between the two variables as a Spearman correlation coefficient takes a value of $.245$ (sig. $.442$).

Inquiring whether they have been lobbied for the change of legislation and cross-tabulating to assess whether they believe MPs are receiving most of the lobbying, 66% of respondents to both questions said they have not been lobbied (QC13) and MPs indeed receive most of the lobbying for regional issues (QC1).²²⁵

I next examine the relationship between their perception of the most prominent local authority and the relevance they think local Councillors have with regional problems. A total of 57% find Councillors possessing the most accurate mental map (QC9) while 75% of those find the local Council to be Dynamic (QD4). In total 71% find the local Council dynamic which indicates the City Council is considered to be a significant political force by the local political elite. The strong concentration of positive replies for the Council and Councillors could be explained by the occupation of the respondents, being themselves Councillors or presiding over local Council bodies. I cannot thus determine whether their esteem for Councillors is dependent on their impression of Councillors possessing a more accurate mental map.

A high correlation between their replies on the state of the Greek and Cretan economies shows replies to correspond

²²⁵ . This relationship attains a Spearman correlation coefficient value of $-.258$ (sig. $.418$) which points to an association between on the one hand having been lobbied themselves and MPs receiving most of the lobbying.

between respondents' views of the economic conditions between the two economies (QD5,QD6).²²⁶

I proceed to investigate their views towards national policy. Seventy percent of those who thought the region to be better off than the nation (QD7) also thought that national policies have failed. So a large proportion of those who believed the national authorities to have failed believed the region to be better off regardless. It seems they do not connect the well-being and progress of the region to national policies. At the same time they have a very positive image for local MPs. One is inclined to think that such a position is either relating to a political apathy with state institutions and policies or in a belief that the system cannot be changed and the local MPs are utilising it to the best of its capabilities.

I next try to identify to what extent the elite from the prefecture differentiates itself from the region and the nation. The first indication of divergence is between those that support the premise that there are no differences between the people of the prefecture and the rest of the region (QD9) and there are no differences between people of the region and the rest of Greece (QD10), who represent 36%

²²⁶ . A very high Spearman correlation coefficient of .751 (sig. .002) signifies the strong link between their perceptions of the regional and national economies, which are considered highly intertwined.

of the sample, and a group of equal size (36%) who support the premise that there are differences both within the region and between the people of the region compared with the rest of the country. Twenty eight percent of the sample support the premise that there are no differences within the region but there are differences between the region and the nation. The whole sample can be thus divided to those that:

- a. find there are no differences whatsoever between all Greeks (36%),
- b. find people from Chania to differ from the rest of the region and Greece (36%),
- c. believe people from Chania differ only from the rest of the Greeks (28%).

The second (b.) and third (c.) groups comprise 64% of the whole sample. So I deduce that these groups represent those who see cultural or other differences between their region and Greece. The first group (a) is intransigent in its belief that Greeks have all the same characteristics cultural or otherwise.

Further attempting to qualify respondents position towards Europe, I see that in the question asking whether respondents believe there are more opportunities or risks in a united Europe (QD13), 71% reply that they believe there are slightly more or more opportunities, while another 21% reply that there are the same level of risks and opportunities, while 7% reply there are many more risks.

Trying to identify trust for multinational enterprises as it compares with their trust for local entrepreneurs I trace a weak relationship since a majority (71%) of respondents who believe multinationals will stay in the case of a recession (QC7) also believe the region depends on local entrepreneurs (QC4). Concurrently, the proportion of those who believe multinationals will go, seem not to trust local entrepreneurs (60%).²²⁷ The size of the sample does not allow a generalisation of this relationship. So, although there are indications for the existence of this relationship, trust in local entrepreneurs cannot be linked with trust in the presence of multinationals in the region.

To conclude, Cretan politicians trust local entrepreneurs and multinationals but show little appreciation for local political effectiveness. Furthermore they are optimistic towards the regions' prospects in Europe.

E. The Cretan business elite

The age structure of respondents in this sub-sample shows 52% to be 45 years old or younger, while only 14% of them were older than 56 years (Table 5.1). The character and

²²⁷ . The Spearman correlation coefficient denotes a low statistical association between replies to QC4 and QC7 at a value of .162 (sig. .579).

average size of business in Crete precluded the possibility of many members of the business elite to be executives. This is not only due to the comparatively small size of incorporated companies, but also due to the predominance of family controlled business, which still comprise the backbone of Greek business. This picture was confirmed in their responses in the survey as 64% of them declared being entrepreneurs and only 32% declared being executives.

Furthermore as mentioned earlier in this chapter, interlockingness between the local political and business elite is assumed to be related to the size of the local economy. The small size, in this case, of the Cretan economy makes the holding of a position in both elite groups a more frequent occurrence than witnessed in the Strathclyde sample. Two cases interviewed had an important role in both elite groups. One of them a managing director of the biggest company in the prefecture was eliminated from the political sample and was only included in the business one. Similarly an editor of one of the local papers was eliminated from the business sample and was only part of the political one.

Some basic aspects of their attitudinal profile are revealed in answers to the question inquiring whether respondents believe a federal structure for Europe is viable (Q2), where an overwhelming majority of 86% said they believed this to

be the case. Half of those also argued that macro economics should be controlled at the international level (Q1). It is noteworthy that only 19% of the sample supported the proposition that macro-economics should be controlled at the regional level, while another 19% supported the proposition that it should be controlled at the national level.

So Cretan businessmen show themselves to be much more internationalist than their Scottish counterparts (75% of whom supported national control of macro-economic policies). An apparent explanation of this, as of many other questions, is that businessmen from the prefecture find the national administration inefficient and trust the European Commission as a comparatively uncorrupted bureaucracy. The efficiency and higher level of development of European business also make them a model which Cretan businessmen would like their economy to follow. By comparison Scottish businessmen may perceive Brussels as a bureaucratic organisation which competes with their national government for imposition of taxes and the establishment of a Social Charter. The European Commission may be perceived thus as an impediment to business by Scottish businessmen in this sample.

A total of 76% of the sample perceive nationalist movements negatively (Q3) which is a similar figure with the Cretan political elite response, but is far higher than the

Strathclyde business figure of 54% of respondents being negative on nationalist movements.

Another interesting distinction between entrepreneurs and executives' replies is that 31% of entrepreneurs could not decide whether nationalism was bad (Q3), while at the same time all executives had a clearly positive or negative position. There is no divergence in their views on nationalism that can be ascribed to their professed ethnic roots either(Q4).

Most respondents replied that their roots are Cretan, a 19% minority in this sample consider their roots to be outside Crete (Table 5.2). This fact in itself is significant, to the degree that it points to the business elite not being as homogeneous in its background as the respective political elite.

Trying to determine whether there are variations in the approach to nationalism and international economic control which depend on the status of respondents, I divide respondent replies on whether they perceive themselves as entrepreneurs or executives. A noteworthy concentration of replies consist of those who identified the region or the nation (Q1) as most appropriate to exercise macro-economic control. Only 13% of executives support the nation as most

appropriate level of management of the macro-economic policies of the region.

I proceed by giving an account of interviewees' attitudes towards devolution, local business, local politicians and European integration.

Remarkably, an overwhelming majority of 95% of respondents believed that the region will benefit by an increase in the powers of the prefecture (QB1), while 90% believed their business will benefit from such an increase in regional powers as well (QB2).²²⁸ A negative perception of nationalism (Q3) does not preclude an almost unanimous support of an increase in the powers of the regional administration. This strong support for devolution from a rather demoralised and centrally dependent regional bureaucracy, points to the distress that the workings of the existing structures bring to businessmen in the region.²²⁹

Although 95% of respondents believe their prefecture will benefit from devolution (QB1), only 29% find that business will see autonomy positively (QD1) while a majority of 62%

²²⁸ . The relevant Spearman correlation coefficient confirms this strong association exhibiting a value of .689 (sig. .001).

²²⁹ . The need for decentralisation and the perceived 'gross inefficiency' of the Greek state to address the problems of the locality was a prevalent theme of almost all interviews with prefecture and development agency representatives in the region. (Interviews in the summer of 1990 and 1991)

think that although the prefecture will benefit from devolution, business will not like autonomy. This reply is particularly intriguing if one considers that this group of respondents are businessmen. From relevant qualifications, respondents gave to their replies, the most apparent interpretation to this 'contradiction' is that, Cretan businessmen can see the benefits of devolution in the administration but would view with unease the possibility of severing their ties with the Greek business community. It seems also to be less the case of resource dependency of the Cretan economy to the mainland than dependence on the Greek market as an outlay for their products and services.

A high correlation exists on whether they foresee more SMEs (QB3) and whether this is beneficial to their own firm (QB4) with whether they have declared themselves to be entrepreneurs or executives.²³⁰ This association is directly relevant to the perceived role of respondents in the business community. I can assume that entrepreneurs view SMEs as competition, while executives view them as a wider market for their products.

²³⁰ . A high association between the two variables with a Spearman correlation coefficient value of .447 (sig. .374) for executives and a value of -.408 (sig. .188) for entrepreneurs. Apparently executives relate more SMEs with a positive development for their firm, while entrepreneurs with a negative development.

From those who responded that more SMEs will create a more devolved economy (QB5), 77% have also found business holding a negative view of the possibility of autonomy (QD1).²³¹ Those that answered that the economy would become more dependent, were equally split, 50% of them believed business to be positive and 50% to be negative to autonomy. An overall majority of those who perceive SMEs to create a more devolved regional economy perceive business to be negative to autonomy.

Those who believe people from Chania to be different from other people in the region or the nation represent 48% of the sample (QD9,QD10); those who believe neither people from the region nor people from the nation to be different from people in Chania represent 24%; finally, those who find there are great differences between people in Chania and the rest of Greece, but no differences between people from Chania and the rest of the region represent 19% of respondents. So, as with the Cretan political personalities I can distinguish three major groups of respondents.

A relationship between their ethnic roots and a perception of difference of the regional people can be demonstrated by the fact that 59% of those who declared their ethnic roots

²³¹ . The Spearman correlation coefficient has a value of $-.305$ (sig. $.191$), which points to a moderately high association between an attitude that SMEs are related to a devolved economy and that business hold a negative view on autonomy.

to be Cretan (Q4) believed there are great differences between people in their prefecture and the rest of Crete (QD9).²³² The inverse is true for those who do not have their roots in Crete, 75% of which believe there are no great differences among the prefecture and the rest of Crete.

Of those that would be prepared to work elsewhere in Greece (QB14), 63% perceived no great differences of people within Crete(QD9). Of those that would not be prepared to work elsewhere in Greece, 67% found there are great differences between the people in their prefecture and those in the rest of Crete. This attitude is consistent with assuming that those who find great differences within their region are not prepared to emigrate and *vice versa*. Further evidence from their qualitative replies identifies this group as the potential 'hard-line' nationalists in the region.

Replies to QB14 and QB15 show an interesting inversion from replies in the Scottish sample. When asked if they would be prepared to do the same job they perform here in another part of Greece 57% replied they were not prepared to move (QB14), this reply was partly anticipated since this sample consists mostly of entrepreneurs with comparatively small

²³² . This association is not as pronounced in the relevant statistics since the value of the Spearman correlation coefficient is only .182 (sig. .431).

operations, while as they have claimed that they believe their region to be better off than the nation (QD7). When replying if they would be prepared to do the same job in Europe, 52% reply in the affirmative (QB15). The inference from the Scottish investigation of replies, was that if someone was not prepared to work outside Scotland in the United Kingdom he was less likely to be prepared to do so in Europe. Many assumptions can be made why Cretan businessmen would be more willing to work in Europe than they would be to work in Greece. Most apparent is the existence of a better organised state infrastructure and better returns for their efforts in most of western Europe. I must not fail to identify their entrepreneurship and keen sense of adventure, and the long history of emigration and immigration (particularly acute in the 1950s' and 1960s') from the region and Greece as a whole.

Respondents knowledge of their elected representatives is very high. All respondents knew who their elected representative was, in both the city or town Council (QB6) and the National legislature (QB7). A total of 57% also knew a Cretan MEP (QB8).²³³ The presumably high degree of interlockingness of the two elite groups, the comparative

²³³ . The electoral system for the European elections allows for one national list of representatives from each party. In that sense there are no MEPs that stand in Crete alone. There are a number of MEPs however who have their political roots on the island. Because of the difference in the electoral systems and the wording of the Greek translation to this question, there are limits in our ability to cross-reference this question with answers from the Scottish sample.

small size of the prefecture and above all the importance of political patronage in the economic life of Greece make the main reasons for a high level of interaction between the two elite groups. This fact poses certain problems in dividing the two groups and identifying which is the dominant function of individual cases in the Cretan sample. It is partly because of the nature of Greek political reality in the regions but also because of an implicit 'forced participation' in political life that there exists such a high awareness and involvement with politics.²³⁴

In assessing effectiveness, receptiveness and fervour of their local Councillors compared with their local MPs, the distribution of replies follows a pattern remarkably different from the Scottish one. An equal percentage (44%) of those respondents who expressed an opinion found their local Councillors less or much less fervent from local MPs with those that found them more or much more fervent (QB11). A majority of 63% of those who expressed an opinion believed that local Councillors are less or much less effective, compared with 25% who found them more or much more effective (QB12). On the question of receptiveness/accessibility 48% found local Councillors more or much more receptive,

²³⁴ . Participation in political life is here given the characterisation 'forced' exactly because of the totality in which the state is geared to serve the political machine. Clientelism is a facet of citizens everyday interaction with the state machine, particularly so in remote provinces like Crete. See Mouzelis (1987) and Lyrantzis (1984).

compared with 24% who found them less receptive (QB13).²³⁵ In cross-tabulating the three questions there was negligible correlation between replies to questions, while their distributions showed no direct patterns and replies to one did not seem to preclude replies to the other, save for an association between receptiveness and fervour. Most importantly their appreciation of the local political elite's effectiveness is small (QB12) and its correlation with their fervour (QB11) and receptiveness (QB13) not extremely impressive. This leads me to assume that although the relation of the local business elite with the local political one is direct, (as it has been demonstrated in their replies to questions QB6, QB7, QB8 and QB9), their appreciation of the local Councillors' and Mayors' ability to be instrumental, in the promotion of the region's or their individual interests, is obviously limited.

Perceived receptiveness of Councillors seems also linked to respondents' position towards the respective local authority. A majority of 57% of those that found their local authority to be 'dynamic' (QD4), also found the local

²³⁵ . The only strong association between the three attitudes exists between questions QB11 and QB13. The Spearman correlation coefficient has a value of .545 (sig. .019), suggesting that those respondents that found Councillors more fervent also found them to be more receptive and vice versa.

Councillors to be more receptive(QB13).²³⁶ Similarly, from those that found their local authority to be 'active' or of 'minor importance', 80% believed their local Councillors to be equally or less receptive than MPs. It seems thus that a positive impression of Councillors receptiveness and accessibility is linked with a dynamic image of the local authority and vice versa.

As anticipated all of those that believe their region's economy is prepared for European integration (QD6) belong to the group of those that believe their prefecture to be in a better position than the nation (QD7).²³⁷ Replies to the question on the competitiveness of the Greek economy (QD5), showed no correlation with those that found the prefecture in the same or worse position than the nation. Since their replies on the position of the prefecture towards the nation does not seem to correlate to their replies on the state of the national economy (while a mild relationship exists between QD7 and QD6), I assume this sub-group does not make that attitudinal connection.

In conclusion, Cretan businessmen supported administrative devolution, were mostly apprehensive of the prospect of more

²³⁶ . The Spearman correlation coefficient for this relationship has a value of -.226 (sig. .324) which gives a mild association between a dynamic view of the Council and receptiveness of local Councillors.

²³⁷ . A high Spearman correlation coefficient of .630 (sig. .002) points to the high association between answers in the two questions.

SMEs and were prepared to work elsewhere in Europe. They tended to know all their elected representatives and believed Crete and Greece to be unprepared for the Single Market.

F. Attitudinal Measures²³⁸

In the last section of this chapter I will include a number of group indicators that will be used as control variables in the testing of a number of the hypotheses. I have devised measures that give an ordinal ranking for these indicators for the four regional elites. The ordinal scale has been coded to denote the highest value for the highest ranking parameter. So, 4 ranks the elite group with the strongest or most positive recorded attitude and 1 the one with the weakest or most negative recorded attitude.

I have initially intended this section to include factor analysis for groups of variables. As explained in chapter two there are a number of reasons that limit the scope of using advanced statistical techniques. These are mainly due

²³⁸. In this section I have to specifically acknowledge extensive advice from Professor William L. Miller. It is naturally my interpretation of that advice that entails any weakness in the indexes that follow.

to the samples' elite character and comparatively small size.

In the case of the present measures care was taken for variables not to be causally related. The data available however was not always of interval character.

Significantly, all but one of the measures constructed are based on dichotomous variables. So, in order to group variables together an empirical assessment had to be made instead of a statistical factor analysis. I trust the measures eventually devised to closely represent the attitudes they attempt to gauge and to be indicative of attitudes of the wider elites outwith my sample.

1. Regional Elite's Grievances Towards their National Government.

From an analysis of replies by the four elite groups to questions QD7, that the region is in a much better position than the nation in regard to 1992 and QD8, that the national policies have failed to create opportunities in the region, certain patterns emerge. Both Strathclyde elite groups believe their region is in the same or worse position than the nation by a wide margin since 69% of the political and 77% of the business elite appear to believe so. In contrast

the Cretan elites appear strongly optimistic, most of them stating their region is in a better or much better position than the rest of the nation, with 86% of the political and 81% of the business elite taking that position.

These replies compare interestingly with their replies on whether national policies have failed to create opportunities in their region comparable to those created in other regions of the nation (QD8). A wide margin of 88% of Strathclyde politicians believe national policies have failed to do this. The reverse was true for Strathclyde businessmen, 57% of whom believed that national policies have not failed in the region. Both Cretan elites believed national policies to have failed, 57% of the political and 65% of the business respondents taking that view.

I assigned a value of 100 to those that both said that national policies had failed (QD8) and that their region was in a much worse position than the nation (QD7). The value of -100 was given to those replies both identifying the region to be doing much better than the nation and national policies not to have failed in the region. For those that did not give an answer or stated they did not know the answer, a value of zero was assigned.²³⁹ This scale thus

²³⁹ . In none of the questions employed here 'neutral' scaling (do not know-refuse to answer) represents more than 14% of the respective sub-samples.

can take values of between -100 and +100, where replies closer to zero identify a neutral view point. In table 5.7, I have calculated the mean score of all respondents to both questions for all four elite groups.

The measure (table 5.7) shows Strathclyde politicians to have the highest level of grievance and the Cretan politicians to have the lowest. Cretan businessmen seem neutral while Strathclyde businessmen, although negative, are not nearly as negative as Cretan politicians.

Table 5.7: Regional elite's grievances towards their national government

ELITE IDENTIFICATION	CUMULATIVE MEAN QD7+QD8 (standard deviations)	ORDINAL RANK VALUE (MEASURE A)
Strathclyde Politicians	39.1 (39.8)	4
Strathclyde Businessmen	-11.4 (57.1)	2
Cretan Politicians	-17.9 (56.7)	1
Cretan Businessmen	-3.6 (49.6)	3

Note: a. Question QD7: Do you find that your region is in a worse position than the nation in regard to 1992? Question QD8: Do you believe that national policies have failed to create the opportunities in your region that have been created in other regions of Britain?

The initial analysis of the frequency distributions for the two questions showed a high degree of regional grievance towards national policies for all elite groups except the Strathclyde businessmen. These latter seem to think that their region is worse off than the nation and at the same

time reject the premise that national policies have failed in the region. It seems thus that overall, Strathclyde businessmen are those with the fewest grievances towards the national government, a result partly confirmed by the measure constructed.

2. Regional Elites' Support of Regional Devolution.

To create a measure for this attitude I initially compare elite group replies to question Q2 inquiring whether respondents believe federalism is viable in Europe and question QD1 inquiring whether respondents think business elites would perceive autonomy positively. I have also included a second measure by including replies to question Q1 inquiring whether respondents believed macro-economics should be controlled at the regional, national or international level.

To establish a measure I decided to use a technique of scaling respondents replies for the questions and then establishing a common numerical factor that if compared for each elite group could give an indication of how favourable or unfavourable they were towards regional devolution. The scale ascribed a value of -100 to replies that were negative on regional autonomy, 0 to those that refused to answer or claimed they did not know and +100 to replies positive on regional autonomy. The group means for the two groups of

questions and all four elite groups are compared in the following table.

In this table (5.8) the highest mean score represents the highest sympathy level for regional devolution by the respective elite. Consequently, Strathclyde politicians and Cretan businessmen high score indicates a strong positive attitude for the questions examined. A lower score indicates a comparatively neutral attitude, which may indicate that there are equal numbers amongst a sub-group of the sample that support and refute a proposition or that most respondents chose a neutral answer.²⁴⁰

Table 5.8: Ordinal Ranking of Variables Indicating Regional Elites Positive Attitudes Towards Regional Devolution

ELITE IDENTIFICATION	CUMULATIVE MEAN Q2+QD1	CUMULATIVE MEAN Q1+Q2+QD1 (standard deviations)	ORDINAL RANK VALUE (MEASURE B)
Strathclyde Politicians	35.3 (60.6)	35.4 (43.0)	4
Strathclyde Businessmen	-6.8 (69.5)	-19.7 (62.3)	1
Cretan Politicians	-17.9 (54.1)	8.3 (51.5)	2
Cretan Businessmen	16.7 (48.3)	28.6 (45.1)	3

Note: Question Q1: Do you believe that macro-economic policies should be controlled at the regional, national or international level? Question Q2: Do you believe a federal structure for Europe can be viable?

²⁴⁰ . A low value in the standard deviation would support the proposition of a concentration of replies close to the mean value, while a large standard deviation would allude to a wide spread in responses. Such an interpretation of the standard deviation assumes normal or bell shaped distributions of replies which are not necessarily feasible in small samples.

Question QD1: Do you believe that if your region were to become more autonomous, business would perceive this as a generally positive development?

The inclusion of question Q1 alters responses for three of the sub-groups. This variable, because it is primarily indicating anti-state sentiments is conceptually similar but not the same as those of variable Q2 and QD1. Strathclyde businessmen become more negative towards devolution/autonomy, while Cretan politicians and businessmen become more positive.

An explanation could lie in the trust of the national state by Strathclyde businessmen, which supports the assumption that they are primarily against further autonomy. Remarkably, Strathclyde politicians are unaffected by the measure, remaining the most positive sub-group on regional autonomy.

Both Cretan elites become distinctly more positive on autonomy by the introduction of the QD1 variable. This could be related to my assumption of the Cretan regional elites overall distrust of the national government and a possible underlying sentiment that may become apparent in future demands of regional autonomy. Such an attitude if true could be relevant to future political developments in the region.

Finally it should be noted that this measure is intended as a gauge of positive attitudes towards regional autonomy and I do not believe it can be taken to indicate a positive relationship to any political party's agenda.²⁴¹

3. Regional Elites' Perceived Difference from the Rest of the Nation.

To create this measure I examine elite replies from question QD9 inquiring whether respondents perceive differences between people in their locality and those in the rest of Scotland/Crete and question QD10 in which they are asked whether they perceive a difference in people from their region and those in the rest of Britain/Greece. This measure is also relevant in establishing whether regional elites perceive people in their region and by inference themselves to be different from people in the rest of their nation.

There was relatively small variation in the replies between the four elite groups. The Strathclyde political elite agreed with the two premises more strongly than any other

²⁴¹ . It is apparent that political interviewees may be rehearsing political standpoints instead of personal attitudes (as mentioned in chapter two). The use of three questions with a partly indirect way of inquiring on this topic is meant to alleviate that possibility.

group 56% attesting that they are different from people in the rest of Scotland (QD9) and 81% saying that the Scottish are different from the rest of the UK. The Strathclyde Business elite was also strong in its identification of difference from the rest of the nation with 83% of respondents answering in the affirmative to question QD10 but only 43% of respondents believing the same difference to hold between their region and the rest of Scotland (QD9).

Table 5.9: Regional elites' perceived differences between people in their region and people in the rest of their nation.

ELITE IDENTIFICATION	CUMULATIVE MEAN QD9+QD10 (standard deviations)	ORDINAL RANK VALUE (MEASURE C)
Strathclyde Politicians	35.3 (70.2)	4
Strathclyde Businessmen	27.1 (73.7)	3
Cretan Businessmen	0.0 (87.7)	1
Cretan Politicians	26.2 (83.1)	2

Note: Question QD9: Overall do you find there are great differences between people in your region and those in the rest of Scotland/Crete?
Question QD10: Overall do you find there are great differences between people in your region and those in the rest of Britain/Greece?

The Cretan elite samples also strongly identified their regional peoples' as separate. The Chania business elite had the stronger indication of this attitude since 71% show people in their locality as different from the rest of the Greeks (QD10) and 55% believed the local people to be different from the rest of Crete. The Cretan political

elite was the one who perceived the least differences between the peoples in their locality and those in the rest of Greece 64% attesting to that effect, while only 36% of them perceived differences between themselves and the rest of Crete.

I will not attempt a comprehensive explanation of the possible reasons for the divergence in attitudes here. This will accompany the analysis of results in the following chapters.

Strathclyde politicians showed the highest score in this measure attesting to their perception of a high degree of separateness between people in their region and people in the rest of Scotland and UK. Strathclyde businessmen and Cretan politicians follow closely behind, while Cretan businessmen show a neutral overall position. This difference of Cretan politicians I assume to be partly due to associating separateness of people with calls for autonomy.²⁴²

4. Elites' Perception of Preparedness Towards 1992.

²⁴² . As analysed in chapters six and seven moves to autonomy are extremely emotive issues for Cretan political elites who at least openly consider any such issues as separative and motivated by foreign propaganda. Many examples of this are apparent in the editorials of local newspapers (Newspaper Kyrikas Chanion, August-September 1991).

To establish this measure I use elite responses to questions QD5 and QD6. These inquire whether the national and regional economy is prepared for the run-up to 1992.

Responding to the question of whether their national economy was prepared for 1992 (QD5) 81% of the Strathclyde politicians, 67% of the Strathclyde businessmen, 79% of the Cretan politicians and 100% of the Cretan businessmen replied their nation was slightly or not at all prepared.

Responding to the question of whether their regional economy is prepared for 1992 (QD6) 86% of the Strathclyde politicians and 67% of the businessmen believed their region to be slightly or not at all prepared. Similarly, 57% of the Cretan politicians and 71% of the businessmen believed their region to be slightly or not at all prepared.

In both these questions a Likert scale was used which for the purposes of this measure is converted to a scale of -100 for the most negative attitude to the proposition up to 100 for the most positive attitude for the proposition. The middle value in the Likert scale is given a value of zero, while intermediate values 4 and 2 are given values of -50 and 50 respectively.

Apparently all elite groups believe their regional and national economies not to be prepared for 1992 (table 5.10).

The elite group with the lowest perception of preparedness towards 1992 is the Cretan business elite. Interestingly the Cretan political elite is the one with the most favourable opinion of regional preparedness.

The opposite pattern is apparent in the Strathclyde elite groups. Politicians think their region and nation is not as prepared for 1992 as businessmen whose opinion is not as pessimistic on regional preparedness.

Table 5.10: Preparedness of the regional and national units towards 1992 as perceived by regional elites.

ELITE IDENTIFICATION	CUMULATIVE MEAN QD5+QD6 (standard deviations)	NOMINAL RANK VALUE (MEASURE D)
Strathclyde Politicians	-48.4 (30.9)	2
Strathclyde Businessmen	-39.6 (38.2)	3
Cretan Politicians	-35.7 (36.3)	4
Cretan Businessmen	-61.9 (29.2)	1

Note: Question QD5: Do you believe that the British/Greek economy is ready for the competition that the 1992 integration will bring?
Question QD6: Do you believe that the Scottish/Cretan economy is ready for the 1992 competition challenge?

To the degree that these results could be generalised for the broader elite groups investigated I could infer that on this particular issue, elite groups in the two regions seem to have diverging attitude patterns or even value systems. Politicians in Strathclyde are more pessimistic than businessmen, while businessmen in Crete were more pessimistic than politicians. As previously I will not

attempt an interpretation of results at this stage of the analysis.

5. Elite Attitudes Towards European Integration

In this measure I use questions Q2 and QD13. The first inquires about elite perceptions of the viability of federalism in Europe while the second inquires whether elites believe there will be more opportunities or risks in a united Europe.

Replying on whether they find federalism in Europe viable(Q2) 86% of the Cretan business elite, 76% of the Strathclyde political elite, 71% of the Cretan political elite and 63% of the Strathclyde Business elite answer affirmatively.

Answering whether more risks or opportunities exist in a united Europe (QD13), 76% of the Cretan politicians, 71% of the Cretan businessmen, 65% of the Strathclyde politicians and 63% of the Strathclyde businessmen replied they believed there will be more or many more opportunities in a united Europe.

The introduction of the recoding and computation of the new measure follows the same rules as above with -100 signifying an extremely negative attitude to the proposition, 0

signifying a neutral attitude to the proposition and 100 signifying an extremely positive attitude to the proposition.

The strongest positive attitude towards European integration is expressed by the Cretan businessmen (table 5.11). Cretan politicians and Strathclyde politicians also show strong but slightly milder support for European integration. Strathclyde businessmen are those with the smallest support indicator for European integration.

Table 5.11: Regional elite attitudes towards European integration

ELITE IDENTIFICATION	CUMULATIVE MEAN Q2+QD13 (standard deviations)	ORDINAL RANK VALUE (MEASURE E)
Strathclyde Politicians	44.1 (62.2)	2
Strathclyde Businessmen	27.1 (54.1)	1
Cretan Politicians	48.2 (57.6)	3
Cretan Businessmen	69.0 (48.7)	4

Note: Question Q2: Do you believe a federal structure for Europe can be viable? Question QD13: Do you believe there are more opportunities or risks in a united Europe?

6. Attitudinal Profiles

I will proceed by identifying certain trends in the replies of the four elite groups on all five constructed

measurements which summarise the findings. It may be significant to note at this stage that average standard deviations (empirically estimated at a value close to 50) are observed in most mean values of measures employed. High standard deviation values are only observed in the case of Measure C (difference between people in their region and the rest of the nation) signifying relative disagreement among members of an elite group, while in Measure D (preparedness towards 1992) a high concentration in their replies produces small standard deviation values.

The **Strathclyde political** elite shows a great sense of grievance towards their national government (Measure A), believes the people of the region to be very different from the people in the rest of the nation (Measure C), has a positive view of regional devolution and European integration (Measures B and E) and believes the region not to be prepared in the run-up to 1992 (Measure D).

The **Strathclyde business** elite has a positive opinion of the national government (Measure A) and believes their region to be unprepared for 1992 but by a smaller margin than any other elite (Measure D). They also find the regional people significantly different from people in the rest of the nation (Measure C) and have a comparatively negative view of regional devolution and lower support for European integration than any other group (Measure B and E).

The **Cretan political** elite shows the most support for their national government (Measure A), have the strongest negative view on regional devolution (Measure B) and at the same time seem keen on European integration (Measure E). They believe their region is rather unprepared for 1992 (Measure D) and are equivocal about whether there are differences between the people in their region and those in the rest of the nation (Measure C).

The **Cretan business** elite do not show signs of grievance towards the national government (Measure A), are comparatively positive on regional devolution (Measure B) and very supportive of European integration (Measure E). They believe people in their region are rather different from people in the rest of their nation (Measure C) and have very strong doubts as to whether their region is prepared for the Single European Market (Measure D).

Interpretations for the divergence among elites in these attitude measures will be attempted as part of the testing of hypotheses (in the chapters immediately following) where the purely quantitative elements used here will be supplemented by the 'qualifying' qualitative input of the surveys.

TITLE

European Regional Elite Behaviour: A Comparative Study of
Political and Business Elites in the Strathclyde Region
of Scotland and Nomos Chanion in Crete

VOLUME I: Main Text Chapters 1-5

VOLUME II: Main Text Chapters 6-8
& Appendices

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Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of Glasgow

Department of Politics

December 1996

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Thesis
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VOLUME II

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Chapter 6

Differences Between Political and Business Elites

A. Introduction to the Analysis

In this chapter I compare patterns of reply by using two and three dimensional cross-tabulations in parts B and D of this chapter. Respondents qualifications to their replies (the qualitative element) are analysed in parts C and E. This approach should provide a degree of data triangulation as it satisfies the need to have multiple methods of measurement and to create multiple measures of concepts. Questions used on the quantitative element are those designed to investigate the particular hypotheses in question, while the qualifications and elaborations on the replies to these same questions provide the qualitative element.

The measures used in this chapter inquire whether business and political elites have different attitudes and also whether differences in those attitudes can be considered

relevant to their region of origin. It is also the case that the tests conducted do not aim at universal explanations as inferences made in this chapter apply primarily to the samples examined.

B. Difference in Attitudes between Elites:

Analysis of Patterns in Relevant Questions

In an effort to reveal potential 'covert' interlockingness among elite groups and in order to be able to clearly distinguish each sub-group, I initially examine whether:

H I. Business and political elites' attitudes differ depending on their region of origin.

The independent variable is the elites' region of origin whose influence on elite attitudes (the dependent variable), I am attempting to measure with this hypothesis. I have chosen to focus on elite attitudes on Europe in the examination of this hypothesis as it is a theme of high significance for both regions and elite groups.

An examination of elite grievances towards their national government (Measure A) and aspirations to autonomy (Measure B), as computed in chapter five, will be employed to examine whether the pattern of elite replies on European issues is

reflected in their replies on these indexes as well. It is presumed that from available attitudinal measures these indexes can act as intervening variables on the attitudes of elites regarding Europe. Determining the possible effect of these two attitudinal measures on the relationship I attempt to investigate will improve causality. I employ working hypothesis one and two (WH1, WH2) to test this hypothesis.

To investigate the degree of divergence between business and political elite attitudes, I compare the pattern of their replies, testing whether:


WH1: Businessmen have a different perception of the challenges of Europe than politicians.

Issues specific to European and regional integration, that are investigated by the questionnaire, have been crosstabulated and the variance analysis of elite replies compared. The replies of the business and political elites within each region are analysed to examine variations in their attitudes.

In all questions constructed to investigate this working hypothesis there was supporting evidence for its validity. I will proceed with an analysis of those questions most characteristic of the general attitude patterns as they relate to their perspectives towards Europe.

Support for the premise is offered in question QD5 (is the British/Greek economy ready for the competition of 1992). In this question the two political and the two business elites answer in a similar manner, suggesting a similarity between elites of the same occupational position that transcends regional disparities. In particular, both political elites show a symmetrical distribution of replies centred on the 'slightly not prepared' option. The business elites were more pessimistic, with 48% of the Greek sample believing their economy is 'not prepared at all'.²⁴³

Graph no 6.1: Distribution of replies of business elite respondents to question QD6.




Note:
Question
QD6: Do you
believe that
the
Scottish/Cre
tan economy
is ready for
the 1992
competition
challenge?

²⁴³ . In certain of the questions investigated it is natural to find divergence of replies between the two regional elites, as the regional circumstances are not the same. I expected thus to find greater divergence in their replies stemming from this cause than what I eventually witnessed.

On their respective regional economy's prospects towards 1992 (QD6) the apparent similarity is between the two business elites, that interestingly, have an even distribution of their replies around the 'slightly not prepared' option (Graph 6.1). Political elites differ, with the Cretans being rather more optimistic: 43% believed their region is 'prepared' or 'well prepared', compared with equivalent figures in Scotland of only 13% (Graph 6.2).²⁴⁴

Graph no 6.2: Distribution of political elite responses to question QD6.



Note: Question QD6: Do you believe that the Scottish/Cretan economy is ready for the 1992 competition challenge?

²⁴⁴ The Spearman Correlation Co-efficient for questions QD5 and QD6 was high for all elite groups investigated. It displayed a value of 0.817 (sig. .000) for the Strathclyde politicians, a value of 0.907 (sig. .000) for the Strathclyde businessmen, a value of 0.752 (sig. .002) for the Cretan politicians and a value of 0.631 (sig. .002) for the Cretan businessmen. As is apparent, the Strathclyde elite groups have a higher correlation co-efficient than the Cretan elite groups. This is not, necessarily, a show of higher concordance among the Strathclyde elites. It is rather a show of higher consistency in their replies to questions relating their respective regional with the national economy.

In regard to perceptions over whether there are more opportunities or risks in a united Europe (QD13), political elites took a generally positive view with a rather even distribution in their replies. The business elites, however, differed not only from their political counterparts but also between the two countries.²⁴⁵ The Cretan business elite is much more optimistic than any other group, 62% of them believing there would be 'many more opportunities in a united Europe'. The Strathclyde business elite on the other hand was more cautious with 46% believing that there would only be 'slightly more opportunities'.

Growth patterns in the two regions may contribute to the reasons for these differences. Cretan businessmen, although believing their economy to be disadvantaged and peripheral within the European Community, anticipate growth both as a factor of Community support and as a long-term expectation

²⁴⁵ . Spearman correlation coefficients between question QD13 and questions QD5 and QD6 show comparatively low levels of correlation and no significance. Remarkable is the value of 0.330 (sig. .211) for the correlation of QD13 with QD6 of the Strathclyde politicians; the value of 0.257 (sig. .375) between questions QD13 and QD5 for Cretan politicians; and the value of 0.236 (sig. .304) between questions QD13 and QD5 for Cretan businessmen. Apparently there are limited inferences that can be made from the existence of these correlation values, further than suggest that Cretan elites exhibit a degree of correlation between their view towards opportunities in Europe and their view of their national economy, while Strathclyde politicians exhibit a limited degree of correlation between their view of opportunities in Europe with their view on their regional economy. Strathclyde businessmen show no correlation between their view on opportunities in Europe and the regional or national economy.

of convergence with Community standards of living.²⁴⁶

Strathclyde businessmen on the other hand do not necessarily have similarly high expectations of growth and at times seemed quite uneasy about the duration and effects of the current recession.²⁴⁷

All three questions analysed above show a distinct difference in the pattern of replies between business and political elite groups, while there is some similarity between elite groups of the same occupational category in the two regions examined. There would thus appear to be support for the premise that for the elite samples surveyed, businessmen have a different perception of the challenges of Europe than politicians in both regions.

The question then arises whether elite groups of the same occupational position have similar perspectives. I inquire on the validity of the working hypothesis that:

WH2: The occupational position of elites influences their perspective.

²⁴⁶ . For a thorough analysis of the economic conditions in Strathclyde and Crete refer to chapter three. The regional economy of Crete is analysed in Mavromatis (1989) and the problems of Greek regional development in the fourth periodic report of the European Commission on the Regions of the Community (1991b).

²⁴⁷ . Business confidence of Strathclyde and Scottish Businessmen is regularly surveyed by Eurobarometer.

I test for this hypothesis by examining elite replies to questions that were asked to the business and political elites on their views on SMEs and MNLs.

In a question particular to the business elites, inquiring whether respondents foresee the development of more SMEs (QB3), there is evidence of a great similarity between the replies of the two groups. It is 60% of the Greek sample and 79% of the Strathclyde one who foresee more SMEs in their region. Replying to whether they believe such a development will be positive for each respondents' firm (QB4), both groups see this as a probable development.²⁴⁸


There are two questions designed to test the attitudes of political elites in comparison with their business elite counterparts. The first question is on respondents' confidence in SMEs (QC5), in which the two national groups had an almost identical pattern of replies.

The question on confidence in multinational enterprises [QC7] shows great divergence in replies (Graph 6.3), since half of Cretan politicians believed multinationals would stay in their region in the case of a recession, while 63%

²⁴⁸ . Spearman correlation coefficients between questions QB3 and QB4 for the Cretan businessmen is -0.152 (sig. .546), while for the Strathclyde Businessmen it is 0.429 (sig. .098). Strathclyde businessmen correlate the creation of more SMEs with a positive business climate. Cretan businessmen perceive more SMEs as a direct competition to themselves. This divergence is analysed in part C of chapter seven.

of Scottish politicians believed multinationals would go.²⁴⁹ This similarity of opinion on SMEs and divergence of opinion on multinationals presumably stems from different experiences of development in the two regions. The Scottish have seen major conglomerates come and go, while the Cretan peoples' experience with multinationals is comparatively recent and limited to small or medium scale projects. This divergence of opinion on the particular issue I believe to be relevant to their respective experience of industrialisation and does not necessarily disprove the hypothesis.

GRAPH 6.3: Patterns of reply by political elites to question QC7.



Note: Question QC7: In the case of a recession do you believe multinational business are more likely to maintain operations in your region or shift to another region?

²⁴⁹ . Spearman correlation coefficients between questions QC5 and QC7 have values of 0.571 (sig. .021) for the Strathclyde politicians and 0.453 (sig. .104) for the Cretan politicians. Both elite groups high correlations and diverging distribution patterns signify a similarity in perspective towards SMEs and MNLs within each group but obviously not between groups.

Overall, evidence presented in the previous working hypothesis testing (WH1) and those analysed here lead me to conditionally accept the premise of WH2. Elite groups seem to hold different positions on issues this questionnaire raises, while these differences can to a degree be attributed to membership of their respective elite group.

Conclusive proof for this working hypothesis can only be provided by the examination of the qualitative element in respondents replies, which follows in part C.

The evidence so far, support the premise that business and political elites attitudes differ depending on elites region of origin (H I). As with the validity of working hypotheses, however, ultimate proof will lie with the qualitative analysis.

C. Differences in Attitudes between Elites:

Inferences from Qualitative Replies ²⁵⁰

To correctly interpret the attitudes of interviewees, qualifications they gave to replies in the questionnaire are deemed essential. As is explained in appendix I,

²⁵⁰ . Quotations of respondents replies are used without the application of omission points before the quotation marks. Respondents replies are used both from their verbatim answers to the structured part of the questionnaire as well as from their discussion of issues raised.

respondents were encouraged to elaborate on their replies to the structured part of the questionnaire. These replies are juxtaposed while the most characteristic, in defining a prevailing attitude, are given verbatim.²⁵¹

From analysing the quantifiable replies I have thus far accepted the premise that, businessmen have a different perception of the challenges of Europe than politicians (WH1). From a thorough analysis of qualitative replies I can also detect a difference between the preoccupations of the business and political elites that relates to their perception of opportunities and risks in a united Europe.

Businessmen were primarily preoccupied with foreign competition and government support levels or government interference. Politicians, on the other hand, believed their constituents not to be interested in European affairs, while Scottish politicians did not think the European Market to be particularly beneficial for the British economy.

I proceed with an assessment of the qualitative replies of interviewees to questions QD5, QD6 and QD13. My inclusion or exclusion of responses is in accord with the prevailing

²⁵¹ . The questionnaire in this respect operated both as a structured and as an open-ended instrument of investigation. For a thorough analysis of the theoretical consideration involved one should look at the methodological analysis of Moyser and Wagstaffe (1987) or Miles and Huberman (1994).

mood in each elite group, while an effort has been made to include replies responding to the most characteristic attitudes.

In Strathclyde, businessmen expressed fear on the "role of Germany"²⁵², while also expressing concern that the "French might come across"²⁵³, or that the national economy is "not as well prepared as the French and German"²⁵⁴. Another major concern was the role of the political establishment. Some businessmen believed there are great opportunities in a united Europe "as long as the politicians will let things happen"²⁵⁵, while they see their shortcomings in that "links [of business] with government are not as strong in this country as is on the mainland (i.e. Europe)"²⁵⁶.

The divergence in the preoccupations and therefore perspective of the two groups becomes apparent from the most vociferous replies that range from the most negative "I have never thought the Common Market was any good for the British economy"²⁵⁷, to more specific remarks on the economy as being "particularly poorly prepared in the training and education of the labour market"²⁵⁸, it becomes apparent that

252 Case 18. Company director. Date of interview:9/11/1991
253 Case 31. Company director. Date of interview:30/5/1991
254 Case 26. Company chairman. Date of Interview:5/6/1991
255 Case 23. General manager. Date of Interview:14/6/1991
256 Case 19. Company director. Date of Interview:25/6/1991
257 Case 14. MEP. Date of Interview:17/10/1991
258 Case 9. Activist. Date of Interview:15/10/1991

the politicians surveyed believe at best that the local economy is ready "only in those areas where we are traditionally strong"²⁵⁹.

As for their perspective on the influence of European affairs on their constituents, some believe that "they don't pay any attention to Europe"²⁶⁰, while others believe that people are optimistic on Europe because they "don't realise what the impact [of European integration] will be"²⁶¹. A revealing comment that, to some extent, clarifies the perspective of some politicians is that "some of the pressures for change are not related to the area, they are generated at an international level"²⁶². Scottish politicians seem to perceive a pressure of integration that comes from international business expediency, while overall being rather hesitant about the benefits of a united Europe.

Evidence from the qualifications of replies for Strathclyde elites, analysed here, is thus in support of the conclusion reached in the primary analysis, accepting the working hypothesis that businessmen have a different perception of the challenges of Europe than politicians (WH1).

259. Case 12. City Councillor. Date of Interview:8/11/1991
260. Case 13. MP. Date of Interview:12/7/1991
261. Case 10. Regional Councillor. Date of Interview:28/10/1991
262. Case 8. MEP. Date of Interview:14/10/1991

In the case of the Cretan elites, the two elite groups seem again to have diverging perspectives, with the political elites mainly concerned about cultural influences of greater integration, while businessmen were mainly preoccupied with the inefficiency of the political elites and the level of 'education' of other businessmen.

The most frequently recurring theme in politicians fears about European integration was the "risk in the alterations to our social structures and character"²⁶³, which was at times defined as an "alteration to our national identity"²⁶⁴ or into claiming that "our cultural traditions are in danger"²⁶⁵. In another recurring theme, they seemed to identify political benefits with European integration. They saw "opportunities in the national level"²⁶⁶ referring to the Greek-Turkish disputes²⁶⁷.

The Business elites in Crete believe in the strengths of the regional and national economy if "we can find someone to organise us"²⁶⁸, while European union will bring an

263 . Case 70. President of local community. Date of Interview:20/9/1991

264 . Case 65. President of local community. Date of Interview:26/9/1991

265 . Case 72. City councillor. Date of Interview:19/9/1991

266 . Case 66. President of local community. Date of Interview:25/9/1991

267 . Turkish aggression is perceived as the major foreign threat to Greece. Particularly in islands like Crete with comparatively recent independence (1897) from Turkey and a long string of revolts these issues are exceptionally relevant. For a balanced historical account of the Greek and Turkish dispute see Clogg (1983).

268 . Case 47. Business manager. Date of Interview:23/9/1991

"improvement on democratic institutions"²⁶⁹. Their main call was for "an organised [business] environment"²⁷⁰, while they believed that "the Greek economy is undisciplined"²⁷¹, partly because "economic development on the way it is implemented is bad for us"²⁷². The uneasiness with the work of politicians was mainly directed at national political elites and not regional ones as can be inferred from their calls for increased local decision making powers.

A theme recurring in both elite groups was their trust in Greek human resources. Businessmen declared that "based on Greeks' ability"²⁷³ they are optimistic, or that "a last minute miracle [can be] expected from Greeks"²⁷⁴. In the words of one political interviewee "I trust Greeks, the dangers[from integration] will be surpassed"²⁷⁵. I speculate that their belief goes beyond a *deus ex machina* trust in destiny, and it should be taken here to signify a homogeneity of attitudes in the Greek elites on what are considered issues of paramount importance.²⁷⁶

269. Case 43. Managing director. Date of interview:25/9/1991

270. Case 48. Managing director. Date of interview:20/9/1991

271. Case 55. Business manager. Date of interview:18/9/1991

272. Case 45. General manager. Date of interview:24/9/91

273. Case 48. Managing director. Date of interview:20/9/1991

274. Case 52. Managing director. Date of interview:17/9/1991

275. Case 67. City councillor. Date of interview:26/9/1991

276. Another recurring theme related to their support of European integration is based on 'internationalist' considerations. As an ageing mayor of a village burned to the ground by the Nazis during W.W.II said "I believe in a united Europe. The only road to peace, development and democracy is the co-operation of peoples with their own will"(case 69, date of interview:20/9/1991). Or in the words of a businessman "we must have political union, an economic union is not enough"(case 43, date of

Evidence presented here suggests that support for the working hypothesis WH1 (differences in perceptions of the challenges of Europe between business and political elites) is present for the Cretan elites as well. Therefore the conclusions reached from the first level of analysis can be upheld. It is also the case, however, that there seems to be a greater preoccupation over issues of 'national importance' or 'ideological' considerations for the Cretan elites (where we can observe a convergence of attitudes), this not being apparent in the evidence from the Strathclyde elite samples.

In all elite groups there seem to be some common themes recurring in the replies from both regions. Both political elites seemed mainly preoccupied with threats from integration, while both business elites were concerned with the performance of the political elites.

Next I examine the qualitative responses relating to the next working hypothesis of whether the occupational position of an elite influences the perspective of its members (WH2).

As previously, this entails an analysis of respondents' qualifications, starting with the business elite and their

interview: 25/9/1991). It is interesting that support for European integration seems to be based on 'ideological' considerations.

replies to questions inquiring whether they foresee the development of more SMEs (QB3) and whether this will be positive for the respondents' firm (QB4).

The qualifications to these questions reverse to a great extent the 'spirit' of the replies as they were recorded in the quantitative part of the questionnaire and analysed in section B of this chapter. An impressive 79% of Scottish respondents foresee more SMEs while at the same time they qualify this by saying "a lot don't survive"²⁷⁷ or that they have "doubts"²⁷⁸ whether this development will materialise "at the moment"²⁷⁹. Similarly Greek respondents believe there will be more SMEs and at the same time find that "contraction of SMEs [leads them] to extinction"²⁸⁰ or that "the market is saturated [of SMEs]"²⁸¹ and "it will be better if they don't [develop]"²⁸². It has been the case that the Greek business sample has the plight of the SMEs more at heart as most of them work for or own SMEs. More SMEs could thus be seen as a scenario that will have more adverse effects for the Greek business elite as it will mean more competition, while Scottish businessmen see it as a

277. Case 23. General manager. Date of interview:14/6/1991

278. Case 36. Managing director. Date of interview:22/5/1991

279. Case 37. Senior manager. Date of interview:22/5/1991

280. Case 43. Managing director. Date of interview:25/9/1991

281. Case 50. Business proprietor. Date of interview:19/9/1991

282. Case 51. Business proprietor. Date of interview:16/9/1991

possible improvement in services or increase in their client base (as most represent larger concerns).²⁸³

Importantly for the purpose of testing the working hypothesis, it is the case that although business elites seem to negate their quantitative replies they do so in unison. The reply pattern in their qualitative replies is thus in support of the basic premise of this working hypothesis as the two business elites maintain a similar perspective on SMEs' development.

I do not believe that this divergence in their response pattern, between their qualitative and quantitative replies, reveals any great contradiction in their attitudes. A deficiency of the interview wording is possibly responsible. Although I find more likely the possibility that their evaluation of what will happen, sometimes contrasts to what they would wish would happen. It is possible that for some more SMEs will be detrimental to their perceived business interests although they could see more developing.

²⁸³ . It is the case that 99.4% of Greek establishments/enterprises belonged to the Micro/Small category in 1984, while 98.74% of UK enterprises belonged in the same category in 1986 (Commission 1990). The bias in favour of SMEs related respondents in the Greek sample and Medium/Large enterprises for the Scottish sample is comprehensively explained in chapter four where data on the profile of the companies of participating elites are considered.

Replies to question QB4 can partly explain the contradiction that seems to exist between the quantitative and qualitative replies of the responses in QB3. This is particularly so, if one considers that Scottish businessmen represent mainly medium to large corporations, while Greek businessmen small and medium ones.²⁸⁴

It seems thus, that the development of more SMEs will be beneficial for the Scots (QB4) although with certain qualifications. "There will be on balance more competition for employees"²⁸⁵ claimed one, while another believed it would "increase the potential customer base" of his firm²⁸⁶. The Cretan businessmen had a similar positive view claiming that more SMEs "will support production [at a higher level]"²⁸⁷ while it would also assist their firm by facilitating "the creation of entrepreneurial co-operatives"²⁸⁸.

Qualitative replies in QB3 and QB4 make a re-evaluation of primary conclusions imperative. This is particularly the

²⁸⁴ . For an analysis of the size of business elite groups represented in this sample refer to chapter four.

²⁸⁵ . Case 29. Company director. Date of interview:4/6/1991

²⁸⁶ . Case 31. Company director. Date of interview:30/5/1991

²⁸⁷ . Case 48. Managing director. Date of interview:20/9/1991

²⁸⁸ . Case 50. Business proprietor. Date of interview:19/9/1991

Entrepreneurial co-operatives were instigated in Chania, bringing together capital from mainly small-business owners to fund large scale projects such as an aquatic theme park, a private hospital etc. Further details can be found in the Greek business press of which the journal *Agora* run a series of articles on the Chania entrepreneurial co-operative in 1991.

case for Cretan businessmen who have answered that they anticipate more SMEs in their region (QB3) but in their qualifications were pessimistic of the future of SMEs.

Next I examine the replies of the political elites to the questions relating to the future of SMEs and multinational enterprises in their region (QC5, QC7).

The qualitative replies of both elite groups on both questions investigated are similar, although certain deviations are apparent. Considerations of the elite groups are corresponding to the same preoccupations. Small and medium enterprises are seen as having a limited mobility and restricted scope of action, while multinational enterprises are seen as mobile and self serving.

Cretan politicians expressed support for SMEs since "they satisfy local needs"²⁸⁹ while at the same time having limited mobility since "they can not transcend Crete"²⁹⁰. Strathclyde politicians replied in a similar vein stating that "it is in the nature of small business [to be tied to the region]"²⁹¹ while further suggesting SMEs "depend on [the] people who live here"²⁹².

²⁸⁹ . Case 68. City Councillor. Date of interview: 9/10/1991.

²⁹⁰ . Case 74. Mayor. Date of interview: 21/9/1991.

²⁹¹ . Case 8. MEP. Date of interview: 14/10/1991.

²⁹² . Case 5. Regional Councillor. Date of interview: 1/7/1991.

Regarding their views on MNL mobility (QC7), Cretan politicians stated that MNLs will go "wherever their interests take them"²⁹³ but also that "they have the ability to increase [local] productivity"²⁹⁴. Strathclyde politicians stated that MNLs will "close down in the periphery [and] go to cheap labour-cost regions"²⁹⁵ while expressing concern in that there are "no constraints in them doing so"²⁹⁶.

This pattern of replies contrasts with their quantitative replies which showed the two groups significantly diverging in their answers on multinationals (QC7). The evidence here suggests that both elite groups, in spite of different experiences of industrialisation, distrust MNLs operating in their region.

The working hypothesis that 'the occupational position of elites influences their perspective' is upheld in the qualitative analysis. Their qualitative replies, at times alter the perspective portrayed in the quantitative analysis, as both business and political elites are diverging from their initial reply patterns. This new 'picture' however does not deduct support from the working hypothesis (WH2).

²⁹³ . Case 75. City Councillor. Date of interview: 26/9/1991.

²⁹⁴ . Case 68. City Councillor. Date of interview: 9/10/1991.

²⁹⁵ . Case 5. Regional Councillor. Date of interview: 1/7/1991.

²⁹⁶ . Case 9. Activist. Date of interview: 15/10/1991.

It appears thus that business and political elites are different and that this difference stems from their respective elite roles and perspectives. The business elites in the two regions had a positive view of SMEs based on considerations of competition and the introduction of new products and services. The political elites viewed SMEs bound by their limited mobility and justifying their existence by satisfying basic local needs.

To examine the validity of hypothesis **H I** it would be desirable to consider possible antecedent and background variables such as party affiliation, level of representation for elected officials and age of respondents. As explained in chapter two however, the small sample size does not permit further fragmentation for statistical analysis. Consideration will be given nevertheless to the influence of the possible intervening variables of regional grievances towards their national government (Measure A) and aspirations of the local elite to autonomy (Measure B).

The difference between the political and business elites in Strathclyde is apparent in the values of Measures A and B (table 6.1). Strathclyde politicians register the highest grievance towards their national government (Measure A) and highest positive attitude towards regional autonomy (Measure B); while Strathclyde businessmen register the second lowest

grievance towards their national government and the only negative attitude towards regional autonomy.

Cretan politicians registered the lowest grievance towards their national government (Measure A, table 6.1), while Cretan businessmen the second higher. Cretan politicians recorded a neutral attitude towards regional autonomy (Measure B), while businessmen a very positive one.

Table 6.1: Ordinal ranking of Measure A (grievance towards their national government) and B (positive attitude towards regional autonomy)

ELITE IDENTIFICATION	MEASURE A	MEASURE B	ORDINAL RANK	
			MEASURE A	MEASURE B
Strathclyde Politicians	39.1	35.4	4	4
Strathclyde Businessmen	-11.4	-19.7	2	1
Cretan Politicians	-17.9	8.3	1	2
Cretan Businessmen	-3.6	28.6	3	3

Note: Measures A and B as computed in chapter five part F.

It is evident that the elite groups show distinctly different perspectives in these indexes for both regions investigated. It is very likely that, the attitudes recorded in these indexes (Measures A and B), have an effect on their attitudes on Europe, examined in working hypothesis one (WH1). It is also possible that their attitudes on SMEs and MNLs, examined in working hypothesis two (WH2), are related to their views on autonomy (Measure B).

It is not apparent however, whether it is exclusively this difference in the attitudes indexed (in Measures A and B) that causes the difference in their recorded attitudes on Europe, SMEs or MNLs. It is further impossible to determine the degree of influence of those measures on their perceptions with available statistics.

I can neither, of course, suggest that these are the only intervening or antecedent variables affecting elite attitudes on Europe.²⁹⁷ The inclusion here of Measures A and B is deemed expedient as the most relevant of the available measures.

In conclusion, the analysis of the first working hypothesis (WH1) suggests that businessmen and politicians in each region hold different positions on the attitudes surveyed. This effectively identifies the political and business elite groups as separate. On the second working hypothesis (WH2) the attitudes across regions are compared for the political and business elites separately. The resulting comparisons suggest that the occupational position of each elite group influences their perspectives. Put differently, the elite role they have, in business or politics, appears to affect the attitude they exhibit.

²⁹⁷ . The possible intervening variable of 'regional development level' is examined in hypothesis H II.

These comparisons support the premise that the business and political elites attitudes in this sample differ depending on their region of origin (H I). It becomes apparent that the elite groups are distinct 'within' each region²⁹⁸ and also that there are identifiable 'between' region differences of elites of the same occupational category.²⁹⁹ By establishing a degree of 'within' and 'between' region difference the four elite groups can be considered as four separate sub-samples in their attitudinal characteristics.

D. Development Level and Regional Differences:

Analysis of Patterns in Relevant Questions

The variable of 'regional development level' that could be considered as an intervening factor in hypothesis H I, becomes the focus of the analysis in the following hypothesis:

H II. The degree of accord between sub-national elite attitudes is related to a regions' development level.

The elites' region of origin (as the independent variable), has an effect on the attitudes of the elite groups in each

²⁹⁸ . Effectively suggesting limited 'covert' interlockingness between the elite groups.

²⁹⁹ . Remarkably, the 'within' region differences appear greater than the 'between' regions differences.

region investigated(as the dependent variable). The effective control for this hypothesis is the different development level of the two regions investigated.

The two working hypotheses employed (WH3 and WH4) attempt to . investigate whether the differences in the socio-economic background of the two regions can be linked with their attitudes on certain issues. I stress again the exploratory character of this investigation as there exists a distinct possibility of multiple causation for the phenomena examined, while the type of relationship for these issues, allow mainly the use of inferential logic.

I first inquire whether:

WH3: Attitudes of regional elites can be identified as being different between a more and a less developed region.

This working hypothesis attempts to define and separate the attitudes of elite groups in each region, in relation to each regions' level of economic development. The tests for this working hypothesis will consist of an examination of the differences in key attitudinal areas between the two regions investigated.

Concerning attitudes towards autonomy the two groups seem to hold different perspectives. In particular the Scottish

elite groups (more developed region) have considerably different attitudes between the political elites, 59% of them believing 'autonomy in their region would be perceived positively by business' (QD1), compared with the business elites, 64% of which took the view that business would perceive autonomy negatively. For the same question the Greek elite groups (less developed region) had very similar reply patterns 86% of the business and 67% of the political samples believing autonomy will be perceived negatively by business.³⁰⁰ The difference in the replies between the Scottish and Cretan Elites gives some support to the contention that there is a difference in the perspective elites from different regions have towards a similar concept.

The next two questions I contrast for the two national groups are those inquiring whether 'the economic future of their region lies in local or out of region capital and entrepreneurial skill' (QD2,QD3).

In these two questions the differences between the two regional elite groups is not so pronounced. The Scottish business elite seems most uncertain about the sources of

³⁰⁰ . In Measure B of chapter five F (positive attitudes towards regional autonomy) there is a 20.3 index points difference between the Cretan elites and a 55.1 index points difference between the Strathclyde elites. These differences are supporting the contention of higher concordance amongst the Cretan elites, which is examined in more detail in part D of chapter 7.

capital for development with 71% not knowing if it will be local or out of region.³⁰¹ Cretan elite groups, on the other hand, agree that on balance it will be indigenous resources that will provide growth. Analysing replies to the question on the importance of indigenous or foreign entrepreneurial skill, the pattern of replies is shown to be similar in all elite groups. This was expressed as a high level of confidence in local entrepreneurial skill except for Cretan businessmen 47% of whom showed a reluctance to identify local entrepreneurs as most important for future growth.³⁰² In both these questions evidence exists, albeit weak, that attitudes amongst the elite groups in each region differ.

In the question inquiring whether they felt 'their region to be in a worse position than the nation in regard to 1992' (QD7) there is a consistent difference between the two regional groups. Scottish replies to the question are centred around the 'same' option, signifying they believe their region to be in overall the same position with the rest of the UK. Cretan replies to the question centre around the 'slightly better-off' option, signifying an

³⁰¹ . Spearman correlation coefficients for questions QD2 and QD3 take a value of 0.285 (sig. .178) for Strathclyde businessmen and 0.116 (sig. .669) for Strathclyde politicians. This indicates a low consistency in the reply upturn between the two questions.

³⁰² . Spearman correlation coefficients for questions QD2 and QD3 take a value of 0.234 (sig. .335) for Cretan businessmen and 0.519 (sig. .057) for Cretan politicians. This indicates a high relevant consistency, between their replies to the two questions, for Cretan politicians.

optimism among the elite groups comparing their chances with those of the rest of Greece. Evidently groups from the two regions have replied in a manner that is distinctly different.

Replying to the question investigating whether the two national elite groups perceive their respective nations' regional policies to have 'failed creating adequate opportunities in their region' (QD8) replies show distinctly diverging patterns. Eighty-eight percent of Scottish politicians agree with the premise, while 54% of Scottish businessmen disagree with it. Fifty-seven percent of Cretan politicians and 62% of Cretan businessmen agree with the premise. Differences among the two national groups are distinctly pronounced here.³⁰³

In questions investigating elites perception of 'differences among peoples in their locality and peoples in the rest of their region' or 'the rest of the nation' (QD9, QD10) I can discern only small differences in the pattern of replies among elite groups. Perceived differences between people in

³⁰³ . Spearman correlation coefficients for questions QD7 and QD8 in order of their ordinal rank value for Measure A (grievance towards their national government) are as follows: 4. Strathclyde politicians -0.170 (sig. .528); 3. Cretan businessmen -0.120 (sig. .605); 2. Strathclyde businessmen 0.321 (sig. .145); 1. Cretan politicians 0.270 (sig. .350). It is apparent that those elite groups with the highest grievance towards their national government (high ordinal rank) also demonstrated a negative correlation in their replies to the two questions. This signifies a relationship between a high grievance level (Measure A) and a discordance between their attitudes on QD7 and QD8.

their locality and those in the rest of Scotland or Crete exist but views are evenly balanced on their significance. When the question becomes one of specifying whether there are differences between people in the region and people in the rest of Greece or UK, all four elite groups in both regions answered in a similar manner, namely stating that great differences do exist.³⁰⁴ This points to a similarity of the two groups in perceptions of national identity. In view of this similarity the premise cannot be supported in reference to these two questions.

In replies to the question inquiring whether there are 'more opportunities or risks in a united Europe' (QD13), a comparatively clear distinction emerges between the two regional elites. Cretans appear to be more optimistic, since 43% of the political and 62% of the business elite support the 'many more opportunities' option; by comparison 35% of the political and 17% of the business elites in Strathclyde were as optimistic.³⁰⁵

304. Spearman correlation coefficients between QD9 and QD10 are: 1. 0.493 (sig. .023) for Cretan businessmen, 2. 0.557 (sig. .039) for Cretan politicians, 3. 0.405 (sig. .050) for Strathclyde businessmen and 4. 0.228 (sig. .379) for Strathclyde politicians.

305. As mentioned in chapters three and four, Cretan elites may be more optimistic than Strathclyde ones for reasons that are relevant to their culture, elite idiosyncrasy or particular economic circumstances. Even if that was the case and a control for these factors would have shown the differences in the two elites responses to be insignificant, these restrictions are considered irrelevant, since at this stage I only try to analyse attitudes at a particular moment in time. Taking account of these restrictions however, results should not be interpreted to infer universal proof for the premise.

In their replies elite groups do not show any dominant patterns. It is the case, however, that for most questions analysed there are differences between the Cretan and the Strathclyde elite. The working hypothesis is accepted thus, that the sample of elite groups examined, from Crete and Strathclyde, has shown consistently different attitudes on a number of regional issues (WH3).

It might also be interesting to note that in general, the Cretan elites seemed more optimistic on their regions' prospects in Europe, while being negative on the possibility of autonomy. The Strathclyde elites seemed to be more exasperated with their national administration, while both groups took a similarly strong perspective on their regions' difference from their respective national units.

The question then arises whether it can be assumed that the Strathclyde business and political elites understand and share each others goals more closely than the Cretan elites. This question is investigated by testing for the working hypothesis of whether:

WH4: The more developed the regional economy, the stronger the concordance of attitudes between elite groups in a region.

In this working hypothesis the degree of development (independent variable) is presumed to influence elite perceptions towards issues of regional importance (dependent variable). These attitudes should in turn be more concordant, the more developed the regional economy.

I will examine the same data that was examined in the previous working hypothesis (WH3). This consists of a number of questions that all four elite groups have answered. A comparison of the distribution of replies, between elite groups in a region, to establish the 'goodness of fit' in the pattern of their replies, is attempted. Strathclyde elites are expected, according to the working hypothesis, to be more consistently similar in their replies than Cretan elites.

Table 6.2 compares the means of the elite group replies for each question separately. In this table the absolute difference between the means of the two Scottish and the two Cretan groups, is calculated as a measure of comparison. Because, however, the distribution patterns depend on the standard deviation this 'mean difference' cannot be considered an exact measure of attitude concordance, as the standard deviation of a mean indicates the 'spread' of opinion for each question within each group.

For the question inquiring whether 'autonomy would be perceived positively by business' (QD1) evidence from the distribution of replies suggests there is a stronger concordance of attitudes among the Cretan than the Strathclyde business and political elites. This distribution of replies suggests, that the working hypothesis as it has been stated is not valid.

In questions inquiring whether 'local or out of region resources and skill' (QD2,QD3) are most important for the region's development, the evidence is inconclusive. In the question of resources there is more concordance between replies of businessmen and politicians in Crete than in Strathclyde. In the question of entrepreneurial skill there appears to be similar concordance in the replies of both the Strathclyde and the Cretan elites. So, from their replies on the source of human and financial resources for development, it is not possible to draw any inferences on the validity of the premise (WH4).

Next I examine replies to questions inquiring whether their 'region is in a worse position than the nation in regard to 1992' (QD7) and whether 'national policies for the region have failed compared with the rest of the nation' (QD8). In both questions the Cretan elites seem to be more in accord than the Strathclyde ones. This constitutes evidence against the hypothesis as stated above.

Table 6.2: Absolute difference in mean values for the replies of elite groups. Standard deviation values in parentheses.

	A SCOT. POL.	B SCOT. BUS.	SCOTTISH MEAN/DIFF A-B	C CRET. POL.	D CRET. BUS.	CRETAN MEAN/DIFF C-D
QD1	1.83 (1.015)	2.32 (0.946)	0.49	2.79 (0.579)	2.38 (0.921)	0.41
QD2	2.00 (0.791)	1.88 (0.537)	0.12	1.57 (0.646)	1.57 (0.676)	0.00
QD3	1.38 (0.619)	1.63 (0.770)	0.25	1.43 (0.756)	1.47 (0.513)	0.04
QD7	2.94 (1.063)	3.00 (0.817)	0.06	3.83 (0.618)	3.71 (0.644)	0.12
QD8	1.24 (0.664)	2.13 (0.992)	0.89	1.86 (1.027)	1.71 (0.956)	0.15
QD9	1.88 (0.993)	2.13 (0.992)	0.25	2.29 (0.995)	1.90 (0.995)	0.39
QD10	1.41 (0.795)	1.33 (0.761)	0.08	1.71 (0.995)	1.57 (0.926)	0.14
QD13	3.71 (1.312)	3.58 (1.018)	0.13	4.07 (0.997)	4.33 (0.996)	0.26

Note: An absolute mean difference value closer to zero denotes a higher concordance. Attention should be given to the value of the standard deviation for each mean figure in interpretation of the mean difference.³⁰⁶

For the questions inquiring whether respondents 'perceive great differences between local people and people in the rest of their region' and 'the rest of the nation'

(QD9,QD10) both national samples have shown very similar

³⁰⁶ . The data analysed are either ordinal in a scale from 1 to 5 (QD7,QD8,QD13) or dichotomous transformed to a scale from 1 to 3 (QD1,QD2,QD3,QD9,QD10). Ninety five percent of the cases will lie within two standard deviations, if the assumption is made that the distribution of replies is normal.

replies and comparatively strong concordance. This appears to be more the case for the Strathclyde elite. This is the first set of questions for which there is support for the premise, although weak.

Replying to the question of whether they believe there are more opportunities or risks in a united Europe (QD13), there is some evidence that the Scottish elite replies are more discordant between politicians and businessmen than is the case for the Cretan sample, which comes again as evidence against the working hypothesis as stated.

In an overall assessment of the questions analysed to test this working hypothesis it becomes evident that support for the premise is in the best of cases weak. It can be argued that not only the hypothesis can not be supported but that the evidence suggests an alternative rival hypothesis to be true. It appears thus that:

AWH4: A stronger concordance of attitudes between local elite groups exists, the less developed a region is.

Since this analysis is exploratory it is not meaningful to attempt a causal explanation of the reasons the working hypothesis had to be rejected, similarly a test of the alternative rival working hypothesis seems superfluous. A brief description of probable explanations for the

relationships observed, is provided in the qualitative element of the analysis, immediately following.

E. Development Level and Regional Differences:

Inferences from Qualitative Replies

The two working hypotheses analysed in the previous section (WH3, WH4) are attempting an investigation of issues for which I can not provide conclusive proof. Qualitative replies thus become essential, to a more insightful exploration of these issues.

I have accepted, so far, that the two elite groups tested show consistently different attitudes (WH3). I have not been able to conclude whether this is due to the fact that the samples used represent a more or a less developed region (WH4). I proceed here to see whether qualifications in interviewees replies will support or refute the quantitative results. Both working hypotheses are examined concurrently.

The analysis begins with the question of whether respondents believed 'business perceive the possibility of autonomy positively' (QD1). A comparative analysis of qualitative replies shows that the sample can be sub-divided into three

main groups. Those that are extremely negative, those that are comparatively neutral and those that are positive to the proposition.

Those that are distinctly negative about the question belong mainly to the Cretan political elite who find the possibility "catastrophic"³⁰⁷. Some believe autonomy should be accepted "under no circumstances and for no reason"³⁰⁸, while some expressed the view that "any such move is suspect and should be crushed"³⁰⁹.

With feelings running high among Greek politicians' on the potential dangers of autonomy the Greek businessmen's view was rather mild. Their opinion ranged from the position that Crete is "totally dependent on the rest of Greece"³¹⁰ to the view that autonomy will make "no difference"³¹¹ to business or that business will accept such an option "only if guarantees are given"³¹². This signifies business preoccupation with the political risks involved in such an option but shows them to be comparatively positive to the idea of self rule.³¹³ Their view can be better understood if one remembers that they consider the central

307. Case 63. Activist. Date of interview: 20/9/1991

308. Case 69. Mayor. Date of interview: 20/9/1991.

309. Case 72. City Councillor. Date of interview: 19/9/1991.

310. Case 44. Business proprietor. Date of interview: 23/9/1991.

311. Case 48. Managing director. Date of interview: 20/9/1991.

312. Case 62. Business proprietor. Date of interview: 16/9/1991.

313. This theme is further explored in chapter seven.

administration's inefficiency as the basic limiting factor to their region's development, a view not fully endorsed by the political elite.

A different kind of balanced approach was shown by the Scottish business elite which took the position that autonomy will be good "if it means raising local issues"³¹⁴ it will be bad if it means an "increase in taxation"³¹⁵ and it will be accepted "if Britain was to become regional[-y autonomous throughout the country]"³¹⁶. It seems thus, that business elites in both regions share similarly neutral views on autonomy in their qualitative replies.

Strathclyde political elites are the most positive elite group. They suggest that business "ought to be [positive about autonomy, but], they will not be"³¹⁷. This they believe to be the case because "business favours the status quo"³¹⁸. So, overall Strathclyde politicians are positive to the idea of autonomy, and do not share the concerns expressed by their Greek colleagues, while differing as well from business elites in both regions.

314. Case 35. Managing director. Date of interview: 23/5/1991.

315. Case 32. Managing director. Date of interview: 29/5/1991.

316. Case 28. Company manager. Date of interview: 4/6/1991.

317. Case 2. City Councillor. Date of interview: 28/6/1991.

318. Case 11. Activist. Date of interview: 10/11/1991.

The qualitative analysis make imperative a re-evaluation of the quantitative interpretation on both working hypotheses. So, attitudes of the two regional elites can be identified as being different (WH3), but this is more the result of political elite variance in what they believe the business elites perceptions are, rather than a substantial difference among the business elites themselves.

Furthermore, taking into consideration the qualifications of their replies in the question investigated, I can not suggest with any conviction that Cretan elites have a stronger concordance in attitudes towards autonomy than the Strathclyde elites do. Both regional elites seem to have a within group divergence of opinion, which however, can not be considered as significantly larger in any of the two regions. Strathclyde political elites believe that 'autonomy would be perceived positively by business' (QD1) while business elites are neutral to positive. Cretan political elites believe business perceive autonomy negatively, while business elites are neutral to negative.

The qualitative evidence analysed here cannot support the quantitative conclusions on AWH4 (assuming a stronger concordance among Cretan elites).

I proceed to see whether clarifications in their replies, regarding whether 'the economic future of their region lies

in local or out of region capital and entrepreneurial skill (QD2,QD3), alters the conclusions reached in the previous section. In the quantitative analysis I have found some evidence to support the hypothesis that 'attitudes between regional elites are different' (WH3), while evidence on whether 'stronger correlation of attitudes is linked to regional development' (WH4) was inconclusive.

Scottish political elite replies are comparatively similar with the business elites' who either suggest that "growth depends on local entrepreneurs"³¹⁹ or that the region "needs the catalyst of outside skill"³²⁰. This 'wavering' attitude is consistent with an overall rejection of the importance of entrepreneurs. Scottish elites do not seem to hold a definite view on the importance of entrepreneurs. One political interviewee admits that "the value of the entrepreneur does not impress me"³²¹ and a businessman suggests that "[development] will not depend on entrepreneurial skill"³²². There appears to be no apparent trend in the Scottish elite attitudes towards local or foreign capital.

The Cretan elite groups seem to have a similarly close concordance in their attitudes. Politicians believe that

³¹⁹. Case 22. Managing director. Date of interview: 17/6/1991.

³²⁰. Case 40. Company chairman. Date of interview: 17/5/1991.

³²¹. Case 14. MEP. Date of interview: 18/10/1991.

³²². Case 18. Company director. Date of interview: 9/11/1991.

"there are considerable local resources"³²³ and that "there is a lot of capital that is not utilised"³²⁴. Businessmen believe that "local capital is not fully utilised yet"³²⁵ or that "local capital is not enough"³²⁶ and that "for big investments [foreign] co-operation is required"³²⁷. On a distinctly different perspective to Strathclyde elites, Cretans appear much more supportive towards entrepreneurs. A businessman suggests that "[foreign entrepreneurs] will bring a new way of thinking and working"³²⁸. Politicians are overwhelming in their praise of entrepreneurship, suggesting that "Greeks are ingenious"³²⁹ and that "foreign entrepreneurs have to co-operate with local operators"³³⁰, assuming in this way a positive attitude on the influence from foreign entrepreneurs.

It becomes apparent from this exposition that the validity of working hypothesis three (WH3) can be upheld from the evidence presented while there is weak support for alternative rival hypothesis four (AWH4).

For the next two questions investigated, namely whether 'their region is in a worse position than the nation' (QD7)

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323. Case 76. Mayor. Date of interview: 21/9/1991.
324. Case 73. Activist. Date of interview: 19/9/1991.
325. Case 52. Managing director. Date of interview: 17/9/1991.
326. Case 53. Company director. Date of interview: 17/9/1991.
327. Case 42. Managing director. Date of interview: 27/9/1991.
328. Case 57. Company director. Date of interview: 20/9/1991.
329. Case 72. City Councillor. Date of interview: 19/9/1991.
330. Case 74. Mayor. Date of interview: 21/9/1991.

and whether 'national policies have failed to create as many opportunities in your region as in other parts of your country' (QD8), qualifications of their replies make elite differences better understood. Differing preoccupations, both in regard to their region's development potential and its position in relation to other regions is apparent in the replies given.

The Cretan elites feel that their region is in a much better position than the rest of Greece, having "a big variety of products and services"³³¹, while "it is developing very fast"³³². This development is hindered however by "lack of infrastructural work"³³³ or "insufficient infrastructural programmes"³³⁴. Both elite groups are also preoccupied with clientelism in the Greek administration albeit from a different angle. Politicians see it as a 'chronic hindrance to development'³³⁵ because they believe it tends to favour other regions in Greece, businessmen because "national policy operates under political and party criteria"³³⁶, which effectively shows their preoccupation with the modernisation of the state machine, while they believe that

331. Case 44. Business proprietor. Date of interview: 23/9/1991.

332. Case 63. Activist. Date of interview: 20/9/1991.

333. Case 57. Company director. Date of interview: 20/9/1991.

334. Case 65. President of local community. Date of interview: 26/9/1991.

335. As explained by a political interviewee who suggested that Crete "belongs to a particular political area [socialist]. When the government was 'of our own', we could not get any favours because it was our own people. When they are 'alien' because they are not our own people". Case 69. Date of interview: 20/9/1991.

336. Case 46. Business manager. Date of interview: 24/9/1991.

"most big projects are based on private initiative"³³⁷ which shows that overall they have a very low regard for the effectiveness of the administration.

In the case of the Scottish elites the issue is again that Scotland does not "have the infrastructure to compete without substantial cost penalties"³³⁸, which "is not a matter of preparation, [since] we are further from the market"³³⁹.

Where the Scottish elites do not seem to have a similar perspective is on the failures of regional policy. The politicians believe that "regional policy has failed abysmally"³⁴⁰, particularly "in comparison with the South East of England"³⁴¹ which has benefited by government policies much more than Scotland. Businessmen on the other hand believe that Scotland has been treated "just as bad"³⁴² or that the government is "trying to create opportunities"³⁴³ and that "not only national policies [are] responsible"³⁴⁴ for the failure of opportunities to be created in Scotland. This difference in perspective may

337. Case 44. Business proprietor. Date of interview: 23/9/1991.
338. Case 12. City Councillor. Date of interview: 8/11/1991.
339. Case 6. MP. Date of interview: 5/7/1991.
340. Case 2. City Councillor. Date of interview: 28/6/1991.
341. Case 3. Administrator. Date of interview: 4/7/1991.
342. Case 21. Managing director. Date of interview: 27/6/1991.
343. Case 37. Senior manager. Date of interview: 22/5/1991.
344. Case 35. Managing director. Date of interview: 23/5/1991.

also signify the two elite groups presumed different political convictions.³⁴⁵

The analysis of their qualifying replies supports the conclusions reached in the quantitative section. It seems thus that the two regional groups have differing perspectives and preoccupations concerning the particular issues of regional development (WH3), while at the same time Cretan elites although coming from a less developed region are more concordant on the issues raised, than Strathclyde elites are (WH4).³⁴⁶

In their qualifications to questions QD9 and QD10 (differences of the local people with those of the region-nation) there are apparent disparities from their quantitative results.

Strathclyde politicians held very diverse views. These ranged from references to "the nationalists [who] have a problem because Scotland is not homogeneous"(8), to

³⁴⁵ . I have made the assumption that Scottish businessmen are predominantly Conservative, while local politicians are predominantly Labour (75% of the present sample).

³⁴⁶ . Reasons for this difference could stem from the regional elites interlockingness levels being higher in Crete than in Scotland, but also from the differentiation of elite functions being more highly evolved the more elaborate societal institutions are. If that is the case, differentiation of functions in an advanced society will position elites into particular socio-political perspectives, while in less developed regions, where modernisation has not yet created such divisions, different elite groups will only differ by the fact that they may represent different interests in the societal exchange.

references to civic culture since "Glasgow folk are locked into a public sector culture to a much greater extent than other regions"³⁴⁷. Overall they appear to think that there are "great differences within Strathclyde itself"³⁴⁸.

The answers of Strathclyde businessmen range from a belief that there are "sizeable differences in attitude"³⁴⁹ among local and regional peoples, to one that "there used to be a marked difference"³⁵⁰. As evident from this exposition of replies there is a marked discordance both within and between elite groups in Strathclyde which was not immediately apparent in their replies of the quantitative part of the questionnaire.

Cretan businessmen find great differences among the peoples in their region and the rest of the nation which they identify as being relevant to "character"³⁵¹, while attesting that "there is a natural difference"³⁵² between the peoples.

Cretan politicians also find that "there are differences in character"³⁵³, believing that these "are psychological

347 . Case 1. Regional Councillor. Date of interview: 26-28/6/1991.
348 . Case 11. Activist. Date of interview: 10/11/1991.
349 . Case 36. Managing director. Date of interview: 22/5/1991.
350 . Case 34. Managing director. Date of interview: 27/5/1991.
351 . Case 47. Business manager. Date of interview: 23/9/1991.
352 . Case 61. Company director. Date of interview: 16/9/1991.
353 . Case 66. President of local community. Date of interview: 25/9/1991.

differences in behaviour"³⁵⁴. Some politicians had a less marked view of differences asserting that "it is chauvinistic to assume there are differences"³⁵⁵ also claiming that "young people are the same"³⁵⁶ throughout Greece.³⁵⁷

Apparently, the diversity of views between Cretan politicians and businessmen is not pronounced on these questions. The minor divergence of attitudes among the political elite can be considered relevant to their particular view-point not warranting further inquiry.

Concordance among Cretan elites and discordance among Strathclyde elites supports alternative working hypothesis four (AWH4). Furthermore, in this exposition there are apparent differences in the attitudes the Cretan and Strathclyde elite groups hold, which supports working hypothesis three (WH3).

In their replies to question QD13 (more opportunities or risks in a united Europe) the elite groups were very vociferous holding rather varied replies.

³⁵⁴ . Case 68. City Councillor. Date of interview: 9/10/1991.

³⁵⁵ . Case 69. Mayor. Date of interview: 20/9/1991.

³⁵⁶ . Case 71. President of local community. Date of interview: 11/9/1991.

³⁵⁷ . Research by Errson and Janda (1985) on regional party strength, points to a small divergence of youth voting across Greece. This does not necessarily mean that youths share the same value systems but rather that they seem to have a similar political outlook.

Cretan politicians perceived risks to be mainly cultural and focused on fears of "alterations to our national identity"³⁵⁸ and "our social structure and character"³⁵⁹, while attesting that "our cultural traditions are in danger"³⁶⁰. Opportunities existed in the "establishment of law and order"³⁶¹ and in achieving gains in international disputes at "the national level"³⁶².

Cretan businessmen perceived risks "if there is no convergence in the development level of Greece [and Europe]"³⁶³, also in the possibility that "big trusts [/multinationals] intervene [into the market]"³⁶⁴. Opportunities existed in the anticipated "improvement in democratic institutions"³⁶⁵ as well as "political opportunities"³⁶⁶.

The emerging picture among the Cretan elites is one of concordance on perceived opportunities and discordance on perceived risks.

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- 358 . Case 65. President of local community. Date of interview: 26/9/1991.
359 . Case 70. President of local community. Date of interview: 20/9/1991.
360 . Case 72. City Councillor. Date of interview: 19/9/1991.
361 . Case 65. President of local community. Date of interview: 26/9/1991.
362 . Case 66. President of local community. Date of interview: 25/9/1991.
363 . Case 56. Business manager. Date of interview: 19/9/1991.
364 . Case 59. Business proprietor. Date of interview: 14/9/1991.
365 . Case 43. Managing director. Date of interview: 25/9/1991.
366 . Case 62. Business proprietor. Date of interview: 16/9/1991.

The Strathclyde political elite perceived risks in "giving too much power to the centre"³⁶⁷ as a result of further integration and also in the "failure to prepare as a result of government policy failure"³⁶⁸. Opportunities existed to "develop our [own] responses to European challenges"³⁶⁹ particularly since European integration is a "*sine qua non* of progress"³⁷⁰.

The Strathclyde business elite perceived risks in that "we lose control of our destiny as a country"³⁷¹ and that "links with government [are] not as strong in this country as [they are] on the mainland [of Europe]"³⁷². This latter view was contested however by those who believed there are more opportunities "as long as the politicians will let things happen"³⁷³. The view was expressed as well that "Scots are very insular people"³⁷⁴ and that "[we are] a long way from Europe [to be affected]"³⁷⁵.

Similarity of replies between Strathclyde elites centred around the position that "failing to take the opportunities entails major risks"³⁷⁶ and that there are "more risks"³⁷⁷

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- 367 . Case 1. Regional Councillor. Date of interview: 26-28/6/1991.
368 . Case 9. Activist. Date of interview: 15/10/1991.
369 . Case 1. Regional Councillor. Date of interview: 26-28/9/1991.
370 . Case 8. MEP. Date of interview: 14/10/1991.
371 . Case 39. Company chairman. Date of interview: 20/5/1991.
372 . Case 19. Senior director. Date of interview: 25/6/1991.
373 . Case 23. General manager. Date of interview: 14/6/1991.
374 . Case 37. Senior manager. Date of interview: 22/5/1991.
375 . Case 28. Senior manager. Date of interview: 4/6/1991.
376 . Case 12. City Councillor. Date of interview: 8/11/1991.

from not being a part of European integration. While their overall preoccupations seemed divergent, the main connecting theme was the relationship with the centre, be it Westminster or Brussels.

From this exposition of their replies it becomes evident that the Strathclyde and Cretan elites have distinctly divergent preoccupations relating to Europe, which supports the premise of working hypothesis three (WH3). There is no conclusive evidence however, that can assist in making any inferences on alternative working hypothesis four (AWH4).

The qualitative analysis supports the premise of working hypothesis three almost uniformly. It appears thus that on evidence analysed, 'attitudes of regional elites can be identified as being different between a more and a less developed region' (WH3).

Evidence from question QD13 (more opportunities or risks in Europe) and QD1 (business positive on autonomy) are inconclusive on alternative working hypothesis four. The bulk of the questions examined however provide support, weak at times, to the premise that 'a stronger concordance of attitudes between local elite groups exists the less developed a region is' (AWH4).

377 . Case 30. Senior director. Date of interview: 3/6/1991.

I am inclined to accept the premise that 'the degree of accord between sub-national elite attitudes is related to a regions' development level' (H II). This follows from accepting that regional elites examined have different attitudes (WH3) and these attitudes are more concordant in the less developed than in the more developed region (WH4).

There is a high probability of multiple causation between the phenomena investigated in hypothesis H II. In this hypothesis I have detected an influence of the degree of development (the independent variable) on attitudes of regional elites (the dependent variable). I note however that regional grievances towards the central government (examined in Measure A) and perceived differences from the rest of the nation (examined in Measure C) can have an effect as intervening variables to this hypothesis which however, is impossible to measure with the means at my disposal. A number of other antecedent variables could be considered relevant as well, including ideological or political affiliation of respondents or position within political party hierarchy which have not been examined as part of this investigation however.

In this hypothesis, I have attempted to determine whether elites in different European regions have substantially different attitudes. This can be important as it could

identify them as separate. I have effectively attempted to determine a 'within' and a 'between' region variance of sub-national elites. Within region differences also ascertain the degree to which elite groups are interlocking. While between region differences establish the separateness of elite groups in the two regions investigated.

There is a number of assumptions relevant to the examined hypotheses. One of the central assumptions used in the rest of my analysis as well is that different elite attitudes in the two regions investigated would point to different behavioural patterns. It is possible in this way to perceive attitudes as a central element of a region's endowment profile. The link of attitudes with a region's development prospects I examine in the following chapter.

Chapter 7

Elite Attitudes: Assessing The Broader Picture

A. Introduction

In this chapter the analysis and tests for hypotheses **H III** and **H IV** are similar in method to those used in the previous chapter. As previously, I first use quantitative data to test the working hypotheses to be followed by qualitative evidence which provide the ultimate indication of proof. In the case of hypothesis **H V** the analysis is exploratory as my investigation cannot provide conclusive proof.

In part B the analysis of hypothesis **H III** explores the relationship between regional elites' perceptions of Councillors and elites' aspirations to autonomy. Measure B from chapter five is used as an indicator of elites' aspirations to autonomy. This entails certain limitations as Measure B provides a nominal index of rank between the elite groups. So, inferences made from the inclusion of Measure B in the findings have to be limited by the nominal character of the index.

In part C working hypotheses WH7, WH8 and WH9 are employed in the discussion of hypothesis **H IV**, which investigates the proposition that elite attitudes on devolution have an effect on the perceptions of business prospects in a region. Of these working hypotheses, WH9 is the one with the closest thematic relevance to **H IV**. The inclusion of WH7 and WH8 in the testing, by examining perceptions of importance for SMEs, introduces an important new variable to the analysis. The inclusion of this variable is considered imperative since SMEs have been considered essential to regional development and, some argue, to regional autonomy.³⁷⁸

Measure B indexing 'Positive Attitudes Towards Regional Autonomy' and D indexing the 'Preparedness of the Regional and National Units Towards 1992' are used extensively in the analysis.

In part D the analysis is exploratory. Hypothesis **H V** investigates whether concordance of attitudes between

³⁷⁸ . References on the importance of SMEs for regional development can be found on a number of European Commission Documents(1989c, 1991a). Gerry Sweeney has argued that in regions where there are large firms "...there is a lower level of entrepreneurial vitality" (1987, p.21), while also claiming that "...autonomy in decision-making within a region ...supports entrepreneurial activity" (1987,p.124), which suggests that entrepreneurial vitality is positively related with the existence of decision making autonomy and negatively with the existence of multinationals. The role of local authorities in promoting SMEs as a measure to promote endogenous growth is covered by a report of Nuttal (1986) for the Council of Europe. It is one of the basic contentions of the Scottish National Party (SNP, 1992) that Scottish economic independence can be based on local firms and the development of local SMEs.

political and business elites in a region affects regional growth prospects. This hypothesis was an integral part of the exercise at the beginning of this research effort. Very early in the construction of the survey it became apparent that limitations in resources would not allow the satisfactory coverage of all issues relevant and that there will be a number of variables that could not be investigated. Instead of dismissing hypothesis **H V** however, I included it here in an exploratory analysis. This is done in order to use the great wealth of data collected that pertain to this hypothesis. Hopefully, this effort may be instructive to a course of future research.

The relevance of findings in chapters five, six and seven to contemporary academic discourse are then examined in the final chapter of this thesis.

B. Perceptions of Regional Elites: The Effect of Aspirations to Autonomy

In this section I will test hypothesis **H III** relating it to the intervening variable of aspirations to regional autonomy. Hypothesis **H III** inquires whether:

H III. Attitudes towards regional political elites vary according to an elite's region of origin.

In this hypothesis the use of working hypotheses five and six should provide an indication of whether the region of origin of the two political and business elites' influence their perceptions of regional political elites. It is of course the case, introduced at length in chapter two, that the evidence presented here will not necessarily cover all possible intervening or antecedent variables. To put it differently, there are a number of other reasons, beyond their different region of origin, that could be the cause of any observed variance between the two regional elites investigated. It is the case, however, that most variables that could affect such a diversion in attitudes have been identified and accounted for. I am also confident that the relationships identified are real and that the logical sequence connecting them is causal.

Working hypothesis five attempts an investigation of business elites' attitudes and in particular their perception of political elites, in considering whether:

WH5: Businessmen perceive the regional political elites to be more receptive to them than the national political elites.

This is a test of whether the independent variable region of origin affects the dependent variable of perceived receptiveness of politicians to businessmen in their area.

The assumption of the working hypothesis is that local politicians will be more receptive than national politicians to the local business elite.

The most important possible intervening variable is the interlockingness between the business and political elites in the two regions. I will give no further attention to such a possibility than referring to my analysis in chapter six hypothesis one (H I) which examines the difference between the business and political elites. From that analysis I conclude that there is limited interlockingness in the case of the Cretan political elites who declare some business interests (50% declaring they hold at least 1% equity in one of the local companies-QC14) and very limited in the case of the Scottish sample (18% of whom declare holding equity of 1% or more in a regional business-QC14). Businessmen on the other hand were vetted for their political activities and when found to have some function in the political community, were placed in the political elite category and asked the relevant questions.³⁷⁹ To put it plainly, businessmen in the sample cannot have a function within political parties and the only effects of interlockingness exist to the degree that political elites

³⁷⁹ . Exception to this rule was one distinguished Cretan businessman (Case 42), who was also a member of the City Council. The decision to include him in the business elite sample was taken because of his prominence in the business community.

have a prominent business function, which I consider unlikely.

It is also possible to consider the intervening effect of stronger clientelistic ties, in the relationship between the regional political and regional business elites, than between the national political and regional business elites.³⁸⁰ Having a very small national sub-sample (consisting of three cases) in the Strathclyde political elite and no national sub-sample in the Cretan political elite it is impossible to comprehensively examine such a premise. From evidence presented in question QC13 however it is apparent that businessmen in Strathclyde and Crete seldom lobby the local political elites.³⁸¹ From their questionnaire replies it emerges that 67% of the Strathclyde

³⁸⁰ . It is interesting to examine the relevant bibliography on Greek client-patron political ties which includes articles by Sotiropoulos (1994), Kouvertaris and Dobratz (1984) and Lyrantzis (1984). They all point to strong and pervasive patronage ties that they relate to underdevelopment or political culture. The relation of centre vs. periphery, within the existing political structures, gets a mention only relating to the 'macro' level of international politics (Kouvertaris 1984, p.36). All commentators identify the highly centralised character of the Greek state, which is heavily politicised along party lines (Sotiropoulos 1994, p.359). These studies do not specifically investigate the relationship between business and political elites or patronage networks between regional and national political elites. It is assumed that patronage networks are vertical with localities at the 'receiving' end of central political institutions patronage.

³⁸¹ . For a detailed anthropological account of a Cretan communities' perceptions of clientelism and patronage see Herzfeld (1985), while a very interesting account of an earlier study of a Greek pastoral communities' perceptions of clientelism is found in Campbell (1964). Work by Clapham (1982) and Gellner (1977) can be useful, by providing a typology with which to examine patron-client relationships in the Mediterranean context.

and 75% of the Cretan local politicians declared that they have not been lobbied by businessmen. By comparison all of the local MPs and MEPs in Strathclyde declared they have been lobbied by local businessmen.

To investigate this hypothesis I proceed by examining for the replies to question QB13, which inquired how receptive businessmen found regional elected representatives compared with MPs. Using the respondents' respective region of origin as a criterion of comparison, I identify a difference in the pattern of replies of the Scottish and Cretan businessmen.

Strathclyde business personalities thought the local and national politicians in their region to be equally receptive to their views. Cretan businessmen tended to find local politicians receptive more often, as 55% said local Councillors were 'more' or 'much more' receptive; this compares with 32% of the Strathclyde sample who took the same position.

In order to understand which sub-groups of the respective elites support or refute the relevant hypothesis I control for their respective rank. This measure sub-divides the business elites into three categories: a. the small business owners, b. the business managers and c. the directors.

Members of the a. group, who are all Greek, claimed that national politicians were equally or more receptive by a margin of 71%. Managers in both Crete and Scotland would strongly support the premise that regional Councillors are more receptive than MPs. The bias, against local Councillors' receptiveness, can be traced to the group of directors in the two regions.

Table 7.1: Distribution of responses to question QB13 collapsed and controlled for categories RANK and ID

Elite Identification by RANK and ID	Councillors are More Receptive	Councillors are Equally Receptive	Councillors are Less Receptive
Cretan Small Business Owners	29%	29%	42%
Strathclyde Business Managers	67%		33%
Cretan Business Managers	100%		
Strathclyde Business Directors	26%	53%	21%
Cretan Business Directors	50%	33%	17%

Note: Question QB13: How receptive do you think regional Councillors are to your views compared with Members of Parliament?

Directors in Strathclyde were symmetrically centred around the equally receptive option for which 53% of their sub-group opted. Cretan directors were more appreciative of

regional representatives' receptiveness, 42% claiming they found them much more receptive.

A possible explanation for this difference could lie with the difference respondents gave to question QB6 in which 62% of the Scottish business elites declared they did not know their regional elected representative, compared with a unanimous Cretan business sample who claimed they knew their local elected representative. Such a discrepancy could lead to the assumption that in the comparatively devolved region of Strathclyde, regional politicians are held in lower esteem among the local business elites than in the nationally controlled prefecture of Chania, where all businessmen know the local politicians and consider them rather receptive.

The construction and tests for this working hypothesis were based on the assumption that regional political elites possess a more accurate mental map of their constituency than national political elites.³⁸² It has not been possible to test this assumption as such but the working hypothesis tested should provide an indication that this may indeed be the case. Both business elites seemed to be in support of the premise if a control was applied for the replies of the

³⁸² . A discussion on the assumptions I made regarding mental maps is given in chapter one, while a further analysis of behavioural geography's perception of mental maps can be found in Gould and White (1986) and Gold (1980).

business directors sub-group. So, the evidence analysed to this point, supports the premise of working hypothesis WH5.

The analysis, so far, has concentrated on quantitative evidence of a receptiveness of the political elites, as viewed by businessmen. I proceed with an examination and analysis of their qualitative replies in the survey.

In the examination of replies to question QB13 there are two trends among the Cretan businessmen. According to the first prevailing view "...Councillors do not count"³⁸³ and "...local Councillors are ornamental and bear little weight"³⁸⁴. This attitude ties in with the prevalent view that "...an MP can do a lot"³⁸⁵ which points to strong existing clientelistic relationships of local businessmen with MPs. The opposite view among Cretan businessmen was that Councillors have been receptive "...within the last decade"³⁸⁶ and they are more receptive than MPs "...relative to their [limited] contribution"³⁸⁷.

Scottish businessmen have an almost uniform appreciation of local Councillors' work, with some reservations however. They think Councillors are "...receptive enough but have no

³⁸³ . Case 45. Business manager. Date of Interview:24/9/1991
³⁸⁴ . Case 62. Business proprietor. Date of Interview:16/9/1991
³⁸⁵ . Case 51. Business proprietor. Date of Interview:16/9/1991
³⁸⁶ . Case 52. Managing director. Date of Interview:17/9/1991
³⁸⁷ . Case 54. Business proprietor. Date of Interview:17/9/1991

clout"³⁸⁸ or that "...regional Councillors being in opposition are more receptive"³⁸⁹. Overall their view is rather positive as they claim that "...Councillors pay more heed"³⁹⁰ to them.

From this exposition the pattern of businessmen's perceptions suggest that Councillors in Chania have no real clout and are held in low esteem, while MPs are perceived to hold the strings of power. In Strathclyde businessmen think that Councillors pay more heed to them, providing indications of a high level of interaction with the local political elite, who in turn appear to play a more decisive role in the integration of political and business interests in the region.

Comparing the response patterns from the quantitative and the qualitative elements, it is immediately evident there is a dichotomy between businessmen's perceived receptiveness of regional political elites (high in the case of Cretan businessmen and low in the case of Strathclyde businessmen) and the esteem in which they are held. Cretan businessmen believe Councillors are more receptive but at the same time, that they have no clout. Strathclyde businessmen believe Councillors are not as receptive as MPs but seem to pay more

³⁸⁸ . Case 38. Managing director. Date of Interview:20/5/1991

³⁸⁹ . Case 26. Company chairman. Date of Interview:05/6/1991

³⁹⁰ . Case 27. Company director. Date of Interview:05/6/1991

heed to them. I will accept the premise of the working hypothesis WH5 that although businessmen perceive regional elites to be more receptive than national political elites, there is evidence that the two business elites have a different perspective on regional politicians' receptiveness.

In the next working hypothesis the premise that regional politicians have a longer term perspective and the economic interests of the region more at heart is given further consideration when I inquire whether:

WH6: Regional politicians will be perceived to favour long term economic policies in the region more than national politicians.

The dependent variable here is the perceived commitment of regional political elites to regional welfare. The region of origin of the two political elites is expected to affect the way they perceive the local and national political elites' commitment to their region.

Replies to this working hypothesis could be conceivably affected by elites' educational level but since this variable was considered 'offensive' to some elites it has not been included in the questionnaire and cannot be controlled for. My personal estimate of the literacy level of the two political elite samples is that Cretan

politicians seemed less educated in regard to standard qualifications, but as worldly as the Strathclyde politicians, a good number of the latter apparently possessing higher academic qualifications.³⁹¹ This evaluation being subjective it cannot be used as a quantifiable measure however, and I refer to it only as an indication.

Another variable that I have to consider is the possibility that regional political elites are not, by definition, considered relevant to macro-economic planning. This could be true particularly in the case of the Cretan sample where the local government had very limited powers since the unification of the island with mainland Greece.³⁹² The particular question asked however (QC12) inquires whether local or national politicians have a longer term perspective when proposing policy. I believe that such an antecedent variable will only become relevant if there is a genuine bias against the local political elites, a matter which is to an extent investigated by the analysis following.

³⁹¹ . This is an empirical assessment of their level of education as there were no questions inquiring about it on the questionnaire.

³⁹² . The unification of Crete with mainland Greece took place in 1913 after a long series of revolts against Ottoman rule and a period of autonomy under the auspices of the Greek monarchy (1898-1913). Hopkins (1977) and Woodhouse (1968) provide concise accounts of modern Cretan and Greek history.

TABLE 7.2: Analysis of replies to question QC12 controlling for political elites' identification by the category RANK.

Elite Identification by RANK	ELITE PREFERENCE FOR:		
	Regional Representatives	MPs	MEPs
Strathclyde Activists/ Administrators			3
Strathclyde City Councillors	1		1
Strathclyde Regional Councillors	3		2
Strathclyde Members of Parliament		1	
Strathclyde Members of European Parliament			1
Cretan Presidents of Local Communities	1	2	1
Cretan City Councillors		2	1
Cretan Mayors			3
Cretan Activists/ Administrators		2	

Notes: a. Question QC12: Which of the following do you believe have a longer term perspective when proposing economic policy: regional, national or European representatives? b. Number of respondents replying to QC12 is 24, missing values (comprising Do Not Know or refusals to reply) equal seven cases.

The basic premise of this working hypothesis holds true for the Scottish political elite who appear to support the proposition that regional politicians and MEPs have a longer term perspective than MPs when proposing economic policy (QC12). In the examination of the replies of the Cretan political elite I find that they diverge from the Scottish pattern of replies in that they believe national and

European elected representatives have a longer term perspective than regional representatives. A full analysis of their replies is given in table 7.2.

Differences in the opinions of the two groups could be related to the Greek elites' low esteem for local authorities. This I understand as an attitude stemming from the limited competence of regional political elites in Greece.³⁹³

The breakdown by occupational category (variable RANK) of the elite replies reveals some trends that are interesting and can elucidate the analysis further. Councillors in the Scottish sample are almost equally split between supporting the view that it is either themselves or MEPs that have the interest of the region more at heart. In the Cretan sample it seems that Councillors believe it is MPs who have a longer term perspective, while all Mayors in Greece seem to think that it is MEPs who have the longer term perspective.

In the interpretation of replies of the Cretan elite I can only assume that the antecedent variable of perceived competencies of the local elites affects respondents

³⁹³ . It is also the case that in the period between the Second World War and the 1967 coup d'etat, local authorities in Crete had very restricted competencies, while during the years of the dictatorship (1967-1974) local authorities were effectively appointed, further discrediting the institution. Relevant analysis can be found in Featherstone and Katsoulas (1987) and Clogg (1986).

replies. This view is reinforced since there is a high indication of regional grievance towards the national government. As computed in chapter five, Measure A identifies the Cretan political elite as the one with the highest grievance indicator towards their national government. Local politicians see the national politicians not as having the interest of the region more at heart but probably as more competent in macro-economic policy (which presumably is beyond their reach). It is also possible that the question used forms an inadequate measure for the Cretan sample, given their assumed lower educational level as compared with the Scottish sample.

Having completed the first level of analysis (for quantitative data) I can only conditionally accept the premise that 'regional politicians are perceived to favour long term policies' (WH6) and that only for the Strathclyde political elite. Qualitative data should further elucidate Cretan sample results.

I proceed to examine politicians' perspective on whether regional, national or European representatives have a longer term perspective (QC12) and effectively inquire which political elite sub-group they hold in higher esteem.

The Cretan respondents, belonging to the local elite themselves, appeared to have a very low esteem for the local

elite. This is apparent in the support for the national and European political representatives. They exhibited a very high esteem for MPs' role attesting that "...MPs will be elected and re-elected, they do not have just a four year perspective"³⁹⁴, while "...MPs have the growth prospects of the region more at heart, while MEPs cannot focus on the region"³⁹⁵. Views on MEPs were consequently split between a mildly negative view that "...we do not know what the MEPs are doing"³⁹⁶ to the more positive "...MEPs living in Brussels have a wider perspective"³⁹⁷. Very few took the view that "...the local Councillor has a stronger interest [in the region] than anybody else"³⁹⁸ while the attitude that Councillors "...have a very limited perspective"³⁹⁹ was prevalent.

Strathclyde politicians took a rather different approach to MPs' contribution to the region. They claimed that "...MPs are led by short-termism"⁴⁰⁰, while "...strategic plans are produced by the regional Council, MPs do not have a regional impact"⁴⁰¹. This support for the Council was not as readily converted into support for the regional Councillors however, since "...long term planning is done by the Council but it

³⁹⁴ . Case 75. City Councillor. Date of Interview:26/9/1991
³⁹⁵ . Case 68. City Councillor. Date of Interview:09/9/1991
³⁹⁶ . Case 64. President of local community. Date of Interview:26/9/1991
³⁹⁷ . Case 76. Mayor. Date of Interview:23/9/1991
³⁹⁸ . Case 66. President of local community. Date of Interview:25/9/1991
³⁹⁹ . Case 65. President of local community. Date of Interview:26/9/1991
⁴⁰⁰ . Case 1. Regional Councillor. Date of Interview:26-28/6/1991
⁴⁰¹ . Case 5. Regional Councillor. Date of Interview:01/7/1991

does not concern the Councillors"⁴⁰². MEPs received more uniform support, expressed as a belief that "...MEPs have a strategic view"⁴⁰³ and particularly since "...the economies of Europe are tied-up [together]"⁴⁰⁴.

From this evidence it becomes apparent that the two political elites have a very different perspective. Cretan politicians seem to hold MPs in very high esteem, while showing an equivocal opinion on MEPs. Strathclyde politicians seem to have a very negative opinion of MPs while holding a uniformly positive opinion of MEPs.

Regarding their perceptions of the regional elites, the Cretan political elite seems to hold Councillors in very low esteem, while the Strathclyde political elite has a rather good opinion of Councillors.

Analysis of their qualifications reinforces the initial quantitative analysis between the political elites. It becomes apparent that on the present evidence working hypothesis WH6 holds true for the Cretan elite. Qualitative replies also elucidate the reasons behind the Cretan opinion to be based on the low level of competencies of regional elites.

⁴⁰² . Case 11. Activist. Date of Interview:10/11/1991

⁴⁰³ . Case 16. Regional Councillor. Date of Interview:19/6/1991

⁴⁰⁴ . Case 10. Regional Councillor. Date of Interview:28/10/1991

On the evidence from the two working hypotheses WH5 and WH6, it becomes obvious that the two regional elites have distinctly different patterns of reply. It appears, as well, that their different origin has a relevance to the pattern of replies they have. To that effect I accept hypothesis H III as true for this sample. Their region of origin seems to be relevant to the way an elite perceives their respective regional political elites.

As is further evident from the analysis of the qualitative data, the varying level of devolution (or decentralisation) between the two regions can be related to their perceptions.⁴⁰⁵ It can be argued that the low competence of Cretan political elites is the actual cause of their perceived low receptiveness to businessmen. Furthermore elite replies show a remarkable covariation with the intervening variable of positive attitudes towards regional autonomy (table 7.3).

The two elite groups with the highest positive attitude towards regional autonomy have the best opinion of regional Councillors. Strathclyde businessmen and Cretan politicians who hold Councillors at the lowest esteem also have the

⁴⁰⁵ . A very interesting case study analysis of devolution versus deconcentration in the decentralisation experience of some low income countries as given by Crook and Manor (1995).

least positive attitudes towards regional autonomy. I have to assume on the basis of this evidence that aspirations to autonomy have an effect on perceptions of regional political elites receptiveness (QB13) and their long-term commitment to their region (QC12).

Table 7.3: Comparison of the way regional political elites are perceived (QB12, QC13) and regional elites positive attitudes towards regional autonomy (Measure B)

ELITE IDENTIFICATION	MEASURE B: ASPIRATIONS TO AUTONOMY	PERCEPTIONS OF COUNCILLORS' PERFORMANCE
Strathclyde Politicians	35.4	Positive
Strathclyde Businessmen	-19.7	Negative
Cretan Politicians	8.3	Negative
Cretan Businessmen	28.6	Positive

Consideration should be given to the unlikely possibility that perceptions of regional elites are the independent variable, having an effect on aspirations to autonomy. I am not able to discount that possibility totally, for lack of specific measures that can test the direction of this relationship. It is reasonable to assume, however, that in the belief system of regional elites issues of regional welfare and autonomy come before those of elites' attitudes on Councillors' performance as examined here.⁴⁰⁶ If this

⁴⁰⁶ . The interrelationship of individuals' feelings and expectations with the environment is analysed by *Behavioural Geography* (Gold, 1980), while *Political Behaviour* (Jaros and Grant, 1974) has interesting insights into belief system attributes and the hierarchies of opinions, attitudes

hierarchy is valid then it is reasonable to assume that aspirations to regional autonomy must influence perceptions of regional elites.

C. Level of Devolution: Does it Influence Growth Prospects?

It has been repeatedly suggested in editorials of the *Financial Times* that the prospect of devolution in Scotland will affect business confidence, by presuming that a tax yielding Scottish Parliament will be likely to increase business tax rates.⁴⁰⁷ Whether this will be done to cover the increased costs of a devolved government or whether it will cover an increase in social welfare policies, the message has been clear. The British business press suggests business would be apprehensive of Scottish devolution. According to this view there is a link between the prospects of devolution in Scotland and business prospects for the region.

and belief systems. Under this typology I assign elites' perceptions on autonomy as part of their ideology and belief system, while their perceptions of Councillors performance belong to the 'inferior' opinion and attitude level (Kavanagh, 1983, pp.14-15).

⁴⁰⁷ . The British Prime Minister opposed the idea of devolution for Scotland on the grounds that it would mean higher taxes and less investment (*Financial Times*, 12 January 1991 and 14 November 1991), while the Scottish CBI members opposed the creation of a Scottish Parliament with tax raising powers (*Financial Times*, 26 April 1991).

Elite attitudes on devolution could be considered relevant, in turn, since they are directly linked with the indicators of business confidence. It could also be the case that elite attitudes on devolution have a direct causal influence on the business prospects in a region by affecting business confidence, which is the next hypothesis I investigate:

H IV. Elite Attitudes on Devolution affect the Perceptions of Business Prospects in a Region.

Elite attitudes on devolution I consider as the independent variable, while business prospects in a region is the relevant dependent variable.

In the examination of this hypothesis I make the assumption that the more business and political elites attitudes are similar in a region, the higher the growth potential for that region. I am using this premise assuming it to hold true for the purposes of this investigation. This premise is more thoroughly explored in my discussion of hypothesis H V.

My test will consist of employing working hypotheses 7,8 and 9 for an analysis of the quantitative data and then proceed with an exposition of qualitative replies in order to decide on the validity of the hypothesis. I first examine whether:

WH7: The level of devolution in a region influences perceptions of SMEs importance among regional elite groups.

For this working hypothesis the level of devolution between the two regions investigated is the independent variable while the perceived importance of SMEs to the regional economy is the dependent variable. Effectively replies between the elites of the two regions will be compared in relation to their attitudes towards SMEs importance.

In this working hypothesis I have made the assumption that a higher level of devolution is linked with a stronger trust in SMEs and local entrepreneurs as compared with MNL enterprises.⁴⁰⁸

To test this working hypothesis I compare respondents' replies specific to the business and political elites. Questions inquiring on the importance of SMEs to the regional economy (QB3, QB4, QB5, QC4, QC5, QC7) were crosstabulated controlling for the respondents region of origin. The comparison consisted of comparing the

⁴⁰⁸ . The relationship between local development, regional autonomy and small business is covered in a series of case studies by Vazquez-Barquero (1990); while the role of local authorities in the development of SMEs is examined by Nuttal (1986).

distribution of replies between the elite groups of the more devolved Strathclyde and the less devolved Chania.⁴⁰⁹

Table 7.4: Crosstabulation of elite replies to questions QB3, QB4 and QB5

	Question QB3: Do you foresee more SMEs		Question QB4: Positive on more SMEs		Question QB5: More SMEs lead to an economy more:	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	Devolved	Dependent
Strathclyde Businessmen	19 79%	5 21%	14 87%	2 13%	19 83%	4 17%
Cretan Businessmen	12 60%	8 40%	15 79%	4 21%	13 76%	4 24%

Notes: a. Question QB3: Do you foresee the Development of more small-medium enterprises in your region? b. Question QB4: Will such a development create a positive environment for your firm? c. Question QB5: Do you think that a shift in the economy towards small-medium enterprises will aid in the creation of: 1. a more devolved economy? or 2. a rather dependent economy?

Table 7.5: Spearman correlation coefficients matrix for business elites' replies to questions QB3, QB4 and QB5

	Scottish Cretan		Scottish Cretan	
QB4	.429 sig .098	-.152 .546		
QB5	.314 sig .144	-.119 .629	.423 sig .116	.464 .052
	QB3		QB4	

Note: As with other association statistics in this survey issues of validity limit the inferential value of these figures. The Negative category is collapsed with the Do Not Know category to facilitate correlations.

As becomes apparent, from the examination of tables 7.4 and 7.6, there is no significant difference in the distribution of replies to the questions investigated, between the

⁴⁰⁹ . Competencies of the respective regional authorities at the time of the survey are covered in chapter three sections A and B.

regional elites. There are some differences in the correlation coefficients (tables 7.5 and 7.7) which could be relevant to a different perception of development among the elite groups and possibly between the two regions.

Table 7.6: Crosstabulation of elite replies to questions QC4, QC5 and QC7

	Question QC4. Prosperity depends on:		Question QC5. SMEs likely to:		Question QC7. MNLs likely to:	
	LOCAL	MNLs	STAY	GO	STAY	GO
Strathclyde Politicians	8 53%	7 47%	14 93%	1 7%	2 17%	10 83%
Cretan Politicians	9 64%	5 36%	13 100%		7 58%	5 42%

Notes: a. Question QC4: Do you believe your region's prosperity depends more on: a. local entrepreneurs or b. Companies with headquarters outside the region. b. Question QC5: In the case of a recession do you believe small-medium sized business that will survive the recession are more likely to maintain operations in your region or shift to another region? c. Question QC7: In the case of a recession, do you believe multinational business are more likely to maintain operations in your region, or shift to another region?

Table 7.7: Spearman correlation coefficient matrix for political elites' replies to questions QC4, QC5 and QC7

	Scottish	Cretan	Scottish	Cretan
QC5	.037 sig .889	.372 .190		
QC7	.075 sig .782	.162 .579	.571 sig .021	.452 .104
	QC4		QC5	

Note: The standard qualifications on validity considerations apply here as well. The Negative category is collapsed with the Do Not Know category to facilitate correlations.

The higher value of the Cretan from the Strathclyde political elites correlation coefficient for questions QC4 and QC5 (table 7.5) can be related to the Cretans' stronger support for local entrepreneurs, rather than MNL enterprises (QC4).

The difference between the two political elites' distribution of replies in question QC7 is the most pronounced one. This I believe is relevant to the different experiences of industrialisation between the two regions, which makes the Strathclyde politicians more apprehensive of the role of MNLs. Because QC7 is not instrumental in the premise investigated by the working hypothesis, I do not consider that this difference merits any further attention.

The Scottish business elites' high values on correlations of questions QB3 and QB4, as well as QB3 and QB5 (table 7.7), relate to their positive attitude on the impact of SMEs on devolution (QB5), while they also tend to believe that more SMEs will be positive for their firm (QB4). An opposite attitude pattern is true for the Cretan businessmen, who relate more SMEs (QB3) with a negative competitive environment for their own business (QB4), and believe SMEs make a region more dependent on outside imports (QB5).

The pattern of elites replies, although divergent, does not follow the pattern assumed by the working hypothesis. The

Scottish businessmen, by exhibiting more trust, and the Cretan businessmen, by being more apprehensive of SMEs, broadly abide by the assumption of the premise. The Cretan politicians, by their unconditional support, and the Strathclyde politicians by holding an equivocal position do not support the premise. With the measures employed so far, my assumption of trust of SMEs and distrust of MNLs in those regions that have a higher level of devolution cannot be supported.

The argument could further be put forward that existing elites in power will not want a change that could affect the status quo. If this is the case it can be also argued that the particular elites interviewed are not those that are likely to instigate such a change.⁴¹⁰

It could be true as well that, my categorisation of Strathclyde as more devolved than the prefecture of Chania, (although reasonable taking account of the respective regional competencies), may not be the way Strathclyde elites perceive their region. For this reason I have used indirect measures by asking questions on SMEs and not on autonomy, in order to have the minimum bias on their replies. It could still be the case, however unlikely that

⁴¹⁰ . I do not consider elite change as it may be linked with broader process of economic and social change. A discussion of the link between micro (elite) and macro (society) interdependence in change of elites are discussed by Welsh (1979, ch.8).

their perception of the degree of regional devolution in their region is lower from that of Cretan elites.

In conclusion it is apparent that, although SMEs and regional entrepreneurs will be trusted more than MNLs in both samples, the pattern of their replies does not follow the one anticipated by the working hypothesis. Consequently, differences in attitudes between the elite groups in the two regions cannot be ascribed to the different level of devolution/decentralisation between the two regions. Which leads me not to accept the working hypothesis based on the quantitative evidence and proceed to examine the qualitative replies of interviewees.

In the case of business interviewees there is no apparent difference in their qualitative replies to questions QB3, QB4 and QB5 that differentiates from the quantitative analysis of their replies. The only minor difference was in replies to question QB3, on whether respondents foresee the development of more SMEs, in which the Cretan respondents seemed more preoccupied with such a scenario. Typical responses centred around the theme of a market with a high level of competition where "...the market is saturated"⁴¹¹ and "...there is no space [for further SMEs developing]"⁴¹². This slight divergence of Cretan businessmen is

⁴¹¹ . Case 50. Business proprietor. Date of Interview:19/9/1991

⁴¹² . Case 59. Business proprietor. Date of Interview:14/9/1991

understandable as they see the development of more SMEs as a direct threat to their own livelihood.⁴¹³

In the case of the political elite groups the only variation in their replies can be traced to question QC7 inquiring on MNL enterprises likelihood to go or stay. Beyond the fact that the issue investigated is marginal to the working hypothesis, apparent differences can be traced to the different experiences of industrialisation between the two regions. In the Cretan case the prevalent view was that "...[MNLs] will not go because they are currently developing the particular [Cretan] market"⁴¹⁴; while in the case of Strathclyde elites the predominant view is that "...multinationals have branch plants in the region [which are] externally controlled "⁴¹⁵. I take this difference in perspective to point to a significant difference in attitudes towards multinationals. It should be noted as well that, there is an underlying distrust in statements on MNLs activities from both elite groups.⁴¹⁶

So the qualitative data analysis, by not adding any significant insights in the similarities and disparities of

⁴¹³ . Cretan business are predominately small. An analysis of the size distribution of this sample compared with the Cretan business as a whole can be found in chapter three section D.

⁴¹⁴ . Case 74. Mayor. Date of Interview:21/9/1991

⁴¹⁵ . Case 9. Activist. Date of Interview:15/10/1991

⁴¹⁶ . A number of researchers have consistently investigated political attitudes towards multinational enterprises including La Palombara and Blank (1976), Fayerweather (1982) and Taggart (1993).

opinion between the elite groups, leaves the analysis inconclusive relating to WH7. The possibility that perceptions of the level of devolution are more important than a quantifiable categorisation of devolution make any results in this working hypothesis tentative. It is further the case that attitudes of two regional elites support and two refute the premise. This could be an indication that it is not the level of devolution, but the perceived level of devolution, that affects elite responses.⁴¹⁷ This consequently has a relevance to the next working hypothesis I examine.

This as all other conclusions in this thesis bears the obvious limitations of the measures and regions employed.

I proceed with an examination of the premise that:

WH8: Those regional elites that aspire to more autonomous rule will be more positive on SMEs prospects in their region.

This working hypothesis develops the premise examined in the previous working hypothesis by introducing a measure for the regional elites devolutionary aspirations which is the independent variable. I examine the importance elites place on SMEs, as the dependent variable in my investigation.

⁴¹⁷ . I note here that according to Anthony Smith "ethnic nationalisms do not generally correlate with economic trends" (1995, p.73).

As with the previous working hypothesis I have retained the assumption here that aspirations of elites to regional autonomy are linked with a trust of local entrepreneurs and SMEs and a distrust of MNLs.

To proceed with a test of this working hypothesis I have to use a measure of devolutionary aspirations that will apply to the four elite sub-groups. In part F of chapter five certain group control parameters were constructed, one of which was Measure B (regional elites' positive attitudes towards regional autonomy). This is the measure I will use here.

This measure employs replies to question Q1, which inquires whether macro-economic policies should be controlled at the regional, national or international level, Q2 which inquires whether federalism in Europe is viable and QD1 which asks whether respondents believe business would perceive autonomy positively.

In the analysis of replies to questions QC4 and QC5 (Table 7.6), pertaining to the political sub-groups, there is some strong evidence that the working hypothesis is supported by the data. In question QC5 inquiring whether SMEs that survived a recession were likely to stay in their region

93% of the Scottish and 100% of the Cretan sample that gave an answer replied in the affirmative.⁴¹⁸

In question QC4 inquiring whether they believe regional prosperity to depend more on local entrepreneurs or MNLs their replies show a trust for local entrepreneurs which is as high as 53% for the Scottish and 64% in the Cretan regional politicians.⁴¹⁹ This I believe to be supportive of their trust of SMEs which almost by definition are local. It would also be the case that for this particular question even a weak support for local entrepreneurs I would consider important since it would go against the popular wisdom of big MNLs being perceived as the driving force of growth.⁴²⁰

The two business elite groups have replies that are concordant with each other on the particular issue of SMEs' importance and prospects, as demonstrated by their replies to questions QB3 and QB4 (Table 7.4). More specifically,

⁴¹⁸ . On these questions I have attempted a measure of respondents acceptance of SMEs as important factors of growth in the region and I take respondents replies to be a testament to that effect. In appendix I on the Questionnaire Formation such issues are covered more extensively.

⁴¹⁹ . When a filter is used on the national politicians of Scotland, excluding the views of the 3 MPs, the Scottish support of local entrepreneurs was up to 62%. The three MPs views can be excluded since the subject matter of the hypothesis permits such a treatment, while for reasons of compatibility of the two samples (i.e. the Cretan sample lacks national MP interviewees) such a filter could be considered desirable.

⁴²⁰ . There is extensive literature referred to throughout this thesis on the importance of MNLs as potential engines of regional development and the relevant studies conducted at the international and European level (Yannopoulos, 1976) (Young, 1993).

79% of the Scottish business elite foresee the development of more SMEs in their region, while 88% believe that such a development will be good for their own business. In the Cretan sample 60% of respondents declared they foresee the development of more SMEs while 79% believed this will be positive for their own firm.

A further test for the business elites perceptions is a comparison in their replies on question QB5 (Table 7.4). Crosstabulations show that 83% of the Scottish and 76% of the Cretan business elites believe that a shift in the economy towards SMEs will lead to a more devolved and autonomous economy. This control proves that businessmen recognise a power in SMEs to 'generate autonomy' and at the same time have a positive opinion about them.

This result is significant if it is combined with the Strathclyde elites' perceived hostility towards regional autonomy and is contrary to assumptions made in the working hypothesis.

To provide a final test for the working hypothesis I compare elite attitudes towards SMEs with Measure B by constructing table 7.8. It becomes apparent from the comparison in this table that for two of the elite groups the relationship seems to hold true and for two of them it does not. It could be argued that attitudes on SMEs are not related with

regional autonomy and that is why the results are inconclusive. From evidence on question QB5 however, it becomes apparent that a great percentage of the business sample believe that autonomy and SMEs are related.

Table 7.8: Elite attitudes towards SMEs (QB3, QB4, QC4, QC5) compared with their attitudes towards regional autonomy indexed in Measure B and their anticipated attitudes as hypothesised in WH8

	Measure B Direction & Value	Recorded Attitudes on SMEs	Expected Attitudes on SMEs (WH8)
Strathclyde Politicians	POSITIVE 35.4	POSITIVE	POSITIVE
Strathclyde Businessmen	NEGATIVE -19.7	POSITIVE	NEGATIVE
Cretan Politicians	NEUTRAL 8.3	POSITIVE	NEUTRAL
Cretan Businessmen	POSITIVE 28.6	POSITIVE	POSITIVE

Note: a. Question QB3: Do you foresee the development of more SMEs in your region?; b. Question QB4: Will such a development create a positive environment for your firm?; c. Question QC4: Do you believe your region's prosperity depends more on local entrepreneurs or companies with headquarters outside the region?; d. Question QC5 In the case of a recession do you believe SMEs that will survive the recession are more likely to maintain operations in your region or shift to another region?.

According to the working hypothesis, elites that are more positive towards regional autonomy are going to be more positive towards SMEs' prospects. Since there are no questions on SMEs common to all elite groups, I can only compare the two political and the two business elites with

each other. In the table 7.9 I have constructed such a measure.

Table 7.9: Expected and Observed Affirmative Responses to Questions QB3, QB4; QC4 and QC5, according to WH8

	EXPECTED ACCORDING TO WH8	OBSERVED PERCENT.
QC4	SCOT.POL.> CRET. POL.	53% < 64%
QC5	SCOT.POL.> CRET. POL.	93% < 100%
QB3	CRET.BUS.> SCOT.BUS.	60% < 79%
QB4	CRET.BUS.> SCOT.BUS	79% < 88%

Notes: Spearman correlation coefficients between these variables are presented in table 7.5 and table 7.7.

In all relationships that could be investigated with the present data the observed relationship has an opposite direction from the expected one according to WH8. It is the case as well that the evidence is weaker for the political and stronger for the business elites.

This leads me to accept with reservations the alternative rival working hypothesis that:

AWH8: Those regional elites that aspire to more autonomous rule will be more negative on the prospects of SMEs in their region.

Such an attitude can be explained as an indication that aspirations to autonomy are linked with a bleak outlook for the economic prospects of a region.⁴²¹

Since their support for SMEs is apparent (Table 7.9) and at least some of them see SMEs as leading to more autonomy (QB5) it is possibly, not their support towards SMEs, but the business prospects of SMEs, that are negatively related to aspirations of autonomy. There are no comprehensive measures to monitor elite attitudes on whether an increased number of SMEs will also mean that SMEs have a bright future in a region.⁴²² I can only turn to elite qualitative replies for an indication of validity for this premise.

On a review of the qualitative replies of the business elites it becomes immediately apparent that most respondents share a great concern over SMEs future in their region. Cretan businessmen say that "...SMEs are closing"⁴²³ and "...they need greater state support"⁴²⁴. While Strathclyde businessmen claimed that more SMEs "...increase our

⁴²¹ . In relation to Scottish nationalism, it has been suggested that the SNP fortunes are linked with a relative poor performance of the Scottish economy. This perspective is summarised by Kellas (1989, p.137): "the SNP does well, according to this argument, when Scotland is seen to be doing badly relative to Britain".

⁴²² . Question QB3 covers this issue only partly, because it inquires whether respondents foresee the development of more SMEs, it does not inquire on whether SMEs have a positive future.

⁴²³ . Case 54. Business proprietor. Date of Interview:22/5/1991

⁴²⁴ . Case 45. Business manager. Date of Interview:24/9/1991

potential customer base"⁴²⁵ but that their increased numbers "...might pose competition"⁴²⁶. At the same time a Cretan executive claimed that "...a big corporation needs many SMEs in its environment"⁴²⁷ and a Strathclyde executive claimed that "...there is a relation between SMEs and economic growth"⁴²⁸. This evidence suggests that Cretan businessmen are rather negative on SMEs' prospects while Strathclyde businessmen, by contrast are rather positive.

The political elites in Crete claimed that "...if the local entrepreneurs invest, we don't need outside investors at all"⁴²⁹ while also stating that the future of the region depended "...mainly on local businessmen who are involved in tourism"⁴³⁰. The Strathclyde politicians claimed that "...the prospects are not good [since there is] no strong entrepreneurial spirit"⁴³¹, also claiming that "...local entrepreneurs [will be important] in the long term"⁴³². Apparently the Strathclyde politicians' perception of SMEs prospects is more negative than that of their Cretan counterparts.

⁴²⁵ . Case 31. Company director. Date of Interview:30/5/1991
⁴²⁶ . Case 18. Company director. Date of Interview:9/11/1991
⁴²⁷ . Case 55. Business manager. Date of Interview:18/9/1991
⁴²⁸ . Case 35. Company director. Date of Interview:23/5/1991
⁴²⁹ . Case 66. City Councillor. Date of Interview:25/9/1991
⁴³⁰ . case 68. City Councillor. Date of Interview:9/10/1991
⁴³¹ . Case 1. Regional Councillor. Date of Interview:26-28/6/1991
⁴³² . Case 7. Regional Councillor. Date of Interview:2/7/1991

The evidence from the qualitative analysis suggests that the alternative rival hypothesis is supported by the replies of elite groups. So, overall, the Cretan politicians were positive, while the businessmen were negative on SMEs' prospects. The Strathclyde politicians were negative, while the businessmen were positive on SMEs' prospects for their region. These attitudes are discordant with their views on regional autonomy (Measure B, in Table 7.8). This contradiction reinforces the validity of the premise of alternative working hypothesis eight (AWH8).

I finally examine whether:

WH9: Positive attitudes towards devolution in a region are related to a positive perception of business prospects for the region.

Respondents' attitudes towards devolution is the independent variable. This working hypothesis attempts to measure the existence of an effect of the independent variable on elite perceptions of the business prospects for a region.

I have made the assumption that elites which are positive on devolution will be positive on the business prospects for their region. This assumption was based on the observation that 65% of those who gave a positive reply on business

perception of autonomy (QD1) had a concordant reply on the preparedness of their region for 1992 (QD6).⁴³³

Effectively this test attempts an investigation of whether regional elites' business confidence relates to their devolutionary aspirations.

In a crosstabulation of respondents' replies, between their perception of business concern over further devolution (QD1) and their regions' competitive position (QD6), I found no apparent distribution variations between the political elites. The two variables appear unrelated for these sub-groups.⁴³⁴ I could either infer that the measures used are inappropriate or that this relationship does not hold true for the political elites.

The reasons that this relationship cannot hold true for the political elites can be traced in a number of causes that are relevant to the particular samples. In the case of the Cretan political sample the fact that 86% believe autonomy

⁴³³ . The figure of 65% is derived if all positive replies on QD1 are compared with replies on QD6 and all replies of QD6 that are at or above the mean value of the particular elite sub-group of QD6 are recorded as success.

⁴³⁴ . The Spearman correlation coefficients for QD1*QD6 were .277 (sig. .338) for the Cretan and -.150 (sig. .579) for the Scottish political elites. A negative view of autonomy (QD1) is correlated with a positive view of the regions preparedness (QD6) for the Cretan politicians, while a positive view of autonomy is correlated with and a negative view of the regions preparedness for Scottish politicians. The relatively small coefficients however, make any further inferences tenuous.

would not be perceived positively by business (QD1) limits the potential for analysis. Similarly in the case of the Strathclyde political elite the fact that 88% find the regional economy unprepared for the challenges of 1992 (QD6) limits the relevant inferences that can be made about the relationship this hypothesis attempts to investigate.

In examining the pattern of replies for the Cretan political elite I found a high degree of concordance in their replies to the two questions. They exhibit a high consistency in that 81% of their replies are either negative on both or positive on both questions investigated. This I take as an indication of a degree of correlation between the two questions, even if their frequency distributions reveal no apparent patterns.⁴³⁵

Inevitably I have to conclude, however, that for the measures at my disposal, no inferences can be made about the political elites. From the analysis of data for the business elites, a relationship becomes evident which is summarised in table 7.10. The business elites in Crete confirmed my initial assumption that a positive view of higher devolution (QD1) is related to a positive view of regional prospects (QD6). The Scottish business elite however, showed a different pattern of replies, since most

⁴³⁵ . The reliability of correlation coefficients is low as there is a large number of cells that have a low expected frequency.

of those believing that business would perceive autonomy positively also stated that their region is not prepared for 1992.⁴³⁶ Overall, the evidence is stronger in the case of the Cretan businessmen and inconclusive in the case of the Scottish businessmen.

This response pattern is sustained when analysing respondents' views on whether macro-economic policies should be controlled at the regional, national or international level (Q1), crosstabulated with their replies on the preparedness of the regional economy for 1992 (QD6). Again a similar pattern between the two business elites emerges. Scottish businessmen are divided into two groups. Those that believe macro-economics should be controlled at the national level and tend to be pessimistic about the region's prospects in 1992. And those believing that macro-economics should be controlled at the international level, are also more likely to believe that their region is comparatively prepared.

The Cretan businessmen have again the opposite perspective, most of those that believe macro-economics should be controlled at the regional level (Q1) being more likely to

⁴³⁶ . The Spearman correlation co-efficient for Strathclyde businessmen was .279 (sig. .209) which links a negative view on autonomy (QD1) with a high score on their perception of their region's preparedness for 1992 (QD6). The Cretan businessmen's sample showed a correlation of -.554 (sig. .009), which links their positive view on autonomy with a low score on their regions perceived preparedness for 1992.

believe that their region is comparatively prepared (QD6), while most of those believing macro-economics should belong to the international domain also believing that their region is not prepared.

Table 7.10: Regional business elites' crosstabulation of collapsed responses between questions QD1 and QD6.

	Strathclyde	Businessmen	Cretan	Businessmen
QD6 BY QD1	Business Positive on Autonomy	Business Negative on Autonomy	Business Positive on Autonomy	Business Negative on Autonomy
Region Not Prepared	5	8	2	12
Region Prepared	2	5	4	2
Region Well Prepared		1		

Notes: a. Question QD1: Do you believe that if your region were to become more autonomous business would perceive this as a generally positive development? b. Question QD6: Do you believe that the Strathclyde/Cretan economy is ready for the 1992 competition challenge? c. Refusals to reply and Do Not Know answers accounted for three cases in the Strathclyde and three cases in the Cretan sample.

I could thus divide the Scottish business elite sample into two main groups. Those that believed their region was prepared for 1992 (QD6) tended to have a negative view on business perception of autonomy (QD1) and at the same time believed macro-economics should be controlled at the international level(Q1). Those that believed their region

was not prepared for 1992 also believed business had a positive view of autonomy and that macro-economics should be controlled at the national level.

The Cretan business elite can also be divided into two main sub-groups. Those that had a positive view of the preparedness of their region towards 1992 (QD6) also tend to believe business will view autonomy positively (QD1) and that macro-economics should be controlled at the regional level (Q1). Those that had a negative view of the region's preparedness towards 1992 also believing business would perceive devolution negatively and supporting the view that macro-economics should be controlled at the international level.

It is apparent from the analysis, that there can be no irrefutable proof that the relationship between the two variables is true for the direction assumed in the beginning of the analysis. It is indeed possible that it is not attitudes on devolution that affect elites' perception of economic prospects, but economic prospects affecting devolutionary attitudes. Since the working hypothesis inquires into the existence of a relationship rather than its direction however, any strong indications to that effect will be considered adequate proof.

Furthermore, comparisons of scores from the measures constructed in chapter five give an indication of a strong link between attitudes on the issues investigated here. I constructed table 7.11 to compare attitudes on Measure B and Measure D.

Table 7.11: Comparisons of Measure B and Measure D

ELITE IDENTIFICATION	CUMULATIVE MEAN OF: Q1+Q2+QD1 MEASURE B	CUMULATIVE MEAN OF: QD5+QD6 MEASURE D
Strathclyde Politicians	35.4	-48.4
Strathclyde Businessmen	-19.7	-39.6
Cretan Politicians	8.3	-35.7
Cretan Businessmen	28.6	-61.9

Note: As calculated in chapter 5, section F, Measure B: Regional elites positive attitudes towards regional autonomy; Measure D: Regional elites perceived preparedness of the regional and national units towards 1992.

The two elite groups with the highest absolute scores on Measure B and Measure D are the Strathclyde politicians and the Cretan businessmen. Both groups had the highest positive scores on Measure B and the most negative scores in Measure D. This could signify a relationship between a positive attitude for regional autonomy as linked with a negative attitude on economic preparedness. Strathclyde businessmen and Cretan politicians recorded comparatively modest scores for these measures.

This evidence is against the basic hypothesis of WH9 that positive attitudes towards devolution are related to a positive perception of business prospects for a region. The evidence even warrants the creation of an alternative rival hypothesis on exactly the opposite premise that:

AWH9: Positive attitudes towards devolution in a region are related to a negative perception of business prospects for the region.

Since the analysis of the quantitative data support the alternative rival working hypothesis AWH9, qualitative replies to questions QD1 and QD6 will be used in order to provide a final test.

From the evidence so far, there seems to be a division of the elites I am investigating into two groups. The first group consists of the Strathclyde political elite and the Cretan business elite and their particular characteristic is their extremity of views on the issues of this working hypothesis. I will identify them as 'radical'. The second group consists of the Strathclyde business and the Cretan political elite who are more 'moderate' on the issues raised.

On their qualitative replies to question QD1 (would business perceive autonomy positively) it becomes apparent that the 'radicals' have a stronger opinion on the issue.

Strathclyde politicians say that business "...ought to be [positive on devolution but] they will not be"⁴³⁷, while suggesting that "...business favours the status quo"⁴³⁸. At the same time Cretan businessmen suggest that "...maybe autonomy would be good if political and economic guarantees are given [by Greece]"⁴³⁹, while showing apprehension that "...there is total dependence on the rest of Greece"⁴⁴⁰.

The 'moderate' elite groups had, overall, more balanced replies on QD1, but at the same time shared similar concerns with their respective 'radical' counterparts.⁴⁴¹ The Scottish business elite was rather negative on autonomy claiming that it will bring "...an increase in taxation"⁴⁴² and concern that "...in [the rest of] UK they will have a different attitude [towards devolution]"⁴⁴³. The Cretan political elite was split between those that claimed there was a great danger in autonomy by stating they will accept "...autonomy under no circumstances and for no reason"⁴⁴⁴ and those that claimed that "...there exists [a high level of] sensitivity on the issue"⁴⁴⁵.

⁴³⁷ . Case 2. City Councillor. Date of Interview:28/6/1991

⁴³⁸ . Case 11. Activist. Date of Interview:10/11/1991

⁴³⁹ . Case 62. Business proprietor. Date of Interview:16/9/1991

⁴⁴⁰ . Case 44. Business proprietor. Date of Interview:23/9/1991

⁴⁴¹ . The semantic interpretation of the term autonomy in this instance could be interpreted to mean devolution in the case of the Scottish and independence in the case of the Cretan elites.

⁴⁴² . Case 32. Managing director. Date of Interview:29/5/1991

⁴⁴³ . Case 36. Managing director. Date of Interview:22/5/1991

⁴⁴⁴ . Case 69. Mayor. Date of Interview:20/9/1991

⁴⁴⁵ . Case 67. City Councillor. Date of Interview:26/9/1991

I proceed with an investigation of elite replies on question QD6 (on whether the regional economy was ready for 1992). From the group of 'radicals' a Scottish politician claimed that "...[regional elites did] not know what 1992 is"⁴⁴⁶, while a Cretan businessman said that Crete was not prepared because "...the Greek economy is undisciplined"⁴⁴⁷.

The concerns of the 'moderates' were not much different. A Strathclyde businessmen claimed that "...Scotland is in a recession for hundreds of years"⁴⁴⁸ while another that "Strathclyde is opening-up a regional route to Brussels"⁴⁴⁹. The Cretan politicians showed concern over the role of the national bureaucracy, one of them claiming that the regional economy is not ready because "...the decision making is done in Athens and we have no direct connection with Brussels"⁴⁵⁰. As is evident, there are no apparent trends in elite replies, relevant to question QD6. The same themes of distrust of the national bureaucracy for the Cretan and apprehension towards 1992 for the Strathclyde elites were eminent here as they were in their replies to question QD1.

⁴⁴⁶ Case 14. MEP. Date of Interview:18/10/1991

⁴⁴⁷ Case 55. Business manager. Date of Interview:18/9/1991

⁴⁴⁸ Case 25. Managing director. Date of Interview:5/6/1991

⁴⁴⁹ Case 33. Managing director. Date of Interview:27/5/1991

⁴⁵⁰ Case 76. Mayor. Date of Interview:23/9/1991

I hypothesise that one of the reasons that two elite groups seem moderate and two seem radical relates to their respective degree of acceptance of the status quo and their consequent propensity to initiate change.

The two 'radical' elites have their own reasons for discontent. The Scottish regional politicians predominantly belong to the opposition parties, where they have been since 1979. They do not accept the UK government's interference, while they see its policies as disruptive and detrimental to their region.⁴⁵¹ The Cretan business elite is systematically hindered in its activities by a centralised and unresponsive national bureaucracy.⁴⁵² Both groups can foresee great benefits from change.

⁴⁵¹ . On an article in the special supplement of the *Financial Times* on Scotland (FT, 13 December 1991, p.30/2) titled 'Farce and Tragedy' the views of all Scottish political parties, including the Conservatives, are reported to be in favour of some form of Scottish assembly. The views of local opposition parties in Strathclyde to Government proposals for the reform of local government, (to a single tier Council system), may be one of the reasons behind their hostility towards the incumbent Government (Glasgow City Council, 1991) (Strathclyde Regional Council, 1993) (Scottish Office, 1992). For a critical analysis of the views of the main British political parties on regional government see Moore (1991).

⁴⁵² . The extent of the Greek states' centralised structures and resistance to reform is attested by the attempt to decentralise the administrative structures legislated in 1986 (Law 1622/86), which however were not yet enacted as policy by 1991 (Pierros 1991, p.55). The role of the prefectures in the attempt to decentralise Greece is analysed by Verney and Papageorgiou (1992). Regional policy incentives combined with the need for decentralisation were identified as a hindrance to development by the 'Fifth Periodic Report on the Social and Economic Condition and Development of the Regions of the Community' (Commission, 1994).

The 'moderate' elites have invested interests in the status quo, that are to an extent threatened by change.

Strathclyde businessmen are alarmed by the prospect of devolution and higher taxes more than they are of increased competition from Europe.⁴⁵³ Similarly, the prospect of autonomy⁴⁵⁴ for the Cretan political elites is an anathema which contrasts with their understanding of the need of the region for administrative devolution from Athens.⁴⁵⁵ The two moderate elites are thus apprehensive of devolutionary change and the effect it may have to their elite position and benefits in their respective regions.

A comparative examination of the results in testing working hypotheses WH7, WH8 and WH9 gives a profile of the elites

⁴⁵³ . Three quarters of the members of the Scottish CBI, in April of 1991, opposed any form of a Scottish Assembly (as reported in the *Financial Times*, 21 February 1992, p.20).

⁴⁵⁴ . Herzfeld (1985, pp.3-50) gives some very interesting insights on the hierarchy of a sense of belonging for the Cretan people and their 'concentric loyalties' between the local, the regional, the national and the European level. In his study he identifies the segmentary view of Cretan allegiances to be based on the view that "Crete, ..., regards itself as an idiosyncratic and proudly independent part of the national entity, distinct from it, physically separated from it, but yet endowed with qualities that have made Crete the birthplace of many national leaders in politics, war, and the arts" (Hertzfeld, 1985, p.6).

⁴⁵⁵ . The calls for political autonomy are related by Cretan and Greek Press to foreign attempts to destabilise Greece. The source of such perceived propaganda has at different times been identified as the United States who hold military bases on the island (Cretan local newspaper 'Alithia', a number of issues in July 1979); Israel, through its intelligence agency Mosad (Cretan local newspaper 'Kritiko Fos', 15 July 1979); the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (national Greek newspaper 'Ethnos tis Kyriakis', 2 February 1992) and Turkey on numerous occasions (Cretan local newspapers 'Chaniotika Nea' and 'Kyrikas Chanion' on a number of issues in 1991). In this political climate Cretan political elites view the debate on devolution from Greece with a marked unease.

investigated relevant to their attitudes on devolution and their perceptions of business prospects for their region (H IV). In particular, the fact that the two regional elites come from regions with a different level of devolution of local government appears to have an equivocal impact on perceptions of SMEs importance (WH7); those regional elites that aspire to more autonomous rule will be more negative on the prospects of SMEs in their region (AWH8); and positive attitudes towards devolution relate to a negative perception of business prospects in a region (AWH9). It is apparent that for the case of the particular elite samples and regions there is evidence to support the hypothesis that there exists a relationship between attitudes on devolution and perceptions of business prospects (H IV).

Finally it should be noted that the assumptions that support this research also limit its universality. There are a number of assumptions that underpin this investigation, and have to be borne in mind in the interpretation of results presented. Particularly relevant to the hypotheses presented here is that aspirations of higher devolution relate to expectations of higher prosperity and also that centralised national control of the local economy is perceived as inefficient.

D. Influence of Attitudes on Regional Growth⁴⁵⁶

As outlined in chapter two, I have included here a discussion of one hypothesis I aspired to test at the beginning of this research effort, but for which there could be no conclusive measures devised for the particular sample and research resources. The advantage of proceeding with a purely exploratory investigation of this hypothesis lies in the existence of a wealth of information in my survey that could give some indication for its validity and possibly assist in future research efforts.

I investigate whether:

H V. The greater the similarity of attitudes among the political and business elite in a region the better the regional growth prospects.

I have used this hypothesis as an assumption in a number of occasions, on the logical deduction that co-operation is a more productive course than friction in societal

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. I have proceeded to the investigation of these issues with the presentation of two papers so far, the first co-authored with Stephen Herbert (Christopoulos and Herbert, 1996) focused on institutional transformations in Strathclyde, while the second is a comparative study of the impact of elite concordance on growth prospects in Strathclyde and Crete (Christopoulos, 1996a). I have to thank reviewers and commentators at the 1996 Annual PSA Conference and the 1996 ECPR Annual Session of Workshops for very constructive comments and ideas that have helped me advance my argument.

interactions. Although logical on the surface this premise is not necessarily true in the everyday experience of elite interaction. Difficulties in providing a proof for this hypothesis are compounded by the difficulty of inferring an influence on the 'macro' level (regional competitiveness) by the 'micro' level (elite interaction).

I have identified the similarity (or diversity) of attitudes between the business and political elites as the independent variable and the regional growth prospects as the dependent variable in each region. I anticipate that the region with a greater similarity in attitudes among two elite groups has better growth prospects. It can be argued that depending on how well a region is doing, we can infer a regional elites' success in promoting regional development.⁴⁵⁷ So, as a measure of comparison I include data on the performance of the two regional economies investigated as they compare with regions of similar development level and position in the economic cycle.

Because of a great number of antecedent and background variables this investigation cannot provide a quantifiable

⁴⁵⁷ . Naturally this proposition applies only to the degree that a regional political elite is responsible for regional development. However, it is safe to assume that in contemporary western Europe national politicians will employ discriminatory regional policy only for the benefit of their dissadvantaged periphery, otherwise acting for the benefit of the whole state. The regional impact of their policies can be therefore considered negligible in the long term, if this assumption is valid.

element on the relative importance of the variable investigated. Furthermore I have to account for the possibility of spuriousness, particularly since an indication of similar responses between elite groups is not necessarily a proof of harmony in their relationship.⁴⁵⁸ It could also be argued that, to the degree that there is interlockingness among the two elite groups in each region, they would be expected to hold similar opinions. I believe that for the samples investigated the degree of covert interlockingness is rather small, as uncovered in a number of previous hypotheses.⁴⁵⁹

To provide a measure of discordance in the replies of the two regional elites, I have devised a new measure based on a comparison of Measures A, B, C and D. In particular I quantify the absolute difference in the scores of the regional elite groups on each of the above measures eventually adding them up to measure the regional elites 'Discordance in Attitudes Score'. I subsequently convert

⁴⁵⁸ . Alternative methods of investigating actor interrelations, including social network analysis (Scott, 1991; Wasserman and Galaskiewicz, 1994) or a sociometric application to decision making networks (John and Cole, 1996) are not considered adequate as they give limited importance to the sharing of values among actors in their analysis.

⁴⁵⁹ . Welsh (1979, p.27) has identified Greece as a country where interlockingness is 'periodically' prevalent due to the 'traditional oligarchies' of the country. A discussion on the tests and identifiable interlockingness of elite groups is presented earlier in this chapter in part B as well as comprising part of the analysis in chapter 6. It is my conviction that positional interlockingness is of minor significance in this sample.

this absolute difference into an index to facilitate the interpretation of results. Since I measure absolute difference, a high index score signifies a high degree of difference and a low index score a low degree of difference. This index can take a minimum value of zero if the two groups are completely concordant and a maximum value of 100 if the two groups are completely discordant.

Table 7.12: Index of Discordance as revealed by the difference in attitudes scores between the business and political elites in Strathclyde and Nomos Chanion.

	Measure A	Measure B	Measure C	Measure D	CUMULATIVE SCORE A+B+C+D	DISCORDANCE INDEX D
Strathclyde Politicians	39.1	35.4	35.3	-48.4	122.6	15.3
Strathclyde Businessmen	-11.4	-19.7	27.1	-39.6		
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN STRATHCLYDE ELITES	50.5	55.1	8.2	8.8		
Cretan Politicians	-17.9	8.3	0.0	-35.7	87.0	10.9
Cretan Businessmen	-3.6	28.6	26.2	-61.9		
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CRETAN ELITES	14.3	20.3	26.2	26.2		

Notes: **a.** The algebraic equation used to produce the absolute difference score a , when one of the Measure scores is negative and one is positive, has the following form: $[a] = [b] + [c]$. When both Measure scores are either positive or negative it becomes: $[a] = [b] - [c]$. **b.** The discordance index **D** is calculated as the sum of the absolute difference values divided by eight $d = (a_A + a_B + a_C + a_D) / 8$.

By examining table 7.12 it becomes immediately apparent that Strathclyde and Cretan elite groups are quite disparate.

This is apparent in both the level and the variance of their discordance. Cretan political and business elites appear to have a constant and consistent discordance across the spectrum of the measures employed. Strathclyde elites portray a very different picture however. In measures A (grievance towards their national government) and B (positive attitudes towards regional autonomy) they show a high level of discordance. Reasons for this discordance can be sought in the high degree of grievance by Strathclyde politicians compared with a negative one by businessmen,⁴⁶⁰ while at the same time a positive attitude towards regional autonomy by politicians compares with a negative one by businessmen. This discordance can be related to the high priority the particular issues hold on the political agenda and their highly 'emotive' content in the political debate. By comparison, there is a comparatively small discordance in measures C (difference of local people) and D (preparedness towards 1992).

Two alternative and rival explanations can be offered in interpretation of Strathclyde discordance. The first one is that Strathclyde region will be doing better (than a

⁴⁶⁰ . Businessmen showing 'negative grievance' towards their national government are in effect supportive of national policies.

comparable region) because regional elite discordance centres along politically sensitive issues. In that respect it will not be able to affect the interaction between the political and business elites who can have an active collaboration, evident from their concordance on non-politically sensitive issues. The alternative explanation would point to the politically sensitive nature of the measures of high discordance and suggest that elite interaction will depend on the existence of non-divisive issues among elites and that therefore Strathclyde is bound to do worse (than a comparable region).

In the Cretan case again two alternative rival explanations can be offered. In the first instance it can be hypothesised that the relative concordance influences elite interaction positively, and that by reflection it has a decisive influence on regional development. In that case Crete would be expected to be doing better than a comparable region. The alternative explanation would be that political elites will not interact successfully with business elites because they have consistently different perspectives as

evident from a small but constant difference in their attitudinal measures.⁴⁶¹

A comparison of the discordance index scores between Strathclyde and Crete points to a higher discordance score for the Strathclyde than the Chania elite. If the two regions could be directly compared I would expect Chania influenced by a comparatively concordant regional elite, to show a better relative performance than Strathclyde. Such a comparison would assume however that agreement in all measures is of incrementally equal importance to elite co-operation.

A final word of caution in the interpretation of the attitudinal results. In the case of the Strathclyde elites' relative discordance, it can be partly ascribed to presumed different political affiliations.⁴⁶² On the other hand, the

⁴⁶¹ . It should always be born in mind that particularly in the era discussed, regional elites in Crete had a limited input on regional development and planning, being rather dependent on national elites. Andrikopoulou (1992) refers to the failure of 'regionalising' the Greek budget and giving power to local political elites in Greece. Furthermore, in attaining a truly comparative measure the region of comparison should be of similar size to the one from which attitudinal data were examined, in this case for instance the West of Crete (Nomos Chanion) with one of the eastern prefectures (Nomos Irakliou). Statistical data limitations preclude that possibility.

⁴⁶² . Small variance of attitudes can be linked to differences in an elites' perception or view-point (Rickets, 1990; Brittan, 1990).

degree to which the measure constructed identifies value orientations, political affiliations can be considered less relevant. The criticism can also be levied that Cretan elites are relatively concordant because there is a limited impact local political elites' power has on business elites.⁴⁶³

I believe that in spite of all such intervening or antecedent variables, the examination of the evidence will give a good indication of the input of regional elites to regional performance.⁴⁶⁴

I proceed to examine data on the growth rate of the two regions between 1990 and 1992 expecting to find how well the

⁴⁶³ . I have argued in this thesis that Cretan political elites are relevant to the political process (even though they belong to a less devolved region than Strathclyde) because they are tied to the national political elites. Their role could be linked to what Kouvertaris and Dobratz (1984) identified as the 'vertical clientelistic relationships' on the pyramid of political patronage and favouritism. Of course this raises the possibility of the particular local elites holding only 'positional' and not 'functional' eliteness in their exercise of power (as discussed by Welsh, pp.166-167). I have empirically perceived their 'functional' elite power, in their locality, to be significant however. Finally, local political elites are definitely relevant to local business interests by their controls on planning permissions and licensing of business. Research on Spanish regional elites (Vazquez-Barquero, 1990) has pointed to the close ties between business and political elites that are fostered under a local development strategy.

⁴⁶⁴ . Valid attitudinal comparisons should entail regions of similar size, endowments, economic development and stage in the economic cycle. Regions like Strathclyde and Merseyside can be considered of roughly similar socio-economic background and offer better grounds for comparison.

two regions performed compared to the regions of Merseyside and Notio/Vorio Aigaio.⁴⁶⁵ I assume that elite membership in regions investigated (Crete, Strathclyde) were the same (or if different displayed similar attitudes and behaviour), for the period investigated.⁴⁶⁶ Regional elites in the 'null hypothesis' regions of comparison (Aigaio, Merseyside) are presumed not to have the characteristics that make Strathclyde and Crete unique.

It is, of course, the case that I cannot provide an exact measure of how significant the regional elites' input is to the respective regional performance. It could also be the case that over the period examined, external events, irrelevant to the input of the respective regional elites, had influenced the performance of the respective regions. I could also identify a number of structural constraints on the influence of elite interaction on regional growth. These would stem from previous rounds of capitalist accumulation and the 'uneven' character of capitalist development between Strathclyde and Crete. Comparing the performance of Strathclyde *vis a vis* Merseyside and Crete

⁴⁶⁵ . Crete has a similar economic profile with different sectors of Vorio and Notio Aigaio, so combining the two appears to provide the best mode of comparison. See table 7.13 for the comparison of the regional economies by sector.

⁴⁶⁶ . Regional elites 'personnel circulation' and 'social circulation' data (as defined by Welsh 1979, pp.25-26), are not available for the Cretan regional elites.

vis a vis Vorio and Notio Aigaio is an attempt to alleviate that condition.

I believe that in spite of all such intervening or antecedent variables, the examination of the evidence will give a good indication of the input of the regional elites to the regional performance.⁴⁶⁷ Finally, results from the regional rate of performance can provide a broad measure of comparison between the two regional elites.

Table 7.13: GVA by sector for Strathclyde/Dumfries/Galloway with Merseyside; Crete with Vorio and Notio Aigaio.

	Agriculture	Industry	Services
Strathclyde+	1%	30%	69%
Merseyside	0%	27%	70%
Notio Aigaio	9%	27%	64%
Vorio Aigaio	25%	17%	57%
Crete	25%	26%	49%


Source: Portrait of the Regions, Vol. 2 and Vol. 3, Commission of the EC, Luxembourg 1993.

Both regions under investigation appear to be doing better than their regions of comparison (graph 7.1). Strathclyde appears to be doing remarkably better than Merseyside, while

⁴⁶⁷ . Ideally this test would be performed on regions of similar size, endowments, economic development and stage in the economic cycle.

Crete appears to be doing marginally better than Notio and Vorio Aigaio.⁴⁶⁸

Graph 7.1: Regional GDP at market prices for Strathclyde/Merseyside and Crete/Notio & Vorio Aigaio measured in PPS, for 1990=100



Note: The weighted PPS value of 100 for the two regions is provided from the formula $a=100/b$, where b equals the respective PPS value of the base year for each region. In the case of Crete $a_C=2.22$ and in the case of Strathclyde $a_S=1.162$. PPS data are available in the Eurostat: *Basic Statistics of the EC/EU*, Luxembourg, 1992-1995.

As apparent from table 7.13 Strathclyde and Crete do not have an economic profile that can allow a direct comparison, Merseyside and Vorio and Notio Aigaio respectively, seem to provide a fair match however.

⁴⁶⁸ . It should be noted that statistics published in relation to regional growth denote a fall in the average growth of GNP for the 12 European Community Member States commencing from 1988. This trend was consistent until 1993 (Commission, 1994).

Coming back to the possible explanations of their discordance I have to conclude that the Strathclyde elites have 'performed better', as is evident from the favourable disparity in regional growth with Merseyside. It is reasonable to assume that the comparative discordance among elites in Strathclyde was focused on political issues with a marginal effect on their co-operation. The evidence here suggests that their co-operation was not hampered by their discordance on politically 'sensitive' issues.

In the case of Crete, it can similarly be argued that although attitudinal discordance is evident in all measures constructed, this discordance does not appear to hamper the growth prospects of the region. It is also the case, however, that the combined regions of comparison appear to be doing just as well. It can be deduced that a small level of discordance influences elite interaction if it is assumed that it points to a varying but not necessarily divisive perspective of the relevant elite groups. Results for the Greek regions are made more tenuous by the limited level of decentralisation of the Greek state at the time of this investigation. This would suggest that regional political elites are less significant to regional development as

regional elite interaction cannot be seen to be instrumental to development.

An exercise of the possible reasons behind attitudinal concordance or discordance can be offered however, based on the two regions for which data exist: Strathclyde politicians assessing that they are in the periphery of Europe and suffering from a declining industrial base were preoccupied with supporting entrepreneurship and regional development (Keating, 1988; Jensen-Butler, 1996).⁴⁶⁹ Their approach was pro-active as they strived to develop links with the local business community and establish a 'policy network', that would allow them to tap into European financial resources (Bomberg, 1994).⁴⁷⁰

In the case of Crete, the region was suffering under strict centralisation of all regional development schemes, and the regional political elite lacked the impetus to produce

⁴⁶⁹ . It has been recently pointed-out that the effect of the Single Market on Scotland has not been particularly significant (Raines et al, 1995). On the other hand the Strathclyde Regional Council using data compiled by Cambridge Econometrics suggest that the region has greatly benefited by European Structural Funds, predicting an impact of an additional 34.500 thousand jobs by the year 2000 (Strathclyde Economic Trends, 1995).

⁴⁷⁰ . The actions of Scottish elites have been well documented (Keating and Midwinter, 1981; Stoker, 1991; Kellas, 1989).

solutions for the business of the region. The networks existing in Crete were clientelistic with the national bureaucratic and political elite at the nexus of those networks. This lack of independence for the political elites does not eliminate their significance however. Local enterprise councils and communal entrepreneurial initiatives, in which the local political elites were highly active created a local 'entrepreneurial milieu'.⁴⁷¹

According to table 7.12, regional elites appear more concordant in Crete than they do in Strathclyde, at the same time regional elites in Strathclyde were comparatively successful while there is no strong evidence to suggest the same for Crete. Except from noting the limited compatibility of the two regions, in terms of the policy making freedom of the relevant political elites, I can offer an explanation that refers to their respective political culture. It is possible that in regions where civil society can only accept a 'meritocratic' dissemination of political patronage, elite concordance is vital to regional development. On the other part of the spectrum where

⁴⁷¹ . Or what Bailly and Lever (1996) call 'regional milieux'.

clientelistic networks are prevalent elite concordance, although important, is not essential. Regional elites in the latter case, although not openly interlocking are likely to be part of a single network.⁴⁷² Evidence for these relationships should lie with elite interaction in each region.

In an attempt to determine which are the factors that play the determining role in the interaction between business and political elites in Strathclyde and Crete I analysed their qualitative replies on a number of questions inquiring on the level and intensity of this interaction (QB6-QB13 and QC4-QC13).

The qualitative data analysis on their value orientations can be summarised in that, Strathclyde business and political elites do not show the singularity of purpose exhibited by elite groups in Chania.⁴⁷³ At the same time

⁴⁷² . Piatonni (1996) in her model of 'virtuous clientelism' suggests that there are certain conditions under which clientelism can induce development, which implies an efficient allocation of resources within a clientelistic network.

⁴⁷³ . This does not imply that there have not been notable success in the interaction between the public and private sector in Strathclyde. An obvious example is *Glasgow Action* that successfully dealt with the '1990 European City of Culture' celebrations.

political elites in Strathclyde seem keen to co-operate with business and facilitate business expansion. This evidence would support the premise that regional elites in Crete although not always co-operating appear to share the same vision for their region. Regional elites in Strathclyde although relatively discordant on politically 'sensitive' issues make a conscious effort at co-operation, even when they do not share the same vision for their region's future.

It is apparent that there are significant differences in the political culture of interviewees in the two regions investigated.⁴⁷⁴ It is however beyond the scope of this paper to investigate that conjecture and determine to what degree it is the differences in the civic and political culture that can be responsible for the different way elite attitudes appear to affect regional elite interaction.

A factor of spuriousness in this analysis could be that higher growth rates for Crete are relevant to its higher potential for growth. Crete starting from a lower level of productivity and an economy based on agricultural production

⁴⁷⁴ . Differences in political culture are examined in chapter 3 section E.

has a higher potential for development.⁴⁷⁵ Data for that period however show that the expected trend to industrialisation cannot account for Crete's higher growth.

As is apparent from Table 7.14, in the Cretan economy an increasing amount of value added is produced in agriculture in a remarkable nine percentage points change between 1986 and 1991.⁴⁷⁶ Scotland is moving in the predictable trend of most post-industrial economies by transferring resources away from industry and into services.⁴⁷⁷ So, industrialisation cannot be relevant to the difference in the growth performance of the two regions.

Table 7.14: Gross Value Added in market prices by sector for Scotland and Crete

	CRETE			SCOTLAND		
	Agriculture	Industry	Services	Agric.	Indust.	Serv.
1986	36.0%	19.9%	44.1%	2.1%	38.6%	59.2%
1991	45.0%	15.9%	39.1%	3.1%	30.4%	66.5%

Note: Source here is the Eurostat publication *Basic Statistics of the Community*, Luxembourg, 1987 and 1994.

⁴⁷⁵ . This potential for development has failed to materialise within the last fifteen years as it can be demonstrated from the data of average GDP growth in table 7.12. This I believe relates more to the economic performance of Greece as a whole rather than to a failing of the region. Certain reasons for the deteriorating competitiveness of the Greek industry are analysed in the relevant report of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 1993).

⁴⁷⁶ . The Cretan economy's shift to agricultural production and tourism is attributed to the specialisation of the local economy away from an 'integrated and self-sufficient economic unit' (Manolikakis, 1963) to a peripheral unit, geared towards European production needs. A complete account of the trends for the regional economy is given in chapter three part D.

⁴⁷⁷ . A more complete discussion of economic trends for the two regions is presented in chapter three.

So does attitudinal concordance among elite actors affect regional performance? Or even more topically, do regional elites agree? And what is the significance of this agreement or disagreement?

In the evidence I have uncovered regional elites' concordance appears to be related to the performance of a region. This happens despite of a presumed negative attitude of a Labour dominated local authority to business (Strathclyde) or of a state 'controlled' local political elite (Chania/Crete). In both regions investigated there appears to be a *modus vivendi* between the local and national political elites under which although the locality may be on the receiving end of state caprice, co-operation over 'practical' development issues prevails. Such an 'understanding' certainly suits local business elites as it typically serves their interests. It could be argued therefore, that regional political elites are significant for business, even in comparatively centralised states, by the degree to which they subjugate their own interests to those of business in their area.⁴⁷⁸ It would be interesting

⁴⁷⁸ . This argument assumes that local politicians associate more closely with issues of 'equity' and 'resource use externalities' than 'efficient use of resources' arguments. For a comprehensive debate of the trade-offs of urban economic policy Jensen-Butler (1996) gives an excellent account, while Pickvance (1996) deals with its political dimensions.

to determine the degree to which political elite actions are guided by a sharing of 'values' with the business elite.⁴⁷⁹

It is also topical at this stage to note that the debate on the relevance of the interaction between regional business and political elites acquires significance only in the context of contemporary local elite interaction.⁴⁸⁰ Within the context of contemporary modern (or post-modern for some) political interaction and under the effects of market globalisation local business and political elites roles change. The emergence of the welfare state to a degree emancipates local political elites from dependence on business or land-owning interests. At the same time integration of international markets creates a new production and consumption space. Difficulty with the onomatopoeia for this new topography of what Swyngedouw (1992) calls the 'glocal' while Coffey and Bailey (1996) call 'micro-global' points to problems with its definition. With the growth in importance of 'place productivity' (Jensen-Butler, 1996) at the expense of the principle of absolute advantage for an area, urban or economic regions

⁴⁷⁹ . It is indeed relevant to the examination of elite interaction within 'policy networks' of whether those elites share the same values. In this respect, value concordance is an essential determinant of what can be termed the 'quality' of elite interaction and could provide a better understanding (instead of a simple investigation of elite interaction) of how closely policy networks coincide with networks of power.

⁴⁸⁰ . Slaven and Kim (1994) among others have noted the extensive interlockingness among business and political elites in Scotland between 1860 and 1960.

become increasingly more important as the new production engines in Europe and the world (ERECO, 1993).

In conclusion, initial examination of the data would support the premise of HV as higher attitude concordance among elite groups in Crete is matched by their higher growth than Strathclyde. When the two regions are compared with the 'equivalent' regions of Vorio/Notio Aigaio and Merseyside, Strathclyde's performance is more remarkable, however. Lack of evidence on elite concordance on the regions of comparison precludes any conclusive evaluation of the premise. There is some degree of confidence in saying that higher concordance of attitudes in Crete correlates with a higher likelihood of agreement and a sharing of values among elite groups than is the case in Strathclyde. However, as unravelled through the examination of data in this section, agreement among regional elites does not necessarily lead to 'productive' co-operation. Evidence analysed here offers support to the alternative hypothesis that only concordance on certain attitudes is significant for elite interaction (that is relevant to regional competitiveness). Strathclyde elites appear more concordant than Cretan one's on Measure D (preparedness towards 1992). If this measure is indicative of other similar attitudes that could be grouped under an elites' concern with a market's efficiency⁴⁸¹ it would lend

⁴⁸¹ . Efficiency considerations can be linked to policy efforts to supplement the workings of the market when it fails to attain a 'Pareto

support to the premise that only certain values are important for regional elite co-operation.

I can juxtapose that the sharing of values among elites facilitates what economists call the 'entrepreneurial milieu' although I cannot test the null hypothesis for this argument. The existence however of elite concordance would be in accord with arguments presuming the emergence of governance in the European regions along neo-corporatist lines. If it can be proven that regional elite co-operation depends only on sharing of values relevant to regional development and happens in spite of or regardless of their sharing of values on issues in the political or social agenda, this would provide support to one of the basic tenets of neo-corporatism.

My initial hypothesis (HV) could be thus refined to examine whether regional elite attitudinal concordance on issues of economic efficiency (as opposed to issues of social equity or political governance) promotes regional growth prospects.⁴⁸² The academic discourse surrounding such an investigation is examined in the next chapter.

optimum' efficiency as well as attempts to introduce 'structural efficiency' by the support of 'urban entrepreneurialism' within the context of interregional competition (Jensen-Butler, 1996, pp.262-279).
⁴⁸² . Efficiency and equity as defined by Jensen-Butler (1996).

So, with conditional support for the hypothesis that attitudinal concordance among elites affects regional development in different ways in both regions investigated, I now turn to a re-evaluation of the whole research exercise, examining the relevance of my conclusions to the current academic debate.

Chapter 8

Conclusions and Inferences

A. Evaluation of Research: Measure of Attainment

I have argued here that regional elite interaction may be one of the causes behind differentials in regional performance. It should be apparent however, that precise measurements of elite interaction and their exact influence on regional development are problematic relationships to gauge. Hence a number of important limitations to this hypothesis arise.

In setting out to investigate the interaction of European regional elites, my attempt has been to study the relevance of their attitudes and interaction with their respective regional polity. I have also attempted to 'question' the relevance of those attitudes to a number of pre-conceived notions on what regional elites do and what they believe while also revealing possible inconsistencies between their professed attitudes and their actual behaviour. In this work I have conducted a study of attitudes with the intention of understanding behaviour.

Consequently, the two main themes investigated dealt with 'regional autonomy' and 'European integration'. A number of secondary or supportive issues examined included 'grievances towards their national government', perceived regional 'difference from the national body' and 'preparedness of their economy towards 1992'. These issues were examined in the interview questions and led to the construction of attitudinal indexes that were subsequently employed in a control function of the main themes investigated.

It has been evident throughout this thesis that on most issues investigated conclusions cannot be final but rather indicative. It is the case as well that a number of very significant issues raised were addressed, leading to a number of novel hypotheses that are expounded in the last section of this thesis.

Validity considerations,⁴⁸³ as they arise out of the nature of an elite survey, together with restrictions arising from the implementation of a limited scale questionnaire⁴⁸⁴ should be taken into account while interpreting results. These limitations however, are endemic to privately funded research and do not necessarily deduct from the originality of the research approach or the relevance of the conclusions.

⁴⁸³ . Extensively discussed in chapter two, part E.

⁴⁸⁴ . A discussion of the sample versus the population size is analysed in chapter four, part D.

The variety of individual answers to questions raised in the interviews were effectively processed by a combined use of quantitative (in codified statistical analysis) and qualitative (recorded responses to open-ended questions) techniques of analysis. The use of both methods in tandem provides potential gains in the reliability of the data, particularly in small size, case intensive and cross sectional elite surveys.⁴⁸⁵ The profile of the four elite sub-groups (extensively explored in chapter five) emerges from their replies to the diverse questions posed. Their rather diverse attitudes became apparent early-on and serve to identify each of the four groups in their idiosyncracies. In the course of testing the hypotheses, within and between regional differences become apparent.

It comes as no surprise, for instance, that devolution and business prospects are correlated, the direction and strength of the correlation however, were not as self-

⁴⁸⁵ . The use in this research of both techniques could be improved by devising a model in the future for case intensive quantitative elite surveys (discussed in part E of this chapter). I have used a quasi-experimental design by employing both qualitative and quantitative techniques. This design led to the introduction of a number of substantive differences in the interpretation of results. A more thorough exposition of the research design is presented in appendix I on the formation of the questionnaire.

evident and required careful interpretation.⁴⁸⁶ The eventual use of this correlation in conjunction with a number of other working hypotheses leads to the support of the premise that a relationship exists between attitudes on devolution and business prospects in a region. In this as in all other hypotheses, the analysis is based on a number of assumptions. These assumptions limit the universality of findings and point to inherent difficulties in interpretations of attitude surveys.⁴⁸⁷ To counteract these hindrances in interpretation I will proceed with an exposition of findings and a parallel analysis of relevant sources of research and theory, particularly as it relates to my own conclusions.

I will attempt to relate my analysis to other surveys of similar context, as a partial test of criterion validity. The limitations here arise out of the dissimilarity of

⁴⁸⁶ . Note should also be made that the survey took place in 1991 before the proposals for the reorganisation of the Scottish local authorities were finalised (Scottish Office, 1992) or there was any prospect of the legislation on Greek devolution to be enacted (law 2218/94).

⁴⁸⁷ . In this respect I would mention here the effect of personnel and social circulation among political elites that point to the 'transient' character of any elite survey. As explored in chapter four, these factors can be particularly significant in times of institutional change, which could influence the composition of emergent local elites.

all relevant available research. Furthermore, I have chosen not to engage in any secondary analysis of other surveys. Instead, I will attempt an evaluation of certain of my conclusions by comparing them with assumptions or conclusions of other relevant academic work. In this respect I address possible criticism by interpreting differences in other academic work.

Finally, I will attempt an investigation of whether my analysis supports the premise of the emergence of regional behaviour as a facet of an increasingly interdependent and integrating European political environment. I aim to determine a degree of content validity, although I am aware that not all aspects of the relevant research questions have been covered in this exercise.

The ultimate section of this chapter suggests possible related aspects and fields to my research and that may be beneficial to the understanding of the questions I raised, if researched further.

B. An Evaluation of Findings: Tested Propositions

Attitudes investigated in tested hypotheses address a number of issues for which references in the international bibliography are rather limited. In

particular, issues addressed pertain to the difference between business and political elites' attitudes (hypothesis H I); the degree of accord between sub-national elite attitudes as it relates with their development level (H II); the existence of a differentiation in attitudes related to a regional elites' origins (H III); the relationship between attitudes on devolution and the perceptions of business prospects for a region (H IV); and the relationship between concordance of attitudes between elite groups and regional growth prospects (H V).

To investigate these hypotheses I employed a number of working hypotheses. These tests have led to a number of interesting conclusions that relate to the samples investigated.

From the analysis of replies pertaining to the first working hypothesis (WH1) I concluded that businessmen and politicians hold different positions on the attitudes surveyed in each region. Furthermore, it seems that their occupational position, as businessmen or politicians, affects the attitude they take (WH2). The distinctiveness of each elite groups' attitudes and perspectives, as it transpires through their quantitative and qualitative replies, is essential for restricting the possibility of interlockingness between elite groups. Its main significance, however, arises from pointing to a difference in elite attitudes among the key elite groups

in a region. It is therefore relevant to an investigation of behaviour at a regional level.

Assuming that the difference in the regional development level is responsible for a difference in their attitudes, I have been able to establish that Cretan and Strathclyde elites have indeed different attitudes(WH3). I have also detected weak support for the premise that stronger concordance of attitudes is apparent in the less developed region (AWH4). So, I have been able to determine variance both 'between' and 'within' regions in terms of attitudes among the regional elites investigated.

Next, I found businessmen to perceive regional political elites as more receptive than national ones' (WH5), although I could identify a number of different causes for this divergence in the two regions investigated. It becomes evident as well that regional politicians are perceived to favour long term economic policies more than national politicians (WH6), although there are significant variations in their perceptions regarding this premise which are relevant to the occupational category of each elite group. From this section of the analysis a possible relationship between aspirations to autonomy and perceptions of regional Councillors performance indicate that there may be a relationship between the two. If such a relationship exists, it could be assumed that 'autonomy' would precede 'Councillors

performance' in the regional elites' value system. It is hypothesised therefore that aspirations to autonomy have a positive effect on Councillors perceived performance. Overall, I was able to detect that regional elites region of origin is relevant to their perception of their respective regional political elites.

The different level of devolution among the two regions investigated seems to have no significant impact on their attitudes towards SMEs importance (WH7). By comparison those regional elites with a higher aspiration to autonomous rule will be more negative on the prospects of SMEs in their region (AWH8). In conjunction, positive attitudes towards autonomy/devolution relate to a negative perception of business prospects in a region (AWH9). This indicates that even if the measures used are inadequate there is strong evidence to support the proposition that there is a relationship between attitudes on devolution and perceptions of business prospects in a region among local elites.

Finally, I investigated the possible link between the concordance of attitudes between political and business elites in a region and regional performance. On the level of investigation permitted with the data available (and by the use of a cross-sectional study), it appears that there is a relationship between high concordance of attitudes between elite groups and growth performance for a region. For the two elite groups investigated, there

are a number of intuitive comments that can be made regarding their differences in attitude. Strathclyde business and political elites seem to have a high discordance among each other for issues relating to grievance towards their national government and their attitudes towards regional autonomy, while they appear comparatively concordant on both other issues indexed.

By comparison, Cretan elites appear equally divergent across the spectrum of measures investigated, but without any acute (or divisive) differences. I initially offered the alternative hypothesis that Cretan elite groups, although holding consistently different attitudes, do not have divisive differences on issues investigated and can thus be constructive in their co-operation. By comparison, Strathclyde sub-groups, although highly appreciative of each other, appear to be discordant on issues of political significance.⁴⁸⁸

My final test consisted of comparing the performance of Strathclyde with Merseyside and Crete with Vorio/Notio

⁴⁸⁸ . From the measures constructed in chapter five (section F) and compared in the index of Table 7.12 in chapter seven, it becomes apparent that difference in attitudes among Strathclyde elites receive high scores on issues of 'grievance towards their national government' and 'attitudes towards regional autonomy' (ranging from 50.5 to 55.1 index points) and low scores on all other measures (from 8.2 to 8.8 index points). At the same time Cretan elites show a consistent discordance but with much lower divergence on all measures investigated (ranging from 14.3 to 26.2 index points).

Aigaio. This comparison points to a remarkably better performance by Strathclyde compared to Crete. By a closer examination of the data it becomes apparent that Strathclyde elites are concordant on issues of 'structural efficiency' but are relatively discordant on issues of 'social equity'. To put it differently, they appear concordant on attitudes that can determine their effective collaboration on regional development, but discordant on 'purely' political or social equality attitudes. Furthermore there are limitations on inferences that can be made on the effectiveness of local elite interaction in Crete since it is positioned on the receiving end of a vertical clientelistic relationship with the national executive. In the case of Strathclyde it appears evident that discordance based on politically contentious issues has not hampered elite interaction, while strong concordance on the condition of the regional economy seems to be in tandem with a high willingness among elites to co-operate. It can be deduced therefore that regional elites need to share the same views on issues of economic efficiency for a region to perform well.

It is difficult to compare other research for an element of criterion validity without engaging in secondary analysis of their data. From current published research however it appears that a number of studies in Europe touch upon issues I have investigated. Particularly issues relating to the emergence of regional elites and

their relevance to regional growth have started receiving attention.

Research by Dupoirier (1994) focuses on the development of political elites in France and not on their relationship with business elites.⁴⁸⁹ In that respect it shows some insights into the relationship between the local/regional elites and the national political elites. She concludes her analysis claiming that "the first regional elites have indeed been bearers of regional autonomy" (Dupoirier, 1994, p.32). In this respect her account points to a process of regional socialisation that according to her, follows institutional decentralisation. Or to put it differently, she accounts for the emergence of a regional elite as a result of institutional change. These regional elites in turn generate 'regional autonomy'. Such a view can be limited, for not taking account of generic or external factors to the 'creation' of regional elites as well as the importance of pre-existing power structures surviving the process of institutional change.

⁴⁸⁹ . A relevant analysis of regional elite roles by Lucas (1994) makes a number of relevant conclusions that cannot however be validly considered as his analysis focuses on Kenya. He found a link between the diminishing of state capacity and an increase in elite leverage while "factions of the [regional] elite are interested in establishing and elaborating their own identity and bases of power, distinct from the state" (Lucas, 1994, p.38). Closer to home Lecomte testifies of the emergence of a 'politically defined regional identity' (1994, p.143) in the region of Rhone-Alps.

Leonardi and Garmise drawing from primary research on a number of European Union states (Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland), point to the "possible connection between regional government and economic growth" (1992, p.247). They base their arguments on an "analysis of the economic data [which] suggests that centralised nation-states have been less successful in mobilising resources ... than their more decentralised counterparts in Europe" (1992, p.265-6). And although it seems that the argument they put forward is primarily one of decentralisation, as this relates to further efficiency, they recognise the significance of regional elites by pointing to "the fact that regional elites do not see the single market as a zero sum game" (1992, p.252) and therefore are optimistic about regional prospects. Their sub-national elite survey points to significant differences among regional politicians on among others the 'state of the regional economy', 'impact of the single market', and 'functions of the EC'. These taken in conjunction demonstrate, according to the authors, that "the ongoing European integration process has established deep roots in the local body politic" (1992, p.257-8). Regional political elite attitudes are implicitly assumed to account for regional prospects and development. The relationship of the political with the regional business elites is not specifically considered, however.

Vazquez-Barquero (1990 and 1992a) gives an account of the interaction of local political and business elites in Spain when faced with the challenge of local development strategies.⁴⁹⁰ He attests that local political leaders "show themselves ready to co-operate and collaborate with other local groups" (1990, p.371). He finds that local development programs depend, among others on a "tacit or express acceptance of the local development strategy by the local entrepreneurs" (1990, p.372), signifying the importance of the interaction between political and business elites in the regions. He concludes his analysis by claiming that "we are witnessing in Spain for the first time the definition of local development strategies which condition the behaviour of the public and private, local and external actors" (1990, p.372).⁴⁹¹ So, in conditions of 'incipient autonomy' local development projects with their importance for autonomous regional development produce regional co-operation and

⁴⁹⁰ . In a comparative analysis of four Spanish regions' political and socio-economic elites Morata points to "the existence of a regional elite which is highly professionalised and with a tendentiously pragmatic and rather anti-centralist behaviour" (1992, p.215). It is easy to infer that a professionalised regional elite would facilitate interaction between the business and political elites. Evident in an identifiable "general agreement in favour of increasing regional powers at the expense of the central government" (Morata, 1992, p.215).

⁴⁹¹ . Vazquez-Barquero also attests to the significance of the "mobilisation of the endogenous development potential" (1992b, p.32) that would imply the active co-operation between regional political and business elites.

consensus. This consensus is viewed by Vazquez-Barquero as quintessential for an autonomous development. The question, posed therefore is whether it is the prospect of regional development that produces co-operation, or consensus that produces regional development.

In an analysis of research on regional elites conducted over two decades Putnam reports that there are changes in the political culture in Italian regions. This has resulted in 'open partisanship' and the 'building' of new regional institutions.

"The first two decades of the regional experiment witnessed a dramatic change in political climate and culture, a trend away from ideological conflict toward collaboration, from extremism toward moderation,...,from abstract doctrine toward practical management..." (Putnam, 1993, p.36).

Accounting for these changes, three hypotheses are proposed, these include: 'electoral replacement', 'national politics' and 'institutional socialisation'. With the use of a series of panel surveys he supports the conclusion that electoral replacement played no contribution to the change; national political trends played a modest role; while institutional socialisation has the highest effect on the moderation of political views. The significance of this study is that it points to the "fostering of a tolerant, collaborative pragmatism" (1993, p.38) among members of the new

political elites.⁴⁹² This pragmatism could affect their attitudes and interaction with the local business elites. Putnam concludes by claiming that "social context and history profoundly condition the effectiveness of institutions" (1993, p.182) assuming that different civic traditions are the basis of regional success. Civic community or civic virtue could be relevant to the development and interaction of modern regional society but they are not necessarily the driving forces behind elite interaction.⁴⁹³

Overall, I have found a number of examples in recent regional elite research to lend support to some of the conclusions I reached. In this respect I have provided some validation to my results, even though other regional elite surveys are not always directly addressing the same issues that I do and cannot provide a direct test of criterion validity.

⁴⁹² . I note here reservations on some of the assumptions made by Putnam in 'Making Democracy Work' as expressed by Tarrow (1996) and some appraisal by Katz (1993).

⁴⁹³ . The seminal work by Almond and Verba (1963) *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* is the starting point, in empirical political science, for the debate on liberal versus civic citizen values. A recent survey by Miller et al. (1995) points to the relevance of 'the moral community' in modern Britain in questions posed to local politicians and a sample of the public.

C. An Evaluation of Findings: Major Inferences

A number of inferences can be made from testing the hypotheses. It has been demonstrated that the interaction between business and political elites in the two regions is marked by qualitative differences.

It is the case that a number of secondary tests constructed point to issue involvement for the different elite groups, in accordance with their perceived regional interests. So it appears that Strathclyde political and Cretan business elites are more concordant with one another on issues of autonomy than with their respective regional counterparts. Put differently, there is at times a greater difference in attitudes within a region's elite groups than there is between the two regions. Moreover, it appears to be the case that this similarity in attitudes does not follow from their respective occupational categories. I have explained this discrepancy as 'issue involvement' together with a presumed division between 'moderate' and 'radical' elites. This latter classification refers to the degree that elite groups investigated welcome or fear change, as it pertains to European integration and regional autonomy.

It seems as well, that aspirations of an increase in devolution are linked with expectations of higher prosperity (and possibly social justice in the case of

Strathclyde). Furthermore, it has been suggested that some members of regional elites are objecting to the centralisation of the nation state in its present form, which will signify that their support of regional autonomy may be based upon a principled objection to centralisation.

I have hypothesised that the difference between the attitudinal patterns of the elite groups I have investigated will point to a difference in the 'endowment base' of a region. This will be the case if the assumption is accepted that regional elites are of paramount importance to regional development. The investigation of this premise in the last section of my analysis points to a relationship between concordance of attitudes on certain key issues and regional performance. This is linked to evidence in support of the premise that a higher degree of concordance, between a region's elite groups, indicates better development prospects for a region.

The importance of European regional elites and their emergence in the European political arena is portrayed by Harvie (1994). Keating (1992), on the other hand, notes that the emergence of a 'variable geometry state order' directly affects European regional interaction. Taken one step further, this notion could imply that regions could be 'empowered' or even 'emancipated' within a European space of regional units. In this way regions

will become significant political actors in the formation of European policy.⁴⁹⁴

The roots of 'regionalisation' of European Union members can be traced beyond the current preoccupation with regional welfare.⁴⁹⁵ It is suggested that European funding institutions favour a 'regionalisation' of member states that would enhance efficiency, by-passing national governments and dealing directly with the regions. On the other hand it is suggested that "the EU does not intend to play the role of 'universal liberator' of subnational government" (Van der Knaap, 1994, p. 96) while at the same time "the Commission seeks to increase communication and contact with subnational groups and

⁴⁹⁴ . The role of local political elites as instigators of institutionalised co-operation across-regions is explored in an article by Perulli (1992) on the Alpe Adria Community.

⁴⁹⁵ . European regional funding through the ERDF, but also through the EIB, the EAGF and the ESF are increasingly directed at the regional level (Armstrong, 1993). It is also assumed that Community Support Frameworks (CSF) are geared towards the co-ordination of the existing EU funds in peripheral and less developed regions (Hitiris, 1994). More importantly it has been suggested that the co-ordination of regional funding has in some cases (i.e. Greece) introduced "...the role of regional authorities as effective administrators of development policies" (Bianchi, 1992, p.66). Using the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes as a paradigm it is suggested that "the IMPs have actively contributed to launching (Greece) or relaunching (France, Italy) the idea of regional planning" (Bianchi, 1992, p.65). This view suggests that national governments devolve and decentralise of their own accord seeking efficiency gains and increased European funding.

regional bodies on the periphery" (Bomberg, 1994, p.58). It can be therefore suggested that the policies and motives towards the EU regions by European Commission policy makers are not necessarily clear. Do EU policies really empower European regions? Is that the result of a conscious effort by the European Commission?

In the case of the Scottish regional elites it can be argued that at the time of the survey the Labour-controlled Strathclyde Regional and Glasgow City Councils had a positive and constructive relationship with the local business community. It was further the case that most businessmen had a very positive image of the local political elite.⁴⁹⁶ Major differences between the two groups centred around attitudes towards regional autonomy, grievance towards their national government and attitudes towards European integration.

In the case of the Cretan regional elites it can be assumed that they exhibit a sharing of purpose that takes them beyond perceived differences in their views on autonomy and European integration. Both elite sub-groups seem to share a sense of what comprises common goods, while at the same time appear divided along party political lines, in a much more categorical way than is

⁴⁹⁶ . In this instance I refer to their positive replies to questions QB11 (78%), QB12 (71%) and QB13 (74%) inquiring whether businessmen found local politicians more or equally fervent, effective and receptive than local MPs.

the case in Strathclyde.⁴⁹⁷ The Cretans seem to differ consistently in all attitudes measured and indexes constructed. Their views on regional autonomy, being overall negative, seem to be undermined by their very strong sense of regional identity on all issues raised. They seem unwilling (or it could be argued unable) therefore to construct a mature case for autonomy as they lack an autonomy inspired 'cultural elite'.⁴⁹⁸

So the two regional elites although living in regions with a strong regional (if not national ethnic) identity, do not share similar aspirations to autonomous rule.⁴⁹⁹ In

⁴⁹⁷ . The difference in values among peoples in the two regions investigated can be credibly linked to the character of the respective societies and the level of their industrialisation and development. It is possible that Cretan people are not aware of the class dimension of political action in a 'mobilised' sense. Attitudes of elites however are not necessarily directly representative of those of the greater populace. So, the connection with class political perceptions, although relevant, is not necessarily a determining factor.

⁴⁹⁸ . There appears to be no significant academic, cultural or artistic discourse in support of a Cretan identity separate from the Greek one. I assume thus that although there exists an identifiable and separate Cretan identity within the concentric identities of the greater Greek *ethnos* (Hertzfeld, 1985, p.xii) there is a lack of willingness (and possibly as well, a local elite incentive) to build-up a consciousness of 'autonomy'. This does not mean that the product of a local cultural elite can not be co-opted at a future date on an autonomy inspired build-up of a cultural identity as discussed by Anderson (1991).

⁴⁹⁹ . Kellas defines ethnic groups as being 'essentially exclusive' compared with nations which "...are more inclusive and are culturally or politically defined" (1991, p.4).

particular the Scottish *ethnie*⁵⁰⁰ seems comparatively emancipated, compared with the Cretan *ethnie* that appears subjugated to a greater Hellenic national identity.⁵⁰¹

It is unfortunate that I cannot determine the degree to which local elite attitudes reflect public opinion. It

⁵⁰⁰ . Smith gives a concise definition of *ethnies* which are "...named units of population with common ancestry myths and historical memories, elements of shared culture, some link with a historic territory and some measure of solidarity, at least among their elites'" (1995, p.57). Smith distinguishes between "'lateral' or aristocratic and the 'vertical' or demotic types of *ethnies*" (1995, 58-9), he further suggests that some *ethnies* are 'peripheral' in that they are determined by a core-periphery relation of alienation and subordination to dominant ethnic communities, as were the Scots to the English. A discussion of nation-building as part of 'an invented tradition' (Hobsbawm, 1983) and an 'imagined community' (Anderson, 1991) takes account of the needs imposed on nation-states by capitalism and modernity. A critical account of 'post-modern' views of nationalism is given by Billig (1995).

⁵⁰¹ . Diamandouros points to the importance of the 'fragmentation' and 'geographical isolation' of Greek society under Ottoman rule "...which gave rise to an ethos of pronounced localism and parochialism that was effectively to impede national integration by placing a premium on primordial sentiments, and by producing fierce and lasting local and regional attachments" (1983, p.46). Greek nationalism during the formation of the Greek state was all pervasive, while religion was used as an 'ethnic tool' that infused "...distinctive life-styles, customs, language and ancestry myths with the capacity for self-renewal and re-interpretation under changed conditions" (Smith, 1986, p.260, n.51). In this context all divergent local identities were subsumed to the dominant Byzantine-Hellenistic tradition. An excellent anthropological account of a 'recessive' local ethnic identity in modern Greece can be found in Campbell (1964).

appears that elite perceptions coincide more with politically over-participating groups and the middle-class than they do with the disenfranchised (Nie and Verba, 1975). It could thus be assumed that political elites have a close concordance with the middle-classes (most of my sample could be considered as middle class). If that is the case, views held by politicians on European integration for instance, could be considered relevant to a wider audience.

From the exposition of findings it becomes apparent that sub-national elites in the two regions have indeed different attitudinal patterns and perceptions. It is not apparent however, whether sub-national elite groups have separate behavioural patterns from national ones. Since the samples investigated did not contain specifically national elites or other elite 'control groups' no inferences can be made on this topic.

Evidence from all research quoted in this chapter provide relevant support to both my conclusions and my inferences. Theoretical assumptions of other researchers are broadly in accord with the results I present here. In this respect an element of construct validity is successful, as attitude measurements complied with the theoretical predictions of hypotheses constructed.

Furthermore, it is assumed that cultural and ethnic characteristics indeed separate the Cretan and Scottish

regional elites from their respective nation-state elites. I can make no direct assumptions however on the degree to which the national political and business culture subjugates the respective regional cultures. There is some evidence to suggest that regional culture, if not predominant, is at least significant in attitude formation in the two regions investigated.⁵⁰²

The question finally arises of whether I have demonstrated the existence of regional behaviour, that is distinct from national behaviour, for the relevant regional elites investigated. As this is a comparative inquiry, I can attest that the empirical findings separate the elites investigated according to their attitudes between the two regions. I have come to no conclusions as to what extent these regional elites have distinctively separate attitudes from their respective national elites not having a national sample to compare each region. I will proceed with a purely exploratory inquiry of this topic in the following section.

⁵⁰² . In their verbatim replies to questions pertaining to how 'separate' people are in their region and the rest of their nation-state (QD9,QD10) respondents invariably expounded on cultural differences.

D. Regional Elite Behaviour?

In the analysis of data and tests of the working hypotheses a number of questions were raised that could have been dealt with if regional elites examined were chosen from within one nation-state. Furthermore, my analysis at times appeared to make the implicit assumption that regional elites in two of the most remote and most disparate areas of Europe could be considered analogous.

Generalisations made here focused on purpose on two regions with different cultural and socio-economic character that share however, certain identifiable common political attributes (as extensively expounded on in chapters three and four). The use of two regions not within the confines of a single nation-state was based on my assumption that in the emerging European polity, even the most disparate of regional units will be likely to share a number of common features. One of these could be the behaviour of their regional elites, particularly if we accept that in the context of globalisation elites will exhibit similar value systems and consequently behaviour (Lasch, 1995). I will argue here that 'regional behaviour', (beyond the culturally defined expected difference in behaviour among regions with different ethnic backgrounds), will be one of the by-products of European integration. It could be further

implied that it is one of the major intangible assets of a region.

The basic arguments on globalisation⁵⁰³ and the emergence of an identifiable political class at the regional level I have assumed would be related to the existence of an identifiable regional behaviour. Post-modernity may be relevant to the vision of Anthony Giddens who predicts that it "...would not be a world that 'collapses outward' into decentralised organisations but would no doubt interlace the local and global in complex fashion." (1991, p.178).⁵⁰⁴ To the degree that this signifies the emergence of new forms of polity, the political space within local and regional units will become the arena where most political decisions (those most affecting everyday life) will be taken. This perspective transcends the view of the emergence of regional democracy, as a response to the need of the contemporary overburdened nation-states, for increased legitimacy as I will be arguing further on.

In this context, regionalism within post or radicalised modernity (as defined by Giddens, 1991, p.150) and the

⁵⁰³ . I note here that globalisation is not an inevitable condition of contemporary capitalism but is seen by some as "no more than an argument deployed by the right to cow the left...[as it] denudes the few existing international institutions of the political and financial support necessary to upgrade their capacity to shape and manage current trends" (Hutton, 1995).

⁵⁰⁴ . For a critical account of the 'neoconservativeness' of postmodernity see Habermas (1987).

focus on a Europe of the Regions among European elites are not necessarily related. The latter has more to do with the democratic deficit of European Union institutions and a nation-based regionalism.⁵⁰⁵

The institutional antagonisms within the EU are also relevant to the emergent importance of regions.⁵⁰⁶ The European Commission "in order to increase its political autonomy,...is looking for 'new partners' against the omnipotent Council" (Van der Knaap, 1994, p.90).⁵⁰⁷ On the other hand, local elites as part of 'territorial communities' that affect decisions taken at the EU institutions are not necessarily 'agents of change' or

⁵⁰⁵ . The idea of a 'Europe of the Regions' received attention during the negotiations and the signing of the Treaty of the European Union which instituted a Committee of the Regions. A critical account of the notion is given by Borrás-Alomar et al. who attest that "...the utopian discourse of a harmonious, peaceful 'Europe of the Regions' has practically no resemblance with current practices, nor even with probable future developments" (1994, p.21). Keating suggests that "the Europe of the regions scenario stumbles on the awkward fact that there are no natural regions or nations in Europe..." (1992, p.52). It can also be assumed that the EU needs to operate at a scale intermediate between the state and the locality for its policy initiatives to be effective.

⁵⁰⁶ . A thorough account on the institutional dynamics of the EU can be found in Lodge (1993,1995), who makes a very concise case for redressing the democratic deficit, as does Martin (1991) in a federalist inspired diatribe.

⁵⁰⁷ . In this respect "one by-product of the subsidiarity debate has been the opening up of a related discussion about expanding the role of subnational governments in EC policy making" (Peterson, 1994, p.129).

'champions of oppositional interests' (Bomberg, 1994, p.56). In the French case Dupoirier (1994) asserts that the emergence of regional elites has fostered an increased awareness on the role of new regions, which in turn has led to an increase in regional autonomy. A similar case is made for Germany where "the success of 'co-operative federalism' was partly due to the emergence of regional political elites" (Harvie, 1994, p.59).⁵⁰⁸ It is the same case in Spain where 'incipient regional autonomy' has "brought about both awareness that local community work is a necessary condition for solving local problems and the willingness of local actors to co-operate" (Vazquez-Barquero, 1990, p.371). In Italy Putnam suggests that "regional leaders exercised more independent influence" in the 1990's than they did in the 1970's while "over the last two decades the region has become an authentic, autonomous, and increasingly distinctive arena in Italian politics" (1993, p.47). These accounts take the perspective that regional elites developed as a result of legislation establishing autonomous government in the regional level, this in turn is assumed to lead to elite formation by a process of incorporation to this new regime that leads to institutionalisation.

⁵⁰⁸ . Although it can also be claimed that the emergence of regional elites in Germany is the product of a unique political moment in the historical development of the German state. A number of relevant arguments on German regional elites are analysed in Kuhne and Ruck (1993).

I have argued earlier (chapter 7 section D) that the regionalisation process is a partly a 'response' to globalisation. The 'glocal' (Swygendouw, 1992) signifies both the importance of 'place productivity' as well as the increased relevance of 'information networks' (Jensen-Butler, 1996). So, the increased relevance of local economic actors for regional competitiveness and the effect of the welfare state in increasing the power and relative independence of local political actors is another factor influencing European regionalisation (Lever, 1996).

A rather idealised and glorifying perspective views the regional unit as "...an institution whose origins are lost in the mists of time, which serves today as a bulwark against totalitarianism. The region is seen to be rooted in a natural law or derived from the theory of intermediate authorities..." (Kukawaka and Tournon, 1987, p.40).⁵⁰⁹ In the same vein there have been calls for a

⁵⁰⁹ . A narrowly defined economic argument is also put forward for the importance of emergent "region-states [which] are the natural economic zones in a borderless world because, by definition, the demands of the global economy shape their contours" (Ohmae, 1995, p.134). It is further suggested that now "economic activity is what defines the landscape on which all other institutions, including political institutions, must operate" (Ohmae, 1995, p.129), while "nation states are eroding as economic actors. Region states are taking shape" (Ohmae, 1995, p.137). This view completely ignores the role of international politics by assuming that 'all politics is local', by inferring that all human

"constitutional guarantee for local and regional autonomy within the Community" (Council of Europe, 1990, p.12).⁵¹⁰ According to this view localities, as the focus of the first level of allegiance among citizens and the founding block of democracy, are only important in promoting democratic efficiency. This can only imply, however, that their historical 'fulfilment' will come with an institutionalised decentralisation.

Identifying the EU as the first 'post-modern political unit' it is suggested that integration leads to an 'unbundling of territoriality' which "is not located some place else: but it is becoming another place" (Ruggie, 1993, p.176). The European Union "may constitute the first 'multiperspectival polity' to emerge since the advent of the modern era" (Ruggie, 1993, p.171-2) while as a part of a 'nonterritorial global economic region' it is significant in that it embodies "novel behavioural and institutional forms and...novel space-time constructs that these forms embody" (Ruggie, 1993, p.173). In other words the EU is perceived not only as a product but also as an inevitable by-product of post-modernity since "the emergence of multiperspectival institutional forms was

motivation is economic and by supposing that local, national and international elites always aim (or should aim) at the highest economic returns.

⁵¹⁰ . A call for "strengthening the regional structures in Europe" (Robert, 1985, p.4) is also related to the need for efficient regional development.

identified as a key dimension in understanding the possibility of postmodernity" (Ruggie, 1993, p.176).

In this respect, regional behaviour, in the European context, is determined by the need to redefine identity in a local sphere and a by-product of modernity and globalisation.⁵¹¹ It is also the product of elite interaction as part of territorially based networks that increasingly by-pass or even ignore the supremacy of nation-state policy networks.⁵¹² And although, as Smith points out, the emergence of a "distinctive value and belief-system shared exclusively by the peoples of Europe" (1995, p.128) may be a chimera, the realities of globalisation are creating the conditions for re-asserting regional identities.

This condition is not one that directly threatens the nation state or national identity.⁵¹³ The nation state

⁵¹¹ . The redefinition of regional identity in the political sphere is not necessarily identical with notions of regional culture or local ethnic identity. The two spheres may be related but should not be confused. According to Keating "there is a danger of culture becoming a residual category to explain everything which can not be explained in terms of structures or political choice" (1991, p.3).

⁵¹² . In his study of 'civic traditions in modern Italy' Putnam suggests that the civic community is far from disappearing and that globalisation and modernity do not necessarily mean that "modernity is the enemy of civility" (Putnam, 1993, p.114).

⁵¹³ . Indeed it has been suggested that "The growth of initiatives and competencies on regional and European levels is accompanied, in many instances, by a reassertion of national governments and

can co-exist within the concentric circles of citizens allegiances and patterns of identification.⁵¹⁴ It is the behaviour of citizens at their locality that can act as a point of convergence for their self-identification and serve as a focus of their identity.⁵¹⁵ The academic interest on regional behaviour will increase in tandem with the emergence of a "variable geometry state order" (Keating, 1992, p.60).

In my analysis most of the difference of regional elite attitudes within the regions investigated can be explained away by party political and socio-economic considerations (H I). Differences between the two regions however cannot as readily be explained away by the same political or socio-economic factors (H II). I have found some evidence that it is their occupational position as businessmen or politicians that accounts for most of the variation in attitudes within regions (WH2). While, on most attitudes investigated, Cretan and Strathclyde elites show a variation in attitude (WH3).

bureaucracies...", while at the same time "...the place of regions in Europe is alongside that of national and non-state actors" (Borras-Alomar et al., 1994, p.24).

⁵¹⁴ . See Smith (1996) for an account of how 'concentric identities' coincide with 'concentric models of territorialised governance' in France.

⁵¹⁵ . In this context Keating also asserts that "...territorial autonomy will depend less on the acquisition by regions and stateless nations of state like attributes and competencies, ...than on the constitution of their civil societies" (1992, p.59).

At the same time there appears to be a higher concordance of attitudes in Crete, which is the less developed region examined, than in Strathclyde, which is the more developed region(AWH4).

My perspective being 'agent-based' it may be inherently restricted, as I try to examine how regional elites influence their regional environment. In that respect, it could also be suggested that my account of the importance of 'regional behaviour', as it is related to globalisation and European integration, may be limited in the same way that neorealist and neofunctionalist accounts are in their analysis of European integration (Hix, 1994). My 'alternative' interpretation of one of the forces of European integration can be related to what Wallace calls 'informal integration', which consist of 'intense interaction patterns' that are a result of the "dynamics of markets, technology, communications networks and social change" (1990, p.9).⁵¹⁶

Inferences that can be made on the general population in the regions examined are naturally limited. This is particularly the case since not all aspects of the relevant hypotheses could be examined in this work, a

⁵¹⁶ . It would be further interesting to note a shift in the emphasis of the debate on globalisation to local and regional 'subnationalisms' (Featherstone, 1990) as well as the emergence of an agenda on the *Self-determination of Minorities in International Politics* (Heraclides, 1991).

result of limited content validity. It is also impossible to deduce 'laws' of conduct for regional elites or infer the emergence of 'regional behaviour' throughout the EU from the comparative examination of two non-typical regions.

So, although I cannot pretend to have 're-evaluated' the role of regional elites, I have found some evidence to suggest that their role may indeed be vital for the development of regional units. The process of European integration could be leading to the reasserting of regional identities and the re-enforcement of those codes of conduct that will lead to a re-assertion of 'regional behaviour'.⁵¹⁷ In this respect I am in agreement with Rosamond in his claim that "there may indeed be identifiable sets of global dynamics, but their impact is entirely dependent upon the mediation provided by localities and regions" (1995, p.401).

I can not give evidence of a transformation of regional civil society as I do not engage in a longitudinal analysis, I can detect causes of strain and discontent with institutional arrangements regarding the respective nation-states that could be eventually related to the emergence of a 'regional awareness'. This, as I have tried to portray from my analysis of the current academic

⁵¹⁷ . It has further been argued that "national and subnational identities are reimagined as awareness of external, globalizing 'threats' takes place" (Rosamond, 1995, p.401).

discourse, is not necessarily envisaged as an antagonistic 'sub-state nationalism'.

The emergence of a politically significant and identifiable 'regional behaviour' can be partly related to the opportunities presented by the emergence of the new European polity.⁵¹⁸ It can be in that sense the product of European integration under the influence of globalisation and radicalised modernity.

E. Suggestions for Further Research

In the course of this research effort one of the main difficulties has been data collection. Existing survey formats are too loose and are based on an intuitive understanding from the researcher of the strengths and pitfalls of particular questionnaire designs. More significantly however, the two basic questionnaire designs are not often linked and there are rare instances of a combined use of quantitative and qualitative survey approaches.

⁵¹⁸ . Wallace claims that the EU is better understood as "a semi-developed political system than as a highly interdependent regional international system" (1994, p.272). The EU is still in the formative phase of its institutional and maybe as well of its social development.

In comparative local elite surveys, which can encompass a large number of informed subjects, it is desirable to conduct surveys that both tap into the need for efficient quantitative analysis and to the possibility of knowledgeable insights from the subjects. In this research I have used a variant of both methods by employing questions that can provide quantifiable measurements (i.e. Likert scale) as open ended questions as well. The quantitative data provided the orientation, while the qualifications to replies provided the insights that can be reasonably expected from an in depth elite survey.

Furthermore, although in the name of efficiency quantitative surveys are considered a more precise and accurate solution, they are embedded in validity considerations exactly because it is impossible to evaluate all relevant parameters while constructing a questionnaire. It is not possible, in other words, to know beforehand the preoccupations of a regional Councillor towards European integration and by asking any number of pre-arranged questions it is not certain that the most relevant issues will be explored or that their strength will be correctly gauged. This condition makes the use in tandem of both quantitative and qualitative tools desirable, if not imperative.

Given the resource limitations there are very few elements that could have been improved on the research

design.⁵¹⁹ In retrospect I would have eliminated some questions that did not belong to the indexes I constructed in chapter five F.⁵²⁰ Furthermore, I would not have separated and distinguished parts B and C of the questionnaire to be exclusively asked to the business and political sub-samples. Although the issues pertaining to each elite group are different this solution diminishes the comparability of a number of their replies.

There are a number of issues that I have considered relevant to this investigation and which I have not been able to test with the measures employed. My inquiry has touched upon a number of these issues and I have consequently decided to give a number of *ex post facto* explanations that can be used in developing relevant research designs and hypotheses in the future.

The first of these fields is the perceived role of multinational enterprises and therefore international

⁵¹⁹ . I would have liked to consider the possibility of a panel study or of a longitudinal survey in the regions and for the topics I have researched, but I know this to be unfeasible.

⁵²⁰ . I also note here the changes that have occurred since I have conducted my survey which include the introduction of a single tier in Scottish local government planned for April 1996 (discussed by Paddison, 1995 and McAteer, 1996) and the introduction of elections of regional prefects in Greece in October 1994 (a discussion of pre-decentralisation attitudes of regional elites by Verney and Papageorgiou 1992). These developments could have an effect on both attitudes and composition of the new regional political elites.

capital in a regional economy. Attitudes towards multinationals could be linked with attitudes to regional autonomy.

Secondly, attitudes on European integration may also be linked with regional elite alienation from the state centre. This may be due to the increase in grievance towards the nation-state in tandem with an increase in expectations from the supra-national EU.⁵²¹

Further research is also needed on the effect of elites' 'locally biased' mental maps of opportunity. These may be affecting regional competitiveness by being markedly different between regional political and business elites.

This last sphere of 'distorted maps of opportunity' could be relevant to the current preoccupation with globalisation and the consequences of modernity (or post/radicalised modernity). What I have termed 'regional behaviour' could be relevant to the emergence of a new regional affinity in defiance of, or as a

⁵²¹ . For instance the question arose, while I was examining working hypotheses six and seven (WH6, WH7), of whether a higher level of devolution is correlated with higher aspirations to autonomy. Evidence from measure B (chapter five section F) suggest that Strathclyde politicians have a high positive attitude towards regional autonomy while the only other group with a high positive attitude are Cretan businessmen. The two sub-groups would reasonably be expected to give answers on opposing sides of that scale. Since there is no corroboration and the data appear inconclusive this question has to remain open in this thesis.

consequence of, the so called laws of globalisation and capitalist accumulation. We may be witnessing the beginning of an era in which there will be a re-focusing of national allegiance to more narrowly defined territorial localities/regions. Such a development will find us ill equipped in making interpretations or understanding change, if current dividing lines between fields of social science research are maintained. New challenges require new tools which can be provided by taking a multidisciplinary perspective.⁵²²

Finally, the examination of policy networks within the context of multi-perspectival polities (and multi-level governance) can improve our understanding of how regional elites interlink with national and supra-national ones.⁵²³ The use of socio-metrics may not be adequate however in determining how closely policy communities and policy networks coincide with power networks.⁵²⁴ In that respect

⁵²² . I have borrowed concepts and dealt with both theoretic and empirical material beyond those of purely political science or European integration studies from among others, political geography, political sociology, social anthropology, regional economics and political economy. I note here the results of a round table organised under the aegis of the Journal of Common Market Studies, where it was stressed that studies of European integration need to be interdisciplinary, while there was also a call for an integration of empirical and theoretical work (Bulmer and Scott, 1994).

⁵²³ . Noting the limitations expressed earlier on employing policy networks as more than an investigative tool.

⁵²⁴ . Social network analysis is explained by Scott (1991) while political networks are analysed by Knoke (1990).

actor 'centrality' or 'betweenness' may be inadequate measures of interaction.⁵²⁵ Elite value sharing should be considered at least as important in determining the effectiveness of network connections. In the same vein, the possibility that collaboration between elites is determined by their sharing of certain values warrants further investigation. Elite actor concordance may enhance our understanding of the workings within policy networks as well as provide us with a better insight of prospects for effective co-operation among elite actors.

⁵²⁵ . For an excellent empirical investigation with the use of sociometrics see John and Cole (1996).

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NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICAL PUBLICATIONS

(Selected Issues)

CRETAN and GREEK

Alithia (Cretan local newspaper)

Chaniotica Nea (Cretan local newspaper)

Chaniotiki Eleftherotypia (Cretan local newspaper)

Ekonomikos Tachydromos (weekly economic journal)

Epilogi (monthly economic journal)

Ethnos tis Kyriakis (national Sunday newspaper)

Kritiko Fos (Cretan local newspaper)

Kyrikas Chanion (Cretan local newspaper)

To Vima tis Kyriakis (national Sunday newspaper)

Tourismos ke Ekonomia (monthly journal), special issue "Crete
and Tourism" June 1991 (No.155)

SCOTTISH and UK

The Economist (weekly economic journal)

The European (European affairs weekly)

The Financial Times (economic newspaper)

The Glasgow Herald (Scottish newspaper)

Scottish Economic Bulletin (HMSO Statistics on Scotland)

The Scotsman (Scottish newspaper)

Strathclyde Economic Trends (published by the Strathclyde
Regional Council)

EUROPEAN

(European Commission, European Union)

Eurobarometer (public opinion statistics of EC & EU)

Eurostat (statistics of the EC & EU)

Regio (regional statistics of the EC & EU)

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CSF	Community Support Frameworks
EAGF	European Agricultural Guarantee Fund
EEC	European Economic Community
EC	European Community
EIB	European Investment Bank
ERDF	European Regional Development Fund
ESF	European Social Fund
EU	European Union
FT	Financial Times
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GRP	Gross Regional Product
IMPs	Integrated Mediterranean Programmes
LDC	Less Developed Country
LIC	Low Income Country
MNLs	Multinational Enterprises
TNLs	Trans-National Enterprises
SMEs	Small-Medium Sized Enterprises
SRC	Strathclyde Regional Council

Appendix I: Questionnaire Formation and Implementation

A. Overview

It has been my judgment that the most appropriate way to collect data relevant to the hypotheses I want to investigate was through a questionnaire in a survey. Elite interviewing was chosen as the most efficient method given the limited resources and particular focus of the hypotheses. The prevalent effort has been to introduce a surveying approach to entail the largest possible sample, which as some researchers content is a method 'superior to elite interviews of informants' (Hoffman-Lange, 1987). Hoffman-Lange further testifies that "the use of a highly structured questionnaire presents no obstacles and does not lead to insufficient response rates" (1987, p.44). This view I combined with the view that interviews are "surely superior to any alternative way of discovering what they (elites) believe and do" (Crewe, 1974, p.43). Effectively the use of both a quantitative measure by providing for graded responses and a qualitative one by creating questions that can be further qualified and expanded upon, has been deemed necessary.

The view that elite attitudes cannot be comprehensively mapped-out by the extensive study of a few individuals is shared in this research while at the same time, it seems apparent, thinning-out of resources to attempt interviews with a larger section of the local elite could create a series of data that could lack on insight.

In this survey I combine a number of surveying techniques on the structure and formation of questions. Heed is taken of the warning on validity by William Belson (1986) of combining the response distributions from open and closed question systems by separating and identifying the two groups (i.e. quantitative and qualitative) when analysing results.

Yes and No questions were combined with questions in which employment of Likert and Semantic Differential scaling is deemed appropriate, to facilitate the more diverse input of data possible in order to test the research hypothesis.⁵²⁶ In this way the use of aggregated data from answers to construct a statistical distribution can be employed, while at the same time

⁵²⁶ Again note is given on validity considerations as expressed by Belson (1986, p.254) in that Semantic Differential Scaling tends to provide comparisons which are prone to bias. His conclusion is that errors although apparent balance out in the net aggregation of results. The small size of the sample in this survey make the use of this investigative tool more prone to bias.

cross reference those distributions with the content of answers from key individuals. Being aware of the limitations in this sample size and maybe even of the sampling method (as referred to in chapter four) any distribution is of limited statistical significance as a descriptive element of the respective populations ⁵²⁷. Further than resource and other limitations as explained, in previous chapters, note should be made that sample populations in many cases were not numerous enough to make a statistical distribution meaningful. Explanations and qualifications of responses to questions become thus essential for claiming relative insight into the elites observed. Most research on elites avoids mixing the two perspectives. I have found the present approach to be a complementary one to those already existing. By taking aggregate data of a small sample and comparing them with responses of key individuals to particular questions, the degree to which an opinion is within or outside "mainline" responses, of the elite sub-group respondents belong to, can be tested. Interviewees were encouraged to give extensive replies qualifying their scaled answers which have been essential for explaining their attitudes.

⁵²⁷. A statistical distribution of replies is bound to be affected by a bias to middle responses. As research conducted by G. F. Bishop asserts "offering respondents a middle alternative in a survey question will generally make a significant difference in the conclusions that would be drawn about the distribution of public opinion on an issue, because such alternatives usually attract a substantial number of people who may be ambivalent about the other alternatives presented to them" (Bishop, 1987, p.229).

An effort was made for the basic questions to remain the same in both languages, changes of questions have only been allowed to facilitate differences in local norms. For example Greek local authorities have far less power than Scottish local authorities, a fact that is facilitated by milder references to regional power in Greece. Such modifications are 'inherent to cross-national surveys' (Nevitte,1990) as long as the comparative logic remains intact. Nevitte and Gibbins further suggest that for cross country research one should try to minimize within group variance so as to sharpen focus in between group variance. To the effect that this was possible in my analysis I have tried to attain a similar perspective.

Respondents where assured of confidentiality in their responses.⁵²⁸ The social position of interviewees and the particular problems of elite interviewing were prominent in the approach used while conducting the survey.⁵²⁹

⁵²⁸. Relevant research on the problems of confidentiality was conducted under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences in the U.S. (Shaw, 1979). Dissenting voices of the particular research conclude however that, "...concern over the issue of confidentiality may have been exaggerated, and they tell against the claim that a promise of perpetual confidentiality or of long delayed access to identifiable data is essential to obtaining information." (Shaw,1979,p.119). In the present research however the elite status of the individuals interviewed makes confidentiality considerations particularly relevant.

⁵²⁹. Further than Manheim and Rich's book (Manheim, 1991) on elite interviewing, standards of conduct are covered in McCrossan (1991).

An introductory presentation of the questionnaire at the beginning of each interview referred to definitions of 'local', 'regional', 'national', 'autonomy' and 'devolution' employed. Interviewees were encouraged to interrupt the interviewer and ask for clarifications of any questions whose meaning they perceived as dubious. So, although every effort was made at keeping the meaning of questions simple and unequivocal, attention was also paid at possible misconceptions that wording could create to respondents.

B. Survey Instrumentation

The construction of the actual questions was done in relation to the hypotheses I wanted to test (as discussed in chapter two).⁵³⁰ The structure was redrawn a number of times in order to facilitate the best possible reception from interviewees, while certain questions had to be positioned, so that they could act as stimuli, for issues this thesis has set out to cover.⁵³¹ This was

⁵³⁰. Relevant to 'desirable' directions of research is the volume by Thomas (1985).

⁵³¹. Considerations of validity in the construction of questions in questionnaire use are given by Belson who raises serious doubts as to the effectiveness of questions he used in his research claiming that "For all the questions tested, the proportion falling within permissible limits was, on average, only 29 per cent." (Belson, 1981,p.350). Basic texts in questionnaire formation also include Manheim (1991), Yates (1953) and Miller (1983).

attained, for instance, by placing questions on issues with a general consensus before controversial ones.⁵³²

The questionnaire itself was divided into four parts. Part A is designed to be answered from all interviewees and contains two sections. The first section provides background information about the interviewee. Particularly the rank within their organisation, the age group as well as information on date and place of the interview. The second section contains one factual question on national identity and three questions on attitudes of interviewees toward European integration and nationalist political movements. The way the questions are asked is intentionally non argumentative, in an effort to establish that the questionnaire pertains to European and nationalist issues. As with most questions in this questionnaire a two stages approach is taken; I try to establish first to what degree the respondent's attitude was internationalist (question Q1.) and then asked whether they were consciously pro-federalist (question Q 2). Positive or negative sentiment towards the local nationalist movements which was asked next was followed by a question on family roots, the possible correlation being obvious.

⁵³². The possibility that low involvement or awareness of an issue affects respondent likelihood to take an extreme position has to be taken into consideration. Research by Bishop suggests that some "response effects in public opinion surveys may well be a function of issue involvement" (Bishop 1990, p.216), although this might not always be the case.

Nationalism being an issue on which people have strong views, I superseded with a more factual question on national origin. If I had asked these questions in reversed order I was preoccupied interviewees could be induced by their national identification to show bias towards a nationalist affiliation.

Part B was aimed at businessmen exclusively. In part B.I. factual information about the size of their company by turnover and employees; the ownership of the company whether public or private, local, national or foreign ; and the operations whether local, regional, national or export oriented were asked. The reason for this being obvious. In the same way that an individual can be representing demographic groups I felt executives could be biased depending on their companies export orientation, ownership and size. I do not propose to investigate this further by extensively testing such hypotheses. I expected however that ownership and size of business to be related to businessmen perspectives.

In part B.II. questions were asked within a framework that builds up to questions QB11, QB12 and QB13 and ends with rather non-controversial questions to prepare the ground for part D. Question one asks about regional government, two about the development of small medium enterprises and three asks on the

contested issue of whether they think small-medium enterprises are relevant to economic integration. This group of questions has two points of interest, the first is a straight-forward one and asks them of whether they think the region (and in part b. the company) will benefit from an increase in the powers of regional government. Answers here can be compared to answers Q1 and Q2, QD1 and QD13 which refer respectively to federalism and business perspective about a united Europe. The second interesting point is eased on the interviewees with question two which is rather general, while question three is introducing an issue that many of them admitted not to have seen under this light before. Responses to this question I consider quite significant for the hypothesis testing.

The next group of questions has question four introducing people to the subject of elected representatives and how well the sample group was acquainted with them. I could have accepted and substituted this question by the frequent relevant polls conducted on degree of awareness of the electorate but I felt since I could not (as explained above) attain completely representative samples I had to get this information for the particular sample. Furthermore, the elite nature of the sample meant that their involvement and political awareness could significantly diverge from that of the general population.

Questions five and six are most interesting since they register opinion (on a Likert scale) of businessmen on Councillors and MPs, being asked to compare them while sub-issues touched upon questions of whether they perceive the local political community as pro or against business interests.

Answers to the next group of questions should be compared with the degree to which respondents consider themselves pro or anti-European as well as whether they have an ethnocentric perspective.

Tied to this issue is question eight which investigates confidence in local entrepreneurs,⁵³³ QB18 extrapolates this by asking whether multinationals will be good for local business. In effect I am trying to determine if they consider multinationals good for the local economy.

Part C was addressed to political personalities exclusively. In part C.I the general information of political party affiliation and body or area of representation were dealt with. This information is important as all relevant information in part A.I.

⁵³³. A minor adjustment between the Greek and the Scottish version of the questionnaire is that the Greek version does not ask question B.II.8.A. in parts a. & b. as the British version does but rather asks if they 'would function effectively in a region different than their own'. The degree of attachment to the region is answered by both versions, the British also examining attitudes to European employment.

and B.I. for classifying responses according to social position and status.

The questions in part C.II. comprise all those questions I felt were not relevant to businessmen, but were particularly relevant to political personalities. Questions QC9, QC10 and QC12 could however be compared with relevant questions QB11, QB12 and QB13. Differences between the two groups centre around the importance these have in relation to the structure of the questionnaire.⁵³⁴ The first two questions on part C comprise one entity. Lobbying and accountability are the issues raised. This is done connecting lobbying with the region while accountability is connected with regional authorities and regional development. Because both questions ask about MPs relationships with the region, question one is designed to reflect regional authorities preoccupation with MPs involvement and accountability to regional issues, while question two asks the same in a more straight forward manner.

⁵³⁴ . Businessmen were asked about the fervour, effectiveness and receptiveness of their local authority representatives after they had been asked to what degree they were acquainted with their local, national or European representatives. Such a question would have been comparatively redundant with the political elite. On the other hand politician's position within the elite I felt warranted questions on the comparative importance of the local vs. the national and European executive.

Question QC4 prefaces QC5 and QC7 in asking which are more important for the development of the region, local or multinational companies. QC5 and QC7 are to an extent situational questions asking whether the respondents believe that if the economy was hit by a recession a surviving firm would tend to migrate, depending on size (small-medium vs. multinational). Omitted are large local concerns. What I try to measure though is confidence in multinationals compared with a distinctly local concern, making this comparison rather pronounced. Questions from part B that can be juxtaposed to this section are QB3 and QB4. In questions QC9, QC10 and QC12 I ask respondents to compare regional councillors with local MPs as they did in the first part of this section (questions QB1 and QB2), but keep the two sets apart because the perspective of the two groups can be seen as different. I try to determine the degree to which regional councillors are considered, better acquainted with their constituency, more willing and more able to be involved in policy decisions. In other words the degree to which they can play a decisive part in the democratic process. QC12 is constructed so as to induce the expression of attitude rather than fact.

Finally I asked two questions that could have been included in part C.I. but I felt their inclusion at the end was more likely to provide an honest reply. The first of the additional

questions (QC13) asks if these political personalities have in effect themselves been lobbied. The second (QC14) asks whether they have a personal interest in business in their area. If they are on the focus of lobbying themselves, that could qualify some of their answers. Similarly if they have a personal business interest in their area it could prove important in dealing with their replies to business interests as in questions QC4, QC5, QC7, QD1, QD2, QD3 and QD5.

Part D was applied to both samples of interviewees. In the first question of whether autonomy is well thought of by business, answers given can be compared with Q1 and Q2, QB1 and QB5. while it is a preamble to questions QD2 and QD3 following. The second and third questions ask of whether the economic future depends on local or out of region resources in capital and entrepreneurial skill. My interest in the juxtaposition is set in the hypotheses about the perceived importance of the local vs. the out of region and foreign resources. In that respect this group of questions is relevant to most of my research. The possible qualifications in responses to them I consider most important. Question QC4 has obvious similarities, but is asked on a different context. Question four gives a set of options categorising the local regional council (City Council in Greece) with two favourable and two unfavourable options. The purpose is to compare answers here

with relevant answers in the previous parts, identifying a possible bias from extreme like or dislike of the work of the regional authority. Q2, QB1, QB6, QB7, QB8, QC1, QC2, QC9, QC10 and QC12 are questions that a positive or negative image of the local council can have an effect on. Questions QD5, QD6 and QD7 . . . comprise a group, giving (in Likert scale) the degree of confidence of the respondents to the relevant national and regional economies; then proceeding to ask whether the region is in a worse position than the nation (emphasising in some way perceived differences in development) concluding with a question on whether the region has not been receiving adequate support by the nation. Measuring possible disaffection with the national administration was the target of this group of questions.

Question QD9 which follows asks whether there are differences between 'us' and 'them'. The region vs. the nation. In the Greek version Europe was added as an option to measure 'alienation' of the locals with the outside world.

The last two questions ask whether Europe represents a challenge (which was the only question with a unanimous-but one-affirmative answer) ; I finish with an assessment question of risks and opportunities in a united Europe.

One of the basic considerations while constructing this survey was to limit the number of questions to the absolute minimum so that if need be it could be implemented in approximately half an hour. Average time of interviews was about forty five minutes although most successful ones I consider those that lasted for . about an hour. The most extreme case was an interview that was conducted in two parts the first session running for 115 minutes and the second for over forty five minutes.

I refer to the way sampling was done in each country on chapter four, as for piloting and pre-testing I tested the interview on fellow research students on three different occasions in order to identify and clarify obscure points as well as to facilitate the best possible flow when administering the actual survey.

As I conducted all interviews myself there was no need for monitoring or verifying the execution of the survey. However I found necessary to cross reference replies in order to eliminate those of the respondents that might give extreme and out of context replies. This I considered a possibility of making an error in either understanding a question or recording an answer. Such errors not being apparent beyond statistical normality, no answers were eliminated. A full record of dates and places of

interviews as well as the actual questionnaires are available in these appendices for any further verification.

Data collected are processed and analysed in chapters five, six and seven. Coding of replies posed certain difficulties stemming from the small sample size that made any one reply significant for the outlook of the research. Furthermore most of the replies having a qualitative element as their most significant part lose a great deal of their intended meaning by codification. It is apparent that the numerical codification of replies can not be separated from their qualifications when interpreting results. In some cases I aggregate results for reasons of simplicity, possible inaccuracies that this entails should always be born in mind.

C. The British Version: Strathclyde

The elite groups I had to approach in Strathclyde were quite diverse. The political personalities are representing a number of bodies: The City Council of Glasgow, The Regional Council in Strathclyde, Members of Parliament and Members of the European Parliament. An effort was made to interview personalities from

across the political spectrum, but Strathclyde being a Labour dominated region, most of the interviewees were from the Labour party.

I did not equate percentage of seats held by Labour with interviewees from this party because in that case all above mentioned bodies are over 85% Labour for Strathclyde. I could alternatively take percentage of party vote in the last elections irrespective of seats won. I felt however that this would bias this sample again since, non elected candidates would not necessarily be part of the interactive process between the business and the political community, to the degree that elected politicians are. Instead I used a gross measure of 70% Labour interviewees and the rest roughly equally divided between the Scottish National Party, the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives.

Since the important factor in this survey was representation of prevailing views and since I could not achieve statistical significance with such a small sample I felt that the rough guide I used was adequate for my purposes.

The business community was more diverse than the political community. I considered that an advantage and tried to avoid

over-representation of bigger interests who had a higher rate of response to the mailing than smaller enterprises.

Approximately 46% of companies in this survey had exports to more than two countries (see graph 5.1), while seven out of ten interviewees were in the most dynamic age group of 36 to 55 years old. More than 75% have the title of director or control a big part of their companies stock. Ownership was predominantly Scottish with over 62% of the companies privately owned. Of public companies 23% of the total are British held while 15% are owned by foreign interests.

The size of the companies was bigger than the average for Scotland. By turnover 26% make up to £5 million and have no more than one hundred employees. Medium sized companies (100-500 employees) were approximately 44% of this sample. While large companies (over 500 employees) were approximately 32% of the sample. Comparatively, gross UK data show that large companies account for 30.03% of employment (Commission, 1990).

The small enterprises I talked to (10-99 employees) comprised 26% of the sample while nationally they are responsible for 24% of employment. Over represented with 44% of the sample are medium size enterprises (100-500 employees which account for 23% of

employment nationally including data for micro enterprises). For the same reasons mentioned above, regarding large enterprises, it was felt that I need not weigh the responses.

I consider the employment indicator a good measure of the social welfare significance of firms in the Community. Larger corporations are able to hold more lobbying muscle by the fact that they have more resources, faster decision making and the ability to approach political personalities directly. Micro and Small enterprises on the other hand are usually unable to master the resources to effectively lobby local political personalities other than collectively. Medium sized enterprises I often found, directly lobby authorities and political personalities in their region. This stems from the fact that most are still owned by those people that created them who are actively involved in local community life and politics.

Overall, it seems that big corporate management keeps a distance from local politics unless they have a particular policy affecting them to lobby for while medium sized business tried to have a more hands-on approach even on issues not directly relevant to them.

In this sample I did not target Micro enterprises (1-9 employees) primarily because I wanted to target those business people that actively interact with the political community but also because on the pilot survey I found them unwilling to take the time to answer a survey. This is understandable since their resources are very limited.

D. The Greek Version: Crete

Problems of researching in Chania become apparent in the exposition of chapter three. From the local body politic I talked with a more representative sample than was the case in Strathclyde. On the other hand there is a deficiency in the sample since I do not have any elected members to the Greek or European Parliament. There are many reasons for this, the most important of which is the unwillingness of Greek national politicians to take part in a survey. Many times over I found that they were too preoccupied with an answer of theirs being quoted, irrespective of my guaranties of scientific integrity. Another disadvantage was, not being myself a member of a political party I could not utilise any party connections to that effect. Of the local politicians that have answered my questionnaire however two have been elected to parliament in the

past and many have been candidates. European Parliament seats on the other hand are not fought locally but nationally, while only one MEP has a directly Cretan political background. Furthermore MEPs in Greece are not necessarily directly linked with the local political 'game' and patronage networks since they are proposed by parties on a national scale and would not have to make a political stand or contest the election themselves.⁵³⁵

Two of the interviewees declared being with or supported by the Left (Communists-KKE and Left Coalition-SYN or jointly with Socialists) eight were elected with the Socialists (PASOK or a Centre-PASOK coalition), two declared belonging to the political centre and two being elected with the Conservatives (Nea Dimocratia). Of them five were councillors in one of the major city councils three were mayors and four presidents of local communities. I also interviewed two key individuals in the local community. The first was the local 'comatarhis' (party representative) for the Socialists. The second was an editor of one of the local political papers. Both were directly involved in the political interaction and I felt their views in many cases

⁵³⁵ . A list of candidates, to be elected according to seniority on that list is produced for a national ballot by each party. This system makes the inducement of MEPs for campaigning minimal, other than maintaining good relations with the national party elite. Their involvement in national politics tends to be marginal.

to be very informed. There was only one female interviewed as there are extremely few elected women locally. The age composition shows most of the interviewees being comparatively young with 46% being younger than 45 years. I trust this sample to be overall closely representative of the local political community.

Interviews were conducted with twenty two businessmen as well. Of those interviewed 54% were 45 years of age or younger showing a comparative dynamism in the business society, to the degree that this sample is representative.

Average size of companies in Greece and Crete in particular, being much smaller than the European average I interviewed a certain number of companies in the Micro category. Although no director interviewed represented a company with less than five employees. Most of the companies interviewed were in the small category which should be expected as Services and Handicraft are the most dynamic sectors in the local economy, while medium sized companies were few in keeping with the national averages (see table 5.3).

Only 23% of the directors interviewed belonged to companies that operated or traded on a national scale and only 14% had exports

outside Greece (see table 5.5). One was a subsidiary company to a European concern, operating in textiles and using local labour to add value to its products. All the rest of the companies were privately owned, predominantly from local concerns. Overall, I have considered this sample as a close approximation to the local business and political elite in Crete.

Appendix IIa: Greek Version of the Questionnaire

ΜΕΡΟΣ Α

I. ΝΑ ΣΥΜΠΛΗΡΩΘΕΙ ΑΠΟ ΤΟΝ ΕΡΩΤΩΝΤΑ:

1. ΗΜΕΡΟΜΗΝΙΑ/ΤΟΠΟΣ
2. ΟΝΟΜΑ ΕΡΩΤΟΥΜΕΝΟΥ
3. ΔΙΕΥΘΥΝΣΗ
4. α. ΑΛΛΗ ΙΔΙΟΤΗΤΑ
β. ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΜΑΤΙΑΣ
γ. ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ
5. ΘΕΣΗ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΣΗ/ΚΟΜΜΑ/ΔΙΟΙΚΗΣΗ
6. ΗΛΙΚΙΑ
α. <35
β. 36-45
γ. 46-55
δ. 56 >

II. ΕΡΩΤΗΣΕΙΣ

1. Πιστεύεται ότι η μακρο-οικονομική πολιτική θα πρέπει να ελεγχεται σε τοπικό, εθνικό ή διεθνές επίπεδο:

τοπικό/εθνικό/διεθνές

2. Πιστεύεται ότι μια ομοσπονδία (φεντεραλιστικού τύπου) για τα κράτη της Ενωμένης Ευρώπης είναι εφικτή:

Ν/Ο/ΔΕ

3. Πιστεύεται ότι τα εθνικιστικά κινήματα παίζουν θετικό ρόλο στην πολιτική ζωή της περιφέρειας:

Ν/Ο/ΔΕ

4. Οι ρίζες της οικογενείας σας βρίσκονται στην Κρήτη:

Ν/Ο/ΔΕ

ΜΕΡΟΣ Β

ΣΥΜΠΛΗΡΩΣΤΕ ΑΝ Η ΑΠΑΝΤΗΣΗ ΣΤΟ ΜΕΡΟΣ Α ΕΡΩΤΗΣΗ Ι.2. ΕΙΝΑΙ Β

I. ΝΑ ΣΥΜΠΛΗΡΩΘΕΙ ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΤΙΚΑ

1. α. Μεγεθος της εταιρίας - κύκλο εργασιών (εκ.δρχ.)
β. Μεγεθος της εταιρίας - αριθμός εργαζομένων
2. Ιδιοκτησία
3. Επίπεδο δράσης
 - α. Τοπικό
 - β. Περιφερειακό
 - γ. Εθνικό
 - δ. Εξαγωγές σε μια ή δύο χώρες
 - ε. Εξαγωγές σε περισσότερες από δύο χώρες

II. ΕΡΩΤΗΣΕΙΣ

1. Πιστεύεται ότι σε γενικές γραμμές:

Α. ο νομός χανίων θα επωφεληθεί από μια αύξηση των εξουσιών της Νομαρχίας; (φοροί/αντίπροσωπευση/εκπαίδευση/δημοσία έργα κλπ)

Ν/Ο/ΔΕ

Β. η επιχείρησή σας θα επωφεληθεί από μια τέτοια μεταβολή στο επίπεδο που περνούν οι αποφάσεις;

Ν/Ο/ΔΕ

2.Α. Προβλεπεται την ανάπτυξη περισσότερων μικρομεσαίων επιχειρήσεων στον νομό σας; (ποσοστιαία περισσότερες μικρομεσαίες επιχειρήσεις σε σχέση με μεγάλες)

Ν/Ο/ΔΕ

Β. Μια τέτοια εξέλιξη θα δημιουργήσει θετικό κλίμα για την επιχείρησή σας;

Ν/Ο/ΔΕ

3. Πιστεύεται ότι μια αναδος στο ποσοστό των μικρών-μεσαίων επιχειρήσεων θα βοηθήσει στην δημιουργία :

α. μιας πιο αποκεντρωμένης (αυτονομής) οικονομίας

β. μιας πιο εξαρτημένης οικονομίας (στην περιφέρειά σας)

γ. ΔΞ

4.Α.Γνωρίζεται ποιος είναι ο εκλεγμένος σας εκπρόσωπος στον Δήμο/Κοινότητα που βρίσκεται ο τόπος εργασίας σας;

N/O/ΔΞ

Β. Γνωρίζεται ποιος είναι ο βουλευτής της περιφέρειάς σας;

N/O/ΔΞ

Γ. Γνωρίζεται κάποιον Ευρωβουλευτή από την Κρήτη;

N/O/ΔΞ

Δ. Μπορείται να ονομασθεί έναν από τους ανωτέρω αναφερθέντες: (Δήμαρχο/Βουλευτές/Ευρωβουλευτές)

Ε. Έχετε τα τελευταία δύο χρόνια προσεγγίσει κάποιον από τους εκλεγμένους σας αντιπροσώπους ή την δημοσία διοίκηση με κάποιο αίτημα της επιχείρησής σας:

α.Δήμο/Κοινότητα

β.Νομαρχία

γ.Υπουργείο/Κυβερνητικούς Οργανισμούς

δ.Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή/Κοινοβούλιο

ε.άλλο.....

ς.καμία επαφή

5. Βρίσκεται ότι οι Δημοτικοί/Κοινοτικοί Συμβούλοι προωθούν τα οικονομικά συμφέροντα της περιφέρειας:

Α.Περίσσοτερο ενθέρμα από τους τοπικούς βουλευτές

1	2	3	4	5
περίσσοτερο		με την ίδια		με λιγότερο
ενθέρμα		θερμη		ενθέρμα/θερμη

Β.Με μεγαλύτερη αποτελεσματικότητα από τους τοπικούς βουλευτές.

1	2	3	4	5
με μεγαλύτερη		με την		με μικρότερη
αποτελεσματικότητα		αποτελ.		αποτελεσματικότητα

6. Πιστεύεται ότι οι Δημοτικοί/Κοινοτικοί Συμβούλοι είναι πιο
πράσιτοι όταν εκέται κάποια αίτημα/γνώμη συγκρινομένοι με
τους τοπικούς βουλευτές:

1	2	3	4	5
περίσσοτερο		ίδια		λιγότερο
δεκτικοί		δεκτικότητα		δεκτικοί

7. Θα εισάσταν προθυμός να κανεται την ίδια δουλειά που
κανεται εδω σε μια άλλη περιοχή αν σας παρέχανταν παρομοίος
μισθος/ανταμοιβή με αυτόν που κερδίζεται εδω:

α. Μεσα στην Ελλάδα N/O/ΔΕ

β. Στις Ευρωπαϊκές Κοινοτητες N/O/ΔΕ

Επιχειρηματίας/Στελεχος

8. Πιστεύεται ότι οι επιχειρηματίες της περιοχής σας:

Α.Θα μπορούσαν να αποδόσουν το ίδιο καλά σε μια περιοχή
διαφορετική από την δική τους:

N/O/ΔΕ

Β.Θα μπορούσαν να αποδόσουν καλύτερα εάν περισσότερες
πολυεθνικές εταιρίες λειτουργούσαν στην περιοχή:

N/O/ΔΕ

ΠΡΟΧΩΡΗΣΤΕ ΣΤΗΝ ΣΥΜΠΛΗΡΩΣΗ ΤΟΥ ΜΕΡΟΥΣ Δ

ΜΕΡΟΣ Γ

ΝΑ ΣΥΜΠΛΗΡΩΘΕΙ ΜΟΝΟΝ ΕΑΝ Η ΑΠΑΝΤΗΣΗ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΡΩΤΗΣΗ Ι.2. ΤΟΥ ΜΕΡΟΥΣ Α ΕΙΝΑΙ Υ.

I. ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΤΙΚΑ ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΑ

1. ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ ΑΠΟΚΛΗΣΗ/ΚΟΜΜΑ

2. ΕΠΙΠΕΔΟ ΑΝΤΙΠΡΟΣΩΠΕΥΣΗΣ

- α. ΔΗΜΟΣ/ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΤΑ
- β. ΝΟΜΟΣ
- γ. ΒΟΥΛΗ
- δ. ΕΥΡΩΚΟΙΝΟΒΟΥΛΙΟ
- ε. ΆΛΛΟ

II. ΕΡΩΤΗΣΕΙΣ

1. Πιστεύεται ότι οι τοπικοί βουλευτές (ανεξάρτητα από το αν είναι στην κυβέρνηση ή την αντιπολίτευση):

α. δέχονται το μεγαλύτερο μέρος των πιέσεων (lobbying) για θέματα με τοπικό ενδιαφέρον:

N/O/ΔΞ

β. θεωρούνται υπεύθυνοι για αποφάσεις που παίρονται από τις τοπικές αρχές (Δήμους/Κοινοότητες/Νομαρχίες);

N/O/ΔΞ

2. Πιστεύεται ότι οι βουλευτές θεωρούνται υπεύθυνοι για την τοπική ανάπτυξη (περιφερειακή) περισσότερο (ακόμα και όταν δεν έχουν εμεση αναμοίξη) από τις τοπικές αρχές;

N/O/ΔΞ

3. Πιστεύεται ότι η ευημερία του νομού σας εξαρτάται περισσότερο από:

- α. Τους τοπικούς επιχειρηματίες (αυτοχθόνο επιχειρηματικό δυναμικό)
- β. Εταιρίες με έδρα έξω από την Κρήτη.
- γ. Δεν ξέρω.

4.1.Α. Σε περίπτωση υφέσεως, πιστεύεται ότι οι μικρο-μεσαιες επιχειρήσεις που θα επιβιώσουν είναι πιο πιθανό να διατηρήσουν δραστηριότητα στην περιοχή σας ή να μεταφερθούν σε κάποια άλλη περιοχή;

- α. Διατηρούν δραστηριότητα
- β. Μεταφέρονται
- γ. ΔΕ

Β. Εάν μεταφέρουν τις δραστηριότητες τους πιστεύεται ότι θα προτιμήσουν να εγκατασταθούν:

- α. εκτός του νομού Χανίων, αλλά μέσα στην Κρήτη
- β. στην υπολοιπή Ελλάδα
- γ. στην Ευρωπαϊκή Κοινότητα
- δ. άλλου.....

4.2.Α. Σε περίπτωση υφέσεως, πιστεύεται ότι οι πολυεθνικές εταιρίες είναι πιο πιθανό να διατηρήσουν την δραστηριότητα τους στον νομό ή να μεταφερθούν σε άλλη περιοχή:

- α. Διατηρούν δραστηριότητα
- β. μεταφέρονται
- γ. ΔΕ

Β. Εάν μεταφερθούν σε πια περιοχή νομίζεται ότι θα προτιμούσαν να δραστηριοποιηθούν:

- α. σε κάποιον άλλο νομό της Κρήτης
- β. σε κάποια άλλη περιοχή της Ελλάδας εκτός Κρήτης
- γ. εντός της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας
- δ. άλλου.....
- ε. ΔΕ

5. Πιστεύεται ότι οι Δημοτικοί Συμβούλοι έχουν πιο ακριβή εικόνα των επιχειρηματικών δυνατοτήτων (mental map) της περιφέρειας τους από τους Βουλευτές της ίδιας περιφέρειας: (ΓΙΑΤΙ:)

N/O/ΔΕ

6.Α.Πιστεύεται ότι οι δημοτικοί σύμβουλοι είναι περισσότερο εξυπηρετικοί σε πιέσεις επιχειρηματιών της περιοχής, σε σχέση με τους τοπικούς βουλευτές:

N/O/ΔΞ

Β.Πιστεύεται ότι οι δημοτικοί σύμβουλοι είναι αποδεκτές περισσότερων πιέσεων από επιχειρηματίες της περιοχής σε σχέση με τους τοπικούς βουλευτές:

N/O/ΔΞ

7.Ποιος εκ των κατωτέρω πιστεύεται ότι έχει πιο μακροχρόνια προοπτική όταν προτείνει οικονομική πολιτική:

- α.Δημοτικός Σύμβουλος
- β.Βουλευτής
- γ.Ευροβουλευτής
- δ.Δεν ξέρω

ΠΕΡΑΙΤΕΡΩ ΕΡΩΤΗΣΕΙΣ

Elite Interviewing Method

1. Έχετε μέσα στα τελευταία δύο χρόνια δεχτεί πιέσεις από επιχειρηματίες που προσβλέπουν στην αλλαγή ή τροπολογία νομοθεσίας: LOBBYING
2. Έχετε κάποιο προσωπικό επαγγελματικό ενδιαφέρον σε κάποια από τις τοπικές επιχειρήσεις: Σε κάποια εθνική επιχείρηση: (Σε σχέση εργασίας ή κάτοχος περισσότερα από 1% εταιρίας)

ΜΕΡΟΣ Δ

ΝΑ ΣΥΜΠΛΗΡΩΘΕΙ ΓΙΑ ΟΛΟΥΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΕΡΩΤΟΥΜΕΝΟΥΣ

1. Πιστεύεται ότι οι επιχειρήσεις της επαρχίας σας θα εβλέπαν θετικά την πιθανότητα να αποκτήσει η Κρήτη σχετική αυτονομία από την υπόλοιπη Ελλάδα:

N/O/ΔΞ

2. Πιστεύεται ότι τα οικονομικά μελλον της περιοχής σας βρίσκεται σε τοπικά κεφάλαια ή κεφάλαια με προέλευση έξω από την Κρήτη:
(εσωτερικές ή εξωτερικές επενδύσεις)

ΕΣ/ΕΞΩΤ/ΔΞ

3. Πιστεύεται ότι η μελλοντική οικονομική ανάπτυξη της περιοχής θα εξαρτηθεί κυρίως από τοπικούς ή επιχειρηματίες που προέρχονται έξω από την Κρήτη:

ΤΟΠ/ΕΞΩΓ/ΔΞ

4. Θα χαρακτηρίζατε την τοπική Δημοτική/Κοινοτική αρχή σαν:

Α. Δυναμικό Παραγοντα στις Δημοκρατικές Διαδικασίες	Β. Σημαντικό Σώμα	Γ. Μικρής Σημασίας	Δ. Ένα Αναχρονισμό
--	----------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------

5. Α. Πιστεύεται ότι η Ελληνική Οικονομία είναι ετοιμη για τον ανταγωνισμό που θα φέρει η Ευρωπαϊκή Ολοκλήρωση και το 1992:

1	2	3	4	5	ΔΞ
Πολύ καλά προετοιμασμένη		Προετοιμασμένη		Ετοιμη	Καθόλου

- Β. Πιστεύεται ότι η περιφερειακή οικονομία της Κρήτης είναι ετοιμη για τον ανταγωνισμό που θα φέρει το 1992:

1	2	3	4	5	ΔΞ
Πολύ καλά προετοιμασμένη		Προετοιμασμένη		Ετοιμη	Καθόλου

6. Πιστεύεται ότι ο νομος σας είναι σε χειρότερη θέση από την υπολοίπη Ελλάδα σε σχέση με την ετοιμότητα για το 1992;

1	2	3	4	5	ΔΕ
Πολυ Καλύτερη		Στην Ιδια		Πολυ	Χειρότερη
Θέση		Θέση		Θέση	

7. Πιστεύεται ότι η εθνική πολιτική δεν έχει δημιουργήσει στην Κρήτη τις ευκαιρίες που έχουν δημιουργήσει σε άλλες περιοχές της Ελλάδας;

N/O/ΔΕ

8. Συνολικά πιστεύεται ότι υπάρχουν μεγάλες διαφορές μεταξύ των ανθρώπων στον νομο σας και στην υπολοίπη:

α.Κρήτη: N/O/ΔΕ

β.Ελλάδα: N/O/ΔΕ

γ.Ευρώπη: N/O/ΔΕ

9. Πιστεύεται ότι η Ευρώπη αντιπροσωπεύει μια πρόκληση για την περιοχή σας: (με ποιο τρόπο αν ναι)

N/O/ΔΕ

10. Πιστεύεται ότι υπάρχουν περισσότερες ευκαιρίες ή κινδυνοί σε μια ενωμένη Ευρώπη:

1	2	3	4	5	ΔΕ
Περισσότερες		Ιδιο	Επιπεδο		Περισσότεροι
Ευκαιρίες		Ευκαιριών/Κινδύνων		Κινδυνοί	

Appendix IIa: British version of the Questionnaire ⁵³³
variable names are in bold.

PART A: ID

I. FILLED IN BY INTERVIEWER BEFORE THE ATTITUDE QUESTIONS

1. DATE AND PLACE.....

ID 2. A. OTHER..... B. BUSINESSMAN C. POLITICIAN

RANK 3. RANK/POSITION WITHIN ORGANISATION

AGE 4. AGE GROUP

- a. <35
- b. 36-45
- c. 46-55
- d. 56>

II. QUESTIONS

Q1 1. Do you believe that macro-economic policies should be controlled at the regional, national or international level?

Regional	National	International	Do Not Know
1	2	3	4

Q2 2. Do you believe a federal structure for Europe can be viable?

Yes	No	Do Not Know
1	2	3

Q3 3. Are Nationalist Political movements (like the SNP) constructive in regional politics?

Yes	No	Do Not Know
1	2	3

⁵³³ . At the beginning of each interview the use of terms such as 'autonomy', 'national' or 'regional' is explained and put in the context within which they are used here (see appendix I).

Q4 4. Are your family/ethnic roots in Scotland?

Yes	No	Do Not Know
1	2	3

PART B.

COMPLETE IF ANSWER TO QUESTION A.1.2. = b.BUSINESSMAN

I. TO BE COMPLETED PROVISIONALLY
If respondents do not object.

P1 1.a. SIZE OF COMPANY BY TURNOVER

P2 b. SIZE OF COMPANY BY EMPLOYEES

P3 2. OWNERSHIP

P4 3. OPERATIONS

- a.LOCAL b.REGIONAL c.NATIONAL
- d.EXPORTS TO ONE OR TWO COUNTRIES
- e.EXPORTS TO MORE THAN TWO COUNTRIES

II. QUESTIONS

1. Do you believe that overall:
QB1 A.Strathclyde region will benefit from an increase in
the powers of the regional government?
(taxes/representation/education/public works etc)

Yes	No	Do Not Know
1	2	3

QB2 B.Your business will benefit from such a shift in power
to the region?

Yes	No	Do Not Know
1	2	3

QB3 Do you foresee the development of more small-medium
enterprises in your region?
(Change of ratio of small-medium to big corporations)

Yes	No	Do Not Know
1	2	3

QB4 Will such a development create a positive environment for your firm?

Yes	No	Do Not Know
1	2	3

QB5 Do you think that a shift in the economy towards small-medium enterprises will aid in the creation of:

- A. a more devolved (autonomous) economy?
- B. a rather dependent (integrated) economy?
- C. DN

QB6 Do you know who is your constituency local/regional political representative? (Regional/District Councillors)

Yes	No	Do Not Know
1	2	3

QB7 Do you know who is your constituency national representative?

Yes	No	Do Not Know
1	2	3

QB8 Do you know your constituency European representative?

Yes	No	Do Not Know
1	2	3

B9 Could you identify by name any of your above mentioned representatives?

.....

QB10 Have you in the last two years approached any administrative officials with some request from your company in the:

- A. Strathclyde regional council
- B. regional governmental authority (Scottish Office)
- C. national government
- D. European Commission/Parliament
- E. Other

QB10 F. Do you consider yourself to be an entrepreneur or an executive?

QB11 Do you find that council representatives promote the economic interests of the region:

A.more fervently than your representatives to Westminster (MP's)

1	2	3	4	5
more		equally		less
fervent		fervent		fervent

QB12 More effectively than your representatives in Westminster

1	2	3	4	5
more		equally		less
effective		effective		effective

QB13 How receptive do you think regional councillors are to your views compared with Members of Parliament?

1	2	3	4	5	0
More		equally		less	Not
receptive		receptive		receptive	Relevant

QB14 Would you be prepared to do the same job you are performing here in another region, if you were given a similar salary/compensation to the one you receive already?

In Great Britain

Yes	No	Do Not Know
1	2	3

QB15 In the European Communities

Yes	No	Do Not Know
1	2	3

QB16 Do you believe that local entrepreneurs:

Would be able to function effectively in a different region than their own?

In Great Britain

Yes	No	Do Not Know
1	2	3

QB17 In the European Communities

Yes	No	Do Not Know
1	2	3

QB18 Are Capable of performing better if more multinational enterprises operate in their region?

Yes	No	Do Not Know
1	2	3

COMPLETE PART D NEXT

PART C

TO BE COMPLETED IF ANSWER TO QUESTION I.2 OF PART A IS C

I. TO BE COMPLETED PROVISIONALLY BY INTERVIEWER

PP1 POLITICAL AFFILIATION/PARTY

PP2 LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION:

a. CITY COUNCIL b. REGION c. NATION d. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

e. QUESTIONS

QC1 Do you feel that local MP's in Westminster (irrespective of being Government or opposition) are:

Receiving most of the lobbying for issues with regional impact?

Yes	No	Do Not Know
1	2	3

QC2 Considered accountable for decisions taken by regional authorities?

Yes	No	Do Not Know
1	2	3

QC3 Do you believe that MP's are held more accountable, for regional development (even when not responsible) than regional councillors?

Yes	No	Do Not Know
1	2	3

QC4 Do you believe your region's prosperity depends more on:

A. Local Entrepreneurs B. Companies with Headquarters outside the region

C. Don't Know

QC5 In the case of a recession, do you believe *small-medium sized business* that will survive the recession are more likely to maintain operations in your region, or shift to another region?

- a. maintain operations
- b. shift to another region
- c. DN

QC6 If they shift where do you think they will prefer to operate?

- a. in another Scottish region
- b. in another British region outside Scotland
- c. within the EC
- d. other

QC7 In the case of a recession, do you believe *multinational business* are more likely to maintain operations, in your region, or shift to another region?

- a. maintain operations
- b. shift to another region
- c. DN

QC8 If they shift where do you think they will prefer to operate?

- a. in another Scottish region
- b. in another British region outside Scotland
- c. within the EC
- d. other

QC9 Do you find that local councillors possess a more accurate 'mental map' of their constituency than MP's?
(get explanation of reply if possible)

Yes	No	Do Not Know
1	2	3

QC10 Do you believe that regional councillors

- a. Are more (attentive) receptive than Westminster MP's to pressure from businessmen in their area?

QC11 b. Receive more pressure than MPs?

QC12 Which of the following do you believe have a longer term perspective when proposing economic policy: regional, national or European representatives? (Councillors, MP's, or MEP's)

- A. Regional B. National C. European D. Don't Know

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

Political Interviewees
Elite Interviewing Method

QC13 Have you been approached by businessmen with requests that would require current legislation amendments or the introduction of new legislation.

QC14 Do you have a business interest in any of the Strathclyde business?
(Directly employed or holding more than 1% of a company)

PART D

TO BE COMPLETED FOR ALL INTERVIEWEES.

QD1 Do you believe that if your region were to become more autonomous, business would perceive this as a generally positive development?

Yes	No	Do Not Know
1	2	3

QD2 Do you think that the economic future of your region lies in local or out of regional capital? (depends on indigenous or exogenous investment)

IND	EXOG	Do Not Know
1	2	3

QD3 Do you believe that future economic growth will depend mainly on local or out of region entrepreneurial skill?

LOCAL	OUT OF REG	Do Not Know
1	2	3

QD4 Do you regard the Strathclyde regional council as:

- A. A Dynamic Element in Modern Democracy
B. An Active Body
C. Of Minor Importance
D. An Anachronism

QD5 A.Do you believe that the British economy is ready for the competition that the 1992 integration will bring?

1	2	3	4	5	DN
Very well Prepared		Prepared		Not Prepared	
				Not All	

QD6 Do you believe that Scottish economy is ready for the 1992 competition challenge?

1	2	3	4	5	DN
Very Well Prepared		Prepared		Not Prepared	
				At All	

QD7 Do you find that your region is in a worse position than the nation in regard to 1992?

1	2	3	4	5	DN
Much		Same		Much	
Better				Worse	

QD8 Do you believe that national policies have failed to create the opportunities in your region that have been created in other regions of Britain?

Yes	No	Do Not Know
1	2	3

QD9 Overall do you find there are great differences between people in your region and those in the rest of:
a. Scotland?

Yes	No	Do Not Know
1	2	3

QD10 b. Britain?

Yes	No	Do Not Know
1	2	3

QD11 c. Rest of Europe?

Yes	No	Do Not Know
1	2	3

QD12 Do you think that Europe represents a challenge for your region?

(expand: in what way if yes)

Yes	No	Do Not Know
1	2	3

QD13 Do you believe there are more opportunities or risks in a united Europe?

1	2	3	4	5	DN
more		same level		more	
opportunities		risks/opport.		risks	

APPENDIX IIc. Questionnaire Codebook (Standard Codes)

NO.	VALUE	VARIABLE DESCRIPTION	VAR.NAME
1.	1	Strathclyde Political Elite	ID
1.	2	Strathclyde Business Elite	ID
1.	3	Cretan Political Elite	ID
1.	4	Cretan Business Elite	ID
2.	11	Small Business Owner	RANK
2.	12	Business Manager	RANK
2.	13	Business Director	RANK
2.	20	Political Activist	RANK
2.	21	Senior Administrator	RANK
2.	22	Glasgow City Councillor	RANK
2.	23	Strathclyde Regional Councillor	RANK
2.	24	Scottish MP	RANK
2.	25	Scottish MEP	RANK
2.	26	Cretan President of Local Community	RANK
2.	27	Cretan City Councillor	RANK
2.	28	Cretan Mayor	RANK
2.	30	Political Administrator	RANK
2.	40	Other	RANK
3.	1	Age Group of 35 or Less	AGE
3.	2	Age Group of 36-45	AGE
3.	3	Age Group of 46-55	AGE
3.	4	Age Group of 56 or More	AGE
4.	1	Control of Macro-economics by the Region	Q1
4.	2	Control of Macro-economics by the Nation	Q1
4.	3	Control of Macro-economics Internationally	Q1
4.	4	Do Not Know	Q1
4.	5	Other	Q1
5.	1	Yes-Federalism in Europe Viable	Q2
5.	2	No-Federalism in Europe Not Viable	Q2
5.	3	Do Not Know	Q2
5.	4	Other	Q2
6.	1	Yes-Nationalist Movements Constructive	Q3
6.	2	No-Nationalist Movem. Non- Constructive	Q3
6.	3	Do Not Know	Q3
6.	4	Other	Q3
7.	1	Yes-My Family Roots Are In the Region	Q4
7.	2	No-My Family Roots Are Not In the Region	Q4
7.	3	Do Not Know	Q4
7.	4	Other	Q4

NO.	VALUE	VARIABLE DESCRIPTION	VAR. NAME
8.	1	Scottish Company Turnover £5m.<	P1
8.	2	Scottish Company Turnover £5-20m.	P1
8.	3	Scottish Company Turnover >£20m	P1
8.	4	Cretan Company Turnover DRCH 10m<	P1
8.	5	Cretan Company Turnover DRCH 10-100m	P1
8.	6	Cretan Company Turnover DRCH 100m.>	P1
8.	7	No Information on Company Turnover	P1
9.	1	Scottish Company No. of Employees 10-20	P2
9.	2	Scottish Company No. of Employees 21-100	P2
9.	3	Scottish Company No. of Employees 100>	P2
9.	4	Cretan Company No. of Employees 5-10	P2
9.	5	Cretan Company No. of Employees 11-50	P2
9.	6	Cretan Company No. of Employees 51>	P2
9.	7	No Information on Number of Employees	P2
10.	1	Scottish Company Privately Owned	P3
10.	2	Scottish Company Publicly Owned	P3
10.	3	UK Company Privately Owned	P3
10.	4	UK Company Publicly Owned	P3
10.	5	Internationally Owned Company	P3
10.	6	Cretan Company Privately Owned	P3
10.	7	Cretan Company Publicly Owned	P3
10.	8	Greek Company Privately Owned	P3
10.	9	Greek Company Publicly Owned	P3
11.	1	Firm Maintains Local Operations Only	P4
11.	2	Firm has Region Wide Operations	P4
11.	3	Firm has Nation Wide Operations	P4
11.	4	Firm Exports/Operates in One or Two Other Countries	P4
11.	5	Firm Exports/Operates In More than Two Other Countries	P4
12.	1	YES-Region will benefit from increase in Regional Power	QB1
12.	2	NO	QB1
12.	3	DO NOT KNOW	QB1
12.	4	OTHER	QB1
13.	1	YES-My business benefits from a power shift to the region	QB2
13.	2	NO	QB2
13.	3	DO NOT KNOW	QB2
13.	4	OTHER	QB2
14.	1	YES-I foresee the Development of more SMEs	QB3
14.	2	NO	QB3
14.	3	DO NOT KNOW	QB3
14.	4	OTHER	QB3

NO.	VALUE	VARIABLE DESCRIPTION	VAR. NAME
15.	1	YES- More SMEs will be beneficial to my firm	QB4
15.	2	NO	QB4
15.	3	DO NOT KNOW	QB4
15.	4	OTHER	QB4
16.	1	YES-More SMEs create more autonomy	QB5
16.	2	NO	QB5
16.	3	DO NOT KNOW	QB5
16.	4	OTHER	QB5
17.	1	YES-I know my constituency regional representative	QB6
17.	2	NO	QB6
17.	3	DO NOT KNOW	QB6
17.	4	OTHER	QB6
18.	1	YES-I know my constituency MP	QB7
18.	2	NO	QB7
18.	3	DO NOT KNOW	QB7
18.	4	OTHER	QB7
19.	1	YES-I know my constituency MEP	QB8
19.	2	NO	QB8
19.	3	DO NOT KNOW	QB8
19.	4	OTHER	QB8
20.	1	YES-I can identify by name an elected representative	QB9
20.	2	NO	QB9
21.	1	YES-I have approached the region with a company request	QB10A
21.	2	NO	QB10A
22.	1	YES-I have approached the governments' regional office	QB10B
22.	2	NO	QB10B
23.	1	YES-I have approached the national government	QB10C
23.	2	NO	QB10C
24.	1	YES-I have approached the European Commission	QB10D
24.	2	NO	QB10D
25.	1	YES-I have approached an other governmental institution	QB10E
25.	2	NO	QB10E
26.	5	1-Council representatives are much more fervent than MPs'	QB11
26.	4	2-more fervent	QB11
26.	3	3-equally fervent	QB11
26.	2	4-slightly less fervent	QB11
26.	1	5-less fervent	QB11
26.	8	OTHER	QB11
26.	9	DO NOT KNOW	QB11

NO.	VALUE	VARIABLE DESCRIPTION	VAR. NAME
27.	5	1-Councillors more effective than MP's	QB12
27.	4	2-slightly more effective	QB12
27.	3	3-equally effective	QB12
27.	2	4-slightly less effective	QB12
27.	1	5-less effective	QB12
27.	8	OTHER	QB12
27.	9	DO NOT KNOW	QB12
28.	5	1-Councillors are more receptive than MP's	QB13
28.	4	2-slightly more receptive	QB13
28.	3	3-equally receptive	QB13
28.	2	4-slightly less receptive	QB13
28.	1	5-less receptive	QB13
28.	8	OTHER	QB13
28.	9	DO NOT KNOW	QB13
29.	1	YES-I would work in another region within nation	QB14
29.	2	NO	QB14
29.	3	DO NOT KNOW	QB14
29.	4	OTHER	QB14
30.	1	YES-I would work in another region within Europe	QB15
30.	2	NO	QB15
30.	3	DO NOT KNOW	QB15
30.	4	OTHER	QB15
31.	1	ENTREPRENEUR	QB10F
31.	2	EXECUTIVE	QB10F
31.	3	OTHER	QB10F
32.	1	YES-Local entrepreneurs can be effective elsewhere in UK	QB16
32.	2	NO	QB16
32.	3	DO NOT KNOW	QB16
32.	4	OTHER	QB16
33.	1	YES-Local entrepreneurs can be effective in Europe	QB17
33.	2	NO	QB17
33.	3	DO NOT KNOW	QB17
33.	4	OTHER	QB17
34.	1	YES- Entrepreneurs performance is affected by MNLs	QB18
34.	2	NO	QB18
34.	3	DO NOT KNOW	QB18
34.	4	OTHER	QB18

NO.	VALUE	VARIABLE DESCRIPTION	VAR. NAME
35.	1	POLITICAL AFFILIATION-GR Left (SIN-ARISTERA)	PP1
35.	2	GR Socialists Left (Left-PASOK)	PP1
35.	3	GR Socialists (PASOK)	PP1
35.	4	GR Socialists Centre (Centre-PASOK)	PP1
35.	5	GR Conservatives Centre(NEA DEMOKRATIA-Kentro)	PP1
35.	6	GR Conservatives (NEA DEMOKRATIA)	PP1
35.	7	GR Communists (KKE)	PP1
35.	8	GR Centre Party (ENOSIS KENTROU)	PP1
35.	10	OTHER	PP1
35.	11	SNP	PP1
35.	12	LABOUR	PP1
35.	13	LIBERAL DEMOCRATS	PP1
35.	14	CONSERVATIVES	PP1
36.	1	YES-MP's receive most of lobbying on regional issues	QC1
36.	2	NO	QC1
36.	3	DO NOT KNOW	QC1
36.	4	OTHER	QC1
37.	1	YES-MPs are held accountable for regional decisions	QC2
37.	2	NO	QC2
37.	3	DO NOT KNOW	QC2
37.	4	OTHER	QC2
38.	1	YES-MPs are held accountable for regional development	QC3
38.	2	NO	QC3
38.	3	DO NOT KNOW	QC3
38.	4	OTHER	QC3
39.	1	LOCAL ENTREPRENEURS-Are important for region	QC4
39.	2	MNLs-Are more important for regional prosperity	QC4
39.	3	DO NOT KNOW	QC4
39.	4	OTHER	QC4
40.	1	YES- SMEs will stay in the region after a recession	QC5
40.	2	NO	QC5
40.	3	DO NOT KNOW	QC5
40.	4	OTHER	QC5
41.	1	SMEs SHIFT-Another Scottish Region	QC6
41.	2	Another British Region excluding Scotland	QC6
41.	3	Elsewhere in the EC	QC6
41.	4	OTHER	QC6
41.	5	DO NOT KNOW	QC6
42.	1	YES-MNLs will stay in region after a recession	QC7
42.	2	NO	QC7
42.	3	DO NOT KNOW	QC7
42.	4	OTHER	QC7

NO.	VALUE	VARIABLE DESCRIPTION	VAR. NAME
43.	1	MNLs SHIFT-Another Scottish region	QC8
43.	2	Another British Region excluding Scotland	QC8
43.	3	Elsewhere in the EC	QC8
43.	4	OTHER	QC8
43.	5	DO NOT KNOW	QC8
44.	1	YES-Councillors have accurate 'mental map'	QC9
44.	2	NO	QC9
44.	3	DO NOT KNOW	QC9
44.	4	OTHER	QC9
45.	1	YES-Councillors receptive to business pressure	QC10
45.	2	NO	QC10
45.	3	DO NOT KNOW	QC10
45.	4	OTHER	QC10
46.	1	YES-Councillors receive more pressure than MPs	QC11
46.	2	NO	QC11
46.	3	DO NOT KNOW	QC11
46.	4	OTHER	QC11
47.	1	REGIONAL-Representatives have longer term perspective	QC12
47.	2	NATIONAL	QC12
47.	3	EUROPEAN	QC12
47.	4	DO NOT KNOW	QC12
48.	1	YES-I have been lobbied by businessmen	QC13
48.	2	NO	QC13
49.	1	YES-I have business interests in my region	QC14
49.	2	NO	QC14
50.	1	YES-Business would perceive autonomy positively	QD1
50.	2	NO	QD1
50.	3	DO NOT KNOW	QD1
50.	4	OTHER	QD1
51.	1	INDIGENOUS-Capital sources more important for region	QD2
51.	2	EXOGENOUS	QD2
51.	3	BALANCED	QD2
51.	4	DO NOT KNOW	QD2
52.	1	LOCAL-Entrepreneurial skill more important	QD3
52.	2	OUT OF REGION	QD3
52.	3	BALANCED	QD3
52.	4	DO NOT KNOW	QD3
53.	1	DYNAMIC-Opinion of Regional Council	QD4
53.	2	ACTIVE	QD4
53.	3	OF MINOR IMPORTANCE	QD4
53.	4	ANACHRONISM	QD4
53.	5	OTHER	QD4

NO.	VALUE	VARIABLE DESCRIPTION	VAR. NAME
54.	5	1-British economy well prepared for 1992	QD5
54.	4	2-almost well prepared	QD5
54.	3	3-prepared	QD5
54.	2	4-slightly unprepared	QD5
54.	1	5-not prepared at all	QD5
54.	8	OTHER	QD5
54.	9	DO NOT KNOW	QD5
55.	5	1-Scottish economy well prepared for 1992	QD6
55.	4	2-almost well prepared	QD6
55.	3	3-prepared	QD6
55.	2	4-slightly unprepared	QD6
55.	1	5-not prepared at all	QD6
55.	8	OTHER	QD6
55.	9	DO NOT KNOW	QD6
56.	5	1-Region much better than nation regarding 1992	QD7
56.	4	2-slightly better	QD7
56.	3	3-same	QD7
56.	2	4-slightly worse	QD7
56.	1	5-much worse	QD7
56.	8	OTHER	QD7
56.	9	DO NOT KNOW	QD7
57.	1	YES-National policies have failed to create opportunities	QD8
57.	2	NO	QD8
57.	3	DO NOT KNOW	QD8
57.	4	OTHER	QD8
58.	1	YES-People different here than in rest of Scotland/Crete	QD9
58.	2	NO	QD9
58.	3	DO NOT KNOW	QD9
58.	4	OTHER	QD9
59.	1	YES-People different here than in the rest of UK/GR	QD10
59.	2	NO	QD10
59.	3	DO NOT KNOW	QD10
59.	4	OTHER	QD10
60.	1	YES-People different here than in the rest of Europe	QD11
60.	2	NO	QD11
60.	3	DO NOT KNOW	QD11
60.	4	OTHER	QD11
61.	1	YES-Europe represents a challenge for our region	QD12
61.	2	NO	QD12
61.	3	DO NOT KNOW	QD12
61.	4	OTHER	QD12

NO.	VALUE	VARIABLE DESCRIPTION	VAR. NAME
62.	5	1-More opportunities exist in a united Europe	QD13
62.	4	2-slightly more opportunities	QD13
62.	3	3-same level of opportunities and risks	QD13
62.	2	4-slightly more risks	QD13
62.	1	5-more risks	QD13
62.	8	OTHER	QD13
62.	9	DO NOT KNOW	QD13

NOTES

1. Values assigned here are those used in the primary analysis. In further analysis certain variable values were collapsed, filtered or order reversed to facilitate more sophisticated tests.

2. In variable RANK (Variable No.2) it was deemed appropriate to assign different values to the political elites of the two regions because of the two different regional political systems.

3. In the variables P1 (Variable No.8) and P2 (Variable No.9) different values were assigned for establishing firm size by turnover and employees. This was done arbitrarily but in a fashion that would reflect the different level of economic development of the two regions. This is a practice routinely followed by the European Commission when publishing reports (Commission,1990,1991b)and I believe best reflects the relative weight of local elite individuals.

4. In variable PP1 (Variable No.35) assignment of a number of variants in the standard political parties of Greece was deemed necessary after a repeated insistence of interviewees to assign themselves political hues when giving out their party affiliation.

5. Variables QC11 (Variable No. 46) and QD11 (Variable No. 60) were exclusively included in the Greek questionnaire. Their inclusion could assist in the analysis of more intricate questions in the region.

Appendix II.d: Sample Letter of Approach

Date [alone, with month spelled out in full]

Dear Sir,

I am currently engaged at the University of Glasgow on a research project which seeks to analyse the impact of the forthcoming European single market on business perspectives and performance. The project is a comparative one, and aims to look at developments in Scotland, Spain and Greece.

A central part of the research involves an assessment of the attitudes of key figures in the Strathclyde business community towards the single market and how its arrival will affect their own plans. To this end, I would be immensely grateful if you would be prepared to spare a short amount of time (no more than three quarters of an hour, at most) to see me and answer a brief questionnaire.

I appreciate that your schedule must be very busy, but if you could possibly oblige I am sure that the results of the research project would be of interest, and - indeed - may help to improve Scotland's competitive edge in respect to other European regions.

Thus, I do hope that you are able to respond positively to this request. I would be happy to arrange an appointment at any convenient time.

I look forward to hearing from you soon.

Yours faithfully,

Dimitrios C Christopoulos

Appendix IIIa: List of Interviewees
(Names of interviewees withheld to maintain confidentiality)

NO/ID	DATE	NAME/FUNCTION
1 SCOT/POL	26-28/6/91	LIB DEM REGIONAL COUNCILLOR
2 SCOT/POL	28/6/91	LIB DEM CITY COUNCILLOR
3 SCOT/POL	4/7/91	ADMINISTRATOR/ASSIST. CHIEF EXECUTIVE
4 SCOT/POL	4/7/91	LEADER OF STRATHCLYDE REGIONAL COUNCIL
5 SCOT/POL	1/7/91	LABOUR REGIONAL COUNCILLOR
6 SCOT/POL	5/7/91	LABOUR MP
7 SCOT/POL	2/7/91	LABOUR/ DEPUTY LEADER OF THE REGIONAL COUNCIL
8 SCOT/POL	14/10/91	LABOUR MEP
9 SCOT/POL	15/10/91	LABOUR/ RESEARCH ASSISTANT
10 SCOT/POL	28/10/91	LABOUR/DEPUTY LEADER STRATHCLYDE REGION
11 SCOT/POL	10/11/91	SNP/COUNCIL CANDIDATE
12 SCOT/POL	8/11/91	LABOUR/ CITY COUNCIL
13 SCOT/POL	12/7/91	LABOUR MP
14 SCOT/POL	18/10/91	LABOUR MEP
15 SCOT/POL	18/10/91	LABOUR MP

16 SCOT/POL	19/6/91	LABOUR/STRATHCLYDE
17 SCOT/POL	26/6/91	LABOUR/CITY COUNCIL VICE CHAIRMAN/BAILIE
18 SCOT/BUS	9/11/91	DIRECTOR/SENIOR MANAG.
19 SCOT/BUS	25/6/91	SENIOR DIRECTOR (MARKETING)
20 SCOT/BUS	24/6/91	AREA MANAGER
21 SCOT/BUS	27/6/91	MANAGING DIRECTOR
22 SCOT/BUS	17/6/91	MANAGING DIRECTOR
23 SCOT/BUS	14/6/91	GENERAL MANAGER
24 SCOT/BUS	7/6/91	DIRECTOR
25 SCOT/BUS	5/6/91	MANAGING DIRECTOR
26 SCOT/BUS	5/6/91	COMPANY CHAIRMAN
27 SCOT/BUS	5/6/91	COMPANY DIRECTOR
28 SCOT/BUS	4/6/91	SENIOR MANAGER GROUP ACCOUNTANT/BOARD MEMB
29 SCOT/BUS	4/6/91	DIRECTOR COMPANY SECRETARY
30 SCOT/BUS	3/6/91	SENIOR DIRECTOR EXECUTIVE
31 SCOT/BUS	30/5/91	DIRECTOR COMPANY SECRETARY
32 SCOT/BUS	29/5/91	MANAGING DIRECTOR

33 SCOT/BUS	27/5/91	MANAGING DIRECTOR
34 SCOT/BUS	27/5/91	MANAGING DIRECTOR
35 SCOT/BUS	23/5/91	MANAGING DIRECTOR
36 SCOT/BUS	22/5/91	MANAGING DIRECTOR
37 SCOT/BUS	22/5/91	SENIOR MANAGER (PERSONNEL)
38 SCOT/BUS	20/5/91	MANAGING DIRECTOR
39 SCOT/BUS	20/5/91	COMPANY CHAIRMAN
40 SCOT/BUS	17/5/91	CHAIRMAN
41 SCOT/BUS	28/3/91	GENERAL MANAGER
42 GR/BUS	27/9/91	MANAGING DIRECTOR
43 GR/BUS	25/9/91	MANAGING DIRECTOR
44 GR/BUS	23/9/91	PROPRIETOR
45 GR/BUS	24/9/91	BUSINESS MANAGER
46 GR/BUS	24/9/91	BUSINESS MANAGER (ASSISTANT)
47 GR/BUS	23/9/91	MANAGER
48 GR/BUS	20/9/91	MANAGING DIRECTOR
49 GR/BUS	19/9/91	MANAGER

50 GR/BUS	19/9/91	PROPRIETOR
51 GR/BUS	16/9/91	PROPRIETOR
52 GR/BUS	17/9/91	MANAGING DIRECTOR
53 GR/BUS	17/9/91	COMPANY DIRECTOR (SALES)
54 GR/BUS	17/9/91	PROPRIETOR
55 GR/BUS	18/9/91	MANAGER
56 GR/BUS	19/9/91	MANAGER
57 GR/BUS	20/9/91	COMPANY DIRECTOR (FINANCE)
58 GR/BUS	12/9/91	SENIOR ADMINISTRATOR
59 GR/BUS	14/9/91	PROPRIETOR
60 GR/BUS	16/9/91	PROPRIETOR
61 GR/BUS	16/9/91	DIRECTOR
62 GR/BUS	16/9/91	PROPRIETOR
63 GR/POL	20/9/91	NEWSPAPER EDITOR
64 GR/POL	26/9/91	PRESIDENT OF LOCAL COMMUNITY
65 GR/POL	26/9/91	PRESIDENT OF LOCAL COMMUNITY
66 GR/POL	25/9/91	PRESID OF LOCAL COMMUNITY

67 GR/POL	26/9/91	PRESIDENT OF CITY COUNCIL
68 GR/POL	9/10/91	LEADER OF OPPOSITION/ CITY COUNCIL
69 GR/POL	20/9/91	MAYOR SMALL TOWN
70 GR/POL	20/9/91	PRESIDENT OF LOCAL COMMUNITY/ & DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATION
71 GR/POL	11/9/91	PRESIDENT OF LOCAL COMMUNITY
72 GR/POL	19/9/91	CITY COUNCILLOR
73 GR/POL	19/9/91	PARTY WHIP/ NEWSPAPER EDITOR
74 GR/POL	21/9/91	MAYOR OF
75 GR/POL	26/9/91	CITY COUNCILLOR
76 GR/POL	23/9/91	MAYOR OF SMALL TOWN

Appendix IIIb :Aggregated Raw Results of Questionnaires

c:\1dc\papers\stat\dc1.sav

id	rank	age	q1	q2	q3	q4	p1	p2	p3	p4	qb1	qb2	qb3	qb4	qb5	qb6	qb7	qb8	qb9	qb10a	qb10b	qb10c	qb10d	qb10e
1	1	23	3	4	1	3	3
2	1	22	2	2	1	1	3
3	1	21	3	2	1	3	1
4	1	23	4	1	1	3	1
5	1	23	3	3	1	3	3
6	1	24	3	2	1	1	1
7	1	23	4	3	1	3	1
8	1	25	3	2	1	3	1
9	1	20	2	1	1	3	1
0	1	23	4	1	3	3	1
1	1	20	2	1	3	1	1
2	1	22	4	1	1	3	3
3	1	24	2	2	1	3	1
4	1	25	4	.	3	3	1
5	1	24	3	1	3	3	1
6	1	23	2	1	1	3	1
7	1	22	3	2	1	3	3
8	2	13	4	2	1	3	3	2	3	1	5	3	3	3	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	2	2	2
9	2	13	2	2	1	3	3	3	3	4	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
0	2	12	1	2	3	1	1	3	3	1	5	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2
1	2	13	3	1	1	1	1	2	3	1	5	1	3	1	1	1	3	3	3	1	1	2	2	1
2	2	13	3	2	1	3	1	2	3	1	5	1	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

	qb10f	qb11	qb12	qb13	qb14	qb15	qb16	qb17	qb18	qd1	qd2	qd3	qd4	qd5	qd6	qd7	qd8	qd9	qd10	qd11	qd12	qd13
1	1	1	1	4	.	.	.	1	1	1	.	1	3
2	3	1	2	4	2	2	3	1	1	1	.	1	4
3	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	1	3	1	.	1	4
4	1	2	1	1	3	4	4	1	1	1	.	1	5
5	3	2	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	.	1	5
6	3	1	1	2	2	2	3	1	1	1	.	1	4
7	3	3	1	2	3	3	2	1	3	1	.	1	4
8	3	3	1	1	2	2	3	3	1	3	.	1	5
9	3	2	2	1	1	1	4	1	3	3	.	1	2
10	1	2	2	2	2	2	5	1	3	1	.	1	5
11	1	1	1	4	3	2	2	1	3	1	.	1	2
12	1	3	.	.	2	2	1	1	1	1	.	1	5
13	1	2	1	2	2	2	3	1	1	1	.	1	2
14	3	3	3	.	2	1	2	3	2	2	.	3	1
15	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	3	3	.	1	4
16	1	2	1	2	2	2	4	1	1	1	.	1	3
17	1	3	1	.	1	1	4	1	3	1	.	1	5
18	2	.	5	.	1	1	1	3	3	3	2	3	4	2	2	3	1	3	1	.	1	4
19	2	4	4	3	1	1	1	1	3	1	3	1	1	2	2	3	3	2	1	.	1	3
20	2	3	1	2	1	1	1	3	.	1	1	2	3	1	1	.	1	3	3	.	1	5
21	2	3	4	3	3	3	1	1	3	3	2	1	2	3	3	3	2	1	1	.	1	5
22	2	3	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	2	3	3	.	1	3	1	.	1	2

pp1	qc1	qc2	qc3	qc4	qc5	qc6	qc7	qc8	qc9	qc10	qc11	qc12	qc13	qc14
1	13	3	3	1	1	2	3	4	3	3	.	1	1	3
2	13	3	3	1	2	1	2	4	1	1	.	3	1	1
3	10	2	3	3	1	1	2	3	1	2	.	3	3	3
4	12	3	3	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	.	3	1	3
5	12	3	3	1	1	4	2	5	1	1	.	1	3	3
6	12	1	3	1	3	1	4	4	3	3	.	4	1	3
7	13	1	3	1	1	1	1	3	1	3	.	1	3	1
8	12	1	1	3	2	1	4	1	4	1	.	3	1	3
9	12	1	1	3	2	1	4	2	3	1	.	3	1	3
10	12	3	1	1	1	4	2	2	1	3	.	3	3	3
11	11	1	1	1	1	4	2	3	1	3	.	3	3	1
12	12	1	3	1	1	3	4	4	3	.	.	.	3	3
13	12	1	3	3	2	1	4	2	3	3	.	2	1	3
14	12	2	2	2	3	1	4	2	3	2	.	.	1	3
15	12	1	3	3	2	3	4	4	3	3	.	4	1	3
16	12	1	3	1	2	2	.	3	1	1	.	4	3	3
17	12	3	3	1	1	3	2	2	1	1	.	1	3	3
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22

id	rank	age	q1	q2	q3	q4	p1	p2	p3	p4	qb1	qb2	qb3	qb4	qb5	qb6	qb7	qb8	qb9	qb10a	qb10b	qb10c	qb10d	qb10e
23	2	13	3	2	1	3	1	3	5	2	1	3	1	1	2	3	3	1	1	1	1	2	2	1
24	2	13	2	2	1	3	1	3	5	5	3	1	1	1	1	3	3	3	3	3	2	1	1	2
25	2	13	3	2	3	3	1	2	3	1	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2
26	2	13	4	3	3	1	1	3	3	1	3	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	3	1	1	1	2	1
27	2	13	2	2	1	1	1	3	3	4	5	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	3	1	1	1	2	1
28	2	12	2	1	1	1	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	3	1	1	3	1	3	1	1	2	2	2
29	2	13	3	2	3	3	1	3	3	1	5	3	3	1	1	1	3	3	3	3	2	1	1	2
30	2	13	1	2	1	1	1	3	3	4	3	1	3	1	1	1	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	2
31	2	13	2	2	1	3	1	2	2	1	2	3	1	1	1	1	3	3	3	3	2	1	2	2
32	2	13	4	2	1	3	1	2	2	1	5	3	3	3	2	1	1	3	1	1	1	2	2	2
33	2	13	3	3	1	3	1	2	2	2	1	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
34	2	13	3	2	1	3	1	1	2	1	2	1	3	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	2	2	2
35	2	13	3	2	3	1	1	3	3	1	5	3	3	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	1	2	2	2
36	2	13	2	1	1	1	3	1	2	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	3	1	3	1	1	1	2	2
37	2	12	2	2	3	1	1	2	3	1	2	1	3	1	2	3	3	3	3	3	1	1	2	2
38	2	13	3	2	3	1	1	3	3	4	3	3	1	1	1	1	3	1	3	1	2	2	2	2
39	2	13	4	2	3	3	1	1	2	1	5	3	3	1	3	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	2	2
40	2	13	3	3	1	3	1	1	2	1	5	3	3	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	2
41	2	13	4	2	3	1	1	3	3	4	3	3	3	1	1	1	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	1
42	4	13	2	3	3	3	1	6	6	6	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	2
43	4	13	3	3	1	3	3	6	5	6	5	1	3	1	1	1	1	3	1	2	2	1	2	2
44	4	11	2	3	1	3	1	5	4	6	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2

qb10f	qb11	qb12	qb13	qb14	qb15	qb16	qb17	qb18	qd1	qd2	qd3	qd4	qd5	qd6	qd7	qd8	qd9	qd10	qd11	qd12	qd13
23	2	4	3	1	3	1	1	1	1	2	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	1	1	1	4
24	2	3	3	1	1	1	1	3	3	2	3	2	2	3	4	3	3	1	1	1	4
25	1	5	5	3	3	1	3	1	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	3	3	1	1	4
26	1	5	5	3	3	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	3	3	5	1	3	3	1	1	3
27	2	5	3	1	3	1	2	1	1	2	3	1	2	2	4	3	3	1	1	1	4
28	2	4	4	3	3	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	1	1	3	3	3	1	1	1	3
29	2	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	3	2	1	3	2	2	3	3	1	1	1	1	4
30	2	2	1	2	3	1	1	2	3	1	1	2	1	1	2	3	3	3	1	1	2
31	2	3	4	5	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	4	2	2	3	3	3	1	1	1	4
32	2	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	3	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	1	1	1	1	3
33	1	3	3	3	3	1	1	1	3	2	1	2	3	3	4	3	1	1	1	1	4
34	2	3	3	4	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	4	2	2	3	1	1	1	1	1	5
35	2	5	4	5	3	1	1	1	3	2	2	4	4	4	4	3	3	1	1	1	5
36	1	4	3	3	1	3	1	3	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	2
37	2	5	4	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	3	3	1	1	1	1	4
38	2	1	2	3	3	1	1	1	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	4
39	2	5	4	3	1	1	1	1	3	2	1	2	2	2	3	1	1	1	1	1	2
40	1	2	4	1	3	1	1	3	3	1	1	1	3	2	2	3	3	1	1	1	4
41	2	5	5	3	3	1	1	1	3	2	1	4	3	3	2	1	1	1	1	1	2
42	1	2	2	5	3	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	3	4	3	1	1	1	1	5
43	1	1	4	2	1	1	1	1	3	1	2	3	1	2	4	3	3	3	2	1	4
44	1	1	5	3	3	1	1	3	3	1	1	1	2	2	5	1	1	1	1	1	5

	pp1	qc1	qc2	qc3	qc4	qc5	qc6	qc7	qc8	qc9	qc10	qc11	qc12	qc13	qc14
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id	rank	age	q1	q2	q3	q4	p1	p2	p3	p4	qb1	qb2	qb3	qb4	qb5	qb6	qb7	qb8	qb9	qb10a	qb10b	qb10c	qb10d	qb10e	
45	4	13	2	1	1	3	1	6	4	6	2	1	1	1	3	2	1	1	3	1		1	1	2	2
46	4	13	1	2	1	1	1	6	6	6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	2	2	
47	4	13	3	3	1	3	1	6	6	5	4	1	1	3	1	1	1	1	3	1	2	2	2	2	
48	4	13	2	4	1	3	1	6	6	9	1	1	1	3	1	3	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	
49	4	11	1	1	1	2	1	7	5	6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	
50	4	11	4	3	1		3	5	4	6	3	1	1	3	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	1	2	
51	4	11	2	1	3	2	1	4	4	6	1	1	1	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	
52	4	11	3	3	1	3	3	5	4	6	1	1	1	3	3	2	1	1	3	1	1	2	2	1	
53	4	13	3	3	1	3	1	6	5	6	2	1	1	3		1	1	1	3	1	2	2	2	2	
54	4	13	2	2	1	3	1	5	4	6	3	1	1	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	
55	4	13	3	3	1	3	1	7	6	9	1	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	
56	4	13	3	2	1	3	1	5	4	6	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	
57	4	12	1	4	1	3	1	6	5	9	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	2	2	1	2	2	
58	4	12	1	3	3	3	3	7	7	7	1	1	2	1	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	
59	4	11	4	3	1	3	1	5	4	6	3	1	1	3	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	2	
60	4	11	3	2	1	2	1	4	4	6	4	1	1	3	1	1	1	3	1	2	2	2	2	2	
61	4	13	4	3	1	3	1	6	4	6	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	
62	4	13	1	1	1	3	1	6	5	6	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	
63	3	20	1	1	1	3	1																		
64	3	26	3	3	1	2	1																		
65	3	26	3	2	1	1	1																		
66	3	26	2	1	1	3	1																		

	qb10f	qb11	qb12	qb13	qb14	qb15	qb16	qb17	qb18	qd1	qd2	qd3	qd4	qd5	qd6	qd7	qd8	qd9	qd10	qd11	qd12	qd13
45	1	4	1	4	3	3	3	.	3	3	1	1	4	1	2	4	1	1	3	1	1	5
46	2	5	2	5	1	1	3	.	1	3	1	.	1	2	2	2	1	3	1	1	1	5
47	2	1	1	3	2	2	2	.	2	3	2	2	3	2	2	4	1	1	1	1	1	5
48	2	3	1	3	3	3	1	.	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	2	1	5
49	1	3	.	2	3	1	3	.	1	1	1	.	1	2	3	4	1	1	1	1	1	3
50	1	5	2	4	1	1	3	.	2	1	3	2	1	1	2	3	1	2	1	1	1	5
51	1	4	1	2	1	1	1	.	3	1	2	1	1	2	2	4	1	3	3	2	1	3
52	2	2	5	2	3	1	1	.	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	4	3	1	1	1	1	5
53	2	4	3	3	3	1	3	.	3	3	2	1	1	1	1	3	3	3	3	1	1	3
54	1	5	.	5	1	1	1	.	1	3	2	2	1	1	1	3	2	3	1	1	1	5
55	2	.	2	5	1	1	1	.	1	3	1	1	1	2	3	4	1	1	1	1	1	5
56	1	2	2	3	3	3	1	.	3	3	3	1	4	2	3	4	3	3	1	1	1	5
57	2	.	1	5	1	1	1	.	1	3	2	2	3	1	1	4	1	1	1	1	1	4
58	2	4	2	5	3	3	3	.	3	3	2	2	1	1	1	4	1	3	1	1	1	3
59	1	1	1	3	3	2	1	.	3	3	1	2	1	1	1	4	1	1	1	2	1	5
60	1	3	4	3	1	1	1	.	2	3	1	2	1	2	2	3	1	3	3	1	1	4
61	1	4	5	5	3	3	1	.	1	3	1	1	1	1	1	4	1	1	1	1	1	5
62	1	2	3	2	3	3	1	.	3	1	1	1	2	1	3	4	3	1	1	1	1	2
63	3	1	1	1	1	1	5	3	1	1	1	1	5
64	3	2	2	1	3	3	5	3	1	1	3	1	4
65	3	1	1	1	2	3	4	1	3	1	1	1	4
66	1	2	1	1	2	2	4	3	3	3	1	1	5

	pp1	qc1	qc2	qc3	qc4	qc5	qc6	qc7	qc8	qc9	qc10	qc11	qc12	qc13	qc14
45															
46															
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60															
61															
62															
63	10	1	3	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	2	3	1	3	1
64	6	1	3	3	2	1	1	1	1	3	2	2	3	3	3
65	4	3	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	1
66	2	1	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	3	3

id	rank	age	q1	q2	q3	q4	p1	p2	p3	p4	qb1	qb2	qb3	qb4	qb5	qb6	qb7	qb8	qb9	qb10a	qb10b	qb10c	qb10d	qb10e
67	3	27	4	3	3	3	1
68	3	27	3	.	1	3	1
69	3	28	4	1	1	1	1
70	3	26	2	1	1	3	1
71	3	26	2	1	1	3	1
72	3	27	3	2	1	3	1
73	3	20	4	2	3	3	1
74	3	28	2	.	3	3	1
75	3	27	2	1	3	3	1
76	3	28	3	1	1	3	1
77

	qb10f	qb11	qb12	qb13	qb14	qb15	qb16	qb17	qb18	qd1	qd2	qd3	qd4	qd5	qd6	qd7	qd8	qd9	qd10	qd11	qd12	qd13
67	3	2	1	1	3	3	3	3	1	1	1	1	5
68	3	1	1	2	4	4	4	3	3	1	1	1	5
69	3	2	3	1	2	2	3	1	3	1	1	1	6
70	3	2	2	3	2	3	4	1	3	3	2	1	4
71	3	1	1	1	2	2	4	1	3	3	1	1	4
72	3	3	1	2	1	2	4	1	3	3	3	1	3
73	3	1	1	1	2	3	4	1	1	1	1	1	2
74	3	2	3	1	2	2	4	3	3	1	3	1	3
75	2	1	1	.	2	2	4	1	3	3	2	1	5
76	3	1	1	1	2	2	4	1	1	1	2	1	3
77

pp1	qc1	qc2	qc3	qc4	qc5	qc6	qc7	qc8	qc9	qc10	qc11	qc12	qc13	qc14
67	3	1	3	2	1	1	1
68	6	1	1	3	1	1	1	.	3	1	1	2	1	3
69	3	1	3	3	2	3	3	.	1	3	2	3	3	1
70	3	1	3	1	2	1	2	3	1	1	1	3	3	3
71	1	1	3	3	1	1	2	3	1
72	3	3	3	2	1	1	1	.	1	3	1	3	1	1
73	3	1	3	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	2	3	1
74	3	1	3	3	2	1	1	.	3	1	1	3	3	3
75	6	1	3	3	2	1	2	2	3	3	2	2	3	1
76	4	1	1	2	1	1	3	.	3	3	2	3	1	3
77