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Electoral Reform in the Former USSR and Russian  
Federation, 1989-1993:

Continuity, Contradiction and Departure

Peter Lentini

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements  
of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,  
Institute of Russian and East European Studies,  
Glasgow University,

October 1996

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## **Abstract**

Through an examination of the elections of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the elections to the Russian Federal Assembly and their deputy compositions, this dissertation argues that the elections held in the former Soviet Union and the contemporary Russian Federation from 1989-1993 have demonstrated elements of continuity, contradiction and departure compared to those elections held before Mikhail Gorbachev's tenure as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). There has been a continuity of a central, powerful institution interfering and designing the electoral system and largely influencing, encouraging and restricting their outcomes. This continuity can be interpreted as a contradiction between the regime's intention to implement democratic changes and its reform efforts. Notwithstanding these factors, with each successive election there have been numerous innovations, greater scope for candidate competition and subsequently public choice, improved possibilities for civic involvement in all stages of the election campaigns and the opportunity for civil society to become actively involved in political affairs. Therefore, this accumulation of these electoral reform measures has resulted in significant departures from the previous electoral system that existed in the USSR from 1937-late 1980s. These developments have changed the Soviet electoral system from a series of plebiscites in which there was no choice among candidates to elections in which citizens were offered a choice among candidates to, ultimately, multiparty elections.

*To Janet, Peter and Melyssa*

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## Acknowledgments

My greatest intellectual debt goes to my supervisor Stephen White. I greatly appreciate all the enthusiasm, friendship and support he has demonstrated for me and this project since its original proposal.

Among my friends and colleagues in Glasgow, my three 'brothers' Ian Thatcher, Vince Barnett and Youcef Bounadcl provided the necessary laughs, criticism and moral support to get me through many-a-tough time. Tanya Frisby patiently instructed me in Russian language. Special thanks also go to Laura Cleary (nee Richards), Bert McLernen, Kay McWalter, Cathic Moonie and Kathleen Young for their cheer and friendship. Others at IREES (formerly ISEES) to whom I am indebted for constant support include Rene Beerman, Richard Berry, Giles Blackburn, Dougie Callum, Tai Kang Choi, Nick Glossop, Mark Knight, Chris Skillen and Jimmy White. I greatly benefited from consultations with Dr Boris Fedorov and Professor Ronald J. Hill when they were visiting scholars at IREES.

I am indebted to my former colleagues at CREES, Birmingham University. In particular I wish to note Marea Arries, Derek Averre, Seth Axelrod, Tricia Carr, Julian Cooper, Hugh Jenkins, Nancy Moore, Thomas Oppenkowski, Agata Pawlowska, Maureen Perrie, Hilary Pilkington, Arfon Rees, Tony Rimnington and Paul Snell.

I wish to acknowledge my friends and colleagues associated with the Sociology Department, Central European University, Prague <sup>especially</sup> Troy McGrath, <sup>former</sup> Department Head Claire Wallace, former Programme Coordinator Lynn Hayes, the late Professor Ernest

Gellner and Research Fellow Andrii Palianytsia, for their non-stop support and friendship during the 1993-1994 academic year. I am grateful to the Department for providing funds for travel and accommodation and allowing me to rework my teaching schedule in order to observe the 1993 elections to the Federal Assembly in Moscow. Many students from the CEU's Prague campus greatly enhanced my knowledge of Russian politics, communist and post-communist politics more generally. In particular, I am grateful to Vrej Atabekian, Serge Bazarya, Olha Buriak, Elena Chernyavskaya, Ivan Chorvat, Alexander Chvorostov, Saulesh Esenova, Magda Gera-Pakulska, Olexander Hryb, Olga Issoupouva, Irina Khmelko, Gennady Korzhov, Michal Kowalski, Krzysztof Olechnicki, Svetlana Oudouchlivaia, Oxana Schmulyar, Vladimir Shevchenko, Elena Sidorenko, Matyas Szabo, Levan Tahrnishvili, Gevork Ter-Gabrielian, Alexander Tulko, Luis Ulrich and Natasha Yakovleva. Donna Starr made sure I didn't get into too much trouble and helped me find the 'ultimate pizza' in Prague. I am indebted to Jochen Lorentzen for his friendship, professionalism and putting me in touch with the CEU Press. Keitha Fine kept after me to keep writing, work hard and stay young. I am thankful to Shannon Schraub for cheerfulness and appreciation of my sense of humour. I am also grateful to Pauline Wickham and Liz Lowther of the Central European University Press who made numerous valuable suggestions on parts of the present dissertation which appeared in my edited volume *Elections and Political Order in Russia*.

In Moscow I greatly benefited from the kindness of Andrey Edmskii who arranged my visit as a guest of the Russian Academy of Science's Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies. My gratitude is also extended to Marina Grafova, Natasha Kuzminnykh, Liudmilla Selivanova and Svetlana Yaroshenko.

In Melbourne I am indebted to friends and colleagues Jack Allen, Sue Blackburn, Marnie Boyce, Andy Butfoy, Pauline Dwyer, Robyn Eckersley, Nick Economou, Hugh Emy, David Goldsworthy, Paul James, Mike Janover, Kylie Huang, Bruce Lindsay, Paul Muldoon, Ray Nichols, Marko Pavlyshyn, Heather Rae, Chris Reus-Smit, Gillian Robinson, Lesley Whitelaw, Steve Wright, David Wright-Neville and Chris Ziguras.

Special thanks goes also to my family and friends back in Rhode Island who have been supportive over the years. In addition, I wish to acknowledge my friend the late John A. O'Neill who was so committed to my interests in (then) Soviet affairs.

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents and my sister who have stood by me for so many years and have had to put up with me living in foreign countries for most of my adult life. Thanks.

# Preface

The elections held in the former Soviet Union and the contemporary Russian Federation from 1989-1993 have demonstrated elements of continuity, contradiction and departure compared to those elections held before Mikhail Gorbachev's tenure as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). There has been a continuity of a central, powerful institution interfering and designing the electoral system and *largely* influencing, encouraging and restricting their outcomes. This continuity can be interpreted as a contradiction between the regime's intention to implement democratic changes and its reform efforts. Notwithstanding these factors, with each successive election there have been numerous innovations, greater scope for candidate competition and subsequently public choice, improved possibilities for civic involvement in all stages of the election campaigns and the opportunity for civil society to become actively involved in political affairs. Therefore, this accumulation of these electoral reform measures has resulted in significant departures from the previous electoral system that existed in the USSR from 1937 <sup>until the</sup> late 1980s. These developments have changed the Soviet electoral system from a series of plebiscites in which there was no choice among candidates to elections in which citizens were offered a choice among candidates to, ultimately, multiparty elections.

Electoral developments in the former Soviet Union and the Russian Federation during this transitional period have been dependent upon the nature of the dominant institutions of power, historical factors and the emergence of the former USSR's and Russia's civil societies. As Troy McGrath argues

Russia's emerging electoral and party systems have been conditioned by the processes of power and authority legitimation that shaped the lives of the contemporary elite. In constructing a new (presumably) democratic order, Russian politicians are drawing upon the only relevant experiences they have: the rules, norms and organisational [sic] structures of the obsolete Leninist *ancien regime*. Thus, Russia's construction crew is composed of workers whose productivity is hampered by behavioural patterns resulting from the disincentives and bureaucratic restrictions of command economies. Leninist systems are the womb from which post-communist democracies must emerge, and consequently it is essential to consider their legacy.<sup>1</sup>

The 'strong hand' in pre-Revolutionary Russian politics, Soviet politics and contemporary Russia is indeed a very prominent feature of Russian political culture. Throughout its existence, Russia has been ruled by tsars, the CPSU and a very powerful President. To rank them equally is entirely unfair. There are significant differences between absolutism, CPSU rule and the Yeltsin administration. Pre-revolutionary Russian rulers did not have to confront collective leaderships like <sup>those</sup> Communist leaders had to confront in the post-Stalin era. Indeed, Stephen White has argued that, '[a] characteristic of the Muscovite state was the absence of political institutions in any <sup>way</sup> constraining the exercise of monarchical power.'<sup>2</sup> Imperial Russian political culture also contained elements of personalised attachment to political authority, a general lack of autonomous sub-group activity, a non-independent judiciary, absence of liberal distinction between actions and beliefs.<sup>3</sup> Yeltsin, although the most powerful constitutional figure in contemporary Russian politics, in theory, does not reign unchecked and is subject to

popular election. The experiences of tsarism undoubtedly influenced how the Bolsheviks reacted to popular discontent. This heritage was taken further by Lenin's successors up to the Gorbachev era. Indeed, as Troy McGrath argues, the Soviet heritage influenced Russia's transition by setting patterns for how the respective sets of governors ruled and set examples for how the population perceives what it should expect of government.

Therefore, the present study may be viewed as a fusion of institutionalist approaches to political science, political culture interpretations<sup>4</sup>, and the literature that has emerged on democratic transitions<sup>5</sup> and civil society.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, the present author does not wish to engage in a re-interpretation of any one or combination of these types of literatures. He shall, however, set this dissertation within the parameters of these political science methodologies and use them to help interpret the topic under scrutiny.

Institutions have played important roles in the political cultures of Imperial Russia, the USSR and the contemporary Russian Federation. From the reign of Peter the Great, throughout the Bolshevik Revolution, Stalin's industrialisation and collectivisation programmes, Nikita Khrushchev's 'Thaw', limited economic reforms under Leonid Brezhnev and more recently, liberalising efforts under Gorbachev and moves towards democratic consolidation under President Boris Yeltsin, major efforts at moving Russian and Soviet society forward have come 'from above'. However, this is not to suggest that elements 'from below' like the civil society that emerged from the late 1980s have not played pivotal roles in transforming Soviet and Russian society and politics. That anti-CPSU candidates won seats in the elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in 1989 and in republican legislatures in 1990 and Boris Yeltsin was elected Russian



President in 1991 can be partially explained by the high rate of civic involvement in the campaigns. However, it can also be argued that the development, emergence and effectiveness of civil society in gaining any footholds in Soviet and Russian political life was, to an extent, directly dependent on the central institution and its political goals.

This dissertation focuses in detail on aspects of the continuity, contradiction and departure in the USSR's first largely competitive national elections <sup>- those</sup> to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies held in March 1989, and the Russian Federation's first set of multiparty style elections <sup>- the</sup> December 1993 elections to the Russian Federal Assembly. As this dissertation will demonstrate, in both cases, there was one dominant institution which designed the electoral guidelines and introduced the electoral innovations. Moreover, this institution set the parameters for competition <sup>and</sup> the electoral legislation and, at points, interfered in the electoral proceedings. That anti-dominant institution forces may have scored limited victories cannot be denied. Certainly these instances stand as tributes to the dedication of supporters of independent candidates, political organisations and individual politicians themselves. However, they may also be understood from the standpoint of an institutionalist perspective. In many cases, supporters of anti-CPSU and anti-establishment figures and anti-Yeltsin and government blocs cast their ballots as protest votes against those dominant institutions. Therefore, there is a tendency in Russian political culture that citizens are more likely to vote *against* certain individuals or institutions, as opposed to casting ballots *in favour of* a candidate or political organisation for positive reasons.

For the purposes of this study, institutions are considered important components in 'transition' literature for two major reasons. First, institutions are important in initiating transitions. Second, the choice of institutional design <sup>- either</sup> presidential systems or parliamentary systems <sup>- largely</sup> influences the degrees of success that a transitional polity can have in consensus building on important issues and the accompanying levels of executive-legislative tensions the polity will encounter. Samuel Huntington argues that the USSR's transition fell <sup>into</sup> a category which he labels as a transformation <sup>- a</sup> process of political reforms which is initiated by the ruling elite or leading institution.<sup>7</sup> From <sup>to</sup> 1917 <sup>to</sup> 1991 the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was the USSR's leading institution. The CPSU dominated the USSR, its monopoly status as the country's leading political organisation was codified in Article 6 of the USSR Constitution from 1977 <sup>until</sup> 1990.<sup>8</sup> It exercised this latter function by controlling and censoring the media and educational curricula, sanctioning social organisations, forming and directing party groups in work places, the military, state and educational institutions, supervising the economy, restricting employment and education opportunities, controlling political appointments to key bureaucratic, state and party posts or the *nomenklatura system*, and managing, overseeing and controlling the electoral process and selecting and approving candidates. The CPSU determined the major direction of the country's internal and external development.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, any impetus for *official* political change had to meet with party authorisation and was party-initiated. Moreover, it was the Party which set the parameters within which any changes would occur. That the electoral system functioned non-competitively until the late 1980s is directly related to the CPSU's desires; that changes were implemented can also be attributed to the Party's will.

Under Gorbachev's stewardship the Party went through a series of reform initiatives in which the leadership attempted to renew its relationship with society, and released information to the population in greater capacities than it had at any other time in its history. Moreover, the Party also spearheaded the overall *perestroika* reform programme.<sup>10</sup> That any progress could have been made in the democratisation process, *glasnost*' or economic reforms without Party involvement is undeniable. Nevertheless, the reforms had very strict parameters. Neil Robinson argues that 'between 1985 and 1991 Gorbachev only tried to stop the CPSU from acting in ways that he perceived to be uncondusive to the expansion of the party's political leadership of society. He therefore only tried to curb the power of the party in a narrow sense.'<sup>11</sup> Robinson convincingly elaborates that while political reform and constitutional changes were taking place under the CPSU's guidance, there were actually no constitutional amendments that pertained to the Party's activities and performance.<sup>12</sup> To an extent, it was still above the law.

By 1990, however, the CPSU appears to have hit a crisis point. Political liberalisation had encouraged Soviet citizens to form and join autonomous political organisations and other socio-political clubs and parties. The revelations from the policy of *glasnost*' revealed the crimes of the Stalin era on repressions, crimes against humanity and the process of the Baltic republics' incorporation into the USSR as well as how poorly the economy was performing. The CPSU which had previously legitimised its right to rule on strong economic performance and its successes during World War II had lost its credibility in the eyes of the population. The Party which since 1921 had not allowed fractions within itself was confronted by huge splits. The Baltic Republics divided themselves into 'native' parties which were organised around the principles of

greater republican sovereignty within the union or full independence and 'Moscow-oriented' parties <sup>(composed)</sup> largely of ethnic Russians living in these areas who preferred that the republic remain integral parts of the USSR. In addition, the Party had to confront a number of 'platforms' within its ranks that had emerged around the time of the XXVIII Party Congress in 1990. As a result of these factors, Party membership began to decline in 1990. Therefore, when Article 6 was amended to allow other political and social organisations to participate actively in the USSR's political process, there were numerous outlets for politically-conscious and active individuals, many of whom had been Party members <sup>to turn</sup> <sup>13</sup>

Therefore, in this sense, the development of the USSR's civil society had further links with the USSR's dominant institution. As this institution collapsed, civil society was able to benefit from its crisis. Many political organisations that developed during the late 1980s and early 1990s were formed after former communists set off to establish their own political parties. Victor Nee has offered some useful suggestions of how elites shifted during this time. Nee argues perceptibly that the communist parties in the former Soviet Union and Eastern and Central Europe were not monolithic. Rather, party membership was <sup>composed</sup> of three distinct groups: 'dogmatic' adherents, 'waverers' and 'opportunists'. The 'dogmatics' joined the parties <sup>owing</sup> to their conviction and belief in Marxist-Leninist principles. 'Opportunists' became members because the party itself was the best means for career advancement; their attachment to party ideology was not a primary concern. Subsequently, they 'jumped ship' when the ruling parties sanctioned <sup>alternative</sup> parties or other opportunities to advance their social positions and accumulate wealth became available. The most important group, according to Nee, were the

waverers. They demonstrated political pragmatism and sided with the group they felt was most likely to end up victorious. They took a variety of routes in their post-communist careers: some moved into business; others into politics.<sup>14</sup> Those who opted for the latter took two major routes. Some entered into the 'democratic camp'. Indeed, individuals such as Nikolai Travkin, a former CPSU member who founded the first anti-CPSU party, the Democratic Party of Russia (DPR), in 1990, is a good example of one of these politicians. Nevertheless, Travkin's party also had an extremely ironic principle for a 'democratic party'. DPR employed democratic centralism, long a CPSU mainstay, as a means to ensure party discipline. David Dyker argues that others adopted either hardcore or moderate nationalist inclinations.<sup>15</sup> The fact that the dogmatic remained also suggests a partial explanation why the 'post-communist' communist parties have actually remained such powerful political organisations in the transition period and have won elections or play dominant roles throughout the former Eastern bloc. Indeed the institutionalist interpretation successfully illustrates this point. Party members firmly believed in their cause. They had a strong core of supporters. Moreover, they had the organisational framework in place and experience from their time in the CPSU and other former Central and East European ruling Marxist parties.

The choice of institutional configuration that Russia employed in the early 1990s has also contributed to the conduct of Russia's elections. From 1990-<sup>1993</sup> the RSFSR's supreme legislative organ was the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies and its permanently functioning legislature was the RSFSR Supreme Soviet which was selected from among deputies in the former. Although a legislature was in existence during this period, it would be incorrect to suggest that the RSFSR was a parliamentary republic.

The CPSU still maintained a hold over political power in spite of whatever difficulties it faced at that time. Moreover, an overwhelming majority of the deputies were CPSU members and were bound by democratic centralism to toe the Party's line. In 1991 Russian voters approved the introduction of a directly-elected presidency through their participation in a referendum. Elections were held for the position in June 1991 and Boris Yeltsin, the charismatic chair of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, won in a landslide victory in a field of six competitors.

This situation produced mixed results. On the one hand, Russia was governed by popularly-elected legislative and executive branches. However, as Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach argue, presidential systems present difficulties for the consolidation of democratic norms in transitional polities: too much power tends to be concentrated in the hands of one individual, the president often loses the desire to build consensus on issues and the chief executive tends to by-pass the legislature and rule by decree in the name of the people. As it will be discussed in Chapter 5, parliamentary systems provide greater means for different views within society to air their grievances and contribute to the governmental process and build structures for accommodation of interests.<sup>16</sup>

Problems between the two institutions began <sup>to arise</sup> seriously in the wake of the August 1991 coup attempt and in particular after the introduction of rapid-pace economic reform in January 1991. As Stephen White argues, Yeltsin emerged the victor after the coup and was awarded extraordinary powers in November 1991. He used this influence to initiate the radical economic reform under acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar. The Russian Parliament initially supported Yeltsin as a symbol of Russian sovereignty and a defender

of the Constitution. However, they turned against him as a result of his greater moves towards consolidating personal power and his use of this power for the economic transformation.<sup>17</sup> In fact, Judith S. Kullberg argues that the contentious issue of the pace of economic reform contributed towards 'moderate democrats', both inside and outside the Parliament, moving into the ranks of the opposition.<sup>18</sup> Subsequently, the Congress voted out Gaidar as acting Prime Minister in December 1992, replacing him with Viktor Chernomyrdin, the former USSR Minister for the Soviet gas industry, and former chair of the Russian state company *Gazprom* and later it stripped Yeltsin of his extraordinary powers at the VIII Congress of People's Deputies in March 1993.<sup>19</sup>

On the other hand, the Parliament, headed by its speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov (and supported by Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi), favoured a political system in which there was a more clearly-defined balance of power between the executive and legislative branches. In addition, the Parliament, <sup>composed</sup> of many party *apparatchiki*, directors of state-run enterprises (see the discussion in Chapter 5), favoured a more gradual approach to economic reform, with a much greater role for the state. Moreover, in Khasbulatov's opinion, Russia's legacy of rule by the tsars and Communist Party General Secretaries provided ample warning signs of the potential for personal dictatorship in the Russian transition and created a legitimate argument against concentrating political power in the hands of one individual.<sup>20</sup>

In this situation, both institutions could claim legitimacy because both were popularly elected. However, this particular situation is an acute problem in presidential systems. Both branches can argue that they are acting on behalf of the population which elected

each of them. Both sides agreed to have the population decide the matter and break the institutional deadlock in a referendum in April 1993. Russian voters were asked four questions:

1. Do you have confidence in the President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin?
2. Do you approve of the socioeconomic policies carried out by the President of the Russian Federation and the government of the Russian Federation since 1992?
3. Do you consider it necessary to hold early elections to the presidency of the Russian Federation?
4. Do you consider it necessary to hold early elections to the people's deputies of the Russian Federation?<sup>21</sup>

On the first two questions the motions would be passed if they were approved by a simple majority of the participants of the referendum (50 per cent turnout was required for the poll to be considered valid). The latter two items required the support of more than 50 per cent of the entire electorate to be enacted. The results indicated that the Russian population voted in favour of stability. Some 64.5 per cent of the electorate participated. Among them 58.7 per cent (37.3 per cent of the electorate) expressed confidence in Yeltsin and 53 per cent (34 per cent overall) approved of the reforms. Nearly 50 per cent of the participants expressed their desires for new presidential elections and 67.2 per cent desired that new parliamentary elections be conducted. However, in reality, this meant that respectively only 31.7 per cent and 43.1 per cent of the electorate favoured elections for new institutions. Therefore, in accordance with the rules of the referendum new elections did not take place.<sup>22</sup>



The two institutions <sup>maintained</sup> an uneasy relationship until 21 September 1993 when Yeltsin dissolved the Parliament with decree No. 1400. Subsequently, the parliamentarians and other supporters barricaded themselves in the White House, the Russian Parliament building. Ultimately, however, their efforts were unsuccessful. The Army sided with Yeltsin and brutally suppressed the revolt. Simultaneously with the dissolving of Parliament, Yeltsin decreed that elections to a new bi-cameral Russian Parliament, the Federal Assembly and a plebiscite on a draft constitution be held on 12 December 1993. The latter document would provide Yeltsin with the dominant position in the Russian political system. Moreover, the President's allies supervised the conduct of the elections and the plebiscite. This campaign and its results are discussed in Chapter 6.

Michael Urban argues that elections under Gorbachev and Yeltsin can be considered 'democracy by design'.<sup>23</sup> Under these circumstances, the dominant institutions established the ground work for the elections so that the outcomes would work to their <sup>own</sup> benefit. Indeed, the present author generally agrees with this point of view. Nevertheless, this point must be taken further. First, this factor should not be considered very surprising. If politics is defined not as 'who governs', but 'who gets what, when, how'<sup>24</sup> then a situation in which politicians create rules which will benefit them (or their supporters) is perfectly understandable. It can be argued that both Gorbachev and Yeltsin were merely engaging in politics. Second, transition literature helps us understand why, <sup>visions of the first</sup> if the 'construction crews'<sup>25</sup> were trying to establish political orders in which their <sup>and their power would be maintained</sup> would be dominant, they did not react entirely negatively and shut down the institutions when the elections did not turn out as they had originally envisaged. It will

be recalled that in pre-revolutionary Russia the tsar shut down assemblies when their compositions were considered 'too radical.'<sup>26</sup> Moreover, J. Arch Getty has demonstrated that one of the reasons that the first elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet were not conducted on a multi-candidate basis <sup>- the</sup> electoral law did not expressly prohibit competition <sup>- was that</sup> the Party discovered in advance of the poll that it would be defeated in many areas of the country.<sup>27</sup> Therefore, it can be argued that, despite interfering in the design of the system, a fact which can be considered as a continuity in Russian and Soviet electoral practices, allowing the results to stand was, indeed, a significant departure. Leading transitologists Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead argue transitions are great periods of uncertainty: leaders and their populations certainly know the form of rule away from which they are moving; their destination is a great unknown. Moreover, there are three other factors that have to be taken into consideration in an analysis of transition politics: first, transitional societies have the consolidation of political democracy as a desirable goal; second, there are bound to be numerous surprises and difficult dilemmas that will occur during the process; finally, 'normal societies' methodologies, i.e., those that rely on relatively stable economic, social, cultural and partisan categories for identifying those who defend the status quo and those who are pushing for changes, are relatively difficult to translate into adequate frameworks for analysing transitional politics.<sup>28</sup> These factors are indeed applicable in the Soviet and Russian transitions.

John Gooding has argued that Gorbachev was 'the leader and the product of a party whose power has for the past 70 years rested on an effective denial of democracy' and that his tactics for a massive overhaul of the economic and political structures <sup>while a</sup>

contrast to <sup>great</sup> Imperial Russian and earlier Soviet reformers.<sup>29</sup> Stephen White also notes that even after Gorbachev had become President of the USSR and was allocated more powers than any tsar or 'greater than even Stalin had commanded' he 'voluntarily surrendered the extra-ordinary powers of the General Secretary of the CPSU, powers which at the time were greater than those of any other world leader.'<sup>30</sup> Moreover, White queries whether or not Gorbachev would have done this if he were seeking unlimited personal authority.<sup>31</sup> Moreover, even though the initial reforms may have been targetted as popular checks against the bureaucracy and there were some limits on debates, legislation was introduced which enhanced some personal and civic freedoms and human rights <sup>— however,</sup> they may not have been implemented fully into practice. Therefore, Gorbachev and the leadership team had some commitments to democratic norms.

Yeltsin suspended the activities of the CPSU and the Communist Party of the RSFSR after its alleged involvement in the coup attempt in August 1991. However, he allowed new communist political organisations, some claiming to be the natural successors to the legacies of CPSU and Communist Party of the RSFSR, or the rightful heirs to their property and their finances.<sup>32</sup> Nevertheless, communist supporters challenged this ruling and claimed that in accordance with the USSR *Law on Public Associations* registered political parties could <sup>only</sup> be disbanded <sup>by</sup> a court of law. This issue was brought before the Russian Constitutional Court. The verdict was in favour of the pro-communist forces. Subsequently, the <sup>re-formed</sup> Communist Party of the Russian Federation in February 1993. Yeltsin did not attempt to have the court's decision overturned nor did he attempt to ban the Party's reformation. There is ample evidence to

support the fact that while Yeltsin and Gorbachev may have been, at best, reluctant democrats, they did demonstrate among their beliefs that results of elections are indeed core elements of democracy to which they needed to adhere.

Other aspects of Russian political culture help explain electoral reform and their implications during the Soviet period and more recently, in contemporary Russia, and help create an appreciation for how civil society began to play an increasingly important role in transitional politics from 1985 <sup>to</sup> the present. There is ample evidence to suggest that during the pre-reform era, Soviet citizens could have been said to have held elections with contempt. However, several arguments exist that demonstrate that in the late- Soviet period there was support for democratic values and institutions, albeit at a somewhat lower scale than <sup>in</sup> established democracies. For instance, James L. Gibson, Raymond M. Duch and Kent L. Tedin argued that in European Russia and Moscow *oblast'* in particular, citizens expressed support for political tolerance (lowest level), personal liberty, rights, dissent, independent media and competitive elections.<sup>33</sup> Indeed, in regard to elections, Kent L. Tedin found quite a high degree of support in the European part of the Soviet Union for a number of questions:

Elections to local Soviets should be conducted in such a way that there are several candidates for each post.

It is necessary to ban elections and allow the <sup>CPSU</sup> to rule the country (without elections) (disagree)

Political parties other than the Communist party should be legalised [sic].

Those supporting competitive elections are doing harm to the country. (disagree)

Competition between the Communist party and other parties will improve the way authorities work in the Soviet union.

A one-party system in the USSR promotes the development of democracy. (disagree)<sup>34</sup>

It is also quite notable to point out that Gibson, Duch and Tedin also included a very important factor in supporting democratic changes, wealth, in explaining turns in voter support. They also address the fact that support for law and order is a key component in Russian political culture; however, they stress that '[p]erhaps the key cultural enemy of democracy in the Soviet Union is the desire for order. Since liberty inevitably poses a potential for disorder, opposition <sup>to</sup> democratisation [sic] is thought to be concentrated among order-loving Soviets.'<sup>35</sup>

While Russian and Soviet history has been characterised by an overabundance of authority in the hands of a tsar or the party, they have not been able to rule without means of legitimacy. Indeed, Nicolai Petro has suggested that Russians may be attracted to a strong, stable government, but they also support 'good government'<sup>36</sup> which protects its citizens and provides the basic necessities of life. Indeed, the state provided for its subjects. Stephen White has argued that communist countries implemented social contracts with their populations. The state provided the basic necessities of life in exchange for monopoly of political power. When economic problems emerged and the social contract showed signs of weakening, the regimes introduced various reform to 'renegotiate' the contract and implement various forms of safety valves that they could use to defuse the social tensions of economic decline and reinvigorate their legitimacy

with the masses.<sup>37</sup> However, these ultimately failed <sup>owing</sup> to lack of resolve and various forms of interference.<sup>38</sup>

Recent events demonstrate that those who have lost the most have clearly departed the most from supporting democratic forces. There is a significantly widening gap in wealth between the highest and lowest earning groups of the population. The Russian State Statistics Committee has reported that Russians with the highest incomes earned more than the lowest stratum of the population in at a rate of 11:1 in 1993 and this compares to a more equitable distribution of 4.5:1 in 1990.<sup>39</sup>

Gibson, Duch and Tedin's hypothesis that in the late-Soviet period 'those who have <sup>profited</sup> the most from the <sup>status</sup> quo are least likely to want to change it,'<sup>40</sup> is well-grounded. The working classes, pensioners, agricultural workers and collective farm directors and state enterprise workers and some directors have been the most resistant to change and the most likely to support opposition forces.<sup>41</sup> Although Gibson, Duch and Tedin limit the validity of their observations from their empirical work in Moscow *oblast'*, their extrapolations certainly held true for the region. Vladimir Zhirinovskii actually won his single-mandate seat in the Shelkovo district of Moscow *oblast'*. This is rather significant given the fact that the party won only 5 of the 66 seats it contested.<sup>42</sup> What is significant here is that the electorate does not appear to have a negative view of these institutions of democracy. There has been, as Gibson, Duch and Tedin predicted, a marked decline in their popular support since the economy 'went haywire'. In addition, this factor has radically reduced Yeltsin's popular appeal since January 1992.<sup>43</sup>

The electorate increasingly associates these negative developments with the democrats. Therefore, in certain cases they have appeared to be consistent in their pattern of anti-system voting throughout the different sets of elections.

Another factor which greatly affected how Soviet political culture developed and ultimately stimulated its civil society was the improvement in the country's level of education. Frederic J. Flernon, Jr. has pointed to the work of Gibson and Duch and their views on the importance of education in the promotion of democratic values in Russian society. Gibson and Duch note that 'individuals with higher education are more likely to be exposed to and socialized into accepting officially sanctioned norms promoting democratic values'; 'education may inherently instill or reinforce liberal values such as equality, tolerance, and respect for individual liberties' and 'education contributes to support for democratic norms, regardless of formal system norms.'<sup>44</sup>

Indeed from the Khrushchev period onwards Soviet society's overall level of education increased. Consequently, citizens began to demand more from their politicians but were unable to articulate their concerns <sup>publicly</sup>. Nevertheless, some key reformers diverge on their opinions <sup>about</sup> why comprehensive reform was not initiated under Khrushchev. For instance, Fedor Burlatskii argues that, 'neither the party nor society was ready for major reforms.'<sup>45</sup> However, Aleksandr Yakovlev states that

[m]y personal point of view is that objectively Soviet society was ready for fundamental changes in 1956 and this was reflected in certain reforms begun then. But I don't think the leadership was ready. It remained stuck

in the past. [Under Gorbachev] the situation [was] different: the leadership [was] ready for these changes.<sup>46</sup>

Frustrated, they retreated inwardly and held discussions within the confines of families and close circles of friends. Indeed, Vladimir Shlapentokh demonstrates that the civil society of the 1980s had its roots in the politics of stagnation during the period of stagnation.<sup>47</sup> At the political extreme, dissidents emerged actively circulating documents against the regime. However, there were very few of these individuals and the communication between them was not significantly strong. Moreover, the regime constantly harassed them. Therefore, their impact within the USSR was limited. Their moral weight outside the Soviet Union's borders was, however, significant.<sup>48</sup>

The Gorbachev leadership sought to capitalise on the human potential in Soviet society in economic and political reforms and win the support of technicians and specialists. Therefore, the regime encouraged freer exchanges within the party and popular press and within scholarly publications. In addition, the Party also encouraged the formation of discussion clubs and other civic organisations. Eventually, movements in support of *perestroika* also emerged throughout the USSR. However, as the political liberalisation increased and the revelations from the media discussed earlier became public, these organisations expanded the scope of their activities and their political demands became greater. Thus, by the late 1980s, movements in support of *perestroika* had taken on more radical agendas. For instance in the Baltics they demanded greater levels of sovereignty. As it will be demonstrated throughout this dissertation, these agents of civil society helped candidates sympathetic to their causes win office in elections



held during 1989-1990. These factors contributed to the amendment of Article 6 of the USSR's Constitution which allowed alternative political organisations like parties to participate actively in Soviet political life. Therefore, during the late 1980s and early 1990s the civil societies of Russia and the former Soviet Union had become politicised. Although these organisations and parties were not as well-organised as they are other industrialised democracies they still played rather important political roles in creating social space between the regime and the individual and, in a small way, developing links between political and civil society. Nevertheless, it needs to be understood that these organisations also took stances of anti-politics. Thus, they were united *against* the CPSU. However, there was little to unite them once the common enemy was defeated. Russia's nascent parties inherited this legacy as the transition began.<sup>49</sup>

Therefore, the combination of political culture, institutions and civil society <sup>helps</sup> to explain why there have been elements of continuity, contradiction and departure in elections in the former USSR and contemporary Russian Federation between 1989 <sup>and</sup> 1993. A dominant institution has designed the election legislation and often interfered in the electoral proceedings. Opposition candidates and political organisations representing emergent civil society have, in varying capacities, played an oppositional role in these elections and provided voters with the opportunity to cast their votes against these institutions <sup>or</sup> factor which appears to be manifested in the population's political values.

## Situating this Dissertation within the Context of Existing Studies on Soviet and Russian Electoral Reform

As Jeffrey Hahn correctly stated, '[g]iven the general lack of importance that most Western observers ascribe to Soviet elections, the volume of specialist literature on the topic is remarkable.'<sup>50</sup> In addition, Timothy Colton referred to Soviet electoral studies as a 'budding subfield' in his well-received article on the 1990 elections in Moscow.<sup>51</sup> There exists a wide variety of English language publications focusing on elections in the former Soviet Union under pre-reform conditions. Moreover, the literature on electoral reform under Gorbachev has blossomed and it has continued to increase in its volume and scope since 1989. That this could have occurred without the Gorbachev reforms is unthinkable: Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost*' greatly increased the scope of topics discussed in Soviet popular and scholarly publications; political reforms under *demokratizatsiya* meant that more political space was open for contestation, civil rights and freedoms were either expanded or, as discussed in this dissertation, finally realised. The fusion of these two factors means that the elections occupied a more prominent role within the Soviet political system. Media coverage of events was much more in-depth and included (albeit with some significant limitations) a much greater discussion of campaign topics. Therefore, from 1989 onwards the range of issues available for analysis increased exponentially.

Existing English language literature on pre-reform Soviet elections focused on a reasonably diverse range of subjects and its content and interpretations appear to be linked to the developments in the post-Stalin political atmosphere. For instance, in the 1960s

and 1970s, English language writings on the Soviet electoral system <sup>were</sup> largely linked to developments in Western, and in particular, American social science. During this time, this body of scholarship was confronted with how to re-conceptualise the Soviet system in the wake of Khrushchev's de-Stalinisation efforts. Hence, the popular totalitarian model was considered to be largely inapplicable for post-Stalin conditions. Therefore, the range of topics that were becoming very popular in Western political science discourse began to be applied to Soviet conditions and those of the communist bloc. Western commentators began to conceptualise the USSR and other communist countries using terms such as 'pluralist',<sup>52</sup> 'corporatist',<sup>53</sup> and discussed major topics like 'interest groups'.<sup>54</sup> Political behaviour also <sup>featured</sup> significantly in Western social science literature. Thus, topics at that time focused on political participation and emphasised citizens' voting patterns in election campaigns as they were manifested in electoral avoidance.<sup>55</sup>

However, it should also be noted that Western writings on the former USSR were not only conditioned by the state of Western political science. Several scholars have noted they were also inextricably linked to the quality of sources available to scholars when they conducted their research in the USSR and those items on hand outside the USSR.<sup>56</sup> Central party and state newspapers were readily available outside the USSR. Moreover, the <sup>bulletins</sup> of both the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet were, for the most part, readily attainable. These publications contained election results, but because of the lack of competition inherent in Soviet elections of the period there was often very little material valuable to extract from these documents and periodicals. However, it should be noted that they offered very little for electoral observers to try to base substantive analyses of Soviet elections. In general, reports from the Central

Electoral Commission contained turnout figures, the numbers of votes that the electorate cast in favour of the candidates and statistical data on the demographic breakdown of the deputies. Statistical handbooks were also published which illuminated the public to virtually the same information as those published in the heralds and central press.

Deputies' biographical information was published widely in the central, regional and local press and, from 1958 onwards, the USSR Supreme Soviet's deputies' biographies were published in bound volumes, *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*. These may not have been the most informative (or exciting) of sources; however, they were useful because they contained summaries of the individual deputies' work and political careers. Roger A. Clarke and Ronald J. Hill produced seminal articles based on information contained in the *Deputaty* and these papers revealed the pecking order in Soviet politics with particular reference to deputy selection and re-election. For instance, Clarke argued that while the USSR incorporated more women, young people and recipients of secondary education in their legislatures than did Western countries, it was obvious that not all of these deputies were important. Particular deputies had more influence than others and the party selected them for different reasons. Hill identified that the real deputy hierarchy could be reflected in who was re-elected to successive terms in the USSR Supreme Soviet. Hill acknowledged the fact that deputies reflected the diversity inherent in Soviet society. However, there were some who were more important than others and those considered most important by the regime were more likely than others to be incorporated in successive Supreme Soviet convocations.<sup>57</sup>

This dissertation follows in the traditions of the existing literature in Russian and Soviet electoral studies and attempts to 'fill in gaps' where they exist in present English language studies. For instance, the present author includes three in-depth analyses of deputy compositions resulting from the 1989 and 1993 elections. These studies contain information from the author's personal databases which were compiled from a range of official Soviet and Russian publications and specialist English language biographical sources.

Chapter 3 discusses the continuity and change between the deputies elected in 1989 with those of their predecessors. However, it addresses, in particular, the radical change that resulted in deputy re-election between the 'old-style' elections and the USSR's first limited choice elections. Whereas in the past there were particular individuals who were guaranteed places in successive legislatures when the Party virtually designated who would be awarded deputy mandates, the 1989 elections showed that, by and large, this pattern was shattered. In addition, the present author demonstrates that the findings that Hill presented between the Seventh <sup>and</sup> Eighth Convocations of the USSR Supreme Soviet (1966-1970) were in many cases identical to his own results for turnover between the Tenth <sup>and</sup> Eleventh Convocations of the USSR Supreme Soviet (1979-1984). This discussion is, at present, the only other work to address the issue of re-election in Soviet national legislatures since Hill produced his groundbreaking article. Mary Buckley, however addressed re-election in an article on the 1985 Azerbaidzhan Supreme Soviet.<sup>58</sup>

Chapter 4 analyses the composition of women in the USSR Congress of People's Deputies by comparing them to those elected to the Eleventh Convocation of the USSR

Supreme Soviet. Soviet statistics demonstrated that during the pre-reform era between one quarter to one third of the USSR Supreme Soviet deputies were women. However, they were overwhelmingly drawn from those ranks which the Party considered least important and, therefore, their parliamentary roles were largely ceremonial. Women deputies tended to be overwhelmingly non-party members or members of the Komsomol (Communist Youth League), they were more likely to have attained secondary levels of education and were primarily manual industrial or agricultural workers. Moreover, the present author considers how important the regime considered them in the pre-reform political system by scrutinising their contributions to the sessions of the Eleventh Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The information contained in this chapter demonstrates that electoral reform measures could have been considered a double-edged sword for women. On the one hand, the number (and percentage) of women elected to the parliament decreased radically. However, the women elected, while more likely to possess the aforementioned traits than their male counterparts in the Congress, were generally better qualified than those who were elected earlier. Moreover, they participated much more frequently in the sessions of the First Congress of People's Deputies (May-June 1989) than they had during the Eleventh Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Therefore, the elections contributed to aspects of continuity, contradiction and departure from previous electoral practices. This chapter is drawn primarily from the author's article 'Women and the 1989 Elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies', *Coexistence*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (March 1994), which is, at present, the only existing in-depth analysis of women in the Congress.

The composition of the Russian Federal Assembly is addressed in Chapter 7. The present author demonstrates that Russia's first multiparty-style election produced a parliament which, in many ways, was radically different from its Soviet predecessors. Virtually all the State Duma deputies and Federation Council Senators were recipients of higher education. There were greater numbers of white-collar professionals than had been elected in the past. However, there were also elements of continuity. For instance, in Soviet elections there were very high numbers of professional politicians who were linked either to the Party or state apparatus who became deputies. In the 1993 elections, the majority of deputies were also professional politicians. However, they had a wider range of 'masters': the presidential administration, subject and local administrations and political parties. Therefore, it is possible to argue that in many cases the voters were represented by deputies whose allegiances were to individuals and institutions other than their constituents and electoral association supporters. During the Soviet period they were, by and large, bound by democratic centralism to uphold the Party line. Duma deputies held their loyalties to those who put them in their positions - be it the President or the political party. In addition, this chapter also contains an application of the findings of Akos Rona-Tas on the 1990 Hungarian elections to the Federal Assembly elections. The present author's data suggests that, like the Hungarian party list deputies, Russian list deputies were more likely to come from 'parking orbits' which gave them access to power during the communist period.<sup>59</sup> In constituencies, deputies were more likely to have been employed in professions conducive to contact with the citizenry or, were politicians who were involved in local and subject levels of government and administration. Therefore, it could be argued that they were more readily available to citizens than list deputies, who tended to be largely Moscow-based and involved at

the national levels of politics. This chapter also uncovers a particularly ironic situation. Despite the fact that this was the first election in which political parties played a significant role and the fact that half of the deputies to lower house were elected through party lists, a significant proportion of these representatives were not members of any political parties or electoral organisations.

The author states at the outset of the study that the statistical level of analysis employed in this dissertation is largely restricted to frequency distributions. There are numerous reasons (which are detailed more elaborately in Chapters 3 and 4) why he adopted this means of analysis. Documents (i.e., pre-election platforms), information on all candidates who competed in the elections, their policy platforms and the socioeconomic profiles of their constituencies, as well as other data to engage in multi-variate analysis on issues like why certain deputies were re-elected and others were not (to name but one example) were unavailable to the author, even during his period of field research in Moscow. Therefore, it was not possible to compile comprehensive material on all candidates and this hampered the possibility to conduct multi-variate analysis that could establish statistically valid relationships on election and re-election. Moreover, the chapters described above are not in any way concerned with voter preferences or voter behaviour which would require more detailed statistical analysis. This dissertation's primary objective is to demonstrate the levels of continuity, contradiction and departure in the elections and these chapters help to illustrate these issues by providing concrete examples of the parliamentarians who emerged after different sets of electoral reforms.



Western accounts of pre-reform Soviet elections and campaigns during the Gorbachev period include macro-level and regional analytical accounts of the campaigns, their major occurrences and the results and their places in within the context of the Gorbachev reform programme. The present study follows in this tradition. Indeed, these case studies allow the present author to identify where the major changes and consistencies of electioneering have occurred. Moreover, the examples raised in these studies provide evidence from which it is possible to observe the degrees of continuity, contradiction and departure undering differing electoral conditions. Chapter 2 outlines the major campaign to the Congress of People's Deputies, detailing the elements of continuity, contradiction and departure from previous Soviet elections. In particular, this chapter addresses innovations like candidates' programmes and the importance of the media in the election campaign and provides the most comprehensive discussions of these topics currently available in English.<sup>60</sup> This chapter is derived primarily from material which appeared in his article 'Reforming the Electoral System: 1989 Elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies', *The Journal of Communist Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 1991) and 'Reforming the Electoral System' in Peter Lentini (ed.), *Elections and Political Order in Russia: The Implications of the 1993 Elections to the Russian Federal Assembly* (Budapest, London and New York, 1995).

Chapter 6 is a case study of the 1993 Russian Federal Assembly election campaign. The present author <sup>discusses</sup> the methods of campaigning that the different electoral associations and candidates employed during the electoral struggle. In addition, he incorporates examples of television advertisements from various electoral associations and candidates and his personal observations from the campaign in Moscow. This chapter,

has been derived from his 'Elections and Political Order in Russia: the 1993 Elections to the Russian State Duma', the *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (June 1994) and his chapter 'Overview of the Campaign' in *Elections and Political Order in Russia*. The former piece formed the core components of his contribution to a co-authored piece with Troy McGrath, 'The Rise of the Liberal Democratic Party and the 1993 Elections', *The Harriman Institute Forum*, Vol. 7, No. 6 (February 1994).

Although the very important elections to the republican Supreme Soviets, RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies and the Russian presidential elections are addressed in Chapter 5, they are not given chapter-length discussions. There are significant reasons for this <sup>approach</sup>. First, there are a number of studies which consider these elections that <sup>already exist.</sup> <sup>61</sup> The present author acknowledges the significance that these legislative elections had in Soviet politics: they increased civic participation in the campaigns, (indirectly) contributed to the USSR's collapse, and (in the case of the RSFSR) when fused with the presidential elections, they established the institutional framework for the post-Soviet transition. However, in the cases of parliamentary elections, and, in particular, those to the RSFSR Congress, they were (with the exception of Georgia) all examples of limited-choice elections like the elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. The present author considered it more useful to include full case studies of the first largely competitive multi-candidate Soviet national parliamentary elections and Russia's first post-Soviet multiparty style elections to its legislature. Therefore, his study is predominantly concerned with the 'firsts' in Soviet and Russian history. Moreover, a case study of the presidential elections, while a

hallmark in Russia's history, would have been methodologically cumbersome. Such an analysis would have had to draw comparisons between elections of two separate institutions and would have not been a consistent analysis.

Studies of the Soviet electoral system have also included reviews of Soviet scholarship and debates amongst scholars and political practitioners on how they would reform the electoral system. For instance, Ronald J. Hill <sup>wrote</sup> the most significant <sup>works</sup> on Soviet debates over electoral reform during the late 1960s-early 1980s.<sup>62</sup> In addition, during the Gorbachev period, Stephen White produced a very comprehensive look at Soviet writings on the subject up to the Nineteenth Party Conference in June-July 1988.<sup>63</sup> In his co-authored volume with Darrell Slider and Graeme Gill, Stephen White notes some 'unresolved issues' in Soviet electoral developments after the 1989 and 1990 republican elections.<sup>64</sup> There was also a major Soviet review of reform writings produced during the Gorbachev era and up to 1989.<sup>65</sup> The present author acknowledges the importance of these writings on the development of the Soviet and Russian electoral processes. However, he does not seek to 'reinvent the wheel' and omits discussions of electoral reform in the pre-reform period and early Gorbachev period by concentrating primarily on those articles produced in the wake of the USSR Congress elections. In particular, he summarises the major issues which were debated after 1990 that addressed the role of political parties and the difficulties they presented in the more competitive atmosphere, the importance of political consultants and political marketing. Parts of this chapter were published previously in his 'Reforming the Electoral System' in *Elections and Political Order in Russia*.

This dissertation begins with an overview of Soviet electoral practices from the Stalin<sup>to</sup> Chernenko periods. It compares elections under single-party rule to those conducted under democratic regimes. In addition, the information presented here illuminates how these elections deviated from the established practices of free elections. The information presented here is largely derived from previously-existing English language sources on Soviet elections and there is probably little new information that the observer of Soviet elections will find in this chapter. Given this author's inclusion of Jeffrey Hahn's views of pre-reform writings this is indeed ironic. Nevertheless, its inclusion is absolutely essential in establishing a foundation from which it will be possible to compare the degree of continuity, contradiction and departure that occurred in Soviet and Russian elections from 1989<sup>to</sup> 1993<sup>^</sup> to those conducted in the pre-reform era.

## NOTES

1. Troy McGrath, 'The Legacy of Leninist Enforced De-Participation' in Peter Lentini (ed.), *Elections and Political Order in Russia: The Implications of the 1993 Elections to the Federal Assembly* (Budapest, London & New York: Central European University Press, 1995), pp. 226-245, p. 229.

2. Stephen White, 'The USSR: Patterns of Autocracy and Industrialisation' in Archie Brown and Jack Gray (eds.), *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States*, Second edition (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 25-65, p. 25. For a fuller discussion of this theme see his *Political Culture and Soviet Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1979), Chapters 1 & 2.

3. White, 'Patterns of Autocracy and Industrialisation', pp. 29-33.

4. For the purposes of this study, political culture

will be understood as the subjective perception of history and politics, the fundamental beliefs and values, the foci of identification and loyalty and the political knowledge and expectations which are the product of the specific historical experience of nations and groups. 'Political culture', it should be added, is not divorced from a 'culture' in the widest social sense. On the contrary, it is closely related to cultural values and orientations more generally. It focuses attention, however, on that part of a culture which bears relevance to politics.

See, Archie Brown, 'Introduction' in Archie Brown and Gray, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-24, p. 1.

5. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead define a transition as 'the interval between one political regime and the other', however, they also claim that 'the typical sign that the transition has begun comes when...incumbents, for whatever reason, begin to modify their own rules in the direction of providing more secure guarantees for the rights of individuals and groups'. See Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), Part I, p. 6. However, Samuel Huntington argues that the transition encompasses the entire process of a state, government or ruling party changing its policy directions and the appearance of a new system of government. Samuel Huntington, 'How Countries Democratize', *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 104 (1991-92), pp. 579-616. Therefore, for the purposes of this study the transition period encompasses events and developments in both the Soviet period under Gorbachev and the contemporary Russian Federation.

6. Civil society can be defined as

that set of non-governmental institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the state, and while not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless prevent it from dominating and atomizing the rest of society.

See Ernest Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994), p. 5.

7. Huntington, op. cit., p. 583.

8. *Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoi Zakon) Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1978).

9. For general discussions of the CPSU see Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (London: Methuen, 1963) and Ronald J. Hill and Peter Frank, *The Soviet Communist Party*, Third edition, (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1987).

10. Stephen White, 'Rethinking the CPSU', *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 3 (1991), pp. 405-428 and idem 'Democratisation in the USSR', *ibid.*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (January 1990), pp. 3-24.

11. Neil Robinson, 'Gorbachev and the Place of the Party in Soviet Reform, 1985-1991', *ibid.*, Vol. 44, No. 3 (1992), pp. 423-443, p. 424.

12. *Ibid.*, *passim*.

13. On these matters see, for instance, Ronald J. Hill, 'The CPSU From Monolith to Pluralist', *ibid.*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (1991), pp. 217-235 and by the same author, 'The CPSU: Decline and Collapse', *Irish Slavonic Studies*, No. 12 (1991), pp. 97-119; Rasma Karklins, 'Explaining Regime Change in the USSR', *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (1994), pp. 29-45; Judith Devlin, *The Rise of the Russian Democrats: The Causes and Consequences of the Elite Revolution* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995), esp., Chapters 3, 4 & 7; Graeme Gill, *The Collapse of a Single-Party System: The Disintegration of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

14. Victor Nee, *Sleeping With the Enemy: Why Communists Love the Market* (Ithaca, NY: Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies, Cornell University Working Papers on Transitions from State Socialism, No. 92.1, 1992).

15. David A. Dyker, 'Nomenklatura Nationalism-The Key to an Understanding of the New East European Politics?', *The Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (January 1995), pp. 55-69.

16. Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, 'Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism', *World Politics*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (October 1993), pp. 1-22.
17. Stephen White, 'The Presidency and Political Leadership in Post-Communist Russia' in Lentini, op. cit., pp. 202-225., p. 209.
18. Judith S. Kullberg, 'The Ideological Roots of Elite Conflict in Post-Soviet Russia', *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 6 (1994), pp. 929-953.
19. White., 'The Presidency...', p. 209.
20. Ibid., p. 210.
21. *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 6 May 1993 and *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 2, No. 21 (21 May 1993), p. 12 cited in Richard Sakwa, *Russian Politics and Society* (London: Routledge, 1993), Appendix 3.5, p. 428.
22. Figures from ibid. and Russian Academy of Sciences, 'Vserossiiski referendum 25 aprelya 1993 goda' (mimeograph).
23. Michael Urban, 'December 1993 as a Replication of Late Soviet Electoral Practices', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1994), pp. 127-158.
24. Harold Laswell, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How?* (London: Peter Smith, 1936), cited in Stephen D. Tansey, *Politics: The Basics* (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 5.
25. I am indebted to Troy McGrath for this term.
26. Ian D. Thatcher, 'Elections in Russian and Early Soviet History' in Lentini, op. cit., pp. 15-35.
27. J. Arch Getty, 'State and Society Under Stalin: Constitutions and Elections in the 1930s', *Slavic Review*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 18-35.
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# **Chapter 1. Introduction: Pre-Reform Soviet Elections**

*For anyone brought up in the Western political tradition, the obvious question is, why even bother with elections in the USSR?*

*- Darrell P. Hammer*

*...applying the term election to this procedure does semantic violence to the word as defined in the Western democratic lexicon.*

*- Frederick C. Baghoorn*

*After Brezhnev's death the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union met to choose his successor. Following his unanimous election as General Secretary, Yuri Andropov, former chief of the secret police, announced: 'Very well comrades, now that you have voted you may lower your arms and come away from the wall'.*

*- Soviet humour*

## **Introduction**

This chapter has several distinct purposes. First, I establish the major provisions of the Soviet electoral system from the Stalin <sup>to</sup> Chernenko periods (1937-1984). The presentation will determine that the elections held during this period are best described as 'elections by acclamation' because they did not provide the electorate with any choices among candidates or policies and they served primarily as mobilisational exercises that demonstrated support for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its policies. Nevertheless, Soviet elections performed several specific functions for the regime and these are analysed below. In addition, this chapter discusses what, if any, democratic features were present in Soviet elections during this period and the amount of choice available to the electorate. From this information it will be possible to establish a baseline from which to determine the extent of continuity, contradiction and departure from pre-reform Soviet elections to those conducted under Gorbachev and Yeltsin from 1989 <sup>to</sup> 1993.

## **Free vs Acclamatory Elections**

Historically, elections to representative bodies throughout the territory of Russia and the

former Soviet Union have yielded relatively impotent assemblies, largely subordinate to and obscured by the tsar and, until more recently, the CPSU. As Stephen White suggests, 'elections have not traditionally been an important form of linkage between regime and public in the USSR, or indeed its tsarist predecessor'.<sup>1</sup> Elections, have, however, played some role in the country's history over the <sup>past</sup> century. However, rather than serving as mechanisms through which citizens could change their rulers, as potential means for influencing policy-making and redirecting government priorities <sup>to</sup> name but a few of their theoretical functions <sup>Soviet</sup> elections had other objectives.

Elections in which two or more political parties compete for seats in a parliament or for a country's presidency <sup>classical</sup> or free elections <sup>are</sup> generally regarded as centrepieces of democratic political systems, satisfy some specific criteria and serve several distinct purposes. Martin Harrop and William L. Miller<sup>2</sup> point to Robert A. Dahl's criteria of comprehensive eligibility, equality of information, universal adult suffrage, equally-weighted votes, the installation of winners in their offices, and the fulfilment of campaign promises among the characteristics that ensure free elections in an 'ideally perfect society'.<sup>3</sup> The aforementioned team regard David Butler, Howard Penniman and Austin Ranney's criteria of the "democratic general election" <sup>universal</sup> suffrage, regularly scheduled elections, opportunities for significant groups to form parties and run candidates, contested seats, non-coercive policies or interference to voters and candidates, secret ballot, honest vote tabulation and the installation of the rightful winners <sup>as</sup> the 'concrete characteristics of elections we consider free and competitive'.<sup>4</sup> Among the infrastructural requisites for free elections, they cite W. J. M. Mackenzie's formula of a free and independent judiciary to interpret electoral legislation, an honest non-partisan administration to conduct the elections, a well-developed

system of political parties, organised enough to put forward their policies, traditions and candidates as alternatives from which voters may choose. Also included in this categorisation is an acceptance of the rules of the game in which the participants realise that if they are not followed 'the game itself will disappear amid the wreckage of the whole system.'<sup>5</sup>

Elections serve particular functions for a polity. David Butler, for instance, suggests that because 'fear of the next election is a constant in politics...elections offer the final sanction against governments.'<sup>6</sup> Thus, elections serve as a popular check that the electorate holds over its leaders. He claims further that they can be regarded as 'ideological consensus of voters' and 'devices to choose viable governments and give them legitimacy', but also warns that they can be 'a mirror of what the electorate felt on one particular polling day.'<sup>7</sup> Mackenzie sees elections as creating popular consent and participation in public affairs despite governmental complexities and providing mechanisms for the direct orderly successions of governments and peaceful transfers of authority.<sup>8</sup> Anthony King argues 'they frequently settle major constitutional issues; they influence, even determine the structure of party systems; they can force changes of government; their results have a far greater impact on the content of public policy than is often supposed.'<sup>9</sup> Ideally, elections serve as a link between the governors and governed, in which an underlying compact is implied: fulfilment of the electorate's wishes helps increase a party's or politician's continuance in office; failure to do so decreases these prospects.

While elections are core components of democratic political systems, not all countries including elections as parts of their institutional frameworks are democratic. Butler, Penniman and Ranney claim that in categorising countries from non-democratic to democratic

it is true that states that do not hold elections would be included at the non-democratic end of the scale; however,

one notch nearer the democratic end of the scale come the...nations in which elections are regularly held but only one candidate is allowed for office and these candidates are all chosen by the nation's sole or 'hegemonic' political party.<sup>10</sup>

As demonstrated in this dissertation's Preface, ultimate political power was held by the USSR's leading and guiding force, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

This chapter will demonstrate that Soviet elections suffered from several serious deficiencies which fell far short of the aforementioned criteria for free and fair elections.

For instance, although no law expressly prohibited ... more than one candidate

*from standing*

*until the*

for each seat, it was the invariable practice from 1937 late 1980s that the number of candidates was equal to the number of seats. <sup>-twice</sup> is '[n]otwithstanding Stalin's observation, in an interview with an American journalist that he expected a "very lively electoral struggle"<sup>11</sup> in the elections to the First Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet and that

Stalin and the party appeared to make considerable efforts to prepare for these elections on a multi-candidate basis.<sup>12</sup> All contestants to these and subsequent elections were

meticulously chosen by the party to satisfy specific *demographic* criteria <sup>-not</sup> because they possessed exceptional political skills. Few deputies had real decision-making powers, and

only an elite corps were re-elected. This is despite the fact that at local level, for instance, well over two million deputies were elected to any convocation of the soviets. True power

and influence were held by high ranking party officials who were frequently re-elected. Soviet representative institutions existed to 'rubber stamp' previously made CPSU decisions and give them an air of popular legitimacy. Although provisions existed in which Soviet voters could be linked to their deputies and have some input over their own lives through their elected representatives, such as voters' mandates which bound deputies to fulfil voters demands, elections were not true means of selecting a government.<sup>13</sup>

Serious students of Soviet politics were brazenly critical of the USSR's elections because of the Party's control over their procedures and the absence of competition in them. Barghoorn's aforementioned scathing assertion reinforces this fact.<sup>14</sup> According to the <sup>discussed previously</sup> criteria, Soviet elections were never free or democratic. From the period 1937-1987 voting in the USSR followed the pattern that Mackenzie labelled 'elections by acclamation'; these were not elections per se, but an 'electoral pathology'. According to Mackenzie, in acclamatory elections:

No one believes in the secrecy of the ballot, the fate of known opponents of the regime is terrible, the whole population is mustered to the poll, and its votes can be depended upon <sup>- it</sup> is probably unnecessary to fake the count, though this is of course within the power of the totalitarian regime. The result is that an election ceases to be a public act of choice and becomes a public act of acclamation. Zealous servants of the regime push voting statistics to unheard of levels <sup>~ 99</sup> per cent of the votes in favour of the government; such figures condemn themselves in the sight of anyone who knows anything about electoral administration. There remains something

which is called an election, and which possesses the trappings of an election, such as electoral cards, polling booths and voting papers: but which belongs in substance to the category not of elections, but of public demonstrations such as May Day processions and Nuremberg rallies. To quote (at secondhand) from an East German official: "The actual voting is of no importance. It has all the inevitability of a marriage ceremony. The courting of the bride has been done."<sup>15</sup>

Therefore, Harrop and Miller correctly ascertain that '[e]lections are about freedom and choice; [but] they are also about control and constraint.'<sup>16</sup> Indeed control and constraint were central elements of the pre-revolutionary and Soviet political systems in general and this included their manners of conducting elections in particular. Moreover, as later chapters illuminate, these conditions were evident even under the Gorbachev regime and, to an extent, under Yeltsin.

## **Pre-Reform Soviet Electoral Procedures**

### *The Significance of Pre-Reform Soviet Elections*

At a superficial level pre-reform elections in the Soviet Union contained elements of the franchise systems of the countries labelled liberal democracies. Soviet citizens elected their representatives to both national and local level legislatures. The individuals elected to represent the interests of their electorate in the organs of state power, the soviets (or councils), were people's deputies. Voting was a constitutional right.<sup>17</sup> All citizens of the USSR who had attained the age of 18 years with the exception of those deemed legally

incompetent

, incarcerated or institutionalised possessed the right to elect people's deputies (active electoral right). Citizens of the USSR who were 18 years or older could be elected to local soviets (ranging from village to *oblast'* levels) and those who were 21 or older could be elected to republican level soviets and the USSR Supreme Soviet (passive electoral right). Elections were governed by law. From 1978 <sup>to</sup> 1988 elections were carried out in accordance with the 1978 *Law on Elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet*.<sup>18</sup> Soviet elections occurred frequently. Elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet (since 1974) and republican supreme soviets were held every 5 years. Citizens voted for their representatives to village, settlement, city borough, city district, autonomous *okrug*, *oblast'* and *krai* soviets once every two and a half years.

In addition to their formal similarities to elections in the liberal democratic world, pre-reform Soviet elections were exercises in mass citizen participation. The Soviet Union possessed a rather large electorate. For instance in elections conducted to local elections in June 1987 there were 184,425,691 eligible voters in the USSR.<sup>19</sup> Such a sizable electorate, alone, is not worthy of study. For instance in the non-communist world, there are immense numbers of voters in both India and the United States. What was indeed significant, was that during the entire Soviet period, official statistics recorded that practically the entire adult population of the USSR participated in the elections in some capacity.

First, Soviet official documents recorded that nearly the entire eligible electorate voted in these elections. Voter turnout at the March 1984 elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet was the highest in the country's history. Official figures claim that 99.99 per cent of the eligible electorate voted. These data indicated that in the entire republic of Turkmenistan



only a single voter out of 1,531,613 eligible electors failed to cast a ballot on election day.<sup>20</sup> High voter turnouts were also recorded at local elections. Soviet voters, for instance, registered a 99.98 per cent turnout at the elections to local councils in February 1985.<sup>21</sup> At the June 1987 elections to local soviets voter turnout declined slightly <sup>- registered</sup> at 99.37 per cent.<sup>22</sup>

An army of agitators worked in *agitkollektivy* (agitation collectives) to ensure that these voters appeared at the polling stations. These institutions existed in local enterprises, schools and other educational facilities and coordinated propaganda related to the elections. Approximately 6 to 8 per cent of the adult population served as agitators; all canvassers were responsible for registering 10 to 15 voters; and 5 canvassers were held accountable to a supervisor.<sup>23</sup> Theodore Friedgut has noted that in the 1975 local elections the overwhelming majority of canvassers, 95 per cent, were members of the CPSU.<sup>24</sup>

Millions of individuals worked in electoral commissions. These commissions, composed primarily of members of work collectives, servicemen and members of social organisations, were responsible for the preparatory work involved with the elections. These election commissions drew up the lists of voters. They would determine the colours of the ballot papers; in addition, election commissions translated the election documents into the proper languages of the locale. <sup>Furthermore,</sup> these commissions registered candidates for deputy. Election commissions were formed in all major territorial divisions of the USSR. Their compositions varied from very large to rather small. For instance, a 29 member Central Election Commission (*Tsentribirkom*) which consisted of a chairperson, a deputy chairperson, a secretary and 26 members, coordinated the elections to the USSR Supreme

Soviet at a national level. Other, lower-level commissions had as few as three members. Electoral commissions were also formed in railway stations, ships, Soviet institutions abroad and medical institutions. Data from recent local elections indicate that a large number of activists contributed to their organisational work. For instance, in 1985, 8,683,421 citizens participated in the work of 52,041 electoral commissions and in 1987 there were 8,530,017 who performed similar activities in 52,567 commissions.<sup>25</sup>

Citizens also participated in the elections as candidates and as people's deputies. However, due to the fact that there was no competition among candidates and certain peculiarities in the voting procedures <sup>- factors</sup> which are undertaken in more detail in other sections of this chapter <sup>- when</sup> a candidate was nominated to be a deputy, he or she was virtually guaranteed to win the seat. In accordance with Lenin's principles and those of the Paris Commune, the system of soviets was intended to function as 'schools of government'. Ordinary citizens, after performing their work activities, were eligible to perform unpaid work in politics. This served to educate ordinary citizens in the fundamental procedures of government. In addition, the Soviet implementation of this system was intended to serve <sup>deterrent</sup> as a <sup>deterrent</sup> to the creation of a caste of professional politicians.<sup>26</sup> However, this dissertation includes evidence that this intention was not fulfilled. In addition, there were higher rates of deputy turnover than in Western countries where incumbents are very likely to be re-elected. Deputy re-election is analysed in much greater detail in Chapter 3.

In addition to serving as a means of popular participation, Soviet elections served as a means of legitimising the Soviet political system. Since early in its rule, the CPSU sought to construct a representative system that was nominally elected by the people. Electoral

procedures, from announcing the elections, printing voters' lists, discussing and endorsing candidates and the holding of elections themselves were interpreted by the CPSU as demonstrating popular support for the regime. Yet, Soviet voters did not have the opportunity to select from among alternative candidates and programmes. The key issue in the pre-reform Soviet election was voter turnout. Simply showing up at the polling station was, in effect, a vote in favour of the Soviet system and the CPSU.<sup>27</sup> As discussed above, voter turnout frequently exceeded 99 per cent. Additionally, the percentage of votes cast in favour of the candidates often closely resembled the voter turnout figure. However, these indicators do not accurately reflect near universal acceptance of the electoral system. As stated earlier, public opinion polls revealed a high level of popular resentment towards the electoral process. Their criticism came from several key sources. The 99 per cent turnout figure, in the first place, was not a true representation of the electorate's preferences or the actual voting. Agitators harassed the electorate into showing up to the polls. The regime provided certificates to vote elsewhere to voters who expected to be away from their constituencies on election day. These documents removed applicants from the electoral rolls. Therefore, they were no longer obliged to vote. Hence, this mechanism reduced the actual size of the electorate. In addition, the regime generated social pressure to discourage secret voting and casting votes against Party-approved candidates.<sup>28</sup>

Soviet elections integrated men and women from diverse social, ethnic, professional and national backgrounds into the state system as deputies. The CPSU and state functionaries could use this means of incorporation to legitimise further Soviet rule and strengthen its argument that the USSR was a state of all the people. For instance, Soviet voters elected representatives of 57 nationalities to the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR

Supreme Soviet of the Tenth Convocation (1979-1984).<sup>29</sup> Forty-one nations were represented by deputies in the Soviet of the Union at the same time.<sup>30</sup> The Eleventh Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet was <sup>composed</sup> of members of 63 nationalities.<sup>31</sup> There were higher percentages of women elected to Soviet state organs than there were in Western countries, with the exception of Scandinavia where they usually constitute nearly one third of the deputies. Since the late 1960s, women accounted for between 25 per cent and one third of deputies elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Women also constituted about half the deputies elected to local soviets. Women's representation is discussed in significantly greater detail in Chapter 4.

#### deputy compositions

Based on these <sup>h</sup>, the Soviet authorities could have argued that the system of soviets and the means of electing deputies to them successfully integrated the diverse peoples of the USSR into the country's political process. However, Soviet citizens did not have even the initial input in selecting deputies. Further discussion <sup>of</sup> the nomination procedure for this time period is contained elsewhere in this chapter. Party and state officials searched desparately for candidates who possessed specific qualifications. Leading figures from political, academic and cultural fields were selected to be people's deputies. In addition, workers and collective farmers with excellent labour records 'competed' for deputy mandates. In reality, local nominating bodies had specific quotas to fill for candidate selection. For instance, Stephen White has mentioned the account of a local party official who reported his election quota to the newspaper *Izvestiya*. He stated that 4.6 per cent of the deputies in his area were to be enterprise directors, 1.1 per cent were to be employed in culture and the arts, 0.8 per cent were to be party officials, 45.9 per cent were to be elected

for the first time and so on. White also reveals another instance in which a well-known prostitute was nominated for deputy because she was the only person in the region who met specific demographic criteria <sup>female</sup>, single with two children, aged between 35 and 40, and a factory worker.<sup>32</sup>

Deputyships were also rewards for service to the state. Nominations were distributed to outstanding labourers and award winners. In the 1984 election to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the party nominated (and Soviet voters endorsed with their ballots) 39 Heroes of the Soviet Union and 253 Heroes of Socialist Labour. In addition, 1,202 deputies (80.1 per cent) were awarded orders and medals of different types; there were 76 recipients of the Lenin Prize and 159 holders of State Orders of the USSR among the 1984 deputy corpus.<sup>33</sup> Over 21 per cent of the deputies elected to local office in 1985 possessed awards, orders or medals<sup>34</sup> and approximately 16 per cent of their counterparts elected in 1987 did also.<sup>35</sup>

Furthermore, the posts of deputies, <sup>both</sup> at the local and national levels, were largely ceremonial. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. Therefore, Soviet elections did not produce legislative organs which were staffed by the most qualified individuals. Indeed, one of the primary objectives of Gorbachev's reform programme was to restructure the system of soviets to produce legislatures that functioned effectively enough to handle the complex issues confronting the USSR during its efforts to restructure. Electoral reform was considered a significant step towards achieving this goal and disentrenching conservative opponents of *perestroika* and, therefore, incorporated popular checks against them.

As stated earlier, Soviet elections were also exercises in mass mobilisation and the

major emphasis of the electoral process was getting the voters to the polls. In addition to attaining high levels of voter attendance, the officials also mobilised the electorate into participating in pre-election meetings. These gatherings were intended to involve as many voters as possible and were conducted on a mass scale, frequently at lunch time in major factories and places of work. They served several key functions. First, the meetings served to legitimise the nomination process. Party representatives presented candidates for deputy to their potential constituents at these mass meetings. The candidates discussed their personal qualities and their achievements. In addition, in theory, the participants were intended to have discussions on the candidates' potential to be a representative. Following a discussion of the candidates, the participants at the nomination meeting would vote on whether they wanted him or her to represent them. Those candidates who received more than 50 per cent of the collective's votes would have their names placed on the ballot paper. The Party used these meetings to legitimise <sup>its</sup> actions <sup>because</sup> they 'involved' the mass of workers in them. Therefore, the Party could claim that <sup>its</sup> version of democracy was more 'democratic' than bourgeois democracy because it involved the electors directly in the nomination process. In addition, the voting procedure (which at this point it should be noted voting was conducted in an open manner) legitimised the Party by claiming that the voters approved the party's decisions for the people's representatives.

Once candidates were nominated they once again met with their potential <sup>- however</sup> in most Soviet instances it is appropriate to say eventual <sup>- constituents</sup> . . . . At this stage of the election process, voters presented the candidates with *nakazy izbiratelei* (voters' mandates). These mandates contained a list of concerns that the voters found of real significance to their locale. Deputies who did not carry out their mandates could, in theory, be recalled by their

constituents. In reality, however, deputies were recalled by the mass organisations which nominated them which, at the last set of elections in 1984 would have included the CPSU, trade union organisations, Komsomol, meetings of work collectives and servicemen. The significance of mandates is discussed in greater detail elsewhere in this chapter.

Elections also served as a means of political socialisation. First, the Party generally nominated individuals who embodied the qualities they hoped would permeate Soviet society. Therefore, these people included Party officials, figures who worked in areas of culture and exemplary workers and collective farmers. The Soviet press contained biographical information on these candidates. In addition to relaying these qualities to the electorate, the Soviet authorities released bulletins in the press that emphasized the importance of the elections. Voting was described as a *grazhdanskii dolg* (civic duty). The party also included educational materials at *agitpunkty* (agitation points) which were established to inform voters on recent Party directives and the individuals involved in the local elections. People participated in the pre-election process in several capacities. Canvassers visited the homes of the electorate and discussed issues that voters considered important. Also (in theory), citizens learned about administration principles when they served as people's deputies in the soviets and on their standing commissions which were concerned with particular issues such as construction, education, environmental protection, to name but a few. In addition, the nearly 30 million activists who participated in the elections as canvassers on election commissions and in other capacities gained experience in different aspects of Soviet politics.<sup>36</sup>

Soviet elections also served as a major means of communication between the

'governed' and their 'governors'. During the election campaign the press contained information about plan fulfillment and the Party's future policies. In addition, the regime was able to receive valuable information from voters on housing and other matters during the election campaign. Victor Zaslavsky and Robert Brym have noted that while the campaigns were being conducted, the Party could use these events for control purposes over the population. For instance, canvassers had to visit the dwellings of the people on their lists. In the event that the canvassers discovered that people were living in areas without permits they would report this information to the police and eventually assist in the eviction process.<sup>37</sup>

Nevertheless, <sup>the</sup> regime did not use the information garnered through the campaign solely for coercive purposes. Often, canvassers would receive negative feedback from the electorate. Soviet voters could, for instance, use the opportunity of meeting with canvassers to pass on their grievances of living condiditons to the local Party and state bodics in the hope that they would help solve them. Agitators were obliged to register every voter on their lists. If the agitator did not intend to present the voters' positions to the local authorities, the voters could threaten not to vote. In addition, voters could make suggestions for further policy initiatives on the ballot papers. After the elections were conducted the local electoral commissions noted all comments that were written on the voting slips. These proposals were discussed at the sessions of the newly elected soviets. Finally, when the electorate rejected candidates (which occurred generally in rare instances), they sent the regime a message that the party's particular choice for popular representative was not compatible for the needs of the particular locality.



Therefore, in response to Hammer's comment, there were several major reasons why Soviet pre-reform elections were significant. First, voting was a constitutional right. Second, the Soviet Union conducted elections <sup>regularly</sup>. Third, the Soviet electoral system served as a means of mass citizen participation. Practically the entire adult population took part in the elections in some way. Fourth, the electoral system served as a means to legitimise the Soviet system. Citizens were nominally able to choose their representatives in the state system. High rates of voter turnout were interpreted as signs of popular support for the system. Fifth, the elections were a means of incorporating the diverse socially-differentiated strata of Soviet society in the state system. This further reinforced the legitimating principles of the electoral process. Sixth, the elections were exercises in mass mobilisation. Seventh, the electoral process was a means of political socialisation and political education. Finally, Soviet elections were a means of communication between the regime and its subjects.

It is significant to note, however, that in the majority of instances the pre-reform Soviet elections served the interests of the Party and state more than the individual voter. However, the elections did not serve the regime alone. There were several key components in the electoral system that could be considered theoretically 'democratic' and provided the electorate with elements of influence and choice.

#### *Conformity with Democratic Principles and Voter Choice*

Pre-reform Soviet elections conformed superficially with some of the criteria of democratic elections. It will be recalled that there were few segments of the population who were

disenfranchised. In addition Article 3 of the 1978 Election Law stated that all voters were to participate in the elections on an equal footing. Each voter had one vote. Men, women and servicemen participated in the elections with equal rights. Moreover, it was codified that candidates who received more than 50 per cent of the votes of electors who cast their ballots were declared winners. However, it should be noted that in order for elections to be declared valid more than 50 per cent of the eligible electorate had to have been registered as having voted.

Nevertheless, it should be stressed that elections under the Soviet regime did not always carry these equalities. For instance in the immediate post-revolutionary period, some members of the *ancien regime* were disenfranchised. For instance, in the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic adopted 1918 persons employing hired labour for profit, living on unearned income, such as interest on capital, revenue from enterprises, income from property, etc., private traders and commercial middle-men, monks and clergymen of all religious denominations, employees and agents of the former police, special gendarme corps and secret service, members of the former ruling dynasty of Russia, persons declared, under established procedure, insane or mentally deficient, and also persons under guardianship, persons convicted of mercenary or infamous crimes and sentenced to a term set by law or by the judgment of a court were all deprived of the right to vote.<sup>38</sup> Termed 'elections under civil war conditions' because of its antagonism towards various sections of the population, this pattern of election was also adopted by the 'people's democracies' after the communists came to power in the post-war period.<sup>39</sup> In addition, violations of the one person-one vote principle frequently occurred in the Soviet Union. For example, two soldiers went out and got drunk the night before the

1954 election and they later froze to death in a <sup>cemetery</sup>. However, votes were cast on their behalf so that a 100 per cent turnout could be recorded. An autopsy was prepared to show that they could have died after having voted.<sup>40</sup> Dr Boris Fedorov, former Russian Federation Minister of Finance and leader of the democratic-patriotic Forward Russia! Party, told the present author the following anecdote:

On election day my father would call together those of us eligible to vote. He would ask which one of us would like to go to the district polling station. The one who volunteered would take the family's passports and present them to the workers at the polling station. He or she would receive the ballot papers for the entire family and vote. This relieved the burden from the rest of the family of having to go out and vote.<sup>41</sup>

Soviet electoral legislation also stated that the candidate who received more than 50 per cent of the votes would be declared a people's deputy. To the best of my knowledge there has not been an account of a candidate who received more than 50 per cent of the vote who was not declared a people's deputy. This would have been absurd. The individuals would never have been included on the ballot paper if the Party had not approved them in the first place. Moreover, as is discussed below in more detail, it was virtually impossible for Soviet voters to put forward alternative candidates or include write-in candidates on the ballot papers. However, there have been instances in which falsifications of voting results have been recorded. The former dissident, Leonid Plyushch, for instance, crossed out the candidate's name on one occasion and wrote Molotov on the ballot paper. He later found out that the candidate against whom he had voted had been elected unanimously.<sup>42</sup> Stephen White has

noted that during the first USSR Supreme Soviet elections in 1937, Stalin recorded votes for his candidacy in excess of 100 per cent. It was explained later that voters in adjoining districts had insisted on casting their votes in the Moscow constituency where he stood as a candidate.<sup>43</sup>

It will also be recalled that Butler, Penniman and Ranney further establish other preconditions for classifying democratic elections. Under these criteria it is possible to observe a general deviation from the established norms. The first criterion, that all adults have the right to vote, has been discussed above in significant detail. Second, the <sup>Criterion</sup> that states that elections occur within the prescribed time limits seems to be applicable to pre-reform Soviet elections. The only exception was the extra-long interval between the First Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet elected in 1937 and the second elected in 1946. However, the combat conducted on Soviet soil was the cause of the election schedule's interruption. Thereafter, however, it will be recalled that voting for local, republican and national legislatures took place on a regular basis.

There was superficial conformity with the third criterion that all seats in the legislature were subject to election. However, in contrast to Butler <sup>Penniman and Ranney</sup>, they were not contested at all until 1987 in a local election. Even then, candidate choice was limited to about 1 per cent of the districts and only about 4-5 per cent of the deputies were elected in this manner. Soviet electoral provisions mandated that 50 per cent of the electorate had to approve the candidate for deputy in order for the representative to be elected. This feature established at least some form of popular consensus on the candidate. However, in practice there was only one name on the ballot paper. Therefore, voters had

no choices among candidates. Nevertheless, Soviet ballot papers contained the instructions that voters were to strike out the name of the candidate against whom they wished to vote. Thus, notionally, candidates still had to pass through at least some type of hurdle before they assumed their positions in the representative body. Restrictions on citizens' fuller use of the possibility to reject deputies is discussed in greater detail elsewhere in the chapter. These procedures, therefore, reduced voting to what could be considered a symbolic act. It should also be noted that no candidate was ever defeated in an election to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Moreover, Stephen White has indicated that the one candidate one seat principle was not even achieved at the last pre-reform election to the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1984. <sup>owing</sup> to the death of one of the candidates shortly before the poll, 1,499 candidates stood for 1,500 seats.<sup>44</sup> However, candidate defeats did occur in elections to the lower level soviets, but they were the exception rather than the rule.<sup>45</sup>

Pre-reform Soviet elections fell far short of Butler, Penniman and Ranney's fourth criterion that no substantial group should be denied the opportunity of forming a party and putting forward a candidate. Under the pre-reform electoral legislation there were selected organisations that possessed the right to nominate candidates for people's deputy. These organisations included the CPSU, the Komsomol, Trade Unions, cooperative and other social organisations, <sup>and also</sup> meetings of servicemen in military units. Article 38 of the 1978 Law stated that the persons at nomination meetings had the right to participate in discussions on the candidates, to support the candidates or submit proposals challenging them. However, nowhere in the Law was it stated that candidates could be nominated directly by individuals or other groups not included in the above mentioned list.

The campaign of <sup>Roi</sup> Medvedev <sup>- a</sup> former dissident historian, USSR People's Deputy from 1989 <sup>until</sup> 1991, former CPSU Central Committee member from 1990 <sup>to</sup> 1991 and co-chairman of the Socialist Workers' Party from 1991 <sup>- to</sup> to the present<sup>46</sup> <sup>^</sup> compete in the 1979 elections as an independent candidate to the USSR Supreme Soviet illustrates the difficulties that independent groups not sanctioned by the CPSU had when they nominated contestants who were not previously approved by the party. In January 1979, the Free Interprofessional Workers' Union (SMOT) created a small organisation 'Election 79', and decided to offer two candidates, among them Roi Medvedev, to stand for election to the Soviet of Nationalities from the Sverdlovsk Electoral District of Moscow in the 4 March 1979 elections. After Medvedev agreed to accept its nomination, 'Election 79' prepared the necessary documents to be registered as a social organisation. A contingent from the group presented their nomination to the Sverdlovsk electoral commission. 'Election 79' was first turned down in its registration bid because it was not considered a legal organisation. However, following substantial legal research it was evident that under a 1931 statute 'Election 79' was indeed legal. The executive committee of the Sverdlovsk district soviet, upon receipt of the necessary documents, tried to dissuade 'Election 79' from <sup>its</sup> intentions to run alternative candidates and to disband the group. However, 'Election 79' continued its lobbying. Grudgingly, the Sverdlovsk district executive committee accepted the papers. 'Election 79' simultaneously wrote a complaint to the Central Election Commission on the nomination <sup>it</sup> hindrances that the Sverdlovsk district soviet presented to them. However, as these proceedings were conducted the deadline for candidate registration passed and 'Election 79' was unable to field a candidate in the elections. In the end, only one candidate, ballerina V. I. Bessmertnova, was registered on the ballot paper.<sup>47</sup> It should come as no surprise that she won the seat.<sup>48</sup>

There was also at least nominal conformity in the pre-reform Soviet electoral practices with Butler, Penniman and Ranney's fifth criterion that election legislation must be reasonably fair: neither law, nor violence, nor intimidation should bar candidates from presenting their views nor voters from discussing them. Soviet electoral law specified that voters had the right to exercise their ballots secretly. All citizens, not declared legally insane, had the right to vote. Also, the Election Law stated <sup>that</sup> it was prohibited for officials to restrict any citizen from exercising his or her right to vote in secret. However, there were instances of non-compliance with these provisions. First, for the reasons described below, the regime hardly ever upheld the individual's right to vote secretly. However, there is, to the knowledge of this author, no recorded instance of violence against or intimidation employed against dissident voters. However, Rasna Karklins has suggested that there may have been unofficial violence which may have been used in situations when people voted against the official candidates.<sup>49</sup> Further, Soviet voters could express their views on candidates in limited manners. The Soviet electoral law allowed citizens to agitate *for* candidates. However, nowhere in the Law was it stated that participants in pre-election meetings or voters could agitate *against* candidates. Therefore, during the pre-election stages it was difficult for voters to discuss candidates freely and constructively.

One of the most deficient aspects of the pre-reform Soviet electoral system was the method of voting. The election law stated that voters had the right to cast their ballots secretly. Voting booths were provided in polling stations for voters to exercise this right. The election Law stated that votes were cast for the candidate whose name was on the ballot paper. Since there was invariably only one name on the ballot paper, voters, after being recorded as participating in the voting, would collect their ballot papers and drop them,

unmarked, into the ballot boxes. This process has been labelled 'inertia voting' by Ronald J. Hill.<sup>50</sup> The voting procedure, therefore, took place more openly than secretly. Moreover, the location of the voting booths did not promote free exercise of the right of choice. Ballot boxes were located in plain view of every voter and election workers who were present at the polls. However, voting booths or rooms for secret ballot, were located away from the ballot box. Voters who intended to vote against the candidate on the paper, scrutinize the document, or even exercise their legal right to vote secret<sup>ly</sup>, had to make detours to the booths or rooms in plain view of their peers. This action was considered to be a manifestation of a voter's intentions, and gave away his or her choice.<sup>51</sup> V. Timofeev, a veteran of war and labour expressed exactly this point in an article published in *Izvestiya*.

You get your ballot <sup>- everyone</sup> is looking at you. You pull a pencil out of your pocket <sup>- everyone ^</sup> can guess your intentions. Young pioneers or poll attendants are standing by the polling booth. If you go into the booth it's clear that you voted against the candidate. Those who don't want to vote against go straight to the ballot box. It's the same at plant or trade union elections and party election conferences. You can't even go off into a corner by yourself before a curious eye is peering over your shoulder.<sup>52</sup>

It should also be noted that voters elected their deputies by leaving the name of the candidate for whom they wished to vote on the ballot paper. All those against whom the voter wished to cast a ballot had to have their names crossed out. Frequently, electoral commission members would not supply the voting booths with pencils or pens to perform these tasks.<sup>53</sup>



There were other attributes of pre-reform Soviet elections that violated democratic principles. Vote counting fell short of Butler, Penniman and Ranney's preconditions. There were many accounts, for instance, of actual falsifications of voting results. The examples presented above of the soldiers voting and Stalin's vote in 1937 exceeding 100 per cent are good illustrations of this point. Often, however, agitators voted for people on the list of electors. For instance, a Soviet scientist, visiting Glasgow in 1989, told the present author of such examples. Once, during the 1985 local elections he received a knock on the door of his flat at 8 pm. He opened his door and recognised his friend, a canvasser. The agitator asked him if he was going to vote. He reminded the scientist that it was getting late and informed him that everyone else on his list had cast their ballots, stressing that he was tired and wanted to go home to be with his family. He had been at the polling station since 6 am and was physically and mentally exhausted. The scientist said he had no intention of voting. After hearing this statement, the agitator became concerned, then flew into a tirade and reiterated how important it was for everyone on his list to show up at the polling station and vote. The scientist held his ground and refused to vote, stating he believed that it would be a meaningless exercise. In a final act of desperation, the canvasser asked the scientist if he would allow him to cast his ballot for him. On this point the scientist agreed. The canvasser later told the scientist that he returned to the polling station, marked off the scientist's name and put his ballot paper in the box on his behalf. This action completed, the canvasser could report that all his voters participated in the voting.<sup>54</sup>

On the seventh criterion, the pre-reform electoral system had some success. Butler lists, as a component of a democratic electoral system, that those elected should be installed in office and remain in office until their terms expire or a new election period is held.

Earlier it was established that voters gave mandates to their deputies. These mandates reflected the interests of the voters. The electorate presented the issues that they wanted implemented in their constituencies. Deputies were obliged to fulfill these mandates to the best of their abilities and were legally bound to do so. Mandates served several key functions. Soviet legal specialists Georgii V. Barabashev, Konstantin F. Sheremet and Nikolai G. Starovoitov suggested that these mandates performed three primary roles. First, they were a form of expression of the will and interests of the population and included the direct participation of the citizen in the direction of the affairs of state and society and the development of socialist self-government. Second, they <sup>strengthened</sup> the ties between deputies and their constituents. Third, mandates served as an information device for the expression of public opinion which facilitated more effective activities in all state organisations.<sup>55</sup> Moreover, they also indicated that the institution of the voters' mandates did not exist in the bourgeois countries. Although they did not state it specifically, Barabashev, Sheremet and Starovoitov implied that elected officials in the bourgeois countries represent special interests in their institutions. They mention, however, that bourgeois legislators function on an anti-democratic basis by not implementing voters' mandates. They suggest that voters' mandates would make them representatives of all the people. However, because of their links with special interests, legislators in capitalist countries needed to remain independent of their electors.<sup>56</sup>

Evidence suggests that deputies did indeed fulfill their mandates. The convocation of local soviets elected in June 1982 was presented with 748,396 mandates. In the period between 1982 and 1984 deputies had implemented 692,939 (92.6 per cent) Within this time period over 90 per cent of all of the mandates had been carried out in the RSFSR, Ukraine,

Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Moldavia and Kirgizia.<sup>57</sup> It must be clearly stated that this is indeed significant evidence which indicates the significance of the bonds between the elected deputies and their electorate. However, there is one major drawback which prevents this author from claiming that the deputies, by fulfilling their mandates, were working very thoroughly to serve their voters' interests. Thomas F. Remington has noted that '[o]ften such commitments had already been included as part of the local plan before being adopted formally as a deputy's mandate'.<sup>58</sup> Nevertheless, he still stresses that 'the process of proposing *nakazy* and pressing them upon deputies gave voters some opportunity to lobby for their particular needs.'<sup>59</sup>

Deputies who did not fulfill their mandates were subjected to recall and the 1977 USSR Constitution included provisions for removing representatives from office who did not achieve their contracts with the voters. Article 107 required that deputies had to report their work to electors and to the bodies that nominated them. The same article further stated that deputies who did not justify the trust of the electors would be recalled at any time by the decision of a majority of the electors. In theory, the regime used this mechanism to ensure that deputies were responsive to the will of the constituents whom they represented. Deputies had to act as instructed delegates while serving their terms of office.<sup>60</sup>

There were no specific reasons for deputy removal. However, Article 6 of the *Law on the Status of Deputies* declared that deputies who did not justify the voters' confidence or who acted in manners unworthy of their high calling <sup>еобща</sup> have been recalled. Actions which constituted failing to justify voters' confidence included not meeting regularly with constituents, not holding office hours in which individual citizens could bring points to the

deputies' attention and not implementing or working on voters' mandates. Deputies who acted in manners which were considered unworthy of their positions included those who were often drunk, behaved amorally, were publically abusive or exhibited poor labour discipline. S. M. Popova indicated that deputy recall was more frequent in the second type of offenses.<sup>61</sup>

The deputy recall process was initiated by the collectives or organisations that nominated the deputy. The deputy was made aware of the meeting. Deputies who were considered for recall had the opportunity to present their cases before the collective or organisation. After this procedure had begun, the local soviet established a date for a referendum on deputy recall. Deputies were recalled if more than 50 per cent of the electorate cast their votes against them.

Recall was not implemented very frequently. Of the more than 2,000,000 deputies who were elected to the local soviets at each convocation, no more than slightly over 500 were recalled in each term between 1970 and 1984.<sup>62</sup> Reasons for this exist in the fact that recall is a lengthy process. Deputies, conversely, served relatively short terms of two and a half years. It is probable that delays in the recall process were dragged into the next round of elections and the discredited representative was not selected for the next convocation of the soviets. Thus, the recall procedures were often avoided. In addition there were instances when recall was abused. Jeffrey Hahn notes that recall could have been used as a tool for furthering Stalin's policies during the collectivisation period. During the first half of 1931 over 23,000 deputies were recalled from village soviets and 1,000 were recalled from urban areas.<sup>63</sup>

Ronald Hill notes that there were a number of *potentially* (emphasis added) democratic principles in the nomination process. These included electors being involved in virtually every step of the candidate nomination process. However, it should be emphasised that this occurred after the Party had made its selections. Again, I would like to reiterate that I feel that there was democratic potential in the nomination procedures and mass meetings. However, it should be underlined that it is more appropriate to claim that these events were more akin to a rubber stamping of the Party's choices rather than serious challenges to its priorities. Hill also argues that citizen participation in electoral commissions' selections and in their compositions and discussions on candidates were other forms of somewhat democratic features of pre-reform Soviet elections.<sup>64</sup> I share Hill's assertion that civic-minded individuals could push their influence during these stages. However, the evidence cited above clearly establishes that it was difficult for citizens to make a significant impact in the overall electoral process.

Above it has been argued that voters in the USSR did not have the choice of selecting between competing candidates, parties or platforms that are taken for granted as key components and, possibly, defining characteristics of liberal democratic politics and electoral systems. The pre-reform electoral system left voters with two choices: to vote or not to vote. As stated earlier, the overwhelming majority of Soviet adults cast their ballots. However, some stayed away from the polls and in isolated occasions, voters cast their ballots against the officially-approved candidates. In a limited number of cases, some of these candidates were defeated—but only at local levels. Voter abstention and dissident voting in the pre-reform period have been seriously-debated issues. However, all major writers on Soviet 'dissident voting'—electoral avoidance and voting against candidates—appear to agree

that the expression of loyalty to the Soviet system, manifested in (a) voting in the elections and (b) casting ballots in favour of the Party-approved candidate <sup>was a</sup> key feature of the pre-reform Soviet electoral system. Therefore, these issues need not be addressed here. Nevertheless, the aforementioned evidence suggests that the electorate was largely unable to vote freely.

## Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued that elections in the pre-reform period although not providing choices for candidate among voters or competing parties were indeed significant. These were exercises in mass mobilisation for the Party and served various functions such as legitimating the system, incorporating the diverse elements of Soviet society in the elected organs by means of quota systems and communicating issues between the regime and the electorate. Most of all, the elections served as the main means of political participation for the adult population.

Soviet elections contained some (abstract) democratic features, but they did not necessarily live up to their potential. The pre-reform electoral system incorporated such features that Robert Dahl suggested that could be used as determinants for a democratic electoral system such as universal suffrage and the installation of winners in their seats. However, candidate nominations were limited. There could be no choice among competing parties or platforms. Voting against candidates was severely discouraged. Nevertheless, there were some (arguably) democratic features, such as the institution of voters' mandates which bound the deputies to satisfy their constituents' demands. However, these items were

already factored into the five-year plans. Although there were no choices on the ballot papers for candidates of parties, voters could choose, albeit under extreme social pressure, whether or not they wished to vote and whether or not they wanted to vote for the Party-approved candidate. Therefore, elections under these conditions were clearly what Mackenzie has termed 'acclamatory elections' which were elections in name only. The next chapter focuses on the first largely competitive election conducted in the USSR in 1989 and demonstrates the elements of continuity, contradiction and departure exhibited between pre-reform Soviet elections and those conducted under Gorbachev.

## NOTES

1. Stephen White, 'The Soviet Elections of 1989: From Acclamation to Limited Choice', *Coexistence*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 513-539, p. 513.
2. Martin Harrop and William L. Miller, *Elections and Voters: A Comparative Introduction* (London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 5-7.
3. Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to a Democratic Theory* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 67-71.
4. David Butler, Howard R. Penniman and Austin Ranney, 'Introduction: Democratic and Nondemocratic Elections' in David Butler, Howard R. Penniman and Austin Ranney (eds), *Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative Study of Competitive Elections* (Washington, DC and London: American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research, 1981), pp. 1-6, at p. 4.
5. W. J. M. Mackenzie, *Free Elections: An Introductory Textbook* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1958), p. 14.
6. David Butler, 'Electoral Systems' in Butler, Penniman and Ranney, op. cit., pp. 7-25, at p. 22.
7. Ibid., pp. 22-23.
8. Mackenzie, op. cit., pp. 13-14.
9. Anthony King, 'What Do Elections Decide?' in Butler, Penniman and Ranney, op. cit., pp. 293-324, at p. 322.
10. David Butler, Howard R. Penniman and Austin Ranney, 'Introduction: Democratic and Nondemocratic Elections' in ibid., pp. 1-6, at p. 4.

11. Stephen White, 'Reforming the Electoral System', *The Journal of Communist Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (December 1988), pp. 1-16, at p. 1.
12. J. Arch Getty, 'State and Society Under Stalin: Constitutions and Elections in the 1930s', *Slavic Review*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 18-35.
13. For discussions on the procedures and functions of elections and re-election in the Soviet period and the effectiveness of Soviet deputies in their legislative institutions see Victor Zaslavsky and Robert J. Brym, 'The Functions of Elections in the USSR', *Soviet Studies*, Vol. XXX, No. 3 (1978), pp. 362-371; Everett Jacobs, 'Soviet Local Elections: What They Are and What They Are Not', *ibid.*, Vol. XXII, No. 1 (1970), pp. 61-76; Theodore Friedgut, *Political Participation in the USSR* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), Chapter 2; Jeffrey W. Hahn, *Soviet Grassroots: Citizen Participation in Local Soviet Government* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988); Stephen White, 'Noncompetitive Elections and National Politics: The USSR Supreme Soviet Elections of 1984', *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1985); Ronald J. Hill, 'Continuity and Change in USSR Supreme Soviet Elections', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1972), pp. 47-68; *idem.*, *Soviet Politics, Political Science and Reform* (London: Martin Robertson, 1980), Chapter 2. Statistical data on Soviet representation can be found in Otdel po voprosam raboty sovetov Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, *Sostav deputatov, ispolnitel'nykh komitetov, postoyannykh komissii i rezervnykh deputatov mestnykh sovetov 1987 g. (statisticheskii sbornik)* (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1987). Much of the information contained in this chapter has been derived from these sources.
14. Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Politics in the USSR* (Boston: Little Brown & Co, 1972), p. 246.
15. Mackenzie, *op. cit.* p. 172.
16. Harrop and Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 1.
17. *Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoi Zakon) Soyuzo Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik* (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1978), Article 95.
18. *Zakon Soyuzo Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik O vyborakh deputatov v Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1978)
19. *Sostav...*, p. 260.
20. 'Soobshchenie Tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi komissii ob itogakh vyborov v Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR odinnadtsatogo sozyv, sostoyavshikhsya 4 marta 1984 goda', *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, 1984, No. 11 (14 March 1984), item No. 2241., pp. 199-203, at p. 199.
21. Otdel po voprosam raboty sovetov Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, *Itogi vyborov i sostav deputatov mestnykh sovetov narodnykh deputatov 1985 g. (statisticheskii sbornik)* (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1985), p. 3.
22. *Sostav...*, p. 260.
23. Zaslavsky and Brym, *op. cit.*, p. 365.
24. Friedgut, *op. cit.*, p. 99.
25. *Itogi...*, pp. 236-237 and *Sostav...*, pp. 256-257.
26. These arguments are raised in several notable studies. See for instance, Friedgut, *op. cit.*, Hahn, *op. cit.* and by the same author, 'State Institutions in Transition' in Stephen White, Zvi Gitelman and Alex Pravda (eds), *Developments in Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 88-106, pp. 88-93.
27. This point is raised in Gilison, *op. cit.*



28. For discussions of dissident voting see, for instance, Max Mote, *Soviet Local and Republican Elections* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 1965), p. 87; Gilison, op. cit.; Jacobs, op. cit.; Rasma Karklins, 'Soviet Elections Revisited: Voter Abstention in Noncompetitive Voting', *American Political Science Review*, (1986); Philip G. Roeder, 'Electoral Avoidance in the Soviet Union', *Soviet Studies*, Vol. XLI, No. 3 (July 1989), pp. 462-483 and Friedgut, op. cit. The methodological problems of several of these studies are discussed in significant detail in Roeder's excellent paper. However, it should be noted that the present author is not concerned primarily with the actual rates of dissident voting and which method of deriving this figure is superior. Therefore, this issue is not discussed in this dissertation.
29. 'Doklad Mandatnoi Komissii Soveta Natsional'nostei', *Pervaya Sessiya Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR (desyaty sozyv) 18-19 aprelya 1979 g.: stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1979), pp. 17 - 21, at p. 19.
30. 'Doklad Mandatnoi Komissii Soveta Soyuz', *ibid.*, pp. 28-31, at p. 30.
31. *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: odinnadtsaty sozyv* (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1984), p. 4.
32. Both examples are derived from *Izvestiya*, 10 February 1987, p. 2 cited in Stephen White, *After Gorbachev*, Fourth edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 32-33.
33. *Deputaty...*, p. 4.
34. *Itogi...*, p. 26.
35. *Sostav...*, p. 18.
36. Stephen White, personal communication with the author 15 March 1990 and Ronald J. Hill, 'The CPSU in an Election Campaign', *Soviet Studies*, Vol. XXVII (October 1973).
37. Zaslavsky and Brym, op. cit., p. 369.
38. 'Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Russian Socialist Federated Socialist Republic' cited in Arych Ungcr, *Constitutional Development in the USSR* (London: Methuen, 1981), p. 37.
39. For a discussion, see Alex Pravda, 'Elections in Communist Party States' in Stephen White and Daniel Nelson (eds), *Communist Politics: A Reader* (London: Macmillan, 1986).
40. Stephen White, 'Reforming the Electoral System', p. 4.
41. Boris Fedorov, personal communication with the author, 25 March 1989.
42. Stephen White, 'Reforming the Electoral System'. p. 2.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
44. Stephen White, 'Non-Competitive Elections', p. 216.
45. Max Mote has observed that 1 in every 10,000 candidates was defeated in local level elections by 1965. Georg Brunner came up with a figure of 1 candidate defeat in every 13,000 instances by 1982. See respectively, Max Mote, op. cit. and Georg Brunner, 'Legitimacy Doctrines and Legitimation Procedures in East European Systems' in T. H. Rigby and Ferenc Feher (eds), *Political Legitimation in Communist States* (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 40, Table 2.1.
46. Biographical information on Medvedev is available in 'Sostav Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuz, izbrannogo XXVIII s"ezdom KPSS', *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 11; Vladimir Pribylovskii, *Sto politikov Rossii: kratkii biograficheskii slovar'* (Moscow: Panorama Group, 1992), p. 22;

N. Poroshina (ed), *Kto yest' kto v Rossii i blizhnem zarubezh'e* (Moscow: Novoe Vremya, 1993), p. 418 and A. S. Barsenkov, V. A. Koretskii and A. I. Ostapenko, *Politicheskaya Rossiya segodnya: ispolnitel'naya vlast', Konstitutsionnyi sud, lidery partii i dvizhenii* (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1993), pp. 310 - 311.

47. Roy A. Medvedev, *How I ran for Election and How I Lost* (Nottingham: Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 1979). This same piece appeared in the American socialist newspaper, *In These Times*, 3 July 1979.

48. See her entry in *Deputy Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: desyatyi sozyv* (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1979), p. 7.

49. Rasina Karklins, op. cit. p. 450.

50. Hill disclosed to the present author that he adopted this term based on the American marketing techniques of 'inertia buying'. Under this system, companies send potential consumers products directly to their homes. When a certain period of time elapses and they do not send the goods back to the company, the consumer, it is understood, wishes to purchase the product and is responsible for paying for whatever has been sent to him or her. This relates to 'inertia voting' because in both instances, neither the consumer nor the Soviet voter performed any type of active choice. Rather, they merely passively approved a choice made by someone else: in the case of the consumer, he or she approves a corporate selection; whereas, Soviet voters passively endorsed decisions and choices made by the CPSU. Hill passed this information to the author in a personal communication in February 1989. Hill also discusses 'inertia voting' in his study, *Soviet Politics, Political Science and Reform* (London: Martin Robertson, 1980) in a chapter focusing on the reform of the electoral system.

51. Ibid.

52. *Izvestiya*, 10 February 1987, p. 2, cited in Stephen White, Graeme Gill and Darrell Slider, *The Politics of Transition: Shaping a Post-Soviet Future* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 22.

53. Stephen White, 'Reforming the Electoral System'.

54. This was conveyed to me by a Soviet scientist who wished to remain <sup>ANONYMOUS</sup> on the eve of the elections of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, 25 March 1989, in Glasgow. <sup>11</sup>

55. G. V. Barabashev, K. F. Sheremet and N. G. Starovoitov, *Sovety narodnykh deputatov na etape sovershenstvovaniya sotsializma* (Moscow: Yuridizdat, 1987), p. 323.

56. Ibid., p. 325.

57. Ibid., p. 323.

58. Thomas F. Remington, 'Patterns of Participation', in White, Gitelman and Pravda op. cit., at p. 157.

59. Ibid.

60. Hahn, *Soviet Grassroots*, p. 184.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid., p. 187, Table 5.4.

63. Ibid., p. 183.

64. Ronald J. Hill, *Soviet Politics, Political Science and Reform*, p. 8.

## **Chapter 2. The 1989 Elections to the USSR**

### **Congress of People's Deputies**

On 26 March 1989, elections were held for the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. For the first time at a national election, in the great majority of cases, Soviet voters had the opportunity to select their deputies from more than one candidate. This chapter chronicles the preparations, campaign and results of those elections. It addresses the following questions: What changes were introduced into the Soviet electoral practices for this election? What did this particular election have in common with previous USSR national or local level elections and what differences were there? What types of deputies were elected? Finally, what were the implications for the political system in general? Throughout the text case evidence from Leningrad is cited. Leningrad was chosen for several key reasons: abundant material on the elections was carried in the local press during the campaign; Leningrad is one of the major cities in the USSR, and its politics were important and representative of large Russian cities; moreover, Leningrad was the site of the heaviest defeats suffered by a local leadership throughout the USSR.

In addition, this chapter outlines the major features of the Soviet electoral system positing that throughout its existence, the USSR—even under the Gorbachev leadership—never held 'free' or 'fair' elections in the conventionally understood sense. Despite increases in opportunities for Soviet voters to select from among more than one candidate, usually with different platforms, the Soviet electoral reform measures implemented under Gorbachev and scrutinised below are considered as examples of *liberalisation*, according to Elemer Hankiss's definition. This process includes 'only half-hearted and incomplete reforms, alternating them with anti-reform measures', owing largely to a 'duality of goals' on the part of the regime. Liberalisation is the 'opposite of democratisation': the latter is the creation of an institutional system based on real power, that guarantees rights stipulated in the constitution

of a community.' Liberalisation, on the other hand, works without rights...[and] make[s] people feel free...without giving them rights. Hankiss argues liberalisation is a form of paternalism. Liberalising rulers are likened to 'enlightened despots': they desire to be loved; however, they do not want the population to become too pushy. Liberalisers strive for their citizens to obey them through love rather than coercion.<sup>1</sup> Under Gorbachev, reform measures opened a wider sphere of participation and new roles for citizens. However, they were intended to be means of strengthening socialist society. The CPSU was to remain the country's leading force. Electoral changes were implemented largely to disentrrench opponents of reform measures, while retaining a CPSU monopoly in the political sphere.<sup>2</sup> Rights that were implemented under the changes were not new; rather they were re-interpreted or, more precisely, finally allowed to be fulfilled.

The evidence presented in this chapter will show that there were elements of continuity, contradiction and departure from the Soviet Union's previous electoral practices. The former is supported by the fact that the CPSU held a dominant position throughout the campaign. No other *official* or informal political organisation could openly compete for seats in the Congress. Other means in which the Party attempted to limit the scope of competition included the manner in which the aspirants in districts had to be approved at mass nomination meetings in order for them make it onto the ballot paper. As it will be discussed in later chapters, the Party was able to pack the meetings with <sup>its</sup> supporters. In addition, aspects of the Constitutional amendments and electoral reform such as the introduction of (largely) <sup>on</sup> uncontested social (or public) organisation seats and a lack of uniform competition in the districts further reinforced aspects of liberalisation rather than democratisation. Therefore, these factors are reminiscent of earlier electoral practices. Criticisms of the 1989 elections

are analysed in greater depth in Chapter 5.

These policies, therefore, equated to a form of contradiction between the democratising rhetoric of the regime and actual practice. Such slogans as 'making the worker the master of his/her own destiny' and 'all power to the soviets' did not necessarily come to fruition as a result of the electoral reform measures. It needs to be underlined that the Party never intended to lose its leading position.

Despite these numerous shortcomings, the 1989 elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies constituted a significant departure from earlier Soviet electoral norms. Therefore, the election, to a large degree, served as an impetus towards a more open society more generally and a streamlined political<sup>system</sup> and parliament in particular. These elections, as it will be argued in the present and subsequent chapters, produced a new parliament which helped generate significant political changes throughout the USSR. The Congress and Supreme Soviet, although dominated by conservative deputies<sup>3</sup> produced several significant legislative acts, including the monumental adoption of the amendment to Article 6 of the USSR Constitution which granted the CPSU a *de facto* political monopoly. Moreover, the elections to the Congress produced Soviet history's first opposition: the Interregional Deputies' Group which included Boris Yeltsin, future St Petersburg Mayor Anatolii Sobchak and (until his death in December 1989) Academician Andrei Sakharov. Nevertheless, its ranks were small and shrank considerably from, for instance, 273 deputies (if its supporters were included the figure was about 450), the First Congress in May-June 1989 to about 159 by the Second in December 1989.<sup>4</sup> Soviet voters also got their 'deputies who were capable of running the country during *perestroika*': parliamentarians were more

likely than before to be from the professions. However, it should not come as a surprise that the majority of deputies elected were CPSU members<sup>3</sup> in fact their share increased when compared to the last USSR Supreme Soviet election in 1984. The composition of the USSR Congress of People's deputies is discussed in much greater detail in Chapters 3 and 4. It should also be noted that these elections constituted a turning point in Soviet politics, serving as a stimulus for greater political participation in union republic elections held in 1990, increased political participation, including grass-roots involvement, and the development of significant distinctions between All-Union and republican legislation. In addition, the 1989 elections—despite <sup>their</sup> numerous shortcomings—made competitive elections key features of late-Soviet and early post-Soviet political practices. Therefore, these principles started to become embedded in the collective political psyche of the Soviet people. Thus, the elections helped to contribute new components to the political culture that had been evolving during the post-Stalin years.

### **Electoral Reform Under Gorbachev**

Several factors prompted Gorbachev to initiate electoral reform measures to change the Soviet electoral from an 'acclamatory' system to a 'limited-choice' variant like those that existed in Eastern Europe<sup>5</sup>; none, however, were intended to weaken the party's control over society or reduce its hegemony in the political system. First, Gorbachev's reform programme was centred initially around economic reform. Political reforms followed as mechanisms to achieve the former. The electoral changes could be interpreted as measures to remove conservative members of the bureaucracy from positions of power. This, in turn would open space for (theoretically) reformist politicians to implement further changes and

assist in achieving the General Secretary's goals. Indeed, there was very high rate of personnel and elite turnover after Gorbachev attained the General Secretaryship.<sup>6</sup> Second, and closely related to the first, Gorbachev sought to bring forth a new corps of deputies who possessed the technical competence to serve as effective legislators. Consequently, they would participate actively in sessions of the soviets and initiate measures necessary for societal reconstruction. Third, Gorbachev sought to renew the Party's relations with society. The CPSU, he claimed, had to prove that it was worthy to lead society. Therefore, Party secretaries would no longer be guaranteed seats in corresponding level soviets. They would have to compete against other candidates and prove their mettle. Should the official fail to win a seat in the legislature his or her position within the CPSU would then come into question. In this sense, it is evident that Gorbachev sought to introduce some forms of popular checks over the Party. Nevertheless, it is indeed plausible that Gorbachev intended to mobilise the 'human factor' against his potential opponents in this manner.

Indeed electability was an important component of Gorbachev's overall reform programme. From 1987, competitive elections were to be conducted for positions within trade union and *Komsomol* organisations.<sup>7</sup> More significantly, places within the CPSU were to be determined by competitive, direct, secret voting. The centrepiece of the economic reform programme, the 1987 Law on State Enterprise, included provisions for workers to elect their managers. Gorbachev himself noted that '...a work collective must have the right to elect its own managers....Elections of economic managers are direct democracy in action.'<sup>8</sup> It was hoped that this mechanism would give workers more of a say in their own affairs and make them feel more like the 'masters of their own destiny'. Despite the potentially good intentions behind attempts to introduce competitive elections for these



Either

positions, the reforms ultimately failed. <sup>^</sup> ~~From~~ *nomenklatura* officials interfered in the electoral proceedings of these organisations or elections were not conducted at all. Stephen White notes that elections in the Party did not come to full fruition because of a lack of implementation at higher levels.

Over 1,000 local party secretaries had been chosen on a competitive basis...[by 1989]. This, however, was only 8.6% of the total, at higher levels the proportions were even less impressive—<sup>^</sup> only seven provincial secretaries, for example, had been elected on a competitive basis, which [was] just 1% of the total.<sup>9</sup>

In addition, it was the intention that delegates to the XIX All-Union Party Conference be universally elected by secret ballot. Nevertheless, local interference thwarted these innovations from being realised to their full potential.<sup>10</sup>

More significantly, however, the Party's leading organs and key officials were elected in a competitive format at the XXVIII Congress in 1990. For instance it has been noted that party organisations discussed the candidacies of nearly 80,000 aspirants, but elected only 4,683 delegates to the Congress.<sup>11</sup> Although Mikhail Gorbachev was re-elected as Party General Secretary at the Congress, his bid did not go unopposed.

Six candidates were proposed during the session, but finally only Teimuraz Aveliani, a district party functionary from the city of Kiselevsk (Kemerevo *oblast'* [sic]) remained. He had no chance, of course, to beat

Gorbachev, who received 3,411 votes of the 4,257 votes cast: Avelyan's share was only 501 votes. The result means, however, that about one quarter of the delegates did not vote for Gorbachev, a surprisingly high figure.<sup>12</sup>

Local officials influenced the proceedings of management elections and workers often voted for candidates who were 'easy going' and proposed lower production targets and higher prices for their goods.<sup>13</sup> Former Politburo member Yegor Ligachev noted other drawbacks from management elections.

How much damage was caused by the pseudo-democratic principle of electing economic leaders? Not a single country in the world elects managers; they are appointed. But here too, we found ourselves ahead of the whole planet, demonstrating the immaturity of our democracy. Many excellent managers were removed from their posts.<sup>14</sup>

Because of their ineffectiveness, management elections were withdrawn from a later variant of the Law.<sup>15</sup>

Elections in these organisations and among economic managers reflect this chapter's theme of liberalisation. These examples demonstrate that legislation was produced which contained an extension of rights. However, these rights were not allowed to be implemented in practice. The CPSU, by either interfering in the elections themselves or failing to implement them, obstructed further political changes.

Gorbachev also introduced an 'experimental' election to local councils in June 1987 in which 1 per cent of the USSR's constituencies were condensed to create multi-member districts. Voters could select from among a number of candidates. The one receiving the greatest share of votes exceeding 50 per cent of those cast by the participating electorate was declared the winner. Candidates who received over 50 per cent became reserve deputies who would 'fill in' when the actual deputy was absent from the soviet. Overall only some 5 per cent of deputies were elected in this manner. However, there were some instances in which leading officials either did not obtain the confidence of more than half of the participating electorate or, were reduced to the status of reserve deputies.<sup>16</sup>

In 1988, the USSR Supreme Soviet released for public discussion drafts of constitutional amendments which revamped the state structure<sup>17</sup> and a new electoral law.<sup>18</sup> These documents were adopted at the Twelfth Extraordinary Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in December 1988.<sup>19</sup> The revisions to the state institutions included the creation of a new supreme legislative organ, a USSR Congress of People's Deputies. This comprised 2,250 deputies: 750 deputies elected from 3 electoral divisions. First, 750 deputies would be elected from territorial districts, based notionally on population. Second, 750 deputies would be elected from national-territorial districts<sup>20</sup> established on a set basis according to the type of territorial administrative unit. For instance, there were 32 deputies allocated to each republic, 11 to each autonomous republic, five to each autonomous *oblast'* and one to each autonomous district. The remaining 750 deputies were representatives of all-union social organisations such as the CPSU, trade unions, creative unions and other similar organisations. Seat allocation was determined by the Electoral Law.<sup>20</sup> Table 2.1 contains this information. In the constituencies registered voters elected their deputies directly,

whereas only delegates to the social organisations' all-union gatherings-conferences, congresses and plenums could elect the representatives from that electoral division.

Table 2.1 Social Organisation Seat Allocation in the 1989 Elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies

Social Organisation	Seats	Social Organisation	Seats
CPSU	100	Creative Unions (continued)	
Trade Unions	100	Union of Journalists	10
Women's Organisations	75	Union of Composers	10
Organisations of Veterans of War & Labour	75	Union of Writers	10
Komsomol	75	Union of Theatrical Workers	10
Cooperative Organisations	100	Union of Artists	10
Including:		Union of Designers	5
Kolkhozes and Associations of the Union of Kolkhozes	58	Other Associations	75
Union of Consumers' Societies	40	Including:	
Fishing Kolkhozes	2	DOSAAP	15
Associations of Scientific Workers	75	Red Cross & Red Crescent	10
Including:		Znanie	10
Academy of Sciences + 20 Scientific Societies & 8 Associations	30	Rodina	10
VASKhNIL	10	Soviet Fund Peace + 8 Committees for the Advancement of Peace, Solidarity and International Cooperation	7
Academy of Medical Sciences + 40 Medical Associations	10	Associations for Cooperation of the UN in the USSR	5
Academy of Pedagogical Sciences + Association of Pedagog. Researchers	5	Soviet Fund for Culture	5
USSR Academy of Artists	5	V.I. Lenin Soviet Children's Fund	5
Union of Scientific & Engineering Societies of the USSR	10	Soviet Fund for Charity and Health	5
All-Union Society of Inventors & Rationalisers	5	USSR Social Sporting Associations	3
Creative Unions	75	All-Union Society for the Struggle for Sobriety	1
Including:		All-Union Society of Booklovers	1
Union of Architects	10	All-Union Society of Friends of the Cinema	1
		All-Union Musical Society	1
		All-Union Society of Philatelists	1

Source: Adapted from *Izvestiya*, 28 December 1988, p. 1.

Congress deputies would elect from among their members 542 deputies to serve in the USSR Supreme Soviet which would function as the Soviet Union's permanently functioning legislative organ (deputies were to serve on a rotating basis)-a change which in effect marginalised the electorate. With deputies electing the permanently functioning legislative body, it can be argued that Soviet voters, in reality, only chose an electoral

college. Moreover, because it was assumed that deputies would be predominantly CPSU members, electing the Supreme Soviet would be yet another means by which the Party could implement a liberalising tactic of increasing electoral choice, but reducing its significance.

The social organisation's provision, which is criticised in greater detail in Chapter 5, can certainly be considered an example of liberalisation. The addition of the social organisation seats was another potential control mechanism that party officials used to maintain dominance in the legislature. First, it was thought that the overwhelming majority of social organisation deputies would be CPSU members. By dint of adherence to principles of democratic centralism, they would be forced to promote the Party line in any vote. Second, not all Soviet citizens had the opportunity to stand for these seats-only members of those organisations could put forth candidacies. Third, not every elector could cast a ballot for these deputies, only the delegates to the all-union gatherings. Hence, these seats and the procedures for their election violated of the principle of one-person-one-vote.

The draft Electoral Law suggested that 'as a rule' there were to be more candidates than seats (Article 9). This however, did not make it into the final version, which mandated that there may be 'any number of candidates'. While the overwhelming majority of seats were contested, it is apparent that competition was not universal. For instance, during the first round of elections (11 March-26 March 1989), there were 2,895 candidates registered in the 1,500 constituencies, which included 1,449 in territorial districts and 1,446 in national-territorial districts. However, this included 384 districts in which a single candidate stood.<sup>21</sup> Following the series of run-off and repeat elections held in April-May the

aggregate number of candidates who made it to the final ballot paper was elevated to 5,074.<sup>22</sup> Nevertheless, 399 deputies were selected in the old manner of one candidate per seat.<sup>23</sup> Within the social organisations there were initially 880 candidates who contested for seats<sup>24</sup> and after repeat and run-off elections there were 912 who participated in the campaign.<sup>25</sup> There <sup>were</sup> however, significant variations in the levels of competitiveness within the social organisations. For instance, there were 100 candidates for the 100 seats the CPSU <sup>was</sup> allocated; but not all of them, including Gorbachev (12 votes against) received unanimous approval.<sup>26</sup> The Council of Collective Farms approved 58 candidates for its 58 seats in an open vote in a half hour;<sup>27</sup> whereas the Writers Union had to whittle down its final list of 12 candidates from a field of 92 contestants.<sup>28</sup>

### **The Elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies**

The constitutional amendments and new electoral law focused on changes in the USSR's state structure and the means of electing these bodies. The first major constitutional change affected the highest organs of state power. According to Article 108 of the constitutional amendments, the highest organ of power in the USSR became the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, superseding the USSR Supreme Soviet. Under the new legislation, the Congress of People's Deputies was allocated powers previously held by the USSR Supreme Soviet. The Congress had the authority to adopt the USSR Constitution and introduce amendments to it, determine state boundaries, and define the domestic and foreign policies of the USSR. It was also assigned new powers. The Congress was empow<sup>er</sup>ed to elect the Committee for Constitutional Review, a body intended to function similarly to a judicial body

by reviewing the constitutionality of legislation, and so forth. As already noted the Congress also elected the USSR Supreme Soviet, which was intended to be formed on the basis of rotating membership.

There were, in fact, significant differences between the Congress of People's Deputies and the pre-reform and reformed USSR Supreme Soviet. The Congress of People's Deputies was one-third larger than the 'old style' Supreme Soviet. The last convocation of the Supreme Soviet, elected in 1984, comprised 1,500 deputies. The Congress also elected the USSR Supreme Soviet's principal officers by means of secret ballot. According to Article 111 of the Constitution, the USSR Supreme Soviet was the 'permanent, active, legislative, regulatory and control organ of state power in the USSR'. The main difference between the 'old' and 'new' Supreme Soviets was their respective times in session. Previously, the Supreme Soviet met infrequently; under the 1988 legislation the USSR Supreme Soviet had to <sup>meet</sup> 'as a rule' from six to eight months a year.

The new electoral law introduced elements of voter choice for deputies, extended participation on both quantitative and qualitative levels and provided for a greater flow of information between the governors and the governed. As stated earlier, pre-reform Soviet elections did not present voters with a choice of candidate for their representatives, although it was possible in theory. One candidate stood for each available seat. In fact, there was not even this degree of choice at the previous national elections in 1984. <sup>It will be recalled that</sup> following the death <sup>of</sup> of one of the candidates shortly before the poll, 1,499 candidates competed for 1,500 deputy positions.<sup>29</sup> However, as it will be recalled, candidate choice was more the norm than the exception in these elections. In this respect, the reform stood as a liberalisation. For the

first time Soviet citizens were (in most instances) finally allowed to vote for a plurality of candidates. This was despite the fact that no previously existing law had expressly stated that only a single candidate could stand per seat.

Article 9 of the 1988 electoral law determined the rights of candidate nomination, whereby individuals who received the votes of more than a half of the assemblies of meetings with 500 or more voters were registered as candidates for people's deputies. Under the new law, the CPSU, the Komsomol, etc. retained their traditional rights of nomination. However, Article 9 extended the right to nominate candidates to meetings of local inhabitants in their places of residence. Moreover, nominations were allowed to come from the floor at the electoral meetings. In early January, for example, a nomination meeting was held at the Ruch'i *sovkhos* (state farm) in Leningrad province. The majority of the meeting's participants voted to put forward Ol'ga Ivanova Chedleeva, a *sovkhos* brigadier, member of the Vsevolzhinskii *gorkom* (city party committee) and Leningrad *obkom* (provincial party committee). Members of the collective made respectful and complimentary remarks about her. Thus, an electric welder, B. Pavlova, said: 'I know Chedleeva from her social activities. She is a good organizer.' A cattle farmer, D. Andronov, asserted 'Chedleeva is an efficient, principled, just brigadier. She is a fair person.' However, from the seats, mechanic Andrei Grachev queried why another candidate had not been proposed. He favoured an aspirant who did not belong to the party or trade union committees. In addition to Chedleeva, Grachev nominated vegetable-growing brigadier Marina Vladimirovna Izmerova. The collective accepted her candidacy. The participants voted on the two candidates and Chedleeva won the nomination to proceed to the next round of elections.<sup>30</sup>

Although the independently nominated contestant did not receive the meeting's endorsement,



the nomination from the floor is still significant because it indicated that Soviet voters could at least propose candidates of their own choosing in addition to those selected by the trade union, party or Komsomol organs and mass meetings. However, relatively few of those nominated in this way reached ballot paper.

Under the new law, the election campaign was extended from two months to four months in order to maximize voter turnout and increase voter awareness of issues and candidates. Soviet elections took place in several stages, the first of which is the announcement of the elections. During the first period, the organisational preparations for the elections occurred. The elections were set for Sunday, 26 March 1989,<sup>31</sup> and in accordance with the new electoral law, a Central Electoral Commission (*Tsentrizbirkom*) was formed to oversee the proceedings of the elections on 1 December 1988. The commission was elected for a five-year term, and its main tasks include approving electoral commissions (*izbirkomy*) at lower levels, registering candidates, distributing state funds for conducting the elections, producing and designing the ballot papers and other relevant documents in the appropriate languages and ensuring that elections were held under the guidelines established by the electoral law. Under the new electoral law the commissions' composition was increased from 29 members (which included a chairperson and a deputy, a secretary and 26 commission members) to 35 individuals. The new guidelines designated a chairperson and two deputies, a secretary and 31 commission members. The social, personal and occupational backgrounds of its members supposedly reflect the diversity of the Soviet Union and it included full-time CPSU Central Committee functionaries, manual labourers, a cosmonaut, workers in health and education, military officials, members of the creative intelligentsia and artists; one notable commission member was a leading advocate of electoral reform in the USSR, Professor Georgii

Barabashev.<sup>32</sup>

Electoral commissions guided the elections at all levels. For the Congress of People's Deputies, electoral commissions were formed in early December for the territorial, national-territorial<sup>33</sup> and social organisations. These bodies were responsible for registering candidates and setting up nomination meetings for work collectives, places of residence and military units and within the specific social and public organizations, and their activities were reported quite frequently in local and central newspapers. Electoral commissions informed the electorate of how the elections were proceeding and announced that they were available to electors, candidates, and campaign staffs for inquiries. For example, Leningrad voters frequently saw notices in their local newspapers on the work of their electoral commissions. Reports from the Leningrad city electoral commissions informed the public of the commissions' addresses, telephone numbers and hours of work: they functioned daily from 7 pm to 10pm except Saturdays and Sundays.<sup>34</sup> In this first phase of the electoral campaign, the electoral commissions were concerned with procedural tasks: the elections of their internal staffs, setting up district and precinct meetings and preparing for the coming electoral campaign.

The second stage of the elections began on 26 December 1989, when the nomination of candidates started. As in the past, candidates had to be nominated by mass meetings of work collectives, and the social organizations. Participants at these meetings discussed the qualities of the candidates, with particular attention focusing on the candidates' work records, involvement in social activities and their relationships to the party. From late December to late January lists of nominated candidates and the collectives that nominated them appeared

in the press.

It has been suggested that the distribution of power at the top of the Soviet political system could be identified through the nomination process:<sup>35</sup> the more nominations a member or candidate member of the Politburo received, the more apparent his or her power position. Certainly, press reports of nominations frequently noted that the workshops of a particular factory proposed General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Chairman of Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, as candidate for People's Deputy. His nominations were often followed by the nominations of Politburo member and Chairman of the USSR Council of Minister, Nikolai Ryzhkov, and Politburo member Vadim Medvedev. The nominations of Gorbachev, the most prominent Politburo leaders, and the first secretaries of the republican communist parties were followed by nominations of manual labourers.

Candidates were approved by mass meetings. In order for a candidate to be nominated, he or she was required to receive the approval of at least half of the participants at quorate meetings. This requirement, in fact, was not always met. At a nomination meeting in the Krasnosel'skii district of Leningrad neither of the two candidates nominated (hospital chief doctor, V.A. Morozov, or department chief I.N. Men'shugin) polled the number of votes necessary to win the nomination.<sup>36</sup>

Criticism of the mass meetings is discussed in Chapter 5.

In addition to more input at the nomination stage and the chance to elect deputies from

more than one candidate, other steps were taken to make the electoral system more responsive to electors' needs and help the citizens 'learn democracy'. For instance, in Leningrad, special consultative groups were established which assisted individuals concerned with the elections and the Leningrad Party Higher School set up meetings for candidates for people's deputies, their campaign staffs, agitators and members of electoral commissions. The primary focus of these meetings was on organising the preparations for the elections and ensuring adherence to the laws on elections. Individuals involved with the elections were able to consult legal specialists, psychologists, economists and social science teachers in order to prepare themselves better for the approaching elections. Sessions began on 5 January, and discussions were held twice weekly: on Thursday evenings from 6 pm to 8 pm and on Saturdays, from 10am to 1 pm. Professor V.D. Sorokin, who chaired the advisory group, stated that in its first two days of operation, 20 people sought advice. The advisers coached the electoral campaigners on what to include in their programmes, which bodies should organise local nomination meetings, the legality of donations from enterprises to their favourite candidates and the rights of the media at nomination meetings. Sorokin stated that raising these questions showed that there was a lack of familiarity with the electoral law, and the professor placed part of the blame for the electorate's poor knowledge of the law on the mass media. For example, initially, television was deficient in its presentation of nomination meetings, and segments of nomination meetings were often televised without informative commentaries on the proceedings.<sup>37</sup>

The third stage of the elections began on 25 January. At this stage, candidates from work collectives and mass meetings met with their potential constituents to decide who would compete on 26 March for election as a People's Deputy. Winners in this round of the

meetings were registered by the electoral commissions, and following their registration, the candidates' names appeared on the final ballot paper. These meetings took place for the territorial and national-territorial districts and for the positions in the social organisations. During this stage of the campaign, grass-roots involvement began to develop. Voters in Zhitomir district of the Ukraine, for instance, mobilised in support of their preferred candidate, journalist Alla Yaroshinskaya. Although nominated by seven collectives, she was not officially recognised until action was taken on her behalf by the electorate. There was a widespread belief that her articles, critical of the local party apparatus, were obstacles that blocked her nomination. On several occasions the local party officials tried to tamper with the memberships at the meetings: eventually, though, Yaroshinskaya did get on the ballot paper and she won in her district.<sup>38</sup>

Citizen participation greatly increased during the 1989 election campaign. According to the Election Law (Article 46) candidates were allowed to have up to 10 *doverennye litsa*-campaign staff or advisers who were able to coordinate activities on their behalf. These activists were empowered to write pieces for them in the press,<sup>39</sup> speak in their absence at meetings with voters and perform organisational activities. This was another movement away from the Soviet electoral practices in which all the candidates-previously approved by the CPSU-were supported by Party and Komsomol activists who conducted the pre-election agitation. However, this does not mean that the CPSU failed to provide support for its own candidates. Indeed, examples of candidates' pre-election platforms indicate that certain people linked with the CPSU had access to computers and laser printers and the result was that their handouts and flyers were much more professional in appearance than the same <sup>own-</sup> affiliated citizens were able to produce. In addition, the *doverennye litsa* of candidates to the

Congress gained essential campaign and political experience and established contacts which certainly has not impeded their own political careers. For instance, Lev Ponomarev, a future RSFSR People's Deputy, activist in the 'Democratic Russia' Movement and candidate to the Russian State Duma from Moscow, was involved in the 1989 election campaign as a *doverennoe litso* supporting Andreii Sakharov.<sup>40</sup>

Electors' clubs in support of candidates (and in some cases against candidates) were other organisations that emerged during the campaign. In Leningrad, for instance, during the elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, voters banded together to oppose the candidacies of the CPSU local hierarchy forming the electors' club *Vybory-89* (Elections '89), largely coordinated by the initiative group 'For a Popular Front'. The group itself leafleted the city's residents, promoting 'democratic' candidates and urging electors to vote against candidates running for the Congress such as Candidate Member to the Politburo and First Secretary of the Leningrad *obkom* Yurii Solov'ev, and first deputy chairman of the *ispolkom* of the Leningrad city soviet and the Chairman of the City Planning Commission, Aleksei Bol'shakov, both of whom ran unopposed. In fact, *Vybory-89*'s slogan was 'One candidate-strike him out!'.<sup>41</sup> *Vybory-89* disseminated on a document which attacked Bol'shakov personally, claiming he was unfit to be a people's deputy. If he was simultaneously a people's deputy and retained his office in the city soviet there would be too much potential for conflicts of interest.<sup>42</sup> By contrast, this voters' group successfully supported the candidacy of young maritime engineer, Yurii Boldyrev, against Gerasimov. Moreover, the club successfully persuaded Leningrad voters to reject both Solov'ev and Bol'shakov as a People's Deputies.<sup>43</sup> *Vybory-89* and 'For a Popular Front' coordinated the Founding Congress of the Leningrad Popular Front in June 1989. The latter organisation

went on to help initiate Democratic-Elections 90 which successfully endorsed 25 democratic-minded candidates out of the city's 33 (75.8 per cent) deputies to the Russian Congress of People's Deputies and 240 of the 380 representatives in the Leningrad city Soviet (63.1 per cent).<sup>44</sup>

In addition, it should be noted that the campaign presented the possibility for a number of the informal groups and National Fronts that emerged during the late 1980s<sup>45</sup> to participate in the election campaign. Nevertheless, it must be reiterated that these organisations were not able to field their own candidates in districts, nor were they allocated any seats among the social organisations. This is further evidence that suggests that the electoral reform measures were examples of liberalisation rather than democratisation. Despite the limitations that these groups faced, the Estonian National Front, Latvian National Front and Sajudis and the other political organisations were able to support candidates who shared their positions and help them win positions in the new Soviet parliament<sup>46</sup> and gain essential experience which helped them in the subsequent elections to local soviets and the republican supreme soviets held in late 1989 and 1990.

A. Luk'yanchikov who headed the Department of Work of the Soviets for the Moscow City soviet's executive committee noted that in Moscow during the elections

nearly 100 different independent formations participated. Frequently, their members were associated by an interest towards national, political, social and ecological problems. Gradually, the Moscow Popular Front, the Ecological Association 'Bitsa', the Memorial Society and the 'Brateevo' Committee of

Social Self-Government became the most influential.<sup>47</sup>

However, it should be noted that Lu'yanchikov was very critical of the activities of these informals during the campaign. He alleged that

[v]arious representatives of the informals exploited the difficulties in the capital, shielding themselves with the slogans of democratisation, broadly using the atmosphere of openness to oppose the work of electoral commissions, the executive and management organs.<sup>48</sup>

The 1989 campaign brought the election to the voters' living-rooms via television. Citizens' electoral awareness and participation in activities concerned the leadership, and attendance at local pre-election meetings tended to decline. In anticipation of this, and in order to keep the voters aware of the contest and candidates, the electoral law contained provisions to allow the mass media free access to any election-oriented event, ranging from election meetings to the counting of votes.

Election-related topics appeared on the nightly national news programme, *Vremya*, and regularly scheduled shows, such as the Friday evening news and current events digest, *Vzglyad* (View), throughout the entire campaign. In addition, special programmes were presented that focused exclusively on elections. Central Television broadcast *Navstrechu vyboram* (Towards the Elections) on Monday and Wednesday evenings, a series of ten-minute programmes that focused on the problems and special occurrences of the electoral campaign. On 10 March, for example, one of the programmes looked at the Ivanovskii territorial district



in the RSFSR and discussed the low levels of interest in the current campaign. The presenter interviewed one of the members of the district electoral commission who indicated that even at such a late stage in the electoral struggle, only two people had visited the pre-election information centre. Constituents were questioned regarding whom they would select as their deputy. The overwhelming reply was that the voters did not know. One respondent replied that she did not know any of the candidates' names. Interviews with the residents either confirmed the voters' low level of interest, or indicated their wish to protect their right to select their deputies secretly.

Programmes focusing on individual candidates were also broadcast. On Tuesday and Thursday afternoons and early evenings Central Television ran a series entitled *Vlast' Sovetam* (Power to the Soviets). These 30-minute broadcasts, which centred on candidates from the social organisations, presented voters with information on the registered candidates, such as their occupations, their platforms and certain aspects of their personal lives. Thus, on Tuesday, 14 February, at 7 pm (Moscow time), Central Television focused on a candidate from the Komsomol, Aleksandra Zemskova, a senior investigator of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the executive committee of the Moscow district soviet in Kaluga. The broadcast began with a fellow officer speaking of the qualities that personify a competent deputy: efficiency, professionalism and a dedication to work. After ten minutes, the candidate appeared and was shown making an arrest, counseling a youth, and meeting with veterans of the Afghan war (the broadcast coincided with the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan): she was also shown with her husband. The broadcast resembled Western election programmes in the sense that it revealed the 'human' face of the candidate, not just her political attributes. It also appeared to present qualities the party and state found

desirable in a deputy: an interest in law and order, concern for Soviet youth, respect for Soviet heroes and the family.<sup>49</sup>

Television proved to be a strong communications medium during the election campaign. The Centre for Political Research of the USSR Academy's Centre for the Study of Public Opinion of the Institute of Sociology conducted a pre-election poll of citizens' attitudes towards the forthcoming exercise of the franchise during the nomination stages of the election campaign. The section of the survey that dealt with the electorate's informational sources found that 70.1 per cent of the voters received information on the elections from television, 54.3 per cent from local press reports and 53.4 from the central press.<sup>50</sup> A poll of 320 Muscovites conducted by *Gosteleradio* (the State Committee for Television and Radio) at the end of April 1989 revealed that 70 per cent of the respondents received information on the elections from the local television broadcast, *Dobryi vecher, Moskva* (Good Evening, Moscow), 55 per cent from central television broadcasts, 40 per cent from central radio and press reports, and 37 per cent from Moscow newspapers.<sup>51</sup> In addition, the results of this poll indicated that the regime's concern for low attendance at pre-election meetings was justified. The survey revealed that in comparison to the public's wide-spread consumption of election-related information from the mass media, only 22 per cent of the electorate received information on the electoral campaign through pre-election meetings, and through friends and acquaintances.<sup>52</sup> This information suggests that television was the primary medium of information for the Soviet voters during the election campaign. However, the same *Gosteleradio* poll reported that although television was frequently watched during the campaign, only 17 per cent of the respondents were completely satisfied with the level of openness that had been shown in coverage of the subject; 62 per cent felt, however, that it

was at least partially fulfilled.<sup>53</sup>

Probably the most significant innovation in the 1989 election campaign was the requirement that candidates present to the electorate programmes of their intended activities. The addition of such programmes allowed voters to select their deputies (theoretically) on the basis of concrete issues rather than their social characteristics or work achievements. Therefore, deputies were required to respond to matters of local and national concern and defend them in the Congress. Programmes were publicised on television, in the press and on leaflets. Voters in Leningrad's Vasileostrovskii Territorial District No.47, for instance, found the following stances of candidate Vladimir Gennad'evich Rachin from a pre-election leaflet:

- the transfer of all power to the soviets;
- the stabilisation of state retail prices for the next five years;
- khozraschet* and lease-holding, the development of the co-operative movement and the construction of joint stock-holding societies;
- the transfer of ownership of the means of production to work collectives;
- a new form of socialism, with the person as the focal point;
- the revival of Leningrad as a prominent scientific, historical and cultural centre;
- full (unreserved) implementation of the programme 'Leningrad. Housing--2000';
- a healthy improvement to the ecological situation and the organisation of research on the whole ecosystem: Ladoga, Neva, the Gulf of Finland and the surrounding areas;
- clean air and the development of an active ecological programme;
- the revision of a technical project on the protective constructions defending Leningrad from flooding, the acceleration and cleaning of buildings, the purification of drainage and the utilisation of waste products;
- the holding of a referendum for Leningraders on the construction of a tourist, cultural, entertainment and fitness centre;
- the guarantee that the elderly get what they deserve in their old age;
- the guarantee of social security for various categories of servicemen;
- an annual adjustment of pensions and stipends in accordance with price changes;
- the expansion of maternity privileges and the education of children up to

three years of age;  
--a better future for each Soviet person.<sup>54</sup>

A special edition of *Leningradskii Metrostroitel'* contained the programmes of the three aspirants for election in Leningrad's Smol'nii territorial electoral district No. 58: the mathematician Ludvig Dmitrievich Fadeev; a doctor of philosophical sciences Nikolai Nikolaevich Skatov; and the writer and chief editor of the journal *Neva*, CPSU member Boris Nikolaevich Nikol'skii, who had served as a deputy in the Leningrad city soviet for three terms. Fadeev proposed ten major areas of concern which included the organisation of science and the utilisation of its achievements; the continuation of educational reform; economic conditions such as the redistribution of the state budget and the curtailment of the deficit; ecological matters; problems of youth education; the democratisation of government; the construction of a rule of law state; social equality; foreign affairs such as improved relations with the USA and Western Europe and a concentration on the conditions of developing states in decisions <sup>concerning</sup> global ecological, health and cultural conditions; the <sup>^</sup> furthering of international contacts; and the problems of Leningrad--the conservation of historical areas, control of air and water quality, and the making of Leningrad into a cultural and spiritual centre of the country.<sup>55</sup> Candidate Skatov's programme was concerned with ecological, economic, social and moral issues.<sup>56</sup> Nikol'skii supported the ideas of *perestroika* and the proclamations of the party, the deepening and developing of the process of democratisation and *glasnost'* on the basis of a legal state, radical economic reform, opposition to an all-powerful bureaucracy, the revival of Leningrad and the defence of the principles of internationalism.<sup>57</sup>

The daily newspaper, *Leningradskaya pravda*, in a regular column, *Anketa kandidata* (Candidate's Questionnaire), published a series of informative bulletins on the candidates, their platforms and what they intended to do if they were elected. The candidates responded to three questions: Why did you decide to become a candidate for people's deputy? What are the main provisions of your programme and have you made any changes to them during the course of the campaign? And what will you discuss at the Congress of People's Deputies?<sup>58</sup> Candidates tended to have a broad range of reasons for standing. For instance, the first deputy chairman of the Leningrad city soviet executive committee, Aleskei Bol'shakov, declared that he intended to stand 'to move *perestroika* forward', to make use of his work experience from the executive committee and to make the soviets the real system of government, rather than the ministries.<sup>59</sup> Steelworker Sergei Ivanov stated that he had worked for years with the people from the collective that nominated him and that he had earned his colleagues' trust.<sup>60</sup> Most candidates included in these surveys mentioned the trust their fellow workers, and their abilities to apply the experience they gained working in the soviets and at high levels of political office as their reasons for standing. However, the first secretary of the Leningrad city party committee, Anatolii Gerasimov, noted as one of his reasons the fact that his election to the Congress of People's Deputies would be his first time as a deputy in the highest organ of state power.<sup>61</sup>

As regards the contents of their election platforms, most of the Leningrad candidates included commitments that related to the work situation (increasing wages and vacation periods), social conditions (education, housing, rights of pensioners, young people and working women), anti-inflation measures, the development of the legal state, cultural policies and individual rights. Several candidates surveyed indicated that they had made changes to

their programmes following on the electorate's suggestions. For instance, future St Petersburg Mayor Anatolii Sobchak, then employed as a professor of Law, pointed out that voters suggested he make changes in 'important social and regional questions', such as housing. He introduced into his platform such additions as the construction of new housing units, the development of a housing fund, more developments for young people and the creation of renter co-operatives.<sup>62</sup> Similarly, candidate Vladimir Rachin, mentioned above, stated that his concerns for the status of servicemen were the result of his dealings with the electorate.<sup>63</sup> The items that most concerned voters in Leningrad found similar attention in Moscow. A survey of 2,879 Muscovites indicated that 40.8 per cent of the respondents considered that solving the housing question was the most important issue their future deputies needed to resolve; 38.7 per cent said environmental protection, and 27.9 per cent the establishment of the legal state.<sup>64</sup>

Finally, candidates were asked to present information on the topics they would discuss at the Congress of People's Deputies if they were elected. Milling machine operator Valentin Kashin intended to discuss the adoption of a law on laws, the transfer of all power to the soviets, a referendum on important state problems, methods of combating the deficit, and the status of deputies.<sup>65</sup> Candidates were primarily concerned with the adoption of new legislation on the press, a new criminal code, and laws on powers of local government and referendums on youth. Other topics included the manner of electing the Supreme Soviet and its chief officers. Seven candidates intended to discuss legislative reforms, five the electoral process, five the devolution of local power, three the effectiveness of the Supreme Soviet, two increased freedom of access to information, two the Law on State Enterprise, two the transfer of power to the soviets at all levels, two curbing the deficit, two improving the

economy and two the relationship between the deputies and their electors.

Despite the fact that candidates were obliged to present election platforms, they could not guarantee their implementation. In addition, there were instances in which candidates proposed platforms with virtually unattainable promises. For example, one contender promised to secure a completely clean environment at enterprises in the constituency within three years, while another undertook to increase procurements of imported goods pending the appearance of Soviet goods of the same quality.<sup>66</sup> In addition, serviceman T.T. Vatanskii, nominated in Akhtubinskii territorial district No. 124, based his programme on the immediate reduction of the size of the armed forces, a large increase in collective farmers' pensions and the closure of all enterprises in Astrkhan *oblast'* that produced a detrimental effect on the environment.<sup>67</sup> Electors, on the whole, viewed these platforms with scepticism, despite the appealing proposals the programmes contained. Among 4,000 voters surveyed in mid-April 1989, 60 per cent felt that candidates' election platforms contained demagogic statements and unattainable promises.<sup>68</sup>

In addition to voters selecting deputies on the basis of their platforms, they also chose their representative for certain personal qualities. The Institute of State and Law and the Institute of Sociology poll asked voters their preferences in respect of candidates' qualities (N=2,800). Respondents listed qualities that fell into five categories: quality and character of knowledge; moral and ethical qualities; qualities necessary for the adoption and realisation of decisions; properties necessary for a leader and informal qualities.

For the first, voters thought most important a knowledge of the electorate's needs (67.8

per cent), broad education (40.9 per cent), a knowledge of the law (32.6 per cent), a knowledge of the workings of state organs (16.7 per cent). In terms of moral and ethical qualities, voters looked for integrity and incorruptibility (56.4 per cent), fairness (46.7 per cent), sensitivity and responsiveness (36 per cent), and honesty (30.7 per cent).

Voters rated their preferences in the following order of the qualities they deemed most necessary for the adoption and realisation of decisions: principles (45 per cent), firmness of purpose and persistence (44.6 per cent), boldness and decisiveness (39.8 per cent) and flexibility and diplomacy (16.8 per cent). Respondents viewed accountability (45.7 per cent), the ability to join and lead the people (43 per cent), devotion to *perestroika* (32.3 per cent) and civic activity (22.3 per cent) as qualities necessary for a leader. Finally, for informal qualities the ability to speak in front of people (48.4 per cent) the capacity to establish personal relations for the fulfilment of duties (42.2 per cent), personal charm and attractiveness (18.1 per cent) and reliability and presence (8 per cent) were the preferences of those questioned. Voters ranked moral and ethical qualities (43 per cent), necessary capacities and character of knowledge (40 per cent), qualities necessary for the adoption and realisation of decisions (37 per cent), leadership qualities (36 per cent) and informal qualities (29 per cent) as the traits that were most important for a deputy to possess.<sup>69</sup>

Poll participants were also asked which types of people they most preferred to be people's deputies. Respondents listed men (40.6 per cent), people elected for the first time (37.2 per cent), middle-aged people (37.1 per cent), workers (35.9 per cent), teachers, doctors, engineers and other representatives of the intelligentsia (34.8 per cent), ordinary workers (34 per cent), people in the same occupation as the respondent (33.2 per cent), and



CPSU members (32.3 per cent) as the types of candidates they preferred most of all. Included in the category of the candidates who were 'those preferred' by the voters were collective farmers (32 per cent), young people (31.8 per cent), figures from science and culture (30.5 per cent), people with low incomes (29.7 per cent), people with middle-level incomes (29 per cent), Komsomol members (27 per cent), people who do not belong to the party (25.8 per cent), servicemen (23.9 per cent), and popular front representatives (23.4 per cent). Those questioned stated that candidates whom they 'least desired' were leading workers (22.3 per cent), workers in communication (20.4 per cent), representatives of grass-roots movements and organisations (19.2 per cent), people who were elected deputies before (18.9 per cent), women (18.6 per cent), workers in the administrative apparatus (16.7 per cent), co-operative workers (13.2 per cent), the elderly (12.2 per cent), and people with high incomes (11.2 per cent).<sup>70</sup>

Campaign techniques also changed from previous elections. Prior to the 26 March election a corps of agitators literally knocked on doors to get voters to the polling stations. There were also significant ceremony involved with the ushering in of elections.<sup>71</sup> As was consistent with the liberalisation of the electoral process in other socialist states, the emphasis on agitation decreased in the 1989 elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies.<sup>72</sup> In an interview with the author, the chairman of a ward electoral commission from the Sevastopol' Territorial District of Moscow revealed that fewer agitators were working in this campaign than in the past. During previous elections, the canvassers were out in full force and nearly dragged the voters to the polling stations. Now they had some new roles. They still registered voters and discussed relevant issues with the electorate, but, on election day, the agitators primarily brought the ballot boxes to invalids.<sup>73</sup> To keep awareness of the

elections high, election commissions sent reminders to voters, and these memorandums appeared in newspapers.<sup>74</sup> Electors in Leningrad's Polytekhnik Territorial District No. 50, for instance, received the following document through the post:

The people deserve these deputies whom they elect. The right of the mandate of the people will be fought for by three candidates in the Polytekhnik electoral district.

Appeal of the district commission of the Polytekhnik Territorial Electoral District No. 50

Comrades!

You will decide the fate of the country and the fate of *perestroika*. First you will choose not just the best person, but a people's deputy! He must inform the Congress of People's Deputies of your problems and questions. You have the power to choose the most worthy and the strongest. The district meeting presented three of the candidates nominated by work collectives. They are:

Denisov, Anatolii Aleskeevich, born in 1934, member of the CPSU, doctor of technical sciences, professor at Leningrad's M.I. Kalinin Polytechnic Institute.

Ivanenko, Tat'yana Nikolaevna, born 1952, non-party citizen, teacher in school No. 63 in the Kalinin district of Leningrad.

Churkov, Leonid Aleksandrovich, born 1955, member of the CPSU, director of the polytechnical department of territorial medical association No. 12 of the Kalinin district.

In National Territorial District No. 19

Bol'shakov, Aleksei Alekseevich, born in 1939, deputy chairman of the executive committee of the Leningrad city soviet of people's deputies, chairman of the planning committee of the Leningrad city soviet.

The crucial stage of the electoral campaign, the pre-election agitation, is ensuing. By casting your ballot you will become more closely acquainted with the candidates and get to know them. The high requirements and principle of your evaluation of the candidates and, most of all, the elections are moving ahead. You will become the creators of the history of our country, not only in words, but in deeds.

Unfortunately, at this difficult moment which is determining the fate of the country, demagogues are appearing publishing lists with appeals to ruin the

elections. To whom is this beneficial? To you?!-hardly. These pseudo-democrats are forcing their own views of democracy and openness proclaiming 'better chaos' through the standard of democracy and are prejudiced by crushing the laws on elections.

We appeal to you, the heirs of the glory of Petersburg workers, intelligentsia and students, to participate actively in the meetings of candidates for deputy. By our words and deeds an investment in the revolutionary transformation of our society will be brought in.

Everyone to the elections! You give Power to the people! On 26 March you will decide the fate of the county. Your vote will decide this.

District electoral commission of the Polytekhnik Territorial electoral district No. 50.

Addresses of electors' clubs:

School No. 199, Timurov Street, house No. 8/2  
School No. 71, Vavilov Street, house No. 5  
School No. 93, 31/5 Grazhdanskii Promenade  
Dormitory, Kultury, Promenade house No. 31.<sup>75</sup>

The arrangements at the polling stations were also altered. Voting booths were now located en route to the ballot boxes, even in single-candidate constituencies, <sup>so</sup> the electors had to enter the voting booth before dropping their ballots in the ballot box. Presentation at the polling stations was also changed. The former merely ceremonial activity of voting was amended. There were no more flowers around the ballot boxes. The Young Pioneers, 'guarding' the ballot boxes, disappeared from some of the polling places. The chairman of the ward commission identified above informed the author that some individuals, particularly older citizens, were somewhat disappointed at the absence of ceremony at the stations. However, there were still some old tricks used to lure voters to the polls: for instance, in a students' residence in Moscow, a supply of Coca-Cola, a sporadically available item in the city, was located on the same floor as the voting area on election day.<sup>76</sup>

A letter sent to the weekly magazine *Ogonek* (Small Fire)- but never published in that periodical-in June 1989 recounts that elsewhere Soviet officials used similar tactics to lure voters to the polls during the elections.

On 21 May 1989, the second round of elections for the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR took place in our town of Vershino-Darasunskii, in Chita *oblast'*.

The high point of the campaign to 'get out the vote' was as follows: An announcement was made that anyone who came in to vote would be given ration coupons for alcoholic products. And that's exactly what happened. The procedure was simple: You'd come up to the electoral commission's table, say your name and address and they'd give you a ballot with the names of the candidates for deputy and a coupon allowing the purchase of one bottle of vodka. And, so that there would be no confusion with the *monthly* coupons (original emphasis), the 'election' coupons were printed on coloured paper [Note: The ration coupon for April is on white paper with number 4 on it, and the 'election' coupon is on coloured paper with no month indicated.] Only the 'election' coupons were being honoured. In the town of Svetlii, they made it even easier for someone showing up at the town soviet to vote: they gave out election ballots and you could buy vodka and *zakuski* right there at the snack stand.

The reactions of the town's residents varied:

1. Some said: 'I'm not going to vote. They want to buy me with a bottle of vodka?!'
2. Some came in, took a coupon and a ballot, and without crossing out a single name (there were two ballots for a single deputy seat), dropped the ballot in the ballot box.
3. Some voted and used the coupon as intended.
4. Some voted, but did not take the coupon.
5. Some voted, took the coupon, but did not use it as intended (or just destroyed it).
6. Some voters wrote on the ballot: 'I'm voting for the bottle.'

In conclusion, I would like to ask a question: Can you imagine a better way to discredit the elections to the Congress of People's Deputies?

Residents of the town:  
L. M. Kartuzova  
and dozens of other

signatures

P.S. All of the above signed work for the Darasunskii Geology Research Expedition.<sup>77</sup>

Some mention must be made of citizens' attitudes towards the elections. A poll of 1,200 Muscovite workers aged 18-30 was conducted by the Sociological Services of the weekly newspaper *Maskovskie novosti* (Moscow News) three weeks before the election. Forty per cent of those surveyed approved of the new electoral system, a figure that included 35 per cent of blue-collar workers interviewed, 43 per cent of engineers and technicians, 53 per cent of workers from the creative fields, 55 per cent of executives and 36 per cent of workers in the service sector. Three per cent of the respondents disapproved of the new electoral system, which included two per cent of blue-collar workers, four per cent of engineers and technicians, two per cent of workers from creative fields and 18 per cent of executives. However, evidence suggests that those surveyed did not feel the new electoral law was much of an improvement on its predecessor. Thirty-one per cent of the target group could not see any difference between the old system and the new system of voting. Also, 16 per cent did not care about the elections and ten per cent were undecided. When asked if they intended to participate in the elections, 62 per cent of the respondents indicated that they planned to vote, while 15 per cent predicted they would not.<sup>78</sup>

Voting for the Congress of People's Deputies began in the social (or public) organisations' conferences on 11 March. The first deputies were elected from the All-Union Society of Inventors and Rationalisers, when five deputies, all males, were elected to represent this association in the Congress. Over the next few days elections proceeded in other organizations. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union held its elections on 15

March at an enlarged Central Committee plenum. As stated earlier, of particular interest was the fact that for the 100 seats granted to it under the electoral law, the CPSU proposed precisely 100 candidates. In a speech made on 15 March, CPSU electoral commission chairman, V.A. Kopyturg, argued that despite the equal number of candidates to seats there was competition and debate involved in the CPSU's candidate selection. He indicated that members in over 105,00 party organizations participated in candidacy discussions, 31,500 nominees were proposed, and the Central Committee received 12,000 telegrams, letters and extracts from resolutions adopted at party meetings. Furthermore, he stated that when the Central Committee selected its final 100 candidates, it did so from a list of 312 potential aspirants.<sup>79</sup> All candidates, not surprisingly, were elected. However, there was far from unanimous approval. Among Politburo members, Ryzhkov received the least number of votes cast against-10; Gorbachev received 12 votes against, and Yegor Ligachev received the most votes against, 78; among the 52 candidates who were elected unanimously, 12 were manual labourers.<sup>80</sup>

The elections in the social organisations, although contested, can be said to have been geared to ensure possibly greater representation for certain groups that might not have fared as well if nominated in the constituencies. In the districts and social organisations, voters elected 334 women to the Congress of People's Deputies by 26 March and by May 352 were elected. However, 75 seats were more or less automatically guaranteed to women by the election law as members of women's councils and members of the Association of Soviet Women (although candidates did not necessarily have to be women); moreover women held ten of the CPSU's seats. Although, after the first round, women increased their representation in the Congress from 16.6 per cent of candidates to 18.6 per cent of deputies,

this number is much smaller than the 492 (32.8 per cent) that served in the Supreme Soviet during 1984-89. Women's representation in the Congress is discussed in much greater detail in Chapter 4.

Voting in the <sup>constituencies</sup> took place from 8 am to 10 pm on Sunday, 26 March: this was two hours less than in the previous elections. However, Soviet interview sources indicated to the author that in some constituencies, voters began showing up at the polling station by 6 am, as in the past. As to the casting of the vote, rather than placing an unmarked ballot paper into the ballot box, in open view of all present at the station, voters now had to proceed through a voting booth, draw a curtain and make their choices in secret before dropping their votes into the box.

There were a number of changes in the results from the previous elections. First, as expected with less pressure in agitation, voter turnout declined. Although turnout was significantly higher than is customary in most of the West-Australia with compulsory voting a notable exception-the 1989 results showed a serious decline from the 1984 turnout for the Supreme Soviet elections. Of the 192,575,165 registered eligible voters, 172,840,130 or 89.8 per cent took part in the elections.<sup>81</sup> Table 2.2 provides the results of voter turnout for the 1984 and 1989 elections by republic. Overall, voter turnout decreased by nearly 10.2 per cent and the mean total of all republics was approximately a nine per cent decrease. There is, moreover, an apparent trend. In republics in which there were nationalist sentiments raised during the previous year, the decrease in voter turnout was above the mean. Armenia's decline was three standard deviations above the republican average.<sup>82</sup> Lithuania's turnout was within two standard deviations above the mean. Latvia, the RSFSR, Estonia and

Moldavia all had turnout declines one standard deviation above the republican average. However, it is also important that those areas which, until the late 1980s, traditionally exhibited the most support for the Soviet state tend to have a decline in voter turnout below the republican mean: Belorussia, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenia, Georgia and Kirgizia all showed voter turnout declines one standard deviation below the mean. Azerbaidzhan had the lowest drop in voter turnout of the country, two standard deviations below the mean.

Table 2.2 Voter Turnout: 1984 and 1989 (%)

Union Republic	1984	1989	Decline*
RSFSR	99.98	87	12.98
Ukraine	99.99	93.4	6.59
Belorussia	99.99	94.2	5.79
Uzbekistan	99.99	95.8	4.19
Kazakhstan	99.99	93.7	6.29
Georgia	99.99	97	2.99
Azerbaidzhan	99.99	98.5	1.49
Lithuania	99.99	82.5	17.49
Moldavia	99.99	90.5	9.49
Latvia	99.99	86.9	13.09
Kirgizia	99.99	97	2.99
Tadzhikistan	99.99	93.9	6.09
Armenia	99.99	71.9	28.09
Turkmenia	99.99	96.1	3.89
Estonia	99.99	87.1	12.89
Total	99.99	89.80	10.19
Mean*	99.99	91.03	8.96
Max*	99.99	98.5	28.09
Min*	99.98	71.9	1.49
Std*	0	6.8	6.8

\* Author's computations; Sources: 'Soobshchenie Tsentral'noi izsbitatel'noi komissii ob itogakh vyborov v Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR sostoyavshikhsya 4 marta 1984 goda', *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, 1984, No. 11, pp. 199-203, p. 199; 'Soobshchenie Tsentral'noi izsbitatel'noi komissii ob itogakh vyborov narodnykh deputatov SSSR v 1989 godu', *Izvestiya*, 5 April 1989.

Soviet citizens elected 1,225 or approximately 81.6 per cent of the 1,500 people's deputies from territorial and national-territorial electoral districts on 26 March. Run-off elections were conducted at a later date in one territorial district owing to the death of the



deputy. Electors in two national-territorial districts had to go to the polls again because in neither did 50 per cent of the voters turn up at the polls.<sup>83</sup> Nationally, repeat and run-off elections had to be held in 274 electoral districts. Included in this group were 76 districts that originally ran more than two candidates and 195 districts with one or two candidates.<sup>84</sup>

Several key defeats occurred during the contest of 26 March 1989. Most notable was the defeat of the several prominent members of the Leningrad city Party committee. Aleksei Alekseevich Bol'shakov was defeated, having received only 49 per cent of the vote in Leningrad city national-territorial district No. 19. Also defeated in the elections on this day were the city party committee first secretary, Anatolii Nikolaevich Gerasimov, and (as it will be recalled) the first secretary of the *oblast'* party committee (and Politburo candidate member), Yuri Fillipovich Solov'ev.<sup>85</sup> There were also major defeats of party leaders in the Ukraine: Kiev city committee first secretary, Konstantin Masik, and Valentin Zgurskii, chairman of the Kiev city soviet executive committee, failed to win seats.<sup>86</sup>

The defeated functionaries aired their thoughts about what happened. Solov'ev, in an interview with *Leningradskaya pravda*, noted that individuals in party and state positions had to face the voters' three bones of contention. These included the problems of the past and future and the inability to make wild promises: 'possessing complete information about the situation in the country and in the region about existing resources and possibilities, and being realist[s] [they] could not, as some candidates allowed themselves to do, promise the voters a land flowing with milk and honey.'<sup>87</sup> The Khabarovsk Territorial Party Committee first secretary, V.S. Pasternak, indicated that many party officials were not accustomed to the practice of having to win the trust of the people.<sup>88</sup>

Repeat and run-off elections took place between 9 April and 21 May. The first round of run-off elections was conducted in districts where there were more than three candidates but none received more than 50 per cent of the vote. Voter turnout decreased further during this second round of the voting. On 14 May more elections were held in districts in which there was no winner. During this part of the campaign the number of candidates per seat greatly increased. In Kishinev, the Moldavian capital, 25 aspirants competed for the mandate; 33 candidates stood in Kiev. However, the record for candidates was in Leningrad city national-territorial district No. 19, where 34 candidates ran for a single seat. A total of 1,216 candidates stood for election in 198 districts, a mean of 6.2 candidates per seat. Included in these districts were 127 that had four or more candidates. Voters could choose between two candidates in 13 districts. However, there were 15 districts where candidates ran unopposed.<sup>89</sup> Deputies were elected in just 72 districts after this round of the elections; after this part of the campaign, two candidates stood in 125 districts.<sup>90</sup>

Repeat elections were also conducted in the social organisations between April and May. Candidates competed for the right to represent the USSR Academy of Sciences, the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, the USSR Union of Artists, the Soviet Fund for Peace, and the USSR Society of Friends of the Cinema. However, the choice among candidates was much smaller in the social organisations during the subsequent rounds than in the districts: 32 candidates competed for 18 vacant seats, 1.8 candidates per seat.<sup>91</sup> All remaining social organisation deputies were elected before the Congress of People's Deputies met on 25 May.

The elections to the Congress of People's Deputies also focused on the campaign activities and election of several notable figures in Soviet society. The contest which

received the most attention in the West (and also in the Soviet Union) was that between Chairman of *Gosstroï* (State Committee for Construction), Boris Yeltsin, and the chairman of the ZiL automobile factory, Yevgenii Brakov, in which Yel'tsin won a landslide victory, with nearly 90 per cent of the votes.<sup>92</sup> Moreover, also winners, albeit in run-off elections, were former dissidents Roy Medvedev, in the Lenin district of Moscow, and Academician Andrei Sakharov, in the USSR Academy of Sciences.

### Conclusion

The elections to the Congress of People's Deputies expanded the opportunities for choice and political participation on different levels compared with previous elections. First, voters were able to choose their representatives, in most instances from among more than one candidate. Second, the electorate could make its choices of candidate on the basis of concrete stances, the election platforms. Nomination rights were also expanded from mass meetings of social organisations and military units to meetings of local inhabitants in places of residence. Also, voters could put forward their candidates from the floor during nomination meetings, and the number of candidates discussed rose dramatically. Other outlets for political participation increased over previous elections: most notably, with the creation of the social organisation seats there were now places for 750 more deputies in the supreme representative body. In addition, citizens had more opportunities to participate in organisational work as the size of electoral commissions was also increased.

Although sometimes considered defective by the electorate, the flow of information on candidates and the elections increased in the course of the campaign, which ran twice as

long as in the past. Also media coverage of the elections, particularly on television, brought more information to the voters. Reports covered nomination meetings, profiles of candidates and preparations for the elections. Most important, candidates had to present their potential constituents with programmes of their choices with a greater degree of information about their priorities and public issues than ever before.

As a result of these and other changes in the Soviet electoral system, the composition of the Congress of People's Deputies <sup>USA</sup> altered somewhat from its predecessor, the Supreme Soviet. First, the opening up of the nomination system and the introduction of competing candidates ushered in more professionals and middle-level managers than in the past. Furthermore, the 1988 electoral law introduced an element of separation of powers into the election system by prohibiting People's Deputies of the USSR from being simultaneously ministers of the USSR. There was also, however, a decline in the election of representatives of certain social groups as a result of the new electoral system: women, manual labourers, collective farmers and young people have seen their numbers decline in the highest levels of state power, whereas men and communist party members increased their numbers. This result is not surprising. Communist party membership had long been a *de facto* key to social mobility, which would include educational opportunities. Thus, the majority of managers, academicians and other high-ranking officials probably owed their status, at least partially, to their party cards, as well as to their own achievements and capabilities. And, as was reflected in the opinion polls, preferred candidates included those who were educated and party members. This seems to represent at least a partial explanation for such an increase in CPSU members in the Congress. Equally, there were elements of manipulation, slander and even some illegality in some instances throughout the campaign.<sup>93</sup>

Thus, the greater number of professionals in its composition indicated that the Congress of People's Deputies appeared to be more qualified to face challenges and function as a working parliament, rather than a rubber-stamp institution as was its predecessor, the old-style Supreme Soviet.

In theory, the elections introduced greater levels of accountability of the party to the people. This was the first step towards elections in which there were guaranteed seats for the first secretaries or other members of the party committees. As was exhibited by the elections to the Congress, party leaders who did not take public demands into consideration or seem to be alienated from citizens in their territorial divisions could be voted out of the state organs. Thus, a further check was introduced into the political arena.

Nevertheless, the elections were far from free and fair. First, not all deputies were elected by the electorate. Special seats were set aside for public organisations in which only special individual<sup>s</sup> could cast their ballots. Second, not every seat was contested. Third, alternative political parties could not compete for seats. The CPSU maintained a monopoly of power throughout the campaign. Therefore, the elections, while departing from earlier Soviet practices, contained some 'holdovers' from the past. The following three chapters discuss, in detail, the deputy turnover during the 1989 elections, women and the 1989 elections and criticisms of the 1989 elections and post-election developments. These chapters will illustrate in greater depth to what extent the elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies exhibited continuity, contradiction and departure from earlier procedures.

## NOTES

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3. See, Giulietto Chiesa, *Transition to Democracy in the USSR: Ending the Monopoly of Power and the Evolution of New Political Forces* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Occasional Papers, No. 237, 1990) and ideam with Douglas Taylor Northrup, *Transition to Democracy: Political Change in the Soviet Union, 1989-1991* (Hanover, NH: University of New England Press, 1993), esp. pp. 211-291.
4. Data collected by Giulietto Chiesa and 'Spisok narodnykh deputatov SSSR, podpisavshikh Zayavlenie MDG', cited in *ibid.*, pp. 124;125.
5. See Alex Pravda, 'Elections in Communist Party States' in Stephen White and Daniel N. Nelson (eds), *Communist Politics: A Reader* (London: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 27-54; Stephen White, 'Economic Performance and Communist Legitimacy', *World Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (1986), pp. 462-482, Werner Hahn, 'Electoral Choice in the Soviet Bloc', *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1987), pp. 29-39 and Barnabas Racz, 'Political Participation and Developed Socialism: The Hungarian Elections of 1985', *Soviet Studies*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1 (1987), pp. 40-62.
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8. Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking For Our Country and the World*, updated edition (London: Fontana Collins, 1988), p. 104.
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11. 'Doklad Mandatnoi Komissii XXVIII S"ezda Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza', *Materialy XXVIII S"ezda Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1990), pp. 159-161, p. 159.
12. Jyrki Iivonen, 'Leadership Elections in the Twenty-Eighth CPSU Congress', *The Journal of Communist Studies*, pp. 111-117, pp. 111-112.
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14. Yegor Ligachev, *Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin*, translated by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, Michele A. Berdy and Dobrochna Dyrca-Freeman (New York: Pantheon, 1993), pp. 331-332.
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22. 'Doklad Mandatnoi Komissii', *Pervyi s"ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR, 25 maya-9 iyunya 1989g: stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow: Verkhovnyi Sovet, 1989), 6 Vols. Vol. I, pp. 41-45, p. 41 and *Sostav narodnykh deputatov SSSR, Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, postoyannykh komissii palat i komitetov Verkhovnogo SSSR, Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo SSSR: statisticheskii sbornik* (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1989), p. 3.
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24. Karpenko, *op. cit.*
25. 'Doklad Mandatnoi Komissii', p. 41 and *Sostav narodnykh deputatov....*, p. 3.
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29. Stephen White, 'Non-competitive Elections and National Politics: The USSR Supreme Soviet Elections of 1984', *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1985), p. 216.
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38. Lidiya Grafova, 'U kamennoi steny', *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 15 February 1989, p. 10.
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60. Ivanov, *op. cit.*

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72. Alex Pravda, op. cit., pp. 50-51.
73. Dr Aleksandr Ivakhnykh, interview with the author, Glasgow, April 1989.
74. See, for instance, *Moskovskie novosti*, 26 March 1989, p. 9.
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78. *Moskovskie novosti*, 26 March 1989, p. 8.
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80. 'Soobshchenie izbiratel'noi komissii po vyboram narodnykh deputatov ot KPSS', pp. 1-2.
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84. 'Soobshchenie Tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi komissii...', op. cit.
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86. *The Independent* (London), 28 March 1989, p. 1.
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**Chapter 3. Continuity, Contradiction and Departure in  
Soviet Deputy Re-election, 1984-1989**

The purpose of this chapter is to determine whether the electoral reform measures implemented by Gorbachev in 1989 had an effect on creating a new corps of national-level deputies by focusing on the social composition of the parliamentarians elected to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and comparing these features to those of their counterparts elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet. One of the key topics that I wish to address is determining if there were any differences between those deputies who were elected under semi-competitive conditions and representatives who were selected to the USSR Supreme Soviet by some form of centrally-determined quota system. This type of analysis will help gauge the degree of continuity, contradiction and departure in the deputy corpus from earlier Soviet elections.

My main thesis in this chapter is that electoral reform measures altered radically the occupation and demographic composition of the country's highest legislative organ. Moreover, the deputies who staffed the Congress had a definite impact on the further development of the political system. Therefore, the electoral reform measures implemented in March 1989 influenced political participation in the creation of a new parliamentary elite. The characteristics of this new parliamentary corpus can be described as follows: the new deputies were overwhelmingly male; it was even more highly represented by CPSU members compared with previous years. A greater number of lower and middle echelon party officials gained advancement into the Congress than they had in the pre-reform USSR Supreme Soviet. The deputies were better educated than their predecessors. This is reflected in the higher proportion of managers and representatives of what could arguably termed as intelligentsia. The deputies were also extremely diverse in their outlooks. Other authors have noted that this was reflected in the

way in which the deputies cast their ballots in roll-call votes and had them recorded and public<sup>ly</sup> disseminated; therefore, this information need not be addressed in this study. It should be noted that this data's publication also indicated that the leadership must have had some serious desires for the electorate to take an interest in their representatives performance. Conversely, the reformers also intended for the deputies to take their constituents' demands very seriously. This action constituted a significant departure from previous electoral and governing practices. In addition, and this could perhaps be considered most crucial, is that the vast majority of the deputies were new. As it will be demonstrated below, there was a consistent corps of deputies who were constantly in the country's legislature during the Brezhnev-Chernenko periods. The elections to the Congress radically altered this facet of Soviet politics. Therefore, in terms of opening up the political arena to a new corps of deputies, electoral reform greatly enhanced political participation. Other social groups, often well-represented in the Supreme Soviet under less competitive conditions, had fewer parliamentarians elected after electoral reform measures were implemented. In particular this can be observed among women, the elderly, deputies under 30 years of age and deputies who did not belong to the CPSU. The following chapter considers women's representation in the new parliament.

The present chapter is divided into several sections. In the first section I analyze the composition of the USSR Supreme Soviet from the late 1950s until the early 1980s. Here I rely extensively on the work of Roger A. Clarke and Anatolii Shaikevich. In the second section of the chapter I analyze patterns of deputy re-election from 1966<sup>to</sup> 1984. Here I compare results that were published by Ronald Hill and those which I have derived from my own databases on the 1979 and 1984 compositions of the USSR Supreme Soviet.<sup>2</sup> Section

three compares the deputies re-elected in 1989 to those who were previously in the Supreme Soviet.<sup>3</sup> Finally, this chapter discusses the presence of re-elected deputies who were elected to key state positions by the Congress, their representation in the USSR Supreme Soviet and the extent to which they were elected to the revamped Soviet parliament's committees and commissions.

### **The Composition of the Supreme Soviet From Khrushchev to Brezhnev**

The composition of the USSR Supreme Soviet of any convocation would be well known. After all the elections the newspapers always published the full list of deputies; some numerical indicators...[that were] irrefutable information of the democracy of the soviet system.<sup>4</sup>

The earliest study on the composition of the USSR Supreme Soviet was conducted by Roger A. Clarke and published in 1967. His investigation had two primary objectives. First, he sought to identify which deputies elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet in the convocations between 1958-1966 were most prominent and what relationship these deputies had to their overall occupation structure. This study attempted to uncover whether or not there were any occupational categories in the population which were over-represented or under-represented based on the figures presented in the 1959 Census. His second objective was closely related to his first. By analyzing the occupational composition of the Supreme Soviets in the years concerned, he hoped to draw some conclusions on the nature of deputy selection.<sup>5</sup>

Clarke's research brought forth significant findings. First, he noted that there were certainly particular groups which had advantages being selected to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Clarke

determined that '[t]he group with consistently the highest representation is government, party, Komsomol and trade union who together compromise around 35 per cent of all deputies [but], over 80 times their weight in the occupied population'.<sup>6</sup> In addition, other groups such as writers were over-represented, while the ITR (engineering and technical workers) were most under-represented. The 'under-representation' of two very large employment groups-agricultural and non-agricultural workers, allowed for this situation to occur.<sup>7</sup> Clarke determined that because of the high proportion of state and party officials that occupied positions in the Supreme Soviet, nearly one third could be considered *ex officio* members of the institution.<sup>8</sup>

Clarke also focused his study upon women and identified that the proportion of women worker-deputies was very large and that the proportion of women employed as agricultural workers was nearly equal to its share in the population. Moreover, he mentioned that 'women actually form[ed] a greater proportion of the worker-deputies than they [did] of all workers in the occupied population.'<sup>9</sup> As the present author argues below, the tendency of women to be over-represented among worker deputies was also present among the 1979 and 1984 convocations of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Clarke also discussed different patterns of deputy selection. His main assumptions were that either local party committees could have set representation norms or they were determined centrally. Based on the stability that the Supreme Soviet demonstrated in the period that he studies, he determined that the levels of consistency in the occupation levels suggested that these deputies were generally centrally determined. Nevertheless, regarding the lack of consistency that was available in the patterns of, for instance, the state structures

and ministries, he conceded there must have been some degree of local input. Therefore, he suggested that

[p]erhaps the process of choice of deputies is analogous to the working out of enterprise economic plans. An initial central directive would indicate the number of deputies to come from each *oblast'* and republic and any general changes of policy on the composition of the new Supreme Soviet. Local committees would then produce a draft list of deputies which would be based on the previous but incorporate any suggested modifications, and this would be finally revised centrally.<sup>10</sup>

Shaikevich, focusing on deputies who served from 1966 until the 1980s, has also noted that certain groups had higher representation in the USSR Supreme Soviet than others. While acknowledging that the share of women and workers grew slowly from 2 to 33 per cent and 3 to 35 per cent respectively and that the percentage of collective farmers declined from 19 to 16 per cent, he pointed out to the relative consistency of other groups. For instance, he pointed to the consistent levels of representation of non-party citizens (about 28 per cent), the intelligentsia (9-10 per cent), party workers (16-17 per cent), workers in the soviets (13-15 per cent), Heroes of the Soviet Union and Heroes of Socialist Labour (15-18 per cent). Moreover, there appeared to be relatively similar levels among the different nations represented in the Supreme Soviet.<sup>11</sup>

Nevertheless, he claimed that the USSR's state configuration of the USSR helped ensure the membership stability of the Supreme Soviet. Moreover, it was clear that some



nations benefited from this situation. For instance, he noted that there were 'fewer Latvians than Chuvash in the USSR, and fewer Chuvash than Germans.' However, there were inevitably more Latvians than Chuvash and more Chuvash than Germans elected to the Supreme Soviet during these time periods (he fails, however, to produce statistics for this comparison). According to Shaikovich, 'The reason is clear: Latvia [was] a union republic, Chuvashiya [was] an ASSR and the Germans had no autonomous state.' It is also important to note that in deputy selections to the USSR Supreme Soviet, smaller nations, would often be over-represented among parliamentarians in comparison to their population per one million individuals. Based on figures Shaikovich computed from the 1970 USSR Population Census, the Dolgany, for instance, had what equated to 203 deputies per one million head of population. However, larger nationalities like Russians had 5.4 deputies per million people and Ukrainians had 4.2 deputies per one million head of population.<sup>12</sup>

Shaikovich's findings of the occupation structures of USSR Supreme Soviet deputies very much reiterates those top-heavy features of the selection to the legislature that Clarke stressed. For instance he notes that officials of '*oblast*' staffs (and higher) had 80 times more chances of finding themselves in the USSR Supreme Soviet than *raion* staffs.' However, he also notes that this latter group was '200 times' more likely to be elected to the Supreme Soviet than for example, 'cooks, who, in agreement with Lenin, would, under communism, learn to manage the state'. Again using the per million head of population figure to illustrate the extensiveness of preferences for certain groups in the USSR Supreme Soviet, Shaikovich notes that there were 5,130 per million officials who occupied positions in *oblast*' levels or higher, 67 persons per million in *raion* positions while only 7 per million workers (the group he used included locomotive <sup>drivers</sup>, miners, textile workers and drivers) were elected

to the USSR Supreme Soviet during the period of *zastoi*. Another important finding to which Shaikevich pointed was that at the same time there were certain 'mass socio-professional' groups such as cleaners (2.5 million), nurses (1.3 million), hospital orderlies (1.6 million), janitors and and watchmen (1.6 million) who were never represented in the legislature at this time.<sup>13</sup>

Comparing the USSR Supreme Soviet with other parliamentary structures which existed at this time (the 1974 UK Parliament, 1987 Italian Parliament and 1983 US Congress), Shaikevich noted several important distinctions between the different national legislatures. For instance, he noted a significant difference in the proportion of women in each parliament. Whereas in the 1966-1984 period women comprised an average of 31 per cent of all Supreme Soviet deputies, they comprised only 11 per cent of Italian deputies and senators and 6 per cent of American representatives and senators.<sup>14</sup> Unfortunately, Shaikevich did not take this point of reference further, and, in particular, he did not analyze the position of women in politically powerful positions at that time, discussing their membership in parliamentary or Congressional Committees-to name but a few instances-which would have brought out more information on where women fell comparatively in the political systems,<sup>15</sup> indicating that the quantity of women that the Soviet system purported to integrate into its politics was not a substitute for the qualitative participation that women parliamentarians achieved in their respective legislatures. To bridge the gap in this literature, the present author compares women deputies' participation in the pre-reform USSR Supreme Soviet to their efforts in the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in the following chapter.

Age structure was another factor which Shaikevich analyzed in comparative

perspective. His conclusions were that the USSR Supreme Soviet was on average a somewhat younger legislature than its foreign counterparts. For instance, in 1966 the typical deputy age was 44.9 years old. Subsequently, deputies' mean ages were 45.4 and 48.3 in 1974 and 1984 respectively. However, the average age of the UK 1974 Parliament was 48.8, the 1983 Congress was 50.4 (including 49.4 in the House of Representatives and 54.8 in the Senate) and 51.9 in Italy (49.7 in the Chamber of Deputies and 56.4 in the Senate) for the period of study.<sup>16</sup>

Table 3.1 Basic Professional Groups in Parliaments (%)

Occupation	USSR 1966 - 84	Italy 1987	UK 1974
Party Workers	16	6	1.4
State Officials	19	6	-
Generals	4	-	-
Officials of Economic Organizations	8	9	24
Heads of Scientific Research Institutes and Institutions of Higher Education	1.6	-	-
Scientific Associates	-	4.5	-
Lecturers in Institutions of Higher Education	-	8.4	-
Teachers	-	10.6	10
Doctors	1.1	6	1.6
Economists, Businessmen	0.4	4	7.6
Journalists, Publicists	0.3	11	10.8
Lawyers	0.1	24	18.4
Engineers	0.6	3	3.5
Workers	24	2	6.2
Peasants	19	1	6.8

Source: Anatolii Shaikovich, 'Portret v manere Rubensa: Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR epokhi zastoya', *Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost'*, 1991, No. 4, pp. 105-118, Table 1, at p. 106.

Shaikovich also noted different occupational structures among, in particular, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the Italian and British Parliaments (he made no mention of the US

Congress) which are contained in Table 3.1. Among the Soviet deputies there were higher numbers of party and state functionaries, generals, workers and peasants than in the British or Italian parliaments. Data on their respective memberships in the Supreme Soviet, with the exception of generals—who constituted 4 per cent of the deputy corpus at this time—is mentioned earlier in the chapter. The Italian and British Parliaments (listed respectively), in contrast, were staffed by more teachers (10.6 and 10 per cent) and engineers (3 and 3.5 per cent). Moreover, they also contained a higher portion of economists, journalists and lawyers. In comparison, the Soviet representatives from these professions were virtually insignificant during the Brezhnev-Chernenko periods. Therefore, while Shaikevich does not label it as such, the USSR Supreme Soviet can be characterized as either (or perhaps both) a 'partyist' or 'statist' institution based on its professional composition. He does, however, draw his readers' attention to the 'humanitarian character' of the Italian Parliament due to its significant composition of teachers, academics and doctors and the 'economic character' of the British Parliament due to the domination of representatives from 'opposing labour and capital'.<sup>17</sup>

What is significant is that Shaikevich took his study further than an analysis of biographical characteristics and determined that there was a positive correlation between the factors of age (in particular those deputies older than 40 years of age), male sex, higher education and membership in the *nomenklatura*<sup>18</sup> in deputy selection to the USSR Supreme Soviet during the 1966-1984 period. (I should state here that based on the criteria that Shaikevich lists for inclusion in the *nomenklatura*, the 1989 elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies could be considered to have broken this trend. This is indeed a

significant factor in establishing a departure from previous electoral trends.) However, he noted that there were conflicting results regarding youth, female sex, non-party affiliation, which was usually connected with 'the toilers' and those who were not officials such as peasants, workers, teachers and doctors. Therefore, he established *shkaly vlasti* (scales of power) to reflect the 'vertical structure of the Supreme Soviet' which reflected a person's likelihood of entering into the legislature. Those who fell under the first set of correlations were more likely to have a much higher scale of power than the latter.<sup>19</sup> Thus, the USSR Supreme Soviet during the *zastoi* period was formed by pre-established selection patterns and positions were set aside for particular 'job slots' much like the elite members and certain workers who held positions in the CPSU Central Committee.<sup>20</sup>

Therefore, these studies of the USSR Supreme Soviet can provide the present analysis with several conclusions. First, the CPSU and Soviet state officials tried to create a national-level legislature which was more akin to a microcosm of society, <sup>than</sup> what is conventionally acknowledged as a working parliament. Therefore, this particular institution contained certain population groups which were not as highly represented in parliamentary structures in other countries. The deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet were predominantly male, like parliamentarians in other countries; however, there was a higher proportion of women among their ranks. Soviet deputies tended to be, on average, younger than their foreign counterparts. However, it should be noted that there was a very high number of deputies who were frequently re-elected. Therefore, the median age of the deputies increased after each convocation. There were more party and state officials among the deputies than legislators in other countries. Significantly higher numbers of workers and peasants were found in the USSR Supreme Soviet than the European bodies Shaikevich studied.

Conversely, those professions which were in the greatest abundance in the Italian Parliament and the British House of Commons—lawyers, doctors, teachers, engineers and economists—for instance, were significantly under-represented in the supreme organ of state power in the USSR. A second point to recount was that those individuals falling under the category of state and party officials had better chances of being USSR Supreme Soviet deputies and, according to Shaikevich, having higher 'scales of power' ratings. The next section of this chapter focuses on another indicator of power and continuity in the Soviet political system, deputy re-election to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

#### **Deputy Re-election, 1966-1984**

Ronald J. Hill established that re-election to the USSR Supreme Soviet revealed some type of pecking order in the Soviet political hierarchy. Of the 1,517 deputies who were elected in 1970, 623 (41.1 per cent) had been members of the 1966 Supreme Soviet and 894 (58.9 per cent) dropped out. Using information drawn from biographical sources, Hill compared the re-elected deputies based on several personal criteria: gender, party membership status, education, age, nationality and occupation.<sup>21</sup>

Hill determined patterns of 'bias' based on the criteria. First, men had greater chances to be re-elected than women. There were 1,092 men (71.98 per cent) and 425 women (28.02 per cent) elected in 1970. Among the deputies who remained from the 1966 Supreme Soviet there were 557 men (51 per cent) and 66 women (15.3 per cent). Second, CPSU members had greater chances of being re-elected than did their non-party counterparts. The total of full CPSU members and candidates for CPSU

membership elected was 1,151 in 1966 and from this group 569 (49.4 per cent) were re-elected. This compares to only 54 of the 362 (14.9 per cent) non-party citizens and Komsomol members in the same category. Third, Hill indicated that there was a close relationship between party affiliation, sex and re-election and that among the 980 male party members 531 (54.2 per cent) were re-elected. Fourth, deputies with higher education were more likely to be re-elected than lesser educated representatives. Of 831 deputies with either complete or incomplete higher education elected in 1966, 481 (57.9 per cent) were re-elected in 1970; whereas, 12 of 82 deputies with primary education (14.6 per cent) and 130 of 600 who achieved either secondary or incomplete secondary education (21.7 per cent) found themselves in the USSR Supreme Soviet for the following convocation. Fifth, certain age groups had advantages over others in being re-elected. For instance, deputies between the ages of 50-69 were re-elected in the highest percentages. Among the 523 who were elected in 1966, 329 (62.9 per cent) were deputies in 1970. Also with strong representation was the over 70 group; 11 of 24 deputies (45.8 per cent) were re-elected in 1970. Most disadvantaged, however, were the deputies under 30 years of age. Only 13 of 123 (10.6 per cent) found themselves members of the subsequent convocation.

The other major areas that Hill analyzed were re-election according to nationality and occupational status. Clearly the nationality most favored<sup>u</sup><sub>^</sub> in 1970 were the Ukrainians as 64 per cent of these deputies were returned. Other nationalities re-elected with more than 50 per cent of their deputies were Tadzhiks and Kirgiz (60 and 52.2 per cent respectively). Conversely, Estonians (31 per cent), Kazakhs (19.4 per cent), Lithuanians (25 per cent), Moldavians (18.2 per cent) and non-titular nationalities (24.1 per

cent) were shown bias against them. Deputies who had certain occupations were more likely to be re-elected than other workers. Re-election patterns of deputies which amounted between one half to three quarters of particular occupation groups included members of the artistic community (72.2 per cent), state officials (70.7 per cent), military officers (67.3 per cent), Communist Party officials (65.6 per cent-however, the group most frequently re-elected, higher party officials-individuals who held the posts of *obkom* chairman and above-returned 155 of 206 deputies or 75.2 per cent) and trade union officials (61.7 per cent). Among all variables, occupation, according to Hill, was the most decisive in ensuring re-election.

The present author's research, conducted on deputies re-elected from the tenth convocation of the Supreme Soviet (1979-1984) to the eleventh convocation (1984-1989), supports Hill's findings and illustrates a very high level of consistency within re-election patterns. Of the 1,500 deputies who were elected to the Supreme Soviet on 4 March 1984, a strikingly similar 41.2 per cent (618) had served as deputies in the tenth convocation. However, it should also be noted that 570 (38 per cent) of the deputies elected on 4 March 1979 served complete terms. The remaining deputies were elected in a series of elections held in different constituencies. The results of these elections reinforce further the point that Shaikevich raised pertaining to guaranteed election of people in varying positions. When party or state officials who were simultaneously USSR Supreme Soviet deputies either changed or lost their positions, they would vacate their seats and their successors would occupy these places after winning in 'new elections'.

On 4 March 1979 Soviet voters elected 1,500 deputies to the Tenth Convocation of



the USSR Supreme Soviet. As stated earlier, in this chapter's epigram, the election results reflected the diversity in Soviet society. However, certain social groups fared much better than others in their chances for re-election or more correctly, perhaps, 're-selection'. Table 3.2 contains information on deputy re-election according to sex. As the table indicates, nearly two thirds of the deputies elected in 1979 were men and about one third were women. However, when the figures for re-election are taken into account, once again, the pattern that Hill established was very much still valid. Again, over half the men elected in 1979 were re-elected to the eleventh convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet. This compares to 16 per cent of the women. Therefore, these data indicate that men were still preferred to be re-elected to this particular convocation of the Supreme Soviet. They had a more than 50-50 chance of becoming deputies to consecutive sessions.

Table 3.2 Deputy Turnover, 1979-1984 According to Sex

Sex	Elected 1979 (N)	Elected 1979 (%)	Re - elected 1984 (N)	Re - elected 1984 (%)
Men	1,013	67.5	540	53.3
Women	487	32.5	78	16.0
Total	1,500	100	618	41.2

Data on re-election according to party status are contained in Table 3.3. As stated earlier, CPSU members had greater chances to be re-elected than their non-party counterparts in 1970. This pattern was repeated in the other election currently under scrutiny. Soviet voters elected 1,098 communists and candidates for membership to the USSR Supreme Soviet (73.2 per cent) in 1979. Of deputies, those 561 were re-elected in 1984; this constitutes a turnover rate of 51.1 per cent. Non-party candidates rates of turnover also remained somewhat low. In 1984, about 14 per cent of the *Komsomol* and non-affiliated citizens were

re-elected from the Tenth Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Thus, the patterns of re-election and party status again indicate that CPSU deputies had about an even chance of being re-elected to the Supreme Soviet.

**Table 3.3 Deputy Turnover, 1979-1984 According to Party Status**

	Elected 1979 (N)	Elected 1979 (%)	Re - elected 1984 (N)	Re - elected 1984 (%)
CPSU & Cand - idates	1,098	73.2	561	51.1
Non - Party Including:	402	26.8	57	14.2
Komsomol mem - bers	185	12.3	24	13.0
Total	1,500	100	618	41.2

**Table 3.4 Deputy Turnover, 1979 - 1984 According to Sex and Party Status**

Political Affiliation	Elected 1979 (N)		Re - Elected 1984 (N)		Re - Elected 1984 (%)	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
CPSU & Candidate	911	187	523	37	57.4	19.8
Non - Party Including:	102	300	17	41	16.7	13.7
Komsomol members	27	158	2	22	7.4	13.9
Total	1,013	487	540	78	53.3	16.0

It is also worthy to note that there appears to be strong correspondence between gender and re-election in the sets of re-elected deputies. Among the deputies re-elected from 1979-1984, 523 CPSU members were men (84.6 per cent) and 40 of the non-party deputies were women (70.1 per cent). In this category the condition a deputy belonging to the party appears to assist his or her chances of being re-elected. Over 57 per cent of male CPSU members were re-elected. Indeed, it should also be mentioned that women members had greater chances to be re-elected than their non-party counterparts (19.8 per cent vs. 13.7 per

cent).

Table 3.5 Deputy Turnover, 1979-1984 According to Education

Education Level	Elected 1979 (N)	Elected 1979 (%)	Re - elected 1984 (N)	Re - elected 1984 (%)
Primary	4	0.3	1	25.0
Secondary	693	46.2	123	17.7
Higher	613	40.9	353	57.6
Postgraduate	190	12.7	141	74.2
Total	1500	100	618	41.2

Table 3.5 contains data on deputy election according to education level. As the information indicates, Supreme Soviet compositions contained a substantially high number of representatives with primary or secondary education, equating to 46.5 per cent of all deputies elected in 1979. Nevertheless, deputies with these educational qualifications were less likely to be re-elected subsequently to the Supreme Soviet than their more highly educated counterparts, constituting 17.7 per cent of re-elected deputies in 1984. By contrast the data indicate that deputies with post-secondary education were most numerous in the cases of both the overall deputy compositions and re-elected corpuses. Deputies with higher education comprised 53.5 per cent of the USSR Supreme Soviet's representatives in 1979. However, these deputies made up 79.9 per cent of deputies re-elected in 1984. Therefore, more highly educated deputies again found that they had extremely high chances of being re-elected.

The age distribution for deputies re-elected from 1979-1984 are contained in Table 3.6. The data show that there are certain patterns which remain similar for the data sets compiled by both Hill and the present author and re-elected under the pre-reform conditions. First,

younger deputies (30 and under), although given representation in the Supreme Soviet, were seriously disadvantaged when party officials considered individuals to be re-elected. Of the 305 elected in 1979, 35 (11.5 per cent) were re-elected in 1984. Second, middle aged deputies were elected in the greatest abundance among the entire deputy corpus-696 (46 per cent). Their turnover rate was 55.7 per cent overall. Among deputies who were older than retirement age, their overall representation in the Supreme Soviet was less than one-fifth; however, well over half of them were re-elected. Moreover, it should be noted that nearly 61 per cent of deputies older than 50 were re-elected. This included nearly two-thirds of those deputies aged between 51-60 and over 55 per cent of those older than retirement age. These figures are indeed significant. The turnover rates exceed these groups' shares of the 1979 deputy corpus respectively by 22.7 per cent and 18.9 per cent. Therefore, the data compiled by the present author reaffirm patterns in Soviet deputy selection that Hill indicated over twenty years ago.

Table 3.6 Deputy Turnover, 1979 - 1984 According to Age Group

Age Group	Elected 1979 (N)	Elected 1979 (%)	Re - elected 1984 (N)	Re - elected 1984 (%)
30 & Under	305	20.3	35	11.5
31 - 40	216	14.4	39	18.1
41 - 50	355	23.7	164	46.2
51 - 60	341	22.7	224	65.7
61 & Older	283	18.9	156	55.1
Total	1500	100	618	41.2

Data on re-election according to occupation is contained in Table 3.7. As stated earlier, Hill concluded that occupation was the key to re-election and, party and state officials were

the deputies most likely to be re-elected; workers and collective farmers were least likely to continue their representative duties. These patterns were similar in the 1979-1984 re-elected deputies. Party officials were re-elected in the greatest number 182 (72.5 per cent). Workers and collective farmers were least likely to have been returned (114 or 16.5 per cent). It is significant to note that the share of re-elected agricultural and industrial workers is actually somewhat lower than their overall representation in the 1979 Supreme Soviet. Indeed, it should be stressed that these are the only groups to which this circumstance applies. Agricultural workers comprised nearly 1 in 5 of all deputies in the Tenth Convocation, however, slightly fewer than 17 per cent of them were re-elected. Industrial workers constituted nearly one quarter of all deputies in the same period. However, only slightly more than 16 per cent of them were re-elected.

Table 3.7 Deputy Turnover, 1979-1984 According to Occupation Group

Occupation	Elected 1979 (N)	Elected 1979 (%)	Re-elected 1984 (N)	Re-elected 1984 (%)
Agricultural Management	85	5.7	20	23.5
Agricultural Workers	308	20.5	52	16.9
Industrial Management	48	3.2	27	56.3
Industrial Workers	381	25.4	62	16.3
Party Officials	251	16.7	182	72.5
Including:				
Politburo/Secretariat	24	1.6	17	70.8
High Ranking	212	14.1	156	73.6
Lower Officials	15	1.0	9	60.0
State Officials (all)	231	15.4	166	71.9
White Collar (all)	141	9.4	73	51.8
Military	55	3.7	36	65.5
Total	1500	100	618	41.2

Representatives of every other significant occupation group had far better chances of being re-elected. Agricultural managers comprised only 5.7 per cent of the 1979 Supreme Soviet deputies but slightly fewer than one quarter of them were re-elected. In addition,

industrial workers were a mere 3.2 per cent of the deputies, however more than 56 per cent of them became deputies to the subsequent convocation of the Supreme Soviet. White collar workers of all levels constituted little more than 9 per cent of the deputies in 1979, but nearly 52 per cent of them were re-elected.

The turnover rate for the party and state officials reaffirms Hill's findings. These individuals had the best chances to be re-elected. Politburo and Secretariat members comprised less than 2 per cent of the Tenth Convocation, yet more than 71 per cent of them were returned. While lower <sup>ranking</sup> officials made up 1 per cent of the deputy corpus, 60 per cent were re-elected. High ranking party officials were re-elected in the greatest proportion: a few less than three-quarters of their number remained in the national legislature for a successive convocation. Nearly 72 per cent of state officials and just under two-thirds of the military deputies were re-elected.

Table 3.8 contains data on deputy re-election according to nationality. As Hill's study indicated Ukrainians were the nationality most favoured for re-election to the Supreme Soviet. In 1984 the Ukrainians also held this status. However, it is worth <sup>noting</sup> that their representation among re-elected deputies decreased from 64 per cent in 1970 to nearly 56 per cent 14 years later. In addition, it should also be noted that the representation for Tadzhiks declined nearly by half. In fact, with the exception of the Turkmenians, compared to 1970, the Central Asian nationalities seem to have suffered drastic decreases in the number of their deputies who were re-elected in 1984. It is also worthy <sup>of</sup> note that the representation of Moldavian deputies nearly doubled during the period. In addition, the Russians also increased their representation. Among the nationalities suffering the greatest declines were

the Uzbeks and Latvians who saw their representatives decline by nearly half.

Table 3.8 Deputy Turnover, 1979-1984 According to Nationality

Nationality	Elected 1979 (N)	Elected 1979 (%)	Re-elected 1984 (N)	Re-elected 1984 (%)
Russian	654	43.6	312	47.7
Ukrainian	188	12.5	105	55.9
Belorussian	56	3.7	14	25.0
Uzbek	53	3.5	12	22.6
Kazakh	38	2.5	15	39.5
Georgian	47	3.1	18	38.3
Azeri	49	3.3	18	36.7
Lithuanian	31	2.1	9	29.0
Moldavian	26	1.7	10	38.5
Latvian	32	2.1	7	21.9
Kirgiz	28	1.9	9	32.1
Tadzhik	29	1.9	11	37.9
Armenian	42	2.8	13	31.0
Turkmenian	28	1.9	13	46.4
Estonian	28	1.9	9	32.1
Other	171	11.4	43	25.1
Total	1,500	100	618	41.2

In conclusion, patterns of deputy re-election for the 1966-1970 Supreme Soviets and the 1979-1984 Supreme Soviets reflected strong continuities. Men were more likely than women to be re-elected. CPSU members had better chances than non-party members to be re-elected. Deputies who completed higher education were extremely likely to find themselves in the next convocation of the legislature. While younger deputies had relatively high patterns of representation and, in the Soviet parliament, were more prominent than in Western legislative assemblies, they were not very likely to be selected to serve consecutive terms. However, deputies who had reached middle age or were of retirement age had better chances to serve more than one term. Deputies who occupied positions in the state and party hierarchy had a nearly 75 per cent chance that they would be re-elected. However, less

than one in 5 workers and collective farmers could count <sup>on</sup> serving consecutive terms in the legislature. In addition, Ukrainians maintained their privileged position as the nationality most likely to have deputies re-selected. Nevertheless, several nations-particularly those in Central Asia <sup>had</sup> had their numbers decline drastically. Russian representation increased during this time period. Therefore, based on the relative stability that the Supreme Soviet held during its years of existence during the *zastoi* period, this author is certainly inclined to believe that there were definite patterns established for deputy selection. Indeed, the fact that in 1966 41 per cent of the deputy corpus and in 1984, 41.2 per cent of the deputies were re-elected seems to indicate a rather fixed membership formula. The next section of this chapter focuses on the corps of re-elected deputies who occupied positions in the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and analyses the similarities and differences that occurred in the parliament's composition after the first competitive elections held in Soviet history.

### Deputy Turnover from the Zastoi to the Perestroika Periods

*The 1989 Elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and Methodo<sup>d</sup> logical Problems Electoral Reform Brought to Soviet Studies*

The constitutional and electoral changes <sup>adopted</sup> by the USSR Supreme Soviet on 1 December 1988 eventually led to a major landmark in the USSR's political life. The constitutional amendments changed the supreme organ of state administration from the 1,500 member bi-cameral USSR Supreme Soviet to the 2,250 member USSR Congress of People's Deputies, elected from territorial, national-territorial and public organization seats. As stated earlier, for the first time at a national election, and for that matter, any Soviet election, the



overwhelming majority of seats were contested. In addition, Soviet voters were able to base their choices of candidates on some types of concrete proposals: the election law mandated that all candidates had to put forward some type of programme of their intended activities.

Nevertheless, these reforms present some obstacles in conducting a consistent, scientific study on the aforementioned social groups and their chances for re-election during the *zastoi* and *perestroika* periods. First, the introduction of candidate choice, alongside the introduction of the largely uncontested social organization seats, created a paradoxical situation: competition and lack of competition. Following all rounds of the elections, 399 deputies won seats after uncontested campaigns,<sup>22</sup> moreover, there was only an average of 1.2 candidates per seat for the social organization seats. At this stage in Soviet electoral development, the system changed from an 'acclamatory' type to a 'limited choice' variant.<sup>23</sup> Therefore, the electoral system could have been considered *ne ryba, ne myaso* (literally, neither fish nor meat-or in this case it was neither entirely competitive nor completely non-competitive). These factors seriously impede constructing a consistent application of the factors discussed above in the present comparison.

Second, candidate choice may have affected some previous deputies' chances for election. The question 'Did the inclusion of more candidates than seats hold significance in affecting their chances to be re-elected?' must be asked in this respect. Unfortunately, this is difficult to determine. One of the methodological problems associated with the analysis of the 1989 Elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies derives from the fact that not all candidates had their biographical information printed in the central and republican press. Thus, the present study cannot determine whether or not voters favoured candidates

who served in the 11th Convocation of the Supreme Soviet or those who had not. However, it will be recalled from the previous chapter that Levanskii, Obolonskii and Tokarovskii noted that Soviet voters viewed former Supreme Soviet deputies rather unfavourably. Other questions that cannot be addressed in this study are whether candidates who served in the 11th Convocation fared better in single candidate, two candidate or three or more candidate constituencies. Related to the latter question is that initially, there may have existed some seats or candidacies designated solely for deputies who had served previously. These instances would have been reminiscent of the 'old style' electoral practices.<sup>24</sup>

Another problem of the electoral reform process that affects this study involves the introduction of pre-election platforms of the candidates' future activities. Under the law, all candidates had to present some type of indication of the principles they stood for and sought to further at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. These programmes were infrequently published in the Central and Republican press. Therefore, in this study it is impossible to determine accurately either the existence or level of programmatic differences between candidates who had served in the previous convocation of the Supreme Soviet and the 'newcomers' to Soviet politics. When combined with the factor of candidate choice, the potential for analyzing the electorate's preferences based on issue-oriented voting is further diminished. These programmes were very difficult to obtain if an analyst was not present in the USSR during the time of the elections. Although the USSR's Central Electoral Commission retained copies of the programmes of all the candidates who stood for election, it was impossible for outsiders to review their contents. Even Soviet scholars had difficulties trying to gain access to the Commission's information. For instance, a team of Soviet geographers intended to conduct a study and sought to

obtain information from the Tsentrizbirkom and were refused access to relevant materials.<sup>25</sup> Moreover, when the present author was in Moscow to conduct his field work he was notified by his contact there, a specialist who <sup>had</sup> worked in the Soviet archive system for over twenty years, that the materials for the elections to the Congress, including programmes, were being transferred from the White House to the State Archives of the Russian Federation and would be unavailable for examination during his period of stay.<sup>26</sup> However, some pre-election programmes that the candidates presented to their intended constituents are available.<sup>27</sup> In addition, a major study of the elections in Moscow includes analyses of the platform content of winners and losers.<sup>28</sup> It should also be noted that several Soviet newspapers carried detailed excerpts or the complete texts of candidates' programmes during the campaign. These included *Bakinskii rabochii*,<sup>29</sup> *Kazakhstanskaya pravda*,<sup>30</sup> *Pravda Ukrainy*,<sup>31</sup> *Sovetskaya Belorussia*,<sup>32</sup> *Turkmenskaya iskra*,<sup>33</sup> *Zarya vostoka*,<sup>34</sup> *Kommunist (Yerevan)*,<sup>35</sup> *Sovetskaya Estoniya*,<sup>36</sup> *Sovetskaya Latviya*,<sup>37</sup> *Sovetskaya Litva*,<sup>38</sup> *Sovetskaya Moldaviya*,<sup>39</sup> and *Vechernyaya Moskva*.<sup>40</sup> As stated in the previous chapter, Leningrad newspapers also carried the entire texts or excerpts of candidates' programmes.<sup>41</sup> Therefore, it is possible to present some of their contents and illustrate the primary positions of some of the candidates who were deputies of the Eleventh Convocation of the Supreme Soviet and competing for the Congress.

For instance, Apas Dzhumagulov, born in 1934, a holder of the degree of candidate of economic sciences, a CPSU member, and the Chairman of the Kirgiz Council of Ministers, a candidate in the Slyutnitskii national-territorial district No. 322 of Kirgizia for the 1989 elections, had been previously elected a USSR Supreme Soviet Deputy of the Soviet of Union from territorial district no. 715 in Kirgizia in a pre-term election in 1986.<sup>42</sup> He stated he

would accelerate scientific and technical progress, guarantee the development of the republic's national economy, improve the administrative and economic mechanisms working in the republic, introduce *khuzraschet* and self-financing in Kirgiz labour collectives, concentrate on the further development of cooperatives and lease-holding farms and improve the republic's social conditions.<sup>43</sup>

Another example can be found in the information that the chairman of the Estonian Academy of Sciences, Karl Rebane, included in his manifesto. Rebane, elected to the Soviet of Nationalities from Tallinn-Lenin electoral district, No. 449 in 1984,<sup>44</sup> Tartu-Ropkas electoral district, No. 477 in 1979<sup>45</sup> and Tartu-Tyakhtveresk electoral district, No. 476 in 1974<sup>46</sup> from Estonia, stood as one of 23 candidates for 20 seats allotted to the USSR Academy of Sciences in March 1989. It should be noted, however, that the election platforms of candidates from the social organisations are probably not entirely representative of Soviet programmatic content. Indeed, it has been noted that in the great majority of cases, candidates who competed for these seats in the USSR Congress of People's Deputies often failed to draft their own platforms; rather, they embraced the programme presented by their own association.<sup>47</sup> There were, however, some notable exceptions. For instance, candidates from the USSR Academy of Sciences presented their own programmes<sup>48</sup> as did some contestants for seats from the CPSU,<sup>49</sup> the Committee for Soviet Women,<sup>50</sup> the Union of Cinematographers<sup>51</sup> and the all-Union Council of Veterans of War and Labour.<sup>52</sup> Finally, it has been noted that the candidates' programmes were often very similar, and reduced to 'slogans' in the press and the absence of inter-party competition greatly impeded distinctions between candidates' political positions.<sup>53</sup>

Candidates from these organisations not only were parliamentarians, however; they were representatives from specific social institutions. Therefore, these candidates included policies that would be most relevant to that social institution in their platforms. Rebane's platform was chosen, therefore, for several reasons. First, it was one of the few instances in which the author was able to find some information on the pre-election stances of a deputy who had served in the 1984 Supreme Soviet. Second, it is the only *complete* text of the original document that I was able to find of a deputy re-elected from 1984-1989 (barring, of course, Yeltsin's). Third, although Rebane's platform contains the concerns of science and the development and functioning of the Academies of Science, it also contains his stances on more general political, environmental and social issues. Therefore, it should serve as an illustration-albeit an imperfect one-of an election programme from a deputy who served in the 1984 Supreme Soviet.

#### Academic REBANE Karl Karlovich

Rebane Karl Karlovich-born 1926; Estonian; CPSU member; academic; President of the Academy of Sciences of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic; head of Tartu State University's faculty of laser optics; Hero of Socialist Labour; participant in the Fatherland War, was wounded at the front; has military decorations.

K. K. Rebane is the author of several books, the author or co-author of nearly 200 articles and five author's testimonies (*avtorskikh svidel'stv*). The works are connected with laser optics and the spectroscopy of molecules, crystals and glasses, luminescence, heat luminescence, difused light activated by admixtures of hard bodies, and optical information- (More than 1100 in the *Science Citation Index*)...

Academic K. K. Rebane is in charge of great scientific-organisational work in the republic and also in the USSR Academy of Sciences. He is the chairman of the scientific council of the USSR, 'Spectroscopy of Atoms and Molecules', a member of the editorial boards of several journals including the

international *Optics Communication*, and chairman of the Soviet side of the permanent organisational committee for the series of USSR-USA seminars 'Problems of Laser Optics of Condensed Matter'. In the course of five years he was a member of the Executive Committee and is now a member of the commission 'Physics and Society' of the European Physics Society.

K. K. Rebane is a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia, a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, was a delegate to four CPSU Congresses; a member of the Constitutional Commission of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, a member of the 'Committee of Soviet Scholars in the Defence of Peace and against the Horrors of Nuclear War', a Laureat of the State Prize of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, and was awarded the P. N. Lebedev Gold Medal. He was awarded two Orders of Lenin, the order Labour of the Red Banner, the order of the Fatherland War (first class), the medal 'For Valour' and other medals.

**PROGRAMME of candidate for USSR People's Deputy from the USSR Academy of Sciences Academic Rebane, Karl Karlovich**

**1. SCIENCE**

1.1 In the analysis and decision of problems having essential significance for the country, republic and region, the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Academies of Sciences of the Union Republics must raise the role of science. [The Congress of People's Deputies must] adopt a law on scientific expertise. The financing of fundamental research should come from the state budget to raise firmly the competence of the administration of science.

1.2 To raise the effectiveness of international scientific ties. To broaden the preparation of students and probationary young scholars, engineers and specialists significantly by sending them abroad. The selection of candidates shall be open, based on competition. To create an amendment to the state budget system of hard currency self-financing of scientific work abroad. To develop scientific work with foreign laboratories on a contractual basis.

1.3 To impress upon people working in science to establish and raise the prestige of work in the scientific sphere. To place attention to the conditions of work and everyday life, scientific growth, raising justice in the nomination of young and other perspective scholars...working in serious science.

1.4 To strengthening the material-technical guarantees of science, to raise the instrument making and scientific instrument making in the country. I consider the main reason that many potentially strong laboratories in the Academy of Sciences and institutions of higher education's work is insufficient is that they lack contemporary tools and materials. To raise the level of students' preparations, and in particular by a path of a broad formation of the bases in the faculties in the academies and other institutions.

1.5 To develop cooperation between the Academy of Sciences of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic and the USSR Academy of Sciences and wise coordination of the work of all the academies in the country.

## 2. ECOLOGY

2.1 To assist in the working out of a contemporary ecological policy, combining a thoughtful development of agricultural and industrial manufacturing with active measures to protect the environment. To place serious attention to the ecological spheres closest to the person—the conditions in the flat, in the work place, on transport (sanitary conditions, verification on toxic chemicals, poisons and materials).

2.2 The development of scientific research and the organization of monitoring the environment, guaranteeing the publicity of results. To create active systems of forces for the quick reaction to ecological accidents, which includes drawing attention to the local population (the education and retraining of the analagous civil defence units concerned with the existing system of military preparation), the transfer of forces and means from defence to ecological activities.

2.3 To achieve levels of medical and sanitary services necessary for a struggle with the coming of AIDS in the shortest possible time.

## 3. POLITICS, THE SOCIAL SPHERE

3.1 To stand solidly for the establishment and development of a rule of law state in our country, for the broadening of human rights and their guarantees as law by the judicial system, and for the morale of society, that people are informed of them.

3.2 To regulate the agreed work of the <sup>deputies</sup> scholar in the composition of the Congress of People's <sup>deputies</sup> and Supreme Soviet of the USSR. To tie the scholar to the scientific community. It is necessary that juridical and technical services guarantee this work.

3.3 Among the social tasks, the care of invalids and pensioners is extremely important to me. It is necessary to develop the means of technical assistance; to study the demands of invalids with regards to the construction of buildings and streets, and in the organisation of transport. To introduce a system of compensation to invalids and pensioners in accordance with the growth of the cost of living.<sup>54</sup>

### *Deputies Re-elected from 1984-1989*

What is included in this section of the study is an analysis of the biographical characteristics of the re-elected deputies. Because all deputies in this group served in the USSR Supreme Soviet previously, there is adequate biographical information available for them. Reports of the Central Electoral Commission produced after the elections also provide us with data as to the constituency the deputy represents, his or her party affiliation (which may have changed since the 1984 election, e.g., a member of the Komsomol or a candidate for CPSU membership may have been admitted to CPSU member status), occupation or post at time of election, and place of work. In this study, several characteristics are analysed: gender, party affiliation, re-election by gender and party affiliation, education, age, nationality, occupation and electoral division. The re-elected deputies are compared among themselves <sup>with</sup> and the remaining deputies elected to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in all the aforementioned categories.

Table 3.9 contains data on the new deputy composition elected in 1989. Among the consequences of electoral reform and the 1989 elections was that the rate of deputy re-election was altered radically. At the surface, it is apparent that the reforms put in place under Gorbachev brought in an overwhelmingly new corps of deputies. Of the 1,500 deputies elected in March 1984, only 161 (10.7 per cent) were elected to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. However, in a series of repeat elections which were conducted between 1984 and 1988 an additional 83 deputies who served in the eleventh convocation were also elected to the Congress of People's Deputies; therefore, 244 deputies



from the last convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet were re-elected.<sup>55</sup>

Table 3.9. New Deputies in the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, 1989

Category	All Elected 1989	Re-elected from 1984 SS	New Deputies (%)
<b>Gender</b>			
Including:			
Men	1897	227	88.0
Women	352	17	95.2
<b>Party Status</b>			
Including:			
CPSU members & candidates	1957	238	87.8
Non - Party and Komsomol	292	6	97.9
<b>Education</b>			
Including:			
Secondary	547	25	95.4
Higher	1702	219	87.1
<b>Age</b>			
Including:			
30 and under	187	2	98.9
31 - 40	454	14	96.9
41 - 50	661	52	92.1
51 - 60	691	140	79.7
61 and older	256	36	85.9
<b>Occupation</b>			
Including:			
Agr. & Ind. Management	344	13	96.2
Agr. & Ind. Workers	638	22	96.6
Party Officials	237	106	55.3
State, TU & KSM Officials	245	50	79.6
Health, Culture, Media, Science & Education	618	35	94.3
Military	80	18	77.5
Others	87	0	100.0
<b>Electoral Division</b>			
Including:			
Territorial	749	99	86.8
National - Territorial	750	60	92.0
Social Organizations	750	85	88.7

Moreover, the Congress of People's was a body that was one third larger, with 2,250 deputies. However, it should be noted that 2,249 deputies were elected.<sup>56</sup> When this expansion is taken into account, only 10.8 per cent of the deputies elected had previous experience in national state administration from the Congress's immediate

predecessor. An additional 23 deputies had served in the Supreme Soviet at some other point, bringing the total <sup>number of</sup> deputies who served previously to 267.<sup>57</sup> Therefore, 89.2 per cent of the deputies were entirely new to the supreme state organ. However, it would be incorrect to say that these deputies lacked experience in the USSR's representative institutions. According to official Soviet statistics, about half of the deputies had served as deputies at some level.<sup>58</sup>

As in

Table 3.10 contains data on deputy turnover rates 1984-1989 according to sex. Earlier Soviet elections, men were more likely to be re-elected than women in 1989. However, their rates of re-election were greatly diminished. Under pre-reform conditions, men stood about an even chance of being re-elected. However, under the more competitive conditions, about 22.5 per cent served in consecutive legislatures. Therefore, electoral reform measures and increased competition significantly reduced their re-election potentials. Overall, women's representation declined from 1984-1989; 352 women were elected to the Congress (15.3 per cent of all deputies). Potential reasons why women's representation declined are discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. However, it is significant to note that whereas women had about a 15-16 per cent chance to be re-elected under the old-style election system, only 3.5 per cent of the women elected in 1984 survived as deputies in the Congress. Therefore, the 1989 elections, while altering significantly the sex composition of the Soviet parliament created opportunities for bringing new people into the legislature.

Table 3.10 Deputy Re-election According To Sex

	Men (N)	Men (%)	Women (N)	Women (%)
Elected 1984	1,008	67.2	492	32.8
Of whom those				
Re - Elected 1989	227	22.5	17	3.5

Like <sup>like in</sup> non-competitive predecessors, the elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies showed that Communists were more likely to be elected and re-elected. <sup>elected</sup> When <sup>in</sup> 1984 some 71 per cent of the deputies were CPSU members<sup>59</sup> and nearly 88 per cent were elected in 1989<sup>60</sup>. Therefore, it should once again come as not too big a surprise that the vast majority of re-elected deputies were CPSU members. Among the 244, 238 or 97.5 per cent were CPSU members. Included among the deputies who were not party members there were 4 who belonged <sup>neither</sup> to the CPSU nor the Komsomol and 2 Komsomol members (see Table 3.11). The new electoral conditions, in general, greatly diminished the chances of a CPSU member's potential re-election. Whereas, under the old system, a member would have had about an even chance to serve consecutively, their ranks were cut down to about 22 per cent. Non-party members were significantly biased against in their chances for re-election. However, in 1989, their numbers among the new deputy corpus were virtually non-existent; only 1.4 per cent of them were re-elected.

Table 3.11 Deputy Re-election According To Political Status

	CPSU (N)	CPSU (%)	Non-Party (N)	Non-Party (%)
Elected 1984	1072	71.5	428	28.5
Of whom those				
Re - Elected 1989	238	22.2	6	1.4

Given that in both of the previous categories the data <sup>have</sup> revealed that the re-elected deputies were overwhelmingly male and Communist Party members, it is natural that men were most abundant among re-elected communists. Among the 238 communist party deputies, 225 were <sup>male</sup> (94.5 per cent) and 13 were <sup>female</sup> (5.5 per cent). Among the non-party deputies (six people), women outnumbered men 2:1. It is important to note that in following the patterns of re-election analysed earlier in this chapter, men once again were more likely to have <sup>constituted</sup> a higher percentage of party members and women a higher <sup>pro</sup> portion of the non-party citizens.

Table 3.12 Deputy Turnover According To Sex and Party Affiliation, 1984-1989

	Elected	Re- Elected	Re- Elected
	1984	1989 (N)	1989 (%)
Men	1008	227	22.5
Including: CPSU Members & Candidates	898	225	25.1
Non-Party	110	2	1.8
Women	492	17	3.5
Including: CPSU Members & Candidates	174	13	7.5
Non-Party	318	4	1.3

There are other significant factors which should be noted. As in Hill's study, party membership appears to have assisted former candidates in their re-election bids. There were drastic declines in the rates of re-election for party members of both sexes when compared with both the present author's and Hill's data sets. Male communist party members stood a 54 per cent chance of re-election and the present author noted that 57.4 per cent were re-elected from 1979-1984. In 1989 only about one quarter of male CPSU members who had been deputies of the Eleventh Convocation were re-elected. Nevertheless, this feature is somewhat stronger to the candidate than just being a man. Similarly, while only 3.5 per cent

of women were re-elected, their rates of representation were more than double among party members.

Table 3.13 contains information on deputy re-election according to education. The overwhelming majority of all deputies elected in 1989 had completed or attended institutions of higher education and this factor constituted a very serious departure from previous electoral practices. Of the 2,249 deputies elected by May 1989, 1,702 (75.6 per cent) <sup>achieved</sup> post-secondary education. Similarly, re-elected deputies were overwhelmingly recipients of higher education-219 (89.8 per cent). Conversely, there were <sup>only</sup> 25 (10.2 per cent) who had attained secondary level education.

Table 3.13 Turnover According to Education

Education Level	1984 SS	1989	
	(N)	Re - elected (N)	(%)
Primary	0	0	0
Secondary	685	25	3.6
Higher	813	219	26.9
Unidentified	2	0	0
Total	1,500	244	16.3

Like the other categories considered thus far, the turnover according <sup>to education</sup> was reduced significantly at all levels. In no circumstances was a deputy with primary education who was elected in 1984 and who had served a full term re-elected in 1989. In addition, there was a significant decrease in the percentage of deputies with secondary education qualifications who were re-elected to consecutive terms. In 1984, 17.7 per cent of the deputies with these attributes were re-elected. However, in 1989 only 3.6 of them were returned. About 53.5

per cent of deputies with higher education were re-elected from 1979-1984. However, this figure declined by nearly 50 per cent in 1989: 26.9 per cent of deputies with higher education were re-elected.

The Congress of People's Deputies elected in March-May 1989 had a very middle - aged character: its average age was 47.8 years.<sup>61</sup> Deputies who served in the eleventh convocation were somewhat older; the average deputy was 48.3 years old. However, the re-elected deputies and the composition of the Congress, when taken as a whole, do share some common characteristics. First, the largest share of deputies in both instances were 51 and older. Among re-elected deputies there were 175 (71.7 per cent) in this age group. In the entire Congress there were 947 deputies who had attained 51 or more years (42.1 per cent). Second, deputies 30 and under are the least represented age group among both the re-elected corpus and the aggregate Congress. In the former, 3 (1.2 per cent) had been representatives of the eleventh convocation and among the latter there were 187 (8.3 per cent). In all age groups, the deputy corpus in the entire Congress was predominantly new. There were 185 new deputies aged 30 and under (98.9 per cent); 440 aged 31 - 40 (96.9 per cent); 609 aged 41-50 (92.1 per cent); 552 aged 51 - 60 (79.9 per cent) and 220 (85.9 per cent) aged 61 and older.

Table 3.14 Deputy Turnover, 1984-1989 According to Age Group

Age Group	1984 SS (N)	1989	
		Re - elected (N)	(%)
Under 30	331	3	0.9
31 - 40	186	14	7.5
41 - 50	334	92	27.5
51 - 60	414	106	25.6
61 and older	235	29	12.3
Total	1,500	244	16.3

Table 3.14 contains the rates of turnover between the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies. As the data show, deputies who were elected when they were 30 or younger in 1989 were few and far between in 1989. <sup>Fewer</sup> than 1 per cent entered the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. In addition, it should be noted that compared to their older counterparts, deputies aged 31-40 witnessed the least significant decrease in their share of re-elected deputies. In 1984, 18.1 per cent of the deputies <sup>were</sup> in this age group. However, in 1989 their representation stood at 7.5 per cent.

The three age groups with the highest rates of turnover from 1979-1984 were also subjected to sharp decreases in 1989. However, it is significant to note that the re-election patterns altered radically in 1989. At the last convocation of the Supreme Soviet, deputies aged 51-60 were the ones most frequently re-elected (65.7 per cent) and they were <sup>e</sup> followed respectively by deputies aged 61 and older (55.1 per cent) and those aged 41-50 (46.2 per cent). In stark contrast to the aforementioned pattern, the group with the third largest percentage of re-elected deputies in 1984 emerged as the age cohort which had the greatest share in 1989 (27.6 per cent). Re-elected deputies aged 51-60 dropped from their number one ranking to second place in 1989 losing 40 per cent (25.6 per cent). The most significant decline, however, occurred among the deputies older than retirement age. In 1984, 55.1 per cent of the deputies in this age cohort were re-elected. However, in 1989 their ranks were radically reduced down to 12.3 per cent to the third largest share of re-elected deputies. Without comprehensive data on contestants and their programmes it is impossible to draw substantive conclusions on how the 1989 elections affected patterns of age and re-election. However, it is possible to note that these same factors were altered significantly from previous elections.

There were representatives of 65 nationalities elected to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in 1989.<sup>62</sup> Among the re-elected deputies, there were representatives of 27 nationalities. Therefore, 41.5 per cent of the nationalities which had deputies in the Congress were represented by individuals who had served in the eleventh convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Slavs were the most numerous among re-elected deputies. *they accounted for* 150 re-elected deputies (61.5 per cent). Included in the entire Congress there were 1,378 Slavs (61.3 per cent). However, in comparison with their constitution of the Soviet population they were under-represented: Slavs were 69.8 per cent of the population. In the cases of both the re-elected deputies and the entire Congress Russians were most abundant. Among all deputies in the Congress, Russians constituted 1,026 of its representatives (41.9 per cent). However, data from the re-elected deputies indicate that the Russians comprised a higher proportion of this group-109 (44.7 per cent). Nevertheless, when compared to their share of the population in the USSR's All-Union Census in 1989, Russians were under-represented: at this time they were 50.8 per cent of the population.<sup>63</sup> The 31 re-elected Ukrainians were the second largest national group in this category (12.7 per cent of re-elected deputies). Like their Russian counterparts, the Ukrainian re-elected deputies constituted a higher share of the re-elected group than did Ukrainians in the Congress (11.5 per cent) and were under-represented in comparison with their national composition (15.5 per cent). Also included among the re-elected deputies were 10 Belorussians (4.1 per cent). This figure is somewhat close to their overall representation in the Congress-there were 94 Belorussians elected (4.2 per cent of the composition).



There were 29 deputies of Central Asian origins (11.9 per cent) re-elected in 1989. Overall, there were 259 Central Asians (11.5 per cent) elected to the Congress. Their representation was only slightly lower in both categories (re-elected and elected overall) in comparison to their population statistics (12.1 per cent). Kazakhs were the largest group among Central Asian deputies. There were 10 re-elected Kazakhs (4.1 per cent of re-elected deputies) and 53 in the entire Congress (2.4 per cent). Therefore, Kazakhs exceed their proportion of the Soviet population (2.9 per cent) with their re-elected corpus, however, fell below the figure in the Congress as a whole. Also included in this national group were six re-elected Uzbeks (2.5 per cent). Soviet voters, however, elected 87 Uzbeks to the Congress (3.9 per cent). Uzbeks were under-represented in both categories in accordance with their population results (5.8 per cent). Five Kirgiz deputies were re-elected from the Eleventh Convocation (2 per cent) and 35 were elected to the Congress (1.6 per cent). In both instances, the Kirgiz exceeded their share of the population (0.9 per cent). There were also five re-elected Tadzhiks (2 per cent) and 44 in the over all Congress (approximately 2 per cent). Tadzhiks also exceeded their national proportion (1.5 per cent). Three Turkmenians were re-elected (1.2 per cent) and 40 elected to positions of USSR People's Deputies (1.8 per cent). These figures compared to a 1 per cent share of the population.

Soviet voters re-elected 27 <sup>Transc</sup>aucasians (11.1 per cent) and 192 overall (8.6 per cent) to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in 1989. Among both re-elected deputies and the deputy corpus as a whole, <sup>Transc</sup>aucasian representation exceeded their share of the Soviet population (5.4 per cent). Among the 60 Azeris elected to the Congress (2.7 per cent) there were 12 re-elected deputies (4.5 per cent of re-elected deputies). Their parliamentary representation was slightly higher and composition of re-elected was nearly double their share

of the Soviet population (2.4 per cent). Also among Congress were 71 Georgians (3.3 per cent) <sup>including</sup> 8 re-elected deputies of that nationality (3.3 per cent of re-elected deputies).

Their representation as both re-elected deputies and as a national group in the Congress exceeded their population figures by more than two times (1.4 per cent). Finally from the <sup>Transcaucasians</sup> there were 61 Armenians in the Congress (2.7 per cent) which included seven

re-elected deputies (2.9 per cent of the re-elected corpus). In both categories the Armenians exceeded their national share of the Soviet population (1.6 per cent).

There were 180 deputies from Moldavian or Baltic origins elected to the Congress in 1989 (8 per cent), of whom 12 were elected to the Eleventh Convocation (4.9 per cent of the re-elected corpus). The re-elected representatives of these nationalities included five Moldavians (2.1 per cent of the re-elected deputies), four Latvians (1.6 per cent), two Estonians (0.8 per cent) and a Lithuanian (0.4 per cent). The share of population of these four nationalities (as an aggregate group) was exceeded in both cases of re-elected deputies and the entire deputy corpus when compared to the national representation (3.2 per cent).

The 15 major nationalities comprised 2,009 of the entire deputy corpus elected in 1989 (89.3 per cent) and 220 of the re-elected deputies (90.1 per cent). Twelve other nationalities (those without republican status in 1989) were represented by deputies who had served in the Eleventh Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Overall, there were 112 deputies from these nationalities elected to the Congress (approximately 5 per cent) which included 24 re-elected deputies (9.9 per cent). Therefore, their representation among re-elected deputies was nearly twice their representation in the entire Congress.

In all nationalities which had re-elected deputies, most of the deputies elected to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies were new. This included 54 Armenians (88.5 per cent), 48 Azeris (80 per cent), 84 Belorussians (89.4 per cent), 39 Estonians (95.1 per cent), 63 Georgians (88.7 per cent), 43 Kazakhs (81.1 per cent), 30 Kirgiz (85.7 per cent), 40 Latvians (90.9 per cent), 51 Lithuanians (98.1 per cent), 38 Moldavians (88.4 per cent), 917 Russians (89.4 per cent), 39 Tadzhiks (88.6 per cent), 37 Turkmenians (92.5 per cent), 227 Ukrainians (88 per cent) and 82 Uzbeks (94.3 per cent) from the major nationalities. Among the nationalities without republics there were 5 new Abkhazians (62.5 per cent), 3 Avars (60 per cent), 5 Checheni (71.4 per cent), 4 Karakalpak (80 per cent), 8 Mari (88.9 per cent), 9 Mordovians (81.8 per cent), 16 Tatars (69.6 per cent), 4 Tuvin (66.7 per cent), 10 Yakuts (90.9 per cent), 9 Germans (90 per cent), 10 Kabardins (90.9 per cent) and 5 Kabardins (83.3 per cent). Table 3.15 contains data on deputy turnover according to nationality.

Table 3.15 Deputy Turnover According to Nationality

Nationality	Elected		Re-elected
	1984 SS	1989 (N)	1989 (%)
Russians	684	109	15.9
Ukrainians	172	31	18.0
Belorussians	53	10	18.9
Uzbeks	58	6	10.3
Kazakhs	37	10	27.0
Georgians	46	8	17.4
Azeris	49	12	24.5
Moldavians	31	5	16.1
Kirgiz	28	5	17.9
Tadzhiks	24	5	20.8
Armenians	24	7	29.2
Turkmenians	30	3	10.0
Lithuanians	39	1	2.6
Latvians	26	4	15.4
Estonians	25	2	8.0
Others	174	26	14.9
Total	1500	244	16.3

Re-elected deputies of all nationalities declined significantly from 1984-1989. There were several notable reductions in the shares of re-elected deputies for particular nationalities. For instance, Ukrainians who were the most favoured in pre-reform elections witnessed the greatest share in their re-elected share (37.9 per cent) and Turkmenians suffered a reduction of 36.4 per cent. Both of these nations had decreases between 1 and 2 standard deviations greater than the overall decrease in re-elected deputies. Russians and Lithuanians (respectively decreased by 31.8 per cent and 26.4 per cent) had their ranks reduced within the range of 1 standard deviation above the average decline. Estonians (-24.1 per cent), Moldavians (-22.4 per cent), Georgians (-20.9 per cent) and Tadzhiks (-17.1 per cent) had re-elected corpus declines within 1 standard deviation of the mean. It is notable to indicate that three of the five Central Asian nationalities had their shares of re-elected deputies reduced to within two percentage points of each other. Kirgiz were reduced by 14.2 per cent, Kazakhs by 12.5 per cent and Uzbeks by 12.3 per cent. Azeris representation amongst re-elected deputies was reduced by 12.2 per cent and the share of Latvian and Belorussian incumbents sank by 6.5 per cent and 6.1 per cent respectively. The Armenians' drop in rate of re-elected deputies was the least significant. There were 1.8 per cent fewer re-elected Armenians in 1989 than in 1984. It should also be noted that the re-election rate amongst the non-titular nations declined by 10.5 per cent.

Perhaps one of the questions that most seriously linked with electoral reform is whether or not re-elected deputies, because they were affiliated with the 'old system', were more abundant among social organisation deputies than those elected in other electoral divisions. There are several reasons for addressing this problem. First, despite the fact that there were more candidates than seats allocated for the social organisations, as it will be recalled,

the least degree of <sup>competition</sup> occurred in this electoral division. Therefore, these seats could have served as a place for getting individuals re-elected who <sup>might</sup> not have stood a good chance in a more competitive district. Second, according to the Law on Elections, only a closed amount of people actually had the right to vote for people in the social organizations -delegates to congresses, plenums and conferences of their all-union bodies. Therefore, these seats could have been seen as places of prestige-the higher up one was in the political hierarchy of the USSR, the more chance the person had to be selected for a seat from one of the social organisations. Despite these arguments, deputies re-elected from the eleventh convocation to the Congress through the social organization seats were actually the *least* represented-60 of 244 deputies (24.6 per cent). There were 40 per cent more (84) re-elected deputies who entered the Congress through the territorial constituencies-the most competitive of the electoral divisions. This, however, does not mean that these deputies universally participated in very competitive campaigns. The relative lack of comprehensive lists of candidates for the constituencies inhibits the drawing of conclusive evidence on the degree of competition the candidates who served in the last USSR Supreme Soviet faced. The largest number of re-elected deputies entered the Congress after winning in the national-territorial districts. As noted earlier, there was a relatively large number of *obkom* first secretaries who ran in these constituencies (who were subsequently deputies in the last convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet) and many did so unopposed.

Of the 38 social organisations allocated seats through the Law on Elections, 14 were represented by deputies who had served in the last USSR Supreme Soviet session (36.8 per cent). This group included the USSR Academy of Sciences, Union of Consumers' Societies, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Voluntary Association for <sup>Assistance to</sup> the Armed

Forces (DOSAAF), Kolkhoz associations, Komsomol, Soviet Women's Committee, Trade Unions, Rodina, Union of Artists, Union of Composers, Union of Theatrical Workers, and the All-Union Organization for Veterans of War and Labour. Thus, those whose seats were filled by deputies who had not been in the last convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet included the All-Union Society of Fishing Kolkhozes (2 deputies), <sup>the V.I. Lenin All-Union</sup> (VASKhNIL) (10), <sup>Academy of Agriculture Science</sup> Academy of Medical Sciences (10), Academy of Pedagogical Sciences (10), Academy of Artists (5), Union of Scientific and Engineering Societies (5), All-Union Society of Inventors and Rationalisers (5), Union of Architects (10), Union of Journalists (10), Union of Cinematographers (10), Red Cross and Red Crescent (10), Znanie (10), Soviet Fund for Peace plus the 8 committees for the advancement of peace, solidarity and international cooperation (7), Soviet Peace Committee plus the Associations for cooperation of the United Nations in the USSR (5), Soviet Fund for Culture (5), Soviet Fund for Charity and Health (5), Social Sporting Associations of the USSR (3), Temperance Union, the Book Lovers' Society, Society for Friends of the Cinema, the Musical Society and the Stamp collectors - each with 1 deputy. It is significant to note that the CPSU held the largest numeric representation of re-elected deputies to any organisation. Nearly one-third of the 100 seats allocated to <sup>it</sup> was held by deputies who had been elected to the Eleventh Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The Writers' Union possessed the largest share of re-elected deputies. Table 3.16 contains data on re-elected deputies elected to social organisation seats.

Table 3.16 Re-elected Deputies Elected to Social Organisation Seats

Organisation	Allocated	Re-elected Deputies (N)	Re-elected Deputies (%)
AN	30	4	13.3
Consumers' Socs	40	2	5.0
CPSU	100	33	33.0
DOSAAF	15	1	6.7
Kolkhozes	58	2	3.4
KSM	75	2	2.7
KSovZh	75	1	1.3
Writers' Union	10	4	40.0
Artists' Union	10	1	10.0
Union of Theatrical Workers	10	1	10.0
Rodina	5	1	20.0
VVIT	75	4	5.3
Trade Unions	100	4	4.0

\* For a list of acronyms, see the errata at the end of this dissertation

Table 3.17 contains data on re-election according to occupation group. In all occupation groups the percentages of re-elected deputies declined significantly. For instance, the share of industrial and agricultural managers decreased by about half. In 1984 about 38 per cent had been re-elected whereas in 1989 they accounted for about 19 per cent. While agricultural and industrial workers had the least chances of re-election under the previous system, it appears that their fate turned for the worse in 1989; slightly fewer than 3 per cent of the toilers who sat in the Eleventh Convocation were re-elected. White collar workers in health, culture, the media and science and the intelligentsia had their share of incumbents reduced by nearly 20 per cent after the elections to the Congress.

Earlier research has noted that party and state officials had the best chances to be re-elected under the old system. Indeed, this appears to have remained consistent in 1989 but with significant alterations. Perhaps the most significant overall decline can be found amongst the state/trade union/Komsomol officials. In 1984, nearly 72 per cent of these officials had

served in the Tenth Convocation of the Supreme Soviet. However, in 1989, only a combined total of 22 per cent were incumbents. It is necessary to state that there may have been some aspects of the electoral legislation which reduced the share of candidates who competed for the Congress from the state ranks. According to Article 11 of the 1988 Electoral Law USSR ministers were prohibited from holding their posts and seats in the Congress simultaneously. The military also had its share of re-elected deputies reduced from 65.5 per cent in 1984 to just under 33 per cent in 1989.

Table 3.17 Deputy Re-election According to Occupation

Occupation by Sector	1984 SS	1989	1989
	Re - Elected (N)	Re - Elected (N)	Re - Elected (%)
Ind. & Agr. Management	68	13	19.1
Ind. & Agr. Workers	769	22	2.9
Party Officials	250	106	42.4
State Officials	198	43	21.7
TU/KSM Officials	19	7	36.8
Health, Culture, Media, Science and Education	134	35	26.1
Military	55	18	32.7
Others	7	0	0.0
Total	1500	244	16.3

CPSU officials still had the largest single share of re-elected deputies in 1989. Nevertheless it is significant to note that the share of CPSU officials who sat in continuous sessions of the legislature from 1984-1989 dropped markedly from previous years. In 1984, nearly three-fourths of all party officials who had served in the Tenth Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet survived to the next parliamentary session. In contrast, in 1989 this share was reduced to about 42 per cent. Therefore, it is significant to note that while the share of re-elected deputies was reduced significantly amongst all occupation groups, CPSU officials still appear to have had the greatest potential chances for re-election.



## Deputy Turnover and Key Appointments in the New State Configuration

As mentioned earlier, the USSR Congress of People's Deputies was empowered by the Constitution to elect and appoint specific individuals to positions of state power. Therefore, according to Article 108 (points 6-11), the USSR Congress of People's Deputies would elect the USSR Supreme Soviet, its Chair and First Deputy Chairman, endorse the Chair of the USSR Council of Ministers, the Chair of the USSR People's Control Commission, the Chair of the USSR Supreme Court and the Chief State Arbitrator of the USSR and elect the Committee for Constitutional Supervision of the USSR. It should be noted, that the majority of these posts went to deputies who had been deputies of the Eleventh Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet. For instance, it is well-known that Gorbachev, who had been a deputy in the final convocation of the Supreme Soviet had been elected by the Congress's deputies as the new Supreme Soviet's Chair-of the 2,221 deputies who participated in the vote, 2,123 voted for him and 87 rejected his candidacy (95.6 per cent).<sup>64</sup> In addition, Anatolii, <sup>LUK'YANOV</sup> another deputy from the Eleventh Convocation, was elected the Congress' First Deputy Chair (in an open vote) in which 179 deputies voted against him and 137 abstained.<sup>65</sup> Two former USSR Supreme Soviet deputies of the Eleventh Convocation received the Congress's endorsements for leading posts. Nikolai Ryzhkov was endorsed as candidate for the Chair of the USSR Council of Ministers and Gennadii Kolbin was backed as the contestant for the Chair of the USSR People's Control Commission.<sup>66</sup> However, it should be noted that 'newcomers' were elected to the other key posts. The Congress endorsed Yevgenii Smolentsev as Chair of the Supreme Court, Yurii Matveev as Chief State Arbitrator and Aleksandr Sukharev as General Procurator.<sup>67</sup>

Soviet statistical sources have virtually ignored the composition of the First USSR Congress of People's Deputies' Committees and Commissions. At present the demographic breakdown of the Mandate Commission of the Congress is the only statistical information which has been made public. Soviet sources indicate that among the 47 members of this commission there were 6 deputies who worked in industry, construction, transportation and communication, 8 agricultural workers, 8 party workers, a single deputy who worked in the system of the soviets, 3 trade union and Komsomol workers, 3 workers in various level educational establishments, 6 workers in health, 3 scientific workers, 5 from culture, arts and press, 1 worker from consumers' cooperatives, 2 servicemen, and a single pensioner.<sup>68</sup> Amongst these deputies there were 6 women, 42 CPSU members and 5 non-party citizens.<sup>69</sup> It should be noted that Soviet statisticians did not include any information on whether or not the corpus of this commission was predominantly new or if there was a considerable <sup>number</sup> of deputies from the Eleventh Convocation had <sup>constituted</sup> its ranks. The present author's findings suggest that this particular commission was overwhelmingly new. Of the 47 deputies, 45 had not been members of the last Supreme Soviet. Only Vladimir Ivashko, at the time the second secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine's Central Committee, and Ivan Polozkov, first secretary of the Krasnodar *kraikom*, sat as members of the Eleventh Convocation, the former serving as one of the commission's two deputy chairs.<sup>70</sup>

Table 3.18 contains information on re-elected deputies who staffed the Commissions and Committees of the Congress. There is evidence that indicates that the overwhelming majority of the posts were held by deputies who had not sat previously in the Eleventh Convocation of the Supreme Soviet (81.6 per cent). Nevertheless, it is possible to suggest that there were larger numbers of deputies who had served under the previous regime in those bodies and

commissions that seem to have had more influence on the direction of policy-making. For instance, the largest share of re-elected deputies sat in the presidium of the Congress, 8 of 18. Chingiz Aitmatov, Viktor Ambartsumyan, Vitalii Vorotnikov, Mikhail Gorbachev, Anatolii Luk'yanov, Soniyabibi Mukhabatova, Rafik Nishanov and Boris Paton had all been members of the last Supreme Soviet.<sup>71</sup> In addition, 21 of 68 members of the Editorial Commission for the Preparation of the draft Resolution of the Congress for the Report 'On the Basic Directions of the Domestic and Foreign Policies of the USSR' served in the Eleventh Convocation of the Supreme Soviet.<sup>72</sup> Moreover, more than one in three deputies who sat on the Constitutional Commission had been a deputy in the Eleventh Convocation.<sup>73</sup> The exception was the Commission for the preparation for a draft law on constitutional supervision in which Grigorii Yereinei was its sole member.<sup>74</sup> Conversely, there were fewer re-elected deputies among those commissions with reduced impact on policy-making or those which conducted inquiries. Among the 75 members of the Accounting Commission, only 4 members were re-elected deputies (Vladimir Anishchev, Georgii Arbatov, Genrikh Novozhilov and Grigorii Tkemeladze).<sup>75</sup> Similarly, only three re-elected deputies sat on the commission connected with the Tbilisi massacre (Vladimir Govorov, Nursultan Nazarbaev and Roald Sagdeev),<sup>76</sup> Olzhas Suleimenov was the sole re-elected deputy on the Gdlyan commission<sup>77</sup> and Aleksandr N. Yakovlev (commission chair), Chingiz Aitmatov and Georgii Arbatov served on the commission evaluating the Nazi-Soviet Pact.<sup>78</sup>

Table 3.18 Re-elected Deputies in Commissions of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies

CPD Commissions	All Deputies	Re-elected Depts (N)	Re-elected Depts (%)
Including:			
Mandate	47	2	4.3
Accounting	75	4	5.3
Editorial	68	21	30.9
Tbilisi Events	24	3	12.5
Gdlyan Commission	16	1	6.3
Soviet-German Pact	26	2	7.7
Constitutional Commission	107	37	34.6
Constitutional Review			
Draft Law Commission	23	1	4.3
Total	386	71	18.4

Re-elected deputies in the Supreme Soviet, while in the minority of deputies, were slightly more abundant than in the Congress. For instance, of the 542 deputies, there were 62 (11.4 per cent) who sat in the Eleventh Convocation.<sup>79</sup> It should also be noted that an additional 4 deputies had served in other sessions of the Supreme Soviet.<sup>80</sup> Therefore, 87.8 per cent of the deputies had never served at the national level until 1989. Half, nevertheless, had experience as deputies to the Supreme Soviets of union and autonomous republics and the local soviets of people's deputies.<sup>81</sup>

Although the permanently functioning part of the Soviet legislature was <sup>composed of</sup> an overwhelmingly new corps of first-time national-level parliamentarians, their leading posts had a significantly high number of re-elected deputies among their ranks. The cases of Mikhail Gorbachev and Anatolii Luk'yanov have already been discussed. However, it should also be noted that the chairs of both chambers, Yevgennii Primakov and Rafik Nishanov, respectively the chairs of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, had been deputies from the last Supreme Soviet.<sup>82</sup> In addition, half of the deputy chairs of the Soviet

of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities were members of the Eleventh Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Deputy Chair of the Soviet of Union Aleksandr Mokanu and Deputy Chair of the Soviet of Nationalities Georgii Tarazevich sat in the Supreme Soviet during its last Convocation; their colleagues (respectively) Bayan Iskakov and Ilmar Bishar were new to the Supreme Soviet.<sup>83</sup>

Specialised tasks and policy-making activities took place in various committees of the Supreme Soviet (which included among its ranks, in addition to the USSR Supreme Soviet deputies, USSR Congress Deputies who were not elected to the permanently-functioning branch of the legislature), and special commissions of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. USSR Supreme Soviet Committees focused on International Affairs, Questions of Defence and State Security, Questions of Legislation, Legality and Law and Order, Questions of the Work of the Soviets of People's Deputies, the Development of Government and Self-Government, Questions of Economic Reform, Agrarian Questions and Food, Questions of Construction and Architecture, Science, National Education and Culture, the People's Health Protection, Women's Affairs, the Protection of the Family, Maternity and Childhood, Veterans' Affairs and Invalids, Youth Affairs, Questions of Ecology and the Rational Use of Natural Resources and Questions of Glasnost', Civil Rights and Appeals.<sup>84</sup> The Soviet of the Union's Commissions included a Planning and Budget-Financial Commission, a Commission for the Questions of the Development of Industry, Energy, Machinery and Technology, Commission for Questions of Transport, Communications and Information and a Commission on Questions of Labour, Prices and Social Policy.<sup>85</sup> The Soviet of Nationalities' Commissions focused on National Policy and International Relations, Questions of Social and Economic Development of the Union and Autonomous Republics,

Autonomous *oblasti* and Autonomous Districts, Questions of Consumer Goods, Trade, Communal and Other Services and a Commission on Questions of the Development of Culture, Language, National and International Traditions and the Protection of Historical Legacies.<sup>86</sup> Among these Committees and Commissions, the overwhelming majority of deputies who served on them had not been members of the previous convocation of the Supreme Soviet. Indeed, 91.5 per cent of the deputies who staffed these committees and commissions fell under this category; 79 had served in the Eleventh Convocation; their share in other ad hoc commissions and committees formed in the Supreme Soviet and the Soviet of Nationalities was not that significant.<sup>87</sup> Tables 3.17 and 3.18 contain data on re-elected deputies and their presence in these committees and commissions.

Table 3.19 Re-elected Deputies in the Committees of the Supreme Soviet

Committees of the Supreme Soviet	All Deputies	Re-Elected Deps (N)	Re-Elected Deps (%)
Including:			
International Affairs	44	14	31.8
Questions of Defence and State Security	43	11	25.6
Questions of Legislation, Legality and Law & Order	43	4	9.3
Questions of the Work of the Soviets of People's Deputies, Development of Government & Self-Government	44	6	13.6
Questions of Economic Reform	43	2	4.7
Agrarian Questions and Food	43	3	7.0
Questions of Construction & Architecture	46	2	4.3
Science, National Education & Culture	50	2	4.0
Defence of People's Health	40	2	5.0
Women's Affairs, Defence of the Family, Maternity & Childhood	39	1	2.6
Affairs of Veterans & Invalids	38	1	2.6
Youth Affairs	39	1	2.6
Questions of Ecology & Rational Use of Natural Resources	50	3	6.0
Questions of Glasnost', Civil Rights and Appeals	40	3	7.5
Total	602	55	9.1
Other Commission			
Deputy Commission for the Review of privileges	28	5	17.9

Table 3.20 Re-Elected Deputies in the Permanent Commissions of The Chambers of the Supreme Soviet

	All Deputies	Re-elected Deps (N)	Re-elected Deps (%)
Soviet of the Union			
Including:			
Planning and Budget-Financial Commission	46	1	2.2
Questions of the Development of Industry, Energy, Machinery & Technology	42	2	4.8
Questions of Transport, Communication & Information	37	0	0.0
Questions of Labour, Prices & Social Policy	41	5	12.2
Soviet of Nationalities			
Including:			
National Policy & International Relations	42	5	11.9
Questions of the Social & Economic Development of the Union & Autonomous Republics, Autonomous oblasts & districts	41	5	12.2
Consumer Goods, Trade, Communal-Social & Other Services to the Population	34	2	5.9
Questions of the Development of Culture, Language, National & International Traditions & the Defence of Historical Legacies	37	4	10.8
Total	320	24	7.5
Other Commissions of the Soviet of Nationalities			
Commission on Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast	12	3	25.0
Problems of Soviet Germans	13	1	7.7
Problems of the Crimean-Tatar People	15	1	6.7
Total	25	4	16.0

In addition, it should be noted that there were 6 re-elected amongst the committee and commission chairs. Therefore, nearly one-third of these bodies were staffed by deputies of the Eleventh Convocation. Nevertheless, it needs to be established that there were no re-elected deputies who chaired any of the Soviet of the Union's Permanent Commissions.<sup>88</sup> However, there were three each who headed the Supreme Soviet's Committees (Vladimir Lapygin, Questions of Defence and State Security; Boris Yeltsin, Questions of Construction

and Architecture and Kakimbek Salykov, Questions of Ecology and Rational Use of Natural Resources); and three who chaired permanent commissions in the Soviet of Nationalities (Georgii Tarazevich, National Policy and International Relations; Gennadii Kiselev, Consumer Goods, Trade, Communal and Other Services; and Chingiz Aitmatov, Questions of the Development of Culture, Language, National and International Traditions and the Defence of Historical Legacies).<sup>89</sup>

## Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated several important features of the compositions of pre-reform Soviet legislatures and the effects that electoral reform measures have had on them. First, there were specific quotas that party officials had to meet to fill deputyships in the USSR Supreme Soviet. Although there were many more 'popular representatives' among these deputies in the USSR Supreme Soviet than would be found in other parliaments, their representation was not nearly as high as their overall share in the population. However, their numbers were made up <sup>at the expense</sup> of white collar professionals. <sup>underrepresentation</sup> The greatest bias towards any particular social group was towards the *nomenklatura* whose share of the deputies was much larger than their representation in the overall population. Re-election was a popular indicator of power within the pre-reform Soviet political system. Ronald J. Hill's research found that men who belonged to the party-state hierarchy and were of Slavic origins had the greatest chances to be re-elected from 1966-1970. The present author has argued that the data presented above indicate that this pattern continued throughout the *zastoi* period by focusing on the 1979-1984 period.



The elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies altered the composition of the Soviet legislature. First, there was a significant decline in the number of deputies who were re-elected from 1984-1989. Therefore, the number of people serving as national-level parliamentarians for the first time was very great indeed. Therefore, the elections brought forth a predominantly new corps of deputies. This has been observed in the re-elected deputies' share amongst the entire Congress and their representation in the USSR Supreme Soviet. In this sense, the electoral reform measures helped bring about a departure from the earlier electoral and appointment practices. Second, the number and share of popular representatives declined significantly. Third, there was a significant increase amongst the number of more highly educated deputies and broadly defined white collar deputies.

Nevertheless, there are some results that appear to hold some facets of continuity from previous elections. Communists were still very prominent amongst the legislators. In fact, their representation increased. This is visible amongst the entire corps of deputies and the re-elected deputies. Although deputy re-election was reduced significantly, the old pattern remained in place: those who were re-elected were predominantly Slav men employed in the party-state apparatus. The following chapter examines how the electoral reform measures resulted in continuity, contradiction and departure from previous electoral practices by analysing the place of women in the 1989 elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

## NOTES

1. A. Ya. Shaikovich, 'Prostranstvo narodnykh deputatov SSSR (analiz poimennykh golosovaniia na II i III s"ezdakh narodnykh deputatov)', *Istoriya SSSR*, 1992, No. 1, pp. 4-40; Tsentr prikladnykh politicheskikh issledovaniia INDEM (Informatika dlia demokratii), *Informatsionno-analiticheskii byulleten' (vypusk 1): Vtoroi*

*i Tretii S"ezdy narodnykh deputatov SSSR* (Moscow: Inter-Verso, 1990); Giulietto Chiesa with Douglas Taylor Northrup, *Transition to Democracy: Political Change in the Soviet Union, 1987-1991* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1993).

2. Data were compiled from *Deputaty Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR: desyatyi sozyv* (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1979) and *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: odinnadstatyi sozyv* (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1984).

3. Data derived from *ibid* and *Narodnye deputaty SSSR*, (Moscow: Vneshtorgizdat, 1990); 'Spisok narodnykh deputatov SSSR, izbrannykh ot territorial'nykh, natsional'no-territorial'nykh okrugov i obshchestvennykh organizatsii', *Izvestiya*, 5 April 1989, pp. 2-12, and subsequent lists which were published in *ibid.*, 16 April 1989, 21 May 1989, 25 May 1989 and 26 May 1989; 'Soobshchenie izbiratel'noi komissii po vyboram narodnykh deputatov SSSR ot KPSS', *Pravda*, 19 March 1989, pp. 1-2; 'Spisok narodnykh deputatov SSSR ot Komiteta Sovetskikh Zhenshchin', *Rabotnitsa*, 1989, No. 5, pp. 9-10. Additional information has been extracted from Gavin Helf, *A Biographic Directory of Soviet Regional Party Leaders, Part I: RSFSR Oblasts, Krai and ASSRs* and *ibid. Part II: Union Republic Oblasts and ASSRs*, (Munich: Radio Liberty Research: 1988), 2nd ed.; Dawn Mann, Robert Monyak and Elizabeth Teague, *The Supreme Soviet: A Biographical Directory*, (Washington, D.C., Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1989) and Alexander Rahr, *A Biographical Directory of the top 100 Soviet Leaders*, (Munich: Radio Liberty Research, 1988), 2nd ed. Other information has been derived from pre-term election announcements and results contained in *Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR*, 1984, No. 20, items 353 and 354; No. 43, items 746-748; 1985, No. 5, items 75-84; No. 17, items 289-291; No. 34, items 616-619; No. 43, items 816-818; 1986, No.3, items 47-53; No. 18, 'O naznachenii vyborov po otdel'nym izbiratel'nym okrugam', p. 303; No. 38, 'O naznachenii vyborov po otdel'nym izbiratel'nym okrugam', pp. 779-780; No. 40, 'O naznachenii vyborov po otdel'nym izbiratel'nym okrugam', p. 800; 1987, No. 4, 'O naznachenii vyborov po otdel'nym izbiratel'nym okrugam', pp. 63-64; No. 8, 'O naznachenii vyborov po otdel'nym izbiratel'nym okrugam'; No. 21, item 280, pp. 324-325; No. 50, item 805, pp. 814-815 and 1988, No. 7, item 78, pp. 70-71.

4. Anatolii Shaikevich, 'Portret v manere Rubensa: Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR epokhi zastoya', *Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremenost'*, 1991, No. 4, pp. 105-118, at p. 105.

5. Roger A. Clarke, 'The Composition of the USSR Supreme Soviet 1958-1966', *Soviet Studies*, Vol. XIX, No. 1 (July 1967), pp. 53-65, at p. 53.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 56.

8. *Ibid.*

9. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 60-65.

11. Shaikevich, *op. cit.*, pp. 105-106.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 106. See especially the figures contained in Table 1.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 107.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 108. In 1984, there were only 23 women in the US Congress (4 per cent) and among them there were only 2 senators. These figures are contained in Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie SSSR, *Zhenshchiny v SSSR 1985 g.: statisticheskie materialy* (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1985), p. 5.

15. For a comparative discussion see Valerii Merkin, 'Politiki: Zhenskoe litso', *Politika* (Tallinn), 1991, No. 7, pp. 47-54.

16. Shaikevich, 'Portret...', p. 108.

17. Ibid., pp. 107-108.

18. Ibid., p. 109. On the same page, in note 5, Shaikevich defines what he considers to be the *nomenklatura* for the 1966-1984 period. He writes:

For our research it is natural to adopt the following understanding of *nomenklatura*: a *nomenklatura* position secured its possessor guaranteed election to the USSR Supreme Soviet. It was mandatory to include in these positions those concerned on the Union level-posts of secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee, CPSU Central Committee department heads, ministers, the Chairman of the Party Control Committee, the secretaries of the Central Auditing Commission of the CPSU Central Committee, the Chairmen of *Tsentrosoyuza*, DOSAAF, the President of the Academy of Medical Science, the President of VASKhNIL, the secretary of the Central Committee of the VLKSM, heads of the Union of Writers, the Union of Composers, the Chairman of the Supreme Court and the Procurator General; on the union and republican levels [they included] the posts of Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Chairman of the KGB, the head of trade unions, the first secretary of the capital's *gorkom*, and the President of the Academy of Sciences. In addition, there were also the posts of first and second secretaries of the Communist Parties of the republics, commanders of fleets and military districts, deputy defence ministers, the first secretary of an *obkom*. Finally the *nomenklatura* concerned second secretaries of the Leningrad and Bashkir *obkoms*, the Moscow *gorkom*, the first secretaries of the *gorkoms* of Leningrad, Kutaisk, Kirovokan, Leninakan, Kirovabad, Sumgait, and the chairmen of the *gorispolkom* of Moscow, 14 *kraispolkoms* and *oblispolkoms* (Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Rostov, Altai, Gor'kii and others), the rectors of Moscow, Tartu, and Yerevan [State] Universities, chief editors of *Pravda*, *Izvestiya*, and the journal *Kommunist*, the director of the Zil Industrial Association, the Khar'kov Heavy Machine Tool, Vol'ga Automobile, Ufa Motor, Leningrad Optical-Mechanic, Chelyabinsk, Altai and Minsk Tractor Factories, the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical and Noril'sk Mining-Metallurgical Combines and *Yuzhmash* (Southern Machine Tool Factory). Also included were the Chairmen of the Councils of Ministers of Bashkiriya, Buryatiya, Udmurtiya, Abkhaziya, Dagestan and Tatarstan.

19. Ibid.

20. The term 'job slot' was coined by Robert V. Daniels and this line of argument is followed in Evan Mawdsley, 'The 1990 Central Committee of the CPSU in Perspective', *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 5 (1991), pp. 897-912. See especially the references to Daniels' work in note 3 on p. 911. A related discussion on the shifting membership rotation among workers, peasants and women members of the Central Committee is found in William A. Clark, 'Token Representation in the CPSU Central Committee', *ibid.*, pp. 913-929.

21. Ronald J. Hill, 'Continuity and Change in USSR Supreme Soviet Elections', *The British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 2 (1972), pp. 47-67, at p. 47.

22. 'Doklad Mandatnoi Komissii', *Pervyi s"ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR, 25 maya-9 iyunya 1989 g.: Stenograficheskii otchet*, (Moscow: Verkhovnyi Sovet/Izvestiya, 1989), 6 Vols, Vol. 1, pp. 41-45, p. 41; *Sostav narodnykh deputatov SSSR, Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, postoyannykh komissii palat i komitetov Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo SSSR: statisticheskii sbornik* (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1989), p. 3.

23. See discussion of these types of elections in Martin Harrop and William L. Miller, *Elections and Voters* (London: Macmillan, 1987), chapter 1.

24. During these elections, there were instances in which *obkom* first secretaries stood as candidates for deputy unopposed in rural constituencies. See the discussion raised in Darrell Slider, 'The Soviet Union', *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 1990).

25. A. V. Berezkin, V. A. Kolosov, M. E. Pavlovskaya, N. V. Petrov and L. V. Smiryagin, 'The Geography of the 1989 Elections of People's Deputies of the USSR (Preliminary Results)', *Soviet Geography*, Vol. XXX, No. 8 (October 1989), pp. 607-634.

26. Liudmilla Selivanova, VISAR Information and Travel Agency, personal correspondence with author, 3 November 1993. She wrote, 'Unfortunately, at present you will not be able to examine the records on the elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in 1989 as there is no [sic] excess to them because they are being transferred from the White House to the State Archives of the Russian Federation.'

27. The most commonly available programme is Boris Yeltsin's, 'Kandidat v narodnye deputaty SSSR po moskovskomu gorodskomu natsional'no-territorial'nomu okragu No. 1 Boris Nikolaevich Yel'tsin'. The author is grateful to Nicholas Glossop who provided him with a photocopy of this document. It is translated from *Moskovskaya pravda* 21 March 1989, in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, SU/0421, p. C1, and David Lane, *Soviet Society Under Perestroika*, (London: Routledge, 1992), 2nd ed., pp. 92-94.

28. Brendan Kiernan and J. Aistrup, 'The 1989 Elections to the Congress of People's Deputies in Moscow', *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 6, 1991, pp. 1009-64.

29. In Azerbaidzhan excerpted programmes of candidates appeared in the republican newspaper *Bakinskii rabochii*, in the column 'Znakomstvo s kandidatom'. Examples include the platforms of Firudin Mamedov (2 March 1989, p. 2), Khurman Abbasova (4 March 1989, p. 1), Vladimir Nikolaevich Chernavin (5 March 1989, p. 2), Balazhiry Tofik Bagirov, Kamil Alyar Gasanalieva and Rukhi Mursal Aleskerova (14 March 1989, p. 1).

30. *Kazakhstanskaya pravda* published the policies of N. A. Drizhd and Oleg Soskovets (3 March 1989, p. 2), Nikolai Aleksandrovich Markin and Petr Alekseevich Poniakin (10 March 1989, p. 2), Syrym Albasov (19 March 1989, p. 1) and N. P. Vasko and V. G. Shumilov (22 March 1989, p. 1).

31. Selected platforms were included in *Pravda Ukrainy*. These included I. A. Vatorchuk, V. V. Vol'kov and M. V. Komov (4 March 1989, p. 3), D. I. Zababuro and G. I. Revenko (18 March 1989, pp. 1 - 2), Yu. A. Kol'tsov (21 March 1989, p. 3), V. S. Shevchenko (22 March 1989, pp 1 - 3), V. A. Zgurskii (23 March 1989, p. 3) and A. Ya. Vinnik (24 March 1989, p. 3).

32. The Belorussian republican newspaper *Sovetskaya Belorussiya* included the platforms of Mikhail Pavlovich Degtyarev and Vladimir Aleksandrovich Sapronov (1 March 1989, p. 2), Nikolai Semenovich Tatum, Nil Semenovech Gilevich and Aleksandr Ol'utrovich Dobrovol'skii (4 March 1989, p. 2), Anatolii Vasilevich Zinkevich and Mikhail Fedorovich Lavrinovich (7 March 1989, p. 2), Vladmir Vladimirovich Polushchik, Nikolai Ivanovich Porubov and Aleksandr Grogor'evich Zhuravlev (12 March 1989, p. 2), Leonid Leonidovich Divsov and Petr Petrovich Moisinovich (10 March 1989, p. 1), M. Ya. Chumanikhina and M. A. Shmelcv (21 March 1989, p. 3) Vasilii Grigor'evich Bartnovskii and Vladimir Nikolaevich Gromyko (22 March 1989, p. 1), Nikolai Grogor'evich Bobritskii and Ivan Gavrilovich Chigrinov (23 March 1989, p. 2), Vyacheslav Fratsevich Kebich and candidate Lukashenko (24 March 1989, p. 2) and Galina Nikolaevna Kiseleva and Aleksandra Nikolaevna Fen'ko (25 March 1989, p. 1) The following candidates had their programmes publicized in *Sovetskaya Kirgiziya*: Tat'yana Viktorovna Boldinskaya and Aleksandr Ivanovich Zakhova (1 March 1989, p. 1), Sergei Aleksandrovich Medvedev and Ralii Lavrent'evich Ten (4 March 1989, p. 1), Yurii Aleksandrovich Vidergol'd and Gennadii Ivanovich Shipit'ko (11 March 1989, p. 1), Milyaev Valerii Vasil'evich (7 March 1989, p. 1), Mamasal Sabirova (10 March 1989, p. 1), Yurii Gerasimovich Gorbunov (15 March 1989, p. 1), Apas Dzhumagalov and Toktonazar Kurmanaliev (18 March 1989, p. 1), Zhunusbek Kurmanalievich Tutashev, Asambat Masalievich Masaliev and Georgii Aleksevich Komarov (22 March 1989, p. 1), Baidyld Shamyratobek (24 March 1989, p. 1) and V. P. Savenkov (25 March 1989, p. 1).

33. Several candidates' programmes were included in the Turkmenian republican newspaper *Turkmenskaya iskra*. Among them were Tokhamurat Shamradov and Durdymurat Babakuliev (15 March 1989, p. 1), Gozel' Yemudova Khodzhaeva (19 March 1989, p. 2), Khekim Orazovich Ishanov (22 March 1989, p. 2) and Bairam Karakhanovich Balakaev (25 March 1989, p. 2).

34. The Georgian daily *Zarya vostoka* contained in its 'Pozitsya' column the programmes of Garsezan Sashikovich Kbilashvili, Omar Aleksandrovich Memanishvili and Aleksandr Levant'evich Khokhashvili (1 March 1989, p. 1), Grigorii Abelovich Tkemeladze (3 March 1989, p. 1), Stanislav Andreeich Batiashvili and Tamara Lukinichna Mnatobishvili (4 March 1989, p. 1), Rezo Adrovich Arshba and Ruslan Ardevanovich Arshba (10 March 1989, p. 1), Makvala Konstantinovna Berelidze and Vasilii Aleksandrovich Khubaev (22 March 1989, p. 3).

35. Examples of candidates who competed in Armenia and published in *Kommunist's* column 'portret kandidata' include Samuel Vazgenovich Usyan and Gevork Gaikovich Gabrielyan (2 March 1989, p. 3), Levon Bagarshakovich Khachatryan, Goarik Yenokyan and Yelchinka Sarkisyan (4 March 1989, p. 3), Elmir Tatulovich Arutyunyan and Mariam Mushegovna Martirosyan (7 March 1989, p. 1), Susanna Gal'st'yan and Svetlana Gabrielyan Papovyan (8 March 1989, p. 1; additional information on Papovya was published on 22 March 1989 at p. 1), Frunze Ishkanovich Ramazyan and Valerik Vaganovich Simonyan (11 March 1989, p. 1), Edgar Sergeevich Oganesyanyan and Azat Komunarovich Yeguzaryan (12 March 1989, p. 1), Stepan Andranikovich Pashyan and Sven Edgarovich Alaverdyan (14 March 1989, p. 1), Oganess Armenakovich Khachartyan (17 March 1989, p. 1), Feliks Armanisovich Kurginyan (22 March 1989, p. 1), Sergei Aleksandrovich Ambarsumyan and Sana Mushegovna Makoryan (23 March 1989, p. 1), Georgii Balabekovich Nanyan, Sergei Viglinovich Oganesyanyan and Georgii Khudeovich Mgoyan (24 March 1989, p. 3).

36. *Sovetskaya Estoniya* contained the programme statements of Vladimir Zakharov (25 February 1989, p. 2), Vladimir Igorevich Parol' (28 February 1989, p. 1), Priit Yarve (2 March 1989, p. 3), O. Klushin (11 March 1989, p. 1), Yevgenii Alekseevich Golikov (18 March 1989, p. 1), P. N. Panfilov and Val'ter Toots (18 March 1989, p. 2), M. Bronshtein (21 March 1989, p. 3), Valerii Kryman, Igor' Nikolacvich Pegel'man, Eduard Olevovich Tinn (22 March 1989, pp. 1 - 2), Boris Moronov and Yulo Vooglaid (23 March 1989, p. 2), Viktor Aleksandrovich Vakht, V. G. Balachevtsev and Laur Karn (24 March 1989, p. 2).

37. The candidates who competed in districts in Latvia and had their platform excerpts published in *Sovetskaya Latviya* were Anatolii Aleksandrovich Bartashevich (2 March 1989, p. 1), Aleksei Nikolaevich Providenko (5 March 1989, p. 1), Gundars Krievis (12 March 1989, pp. 2 - 3), Fedor Mikhailovich Kuz'min (14 March 1989, p. 2), Oleg Anatol'evich Moshenko (17 March 1989, p. 3), Vyacheslav Darnilovich Solov'yanov (21 March 1989, p. 3), Alfred Rubiks and Vitalii Teivans (22 March 1989, pp. 1 - 2), Arnol'd Petrovich Klautsen, Averkiya Kir'yanovich Grigor'ev and Andras Livchan (23 March 1989, p. 2), Vitalii Pavlovich Sobolev (24 March 1989, p. 2) and Anatolii Gorbunov (25 March 1989, pp. 1 - 2).

38. *Sovetskaya Litva* included the following candidates' election objectives in its pages: Lyaonas Yankauskas (2 March 1989, pp. 2 - 3), A. Vasilyauskas (4 March 1989, p. 2), Klemensas Sheputis (5 March 1989, p. 3), Valerii Shurupov (7 March 1989, p. 1), Irena Kachenskene (8 March 1989, p. 2), Kyastutis Aslmonas (10 March 1989, pp. 1 & 3), K. Surblis (12 March 1989, p. 7), Antanas Zheitmanas (14 March 1989, pp. 2 - 3), R. Visokavichyus (15 March 1989, p. 1), Boleslav Rudis (17 March 1989, p. 3), Rimvidas Yasinavichyus (18 March 1989, p. 2), Chelovas Yureshans (21 March 1989, p. 2), Bronislovas Zaikauskas (22 March 1989, pp. 1 - 2), Mikhail Kachanov (23 March 1989, p. 2), Vladislav Shved and Oktyabr' Burdenko (24 March 1989, p. 2) and Antanas Burachas and Dommenikas Gumulyauskis (25 March 1989, p. 2).

39. Included in *Sovetskaya Moldaviya's* pages were the programme excerpts of Timofei Moshnyag (15 March 1989, pp. 1 & 4), Valerii Kozhukhar (24 March 1989, p. 2), V. K. Pshenichnikov (22 March 1989, p. 2), Sergei Akhromeev (5 March 1989, p. 2 and 23 March 1989, p. 3), Boris Palagnyuk (23 March 1989, p. 3), S. Platon (21 March 1989, p. 3), A. A. Zhuchenko (19 March 1989, p. 2), Vladimir Osipov (12 March 1989, p. 2), I. Morozov (11 March 1989, p. 2), Anna Kanarovskaya (8 March 1989, p. 2), Ion Russu (10 March 1989, p. 2), Vladislav Kutyrkin and A. P. Belyi (7 March 1989, p. 2), Aleksei Marcs'ev (5 March 1989, p. 2), Mikhail Dumbravan (4 March 1989, p. 2) and A. A. Mokuanu (3 March 1989, pp. 1 - 2, esp. at p. 2).

40. *Vechernyaya Moskva* published the programme excerpts of Natal'ya Kuklina and Anatolii Firsov (20 March 1989, p. 2), V. F. Romashkin and Yurii Prokof'ev (24 March 1989, p. 2), Anatolii Kanashchenkov (2 March 1989, p. 2 and 22 March 1989, p. 2), Il'ya Zaslavskii and Aleksandr Krutov (21 March 1989, p. 2), Aleksandr Kuz'min and Aleksandr Sarzhin (18 March 1989, p. 2), Yurii Afonin and Viktor Tsyurupa (17 March 1989, p. 3), Yurii Andreev, Valerii Ryzhikov and Viktor Chepkin (15 March 1989, p. 2), Boris Bondarev and Vasilii Romashkin (14 March 1989, p. 2), Arkadii Murashev, Vladimir Syrtsov and Yurii Yurchenko (13 March 1989, p. 2), Yevgenii Adamov and Aleksandr Kraiko (11 March 1989, p. 3), Yurii Chernichenko and Viktor Yaroshenko (10 March 1989, p. 2), Valerii Zhukov, Ncl'son Popkov and Andrei Sebentsov (9 March 1989, p. 2), Svetlana Geraskina and Nina Ageeva (7 March 1989, pp. 1 - 2), (Vladimir Belyaev and Vladimir Tsarkov (6 March 1989, pp. 1 - 2) and Mikhail Mamchenkov (4 March 1989, p. 2).

41. *Leningradskaya pravda* published excerpts from the programmes of the following candidates in their column 'Anketa kandidata': Aleksei Bol'shakov (14 March 1989, p. 1), Viktor Yermakov and Vladimir Smirnov (18 March 1989, p. 2), Yurii Boldyrev, Aleksandr Obolenskii, Viktor Sokolov and Anatolii Gerasimov (23 March 1989, p. 1), Yurii Solov'ev and Valentin Kashin (25 March 1989, p. 1), Gennadii Steshovikov (12 March 1989, p. 1), Anatolii Fateev (24 March 1989, p. 1), Nikolai Popov and Galina Stoimova (19 March 1989, p. 2), Sergei Podobed (7 March 1989, p. 1), Vladimir Rachin (2 March 1989, p. 1), Anatolii Sobchak (16 March 1989, p. 2) and Sergei Ivanov (10 March 1989, p. 1). In its 23 March 1989 edition another Leningrad local newspaper, *Leningradskii metrostroitel'* published the complete texts of the programmes of Lyudvig Faddeev (p. 2), Nikolai Skatov (p. 3) and Boris Nikol'skii (p. 4) who competed in the city's Smol'ninskii territorial district.

42. Information from author's database.

43. This information is presented in *Sovetskaya Kirgiziya*, 18 March 1989, p.1.

44. See information contained in *Deputaty...odinnadtsati sozuv*, p. 369.

45. *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: desyati sozuv*, p. 375.

46. *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: devyati sozuv*, (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1974), p. 371.

47. This point is brought out by S. A. Avak'yan, 'Zakonodatel'stvo o vyborakh: opyt primeneniya, voprosy sovershentsvovaniya sotsializma', *Vestnik moskovskogo universita (seriya pravo)*, 1989, No. 6, pp. 9-19, p. 11.

48. See for instance the collection of programmes in *Vybory narodnykh deputatov SSSR ot AN SSSR: spravki-annotatsii na kandidatov i ikh predvybornye platformy*, (Moscow, 1989).

49. See the platform of Zukhra Valeeva, 'Yesli menya izbrut', *Izvestiya*, 9 March 1989, p. 1.

50. This point is mentioned in the introduction to 'Programma deistvii', *Krest'yanka*, 1989, No. 3, p. 6.

51. See Ye. Karakoleva's interview with candidate Vladimir Dostal', 'Zhit' i myslit' nado po novomu', *Vechernyaya Moskva*, 28 February 1989, p. 2.

52. See A. Tkhorov's summary of candidate G. G. Dygai's programme in 'Sdelayu vse, chto lyudam zhilos' luchshe', *Sovetskaya Moldaviya*, 2 March 1989, p. 2.

53. Berezhkin, *et al*, op. cit, p. 610.

54. Biographical information and 'Programma kandidata v narodnye deputaty SSSR ot Akademii Nauk SSSR akademika Rebane Karla Karlovicha', *Vybory narodnykh deputatov SSSR ot AN SSSR*, pp. 73-77.

55. My figures vary slightly with those compiled by Soviet statisticians. According to the latter, 243 deputies were re-elected from the 11th convocation of the Supreme Soviet to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

See, for instance, *Sostav narodnykh deputatov SSSR...*, p. 30.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 4; 'Doklad Mandatnoi Komissii', p. 42 and 'Postanovlenie S"ezda narodnykh deputatov Soyuzo Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik O priznanii polnomochii narodnykh deputatov SSSR', No. 5-1 (25 May 1989), *Pervyi s"ezd*, Vol. III, pp. 345-346.

57. *Sostav narodnykh deputatov SSSR...*, p. 30.

58. Statements on representation are in *Sostav narodnykh deputatov SSSR...*, p. 4. and the distribution the representative levels where deputies gained experience is in *ibid.*, pp. 30 - 31. Similar information on deputies in the soviets appears in 'Doklad Mandatnoi Komissii', p. 45.

59. 'Soobshchenie Tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi komissii ob itogakh vyborov v Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR odinnadtsatyi sozyva, sostoyavshchikhsya 4 marta 1984', *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, 1984, No. 11, pp. 199-203, p. 203. After the death of a candidate in one constituency in 1984, another communist was elected. Therefore, 1,072 communists were elected. See *Deputaty...odinnadstatyi sozyv*, p. 3.

60. This figure appears in *Sostav narodnykh deputatov SSSR...*, p. 3.

61. *Sostav narodnykh deputatov SSSR...*, p. 12.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 5; 'Doklad Mandatnoi Komissii', p. 44; for a discussion of the nationalities' implications of the elections see V. A. Tishkov, 'Assembleya natsii ili soyuznyi parlament? (Etnopoliticheskii analiz sostava S"ezda narodnykh SSSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR)', *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1990, No. 3, pp. 3-18.

63. Population data in this section of the chapter has been derived from Goskomstat SSSR, 'Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleniya 1989 goda', *Vestnik statistiki*, 1990, No. 10, pp. 69-79.

64. *Pervyi s"ezd...*, Vol. I, p. 109; 'Postanovlenie S"ezda narodnykh deputatov Soyuzo Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik O Predsedatele Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR', No. 7-1 (25 May 1989), in *ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 351.

65. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 383-384; 'Postanovlenie S"ezda narodnykh deputatov Soyuzo Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik Ob izbranii Pervogo zamestitelya Predsedatelya Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR', No. 12-1 (29 May 1989) in *ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 357.

66. See respectively, 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Po zayavleniyu Soveta Ministrov SSSR', No. 28-1 (7 June 1989) in *Pervaya sessiya Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: Stenograficheskiy otchet*, 11 Vols, Vol. XI, p. 67 and 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR O predpolozheniyakh po strukture i sostavu Soveta Ministrov SSSR', No. 54-1 (10 June 1989), *ibid.*, p. 70; 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Komiteta narodnogo kontrolya SSSR', No. 29-1 (7 June 1989), *ibid.*, p. 67. 'Postanovlenie S"ezda narodnykh deputatov Soyuzo Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik Ob utverzhenii Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR', No. 34-1 (8 June 1989), *Pervyi s"ezd...*, Vol. III, p. 405 and 'Postanovlenie S"ezda narodnykh deputatov Soyuzo Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik Ob utverzhenii Predsedatelya Komiteta narodnogo kontrolya SSSR', No. 37-1 (8 June 1989), *ibid.*, p. 407.

67. See the respective Supreme Soviet and Congress resolutions 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Verkhovnogo Suda SSSR', No. 30-1 (7 June 1989), *Pervaya sessiya...*, p. 68; 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR O naznachenii Glavnogo gosudarstvennogo arbitra SSSR', No. 31-1 (7 June 1989), *ibid.* and 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR O naznachenii General'nogo prokurora SSSR', No. 32-1 (7 June 1989), *ibid.*; 'Postanovlenie S"ezda narodnykh deputatov Soyuzo Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik Ob utverzhenii Predsedatelya Verkhovnogo Suda SSSR', No. 35-1 (8 June 1989) in *Pervyi s"ezd...*, Vol. III, p. 406, 'Postanovlenie S"ezda narodnykh deputatov Soyuzo Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik Ob utverzhenii Glavnogo gosudarstvennogo arbitra SSSR', No. 36-1 (8 June 1989), *ibid.* and 'Postanovlenie S"ezda narodnykh deputatov Soyuzo Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik

Ob utverzhdenii General'nogo prokurora SSSR', No. 38-1 (8 June 1989), *ibid.*, p. 407.

68. *Sostav narodnykh deputatov SSSR...*, p. 32.

69. *Ibid.*

70. 'Postanovlenie S"ezda narodnykh deputatov Soyuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik Ob izbranii Mandatnoi komissii S"ezda narodnykh deputatov SSSR', No. 4-1 (25 May 1989), *Pervyi s"ezd...*, Vol. III, pp. 342-345.

71. 'Postanovlenie S"ezda narodnykh deputatov Soyuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik O Prezidiume S"ezda narodnykh deputatov SSSR', No. 1-1, (25 May 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 334-335.

72. 'Postanovlenie S"ezda narodnykh deputatov Soyuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik Ob izbranii Redaktsionoi komissii po podgotovke proekta Postanovleniya S"ezda narodnykh deputatov SSSR po dokladu Predsedatelya Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR "Ob osnovnykh napravleniyakh vnutrennei i vneshnei politiki SSSR"', No. 14-1 (31 May 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 394-398.

73. 'Postanovlenie S"ezda narodnykh deputatov Soyuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik Ob obrazovanii Konstitutsionnoi komissii', No. 40-1 (9 June 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 430-436.

74. 'Postanovlenie S"ezda narodnykh deputatov Soyuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik Ob obrazovanii komissii po podgotovke proekta Zakona SSSR o konstitutsionnom nadzore v SSSR', No. 41-1 (9 June 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 437-438.

75. 'Postanovlenie S"ezda narodnykh deputatov Soyuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik Ob izbranii Schetnoi komissii S"ezda narodnykh deputatov SSSR', No. 6-1 (25 May 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 346-351.

76. 'Postanovlenie S"ezda narodnykh deputatov Soyuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik Ob obrazovanii komissii dlya rassledovaniya obstoyatel'stv, svyazannykh s sobytiyami v gor. Tbilisi 9 aprelya 1989 goda', No. 15-1 (31 May 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 399-400.

77. 'Postanovlenie S"ezda narodnykh deputatov Soyuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik Ob obrazovanii komissii dlya proverki materialov, svyazannykh s deyatelnost'yu sledstvennoi gruppy Prokuratury Soyuz SSSR, vozglavlyayemoi T. Kh. Gdlyanom', No. 17-1 (1 June 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 401-402.

78. 'Postanovlenie S"ezda narodnykh deputatov Soyuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik Ob obrazovanii komissii po politicheskoi i pravovoi otsenke sovetsko-germanskogo dogovora o nenapadenii ot 1939 goda', No. 18-2 (2 June 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 403-404.

79. *Sostav narodnykh deputatov SSSR...*, p. 56; 'Postanovlenie S"ezda narodnykh deputatov Soyuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik Ob Izbranii Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR', No. 13-1 (31 May 1989), *Pervyi s"ezd...*, Vol. III, pp. 358-394.

80. *Sostav narodnykh deputatov SSSR...*, p. 56.

81. *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57.

82. 'Postanovlenie Soveta Soyuz Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Soveta Soyuz', No. 19-1 (3 June 1989), *Pervaya sessiya...*, p. 175; 'Postanovlenie Soveta Natsional'nostei Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Soveta Natsional'nostei', No. 25-1 (6 June 1989), *ibid.*, p. 188.

83. See respectively 'Postanovlenie Soveta Soyuz Ob izbranii zamestitelya Predsedatelya Soveta Soyuz', No. 127-1 (26 June 1989), *ibid.*, p. 177; 'Postanovlenie Soveta Soyuz Ob izbranii zamestitelya Predsedatelya Soveta Natsional'nostei', No. 122-1 (26 June 1989), *ibid.*, p. 191; 'Postanovlenie Soveta Soyuz Ob izbranii zamestitelya Predsedatelya Soveta Soyuz', No. 46-1 (10 June 1989), *ibid.*, p. 176; 'Postanovlenie Soveta



Soyuza Ob izbranii zamestitelya Predsedatelya Soveta Natsional'nostei', No. 51-1 (10 June 1989), *ibid.*, p. 189.

84. 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR O Komitetakh Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR', No. 33-1 (7 June 1989), *ibid.*, p. 69.

85. 'Postanovlenie Soveta Soyuzo O postoyannykh komissiyakh Soveta Soyuzo', No. 20-1 (3 June 1989), *ibid.*, p. 175.

86. 'Postanovlenie Soveta Natsional'nostei O Postoyannykh komissiyakh Soveta Natsional'nostei', No. 26-1 (6 June 1989), *ibid.*, p. 188.

87. See 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po mezhduнародnym delam' No. 132-1 (26 June 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 75-77; 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po voprosam oborony i gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti', No. 133-1 (26 June 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 77-79; 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po voprosam zakonodatel'stva, zakonnosti i pravoporyadka', No. 134-1 (26 June 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 79-81; 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po voprosam raboty Sovetov narodnykh deputatov, razvitiya upravleniya i samoupravleniya', No. 135-1 (26 June 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 81-83; 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po voprosam ekonomicheskoi reformy', No. 136-1 (26 June 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 84-85; 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po agrarnym voprosam i prodovol'stviyu', No. 137-1 (26 June 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 86-88; 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po voprosam stroitel'stva i arkhitektury', No. 138-1 (26 June 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 88-90; 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po nauke, narodnomu obrazovaniyu, kul'ture i vospitaniyu', No. 139-1 (26 June 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 90-92; 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po okrane zdorov'ya naroda', No. 140-1 (26 June 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 93-95; 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po delam zhenshchin, okhrany sem'i materinstva i detstva', No. 141-1 (26 June 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 95-97; 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po delam veteranov i invalidov', No. 142-1 (26 June 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 97-98; 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po delam molodezhi', No. 143-1 (26 June 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 99-100; 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po voprosam ekologii i ratsional'nogo ispol'zovaniya prirodnykh resursov', No. 144-1 (26 June 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 101-103; 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po voprosam glasnosti, prav i obrashchenii grazhdan', No. 145-1 (26 June 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 103-105; 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izmeneniyakh v sostave komitetov Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR', No. 187-1 (5 July 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 108-109; 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR O sostave deputatskoi komisii po rasмотрeniyu privilegii, kotorymi pol'zuyutsya otdel'nye kategorii grazhdan', No. 285-1 (27 July 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 139-140; 'Postanovlenie Soveta Soyuzo Ob izbranii Planovoi i byudzhetno-finansovoi komisii Soveta Soyuzo', No. 128-1 (26 June 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 178-180; 'Postanovlenie Soveta Soyuzo Ob izbranii Komissii Soveta Soyuzo po voprosam razvitiya promyshlennosti, energetiki, tekhniki i tekhnologii', No. 129-1 (26 June 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 180-182; 'Postanovlenie Soveta Soyuzo Ob izbranii Komissii Soveta Soyuzo po voprosam transporta, svyazi i informatiki', No. 130-1 (26 June 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 182-184; 'Postanovlenie Soveta Soyuzo Ob izbrauii Komissii Soveta Soyuzo po voprosam truda, tsen i sotsial'noi politiki', No. 131-1 (26 June 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 184-186; 'Postanovlenie Soveta Soyuzo Ob izmeneniyakh v sostave komisii Soveta Soyuzo Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR', No. 188-1 (5 July 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 186-187; 'Postanovlenie Soveta Natsional'nostei Ob izbranii Komissii Soveta Natsional'nostei po natsional'noi politiki i mezhnatsional'nym otnosheniyam', No. 123-1 (26 June 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 191-193; 'Postanovlenie Soveta Natsional'nostei Ob izbranii Komissii Soveta Natsional'nostei po voprosam sotsial'no i ekonomicheskogo razvitiya soyuznykh i avtonomnykh respublik, avtonomnykh oblastei i okrugov', No. 124-1 (26 June 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 193-195; 'Postanovlenie Soveta Natsional'nostei Ob izbranii Komissii Soveta Natsional'nostei po tovaram narodnogo potrebleniya, trgovle, kommunal'no-bytovym i drugim uslugam naseleniyu', No. 125-1 (26 June 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 196-197; 'Postanovlenie Soveta Natsional'nostei Ob izbranii Komissii Soveta Natsional'nostei po voprosam razvitiya kul'tury, yazyka, natsional'nykh i internatsional'nykh traditsii, okhrany istoricheskogo naslediya', No. 126-1 (26 June 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 198-199; 'Postanovlenie Soveta Natsional'nostei O dopolnitel'nom izbranii narodnogo deputata SSSR Odzhieva R. K. v sostav Komissii Soveta Natsional'nostei

po natsional'noi politike i mezhnatsional'nym otnosheniyam', No. 189-1 (5 July 1989), *ibid.*, p. 200; 'Postanovlenie Soveta Natsional'nostei Ob obrazovanii Komissii po Nagorno-Karabakhskoi avtonomnoi oblasti', No. 218-1 (12 July 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 200-201; 'Postanovlenie Soveta Natsional'nostei Ob obrazovanii Komissii po problemam sovetskikh nemtsev', No. 219 (12 July 1989), *ibid.*, p. 201; 'Postanovlenie Soveta Natsional'nostei Ob obrazovanii Komissii po problemam krymsko-tatarskogo naroda', No. 220-1 (12 July 1989), *ibid.*, p. 202.

88. Neither Viktor Kucherenko, Vladimir Kurtashin, Valentin Tetenov nor Nikolai Gritsenko were deputies in the Eleventh Convocation. See the resolutions on their respective elections, 'Postanovlenie Soveta Soyuz Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Planovoi i byudzhethno-finansovoi komisii Soveta Soyuz', No. 47-1 (10 June 1989), *ibid.*, p. 176; 'Postanovlenie Soveta Soyuz Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Komissii Soveta Soyuz po voprosam razvitiya promyshlennosti, energetiki, tekhniki i tekhnologii', No. 48-1 (10 June 1989), *ibid.*, pp. 176-177; 'Postanovlenie Soveta Soyuz Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Komissii Soveta Soyuz po voprosam transporta, svyazi i informatiki', No. 49-1 (10 June 1989), *ibid.*; 'Postanovlenie Soveta Soyuz Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Komissii Soveta Soyuz po voprosam truda, tsen i sotsial'noi politiki', No. 50-1 (10 June 1989), *ibid.*

89. See respectively, 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po voprosam oborony i gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti', No. 55-1 (10 June 1989), *ibid.*, p. 70; 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po voprosam stroitel'stva i arkhitektury', No. 60-1 (10 June 1989), *ibid.*, p. 72.; 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po voprosam ekologii i ratsional'nogo ispol'zovaniya prirodnykh resursov', No. 66-1 (10 June 1989), *ibid.*, p. 74; 'Postanovlenie Soveta Natsional'nostei Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Komissii Soveta Natsional'nostei po natsional'noi komissii politike i mezhnatsional'nym otnosheniyam', No. 52-1 (10 June 1989), *ibid.*, p. 189; 'Postanovlenie Soveta Natsional'nostei Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Komissii Soveta Natsional'nostei po tovaram narodnogo potrebleniya, trgovle, kommunal'no-bytovym i drugim uslugam naseleniyu', No. 68-1 (10 June 1989), *ibid.*, p. 190; 'Postanovlenie Soveta Natsional'nostei Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Komissii Soveta Natsional'nostei po voprosam razvitiya kul'tury, yazyka, natsional'nykh i internatsional'nykh traditsii okhrany istoricheskogo naslediya', No. 69-1 (10 June 1989), *ibid.*

Sergei Alekseev (Questions of Legislation, Legality and Law and Order), Nikolai Pivovarov (Questions of the Work of the Soviets of People's Deputies, Development of Government and Self-Government), Valentin Vologzhin (Questions of Economic Reform), Arkadii Veprev (Agrarian Questions and Food), Yurii Ryzhov (Science, National Education and Culture), Yurii Borodin (Protection of People's Health), Valentina Matvienko (Women's Affairs, Protection of the Family, Maternity and Childhood), Nikolai Bosenko (Affairs of Veterans and Invalids), Valerii Tsibukha (Youth Affairs) and Vladimir Foteev (Questions of Glasnost', Civil Rights and Appeals) were the chairs of the Supreme Soviet Committees who had not been deputies in the Eleventh Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Likewise their colleague in the Soviet of Nationalities Eduardas Vilkas who chaired the Commission on Questions of Social and Economic Development of the Union and Autonomous Republics, Autonomous *oblasty* and districts had not been a member of the last convocation of the Supreme Soviet. See respectively, 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po voprosam zakonodatel'stva, zakonnosti i pravoporyadka', No. 56-1 (10 June 1989), *ibid.*, p. 70; 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po voprosam raboty Sovetov narodnykh deputatov, razvitiya upravleniya i samoupravleniya', No. 57-1 (10 June 1989), *ibid.*, p. 71; 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po voprosam ekonomicheskoi reformy', No. 58-1 (10 June 1989), *ibid.*; 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po agrarnym voprosam i prodovol'stviyu', No. 59-1 (10 June 1989), *ibid.*; 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po nauke, narodnomu obrazovaniyu, kul'ture i vospitaniyu', No. 61-1 (10 June 1989), *ibid.*, p. 72; 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po okhrany zdorov'ya naroda', No. 62-1 (10 June 1989), *ibid.*; 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po delam zhenshchin, okhrany sem'i, materninstva i detstva', No. 63-1 (10 June 1989), *ibid.*, p. 73; 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po delam veteranov i invalidov', No. 64-1 (10 June 1989), *ibid.*; 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo

Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po delam molodezhi', No. 65-1 (10 June 1989), *ibid.*; 'Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po voprosam glasnosti, prav i obrashchenii grazhdan', No. 67-1 (1989), *ibid.*, p. 74 and 'Postanovlenie Soveta Natsional'nostei Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Komissii Soveta Natsional'nostei po voprosam sotsial'nogo i ekonomicheskogo razvitiya soyuznykh i avtonomnykh respublik, avtonomnykh oblastei i okrugov', No. 53-1 (10 June 1989), *ibid.*, p. 190.

**Chapter 4. Continuity, Contradiction and Departure in  
The Composition of Women Deputies, 1984-1989**

My objectives in this chapter are to present biographical information on the 352 women elected to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in March-May 1989,<sup>1</sup> to establish the differentiation between them and the men elected during the first largely competitive elections in Soviet history and to discuss the extent of change that electoral reform may have had on the composition of women deputies since the last election to the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1984. I also examine the extent of women's participation in the First USSR Congress of People's Deputies held May-June 1989. My data indicate that the electoral reform measures implemented in 1989 brought forth a corps of women deputies which had better political, educational and occupational credentials than its 1984 predecessor. Nevertheless, men were considerably more qualified and this can perhaps be considered at least a partial explanation <sup>of why</sup>

their participation was higher during the First congress. Comparative criteria employed in this analysis include: party affiliation, education, nationality, occupation and the divisions from which the deputies were elected. It is necessary to state at the outset that this chapter is not concerned with the overall decline in women representatives in the former USSR or the position of women in post-Soviet politics. Rather, my primary aim here is to 'fill in' some of the existing gaps <sup>in the literature</sup> on women's representation in the Congress. That there were 352 women elected is quite well known. However, the present study provides the most detailed analysis of their biographical characteristics to date. Also, I hope, perhaps, to add some more information to the existing literature on the 1989 Elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and women's participation in Soviet politics.

These data also show that the electoral reform measures that came to fruition in the 1989 elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies eventuated in continuity, contradiction and departure from previous elections. Men were most abundant among all deputies.

Women were more likely than their male counterparts to have been agricultural or manual workers. Men were much more likely than women to have been party and state officials and representatives of the white collar professions and intelligentsia. The reforms, nonetheless, constituted a departure from previous electoral practices. While more women than men were represented among the workers, there were also more educated, more potentially forceful deputies elected among them. Electoral reform measures provided them with better opportunities to showcase their political talents and *earn* the electorate's respect based on their merits. Nevertheless, it appears that the political reform measures in general, and electoral reform initiatives, in particular, worked more to the benefit of men than <sup>of</sup> women. This could be considered to be a contradiction in the official democratisation rhetoric. These implications are illustrated more clearly in the next section of this chapter. Indeed, it is therefore, well understood why the motto of the *Nezavisimaya zhenskaya demokraticeskaya initsiativa*-Independent Women's Democratic Initiative (its abbreviated form was *Nezhdi* which translates as Don't Wait), the USSR's first independent feminist organisation was 'Democracy without women is no democracy!'.<sup>2</sup>

### **Women in Soviet Politics and Society**

Among the goals of the first socialist state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was creating a society in which class equality would precipitate conditions for gender equality. During the seventy-four years of its existence, the Soviet state could boast of impressive numbers indicating women's active participation in the USSR's social life. In 1989 approximately 68,000,000 women were employed and comprised over half the USSR's labour force;<sup>3</sup> more than half a million directed enterprises, organisations and

institutions, and nearly one million led smaller industrial subdivisions.<sup>4</sup> The largest share of women worked in health, education, physical culture and social security (23 per cent), trade, public catering, material technical supply, sales and procurements (13 per cent).<sup>5</sup> Women comprised over 61 per cent of all specialists with higher and secondary specialist education; nearly 60 per cent of all engineers, 45 per cent of agronomists, animal technicians and veterinary workers, 87 per cent of economists and accountants, more than 70 per cent of doctors and teachers and over 90 per cent of librarians and bibliographers.<sup>6</sup>

Although these data reflect positive aspects of women's employment, they do not indicate that in many respects there still existed a high degree of gender inequality in the work sphere. According to 1988 data, nearly 16 per cent of men and over 43 per cent of women received average monthly wages of up to 150 rubles; among those who received between 200 and 300 rubles they were, respectively, nearly 35 per cent and 14.5 per cent; and, among those who were paid over 300 rubles monthly, women were 11 per cent and 2 per cent.<sup>7</sup> Information from family budgets for March 1989 indicates that women's average wages were less than men's at 170 rubles and 233 rubles respectively.<sup>8</sup> Despite their comparatively impressive representation in the national work force, women comprised only 5.6 per cent of enterprise and industrial organisation directors in 1991.<sup>9</sup> Women were also heavily affected by job layoffs made during Gorbachev's economic restructuring programme; according to sociologist Tatyana Zaslavskaya, women made up to 70 per cent of restructuring redundancies,<sup>10</sup> or, two women lost their jobs for every man.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, women's unemployment increased as market reforms began to take effect: among over 60,000 registered as unemployed in the Russian Federation on 1 January 1992, two

thirds were women.<sup>12</sup>

The USSR also included higher numbers of women in their political bodies than non-socialist countries. Women's representation and participation in the Eleventh Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet is discussed in greater detail below. Women also comprised 36 per cent of the deputies elected to the supreme soviets of union republics, 40 per cent elected to the supreme soviets of autonomous republics in 1985,<sup>13</sup> and 49 per cent of the deputies elected to the local soviets in 1987 (*krai, oblast'*, district, city, settlement and village level soviets); Moreover, women occupied many leading positions in local state organs.<sup>14</sup>

Despite strong representation in Soviet state organs, women, however, did not necessarily constitute major actors in the political arena. As discussed in the previous chapter, for instance, men were more likely to be 're-elected' to the USSR Supreme Soviet than were women in the pre-reform era. Mary Buckley also found that among deputies elected to the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaidzhan in 1985, there were similar links between gender, occupation and re-election.<sup>15</sup>

Women were also active in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. According to party statistics, on 1 January 1990, there were 5,813,610 women in the CPSU (30.2 per cent of the entire membership)<sup>16</sup> and by March 1991 they constituted 30.5 per cent of its members.<sup>17</sup> However, it is in the Communist Party that it was evident that Soviet politics was very much dominated by men. In 1989, there was only one woman, Rimadzhon Khudaibergenova, who was an *obkom* first secretary, and even as late as 1991 there were



only 3.<sup>18</sup> Similarly, women were infrequently represented in the Party's leading organs. For instance, Yekaterina Furtseva became the woman elected as a full member to the CPSU's main policy making body, the Politburo in June 1957, and was dropped from its composition in May 1960.<sup>19</sup> It was not until September 1988, with the election of Aleksandra Biryukova, that another woman entered into the ranks of the Politburo, but only at the level of candidate (non-voting) status.<sup>20</sup> She remained a candidate member until the XXVIII Congress in 1990, at which Galina Semenova was elected as a full member to the Politburo (at this stage, candidate membership was eliminated).<sup>21</sup> In other party capacities women comprised 13.3 per cent of the Central Control Commission and 18.4 per cent of full-time branch secretaries.<sup>22</sup> Only 4.3 per cent of the of the first secretaries of *gorkomy* and *raikomy* were women and there were no women among 125 union republican central committees, republican <sup>and</sup> *kraikom* secretaries.<sup>23</sup>

Women's representation at the last all-union party Congress and the 1988 XIX Party Conference was lower than <sup>their</sup> share of CPSU membership. Earlier, the proportion of women in the party and their representation at congresses had been similar. For instance, women comprised 26.5 per cent of members in 1981,<sup>24</sup> and 26.5 per cent of the delegates to the XXVI Congress.<sup>25</sup> In 1986 women constituted 28.8 per cent of party members;<sup>26</sup> however, they were under-represented slightly at the XXVII Congress, comprising 27 per cent of the delegates.<sup>27</sup> In 1988 the disparity increased somewhat further: 29.6 per cent of party members were women <sup>28</sup> but 25 per cent<sup>29</sup> of the delegates were women. In 1990, the gap was seriously widened. As stated above, women comprised 30.2 per cent of party members at the beginning of 1990, but constituted only 7.3 per cent of the delegates to the XXVIII Congress, held in July;<sup>30</sup> <sup>1990</sup> 'the lowest indicator in the post-

war period.<sup>31</sup>

### **Women in the 11th Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet (1984-1989)**

It will be recalled that there were 492 women elected to the 11th Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet in March 1984. Therefore, nearly one third of the deputies were women. This figure constituted a much higher number of Soviet female parliamentarians than their American counterparts. The 1985 edition of the annual Soviet statistical publication on women indicated that the US Congress had among its ranks only 23 women or 4 per cent of its composition and, moreover, there were only 2 in the Senate in 1984.<sup>32</sup> Nevertheless, there were substantial differences in the party statuses, age distributions, education levels and occupation backgrounds of the men and women elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1984 which suggests that women's positions in the Supreme Soviet were mainly ceremonial or 'token'.<sup>33</sup> However, it should also be noted that there were also rather large numbers of men who also fell under this token category. Power was held by high-ranking communists who were a very small group indeed. Therefore, in a sense, sex may not have determined power within this body.<sup>34</sup> Political affiliation was more important in determining power. Nevertheless, as the aforementioned statistics indicate and as the ensuing discussion will support, men were more likely than women not to have been among the tokens in the Supreme Soviet.

First, men were much more likely to have been CPSU members than women were. Among the 1,072 CPSU members in the Supreme Soviet 898 or 83.8 per cent were men. What could be considered even more important is the fact that nearly nine tenths of all men

in the Supreme Soviet were CPSU members. Conversely, women were much more abundant among deputies who were not CPSU members: 318 of 428 (74.3 per cent). In this category women accounted for 156 of 223 deputies who were neither CPSU nor Komsomol members (nearly 70 per cent) and 162 of 225 Komsomol members (72 per cent). Second, women tended to be more frequently represented among the younger deputies than men were. Included among the 331 deputies aged 30 and younger, 245 were women (74 per cent). This figure accounted for nearly half of all women deputies. Third, more men received some type of higher education and more women achieved some type of secondary education. Of the 813 deputies who undertook post-secondary education (including complete higher, incomplete higher and post-graduate) 730 were men (89.7 per cent) and there were 409 women (59.7 per cent) included among the 685 deputies who attained some level of secondary education (complete, vocational and incomplete). Moreover, these data represent 72.4 per cent of all men and 83.1 per cent of all women. Fourth, men elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1984 were more highly represented among the ranks of industrial and agricultural managers, the scientific and creative intelligentsia, CPSU, state, military and public organisation officials (90.5 per cent of these occupations) and women were most highly represented among industrial workers and collective farmers (54.1 per cent of these workers).

The data presented above indicate that women parliamentarians in the Supreme Soviet were not entirely on an equal footing with the male deputies. However, there are other factors which clearly indicate that the role and status of women in the Supreme Soviet was indeed ceremonial and that Party officials included women in the composition of the parliament to create some type of 'social picture' of Soviet society, but they undoubtedly did not intend for them to play a major role in political participation or policy making. Three

factors can be used to support this <sup>assertion</sup> claim.

First, power and status in the Soviet Union was held by CPSU membership. As indicated above, women were more abundant among individuals who were not party members. Moreover, women deputies constituted 16.2 per cent of the 1,072 members of the Supreme Soviet, whereas, if we use party statistics compiled between the XXV and XXVII Congress, we find that in 1984, women comprised somewhere between 26.5 and 28.8 per cent of all Party members.<sup>35</sup> Therefore, women party members were greatly underrepresented in the Supreme Soviet compared to their share of Party members. Given the fact that the CPSU was the dominant nominating institution at this time, if the party was serious about bringing the most politically experienced individuals into the Supreme Soviet, it stands to reason that more women CPSU members would have been included in the deputy corpus.

Second, the occupational status of the women indicates that, again, officials were not concerned with bringing the most experienced managerial and professional women into the Supreme Soviet. Data from the 1979 All-Union Population Census indicates that there were about 24.3 million women employed in occupations that would be considered predominantly 'mental work' and they comprised about 61 per cent of all workers in this category.<sup>36</sup> Moreover, there were certain occupations in which women were employed which would have been more suitable for parliamentarians than milkmaids and crane drivers. Forty-four per cent of all directors of state management and their structural divisions were women; 24 per cent of agricultural and industrial managers of all levels, and 44 per cent of all juridical personnel were also.<sup>37</sup>

My above argument suggests that women were elected mainly as 'tokens', i.e., elected more for their personal qualities than their professional or political abilities. However, it is also possible to argue that by including large numbers of women in their parliament, the CPSU, at least in theory, provided a *potential* means for including women in the political process. I firmly believe that this incorporation did provide a *theoretical* outlet for participation. Contributions to the sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet are a means-albeit imperfect-to test this hypothesis. Using the proceedings of the Supreme Soviet to determine the level of political participation of deputies is flawed mainly due to the fact that although the institution existed since 1937, it was not until very late in the 1980s that it began to function as somewhat of a working legislative organ. Previously, it was considered a rubber stamp mechanism for legitimating CPSU decisions. This means that the CPSU controlled the agendas of these sessions, but it also means that it controlled the list of speakers in the Supreme Soviet. Therefore, my assumption is that if the CPSU desired to promote women's participation in the sessions, there would have been a <sup>relatively</sup> high proportion of women speakers, and 32.8 per cent, a figure equal to women's share of the Supreme Soviet deputies, could serve as a good base figure for comparison.

This brings me up <sup>to</sup> my third point. Women's contributions to the Supreme Soviet sessions were far too low to satisfy a claim that their being in the parliament increased their chances for political participation. Twelve sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet were convened between April 1984 and December 1988-including a twelfth extraordinary session convened in November-December 1988 which adopted amendments to the USSR Constitution and a new Electoral Law. In eleven of those sessions, there were 448 speeches delivered; however, women spoke only 60 times (13.4 per cent of speeches).<sup>38</sup>

Therefore, women constituted a <sup>relatively</sup> high proportion of USSR Supreme Soviet Deputies. However, it was not the intention of the CPSU to have them play a significant role in policy making. They lacked the proper political and professional backgrounds to be considered the most active deputies in the parliament. Moreover, the party did not incorporate them in speaking roles in the sessions of the Supreme Soviet.

### Some Methodological Hurdles

The previous chapter discussed methodological problems in analysing deputy compositions between the pre-reform era and the Gorbachev period; this section raises some similar points with particular reference to women deputies. First, there may have existed some seats or candidacies designated solely for women. Examples from Leningrad illustrate this point. It will be recalled that when Ol'ga Ivanovna Chedleeva, a *sovkhos* brigadier and member of the Vsevelozhinskii *gorkom* and Leningrad *obkom*, was initially nominated unopposed at a candidate discussion at the Ruch'i *sovkhos* in Leningrad *oblast'* in January 1989, participants at the meeting put forward the candidacy of another woman for discussion, Marina Vladimirovna Izmerova. Following a debate on their qualities and a vote, Chedleeva won the right to proceed to the next round of the nomination process. Chedleeva was registered as a candidate for Vyborg territorial district No. 61 in late February,<sup>39</sup> and her opponent was another woman, Lyudmila Bystrova.<sup>40</sup> Neither candidate received the required amount of votes necessary to be elected.<sup>41</sup> Later, Chedleeva, one of 16 candidates (which included three other women)<sup>42</sup> in a repeat election held 19 May, ultimately finished in second place, losing to the editor of the *raion* newspaper, *Vyborgskii kommunist*, V. I. Kotolev.<sup>43</sup> Also,

livestock *sovkhos* chief, Galina Ivanovna Stoumova<sup>44</sup> eventually stood unopposed in Leningrad's Gatchinskii territorial district No. 62 and received 66 per cent of the vote.<sup>45</sup> At one point during the campaign she confronted deputy chief engineer of the Leningrad atomic energy station, V. P. Moskovskii.<sup>46</sup>

The contest in Vyborg territorial district 61 and Chedleeva's candidacy, in my opinion, raise serious doubts over the overall competitive nature of the elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. First, there has been a great deal of fuss made by students of Soviet and Russian politics and history over the patriarchal nature of the Russians. There is a brief discussion of this in relation to the elections later in this chapter. Therefore, with this in mind and other factors which are discussed later, without some type of 'rigging' or quota fixing, (if the Ruch'i *sovkhos* nomination meeting is taken into consideration), it seems unlikely that the *only* opponent nominated against Chedleeva could have been a woman. Second, if the voters did not have this patriarchal strain in them, then how come neither of the women won on the first ballot? This, could be answered in a positive manner by the stating that both candidates were nearly equally as qualified. However, if this was the case, then it seems that Chedleeva would have won outright in the repeat election when her opponent was removed. This brings up a third, and extremely crucial point. According to Article 61 of the *Law on Elections of USSR People's Deputies*, when neither of the candidates in a two candidate contest <sup>was</sup> able to achieve 50 per cent of votes, then, by law, new elections had to be held. Generally, it was the practice that when this situation occurred, neither of the original two candidates stood again. Chedleeva's example is rare. On the one hand, maybe we should applaud her ambition to win her seat. On the other, given her pedigree, Chedleeva, was certainly an establishment figure; perhaps therefore, the

continuance of her candidacy was <sup>an</sup> attempt by the Leningrad party apparatus to try to retain some seats. Or, perhaps the party apparatus wanted a seat for a woman.

Second, there is the problem of competition affecting women's participation in the elections. Official data suggest the electoral changes worked more to the benefit of men than women. As stated earlier Soviet voters elected 492 women to the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1984. Because the Soviet electoral system at that time operated on the principle of one candidate per seat (although the election law did not prohibit more than this), there were 492 women candidates for these seats, or women comprised 32.8 per cent of the candidates for the USSR Supreme Soviet. In 1989, women constituted only 16.6 per cent of the 2,895 candidates in the districts for the first round of elections in 1989,<sup>47</sup> or 481<sup>48</sup> and constituted 17.8 per cent of all candidates in the districts and public organizations<sup>49</sup> or 672<sup>50</sup> altogether. According to these figures, we can determine that the electoral reforms implemented in 1989 afforded women with a greater chance for political participation as candidates than before. However, men certainly constituted the overwhelming majority in both the districts and social organizations. Although there was a larger number of women who stood for election in the districts than in the social organizations (481 vs. 191), the percentage of women as candidates for the electoral divisions was higher in the latter (21.7 per cent vs. 17.8).

Table 4.1<sup>51</sup> gives some indications of the decrease in the number of women candidates during the two elections in several territories. According to the data, there were 182 candidates to the USSR Supreme Soviet from Moscow and Leningrad constitutencies, Lithuania, Moldavia and Estonia in 1984, which included 60 women (33 per cent). During



the next elections citizens certainly took advantage of the opportunities for political participation as candidates for people's deputies; 469 were registered by the end of February 1989 (this was an increase of nearly 158 per cent from 1984). However, the overall number of women decreased by more than half and constituted only 4.7 per cent of the candidates in these constituencies.

Table 4.1 Distribution of Women Candidates in Several Territories, 1984 & 1989

Territory	All Candidates		Women (N)		Women (%)	
	1984	1989	1984	1989	1984	1989
Moscow	43	82	15	5	34.9	6.1
Leningrad	19	44	9	5	47.4	11.4
Lithuania	41	150	13	4	31.7	2.7
Moldavia	43	71	14	4	32.6	5.6
Estonia	36	122	9	4	25.0	3.3
Total	182	469	60	22	33.0	4.7

As stated earlier, election programmes were difficult to obtain and this fact constitutes an obstacle to comprehensive analysis on voter selection patterns and issue identification with candidates. Nevertheless, it is possible to provide some examples of women's platforms for the purposes of the present chapter. For instance, excerpts from the election programme of Khurman Abbasova, a kolkhoz chairwoman from Agdamskii national-territorial district No. 202, were published in the Azerbaidzhan republican newspaper, *Bakinskii rabochii's* rubric, *Znakomstvo s kandidatom*. Abbasova, born in 1927, a CPSU member since 1954 and delegate to the XIX Party Congress in 1988, who had served two previous terms in the Azerbaidzhan Supreme Soviet, included such items on her political agenda as conducting an active struggle for improvements in inter-nationality relations, and implementing the rational use of land and strong environmental protection policies.<sup>52</sup> Her candidacy was successful.<sup>53</sup>

The programme of Mariam Mushegovna Martirosyan, a weaver at a silk combine and candidate in Yerevan-Shaumyanskii national-territorial district No. 391 of Armenia, is an example of an unsuccessful woman's platform. Martirosyan's programme contained a detailed plan for defending the rights of mothers. This included creating a kind of 'children's industry for nutrition', improving industrial manufactured goods, medical services and education, extending maternity leave for up to three years, raising the allowances for families with many children and lowering the criterion for this category from families with five children to those having at least three children. Martirosyan also focused on other issues such as improving the ecological situation, public services, socio-cultural activities and transport services and using energy more cost-effectively. She was also concerned with several issues of concern to her fellow combine workers: improving their socio-cultural activities and facilities, improving the housing situation for the workers and opening up foodshops for them in the combine.<sup>54</sup> She was defeated by Elmir Tatulovich Arutyanyan, a tool-makers' brigadier from an industrial organization in Yerevan, born in 1938, a CPSU member since 1966,<sup>55</sup> and a former deputy to the Armenian and USSR Supreme Soviets.<sup>56</sup> Arutyanyan had participated in all sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the Nagorno-Karabakh problems at that time and had twice met with Gorbachev on special commissions pertaining to that matter. He was extremely concerned with questions related to the republics and the centre and favoured a forceful centre and independent regions. He proposed that he would fulfil his voters' mandates as a primary task and that he would work to broaden the sovereignty of republics and increase national self-determination, construct a rule of law state in the USSR, <sup>and</sup> improve the environment and housing construction.<sup>57</sup>

Although these examples are not the only ones which were published in the republican

press, and they may not be entirely accurate samples of the programmes presented by men and women, they are, however, representative of the way in which the Soviet media portrayed the differences between male and female candidates. First, the published platforms and excerpts are evidence that women's programmes contained more instances of issues that pertained to women, families, work environments and problems specific to their localities than did men's. Second, men's platforms were more concerned with issues of the construction of the rule of law state, and contained more concrete proposals of political and economic reform. The extraction of programmatic information from the republican press poses another methodological problem on the validity of the issues. Analysts must ask the question of whether the issues presented in the excerpts of the platforms were comprehensive. One of the consequences of this material is that it may have been subjected to manipulation and there could be the possibility that the press wanted to present women and men as being concerned with the types of issues noted above.

## **Biographical Information on Women Elected to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies**

### *Sex and Party Affiliation*

Like its non-competitive predecessors, the elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies showed that Communists were more likely to be elected than their non-communist counterparts. It will be recalled that in 1984 some 71 per cent of the deputies were CPSU members, and nearly 88 per cent were elected in 1989. As table 2 indicates, the majority of both men and women were CPSU members. This is a radical change from 1984 in which most women were not members of the CPSU. However, again, the percentage of non-

communist women was higher than non-communist men (despite the fact that there were more men in the non-party and Komsomol categories). Ninety-four women (26.7 per cent of women) either belonged to the Komsomol or were neither CPSU nor Komsomol members compared to 198 men (10.4 per cent).

Table 4.2 USSR People's Deputies Elected According to Sex & Political Status

Political Status	All (N)	All (%)	Women (N)	Women (%)	Men (N)	Gender as % of Category		
						Men (%)	Women Men	
CPSU & candidates	1957	87.0	258	73.3	1699	89.6	13.2	86.8
Komsomol members	48	2.1	19	5.4	29	1.5	39.6	60.4
Non - party	244	10.8	75	21.3	169	8.9	30.7	69.3
Total	2249	100	352	100	1897	100	15.7	84.3

Sources: Author's database and figures adapted from *Sostav narodnykh deputatov SSSR...*, p. 11.

#### *Sex and Education*

Table 4.3 contains information on the level of education and gender of deputies elected to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. Voters elected a deputy corpus in 1989 which was more educated than its 1984 predecessor. Included in the last session of the USSR Supreme Soviet were 789 deputies with completed higher education (52.6 per cent), 24 with incomplete higher education (1.6 per cent); 644 with some type of completed secondary education (43 per cent) and 41 with incomplete secondary education (2.7 per cent).<sup>58</sup> As the data above indicate, over three quarters of the deputies had pursued some type of post-secondary education. In addition, more than 1 of 5 had received some type of postgraduate training. Most women received some type of post-secondary education (195 or 55.4 per cent)-a dramatic change from their share in the 1984 Supreme Soviet. However, the percentage of men who achieved the same levels was significantly higher. Nearly 8 of 10 men were in this category (1,509 or 79.5 per cent). Therefore, although there were more

men than women who received some type of secondary education (388 vs. 157), the percentage of women with this qualification was more than <sup>twice as high as</sup> among men (44.6 per cent vs. 20.4 per cent).

Table 4.3 USSR People's Deputies According to Sex and Education

Education Level	All (N)	All (%)	Women (N)	Women (%)	Men (N)	Gender as %		
						Men of Category (%)	Men	
General Secondary	334	14.9	92	26.1	242	12.8	27.5	72.5
Secondary Specialist	194	8.6	53	15.1	141	7.4	27.3	72.7
Incomplete Second - or Unknown	19	0.8	12	3.4	7	0.4	63.2	36.8
Completed Higher	1,187	52.8	156	44.3	1,031	54.3	13.1	86.9
Incomplete Higher	33	1.5	4	1.1	29	1.5	12.1	87.9
Post - Graduate*	482	21.4	35	9.9	447	23.6	7.3	92.7
Total	2,249	100	352	100	1,897	100	15.7	84.3

\*Derived from *Sostav narodnykh deputatov SSSR...*, pp. 17 & 21.

### Gender and Nationality

Table 4.4 contains data on the gender and nationalities of the deputies elected in 1989. Soviet voters elected representatives of 65 nationalities to the Congress of People's Deputies.<sup>59</sup> Men constituted the overwhelming majorities of all nationalities with titular republics. Slavs were the most numerous national group in the Congress (1,378 or 61.3 per cent) and Russians were the nationality represented most frequently (1,026 or 45.6 per cent). This trend was also apparent among both sexes; however, Russians constituted a greater percentage among all elected male deputies (47.1 per cent) than among their female counterparts (37.5 per cent)-a point which was also reflected among the re-elected deputies. It is worthy to note that among most nationalities, the percentages of both male and female deputies is remarkably close. For instance, among Ukrainians, men and women comprised 11.5 and 11.4 per cent respectively of all their genders elected (who constituted 11.5 per cent of all deputies); Belorussians (4.2 per cent of all deputies), 4.2 and 4.3 per cent; and also among Kazakhs, Kirgiz, Tadzhiks, Armenians, Lithuanians and Turkmenians. Women's percentages of nationalities exceeded men's among Uzbeks, Georgians, Azeris and Others

(nationalities without titular union republics).

Table 4.4 People's Deputies Elected According to Sex And Nationality

Nationality	All (N)	All (%)	Women (N)	Women (%)	Men (N)	Gender as %	
						Men of Category (%)	Women Men
Russians	1,026	45.6	132	37.5	894	47.1	12.9 87.1
Ukrainians	258	11.5	40	11.4	218	11.5	15.5 84.5
Belorussians	94	4.2	15	4.3	79	4.2	16.0 84.0
Uzbeks	87	3.9	26	7.4	61	3.2	29.9 70.1
Kazakhs	53	2.4	12	3.4	41	2.2	22.6 77.4
Georgians	71	3.2	18	5.1	53	2.8	25.4 74.6
Azeris	60	2.7	23	6.5	37	2.0	38.3 61.7
Lithuanians	52	2.3	6	1.7	46	2.4	11.5 88.5
Moldavians	43	1.9	3	0.9	40	2.1	7.0 93.0
Latvians	44	2.0	3	0.9	41	2.2	6.8 93.2
Kirgiz	35	1.6	6	1.7	29	1.5	17.1 82.9
Tadzhiks	44	2.0	6	1.7	38	2.0	13.6 86.4
Armenians	61	2.7	9	2.6	52	2.7	14.8 85.2
Turkmenians	40	1.8	8	2.3	32	1.7	20.0 80.0
Estonians	41	1.8	3	0.9	38	2.0	7.3 92.7
Others	240	10.7	42	11.9	198	10.4	17.5 82.5
Total	2,249	100	352	100	1897	100	15.7 84.3

Sources: Author's database and adapted from figures in *Sostav narodnykh deputatov SSSR...*, pp. 13-16.

### Sex and Occupation

Data on women's occupations are contained in Table 4.5. Perhaps one of the more important changes electoral reform had over Soviet representative institutions was transforming the USSR Supreme Soviet from a largely ceremonial political body reflecting the demographic features of Soviet society, to the Congress of People's Deputies, as a more 'working' parliament, staffed with 'a full fledged corps of deputies capable of running the country at the time of *perestroika*'. A. Nazimova and V. Sheinis published a very detailed breakdown of the occupational disparities between the two institutions in *Izvestiya* in early May 1989.<sup>60</sup> Their study points to a decrease in industrial and collective farm manual workers and an increase in industrial and collective farm managers and specialists.

Table 4.5 USSR People's Deputies Elected in 1989 According to Gender &amp; Occupation

Occupation by Sector	All (N)	All (%)	Women (N)	Women (%)
Industrial Management	152	6.8	32	9.1
Industrial Workers	405	18.0	90	25.6
Agricultural Management	192	8.5	25	7.1
Agricultural Workers	233	10.4	45	12.8
Party Officials	237	10.5	8	2.3
Including:				
CPSU CC	23	1.0	0	0.0
Republican 1st Secs	35	1.6	0	0.0
Obkom/Kraiokom 1 Secs	113	5.0	1	0.3
Local 1 Secs	43	1.9	1	0.3
Other Officials	23	1.0	6	1.7
State Officials	150	6.7	24	6.8
TU/KSM/Other Public Orgs.	95	4.2	21	6.0
Secondary/Primary Ed.	183	8.1	33	9.4
Health	98	4.4	28	8.0
Scientific Workers	133	5.9	19	5.4
Culture/Media	204	9.1	21	6.0
Military	80	3.6	0	0.0
Others	87	3.9	6	1.7
Total	2249	100	352	100

Sources: Author's database and adapted from figures in *Sostav narodnykh deputatov SSSR...*, pp. 23-28. Note: the category Other Industrial Workers' includes some hard to define positions. This contributes to some discrepancies with official Soviet data and the study by Nazimova and Sheinis. Notwithstanding, the author's data indicate a quantitative increase in the industrial and agricultural management over the 1984 figures Nazimova and Sheinis provided in their study.

Among the 2,249 deputies who were elected, men constituted  $\frac{1}{n}$  the overwhelming majority of deputies employed in all sectors. Nevertheless, there still existed some gender gaps among the deputies. For instance, industrial and agricultural workers constituted over 38 per cent of all women elected whereas they were more than one quarter of the men elected. Also, among party officials, there was a huge gap between men and women: 229 and 8 respectively. What is more striking is the difference in the positions held by these men and women: men held a virtual monopoly over the highest ranks of party leadership; women were more concentrated among the lower echelons of power. There was only one woman elected from among the party elite of *obkom* first secretary of above, Rimmadzhon Khudaibergenova, who, incidentally, was the only woman occupying that post in the USSR at that time. Also, the other women party officials were predominantly from among the

ranks of *kolkhoz/sovkhov/profkom* party organizations. Although industrial managers constituted a higher percentage among women than men, women managers came more from light industry backgrounds whereas their male counterparts were more likely to have had heavy industry and engineering portfolios.

### Sex and Electoral Division

Data on gender and the distribution of elected deputies according to electoral division are contained in Tables 4.6-4.8. As stated earlier, territorial districts were the most competitive electoral divisions followed respectively by the national-territorial districts and public organisations. When the distribution of elected women is analyzed, an inverse relationship exists: where there was greater competition for seats fewer women were elected and, where there was less competition for seats, a greater number of women were elected. Table 4.8 contains comprehensive data on women elected to territorial district seats.

Table 4.6 Distribution of Deputies Elected to Territorial Districts According to Gender

Territory	All (N)	Women (N)	Women (%)	Gender as		% of	
				Men (N)	Men (%)	Women	Men
RSFSR	403	22	30.1	381	56.4	5.5	94.5
Ukraine	143	15	20.5	128	18.9	10.5	89.5
Belorussia	28	3	4.1	25	3.7	10.7	89.3
Uzbekistan	38	12	16.4	26	3.8	31.6	68.4
Kazakhstan *	40	5	6.8	35	5.2	12.5	87.5
Georgia	16	5	6.8	11	1.6	31.3	68.8
Azerbaijdzhan	15	5	6.8	10	1.5	33.3	66.7
Lithuania	10	2	2.7	8	1.2	20.0	80.0
Moldavia	11	0	0.0	11	1.6	0.0	100
Latvia	8	0	0.0	8	1.2	0.0	100
Kirgizia	9	1	1.4	8	1.2	11.1	88.9
Tadzhikistan	9	0	0.0	9	1.3	0.0	100
Armenia	8	0	0.0	8	1.2	0.0	100
Turkmenia	7	2	2.7	5	0.7	28.6	71.4
Estonia	4	1	1.4	3	0.4	25.0	75.0
Total	749	73	100	676	100	9.7	90.3

\* Note: Kazakhstan was allocated 41 deputies in territorial districts, however, only 40 were in office due to the death of a deputy in one of the territorial districts. See 'Doklad Mandatnoi Komissii', p. 42. Sources: Author's database and adapted from 'Postanovlenic Tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi komissii po vyboram narodnykh deputatov SSSR O territorial'nykh izbiratel'nykh okrugakh po vyboram narodnykh deputatov SSSR' in *Izvestiya*, 7 December 1988, pp. 1-5.



Table 4.7 Distribution of Deputies Elected to National-Territorial Districts According to Gender

Territory	All (N)	Women (N)	Women (%)	Men (N)	Gender as		Men
					Men (%)	% of Category Women	
RSFSR	32	2	1.9	30	4.6	6.3	93.8
Ukraine	32	5	4.9	27	4.2	15.6	84.4
Belorussia	32	6	5.8	26	4.0	18.8	81.3
Uzbekistan	32	3	2.9	29	4.5	9.4	90.6
Kazakhstan	32	5	4.9	27	4.2	15.6	84.4
Georgia	32	7	6.8	25	3.9	21.9	78.1
Azerbaijani	32	16	15.5	16	2.5	50.0	50.0
Lithuania	32	1	1.0	31	4.8	3.1	96.9
Moldavia	32	2	1.9	30	4.6	6.3	93.8
Latvia	32	2	1.9	30	4.6	6.3	93.8
Kirgizia	32	2	1.9	30	4.6	6.3	93.8
Tadzhikistan	32	1	1.0	31	4.8	3.1	96.9
Armenia	32	6	5.8	26	4.0	18.8	81.3
Turkmenia	32	4	3.9	28	4.3	12.5	87.5
Estonia	32	1	1.0	31	4.8	3.1	96.9
Abkhaz ASSR	11	2	1.9	9	1.4	18.2	81.8
Adzharia ASSR	11	4	3.9	7	1.1	36.4	63.6
Bashkir ASSR	11	1	1.0	10	1.5	9.1	90.9
Buryat ASSR	11	2	1.9	9	1.4	18.2	81.8
Dagestan ASSR	11	3	2.9	8	1.2	27.3	72.7
Kabardin - Balkar ASSR	11	3	2.9	8	1.2	27.3	72.7
ASSR Kalmyk	11	0	0.0	11	1.7	0.0	100
Karakalpak ASSR	11	4	3.9	7	1.1	36.4	63.6
ASSR Karelian	11	3	2.9	8	1.2	27.3	72.7
Komi ASSR	11	1	1.0	10	1.5	9.1	90.9
Mari ASSR	11	0	0.0	11	1.7	0.0	100
ASSR Moldavian	11	2	1.9	9	1.4	18.2	81.8
ASSR Nakhichevan	11	2	1.9	9	1.4	18.2	81.8
N Osetia ASSR	11	2	1.9	9	1.4	18.2	81.8
Tatar ASSR	11	3	2.9	8	1.2	27.3	72.7
Tuvan ASSR	11	1	1.0	10	1.5	9.1	90.9
Udmurt ASSR	11	1	1.0	10	1.5	9.1	90.9
Chochen - Ingush ASSR	11	1	1.0	10	1.5	9.1	90.9
Chuvash ASSR	11	1	1.0	10	1.5	9.1	90.9
Yakut ASSR	11	1	1.0	10	1.5	9.1	90.9
Adygei AO	5	0	0.0	5	0.8	0.0	100
Gorno - Altai AO	5	1	1.0	4	0.6	20.0	80.0
Gorno - Badakhshan AO	5	0	0.0	5	0.8	0.0	100
Jewish AO	5	0	0.0	5	0.8	0.0	100
Karachaev - Cherkess AO	5	1	1.0	4	0.6	20.0	80.0
Nagorno - Karabakh AO	5	0	0.0	5	0.8	0.0	100
Khukass AO	5	0	0.0	5	0.8	0.0	100
S Oseti AD	5	1	1.0	4	0.6	20.0	80.0
Agln - Buryat AD	1	0	0.0	1	0.2	0.0	100
Komi - Permyak AD	1	0	0.0	1	0.2	0.0	100
Koryak AD	1	0	0.0	1	0.2	0.0	100
Nenets AD	1	0	0.0	1	0.2	0.0	100
Talmyr AD	1	0	0.0	1	0.2	0.0	100
Ust' - Ordin - Duryat AD	1	0	0.0	1	0.2	0.0	100
Khanti - Mansi AD	1	0	0.0	1	0.2	0.0	100
Chukotsk AD	1	0	0.0	1	0.2	0.0	100
Even AD	1	0	0.0	1	0.2	0.0	100
Yanafo - Nenets AD	1	0	0.0	1	0.2	0.0	100
Total	750	103	100	647	100	13.7	86.3

Sources: Author's database and adapted from, 'Postanovlenic Tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi komissii po vyboram narodnykh deputatov SSSR O national'no-territorial'nykh izbiratel'nykh okrugakh po vyboram narodnykh deputatov SSSR in *Izvestiya*, 7 December 1988, pp. 5-8.

Table 4.8 Distribution of Women Elected According to Public Organizations

Public Organization	All	Women (N)	Women (%)
All Public Organizations	750	176	23.5
Including:			
CPSU	100	12	12
Trade Unions	100	23	23
Cooperative Organizations	100	27	27
Komsomol	75	11	14.7
Women's Councils	75	75	100
All - Union Organizations of Veterans of War and Labour	75	6	8
Associations of Scientific Workers	75	6	8
Creative Unions of the USSR	75	5	6.7
Other Social Organizations	75	11	14.7

Sources: Author's database; and adapted from *Sostav narodnykh deputatov SSSR...*, p. 9.

There are several reasons<sup>61</sup> which I have found which may explain both the reasons for women candidates winning more seats in less competitive electoral divisions and their decline in comparison to the 11th convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet. First, there is a strong possibility that a patriarchal attitude existed among Soviet voters. It will be recalled that in a pre-election public opinion poll conducted by the Centre for Political Research of the Institute of State Law and the Centre for the Study of Public Opinion of the Institute of Sociology of the USSR Academy of Sciences (N=2,800) women were regarded among the groups of people respondents least desired as their deputies.<sup>62</sup> It is very possible that in addition to this patriarchal attitude, the 'token' women (selected more for their personal characteristics rather than their leadership and political abilities) that Soviet party officials nominated to become deputies during previous elections may have caused voters to be reluctant to vote for woman candidates when obstructions to competition were removed. Leading feminist from the former USSR Anastasya Posadskaya has noted that the 'obedient' women who sat in bodies often did the cause of women in politics more harm than good.<sup>63</sup> Second, the amount of free time that women had declined during the years

of *perestroika*<sup>64</sup> and with an opening up of the electoral system, it is highly doubtful that they could have had the time necessary to undertake participation in competitive campaigns. This point may be especially valid given Soviet men's lack of enthusiasm for participating in domestic duties.

A third factor was exposed by former First Deputy Chairwoman of the Soviet Women's Committee (later elected to the CPSU Central Committee in July 1990)<sup>65</sup> Alevtina Fedulova in an interview published in *Izvestiya*. Fedulova mentioned that stereotypes certainly had some reason to play why women made such a poor showing at the polls. More importantly, in the opinion of the present author, is that she stated the Soviet Women's Committee failed to provide adequate support for women candidates outside the seats allocated to the *zhensovet*. 'As it turned out, even women's councils were not prepared to work under the new conditions and failed to consider the changed political situation and the public mood. As a result, they did not nominate a single woman for candidate for deputy in territorial, <sup>and</sup> national-territorial districts in a whole series of oblasts, krais or even republics.'<sup>66</sup> Fedulova brought forth other reasons which contributed to women's poor showing at the polls. 'First, in terms of numbers, there were far fewer women among the candidates than men. Second, wherever a woman ran against a man, voters preferred a man (this shows how voters think in terms of stereotypes). Third, women, as a rule, were short of oratorical skill, confidence in their strength, and in conviction concerning the merits and advantages of their own programmes. Forgive me for saying so, but there were times when our candidates were not bold enough. One confirmation of this is the fact that not a single woman who thought she had unfairly lost an election appealed to the Central Election Commission for a recount'.<sup>67</sup>

I feel these are strong reasons which certainly affected the reduction of women deputies in the highest organ of state power; however, I believe that her second point is probably a well-grounded, over-generalization, and, at least in the case of Lithuania, it is entirely incorrect. In only 1 of four instances did a man defeat a woman during the first round of elections: journalist Vitas Tomkus received 168,847 votes for and 46,335 votes against his candidacy whereas, secondary school director Irena-Dnena Kachinskene polled only 9,342 votes for and 205,430 against during their competition for Panevezhskii territorial district No. 961. Tomkus also defeated Antanas Budvitas, director of the Lithuanian scientific research institute of agriculture.<sup>68</sup> The three victorious women included in the territorial districts, Zita Shlichite who defeated Bronislavas Sheshplaukis in Klaipeda territorial district 690 and Kazimiera Prunskiene who defeated Sigitas Vilchauskas and Pranis Leonitas in Shyalyauskii territorial district 694.<sup>69</sup> In the national-territorial districts, Jurate Kupliauskiene polled the highest number of votes among her competitors in Vilnius-Dzerzhinskii district 226, Valerii Shurupov and Algimantis Matulyavichyus, during the first round of elections on 26 March<sup>70</sup> and later won in a run-off election. It should be noted, however, that, at least in the cases of Prunskiene and Kupliauskiene, the candidates were members of *Sajudis*.<sup>71</sup>

A fourth factor, which I noticed is that there were few informational items on women candidates, particularly in the districts, in the Central and Republican press on 8 March 1989, International Women's Day. *Izvestiya*, for instance, failed to publish either information on women candidates in either the districts or public organisations or their pre-election programmes<sup>72</sup>. There were some exceptions, with particular reference to candidates in the districts in some republican newspapers.<sup>73</sup> This event would have been

a good opportunity for the social organizations, the CPSU and the participants themselves, to promote women's candidacies, as items in the press on that day naturally, were devoted partially to women.

There are other criteria which should also be considered in evaluating both women's representation in the electoral divisions and the influence that this had on the deputy corpus. It has already been stated that women were most highly represented in social organisation seats. However, the composition of the social organisations suggests some discrepancies between the men and women in several categories. First, based on occupations it appears that the social organisations could have been used to boost the compositions of the certain professional and politically affiliated women. Of the 127 industrial managers who were elected to the Congress from the territorial and national-territorial districts, 116 (91.3 per cent) were men; whereas, of 25 elected to social organisation seats, 18 (72 per cent) were women. A similar trend is found among party and state officials. Men accounted for 206 of 207 party officials elected from the districts (99.5 per cent) and women comprised 7 of 30 from the social organizations (23.3 per cent). Among state officials, 115 of 122 elected from the districts were men (94.3 per cent); however, 16 of 28 state officials from the public organisations were women (57.1 per cent). Also, although agricultural workers were least represented among deputies in the social organisations, 21 of 28 from this electoral division were women (75 per cent). Table 4.10 contains data on women deputies' occupations according to electoral division. Second, the largest share of women with higher education were elected to social organisation seats: 89 of 156 women who completed higher education (57.1 per cent) and 21 of 35 with post-graduate qualifications (60 per cent). Table 4.11 contains data on women deputies' educational attainments according to electoral division.

Table 4.9 Distribution of Women Deputies Elected in Territorial Districts

Territory	Seats	Women as %	
		Women (N)	of Deputies
RSFSR	403	22	5.5
Including:			
Moscow City	26	0	0.0
Moscow Oblast'	19	1	5.3
Leningrad City	14	0	0.0
Leningrad Oblast'	5	1	20.0
Altai Krai	8	0	0.0
Krasnodar Krai	14	1	7.1
Krasnoyarsk Krai	10	0	0.0
Primorsk Krai	6	0	0.0
Stavropol Krai	7	2	28.6
Khabarovsk Krai	5	1	20.0
Amur Krai	3	0	0.0
Arkhangel'sk Oblast'	4	0	0.0
Astrakhan Oblast'	3	0	0.0
Belgorod Oblast'	4	0	0.0
Bryansk Oblast'	4	1	25.0
Vladimir Oblast'	5	1	20.0
Volgograd Oblast'	7	0	0.0
Vologda Oblast'	4	0	0.0
Voronezh Oblast'	7	1	14.3
Gorkii Oblast'	10	1	10.0
Ivanov Oblast'	4	0	0.0
Irkutsk Oblast'	7	0	0.0
Kaliningrad Oblast'	3	1	33.3
Kalinin Oblast'	5	0	0.0
Kaluga Oblast'	3	0	0.0
Kamchatka Oblast'	1	0	0.0
Kemerovo Oblast'	8	0	0.0
Kirov Oblast'	5	0	0.0
Kostroma Oblast'	2	0	0.0
Kuibyshev Oblast'	9	0	0.0
Kurgan Oblast'	3	0	0.0
Kursk Oblast'	4	0	0.0
Lipetsk Oblast'	3	0	0.0
Magadan Oblast'	1	0	0.0
Murmansk Oblast'	3	0	0.0
Novgorod Oblast'	2	0	0.0
Novosibirsk Oblast'	8	1	12.5
Omsk Oblast'	6	1	16.7
Orenburg Oblast'	6	0	0.0
Orël Oblast'	3	1	33.3
Penza Oblast'	4	0	0.0
Perm Oblast'	8	0	0.0
Pskov Oblast'	3	0	0.0
Rostov Oblast'	12	0	0.0
Ryazan Oblast'	4	0	0.0
Saratov Oblast'	7	2	28.6
Sakhalin Oblast'	2	0	0.0
Sverdlovsk Oblast'	13	0	0.0
Smolensk Oblast'	3	0	0.0
Tambov Oblast'	4	1	25.0
Tomsk Oblast'	3	0	0.0

Tula Oblast'	5	0	0.0
Tyumen Oblast'	8	0	0.0
Ul'yanovsk Oblast'	4	0	0.0
Chelyabinsk Oblast'	10	0	0.0
Chita Oblast'	3	0	0.0
Yaroslavl' Oblast'	4	0	0.0
Bashkir ASSR	10	0	0.0
Buryat ASSR	3	0	0.0
Dagestan ASSR	4	1	25.0
Kabardine - Balkar ASSR	2	1	50.0
Kalmyk ASSR	1	0	0.0
Karelian ASSR	2	1	50.0
Komi ASSR	3	0	0.0
Marii ASSR	2	0	0.0
Mordovian ASSR	3	2	66.7
N Osetian ASSR	2	0	0.0
Tatar ASSR	10	0	0.0
Tuvin ASSR	1	0	0.0
Udmurt ASSR	4	0	0.0
Chechen - Ingush ASSR	3	0	0.0
Chuvash ASSR	3	0	0.0
Yakut ASSR	2	0	0.0
Ukraine	143	15	10.5
Including:			
Vinnitsa Oblast'	6	2	33.3
Volynsk Oblast'	3	0	0.0
Voroshilovograd Oblast'	8	0	0.0
Dnepropetrovsk Oblast'	10	0	0.0
Dontesk Oblast'	15	1	6.7
Zhitomir Oblast'	5	1	20.0
Transcarpathian Oblast'	9	2	22.2
Ivano - Franko Oblast'	4	2	50.0
Kiev City	6	0	0.0
Kiev Oblast'	6	1	16.7
Kirovograd Oblast'	4	0	0.0
Crimea Oblast'	6	0	0.0
Lvov Oblast'	7	1	14.3
Nikolaev Oblast'	4	0	0.0
Odessa Oblast'	7	1	14.3
Poltava Oblast'	5	1	20.0
Roven Oblast'	3	0	0.0
Suma Oblast'	4	1	25.0
Ternopol Oblast'	3	0	0.0
Khar'kov Oblast'	9	0	0.0
Kherson Oblast'	3	1	33.3
Khmel'nitskiy Oblast'	4	0	0.0
Cherkassk Oblast'	5	0	0.0
Chernigov Oblast'	4	1	25.0
Chernovtsy Oblast'	3	0	0.0
Belorussia	28	3	10.7
Including:			
Brest' Oblast'	4	0	0.0
Vitebsk Oblast'	4	0	0.0
Gomel Oblast'	5	0	0.0
Grodno Oblast'	3	1	33.3
Minsk Oblast'	8	1	12.5
Mogilev Oblast'	4	1	25.0
Uzbekistan	38	12	31.6

Including:			
Andizhan Oblast'	3	0	0.0
Bukhara Oblast'	2	1	50.0
Kashnadar'in Oblast'	3	1	33.3
Namangan Oblast'	3	0	0.0
Samarkand Oblast'	5	3	60.0
Surkhandar Oblast'	2	1	50.0
Sydarin Oblast'	3	2	66.7
Tashkent Oblast'	9	1	11.1
Fergana Oblast'	4	1	25.0
Khorzem Oblast'	2	2	100
Karakalpak ASSR	2	0	0.0
Kazakhstan	40	5	12.5

Including:			
Alma Ata City	3	0	0.0
Alma Ata Oblast'	2	0	0.0
Aktyubin Oblast' *	1	0	0.0
E Kazakhstan Oblast'	3	1	33.3
Gunev Oblast'	2	0	0.0
Dzhambul Oblast'	2	2	100.0
Dzhezkazgan Oblast'	1	0	0.0
Karaganda Oblast'	3	0	0.0
Kyzyl - Ordin Oblast'	1	0	0.0
Kokchetov Oblast'	2	1	50.0
Kustanai Oblast'	3	0	0.0
Pavlodar Oblast'	2	0	0.0
N Kazakhstan Oblast'	2	0	0.0
Semipalatinsk Oblast'	2	0	0.0
Taldy - Kurgan Oblast'	2	0	0.0
Ural'sk Oblast'	2	1	50.0
Tselinograd Oblast'	3	0	0.0
Chimkent Oblast'	4	0	0.0
Georgia	16	5	31.3
Azerbaidzhan	15	5	33.3
Lithuania	10	2	20.0
Moldavia	11	0	0.0
Latvia	8	0	0.0
Kirgizia	9	1	11.1
Tadzhikistan	9	0	0.0
Armenia	8	0	0.0
Turkmenia	7	2	28.6
Estonia	4	1	25.0
Total	749	73	9.7

\* Note: Due to the death of a deputy in this oblast', there was only 1 deputy in office when the first Congress met in May 1989. Sources: Author's database and adapted from 'Postanovlenie Tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi komissii po vyboram narodnykh deputatov SSSR O territorial'nykh izbiratel'nykh okrugakh po vyboram narodnykh deputatov SSSR' in *Izvestiya*, 7 December 1988, pp. 1-5.



Table 4.10 Women Deputies Elected According to Occupation & Electoral Division

Occupation by Sector	All (N)	All (%)	Terr. (N)	Terr. (%)	Nat'l-Terr. (N)	Nat'l-Terr. (%)	P. Orgs. (N)	P. Orgs. (%)
Industrial Management	27	7.7	3	4.1	6	5.8	18	10.2
Industrial Workers	63	17.9	14	19.2	21	20.4	28	15.9
Agricultural Management	28	8.0	5	6.8	6	5.8	17	9.7
Agricultural Workers	77	21.9	27	37.0	29	28.2	21	11.9
Party Officials	8	2.3	0	0.0	1	1.0	7	4.0
State Officials	23	6.5	3	4.1	4	3.9	16	9.1
TU/KSM/Other Public Orgs.	18	5.1	0	0.0	2	1.9	16	9.1
Secondary/Primary Ed.	34	9.7	7	9.6	16	15.5	11	6.3
Health	30	8.5	12	16.4	10	9.7	8	4.5
Scientific Workers	21	6.0	1	1.4	6	5.8	14	8.0
Culture/Media	18	5.1	1	1.4	2	1.9	15	8.5
Others	5	1.4	0	0.0	0	0.0	5	2.8
Total	352	100	73	100	103	100	176	100

Sources: Author's database; *Sostav narodnykh deputatov...*, pp. 23-28.

Table 4.11 Women Deputies Elected According to Education and Electoral Division

	Terr (N)	Terr (%)	Nat'l-Terr (N)	Nat'l-Terr (%)	P. Orgs (N)	P. Orgs (%)
Secondary*	43	58.9	50	48.5	64	36.4
Higher**	25	34.2	44	42.7	91	51.7
Post-Graduate	5	6.8	9	8.7	21	11.9
Total	73	100	103	100	176	100

\* Includes women who achieved general secondary, specialist secondary and incomplete secondary education.

\*\* Includes women who achieved incomplete and complete higher education.

Sources: Author's database; *Sostav narodnykh deputatov...*, pp. 17 and 21.

## Women in the USSR Congress of People's Deputies

Women's participation in the first USSR Congress of People's Deputies in May-June 1989 is a final factor to consider in the ways in which electoral reform measures affected the women deputies' share of the Soviet parliament and political participation. As stated earlier, between the sessions of 1984-1988, women were infrequent contributors in the Supreme Soviet, and, because the agenda was more or less controlled, it can be safely assumed that the CPSU did not intend to promote their participation even as high as their representation in the legislature. Thus, the question now poses itself as to how women fared in a generally more open atmosphere. At present, the one major existing study concerning participation in the first USSR Congress of People's Deputies, written by Italian journalist, Giulietto

Chiesa, suggests the women were infrequent contributors to the sessions<sup>74</sup> and suggests that they belonged to what he considered a 'marsh' of deputies- 'those who either do not want or are unable to take sides.'<sup>75</sup>

There are three ways<sup>76</sup> <sup>in</sup> which I concluded that are possible to analyse women's participation in the Congress: as chairs of sittings; as makers of major speeches and those who contributed to discussions from the floor. During the 13 sittings (and one extraordinary session) held between 25 May and 9 June 1989, there were nearly 2,100 entries entered into the Congress's stenographic report made by 413 USSR People's Deputies.<sup>77</sup> Men chaired every one of these sittings. However, in the Second Session held in December 1989 Valentina Shevchenko chaired the 4th and 6th sittings.<sup>78</sup> Among the 413 contributors overall, 32 were women (7.7 per cent of all contributors; 9.1 per cent of all elected women).<sup>79</sup> While this figure was lower than the total from the previous convocation of the Supreme Soviet, it was certainly a higher total of women speaking at any one sitting of held between 1984-1988.<sup>80</sup> Thus, we can consider that women's participation in the legislature may have been enhanced somewhat by a reduction of CPSU control over the agenda. The deputies made 188 major speeches or reports; however, only 8 women contributed in this capacity (4.2 per cent). Therefore, the majority of women contributed 'from the floor'. However, it should be pointed out that there existed extreme discrepancies between the percentage of women contributors and the amount of times they were entered into the stenographic report. It should not be surprising that Mikhail Gorbachev had the greatest number of contributions recorded in the parliamentary proceedings (578). However, no woman's name was entered more than four times in the record.

What were the characteristics of these women? The majority of them belonged to the CPSU: 23 or 71.9 per cent. Also, most were recipients of higher education (27 or 84.4 per cent), and more 1 in 4 women deputies who had achieved a post-graduate degree contributed to the Congress. In addition, most of the women were from white collar backgrounds of some sort (26 or 81.2 per cent). Women from the social organisations contributed most to the Congress (14 or 43.8 per cent) and were followed respectively by those in the national-territorial districts (10; 31.3 per cent) and territorial districts (7; 21.9 per cent). Table 4.12 contains data on women who spoke at the First USSR Congress of People's Deputies (May-June 1989).

Table 4.12 Women Speakers at First USSR Congress of People's Deputies

Session	Speakers	Women	%
1	7	1	14.3
2	44	8	18.2
3	40	4	10.0
4	45	7	15.6
5	50	5	10.0
6	59	9	15.3
7	30	4	13.3
8	34	4	11.8
9	62	8	12.9
11	40	5	12.5
12	37	5	13.5
Total	448	60	13.4

Sources: Author's database; *Pervyi S'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR 25 maya-9iyunya 1989 g.: Stenograficheskiy otchet*, (Moscow: Verkhovnyi Sovet/Izvestiya, 1989), 6 Vols, Vols 1-3.

## Conclusion

Electoral reform measures had varying effects on the composition of women in the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. As a result of the elections women's representation decreased. However, the women were more likely to have been party members, white collar workers, and recipients of higher education than they were in 1984. Thus, on these levels,

it seems that the women could have been in better positions to contribute to the sessions of the Congress than their predecessors in the last convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet. However, the greatest share of women with these traits were elected to the social organisation seats which were less competitive than the electoral districts. The social organisation seats, eliminated from the Law on Elections of USSR People's Deputies after the Second Congress in December, certainly violated the principle of universal suffrage and one-person one vote. This point is among the topics discussed in the following chapter. However, in the case of the First Congress, the largest share of women deputies who participated in the proceedings were elected from these seats. In one way it is not surprising. Some of them were leading figures in science, the state and management and they would have had strong party ties. For instance two of the three women speakers (among eight overall) who made major speeches at the Congress and were elected to social organisation seats included Zoya Pukhova, the chairwoman of the Soviet Women's Committee, and Zeina Beishekeeva, a <sup>special state farm</sup> (gospetskhos) senior shepherd, and member of the CPSU Central Auditing Commission since 1986. Nevertheless, the social organisation seats provided at least in theory a mechanism for increased participation for women. The removal of these seats certainly affected women's representation in subsequent elections at the republican and local levels, and for instance comprised about 5 per cent of the Russian Congress of People's Deputies.<sup>81</sup> However, men's political participation in Soviet politics increased in all areas: candidates, deputies and participants in the parliament. Nevertheless, as later chapters will argue, women's representation increased in the 1993 elections to the Russian Federal Assembly.

## NOTES

1. Data on women deputies were compiled from author's personal database derived from the sources cited in notes 2 and 3 from in the previous chapter.
2. See the organisation's entry in B. N. Berezovskii, N. I. Krutov and V. V. Chervyakov, *Rossiia: partii, assotsiatsii, soyuzy, kluby* (Moscow: RAU Press, 1991), Vol. 1, Part 1, p. 57; Cynthia Cockburn, "Democracy Without Women is No Democracy": Soviet Women Hold Their First Autonomous Congress', *Feminist Review*, 39 (Winter 1991), pp. 141-148; 'Feminist Manifesto: "Democracy Without Women is No Democracy"' (translated by Linda Edmondson), *ibid.*, pp. 127-132 and Sarah Ashwin, 'Development of Feminism in the Perestroika Era', *Report on the USSR*, Vol. 3, No. 35 (1991), pp. 21-25.
3. 'Zhenshchiny v strane', *Vestnik statistiki*, 1992, No. 1., pp. 52-66, p. 52.
4. *Ibid.*
5. Goskomstat SSSR, 'Zhenshchiny v SSSR', *ibid.*, 1990, No. 1, pp. 41-64, p. 41.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*
8. 'Zhenshchiny v strane', p. 53.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
10. Quoted in Judith Shapiro, 'The Industrial Labour Force', in Mary Buckley (ed.), *Perestroika and Soviet Women*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 14 - 38, p. 24.
11. *Ibid.*
12. See, Tass report, 'O bezrabotnykh v Rossii', *Izvestiya*, 24 January 1992, p. 1.
13. Goskomstat SSSR, *Zhenshchiny v SSSR 1989: statisticheskie materialy*, (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1989), p. 13.
14. *Ibid.* and Otdel po voprosam raboty sovetov Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, *Sostav deputatov, ispolnitel'nykh komitetov, postoyannykh komissii i rezervnykh deputatov mestnykh sovetov narodnykh deputatov 1987 g.: statisticheski sbornik*, (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1987), p. 4. Women comprised 49.3 per cent of all local deputies, 37.2 per cent of members in executive committees, 27.5 per cent of their chairpersons, 24.8 per cent of deputy chairpersons and 85.1 per cent of all secretaries.
15. Mary Buckley, 'Female Workers by Hand and Male Workers by Brain: The Occupational Composition of the 1985 Azerbaidzhan Supreme Soviet', *Soviet Union/Union Sovietique*, 14, No. 2 (1987), pp. 229-237.
16. Otdel po partiinogo stroitel'stva i kadrovai raboty, 'Statisticheskie dannie po KPSS na 1 yanvarya 1990 g.', *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 4, pp. 113-115, p. 113

17. Komissiya TsK KPSS po voprosam zhenshin i sem'i, 'Ob osnovnykh napravlennykh raboty KPSS s zhenshinami i zhenskim dvizheniem', in *ibid.*, 1991, No. 6, pp. 26 - 39, p. 27.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
19. *Politbyuro, Orgbyuro, Sekretariat, TsK RKP (b), VKP (b), KPSS: spravochnik*, (Moscow: Politizdat, 1990, pp. 41 & 242.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 54 & 76.
21. 'Informatsionnoe soobshchenie o plenumе Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuzа', *Materialy XXVIII S"ezda Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuzа* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1990, p. 202); 'Politbyuro i Sekretariat Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS', *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1990, No. 8, pp. 6-71.
22. Komissiya TsK KPSS po voprosam zhenshin i sem'i, *op cit.*, p. 28.
23. *Ibid.*
24. Otdel organizatsionno-partiinoy raboty TsK KPSS, 'KPSS v tsifrah', *Partiinaya zhizn'*, 1981, No. 14, pp. 13-26, p. 18.
25. 'Doklad Mandatnoi Komissii XXVI S"ezda KPSS', *XXVI S"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuzа: Stenograficheskii otchet*, (Moscow: Politizdat, 1981), 3 vols., Vol. 1, pp. 215-220, p. 219.
26. Otdel organizatsionno-partiinoy raboty TsK KPSS, 'KPSS v tsifrah', *Partiinaya zhizn'*, 1986, No. 14, pp. 19-22, p. 24.
27. 'Doklad Mandatnoi Komissii XXVII S"ezda Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuzа', *XXVII S"ezd KPSS: Stenograficheskii otchet*, (Moscow: Politizdat, 1986), 3 vols., Vol. 1, pp. 217-221, p. 221.
28. *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1989, No. 2, pp. 138-142, p. 140.
29. 'Doklad Mandatnoi Komissii XIX Vsesoyuznoi Konferentsii KPSS', *Materialy XIX Vsesoyuznoi Konferentsii Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuzа*, (Moscow: Politizdat, 1988), pp. 90-95, p. 94.
30. 'Doklad Mandatnoi Komissii XXVIII S"ezda Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuzа', *Materialy XXVIII S"ezda...*, (Moscow: Politizdat, 1990), pp. 159-161, p. 160.
31. Komissiya TsK po voprosam zhenshin i sem'i, *op cit.*, p. 28.
32. Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie SSSR, *Zhenshchiny v SSSR 1985: statisticheskie materialy* (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1985), p. 5.
33. Aggregate data on the USSR Supreme Soviet <sup>are</sup> derived from *Deputy...*, pp. 3 - 4 and data on women <sup>are</sup> derived from author's database.

Political Affiliation	All	Women
CPSU and candidates	1072	174
Non - party	428	318
Including Komsomoltsy	225	162

Age	All	Women
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30 and under	331	245
31 - 40	186	117
41 - 50	334	110
51 - 60	414	16
61 and older	235	4
Total	1500	492

Education Level	All	Women
Higher	789	73
Incomplete higher	24	10
Secondary	644	398
Incomplete secondary	41	11
Undetermined	2	0
Total	1500	492

Post - graduate/Academic titles	218	9
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Occupation by Sector	All	Women
Workers/kolkhozniks	769	416
Industrial/agricultural mgt.	68	19
Science/health/culture/arts & literature/education	134	39
Party officials	250	3
State/trade union/komsomol officials	217	8
Military	55	0
Others	7	7
Total	1500	492

34. I am grateful to Hana Havelkova, Charles University, Prague, and Centre for Gender Studies, Prague, for bringing this point to my attention. I did not address this point in my article 'Women and the 1989 Elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies', *Coexistence*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 1-28.

35. See, for instance, Otdel organizatsionno-partiinnoi raboty TsK KPSS, 'KPSS v tsifrakh', *Partiinaya zhizn'*, 1986, No. 14, pp. 19-32, p. 22.

36. Goskomstat SSSR, 'Zhenshchiny v SSSR', *Vestnik statistiki*, 1991, No. 2, pp. 36-52, p. 39.

37. *Ibid.*, pp. 39 - 40.

38. This data does not include reports made by state and party officials - which would have made the figure on women participants even lower (the only reports made by a woman deputy were the reports of the Soviet of Nationalities in the seventh and ninth sessions made by G. M. Grineva). See, for instance, *Pervaya Sessiya Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR (odinnadtsatyi sozyv) 11 - 12 aprelya 1984 g.: stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1984), (I. V. Lagidze, pp. 101 - 104); *Vtoraya Sessiya Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR (odinnadtsatyi sozyv) 27 - 28 noyabrnya 1984 g.: stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1985), speeches by L. P. Lykova, pp. 112 - 116; Ya. Yu. Bal'tmishkene, pp. 147 - 150; T. M. Nurmanbetova, pp. 161 - 164; Z.

Fazilova, pp. 171 - 147; L. A. Ishchuk, pp. 178 - 181; R. A. Kukain, pp. 187 - 190; Kh. A. Raik, pp. 203 - 206 and D. V. Mukhlaeva, pp. 232 - 235; *Tret'ya Sessiya Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR (odinnadtsatyi sozyv) 2 - 3 iyulya 1985 g.: stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1985), speeches by Ye. V. Balakina, pp. 61 - 64; L. N. Krasnova, pp. 103 - 106; D. Arutyunyan, pp. 144 - 147 and N. M. Makhmudova, pp. 205 - 209; *Chervertaya Sessiya Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR (odinnadtsatyi sozyv) 26 - 27 noyabrya 1985 g.: stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1986) speeches by A. D. Shlapakova, pp. 73 - 76; D. A. Kadyrova, pp. 101 - 104; N. V. Gellert, pp. 145 - 148; R. V. Serebyanskaya, pp. 156 - 159; E. Ya. Kupcha, pp. 170-173; N. N. Mitrofanova, pp. 191 - 193 and N. M. Motova, pp. 253 - 255; *Pyataya Sessiya Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR (odinnadtsatyi sozyv) 18 - 19 iyunya 1986 g.: stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1986), speeches by V. S. Zorina, pp. 91 - 95; N. P. Otke, pp. 208 - 212; G. Kh Shankieva, pp. 227 - 230 and M. Mirbabaeva, pp. 259 - 263; *Shestaya Sessiya Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR (odinnadtsatyi sozyv) 17 - 19 noyabrya 1986 g.: stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1987), speeches by L. P. Shurygina, pp. 85 - 89; G. S. Zharko, pp. 122 - 124; V. Yu. Mamedova, pp. 154 - 158; L. D. Ovsyannikova, pp. 188 - 191; V. M. Aksamitauskene, pp. 217 - 220; T. D. Trofimova, pp. 247 - 250; V. A. Lebedeva, pp. 254 - 258; G. S. Sadretdinova, pp. 308 - 311 and L. V. Sharova, pp. 339 - 341; *Sed'maya Sessiya Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR (odinnadtsatyi sozyv) 29 - 30 iyunya 1987 g.: stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1987), speeches by A. A. Bryzgalova, pp. 74 - 78; D. O. Skulme, pp. 158 - 160; A. V. Shelduyakova, pp. 172 - 175 and R. G. Roshchinskaya, pp. 192 - 194; *Vos'maya Sessiya Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR (odinnadtsatyi sozyv) 19 - 20 oktyabrya 1987 g.: stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1987), speeches by Ye. Ya. Lobacheva, pp. 81 - 84; I. Kh. Akhmedova, pp. 135 - 138; N. N. Sitnik, pp. 164 - 166 and L. Kh. Rasulova, pp. 186 - 189; *Devyataya Sessiya Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR (odinnadtsatyi sozyv) 24 - 26 maya 1988 g.: stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1988), speeches by G. I. Shegeda, pp. 125 - 128; S. Kazatova, pp. 145 - 149; S. Z. Umalatova, pp. 211 - 215; Ye. P. Maryakhina, pp. 243 - 246; R. A. Timurbacva, pp. 263 - 266; Kh. A. Perelyainen, pp. 290 - 293; V. S. Shevchenko, pp. 332 - 336 (she was elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet in a by - election in November 1985; see, 'Soobshchenie o vyborakh deputatov Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po otdel'nym izbiratel'nym okrugam', *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, 1985, No. 47, p. 741; therefore, her biographical information is not available in the *Deputy*) and T. V. Krivonogova, pp. 343 - 346; *Odinnadtsataya Sessiya Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR (odinnadtsatyi sozyv) 17 - 28 oktyabrya 1988 g.: stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1988), speeches by V. A. Dyagel', pp. 95 - 97; G. G. Bedareva, pp. 141 - 144; V. P. Kuchina, pp. 187 - 190; K. G. Martirosyan, pp. 227 - 232 and G. S. Rybakova, pp. 247 - 250 and *Vneocherednaya Dvenadtsataya Sessiya Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR (odinnadtsatyi sozyv) 29 noyabrya - 1 dekabrya 1988 g.: stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1988), speeches by V. S. Shevchenko, pp. 32 - 36; Z. P. Pukhova, pp. 56 - 59; O. V. Ketryan, pp. 136 - 139 and Kh. A. Abdurakhmanova, pp. 156 - 159.

39. LenTass report, 'Registratsiya kandidatov v deputaty', *Leningradskaya pravda*, 21 February 1989, p. 1.

40. Ibid.

41. 'O rezul'tatakh vyborov narodnykh deputatov SSSR', *ibid.*, 29 March 1989, p. 1.

42. 'Pust' v marafone pobedit sil'neishii', *ibid.*, 13 May 1989, pp. 1 - 2, p. 2.

43. 'O rezul'tatakh povtornogo golosovaniya po vyboram narodnykh deputatov SSSR 19 maya 1989 goda', *ibid.*, 21 May 1989, p. 1.

44. Information on Stoumova appears in 'Opravdat' nadezhdy', *ibid.*, 19 March 1989, p. 2.

45. 'O rezul'tatakh vyborov narodnykh deputatov SSSR', *ibid.*, 29 March 1989, p. 1.

46. 'Opravdat' nadezhdy', *ibid.*, 19 March 1989, p. 2.

47. Karpenko, 'Nachalis vybory narodnykh deputatov SSSR', *Izvestiya*, 8 March 1989, p. 1.

48. Author's computation.



49. I. Karpenko, 'Dorogi, kotorym my vybiraem', *Izvestiya*, 8 March 1989, p. 2.
50. Author's computation.
51. Data were derived from biographical information in *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: Odinnadsatyi sozyv*, 'Soobshchenie okruzhnykh komissii territorial'nykh izbiratel'nykh okrugov g. Moskvy po vyboram narodnykh deputatov SSSR', *Vechernyaya Moskva*, 27 February 1989, p. 1; 'Soobshchenie okruzhnoi izbiratel'noi komisii Moskovskogo gorodskogo natsional'no-territorial'nogo izbiratel'nogo okruga, No. 1, RSFSR po vyboram narodnogo deputata SSSR', *ibid.*, 'Soobshchenie okruzhnykh izbiratel'nykh komissii o rezul'tatakh vyborov narodnykh deputatov SSSR 26 marta 1989 goda', *Leningradskaya pravda*, 29 March 1989 p. 1.; 'Spisok kandidatov v narodnye deputaty SSSR zaregistrirovannykh izbiratel'nym komissiyami territorial'nykh i natsional'no-territorial'nykh izbiratel'nykh okrugov', *Sovetskaya Litva*, 26 February 1989, pp. 1-2; 'Soobshchenie okruzhnykh izbiratel'nykh komissii po vyboram narodnykh deputatov SSSR o rezultatakh vyborov v Moldavskoi SSSR', *Sovetskaya Moldaviya*, 31 March 1989, pp. 1, 3; 'NSV Liidu Rahvasaadikute Kandidaadid', ('Candidates for USSR People's Deputies'), *Rahva Haal (The Voice of the People)*, (Tallinn), 26 February 1989, pp. 1-2. These constituencies were selected because the electoral commissions published comprehensive lists of candidates for USSR People's Deputies during the electoral campaign.
52. *Bakinskii rabochii*, 4 March 1989, p. 1.
53. See for instance, the list of deputies printed in *Izvestiya*, 5 April 1989, p. 2 and her biographical entry in *Narodnye deputaty SSSR*, p. 7.
54. *Kommunist (Yerevan)*, 7 March 1989, p. 1.
55. Biographical information on Arutyunyan appears in the list of deputies in *Izvestiya*, 5 April 1989, p. 1; *Narodnye deputaty SSSR*, p. 24; *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: Odinnadstatyi sozyv*, p. 32 and Mann, Monyak and Teague, *op cit.*, p. 107. In the latter, the authors failed to indicate that Arutyunyan was a deputy to the 11th Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet.
56. *Kommunist (Yerevan)*, 7 March 1989, p. 1.
57. *Ibid.*
58. *Deputaty....*, p. 3.
59. *Sostav narodnykh deputatov SSSR....*, p. 16.
60. A. Nazimova and V. Sheinis, 'Vybor sdelan', *Izvestiya*, 6 May 1989, p. 3. Due to differences in classifications, and the fact that their study focused on the deputy corpus elected by 26 March 1989, the figures they presented may not entirely coincide with my own.
61. I have argued the first two points previously in a review article; see Peter Lentini, 'Women and Social Change in the USSR', *The Journal of Communist Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (December 1992), pp. 318-323, p. 321.
62. V. A. Levanskii, A. V. Obolonskii and G. D. Tokarovskii, 'Izбирatel'naya kampaniya po vyboram narodnykh deputatov SSSR 1989. (Opyt sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniya)', *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, 1989, No. 7, pp. 12-26, p. 19. Women were ranked fifth with 18.6 per cent of the responses in this category.
63. See, for instance, Maxine Molyneaux, 'Interview with Anastasya Posadskaya (25 September 1990)', *Feminist Review*, No. 39 (Winter, 1991), pp. 133-140., p. 136.

64. According to figures published in Goskomstat SSSR, *Zhenschiny v SSSR 1989*, p. 54, working women had the following amount of free time in March 1985: blue collar and white collar workers had 2 hours 24 minutes free time on a work day and 6 hours 32 minutes free time on days off; women collective farm workers had respectively 1 hour 57 minutes and 4 hours 54 minutes free. In March 1990, these figures declined to 1 hour 23 minutes and 4 hours 36 minutes for industrial workers and white collar workers and 1 hour 3 minutes and 3 hours 23 minutes for collective farm workers. See Goskomstat SSSR, 'Zhenschiny v SSSR', *Vestnik statistiki*, 1991, No. 2, p. 52.

65. For a discussion on women elected to the CPSU Central Committee in 1990, see Peter Lentini, 'Women in the CPSU Central Committee, 1990', *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 4 1993, pp. 729 - 736.

66. Interview conducted by T. Khudyakova in *Izvestiya*, 30 December 1989, p. 2, quoted in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XLI, No. 52 (1989), pp. 32 - 33, p. 33.

67. Ibid.

68. 'Itogi vyborov narodnykh deputatov SSSR po territorial'nym okrugam 26 marta 1989 goda', *Sovetskaya Litva*, 29 March 1989, p. 1.

69. Ibid.

70. 'Itogi vyborov narodnykh deputatov SSSR po natsional'no - territorial'nym izbiratel'nym okrugam 26 marta 1989 goda', *ibid.* pp. 1, 3 - 4, at p. 1.

71. See Mann, Monyak and Teague, *op. cit.*, pp. 86 and 126 respectively.

72. *Izvestiya*, 8 March 1989.

73. See for instance the programmes of candidates Lilita Ozolinya in *Sovetskaya Latvija*, 8 March 1989, p. 2; Anna Matveevna Kanarovskaya, *Sovetskaya Moldaviya*, 8 March 1989, p. 2; and Irena Kachenskene, *Sovetskaya Litva*, 8 March 1989, p. 2.

74. Giulietto Chiesa, *Transition to Democracy in the USSR: Ending the Monopoly of Power and the Evolution of New Political Forces* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Occasional Papers, No. 237, 1990), p.6.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

76. There could also be a fourth considered, submission of speeches which were not read out at the Congress but were submitted to the Presidium of the Congress. Overall, 360 speeches of this type were written. This included 22 contributions from women (6.1) per cent. This information is derived author's database based on texts contained in *Pervyi S'ezd Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR, 25 maya - 9 iyunya 1989 g.: stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow: *Izvestiya*, 1989), 6 vols., Vols. IV - VI.

77. Data is from author's database based on entries in the stenographic reports of the Congress derived from *ibid.*, vols 1 - 3. In addition to these speakers there were an 224 entries in the stenographic report attributed to voices from the seats or unidentified deputies. Chiesa's study indicates that 464 deputies participated in the First Congress as speakers. See Chiesa, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

78. See *Vtoroi S'ezd Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR, 12 - 24 dekabrya 1989 g.: stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow: *Izvestiya*, 1990), 6 vols., Vol. I, pp. 496 - 638 and Vol. II, pp. 222 - 283.

79. This includes S. B. Aguzarova, I. A. Andreeva, L. A. Arutyunyan, P. A. Azizbekova, L. V. Barusheva, R. A. Bazarova, Z. Beishekeeva, A. V. Belina, I. A. Yegorova, V. A. Gontar, T. I. Kayumova, T. D. Kazakova, K S Khallik (Hallik), V. P. Khmel', G. I. Kravchenko, M. I. Lauristin, T. V. Momotova, K. D. P. Prunskiene, Z. P. Pukhova, Z. K. Rustamova, N. V. Savchenko, V. S. Shevchenko, G. V. Starovoitova,

G. I. Stoumova, N. I. Timashova, Z. N. Tkacheva, R. A. Ubaidullaeva, R. G. Voronina, G. A. Yenokyan, T. I. Zaslavskaya T I, A. A. Zgerskaya (Yaroshinskaya) and T. P. Zhukova.

80. During the 11th Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet the greatest number of women who spoke was at the 6th sitting (9).

81. Data derived from author's database based on biographical information from *Spisok Narodnykh Deputatov RSFSR na 12 fevralya 1991 goda*, (Moscow: Verkhovnyi Sovet/Vneshtorgizdat, 1991).

## **Chapter 5. Developments in Elections and Parties,**

**1989-1993**

The purpose of this chapter is to create a link between the USSR's first multi-candidate national parliamentary election conducted in March 1989 and Russia's first Post-Soviet 'multiparty' election in December 1993. There are several particular points of reference upon which this chapter focuses. First, the present author outlines some of the major occurrences in the republican and local elections of 1989-1990 and discusses to what extent these demonstrated elements of continuity, contradiction and departure from earlier elections. The second part of this chapter discusses the elections to the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies and the Russian presidency. These elections set the stage for Russia's post-communist transition by creating its two most important institutions. Third, the present author engages in a survey of Soviet writings on electoral reform between 1989-1991 and demonstrates the deficiencies contained in the legislation throughout this period and the great variations between the republics governing the franchise. Moreover, these authors amply illustrate that the electoral process was rapidly moving towards conditions in which citizen groups, public organisations, like political parties and movements and other actors took increasingly more prominent roles. The final section of this chapter presents a brief exposition on the state of parties from 1990-1993 and therefore establishes the importance these organisations had and the numerous difficulties they had to overcome on the eve of Russia's first Post-Soviet multiparty elections.

### **Elections to Local and Republican Soviets of People's Deputies, 1989-1990**

Elections to local soviets of people's deputies and republican legislatures took place between 1989-1990. These elections were significant for several reasons. First, the contests and the new legislatures they produced were necessary steps towards the

fulfilment of one of the points of Gorbachev's overall reform program.<sup>me</sup> In his book *Perestroika*, Gorbachev advocated re-invigorating the soviets of all levels.<sup>1</sup> In addition, the XIX Party Conference resolved that these newly elected bodies would have greater degrees of autonomy from the centre and from the CPSU.<sup>2</sup> Second, the manner in which these elections were conducted reveal significant differences between (a) politics at the all-union level and the republics and (b) among the 15 union republics and other administrative subdivisions. These developments are important because they constituted a radical departure from previous republican election legislation. In the pre-reform period, the electoral laws (and constitutions) of the union republics were, more or less, carbon copies of the all-union legislation. N. A. Mikhaleva and L. A. Morozova have suggested that

There have been changes and amendments to the [USSR] Constitution on questions of the electoral system and all union and autonomous republics adopted new laws on elections and developed normative acts on the various levels of soviets. This is a serious step in the development of a sovereign nation-state of union republics and the elevation of the status of the autonomous formations.<sup>3</sup>

They also noted that following the Second USSR Congress of People's Deputies held in December 1989 and the adoption of constitutional amendments pertaining to questions of the electoral system, '[r]epublics received the possibility to determine independently the forms of their highest bodies of state and local self-government.'<sup>4</sup> For instance, at the all-union level the state was governed by the President of the USSR, the USSR Congress

of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet.<sup>5</sup> (However, it will be recalled that the USSR Presidency was approved at the Extraordinary Third Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, 12-15 March 1990.<sup>6</sup>) Mikhaleva and Morozova specify that

[i]n the RSFSR [the corresponding state organs were the] Congress of People's Deputies and Supreme Soviet and in the other republics and autonomous republics, supreme soviets. In the Russian Federation the Supreme Soviet <sup>consisted</sup> [ ] of two equal chambers, a Soviet of the Republic and a Soviet of Nationalities.<sup>7</sup>

Darrell Slider has noted the importance of these developments:

Legislation on republic and local elections was passed not at the level of the central government, but by each republic's government. Even the timing of the elections was left up to republic authorities; they extended from January to late October [1990].<sup>8</sup>

It is also significant to point out, with the advantage of hindsight, that it is clear that the elections of the republican organs of legislative power were extremely important in late-Soviet politics and contributed greatly to the governing process in the immediate post-Soviet transition. These institutions were popularly-elected under their *own*, rather than centrally-directed, electoral legislation; therefore, they had (theoretically) some popular legitimacy. Therefore, the body of legal documents that they enacted during the late Soviet period and early Post-Soviet period held their status after the Union collapsed in

1991. Moreover, the independence and sovereignty declarations that the legislatures passed in the names of their respective republics carried both legal and moral force. Thus, in a sense, these elections could be considered to have contributed indirectly to the USSR's dissolution. However, it should also be noted that to an extent these legislatures were also able to keep total power vacuums from developing in the wake of the August 1991 coup and its aftermath-despite the volatile political climates in that period.<sup>9</sup>

During these elections the opportunities for competition and political participation increased greatly compared to the elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. Indeed, Soviet scholar V. A. Kryazhkov, writing in the legal journal *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* in 1990, went so far as to declare that '[a]t the present time the competition among candidates for deputy may be considered as a *principle of the Soviet electoral system*' (original emphasis).<sup>10</sup> Not only did these elections bring forth an increase in the number of individual candidates<sup>11</sup> who competed for seats in the new republican legislatures, but political organisations such as National Fronts and other informal movements increased the scope of their activities through their campaigning.<sup>12</sup> Despite these attributes it must be established that while the competition increased in these elections, the CPSU still maintained a dominant position on a union-wide level. Therefore, the rights that were extended in this series of elections reinforces the thesis that the reforms were part of a liberalisation, not a full democratisation. Several examples highlight this proposition.

Delegates to the CPSU Central Committee's February 1990 voted to suggest amending Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, which granted the Party its monopoly in



the Soviet political system. This suggestion was approved by the Third USSR Congress of People's Deputies and made into law in March 1990.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, this motion meant that the CPSU had, *de jure*, renounced its privileged position in Soviet society. In its previous incarnation, Article 6 declared:

The leading and guiding force of Soviet society, its political system, state and social organisations is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The CPSU exists for the people and serves the people.

Armed with Marxist-Leninist thought, the Communist Party determines the general perspective of society, the lines of the domestic and foreign policies of the USSR and leads the great constructive activity of the Soviet people and gives a planned, scientific fundamental character for its struggle for the victory of communism.<sup>14</sup>

In March 1990 this article was amended to read:

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, other political parties and also trade unions, youth and other social organisations and mass movements, through their representatives elected to the soviets of people's deputies and in their other capacities shall participate in the making of the politics of the Soviet state and in the management of state and society.<sup>15</sup>

Therefore, the legal groundwork for new political and social forces to contend for power legally had been established. Although this was indeed a significant political development, the amendment came far too late for the political organisations which had been developing since the late 1980s to participate effectively against the CPSU. It should be noted that the *Law on Public Associations* which governed the registration, operations and norms of these new public organisations was <sup>not</sup> adopted until October 1990.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, the law (the provisions of which will be discussed later) did not go into effect until 1 January 1991.<sup>17</sup> The timing of these measures reinforces the argument that the CPSU implemented liberalising tactics in its reforms.

Slider argues that the conditions surrounding the elections could not have assisted any of the newly-formed political organisations with the possible exception of those in the Baltics where they were reasonably well-established.<sup>18</sup> In Lithuania, for instance, during the first round of elections (24 February 1990) 72 of the 90 seats that were filled were won by *Sajudis*-backed candidates (the Lithuanian Movement in Support of Perestroika). This included 46 of 48 independents, 13 of 22 members of the Independent Lithuanian Communist Party and every deputy of the Social Democratic Party (9), Green Party and Christian Democratic Party (2 each). During the second round (10 March) 17 of 26 elected deputies were supported by *Sajudis*.<sup>19</sup> Rein Taagepera notes that although the Estonian Popular Front did not win an outright majority in the republic's Supreme Soviet, its leader Edgar Savisaar was elected Prime Minister; whereas in Latvia, the Popular Front of Latvia won a clear majority of 131 of 201 seats during the first two rounds of the elections.<sup>20</sup> Slider argues that with the exception of these examples, the CPSU was the only political organisation that could have benefited from the early election dates. Indeed it was only in Georgia, where the authorities postponed elections until late autumn, that there were multiparty-type elections.<sup>21</sup>

There are other points which reinforce CPSU dominance throughout the campaigns to the republican legislatures. Slider maintains that CPSU officials were afforded greater access to media than other candidates. In addition, the ballot papers did not identify the political affiliations of any of the candidates and this worked to the disadvantage of members of the newly-formed political organisations and social movements. (It will be demonstrated later in this dissertation that Yeltsin's team utilised this same practice-a

move which theoretically hindered those who were affiliated with political organisations other than Russia's Choice.) Moreover, in all republics, the vast majority of candidates were nominated at work places through the 'production principle' as opposed to places of residence. It was in the work places that the CPSU and its satellite organisations were able to manipulate nomination meetings. Candidates who were members of the newly-formed political organisations, <sup>or</sup> supported by them or those who stood on issues that deviated from the CPSU's official line were nominated by 'research institutes and progressive enterprises'. New political organisations, their supporters and their candidates were harassed in Turkmenia, Kirgizia and Belorussia. In fact the degree of official interference was so extreme in the latter case that the Belorussian National Front was forced to convene its founding Congress in Lithuania.<sup>22</sup> Independence-minded political organisations and progressive forces were represented in instances in large Russian cities, Moldavia, Armenia and Georgia.<sup>23</sup> However, these forces can attribute their victories to dissatisfaction with the CPSU, the legitimacy of their candidates and the dedicated work of their supporters in the face of significant opposition.

Slider correctly identifies that Party-manipulation was a negative feature of the production principle method of election. However, there were many notable Soviet politicians, commentators and scholars who have praised the idea of founding electoral districts around enterprises as the best possible way of fusing the political and economic aspects of socialist democracy, claiming that Lenin preferred this method of election. For instance, the noted legal scholars and leading advocates of electoral reform Georgii Barabashev and Konstantin Sheremet have noted that this would contribute a significant move towards a 'return to Lenin'; however they conceded that there would be drawbacks

like large work collectives having advantages over smaller enterprises when nominating candidates.<sup>24</sup> Indeed, socialists with divergent views on politics such as former dissident historian Roy Medvedev<sup>25</sup> and Yegor Ligachev have considered this method among their preferred variants of electoral reforms.<sup>26</sup>

Mikhaleva and Morozova note that in late 1989 the Leningrad United Workers' Front put forth a proposal to conduct elections to local soviets on the production principle and this initiative began to gain support in a number of regions throughout Russia. Thus, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet issued a resolution on 27 October 1989 in which it was stated that experimental elections would be conducted on the production principle. Therefore, electoral districts were established in two Moscow hamlets where there were large enterprises, Perov and Tushina. Mikhaleva and Morozova argue that advocates of this experiment hoped that voters' alienation from the previous election to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies would be resolved, i.e., the deputy corpus would be more in accordance with the area's social structure and more working class representatives would be elected than would be elected in territorial districts. In addition, they noted that the experiment had other objectives. First, the drafters wanted to have the workers elect those of their colleagues with whom they were most familiar. Second, it was hoped that production principle elections would create conditions in which more workers could participate in the nomination meetings. They pointed out the fact that no more than 5 per cent of the toilers participated in nomination meetings in places of residence whereas under the alternate system, this figure would be raised to closer to 100 per cent. Third, they stated that the increased possibilities for the candidates to come into contact with workers could result in more discussions on the aspirants' stances and the creation of

programmes that reflected more accurately the will of the workers. Finally, they noted that in the production principle districts there were alternative candidates, whereas in the territorial districts there were instances in which a single candidate stood for a given seat.<sup>27</sup>

Despite the production principle's theoretically positive attributes, Mikhaleva and Morozova pointed out some deficiencies in the experiment. First, they noted that the scope of the election was far too small and that deputies were not elected in this manner to either the Moscow City Soviet or the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies. Second, the enterprises's work schedule made it difficult to hold elections at the same time and, therefore, the elections were held on two days. Third, the principle of one-person one-vote was often violated in these districts. Mikhaleva and Morozova note that only 30 per cent of the workers in those production principle districts resided there and cast their ballots solely in elections for those seats; the other 70 per cent of the workers had places of residence outside those areas and were on the electoral rolls of other districts as well. Therefore, these workers had extra votes. In addition, they pointed out that voter turnout did not reach the levels that had been hoped, some 85 per cent. For instance, in Tushina the figure stood at 76 per cent and in Perov it was 75 per cent. This compares to 60-70 per cent in the territorial districts that held elections during the same period. Mikhaleva and Morozova considered that weak administrative work and poorly defined legislation could be attributed to these elections not being as successful as their initiators would have hoped.<sup>28</sup>

## **Elections to the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies, March 1990 and RSFSR Presidency, June 1991**

Elections to the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies were conducted on 4 March 1990.<sup>29</sup> Voters chose their deputies in 900 territorial districts established on a nominally equal share of population and 168 national-territorial districts in which the ethno-territorial administrative units were each allocated a specific number of deputies. It will be noted that the RSFSR's election law did not grant any seats to social organisations in the new legislature.

Judith Devlin has argued that the Russian Congress 'had been elected on a fully democratic basis';<sup>30</sup> however, the present author will demonstrate that like the elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, the hustings for the RSFSR's parliament were limited-choice elections. New political organisations campaigned actively in the contest. However, none were allowed formally to put their candidates forward. Despite the restrictions on candidates from alternative political organisations standing officially, there were two other significant political forces which competed in the elections in addition to the CPSU: National Patriots and Democrats. However, it will be noted that there were criticisms <sup>levelled</sup> by democratic supporters that the National Patriots and CPSU were working closely during the campaign. Overall, some 7,018 candidates, 84 per cent of them men, competed for mandates in the parliament. Although the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe noted that there were more than 20 candidates in some districts, they reported that in 33 a solitary candidate stood unopposed.

Despite the increase in candidate competition in comparison to pre-reform elections and the elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, there were numerous instances in which candidates opposed to the CPSU had their chances for competing on an equal footing with their opponents violated. In addition, there were several accounts in which the *apparatchiki* abused their positions of power and took advantage of their access to the media, computers and printing and photocopying equipment. Some significant examples include the fact that candidates who supported the Party line were granted space for their platforms in the central press. In addition, they appeared 'on television to discuss non-election related issues, but they would be identified as candidates for office, thus providing them with publicity and an oblique opportunity to campaign.'<sup>31</sup> Overall, voters felt that they knew little about the candidates. Often the electors stated that the first time that they found out any information on the aspirants was when they went to vote and read their pre-election materials at the polling places. Moreover, the Party was able to manipulate and direct the composition of the election commissions which supervised the conduct of the elections.

Irregularities and violations of the law occurred during the nomination stages, the campaign itself and during the counting of votes. For instance, the Memorial Society which advocated constructing a monument in remembrance of the victims of the Stalin period was denied the right to register as a public organisation for over a year. As a result the movement was not able to field candidates.<sup>32</sup> (It should be noted that only work collectives, voters of electors in places of residence and previously approved public organisations possessed the right to nominate candidates to the Congress.) Campaign literature and posters were defaced. In addition, the Commission on Security and

Cooperation in Europe noted that 'two carloads of soldiers were apprehended two nights before the run-off elections (held 28 March 1990) pasting up leaflets containing slanderous attacks on [Army colonel Vitalii] Urzhatsev', a key figure in the *Shchit* (Shield) military reform movement.<sup>33</sup> On election day voters in one Moscow district complained that 'a local election commission changed the location of the polling station without properly notifying voters'.<sup>34</sup> In Moscow, the election protocols were taken to the regional executive committee before they were submitted to the electoral commission. There were also reports of ballot box stuffing. The principle of one person-one vote was also violated when one family member cast votes for the entire family. In fact, in Krasnodar, a father who voted for his daughter claimed, 'we're all of the same opinion back at the house.'<sup>35</sup>

Voter turnout during these elections decreased even further than <sup>in</sup> the previous elections <sub>h</sub> to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. It will be recalled that some 87 per cent of the voters in the RSFSR participated in the 1989 elections to the Soviet parliament. However, in 1990, this figure fell to 72 per cent.<sup>36</sup> Nevertheless, it should be noted that the decline in voter participation <sup>may</sup> have worked to the Party's benefit. The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe argues that 'knowing the mood of the electorate, Party officials were more interested in keeping voter turnout low in areas where reform candidates stood a good chance of winning.'<sup>37</sup>

Voters elected key reformers such as Boris Yeltsin in Sverdlovsk National-Territorial District No. 74, Democratic Russia movement co-chairman Lev Ponomarev in Zamoskvoretskii National-Territorial District No. 2 in Moscow city, former political



prisoner Father Gleb Yakunin in Shchelkovo National-Territorial District No. 11 in Moscow *oblast'* and human rights activist Sergei Kovalev in Chertanovskii Territorial District No. 58 in Moscow city.<sup>38</sup> Electors' clubs were also important in the elections to the Russian Congress of People's Deputies. Peter Duncan notes that the Inter-Regional Association of Voters, which was strongly oriented towards the Inter-Regional Deputies Group, played the major grass-roots role in establishing other voters' blocs such as Elections-90 for the Moscow City Soviet (Mossovet) and Democratic Russia for the Russian Congress of People's Deputies. Moreover, he states that the organisation was important in contributing to the creation of the Democratic Russia Movement.<sup>39</sup> Accordingly, he notes the successes of the aforementioned voters' organisations and other candidate support groups.

In Moscow Democratic Russia won fifty-seven of sixty-five seats in the Congress and 281 of the 463 (filled at the second round of voting) on Mossovet. In Sverdlovsk, Democratic Choice had endorsed seven of the nine successful Congress deputies, including Yeltsin, and eighty of the 194 victorious candidates in the City Soviet. Members of democratic electoral blocs took control of city soviets in some major *oblast'* centres, and became influential in a number of *oblast'* soviets such as Sakhalin where the Democratic Movement for Perestroika in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk was still strong and had helped to initiate the Sakhalin Popular Front. Democratic Russia could claim the allegiance of 370 out of 1,061 deputies to the Russian Congress.<sup>40</sup>

In addition, Alla Nazimova and Viktor Sheinis have indicated similar levels of support for Democratic Russia at the Congress during April-May 1990, claiming that its members or fellow travellers constituted between 30-35 per cent of the deputies.<sup>41</sup>

These successes for the democrats notwithstanding, the 1990 elections could be considered to have greatly benefited the *nomenklatura*. Overall, some 86 per cent of the deputies elected were CPSU members.<sup>42</sup> However, Party unity at that time should not be overestimated. Ronald J. Hill has argued that by 1990 the CPSU began losing members, it had begun to divide<sup>e</sup> along ethnic lines in the Baltics and in the 1990 elections its members competed against each other for seats in the Congress; the Party failed to run a unified election campaign.<sup>43</sup> However, Nazimova and Sheinis indicate that Russian voters elected more deputies who were enterprise directors, state and Party officials in 1990 than they did in 1989 when they elected deputies in territorial districts and national-territorial districts to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. In 1989, 67 per cent of the 646 deputies allocated to the RSFSR fell under this category; the following year this figure increased to 78.6 per cent.<sup>44</sup>

Several significant shifts in professional composition took place between 1989 and 1990. It must be noted, however, that there was no change in the share of elected deputies who were from the ranks of the country's highest political leadership (including Politburo and Secretariat); in 1989 and 1990 they constituted 0.3 per cent of each corpus. In addition, there was virtually no alteration in the proportion of officials employed in the lower echelons of party, state and economic management (secretaries of factory party committees, shop floor chiefs, low ranking military officers). In 1989 these deputies

comprised 21.2 per cent of the RSFSR's deputies in the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and in 1990 they were 21.7 per cent of the RSFSR Congress deputies. The greatest growth amongst the differing groups occurred (respectively) within the ranks of deputies elected from the high echelons of power (*obkom* secretaries, leading figures in the corresponding level soviets of people's deputies, ministers and leading workers in the state apparatus at all levels, high ranking military officials), the middle levels of management (secretaries of *raikomy*, *gorkomy*, officials from corresponding level soviets of people's deputies, enterprise directors, agricultural managers, scientific research institute directors) and the highly qualified white-collar workers (engineers, technicians, teachers, physicians and the scientific and creative intelligentsia).<sup>45</sup>

The former group saw its share increase from 14.4 per cent in 1989 to 18.7 per cent the following year. While the share of *obkom* secretaries declined from 8 per cent to 6 per cent, state representatives were elected in significantly higher proportions. For instance, workers in the ministries nearly doubled their presence in comparison to 1989, increasing their ranks from 2 per cent to 3.8 per cent. In addition, officials from *oblast'* soviets jumped from 1.4 per cent of the corpus in 1989 to 4.9 per cent in 1990.<sup>46</sup>

Middle-level management had the highest increase. In 1989 this group comprised slightly more than 31 per cent of the deputies. However, in 1990, officials in these positions constituted just fewer than 39 per cent. Among these officials, secretaries of *raikomy* and *gorkomy* increased their representation from 1.9 per cent to 4.7 per cent. In addition, the proportion of officials from corresponding level soviets of people's deputies grew from 0.9 per cent to 2 per cent. Enterprise directors and their chief specialists were

also more abundant in 1990. Their share of the deputies was elevated from 9.1 per cent to 11.6 per cent. Amongst the white collar workers, scientific workers raised their representation by more than 50 per cent (3.9 per cent vs. 6 per cent). In addition the share of journalists nearly doubled (1.1 per cent vs. 2 per cent).<sup>47</sup>

There were, however, some significant declines in certain professional categories. For instance, the share of workers and collective farmers was reduced radically from 1989. Some 21.1 per cent of the RSFSR's deputies in the USSR Congress belonged to these groups. However, they comprised a mere 5.9 per cent the following year. It should also be noted that the combined share of *sovkhos* and *kolkhos* workers was less than 1 per cent in 1990.<sup>48</sup>

The elections to the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies can be considered significant in Russia's political development for reasons other than those included at the beginning of this chapter. First, these elections expanded the candidate choice that was first implemented in 1989 and this act alone signified that the citizens of the RSFSR (either as voters or <sup>as</sup> candidates) considered competitive elections an essential part of the Russian political system. More importantly, despite their efforts to thwart alternative candidates and forces, Party officials also worked in competitive conditions. Second, these elections provided a forum in which civil society could play a role-albeit very limited. Therefore, these elections : in some instances represented a further step in the development of electoral procedures throughout the territory of the USSR.

Third, following in the tradition of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, like-minded deputies organised themselves in fractions. However, it should be noted that deputy participation was much higher in the RSFSR Congress than it had been in the USSR Congress of People's deputies. Fractions, according to Vladimir Novikov, Leader of the Council of Deputies' Fractions, were defined as 'group[s] of people's deputies of the Russian Federation professing united political views and the same organisational principles.'<sup>49</sup> The *Reglament* (Standing Orders) of the Congress established that People's Deputies <sup>might</sup> associate in groups according to territorial or other principles. Those deputies who associated on territorial principles were able to group according to their republics, autonomous *oblasti*, autonomous districts, *kraya*, *oblasti* and the cities of Moscow and St Petersburg.<sup>50</sup> Novikov stated that there were two further requirements to which deputies entering into fractions had to adhere. 'A deputy [could] belong to only one association and ... there [could] not be less than 50 people per fraction'.<sup>51</sup> In addition, deputy fractions were associated into blocs, which were required to contain at least three fractions. There were 14 major fractions in the former Russian Federation Congress of People's Deputies and they organised into four blocs.<sup>52</sup> In late April 1993, 834 deputies out of the 1,040 in the Russian Congress belonged to these fractions<sup>53</sup> (80.2 per cent of deputies).

Several of these fractions and blocs had links with Russian political parties. For example, the deputy fraction 'Communists of Russia' included the members of the conservative Communist Party of the Russian Federation. Conversely, more liberal Communists rallied around Aleksandr Rutskoi and in the spring of 1991 banded together to form 'Communists for Democracy' to oppose 'Communists of Russia'.<sup>54</sup>

'Communists for Democracy', became the building bloc for the People's Party of Free Russia.<sup>55</sup> Later, the People's Party of Free Russia's parliamentary activities were coordinated by the 'Free Russia' fraction. It should also be noted that many of the fractions formed the cores of the electoral associations that competed in the 1993 elections. For instance some 'Agrarian Union' deputies joined the ranks of the Agrarian Party of Russia. 'Change-New Policy' and 'Free Russia' were important in creating the 'Future of Russia-New Names' electoral association.

Referendums also contributed significantly to electoral development in 1990. In accordance with the USSR Constitution's (Article 5), the most important questions of state life shall be introduced for national discussion and also put to national referendums. Despite this provision, no referendum was ever held in the USSR until 1991. Moreover, there was no legislation governing their procedures until the Gorbachev period. The USSR Congress of People's Deputies adopted a Law on the Refendum in December 1990<sup>56</sup> which went into effect immediately.<sup>57</sup> The first referendum, inspired by the secessionist tendencies demonstrated throughout the USSR, took place on 17 March 1991, and asked citizens about their attitudes towards the Soviet Union's future configuration. The question asked voters 'Do you consider necessary the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, in which the rights and freedom of the individual of any nationality will be fully guaranteed?'. Voters had to answer either yes or no and its outcome was binding if more than 50 per cent of the entire electorate approved it.

Some 80 per cent of the electorate participated in the vote, among whom nearly three quarters supported the proposal. However, it should be noted that boycotts were conducted in the Baltic States, Georgia, Armenia and Moldavia.<sup>58</sup> This particular referendum gave Gorbachev impetus to hasten the moves towards a renegotiation of the Union Treaty which established the USSR in 1922. However, the putchists who attempted to obtain power in August 1991 also used the results of this document to legitimise their actions. However, more in relation to the purposes of this chapter, supplementary questions were placed before citizens of the RSFSR. Throughout the republic, citizens were asked if they supported the establishment of a directly-elected presidency, which the overwhelming majority supported. In addition, residents of Moscow and Leningrad were asked if they supported the creation of the post of popularly-elected mayors (Leningraders were also polled as to whether or not they wished to change the name of their city back to St Petersburg; a proposal the electorate endorsed). In both cities, these motions were approved. These institutions constituted a significant achievement in Soviet local government. For the first time, the chief executives of a locality would be directly elected by the population. It also indicated a separation of powers between the local executive and legislature. Previously, deputies elected from among their ranks a chairman of the soviet's executive committee as the chief officer of the state branch. In the first contests, Muscovites voted in economist Gavriil Popov and Leningraders elected Anatolii Sobchak as their mayors. Despite this innovation in the political system, there were numerous problems and conflicts that arose, for instance, between the mayor and the City Soviet in St Petersburg.<sup>59</sup>

The creation of the post of the President of the RSFSR was indeed a significant development.<sup>60</sup> This position signified a further move towards the development of republican autonomy and a break away from the dominance of the centre in Soviet politics. Indeed this is reflected in the fact that some 70 per cent of the Russian population supported the creation of this position. It should also be noted that Russia's political elites seem to have given the presidency some form of tacit approval. For instance, 'the 'Communists of Russia' group-perhaps the most obdurate opponents of Yeltsin [sic] and his supporters in parliament-had even arrived at the Congress with a proposal among the amendments that they offered to the RSFSR Constitution.'<sup>61</sup>

Introducing election legislation for the presidency also reveals further elements of the importance of institutions. First, Russia was not to be outdone by either the USSR or Georgia which each had presidents governing over their respective jurisdictions. However, it will be noted that although the constitutional amendments noted above called for the election of the President of the USSR in a popular vote, Gorbachev was elected only by a vote in the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. Also, two points could also be argued with relationship of the USSR's central authorities and other subordinate administrative subdivisions. By allowing the results of the RSFSR's referendum to stand, and, moreover, permitting them to be enacted it can be deduced that the central leadership took on a belief in the validity of democratic principles and felt that the people's choice reigned supreme. Therefore, there was an evident shift in the political culture of the population and the ruling elite. In addition, it could also be argued that the central authorities had lost the support of the republican elite that had propped them up during



the post-Stalin years. Indeed the formation of the Communist Party of the RSFSR in June 1990 is a concrete illustration of this point.

Another factor which needs to be considered in this regard is that Yeltsin was able to 'outflank' his opponents by not treating the creation of the presidency like any other constitutional issue. That the constitution needed to be amended to introduce the presidency is undeniable. Moreover, according to the RSFSR's constitution, the only legal manner in which it was possible to amend that document was if two-thirds of the RSFSR deputies approved them.

The campaign itself could be considered a form of departure from previous electoral practices. Indeed, Russia's emergent civil society was able to play an even greater role than it had in the elections to the RSFSR Congress. As Michael Urban aptly illustrates, Democratic Russia conducted the lion's share of Yeltsin's campaign activities-even though it appears that the then RSFSR Supreme Soviet Chairman was rather dismissive of their actions. In addition, Yeltsin was able to exploit links with the growing labour and strike movement, supporting miners' demands for the transference of Russia's mines from all-union to Russian jurisdiction, and use this as a source of backing throughout the campaign. It will be recalled that strikes and independent labour initiatives and organisations, like trade unions, had been prohibited. There was a notable increase in the number of *doverennye litsa*;<sup>6</sup> each candidate was able to field 100. Moreover, Yeltsin's campaign was able to take advantage of the relaxation in international tensions and the increased contacts with the outside world-American political consultants offered advice to Democratic Russia activists coordinating Yeltsin's presidential bid.

Russia's civil society and newly-formed political parties, movements and other political organisations were provided with a theoretical means for increasing their participation in the election campaign. Electoral legislation allowed candidates from officially *registered* parties and other public organisations to compete for the presidency if they had the support of at least 20 per cent of the Congress. Vladimir Zhirinovskii the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union (LDPSU) owed his place on the presidential ballot to this provision.

However, it may also be possible to question whether or not this particular provision could have been used as yet another filtering mechanism to prevent anti-establishment political organisations from putting their candidates on the ballot paper. The data presented above suggests that the RSFSR Congress could be considered a rather conservative collection of Party officials. Moreover, the reformist ranks within the parliament began to shrink during 1991. Therefore, the present author is doubtful whether candidates proposed by democratic-minded reformist public organisations and political parties and movements would have been able to pass through this gauntlet. Indeed, Zhirinovskii was considered useful to the regime in his capacity as a presidential candidate. Urban argues that the CPSU can be considered to have been behind his campaign as <sup>it</sup> made 'direct contributions in terms of personnel and materials to the Zhirinovskii [sic] campaign',<sup>62</sup> He argues further that 'tactically', the use of the term 'liberal democratic' may have been used to draw non-communist and anti-communist support away from Yeltsin. Moreover, his rhetoric may have scored him points among the nationalist camp.<sup>63</sup> Indeed, Ronald J. Hill has suggested that the CPSU encouraged the creation of 'friendly' political parties which it could direct in case there was a

multiparty system in the USSR and the Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union was one of them. Stephen White's evidence that by the time the USSR collapsed there were only two officially registered parties in the Soviet Union, the CPSU and the LDPSU reinforces this point.<sup>64</sup>

That the CPSU attempted to interfere in other ways to prevent Yeltsin from winning is undeniable. Urban presents evidence that the communists bombed Democratic Russia's campaign headquarters. In the provinces, Yeltsin's media campaign was severely impeded. Moreover, he cites evidence from key Democratic Russia activists Vladimir Bokser and Mikhail Shneider that there was evidence of ballot fraud occurring on election day and that in the provinces officials exploited Democratic Russia's observers' inexperience and did not allow them to exercise their rights fully.

These elections also demonstrated that the previously dominant institution, the CPSU, was extremely factionalised. The Party did not support a single candidate against Yeltsin. However, it is doubtful whether even with full Party support behind him, any other contestant would have matched Yeltsin's popular appeal. In fact it is doubtful to gauge <sup>to</sup> what <sup>extent</sup> Party-initiated central campaign coordination occurred.

Urban argues that

those associated with the old order fielded a spate of candidates all of whom ran against Yeltsin [sic]...The whole point was to deprive Yeltsin of a first-round majority and thus force a run-off between him and the next best vote getter.<sup>65</sup>

Indeed, Yeltsin's opponents (other than Zhirinovskii whose candidacy has been discussed previously) reflect the deep divisions that were present in the CPSU at that particular time. For instance, Urban argues that the former Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov represented the conservative wing of the Party as personified by Yegor Ligachev and Ivan Polozkov. Moderate Vadim Bakatin was associated with the Gorbachev camp. Colonel-General Al'bert Makashov was considered essential in drawing the votes of the national-patriots among the population and Party. Chair of the Kemerovo *oblsoret* Aman-Gel'dy Tuleev, who advocated local autonomy, gradual economic reform and social protection, was a candidate who hoped to draw support away from Yeltsin in the east and particularly from the miners.<sup>66</sup>

That Yeltsin won a landslide victory, garnering 57.3 per cent in the first round of the election, is well known.<sup>67</sup> It is also significant for several specific reasons. First, it officially raised Yeltsin's profile in his relationship with Gorbachev. After this poll, Yeltsin could boast that he had won his position in a popular election-which was even impeded by the central authorities. Gorbachev could not claim to have ever won any post in a contested election. Thus, Yeltsin received a popular mandate from the Russian people and, legally, only they could remove it. Nevertheless, this did not prevent the putchists from attempting to snatch him during the August 1991 coup attempt. Second, this election contributed to the establishment of the presidency as a central component of Russia's institutional framework. Moreover, the presidency was to have an extremely important role in post-Soviet Russia.<sup>68</sup> Third, the elections were another step closer *towards* a multiparty contest. Political organisations like Democratic Russia played an active role in the campaign. In addition, Vladimir Zhirinovskii became the first non-

CPSU member to compete in a national election as a representative of a political party, notwithstanding the fact that the party was at that <sup>stage</sup> very small and could have been considered a CPSU/KGB front organisation. Fourth, this campaign hurled Zhirinovskii into the Russian political limelight and he was able to exploit his name recognition in the 1993 elections to the Russian Federal Assembly. Therefore, a combination of Yeltsin's personal appeal as a 'democrat', the personification of Russian sovereignty and an anti-establishment figure, the active involvement of Russia's civil society, popular disillusionment with the CPSU and its rule from the centre and a fractious CPSU all contributed to the final electoral result.

The present author acknowledges the difficulties that emerged between the President and the Russian Parliament during the aftermath of the August coup and September-October 1993 but must stress that an analysis of these complex issues is beyond the purposes and scope of his study. However, it must be stated that electoral reforms contributed indirectly to the difficult state of affairs in the transition. Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach argue that presidential systems create shaky foundations for transitional societies because they foster competing legitimacies. This state of affairs can be applied to Russia in the 1991-1993 period. Under these conditions, both the chief executive and the legislature are popularly elected separately. Therefore, they can both claim to reflect the will of the people. Stepan and Skach refer to this condition as 'mutual independence'. However, parliamentary systems exist <sup>in</sup> situations of 'mutual dependence'. The executive is derived from the ruling party or coalition in the legislature. Legislatures are dependent upon the executive in order to continue in session. In addition, the executive relies on the confidence of the legislature to keep governing.<sup>69</sup> As stated earlier, Yeltsin and the

deputies in the Russian Congress (with the possible exception of the 33 deputies who ran unopposed) won their seats against competitors and could claim to be invoking the will of the people. Therefore, they could legitimately argue to support their efforts to obstruct the opposite camp.

### **Choice is Not Enough: Soviet Debates on Electoral Reform 1989-1991**

The candidate competition first implemented on a broad-ranged scale during the 1989 elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies was a marked improvement over the manner in which the Soviet Union previously conducted elections under leaderships from Stalin<sup>to</sup>Chernenko. An overwhelming majority of Soviet voters were presented with opportunities to select their representatives from among a plurality of contestants who competed against each other on the principles established in programmes. Nomination rights were increased as the CPSU and approved social organisations were joined by meetings of electors in their places of residence which could propose deputies. Individuals could also put themselves forward and have meetings approve or reject their candidacies. These measures were qualitative steps forward, advancing the administration and conduct of Soviet elections. However, in themselves, they did not, for instance, alleviate CPSU control over electoral procedures or maximise the democratic potential contained within the Electoral Law. Moreover, as political reforms expanded during 1989-1991, electoral legislation did not keep pace with other developments. This, in effect, further reinforces the argument that the electoral system was liberalised under Gorbachev, not entirely democratised.

Electoral shortcomings were quickly identified by Soviet scholars and political practitioners. Indeed, these individuals were among the first to indicate that although bringing positive changes into Soviet politics, electoral reform measures needed further improvements to catch up with political realities. Moreover, the content of these criticisms reflects the political atmospheres during which they were written. For instance, writings appearing immediately after the 1989 elections to the Congress of People's Deputies were system-specific: they focused exclusively on how Soviet legislators could introduce innovations to improve the conduct of elections and how to improve the electoral system in conditions of an 'enlightened' single-party rule. Following the introduction of new republican Constitutions and electoral laws in 1989-1990, Soviet writers concentrated on improving the mechanisms for conducting elections. However, they were also forced to take into consideration the new political forces which (following the adoption of the amendment to Article 6 of the USSR Constitution) had previously existed informally, but now had to right to become accepted, legal contestants for power in their own right. Subsequent debates emphasised tactics candidates and political organisations could use to win elections; systemic improvements were of secondary importance. By this time, the CPSU had lost its credibility as a ruling party and accepted that it would become one among several competing for power as potential parliamentary parties. Therefore, these contributions were part of the foundation upon which post-Soviet electoral administration was built.

Electoral geography and the principle of one-person-one vote were among the first of the shortcomings that Soviet scholars and politicians felt needed immediate

improvements. Latvian deputy Viktor Alksnis, speaking at the First USSR Congress of People's Deputies in May 1989, noted that in his republic there were grossly disproportionate numbers of voters in different districts.<sup>70</sup> For instance, in one rural national-territorial district there were 28,000 voters, while in an urban constituency there were 137,000.<sup>71</sup> This posed a particularly acute problem in the republic. The rural voters' ballots had greater weight than their urban counterparts. Although 71% of Latvia's population was based in urban areas and ethnic Russians living in the republic were more abundant there—the majority of rural dwellers were ethnic Latvians.<sup>72</sup> According to legal specialist Suren Avak'yan this demographic imbalance reduced the chances of working class and Russian candidates being elected. Moreover, he recounts that 10 of 11 National Front of Latvia deputies won seats from these constituencies.<sup>73</sup> Political geographers A. V. Berezkin, V. A. Kolosov, M. E. Pavlovskaya, N. V. Petrov and L. V. Smiryagin indicate that if

electoral district boundaries were drawn based on the population count according to the 1979 census, then a transfer of 14 electoral districts from certain republics to others would be necessary, and, according to the preliminary results of the 1989 census, 28 of the 750 [territorial] districts would need to be changed.<sup>74</sup>

Russian authorities did not alleviate the huge gaps of voters in constituencies and the problem of some voters' ballots weighing more than others. Elsewhere in this volume, the present author indicates this problem also occurred during the 1993 elections to the Russian Federal Assembly.



The principle of one-person-one vote was challenged by the introduction of social organisation seats. According to the Electoral Law, not all voters were allowed to elect these deputies-rather they were chosen by delegates to all-union congresses, conferences and plenums. Although not all voters could elect these deputies, they could participate in candidate discussions and nominations-proposals for candidacies were supposed to come from the lower levels and were approved at higher levels within the organisation. Gorbachev shrugged off criticisms that a portion of the electorate would be effectively disenfranchised by the procedure for electing these deputies. Given the nature of the Soviet system, the majority of citizens belonged to trade unions and other social organisations of some type. Therefore, they possessed the right to discuss the candidates. As a result, Gorbachev claimed that it was not important to discuss disenfranchisement; in reality, there were very few Soviet citizens who *did not* belong to any of these organisations.<sup>75</sup> In any event, these 750 deputies were elected by only about 16,000 people.<sup>76</sup>

Avak'yan, while accepting that members of the organisation possessed the right to discuss these candidates, nevertheless found further faults connected with the social organisation seats. First, voters in these congresses, conferences and plenary meetings possessed an extra vote other than what most of the electorate was granted: one for a deputy in a territorial district and one for a national-territorial district. Second,

...both theoretically and practically, some [social organisation seat electors] may have had even more votes, so far as members of several leading organs (for example the CPSU Central Committee, the All-Union Central

Council of Trade Unions, the Central Committee of the Komsomol, the governing board of a creative union, etc.) participated in the elections of a series of deputies.<sup>77</sup>

Unlike candidates who stood in constituencies, social organisation seat contestants often did not have their own personal election programmes. Rather, they frequently adopted the manifesto of their social organisation.<sup>78</sup> There were, however, as stated earlier, some notable exceptions.

The social organisation seats' status was heavily debated by Soviet parliamentarians and <sup>they</sup> were removed from the USSR Constitution at the Second Congress in December 1989; republics possessed the right to retain them in elections to their own supreme legislatures.<sup>79</sup> Only Belorussia and Kazakhstan chose this option.<sup>80</sup>

There were other criticisms of the electoral system that needed to be addressed further. Avak'yan viewed the structure and practices of the Congress of People's Deputies itself as faulty. For instance, the Parliament was to meet infrequently (only twice per year), undertake the formation of the Supreme Soviet and adopt major laws at these sessions. He also claimed, based on their performances at the First Congress, that most deputies were not inclined to take so modest a role. In addition, he felt the Congress was too large and queried how the legislature could function effectively with more than 2,000 deputies.<sup>81</sup>

Nomination rights were also vague and introduced inconsistencies and inequalities. The Electoral Law mandated that candidates could be proposed by no less than 500 workers at a meeting, but also, it was formally permissible for work collectives of 7-11 (cooperatives, the court, the procuracy), 15-20 (editorial boards of periodicals, food shops, hairstylists), 30-40 (polyclinics and schools) to nominate candidates alongside factories, institutes and universities, where, for instance, the number of workers ranged from 15,000-50,000.<sup>82</sup> Another commentator noted that there were problems with work place nomination meetings-the work collective was also the easiest place for the apparatus to manipulate the candidate selection.<sup>83</sup>

Nomination meetings and candidates' meetings with the electorate received further criticism both in the USSR and abroad. Stephen White has argued that these served as filters through which candidates had to pass; however, party officials 'packed' the meetings with their supporters to ensure that 'their' people would win nominations.<sup>84</sup> Giulietto Chiesa considered them 'one option among many for district leaders in protecting their position' and they 'became the *apparat's* weapon of choice in eliminating radical candidates'.<sup>85</sup> Indeed, Boris Yeltsin noted that they were 'carefully designed to sift out undesirable candidates'.<sup>86</sup> Aleksandr Ivanchenko, a current member of the Russian Federation's Central Electoral Commission (appointed by the State Duma),<sup>87</sup> writing in 1990, argued that putting deputies forward through work collectives and meetings of electors would not be the 'wave of the future'-given that new political forces had emerged. However, he defended them claiming that they would play a role in the 'making of a multiparty system' by expanding paths for candidate nominations and stimulating assistance for candidates during the final stages of the electoral struggle.<sup>88</sup>

Avak'yan saw other inequalities in the way pre-election meetings were conducted between candidates who stood in the constituencies and those from social organisations. Some of the former had to speak up to 30-40 times-including some who had up to 100 or more meetings-before different crowds in different auditoria. In contrast, candidates from the social organisations had, on average, 2-4 meetings per month and, moreover, these occurred in meetings with colleagues, in environments where they were well-known and among people with whom they were close.<sup>89</sup> Subsequently, district meetings were removed from the electoral laws of 11 republics-Turkmenia, Uzbekistan, Kirgizia and Kazakhstan the exceptions.<sup>90</sup>

Parties and other organisations were formally accepted as components of the Soviet political system. However, electoral legislation did not adequately address their status in the new conditions. For instance in a contribution to a round table on 'Problems of the Development of Electoral Legislation' sponsored by the parliamentary journal *Narodnyi deputat*, director of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Soviet State Construction and Legislation, V. Vasil'ev, noted that the emergence of multiparty conditions created problems of equality in campaigning. Previously, the state provided the sole means of financial support and allocation of media time and space. In the new circumstances, this would not be acceptable: the state could not afford these policies. Nevertheless, he contended, measures had to be implemented to ensure that parties, other social organisations and citizens would be able to undertake comprehensive support of candidates. At the same time, he argued, all should have equal rights to the feeding trough. Therefore, he proposed that the state should fairly equally distribute finances to candidates and parties and place a cap on non-state donations to electoral contestants.<sup>91</sup>

In another round table forum, <sup>the</sup> Head of the USSR Academy of Science's Institute of State and Law V. Smirnov noted the importance of regulating non-monetary sources of campaign support such as equipment, media, printing and specialist services.<sup>92</sup>

Political parties and movements were not the only problematic issues challenging electoral legislation development. The situation in the USSR during 1990-1991 also reflected the increase in the significance of the shift in power relations from the centre to the republics. This was reflected in differing electoral codes the republics adopted.<sup>93</sup> Some of which, like those enacted in the Baltic states, conflicted with the rights of Soviet citizens.<sup>94</sup> There were also deficiencies in electoral legislation regarding deputy recall procedures, referendums, and a lack of systematised information on electoral laws which needed to be rectified.<sup>95</sup> Therefore, the electoral reform process, although providing for increased choice and participation, lacked many legal provisions which guaranteed what were outlined in the 'Introduction' as free and fair elections.

While accepting that the ground rules (electoral laws) regulating the hustings are important, Soviet writers also realised that the objective of any election campaign is to win seats. Therefore, writings from 1991 addressed campaign strategy, tactics and the role of 'political marketing'. For instance, *Narodnyi deputat* and the CPSU Central Committee's Institute of Social Problems conducted a round table discussion between American and Soviet specialists concerned with the study of electoral campaigns. The discussion revealed some notable differences between how the Americans and Soviets approached electioneering.

Ralph Murphine, director of the Washington-based Institute for Practical Politics, for example, stressed how political consultants and pre-election research in a campaign benefited the *contestants*. He informed his Soviet colleagues that the political consultant is a specialist who assists candidates or parties by organising support among the electorate, develops an electoral strategy and works for its realisation. In addition, political consultants contribute to their clients' success by providing answers to the important questions: Who is our candidate? What is his/her character? What are the candidate's views, political positions, experience or other qualities which may influence the voter's choice? Who is our opponent? What are his/her strong and weak points? What concerns our voters and what are their interests? How will the personality of the candidate, his/her slogans and arguments influence the electorate? Moreover, he emphasised how important it was to study surveys, demographic analyses and focus group interviews to help the candidate win office.<sup>96</sup>

Soviet commentators, however, tended to focus on how election-related research was useful to *official bodies*. For instance, A. Demidov of the USSR Academy of Science's Institute of Sociology noted that these materials could benefit the soviets and electoral commissions. He added, however, that it could also be useful to political parties and groups and their candidates by providing recommendations about the qualities the electorate preferred in a candidate. District soviet chairwoman O. Bektabekova noted that election-related research was important because it notified authorities of electors' orientations, what they knew about the elections, the candidates, whether they met with the candidates and whether they intended to vote.<sup>97</sup> Notwithstanding their differences with their American colleagues, Soviet specialists recognised the changing nature of their

political environment and deduced that the old ways of conducting elections were no longer appropriate.

The best example of new thinking in Soviet electoral strategies was produced by Moscow State University sociologists Tat'yana Yurasova and Ol'ga Selivanova and published in the Tallinn journal *Politika* (formerly the Communist Party of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic's theoretical journal *Kommunist Estonii*). The authors viewed politics as a 'market': '[p]olitics is a social sphere where supply (the number of candidates) increases and this will decrease demand (deputy mandates and various kinds of political vacancies)'.<sup>98</sup> Moreover, they argue, politics can be seen as a market because its 'commodities' are the 'possibilities of profits and privileges...connected with any political decision'. Power holders can be considered 'salespersons' and the voters are likened to 'consumers'. In order for the former to present their product to their buyers, they must engage in 'political marketing' which encompasses

the careful and comprehensive study of the political market, the interests and expectations of various social groups and addresses the basic position of the candidate's pre-election programme. On the other hand, it is the active influence over public opinion, on the formation of interests and political preferences.<sup>99</sup>

To conduct this activity, it is necessary to construct some type of strategy. In drawing up the 'marketing plan', Yurasova and Selivanova argue, it is necessary to analyse the arrangement of forces in the local and central powers. Because of the activities of the

CPSU and its dominance within the Soviet political system, it was necessary to determine whether or not the bodies would remain neutral during the campaign; and, if not, deduce whether they would show support for one candidate or assist the other. They also advised that it was necessary to study the economic situations in particular areas such as employment structures, unemployment and its sources, the average wage levels, the supplies in the region and prices. All these factors, they argue, should be included in the plan, because the candidate's aim is to attract the consumer. Moreover, candidates must consider the parameters of the social groups they seek to influence, taking into account their income, age and professional structures, national features, traditions, etc. In this manner candidates should 'model an image of the typical representative of the...group' and build a campaign to influence that person's vote.<sup>100</sup>

Yurasova and Selivanova argue that there are several important factors to consider when campaigning. First, candidates must devise a strategy of how to attract more votes than their opponents. Second, they must determine causes of voter abstention and seek to remedy these symptoms. Third, candidates must remember that what they say is, to the electorate, felt to be more important than what they actually know. Therefore, contestants must make their statements tactfully. Fourth, they claim that if candidates want to be covered extensively, they have to 'create a spectacle'. Finally, they recommend that competitors should not give their opponents any ideas which they could put to their own use.<sup>101</sup>



## The Development of Political Organisations and Political Parties, 1990-1993

Until 1990 the only political organisations legally operating in Russia were the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), its leading role codified in Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, and the Communist Party of the RSFSR (formed in June 1990). Only social organisations sanctioned by the CPSU were allowed to function including trade unions, the Communist Youth League (Komsomol), and, for instance, women's organisations. Despite this fact there were numerous political organisations which developed in the late 1980s and early 1990. It will be recalled that the CPSU's political monopoly lasted *de jure* until March 1990 when the USSR Congress of People's Deputies amended Article 6. Subsequently, the USSR Congress of People's Deputies passed the USSR *Law on Public Associations* in October 1990 which went into effect on 1 January 1991. On New Year's Day 1991, some 700 public organisations, including political parties, trade unions and other formations had submitted their programmes and rules to the USSR Ministry of Justice for registration at the all-union level.<sup>102</sup>

Political organisations in the RSFSR began to form and develop during 1990-1991. According to a handbook on parties, associations, unions and political clubs published during this time period, there were 2 world organisations (the World Anti-Zionist and Anti-Masonic Front, Pamyat' and Party of the World-which wished to associate Greater Russia, Greater Europe and America into a United Human State-a United World or the United States of the World); 85 all-union organisations; 47 republican; 13 inter-regional; 45 regional and 265 local organisations.<sup>103</sup> Figures for registered and non-registered public associations were not determined. Moreover, it will

be recalled that despite the high number of public organisations that registered in early 1991, only 2 all-union political parties were officially registered with the USSR Ministry of Justice by August of the same year: the CPSU and Vladimir Zhirinovskii's Liberal-Democratic Party of the Soviet Union.

The parties ranged from monarchists, socialists, Christian democrats and other political groupings with serious aspirations to compete for, and win, elected offices, to associations of citizens who viewed the political party with more light-hearted outlooks.<sup>104</sup> For instance, in October 1991 an organisational committee for the *Duratskaya Partiya Rossii* (Fools' Party of Russia), chaired by the well-known political activist and poet Yurii Alekseev, convened in Tyumen'. According to Alekseev, 'only in a land of fools could his party achieve success' and the party's slogan was 'Give the people beer and sausage'.<sup>105</sup>

During the months following the abortive putsch and the collapse of the USSR, political formations increased in the Russian Republic. In particular, between September and December 1991 several political organisations emerged after the CPSU's and Communist Party of the RSFSR's suspensions claiming either to be their successors, legal heirs to their property and funds, or communist or socialist organisations having nothing to do with the CPSU.<sup>106</sup> Moreover, in an informative item published in the political journal, *Narodnyi deputat*, it was established that among the social organisations, there were 38 political organisations registered with the Russian Justice Ministry by 20 February 1992 (one was the CPSU)<sup>107</sup>; and in April of that year, State Adviser to the President on Political Questions, Sergei Stankevich, noted that there were 820 registered

public organisations, including 25 political parties, in the Russian Federation. He also mentioned that there were many other political parties and that more than 300,000 people were involved in these formations.<sup>108</sup> It is indeed particularly significant that in November 1992 the Russian Constitutional Court overturned Yeltsin's ban of the Russian Communist Party and in February the Party reformed as the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) headed by Gennadii Zyuganov. The KPRF boasted some 500,000-6000,000 members and became easily the largest party in Russia.<sup>109</sup>

Political parties in post-Soviet Russia face some problems. None of these parties has the membership that the CPSU formerly had; some 9.6 per cent of the Soviet adult population were members.<sup>110</sup> Until February 1993, the largest political parties operating in Russia were Nikolai Travkin's Democratic Party of Russia with a membership of about 40,000-50,000; the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia with its self-proclaimed membership of between 80,000-100,000 members and Aleksandr Rutskoi's People's Party of Free Russia claiming about 120,000, but estimated to have 50,000-60,000 members.<sup>111</sup> The parties also lack the strength the former CPSU had in its representation in all territorial administrative divisions, social organisations, public institutions and work places, which impedes their potential for strength.

In addition these parties were viewed sceptically by the Russian population. A poll of 1,000 Muscovites conducted on 19 March 1992, asked the question, 'with whom do you connect your hopes for leading Russia out of the economic crisis?'. Among these respondents only 4 per cent put their faith in the new political parties.<sup>112</sup> Professor Konstantin Kholodei of St Petersburg University has noted that at the end of 1992 there

was extreme antipathy towards the political parties; some 85 per cent of the Russian population were 'very sceptical of all of them'.<sup>113</sup> However, according to data collected in the 'Political Parties in Russia' survey of December 1992 the Russian populace had the highest positive attitude towards Nikolai Travkin's Democratic Party of Russia-18 per cent. What is more important, however, is the fact that even as 1992 came to a close the majority of those surveyed was either uninformed about political parties and movements or still had not made up their minds about them. While only about one third of the respondents were unsure of their attitudes towards Nina Andreeva's conservative All - Union Communist Party (Bolshevik), 80 per cent did not know about or form an opinion on the Russian All-People's Union, led by Russian People's Deputy Sergei Baburin.<sup>114</sup> More recently, a poll conducted by the All-Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) in June-July 1993 indicated that over half the respondents had no support for Russian political parties.<sup>115</sup>

Richard Sakwa has claimed that during the 1990-1993 period Russia had parties but no party system. He notes nine factors hampering the development of a stable party system in Russia. These include: an unstable ideological basis, reflected in indistinct programme differentials; a problematic relationship between leaders and parties resulting in *krugovshchina*-the tendency for parties to fracture around their dominant personalities; a political and social atmosphere which was decidedly anti-party, preferring looser coalitions and political institutions to fill the space between the voters and government and lack of experience in opposition politics; the emergence of a presidential system, and moreover a president who has not allied himself with any political parties or movements, claiming to be above politics and the election of a non-party parliament in 1990; the

cooptation of the most able individuals into government rather than into political parties; small party memberships reflecting an anti-party stance among the Russian population; the absence of reliable social bases from which parties could draw support; the importance of regional politics hampered the effectiveness of a national base for party development. Finally, the breakup of the Soviet Union 'weakened the coherence of the parties and challenged them to find a new synthesis of the national idea and democratic principles.'<sup>116</sup> Therefore, his categorisation of Russia's political configurations as not *proto-party* but *pseudo-party* has significant grounding.<sup>117</sup> Russia's political parties entered the 1993 elections to the Russian Federal Assembly with these obstacles in front of them.

## Conclusion

Despite increasing the amount of choice available to voters in 1989, the electoral system had many significant deficiencies. Nevertheless, Soviet scholars and political practitioners attempted to debate these points and refine them. Elections to the republican Supreme Soviets, the RSFSR Supreme Soviets and the Russian presidency brought with them greater chances for candidate choice and civil society played an even greater role in them than they had in 1989. In addition, these elections marked a turning point in which the republics' stature within the union increased significantly. Indeed, the election of these institutions greatly enhanced this facet of Soviet politics and conditioned early post-Soviet politics. Nevertheless, the CPSU still tried to thwart alternative political forces. This factor stands despite the fact that the Party itself was facing many internal squabbles. Parties were given the official 'go ahead' to participate in political life.

However, their influence was limited significantly. Elections to the republican Supreme Soviets, although infused with the participation of alternative political movements and other civic organisations, were not multiparty elections-rather they were limited choice elections. Presidential elections in Russia had a 'multiparty flavour'. However, it was only in December 1993 that Russia had its first contest in which political organisations played a major role.

### NOTES

1. Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking For Our Country and the World*, updated edition (London: Fontana/Collins, 1988), pp. 110-113.
2. See, for instance, *ibid.*, pp. 282-284.
3. N. A. Mikhaleva and L. A. Morozova, 'Reforma respublikanskogo izbiratel'nogo zakonodatel'stva (Svravnitel'no-pravovoi aspekt)', *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, 1990, No. 6, pp. 29-39, p. 29.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. See 'Zakon Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik Ob uchrezhdenii posta Prezidenta SSSR i unesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v Konstitutsiyu (Osnovnoi Zakon) SSSR', No. 1360-1 (14 March 1990), *Vneocherednoi tretii s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR 12-15 marta 1990 g.: Stenograficheskie otchet*, 3 Vols., Vol. III., pp. 192-207. The Congress' deputies approved the post and the accompanying amendments in a vote in which 2,011 deputies participated with 1,817 ballots in favour of the motion, 133 against and 61 abstentions (*Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 193; roll-call voting data on the subject is in *ibid.*, pp. 194-214). Chairman of the Accounting Commission of the Third Congress, Vice President of the USSR Academy of Sciences Yurii Osip'yan announced that 1,329 deputies cast their ballots in favour of Gorbachev, the sole candidate, 495 voted against his candidacy and 54 spoiled their ballots (*ibid.*, Vol. III, pp. 54-55). Therefore, he received 59.2 per cent of the votes of the entire Congress, the support of 66.45 per cent of deputies who received ballots and 70.76 per cent of all deputies who participated in the poll (*ibid.*, p. 55). The protocol of the Accounting Commission containing these results was supported by 1,822 deputies and opposed by 47 with 35 abstentions (*ibid.*, p. 56). Therefore, in accordance with the Law, Gorbachev was elected President of the USSR (*ibid.* and 'Postanovlenie S'ezda narodnykh deputatov Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik O Prezidente Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik', No. 1362-1 (15 March 1990), *ibid.*, p. 211). Subsequently, he relinquished his position as Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet ('Postanovlenie S'ezda narodnykh deputatov Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik Ob osvobodzhenii Gorbacheva M. S. ot dolzhnosti Predsedatelya Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR i prekrashenii ego deputatskikh polnomochii', No. 1363-1 (15 March 1990), *ibid.*, p. 212). Also in accordance with the law, USSR Supreme Soviet Deputy Chair Anatolii Luk'yanov was elevated to

the post of Chair of the body. ('Postanovlenie S'ezda narodnykh deputatov Soyuzha Sovetskikh Respublik O Predsedatel'e Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR', No. 1367-1 (15 March 1990), *ibid.*, p. 214).

7. Mikhaleva and Morozova, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

8. Darrell Slider, 'The Soviet Union', *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 1990), pp. 295-302, p. 296.

9. See Rogers Brubaker, 'Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia: An Institutionalist Account', *Theory and Society*, Vol. 23 (1994), pp. 47-78.

10. V. A. Kryazhkov, 'Sostyazatel'nost' kandidatov v deputaty', *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, 1990, No. 6, pp. 39-49, p. 41.

11. See, for instance the figures presented in Slider, *op. cit.*, Table 1, p. 299 and Stephen White, Graeme Gill and Darrell Slider, *The Politics of Transition: Shaping a Post-Soviet Future* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 32, Table 2.1.

12. See for instance, Slider, *op. cit.*, Rein Taagepera, 'The Baltic States', *ibid.*, pp. 295-302; Commission On Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Elections in the Baltic States and Soviet Republics: A Compendium of Reports on Parliamentary Elections Held in 1990* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1990); Judith Devlin, *The Rise of the Russian Democrats: The Causes and Consequences of the Elite Revolution* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995), pp. 152-156.

13. 'Zakon Soyuzha Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik Ob uchrezhdenii posta Prezidenta SSSR i unesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v Konstitutsiyu (Osnovnoi Zakon) SSSR'.

14. *Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoi Zakon) Soyuzha Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1978).

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# **Chapter 6. The 1993 Elections to the Russian Federal Assembly**

Boris Yeltsin's Presidential Decree No. 1400 of 21 September 1993 disbanding the Russian Parliament elected in 1990 and supplementary legislation creating the bi-cameral Russian Federal Assembly<sup>1</sup> set the stage for Russia's first multiparty-type elections since those to the short-lived Constituent Assembly in 1917.<sup>2</sup> As discussed in earlier chapters, Russian and Soviet elections have not created institutions affecting major political changes: the elections themselves and the legislatures they produced were marginalised by the supremacy of tsar and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Criteria defining the major qualities and components of democratic elections indicate that Soviet elections possessed numerous deficiencies excluding them from this classification. Electoral reform measures implemented during the Gorbachev years increased the scope of citizen activity in elections, provided the electorate with choices among candidates for state offices who stood on specific programmes (although competing parties were not allowed), influenced the creation of more professionally qualified parliamentary elites, infused the USSR's legislative organs with slightly higher degrees of autonomy from the CPSU and transformed them from their previous status of institutions whose purpose was to 'rubber stamp' decisions made earlier at party Central Committee plenums, to elected assemblies more akin (but not entirely similar) to, the 'working' legislatures reflecting voters' choices established in liberal democratic countries. Nevertheless, these modifications all occurred within the context of maintaining and improving the single-party system that had been in existence since Lenin's time. Notwithstanding the election of a number of notable reformers and anti-CPSU politicians to them, *perestroika*-era institutions such as the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies were dominated by CPSU members who were bound to pursue the party line. This in itself seriously limited the degree of political and economic changes that could be implemented within their respective territories.

Russia was presented with new political, social and economic challenges and possibilities to improve its nascent democratic order following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Communist party rule. Ironically, after having jointly led and orchestrated the popular resistance that thwarted the attempted coup in August 1991, the Russian President and Parliament quickly fell out over numerous divisive issues, particularly the formation of government, the pace of economic reform and, possibly most contentious, over which institution-legislative or executive-would occupy the primary role in the post-Soviet political arrangement.<sup>3</sup> The crisis contained a series of flash points and reached its crest during the April 1993 referendum on the future of economic reform, the presidency and the Russian parliament.<sup>4</sup> A majority of Russians indicated that they preferred that their leaders should remain in place and that reforms should continue,<sup>5</sup> despite the harsh economic difficulties they confronted and the hostilities that the two branches of government demonstrated towards each other. Leading students of Russian politics generally agree that Yeltsin squandered an opportunity to usher in a reform-oriented legislature by not disbanding the RSFSR Congress in the wake of the post-coup victory. They believe that timing of elections is crucial to establishing a more stable democratic order and that Russia's democratic forces could have ridden Yeltsin's coat-tails in elections to a new legislature.<sup>6</sup> Instead, the institution remained and president and parliament were locked into a conflict lasting well over a year and a half which climaxed in the bloody events of October 1993.

Russia's inheritance of institutions created during the Soviet period (including its parliament, presidency and constitution) may have impeded the growth of its own post-communist democratic institutions during 1991-1993. However, did Yeltsin's dissolution of the parliament in the 'name of democracy', conducting new elections and a plebiscite for a

new post-Soviet Constitution lay the foundations for a new, legitimate democratic order? More importantly, were Russians deprived yet again of a political order in which they could influence the state's agenda through their elected representatives? If so, who 'hijacked' these possibilities for them: Yeltsin, old elites or the Russian people themselves? The purpose of the present chapter is to provide a general overview of the 1993 elections to the Russian Federal Assembly and the Constitutional plebiscite outlining their general provisions, protagonists, organisational structures and outcomes and placing this event within the context of the controversial debate<sup>over</sup> whether or not they contributed development of a 'new', 'democratic' or 'other' type of political framework. Throughout this chapter it will be demonstrated that there were great instances of continuity, contradiction and departure exhibited in the campaign to the Federal Assembly

### **New Institutions and the Draft Constitution**

The *Provisions on Federal Organs of Power in the Transitional Period* created a restructured Russian legislature, the *Federal'noe Sobranie* (Federal Assembly), a bi-cameral institution consisting of an upper house, the Federation Council and a lower house, the State Duma.<sup>7</sup> The Federation Council was devised in a manner in which regional interests, growing in significance since the late 1980s, would be represented. Each of Russia's 89 'subjects' would be represented by two members,<sup>8</sup> one from the representative organs; the other from the executive bodies of authority. The chamber is empowered to implement border changes between subjects of the Federation and Presidential decrees on martial law and states of emergency, decide on the use of Russian armed forces outside the Russian Federation's borders, set presidential elections, affirm federal judges and the Russian Procurator General



and decide on the President's removal from office (Article 8).

The *Provisions* mandated that legal voters—those who had achieved the age of 18 and were not declared insane by a court of law—would elect representatives to the 450 member State Duma (its deputies had to be at least 21 years of age).<sup>8</sup> The chamber would function on a 'permanent basis' (Article 6) and is empowered to approve the Chair the Government of the Russian Federation (Prime Minister), conduct votes of confidence in the Russian government and its members, appoint and release from office (with presidential approval) the Chair of the State Bank of the Russian Federation, and also the Human Rights Commissioner, and grant amnesties (Article 10). It should also be noted that although the Federation was 'to be formed', the first sitting was popularly elected.

In addition to a restructured parliament, Russian voters also participated in a controversial plebiscite on a draft Constitution for the Russian Federation. As Wyman, Miller, White and Heywood have indicated elsewhere, 'Yeltsin's decree described the vote as a "plebiscite" rather than a referendum, since the terms of the Russian Law on Referendums, promulgated in October 1990, required that constitutional changes gain the support of the majority all registered voters.'<sup>9</sup> The draft of the Constitution was published in major papers and in booklet form for public scrutiny. Nevertheless, it appears that its dissemination and distribution schedule left little time for the electorate to become acquainted with the document and its provisions.<sup>10</sup> Stephen White has argued that the document clearly bore Yeltsin's vision for the future restructuring of a Russian political order in which the president would be the dominant actor.<sup>11</sup>

Despite its presidential favourings, the draft was a radical departure from earlier constitutions. The document's provisions ensured it was not just a tool for another form of dictatorship. Moreover, the draft reflected the leadership's interest to fuse the move towards a market economy with some type of social safety net creating *at minimum* a foundation for some type of social contract between the regime and the population. This theoretically established a means for further popular legitimation.

Whereas the last Soviet Constitution's<sup>12</sup> Chapter VII listed the rights and duties of citizens which the regime could use for coercive purposes rather than human fulfilment, the Yeltsin draft contained a section on human and citizen's rights and freedoms which had the person, not the state as its focal point. For instance, under the 'Brezhnev Constitution', work was a right, but also a duty. Individuals were not allowed to 'live off the labour of others'; those who violated this principle were subject to prosecution under 'parasite' laws and deprived of their personal freedom. In conditions of 'full-employment' and complete party control it was feasible to maintain such a policy.

The Yeltsin draft also included particular duties which Russian citizens had to perform or to which they would be subjected. Among them are temporary suspensions of their rights and freedoms during states of emergency, payment of taxes and duties, maintenance of the environment and defence of the fatherland (including military service) (Articles 56-59). In certain circumstances Russian citizens committing serious crimes would be subjected to the death penalty (Article 20). However, the draft also took into account the changing political, economic and social conditions in Russia. With the emergence of a competitive labour market and a switch from a state-centralised to a market economy and the increase of

unemployment, work is naturally no longer considered a duty; <sup>rights and</sup> nevertheless

citizens are free to choose their preferred career paths (Article 37). Private property is protected by law and citizens and civic associations are allowed to hold private property in the form of land (Articles 35-36).

Draft provisions included elements of a social-safety net for Russian citizens. Article 7, for instance, states that 'The Russian Federation is a social state'. Moreover, the same article mandated

In the Russian Federation, labour and the people's health shall be protected, a guaranteed minimum wage shall be established, state support of the family, maternity, fatherhood and childhood, invalids and elderly citizens shall be guaranteed, a system of social services shall be developed and state pensions, stipends and other guarantees of social defence shall be established.

Other social guarantees in the draft included the rights to choice of place of residence (Article 27), housing (Article 40) and education (Article 43).<sup>13</sup>

### The Contestants

Drafters of the *Provisions on Elections of State Duma Deputies* selected an electoral formula which combined proportional and population-based representation for voters to choose their parliamentarians. In the former, political parties and other social organisations established on an all-Russia basis and whose rules were registered by the Russian Ministry

of Justice were permitted to put forward lists of candidates for a federation-wide constituency. Those lists receiving more than 5 per cent of the votes would have their deputies represented in the Duma. Social organisations, parties and blocs had to collect at least 100,000 signatures with no more than 15 per cent from any of Russia's regions and submit these documents to the Central Election Commission by midnight 6 November 1993 to be included on the ballot paper. Therefore, the electoral associations had a very limited time period to organise their platforms, campaigns and coordinate electoral support bases. As Richard Sakwa has argued, this innovation should have favoured the (relatively) older and more established political organisations. The regulations, however, forced a number of organisations to band together as diffuse blocs. As a result, many smaller, comparatively marginal political organisations were able to compete at the federal level.<sup>14</sup> Therefore the range of the participants in the Russian political spectrum was not reduced as efficiently as the drafters probably intended and lowered the potential for effective parties to participate in a parliament with strong coalition-building potential.<sup>15</sup>

The Central Election Commission released a list of some 91 all-Russian political and social organisations possessing the right to nominate candidates for the Duma.<sup>16</sup> Initially, the Government attempted to prohibit three of them from participating in the elections and Russian political life because of their links with the opposition groups in October 1993: the Russian Communist Workers' Party, the People's Party of Free Russia and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.<sup>17</sup> Subsequently, however, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation was allowed to continue its activities by the Russian Ministry of Justice.<sup>18</sup> In addition, members of the other banned parties contested in single seat constituencies or as members of other electoral associations.

Twenty-one parties and blocs attempted to get on the ballot paper. However, the number of contenders was reduced to 13 after the document submission deadline. Although all 21 blocs and parties claimed to have obtained the required number of signatures, 8 were banned initially due to various administrative barriers. These included the Russian All-People's Union, led by the former head of the Russian parliamentary fraction Russian Unity and staunch Yeltsin opponent, Sergei Baburin. According to Baburin, police raided the bloc's offices and stole documents containing 20,000-22,000 signatures.<sup>19</sup> In addition, he claimed that his phone, and those of his colleagues, had been cut and that he could only meet with foreign journalists in his home after receiving official permission from the authorities.<sup>20</sup> Nevertheless, Baburin contested the election, winning in Tsentral'nyi district No. 130, Omsk *oblast'*.<sup>21</sup> Other blocs initially excluded from the poll included Nikolai Lysenko's National Republican Party of Russia (although Lysenko contested and won a seat in Engel'skii district No. 158 in Saratov *oblast'*); Mikhail Astaf'ev's Constitutional Democratic Party-People's Freedom Party (however, one of its members, Anatolii Fedoseev won a seat in the Federation Council from the Komi-Permyak Autonomous District); the New Russia bloc, headed by Telman Gdlyan; and the *Avgust* (August) bloc.<sup>22</sup> One of the latter's principal figures, Konstantin Borovoi, leader of the business-oriented Party of Economic Freedom, also competed as an individual candidate.<sup>23</sup> His *Avgust* bloc received only 62,000 signatures.<sup>24</sup>

Thirteen electoral associations were included on the final ballot paper. These included what can be broadly categorised as four main camps: 'democrats', 'interest groups', 'centrists' and 'opposition'. The following ranks the blocs on a pro-anti reform axis. The

'democrats' included the most overtly pro-market and pro-Yeltsin coalition, Yegor Gaidar-led Russia's Choice, Russian Democratic Reform Movement (RDDR) led by St Petersburg Mayor Anatolii Sobchak, the Yavlinskii-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc (Yabloko) which was headed by reform economist Grigorii Yavlinskii, Yurii Boldyrev and former ambassador to the US Vladimir Lukin, and the Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRES) led by deputy chairman of the Russian Federation's Council of Ministers, Sergei Shakhrai. 'Interest Groups' included Dignity and Charity (DIM) which advocated the rights of invalids, Chernobyl victims and those adversely affected by market reforms (led by Konstantin Frolov), the Constructive Ecological Movement of Russia (KEDR) led by the chairwoman of the 'Soldiers' Mothers of Russia' Movement, Lyubov' Lymar'; and Women of Russia (ZhR) led by former deputy chairwoman of the Soviet Women's Committee and CPSU Central Committee member Alevtina Fedulova. (Although this group seeks to advance a female-directed voice in the parliament, their voting record shows them to be very closely allied with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation). 'Centrists' were comprised of Future of Russia-New Names (which among its goals included promoting new, younger politicians into political life, led by Vyacheslav Lashchevskii, secretary of the Russian Union of Youth; Civic Union, which represented industrial interests, led by Arkadii Vol'skii, and Nikolai Travkin's Democratic Party of Russia (DPR). 'Opposition' coalitions included Mikhail Lapshin's Agrarian Party of Russia (APR), Gennadii Zyuganov's Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) and Zladimir Zhirinovskii's ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR).<sup>25</sup>

Voters elected the remaining 225 deputies in a first-past-the-post system from

candidates who stood in single seat constituencies which were notionally based on population: each district deputy would represent some 500,000 people.<sup>26</sup> Candidates only needed to win the highest number of votes in the constituency to claim their seats; a contrast from Soviet practices in which they needed the support of 50 per cent of the eligible electorate in the district plus one vote. Contestants could stand independently (as the majority did), or representatives of electoral associations after collecting signatures of no less than 2% of the voters in the district. The turnout figure was reduced to 25 per cent from its 50 per cent Soviet predecessor, largely in anticipation of greater political apathy and disaffection.

Overall some 3,797 people competed for seats in the Federal Assembly, including 494 Federation Council candidates, 1,586 State Duma contestants in single seat constituencies and 1,717 on party lists. About 40 per cent of the Federation Council candidates were heads of the executive branch and 16 per cent were from representative organs. Among all candidates nearly a quarter were involved in economics and finance such as heads of large industrial enterprises, joint stock companies, funds, commercial banks, etc; nearly 8 per cent were employed in education at different levels, and only about 1-3 per cent were journalists, lawyers, workers in the agro-industrial complex<sup>or</sup> health or had other special training. Moreover, a little more than 13 per cent were formerly Russian People's Deputies.<sup>27</sup>

In summary, the elections of December 1993 and the Constitutional plebiscite would set the groundwork for a potentially new, post-Soviet political order. That Yeltsin would have the dominant position in the new institutional arrangements is undebatable. Nevertheless, citizens would be able to select representatives to both houses of the Federal

Assembly and establish links with these politicians who would have some degree of influence over certain areas of Russia's policy formation. Moreover, the draft Constitution could be considered as a form of social contract between Yeltsin and the population in which the former would be granted a prominent role in the country's politics and simultaneously, the population could be guaranteed of civic, human and social rights and freedoms.

### **Electoral Provisions**

Electoral commissions coordinate the elections from the Federal level down to each individual precinct. A Central Electoral Commission (*Tsentrizbirkom*) oversees the electoral procedures throughout the country and is comprised of a chairman, appointed from among Russian Supreme Court judges by the President, and 20 other members. The chairman for the 1993 elections was Nikolai Ryabov. Half of the membership is drawn from legislators in the Russian Federation appointed by the President while he also selects the other ten from among the existing heads of administration. Therefore, the president had considerable influence over the *Tsentrizbirkom's* composition, akin to the CPSU's powers of appointment of similar bodies during the Soviet period. In addition, all competing electoral organizations possess the right to appoint one of their members to the Central Electoral Commission; however, they did not possess full voting rights in it. Election commissions at all levels ensure compliance with the electoral statute: that candidates and their campaign staffs (*doverennye litsa*) are registered; lists of candidates and voters are available and distributed to the electorate and that ballots and finances are dispensed properly.

The elections were financed by several means. There is still some measure of state



support for the elections (previously the state provided the only source). By the beginning of December 1993, it was estimated that the government had expended about 252 billion roubles on the election campaign.<sup>28</sup> In addition to state support, the European Union donated an additional 100,000 ECUs (\$US113,000) to the *Tsentrizbirkom* to purchase equipment such as copying and fax machines.<sup>29</sup>

*Tsentrizbirkom* contributions went to the various electoral committees in order for them to conduct their duties. For instance, each Moscow polling station received close to 642,000 roubles to conduct the elections, and some <sup>may</sup> have <sup>been eligible to</sup> receive an additional 300,000 roubles. Included among some of the expenditures of the more than 3,000 Moscow electoral precincts<sup>30</sup> were about 30,000 roubles for preparing the stations for elections: assembling and dismantling equipment, 80,000 to print voters' lists, 15,000 for the costs of paper goods, 50,000 for hooking up phones, and about 12,000 for security.<sup>31</sup> In addition, the Tsentrizbirkom distributed 50 million roubles to each electoral organisation to conduct its own campaign.

Both electoral associations and individual candidates have the right to create campaign accounts. These sources of support are derived from several means. First, candidates and blocs have the opportunity to include finances which were provided through the election commissions from the Russian State Budget. Second, they may comprise the candidates' and the blocs' own finances. Third, the associations nominating individual candidates in the districts may provide them with financial support. Fourth, election funds may include voluntary private donations of both individuals and other legal entities. Nevertheless, there are certain limitations on funding; campaigns must be financed solely

by Russian sources.

The electoral associations clearly used a wide range of financial sources to pay for the 1993 contest. For instance, the KPRF paid for its campaign through membership dues and the 50 million roubles it received from the *Tsentrizbirkom*. Civic Union received 100 million roubles from different sponsors and some from a bloc agitational concert held to attract younger voters. It used these funds to pay for publishing leaflets and signs bearing bloc leader Arkadii Vol'skii's portrait. The Democratic Party of Russia (DPR) produced 3,000 leaflets, several tens of thousands of posters and 2 million calendars. The total for these items <sup>was</sup> 50 million roubles.<sup>32</sup> <sup>(cost)</sup>

Before the elections, very few candidates or blocs publicised their financial information. For instance, in St Petersburg, of the 95 candidates competing in 9 electoral districts, only city council chairman Aleksandr Belyaev published a declaration of his income from the beginning of the year.<sup>33</sup> Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Shakhrai publicized that he earned only 332,000 roubles per annum and at the end of October had only 14,000 in a savings bank.<sup>34</sup> Yabloko was the only association which openly reported its financial information. According to its figures the bloc had 64,722,934 roubles in its account on 29 November 1993. Among their contributors was the firm *Mossibinterservis*, donating 30,000,000 roubles. Yabloko's expenditures <sup>during</sup> 23-29 November included 1,305,402 roubles for copying agitation materials; 2 million roubles for issuing and distributing special editions of newspapers and posters; 4.5 million roubles for issuing brochures of the pre-election platform; 47,320 roubles for sending telegrams and 2.2 million roubles for publishing agitation materials.<sup>35</sup> On 6 December 1993, the bloc had 222,573,967 roubles

in its account and expended 87,317,967 of them on its campaign. The largest amount, 40,000,000, roubles went to the periodical, *Zhurnalist* (Journalist) for printing informational materials and publishing an interview which ran in 30 Russian regional newspapers. Among the contributors that week were the companies *Viamond* (30,000,000 roubles), the influential *Gruppa Most* (100,000,000 roubles), *Optision* (10,000,000 roubles), *Investionnaya kompaniya Most-Investment* (100,000,000 roubles) and *Torgovlya i Kredit* (10,000,000 roubles).<sup>36</sup>

In addition to providing for some type of equality for contestants regarding their financial support in the poll, the electoral statute contains provisions designed to ensure fair play in agitation. First, state institutions are forbidden from conducting any form of agitation (either for or against any candidate or electoral organisation). Rather, their function was to assist candidates and blocs find halls for meetings and like matters. Second, the statute expressly forbid<sup>s</sup> any publication of election related survey results during the last ten days before the elections. According to Daphne Skillen this stipulation was a factor in the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia's surprising performance.<sup>37</sup> Third, the state contributes towards the use of the media for the contestants. Each candidate had the right to present one speech on both state radio and television (the time allotment for the speeches was not specified in the statute). In St Petersburg, for instance, every candidate received 20 minutes of state-financed air time.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, the St Petersburg channel programme, 'Vybory: pryamoi efir' (Elections: Direct Broadcast), kept a timer on the candidates. Additional television presenters and programme staffs monitored the time on other election broadcasts. However, it was difficult to maintain a strict control over time allotments. For instance, during one telecast, Russia's Choice leader Yegor Gaidar 'was occupied with his speech and...[the bloc] was on the air a minute and a half longer' than they were scheduled.<sup>39</sup> The

*Provisions* also mandated that state television must allocate no less than one hour of air time per day to state<sup>A</sup> financed political broadcasts between 7 and 9 am and 7 and 11 pm (taking into account regional differences) during the three weeks preceding the elections.

### **Electoral Shortcomings**

The new electoral provisions had some potentially threatening features to the overall legitimacy of the deputies elected and equal weight among the electorate's votes. As Richard Sakwa has noted the reduced turnout level and first-past-the-post system 'would theoretically allow a candidate to win with only 6 per cent of the vote in a constituency where, for example, there were three candidates.'<sup>40</sup> In addition, the schema of each deputy representing about 500,000 people was not strictly adhered to and there were some seriously unequal distributions of voters amongst the 225 electoral districts, meaning that the votes of part of the electorate were worth more than those elsewhere throughout the country. For example, the Central Election Commission's list of constituencies and number of voters in them published in *Izvestiya* on 13 and 14 October 1994 revealed that the deputy elected in Astrakhan district No. 62 represented some 737,800 electors<sup>41</sup> while the deputy from Evenkii district No. 224 represented approximately 13,800 electors.<sup>42</sup> Therefore, as Wyman, Miller, White and Heywood correctly note, '[t]he voice of the Evenki in the State Duma would thus be 53 times louder than that of Astrakhan, leaving aside their two deputies to the upper house.'<sup>43</sup> It will be recalled that the unequal number of voters in districts has been a serious point of contention that Soviet and post-Soviet elites have not been able to solve effectively and can be traced back to the 1989 elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

The eligibility requirements for candidates included a major reversal of one aspect of Soviet electoral legislation. Under the 1988 Electoral Law, USSR ministers were not allowed simultaneously to hold their posts and be USSR People's Deputies (Article 11).<sup>44</sup> This provision would theoretically reduce the possibilities of creating conflicts of interests for ministers who would be serving as elected representatives of the people, not just their ministries. Ministers would have to decide whether they wanted to serve the electorate or remain in their places. By forgoing a loss of status, most ministers chose to remain in their positions—the notable exception being Yeltsin who resigned as the chairman of the State Construction Committee to take his seat in the Congress. Thus, this move strengthened Gorbachev's position in the Parliament vis-a-vis the state apparatus.

The *Provisions* mandated that Duma deputies could not be members of the Federation Council, representative organs or organs of local self-government at the same time (Article 3). However, as written in a concluding section of the draft Constitution, members of the Government of the Russian Federation could be simultaneously members of the Duma of the first convocation (Point 9). This is a factor which, theoretically, worked to the advantage of the 'pro-reform' forces. Moreover, this had the potential to strengthen further Yeltsin's power base in the lower house. Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin did not seek election to the parliament (although he is reputed to have supported Sergei Shakhrai's Russian Party of Unity and Accord).<sup>45</sup> Other members of government, however, actively sought seats in the Federal Assembly. Standing on the Russia's Choice list were, for instance, First Deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, Minister for Social Defence of the Population Ella Pamfilova, Deputy Prime Minister Anatolii Chubais, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, Finance Minister Boris Fedorov, Environment Minister Viktor Danilov-Danil'yan, Deputy chair of the Council

of Ministers Yurii Yarov, Deputy Finance Minister Aleksandr Pochinok, Science Minister Boris Saltykov and Culture Minister Yegvenii Sidorov. The Party of Russian Unity and Accord's candidates included deputy chairs of the Russian Federation's Council of Ministers Sergei Shakhrai and Aleksandr Shokhin, Justice Minister Yurii Kalmykov and Labour Minister Gennadii Melik'yan. Deputy Chairman of the Russian Federation's Council of Ministers Aleksandr Zaveryukha stood as a candidate for the opposition Agrarian Party of Russia.<sup>46</sup>

The prominence of government officials among Russia's Choice candidates and their activities in the campaign have led Michael Urban to suggest that the December elections demonstrated some continuity with late-Soviet electoral practices. He considers this "democracy by design", whereby those in control of the state machinery attempt to shape the institutions and procedures of a competitive election in ways that ensure an outcome favorable to the designers themselves.<sup>47</sup> Russia's Choice, considered by Urban to be a 'party of power', had its candidates in key positions: Mikhail Poltoranin headed the Federal Information Centre and 'others in the bloc holding the top posts in state broadcasting would have a free hand to shape the images and messages of the election transmitted to mass audiences *via* television and the radio.'<sup>48</sup> Urban also claims that Russia's Choice had control over the 'primary rules'-the established offices for which parties and independent candidates compete'-and 'secondary rules'-the procedures and regulations that govern this competition'-of the campaign.<sup>49</sup> His evidence for the former includes examples such as the manner in which the constitution was drafted (by a 'narrow political clique' rather than a constitutional convention), ministers were able to be members of the Duma, prohibiting criticism on the draft constitution and the committee overseeing the conducting of the

plebiscite was headed by Russia's Choice candidate Vladimir Shumeiko. Included among the second category are constituency gerrymandering from the former RSFSR Congress which represented 1,068 districts to the 225 district Duma and the resulting grossly unequal numbers of voters per constituency, the speed in which the campaign was conducted and the manner and time frame in which electoral associations had to scramble for signatures, <sup>usweta</sup> hurt blocs other than Russia's Choice. Because Russia's Choice had the largest number of candidates competing for seats, the Central Electoral Commission's directive to keep the political affiliations of the candidates off the ballot paper worked more to Gaidar's bloc's benefit and disadvantaged others. Moreover, he claims that media coverage was biased heavily in favour of Russia's Choice.<sup>50</sup> Indeed, as Daphne Skillen argues, the fact that Russia's Choice's candidates included so many members of government and prominent personalities, further ensured that the high profile candidates would gain greater exposure for the coalition in the run up to 12 December.<sup>51</sup>

### **Campaigning for the Federal Assembly**

The media's importance in shaping the former Soviet Union's electoral politics is a recent development. It will be recalled that the first election-related television broadcasts, for instance, began during the 1989 elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. Programmes like *Vlast' sovetam* (Power to the Soviets) and *Navstrechu vyboram* (Towards the Elections) informed the Soviet electorate of selected issues and candidates surrounding to the poll. Local programmes like Moscow's *Dobry vecher Moskva* (Good Evening Moscow) presented debates between contestants for the seats.<sup>52</sup> Subsequently, television took a more prominent role as the political system opened further. Television was the most

widely used form of media agitation in the 1993 campaign.<sup>53</sup> Nevertheless, it was an extremely expensive campaign medium. For instance, it was reported in *Izvestiya* that for one minute of air-time on Ostankino a party or bloc had to pay 707,000 roubles and it cost 632,095 roubles for the same time allotment on the Rossiya channel.<sup>54</sup>

Party political broadcasts began in late November providing voters with the programmatic specifics and personalities in the campaign<sup>55</sup> bringing the *agitvecher*<sup>56</sup> (agitational evening) into the Russian political lexicon. As Daphne Skillen notes these telecasts were relatively important in influencing voters.<sup>57</sup> However, the entire viewing public did not watch them enthusiastically. For instance, many voters preferred to watch imported soap operas such as the Mexican 'Prosto Mariya' (Simply Maria) or the American favourite 'Santa Barbara'<sup>58</sup> while the party political broadcasts were shown. Former Constitutional Court Chairman Valerii Zor'kin noted the intrusiveness and abundance of political broadcasts when he claimed 'I eat in the morning-they tell me to "Vote for Russia's Choice". I eat in the evening and it is the same.'<sup>59</sup>

On 30 November 1993 at 23.30 (Moscow time), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia presented a party political broadcast on the Rossiya channel devoted mainly to agricultural problems. Chairman Vladimir Zhirinovskii bragged about the specialists and academics he had on his team. He then 'turned the show over' to the candidates appearing with him-Aleksandr Kozyrev, Mikhail Lemeshev and Mikhail Sidorov. During the course of the broadcast Lemeshev spoke about the mistake of talking about social protection without taking into consideration the position of agrarian workers. He pointed out that other countries subsidised their agricultural sectors. Lemeshev also spoke of the need to invest more



materials into Russia's agricultural sector, noting that land is the country's 'greatest national heritage and salvation'. Lemeshev reminded his audience that the health of the population is related to food problems. When it was Zhirinovskii's turn, he again spoke of the capacities of his party members and assured the Russian electorate that the only way to change the status of agriculture and develop the rural infrastructure was by voting for the Liberal Democratic Party. He emphasized that neither the Peasant Party (competing in the election as part of Russia's Choice) nor the Agrarian Party could defend adequately the rights of the agricultural workforce; but that the Liberal Democratic Party would.<sup>60</sup>

Zhirinovskii's television appearance is worth noting. The LDPR leader always looked in control of the situation. When cameras focused on Zhirinovskii during the speeches of his fellow party members, he looked very much involved in the speech despite the fact that he was not speaking. In addition, he knew how to perform vigorously and confidently before the cameras. Stylistically, he differed radically from Anatolii Yemets, the President of the group 'Yemets', a candidate from St Petersburg who nervously and apprehensively spoke of the need to raise the pensions of invalids and take into account women's concerns<sup>61</sup> and (surprisingly), actress Natal'ya Gundareva, one of Women of Russia's three leading candidates, who 'obviously...read badly and kept her eyes on the paper the whole time'<sup>62</sup> during a spot on the second channel.

There were also incidents in which Zhirinovskii's style either shocked viewers or attracted people's attention. For instance he spoke for several minutes in Turkish during one election broadcast. In another, Zhirinovskii described Russia's experiences under Communist rule using sexual analogies. The Bolshevik Revolution he equated with the rape of the

country. The Stalin period, because men were killing other men and the population did not grow, was likened to homosexuality. Khrushchev's period, because of its messing around with the system and not producing anything, was compared to masturbation. Zhirinovskii categorized the Brezhnev era as group sex and classified the Gorbachev and current periods as phases of impotence.<sup>63</sup> There may have been some agreement in some Russian people's minds with his sexual analogies. Dr Daphne Skillen, coordinator of a Moscow based project evaluating central and regional press items on the elections, mentioned to the author that there was very little reaction from the Russian people in the press following his sexual comparison statements.<sup>64</sup>

St Petersburg television's 'Vybory: pryamoi efir' provided candidates competing in the city's single seat districts with opportunities to speak about their programmes and their intentions. Candidates used different methods to convey their election messages. For instance, on one show broadcast on 1 December 1993 at 21.45 (Moscow time) Vitalii Kalinin a PRES candidate presented a speech to promote his platform. However, Russia's Choice candidate, advocate Aleksei Aleksandrov, used a video to present his personal and programmatic information to the St Petersburg electorate.<sup>65</sup>

Some electoral associations produced their own television political advertisements. The Constructive Ecological Movement of Russia (KEDR) broadcast an information spot on 2 December 1993 at 23.45 (Moscow time) on the Moscow Channel with a screen split into four small squares depicting environmental hazards, urging the electorate to vote for them in order to ensure their futures and those of their children. The Russian Democratic Reform Movement's (RDDR) political advertisements depicted its symbol the astrological Taurus

which then broke off into photos of the movement's three leading candidates on the ballot paper, St Petersburg mayor Anatolii Sobchak, entrepreneur-physician Svyatoslav Fedorov and writer Oleg Basilashvili. A Civic Union commercial contained a large gathering of people depicting the diversity of the Russian population. Russia's Choice ran several advertisements. One showed a small child very cozy in his home and resting his head on what was (presumably) a St Bernard uttering 'I'm too young to vote'. In addition the bloc also broadcast an advertisement in which an announcer stated 'You can vote for this...' and then hands put forward several large cards depicting solid colours or spots. After two alternating successions of a solid card and a spotted card the announcer chimed in, 'Your choice "Russia's Choice"'.

The bloc-sponsored rock concert is a novel form of agitational-informational event used by electoral associations in the 1993 campaign specifically targetted to attract the support of young voters. Russia's Choice, for instance, promoted a major rock concert at the Palace of Congresses in Moscow on 3-5 December. Their advertisement for this event used a 'take off' (or 'rip off') of the Pepsi Cola advertising slogan 'novoye pokolenie vybiraet' ('The choice of the new generation'). This event was televised on Ostankino at 3 pm 5 December 1993. RDDR held a concert sponsored by the Fund For Support of the Russian Democratic Reform Movement on 5 December 1993 in St Petersburg entitled 'Stars of the Stage in Support of the RDDR' televised on the St Petersburg station between 2-3 pm (Moscow time). The event was kicked off by the bloc's leader in the elections, St Petersburg mayor Anatolii Sobchak, who informed spectators in the hall and in the viewing audience in their homes of the notable people on RDDR's list of candidates and urged voters to make their choices for those individuals who 'got their positions through their talents'. The

performers included Mikhail Murmon, saxophonist Aleksandr Sirov (who, incidentally, performed a very impressive cover version of the Johnny Mathis classic, 'Misty'), Igor Nikolaev, Yurii Antonov (due to technical difficulties he was caught clearly lip-synching his selections) and the group 'Lyuba'. The broadcast was interrupted by a hockey game between SKA St Petersburg and Dynamo Moscow. Nevertheless, RDDR was able to capitalise on this change in programming. Later, (for either personal or political motives) Sobchak and other members of the RDDR arrived at the game during the second period. The cameras depicted them amid cheers of the crowd. Therefore, RDDR gained extra, unpaid publicity.

There was extensive coverage of the parties and blocs and in some cases individual candidates in the central press. *Izvestiya*, for instance, regularly devoted page 4 during the campaign to election-related issues and interviews with leaders of the parties and blocs. *Rossiiskaya gazeta* and *Kommersant* daily published excerpts of the parties' and blocs' platforms on their pages. The Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRES) ran an extensive press campaign. An advertisement for voters to cast their ballots for the party regularly ran in the bottom right hand corner of page 3 in the daily newspaper *Nezavisimaya gazeta*.<sup>66</sup> RDDR, compensating for <sup>its</sup> last place position on the ballot paper, conducted a thorough media blitz publicising its programme stances and leading candidates. The advertisement, appearing in several newspapers, had a header reading 'Vote for the list of the Russian Democratic Reform Movement (last on the ballot paper)'; and a footer stating 'Our list is last on the ballot paper, but we are not last in affairs'.<sup>67</sup> KEDR ambitiously serialised its economic programme in four numbers of *Nezavisimaya gazeta*.<sup>68</sup> In addition, KEDR printed a post-election thank you notice. In this advertisement the bloc expressed gratitude

for their voters' support during the election campaign and ensured them that they would still continue to be involved in the struggle for environmental protection regardless of the election's outcomes.<sup>69</sup>

There were 'human factor' agitational techniques employed during the election. Moscow residents, for instance, received election-related materials in their mail boxes. For instance, voters living in the areas casting their ballots in Kashirskii district 194 for the State Duma; Federation Council district 77 and City Duma district 22 (centring around Kashirskoe shosee)<sup>70</sup> received the following Russia's Choice information note in their boxes:

Federation Council	District 77
State Duma	District 194
City Duma	District 22

Dear Friends!

Together we made our choice in the April 1993 Referendum,  
We hope that today, in the first free parliamentary elections,  
**YOUR CHOICE IS "RUSSIA'S CHOICE"**

The candidates whom we are supporting in Your district are:

- |                             |   |
|-----------------------------|---|
| - To the Federation Council | S. N. KRASAVCHENKO<br>Yu. D. CHERNICHENKO |
| - To the State Duma         | I. M. KHAKAMADA                           |
| - To the Moscow City Duma   | Ye. I. ISTOMINA                           |

[On] The Presidential draft of the Constitution of Russia - [Vote] YES

[Signed] Yegor Gaidar  
Sergei Kovalev  
Ella Pamfilova<sup>71</sup>

Other parties/blocs and citizens' groups were also active in this district and employed post box drops to publicise their candidates. For instance, the supporters of I. N. Petrenko, chairman of the governing board of the commercial bank 'Lyublino', circulated pre-election

flyers which not only told about the candidate, but informed voters of the ballot paper they would be using (ballot paper three for the single seat districts) and against whom their candidate was running. In addition, his candidacy was endorsed by notable figures such as I. N. Avachev and D. N. Bezdenezhnykh, respectively chairmen of the Councils of Veterans of War and Labour in the South-East and Southern administrative districts of Moscow; R. A. Pechenkina, a chief doctor of the Semashko hospital; Ye. I. Zharikov, a People's Artist of Russia and President of the Screen Actors' Guild of Russia, and A. V. Firsov, a former member of several Soviet olympic and world champion hockey teams.<sup>72</sup> In addition, Yabloko (here it will be noted that Yabloko is the Russian word for apple) distributed information for their candidate in the district, Vera Stanislavovna Stepanenko, director of a youth centre (however this is not mentioned on her pre-election materials; however, it is mentioned on Petrenko's sheet and in a list published in the newspaper *Kuranty*), in which she appears in one photo speaking behind a rostrum and in another with bloc leader Grigorii Yavlinskii whose caption states 'Ya veryu Vere' '(I trust in Vera)'. The document, in which the bloc's name was surrounded with apples on both sides, contained information on Stepanenko's political experience.

She was born in 1957, is a Muscovite and is married. Her son is a pupil. She completed the Moscow Institute for Railroad Transport Engineers and is by specialty a конструктор электровозов r. From 1989 she participated in the work of the Tushin Electors' Club. From 1990 - 1993 she was a deputy of the Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies and was chairwoman of the Commission for Youth Affairs. She was coordinator of the "Democratic Russia" fraction in the Mossovet from 1991 - 1993.<sup>73</sup>

The Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRES) carried a strong publicity campaign in

Moscow city's State Duma constituency No. 204 and distributed large amounts of agitational materials among the many students' <sup>dormitories</sup> (*obshchezhitia*) located around the Kon'kovo metro station area.<sup>74</sup>

In addition, several candidates also involved themselves in different photo- and news opportunities. For instance, *Kommersant* "daily reported that Federation Council candidate Nikolai Gonchar and Duma candidates Sergei Stankevich, Sergei Shakhrai and Konstantin Zatulin attended the blessing of the publications building of the Moscow Patriarchate at the end of November.<sup>75</sup> Therefore, the candidates were able to get extra, unpaid publicity through their activities.

Daphne Skillen argues that

[i]t was clear from the start that the election campaign would be fought out on television. In a country as vast as Russia, with poor roads, fuel shortages and unpredictable delays in travel, campaigning on television made for more efficient use of time than having direct contact with voters, especially in the short time-span which allowed five weeks in all to polling day on 12 December 1993.<sup>76</sup>

Therefore, it appears consistent that there was very little individual candidate and bloc campaigning was conducted in Central Electoral District No. 202 for the State Duma around the Tverskaya street area in the last two weeks before the elections, where the current author

was based during his field work. For instance, during this time, the author only observed campaign workers passing out leaflets for Russia's Choice Federation Council candidate and Peasants' Party leader, Yurii Chernichenko, on 3 December 1993 outside the Pushkinskaya metro station. Also, there were only several candidates who had their campaign posters up in the area during the period immediately after my arrival in Moscow (30 November 1993) until 10 December 1993. These included Vladimir Kozhemyakin, a PRES candidate, whose pre-election agitation materials were posted in the Myasnitskaya street area. Kozhemyakin, born in 1956 and a state worker,<sup>77</sup> had a campaign poster which read 'Duma Candidate Vladimir Kozhemyakin is your candidate. He's young, intelligent and he's not soiled with the politics of the past.'<sup>78</sup> This approach of not being tied to the past was not the style adopted by Chernichenko in his bid for the Federation Council. One of his pre-election documents bearing his photograph and the personal endorsements of notables including writer Fazil Iskander stressed his political experience in Soviet organs.<sup>79</sup> Other Duma candidates who 'got the jump' in the district before the final week were banker Valerii Kubarev, historian Aleksandr Kotenev, human rights activist Valerii Fadeev, the only woman standing in the district, entrepreneur Vera Balakireva and mining engineer-geophysicist Aleksandr Kransov. Kotenev, incidently, is a co-chairman of the National-Patriotic Party and a chairman of the Union of Veterans of Afghanistan;<sup>80</sup> however, in his election material, only this last point was mentioned. On 10-11 December agitational activities increased in this area. Supporters for Duma candidate lawyer Anatolii Basargin began putting his signs in their shop windows on Tverskaya street. At about the same time campaigners for Federation Council candidate, Presidential administration worker, Vladimir Komchatov started putting up posters (he had at least two variants) and distributing his personal and programmatic information to prospective constituents. However, it should be noted that during the the two



weeks preceding the election, the Liberal-Democratic Party appeared to be the only party which set up *agitpunkty* (agitation points) to attract voters and distribute campaign literature to voters demonstrating their dedication and organization.<sup>81</sup>

Candidates and electoral associations were not the only actors interested in presenting information to the electorate. The Russian government used the media to achieve different goals. First, the government had to get voters to the ballot boxes; and second they had to persuade them to vote in favour of the draft Constitution. There were several ways in which the status quo promoted and publicized the elections and the plebiscite. The government hung large banners over streets stating '12 Dekabrya vybory v Federal'noe Sobranie i Gorodskuyu Dumu' (12 December Elections to the Federal Assembly and City Duma). In addition, the government sponsored several public service announcements advising citizens when to vote, the institutions they would be choosing and the proper methods to cast their ballots.

Under the new rules, voters would have to cast their ballots differently than they did when they elected deputies to Soviet institutions. Therefore, the government was responsible for informing voters on this subject. Earlier, voters were instructed to cross out the name(s) of the person(s) *against whom* they wished to vote. The new provisions mandate that voters put a cross, an 'x' or some other mark in the box next to the electoral association or person(s) *for whom* they wish to vote for deputies on the party lists or in the constituencies. However, they were instructed to *cross out*-as they were instructed before-the opposite response to their acceptance or rejection of the draft Constitution.<sup>82</sup>

Several government-sponsored public service announcements dealt with election and plebiscite procedures. The Rossiya channel broadcast one such informational programme on 1 December at 16.20 (Moscow time). This particular advertisement informed Russian voters that the polling stations would be open from 8 am to 10 pm on 12 December. In order to vote citizens would have to bring their passports; voting for others was prohibited. Actors in the broadcast properly demonstrated the voting procedures described by the announcer. The government sponsored another procedural broadcast pertaining to the elections at about 21.50 (Moscow time) on 6 December on the Rossiya channel. On this public service announcement Central Electoral Commission chair Nikolai Ryabov 'walked the electorate through' the different numbered ballot papers and demonstrated how to mark them validly. First, Ryabov noted that voters would be given four ballot papers (although there were other elections to other institutions held in some of Russia's regions and major cities).<sup>83</sup> Ballot one contained the list of names of Federation Council candidates. The second ballot paper was the list of parties and blocs competing for the State Duma. Ballot three contained the names of the candidates competing for the State Duma in the single candidate districts. The final ballot paper was for the draft Constitution. Nevertheless, as Skillen has pointed out, Ryabov 'used a public service announcement to persuade viewers to make the "right choice" and vote for the constitution.'<sup>84</sup>

The Constitution itself occupied a primary place in the election campaign and affected the way in which the electoral associations candidates canvassed. Vice Premier Vladimir Shumeiko, in charge of the government commission which oversaw the conducting of the nation-wide plebiscite, tried to ban the activities of four electoral associations-Civic Union, the Agrarian Party, BRNI and Yabloko-for critically expressing their opinions against the

Constitution in their pre-election broadcasts.<sup>85</sup> However, there was a public outcry against this proposal. Noted scholar and Civic Union candidate Aleksandr Tsipko opposed Shumeiko's stance, declaring that if the *Tsentrizbirkom* barred the dissenting electoral associations from participating in the elections all candidates would have a 'moral question' placed in front of them about whether to continue participating in the 'vulgar style' of the election campaign.<sup>86</sup> In addition, neither the Central Electoral Commission nor the Arbitration Court, formed to resolve media disputes, supported Shumeiko's proposal.<sup>87</sup> Finally, in order to clear confusion about the issue (and possibly to distance himself from Shumeiko in the eyes of the electorate) Yeltsin himself issued a statement declaring that constructive criticism is a 'natural manifestation of an original position of the different parties, population groups and political leaders'; but that 'indiscriminate, negative [criticism] from a position of narrow party egoism and political revenge' was unacceptable.<sup>88</sup> Nevertheless, this 'confusion' certainly put a damper on even a constructive debate on the Constitution. Parties and blocs did, however, express their opinions on the Constitution.<sup>89</sup> Moreover, former Constitutional Court chairman Valerii Zor'kin strongly asserted that

[t]he relationship to the Constitution is the basis of [the electoral associations'] pre-election platforms. It is forbidden to criticise the draft Constitution-this, in effect, violates free elections, it violates a free Russia. This means, that one must do nothing but praise if one hopes to gain access to 'the feeding trough'. But excuse me, then this is the same as Orwell.<sup>90</sup>

## The Voting Process: Observations and Violations

On 12 December voters proceeded to their local polling stations to cast their ballots. After arriving at their respective precincts<sup>91</sup>, voters, in accordance with the *Provisions*, presented their passports to election commission workers. Upon viewing documents, the commission workers struck the voters' names off the electors' list indicating they participated. Subsequently, voters proceeded to another table to receive ballot papers. Again, voters presented their passports. The attendants inspected the passports, signed or initialed the ballot papers and passed the documents back to the voters. Voters then walked across the room taking their ballot papers to the voting booths—little stalls with light blue curtains—entered the booths, pulled back the curtains, closed them and made their selections in secret. Voters then exited the booths, folded their ballot papers, walked directly to the voting urns, dropping them into the secured ballot boxes; thus completing the voting procedure. The voting was largely unceremonious, in stark contrast to the picture of Soviet elections that Theodore Friedgut painted in his classic *Political Participation in the USSR* in which he describes polling stations adorned with flowers, young pioneers guarding the ballot boxes and election day a national holiday.<sup>92</sup> Nevertheless, it was noted that in some Russian areas the old traditions continued. For instance, in Volgograd the voters treated the elections like a holiday<sup>93</sup> and in Tula, first time voters continued to receive live flowers or books<sup>94</sup> as initiation presents for performing their civic duties.

The election and entire campaign were the subjects of external scrutiny. On 9 December 1993, the Central Election Commission accredited more than 800 foreign observers from more than 50 countries and 20 international, parliamentary, social, legal and

research organisations who worked in more than 100 Russian cities and other population points.<sup>95</sup> There was general agreement among the observers that the contest was held fairly and without widespread violations of voters' or candidates' rights. For instance, Adzum Sedze, Japanese First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, heading the Japanese observers' team, Magdalena Hoff, in charge of the observer team from the European Parliament and the EC and the head of the Group of the European Parliament for ties with the CIS and Michael Emerson, the official representative of the EC in Moscow noted that the elections were 'the first honest elections in Russia in the last 75 years'.<sup>96</sup> Dane Ole Espersen and Austrian Fritz Probst, observers from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, after visiting 8 electoral precincts, stated that 'there were no serious violations of voting procedures nor was there evidence of any influence over voters.'<sup>97</sup> Japanese observers, focusing their activities in Moscow and Khabarovsk *krai*, felt that during the preparatory stages of the elections all blocs were given free access to the media; however, representatives of the European Parliament after concentrating their efforts in 37 regions, felt that Russia's Choice exercised power over the media.<sup>98</sup>

Despite her generally positive evaluation of the poll, Hoff complained that the right of secret ballot had been violated in some instances and that the electorate was ill-informed on matters such as candidates' party or bloc affiliations. She noted that there were no bloc representatives to provide further information to voters at polling stations. Moreover, she felt that voters did not have enough time to become acquainted with the draft Constitution. Hoff also stressed that the wording of the document and the referendum itself were Presidentially directed.<sup>99</sup> Michael Urban's previously mentioned observations reaffirm Hoff's claims.

Incidents of 'foul play' also occurred during the campaign. For instance, *Izvestiya* reported that entrepreneur Ivan Degtyarev, a candidate for the Democratic Party of Russia standing in Arkhangel'sk *oblast'*, committed a criminal act when he illegally sold fish from boats of the Arkhangel'sk <sup>Trawler</sup> Fleet in Norway. The Arkhangel'sk tax inspector estimates that from the losses and damages caused by Degtyarev, he will face penalties amounting to 32 billion roubles. The *oblast'* procurator issued a warrant to arrest Degtyarev and his assistant; the latter was arrested.<sup>100</sup> This prompted a reaction from the *Tsentribirkom* stating that *Izvestiya's* editors violated a portion of the *Provisions* prohibiting the dissemination of materials weakening the honour and dignity of a candidate to the State Duma and that as a penalty the paper would have to publish the Commission's decree on Mass Information without any cuts, editorial headlines or commentaries before 10 December 1993.<sup>101</sup> This appeared in the newspaper on 8 December 1993.<sup>102</sup> In order to avoid problems that candidates with criminal convictions may have brought to their electoral association, PRES adopted a decision to remove any candidate from its list who did not have 'a clean past'.<sup>103</sup> Gavriil Popov complained that Russia's Choice had privileges that other blocs did not alleging that Gaidar visited a military unit, whereas, none of the other bloc leaders received the opportunity to speak to the army.<sup>104</sup> In addition, he argued that the bloc used Yeltsin's image on their signs, which, in effect made him a supporter solely of that bloc.<sup>105</sup> Bagavutdin Gadzhiev, a Federation Council candidate and chairman of the council of the 'Dagestan' commercial-investment corporation, was killed (along with two others) by submachine gun fire while leaving work in the city centre of Makhachkaliya.<sup>106</sup>

Table 6.1 Seat Allocation in the State Duma

Party/Bloc	PR SEATS (N)	CONSTITUENCY SEATS (N)	TOTAL (N)	TOTAL (%)
Russia's Choice	40	30	70	15.6
LDPR	59	5	64	14.2
KPRF	32	16	48	10.7
APR	21	12	33	7.3
Yabloko	20	3	23	5.1
Civic Union	0	1	1	0.2
DPR	14	0	14	3.1
DiM	0	2	2	0.4
PRES	18	1	19	4.2
Women of Russia	21	2	23	5.1
RDDR	0	4	4	0.9
Other Parties	-	14	14	3.1
Independents	-	129	129	28.7

Source: Adapted from 'The Final Tally', *The Economist*, 8 January 1994, p. 30.

Table 6.2 Seat Allocation in the Federation Council

Party/Bloc	Number of Seats (N)
Russia's Choice	6
Yabloko	0
PRES	1
RDDR	1
Other democratic parties & blocs	4
LDPR	0
KPRF	11
APR	1
Other communist parties & organisations	4
Women of Russia	0
DPR	0
Civic Union	0
Independents	144

Source: Adapted from Terry D. Clark, 'The Russian Elections: Back to Square One?', *PS: Political Science & Politics*, Vol. XXVII, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 520-524, at p. 524.

The results (see Tables 6.1 & 6.2) and their subsequent validity have been the subject of criticism from just several hours after the polls closed. Emulating the traditions of both the American and British political broadcasting, the Russians attempted to hold a night-long

television special devoted to the reporting official results as they were tabulated. Although the adoption of the draft constitution was reported quite early on in the programme, actual voting tabulations kept being delayed. Due to the show's presenters' failure to provide accurate and prompt electoral information, the Central Electoral Commission issued a <sup>statement</sup> claiming that it was not involved in the delays in any way.<sup>107</sup>

The elections and plebiscite were scrutinised more closely during the months that followed the elections. Protocols from district electoral commissions on the results of the plebiscite indicate <sup>that</sup> 58,187,755 voters participated (54.8 per cent of the electorate). Among them there were 32,937,630 who cast their ballots in favour of the draft Constitution (58.4 per cent); 23,431,333 and 23,431,333 who voted against it.<sup>108</sup> However, Aleksandr Minkin writing in *Moskovskii komsomolets* noted that there were substantial differences among the reportages in a number of newspapers and that the Constitution was approved by what amounted to 31 per cent of the electorate.<sup>109</sup> Therefore, the legal status of the Constitution is indeed questionable. In February 1994, the human rights activist Konrid Lyubarskii noted that as late as two months after the elections no one really knew how many electors had voted and that there was still no final district by district list published.<sup>110</sup> However, several preliminary reports existed.<sup>111</sup> Moreover, in May 1994 *Izvestiya* published an article which disclosed that nearly 3.5 million votes were falsified at precinct level and that about 5.7 million were tampered with at the constituency level.<sup>112</sup> Thus, <sup>the</sup> election was considered a subject of serious disrepute. <sup>motions to invalidate the</sup> Nevertheless, <sup>no</sup> were made <sup>during</sup> the entire first convocation of the the Federal Assembly.



## Evaluations and Conclusions

Several evaluations can be derived from the final election results. The first conclusion that can be reached is that the Russian population elected candidates who represent diverse political tendencies. This factor by itself reduces the coalition building potential of the parliament, enhancing the prospects for inter-fractional conflict. Parliamentary fragmentation further strengthens Yeltsin's position within the Russian political system. As the data indicate, no party or bloc won an absolute majority in the lower house. In fact the largest proportion of elected deputies stood as independents (129 or 28.7 per cent). Among electoral associations Russia's Choice had the largest number of deputies in the Parliament 70 (15.6 per cent of all seats). However, nearly one third of the Parliament was hostile to Yeltsin or 'democratic reforms'-the Liberal Democrats gained the largest share of voters' support of the party list votes-59 seats (22.8 per cent of the votes in this category); KPRF controlled 10.7 per cent of the seats while the APR won 7.3 per cent of the mandates.

Richard Sakwa makes several key observations about the elections. First, he notes that the vote 'revealed the profound divisions in Russian society and the absence of consensus over many issues'. He points to the baffling situation that arose as a result of the choice of electoral system: had the deputies been elected solely according to a proportional representation system the LDPR would have been the country's leading party whereas under a first-past-the-post formula, it hardly would have mattered. In adopting the Constitution and electing an anti-reform lower house, the electorate sent forth 'two mutually exclusive signals: in accepting the constitution they were voting for stability; but in voting for the opposition, they were rejecting the existing basis for order.' The results

underlined the significance of regional variations in Russia. Rather than consolidating Russian politics, the results indicated its degree of fragmentation. The elections could also be placed within the European context of disenchantment with traditional parties and as a protest vote against IMF-directed reform. He suggests the elections mark the beginning of 'a new Russian politics' in which the previous bipolarity of 'communist'/'democrat' was replaced by tri-polarity in which the earlier were joined by a 'semi-fascist movement of the leadership type'.<sup>113</sup>

Other authors have suggested other interpretations. Stephen Whitefield and Geoffrey Evans write that on the one hand the elections could be seen a 'predictable reaffirmation of traditional Russian political culture' regarding values of "orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality" with 'support for state control of the economy and egalitarianism' as well as 'protest vote by an electorate whose political culture had changed significantly during the last forty years'.<sup>114</sup> Terry D. Clark suggests that the communists scored a 'remarkable victory' reemerging at the centre of the anti-reform movement, however will, nevertheless, not be assured of control over the political agenda.<sup>115</sup> However, Stephen Sestanovich suggests the elections were 'a communist setback' because the Russian electorate rejected the Communist vision and legacy.<sup>116</sup> Nevertheless, this interpretation shows points of weakness. Data that the present author compiled and presents in Table 7.3 show that KPRF was the electoral association with the greatest number of members in both houses of the Federal Assembly (57). They were followed respectively by Russia's Choice (46) and the LDPR (38). Moreover, the results of the 1995 elections in which the KPRF won more than 22 per cent of the list votes and the greatest share of seats in the constituencies works against Sestanovich's thesis.

While other chapters contain much fuller discussions about the implications of the elections, a few general observations can serve as a conclusion to the campaign. First, the elections to the Federal Assembly marked a greater movement towards-but fell far short of-fulfilling the criteria for free and fair elections and satisfying the conditions that elections are supposed to serve raised in the Introduction. Moreover, the campaign had many attributes which are common to those established in liberal-democratic countries consistently employing free elections to change government. Alternative parties and coalitions competed against each other to win seats. They publicized their objectives broadly through the media and made serious attempts to reach a wide array of supporters using various campaign techniques. Nevertheless, Russia's Choice had particular advantages in particular aspects of the campaign that others did not, marginalising the fairness of the poll.

The outcome affected policy-making and the composition of the government. Aspects of the former can be seen in the Yeltsin administration's more hawkish attitude to, for instance, <sup>usual West European policy towards</sup> Serbia, NATO's eastward expansion and its controversial foray into Chechnya and an initial backtracking on economic reform. The government composition was affected by the people's voting preferences. The high vote for the opposition reflected deep dissatisfaction with the pace of economic reform. A Russia's Choice victory could have signalled the reverse. Had Russia Choice performed better, it is probable that Yegor Gaidar would have replaced Chernomyrdin as Prime Minister and that this could have had some type of impact over the pace of the reform process: either its continuance or its acceleration. However, as the vote stood, Chernomyrdin remained.

Nevertheless, the 1993 campaign reflected historical trends. There was still some

form of interference hindering the electoral associations' and populations' abilities to have their attitudes reflected accurately. Elements of censorship, government interference, vote falsifications, scanty information, restrictions on candidates and electoral associations certainly support Michael Urban's thesis that the elections replicated early Soviet practices.

There are further points, however, which may be important to consider relating to a line of continuity from 1989-1993. In both instances, there was some institution which attempted to impede what it considered threatening contestants from winning seats in the parliament. However, in both cases, some significant victories were scored by those who were supposed to be kept out of seats. In these respects, the electorate was important in expressing its preferences and <sup>it</sup> delivered decisive shots over the bows of the CPSU and Yeltsin administration respectively. While it is unconceivable to believe that popular power could come close to matching either CPSU or presidential power, the voters showed that they certainly have the ability to influence their rulers and inform them of their satisfaction or disaffection of particular policies and governance.

There are a few points, however, which need to be mentioned further. Parties and political organisations, although considered weak, were ushered into active roles in Russian politics. The professional composition of the parliament was altered significantly. This factor is discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. Citizens were able to establish links with their parties. Non-state campaign financing was allowed for the first time. Therefore, despite many shortcomings the elections were a form of departure from the previous electoral practices.

## NOTES

1. 'Polozhenie o federal'nykh organakh vlasti na perekhodnyi period', *Izvestiya*, 24 September 1993, p. 3.
2. For a discussion of these elections see Ian D. Thatcher, 'Elections in Russian and Early Soviet History' in Peter Lentini (ed.), *Elections and Political Order in Russia: The Implications of the 1993 Elections to the Federal Assembly* (Budapest, London and New York, 1995), pp. 15-35, pp. 22-25.
3. For a discussion of the conflict between Yeltsin and the parliament see Richard Sakwa, *Russian Politics and Society* (London: Routledge, 1993), Chapter 2. The reflections of power distributions in postcommunist Russia of the principle figures in the struggle are can be found in Boris Yeltsin, *The View From the Kremlin*, translated by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (London and Glasgow: Harper Collins, 1994) and Ruslan Khasbulatov, *The Struggle for Russia: Power and Change in the Democratic Revolution*, edited by Richard Sakwa (London: Routledge, 1993), esp. Part III. On the problems of drafting a post-Soviet Constitution see Edward W. Walker, 'The New Russian Constitution and the Future of the Russian Federation', *The Harriman Institute Forum*, Vol. 5, No. 10 (June 1992).
4. See Stephen White, *After Gorbachev* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), Chapter 8.
5. Russian Academy of Sciences, 'Vserossiiskii referendum 25 aprelya 1993 goda' (mimeograph). I am grateful to Hugh Jenkins, CREES, Birmingham University for this document. Results also appear in Richard Sakwa, *Russian Politics and Society*, p. 428.
6. Michael McFaul, *Post-Communist Politics: Democratic Prospects in Russia and Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993).
7. 'Polozhenie o Federal'nykh organakh vlasti na perekhodnyi period'.
8. It should be noted here that the *Provisions on Elections of State Duma Deputies* initially mandated that the lower house would consist of 400 deputies: 270 elected in single mandate electoral districts and 130 of whom would be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from federation-wide party lists. See, 'Polozhenie o vyborakh deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy', in *Izvestiya*, 24 September 1993, pp. 3-5.
9. Matthew Wyman, Bill Miller, Stephen White and Paul Heywood, 'The Russian Elections of December 1993', *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 254-271, at p. 255.
10. See, for instance, 'Konstitutsiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii (proekt)', *Argumenty i fakty*, 1993, No. 45, pp. 7-12. The state published text, *Konstitutsiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii (proekt)* (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1993) was available from street vendors for about 1,000 rubles or slightly less than \$1 US.
11. Stephen White, 'The Presidency and Political Leadership in Post-Communist Russia' in Peter Lentini (ed.), *Elections and Political Order in Russia*, pp. 202-225
12. *Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoi Zakon) Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik* (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1978).
13. In addition to the variants of the draft Constitution cited above, discussions of its main features were published in *Izvestiya*, 9 December 1993, p. 7.
14. Richard Sakwa, 'The Development of the Russian Party System: Did the Elections Change Anything?' in Peter Lentini (ed.), *Elections and Political Order in Russia*, pp. 169-201, p. 176.
15. For a discussion of what constitutes effective parties see James McGregor, 'How Electoral Laws Shape Eastern Europe's Parliaments', *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 22 January 1993, pp. 11-18.

16. The complete list included the Russian Creative Union of Workers of Culture; Democratic Party of Russia; Social-Democratic Party of the Russian Federation; Republican Party of the Russian Federation; Peasants' Party of Russia; Russian Penitentiary Association; Russian Federation of Free Trade Unions; 'Shchit'; Trade Union Workers in Lumber Sectors of the RSFSR; Russian Association of Victims of Unlawful Political Repression; Russian Christian Democratic Movement (Party); Association of Women Entrepreneurs of Russia; All-Union Fund for the Social and Legal Defence and Rehabilitation of Invalids; Trade Unions of the RSFSR 'Unity'; Movement, 'Soldiers' Mothers'; Legal Defence Association 'Fathers and Children'; Cherkassian (Adygei-Abazin) Fatherland KhOSE; All-Russian Society of Temperance and Health; RSFSR Union of Entrepreneurs and Leaseholders; Russian Scientific Fund; Union of Architects of the Russian Federation; Association of Doctors of Russia; Association of Deaf Artists of Russia; All-Russian Social Fund for Defence from Unemployment; Society of Autotechnical Consumers of Russia; Associated Unions of Russia SOTSPROF; Russian Trade Union of Workers in Television and Radio; Russian Christian Democratic Party; People's Party of Russia; Constitutional Democratic Party (People's Freedom Party); Russian Society of Sociologists; Movement 'Veterans of Wars for Peace'; Association 'Russian Press'; Russian Bourgeois Democratic Party; All-Russian Society for Ties and Cooperation with Foreign Compatriots 'Dawn of Russia'; Russian Party of Democratic Transformation; Socialist Workers' Party; Congress of Journalists; Russian Party of Free Labour; All-Russian Association for the Social Defence of Citizens 'Zagrada'; the Party Christian Democratic Union of Russia; Trade Union of Workers in Construction and Building Materials Industry of the RSFSR; All-Russian Fund for Progress, Defence of Human Rights and Charity; All-Russian Fund for the Rehabilitation and Assistance to Victims of Stalinism and Forced Labor; League of Independent Scholars of Russia; Association of Aircrews of Russia; Creative Association of Workers in the Legal Apparatus 'Iceberg'; All-Russian Organisation of Veterans (Pensioners), of War, Labor, the Armed Forces and Law Enforcement Organs; Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs; Russian Association of People's Deputies' Assistants; Federation of Cosmonauts of the RSFSR; Union of Social Ecological Funds; Russian Social-Ecological Union; Conservative Party; Party of Constitutional Democrats of the Russian Federation; National-Republican Party of Russia; European Liberal-Democratic Party; Society of Germans of the Russian Federation 'Vidergeburt' (Rebirth); Movement 'Cooperation of Peoples in the Name of Life' (Senezhskii Forum); Russian Cinema-Video-Technical Society; Fund for the Defence of the Development of Civilisation; Free Democratic Party of Russia; Socio-Political Movement 'Russian All-People's Union'; Russian Social-Liberal Party; Russian Party of Communists; League of Cooperativists and Entrepreneurs of Russia; Party of Economic Freedom; All-Russian Social Organisation of Veterans-Participants of the Great Fatherland War 'Final Military Appeal'; Russian Democratic Reform Movement; National-Patriotic Party; Association of Russian Workers in Law Enforcement Organs; Union 'Young Republicans'; Association of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Russia; Association of Cosmonauts of Russia; Party 'Union of Communists'; Russian Union of Directors of Territorial Organs of Executive Power-'Governors of Russia'; Party of Consolidation; Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia; Social Association 'Assembly'; Russian Social Democratic Centre; Society of Russian Germans 'Fraikhait' (Freedom); Agrarian Party of Russia; Constructive-Ecological Movement 'KEDR'; Russian Christian-Democratic Union-New Democracy (Party); Association of Supporters of Reform (Bloc) Democratic Choice; Association 'Entrepreneurs for a New Russia'; Political Movement 'Women of Russia'; Movement 'Democratic Russia'; Youth Movement in Support of the People's Party of Free Russia; Politico-Economic Association 'Civic Union'. See Interfax report, 'Kto budet borot'sya za mandaty v gosudarstvennyu dumu', *Rossiiskaya gazeta* 14 October 1993, p. 2.

17. Postfaktum report, 'Bitva za izbiratelei nachalas'', *Izvestiya*, 14 October 1993, p. 4.

18. Jonathan Steele, 'Yeltsin's Beauties Line Up', *The Guardian*, 23 October 1993, p. 14.

19. See, for instance, John Lloyd, 'A Constitution For Yeltsin's Time', *Financial Times*, 11 November 1993, p. 3 and David Hearst, 'Moscow Bars a Third of Parties from Poll', *The Guardian*, 11 November 1993, p. 4.

20. John Lloyd, 'Yeltsin Accused of Impeding Fair Russian Election', *Financial Times*, 5 November 1993, p. 1.

21. 'Spisok Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, izbrannykh po odnomandatnym izbiratel'nym okrugam', *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 28 December 1993, pp. 3-5, at p. 4.

22. Information on winning candidates is from *ibid.* and 'Spisok deputatov Soveta Federatsii Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, izbrannykh po dvukhmandatnym izbiratel'nym okrugam', *ibid.*, pp. 5-6, at p. 6. A listing of the political organizations prohibited from putting lists forward is in David Hearst, 'Moscow Bars...'.  
 23. *Ibid.*  
 24. Georgii Ivanov-Smolenskii, 'Vybornuyu gonku prodolzhayut 21 blok i partiya', *Izvestiya*, 9 November 1993, p. 2.  
 25. Ranking based on arrangement in Yana Metelva, Dmitrii Orlov and Lyubov' Tsukhanova, 'Izбирatel'nye bloki: kto yest' kto', *Rossiiskie vesti*, 11 December 1993, p. 2. For a more comprehensive exposition of the blocs' programmatic information see Peter Lentini, 'Electoral Associations in the 1993 Elections to the Russian State Duma', *The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 1994), pp. 1-36.  
 26. See 'Kak budem golosovat' column, *Argumenty i fakty*, 1993, No. 42, p. 2.  
 27. N. Ryabov, 'Nam yest' iz kogo vybirat', *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 11 December 1993, p. 1.  
 28. Ivan Rodin, 'Repressivnaya propaganda Konstitutsii', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 2 December 1993, p. 1. During the first ten days of December, the government was to direct 76 billion rubles to bread subsidies to the lowest stratum of the population; 65 billion rubles to pension subsidies whereas 85 billion rubles were to be spent on the elections and referendum. This point is raised in 'Pravitel'stvo-maloimushchim: idte vy na referendum', *Megapolis Express*, No. 48, 8 December 1993, p. 3.  
 29. 'Yevropeskii soyuz podaril Tsentrizbirkomu orgtehniki', *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 7 December 1993, p. 2.  
 30. Roza Sergazieva has suggested that there were 3,473 electoral precincts in Moscow. See for instance her article 'U oblasti svoya Duma', *Moskva* (supplement to *Argumenty i fakty*), No. 24, p. 1. Whereas it was published elsewhere that there were 3,199 precincts in the city in A. K., 'Moskva gotova k 12 dekabrya', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 9 December 1993, p. 1.  
 31. Roza Sergazieva 'Po "limono"-izbirkomu', *Moskva*, No. 24, 1993, p. 1.  
 32. 'Vlast' stoit dorogo', *Moskovskie novosti*, No. 49 (1 December 1993), p. 9A.  
 33. Sergei Slyusarenko, '70 peterskikh bomzhei gotovy k golosovaniyu', *Kommersant* daily, 10 December 1993, p. 4.  
 34. John Lloyd, 'Russian Deputy PM Milks Poverty Ticket', *Financial Times*, 30/31 October 1993, p. 2.  
 35. 'Vlast' stoit dorogo', *Moskovskie novosti*, No. 49 (1 December 1993), p. 9A.  
 36. 'Kto zakazyvaet muzyku?', *ibid.*, No. 50 (8 December 1993), p. 9A.  
 37. Daphne Skillen, 'Media Coverage in the Elections' in Lentini (ed.), *Elections and Political Order in Russia*, pp. 97-123, pp. 108-109.  
 38. Sergei Slyusarenko, '70 peterskikh bomzhei...'.  
 39. Rodion Ivanov, "'Vybor Rossii" pereshel v nastuplenie', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 2 December 1993, p. 1.  
 40. Richard Sakwa, 'The Elections of December 1993 and the New Russian Politics', (unpublished manuscript, 1994).

41. 'Odnomandatnye okruga po vyboram v Gosudarstvennuyu dumu v 1993 godu', *Izvestiya*, 13 October 1993, p. 4.
42. *Ibid.*, 14 October 1993, p. 4.
43. Wyman, Miller, White and Heywood, *op. cit.* p. 255.
44. *Zakon Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik O vyborakh narodnykh deputatov SSSR* (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1988).
45. 'Kto pretenduet na mesta v novom parlamente', *Izvestiya*, 28 October 1993, p. 4.
46. Yana Meteleva, Dmitrii Orlov and Lyubov' Tsukhanova, 'Izbitatel'nye bloki...?'
47. Michael Urban, 'December 1993 as a Replication of Late-Soviet Electoral Practices', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 127-158, p. 128.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 131.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 132.
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 133-139.
51. Skillen, *op. cit.*, p. 100.
52. These broadcasts are discussed in Chapter 2; See also Brendan Kiernan and Joseph Aistrup, 'The 1989 Elections to the Congress of People's Deputies in Moscow', *Soviet Studies*, vol. 43, No. 6, pp. 109-164 and Stephen White, 'The Soviet Elections of 1989: From Acclamation to Limited Choice', *Coexistence*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 513-539.
53. For discussions of the media and the elections see James Hughes, 'The "Americanization" of Russian Politics: Russia's First Television Elections, December 1993', *The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (June 1994), pp. 125-150.
54. 'Za skol'ko politiki pokupali efir', *Izvestiya*, 10 December 1993, p. 4.
55. For a description of these broadcasts, see David Hearst, 'Party Political Broadcast Wakes up Russian Viewers', *The Guardian*, 22 November 1993, p. 4.
56. This term was employed by *Kommersant* daily journalist Maksim Sokolov in his column during the campaign 'TV vybor'.
57. Skillen, *op. cit.*
58. See for instance, 'Vybor Rossii-"Prosto Mariya"', *Moskovskie novosti*, No. 49, 1 December 1993, p. A9. See also Helen Womack, 'Politicians Soft-Soap Russian Viewers', *The Independent*, 24 November 1993, p. 13.
59. Radik Batyrshin, "'Svobodnykh vyborov ne budet'", *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 1 December 1993, pp. 1 and 3, at p. 3.
60. Zhirinovskii's television and radio speech schedule is published in 'Vystupleniya lidera LDPR V. V. Zhirinovskogo po radio i televideniyu', *Yuridicheskaya gazeta*, No. 40 - 41, 1993, p. 16.
61. Yemets appeared on the programme 'Vybory: pryamoj efir', broadcast on the St Petersburg channel late night 30 November 1993.



62. Ivan Rodin, 'Zakonchilas' vtoraya nedelya telegitatsii', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 7 December 1993, p. 2.
63. I am grateful to Daphne Skillen for bringing this information to my attention. This is also mentioned in Janine di Giovanni, 'Mad Vlad and Dangerous to Know', *The Sunday Times Magazine* (London), 1 May 1994, pp. 18 - 27 at p. 23.
64. In one instance the present author actually found one account in which these statements were major reasons for supporting Zhirinovskii. See Ye. Semcnova, 'Pank Scroga tozue izbiratel', *Argumenty i fakty*, No. 49, 1993, p. 4.
65. 'Vybory: pryamoi efir' broadcast on the St Petersburg channel 1 December 1993, 21:45 (Moscow time).
66. See for instance issues of *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 1, 2 and 3 December at p. 3. Although PRES advertised here regularly, this was not the only newspaper in which they conducted their publicity activities. See, for example, similar variants of the advertisement in *Argumenty i fakty*, No. 49, 1993, p. 11 and *Kuranty*, 30 November 1993, p. 6.
67. For examples of where the movement's ads appeared see *Moskovskii komsomolets*, 4 December 1993, p. 4; *Vechernyaya Moskva*, 6 December 1993, p. 2 and *Izvestiya*, 10 December 1993, p. 5.
68. See 'Klyuch k stanavleniyu ekonomike Rossii', which appeared *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 2 December 1993, pp. 1 and 5; 3 December 1993, p. 7; 7 December p. 4 and 8 December p. 6.
69. See *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 14 December 1993, p. 5.
70. Electoral district listings and their administrative centres are published in 'Odnomandatnye okruga...', 14 October 1993, p. 4.
71. 'Vybor Rossii' agitation material.
72. I. N. Petrenko, official pre-election campaign material.
73. Vera Stepanenko, official pre-election material.
74. For instance the standard information packet the party distributed to students living in the hostels included the booklet *Yedinstvo i soglasie dlya Moskvyy* (Moscow: PRES, 1993) which included information about the party's objectives (pp. 5-9), excerpts from the party rules 'Ustav Partii Rossiiskogo Yedinstva i Soglasiya' (pp. 10-12) the structure of the party's Moscow city organisation (p. 13) the Moscow regional list of PRES candidates, 'Kandidaty Partii Rossiiskogo Yedinstva i Soglasiya v Gosudarstvennyuyu Dumu Rossii-Moskovskii regional'nyi spisok' (p. 14); the party's list of candidates for the City Duma, 'Kandidaty Partii Rossiiskogo Yedinstva i Soglasiya v moskovskuyu gorodskuyu dumu' (p. 15) and a brief biography on Stankevich. Other documents they distributed included an informational handout on the State Duma candidate for the district Dmitrii Ol'shanskii; a small poster with a colour portrait of Sergei Stankevich, one of the party leaders, which included a message to support Ol'shanskii; Mikhail Malei (a candidate in Preobrazhenskii district No. 198. and Boris Mozhaev, another candidate on the PRES regional list of candidates and another small poster presenting captions of the party's programme objectives with the headings 'Soglasie lyudei, yedinstvo naroda, velichie Rossii' ('The Agreement of the People, the Unity of the People, the Grandeur of Russia').
75. 'Tserkovyi obryad stal politicheskim meropriyatiem', *Kommersant* daily, 1 December 1993, p. 4.
76. Skillen, op. cit., p. 98.
77. Biographical information (names, years of birth, occupations and residences) for all candidates competing for the Federal Assembly in Moscow districts is contained in 'Spisok kandidatov v deputaty Soveta federatsii i Gosudarstvennoi dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii po izbiratel'nym okrugam goroda Moskvyy', *Kuranty*, 30 November 1993, p. 5.

78. Vladimir Kozhemyakin official election poster.
79. Yuri Chernichenko, official pre-election material.
80. See, for instance, the National-Patriotic Party's newspaper *Soglasie*, special edition, (nd: 1992?), esp. pp. 1-2 and Vladimir Pribylovskii, 'Sto politikov Rossii', *Partiinformat*, 1993, No. 16 (15-21 April), pp. 11-12, p. 11.
81. See Peter Lentini and Troy McGrath, 'The Rise of the Liberal Democratic Party and the 1993 Elections', *The Harriman Institute Forum*, Vol. 7, No. 6 (February 1994).
82. The ballot paper was worded in the following manner:
- Do you accept the Constitution of the Russian Federation?
- |     |    |
|-----|----|
| Yes | No |
|-----|----|
- If you vote for the adoption of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, cross out the word "NO".
- If you vote against the adoption of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, cross out the word "YES"
- See *Vsenarodnoe golosovanie po proektu Konstitutsii Rossiiskoe Federatsii 12 dekabrya 1993 goda byulleten' dlya golosovaniya*. Official ballot paper.
83. On these other elections see Roza Sergazicva 'U oblasti svoya Duma', *Moskva*, No. 24, 1993, p. 1; 'V Rossii yeshche odin prezident', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 14 December 1993, p. 1. Vladislav Dorofeev, 'V Federal'noe sobranie proshlo mnogo gubernatov', *Kommersant* daily, 14 December 1993, p. 3.
84. Skillen, op. cit., pp. 104-105.
85. Ivan Rodin, 'Repressivnaya propaganda konstitutsii'.
86. Ol'ga Odintsova, 'Trebuyut ostranit' "Vybor Rossii", *Kommersant* daily, 2 December 1993, p. 2.
87. See for instance, Interfax, 'Tsentrizbirkom ne udovetvoril trebovanie Shumeiko', *Izvestiya*, 3 December 1993 and ITAR-TASS, 'Treteiskii sud ob obrashchenie Shumeiko', *ibid.*, 2 December 1993, p. 2.
88. ITAR-TASS, 'Prezident PR schitaet, chto proekt Konstitutsii kritike podlezhit', *ibid.*, p. 1.
89. See for instance, 'Konstitutsiya: "za" i "protiv"', *Moskovskie novosti*, No. 49, 1993, p. A10.
90. Radik Batyrshin. "Svobodnykh vyborov, ne budet", *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 1 December 1993, pp. 1 & 3, at p. 3.
91. The following examples recount the experiences I had observing the voting at electoral precinct 2411 located in Moscow's single member district 204 (Yugo-zapadnyi) on 12 December 1993.
92. Theodore Friedgut, *Political Participation in the USSR* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 110.
93. Vitalii Cherkasov, 'Volgograd', *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 14 December 1993, p. 1.
94. Nikolai Kireev, 'Tula', *ibid.*, p. 2.
95. N. Ryabov, 'Nam yest' iz kogo vybirat'.

96. Aleksandr Koretskii and Valeriya Sycheva, 'Sereznykh narushenii zamechno ne bylo', *Kommersant* daily, 14 December 1993, p. 3.
97. 'Nablyudateli: narushenie ne bylo', *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 14 December 1993, p. 2.
98. Aleksandr Koretskii and Valeriya Sycheva, op. cit. For another example of foreign observers' positive evaluations of the poll see Aleksei Portanskii, 'Vyборы byli svobodnyimi', *Izvestiya*, 14 December 1993, p. 2.
99. All examples are derived from *ibid.*
100. Viktor Fridman, 'Kriminalnyi ottenok v izbiratel'noi kampanii: ot partii Travkina ballotiruetsya kandidat, kotorogo rasskazyvayut norvezhskie i rossiiskie syshchiki', *ibid.*, 7 December 1993, p. 4.
101. 'O publikatsii "Kriminalnyi ottenok v izbiratel'noi kampanii" v gazeta *Izvestiya* ot 7 dekabrya 1993 goda', *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 10 December 1993, p. 1.
102. 'Tsentrizbirkom preduprezhdaet', *Izvestiya*, 8 December 1993, p. 2.
103. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 7 December 1993, p. 2; 'PRES peresmatrivaet spiski svoikh kandidatov', *Izvestiya*, 7 December 1993, p. 4.
104. Indira Duraeva, 'RDDR zhaluetsya na "Vybor Rossii"', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 10 December 1993, p. 2.
105. *Ibid.*
106. 'Ubit kandidat v deputat', *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 8 December 1993, p. 1.
107. 'Zayavlenie Tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi komissii po vyboram v Sovet Federatsii i po vyboram v Gosudarstvennyu Dumu Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii', No. 139 (13 December 1993), *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 14 December 1993, p. 1.
108. 'Postanovlenie Tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii O rezultatakh vsenarodnogo golosovaniya po proektu konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii', No. 142 (20 December 1993), *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 25 December 1993, p. 1.
109. Aleksandr Minkin, 'Opyat' "dvoika"?' *Moskovskii komsomolets*, 11 January 1994, p. 1.
110. Konrid Lyubarskii, 'Fal'sifikatsiya', *Novoe vremya*, 1994, No. 7, pp. 8-12 and by the same author 'Fal'sifikatsiya-2', *ibid.*, 1994, No. 9, pp. 10-13. See also his interview (conducted by Georgii Tselms, 'Taina tainykh vyborov', *Ogonek*, 1994, No. 6-7 (February), pp. 6-7.
111. See the series of reports prepared by Organizatsionnyi otdel, Tsentr operativnoi informatsii, Upravlenie po rabote s territoriyami i predstavitel'yami Prezidenta Administratsii Prezidenta RF, Otdel regional'noi politiki, Otdel vzaimodeistviyu s federal'nymi organami predstavitel'noi vlasti i obshchestvennymi organizatsiyami Soveta Ministrov - Pravitel'stva RF. These include 'Predvaritel'nye rezul'taty golosovaniya po obshchefederal'nomu okrugu' (this report includes district by district support levels of each electoral association and contains data as of 14 December 1993), 'Vyборы Совет Федератсии РФ' and 'Vyборы в Государстvennyu Dumu po odnomandatnym okrugam' (these reports include constituency results for the top three and two candidates respectively and contains information as of 21 December 1993) and 'Vyборы в Государстvennyu Dumu RF po obshchefederal'nomu okrugu' (this report includes data on support for the electoral associations according to Russia's subjects as of 21 December 1993). I am grateful to Hugh Jenkins, CREES, Birmingham University for these documents.
112. Valerii Vyzhtovich, 'Tsentrizbirkom prevrashchaetsya v politicheskoe vedomstvo', *Izvestiya*, 4 May 1994, p. 4.

113. Richard Sakwa, 'The Elections of December 1993', *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 47, No.2 (March 1995), pp. 195-227, pp. 220-222,
114. Stephen Whitefield and Geoffrey Evans, 'The Russian Election of 1993: Public Opinion and the Transition Experience', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1994), pp. 38-60, p. 39.
115. Terry D. Clark, 'The Russian Elections: Back to Square One?', *PS: Political Science and Politics*, Vol. XXVII, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 520-524, p.523.
116. Stephen Sestanovich, 'A Communist Setback', in 'Symposium: Is Russian Democracy Doomed?', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (April 1994), pp. 4-41, at pp. 23-27.

**Chapter 7. The Composition of the Russian Federal  
Assembly: Towards a New Russian Parliamentarian?**

On 12 December 1993 voters in the Russian Federation elected 444 deputies out of 450 (225 on party lists and 219 in the single seat constituencies)<sup>1</sup> to the lower house of the Russian Federal Assembly, the State Duma and 171 members of the upper house of the Russian Parliament, the Federation Council (see Table 7.1). The purpose of this chapter is to examine the composition of the new Russian representative organ.<sup>2</sup> Throughout the chapter I compare the composition of the Russian parliamentarians elected in 1993 with those of its immediate predecessors, the last Soviet era national legislature, the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic elected in 1990 and forcibly disbanded in September-October 1993. My objectives are to examine the degree of change between parliamentary elites resulting from the first large-scale election held in the former USSR on a competitive basis in 1989, Russia's first competitive election to its republican legislature and the first election held in Russia in which parties and political organizations other than the CPSU were able to compete.

Table 7.1 Deputies and Senators Elected to the Russian Federal Assembly on 12 December 1993 According to Chamber

Chamber	(N)	(%)
State Duma	444	98.7
Including:		
List	225	100
District	219	97.3
Federation Council	171	96.1
Total	615	96.4

*Sources:* 'Postanovlenie Tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii Ob ustanovlenii obshchikh itogov vyborov deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii', No. 155 (25 December 1993), *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 28 December 1993, p. 2; data from 'Spisok deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, izbrannykh po obshchefederal'nomu okrugu', *ibid.*, pp. 2-3; 'Spisok Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, izbrannykh po odnomandatnym izbiratel'nym okrugam', *ibid.*, pp. 3-5; 'Spisok deputatov Soveta Federatsii Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, izbrannykh po dvukhmandatnym izbiratel'nym okrugam', *ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

Several comparative criteria are utilized in this analysis. First, the biographical traits of the deputies are scrutinized in order to determine the dimensions of parliamentary elite changes. In particular I address the levels of continuity, contradiction and departure between the aforementioned elections focusing on traits such as the parliamentarians' sex, party affiliation, educational attainment, nationality, age, geographic locations and occupation. Second, the State Duma deputies elected through the party lists and through competition in the districts are compared against each other. My purpose here is to compare and contrast the similarities and differences of the deputies who were 'selected' for their offices by their political organisations and those 'elected' by their constituents.<sup>3</sup> <sup>the</sup> Hungarian scholar Akos Rona-Tas has noted in a study of the Hungarian Parliament elected in 1990 that deputies elected to their seats through party lists had different occupational backgrounds than their constituency-based colleagues and were recruited primarily from different 'parking orbits' which gave them indirect access to politics in the communist period. These individuals were more likely to be economists, sociologists, historians and legal specialists. These deputies, because they were selected by their political parties, were very likely to support the initiatives their parties advocated in roll-call votes. By contrast, deputies elected in competitive contests in constituencies came from occupational backgrounds which tended to be more familiar to the common voter and they would be people with whom voters would regularly come into contact (physicians, managers, etc.). More importantly, the study by Rona-Tas indicates that these deputies were more likely to support the desires of their constituents in roll call votes even if the issues contradicted their party lines.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, it may be possible to suggest that the composition of the two different electoral divisions from which the deputies were elected may eventually affect the way deputies in the Russian Parliament vote and this may have serious consequences for future political developments. Third, the two chambers of

the Federal Assembly are also compared against themselves to establish which types of deputies were most prominent in the Duma and the Federation Council. Finally, this chapter includes an overview of deputy re-election. Analyzing deputy re-election or, more precisely, continuity and change between the different institutional organs may help suggest the extent to which the present Russian political system has been able to distinguish itself from the Soviet political system.

This chapter will demonstrate that there were indeed elements of continuity, contradiction and departure in the compositions of the first Federal Assembly. For instance, typical State Duma deputy was a man between 41-50 years old who had completed higher education and was employed as a professional politician (minister, administrator or party official), white collar manager or some type of academic or researcher. The archetypical Senator was about 47.7 years old, <sup>had</sup> completed tertiary education and was a professional politician. There was continuity in the following areas: the deputies elected were overwhelmingly male, the 'popular representatives' declined in their number as the electoral system became more competitive and voters did not necessarily elect deputies and senators who were divorced from the existing power structure. This latter point constitutes somewhat of a contradiction between the rhetoric of democracy and actual practice. Under the Soviet regime, even under more competitive elections, the great majority of elected representatives were linked to the party, while deputies elected in the 1993 elections were largely professional politicians linked to the Federal Government, Presidential Administration or Subject Administrations. Nevertheless, the composition of Russia's first Federal Assembly marked a significant departure from the Soviet era: the overwhelming majority of deputies and senators had not been elected to the previous parliament and constituted a new legislative



elite.

## General Characteristics of Deputies and Senators

### *Election According to Sex*

Table 7.2 Composition of the Federal Assembly's Chambers According to Sex

Chamber	All Members	Men (N)	Men (%)	Women (N)	Women (%)
State Duma	444	385	86.7	59	13.3
Including:					
Lists	225	192	85.3	33	14.7
Districts	219	193	88.1	26	11.9
Federation Council	171	162	94.7	9	5.3
Total	615	547	88.9	68	11.1

Under the pre-Gorbachev Soviet political system, the political leadership placed a great emphasis on including different groups in the different level legislatures in order to claim they were incorporated in the USSR's institutional structure and participated in decision-making. It has been discussed in previous chapters that since Khrushchev, the highest legislative body in the Soviet Union, the USSR Supreme Soviet, was composed mostly of men but women constituted between one quarter to one third of its members. It will be recalled from previous chapters that at the last non-competitive election held in 1984, Soviet voters sent 492 women (32.8 per cent of all deputies) to the Supreme Soviet. However, women's representation declined significantly under the more competitive elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies for various reasons including a patriarchal attitude among Soviet voters, a decline in women's free time and the need for this commodity in order to conduct an active campaign, men's unwillingness to undertake domestic

responsibilities when women were campaigning, and a lack of support from the Soviet Women's Committee in constituencies. At this time Soviet voters elected 352 women (15.7 per cent). However, half of all women deputies were elected through the largely uncompetitive social organisation seats set aside for all-union organisations such as the CPSU, Komsomol, Trade Union organizations and the Soviet Women's Committee. These deputies were not elected by Soviet voters, but by delegates to all-union meetings and conferences and congresses. Public organisation seats were eliminated from national legislation in 1989 and most republics (with the exception of Belorussia and Kazakhstan) excluded these provisions from their electoral legislation for the campaigns to their legislatures in 1990. As a result there were fewer women elected to republican level parliaments. Darrell Slider has noted that in no instances did women exceed 12 per cent of republican people's deputies.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, in Russia only 5.3 per cent of its 1,068 deputies were women.<sup>6</sup>

Women's representation in the Russian parliament increased slightly after the 1993 elections; however, the composition of the State Duma remained overwhelmingly male (see Table 2). Among the 444 deputies elected to the State Duma there were 385 men (86.7 per cent) and 59 were women (13.3 per cent). List deputies consisted of 192 men (85.3 per cent) and 33 women (14.7 per cent). Russian voters elected 193 men (88.1 per cent) and 26 women (11.9 per cent) in the single seat constituencies. Russians elected 9 women senators (5.3 per cent) to the Federation Council. Perhaps the most notable means for promoting women's representation in these elections was the formation of the Women of Russia movement <sup>(ZhR)</sup> in late 1993. ZhR fused the Union of Women of Russia (successor to the Soviet <sup>^</sup>

Women's Committee), Union of Women Entrepreneurs of Russia and Union of Women of the Navy. The movement united several thousand women and several hundred local organisations which helped to promote their candidates. In addition, the movement was able to draw upon the support bases of the former Soviet Women's Committees networks: Committee organisations had been established in just about every city throughout the former USSR. Moreover, the movement had the widest possible potential base of support-Russian women. According to the last set of Soviet official statistics there were 78,797,000 women in the RSFSR and they comprised about 53 per cent of the republic's population.<sup>7</sup> In addition, the movement, while absconding the promotion of a clearly 'engendered' political programme, did have the appeal of an entire segment of the population. This is a factor that the other parties and blocs may not have been able to create in the few weeks before the election. Another factor which may have helped increase women's representation was the fact that there were some outstanding women politicians who emerged in Russia during the late-Soviet and immediate post-Soviet periods. For instance, from 1991 until shortly after the 1993 elections Ella Pamfilova, a long-standing democrat, had been the RSFSR's Minister of Social Protection for the Population.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, among parliamentary circles, Irina Vinogradova was the chairwoman of the Free Russia Deputies' fraction, was a deputy chairwoman of one of the largest political parties (before September-October 1993), the People's Party of Free Russia, and a member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet's Committee on Science and National Education.<sup>9</sup> However, it must be noted that she failed to win election to the Duma as a contestant on BRNI's list and although she was the number 1 candidate (of six) on that electoral association's Novosibirsk regional sheet, she had a rather inconsequential position on their all-federal list, no. 49.<sup>10</sup> Nevertheless, the examples of Pamfilova and Vinogradova suggest that women politicians may have gained some degree of

credibility during the post-Soviet period, in stark contrast to the 'dragon ladies' who occupied party and state positions during the stagnation period. Another factor which may have influenced the sex breakdown of the parliament was the fact that men were clearly preferred to women as candidates. The associates of the political-psychology faculty of St Petersburg University conducted a poll of the population's conceptions of the ideal leader's qualities on the streets of Moscow, St Petersburg and Yaroslavl' (which may not be entirely indicative of Russian public opinion on the subject) in early December 1993. Their findings noted that 46 per cent of their respondents felt that men would make the best leaders, while only 7 per cent felt the same about women.<sup>11</sup> However, leading ZhR official Alevtina Fedulova cited other opinion poll data which suggested that 46 per cent of the electorate was willing to vote for women while only two per cent would under no circumstances vote for them.<sup>12</sup>

#### *Election According to Political Affiliation*

As stated earlier, one of the most significant achievements of the 1993 elections was the fact that it was the first time since 1917 that Russians voted in multiparty elections. Precise electoral association representation in the Federal Assembly has been illustrated and discussed in this dissertation's chapter on the 1993 election campaign. Table 7.3 illustrates the wide political spectrum represented in the first Federal Assembly. Nevertheless, there are some features of the corps of deputies and the political organisations and blocs elected to the Duma which seem somewhat strange. For instance, it seems quite ironic that despite the fact that these were Russia's first post-Soviet multiparty elections and that there were representatives of many political organisations who participated in them-eight securing seats through party

lists-there was a large number of independent deputies who also won seats through these lists. Table 3 indicates that 314 members of the Russian parliament (51 per cent of all deputies) elected to the Federal Assembly did not belong to any political organisation. Included among the 225 deputies elected on an all-Federal level through the lists, 69 <sup>of whom</sup> (30.6 per cent) did not belong to any political party or organization. It is also worthy to note that there were two deputies who were elected to the LDPR's party list from other parties. This included one member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and a member of the Party of Social Justice.

Table 7.4 contains the breakdown of non-party deputies elected through party list seats. It is significant to note that the distribution of seats in the Federal Assembly's chambers and the number of non-party candidates reveals characteristics about the state of affairs of parties and political organisations at the time of the elections. As numerous commentators have noted, only the KPRF could have been considered to be a true political party and the one with the highest degree of support nation-wide. While the LDPR may have won the highest number of seats through the list component of the vote, nearly 41 per cent of its deputies elected in that manner were not members of that party. Indeed this is ironic given that the party boasts that it is one of the most organised parties with large membership reserves. This factor is discussed in greater detail in this chapter's section on centre- vs. periphery-based politicians elected to the Federal Assembly. The KPRF had the most party members elected to both houses-although in the upper chamber, political party representation is at best of marginal significance. Therefore, the arguments put forward by Stephen Sestanovich cited in this dissertation's chapter on the 1993 elections interpreting the vote as the Russian population's rejection of Communist rule stand on shaky grounds indeed. However,

Terry Clark's interpretation that the combined support the KPRF and APR, two neo-communist formations, garnered at the elections is clearly more important for the interpretation of post-Soviet politics in Russia: there were clearly established groups which identified with their policies and this made them influential; their organisational structures made them powerful political contenders.

Table 7.3 Comprehensive List of All Political and Social Organisations Represented in the Federal Assembly According to Chamber

Political Organisation	DL	DD	All	FC	FA
KPRF	30	16	46	11	57
VR	22	18	40	6	46
LDPR	33	5	38	0	38
APR	16	12	28	1	29
DR	9	7	16	1	17
PRES	14	1	15	1	16
ZhR	11	2	13	0	13
DPR	9	1	10	0	10
RPRF	5	2	7	0	7
RDDR	0	4	4	1	5
Renewal	0	2	2	1	3
SPT	0	1	1	1	2
SDPRF	1	1	2	0	2
KPR	0	1	1	1	2
RKhDS-ND	1	1	2	0	2
DiM	0	2	2	0	2
PES	0	2	2	0	2
Senezhskii Forum	1	0	1	1	2
NRPR	0	1	1	0	1
NPRF	0	1	1	0	1
PT	0	0	0	1	1
KDP-PNS	0	0	0	1	1
Maril' Ushem	0	1	1	0	1
RES	0	1	1	0	1
RTS	0	1	1	0	1
ROS	0	1	1	0	1
RNA	0	1	1	0	1
EZNR	1	0	1	0	1
GS	0	1	1	0	1
DI	1	0	1	0	1
PSS	1	0	1	0	1
SvDPRF	0	1	1	0	1
Yabloko	0	1	1	0	1
SKK	0	0	0	1	1
SS	0	1	1	0	1
RPST	0	1	1	0	1
Independents	69	129	198	143	341
Unknown	1	0	1	0	1
Total	225	219	444	171	615

\* For a list of acronyms, see the errata at the end of this dissertation

Table 7.4 Non-Party Deputies Elected As Party List Deputies

Electoral Association	All	Non-Party (N)	Non-Party (%)
APR	21	5	23.8
DPR	14	5	35.7
KPRF	32	3	9.4
LDPR	59	21	40.7
PRES	18	4	22.2
ZhR	21	10	47.6
VR	40	6	15
Yabloko	20	15	75
Total	225	69	30.7

Another factor to consider in relation to party affiliations is the extent to which there were sex differences in the party lists and, moreover, the extent of sex differences in political affiliations. The present author's findings indicate that men were most prominent among all parliamentarians in the categories of belonging to a political organisation and as independent deputies. Nevertheless, within party lists women were only slightly more likely to have been members of some type of political organisation (18 who belonged to organisations vs. 15 independents). Table 7.5 contains a breakdown of the number of women elected to the party lists of the eight electoral coalitions.

Table 7.5 List Deputies Elected According to Sex

Electoral Association	All	Men (N)	Men (%)	Women (N)	Women (%)
APR	21	21	100	0	0
DPR	14	14	100	0	0
KPRF	32	29	90.6	3	9.4
LDPR	59	54	91.5	5	8.5
PRES	18	18	100	0	0
VR	40	38	95	2	5
Yabloko	20	18	90	2	10
ZhR	21	0	0	21	100
Total	225	192	85.3	33	14.7

As the data illustrate, women's representation in the party list seats was overwhelmingly supported by the inclusion of the Women of Russia bloc who accounted for 63.6 per cent of all women elected through this section of the poll. It is also significant to note that three electoral associations-the Agrarian Party of Russia, Democratic Party of Russia and Party of Russian Unity and Accord-all had men elected to their party list seats. Also, with the exception of Women of Russia, no electoral organisation had women comprising more than 10 per cent of its list deputies. Another factor to consider, in light of the fact that there were many non-politically affiliated deputies elected to list seats, is whether the women who occupied these seats were predominantly members or independents. As stated earlier, Women of Russia's list comprised 11 deputies who belonged to the organization. Among the other blocs, most of the women who were elected belonged to some type of political organisation. However, Yabloko's two women deputies were independents. In addition, although Ella Pamfilova was the number three candidate on VR's national list, she was listed as a non-party deputy. All women elected to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation's list belonged to the KPRF. Russia's Choice's other women deputies, Bela Denisenko and Ol'ga Zastrozhnaya, were members of Democratic Russia and Russia's Choice respectively. In addition, three of five of the women deputies, <sup>elected through</sup> the LDPR's list were party members.



Table 7.6 Distribution of Women Party List Candidates

Political Organisation	Candidates	Women (N)	Women (%)
ZhR	36	36	100.0
KEDR	44	9	20.5
Yabloko	172	34	19.8
KRPF	151	16	10.6
RDDR	153	13	8.5
VR	211	16	7.6
BRNI	95	7	7.4
DPR	167	11	6.6
LDPR	147	9	6.1
DiM	58	3	5.2
APR	145	7	4.8
PRES	196	7	3.6
GS	184	6	3.3
Total	1759	174	9.9

Another factor to consider pertaining to the combination of factors regarding sex and political affiliation regards the place of women on the party lists. Party lists were drawn up in order to ensure that the (theoretically) strongest candidates would get seats in the Duma if they failed to win in constituencies. Therefore, it is possible to postulate that if a candidate was placed higher on an electoral association's list he or she was valued very much by that bloc and was considered to have a high degree of political capital. Conversely, it could be argued that a lower ranking on the list could be equated with a candidate having less potential appeal to the electorate. Nevertheless there are a few ways in which the political value the parties and blocs placed upon women can be analyzed. First, it is possible for analysts to consider them important if electoral associations ranked women among their three leading candidates on the national lists. Second, their places in the order on the lists themselves may serve as an (imperfect) indicator to how highly electoral blocs valued women candidates.

It will be recalled that 13 electoral associations competed for seats in the State Duma by putting forward all-federal lists. The ballot paper for the all-federal constituency contained the names of the three leading candidates. In some cases-the Agrarian Party of Russia, Yabloko, Future of Russia-New Names, Russia's Choice, Civic Union in the Name of Stability, Justice and Progress and the Party of Russian Unity and Accord-the electoral associations established regional lists on the ballot paper which included the three leading contestants for a particular area. Among the thirteen national lists, therefore, there were 39 spots for the leading candidates. Excluding Women of Russia's three leading candidates, respectively Alevtina Fedulova, Yekaterina Lakhova and Natal'ya Gundareva, there were only two other women who were among any bloc's top three spots. This included Russia's Choice candidate Ella Pamfilova who occupied the number three spot on the list (who, nevertheless won a seat in a constituency) and Lyubov' Lyumar' who was the leading candidate for the Constructive Ecological Movement of Russia (KEDR) which failed to clear the five per cent threshold to win seats in the Duma. Thus, women occupied 12.8 per cent of the spots on the all-Federal lists of candidates. Women were not represented much more significantly as key figures of the Moscow regional lists which also appeared on the ballot paper. Among 18 spots available, 3 were occupied by women (16.7 per cent). Shamisyat Muradova occupied the number two spot on the Agrarian Party of Russia's Moscow list, Galina Bodrenkova was the number three candidate of Yabloko's Moscow regional group and Svetlana Savitskaya headed Civic Union's Moscow regional candidates. Future of Russia-New Names, Russia's Choice and the Russian Party of Unity and Accord had all-male Moscow regional lists.<sup>13</sup>

The place of men and women on the deputy lists could possibly give some type of

indication of how the electoral associations felt their women candidates were in their overall ranking. Indeed the data suggests that women may have been considered marginally effective by their blocs. Table 7.6 indicates the women constituted slightly less than 10 per cent of all list candidates. Moreover, men generally occupied much higher spots on the lists than did their women counterparts. It has already been noted that Lyubov' Lyumar' headed KEDR's 44 candidate all-federal list. The other women who stood on KEDR's list (and their places on the list) included Irina Kaminskaya (11), Ol'ga Babkina (22), Galina Kuchina (23), Natal'ya Ivanova (25), Valentina Farafanova (29), Irina Likacheva (38), Lyudmila Boyarina (39) and Svetlana Sutulova (42).<sup>14</sup> The LDPR fielded 147 candidates on its national list and contested 66 constituencies. Most of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia's list candidates were men (138 or 93.1 per cent) and only 4 of its candidates who contested seats in constituencies were women (6.1 per cent). None of the women, however, were victorious in the districts. Among the bloc's candidates, men certainly had prominent positions on the all-federal list. The first 30 spots were entirely filled by men. Women occupied spots numbers 31, 32, 49, 50, 56, 64, 87, 89 and 105. However, it is notable to point out that two-thirds of the women were included among the top half of the list. This certainly is reflected in the electoral association's Duma composition. More than half of all the women who stood for the bloc were elected. It should be noted that Vladimir Zhirinovskii, the party's chair, who held the bloc's number one position, was elected in the Shchelkovo district of Moscow *oblast'*. Therefore, all the women moved up one more place as a result of his election.<sup>15</sup> The APR's 9 women occupied spots 70, 77, 96, 97, 110, 131 and 134.<sup>16</sup> Civic Union's 6 women candidates fared somewhat better. Three occupied the top twenty spots on the list (Yelna Vol'demarova, 5; Tat'yana Novikova, 10 and Valentina Kabanova, 20) while others occupied positions 80, 93 and 163.<sup>17</sup> DiM's women candidates occupied

spots 11, 38 and 45.<sup>18</sup> Place numbers 20, 31, 56, 65, 68, 103, 129, 131, 138, 148, 150, 152 and 153 were occupied by women candidates on RDDR's 153 candidate list.<sup>19</sup> KPRI's women candidates held spots 4, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 43, 54, 55, 62, 63, 82, 89, 95, 109 and 139.<sup>20</sup> Women who stood for BRNI were placed in positions 19, 49, 58, 63, 64, 74 and 84.<sup>21</sup> PRES's women candidates occupied places 60, 66, 72, 135, 147, 167 and 180.<sup>22</sup> Women on DPR's list held spots 9, 20, 29, 42, 59, 83, 84, 122, 137, 163 and 164.<sup>23</sup> Positions 3, 38, 41, 44, 79, 80, 93, 98, 99, 127, 139, 151, 161, 181, 187 and 201 were held by VR's women candidates.<sup>24</sup>

Altogether, Yabloko fielded 172 candidates. However, the bloc put forward a 34 candidate all-federal list and regional lists comprised of the remaining 138 aspirants. The three women who were on the all-federal list included Tat'yana Yarigina (8), Oksana Dmitrieva (19) and leading feminist activist Anastasiya Posadskaya (33). An additional 31 women held positions on the bloc's regional lists.<sup>25</sup>

The inclusion of certain electoral blocs/regional lists and women's position on them certainly sheds doubt on the proposition that they were viewed as candidates with less electoral appeal or political capital than men. The places of Irina Vinogradova (BRNI), Svetlana Savitskaya (GS) and Shamisyat Muradova (APR) have already been discussed and support this position. In addition, it should be noted that APR candidates Valentina Luneva (sole candidate), Valentina Anosova, Nina Kovaleva (sole candidate) and Tamara Tokareva (sole candidate) led the party's regional lists in Kursk, Smolensk, Perm' and Sverdlovsk *oblasti* respectively. Tat'yana Rozanova led GS's Kaluga regional list. In addition to Vinogradova, five other women led regional lists for BRNI. These included Vera

Skorobogatova (Republic of Komi), Lyudmila Orlova (sole candidate, Orel *oblast'*), Natal'ya Serdyukova (sole candidate, Rostov *oblast'*), Yelena Bunyashina (sole candidate, Ryazan *oblast'*) and Marina Poddubnaya (sole candidate, Chelyabinsk *oblast'*). Larisa Nozhdina (Orenburg *oblast'*), Bela Denisenko (Kemerovo *oblast'*) and Alla Baydasarova (sole candidate, Ul'yanovsk *oblast'*) led VR's regional lists. Tat'yana Latysheva (Belgorod and Kursk *oblasty*) and Galina Bodrenkova (sole, Kemerovo *oblast'*) headed Yabloko's regional lists.

The argument present above certainly indicates that electoral organisations were more likely to place men in the top positions in their all-federal lists. However, women were occasionally leading candidates on several parties' and blocs' regional lists. Moreover, the fact that many were placed in much lower positions on the federal lists may not be enough evidence to conclude that the electoral associations valued their potentials as candidates less than men. Indeed, the blocs had to target these regions and constituencies with their strongest candidates. Some women (and indeed it is possible to include the same line of argument for some men) may have been placed lower on the party lists because they may have had the potential to win in a particular area. Perhaps it may be possible to note that the electoral associations may have not had a wealth of women politicians of national re:nowm from which to choose their candidates. However, at local and regional levels, women may have been potentially stronger players and the electoral associations sought to exploit these favourable qualities on their 'home turf'.

## *Election According to Education*

Table 7.7 Federal Assembly Members' Educational Attainment

Education Level	DL (N)	DL (%)	DD (N)	DD (%)	Total (N)	Total (%)	FC (N)	FC (%)	FA (N)	FA (%)
Higher Incomplete	212	94.2	207	94.5	419	94.4	169	98.8	588	95.6
Higher General	2	0.9	3	1.4	5	1.1	2	1.2	7	1.1
Secondary Vocational	4	1.8	5	2.3	9	2.0	0	0	9	1.5
Secondary	7	3.1	4	1.8	11	2.5	0	0	11	1.8
Total	225	100	219	100	444	100	171	100	615	100

Traditionally, Soviet elected organs included a large number of deputies who had received only secondary levels of education. However, with the onset of electoral reform measures in 1989, this situation drastically decreased. For instance, in 1984, 685 deputies (45.7 per cent) did not pursue tertiary education.<sup>26</sup> By contrast in 1989 Soviet voters elected 547 deputies with secondary education, including general, specialist and incomplete secondary education (24.3 per cent) and 1,702 with higher education-encompassing those who did not complete courses, completed tertiary education or achieved a postgraduate degree or possessed an academic title.<sup>27</sup> In addition, despite its conservatism, the Russian Congress of People's Deputies could be considered to have been staffed by highly educated politicians. For instance, Gregory J. Embrac has stated that in the 1990 contest the intelligentsia won 66 per cent of the seats from urban constituencies and in 50 per cent of the rural districts.<sup>28</sup> Table 7.7 contains the distribution of deputies in the Duma according to their level of educational attainment. As the data indicate, the corpus is overwhelmingly composed of deputies who are either enrolled in, <sup>or have</sup> completed or participated in at least some tertiary

education. Among the 444 deputies elected in December 1993, 424 (95.5 per cent) fell into this category. In addition there were few differences in this category between deputies elected in the constituencies or deputies who won their seats through party lists. It should also be noted that the majority of the candidates for all electoral associations had pursued some form of higher education. However, among the 20 deputies in the Duma who had only secondary education nearly one third were elected from the LDPR<sup>29</sup> and a fifth were KPRF deputies. These electoral associations were supported by individuals in demographic groups who had attained similar levels of education: i.e., young manual workers in state enterprises and the elderly.<sup>30</sup>

There are major reasons why parliamentary deputies' educational levels are important for the development of democratic values and competent political performance in Russia. First, the increase in deputies may lead to a greater professionalization of the institution and may therefore have some type of impact on increasing the level of political participation among its deputies. Moreover, the increase in educated deputies, in theory, provides a corps of deputies who may be potentially more effective in solving the complex problems currently facing Russia. Second, Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. has pointed to the work of scholars James L. Gibson and Raymond M. Duch and their ideas on the importance of education in the promotion of democratic values in Russian society. Gibson and Duch note that 'individuals with higher education are more likely to be exposed to and socialized into accepting officially sanctioned norms promoting democratic values'; 'education may inherently instill or reinforce liberal values such as equality, tolerance, and respect for individual liberties' and 'education contributes to support for democratic norms, regardless of formal system norms.'<sup>31</sup> Although the team was referring predominantly to

the population at large with these statements, it does not seem inconsistent if this logic is applied to parliamentarians. The high level of education deputies-even from among the opposition ranks-may not greatly influence a continued pattern of economic reform. Indeed the political programmes of the parties from which the opposition deputies were elected seriously <sup>militate</sup> against market orientations. As the next chapter illustrates there were very high levels of tension apparent between the executive and legislative branches of government during 1993-1995. However, the education level of the deputies may help contribute to an acceptance of the 'rules of the game' or the manner in which decisions in the political arena are adopted and implemented. Moreover, it has been noted, in respect to the opposition, that the relative government defeat in the 1993 elections 'made the opposition accept the fairness of the election and may thus have helped to entrench the democratic system in Russia's developing political culture.'<sup>32</sup> Therefore, a more highly educated corps of deputies and a growing political culture in Russia may help contribute to a more stable political system in the immediate future.

### *Generational Changes in the Deputy Corpus*

As discussed in earlier chapters, Soviet elected organs generally contained greater numbers of deputies older than retirement age and younger than thirty than their Western counterparts did. It will also be recalled that despite their incorporation in the Supreme Soviet, these deputies did not possess great political power within the institution. This can be illustrated <sup>using</sup> Ronald Hill's proposition that power was equated to an individual's chance to be re-elected: these social groups were less likely to be re-elected than deputies in their forties and fifties. However, after the election to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, the age



structure of the deputies was altered and was comprised of more middle-aged deputies. The average age of the deputies was 47.8 years.<sup>33</sup>

Table 7.8a. Age Distribution of Federal Assembly According to Age Group (N)

Age Group	List	State Duma Districts	Total	Federation Council	Federal Assembly
30 and younger	14	12	26	3	29
31-40	42	62	104	24	128
41-50	87	93	180	75	255
51-60	58	48	106	63	169
61 and older	24	4	28	6	34
Total	225	219	444	171	615

Table 7.8b. Age Distribution of Federal Assembly According to Age Group (%)

Age Group	List	State Duma Districts	Total	Federation Council	Federal Assembly
30 and younger	6.2	5.5	5.9	1.8	4.7
31-40	18.7	28.3	23.4	14.0	20.8
41-50	38.7	42.5	40.5	43.9	41.5
51-60	25.8	21.9	23.9	36.8	27.5
61 and older	10.7	1.8	6.3	3.5	5.5
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Table 7.8c. Age Distributions of Party List Deputies by Electoral Association (%)

Age Group	APR	DPR	KPRF	LDPR	PRES	VR	YAB	ZhR
30 and under	4.8	7.1	3.1	8.5	0	7.5	15	0
31-40	0	21.4	3.1	25.4	44.4	20	20	14.3
41-50	23.8	57.1	56.3	33.9	27.9	25	40	61.9
51-60	57.1	7.1	21.9	22	16.7	35	15	23.8
61 and older	14.3	7.1	15.6	10.1	11.1	12.5	10	0
Average age (years)	52.4	44.2	50.1	44.5	45.9	48.6	44.7	45.4

Tables 7.8a-7.8c contain data on the age levels of the deputies elected according to age group in the Federal Assembly and the age breakdowns of the party list deputies. The age composition of the Parliament is indeed consistent with its predecessors: its corpus is

generally middle-aged. The bulk of the list deputies were between 41 and 50 years of age (87 or 38.7 per cent) and the average age of all list deputies was about 47 years old. It has been noted earlier that the average age for Senators was slightly younger than 48 years old. As Table 8c indicates, three blocs, the Agrarian Party of Russia, Russia's Choice and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, had average ages which exceeded the norm for the Parliament. By contrast, the remaining blocs had average ages between 44 and 46 years.

### *Election According to Nationality*

As Table 7.9 indicates Federal Assembly politicians were overwhelmingly ethnic Russians. Overall, some 366 Duma deputies are ethnic Russians (82.4 per cent). This figure is slightly less than the Russian share of the population of the Russian Federation (approximately 85 per cent). Among the party list deputies, 83.6 per cent were ethnic Russians. Not surprisingly there are slightly higher representations of non-Russians elected from constituencies and the Federation Council, seats which were to reflect regional interests, and in some cases, those republics with a titular nationality. Of the 219 deputies winning constituency seats, 41 (18.7 per cent) are non-Russians. Forty senators were not Russians (23.3 per cent).

Table 7.10 contains a breakdown of the national composition of list deputies elected to the Duma. In total, 15 nationalities are represented in the national lists. Following the 188 Russians there are 5 Belarusian and Jewish representatives, 3 Armenians and 2 Avars. There were single representatives from the Adygei, Bashkir, Cherkessian, Chuvash, Georgian, Greek, Komi, Lak and Tatar nations elected in this manner. Nevertheless, as the data indicate, the Democratic Party of Russia is the only electoral organisation completely

represented by Russians.

Table 7.9 Distribution of Federal Assembly Deputies According to Nationality

Nationality	List	State Duma District	Total	Federation Council	Federal Assembly
Russians	188	178	366	131	497
Ukrainians	13	9	22	3	25
Belarusians	5	2	7	1	8
Jews	5	2	7	1	8
Germans	0	3	3	3	6
Buryats	0	2	2	4	6
Bashkirs	1	3	4	1	5
Armenians	3	1	4	0	4
Osetins	0	2	2	2	4
Avars	2	1	3	1	4
Komi	1	1	2	1	3
Tuvinians	0	1	1	2	3
Chuvashi	1	0	1	2	3
Kabards	0	1	1	1	2
Dagrintsis	0	1	1	1	2
Tatars	1	1	2	0	2
Ingushi	0	0	0	2	2
Karelians	0	0	0	2	2
Yakuts	0	1	1	1	2
Adygeians	1	0	1	1	2
Koryaks	0	1	1	1	2
Kalmyks	0	1	1	1	2
Karachais	0	1	1	1	2
Mariis	0	1	1	1	2
Chukchi	0	0	0	1	1
Altai	0	0	0	1	1
Balkars	0	0	0	1	1
Nanais	0	0	0	1	1
Khakasians	0	0	0	1	1
Kazakhs	0	0	0	1	1
Mordovians	0	0	0	1	1
Laks	1	0	1	0	1
Udmurts	0	1	1	0	1
Latvians	0	1	1	0	1
Permyaks	0	1	1	0	1
Evenki	0	1	1	0	1
Koreans	0	1	1	0	1
Georgians	1	0	1	0	1
Greeks	1	0	1	0	1
Cherkessians	1	0	1	0	1
Khanty	0	1	1	0	1
Total	225	219	444	171	615

Table 7.10 National Composition of List Deputies

Electoral Association	All	Russians	Others
APR	21	16	5
DPR	14	14	0
KPRF	32	25	7
LDPR	59	51	8
PRES	18	13	5
VR	40	34	6
Yabloko	20	16	4
ZhR	21	19	2

### *Election According to Occupation*

Previously, deputies elected to Soviet representative organs fell under three major categories: elite, needed and fillers. Elite deputies, which comprised about 5 per cent of the deputies, were usually recruited from the ranks of party and state officials. The 'needed', who constituted about 20-30 per cent of the deputy corpus, included specialists whose skills were necessary to assist the elite in decision-making. The remaining deputies were the 'fillers' who were workers and collective farmers who achieved re<sup>u</sup>nown for their workplace endeavors or for their unswerving loyalty to party directives. In short, the people who comprised the ranks of state and party officials were most likely to be re-elected and carry the most weight in deliberations and policy making within the representative organ. The needed were occasionally re-elected while the fillers were selected to pay lip service to the party's commitment of representing different social strata in governing bodies and to keep alive the party's commitment to make the Soviets 'schools of administration' in which the average working person would be able to participate in extra-curricular political activities.<sup>34</sup> The latter had very little influence over policy-making and were rarely re-elected.

Table 7.11 Occupational Composition of the Federal Assembly (%)

Occupation	DL	DD	All	FC	FA
Federal Officials	8	5	6.3	6	6
Including:					
Deputy Prime Ministers & First Deputy Prime Ministers	2	0	1.1	1	1
Ministers, Deputy Ministers & First Deputy Ministers	3	2	2.7	3	3
Other Federal Government Officials	3	2	2.5	2	2
Presidential Administration	7	4	5.6	2	5
Including:					
Functionaries (all levels)	7	3	4.7	0	3
Presidential Representatives	0	1	0.9	2	1
Executive and Legislative Officials from Russia's Subjects	2	8	5	25	11
Including:					
Subject Presidents	0	0	0	4	1
Prime Ministers, Deputy Prime Ministers & First Deputy Prime Ministers	0	1	0.7	6	2
Ministers, Deputy Ministers & First Deputy Ministers	0	1	0.7	1	1
Other Subject Government Officials	0	1	0.5	1	1
Chairs of Subject Legislatures, Deputy & First Deputy Chairs	0	1	0.2	12	4
Other Subject Legislature Officials	1	3	1.8	1	2
Other Officials from Subject Executive, Legislative & Judiciary Organs	0	2	1.1	1	1
Subject Administration	2	7	4.5	28	11
Including:					
Administrators and their Deputies	1	2	1.4	25	8
Other Subject Administration Officials	1	5	3.2	3	3
Local Executive, Legislative & Judicial Officials	1	4	2.3	2	2
Including:					
Mayors and Deputy Mayors	0	1	0.5	1	1
Chairs of Legislatures & their Deputies	0	2	1.4	1	1
Other Local Legislative Officials	0	1	0.2	0	0
Chairs of Local Judiciaries & their Deputies	0	1	0.2	1	0
Local Administration	0	6	3.2	5	4
Including:					
Administrators & their Deputies	0	3	1.6	5	2
Other Local Administration Officials	0	3	1.6	0	1
Total	20	33	27	68	38

Table 7.11 continued on next page

Occupation	L	D	All	FC	FA
Political Party and Social Organisation					
Activists and Officials	20.9	5.0	13.1	0.6	9.6
Including:					
Political Party Officials	13.3	1.4	15.1	0.6	5.5
Social Organisation Officials	4.4	1.8	3.2	0.0	2.3
Trade Union Officials	3.1	1.8	2.5	0.0	1.8
Management	16.0	28.8	22.3	16.4	20.7
Including:					
Agricultural and Agro-Industry	2.7	6.8	4.7	2.3	4.1
Finance and Banking	3.6	6.4	5.0	0.6	3.7
Industry	6.7	12.8	9.7	10.5	9.9
Media and Communications	0.9	0.5	0.7	0.6	0.7
Transportation	0.4	0.5	0.5	1.2	0.7
General Directors, Presidents of Concerns & Funds	1.8	1.4	1.6	1.2	1.5
Other Entrepreneurs	0.0	0.5	0.2	0.0	0.2
Workers in Science, Culture & Academic Institutions	30.2	18.7	24.5	7.0	19.7
Including:					
Writers & other figures in Arts & Culture	2.7	0.9	1.8	0.0	1.3
Editors of Newspapers and Journals	2.2	0.9	1.6	1.2	1.5
Journalists (all media)	0.4	2.3	1.4	0.0	1.0
Researchers in Non-University Institutions and Centres	14.7	5.5	10.1	0.6	11.1
University Rectors and Presidents	0.9	0.9	0.9	2.9	1.5
University Deans	0.0	0.9	0.5	0.0	0.3
University Heads of Faculty	3.6	2.3	2.9	0.6	2.3
University Professors	3.1	0.5	1.8	0.6	1.5
University Dotsents	0.0	0.5	0.2	0.6	0.3
University Lecturers	0.4	1.4	0.9	0.0	0.7
Directors of Secondary Schools	0.0	0.9	0.5	0.0	0.3
Secondary School Teachers	0.4	0.9	0.7	0.6	0.7
Scientific Workers	1.8	0.9	1.4	0.0	1.0
Military and Law Enforcement Officials	0.4	3.1	1.8	0.6	1.5
Including:					
Military	0.4	2.7	1.6	0.6	1.3
Law Enforcement	0.0	0.5	0.2	0.0	0.2
Workers in Health & Legal Professions	4.0	4.6	4.3	2.3	3.7
Including:					
Health	1.8	1.4	1.6	1.2	1.5
Legal	2.2	3.2	2.7	1.2	2.3
Manual Workers	1.8	0.5	1.1	0.0	0.8
Including:					
Agriculture & Agro-Industry	0.4	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.2
Industry	1.3	0.5	0.9	0.0	0.7
Citizens Receiving State Benefits & Stipends	4.9	4.1	4.5	4.7	4.6
Including:					
Students	0.9	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.3
Pensioners	0.4	0.9	0.7	0.0	0.5
Unemployed	3.6	3.2	3.4	4.7	3.7
Other	1.8	1.4	1.6	0.0	1.1
Total	80.0	66.2	73.2	31.6	61.6

As stated earlier, the results of the Gorbachev years brought forth deputies who were more technically competent. In addition, there were still large numbers of state and party functionaries who were elected to USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies. However, these elections produced more middle- and lower-ranking officials into parliament while the percentage of higher level officials declined. Industrial and agricultural managers also had their representations increased as results of the more competitive conditions.

Table 7.11 contains data on the occupational composition of the Federal Assembly Russians elected in 1993. These data indicate that Russians elected a corps of white-collar deputies: the percentage of manual workers was less than 1 per cent. Nevertheless, the 'independence' of the Parliament is a particular stumbling bloc. On the one hand, approximately 44 per cent of the Parliament consisted of managers from all sectors of the economy, health care and legal professionals, and those in the scientific and creative intelligentsia. However, the largest share of the parliamentarians were professional politicians. Moreover, within this group, the greatest percentage were linked to the state governing structures system (236 or 38.4 per cent). Well over one in four Duma deputies were state politicians. This included approximately one in 5 list deputies and one third of constituency deputies. Slightly fewer than seven in ten Senators belonged to the same occupation groups. The greatest share of state-affiliated list deputies were from the ranks of federal officials (8 per cent) and were followed by representatives of the presidential administration (7.1 per cent). By contrast, there were fewer politicians elected who worked at the subject and local levels of Russian politics. Only 2.2 per cent of the list deputies

worked in subject administrations, 1.8 per cent were executive and legislative officials from Russia's subjects and less than one per cent worked at the local levels. Therefore, these individuals were clearly recruited from occupation slots with some form of national significance.

Conversely, state-affiliated constituency deputies tended to be recruited more frequently from subject or local organs of power. For instance, 8.2 per cent of these deputies were executive and legislative officials from Russia's subjects, 6.8 per cent belonged to the ranks of subject administration officials-however, it should be noted that they were more likely to be workers in these administrations; 11 of 15 had these qualities, 6.4 per cent worked in local administration and 3.7 per cent were drawn from local executive, legislative and judicial organs. There were fewer constituency deputies elected who worked for the federal government or presidential administration-respectively 4.6 per cent and 4.1 per cent.

According to the Russian Federation's Constitution, the Federal Assembly is to be comprised of the heads of the executive and legislative organs of Russia's subjects.<sup>35</sup> These data reflect that 53.2 per cent of the Senators had these characteristics. Slightly more than 28 per cent of the upper house's members were linked to the subject administrations. However, in contrast to their counterparts in the lower house, the overwhelming majority who worked at this level were either administrators or their deputies. In addition, more than one quarter of the senators were heads of the subjects' executive and legislative bodies. Managers accounted for 16.4 per cent of the chamber, a figure nearly 6 per cent less than the Duma's composition. Members of the intelligentsia, health and legal professions composed 28.8 per cent of the Duma but only 9.3 per cent of the Federal Assembly. In



addition, Russians did not elect any manual labourers as their Senators. It is ironic, however, that there is a slightly higher percentage of recipients of state assistance in the Federation Council than in Duma.

Some important findings need to be highlighted. First, as stated in this chapter's introduction, one of the present author's primary objectives in this analysis is to determine the differences in the 'parking orbits' between the list and constituency deputies. The former would be individuals with whom the average voter would have come into contact less frequently than a constituency deputy. The data indicate that the Russian lower house elected in 1993 was generally composed of deputies who fit that pattern. Political and social activists formed the largest share of all list deputies elected—approximately 21 per cent. Only 5 per cent of constituency deputies fell under this category. However, managers from all sectors of the economy formed the largest share of constituency deputies elected from constituency seats. Among them, industrial managers comprised the largest group—12.8 per cent. It should also be noted that there were more than one and a half times more workers in science, culture and academic institutions elected from the lists than in the constituencies (30.2 per cent vs 18.7 per cent). Citizens receiving state benefits and stipends were more likely to have been elected through party lists than in constituencies. Some of them included former high ranking political figures. Therefore, these data reflect the occupational trends recorded by Rona-Tas. When roll-call voting data become more widely available, it will be useful to see if list deputies were more likely to vote along party lines than their constituency colleagues.

## *Centre vs. Periphery Deputies*

Among the most acute problems currently facing the Russian Federation is the conflict between the central administration in Moscow and the powers of the regions and subjects in the country. One of the means in which this is manifested is in the composition of deputies.

In this light, this section is a comparison of the composition of deputies elected to the Duma

who were based in large metropolitan areas of the country against those who were resident or work<sup>ed</sup> in the peripheral areas or in the subjects<sup>Federation's excluding Moscow and St Petersburg</sup>. Also, it is necessary to determine if there were differences between the deputies who were elected through the lists and the constituency deputies.

Overall, the Duma consisted of 171 deputies who worked or resided in Moscow (38.5 per cent of all deputies). Nevertheless, there seems to be a major discrepancy between the deputies who were elected to party list seats and those who were elected in the districts: the former were much more likely to have been based in Moscow than were the latter. Thus, Russian voters probably felt that the people who lived in their areas were more likely to be able to address parochial concerns than politicians of national significance living in Moscow.<sup>36</sup> List deputies could probably be considered to be representatives more of the political elite or more of an unbranized, intelligentsia than the average voters. Among the list deputies 136 were selected from Moscow (60.4 per cent). However, in the pre-election stages, it was certainly more Moscow-focused. Russian journalist Yurii Buida has noted that originally the party lists contained more than 70 per cent of its candidates who were from Moscow and Moscow *oblast*'. This factor only served to reinforce an anti-Moscow flavour among the Russian electorate.<sup>37</sup> The majority of Federation Council Senators were from

the areas they represented. Nevertheless, while Moscow city was allocated two seats in the upper house, 13 Senators resided there.

A breakdown of the Moscow-periphery deputies among the list deputies reveals some important information about the Russian party system and the composition of the parties in general-outside Moscow, most political organisations have little organised support. Half of the electoral associations which were represented in the Duma drew their deputies from Moscow. Nevertheless, the organisations with a more balanced distribution of deputies seem to have been around longer and had greater opportunities to develop some regional support bases outside the capital. For instance, less than half of the deputies elected to seats for the APR, KPRF, and ZhR were from Moscow. These electoral associations (we may consider the APR to be elderly, rural communists) were able to draw upon old CPSU and Communist Party of the RSFSR networks and Soviet women's committee links and their all-Russia organisational structures to select their candidates and eventually deputies. Moreover, the DPR brought about a third of its deputies from Moscow. Three quarters of the Yabloko deputies are from Moscow, however, a significant portion of them are affiliated with the *EPitsentr* economic and political research centre headed by Grigorii Yavlinskii. Similarly, nearly two thirds of Russia's Choice deputies were from the Moscow area.

There were two electoral organizations which were surprisingly comprised of predominantly Moscow-based deputies, PRES and the LDPR. In the first instance, this seems rather ironic because PRES calls itself the party of the regions. Therefore, with 16 of its 18 deputies (88.9 per cent) coming from Moscow, its self-ascription is generally misleading. Nevertheless, it has been noted, that when the party initially entered into the

electoral campaign it suffered from a lack of strong regional support bases.<sup>38</sup> The fact that the LDPR's deputies were mainly drawn from Moscow is extremely ironic. According to several Russian encyclopedias and handbooks on political parties and movements, the LDPR has some of the strongest regional organizational structures in the contemporary Russian political spectrum. Although various authors claim that the LDPR has its largest centres of support in Moscow, St Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, Nizhnii Taigil, Smolensk, Belgorod and Krasnoyarsk, they also mention that at the end of 1992, the LDPR had 33 city organizations including 9 located outside Russia's borders, and an additional 46 strong centres of support including 10 outside Russia. In addition to its legal, regionally-established branches in all the other republics of the former USSR, the LDPR maintains illegal party organisations in the Baltic States and Ukraine. The party also claims to have established cells in Austria, Hungary, Germany (Munich) and Finland.<sup>39</sup> Moreover, like all other electoral associations that competed in the December 1993 poll, the LDPR did not contest all constituencies. However, they competed in a surprisingly low 66 constituencies (29.3 per cent of all districts). Nevertheless, the party ran for seats in every district in Vologda, Kamchatka, Kostroma, Kursk, Orlov, Pskov, Tambov and Yaroslavl' *oblasti* and the Koryak autonomous district. The LDPR also fielded candidates in half the constituencies in St Petersburg, the Republic of Komi, Republic of Udmurtiya, Krasnoyarsk, and Stavropol' *kra ya*, Belgorod, Vladimir, Voronezh, Ivanovsk, Kirov, Penza, Ryazan and Chita *oblasti*).<sup>40</sup>

The discrepancy between the amount of deputies elected from the centre and periphery was a factor which lasted throughout the term of the Duma. In fact, the 1995 Federal Law on the Duma Elections restricted the number of list candidates from Moscow and St Petersburg to no more than 30 per cent of the entire list. It was hoped that this would help

stimulate further the development of parties in the peripheral areas and increase greatly the proportion of regional representation in the lower house.

### *Parliamentary Continuity and Change*

The data in tables 7.12 and 7.13 indicate that the overwhelming majority of parliamentarians<sup>ca</sup> elected in 1993 had not served in the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies or Supreme Soviet. Overall, 82.1 per cent of the parliamentary corpus fell under this category. This figure included 85.1 per cent of Duma Deputies and 74.3 per cent of the Senators. Therefore, these elections brought forth two important changes in the patterns of political participation and parliamentary elite formation in the Russian Federation. First, the elections were a stimulus for many candidates new to the Russian electoral politics to compete for seats in the Russian Parliament. For instance, only 83 deputies from the Russian Congress of People's Deputies competed on party lists for seats in the Russian Federal Assembly.<sup>41</sup> Second, as the following data will indicate, the elections also brought forward an overwhelmingly new corps of deputies selected by the Russian voters directly and indirectly (as party list deputies). This number included 30 deputies who were elected from party lists (13.3 per cent of list deputies) and 33 (15.1 per cent) who were elected in districts. Among the parties and blocs which put forward party lists on election day, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia alone had no candidates who sat in the previous Russian Parliament. By contrast, 12 of Russia's Choice's 40 deputies (30 per cent) and one third of the Agrarian Party of Russia's deputies were former representatives.

Table 7.12 Deputy Re-election, 1990-1993 According to Chamber

Chamber	Deputies (N)	Deputies (%)
State Duma	66	14.9
Including:		
List	30	13.3
Districts	33	15.1
Federation Council	44	25.7
Total	110	17.9

Table 7.13 Party List Deputies Re-elected 1990-1993 According to Electoral Association

Electoral Association	All	Re-elected (N)	Re-elected (%)
APR	21	7	33.3
DPR	14	1	7.1
KPRF	32	5	15.6
LDPR	59	0	0.0
PRES	18	1	5.6
VR	40	12	30.0
Yabloko	20	3	15.0
ZhR	21	1	4.8
Total	225	30	13.3

## Conclusion

The discussion above demonstrates that Russian voters elected a parliament that contained elements of continuity, contradiction and departure from its Soviet predecessors. First, there was continuity in the sense that it was predominantly staffed by middle-aged men who had achieved higher education. These are attributes that Soviet parliamentarians gained after electoral reform measures were implemented under Gorbachev's leadership. In addition, there were greater numbers of managers who were elected to the Federal Assembly. This is another factor which had occurred from the late 1980s. It is also significant to note that there was a substantial number of state-affiliated politicians who were elected. Perhaps it is possible to suggest that in some ways these officials are analogous to some CPSU officials. This is particularly true in the instances of federal officials and presidential representatives

who may have had greater loyalties to other institutions than voters. Deputies elected through party lists also owed their positions more to their respective electoral associations than <sup>to</sup> the voters. Therefore, the Russian electorate may not have had a parliament that would <sup>take</sup> its views completely into account: its deputies may have had divided interests. In addition, this situation seems to be somewhat of a contradiction between democratic rhetoric and practice.

Nevertheless, the deputy composition of the Duma is a clear departure from its predecessors. There are very low levels of continuity between the Russian Congress and Supreme Soviet and the Federal Assembly. However, it is significant to note that there existed a greater degree of re-election than existed in the late Soviet period.

Data presented in this chapter also argued that the occupational composition of the Duma Assembly was analogous to the Hungarian Parliament elected in 1990. Without proper data it is not possible for the present author to undertake an analysis of roll-call voting results to test this hypothesis further. Nevertheless, part of the following chapter contains a discussion of how the Federal Assembly functioned and interacted during its first term with the executive branch of government.

## NOTES

1. 'Postanovlenie Tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii Ob ustanovlenii obshikh itogov vyborov deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii', 25 December 1993 No. 155, in *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 28 December 1993, p. 2; 'Spisok deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, izbrannykh po obshchefederal'nomu izbiratel'nomu okragu', *ibid.*, pp. 2-3; 'Spisok deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, izbrannykh po odnomandatnym izbiratel'nyim okrugam', *ibid.*, pp. 3-5 and 'Spisok deputatov Soveta Federatsii Federal'nogo

Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii izbrannykh po dvukhmandatnym izbiratel'nym okrugam', *ibid.*, pp. 5 - 6. According to the aforementioned proclamation in 5 instances in Tatarstan elections were considered invalid because less than 25 per cent of the voters participated. In one Tatarstan district only a single candidate was registered for the seat.

2. Information for this chapter has been derived from the lists cited in note 1. It should be noted, however another set of statistical data has been published which has different figures than what is presented below. According to journalist Dmitrii Orlov the Central Election Commission released a statistical list on the biographical qualities of the deputies which states that 94.4 per cent of the State Duma achieved higher education; men constituted 87.2 per cent of all deputies; Muscovites comprised 62.2 per cent of all list deputies. Orlov also reports other significant data pertaining to the Duma deputies. For instance, he points out that there is quite a large number of deputies who are participants in Russia's political and social organizations which won seats in the Duma. Among the 444 deputies 54 are functionaries of electoral associations and political organizations which did not compete in the all-federal district (12.2 per cent); there are 22 party leaders among the Duma deputies (5 per cent); 32 deputies (7.2 per cent) are local party functionaries, advisers and heads of party apparatuses; and there are 3 trade union activists (0.7 per cent). There is also quite a large number of state appointed and elected officials among the current Duma deputies. This includes 80 deputies (18 per cent) who work in executive and representative organs-among them 25 members of the Government of the Russian Federation, heads and workers in the Central Ministries and departments or 5.6 per cent-and 49 heads of administration, representatives of the President and other heads of executive power in the localities (11 per cent). Over 26 per cent (116) of the deputies are employed using their minds primarily. Among them there are 29 jurists (6.5 per cent) and 11 journalists (2.3 per cent). The report also notes that there are 47 entrepreneurs, and managers of commercial and state enterprises among the Duma deputies (10.6 per cent). Dmitrii Orlov, 'Portret Dumy v tsifrakh', *Rossiiskie vesti*, 10 January 1994, p. 1.

3. Nevertheless, it must be clarified that the data presented here cannot provide conclusive proof of the differences in organization and voter choices in deputy preferences. They can, nonetheless, offer some possible indications between elite and citizen priorities in deputy selection. In the future, when relevant data <sup>are</sup> published, it might then be possible to compare the loyalties of the deputies 'selected' through party lists by their electoral organizations with those elected by constituents using roll-call voting results and then conclude resolutely in whose interests the deputies are more prone to support-their political organizations or their constituents.

4. Akos Rona-Tas, 'The Selected and the Elected: The Making of the New Parliamentary Elite in Hungary', *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Fall 1991), pp. 357-393.

5. Darrell Slider, 'Political Elites and Politics in the Republics' in David Lane (ed.), *Russia in Flux: The Political and Social Consequences of Reform* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1992), pp. 41-61, pp. 42-43 and Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Elections in the Baltic States and Soviet Republics* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1990).

6. Figures from author's database based on biographical information derived from *Spisok narodnykh deputatov RSFSR na 12 fevralya 1991 g.* (Moscow: Verkhovnyi Sovet/Vneshtorgizdat, 1991).

7. Goskomstat SSSR, 'Zhenshchiny v strane', *Vestnik statistiki*, 1992, No. 1, pp. 52-66, p. 54; Peter Lentini, *Statistical Data on Women in the USSR* (Glasgow: Lorton Paper No. 10, 1994), Table 2., p. 4.

8. See her biography in Pavel Gazukin (compiler), *Kto yest' kto v Rossiiskom pravitel'stve* (Moscow: Panorama, April 1992), pp.38-39.

9. A. S. Barsenkov, V. A. Koretskii and A. I. Ostapenko, *Politicheskaya Rossiya segodnya: predstavitel'naya vlast'* (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1993), pp. 68, 349, 355; Galina Myl'nikova's interview with Vinogradova appears in 'Spasat-zalozheno v vas prirodui', *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 22 June 1993, p. 2.

10. 'Postanovlenie Tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi komissii po vyboram v Sovet Federatsii i po vyboram v Gosudarstvennyu Dumu Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii Vybory deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 12 dekabrya 1993 goda O registratsii obshechefederal'nogo



spiska kandidatov v deputaty Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii vydviznutogo izbiratel'nym ob"edineniem "Budushchee Rossii-Novye Imena", No. 37 (10 November 1993) in *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 12 November 1993, p. 7; 'Obshchefederal'nyi spisok kandidatov Ot izbiratel'nogo ob"edineniya "Budushchee Rossii-Novye Imena" vydvynuty kandidatami v deputaty Gosudarstvennoi Dumy na osnovanii Protokola zasedaniya polnomochnykh predstavitelei Molodezhnogo dvizheniya v podderzhku Narodnoi partii Svobodaya Rossiya i Politiko-ekonomicheskoi assotsiatsii "Grazhdanskii Soyuz" No. 5 ot 6 noyabrya 1993 goda', *ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

11. I. Morzhetto, 'Portret deputata', *Argumenty i fakty*, 1993, No. 49, p. 4.

12. See Tat'yana Khudyakova's interview with Fedulova, 'Alevtina Fedulova: Nashe dvizhenie sledovalo by nazvat' "Zhenshchiny dlya Rossii"', *Izvestiya*, 2 December 1993, p. 4.

13. See, for instance, *12 dekabrya 1993 goda. Izbiratel'nyi byulleten' po vyboram deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Obshchefederal'nyi izbiratel'nyi okrug. Gorod Moskva* (official ballot paper 2).

14. 'Postanovlenie Tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi komissii po vyboram v Sovet Federatsii i po vyboram v Gosudarstvennuyu Dumu Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii Vybory deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 12 dekabrya 1993 goda O registratsii obshchefederal'nogo spiska kandidatov v deputaty Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii vydviznutogo izbiratel'nym ob"edineniem "Konstruktivno-ekologicheskoe dvizhenie Rossii (Kedr)", No. 25 (10 November 1993), *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 12 December 1993, p. 3; 'Obshchefederal'nyi spisok kandidatov Ot izbiratel'nogo ob"edineniya "Konstruktivno-ekologicheskoe dvizhenie Rossii (KEDR)" vydvynuty kandidatami v deputaty Gosudarstvennoi Dumy na osnovanii resheniya rasshirennogo zasedaniya Koordinatsionnogo Soveta "Konstruktivno-ekologicheskoe dvizhenie Rossii (KEDR)" ot 2 noyabrya 1993 goda, *ibid.*

15. 'Postanovlenie Tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi komissii po vyboram v Sovet Federatsii i po vyboram v Gosudarstvennuyu Dumu Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii Vybory deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 12 dekabrya 1993 goda O registratsii obshchefederal'nogo spiska kandidatov v deputaty Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii vydviznutogo izbiratel'nym ob"edineniem 'Liberal'no-demokraticeskaya partiya Rossii', No. 26, (10 November 1993), *ibid.* and *Yuridicheskaya gazeta*, 1993, Nos. 40-41, pp. 6; 'Obshchefederal'nyi spisok kandidatov Ot izbiratel'nogo ob"edineniya 'Liberal'no-demokraticeskaya partiya Rossii', vydvynutykh kandidatami v deputaty Gosudarstvennoi Dumy resheniem Vysshego Soveta LDPR ot 3 noyabrya 1993 goda', *ibid.*, pp. 6-7 and *Rossiiskaya gazeta* 12 November 1993, p. 3; 'Spisok kandidatov LDPR v Gosudarstvennuyu Dumu po odnomandatnym izbiratel'nym okrugam', *Yuridicheskaya gazeta*, 1993, Nos. 40-41, p. 7; 'Spisok deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, izbrannykh po obshchefederal'nomu izbiratel'nomu okrugam', *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 28 December 1993, pp. 2 - 3; 'Spisok deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, izbrannykh po odnomandatnym izbiratel'nym okrugam', *ibid.*, pp. 3 - 5.

16. 'Postanovlenie Tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi komissii po vyboram v Sovet Federatsii i po vyboram v Gosudarstvennuyu Dumu Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii Vybory deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 12 dekabrya 1993 goda O registratsii obshchefederal'nogo spiska kandidatov v deputaty Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii vydviznutogo izbiratel'nym ob"edineniem "Agrarnaya partiya Rossii"', No. 27 (10 November 1993), *ibid.*, 12 November 1993, pp. 3-4 and 'Obshchefederal'nyi spisok Ot izbiratel'nogo ob"edineniya "Agrarnaya partiya Rossii" vydvynutykh kandidatam v deputaty Gosudarstvennoi Dumy na osnovanii reshenii vtorogo (vneocherednoi) s"ezda Agrarnoi partii Rossii (APR) 16 oktyabrya 1993 goda', *ibid.*, p. 4.

17. 'Postanovlenie Tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi komissii po vyboram v Sovet Federatsii i po vyboram v Gosudarstvennuyu Dumu Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii Vybory deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 12 dekabrya 1993 goda O registratsii obshchefederal'nogo spiska kandidatov v deputaty Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii vydviznutogo izbiratel'nym ob"edineniem "Grazhdanskii soyuz vo imya stabil'nosti, spravedlivosti i progressa"', No. 28 (10

November 1993), *ibid.*, pp. 4-5; 'Obshchefederal'nyi spisok kandidatov Ot izbiratel'nogo ob"edineniya "Grazhdanskii soyuz vo imya stabil'nosti, spravedlivosti i progressa" vydvinyty kandidataimi v deputaty Gosudarstvennoi Dumy na osnovanii resheniya izbiratel'nogo ob"edineniya ot 21 oktyabrya 1993 g.', *ibid.*, p. 5.

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19. 'Postanovlenie Tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi komissii po vyboram v Sovet Federatsii i po vyboram v Gosudarstvennyu Dumu Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii Vybory deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 12 dekabrya 1993 goda O registratsii obshchefederal'nogo spiska kandidatov v deputaty Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii vydvidnutogo izbiratel'nym ob"edineniem "Rossiiskoe dvizhenie demokraticeskikh reform", No. 31 (10 November 1993), *ibid.*, p. 6; 'Obshchefederal'nyi spisok kandidatov Ot izbiratel'nogo ob"edineniya "Rossiiskoe dvizhenie demokraticeskikh reform" vydvinyty kandidataimi v deputaty Gosudarstvennoi Dumy na osnovanii Postanovleniya Politicheskogo Soveta ot 6 noyabrya 1993 goda, protokol No. 15', *ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

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26. *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: odinnadtsatyi sozyv* (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1984), p. 4.

27. *Sostav Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR, Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, postoyannykh komissii palat i komitetov Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: statisticheski sbornik* (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1989), pp. 17 and 21.

28. Gregory J. Embree, 'RSFSR Election Results and Roll Call Votes', *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 6, 1991, pp. 1065-1084, at p. 1066.

29. Information from the author's database and published in Dmitrii Orlov, 'Portret Dumy v tsifrakh' indicate that the deputies from the LDPR were on average less educated than the the federal list of deputies. The former indicates that 88.1 per cent of the LDPR deputies as opposed to 95.1 per cent of all deputies while the latter indicates that 89.9 per cent of the LDPR's deputies achieved higher education compared to 94.4 per cent of the deputies.

30. Matthew Wyman, Bill Miller, Stephen White and Paul Heywood, 'Parties and Voters in the December 1993 Elections' in Peter Lentini (ed.), *Elections and Political Order in Russia: The Implications of the 1993 Elections to the Federal Assembly* (Budapest, London and New York: Central European University Press, 1995), pp. 124-142.

31. James L. Gibson and Raymond M. Duch, 'The Origins of a Democratic Culture in the Soviet Union: Modeling the Acquisition of Democratic Values', Unpublished manuscript, Version 2.1 (nd), pp. 9-10, cited in Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., 'Comparative Politics and Lessons for the Present', in Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., Erik P. Hoffmann and Edward W. Walker, 'Wither Post-Sovietology?', *The Harriman Institute Forum*, Vol. 6, Nos. 6 - 7 (February-March 1993), pp. 1-13, pp. 11-12.

32. Glasgow University Team on Public Opinion and Democratic Consolidation in Russia and East Europe, 'Zhirinovskiy's Voters', Press Release No. 5 (1994), p. 2.

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34. Daniel Nelson, 'Citizen Participation in Romania: The People's Council Deputy' in Daniel Nelson, (ed.) *Local Politics in Communist Countries* (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1980), pp. 90-120, cited in Jeffrey W. Hahn, *Soviet Grassroots: Citizen Participation in Local Soviet Government* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988), pp. 257-258.
35. For a discussion of the powers and responsibilities attributed to politicians working as administrators and presidential representatives See Richard Sakwa, *Russian Politics and Society* (London: Routledge, 1993), Chapter 5 and John Miller, *Yeltsin's Reconstruction of Provincial Administration: An Old or New Pattern* (Melbourne: Monash University Slavic Section East Europe Forum Working Paper No. 1, 1995).
36. For a discussion of the importance of local ties in the 1993 elections see Elena Omel'chenko and Hilary Pilkington, 'Stabilization or Stagnation: A Regional Perspective' in Peter Lentini (ed.), *Elections and Political Order in Russia*, pp. 143-166.
37. Yurii Buida, 'Russkii noyabr': oppozitsionnost' vkhodit v modu', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 2 December 1993, pp. 1, 3.
38. 'Kto predenduet na mesta na novom parlamente', *Izvestiya*, 28 October 1993, p. 4.
39. This information is contained in V. G. Gel'bras, et al., *Kto yest' chto: politicheskaya Moskva 1993* (Moscow: Catallaxy, 1993), pp. 233 - 239, at p. 233. A
40. See 'Odnomandatnye okruga po vyboram v Gosudarstvennuyu Dumu v 1993 godu', *Izvestiya*, 13 October 1993, p. 4 and *ibid.*, 14 October 1993, p. 4; 'Spisok kandidatov ot LDPR...po odnomandatnym izbiratel'nym okrugam'.
41. Data on candidates who served previously in the RSFSR Congress and Supreme Soviet derived from 'Stepen' podderzhki politicheskikh i ekonomicheskikh reform', *Argumenty i fakty*, 1993, No. 49, p. 4. are

## Chapter 8. Conclusion

This dissertation has demonstrated that there have been elements of continuity, contradiction and departure in Soviet and Russian elections <sup>during</sup> 1984-1993. Before Gorbachev's elevation to CPSU General Secretary, elections in the USSR were considered shams. The regime mobilised-or perhaps it may be more appropriate to state coerced-voters into casting their ballots for Party-approved candidates who stood unopposed. Moreover, these candidates did not even have any concrete programmes upon which they based their campaign strategies. The legislatures to which they were elected were more aptly described as ceremonial gatherings of the 'ideal' Soviet citizens. These soviets existed to rubber stamp previously-adopted CPSU directives.

Gorbachev enacted a comprehensive reform programme which attempted to restructure the Soviet economy. *Perestroika* was also supplemented by *glasnost*' which opened up the scope of political discussion and political reforms which included a restructuring of the state system, a greater acceptance for republican and local autonomy, a transference of political authority from Party to state institutions, a revamping of the electoral system and the encouragement of greater civic participation in political life. Despite these innovations, until 1990 the CPSU <sup>in the eyes of the Soviet regime,</sup> was still considered the sole, legitimate political organisation. Although there was a wealth of legislation introduced in the reform programme, there were no limitations placed upon the Party.

Electoral reforms under Gorbachev could be considered examples of liberalisation because the rights Soviet voters exercised at the polls had not been prohibited earlier. Rather, they were never implemented. Moreover, the CPSU had an organisational and material superiority in the 1989 elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and

subsequent elections to republican legislatures. The Party also interfered in the campaign to limit the effectiveness of non-endorsed or opposition candidates. These actions established a continuity in Soviet electoral politics<sup>o</sup> the Party was still overseeing the conduct of the elections and restricting some elements of choice. Therefore, this could have been considered a contradiction in the regime's efforts to institutionalise political reforms.

Nevertheless, the 1989 elections were a substantial departure from previous elections. First, the level of competitiveness increased dramatically. In 1984, the last pre-reform election to the USSR Supreme Soviet there was no competition among candidates. However, it would be entirely incorrect to claim that all deputies elected to the Congress won their seats in <sup>a</sup> competitive manner. Earlier it was established that nearly 400 USSR People's Deputies won their seats without competition in the territorial and national-territorial districts. Moreover, the average Soviet voter was denied his or her active electoral right in relation to the social organisation deputies. Indeed, only the elite could select these representatives. The fact that there was, on average, slightly more than one candidate per seat further strengthens the argument that the Party largely controlled the election campaign.

However, it must be <sup>asserted</sup> that even in an absence of universal competition there were signs that the regime would allow voters to have their say and honour their choices when they successfully agitated *against* and defeated Party-endorsed candidates. Even in constituencies where candidates stood unopposed voters had to enter ballot booths and decide whether or not to keep their ballot papers unmarked and vote in the

candidate's favour or to strike out the individual's name and cast a vote against him or her. Case evidence from Leningrad demonstrates that (a) the Party-endorsed candidates were indeed defeated and (b) candidates who stood unopposed did not always win. These factors can certainly be considered innovations.

In addition, the flow of information increased substantially to accommodate the explosion in the number of candidates. Soviet television, although not considered completely objective or thorough in its campaign coverage by the electorate, introduced new programmes to inform voters of the changes to the electoral system. In addition, candidates stood on the basis of platforms and the electorate had the opportunity to choose its representatives in accordance with particular objectives. There were specific deficiencies in these platforms: there was no guarantee <sup>of</sup> how candidates could keep their campaign promises; most of the points of the candidates' manifestos were slogans rather than well-developed, achievable policies and many of the candidates competing against each other in the same constituencies sought to further identical policies. In this respect the electorate was forced to make its choices on the candidates' personal qualities. Therefore, the programmes were not very effective political tools. Nevertheless, this innovation was a form of quality control mechanism introduced into the Soviet electoral system-one which created (theoretically) a means whereby citizens could observe how closely deputies represented their interests. Thus, there was at least some incentive for the legislators to take seriously their constituents' demands-even in the face of democratic centralism.



The elections to the Congress can be considered a departure from previous Soviet electoral practices because candidate competition became a core component of the political system. This was reflected in the extent of competition in Soviet local and republican elections conducted in 1989-1990. The number of candidates increased substantially in these elections. Moreover, a greater number of political organisations participated in these contests by supporting candidates. However, the CPSU was still the only legal political organisation allowed to contest these elections. Thus, the Party's efforts not to recognise formally these organisations and stifle their potential effectiveness and harass their members and leaders may be considered forms of continuity from previous practices. It is also somewhat of a contradiction in the Party's efforts to increase civic involvement in Soviet politics.

The composition of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies also reinforces the themes of continuity, contradiction and departure in Soviet elections. It is true, however, that there were particular representation patterns that were consistent with previous elections. Men were most abundant among the legislators. CPSU members formed the lion's share of the parliamentarians.

However, the revamped electoral system helped to create a deputy corps that departed radically from those elected under the old style conditions. First, the vast majority of Soviet deputies had not served previously in a national-level legislature. This fact stands in stark contrast to pre-reform USSR Supreme Soviet deputies-particularly when the examples raised in Chapter 3 are considered-of whom nearly 41 per cent were directly re-elected from the previous convocation.

The electoral reforms also affected women's representation significantly. Women's overall share in the national legislature decreased by about one half between 1984<sup>and</sup> 1989. Soviet voters elected a greater number of professionals to the Congress than they did to any previous Supreme Soviet. However, women were more likely than men to be employed in manual industrial or agricultural labour. Nevertheless, the overall share of women with professional qualifications increased substantially in comparison with the those elected to the Eleventh Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The combination of political reforms, reduced Party influence over the legislative agenda and more competent women representatives was reflected in the fact that more women parliamentarians contributed to the First USSR Congress of People's Deputies than they did during the Eleventh Convocation of the Supreme Soviet—a factor which can be partially be attributed to the Congress's longer periods in session.

Elections to the Russian Federation's Federal Assembly in December 1993 certainly contained elements of continuity with Soviet practices. A dominant institution (the presidency) decreed the elections, included provisions to try to 'rig' the elections in favour of its supporters and had 'its people' overseeing the conduct of the elections. That the elections occurred after Yeltsin forcibly dissolved the Russian Parliament can also be considered as a contradiction between democratic intentions and deeds.

Nevertheless, the electoral provisions that governed Russia's first post-Soviet elections were a radical departure from those that coordinated pre-reform (and to an extent reform-era) Soviet elections. Within less than nine years, the electoral system had developed from an 'acclamatory' manifestation to a multiparty variant. Although some of the

electoral associations had similar objectives and voters in many instances cast their ballots for them based on the individuals who led them, these electoral associations still managed to appeal to particular segments of the electorate. However, it must be reiterated that party politics was (and still is) in its infancy. The 'independent' variable was extremely important in the constituencies. Nevertheless, political organisations, some of which were openly antagonistic to the President and Government of the Russian Federation, won seats in the Parliament.

In addition, the composition of the first post-Soviet Russian legislature more closely resembled Western parliaments in the sense of its greater share of deputies who had received tertiary education and the proportion of professionals elected to it. However, many of the deputies and Senators elected to the Federal Assembly's first convocation were either linked to the Yeltsin Administration, appointed by Yeltsin or elevated to their positions by political parties. Therefore, in many instances, Russian voters did not have complete popular control over their representatives. Their legislators' allegiances went elsewhere.

In this dissertation's 'Preface', the present author contends that the transition from the pre-reform Soviet electoral system to the Russian Federation's multiparty framework can best be explained through a fusion of institutional, democratisation (or transition), civil society and political culture approaches to political science. The evidence presented in the preceding chapters clearly demonstrates the importance of the leading institution in initiating electoral reform, setting the parameters and scope for change, its tolerance of civil involvement in the hustings and, on occasion, in how much it interferes in the

campaign. Despite the fact that these institutions may have tried to restrict particular individuals and political organisations <sup>in</sup> from winning seats in the respective parliaments, they were unable to prevent them from entering into them. This can be partially explained because the leading institutions created conditions which allowed civil society to participate in the political process and the (frequently) anti-systemic political organisations took advantage of the new political atmosphere to advance their causes, agitate for their preferred candidates and against regime-sponsored or supported candidates (Soviet period) or field their own lists of contenders (1993 Federal Assembly elections). Moreover, Soviet and post-Soviet political culture has demonstrated an anti-systemic pattern in its voting behaviour. In addition, competition has now become embedded in the political culture and has helped create an acceptance for the 'rules of the game'. It is most important to point out that both the leaders and the electorate adhere to the principle that the results of elections must be honoured. Therefore, in accordance with the democratisation literature, it is apparent that despite the leading institution's interference, there is a commitment to democracy. In addition, the numerous 'hiccups' in electoral management and the regime's and pundits' misinterpretations and misreadings of political events may be partially attributed to the fact that setbacks are bound to occur during transitions and that the political climate is fluid, with institutions and bases of social support not clearly-defined.

Russia is currently governed by a presidentially-dominated political system. However, as the present author has demonstrated elsewhere, this does not mean that the Parliament has allowed Yeltsin to reign unchecked. Despite its constitutional limitations, the Russian Federal Assembly has worked within its powers to voice its disapproval of

policies ranging from the intervention into Chechnya, the pace of economic reform and Yeltsin's choices of judges and ministers. Moreover, the Parliament has contested the constitutionality of Yeltsin's secret decrees sanctioning the Chechen campaign, has tried to lobby to begin impeachment proceedings against Yeltsin and has conducted several votes of confidence in the Chernomyrdin Government. Although these instances demonstrate that there are strong divergences of opinion between the executive and legislative branches, these conflicts were all conducted within the constitutionally-defined guidelines. The 'opposition' did not organise mass demonstrations to bring down the existing order and transform society by 'extra-legal' means. Yeltsin did not use tanks against the parliament to resolve issues in his favour.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the two sides have also demonstrated that they can work through legislation peacefully and make concessions for the greater good of the country and political system. The conciliatory manner in which the President, Federation Council and State Duma were able to reach agreement on, first, the 1995 State Duma Election Law and, second, the formation of the Federation Council after considerable deliberations illustrates this point.<sup>2</sup>

Elections are important features in Russian politics. However, they suffer from some deficiencies which should be identified. First, not all the country's regional executive <sup>n position</sup> were filled by election. Rather, Yeltsin has appointed regional and subject administrators since early after the 1991 coup attempt and has suspended gubernatorial elections. It is only recently that elections to these positions have been held. Therefore, there is a minority of governors who won their seats through an election. However, it is now required that all governors have to be elected by December 1996. Second, the population's interest in regional and local elections during 1994 declined significantly. As

a result there were many constituencies in which fewer than 25 per cent of the electorate voted for their legislators. Consequently, these representative organs began their sessions only partially-staffed. Moreover, the democrats demonstrated their organisational weakness and divisiveness and the opposition showed their numerical and political efficiency and their abilities to tap into popular concerns in the contests to these legislatures.<sup>3</sup> As a result, the KPRF demonstrated its position as the country's most powerful political organisation and this carried into the December 1995 elections to the State Duma.

There are, however, some points which can further demonstrate how radically elections and the institutions they produced have departed from the pre-reform era. First, the Russian Federal Assembly elected in 1993 completed its constitutionally-defined period in office. This is significant because this convocation of the Parliament was the first legislature to sit for a full term since electoral reforms began. Second, the elections to the Second Convocation of the State Duma were conducted within the prescribed time period-notwithstanding the fact that Russian commentators feared that the hustings might not occur. Third, anti-Yeltsin and anti-government forces scored considerable victories at the polls. Nevertheless, the election results were honoured and the Communist-dominated Parliament is currently functioning. However, during the <sup>1996</sup> presidential campaign, Yeltsin demonstrated his reliance on old-style tactics of censorship and negative campaigning to help boost his chance of victory.<sup>4</sup>

Elections under Gorbachev and Yeltsin have demonstrated elements of continuity with their pre-reform Soviet predecessors. These actions have contradicted the leading

institutions' intentions to introduce greater elements of democracy into their respective political systems. Nevertheless, the accumulation of changes these institutions introduced, their strengths, popular support, commitments to democratic principles, tolerance of civil society, civic involvement, the attitude of the population towards the political system and their final judgments on election day have resulted in a significant departure from those elections held in the pre-reform period.

### NOTES

1. Peter Lentini, 'Conclusion' in Peter Lentini (ed.), *Elections and Political Order in Russia: The Implications of the 1993 Elections to the Federal Assembly* (Budapest, London & New York: Central European University Press, 1995).
2. Peter Lentini, 'Elections and the Russian Political Order' paper presented to Centre for Russian and Euro-Asian Studies, Melbourne University, 7 August 1995 (unpublished manuscript, 1995).
3. I have argued these points earlier in Peter Lentini, *Russia on the Eve of the 1995 Elections* (Melbourne: Monash University Slavic Section's East Europe Forum Occasional Paper No. 4, 1995) and 'Conclusion' in *Elections and Political Order in Russia*.
4. Peter Lentini, 'Reflections on the 1996 Russian Presidential Elections', *Centre for Russian and Euro-Asian Studies Russian and Euro-Asian Economics Bulletin*, Vol. 5, No. 7 (July 1996), pp. 1-8.

## Bibliography



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## Errata

### List of Abbreviations and acronyms

AN-USSR Academy of Sciences  
APR-Agrarian Party of Russia  
DD-Duma District Seats in 1993 Federal Assembly Elections  
DI-Democratic Initiative Party  
DiM-Dignity and Charity  
DL-Duma Party List Seats in 1993 Federal Assembly Elections  
DOSAAF-Voluntary Society for Solidarity with the Armed Forces  
DR-Democratic Russia  
EZNR-Entrepreneurs for a New Russia  
FA-Federal Assembly  
FC-Federation Council  
GS-Civic Union  
KDP-PNS-Constitutional-Democratic Party/People's Freedom Party  
KPR-Peasants' Party of Russia  
KPRF-Communist Party of the Russian Federation  
KSM-Komsomol  
KSovZh-Soviet Women's Committee  
LDPR-Liberal Democratic Party of Russia  
NPRF-People's Party of the Russian Federation  
NRPR-National Republican Party of Russia  
PES-Party of Economic Freedom  
PRES-Party of Russian Unity and Accord  
PSS-Party of Social Justice  
PT-Labour Party  
RDDR-Russian Democratic Reform Movement  
RES-Union of Russian Entrepreneurs  
RKhDS-ND-Russian Christian Democratic Union-New Democracy Party  
RNA-Russian National Assembly  
ROS-Russian All-People's Union  
RPRF-Republican Party of the Russian Federation  
RPST-Russian Party of Free Labour  
RTS-Russian Theatrical Workers' Union  
SDPRF-Social Democratic Party of the Russian Federation  
SKK-Union of Communists of Karelia  
SPT-Socialist Workers' Party  
SyDRPF-Free Democratic Party of the Russian Federation  
VR-Russia's Choice  
VVIT-All-Union Association of Veterans of War and Labour

