Degree of MPhil.

"A War of Their Own"-

Home Front Morale Assessment and Scottish Ideological Need in Glasgow, 1939-41

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Submitted to the University of Glasgow-
Faculty of Arts; December, 2000

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Thesis Abstract

Perhaps the most definitive image of the Second World War experience in Great Britain is that of civilian population as military target- a society that heroically braced itself against the odds, and with an unprecedented sense of unity and sacrifice weathered the attacks of the German Luftwaffe to emerge victorious. The war of 1939-45 was unlike all others preceding it, and this was in large part due to the unavoidably pronounced role for civilians in victory (or defeat). Of course, the concept of a direct contribution by civilians to the war effort of their respective country was nothing new; in the last war, for example, civilians who worked in factories that supported forces on the continent were directly tied to the outcome of the conflict. In this war, however, the technology insured that factories and towns themselves would be targets of bombardment.

In preparation for this unprecedented form of Home Front warfare, the British Government enacted emergency legislation and took complete control over virtually every aspect of British society, using centralised planning and policy to transform the country into an active war zone. Naturally, however, the complete control that the wartime Government had assumed over the country was one that did not end at the mere practical side of war mobilisation. The survival of the British nation on the Home Front required that people throughout Britain risk their lives in ARP (Air Raid Prevention) duties, work overtime in war jobs, and give up many of the amenities and conveniences of their lives for the sake of the war effort.

This kind of unified effort and determination required an ideological basis, amply provided by the nationalist sense of unity and common purpose that the struggle against the Axis brought to the fore. At the outset of war in 1939, however, the Government could not be sure that this collective unity and confidence (or morale) could sustain the widespread panic and disillusion that the bombing of civilians could cause. The national identity and determination of the country may have provided a fundamental basis for action and mobilisation on the Home Front, but the new importance of public opinion and the well-being of Britain's people as the war continued demanded Whitehall's attention. To address this issue, the Ministry of Information was formed for the purpose of monitoring and guiding "collective morale", as well as coordinating war news and conveying centralised Government policy to the wartime media. Likewise, the new medium of radio broadcasting, though nominally under the authority of Whitehall, would become in the hands of the British Broadcasting Corporation a powerful independent force in the fortification of morale through propaganda. But unlike other more tangible factors in war, public morale was not easily measured or even defined, and thus lent itself easily to the biases of those who attempted to assess it.

It is within this broad realm of the loosely defined, yet vital factors of ideology and morale on the British Home Front that this thesis is concerned. However, while the work must include discussion of the British Home Front and trends in Government policy pertaining to morale and propaganda, its focus will be upon the Glasgow area in the period of relatively heavy air attack culminating in 1941, which constituted Germany's only direct offensive on Britain's shores. For even as Britain alone stood unified against Nazi conquest in Europe, Whitehall's assessment of public morale along the Clyde reflected trepidation, heavily rooted in perceptions of Scotland as a distinct nation within Britain. Though Home Front experience was fundamentally the same for civilians throughout Britain, this thesis will show that wartime ideology and propaganda had very unique implications in Glasgow, due to a perceived ethos of nationhood that was not being adequately reinforced from London.

While the volume of published works that discuss civilian morale in Britain during this period is extensive, there are few if any that approach a study of the Scottish Home Front as a distinct nation. There are many possible reasons for this, including the virtually indisputable exigency for British unity that the prospect of total war had brought, as well as the inherent difficulties of historical study which is heavily centered on such broad terms. Using research relating to the wartime Government's domestic campaign to maintain and reinforce public morale, this thesis seeks to explore the influence of what became known as "special ideological needs" of the people of Scotland, including outlets for a unique strain of nationalism, administrative devolution, and increased media attention to Scottish Home Front concerns and problems. These "special needs" were certainly perceived in Glasgow, which was the region's most populous city and the only Scottish area to undergo heavy bombing during the war. Perhaps as a result of these distinctions, Scotland's needs as stated by politicians seem largely based on reports and perceptions emanating from this area.

In looking at the interplay of public morale issues with the development and implementation of Government policy on the Home Front, it becomes apparent that the Clydeside experience evidences a unique incarnation of British wartime nationalism. By identifying and examining the claims of exceptional ideological issues and alleged threats to wartime ideology present within Glasgow, I hope to provide an in-depth look into the substance of what was thought to be necessary for preserving civilians' unity and war effort. In studying the British Home Front along these lines, my conclusions will not only show the level of legitimacy that total war on the Home Front brought to specialised interests within Scotland, but will reveal the shortcomings of British policy and propaganda where it was specifically geared toward the alleged ideological needs of a nation within a nation.

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Chapter 1-

Introduction

At the onset of war in 1939, there was little significant doubt that the people of Glasgow would willingly join the rest of Britain in the fight for survival that the declaration of war against Germany entailed. The attempts of Chamberlain and others to stay the outbreak of total war had failed, and the United Kingdom was bracing itself for what could be yet another devastating conflict in Europe. As the perception and reality of Nazi tyranny spread unchecked across Europe, the possibility that the war would be fought on British soil was one that very few ignored, especially after the failure of Appeasement as a diplomatic alternative to hostilities.

The war would soon come to Great Britain. By 1939, probably no event in the nation's history had prepared it for the direct involvement that would be demanded of the general population. Whereas the last war had been fought almost solely by armies on the battlefields of Europe, this war was destined to be fought in every domestic city as well, by civilians on the streets, volunteer firemen and air raid recovery personnel, and in the factories as the country directly faced the ordeal of mass warfare. The Germans' ability to fly bombers on missions over British cities made the civilian population of Britain virtual combatants, and every town a possible battlefield.

With civilian areas as potential military targets for bombers and possibly even an invading army, the vital (and unprecedented) importance of the Home Front for this war was inescapable to the nation's leaders as well as the individuals on the ground. Consequently, mobilsation for war in Britain would quickly transform the social, political, and

individuals on the ground. Consequently, mobilsation for war in Britain would quickly transform the social, political, and economic landscape of the country. In order to hasten this transformation from a peacetime civilian society to that of a nation at war, a body of temporary laws known as Defence Regulations were enacted in 1939, which gave Whitehall the power to rule virtually by decree over all aspects of British society.[1] For the duration of what would become a global conflict, the job of "running the war" became an all-pervasive priority for the British government and a way of life for the rest of the country. As a result of these regulations, combined with the general mind set of war mobilsation that manifested itself throughout Britain, the Government took on a broader view of its own responsibilities than ever before. Using these wartime measures, Whitehall guided the war effort on every imaginable level with centralised planning and policy-making.

While the responsibility of the Government for its people expanded during war mobilsation, the role of civic duty became a fact of life for the British people. Warfare on the Home Front required that many civilians take part in the defence of Britain. For some, this meant serving duties in an environment that could often become every bit as frightening and dangerous as a conventional battlefield. By

[1] Of significant value in relating the stated Government policies on the Home Front to events occurring in Glasgow and elsewhere was the political study entitled Civil Liberties During the Second World War by Neil Stammers (Croom-Helm, 1983). His work traces the development of Defence Regulations through the course of the war and helped to provide vital background on the creation and implementation of the legislative measures that both enabled and guided ongoing wartime policies. Among those relevant here are policies on censorship, prosecution of individuals, and various types of domestic political activity, including Communism.

frightening and dangerous as a conventional battlefield. By June of 1940, for example, local ARP (Air Raid Prevention) and other Civil Defence organisations throughout the country employed almost a thousand civilians as air raid wardens, rescue crews, messengers, and firefighters. After training, these volunteers had to maintain a state of readiness to prevent and minimise the horrors of mass warfare in their respective areas[2]. In addition to these personnel engaged in the generalised ARP services, thousands more would do their part from within the other branches of Civil Defence, such as the Casualty Service and Auxiliary Police[3].

Naturally, the complete control that the wartime Government had assumed over the country did not end merely at the practical side of war mobilsation. If the survival of the British nation on the Home Front required people to risk their lives in ARP duties, work overtime in war jobs, and give up many of the amenities and conveniences of their lives for the sake of the war effort, then this kind of unified effort required an ideological basis. This was provided in large measure by an evolving sense of national unity and common purpose that emerged through Britain's struggle against the Axis.

Fundamentally, the common ideology that motivated civilians' collective war effort and the militarised culture of the Home Front itself was British nationalism. If the people of Britain showed a willingness to endure the hardship and sacrifices of war, then it must have been because they believed that Britain was worth fighting for. Of course,

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[2] Terence O'Brien, Civil Defence, HMSO (London) 1955, Appendix X.
[3] O'Brien, Appendix X.

believed that Britain was worth fighting for. Of course, nationalism as a doctrine or ideology could encompass varying shades of social, cultural, or political opinion. For example, individuals or groups within the country could be unified in fighting to save Britain from the aggressions of the common foe, even if they internalized conflicting definitions of Britain and what it meant to be British. As long as the common threat endured, such differences would seem relatively superficial, co-opted by the common cause.

In 1939, however, the Government could not be sure that this collective unity and confidence would withstand the kind of widespread panic and disillusionment that could be caused by a massive bombing campaign against civilians. Lacking direct experience in this new form of warfare, Whitehall could only speculate as to the psychological effects of such attacks against urban areas. Resting their estimations on casualty rates from a few zeppelin raids during the previous war, Whitehall made forecasts based on new technology and had come to expect the worst[4].

Due in part to this grim projection, the Government from the earliest days of war mobilsation began to concern itself directly with taking active steps to strengthen and preserve public morale. The nationalist identity and determination of the country may have provided a foundation for action and mobilsation on the wartime Home Front, but the new importance of public opinion and the ongoing threat to the well-being of Britain's people demanded Whitehall's attention. In 1935, as the menace of another European war grew more imminent, the Ministry of Information was planned as an extension of the

[4] O'Brien, p.283.

Ministry of Information was planned as an extension of the Home Office, for the purpose of monitoring and guiding "collective morale". Additionally, it was responsible for coordinating war news and conveying centralised Government policy to the media throughout the country in the event of war. Though fundamentally modeled after Goebbels' Ministry of Propaganda in Germany, the MoI would spend most of the war constantly reevaluating its role and functions within the British wartime Government and adapting to changing conditions on the Home Front as they were perceived.[5]

Clearly, the active role to be taken by civilians in Britain made morale on the Home Front a vital issue. Unlike more tangible aspects of the war effort, however, morale was not easily measured or defined in specific terms. Tonnage of shipping produced, the rate of air raid shelter construction, and levels of factory worker absenteeism, for example, could be easily monitored and effort directed according to where it was needed. Morale and the general state of public opinion itself, on the other hand, could not be empirically measured. As a result it was subjected to a wide spectrum of definitions, depending on the context within which it was being interpreted. Even Tom Harrisson, co-founder of Mass Observation, an investigative body which submitted case-studies to Whitehall on the state of morale in various areas throughout the war, was quoted as having remarked, "I am unable to define morale. It is too complex and variable"[6] .

On its most basic level, morale on the Home Front may be defined as the moral and mental ability of civilians to

[5] Ian McLaine, Ministry of Morale, London: Allen and Unwin, 1979, p.2.
[6] McLaine, p.8.

defined as the moral and mental ability of civilians to withstand the hardships and sacrifices of war, coupled with public confidence in Britain's ability to eventually win. However, beyond this basic definition, its complexity and variability arise, because the term is linked directly to the wider issue of the ideology of nationalism and its role in the everyday life of civilians. In much the same way that the common ideology toward British victory could encompass any number of varying shades of secondary opinion, the state of morale could be subject to varied interpretation. In 1941, for example, morale in Glasgow seemed precarious to observers from London, who in making their evaluation carried with them the bias of a different, English strain of wartime nationalism.

It is within this broad realm of the loosely defined, yet vitally important factors of ideology and morale on the British Home Front that this thesis is concerned. The work necessarily includes a general discussion of the British Home Front, but its emphasis will be upon the experience of Glasgow from the onset of war through the period of heavy German aerial attack that had abated by the end of 1941. It was during this period that a general collapse in morale as feared by Whitehall probably would have most directly affected the course of the war, since it was these first years that witnessed Germany's only direct offensive against the shores of Great Britain. The attacks of the Luftwaffe were the danger that most concerned the British Government in their speculations of civilian morale, and it was during this time that enemy bombing brought the war directly to British civilians in their own homes. In contrast, Britain by 1942

time that enemy bombing brought the war directly to British civilians in their own homes. In contrast, Britain by 1942 would no longer be standing alone against Germany, and large-scale civilian bombing would soon be more frequent within Germany than in London and other areas. Although ultimate victory was still a long way off at the end of 1941, it was within this period that Britain achieved its most important wartime goal- that of its own survival.

As Scotland's largest city and wartime industrial centre, there was good reason for Glasgow to be the subject of Government concern surrounding civilian morale during the first years of the war. Indeed, these characteristics made the city such a likely target for the Luftwaffe, that the Mass Observation Unit had possessed the foresight to conduct their morale study just before the attack that would strike the city in March of 1941. Their alarmist results, when compared with reports made after the Clydeside Blitz, reveal that Whitehall acknowledged Glasgow and the Scottish region even in wartime as a culturally distinct nation from the rest of Britain. For though on a general level Home Front experience was fundamentally the same for civilians throughout Britain, the issues of morale and wartime ideology had very unique ramifications along the Clyde, due to presumptions on both sides of the border relating to distinct Scottish nationhood. In spite of the common cause being embraced throughout Britain, reports from Glasgow portrayed a group of civilians who saw their role as part of a nation within a nation, creating the perception of unique needs for morale maintenance that were apparently not being met by the propaganda policies of the centralised Government.

morale maintenance that were apparently not being met by the propaganda policies of the centralised Government.

While the volume of published works that discuss civilian morale in Britain as a whole during this period is extensive, there are few if any that approach a study of the Scottish Home Front as a distinct nation. There are many possible reasons for this, including the civic unification of British nationalism that the prospect of total war had brought to the Home Front. Also not to be discounted are the inherent difficulties of historical study that is heavily centered on such broad terms. Of equal breadth is the range of archival material now available from the period that directly or indirectly touches upon morale where an aspect of the civilian war effort is discussed. Consistently involved in morale and propaganda from inside the Government was the Ministry of Information. Though the Ministry's files suffer the same shortcomings as other documents on the matter of morale, they nonetheless provide valuable insight into the perceptions of centralised government toward its civilians throughout the conflict.[7] It is these perceptions involving morale and British ideology within the Clydeside region that this thesis will help bring into focus.

Any historical consideration of the British Home Front must inevitably touch upon the issue of civilian morale. Its influence was pervasive throughout the Home Front and was the subject of ongoing Government scrutiny during this period.

[7] Specifically, the classes of documents contained in the Public Record Office at Kew that were of valuable use in this study are the general correspondence of the MoI itself (INF.1), those of the Home Security division of the Home Office (HO.205), and those of Home Intelligence directly pertaining to the Ministry of Information and its operations throughout the war (HO.262).

subject of ongoing Government scrutiny during this period. In "a war of ideas", sound national unity and morale became as vital to the war effort at home as on the front lines. Willingness to fight as a necessary condition of victory was extended directly to British society as a whole for the first time. It could be assumed, with hindsight, that morale (according to its most basic definition) was adequately cohesive and strong, since Britain weathered the attacks of the Luftwaffe, eventually winning the war along with her allies.

The general experience of British civilians on the Home Front, as well as that of the Government under war conditions, is addressed in Richard Titmuss' Problems of Social Policy, a comprehensive official history of Britain's wartime social services. His study is focused on some of the challenges faced by civilians and Government in attempting to prevent and alleviate the effects of air attack in populated areas. This includes the evacuation of children, development of the emergency medical services, and provision of shelters for those rendered homeless by bombings. Though his study is centered on the practical side of mobilsation and life on the Home Front, Titmuss makes clear that civilian morale was a central issue in most aspects of war preparation as well as during attacks and their aftermath. Perhaps more importantly, he also observes that prewar speculation as to the nature of the morale problem in Britain as a whole would prove to be inaccurate. In fact, before war broke out, the Committee of Imperial Defence had presumed that the psychological effects of civilian bombing would far outweigh any physical damage, and that the British social services

psychological effects of civilian bombing would far outweigh any physical damage, and that the British social services would be overwhelmed with masses of panic-stricken individuals whose resolve had been broken by the horror of air raids.[8] By showing how these problems were actually among the least frequent, Titmuss establishes that fundamentally, the British public held up to the challenges presented by war fought on a Home Front.

Just as Titmuss examines the British Home Front from the practical side of the social services, Terence O'Brien gives a thorough examination of the development and operations of ARP and other wartime services in Civil Defence. In his comparison of prewar expectations and the reality of Britain's Home Front, O'Brien reaffirms Titmuss' conclusion. Both point out that contrary to the previous assumptions of Whitehall (and other organisations concerned with morale), the experience of air raids did much to bolster civic unity and resolve among the general public. This was due in large part to the active role taken by volunteers in ARP and Auxiliary Forces, and its unifying effect on communities throughout the realm. O'Brien argues that morale, though open to widely varying definition, was at its worst during periods of low enemy activity on the Home Front, such as during the "Phoney War" leading up to Hitler's invasion of Norway in the spring of 1940. It was throughout this period that, after having rapidly prepared the island of Britain for what was expected to be a "knockout blow" of aerial bombardment, civilians and Civil Defence personnel found themselves merely waiting for an attack that seemed as if it

[8] Richard Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy, HMSO (London) 1950, p.18.

themselves merely waiting for an attack that seemed as if it might never come. This period is in contrast to that of the Blitz that began on London in the autumn of 1940, when in the face of the common threat presented by the German air force, the public seemed to be entirely committed to the singular cause of fighting the war.

In considering these histories of the Home Front, it is clear that when the prospect of war in Britain had become reality, the breakdown of public confidence and resolve that had hitherto been expected by Whitehall was never realised. Rather, the common threat of aerial bombardment served to cement the resolve of the public by providing the community with the all-encompassing goal of fighting and winning the war. Both works mention difficulties that were experienced on a practical level in mobilsation and implementation of wartime measures, such as slow preparation of ARP in many areas and unauthorised evacuations (or, "trekking") of civilians. Such trends were perceived to be indicative of poor civilian morale; however, these and other difficulties were considered primarily logistical and administrative, rather than ideological. The "maintenance of preparedness versus the avoidance of panic", as O'Brien describes it, certainly carried difficulties, but by war's end these would be seen as exceptions to the rule rather than fundamental problems. Within this context, it is demonstrated that many of the problems of conducting war on the Home Front were overcome by Whitehall and the various services as they adapted to actual wartime conditions. However, because these histories do not specifically address perceived threats to sanctioned wartime ideology itself, they shed little light

these histories do not specifically address perceived threats to sanctioned wartime ideology itself, they shed little light on the direct methods by which the Government attempted to assess and strengthen morale.

If the victory of the Allies is sufficient proof that morale was strong in Britain, then the study of the Home Front from the standpoint of morale is one that is best not undertaken as a means by which to support direct interpretations of the war's outcome. Rather, its contexts and uses can be an indication of the perceptions that linked the British wartime Government with its people. Ian McLaine uses this approach in his history of the Ministry of Information, which gives an analysis of the often ill-fated attempts of Whitehall in bolstering morale on the Home Front. His discussion makes an attempt to assess the pervasive ideology of the Home Front by focusing on the Government department that was created to assess and maintain it. When seen in this way, it becomes clear that difficulties on the part of the Government in defining morale often stemmed from the inherent biases of those who were working to fulfill the Ministry's occupation. Their objectives were to identify threats to the "inherent" unity of the war effort among the heterogeneous general public, and to take active steps to diffuse them.

Naturally, not all of these perceived threats posed a serious actual danger to the collective unity of the country. If minority groups along the Clyde or elsewhere who ideologically opposed the Government had had a profound influence over public opinion throughout the country, they would have eroded the national war effort. But groups like

influence over public opinion throughout the country, they would have eroded the national war effort. But groups like the Communist Party, provincial Nationalists in Scotland and Wales, and workers who took part in strikes within war industries certainly represented a break from sanctioned ideology in the eyes of the centralised wartime Government. After all, the relative influence of such groups was not only an indication of unfavourable public opinion toward the wider British nationalism of Home Front ideology, but many of their actions were also criminal offenses after the passing of Defence Regulations in the Commons.

In assessing the state of British Home Front morale as interpreted by the Ministry, McLaine reaffirms the essential conclusions of Titmuss and O'Brien, that contrary to prewar expectations, German attacks on the cities of Britain were actually highly effective in bolstering morale, since all other immediate concerns paled in comparison with the common cause of fighting the war, staying alive, and saving Britain. Morale (in this context) was eventually thought to be indestructible. As to whether or not the Ministry of Information was ever successful in perceiving or successfully serving the needs of the British public in its morale-maintenance, McLaine asserts that as with many aspects of wartime government, the Ministry of Information's difficulties were overcome as the war continued, both from the adjustment of the public to wartime conditions and from the evolution in their own policy that came with experience.

While McLaine's history illustrates the difficulties and evolution within the centralised Government as it attempted to identify and meet the ideologically-orientated needs of

evolution within the centralised Government as it attempted to identify and meet the ideologically-orientated needs of the British populace, Angus Calder stresses the effects of the morale issue on civilians themselves in The People's War, a comprehensive social history of the Home Front. In considering the new urgency that total war had brought to the perceived needs of the working classes, Calder asserts that an unprecedented, almost revolutionary empowerment of the civil society throughout Great Britain was the result.[9] With the working class comprising almost 70 percent of the population, actively mobilised into a militant whole, the willing cooperation and sacrifice that would be demanded of the people would have to be reciprocated with concessions on the part of the wartime Government. More was being required of the civilian population than ever before, and with it came the implication not only of a British nation preserved through hard work and sacrifice for the war effort, but also a victory that would ensure a better way of life for the majority of British people than had existed before.

Calder also points out that where the specific needs of the people were being overlooked by the Government, civilians were capable of taking charge at a grass-roots level, thus directly influencing and guiding Government policy. This is probably most notably exhibited in 1940, when thousands of Londoners, in search of adequate deep shelter during air raids, took it upon themselves to occupy the Underground stations, and rather than prohibit their use, the ARP services resolved to ensure that stations throughout the city would remain open to the public. Such initiative in London

[9] Angus Calder, The People's War, Pimlico (London) 1969, p.18.

would remain open to the public. Such initiative in London and other areas served the national interest and reinforced public confidence, but was often in spite of rather than as a result of Whitehall's specific policies.

Clearly, the nature of militarised life on the Home Front, with its necessary sacrifices for the war effort, was conducive to a fundamental ideological unity, with public opinion reflecting the British context of nationalism. As Calder points out, the war even lent a profound sense of democracy to civilians throughout the country, giving them a new voice in their own destiny. Of course, being a heterogeneous nation, there were inevitable incidents of behaviour and ideologies within Britain that could be perceived as being in conflict with the mind set of the Home Front. However, this was also more a result of the new influence that the working classes had been given by the importance of public morale and national unity. The fact that collective civilian morale did remain fundamentally strong throughout the Blitz and beyond has supported, as Calder has asserted, "a myth of British or English moral preeminence, buttressed by British unity."[10]

Calder, in Myth of the Blitz, investigates this mind set in depth, and concludes that the ideological unity and willingness of civilians on the Home Front to make sacrifices on behalf of the war effort fall into a broad 'mythological ethos' that motivated civic action and maintained resolve on the Home Front, as well as serving to purify memory and collective experience after the war had ended. In clarifying this mentality as it relates to the war, Calder mentions the

[10] Angus Calder, Myth of the Blitz, Pimlico (London) 1991, p.2.

this mentality as it relates to the war, Calder mentions the evacuation of Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, and the period of heavy urban bombing during the Blitz as events that quickly became moments of "absolute definitiveness" for the character of the British nation as a whole, and hence justification for victory, both when these events actually occurred and thereafter.[11] The nation-defining heroism of democratic Britain's lone struggle against Nazi conquest was carried into every aspect of individuals' daily lives throughout Britain, either directly or through the wartime media, and was the natural basis for the civic unity and patriotism that had become more vital than ever. In this sense, such events, rather than exist as mere history (both then and now), are imbued with a certain sense of natural justification that isolated contradictions occurring at the time (such as strikes and other violations) could do little to refute. Such contradictions occurring in Scotland easily fit into this myth with hindsight, but if ideology and unity on the Home Front fundamentally rested on a myth of "English preeminence", morale in a Scottish area like Clydeside certainly would have seemed precarious to some who assessed it.

This myth of preeminence, as Calder describes it, is primarily what gives a fundamental basis to the militant nationalism that is brought to the forefront within any nation at a time of war, especially one being fought on its own shores as with the British war of 1939-41. Such a war by definition presents an entire society with obvious, specific, and universal goals which overlap and co-opt most others. As

[11] Calder, Myth, p.1.

and universal goals which overlap and co-opt most others. As culturally and politically heterogeneous as Britain may have been in 1940, very few people could realistically have argued that their lot would be improved if Scotland or any other part of Britain were to become an occupied province of the German Reich.

The strength of this mind set and culture of unity, however, could only remain intact for as long as the perception of a common threat endured. As mentioned, published history has established that during the eight-month period of 'Phoney War' leading up to the Luftwaffe's all-out aerial attack on Britain, morale was considered to be at its nadir. After mobilising the general population to direct and urgent action, and using Defence Regulations to transform the entire island summarily into a war zone, the Government suffered criticism from all directions when the Luftwaffe's poor showing in the skies over Britain began to make it look as if the Home Front, with all of its restrictions and inconveniences, had not been necessary after all. By contrast, the image of a united Britain holding fast under German aerial attack was virtually unavoidable from that summer onwards, when the RAF, with the numerical odds against them, fought (and won) what would become the longest, most intense air battle in the history of warfare.

Clearly, the nationalistic ideology of a common struggle against the Axis could overlap and incorporate most any other ideology or community within Britain, as long as it was accepted that the need to win the war was a top priority, and the threat clearly perceived. The Ministry of Information and the Government, taking on the direct responsibility of

the threat clearly perceived. The Ministry of Information and the Government, taking on the direct responsibility of reinforcing this fundamental unity, however, were naturally wary of the influence that ideologies like communism, pacifism, and provincial nationalism could have on civilians' motivations for fighting the war. This was a concern acted upon throughout the country, where the MoI, Mass Observation, and other groups like the British Broadcasting Corporation constantly strived to solidify not only the perception of the common threat, but also fast recognition of direct action to be taken in preventing the spread of potentially detrimental ideologies.

The histories that focus on various difficulties faced by the Government on the Home Front invariably remain within the scope of British experience generally, making mention of specific communities where relevant. However, one portion of the country where Government concern for reinforcing British wartime nationalism seemed to be especially focused was within Scotland, and perhaps for good reason from the point of view of London. As Mass Observation's morale study in Glasgow makes clear, there certainly was a presence of groups in Scotland whose ideology threatened the wartime mind set of unity, such as the Scottish Nationalist Party, in whom the Government saw the potential of a "Sinn Fein" movement similar to that which led to Eire's independence from Great Britain. Likewise, Communism seemed to be a potentially stronger force in Scotland than the rest of the country. The area in and around Glasgow had developed a long tradition of Communist-affiliated labour unrest, establishing for the city its nickname "The Red Clyde". In the last war, Lloyd George

Communist-affiliated labour unrest, establishing for the city its nickname "The Red Clyde". In the last war, Lloyd George had even sent the military into Glasgow's George Square to squelch a general strike that had begun within that city's munitions industry, and the district of West Fife had elected Britain's only Communist MP (Willie Gallacher), whose criticism of the Government's domestic policies certainly did not relent with the outbreak of war, as Commons debate transcripts show.

Aside from these and other more specific perceived threats to morale, there were also certain fundamental reasons why Whitehall might have seen fit to think of Glaswegian morale as a separate issue from that of other industrial centres in Britain. After all, if sound public opinion and/or morale was contingent upon a certain amount of militarised nationalism, then that nationalism would have to be one with which the people on the British Home Front as a whole could readily identify. The people of Glasgow certainly did identify with the broad mind set of the Home Front, acknowledging the Axis as a common enemy to be defeated, but this unity was qualified by the fact that Scotland was in many ways a separate nation within Britain, possessing its own history and cultural traditions, even a different language in remote parts of the country. Scotland's history, in addition to being simply unique from that of England, was also one imbued with a long tradition of active resistance to English culture and law, playing no small part in how the Scottish nation as a whole defined

itself.[12]

Certainly these fundamental cultural and civic distinctions would be a matter for consideration by the MoI and the rest of the centralised Government, if they hoped to assess and maintain morale within the Scottish region from four hundred miles south of its border. Perhaps the first attempt to address the difficulties created by this physical and ideological distance was in 1939, when the Government passed the Reorganisation of Offices (Scotland) Act. The Act, intended to remove the strain from the previously London-based administration of the Scottish Region, centred Scottish governmental departments in Edinburgh, headed by the Scottish Secretary of State, whose duties included representing "the Scottish point of view" and safeguarding "Scottish interests".[13] This administrative devolution was granted primarily due to the practical difficulties of governing Scotland from London during wartime, but there was also an acknowledgment of the need for distinctly Scottish interests to be dealt with in Edinburgh. The broadly-defined duties of the Scottish Secretary gave him the ability to address the Government on a wide range of issues; in a wartime context, these issues would come to be linked almost invariably with Home Front morale as it related to Scotland.

Scotland's unique practical needs may have been what fueled the development of this relatively self-contained aspect of the wartime Government, but it inevitably became a platform for what became known as special ideological need as

[12] Keith Webb, The Growth of Nationalism in Scotland, Molendinar Press (Glasgow) 1977, p.3.

[13] Scottish Home and Health Dept, Correspondence, HH.45.34, taken from Ian Levitt, ed., The Scottish Office- Depression and Reconstruction 1919-1959. Pillans & Wilson (Edinburgh) 1992, p.99.

platform for what became known as special ideological need as well. This tendency was established most fervently by Thomas Johnston, who acted as Scottish Secretary of State through most of the war. Johnston, before joining the War Cabinet, had acted as Civil Defence Commissioner for Scotland, an occupation that had given him firsthand experience not only as an administrator over Scottish wartime affairs, but one that had also provided him with a solid background in the use of morale as a pillar in political argument.[14] Like the rest of Britain in wartime, potential threats to morale became latent concerns in almost any matter relating to Scotland on the Home Front, but the perception of distinct Scottish Home Front experience in the Commons and Cabinet was also one that was nurtured by the Scottish Office and Scottish Members of Parliament whenever possible. In much the same way that British people as a whole had become empowered by the necessities of a Home Front war, Scottish politicians like Johnston were provided with an opportunity to convey a new dimension of legitimacy for Scottish concerns, most of which (such as Glasgow's industrial unrest) had existed long before 1939.[15]

This perception of distinct wartime stakes underpinning the direction of Scottish unity and loyalty was one that was often reinforced by Government organisations charged with monitoring public opinion in the Region. This is clearly present on the eve of the Clydeside Blitz, when Mass Observation warned that the city's inhabitants were having "a

[14] Graham Walker, Thomas Johnston, Manchester U. Press, 1988, p.148.

[15] An important survey book on Scottish History for this work was Christopher Harvie's No Gods and Precious Few Heroes (Edinburgh U. Press, 1993), which provided a good fundamental overview of issues concerning Scotland between the wars.

Observation warned that the city's inhabitants were having "a war of their own", ensconced in industrial relations and other matters, and displaying an apathy toward "the English war" that was indicative of detachment from the civic unity (in the British context) upon which the outcome of the war supposedly rested.[16] Glaswegian workers, in addition to appearing generally sympathetic to Communism, were also taking advantage of full employment to strike with impunity on a regular basis. As to whether Glaswegians perceived a common threat, one that would provide a fundamental basis for unity with the rest of Britain, this was also found to be lacking, because the people of Glasgow generally did not expect to fall victim to German air raids. Sympathy was expressed for the inhabitants of London, but few seemed to identify themselves directly with their countrymen to the South.[17] A reversal in this trend of apathy was reported after the Luftwaffe visited Glasgow in March of that year, but the perception of questionable unity remained.

The actual effects of this complacency and self-absorption on public support for the war effort were certainly exaggerated, being as none of the fears (including Communist uprising) of Whitehall were ever realised in the Glasgow area, or any other region of Scotland. If Glaswegians were in fact "fighting a war of their own", then this tendency must have co-existed with the ideology of the

[16] This Mass Observation "Preliminary Report on Morale in Glasgow" , held at the Strathclyde Regional Archives within the Mitchell Library in Glasgow (file AGN.2252), is organised and presented according to what the M-O group presumed would be the most indicative social trends in diagnosing the local state of public morale, including general expectation of heavy raids, and percentage of overheard conversations which discussed the war in general.

[17] AGN.2252

Home Front in general. However, the brand of nationalism particular to Scotland was one that manifested itself in ways that the centralised Government in London perceived as being somehow a matter for special attention. Threats to morale in Scotland were often just as prevalent in Britain as a whole, but were assessed with more urgency in Scotland, due to the already-existing conception of Scotland as a community that internalized its own ethos of nationhood. This ethos, and ways that it contributed to Scottish morale, could never be actively reinforced from London without significant difficulty.

Just as the onset of the war on the British Home Front seemed to open a door to the practical importance of special Scottish administrative needs, there also arose a new medium through which guidance and influence over public opinion could be established. Maintenance of unity and loyalty on the Home Front in the 'war of ideas' would be naturally based on the inherent sense of nationhood and need for survival that intensified with the approach of war. Still, to reinforce this mind set on the Home Front would require the centralised control of the British mass media, effectively converting it into the largest internal propaganda system ever devised in Great Britain. The Ministry of Information, in its defined duty of actively maintaining and defining morale, provided services directly to the population of Britain through a constant output of posters, newsreels, town-hall-style 'information meetings', and other services. After the advent of Defence Regulations, the MoI also had indirect control over all news and other material (such as that which was released in the press), and oversaw censorship

not only of news that could be of strategic value to the enemy, but also any views that ran against the current of wartime ideology.[18]

Along with this new degree of control over the mass media ushered in with the outset of war and Defence Regulations, Britain also saw the rise of a powerful, centralised, and largely independent new medium that would prove indispensable in maintaining the link between Government and civilians. Radio broadcasting, after rising through the 1920s and 30s to a significant place within British popular culture, was originally intended to be discontinued altogether at the outbreak of hostilities. The BBC instead became a major complement to the British Government's domestic and foreign propaganda effort, allowing the message of democratic unity and loyalty to reach a much greater audience.

Due to the exclusive control that the British Broadcasting Corporation has had over the medium since its beginnings, the very history of radio as it pertains to wartime propaganda is also the wartime history of the BBC. Therefore, it is not realistic to explore broadcasting as merely another arm of the Ministry of Information's domestic propaganda campaign, but rather as a largely separate entity, whose policies worked to achieve similar goals. Perhaps the most comprehensive history of the Corporation is the four-volume work of Asa Briggs, which includes a detailed study of the BBC on the Home Front, when it was supposedly under the supervision of the Ministry of Information. As Briggs argues, the war had a profound impact on the development of

[18] Stammers, p.14.

the BBC, allowing its influence to reach a larger audience and its internal structure to grow. However, the influence that was wrought on the Home Front in the area of domestic propaganda by the still-fledgling medium of broadcasting was certainly more profound.[19] For though technically under MoI supervision, the BBC by 1940 had begun to take the initiative, becoming an independent force on the Home Front at a time when the Ministry of Information was under widespread criticism for its own organisation and methods. The BBC did not escape such criticism, but for a medium that was originally going to to be taken out of operation altogether (for security reasons) in 1939, the growth of broadcasting during the war was significant. The size of the BBC staff would grow from 4,889 in the beginning of the war to 11,663 by 1944.[20]

In his history of the Corporation, Briggs also shows how war gave the BBC a vital task on the Home Front, and its fulfillment not only provided British civilians with a unique link to the Government, but also endowed the public with a broad perspective on the effects that their individual efforts were having on the war effort. The most immediate technical effect of the war on broadcasting itself was the synchronisation of transmitters, which tuned all broadcasts to one single wavelength in order to avoid providing direction-finding signals to the enemy's bombers.[21] Synchronisation concentrated the BBC's programming in London for the duration of the war, and the content of the

[19] Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, Vol. III- The War of Words. London (Oxford U.), 1970, p.3.
[20] Ibid, p.18.
[21] Briggs, p. 46.

programming was the product of this centralisation. To many listeners this centralised broadcast possessed a certain bias; namely that of the Home-Counties Englishman.

Some of the difficulties created within Scotland by the technical necessity of synchronisation are addressed by W.H. McDowell in the History of BBC Broadcasting in Scotland, which mentions some of the effects that came with the disappearance of regionally-based wavelengths. McDowell observes that because synchronisation had so drastically limited the amount of programmes that could be broadcast to suit special interests, the BBC's centralised broadcasts were "expected to have general rather than regional appeal".[22] McDowell also mentions that the lack of adequate Scottish programming on the wireless was seen largely as a necessary sacrifice for the war effort, and was actually very instrumental in establishing a greater amount of post-war control over programming from within the Scottish Region.

Both of these general histories make clear the significant development undertaken by the BBC throughout the war, as well as the practical difficulties that war brought to radio programming on the British Home Front. However, the issue of Scottish programming needs as they related directly to Home Front ideology and morale is merely mentioned in passing, part of the broad overview that is given of broadcasting in the Regions. As these are general histories of the BBC, the focus is necessarily placed away from many of the issues that will be of primary concern in this thesis, such as the ongoing debate over the importance of an

[22] W.H. McDowell, The History of Broadcasting in Scotland, 1923-83, Allen & Unwin, 1992, p.44.

independent Scottish wavelength and the implications of the Scots' special ideological need on that debate.

It is clear that radio broadcasting was a monumental force on the Home Front. Naturally, such a powerful medium would be one over which the wartime Government would endeavour to have some direct control, yet as Briggs has pointed out, this never transpired, and this places wartime broadcasting in stark contrast to other media and propaganda in the period. The British Broadcasting Corporation, though under a certain amount of nominal Government regulation, was allowed to develop as an independent propaganda force on the Home Front. This independence from Whitehall gave the BBC and its Director-General (John Reith) an appearance of objectivity that could not be easily established by any other wartime media, and provided radio with the ability to serve the needs of the Home Front public using their already-existing system of listener polling. Their conversion from peacetime entertainer to wartime propagandist was certainly not an easy one, however, and the BBC suffered many of the difficulties of the MoI and Government in interpreting its role on the Home Front.

Just as the Government itself was criticised throughout the war for not adequately addressing the distinctive aspects of unity and patriotism inherent in a Scottish population, there also came a great deal of negative reaction to the propaganda methods used for this maintenance, including radio. Out of technical expediency, the general censorship operations of the MoI had been largely de-centralised to allow a separate office in Scotland working in conjunction with the newly de-centralised Edinburgh administration, but

war had brought the opposite effect to the BBC. Synchronisation of transmitters meant that for much of the war, the only programming available to Scots on the wireless was that which was centrally broadcast from London, and this was necessarily geared in content toward an audience that was primarily English. Since Scotland was not only a region but a nation within Britain, this deprioritisation of a significant home-grown Scottish influence on BBC programming inevitably created the perception of an active practice of cultural censorship.

In an effort to rectify this tendency toward cultural exclusion on the wireless, Johnston and others from the outset of war began to argue strongly in favour of a separate radio wavelength for the Scottish region in correspondence to the BBC and Ministry of Information. The case for an independent Scottish programme, being largely an issue of morale-maintenance, can be readily analysed from an historical point of view as a test-case in the study of how Scotland's ideological needs as exhibited by the Glasgow morale reports factored into Home Front propaganda policy in general. Presumedly, radio as a medium of propaganda drew its strength from its inherent cross-cultural appeal, and its ability to influence the audience by bringing the spoken word directly into British homes. As a source of nationalist propaganda like any other, however, the power of broadcasting to co-opt its audience could be easily compromised if it was perceived to be in ignorance of the culture upon which the inherent nationalism of a specific audience is founded. The reaction of Johnston and others to what were considered by the BBC and MoI to be practical and inadvertent programming

oversights was indicative of this ignorance, and hence a serious danger to favourable public opinion. Its most immediate cultural effect was to leave a void that enemy broadcasts from across the channel would all too readily (though clumsily) attempt to fill. The MoI and the BBC both acknowledged the separate listening needs of Scotland as a legitimate factor in effective morale maintenance, in need of attention. The added wavelength was never realised, however, due to technical limitations of the wartime service.

In looking at the British Home Front experience on a general level, it is apparent that the mind set of unity and patriotism among civilians was one that remained fundamentally intact. This conclusion is readily supported by the fact that eventually the country arose victorious from the ashes of the Blitz to defeat the Axis powers. Victory was due in no small measure to the successful mobilsation of the civilian population into a virtual fighting force that resembled in many ways the conventional military. After all, the nature of war by 1939 required civilians to take on many of the necessary qualities of soldiers; to act on directives that at times may not have seemed entirely justified, and to live a daily existence in what had become a frightening, uncomfortable and sometimes dangerous environment.

One of the most prominent effects of this large-scale mobilsation and militarisation of civilians was a greatly broadened sense of responsibility of the British government to its people. In order to be able to administrate over the country in total war, the Government passed legislation giving it the power to oversee all aspects of the Home Front, including that of public opinion. To maintain morale among

British civilians, the Government had to ensure that faith in the struggle for survival and victory was ever-present. To this end, an entire Ministry was created within the Government, for the purpose of producing domestic propaganda as well as identifying potential threats to morale. The morale of the British people had been thrust to the level of utmost importance by the outset of total war, and its maintenance became a fundamental wartime objective for the wartime Government on the Home Front.

Using research based on the wartime Government's ongoing domestic campaign to maintain and reinforce public morale and ideological unity, this thesis seeks to explore the influence of what became known as "special ideological needs" of the people of Scotland. These "special needs" were certainly perceived by Whitehall when morale was closely examined in Glasgow, and were the primary justification used by Scottish politicians like Johnston when attempting to argue for changes in Home Front policy, such as the introduction of separate radio programming for Scotland. Specifically, these needs included outlets for a unique form of nationalism, administrative devolution, and increased media attention to Scottish Home Front concerns and problems. In looking at the interplay between civilians in the Clydeside region and the Government bodies concerning themselves with morale throughout Britain, it becomes apparent that Glasgow's experience evidences various levels of community with unique needs. By identifying and examining these ideological needs, an in-depth understanding will be gained of the substance of what was thought to be necessary for preserving unity and war effort. By analysing the war along these lines, conclusions

will show the level of legitimacy that total war brought to provincial interests on the Home Front. In doing so, the study will also reveal the shortcomings of British policy and propaganda where it was geared toward the alleged ideological needs of "a nation within a nation" on the Home Front.

Part 1-

Scotland, Government,
and
Guiding Wartime National Unity
on the
Home Front

Chapter 2-

Preparing for the 'Knock-Out Blow'

In 1939, the crisis presented to the nation of Great Britain at the onset of war against Germany was one that could not easily be denied. The nature of warfare itself, with the introduction of heavy civilian bombing, had brought every man, woman, and child onto the Front lines, and survival would depend on the strength of that 'Home-Front'. The common purpose that existed in Great Britain towards survival and victory in this new theatre of warfare brought a vital importance to the maintenance of national spirit and individual sacrifice. If unity and morale, the primary factors of wartime public opinion, were allowed to falter through unpreparedness for attack, inefficient administration, or apathy of the general populace to the policies and aims of the British wartime Government, then the war could be lost.

War had transformed the British nation. Of course, as the Government began to make attempts to define and quantify morale throughout the heterogeneous British public, there developed a perception of potential threats to the unity and fighting spirit of the country. Most of these perceived threats occurred throughout Britain, yet by looking into such threats within the Scottish Region, it seems that the unity and strength of public opinion was at several stages assessed with more urgency than in other areas. Scotland's unique position of being a relatively independent cultural and civic nation in Britain, with its own Department of State, meant that the pervading ideology of the unified British Home Front would have to co-exist with a form of national resolve in a Scottish context. Although threats to unity and morale within Scotland were

Scottish context. Although threats to unity and morale within Scotland were considered latent, many politicians, such as Secretary of State Thomas Johnston, used the image and potential implications of such threats in an attempt to ensure that the war would win some concessions for the Scottish nation.

> "...If these great trials were to come upon our island, there is a generation of Britons here now ready to prove itself not unworthy to the days of yore and not unworthy of those great men, the fathers of our land, who laid the foundations of our laws and shaped the greatness of our country..."
>
> -Winston Churchill addressing the House of Commons, September 1939.

The outbreak of war with Germany in September 1939 brought with it much cause for unity within British society. The 'front line' of this conflict would not be a far-off battlefield, as in 1914-18. It would include the entire civilian population in an unprecedented Home Front theatre of total warfare. Not only would workers be struggling to maintain the level of industrial and agricultural output necessary to sustain the total war effort, but they would be striving to survive direct attack by the Germans as well. This attack could come from the air, as the Luftwaffe attempted to defeat Britain in a "Knock-out Blow" of sustained heavy bombardment, or from Britain's own beaches as the Germans launched a large-scale invasion. It was quite clear that this war would be fought not only by militaries, but by entire nations, and the one(s) that held up best under war conditions, both

war conditions, both practically and psychologically, would reap victory.

In short, the British home front at the outbreak of war was a scene not only for unprecedented national purpose, but also a level of physical effort and fortitude that was apparently unavoidable to the individual. Mobilisation for the war, though ongoing since the thirties, had begun in earnest since the 1938 Munich Crisis. By the time threat of war with Germany became reality in September of 1939, for example, 1,500,000 men and women had joined local ARP volunteer services.[1] Individuals generally recognised an active role in the universal goal of victory.

The British public as a whole had become militarised in its preparations for war on the Home Front, and a widely accepted national identity, thrust to the ideological fore by threat of destruction, played no small part in the maintenance of that unity. This might seem obvious enough; after all, as one scholar of nationalism has observed, a national identity (particularly during wartime) is generally defined and reinforced not only by its idealised view of history and unique qualities of its people, but by a belief that these are worth preserving through sacrifices made on an individual level.[2]

However, while strong morale and ideological unity amongst the British public seemed self-evident when it came to supporting their own nation in war, the Government from the outset began to debate not only the practical

[1] Terence O'Brien, Civil Defence, HMSO (London) 1955, p.286.
[2] Keith Webb, The Growth of Nationalism in Scotland, Molendinar Press (Glasgow) 1977, p.5.

of morale, but what methods, if any, should be used in its maintenance. The war had given a heterogeneous nation a common goal, but the sacrifices that the Government required of individuals would have to be justified as absolutely necessary. Specifically, these sacrifices would have to appear as being shared equally throughout all strata of society. With the working class comprising over seventy percent of a militarised population, the implications of a break-down of wartime civil solidarity were not lost on the nation's leaders.[3]

The presentation of the common, undivided "national case" on the Home Front as well as abroad became the nominal function of the Ministry of Information. To this end, the Ministry began in the first year of the war to argue in favour of a broad-based "Social Survey" for the purpose of ascertaining practical and ideological needs of Britain's people. Using the Survey, the fundamental goal of Britain's survival and Germany's destruction could be served by the Ministry through a specific knowledge of what the people thought they were fighting for. However, as the Commons debated the necessity of this survey, it was clear that there was little if any marked concern over general public opinion at this stage. Many Members objected outright to such a survey as a shameless waste of public money, since "this country is perfectly happy", and "was never in its history more united than it is now".[4]

As time went on, however, the unity of fighting spirit, which many leaders had taken for granted at the

[3] Paul Addison, Now the War is Over, Cape (London) 1985, p.5.
[4] House of Commons Debates (Hansard), fifth series, vol. 363, col.1515.

which many leaders had taken for granted at the outset, became questionable, when it began to appear in 1940 as if the urgently prepared-for German aerial attack would never come. It was during this period of "Phoney War" leading to Hitler's invasion of Norway that could be seen as the essential low-point of British morale generally; not because of reaction to German direct attack, as had been speculated at the outset of hostilities, but because it began to appear as though it might never come. As the weeks went by without heavy attack, the public that had been urged to prepare for the worst became sceptical as to the necessity of the food, lighting, entertainment, and other restrictions that had become a daily reality in the name of civil defence.[5] In addition, the confidence that had been inspired by fast mobilisation of ARP, reinforced by official statements in the first days of war, had contributed to a general attitude that appeared to the authorities to resemble indifference.[6]

This feeling of apathy was still perceived in the Spring of 1940, after Hitler had invaded Norway and Denmark. Likewise, in the last weeks before Dunkirk, the Cabinet was still discussing what could be done at the top to "educate public opinion to the reality of the air threat", and Home Secretary John Anderson reported to the Cabinet that he was "anxious about the apathetic attitude displayed by the general public toward civil defence".[7] Nor was this perceived sense of apathy restricted to the

[5] O'Brien, p.297.
[6] Ibid.
[7] War Cabinet Minutes (Public Record Office microfiche, 116 (40)1), 9 May, 1940.

June, the Cabinet concluded that an instruction from the Prime Minister to all departments would have to be issued to combat "defeatist talk" that had been reported as spreading within the Government.[8] This instruction, not released until July, urged officials "to report, or if necessary remove, any officers or officials, who are found to be consciously exercising a disturbing or depressing influence, and whose talk is calculated to spread alarm and despondency".[9] Apparently, the mood with which officials were so concerned was not limited to the general populace.

By the summer of 1940, however, the Government need not have been overly concerned about what active steps could be taken to reinforce morale as it related to enthusiasm for the war effort. By 18 June, the evacuation of Dunkirk followed by the fall of France to an occupying German force was enough to rouse the public out of any previous indifference. Suddenly Britain stood alone in Western Europe, facing German invasion. The unavoidable gravity of this fact was certainly sufficient to rekindle the united sense of purpose that had waned since the first days of the war. As official historian Terence O'Brien has observed, "British people had attached themselves completely to the war...This was the great transforming fact".[10]

As the reality of war was uniting Britain ideologically for the national war effort, legislation was

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[8] War Cabinet Minutes (Public Record Office microfiche, 19(40)10), 2 June, 1940.
[9] Winston S. Churchill, The Roar of the Lion, Tandem (London) 1969, p.158.
[10] O'Brien, p.353.

Committee headed by Sir John Gilmour had reported to the Government on an inquiry held into Scottish administration. The Committee, which investigated the operation and organisation of existing Scottish Governmental Departments, concluded that due to the practical difficulties presented to the Scottish Boards by distance from Whitehall, their ability to provide opinion on "technical work" and other administrative matters was unnecessarily strained.[11] Their recommendations included the setting up of four Departments of State; Health, Home (including Fisheries and Prisons), Agriculture, and Education, with whom the Scottish Secretary of State could confer when departments clashed. These would be headquartered at Calton Hill in Edinburgh as a bonafide Government Department, supporting the broad duties of the Scottish Secretary of State.[12]

The proposals of the Gilmour Committee had their Second Reading in the Commons in December of 1938, and were enacted in 1939 under the Reorganisation of Offices (Scotland) Act. This removal of Scottish administration to Edinburgh brought added control of Scottish matters with it from London, giving the Secretary of State a Scotland-based Department from which he could administrate specific duties. In addition, the nominal functions of the Scottish Secretary were supplemented by a broad influence over Scottish matters generally: "quite apart from his statutory duties, he has a large..sphere of other duties in which he is supposed to represent the Scottish point of

[11] George Pottinger, Secretaries of State for Scotland, 1926-76 Scottish Academic Press (Edinburgh) 1979, p.17.
[12] House of Commons Debates, (Hansard), fifth series, vol. 342, col.1842.

Scottish point of view and to safeguard Scottish interests".[13]

This administrative separation at the outbreak of war was not intended to be a move towards Home Rule for Scotland, nor did it give the Scottish Office independent authority in the sweeping Ministerial decisions that were transforming Scotland (and the rest of Britain) into a Home Front. The possibility of an eventual transition to post-war Home Rule was mentioned immediately during the Second Reading of the Bill, in spite of a wartime mandate barring such debate in the Commons. Thomas Johnston, like several others, stated that there was no intention of straying from this mandate, yet reiterated in his remarks that the legislation did not succeed in giving Scotland the democracy that they demanded, and that "things cannot go on as they are."[14] Perhaps mere administrative efficiency-building was, as Johnston concluded, "inadequate" to the needs of the Scottish nation.[15]

Nevertheless, the Act succeeded in creating for Scotland a separate, closed administrative community from which practical as well as political conclusions would be drawn and supported on matters relating to Scotland. Though not an outward recognition of fundamental ideological differences, the Act can be perceived as a clear acknowledgement of separate practical needs in the government of Scottish people as a community. As time went

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[13] Scottish Home and Health Dept, Correspondence , HH.45.34, taken from Ian Levitt, ed., The Scottish Office- Depression and Reconstruction 1919-1959 Pillans & Wilson (Edinburgh) 1992, p.99.
[14] House of Commons Debates (Hansard), fifth series, vol. 342, col.1858.
[15] Ibid, col.1856.

many of which appeared (or were made to appear) as arising directly from the war on the Home Front.

While the political efforts of various Scottish leaders succeeded in gaining a degree of administrative consolidation for Scotland, another aspect of control over Scotland was brought to Edinburgh by the onset of war. The administration of Civil Defence, fully in place by August of 1939, divided Britain into twelve "Defence Regions", each with a Regional Commissioner who acted under Royal Warrant of Appointment as overseer for Civil Defence in his area.[16] Scotland as a whole comprised a single Defence Region, and its first Commissioner was Thomas Johnston, followed by the Earl of Rosebery in February of 1941.

The duties of a Regional Commissioner, like those of the Secretary of State for Scotland, were broad. He was to supervise all Civil Defence arrangements, acting as liaison with the Ministry of Home Security, control local authorities to ensure that CD directives were being carried out, and maintain morale of the general population.[17] This regionally-based entity of the Home Office comprised yet another separate administrative community. Such a remote administration would feel the natural "centrifugal force" that, according to the Gilmour Committee had always been inherent in Scottish government generally. Namely, administration of Scotland was unique simply by being an arm of centralised authority reaching four hundred miles from London.

The Regional Commissioner was virtually without

[16] O'Brien, p.308.
[17] Pottinger, p.90.

The Regional Commissioner was virtually without official power in the capacity that the Home Front war had created. However, the decidedly general terms of his authority were completely variable to the scale of enemy activity that occurred within his Region. These powers were outlined in Defence Regulations, which in time of crisis empowered him to

> "issue directions affecting persons in Defence Areas..for the purpose of meeting or hindering an actual or apprehended attack by the enemy or of protecting persons and property from dangers involved in any such attack".[18]

This directive would still be in place by May of 1942, long after the primary threat of German invasion or large-scale attack had passed.[19]

Clearly, depending on the events that would determine "military necessity", the Regional Commissioner was anything from a benign overseer of Ministry policy to a virtual dictator, in the event of a breakdown of communication with London. The fact that this necessity never arose in Scotland or any other Defence Region throughout the war does not deter from the moral responsibility that was borne with the position. On the whole, this responsibility was to be London's man in the field, seeing to the practical measures in Scotland that would help to preserve the lives and minds of the Scottish people, as well as helping to ensure support of the war effort. This duty to "prepare for the worst and hope for the best", as Johnston called it in his memoirs, was on a

[18] Scottish Home and Health Department, Regional Commissioner's Powers Under Defence Regulations, Scottish National Archives, HH.36.14.
[19] Ibid.

local authorities, many of which were not co-operative. In Glasgow, which was the most obvious military target in the Scottish Region, Johnston found the status of ARP preparation to be "woefully inadequate", and relations between himself and the Lord Provost Patrick Dollan were strained as Johnston pressed the necessity of local preparations like evacuation of children, better fire prevention and local air raid shelter policy.[20] Johnston also used his authority to create five District Commissioners for heavily-populated areas, in order to keep a close contact of the Scottish Office with public opinion and/or the state of morale. By the time Glasgow became the target of heavy German attack, however, Johnston had been appointed to the Cabinet in London as Secretary of State for Scotland. His tenure as Regional Commissioner had evidently led to a position well-suited to his ongoing attempts of persuasion on behalf of Scotland's needs, and it is not likely that he had forgotten the direct connection that every aspect of the British Home Front seemed to have with the issue of morale.

[20] Graham Walker, Thomas Johnston. Manchester U. Press (Manchester) 1988, p.148.

Chapter 3

The "Supreme Factor" on the Home Front- Morale and Scottish Stakes in the War Effort

Any historical study of the British Home Front must perhaps inevitably include a discussion of the role of morale. When considering the political implications and uses of the term by British leaders when they attempted to assess or influence public opinion, it is immediately apparent as a focal concern. Speculation of the effects of bombing against heavily populated areas viewed morale simply in terms of psychological stamina and willingness of the public to carry on under air-raid conditions. As early as 1924, studies anticipated (along with heavy physical casualties and material damage) a huge breakdown of civilian morale. In the first of what would be a series of Circulars on the subject, the Home Office issued a warning to all Departments that "it would be impossible to guarantee immunity from air attack".[21]

Since heavy air attack on civilians was a new factor in war, any estimation of its effects, material or psychological, was unclear. Because a few raids on London in the last war had created an average of 50 casualties per ton of bombs dropped, the Air Staff factored the likely tonnage that the Luftwaffe would be capable of delivering using current technology. The figures were decidedly grim. Assuming that the outbreak of total war would bring an all-out aerial offensive from Germany, the London area could expect something in the vicinity of 8750 people killed or wounded in the first 48 hours of the conflict, followed by an additional 2500 every subsequent 24 hours.[22] Even in 1939, it was generally expected in Whitehall that the

[21] O'Brien, p.58.
[22] Ibid, p.16.

would take with it some 2 million casualties throughout the country within a few weeks, as the Luftwaffe attempted to crush the resolve of the British to carry on.[23]

Given the dire effects of bombing on the Home Front that were expected prior to the outbreak of war, it is hardly surprising that the Government perceived a chance for mass death and sheer horror to outweigh nationalist unity and general civic fortitude. As previously mentioned, however, the British leadership had made little if any preparation to deal with the psychological effects of what would become eight months of "stand-by" for a militarised civilian populace.[24] It was during this period of inactivity that civilian morale became an issue for discussion and analysis between Government departments and MPs, who after establishing it as the "supreme factor" of warfare, began what would be an ongoing endeavour to bring morale under its centralised control.

The essential problem in controlling or influencing civilian morale was one that presented itself from the outset of Civil Defence organisation during the inter-war period; namely that of its defining characteristics. The Ministry of Information, planned in 1935 as a centralised Department with the task of maintaining it, was supplemented at the height of the Phoney War in May of 1940 with the Home Morale Emergency Committee as well as the work of the Mass Observation Unit, a social survey group that attempted to assess morale throughout the country using sociological case-studies.

[23] Russell Galbraith Without Quarter- A Biography of Tom Johnston Mainstream (Edinburgh) 1995, p.223.
[24] O'Brien, p.297.

It is clear, however, that these organisations were striving throughout the war to assess and lead what they could never adequately define in specific terms. The Ministry of Information and related bodies, whose primary function concerned morale assessment and maintenance, pursued this goal through release (and censorship) of official news as well as public information programmes for other departments. But this system was decidedly subjective in practice. In August of 1940, as the necessity of methodical "morale maintenance" was being debated in the Commons, the Minister of Information (Duff Cooper) succeeded only in illustrating the variable nature of morale in the wide field of public opinion:

> The word 'morale'..does not mean the same thing as courage. Good morale does not simply mean courage, and bad morale does not simply mean cowardice. Morale is something much broader than that...[25]

Likewise, the co-founder and head of Mass Observation, Tom Harrisson, was reportedly "honest enough to confess that it is difficult to sift this..evidence without developing a certain bias...".[26] Apparently, the individuals charged with the assessment and maintenance of morale could only make the vaguest attempts to narrow its description.

Home Front morale was never limited to one working definition, but instead was roughly clarified by its connection to a broad spectrum of social, economic, industrial, and/or political factors in British society. Each Government Ministry adopted its own, largely arbitrary standard in correspondence and circulars, linked more or

[25] House of Commons Debates (Hansard), fifth series, vol. 363, col.1547.
[26] Ibid.

standard in correspondence and circulars, linked more or less directly to its perceived function in "running the war" at any given time. As a result, the morale issue can be seen first and foremost as an indicator of the perceptions of individuals or groups who attempted to assess and employ it as a pillar of argument. Since morale on its most basic level (moral/psychological fortitude in wartime) was generally sound throughout Britain, any evidence to the contrary could quickly be used to set a community apart in an attempt to give a flag of priority in London to its problems. This is essentially what made public morale in Clydeside a very frequent issue with leaders and departments for whom Scottish needs were a primary function and concern.

A few weeks before the German attack on Glasgow in March of 1941, the Mass Observation Unit conducted a case-study of the city in an effort to ascertain morale and the general state of public opinion. Regarding economic conditions in the city, they concluded that in the absence of heavy German attack, Glasgow was benefiting greatly from the war:

> ...it must always be remembered that in relation to the pre-war situation Glasgow is now a thriving and prosperous place, with better economic opportunities than for a great many years...[27]

Of course, the demand for labour in munitions and shipbuilding brought on by the onset of war was a boom to the Scottish economy, which had suffered greatly between the wars. By comparison, 133 factory closures between 1932

[27] Mass Observation, "Preliminary Report on Morale in Glasgow" (Strathclyde Regional Archives, AGN.2252).

had seen in the same period.[28] By the outbreak of war, when rearmament was in full swing, the Clyde shipyards were producing some 400,000 tons of shipping per year, and unemployment was down to 1.6% from an average of 14% during the 1920s.[29] Clearly, at least on an economic/industrial level, the war had brought with it a measure of prosperity to Scotland.

Of course, the high demand for labour and war materials had solved (at least temporarily) the unemployment problem that had plagued Scotland during the inter-war period. However, this wave of prosperity brought on by the war acted to mask many discontents that lingered on in spite of the reinforced British national unity that had allegedly been created by the war effort. If adherence to Defence Regulations could serve Whitehall as a measuring stick for the general sacrifices that individuals were willing to make toward the British war effort, then the ideological unity of Scotland to the British cause of war can be seen as questionable. An example from the industrial sector, which perhaps should have alarmed Ministers and MPs, was the population-adjusted number of prosecutions in Scotland under Defence Regulation 2B, which prohibited industrial sabotage as an impediment to the war effort. These numbered four and a half times more in the Scottish Region than in England and Wales combined for the same period (1939-'44), yet did not get more than passing mention in Scottish Office correspondence.[30]

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[28] [illegible] Regulation 2B
[29] [illegible] Few Heroes, Edinburgh U. Press (Edinburgh) 1993, 2nd ed., p.52.

correspondence.[30]

A matter of greater concern to the Mass Observation Unit was the number of strikes that were occurring in the Glasgow area at the time of their study. This was also an infringement of Defence Regulations, and thus subject to prosecution. The Government had deemed strikes of any kind to be a clear indication of weak or poor morale, but especially in war work. Stoppage in vital war industry (such as shipbuilding) naturally meant big trouble for the war effort. However, the high demand for labour afforded workers the opportunity for leverage in improving conditions for themselves and for the future. This was certainly not lost on Glaswegian workers, as the number of strikes shows.

The fact that workers in the Glasgow area could (and did) strike with relative impunity displays a pragmatic adoption of the civic unity that was supposedly prevalent throughout Britain. The ideology of sacrifice and individual effort in wartime was adopted in Scotland as elsewhere, but when it appeared as though workers on the Clyde were striving to achieve aims of their own as well, this was construed by Mass Observation and others as a sign of poor morale:

> There is less interest in the course of the war...Clydeside workers are..having a war of their own, and ..they cannot forget the numerous battles of the past thirty years, and cannot overcome the bitter memory of industrial insecurity in the past ten years...[31]

Evidently, the ideology of discipline and willing sacrifice

[30] Scottish Home and Health, Cases Prosecuted Under Defence Regulation 2B (Sabotage), Scottish National Archives, HH.50.35.
[31] Mass Observation (Strathclyde Regional Archives) AGN.2252.

the Clyde. The basis in fact of specifically Scottish stakes in the war effort is vague, but there is little doubt that the tradition of labour unrest and experiences of Glasgow in the 1920s and 30s were present in the minds of many individuals who were making morale assessments in 1941. Since morale was essentially an undefinable term that was being given a direct link to the analysis of wartime public opinion generally, even relatively isolated signs of discontent such as those emanating from industry were enough to create a perception of questionable morale in the entire Scottish Region. This perception, based on incidents that were generally as frequent south of the border, nevertheless became support for assumptions that Scotland's "national identity" on the Home Front was worth close scrutiny.

The apparent apathy of many Glaswegians toward the national war effort, which so concerned the Mass Observation Unit, was cited as being mainly due to the lack of heavy German air attack, but the surveyors were also quick to set it apart from other "quiet" areas:

> The most striking distinction between Glasgow and previous areas studied is the apparent lack of interest in much of what is going on in the war, and the very low degree of excitement or enthusiasm about war issues among the mass of the people. The war still seems to be locked upon here as largely a personal matter and an economic affair...[32]

From the impression that Mass Observation was getting during its study, it seemed that the Glasgow area was not subscribing fully to the ideology of the British war effort, since they did not even seem to think of themselves

[32] Mass Observation (Strathclyde Regional Archives) AGN.2252.

directly involved. In spite of the wartime strain of nationalism that mandated complete involvement in the war, workers on the Clyde concerned themselves with other matters that should have been peripheral at best under the circumstances. This impression was partly due to the fact that only 3% of overheard conversations in pubs related to the war, which to Mass Observation showed that the war was not being taken into every aspect of social life as it had been elsewhere.[33] Although apathy or indifference toward ARP and civil defence from a lack of German attack was nothing new by 1941, it was considered a matter for concern after Britain had borne witness to the heavy raids on London from November of 1940.

Nor was there much expectation of heavy raids in the Glasgow area on the eve of the "Clydeside Blitz" that would strike the city on 13-14 March. According to a Mass Observation poll, only 30% of individuals interviewed in the Glasgow area expected heavy raids at all, and less than half that number expected them to occur anytime within the following two months[34]. This was not the kind of confidence that the Government wanted to encourage in the civil population, and as the report recommended, "..If we are concerned with leading morale in Glasgow we should be very disturbed at seeing so many people living in a fool's paradise...".[35]

Aside from the normal (though "alarming") apathy that was cited as a result of the relative peace that the city of Glasgow had enjoyed since the outbreak of war, Mass

[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.

Glasgow had enjoyed since the outbreak of war, Mass Observation also attributed this poor level of enthusiasm to something that fell along traditional national lines:

> This lack of close identification with the English war is clearly a dangerous tension, and one which might easily continue to develop, and is indeed in line with much unformulated and largely unconscious Scottish thinking about the direction of unity and loyalty.[36]

The individuals who investigated Glasgow for the purpose of the morale study, basing their terms on loyalty and unity toward the British (though the word 'English' seemed to suffice) war effort, found that there existed a complacency that in London had wrought "nearly disastrous" consequences a year previously. Mass Observation's conclusion that Scotland required a "stimulus for unity" contributed greatly to the assertions that were being made in Whitehall; that Scotland's contribution to the war effort would require morale measures going beyond those employed in the rest of Britain.

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[36] Ibid.

Chapter 4-

Unity Reinforcement, The Clydeside Blitz, and Threats to Morale

If the root cause of Glasgow's apathy toward the progress of war in early 1941 was a lack of heavy German bombardment, the remedy was on its way. After failing to quell the general resolve of the British with the Blitz on the capital (primarily between July-October, 1940), the Germans shifted their bombing concentration from London to the provincial port cities. With successive night raids on cities like Manchester, Portsmouth, Liverpool, and Glasgow, the Germans began an attempt to knock out what formed the backbone of British industry as well as its vital access to Atlantic shipping.[37] On the night of 13-14 March, approximately 236 Luftwaffe aircraft bombed the Clydeside area of Glasgow, returning the following night to inflict further damage. Clydebank suffered most, however, due primarily to the success of the Luftwaffe in starting "Pathfinder" fires in the area at which the majority of the bombs were dropped on the second night of the attack.[38] While most of the city escaped heavy material damage, Clydebank experienced some of the most devastating of the entire war in Britain. Out of 11,945 houses in the area, 76% were destroyed or made uninhabitable, some 35,000 people were rendered homeless, and only 7 houses were left undamaged.[39]

Although morale was judged before the Glasgow Blitz in relation to the "traditional disunity" and apathy of the general populace to the ideology of the Home Front, it was assessed after the raid chiefly according to the ARP

[37] O'Brien, p.412.
[38] I.M.M. MacPhail, The Clydebank Blitz, Clydebank District (Glasgow) 1991, p.19.
[39] Richard Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy, HMSO (London) 1950, p.313.

and behaviour of the public during the immediate recovery period. In this respect, the Glasgow area seemed to hold up very well to the raids, as shown by the fortnightly reports of Chief Constables in the Scottish Defence Region, which concluded that the public deserved "universal commendation" for the calm that prevailed throughout the attack.[40] The raids also were reported to have "crystallised resolve" of the general public toward preparations for air attack such as evacuation plans, and industrial unrest in many areas was quelled considerably. This turnaround is exhibited by John Brown's Shipbuilders Clydebank, which had been the epicentre of a widespread apprentices' strike in the weeks preceding the blitz. Only a fortnight after most workers in the area had been rendered homeless and transport to the yard totally disrupted, the management reported worker absenteeism of a mere 20 percent.[41]

Clearly there was no fundamental difference in the direct reaction of a Scottish public to heavy air raids from that of their counterparts in the South. One indirect reaction of the public in Glasgow that made its way down to Whitehall in the weeks following the attack was the concern of local and regional leaders over the release of casualty figures for the area. After the raid, Civil Defence administrators had reported casualty levels as "relatively light", which was perceived by readers as a downplayed report.[42] When local officials learned of this, they decided

[40] Home Office Correspondence, 'Police Instructions to Regional Public Reactions to Air Raids' (Public Record Office, HO.45.25010).
[41] Glasgow District Civil Defence, Circulars (Scottish National Archives, D-CD.6).
[42] The Times, "First Big Raid on Clydeside" 15 March, 1941.

to breach Civil Defence policy and release specific figures in an effort to allay any distrust of official information. Unfortunately, the number of 500 killed was also a serious underestimate, and Chief Constable's Morale Reports for the Region began to focus on "adverse comment" and scepticism toward official communiqués.[43]

The beginning of April saw the issue raised in the Commons by several Scottish MPs, including James Maxton, George Buchanan, and John McGovern, who referred to public reaction in the area as resentful, with the spread of wild rumours resulting from disillusionment with the local information authorities[44]. As a result of this pressure the Cabinet agreed to release yet another figure, numbering the dead at 1,040, "in order to satisfy public opinion of the reliability of official figures".[45] Naturally, the German attack on Clydeside and the issue of casualty figures brought the Scottish Region into the fore (at least temporarily) regarding discussion on Civil Defence policy.

Aside from the physical and psychological threats to Scottish morale presented by bombing itself, the Government also concerned itself during the war with organisations in Scotland whose ideology did not seem compatible with that of the unified British Home Front. Perhaps most obvious of these groups was the Scottish Nationalist Party, formed in the mid-1920s by Roland Muirhead after he became disillusioned with Labour's Home Rule Movement. Thomas Johnston had pointed out in the Commons in 1938 that the

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[43] Public Record Office, HO.45.25010.
[44] House of Commons Debates (Hansard), fifth series, vol. 370, col.856.
[45] War Cabinet Minutes (Public Record Office microfiche, 32(41)3), 27 March, 1941.

Johnston had pointed out in the Commons in 1938 that the Scottish Nationalists were certainly a force to be reckoned with:

> "..I say that it is up to the Secretary of State for Scotland, it is up to us, it is up to Members of all parties, while there is yet time, and before a new Sinn Fein movement occurs on our northern frontier..to make democracy efficient and to make it work"

Clearly, a group whose purpose was to win independence of Scotland from the London-based government presented a case of conflicting ideals, especially at a time when the possibilities of nationalist movements were making themselves fairly plain throughout Europe. If nationalism is, as one theorist has suggested, the most powerful ideological force in the post-Reformation world, any alternative to British nationalism on the Home Front was a potential threat.[46]

By 1939, however, any perception of the SNP as a serious threat to unity of Scots with the war effort was clearly exaggerated. Membership of the Party had gone down to 2,000 from 10,000 just five years previously, and this was compounded by serious financial trouble; at the outbreak of war they had an overdraft of 800 pounds.[47] In addition, the Party had seen a fair degree of internal strife, much of it resulting from the dilemma over what would be the best position for the Party to take in the impending war in Europe.[48] Though opposed to Fascism, the Nationalists had a traditional belief that the British Government had no right to take Scotland into war without

[46] Webb, p.2.
[47] Ibid, p.61.
[48] Ibid, p.56.

the Scottish people.[49] This policy was subjected to almost continuous revision until the outbreak of war and conscription, by which time it stated Home Rule as a condition of Scottish participation in the war. Unfortunately for the SNP, by this time the statement had no electoral impact.

Considering the hard times that had befallen the Scottish Nationalist Party by the outbreak of war, it is not surprising that it had not called much attention to itself as a significant influence on public opinion. However, there was some threat perceived to the British war effort from Scottish nationalism as an ideology. The Germans, for example, supplemented their radio propaganda to Britain with "Radio Caledonia", a programme aimed specifically at Scotland for the purpose of attempting to arouse nationalist sentiment in opposition to the war.

Although the Government never took any direct steps to repress groups that professed Scottish nationalist sentiment, they were not left completely unscrutinised. The homes of 17 individuals involved in various Scottish Home Rule movements were searched by the police in May of 1941, and 11 were actually detained for questioning.[50] When James Maxton came before the House of Commons two weeks later to ask for what reason, aside from involvement in Scottish Home Rule Association, the men had been searched and detained, he was told by the Secretary of State for Scotland (Tom Johnston) that the warrants had been issued under Defence Regulation 88A, addressing "preparation or

[49] Ibid, p.57.
[50] House of Commons Debates (Hansard), fifth series, vol. 371, col.1696.

88A, addressing "preparation or instigation of acts prejudicial to the public safety and the defence of the realm".[51] Although this appears (as was implied by Maxton) to be selective repression of political enemies under the umbrella of Defence Regulations, the authorities only prosecuted one of the men under this charge, who was given a £20 fine. Considering that military rifles, bayonets, and live ammunition were found in his possession, this punishment was considerably light.

Aside from one individual who seemed prepared for armed rebellion, Scottish nationalism as an ideology in itself did not affect much popular opposition to conditions on the Home Front, nor would it spread much demand for Home Rule once the war was over. The specifically "Scottish identity" on which it depended was not directly relevant to politics on the Home Front. Being largely culturally-based, the "Scottish identity" seems to have co-existed in most respects with the British context of the war. It was this co-existence that could be brought to the level of conflict by Johnston and others whenever British Home-Front politics seemed to be deprioritising or ignoring Scottish social or cultural interests.

Perhaps of greater concern to Mass Observation and the centralised government with regard to opposition groups in Scotland was the Communist Party. The Communists, in accordance with the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact existing prior to Germany's Eastern Front, had taken a position of 'revolutionary defeatism'. They also voiced open opposition to the war in their Party newspaper, the

[51] Ibid.

to the war in their Party newspaper, the Daily Worker, which was boasting weekly sales of up to 362,000 in 1940.[52] The War Cabinet had considered suppression of the publication under Defence Regulation 2D (publishing matter intended to foment opposition to the war), but decided against it. Not only would it serve to agitate industrial workers, but there "were a number of other newspapers which were as worthy of drastic action as the Daily Worker".[53] This decision was reconsidered however, and the ban was administered in January of 1941. In addition to protesting the ban of the Worker, the Party continued relatively unmolested in its other activities, mainly calling for social reform on the Home Front, provision of better shelters and adequate control of food prices. Ironically, it was this programme that probably should have concerned the War Cabinet most, as the general population was much more likely to side with the Communist Party on such matters affecting Home Front life than with any direct anti-war propaganda.

Ongoing concern (and surveillance) over the presence of Communist ideology in Britain inevitably turned its attention to the Glasgow area as one that was perhaps particularly susceptible to CP-instilled discontent. After all, the Clydeside area had a long tradition of Socialist agitation; it is likely that many remembered the last war, when tanks and troops were sent into George Square in Glasgow's City Centre to suppress a demonstration of

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[52] Paul Addison, Churchill on the Home Front 1900-1955 Jonathan Cape (London) 1992, p.343.

[53] War Cabinet Minutes (Public Record Office microfiche, 193(40)2), 4 July, 1940.

of a series of events in the past thirty years that had earned for the general area the name of "Red Clydeside". Mass Observation even went so far as to attribute a certain amount of Communist influence to apathy toward air attack, stating that "one of the reasons frequently given for not expecting heavy raids was that the Germans believe revolution will develop so long as bombs don't stir up the people".[54] Police in the area kept close watch on Communist activities, as is clearly revealed in Police Intelligence Reports from the Scottish Region, but action was never taken. By the time of the Blitz on Clydeside, Constables could report that their meetings showed "no sign of attracting any greater degree of public interest", and aside from the increased opportunity created by the bombing for the Party to "create difficulty" over fire-fighting arrangements and the food situation, there was little if any significant public disorder directly connected to the Communists.[55]

Although the Communist Party did not create a significant threat in and of itself to the war effort (particularly after the ban of their press), there was a strong perception of its influence in the periodic labour unrest in Glasgow that was the focal concern of Mass Observation's morale report in early 1941. Strikes, as previously mentioned, were certainly not a figment of MO's imagination according to local ARP records. Many of these, such as an apprentices' strike during that year, had become widespread in engineering and shipbuilding areas throughout

[54] Mass Observation (Strathclyde Regional Archives, AGN.2252).
[55] Public Record Office, HO.45.25010.

Glasgow and Edinburgh. Such strikes were apparently thought by the public to be the result of exploitation by "outside agitators", though the Communist Party was not mentioned by name.[56]

As in the case of the various other forces that were seen to be at work in areas of Scotland, the actual threat of the Communist Party or industrial unrest in general was at worst a case of co-existence with what was a fairly stable war effort. However, what appeared to be a threat to observers was enough to create a mind set that magnified incidents and applied them directly to a subjective, British ideal of morale and national unity. When working-class Scots appeared to be placing their own interests over those mandated by shared nationalism and wartime solidarity with the rest of Britain, morale was perceived as threatened. Actions contrary to the prescribed conduct of the Home Front, like strikes, when shown to co-exist with "subversive" Home Front ideologies like Communism, immediately became serious considerations. Even Mass Observation, in an attempt to summarise the lack of "direction and loyalty" on Clydeside, acknowledged Communism as a secondary factor:

> ..The antagonisms which are inevitable under war conditions, which should properly be directed towards the enemy, have not here been so directed...Rather, they have gradually directed themselves along the well-established Clydeside line, which long pre-dates the Communist Party, i.e. of worker vs. boss, and this direction to antagonism is in itself the..antithesis of good morale (though it might be good morale from a revolutionary point of view!).[57]

[56] Public Record Office, HO.45.25010.

[57] Mass Observation (Strathclyde Regional Archives) AGN.2252.

Clearly then, the findings of Mass Observation served to reinforce much of the concern in Whitehall that existed over Scottish public opinion and what was serving to shape it. Government action (when taken) was slight, especially considering the possibilities open to them through Defence Regulations. Nevertheless, the perception of mere potential was enough to provide an added pillar in virtually any sociopolitical argument regarding Scotland, given the broad view that the wartime Government had accepted of its functions. Actual threats to unity and morale of communities may have preceded the use of their possible ramifications as political leverage, but only in a decidedly benign form.

Along with the variety of opposing ideologies that existed domestically within Scotland and Britain as a whole, the Home Front was subjected to that of the German enemy through radio broadcasts aimed at Great Britain. These broadcasts, which began in the 1930s under a service known as the New British Broadcasting Service (NBBS), were best known for the talks given by "Lord Haw-Haw", whose broadcasts were made to appear as if they were coming from within Britain. The programmes of Lord Haw-Haw were supplemented in 1940 with Radio Caledonia, a service aimed specifically at the Scottish Region for the purpose of arousing nationalist sentiment, as well as Welsh Freedom, Workers' Challenge, and Christian Peace Movement stations.[58] By January of 1940, a BBC listeners' poll revealed that 33% of the public in Britain were tuning in to the German

[58] Michael Balfour, Propaganda in War 1939-45 Routledge (London) 1979, p.139.

The fact that people of Britain were regularly tuning in to listen to enemy radio broadcasts in 1940 is probably more a result of the strict censorship of news that was being upheld by the Ministry of Information and the BBC at the time, as well as the lack of activity on the Home Front generally. Nevertheless, the German broadcasts were given surprisingly little attention by the Government. When the prospect of monitoring the number of people listening to the broadcasts was mentioned in the Commons in August of 1940, it was added that they were not expected to do any harm.[60] The Ministry of Information, accepting a policy of striving to discourage rather than prohibit listening, arranged with the BBC the simultaneous broadcast of talks by JB Priestly as a more attractive alternative.[61]

By early 1941, the number of people listening to German radio was reported to have decreased considerably, and was thought to be no threat to general morale by many in Whitehall. The Mass Observation Unit, meanwhile, was urging for more active monitoring and prevention of the "Haw-Haw habit" amongst the public of Glasgow:

> There is nothing..to justify the complacency so often shown in official circles, about the present unimportance of Haw-Haw. A thing is not unimportant because it is not obvious; and things can go on and simmer along the mass of the public without ever becoming obvious to leaders...[62]

This claim by Mass Observation would be refuted by Police Intelligence immediately following the German attack on Glasgow, describing the effect of the broadcasts as

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[60] House of Commons Debates (Hansard), fifth series, vol. 363, col.1528.
[61] Ibid, col.768.
[62] Mass Observation, AGN.2252.

"negligible"[63]. One issue raised by Mass Observation, which was perhaps of greater concern, was their claim resting most of the blame for Scottish Haw-Haw listening onto the BBC, as "the Home programme is largely unsuitable for the mass public, who therefore were forced to find alternative programmes..."[64] Apparently, the cultural distinction of the Scottish people lent an added dimension to what was a common problem on the Home Front. As will be discussed later, this distinction was commonly made by Scottish leaders and others, who continually claimed that British broadcasting propaganda, rather than the wartime Government, had failed to appeal to Scottish needs and/or tastes.

Considering the perceived threats to the direction of Scottish 'unity and loyalty' that were of periodic concern to the Government throughout the war, it is apparent that these threats were never brought beyond the realm of potential, yet the image of a danger was enough to be of political use. Perhaps no Scottish leader had kept that fact in mind as firmly as Thomas Johnston. When he was offered the appointment of Secretary of State by Winston Churchill in 1941, based partly on the skill of his administration as Regional CD Commissioner, Johnston wasted no time. He accepted the position, but only on the grounds that he be allowed to form a 'Scottish Council of State' so that matters affecting Scotland could be discussed without interference from Government Departments or 'partisan political strife'.[65] In addition, the Prime Minister was to

[63] Public Record Office, HO.45.25010.
[64] Ibid.
[65] Galbraith, p.238.

the Council made unanimously. His use of Committees looking into various aspects of industry, health, and education allowed him to investigate and present Scottish needs with the minimum of outside interference, such that in retrospect, he could claim that "we had got Scotland's wishes and opinions respected and listened to, as they had never been ..since the Union".[66]

The emergence of war had not only brought with it an expansion of the focus of Government over all aspects of British society, but also a relaxation of party politics, forcing many interests to assume a low priority in discussion and policy-making. It was in these matters that the issue of Scottish morale and public opinion generally could be used by Johnston as well as others to establish cause for immediate consideration. The unique position of Scotland as a culturally separate nation in the United Kingdom made moral and psychological unity with the rest of the Home Front seem more difficult to maintain, and more likely to be compromised, than in other areas of Britain. The recognised cultural and social identity of the Scottish nation, when existing alongside perceived threats to the dominance of wartime nationalism in the British context, quickly brought legitimacy, if not action, onto problems that affected the Scottish people.

[66] Ibid, p.236.

Part II

The War of Ideas and "The Eyes of the Londoner"-
Propaganda and Specialised Ideological Needs
on
The British Home Front

Chapter 5-

Development of the Broadcasting Medium and the Rise of the BBC as Propagandist

The nature of total war on the British Home Front in 1939 required a new emphasis on what had loosely become known as civilian morale; a broad, all-inclusive term that encapsulated the collective strength, both physical and psychological, of the British populace. With morale maintenance on the Home Front as a fundamental priority for the Government, so too came a new emphasis on the means by which the ideology of Home Front civic unity could be actively reinforced. Wartime propaganda, a form of communication borne of the need for immediate stimulation and action on the part of the British public, was an integral part of the process of morale maintenance.

The Government and Ministry of Information employed all available means of communication in its efforts to instill throughout Britain the resolve that was necessary to emerge victorious from a conflict that would be widely referred to as "a war of ideas". In this arena, perhaps the most powerful weapon would be that of broadcasting. The British Broadcasting Corporation, holding a monopoly over this relatively new and powerful medium of propaganda, managed to retain a unique degree of creative and administrative distance from the Wartime Government that was not seen in any other facet of "morale maintenance" overseen by Whitehall. In spite of earlier plans to place broadcasting entirely in the hands of the Government, the BBC was given a relatively free hand to provide the kind of morale maintenance that the Ministry of Information strived to define and administer. However, the factors contributing to effective radio propaganda in wartime, like the issue of morale itself, were subject to varied interpretation, making broadcasting a

propaganda in wartime, like the issue of morale itself, were subject to varied interpretation, making broadcasting a factor in virtually every other issue facing Home Front Britain. The independence of the BBC from Whitehall, though allowing the BBC to appear as an objective entity acting on behalf of the listener's needs, also opened the door for criticism of its shortcomings, from within the Commons as well as the British public, when it appeared as if certain listeners' needs were being ignored. Perhaps the most vocal of such criticism came from the Scottish Region, where different traditions, culture, and history made the case for a separate propaganda programme seem unavoidable. The unwillingness of the BBC and Government to meet the acknowledged need for a separate Scottish programme revealed the practical limits of wartime radio as a means of propaganda. More importantly, however, it also revealed the limitations of the morale issue as a means for gaining social and political concessions for the Scottish nation.

Aside from the practical aspects of Home Front morale discussed previously, the policy for maintenance of Home Front national unity in Scotland, as well as Britain in general, was largely an issue of propaganda; that is, information and ways in which it was communicated between individuals and groups on the Home Front. After all, in "a war of ideas", this (along with morale) was given a new level of significance as a factor in warfare. Of course, propaganda as a form of communication was nothing new at the outset of war with Germany in 1939. However, the wholesale militarisation of entire societies for direct involvement in the course of war, as well as the new medium of broadcasting,

militarisation of entire societies for direct involvement in the course of war, as well as the new medium of broadcasting, brought propaganda (and its uses) prominence as a focal concern.

On its most basic level, propaganda in war (as elsewhere) is merely a form of communication, taking place as a means by which individuals and groups come to understand their environment. Like other forms of communication, propaganda serves to increase understanding of the environment by abstracting and thus simplifying. Generalised stereotypes are held by individuals as a means to interpret reality, and when various individual interpretations conflict, then further communication must take place in order to reach understanding. It is at this primary level of abstraction, which carries inherent risk of oversimplification, that propaganda is rendered effective or ineffective. As one theorist of propaganda has observed, the basic assumptions with which individuals interpret their environment, being based largely on emotions, are "impregnated with values".[1] Clearly, the people of Scotland shared many such values and stereotypes with the rest of Britain. Otherwise, the centralised propaganda of the MoI and the BBC would have been completely alien to them, rather than simply inadequate. Since Scotland represented a separate culture within Britain, however, there were times when differences in socially-held values could render propaganda ineffective or in some way lacking to the Scottish audience. The National Programme of the BBC would become a

[1] Michael Balfour, Propaganda in War 1939-45. Routledge (London) 1979, p.419.

audience. The National Programme of the BBC would become a prominent example of this trend.

Effective propaganda succeeds in maintaining and strengthening the bond of communication between the government and its people. When people seek information to further understanding, they will invariably seek it from trusted sources, allowing the success of the communication to be analysed in terms of the degree of uncertainty that is removed by it. The exchange of information between "trusted source" and individual is ideally a neutral one, promoting mutual understanding. Since no individual has the time or inclination to verify all of the information given, however, less proof is needed by the source as confidence is established.[2] Of course, if the information given is disputed, then the bond of mutual understanding is compromised. This was especially true at the outset of the Second World War, as full-scale mobilisation and civilian bombing not only created widespread uncertainty among the general population as to the future of life as they knew it, but also a completely altered daily environment. The interdependency created between British society and its leadership was practical in terms of the collective war effort, but primarily ideological, as confidence in the unity and loyalty of Britain had to be established and maintained in order for any action to take place.[3] This helps to clarify the Government's perception of Glasgow in 1941 as an area that perhaps needed special attention. If desired action did

[2] Garth Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, Sage (London) 1976, p. 34.

[3] Philip M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind- War Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Nuclear Age, William Collins (Glasgow) 1990, p.14.

that perhaps needed special attention. If desired action did not take place within Scotland, be it faithful industrial work or war conversations in pubs, then it was presumed that the source of the problem was ideology and morale.

This immediate need for action over understanding forms the essential distinguishing characteristic separating propaganda from other means of communication, and makes it one of the most frequently used in wartime.[4] In war, the primary goal for a nation's leaders is to persuade people to fight, but unlike persuasion, propaganda solicits this action without the use of rational argument, since the desired action (or inaction) must be achieved before such an argument can be formed.[5] Whether propaganda solicits specific action (agitative) or is aimed at rendering its audience passive and accepting of their environment (integrative), it must reach the desired effect without being widely disputed by its audience. Therefore, the most successful methods of propaganda are those that closely resemble mutually interactive and beneficial communication.[6] Whether the Scottish public on the Home Front was being subjected to a programme of propaganda or persuasion, the overall success of the methods used would be apparent by 1945.

As propaganda and persuasion are forms of communication between society and its leaders, then use of the mass media is by definition inherent in the transaction. After all, for information to pass from a source to an audience, it must have a medium, which automatically shapes the content of the message being sent. This varied content is based, according

[4] Ibid.
[5] Jowett and O'Donnell, p.13.
[6] Jowett and O'Donnell, p.34

message being sent. This varied content is based, according to one scholar of media theory, on the level of "sensual involvement" that is required by the audience in receiving the information.[7] A high level of sensual involvement for example, defines a 'hot' medium, while a 'cool' medium elicits specific or limited sensory involvement. By this qualification, perhaps the strongest of all media is that of the spoken word.[8] Its emphasis on the oratory and its tendency to heighten visual power traditionally makes it a staple medium for propaganda and/or persuasion. By 1939, the development of broadcasting had amplified the role of the spoken word to new dimensions. This would be affirmed by Peter Eckersley, former Chief Engineer of the BBC, in 1941:

> Broadcasting is a very powerful medium of propaganda. It is oracular and yet friendly. It is not what is said that influences its listeners...Political beliefs need not be imposed: they can be made to grow out of men's minds by suggestion...The BBC exalts the value of compromise and escapism by not letting the loudspeaker say anything exceptional, thus implying that it is better not to let anything exceptional be said...[9]

By the time Eckersley made this matter-of-fact assessment of the development of broadcasting in the prewar period, it was apparent that unlike the Ministry of Information and other Government bodies created for morale-maintenance, the British Broadcasting Corporation had had long experience as an agent of propaganda and persuasion at national, regional, and local levels by 1939.

Unlike most other aspects of Home Front, Government

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[7] Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media, Routledge (London) 1964, p.78.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Peter Eckersley, The Power Behind the Microphone, Cape (London) 1941, p.155.

control of the BBC did not begin with mobilisation for war. When the British Broadcasting Company was founded in 1922, broadcasting was already under State regulation according to the Wireless Telegraphy Act of 1904, which gave the Post-Master General ministerial responsibility for regulation of all transmitters and receivers in Britain. At this time, the Government's role was merely to act as overseer of a cartel of companies (including Marconi) that produced and sold receivers to a small market of enthusiasts, who paid an annual license fee of 10 shillings to the Post Office for the service.[10]

In 1927 the British Broadcasting Company became the British Broadcasting Corporation, after being granted a complete monopoly over transmitter facilities throughout the country. From that point on, the BBC would have complete power to select programming according to its own perceptions of the listening needs of the public. Though they still answered to the Government through the Post-Master General, the BBC had essentially become a separate entity administratively. More importantly, they were independent creatively as well, and this precedent would allow the BBC to avoid being overwhelmed when wartime Government control increased in virtually every other sphere of British society.

In 1935 a Broadcasting Committee report concluded that due to "a high and certainly unforeseen degree of educative and cultural importance" that had developed in the medium, there had arisen a need for more articulate ministerial

[10] Paddy Scannell and David Cardiff, A Social History of British Broadcasting, Vol.1, Basil Blackwell (Oxford) 1991, p.5.

representation of the BBC.[11] It was suggested that, although the Post-Master General should remain in control of "the technical side" of broadcasting, "the cultural side..should be transferred to a Cabinet Minister in the House of Commons, preferably a senior member of the Government, and free from heavy departmental responsibilities".[12] It was becoming apparent to Whitehall that their primary concern with the BBC and its functions should not merely be a matter of revenue and infrastructure, but also one that could allow them to provide articulate input as to content of the medium.

As Director-General of the BBC, John Reith personified the BBC's monopoly of broadcasting with the large measure of personal control he wielded over all levels of the Corporation's decision-making. The national programme (in Scotland and elsewhere) had been supplemented in 1932 with Regional broadcasts, in order to cater to specialised interests. Within BBC administration, however, this did not mean autonomy for Scotland in the area of broadcasting; although the popularity of radio had spread since its foundation, the staff was still small enough for Reith to be able to hand-pick announcers and monitor their performances in the Regions as well as in London.[13]

In addition to concerns over how best to interact with the BBC, the Government was by 1935 beginning to speculate on the possibility of involvement in another European war, and the potential for broadcasting as a means by which to influence public opinion was becoming a focal concern of

[11] Ministry of Information Correspondence, "Broadcasting in Time War" (Public Record Office- INF.1.362).
[12] Ibid.
[13] Briggs, The BBC- The First 50 Years, p.29.

influence public opinion was becoming a focal concern of those who were beginning to make preparations for war. However, the practical measures that were being drawn up for Civil Defence were given priority. With the danger presented by radio signals as a direction-finder for enemy aircraft, the essential question was not the content of the medium itself or how best to serve specialised listener needs, but whether civilian broadcasting of any kind could be allowed to continue in the event of war.[14] In weighing the options, Reith and the rest of the Broadcasting Committee were quick to assert that

> ..the problem seemed to resolve itself into offsetting the dangers..the advantages, from the point of view of morale, which would result from the broadcasting of warnings, official announcements, and other features.[15]

Clearly, the BBC was well aware of the ideological role that it could fill for a society engaged in total war.

In spite of the possibility of being taken off the air completely in the event of war, plans were made by 1938 to provide a national programme at minimum risk to Civil Defence. At the outbreak of hostilities, the transmitters throughout Britain would be "synchronised" to one of two possible wavelengths, all broadcasting the same national programme so as to avoid the problem of enemy direction-finding. Of course, this effectively put an end to plans for increased decentralization and control given to Regional broadcasting, in Scotland as elsewhere.[16]

The centralised administration of the BBC would undergo

[14] Public Record Office, INF.1.362.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.

The centralised administration of the BBC would undergo some changes as well. If war became imminent, the "non-technical" powers of the Post-Master General would be transferred to the Ministry of Information, who would have the authority to prescribe broadcasting hours, veto any programme matter, and prescribe conditions for the BBC's programming.[17] In addition, the BBC Board of Governors would be completely dismantled, leaving the Director-General and his Deputy in sole control over the actual running of the Service.[18] Of course, the prospect of leaving this influential new medium in the hands of so few would presumably jeopardise the BBC's well-cultivated image as an objective, democratic body in the service of the British people. The function of the BBC at the outset of war would nominally be as an extension of Government (particularly MoI) policy. However, traditional freedom from Government interference with content would eventually make the BBC as independent and powerful a force in propaganda as it had been in "education, information, and entertainment" up to 1939.

When war was declared, the vast majority of the public in Scotland and elsewhere probably first got the news by listening to the Prime Minister's speech, which was broadcast across Britain on the newly synchronised transmitters. By this time, radio licenses were held by some nine million households throughout the United Kingdom, 783,883 of which were in the Scottish Region.[19] The BBC, having become a major facet of the mass media in Britain, was providing a profound direct link between the public and the Government.

[17] Public Record Office, INF.1.362.
[18] Briggs, p.179.
[19] McDowell, p.43.

profound direct link between the public and the Government. To be able to hear directly from the Prime Minister as Britain went to war surely added much to the feeling of national unity and common purpose that the Government hoped to maintain in the face of heavy German attack.

The radio would soon be widely considered (especially at the Ministry of Information) to be a staple means by which to affect attitudes and behaviour within the British public, but this wide recognition was not immediate. Aside from the fact that Chamberlain and the Air Ministry were prepared to put a stop to broadcasting altogether for the duration of the war, the Government was also generally slow in making effective use of the medium. This is clearly seen when considering that, for the BBC as well as other agents of the wartime mass media (including the Ministry of Information), direct attempts at propaganda in the early days of war gave rise not to reinforced morale, but to a certain amount of public disdain. Due to the news blackout maintained by the Government Ministries, for example, the content of BBC broadcasts were widely considered to be dull and uninformative.[20]

The apparent lack of BBC influence on the general morale of Britain in the early months of the war is hardly surprising given that its chief source for news and other programming was the Ministry of Information. After all, from the outbreak of war the only source for official news was material that had passed through the MoI, which at the time was experiencing difficulty in its broad functions and

[20] Briggs, p.175.

responsibilities.[21] Aside from the initial news blackout and poor cooperation that it was getting from other Government Departments in the release of news, the Ministry was struggling in their task to define and assess morale so that it may "direct popular opinion and forestall and prevent any sudden drop in public courage".[22]

Broadcasting, a popular new medium in the service of wartime Government, was naturally reflecting many of the shortcomings of the Ministry of Information. By the end of 1939, however, the BBC had taken the initiative to begin broadcasting programmes aimed at providing the Home Front populace with more riveting material than the Government had specifically prescribed. At a time when many cinemas were closed and newspapers smaller due to a paper shortage, features such as eyewitness accounts of battles and missions over Germany were a welcome break from the monotony of official news.[23]

In many ways the BBC was more experienced than the MoI in taking the pulse of public opinion. Their established methods of listener research, in the words of one MoI memorandum, made the BBC "more responsive to public opinion..as it tries to please its public".[24] Still, the onset of war signaled a shift in method; namely from entertainment of an audience to propaganda aimed at the general public, and in the eyes of the Ministry of Information, this shift gave the BBC a commitment (not unlike

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[21] see part I.
[22] Minstry of Information Correspondence- "Psychology in Propaganda" 1939-41 (Public Record Office, INF.1.318).
[23] McDowell, p.43.
[24] INF.1.318

the Ministry itself), "..to satisfy the psychological needs of the people, and to canalise them in to most useful directions...".[25] Apparently, the Ministry was able to identify the general objectives of broadcasting in time of war; however, just as civilian morale and national unity were subject to a wide variety of interpretations and definitions, the so-called psychological needs of the British listening public were never interpreted or explained fully, making it a variable in virtually every debate over broadcasting as a propaganda medium while the war continued.

[25] Ibid.

Chapter 6-

Defence Regulations- Regional and Cultural Censorship

In considering the evolution of the BBC and media policy in Great Britain after 1939, it is clear that although the wartime Government had grasped the potential of broadcasting as a way of influencing and shaping public opinion, the specific method by which this influence could best be utilised remained (like the issue of morale itself) loosely defined. Perhaps partly as a result of such variable interpretation, the ongoing debate on Government policy toward the wartime media was essentially guided by (and centred on) the wider debate over the creation and application of Civil Defence Regulations. This legislation had by early 1940 completely altered the social, political, and economic landscape of Britain, and as such would be a powerful factor in the ideological sphere of broadcasting and its uses in wartime.

The development of the legislation that would be included under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act of 1939 effectively began with the establishment of the first War Emergency Sub-Committee from the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1924.[26] The primary objective of the committee from the outset was to draw up draft Defence Regulations (based on the Defence of the Realm Acts), which could be used to guide mobilisation and maintain the public order in the event of any future war.[27] Due to the relatively low expectation of a major war recurring, however, the committee met infrequently through the 1920s.[28]

By the mid-1930s, the Committee had produced a report

[26] Neil Stammers, Civil Liberties in Britain During the Second World War, Croom Helm (London) 1983, p.7.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.

By the mid-1930s, the Committee had produced a report that discussed the nature that such legislation might take in the event of another war, although most of their recommendations were essentially modifications of the Defence of the Realm Acts. Even at this stage the measures were decidedly drastic, providing for the detention without trial of citizens, as well as search of premises and seizure of private property.[29] The Regulations would undergo more revision at the Committee stage as time went on, but due to the likely reaction of the British public to a set of laws that would effectively suspend rights throughout the country, it was decided that they should not be enacted during peacetime. Once they were completely drawn up, the regulations would be enacted after war had broken out, since a clear national emergency would be necessary in order to justify the transfer of such broad powers to the Government.

On the other hand, this policy would effectively prevent a thorough discussion of Defence Regulations in the Commons until after the outbreak of war. The concept of bringing such legislation to bear on the British public without a legitimate Commons vote could have a disastrous effect on public opinion, as well as a hesitation in the numerous practical challenges faced with imminent war. Since morale was becoming a more prominent issue to the leadership of Great Britain by the late 1930s, a public revolt in reaction to what amounted to the complete removal of democratic freedoms was not beyond the realm of political imagination, and as a result it was decided to put the legislation to a Commons vote before the emergency had actually occurred. On

[29] Stammers. p .9.

Commons vote before the emergency had actually occurred. On 25 August, 1939, the enabling clause of the Regulations was read in the Commons:

> His Majesty may by Order in Council make such regulations as appear to him necessary...for securing public safety, Defence of the Realm, maintenance of public order, and efficient prosecution of any war.
>
> -(Emergency Powers Defence Act, 1939, quoted in Stammers, p.14).

If there was going to be an initial outcry in the Commons as many lawmakers expected, it certainly would not be over the perceived necessity of such broad wartime powers; the Bill was passed into law in under four hours.[30]

The relatively easy ratification of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act is testimony to the fact that by August of 1939, there was little significant doubt that total war was imminent, and that in order to be able to fight such a war (and win), more Government control was necessary over the economy and society of Great Britain. The Act, being one that gave the Government almost total control over all perceived factors in a British war effort, naturally addressed the wartime use of the mass media at an early stage, both as a form of mere persuasion and as agitative propaganda. The linchpin section of the regulations that could be brought to bear directly on the mass media was Regulation 39B, which made it an offence to

> —endeavour to influence, orally or otherwise, public opinion in a manner likely to be prejudicial to the defence of the realm.[31]

This broad clause in the Regulations could make it very easy

[30] Ibid, p.11.

[31] Stammers, p.14

This broad clause in the Regulations could make it very easy to censor or suppress any form of communication, written or spoken, but Section 1 of the Regulation went on to give the Secretary of State full power to censor any publication that "might" be a threat to the British war effort.

The mainstream perception of the Defence Regulations seems to have been of the necessary sacrifice of democracy in order that democracy could be preserved. Although the regulations as a whole were passed in the Commons with very little if any vocal opposition, there was, however, an immediate effort on the part of many MPs to ratify several aspects of them as soon as they had been passed, mostly in response to the injustices that would occur if such power was abused. Regulation 39B came under fire as early as October 1939, when MP Dingle Foot moved to have the entire Act annulled on the basis that it had no foundation in precedent, and on its contribution to "Nazi tendencies at home".[32] After the motion was delivered, the discussion immediately centred on Regulation 39B, which was referred to as "one of the most menacing of the regulations", since its broad terminology essentially allowed the Government to suppress any individual (or statement) perceived as aimed to "influence public opinion".[33]

Clearly, Defence Regulations brought some criticism from within the Commons from the earliest days of their ratification, and it came primarily due to the lack of explicit limits to the new powers that were being imparted to the Ministers of the Government. According to the new law,

[32] House of Commons Debates (Hansard), fifth series, Vol.352, col.1929.
[33] Ibid, col.1876.

the Ministers of the Government. According to the new law, and as Dingle Foot and others pointed out, necessary and even healthy criticism of the Government or the administration of the war could be suppressed under Regulation 39B, along with any that directly fostered defeat and/or paranoia. Secretary of State John Anderson, while urging that they would be applied with the utmost restraint, reminded the House that "it is because the efficient prosecution of the war is in fact a necessary condition of freedom that these regulations are required".[34] In spite of criticism over the proper application of the Regulations, it was generally accepted that a national crisis of such magnitude called for drastic governmental measures.

Once in effect, Defence Regulations became a valuable tool of wartime policy at home, giving the Cabinet and Government Ministries full power over British society and its institutions to guide (and enforce) the nation's survival in the crucible of total war. However, having come at a time when issues like maintenance of civilian morale and effective use of broadcasting were still largely at an undefined stage, the censorship guidelines presented in Regulation 39B and others became the only concrete Government policy on such matters by 1939. As time went on and fears of a "knock-out blow" abated, Defence Regulations began to appear to many in the Commons and elsewhere as serving to oversimplify or even ignore many essential issues of British daily life during wartime. Most of these domestic issues would in turn become "morale" issues, and radio programming in Scotland would be a central focus of such criticisms.

[34] Commons Debates, vol.352, col.1876.

central focus of such criticisms.

After the British declaration of war in 1939, Defence Regulations heralded more direct Government control over broadcasting throughout the country; however for the BBC, this was essentially nothing new. The 1926 Charter that had granted the BBC its authority to operate had forbade the discussion of 'controversial matters' on the wireless.[35] In spite of such guidelines, Reith had won for the BBC a large degree of independence from Whitehall in the more creative and cultural aspects of broadcasting, but the traditional principles of the BBC (to educate, inform, and entertain) had by the late 30s taken on much stronger social and political ramifications. This was felt almost immediately when the censorship policy of Defence Regulations began to take shape.

In the mid-30s, as the Government began to make administrative preparations for the possibility of war by drawing up the Regulations, an attempt to gain additional control over the BBC in wartime was also planned. Should there be an outbreak of war, the entire BBC Board of Governors, who ordinarily made all of the creative and administrative decisions related to programming, would be taken "out of commission", and the Corporation placed under the direct control of the newly formed Ministry of Information.[36] Although the Director-General and his deputy would be left as Governors, the MoI would prescribe broadcasting content and retain full veto power over programmes.

This complete takeover by the Government of the medium

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[35] Scannell, p.23.
[36] Briggs, p.179.

This complete takeover by the Government of the medium of broadcasting was, like the Regulations that enabled it, seen by the Government as a necessary recourse in the event of total war. Of course, the development of censorship legislation was made without a working definition of what was required to positively reinforce public opinion in wartime. This was even more so with the BBC, which was originally going to be taken off the air completely. As a result, rather than positively direct the BBC, the Government in 1939 could only instruct the BBC as to what it could not broadcast, and criticisms arose almost immediately. In July of 1939, this was already a central focus of the BBC Board's argument for creative distance from Whitehall, and a formal complaint was submitted to Chamberlain's advisor (Horace Wilson) warning of the serious "blow to liberty" entailed in such a takeover. The complaint made sure to mention the difficulties that would be created for the Government "before the public opinion of the country", were it ever to come into effect.[37]

> ...The only counter to the enemy's propaganda offensive is confidence on the Home Front in our ability to win the war, and positive evidence to show that victory is worth fighting and suffering for, whatever the strain on our own people...[38]
>
> -Excerpt from Ministry of Information memorandum on propaganda policy and issue of news, 1940 (Public Record Office, INF.1.851).

As discussed earlier, the fundamental goal of the wartime Government in the arena of "morale maintenance" was to endeavour to reinforce directly the general support for

[37] Briggs, p.179.

[38] Ministry of Information Correspondence, "Propaganda Policy and Issue of News", 1940. (Public Record Office, INF.1.851) (x/30).

to endeavour to reinforce directly the general support for the war that existed throughout the country, or as official historian Terence O'Brien observed, to centre on the "maintenance of readiness versus the avoidance of panic".[39] This was indirectly accomplished with Defence Regulations, in so far as they lent Whitehall the broad power that was necessary to direct the nation toward this goal. As time went on, however, the Regulations (particularly 39B and related clauses) became the sounding board for criticisms leveled at wartime policy, and as such represent a means by which to gain insight into the various stages of the Home Front War and its relationship with the development of propaganda policy in practice.

The potential of Defence Regulations as a tool for political repression of the media throughout Britain wrought criticism from even the earliest stages of their development. Yet, their necessity was not widely debated when war was declared and the country was bracing itself for a devastating blow from the German Luftwaffe. However, as the first few months of war proved to be relatively uneventful for the majority of civilians on the Home Front, such criticisms of unnecessarily broad powers gained a marked degree of credibility in Whitehall. The Regulations, once they had been put into practice, sparked protest not only from opposition groups such as the National Council for Civil Liberties, but also by the agents of the media, who in the wake of a zealous application of the new censorship policy were left with very little material with which to inform, let alone educate or entertain.

[39] Terence O'Brien, Civil Defence, HMSO (London) 1955, p.298.

alone educate or entertain.

Although the Ministry of Information, as objective regulator, relied largely upon the other Government Ministries for its own supply of news, blame for the effects of the "news blackout" in the first weeks of war fell entirely on the MoI.[40] This lack of news was not experienced merely in Scotland and the other provincial areas. At a Cabinet meeting in September of 1939, the London press was reported to be "in a state of revolt" over this lack of news, as well as the application of the censorship policy, which was felt to be "depending on the whim of individual officials".[41] The Cabinet agreed that a certain amount of leniency was advisable, and that the Ministers themselves could alleviate the lack of news by giving broadcasts "at regular intervals", though the actual content or even frequency of such broadcasts was never specified.[42]

While the nominal arbiters of the Defence Regulations were preparing to act as direct agents of broadcasting, this pragmatic policy of leniency was also applied directly to the Regulations, including those governing the Press. In October of 1939, a Committee met to consider amendments to Regulations which were creating criticisms in Parliament, including 39B, the clause which most directly controlled the content of the wartime media. By 23 November, its recommendations were enacted, and 39B was altered; though it remained an offense to influence public opinion negatively, it could only be brought to bear on those who did so by means

[40] Ian McClaine, Ministry of Morale, Allen and Unwin (London) 1979, p37.
[41] War Cabinet Minutes (Public Record Office) CAB 17(39) #10.
[42] Ibid.

of "any false statement, document, or report".[43]

By comparison, in the spring of the following year, when Britain was under threat of direct invasion by the Germans, the Home Secretary (Sir John Anderson) asked the Cabinet for more power to suppress the media. This was sparked in large part by the critical view of the war which was being taken by the Communists' Daily Worker and Action newspapers. By May of 1940, Regulation 2D was added, which gave the Secretary of State the power to suppress any newspaper in the United Kingdom. By this time, with the crisis government of the Coalition in effect, the Regulation was passed by the Cabinet the following day, without consulting the House of Commons .[44] Presumably, this regulation was one which needed to be enacted as soon as possible.[45]

The passing of such potentially strong measures of control over the British press after almost a year of "leniency" was, presumably, another facet of the Government's commitment to maintain the morale of the British public, whose ideological unity was founded upon the struggle for liberty against the tyranny of Nazi Germany. Thus, the potential for a public outcry (or even an uprising) over active repression of the traditional opposition press was also a legitimate concern to the country's leadership, both in and out of the Cabinet. A month after Regulation 2D was enacted, the Daily Worker was issued with a warning, and though the Home Secretary wanted to suppress the paper

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[43] Stammers, p.20.

[44] Stammers, 24.

[45] By comparison, the Regulations of May 1940 (Industrial Conscription) were the most extreme of all, yet these went before the Commons and passed both houses within a few hours (Stammers, p.27).

altogether, it was acknowledged by the Cabinet that "there were a number of other newspapers which were as worthy of drastic action as the Daily Worker".[46] Eventually a full ban of the Worker was carried out in January of 1941, along with an official warning to the Daily Mirror, and for the remainder of the war would be the only prosecution made under Regulation 2D.

Apparently the wartime Government, after giving itself complete control over the medium of the press, opted rather to oversee that which had already been communicated by it. The fact that the Daily Worker was the only publication to be suppressed under Regulation 2D, however, lends considerable validity to accusations that the Coalition government was using the crisis of war (and Defence Regulations) not only as a means by which to revoke civil liberties unnecessarily, but also as a weapon against traditional political opposition. This point was perhaps most fervently raised in the summer of 1940 by MP Willie Gallacher, himself a Communist for West Fife, one of the districts in Scotland that had been earmarked by Whitehall as an "area of disaffection":

> The Daily Worker is in danger, not because of the systematic publication of material that affects the successful prosecution of the war, but because of..publication of political opinions that are not acceptable to the Executive in this country.[47]

Clearly, in spite of the relative freedom that had been given to the British press in the wake of the "news blackout" of 1939, the Coalition Government in the invasion crisis of 1940 was prepared to use coercion against those who did not serve

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[46] War Cabinet Minutes (Public Record Office), CAB 193(40)2, 4 July, 1940.

[47] Commons Debates, Vol.363, col.1330.

was prepared to use coercion against those who did not serve to reinforce public support of the war effort.

Likewise, the initial question of whether or not the Government would use Defence Regulations to retain creative control over the BBC for the duration of the war was one that occupied members of Parliament as well as those on the Corporation's Board, albeit without the immediate political implications that arose over press censorship. This was largely due to the fact that, as previously mentioned, the BBC's tradition of independence from Whitehall carried into wartime practice by virtue of its overall compatibility with Government policy.[48] Reith as Director-General had fought to bring political discussion to the wireless, but such discussion had always been within the scope of what the Government could (or would) allow the British public to be exposed to.[49] As a result of this traditional attitude of independence, a policy of government-supported self-censorship existed within the BBC, to the degree that when the Under-Secretary of MoI asserted in the Commons in 1941 that "the BBC accepts the direction of the MoI in all matters affecting the National effort", he drew protest from the Corporation for having made such a presumption.[50]

This overall cooperation of the BBC with the censorship policy of Whitehall from the outset of war was immediately perceived by many to be a compromise of the very qualities which could have empowered wartime broadcasting as a medium of support for the national wartime ideology of democracy against tyranny. One such insight came from Peter Eckersley,

[48] Stammers, 154.
[49] Scannell 23.
[50] Stammers 154.

against tyranny. One such insight came from Peter Eckersley, whose experience from within the Corporation led him to assert that

> ..there can be no bias in a policy which allows free expression of controversial opinions...The degree of censorship must depend on the directorate's interpretation of its duties. What is wanted is a wise and witty directorate having the courage of its intellect rather than its convictions...[51]

Moreover, the BBC, by virtue of its compatibility with the fundamental aims of the wartime Government, was able to maintain this independence of operations for the duration of the war. It was through this creative independence that Reith was able to make the BBC a primary link between the wartime British Government and civilians on the Home Front.

At the height of the 'news blackout' at the end of 1939, when Reith began to take matters into his own hands and broadcast material that would help bring the war directly into civilian homes, it had become clear that the wireless was going to prove a valuable tool for influencing public opinion on the Home Front. The Ministry of Information, however, did not use the power imparted by Defence Regulations to dominate the operation of the medium with specific restrictions. Rather, as the BBC continued to play its wartime role as ideological link between government and the British people, it became clear that its traditional directive, like its new administration, ran parallel to the nature of morale maintenance that the Government had strived to define. Like the Ministry of Information, however, its active role would make it the target of criticism both from

[51] Eckersley, p.156.

active role would make it the target of criticism both from the British Government and the British people, including those whose perceived needs were not being met by the wartime Service.

Once the Government had established a wartime monopoly over use of the mass media throughout the United Kingdom, it was taking on responsibility toward its audience that ordinarily would fall on the individual agents of the media themselves. Thus, the question of whether the Government in its censorship policy adequately served, or even acknowledged, the kinds of specialised ideological needs borne out in morale reports from Glasgow can be addressed in part by considering how it asserted itself as a trusted information source for the Scottish people. After all, if the desired action and inaction of the Scots within a national war effort could be affected by London-based propaganda, it would be through acceptance of Whitehall's interpretations of Scotland's needs.

As with other forms of administrative decentralisation that occurred in Scotland at the outbreak of war, the establishment of a Regionally-based censorship office in Edinburgh came more as an indirect result of practical necessity than in reaction to so-called specialised needs. The Ministry of Information's offices were dispersed throughout the United Kingdom to maintain the ever-evolving centralised Government policy at local and regional levels, as well as to provide for fast coordination of local efforts in the event of attack or invasion. According to one Ministry memorandum, the Regional Information Officers were expected to act as representatives of the Ministry in their

Ministry memorandum, the Regional Information Officers were expected to act as representatives of the Ministry in their areas, to ensure adequate dispersal of the Ministry's circulars and other material to the target populations, and to act as advisors on the Government censorship policy when needed.[52] The Regional Officers initially had no authority to censor the media in their areas without permission from London, and all decisions regarding censorship issues had to be made centrally before a Regional Officer could act.[53]

Of course, in wartime it was also necessary for information to reach its intended audience quickly, and it did not take long for practical problems of centralised decision-making for the provinces to make themselves apparent. The first Civil Defence Region to suggest a de-centralised censorship office for this reason was that of Northern Ireland, where from the outbreak of hostilities in 1939 it was noted that "censorship undermines competition with [the press of] Eire, who don't censor".[54] After a visit to Northern Ireland, the Ministry of Information agreed to set up a regional organisation to relay news "from authentic sources", and it was acknowledged that such a scheme would effectively be "censorship in all but name".[55]

As soon as the plan for partial decentralisation of censorship in Northern Ireland was launched, the precedent was soon used to argue for more Regional independence in other areas, including Scotland and Wales. The issue of

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[52] Ministry of Information Correspondence, "Regional Censorship" (Public Record Office, INF.1.188).
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid.

specialised ideological needs was utilised immediately by the Regional Officer in Wales, who asserted that it would serve to "convince Wales that her vital interests are not being overlooked by the Government in London".[56] When regionally-based censorship began in April of 1940, sheer distance from London made it advisable in Edinburgh. In spite of the argument made by the Officer in Wales, as well as the difficulties presented by popular use of the Welsh language, the only other area to be given this relative autonomy was Birmingham, England. At least in the case of Government censorship, decentralization in provincial areas does not seem to have been motivated directly by the issue of questionable morale.

As a result of the regional basis to the Government's censorship policy as it existed in Scotland, Information Officers in the region were capable of acting to a certain degree without direct guidance from London. Although the censorship policy, being based `upon strategic necessity', was generally uniform throughout the United Kingdom, the regional basis provided the Scottish press with the convenience of a fast, localised authority from which decisions on content could be made. Perhaps more importantly, however, as the Regional Office performed its duty to represent the Ministry of Information to the Scottish people, inevitably it would have to react on behalf of the Scottish people as a nation when relating to the general policies of the central office in London, and in that capacity would come to support the interests that were perceived as vital to the maintenance of Scottish morale.

[56] Ibid.

perceived as vital to the maintenance of Scottish morale. Soon, the Ministry's Scottish office would be playing a key role in the debate over Scottish needs in broadcasting.

In looking at the propaganda aimed at the British populace by the Ministry of Information and the wartime BBC, it is clear that the emphasis that the war placed on national unity was one that had to be reinforced by appealing to the varied communities within the country on a common nationalist level. As previously mentioned, the new medium of broadcasting gave propaganda an unprecedented ability to draw the nation together as individuals toward the common cause presented by total war, which at the outset was one of mere survival. Chamberlain's ability to speak directly to the people of Britain in their own living rooms when war broke out in 1939 certainly lent credibility to the assumption that the war on the Home Front was going to be a common experience that would unify the country like never before. However, the cross-cultural nature of the mass media (especially in wartime) could often run counter to the forms of nationalist feeling at regional levels that would need to be maintained if civilian morale was to be strengthened. In the case of Scotland, alienation stemming from an Anglo-centric view of the Home Front war by both the MoI and the BBC would soon develop into a problem which, many would argue, could only be rectified through independent broadcasting.

During the inter-war years of radio's development from enthusiasts' hobby to major facet of the British mass-media, the National Service by definition did not cater to the specialised tastes of Scottish (or any other) regional audiences. Rather, it served as a means by which to provide

specialised tastes of Scottish (or any other) regional audiences. Rather, it served as a means by which to provide the average (that is to say, English) listener with the highest quality of service. Regional interests before 1939 were adequately addressed by the regionally-based stations, which specialised in providing audiences with a more localised form of information, education, and entertainment. It was through this choice of programming that the BBC Board could prescribe alternatives to suit these specialised needs, which co-existed with those that the Scottish region had in common with the rest of Great Britain.

In 1939, however, the military necessity of synchronisation brought an end to Regional programming, and the only way for broadcasting of any kind to exist was through an exclusively National service on the Home Front. The BBC, after bringing political discussion and other items of interest to the wireless following the 'news blackout' in the first months of the war, was successful in maintaining basic cross-cultural national unity by identifying a wide range of shared interests of the country as a whole.[57] It was acknowledged fairly early by the Ministry of Information in the Scottish region however, that Scotland would require special attention:

> ..The task in Scotland, therefore, is one of providing programmes for listeners,..and of breaking down the national reserve which exists in many country districts. What is required, therefore, is a campaign of intensive propaganda...[58]

Evidently, the appeal of the BBC's national service to

[57] Scannell, p13.

[58] Dinwiddie, Regional Information Officer for Scotland, quoted from McDowell, p.33.

Evidently, the appeal of the BBC's national service to Scottish people was one that ideally would need to be supplemented.

After practical necessity had made the BBC an exclusively national broadcaster, there was a strong possibility of criticism relating to a certain lack of attention paid to provincial interests. Of course, complaints in reference to the London-centric slant of the national programme were certainly not without precedent in 1939. This perceived one-sidedness was exacerbated by the subservience of individual presenters to the Corporate image of the BBC, whose opinions and individual cultural biases inadvertently brought direct responsibility upon the BBC itself. During the BBC's rise in the 1920s, when London-based control increased, Regional Directors who voiced this concern were instructed by Reith to accept such bias as a "cultural loss" that was compensated by the superior quality of the London broadcast.[59] This was partially rectified by the advent of Regional broadcasting, but as one Home Office memorandum warned, "those who have not been much in the provinces cannot assess the extraordinary value placed upon the local station by provincial listeners".[60] By 1939, with programme options eliminated, these problems, though ongoing throughout the Corporation's development, would be elevated to the level of morale issues when they began to resurface more vocally than ever.

After war broke out, the supposed cross-cultural approach of the BBC in its broadcasting was soon perceived as

[59] Scannell, p. 323.
[60] Scannell, p 322.

approach of the BBC in its broadcasting was soon perceived as being culturally biased, and this was seen not only on the basis of content but in reference to the presentation of the medium itself. The standard accent of the BBC presenters, for example, being invariably that of Home-Counties English, was considered by many Scottish listeners to be a 'deliberate class barrier'.[61] By June of 1940, this was reported by the Home Morale Emergency Committee to be an ongoing problem:

> ...After referring to an increase in class resentment in the country..it is suggested that something might be done to diminish the present predominance of the cultured voice upon the wireless. Every effort should be made to bring working-class people to the microphone...[62]

Apparently, with the importance that the Home Front war brought to unity and loyalty of the lower classes for the war effort, this resentment was one of concern for the wartime Government. This cultural barrier, be it real or imagined, would serve to fuel the assertion by Scottish leaders that the needs of Scots were not being sufficiently addressed by the wartime media.

The standardised Home-Counties accent of BBC presenters was a potential liability if the BBC was to render its entire audience more receptive to its programming. However, from Scotland came great concern over the programmes themselves, which were seen as lacking recognition of the Scots as a nation within Britain, possessing profound cultural differences that would have to be served if Scottish morale was to be nurtured. In July of 1940, the Ministry of Information Committee on Broadcasting reported "anti-English

[61] McDowell, p.31.

[62] Ministry of Information- Home Morale Emergency Committee (Public Record Office, INF.1.254 (H/2)), 1940.

Information Committee on Broadcasting reported "anti-English feeling" resulting from the fact that "nothing has been done so far to appeal to Scottish, as opposed to English, traditions".[63] This anti-English feeling, according to the conclusions of the Committee, could only be remedied by "putting on programmes specifically designed to appeal to the patriotism of Scotland".[64] Apparently, the propaganda of the BBC's national broadcasts, by not acknowledging these cultural differences, was in danger of sacrificing its credibility toward Scottish listeners. In wartime, this could not be considered an acceptable "cultural loss".

Where the lack of homage paid to Scottish national culture was considered alienating, there was also broadcasting content that the Scots found insulting. In addition to the potential public dismay caused in Scotland by the lack of Scottish issues on the national programme, the Committee on Broadcasting was also quick to warn of the dangers caused by the BBC's "active slighting of Scottish susceptibilities", such as the use by presenters of the word "English" where "British" was intended.[65] Such errors of reference, according to the Committee, were enough to put the average Scottish listener in "an antagonistic, unreceptive mood".[66] At a time when both the MOI and the BBC were actively striving to reinforce British national unity and neutralise perceived threats to the war effort on the Home Front, constant reference to the Scottish nation as merely a

[63] Ministry of Information- Proposed Scottish Radio Programme (Public Record Office, INF.1.162), 1939-41.
[64] Ibid.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid.

part of England certainly did not help win active support of the BBC as a reliable representative of the Scottish public interest.

It is apparent that the National Service was by definition inadequate to the specific interests of many Scottish listeners. However, in considering whether the conclusions of the Ministry of Information Committee on Broadcasting were an accurate reflection of majority listener opinion within Scotland, it is clear that, as with Mass Observation's Glasgow morale report, the perceived danger of a complete "morale breakdown" sparked by the oversights and limitations of the BBC was exaggerated. After all, the Scottish public were just as interested in non-Scottish, London-based programmes, as they provided the reinforcement of the British nationalism that fueled the war effort.[67] But as with the other issues that called attention to "Scottish morale" throughout the war, the basis of perceptions in fact did little to allay their very real consequences. This is seen in the Government correspondence that centred on the work of the BBC in the Scottish Region, where it was considered inevitable by Information officers that public opinion there would be harder to bolster. In a memorandum from the BBC's Director of Broadcasting Relations to the MoI Controller for the Scottish region in 1940, it was acknowledged that "it is inherent in wartime circumstances that instances of centralisation and..control from London should multiply". According to the Director, it was also inevitable that this would in turn spark "the growth of Scottish Nationalism and restiveness in the minds of more

[67] McDowell, p.49.

Scottish Nationalism and restiveness in the minds of more balanced and sensible people..."[68] Clearly then, the political implications of this perceived bias from within the BBC could be affected directly.

Aside from potential growth of Scottish Nationalism resulting from neglected cultural issues, there was relatively strong concern over the use that could be made of the issue by the Communists, whose own propaganda at the time was thought to be aimed at instilling a Bolshevik revolution in Scotland. In 1940, this was stated clearly in a condensed report from Regional Defence Commissioners, where it was named as the foremost danger to morale in some areas, namely Scotland as well as the South of Wales. By comparison, Fascism and provincial Nationalist movements were not considered to be "immediate dangers" in any region at the time, though the Welsh Nationalists were said to number over 40,000, and "developing along Sinn Fein lines".[69] Such reports make clear that if the specific national culture of Scotland was not made more prevalent on the wireless, there could be very real and potenially even disastrous political consequences for the war effort.

Perhaps the most fundamental consequence of the cultural neglect that was making itself apparent in the wartime broadcasting arena was a form of indirect, culturally-based censorship. By de-prioritising the kinds of programming policies that Dinwiddie and others were suggesting for

[68] Ministry of Information- Memo from BBC Programmes Controller to MoI Director of Broadcasting Relations, 4 April, 1940 (Public Record Office), INF.1.162.

[69] Ministry of Information- "Pacifist, Communist, Fascist Propaganda 1939-41"- Reports from Regional Commissioners (Public Record Office, INF.1.319), 9 March, 1940.

policies that Dinwiddie and others were suggesting for strengthening the morale of the Scots, the BBC and the MoI were essentially overlooking many of the factors that made broadcasting such a potentially powerful medium of propaganda. The ability of broadcasting to involve the listener's senses and provide a vital civic and psychological link to the war effort was compromised by this lack of specialised programming. The Scottish people, being a culturally separate nation within Britain, were arguably in need of this special attention.

Even if exaggerated, the perception on the part of the BBC's critics of unwillingness to give more attention to "Scottish interests" had become an issue that could be used as a factor in claims of endangered Scottish morale such as those emanating from Clydeside. However, many of the the BBC's shortcomings in providing the kind of regional programming that the Scots needed were purely practical. Even if the BBC or MoI had decided that it was advisable to continue Scottish regional programming after the outbreak of war in 1939, for example, the strategic necessity of synchronisation to a single wavelength would have made it impossible. As mentioned earlier, due to this lack of alternative wavelengths, the only programme available in 1939 was the National Service, which was broadcast daily throughout Britain from 7pm to midnight.[70] In order to provide the Scots with specialised programmes at the outset, the BBC would have had to force all of Britain to listen to announcements and programming which applied only to the Scottish Region.

[70] McDowell, p.42.

Scottish Region.

On the other hand, however, the exclusively national programme caused confusion as well as alienation in the Scottish Region, where there was no way of knowing whether national announcements and bulletins actually applied to Scotland.[71] If Mass Observation and others were correct in claiming that the Scots in the early stages of the war were relating to the war effort in a detached way, then such difficulty with the validity of public announcements would certainly not have helped the situation.[72] Even in 1940, when an extra wavelength was added to provide for the Forces programme, and again in 1944 for a General Forces programme (allowing soldiers and civilians to listen to the same broadcast), the practical limitation presented by synchronisation would be repeatedly given throughout the war as the primary obstacle to specialised programming for Scotland.[73]

In November of 1939, when Scottish Regional Defence Commissioner Tom Johnston proposed the creation of a separate radio wavelength for Scotland, based on the need to strengthen involvement and support of the war effort, Sir John Anderson conveyed that "his suggestion of a separate programme for Scotland could not be adopted without modification of the present system of synchronisation".[74] Although synchronisation was a legitimate rationale for the lack of special interest programming on the Home Front, there

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[71] McDowell, p.46.
[72] See part 1.
[73] McDowell, p. 49.
[74] Public Record Office, INF.1.162. Memo from John Anderson to MacMillan, 27 November, 1939.

were those who eventually saw it as a hackneyed excuse used by the MoI and the BBC to answer accusations of a bias against specialised forms of wartime programming. One such critic was Peter Eckersley, who by 1941 had stepped down as Chief Engineer at the BBC. According to Eckersley, synchronisation was far more of a bolster to the BBC's cultural biases than a defensive necessity:

> The BBC does not want to take on cultural attitudes...The very lack of wavelengths which brought it into being is its excuse to go on being careful and cautious...[75]

Obviously for Eckersley (whose expertise in the field of broadcasting would suggest acceptance of practical limitations), the lack of wavelengths that existed in wartime Britain was merely an excuse to strengthen the hegemony of its cultural biases over the British public.

[75] Eckersley, p.22.

Chapter 7-

Government/BBC Policy and Ongoing Scottish Programming Proposals

The BBC's control over the broadcasting medium brought inevitable criticism regarding specialised programming and the so-called cultural needs of its listeners, as well as other factors that could be identified as influential on public morale. It is also clear that the BBC's policy of self-censorship made it a more independent agent of propaganda on the Home Front than anything resembling the handservant of the Ministry of Information that Defence Regulations could have created. This freedom from the broad-reaching controls of the wartime Government certainly gave the Corporation independent responsibility. The proposal for a separate Scottish radio wavelength being made by Thomas Johnston, and supported by the Scottish Regional Committee on Broadcasting, was one that stemmed from the sort of criticisms that were expected toward an organisation dominating the medium. However, in spite of its connection with the larger issue of public morale in Scotland, the Government itself refrained from fundamental reprehensions, due to the fact that lack of wavelengths seemed to make it impossible to act on Johnston's request. Of course, this practical limitation was not enough to quell complaints from Johnston and others that the BBC, rather than reinforcing public support for the war, was endangering it with its inherent administrative and creative biases.

Considering the established importance of the BBC and its policies, there was little comprehensive debate in the Commons addressing the wartime workings of the BBC itself, but rather its connection with other, wider issues like propaganda in general. By April of 1943, MP George McGovern urged for more scrutiny to be placed over the BBC, asserting

propaganda in general. By April of 1943, MP George McGovern urged for more scrutiny to be placed over the BBC, asserting that the BBC's domination of the medium evidenced a complete takeover of the wartime Government over the opinion of the public:

> ..[the BBC] is being directed on totalitarian lines and..the Government should take the necessary steps to secure that more opportunity should be given for the propagation of the different shades of opinion..so that they should be used as an instrument of democracy instead of one for the creation of an authoritative regime in this country...[76]

These remarks by McGovern actually came as a response to the Government's ban of a scheduled performance of the Glasgow Orpheus choir, whose conductor (Sir Hugh Robertson) was known to express anti-war views.[77] The issue, however, was directly linked to perceived narrowness of the BBC's programming. In seconding Mr. McGovern's amendment, Mr. Stephen of Glasgow gave a plea that "this instrument should not be used as if it belonged to the Tory Party, but it should give the liberty to different shades of opinion to express themselves".[78] Apparently, the political implications of the BBC's cultural programming biases were as inevitable as its practical limitations.

Some MPs, in spite of general support of the BBC's wartime efforts, were certainly not lax in their efforts to break the BBC's control of the broadcasting medium whenever it seemed to pose a threat to liberty and diversity of the country. Of course, the alternative viewpoints that MPs like McGovern and others saw as neglected by the BBC could have

[76] Commons Debates, Vol.388, col.835.
[77] Ibid, col.848.
[78] Ibid, col.852.

McGovern and others saw as neglected by the BBC could have emanated from anywhere in Britain. However, the issue of priority to specific "morale needs" of Scottish civilians was utilised most vocally throughout the war by Thomas Johnston and the Scottish Regional Committee on Broadcasting, as well as (on occasion) from within the Ministry of Information itself:

> I thought that the series on Freedom was stopped because of the examples given; three-quarters of them were anti-English...If I can think of any Scots who defended their freedom against some country other than England or one of our Allies I will let you know...[79]
>
> -Excerpt from a BBC memorandum by Andrew Stewart, Director of Programming Relations, 1940

As is seen in the remarks made in the Commons by critics of the MoI and BBC, the perceived failure on the part of the BBC to remain a politically objective entity in its wartime broadcasting was an issue that continued throughout the war. A significant consequence of this general shortcoming was thought to be exacerbated in the Scottish Region by the BBC's failure to concede a form of programming thought to be more acceptable to the people in that Region. By not providing this specialised programming, the BBC and Ministry of Information were risking credibility as a reliable source of information in a region considered by Whitehall to be in need of concerted morale maintenance. According to the arguments of Thomas Johnston and others, this was an oversight that would need to be rectified if the Scots were to remain a part of a unified Home Front war effort, politically as well as

[79] Ministry of Information (Public Record Office), INF.1.162 Memo from Andrew Stewart to Moultrie Kensall, BBC Programme Director, 3 October, 1940.

of a unified Home Front war effort, politically as well as otherwise.

In November of 1939, in the midst of wholesale criticism of the BBC and the Ministry of Information throughout the country, Thomas Johnston (then Regional Defence Commissioner in Scotland) had begun to enquire into the possibility of a separate BBC programme for Scotland. In a letter to Sir John Anderson relating to general morale in Scotland, Johnston pointed out that the BBC's programming was generally inadequate to Scotland. He affirmed that morale was "on the whole" doing well, but insisted that this was not being helped by the BBC's broadcasts, which had recently omitted several news items of "urgent importance" to Scotland from their broadcast.[80] According to Johnston, vain attempts to make the BBC fully aware of the importance of these items (relating to the Home food campaign) were "rather disheartening", and the time had come "to face up to the issue" of a wavelength for the purpose of broadcasting food bulletins and other matters relating to what he called "distinct Scottish affairs and interests".[81] In closing, Johnston also intimated that there was great anxiety over being denied better access to "our most effective channel of reaching the Scottish people".[82] Apparently, when making this appeal to the Secretary of Defence, the issue overlaying the lack of attention being paid to Scottish issues was principally one of morale, which would elevate its urgency.

The immediate reaction of Government and BBC officials

[80] Ministry of Information (Public Record Office), INF.1.162- Letter from Thomas Johnston to John Anderson, 23 November, 1939.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid.

The immediate reaction of Government and BBC officials to Johnston's proposal was unfavorable. The synchronisation of transmitters was given as the main reason for the impossibility of a Scottish wavelength, but there was also some "alarm" expressed by the BBC at his suggestion, since "all energies must be directed towards establishing the new programme for the British Expeditionary Force".[83] It is not surprising that a higher priority was given to the BEF programme, and Johnston would certainly agree to its necessity. After all, the new wavelength would include items of interest to Scottish troops in the field. Anderson did support the idea of increased air time for Scottish programming and announcements, "in the event that a separate programme is out of the question".[84] However, neither the practical limitation of the lack of wavelengths available, nor the consolation of increased programming on the National Service was enough to quell the complaints that were coming from the Scottish Region.

Those representing Scotland's interests from within the MoI, nominally in a position of some control over the programming of the BBC, also met with little success in arguing the case for a separate programme throughout the war. One such argument was made in August of 1940 by Moultrie Kensall, acting MoI Programme Director for Scotland. While not as strong as the comments being made by some Scottish leaders, Kensall conceded that the Ministry Committee on Broadcasting took "a very low view of the work being done for Scotland by the BBC", and that "we should be doing all in our

[83] INF.1.162- Letter forwarded to TJ by Lord Macmillan, 21/12/39]

[84] INF.1.162- Letter from Sec. of Defence John Anderson to Lord MacMillan, 27 November, 1940.

Scotland by the BBC", and that "we should be doing all in our power to eliminate anything that tends toward disunity".[85] This appeal to the need for civil and political stability among a Home Front population in Britain, being a fundamental priority for the MoI and the wartime BBC, was nevertheless met with a negative response.

In considering the programming that already existed for Scottish audiences during this time, it is clear that although the morale issue was probably being used deliberately to draw Whitehall's attention to alternative programming proposals, inadequate programming was not a figment of Thomas Johnston's imagination. According to Ministry of Information lists of BBC broadcasts aimed toward Scottish audiences in the month of August, 1940, there were a mere five scheduled Scottish talks, and no musical performances at all.[86] Likewise, the scheduled programmes for the month of October of the same type numbered only four. By comparison, the Welsh Region was scheduled for nine talks in the Welsh language in each month, respectively.[87] A separate list compiled by the MoI, giving a summary of Scottish contributions to broadcasting (organised according to programme type), also revealed a very sparse selection of Scottish programmes. Scottish postscripts in the news, for example, which had been the focus of many original complaints to the BBC, numbered only two or three per month.[88] If the

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[85] Ministry of Information, "MoI Proposed Scottish Program; Letter to A Stewart from Moultrie Kensall, Programme Director 15/8/40" (Public Record Office, INF.1.162) .

[86] Ministry of Information Correspondence, "Lists of MoI Radio Broadcasts", 1940 (Public Record Office, INF.1.172).

[87] Ibid.

[88] Ibid.

to the BBC, numbered only two or three per month.[88] If the Scottish public was in any way predisposed to radio programming that pertained directly to them as a nation, their needs were certainly not being met in 1940.

By January of 1941, after additional wavelengths had been added to the BBC Home Service, the argument for a separate broadcast was restated to Whitehall, this time by McNicoll, the Scottish Regional Officer of the Ministry of Information. At this point, the same sort of morale argument made by Johnston in 1939 was put more strongly. In addition to the difficulties created by announcements not pertaining to Scotland (or its separate civil government offices), the morale issue was specifically mentioned in regard to the threat of "communist influence in the industrial areas" of the country.[89] Stewart also made sure to point out that the ongoing problem of Communist influence could only be alleviated through "a technique based on Scottish conditions and the Scottish idiom".[90] This proposal, like that of Johnston, was not met with a positive response from the BBC or Whitehall.

The claims of potential danger to morale by Johnston and others, though perhaps exaggerated, were certainly addressing a perceived need among the civilian populace in that region. The drive for increased Scottish programming took on political overtones as soon as it began, an inevitable result of its connection with the wartime Government's active attempts to maintain civilian morale. Perhaps more decisive,

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[88] Ibid.

[89] Ministry of Information- Memorandum of Andrew Stewart RIO to Reg. Admin. Division. (Public Record Office, INF.1.162).

[90] Ibid.

attempts to maintain civilian morale. Perhaps more decisive, however, was the presumption in Whitehall that Scottish unity toward the war effort was in many ways more delicate than elsewhere. These factors made the morale issue an obvious vehicle for those who were trying to give such programming a sense of urgency in Whitehall. Likewise, the BBC had direct involvement in this sociopolitical issue as a popular and powerful independent force in the wartime mass media.

The political nature of the creative decisions being made in broadcasting during wartime was certainly an inevitable by-product of its pervasiveness as a propaganda medium. As such, the question of whether the Scottish Region could (or should) have a separate programme was one that immediately became a part of the wider issue of whether or not the centralised wartime Government could adequately serve the general needs of provincial interests. In 1940-41, when the case for increased (or separate) Scottish programming was being made most strongly toward the MoI, the practical limitations inherent in the wartime service took a backseat to the stated need for so-called political justification. Moreover, the idea of decentralization of programming was never given serious consideration by the Cabinet, where it was thought to be creating a dangerous precedent for the needs of the British populace as a unified whole. Hugh Dowden, for example, commented that "Wales will scream loud and hard if a separate Scottish programme should ever materialise".[91]

Likewise, when Scottish programmes on the National Service were taken off rather than added to the monthly

[91] Ministry of Information 7/2/41(Public Record Office INF.1.162).

Service were taken off rather than added to the monthly schedule of the BBC, it was often for unspecified "political" reasons. When these omissions could possibly be seen as an unjustified bias on the part of Whitehall and the BBC (as with the ban on the Glasgow Orpheus Choir), the issue would inescapably lead to the effect that might be wrought upon Scottish morale. This was also apparent after the discontinuation of a programme entitled "The Week in Scotland", which was aimed at providing the kind of specialised programming that John Anderson thought would allay the need for a separate wavelength. In one memorandum from the MoI to the Director of Broadcasting Relations for the BBC, it was conveyed that the programme "was only to be accepted on substantial political justification".[92] If the stated purpose of the "Week in Scotland" and related programmes was to act as a means for Scottish morale maintenance, the implication seemed to be that "political justification" for such a programme would have to include an apparent collapse of Scottish morale. This was acknowledged in a response to Wellington's memorandum, which urged the BBC to begin the programme "before it is strictly necessary", lest it be taken as a deliberate political move.[93] Apparently, the BBC and Ministers of the Coalition government, though seeking political justification for specialised Scottish programming, did not want their decisions to appear as being politically motivated.

Clearly, the danger posed to civilian morale in the Scottish Region by the lack of variety or specialised

[92] Ministry of Information letter to REL Wellington, 10/2/40 (Public Record Office, INF.1.162).
[93] Ibid.

Scottish Region by the lack of variety or specialised programming was not considered a case for concerted effort on the part of the Ministry of Information or the BBC. The practical limitations of the service, together with higher priorities for additional wavelengths, gave the case for a separate Scottish wavelength a low priority. Beyond that, for the BBC to implement a separate wavelength acknowledging Scotland as a culturally unique nation within Britain would run against their fundamental mission as propagandists. After all, to allow an entirely separate service for the Scottish people would reinforce not only their uniqueness and inherent culture, but also nationalism in general, and therefore would legitimise the perceived tendency of the Scots to feel removed from the war effort and from Britain as a nation. As to the question of whether the London-centric National Service alienated more Scottish listeners than it co-opted, there is little evidence showing that the lack of a Scottish wavelength itself created wholesale discontent across the country, and thus the drastic measure of creating a separate wavelength was never given serious consideration. The potential threat to London-based propaganda that was taken very seriously, however, was the alternative listening provided to Scotland by the Germans.

Considering the repeated proposals of Johnston and others, it is clear that the Scottish Region was one whose civilian population could have benefited greatly from an alternative, more specialised wireless service, and in wartime this issue was one that bore directly on the belief that Scottish morale was in need of special attention. The London-based National Programme, though largely fulfilling

that Scottish morale was in need of special attention. The London-based National Programme, though largely fulfilling its Reithian mission to educate, inform, and entertain, nevertheless lacked the ability to serve many of the distinct predispositions of the Scots, whose unique condition of being a separate country within Britain made the London-based service inadequate. The negative effects of this inadequacy on public opinion in Scotland could easily be justified by asserting that the lack of variety was a necessary sacrifice to be made on behalf of the war effort. As such, the kind of alienation and unreceptiveness that was created among Scots by the London-centric broadcast was seen by many in the BBC and MoI as an inert issue, as long as Scots continued to listen to the National Service in spite of its shortcomings. One trend on the British Home Front that kept the issue of Scottish needs alive from a propaganda perspective, however, was its relation to the trend among civilians throughout Britain of listening to other programme services aimed at Britain by the enemy rather than live with the BBC's lack of variety as a wartime sacrifice. As previously discussed, this tendency became an issue of grave importance to the Government, as it was considered to be indicative of a major failure of morale and of Home Front propaganda generally. In Scotland, where morale was perceived as precarious, increased listening of such broadcasts was considered a particularly alarming trend.

As discussed earlier, the definition and criteria for sound Home Front morale could vary wildly, depending on the Government Department attempting to assess it and the prevailing conditions on the Home Front at the time of

Government Department attempting to assess it and the prevailing conditions on the Home Front at the time of assessment. In the realm of the wartime mass media, one trend that was considered to be a glaring sign of precarious morale by virtually all concerned was the tendency of British civilians to listen to the programmes of "Lord Haw-Haw" and other German broadcasts.[94] The popularity of programmes designed specifically to crush the unity and resolve of the British Home Front naturally meant trouble for the BBC as well as the MoI. It evidenced an obvious shortcoming in the ability of the Home Service to meet its most fundamental wartime objective of conveying the British Home-Front ideology.

This was certainly not a problem that affected the Scottish Region exclusively, however. With 33% of civilians throughout Britain listening to the German broadcasts by early 1940, the occurrence of so-called "Haw-Haw listening" was fairly widespread.[95] As with any other use of the media that supposedly represented a threat to Home-Front solidarity and/or morale, however, there was immediately an added dimension to the danger in regard to the Scottish Region. Due to the perceived danger of latent Scottish nationalism and other supposed symptoms of weak or questionable morale, groups like the Mass Observation Unit and the MoI considered the Scots to be more susceptible to such broadcasts, their loyalty to British unity traditionally less solidified.[96]

Such avid listening of German broadcasts in the Scottish

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[94] Angus Calder, The People's War, Cape (London) 1971, p.135.
[95] Balfour, p.139.
[96] Mass Observation, "Preliminary Report on Morale in Glasgow" (Strathclyde Regional Archives, AGN.2252).

Such avid listening of German broadcasts in the Scottish Region was observed by Information officers who had been reporting periodically to Home Intelligence as to the general condition of morale in industrial areas. According to one memorandum inspired by informal discussions with Clyde workers, for example, it was noted that several talks had centred on the subject of Lord Haw-Haw broadcasts, and that many workers "believed a good deal of what the Germans said on the radio".[97] Comments by some of the workers that were directly quoted in the report included those expressing general praise for the quality of the German broadcasts, as well as praise of Hitler himself, whose definition of British capitalism was said to be "first class".[98] The mere fact that British civilians were regularly tuning in to such broadcasts was a matter for concern in Whitehall, being as it was in direct violation of Defence Regulations. In addition to praise of the German broadcasts, however, the Clyde workers interviewed also expressed scorn and general scepticism of the work of the BBC.[99] In light of existing claims regarding the BBC's neglect of Scottish needs, this increased listening of German broadcasts was immediately seen as a direct result of failure on the part of the BBC to fully co-opt the Scots as an audience.

By comparison, however, similar reports generated from English Defence Regions were very expressive of these same views, and in some cases were in decidedly stronger terms. One letter received by the Ministry of Information from an

[97] Ministry of Information Correspondence- Haw-Haw Broadcasts 1940-44 (Public Record Office, INF.1.265).
[98] Ibid.
[99] Ibid.

One letter received by the Ministry of Information from an English munitions worker complained that her co-workers called her "alsorts of fools" for believing the BBC broadcasts, and that she was actively encouraged to listen to Lord Haw-Haw, as she may "get more truth from him".[100] She added that the prevailing opinion on the factory floor was that "the government ought to be shot for what they have done to our boys".[101]

Clearly, Haw-Haw listening as an alternative to the BBC National Service was not unheard of south of the Scottish border. However, the popularity of German broadcasts like Lord Haw-Haw and Radio Caledonia in Scotland was arguably a much more serious issue, due to the preexisting conditions (both real and imagined) that could be exploited by such propaganda. Such programmes, in attempting to foster disillusionment of the war effort through Scottish Nationalism, pacifism, and other minority opinions, were not simply providing an alternative to the BBC's existing broadcasts. Rather, they were operating in Scotland within a cultural/regional vacuum left by the BBC's unwillingness to provide specialised programming. This lack of concern for Scottish interests and the "Scottish idiom" costed the BBC its credibility as a trusted source of information, making it a significantly less effective agent of wartime communication between Scottish civilians and the wartime Government.

The BBC's single National Programme, like wartime propaganda generally, provided the heterogeneous British nation with a vital means by which to feel drawn together as

[100] Ministry of Information- Effects of Rumour on Morale, (Public Record Office, INF.1.266).
[101] Ibid.

nation with a vital means by which to feel drawn together as a unified whole, taking part in the common struggle against the tyranny of the Axis. Due to the centralised nature of the BBC's administration and the necessity of synchronisation, the wireless was quickly recognised by many provincial listeners as having a cultural/ideological bias toward a certain group within the British nation; namely Home-Counties English. This inherent bias in what had become such a vital medium of British morale maintenance immediately became an issue in the Scottish region, whose unique position of being a separate nation within Britain made much of the BBC's programming irrelevant, if not offensive, to listeners there. This issue, voiced by many in Scotland and Whitehall as a matter of grave concern in the wide arena of morale, gave rise to the supposed need for Home-Front ideology in Scotland to be defined and served by Scots, as part of a separate radio wavelength.

This proposal for a separate wavelength, being based on the assumed need for Scotland to be treated as a separate nation within wartime Britain, never came to fruition. The potential threat of latent ideologies that Whitehall feared in Scotland, such as widespread communism and Scottish nationalism, were not enough to justify special attention in the field of broadcast propaganda. Rather, specialised need for Scottish programming was presumed to have been neutralised by the practical limitations inherent in the medium itself. The immense competition for priority in wartime broadcasting could always be used to deprioritise Scotland's unique cultural and civic programming interests, even after the validity of these interests had been

Scotland's unique cultural and civic programming interests, even after the validity of these interests had been acknowledged by those who possessed authority over the BBC.

By failing to serve these specialised cultural needs, however, British wartime propaganda in Scotland fell short of its intended purpose. For centralised propaganda to be effective as a trusted source of information (through broadcasting or any other medium), it was imperative that it convey the cultural, political, and civic familiarity necessary to fully co-opt its audience. The BBC's Anglo-centric programming was adequate for Scotland, but only when it related to the Scots as Britons. On this level, ideological unity existed. War in Europe had created more of these shared cultural and civic needs than ever before, from mortal survival to adequate news of the war's progress. Despite this common ground, Scots persisted in their own sense of nationhood and culture. The BBC, by not giving special attention to this nationhood and culture, strengthened, rather than eliminated, the kinds of confusion, apathy, and alienation that served as a barrier to unity.

Chapter 8-

Conclusion

The Second World War in Great Britain ushered in a new factor in warfare. It presented the civilian population as a German military target- a society heroically bracing itself against the odds and, with an unprecedented sense of unity and sacrifice, eventually weathering the direct attacks of the German Luftwaffe to emerge victorious. Unlike all others preceding it, this was a war of entire societies, with the civilians' role in victory (or defeat) unavoidably pronounced. Of course, the concept of direct contribution by the general populace to the war effort of their homeland was nothing new. During the Great War, for example, the industrial output of munitions that supported military forces on the Continent was a factor for which civilians, through war work, had direct responsibility.

In stark contrast, it would be during this war that factories themselves would become targets. Until late 1941, Britain would be defending itself against what would be the largest direct offensive by the Germans, as the Luftwaffe attempted to bring the surrender of the nation through air attack. It was during this period that British civilians were most often directly engaged in a struggle for their nation's survival.

Preparation for this new form of Home Front warfare by 1939 had significantly transformed both the appearance and the perceptions of Great Britain. By 1940, Defence Regulations had effectively suspended democracy for the purpose of administrating the war effort. Concurrently, a Coalition Government had taken absolute control over Britain's domestic affairs, from food availability and travel

Britain's domestic affairs, from food availability and travel to the content of the country's newspapers. Under the direction of this centralised Government, virtually every aspect of civilian life became linked directly to a collective war effort in which every individual was expected to play a direct role.

This common struggle was a very powerful force in unifying the nation. The creation of a militarised Britain was one that required an unprecedented level of commitment and cooperation on the part of the country's citizens. Such a level of unity and cooperation, in conjunction with the daily realities of war, was one that would have to be founded on a solid ideological justification. This fundamental ideological basis was amply provided by the sentiment of British nationalism that was aroused by mobilsation for war against the common enemy. Up until the end of 1941, the war on the British Home Front would be one of sheer survival in the face of the heavy German air offensive. Since this war would decide the fate of the British as a nation, the common cause was able to supersede conflicting ideologies that existed throughout the country, such as Communism and provincial nationalism. For as long as the common threat endured, everyone in Britain would be able to grasp the necessity for sacrifice and effort, regardless of varying perceptions of what it meant to be British.

While the common goal of survival and ultimate victory provided justification for the control that the Government retained over British life, this also heightened the sense of Governmental responsibility towards the needs of the people

Governmental responsibility towards the needs of the people as never before. At the outset of war, the Government could not be certain that civilians' sense of unity and willingness to fight could withstand the kind of widespread horror and devastation caused by mass bombing. In an ongoing effort to directly prevent such a collective breakdown, the centralised British government strived throughout the war to identify and rectify any thought or behaviour that might pose a threat to Britain's collective war effort. While the maintenance of "civilian morale" became a pivotal aspect of the Government's policies on the Home Front, it also held a commanding influence over the British people. Morale, though not empirically definable, was inexorably linked with the perceived practical and psychological needs of civilians. Where such exigencies could not be met, morale demanded that authorities explain why the fulfillment of those needs was not plausible under wartime conditions.

Whitehall's ongoing concern for morale maintenance was extrapolated to Great Britain as a whole, identifying potential threats to mandated wartime ideology and taking active steps to remove them wherever possible. In the Clydeside area, however, such threats were seemingly perceived as more acute than in areas south of the border. According to Mass Observation's morale report to the Government in early 1941, a breakdown of morale along the Clyde could easily be caused by opposing ideologies like Communism and provincial nationalism. Beyond these specific ideological threats, there was also marked concern over the industrial unrest and perceived apathy of the local

population, in whom the all-important perception of an immediate common threat simply did not exist. These specific dangers to morale, which were generally present throughout the country in some form, were thought to be exacerbated by the fact that Scotland, though part of Britain, was also a distinct and separate nation within Britain, having its own history, civic laws, and cultural traditions. Even after Glasgow had proven itself able to physically and psychologically withstand heavy bombing as well as any English blitzed city, these perceptions would be present in arguments being made by those who were attempting to affect changes in Home Front policy.

These distinctions, when examined merely as regional variation, were simply a natural aspect of Britain as a diverse but fundamentally unified nation in wartime, comprised of communities who were contributing to a common goal. Where regional distinctions and culture were removed or deprioritised through the channelisation of civilian daily life (such as the disappearance of regionally-based broadcasting), it could be reasonably argued that the sacrifice was necessary for the war effort. The nationalism that was aroused and maintained by Britain's war against the Axis was one that ideally overshadowed all other ideology and culture throughout the country. There is little if any evidence to show that there was significant objection on the part of specific regional groups to this sacrifice.

The sense of British nationalism that was brought to the fore of common ideology by the cause of war was one that could easily displace or co-opt various cultural differences

inherent in the population of Great Britain. Scotland, however, possessed a unique culture that already worked within its own established mind set of nationalism. Scottish culture defined itself largely in opposition to English traditions that dominated common wartime doctrine. If nationalism rested upon common culture and sense of history, then Scotland presumedly exhibited special ideological needs to the centralised London-based Government. Glasgow and the rest of Scotland certainly shared the fundamental basis for unity of sacrifice and effort toward the goal of victory for Great Britain, but Whitehall could never presume that Scottish civilians would be fighting the "war of ideas" with the same perceptions as their English counterparts. War had come to Clydeside as well as the rest of Great Britain, but the status of Scotland as a relatively self-contained nation (rather than merely a region) provided added legitimacy to indigenous concerns, which like most issues arising out of the Home Front were directly tied to morale.

These special needs of Scotland, as reflected in MO's report on Clydeside, became an issue in the Government's efforts to assess and maintain morale throughout the war. Supposed threats to Home Front ideology, such as Communism, labour unrest, and provincial nationalism, were never shown to be noticeably more pronounced in Scotland than in the rest of the country. If such ideologies had been influential enough to usurp the loyalty of Scots in the Clydeside area, then a breakdown of morale would have been the result. However, as underscored by Whitehall's approach to administering wartime policies and propaganda, the mere

perception of danger was enough to predicate real consequences for the Scottish nation. Likewise, the practical necessity for self-contained decision-making in the region acted to expedite rather than overshadow the need for administrative devolution of Scotland. In attempting to emphasise the needs of Scotland in the wartime Parliament, "special ideological need" became a term used by those working within the Scottish Region to place import on Scotland's morale. The issue of morale in Glasgow bears out that due to Scotland's unique nationhood, morale could not be directly bolstered by supplying Anglo-centric propaganda. This assumption was reiterated by Scottish leaders like Thomas Johnston, who in his capacity as Scottish Secretary of State strived throughout the war not only to satisfy the immediate needs of Scottish civilians, but also to ensure a better future for Scotland in post-war Britain.

Clearly, the sense of separate nationhood and need for a certain amount of self-determination for the civic population of Scotland was acknowledged by Whitehall as well as organisations that were closely involved with morale maintenance in Britain. The actual conveyance of the prevailing ideology on the Home-Front, however, rested upon the British mass media. Defense Regulations had given Whitehall essential control of Home-Front propaganda, but the new medium of broadcasting, operated by the BBC, was one that had managed to retain its status as a widely influential and independent agent of propaganda throughout the war, in spite of its having become completely centralised in the capital. This was possible through the BBC's tendency to reflect the

same centralised and paternal approach to its own task as the Government itself had developed from the necessities created by war. The BBC in fact maintained significant independence from Government, relative to its influence over the wartime public. However, since this was largely due to its tendency to enhance directly the unity and ideology that Whitehall strived to maintain, it was never seen as a threat to Government control. As in morale-maintenance generally, however, the BBC's inherent biases and practical oversights became a matter for major concern in regard to Scotland, where propaganda created with "the eyes of the Londoner" brought added legitimacy to the cultural separatism that could potentially alienate Scottish civilians from the common war effort. The lack of a separate Scottish wavelength, though clearly a result of practical wartime difficulties in broadcasting, was nonetheless presented as an urgent morale issue.

The universal goal of survival and victory for civilians on the Home Front in Britain was certainly one with which all could readily identify. However, the Glasgow experience on the Home Front illustrates how the British sense of nationalism that fueled this unity was qualified in Scotland by a competing sense of nationhood. War may have increased the perceived responsibility of the Government toward its people, but the Scots throughout the war were shown by agents of morale-maintenance to have unique needs that could not be patently fulfilled by a centralised, London-based government. The role adopted by the Government in maintaining the ideological unity of all civilians on the Home Front made

many of these specialised needs clear and outspoken, and even wrought some concessions toward specifically Scottish interests. The question of the direction of Scottish unity and loyalty, easily answered in the face of Britain's common threat in 1939, was nevertheless qualified with the perceptions by which the British Home Front defined itself. In many ways, the struggle experienced by British civilians in war was fundamentally unifying. But when morale on the Clyde was interpreted by London through inherent cultural differences, their findings could only serve to underscore Whitehall's presumption that many Scots were indeed fighting "a war of their own".

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