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THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW

IMPLEMENTATION IN THE PLANNING PROCESS:

A CASE STUDY OF STRATHCLYDE PARK

ALAN ALFRED PRIOR B.Sc.(Hons.)

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SUMMARY

There has been a renewed emphasis in town and regional planning
in recent years on implementation and "getting things done". This has
arisen partly as a consequence of (i) sociological critiques of the
effects of planning decisions in the 1960's and 1970's, and (ii) the
reduced status for the activity and profession of town planning in the
context of a political-economic milieu which restricts public
spending programmes and emphasises a market economy approach to the
distribution of goods and services (including the development of land).

· Although implementation has become an "idea in good currency",
there is little general agreement among theorists and practitioners of
policy planning as to what implementation involves, or its role in
decision-making processes. Chapter I identifies and discusses a wide
range of interpretations and definitions based on different
conceptualisations of planning and of the relationship of planning
to action. The burden of recent research and practice focusses on
the "pathological" nature of implementing policies and plans, on
improvements to policy design, and on management strategies, as central
to improving the prospects for "successful" implementation. Little
attention has been given to pluralist/structuralist conceptions, and
the role of key individuals, emphasising the politics of decision-
making and the dynamics of competing interests and value-systems in
which planned action is shaped, modified, and occassionally subverted.

Chapters II to IX provide an in-depth, historical analysis of a
major, long-running development project in west central Scotland. They
seek to identify the detailed processes of bargaining and negotiation
in the evolution and implementation of the project in relation to (a)
the power relationships between, and patterns of influence brought to
bear by, participating individuals and organisations; (b) the
changing context for action provided by wider policies in regional
development planning, and in planning for leisure and recreation, over
the post-war period; (c) the effects of combinations of circumstance
on the course of implementation, and on the scope for action and
manoeuvre as perceived by participants.

The evolution and development of Strathclyde Park, in the middle
Clyde valley was, at the time of its construction, one of the largest
and most significant physical planning projects in Scotland. The
development history of the park is interwoven with the history of post-
war physical and economic planning in Scotland, from the early regional
plans, through the high growth/low inflation 1960's and low growth/
high inflation 1970's, to the severe economic environment of the 1980's.
This changing context for action, and the behaviour of participating
interests, significantly influenced the course of implementation of
the park idea.

The final chapter concludes with a reformulation of the main
characteristics of public planning processes, and considers current
trends in British planning practice, particularly the pursuit of
"effective" planning and the search for new styles, addressed to the
current political-economic context for action. It may be a
misconception of the implementation process to judge the
effectiveness of planned action by the extent to which stated
objectives and intentions are realised. A more sophisticated method
of evaluating the outcomes of planning efforts is required which
takes account of the complex environments in which planning is pursued.

In research and education, there is a need for a greater
understanding of (a) the political nature of implementing public
policies; (b) the organisational and resource requirements of planning
processes; (c) the implications of both for how decision-makers
approach the planning task, in particular how they address the
inherent problems of future uncertainties.

CHAPTER I

CONCEPTS AND PARADIGMS

CONCEPTS AND PARADIGMS

1. Introduction

Despite the apparent successes of post-war town planning in the UK (Cullingworth 1982; Hall 1974), a paradox has emerged whereby both the town planning profession and the town planning system have come under attack from (a) a radical sociological critique founded upon issues of distributional equity (Davies 1972; Harvey 1973; Simmie 1974), and (b) public expenditure restraint in a period of reduced investment and economic decline, leading to a reassessment of the utility of town planning and its contribution to the achievement of the dominant economic goals (Diamond 1979).

A reorientation of public and political attitudes to town planning has induced a decline in (i) its status as a legitimate field of government activity, and (ii) the morale of town planners. These changes have stimulated a period of self-examination by the planning profession which accelerated in the late 1970's. The Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI) set up working parties to consider the implementation (RTPI 1979) and the promotion of planning (RTPI 1980). The themes of recent RTPI annual conferences also reveal some sensitivity to these changes - "Getting Things Done" in 1980, and "Planning Achievements on the Ground" in 1981. The emphasis has shifted away from planning as a central task of bureaucratic organisations, back towards town planning, its achievements, effectiveness, and the need for action, ie a shift from "planning society" back towards "planning towns" (Healey et al 1982). The underlying motive is that of seeking utility for planning processes and policies.

Healey et al charge that the concern with "getting things done" marks a retreat from theory and a "dangerous relapse into pragmatism". Yet there are two points which need to be made to put what has been termed the "crisis in planning" into some perspective;

(i) the critique of planning is not confined to physical or

land-use planning, but permeates the whole field of public
policy in the 1980's, and calls into question the general
efficacy and utility of public intervention strategies.
Questions about the nature and effectiveness of
implementation processes sit at the fulcrum of debate about
the future of planning and public policy-making.

(ii) the "failure of planning" critique is largely a failure of the
prevailing rational-comprehensive paradigm, rather than a
failure of planning per se. The focus on implementation
could therefore mark a paradigm-shift away from considerations
of general societal guidance towards contextual, problem-
orientated planning: away from a focus on management, towards
a focus on "action".

Implementation issues are therefore central to the debate about
the usefulness and effectiveness of public planning processes. Levin
(1981) has suggested that the renewed emphasis on implementation is
due to a recognition that, in recent times, something has "gone wrong"
in the application of policy:deficiencies have been noted in the
plans and programmes themselves, in their data bases and forecasting
methods, and in the organisational and political structures within
which planning processes have operated. These deficiencies have
given rise to concern about our ability to identify and resolve the
issues that beset public policy at the present time, or will do so in
the future.

Much is assumed, but little understood, about implementing
policies and plans. Alterman (1981) has suggested that this stage
in decision making has been regarded as a "black box" where something
is supposed to occur to make reality out of policy. What she terms
"implementation analysis" seeks to open this box in order to gain
understanding of the processes occurring within it and the factors
affecting them, so that the prospects for more effective
implementation may be enhanced. One of the reasons why implementation
is regarded as so difficult, therefore (Gunn 1978), is its neglect as
a field of distinct expertise and social research. It was Nehru
(Faludi, ed. 1973) who was reported to have said of the Indian five-
year plan "We are not quite as expert at implementation as at

planning" (p.278). More recently Goldsmith (1980) has suggested that:

> In a period of economic decline and financial
> uncertainty, planners have learned how difficult
> it is to persuade others to do the things necessary
> if a plan is to be fulfilled. In a nutshell, while
> planners produce plans, others implement them, and
> to a large extent it is this lack of control over
> their environment, and over the other agencies and
> actions whose support is necessary if plans are to
> be successfully implemented, that lies at the heart
> of what may be regarded as the current crisis in
> planning.   (p.126)

Blowers (1980) suggests that the power to implement policies is often weaker than the power to make them, and adds:

> There is evidence of a growing dissatisfaction with
> planning, and this partly stems from the delays,
> duplication and ineffectiveness of the present
> system.   (p.37)

Much of the research focus to date has been directed at understanding the inputs to policy-making processes, ie the factors influencing the formulation of policy. The objective of such research has been to improve the rationality of policy and the reduction of uncertainty through the improvement of the knowledge base and the development of new decision-making technologies (Weiss 1972). Rossi and Wright (1979) contend that what they term "evaluation research" is part of a broader effort to bring greater rationality to the policy process. Much recent action-orientated research has been directed at the impacts of public policies, in particular, the distributional consequences (Webster, 1977).

Very little research has been focussed specifically on the stage which bridges and translates inputs into impacts, ie the outputs of decision-making processes. There is an important distinction to be drawn between studies of policy impact and studies of policy implementation (Dunsire 1978). Policy impact studies attempt to evaluate policies by measuring the amount of change brought about by policy decisions, comparing it with the amount intended, and accounting for any difference. Such studies are concerned with the substantive results or outcomes of action. Their aim is the improvement of policy preparation and decision. Policy implementation studies are less concerned with outcome than with output. They attempt to identify the conditions under which an intended output may be achieved. Such studies attempt to evaluate not policies but

<u>agency capacity to deliver,</u> or carry through to output stage, whatever policies are agreed and promulgated. They measure output intended, compare it with output achieved, and attempt to account for any difference: what Dunsire (1978) has termed the "implementation gap".

Concern with implementation is not new. Underlying many of the developments in planning thought and legislation has been the aim to ensure better chances of successful implementation. The report of the Planning Advisory Group (Ministry of Housing and Local Government 1965), followed by the 1969 and 1972 Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Acts, were essentially attempts to move away from static, end-state planning, and to improve the effectiveness of development plans. Yet the RTPI's "Implementation in Planning" working party (RTPI 1979) was moved to state:

> Compared with the attention given to plan-making, implementation is a neglected subject. The practice of planning has developed an emphasis on strategic policy, flexibility, monitoring and review, and has drifted away from its original focus on impact and implementation.   (p.1)

Few systematic questions have been asked about what the assumed implementation processes actually entail, what factors are likely to affect them, and how likely is a given proposal to improve them in practice. Consequently, the literature on implementation is diffuse and difficult to assemble. Van Meter and van Horn (1975) state:

> At present we know relatively little about the process of policy implementation.   (p.449)

Pressman and Wildavsky's (1973) earlier literature search revealed the dearth of studies which took implementation as their central focus of attention:

> We have not been able to locate any thoroughgoing analysis of implementation.   (p.xiii)

Whilst those studies which have been undertaken have focussed on initiation rather than execution (Friend and Jessop 1969; Levin 1976), implementation has rarely been formally defined or taken as a major concept or process to be studied or explained. In planning practice, a great deal of effort and energy is expended preparing plans of various kinds with little or no consideration given to the complex chains of reciprocal interaction required to implement them.

Planning theory and education pay lip-service to the importance of
policy execution, but there is little or no understanding of what this
involves. Barrett and Fudge (1981) decry the paucity of British case
material on policy implementation, whilst Hambleton (1978) remarks
on his "astonishment" at the little attention that has been paid to
the connection between planning and implementation, which he regards
as the most urgent problem for planning theory, education and practice.
Roberts (1974) had earlier come to the same conclusion:

> It is a familiar, but still valid, criticism of land
> use planning that it fails to place enough emphasis
> on the "quality of the action". A look at the
> literature of planning, the allocation of research
> funds or the content of planning courses would give
> the impression that much more effort, time and money
> goes into the production of land use plans on paper
> than into the achievement of those plans in reality.   (p.161)

2. Models of Planning

A few conceptual frameworks have been constructed and applied
to the main questions about the nature, characteristics and role of
implementation with a view to clarifying the nature of the policy
process and the significance of implementation within it. To
different degrees, these frameworks tend towards either a model of
decision-making based on comprehensive rationality, or on
incrementalism. Different models of decision-making processes imply
differing conceptions of what implementation entails and how it is
measured. It is important, in this context, to arrive at a clear
conception of the implementation process before trying to speculate
about what might be done to resolve these problems. The two
prevailing models of the planning process might be characterised as
follows:

(a) the rational-comprehensive model, drawn largely from
operations research (Friend and Jessop 1969), cybernetics
principles (McLoughlin 1969) and what Faludi (1973) has
termed "procedural planning theory". It is based upon the
classic rational model of decision-making, and the use of
rational procedures and frameworks in which the central
elements are seen as knowledge and control. This has
been the dominant model of planning for the last 25 years or so;

(b) the behavioural-incremental model, based on a critique of the
rationalist model, behavioural studies of organisational
activity, and especially the writings of Lindblom (1959,
1965). This model stresses the inherent problems of
prediction, and instead focusses upon political bargaining
("partisan mutual adjustment") and "satisficing", in contrast
to "optimising" objectives of the rationalist model. Its
proponents argue that policies must be prepared to adapt to
survive.

From these, several sub-models, specifying degrees of
rationality or incrementalism, have been developed in recent years
in recognition of the limitations of both;

(c) new idealism or "social utopian" model, based on humanist
philosophy, community participation in decision-making, and
a revolution in attitudes to environmental change (Friedman
1973, Schon 1971). Its proponents stress the fusion of
policy-making and implementation into a community-based,
adaptive rationality employing systems analysis (Emery ed.
1969);

(d) urban managerialism, as developed by Pahl (1970). A variant
of the rational-comprehensive approach which focusses on
bureaucratic management or "steersmanship" of the policy
implementation process through a pluralist social milieu;

(e) political economy model, only recently developed, and still
highly theoretical, it comprises essentially a neo-Marxist
critique of capitalist-dominated urban planning, focussing
on the plurality of the policy-making environment, conflict
and power, the central role of values and beliefs (ideology)
and distributional impacts (Paris ed. 1982, Castells 1977).
In its present state of development, the model has more
explanatory than prescriptive value.

Given that policy implementation is highly complex, undertaken
in a plural context of a variety of goals, perceptions, "assumptive
worlds" (Young 1979) and conflict, how is this complexity reduced
and managed in practice? Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) may be right
to suggest that it is often surprising that implementation takes

place at all, but why does it often "fail" or change course? Is it
due to weaknesses in policy design, to organisational factors, to
external environmental factors, or to the values, motives and
influences of powerful and energetic individuals? Perhaps there are
different kinds of implementation forces at work, pushing or pulling,
explicitly or implicitly, to influence the direction and effect of
policies and plans? By analysing the rationalist/incrementalist
dialectic, the main features of the debate about the factors
influencing action may be highlighted.

As Reade (1982) has pointed out, up until the 1950's no general
theory or ideology of planning had been articulated, for the simple
reason that none was necessary. Planning was implicitly accepted as
a valid and valued activity of the State. The emergence of issues
concerning the impact and effectiveness of planning, firstly in the
United States in the 1950's, led to more explicit consideration of
and debate about theoretical and ideological aspects.

Rational-Comprehensive Planning

One of the earliest statements of the rational-comprehensive
model, based on empirical study, is that by Meyerson and Banfield
(1955). In this and their subsequent writings, they spawned a
school of thought on the planning process based on rational-
comprehensive principles. Proponents of this mode view society as an
organic whole. They suggest that traditional comprehensive planning
has never really been effective due to the lack of relevant
information and guidance to decision-makers on the consequences of
their decisions (Friend and Jessop 1969). Rational-comprehensive
planning is therefore seen as a linear process of (Banfield 1959);

1. listing all opportunities for action;
2. identifying all consequences following from each possible
   action;
3. selecting the action which would be followed by the preferred
   set of consequences;
4. monitoring the results.

The "intelligence function" is central to this model, since it
is employed to assist in the clarification for decision-makers of the
implications of (a) alternative policy decisions so that more
meaningful policy choices can be made, and (b) the performance of

policy in action. Hence Faludi (ed. 1973) contends that successful
implementation in rational-comprehensive planning rests on the twin
factors of knowledge and power, and that shortcomings or failures in
implementation are due to (i) an imperfect image of the outside
world, and/or (ii) misapprehension of the control process and of
available resources:

> Difficulties during implementation must stem from
> inadequacies in the way in which that programme
> has been formulated.   (p.278)

Therefore, effective implementation is seen as a function of
the degree of formal and informal control which can be brought to
bear to ensure policy conformance. Banfield (1959) therefore
suggests that:

> It is by the process of rational choice that the best
> adaptation of means to ends is likely to be achieved.

Rational-comprehensive planning thus assumes, in ideal form,
that rationally-derived policies offer the best prospects for
implementation, based on perfect knowledge of the consequences of
action. The implementation structure is seen as pyramidal, with
control focussed at the centre. The aims of the implementers are
assumed to correspond with the aims of the policy-makers. Successful
implementation is thus based upon a high degree of consensus between
the makers and the applicators of policy. The implementation process
is seen as a linear progression by which policies or plans are
translated into anticipated consequences.

Friedmann (1973) and others have described the aim of rational-
comprehensive planning as a "search for the holy grail", whilst
Schon (1971) has dismissed it as a "myth". The main defects in this
model have been cited as;

1. its a-political presumptions;
2. its deterministic view of the policy implementation process;
3. its assumption of goal-consensus between policy-makers and
   implementers;
4. its emphasis on comprehensive knowledge and accurate
   prediction of policy consequences;
5. its assumption of the linear/sequential nature of decision-
   making;
6. its implicit distinction between means and ends, and between

the formulation and the implementation of policy.

Although this model has dominated planning theory and practice throughout the 1950's and 1960's, these are characteristics which have been attacked for being at variance with the realities of policy-making (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973; Friedmann 1973; Bardach 1977). Faludi (1973) admits that the problem which rational-comprehensive planners have been unable to come to terms with is the gap between the ideal and the reality of organisational choice and system control. He suggests that it is only as a normative model that the rationalist conception has any relevance.

Behavioural-Incremental Planning

Much of the critique of rational-comprehensive planning has emerged and developed from empirically-based studies of organisational behaviour and decision-making. The antithesis of this model is Lindblom's (1959) "disjointed incrementalism". Lindblom denies the validity of even the ideal of rational-comprehensive planning. In his view, decision-makers do not, cannot, and have no chance of ever being able to, decide in ways outlined by the rational-comprehensive model. Lindblom starts from the premise that practicioners of disjointed incrementalism expect to achieve their goals only partially, and implementation thus has a lower horizon of achievement. Whilst policy-making in rational-comprehensive planning starts from the isolation of ends, followed by identification of the means to achieve them, in Lindblom's model means and ends are not distinct. The main presumptions behind the incrementalist model are;

1. administrators often decide policy without first clarifying objectives;
2. choices are made among policies which combine values in different ways;
3. circumstances play an important part in policy choices.

Lindblom sees agreement on policy as "the only practicable test of the policy's correctness". The plural conception of society is viewed as ensuring a process of mutual adjustment between objectives and strategies. Incremental policy-making is seen as fitting with this multiple pressure pattern:

Policy is not made once and for all, it is made and re-made endlessly. Policy-making is a process of successive approximation to some desired

objectives in which what is desired itself
continues to change under reconsideration. (p.164/165)

An essential feature of the planning process in the
behavioural-incremental conception is that implementation is viewed
as part of, and not distinct from, policy-making. The
incrementalist approach has been criticised (Etzioni 1967; Faludi ed.
1973) for;

1. favouring powerful groups in its emphasis on partisan mutual
   adjustment in a plural society;

2. neglecting basic social innovations in its focus on the short
   term;

3. not applying to large-scale or fundamental decisions, thus
   amounting to action without direction.

Blowers (1980) contends that incrementalism is not a model for
decision-making, so much as a description of what tends to occur,
whilst Michael (1973) rejects Linblom's thesis as "profoundly
inadequate for dealing with the present and conjectured future" (p.4).
Schon (1971) has accused it of playing into the hands of what he
terms society's "dynamic conservatism". Etzioni (1967) seeks to
combine the advantages of the rationalist and incrementalist models
in his strategy of "mixed scanning" in which;

1. high-order, fundamental policy-making processes set the basic
   directions, and

2. incremental processes prepare for fundamental decisions, and
   work them out after they have been reached.

Etzioni contends that the "unrealistic" aspects of rationalism
are reduced, combined with avoiding the "conservative" slant of
incrementalism. Faludi (ed. 1973) suggests that this approach provides
a description of and a prescription for effective action.

Utopian Planning

The "New Humanist" or social utopian models are characterised
by the writings of Friedmann (1973, 1976), Schon (1971) and, to a
lesser extent Michael (1973) and Dunn (1971). Their search for a
normative model of societal organisation is based upon individual
interactions, a decentralised, bottom-up approach to policy and
action which rejects the central control inherent in rationalist
models, and the pragmatism of Lindblom's disjointed incrementalism.

The decision-making structure is seen as reticular rather than pyramidal. Friedmann (1973) stresses the fusion of policy-making and implementation into a community-based, adaptive-responsive framework, based on the accumulation of knowledge about the policy environment through action upon it. In his "paradox of planning" Friedmann contends that rationality only occurs when it is least needed, ie under conditions of relative calm and stability. Under conditions of extreme crisis, planning becomes an extension of politics:

> The rationality of planning practice must therefore be a rationality adapted to its conditions: it must sacrifice comprehensiveness to the urgency of overcoming specific bottlenecks; it must be more problem- than goal-orientated; it must be piecemeal and fragmented rather than co-ordinative.
> (Friedmann, 1965, pp 28-30)

Friedmann thus advocates the fusion of planning and action into a single operation so that the conceptual distinctions between planning/decision/implementation/review are expunged. He suggests that the reason for the inconsequential nature of much planning resides in its failure to take into account the basic difficulties of implementing decisions. The essential problem, therefore, is not how to make decisions more "rational", but how to improve the quality of the action (which he regards as far from identical with the rationality of the underlying decision process).

Schon (1971) draws attention to what he terms the "distorted forces" which, in practice, act upon centre-periphery models of policy implementation. These forces are the different interests, perceptions and values of the actors involved. Schon's thesis thus focusses upon organisational pathologies as central to implementation problems. Organisations, he argues, exhibit dynamic conservatism as a means of resisting change, which does not occur in a vacuum, as inferred by the rationalist models, but in "the plenum of self-reinforcing systems".

Schon and Friedmann, and Dunn (1971), contend that the formation of policy cannot be separated from its implementation, for implementation is the means by which knowledge about the environment, and about the impact of policy outcomes upon it, is gained and used to inform on the effectiveness of policy. Whilst the "new humanists"

advocate an approach based upon "bounded" rationality, it is a
decentralised conception based upon reticular decision networks. It
is essentially a utopian approach, since it is dependent upon a
prior revolution in social attitudes and organisational responses to
change. It is a conception borne of experience in the United States
with advocacy forms of planning, and is not easily translated to
highly centralised policy-making systems such as exist in the UK.
In the absence of empirical formulations it remains, like the Marxist
model, a useful analytical rather than prescriptive framework, where
its philosophy has much in common with community-based politics and
neighbourhood action.

Urban Managerialism

The urban managerialist thesis emerged from a late-1960's
view of town planning as "urban management" (Pahl 1970). It has
three strands;

1. a systems-based approach (McLoughlin 1969,1973; Chadwick
   1971);
2. urban sociology (Gans 1968, Pahl 1970);
3. applied management techniques (Stewart 1971, Edison 1975).

The basis of these approaches is an assertion that, by virtue
of the complexity of urban living, considerable power is placed in
the hands of bureaucratic officials (Lambert 1970). Town planners
are thus viewed as the master-allocators of the scarcest urban
resources (Eversley 1973). This is fundamentally a top-down,
elitist, hierarchical view of decision-making and implementation.
The focus on urban managers has been criticised (Rhodes 1981) for
drawing attention away from the crucial influences of central-local
government political relations, and national economic changes. The
assumption of the effectiveness of central control over the processes
of implementation and change far exceed what occurs in reality. In
this respect, the thesis is sensitive to many of the criticisms of the
rationalist model.

Political Economy : The Marxist Critique

The political economy model, propagated since the early 1970's
in sociological critiques of the planning process such as those of
Davies (1972), Harvey (1973) and Paris et al (1982), rejects
ameliorative policies as mechanisms for long-term structural change

(and hence rejects both the rationalist and incrementalist
conceptions) and sets town planning firmly within the capitalist
mould. It is essentially a theoretical critique which relates broad
economic and political forces to the detailed operation of urban
and regional policies. As such, it has yet to spawn any detailed
frameworks within which could be explained the nature, role and
scope of implementation processes. In its present state of
refinement, it has more analytic than prescriptive value. It may be
seen as occupying the opposite end of the conceptual spectrum from
rational-comprehensive planning, and shares with behavioural
approaches a concern for the circumstances within which policy is
formulated and implemented. The model stresses the political
dimensions of planning, and takes a view of planning as being largely
impotent in seeking to achieve its objectives, and highly sensitive
to the interplay of market forces and capitalist power structures.
Hence, in Fainstein and Fainstein's (1982) view:

> The effectiveness of planners depends on the
> functions which planning fulfils within advanced
> capitalism and its importance to the maintenance
> of the economic systems.   (p.155)

Criticisms of the Marxist model tend to be ideologically loaded,
but its usefulness for implementation research is the reformulation
it provides for interpreting planning activity and the constraints of
(i) its operation within State bureaucracies, and (ii) its impact
upon capitalist economic systems. The model can be viewed as an
extension of the "politicisation of planning" debate, heightening
renewed interest in the distributional aspects of planning, equality,
and democratic planning.

3. Implementation : Empirical and Theoretical Concepts

The foregoing appraisal of the main models of the planning
process is a necessary precursor to the analysis of specific
approaches to implementation which follows. Each of these approaches,
either implicitly or explicitly, draws on one or more of these models
in its conception of (i) the definition and nature of implementation
and its position in the planning process, and (ii) prescriptions for
improving the effectiveness of action.

Much of the debate about implementation focusses on where in

the decision making process it occurs: whether it occurs at specific
stages, eg after policy is "made" and before it is reviewed, or
whether it permeates the whole planning process to the extent that,
as Friedmann (1973) and others contend, distinctions between policy
analysis, decision-taking, execution and review are blurred. It is
not proposed here to get embroiled in a debate which Dunsire (1978)
has described as "a wrong turning leading to a dead end", but as
Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) argue:

> There must be something out there prior to
> implementation; otherwise there would be nothing
> to move toward in the process of implementation.
> A verb like "implement" must have an object like
> "policy".   (p.xiii)

What is important here is what the segregation of policy from,
or its integration with, implementation reveals about the conceptual
biases of empirical or theoretical formulations about implementation.
None of these formulations are objective or value-free. Descriptions
of the implementation process each have an underlying model (mainly
pyramidal or reticular in conception) made up of assumptions about
a number of elements;

1. about the nature of the implementation process: stages of
   development or chain of events;
2. about the ordering or sequence of such stages or events;
3. about the character of each stage or groups of events;
4. about the nature of the transition between stages or links in
   the chain (how progress is made);
5. about the relationship of the implementation process to
   "authority".

Differing assumptions about each element create differing
accounts of the implementation process. These assumptions, and the
relative strengths or weaknesses of the models on which they are
based, can be weighed against the potential effectiveness of the
prescriptions for change advocated in each.

The "Pathology" of Implementation

One of the earliest, and foremost, studies of the
implementation process is that by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973).
They sought to trace the tortuous course of an urban aid programme
from the time of its inception, examining those factors that lay

behind the programme's frustrations: difficulties of translating
broad agreements, among the large number of organisations involved
and their differing perspectives, into specific decisions; the
opportunities for blockage and delay resulting from a corresponding
multiplicity of decision points; and the economic theories on which
the programme was based. Pressman and Wildavsky argue that the
study of implementation requires understanding that apparently simple
sequences of events depend upon complex chains of reciprocal
interaction: what they refer to as the "implementation chain". In
their view, each part of the chain must be built with the others in
view:

> The separation of policy design from implementation
> is fatal. It is no better than mindless
> implementation without a sense of direction.　　(p.xvii)

Pressman and Wildavsky thus focus on the causes of
implementation "failure" which they highlight as;

1. inability to follow through (ie lack of continuing
   commitment among crucial participants);

2. poorly conceived policies (in terms of to whom they were
   directed);

3. delay due to "technical details" of implementation, rather
   than initial design and commitments (ie poor conception);

4. conflicting objectives, and conflicts of interest;

5. administrative antagonisms within and between agencies;

6. poorly defined aims and intentions, and lack of attention to
   detailed programming and co-ordination among agencies which
   have diverse perspectives and objectives. Hence they conclude:

> What had looked like a relatively simple, urgent
> and direct programme...eventually involved numerous
> diverse participants and a much larger series of
> decisions than was planned. None of the
> participants actually disagreed with the goal...
> but their differing perspectives and senses of
> urgency made it difficult to translate broad
> substantive agreement into effective policy
> implementation. It was not merely the direction of
> their decisions - favourable or unfavourable -
> but the time orientation of the participants -
> fast or slow, urgent or indolent - that determined
> the prospects of completion. When so many future
> decisions depend on past actions, delay in time
> may be equivalent to defeat in substance.　　(p.113)

According to Pressman and Wildavsky, the basic reason that
programmes survive is that they adapt themselves to their

environment over a long period of time. In their view, delay is a basic pathology of implementation processes. It is a function of the number of decision points, the number of participants at each point, and the intensity of their preferences. The essential policy problem is seen as how to provide incentives to change low to high intensity, and how to maintain high positive intensity through lengthy delays. Pressman and Wildavsky thus focus on organisation and policy design in order to minimise the commitment-eroding nature of programme delays.

Successful implementation is seen as depending upon a high probability of co-operation between all the actors involved (ie consensus-building). Improved co-ordination is seen as a function of (a) mutually supportive rather than contradictory policies, and (b) corporate and inter-corporate management. Policy makers can "close the gap" between design and implementation by gearing programmes more directly to the demands of their execution by;

1. appreciating the length and unpredictability of necessary decision sequences in implementation, and by minimising the number of what Levin (1976) has termed "multiple clearance points" (ie the need for prior agreement by a number of participants on any course of action); and

2. paying as much attention to the creation of the organisational machinery for executing a programme as for launching one.

This leads Pressman and Wildavsky to conclude that:

The fewer the steps involved in carrying out the programme, the fewer the opportunities for a disaster to overtake it. The more directly the policy aims at its target, the fewer the decisions involved in its ultimate realisation and the greater the likelihood it will be implemented. (p.147)

This approach, though representing the most detailed and comprehensive study of implementation yet undertaken, is criticised by Barrett and Fudge (1981) for its basic assumption that policy-making and implementation proceed by a series of logical steps (from intention, through decision, to action); by distinguishing between policy-making (the "initial conditions") and the creation of programmes, which are seen as "inputs" to the implementation process; and by conceiving implementation as a process of putting policy into effect. The approach focusses on co-ordinative and managerial skills to assemble and maintain consensus in order to achieve desired ends.

Pressman and Wildavsky therefore exclude from the implementation process what they nevertheless refer to as "governmental action" to convert policy intentions into programmes.

The Pressman and Wildavsky approach, although behavioural in its analysis, exhibits many of the characteristics of the rational-comprehensive model. They view implementation as distinct from policy-making, as a linear process, requiring central management. They fail to take account of the reality of the conditions in which policy implementation takes place. The central task is seen as control, to ensure conformance to original intentions.

Dunsire's (1978) sphere of interest is the very process which Pressman and Wildavsky ignore - the conversion of policy intentions into programmes of action. His is the most explicit focus on output of any recent study of implementation. Dunsire argues that programme implementation is not linear, nor even uni-directional. People alter their objectives as circumstances change; money and staff and other resources are subject to slippage; the actual implementers find themselves sustaining the "initial conditions" in assembling fresh political support. The longer the chain of causality, the more numerous the reciprocal relationships among the links. Dunsire defines implementation as:

> The choosing, linking and wielding of the
> implements by which words become action-on-
> the world.   (p.viii)

Dunsire focusses on behavioural factors influencing the actions and motives of bureaucracies and the individuals within them. In order for implementation to proceed, the intentions of policy-makers must first be transformed into the actions of officials:

> Do organisations decide, or is it only organisms
> (men and women) that decide? Can organisations
> act, or is it only organisms that can act?   (p.10)

In this conception, two types of implementation process are identified; (a) developmental, and (b) aggregative. The developmental assumption states that the nature of a succeeding step in the process is uniquely determined by the nature of the preceding step. Thus progress is made at the expense of shutting off, at each stage, all the other possibilities. Implementation by this means becomes a progressive "pragmatisation" of the general into the

specific, in a series of stages marked by the passage of time, and by descent through a hierarchy. The aggregative approach, on the other hand, is multi-organisational. Getting something done is seen as a matter of putting together a number of discrete units, ie "making a chain". Each link in the chain has its own function. The nature of activity at each succeeding stage is wholly independent of the nature of the activity at the preceding stage. The stages pre-exist the process, and can be combined in different ways, orders or sequences, provided only the output of one can be "plugged into" the input of the next. Which method is most appropriate to a particular circumstance depends, says Dunsire, on the hierarchical, organisational and temporal context.

Dunsire's aggregative model and behavioural focus has much in common with Bardach's (1977) conception of the implementation process as "a process of assembling numerous and diverse programme elements" (p.37). In Bardach's view, implementation is concerned with "putting the machine together and making it run". Implementation problems are, in this conception, control problems, specific to the assembly activities that constitute some implementation process. The processes of assembly and control occur in the realm of politics, and are integrated through the idea of a system of loosely-related implementation "games". Here Bardach concurs with Dunsire that a crucial element in the success of implementation programmes is the motives and behaviour of key individuals. He stresses the importance of actively seeking out or creating resources, maintaining or recreating legitimacy and motivation during the implementation process:

> The implementation process is therefore
> characterised by the manoeuvring of a large number
> of semi-autonomous actors, each of which tries to
> gain access to programme elements not under its own
> control while at the same time trying to extract
> better terms from other actors seeking access to
> elements that it does control.   (p.51)

There are so many features of the implementation process that tend to aggravate and exaggerate underlying conflicts, that much of the process moves along "out of control", driven by complex forces not of any party's making. The process is therefore dynamic and, says Bardach, "shot through with gamesmanship". This analysis leads on to his metaphor of implementation as a system of games, the rules of

which must be grasped in designing strategies for minimising delay - which Bardach, like Pressman and Wildavsky, regards as the central problem:

> If there is one attribute of the implementation
> process that everyone would agree was symptomatic
> of "pathology", it would be delay.   (p.180)

Thus, delays arise from (a) inherent difficulties of future-testing under conditions of uncertainty, and (b) the latent functions of protracted negotiations as a ritualistic and instrumental adaptation to residual uncertainties. Bardach suggests that delay can be avoided by (i) using intermediaries to .facilitate negotiations (who can and who is willing to do it?), and (ii) foreclosing options by manoeuvring, ie by closing off viable alternatives, actors can be manoeuvred into certain inescapable positions. In this context, the essential implementation problem is seen as the control and direction of the "vast profusion" of programme-related activities carried on by numerous and disparate organisations and individuals so as to achieve programme objectives, keep costs down, and reduce delay. Therefore the message is quite clear: design simple, straightforward programmes that require as little management as possible.

The approaches by Bardach, Dunsire, and Pressman and Wildavsky are founded upon a view of implementation as a sequence of events "triggered off" by a policy decision, involving translation of policy into operational tasks to be carried out by a variety of actors and agencies, and requiring substantial co-ordinating activity to ensure availability of resources, and that things happen as intended. This is the conception of the implementation task most widespread in current planning practice. As such, these approaches have much in common with rational-comprehensive ideology, and Pahl's (1970) managerialist methodology. It is also a conception which underlies much of the literature on implementation. It indicates a shift from diagnosis of policy failure, to identification of ways in which such failure can be prevented. Bardach's games metaphor is perhaps the most refined form of this managerialist view.

The rationalist conception of implementation as putting policy into effect is the prevailing perspective from which implementation and its problems tend to be conceived, and in many cases leads to formulae-type approaches such as those of Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980)

and van Meter and van Horn (1975). Unlike the previous
conceptions, these are purely abstract formulations of the
implementation problem and frameworks for its explanation and
resolution. Each of these is considered in turn, for they are perhaps
the most detailed attempts yet to move towards a "theory" of
implementation.

Sabatier and Mazmanian identify six preconditions for
"successful" policy implementation;

1. clear and consistent policy objectives;

2. the existence of a sound causal theory for the policy,
   relating changes in target group behaviour to the achievement
   of objectives (ie the desired end-state);

3. implementing agencies must have sufficient control over the
   target groups and other critical areas of intervention, and
   policy design must maximise the probability that target groups
   will perform as desired;

4. leaders of the implementing agency must possess substantial
   managerial and political skill, and must be committed to the
   policy goals;

5. the programme must be actively supported by organised
   constituency groups and by a few key politicians throughout
   the implementation process;

6. the relative priority of the policy objectives must not be
   undermined over time by the emergence of conflicting public
   policies, or by changes in relevant socio-economic conditions,
   which undermine the policy's causal theory or political
   support.

Similarly, van Meter and van Horn focus on consensus-building
and policy design, which together they regard as providing an
effective antidote to implementation pathologies. They assert that
"effective" implementation is most likely to occur where goal consensus
is high and the change proposed is marginal. Conversely, where major
change is intended and goal consensus is low, the prospects for
effective implementation will be less assured. This leads them to an
identification of six variables which, they suggest, shape the
linkages between policy and performance;

1. policy standards and objectives;

2. policy resources;

3. interorganisational communications and enforcement activities;

4. characteristics of the implementing agencies;
   (a) competence and number of staff;
   (b) degree of hierarchical control;
   (c) political resources;
   (d) vitality;
   (e) degree of "open" communications within an organisation;
   (f) formal and informal linkages with the policy-making or enforcing body;
5. economic, social and political conditions;
6. disposition of the implementers.

These two theoretical formulations are perhaps the rational-comprehensive model of implementation in its purest form. As such, they are sensitive to the criticisms of rational-comprehensive planning as previously discussed. These formulae must be regarded as most demanding for any policy process, and they have been severely criticised for demanding preconditions which have no prospect of being found in reality, derived from simplistic conceptions of implementation processes (Figure 1). The attempt to construct a general theory of implementation is regarded, at the very least, by Bardach (1977) as premature, since the systematic study of implementation processes, problems and remedies is in its infancy. It is perhaps more realistic, with the present state of knowledge, to seek to suggest, describe and illuminate certain problematic tendencies and to offer a preliminary assessment of strategies that might offset them.

The Structuralist Analysis

Barrett and Fudge (1981) advocate the pursuit of alternative avenues of investigation from the "conventional wisdom" based on;

1. a closer examination of the whole question of consensus, control and compliance as essentially a political rather than a managerial issue, and
2. a re-examination of the conceptualisation of the implementation process itself.

Barrett and Fudge therefore suggest that:

Rather than treating implementation as the transmission of policy into a series of consequential actions, the policy-action relationship needs to be regarded as a process of interaction and negotiation, taking place over time, between those seeking to put policy into effect and those upon whom action depends. (p.4)

Fig.1   A Model of the Policy Implementation Process (van Meter and van Horn, 1975).

They argue the need for theories of the implementation process
that take account of individual and group behaviour within
institutional settings, and practical methodologies that utilise more
behavioural explanations, as a reaction to rationalist approaches.
Barrett and Fudge therefore emphasise the ideological and value-
laden nature of policy-making processes, in a plural social context,
in which distinctions between the making and implementing of policy
are blurred. In this conception, the key issues of importance in
understanding implementation processes are considered to be:

    (a) the multiplicity and complexity of the linkages involved;

    (b) questions of control and co-ordination; and

    (c) issues of conflict and consensus.

Here, policy is seen as the key to the whole debate about
implementation. It is seen as the starting point for action, the
focus of negotiations, the expression of values, stances and practices
which frame organisational activity. Barret and Fudge therefore
present a conception which moves away from a pathology orientation to
a structuralist analysis of the context for, and influences upon,
action. They have much in common with the theoretical perspectives
of Lindblom's (1959) incrementalism and Etzioni's (1967) "mixed
scanning" in their quest for practical, behavioural-based methodologies.
The conception of implementation is action-centred as opposed to the
rationalist's policy-centred.

In this pluralist conception, policy cannot therefore be taken
as constant. On the contrary, it is seen as being mediated by actors
operating within different "assumptive worlds" (Young 1979) from
those formulating policy. It thus inevitably undergoes interpretation
and modification and, in some cases, subversion. Since "pluralists"
assert that, in a complex and dynamic society, there are a multitude
of forces, many of which are inherently opposed to one another, these
are incapable of being accommodated simultaneously. The horizons of
the expected achievements of implementation are therefore more modest
than in the well-ordered and controlled assumptive world of the
rationalist conception. The focus of analysis and evaluation is
therefore policy performance, rather than the policy conformance which
predicates the rationalist "knowledge-control" perspective. In the
former, negotiation, bargaining and compromise assume central
importance in the process.

4. Conclusion

Derived from the theoretical frameworks discussed previously, there emerge two quite distinct schools of thought on the methodology of implementation:

(i) <u>those deriving from the rationalist/policy analysis perspective,</u> represented by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), Bardach (1977) and Dunsire (1978), who view the implementation problem from a managerialist perspective, requiring the development of strategies to steer the course of a policy or programme through a "turbulent" operational environment. The key to effective policy <u>conformance</u> is therefore the construction of rational policy designs, organisational structures and decision-making frameworks;

(ii) <u>those deriving from the incremental/behavioural perspective,</u> represented by Barrett and Fudge (1981), and also Goldsmith (1980), who see implementation in essentially a political context, where policy must be expected to undergo alteration, and even subversion, as it impacts upon a dynamic environment of conflicting interests, values and power. Policy <u>performance</u> therefore becomes the criterion of evaluation. In this context, policy and action are inextricably interlinked. In many respects, Lindblom's "partisan mutual adjustment" is the key to action.

Leach (1982) contends that explanations of and prescriptions for policy processes cannot be restricted by a simple choice between rational-comprehensive and disjointed incremental models. Whilst the pure rationality model, taken to its logical conclusion by Dror (1964), has little practical value, Leach and Stewart (1982) see no inherent conflict between the use of rationality in policy processes, and the constraints imposed by organisational structures, politics and values. Theirs is the <u>bounded rationality</u> of Banfield (1959), in which the rational model is used flexibly. Leach, in fact, refers to "purposive rationality" to mean a rationality which also includes judgements as to ends, and an ability to recognise ways in which it is possible and appropriate to apply the rational model.

The use of the rationalism/incrementalism dichotomy has become something akin to a conceptual straitjacket, restricting understanding and the development of a constructive debate about policy processes. Whilst Friedmann (1973), Schon (1971), Barrett

and Fudge (1981) and others attack the rational approach, they seek to replace it with a form of rationality adapted to its conditions and context. Therefore, for the purpose of understanding and explaining policy processes and the conceptualisation of implementation within these, the rationalism/incrementalism debate should be viewed less as a dichotomy and more as a continuum along which the different models of policy-making processes may be placed, according to whether the emphasis is (a) more prescriptive (rational) or more descriptive (incremental), and (b) more theoretical or more practice-orientated (see Figure 2). The pure rationality of Dror (1964) or the disjointed incrementalism of Lindblom (1959) might therefore be seen as occupying polar positions on this continuum.

Thus, all planning processes are, by definition, "rational". Models which exhibit more of the characteristics of pure rationality tend to arrive at a technical rationality, whereas behavioural models tend to exhibit a political rationality. Planning processes have been characterised more by technical rationality in a decision context dominated by political rationality.

Attempts to analyse the policy process are inescapably based upon explicit or implicit models of the policy system, which themselves derive from ideological considerations. Some models are seen as being "driven" by environmental forces; others by internal objectives and goals; and others by internal perceptions of the external environment. However, these models can tend to over-emphasise the constraints to action to the point where patterns of activity are portrayed as the necessary outcomes of a confluence of forces.

Implementation is taken for granted in rational-comprehensive models, since problems are seen as technical, the climate as consensual, and the process as controlled. Behavioural-incremental models, on the other hand, view policy-making as an inescapably political activity. Implementation thus becomes problematic, where policy is seen as a bargained outcome (as opposed to an input), the environment as conflict-ridden, and the process as characterised by diversity and constraint. Rational models therefore posit a high degree of control over the decision-making situation, whilst incremental models assume much less command over the environment.

Fig. 2 A Matrix of Models of the Planning Process

The assumptions of the rational model have been undermined by
empirical studies of policy processes, whilst its predictive record
is uneven. It survives primarily due to its status as a normative
model (Faludi 1973), and as a "dignified myth" often shared by
policy-makers. Therefore, as Gordon et. al. (1977) state:

> To depart from the assumptions of classic
> rationality is inevitably to widen the
> boundaries of the "relevant" in the analysis
> of policy making. (p.29)

Whilst the most recent implementation analyses have been less
useful as predictive and prescriptive instruments, the improved
understanding of the processes of policy determination, and the
"transmission" of policy through outputs into impacts, has at least
as much to contribute to the improvement of policy-making as better
information has to contribute to the improvement of policy.

The issues to emerge from the preceding analysis, and which
would appear to have a critical influence upon policy processes,
might be summarised as follows;

1. the relationships between policy-makers and implementers;
2. the nature of the decision-making structure - reticular or
   pyramidal;
3. the nature and role of implementation in the policy process -
   policy performance or policy conformance;
4. policy as management, or policy as politics;
5. the influence of individual and organisational perceptions,
   values and beliefs.

From these issues derive some fundamental questions which must
predicate any analytical standpoint;

(a) to what extent is the environment controllable by public
    authorities?
(b) to what extent are they subordinate to or dependent upon it?
(c) to what extent can they influence or shape the nature of the
    distribution of public goods and services, and move towards
    realisation of policy objectives?

These are fundamental questions which need to be resolved before
embarking on any exegesis of implementation processes. As Goldsmith
(1980) observes:

> The realisation that governments have limited
> ability to control or manage their turbulent
> environment is the major lesson to be learnt
> from the experience of the 1970's.   (p.169)

The last few years have seen the emergence and development of
a raging debate, primarily in academic environments, about the
nature of planning, its relationship to social processes, and the
validity of planning theory (Healey et al 1982; Paris et al 1932;
Minay ed. 1979). Healey et al (1932) refer to the current "pluralism"
of theoretical positions on planning, primarily as a reaction to
rational-comprehensive models (see Faludi ed. 1973). Consequently,
there will persist a concurrent plurality of concepts about
implementation. Reade (1932) contends that any attempt to build a
theory of planning, or a theory of implementation, can only be
understood through causal explanation. The conclusion from the
preceding analysis is that, like Friedmann's (1973) criticisms of
comprehensive-rationality, the search for a theory of implementation
is misguided. It may not be possible to consider causal explanations
of implementation in abstraction from causal explanations of general
planning activity. In the end, as Blowers (1980) suggests, theories
of planning merge with theories which seek to explain social
processes.

5. The Implementation Problematic

The study of implementation in the planning process is
problematic. The limited research undertaken to date on the outputs
of the planning process contrasts sharply with the abundance of
case material on policy-making (inputs) and evaluation (impacts).
Research into implementation processes encounters three major problems.
The first is that implementation analyses, like all social science
research, proceed from some implicit or explicit "paradigm" - a set
of organising principles which tend to colour the perceptions of the
analysts. Such perceptions generally fall into two groups. Firstly
those that perceive the problem as one which can be resolved by
greater rationality - better information, and better communication
with and control over those implementing policies and programmes.
Secondly, those who view the prospects for more effective
implementation as being closely tied to the need for _less_ overt
rationality and more emphasis on behavioural aspects, together with
the development of more adaptive response frameworks.

The second problem for implementation research concerns terminology. There is no generally accepted definition of "implementation". How one defines implementation is closely tied to one's conception of the policy-making process. Rationalist frameworks tend to view implementation as a discrete stage, proceeding policy formulation and preceding evaluation. Behavioural orientations tend to view implementation less as a discrete stage, but more as one aspect of what Barret and Fudge (1981) have called a "policy-action continuum".

The third problem is the lack of previous research specifically on implementation aspects of the policy process. The seminal study on implementation remains that by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), although more recently, theoretical frameworks have been developed by Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980), van Meter and van Horn (1975), and Barrett and Fudge (1981). However, implementation remains a relatively under-developed field of social science research. This poor level of understanding is reflected in a contemporary perception of planning which highlights its under-achievements, both as an approach to decision-making, and as a substantive field of public policy (namely, land-use planning).

CHAPTER II

STRATHCLYDE PARK:

A CASE STUDY IN IMPLEMENTATION

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1. Introduction

The proposal to create a regional park out of dereliction in the highly urbanised middle Clyde valley (Figure 3) spans the whole period of post-war physical and economic planning in Scotland. The development of Strathclyde Park is intertwined with the evolution of ideas in Scottish regional and recreation planning during a period of changing economic and political conditions over the last 35 years. As a project, Strathclyde Park is a good example of the application of national economic and physical planning at the local scale, and provides a section through the profile of post-war Scottish planning.

The park had national/regional and local objectives, and its planning and development proceeded via a multi-organisational planning context involving central government departments and agencies, local authorities, and sectional interest groups. The park project is also a good example of public policy-making processes in action, over an extended period of time, subject to varying political and economic conditions. The development of the project illustrates the use of political and economic power, by both institutions and individuals, the influence of the general political and economic conditions, and the interrelationships of central and local government, and the links between national/local and physical/ economic planning.

As a physical planning project in Scotland, the park covers many aspects of Scottish planning practice in the post-war period, and has both historical and contemporary relevance. The project has yet to be "completed" nearly 40 years after its original conception, and 20 years after detailed planning began in earnest. It may never be completed as originally intended by its protagonists, and the reasons are of central relevance to contemporary physical planning problems and to our understanding of implementation in the planning process.

Fig.3 The Middle Clyde Valley: Regional Setting

Whilst Greenburg et al's (1977) truism that implementation is an inherently localised and responsive phenomenon, highlights the important role circumstances play (to the extent that the construction of all-embracing theory is a mis-direction of research effort) it does not follow that such processes are not amenable to the search for their greater understanding.

The detailed analysis of one long-running case-study potentially provides opportunities to make more meaningful statements about the influences bearing upon implementation processes in planning. In this respect in-depth implementation analysis is an under-developed field of research into policy processes in comparison to comparative analysis (ie unlocking Alterman's (1982) "black box").

Since the case-study is set in central Scotland, involving national public bodies and Government departments, as well as local interests, the geographical factors which assume significance in comparative studies are less relevant in the findings of the Strathclyde Park analysis, ie what can be said about the implementation processes of Strathclyde Park should be generalisable to other Scottish physical planning contexts, in both time and space. Finally, an understanding of the processes leading to the implementation of the Park, together with the current state of knowledge about implementation generally, has important application to the current focus on the effectiveness of planning and policy-making systems.

2. Strathclyde Park : Historical Outline

The genesis of Strathclyde Park occurred during the years of the Second World War. Around the time Abercrombie and his team were studying the Clyde Valley region, there was a scheme to create an artificial loch in the Hamilton Low Parks area on which to land seaplanes flying the north Atlantic route from North America. Whether Abercrombie knew of this scheme when he was preparing his Clyde Valley Regional Plan is not known, but he gave formal expression to the potential of the area as a recreational centre of strategic significance in his 1946 proposals to the Clyde Valley Regional Plan Advisory Committee. The Committee comprised elected representatives

of the local authorities for the Clyde valley area, appointed by the Secretary of State for Scotland in 1943 to prepare:

> An Outline Plan for the whole area, which Plan, when approved, is intended to form the basis or groundwork for the statutory Schemes of Planning of the individual Local Authorities. (Abercrombie & Matthew, 1949, p.1)

Abercrombie's conception included a hierarchy of recreational provision at the national, regional and "community planning" scales. Four "Regional Recreation Centres" were proposed, including one at the Hamilton Low Parks (Figure 4) which, like others, was "placed strategically to serve groups of towns and urban areas...to give a wide range of sports suitable for all ages and conditions of people" (Abercrombie & Matthew, 1949, p.157). The Plan saw the special advantage of the Low Parks area in the following terms:

> It is strategically placed to serve a great industrial population within easy reach and it was an obvious choice, particularly in view of the fact that it entailed a certain amount of river training which is badly needed in any case. (p.157)

Whilst the Advisory Committee failed to reach agreement on a number of proposals contained in the Plan, the concept of and locations for the Regional Recreation Centres were accepted. There is no evidence to indicate why, in the early post-war period, no action was taken. These reasons may have included the following:

(a) heavy local industrial pollution, and some active coal working;

(b) the availability nearby of country and seaside of some scenic beauty;

(c) periods of alternating industrial and mining development and slump;

(d) local authority interests in the area for refuse disposal and sewage treatment;

(e) the low priority of planning for leisure and recreation in the early post-war period;

(f) limited local resources, and lack of policy direction both locally and nationally.

The Clyde Valley Plan had also included proposals for an A74 Hamilton by-pass road through the Low Parks area, but again this was only a paper scheme until around 1960 when the whole question of traffic growth and movement was re-examined by the Scottish Office.

Hamilton

ent Park

Fig. 4   Proposed Regional Recreation Centre, Hamilton Low Parks, 1949

The outcome was a motorway scheme, more or less on the old line, with a major service area in the Low Parks close to the Mausoleum of the Dukes of Hamilton.

The 1960's was a decade of great activism by Government in regional planning. The 1963 White Paper "Central Scotland: A Programme for Development and Growth" (Cmnd. 2188) laid great stress on making industrialised central Scotland more attractive to new industry by schemes to eliminate the impression of decay and dereliction. It suggested a number of "growth points", one of which was to be north Lanarkshire:

> The hub of which, so far as blight is concerned, is
> the Hamilton Low Parks which is to be traversed by
> the motorway link between Scotland and the South;
> the fast route which will be taken by the tourist
> and the industrialist travelling into Scotland by
> road. The impression of dereliction created will
> do nothing to help the Scottish industrial image.
> (Lyall, 1964, p.2)

As well as questions of aesthetics and image of the area, there was also, at that time, the potential resource provided by the bings in the area as spoil material for the motorway construction, whilst at the same time using excavated material from the motorway to landscape the Low Parks area (Figure 5).

In addition to the spoil heaps and refuse tips, the major feature of the area was flooding caused by subsidence resulting from coal workings. The last of the local workings, Bothwellhaugh colliery, closed in 1958. These workings resulted in considerable subsidence as the tunnels collapsed, as much as five metres in places. Local depressions were formed which filled with water or turned to marsh. Some of the ponds were filled and stocked by angling clubs. Others were adopted by wildlife. Such was the wildlife value of the area that, in 1953, the Secretary of State for Scotland issued an Order under the Protection of Birds Act 1954, providing for a 335 acre sanctuary.

Building on the aims of the 1963 White Paper, the Scottish Development Department (SDD) resurrected Abercrombie's proposal in 1964 by suggesting to the local authorities for the area the formation of a loch in the Low Parks in order to (a) rehabilitate areas liable to flood, and (b) provide water sports facilities, as part of a

Fig.5   The Middle Clyde Valley c.1970

(Reproduced from Ordnance Survey Plans, with permission)   1:25000

general recreation plan for the middle Clyde valley. This outline
scheme was put to the North Lanarkshire Growth Area Committee (set
up in the wake of the White Paper) in November 1964. It is clear
SDD considered the scheme a priority requiring early implementation
in view of the M74 construction programme, due for completion in
1966:

> The need for rehabilitation and landscaping at this
> point where the motorway from the South enters
> Central Scotland is paramount and must be tackled. (Lyall, 1964, p.4)

The 1964 outline scheme drew on the knowledge of the Lee Valley
Park project in north London (Civic Trust 1964), a similar reclamation,
landscaping and recreation project, but comprising a number of
schemes linked together to form a linear park 20 miles in length. At
the same time, the SDD scheme was based on what central government
planners saw as "an obvious relationship between the general
condition and amenity of the countryside, and the probability of
firms moving into a district" (SDD 1964, p.1). The Middle Clyde
Regional Park (as it was then named)emerged as a form of landscape
"infrastructure" for industrial development in the area.

The park scheme was conceived in the days before the 1967
Countryside Act which formally established the Country Park idea.
The scheme emerged, and its main components were largely finalised
during, an era notable for its countryside policy vacuum. There was
no SDD view on planning for the countryside, nor on recreation
planning, at that time. This presented considerable scope for a
variety of ideas and ambitions for the development of the area, most
notably from the local authorities. SDD's "Middle Clyde Regional
Park" was seen from the outset as the focal point of a much wider
rehabilitation programme encompassing a nine-mile stretch of the
middle Clyde valley. The park was to be linked to other recreational
facilities in this wider area by a system of footpaths, picnic areas,
tourist viewpoints, and a transformed visual environment. Apart
from the cost of forming the loch, which required a detailed
feasibility study, the cost of realising the SDD scheme was estimated
in December 1964 at £575,000.

In April 1965, following further discussions with SDD, the
three local authorities involved - Lanark County Council, Motherwell
and Wishaw Town Council, and Hamilton Town Council - formed a joint

working party and appointed engineering consultants to investigate
the feasibility of forming an artificial loch on the River Clyde in
the Hamilton Low Parks area. As required by the Working Party the
loch was to have a surface area of approximately 200 acres, and would
have amenities for sailing and other recreation (Figure 6). The
consultants estimated the cost of the major works at £300,000, and
recommended further technical studies of the river system, likely
pollution problems, and hydraulic studies of the Low Parks area
(Binnie and Partners, 1965). Evidence of the national importance of
the park project is provided by reference to it in the 1966 White
Paper "The Scottish Economy 1965 to 1970: A Plan for Expansion"
(Cmnd. 2364):

> Perhaps one of the most imaginative pointers to ways
> in which new development and rehabilitation can be
> combined is the proposal now being investigated for
> a Middle Clyde Regional Park...a landscaped entrance
> to the heart of the country from the South which
> could do much to repair the tarnished image of
> industrial Scotland.   (p.42)

The whole scheme had by then gathered sufficient momentum to be
publicly launched in August 1966, following discussions in Edinburgh
between the three local authorities and the Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State for Development, J Dickson Mabon. It was
anticipated that the scheme, to cost approximately £1million, would
take five to seven years to complete. Further investigations were to
be held to determine how costs could be shared between central and
local government.

In April 1967, the three local authorities appointed landscape
and planning consultants for the project, and in the autumn they
produced their main planning proposals for the park (Montagu, 1967)
based on a detailed brief specifying the main requirements of the
local authorities. The proposals were focussed on the middle Clyde
area as "a potential linear park serving the Region south-west of
Glasgow" and were based on the following assumptions;

1. the working-out of coal in the area nearing completion;
2. an advanced programme of elimination of pollution by the
   Clyde River Purification Board;
3. increased leisure time;
4. pressure of population;
5. improved communications and increased personal mobility.

Fig. 6 Middle Clyde Regional Park, General Plan 1965. (Binnie and Partners, 1965).

The Park was seen as serving an immediate population of some 215,000 within a three mile radius, and perhaps as much as four-fifths of the population of Scotland, living within a 50-mile radius of the park. These opportunities were seen to be enhanced by the growth prospects forecast in the 1963 White Paper, particularly the planned population growth in north Lanarkshire. It was in the 1967 report that the term "Strathclyde Park" was first used. The proposals included a phased development based on the following objectives;

(a) the elimination of industrial dereliction and dumps, and the screening of essential industrial features;

(b) the improvement of access to the area; .

(c) the provision of additional attractions and amenities, and their grouping with those already existing in the area.

After land reclamation, the main proposals of the 1967 scheme were much more ambitious than SDD's outline suggestions. As well as including a loch with provision for sailing, canoeing and angling, the 1967 proposals also featured an international standard, 2,000 metre rowing and canoeing course, caravan sites and a motel, restaurants, dry ski slopes, an equestrian centre, a regional sports centre, and an athletics stadium and sports village. The whole complex was aimed at attracting and supporting national and international events:

> The aim should be to provide as many complementary
> facilities as possible, grouped together in order
> to serve different age groups, and varying weather
> conditions.   (Montagu, 1967, p8)

Stage 1 of the scheme was costed at £2,532,000, and this excluded the second phase of the sports centre, the ski slopes, the canoe centre, additional restaurants and leisure facilities, and further landscaping and car parks. Also excluded was the athletics stadium, which was to be undertaken in Stage 3, and the sports village in Stage 4. In short, the local authorities had transformed the SDD outline plan into a plan for a regional park: a complex of active and passive recreation facilities serving west central Scotland.

Not surprisingly, SDD expressed some concern at the cost of these proposals, and there followed a period of re-evaluation of what could feasibly be provided within a reasonable time-scale

in the context of the financial resources likely to be available.
Consequently, a second Ministerial meeting was held in Edinburgh in
January 1968 to rationalise central and local government ambitions,
and to establish what the extent of Government involvement would be .
To compound matters, the engineering consultants to the project
revealed at the meeting that major changes in the loch arrangement
were required as a result of studies which had shown that the River
Clyde carried too much sediment to be the loch's source of water
supply. A new channel for the Clyde would have to be cut,
separating it from the loch, which would instead be supplied by the
South Calder Water. This major revision was estimated to increase
the capital costs of the project by around 10% (£200-300,000),
although these would be offset by avoiding annual dredging costs of
approximately £50,000.

At the same meeting the Minister, Lord Hughes, suggested to the
local authorities that they form a joint authority to set up and
manage the park. They agreed to consider a revised layout in the
context of the engineering consultants' findings, and to carry out
further investigations so that detailed costs could be worked out and
the availability of grant-aid settled. SDD felt the 1967 proposals
were "too lavish", and one of the purposes of the January meeting was
to consider what major works were required initially in order to get
the project going, so as to get some measure of the kind of
expenditure which would have to be met:

> There is room for a good deal of detailed argument
> about what might or might not need to go in at
> this stage.   (SDD, 1968, p.3)

The main sources of Government grant-aid were section 20 of the
Industrial Development Act 1966, which provided for up to 85% grant
for the rehabilitation of "derelict, neglected or unsightly land",
and section 67 of the Countryside (Scotland) Act 1967, which provided
for up to 75% grant for the provision of countryside recreation
facilities. A later source of grant-aid was the Scottish Sports
Council which assisted, through the Scottish Education Department,
the provision for some of the sports facilities, notably the rowing
and canoeing course.

Whilst section 20 of the 1966 Act was primarily intended to
contribute to the development of industry in a given area, this

requirement had been liberally interpreted to include "the clearance
of dereliction where this would make a piece of country more
attractive to potential industrialists". Even so, there was some
debate between the planning and finance divisions of SDD concerning
the definition of derelict land in the case of Strathclyde Park,
since only a small part of the park site (Bothwellhaugh bing) could
be considered "classic" derelict land within the strict meaning of
the Act. Most of the rest of the area was nominally in agricultural
use, although the poor drainage and flooding in the area severely
curtailed agricultural use for all practical purposes.

The provisions of the 1966 Act were used to rehabilitate and
reclaim the land, and the provisions of the 1967 Act used to
transform it into "countryside". Thereafter, grant-aid for passive
recreational facilities could also be provided under the 1967 Act.
It was not until the establishment of the Scottish Sports Council
in 1972 that the sports facilities became eligible for grant-aid.

Following the preparation of the hydrological report on the
new loch arrangement, the planning consultants prepared in 1969 a
more detailed study report, with cost estimates, as a basis for final
decisions. At the same time, a Technical Working Party of central
and local government officials, together with the consultants,
considered what, in detail, would be eligible for grant-aid.
Eligibility for grant-aid was a major consideration since:
    ___The scope of the scheme as a whole depended on the
    extent to which the rehabilitation grant would be
    payable.   (Technical Working Party, 1969, p.1)

The Technical Working Party reported in 1970 that the necessary
Stage 1 works would cost approximately £1,146,300, and would comprise
the formation of the loch and diversion of the River Clyde by
means of a by-pass channel; construction of a park road, bridge and
culverts; two caravan sites; car parks, playing fields and footpaths.
The total area of the park would extend to approximately 1,745 acres.
Of the £1,146,300 estimated cost for a revised Stage 1, all but
£90,000 was expected to attract either rehabilitation or countryside
grant. SDD gave strong support to the scheme in its submissions to
the Treasury:
    In view of the benefits accruing to the immediate

area and to Scotland as a whole in terms of
the encouragement of industrial development.   (Butler 1969)

In 1970, rehabilitation grant was expected to account for
approximately two-thirds of the total cost of the scheme, whereas
the "countryside" element was estimated at £300,000. Following
consideration by the local authorities of the report by the Technical
Working Party, SDD granted approval in April 1970 for the revised
Stage 1 and the Strathclyde Park project was officially re-launched.

In the early part of 1971, there was some re-evaluation of the
need for the international rowing course, in view of the cost of
providing this to the exacting standards set by the Federation
Internationale des Sociétés d'Aviron (FISA), the international
sporting body for rowing. To provide a course to international
standard required a larger and deeper loch than would otherwise be
necessary, as well as additional access roadworks and race timing
equipment. It was estimated that savings of £276,000 could be made
(Binnie & Partners, 1971). Whilst the provision of the course was not
an automatic by-product of the park development, and required
substantial expenditure over and above that required to form a
similar loch without the rowing course, there was nevertheless
considerable pressure exerted on the Joint Committee at this time
to retain the proposal.

It was the Scottish Amateur Rowing Association (SARA) and the
Scottish Council for Physical Recreation (SCPR) who had suggested
the inclusion of the 2,000 metre course in the 1967 proposals, and it
was SARA again which in 1971 reminded the Joint Committee of what
it saw as the excellent opportunity to provide at Strathclyde Park
facilities for improving standards of amateur rowing and for
national and international rowing events, for which there was only
one other centre in the UK (at Nottingham) at the time. SDD also
brought some pressure to bear for the course's retention:

> We are as concerned as the local authorities that
> the opportunity to provide this when the main
> engineering works are undertaken should not be
> missed...In view of the acceptance by the
> Government of so large a proportion of the overall
> costs of this highly expensive scheme we should
> hope that the Joint Committee would see their way
> to accepting the relatively low balance of cost of
> developing the rowing course.   (SDD, 1971)

At its meeting on 14th April 1971, the Joint Committee agreed to retain the 2,000 metre international rowing course, and to construct the loch accordingly. As far as the Joint Committee was concerned, the future prospects for the whole area were tied up with Strathclyde Park. International rowing held out the prospect of international recognition for the area, and the provision of a new landscape and new recreational facilities on a large scale was seen as a way of transforming the image of north Lanarkshire and thus improving the attraction of the area to inward investment. The revised cost of the 1971 scheme was £2,637,000, and the local authorities' contribution had risen to £500,000 (20% of the total capital costs).

Following the deliberations of the Technical Working Party, revised Stage 1 proposals were produced by the planning consultants in July 1971. The estimated cost of the revised scheme was £2,784,600 of which £1,308,000 was eligible for up to 85% rehabilitation grant. Approximately 50% of this cost was attributed to the engineering works required to form the new loch and by-pass channel (including the capacity to accommodate the rowing course) (Figure 7). Of the remaining £1,467,000 some of this was eligible for up to 75% countryside grant. The revised Stage 1 therefore essentially comprised the complete clearance of dereliction, the formation of the loch, the raising of the ground subject to frequent flooding, and the provision of a nucleus of sports and recreational facilities linked by roads, car parks and footpaths. The area of the park was to be 650 hectares(1600 acres) and the loch 81 hectares (299 acres). The watersports centre was not originally included in Stage 1 but, following consultations with SARA and SCPR, a combined centre for storage and changing facilities was to be provided, to be grant-aided up to 30% by the new Sports Council.

In November 1971, the Joint Committee of the three local authorities was formally constituted, and it assumed the powers of section 48 of the Countryside Act for the area within the park boundary. Twelve months later, it appointed a Park Director, who was to be its principal advisor, and who would assume overall responsibility for co-ordinating and carrying through park construction and, thereafter, its management and further development. This was followed by the appointment of new landscape consultants in

Fig.7   Construction of Loch and Rowing Course.

1973, who produced a Landscape Master Plan in May 1974. The Master Plan provided the detailed framework for implementation lacking in earlier proposals.

Construction work on Stage 1 began in June 1973 with the reclamation and rehabilitation of the land, major earthworks, the excavation of the loch, and the diversion of the River Clyde. The total cost for the approved part of the project had risen to £4,300,000. Of this, £2,300,000 was provided in grant-aid by the Government, which also permitted the Joint Committee to borrow an additional £1 million to meet the cost of the sports facilities. At that time, it was envisaged that the Stage 1 works would be completed in 1975 and, as far as the local authorities were concerned:

> The Park will continue to grow to meet needs as they
> develop...Eventually it is hoped that the Park will
> grow outwards, especially along the Clyde and Avon
> rivers, with riverside walkways forming a network of
> open spaces throughout Lanarkshire. (The Surveyor, 1973, p.21)

In April 1974, the Joint Committee considered the Stage 2 proposals which it envisaged being constructed over the 1974-1977 period. These included further major recreational facilities including a dry ski slope, an indoor sports centre and swimming pool, a separate sailing centre on the north side of the loch, an athletics track and stadium, an equitation centre, a canoe slalom course, and feasibility studies for the extension of the park northwards and southwards to include Hamilton High Parks, Cadzow Castle, and the Avon Gorge.

The formulation of the Stage 2 proposals was undertaken at a time of change in the economic and political climates. Whilst both the Nature Conservancy Council (NCC) and the Sports Council were becoming critical of too many "man-made" and active recreational facilities being "squeezed into" the park, to the detriment of the park's role as a focus of passive recreation, SDD's earlier, equivocal, view of Stage 1 had hardened into a positive hostility to any further development beyond that which had already been agreed in detail, in view of imminent local government reorganisation, the rising costs of the project in general, and its demands on the countryside budget in particular. SDD considered the first priority to be the implementation and operation of the Stage 1 proposals, and suggested that the Joint Committee leave the consideration of

Stage 2 to the successor Strathclyde Regional Council.

In March 1975, following representations from the Joint
Committee, Strathclyde Regional Council agreed to assume
administrative and financial responsibility for the park on local
government reorganisation. By 1976, the cost of Stage 1 had reached
£10 millions, and the increasing costs of the project, combined with
persistent technical problems such as pollution control, had a
serious impact on the project's public image, and hence its political
support. Financial restrictions began to affect the completion of
Stage 1 as well as the prospects for Stage 2. The most serious
outcome of these restrictions was postponement of the completion of
the centrepiece of the park, the international rowing course:

> In the present economic crisis, Strathclyde Regional
> Council just doesn't have the cash for this kind of
> project.   (McKillop, 1976)

As a result, in 1976 the Regional Council's Leisure and
Recreation Committee had £800,000 of planned expenditure on the
park cancelled. The proposed park administration building and
education centre were deleted, as well as some footpath construction,
one of three planned beaches, road lighting, a sluice gate and
pumphouse, work on the camping sites, and completion of a clean-up
of the South Calder Water. As the "Glasgow Herald" reported at the
time:

> When plans for the centre were drawn up, nobody
> doubted that the loch would provide facilities
> for international rowing. If the Government does
> not come up with the money and this course has to
> be scrapped, the centre could well prove to be too
> elaborate.   (McKillop, 1976)

On 13th September 1976, Strathclyde Park was opened to the
general public, exactly 30 years after its conception in the Clyde
Valley Plan. However, the Government would not approve the £500,000
for the installation of the race timing equipment needed to bring
the rowing course up to international competition standard. Yet some
of the more modest and less politically sensitive facilities continued
to be provided, such as a golf driving range, clubhouse, and catering
facilities.

On 22nd April 1978, Secretary of State for Scotland, Bruce
Millan, officially opened the park, which at the same ceremony was

formally certified a Country Park by the Chairman of the Countryside
Commission for Scotland. To those critics of the cost of the £10
million park, the Secretary of State reminded them that clearing up
the original dereliction would have had a financial cost anyway.
Whilst this had been done, a park had also been established in its
place:

> I look upon this as an investment for the future.
> This is only the first phase. I think future
> generations will be grateful for the foresight of
> those who planned and those who have developed
> this project.   (Motherwell Times, p10)

The Countryside Commission had contributed £3,200,000 in
countryside grant, whilst the Sports Council had provided £300,000.
The Chairman of the Countryside Commission remarked on "the
characteristics of real countryside that have now been created in
the heart of Strathclyde". Councillor Bernard Scott, former Park
Chairman and then Convener of the Regional Council's Leisure and
Recreation Committee, picked up the Secretary of State's optimistic
remarks:

> I see today not as the end of this project, but
> merely the beginning of a new era and approach in
> the field of leisure and recreation. (Motherwell Times, p10)

A survey of park useage in 1977 (Arnott et. al. 1978)
concluded that the majority of park users lived in adjacent urban
areas, whilst use of active sports facilities was primarily made by
higher socio-economic groups, travelling greater distances. The
study team therefore concluded "it is primarily a neighbourhood park
serving the needs of adjacent communities" (p.xxii). The
importance of the park lay not only in its wide variety of
recreational opportunities and its proximity to large concentrations
of population, but also in its catchment area, which includes many
areas suffering from economic decline and possessing large areas
of substandard housing. In this respect, the study team made a
number of recommendations for improving the accessibility and
management of the park which were not taken up. The Regional Council's
concern, faced with the park's burgeoning capital debt and delays in
its construction, was to finish Stage 1 as quickly as possible and
at minimum cost.

In 1978, the revised estimated cost of the project was

£11,015,000. To date, the rowing course has yet to stage
international competition, although the race timing equipment is to
be installed in time for the 1986 Commonwealth Games rowing events.
After 1975, with the aim of an early conclusion to the park
development, the role of the Leisure and Recreation Committee declined,
and responsibility for the park is now vested in the Council's
Buildings and Property Committee, which has no remit for the
development of park policy. The capital debt for the park for the
year 1982-83 was £6,900,000, whilst annual running costs were £2,022,000
(Wilkinson 1983). In 1979, the park recorded 1 million visitors
(compared with 300,000 forecast during planning). The nearest
comparison is Clyde-Muirsheil Regional Park, which attracted 500,000
visitors in the same year. The estimate for 1984 is 3·5 million
visitors.

Strathclyde Park does not figure amongst the Regional Council's
current priorities, and no reference is made to it in the Council's
policies for leisure and recreation. It is unlikely that the items
earmarked in Stage 2 will be constructed, at least in the forseeable
future. The park has not attracted the private capital anticipated
(which may be due in part to its uncertain future), whilst it is
currently the focus of a marketing exercise by the Scottish
Development Agency (Drivers Jonas, 1983). The former Park Chairman,
Bernard Scott, remarked in 1983:

> The park was never built the way it should have
> been built...it doesn't function as it should
> function. Some of the main essential things are
> missing.   (Scott, 1983)

Strathclyde Park was the product of a cooperative effort over
12 years by central and local government to bring about a trans-
formation of the middle Clyde valley and provide much-needed recreational
facilities in a countryside setting. In contrast to other projects
which have foundered due to opposition or conflicts of interest, there
was no "opposition" to the environmental changes which the project
entailed. All the participants in the project, and other interested
parties were agreed on the need for change. Yet the project took 12
years to realise from its "re-launch" in 1964, and even then it is
generally accepted that its original conception has not been fully
realised, and that it does not perform some of the functions for which
it was constructed. The construction of the park cost much more and

was the subject of some bitter conflict between the main participants
over detailed aspects of its development. Figure 8 lists the main
stages in the development of Strathclyde Park, in chronological order,
since the publication of the Clyde Valley Regional Plan.

3. The Context for Action

In order to put the evolution, planning and construction of
Strathclyde Park into context, it is important to consider the
significance of external influences on the project before the
detailed analysis of the park which follows thereafter. These external
influences could be regarded as the opportunities and limitations
presented by Government policies; by the wider relationships between
physical/land-use and economic planning; by general trends in
recreational planning theory and practice; and by local political
influences.

From the outset, the recreational potential of the Hamilton
Low Parks/middle Clyde valley was given a regional context by the
Clyde Valley Plan. SDD resurrected and actively promoted a landscape/
recreation scheme for the area as a direct response to the 1963
White Paper and to the impending construction of the M74 motorway.
The park project was widely promoted at the time as a good example
of the interlinking of physical planning with regional economic and
industrial planning. Local government reorganisation in 1975 and
changing regional priorities had an important bearing on park
implementation. The evolving and changing regional economic and
land-use planning context has been an important factor as the fortunes
of the park project have waxed and waned. Although resurrected by
SDD in 1964 as primarily an exercise in land rehabilitation with
recreation as a secondary, but supporting, consideration, the park
project was born into an era of intense activity in the recreation
planning field. Following the land reclamation phase, the main
focus of the park shifted to a recreation perspective on a regional
scale.

The developments in regional and recreation planning over the
last 35 years, particularly since 1964, have had a significant
influence upon the timing, content and eventual prospect of

Year	Event
1946	Clyde Valley Regional Plan; proposed "regional recreation centre" at Hamilton Low Parks.
1954	MOT proposes A74 Hamilton by-pass.
1955	Nature Conservancy designates SSSI at Hamilton Low Parks.
1958	Secretary of State designates Bird Sanctuary at Hamilton Low Parks.
1964	SDD proposes landscape rehabilitation scheme for Middle Clyde Valley, including proposal for a "Middle Clyde Regional Park". Estimated cost £0.5m. Scheme put to North Lanarkshire Growth Area Committee.
1965	LA's of Lanark County, Motherwell and Wishaw, and Hamilton form joint committee - engineering consultants appointed - feasibility report on man-made loch prepared.
1966	3 LA's meet Minister to discuss loch proposal - scheme publicly launched - estimated cost £1.0m.
1967	Landscape consultants A V Montagu prepare report "Strathclyde Park" with phasing plan, including proposal for 2,000m international rowing course - total estimated cost £2.5m.
1968	3 LA's meet Minister to discuss Park plan - SDD estimates costs of "essential items" at £1.0m - engineering consultants report 10% cost increase due to loch re-design and need to divert River Clyde.
1969	Technical Working Group of SDD/LA officials and consultants established to consider essential elements of Stage 1 and items qualifying for grant aid - estimated cost of Stage 1 £1.14m.
1970	Main Working Party considers report of Technical Working Party.
1971	3 LA's submit amendments to respective Development Plans. Interim Report on main civil engineering works for Stage 1 - rowing course element reappraised, but retained - SARA memorandum. Strathclyde Park Joint Committee (SPJC) formally constituted - assumes powers under s48 of Countryside Act. Scottish Sports Council (SSC) become involved. Estimated cost of Stage 1 £2.784m.
1972	Interim Report on Stage 1 landscaping by Montagu - Park Director appointed - Secretary of State approves amendments to Development Plans - Stage 1 plan approved by SDD.
1973	Landscape Report by Montagu - construction begins - Nature Conservation Advisory Group formed - Wm Gillespie appointed landscape consultants in place of A V Montagu - estimated cost of Stage 1 £4.3m.
1974	Wm Gillespie prepares Landscape Master Plan - SSC makes first grant payment - Stage 2 proposals by Park Director - SDD begins to "blow cold" on Stage 2.
1975	NCC Habitat Survey of Park - consultant structural engineers appointed - Project Coordination Unit set up - Loch Consultative Committee formed to consider pollution aspects - Strathclyde Regional Council take over Park.
1976	Park opened to the public - SRC begins expenditure cut-backs in face of rising costs - £10m - £0.8m lopped off Park programme.
1978	TRRU Monitoring Report - survey of Park useage - Park officially opened by Secretary of State - formally designated a Country Park - estimated cost of Stage 1 £11.015m.
1979	Cost of upgrading rowing course to international standard estimated at £0.55m.
1980	Park Director resigns
1982	Park transferred from SRG L&R Committee to Buildings and Property Committee.
1984	SDA appoints consultants to identify leisure based initiatives for the Motherwell Project area, including proposals for Strathclyde Park. Rowing course completed to international standard.

Fig.8 Strathclyde Park: Chronology of Main Events

Strathclyde Park. It is important to understand these
interrelationships if meaningful conclusions are to be drawn from
the subsequent detailed analysis. Furthermore, by considering the
regional economic and recreation planning dimensions, the external
events which are most likely to have had the most significant impact
on the park's development, and on the perspectives and scope for
manoeuvre of the principal actors, are brought into focus.

CHAPTER III

THE CONTEXT FOR ACTION (1):

THE REGIONAL PLANNING PROCESS 1946-82

.

THE CONTEXT FOR ACTION (1):

THE REGIONAL PLANNING PROCESS 1946-82

1. Introduction

The idea for a major countryside recreation facility which
eventually became Strathclyde Park is rooted in a regional conception
of recreational provision as part of the supporting structure for the
economic development of west central Scotland. The interlinking of
physical and regional economic planning was first articulated in
Scotland in the 1946 Clyde Valley Regional Plan, and remained a
strong feature of Scottish regional planning, at least until the mid
1970's. Ultimately, the link between Strathclyde Park and this
regional planning dimension contributed to undermining the major
aspirations of the park's protagonists.

It is important to set the history of Strathclyde Park within
the evolving post-war regional planning context since;

(a) Abercrombie's original proposal was for a regional centre,
    forming part of a spatial and functional hierarchy of
    recreational provision which was an important component of
    the Clyde Valley Regional Plan. The idea of a regional park
    was revived by SDD planners in the 1960's for primarily
    strategic reasons, and the intentions as subsequently
    expressed in new detailed proposals were certainly regional
    in outlook;

(b) During the 1960's, through to the early 1970's, regional
    economic planning in the UK, but traditionally even more so
    in Scotland, was politically fashionable, and major physical
    renewal and infrastructure provision was considered an
    essential foundation for industrial development and economic
    growth in the depressed regions;

(c) The whole project was seen from the outset as beyond the
    scope of any single local authority. Abercrombie saw the
    provision and management of the regional recreation centres

as functions of a new regional authority; the 1960's
proposals were progressed through to detailed planning and
construction by a partnership of local authorities, assisted
by specially tailored central government financial aid and
advice; from 1975, development and management passed to the
Strathclyde Regional Council, and up to this time at least,
the park was generally regarded as a regional facility.

An appraisal of the regional context provides an important
dimension to understanding the park's origins, the timescale of
planning and development activity, the flow of financial resources,
and the level of political support at various stages. Changes in the
regional context can also be offered as a partial explanation for the
lack of progress during the 18 years following publication of the
Clyde Valley Regional Plan, the intense planning and development
activity between 1964 and 1976, and the curtailment of further
development in recent years.

The remainder of this chapter comprises (i) a brief historical
outline of the evolution and development of regional planning in
Scotland; (ii) a focus on the particular phases of this development
which have had a significant bearing on the Strathclyde Park project;
(iii) some concluding comments on the interrelationships between
regional and local planning processes in this instance.

2. Regional Planning in Scotland : A Historical Outline

The first attempts to deal with the economic imbalance between
the different regions of the UK was the creation of "special areas"
under the Special Areas (Development and Improvement) Act 1934, and
its Amendment in 1937. This legislation, along with the report of
the Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population
(1940), which emphasised the need for the dispersal of industry, set
the pattern for the more comprehensive Distribution of Industry Act
1945, which introduced financial inducements and associated measures
for industrial development in "Development Areas". This was allied
with other measures which emerged from a number of wartime studies,
including the 1946 New Towns Act to aid the dispersal of population
from overcrowded cities; the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act,
which introduced a comprehensive system of land use controls,

including a certification system for industrial developments; and a
number of regional planning studies, including reconstruction plans
for Greater London (1944), and in Scotland studies and plans for the
river valleys of the Clyde (1946), the Forth (1947) and the Tay (1950).
These Scottish regional advisory plans were the product of a Scottish
Office enthusiasm for regional development which had also included
the earlier establishment of both the North of Scotland Hydro Electric
Board, and the Scottish Division of the Forestry Commission in 1943,
and the Scottish Tourist Board in 1949.

The Clyde Valley Plan represented the first practical steps
in positive regional planning in Scotland (McGuiness 1968). However,
this early activity was followed by a period of retrenchment in
regional planning which began in 1951 with the return of a
Conservative government hostile to such intervention. No new
regional plans were prepared in the UK during the subsequent 10 years,
although Carter (1982) suggests that the period was not insignificant
in contributing to a distinctive approach to regional planning in
Scotland, where economic problems were dominated by Clydeside and
thus differed significantly from the rest of the UK. The Scottish
interest in regional planning was maintained with the Cairncross
Report (Scottish Council 1952) on "Local Development in Scotland",
Glasgow's overspill programme requiring the designation of a third
new town at Cumbernauld in 1955, further new town construction, and
the generation of industrial effort (Lyddon 1971). Local Authorities
were preparing development plans under the 1947 Act which the Scottish
Office was guiding towards the objectives of the regional advisory
plans (McGuiness 1968).

Only in the early 1960's did the UK government begin to find
favour both with national and regional economic planning as a
response to (a) recurrent and ever-deepening economic crises during
the 1950's, which highlighted the shortcomings of existing methods
of economic control; (b) more acute economic imbalances with the
onset of recession in 1958; (c) a growing interest in France's
economic success, which was attributed to a sophisticated form of
economic planning; and(d)criticisms of existing regional policy, which
in the case of Scotland, were focussed in the Toothill Report
(Scottish Council 1961).

The Local Employment Act 1960 had replaced Development Areas with more limited "Development Districts" where unemployment was acute or expected to become so. This approach was much criticised for dispersing industry over wide and often remote areas lacking in any economic advantages. The Toothill Report advocated the need for positive industrial redistribution away from the magnetic pull of the Midlands and the South-East of England, and argued for specific grants for factory building, investment in infrastructure, a balanced national policy, and a strengthening of economic planning measures in the Scottish Office. These recommendations were largely taken up in the 1963 White Paper for Central Scotland (and in a similar paper for the North-East of England) which identified growth zones within Development Areas where especially advantageous growth prospects were defined. Public expenditure focussed on improving communications, urban renewal, and improved public services in these zones, on the grounds that building upon their growth prospects would make for a much more effective industrial location policy, with the zones developing eventually into industrial complexes capable of self-generating growth. (Figure 9)

The 1963 White Papers expressed the priority attached by Government to the less prosperous areas, and acknowledged the radically changed circumstances since publication of the regional advisory plans in the 1940's. They were intended as regional economic plans which translated their programmes into spatial terms. The Central Scotland White Paper was prepared by the Scottish Development Department, which was formed in 1962 out of the planning division of the Department of Health with the express purpose of bringing together under one administrative umbrella all the physical planning and infrastructural services of Government which required coordination if economic planning objectives were to be achieved. Of the Central Scotland White Paper, according to Carter (1982), "it truly did represent a coming together of economic and physical planning at the regional scale" (p22). This view is supported by McGuiness (1968) who states that the objective of this period was to marry the techniques and processes of physical planning to the economic policies of Government in order to stimulate new economic growth and exploit resource potential. A feature of this period was a deliberate policy in the Scottish Office to establish closer links between the central administration and the planning and economic expertise and advice

Fig.9   The 1963 White Paper : Main Planning Proposals

available in the Scottish Universities (Lyddon 1971) of which early
evidence was indicated in the commissioning of the Lothians Regional
Survey and Plan in 1962. Full regional planning machinery in
Scotland was established in 1965, with the definition of eight sub-
regions, and following the formation of the Scottish Development
Group of civil servants in 1963 to implement the White Paper.

The 1963 White Papers opened a period of intense Government
activity in regional economic planning throughout the UK. The early
1960's were also notable for the establishment of the Location of
Offices Bureau, the Beeching Report on the rail network, the
decentralisation of the Midlands car industry, including new car
assembly plants at Linwood in Renfrewshire and Bathgate in West
Lothian, the location of an aluminium smelter at Invergordon on the
Cromarty Firth, a green-field steelworks development at Ravenscraig
in Lanarkshire, and the formation of the (short-lived) Department
of Economic Affairs by the incoming Labour government.

The 1955 to 1964 period had been characterised by an unexpected
and continuous rise in the national birth rate. Official national
projections of future population were continually revised upwards:
in 1960, a total UK population of 64 millions was forecast by the end
of the century. In 1965, this was revised to 75 millions (Hall 1974).
By the mid-60's, the UK population level was rising by 500,000 per
annum and was expected to accelerate. From 1965, however, the
Scottish population level began to fall for the first time, primarily
due to emigration, leading to substantial falls in the projected
working population in the late 1970's and 1980's. A major objective
of the 1966 White Paper, which set out the Labour government's plans
for the expansion of the Scottish economy up to 1970, within the
framework of the 1965 National Plan, was to reduce emigration by
creating a fast flow of new jobs. It proposed new special incentives
in the Development Areas for industrial investment; the maintenance
of the high level of public investment embarked upon in 1963; a 50%
cut in emigration to 20,000 per annum; a programme of advance factory
building; grant-aid; industrial redistribution; and improvements to
the physical environment, including measures to achieve faster rates
of slum clearance and derelict land reclamation.

An accelerated programme of infrastructure provision and road

building was proposed, including the Clyde Tunnel approach roads, the Glasgow inner ring road, the Tay and Erskine bridges, rail electrification and port modernisation, the development of Abbotsinch Airport, and 200 miles of motorway standard roads. A 43% increase in the output of the construction industry was envisaged, with nearly £2,000 millions of public investment to 1969-70. The population of Scotland was expected to increase by 100,000 by 1970, 500,000 by 1980, and 2 millions by the end of the century (Nicoll 1969). This strategy was assisted by the definition of wider Development Areas in the 1966 Industrial Development Act.

The 1963 White Papers were not a rational allocation of investment resources, since the rival claims of different regions were not considered. They were more a response to particular regional pressures bearing on the Government at that time (McCallum 1976). This probably contributed to the Labour government's entirely new machinery for regional planning, in support of the new policy initiatives. This included the setting up of Regional Economic Councils and Boards for each of the UK planning regions, which in Scotland replaced the Scottish Development Group.

The general theme of this period was growth. The UK population was forecast to increase by 20 millions by the end of the century, the car industry was expanding rapidly, oil was cheap, and the natural birth rate was high. The particular problem for regional planning in Scotland during the 1960's was not unemployment but emigration (Nicoll 1966), which was then running at 40,000 persons per annum (almost equivalent to the birth rate) with Clydeside being the major source. The principal aim of the 1966 White Paper was therefore;

> To speed up the evolution of a modern industrial
> structure in Scotland, providing more jobs and
> stemming the outward flow of young Scots to the
> south.   (p.vii)

The reasons for such high levels of emigration were considered to be poor employment opportunities and poor environment. The latter was also regarded as a factor which required resolution if central Scotland was to compete successfully for mobile industry with more attractive locations in the south of England. The White Paper represented the first attempt to provide comprehensive socio-economic guidelines for subsequently more detailed regional and local planning

and, according to Grieve (1973) was "probably the most important of all the productions of the Scottish planning process" (p.413).

In the wake of the White Papers, the late 1960's and early 1970's were notable for a focus on sub-regional planning studies which integrated social, economic and physical aspects. These included studies and plans for the Lothians (1966), the Falkirk-Grangemouth area (1968), the Central Borders (1968), and the Moray Firth (1968). Indeed, by 1970, seven of the eight planning sub-regions set up by the Scottish Office in 1967 had been the subject of a sub-regional plan, whilst work on the West Central Scotland Plan began in 1970.

The early 1970's witnessed changing political, social and economic circumstances. Following the report of the Royal Commission on the Reform of Local Government in Scotland, (1969), the 1973 Local Government (Scotland) Act introduced a two-tier local government system broadly based on city regions, and the 1972 Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act introduced structure and local plans following the report of the Planning Advisory Group (1965). The late 1960's and early 1970's also saw the establishment of new government planning agencies with an implementation focus at the national scale: the Countryside Commission for Scotland (1967); the reconstituted Scottish Tourist Board (1969); and the Scottish Sports Council (1972). The Highlands and Islands Development Board had been set up in 1965 as a response to the particular economic problems of that area, following the previous focus on industrialised central Scotland.

In contrast to the future prospects as envisaged in the 1963 and 1966 White Papers, there was a slow rate of growth in the national economy after 1965, which slowed even more after 1970 into real decline in 1974-75, partly as a result of international recession which, after 1973 became the most serious since the 1940's. Yet the period 1965 to 1975 was a time of economic optimism in Scotland. There were significant falls in unemployment relative to the UK as a whole, and in emigration, and above-average growth in GDP (Cuthbert 1982). During the 1960's, Scotland steadily improved its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) relative to the UK, and in 1976 it had reached 98% of the UK level (compared with 88% in 1965). Scotland's share of total UK investment peaked during the period 1971-75, whilst 1971-76 saw a 140% increase in the total personal disposable income

of Scots (compared with 134% for the UK) (SDD 1978). Over the period 1971-77, the total Scottish population fell marginally to just below 5·2 millions, almost wholly due to a 100,000 decline in Strathclyde.

The policy after the White Papers largely served to create a physical environment (transport, housing and other infrastructure) to accommodate the additional population, jobs and investment anticipated. The mileage of motorway standard and trunk roads increased from 83 miles in 1963 to 265 miles in 1973; the north and west flanks of the Glasgow inner ring road were completed, as also the Clyde Tunnel approaches and major bridges over the Tay and over the Clyde at Erskine. The 1966 Industrial Development Act increased Government grant-aid for land rehabilitation, and physical planning and land renewal projects such as Strathclyde Park were major components of this programme.

From the mid-1970's, there was a discernible change in this broad inter-regional policy towards an intra-regional and urban focus, in response to changing demographic, employment and economic circumstances. There was no growth in Scottish industrial production after 1975 (Cuthbert 1982). Scottish manufacturing employment fell by 10% between 1977 and 1980 (compared with 7% for the UK) whilst unemployment increased by 9% above the UK average between 1979 and 1980. The Scottish population peaked at 5·2 millions in 1974, and by the end of the 1970's it was expected to fall by 7% by 1991, Clydeside's by 13%, and Glasgow's by almost 33% (Firn 1976), with a continuing downward trend to the end of the century. New town development programmes began to be cut back with the slowdown in dispersal of population from Glasgow and the severe curtailment of the city's massive redevelopment plans. More emphasis began to be placed on rehabilitation and urban initiatives such as the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal project, which was launched almost coincidentally with the abandonment in 1976 of Scotland's sixth new town at Stonehouse in Lanarkshire.

The Regional Employment Premium, which was introduced in 1967 and provided 39% of Government expenditure on regional assistance to industry in Scotland in 1974-75, was abolished in 1976. There was also a reduction in the coverage and intensity of regional industrial and office development controls, and a slowdown in the Government's

jobs dispersal programme. According to Ashcroft (1982) 1979 was
"a watershed year" in British inter-regional policy, with a two-
thirds cut in Scotland's share of dispersed Government office jobs,
inter-regional industrial location controls effectively abandoned,
and a phased reduction in the size of the Assisted Areas over the
following three years from 43% to 25% of the UK working population.
Regional Development Grant, introduced in the 1972 Industry Act, and
providing 42% of regional assistance in Scotland during 1974-75, was
reduced from 20% to 15% in 1980. At the same time, there was an
expansion in urban policy initiatives which had uncoordinated
beginnings in the late 1960's and early 1970's, but which gained
momentum after the 1977 White Paper "Policy for the Inner Cities"
and the Inner Urban Areas Act.

The Scottish Development Agency became the focus of industrial
and economic planning initiatives after 1975, whilst the link between
physical and economic planning, which had been characteristic of
Scottish post-war regional planning, was effectively severed in 1973
with the formation of a new Scottish Economic Planning Department,
which became responsible for industrial policy, independent of SDD.

Scottish local government was reorganised in 1975, and the
nature of and economic climate for local government activity was from
the outset radically different from the immediately preceding period.
The West Central Scotland Plan 1974 was a very different type of
regional study from the Clyde Valley Plan. Its economic and strategic
planning analysis provided much of the foundation for the abandonment
of Stonehouse new town and for much of the subsequent strategic
planning of the Strathclyde Regional Council.

Since 1975-76, there has been a falling trend in Scottish local
government expenditure (Heald 1982). The introduction in 1976-77
of the block grant system of financial allocations by the Scottish
Office coincided with sharp reductions in local authority capital
expenditure programmes, and the Government proportion of local
authority financial resources has fallen steadily since 1975-76.
Criticisms of the structure and functioning of the two-tier local
government system led to recommendations by the Stodart Committee
of Inquiry into Local Government in Scotland (1981) for the
transfer of some regional powers to the District Councils which was

enacted in the Local Government and Planning (Scotland) Act 1982. These particularly affected leisure and recreation functions, whilst there has been a mounting campaign by the four city Districts for a return to their unitary status.

Since the 1940's, the need for regional policies has varied with the state of the national economy. The policy mix and the' extent of enforcement have shifted according to the economic, social and political objectives of successive governments (House 1982). However, throughout the 1960's and 1970's there was a general political consensus on the continuing importance of full employment, industrial location policy, regional aid, extension of the social services, population redistribution, improvement of the national infrastructure (especially housing and communications) and the total living environment, and local government reform. Over this period, regional economic-physical planning has been a central feature of industrial planning in Scotland.

In the 1960's particularly, the regional problem was seen as a problem of economic growth (McCrone 1969). Attention was directed to ways of promoting regional expansion and to the contributions the regions might make to the achievement of a higher national rate of growth. To this end, the 1963 and 1966 White Papers were concerned with creating an environment (physical, economic and social) conducive to growth. Increasing priority was given to regional policy during this period, and to the role of new towns, urban renewal and infrastructure provision as means to the achievement of this end.

Changing economic conditions in the 1970's, and growing emphasis on the problems of inner cities, together with a philosophy of rehabilitation rather than wholesale redevelopment, led to a focus on tackling the structural problems of older urban concentrations in situ, as opposed to population and industrial dispersal. Reduced financial resources, economic and population decline have served to lower the horizons of expectation about influencing regional change, and have correspondingly witnessed a reduction in the status of regional scale approaches, and thereby ambitious, large-scale capital projects purporting to serve a regional purpose. House (1982) suggests that the adverse economic climate of the 1980's has rendered much of the regional planning initiatives of the 1960's "little

more than relics of a vanished age of growth optimism" (p.52).

According to the "Scotsman" (1983) it is the "spectacular
failures" that have helped to give regional policy "a bad name", the
most vivid Scottish examples being the closure of the Linwood car
assembly plant in 1981, with the loss of 4,800 jobs, at a cost of
£173 millions; the aluminium smelter at Invergordon, which closed in
the same year with a loss of 900 jobs, at a cost of £170 millions.
The future of other regional development initiatives of the 1960's,
such as the Ravenscraig steelworks, remains finely balanced.

Unemployment in Scotland in September 1983 stood at 14·5% of the
workforce, and in contrast to policies of the earlier periods, current
regional economic planning in the depressed regions is led by the
Scottish Development Agency and the strategies of the Regional
Councils. The primary focus is now on safeguarding existing jobs and
industries and competing, together with District Councils, new towns,
Enterprise Zones and Inner City Partnerships for the limited mobile
industry available.

3. The Regional Influence

The significant stages in the evolution and implementation of
the Strathclyde Park project coincide with periods of ascendancy in
regional planning ideas and mechanisms. These periods can be
identified as, firstly, the late 1940's, commencing with the
publication of the Clyde Valley Plan; secondly, the early 1960's
through to the mid-1970's, starting with the 1963 White Paper on
central Scotland; through to local government reorganisation in 1975
and the opening of the park to the public one year later.

The Clyde Valley Plan

As early as the war years, Abercrombie was quick to see the
importance of integrating regional economic planning with physical
planning, not only as a means of rebuilding war-damaged areas, but
also in tackling industrial obsolescence, population overcrowding,
and physical decay on Clydeside. No less important to the achievement
of economic aims was the physical renewal of places such as North
Lanarkshire, with all the characteristics of neglect, depression and
"sheer muddled untidiness" (Abercrombie & Matthew, 1949, p.8) which
combined to reduce the competitive potential of the area for new

industries and jobs with parts of the country where amenity was much higher. The Clyde Valley Plan (Abercrombie & Matthew, 1949) called for the urgent treatment of this whole area:

> Especially in the case of North Lanark, the
> re-creation of amenity will be an essential
> factor for industrial recovery.   (p.9)

In North Lanarkshire alone, the Plan saw the need to re-house one-third of the population, excluding further housing to relieve high densities in some central areas. As part of these proposals, one of four "regional recreation centres" was proposed at Hamilton Low Parks in view of its "strategic" location, as well as the opportunity to undertake major rehabilitation of derelict and despoiled land. Thus, in 1946, the link was established between land reclamation and environmental improvement, allied to strategic industrial and economic policies for the region, which have provided the backdrop to the Strathclyde Park project. The regional recreation centres were part of a hierarchy of recreational provision intended to provide more space for games of a regional character, and in order to compensate for the low standard of open space in the Clyde Valley in general, and in industrial Lanarkshire in particular.

Like many other recreational aspects of the Clyde Valley Plan, no action was taken on this proposal for a period of time which coincided with a hiatus in regional policy initiatives, in particular the failure to maintain the momentum established by the Plan and other initiatives of the 1940's. The main priority for local authorities in the immediate post-war period was to tackle the problems of unfit housing, overcrowding, and traffic congestion in central areas. The regional recreation areas were dependent for their development and management on the setting up of the regional authority recommended in the Plan. Recreation planning at local level generally only began to blossom after the introduction of the Countryside Act in 1967, and Government aid to undertake derelict land reclamation, which only became sufficiently attractive with the additional resources provided in the 1966 Industrial Development Act. Of regional planning up until this time Grieve (1973) has suggested that "psychologically, and in terms of statutory planning powers, the times were not yet ripe" (p.411).

The 1960's and the White Papers

Regional economic planning was rediscovered in the 1960's, largely in response to a deterioration in regional imbalances during the preceding decade. The 1963 White Paper on central Scotland (Cmnd.2188) proposed a major programme of infrastructural development, based on growth centres, to provide the foundation for new investment and economic development. Stress was laid on making industrial Scotland attractive to new industry by schemes designed to eliminate the impression of decay and dereliction:

> It is also vital more rapidly to create a Scottish
> environment which, both from the point of view of
> industrial firms and in terms of its attraction as
> a place to live in, makes Scotland and the more
> prosperous areas in the South more equally matched. (p.15)

To assist in the achievement of this objective, grants for the rehabilitation of derelict land were increased, whilst town centre renewal schemes were envisaged to create a more favourable economic environment. The raising of standards of amenity and environment were considered essential if Scotland was to attract and hold a population with increasingly varied skills, rising earning capacities and a widening variety of personal tastes, as well as to present a favourable image to the potential industrialist. It was recognised in particular that the older urban centres identified as growth areas, such as north Lanarkshire, were dependent upon substantial investment in the clearance of derelict land and general rehabilitation. To this end, £2 millions were allocated by the Government in 1964-65.

Whilst the task of phasing and coordinating the implementation of the outline programme set out in the White Paper was given to the Scottish Development Group, local Growth Area Committees were established, including representatives from local and central government, to consider the implications of the White Paper for each Growth Area. SDD took the initiative to resurrect the idea of a recreation centre in the Hamilton Low Parks as an opportunity to bring about large-scale landscape improvement in an area of despoilation through which the construction of the M74 motorway from the south was due to pass, on the basis that;

(i) the image of the area, through which visitors, including
   potential developers and industrialists, would pass would
   have a significant bearing on future private investment in
   west central Scotland, and

(ii) there was assumed to be a direct relationship between the
general condition and amenity of a locality, and the
probability of firms moving into it.

SDD took the initiative on the basis of these factors (Lyall
1964), and the local authorities became initially involved through
the Growth Area Committee. Whilst the White Paper provided the
favourable conditions, it was the construction of the M74 motorway
through the Low Parks that presented the opportunity to examine the
whole condition, use and future of the area, and which introduced the
national/regional perspective to the park idea. Specifically, Hamilton
Low Parks were seen as the "blighted hub" of the North Lanarkshire
Growth Area, and:

> The impression of dereliction created in all but
> the most insensitive will do nothing to help the
> Scottish industrial image.   (Lyall, 1964, p2)

The first Ministerial meetings on the park project commenced
in 1966, and the White Paper of that year on the Scottish economy
(Cmnd.2864) provided a further fillip to the embryo park proposals.
The White Paper sought to accelerate the programme of infrastructure
investment to stimulate economic growth as embarked upon in 1963.
Again, great emphasis was placed on the need to clear dereliction and
rehabilitate unsightly and run-down areas, especially at the approaches
to towns and on important routes. Examples in addition to the
"Middle Clyde Regional Park", as it was then labelled, included the
Glasgow inner ring road, the infilling of the disused Monkland and
Forth and Clyde canals, and the rehabilitation of the shale mining
areas of West Lothian as part of the Livingston proposals.

Physical planning and infrastructure were seen as the essential
backbone of future economic prosperity, with environmental
improvements an integral component of this programme during an era
dominated by population and emigration issues, in particular high
levels of emigration from west central Scotland. A basic cause of
emigration was considered to be the generally poor environment of
Clydeside:

> The speed at which new industry can be attracted,
> and the readiness of firms to establish head-
> quarters as well as production units in Scotland
> will depend considerably on the energy and
> imagination with which general amenity can be
> improved.   (Cmnd. 2864, p.42)

The regional significance of the ideas for a major land
rehabilitation and recreational development scheme in the middle
Clyde area was explicitly referred to in the White Paper as:

> One of the most imaginative pointers to ways in
> which new development and rehabilitation can be
> combined...The proposals would not only create
> a valuable recreational asset for nearby urban
> communities but also provide on M74 a landscaped
> entrance to the heart of the country from the
> South which could do much to repair the
> tarnished image of industrial Scotland.   (p.42)

The park proposals represented the biggest planned scheme of
land rehabilitation in Scotland at this time (McGuiness 1968) and was
regarded by the Scottish Office as a big and important pioneering
project which was hoped to stimulate, by example, other authorities
to consider land rehabilitation and recreational provision on a
large scale:

> The importance of this project for the region
> itself and for Scotland as a whole is such that
> expenditure on it ought to be given as early a
> place as possible in the programmes for
> rehabilitation and country parks.   (Butler, 1969)

Strathclyde Park was thus launched on a tidal wave of enthusiasm
for large-scale physical renewal in support of economic development,
stoked by the climate of growth optimism then prevailing. SDD played
the role of catalyst in re-launching the park idea, backed by the
increased financial resources provided for land reclamation and
recreational developments in the 1966 Industrial Development Act and
the 1967 Countryside (Scotland) Act respectively.

The Post-1975 Period

The commencement of park construction in 1973 coincided with
the onset of recession and a period of rapid inflation, growth in
unemployment, and economic crisis. The escalating costs of the
project over this period, combined with a changing perspective on
regional issues, exemplified at the regional scale by the 1974 West
Central Scotland Plan and by the early priorities and policies of
the Strathclyde Regional Council after 1975, served to severely
diminish the status of the scheme.

Whilst park development and administration became tasks for the
Regional Council, leisure and recreation was a low priority policy

area compared with the economic, industrial and environmental
problems of the older urban centres, and other issues such as
deprivation. From 1976, the capital spending programme for the park
was substantialy pruned, and the recommendations of the Stodart
Committee (1981) and subsequent legislation have since rendered the
development future of the park uncertain. The high status scheme of
the 1960's and early 1970's has subsequently been perceived by its
administrators as a financial burden much more than a regional asset.

4. Conclusion

Although conceived in the 1940's, Strathclyde Park was
essentially a product of the growth conditions of the 1960's,
particularly of Scottish Office initiative in regional planning in
the west of Scotland. The local authorities played a relatively minor
role in this process until around 1965, when, at SDD's prompting, they
joined forces to commission feasibility studies, and thereafter
to progress the project to implementation.

Such a large project was beyond the financial resources of
even three local authorities acting together, and the relaunch of the
park idea in the mid-1960's coincided with the substantial increase
in Government financial aid for the reclamation of derelict land,
followed by the introduction of a new grant for the provision of
recreational facilities in the countryside. The whole park project
was conceived, relaunched and progressed in a regional planning
context, directed by Government. Only in this way could justification
be marshalled for the substantial public resources required. The
rationale for Government action was essentially grounded in the
economic development policies of the 1960's, and it is significant
that the political fortunes of the park began to wane after 1975-76
when the emphasis of regional policy started to tilt towards tackling
the problems of city regions at their source, ie within the older
urban centres, whilst the comprehensive system of regional controls
on industrial investment began to be dismantled.

It is unlikely that the park in its present form would have
emerged purely from local initiative. The area straddled the
administrative responsibilities of three local authorities, whose

primary interests in the area up until the SDD initiative were in its
value as a location for waste disposal and sewage treatment. The
problems of dereliction and subsidence were of such a magnitude that
they required intervention from an outside source, and the injection
of substantial financial aid, for their resolution. At the same time
a stimulus to action was required, and this was provided by (i) the
strategic location of the area in relation to a major transport (and
investment) route, and (ii) a favourable economic and political
environment which encouraged action to be viewed in regional terms.

The year 1975 could almost be taken as the fulcrum in a
transition from the planning context of the decade preceding to the
decade following. The general economic and demographic context had an
important bearing on the timing and implementation of the park proposals.
In general terms, the scope for local initiative on an ambitious
scale is so circumscribed by general economic and political conditions
that successful implementation is often dependent upon favourable
conditions in this wider environment and a policy or project
sustaining as an "idea in good currency" (Schon 1971) in order to
attract the required level of political and financial support. Figure
10 identifies, in chronological order, the main events in the
evolution of regional planning in Scotland since the 1920's.

1927	Clyde Valley Regional Planning Committee.
1934	Special Areas Act
1937	Special Areas (Amendment) Act.
1939	Basis of present system of Scottish Office administration established.
1940	Barlow Report (Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population).
1942	Scottish Council for Industry.
1943	North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board established.
	Clyde Valley Regional Planning Committee reconstituted.
1945	Distribution of Industry Act.
	Election of Labour Government.
1946	New Towns Act.
	Clyde Valley Regional Plan.
1947	Town and Country Planning Act.
	Designation of East Kilbride New Town.
	South East Scotland Plan.
1950	Designation of Glenrothes New Town.
	Tay Valley Plan.
1951	Election of Conservative Government.
1952	Cairncross Report "Local Development in Scotland".
1957	Town Development (Scotland) Act.
1959	First Glasgow overspill agreements.
1960	Local Employment Act.
	Rootes and BMC establish car assembly plants in Scotland.
1961	Toothill Report.
1962	Designation of Livingston New Town.
	Reorganisation of Scottish Office – establishment of Scottish Development Department.
	Lothians Regional Survey and Plan commenced.
1963	Local Employment Act.
	White Papers on Central Scotland and North-East England.
	Formation of Scottish Development Group.
	Falkirk/Grangemouth study commissioned.
	Location of Offices Bureau.
	Election of Labour Government.
	Department of Economic Affairs.
	UK Economic Planning Regions.
1964	Scottish Economic Planning Board.
1965	Scottish Economic Planning Council.
	National Plan.
	Planning Advisory Group report.
	Establishment of Highlands and Islands Development Board.
1966	White Paper "The Scottish Economy 1965-1970".
	Industrial Development Act.
1967	Special Development Areas.
	Regional Employment Premium introduced.
	8 Scottish Economic Planning Regions.
1968	Sub-regional plans published for Lothians, Falkirk/Grangemouth, Central Borders, and Moray Firth.
	Countryside Commission for Scotland.
1969	Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act.
	Sub-regional plan published for North-East Scotland.
	Wheatley Report on reform of local government in Scotland.
	Scottish Tourist Board reconstituted.
	Conservative Government elected.

1970	Local Employment Act.
1972	White Paper "Industrial and Regional [...] Industry Act.
	National Enterprise Board.
	Regional Development Grant introduced
	Designation of Stonehouse New Town.
	White Paper on reform of local govern[...]
	Report of Select Committee on Scottis[...] Resource Use in Scotland".
1973	Local Government (Scotland) Act.
	Establishment of Scottish Economic Pl[...]
1974	Labour Government elected (SNP gains).
	West Central Scotland Plan published.
1975	Scottish Development Agency establishe[...]
	Circular 4/75 on Regional Reports.
	New Scottish local government system c[...]
	Industrial Strategy launched.
1976	Regional Employment Premium abolished.
	Regional Reports submitted.
	Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal project 1[...]
	Stonehouse New Town de-designated.
1977	Reduction in Assisted Areas.
	Reduced industrial and office floorspa[...]
	Cut-back in dispersal of Government of[...]
1979	Conservative Government elected.
	Commencement of phased reduction in re[...]
	Further cuts in dispersal of Governmen[...]
	Further reductions in Assisted Areas.
	Strathclyde Structure Plan submitted.
1980	Regional Development Grant reduced.
	Clydebank Enterprise Zone designated.
1981	Stodart Report.
	Closure of Linwood car assembly plant [...] smelter.
	New Towns Policy Statement.
1982	Industrial Development Certificate con[...]
	Local Government and Planning (Scotlan[...]
	Enterprise Zones designated at Invergo[...]
1984	SEPD becomes Industry Department for S[...]

Fig. 10   The Evolving Regional Planning Context

CHAPTER IV

THE CONTEXT FOR ACTION (2):

PLANNING FOR RECREATION AND LEISURE SINCE 1945

THE CONTEXT FOR ACTION (2):

PLANNING FOR RECREATION AND LEISURE SINCE 1945

1. Introduction

Although proposals for a major recreation facility in the middle
Clyde valley were first set down in the 1946 Clyde Valley Regional
Plan, no further action was taken until the idea was resurrected in
1964 by SDD with the outline scheme for land rehabilitation and
recreational development. With initial Government prompting and the
prospect of significant grant-aid, the local authorities affected
combined to commission and then implement a plan for a regional park.
These proposals were based on quite different concepts and assumptions
from those in the Abercrombie plan.

The reasons for the 18 years of inactivity since 1946, and for
the changing nature of the project, can to some extent be explained by
considering the evolution and realisation of the park idea in the
context of the parallel evolution of ideas and practice in planning
for recreation and leisure which emerged in the UK in the years after
1945. Such ideas reached the height of their currency during the
years from the mid-1960's to the mid-1970's, until the onset of
recession and the emergence of radically different ideas about the
nature of leisure and the distribution of leisure opportunities. A
consideration of the changing state of knowledge, attitudes and
practices in public provision for leisure and recreation over this
period also provides an insight into some of the external factors
influencing the preparation and execution of the Strathclyde Park
proposals.

The evolution of public policy-making for leisure and recreation
can be divided into four distinct historical phases;
    (a) the period up to the early 1940's;
    (b) the post-war years, up to the early 1960's;
    (c) the mid-1960's to the mid-1970's;
    (d) the period since the mid-1970's.

These phases can be distinguished by distinctly different
concepts and ideas about planning for leisure. The threshold of change
from one phase to another is marked by a burst of Government policy
activity, and by changing perceptions of social and economic trends.
This chapter therefore seeks to put Strathclyde Park into the context
of developments in recreation planning ideas and practice by
considering;

    1. the evolution of planning for recreation in the countryside;

    2. the development of leisure research; and

    3. the evolution of the Country Park concept in Scotland.

2. Developments up to the Early 1940's

The development of planning policy in relation to the spatial
aspects of leisure and recreation essentially originates from the
mid-20th century, although it is helpful to consider earlier history
in order to appreciate the timing of Strathclyde Park.

Prior to the 1940's, planning as an activity of local government
was generally limited to urban areas, reflecting the modest land-use
planning powers and initiatives prior to 1947. Public provision of
open space and parks in towns and cities in the 19th century was
essentially a response to a general concern about public health in
overcrowded and congested urban areas, assisted by some Victorian
philanthropy. Ashworth (1965) points to the Report of the Select
Committee on Public Walks (1333), and the campaigning of Octavia Hill,
the Society for the Preservation of Commons, and the Public Health
Acts of the latter half of the 19th century. During this period, the
main focus of public leisure provision was in formal urban parks,
open spaces and playgrounds, whilst attending theatres and music halls
was a major form of mass entertainment. In the latter half of the
19th century, railway expansion, shorter working hours and free
saturdays made the seaside and country areas more accessible to many
town dwellers. The trip "doon the watter" to the Clyde coastal resorts
became a feature of the annual Glasgow Fair holiday. Such provision for
these new leisure opportunities was fluctuating in response to demand,
and public provision only emerged incrementally during the first half
of the 20th century.

During the 1920's and 1930's, unfettered urban expansion began
to be seen as prejudicing countryside amenity, which developed into a
major concern, culminating in the appointment in 1929 of the Addison
Committee to examine the relevance of national parks, already well
established in North America, to the UK context. The early regional
planning schemes of the 1920's had drawn attention to the need to
preserve good landscape (Cherry 1975), whilst the 1930's saw the
emergence of urgent questions concerning the need to reserve country-
side areas for amenity and recreation, related to the introduction of
"green belts" to contain urban expansion, and the need to plan for
the provision of countryside facilities in response to new demands
from urban areas. Whilst car ownership was rising, the most popular
countryside pursuits were rambling, hiking and cycling (the Scottish
Youth Hostels Association was formed in 1931, and by 1940 it had
46,000 members). The National Trust for Scotland was formed in the
same year, and the first national forest park opened in Argyll in
1936. However, such provision was ill-coordinated, and whilst
Cullingworth (1974) points to a "policy vacuum" in recreation planning
until the 1940's, Veal (1975) remarks of this period:

> As with planning generally, local authorities were
> enabled to do certain things in the area of
> recreation, but were not required to do anything. (p.4)

The Addison Committee reported in 1931 with recommendations for
the introduction of National Parks, whilst in urban areas the 1937
Physical Training and Recreation Act signalled the move away from
Victorian ideas about public walks and pleasure grounds to a focus on
major facilities such as playing fields, gymnasiums, swimming baths
and camping sites (Roddis 1970). It was in 1925 that the first
national standards for open space provision in towns were formulated
by the National Playing Fields Association.

Whilst evidence to the Barlow Commission (1940) pointed to the
importance of open space and recreation for the health of the
community, and to its scarcity as an example of the disadvantages of
living in large urban centres, it was the Scott Committee (1942) which
pointed to the need for comprehensive planning for the countryside as
well as towns. The 1940's mood of post-war reconstruction produced
much governmental activity, with recreation and national parks again
resuming significance with the Dower Report (Ministry of Town and
Country Planning 1945). In Scotland, a Scottish Council on National

Parks was appointed in 1942, and in 1944 the Scottish National Parks Survey Committee was formed to advise on the identification of suitable sites. In 1942, Abercrombie produced his Greater London Plan, in which his comprehensive, hierarchical approach to provision for leisure and recreation was further advocated in the Clyde Valley proposals four years later. The tide had turned in favour of positive public planning for recreation and leisure, primarily in response to a perceived threat to high quality landscapes of national significance as articulated by a well-organised amenity lobby (Cherry 1975). At the same time, leisure and recreation began to emerge as an important component of development plans for large conurbations.

3. The Late-1940's to the Mid-1960's

The late 1940's saw the laying of the foundations for a centralised, comprehensive land-use and environmental planning system with the passing of the Distribution of Industry Act in 1945, the New Towns Act in 1946, the Town and Country Planning Act in 1947, and the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act in 1949. In relation to leisure and recreation, government was confronted with a new set of problems concerned with useage of the countryside, as a result of rising car ownership, affluence, and more leisure time (the 1938 Holidays With Pay Act increased from 4 millions to 14 millions over the following decade the numbers of UK insured workers entitled to annual paid holidays). The need for more open space in cities and the preservation of open space in the countryside for agriculture and recreation were fundamental considerations in new planning approaches.

Although legislation and developments in planning procedures during the early post-war period did much to increase the abilities and powers of local authorities to plan, their abilities and powers to provide facilities were less fully developed, partly due to a general shortage of resources, and partly due to the low priority given to recreation compared with other concerns such as housing, education and transport. Whilst National Parks were not introduced in Scotland, and much of the Scott Committee's recommendations did not apply, the early post-war period in Scottish recreation planning was characterised by little activity by local authorities, although the Forestry Commission began to develop its interest in forest parks,

and the Nature Conservancy, established under the 1949 Act, began to
articulate the ecological interest. The post-1949 Act era is
characterised by a gradual movement towards comprehensive policies
for leisure and recreation, in both urban and rural locations.

In the early post-war years, annual paid holidays were extended
to nearly all workers, there was growth in holidays away from home
and in spectator sports, and a rise in cinema attendances up to the
mid-1950's, before the advent of TV in the home. From the mid-1950's
to the mid-1960's there was a significant rise in active recreation,
with rapid growth rates in sailing, golf, climbing, pony-trekking,
caravanning and camping, and motoring for pleasure. These were the
product of several influences, including paid holidays, reduced
working hours, and rises in real incomes. Burton and Wibberley (1965)
contend that the single most important factor was the rise in car
ownership, bringing increased mobility and greater flexibility in
the use of leisure time.

Many of these developments were seen as mirroring earlier
changes in the United States. Cranz (1982) points to the early 1900's
as the period when "leisure time" emerged in the US, for the same
reasons as outlined by Burton and Wibberley. Demand led to the sudden
creation of facilities such as urban parks, whilst the 1930's to the
1960's saw the characterisation of the urban mass population in the
US as the "leisure class" whose members had achieved their economic
goals, and who were now focussing on leisure pursuits as a means of
life-enhancement.

The early 1960's in the UK saw an enlarged awareness and new
scale of thinking on provision for recreation and leisure, relating
to a developing set of academic and other enquiries in the UK and
especially in North America, particularly the 1962 study by the
Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission (ORRRC), which analysed
US demands in great detail. This new government interest was in part
stimulated by the 1963 "Countryside in 1970" conference, which
articulated the implications of the general pressures on countryside
and other recreation resources arising from a rapidly growing urban
population with more money and leisure time. Cherry (1975) points
to these rapid changes in national circumstances and to two factors
in particular which occassioned a review of leisure and recreation

planning in the mid-1960's:

    (a) US research into the use of leisure time suggested an explosion
        of demand for family-based, car-orientated, countryside
        activities. There was no reason at the time why the UK should
        not follow suit;

    (b) the need to reconsider UK land-use policies, including those
        affecting outdoor recreation, in the context of the "threat"
        posed by the effects of rapidly increasing car ownership.

Between 1950 and 1960, there was a 100% increase in UK car
ownership, which doubled again between 1960 and 1970, producing "a
wave of recreationists escaping from the towns and cities in search of
leisure in the countryside" (Blackie et al, 1979, p.8). Day trips by
car had become the most popular form of countryside recreation. Yet
even with the growth in weekend and annual holidays, rises in car-
ownership and personal incomes, and reductions in average working
hours, little advance thinking had taken place prior to the early 1960's
about provision for the growth in and demand for leisure and recreation.
(the Clyde Valley Plan authors complained of a 1940's "indifference"
to the need for recreation space).

By the mid-1960's, public bodies began to realise the strength
of what Dower (1965) evocatively termed the "fourth wave" of mass
leisure activity which had developed since 1945, and the writings of
Dower and Burton and Wibberley (1965) which pointed to the
significance to the UK of US research into leisure patterns, in
particular the 28 volume study by ORRRC (1962). This study concluded
that the volume of demand for most outdoor recreation activities would
treble, and in some cases quadruple, by the end of the century.
Several British surveys confirmed these findings, including those by
Burton and Wibberley (1965), the Pilot National Recreation Survey
(British Travel Association/University of Keele 1965), and the
Government Social Survey "Planning for Leisure" (Sillitoe, 1969)

There emerged a view in Government that there was a need for
action on a wider front than simply amending the 1949 Act as had
hitherto been proposed, focussing in a comprehensive way on protection
of the countryside and its use for recreation and leisure. The 1949
Act and the Hobhouse Report (Ministry of Town and Country Planning
1947) were based on an expected resumption of pre-war trends, in a

countryside as envisaged by the Scott Report (1942). There was a
need for a readjustment of policy in response to current and
anticipated conditions.

Countryside policy had fared even less successfully in Scotland
than south of the border. The parts of the 1949 Act setting up the
National Parks Commission and National Parks did not apply, and no
Scottish national parks have since been designated. Two attempts
at introducing Scottish countryside legislation foundered in the
early 1960's before the deliberations of Study Group 9 of the 1965
"Countryside in 1970" conference recommended the establishment of a
Countryside Commission for Scotland, thus presaging the 1967 Act.
Government action in Scotland up until then had been limited to
piecemeal measures such as Scottish Health Department Circular
40/1960, providing the basis for control of development in the country-
side, and SDD Circular 2/1962, recommending local authorities to
survey and produce proposals for tourism and the establishment of
Areas of Great Landscape Value. Further action awaited the machinery
and finance provided in the 1967 Act.

4. The Mid-1960's to the Mid-1970's

By the mid-1960's, there was a clear perception in Government,
based on a "burgeoning latent demand" (Bannister 1974) that widespread,
positive provision of leisure space in the countryside was needed,
and for participation in active sport in both urban and rural settings.
In 1966 the Government produced its White Paper "Leisure in the
Countryside" (Ministry of Housing and Local Government, 1966) which
followed both Labour and Conservative manifestoes in emphasising the
need to promote outdoor recreation (in contrast to the 1949 Act, which
was founded on preservation of the landscape). There was a dramatic
shift of focus from national parks to "country parks", and a need to
make provision "both to meet public demand and to relieve pressure
on remote or outstandingly beautiful places" (para.7). Cherry (1975)
suggests that it was only with the countryside arguments of the 1960's
that anything like a comprehensive countryside policy began to emerge:

> In both England and Wales and Scotland the country
> park idea was taken up so avidly that one is led
> to think that in Government circles at least it
> was almost a reaction to the years of failure. (p.159)

The 1967 Act established the Countryside Commission for
Scotland, introduced Government grant-aid for countryside projects,
and the concept of the country park. To some extent it represented
Scotland catching up with the provisions of the 1949 Act. This period
saw the start of what Dower (1974) has referred to as "a new era" in
official leisure planning and provision. The need for action had
been focussed by the Wolfenden Report (1965) "Sport and the Community",
by the "Countryside in 1970" conferences, and by the 1966 White Paper.

Up to the late 1960's, the role of Government was seen as the
provision of support for voluntary bodies through a variety of
statutory and non-statutory agencies; to pass enabling legislation;
and to exhort local authorities to examine provision in their own
areas. By the end of the decade, the Government role had been
strengthened by the replacement of voluntary bodies with statutory
agencies. The 1969 Development of Tourism Act provided statutory
duties for the Scottish Tourist Board. In 1972 the Scottish Sports
Council was formed by amalgamating the Scottish Council for Physical
Recreation with the Advisory Council for Scotland and that part of the
Scottish Education Department with responsibility for grant-aiding
sport and recreation. Thus, three central implementing agencies were
created within five years, providing the framework for further
developments in the field.

At local authority level at this time, there was increasing
recognition of leisure planning, not only as an integral part of
physical planning and development, but also as a means of attracting
grant aid. At national level, there was concern to develop
recreational pursuits as ends in themselves, and an acknowledgement
of the broader role of leisure, eg as a tool for community
development:

> The Government's concern with recreation flows
> basically from their recognition of its importance
> for the general welfare of the community.
>   ("Sport & Recreation.",Cmnd.6200, Para.13)

In the late 1960's, increasing attention was now being given
to planning for leisure, with the spread of regional sports councils,
physical education, provision in new towns, the development of arts
centres, financial aid to live theatre, museums and libraries
(Cullingworth 1974). The Highlands and Islands Development Board,

established in 1965, included within its remit powers which could be used for recreation provision in the countryside; the Scottish Tourist Board was focussing on countryside recreation matters, particularly caravanning and camping; the Local Government (Development and Finance) (Scotland) Act 1964 provided local authorities with new powers to provide facilities for the public enjoyment of the countryside. Greater public funds were becoming available, and with them possibilities of a new scale of public investment to meet recreation demands.

Leisure spending in the 1970's was occupying a growing proportion of public expenditure, mirroring the increase in spending on leisure by the individual (Morrell 1969). Even so, there was a perception that demand had outstripped supply: Dower (1974) forecast the need for 1,000 new sports centres in the UK to meet 1981 needs. He also pointed to the growth of leisure and the use of space at the regional scale, as illustrated by the 10,000 acres Lee Valley regional park on the northern fringe of London (Civic Trust 1964), and regional-scale developments in Europe and North America. The climate for public action during this period was firmly set fair for greater financial provision and comprehensive planning. Bannister (1974) has charted the significant growth in provision for sport, leisure and informal recreation over the decade preceding local government reorganisation.

The highpoint of planning for leisure and recreation during this period could be regarded as the Scottish Tourism and Recreation Planning Strategies (STARPS) as developed jointly by the Countryside Commission, Sports Council, Forestry Commission and Scottish Tourist Board. STARPS was an attempt to coordinate the activities of national agencies and local authorities "to assist in the evolution of outline strategies for each new regional and island authority area in Scotland, coordinated within a broad national framework"(SDD, 1975, para.1). The strategies were aimed at coordination, but were adversely affected by the financial cut-backs after 1975, and overtaken by the preparation of structure and local plans.

5. After the Mid-1970's

The 1972 Town and Country Planning Act and the 1973 Local

Government Act provided a new organisational context for recreation
planning at both regional and local levels in Scotland. The changing
social and economic conditions of the mid/late 1970's and a greater
emphasis in public programmes on tackling urban deprivation, led to
new considerations and priorities for recreation planning. The 1973
Act laid a statutory duty on regional authorities to ensure adequate
provision for countryside recreation, and new leisure and recreation
departments were formed in Regional and District Councils. However,
leisure and recreation committees were politically "lightweight"
concerns in terms of budgetary and political influences, and recreation
issues developed a secondary importance in relation to what were seen
as more pressing economic problems.

At the same time, agencies individually began to develop and
refine their recreation strategies. In 1975 the Scottish Tourist
Board produced its Preliminary National Strategy emphasising the
employment-generating role of tourism and the importance of urban-
based facilities. In 1974 the Countryside Commission produced its
"Park. System for Scotland", and in 1978 it produced a policy for
National Scenic Areas. At the same time, Government instituted its
programme of disengagement from day-to-day local planning, delegating
grant disbursement to the national agencies. More emphasis was being
given to effective management of existing facilities than to the
planning of new projects involving large amounts of public expenditure.

Leisure services today are generally regarded as a non-key
sector of local government spending, and have been an easy target for
severe restrictions in the annual round of Rate Support Grant
settlements:

> Current restrictions on spending imposed by central
> government severely constrain any proposals for
> providing leisure and recreation facilities.
>   (Tourism & Recreation Research Unit 1976, p.118)

The focus in the early 1980's has been on the development of
joint initiatives between the public and private sectors in the
provision of major leisure facilities - a feature of the current
economic climate in which public funds are no longer readily available.

The early 1970's formed a high point in recreation and leisure
provision by government. Since then, real incomes have risen despite

inflation, but transport costs have been greatly increased by the
rapid rise in petrol prices since 1973. Current trends show a lower
rate of increase in leisure activity than assumed in earlier
predictions. Reductions in rural bus services make it more difficult
for people without cars to gain access to countryside facilities.
The long-established trend of increasing car ownership is slowing down,
and demographic changes are likely to affect the pattern of
participation, not only spatially but also in terms of socio-economic
groups.

Criticisms have been levelled at the emphasis in recreation
provision of large-scale recreation centres which limit the
opportunities for participation by the less mobile. Hillman (1979)
asserts that there is a steady fall in participation with distance,
and that this is sharpest among people without access to a car. The
extension of participation to a representative cross-section of the
population requires a major shift of policy from the provision of large,
expensive (and few) leisure facilities, entailing long journeys to
reach them, towards a strategy of providing smaller, cheaper (and
therefore more numerous) facilities, local to intended users.

6. The Development of Leisure Research

Most writings on recreation since the 1950's/early 1960's
usually include some reference to the "growing importance" of
recreation in people's lives, and to the burgeoning of leisure activity
as a direct consequence of increases in leisure time, personal incomes,
mobility and education. Recreation planning in the UK in the 20 year
period following the end of the Second World War was conceived and
developed against a background of US research and practice, and by
existing and anticipated growth in car ownership, incomes and leisure
time (Dower, 1965).

The theme of demand for outdoor recreation was first
substantively developed by ORRRC in 1962, and this research, with its
forecast of an explosion in leisure demand by the end of the century,
provided much of the early foundation for British research and
practice. The first British research began to develop in the mid-
1960's (Dower 1965; Burton and Wibberley 1965; BTA/University of

Keele 1965; Sillitoe 1969). Cullingworth (1964) complained of "the much neglected subject of planning for leisure", and added in 1974 that:

> The discussion of positive planning for leisure
> (in the 1960's) dealt mainly with American
> material and experience; there was little that
> could be recounted of policies and achievements
> in Britain.   (p.226)

The "Countryside in 1970" conference concluded, largely by analogy with research results from the US, that demand for leisure provision in the UK might treble by the year 2000, and that a large increase was likely before 1980. The conference concluded:

> During the forseeable future there will continue to
> be a rapidly expanding demand for a variety of
> outdoor recreation facilities.   (p.13·6)

Influential studies by Dower (1965) and Burton and Wibberley (1965) were based upon the application of US trends to the UK planning context. Burton and Wibberley cite the importance of US experience and its relevance to UK leisure planning for two reasons;

(i) the US had by then already achieved many of the social and economic goals most likely to be achieved in the UK over the following 25 years, and therefore there was a "strong tendency" for these achievements to have similar impacts over the immediate future;

(ii) the US possessed at that time the most detailed information on outdoor recreation in the world (the 23 volume ORRRC study, 1958-62). The ORRRC study found that two factors particularly affected the level of outdoor recreation activity: location and accessibility. The major imbalance between supply and demand was considered to be due largely to location. The study established links between active recreation and the rise in real incomes (up to a threshold), level of education, age, occupation and opportunity ("when the facilities are there, people use them").

Dower (1965) agreed, and likened the future impact of leisure to three earlier "waves" influencing the growth and pattern of urban development: (i) 19th century growth of industrial towns; (ii) railway development and expansion; (iii) 20th century suburban growth. There was liberal use of emotive, metaphoric language to colour perceptions

about leisure needs during this period, and their potentially
damaging impact on the countryside if not controlled:

> People like ants scurrying from coast to coast,
> swarming out of cities...roads sweat with traffic..
> (Dower 1965, p.167)

Thus practice, up until the mid-1970's at least, had sought
to develop and implement recreational policy on the basis of ideas
and information originating in the US, on the assumption that leisure
demands experienced there in the 1950's and 1960's would be replicated
in the UK over the rest of the 20th century. It had also focussed
on the provision of facilities, on the assumption that there was a
demand that needed to be satisfied, and took its cue from Government
policies and financial incentives which themselves were a reaction to
external pressures, with Government rarely the innovator (Cherry
1975). At the same time, research has sought to expand on the first
tentative explorations into need in the 1960's, towards a concern
to define more rigorously the nature of "leisure" and the estimation
of "need" based on pluralist concepts, in contrast to the unitary
view of leisure provision which has traditionally dominated practice.
Roberts (1981) asserts the need to focus much more on a recognition
of conflicting needs for leisure provision, in a context dominated
by conflicting groups competing for limited resources:

> Paternalism has yielded ground to a liberal
> definition of the leisure problem which professes
> agnosticism as to which pastimes are particularly
> worthy.   (p.114)

Elson (1977) suggests that, during the late 1960's/early 1970's,
leisure research had developed twin focii of interest: (i) a concern
to predict the future scale of leisure and recreation impacts, as
a reaction to the "burgeoning demand" thesis of the 1960's, and
(ii) a concern to explain more accurately the place of leisure and
recreation as part of emergent life-style patterns.

Demands for action on the leisure front usually start from the
assumption that leisure time and its uses are growing problems. In
this conception, it is difficult to resist the case for more arts,
sports and community centres, and more provision for countryside
recreation and education. Driver (1970) criticises this traditional
"activity" approach to recreation planning, which assumes that supply
defines preferences (and sometimes that supply will generate demand),

but does not question which latent demands are not being met. This causes recreation planners to focus on supply, and to give too little attention to demand, which is frequently assessed in terms of past consumption.

During the 1970's, this developing behavioural critique began to stress the importance of the perceptions and psyche of the recreationist as a crucial connection between supply and demand. Recreational behaviour began to be directly linked to social and economic circumstances, and to the spatial impact of the consumption of recreation resources.

Traditionally, there have been four causal factors regarded as central to assessments of recreational demand: mobility, leisure time, population and income. Behavioural approaches go beyond these. Stankey (1979) attempts to define a set of concepts for recreation planning, whilst more systematic approaches to the problem of demand began to emerge (Lavery 1975). At the same time, others were drawing attention to the poor data base for estimating demand, and the aridity of conceptualisations, whilst recreational packages began to be seen in terms of social meanings (Hendlee et. al. 1971). Interest began to develop in useable behavioural models incorporating individual perceptions of recreational opportunities (Elson 1977), and "interest fulfillment" (Rapoport and Rapoport 1975). Behavioural approaches stemmed from a criticism of the trend towards the institutionalisation of leisure provision in the UK which, they argue, leads to a gap between the goals and procedures of providers, and the needs and desires of those provided for. Much of this work is still at the theoretical stage of development.

This radical critique has sought to re-interpret leisure as "a central life interest" (Smith et. al. 1973) rather than the residue of social life, at a time of ascendancy in the importance of leisure as a social issue, characterised by increasing diversity in the form and content of leisure values and behaviour - the antithesis of the view, prevalent in the 1960's, of leisure as mass demand, and therefore requiring large-scale solutions.

Roberts (1931) suggests that, ultimately, individuals' ability to use leisure to enhance their quality of life depends less on the providers of recreation facilities than the other resources at

their disposal, namely time and money, but also self-confidence, the
distribution of which is not in the hands of the recreation professions.
The role of the professionals in recreation provision may therefore
be incidental to the equation of leisure provision and life-
satisfaction:

> Leisure activity is most limited among individuals
> handicapped by age, gender and low income, and the
> best way of extending their leisure opportunities
> would be through addressing these disadvantages. (p.125)

The transitory nature of trends in outdoor recreation demand
over the past 30 years has made its forecasting difficult. Patmore
(1977, 1978) points to the inherent problems of prediction due to
the mercurial nature of leisure behaviour, which is moulded by
taste, fashion and the media, responds to a variety of cultural,
psychological and economic stimuli, and is conditioned by the supply
of facilities and by participants' effective knowledge of
opportunities, and means of access to them. Patmore identifies a
concern to date with symptom rather than cause, with conflict-resolution
and cost-effectiveness rather than human needs and satisfactions.
There is still a fundamental lack of understanding of the phenomenon
of recreation, and we need to treat US and other experience elsewhere
with care. The simple transformation of ideas and methods ignores
wide variations in the patterns of experience between nations, even
where the basic elements of population and resources seem closely
matched.

In the post-war period up to the early 1970's, rising mobility
was seen as a central precept of recreation planning. What could
not be foreseen was the impact of external factors on the patterns of
mobility, especially the oil crises of 1973 and 1979. The effect of
these, combined with the evolution of more critical, context-based
research, has been to ask fundamental questions of the assumptions
on which UK planning has been based. There has persisted during
this period an "ideology of leisure" (Cranz 1982) to the extent
that:

    (a) there was a belief in the continued growth of leisure time,
        affluence, mobility and population which would produce
        "mass" demand for leisure facilities, especially in
        countryside locations;

    (b) US leisure patterns, and economic and social trends, would be

repeated in the UK;

(c) "sensitive" locations had to be safeguarded by deflecting
recreation pressures to accessible, multi-purpose recreation
centres, based on a hierarchy of provision at different
spatial scales;

(d) there was a focus on supply-led provision to meet a perceived
"burgeoning demand".

This was an "ideology" in the sense that leisure provision has been
based on beliefs rather than research knowledge. As Roberts suggests:

> The leisure concept is analytically arid but
> ideologically potent. (p.118)

7. Conclusion

The evolution of recreation planning in the UK since 1945 can
be summarised as;

(i) a dependence, up until the mid-1970's at least, on research
and ideas imported from North America, based on the premise
that the assumptions upon which US provision was based held
good for a UK planning context. These assumptions proved
to be (a) ill-founded, since trend projections in the US did
not materialise to the same extent in the UK, and (b) ill-
suited to a land-use context where the impact on land and
ecology required stricter controls;

(ii) provision based on ascending spatial scales, ie at local,
regional and national level, and an attempt to utilise
recreation provision as a means of directing pressures away
from sensitive landscapes;

(iii) a focus on the affluent, mobile, active and middle/upper
income earners, to the detriment of the poorer sections of
the population, reliant upon public transport, and generally
able to participate only at the local level of provision;

(iv) ad hoc and pragmatic in its application, (eg the country
park idea underwent radical reformulation following experience
with the early parks);

(v) the central role of national government policy, agencies and
financial resources;

(vi)an over-reaction to what was perceived in the 1960's as
a "wave" of mass leisure demand which had to be satisfied
primarily in the form of comprehensive, multi-purpose,
indoor and outdoor leisure facilities;

(vii)changing conceptions of the nature of leisure, with
implications for future provision - away from leisure as the
residue of working hours and as a unitary phenomenon, towards
leisure as intertwined with the life-cycle (producing
different needs at different stages);

(viii)a lack of articulation between an understanding of leisure
and planning for it. "Needs"assessments have been a
misnomer, but have had emotive appeal to practitioners and
politicians.

8. Country Parks in Scotland

The centrepiece of the 1967 Act was the country park. The whole
concept stemmed from the "urgent need" to provide adequate facilities
for open-air recreation in the countryside in order to meet growing
demand from the towns. Section 48 of the Act defined a country park
as:

> A park or pleasure ground in the countryside which
> by reason of its position in relation to major
> concentrations of population affords convenient
> opportunities to the public for enjoyment of the
> countryside or open-air.

Unlike the 1949 Act, the country park was based on a promotional
view of the countryside - on the "honeypot" principle, ie deflecting
mass, car-borne recreationists into locations where they could be
controlled, and thereby reducing pressure on more sensitive landscapes
and farmland. The new Countryside Commission's first priority was
to promote country parks, and to encourage local authorities to take
advantage of the new grant-aid arrangements for countryside facilities.
The combination of the 1967 Act with the new local authority powers
provided in the 1967 Civic Amenities Act, the 1969 Town and Country
Planning Act, and the 1969 Development of Tourism Act, marked a new
focus of government activity in countryside recreation planning.
During this period, an enhanced countryside lobby emerged with the
formation of the Scottish Wildlife Trust in 1964, and the Scottish

Civic Trust and Scottish Countryside Activities Council (a consumers'
group), in 1967. At the same time, the Nature Conservancy, established
under the 1949 Act, became part of the Natural Environment Research
Council, and began to turn attention to the growing demand for outdoor
recreation.

The priority country parks in the years immediately following
1967 were those which involved the creation of recreation facilities
out of derelict land (Countryside in 1970 Conference, 1970). The
first Scottish country parks were to be designated in the early
1970's at Muirshiel, Culzean and Palacerigg. However, at the time
of the Commission's establishment in early 1968, the Strathclyde
Park proposals were the most advanced, and were immediately seen by
the Scottish Office as the kind of pioneering proposals the Commission
was set up to promote, involving as it did the creation of major
countryside recreation facilities out of a derelict landscape, and
addressed to a regional scale of demand. Strathclyde Park provided
an early and convenient test-bed for new recreational concepts, the
establishment of criteria for grant-aid, and a working example of
central-local, intercorporate action.

The Commission soon set the whole country park concept within
a wider recreation strategy, and in the early 1970's set out the
three main functions of country parks (Select Committee on Scottish
Affairs 1972-73);

(a) to provide, within a parkland system for Scotland, a
    variety of convenient areas in each of which people can
    enjoy a wide range of open-air leisure pursuits, both passive
    and active, with or without charge, in pleasant rural
    surroundings;

(b) to ease pressure of public use on vulnerable scenic and
    wildlife areas and high quality farmland and woodland, and
    thereby reduce the risk of damage to them;

(c) to help towards a better understanding of the need for
    conservation through a planned and controlled use of the
    countryside for leisure pursuits, and by including, where
    applicable, an interpretive function for the town dweller to
    appreciate countryside and the point of view of the
    countryman.

Country parks therefore emerged from a gestation period during
the late 1960's/early 1970's with a range of functions, including the
provision of new recreational opportunities, the reduction of
pressures elsewhere, and the education of the visitor. The focus of
grant-aid, unlike the Regional Parks proposed under the 1981
Countryside Act, has been on the establishment of country parks
rather than their management or operation. By 1980, the Commission
felt able to state that:

> Country parks now represent a significant element
> in the developing system of countryside recreational
> provision in Scotland.   (Countryside Commission 1980, foreword)

No evaluations of country parks as a whole have been under-
taken since their inception, although surveys have been undertaken
on the use of individual parks (Arnott et al, 1978). Country parks
were introduced during a time of developing momentum in countryside
recreation provision, and at a time when demand for recreational
facilities was generally viewed as growing exponentially. In Scotland
in particular, they were regarded almost as a substitute for the failure
to establish National Parks, which had been introduced in England
and Wales 20 years earlier. The 1967 Act was something of an attempt
to catch up on ground lost in the Scottish emasculation of the 1949
Act. This may partly explain the speed and enthusiasm with which
central and local government action proceeded on the implementation
of country parks in Scotland.

Nine Scottish country parks had preceded the designation of
Strathclyde Park in 1978. Their momentum (nationally) has been
sustained more by grant-aid and ideological commitment than by any
clear evidence of demand. The variety of ways in which country parks
have been justified may be evidence of a lack of clarity of
objectives and the lack of precision in policy:

> The imprecision surrounding the term "need" has
> not made the development of a coherent policy on
> country parks any easier, and may have been used
> as a convenient means to by-pass rigorous thought. (Slee 1982, p.4)

Studies that have been undertaken of the use of country parks
suggest that they cater for a "specialised and privileged clientele"
(Arnott et al, 1980). The socio-economic profiles of the users of
visitor centres, for example, are markedly different from those of
the population as a whole. Implicit in much of the thinking of the

country park idea, and in the ideology which produced and sustained
it, is the belief in mass recreation in the countryside. Country
parks purportedly offered a type of facility wherein these mass demands
could be concentrated and effectively managed:

> However, country parks have not satisfied mass
> demands and it is debatable whether these demands
> ever existed.   (Slee 1982, p.3)

Duffield and Owen (1970) had, even earlier, gone as far as to
suggest that:

> Despite the fact that the concept of the country
> park was embodied in the..(Act)..there are still
> doubts as to what constitutes a Country Park, what
> function it should serve, and what facilities it
> should contain.   (p.57)

It could be argued that the challenges of the 1970's have been
the creation of country parks, whereas the challenges of the 1980's
are becoming the maintenance and adaptation of country parks to meet
changing circumstances. In stark contrast to the 1960's and 1970's,
these challenges must be met in an economic and political environment
which, if not hostile to country park philosophy, certainly offers
no significant encouragement.

It is perhaps significant that it was not until 1980 that the
Countryside Commission was able to produce a coherent policy for
country parks in Scotland (Countryside Commission 1980), based on
the principles of cost-effectiveness and evidence of demand. Clearly
the Commission has learned from experience of a trial-and-error
nature in the development of country parks in particular and country-
side recreational opportunites in general.

Both at the detailed design stage of Strathclyde Park, and
during construction, when it was attracting substantial grant-aid,
there was no clear conception of the scope and purpose of a country
park in detail, and no policy context or strategy for the disbursement
of grant-aid. Although Strathclyde Park was developed during a
policy and information vacuum, this was of some benefit to the speed
of the construction programme following completion of the land
reclamation works. Overall, as a country park, the development of
Strathclyde Park has been influenced by a number of factors deriving
from the evolving nature of recreation and leisure policy;

(i) the prevailing ideology of leisure, imported from the US in the 1960's, led to the assimilation in the Park design of unquestioned assumptions about continued growth in population, income and mobility, and the supply-led nature of demand;

(ii) these factors not only influenced the Park designers, but also pervaded Government policy and recreation research throughout the late 1960's and early 1970's;

(iii) developed during a period of immaturity in leisure concepts and policies, and coincident with the introduction of the 1967 Act, the Park was seized by Government as a prototypical scheme by which ambitious but ill-thought out ideas about large-scale recreation provision could be promulgated;

(iv) whilst the Park to some extent fed off these influences, the major social and economic changes of the mid-1970's, coupled with emerging evaluations of leisure policy, a new focus on cost-effectiveness in times of severe financial restraint, and a new administrative framework after 1975, combined to begin to question the basic assumptions and objectives behind the Park proposals, and led to a severe curtailment of further Park expansion after 1978.

In conclusion, it could be said that Strathclyde Park, like many other contemporary recreation schemes, was to some extent a victim of changing circumstances - conceived in affluence, born in uncertainty, and ended in austerity. Figure 11 lists, in chronological order, the main events in the development of planning for leisure and recreation since 1945.

1945	Report of Scottish National Parks Survey Committee	1968	Countryside Commission for Scotland begins operation
1946	Clyde Valley Regional Plan		Countryside Recreation Research Advisory Group formed
	New Towns Act		Transport Act
1947	Town and Country Planning Act	1969	Development of Tourism Act
	Hobhouse Report		Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act
	Report of Scottish National Parks Committee		"Wilderness and Plenty" lectures
1948	National Park Direction Areas	1970	European Conservation Year
1949	National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act		third "Countryside in 1970" conference
1952	Town Development (Scotland)Act	1972	Scottish Sports Council
			Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act
1960	DES Circular 40/1960 "Green Belts and New Houses in the Country-side"	1973	"Recreation for All" campaign
	Wolfenden Report "Sport and the Community"		Local Government (Scotland) Act
1961	first Scottish countryside Bill		first OPEC oil crisis
1962	ORRRC Report published		Nature Conservancy Council Act
	SDD Circular 2/1962 "Areas of Great Landscape Value; Development of Tourism"	1974	"A Park System for Scotland"
1963	first "Countryside in 1970" conference		Local government reorganisation in England and Wales
			Coastal Planning Guidelines
1964	Local Government (Development and Finance)(Scotland) Act		Minister for Sport and Recreation (England and Wales)
	Government Social Survey "Planning for Leisure"	1975	Scottish Tourism and Recreation Planning strategies
	Sports Council		Local government reorganisation in Scotland
	second Scottish countryside Bill		White Paper "Sport and Recreation"
1965	Dower's "Fourth Wave"		Scottish Tourist Board "Preliminary National Strategy"
	second "Countryside in 1970" conference	1977	"Leisure and the Quality of Life" studies
	National Recreation Survey	1979	second OPEC oil crisis
1966	White Paper "Leisure and the Countryside"	1980	National Scenic Areas
	Lee Valley Regional Park Act	1981	Wildlife and Countryside Act
1967	Countryside (Scotland) Act		Countryside Act - Regional Parks
	Lee Valley Regional Park plan		Stodart Report
	Civic Amenities Act	1982	Local Government and Planning (Scotland) Act

Fig.11   Main Events in Planning for Recreation and Leisure Since 1945

CHAPTER V

THE CONTEXT FOR ACTION (3):

CONCLUSION

THE CONTEXT FOR ACTION (3):

CONCLUSION

1. Introduction

The main periods of the evolution and implementation of
Strathclyde Park coincide with phases of intense Government activity
in regional economic planning, and in planning for leisure and
recreation. Figure 12 attempts to illustrate, in simplified form,
the major interrelationships between the regional and recreation
planning contexts, and park development. The schematic representation
of these interrelationships cannot be exhaustive since (i) a schema
is, by definition, a simplification of a subjective reality, and (ii)
complex and dynamic policy processes are not amenable to exactitude
in terms of the expression of direct causal linkages. However, the
diagram is useful as an aid to clarifying and understanding the main
influences of the external planning context on the development process
in this instance, prior to the detailed analysis in the following
chapters, (which focus on the internal characteristics of the Park's
evolution and development).

As Figure 12 illustrates, the development of Strathclyde Park
can be considered on the basis of three, broadly distinct, phases in
which regional development and national recreation policies converge
to stimulate or constrain the scope for action. These three phases
are linked by intervening periods of uncertainty as to the future
progress and direction of the development, but for contrasting
reasons.

2. Phase 1 : The Launch

The launch of proposals for a "Middle Clyde Regional Park"
was stimulated by an eagerness in Government to make up for the
period of relative inactivity in (a) regional planning, following
the first regional surveys and plans in the early 1940's and 1950's,

Fig. 12 The Changing Context for Action

Year	INNER CITIES POLICY	REGIONAL PLANNING	STRATHCLYDE PARK	RECREATION PLANNING	Phase
1963		Re-structuring of Scottish office – SDD formed		1st "Countryside in 1970" conference	Phase 1 – The Launch
1964		White Paper on Central Scotland; SEPB/SEPC	SDD proposes landscape scheme for middle Clyde valley	"Planning for Leisure"	
1965		HIDB; White Paper on Scottish economy	3 LA's form Joint Committee	Dower's "Fourth Wave"; 2nd "Countryside in 1970" conference	
1966		Industrial Development Act	Scheme launched by Minister	"Leisure and the Countryside"	
1967		Special Development Areas	"Strathclyde Park" proposals by Joint Committee	Countryside Act; Lee Valley Park Proposals	
1968			2nd Ministerial meeting – revised loch arrangement	Countryside Commission established	(Reappraisal)
1969		Wheatley Report; Structure Plans	Technical Working Party	"Wilderness and Plenty" lectures	
1970	DOE Six Towns/Inner Areas studies		3rd Ministerial meeting – park re-launched	3rd "Countryside in 1970" Conference	
1971			SPJC formally constituted; Revised proposals		Phase 2 – Action
1972	Community Development Projects	Select Committee on Scottish affairs	Park Director appointed	Sports Council Act	
1973		Local Government Act	Stage 1 Plan approved by SDD	NCC Act	
1974		SEPD formed	Stage 1 construction begins	"Recreation for All"	
1975	Comprehensive Community Programmes	West Central Scotland Plan; SDA formed; New local government structure	Landscape Master Plan; Stage 2 proposals; SRC take over Park	"A Park System for Scotland"; STARPS; "Sport and Recreation"	(Uncertainty)
1976	GEAR launched	Stonehouse New Town de-designated	Park opened to public		
1977	"Inner cities" White Paper	Regional Reports; Reductions in Assisted Areas	SRC begins financial cuts	"Leisure and the Quality of Life" studies	Phase 3 – New Directions
1978	Inner Urban Areas Act	Cut-backs in jobs dispersal programme	Park officially opened		
1979	Urban Development Corporations	Phased reductions in regional aid begin			
1980	Clydebank Enterprise Zone	Further reductions in jobs dispersal and in Assisted Areas	Park Director resigns	National Scenic Areas	(Uncertainty)
1981	Urban riots; Scarman Report	RDG Reduced; Stodart Report		Wildlife and Countryside Act; Regional Parks	
1982		Closure of Linwood and Invergordon; IDC controls abolished; Review of regional policy	Park transferred to Buildings and Property Committee; SDA feasibility study		

and (b) planning for recreation and leisure, interest in which began
to develop in the 1930's, but which, as a policy area, was relegated
in the enthusiasm for post-war reconstruction.

Although conceived in the 1946 Clyde Valley proposals, the
regional park idea at that time had no means of implementation.
Indeed, the immediately "successful" parts of the plan, in terms of
implementation were those that fitted the prevailing circumstances
of the late 1940's and 1950's, namely slum clearance and rehousing,
and population and industrial dispersal. Until the 1960's, there
was no locus for initiatives in the provision of regional or country
parks, since until then (i) recreation planning was not a Government
priority, hence (ii) there was no policy guidance for local action,
nor any financial incentive, and (iii) they were not "ideas in good
currency" (Schon, 1971).

An examination of the context for action at Strathclyde Park
suggests that, whilst the Clyde Valley Plan team were the progenitors,
the catalyst for action came from central government planners eager
to demonstrate the role of the newly-formed Scottish Development
Department and carry through the physical implications of regional
development priorities in central Scotland. The period of the late
1960's saw the launch of and initial planning studies for the Middle
Clyde Regional Park, against the backcloth of considerable central
government activity in exhorting local action and initiative in
physical and industrial renewal in support of, firstly, the 1963
White Paper (in which North Lanarkshire was identified, with the New
Towns, as a growth area), and secondly, the 1966 White Paper, in which
the Park proposals were hailed as a pioneering approach in this
respect. Also during this period, there was a growing momentum for
national and local responses to a perceived growth in demand for
recreation in the countryside. The advocacy of a Scottish countryside
planning agency, following the deliberations of the second
"Countryside in 1970" conference, emerged in tandem with the initial
lobbying of the conference by SDD planners in support of their
Middle Clyde Park initiative. This initial relationship continued
through the early years of the Countryside Commission, during which
the Park became a major preoccupation.

Phase 1 culminated in the 1967 park proposals. Since these
locally-inspired proposals considerably overstepped SDD's outline

thoughts on the level of action required, a period of reappraisal
followed whilst the financial feasibility of the proposals was
considered through the Technical Working Party of central and local
government officials. This period also marked a consolidation of
activity in countryside policy following (a) the enactment of the
Countryside Act and the establishment of the Countryside Commission,
and (b) the White Papers and the establishment of the organisational
and financial frameworks for their implementation.

3. Phase 2 : Action

The main elements of the Park as it exists today were
constructed during the period 1973-76. The approval by SDD of revised
proposals for Stage 1 coincided with an upsurge in interest in
planning for sport, as opposed to the previous emphasis on planning
for passive forms of recreation. The Scottish Sports Council was
established in 1972 to promote such provision, followed by the
national campaign "Recreation for All". Although external events
such as the first OPEC oil crisis in 1973, industrial action at home .
(the miners' strike and the three-day week of 1973-74), and a
reappraisal of Scottish land-use policies (culminating in a critical
report by the Parliamentary Select Committee on Scottish Affairs
1972-73), sufficient momentum in terms of detailed planning, financial
resources, and political commitment meant that park construction
commenced during a generally hostile period for large-scale capital
projects (especially those with a low financial return), with a
quadrupling of oil prices setting off a period of accelerating inflation
and rising unemployment. By the start of construction in summer 1973,
SDD was reluctant to sanction development proposals beyond a
curtailed Stage 1.

This financial uncertainity following Phase 2 was fuelled by
uncertainties as to the future management of the park during a period
of public debate as to the details of the new local government
structure following the recommendations of the Wheatley Report (Royal
Commission, 1969). The rapidly-changing political and financial
contexts for large-scale public sector development meant that
consideration of the further development of the park was being conducted
in circumstances radically different from those in which the park was

launched.

4. Phase 3 : Changing Directions

The period from the late 1970's witnessed a continuing growth
in interest and provision for leisure and recreation, but against
a background of decline in regional policy and increasing financial
stringency on the development initiatives of local authorities. In
this changed planning climate, there has been substantially less
scope for providing and expanding projects which are capital-
intensive in their consumption of resources, and which are not
directly related to economic development.

The rapid inflation of the 1970's, which contributed to a
substantial escalation in the development costs of the park, together
with new regional planning priorities as articulated in Strathclyde
Regional Council's 1976 Regional Report and subsequent strategies, -
have served to severely curtail ambitions for further park
development. The reduction in regional development initiatives was
linked to a re-emergence of interest in inner cities, as expressed in
the 1977 White Paper and DOE action-research projects. In addition,
the refinement of policies for recreation and the countryside clearly
indicated that the style of development of Strathclyde Park was at
variance with revised conceptions of country and regional parks, and
new priorities in the deployment of the Scottish countryside budget,
as defined by the Countryside Commission.

In the wake of these policy changes, financial stringency
and the findings of the Stodart Committee of Inquiry (1981) and the
subsequent Local Government and Planning (Scotland) Act 1982, the
administrative and development future of the park remains uncertain.

As an initiative, Strathclyde Park largely owes its launch to
a convergence of policy issues and an enthusiasm for new approaches
in the 1960's, fuelled by a favourable investment climate and general
expectations of continued economic growth. This climate was severely
curtailed from the early 1970's by a combination of externally-
imposed financial stringency, new policy priorities, and a revised
structure of local administration which expunged the political support

which had underwritten the park's momentum.

In 1984 Strathclyde Park, although a Regional Council responsibility, has no clear role in that Council's development strategies, and is not referred to in the approved structure plan, nor its second review.   In the wake of new initiatives in the North Lanarkshire Area by the Scottish Development Agency (now established as the principal tool of regional development) the future development of the park would appear to be dependent upon the injection of private sector capital (Drivers Jonas, 1983) which, although anticipated in the early park proposals, has yet to materialise.

CHAPTER VI

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATHCLYDE PARK (1):

INTENTIONS

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATHCLYDE PARK (1):

INTENTIONS

1. Introduction

This chapter and the three that follow draw on the theoretical discussion in chapter 1 in attempting to interpret and explain the development of Strathclyde Park as set out in chapters 2-5. This is undertaken by considering the outputs of the planning processes leading to the creation of the park, comparing them with the outputs intended, and attempting to account for any differences - what Dunsire (1978) has termed "the implementation gap". In this way, these chapters seek to identify:

(a) the intentions of the various participants, and how and why these varied both between participants and over time;

(b) the means employed to translate intentions into deeds, the reasons underlying their selection, leading to an identification of the preferred planning style, focusing in particular on the procedural context, the plans prepared, and the organisational arrangements constructed;

(c) the processes generated by the procedural and organisational contexts and the overall planning context, and how these varied during each "phase" of the development;

(d) the outputs of these processes, focusing on the implementation gaps between intentions and achievements, and the underlying reasons.

The construction of Strathclyde Park depended upon a coalition of diverse and often conflicting interests and, from the outset at least, it was important that there was broad agreement as to the action required, and for which financial resources would be provided. This broad unanimity prevailed during the political/technical debate about the content of the park but the fragile consensus began to fragment during park construction, and in negotiations over subsequent stages, which were conducted during a period of transition in (a) attitudes to regional planning, and (b) the economic and political

contexts. The reasons for this fragmentation are partly explained by the changing attitudes and intentions of key participants in the project, particularly in the wake of the 1967 proposals. The next section attempts to identify the implications of these attitudinal changes by focusing on the aims of each of the main participants in turn.

2. Scottish Development Department

Up until the early 1960's responsibility for local government and town and country planning in the Scottish Office rested with the Scottish Health Department. However, on the rising tide of regional policy, a reorganisation saw the physical planning, engineering and infrastructure interests combined in a new Scottish Development Department, established in 1962 to facilitate "the promotion and coordination of economic and industrial policy in Scotland" (Scottish Council, 1961).

Whilst a revived regional planning context provided the favourable conditions for the re-emergence of a number of erstwhile neglected proposals in the Clyde Valley Plan, including the Hamilton Low Parks project, and whilst the construction programme for the M74 provided the initial impetus, it was the new SDD's initiative and lobbying, particularly of the local authorities, the North Lanarkshire Growth Area Committee, and Study Group 9 of the 1965 "Countryside in 1970" conference, which provoked action. In later stages, it was to be SDD's lobbying within the Scottish Office and in Whitehall which was to ensure that the park project obtained the highest priority in order to justify the necessary Exchequer funds.

SDD saw the context for action in 1964 being provided by (a) the 1963 White Paper, in which the relationship between environmental conditions and the attraction of industry was articulated, and (b) the new interest in planning for recreation in the countryside, being debated at that time in the "Countryside in 1970" conferences. The emerging proposals for a Lee Valley Regional Park north of London (Civic Trust, 1964) provided a contemporary example of the potential for environmental change in North Lanarkshire.

The M74 motorway was seen as "an arm of possible future
prosperity" (SDD, 1964),and presented the opportunity to examine the
whole condition, use and future of that part of the Clyde Valley
through which it runs and which, in the vicinity of the Hamilton Low
Parks, was regarded by SDD as:

> A sort of "back yard" to the towns on either side,
> occupied by refuse tips, sewage works, flooded land,
> derelict houses, bings...the centres of population
> turning their backs on the scene they have permitted,
> if not actually created.   .   (SDD, 1964a,p.1)

SDD saw the implementation of the proposal in the Clyde Valley
Plan for a regional recreation centre as an opportunity to coordinate
land uses in the area, and to undertake a large-scale rehabilitation
of a despoiled part of the Clyde valley:

> The construction of the motorway, with the extensive
> earth movements which this will involve, provides
> an opportunity not only for the landscaping of its
> immediate environs, but for an integrated
> rehabilitation scheme for this whole stretch of
> the valley. This scheme would eliminate the
> legacy of past industrial exploitation which serves
> as a brake on the attraction of the new enterprise
> which is necessary for future prosperity. It would
> also turn the valley into a positive asset to the
> area and enable a high standard of recreational
> facilities to be provided for the substantial
> population of the surrounding built-up areas.
>   (SDD, 1964 b, p.1)

SDD's initial aims were therefore (a) land rehabilitation to
improve the appearance of the landscape from the motorway, and
thereby to improve the investment "image" of the area, and (b)
provision of new recreational facilities for a large urban
population, linked to a network of footpaths and other facilities
north and south of the park focus. At this time, the formation of an
artificial loch was seen as expedient given (i) the low-lying and
flooded nature of much of the land, and (ii) the general view then
prevalent that a stretch of water provides a positive recreational
asset.

With the establishment in 1965 of a joint committee of the local
authorities involved to commission further studies into the
feasibility of the project, the initiative for further action then
passed to them. SDD continued to be involved, but its role changed
to that of (i) a financial controller on the ambitions of the joint

committee for major developments through regulating borrowing consent and fixing the items to be considered for grant aid under the 1966 and 1967 Acts, and (ii) as advocate for the scheme in discussions nationally with the Treasury for the allocation of funds.

Whilst SDD continued to ensure that the park scheme occupied a high profile in Government thinking of ways in which physical planning could assist in the achievement of economic planning objectives (most notably through specific reference to the scheme in the 1966 White Paper), after 1967 (when the local authorities produced detailed proposals for a regional park) some modification began to take place in its view as to what action was desirable in the middle Clyde valley in the circumstances.

SDD planners had no further direct involvement in the project after the report of the Technical Working Party in 1970, followed by the arrival of the Countryside Commission and detailed consideration of the cost implications of the scheme. The initial aims and enthusiasm could be said to be those of SDD planners, and may at least partly explain the later modified attitude of the Scottish Office, particularly with regard to Stage 2 of the 1967 proposals, which were under consideration in 1974. The first reappraisal within Scottish Office occurred in 1968, during early discussions of the joint committee's 1967 proposals which SDD considered "too lavish". Although SDD saw the scheme as "important" and "pioneering" and "of a kind....which we hope will serve to stimulate other local authorities" (SDD, 1968, p.2) SDD also felt that, in view of the estimated costs, a "basic" scheme should be defined focusing on the "essential" items, on the grounds that:

> The amenities in the park must be designed with an
> eye to what is being provided elsewhere and to the
> likely demand.   (SDD, 1968, p.2)

By this time Scottish Office were beginning to regard costs as more important than content, and this led even to a questioning of the loch proposal in 1970. An early outcome of these scaled-down objectives of Government was the formation in 1969 of a Technical Working Party to set out the essential first stage works for the park, their cost and their phasing since:

> The scope of the scheme as a whole depended on the
> extent to which the rehabilitation grant would be
> payable.   (Technical Working Party, 1969, p.1)

Nevertheless, the basic principle of rehabilitating the
landscape and providing recreational facilities continued to be
promulgated by SDD in discussions with the Treasury for the provision
of the necessary funds:

> We feel that the importance of this project for
> the region itself and for Scotland as a whole is
> such that expenditure on it ought to be given as
> early a place as possible in the programmes for
> rehabilitation and country parks.   (Butler, 1969)

Whilst seeking to promote (a) a landscape rehabilitation of the
middle Clyde valley in accordance with regional policy objectives,
and (b) a demonstration project for landscape reclamation and country
park provision, the early SDD planning-orientated enthusiasm for a
major recreation project was supplanted during the late 1960's by a
finance-orientated concern to keep in check the ambitions of the local
authorities. This conflict of interest between central and local
government led to the political conflicts discussed later.

SDD wanted to see a start on their "basic" scheme, incorporating
the rowing course and most of Stage 1 of the 1967 proposals, without
giving any commitment to funding for subsequent stages:

> Faced with the likely effects of the expenditure
> for Stage 1 during a period of restriction on
> public expenditure generally and in fairness to
> other parts of Scotland we could not at this time
> give any undertaking to commit countryside funds
> to Stage 2.   (Neilson, 1974)

SDD had by 1974 become concerned at the consumption by Stage 1
(by then under construction) of a substantial proportion of the total
funds available for the Scottish countryside programme, and the
higher costs and longer construction period than had originally been
provided for. By this time, the park project no longer occupied the
priority nationally that it had done, and SDD's intentions focussed
on bringing to successful completion that part of the project already
committed.

Between 1964 and 1974, the SDD view on the Strathclyde Park
project changed considerably. In the initial stages, SDD planners
took the initiative to encourage the local authorities to think
positively about the middle Clyde area, and then to work jointly to
undertake the landscape and recreational improvements considered

necessary. With the establishment of a joint committee of the local
authorities involved to investigate the detailed feasibility of the
scheme, and to prepare and carry out a plan, SDD planners effectively
withdrew from any further direct involvement. Scottish Office interest
thereafter focussed on financial control of the project. The SDD
role had therefore changed from instigators to regulators, ie from a
planning input to a financial and administrative unput. The different
personnel involved, combined with a radically changed financial climate
from the early 1970's, and the dissipation of the regional effort
throughout the 1970's, served to significantly modify Government
interest in and attitudes to the project as a whole and its further
consumption of countryside funds.

3. Local Authorities

Prior to the approach by SDD in 1964 with its outline
rehabilitation scheme the local authorities of Lanark County Council,
Hamilton Town Council, and Motherwell and Wishaw Town Council had no
positive intentions for the middle Clyde/Hamilton Low Parks area. The
area was covered by three separate development plans: the Lanark
County (Central Industrial Area) (Part) Development Plan 1958 had
zoned the middle Clyde valley outwith the burghs predominantly green
belt, whilst it had an operational refuse tip at Bothwellhaugh; the
Burgh of Hamilton Development Plan 1953 comprised a number of zonings
for 334 hectares within its boundary, including 50% as public and
private open space and 37 hectares for refuse disposal; the Burgh of
Motherwell and Wishaw Development Plan 1953 included 145 hectares of
the park within its boundary, with 66% allocated for public and
private open space. All three authorities operated sewage treatment
plants in the area, whilst the Bothwellhaugh mine was operational
until 1958. There were no proposals for the development or
improvement of the area in any of these plans.

The first approach by SDD to the local authorities suggesting
landscape and recreational improvements in this part of the Clyde
valley was made via a submission to meetings of the North Lanarkshire
Growth Area Committee in November 1964 and January 1965. SDD
recommended that the three local authorities involved should set up
a joint planning committee to investigate the detailed feasibility

of its outline scheme. Following that meeting, a joint committee
of the three authorities was set up in February. Such joint
arrangements to administer matters of common concern extending beyond
the boundaries of individual authorities were not unknown, with
similar joint committees existing at that time for police, fire and
education.

The lack of any positive proposals by the local authorities up
until the mid 1960's could be explained by reference to the general
lack of local authority initiative in the fields of land reclamation
and countryside recreation, partly due to a lack of expertise, but
more importantly due to lack of funds for such a large-scale project
of earth-moving, hydraulics and leisure provision. Local planning
priorities generally at that time were directed at tackling housing
problems and industrial obsolescence. The 1960 Local Employment Act
provided only limited grant aid for land rehabilitation, particularly
where the after-use involved financially low-return developments
such as recreation. The provisions of the 1966 Industrial Development
Act significantly increased the levels of grant aid available for
reclaiming derelict land, and a liberal interpretation by SDD of
the definition of dereliction ensured that the necessary financial
resources to tackle a project then estimated at £1 million would be
available. The 1967 Countryside Act introduced for the first time
substantial grants for the provision of passive recreation facilities
in the countryside, together with expertise in and advice on such
matters from the Countryside Commission, whose officials began to take
an active part in the Strathclyde Park project from early 1969.

Local authority aspirations for Strathclyde Park were founded
upon the prior commitment of Government grant aid for land
rehabilitation and countryside recreation. Without the prospect of
such aid, it is unlikely that any initiative would have been taken
at local authority level at that time. The initial loch feasibility
study (Binnie and Partners, 1965), Ministerial meetings during the
mid 1960's, and the firm ideas contained in the 1967 proposals,
generated full local authority commitment to the development of
Strathclyde Park. The local politicians saw, in the prospect of
substantial Government financial assistance, a major opportunity to
transform a degraded landscape into a major recreational resource.
Their receptive attitude to early approaches for a rowing course to be

incorporated in the loch design derived from what they saw as the potential of such a unique international sporting facility to enhance the image of north Lanarkshire.

Of the three local authorities, Motherwell and Wishaw Town Council was the most enthusiastic towards the project, partly since it had most of the derelict land within its administrative boundary, and partly on account of the enthusiasm of its planning convener, Bernard Scott, a highly motivated local politician who was to play a central role in the park development. Lanark County Council was not noted at the time for its initiatives in land rehabilitation (SDD, 1968), whilst most of the land affected by the park within the administration of Hamilton Town Council comprised neglected parkland and policies of the former Low Parks.

The local authorities had two primary motives in taking up SDD's initiative: (i) the removal of dereliction, the considerable extent of which could only be tackled with the use of major financial resources, and (ii) the exploitation of what was seen as potentially a large population catchment afforded by the location of the park and its proximity to the M74 motorway. The ambition of the three local authorities was to create a regional park, and this conception was maintained by the joint committee up until 1975, and explains their ambitious 1967 proposals and the subsequent advocacy for their full realisation in the face of Scottish Office opposition and restrictions on public expenditure during the 1970's.

A regional park, providing a recreational focal point for the Glasgow conurbation, was the joint committee's basic scheme, but they also wanted to improve the national and international image of north Lanarkshire, and the rowing course was regarded as the crucial component in this respect. Once their interest and commitment had been established, the aims of the local authorities coincided with initial SDD aims deriving from the wider concerns of regional policy, particularly the need to create environments attractive to mobile industry. Unlike SDD, the local authority view did not change substantially until 1975, with the arrival of Strathclyde Regional Council and its wider political interests and new leaders with other allegiances:

It is not often that you get the commitment from

> politicians that Strathclyde Park had at that
> time...They all had a personal commitment because
> the area was such a mess...They all wanted
> something to be done, and they saw this as an
> opportunity, politically, whereby practical
> implementation could in fact demonstrate that
> politicians not only just talk, they do things...
> They were genuinely interested in providing
> something for the community.   (Reid, 1982)

The commitment-generating effects of planning processes
described by Levin (1976) were broken by external means with the
transfer of power and influence to new personnel in 1975. Strathclyde
Regional Council quickly took up the challenge of the 1974 West
Central Scotland Plan. The 1976 Regional Report outlined a strategy
geared to addressing problems of unemployment, multiple deprivation
and urban renewal. The whole approach to regional planning after
1975 focussed on a range of priorities which relegated leisure and
recreation, and countryside planning, to minor considerations. Although
a Leisure and Recreation Committee with the former park chairman as
convener was included in the new political structure, it was a
political "lightweight," and administration of the park passed to a
new Director of Leisure and Recreation, (although the post of Park
Director was retained). The Regional Council's low priority for
leisure and recreation, coupled with the uncertainity about the future
of country parks under its administration, contributed to a decline
in the park's development programme and to a major review of its
expenditure in 1976. Effectively, there were no advocates of the 1967
proposals in the face of general expenditure cutbacks. The former
chairman remarked of the new regional administration, "they did not
'know' the 1967 plan - they did not have the concept of it" (Scott,
1983).

Before 1975, Strathclyde Park was the biggest project for the
local authorities concerned. After 1975, it came to be seen in a
much wider spatial and political context, and against a radically
different financial and policy background.

4. The Consultants

Binnie and Partners were appointed consultant engineers to the
Joint Committee in April 1965 to "ascertain by means of a hydraulic

survey of the river Clyde whether the lake proposal is a practical proposition having particularly in mind the effect of carrying out such a proposal upstream and downstream of that point and the liabilities of the authorities concerned which might emerge therefrom" (Binnie and Partners, 1965).

The whole concept of tackling the degraded and subsided land in the form of a man-made loch hinged on surveys to assess the technical feasibility of this aspect. Binnie and Partners were appointed on the basis of previous commissions they had undertaken for Lanark County Council, specifically large scale hydrological projects such as dams and reservoirs. They were therefore well known to officials of the County Council, which had taken up the initiative provided by SDD's lead. The creation of a new loch, initially by damming and latterly by diverting the river Clyde, although apparently a logical solution to eradicating the mining subsidence in the Low Parks, had major technical implications for the whole river system, particularly since the park was to be situated in the flood plain of the river. Binnie's task was essentially to investigate the engineering feasibility of the project, assemble the technical analyses and data required, and report to the Joint Committee.

Binnie and Partners were unique among the consultants in being involved in the park project from the early planning days of the mid 1960's through to construction and realisation in the mid 1970's. Binnie handled all the detailed technical aspects relating to the formation of the loch and the diversion of the river, and submitted their preliminary report on the loch scheme to the Joint Committee in April 1965. Whilst the loch was to be a fundamental feature of any proposals, the same could not be said of the rowing course:

> The provision of a 2000 metre rowing course to
> internationally approved dimensions (ie length,
> minimum depth and width, clearance at ends) is
> not an automatic by-product of rehabilitation of
> the Park area. Additional cost is incurred in its
> provision.   (Binnie and Partners, 1971, p.2)

Binnie and Partners were largely unfettered in their analyses and advice to the Joint Committee, and there was very little conflict over these technical and engineering aspects. The initial proposal to dam the River Clyde was dropped in 1968 when studies commissioned at Strathclyde University indicated that this would cause high levels

of sedimentation, requiring regular dredging to keep to within
acceptable limits. It was then decided that the only alternative was
to by-pass the Clyde and feed the loch from the South Calder Water.
The effects of these engineering changes were expected in 1968 to
increase the costs of the project by 10%, and led to a whole set of
new problems concerning water quality.

At the outset of the investigations of the Joint Committee in
1964-65, there were seen to be three alternatives to tackling the
rehabilitation problem;
   1. leave the area as "natural";
   2. infill and grass over;
   3. excavate to form a loch.
The last alternative was favoured by Binnie, on the basis that it
was likely to be the cheaper solution.

In the view of one official of the Countryside Commission
closely involved with the project at that time, the consultant
engineers were given a free hand to manage the project, taking
engineering decisions without reference to the Joint Committee. In
his view, the result was additional costs without Committee approval:

> There were occassions when the tail was wagging the
> dog, and others when the tail and the dog were
> nowhere near each other.   (Cameron, 1982)

Binnie and Partners made perhaps the most significant
contribution of the main consultants to the processes of Strathclyde
Park. They undertook or supervised all the engineering aspects of
the project, as well as the landscape aspects after 1971, and were
the leading advisers to the Joint Committee until the arrival of the
Park Director in 1973.

Binnie played a significant role in establishing the technical
feasibility of the loch proposal, and in the final form of the park,
with the loch divorced from the river Clyde by means of a by-pass
channel which in itself was a major feat of engineering. However,
Binnies were not expert in the design of water facilities for
international rowing competition, and did not appreciate the exacting
standards and design parameters. Consequently, they underestimated
the costs of provision of such a course. As a result, there were
radical reappraisals during construction, leading to significantly

increased costs and a longer time-scale for construction. Reid (1982) considers that "the specialism just was not there at the time". However, by the early 1970's the whole project had gained such momentum, during a favourable development climate, that it is difficult to assess whether more accurate cost estimates would have led to the deletion of the rowing course from the park proposals. Hall (1980) has shown that substantial cost underestimating is a factor common to many large scale projects where new approaches and technologies are being pioneered, ie where there is a high degree of uncertainty as to their outcomes.

A.V. Montagu and Partners were appointed architects, planning and landscape consultants to the Strathclyde Park Joint Committee in April 1967 "to report in general terms on the Clyde Valley from Garrion Bridge to downstream of Bothwell Bridge, and to make more detailed proposals within the Park area" (Montagu, 1967, p.1). A.V. Montagu was a small, London-based practice appointed largely on the basis of its previous working relationship with Binnie (it had provided architectural and landscaping input to some of Binnie's engineering contracts). The major contribution Montagu made to the Strathclyde Park project was the 1967 report, in which credence was given to the ideas and aspirations of the local authorities. The 1967 report provided the catalyst for subsequent central-local conflicts over the final form of the park.

Montagu saw the solution to the problems of the middle Clyde valley not in the form of an overall "plan", but as a "shopping list" of environmental and recreational improvements. The 1967 report contained no land use plan or other spatial form of presentation, yet this list, and the eclectic nature of the conceptions and assumptions underlying it, were vigorously pursued by the local authorities. This indicated that the report was less a fresh look at the area, and more of a cobbling together of ideas and earlier "bottom drawer" schemes, some of which were subsequently shown to be poorly conceived. The estimated cost of £2,532,000, and its breakdown in Stage 1, was a substantial underestimate (as revealed during construction) and indicated Montagu's limited abilities to undertake such a major project.

Considerable pressure was put on Montagu over the period 1969-1971, during the deliberations of the Technical Working Party,

and culminating in the revised 1971 proposals (Scott, 1983). In
April 1971, Montagu's responsibilities for design, contracts and
site supervision of landscaping were passed to Binnie, although they
retained a role as general landscape consultants. In May 1972
Montagu produced interim proposals for Stage 1 landscaping which
were severely criticised by the Countryside Commission and the Nature
Conservancy Council. At its meeting of 5th November 1973 the Joint
Committee accepted Montagu's resignation and appointed as replacement
landscape consultants William Gillespie and Associates. Montagu et. al.
were to remain as architectural consultants, but this role also ceased
in 1975 with the resignation from the practice of the principal member
responsible for much of the design work on the park buildings. By
a combination of internal problems in the practice, and a generally
poor standard of landscape advice (no member of the practice was a
landscape architect) Montagu's role in the Strathclyde Park project
began to diminish after 1971, and ceased altogether after 1975.

William Gillespie and Associates were appointed in November
1973, and in May 1974 prepared their Landscape Master Plan for the
park (Gillespie, 1974). This plan was instrumental in establishing
the landscape framework which has been a major success of the park.
The landscape treatment of the area was regarded as a crucial factor
in the success of the rehabilitation and recreational proposals, and
this was the motivation behind Gillespie's appointment.

A large part of the overall concept for the design of the park
had been firmly established prior to Gillespie's appointment. The
contract for Stage 1 had been in progress for some months, and
consequently Gillespie had to accept many of the basic design concepts,
and weld these together within the existing and proposed park
landscape. They had to focus from the outset on land form, footpaths,
the treatment to the loch shore and planting in order to avoid hold-
ups in the contract. A requirement of the detailed brief prepared
by the Park Director was the production of a comprehensive landscape
policy map, and a master plan which Gillespie saw as:

> Essential in order that landscape, engineering and
> architectural features can be satisfactorily
> interrelated within the Park. (Gillespie, 1974, p.1)

Unlike the Montagu proposals, Gillespie's master plan outlined
proposals based on nine major habitat areas of the park, and included

costs and phasing. Thus Gillespie brought a rigour and rationality to the Strathclyde Park project through the preparation of a detailed and comprehensive plan for the treatment of the landscape, as well as the design of the loch shore, car parking areas and the footpath system. Gillespie's major influence on the project was therefore the master plan and associated woodland management proposals which were regarded as solving:

> The various competing design and management concepts
> for the Park. (Gillespie, 1974, p.1)

At the outset of detailed planning for the Strathclyde Park project in the mid 1960's, none of the three local authorities responsible for bringing the park idea to fruition had the detailed technical advice at its disposal within the ranks of its own officials. The creation of the loch was a major engineering task which demanded detailed investigation prior to detailed planning of the form and content of the park. Each of the main consultants played a crucial role in influencing the output of the park project. Binnie's was perhaps the most significant contribution, as they were the only consultants involved throughout the feasibility, design and construction stages. The form of the loch was based on Binnie's advice, and it was largely left to them to resolve the major hydraulic problem involved in diverting the river Clyde and forming the loch, with the exacting standards required for the rowing course.

Montagu's major contribution was the 1967 proposals, which articulated the local authorities' aspirations for the park and middle Clyde valley area, although these led to major conflicts at political and professional levels with central government. Certainly, Scott (1983) evaluates the achievements of the whole Strathclyde Park process against the 1967 proposals. Yet implementation subsequently revealed the inadequacies of the planning stages, since much of the basis for the cost estimates of the landscaping and recreation facilities was subsequently revealed to be inaccurate. It was only with the provision by Gillespie of a plan for the landscaping of the whole park area that some order was brought to the project, and this plan was Gillespie's major contribution and influence. The plan was prepared during the construction of Stage 1, in association with the Park Director, Binnie, and the Countryside Commission, and involved much reappraisal and redesign of detailed aspects (such as car parks). It also included new proposals which had not previously been

considered (including edge treatment of the loch).

Each of the main consultants had different characteristics, were involved with different aspects of the park, at different stages in the project, and therefore it is difficult to sum up the role and influence of consultants as a whole: different consultants brought different abilities and perspectives to bear, with correspondingly different results. However, what they did have in common in the case of Strathclyde Park were (a) a technical expertise lacking within the ranks of the local authorities; and (b) an interdisciplinary and multi-organisational perspective.

5. Government Agencies

Following the establishment of the Countryside Commission for Scotland in 1968, the Nature Conservancy Council and a reconstituted Scottish Sports Council in 1972, these Government agencies, with their grant-aiding powers and specialist knowledge, immediately began to play an active role in the refinement and implementation of the park proposals.

Part I of the Countryside (Scotland) Act 1967 established a Countryside Commission for Scotland with a general remit to keep under review all matters relating to (a) the provision, development and improvement of facilities for the enjoyment of the countryside, (b) the conservation and enhancement of its natural beauty and amenity, and (c) the need to secure public access to the countryside for the purposes of open-air recreation. In particular, sections 5 and 6 of the Act charged the Commission to become involved in development projects which (i) involved the application of new or developed methods, concepts or techniques, and (ii) were designed to illustrate the appropriateness of a project to that area or to other areas with similar problems. In addition to these specific tasks, Part IV of the Act provided powers for local authorities to establish country parks, countryside accommodation such as camping sites, and to make bye-laws and appoint wardens for certain areas of land, parks or waterways. Part V provided grants to local authorities of up to 75% of expenditure incurred in "designated countryside" within the purposes of the Act.

With the appointment of Commissioners and officials from early
1969, charged with a new and untried remit, the Strathclyde Park
proposal was already at an advanced planning stage, and immediately
became the Commission's early priority. Its objectives coincided with
the new Act, the country park concept, and the remit of the Commission
(SDD, 1968). The concept of the country park stemmed from a
perception in the mid 1960's of the "urgent need" to provide for
townspeople in concentrations of population adequate facilities for
open air recreation in the countryside. The 1967 Act laid a duty on
local planning authorities to assess need in their areas, and for
the Countryside Commission to pay particular regard to this aspect of
recreational and amenity planning. Whilst section 48 of the Act
provided what could be regarded at the time as a working definition
of a country park, in the late 1960's and early 1970's there was no
clear conception of what a country park was in practice (Duffield and
Owen, 1970). There appeared, therefore, to be little conflict of
interest between the Commission and the local authorities when the
Commission suggested that Strathclyde Park should be termed a "country
park", although the local authorities continued to regard the park
as having a regional focus. It was not until the 1981 Countryside
Act that separate definitions and roles for country parks and regional
parks were articulated.

The Commission's initial objectives for Strathclyde Park, within
the framework of the 1967 Act, were (Cameron, 1982):
1. conservation: protection of the nature reserve and the natural
   woodland;
2. rehabilitation of the landscape;
3. provision of recreational facilities for a deprived area.

Although the 1967 proposals for the park had already been
prepared, and advanced discussions between central and local government
had already taken place before the Commission's establishment, there-
after Commission officials played a central role through (a) advising
on general landscape matters, and (b) influencing the style of the
development. The Countryside Commission became involved in the park
proposals automatically and inevitably, since the whole project
developed out of a Scottish Office initiative. It should also be
noted that proposals for the development of the park were evolving
coincidentally with the campaign in the early 1960's for the

establishment of a Countryside Commission for Scotland.

Whilst the 1967 Act provided a remit for the Commission and
a working definition of a country park, it was not until the mid
1970's that the Commission began to develop a countryside recreation
policy framework (Countryside Commission for Scotland, 1974).   Between
the late 1960's and the mid 1970's therefore, there was no firm policy
context for Scottish countryside planning other than ideas imported
from abroad, and the "Countryside in 1970" conferences.   The early
initiative of Strathclyde Park therefore provided a test bed for
recreational ideas, and perhaps had more influence on the development
of the Commission's policies and objectives than vice-versa.

The early aims of the Countryside Commission for Strathclyde
Park were very much the aims of SDD planners, since the Commission
was pitched into the detailed planning and implementation of the
modified 1967 proposals from the outset.   Strathclyde Park provided
a learning experience for the embryo Commission, whilst its
involvement assisted in bringing the park idea to practical reality,
particularly concerning the detailed design of the landscape and the
passive recreational facilities.

The criticisms of country parks generally articulated by Slee
(1982) are directed at the process by which countryside recreation
policies have emerged, in particular the early policy vacuum and
the imprecision of the country park concept.   The changing aims of
countryside recreation policy in general, as stated by the Country-
side Commission from the mid 1970's, have influenced the fate of
Strathclyde Park.   Whilst these aims did not alter significantly
during the construction of Stage 1, their subsequent reformulation   ·
(Countryside Commission for Scotland, 1980) has served to reduce the
prospects for the further development of the park.

At the time of construction, Strathclyde Park was consuming
most of the Scottish countryside budget (Scott, 1983; Cameron, 1982)
primarily due to the advocacy of the park members and officials.   To
date, the Commission has contributed £3,200,000 in grant aid for the
park's countryside facilities.   The Strathclyde Park experience,
together with the other early parks, has assisted in the clarification
of countryside recreation planning objectives, and has also clarified

the role of the Countryside Commission in their achievement.

By the time that construction had begun on the park, the Countryside Commission had indentified three main functions of a country park;

    (i) the provision of a convenient area, in a rural location and within a parkland system for Scotland, where people can enjoy a wide range of open air leisure pursuits;

   (ii) as a means of reducing recreational pressures on high quality farmland and in vulnerable scenic and wildlife areas;

 (iii) to assist in the improvement of education in conservation.

                  (Select Committee on Scottish Affairs, 1972, p119)

By 1974, the Commission had formulated these objectives into its "Park System for Scotland". By 1981, sufficient clarity had been brought to the parkland concept to separate the roles and functions of country parks from regional parks in the 1981 Countryside Act. Cameron (1982) suggests that, initially, Strathclyde Park was not considered country park material, and certainly there were disagreements within SDD during the formative stages of the park proposals. Cameron also suggests that the experience of Strathclyde Park changed the Commission's ideas about countryside recreational provision, particularly with regard to the potential of urban fringe areas:

> Countryside recreation is wherever a countryside experience can be found. In the case of Strathclyde Park, this countryside experience was created.   (Cameron, 1982)

In the view of at least one senior official, therefore, the park experience changed, to some extent, Commission policy to give preference to recreation schemes in the urban fringe.

The Scottish Sports Council was established in 1972 by Royal Charter with the objects of "fostering the knowledge and practice of sport and physical recreation among the public at large and the provision of facilities therefor" (SDD, 1975). Like the Countryside Commission its members are appointed by the Secretary of State and serve as individuals rather than in representative capacities. The Council identifies its main role as being to encourage people to take part in some form of sport or physical recreation and to provide or

assist in the provision of opportunities to enable them to do so.

Sports interests first became involved in the Strathclyde Park proposals in January 1967, through the predessor organisation, the Scottish Council for Physical Recreation (SCPR). SCPR had links with water sports interests, and followed up the proposed mile-long loch and water sports centre by suggesting to the local authorities the provision of a rowing and canoeing course to international standard, since there were no such facilities in Scotland at that time. According to one senior official of the Sports Council (Davies, 1983), the international rowing course derived from one member of SCPR, who also happened to be a member of the Scottish Amateur Rowing Association (SARA), learning in the mid 1960's of the middle Clyde park proposal "on the grapevine", and suggesting SCPR capitalise on the opportunity to provide a rowing and canoeing centre to a standard capable of attracting international competition.

By the time the Scottish Sports Council was established, the main elements of Stage 1 of the park had been defined, and the construction period was soon to commence. Like the Countryside · Commission, this was the new Sports Council's first major project, and it participated in its planning and development on two levels: (i) grant-aiding those aspects of the park's facilities intended for international competition and national training, and (ii) advising on the design and provision of other facilities for sport or other active recreation, such as sports pitches, golf courses, equipment storage. From autumn 1973, the Sports Council began to make financial contributions in the form of grant aid for the rowing and canoeing course, and for associated facilities.

In addition to advising on sports facilities, the Council played an influential role, in the form of its predecessors the SCPR, in the formative stages of the park plan, advocating, in concert with water sports interests, the adaptation of the loch element of SDD's outline plan to include a rowing and canoeing course to international standard. In this respect, SSC/SCPR were taking advantage of a large scale engineering project, which was to have a mile-long man-made loch as its focus, to provide a catalytic facility for rowing and canoeing, and thereby to aid the development of such watersports in Scotland. Over the period of evolution and implementation of the

park proposals, SSC has not shifted in attitude or intention, whereby
its objectives for the park have been on two levels (Davies, 1982):

(i) provision of advice and, where appropriate, grant-aid for the
provision of sports facilities in accordance with the terms
of the Sports Council Charter;

(ii)provision of a water sports centre for national training
and international competition for rowing and canoeing.

There is evidence from 1974 that SSC was becoming concerned
that active sports were tending to dominate the park, to the detriment
of its country park role (SSC, 1974), whilst its latter objective
remains unfulfilled pending the completion of the rowing and canoeing
course to international standard. To date, SSC has contributed
£300,000 to the development of the rowing course, and has allocated
a further £40,000 as a contribution to its completion.

Whilst the rowing and canoeing centre has yet to stage
international competitions, SSC regards it as providing a valuable
national training facility, and it is well used by rowing and
canoeing clubs. However, such a facility did not have to be provided
in a country park, nor in north Lanarkshire. The mere fact that
major land rehabilitation, including the provision of a large, man-
made loch, was proposed presented the opportunity at the time
to provide such a facility. In these respects the water sports centre
meets the Sports Council's objectives.

The Council did not play a leading role in the project, but has
been dependent upon what one SSC official regards as the rigours of a
local democratic process made more complex by the number of local
authorities involved, presenting difficulties in the disbursement of
its grant aid according to its capital programme (Davies, 1982).

The Nature Conservancy was established under the National Parks
and Access to the Countryside Act 1949, and was one of the few
provisions of that Act which applied to Scotland. It acquired some
additional powers under the 1967 Countryside Act, and became the
Nature Conservancy Council (NCC) with the passing of the Nature
Conservancy Council Act in 1973.

From the very early stages of the evolution of proposals for

Strathclyde Park, there was a strong nature conservation interest
with the colonisation of the ponds and wetlands (created by the
subsidence) by wildfowl and other fauna. This led to the designation
of a Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) in 1955, and a Bird
Sanctuary in 1958. The early objective of the Nature Conservancy
was to safeguard the wildlife value of this area during consideration
of a Hamilton by-pass road in the 1950's, which in the 1960's became
the M74 motorway. The Nature Conservancy officer with responsibility
for the area indicated in 1967 that, even then, there was a danger
of the wildlife interest being neglected in plans for the area:

> There has been confusion and uncertainty in the
> minds of those with whom I have been dealing as
> to the area of the Bird Sanctuary, what its
> interest was and whether the fact of the Bird
> Sanctuary laid any limitations upon their
> proposed plan.   (Huxley, 1967)

In the early 1960's, when SDD was preparing its outline plan,
Nature Conservancy, together with the Royal Society for the Protection
of Birds and the Scottish Wildlife Trust, expressed strong reservations
about a major recreation facility in the Hamilton Low Parks area, in
particular the replacement or extension of some of the ponds to form
a new loch. Although Nature Conservancy had little direct involvement
in the discussions leading firstly to the 1967 proposals, and latterly
to the 1971 modified Stage 1, Norden and Idle (1975) were able to
state:

> Despite the construction of the M74 the interest
> and potential of the area has hardly waned and
> still has considerable scientific, educational
> and amenity value. The creation of Strathclyde
> Regional Park presents an excellent opportunity
> to both develop and conserve the wildlife
> resources of the area for the benefit of the
> community as a whole.   (p.2)

The impact of the decision to proceed with the M74 motorway
through the Bird Sanctuary, effectively bisecting it, radically
changed the context for Nature Conservancy attitudes to the park idea.
Whilst Huxley could bemoan in 1967 the apparent inability of SDD to
coordinate the activities of its engineers and roads surveyors with
the requirements of the 1958 Order, once the motorway was constructed
a park whereby the nature conservation interest could be managed and
developed was recognised as representing the best prospect. On this
basis, a Nature Conservation Advisory Group was established with the
agreement of the Joint Committee in 1973, chaired by the Conservancy,

and including representatives of the Scottish Wildlife Trust (SWT),
the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB), and Hamilton
Natural History Society. It provided detailed comments on the local
authorities proposals, whereas the 1975 habitat survey by Norden and
Idle provided more detailed guidance in the wake of Gillespie's 1974
landscape plan.

Nature Conservancy Council today regards Strathclyde Park as
meeting nature conservation objectives, in that being included within
the park, it has been easier to control public access to the nature
reserves and the SSSI. Most of the damage and disruption to the
nature conservation value of the area occurred during the
construction of the M74 in the 1960's. Overall, NCC regards the
development of the park as a benefit to nature conservation. However,
in 1974 when Stage 1 was under construction and the Joint Committee
was considering the detailed requirements of Stage 2, NCC and others
criticised the local authorities' enthusiasm for maximising active
recreation facilities in the park, which were perceived as prejudicing
other objectives:

> There does seem to be the danger here of trying
> to squeeze too many uses into the area, and
> very careful thought will be required if the...
> ..activities (proposed) do not begin to cut
> across other things proposed for the Park.   (Idle, 1974)

The Clyde River Purification Board (CRPB) first became involved
in the Strathclyde Park project in 1965, since the creation of the
loch was to be controlled by the Reservoirs (Scotland) Act, and then
with the decision to supply the loch from the South Calder Water.
Earlier, the hydraulics and engineering feasibility studies on firstly
damming and secondly diverting the river Clyde had significant
implications for the flow of water in the river (which was subject
to periodic spate), and for water catchment and the river system
generally. CRPB was established under the Rivers (Prevention of
Pollution)(Scotland) Act 1951, but it obtained special powers to
control underground discharges and the diversion of rivers under the
Clyde River Purification Board Act 1972.

There were great problems of discharges to the South Calder
Water due to a plethora of outlets from local steelworks which
multiplied in the years preceding the establishment of the River
Boards. Much of the pipework was underground and unrecorded, and

there were many discharges to boreholes and old shafts. The effect
of the Strathclyde Park scheme was to tackle, much earlier than would
have been the case, these substantial pollution problems if the water
sports facilities were to operate successfully.

CRPB did not participate directly in the planning of the park,
and only became significantly involved in 1972 when problems of
effluent discharge to the South Calder Water were bringing pollution
issues to the fore on the eve of the onset of construction works.
Even after 1967, by which time the local authorities had formulated
their proposals for the park, the pollution aspect was only given
serious consideration immediately prior to the formation of the loch,
despite attempts by CRPB to become more formally and directly
involved in the deliberations of the Joint Committee. Whilst the
priority, regionally and locally, for Strathclyde Park served to
accelerate the introduction of measures to deal with pollution,
including major treatment works at Ravenscraig and the upgrading of
public plants, serious consideration of the continuing problems of
effluent discharge, which threatened the viability of the water sports
facilities, only began to take place with the establishment by the
Park Director in 1975 of a Loch Consultative Committee in recognition
that:

> The success of the Park depends upon and will
> continue to depend upon the collaboration of the
> British Steel Corporation works in and around
> Motherwell.   (NCC, 1975)

Water quality as an objective only became significant during
park construction, and the failure to directly involve CRPB
throughout design, particularly after 1968 when the source of water
supply was to be the South Calder, serves to highlight the lack of
consideration of the full implications of using the South Calder as
the source of water supply for a loch which was to have a major
recreational function.

6. Sectional Interests

The major industrial operations fringeing the park had little
involvement in implementation beyond the Loch Consultative Committee,
whereas water sports interests played a more central and direct role

in the development of the park from the outset. The Scottish Amateur
Rowing Association(SARA) in particular, through links with SCPR,
pressed for the international standard rowing course. In 1971, it
submitted views to the Joint Committee in support of this element
at a time when the additional costs of the higher specification for
the loch design were being reappraised by the engineering consultants.
SARA and the Scottish Canoe Union (SCU) advised on detailed design
aspects of the water sports facilities and, with completion of the
rowing course to international standard in time for the 1986
Commonwealth games, can be considered to have achieved their objectives,
if belatedly.

Nature conservation interests were represented by the Scottish
Wildlife Trust (SWT) and the Royal Society for the Protection of
Birds (RSPB), who were involved from the early stages of park design,
and the Hamilton Natural History Society, which joined with the
former in the Nature Conservation Advisory Group. The Trust and RSPB
were particularly active in initially opposing the whole idea of a
park at this location, which they saw as conflicting with the needs
of conservation, particularly with regard to the control of public
access. However, the completion of the M74 had the more significant
impact, which Norden and Idle (1975) indicated was of a short term
nature. Thereafter the park was regarded as a means of introducing
positive management of the wildlife resource.

7. Conclusion

Strathclyde Park is the product of a diversity of aims and
intentions deriving from a multi-organisational planning context.
Although the original idea is rooted in the Clyde Valley Regional Plan,
although SDD resurrected and promoted the idea in the early 1960's,
and although responsibility for implementation was vested in a Park
Authority created for the purpose, no one particular set of aims
dominated throughout. Indeed, the Park in its current form could be
considered the outcome of a conflicting central-local government
relationship, mediated by the viewpoints and influences of a range of
other government, quasi-government and sectional interests.

Whilst no one set of aims held eminence throughout the life of

the project, it is also the case that sets of ideas changed and evolved over the period, as a response to external and internal factors, and as a consequence of the learning process of experience (Dunn, 1971).

Whilst SDD's primary consideration was to rehabilitate the landscape, including the formation of a loch, to assist economic planning initiatives, the radically different intentions of the local authorities soon brought them into conflict with the Government view. As a consequence, the whole project underwent a bargaining process over the period 1967-1974 in which SDD was concerned to limit the ambitions of the local authorities to the level of grant aid likely to be available.

Both central and local government were motivated by a concern to see environmental improvements to an area badly scarred by industrial processes. SDD saw this being achieved by a landscape improvement which, in the view of the local authorities, merely removed the appearance of dereliction as seen from the motorway. The local authorities, on the other hand, wanted to improve the whole environmental image of the area in a much wider sense. They were thus receptive at the outset to approaches from watersports interests that a rowing and canoeing course to international competition standards should be incorporated in the loch design. At that time, there was only one inland water sports centre of international standard in the UK, and none in Scotland. The acceptance by the local authorities (and SDD) of the rowing course idea radically changed the whole nature of the park, and particularly the role of the loch within it.

The local authorities saw the opportunity to bring national and international attention to North Lanarkshire as a venue for water sports competition, with the attendant publicity. Although the rowing course was included in the local authorities' 1967 proposals, it was the establishment of the Scottish Sports Council in 1972 which gave a further boost to the prospect for providing the rowing course by virtue of the Council's remit to advise on the provision of sports facilities generally, but particularly for national training and international competition, and its grant-aiding powers. Up until that time, SDD expected the local authorities to

finance the rowing course, since SDD was financing, through grant
aid, the land reclamation and countryside elements.

The Scottish Council for Physical Recreation, reconstituted
as the Scottish Sports Council in 1972, had been a supporter of the
rowing course from the outset by virtue of its links with the Scottish
Amateur Rowing Association and the Scottish Canoe Union. SARA in
particular strongly advocated the inclusion of the rowing course
specification in the loch design, thus seizing the opportunity
provided by the intention to form the loch as an integral part of the
project. In the meantime the Countryside Commission for Scotland
had been established following the 1967 Act, and from early 1969 had
begun to advise the local authorities on the countryside recreational
aspects of the park. The growth of leisure research stressing
mobility and affluence, and the importance of ideas and concepts
from the United States, both combined with the rising currency of
regional planning to encourage the local authorities to stress what
they saw as the strategic importance of the middle Clyde valley as
added justification for the rowing course, as well as their ambitious
range of recreational proposals. These factors shifted the park idea
much closer to the Abercrombie proposal for a centre for regional
sports and pastimes, and away from an essentially land reclamation
exercise with attendant recreational facilities.

Whilst the development and implementation of Strathclyde Park
has been characterised by a multi-organisational planning framework,
with the added involvement at various times of sectional interests,
some of these organisations, as in the case of Government agencies,
only became involved during implementation. Although they were unable
to influence the design stage, they sought to bring their own interests
and objectives to bear during implementation, and thereby reappraise
original objectives and alter the course of implementation. Others,
as in the case of sectional interests, were involved from the outset,
and although enjoying mixed success in achieving their aims did
influence the project throughout its evolution and established at an
early stage a priority for their particular interest. Yet others,
such as CRPB and local industries were unable to become centrally
involved, due to a lack of appreciation by the Joint Committee of the
pollution implications for the project. This omission, and the
failure to ensure that pollution control paralleled   park development,

has had some adverse consequences for the park's public image, and contributed to the curtailment of the project after 1975. Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) have shown that it is often the failure to consider some of the fine detail of implementation that can have serious consequences for the success of a project.

A feature of park development has therefore been the need for the implementers to resolve a number of conflicts which were highlighted by sectional interests. Whilst the recreational interests have largely achieved their aims, the pollution problem has still to be adequately resolved.

The central participants in the project were representatives of central and local government. The particular feature of their involvement was the changing nature of their objectives, which in the case of both saw a reduction in their horizons of expectations, both due primarily to changes in the involvement of key personnel. In the case of SDD, the early enthusiasm of Government planners which launched the project in 1964 gave way to the financial pragmatism of the administrators of the countryside and land reclamation budgets, particularly after 1970 and more seriously after 1974. The commitment of the local authorities disappeared after 1975, when responsibility for the park passed from the joint Committee to the new regional council, which had wider interests and different priorities.

From the preceding analysis, it would appear that;
(i) it is difficult to evaluate the success of the park in meeting its objectives, since objectives varied between participants in the project, were not clearly defined, and tended to change as the park project evolved;
(ii) the development of the park cannot be explained by reference to any model of comprehensive rationality, but rather has proceeded via a bargaining process in a multi-organisational planning context in which some objectives have been reformulated in order to achieve reduced expectations;
(iii) the objectives and interests of organisations participating only during later stages of the development have had a mediating effect on the objectives of the principal participants, particularly the Joint Committee as main implementing agency;
(iv) park development has proceeded not by one planning process,

but by a number of sub-processes emerging in response to
the currency of particular issues. These processes have
been less of a linear and more of a recursive or iterative
nature.

The changes in objectives explain in part the changing nature
of the various park proposals, derived in part from revised
organisational arrangements. These changes also coloured the
processes of communication generated by the organisational framework
and the wider influence of external factors, providing at various
times opportunities for and constraints to action. The central-
local government relationship, mediated by the multi-organisational
planning context, is the main feature affecting the development and
implementation of Strathclyde Park, and is uppermost in the following
chapters in which means, processes and external factors are considered
in detail.

CHAPTER VII

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATHCLYDE PARK (2):

THE MEANS TO ACTION

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THE MEANS TO ACTION

1. Introduction

Although the proposal for a major recreational facility in the middle Clyde valley originates with the 1946 Regional Plan, a period of 18 years elapsed before the conditions became favourable for action. The regional and national recreation facilities proposed in the 1946 Plan were dependent upon the establishment of a regional planning authority, also advocated in the plan, to provide and manage such facilities, as well as to coordinate the implementation of the overall strategy as it affected the conurbation, specifically: (i) acquisition and control of green belt land; (ii) regional parks; (iii) conservation of water resources; (iv) establishment of new towns and oversight of local planning schemes; (v) distribution and location of industry; (vi) land rehabilitation

Much of what was recommended in the plan was accepted by the Advisory Committee, but no agreement was reached on the proposed regional authority. This proposal was not implemented, and with the failure to establish the regional authority some aspects of the plan, including the regional parks and recreation centres, were not incorporated into the subsequent development plans of the local authorities.

Any action to bring about a rehabilitation of the middle Clyde valley was dependent upon (a) substantial financial resources, due to the major engineering operations required, and therefore necessitating the involvement of the Government; (b) the motivation for action: up until the mid-1960's, Government grants for land rehabilitation militated against large-scale schemes with a low financial return, such as recreational open space. There were no grants until 1967 for the provision of recreational facilities, and no policy direction on countryside recreation until the 1960's.

2. SDD's 1964 Outline Scheme : a Catalyst for Action

One of the proposals in the Clyde Valley plan was for an A74 by-
pass road for Hamilton, passing through the middle Clyde valley. In
the 1950's, SDD engineers reassessed the requirements of this road,
and concluded that upgrading to motorway standard was required. The
programme for the construction of the M74 indicated that site works
would take place in the middle Clyde valley in the 1963-66 period.
At the same time, emerging Government regional policy, first expressed
in the 1963 White Paper, was identifying a link between high levels
of out-migration from Scotland (particularly from west central
Scotland) and poor environment, and it became a priority of regional
policy to focus attention on action to improve the physical
environment as a complement to economic policies for the attraction
of new industrial investment. It was these factors in combination
which motivated SDD planners to prepare in 1964 an outline plan for
the rehabilitation of the middle Clyde valley (SDD, 1964a, b) and
thereby give a lead to the local authorities through the North Lanark-
shire Growth Area Committee, established in the wake of the 1963
White Paper.

The 1964 plan was important in that (a) it focused discussion
on a series of proposals, although both their implications and
feasibility required further investigation; (b) it demonstrated to
the local authorities what could be done, given the commitment, the
resources, and a positive attitude; (c) it provided the first clear
indication to the local authorities that SDD regarded the middle Clyde
valley as a planning priority. The main features of SDD's 1964
proposal for a "Middle Clyde Regional Park" were:
  (i) landscaping of the Low Parks west of the motorway, using
       surplus soil from the M74 roadworks;
  (ii) creation of a loch providing a surface of 200 acres for
       sailing and other water sports;
  (iii) use of material removed in forming the loch in the rehabil-
       itation of adjoining areas;
  (iv) landscaping of sites surrounding the loch and construction
       of a boating centre, restaurants and picnic spaces, and a
       caravan and camping centre;
  (v) construction of a tourist roadway with parking spaces east
       of the loch;
  (vi) formation throughout the valley of a system of pedestrian

ways, picnic places and tourist viewpoints, and provision of
parks at Blantyre and Dalzell, Motherwell;
(vii)extensive tree planting to form a sense of enclosure and a
clear visual break between the built-up areas and the valley.

The 1946 Clyde Valley Plan had referred to the advantage of
having a water focus to each of the regional parks and recreation
centres, and one of the locational advantages of the Hamilton Low
Parks was that the river Clyde meandered through it, and there were
a number of ponds created by mining subsidence. The provision of a
loch was central to the park plan from the outset, and was given
additional credence by SDD's view in 1964 that:

> Not only is the creation of the lake itself a main
> feature of the proposals, but its construction is
> closely linked with the rehabilitation and after
> use of the adjoining land. (SDD, 1964b, p.2)

The estimated cost of the 1964 plan, excluding the formation
of the loch was £575,000. The only grant aid likely to be available
at that time was for clearance of derelict land under section 5 of
the Local Employment Act 1960. Additional proposals included a new
railway station to serve the recreational centre, a heliport to
provide a link with internal air routes, a motel at nearby
Chatelherault, and a limited number of high cost housing sites in
the valley, to assist in recouping some of the costs of the scheme.
The proposals were accepted in principle at the meeting of the North
Lanarkshire Growth Area Committee in November 1964. Early in 1965,
the three affected local authorities established a Joint Working
Party to commission consultants to establish firstly the engineering
feasibility of the loch proposal, followed by a detailed plan for the
middle Clyde Valley.

3. The 1967 Proposals : a Bid for Resources

In their 1965 Interim Report (Binnie & Partners, 1965), the
engineering consultants established the feasibility of the loch proposal,
at a cost in excess of £300,000. The 1967 Montagu planning proposals
were based on assumptions of local population growth (as indicated in
the 1963 White Paper), the expanded catchment area provided by the
accessibility of the motorway, and that the provisions of the (then)

forthcoming Countryside Act would apply to the proposals. Whilst
Montagu saw the middle Clyde area as a potential   linear park on the
Lee Valley Park model (Civic Trust, 1964), they also saw the proposed
loch as the obvious location for "Strathclyde Park" as the focus for
the whole area.

The 1967 proposals comprised a list of landscaping and
recreational projects for a nine-mile stretch of the Clyde valley,
with Strathclyde Park at its focus. These comprised:
    (i) the elimination of industrial dereliction and dumps, and the
        screening of essential industrial features;
    (ii)the improvement of access to the area, including a Clydeside
        footpath, connecting footpaths, bridleways, roads, bus services
        and car parks;
    (iii)the provision of additional attractions and amenities, and
        their grouping with those already existing in the area.

In (iii) a Strathclyde Park was seen as the focus of the whole
rehabilitation scheme, with the main elements comprising:
    (a) caravan sites and a motel as staging facilities for motorway
        travellers in addition to the service areas;
    (b) a loch, with provision for sailing, international rowing and
        canoeing, and angling;
    (c) an educational training centre;
    (d) a nature reserve in lieu of the former Bird Sanctuary;
    (e) a riding and pony trekking centre;
    (f) dry ski slopes and a lift in the South Calder Valley;
    (g) adventure playgrounds and a canoe centre;
    (h) a lochside road, restaurants, picnic areas and car parks;
    (i) a regional sports centre, including an athletics stadium,
        museum and cinema, the whole complex to be capable of
        supporting national and international events, and located
        close to the motorway interchange for maximum accessibility;
    (j) a local park golf course, and a sports village to serve the
        regional sports centre.

The programme for the creation of the Strathclyde Park was
envisaged as being undertaken in four stages, with the land rehabilita-
tion and landscape works, the playing fields, countryside recreation
and water sports centre comprising Stage 1, at an estimated cost of

£2,532,000. The costs given were emphasised only as a very rough
guide and indication of the scale of operations required to implement
Stage 1. Of this sum, by far the most expensive item was the
formation of the loch at an estimated cost of £420,000, and a further
£200,000 for the water sports centre. The main items to be provided
in Stage 2 were the sports centre, dry ski slopes, a canoe centre,
and a museum and art gallery. A large athletics stadium was the
principal component of Stage 3, and a sports village in Stage 4.

In the range of facilities proposed, the 1967 proposals were
approaching the original idea of the regional recreation centre in
the Clyde Valley Plan, and represented a substantial move away from
the landscaping exercise outlined by SDD three years earlier. These
proposals could therefore be considered a "bid" by the local
authorities for additional Government finance, in the context of (a)
the favourable economic and regional policy environment, (b) the
Government's advocacy of major projects to tackle land rehabilitation
in the interests of economic expansion, and (c) the Government's
concern to illustrate how the provisions of the Countryside Act could
apply to large-scale recreational developments.

Whilst the 1964 plan served the purpose of illustrating to the
local authorities how the aims of the 1963 White Paper could be
implemented in practical planning terms (and hence sufficed as a
catalyst for action), the 1967 proposals were the product of the local
authorities' new-found enthusiasm for recreation planning in a new
and favourable development climate. In addition, the 1967 proposals
envisaged a rehabilitation of the middle Clyde valley with a regional
park at its centre, attracting population from throughout central
Scotland in addition to the north Lanarkshire/middle Clyde area. In
this respect, the local authorities saw the opportunity to provide,
within the loch design, an international standard rowing course as
not only a means of legitimising the regional focus of the park, but
also as a means of improving the symbolic image of north Lanarkshire,
through its association with international rowing events and the
attendant publicity:

> That centre, being in its complete, finished
> product, would have been a "one-off" for Western
> Europe. Indeed, we could have sold the west of
> Scotland on Strathclyde Park, as far as incoming
> industrialists are concerned.   (Scott, 1983)

The ambitions of the local authorities, as expressed in the 1967 proposals, provoked a new round of central-local government discussions. SDD criticised the revised scheme as being "too lavish", although agreeing that:

> The work which the County and burghs have done here
> meets the terms of the (1967) Act, and is the kind
> the Countryside Commission was designed to encourage.
>   (SDD, 1968, p.2)

The estimated costs of £2·5 millions for Stage 1 were considerably in excess of SDD's anticipations as expressed in the 1964 plan. The concern to keep the costs within manageable proportions, whilst at the same time seeking to avoid dampening the enthusiasm of the local authorities (with consequences for the political momentum of the project), led to the establishment of the Technical Working Party in 1969, the identification of those aspects likely to qualify for grant-aid, and an emphasis on Stage 1 only. The outcome was revised proposals by Montagu in 1971. Additionally, the estimated 10% increase in the costs of the engineering and hydrological works due to the need to divert the river Clyde encouraged SDD to adopt a much more pragmatic, finance-led approach to the project after 1968.

4. The 1971 Proposals : a Compromise

The revised 1971 proposals included the loch and by-pass channel, retention of the rowing course, the nature reserve, two caravan sites and a camping site, playing fields, car parks and a park road, and informal open space and footpaths. The total cost of the revised proposals was estimated at £2,784,600 (bearing in mind the cost increases due to the diversion of the river Clyde via a new by-pass channel). Approximately 50% of this cost was expected to qualify for derelict land grant.

The 1971 proposals represented a considerable reduction in the scope of the project. In Scott's (1983) view, this was a major paring-down of what the local authorities wanted:

> (SDD) were going to do a cosmetic exercise and tart
> up the thing so that they would only then have to
> take away the appearance of dereliction...We then
> made up our minds that we were going for something
> worthwhile, that this community needed.   (Scott,1983)

The 1971 proposals therefore provided the basis for the start
of construction work in 1973, and represented in large part a shift
back to the earlier intentions of SDD in 1964. However, the local
authorities continued to press for their vision of the park in
discussions on Stage 2, to which SDD had given no commitment when
accepting the revised Stage 1 plan in 1971.

The 1964 and 1967 proposals represented, in their purest forms,
the expectations of central and local government respectively. The
1964 plan was conditioned by an initial concern to meet the timetable
of earthworks for the M74 construction, and latterly to improve the
landscape appearance of the middle Clyde valley. For their part,
once they had been spurred to action, the local authorities expressed
in their 1967 proposals an emphasis much more on recreation than on
landscape. In this respect they could be said to be closer than the
SDD plan to the intentions of the 1946 proposal.

The 1971 proposals represented a victory for central government
pragmatism over local authority idealism. SDD was to be the major
financial sponsor since approximately 80% of the costs of Stage 1 were
to be met from rehabilitation and countryside grants. SDD had gone
some way in the late 1960's to bend the definition of derelict land
which qualified for grant under the 1966 Act, and it was generally
recognised that the project as a whole could only proceed on the basis
of substantial Government financial aid. The park proposals therefore
had to satisfy Government objectives more than local objectives, since
the local authorities, even in combination, did not have the resources
to proceed to implementation on their own account.

Sillince (1934) suggests that, as means, plans have multiple
purposes:
   (i) the production of a technical result, such as a master
       plan or blueprint;
   (ii) a tool for arguing for more resources, by presenting a
        rationally argued "bid" (such as Housing Plans);
   (iii) a means of countering criticism, by responding to particular
         political pressures, but keeping its objectives implicit;
   (iv) a generator of ideas or catalyst for action by others, or for
        simply generating confidence.

From this analysis Sillince contends:

> Thus plans nearly always have a wide variety of
> functions. Only some of these functions are
> technical, or implementational, or product
> orientated. The rest are political. It may be a
> mistake therefore for planners to evaluate plans
> solely in terms of whether or not they are
> implemented. Sometimes whether or not a plan is
> implemented can be an irrelevance.   (p.21)

Clearly, the only plan in the Strathclyde Park process geared
towards producing a technical result was the 1974 Landscape Master
Plan, together with individual designs for the loch, the water sports
centre and other components. The 1964 SDD plan, on the other hand,
functioned as a generator of ideas: as a catalyst for the actions of
the local authorities. The 1967 proposals represented a clear bid
by the local authorities for Government resources. The 1971 revised
scheme could therefore be regarded as the outcome of a process of
mediation between local political aspirations, technical feasibility,
and realism in terms of the financial resources likely to be available.

Construction work began on the basis of the revised 1971
proposals in June 1973. At the outset of the construction period,
the cost of Stage 1 was estimated at £4·3 millions. During
construction the inadequacies of the 1971 proposals were highlighted,
particularly in regard to the landscaping and design of the car parks.
These inadequacies contributed to the commissioning of William
Gillespie and Associates as replacement landscape architects in 1973.
Many of the specifications of the 1971 proposals were changed in
response to criticisms by the Countryside Commission and the Nature
Conservation Advisory Group. New specifications for the design of
car parks, and for landscaping and tree planting, substantially
increased the costs of the project, as did the design of the rowing
course to meet the exacting standards required for international
competition.

Much of the detail of Stage 1 was therefore redesigned during
construction on the advice of the replacement landscape consultants
and others, such as the Countryside Commission, who had played little
or no part during the earlier planning stages. In this respect, the
constitution and operation of the Joint Committee, and the influence
and behaviour of the Committee Chairman and the Park Director, were
central influences on the outcome of Stage 1 and the lobbying for

Stage 2.

5. The Joint Committee

Joint planning and administration of local government functions
was not unknown in Lanarkshire when in 1965 the three local authorities
of Lanark County Council, Hamilton Town Council, and Motherwell and
Wishaw Town Council set up a joint steering group and joint working
party to undertake feasibility studies and produce planning proposals
for the middle Clyde valley. Similar joint working arrangements were
already in operation for the fire, police and education services.
Since all three authorities had responsibilities for different parts
of the·middle Clyde valley, since there was no regional authority in
existence at that time, and since SDD had no means by which to bring
their outline ideas to reality, joint investigation by the three local
authorities was the obvious means to progress the "middle Clyde Park"
initiative.

Although proposals for a much larger land rehabilitation and
recreation project were being progressed at that time for a Lee
Valley Regional Park north of London (Civic Trust, 1964) via a
Regional Park Authority, and by means of special legislation promoted
by the Greater London Council, there was no equivalent for Scotland
at that time. There would have been little justification for promoting
special legislation for a regional park of 1600 acres in Scotland.
There was a willingness by the local authorities to cooperate on
investigation of the proposal, as well as precedents for joint
working and so, from 1965, the joint committee was established.

Following preparation of the 1967 proposals, SDD suggested in
discussions that the local authorities might consider forming a joint
park authority, taking advantage of the provisions of the Countryside
Act. In circular 75/1967, which introduced the 1967 Act, the
Secretary of State laid particular emphasis on the importance of
local planning authorities, especially those in the central belt,
taking early action under section 48 of the Act to study the establish-
ment of country parks. In 1968, therefore, at a Ministerial meeting
to discuss the local authorities' proposals, SDD suggested a joint
authority to set up and operate the park. Section 48 of the Act was

designed explicitly for this purpose. SDD also had other motives
for this suggestion:

> From the presentational point of view, we should
> be very pleased to see these provisions of the Act
> inaugurated for a big, pioneering scheme of this
> kind, and we hope the local authorities will adopt
> this procedure.   (SDD, 1968, p.5)

In the meantime, the Joint Working Party progressed the 1967
proposals through the meetings over the 1969-70 period of the Technical
Working Party, to the 1971 revised proposals. In July 1971 it first
considered the draft constitution for the joint park authority. The
Strathclyde Park Joint Committee (SPJC) was formally constituted in
July 1971, six years after the local authorities embarked on their
joint planning exercise, and four years after the introduction of the
1967 Act. The constitution of the Joint Committee was amended in
November 1971 to raise the number of members from nine to 15 (five
from each local authority).

Under section 48(5) of the Act, the Strathclyde Park Joint
Committee had transferred to it the functions conferred on local
authorities under section 48(4), namely powers to (a) acquire land,
lay it out and manage it as a country park, and (b) make bye-laws in
terms of section 54. Under the Joint Committee's constitution (i)
the three local authorities agreed to transfer to SPJC land within
the park boundary belonging to the three councils; (ii) nett
expenditure of SPJC would be apportioned between the three councils
on the basis of 46% from Lanark County Council, 36% from Motherwell
and Wishaw Town Council, and 18% from Hamilton Town Council; (iii)the
expenses of SPJC would be met from a Strathclyde Park Fund, to which
each council would contribute; (iv)a chairman and vice-chairman would
be appointed annually; (v)a clerk and treasurer would be appointed
from the officers of one or more of the three councils, and (vi) SPJC
could appoint its own officials, and engage professional and technical
consultants.

The Strathclyde Park Joint Committee was the first formally
constituted joint park authority under section 48 of the 1967 Act, so
there were no well tried models other than those which had operated
in respect of other jointly administered services. By any standards,
the powers delegated by the three councils to the Joint Committee
were considerable, and provided substantial scope for independent

action. The fact that its members were drawn exclusively from the
three local authorities provided political accountability, although
only at a distance. The financial arrangements also gave SPJC
considerable power to commit local authority expenditure to the project,
and these financial arrangements, particularly the lack of budgetary
control exercised by the three councils, were criticised by the
successor Strathclyde Regional Council after 1975. This lack of
financial stringency, and a development-rather than a finance-led
approach by SPJC, was regarded by the Regional Council as a prime
cause of escalating costs over the 1973-76 main construction period.

Although the constitution of the Joint Committee invested it
with considerable powers to bring Strathclyde Park to reality, the
great driving forces behind the park were the Joint Committee
Chairman and the Park Director, and their roles and influence are
now considered in turn.

6. The Park Chairman

Bernard Scott represents the one, continuous strand of
consistency in the whole history of Strathclyde Park. At the time
SDD introduced their 1964 rehabilitation plan, Scott was planning
convener of Motherwell & Wishaw Town Council, and the last chairman
of the Clyde Valley Regional Plan Advisory Committee, which ceased
to function after 1972. By his own admission, Scott was perhaps the
most enthusiastic member of the most enthusiastic of the three local
authorities for the park project. He represented an authority which
had on its doorstep some of the worst dereliction and industrial
pollution in Lanarkshire. He is a socialist, and has strong views
about a community which has contributed so much to the success of the
country's heavy engineering, mining and steelmaking, but which had so
little to show in return other than a polluted and degraded environ-
ment. He is a man of great energy and commitment to what he thinks
is right, and also displays some arrogance in his views:

> My job as a local authority representative is to
> create an environment and create horizons, and create
> a different way of life if possible from a very
> industrialised area - an area which had suffered
> from the industrial revolution.   (Scott, 1983)

Scott was chairman of the Strathclyde Park Joint Committee for
all but one year of its existence, and for his efforts he was
appointed to the Countryside Commission, and to the Scottish Sports
Council. It was largely at his insistence that, on local government
reorganisation, the park was transferred to Strathclyde Regional
Council. On election to the Regional Council in 1975, he became
the first convener of its leisure and recreation committee. Scott
is the only member of the original Joint Committee still active in
local government. He was and remains an enthusiastic advocate of the
regional park concept, and is the sort of politician who could get
commitment in principle from people and agencies without paying too
much attention to costs:

> What are you trying to create? Is it right? Is it
> proper? And if you come to the conclusion that it
> is right and proper, then you go ahead and do it,
> and to damn with the costs. All the big things
> that have been done in this world would have never
> been based on a cost exercise. You have got to get
> the thing right, and then to have the dedication
> and drive to do the thing. Then stand up and take
> the criticism.   (Scott, 1983)

Scott therefore did not see the cost of the project as a
problem, provided the "concept" was right: the whole idea of a
regional recreation facility centred on the middle Clyde Valley.
Whilst the Joint Committee met bi-monthly to oversee park develop-
ment, there was considerable scope, either provided or assumed, for
the Chairman and Park Director to sanction changes in detailed
specifications, and hence increases in costs. Scott argues that
this allowed quick response to additional costs arising during con-
struction, although it also allowed the Chairman to dictate changes
and present his committee with a series of faits accompli.

There was considerable friction between the Park Chairman and
Scottish Office Ministers, which Scott puts down to changes in their
attitudes to the project according to whether they were in or out of
office. Interestingly, most of the friction occurred with Labour
Ministers. Friction also arose between Scott and his new regional
colleagues after 1975, who did not share his enthusiasm for the project.
He found that he had to "sell" the whole project all over again in
1975. Scott is perhaps the clearest example of what Cranz (1982) has
termed an "inspired change agent":

Anybody, in any walk of life, who has got the

power and drive will do things. You always find,
right throughout life...all the gigantic things, the
good things that have been done, have been done by
one or two or three individuals. It all boils down
to individuals who believe in a thing, not for
themselves, but the creation of something for the
community. That's what its all about.   (Scott, 1983)

7. The Park Director

The constitution of the Strathclyde Park Joint Committee
provided for the appointment of its own officials, and in 1972 a
Park Director was appointed. From the initial launch of the project
in 1964, the local authorities had been advised directly by their own
officials. However, this ceased from 1973, and planning and other
officials of the three local authorities had only a peripheral
involvement in the project after that time.

The Joint Committee had been considering the appointment of
a "park manager" from 1971, when it was formally constituted. They
took advice from the Sports Council on the matter, which strongly
advocated the appointment of someone with overall responsibility for
translating policy into practice, and for reviewing the effectiveness
of that practice. In the Sports Council's view:

> The success of any recreational establishment is
> directly related to the quality of the management..
> ..the Strathclyde Park project could eventually be ___
> one of the largest in Scotland if not in the
> United Kingdom, involving an extremely wide
> variety of facilities...The importance of this post
> cannot be overemphasised and we would make a special
> plea that this appointment be made as soon as
> possible.   (Chapman, 1971)

The Joint Committee, up until 1972, had been advised by a
number of officials, but then took the view that they should have an
officer of their own to coordinate the whole project. Up until then,
they had been experiencing problems in committee with conflicting
professional advice (Reid, 1982). Sam Reid was appointed Park
Director in November 1972. Reid was at that time occupying a third-
tier post in the Parks and Recreation Department of Edinburgh
Corporation. Prior to that, he had varied experience of town planning,
recreation planning, education and management in England and Scotland.

The Park Director (apart from the clerk to the Committee) thereafter
was the only official who attended the meetings of the Joint Committee:

> They took the view that they had appointed an
> official who would act as coordinator with all
> these different officials and try to rationalise
> their views on each issue....What the Joint
> Committee wanted was a single approach that was
> being presented to them, with all the answers, and
> that was by no means an easy situation.   (Reid, 1982)

For the first eighteen months after appointment, Reid had no
department and operated on his own, liaising with all the consultants
who were operating on site, and with the other agencies involved.
Although the overall design concept was fixed prior to the Park
Director's appointment, so many aspects had not been worked out in
detail that a great deal of redesign took place during the construction
period. Those aspects that were fixed were the location of the loch
itself and the buildings. Whilst the original contract for Stage 1
was let in 1973, costs increased as a consequence of the Park Director
and his Chairman advising the Joint Committee that certain aspects
could not operate the way they had been proposed. Redesigning
facilities, such as changing pavilions and car parks, and the edge
treatment to the loch, substantially increased overall project costs.

In practice, Reid was responsible, through the Chairman, for
ensuring that the contract for Stage 1 was carried out, and for
coordinating the advice of the consultants and participating agencies
on detailed aspects of the project during implementation. In this
regard, the role of the Director could be described as a "fixer", as
well as principal adviser to the Joint Committee. In detail, progress
on implementation, and modification of the proposals in the light of
problems arising, proceeded via a series of ad-hoc committees
convened by the Director in reaction to such problems.

The Park Director and Chairman worked as a team, taking decisions
on behalf of the Joint Committee in order to resolve quickly design
or cost issues as they arose. They were both forceful individuals,
with a commitment to the park project which bordered on evangelism.

From 1974, Stage 2 of the 1967 proposals was under active
consideration by the Joint Committee. As well as coordinating the
implementation of Stage 1, the Park Director also advised the Joint

Committee on the content of and specification for Stage 2. By 1974,
the financial, regional policy and political climate had changed
radically from the much more conducive climate of the 1960's. SDD
was taking a less enthusiastic view on Stage 2, in view of the
escalating costs of the project and impending local government
reorganisation. However, Reid and his Committee approached Stage 2
as if this climate had not changed at all. As well as proposing a
whole series of major capital and revenue-intensive recreational
facilities, they were also considering the extension of the park
boundaries to include adjoining countryside with recreational
potential, such as the Avon Gorge and the Hamilton High Parks (Reid,
1974).

The Sports Council in particular was concerned, with the Nature
Conservancy Council, that too many facilities for active recreation
were being "squeezed into" the park to the detriment of the
countryside and nature conservation elements. SDD was concerned to
avoid any consideration of Stage 2 until Stage 1 had been completed:

> Stage 1 of the project has committed a substantial
> proportion of the total monies available for the
> Scottish Countryside programme and it seems
> evident that the costs of Stage 1 may be higher
> and the period of construction longer than
> originally provided for. In effect this would
> mean a more prolonged and greater demand on
> countryside funds generally for this particular
> project...Faced with the likely effects of the
> expenditure for Stage 1 during a period of
> restriction on public expenditure generally and
> in fairness to other parts of Scotland we could
> not at this time give any undertaking to commit
> countryside funds to Stage 2...It will not be
> possible for your Committee to determine precisely
> the priorities and probable costs for the
> development and expansion of countryside facilities
> in the park until the Stage 1 facilities are
> brought into use and that this should be the first
> priority.   (Neilson, 1974)

Stage 2 of the project, as outlined by the Park Director,
comprised a substantial expansion of the activities to be provided in
the park as intended in the 1967 proposals, and included a dry ski
slope, an interpretation centre, indoor sports centre and swimming
pool, a sailing centre, athletics track and stadium, a golf course,
an equitation centre, a canoe slalom course, additional playing fields,
car parks and footpaths. Reid's advocacy of the regional park
concept was matching Scott's, although certainly whatever additional

facilities were provided in the park would represent a considerable accretion of power, responsibility and prestige to the Park Director. Reid was therefore concerned to point out to the Joint Committee in 1974 that:

> The momentum which the whole project gains weekly
> and the interest generated locally, nationally and
> internationally will be substantially reduced if
> we stand still pending reorganisation, which in
> substance is what SDD are saying.   (Reid, 1974b)

At local government reorganisation, Reid no longer reported directly to a Park Authority, but to the Regional Council's Leisure and Recreation Committee, of which Bernard Scott was convener. However, the Park Director was firstly responsible to the Director of Leisure and Recreation, and so the essential link between the executive and political leaders of the park project was severed. The unique Joint Park Authority was replaced by a minor Committee of a large bureaucracy which, at its political head, had wider interests and other priorities. Reid and Scott no longer had the freedom to take executive action, and the interests of the park, its centre of power and influence, shifted dramatically. Figures 13 and 14 show the changing organisational structure of the Park project during the periods preceding and proceeding local government reorganisation in 1975.

Stage 1 of the park was substantially completed in 1976, and the Regional Council expressed little interest in further development. Reid's responsibilities changed from construction to management of the facilities that had been provided. Capital expenditure for the park was substantially reduced. Reid resigned in September 1980, and the park presently has an Acting Director.

Reid considers that there is still a requirement for some facilities to "logically round off" Stage 1: a multi-purpose leisure centre; residential accommodation for sports participants; hotel accommodation; and educational/interpretation facilities. He believes strongly in the value of recreational facilities to offset social deprivation, and he sees the potential of Strathclyde Park as an important social factor in counteracting the effects of local unemployment:

> The park's function is heavily involved with the
> social interface of the community.   (Reid, 1982)

Fig 13 Strathclyde Park Organisational Structure 1971-75

Fig.14 Strathclyde Park Organisational Structure 1975-80

As a means of implementing the park proposals, Reid considers that the Joint Committee did not work satisfactorily, principally because the finance for the project came from within the traditional central-local government relationship. This meant that:

> One of the problems in creating a project of this
> nature was that we were competing for Scottish
> national resources, which were part of the British
> national resources in a field where really practically
> all the money that was available for Scotland had
> in fact to come to Strathclyde Park in order to let
> the job be done.   (Reid, 1982)

Reid considers that the implementation of Strathclyde Park would have been better served by the model of the Lee Valley Park (Civic Trust, 1964), with a special Act of Parliament providing for the establishment of an agency and a guaranteed source of funds for development. He considers that the park development suffered from the multiplicity of agencies involved, each pursuing their own objectives, and failing to come together on an agreed, coordinated approach. It was left to the Park Director to undertake this coordinating role. Although the construction of Stage 1 took less than three years, the nine years which had elapsed between SDD's outline scheme and site works proved crucial, since the climate for action changed considerably over this period, particularly during the early 1970's.

8. The Role of the Individual

Much of the recent literature on policy-making identifies the key role of the individual in shaping the outputs of implementation processes. In the case of Strathclyde Park, whereas SDD provoked the local authorities into action, the role of key individuals within the agency responsible for the coordination of action, the Joint Committee, was central to the destiny of the whole project after the momentum had gathered during the 1960's.

Although the Joint Committee was formally constituted to apply the provisions of the 1967 Countryside Act as a means of creating countryside and recreational resources from a rehabilitated landscape, it clearly emerges from analysis of this process of environmental change that the continuing momentum of implementation through the

1970's depended upon the energy and enthusiasm of the Joint Committee chairman, who saw the park as the realisation of his own vision of an improved environment for north Lanarkshire. An integral component of this vision was the provision of facilities which would attract people and interest from a much wider area, and thereby improve and heighten the image of an area previously associated with an over-industrialised landscape.

Scott was the "inspired change agent" of the project (Cranz, 1982), and he certainly had the characteristics considered essential by Edwardes (Hingely and Cooper, 1983):

> All change agents have one thing in common,
> provided they are the right people for that role,
> they all have drive. That is the one thing they   .
> must have. They don't need a high intellect, but
> drive, yes, it's crucial.   (p.468)

Hingley and Cooper identify two principal characteristics from their study of successful individuals:

(i) such individuals see their actions as part of a much wider philosophical perspective;

(ii) they have well developed and clearly articulated value and belief systems in which their own actions are precisely located. These beliefs not only provide direction and purpose, but also justification and support when they come under pressure.

Scott's attitude and behaviour fit well with this model. Whilst power derives from legislation and institutions, it is focussed in individuals, and Scott used his power and influence to promote and defend the regional conception of Strathclyde Park. Scott's key role in the realisation of the project was also understood by the other participants, particularly the Scottish Office, and he deployed the tactic of threatening resignation to good effect on occassion unless his view prevailed.

An analysis of the evolution and implementation of Strathclyde Park points to a characterisation of policy processes as not comprising abstract organisations pursuing corporate policy objectives, but of individuals bringing their own interpretation of their organisations' interests to bear, deploying their own values and aspirations, based on their respective "assumptive worlds" (Young, 1979): what Dunsire (1978) has identified as the rational man pursuing his

own interests via the organisation.

Whilst Scott played the "inspired change agent", it was Reid
who played the "fixer", or what Friend et.al. (1974) term the
"reticulist" in a multi-organisational planning context where "connec-
tive planning" is central to action processes: the ability to identify
and construct informal networks of cooperation across formal
administrative boundaries. Reid therefore could be said to have
been the prime mover in the sub-processes of the implementation of
Strathclyde Park.

Although Scott and Reid can be identified as the principal
advocates of Strathclyde Park, they had clearly separate roles: Scott
the politician and "leader", negotiating with Ministers, chairmen of
government agencies, and political colleagues on the local
authorities. Reid's responsibility was to ensure that the political
commitment mobilised by Scott, and the extra finances he brought
to the project, were translated into action on the ground. Here Reid's
role was as coordinator of the inputs of the other actors in the
process: arranging technical meetings and detailed programming;
providing briefs for the landscape consultants; identifying
where changes in design specifications were required; articulating
these to Scott, who mobilised the support of his Joint Committee in
submissions for additional finance.

The roles of Scott and Reid in the implementation of Strathclyde
Park reveal the importance of key individuals, in the right place at
the right time. Scott in particular exploited to the full the
favourable climate for planning during the 1960's and early 1970's,
in mobilising commitment and translating broad ideas into specific
requirements for the 1967 proposals. Reid joined the project during
the much less favourable financial climate of the 1970's, when the
whole idea of Strathclyde Park was decreasing in the priorities of
the Government and, after 1975, in the priorities of the Regional
Council. In their evangelism for the project, which did not temper
during this more hostile period, the counter-productive effect on
those key institutions with much less commitment and interest in the
project, had an influence on its frustrated output and the limited
success of the Joint Committee in realising its full intentions for
Strathclyde Park.

9. Conclusion

This chapter has sought to identify the means which influenced the evolution and development of Strathclyde Park, their characteristics, and in which ways they were influential. These means were identified as:

(i) the need for a favourable climate for action : this did not exist in the 1950's, but emerged during the mid-1960's, through to the early 1970's, and partly explains the failure to carry out the proposal in the 1946 Clyde Valley Regional Plan;

(ii) a commitment to action from the Government : deriving from its concern to promote major environmental change in the middle Clyde valley in pursuit of wider economic objectives, and latterly to demonstrate the provisions of the 1967 Act. The contiguity of objectives of local and central government provided the springboard in the mid-1960's from which momentum gathered until the mid-1970's. This Scottish Office commitment ensured the priority of the project in the allocation of grant-aid;

(iii) new legislation providing grant-aid : to the extent of funding 80% of total development costs. Without this grant-aid, and SDD's liberal interpretation of the qualifying guidelines, it is unlikely that anything other than minimal landscaping would have been undertaken;

(iv) the establishment of the Joint Committee : effectively a joint park authority whose sole objective was the pursuit of the project for which it was created. The constitution of the Joint Committee ensured the commitment of the three sponsoring local authorities;

(v) dedicated individuals : with drive and enthusiasm, committed to their conception of change. They provided the necessary motivation and sense of urgency which maintained the momentum of the project.

CHAPTER VIII

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATHCLYDE PARK (3):

PROCESSES, NEGOTIATIONS AND BARGAINING

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATHCLYDE PARK (3):

PROCESSES, NEGOTIATIONS AND BARGAINING

1. Introduction

The process of preparing and carrying out proposals for the
construction of a regional park on derelict and degraded land in the
middle Clyde valley is characterised by a multi-organisational planning
context consisting of local authorities, a park authority, Government
departments and agencies, private consultants, and independent
sectional interests.

The implementing agency was the Joint Committee, constituted
from the ranks of the three local authorities. SDD and the Scottish
Education Department (SED) provided the initial sponsorship, regulated
the Government's financial contribution, and the borrowings of the
Joint Committee for non-grant-aided aspects. The Countryside Commission
and the Sports Council participated late in the design of the project,
primarily during implementation, providing technical advice to the
Joint Committee on countryside and sporting aspects respectively, and
advising SDD and SED on grant-aid. Nature Conservancy Council (NCC)
was involved from the earliest stages, but only in respect of the
nature conservation aspects. SARA, SCU, CnPB and British Steel
similarly were involved only in respect of specific aspects. The main
participants, therefore, were the local authorities (in the form,
latterly, of the Joint Committee) and the Government, ie SDD.

The Government had commissioned the Clyde Valley Regional Plan,
resurrected the park proposal in 1964, advocated the idea in the early
stages for Treasury support, and saw the whole project as a prototype
for regional economic and physical planning, derelict land reclamation,
and countryside recreation provision. The local authorities provided
the means of translating legislative backing, grant-aid, and ideas
into practice through cooperative effort and their powers under the
planning and countryside Acts.

The whole evolution and development of Strathclyde Park is therefore characterised by the interplay of changing central and local government intentions and priorities, and this central-local relationship was an influential factor in the development of the park. In order to understand the process of interaction between central and ·local government, it is necessary to consider the structural context within which this is set, since it is the structure which determines the means and nature of the central-local relationship.

2. The Structure of Central-Local Relations in Scotland

The principle of a separate administrative system for Scotland derives from the Act of Union of 1707, which preserved the legal, educational and religious systems, although it was not until 1334 that Scotland had a Secretary of State. Until 1939, with the establishment of the Scottish Office, policy was administered by a number of ad hoc boards. Since 1939, the Scottish Office has accumulated further functions where (i) strict UK uniformity was not essential, or (ii) in response to pressure from Scottish interests.

During the late 1950's and early 1960's, concern about the performance of the Scottish economy and the need to improve physical and economic planning led to the creation of the Scottish Development Department in 1962. Prior to 1962, town and country planning and local government had been the responsibility of the Scottish Health Department. This integration of physical and economic planning was maintained until the establishment of a separate Scottish Economic Planning Department in 1973.

In addition to the Secretary of State, there are up to four Parliamentary Under-Secretaries and, since 1951, a Minister of State in the House of Lords. Under recent Labour administrations, there has also been a Minister of State in the House of Commons. The Scottish Office is linked into the UK decision-making structure at several levels: the Secretary of State is a Cabinet minister, and able to put the Scottish viewpoint on major policy matters. In addition, Scottish Office is also represented on all committes dealing with matters for which it has responsibilities. The status of the Scottish Office partly depends upon the political rank of the

Secretary of State, and on the perceived importance of Scotland to
the Government. Scottish Office acquired added political weight in
the late 1960's and late 1970's due to the Labour government's
greater dependence on Scottish seats than the Conservative government's
(Keating and Midwinter, 1983). Figure 15 shows the administrative
structure of the Scottish Office.

The Scottish Office's budget is provided in the form of a block
sum from the Treasury. Although the Public Expenditure Survey Committee
(PESC) system is a major constraint on Scottish Office autonomy due
to its functional approach, within its block allocation Scottish
Office does have scope to transfer surplus sums between different
budget areas. In this context, Keating and Midwinter (1983) identify
three functions of the Scottish Office as a territorial department
of the UK government:

    (i) to administer those functions which need separate management
       in Scotland (due to the legal system or tradition);

    (ii)to allow for a distinctiveness in policy making for Scotland;

    (iii)to "lobby" within Government for extra resources for Scotland.

Whilst each of the five departments of the Scottish Office is
headed by a Secretary, and with its own portion of the block allocation,
the Finance Division of SDD controls grant-aid to local authorities
and therefore, in theory at least, provides a corporate context for
Departmental financial assistance to local authority spending.

The powers of local authorities are provided and circumscribed
by statute. In recent times, 65 to 70% of all local authority capital
spending has been financed by the Government through the Rate Support
Grant, whilst capital borrowing also requires Scottish Office approval.
Legislation also provides the Secretary of State with powers of
Direction, ie to statutorily require specific actions by local
authorities. Government also provides advice and guidance in the form
of White Papers and Circulars. Since 1977-73, the distribution of
grant-aid in Scotland has been on the basis of a block allocation which
some contend gives local authorities more freedom to decide between
priorities, whilst others argue that the block grant system represents
a further shift in the balance of power to the centre (Cuthbert et.
al., 1982).

Fig. 15   Scottish Office Administrative Structure

The structure of central-local relations would therefore appear to favour central government in terms of compliance with central policy aims which, in the 1960's when economic and population growth were the dominant concerns, laid emphasis on the capital investment programmes of local authorities and their need to facilitate economic and industrial development. Since the 1970's, the emphasis has been on financial stringency and a policy focus on (a) inner cities and (b) economic development. Local government reorganisation straddled eras of expenditure growth/low inflation and economic stringency/ high inflation.

An additional arm in the power of central government over local government has been the growth of "quangos" (quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations) such as the Countryside Commission, the Sports Council and, since 1975, the Scottish Development Agency. The creation of these agencies, with an emphasis on implementation, has been designed to ensure further compliance with the policy aims of central government.

3. Models of Central-Local Relations

The "conventional wisdom" model of central-local relations argues that local authorities are merely the agents of central government, existing to implement national policies, supervised by central departments, with little or no discretion. The "partnership" model assumes a consensus of values and objectives, an equality of power and influence, and therefore that local authorities have considerable discretion in designing and implementing their own policies. Both models have been criticised in recent literature (Schon, 1971; Friend et. al., 1974; Rhodes, 1981; Barret and Fudge, 1981). Critics of these models contend that local authorities should be seen as political systems in their own right. Rhodes (1981) argues that it is misleading to talk of central control: rather, there are different types and degrees of control exerted by the various constituent units of central government, and that local authorities vary in their willingness to accept such control.

The convential wisdom model assumes that (a) intentions are fully defined prior to implementation, (b) there is central management

of the process of implementation, and (c) there is full control at
the centre, and that the implementers operate in a compliant
relationship. In contrast, Rhodes (1981) posits the "forgotten
dimensions" in the study of central-local relations:

  (i) that there is <u>bargaining</u> in central-local relations as well
      as central control;

  (ii) that there is a <u>plurality</u> in central-local relations; since
       other organisations have an influence, we cannot assume a
       single pattern of links between control departments and local
       authorities;

  (iii) the influence of <u>political</u> factors: there is little known
        about political channels of influence between central and
        local government, eg to what extent, and under what conditions,
        can local politicians embarass national politicians and affect
        changes in policy?

  (iv) the influence of <u>professional/bureaucratic factors</u>: little
       is known about their role in central-local relations.

This analysis leads Rhodes to his articulation of a "power-
dependence" model of central-local relations, the main features of
which are:

  (a) any organisation is <u>dependent</u> upon other organisations for
      <u>resources</u>;

  (b) in order to achieve their <u>goals</u>, the organisations have to
      exchange resources;

  (c) although decision-making within the organisation is constrained
      by other organisations, the <u>dominant coalition</u> retains some
      discretion. The <u>appreciative system</u> of the dominant coalition
      influences which relationships are seen as a problem and
      which resources will be sought;

  (d) the dominant coalition employs <u>strategies</u> within known
      <u>rules of the game</u> to regulate the <u>process of exchange</u>;

  (e) variations in the degree of discretion are a product of the
      goals and the <u>relative power potential</u> of interacting
      organisations. Relative power potential is a product of the
      resources of each organisation, of the rules of the game, and
      of the process of exchange between organisations.

Barret and Fudge (1981) identify three key issues of negotiation
processes central to the understanding of implementation processes:

(a) the multiplicity and complexity of linkages;

(b) questions of control and coordination;

(c) issues of conflict and consensus.

They regard implementation as an interactive and negotiative process over time between policy-makers and implementers, emphasising issues of power and dependence, interests, motivation and behaviour. Thus, as Rhodes (1981) asserts:

> Local authorities are not "mere agents" of central
> government. They are political systems in their
> own right with the capacity to resist central demands.
> Moreover, central government is dependent upon local
> authorities for information, for expertise and for
> the implementation of policy.   (p.87)

Based on the recent literature of the study of inter-governmental relationships, and the power-dependence model of central-local relations, the interactions between central and local government can be regarded as a process of negotiation and bargaining in a political context, in which the process of exchange affects the deployment of financial, manpower and other resources, in which personalities have a central role to play in the deployment of these resources and the selection of strategies. Furthermore, the larger the number of participants, the more complex the process of exchange, the greater the constraints on participants, and the more difficult it will be for any participant to achieve a desired outcome. Where such processes occur over extended periods of time, the greater will be the influence of external factors on the context for negotiation and bargaining, and on the power-dependence relationship.

4. Strathclyde Park and the Central-Local Relationship

It was not until the 1960's that Government was assembling the means to directly influence the actions of local authorities in economic and physical planning. The proposals of the 1946 Clyde Valley Regional Plan were advisory only : there was no statutory obligation on the local authorities to carry these out, whilst Government's influence on physical aspects was limited to the regulation of development plans. During the 1960's, the Scottish Office began to acquire expanded powers, backed by substantially improved and new financial inducements to encourage local authorities to tackle large-scale physical planning problems.

The relationship between central and local government in Scotland therefore came to be more clearly articulated from the mid-1960's with the formalisation of regional development policy, which in itself was dependent upon the cooperation and commitment of local authorities for its implementation. To this end, additional financial aid was provided by the Government. Much of the dialogue between central and local government interests in the case of Strathclyde Park revolved around conflicting ideas of what the park proposals should consist of, and the grant-aid factor was used by Scottish Office as both a control lever and negotiating weapon. At the same time, the principal weapon deployed by the local authorities was their role as implementers, in particular, their resources of manpower, skills, local organisation and land ownership.

The initial proposals launched by SDD in 1964 received a limited response from the local authorities. After 1966, however, and following the first Ministerial meeting when the prospects of substantial Government financial support were raised, the local authorities became much more committed to the project, and this commitment received its full expression in the 1967 proposals. By this time, the Industrial Development Act 1966 had increased grant-aid for the reclamation of derelict land to 85%, whilst the Countryside Act, which introduced up to 75% grant-aid for countryside recreation projects, was close to enactment.

The 1967-71 period was one of intense bargaining between SDD and the local authorities. SDD was concerned at the ambitious nature of the local authorities' proposals, which exceeded its own initial thoughts on the area. This "planning" phase extended overall to the period 1964-74, and provided the main focus of negotiation and bargaining between central and local government. The intense nature of this bargaining, leading to the 1971 proposals, partly explains the length of this period.

Very little of the landscape rehabilitation involved "derelict" land within the strict meaning of the 1966 Act. Most of the area of the park was not "derelict" at all, so the local authorities were dependent upon the liberal interpretation of dereliction established by SDD in negotiations with the Treasury, to include the reinstatement or bringing into beneficial use land for development which would

improve the industrial attraction of a locality (Irving, 1983).
North Lanarkshire was a "growth area" as identified in the 1963 White
Paper, and the Strathclyde Park project was seen by SDD as serving
as an example to other local authorities of what could be achieved in
this field through cooperation between central and local government.
The project illustrated the intentions behind some of the main
provisions of the 1966 and 1967 Acts, and SDD was particularly
concerned to see the park proposals progressed to realisation for
these reasons. The main weapon the local authorities could bring to
bear on SDD was their role as implementers. Without government
financial aid and sanction, the project could not proceed. Similarly,
without local government cooperation, there was no means to implement
SDD's objectives. There was, therefore, a <u>dependence</u> on the one hand
by SDD, on the active cooperation of the local authorities, and on
the other by the local authorities on Scottish Office to provide
financial support.

The <u>resources</u> which each deployed in the process of negotiation
and bargaining were therefore crucial to the planning phase of the
development. SDD could ensure that the grant-aiding provisions of
the 1966 and 1967 Acts were mobilised to provide the capital funds
required to realise the project. SDD strongly advocated maximum use
of this grant-aid in its negotiations with the Treasury:

> Substantially increased provision should be made
> for clearing dereliction, within the total allocated
> to environmental services, but if it becomes
> necessary to review the rehabilitation programme
> provided for...to give this scheme the priority it
> ought to have, we are prepared to do so...our
> experience to date of Countryside Grants is that
> they are being sought for the provision or
> improvement of fairly small facilities. This is
> understandable but it has always been our expectation
> that as time passed they would also be required for
> creating major recreational facilities. Strathclyde
> is the first proposal on this scale to have reached
> this stage of specific planning and we should be
> glad to have Treasury approval to taking the matter
> a stage further with our giving an assurance to the
> local authorities that Countryside Grant will be
> payable...on whatever scale is decided to be
> appropriate.   (Butler, 1969)

Rhodes' (1981) power-dependence model therefore seems highly
appropriate as a means of explaining the processes of negotiation
and bargaining in the evolution and development of Strathclyde Park.

The resources deployed by the local authorities comprised manpower,
local organisation (political and administrative), the powers of
action provided under the Industrial Development, Countryside and
Town and Country Planning Acts, and a growing commitment on the part
of local politicians to a major improvement of this part of the
middle Clyde valley:

> I made the statement in 1967, at a Clyde Valley
> Planning Advisory Committee meeting, that I would
> bring the seaside to Motherwell and Hamilton.
>   (Scott, 1983)

Bardach (1977) developed his "games" metaphor of implementation
processes in order to identify and analyse:

(i) implementation processes that result in perversion or
     subversion of policy goals; or

(ii) processes that lead to excessive financial costs; or

(iii) interactions that routinely link different kinds of
      institutions or roles normally involved in assembling
      programmes.

A focus on implementation as a "game" leads to the identification
of "players", what they regard as the "stakes", their strategies and
tactics, their resources for playing, the rules of play, the nature
of the communications among players, and the degree of uncertainty
surrounding the possible outcomes.

The rules of the game in the case of Strathclyde Park were
largely determined by the structure of central and local government
in Scotland, the legislative and procedural arrangements, and the
normal pattern and channels of communication, which functioned
initially through communications between officials, followed by
communications between politicians. The establishment of the formally
constituted Strathclyde Park Joint Committee in 1971 changed the
procedural and administrative arrangements to the extent that central
government was no longer dealing directly with local authorities,
but with a quasi-independent park authority wherein the allegiance of
its members was to the park concept (specifically the 1967 version
of it). In 1971 the Joint Committee acquired the powers of the
local authorities in respect of the Countryside Act, but held political
accountability only at a distance. Thereafter, the approach of
the Joint Committee to the park concept was basically ideological.

Part of the reason for the ten-fold increase in the costs of the project over the period 1971 to 1981 was the success of the Joint Committee in obtaining concessions from SDD on the content of the park plan, particularly the changes made during construction. The establishment of a formally constituted Joint Committee with specific powers and responsibilities served to heighten the commitment of its members to the park project. SDD was therefore dealing with an implementing authority whose whole reason for existence was to undertake the Strathclyde Park project. It was therefore during the latter stages of the "planning" phase, and throughout the main construction period 1973-76, that the Joint Committee wielded its maximum power and influence in the central-local relationship. The actual process of construction therefore accrued additional power and resources to the Joint Committee by virtue of the political and financial commitment established once work had begun. This allowed the Joint Committee to subvert or pervert the aims of central government.

Whilst SDD dominated the central-local relationship during the early, planning, stages by virtue of its control over the financial resources, it was during the main phase of construction 1973-76 (during which there was a financial as well as a political commitment to action) that the balance of power in this relationship tilted in favour of local objectives. As Joint Committee chairman, Scott wielded this power to the full in negotiations with central government over additional finance for increasing costs. For example, conflict arose over the costs of the sports pavilions. Scott was adamant that the higher standards proposed were necessary:

> So I said "you build them. I'm not building them. I'm walking out". Then they (SDD) caved in.
> (Scott, 1983)

By 1974, the balance of power in the central-local relationship was tilting back towards SDD during a period of increasing financial stringency. At the same time, the costs of Stage 1 of the project were increasing significantly, and media attention began to focus on this aspect. The Strathclyde Park project was no longer the only land reclamation or country park project requiring a financial input from central government. In addition, the Countryside Commission was beginning to clarify its policy objectives for country parks (Countryside Commission for Scotland, 1974) and the loose coalition

of interests that had brought the Strathclyde Park project to
fruition was beginning to fragment. At this time also, whilst the
local authorities were dependent upon Government support for Stage 2
of the project, impending local government reorganisation held
uncertainties for the future administration of the park. The Park
Director recognised the implications of delay for the full completion
of the project, and suggested that the park should merit special
financial arrangements due to what he saw as its national and
international significance:

> The project is just too big to fit into all the
> peculiarities of existing regulations.   (Reid, 1974b)

On the opening of the park to the general public in September
1976, Scott commented:

> It is ludicrous that we can't get the money to
> finish the job and bring the loch facilities up to
> the standards required for holding national and
> international events.   (Bellshill Speaker, 1976, p.15)

After May 1975, the central-local relationship changed
fundamentally with the transfer of responsibility for management and
development of the park from a uni-directional and highly committed
local park authority to the larger and more heterogeneous Regional
Council with wider interests and other priorities. The extinguishment
of the Joint Committee meant the removal of the power base of the
park's protagonists, save for the Park Chairman and Director, but
whose power and influence were significantly eroded in the new
regional administration. At the official opening of Strathclyde Park
in April 1973, Secretary of State for Scotland, Bruce Millan,
stated that:

> The creation of the Park marks a magnificent
> achievement by local government with central
> government support.   (Motherwell Times, 1973, p.10)

Despite the problems achieved in obtaining the funds required
to complete the park to the standard he wanted, Scott said:

> What you see today is Phase 1. We have, I think
> created the base for an expansion of leisure
> facilities in this area by both private and public
> expenditure. I see today not as the end of this
> project, but merely the beginning of a new era and
> approach in the field of leisure and recreation.
>   (Motherwell Times, 1973, p.10)

The involvement of implementing agencies such as the Countryside

Commission and the Sports Council, although government-appointed, assisted the local authorities in their dealings with central government since, in the early stages of their existence (which largely coincided with the detailed planning and construction of Stage 1), Strathclyde Park appeared to be tailor-made for the remits which these agencies had been given. It was only towards the end of the construction of Stage 1, when costs began to escalate seriously (and by which time these agencies had begun to formulate their own policies, partly based on their Strathclyde Park experience) that their support began to diminish. By 1976, Strathclyde Park was no longer seen as strictly country park material (Countryside Commission for Scotland, 1974), although the Sports Council continued to support and lobby for the completion of the international rowing course (Scottish Sports Council, 1981).

5. The Negotiation Process : Outcomes

The central-local relationship in the planning and development of Strathclyde Park was a central element in the whole process, and was characterised by these two main participants vying for control over policy execution. Yet neither had the required comprehensive control over resources, agencies, and the whole implementation "environment" to ensure policy execution on their terms. The original intentions of the principal participants had to be compromised in order to ensure action.

SDD wanted a development which would improve the image of west central Scotland's environment, expecially the sensitive southern "gateway" via the A74/M74 route. SDD also sought to use the park concept and its procedural arrangements as a model scheme for (a) the reclamation of derelict land, and (b) the country park concept, and thereby to illustrate in a striking way the potential offered by the 1967 Act.

The park project was conceived on a "grand" scale to "sell" west central Scotland economically, and to attract Treasury funding. The ends at the outset were SDD's, the means were provided by grant-aid and by the action of the local authorities. When these aims were largely met (ie after the project was officially launched and

committed in 1973) SDD was no longer interested in ambitious plans
by the local authorities for additional facilities, particularly
where these involved additional capital costs. SDD had achieved its
objectives, whilst problems of continuing pollution and accelerating
costs had attracted media attention, with the result that the project
was becoming politically sensitive. It was not functioning as a
regional park (Arnott et. al., 1978)and, being wedged between two
urban areas and with distinctly urban-orientated intensive recreational
facilities, it could not be regarded as a "true" country park either.
Studies had shown it to operate as "a rather lavish local park"
(Arnott et. al., 1978), whilst the water sports facilities attracted
only a very small proportion of park users.

From the onset of active planning in 1964, through to
construction in the mid-1970's, there was strong political commitment,
and strong influence from SDD. Central and local government objectives
were coterminous for as long as was necessary to effect the basic
scheme all were agreed on. After 1975, central and local objectives
converged once more on the pragmatic decision to wind down park
development in the face of escalating costs. The park protagonists
no longer had a political power base from which to resist these changes.
Local government reorganisation effectively quashed the autonomous
park authority and replaced it with a political organisation with
wider perspectives and loyalities during an era of changing political
priorities in response to an adverse economic climate. As a result,
the pace of development was all but halted, the momentum of the
project dissipated, and the park "completed" as far as was required
both politically and financially. Plans for the development of
Strathclyde Park, conceived during the 1960's, eventually fell victim
to a readjustment in planning strategies to meet much-altered
circumstances in the 1970's.

CHAPTER IX

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATHCLYDE PARK (4):

OUTPUTS

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATHCLYDE PARK (4):

OUTPUTS

1. Introduction

In his analysis of policy execution, Dunsire (1978) observes
that whilst policy-makers may devise a policy to solve a problem, it
is common experience that the policy "output" actually produced is
not that which was envisaged. Either no output is produced at all
(ie the policy intentions never reach the point of being transformed
into action), or else an output different in quantity, quality or
direction from that intended is produced. Whatever policies are
agreed and promulgated, by measuring output intended, comparing it
with output achieved, and accounting for any difference, the
"implementation gaps" (the extent to which policy intentions are
realised) can be identified. Implementation gaps may well be a factor
in any "impact gaps" (ie the variation between the intentions and
the consequences of action).

Unlike most studies of policy-making processes, the emphasis
here is less on the origins and characteristics of the policy itself,
and much more on the influences acting upon the processes which
translate the policy intention into action on the environment.

There are two aspects to a consideration of the outputs of
the Strathclyde Park planning processes:
  (i) the environmental changes brought about in the middle Clyde
      valley; and
  (ii)the behavioural changes induced in the future actions of
      the main participants, ie, the effect of the implementation
      experience on policy-makers - what van Horn (1983) has
      termed the "implementation images" that become the basis
      for future interventions.

2. Environmental Outputs

In considering environmental outputs, there are four central questions:

(a) how does the current state of development of Strathclyde Park compare with original intentions?

(b) how do the uses and functions of the park compare with the planning conceptions?

(c) in what ways, and by whom, is Strathclyde Park considered to be a "success" or "failure"?

(d) as a planning process, how does it compare in its characteristics with what might be expected from current knowledge of decision-making processes?

A. Plan Performance

Construction work on the revised Stage 1 proposals began in June 1973, and by September 1976 was sufficiently completed to permit the opening of the park to the general public. Within the three-year construction period, a park of 651 hectares was created out of reclaimed and rehabilitated land. At its focus was a man-made loch 2,000 metres long and extending over 31 hectares, incorporating an Olympic-standard rowing and canoeing course. The river Clyde had been diverted via a new by-pass channel; a watersports centre constructed; 23 hectares of playing fields; car parking for 1200 cars and 14 kilometres of roads; a nature reserve of 39 hectares; and 9 kilometres of public footpaths (Figure 16). The park was formally designated a country park by the Countryside Commission at its official opening by the Secretary of State for Scotland in May 1978.

What has been provided is based on the 1971 revised Stage 1 proposals. None of the elements of subsequent stages, as envisaged by the Joint Committee firstly in 1967 and then in 1974, have been realised. On the contrary, Stage 1 suffered substantial expenditure cuts in 1976 following a financial review by Strathclyde Regional Council. However, the completion of the rowing course to international competition standard in time for the 1986 Commonwelath Games will conclude the main focus of the park 19 years after the preparation of the 1967 proposals (Figure 17).

Pollution of the loch continues to be an intermittent problem

Fig.16 Strathclyde Park: Main Features of Stage 1 as Constructed.

Fig. 17 Strathclyde Park, Plan Performance: Main Elements

and one which has yet to be satisfactorily resolved. The park has
not continued "to grow and meet needs as they develop"(Surveyor, 1973)
as envisaged by the Joint Committee, and in the current economic
climate and priorities of the Regional Council, further development
or expansion is unlikely in the forseeable future. Responsibility for
the park has been transferred from a policy-making body of the
Regional Council (the Leisure and Recreation Committee) to the
Buildings and Property Committee, largely on a "care and maintenance"
basis. The private investment which it was envisaged would be
attracted to the park to provide restaurants, hotels and other leisure
facilities has not been forthcoming, and this aspect is currently
the subject of a feasibility study commisioned by the Scottish
Development Agency (Drivers Jonas, 1983).

At the present time, the final costs of park development have
still to be apportioned between the main participants, largely due
to what one senior finance officer of the Regional Council termed
the "financial shambles" which the Council inherited in 1975. It is
likely, however, that the total cost will be around £12 millions,
with approximately 75% to 30% being financed by central government
through grant-aid for land rehabilitation, informal countryside
recreation, and sports facilities. However, Bernard Scott, who now
has other responsibilities as a Regional Councillor, could still
remark in 1983:

> I've had personal frustration with the whole thing,
> because the park was never built the way it should
> **have been built...it doesn't function as it should
> function.** Some of the main essential things are
> missing.   (Scott, 1983)

B. Park Useage

A study by consultants of the use of Strathclyde Park (Arnott
et. al., 1978) was commissioned jointly in 1977 by Strathclyde
Regional Council and the Countryside Commission for Scotland in order
to:

1. provide a comprehensive record of the initial use of the park,
   and thus a baseline for assessing future changes;
2. help in the guidance of decisions about future park development;
3. contribute to an assessment of the impact of the park on
   patterns of recreation in north Lanarkshire.

The study found that:

(i) over a 16-week period in the summer/autumn of 1977, an
   average of 2,300 vehicles per day entered the park, whilst
   total visitors (including pedestrians) was 988,000;

(ii)82% of park users came from Hamilton and Motherwell Districts,
   with the average travel distance of 6·4 kilometres. Only
   6% of car-borne users had travelled more than 16 kilometres;

(iii)the average length of visit by users was 1·5 hours;

(iv)only 9% of users made use of the active sports facilities;

(v) attitudes to the park were generally favourable: over 66%
   of users were attracted by features related to the park's
   rural character, particularly the open-air and "sense of
   freedom" (24%)and the scenery (23%). The built facilities and
   those for sport attracted much smaller proportions;

(vi)only 5% of residents interviewed in neighbouring areas had
   not heard of Strathclyde Park, whilst 74% had visited it.
   Most used the passive facilities such as the beaches (61%),
   play areas (54%), restaurant (44%) and picnic areas (38%);

(vii)60% thought the creation of the park had **benefitted their**
   area, whilst 22% disagreed. Over 80% of respondents living
   in Motherwell District thought it had benefitted their area.

The findings from the survey led the researchers to conclude
that:

(a) the Park's primary appeal was based upon its open nature,
   scenery, natural features and landscaping "which combine to
   provide an almost rural environment in a predominantly
   urban setting" (Arnott et. al., 1978, p.74);

(b) the designers and managers of the park have been largely
   successful in presenting the loch and associated facilities
   for water sports as the primary focus for activity within
   the park;

(c) by and large, attitudes to Strathclyde Park were positive:
   local people felt that the area had benefitted from the
   creation of the park, and that the money spent on leisure
   and the improvement of local amenity was well spent;

(d) the park is capable of much greater use, particularly in
   respect of informal recreation; that its use is selective in
   respect of the demographic and social groups from which users
   are drawn; and that the great majority of users come from the
   immediate locality.

These findings, from the only comprehensive survey undertaken of park useage, indicate that, whilst the revised Stage 1 plan was largely carried through to realisation, the concepts upon which the park was based, and which largely justified its priority allocation of national land rehabilitation and countryside funds, were not realised. The reasons can be partly explained by:

1. Scott's view that, as a regional park, it does not function because the full implications of the regional conception were never accepted by the Government, ie the implementation of the 1967 proposals in full; or

2. the conception of a regional dimension to the park was fundamentally flawed, in that (a) it was based on over-optimistic forecasts of population growth, car ownership and mobility, and (b) it did not take into account competing recreational and leisure attractions for the population of central Scotland (most notably Loch Lomond and the Clyde coast resorts), nor leisure and recreational initiatives which would be undertaken in the future by other local authorities, also taking advantage of the provisions of the Countryside Act and other legislation. Only in respect of the watersports facilities does the park attract users from outwith the immediate locality.

C. Strathclyde Park : Success or Failure?

Evaluation of the impact of Strathclyde Park is beyond the scope of this study. However, all planning processes are means to ends, and aspirations for the middle Clyde valley area coloured the intentions and attitudes which both shaped detailed proposals and influenced their implementation. This evaluation is therefore limited to an appraisal of how the impact of the park has been regarded by others, and the influence of such evaluations on the development of the park, particularly after 1975.

Seen as the creation of countryside and recreational resources out of a despoiled and largely neglected landscape, the park is generally considered to have been successful and worthwhile, as reflected in statements made at the official opening in 1973 by Secretary of State for Scotland and the chairman of the Countryside Commission. The study of park useage (Arnott et. al., 1973) suggests that this view is shared by the residents of the surrounding areas,

who are the main park users. Major watersports and passive country-
side facilities have been provided in an area generally regarded as
being deprived of open space and recreational facilities at the time
(SDD, 1964a, b), whilst these areas continue to be regarded as deprived
communities requiring priority treatment in the programmes of
Strathclyde Regional Council. On completion of the rowing and canoeing
course to international competition standard, the park will provide
a major focus for international events, and in that respect one of
the main aspirations of Bernard Scott will have been fulfilled.

Overall, however, Scott considers that the project has been
only partially implemented, and an SDA study (Drivers Jonas, 1933)
suggests that the full potential of the park has still to be achieved.
The study by Arnott et. al.,(1973) revealed a general perception
amongst the main users of the park that further facilities were still
required, such as a sports centre and a swimming pool.

Criticisms of the park have been levelled less at the outputs
of the planning processes, and more at the processes themselves.
Strathclyde Regional Council criticised the lack of budgetary control
by the local authorities as a major cause of the rapidly escalating
costs of the project during construction, whilst Reid (1932), Davies
(1933) and others have criticised the complex nature of decision-
making necessitated by the number of participating agencies. This
complex structure, requiring "multiple clearance" for decisions
(Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973) was a contributory factor in the delays
which occurred during a period of particularly high inflation. The
Regional Council's evaluation led to £300,000 being cut from the
park's budget for 1976/77.

Although major criticisms can be levelled at the development-
led nature of implementation, construction costs were subject to
the influence of factors outwith the control of the Joint Committee
(particularly inflation). Furthermore, as Scott (1933) contends, it
is unlikely that the park would have been constructed even in its
present form if the full cost implications had been known from the
outset. Hall (1930) has illustrated the particular problems inherent
in large-scale "prestige" developments.

The content of the park proposals and their implementation were

not subject to any direct public participation, which only became a
statutory requirement for the preparation of the new-style development
plan system introduced in the 1969 Town and Country Planning (Scotland)
Act. By 1969, and the Report of the Skeffington Committee (1969),
proposals for the park were already well advanced and entailed a high
degree of commitment. Development Plan amendments were submitted
jointly by the three local authorities in 1970, and were approved by
the Secretary of State in 1971, without a public inquiry. The
proposals were implicitly assumed to be beneficial, and the land-
scape improvements long overdue.

D. The "Rationality" of the Process

The processes leading to the development of Strathclyde Park
followed no rational-comprehensive model of decision-making. Whilst
procedural planning theory provides a normative basis for planning
frameworks, in practice "disjointed incrementalism" is a closer
approximation to the characteristics of the Strathclyde Park
processes since:

    (i) the 1971 proposals were reached through a process of conflict
and bargaining which was continued during the construction
stage, when the balance in the power-dependence relationship
shifted, thus blurring distinctions between policy-making
and implementation;

   (ii) objectives and intentions changed during development in
response to changing circumstances and horizons of expectations;

 (iii) the multi-organisational planning context, and the power-
dependence relationship (particularly in respect of resources
for implementation) distorted notions of simple decision
hierarchies and channels of control;

  (iv) external factors, outwith the control of participants,
had an important bearing on the opportunities for and
constraints to action;

   (v) key individuals played a central role in implementation,
acting on the basis of their own "assumptive worlds" and
perceptions of room for manoeuvre;

  (vi) the Joint Committee was constituted soley to plan, develop,
and manage the park, and thus the rationality of their actions
was ideologically based;

 (vii) planning and development proceeded via a series of recursive
steps, largely due to the foregoing.

Thus, the decision-making processes from which Strathclyde
Park emerged were more incremental and pragmatic than comprehensive
and "rational"; more political than technical; conducted and controlled
according to whom prevailing circumstances favoured; and depended
upon human factors, whilst the focus for action was constrained by
external factors.

The main features of the implementation of Strathclyde Park
were therefore:
1. the role of central government as the catalyst and prompter
   for local planning action, setting down the regional economic
   policy context, and mobilising and controlling the financial
   resources for implementation;
2. conflicting central-local government objectives for the
   middle Clyde valley area, which in combination with (1) led
   to extended negotiations, conducted in a political arena,
   over the legitimacy of planning proposals;
3. the importance of wider economic and political conditions,
   which influenced the timing of planning and development, the
   priority of the project for Government funds, and which either
   facilitated or frustrated the general scope for action.
   Certainly, over the period 1964-73, Strathclyde Park was an
   "idea in good currency" (Schon, 1971);
4. the key role of certain individuals or "inspired change
   agents" who used their positions of power and influence to
   steer the development of the park towards particular objectives
   which coincided with their own aspirations;
5. the central influence of an implementing authority established
   specifically for the achievement of one single objective. To
   some extent, the Joint Committee shared some of the ideological
   characteristics of new town development corporations, inasmuch
   as there was an interdependence between the agency and its
   implementation task. In other respects, the Joint Committee
   had coordinating functions more characteristic of contemporary
   physical and economic planning;
6. the implementation of the park fell victim to a changing
   planning context for action which rendered obsolete many of
   the assumptions upon which it was based, and which served to
   erode the commitment to action which had been built-up under
   previous conditions;

7. although a lineage in park development can be traced back to proposals in the 1946 Clyde Valley Regional Plan, these earlier proposals served only as a springboard to legitimate, firstly, SDD's 1964 outline scheme and, latterly, the regional concepts and assumptions upon which Joint Committee aspirations were founded;

8. the length of the planning period in particular made the park proposal sensitive to changes in planning "fashion" and hence to the influence of external factors.

3. Behavioural Outputs

Although during its planning and the early stages of its construction Strathclyde Park was a major development project which consumed substantial national financial resources and provided early experience for the embryonic Countryside Commission, Sports Council and Scottish Development Department, it is difficult to draw accurate assessments of the influence of the Strathclyde Park experience on subsequent countryside and recreation planning in Scotland.

Certainly, during this period there was no countryside policy (Irving, 1933), so the park experience must have had some influence on the subsequent thinking of these organisations. For example, Cameron (1982) suggests that Strathclyde Park influenced the Countryside Commission's attitudes to urban fringe recreation.

Within SDD, the debate as to whether the local authorities' proposals were or were not "country park material" suggests that during this period there was little clear idea as to what functions a country park was intended to perform (Duffield and Owen, 1970). This was a problem with which the Countryside Commission was grappling in the early 1970's, culminating in "A Park System for Scotland" (Countryside Commission for Scotland, 1974), and further refined in the 1981 Countryside (Scotland) Act, which introduced the statutory definition of a regional park.

Both the Commission's and the Sports Council's operations were largely determined by the pace of implementation, which was dictated by the central-local relationship, and the need to forge agreement

between the main participants: an arrangement of which Cameron (1982) and Davies (1983) were highly critical, but which is more characteristic of contemporary planning contexts.

Whereas the early focus was on the concepts upon which the proposals were based, latterly the overriding considerations were of a budgetary nature, when it became clear that the project was consuming a substantial proportion of funds available for both land rehabilitation and countryside recreation. Lessons were learnt about the cost implications of planning processes, and their impact on horizons of expectations, during a transition in the mid-1970's from profligacy to parsimony in the availability and deployment of financial resources.

The planning and development of Strathclyde Park straddled not only a period of change in local government administration, and in economic and political conditions, but also in the emergence of central and local policy on a whole range of land-use and environmental issues. The fate of Strathclyde Park was intertwined with these new policy initiatives since the onset of construction work coincided with a period of changing attitudes by central government, the Countryside Commission, Sports Council and other agencies, arising from the development and refinement of their own policy frameworks. The 1974 West Central Scotland Plan was the last of the sub-regional plans sponsored by SDD, and brought the context for planning in the Clyde Valley, and the fate of Strathclyde Park, full circle since 1946 (Figure 13).

Fig. 18   The "Life Cycle" of Strathclyde Park

CHAPTER X

UNDERSTANDING ACTION:

A CONTRIBUTION TO THE EPISTEMOLOGY

OF PLANNING PROCESSES

UNDERSTANDING ACTION:

A CONTRIBUTION TO THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF

PLANNING PROCESSES

1. Introduction

The purpose of this concluding chapter is three-fold

(i) to relate the case study findings to the hypotheses and concepts
discussed in Chapter I;

(ii) to consider contemporary issues in the theory and practice
of town and regional planning in relation to the understanding
of implementation developed in preceding chapters;

(iii) to suggest avenues for further research into implementation
processes.

Chapters II to IX have provided a detailed analysis of one
major, long-running development project, and identified the detailed
processes of bargaining and negotiation in the evolution and
implementation of the project in relation to (a) the power relation-
ships between, and patterns of influence brought to bear by,
participating individuals and organisations; (b) the context for
action provided by changes in regional economic planning, and in
planning for leisure, over the post-war period; (c) the effects of
combinations of circumstance on the course of implementation, and on
the scope for action and manoeuvre as perceived by participants.

The first section of this final chapter attempts to progress
the knowledge-base of implementation processes in terms of action in
the context of circumstance, and the implications this has for the
policy-action relationship. This section concludes with a
reformulation of the main characteristics of public planning processes.
The second section considers current trends in UK planning practice,
in particular the ideology of the plan and its relationship to
planning processes. It is suggested that, since the introduction of
a comprehensive system of statutory land-use planning, the significance

and value of the development plan as the main vehicle for implementing land use planning strategies may have been overstated, to the neglect of opportunities to develop less formalised action-response frameworks which are not necessarily plan-based. It may be a misconception of the role of a formal plan to judge its effectiveness by the extent to which its stated provisions are realised. The third section suggests avenues for further research into implementation processes. Greater understanding of the influence bearing upon the implementation task is required, and the role of the planner in this dynamic environment.

Efforts in theory and practice to date have focussed on the improvement of decision technologies in the pursuit of the cybernetic principle of "requisite variety" (Ashby, 1969), to the detriment of a consideration of the political nature of policy in action. This suggests a need for a shift in research, teaching and professional attitudes towards understanding (a) the political nature of the implementation of public policies, (b) the organisational and resource requirements of such processes, and (c) the implications of both for how planners approach the planning task, in particular how they address the problems of future uncertainties. The concluding section re-visits the interrelationships between policy, implementation and politics, the linkages between which comprise the overall theme of this research.

2. Implementation Processes

The case-study analysis suggests a re-evaluation of (i) the role of the individual in processes of change, and (ii) the nature of planning processes in relation to the characteristics of implementation.

The evaluation of the effectiveness of planning is problematic, since there is currently no generally accepted model for, or concept of, planning (Healey et. al., 1982), nor consequently of the place of implementation within it. In recent years there has developed a plurality of theoretical positions on the meaning and nature of planning within strategies of public intervention, which may have assisted the general flight of practitioners from theory towards a

pragmatic concern for utility. The implementation of proposals for
a Strathclyde Park can therefore be variously interpreted. Even
against criteria of plan conformance, which is the evaluative focus
of rational-comprehensive planning, the park as constructed represents
a significant under-achievement for the progenitors of the regional
park idea, as articulated in the 1967 proposals. Yet, as the main
catalysts for action, Government intentions were exceeded, both in
terms of the content and the cost of the subsequent development.

In the context of more incremental criteria of plan performance,
Strathclyde Park represents a significant achievement, not least
since the local authorities succeeded in a major development initiative
during a generally unfavourable economic and political climate, and
in the face of some resistance from central government to proposals
which, by their nature, exceeded the latter's view as to the degree
of environmental change that was required. The following paragraphs
summarise the main characteristics of implementation processes.

(i) The Structural Context
        Due to the structure of government in Scotland, and the
distribution of financial and other powers, local authority initiative
is significantly constrained by the attitudes and policy priorities of
central government. At the same time, central government has
traditionally been dependent upon action by local authorities for
the achievement of its social and economic objectives. There exists,
therefore, a power-dependence relationship in which central govern-
ment financial and other powers are mediated by a dependence upon
action by local authorities. There is evidence, since the mid-1970's,
that this relationship is changing fundamentally as more financial
control is concentrated at the centre (Cuthbert ed., 1982; Keating
and Midwinter, 1983), and as the resources to act are redirected from
local authorities to Government-appointed agencies with an
implementation remit (such as the Scottish Development Agency). In
the case of Strathclyde Park, there was confusion as to the most
appropriate kind of relationship between central and local government
for effective action: whether the local authorities should take the
initiative and commit resources in the manner they thought most
appropriate to their own conception of local needs, or whether the
project was primarily a central government initiative in which the
Scottish Office should determine, or at least oversee, the deployment

of resources.

(ii) Entrepreneurial Action.

Despite the power-dependence relationship, the structural context
can be mediated and influenced by "policy entrepreneurs" - highly
motivated and committed individuals who can "gatecrash" this frame-
work and manipulate or "bend" it in the direction of other ends.
The development of Strathclyde Park was significantly influenced by
key individuals, acting at the local level, who were able to exploit
implementation processes and the power-dependence relationship.

The significance of individual action can be considered from
the polar positions of materialist and idealist social theory (Young
and Mills, 1983). Materialist social theory contends that the
influence of individuals in social change is but an intervening
variable, a source of friction or distortion in a system which is
otherwise driven by force of circumstance. Individual action is
therefore secondary to and derived from the underlying realities of
political life. In the idealist view, however, reality is itself
seen as a product of consciousness, and the reforming politician or
administrator is seen as an independent agent. Decision-makers are
portrayed as engaged in a process of "strategic choice" in order to
manage uncertainty (Friend and Jessop, 1969). According to whichever
view is adopted, therefore, individuals and organisations may be
seen as either borne along on the stream of material events,
responding as promptly or prudently as they are able to the exigencies
of an ever-changing situation, or as shapers of events.

However, neither the materialist nor the idealist view can
account satisfactorily for policy change, the first because it denies
the significance of the role of the individual, the second because it
overlooks the pressures of rapidly-changing circumstances. Further-
more, a shift of the attention of analysis from the individual agent
to the agency is complicated by the organisational context for action.
Young and Mills (1983) therefore conclude:

> The entirely independent agent is then inconceivable..
> ..no policy-maker is invulnerable to turbulence or
> to the relentless contraction of domain - be it
> political support, clientele, market share or empire.
> Men are constrained both by circumstances and by
> their own appreciations; they make their own
> history, but not under circumstances chosen by
> themselves.   (p. 15)

(iii) Objectives and Intentions.

Intentions and motivations are more significant than declared policy objectives. The former derive from what Young (1979) has termed the "assumptive worlds" of participants in policy-making, which derive from group values and ideologies. Such interpretations of the scope for action in processes of negotiation and bargaining have a mediating effect on the pursuit of technical rationality in planning processes. As a result, objectives tend to shift in response to changing circumstances and expectations. The decision-making process is not discrete, but part of an ongoing complex of interrelated acts. Implementation is therefore circumscribed by multiple realities: any particular "objective" context is capable of an infinitude of possible appreciations and interpretations. Yet, within a given organisational setting, there are likely to be only a limited number of plausible accounts competing for legitimacy, as well as a strong drive towards finding a single, accepted account masquerading as a technical rationality.

(iv) Political and Economic Circumstances.

This context can significantly affect expectations and intentions, especially in the case of complex, long-running implementation tasks. The development of Strathclyde Park was substantially affected by a climate for action radically different from the climate prevailing when the project was launched. International events can also have an influence, such as the effect of the oil crises in the 1970's on subsequent patterns of mobility and energy consumption.

(v) The Mercurial Nature of Implementation.

Much implementation activity is so heavily influenced by circumstances, by external events, and by the pattern of relationships between participants (all of which are dynamic) that it has a mercurial quality as a social phenomenon which makes the development of explanatory theory problematic. Policy does not exist in a pure form, independently of those who make or influence it. It has both subjective and objective qualities, and is as much a matter of interpretation as of statute (Higgins et. al., 1983). Consequently, what policy is, and whose particular ideas have shaped and fashioned it, are open to considerable dispute. Strathclyde Park emerged from a complex of processes characterised by shifting coalitions of groups,

each pursuing their own rationality. Planning and development
proceed, therefore, not by any pure rational mode, but by a series
of compromises. This would accord with Hall's (1980) "tentative
theory" of decision-making in which he suggests that:

> Decisions arise from a complex process of
> interactions among actors. All these people
> think themselves rational, and are trying to
> behave rationally for much of the time; but
> their conceptions of the rational differ. They
> have different goals, and different ways of
> achieving these goals. (p. 196/7)

This leads Hall to suggest that planning in practice, however
well managed, is "a long way from the tidy sequence of the theorist"
(p.293). It involves conflicts of values which cannot be fully
resolved by rational discussion or by calculation; the clash of
organised pressure groups and the defence of vested interests; and
the confusions that arise from the complex interrelationships between
decisions at different levels and at different scales, at different
points in time. These complex interrelationships, together with the
unpredictable consequences of the increasing rapidity of knowledge
about the external environment of planning decisions, and the tendency
of human values to change over time, combine to explain to some degree
why intentions and expectations tend to "drift" during implementation,
and often why policy intentions yield unexpected outputs and
unintended impacts. Strathclyde Park's completion suffered
significantly from changing values and political priorities from the
mid-1960's, to the mid-1970's.

In summary, implementation is therefore:
(a) both constrained by context and circumstance, yet presents
    opportunities for entrepreneurial action;
(b) affected by fashion and "ideas in good currency" (Schon, 1971),
    and hence exhibits mercurial qualities;
(c) not amenable to the development of positivist explanatory
    theory, but analysis can assist in the understanding of the
    limitations and dependencies of programmes of action;
(d) in the Scottish context at least, strongly influenced by
    central government financial controls and policy priorities,
    although does provide opportunities to deflect or subvert
    centrally-derived goals;
(e) changing in its nature, during a period of financial and

other resource restraints, towards less formalised structures
for action

3. The Main Features of Planning Processes

It was suggested in chapter I that a feature of planning
processes is the attempt by planners and other policy advisers to
both central and local government to construct a technical rationality
for implementation in a decision context dominated by political
rationality. Whilst the various proposals for Strathclyde Park sought
to exhibit a rationality based on professional and technical values,
they were exploited as instruments of bargaining in a political arena.
Planners especially have been generally criticised for seeking to
cloak their own political objectives behind a technical rationality,
often in the form of blueprints or development plans. Whilst this
led Davies (1972) to coin the descriptive term "evangelistic
bureaucrat", Knox and Cullen (1981) suggest that there is an "ideal
type" of planning personality which centres on a managerial ethos,
and which is directed towards "problem-solving" in a rationalistic,
positivistic way, within a strictly defined hierarchy of authority.
Recent Marxist-inspired analyses of urban planning have supported Knox
and Cullen's conclusion that planners are:

> The functionaries of a political apparatus which
> exercises its power to create a physical landscape
> in its own ideological image and to sustain a
> social environment conducive to its own preservation.
> (p.897)

- Thus, not only are the boundaries of planners' "action-space"
(and thereby potential for exerting influence in the political arena)
more limited than they would wish, but also, in attempting to increase
their influence, they adopt principles which are likely to be
acceptable to those they seek to influence (Healey and Underwood, 1978).
Planning principles thus come to be influenced by the interests of
the dominant pressures within any organisational context. This may
partly explain current attempts to seek utility for planning within
the context of the prevailing market economy ideology. From this
analysis, it would appear that planning principles are unstable and
subject to the influences of the interests which surround them.
Planners are not, therefore, a variable independent of the
organisational context, as Pahl's (1970) managerialist thesis would

contend.

Hall (1980) suggests that the technical-professional planning process was overcome by the political planning process as a consequence of changes in dominant social values during the 1960's and 1970's, in particular against rational-comprehensive planning concepts and the large-scale urban renewal projects they generated. The pre-war concept of urban order narrowed in the 1950's and 1960's to a focus on technical solutions based on heavy investment. Both were "hard planning solutions" (Hall, 1980) demanding investment for major urban surgery. The late 1960's onwards witnessed the emergence of a radically alternative mode : a more "flexible" system in which policies were progressively shaped by changing opinion and community concern.

An assessment of the main characteristics of planning processes, that substitutes for the normative traits of rational-comprehensive planning, features that derive from a more incremental, political perspective is complicated by two contrasting conceptual viewpoints: planning as a cognitive style, and planning as a substantive policy field.

Planning as a cognitive style derives from experiments and trends in the 1960's and 1970's when town planning began to occupy more central ground in the management processes of local government, particularly in metropolitan authorities. Eddison (1975), Stewart (1971) and Webber (1969) have been among the foremost advocates of the corporate management style. The idea of town planning knowledge and expertise being central to decision-making systems is frequently paired with the contention that technically-skilled persons hold the required knowledge:

> Just as troubles with an automobile engine can be
> analysed and then repaired by a skilled mechanic,
> so too can the problems confronting communities of
> people.   (Webber, 1969, p90)

Yet implementation analyses reveal that most problems in planning do not enjoy that fortuitous mix of goal consensus and available technique. The rational-comprehensive planning model will not work in the absence of agreement on objectives, nor where there is consensus on goals, but no available technology. Therefore,

there are two basic misconceptions in rational-comprehensive planning:
(i) a unitary set of goals, and (ii) technocratic substitutes can be
found for the self-correcting processes of social systems. The
"planning idea" suggests that portraits of desired future conditions
can be prepared, usually accompanied by time-sequence programmes
mapping out courses of action to attain desired ends. This requires
detailed plans to be drawn up. Yet, unitary plans deny that there
are plural publics which seek plural purposes, many of them mutually
incompatible. Although Webber (1983) strives for a planning style
that does not seek a unitary set of plans or policies, does not
promote a single conception of public interest, and which professes
to be essentially political rather than technical in character, he
fails to spell out the implications of his analysis. Friedmann (1973)
is one of the few to follow up a critical analysis of rational-
comprehensive planning with an alternative decision technology, based
on a decentralised, bottom-up sequence.

Approaches based upon planning as a cognitive style have
recently been criticised (Healey et. al., 1982) for their contentless
and contextless approach, which subsumes political rationality within
an overt technical rationality in which the planning method is
monopolised by professional ideologies. From these criticisms a view
has emerged that planning concepts must be context-based, that planning
should be regarded as a substantive policy field (namely, land use
planning). Thus Healey and Underwood (1978) suggest that:

> To maintain credibility in the eyes of central
> government, local government and the public at
> large, it is time that thinking among planners
> was focussed more directly on land use policy,
> its implementation and the interests and ends
> this can serve. (p.124)

This view assumes an acceptance of the current structural
context for planning, and is an attempt to legitimise the current
pragmatism in planning practice which seeks a utility for planning
within the prevailing economic and political environments. It also
rejects the advantages and benefits of the corporate administration
of public policy (ie planning as a cognitive style). The current
focus in planning practice on implementation and "getting things done"
is a symptom of the general view that the scope of government should
be reduced because government lacks the capacity to translate its
ideas into effective programmes of action - what Booth et. al. (1982)

describe as the reach of government constantly exceeding its grasp.
A focus on land use planning could be interpreted as a reaction to
the 1960's and early 1970's ideology of planning as "urban governance"
(McLoughlin and Diamond, 1973), which itself was a reaction to the
perceived deficiencies in the role of planning as contained in the
1947 Town and Country Planning Act.

In concluding Chapter I, it was suggested that the principles
of rational-comprehensive planning had little value either for
(a) normative guidance, or, (b) practice. In the former, such
principles exude technical rationality, whereas in the latter,
such principles are rarely applicable to practical contexts, which
exhibit much more the characteristics of incrementalism. It is
therefore less problematic to consider what the planning process is
not. It is not a unitary, logical sequential process integrating
means-ends relationships, in accordance with the model of classical
rationality. Organisational activity appears to exhibit much more the
characteristics of "disjointed incrementalism" (partisan mutual
adjustment and sub-optimising strategies), together with its general
resistance to change which Schon (1971) terms "dynamic conservatism".
From the analysis in chapter I, and the case-study findings, the
characteristics of public planning processes include the following:

> (a) fluid intentions and objectives, in response to the dynamics
>   of such processes;
> (b) an amalgam of sub-processes, rather than one unitary process;
> (c) founded upon political rationality, yet influenced by the
>   overt technical rationality of professional ideologies;
> (d) less goal-directed and more issue/contingency directed;
> (e) generally incrementalist, but containing elements of purposive-
>   rationality (such as plans).

Within this context, Rein (1983) understands implementation to
be (i) a declaration of (usually government) preferences, (ii)
mediated by a number of actors, who (iii) create a circular process
characterised by reciprocal power relations and negotiations.
Implementation involves "drift" from declared purposes since no
acceptable trade-off rules can be formulated in advance of practice.
Implementation could therefore be regarded as a continuation of the
political process (including policy-making) in another arena. It
involves not only processes of political bargaining, but also processes

of <u>administrative learning</u> (ie it uncovers new and unanticipated
problems). Ideals tend to drift in this context. Implementation may
therefore be regarded as an attempt to reconcile three potentially
conflicting imperatives:

   (i) what is legally required;

  (ii) what is rationally defensible in the minds of administrators;

 (iii) what is politically feasible in striving for agreement
      between contending parties, each with a "stake" in the
      outcome.

     The "legal" requirement for Strathclyde Park was established in
SDD's 1964 view of the scope for action, in the constitution of the
Park Joint Committee, and in the provisions of the 1967 Countryside
(Scotland) Act. Rational defensibility depended on from which interest-
perspective the various park proposals were viewed. The 1971 revised
proposals exhibited what, in the minds of Scottish Office administrators,
was rationally defensible in the context of the resources likely to
be made available. The political feasibility of the project varied
according to the prevailing circumstances : what was politically
feasible in the 1960's was not so in the late 1970's. The fortunes
of Strathclyde Park were affected by variations in these three factors
from the mid-1960's onwards. This suggests that, since "implementation
takes a long time" (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973), it cannot be
assumed that the rationales on which plans and policies are launched
will be the same rationales during the period they are put into effect.
This poses questions concerning the dynamic nature of "effectiveness",
which is a relative and not an absolute term.

4. The Nature of Effective Planning

     The RTPI's (1979) "Implementation in Planning" Working Party
drew three main conclusions:

   (i) planning objectives and procedures must have regard for the
      realities of constraints and objectives affecting development
      decisions, if these are to be influenced;

  (ii) the formal planning machinery has little influence on
      development, and insufficient attention is paid to other
      forms and patterns of influence;

 (iii) the "top-down" model of implementation is a questionable one

in practice. There is a need to harness the positive
advantages of the influences which combine to "disrupt" this
model in reality.

This analysis led the Working Party to conclude:

> In the past it has been commonly assumed that the
> essential ingredient of the planning process is the
> plan or policy, and to the extent that this is not
> implemented, there is cause for concern...this is a
> false and misleading basis from which to proceed in
> search of ways of making planning more effective.
>
> (p.30/31).

This infers that there are powerful and influential <u>informal</u>
processes (as opposed to legislation, plans and procedures) affecting
the development process, including attitudes, commitment and
inspiration, sense of purpose, rewards and incentives. It therefore
follows that formal planning processes can often be marginal to much
more complex processes of political negotiation. Rein (1983)
therefore contends that:

> Only for the planners who are professionally
> committed to the process, does the meaning lie within
> the plan itself : for everyone else, planning is a
> political means from which they will be tempted to
> withdraw, covertly or openly, whenever there is a
> better way of pursuing their advantage.
>
> (p.52)

Whilst planners do not characteristically carry out their plans,
only for them is the integrity of the framework for prospective
action a constant, crucial preoccupation. Others only look for a
plan when they are frustrated or bewildered by events or by other means.
For them, planning is "an episodic response to the disintegration of
purpose in action" (Rein, 1983, p.62).

One of the reasons for the change from the 1947 Act plan system
was the assumption that the circumstances in which policies are
applied may change, and that plans should be sufficiently flexible
to adapt accordingly, whilst intentions would remain fairly stable.
However, policies are articulated through vehicles such as development
plans, and the plans subsequently used in a multi-organisational
context. Government and local authorities play a central part in
determining the <u>content</u> of plans, but are not necessarily in aggreement
over either their general direction or their detailed realisation.

The Planning Advisory Group (Ministry of Housing and Local Government, 1965) was appointed in 1964 to reappraise the development plan system established under the 1947 Act. In its report, the Group proposed that "strategic"policy decisions should be distinguished from detailed "tactical" decisions, and that each should be handled in different ways. The Group's report was prepared against the background of accelerating rates of demographic and economic growth, which influenced a perception that plans needed to be responsive to change.

In the late 1960's and early 1970's, there was a significant shift in UK local government practice towards the adoption of more corporate and purposeful approaches to processes of public policy-making, drawing on experience in the United States. There was a similar, related movement in central government. This led to a proliferation of planning systems for particular policy sectors and to the development of expenditure-based programmes. The 1970's witnessed what Hambleton (1983) refers to as an "enormous expansion" in planning activity linking central and local levels of government, and a growing acceptance of the need for more "rational" approaches to policy-making. This movement was linked to a body of theory which stressed the idea of planning as a rational, problem-solving method (Faludi, 1973; ed., 1973; McLoughlin, 1969; Chadwick, 1971).

Evaluations of the effectiveness of planning tend to focus on the degree to which the intentions of plans and policies, as originally formulated, are achieved. Eddison (1975) and others contend that too much attention is focussed on the plan, to the detriment of the process. The"ultimate faith"in plans as products is enshrined in legislation, professional ideology, local government structure, and the management structures and administrative processes of local authorities. The process of plan-making is seen as central to the process of planning. A re-commitment to the process is as important as the validity of the modes of expression for policies and plans. Planning, suggests Eddison (1975), is too concerned with "sets" of decisions, as distinct from decision-making in general:

> A planner, of whatever sort, is not in business to
> produce plans. His task is to understand the
> planning system so that he can help to enable it
> to produce the effects society wants of it.
> (p.17)

The town planning system has been described as "the means by which the public interest is brought to bear on the process of developing land"(RTPI, 1979), although the institutional arrangements and legislation introduced in the 1947 Act assumed considerable direct public involvement in development. The central purpose of development plans within this conception was to guide local planning authorities in the consideration of the "public interest", as well as to coordinate development initiatives. The development plan remains the pre-eminent heart of the planning system. However, since the early 1970's, in practice schematic planning, focussing on the preparation of plans designed to anticipate future events, has been replaced by a political strategy of programmatic planning in response to prevailing economic conditions and a heightened awareness of uncertainty, and which operates within the perceived constraints on action. In this strategy, budgetary instruments have replaced spatial development plans as the principal device of forward planning (Gillingwater, 1983). Within the programmatic style, policy is seen as "an ongoing stream of intentions" (Healey et. al., 1982). Development plans may thus be viewed as episodic responses in relation to these shifting intentions, as well as mechanisms for their pursuit. In this context, it may be more appropriate for planning to concentrate primarily on influence and intervention, utilising a wide range of tools, not just plans. Thus, the RTPI (1979) Working Party suggests that:

> Planning and planners should be far more entrepreneurial,
> product-orientated, opportunistic in pursuit of the
> service to the public interest...these qualities and
> aptitudes...are latent in the profession more often than not
> locked in by a preoccupation with the production of plans
> rather than being applied to the task of implementation.
> (p.33)

A central tenet of planning and policy-making rests on the notion that such activity is primarily about using knowledge to change the world in some way, rather than to solely understand it. Knowledge and action represent two poles which are spanned by the activity of planning. Much evaluative analysis of the effectiveness of planning and other forms of social policy reviews actions in the light of their outcomes, and these outcomes compared with the stated purposes. Such analysis implies that policies will make sense when the actors know their situation and define their purposes clearly. Harris (1982) contends that such an approach treats purposes artificially, as if

they were plucked out of a repertoire of values which the actors
are supposed to cherish independently of events. On the contrary,
purposes are as much an interpretation of previous experience (ie
a response to the outcomes of action) as an expression of pre-conceived
ideals. Thus:

> The rationality of purposes in the light of experience
> is as crucial and analysable a question as the
> rationality of actions in the light of purposes.
> (Marris, 1982, p.4)

The context of meaning expresses the needs of living actors
constantly adapting to events - a conceptual operation by which an
actor or group constantly develops an interpretation of experience.
It comprises a comprehensive, integrative structure of interpretations
which each individual elaborates through experience, and which he
depends upon for confidence to act. It may not be possible, therefore,
to learn very much by evaluating actions soley in terms of their
"effectiveness". Actions can only be effective or ineffective from
some standpoint of attention which itself reflects a whole context of
purpose and understanding.

Social policy has been based upon the paradigm of positivist
applied social science, in which social and economic relationships
were perceived as regular and "lawful", and government was based on
objectivity, the maximisation of the total supply of welfare, and its
equitable distribution. It also assumed that, given an understanding
of economic and social "laws", and a sense of collective social
purpose, the government of society had the power to use this knowledge.
Social policy in the UK now confronts characteristic problems which
neither it nor any other nation knows how to solve. A dominant
paradigm represents the collective intelligence of society - the
ability to ground action in a coherent sense of purpose and bring all
relevant knowledge to bear on an issue. Once it disintegrates,
policies become more impulsive, opportunistic, and vulnerable to
intellectual or ideological "fads". Being less coherent or consistent,
policies are thus likely to be cumulatively less successful, on their
own terms, and to teach less by their failures. The prevailing
paradigm of planning is in a state of transition, exhibiting a plurality
of theoretical positions which has "balkanised" research and stimulated
a hostile, anti-theoretical view in planning practice, a relapse into
pragmatism, and a concern to demonstrate the effectiveness of planning

and of planners, in terms of both process and outputs. The likely
effectiveness of planning, and the entrepreneurial role, can be
judged according to two contrasting paradigms : the "market economy"
paradigm, and the "ecological balance" paradigm.

(i) The Emerging Market Economy/International Capital Paradigm.

This paradigm assumes a dominant structure of economic
organisation to which societies must adapt themselves competitively;
that social goals incompatible with competitive success are
unrealistic and self-defeating; but that intelligent planning in
conformity with the logic of the international organisation of
capital makes the most of a nation's assets. If every political
jurisdiction acts in this way, without inhibiting the competitive
deployment of capital, the growth of global wealth will be as great
and its distribution as fair as possible.

The emergence of the "getting things done" attitude, and the
entrepreneurial approach currently in vogue in planning practice, flow
from this paradigm, and have stimulated several "market theory"
approaches to planning (Sorensen, 1983; Moor, 1984). Such approaches
infer that planners are coming to terms with the fact that the
prevailing political-economic environment (rather than their own
professional ideology) is the major influence on the choice of policies
they must implement. This is manifested in professional doubts with
regard to the ability and desirability of planning attempting to
redirect market forces, an over-emphasis on plan-making to the
neglect of implementation, and a failure to take account of likely
resource availability in the compilation of planning policies and
programmes.

The focus of entrepreneurial planning is therefore on utilising
rather than re-directing market forces. To impose new patterns on
market forces requires a level of resources which is no longer
available. The practical problems of funding development programmes
have tended to be ignored in the past as a consequence of (a) the
relative isolation of the planning profession from the centralised
budgetary and financial planning carried out in local authorities,
leading to (b) limited contact with the realities of securing resources
for implementation, resulting in (c) a skill-deficiency in planners.
Entrepreneurial planning is concerned with the relationship between
resource availability and planning policy, in the context of real

reductions in local authority expenditure as a consequence of central
government policies, the disproportionate share of these resources
being borne by the planning budgets of local authorities, and the
limited access by the planning function to either specific sources or
specific resource-bidding machinery.

The RTPI report "Land Values and Planning in the Inner Areas"
(RTPI, 1978) indicated a need for planners to be more aware of market
conditions and trends, and put forward some recommendations for
changes in practice, especially in the preparation of development plans,
which might meet the conflicting requirements of certainty and the
creation of confidence on the one hand, and responsiveness to
change on the other:

> We must, in future, act positively and make sure
> that we do not, wittingly or unwittingly, stifle
> the developer's flair, initiative and investment
> which are vital if our plans and policies are
> ever to be implemented.   (Booth, 1979, p.181)

To date, local economic planning has emphasised practical
action at the expense of wider considerations of objectives and
effectiveness. Local economic planning, and the development of the
entrepreneurial approach, is perhaps the clearest example of the
current pragmatism in planning and the professional/academic focus on
"town planners in search of a role". This approach focusses on
supply factors (land and premises, information, finance and skills)
and is predicated on growth and small firms policies. It raises a
number of questions, including whether planning should confine itself
to land and development matters (as advocated by Healey et. al., 1982)
or embrace wider corporate concerns, and the implications of such an
expanded focus for developing and implementing planning strategies.
Such questions have profound implications for professional training
and practice.

The debates leading to the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act
envisaged that the public sector would have a major role to play,
not only in planning post-war reconstruction, but in directing it and
carrying it out. However, Cadman (1984) suggests that:

> Economic uncertainty and high levels of unemployment
> have made local authorities acutely aware of the
> need to generate economic activity and to create jobs.
> This need has come to dominate policy, pushing the
> aims of what was once thought to be "good planning" to

a much lower place on the agenda. Planners brought
up to think in terms of design, social gain and long
term strategy have been encouraged to become "Mr.
Fix-its" and to "get things done" - almost at any
cost.   (p.207)

This suggests that the planning system can no longer be
adequately measured against the expectations and conditions of the
immediate post-war period. Its relevance and effectiveness must be
assessed within a new and dynamic set of social and economic conditions.

(ii) An Alternative Ecological Balance/Transactive Paradigm
This paradigm assumes the impossibility of continual economic
growth due to (a) the scale of changes it imposes, and (b) eventual
exhaustion of the fossil fuels on which it depends. Furthermore, the
use of energy at such a rate is likely to cause irreparable damage to
the natural world which sustains human life. This paradigm rejects
the economic ideal of growth, in favour of the ecological ideal of
balance. It reintegrates government with the cooperative management
of everyday life as a pervasive, decentralised process of mutual
accommodation.

The pluralism at the heart of this paradigm has only been
enshrined in planning law since the 1968 and 1969 Town and Country
Planning Acts, stimulated by the Reports of the Planning Advisory Group
(Ministry of Housing and Local Government, 1965) and the Skeffington
Committee (Ministry of Housing and Local Government, 1969). Until the
1970's, neither the law nor the practice of planning had been much
informed by pluralist and participatory concepts (Simmie, 1984).

The Skeffington Report was an early establishment response to
the criticisms then being levelled at the impacts of comprehensive
urban renewal programmes. Yet, despite criticisms of the Report by
Levin and Donnison (1969) and others, its recommendations still form
much of the basis of planning statute and practice. No adequate
consideration has yet been given to public participation in planning
per se (including implementation) as opposed to plan-making.
Skeffington (1969), RTPI (1982) and political responses to demands
for more citizen involvement in public policy-making and execution
have focussed on land-use planning, and have merely sought to overlay
new procedures for participation, rather than address more fundamental
concepts concerning the role of public participation in government:

unitary and pluralist concepts of society; participatory and
representative styles of democracy; and the nature of the "public
interest" as a foundation for the professionalisation of decision-
making. The evidence of the last fifteen years has shown the
consensus view of planning to be fallacious. The distributive effects
of planning show it to be a political process by nature, in which some
interests are served at the expense of others, and that implementation
in the planning process functions as an extension of the politics of
decision-making.

The pluralist conception of society infers a pluralist
conception of policy-making. Such a conception implies a revolution
in professional roles and in the processes of policy-making and
implementation. In contrast to the market economy paradigm, the
ecological/transactive paradigm infers a decentralised bottom-up view
of policy-making, and takes as its cue experience in the United
States with advocacy planning (Davidoff and Reiner, 1960), and emerging
ideas from ecological politics and humanitarianism (Schumacher, 1973,
Robertson, 1980). Friedmann's (1973) "transactive planning" seeks
to apply these concepts and ideas in the pursuit of principles for
planning in which the entrepreneurship of the professional planner is
mobilised in support of individual and community self-help (ie human
resources), rather than the financial resources of corporate interests.
Friedmann thus seeks to shift the emphasis away from planning as an
activity of professional planners, towards planning as "a process of
social systems". Here, the social environment would give rise to
a style of planning adapted to the conditions through which it had to
work.

Friedmann's "transactive" planning is normative, analytical,
future-orientated, and strategic. In his conception, the role of
the professional planner is not to set out alternative courses of
action, but to advocate points of view that will explicitly affect
the lives and well-being of others, in a process of mutual learning.
Here, innovative planning involves "a fusion of plan-making with plan-
implementing activities during the course of action itself". Innovative
planners perform an entrepreneurial function in mobilising and
organising the use of institutional resources, rather than distributing
resources among competing users, in the traditional allocative style.
The transactive style involves forging relationships between the

"corporate" structure and the "participant" structure in which planners assume an advocacy role. In this relationship, professional planners contribute concepts, theories, analysis, professional knowledge, new perspectives, and systematic research procedures, whereas clients contribute an intimate knowledge of context, realistic alternatives, norms, priorities, feasibility judgements, and operational details.

The transactive style is rooted in concepts of advocacy planning as developed in the United States. The closest parallels in the UK context include the evolution of planning aid and the emergence of neighbourhood action. Here, the planner is divorced from the "corporate" structure, and acts on behalf of the "participant" structure, ie client groups. The transactive style is perhaps most useful in indicating ways in which planning skills can be directly applied to implementation tasks, as an alternative to allocative planning, than as a model for revolutionising a UK planning system which operates within a unitary governmental structure.

5. Implementation Analysis : The Search for Understanding

Policy-making processes are extremely complex, and thereby present severe methodological problems for analysis. Levin (1981) contends that, at the present time, established methodologies are lacking. Essentially, any methodology selected involves a choice about which aspect of the decision process (usually based on some variation of the classical model of rationality) is to be studied - some more or less "visible" feature, amenable to analysis (its output, inputs to it, some aspect of the process itself, or the structure within which it takes place) and exploring what lies behind it. Levin identifies six characteristics of public policy-making processes:

(a) a process, comprising activities both of a "technical" kind, to do with the generation and treatment of information, and overtly "political" activities, such as bargaining, negotiation, and mobilising support;

(b) its output, usually a policy, which is essentially a specification for action of some kind, or a statement that

has implications for whatever course of action may later be
specified and adopted;

(c) <u>inputs,</u> usually information and the claims of certain interests,
either of individuals or organisations who stand to be similarly
affected by the output of a process;

(d) a governmental <u>structure</u> within which processes of public
policy-making take place, comprising organisational elements,
political elements, and procedural requirements;

(e) an <u>environment,</u> ie "the world outside", and patterns of life
and work within which the structure exists. This environment
continuously impinges upon government through the medium of
pressures, demands and supports, and is in turn impinged upon
through the medium of policies and their implementation;

(f) <u>human factors</u> influencing each stage of the process, such as
pre-dispositions, abilities and ambitions. These factors are
less amenable to study than the more visible or regular
structural and environmental factors, but are of considerable
influence.

Research on planning processes to date has been largely based
on studies in the United States, has been theoretical in nature, heavily
biased towards policy design and organisational aspects, and has used
as case examples the evolution and implementation of mainly economic
and social programmes at the national, regional, or city-wide scales.
Alterman (1982) classifies current work in the broad area of
"implementation analysis" as follows;

(i) <u>theoretical-descriptive:</u> such contributions are intended to
aid in the description of implementation processes and in
their understanding, usually using some metaphor as an
analogy (Bardach 1977; Barrett and Fudge 1981; some aspects
of Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). It is doubtful that a
descriptive framework can be proposed that would be appropriate
for all contexts;

(ii) <u>descriptive-narrative:</u> empirical work based on case studies
describing the course of implementation (Meyerson and
Banfield 1955; Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). Such narratives,
which attempt to bring out the salient political and social
factors, require to be set in a theoretical context;

(iii) <u>theoretical-analytic:</u> theoretical work intended to present a
set of factors, or a checklist, to aid in the prior assessment

of chances of successful implementation (Sabatier and
Mazmanian 1980; van Meter and van Horn 1975). Such studies
present a significant advance in conceptualisation, if over-
reaching in seeking to establish "theory". They provide
a stimulus for more contextual, empirical analysis;

(iv) <u>empirical-analytic</u>: empirical work often using statistical
techniques, attempting to identify factors that enter the
implementation process and that can explain its progress
(Alterman 1980; Montjoy and O'Toole 1979). Such work has yet
to focus on variables of specific interest to town planning;

(v) <u>prescriptive</u>: "how to" contributions providing clues for
achieving better success at implementation (Bardach 1977
in part). Such contributions lack any stated theoretical
basis;   .

(vi) <u>evaluation studies</u>: empirical work that is often both descriptive
and analytic, commissioned by some agency in order to   ,
evaluate the performance of some programme and the reasons
for success or failure, whether ex-post or during the process
of implementation (Derthick, 1972; Alexander, 1975). Such
work is process-orientated, focussing on goals and impacts/
outcomes.

Whilst it may be difficult to "get things done", to implement
public policy, it is also difficult, as Barrett and Fudge (1981)
conclude, to provide general explanations which hold in a variety of
situations. Furthermore, implementation analysis is not a tool of
the explanatory sciences : it is not amenable to law-like statements.
It is much more a tool of the interpretary sciences. Since there is
a paucity of UK case material on policy implementation, <u>practice</u>
must be the starting point for the development of understanding. The
issue of the in-depth case-study versus the comparative focus is a
central methodological problem (ie the level of analysis on which to
operate). Barrett and Fudge (1981) therefore suggest that:

> The study of implementation at this time needs to
> consider a linking of levels of analysis, a
> synthesis of different theoretical positions and
> viewpoints and yet be grounded in practice.   (p.250)

The approach in the current analysis is to complement the wide
range of comparative social policy research with an in-depth case
study over a long time period, and set against the background of

current hypotheses and concepts. Thus the research is structured around (a) alternative views of implementation in planning processes, (b) in-depth empirical research, (c) an evaluation of how well the "current wisdom" fits with what goes on in reality, and (d) the provision of some normative guidelines for future research and practice.

Implementation could be regarded as a field of what Healey (1981) terms "interactive policy studies", which is concerned with the ways in which policy is created, interpreted, manipulated and transformed through the perceptions and actions of the individuals and groups who constitute the organisational environment in which policy is made and promulgated. This replaces the previous emphasis on policy design with an emphasis on the way individuals and groups interact within complex organisational settings. Such studies thus follow the development of organisation theory and management studies, shifting between scientific/mechanistic approaches and behavioural/ interactional approaches. This is essentially a pluralist view of the social structure within which public agencies exist, and reflects a socio-psychological focus. An implementation perspective does not merely focus on action, reaction or response, where the nature of organisations and their behaviour influences the differential scope for action and the use made of this scope within a given policy. It also focuses on the politics of policy. Theoretical understandings therefore require to be set within an understanding of a specific socio-historical situation, and require to articulate the relationship between economic and social processes, and the nature and role of government. Implementation is viewed as one element in the politics of change, and policy is seen as being subject to a range of environmental determinants. Thus, Stewart and Underwood (1981) suggest:

> It is indeed because the policy sector is so diffuse,
> so all embracing, and so opaque that it is the
> implementation process which sheds light on the
> politics of the policy and on the values and purposes
> which underlie the policy.   (p.219)

Understanding has to overcome the complexity of the policy-action relationship. Interactions between actors are the crucial areas for understanding. It is important to examine the particular organisational and administrative linkages used for implementation, and the negotiative activity taking place. Plans and policies cannot be regarded as constants, since they are mediated in

implementation by actors operating with different assumptive worlds from those formulating policy. The conventional wisdom rests on the assumption that successful implementation requires the achievement of consensus in the policy process. In reality, however, conflict is likely to occur at various stages in the "implementation chain", as a reflection of different interests and value systems impacting upon the power structure of society, and differences in values concerning policy content and direction.

Understanding the meaning of assumptive worlds is essential to successful policy analysis, since it enables events to be interpreted in the context of the meaning which the actors involved ascribe to their own actions, rather than to interpret these actions in terms of postulated motives, interests or goals. Thus:

> The degree to which policy represents change can be
> seen both as a function of the polarisation of
> ideologies, attitudes and value systems participating
> within the existing social order and as a
> determinant of the degree and types of negotiation
> likely to be necessary if it is to be implemented.
> (Barrett and Fudge, 1981, p. 273)

Planners are not alone in devoting attention to implementation. In recent years, policy science has produced a considerable amount of theoretical and empirical works directed specifically at implementation. Alterman (1981) suggests that, if the field of urban and regional planning is to benefit from implementation analysis, there is much room yet for developing theory and empirical research directed specifically at the types of problem and contexts faced by planners. A variety of perspectives is required when attempting to interpret a phenomenon so diverse as implementation. Detailed, in-depth historical analysis and interpretation provides one perspective.

In this regard, Masser (1983) makes a plea for "middle range" theory, recognising the degree to which elements of different theoretical positions can be combined. He suggests that the attention of analysis is increasingly being directed towards planning practitioners, in recognition that the success of planning is mainly constrained by the interactions of professionals, bureaucrats and politicians engaged in planning, rather than by resources or technology. This infers a notion of the planner as an instrument of the planning process rather than a mere technician. Thus, plans are shaped as much by

the actions of planners and politicians in implementing them as by the substantive tasks that are involved. Masser therefore suggests that there is a need to develop both personal and organisational theories of action which stress the importance of qualities such as flexibility, ingenuity, opportunity and advocacy, and which take account of personal and organisational beliefs and commitments.

Hall (1980) suggests that there is no all-embracing model for predicting the likely success or failure of plans and that, at best, we must look for piecemeal improvements that can be "stitched" together to provide some normative guidelines. Hall sees the potential for two types of improvements:

    (a) improvements in forecasting the future world : we need to know how people will judge the results of decisions;

    (b) improvements in evaluation : what should be the criteria where choices between alternatives have to be made?

Whilst this involves the development of more incremental, adaptive strategies, Hall's focus on improving explanatory theory is unlikely to be productive (for the reasons stated earlier). Rather, the choice lies between developing better explanatory theory (attempting to improve the predictive value of planning) or better interpretive theory, based on improved understanding of the complexity, dynamism and socio-psychological characteristics of policy processes.

During the last ten years or so, there has been a sustained strengthening of work on planning theory, marked by a proliferation of academic texts and debates (Healey et. al., 1982; Paris et. al., 1983). However, paralleling these developments in theory has been a steady deterioration in the standing of planners and planning practice, reflecting a disenchantment with the products of the planning system, the decline in actual and anticipated economic and demographic growth, and the advent in the UK of a dominant political doctrine ideologically hostile to government intervention in market processes.

In the context of the foregoing, there would be benefits to be gained from the improvement and development of interpretive and interactive theory by focussing future research on:

    (a) the political nature of planning processes, ie a behavioural orientation;

(b) organisational and resource requirements of planning

   processes, eg "connective" planning (Friend et. al., 1974);

(c) a plurality of methodologies (Levin, 1981; Alterman, 1981).

This would assist in the improvement of action-research knowledge aimed at improved understanding of the processes of policy implementation.

6. <u>Policy, Implementation and Politics</u>

This concluding section seeks to draw together the main themes of the preceding analysis.

Esher (1981) remarks that, for centuries, construction was regarded as synonymous with improvement and constructors with improvers. From the early 1960's, there was a "moral revolution", spurred by the adverse impacts of urban renewal, and a rejection of town planners as interpreters of the public interest in a consensus world. It was at the time that the Skeffington Committee was publishing its findings and recommendations that Webber (1969) wrote:

> Planning is unavoidably and inherently a political
> activity...Insofar as the outcomes of planned actions
> effect a reallocation of benefits and costs (and
> they almost always do), the problems they address
> can have no technical solutions - only political ones.
>   (p.61)

In the conception of a plural, dynamic, conflict-ridden society, therefore, there is no one "best answer" to urban and regional policy problems. In their criticisms of Skeffington, Levin and Donnison (1973) argue that :

> Conflict amongst the many interests in a complex
> urban society is inevitable, and can be resolved
> only by staging explicit public contests leading
> not to agreement but to compromise based on
> bargains.   (p.91)

Negotiation and bargaining are at the heart of the politics of planning, are illustrated in the case study of Strathclyde Park, and are the features of planning processes which in-depth implementation analysis highlights as an aid to heightened understanding. From the standpoint of constructing useful interpretive theory, this

suggests a need to examine planning processes more carefully and deeply than hitherto.

Since there is no universally accepted test of "effectiveness" in planning, it is misleading to consider greater democracy in planning processes as a means of ensuring "better" plans and policies. Experience since the Skeffington Report has shown how public involvement can lead to delay or even the abandonment of planning proposals (eg motorway schemes in the 1970's; third London airport). It may be more useful to regard such democratisation of planning as an end rather than a means, since it presents opportunities to maximise variety in the "inputs" to such processes (assumptive worlds, interests and values) and thereby the scope for negotiation and bargaining which is at the heart of decision-making activity.

Furthermore, it may be misleading to conceive of one planning process, since (a) planning involves a range of processes, only some of which converge, and (b) such processes are rarely sequential or linear, but more iterative and reticular in character. The assumption of the cyclical model of continuous planning serves to obscure the inherent complexity of planning processes and to focus attention on abstractly-defined phases, to the detriment of the detailed consideration of the whole complexity of processes which together produce the outputs of decision-making, and which in turn are translated into impacts, both positive and negative.

The search for improved techniques of forecasting in an attempt to build "requisite variety" (Ashby, 1969) into planning systems is predicated upon the false assumption that better policy design (in anticipation of future consequences) leads to better policy implementation. In contrast, innovative styles of planning seek to work within the limited horizons of partial knowledge of social and economic behaviour, and addressed to the realities of uncertainty. Implementation then becomes less the automatic process of policy execution, and more an arena for political bargaining in the deployment of financial, managerial, informational and other resources. In this respect it is also a learning process, in which knowledge gained through action is applied to future policy-making. The pursuit of long-term visions of the future is not antithetical to this conception. Such visions drive and motivate the ambitious in

their dealings in the political arena, and sustain a momentum which counteracts the debilitating effects of delay. What Lindblom (1959) describes as "partisan mutual adjustment" is less the pursuit of sub-optimal strategies as such, and more the outcome of the deployments of power and resources in multi-organisational planning contexts where no single interest has sufficient control over the levers of change, and where compromise is inevitable.

The pursuit of greater understanding of the processes by which planning becomes "action-on-the-world", together with analyses of the impacts of policies (particularly the distributional consequences) may occassion the paradigm-shift in professional practice that already seems underway in academic thinking (Healey et. al., 1982)

The rational-comprehensive model is misconceived as describing how decisions are, or ought to be, made. Planning in many respects has, according to Eddison (1975) and others, deceived itself by evading the realities of uncertainty about the future and of change through the passage of time. Whilst Dennis (1972) describes planning as a process which is intended to increase the predictability of life and the scope for orderly control, because policy-makers ignore the fact of uncertainty and the realities of power, they in effect decrease both predictability and control. Implementation aspects have been rated lower-order concerns in the mistaken belief that the pursuit of rationality in processes of policy-making will be automatically and faithfully replicated during policy execution. There has been, both professionally and politically, a "faith" in planning, almost a faith in the omnipotence of plans. By contrast, much of British public policy is the story of the incremental adoption of measures imperfectly conceived in respect of problems only partially understood.

Friedmann's (1973) thesis is that this problematic should not be regarded as a pathology to be cured, but a reality to be faced and accounted for in the design and operation of planning frameworks. Whilst Davies (1972) and others contend that social and economic changes must first occur "before planning can become either possible or desirable", innovative styles of thinking and practice are attuned to more short-term considerations. Here there is potential for studies of implementation processes to reveal and articulate the political

realities of the operational environments of planning in order to avoid a "mindless relapse into pragmatism" by practice (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973), whilst acknowledging the changed social, economic and political conditions from those within which the statutory planning system became established.

Advocates of "market economy" planning propose an accommodation to this reality if planning is to survive as an activity of government. Whether or not this is desirable, it is clear that, just as pluralist conceptions of society can generate pluralist theories of its behaviour, so they may also generate pluralist styles of planning. Such styles would pursue greater opportunities for innovation, and the operationalisation of "transactive" strategies which may be less orientated towards the assumptive worlds of the "corporate" structure of governmental institutions and professional ideologies, and more towards the "participant" structure and the community groupings which have hitherto been regarded as the "objects" of planning.

The acceptance of an explicitly politically-orientated approach to the analysis of planning behaviour may be closer to an understanding of processes which, by their nature, are political. Such heightened understanding may lead to conclusions of greater benefit to the improvement of the theory and practice of public policy-making, of which town and regional planning will continue to be an integral part.

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