FACT AND VALUE

— The modern confrontation of philosophy and theology

in the field of ethics —

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Introduction.

The interest which lies behind this thesis is an interest in the question of the basis of theological ethics. A confrontation between theological ethics and the current philosophy of ethics is always necessary if theological ethics is at every time to have a clear understanding of itself, and to uphold its claim to be a separate and serious discipline. But it is our conviction that this confrontation is particularly important today.

The reason for this is, as we see it, that the main-stream of philosophy of ethics today, at least in the Anglo-Saxon world, advocates a general theory of ethics which appears to put the whole undertaking of theological ethics in jeopardy.

We are here referring to the separation of fact and value which, if it has to be accepted, will leave us with no basis for asserting any theological ethic.

It must be pointed out that the recognition and the subsequent refutation of the so-called "naturalistic fallacy" in ethics was a valuable contribution to ethical theory. By "naturalistic fallacy" we refer to the attempts made to define value words in terms of non-evaluative ones, or to derive value judgements from non-evaluative statements.

But when this refutation of the "naturalistic fallacy" becomes identical with a separation of fact and value, and when this separation becomes absolute, the theory turns out to be disastrous for theological ethics.

The field in which the separation of fact and value is most strictly maintained today, is that of the philosophy of linguistic analysis. It is an examination of that part of the ethical theory of linguistic philosophy which forms the main object of this thesis.

We recognize that linguistic philosophy is not one single school. But we think that it is after all a distinguishable movement in contemporary philosophy, with a marked similarity between its representatives. This holds true also with regard to our main problem. That this is so is not simply taken for granted. We have tried to substantiate it in the course of the inquiry.

It is not possible, however, to deal satisfactorily with the whole of linguistic philosophy in general, or to give all its representatives equal treatment.

We have concentrated our attention on R.M. Hare's writings. Because in the respects which relate to our problem his philosophy is a relevant and a fair example of the linguistic analytical approach to ethical theory. It must be emphasized that we have

not been using R.M. Hare as a whipping-horse. We have not been interested in him for his own sake, but as one who has posed our problem most clearly, and also the argument of linguistic philosophy with regard to the separation of fact and value.

After closing a sympathetic examination of the writings of R.M. Hare we have made a comparison with other philosophers of his school, drawing lines also to the "predecessor" of linguistic philosophy, namely logical positivism. It is our contention that there is a basic unity in the whole of this movement, in the respects which we have shown. This is the reason why the term "analytical philosophy" is deliberately used in the sub-heading to pose the problem as one that relates to both linguistic philosophy and to earlier and related schools.

We are only too aware of the inadequacy in many respects of relating linguistic philosophy to logical positivism under a common name. But we are only treating "analytical philosophy" as a unity in so far as our own investigation has shown that there is such a unity, despite the diversity in the various accounts of the meaning of moral language.

It is, however, partly the relation to logical positivism which has suggested the lines along which our further discussion of the problem have to be pursued.

What is needed is really to raise the fundamental question about the presuppositions of the philosophical method of the school of philosophy we are dealing with. This becomes evident from a closer study of the argument of R.M. Hare.

This, however, opens up the problem in a way which makes it impossible to deal with it exhaustively in one single thesis.

Still, we think that we have been able to find a pathway through the wide field of philosophical debate which opens up once we start asking the whole question of philosophical method. We have reached conclusions which are not exhaustive, but which are, we think, sufficiently clear and concrete to help and determine future philosophical approach to the problem.

Because we have found that it is the fundamentals of the method of the linguistic schools that we have to question, we have had to refer to a wide variety of other philosophical schools to illustrate other methods. This has made it necessary to pass from the one to the other in a way which might give an impression of discontinuity. This discontinuity is more emphasized by the difference in philosophical style between the various schools today. This is, however, how the case is today, and it cannot be avoided if one feels that a confrontation has to be attempted. (Though we hope to have shown that it is possible to some extent to discuss

the various views by means of a more traditional form of
philosophical language).

We hope that in the end our excursions into those various
fields of philosophy can be justified by the relevance which we
have been able to show within them, the relevance to the problem
which forms the basic interest in this thesis, i.e. the
possibility of theological ethics.

It is obvious that the broad front on which we have been
forced to pursue the inquiry has not allowed us to discuss all
the themes that have presented themselves as more or less relevant
to our problem.

First of all we have had to leave out any discussion of the
relation between a view like Hare's with its separation of fact and
value, and other earlier theories of ethics.   Here the relation to
the formalism of Kant's ethical theory would have deserved an
extensive treatment.   R.M. Hare himself explicitly recognizes the
connections between his theory and that of Kant.   The logical rule
of the separation of fact and value is, according to Hare, that which
Kant's polemic against the "heteronomy of the will" rests upon.
It is also the basis of Hume's observation of the impossibility of
deducing an "ought"-proposition from a series of "is"-propositions.
And it can even be traced back to Aristotle as the source of his
ethical differences from Plato, Hare claims.

Because a satisfactory treatment of all these relevant ethical theories would cause the present work to grow out of all proportions, we think we are justified in restricting ourselves to a discussion of the contemporary form of the problem.

It will nevertheless be clear, we hope, that our approach to the problem also has a bearing on the discussion of e.g. the Kantian theory, and of the views of those who still represent a more or less similar theory of ethics.

Among the themes which we have not been pursuing to any extent we can mention the question whether morality is to be conceived of in terms of rules of some kind, or whether it is entirely "situational". This question, which plays an important role in present-day ethical debate, at least on the theological side, would have to be considered in a further development of our views.

Another question which would also need an answer is the one about the understanding of theological ethics itself, particularly about its relation to a general approach to ethics. This would include e.g. the question about a morality based on a "natural law" or some similar notion.

Some technical matters should be mentioned here in the introduction. They relate first of all to terminology and

spelling. We have generally let this be determined by the
texts with which we have actually been dealing. That is to say,
we have not necessarily tried to impose any unified terminology on
our material. This would have created confusion rather than
clarification.

One instance of the diversity in the use of some terms is
the use of the words "moral" and "ethical". Although there is much
to be said for making a distinction between these words and adhering
to a strict definition of each of them, we have used them
indiscriminately. This is because there is not yet established
any particular use of the terms as distinct from each other. The
meaning of the terms will, we think, be clear from the context in
which they are used, and refer mostly to the use of the author
whose work we are discussing in each context.

Contents.

I.   ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF ETHICS AND THE PROBLEM OF MORAL VALUES.

1. An analytical philosopher's approach to the theory of ethics.: R.M. Hare.

We think it is profitable first of all to undertake the mainly descriptive task of sketching R.M. Hare's conception of ethics as it is exposed in his two main works on the subject of moral language,[1] and we will at the end of this chapter only indicate our points of criticism to be developed in the course of this thesis.

A. The Task of Ethics.

Like the analytical philosophers in general R.M. Hare regards it as no concern of his to issue a moral code or to give a conclusive answer to any specific moral problem. The moral philosopher's interest lies in the analysis of moral language, in an exposure of its logical structure[2]. He does not want to be a "moralist"[3]. Accordingly, the theory which he elaborates is "neutral as between different moral opinions"[4].

We must not, however, take this to mean that ethics has no bearing on moral problems. Its function is "that of helping us to think

1. The Language of Morals, 1952 (hereafter referred to as LM) and Freedom and Reason, 1963 (hereafter referred to as FR)

2. See LM, p.v and FR, p.v.

3. For the expression and a similar distinction see A.J. Ayer's editorial foreword to P.H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics, 1954.

4. FR, p.89.

better about moral questions"[1]. That is to say, there is no doubt that the answering of a moral question should be a rational activity, even if the "naturalist" way of making it such must be repudiated[2]. On the one hand the freedom of our moral activity must be asserted. We are free "to form our own opinions about moral problems"[3]. It cannot, for one thing, be said to be self-contradictory or a misuse of language not to answer a given moral question in one particular way[4]. On the other hand the rationality of moral thought must not be denied[5].

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1. FR, p.v.

2. FR, p.2, "there can be no logical deduction of moral judgements from statements of fact! See also FR, pp. 86ff, and cf. LM, pp. 29ff. This view can be traced back to Hume (Treatise III,1,i).

3. FR, p.2

4. See FR, p.1.

5. Hare reproaches most moral philosophers with having denied either one or the other side of moral thought. The "descriptivists" (including the "naturalists") deny our freedom in moral questions, while the "subjectivists", together with the "emotivists", disregard the rationality of morals. See FR, p.3.
   Whether this characterization of the "emotivists" in the lump is just can be discussed. For a representative exposition of the emotivist ethical theory see C.L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language, 1944, where the author, in his way, stresses the place of reason in morals.

"Although most of us think that we are free to form our own
opinions about moral questions, we do not feel that ...
the answering of moral questions is a quite arbitrary
business.   ... We feel, rather, that it matters very much
what answer we give, and that the finding of an answer is a
task that should engage our rational powers to the limit of
their capacity".[1]

The logical study of moral concepts has as its main purpose the
resolving of "the antinomy between freedom and reason"[2].   This study
enables us to understand the character of moral reasoning and to
realize that it proceeds according to logical rules.   It can thus be
shown that ethics is highly relevant to morals and that the logical
approach to ethics has been wrongly accused of failing to provide a
rational basis for moral thought.[3]

That Hare's assertion on this point does not satisfy all his
critics can be seen from some of the numerous comments on his views in

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1. FR, pp. 2f.

2. Ibidem.

3. See LM, p.45: "... it is not surprising that the first effect
    of modern logical researches was to make some philosophers
    despair of morals as a rational activity.   It is the purpose
    of this book to show that their despair was premature".
    See also FR, pp. 3f, 86ff.

various ethical writings[1].   It may be suggested that most of this criticism arises from philosophical views basically different from those of Hare, and it is into this fundamental disagreement that we will have to go in the following chapters.

B. An Analysis of Moral Language.

The main characteristic of moral language, according to Hare, is that it is a sort of prescriptive language.   This follows from the fact that its function is to guide conduct[2].   But it is not the only kind of prescriptive language.   Prescriptive language can, roughly, be divided into imperatives and value-judgements, each class of which again can be divided into two sub-classes, singular and universal imperatives on the one hand and non-moral and moral value-judgements on the other[3].   Because the different kinds of prescriptive language have certain important features in common, Hare devotes considerable space to the discussion of non-moral value-judgements[4].

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1.   See, e.g., A. Gewirth's review of LM in Ethics, 1953-54, p.228: "I am not saying here that Hare should have provided us with a ready-made doctrine of the content of moral principles or norms, but rather that his discussion of the method by which such principles may be established suffers precisely from his unwillingness or inability to bridge the separations (of imperatives from indicatives, commendation from knowledge a.s.o.) on which his theory rests."

2.   See LM, p.1.

3.   See LM, p.3.

4.   This is what causes M. Warnock to make the somewhat far-fetched remarks that Hare's book has not "any very direct connexion with ethics" and that Hare "incidentally lets fall some views about morals", Ethics since 1900, 1960, p.129.

The ordinary imperative sentence is the simplest form of
prescriptive language, and it is therefore the best introduction to
the study of ethics to make imperatives the subject of a study.
This is how Hare sets to work in LM, thus rendering the analysis of
imperatives the key to his work as a whole.

An interesting point is then how Hare regards the relation between
the indicative and the imperative sentences in general.   If one wants
to understand this relation correctly one must not disregard either
the difference between the two kinds of sentences or what they have in
common.   On the one hand it must be asserted against all attempts to
"reduce" imperatives to indicatives[1] that the difference is not only
one of grammatical form.

> "It is difficult to deny that there is a difference between
> statements and commands; but it is far harder to say just
> what the difference is.   ... The distinction lies between
> the meanings which the different grammatical forms convey ... .
> An indicative sentence is used for telling that something is
> the case; an imperative is not - it is used for telling
> someone to make something the case."[2]

1. These attempts are of various kinds, trying, for instance, to
   represent imperatives as expressing statements about the mind
   of the speaker, or as stating that a certain action is conducive
   to a certain aim.
   The source of these attempts is, according to Hare, the same as
   that of the temptation to analyse value-words in the way called
   "naturalistic", namely a feeling that the imperative sentence is,
   in some way or other, suspicious, so that it needs to be rescued
   by being shown to be really indicative.   See LM, pp.5ff.

2. LM, p.5.

On the other hand it is also a misinterpretation of imperatives to regard them as expressions of attitudes only, or as attempts to influence the emotions of a person, or to make him act in a certain way[1].

> "Commands, however much they differ from statements, are like them in this, that they consist in telling someone something, not in seeking to influence him."[2]

When we analyse imperative and indicative sentences we shall find that both of them consist of two parts, which can be called the "phrastic" and the "neustic"[3]. The phrastic is the content which is common to both kinds of sentences, that which they "tell about", while the neustic is what is different in them, according to the particular moods. Hare's conception on this point can best be made clear by one of his own examples: The sentences "You are going to shut the door" and "Shut the door" can be re-written so that they have in common the phrastic part "Your shutting the door", while the neustic

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1. This is an "emotivist" mistake, the former a "naturalist" one.

2. IM, p.15. Though Hare undoubtedly is right in what he positively asserts here, it is not so evident that he is right in what he denies. It may be suggested that the focusing of all interest on prescriptiveness hardly does justice to the character of imperatives.

3. From the greek words "$\varphi\rho\alpha\zeta\omega$", meaning "to tell", and "$\nu\epsilon\upsilon\omega$", meaning "to nod".

of the indicative adds the word "Yes" and the neustic of the imperative the word "Please"[1].

If this is so, it is decisive of our whole understanding of the character of imperatives. Like indicatives they have factual reference, i.e. they refer to actual or possible states of affairs, and they have their logic." ... we can study the logic of imperatives with as much assurance as that of indicatives"[2]. That commands are governed by rules, just as statements are, means, for instance, that they must not be self-contradictory, and that there be entailment-relations between them.[3]

Perhaps the most important part of the logic of imperatives is the rule that no imperative sentence about what is to be done can be derived from indicative sentences stating facts only. There can be no imperative conclusion without an imperative in the premisses. That is to say, all attempts to make imperatives purely factual, are attempts to deprive them of what makes them moral, namely their function of guiding choices.[4]

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1. See LM, pp. 17 ff.

2. LM, p.27.

3. A set of premisses containing the command "Take all the boxes to the station" and the factual statement "This is one of the boxes" entails the command "Take this to the station". See LM, pp. 27f.

4. See LM, pp. 28f.

Equally unsuccessful is the attempt to deduce imperatives from some self-evident first principles, a procedure which Hare calls "Cartesian". This procedure is illusory not only in morals, but in science as well.[1] "... no general principle can be self-evident which is to be of assistance in deciding particular questions about which we are in doubt"[2].

Hare not only denies the possibility of the existence of any relation of logical entailment between imperatives and factual premisses, but even that there can be any inference at all.

> "... by no form of inference, however loose, can we get an answer to the question 'What shall I do?' out of a set of premisses which do not contain, at any rate implicitly, an imperative."[3]

The error is here again first of all that the essential factor of decision is left out of the answering of moral questions. The decision to do something requires as its premisses not only the facts of the case, which correspond to the minor premiss of the Aristotelian practical syllogism, but also a principle of conduct, corresponding to the major premiss.[4]

The question of how we then do arrive at the decision of a moral principle is thus still left unanswered. But before we look at the way Hare positively tries to answer this crucial question it might perhaps be useful to consider his conception of the character of

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1. See LM, p.39

2. LM, p.41

3. LM, p.46

4. See LM, pp. 56ff.

value-words and value-judgements, the other kind of prescriptive
language.

Hare's discussion of value-words is confined mainly to a treatise
on two such words, namely "good" and "ought". This does not mean
that there is no difference between these words and other value-words
like "right" and "duty", but only that there is a close logical
relation between them which makes a study of each of them disclose
the same main features.[1]

The function of value-terms in language is that of commending.[2]
Thus the meaning of the commendatory word "good", for instance, is
constant and can be understood as applied to an object within any
class of objects.[3] It is not surprising that moral philosophers
have felt tempted to try to discover some characteristics which they
supposed to _entail_ a thing being good. This is, however, a fallacy,
no matter whether the characteristics in question are thought to be
naturalistic or metaphysical.[4] This fallacy is similar to the
fallacy of trying to derive imperatives from statements of fact.
What is wrong is the attempt to leave out the commendatory element in
value-judgements.

1. See LM, pp.71ff and FR, p.20.
2. See LM, p.91.
3. See LM, p.102.
4. See LM, p.91.

"Value-terms have a special function in language, that of commending; and so they plainly cannot be defined in terms of other words which themselves do not perform this function; for if this is done, we ∧are deprived of a means of performing the function."[1]

Accordingly, there is no complex or simple "property" which is named by the word "good" and which is recognizable in all cases where this is applied to an object.   Not even if we try to make a distinction between "instrumentally good" (good as a means) and "intrinsic good" (good in itself) and eventually other uses of the word "good" shall we succeed in pointing at a common property which is meant by the word "good" in each of the classes[2].

This must not, however, be taken to mean that there is no relation between "good-making" characteristics and "good", but only that there is no relation of logical entailment between them. Value-judgements about something are certainly made for reasons, because of the possession of certain properties.[3]   These properties are the criteria for the application of the value-word, but they are not its meaning.   The criteria for applying the word "good" varies

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1.   LM, p.91.

2.   See LM, p.103.
It does not make the case better if we say that "good" stands for a non-natural property, as Moore said.   "The reason why this happened was that it was taken for granted by everyone, Moore included, that the only job an adjective could do was to attribute a property to a thing ...   ... people should have been looking for differences in the roles of these different words (sc. adjective₈)" - R.M. Hare, "The Objectivity of Values", Common Factor, No. 1, 1964, pp. 3ff.

3. See LM, p.94, cf. FR, p.21.

for each class of objects.   Even in the case of instrumental

goodness there is no common criterion for all classes.   The criteria

for commending must thus be taught for each class of objects in

particular.[1]

The distinction between the meaning of and the criteria for the

application of a value-word is the same as between its "prescriptive"

or "evaluative"[2] and its "descriptive" meaning.   A value-word is, as

Hare defines it, a word which has both these kinds of meaning, and a

value-judgement is accordingly a judgement in which such a term is

used.[3]   The evaluative meaning of the typical value-words like "good"

is primary to the descriptive meaning, as is shown for instance from

the fact that the evaluative meaning is constant for every class of

objects, while the descriptive meaning is different in each case.[4]

There are, however, other words, like "tidy" and "industrious", in

which the descriptive meaning is the primary and the evaluative the

secondary one.[5]

What is it then for a term to have descriptive meaning?   The

understanding of this is crucial for our understanding of the

rationality of morals, as Hare conceives it.

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1.   See LM, p.102

2.   In FR Hare prefers the expression "prescriptive" to "evaluative",
     the latter being the one he used in LM, thus presupposing that
     what gives the terms in question their evaluative meaning is their
     prescriptivity.   See FR, pp.26f.

3.   Ibidem.

4.   See LM, p.118.

5.   See LM, p.121.

A term is said to be descriptive when there is a meaning-rule attaching it to a certain kind of object.

> "... a person is misusing a descriptive term if ... he says that an object is of one kind, meaning, or intending to convey that it is of another kind. A descriptive term may thus be defined as one, to misuse which is to do this.[1]

The meaning-rule in question can also be said to be one concerning similarity, stating "that we may apply an expression to objects which are similar to each other in certain respects."[2] A descriptive judgement is then an indicative sentence with descriptive terms as its predicate(s).[3]

From what is said about the meaning of descriptive terms it follows that a descriptive judgement is _universalizable_, i.e. "it commits the speaker to the further proposition that anything exactly like the subject of the first judgement, or like it in the relevant respects, possesses the property attributed to it in the first judgement."[4]

Turning again to value-words, and considering what was said above of the criteria for their application, we can now, perhaps, better understand what it means that a value-word has descriptive meaning. It is applied to an object because of its (i.e. the object's)

1. FR, p.8.
2. FR, p.13.
3. See FR, p.10.
4. FR, p.12.

possession of certain properties.   Accordingly, universalizability
is a feature of value-judgements, including moral judgements, as well
as of descriptive judgements, in so far as value-judgements carry
descriptive meaning.   The last reservation is highly significant.
It points to the fact, that while the descriptive meaning exhausts
the meaning of a descriptive term, this is not the case with a
value-term.[1]

There is another, additional element in a value-word, that makes
the rule for its application more than a mere meaning-rule.   This
element is its prescriptive meaning.   A rule telling us to apply the
word "good" to a certain kind of man is no descriptive meaning-rule,
but a synthetic moral principle.   It is not just an explanation of a
word, but a moral instruction.   The prescriptive element thus gives
value-words a logical character of their own, and therefore we should
not call value-words and value-judgements "descriptive words" and
"descriptive judgements" respectively, though they "have descriptive
meaning".[2]

The particular logical character of value-words means that these
terms behave in a particular way in inferences.   An evaluative
sentence about something cannot be inferred from a descriptive sentence
about the thing in question.   As far as morals is concerned, this
means that no "ought" can be derived from an "is".   This is crucial
for our understanding of the character of morals.[3]   An evaluative

1.   See FR, pp. 10ff, esp. pp.10 and 22.

2.   See FR, pp. 22f and 10,26.

3.   See FR, p.22.

conclusion about something can only be derived from a descriptive sentence in the minor premiss together with an evaluative principle or standard in the major premiss. Thus the purpose of value-words is to be used for teaching standards.

It can now be seen that there is a close similarity between the inference leading to an evaluative conclusion, and the inference, discussed above, from factual premisses together with a principle of conduct to an imperative conclusion. This similarity corresponds to the similarity in purpose between value-judgements and principles for choosing between actions. In fact, "critical value-judgements are all ultimately related to choices".[1]

> "To teach a person - or to decide on for oneself - a standard for judging the merits of objects of a certain class is to teach or decide on principles for choosing between objects of that class".[2]

Thus the decision of principles has turned out to be the essential feature in the making of value-judgements, as it was in the issuing of universal imperatives.

It may how, perhaps, seem necessary to consider the relation between moral and non-moral value-judgements, as well as the distinction between them, in the light of what is said above. The important logical features of value-judgements are common to both classes. The evaluative meaning is the same in both moral and non-moral contexts,

1. LM, p.127.

2. LM, p.134. Cf. LM, p.70, "to make a value-judgement is to make a decision of principle".

namely that of commending. What is different in the two cases is the descriptive meaning.[1] We must not, however, take this to mean that there is no important difference. In fact, the object of our commendation matters very much, and this object is, in the case of moral judgements, men as men.

> "As we have seen we cannot get out of being men; and therefore moral principles, which are principles for the conduct of men as men - and not as poisoners or architects or batsmen - cannot be accepted without having a potential bearing upon the way that we conduct ourselves. ... I can always choose whether or not to take up poisoning or cricketing as a profession. This is bound to make the spirit in which we consider moral questions very different from that in which we consider how we ought to poison Jones, or build him a house; but the logic of the word "ought" is not markedly different in the two cases."[2]

"Emotivity" is not the essence of moral language, but "only a sumptom of ... an evaluative use of words". What makes moral language emotive is the fact that we so often "feel deeply" about the situations in which it is used.[3]

C. Moral Reasoning.

As was indicated in our introductory remarks about the task of ethics, Hare's analysis of moral language has shown that no substantial moral principle can be forced upon us as a matter of logical necessity.

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1. See IM, p.140.
2. IM, p.162.
3. See IM, p.144.

When we subscribe to a moral principle we do not state a fact, but make a decision of our own.[1] And if we are asked to justify a decision of principle we have no means by which we can compel the inquirer to accept our decision, if he still goes on asking for reasons after we have shared with him all the considerations upon which our decision is founded. "We can only ask him to make up his mind which way he ought to live".[2]

But on the other hand the study of moral language has disclosed the fact that there really is a place for reason in morals. Decisions of principle <u>are</u> based upon considerations of facts, even if they are not derived from them, and they are made within a logical framework, in accordance with certain rules. Therefore moral argument is possible.

It is enlightening in this connection to consider the similarity which, according to Hare, exists between the procedure of moral reasoning and scientific inquiry. Hare agrees with Professor Popper that there is no so-called "inductive" inference in science, from observation-data to "scientific laws". What the scientist does is to propound hypotheses which he tries to test experimentally. The only possible inferences here are deductions from certain observations to

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1. See IM, p.196.

2. See IM, pp. 68f.

the falsity of a hypothesis. "Scientific inquiry is rather a kind of _exploration_, or looking for hypotheses which will stand up to the test of experiment".[1]

Now, the characteristic of moral reasoning is that it, too, is a kind of exploration, a looking "for moral judgements and moral principles which, when we have considered their logical consequences and the facts of the case, we can still accept".[2] The kind of inference is deductive, from the consequences of the principles suggested to the possibility or non-possibility of accepting them.

What is needed before we can start a moral argument is, first, the facts of the case[3]. Secondly, the logical rules of moral reasoning are required. The logical analysis of moral language has shown us that they are, first of all, prescriptivity and universalizability.

> "When we are trying, in a concrete case, to decide what
> we ought to do, what we are looking for ... is an action to
> which we can commit ourselves (prescriptivity) but which we
> are at the same time prepared to accept as exemplifying a
> principle of action to be prescribed for others in like
> circumstances (universalizability). If, when we consider
> some proposed action, we find that, when universalized, it
> yields prescriptions which we cannot accept, we reject this
> action as a solution to our moral problem - if we cannot
> universalize the prescription, it cannot become an "ought".[4]

1. FR, p.88.

2. Ibidem.

3. In moral reasoning these facts need not be actual, they may be supposed. See LM, p.93.

4. FR, p.90.

What makes this argument work (and what thirdly is required) is that people have inclinations, which make them unwilling to accept prescriptions with undesirable consequences for themselves. One more ingredient, i.e. the fourth, must be added to the list in connection with the foregoing, namely the faculty of imagination. The person — or persons — involved in the argument must be able to imagine what it is like to be in the situation in which another person is placed.[1]

The task of ethics is, as has been shown, to disclose the logic of moral language, and far from being a useless occupation, it provides us with "a powerful engine for producing moral agreement"[2]. If two persons are willing to use the moral words properly, we should expect that the other sources of disagreement could be eliminated.

> "People's inclinations about most of the important matters in life tend to be the same (very few people, for example, like being starved or run over by motor-cars); ... The facts are often, given sufficient patience, ascertainable. Imagination can be cultivated."[3]

This method of moral argument makes it possible to achieve great results even if the inclinations or interests of the parties differ.

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1. A person can be supposed to refrain from saying that he ought to put another person in prison for debt, because that involves that he himself ought to be put in prison in a similar situation. See FR, pp. 92ff.

2. FR, p.97.

3. FR, pp. 97f.

The appeal to universalized self-interest implies an appeal to equal consideration of conflicting interests, one of the utilitarian principles.[1]   Imagining myself having the interests of my counterpart I must "allow my choices to be circumscribed by the desires of other people".[2]

Hare repeatedly assures us that his theories on moral reasoning imply no breach of "Hume's Law" ("No 'ought' from an 'is'").   His method is only formal, and neutral as between different substantial moral principles.   We must not represent Hare as saying that a person's inclinations are inconsistent with a moral judgement.   What he says is that, "his inclinations being what they are, he cannot assent sincerely to a certain singular prescription, and if he cannot do this, he cannot assent to a certain universal prescription which entails it".[3]   And this is an analytic statement.[4]

As a proof that his theories are morally neutral Hare stresses the view that it is possible for a person to escape his argument by holding an _ideal_ with complete disregard of his own interests.   Such a person takes a fanatical attitude, but his moral principles are logically quite possible.[5]   It is possible for a Nazi to hold the view that he himself should be sent to a gas chamber if a Jew.

1.   See FR, pp. 115ff.
2.   FR, p.195.
3.   FR, p.109.
4.   See FR, pp. 111,193.
5.   See FR, pp. 110f, and passim.   Hare admits that his discussion of this point in LM was confused, to say the least.

He further argues against the view that the only kind of cogent moral argument is one which has as a premiss a moral principle already accepted by both parties to the argument.

> "I have maintained that once the logical character of the moral concepts is understood, there can be useful and compelling moral argument even between people who have, before it begins, no substantive moral principles in common".[1]

Elsewhere, discussing the principle that everyone is entitled to equal consideration, Hare holds:

> "It must be emphasized that it, like the principle of universalizability itself, is a purely formal principle, following from the logical character of the moral words."[2]

To indicate briefly our criticism at the present stage of the inquiry: Hare claims that his analysis of the logic of moral discourse is formal and independent of any moral presuppositions.

It is doubtful whether such a dichotomy between form and content is possible in the sphere of morals. But even if it were possible, Hare has not lived up to his claim. His terminology and choice of examples are highly evaluative. In calling a "consequent 'idealist' attitude" "fanatical" and using a Nazi attitude towards Jews as an example, while desires-for-oneself are just "ordinary" inclinations which we can expect everybody but "eccentrics" to share[3], Hare is, to some extent, relying on shared moral convictions to carry his point.

1. FR, p.187.
2. FR, p.118.
3. See FR, pp.115, 110.

Again, it is one thing to say that universalizability is a fundamental principle of moral judgement. It is questionable whether even this principle is purely formal. But it is altogether beyond question that the principle of universalized self-interest and of equal consideration of interests is not purely formal. It is a substantial moral principle. It is only in a case where people are subscribing, whether expressly or not, to these principles that they, together with the logical principles of prescriptivity and universalizability, render an argument like Hare's compelling.

This points to what must become our main point of critical tension with Hare. We are lead to question whether prescriptivity, considered as a formal principle, really expresses the logical structure of moral language.

2. The separation of fact and value in analytical philosophy. A survey.

We have in the foregoing chapter given an outline of R.M. Hare's conception of ethics, taking him as a representative of the movement, or trend, in contemporary philosophy called "analytical philosophy". We have not done so claiming that there is in every respect a uniformity of thought in this movement, far from it. Neither are we suggesting that the ethical writings of its representatives are in any particular way similar in their exposition of all the relevant topics.

What we are suggesting, however, is that, counting for all the differences, there is after all a certain line of thought that can be traced from the earliest remarks of the "analysts" on the subject of ethics (Hägerström, Carnap, Ayer, see below) to the more elaborate ethical works of the present-day "linguists".

Our use of R.M. Hare is justified by our seeing in his writings perhaps the most mature and balanced work of the analyst tradition in ethical theory, but still a work defending the basic position of this tradition.

Admittedly, the earliest forms of the "emotive" theory of moral language were very crude in their characterization of value judgements, including moral judgements, as emotional exclamations and such like. It is not surprising that remarks, like the following by A.J. Ayer,

tended to arouse the feelings of the opponents[1].

"We begin by admitting that the fundamental ethical concepts are unanalysable, inasmuch as there is no criterion by which one can test the validity of the judgements in which they occur. ... the reason why they are unanalysable is that they are mere pseudo-concepts. ...Thus if I say to someone, 'You acted wrongly in stealing that money', I am not stating anything more than if I had said, 'You stole that money', in a peculiar tone of horror, or written with the addition of some special exclamation marks. The tone, or the exclamation marks, adds nothing to the literal meaning of the sentence. It merely serves to show that the expression of it is attended by certain feelings in the speaker".

It must be noted that the function of ethical terms is not only to express feelings. They are also seeking to "arouse feeling, and so to stimulate action".[3] This is how Ayer sees it, at any rate.

Ayer stresses the point that ethical judgements _express_ feelings, they are not _assertions_ of feeling.[4] If the latter were the case,

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1. Ch.L. Stevenson, _Ethics and Language_, 1944, p.265, quotes Martin D'Arcy, who says: "Under the pretence of ultimate wisdom it (i.e. Ayer's book) guillotines religion, ethics and aesthetics ... and everything worth while".

2. _Language, Truth and Logic_, 2.ed.1946, p.107. This can be said to correspond to sayings by R. Carnap, like the following: "A value statement is nothing else than a command in a misleading grammatical form", _Philosophy and Logical Syntax_, 1935, p.24.
This view had its earliest and perhaps most radical spokesman in Axel Hägerström, cf. his statement in "Sosial-filosofiska uppsatser", a collection of essays published in 1939: "If I say, 'This action is infamous', I am expressing exactly the same thing as if I had said, 'Fie! What an action!': That is to say, what is expressed by this is only a certain feeling in connection with the notion of the action as actual." (Quoted from G. Hillerdal, _Teologisk och filosofisk etik_, 1958. The translation is by the author of the present thesis.)

3. Ayer, _op. cit._, p.108.

4. _Ibidem_, p.109.

we would in fact be confronted with an ordinary subjectivist theory which holds that ethical judgements are genuine propositions, namely about the feelings of the speaker, whereas Ayer maintains that they are not propositions at all, and that therefore it is impossible really to dispute about questions of value.[1]

It might be suggested, however, that the heated discussion which followed remarks like those by A.J. Ayer, partly was caused by a certain tendency towards pushing matters to extremes, at least terminologically. To get the correct picture it is necessary to take into account that Ayer himself allows that an ethical judgement may often be linked up with questions about the facts of the case. Thus there can be dispute in connection with an ethical judgement, but only as far as these facts are concerned. That is to say, if a man has adopted a system of moral principles, he has committed himself to react morally to certain empirical facts in a certain way. Therefore, two persons who hold the same principles, can, by discussing the facts, obtain the same attitude towards them, i.e. come to have the same ethical feeling towards them.[2]

In other words, moral judgements have usually got to do with facts, and there can therefore exist such a thing as a system of moral principles, i.e. moral judgements can be logically related to one another. Contraries in moral attitude can thus be reconciled by the persons involved gaining true knowledge of the facts and applying logic.

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1. *Ibidem*, p.110.
2. *Ibidem* ., p.111.

But admitting that these qualifications have to be made in order to give the right impression of a view like Ayer's, we might still be justified in saying that in its more elaborate form, especially in the works of C.L. Stevenson[1], the emotive theory took on a more sympathetic shape, if we mean by that, that it seemed to take moral problems quite seriously and not only treat them as a kind of pseudo-problem.

First, Stevenson speaks of ethical judgements having "emotive meaning" without putting "meaning" in inverted commas, thereby showing that "emotive" is not in any sense used derogatorily. This emotive meaning of ethical and value judgements lies in their function of speaking from and to the conative-affective nature of men, namely expressing the speaker's attitude of approval or disapproval towards a certain object, and trying to evoke a similar attitude in the hearer.[2]

Stevenson is willing to apply the predicate "true" to ethical judgements even in their purely emotive function, although only in a particularly broad sense of the word "true", in which it is used to signify an agreement in attitude.[3]

1. Especially Ethics and Language.

2. See Op.cit., pp.20ff.

3. Ibidem, pp. 169ff.

Like A.J. Ayer, Stevenson states that ethical judgements usually are based on beliefs about facts, e.g. about the actual state of affairs and about what will be the result of a certain action.[1] Because of this ethical judgements can be reasoned about.

More important than all this is Stevenson's statement about ethical judgements having descriptive meaning, which gives them a theoretical function as well. First, they refer to the speaker's attitudes, thus giving a description of them that may be true or false in the ordinary way. Secondly, descriptive meaning attributes qualities or sets of qualities from which one could infer the speaker's definition of ethical terms. Ethical judgements can thus be true and false in that they give references which might be tested by observing the speaker's use of these terms on other occasions.[2]

That is to say, even if an ethical judgement eventually is founded on the conative-affective nature of men and in this respect cannot be made subject to verification, it can still be treated theoretically, i.e. be described and systematized.

R.M. Hare, on his part, does not want to characterize moral language as "emotive". Its function is, according to his view, "prescriptive". The function of imperatives is to command, and the function of moral judgements, like value judgements in general, is to commend, to guide choices.

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1. Ibidem, pp. 26ff.

2. Ibidem, pp. 154 and 207.

This concept of "prescriptive" meaning certainly is not likely to arouse such antagonistic feelings as did the concept of "emotive" meaning. Hare seems to use a terminology which to a great extent does justice to the character of moral language.

He has further brought out the distinction, and the relation, between the exclusively moral meaning of moral judgements and their descriptive meaning in a clear formula. He makes a distinction between the meaning of a value term and the criteria for its application, saying that the meaning which makes a term a value term, i.e. its evaluative or prescriptive meaning is primary to the criteria for its application. These criteria constitute the descriptive, secondary meaning of value judgements, and this descriptive meaning is in its turn what makes a logical relationship between value judgements possible, and also required.

In so far as the making of ⌒ value judgements can, and should be a rational activity, it is because of the logical consistency which is demanded in the making of them. There is, accordingly, no question of moral judgements being arbitrary.

The important thing to notice in this view is, however, that the system of evaluations is based on a decision of principle that certainly is made for reasons, but which still is a free decision. That is to say, there is no fact, no authority or anything else that can force a person rationally to accept a certain value system.[1]

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1. Whether Hare himself is consistent in the further development of his thoughts on moral reasoning is a question that is treated elsewhere and need not concern us here.

After having considered the development, and to some extent the variety, of the thoughts of the analysts on the nature of value language, we are now able to see that, what is still the chief interest, is the maintaining of a <u>non-cognitivist</u> or <u>non-descriptivist</u> position.

That is to say, even if a moral sentence can be said to give us knowledge of the speaker and of existing systems of moral values, it does not convey any knowledge in its strictly <u>moral</u> function. To use R.M. Hare's terminology, the prescriptive meaning of a moral judgement does not present us with any knowledge of a moral kind, although in its secondary meaning a moral or non-moral value judgement may present us with a knowledge of the criteria for the actual application of a value term to an object.

The same view could also be stated in the following way: The unique function of a value judgement is not to describe an object by ascribing a certain property, or certain properties, to it, but to prescribe the choice of it, i.e. to recommend it.

Therefore, in its function as a kind of prescriptive or evaluative language a moral judgement does not state anything that can be said to be true or false in any ordinary sense of the words.

Part of the non-cognitivist conception is the dismissal of all kinds of naturalism in ethics. To try to define the meaning of a moral judgement in terms of non-moral concepts, is, as G.E. Moore held, a fallacy. "Good" cannot be defined in terms of "pleasure",

"Happiness", or "usefulness". And as a result of this insight we see that the cognitivistic theories of hedonism, eudaimonism and utilitarianism are impossible to defend any longer.

It is of special importance to notice, that, according to the non-cognitivist view, the argument against naturalism in ethics applies to all attempts to define moral words in terms of metaphysical and theological concepts as well. There is no use in trying to evade the argument of the non-cognitivists, by maintaining that e.g. "good" means "what God commands" or "what God wills".

Although Moore's expression "naturalistic fallacy" in his use of it means an attempt to define "good", a broader, but closely related, use of the term has gained currency. It is used as a characterization of all attempts to derive moral statements (or normative and prescriptive statements in general) from statements which are purely theoretical (scientific, descriptive, factual). Hence the common characterization of the interest of non-cognitivism as the one of separating facts and values.

This separation of facts and values means that, according to the non-cognitivist view, we cannot from any factual information about man and the world arrive at any conclusion about values or moral obligations. I.e., the actual wishes, interests, desires of people do not tell us what is valuable, nor does any knowledge of what will make people happier, what will diminish pain, what will strengthen family life and so on.

Equally impossible is the deduction of value judgements from any knowledge of metaphysical or theological facts, even supposing that we had any access to such knowledge, e.g. about the "nature of the world", about God as the creator of heaven and earth[1], about God's love of the world in Christ, about the Kingdom of Heaven as man's ultimate goal.

It might be important to point out that on the view sketched above, existing moral codes are themselves considered as "facts", and the _fact_ that something is ordered by an established set of moral standards does not entail that it is an _obligation._ Not even if these standards are thought of as established through a divine revelation. That is to say, the fact that something is commanded by God, is still only a _fact_, whereas for me to say that I ought to do X _means_ to say that _I have decided_ that this is my duty.

From Hare's point of view at least, the "informalist" attempt to bridge the gap between facts and values must be repudiated as well. We use this term as a name of the trend in ethical theory, represented

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1. P.H. Nowell-Smith quotes (op. cit.,p.37) the following passage from Bishop Mortimer, Christian Ethics as an example of this kind of reasoning: "The first foundation is the doctrine of God the Creator. God made us and all the world. Because of that He has an absolute claim on our obedience. We do not exist in our own right but only as His creatures, who ought therefore to do and be what He desires."

for instance by S. Hamshire, J. Wisdom, S. Toulmin and P.H. Nowell-
Smith[1]. They point out that there is an actual connection between
facts and values, or obligations, in ordinary, "informal" language.
A statement of fact can come to imply a judgement about obligation
in the normal conventions of language. And this implication is
realized by anyone who knows these conventions, i.e. who knows the
context in which the sentence is uttered. "Contextual implication",
which is the expression used by Nowell-Smith, is broader than
"logical implication", and it is not self-contradictory to question
such an implication, even if it is "logically odd".[2]

R.M. Hare would object to a theory like this, because, no matter
how loose the inference, any assertion that such an influence is
possible only serves to deprive a moral judgement of what makes it
moral, i.e. its character of being an autonomous, free decision.[3]

This objection does not mean, however, that the informalist
theory represents any kind of cognitivism as opposed to the theories
mentioned earlier. Nowell-Smith speaks of moral judgements as
giving knowledge, but this is practical knowledge, i.e. knowledge of

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1. Besides Nowell-Smith, Op.cit., perhaps the most important
   contribution to this type of ethical theory is S. Toulmin, An
   Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics, 1950.

2. See Nowell-Smith, Op.cit., pp. 79ff.

3. See LM, p.46.

what to do, not theoretical knowledge, i.e. knowledge that something is the case.[1]   "Contextual implication" simply means that the crucial moral premiss is tacitly assumed.   The reason-giving sentence does not serve as a statement of fact from which a moral judgement is deduced, but it is, in the context, a practical sentence from the beginning.[2]

This means that the question of whence the key premiss, is still unanswered, and it is essential that it should stay so, if what we are asking for is a theoretical foundation for it.

Finally, according to a view like the one we have tried to sketch above, the "intuitionist" type of ethical theory must be opposed as an attempt to maintain an ethical cognitivism. Intuitionism deserves recognition for its refutation of all attempts to define moral words in terms of non-moral concepts.   But it still contends that these terms stand for properties of an indefinable or unanalyzable, i.e. a simple, kind.   And by applying these words to certain objects moral judgements convey knowledge and can thus be true and false.   This knowledge, which represents knowledge of objective values, is not, however, arrived at by way of logical inference, but by immediate apprehension through the special faculty called intuition.

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1. Op.cit., p.11.

2. We consider this a fair interpretation of the theory, see Nowell-Smith, Op.cit., pp. 79ff.

From a non-cognitivist point of view the intuitionists have rightly noted that there is a difference between theoretical and practical discourse, or between empirical and moral discourse, but they misrepresent the difference totally. They hold that the difference lies in the difference between the sets of objects which are described in each case, so that moral discourse describes a special world of objects. Instead they should have noticed that moral words do an altogether different job from words describing things.

It is clear that, if this view is correct, it has no longer any meaning to speak of moral values and obligations as having objective validity. We here use "objective" in the sense of being a "datum", i.e. something that is "given", either in man's existence in the world, or in a realm of values.

Both R.M. Hare and P.H. Nowell-Smith make perfectly clear what the consequence of their views is in this respect. Hare says, speaking of decisions of moral principles,

> "If pressed to justify a decision completely, we have
> to give a complete specification of the way of life of which
> it is a part ... If the inquirer still goes on asking 'But why
> should I live like that?', then there is no further answer to
> give him ... We can only ask him to make up his own mind which
> way he ought to live; for in the end everything rests upon
> such a decision of principle."[1]

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1. LM, p.69.

Nowell-Smith puts it this way,

> "Moral philosophy is a practical science; its aim is
> to answer questions in the form 'What shall I do?'. But no
> general answer can be given to this type of question. The
> most a moral philosopher can do is to paint a picture of
> various types of life in the manner of Plato and ask which
> type of life you really want to lead. But this is a
> dangerous task to undertake, for the type of life you most
> want to lead will depend on the sort of man you are. ...
> The questions 'What shall I do?' and 'What moral principles
> should I adopt?' must be answered by each man for himself;
> that at least is part of the connotation of the word 'moral'".[1]

It is therefore not wide off the mark when W.K. Frankena[2]
regards even the less extreme of the non-descriptivist theories as
admitting a kind of basic relativism after all. "... they almost
invariably allow or even insist that the validity of these reasons
(scil. for ethical and value judgements) is ultimately relative,
either to the individual or to his culture, and, therefore,
conflicting basic judgements may be both justified or justifiable."

Others interpret these views in a similar way, e.g.
F.W. Herring who holds that they imply that "choices are ...
ultimately arbitrary, that is, non-rational".[3]

This consequence of the non-cognitivist views is the reason
why "value nihilism" has gained currency, at least in Scandinavia,
as the name of this type of ethical theory. As we have seen, this
must not be understood as practical, or subjective, value nihilism.

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1. Op.cit., pp. 319f.

2. Ethics, 1963, p.91.

3. "What has Reason to do with Morality?", Journal of Philosophy,
   L,1953, p.688.

It might therefore be misleading to use terms like "relativism" and "arbitrariness" in this connection. But as a characterization of the non-cognitivist theory of how value judgements are related to theoretical statements "value nihilism" might after all be a fairly adequate term.

What lies at the root of all the arguments of the non-cognitivist is a certain view of the difference between words which stand for values and words which stand for facts, or between value words and descriptive words. Or, to put it even more precisely, in the terms of R.M. Hare, there is an important distinction to be made between "evaluative" and "descriptive" meaning, which makes it necessary to distinguish between value words and descriptive words. Hare speaks quite explicitly of "two classes of words" (underlined by me).[1] Consequently, according to this view, we can speak of moral as well as non-moral words.

When, by the use of the last mentioned terms, the definist theory is presented as one trying to define moral words in non-moral terms, there does not seem to be any objection which can possibly be made against the non-cognitivist refutation of it; for the argument simply says that by defining a moral word in terms of a non-moral one we are depriving it of what makes it moral, i.e. we are making it non-moral. This seems an analytical sentence, and the denial of it clearly a fallacy.

1. FR, p.26.

The "naturalistic fallacy is thus a logical fallacy.

Similarly, it seems like a plain, logical truth that we cannot derive a value statement from a statement of facts; because the term "statement of fact" is understood to mean a "non-evaluative statement". The procedure in question is, therefore, the fallacious one of deriving an evaluative conclusion from exclusively non-evaluative premisses.

The non-cognitivist case against intuitionism has a somewhat different character, at least on the face of it. Although accusations of inconsistency plays some part in the argumentation, e.g. of P.H. Nowell-Smith, it might be fairly obvious that, what is really at stake, is the epistemological and ontological conceptions on which intuitionism is based. This is most important to note, for it is here that the main criticism of the non-cognitivist theories will have to set in. The intuitionist contends the possibility of belief in non-empirical concepts, intuition as a way of gaining theoretical knowledge, synthetic necessary propositions and non-natural properties. This is what is inacceptable to the non-cognitivist.

For, what we encounter in the theories of the non-cognitivists, is, we venture to say, a view which is founded on the basic notions of logical empiricism, with its epistemological and ontological implications.

In the case of the logical empiricists themselves this was said openly, e.g. by A.J. Ayer.

"There is still one objection to be met before we can claim to justify our view that all synthetic propositions are empirical hypotheses. This objection is based on the common supposition that our speculative knowledge is of two distinct kinds, that which relates to empirical fact, and that which relates to questions of value. It will be said that "statements of value" are genuine synthetic propositions, but that they cannot with any show of justice be represented as hypotheses, which are used to predict the course of our sensations, and, accordingly, that the existence of ethics and aesthetics as branches of speculative knowledge presents an insuperable objection to our radical empiricist thesis.

In face of this objection, it is our business to give an account of "judgements of value" which is both satisfactory in itself and consistent with our general empiricist principles. We shall set ourselves to show that in so far as statements of value are significant, they are ordinary "scientific" statements; and that in so far as they are not scientific, they are not in the literal sense significant, but are simply expressions of emotion which can be neither true nor false."

It is on this background Ayer deals with what he calls the "absolutist" or "intuitionist" theory of ethics:

"Considering the use which we have made of the principle that a synthetic proposition is significant only if it is empirically verifiable, it is clear that the acceptance of an 'absolutist theory of ethics' would undermine the whole of our main argument."

Although there is among analytical philosophers to-day a willingness to speak of different kinds of meaning, or different uses of functions of words, the conception of factual meaning is in all main essentials the same, despite all reformulations of the principle

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of verifiability (or falsifiability).

Accordingly, knowledge (if it is not analytic) is knowledge of empirical fact, knowledge gained through empirical observation, or at least testable by empirical observation.

The important thing here is not first of all the light this might throw on the non-cognitivist rejection of intuitionism, but its significance for understanding the separation of fact and value in analytical philosophy as a whole. We must observe both what non-cognitivism denies and what it asserts. It denies knowledge of value, and is in so far at odds with intuitionism. But it asserts knowledge of empirical fact. The latter might be the most important from the point of view of ethical theory, and in this latter respect it is not significantly opposed to intuitionism.

For although intuitionism attributes another status to values than do the non-cognitivist theories it is at one with non-cognitivism in the refutation of any definist theory, and we want to ask whether this is not because it is itself moulded on the form of empiricism.

The one asserts knowledge of value as distinct from knowledge of empirical fact, the other asserts value judgements as distinct from knowledge of empirical fact. That is to say, non-cognitivism is exclusive towards intuitionism in that it denies knowledge apart from the empirical, but there might be an affinity, at least, between the two in the understanding of empirical fact itself.

The question is not only whether there are "other" facts than those acknowledged on the principle of empirical verification, but first of all whether there is more to the "facts" than the empiricist understanding of them will allow for.

Thus we are lead to a questioning, not only of non-cognitivism in ethics but also of intuitionism itself. For despite all its talk about non-natural properties the separation of these from natural properties is seen as a clear-cut matter. Knowledge of natural properties, constituting the factual, is one thing, and knowledge of values is another thing, something additional. Therefore intuitionism can go well together with the other types of analytical philosophy in its rejection of any logical connection between fact and value.

The important thing is the empiricist basis for the separation of fact and value, whatever status might be given to values. That is to say, the importance lies, not in the denial of values as existents, but in the empiricist understanding of the factual.

We will undertake this questioning by concentrating on the non-cognitivist view of R.M. Hare, and although we think that we shall thereby expose the basic elements in any theory which separates fact and value this will not be argued any further than is done in this chapter. I.e., how far our argument in the following will apply to other views than that of R.M. Hare must be decided on the background of what we have said above.

Because our special interest in this thesis is to consider the possible role of a theological ethic to-day, we shall first ask what light the discussion of the relation between fact and value might throw on the question of how theological ethics is to be understood. We shall ask whether theological ethics can be understood in terms of the fact and value separation, and if not, whether a study of theological ethics can itself suggest a new approach to the general, philosophical, theory of ethics to-day.

In the next chapters we shall draw attention to some explicitly or implicitly theological considerations of the ethical problem. We do not claim that the views discussed are necessarily exhaustive, but we have chosen some views which we find worthy of discussion in the present context, representing as they do markedly different approaches to the problem of theological ethics.

II. THEOLOGICAL ETHICS IN THE LIGHT OF THE FACT-AND-VALUE PROBLEM.

1. <u>Facts and the ethical demand in K.E. Løgstrup's thought.</u>

In the writings of K.E. Løgstrup[1] we find a view of ethics which seems to be flatly contradicting the theory of ethics in analytical philosophy.

Løgstrup holds the radical view that there is no particular "Christian" ethic as opposed to an ethic on generally human premisses. The ethical demand which meets us in the teaching of Jesus is the demand which belongs to human existence as such, and whatever particular role theology might have in relation to ethics it cannot be basically other than that of making possible a deeper understanding of the general ethical demand. It does not provide us with any particular standard for deciding what to do, let alone any such exclusive standard.

It might be added that Løgstrup is not by this saying anything entirely new. He is rather giving a very original interpretation of a view which is quite traditional in the context of a Lutheran theology, namely that the knowledge of God's will belongs to man as such and is not confined to the content of the Christ-revelation.

1. His main work in the field of morals is <u>Den etiske Fordring</u>, 1956, German translation <u>Die ethische Forderung</u>. This is a volume of essays dealing with the basis of morality. In <u>Kunst og etik</u>, 1961, he deals specifically with problems in connection with arts and morals, but the book has a polemic appendix in which Løgstrup enters into a brief discussion with some of the critics of <u>Den etiske fordring</u>.

Løgstrup, therefore, starts explicitly with the general human situation, claiming that the answer to the ethical question is to be found by a study of the phenomena of human existence, and the phenomenon Løgstrup first wants to make the object of his study is "trust".

Løgstrup claims that trust is the basic phenomenon of man's moral existence. Trust is a fact which is given with our existence together as men. That is to say, it is not an attitude which man arbitrarily chooses to show towards other persons, but it belongs, rather, to the basic elements of his life.

Løgstrup starts with the thesis that, "It belongs to our human life that when we meet, we normally do so having a natural trust in each other".[1] That is, our trust is extended not only to persons whom we know well, but also to the stranger. Special things must have happened before a stranger is met with distrust, e.g. betrayal in war or under dictator-rule. We normally believe that a person whom we meet in the railway compartment, is not lying or stealing. We trust him until his words or behaviour raises our suspicion, or our distrust is caused by earlier unfortunate experiences with fellow travellers.

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1. Den etiske fordring, hereafter referred to as E.F., p.17.

To be man implies being in a relationship of trust. Distrust is contrary to life itself. That is, if distrust were a basic feature of men's encounters, life itself would in fact be impossible, because we would always in advance believe each other to steal, lie, pretend and deceive.

That trust is fundamental for our existence can also be seen, Lögstrup says, from the vehemence of our reaction when somebody abuses our trust, i.e. commits a "breach of faith". To trust in somebody means to give oneself away, and a person who takes advantage of the confidence I have in him, has not really accepted my trust. He has not responded to my giving myself away. That is why I react so strongly.

E.g.: Trust belongs, says Lögstrup, in an elementary sense, to all dialogue. The person who addresses another person, gives himself away, and thereby a certain demand is laid upon this other person. This does not only mean that he is under an obligation to give an answer to what the first one said. Neither does the giving-oneself-away depend upon what is said, its private character a.s.o. It means, rather, that in addressing another person, no matter what the importance of what is said, a certain tone is struck. He who speaks steps outside himself in order to exist only

in the dialogue-relation to the other.   The demand which is laid

upon the other, is the demand to accept the speaker himself, by

taking up his tone.   Not to hear, or to refuse to hear the tone

which he strikes, is simply to ignore the self of the speaker,

for it is his own self which the speaker exposes when he addresses

the other person.[1]

Løgstrup's analysis might be exposed to some naive misunder-

standings which it is necessary to point out.

Saying that trust is a fundamental, or primary or elementary

feature of man's life Løgstrup does not pretend to state any

statistical fact about the amount of trust that can be found among

men, that is, that there is more trust than distrust in the world.

Neither is he saying that trust, in relation to distrust, is

the primary phenomenon in the sense that the latter is necessarily

successive to the former in time.[2]

1.   E.F., p.24.

2.   One passage, in particular, in E.F., p.24, might have given rise
to such an interpretation.   He claims support for the result of
his analysis from the sciences of psychology and psychiatry.
They have shown how the whole of a child's future life can be
determined by the adult's behaviour towards it.   The child is
not capable of showing reserved trust, because it has not learned
to make any reservations.   The reservations which the child makes,
are automatic psychic reactions which follow the disappointment of
the child's unconditional trust.   The letting down of a child might,
therefore, deprive it of its courage for the rest of its life.
This example, for Løgstrup, is an indication of the relation
between trust and distrust.

The succession in time between trust and distrust in the life of an individual is rather a manifestation of what is really a precedence in rank.[1]

The question of what is "first" and what is "last" is a question of what is basic and what is derivative. Trust is the basic phenomenon, and distrust comes from the lack of trust, and is its negation. This is why we do not have to give reasons for our trust, while we have to justify our distrust.

But is this a sufficient reason for maintaining that there is a difference in rank between trust and distrust? Is not this to smuggle the evaluation into the analysis?[2] To say solely that distrust is the negation of trust is not to say that the latter is "better" than the first. It might even be thought that Lögstrup

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1. Cf. Kunst og etik, hereafter referred to as KE, pp. 190ff.

2. This is what e.g. Gunnar Hillerdal accuses Logstrup of doing, in Teologisk och filosofisk etik, 1958.

has just been mislead by, or that he has exploited, the ambiguity of the terms "positive" and "negative", and that he thinks he can draw a conclusion about value from the grammatical structure of the word-pair "trust-distrust".

We have to bear in mind, however, that Løgstrup is not primarily concerned with a study of words, but of the phenomena which lie behind the words. So he is not just arguing on the basis of terminology.

But is he still deriving his statement about the order of value between trust and distrust from the fact that distrust is the negation of trust? If he is arguing on a formal basis only, then the conclusion is not convincing, to say the least.

And admittedly, Løgstrup's formulations might be unguarded at this point and therefore seem readily exposed to criticism.

He quite simply assumes that the question of what is basic is the same as the question of what is superior in rank.

> "Stangerup (i.e. one of Løgstrup's critics) asks
> about what is first and what is last in time, while,
> for me, the difference between first and last is rather
> a difference in rank. What I have in mind is the
> question of what is basic"[1].

And the surreption seems even more evident in the following passage:

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1. KE, p.190.

"The experience of novelists shows us - <u>if we ask about the order of rank</u> - that distrust is based on trust as its negation"[1].

We think, however, that we miss Løgstrup's point if we simply take this as a misuse of words or as a leap in the argument.

The identification of what is basic with what is of value is, in this connection, not a methodical presupposition, but a <u>result</u> of Løgstrup's analysis of trust and distrust, even if he never states this explicitly himself.

The way he is thinking becomes a bit clearer when we consider what he says in another place:

"... trust and distrust are two ways in which man understands his life and himself. ... it is part of the self-understanding of trust, that it is something positive, in the same way as it is part of the self-understanding of distrust, that it is something negative. It is no evaluation which comes afterwards, and to which trust and distrust are made subject, but it belongs to the phenomena themselves. It lies, therefore, also in the meaning of the two words. To evaluate trust as something negative is against the essence of trust, and it is contrary to the meaning of the word"[2].

It will be noticed that "positive" and "negative" are here clearly used in the sense of "good" and "bad". Further, that

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1. KE, P.191.

2. KE, p.193.

Løgstrup finds the evaluation of trust and distrust as good and bad, respectively, in the words themselves. But the words have this character because it belongs to the phenomena which they cover.

By the expression "self-understanding", Løgstrup wants to say that trust forces upon us an understanding of itself as good.

In the proper sense it is, therefore, impossible, says Løgstrup, to understand trust as something negative.

We may, however, still evaluate it as something negative, he continues. But this is possible only if we adopt a point of view which is foreign to trust, and contrary to its own presentation of itself. This is not only a theoretical possibility. It is indeed something that happens quite frequently. We evaluate trust as something negative, because in a given circumstance it might be dangerous to show trust. Because people might abuse the trust of a child, we have to teach it not to trust people under such and such conditions. That Løgstrup's argument here is naively exposed to criticism must be admitted. A possibly more adequate account of the fact of our complex attitude towards trust will be discussed below.

First, the following must be noted: Løgstrup does not want to say that trust is a neutral phenomenon which we are at liberty

to _understand_ either as positive or negative. We can _evaluate_
it negatively only in spite of "its understanding of itself".
Correspondingly, a positive evaluation of distrust is possible
only in spite of its understanding of itself as negative.[1]

It might be appropriate to question Løgstrup's way of
expressing his view on this point. To say that we cannot
"understand" trust negatively, but only "evaluate" it negatively,
by a kind of secondary procedure, as it were, seems most
unfortunate for Løgstrup's own argument. It seems to indicate
just what he wants to deny, namely, that the value aspect is
something which comes "afterwards", and which is _added_ by our
evaluation.[2]

There is, however, no mistaking what Løgstrup wants to
maintain:

> "Whether something is positive or negative, good
> or bad, is not determined only when we evaluate it; it
> is not decided only when we take possession of it. My
> life has taken possession of me before I have taken
> possession of my life. My life has given me to understand
> what is good and what is bad, before I evaluate it and
> decide on the attitude to adopt towards it. I might then
> ... make up my mind that it is right in a given situation
> to further what life itself has taught me is something
> negative, e.g. when I teach a child to show distrust.

1. See KM, pp. 193ff.

2. The relation between the Danish word-pair "verdi-vurdering"
   is the same as that between the English words "value" and
   "evaluation".

That is to say, our evaluation might be contrary to the
phenomena's own determination of themselves as good and
bad, but it cannot suspend it; it cannot make the
phenomena themselves ethically indifferent"1.

However, the way in which Løgstrup here distinguishes
between "understanding" and "evaluation" seems to introduce a
certain ambiguity in his theory. What is really the basis for
morality? Is it the understanding which is given with the
phenomenon itself, or is it my secondary evaluation of it? The
analyst would certainly understand Løgstrup's view in the second
sense, and say that after all he admits that the basis of morality
is to be found nowhere else than in my own decision of what is to
count as good and bad.

The reason why Løgstrup introduces the ambiguity which lays
him open to this interpretation, is evidently that he wants to find
a way of accounting for the complexity of the moral situation, e.g.
the fact that we do not always think it right to show trust.

But Løgstrup could have given a more consistent account of this
within the context of his own theory. It could be argued e.g. that
there is no single phenomenon of human existence which forms the
basis of morality, but a number of phenomena which must be taken
together. One might, for example, but need not necessarily, speak

1. K.E., p.194.

of conflicting duties. In any case, it is perfectly possible
to maintain that it is the phenomenon or phenomena themselves
which teach us that it is not always right to show trust.

As it is Løgstrup is now left without the possibility of
saying that a value judgement is a statement of value, i.e. a
statement of the understanding which life itself has given me of
what is good and what is bad. The ambiguity referred to above
seems to blur the distinction between a statement of the
phenomena's own determination of themselves as good and bad, and
an expression of my subjective attitude towards the phenomena.
We do not say that the former statement can be abstracted from
an expression of attitude, we would rather say that attitude is
always implied in such a statement, but we are saying that it is
always possible to abstract one's subjective attitude from the
understanding which is given by the phenomena themselves. That
is to say, it is always possible to ignore this understanding and
not claim any cognitive status for one's "evaluations". If this
is the distinction Løgstrup really wants to make when he
distinguishes between "understanding" and "evaluation", and of
which he only makes an improper use, then we have no objection to
it. It would seem rather to be a useful means of relating, and
distinguishing between, the views of Løgstrup and e.g. R.M. Hare.

Both would then be saying that it is quite possible to take
up any attitude towards, i.e. make any evaluation of, a given
fact.   But while Hare would say that this is really the basis of
morality, Løgstrup would say that this basis lies elsewhere,
namely in the phenomena's presentation of themselves, and that
the evaluation must always be seen on the background of the
understanding which is given there.

Løgstrup is well aware that his concern brings him into
conflict with certain contemporary philosophical views.

> "It is strange that neither the anti-metaphysical
> philosophy nor existentialism will recognize the
> understanding of what is good and bad, which comes from
> our existence itself, they only want to know of the
> determination which is a result of my own evaluation"[1].

By the term "anti-metaphysical philosophy" Løgstrup is
evidently referring to what we have, rather vaguely, called
"analytical philosophy", as it prevails in the Anglo-Saxon and,
to some extent, the Scandinavian countries to-day.

We shall else where question the legitimacy of identifying
the views of analytical philosophy and existentialism in this
respect.   What is of interest here is to notice that Løgstrup
is conscious of the fundamental philosophical point at issue

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1. KE, p.194.

between him and his critics. He (rightly) identifies e.g.
Hillerdal's view with that of analytical philosophy.

Hillerdal, in one passage, accuses Løgstrup of "moving
directly from an analysis of a commonly occurring relation,
that of trust, to a positive evaluation of this as something
good". For Hillerdal it is clear that "from a purely
phenomenological analysis can never follow that, what is exposed,
is right and desirable".

Løgstrup, on the other hand, holds that, "it is true that the
phenomenological analysis, taken by itself, is neutral, but not
the phenomenon which it examines. If trust is the object of its
analysis, the desirability belongs to that which we become
conscious of in the phenomenological analysis".[1]

Part of this passage we find questionable, that, namely,
where it is maintained that the phenomenological analysis, taken
by itself, is neutral.

What could this be taken to mean?

In the first place it could mean just what Løgstrup has
been saying repeatedly, i.e. that it is not the analysis which
makes the phenomena good or bad. This would, however, be a
trivial statement in this connection.

1. K.E., p.195.

It could also mean that the analyst approaches the phenomena without any preconceived idea about whether they are good or bad. This might be the description of a sound analytical attitude, but it is hardly what Lögstrup is thinking of here.

Or it could mean that there are no presuppositions at all behind the analysis, which is a very doubtful statement. The analysis, which Lögstrup describes is at least open to the possibility of finding that the phenomena have an inherent value. This is hardly a "neutral" position with regard to the value question. It is at any rate the expression of a certain philosophical position. Neither are any other positions neutral in this respect.

But most likely Lögstrup wants to maintain that the analysis, of which he speaks, is, at least in principle, separable from its object and its results. This would mean that the analysis is, in a way, indifferent about its own results.

This is indeed the questionable assertion. Is it really the case that the analysis can obtain its results concerning value without a certain congeniality? Will not, therefore, a statement about value always express an element of acceptance? This must not, of course, be confused with an eventual expression of the intention to pursue this value. This intention does not follow from the recognition of the value.

To sum up the discussion of Løgstrup's analysis of trust: We take him to mean that trust is a fundamental feature of human existence. That is to say, he is not primarily dealing with trust as a _feeling_ of confidence, which men might have in each other, but with trust as men's giving their life in each other's hands. Trust is not identifiable with any particular emotional state in man, but lies on a more basic level. It is rather an aspect of all man's dealings with other men.

We think it is correct to interpret Løgstrup as saying that, by his very existence man is saying something about what is good and bad, and that if we want to say something about the life of man, i.e. analyse the phenomena which constitute it, we cannot avoid saying something about values, without being untrue to our object.

Some might feel inclined to judge that Løgstrup's view is really only a variation of the "naturalistic fallacy". Can he not be understood as just saying that "good" means e.g. "what is fundamental for man's existence"?

It could perhaps be said that "good" means something like this for Løgstrup. But this could hardly with any justice be called a naturalistic fallacy. For Løgstrup does not hold that his statements about trust and about men's dependence upon one

another are "non-evaluative".

The results of his analysis cannot be identified with those of scientific psychology or sociology, for instance. Løgstrup claims explicitly that there is such a thing as a _philosophical psychology_, beside scientific psychology[1].

This philosophical psychology does not ask about "non-evaluative" facts. The insight it acquires is, therefore, also an insight into the question of value, i.e., for Løgstrup, of rank.

So that if Løgstrup would accept the identification of "good" with e.g. "fundamental" this would not mean a kind of "naturalism". It would only mean that the word "fundamental" and the phenomenon which it characterizes has a value aspect as well.

This would mean that there is no absolute distinction between "good" and e.g. "fundamental". At least in some contexts it is impossible to talk about fundamentality apart from an evaluation.

For in his deeds and sayings man is necessarily involved in evaluative activities, so that even an analysis of language cannot be undertaken independently of epistemological and

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1. KE, p.190.

ontological commitments, which are partly attitudinal, and
which cannot, therefore, be shown to be entirely "factual",
in the sense of "non-evaluative".

If it is true that man's life is intertwined with that of
his fellow men in the way that we have said above, so that we
are, in Løgstrup's words "each other's world" and "each other's
destiny" or, in Luther's words "each other's daily bread", what
does this mean in terms of moral obligation?

For Løgstrup the case is as follows:

It is equally certain both that "no matter what we want,
our life is actually created in such a way that it cannot be
lived in any other way than by man giving himself away and giving
more or less of his life in the other's hand, showing or asking
for trust"[1], and that the demand to take care of the life of the
other belongs to our existence as it actually is.

No matter how much or little of his life a person by his
trust gives in the hands of the other person in the concrete
situation, in every encounter between men there lies an
"unexpressed demand". This holds true regardless of the
character of the encounter and the circumstances in which it
takes place.

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1. EF, pp. 27f.

"However manifold the character of the communication between ourselves it is always a venturing forward in order to be met. This is the essence (lit.: nerve) of communication, and the basic phenomenon of moral existence. The demand which follows from this does not need any revelation in the theological sense to be heard, any more than it comes into existence because we have agreed upon it, more or less consciously, for our mutual benefit.

If trust and its giving oneself away only were something that we could decide on at pleasure ... , there would not in our life together have existed other claims than those, which people might think of laying upon each other, whether they are conventional, sentimental, or megalomaniac in character. This is not the case, however. Trust does not lie with us. It is something given."[1]

For Løgstrup it is important to stress that this demand is not the same as the actual wishes and demands that are voiced by the other person. It is incidental whether these wishes do or do not coincide with the demand which is contained in every relation to the other person.

This is part of the meaning of Løgstrup's statement that the demand is unexpressed, or anonymous.[2]

"For one thing is the other person's own interpretation of what the trust, which he shows or desires, aims at. Another thing is the demand which is given with the trust as a created fact, so to speak, and which it is up to me to interpret. And these interpretations might very

1. EF., p.27.

2. EF., p.28.

well contradict each other.   The relation may be a
single challenge to me to go against the expectations
and wishes of the other person, because only this will
be for his own benefit.   That is to say, the challenge
presupposes that I know better than the other person
himself what is for his good."[1]

As Løgstrup also puts it: The demand is unvoiced, it is silent.
He, to whom it is addressed, must in each concrete relation
determine what the demand is.

This does not mean that the individual arbitrarily can give
to the demand the content that he wishes.   In that case there would
be no demand.

But now there is a demand, and because it is given with the
fact that the individual is part of the world in which the other
person has his life, and that he, thefore, has something of the life
of this other person in his hands, it is a demand to take care of
this life.   But nothing is said about how this is to be done.

> "It is part of the demand, that the individual himself, by
> using the insight, imagination and understanding which he
> might possess, shall see to it that he becomes clear about
> what the demand means."[2]

Løgstrup is thus advocating the view that we cannot from the
analysis of man's existence derive any detailed moral rules or
commands which can be applied to the concrete relations in which man
finds himself.

1.   EF., p.31.

2.   EF., p.32.

But it is even more important to note that, on the other hand, he is not holding that the "unexpressed demand" is a formal demand only. It is not without content. On the contrary, the content is quite definite.

It might perhaps not be misleading to say that Løgstrup is, in his way, maintaining the distinction between the fundamental, or highest, norm and derivative norms which apply to the diversity of moral relations, and that the "unexpressed" demand cannot be brought to bear upon the concrete relation except from within this relation to which it is to be applied.

The understanding of the human condition and its demand which we have attempted to sketch above is, according to Løgstrup, the same as that which we encounter in the ethical preaching of Jesus in the Gospels.

One must not from our exposition get the impression that the preaching of Jesus plays an unimportant part in Løgstrup's theory. The point is, however, that Jesus' preaching is not a source of esoteric ethical knowledge, nor does it itself constitute the authority of the ethical demand, though it might be said to express or reveal this authority. Not, however, in an exclusive sense.

As to the distinction which Løgstrup makes between the unexpressed demand and the actual interpretation of it, this

raises a number of far-reaching problems with which Løgstrup is dealing at some length, but which we will not discuss here, since our primary concern is only the problem of the relation between facts and the moral demand. It is with regard to this that we have been discussing Løgstrup's view. We will only venture to suggest two possible points of criticism here.

First, is it in any sense adequate to say that the demand is "unexpressed" or "silent" when it has a definite content, as Løgstrup has shown that it has?

Secondly, is it in the end possible to maintain a hard and fast distinction between the fundamental moral demand which the moral philosopher can point out, and the actual applications of this demand which only the moral agents can undertake in the actual moral situations?

It is easy to understand that it is on Løgstrup's statements about the relation between fact and demand that the interest of his critics is focused. He is quite familiar with the objection that is bound to be made:

> "I state, that men's lives are intertwined, and then I immediately say that out of this there arises a demand that I shall take care of the life of the other which is given to me. But from a judgement about what is there can never follow any judgement about what ought to be".[1]

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1. KE., p.196.

Has Lögstrup succeeded in presenting his conclusion convincingly, and in defending it against the objections he mentions?

Explicitly, Lögstrup deals with the transition from fact to demand only in passing, and very briefly. This is, of course, rather unsatisfactory. The main passage in EF in this respect is to be found in a note,

> "What matters here is only to point to the intimate connection between fact and demand, that the demand follows very directly from the fact. For the fact leaves us with the only alternative, to take care of the life of the other, or to destroy it. There is no third possibility, life being created as it is. To accept the fact without wanting to hear the demand means, therefore, to take up an indifferent attitude towards the question, whether life is to be furthered or to be destroyed."[1]

In KE Lögstrup has developed this a bit further, holding that "it is no problem at all, how a demand can arise out of a fact. It goes automatically and cannot at all be avoided."[2]

This is so, because we cannot be content with describing and theorizing about things. We cannot exist without taking our stand and intervening. For we are primarily active and emotional beings, and therefore our life is characterized by purpose, action and decision.

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1. EF., p.29.
2. KE., p.196.

In the actual situation it is impossible, Løgstrup holds, to state that the life of the other is given in my hands without taking up an attitude towards this fact. Whether we want it or not, we must either hear or ignore the demand to take care of his life, quite simply because he as well as I live actively and emotionally, and do more than state facts.

There are formulations in Løgstrup's argument on this point which, on the face of it, seem little more than naive attempts to bridge logical gaps, e.g. when he says that it is no problem at all how a demand can arise out of a fact, and that it goes automatically. That is, if he is trying to justify a transition from a non-evaluative fact to an evaluative affirmation of a demand.

At best he could be taken to mean that for all practical purposes we can say that it is impossible for anybody just to observe that something is the case, without taking up an emotional attitude towards it. In this case Løgstrup's position would not be far from being an "informalist" one, meaning that there is a conventional connection between fact and demand because we happen to be beings who react emotionally to things.

But from the rest of what Løgstrup says it is clear that the relation between fact and demand for him is no "practical" question. What he says is that our existence compels us to take stand, i.e.

to say "yes" or "no" to the demands which are there already, given with the fact. That is to say, there is some kind of necessity in the connection between the fact of my existence and the demand before which I am forced, as an "active and emotional being", to take a stand. So that the hearing of the demand by the person who lives actively and emotionally has some kind of cognitive status, being an apprehension of an involvement which is given with the fact.

As we see it, we cannot understand Lögstrup's description of the transition from fact to demand unless we have understood how he conceives of the "fact".

The demand arises directly out of the fact, because the fact is never "only" factual. It has already a value aspect.

Lögstrup knows that it is in the understanding of "facts" that his way and that of his critics part. What Lögstrup understands by "facts" is "facts before they are reduced by science".[1] He vigorously repudiates the view that science should have a monopoly on issuing statements about reality, for there are facts which can be better stated by our everyday language than by that of the sciences. There are even phenomena which can only be described by, and distinctions which can only be expressed by our natural language".[2]

1. K.E., p.196.

2. K.E., p.197.

The facts from which the demand arises directly are the facts of the "concrete life-situation with its plenitude of perspectives"[1]

That this attempted justification, on Løgstrup's part, of his own theory of the ethical demand contains little more than suggestions is obvious, and it remains to be seen whether these or similar suggestions could be developed into a more systematic theory.

Løgstrup's theory can really only be understood when its existential and metaphysical elements are brought out more clearly than Løgstrup has done it himself. Therefore, our discussion later in this thesis will form a necessary background for the understanding of Løgstrup's views. At the present stage they have served as an example of one way of presenting the ethical demand in its relation to the facts of human existence, and they have served as an incitement to a further discussion.

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1. K.E., p.196.

2. Ethics and revelation in the thought of Karl Barth,

Emil Brunner and Torsten Bohlin.

In the case of K.E. Løgstrup we met with a theory of ethics
which was from the outset explicitly contradicting the modern
analytical theories of moral language, claiming as it did that
the demand "arises very directly out of the fact".

The case appears to be very different when we turn to the
views of theologians who maintain the exclusive character of
theological ethics in the sense that the whole understanding of
the ethical question be based on our understanding of the Christ-
revelation.

The view is not infrequently expressed that the contenders
of a theological ethic in this sense are at one with the
analytical trend in moral philosophy, at least in what they deny.

So for example N.H. Søe[1]. What unites them all, he says,
is the struggle against the "naturalistic fallacy". This
fallacy has characterized much of theological ethics, too, Søe
says, although it ought to have been clear that, from a
theological point of view, ethics cannot be justified scientifically.

1. In his "Fra Renaessancen til Vore Dage" ("From the
Renaissance to Our Times"), 3rd ed. 1960, esp. p.346.

There will always be a leap from the facts, that can be stated, to the imperative.[1]

In Karl Barth's criticism of Catholic ethics, namely that it derives obligation from being, SÖe sees an expression of the same protest as the analytical philosophers' against any attempt to bridge the gap between factual statements and ethical judgements, but Barth's protest is made on the basis of strictly theological considerations.

SÖe holds that it is the same dichotomy between facts and values which is expressed in E. Brunner's statement that "The imperative 'Thou shalt' is a stranger in this world, it has nothing to do with things as they actually are"[2].

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1. This identification of factual statements, statements about what is, with scientific statements is SÖe's, and it suggests a certain naivity in his alliance with the analysts, in that he seems surprisingly unconcerned about the consequences of this identification for theology in general.

2. Das Gebot und die Ordnungen, 1932, Eng. transl.,
    The Divine Imperative, p.48 (p.34 in the orig.).
    Quotations from the works of Brunner and Barth will be taken from the current English translations, with the page number in the original in brackets.

Is it, then, really the case that theological ethics,
as Barth and Brunner conceive of it, can be understood in terms
of the separation of fact and value which we have been discussing
in this thesis?

Is the ethic of Barth and Brunner really possible on the
basis of a theory about the meaning of ethical language which
separates fact from value in the way the non-cognitivists, or even
the intuitionists, do?

The exclusive character of theological ethics, as Barth
sees it is expressed by the place it is given in the system of
his thought.   It belongs to theology in the strict sense, to the
doctrine of God.   Barth, therefore, discusses the problem of
ethics in his Church Dogmatics, under the heading "God's command".[1]

It is an expression of Barth's conception of the
exclusiveness of theology that he even refuses to allow the general
concept of "ethics" into the theological context, without having
first made the reservation that the concept might have to get a
new meaning, or to have its meaning altered by this particular
context[2].

1.   Kirchliche Dogmatik, II$_2$, English translation:
      Church Dogmatics, II$_2$. 1957, p.509(564)

2.   Ibidem, pp.512f (568).

But, with these reservations, Barth finds that the "ethical question" is a valid one, which needs to be answered also by the theologian and which, in the end, only the theologian can answer.

This general question of ethics is, according to Barth, the question of the possibility and basis of certain modes of action in and through the multiplicity of human actions, i.e. the question of whether, and how, there can be constancy and continuity in human behaviour through laws and rules.

It is further the question as to the rightness of these constants, or the propriety of the laws.

That is to say, the ethical question is the question as to what it is that gives to any action its normative character, by which it can claim the right to be repeated.

> "What is the true and genuine continuity in the so-
> called continuities of human action? What is it that is
> valid in and above all the recognised laws?[1]   What is the
> good in and over every so-called good of human action?
> This is - roughly - the ethical question ..."[3]

1. It will be seen that we differ here from the authorised English translation, which renders the German "Was ist das Gültige in und über all den geltenden Gesetzen" with "What is it that really gives force to all these recognised laws?" This translation makes the question more a question about the "empirical" character of the laws than about their validity.

2. Op.cit., p.513 (569).

The ethical question is, therefore, not to be identified with every question about laws and rules and continuities in human behaviour. It is different from the psychological question as to whether there is a uniformity of the human will (which Barth identifies with the question of whether there is a "natural law", though it is hardly adequate as an account of the various theories of a natural law to say that they are just advocating the view that there occurs a certain pattern of human volition which can be discovered psychologically. They have always tried, at any rate, to establish, philosophically or theologically, a status for such a uniformity of the will above the merely psychological.)

The ethical question is also altogether another question than the statistical one about patterns of overt behaviour in various cultural contexts.

And the continuity it seeks for is not the one that jurisprudence could point to in the legal systems of various human societies. Neither is it the one that a philosophy of history could show to be present in human action in the middle of the changes of history.

The ethical question transcends the questions asked by all sciences. It asks the supremely critical question concerning the

law of the good.   That is to say, it questions the validity of
the claims which all these other laws lay upon us.[1]

>"Our contention is, however, that the dogmatics
>of the Christian Church, and basically the Christian
>doctrine of God, is ethics.   This doctrine is,
>therefore, the answer to the ethical question, the
>supremely critical question concerning the good in and
>over every so-called good in human actions and modes of
>action."[2]

How then is the relation between the general (philosophical)
answers to the ethical question and the theological answer to the
same question to be conceived of?

Barth discusses various attempts from the theological side
to combine the general and the theological answers in one
harmonious system.[3]

The first one is the apologetic approach, which seeks to
justify the theological answer by finding a place for it within
the framework and on the basis of the presuppositions and methods
of non-theological, generally human thinking and language.   This
is the approach of Schleiermacher and W. Herrmann, to mention the
most notable, and of G. Wünsch[4], who seeks to secure a place for

1.   To all this see op.cit., pp.513ff (569ff).

2.   Ibidem., p.515 (571).

3.   To the following, see Ibidem., pp.520ff (577ff).

4.   Theologische Ethik,1925.

the "holy" as a transcendent supreme value, within the framework
of a general value theory.

The second attempt to combine theological and philosophical
ethics is the maintaining of a certain two-foldness of the
ethical inquiry, whereby both parts can be given comparatively
independent positions, though completing complementary tasks.
This approach is often combined with the apologetic one as a second
stage, Barth thinks, because when the apologetic theologian has
justified theological ethics in terms of general ethics, he finds
himself confronted with the task of saying why he still thinks
there is a need for any "theological" ethics as a separate
discipline at all.

In this tradition one tries, therefore, to show the partial
independence of theological ethics in four respects.

First, theological ethics has, it is said, as its source,
the Christian, or the religious, consciousness.   Others would say
that revelation is this exclusively theological source.   The
source of philosophical ethics, on the other hand, is reason or
experience, or both together.

Secondly, theological ethics has a subject of its own, the
Church, or the regenerate man.   Philosophical ethics is concerned
with rational man in general.

Thirdly, theological ethics has its own presuppositions,
e.g. the operation of the Holy Spirit in the believer.

Lastly, theological ethics has its own content, which might
be connected with Jesus' conception of life in general, or with
the idea of the Kingdom of God. While the central idea in
philosophical ethics might be, for example, the idea of the
ethical personality.

Barth's objection to these two attempts to bring together
theological and philosophical ethics, the "apologetic" and the
"complementary", will be clearly understood when we later turn to
a discussion of what he positively asserts. But his objection
is really quite evident already. It is an objection made from
a theological point of view, namely that any attempt to justify
theological ethics by general means, or to find a safe place for it
in some particular field apart from the field of ethics in general,
disregards the claim of theological ethics to be the ultimate
ethical authority and to be all-embracing in the sense that it
applies to anybody and to any ethical problem.

It is in Barth's discussion of the third way of combining
the two kinds of ethics, i.e. the Roman Catholic solution, that
he expresses his view in a way which seems to have more direct
bearing on the problem of our thesis, and which seems to lend

itself to an interpretation in terms of the separation of fact and value in analytical philosophy.

The Roman Catholic theory, in its classical form, of the relation between theological and general ethics, is, according to Barth, the one which deserves the most serious consideration.

Here we really have a theory which is reasonably consistent, and which neither makes ethics subject to heterogenous principles, nor limits its task to the covering of a special field only.

For on this view the natural morality which is advocated by the sound philosophy is really a Christian morality (anima humana naturaliter christiana). It is Christian, even if it is not built on a theological basis. The fundamentals of the moral life are accessible to the philosophy of morals, through the light of natural man's reason, educated in history and by experience. Moral philosophy is capable of knowing the moral principles, e.g. in the form of the philosophical virtues of prudence, justice, courage and temperance, still knowing that these are relative to the absolute Good, which is the Divine Being. It is thus capable of apprehending the moral principles as "the imperative which has its root in man's very being"[1], and to prepare himself for the eternal bliss, which is communion with God.

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1. Op.cit., p.528 (586).

It is not that philosophy is infallible in this respect. It needs to be enlightened and corrected by revelation, and it is thus moral theology which has the supreme authority, operating as it does from the sources of the special revelation, i.e. the Bible, the tradition and the decisions of the Pope.

Moral theology is the supreme authority in the sense that it corrects the insights of moral philosophy, but first of all in the sense that it alone can lead man to the goal which is recognized also by philosophy. It alone represents the supernatural morality, which has as its centre the three Christian virtues of faith, love and hope. Moral theology operates within the ordinance of grace, and there alone can man be healed and raised again from his sin. Therefore, supernatural morality is not a speciality beside natural morality. It is rather a renewal of natural man.

This conception of the relation between philosophical and theological ethics as a form of gradation , with theological ethics on the top as all-embracing and supreme in authority, is attractive, Barth admits.

But still it is, according to him, a conception which must be rejected fundamentally. For it is based on the presupposition that in the concept of "being" there can be established a harmony

between nature and supernature, between reason and revelation, between man and God. That means that man, in spite of his state of sinfulness, in principle is capable of knowing the _true_ being, and of having communion with God, the highest being and the highest good.

Barth's objection is that a methaphysic of being can never be the place where we can arrive at a true understanding of the relation between God and man, grace and nature, revelation and reason. This relation is not to be found in a theory about the relation between the being of the Creator and the being of his creation, but only in the _event_ in which God establishes this relation, i.e. in his eternal decision in the predestination and the actualization of it in time.

The theory about the relation between God and man must, therefore, be a theory not about _being_, but about _God's acts_, about the _revelation of his grace in Christ_.

It is only through the revelation of God's grace in Christ, i.e. through God's acts, that his commands can be known. Only in this context, therefore, is ethics really possible.

For no order of obligation can be built on an order of being. If obligation is based on being this means that it has

not its reason in itself, but is, ontically, subordinated
something else, and, noetically, even derivable from it. It
becomes a command only by force of this "other" which is above
it.

But if that which is above the obligation is the being in
which both man and God partake, how can the command be a true,
unconditional command, Barth asks. It cannot be a command
which simply encounters man as an absolute obligation, since its
authority is derived from being, which is, in a way, under man's
control.

Thus, no order of being can form the basis for the ethical
command, if this is to be God's unconditional command.

How, then, is this theological view of Karl Barth to be
related to the philosophical view of the logical separateness of
fact and value?

Only a superficial study of Barth's view can find in it a
theological parallel to the analytic philosophical conception of
the logical structure of ethical language. Barth's separation
of being and obligation is altogether a different problem from
the separation of fact and value, as we have been discussing it.

What Barth refutes is the view that man can know God and establish a relation to God because his (i.e. man's) being is analogous with the being of God, and accordingly, that man can know God's command through his knowledge of being.

But Barth does not thereby deny the unity of fact and value in terms of the problem we have been discussing or, if he does, he makes his own theory of ethics incomprehensible.

In fact, Barth's view is eminently a maintaining of the theory that ethical judgements are derivable from, or identical with, facts, namely God's acts, i.e. God's "factum" in Christ.

In a double sense does Barth's view contradict the fact and value separation. First, he hold that the ethical obligation is identical with God's command. This, he says, is what makes it an unconditional command.

This is, however, directly the opposite of what the analytical philosophers are saying. On Hare's theory, for instance, it is exactly the fact that a moral judgment in the end rests on the decision of the person who makes it, which makes the moral judgement moral. That is to say, it is moral just because it cannot be derived from, or identified with, God's

command, or any other fact. Barth, on the other hand, must

definitely be understood as holding that an ethical judgement

is a command apprehended, and not a command issued by the human

speaker, and it is apprehended, not as autonomous in the

Kantian sense, but as having its authority from the other (God)

who. issues it.

> "We do not seriously ask what we ought to do,
> except when we see our duty as the content of a
> decision which confronts our own will -- even when it
> is supremely free in form -- in absolute and inflexible
> sovereignty, so that, even when we give it our
> wholehearted, spontaneous approval, it is never the
> result of our decision, and therefore it never owes its
> authority and power to our decisions but always to
> itself. That this is the case is unequivocally clear,
> and safeguarded against all relapses into eudaemonistic
> distortions, only when we keep plainly in view -- as
> Kantian ethics very obviously failed to do -- the
> christological foundations of the concept and actuality
> of obligation"[1].

...

> "An imperative to which I owe absolute obedience
> must necessarily come in the most radical sense from
> without[2], in order that it may claim me most radically
> within. A command which transcends our actions cannot
> in the last analysis be merely a command which I have
> given myself on the basis of what I myself have seen and
> experienced and felt and judged of the good and the true
> and the beautiful. It must come to me as something alien,
> as the command of another ..."[3] (underlined by me).

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1. Ibidem., p.651 (725f).

2. The authorized translation says "within", which is obviously
   a misprint.

3. Ibidem., p.651 (725).

Barth asserts the unity of fact and value in a second sense, namely by holding that our obligation is disclosed not only in the verbally expressed commands of God, but also in the very <u>acts</u> of God in history. The divinely imperative obligation is "introduced in Jesus Christ, in the divine act of the world's reconciliation with God as the act of his pure goodness"[1].

> "The true and genuine obligation, law and duty voiced by another than ourselves, emerges and persists, in face of our own will with its conceptions and aims, <u>in and with the fact</u> that, in fulfilment of the divine will, Jesus Christ has died and risen again for us, so that now that He is our Lord and our Head we should not belong to ourselves but to Him, and therefore should not live to ourselves but to Him. This is what makes us ourselves debtors to God; and we experience obligation - as distinct from desire - in and with the fact that we ourselves become debtors to God. This is the sovereign decision which confronts our decisions. ... The obligation revealed and grounded in the person and work and lordship of Jesus Christ fulfils the idea in all its strictness"[2] (underlined by me).

This is as directly opposed to the analytical moral philosopher's theory as possible.

The view of the obligation as being grounded in the fact runs through the whole of Barth's exposition of ethics. Already

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1. Ibidem p.532 (591).

2. Ibidem, pp.651f (726)

in the fact of God's election the obligation is present. For, when God elects man, this is because he wills something with him. The divine election is the determination of man to the partnership in the covenant with God, to the service of God, to being a witness of God's own glory[1], and it is exactly from this determination through the divine election that man's obligation can be derived. This is clearly how Barth thinks.

> "The election itself and as such demands that it be understood as God's command directed to man; as the sanctification or claiming which comes to elected man from the electing God in the fact that when God turns to him and gives Himself to him He becomes his Commander".[2]

Therefore Barth can say that "the evangelical indicative ... becomes itself an imperative"[3], which is why the Law can be regarded simply as the form of the Gospel[4].

Knowledge of God is, as a result of this, inseparable from an awareness of obligation, the only real obligation.

> "For who can possibly see what it is meant by the knowledge of God, His divine being, His divine perfections, the election of His grace, without an awareness at every point of the demand which is put to man by the fact that this God is his God, the God of man?"[5]

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1. Cf. Ibidem p.510(565).
2. Ibidem; p.512(567)
3. Ibidem.
4. Ibidem. p.511 (567)
5. Ibidem. p.512 (568)

Still another way of saying this is to say that "the grace of God is the answer to the ethical problem"[1].

Viewed that way, i.e. starting with the grace of God, it turns out that the ethical question is, after all, a question about the being of man. For man to exist is to stand under the command of God's grace.

> "It [the ethical question] is his life-question, the question by whose answer he stands or falls. 'To be, or not to be, that is the question.' Why? Because with its answer there is put into effect the decision of the power which disposes absolutely of his existence or non-existence, the power of God. For it is the electing grace of God which has placed man under His command from all eternity. The command of God is therefore the truth from which — whether he knows and wants to know or not — man derives, and which he will not evade."[2]

And Barth makes it quite explicit that on his theory the question about what we ought to do is a question about knowledge.

> "It asks after truth, but not the truth that we seek, but the divine truth that seeks us, the truth of the divine command that desires us and demands us and binds us and commits us, the truth that we must know because it is the rule and norm of our conduct. ... we ask concerning what we ought to do."[3]

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1. Ibidem. p.516 (571).

2. Ibidem., p.516 (572)

3. Ibidem, p.649 (722).

Barth's theory can, from a philosophical point of view, only be described as a <u>cognitivist</u> theory, and as one which also goes against the theories of the intuitionists and of Kant, by its identification of the "ought" with the truth of God's grace and command.

We have not here been concerned with a discussion of the views of Karl Barth in general, or with a criticism of his view of theological ethics in particular.[1] Our main intention has been to show, as we think we have done, that even a theological ethic on Karl Barth's terms denies, implicitly at least, the validity of the fact-and-value separation. Of his theory, as much as of the theories of theological ethics which see the ethical demand as somehow derivable from the being of man, or from the facts of his existence in the world, is it true that the possibility of speaking about fact and value as a unity is its conditio sine qua non.

If we turn to the writings of <u>Emil Brunner</u>, mainly his important "The Divine Imperative"[2], we will find that,

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1. The main point where we would differ from his is in his linking necessarily together knowledge of God's command and the revelation in Christ.

2. Cf. above, p.67.

with regard to our problem, he represents the same view as Karl Barth does, and here he is faithful to their common dialectical theology, despite the fact that later their ways came to part with regard to the understanding of man and his relation to God.

There is, however, a significant difference in the way the two writers approach the problem of ethics. Barth will base his criticism of philosophical ethics on explicitly theological premisses only. E. Brunner, on the other hand, tries to discuss the various types of philosophical ethics on their own presuppositions, aiming at a phenomenological analysis of the immanental ethical self-understanding. He tries to show the insoluble dilemma they run into, as long as they know nothing of a transcendence as the only possible source of an absolute obligation, while K. Barth would postulate this connection between God's command and the ethical obligation as the starting point for his discussion.

In the history of philosophical ethics we can, Brunner thinks, distinguish two main types of ethics, the naturalistic and the idealistic. Naturalism finds the basis of ethics in pleasure and happiness, while idealism in ethics finds it in duty as such, and the peak of the deonological ethics of idealism is the formal ethics of Kant, Brunner holds.

There are, however, instances of attempts to harmonize the two types of ethics. So, for example, in the Aristotelian ethics, which is built on the principle of eudaimonism, but which relates this to the realization of the human, which is then conceived of as a duty.

But these attempts really represent a logical leap, Brunner thinks. For "no sense of obligation can be evolved from the actual constitution of humanity without some logical sharp practice. It is impossible to define what man ought to be from that which he actually is".[1]

The same fallacy lies at the root of the so-called "material value ethics". From the fact that certain things have a capacity for being regarded as valuable by men there cannot be derived any "ought" or a duty to pursue these things. This holds true, Brunner says, no matter whether the values are considered as physical, or as spiritual "entities" which confer value on the empirical object. That they are "values", means that they are of such a kind that they can be desired, but it "does not establish their ethical and normative character"[2].

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1. Op. cit., p.40 (26).

2. Ibidem, p.42 (28).

Not even Kant managed to avoid the surreptitious procedure of smuggling eudaimonism into his notion of the cathegorical imperative, in order to bridge the gap between the absolute duty and the matters of this world. This is the point in Brunner's discussion where he clinches matters with the much quoted remark: "The imperative 'Thou shalt' is a stranger in this world, it has nothing to do with things as they actually are."[1]

It is important that it was Kant who was forced to make this false move, he, who has thought more clearly than anybody else about the ethical problem. For this shows that the dilemma of ethics is not the dilemma of confused thinkers only, but rather a sign of the basic insolubility of the ethical problem on an immanental philosophical basis.

The dilemma is not the dilemma of philosophical ethics gone astray, but the necessary end-result of philosophical ethical reflection, as we can learn from the history of this thinking.

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1. Ibidem, p.48 (34), as quoted above, p.67 .

"Through philosophical reflection the situation has become, in the full sense of the word, hopelessly contradictory".[1]

It is evident that Brunner's discussion so far bears a closer resemblance to the discussion of fact and value in analytical philosophy than does Barth's discussion of the subject. What Brunner says in the negative he claims to be saying on the basis of a philosophical analysis, and although it is not the logical analysis of analytical philosophy, it could still be said that it is the logic of ethics which is expressed in the ethical problem as Brunner sees it.

But when it comes to Brunner's statement of his positive view it becomes clear that he is really of the same opinion as Karl Barth, and that his argument is the same.

For it is only revealed religion which can solve the ethical problem. That this is the solution is not something that phenomenological analysis can see, but only faith.

This is not, however, because faith overlooks the problem. Faith really sees the dilemma, but it sees the way through it.

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1.   Ibidem. p.44 (29).

"Thus in faith there lies an 'understanding' of
these antitheses which also sums them up in one, with an
intensity which human powers could never attain, and
faith possesses a solution of that one single contra-
diction, which, because it is seen and felt in all its
painful urgency, is no longer a matter of theory, but a
matter of life and death; it is perceived 'existentially',
that is, it is seen to be an act of humanity as a whole,
and, as such, it can only be removed by an act of God as
a whole, which affects humanity as a whole."[1]

Thus "the answer of Faith to the ethical problem is the Word
of Sin and Grace"[2].   That is the answer which

"removes those antitheses which entangle 'natural'
morality and ethics, an answer in which the question of
morality is seen in its purity — that is, free from
'sacred' and ritual irrationality — and is yet grounded
in something which is higher than human reason;   an
answer in which the Good is both in the highest sense
human, and yet in the highest sense Divine;   an answer
in which the conflict between the empty but pure form of
the command and its concrete but impure ethical content
is ended ..."[3]

Therefore Brunner can point to "justification by grace alone
as the removal of the contradiction and the foundation of the Good".[4]
He agrees with Barth that ethics can be rightly represented only as
part of dogmatics.[5]

1. Ibidem., p.52 (37)

2. Ibidem., p.52 (37)

3. Ibidem, p.51 (36)

4. Ibidem, p.68

5. Ibidem, p.85

It is in accordance with this view that Brunner, after having exposed phenomenologically the insoluble problem of ethics in the philosophical context, makes an entirely new start.[1]

For it is God's command, given in revelation and known in faith, which is the starting-point for Christian ethics, the only possible form of ethics.

Thus it is clear that, in the end, Brunner, too, is bound to have to reject the separation of fact and value.

It might well be that the "Thou shalt" is a stranger in this world. But then it is in this world, the world seen from a purely immanental point of view.

In the other world, that is the world which has broken into this one in God's revelation, it is certainly not a stranger. On the contrary, that is where the "Thou shalt" comes from. It is based on the reality of God, on the facts of his words and actions, and is, in a way, identical with these.

It is summed up quite clearly in Brunner's own definition of Christian ethics as "the science of human conduct as it is determined by Divine conduct."[2]

1. In the transition from Section I to Section II of his book.
2. Ibidem., p.86 (73)

That a standpoint like Barth's and Brunner's demands a rejection of the fact and value separation is realized by Torsten Bohlin, whose work is worth mentioning in the conclusion of this chapter.[1]

Bohlin states his main thesis in a way which, in the relevant aspects, sounds very near to what Barth and Brunner are saying:

"If it is possible at all to establish a generally valid "Thou shalt' then it is only on the condition that an essential connection between ethics and religion is recognized. That must mean: The belief in the revelation forms the basic condition, without which neither ethics nor religion could be established or last."[2]

And he realizes that this means to base the general "Thou shalt" on a "transcendent reality ... in which there is both value and being."[3]

The important thing to notice here is that Bohlin does not assort this on theological grounds but on logical:

"From a logical point of view the question about the validity of the moral (obligation) is relentlessly forced back on this alternative: either there is manifested in the

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1. Bohlin's two most important contributions to the discussion of the relation between philosophical and theological ethics are "Das Grundproblem der Ethik. Uber Ethik und Glaube" (The basic problem of ethics. On ethics and faith), Uppsala 1923, hereafter referred to as G.d.E., and "Etikens uppgift och huvudformer" (The task of ethics, and its main forms), an essay in the yearbook of Abo Academy, 1925, hereafter referred to as E.u.

2. G.d.E., p.7.

3. Ibidem, p.399

consciousness of the unconditional moral obligation ...,
with more or less clarity, an over-worldly will, which,
by virtue of its own essential determination, has the
right to be regarded as valid for every man, or else this
religious-metaphysical will, the existence of which is
demanded by our thought, is nothing but an illusion; but
in that case all talk of a moral obligation is invalid
and meaningless."[1]

Bohlin maintains that this alternative is something which
philosophical ethics must envisage; it is an insight to which
reason itself leads us.   That is to say, reason, when confronted
with the problem of the basis of moral obligation, demands a
solution which entails presuppositions which fall outside the
sphere of the rational.[2]

Or, if one decides for the latter part of the alternative and
calls any thought of a transcendent will an illusion, then there
is no moral obligation possible, at least not in such a way that
we can have a really normative ethics.

This is what comes out of e.g. A. Hägerström's theory,
Bohlin holds. Hägerström shows very clearly what the necessary
consequences are of building an ethical theory on a purely
immanental basis.[3]   Ethical judgements become only subjective
emotive evaluations, and ethical theory cannot be normative.

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1.   E.u., p.96

2.   Ibidem., p.93

3.   G.d.E., p.182

Thus Bohlin has seen that theological ethics, as he conceives of it, implies a theory of the unity of value and being in the transcendent reality, which is God.

But still he has not got the full understanding of the nature of the conflict between his view and the form of analytic philosophical ethical theory which confronts him, i.e. Hägerström's emotivism. Bohlin apparently thinks, as do Barth and Brunner in their way, that the problem of the basis of moral obligation is solved, once we stop confining ourselves to, or building on, the facts of the Immanence and start from the postulation of certain facts about a transcendence, i.e. God.

In fact, it is equally difficult, according to the analytical philosophers, to bridge the gap between fact and value in the transcendent realm as it is in this world.

If we are to take seriously the problem created by the theory of the gap between fact and value, we need to ask, as we shall attempt to do in the following chapters, why it is that we cannot separate value from being in our knowledge of God, and, positively, how value and being are united in God. We also have to ask whether it is only possible to conceive of fact and value as united in the transcendent reality, and of theological ethics as the only possible normative ethics, as e.g. Bohlin does.

3.   Emotivism and theological ethics in the view of Gunnar Hillerdal.

There are not many examples of theologians who have tried

explicitly to bring the analytic philosophical conception of

the meaning of ethical language to bear on the understanding of

theological ethics with its distinct presuppositions.

One attempt, however, is made by Gunnar Hillerdal in his

"Teologisk och filosofisk etik"(Theological and philosophical

ethics), 1958.

This work is an account of the relation between various forms

of philosophical and theological ethics throughout the history of

ethics, and Hillerdal's discussion of the ethical theory of the

analytic philosophical tradition occupies only a small space in

this context.   But it is all the more important, and serves to

bring out quite clearly what the consequences are of trying to

understand theological ethics in terms of this theory.   How far

the consequences are really faced by the author is another

question.

According to Hillerdal the theory of the meaning of ethical

language generally held in Swedish and Anglo-Saxon philosophy

is a modified form of the so-called "emotive value theory".

One might want to dispute the adequacy of this account, even

considering that it was written 10 years ago, but we do not think that Hillerdal's limitation of the discussion to emotivism really affects its usefulness for throwing light on the general "fact and value" problem in its relation to theological ethics.

Part of the conclusion of Hillerdal's study is that theological ethics should be confronted with all kinds of philosophical ethics which make their influence felt at the time.

This does not mean that theology should decide which is the "right" philosophical ethic. Neither does it mean that theological ethics should decide what kind of philosophical ethics corresponds best to theological ethics.

The confrontation should not at all aim at passing any judgement on philosophical ethics, but only at bringing a clearer understanding of theological ethics itself. It should do this by taking the various types of philosophical ethics as they are, and find out where the two differ from theological ethics, and, on the other hand, where they could be regarded as corresponding to or as being complementary to each other.

And it would seem that Hillerdal conceives of the ethical analysis of emotivism as being in a sense complementary to the investigations of theological ethics itself.

So that theological ethics can happily accept it as a kind of meta-ethics, by means of which it can get an understanding of the general characteristics of its own language.

Hillerdal understands the emotivist theory as follows: Every evaluation is, in the last resort, based on an emotion. The original, authentic evaluation is, therefore, not verifiable, as theoretical statements are. It is neither true nor false.

But, although value principles ultimately rest on emotive evaluations, they can still be described and systematized. Ethical judgements can, therefore, be said to have a descriptive function, in the sense that they refer to a system of values which itself is accepted emotively.

Within the framework of the emotive theory it is quite possible, Hillerdal holds, to stress the descriptive reference of value judgements also in another sense:

Although the evaluation has an affective basis, it has also a point of reference in some thing or some utterance of a theoretical and, thereby, verifiable character[1].

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1.   Cf. Op.cit., p.225.

This view is in effect similar to R.M. Hare's somewhat clearer theory about the "primary" evaluative meaning of value judgements and their "secondary" descriptive meaning, the latter referring to some factual state of affairs, which forms the speaker's reason for making the value judgement, but which is no logical reason for it.

As Hillerdal conceives of theological ethics it is, briefly put, the continuous actualization, in the changing historical situations, of the evaluations of the New Testament.

Therefore the first question would seem to be a question about the meaning of the value judgements to be found in the New Testament and, since Hillerdal wants to investigate the ethical judgements of the New Testament on the basis of the general theory of ethical language offered by emotivism, his explicit question is: "What are the consequences of the emotive theory for New Testament ethics?"[1]

There is no reason why one should object to emotivism from a theological point of view, Hillerdal maintains. First, one must not be mislead by the term "value nihilism", when this is applied to emotivism.[2] For in no case is there a question of a "practical"

1. Ibidem., . .

2. The term "value nihilism" perhaps more frequently used in the Scandinavian than in the Anglo-Saxon context.

value nihilism, by which Hillerdal apparently means an attitude which does not place value on anything in life. It is "only" a question of a theory about the relation of ethical judgements to theoretical statements.

Secondly, and that is the most important point, it is quite possible on the emotivist formula to account for all the main elements of New Testament ethics.

For it is clear, Hillerdal holds, that the basic evaluations to be found in the New Testament express an _affective_ engagement. But it is also clear that in some sense the emotion expressed in the evaluations has a basis which is of a theoretical character.

Here the same applies, as applies to faith in general. Although faith is feeling and will, it is also based on a knowledge of certain facts. It holds certain elements of theoretically understandable proclamation to be true.

New Testament ethics, which is based on faith, in its turn refers to these facts and (theoretical) convictions.

The facts in question are partly of a historical character, e.g. that Jesus did some remarkable things, and that he showed himself to many as risen again after his death. But first of all the facts represent a theoretical interpretation of the historical event, that Jesus was the Messiah promised through the prophets.

The proclamation of the New Testament is both teaching and admonition to believe what has thus been taught to be true.

And – here ethics comes into the picture – the proclamation is an exhortation to draw the consequences of these historical facts, thereby engaging the whole of the person. In connection with this exhortation the New Testament proclamation also presents us with a description of these consequences, in that it pictures a certain kind of life which is worthy of the Gospel of Christ, i.e. of the new Christ-reality.

To try and simplify the somewhat confusing picture presented by Hillerdal's account of the ethics of the New Testament:

The value judgements in the New Testament are affective, i.e. they are built on emotions, and as such they have a recommending function (the terms are Hillerdal's).

But they have also a descriptive function, and that in a double sense. First, they refer to events and interpretations of these events in a theoretically formulated proclamation and, secondly, they describe a certain mode of conduct which is expressed in the recommendations, i.e. they describe the consequences which the speakers in the New Testament (presumably including Jesus himself) think should be drawn from the facts referred to.

This, of course, seems to fit extremely well the emotivist theory, and, with a certain adjustment of the terminology, any of the analytic philosophical theories of ethics.

But one may doubt whether Hillerdal has fully realized what he has thereby committed himself to saying.

His acceptance of the emotivist theory as a possible basis for an account of the meaning of theological ethics necessarily implies the admission that in the end there is no other connection between the Christ events, with their theoretical implications, and the ethical consequences drawn from them in the New Testament, than the emotions of the speakers in question.

It implies further that there is, basically, no other connection between the consequences drawn by the speakers in the New Testament, i.e. their evaluative judgements, and my ethical judgements when I accept these consequences, than the pure coincidence of identical, or similar, emotional reactions to certain facts.

It is of course decisive that the similarity or identity of these emotional reactions is, strictly speaking, a coincidence, no matter how frequent its occurrence might be. If it were not so, i.e. if it could be said to be in some sense necessary, this would have been the same as saying that there was a necessary connection between certain facts and our emotional reactions to them, i.e.

between facts and value judgements, which would have been directly contrary to the emotivist theory.

It would further have implied that the very emotions which form the ultimate basis of value judgements could have a cognitive function, that they were a kind of experience through which we could obtain knowledge. To hold this would have meant to reject generally the fact-and-value separation, and to assert an altogether different theory about the relation between evaluation and knowledge.

It should be made clear that the point at issue in the emotive theory is not so much the question of whether evaluations are based on emotions, or expressions of them, as the question of whether these emotions are logically separated from cognition, so that there is no necessary connection between them and statements of facts.

We cannot, of course, deny Hillerdal the right to advocate a theory about theological ethics, which rests content with claiming that it expresses emotionally based recommendations, together with references to certain non-evaluative facts of one kind or another.

But we seriously want to dispute that his account does justice to theological ethics in any of its main historical forms, including the ethics of the New Testament.

For one thing, it would seem that the facts which New Testament ethics refers to, according to Hillerdal, i.e. that Jesus is Messiah, and even the events of Jesus' life themselves more than any other "facts", are facts not to be separated from their value, and not to be stated apart from an evaluation of them. So that in the events of the New Testament fact and value is inseparable.

But even supposing that such a theoretical, "non-evaluatige" statement of these facts is possible, it is really inconceivable how the evaluations of the New Testament writers and their successors as theological ethicists can be considered to be just describing certain facts and then to be describing a certain mode of conduct which they recommend as worthy of these facts.

When they describe conduct worthy of the Gospel of Christ, they certainly intend to make an evaluation which is more than their personal recommendation, and which, although it requires my apprehension and acceptance, is not dependent on my emotional acceptance to become an obligation for me.

III.   THE VALIDITY OF THE SEPARATION OF FACT AND VALUE - A CRITICISM.

1.   **The basis for the logical separation of fact and value in**

R.M. Hare's theory.

To outline the position at the present stage of our inquiry:
We have seen that the fundamental aspect of R.M. Hare's account
of moral language is the maintaining of a non-cognitivist theory
about its nature.

The non-cognitivist theory of ethics holds that it is not the
function of moral language to convey knowledge of any kind, e.g.
of so-called "moral values", but to perform some other function,
in Hare's opinion, to prescribe actions.   Only in a secondary,
non-evaluative capacity can moral language be said to be
informative.

The implication of this is that it is a mistake to think that
judgements about what one ought to do stand in any relation of
logical inference to statements about facts, about "what is".
That is to say, factual statements are logically separated from
evaluative judgements.

The theory of such a logical separateness is common to all
the ethical writers of the movement we have loosely called
"analytical philosophy", although it need not necessarily be

non-cognitivistic. The theory of values as undefinable non-natural properties leads to a similar theory with regard to the logical character of moral language.

A study of various types of theological ethics has disclosed that if the claim of R.M. Hare and others to have given a true account of the basic structure of moral language is justified, this means that it will not be possible any longer to give a serious meaning to theological ethics.

This incompatibility of theological ethics with a theory like R.M. Hare's is not, of course, in itself any argument for or against the latter (although our discussion of theological ethics so far might have indicated some possible alternatives to Hare's view). But it certainly adds interest to the closer study of Hare's theory which we think is called for. What is needed is in the first place an internal criticism of his analysis.

On what basis, then, does Hare hold that the main feature of moral language is the logical independence of values from facts? This question means that the main task which lies before us is to take a closer look at Hare's very conception of a "logic of moral language". What does it mean to say that there is a certain logical structure of moral language? Is it a question of a

contingent use of language, of how moral language happens to be
used, either sometimes, mostly or always?   In other words of
the actual use of words?   Or is it in some sense a question of
an a priori logic, of a logical structure which moral language
has by necessity?

If the latter is the case, what are the grounds for holding
that moral language must have a certain logical structure?

No matter what the answer will be to these questions, they
are in fact questions which will be seen to involve a discussion
of the basic principles of linguistic philosophy, not only with
regard to moral philosophy, but to philosophy as a whole.

It is, to begin with, quite clear, that the logical structure
of moral language is something which is actually present in moral
language as it is.[1]

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1.   As we have seen earlier the two main features of the logical
     structure of moral language is prescriptivity and universal-
     izability.   Prescriptivity means that moral language in its
     purely moral meaning prescribes, and does not give factual
     information, hence the logical independence of values from
     facts.   Universalizability means that in a moral judgement
     there is always something which is prescribed, i.e. some
     characteristics of human conduct, and this "something" is
     prescribed for all cases, ceteris paribus.

     To bring the theses of prescriptivity and universalizability
     on one short formula: There can be no logical relation between
     a statement of fact and a judgement of value (prescribtivity),
     but there can be a logical relation between value judgements
     (universalizability).   See F.R. p.4.

In the central passage from the Preface to Freedom and Reason, which we have quoted earlier, Hare speaks of his task as that of "exposing the logical structure of the language in which this thought [namely about moral questions] is expressed" [1] (underlined by me).

In other passages, too, Hare seems to claim to be stating something empirical about the use of language by exposing its logical structure. For instance, "... it is necessary not merely to achieve an understanding of the moral concepts, but to use this understanding in order to give an account of moral reasoning - showing that moral arguments proceed as they do because the logical character of the concepts is what it is" [2] (underlined by me). . . .

Of course, nothing is yet said about what it is that establishes this use. Is it just people's conventions, or is it a logical necessity of some kind?

The result of the study of moral language, Hare hopes, is that we shall be able to think better about moral questions, viz. by understanding better what we actually are doing when we make moral judgements.

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1. F.R., p.v.

2. F.R., p.4.

Various past theories about morals have, apparently, confused people's moral reasoning, by misrepresenting what is actually going on in such reasoning. And the way to make our thoughts about moral questions clearer and more efficient, is to try and understand correctly the moral concepts, which have, up till now, been so widely misunderstood.[1]

It will be clear, however, that although Hare is speaking of how moral argument <u>proceeds</u>, he is not maintaining that it <u>always</u> proceeds in a certain way, i.e. that the moral concepts are used in one way only.

Speaking of meaning in general he holds that the meaning of an expression is or involves the use of it in accordance with certain rules.[2] This means, evidently, that the meaning of the moral terms involves, at least, that they are used in accordance with the rules of prescriptivity and universalizability.

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1. The key to the problem is the study of the concepts which have, through being misunderstood, brought us into this perplexity (viz. the seeming antinomy between freedom and reason). F.R. p.3.

2. F.R. p.7.

But Hare does not want to be understood as "making out
language to be more inflexible than it is".[1]   Although he speaks

of rules determining the meanings of expressions, he still

accepts the account of language which lies behind the now so

familiar terms "open texture" and "family resemblance" a.s.o.

Hare certainly thinks that the expressions of language are

used very tolerantly, and this in two ways.   First, the use of

the expressions can change, and secondly, there can at one time

be many border-line cases, i.e. a certain liberty in the way the

expressions are used.

The important thing, Hare says, is to refrain from taking

"advantage of the flexibility of language in order to blur

philosophical issues".   This must mean that he thinks there is a

certain philosophical issue at stake below the level, so to speak,

of the actual flexible use of language.   In other words, that there

is one certain logical structure in the use of language, though it

is in order that language is not always used in accordance with it.

This view is, of course, not so strange.   If we are going to

speak of a liberty in the use of expressions, and not of anarchy,

there have to be some rules from which the use of expressions are

sometimes, or in some connections, "set free".

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1.   F.R. p.7.

What Hare appears to be speaking about, is something that we could adequately call "standard correct usage", although he never uses this expression. For on the one hand it turns out, or so it seems, that the logical rules he is thinking of, can be observed in the actual use of language. By "rules" he means "that consistency of practise in the use of an expression which is the condition of its intelligibility."[1]

I.e., it is the use of moral language in society Hare is thinking of. His intention is to give an account of the logic of moral language which will "do justice to the moral language of a society like our own."[2]

On the other hand, this wish to give an account of _our_ moral language, and its likes, does not arise merely from a desire to start with the task nearest at hand.

It comes, rather, from a certain preference for the moral language of _our_ society. There seems to be something in our society which brings out, so to speak, the ultimate logical character of moral language. For the reason why our account must cover the moral language of our society, is that it is a society, "in which some people sometimes think about ultimate moral questions".[3]

1. F.R. p.7.

2. F.R. p.25.

3. Ibidem

"Ultimate" means here probably just "that, beyond which we cannot reach." That is to say, Hare might just mean that our theory must cover the most extreme, or far-reaching cases.

The context in which these expressions occur, deserves closer attention.

What Hare is discussing here is the feature of our language that it has both "primarily" and "secondarily" evaluative words. This point has been mentioned earlier in our thesis, but we have not considered its implications from a critical point of view.

To the first class of words belong words like "good", to the second "industrious", honest", "courageous" a.s.o.

The characteristic of a word of the latter class is that it is primarily descriptive. That is, it is describing a quality, a way of behaving, and only secondarily placing a positive value upon this kind of behaviour. The positive evaluation which is implied in the words, is just a result of the fact that the society in question for a long time, or always, has tended to regard the quality which it describes, as something positive.

Let us imagine a society which possesses only such secondarily evaluative words. Such a society could, or does perhaps, exist. Its standards of evaluation would be irrevocably fixed. One could not express disagreement with them, as long as one used its moral words.

All one could do in such a society (this seems to follow from Hare's views, although he does not point it out in this connection) is perhaps to _stop_ talking about moral questions altogether, by ceasing to use the moral words of the society, and instead try to express the descriptive content by means of other words which have no evaluative meaning at all. This is an important consequence of the logical separation between facts and values, as Hare sees it, and it is this possibility of stating the descriptive content of a value word like "courageous" in non-evaluative terms, which is doubtful to us.

In this connection, however, let it suffice to try and analyse Hare's view in order to find what is for him the basis of his account of the logic of moral language. _If_ we had had only secondarily evaluative moral words, like those of the imagined "closed" society, the naturalists, as Hare pictures them, would have been right in the account of moral language.

It would then really be true that once we had established the facts of the case, the moral conclusion would follow by itself. That is, it would be just a matter of bringing out the meaning of the words, of giving a verbal instruction. If, for instance, we had had only value words of the same type as "nigger", it would have been impossible for us to protest against the standards behind

racial discrimination.   It would have been a misunderstanding of language.

It is of great importance to be quite clear about Hare's reasons for refuting naturalism in ethics.   He is not saying that naturalism is wrong because it is untrue altogether, but rather because it is _insufficient._[1]

That is to say, naturalism is true, as far as it goes, but it is not general enough to cover all of the picture.   What is wrong is that it presents the combination of descriptive meaning and evaluative meaning as necessary, i.e. that it pretends that its account of moral language is all that has to be said about it.

But now, Hare holds, this naturalistic account is not adequate.[2] For it is possible, with our language, to express the opinion that the negro is an equal to the white man, and it is possible to place negative value on wife-beating (despite the standards of society in the fifteenth century).[3]

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1.   Cf. F.R., pp.20f.

2.   It seems that the "naturalistic fallacy", for Hare, is a result of the inadequacy of the naturalistic picture of the logical structure of moral language.

3.   Cf. F.R., p.24.

If we were confined to a value language of the "nigger" type,
we could not have broken free of the established standards.
"But fortunately we are not so confined, our language, as we have it
[underlined by me] . . . can be a vehicle for new ideas."[1]

It is a matter of fact that "in the real world standards of
human excellence change."[2]

This is, at least partly, because we have a language with
primarily evaluative words, like "good" in its ordinary use.
These words can be used to recommend different, and opposite,
qualities.   That is, there is no necessary logical connection
between the evaluative and the descriptive meaning of these terms.
(This is where the naturalist's presentation of the case goes wrong.)

It is the logical independence of prescription from
description in words like "good" which makes it possible to express
disapproval of e.g. honesty and courage.   It is quite possible to
say e.g. that "honesty is bad", and there is therefore no logical
inference-relationship between the prescriptive and the descriptive
meaning of secondarily evaluative words either.

1.   F.R., p.25.

2.   F.R., . p.24.

In a sum, it is a consequence of the _logic_ of moral language that a moral question is not a _logical_ question, but a question of _synthetic_ moral principles.

This logical independence of value from fact is, as we have seen, a feature of language "as we have it", "in the real world".

> "The substantive part of the prescriptivist thesis is that there _are_ prescriptive uses of these words. ... Prescriptivism would be refuted if it could be shown that we do not ever use moral words in the way that I have characterized as prescriptive".[1]

It is necessary to qualify this in a certain way. Hare explicitly states[2] that nothing whatever in his argument hangs upon the "actual use of words in common speech". This might sound a bit surprising, but should probably be explained in the following way:

Hare is describing the use of language in a way that would be true, no matter what _sounds_ people would use to express their concepts.

Making a comparison, Hare holds that it would not make any real difference for mathematics if a person said that five plus six are a dozen, granted that the person in question simply used "a dozen" to mean "eleven". In the same way it would not matter if

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1. F.R., p.84.

2. F.R., p.96.

people changed their expressions and started using "bad" (or "green" for that matter) instead of "good", or any other sound instead of "ought" (these examples are not Hare's).

> "There is, however, something which I, at any rate, customarily express by the sound 'ought', whose character is correctly described by saying that it is a universal or universalizable prescription. I hope that what I customarily express by the sound 'ought' is the same as what most people customarily express by it; but if I am mistaken in this assumption, I shall still have given a correct account, so far as I am able, of that which I express by this sound. Nevertheless, this account will interest other people mainly in so far as my hope that they understand the same thing as I do by 'ought' is fulfilled, and since I am moderately sure that this is indeed the case with many people, I hope that I may be of use to them in elucidating the logical properties of the concept which they thus express".[1]

The crucial statement here is evidently "there is something", this something being the moral concept, which Hare, for one, expresses by the sound "ought".

If we understand Hare correctly we could say that by "the logical properties of the moral words he does not mean that the actual sounds have any logical properties. He means, rather, "the logical properties of the moral concepts". This is implied in the passage: "Ethical theory, which determines the meanings and functions of the moral words, and thus the 'rules' of the

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1. FoR., pp.96f.

moral "game", provides only a clarification of the conceptual framework within which moral reasoning takes place".[1]

It is thus probable that Hare would agree with the understanding of logic which says that it deals with the relation between concepts.

This must still, however, be understood as an account of language as it is.

In terms of the argument against the naturalist, it means that it is the conceptual apparatus, with which he is dealing, which is inadequate for an account of moral language.

> "It is rather that there is this concept 'ought' which we have all learnt the use of (though perhaps less-developed cultures have not), and, having it, we are able to distinguish it from other concepts (as, also, we can distinguish the concept of adding from that of subtraction), and thus to tell when we are having a dispute about what one ought to do, and when we are having some other kind of dispute. We are therefore able to point out to the naturalist that, though he is entitled to use his concepts, the mere existence of ours opens up a field of dispute more general than they can express, and one with which the moral philosopher is called upon to deal, but which is outside the scope of a naturalist moral philosophy".[2]

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1.   F.R., p.89.

2.   F.R., pp.201f.

Hare claims to get the better of the naturalist because his (i.e. Hare's) language is general enough to deal with what the naturalist wants to say, and also with other crucial moral problems with which the naturalist cannot deal.

> "For our language admits of descriptive terms
> (as required by the naturalist); but it includes also
> evaluative terms, in our sense (i.e. universally
> prescriptive terms), which he cannot admit, but which
> are required in order to express things that we say".[1]

This underlines further the understanding that Hare's description of language is simply a description of "things that we say".

But could we go further and ask why it is that we say the things that we say?

We shall see that this seems to be a perfectly possible, and valid, question according to Hare's view, and the consideration of his theory from this point of view shows us a line of thought of his, which is very interesting when taken together with what he says about the actual character of moral language.

Hare is (this is made clear at least from the beginning of Freedom and Reason) able to say why moral language has the logical character he has shown it to have.

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1.   F.R., p.202 .

Though it has seemed, from Hare's account, that it is the logical independence of values from facts which leaves the possibility open for a free choice of moral principles, it is actually rather the other way round. It is man's freedom which gives moral language the character it has.

Indeed, the starting point of Freedom and Reason is a description of a moral agent's introspection. When a person is faced with a serious moral problem, Hare says, he "knows that it is his own problem, and that nobody can answer it for him".[1] He himself has to answer it.

> "If anyone were to suggest that the answer must be such and such, because everybody says so - or that, even, he would be abusing the English language if he gave any other answer - he will, if he understands what moral questions are, feel that to accept these suggestions would be to accept a diminution of his own freedom. For one of the most important constituents of our freedom, as moral agents, is the freedom to form our own opinions about moral questions, even if that involves changing our language".[2]

It is not so easy to say definitely what it means in this connection that we are free to change our language. Does it mean that we are free to change some secondary features, as it were, of e.g. contemporary English according to a certain

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1. F.R., p.1.

2. F.R., pp.1f.

underlying structure of this same language, or does it mean that we are free to create a universally prescriptive language, even if such a language did not exist up till now?

It is most likely that it is something like the first suggestion Hare has in mind.   Another question is, as we shall see, whether Hare's view does not in the end point more towards the alternative suggestion.

For a person who recognizes himself as a free moral agent, in Hare's sense, has not just discovered some feature of language. He has discovered some fundamental feature of his own situation, as man, which is prior to language as a tool for expressing this freedom.

Hare makes this quite plain:

"... I shall ask what it is about our human situation which gives rise to the need for a language in which prescriptive judgements (among them moral judgements) can be expressed."[1]

This means asking about the "reasons , in our situation as men, for having a set of terms with this feature".[2]

The answer is indicated briefly in the following passages:

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1.   F.R., p.5.

2.   F.R., p.51.

"... it is because we are free agents that we need to
ask prescriptive questions"[1].

"... only those who are free to think and act need a
prescriptive language"[2].

That is to say, the logic is a consequence of the fact:

"My aim is ... (that of) showing how the _fact_ of
moral freedom is what gives moral language one of its
characteristic _logical_ properties; it is because we
have to make decisions that we have use for this sort
of language"[3] (underlined by me).

Language would probably have had other logical features if
it had not been the language of men.

Compare e.g. the situation of men with that of stones
(this example is Hare's own). Granted that stones had the
faculty to talk, they would be content with having a language in
which they could describe their environment. They would not
require any prescriptive language. Whereas we are in a very
different position, being _acting_ bodies. We require a prescriptive

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1. F.R., p.6.

2. F.R., p.5.

3. F.R., p.61.

language because we "have to make choices and decisions about what to do."[1]

This is where Hare's discussion of the free will problem comes in, that which gets its answer in the slogan "'ought' implies 'can'".

> "It is because I _can_ act in this way or that, that I ask, 'Shall I act in this way or that'"[2].

That is to say, if the human situation were not of a certain kind, "ought" - questions would never have arisen.

The sense in which "ought" implies "can", Hare says, is not that of a logical entailment, but of a weaker kind, like that between the statement "The King of France is wise" and the statement "There is a King of France". Unless there were a

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1. F.R., p.51.

    Hare makes a qualification, however, of the statement that talking stones would not need a prescriptive language. They would not need it, "except in so far as even talking is an activity which can be done right or wrong, well or ill". This recognition of the fact that there can be a question of how one ought to talk, is important. Is there also something prescriptive in the way we talk about language, i.e. also in the way Hare analyses moral language?

2. Ibidem.

King of France the question about his wisdom would never arise.[1]

If, therefore, naïve determinism had been true we would not have asked "ought"-questions, as Hare understands them. By "naïve determinism" Hare means a kind of determinism which says "All is predictable; therefore moral judgements are out of place".[2]

That moral judgements are out of place must mean that it does not matter what we decide to do. This is clearly wrong, Hare apparently thinks, for even if we could predict a man's choice of behaviour, his choice would still be part-determinant of his consequent behaviour.

Consider an example:

If I am driven by a gale towards the coast of France it really does not matter whether I ask the question "Ought I to land in France?" My answer to the question would not have anything at all to do with the landing in France, i.e. it would not influence the fact that I am going to land in France.

But if I am a cashier contemplating taking money from the till, my taking or not taking the money depends on my answer to the question "Shall I take the money?". That my choice could

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1.   F.R., p.54.

2.   F.R., ͵ p.63.

have been predicted, e.g. by an encephalographic examination of the brain, does not alter the picture. The situation where I ask the question "Shall I?" was a real situation of choice, in the sense that the answer to the question determined the succession of events[1].

We are not here discussing Hare's treatment of the free will problem as such, but only trying to describe his account of the relation between a certain feature of the human situation and man's moral language with its logical properties.

It is important to guard oneself against two possible misrepresentations of Hare's view on this point.

On the one hand, Hare is not saying that statements about the human situation can be derived from statements about language, e.g. about man's actual use of "ought"-sentences. That is to say, Hare is not saying that it can be stated on verbal grounds that man is a free agent. (All that could be said on verbal grounds was, or so Hare would probably say, that man is not bound by his language to act in a certain way.)

1. F.R., pp. 61f.

On the other hand, Hare is not claiming that his statements about moral language can be derived from statements about the human situation. – It is necessary to be clear on this point. Hare does not hold that the character of the human situation is _his reason for saying_ that moral language has the logical character which he says it has. The human situation is the reason for moral language being as it is. That is to say, Hare is giving an explanation why it is as it is.

Hare clearly claims that it is by a direct study of language that we can find the logical distinction between fact and value. The introduction of the human situation is not made to say why we _recognize_ the distinction, and Hare would probably maintain, if pressed, that he is prepared to give up his talk about the human situation in order to show that this would not affect his theory of the logical structure of moral language.

So much for Hare's own understanding of what his talk about the human situation means.

But the question arises whether it is really possible for Hare to escape the accusation of having, in some sense, based his theory of language on a conception of the human situation, i.e. on an assertion of extra-linguistic truths.

There are passages in Hare's work where he can be interpreted as even admitting this.

> "... the very existence of the problem — the fact that ordinary people feel [underlined by me] . , that 'ought' implies 'can' and that this creates philosophical difficulties — is prima facie evidence against descriptivism ... if moral judgements were not prescriptive, there would be no problem about moral weakness; but there is a problem; therefore they are prescriptive" (apparently meaning "therefore it follows that they are prescriptive")[1].

Here is a direct reference to introspection as a support for Hare's case against descriptivism as a theory about moral language. It seems that something can be said about the truth, or adequacy, of Hare's account of moral language from the way people ordinarily feel about their moral situation.

What we now want to maintain, and this will turn out to be the main point of our thesis, as far as Hare is concerned, is that his account of the logic of moral language is in fact built upon a view of the world.

We might even say that it is not about language, but about the world.

This thesis is not based upon isolated passages such as the last one quoted. This passage is only a pointer to the fact that Hare's analysis of moral language is built on what we think is an illusory assumption, namely that it is possible just to analyse language.

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1. F.R., p.68.

What this really amounts to is, of course, a criticism of the whole of the linguistic approach to philosophy, saying that it is basically mistaken.

The reason why Hare's approach is mistaken is not just that he is building his theory of language on some contingent truths about human existence, e.g. what people usually feel in the situations we call moral.

The reason is rather that language is <u>analysed in terms of concepts which already have a certain content.</u>

That is to say, in his analysis of language Hare, and the linguists in general, are using concepts in which a view of reality, and of how we can know it, is already incorporated.

We are not saying that Hare is wrong in doing what he is doing.

But he is wrong in not knowing what he is doing and admitting it. That is, in presenting himself as doing something different from what he is doing.

For, far from being "formal" (if such a thing as a "formal" concept exists at all, or makes sense as an expression), the very concepts by which Hare analysis the language of morals are already presupposing the result of his analysis.

The concepts "fact" and "value", to take the two on which
most of his argument hangs, are clearly saying something about the
world.

And they are not expressing some contingent truths about the
world.

They are rather a kind of non-contingent, a priori, cathegories
in which man and his world are interpreted.

The very distinction between something called "fact" and
something called "value" is not made by people who are thinking
about moral questions i.e. who are deliberating or arguing about
what to do.   It is brought in from without by the theorizer about
moral language, reflecting his own world-view.   That is, the
analyst tries to understand moral language in terms of his own
understanding of the world.

That his analysis represents common sense in the understanding
of moral language is simply an assumption (unless "common sense"
is defined in such a way that it begs the question).   We think that
common sense gives much more prima facie evidence against Hare's
analysis.

We say only "prima facie evidence", because we do not think
that our problem can be settled on the basis of "common sense" or a
study of the use of language.   We therefore repeat that Hare's

procedure is not in itself invalid. Let him only say what he is doing so there can be discussion about the real issues at stake.

What we maintain is that e.g. the concept of "fact" itself already incorporates an epistemology. This will be a main point in our discussion in the following chapters.

Clearly, Hare is not himself going to admit that this is so, but we think that he cannot avoid these consequences being drawn.

All this has, of course, great consequences for the way we look at the case between Hare and his adversaries in their account of moral language.

When Hare thinks he can "get the better"[1] of his opponents, whether they be descriptivists who ignore prescriptivity, or the ones on the other side who do not account for the universality, it is because Hare is presenting the case of his opponents in terms of his own concepts.

Let it be pointed out that we are not in this connection interested in defending any one in particular of the positions Hare is attacking. Our purpose is to give a critical analysis of Hare's own position, thereby seeing if it is not possible, or indeed

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1. cf. F.R., p.202.

necessary, to look at the problem of moral values in a different way from the way he does.

In order to see the nature of Hare's argument let us consider some of the fundamental aspects of his case against the "naturalists". (The following applies also to other of the critics of naturalism).

Hare presents naturalism as a theory saying that a moral conclusion can be drawn from a set of only factual premisses, and "factual" means "non-moral".[1]

Similarly Hare takes it for granted that there is an exclusive relation between "is" and "ought", so that when the naturalists violate the rule "no ought from an is" they are really sinning against a rule which says "no ought from a non-ought".

But is it reasonable to presume that the naturalists did commit such a blatant fallacy?

Would the naturalists really recognize this as an adequate presentation of their case? That is, that the conclusion can contain something that is not contained in the premisses?

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1. This is clearly implied in what Hare says, e.g. in L.M.,p.91. See above, p.10.

"Very well", Hare might answer. "I am not saying that in his inferences the naturalist is actually deriving an "ought" from an "is". I am only saying that he gives an inadequate account of what is going on in his inferences."

Let us consider the interpretations possible for Hare of the naturalist's procedure.

An example of an inference, which the naturalist finds in actual moral argument:

X brings pleasure

Therefore X is good.

This can only mean two things according to Hare's view. Either "good" is used in the, unlikely, but quite possible, sense of "what brings pleasure", i.e. in a purely descriptive sense, saying what brings about a certain factual state of affairs.

In which case the inference would just say that "X brings pleasure, because it is pleasure-bringing", or something like that. This would not, Hare says, be any moral judgement at all. Or, on the other possible interpretation, which Hare probably would hold to cover most of the cases where such inferences are made: The inference contains in fact a hidden premiss, and should therefore be presented like this:

(That which brings pleasure is good)

Y brings pleasure

Therefore X is good.

In this case the first premiss is a substantial decision of principle, i.e. a real moral judgement.

And in consequence we can protest against the judgement that X is good, because we do not agree with the judgement expressed in the premisses. That is to say, we have shown that the premisses consist of two different steps, an evaluation and a factual statement. And acceptance of what is contained in the factual premisses, does not compel us to accept the conclusion which implies the other premiss as well.

In other words, what Hare claims to have demonstrated, is that words like "pleasure", when used in cases like those "exploited" by the naturalists, are doing two jobs, which can be distinguished and separated, that of describing a state of affairs, and of evaluating it.

In Hare's own words, the concepts of the naturalists are "good fat substantial concepts"[1], and nobody needs to accept their substance, i.e. their prescription of e.g. a certain kind of action.

1. F.R., p.200.

One example of a concept which incapsulates determinate moral principles, and one which Hare makes much of, is the concept "courageous".[1] This concept "incapsulates a certain view about what one ought to do in situations of danger."[2]

If a person did not want to commend those who preserved the safety of others by disregarding their own, he could just say that he did not any longer wish to use the word "courageous", because it incapsulated the attitude to which he did not subscribe. He could say,

> "I prefer the longer, morally neutral expression, 'disregarding one's own safety in order to preserve that of others.' This, though it is not equivalent to 'courageous', even descriptively, is in fact all that we can be logically compelled to admit of a person, once he has done the 'courageous' act referred to. To go on to call the act courageous is, strictly speaking, an additional step which I am not disposed to take, because I do not share the evaluations of those who take it. It is true that there is no single evaluatively neutral word, like 'negro'[3] which in the present case can be used to describe such actions without committing the describer to any evaluation; but we could have such a word. What I shall actually do, in default of an invented word, is to use the same word 'courageous', but to make it clear by

1. F.R., p.187ff.
2. F.R., p.200.
3. Referring to the case of a person who does not despise negroes, and therefore refuses to use the word "nigger" and decides to use only the neutral word "negro".

my tone of voice or by putting quotation marks round it, that I am using it in a purely descriptive sense, implying thereby no commendation whatever",[1]

Particularly interesting in this passage is the admission that "disregarding one's own safety in order to preserve that of others" is not equivalent, even descriptively, to "courageous". Hare apparently thinks that it would be possible to find a lengthier expression which would be equivalent to the descriptive meaning of "courageous" without having its evaluative meaning incapsulated.

What Hare is actually doing here is only to postulate the possibility of isolating the purely descriptive (in his sense) meaning of "courageous", i.e. that we could describe the action referred to by "courageous" non-evaluatively, and that we could describe this action by an invented word, or by expressing the word "courageous" in a certain tone of voice or by writing it inside quotation marks.

We want to maintain that no tone of voice and no quotation marks can ever suffice to establish what is really a theory about our knowledge of the world, and which Hare should have been arguing about, namely that there is something called "facts",

1.   F.R., p.189.

which always _can_ be apprehended apart from any evaluation.

All this means that Hare is not describing the difference between his theory of moral language and other theories on a "neutral" basis, so that he can expect everybody to accept it just by looking again at language, i.e. on a purely linguistic basis. He is really describing the controversies in terms of his own understanding of the world and of the human situation.

He will answer, that what he asks of his opponents is only that they shall take into account what _he_ at least is doing. For by his moral reasoning he shows thatit is possible to separate the prescriptive meaning of moral words from their descriptive meaning, and therefore facts and values are not logically bound together.

But however modest a claim this sounds, what it really ammounts to is a claim that we must account for his use of moral language on _his_ own epistemological premisses. But these premisses are exactly the questionwhich is at issue. So that when Hare charges his opponents with giving an insufficient picture of moral language, this insufficiency is really determined by Hare's own concepts.

Hare adopts the principle "no ought from an is" claiming to derive this from his analysis of language. But the conceptual equipment which he uses to carry out this analysis already presupposes his conclusions. The understanding of "is" and "ought" which he brings to the analysis already presupposes an exclusive relation between them.

This is the petitio principii of Hare's analysis of moral language, as long as he does not find it necessary to try and justify his concepts. But this he is not prepared to do, because it would involve him in something other than linguistic analysis.

If we are right in our interpretation of Hare's procedure, then the logic which he claims that moral language has, is really a logic which exists prior to what any study of moral language might disclose, i.e. a logic implied in the conceptual apparatus with which Hare undertakes the analysis of language.

Only on this background can we understand how it is possible to single out one use of a certain moral term and say that it is "central", or "typical" a.s.o.

For Hare does this repeatedly.

"... prescriptivism ... maintains that it is one of
the characteristics of moral terms ... that judgements
containing them are as typically used, intended as
guides to conduct"[1]

"... moral judgements, in their central use, have it
as their function to guide conduct".[2]

Similarly, Hare is able to state that a man who says, "I

ought but I can't" is not "intending his moral judgement seriously"

and with its "full force".

"This kind of quasi-universal prescription is ...
very characteristic of our actual moral language. I
have argued that moral judgements, <u>when intended seriously
and with their full force</u>, must be taken as committing the
speaker to some universal judgement applying to anyone in
relevantly similar situation"[3] (underlined by me). . .

"There are a great many kinds of 'off-colour' moral
judgements which do not, like the perfect specimen,
'imply "can"'. Thus the man who says 'I ought but I can't'
is not necessarily saying anything absurd, all that he is
doing is to use 'ought' in one of the many off-colour ways
that are possible".[4]

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1. F.R., p.67.

2. F.R., p.70. And to "guide conduct" means for Hare, as we
   know, to make evaluative decisions of principle, as distinct
   from describing something which is the case.

3. F.R., p.53.

4. F.R., p.68.

That is to say, among the many possible, and actual uses of
a moral term Hare is able to point out the use which is not in
accordance with the perfect specimen and which is therefore
"off-colour".

We want to quote at length one passage which brings out most
clearly the opposed trends of Hare's theory of moral language,
the desire to take language as it is, and the desire to interpret
it in terms of an ideal language, i.e. to arrange all the actual
uses of language around one of those uses, which is then honoured
as the ideal use.

> "So difficult is it, in fact - so great is the strain
> between prescriptivity and universalizability in certain
> situations - that something has to give; and this is the
> explanation of the phenomenon of moral weakness. Not only
> do we give, because we are morally weak; we have found for
> ourselves a language which shares our weakness, and gives
> just where we do. For moral language is a human institution.
> It is the business of the moral philosopher to say, not what
> the logical behaviour of moral terms would be like, if they
> were devised by and for the use of angels, but what it
> actually is like. ... a 'holy' moral language would be a
> very simple one; it would consist of universalizable
> prescriptive judgements without any way of escaping from
> either their prescriptivity or their universality.
>
> ... human moral language, unlike a holy or angelic moral
> language, has, built into its logic, all manner of ways of
> evading the rigour of pure universality. ... But
> nevertheless it would be a slander upon human moral language
> and on its users to claim that they do not even aspire to
> have universal prescriptive principles.

... we are not angels; and therefore, although the
simplest logic for a moral language would be that of
the universalizable prescriptive, we shy at this
rigorous and austere simplicity, and, in our vain
struggles to find a more comfortable way of speaking,
have introduced complexities into the logic of our
moral language – vain struggles, because the ideal of
pure universal prescriptive moral principles
obstinately remains with us, and we are not in the end
satisfied with anything which falls short of it."[1]

It is made quite plain, then.   There _is_ an ideal of moral

language operating, as it were, inside our actual use of moral

language.   It is not of decisive importance how the deviations

from this ideal are characterized.   As we saw in the last passage

they are given, somehow, a status within the logical framework of

moral language, belonging as they do to the "complexities" of this

logic.

On other occasions they are characterized less favourably.

For instance, when it comes to Hare's attempt to give a practical

example of the usefulness of his theory for moral reasoning, the

persons who are refusing to play his game of "pure universality"

are given this label:

"... they are not asking whether they can universalize their
prescriptions; though they may make play with the moral

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1.   F.R., pp. 73ff.

words which they have heard other people use, they are
not, in their own thinking, using these words according
to the logical rules which are implicit in their
meaning."[1]

This ambiguity does not, however, affect decisively what is
our major concern: To bring out that the logic of moral language,
as Hare describes it, is the logic of an ideal language, and that
this description of moral language depends upon a concept of the
world which must be postulated, and indeed by a postulation of
which the evaluative aspect is an inseparable part.

That is to say, the understanding of moral language, whereby
our apprehension of the facts of the world can be separated from
our evaluations of them, rests upon concepts by means of which
something about the world and our apprehension of it is postulated
as an ultimate.

The interpretation of Hare's theory as a theory about the a
priori logic of an ideal of moral language might seem untenable
on the background of some of Hare's explicit statements, e.g. the
one quoted earlier saying that "Prescriptivism would be refuted if
it could be shown that we do not ever use moral words in the way

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1.   F.R., p.224.

I have characterized as prescriptive"[1].

But this passage only appears to be a counter-proof against our account of Hare's theory.

For the thing is that, granted Hare's premisses, i.e. his world-view, it _could_ never be shown that we do not (or that he at least does not) ever use moral words in the way that he calls prescriptive.

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1. F.R., p.84.
    See above, p.113.

2. Religion and "blik" in R.M. Hare's thought in relation to his theory of values.

Surprisingly enough, it is R.M. Hare who points to the reason why his own absolute distinction between facts and values eventually seems to break down, even from a logical point of view.

When he starts asking what knowledge of facts really means and how it is arrived at he appears to be maintaining views which are at variance with the assumptions we found underlying his analysis of moral language and which could therefore provide a different context for the understanding of moral language.

These thoughts are not to be found in any of the ethical writings of R.M. Hare, but they occur in the shorter contributions which he has made to the discussion of religious language, namely in his remarks in the "Theology and Falsification" - discussion in University 1950-51[1] and in his article on "Religion and Morals" in Faith and Logic, ed. B. Mitchell,1957 (this is an article based on a lecture given in 1954).

As will be seen, these contributions do not represent any "later" view of R.M. Hare. They date from the time between the

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1. Reprinted in New Essays in Philosophical Theology, ed. A. Flew and A. Macintyre, 1955, hereafter referred to as N.E., pp. 99ff.

publication of his two main works on ethics. They are all the more interesting, however, as Hare himself openly confesses that he is not at all sure what he wants to say about the subject he is discussing here, and that much of what he says is undigested and only tentatively put forward[1].

His contribution in the University-discussion is one of the answers to A.Flew's parable (or use of the parable) of the two explorers who find a clearing in the jungle. One of the explorers asserts that this is the work of a gardener, but he is in the end incapable of saying anything whatsoever about what would have to be the case if he should have to say that the existence of the gardener (scil. God) was disproved. The assertion is, therefore, compatible with anything happening or not happening, and it is thus no real assertion, it has no factual meaning.

With this Hare agrees entirely. But he holds that religious language actually does another job. He goes on to relate another parable ("parable" is Hare's own term). This parable concerns a lunatic who is convinced that all dons want to murder him. All his experiences of dons seem, for all normal persons, to show the opposite. The dons are all treating him in the manner of utmost

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1. Faith and Logic, p.176.

cordiality. But nothing of this is allowed to count against the lunatic's conviction. The dons are only hiding their diabolical plans behind a friendly appearance.

Since nothing will count against the lunatic's theory it asserts nothing. In this Flew is right. But still the lunatic thinks quite differently about dons from what other persons do, even if he says nothing about their outward behaviour. The lunatic has a different "blik" about dons.

This blik is of the greatest importance. Because it determines the persons attitude towards other persons, in this case dons, and not only his inward attitude towards them, but all his dealings with them in his life.

In a more everyday situation,too, the blik applies to many things. For instance, the driver of a car usually has a certain blik about his car. He trusts that it will obey his steering, and therefore he confidently places himself and other people, whom he loves, in his car.

This blik about the car is not the same thing as knowledge, e.g. that the car is in perfect technical order. It is not difficult to imagine a person who would never dare to go into a car, even if he knew that everything had been tested in detail. But such a person would certainly have a very different attitude towards the contemporary way of living from most of us.

It is, in fact, the thoughts of Hume, R.M. Hare claims to be voicing in his talking of blik. Hume himself pointed to the fact that our "whole commerce with the world depends upon our blik about the world".[1] It is impossible to reach agreement in blik-attitude by observing what happens in the world, but the blik we have determines how we are going to treat our observation of what happens. The blik is no scientific explanation, but even a scientific explanation will need a blik.

Without a blik about how the happenings of the world are related to each other, no explanation of what happens would be possible. It would not be incompatible with any possible observation to say that everything happened by pure chance, for instance.

Now it seems that Hare wants to hold that the blik which a person, or group of persons, or indeed, all mankind, has, does not play any part in the question of what is happening or not happening, and that observations of what is the case can be made independent of any blik.

But is this so?

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1. N.E., p.101.

Let us examine again more closely the parable of the person with the insane blik about Oxford dons. The friends of the lunatic want to make him change his opinion about dons, and therefore they introduce him to the mildest and most respectable dons they can find. Afterwards they say to him, "You see, he doesn't really want to murder you, he spoke to you in a most cordial manner; ..." And the lunatic's reply is, "Yes, but that was only his diabolic cunning; he's really plotting against me the whole time ..."

What Hare apparently wants to illustrate here is that the lunatic's blik is compatible with any facts about the behaviour of dons. The sentence, "he spoke to you in a most cordial manner" is thus thought to be a statement of fact, in Hare's sense of the word "fact", as distinct from e.g. "value".

But surely, "cordial", if any, is an evaluative word. And it is very unlikely that the lunatic should find a statement about the cordiality of the don compatible with his blik. Would it not be more probable that he should deny the cordiality in the don's words to him, being aware all the time, as he thinks, of the don's diabolic intentions.

In this case the lunatic and his friends would certainly disagree about facts, namely how the don spoke to the poor man on a certain occasion. But it would be impossible to speak about the behaviour of the don without making an evaluation at the same time. We are not, of course, arguing from this imaginative course of the conversation. It serves only as an illustration of what could be said about a term like "cordial".

If "cordial" is a fact-word, it should be possible to render its meaning in unquestionably factual terms. Let us try to imagine how the friends could express what they want to say by the sentence "he spoke to you in a most cordial manner", in a way that would be unmistakably non-evaluative.

They could say something about the don's voice, its volume, its sonority, measured in acoustic units, they could describe with accuracy his vocabulary, they could describe the movements of the corners of his mouth and of his eyebrows while he spoke, and so on indefinitely.

But describing these characteristics of the don's way of speaking, the friends would all the time be moving further and further away from what they originally wanted to say, i.e. "he spoke to you in a most cordial manner". In fact, the sentence would lose its intended meaning altogether.

And it will not do to admit that the sentence was evaluative from the beginning and the listed characteristics were their criteria for applying the term "cordial" to the way the don spoke. This would mean that they by using the word "cordial" simply wanted to commend it for having these characteristics.

Their original sentence was clearly intended to be fact-stating, to say that something was the case. And it is just this "something", i.e. that which is meant by the word "cordial", which seems to disappear when the attempt is made to state it non-evaluatively.

What this example of the use of words like "cordial" shows, is that, in some human situations, at least, the distinction between fact-stating words and value words might be impossible to maintain, and this might not only be the sign of a practical difficulty, e.g. that a strong emotional attitude very often seems to distort the facts for the percipient ("Love makes blind").

It is the sign of an essential feature of our "commerce with the world". There are things, i.e. things that matter much for us as men, the existence of which we cannot affirm or deny without giving them a value status (positive or negative). There are situations in which we want to say that something is the case, and are unable to state this in non-evaluative terms. And, at this point the question should be raised, at least, whether our language

is here reflecting fundamental epistemological conditions. This could mean, e.g. in the case of the lunatic, that the question of whether you see what there really is to be seen in the situation depends on whether you have got the right blik by which you could be aware of the value aspect of the situation. To say this would also mean to make some ontological assertions.

To be true, it might often seem possible to regard facts and values as separable, but is this because we deliberately block the access to one aspect of reality and create an artificial language to cover this distorted experience of it? In which case it is not only an "amputated" experience, because the experience is wrong).

The relation between factual assertions and evaluations is perhaps most evident in religious language. This becomes especially clear from what R.M. Hare himself says in his article in Faith and Logic. We will have to examine this article rather closely.

First, Hare deals with the logical positivists' theory of empirical verifiability as the criterion of the meaningfulness of a statement, and the impact of this theory on the conception of religious and moral language.

As might be expected, Hare holds that this criterion swept language too clean[1], reducing moral and theological language to pseudo-propositions. What the theory did, Hare says, was to isolate _one_ kind of use we make of language, and give an enormously useful criterion of meaningfulness for statements made in this field.

The interesting point is, however, that when Hare himself names this field of statements as distinct from religious statements, he does not simply talk of "factual statements", but of "what we ordinarily called statements of empirical fact" (underlined by me)[2]. Hare thereby indicates his awareness of the complexity of the relation between so-called statements of fact and, in this case, moral and religious utterances, and that it is not so easy to operate with a clearly circumscribed meaning of the term "fact" itself.

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1. One feels compelled to ask: "Too clean" — in relation to what? Perhaps "in relation to actual (empirical) uses of language". But this is an extremely difficult position to hold. For how is one to decide which, if any, of the uses of language should be swept out if the court of appeal is only these empirical uses themselves? Or does language become too clean in relation to an ideal of language? Or is it judged too clean on the basis of some other considerations, perhaps of epistemological conditions? We think that the latter is the case, and that this is implied in Hare's argument as it is sketched in the following.

2. _Faith and Logic_, p.177.

The first thing to be said about religion and morals, according to Hare, is that religion usually has a moral aspect. This does not only mean that the supporters of a particular religion tend to behave according to a particular moral pattern. It also means that the preaching of a particular religion seems to be intimately linked with the prescription of a particular set of moral principles.

In fact, the most obvious difference between particular religions is very often the difference in the behaviour of their believers. Thus the very obvious thing that happened to St. Paul when he became a Christian, was that he did not any longer regard it as his duty to persecute Christians. He suddenly came to think that he ought to increase their number instead.

It is not Hare's intention, however, to say that religious belief means commitment to a particular way of behaving (as others have done in an attempt to state the function of religious language). It is not the moral judgements which constitute a religious belief. They arise out of this belief, as is clear from St. Paul's case.

The reason why he stopped persecuting Christians was that he had changed his belief about a particular non-moral matter, namely who Jesus of Nazareth really was. He had come to believe that he was Christ, the Son of God.

This resembles, however, very much a factual statement, and it seems that it was not actually his moral principle that had changed at all. For Paul had always regarded it as his moral obligation to follow the Christ when he appeared. So it might be most correct to say that Paul's actions were changed, not by a change in moral principles, but by a change in his factual belief.

Hare is not, however, content with this way of putting it either. For, can we say that a person by the sentence "Jesus is Christ" is stating a fact at all (and Hare adds significantly, "in the ordinary sense")?

St. Paul's new belief was not caused by any increase in knowledge of the facts about Jesus. He might very well have known before that Jesus cast out devils, for instance. But he might have said that it was Beelzebub who stood behind him. Or, if he had been a 20th century critic, he might have said that he cured mental diseases by suggestion. And this would not in any case have altered the facts in question, in one sense of the word "fact".

But are there not other kinds of facts, and is not the most important point in connection with St. Paul's conversion just such a fact of "another kind"? The appearance, namely, of the voice of

Christ while Paul was on the road to Damascus?   This could then
be called a "supernatural" fact.

Someone might easily object, however, that the actual fact
was that St. Paul had a powerful emotional experience accompanied
by an illusion of someone talking to him.   This would be
perfectly consistent with what could be observed in the case.

It seems, therefore, that we cannot point to any difference
between facts and illusions when we are dealing with "supernatural"
facts.[1]

But another way of looking at St. Paul's conversion is to say
that what he did was to adopt a new, as it were, worshipping
attitude to the facts.   So that to say "Thou art the Christ", is
not to state a fact, but to do something, namely, worship.

But even this explanation does not make the problem clearcut.
For to worship something seems to mean, partly at least, certain
assertions.   For instance that the object worshipped is a person,

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1.   We are here only referring to Hare's use of the adjective
     "supernatural", namely to characterize that which is supposed
     to belong to an order of being above that of the objects and
     order of events in the natural world.   And Hare's point seems
     to be the familiar one that we cannot speak of any such kind
     of facts because statements about them could never be verified
     or falsified empirically.

and that this can be seen from what the object of worship does. Usually this is thought of as a certain course of events which is expected to follow an act of worship.

It might be true, Hare holds, that the less primitive the religion is, the less willing are its adherents to expose its statements to such empirical falsification, but even advanced religious beliefs imply _some_ empirical expectations.

On the other hand, even the most primitive religious beliefs are not just statements of empirical fact. For the meaning of the word "god" is "a proper object of worship", and "proper" is here clearly a value-word, with a prescriptive meaning.

So Hare seems to have brought out, in connection with religious language, a case very similar to that of moral judgements.

The word "god", for instance, has both evaluative and descriptive meaning. For, "According to this view, in calling something a god, we are saying, not merely that worshipping it will have certain results, but that it is _proper_ to worship it; that is to say, we are at least in part prescribing the taking up of a certain attitude towards it"[1].

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1. _Faith and Logic_, p.187.

Has Hare now managed to give an adequate description of religious discourse, which fits, say, St. Paul's beliefs after his conversion?

As we saw, it is impossible to say that it was some single thing about St. Paul which had changed when he started saying, "Jesus is Christ". In fact, everything in his life changed, his factual beliefs, his attitude and moral principles. Accordingly, religious discourse consists of many kinds of utterances, which are interwoven, i.e. "all these kinds of utterances are, so to speak, in circuit with all the rest".[1]

Hare sums up his attempt to classify religious language in the following way.

> "I started, it will be remembered, by considering the suggestion that moral judgements are the distinctive constituents of religious discourse. This view I rejected, and then considered in turn the claim of statements of religious beliefs to be called statements of facts in the ordinary sense; and this, too, appeared unsatisfactory. If we take religious language as a whole, it is too factual to be called specifically moral, and yet too closely bound up with our conduct to be called in the ordinary sense factual".[2]

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1. Ibidem, p.188.

2. Ibidem, p.189.

Hare then tried to sketch a synthesis which would include both the adoption of a factual belief and the subscription to certain principles of action in the taking up of an attitude of worship to an object.

> "As a first sketch of a synthesis, it is plausible to say that in so far as religious discourse seems to refer to supernatural facts, this is the result of the superimposition of the attitude of worship upon factual beliefs which are themselves not other than empirical".[1]

This would, says Hare, point to a mistake like the one about "non-natural qualities" in ethics, i.e. the view which takes the application of the adjective "good" to an object to mean the attribution of a _quality_, instead of seeing that it means to _commend_ the object for having other, empirical, qualities.

> "... it might be that the _facts_ that religious discourse deals with are perfectly ordinary empirical facts like what happens when you pray; but we are tempted to call them supernatural facts because our whole way of living is organized round them, they have for us value, relevance, importance, which they would not have if we were atheists. If this view were correct, then the belief that there are specifically religious, supernatural facts could be said to be the result of failing to distinguish in logic what cannot be distinguished in practice, namely, facts, and our attitudes to them".[2]

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1.   Ibidem.

2.   Ibidem, p.190.

If we could be satisfied with this way of putting it, everything would fit very neatly into the pattern used to describe moral language, that of evaluative and descriptive meaning as logically independent of each other.

But Hare thinks that even this will not do for religious language.

What he then goes on to question, is just this simple logical distinction between facts and attitudes.

> "... though it is most important to start by making this distinction, it is important to end, not by blurring it, as is often done, but by articulating the relations between these two kinds of things".[1]

What Hare wants to refute is the idea that facts are given us irrespectively of our dispositions. I.e., he opposes what he, adopting a phrase of Professor Popper's, calls "the bucket theory of the mind",[2] that "knowledge" is the result of facts dripping, so to speak, into an empty bucket.

Kant, as Hare points out, long ago realized that this is not so. Any statements of fact which claim objectivity, contain a reference to causal necessity, and is thus partly modal.

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1. Ibidem

2. Ibidem, p.192.

Such a modal statement is in fact prescriptive, and not only descriptive.

This would mean that a statement which is, explicitly, a statement of fact, contains as such a prescriptive element, which, as Hare admits, presents certain analogies with the presciptive element in moral judgements, and in the end Hare maintains that, "From this it follows that without principles of some sort we do not get any facts; there is no distinction between fact and illusion for a person who does not take up a certain attitude to the world" (underlined by me)[1].

For this view, Hare, surprisingly enough, draws support from the works of modern neuro-physiology, in particular from Professor J.Z. Young's Reith Lectures[2].

It might seem surprising that a man of Professor Young's profession should be able to give any support to Kant's doctrines. But since there obviously are certain formal analogies between the features of language and the processes in the brain, the agreement between Kant and Professor Young simply shows (for Hare, that is) that Kant himself was in the end a "linguistic" philosopher.

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1. Ibidem, p.190.

2. Doubt and Certainty in Science.
    British Broadcasting Corporation Reith Lectures 1950, Published Oxford 1951.

Professor Young holds (as quoted by Hare) that,

"We cannot speak as if there is a world around us of
which our senses give us true information.   In trying to
speak about what the world is like we must remember all
the time that what we see and what we say depends on what
we have learned; we ourselves come into the process. ...

The brain of each one of us does literally create his
or her own world.   To explain this we must answer the
question: How does each brain set up its own characteristic
rules?   How do those regular patterns of activity in the
cells of the brain ... develop?   This is the process that I
call the establishment of certainty, and it is a process
that we may consider as beginning in each human being at the
moment when, as a newly born baby, his eyes open on to the
world"[1].

That is to say, Young wants to investigate how the brain sets

up the rules for distinguishing facts, or for understanding the

concept "fact".

Hare contends that, "the lesson that is to be learnt from

Professor Young, as from Kant, is that (as Kant might put it)

nothing can become an object (or a fact) for us unless in our

thinking we follow certain rules or principles -- that the mind

plays an active part in cognition, and that therefore the principles

which govern its action are part-determinants of what we experience"[2]

(underlined by me).

1.   Faith and Logic, p.191.

2.   Ibidem, p.192.

If this is so, we ought to be reluctant to speak too easily about facts as something absolutely distinguishable from our attitudes. We cannot speak of anything as really existing, i.e. of facts, objects or entities, until we have accepted rules for discriminating between facts and illusions".[1]

It is here that religious belief comes into the picture, according to Hare. We believe that God created the world out of chaos.

> "Is it possible that this is our way of expressing the truth that without belief in a divine order – a belief expressed in other terms by means of worshipping assent to principles for discriminating between fact and illusion – there could be no belief in matters of fact or real objects? Certainly it is salutary to recognize that even our belief in so-called hard facts rests in the end on a faith, a commitment, which is not in or to facts, but in that without which there would not be any facts"[2].

What comes out of this is, it seems, that the basis of the very notion of "facts" is a prescriptive attitude, and we remember that a main point in Hare's theory of ethics was the relation between evaluation and prescription.

1. Ibidem

2. Ibidem

We might therefore be justified in saying that to speak of
something as a "fact" means, according to Hare, to take up the
evaluative attitude that it is to be regarded as a "fact" or a
"real object". Or, in other words, to make the value judgement
that it is to be regarded as a such one. That is to say, not
the fact itself but the recognition of its "factuality" is
prescribed.

Hare is not holding, and neither do we want to hold, a
peculiar kind of Berkeleyan idealism, a kind of "esse est
aestimari". That would mean that the being of an object is its
being evaluated.

Hare clearly does not want to deny the reality of the external
world. He want to say something close to what Kant said. Put
briefly the view is that the phenomena, or the things as they
appear to us, are determined, partly at least, by our own
cathegories of apprehension. Or, we could say, by the way we
apprehend the things.[1]

Hare wants to develop this even further in including evaluative
and indeed, religious attitudes among the possible determinants of
our cathegories.

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1. How far there is a real agreement between Kant and Hare in these
matters cannot be discussed here. We are limiting the task to
a presentation of Hare's own view.

This means that "facts", as they come to us, are determined by our decision of what is to count as a fact. This decision is repeated each time a new human individual learns how to distinguish between facts and illusions.

This decision is not an individual decision, i.e. in the meaning that it varies from individual to individual. It is rather a common human decision, at least for all who have decided to use the word "fact" or its equivalents, a setting up of rules or principles for discriminating between facts and illusions.

There is no indication that Hare himself finds his view that belief in facts is based on attitudes incompatible with the main thesis in his ethical writings, i.e. that of the dichotomy between facts and values.

He might want to say that the prescription or evaluation which is the basis for our notion of "facts" is a general prescription of the human mind, stating what is to count as a fact, while the prescription of the value judgement proper is an expression of the individual's choice among the facts already established by the initial distinction between facts and illusions.

But we do not think that the theory of the dichotomy between fact and value can really be upheld on the basis of this or a similar argument.

For what Hare has done by stressing the importance of blik[1] and religious belief (as he understands it) is to question the whole notion of "facts" as something objectively given in the sense that it can be considered independently of its relation to the apprehending subject, the relation which is expressed in the subject's evaluation.   The doubts as to the consistency of the fact-and-value separation would be the same whether this "evaluation" is thought of as a purely subjective prescription or as having some cognitive status, e.g. referring to some ontological structure.

By introducing such elements into our discourse as the ones above we have already indicated that a discussion of another important trend in contemporary philosophy, so-called "existentialism", might have a bearing on the understanding of our problem.

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1.   It should be noted that Hare uses the term "blik" only in the first of the two articles we have been discussing above.   So that we alone are responsible for the use of the term in connection with the attitudinal basis of the belief in "facts".

IV.   TOWARDS A THEORY OF THE UNITY OF FACT AND VALUE.

1.   Values and existentialism.

The task of comparing the ethical conception of analytical philosophy with that of existentialist philosophy seems prima facie a confusing one.

On the one hand there are utterances by the analysts which seem to dismiss existentialism as a fallacy altogether.   The analysts present it as resting on the assumption that existence is an attribute, and that it, therefore, has meaning to raise questions about Being.   The mistake which lies behind such questions is that of thinking that, since sentences like "X exists" and "X works" have the same grammatical form, they are also of the same logical type, i.e. they are ascribing attributes.[1]

This might lead us to think that our question about the relation between analytical and existentialist philosophy with regard to the question of ethics is easily answered, the answer being that there is no relation at all, but rather a total discrepancy.

A conclusion like this is, however, certainly premature.   As far as our question is concerned, there are repeated assertions from

1.   Cf. e.g. A.J. Ayer, op.cit., p.42.

different quarters that existentialism is actually the most
faithful ally of analytical philosophy in maintaining a consequent
non-cognitivism, holding that value judgements are neither true
nor false, that they cannot be inferred from any statements of
facts, that we can get no imperative from an indicative, no "ought"
from an "is" and so on. Very often existentialism is pictured as
admitting a moral arbitrariness which by far exceeds that which
any moral philosopher in the analytic philosophical context would
admit.

The Norwegian philosopher K.E. Tranöy, for instance, sees in
value nihilism and existentialism a common tendency, in that the
vital centre of morality is sought, not in the rational and
intellectual side of man, but in his emotions and feelings. This
implies, then, that value nihilism and existentialism, though
commonly regarded as plain contraries, are, in a sense, variations
on a common theme.

> "The problem of motivation, of the relation between
> reason and feelings, knowledge and choice, is ... a central
> problem in the emotive and value nihilistic theories.
> Existentialism, also, is much occuped by the same, or a
> closely related, problem. It tells us that both life and
> death are meaningless, ... that everything is absurd. ...
> For what do the existentialists mean when they are speaking
> of life as meaningless and absurd? They can ... mean to
> say that we cannot by way of reasoning come to know that
> life has any adequate value in itself, any ultimate goal,

any purpose. ... If we choose to live, we have to choose without being able to say that reason has chosen for us. Does not this resemble what the value nihilists are saying? ...

It may thus in a way be the same insight they are conveying, the existentialists, when they say that life is absurd, and the value nihilists, when they say that standards and evaluations are neither true nor false."[1]

The way in which this apparent relationship is stated, varies, even though the meaning is fairly constant. A. Montefiore, speaking especially of R.M. Hare, holds that "this freedom of evaluation ... has obvious affinities with that proclaimed by the logical autonomists' Continental existentialist cousins ..."[2]

W.K. Frankena compares the existentialists to the most extreme of the non-cognitivists: "Many existentialists likewise regard basic ethical and value judgements, particular or general, as arbitrary commitments or decisions for which no justification can be given."[3]

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1. _Fornuft eller fölelse._ Universitetet i Bergen. Småskrifter 1961, pp. 28,33.   (Translated by me - A.B.).

2. "_Fact, value and ideology_" in _British Analytical Philosophy,_ ed. A. Montefiore a.B. Williams, p.198.

3. _Op. cit.,_ p.88.

R. Bambrough expresses the relation in a simple formula, asserting that "both Hare and Sartre insist that we _fashion_ our values and do not _find_ them".[1]

This picture of the ethical conceptions of existentialism and analytical philosophy as in certain respects identical might, of course, be true, despite the analysts' light-hearted dismissal of existentialism. It might be that the analysts have simply misunderstood existentialism, and that they are really "cousins", united in a common anti-essentialism. Anti-essentialism is, indeed, a common factor in both views, and it cannot be denied that this causes a striking similarity between utterances from both sides, not only as far as ethics is concerned.

What we want to question is the legitimacy of taking this similarity on its face value. Considering that the anti-essentialist conception of the existentialists has a different origin and purpose from that of the analysts, we might be entitled to ask whether the picture of their ethical conceptions, referred to above, is true. Or, rather, whether this is the whole of the picture. It might be that crucial elements of the existentialist conception is left out.

1. "Moral Scepticism and Moral Knowledge", in Common Factor, 1/1954, pp.5f.

In order to be able to see the bearing of existentialism
upon ethics we have to consider as a whole the basic line of thought
of the existentialists[1], and since there are great differences
between them, some of the most important of the existentialists
even refusing to be called "existentialists", we find it most
adequate to study some of the existentialists separately.

A. Analysis and Evaluation in Martin HEIDEGGER.

M. Heidegger's intention is from the very beginning[2] to ask
the "neglected" question what Being ("Sein") really is.   His aim
is thus to elaborate an ontology, a "fundamental ontology".

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1.   None of them has written anything on ethics in particular,
      if we by that are thinking of anything like a textbook of the
      traditional kind.   The following is, therefore, intended to
      trace the ethical implications, if any, of their thinking in
      general.

2.   See Heidegger's statement on p.1 of Sein und Zeit, 1927,
      hereafter referred to as S.Z.   Quotations are translated by the
      present writer,from the 6th edition, 1949.   This is because, in
      writing this chapter, I have been working from the original,
      where so much depends on Heidegger's original use of language.
      But it does not necessarily indicate any substantial disagreement
      with John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson in their translation
      of the work ("Being and Time", London, S.C.M. 1962).   It should
      be noted that the various German editions of S.Z. differ slightly
      with regard to pagination.

The method which Heidegger wants to employ is called, by Heidegger himself, "phenomenology"[1] This does not, in Heidegger's terminology, mean that he distinguishes between the "phenomena" and an eventual "noumenal" world behind them, as Kant does. It is rather a question of a "disclosure of essence" ("Wesensschau"), whereby we can apprehend the essential Being of being ("Sein des Seienden")[2], or the meaning of Being ("Sinn des Seins")[3].

In order to reach this goal Heidegger want to investigate the being which we ourselves are, man's "Being-there" ("Dasein"). It is important to notice that it is no anthropological, biological or psychological study Heidegger wants to make. What he is concerned with is the fundamental structure of man's Being, not its actual appearance under different circumstances.

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1. Cf. S.Z., pp. 27ff.

2. It will be seen that we translate the substantive "Sciendes" by the noun "being", not with "entity" (Macquarrie-Robinson), because it preserves the connection with the participle "being" and also with "Being" as a translation of the substantive "Sein".

3. Heidegger's background is E. Husserl's "phenomenology", i.e. the method by means of which he, through abstraction from the actual, concrete reality of the phenomena, thought it possible to grasp their essence or idea. But, unlike Husserl, Heidegger, who wants to inquire into Being itself, cannot leave the question of existence outside his phenomenological consideration.

This means that the study is "ontological", not "ontic".[1] This corresponds again to the distinction between the "existentialia" ("Existenzialien"), i.e. the structural characteristics of human Being, and the existential ("existenzielle"), i.e. the actual, contingent, realization of the fundamental structure in men's lives.[2]

This choice of man's Being-there as subject for the analysis with a view to grasping Being is not accidental. To approach Being we have to address our question about the Being of being to a specific being. In this respect a being which asks the question of Being has a pre-eminence.

That is to say, Being-there, which can be ascribed to men only, is distinguished ontically, not only by the fact that it is unique to human beings, but also by the fact that, in its Being, it is concerned with Being itself. This Being, with which Being-there is concerned in its Being, is called "existence". "The 'essence' of Being-there lies in its existence". Thus it follows that "existence" is the name of the specific mode of Being of Being-there. Existence is a "possibility ... (sc. for Being-there) of being itself or not itself".[3]

1.   Cf. S.Z., pp.45ff.
2.   Cf. e.g., S.Z., p.295.
3.   Cf. S.Z., pp.41ff.

In his attempt to understand what Being-there is Heidegger tries to dispose entirely of the traditional "Cartesian" notion of the world as composed partly of apprehending subjects (res cogitans) and partly of the objects to be apprehended (res extensa). We must not regard subject and object as two forms of Being, existing spatially beside each other and in principle independent of each other. This "dualism" must not, however, be disposed of by man being made a piece of nature. Neither by the spirit being regarded as the only real Being.

Being-there is not a "oneness", but a "duality", an original, indissoluble combination of subject and object, an original "Being-in-the-world". The notion of an apprehending subject, an "I" isolated from the surrounding world, is a misinterpretation of the essence of all real existence. It leads to a "depersonalization", because the person is primarily "agent". Man's "substance" is his "existence" as "Being-in-the-world". His essence is activity, as existing is Being-there not within the confines ("Gehäuse") of consciousness", but "out there" "with" the things encountered in the world. We do not apprehend the things in a disengaged scientificality, but in an acting intercourse with them as utensils ("Zeug").[1]

1. Cf. S.Z., pp. 47ff.

The relation to the Being-there of other men is also something which is originally part of my Being-there ("das jemeinige Dasein"), it is not a thing that I can affirm or deny as it suits me.[1]

It is important to realize that the Being of man is temporal. It is un-secured, thrown towards the future. It is thrown into the "there of Being-there" not in order to be in security, but unavoidably to become. Man's basic attitude towards life is, therefore, the "not-being-at-home" ("das Un-zuhause, die Unheimlichkeit").[2]

This means that the "not-yet", a "continuing inconclusiveness", belongs to the fundamental structure of Being-there, and this is connected with the fact that Being-there as "thrown Being" ("geworfenes Sein") exists "towards its end", that we are thrown towards death as the "end of Being-there". For death is not only the sign of the end of an uncertain future; the unavoidability of

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1. "The Being-in is Being-with the other."
"Being-with determines existentially ('existenzial') Being-there, also when an other is not present and apprehended. The Being-alone of Being-there is also Being-with in the world. ...Being-alone is a deficient mode of Being-with, its possibility is a proof of the latter". S.Z., pp.118,120.

2. Cf. S.Z., p.189.

death means rather that all our Being is a "Being towards its end". "Being-there dies in fact as long as it exists".[1]

The "throwness into death" discloses itself for Being-there in "dread" ("Angst"). This is not the same as fear, i.e. fear for this or that. It is a "fundamental state of mind of Being-there, the disclosure of the fact that Being-there as thrown Being exists towards its end".[2]

Now we must notice, however, that we by nature are apt to try to escape from this fundamental condition of our existence into an "inauthentic existence". We wish to lose ourselves in the many things of everyday life, to dispose of the problems of life by "talk", never taking anything really seriously. This means to lose oneself in the "One" ("Man"), doing or not doing a thing because this is what "One" does, or does not.[3]

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1. S.Z., pp.257ff.

2. S.Z. , p.251.

3. "The 'One'" is here used as a translation of the German "das Man", and it refers to the use in English of "one" as an indefinite pronoun, e.g. in expressions like "one does", "one says".

Even death is thus taken lightly. Its real seriousness is pushed aside by remarks about "all having to die one day" or by curious or anxious interest in what will turn out to be the cause of our death.

This is man's "Fallenness", his running away in front of death. The "One" does not allow the "courage to experience dread for death" to arise.[1]

A return to man's own true self is made possible through the call of conscience. Conscience is the voice of Being-there, and under its call the "One" comes together in itself, reminding me as conscience does that my Being is a "Being towards death". When I die it is not "One" who dies, but my very self. I must take over my-self. That is to say, I must decide, choose to be myself. The call is a call to the "authentic power-to-be-whole of Being-there", to be oneself "in the passionate, factual freedom towards death, conscious of itself in dread, set free from the illusions of the 'One'".[2]

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1. Cf. S.Z., p.254.

2. S.Z., pp. 273, 266.

Conscience does not say anything concrete. "Conscience speaks only and always in the mode of silence."[1] But just thereby I am called back into "the silenced-ness of the existent power-to-be".[2]

Thus we are unmasked as guilty, independent of and preceding every actual single guilt. This is because we are always bound by our throwness and thereby by the emptiness or nothingness which characterizes our Being-there, as Being towards death. "Being-there is guilty as such."[3] Now the point is to see this and in free decision take over this "groundlessness" ("Bodenlosigkeit"). This is authentic existence.

Trying to see what bearing this has upon our previous discussion of the relation between facts and values and of whether value-judgements convey knowledge, we have to bear in mind that Heidegger has not, either in Sein und Zeit or elsewhere, written a

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1.   S.Z., p.273.

2.   S.Z. , p.277.

3.   S.Z. , p.285.

moral philosophy[1].   He is not dealing with the subject in question

for us, at least not explicit.   Thus the scope of his investigation

is not a concrete, moral exposition of human existence (i.e.

"moralisch-existenziell"), but an analysis of its fundamental

structure ("existenziale Analytik").

This means that e.g. the difference between authenticity and

inauthenticity is primarily an ontological difference.[2]   But it

does not exclude the notion of authenticity as also an ontic

possibility.   And so it happens that Sein und Zeit very often is

interpreted, and we should say, rightly so, as "existenzielle

Verkündigung".

Even if Heidegger wants to maintainthat the term "authenticity"

does not signify any moral value or obligation, but simply one

possible way of Being in the world, we venture to object to this

reservation.   It might be difficult to deny that the use of the

name "authentic" of a way of Being, implies that it is the right

way of Being.   The call from conscience to authentic existence is,

on the ontic level, a call to lead the right life.

1.   Cf. the question from Heidegger's young friend just after the
      appearance of Sein und Zeit, "When will you write an Ethics?"
      We might suppose that there was a feeling that Heidegger's thoughts
      had got very much to do with the life of men, - but "what was
      their ethical consequences?"
      See Uber den Humanismus, 1946, p.38.

2.   Cf. Ibidem, p.21.

Of course, conscience does not provide us with a _set_ of moral values, old or new; neither does it necessarily destroy traditional "values", although it might do so with the way men look at these values.   The value, to the recognition of which we are called by conscience, is authentic existence itself, the courageous existence face to face with death and finitude.

The element of evaluation is present even on the ontological level, though not, of course, as a "moral" value (that belongs to the ontic level).   For, as we saw, "authenticity" is primarily the name of an ontological possibility, revealed by "die Existenzialanalyse".

This interpretation of the term "authentic" as evaluative is rendered plausible by Heidegger's own statement:

> "But does there not at the root of the accomplished ontological interpretation of the existence of Being-there, lie a certain ontic notion of authentic existence, an actual ideal of Being-there?   It is in fact so.   This fact must not only not be denied and admitted on compulsion, but it must be understood in its _positive necessity_ which arises out of the thematical object of the investigation. Philosophy will never rule out its 'presuppositions', neither does it admit them, only.   It understands the presuppositions, and unites with them that for which they are presuppositions, to a penetrating display".[1]

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1. _S.Z._, p.310.

Heidegger is quite willing to admit that the fundamental-ontological problem which is here developed, moves in a "circle". This must in fact be so, because all investigation is itself a mode of Being of Being-there. And, in its Being, Being-there has already understood itself in certain "existenzielle Möglichkeiten". Existence is thereby in one way or other, adequately or not, "mitverstanden". I.e., "every ontologically explicit question about the Being of Being-there is already prepared by the mode of Being of Being-there."[1]

Thus, since we do not want to deny a "circle" (Heidegger finds the term inadequate), the case could in a way be described like this: "The idea of existence and Being is as a whole 'presupposed' and 'afterwards' Being-there is interpreted, in order to gain the idea of Being."[2]

We must, however, be careful to notice that this does not mean that the "presupposition" serves as a kind of premiss from which other sentences about the Being of Being-there are deduced by means of the rules of the logic of consequence. This would mean that, to use the terms of the analysts, a deliberate attempt was made to prove the truth of a synthetic proposition by making it true by definition.

1. S.Z., pp.315,312.

2. S.Z., p.314.

But it is equally important to notice that existential analysis cannot either "avoid" a "circle" in the proof, because it does not at all proceed according to the rules of any "logic of consequence". An introduction of this way of speaking is totally alien to this kind of analysis.[1]

The presupposition of the existential analysis in question is rather a preceding understanding which makes the "object" to be interpreted, i.e. Being-there itself get a hearing, so that it can itself decide whether this is the structure of Being which it discloses.[2]

To try to deny the circle, or to avoid it, in order to carry through a strictly scientific investigation, is to block the access to the Being of Being-there. It is itself a mode of Being of Being-there, a confinement, namely, to the prudence of the "One" ("Verständigkeit"). The prudence of the "One" wants to confine itself to the experience of the "factual" being ("Seiende"), not realizing that being ("Seiendes") can only then be "factually" experienced, when Being ("Sein") is already understood.

1.   Cf. SZ., pp.314f.

2.   "...does this pre-supposing have the character of an understanding projection, in such a manner indeed that the interpretation by which such an understanding gets developed, will let that which is to be interpreted put itself into words for the very first time, so that it may decide of its own accord whether, as the entity which it is, it has the state of Being for which it has been disclosed in the projection with regard to its formal aspects?". S.Z., p.314.

"The effort must rather aim at, originally and
totally, leaping into this "circle", in order to
ensure, already from the beginning, the full view of
the circle-like Being of Being-there."[1]

It is also a misconception of the task of an ontological
analysis of Being-there to regard it as confined to a "theoretical
subject", which afterwards has to be completed from the "practical"
point of view by an added "Ethics".[2]

We may thus be justified in holding that, according to Heidegger,
the call to authentic existence arises out of Being-there in a way
which is disclosed by the ontological analysis. An analytic -
philosophical critic will surely find sufficient reason to object
that there must here somewhere lie a surreption, a gliding from an
indicative to the imperative. In other words, a "naturalistic
fallacy".

But, judged as a criticism of Heidegger's intention, this
objection hits off the mark. As it is interpreted by us, and in
our terms, Heidegger's analysis does not infer value judgements
from descriptive statements. The analysis is evaluative from the
very beginning. This does not, however, mean that it is not
descriptive.

1. S.Z., p.314.

2. Cf. S.Z., pp.314f.

This is just the point at issue.   We are here on a level where the separation of description and evaluation is impossible. We do not describe the "facts"[1] if we leave out the evaluative factor, we rather shut ourselves out from them.

It might perhaps deserve further underlining, that this does not imply that Heidegger "fashions his values" (or "his value"). He certainly "finds it".   But this finding is possible only for him who is already evaluatively engaged.   It is only for him Being-there discloses itself.

It might not be inappropriate to characterize this view as "cognitive", from an ethical point of view.   Its value judgement conveys knowledge which claims to be true.

It is, however, more dubitable whether we can apply terms like "theoretical" and "objective" to this apprehension of values.   These terms belong to a mode of discourse which is very different from Heidegger's analysis, and unable to penetrate to Being-there and Being itself.   But this does not bring the view any nearer to that of ethical non-cognitivism.   It rather, if we understand it rightly, widens the gap between them.

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1.   Heidegger uses the term "fact" e.g. in connection with conscience. But "the demand for an 'inductive, empirical proof' of the 'factuality' of the conscience and the legitimacy of its 'voice' rests on an ontological inversion of the phenomenon". S.Z., p.269.

B.   Freedom and Values in J.P. Sartre.

We have seen that the existential analysis of M. Heidegger provides a new context for an understanding of the relation between fact and value, in which they can be seen to be united, and not separated.

What is the picture if we turn to the other main exponent of existentialist philosophy, J.P. Sartre?   Can his work, too, give a contribution to our understanding of the relation between fact and value as a unity?

To many it would seem obvious that this could not be the case. For it is first of all some striking passages in the works of Sartre which have given rise to the opinion that there is a great similarity between the ethical thought of the analysts and some features of the thoughts of the existentialists.

Speaking of the ethical implications of his philosophy in L'Etre et le Neant[1] he puts his view in a way which immediately leaps to the eye as equally representative of the ethics of the successors of Hume: "Ontology itself can not formulate ethical precepts.   It is concerned solely with what is, and we cannot possibly derive

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1.   L'Etre et le Neant, 1943. Hereafter referred to as E.N.   The quotations are from the English translation, 1957, Being and Nothingness.   Here pp.625f.

imperatives from ontology's indicatives".   We are "condemned to

be free", and have to create our own values.

This seems to come very near to what R.M. Hare is saying.

For him, too, "freedom" is a very important concept, though he is

dealing with it only in so far as it is a feature of our use of

moral language.   The "gap" between factual statements and

judgements of value, between indicatives and imperatives, is the

freedom of which Hare is speaking as a linguistic philosopher.

"Freedom" is thus a linguistic logical concept, whatever else

it might also be.   It says that neither language nor logic can

provide any necessary link between a set of factual premisses and

a certain moral conclusion, and that we cannot therefore be forced

by our moral concepts to make a particular value judgement in a

given case.

To form a moral conclusion means, for language reasons, to

make a free decision of how one wants to use the moral term in

question.   The only limit to this freedom is the demand for

logical consistency.

Is it, then, the same, or a related use of the term "freedom"

which occurs in the thoughts of J-P.Sartre?   To see whether this

is in fact so, we have, to some extent, to study the use of the

concept in Sartre's thought as a whole.

Sartre's starting point in E.N. is an analysis of the phenomenon. Not of language, as it was for Hare, for instance.

The first step in this analysis is the reduction of the phenomenon to the series of appearances through which it manifests itself[1]. That means an abolition of the Kantian concept of the phenomenon as "Erscheinung" with a "Ding an sich" behind. The phenomenon is what appears. It exists qua appearance[2].

This is not to say that the being of the appearance is its appearing. This would only mean Berkeley's "Esse est percipi", put in a new way. And Sartre's intention is not to maintain a Berkeleyan idealism.

On the contrary, rather, Sartre holds that the appearances of the phenomenon from an ontological point of view demands a being which is not itself an appearance, but something transphenomenal[3].

We arrive at this transphenomenal being by going backwards from the perception to the perceiving subject. The "percipi" refers to a percipiens. This subject is not itself perceived or experienced, it simply is. The being of the percipiens is "consciousness". This is what Sartre also calls "being for-itself", or simply the "for-itself"

1. Cf. E.N., p.xlv.
2. Cf. E.N., p.l.
3. Cf. E.N., p.lvii.

("le pour-soi"). In consciousness Sartre sees a being which is not itself subject to knowledge, but which founds it.

Now Sartre holds (following Husserl) that consciousness is always consciousness of something. This does not mean that consciousness is constitutive of the being of its objects, but that consciousness in its nature is a relation to a transcendent being. ("Transcendent" does not here mean "transcending the empirical world", but "transcending consciousness".) That is, from this statement about consciousness we can infer that there is another form of being. "Consciousness implies in its being a non-conscious and transphenomenal being"[1].

> "To say that consciousness is consciousness of something is to say that it must produce itself as a revealed-revelation of a being which is not it and which gives itself as already existing when consciousness reveals it".[2]

Sartre holds that Heidegger's definition of Dasein could be applied to consciousness as well, but it would have to be completed: "Consciousness [Dasein, resp.] is a being such that in its being, its being is in question [this is where Heidegger stops] in so far as this being implies a being other than itself"[3].

1. E.N., p.1.

2. Ibidem.

3. Ibidem.

It must be stressed that this being is the transphenomenal being of the phenomena. It is no noumenal being which is hidden behind the phenomena. It simply means that the "being of that which appears does not exist only in so far as it appears. The transphenomenal being of what exists for consciousness is itself in itself".[1] Hence the name "being in-itself", or the "in-self" ("le en-soi") as the name of the being of all that is not consciousness.

A crucial point in the thoughts of Sartre is the assertion that non-being has objective existence[2]. The existence of non-being can be shown in the following way: Questioning a being about its way of being or about its being we will get a reply which is a "yes" or a "no". (Even if the question on the face of it does not permit a negative reply, a negative reply in one form or another is still always possible.) Indeed, what distinguishes the question from affirmation or negation is just the existence of these two contradictory and equally objective possibilities.

Thus, while in pursuit of being, we suddenly find that the very question about being shows that we are "encompassed with nothingness".

1.   Ibidem.

2.   Cf. E.N., p.5.

"The permanent possibility of non-being, outside and
within, conditions our question about being. Furthermore
it is non-being which is going to limit the reply. That
being will be must of necessity arise on the basis of what
it is not. Whatever being is, it will allow this formulation:
"Being is that and outside of that, nothing."[1]

The means by which consciousness, or being for-itself,

constitutes itself, is a nihilation (neantisation) of the in-itself,

and what is in itself is not only external objects, but also the

for-itself's own past.

"For the for-itself, to be is to nihilate the in-itself
which it is. Under these conditions freedom can be nothing
other than this nihilation. It is through this that the
for-itself escapes its being as its essence; it is through
this that the for-itself is always something other than what
can be said of it. For in the final analysis the for-itself
is the one which escapes this very denomination, the one which
is already beyond the name which is given to it, beyond the
property which is recognized in it. To say that the
for-itself has to be what it is, to say that it is what it is
not while not being what it is, to say that in it existence
precedes and conditions essence ... all this is to say one and
the same thing: to be aware that man is free. Indeed, by
the sole fact that I am conscious of the causes which inspire
my action, these causes are already transcendent objects for
my consciousness; they are outside. In vain shall I seek
to catch hold of them; I escape them by my very existence.
I am condemned to exist forever beyond my essence, beyond the
causes and motives of my act. I am condemned to be free.
This means that no limits to my freedom can be found except
freedom itself, or, if you prefer, that we are not free to
cease being free. To the extent that the for-itself wishes
to hide its own nothingness from itself and to incorporate the
in-itself as its true mode of being, it is trying also to hide
its freedom from itself".[2]

1.   E.N., p.5.

2.   E.N., p.440.

This means that the things have no stability or identity. They can be "anything". Their appearance of stability and identity is something we have attributed to them. Neither is there any constant human nature which forms the basis of the individuals. There is only an absolute free consciousness. It is this free consciousness which attributes meaning to the contingent existence. Because existence is there without any reason, without our possibility of saying _why_ it is. This means that anything can happen, there is no pattern, no rule or set of rules.

There are, then, no rules for our conduct, no moral norms or standards, and no values, in the pursuit of which we could decide on how we ought to act. We have to create our own values and decide on our own rules, with no assistance from anything outside _or inside_ ourselves.

The Sartrean existentialism is definitely atheistic[1] and this is significant for Sartre's conception of values. If God _did_ exist, there would still be a possibility of finding values which were valid a priori, God being the infinite and perfect consciousness that could think these values.

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1. See _L'Existentialisme est un humanisme_, 1946.
   English translation, _Existentialism and Humanism_, 1948, pp.33f.

But as it is, there are only _men_ upon the plane where we are now.

The situation pictured by Dostoievsky, saying that, "if God did not exist, everything would be permitted", is indeed our situation. This is the all-determining starting point for Sartre's thinking. No divine will can, according to Sartre, provide us with any values or commands which could legitimize our behaviour.

No deterministic theory can be established, which could explain our action by referring to a human nature in general, or to any special physical or psychical nature, to influence from the surrounding society, or to anything else.

Sartre is in this connection almost mocking at the French secular morality of the last decades of the 19th century, which was built on the assumption that nothing would be changed if God did not exist. For certain moral values had still their a priori existence in an intelligible heaven[1].

The meaning of the phrases "Man _is_ freedom", and "Man is condemned to be free"[2], is that man is thrown into the world, he did not create himself. And at the same time he is totally responsible for all he is doing. He is forced to act and thereby to create rules which claim to have universal validity. In so far as morality

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1. See E.H. p.33.

2. E.H. ., p.34.

is a matter of creation and invention it can be compared to the work of art. The artist does not work according to any pre-established aesthetic values. He creates his picture, and the values appear when the work is done.[1]

But, as we saw, in his moral activity man is not only acting for himself and creating his own rules. He is in fact saying that the law he invents is binding for all mankind, and man is further responsible for all the effects of his choices and actions.

There is in all this no possible justification for what man is doing. No explanation, no excuse can be given for man's choice of values, for his actions. Passion is no explanation for man's actions either. For man is responsible for his own passion.

This means that all questions of morality and values belong to the ontic level exclusively, i.e. they deal only with that which is created by man alone. On the ontological plane there is nothing to be said of values. We could, therefore, characterize Sartre's view by saying that, according to him, there is no ontological basis whatever for our values and actions.

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1. See E.N., p.49.
    Cf. the situation of Sartre's pupil who, during the war, sought Sartre's advice, whether he should stay in France and help his mother, or go to England and join the Free French forces. The student could not get any other answer than the one, that he had to invent his own law. No established rules could possibly help him. Cf. E.N. pp.35ff.

Man experiences this unlimited freedom of his in _anguish_.
Anguish is man's sense of complete and profound responsibility[1],
when he realizes that he has to act as a legislator for the whole
of mankind, without having the least proof that he has the right
to do so, and without any reason for the choice of values which
he makes.[2]

Man is always free. He has no means by which he can escape
freedom. But man has, nevertheless, a desire to try and run away
from the anguish which he experiences when he realizes his freedom.
He tries, therefore, to conceal his freedom, and actually the
contingency of all existence.

He may try to rationalize contingency and give unity to the
manifold by means of laws of science. But the world of science
is itself arbitrary, constructed in order to make it possible for
man to escape from a totally arbitrary process.

Man manages by means of magic, i.e. merely by pronouncing
certain words, to decide that there are constant objects, absolute
and unchangeable norms. And he may try and lay a more solid
foundation for his magic by building a metaphysic. That is, he
gives life to a higher world by means of concepts which are, in
fact, empty. Man does all this in order to hide the nothingness
of all there is.

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1.   Cf. E.H., p.30.

2.   Cf. E.H., p.31.

As far as man's actions are concerned, all attempts to explain them in terms of a causal relationship between motives and actions are "bad faith", or self-deception ("mauvaise foi").

Determinism is an instance of this bad faith. It denies the break caused by the nihilating activity of consciousness. What it wants to establish in ourselves is a continuity without break of existence-in-itself.

This takes place, psychologically, when one tries to regard reasons and motives as things, when one takes them as constants. One would like to convince oneself that the motive of one's action is what it was. Because the motive could then pass from one's past consciousness to one's present, retaining its full force. In this case it would inhabit consciousness. But this is equivalent to giving essence to being for-itself.

Man is, however, free just because he is not "itself". A being which is what it is, would not be free. Freedom is just the nothingness which is created in man, and which compels him to create himself, instead of being. As we saw[1], for man to be is to choose oneself, because nothing comes to man from without, nor from within.

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1. Cf. E.N., p.440.

e are thus, by the nihilating activity of the for-itself, separated from what is in itself. Therefore we are free, and this freedom remains until death reaches us and puts an end to all the possibilities which lie in the nihilating activity of the for-itself. Only when we die can we become something which is in itself, for then consciousness cannot any longer prevent our becoming identical with ourselves, and others may make pure objects of us.

The conception of death in Sartre's thoughts is interesting in its marked difference from Heidegger's conception of it. Their views may be put briefly like this: for Heidegger the centre of interest lies in death: Death is the source of dread and to exist in authenticity means, therefore, to choose to face death, in the meaning of choosing to "allow the dread for death to arise". While for Sartre it is choice itself (or self-transcendence) which is the primary necessity. Hence it is the necessity of deciding which causes anguish. So that, for Sartre, authentic existence means to choose face to face with death (not, as for Heidegger, to choose to face death).

A main characteristic of being for-itself is, as Sartre sees it, a desire to try and put an end to the nothingness that it is. It wishes to stop nihilating the in-itself, but at the same time it does not want to cease being free consciousness.

Thus the fundamental incentive in the self-transcendence of the for-itself is an incentive to unite that which is for itself with what is in itself. But this incentive will never lead to the goal, because it is self-contradictory.

In this incentive, however, lies the basis of values. The highest value is just this impossible union of the for-itself and the in-itself.

The idea of a conscious being in-itself, i.e. the idea of the perfect, is the idea of God.

> "The fundamental value which presides over this project (scil. of the for-itself) is exactly the in-itself-for-itself, that is, the ideal of a consciousness which would be the foundation of its own being-in-itself by the pure consciousness which it would have of itself. It is this ideal which can be called God. Thus the best way to conceive of the fundamental project of human reality is to say that man is the being whose project is to be God. ...God, value and supreme end of transcendence, represents the permanent limit in terms of which man makes known to himself what he is".[1]

But to say that God exists, is to express a self-contradictory sentence. Man's effort to become God is, therefore, in vain.

Because the effort of the for-itself is a vain effort to realize itself as conscious being in-itself, it can attempt to do this in a countless number of ways. Man is, therefore, the source of his own set of values, of his own moral law. There is no "human nature" which forces us to act in a certain way. What

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1.   E.N., p.566.

we do, is done in complete freedom.

Man is thus responsible in an absolute sense. We are also responsible for our own situation. Man creates his own historical situation through his choice of a goal for history.

It seems obvious, that a view which makes values subject to a personal choice, and thereby declares one value as good as any other, opens for a nihilism.

Already in E.N. however, Sartre makes some reservations against this consequence, even if it is only interrogatorily.

> "But ontology and existential psychoanalysis ... must reveal to the moral agent that he is the being by whom values exist. It is then that his freedom will become conscious of itself and will reveal itself in anguish as the unique source of value and the nothingness by which the world exists. As soon as freedom discovers the quest for being and the appropriation of the in-itself as its own possibles, it will apprehend by and in anguish that they are possibles only on the ground of the possibility of other possibles. But hitherto although possibles could be chosen and rejected ad libitum, the theme which made the unity of all choices of possibles was the value or the ideal presence of the ens causa sui. What will become of freedom if it turns its back upon this value? ... Will freedom by the very fact that it apprehends itself as a freedom in relation to itself, be able to put an end to the reign of this value?
> In particular is it possible for freedom to take itself for a value as the source of all value, or must it necessarily be defined in relation to a transcendent value which haunts it? ...
> In particular will freedom by taking itself for an end escape all situation? ...
> Or will it situate itself so much the more precisely and the more individually as it projects itself further in anguish as conditioned freedom and accepts more fully its responsibility as an existent by whom the world comes into being"[1]

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1. E.N., pp. 627f.

These are questions which belong to the area of ethical problems, says Sartre, and can only get their answer there. Sartre promises to undertake the task of treating them in a separate work which has not yet appeared.

Virtually, however, Sartre may be said to have answered his questions. His line of thought becomes quite clear, for instance and above all in E.H. While earlier, as we have seen, the effort of consciousness to reach a certain perfection was the supreme value, _freedom_ is now definitely this value.

Freedom is not (any more) only a characteristic of consciousness, without value implications. It is itself a value to be realized by man.

Sartre uses great effort to refute the accusation of subjectivism. The free choice what to do is no subjective caprice. It is not true that it does not matter what I do. Even if there are no a priori values which I choose, it matters very much what I do. For my choice "involves mankind in its entirety"[1]. The one _obligation_ I am under, is, therefore, to _choose_.

> "For, when I confront a real situation ... I am obliged to choose my attitude to it"[2].

I.e., to say that I must make a free choice, is not just to utter a descriptive statement, but to express an obligation as well.

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1. E.H., p.48.

2. Ibidem.

Further, it is not true, Sartre says, that he cannot judge others in their choice.

Certainly, he cannot judge a man's choice on the basis of a validity of certain purposes rather than others, but he can judge his sincerity[1].

First, this has a logical side: If a man tries to deceive himself by hiding the fact that his situation is one of "free choice without excuse and without help", taking "refuge behind the excuse of his passions, or by inventing some deterministic doctrine", I might judge his procedure as erroneous.

The same applies if a man says that certain values are incumbent upon him. This is simply contradictory to saying that he wills these values.

But the judgement of others has a moral side as well.

> "I can pronounce a moral judgement. For I declare that freedom, in respect of concrete circumstances, can have no other end and aim but itself; and when once a man has seen that values depend upon himself, in that state of forsakenness he can will only one thing, and that is freedom as the foundation of all values. That does not mean that he wills it in the abstract: it simply means that the actions of men of good faith have, as their ultimate significance, the quest of freedom itself as such. ... We will freedom for freedom's sake, and in and through particular circumstances. And in thus willing freedom we discover that it depends entirely

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1.   See E.H., pp. 50f.

upon the freedom of others and that the freedom of others depends upon our own"[1].

And it is important to notice the inference which Sartre

makes in the following passage:

whether he ought to stay with his mother or join the Free Fre
"Consequently, when I recognize, as entirely authentic,
that man is a being whose existence precedes his essence,
and that he is a free being who cannot, in any circumstances,
but will his freedom, at the same time I realise that will
to freedom which is implied in freedom itself, I can form
judgements upon those who seek to hide from themselves the
wholly voluntary nature of their existence and its complete
freedom".[2]

So, although man can nowhere find any specific rules or values

imposed upon him, this is not, according to Sartre, all there is to

say about it.

"Thus, although the content of morality is variable,
a certain form of this morality is universal".[3]

In this connection Sartre again mentions the student who asked

whether he ought to stay with his mother or join the Free French

forces.   We have no means of judging the content of his choice.

The content is always concrete, and therefore unpredictable; it

has always to be invented.   "The one thing that counts, is to know

whether the invention is made in the name of freedom".   (the

sentence underlined by me).[4]

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1.   E.H., p.52.

2.   Ibidem.

3. Ibidem.

4. E.H., p.53.

In other contexts Sartre is even inclined to deduce certain political consequences of the notion of freedom as the supreme value. This relation, or any relation at all, between freedom and particular realizations of this value need not concern us here. That is of importance from our point of view is that Sartre quite clearly seems to think that he can say what he says about freedom as value, on the basis of his ontological analysis.

That is to say, even if the value of freedom is not based upon the "essence" of man, or upon a universal human "nature", it is still based upon a "human universality of <u>condition</u>"[1]. It is based upon the characteristic of consciousness, that, namely of being free consciousness.

If this interpretation of what Sartre says, explicitly or implicitly, is correct, we might say that from one point of view freedom is a necessary human condition. But from another point of view this necessary human condition is itself a <u>demand</u>, namely, that we shall assume it.

And above[2] we saw that Sartre in the end seems to derive his right to judge those who refuse to assume their freedom, from the fact that man is a being whose existence precedes his essence.

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1. <u>E.H.</u>, p.46.

2. Cf. the quotation from <u>E.H.</u>, p.52. above pp. 195f.

It might be easy, of course, to say that Sartre makes a surreptitious inference, that it is simply (deliberately or unconsciously) by a twist of the hand that he manages to turn the descriptive term "freedom" into an evaluative one.

But is this a fair description of Sartre's case? Is it not much more the case that these two aspects are present, more or less, all the time? Is there not already an element of evaluation in the statement that freedom is recognized in anguish? Why not rather in total indifference, for instance?

It seems that in a way an anti-essentialism like that of Sartre ends with a certain contradiction of its own starting point. The old "ideas" and "essences" are abandoned. But in the end we meet with a new idea, or set of ideas, and new essences (even if these are terms that Sartre and others holding the same views would not accept).

This does not necessarily mean that Sartre has left his original way of thinking. It might be that all existentialist thinking must necessarily stand in a paradoxical relation to its own starting point (as Kierkegaard was also aware of: "I think, therefore I am not"). I.e., thinking is hardly possible if we should practice a consequent anti-essentialism.

And must we not understand this "in its positive necessity" (to borrow Heidegger's expression used in a partly different connection). Thus we might be able to understand how the notion of freedom as virtually an a priori value can occur in a kind of thinking like that of J. -P. Sartre.

This means, to return to the comparison between Sartre and R.M. Hare, for instance, that there is certainly an agreement in so far as both hold that man is the author of his own set of moral values. These values have no validity of their own. This is man's freedom as a moral agent.

The crucial point is, however, that for R.M. Hare this is a feature of our language, and that the failure to notice this freedom is a mistake (that is at least all he can say as a philosopher). For Sartre on the other hand freedom is a feature of the human condition, and itself a demand, so that the refusal to accept this freedom in the utmost sincerity makes man subject to a moral judgement.

Freedom is not only the formal side of morality, even if Sartre himself seems to want to say this of his view. What Sartre judges in a person who disguises his freedom, is the lack of sincerity, and even if sincerity cannot justify a certain choice, is it not a substantial part of any choice which is made in its name?

Thus we think it can be said that existentialism as a whole opens up a new way of looking at the problem of fact and value. It suggests a new context in which moral language can be analysed and in which fact and value can be understood as a unity. For it would seem that the possible unity of fact and value resides somehow in man's existential relation to the world.

Therefore it is not true that existentialism is in ultimate agreement with analytical philosophy in the latter's separation of fact and value. It is more true to say that there is some affinity between existentialism and that feature of R.M. Hare's thought which was indicated by his concept of "blik".

To say that existentialism suggests a possible new way of looking at the relation between fact and value does not necessarily mean, however, that we accept existentialism as a whole in any of its forms, let alone that it should be considered as excluding all other forms of thinking.

What we maintain is that existentialism points to an element which we must take account of in our thinking and which might have a bearing particularly on the understanding of our problem.

The existential and ontological dimension of theological language.
John Macquarrie.

One writer who had developed elements of existentialist

thought more systematically within the wider context of

reasoned discourse is John Macquarrie.   His work is worth dealing

with in some detail, because of the quite direct way in which it

relates to our problem.[1]

Influenced, in thought and terminology, by contemporary

existentialist philosophy he argues that all discourse expresses

existence or "being-in-the-world"[2].   That existence is "being-in-

the-world" means that it is always "self and world together".[3]

Macquarrie admits that

"... it is always possible to dim down whatever belongs to
the side of the self, or to personal being, such as feeling,
volition, value-judgement, concern and so on, so that the
self remains as a mere point, a cognitive subject which
stands over against its object.   ...   The spectator does
not express 'total existence'.   What finds expression in
his utterance is simply a report of the 'objective facts's.
These, in turn, are obviously never more than an
abstraction from 'total existence', that is to say, from

1.   This is the case first of all with his book God-talk, 1967,
      and it is with that book we shall be dealing in this chapter.

2.   Cf. Ibidem, p.71.

3.   Cf. Ibidem, p.70.

the full range of being-in-the-world"[1].

But, holding that existence is always self and world together, Macquarrie stresses that "even in discourse where the mode of expression abstracts most from the self, some element of concern and evaluation cannot be entirely absent"[2]. In support of this view he refers to the argument of Michael Polanyi, who insists "that there is a personal factor in all knowing, and that even scientific understanding involves personal participation, without thereby becoming merely subjective"[3].

And Heidegger, comparing two other kinds of discourse, is quoted as saying that "mathematics is not more rigorous than historiology, but only narrower, because the existential foundations relevant for it lie within a narrower range"[4].

It is Macquarrie's view, as it is ours, that the fatal thing occurs only when these more abstract kinds of discourse ("abstract") because they abstract from the full range of existence) are absolutized, and when it is presupposed that they show us all that there "really is". This is what happens e.g. when language which

1.   Ibidem., p.69.

2.   Ibidem, p.70.

3.   Ibidem.

4.   Ibidem, p.71.

claims to express total existence is considered to have only

emotive or subjective meaning, and no cognitive significance.

Insofar as language is concerned with understanding it is

always, Macquarrie thinks, representing something. That is to

say, it stands for some person or thing or state of affairs that

is pointed at or referred to. Now, there might be different

modes of representation. What we are doing in "abstract" discourse

is to restrict the representation to universal and objective

characteristics, such as size, mass, shape and the like.

But there are other modes of representation, "in which we

seek to represent what we are talking about in the most concrete

way, including such characteristics as may be at least partly

dependent on our own relation to what we are talking about".[1]

These modes might speak of e.g. beauty, Macquarrie says, and they

might presumably speak of moral values as well.

How, then, do we become aware of these characteristics that

we seek to represent in value language, for instance? ("Value

language" being our expression, not Macquarrie's).

Macquarrie thinks that we cannot abandon the concept of

intuition in this context. He holds that intuition is

1. Ibidem., p.73.

indispensable in all discourse, or rather as a relation underlying all discourse. Discourse is communication, and for it to be possible there must be "more direct and fundamental relations than the mediate one of language between the speaker and the two other terms of the discourse situation" (i.e. the person to whom is spoken, and that of which it is spoken)[1].

This intuition is the same as man's openness in his being-in-the-world.

Macquarrie claims that this intuition cannot be restricted to the perception of objects through sense experience. There is another kind of intuition. What he has in mind is what the existentialists have called "affective states", such as anxiety.

> "These affective states too are intuitions, disclosing existence in the world, and making accessible structures that can be brought to expression in language. These structures are not like the objects intuited through the senses, but we might claim that they are of an even more fundamental kind, since they have to do with what we have called 'total existence", and embrace both subject and object. But for this reason, they can never be objectified, and we are aware of them only through participation".[2]

It is our opinion that nothing in this argument hangs on the actual terms "anxiety" and "being-in-the-world" and other parts of the terminological apparatus which Macquarrie has got from the existentialists.

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1. Ibidem, p.76.

2. Ibidem,

What he has laid hold on is the fact that there are structures of reality which we can become aware of through intuition, but which are not demonstrable like the observable objects of sense perception, because they belong to the relation between subject and object.

That is to say, there are modes of awareness which are neither purely subjective nor purely objective, because they disclose situations in which we ourselves are involved, and which therefore have a "comprehensive" character (the term is Karl Jasper's).[1]

It is within this framework that we must seek an understanding of theological language.

Therefore, e.g. the emotive theory of the meaning of theological language will not do, according to Macquarrie. This theory is really a prejudgement of the case, and against such prejudgements,

> "... it must be maintained that ... the affective
> states or moods that we have talked about, ... afford
> disclosures of existence which, just as much as what is
> disclosed in sensuous intuition, have some cognitive
> significance that can be brought to expression; though
> admittedly the mode of expression will be more complex
> than what is involved in pointing to the observable but
> not very exciting fact that *the cat sits on the mat'. ...
> Theological language does not convey subjective
> impressions from one mind to another, still less does it
> convey scraps of metaphysical information. Rather,
> through expression and representation it interprets and

1.   Cf. Ibidem, p.81.

lights up a shared existence at the deepest levels"[1].

It is clear that in such a theory of theological language a kind of realism as opposed to nominalism is presupposed. Macquarrie explicitly protests against what he calls "A thoroughgoing nominalism", without being willing to identify his view with that of any of the schools that have been opposed to nominalism. It might have been more adequate of him to come out openly on the side of realism in these matters.

Be that as it may, the contents of his view in this respect is that names, and that means all names, have, or originally had, "existential connotations"[2].

Words in discourse carry with them associations which are not to be regarded merely as emotional obscurations of the "true" or "precise" significations of the words. The erroneous view that names are mere labels is the result of an abstraction. The truth is that because of their connotations words have a certain interpretative power, which is "just as basic and essential a function of names as their capacity to refer to objects". This interpretative power means a power to light up meaning[3].

1. Ibidem, pp.82f.

2. Cf. Ibidem, p.90.

3. Cf. Ibidem, p.93.

Now, the distinction between the denotations of a word and its connotations is related to the distinction between different modes of discourse, which we have discussed earlier.

> "... it would appear that in some modes of discourse the denotation of names is of primary importance, whereas in other modes their connotation plays a major part. Generally speaking, scientific language is interested in denotation; each name must refer as precisely as possible to some referend in the observable world. In other modes of discourse - not only theology, but also history, poetry, and many other subjects and everyday ways of talking - the existential or intuitive connotations of words are of great importance for the understanding of the discourse. ... in the first, words refer to objects; in the second, ... they express situations which belong to what we have called "total existence". ... with a word like "water", something approaching an abstract, impersonal, denotative use is possible .... But how does it stand with such a name as 'love'? Can it have any significance for a person who has not participated in the experience of loving or of being loved?"[1]

What is really intended in words like "thought", "memory" and "love" is something that cannot be seen or described by a neutral observer, i.e. it is known only through participation in acts of thinking, remembering, loving and so on. What these words want to express is, in other words, unobservable experiences[2].

Is it, then, the case that theological language has no point of reference beyond the experience itself? Could the experience

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1.   Ibidem., p.94.

2.   Cf. Ibidem, pp. 95f.

which is referred to, after all be described more or less

adequately as "only subjective"?

This is clearly not Macquarrie's view. The experience in

question is not only an experience as such, but an experience

of something.

> "If we explore the various items in the distinctly
> theological vocabulary, I think that somewhere among their
> connotations we are always pointed to the experience of
> God. This would be true even of names that stand for
> physical objects used in Christian worship" (e.g. the altar)[1].

And to the word "God" an ontological dimension is

indispensable[2]. Macquarrie explicitly rejects the various attempts

to account for the meaning of theological language without their

accepting that it has any "transcendent" reference. We must take

seriously that it claims to deal with the "knowledge of God".[3]

An investigation of our "affective intuitions" by a kind of

"existential phhnomenology" might, Macquarrie thinks, accord to

them a "transsubjective validity". That is, we might be able to

reach the ontological dimension where we are speaking of "transhuman

realities"[4].

1. Ibidem., p.98.

2. Cf. Ibidem, p.100.

3. Cf. Ibidem, pp.109?.

4. Cf. Ibidem, pp.237, 239.

"... theology is commonly understood to be more than a
psychology of religion and faith is more than a state
of mind. Theology claims some kind of transsubjective
validity for the experiences which belong to the life of
faith. In particular, God and Christ are regarded not
merely as elements in human experience, but as standing
independently over against man. Certainly, theologians
of many different persuasions have often declared that
we do not know God as he is in himself, but only as he
relates himself to us. But they have never intended by
this to imply that God is nothing but a factor in human
experience"[1].

Speaking of theologians who have used a "language of existence"

(Schleiermacher, Otto, Herrmann, Bultmann) Macquarrie admits that

the most vulnerable parts of their theories are the parts where

they seek to establish that the Christian experience of God is

founded in a reality which transcends the human consciousness.

"Frankly, I do not suppose there is any way in which
one could prove that the assertions of faith and of
theology do refer to a Reality (God) that is independent
of and prior to the experiences which we call "experiences
of God". In order to prove that there is an encounter
with a real Other, one would somehow need to get behind the
experience, or find a second route to that which we know in
the experience, and this is not possible. Yet on the
other hand the conviction that there is a real Other in this
experience is extremely deep-rooted".[2]

1. Ibidem, , p.242.

2. Ibidem, p.244.

That there is no such second route to the reality of God seems in fact to be part of the very meaning of the word "faith"[1].

When we have given so much space to a discussion of Macquarrie's views it is not because we want to take up the whole problem of the meaning of theological language, which is Macquarrie's topic. Neither is it because we think that what we have quoted or referred to in Macquarrie's work is adequate or sufficient in every respect as an account of the meaning of theological language. Our topic is the meaning of value language, or moral language in particular. And we are drawing attention to Macquarrie's thoughts because, no matter how inconclusive in some respects, they express some important truths about language in general and, by way of a pointer, about theological language in particular, which bring us nearer to an understanding of value language and its relation to language in general and to theological language in particular.

That there are close affinities, at least, between value language and theological language, as Macquarrie conceives of it,

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1. Ibidem., p.246.
   Here Macquarrie says that "faith" means that there can be no "certitude" in these matters. In this respect he is wrong. "Faith" in the Christian context means rather "certitude without external proofs".

seems obvious.   We believe it to be true that, whatever more should be said about it, theological language intends to deal with a reality (God), which stands over against man, but which cannot be experienced apart from an intuition which implies participation. and which cannot, accordingly, be expressed without a language which implies participation.   That is to say, in theological language we are speaking of transhuman realities, but only "as they impinge upon us".[1]

This is where the value aspects come into the picture.   Part of what is intuited in the experience of the reality of God is that it has a value character, that is, that it exerts a claim upon me, and what is expressed in theological language is therefore a recognition of and an acceptance of this claim.

This might not be far from what Macquarrie is saying explicitly.

> "The ontological dimension of the word 'God' is indispensable to it ... but as the word is used in religion, it implies an existential just as much as an ontological dimension.   ...   The Being encountered is not an object of which we can talk in a disinterested way, but the Being in which we live and move and have our being.   So too, religious discourse is always of God in his relation to us. When we talk of God, we talk at the same time of ourselves. The word 'God' does not just signify Being, but also implies an evaluation of Being, a commitment to Being as Holy Being, Being that is gracious and judging.   This [is the] existential or evaluating dimension of the word 'God' ...

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1.   Cf. Ibidem., p.239.

The name of 'God' is not a disinterested label for Being
or Reality or any remote abstraction, but connotates our
existential concern with Being.   In Tillich's language,
God is both Being itself and ultimate concern".[1]

And, referring to the theology of St. Athanasius,
Macquarrie holds that "the word 'God' speaks of Being as ultimate
concern, Being which is at the same time *summum bonum*, uniting
highest reality and highest value."[2]

This means, then, that theological language from one point
of view *is* value language.   Not in the sense that it is identical
with value language, but in the sense that one aspect of it is
evaluation, or assertion of value as an aspect inseparable from
the reality which it seeks to express.

And we might on the basis of this insight be able to indicate
an answer to the question about the relation between moral value
judgements and theological statements about the "Will of God".

As we have seen earlier the understanding of judgements
containing value terms like "good" and "right" as in any sense
derivable from statements about the Will of God, has been
dismissed by the advocates of a non-cognitivist theory of ethics
as just one type of the "naturalistic fallacy".   For in their

1.   Ibidem., pp. 100f.

2.   Ibidem, p.139.

understanding of it, this means just that one thinks one can derive one's own moral judgement of the case from a statement of fact about what God wills.

There are, according to this view, only two alternatives to the fallacy, if we want to say that something is good because God wills it. We could either say that "God wills X" means just "I prescribe X (to use R.M. Hare's terminology)", in which case "God wills X" does not state any fact at all. Or we could say that "X is good" is just identical with a factual statement about God's Will, which means that we admit having reduced the value judgement to something purely "factual" and non-evaluative.

But now it could be maintained that a statement about God's Will is clearly neither identical with the speaker's prescription, nor does it convey a piece of "factual" knowledge about the opinion of somebody else (in this case God).

And still it is not a fallacious procedure to derive a value judgement from a statement about God's Will. For to identify the "good" with the Will of God, or to present the one as derivable from the other, does not mean to make a confusion of value judgements and "factual" statements. But it means that to speak of the reality of God is to speak of a reality which embodies in it value and obligation at the same time, as something inseparable from it, and statements about the Will of God are just explicit references to this value aspect of the God-reality.

This is true, no matter how we conceive of the way, or ways, in which man may get to know the Will of God.

It is also the way in which e.g. the narrative of the giving of the Law to the Israelites at Mount Sinai could be understood in its biblical context. Not even in the reception of the two tables of the Law by Moses did they receive a piece of "factual" information about God's moral opinion. But they had an experience of the reality of God, in which they were grasped by a divine demand. I.e. they received a new awareness of their existence in the world as constituted by a divine gift and a divine obligation. We can only think of how the Israelites regarded both God and his demand as present in the Ark of the Covenant, in which the tables of the Law were kept.

It is clear from this that theological discourse refers to an awareness of a reality which we can know only in its value for us. That is to say, to separate the factual from the evaluative in this kind of discourse is meaningless.

But it is important to stress that this unity of fact and value is not expressed only in theological language, though it is perhaps most manifest there.

And in a way all language is therefore value language. Words in all kinds of discourse have value connotations and refer to an

experience of a structure of reality which is not accessible to sensory observation, whether the speaker is conscious of this or not.

But although all language could be described as value language it is still true that it is more or less explicitly so. It might therefore be quite justifiable to speak of "value language" as a kind of language in which this value aspect is brought directly to expression.

The point is, however, that the value intuition referred to in value language is not exclusively bound to the experience of God, with which theological language deals explicitly. An awareness of value and obligation is present in the experience of men also where there is no reference to an experience of God. We might of course maintain that the value or obligation is not then recognized in its full significance. But this does not invalidate the non-religious value experience as such.

It will at this stage be clear on what points this theory of moral language will come to differ fundamentally from that of naturalism in ethics on the one hand and from that of intuitionism on the other.

Ethical naturalism, as it has normally been understood, identifies moral values with what is conducive to certain factual

states of affairs.   This means, in terms of the fact and value-separation, that values are reduced to something non-evaluative.

Intuitionism, as it was held e.g. by G.E. Moore, conceived of values as properties of the things, but properties of a special, non-natural kind, which were apprehended by a special, immediate kind of apprehension, namely intuition.

On the theory which we have indicated, there is no question of a reduction of values to facts and, though there might be greater affinities between this view and that of intuitionism, we do not hold that values are properties to be apprehended _in addition_ to natural properties.

We might find the concept of "intuition" indispensable in an account of value cognition and of value language.   But this intuition plays a much more central part than it would do if this value cognition were just a gathering of some peculiar extra-information about some of the objects of knowledge.

To sum up our argument so far:

What we want to maintain is that the question of the meaning of moral language, and of any kind of value language at all, cannot be settled apart from the question about the nature and condition of human _cognition_.

The question whether judgements of value have a "prescriptive" meaning, which is distinguishable from the meaning of something that we could call "factual" statements, and which does not, accordingly, give us any knowledge of the world, belongs rightly to the study of cognition, and not in the sense that it is a question of the possibility of granting value judgements some doubtful cognitive status on the fringe of human knowledge. But in the sense that we must ask whether the value question is not fundamental for the understanding of human cognition as a whole.

We have earlier drawn attention to R.M. Hare's own discussion of the basis for our talk about something as a "fact"[1].

His view was that nothing can become a fact for us unless we take up a certain attitude towards the world.

Hare links this with Kant's doctrine of the cathegories of apprehension. What we experience is, so Hare interprets Kant, partly determined by our mind, i.e. by the principles or rules which the mind follows in its cognition. In these principles, or cathegories, there is, Hare seems to hold, an element of attitude, and even of worship. He can speak of "worshipping assent to principles for discriminating between fact and illusion"[2].

1. Cf. above pp 156ff.

2. Cf. above, p. 158.

Hare's use of Kant in this connection is, we think, open to criticism.   It is doubtful whether it is possible to fit the concept of "attitude" and "worship" into the epistemological doctrine of Kant.

The principles which govern the actions of the mind, do not call for any assent in a "worshipful attitude".   They can by an analysis of the process of cognition be found to be necessary and fixed structures in the working of the mind.   And from one point of view, what happens in cognition is that the cognizing subject relates the external objects to these fixed principles of the mind.   So far Kant.

To say, however, that it is necessary to take up a certain attitude towards the world for there to be any facts at all, and that this attitude is of a worshipful character, must mean something quite different from the Kantian doctrine of the cathegories.   It must mean, rather, that there can be no cognition unless we are relating ourselves to that which is being cognized.

What Hare is saying is perhaps not necessarily incompatible with Kant's thoughts.   But it belongs at any rate to a different level of interest from that of a reference to common structures of the mind.   Hare may not be entirely clear himself about the impact of his remarks – he admits that they are tentative – but we think that they are very illuminating if we allow the consequences to be

fully drawn from them.

The remaining importance of expressionslike "attitude" and "worship" in the context in which Hare uses them, is that they suggest to us the centrality of <u>involvement and interest</u> in all cognition.

Formulated in another way, reminiscent of one of Hare's sentences:

Nothing can become an object of cognition if it is only an "object", i.e. if it is something over against which I am standing in the position of a disinterested observer.

If we draw the consequences from Hare's remarks it will be impossible to dissociate "fact" from "value". For already behind the conception of something as a "fact" there lies a certain interest in that which is thus named, and even a commitment to a certain view of the world. Behind all cognition there is involvement and interest.

This might seem to open the way for an entirely subjectivistic theory about cognition. When we hold that interest is essential in all cognition, do we not indicate that what we call cognition is really a construction of the world according to taste?

This is, however, not our intention, and it is not a consequence which can be drawn from what we have said above, or from R.M. Hare's own expressions.

We have said that in all cognition we are in some way relating ourselves to that which is being cognized. It is not the case that I _first_ apprehend the objects of apprehension and _then_ evaluate them, by a secondary process, as it were. It is much more the case that the process of cognition itself is fundamentally a _recognition_ of an existing relation between me and that which is apprehended. To take up a worshipping attitude towards something (to use Hare's expression once more) must mean to recognize a relation to something which is worthy of worship.

That is to say, basic for all cognition, or rather, _in_ all cognition is a sense of value or obligation. . A _value_ which is not something _apart_ from me. Neither is it something which comes _from_ me, and which is identical with one of my subjective likes, but a value which is a value _for_ me. Therefore it belongs as much to reality as does anything else.

This is, of course, a crucial point. We might feel justified in saying that values have a greater claim on the adjective "real" than has anything else, because they assert something which is constitutive of my relation to the world.

Therefore we might, using a somewhat dangerous expression, say that values are properties, not of _things_, but of _my relation to the world_. And in that sense they belong to the nature of the world, of which my relation to it is an aspect.

If it is true, as we have said, that evaluation is fundamental for all cognition, then the recognition of our value relation to the world is decisive for our assertion not only of something in addition to the factuality of the thing, but of the factuality itself. Nothing can become a fact for me unless it has value for me, i.e. unless I have recognized that I stand in a value relation to it.

3. <u>Values and knowledge in John Oman's thought.</u>

In this thesis we have advocated the view that we can understand the relation between judgements of value and knowledge of fact only on the basis of an understanding of knowledge itself. With theological language, as we have been discussing it in the previous chapter, it is seen to be the case that in so far as it expresses knowledge of some kind of reality, this reality is inseparable from an aspect of value which belongs to it. So that in some areas of knowledge, at least, it could be said that value is part of what is known, and that this cannot be separated from something "factual", i.e. "non-evaluative".

But is it possible to say anything more definite about the relation between evaluation and cognition? That is to say, what is the place and role of evaluation in cognition?

An important contribution to the answering of this question is given in John Oman's work. He belongs to a number of writers who up till now may have been undeservedly neglected, because they were writing, as it were, against the tide of their time.

In turning to the work of e.g. John Oman we acknowledge that the recognition of the existential element in human discourse is not confined to contemporary existentialist philosophy in any strict sense. The existential element is present also in earlier philosophy and in other types of philosophy. It can be claimed that,

in a sense, there is something perennial in the theory we try to maintain.

The recognition of the inseparability of cognition from evaluation is expressed first of all in Oman's book "The Natural and the Supernatural", 1931. This book is primarily a study of religion. Or, stated in another way, a study of all environment from the point of view of interest for religion[1]. This is what is indicated by the terms the "Natural" and the "Supernatural". Together they include all things in heaven and earth. But when a distinction is made between them, as in Oman's work, this indicates that the inquiry is limited by the particular interest of religion.

Our interest is not primarily that of arriving at a theory of religion, and, accordingly, our chief aim in this connection is not to discuss the adequacy or sufficiency of Oman's account of religion. It is rather the case that the answers we might arrive at with regard to our problem will still leave a number of the most important questions about religion unanswered.

Neither do we propose to discuss Oman's use of the terms "natural" and "supernatural" and all the difficulties which are connected with the ambiguities of these terms. We take it that

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1. Cf. Op. cit., pp.2f.

the content of Oman's thoughts, at least with respect to our

problem, can be brought out irrespectively of such a discussion.

A preliminary definition of what Oman wants to convey by the

distinction between the "Natural" and the "Supernatural" is that

of the distinction between the sensory world and what transcends

it.

> "If ... we take the Natural to be what appeals to our senses,
> and the Supernatural to be what is above it, we can say that
> the essential mark of religion is concern with whether there
> is such an environment as the Supernatural, and that what at
> least religion ought to be depends on what the nature of this
> environment is. The question of religion, therefore, is a
> question not merely of reality, but of ultimate reality."[1]

But we could also say that the distinction between the Natural

and the Supernatural is a distinction in value.

> "... both the Natural and the Supernatural are distinguished
> by the way in which they make themselves known, which is by
> the meaning, or in other words, the value they have for us.
> As the natural world is known by sensation and its varied
> comparative values, so the supernatural world is known by
> the sense of the holy and its sacred or absolute values;
> and for practical purposes, the distinction between the
> Natural and the Supernatural is between comparative value
> and absolute".[2]

That is to say, there is a world which Oman thinks of as the

world of "natural" values, where we judge the value of things by

degree, according to their comparative worth from the point of view

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1.   Ibidem, p.26.

2.   Ibidem, p.69.

of our physical interests, as it were.

But there is also another world, where we do not judge according to standards which have arisen out of a comparison of the physical characteristics of things in the world, but according to values which manifest themselves with a kind of absoluteness. This absoluteness means incomparable worth, "and incomparable is not merely super-excellent, but what may not be brought down and compared with other goods."[1]

This valuation, which is not to be weighed or bargained with, speaks to man of another reality than that which he knows by his senses and judges by his appetites[2].

That is the reality of the Supernatural.

"As here used, the Supernatural means the world which manifests more than natural values, the world which has values which stir the sense of the holy and demand to be esteemed as sacred".[3,4].

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1. Ibidem., p.65.

2. Cf. Ibidem, p.67.

3. Ibidem, p.71.

4. Concerning the use of the terms "holy" and "sacred" it should be pointed out that Oman wants to coin them for more precise uses than is common: "The 'holy' I propose to use for the direct sense or feeling of the Supernatural, and the 'sacred' for its valuation as of absolute worth", Ibidem, p.92.

That means that the sense of the holy has got to do, from one point of view with the existence of a kind of environment, i.e. the Supernatural, and from another point of view with value, i.e. sacred value.

> "As mere feeling taken by itself, we cannot rightly interpret the sense of the holy, but must relate it to sacred value and the existence of the Supernatural, because we cannot explain one feeling by another, but only by the judgement of value which depends on it and the kind of environment into which it introduces us. ... As mere feeling, the sense of the holy would be impossible to distinguish from the mere spooky feeling which is magical, at one end, and from the sense of the sublime which is artistic, at the other. But, when we relate it to the absolute value of the sacred, we see at once that its awe has a quality different from dread, and its reverence from the sense of the sublime. ... If it is a feeling which is wholly directed towards our own advantage, it is not the sense of the holy: if it has to do with incomparable value, to which desires, convenience and profit must be subordinate, in the presence of a reality before which one may not seek his own pleasure or walk after the imagination of his own heart, it is."[1]

Besides the distinction between "natural" and "sacred" values Oman also makes a distinction between "natural" and "ideal" values. The ideal values are the values that can be summed up as the true, the beautiful and the good.[2]

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1. Ibidem,.., pp.61f.

2. Cf. Ibidem,.., p.140.

These values are related to sacred values and to the Supernatural, but that does not mean that sacred values are identical with ideal values.

It might be more correct to say that, as Oman conceives of it, the sacred is the sphere where ideal values can arise, because it is where we can become free from the merely natural[1,2].

Therefore, we can say that ideal values are "supernatural in the sense that loyalty to them is concerned with a worth beyond all merely natural values"[3,4].

1. Cf. Ibidem., p.92.

2. We may perhaps say that "sacred" is a wider concept than "ideal" in this context, because it may still be something concrete, material which has the character of being sacred of absolute in value. But its sacredness or absoluteness has already taken us away from the comparative worth, and thus made it possible that ideal values can arise.

3. Ibidem, p.208.

4. We must not, however, take the distinction between natural and ideal values to mean that they can be totally separated and that there is no relation between them. On the contrary, Oman holds that "we cannot have sound natural values quite apart from right ideal values" (p.141), and that "there is no break in principle between natural and ideal values. Nor is there in practice, for the higher values of the Natural already manifest the ideal. Both may deal with the same facts, and may differ with different situations, and there may be uncertainty and even mistake about either, although there is an entirely different way of judging what we take to be of sacred obligation and what we take to be merely of expediency and convenience." (p.205).
   This relation between natural and ideal values corresponds in a way to the relation between the Natural and the Supernatural in general, for, as Oman sees it, the Supernatural is manifested through the Natural. (Ibidem).

But not in the sense that the claim which they lay upon us is derived from the Supernatural or from religion as an external authority. The values should be sought for their own sake. To say that they are supernatural is to express something about the character of their claim, not to try and justify it by a reference to something else.

> "Both the sense of the holy and the judgement of the sacred are ways of living in the higher environment we call the Supernatural, and a right judgement, or in other words a right sense of it and a right living in it, are necessary for a right knowing of it. ... Yet directly no question of truth, beauty or goodness is to be determined by the Supernatural. ... Religion may not lay down their rules, but also it may not enforce them by external motives. ... Nevertheless, all absoluteness ... is from being in the Supernatural. ... None the less, only in one way should this be determined by the Supernatural, and that is by living in it in its own order which is freedom. All its worth depends on being freely chosen, and we can enter it only as we are free."[1]

What has been said about the relation between ideal values and the Supernatural holds of the relation between morality in general and religion or the Supernatural. It is from the sense of the awesome holy, and the sense of something absolute in value, that all morality springs. Historically, too, the awesome holy has developed into moral reverence, Oman holds.[2]

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1. Ibidem., pp.309f.

2. Cf. Ibidem, p.62.

This does not mean that the sense of the holy is mere moral reverence. "It is the sense of the Supernatural, and only becomes moral reverence because of the moral nature of this environment".[1]

"It is necessary to distinguish what religion provides for morality directly from what it should provide only indirectly. Directly, it provides only the sphere in which persons have absolute worth and duties have sacred obligation. As, without both, there is no morality, no morality that is truly moral is non-religious; and as there is no religion which does not provide this sphere, there is none which is non-moral. But ideals and motives religion should provide only indirectly. When, in the name of religion, rules are laid down by authority and enforced by hope of bliss and fear of misery, we have neither religion nor morality"[2].

Religion is thus not the external authority which imposes obligation, but the sphere in which values and obligations manifest themselves as absolute, where they themselves take hold of us.

"In the first place, religion is a life within, a transaction of the soul; and as such embraces all the physical functions. It is not only an idea, a discerning and knowing, or, if we speak critically, an opinion, a conviction, but also a consciousness of worth, a feeling, a sense of being taken possession of and of self-surrender, and further, in accord therewith, a willing and accomplishing."[3]

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1. Ibidem., p.64.

2. Ibidem, pp.387f.

3. Ibidem, p.15.

The decisive aspect of Oman's view, in relation to our problem is not, however, the distinction he makes between "natural", "sacred" and "ideal" values, nor the relation he finds between them.

That is of interest to us is first of all the way in which he makes it clear that, whenever we are concerned with obtaining knowledge of any "objective", whether we call it "Natural" or "Supernatural", we cannot hope to get to know it without being concerned with the value it has for us.

This is what was indicated in the passage quoted above[1], where Oman says that the Natural and the Supernatural are distinguished by the way in which we get to know them, i.e. by their meaning or value, and that the natural world is known by its comparative values, as is the supernatural world by its sacred or absolute values.

It is thus in Oman's basic theory of knowledge that we must seek an understanding of his conception of values.

To separate knowledge from valuation means to impose an abstraction which violates the experience through which anything is known.

1.   p.224.

"We know all environment, not as impact or physical influx, but as meaning: and this meaning depends on (1) the unique character of the feeling it creates; (2) the unique value it has for us; (3) the immediate conviction of a special kind of objective reality, which is inseparable from this valuation; and (4) the necessity of thinking it in relation to the rest of experience and the rest of experience in relation to it"[1.2.]

And as a concise exposition of this view the following passage

is worth quoting in full:

"Inall experience these four aspects are indivisibly joined in one, and each loses its significance in isolation. The feeling depends on the value, and the value on the feeling; the conviction of reality is not an additional inference, but the valuation depends on the conviction of reality, and the conviction of reality on the correctness of the valuation; the thinking of it in its place in our whole experience is not after we have received it, but is necessary for receiving it, and essential to the conviction of its reality. These elements are the same for the experience of things physical as for the experience of things spiritual. What distinguishes religion from all else is the unique quality of the feeling, of the valuation, of the nature of the object, and the way of thinking things together".[3]

1. Op. cit., p.58.

2. Cf. Ibidem, p.54, where Oman says of the experience of reality that it "comes as meaning, not as impact; and meaning is value; and value in the end depends upon feeling: yet it is not upon mere feeling, but upon right thinking and acting in relation to it".

3. Ibidem, p.58.

This implies that to speak of knowledge of something means to refer to an experience where the aspects of meaning, value and reality are really inseparable.

In Short, Oman can say that "right values are right knowing ..."[1].

It is important to point out that Oman holds this to apply also to the perception of physical things, cf. the statement that "all perception concerns meaning, and therefore the reality of natural values"[2].

This is why there can be no knowledge without interest, an interest which is constitutive also of sense perception.

> "All perception of all living creatures from the beginning has been developed by interest, and interest has embedded in it value-judgement; and their perception has advanced as, by sincere living in their environment, they have tested its values. They do not merely prefer one thing to another because life is what it is, but life is what it is because the values of environment are what they are. ...
> A true value-judgement is thus a judgement of reality; and, what is more, no kind of judgement ever was formed except from knowledge which derived its meaning from value, nor would man take the trouble to form any other kind of judgement except for value already determined"[3].

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1.   Ibidem,.., p.205.

2.   Ibidem, p. 206.

3.   Ibidem, p.202.

This interest is not present only when there is a search
for ideal values, to use Oman's term, but also, for instance,
in the whole range of interests which determine the scientist's
work.

> "All life, at all events, has dealt with the world
> only by interest, and the world does not seem to have
> responded to anything else all down the ages.   And to
> the higher interests of truth and beauty and goodness it has
> responded most.   Even the scientist, to quote Prof. Whitehead
> again, is a kind of artist, sustained in his labours by the
> ideal of finish and perfection in his work.   And, on the
> lowest grounds of utility, science would have no uses were
> there no validity beyond the mere mechanical world which
> science has been supposed to prove to be alone real"[1].

This interest, then, is not a construction or shaping of the
environment according to personal likes or dislikes.   It is
more like an openness to the meaning of the environment, or a
willingness to respond to it by evaluating it rightly.

> "Thus the way to receive the witness of all reality
> would seem to be a mind concerned to know the object by
> valuing it aright, and this goes back even to sensation,
> making it a true response to the witness of reality"[2].

Therefore, Oman adheres to the view that the mind plays an
active part in cognition.   Activity is not involved only when its
interest is directed towards altering the world for some purpose.

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1.   Ibidem,., p.6.

2.   Ibidem, p.141.

The activity of the mind is also directed towards knowing the world, by "responding to impressions justly and completely"[1].

That is to say, no knowledge is received passively, but neither is it a creation of the mind. Meaning is given, but we must actively interpret it as our own for it to become ours.[2]

> "On the one hand, our knowledge cannot be a purely mental creation; and, on the other, it cannot be a mere effect of an outward cause or a mere reflection passively, as in a mirror, of an outward reality. Neither the appeal to mind, nor the affirmation of objective reality may be permanently ignored without distorting our view of the Natural; and the study of the Supernatural has been still more disastrously affected by regarding only one aspect. Knowledge is taken to be exclusively a mental construction, any correspondence it may have with reality having to be proved by something apart from our experience itself; or our knowledge is taken to be imposed wholly from without, and to be true in proportion as it requires no task of awareness and understanding or any kind of active dealing with it on our own part. In neither case can our knowing be truly knowledge.

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1. Cf. Ibidem,., p.204.

2. Cf. Ibidem,., p.499: "Another argument is that, as we receive knowledge of the Natural passively at the bottom of the ladder of our knowing, so we may receive knowledge of the Supernatural passively at the top. This ... is merely a very ancient error. Our whole study of perception has shown that even the lowest perception is an active interpretation, the meaning doubtless given, but becoming ours only as we actively interpret it as our own. Knowledge is just activity of the mind, and a passive knowledge is a contradiction in terms".

Nor is it enough to hold these two aspects together and not to neglect either. In our active life they are intimately one. The more our minds are active, the greater the assurance that our knowledge is objective; and the stronger and more direct the impression of the reality, the more our minds are stirred to activity concerning it. Only in this intimate unity can we ever hope to find any light on our knowledge of reality, natural or supernatural".[1]

It is clear that, on this view, a "knowledge of facts" which can be contrasted with "evaluation", is inconceivable.[2]

With regard to the response to the world, by which only we can know it, it should be pointed out that it is not an isolated intellectual activity. It is something with which the whole person is concerned.

"We know our environment only as we rightly live in it; and we rise to the height of its meaning according to the kind of persons we are"[3].[4]

1. Ibidem,., pp. 110f.

2. Cf. Ibidem,., p.169: "Sensations and physical impacts, as discrete isolated facts, are unknown, for all that gives them significance is just the part they play in the world of meaning and rational experience. Even if science reduces the physical facts to vibrations, what is most important about them must be that they are in a context of meaning, and that between them and sensation there is not mere passive subjection but active interpretation of them as meaning".

3. Ibidem,., p.204.

4. Cf. Ibidem, p.71: "we rightly know any environment only when we have a mind to perceive it aright and a will to use it well".

That is to say, to know the world is a question of living

in it in such a way that one expects to see what there really is

to see.

Because measuring of quantity is one way of managing the

world, and therefore judgements of it seem very convincing, it is

possible to be mislead by a view which limits the meaning, which

environment manifests, to quantity.[1]

However,

"the first task, even for managing our world, is to be sure
that we actually see the world and the fullness thereof.
For this the first question is whether we are so living in
our natural environment that we can expect to have the
normal natural values by which we could perceive what is
highest and greatest in it"[2].

Knowledge of the environment is possible only if we have the

right awareness, which is the power to appreciate.   And this is

only another way of saying that the experience of the environment in its mea

or values is dependent upon our response, or our attitude.

1.   This is what happens e.g. when one thinks that science can
      provide a world-view: "Science serves its purpose precisely
      by its limitation.   Its justification is that it extends a
      process of arresting and stereotyping which has already begun
      in perception;   that it enlarges man's practical management of
      his world by isolating quantity from all else, both the mind
      that knows and the varied meaning by which it knows;   and that
      it goes behind all meaning the world manifests to find the means
      whereby we can make the world speak our meaning.   Thus it is an
      effective instrument precisely because it is not fitted to
      provide a cosmology" Ibidem., p.257.

2.   Ibidem, p.204.

"it is certain that nothing does reveal itself to us
unless we take up the right attitude towards it, and
this more concerns right feeling, which means sensitive
and sincere and objective feeling, than even right
acting or right thinking. We can neither be argued into
it or drilled into it, and there is no narrower education
for it than the whole of life"[1].

And a lack of appreciation or response does not mean just
to leave things "as they are". It is rather the lack of
appreciation (we could also say "evaluation") which represents the
distortion of the facts. For it means that we do not allow life
to impress us as it is, but "corrupt experience at its source by
the absence of simple, direct, whole-hearted response to its
witness"[2].

A denial of part of reality may, therefore, be just a
reflection of a lack of interest, or appreciation, as is so
often the reason why the Supernatural is denied or ignored.[3]

1. Ibidem,., p.211.

2. Ibidem.

3. Cf. Ibidem, p.74: "Of any environment we may be unaware, either
because we have not developed the interests it serves, as space
to a creature without motion, or because it so constantly serves
them as not to stir any reflections, as space to the animals that
rove about in it. Also it is possible to deny in theory what
is believed in practice ... For any of these reasons the
Supernatural can be ignored. We may not be seeking anything it
provides; we may so live and move and have our being in it every
day and all day that because it has never failed us, we have not
reflected on it; the belief we profess may be one thing, and the
belief we act on another".

It is not only the case that the lack of interest prevents

us from receiving the "witness of reality"; it is also often the

case that, when we think that we can ignore interest and

appreciation, we introduce interests which are alien, and therefore

misleading[1].   This is the fate of so many studies of religion[2].

Fundamentally, the question of the awareness of the environment

in its values is not, for Oman, a question of a rational understanding.

At least not purely.   It is rather, as we saw, a question of right

feeling[3].   Feeling, not as subjective emotions, but as an "ultimate

element in experience", which "cannot be explained by anything else"[4]

"That feeling is the way mind responds to its environment
is an ultimate fact which has merely to be accepted"[5,6].

1.   Cf. Ibidem., p.6.

2.   Cf. Ibidem., p.8: "In respect of religion, more than any other
subject, we can say that, without the right interest and attitude
of mind, all attempts to distinguish its sphere by definition or
description are vain".

3.   Cf. e.g. above, p.231, note 2.

4.   Cf. Op. cit., p.204.

5.   Ibidem., p.188.

6.   If, on this view, we let feeling play an important place in our
theory of religion this does not mean that we make of religion a
psychological matter, or that we assent to an "emotivist" theory
of religion, which describes its meaning as just expressions of
emotions.   Cf. op. cit., p.27: "If we look more closely at the
theories of religion as essentially of reason or feeling or will ...,
we shall see that there is one point on which they are agreed.
They are metaphysical and not merely psychological.   They ask how
environment is known, and the presupposition of them all is, that it i
known by what is the really creative element in all knowledge.   ...
To say generally that, for Schleiermacher, religion is feeling is to
miss his central conviction, which is that religion has its source
in the peculiar feeling or intuition which is the contact with the
universe that creates all experience of reality".

Where he speaks of the two kinds of values, which we may call the natural and the ideal, Oman holds that it is plain that the ideal values cannot be separated from the "sincerity of feeling by which anything is rightly valued and so rightly known".

But for both kinds of values alike "it is sincerity of feeling which arrives at right and objective values, there being for anything an appreciation which is according to nature and a perversion which is not, and a true objective sense of the natural world is as dependent on this as a true objective sense of the supernatural"[1].

That is to say, our apprehension or awareness of the values of the environment is a question of an immediate experience.

It is here that traditional aesthetic theories fail, according to Oman.

> "None of the treatises on the sublime and beautiful
> have in them much to help us, because they are, mostly at
> least, determined by the rationalist view that everything
> must be justified by the understanding, whereas all our
> argument has been that it must be determined by the true
> nature of our whole environment, and that means by
> intuitions and anticipations which go far beyond what we
> can set in the clear hard light of the understanding.
> It concerns primarily what we have suggested about
> perception, that it is like personal intercourse when speech
> is more than a set of symbols to be interpreted, something
> beyond the mere expression of the speaker and the sympathetic
> response of the hearer, when every word has in it something
> of the whole mind of the speaker and some direct sense of

1.   Ibidem., p.140

it in the hearer"[1].

In line with this view Oman still wants to make use of the concept of conscience in his theory of morals. It seems that a direct sense of values can be ascribed to it.

But not in the sense that it is infallible. It is itself in need of education, but by nothing else than experience itself, through which reality is allowed to manifest its values. Therefore, though the verdicts of conscience are not final, they should still be regarded as sacred and demanding absolute loyalty. For the "very pursuit of more light requires absolute loyalty to the light we have"[2].

> "if in loyalty to the absolute requirement of the sacred, in courageous freedom following its guidance and trusting its power, we stand on our feet and allow experience to speak for us, ... we can hope to find what justly claims absolute value because it is our true environment in which we find our true selves"[3].

It is our conviction that, if we are to give a consistent theoretical account of the meaning of ethical language, we have to return to a way of thinking which, like J. Oman's, finds it impossible to speak of reality apart from its values.

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1. Ibidem, p.210.

2. Ibidem, p.317.

3. Ibidem, p.325.

In conclusion.

The line of argument in the thesis has been as follows:

A study of the conception of ethics in the writings of
R.M. Hare, whom we chose as an exponent of contemporary so-called
linguistic philosophy in the field of ethics, brought out the
following view:

The task of ethics, i.e. the work of the moral philosopher,
is not to discuss substantial moral problems but to disclose the
logical structure of moral language. For it is Hare's view that
moral language has a form which can be exposed independently of any
discussion of the content of morality. This formal structure of
moral language can be known through a study of the actual use of
this language.

There are two formal characteristics of moral language, Hare
says, namely prescriptivity and universalizability. The first of
the two expresses the formal meaning of moral language as that of
prescribing actions. (making moral language, when it is
characteristically used, a sub-class of value language, which is
in turn one sort of prescriptive language. What gives value
language its evaluative meaning is, according to Hare, its
prescriptivity. So that the evaluative meaning of value language

is identical with its prescriptive meaning[1]).   That is to say,
when a moral judgement is made, this means that the speaker is
prescribing a certain action.   And that in his prescribing, though
he may have his reasons for prescribing this particular action, he
is _logically free_ to prescribe _any_ action.

Everything that is distinctively moral in the meaning of a
moral judgement is totally independent (logically independent) of
the nature of the action which it actually prescribes.

The second formal principle of moral language, universalizability,
serves as a rational check on the moral judgements of the speaker,
i.e. it ensures that he is consistent and does not prescribe
different actions in situations which are similar in all relevant
aspects, that is to say, unless he has changed his moral opinion.

It is the first of the two principles, prescriptivity, which
is the most important from the point of view of our discussion.
For it is prescriptivity which makes moral language moral, Hare
holds.   I.e., the primary meaning of a moral judgement is the
prescribing of a certain action, for which prescribing there is no
logical reason in the actual action itself or in any of the factual
aspects of the action, e.g. some characteristics of the action itself

1.   See F.R., pp. 26f.

or some result it might have.

So here we see that Hare's main contention is to state the logical independence of moral judgements (and value judgements in general) from factual statements.

And this means that Hare is establishing on formal premisses, (i.e. on the basis of a formal study of language) that has previously been held on various other premisses. He holds that there is no necessary connection between facts and values, or between what is and what ought to be, or how it might have been put.

In this separation of fact and value Hare is at one with the other representatives of linguistic philosophy, and also with the views of the logical positivists with which linguistic philosophy is sometimes linked under the common name "analytical philosophy", despite all the differences in mood and terminology and also matters of substance.

After having considered R.M. Hare's view so far we turned to a study of some recent exponents of a theological ethic, including such views as those of K... Lögstrup, who claims on a theological basis that there is no particular Christian ethic apart from a morality based on the general human situation, and those of K. Barth and E. Brunner, who hold that ethics is only possible on the basis of the Christ-revelation. In either case we have got to do with a

view of ethics which implies another theory about the meaning of moral language than the one provided by the analysts. And an interpretation of theological ethics on terms which are compatible with the separation of fact and value constitutes a fundamental break with anything that has hitherto been meant by ethics in a theological context.

This confrontation of the ethical theory of analytical philosophy with various theological views of the meaning of ethics prompted us to a closer critical analysis of R.M. Hare's account of the meaning of moral language.

What we claim to have shown in this analysis is that the understanding of the meaning of moral language, which Hare holds that he has arrived at by a study of the actual use of language, represents an interpretation of language based on other premisses than those offered by language itself. That is to say, what Hare calls the logical structure of moral language is really a structure imposed on this kind of language on extra-linguistic grounds in the actual process of analysis. The "form" of language which Hare's analysis discloses to us is the form which emerges when language is studied on the basis of a certain view of the world and our knowledge of it, and of the function of language in this world. Hare's substantial philosophical views are embodied in the very concepts which he uses for analysing moral language, first of all the concepts

of "fact" and "value" themselves.

That is to say, the _formal_ characteristic of moral language which is expressed in the _disunity of fact and value_ derives from the _context_ in which moral language is analysed.

For underlying Hare's analysis is the view that what we can have knowledge of are "_facts_" as something separate from the factor, or factors, which make morality moral. And that the informative function of language lies in reporting these "objective" facts, so that statements about them are the only possible statements about what there really "is". (Whether statements about these facts require a verification in some looser or stricter sense does not affect this argument.) In that case scientific language is the paradigmatic case of cognitive language.

But if _this_ is the context in which moral language is to be analysed then there is not much left for moral language to have but "prescriptive" or some similar kind of meaning, with its logical independence from "facts".

What if one holds that the notion of "facts" as described above does not express all there "is", but rather an abstraction from it? This abstraction may have some purpose and validity in a certain context. But the limitation of the context in which all kinds of language are to be understood to this context alone is quite arbitrary, i.e. unless we operate on the basis of a certain view of the world and of language.

What Hare is doing is to postulate something which he calls "facts" and of which he claims that his prescribing of certain actions is logically independent (Cf. his own statement that it is enough that _he_ uses moral words prescriptively for his theory of moral language to be the correct one).

But there is no reason whatsoever why one should accept Hare's (explicit or implicit) definition of "facts" and of "prescriptivity" as a basis for an analysis of moral language and of the moral phenomena which are expressed in it.

In other writings apart from his direct contributions to the discussion of ethics Hare himself seems to be on the point of realizing that the matter is not so clear-cut as the fact-and-value separation suggests, and that when we make a factual statement we are not just _labelling_ some "objective fact" with a name. Something more is involved, for we do not call something a "fact" unless we "take up a certain attitude to the world"[1]. This would seem to open up at least the possibility of a broader context in which moral language could be understood. Hare's own contribution does not take us very far, however, and for two reasons: First, his thoughts on the function of blik and of religious belief are unrelated

1.   See above p. 156.

to his ethical writings. And secondly, his thoughts on these matters are inconclusive, not to say ambiguous. They might be interpreted as implying that what we call "facts" are in the last resort creations of the subject (i.e. of the common human mind). But this is hardly Hare's view. It might be more fair to say that for him the attitude in question corresponds to <u>something about the world</u>, but something other than the "facts" themselves, in the sense in which Hare prefers to use the word "fact".

In any case, it is to be deplored that Hare stops short of asking what this means for our whole understanding of language and of moral language in particular, since that is what he has primarily been concerned with.

But still these thoughts by R.M. Hare create a certain link with other trends in recent thought, which would seem to offer a more adequate understanding of the context in which moral language should be analysed than does his theory. So e.g. contemporary <u>existential analysis.</u>

It would seem that human existence, as here analysed, is the context where language has to be studied. In the existential aspect of language a union, or unity, between fact and value becomes possible. Or rather, necessary. For although conventional values might be rejected by existentialist philosophers there still emerges

a phenomenon of human existence which is both constitutive of existence and itself a value or a claim. More often than not this phenomenon is "freedom".

It has been left to the expositors of the great representatives of existentialist philosophy to try and work out more systematically what the suggestions of the latter mean and what their implications are. We found reason to draw attention to the work of John Macquarrie in this connection. His understanding of theological language is based on Heidegger's philosophy, underlining its ontological aspects, and also drawing a line to elements in idealist philosophy, in case the thoughts of .M. Urban on the meaning of language.

Macquarrie stresses, with Heidegger, that language is an existential phenomenon and that it cannot be understood apart from its existential context, i.e. from its human context, "the context of the life and experiences of the beings who use language"[1].

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1. _Principles of Christian Theology_, 1966, p.113).
   Incidentally, Macquarrie thinks that on this point there is a convergence of existentialism and logical analysis with its stress on the use of language. But no convergence is really possible here. For the analysts imagine the possibility of an analysis of the use of language per se, by observing its overt behaviour, as it were, i.e. independently of any understanding of the context of this use, e.g. of human experience. These are exactly questions which the logical analysts would claim to transcend with their study of language.

The modes of language which express its existential elements introduce such personal factors as valuation, feeling and interest. But this does not make them non-cognitive, as Macquarrie sees it. If the dogmas of religion express "an intention to follow a policy of action, this is inseparable from the conviction that such a policy is both demanded and supported by the structure of reality". And "although elements of feeling underlie them [i.e. theological statements] in a way which is not the case with scientific assertions, these affective elements are inseparable from what are believed to be insights into the way things are"[1].

Such existential language lights up a situation, it "lets us be aware of the situation as a whole and permits us to notice dimensions of that situation which are disclosed to a participant but may be veiled from a mere beholder".[2]
Affective states and the sentences in which they come to verbal expression do not give knowledge of particular beings. But that does not mean that they refer only to the subject of these affective states. They point to some state of affairs beyond themselves, to an "unbroken unity of subject and object within a situation or

1. Ibidem, p.115.

2. Ibidem, p.88.

structure that is known from within? An unbroken unity experienced on the level of feeling, that is to say, "in feeling we intuit the situation in which we find ourselves"[1].

It is clear that this analysis of the existential context of possible modes of language, amongthem theological language, provides a context for an understanding of the logical structure of moral language, of the relation between fact and value, very different from the context provided by a philosophy which has no room for this human situation or these dimensions of the human situation among the "structures of reality" or "things as they are". Statements about "God" in theological language do not express subjective emotions, nor subjective undertakings to pursue a certain policy, nor do they on the other hand give information about some fact per se. They always imply a relation of value or obligation, i.e. they have moral implications.

This might be a valid interpretation of Macquarrie's view.

But this does not mean that such a context for understanding moral language is to be found only in so-called "existentialism". Indeed, Macquarrie himself links his view with that of W.M. Urban.

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1. Ibidem.

And we found a related view in John Oman's work. He deals explicitly with the question of values in relation to knowledge, combining existential elements systematically with reasoned discourse. His view is that experience of values through participation and interest is essential for all knowledge, and thereby an essential element in all knowledge.

Oman is thus providing a context in which moral language could be understood both as cognitive and as allowing for a unity between fact and value. Values are aspects of reality to be known, and they are always related to the rest of what is known.

It should be pointed out that in concentrating on the above mentioned writers we are not necessarily arguing that access to a structure of reality in which the unity of fact and value resides can only be conceived of as obtainable through experience. In this connection we want to leave the possibility open for arguing that we can reach an understanding of it through innate reason. In either case the context for understanding moral language would have the same structure.

It is even more important to point out that we are not interested in understanding "experience" in any narrow sense. We will indeed hold the possibility open for arguing that the experience through which we see the total context of human life and language is determined by revelation and its acceptance in faith, in any sense

of these words.

It will be clear that a theory which seeks to understand moral language in its context will have to start with an analysis of the so-called "factual" words which occur, or might occur, in moral discourse as bearers of moral meaning. These are the words which Hare admits can have a "secondary" evaluative meaning, i.e. they can come to be connected with a certain moral opinion about the facts which they denote. But in Hare's view the important thing is that their primary, factual, meaning can always be abstracted from the moral opinion and brought to expression in other words, if necessary.

Our contention has been that this is the question-begging presupposition of Hare's theory. We get a totally different picture if we see that the logical structure and the meaning of moral language is not to be found first of all by a study of words like "good", "right", "ought", as if they had a meaning in isolation from everything else. It is to be found in the logic of words like "love", "courage", "trust", in words expressing basic human relationships like "father", "son" ..., "neighbour", "friend", and in words with a theological character like "God", "creature", "grace", "commandment" and so on.

Words like those last mentioned are not mere labels for objective facts, but they have connotations which derive from the total context

in which these facts are known. That is to say, these connotations refer to such aspects of the context as place the subject in a moral relation to the facts, still claiming that they thereby refer to a structure of reality.

What the moral words like "good", "right" and "ought" do is to refer explicitly to this moral aspect of our apprehension or awareness (or what word we might want to use) of reality, and their meaning cannot be found anywhere else.

That Hare postulates another use and meaning of these words which he wants to call the "moral" meaning does not automatically make him a victor in the dispute about their meaning, just because it allows him a "free-er" use of them. We have maintained that there are substantial philosophical issues involved in the understanding of language, and that these issues, of epistemological and ontological character, have to be argued about.

And it is on these issues that we differ from Hare, holding that he denies the very context in which moral experience and moral language could be consistently analysed and understood.

Two distinctions have to be made in this connection:

First, by holding that moral words refer to a structure of reality, but not some "objective" characteristic of things, we do not advocate a view similar to so-called "intuitionism", which

holds that moral words describe non-natural qualities of things. For on that view the fact and its value are still to be apprehended in two separate and different acts, as it were. Whereas our main objective has been to show that when we consider the fact in its context, i.e. without making any abstractions in our statement of it, its value _is always a constituent element_.

And, secondly, our view must be distinguished from the informalist theory which also speaks of "contextual implications" of factual statements. For on that view "contextual implication" means just that in a given context a fact and a certain evaluation of it can come to be associated in the conventions of a smaller or larger society, although there ultimately is no logical reason for the association.

On our view the context in which the fact and its value are seen as inseparable is _itself_ the ultimate point of reference.

We should also perhaps make it explicitly clear that our theory does not involve us in any "naturalistic fallacy". The whole purport of our argument has been to refute the view which identifies the "factual" with the "non-evaluative". It is on the validity of this identification that the charge of fallacy rests.

As will have become clear we have indicated a basis on which a

theological ethic can still be meaningfully maintained. For theology provides a context in which there can be a unity of fact and value. This is true whether the insights of theology are conceived of as arrived at by way of reason, experience or revelation, or by some combination of these.

Nothing has been said by this about the question of whether theological ethics is to be understood as exclusive in relation to other kinds of ethics or not. That is first of all a theological problem, not to be settled on logical grounds. It might well be argued that the understanding of the moral demand in the context of the Christ-revelation does not make the understanding of the moral demand in a general human context invalid.

In addition to this it must be admitted that our discussion does not seem to have taken us very far towards answering particular substantial moral questions. Despite this we think that something necessary has been said with a view to providing a basis on which we can hope to get an answer to our moral problems.

To summarize what we have been doing in this thesis:

(a)   We have examined the ethical theory of linguistic analytical philosophy, mainly in R.M. Hare as its perhaps most representative exponent, finding that its main characteristic is the separation of fact and value.

(b)   With a view to the problem of theological ethics we found that on that point there arises a basic conflict in which the whole possibility of theological ethics is at issue.

(c)   On a closer examination it turns out that what we have got to deal with is the fundamental methodical presuppositions of a philosophy like R.M. Hare's.

(d)   This makes it necessary to pursue the inquiry on a very broad front in search of a more adequate method for deciding the fundamental problems of ethics.
That is to say, the present state of the relations between philosophical and theological ethics calls for some broad strategic decisions of method and approach before specific problems can be tackled.   It is in relation to the need for such preliminary decision that we have elucidated our question and worked towards an answer which, though not definitive, is a sufficient basis on which to decide the direction in which

future inquiry and more detailed studies would be likely to prove fruitful. It is thus a contribution towards breaking the present stale-mate in relations between the two disciplines.