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INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS 1959-1971

TIRUCHINAPALLI SURENDAR

A thesis submitted for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Faculty of Arts,
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S U M M A R Y

India and the dominant powers of the West have had no territorial disputes. They have much in common in their commitment to liberal institutions and individual rights. English plays a dominant role in India's intellectual life; it is the link language of India. Therefore, their relations should have been cordial. But they were rarely so. Western global interests clashed with India's national interests in the subcontinent. This clash of interests was taken advantage of by the Soviet Union, whose interests also clashed with those of the West, to build friendly relations with India.

The thesis discusses Indo-Soviet relations vis-avis Soviet claims to ideological fidelity and argues that ideology is of secondary importance in Soviet foreign policy considerations. The very starting and ending points of the thesis belie such Soviet claims: In September, 1959, a few days after the first shooting occurred on the Sino-Indian border, the Soviet news agency, Tass, issued a statement declaring in effect, the neutrality of the Soviet Union.¹ Such a stand on a dispute involving a socialist and a bourgeois country hardly speaks for either ideological solidarity or proletarian internationalism.

1. This, Jen-min Jih pao was to say, amounted to "tipping off the enemy that the Socialist camp was not a monolithic whole". See Peking Review, No. 35 (August 30, 1963), P. 7

In August, 1971, the Indo-Soviet treaty was signed. Evidence suggests that this was an Indo-Soviet reaction to Sino-American detente. Neither the Chinese action (rapprochement with capitalist America) nor the Soviet reaction was in the spirit of Marxism.

The thesis discusses Indo-Soviet relations between 1959 - 1971. It discusses only political, economic and military relations. Cultural relations are not taken into consideration because all the Soviet cultural offensive has not even made a dent into the preponderant cultural influence of the West (almost totally British).

First in Pakistan and later in China, Indo-Soviet interests coincided. This resulted in Soviet support to India on issues involving her vital interests. The Soviet Union's diplomatic success in India is attributable to this support; conversely, the failure of Anglo-American diplomacy in India is due to lack of such support. Therefore, all these issues and the attitudes taken by both blocs to them receive exhaustive discussion in the thesis.

The thesis is divided into eleven chapters; the first three give an historical insight into Indo-Soviet relations before 1959; the last eight discuss their relations between 1959 - 1971.

Convergence of interests contributed to cordiality in Indo-Soviet relations, as evidence suggests. However, interests between two political entities need not necessarily coincide over a long period of time. The Soviet Union and India belong to two different categories: the former is a global power and the latter, a regional power. Sooner or later, Soviet global interests are likely to clash with India's regional interests.

The cordiality that prevails in Indo-Soviet relations now is, among other things, an indirect result of policies pursued by the United States, China and Pakistan towards India. India is interested in improving her relations with these countries in order to have diplomatic manoeuvrability. There are already signs of thaw in the relations between India and these countries. If this happens, India's need of Soviet support will be less. Besides that, there are enough institutional differences between India and the Soviet Union which have caused in the past and will cause in future irritations in their relations. As long as states need each other, such irritations are ignored; once their interests begin to diverge, even small issues can then become major problems. However, if Moscow takes a realistic view of an improvement in the relations between India and China and does not proceed to take retaliatory steps out of pique, Indo-Soviet relations can still be maintained on correct lines; otherwise, tensions are likely to appear in their relations.

THE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS
COLONIAL AND EX-COLONIAL STATES, WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
INDIA

The success of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia made Lenin and his colleagues not only the temporal rulers of the Soviet Union but also spiritual mentors of the international communist movement. Inevitably, the question of communist attitude to bourgeois nationalist movements in the colonial world, and in the post World War II period, to the new nationalist regimes of the ex-colonial states had to be decided by the leaders of the international communist movement from time to time. This policy naturally changed over the years. The chapter seeks to analyse the relative influence of ideology and Soviet state interests on the policies enunciated from time to time.

LENIN'S PERIOD

In a letter addressed to the American workers in August, 1918, Lenin said "that circumstances brought our Russian detachment of the socialist proletariat to the fore not because of our merits, but because of the exceptional backwardness of Russia....."¹ However, he felt that the victory of the Russian proletariat "could not be permanent unless it was followed up by a proletarian revolution in the West.... or at any rate in several of the main capitalist countries".²

-
1. Lenin on the Foreign Policy of the Soviet state (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968), P. 115 (hereinafter referred to as the Foreign Policy of the Soviet State).
 2. Lenin, collected works, Vol. XXXI (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966) P. 411.

Lenin believed that the working class in the advanced capitalist countries sympathised with Soviet Russia, though some of their leaders held "a stand point, not of the working class but of the bourgeoisie...."³ He felt that the Entente could not fight Soviet Russia because the "workers and peasants of the capitalist countries could not be forced to fight" it.⁴ "Domestic conditions have not allowed a single powerful capitalist state to hurl its army against Russia, this has been due to the revolution having matured within such countries....."⁵ Therefore, Lenin was "banking on the inevitability of the world revolution", though not on a definite and early date".⁶

As the spiritual leader of the international communist movement, Lenin organised the Communist International⁷ to guide the movement, and, probably, also to take the best possible advantage from it. As a struggling new state, Soviet Russia was hardly in a position openly to conduct hostile propaganda against the then great powers and face the consequences. Lenin hoped to use the Comintern to promote the Soviet State interests, conduct Marxist propaganda and yet take shelter under the non-state character of the organisation to ward off any retaliatory action on the part of the capitalist states.⁸ However, revolutionary propaganda apart, Lenin was opposed to any precipitate revolutionary acts on the part of either Soviet Russia or the Comintern.

3. Ibid., P. 139

4. Ibid., PP. 412 & 414

5. Ibid., P. 412

6. The Foreign Policy of the Soviet State, P. 115

7. On March 2, 1919, an International Communist Conference met in Moscow. It was attended by 52 delegates from 35 organisations of 21 countries, there was none from India. On March 4, 1919, it became the Foundation Congress of the Communist International. G. Adhikari, ed., Documents of the History of the CPI, Vol. I 1919-22 (New Delhi: Peoples Publishing House, 1971), P.105.

8. In what he called an off the record remark, Lenin said in December, 1920, that Soviet Russia would maintain that the Comintern was not a governmental organisation. See Collected works, Vol. XXXI, P. 472

He had sound theoretical grounds for opposing the policy, advocated by the "Left" Bolsheviks, like Trotsky, of artificially "inseminating" revolution from without, for it ignores the internal conditions on the basis of which revolution matures in each separate country, and makes the position of the internal revolutionary forces more difficult, because it allows "reactionaries" to portray revolution as a product of foreign interference and, on that ground, to fan nationalism.⁹ He had practical problems too: The Civil war and foreign intervention, in the wake of the Revolution in Russia.¹⁰ Lenin was in "no doubt that the most insignificant concentration of forces by these three powers [Britain, France and Japan] would have been quite enough to win a victory over us in a few months, if not in a few weeks."¹¹ Bolshevik control, then, confined to the Great Russian interior.¹² The last interventionist forces, Japanese, were to be withdrawn not until October, 1922.¹³

9. P.N. Fedoseyev, ed., Leninist Theory of Socialist Revolution and the Contemporary world (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), P. 226

10. Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Bombay: The Times of India Press, 1969), PP 90 - 97.

11. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XXXI, PP. 412 - 13.

12. Merle Fainsod, Op.cit., P. 355

13. Ibid., P. 360

Therefore Lenin was not in a position to conduct military campaigns. He was making desperate attempts to buy peace with Germany in the teeth of opposition from the "Left" Bolsheviks.¹⁴ Brest Litovsk Treaty with Germany was finally signed on March 3, 1918; this deprived Russia of one third of her population.¹⁵

The survival of the Bolshevik regime being the one overriding consideration, Lenin had to follow a policy of moderation and pragmatism even in the economic field. While in the first flush of the Bolshevik victory, he introduced War Communism,¹⁶ which resulted in a disastrous situation, with peasant revolts and further fall in production both in agricultural as well as industrial sectors, he did not hesitate to revise the policy and give incentives to agriculture, small-scale industry and private trade in order to improve the economy.¹⁷ Lenin even confessed that the New Economic Policy was a "retreat".¹⁸

14. Bukharin was for a "revolutionary war", Trotsky, for a policy of "neither peace nor war". Trotsky resigned as Commissar of Foreign Relations on the eve of the talks with Germany for making a peace treaty, after the receipt of a 48-hour ultimatum, issued by Germany on February 23, 1918, for starting negotiations. See Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy 1917 - 1967 (New York : Fredrick A. Praeger, 1968), PP. 64 - 71.

On February 24, 1918, the Moscow Regional Bureau of the RSILP, then under the leadership of Bukharin and others, passed a resolution expressing its lack of confidence in the Central Committee and refusing "to obey unreservedly those decisions.... connected with the implementation of the terms of the peace treaty with Austria and Germany". See Lenin, Collected works, Vol. XXVII (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), P. 68.

15. Adam B. Ulam, op.cit., P. 71. The Ukraine, Finland, The Baltic states were granted independence and her polish territories were wrested away. In the Caucasus, territorial concessions were made to Turkey. Ibid.

16. Under it, all the surplus grain, sometimes even part of the grain the peasants required for food, was taken away. On June 28, 1918, virtually every important branch of industry was nationalised. See Merle Fainsod, op.cit., PP. 93 - 98.

17. Ibid.

18. The Foreign Policy of the Soviet State, P. 374

Lenin even sought to induce foreign capitalists to invest in Soviet Russia by offering them "concessions".¹⁹ The ~~benefits~~ that Lenin hoped to secure through various concessions were: 1. Rehabilitation of the economy through the restoration of trade with advanced capitalist countries, which would facilitate direct and extensive purchases of machinery and other essentials.²⁰ 2. An "opportunity to learn, by stipulating that our technicians take part in the work....."²¹ 3. Preclusion of wars with the capitalist countries "because war cancels every thing, and should one breakout we shall get possession of all the buildings, installations and railways"²² 4. Make "systematic use of the dissension between them [capitalist states] so as to hamper their struggle against us."²³ However, "in all but a few cases negotiations [with foreign capitalists] failed".²⁴

19. See Lenin, collected works, Vol. XXXI, PP. 478 - 79 and 493 for details on the Law on Concessions of November 23, 1920.

20. Ibid., PP. 471 and 473

21. Ibid., P. 481

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., P. 413. In 1920-21 the Soviet Government conducted negotiations with an American industrialist, W. Vanderlip, on concessions in Kamchatka, which caused extreme resentment in Japan, although there was only a draft agreement. Lenin sought to use this "dissension between them".

In his Report on Concessions to the VIII All-Russia Congress of Soviets on December 21, 1920, Lenin cynically observed: "Today we are giving America Kamchatka, which in any case is not actually ours because it is held by Japanese troops". By so doing "we are setting American imperialism against Japanese imperialism."
Ibid., P. 467

24. Merle Fainsod, op.cit., P. 98

In his quest for security, Lenin tried another strategy:

"grouping around the Soviet Republic those capitalist countries which are being strangled by imperialism."²⁵ He was encouraged by Poland's signing of a peace treaty with Soviet Russia in spite of French opposition. He felt that"..... The minor powers - and they form the majority of the world's population - are therefore all inclined to make peace with us."²⁶ And after Germany's defeat and humiliation, he thought that"..... her only means of salvation lies in an alliance with Soviet Russia....."²⁷ He was ready to befriend Germany in "an alliance of the oppressed masses, which is a factor in the future proletarian revolution."²⁸

Lenin also sought popularity for Soviet Russia among the small and weak states of Europe as well as the colonies by exposing the methods adopted by the then great powers to promote their interests at the expense of the small states.

25. Lenin, Collected works, Vol. XXXI, P. 478

26. Ibid., PP. 413 - 14

27. Ibid., PP. 475 - 76

28. Ibid., P. 478

Either for idealistic reasons or for embarrassing the great powers or for impressing the small and subject nations or for all of these, Soviet Russia annulled the secret treaties concluded by the Czarist and Provisional governments of Russia.²⁹ Soviet Russia also called for peace without annexations and indemnities,³⁰ another pronouncements sounding idealistic.

It was against this background of constant anxiety for the security of Soviet Russia, of uncertainties of the outcome of the Civil War and foreign interventions, and, therefore the need for caution in both domestic as well as foreign policies, that Lenin was faced with the question of formulating a policy towards the colonial and semi-colonial world.

He was convinced that in the last analysis, the outcome of the struggle of the world proletariat would be determined by the fact that Russia, India, China, etc., account for the overwhelming majority of the population of the world. Since this majority was drawn into the struggle for emancipation, he was convinced of the complete victory of socialism.³¹

29. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XXVI (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968), P. 251

Over a hundred secret treaties and documents were published in December 1917 and early 1918. Among them were a number of Austro-Hungarian, German, Italian, French, British and other documents.
The Foreign Policy of the Soviet State, P. 429

30. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol XXVI, P. 252

31. The Foreign Policy of the Soviet State, PP. 416 - 17

While it was "self-evident" that the final victory could be won only by the proletariat of all the advanced countries, they would "not be victorious without the aid of the working people of all the oppressed colonial nations, first and foremost of the Eastern nations".³² For, the socialist revolution "will not be solely, or chiefly, a struggle of the revolutionary proletarians in each country against their bourgeoisie..... the Civil War of the working people against the imperialists and exploiters in all the advanced countries is beginning to be combined with national wars against international imperialism".³³ In playing this auxiliary role in the world revolution, Lenin advised the Eastern Communists to rely on the general theory and practice of communism but, "you must adapt yourself to specific conditions such as do not exist in the European countries, you must be able to apply that theory and practice to conditions in which the bulk of the population are peasants, and in which the task is to wage a struggle against medieval survivals and not against capitalism".³⁴ Further the Eastern Communists "will have to base [themselves] on the bourgeois nationalism which is awakening among those peoples,..... and which has its historical justification".³⁵

32. Lenin's address to the Second All-Russia Congress of Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East, November, 22, 1919. The Foreign Policy of the Soviet State, P. 163.

33. Ibid., P. 160

34. Ibid., P. 162

35. Ibid., P. 163

At this stage it would be proper to assess the impact of the Bolshevik Revolution on India. The Marxist concept of equality of all peoples, the new Soviet government's denunciation of annexations and secret treaties, and the acceptance of the independence, although under unavoidable circumstances, of Finland and the Baltic States, and the new rulers' calls for the acceptance of the principle of national self-determination³⁶ naturally had some appeal to colonial India.

The authors of the Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms wrote in 1918:

The revolution in Russia in its beginning was regarded in India as a triumph over despotism, and, notwithstanding the fact that it has since involved that unhappy country in anarchy and dismemberment, it has given impetus to Indian political consciousness.....³⁷

However, Lenin was more interested in concluding a trade agreement with Britain than in exploiting this opportunity. The factors which inhibited him from taking advantage of the opportunity have been mentioned earlier.³⁸ There was no communist party in India then either.

36. Manuilsky was to say at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern that Bolshevism "always insists" on the absolute right of nations to dispose of themselves". See G. Adhikari, ed., op.cit., Vol. II, P. 364

37. Quoted in Chatter Singh Sarma, India and Anglo-Soviet Relations 1917 - 1947 (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1959), P. 29

38. See PP. 3 - 7

Lenin sent Leonid Krassin to London in May, 1920, to negotiate with the British government for concluding a trade agreement. The British government dragged its feet and the negotiation continued until March, 1921.³⁹ In July, 1920, the British Government presented a complete text of the trade agreement which in effect said that Soviet Russia had "to declare as a matter of principle" that she "would not carry on official propaganda or do any thing contrary to British interests in the East....." They asked whether we would like to sign it. We replied we would..... We are proposing maximum concessions, and we believe it to be in our interest to sign a trade pact⁴⁰

It was against this background that the Second Congress of the Comintern met in July-August, 1920, in Moscow and the famous debate, on the national and colonial questions, between the Indian Communist, M.N. Roy, and Lenin took place.

In the Colonial commission of the Comintern, Roy said, that masses in India were not infected by nationalism, that their interest lay in questions of socio-economic nature, that with her five million workers, India had elements for the creation of a strong communist party, that the European capitalists were in extreme cases, able to give all the surplus value to the workers to win them over and continue to exploit Asia.⁴¹

39. Chattar Singh Sarma, op.cit., P. 56

40. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XXXI, P. 473

41. G. Adhikari, ed., op.cit., Vol. I, P. 162

In view of this, Roy argued, attention should be paid to the development and advancement of the revolutionary movement in the East and to accept as the main thesis the proposition that the fate of the world of communism depended on the triumph of communism in the East.⁴² This was to become Roy's motif for the duration of his association with the Comintern.

Lenin maintained that though India had five million proletarians and thirty seven million landless peasants, Indian communists had failed in founding a communist party in the country and for that reason alone the views of Roy were largely unsubstantiated.⁴³

The differences on the question whether the Comintern should support bourgeois democratic movements were resolved by the "verbal expedient" of calling them "national revolutionary"⁴⁴

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid., P. 163

44. Jane Degras, ed., The Communist International 1919 - 1943: Documents, Vol. I (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1971), P. 139

Some of the important of Lenin's theses on the National and colonial question, adopted by the Congress, were: 1. The Comintern should bring together the working classes of all nations, for only such united action would ensure victory over capitalism, without which it was impossible to abolish national oppression and inequality of rights. 2. It should bring into being a close alliance of all national and colonial liberation movements with Soviet Russia; the forms taken by this alliance would be determined by the stage of development reached by the communist movement among the proletariat of each country. 3. Proletarian internationalism demands subordination of the interests of the proletarian struggle in one country to the interests of the struggle on a world scale; the nation which achieves victory over the bourgeoisie shall display the capacity and readiness to make the greatest national sacrifice in order to overthrow international capitalism. 4. All communist parties must support by action the revolutionary liberation movements in colonies. The form which this support shall take should be discussed with the communist party of the country in question, if there be one. 5 The Comintern should collaborate provisionally with the revolutionary movements of the colonies and backward countries, and even form an alliance with it; but it must not amalgamate the proletarian movement with it, even if it is only in an embryonic stage.⁴⁵

45. G. Adhikari, op.cit., Vol.I, PP. 198 - 205. I have not quoted all the theses; the numbers I have given to the theses I quoted are not the ones they get in the text.

Roy submitted supplementary theses, which were accepted by the Congress too. However, Lenin first amended Roy's original theses. Some of the important theses of Roy were: 1. One of the main sources from which European capitalism drew its main strength was no longer to be found in the industrial countries of Europe, but in the colonial possessions.⁴⁶ 2. The breaking up of the colonial empire, together with the proletarian revolution in the home country, would overthrow the capitalist system in Europe.⁴⁷ 3. There were two distinct movements in the dependent countries: (i) Bourgeois democratic nationalist movement with a programme of political independence under the bourgeois order. (ii) Mass action of peasants and workers for their liberation from all sorts of exploitation.⁴⁸

46. Ibid. PP. 180 - 81. Roy's original used the words " the fountain-head " from which European capitalism..... Ibid.

47. Ibid. Roy's original was : without the breaking up of the colonial empire, the overthrow of the capitalist system in Europe did not appear possible. Ibid.

48. The concept of mass action by workers etc., must have been influenced by the strikes^{of} the textile workers in Bombay between 1918 - 1920. By 1919, 125,000 workers were out and practically all textile mills were closed. Ibid., P. 206

A resolution passed by the first congress of the Comintern in March, 1919, said: "In India the revolutionary movement has not subsided for a single day, and has lately led to the greatest workers strike in Asia, which the British government met by ordering its armoured cars into action in Bombay" Ibid., P. 108

The former tried to control the latter and often succeeded in doing so. The Comintern and the parties affected must oppose such control and help develop class consciousness among the peasants and workers. However, in the struggle against imperialism and capitalism "the co-operation of the bourgeois nationalist revolutionary elements is useful".⁴⁹ The foremost and necessary task was the formation of Communist parties which would organise the peasants and workers and lead them to the revolution. "Thus the masses in the backward countries may reach communism, not through capitalistic development, but led by the class conscious proletariat of the advanced capitalist countries."⁵⁰ 3. The revolution in the colonies was not going to be communist in its first stage. It would be "extremely erroneous" in many of the oriental countries to try to solve the agrarian problem along pure communist lines. The revolution in the colonies must be carried out with a programme which would include many petty bourgeois reform clauses, such as ~~land~~ reforms etc. It did not "at all" mean that the leadership would have to be surrendered to the bourgeoisie.⁵¹

49. Ibid., PP. 184 - 85

50. Ibid. Roy's original thesis was: Bourgeois nationalist movements were limited to the small middle class which did not reflect the aspirations of the masses. But in many countries, especially in India, the masses were not with the bourgeois nationalist leaders; they were moving towards revolution independently of the bourgeois nationalist movement. Roy thought that the co-operation of the bourgeois nationalist movement might be useful - Ibid.

51. Ibid., PP. 186-87. Roy's original thesis said that it was true that the revolution in the colonies was not going to be communist; that it would be "very difficult" in many of the oriental countries to solve the agrarian problem along pure communist lines; that many bourgeois reform clauses, like land reforms, would be included in the programme of the revolution; that it did not necessarily follow that the leadership of the revolution would have to be surrendered to the bourgeois democrats. Ibid.

Roy's revolutionary zeal seemed to have been dampened by Lenin's refusal to indulge in revolutionary rhetoric. He wanted to move a resolution at the congress but did not "because I do not think that the questions can be discussed here with necessary impartiality"⁵²

M.N. Roy took the initiative and founded the communist party of India (CPI) at Tashkent on October 17, 1920.⁵³ Being very optimistic about the revolutionary potential of the Indian masses⁵⁴ and impatient to carry out a speedy revolution in India, Roy also set up the Indian Political and Military School at Tashkent in October, 1920.⁵⁵ Roy wanted to create a nucleus of Indian Liberation Army by enlisting the Indian muhajirs⁵⁶ (self-exiled) in Soviet central Asia. The Soviet government supplied⁵⁷ two train-loads of arms and deputed instructors to the School.

52. Ibid., P. 194

53. Ibid., P. 231

54. See PP. 16-11

55. G. Adhikari, op.cit., Vol.I, PP. 231 and 240.

56. When the British government refused to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire at the end of the world war I, as demanded by the Muslims of India, some of the more fanatical among them considered that British India "was no longer a fit country for the Muslims to live in"; and they left the country. see Muzaffar Ahmad, Myself and the Communist Party of India 1920-1929 (Calcutta: National Book Agency Pvt. Ltd., 1970), PP. 160 - 63.

57. G. Adhikari, op.cit., Vol.I, P. 240

In the meantime, after protracted negotiations, an Anglo-Soviet trade agreement was signed on March 16, 1921.⁵⁸ The agreement bound each party to refrain from "hostile actions or undertaking against the other....."⁵⁹ The agreement declared, "more particularly that the Russian Soviet Government refrains from any attempt, by military or diplomatic or any other form of action or propaganda, to encourage any of the peoples of Asia in any form of hostile action against British interest or the British Empire, especially in India and the Independent State of Afghanistan".⁶⁰

Lenin's interest in concluding a trade agreement, with Britain has already been mentioned.⁶¹ When it was concluded, Krassin, the Soviet negotiator of the deal, described it as "a great success for the Soviet Republic, as it ^{is} equivalent to the recognition ~~defacto~~ of the Soviet Government by the greatest of the capitalist powers".⁶² The Soviet government did not like to do anything which would put its relations with Britain in jeopardy. Therefore when the British government objected to the presence and activities of the Muhajirs in Soviet Central Asia, the Soviet government closed the Indian Military and Political School in Tashkent in May, 1921.⁶³

58. Chatter Singh Sarma, op.cit., P. 56

59. Ibid., P. 57

60. Ibid.

61. See PP. 9 -10

62. His telegram to Moscow, quoted in Chatter Singh Sarma, op.cit., P. 58

63. G. Adhikari, op.cit., Vol.I, P. 239. In May, 1921, the Communist University of the Toilers of the East was founded in Moscow. The Indians at Tashkent were sent to Moscow. Ibid., P. 240

The Third Congress of the Comintern met in June-July, 1921.⁶⁴

By then the Civil war had ended, so did the intervention for all practical purposes.⁶⁵ Excepting for the loss of Finland and the three Baltic States, whose freedom was recognised by Soviet Russia, the Bolsheviks brought the rest of the erstwhile Czarist empire under their control.⁶⁶ However, the economic position of the country was frightful; early economic radicalism,⁶⁷ besides the war, having contributed its mite to the plight. Bolshevik political control was more or less complete; but there was a lot of mass discontent due to economic hardships. In early 1921 "the most distinct danger signal was provided by the rebellion in the great naval base of Kronstadt".⁶⁸ It was suppressed.⁶⁹ Lenin now turned his attention to economic reconstruction.⁷⁰ He considered that a "living example, tackling the job somewhere in one country is more effective than any proclamations and conferences; this is what inspires working people in all countries."⁷¹

64. Ibid., P. 262

65. Adam B. Ulam, op.cit., P. 104. Japan was to leave only in October, 1922. See p. _____

66. Ibid.

67. See p. 4

68. Adam B. Ulma, op.cit., P. 126. Traditionally, they were "the most stalwart followers of the communists and their main support in 1917..."
Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. See PP. 4-5 for his new Economic Policy.

71. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XXVI, PP. 470 - 71.

Therefore, at the Third Congress of the Comintern, he continued his opposition to adventurist policies. He called for putting an end to the "Left" illusions that the original stormy tempo of the world revolution continued uninterrupted; and that the victory of the world revolution depended exclusively on the will of the communist parties and their activities⁷². As if to discourage any euphoria the impatient revolutionaries might have about the success of the Bolshevik revolution, Lenin said that "a small party"⁷³, like the Bolshevik, could carry out the revolution in Russia because they had, in addition to the support of the majority of the Soviets throughout the country, half the army with them, which then numbered at least ten million men. He asked them to show him a country where such conditions prevailed.⁷⁴

Lenin supported the German Communist party's call for a united front with social democrats, issued on the eve of the Congress, which was opposed by the "Leftists." He said that in Europe where almost all proletarians were organised, the communists "Must win the majority of the working class and anyone who fails to understand this is lost to the Communist movement".⁷⁵

72. G. Adhikari, op.cit., Vol. I, P. 263

73. In 1917, the total membership of the Bolshevik party was 23,600. Mere Fainsod, op.cit., P. 249

74. G. Adhikari, op.cit., Vol. I, P. 264

75. Ibid., P. 263

The Congress rejected the "theory of going over to the offensive".⁷⁶ The theses on the world situation and the tasks of the Comintern, adopted at the congress,, spoke of the "rigorous development of capitalism in the East, particularly in India and China" which created "new social bases there for the revolutionary struggle". The bourgeoisie of these countries having "tightened their bonds with foreign capital" had become "an important instrument of its rule". Their struggle against foreign imperialism was "half-hearted and feeble in character." The combination of Military oppression by foreign imperialism, of capitalist exploitation by the native and the foreign bourgeoisie, and the survival of the feudal servitude creates favourable conditions for the young proletariat of the colonies to develop rapidly and to take its place at the head of the revolutionary peasant movement". The popular revolutionary movement in India and in other colonies, the theses said, had become as integral a part of the world revolution as the uprising of the proletariat in the capitalist countries.⁷⁷ However, no licence was given for precipitate actions; these developments were to be used for building up communist parties.

Roy was unhappy with the way the Eastern question was discussed. He called it "purely opportunistic and more worthy of the programme of the Second International"⁷⁸.

76. Ibid., PP. 264 - 65

77. Ibid., PP. 265 - 66.

78. Ibid., P. 266. For more of Lenin's conciliatory gestures to Britain see Chatter Singh Sarma, op.cit., PP. 75 - 85.

There was famine in Russia in 1921-22. On July 30, 1921, the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI) called for international help to provide relief to the affected people. Though the Civil War and the intervention had practically ended, as late as December 21, 1920, Lenin spoke of "Secret" reports according to which the capitalist countries were about to launch " a new war against Soviet Russia in the spring".⁷⁹ Thus Lenin's fear for the security of Russia was still there, the state of the economy was bad, and added to these was the famine. Lenin's belief in the sympathy of the working class of the capitalist states for Soviet Russia and his view that the communist parties should win the support of the organised working class in Europe have been mentioned.⁸⁰ And now there was an additional need to win such support: assistance for the famine-stricken people of Russia. The labour unions in the capitalists could either bring pressure on their governments to give assistance to Russia or send some help themselves by voluntary contributions.

Whatever the considerations, the ECCI adopted the thesis on the United Front of the Working Class on December 18, 1921.⁸¹ Early in 1922, the ECCI took the initiative and called a conference of the representatives of the Second International and the Comintern to consider united action of the working class of Europe and America against the ~~post-war~~ offensive of the capitalists: retrenchments and wage cuts. The second International decided to hold a separate conference with the exclusion of the communists. Yet the ECCI, at its plenum in June 7-11, 1922, called for carrying forward the united front tactic.⁸²

⁷⁹. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XXXI, P. 468.

⁸⁰. See PP. 2 & 17

⁸¹. G. Adhikari, op.cit., Vo. I, P. 519

The Fourth Congress of the Comintern met between November 5 - December 5, 1922.⁸³ W. L. Roy, who made the report on the Eastern Question, again expressed his unhappiness with the scant attention paid by the Comintern to the study of the questions of development of the Comintern programme in the East.⁸⁴

The theses on the Eastern question adopted by the Congress spoke of the clash between native capitalism and world imperialism, and reiterated its support to "all national revolutionary movements against imperialism"⁸⁵ Peasant participation in the national liberation struggle being necessary for its success, land reforms which "can rouse the vast peasant masses" should form part of the anti-imperialist programme.⁸⁶

The Fourth Congress called upon the communist to adopt the United Labour Front tactics in the West and the United Anti-Imperialist Front tactics in the colonies and the semi-colonies. "Just as the watchword of the united labour front in the West facilitates the exposure of the social democratic betrayal of the interests of the proletariat, so the watchword of the united anti-imperialist front will facilitate the exposure of the wavering and hesitation of certain bourgeois nationalist groups in the East".⁸⁷

83. Ibid., P. 520

84. Ibid., P. 543.

85. Ibid., PP. 548 - 49

86. Ibid., P. 550.

87. Ibid., P. 555

The Communist parties in the colonies and semi-colonies "must take part in every movement that gives them access to the masses."⁸⁸ The refusal of the communists "in the colonies to participate against imperialist oppression on the pretext of alleged "defence" of independent class interests is opportunism of the worst kind calculated only to discredit the proletarian revolution in the East. No less harmful must be recognised the attempt to isolate oneself from the immediate and everyday interests of the working class for the sake of "national unity" or "civil peace" with bourgeois democracy".⁸⁹

At this stage, there was no unified communist party in India. Communist groups were organised independently of each other at Bombay, Madras, Calcutta and Lahore. In some cases the Comintern introduced leaders of the groups to one another.⁹⁰ On the eve of the Fourth Congress, Roy sent Charles Ashleigh of the British Communist Party to India to meet S.A. Dange,⁹¹ then leader of the Bombay group, and Muzaffar Ahmad of the Calcutta group, and request them to arrange to send delegates to the Congress; none went from India.⁹²

88. Ibid., P. 554

89. Ibid., P. 553

90. Muzaffar Ahmad, op.cit., P.78

91. See P. 211

92. G. Adhikari, op.cit., Vol.I, PP. 520 - 21 and 524. Muzaffar Ahmad accused Dange of having pocketed £ 800 that Ashleigh gave him for the prospective delegates' passage-money. Op.cit., PP. 319 -20. G. Adhikari denies it. op.cit., PP. 522 - 23

Roy wrote Dange on December 19, 1922, that the Comintern thought the time had come in India for the organisation a "revolutionary mass party..... as a part of the Congress".⁹³ The revolutionary left wing mass party in the National Congress "must be under the control and direction of our party which can not but be illegal".⁹⁴ Roy also suggested that a conference of the representatives of all the four communist groups should be held in Berlin to form a central nucleus of the communist party. Dange considered it a "mad venture for Indians to go hunting Communism in European conferences. Whatever has to be done, must be done in India. Moreover, there must be less talk of revolution than what Roy indulges in, even when the preliminary rights of labour are not obtained, it is a dream to talk of proletarian revolution."⁹⁵

Lenin died in January, 1924, and through a series of skilful manoeuvres and terror Stalin neutralised and liquidated influential individuals and groups, like Trotsky, the Zinoviev-Kamanev group and the Bukharin-Rykov-Tomsky group, and gained ascendancy over the party and the state by 1930.⁹⁶ And thus began the Stalin era.

93. Ibid. P. 525. The Congress is a reference to the Indian National Congress which, under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, led the Indian struggle for freedom.

94. Ibid.

95. His letter to Singaravelu Chettiar, the leader of the Madras group. Home Department, Political File No. 103/IV, PP. 3 - 30 - National Archives of India as quoted in Muzaffar Ahmad, op.cit. P. 305

96. See Adam B. Ulam, op.cit. P. 128 and also Merle Fainsod, op.cit. PP. 429 - 62. Also see below P. 26

THE STALIN ERA

Stalin was as cautious as Lenin in his leadership of the Comintern. If Lenin, with a hale round his head, had to be cautious because of domestic and international constraints, Stalin, in addition to having these constraints, also had to contend for power with brilliant people like Trotsky, Bukharin and others. Wrong steps and failures would cost him dearly.

In theory, Stalin remained a revolutionary. He thought that:the transition from capitalism to Socialism and the liberation of the working class from the yoke of capitalism can not be effected by slow changes, by reforms, but only a qualitative change of the capitalist system, by revolution.

Hence in order not to err in policy, one must be a revolutionary, not a reformist.

Hence, we must not cover up the contradictions of the capitalist system, but disclose and unravel them; we must not try to check the class struggle but carry it to its conclusion.⁹⁷

But at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern, the first to be held without Lenin, no revolutionary zeal was exhibited by Stalin. However, changes in the style of functioning were evident. The Report on National and Colonial Question was made by Manuilsky⁹⁸, one of "the most servile of Stalin's followers."⁹⁹ Irrepressible dissenter like Roy would not be acceptable to Stalin.

97. J.V. Stalin, Dialectical and Historical Materialism (Calcutta: National Book Agency Pvt. Ltd., 1975), P. 14

98. G. Adhikari, op.cit., Vol. II, P. 351

99. Adam B. Ulam, op.cit., P. 144

The resolution adopted at the Congress called upon the Communist parties to win the support of the peasant masses and the oppressed national minorities and to win over the revolutionary movements for the emancipation of colonial peoples so as to make them the allies of the revolutionary proletariat of the capitalist countries.¹⁰⁰ The resolution also called for a further development of the direct contact of the ECCI with the national movements for emancipation.¹⁰¹

Roy moved an amendment saying that while keeping in touch with the movement as a whole, direct contact must be maintained with the revolutionary element of the same.¹⁰² Roy's argument was that a movement which might have had a revolutionary significance in 1920 was not in the same position in 1924; classes which might have been allies of the revolutionary proletariat in 1920 would not be allies in 1924.¹⁰³

Roy was not opposed to the policy of wooing the parties leading the national liberation movements either. He had himself drafted radical manifestoes and got them distributed at the annual sessions of the Indian National Congress in 1921, 1922, and 1926¹⁰⁴ to win it over. Nothing of the sort had happened. Therefore, he wanted the Comintern to rely on communist groups, even if they were in an embryonic stage, while keeping in touch with the nationalist movement as a whole. This amendment was rejected as being at variance with Lenin's thesis adopted at the Second Congress.¹⁰⁵

100. G. Adhikari, op.cit., Vol.II, P. 350

101. Ibid., P. 351

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid., P. 358

104. For the texts of the manifestoes, see Muzaffar Ahmad, op.cit., PP. 136 - 51, 267 - 80, 492 - 510.

105. G. Adhikari, op.cit., Vol.II, P. 351. See p.12 for Lenin's theses.

Like Lenin, Stalin was opposed to the rigid application of the communist dogma or the Soviet revolutionary experience in all countries. In his address to the Communist University of the Toilers of the East in May, 1925, Stalin prescribed three strategies for varying conditions: 1. The rapid growth of capital in some countries, like India, had engendered a more or less numerous proletariat as well as the oppression of the workers by the native and foreign capitalists. The national bourgeoisie in such countries had split into a revolutionary section (the petty bourgeoisie) and a compromising section (the big bourgeoisie), the former continued the revolutionary struggle, while the latter entered into a bloc with imperialism. Under such conditions, the workers and the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie would form an anti-imperialist bloc.¹⁰⁶

2. In some countries, like Morocco, where there was neither a proletariat nor a bourgeoisie, a united anti-imperialist front was in order. In such cases, communist parties would be formed immediately before or just after the victory over imperialism.¹⁰⁷

3. In countries, like China and Egypt, with little development of industry or proletariat, there was a compromising section of the bourgeoisie which had not yet formed a bloc with the imperialists. Under such conditions, the communist party and the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie might be united in "a single party of workers and peasants, like the Kuomintang". This bloc, led by non-communists, would preserve the freedom of action of the communists. However, this would be a temporary arrangement.¹⁰⁸

106. Quoted in Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Policy Towards India: Ideology and Strategy (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 23 - 24.

107. Ibid.

108. Ibid.

In the meantime the power struggle continued in the Soviet Union. Having first isolated Trotsky by joining hands with the Zinoviev - Kamenev group, in the wake of Lenin's sickness which made him an invalid by December, 1922, Stalin later turned against the group when it sought to curb the menacing power of the General Secretary in 1924 - 25.¹⁰⁹

Then Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev united to oppose Stalin. At the Seventh Enlarged Plenary Meeting of the ECCI held in November-December, 1926, the three sought to revive Trotsky's dormant concept of "permanent revolution". According to a Soviet publication, the three maintained that socialism could be built in the Soviet Union only if there was a revolution in the West, and that such a revolution had to be "jagged" by any means, including the unleashing of a war.¹¹⁰ They spoke of the CPSU "ignoring the world revolution" and accused it of "national narrow-mindedness" and "degeneration". This attempt at changing the course of the Comintern was defeated.¹¹¹ If it were successful, Stalin's political fortunes would be affected. And Stalin acted swiftly; Zinoviev was removed from the Chairmanship of the ECCI.¹¹²

109. Adam B. Ulam, op.cit., P. 128. Stalin, then, made friends with the Bukharin-Rykov-Tomsky group, which was in turn destroyed by 1930, which made him the unquestioned leader. Ibid.

110. The Communist International (Brief Outline Prepared by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee of the CPSU) (New Delhi: New Age Printing Press for the CPI, 1969), P. 33 (hereinafter referred to as the Communist International).

111. Ibid.

112. Ibid., P. 34

The revival of Trotsky's concept of "permanent revolution" at the ECCI meeting in December, 1926 seemed to have mostly been politically motivated. This is borne out by the report of a special committee of the politburo of the CPSU presided over by Trotsky to study the question of China, submitted on March 26, 1926. This, preserved in his archive, did not call for any more revolutionary policy in China than envisaged by Stalin.¹¹³ The ~~path~~ ¹¹⁴ of the policy recommended by it was that following the Locarno Pact,¹¹⁴ the Soviet Union faced isolation and, perhaps, again a united front of other powers: she was in need of a breathing spell.¹¹⁵ This called for restraint in the Chinese revolution. Any intemperate attack upon foreign interests in China might lead to the creation of an anti-Soviet coalition. It was especially important not to isolate Japan. Thus, both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists should forego any move against the pre-Japanese warlord, Chang Tso-lin, who controlled Manchuria.¹¹⁶ The report also suggested that the question of allowing Japanese immigrants into the Siberian maritime provinces should be considered; this should be done "carefully and gradually" so that the Japanese would not ethnically dominate the region".¹¹⁷ So, when it came ^{to the} crunch, Trotsky was not opposed either to collaboration with the bourgeoisie or appeasement of the imperialists.

113. See P. 25 for Stalin's China strategy.

114. Under the Locarno pact of 1925, Germany pledged to observe her frontiers with France and Belgium. Britain and Italy in turn guaranteed militarily the status quo in the West. Germany was to enter the League of Nations and take a seat in its Council. See Adam B. Ulam, op.cit., P. 159

115. The Trotsky Archive T870 as quoted, Ibid., p. 175

116. Ibid.

117. Ibid., P. 176

Stalin, who was then in the throes of the struggle for absolute power, must have interpreted this about-turn in Trotsky's stand on China in less than nine months as challenge^a to his power. While he had defeated and disgraced most of his rivals by this time, they ^{were} still alive. Trotsky was exiled to Alma Ata in January 1928;¹¹⁸ but Zinoviev's and Kamanev's movements were not restricted though they were being subjected to increasing harassment.¹¹⁹ Like all tyrants, the more the power Stalin had acquired and the more the rivals he had defeated and disgraced, the more insecure he felt. He gave expression to this paranoia in a speech in April, 1928: "we have internal enemies. We have external enemies. This, comrades, must not be forgotten for a single moment".¹²⁰ The plural pronoun "we" in the speech was probably a euphemism for "I" or Stalin used "we" for "I" the way monarchs and the Popes traditionally did.

Stalin resorted to terror in his relentless drive for absolute power.¹²¹ However, terror against his rivals unaccompanied by necessary policy shifts would expose his lust for power. Besides, the Comintern's earlier policies brought no gains for the movement. In Western Europe, the workers looked to the Socialist

118. Merle Fainsod, op.cit., P. 154

119. Ibid., PP. 153 - 54

120. Quoted in Robert C. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind: Stalinism and Post-Stalin Change (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1972), P. 55.

121. See Merle Fainsod, op.cit., PP. 421 - 47

rather than Communist parties as their representatives. Any collaboration with the socialists was bound to increase susceptibility to ideological infections. Stalinism required that communist parties everywhere be parties of a truly new kind, with their loyalties due exclusively to Moscow.¹²² In the Far East, the Communist party of China, whose interests Moscow always subordinated to its interests, was decimated by Chiang Kai-shek in April, 1927, in his drive to become the political as well as the military master of the whole of China.¹²³

In India too communism made little progress. The Indian Government Report for 1926-27, made in 1928, declared: "Indigenous Communism, as represented by the so-called Communist party of India, seems to have made little appreciable headway."¹²⁴ Mahatma Gandhi, the leader of the Indian national movement, wrote as late as November, 1928: "I must confess that I have not yet been able fully to understand the meaning of bolshevism".¹²⁵ He continued "... from what I know of bolshevism it not only does not preclude the use of force but freely sanctions it..... It is my firm conviction that nothing enduring can be built on violence".¹²⁶ Thus, the hope of influencing and winning over the bourgeois leaders did not materialise.

122. Adam B. Ulam, op.cit., PP. 187-88

123. Ibid., PP. 176-78.

124. Quoted in Chatter Singh Sarma, op.cit., PP. 92-93

125. M.K. Gandhi in Young India, November 15, 1928 as quoted in Ideology and Emergency, Communist Party Publication No.9 (New Delhi: New Age Printing Press, 1976), PP. 27-28 (hereinafter referred to as Ideology and Emergency).

126. Ibid.

The reverses in Europe and the Far East and the pressure of Stalin's rivals at home called for radical new policies in domestic as well as external fronts.¹²⁷

The Sixth Congress of the Comintern met in Moscow in July - September, 1928. The Congress put emphasis on discipline. This international communist discipline must find expression in the subordination of the partial and local interests of the movement to its general and lasting interests and in the strict fulfilment, by all members, of the decisions made by leading bodies of the Comintern.¹²⁸

The Congress did not essentially differentiate between social democracy and facism. The left-wing of social democracy was characterised as the most dangerous faction of the social democratic parties.¹²⁹ The communists were to differentiate the social democratic leadership from the social democratic workers and work for the United Front From Blow.¹³⁰

127. It was in 1928, about the time the Sixth Congress of the Comintern was going to change its tactics, that Stalin began the forced collectivisation of agriculture and launched the First Five Year Plan with emphasis on heavy industry. See Merle Fainsod, op.cit., PP. 100 - 109.

128. The Communist International, P. 39.

129. Ibid., P. 40.

130. Ibid., PP. 38 and 40.

As for India: The CPI, the Comintern ordained, "must unmask the national reformism of the Indian National Congress and, in opposition to all talk of the Swarajists, Gandhists, etc., about passive resistance, advance the irreconcilable slogan of armed struggle for the emancipation of the country and the expulsion of the imperialists".¹³¹

The CPI met in Calcutta in December, 1928, after the Sixth Congress of the Comintern. It decided to make the party active and do propaganda in the name of the CPI.¹³² It swung to the left and decided to adopt the Sixth Comintern theses as the basis for work. This trend continued until 1934-35; the party was banned by the Indian government in 1934.¹³³

In the meantime important changes occurred in the national (Soviet) as well as international scenes. By 1930, Stalin became the unquestioned leader of the Soviet Union.¹³⁴ In Germany Hitler came to power in 1933 and consolidated his position.¹³⁵

At the Seventeenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) held early in 1934, Bukharin predicted an unavoidable Soviet collision with that irrational force (Hitler's fascism).¹³⁶ But Stalin thought otherwise. He cautioned the Germans

131. Jane Degras, op.cit., Vol. II, P. 544.

132. Until then there were four communist groups, See P. 21

133. M.R. Masani, The Communist Party of India: A Short History (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1967), PP. 21-22

134. See P. 26.

135. Walter Laqueur, A Dictionary of Politics (London: Pan Books Ltd., 1973) PP. 223-25

136. Robert C. Tucker, op.cit., PP. 73-74

against thinking that the USSR was now orienting itself towards France and Poland because fascism had come to power in Germany. "Of course, we are far from enthusiastic about the fascist regime in Germany", he said. "But fascism is beside the point, if only because fascism in Italy, for example, has not kept the USSR from establishing the best of relations with that country". He indicated a rapprochement with Berlin, if Soviet interests would be served thereby.¹³⁷

At this stage there was no response from Hitler. In the Far East too the developments since the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 were disquieting. The Western powers did not react in any effective way. Moscow could not be sure of Japan's next target: it might be Soviet satellite of Outer Mongolia or the Soviet Far Eastern territories. The Soviet Union, therefore, significantly strengthened her Far Eastern army, but spared no effort to come to an understanding with Japan, including an offer to enter into a nonaggression treaty.¹³⁸

The Seventh Congress of the Comintern met in July - August, 1935, amidst such Soviet fears and uncertainties. It was evident from the tone and tenor of the Report made by Dimitroff and the resolutions adopted at the Congress that even while making efforts to come to terms, if possible, with the fascist powers, the Soviet leaders were trying to woo the West as an insurance against their failure to arrive at an understanding with the fascists.

137. Quoted, *Ibid.*

138. Adam B. Ulam, *op.cit.*, PP. 200-201

Dimitrov's report stressed that the Germans fascism was the mailed fist of international counter-revolution; that it was the main force of world fascist reaction, the chief instigator of another imperialist war and the sworn enemy of the Soviet Union. Fascism was a tremendous step backwards from bourgeois democracy.¹³⁹

The Congress rejected the thesis of equal responsibility of all capitalist states for the unleashing of war and directed its main blow against the fascist states: Germany, Italy and Japan.¹⁴⁰

The Congress directed the communist parties to work for a United Front with social democrats against fascism at all levels.¹⁴¹ The untouchability, imposed against the social democrats leadership by the Sixth Congress of the Comintern under the united front from below tactics was, abolished "Revolutionary" trade unions which had not yet become mass organisations were asked to join "reformist" trade unions. Mass revolutionary trade unions were directed to seek unity with mass reformist trade unions on an equal footing subject to two conditions: 1. Freedom to wage a class struggle in the interests of the proletariat. 2. Observance of democracy within the unions.¹⁴²

The Congress called for the formation of popular Front. It was based on the idea that in the struggle for democracy it is possible to defeat fascism, restrict the power of capital and create favourable initial conditions for further struggle for socialism.

139. The Communist International, P. 56

140. Ibid., P. 62

141. Ibid. P. 58

142. Ibid.

The Congress drew the conclusion that united action by proletariat, peasantry, urban petty bourgeoisie, artisans and the working intelligentsia was possible.¹⁴³

The Communist parties could participate in popular Front Governments and parliaments.¹⁴⁴

In the colonies the creation of a United Anti-Imperialist Front was the prime task of the communist parties. An alliance between the proletariat and peasantry in the colonies was of special significance. Attaching great importance to rallying together of all revolutionary forces of the world, the Congress directed the communist parties actively to support the national liberation struggle of the oppressed colonial and semi-colonial peoples. The Congress also sharply criticised those who believed that the national bourgeoisie was thoroughly pro-imperialistic.¹⁴⁵

In the event of fascist aggression the proletariat and the communist parties must, the congress declared, defend the national independence of their countries. This was a reversal of Lenin's policy.¹⁴⁶ In order to create the illusion of the autonomy of the

143. Ibid., P. 59.

144. Ibid., P. 60

145. Ibid., P. 61

146. Ibid., P. 62. When Lenin said that one of the advantages of the policy of offering concessions to American capitalists was that it would set American imperialism against Japanese, one comrade in his audience observed that a war between the USA and Japan would only lead to "the shedding of workers' blood!" Lenin's reaction was that "socialists should think not of defending their respective countries but of overthrowing the capitalists" See Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XXXI, P. 470. See also P. 5 foot note 23.

Communist parties, the Congress also advised the ECCI to avoid, as a rule, direct intervention in internal organisational matters of the Communist parties.¹⁴⁷ However, the Congress also declared that it was the duty of the communist parties to help with all their might and by all means to strengthen the USSR and to fight her enemies.¹⁴⁸

Wang Ming of the Chinese Communist Party who made the report on the colonial countries, berated the CPI for their "left " Sectarian errors", and, for their failure to "participate in all the demonstrations organised by the National Congress".¹⁴⁹ Since the CPI did not have sufficient strength " independently to organise a powerful and mass anti-imperialist movement ", it was " to a considerable extent isolated from the mass of the people....."¹⁵⁰

The directive to the CPI was that it should " in no case disregard work within the National Congress and the national revolutionary and national reformist organisations affiliated with it, maintaining at the same time their complete political and organisational independence".¹⁵¹

147. The Communist International, PP. 63 - 64

148. Ibid., P. 63

149. Quoted in M.R. Masani, op.cit., PP. 40 - 41.

150. Ibid.

151. Ibid.

At this stage, it is proper to discuss how best the CPI followed the directives of the Comintern. It has already been mentioned that the CPI was banned by the Indian government in 1934.¹⁵² In the same year the socialist intellectuals of the Congress party formed a Congress socialist party (CSP) within the congress.¹⁵³ Jaya Prakash Narayan,¹⁵⁴ who was the General-Secretary of the Congress Socialist Party was very enthusiastic about a united front between the CSP and the CPI.¹⁵⁵ In January, 1936, the CSP decided to respond favourably to the suggestion of a united front with the CPI.¹⁵⁶ The character of the front was to be two-fold: one, a united front as between party and party and, two, admission of individual communists to membership of the CSP to pave the way for complete merger and socialist unity. The CPI, taken to task for its "left" sectarianism at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, avidly seized the opportunity and by 1937-38 the CSP had two communists as Joint Secretaries and two others in the Executive Committee.¹⁵⁷

But the CPI's united front tactics were not in the spirit of cooperation in a joint anti-imperialist struggle, but were calculated to isolate the national leadership from the rank and file.¹⁵⁸ At the National Executive meeting of the CSP in

152. See P. 31

153. M.R. Masani, *op.cit.*, P. 37

154. He spearheaded the movement against Mrs. Indira Gandhi's authoritarianism and was instrumental in ending her diatatorial regime in March, 1977. See also chapter VIII, P. 261

155. M.R. Masani, *op.cit.*, P. 49.

156. *Ibid.*, P. 50

157. *Ibid.*, P. 50

158. *Ibid.*, P. 44

Patna in 1937 a statement of the CPI was read which caused great indignation. It said that the CSP was no socialist party and that it was to be used only as a plat form.¹⁵⁹ Later in September, 1938, M.R. Masani, Joint Secretary of the CSP, published a secret CPI circular dated May 9, 1938, which laid down in detail the tactics to be followed by the communists to capture the socialist party.¹⁶⁰ The tensions between the CSP and the CPI reached such levels that in 1940 the CSP expelled all communists from the party and ended the united front.¹⁶¹

Now to return to Stalin: he left no stone unturned to ensure the security of his country. He was not complacent about his far Eastern borders, having made friendly overture to Japan.¹⁶² He tried to bring about a rapprochement between the Chinese Communist Party and Chiang Kai-shek in the hope that collective Chinese resistance to the Japanese aggression on their country would make it hard for Japan to turn on the Soviet Far Eastern territories. The appeal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China of August 1, 1935, for ending the internecine strife in the country and organising joint military operations against Japan, was drafted with the active participation of the ECCI.¹⁶³

Stalin's attempts for arriving at an agreement with Germany brought no results in 1936 and 1937. On the contrary, Hitler would soliloquise about the benefits that would accrue to Germany if she could have the fertile plains of the Ukraine at her disposal.¹⁶⁴ The Anti-Comintern Pact of November 25, 1936,

159. Ibid., PP. 51-52

160. Ibid.

161. Ibid. P. 54

162. See P. 32

163. The Communist International, P. 55

164. Adam B. Ulam, op.cit., PP. 238-39

between Germany and Japan heightened Moscow's fear.¹⁶⁵ By the end of 1936, the situation in the Far East was bleak. Chiang Kai-shek rebuffed the Chinese Communist appeal for joint action against Japan; on the contrary, direct negotiations were going on between the Chinese and Japanese governments. Any agreement between them would be disastrous for the USSR as well as the Chinese communists.¹⁶⁶

However, domestic compulsions¹⁶⁷ made Chiang Kai-shek agreeable to an understanding with the Chinese Communists in 1936-37. Under this agreement the Red Army was to be subordinated to Chiang's command, and he would end fratricidal war and take a strong anti-Japanese stand.¹⁶⁸

Japan was angry with this development. On July 7, 1937, Japan attacked China.¹⁶⁹ This turn of events was an undoubted triumph for Moscow. And in August, 1937, China and the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of Nonaggression and Friendship. Thus, in the Far East the Soviet Union got some respite.

165. Ibid., P. 239

166. Ibid., P. 248

167. This is a reference to the famous "Sian Incident". Chang Hsueh-ling, a former boss of Manchuria, who was to command the campaign against the communists then planned by Chiang Kai-shek, not only refused to fight the fellow Chinese but also imprisoned Chiang when he flew to Chang's base in December, 1936. Chiang was released following Chou En-lai's intervention. Ibid., PP. 248 - 49

168. Ibid., P. 249

169. Ibid., In June, 1937, Japan occupied two Soviet islets in the Amur river following a sharp Soviet-Japanese armed clash. Moscow acquiesced in the occupation. Ibid., P. 250

In Europe, however, there were no such encouraging developments. Britain and France were following an appeasement policy towards Hitler. This policy could not but have caused misgivings to any normal man in charge of Soviet foreign policy in view of the state of relations between Moscow and the West. Nothing need be said about the reaction of an abnormally suspicious person like Stalin to such a policy.

After the occupation of Austria by Hitler in March, 1938, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Litvinov, issued a statement on March 17, 1938, appealing to "all the states and the Great powers in particular [to] take a firm and unambiguous stand" before it was "too late."¹⁷⁰ But Britain felt it was undesirable to divide Europe into two groups.¹⁷¹

The Soviet Union was nervous. About the same time that the negotiations with the British were begun to come to an understanding, an approach was made to Germany.¹⁷² The West's response was "half-hearted", and tactics, "dilatatory".¹⁷³ Hitler, at least temporarily, would prefer to avoid fighting on two fronts.¹⁷⁴ Therefore, on August 23, 1939, the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact was signed.¹⁷⁵

Hitler's forces marched into Poland on September 1, 1939. Britain and France declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939.¹⁷⁶ Thus began World War II. Stalin also took advantage

170. Quoted, Ibid., P. 253

171. Ibid.

172. Ibid., P. 271

173. Ibid., P. 274

174. Ibid., PP. 267-68

175. Ibid., P. 276.

176. Ibid., PP. 278-79

of his treaty with Germany for territorial aggrandisement.¹⁷⁷
 But Hitler did not wait too long; German forces attacked the
 Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.¹⁷⁸

Like all communist parties, the CPI had to defend
 all dubious Russian moves. While the Soviet Union herself
 behaved like an imperialist power by absorbing the three Baltic
 states into the USSR and extracting territorial concessions from
 Finland, the CPI, like other communist parties, called world War II
 as waged by Britain and France an imperialist war. The CPI took
 the Congress party to task for its inactivity. A manifesto
 issued by the CPI on January 26, 1940, declared:

No longer is Britain the master of the situation,
 master of our destiny..... Never were we as powerful
 as we are today. Never was our enemy so weak.¹⁷⁹

The CPI wanted the congress to intensify the freedom struggle
 to take advantage of Britain's problems in Europe.

177. When the Finns refused to move the frontier on the Karelian Isthmus away from Leningrad and grant bases to the USSR on Finnish territory, the Soviet forces invaded Finland at the end of November, 1939. The Finns fought back bravely. Moscow stopped the war in March, 1940, for fear of the landing of a Franco-British expeditionary corps. But Moscow did extract concessions it wanted. On June 15-16, 1940, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were occupied. Ibid., PP. 290 - 97.

178. Ibid., P. 312

179. Quoted in Chattar Singh Sarma, Op.cit., P. 151

For six months after the German attack on the Soviet Union, the CPI continued to call the war as fought by the West an "imperialist War" and, as waged by the USSR, a "people's war."¹⁸⁰ Harry Politt, Secretary of the British Communist Party, wrote a letter to the CPI leaders asking them to drop this distinction. This letter was delivered to the communist leaders in their detention camp at Deoli by courtesy of Sir Reginald Maxwell, the then Home Secretary of the Government of India. Soon thereafter, the imperialist war became a "people's war"¹⁸¹ on July 24, 1942, the British government lifted the ban on the CPI.¹⁸²

The Congress Party also opposed the war, but for a different reason.¹⁸³ On August 8, 1942, the congress passed the "Quit India" resolution. On August 9, 1942, almost all the congress leaders were arrested, and the country broke out into a spontaneous revolt.¹⁸⁴

The CPI held its First Congress in May, 1943. A resolution passed on May 23, 1943, called the nationalist leaders "fifth columnists", "traitors", and "criminal gangs". The CPI declared that these "must be treated by every honest Indian as the worst enemy of the nation and driven out of political life and exterminated".¹⁸⁵

180. Ibid.

181. M.R. Masani, op.cit., P. 62.

182. Ibid.

183. See chapter II, P.P. 72 - 73.

184. M.R. Masani, op.cit., P. 63.

185. Ibid., P. 219

On the role of the workers, the resolution declared:

It is the patriotic duty of the worker to strengthen defence by taking initiative for organising more production and better transport and against stoppage of work irrespective of what the boss or the bureaucrat does..... Communists take a bold and open stand against strikes as they injure the defence of the country by holding up production.¹⁸⁶

The CPI spied on the underground resistance leaders and got them arrested wherever possible.¹⁸⁷

The British Indian government was happy with the role of the CPI. It was allowed to establish contact with Moscow by sending a goodwill mission there in October, 1942.¹⁸⁸ The United front tactics of the CPI between 1936-40 helped strengthen the party. By the time the CSP ended the united front,¹⁸⁹ the CPI succeeded in spitting the All-India Students' Federation, the All-India Kisan Sabha (Farmers Union).¹⁹⁰

While parting, the communists carried with them almost intact three of the best organised state branches of the CSP: Tamilnad, Andhra and Kerala.¹⁹¹ During 1942-45 when all nationalist political leaders and workers were either in prison or underground, the CPI strengthened itself. During this period the All India Trade Union Congress also became a purely communist organisation.¹⁹²

186. Ibid.

187. Ibid., P. 64

188. Chattar Singh Sarma, op.cit., P. 152.

189. See P. 37

190. M.R. Masani, op.cit., P. 60

191. Ibid., PP. 60-61

192. Ibid., PP. 67 and 36-37

The Anglo-Soviet alliance drew heavily on Indian resources. Indian troops guarded the supply routes in the Middle East, to the Soviet Union. India's industrial and agricultural products and raw materials formed a considerable segment of British shipments to the Soviet Union. During this period the Soviet Union did not say a word in support of India's freedom.¹⁹³

The cooperation between the Soviet Union and the West did not last long. Stalin's attempts at the imposition of communism on East European countries caused anxiety in the West. At Fulton, Missouri, Churchill advocated an alliance between the United States and the Commonwealth against the growing threat from the Soviet Union, on March 5, 1946.¹⁹⁴

On August 15, 1947, India became independent. Moscow remained indifferent to the event, being busy with East European affairs. Stalin preferred the certain benefits that would accrue to his country from turning Eastern Europe into a belt of satellites¹⁹⁵ to running after the uncertain benefits from wooing the new nations.

193. Chattar Sing Sarma, op.cit., PP. 152-53

194. Walter Laqueur, op.cit., P. 189

195. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1967) for the process of Communisation of Eastern Europe.

One and a half years after Churchill's speech, Zhdanov delivered a speech at the meeting which founded Cominform in September, 1947; he advanced his "two camps" concept in this speech.¹⁹⁶ He announced the end of collaboration between the USSR and the West. His attack on the French and Italian communists meant an end to their hopes of sharing or acquiring governmental power through constitutional means; at the same time, the parties were not given the licence for full-scale revolutionary action. They were simply to disrupt and destroy any prospects for success of the European recovery plan.¹⁹⁷

Zhdanov seemed to have kept open the communist camp's options to befriend the emerging nationalist regimes. He thought that Indo-China and Indonesia were not only truly independent of the West but also "associated with" the Soviet camp; he also felt that Egypt, Syria and India had reached the stage where they "sympathised with" it.¹⁹⁸

It is possible that Nehru's admiration for the Soviet Union, exhibited in his pre-independence writings and speeches,¹⁹⁹ gave the impression to Zhdanov that India had also reached the stage where she "sympathised with" the Soviet bloc. At any rate this view of India not last long.

196. Adam B. Ulam, op.cit., P. 460

197. Ibid.

198. Quoted in Uri Ra'anani, The USSR Arms the Third World: Case Studies in Soviet Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, P. 39

199. See Chapter II, PP. 78 - 84

Not long after Zhdanov's speech, the Soviet Indian expert, Dyakov, wrote that the acceptance of the Mountbatten plan [partition of India] by the Congress "was the result of a compromise and deal between the Indian bourgeoisie and British imperialism".²⁰⁰ The deal, he thought was based on concessions made by the both sides. "The British government announced that it was prepared to grant India dominion status. Congress, for its part, renounced the demand for immediate Indian independence and consented to the partition of the country."²⁰¹

However, Dyakov averred that as a result of the partition, "Hindustan has become a relatively more highly industrial and capitalist country than was pre-partition India as a whole. The weight and influence of the feudal elements have somewhat declined in Hindustan..... The relative importance of both the native bourgeoisie and the working class in this dominion has accordingly been enhanced".²⁰² Anyway, Stalin did not take interest in developing warm relations with India.²⁰³

In his last theoretical work, written in 1952, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, Stalin elevated the two camps concept to the status of a canon. He wrote that one of the consequences of World War II was the birth of:

...a united and powerful Socialist camp confronting the camp of capitalism. The economic consequences of the existence of two opposite camps was that the single all-embracing world market disintegrated, so that now we have two parallel world markets, also confronting one another."²⁰⁴

200. A. Dyakov, "Partitioned India", New Times, No. 3 (January 14, 1948), P. 3

201. Ibid.

202. Ibid., P. 6

203. See Chapter III, PP. 94-101 for Indo-Soviet relations during the Stalin era.

204. Bruce Franklin, ed; The Essential Stalin: Major Theoretical Writings 1905-1952 (London: Croom Helm, 1973), P. 468

Since the economies of the new nations were appendages to the capitalist economies of the West, it could be inferred that the new nations were part of the camp confronting the Socialist camp. Whatever might have been the reason, Stalin did not develop a separate policy towards the emerging world.

We will now briefly discuss how the CPI conducted itself in the post-War and post-independence era. The party carried the stigma of following a traitorous policy in furtherance of the interests of the USSR. In the general elections to the Central Legislative Assembly in 1946, the CPI could not carry a single constituency.²⁰⁵ After the independence, the party, under the leadership of P.C. Joshi, followed a moderate policy. It held its Second Congress in Calcutta in February, 1948, after Zhdanov's speech. The impact of Zhdanov's speech on the party was evident. A political thesis adopted at the congress said that the "bourgeois leadership" had "betrayed" the freedom struggle and "struck a treacherous deal behind the back of the starving people....."²⁰⁶ The CPI was purged of all "reformists" elements. B.T. Ranadive was elected the General Secretary. He followed a policy of reckless violence and insurrection.²⁰⁷ Many calls for strike were given; almost all of them failed. The party was banned in the states of West Bengal, Madras, Hyderabad and Travancore-Cochin in 1948. The CPI's membership dwindled from 90,00 in 1948 to 20,000 in 1950 and that of its trade union, AITUC, from 700,000 to 100,000 during the same period.²⁰⁸

205. M.R. Masani, op.cit., P. 69

206. Quoted, Ibid., P. 72

207. Ibid., P. 73

208. Ibid., PP. 73-82

In June, 1950, Ranadive was ousted. C. Rajeshwar Rao became the General Secretary of the party. Moscow invited a delegation of the CPI leaders in 1950; the delegation returned home with an important secret document, the Tactical Line, in 1951. This document emphatically said that without an armed revolution the Indian government could not be replaced; that the armed revolution would be a combination of partisan war in the rural areas and armed workers' risings in the cities. The entire work of the party was to lead, step by step, to this ultimate goal.²⁰⁹

In May, 1951, the party published a policy statement which was a rehash of the tactical line, which, being a secret document, could not be published. The statement called India a dependent semi-colonial country. The keys to naval and military defence were held by the British. The Statement said that in view of the backwardness of the economic development and the weakness of the mass organisations of the workers, and peasants etc., the party did not find it possible to carry out immediately a socialist transformation of the country. It would work for a new government of People's Democracy, created on the basis of a coalition of all democratic, anti-feudal and anti-imperialist forces in the country.²¹⁰ In October, 1951, the party unconditionally withdrew the Telangana "struggle", i.e., insurrection,²¹¹ an acceptance of its failure.

209. Ibid., PP. 85-96 The historians of the CPI published the Tactical Line at a later stage.

210. Ibid., PP. 95-97

211. Ibid., P. 100 See Chapter III, P. 100.

POST-STALIN POLICIES

Stalin died in March, 1953, having stabilised the communist regimes in Eastern Europe.

After Stalin's death, there was a significant change in the Soviet attitude to the non-communist world. The natural urge for change after three decades of terror under Stalin, realisation of the dangers involved in further communist expansion and, therefore, a desire to consolidate what they had,²¹² some feeling of security induced by the West's unwillingness to intervene in the East German workers revolt in the summer of 1953,²¹³ when the Soviet Union was in a state of flux following Stalin's death, the possibility of taking advantage of increasing tensions in the relations of the West and the non-aligned states on account, particularly, of differences on colonial and racial issues²¹⁴ must have contributed to this change in Soviet policy.

212. Bertrend Russel's suggestion, to the USSR and the United States, to "abandon the futile strife and agree to allow to each a sphere proportionate to its present power", in his open letters to Eisenhower and Khrushchev, published in the New Statesman on November 23, 1957, was readily accepted by Khrushchev in his reply to the open letter, also published in the New Statesman on December 21, 1957. Khrushchev wrote that he was ready to lend his name to Russel's thesis "that East and West should recognise their respective rights...." and accept the "Status quo". See the texts of the letters in International Affairs (Moscow), No.1 (1958), PP. 10-13.

213. David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1962) P. 96.

214. See Chapter IV.

At first there were certain changes in the domestic political scene in the Soviet Union suggestive of a departure from the Stalinist legacy. Steps were taken to mitigate terror and give a more humane look to Soviet administration. An amnesty decree was issued on March 27, 1953. A Pravda editorial on March 30, 1953, promised that all cases of official "high-handedness and lawlessness" would be rooted out and that constitutional rights would be safeguarded.²¹⁵ On one question different groups in the party held the same opinion: the need to control the secret police (MVD) Beria, whose control of the awesome MVD was considered a threat by all other leaders, was accused of seeking to set the MVD "above the party and government", arrested in July, 1953, and shot in December, 1953.²¹⁶

The leadership of the party and the government were entrusted to Khrushchev and Malenkov respectively, thus dispersing power.²¹⁷ This did not finally settle the struggle for power. Besides that, important policy issues seemed to have divided the new leaders. Malenkov was of the opinion that a nuclear war would result in "the destruction of world civilisation" and, therefore, called for a detente with the West.²¹⁸ Khrushchev, on the other hand, thought that a nuclear war would only mean the end of capitalism rather than of world civilisation.²¹⁹

215. Merv Fainsod, op.cit., P. 447

216. Ibid. See also PP. 162-163

217. Ibid., PP. 161-62

218. Pravda, March 13, 1954, as quoted, Ibid., P. 164

219. Izvestia, June, 1954, as quoted, Ibid., P. 165

But after Malenkov's fall from power on February 8, 1955,²²⁰ Khrushchev did what Malenkov proposed to do-work for the relaxation of tensions. Khrushchev seemed to have opposed Malenkov more for reasons of political expediency than out of conviction.

Within months of Stalin's death, Malenkov, the then Prime Minister, made friendly references to India.²²¹ Another few months, and there was a convergence of Indo-Soviet interests on the issue of the United States supply of arms to Pakistan in return for military bases offered by her.²²²

Once Khrushchev gained ascendancy, he made conciliatory gestures to the West: Austrian State Treaty was signed on May 15, 1955, under which occupation forces, including Soviet, were withdrawn and sovereignty restored to the country subject to the condition that Austria would remain neutral.²²³ Moscow agreed to return the Porkkala naval base to Finland, during the visit of the country's President to Moscow in September, 1955.²²⁴ Khrushchev and Bulgarin attended the Geneva Summit conference, July 18-23, 1955, with the heads of the United States, British and French governments, thus establishing personal contacts with the Western leaders.²²⁵

220. Ibid., P. 166

221. See chapter III, P. 101

222. Ibid., P. 102

223. David J. Dallin, op.cit., P. 260

224. Ibid., P. 272.

225. Ibid., P. 281. Nothing was achieved at the Summit. Eisenhower raised three issues: Germany, Eastern Europe and international communism. Bulgarin, on the other hand, wanted discussions on disarmament, prohibition of atomic weapons, collective security etc.

Later, Khrushchev began a policy of assiduously courting the non-aligned nations. Success with the non-aligned nations would serve Soviet interests in some respects: 1. If the Soviet Union could convince the non-aligned about her peaceful intentions and if this would result in more adherents being won for the non-aligned movement, Soviet interests would be served to an extent. In those days the United States was feverishly building military alliances against the USSR and acquiring bases. The more the non-alignment gained momentum, the less would be American opportunities to acquire bases.²²⁶ 2. Soviet image, badly tarnished during Stalin's stewardship of the country, would improve if Moscow succeeded in winning the trust of the non-aligned. 3. The West would have to take into consideration not only Moscow's growing power but also its new influence and respectability in dealing with it.

Naturally, India, as the biggest of the non-aligned states, received due importance from Moscow. The genuineness of India's non-alignment and her eagerness to improve relations with the Socialist countries were demonstrated by the fact that even when Stalin remained indifferent to New Delhi, Nehru stuck to the policy, and where possible, improved relations with Socialist countries.²²⁷

Moscow began its new diplomacy. Khrushchev and Bulganin exchanged visits with the leaders of India, Burma and Afghanistan.²²⁸

226. See Chapter II, P. 89 for Arnold Woefers' view.

227. See Chapter, VII PP. 199-200 for Nehru's successful initial efforts to develop friendly relations with China.

228. See Chapter III, PP. / for their visit to India.

It is customary for the Soviet leadership to interpret anew the Marxist dogma to suit the state interests of the Soviet Union, and, thus, continue to claim ideological exactitude. The needs of the Soviet State in the mid-1950s called for such an exercise; and the XXth Congress of the CPSU was utilised for the purpose.

THE XXTH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU

The Congress was used by Khrushchev and his colleagues to demolish the Stalin myth.²²⁹ In his Report to the Congress, Khrushchev also called for unity between communists and socialists.²³⁰ He gave due importance to the new nations in his Report. He mentioned the exchange of visits by the Soviet leaders with the leaders of India, Burma and Afghanistan as a proof of growing friendship between Eastern peoples and the Socialist bloc.²³¹

229. See Merle Fainsod, op.cit., PP. 124-125.

230. Pravda, February 15, 1956. Complete text in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. VIII, No.4, P. 8 (hereinafter referred to as CDSP). This call was repeated by the conference of World Communist Parties in November 1960. It called for joint action by communist and socialist parties on a national and international scale. Pravda, December 6, 1960.

231. Pravda, February 15, 1956. Complete text in CDSP, Vol VIII, No. 4., P. 8.

The most important part of his Report was the theses on international developments: 1. Peaceful co-existence was not a mere tactical expedient but a fundamental principle of Soviet foreign policy, based on the certainty of the victory of communism in peaceful competition. His rationale for the new policy was: "either peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war in history; there is no third way". 2. The Marxist-Leninist concept of wars being inevitable as long as imperialism exists remains valid. "But war is not a fatalistic inevitability". This new evaluation stemmed from the existence of "mighty social and political forces" which possessed formidable means to prevent the "imperialists" from unleashing war. 3. There are increasing possibilities of non-violent transformations to socialism in a number of capitalist countries. However, he did not rule out "sharp revolutionary class struggle" where "reactionary forces" offer serious resistance.²³²

There was nothing new about the new theses. They were said before either by communist stalwarts or in the resolutions adopted at the congresses. While asserting the inevitability of the triumph of communism, Lenin adopted the policy of peaceful coexistence and opposed the export of revolution by Soviet Russia.²³³ Even at the height of tensions in the mid-1930s, the VIIth Congress of the Comintern rejected the fatalistic notion that war was inevitable, and noted the new possibilities of struggle for peace because of the changed balance of class forces in the world. Karl Marx felt

232. Ibid., PP. 9-11

233. See PP. 2 - 5

234. The Communist International, P. 62.

that in countries like the United States, United Kingdom and Holland " the working people may achieve their goal [socialism] by peaceful means ".²³⁵

As a natural corollary to this policy of reiteration of peaceful intentions, Khrushchev developed a separate policy towards the non-aligned world. By the mid-1950s, the non-aligned countries had attained some importance in international politics; they represented a significant part of the world's population; they were also frequently at odds with the West on colonial and racial issues. Khrushchev had also established rapport with some non-aligned leaders through exchange of visits. He sought to consolidate the relationship with the new non-aligned states of Afro-Asia as well as with the neutral states of Europe through a doctrinal innovation-the concept of " peace Zone ".

Khrushchev said in his Report that the Socialist states and the " peace loving " European and Asian States, which proclaimed " non-participation in blocs " as a principle of their foreign policy constituted a " Peace Zone ".²³⁶

Let us now examine the reaction of the CPI to the post-Stalin developments. The increasing warmth in Indo-Soviet relations left the CPI in a quandary. As late as January, 1954, the CPI, at its Third Congress at Madurai, described India as " the biggest semi-colonial country yet to win freedom".²³⁷

235. Quoted in P.N. Fedoseyev, op.cit., P. 152

236. Pravda, February 15, 1956

237. Quoted in M.R. Masani, op.cit., P. 171

Yet Soviet appreciation of India's foreign policy²³⁸ was something that the CPI could not ignore. There were also squabbles within the party on the stand that the party should take in the light of the new developments.²³⁹ It was probably to seek guidance that Ajay Ghosh, the then General Secretary of the CPI, visited Moscow and returned to India in December, 1954.²⁴⁰ At a press conference on December 7, 1954, he said that the internal policy of the Nehru government did not suit the interests of the masses, but the foreign policy did.²⁴¹ During the visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin, the CPI was practically ignored; even the party's electoral interests were sacrificed by the Soviet press.^{242.}

After the XXth Congress of the CPSU, the CPI held its IV Congress in April, 1956 and decided to support the national bourgeoisie against foreign competition and in whatever effort it might make to overcome economic dependence.²⁴³ On April 15, 1957, the party formed government in the state of Kerala, after its victory in the state in India's second general election.²⁴⁴ In July, 1957, the CPI politbureau asserted that the central and state legislatures "have become the most important forums for fighting for the cause of the people and the country, for uniting the democratic masses on policy issues....." ²⁴⁵

238. See Chapter III, P.P. 101 - 106

239. Marshal Windmiller, "Indian Communism and the New Soviet Line", Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXIX, No. 4 (December, 1956) PP. 349-52

240. Ibid., P. 353

241. Ibid.

242. See Chapter III, PP. 112 - 113

243. Marshal Windmiller, "Constitutional Communism in India", Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXI, No. 1 (March, 1958), P. 26.

244. Ibid., P. 22. See also Chapter III, P. 113

245. Ibid., P. 33

Either its encouraging victory in Kerala or the Soviet government's unwillingness to let the CPI frustrate its diplomatic moves in India or both made it a responsible party.

By the time the XXIst Congress of the CPSU met, Khrushchev was at the pinnacle of power having defeated the "anti-party" groups' attempts to overthrow him. His opponents Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov and Shepilov lost their positions in the party and government.²⁴⁶ He was emboldened by the freedom he had got with the departure of his rivals. On March, 27, 1958, Khrushchev assumed the office of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, thus becoming the head of the party as well as the government.²⁴⁷

That Khrushchev exercised this freedom is evident from the XXIst Congress thesis that "there will arise a real possibility of excluding world war from the life of society even before the complete triumph of socialism, even with capitalism existing in part of the world".²⁴⁸ He was no more hamstrung by rivals to necessitate concessions, as he was at the time of the XXth Congress. That Khrushchev had to make concessions to his rivals at the XXth Congress is clear by the way the second and third theses on international developments were worded.²⁴⁹

Khrushchev was even confident enough to declare that the "capitalist encirclement no longer exists for our country".²⁵⁰ This confidence was probably fostered by the

246. Merle Fainsod, op.cit., PP. 171-73

247. Ibid., P. 120

248. Pravda, January 29, 1959. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XI, Nos. 4 and 5

249. See the theses on P. 53

250. Report to the XXIst Congress. Pravda, January 28, 1959

increasing Soviet military might as manifested by the putting of the first artificial satellite into the space in October, 1957, thus overtaking the United States in the field at that time.²⁵¹ It is possible that the Soviet belief that thanks to Afro-Asian support it had become possible to defeat the American attempts to impose a diktat on other countries²⁵² also contributed to this confidence.

THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC STATE

And the Soviet leaders tried to further cement their relations with the Afro-Asian countries. The increasing co-operation between the Soviet Union and the new nations, and the fact that socialism of sorts was being adopted by many of them, seemed to have encouraged the leaders of the international communist movement to make further doctrinal innovations. The result was the concept of national democratic state evolved at the Conference of World Communist Parties in November, 1960

According to the statement issued at the end of the conference, a national democratic state is one which consistently defends its political and economic independence, struggles against imperialism and its military blocs, against military bases on its territory, against new forms of colonialism and the penetration of imperialist capital, rejects dictatorial and despotic methods of

251. Adam B. Ulam, op.cit., P. 609

252. See Chapter V, P. 170

government, and assures to its people broad democratic rights and freedoms and the opportunity to work for agrarian reforms and participate in the determination of state policy.²⁵³

Indonesia, Mali, Guinea and Ghana were said to have created the prerequisites for the creation of national democracies. Of these, Mali, Guinea and Ghana had no communist parties.²⁵⁴ In his Report to the XXIIIrd Congress of the CPSU, Brezhnev spoke of "serious social transformations" in the UAR, Algeria, Mali, Guinea, the Congo (Brazzaville) and Burma.²⁵⁵ He dropped Indonesia and Ghana from the list obviously because of coups in those countries²⁵⁶ and the emergence of pro-Western governments.

None of the countries where "serious social transformations" were said to have occurred, as certified by Brezhnev, had allowed communist party to function in its territory. They are national dictatorships, with varying degrees of radicalism. It was the nationalism of the new nations which was at odds with

253. Pravda, December 6, 1960. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XII, No. 48, P. 4. The Conference also declared: "American imperialism is the main bulwark of world reaction". Ibid.

254. William T. Shinn Jr., "The National Democratic State: A Communist Programme for less Developed Areas", World Politics, Vol. XV, No. 3 (April, 1963), P. 384.

255. Pravda, March 30, 1966. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XVIII, No. 12, P. 10.

256. There was a coup in Indonesia in September, 1965, and Ghana, in February 1966. See Walter Laqueur, op.cit., PP. 246 and 203

the West. There were clashes of interests between the new nations and the West because of the latter's association with colonialism and racialism for centuries. The Soviet Union had no such clashes with the new nations' nationalism. Hence the XXIInd Congress tried to reconcile the diplomatic need to support the new states' nationalism with ideology.

The resolution adopted at the XXIInd Congress of the CPSU declared that, in many countries, the liberation movement of the peoples that have awakened proceeds under the flag of nationalism; and that Marxists-Leninists draw a distinction between the nationalism of the oppressed and that of the oppressor:

The nationalism of an oppressed nation contains a general democratic element directed against oppression, and communists support it because they consider it historically justified at a given stage. That element finds expression in the striving of the oppressed peoples to free themselves from imperialist oppression, to gain national independence and bring about a national renaissance. But the nationalism of an oppressed nation has yet another aspect, one expressing the ideology and interests of the reactionary exploiting top stratum.²⁵⁷

and interests of the reactionary exploiting top stratum.²⁵⁷

1 or

former colonial states is not connected with the imperialist circles, the resolution continued, it "is objectively interested

257. The Road to Communism: Documents of the XXIInd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, October 17-31, 1961 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), P. 493, (hereinafter referred to as the Road to Communism)

in accomplishing the basic tasks of an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution. Its progressive role and its ability to participate in the solution of pressing national problems are, therefore, not yet spent."²⁵⁸

In the mid-1960s, the Soviet leadership turned its attention to developing contacts with the parties running non-communist one-party dictatorships. By the late 1940s, Stalin realised that fealty to Moscow could not be expected from ruling communist parties for all time; Yugoslavia revolted against him as early as 1948.²⁵⁹ By early 1960s there was an irreconcilable split in the international communist movement. China began challenging the Soviet leadership of the movement; there were serious clashes of interests between the two communist giants.²⁶⁰ After the XXth Congress the Italian communist leaders, Togliatti, declared in June, 1956, that instead of depending on a single guiding centre as in the past, the world communist movement was in fact becoming polycentric.²⁶¹ Even some of the big parties out of power were not willing to be pliable tools in the hands of Moscow to further Soviet interests. Therefore, developing contacts with non-communist parties, where possible, was considered as one of the means of increasing Moscow's influence and furthering its interests. And the concept of National Democratic Parties was evolved.

258. Ibid.

259. See Robert Bass and Elizabeth Marburyed, The Soviet - Yugoslav Controversy 1948-1958: A Documentary Record (New York: Prospects Books, 1959) for an account of the dispute.

260. See Chapter VII, PP. 209 - 16.

261. Walter Laqueur, opcit., PP. 392-93

In May, 1966, Izvestia published an article which defined National Democratic Parties. According to the article, The National Democratic Parties are closely linked with the labouring strata, take revolutionary positions in the struggles against colonialism and imperialism, and are led by revolutionary-democratic figures from amongst patriotic-minded circles of the national intelligentsia.²⁶²

When in power, the National Democratic Parties are not content with formal independence, but advance along the path of economic liberation. They promote the development of friendly economic and cultural relations with the countries of socialism. They work for the active cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in the struggle for peace and against the aggressive intrigues of international imperialism, headed by the United States.²⁶³

The article also mentioned that the XXIIIrd Congress of the CPSU was attended by the national democratic parties of the UAR, the Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Mali, and Tanzania.²⁶⁴

In his speech to the Conference of International Communist parties in June, 1969, Brezhnev slightly changed the designation of the parties and called them Revolutionary Democratic Parties.²⁶⁵ He said that the Soviet Union regarded contacts

262. V. Midtsev, "On National Democratic Parties", Izvestia, May 17, 1966. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XVIII, No. 20, P. 21.

263. Ibid.

264. Ibid.

265. Pravda, June 8, 1969. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XXI, No. 23, P. 9.

between communist parties and the revolutionary democratic parties as "highly important"; they "are our comrades-in-arms in the struggle against imperialism and for socialism and for social progress". He also said that the CPSU had contacts with 18 such parties.²⁶⁶

Thus, the history of the development of Soviet policy towards the colonies and ex-colonies was one of a series of alterations of the communist dogma to suit Soviet state interests. Even the relations between communist countries were conducted on the basis of national interests rather than proletarian internationalism. By the beginning of the 1970, the Soviet leaders themselves began advancing national interests as the criterion of their policies even towards fellow socialist states. For instance, referring to Sino-Soviet relations in his Report to XXIVth Congress of the CPSU, Brezhnev observed: "we are not foregoing the national interests of the Soviet State."²⁶⁷ This was just an honest confession of a policy followed all along.

266. Ibid. See also Brezhnev's Report to the XXIVth Congress of the CPSU, Pravda, March 21, 1971.

267. Ibid.

EVALUATION

The above analysis shows that ideology plays a secondary role in the making of Soviet foreign policy. Like the foreign policies of all countries, national interests, personal predilections of the powers that be and internal and external political conditions influence in the making of Soviet foreign policy; and, as with all foreign policies, national interest is the lodestar of Soviet foreign policy. Whatever may be the tall claims of her leaders, the Soviet Union is not a different type of state; it is only a different politico-economic system. As with all states, the USSR's primary concern is with its security; and, like all political leaders in charge of states, Soviet leaders also always made lofty ideological declarations but never hesitated to make unprincipled compromises²⁶⁸ and opportunist alliances²⁶⁹ to further the security interests of the USSR.

But in what sense are the terms "ideology" and "national interests" used in this discussion?

Since the topic under discussion, Indo-Soviet relations 1959-71, falls within the purview of international relations, the part of Marxist ideology that is relevant in the context is the much-vaunted proletarian internationalism. The communists claim that they have no nationality and recognise no national borders; they stand for the promotion of the interests of the working

268. See PP. 10 & 16

269. See PP. 37 43

class all over the world. At least that has been their claim until Brezhnev advanced national interest as the criterion of Soviet policy at the XXIVth Congress.²⁷⁰

National interest is not an easy concept to define. In pluralist societies—and all modern societies are pluralist in varying degrees—different groups are likely to perceive national interests in different ways. Then, how and by whom is national interest assessed? The fact is that even in countries where there is freedom of expression, people take very much less interest in foreign policy, unless an emotive issue is involved, than in domestic policy. Therefore, in democratic countries too those at the helm of affairs have freedom to examine the alternatives and decide on a course of action they consider to be in the best interest of the country in a given situation. In totalitarian countries like the Soviet Union, the rulers enjoy near-absolute power to decide what constitutes national interest.

Is, then, Soviet foreign policy ideologically motivated or motivated by national interests?

The Soviet record of sacrifices in the spirit of proletarian internationalism has been dismal. Of course, in theory, the Soviet leaders always maintain that particular interests have to be subordinated to the general interests of the movement.²⁷¹ But, being the leaders of the movement,

270. See P. 62

271. See PP. 12 & 30.

the Soviet leaders would decide what constitutes general interest and what, particular.²⁷² The USSR, being "the base of the world revolutionary movement", unqualified defence of "the base" constitutes the general interest of the movement. Lenin thought that such support was voluntarily forthcoming²⁷³ and Stalin demanded it.²⁷⁴ He also saw to it that the call for the defence of the Soviet Union became binding on communists in the shape of a Comintern directive: international communist discipline.²⁷⁵

This is not to deny that as tactics the series of doctrinal retreats was superb. Lenin was aware of the fact that "circumstances" and not "merits" brought the Russian Communist detachment to the fore.²⁷⁶ He was conscious of the precarious existence of the Soviet State.²⁷⁷ Therefore, there was need for pragmatism and caution. He exhibited his pragmatism in entering into a trade agreement with Britain and closure of the Indian Political and Military School at Tashkent.²⁷⁸

The School could have only served one purpose: being a constant source of anxiety to the British Indian government. It could not have hastened the revolution in India where there was a strong and efficient government. There was no communist party in India and the masses definitely accepted the charismatic

272. Stalin said on August 1, 1927: "He is an internationalist who unreservedly, unhesitatingly and unconditionally is prepared to defend the USSR, because the USSR is the base of the world revolutionary movement...." Quoted in Elliot R. Goodman, The Soviet Design for a World State (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960) P. 65

273. See P. 2

274. See P. 35

275. See P. 30

276. See P. 1

277. See PP. 2 - 7

278. See P. 16.

leadership of Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress Party. If the School proved to be too much of an anxiety for British India, the British government was certainly in a position to take effective military action and the Soviet government was unsure of its capacity to withstand British pressures. The continuance of the School could only have served the symbolic value of defying the then most powerful country in the world. The costs would have been unacceptable: losing both the defacto recognition as well as the commercial benefits from the trade agreement. Lenin was not prepared to sacrifice the certain benefits from the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement for the sake of a distant and uncertain revolution in India. Anyway, revolutions are conceived and nurtured underground until it is most opportune to stage them; they are never prepared under the glare of publicity. It is also bad strategy to locate the base of operations close to the borders of the enemy, as Roy did in Tashkent. Lenin's closure of the School in deference to the wishes of the British government need not have meant to the end of the training of Indian communists; that work could as well be done in Moscow, in the Communist University of the Toilers of the East.²⁷⁹ Politics is the art of the possible; it was impossible for Lenin to take on the British Empire. And so, he did not hesitate to close the School. Besides, the success of Roy's plan was contingent upon the cooperation of the Afghan government; and Kabul refused to let Roy's army cross over to British India.²⁸⁰

279. See P. 16

280. G. Adhikari, op.cit., Vol. I, P. 241

As tactics, the calls for different types of united fronts issued at different times were flawless too.²⁸¹ If in the process of working united fronts, the national bourgeoisie of the colonial and semi-colonial countries or the bourgeois trade unions in the West were won over to communism, it would have been a great boost to the movement. Similarly, if the calls for communist-socialist unity issued at the XXth Congress of the CPSU and the Conference of World Communist Parties in 1960²⁸² had materialised, there would have been a split in the Western world; the United States, where there is no socialist party, and Western Europe, where there are strong socialist parties, would have fallen apart. This would have served Soviet interests well.

As tactics, Stalin's Nonaggression Pact with Germany, the occupation of the Baltic states and the extraction of territorial concessions from Finland²⁸³ would have been brilliant if they were temporary and preventive steps in defence of "the base of the world revolutionary movement".

But were they all tactics adopted with ideological motives? It is hard to say so. Even the votaries of "permanent revolution", like Trotsky, were prepared to sacrifice the interests of the Chinese revolution for the sake of Soviet State interests. Trotsky did not hesitate to express racist apprehensions either.²⁸⁴ It is evident that these Soviet moves were inspired more by nationalist considerations than ideological motives. Soviet

281. See PP. 19, 30 & 33

282. See P. 52

283. See P.P. 39 - 40

284. See PP. 27

foreign policy could be considered an ideologically-motivated one if it would take conscious and risky steps to establish Marxist regimes in the world. The Soviet Union had hardly ever done it; instead, her leaders altered their dogma whenever diplomatic expediency demanded it. The establishment of communist regimes in Eastern Europe was not a risky step because circumstances in the wake of the defeat of Hitler were conducive to the imposition of communism on Eastern Europe. Britain was incapable of physically resisting Stalin's communisation of East Europe; and the United States was unwilling to commit herself to another war. The clearly nationalist outlook of Stalin was evident from the way "their [The East European countries] wealth was being extracted in various ways, most frequently through joint-stock companies in which the Russians barely invested any thing except German capital, which they had simply declared a prize of war".²⁸⁵ That was hardly in the spirit of proletarian internationalism. Even after the communist regimes were stabilised in Eastern Europe, Stalin or his successors never thought of returning the territories wrested from Rumania, Poland, East Germany and Finland²⁸⁶ or making the Baltic republics independent communist states. Stalin's policy in Eastern Europe smacked of irredentism and imperialism.

285. Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1962), P. 126. The Chinese had to pay the USSR for the arms used in the Korean War, which was "essentially Russia's War" Adam B. Ulam, op.cit., P. 530

286. See Chapter VII, P. 214

Stalin did not trust communists like Mao and Tito, who asserted their independence. He would not permit Mao to carry out a revolution; he would always advise the Chinese to make up with the Kuomintang.²⁸⁷ He would judge when the revolution was to be started and when it was to be wound up.²⁸⁸ In deciding the fate of the revolutions, what Stalin took into consideration was the effects of the revolution on Soviet interests. If the risks were unacceptable, he would ask for its folding up.

287. Ibid., P. ^{209 - 210} and above Pp. 37 - 38

In April, 1949, when the Kuomintang regime was in the throes of death Chiang having temporarily retired, acting President, Li Tsung-jen, having sued for peace with the communists, the Soviet ambassador was negotiating with the nationalist government for the renewal of air agreement relating to Sinkiang. The Soviet government was even reported to have akded for agreement regarding mining concessions in Sinkiang. See K.M. Panikkar, In Two Chinas (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1955), P.45

288. Talking to Kardelj, a Yugoslave communist, Stalin referred to the communist uprising in Greece after World War II and said that it had to fold up. Do you believe in the success of the uprising in Greece?

"What do you think that Great Britain and the United States - The United States, the most powerful state in the world - will permit you to break their line of communication in the Mediterranean? Nonsense. And we have no navy. The uprising in Greece must be stopped, and as quickly as possible!" Milovan Djilas, op.cit., P. 164

He did not care much for ideology or the interests of the movement. For instance, his expert on India, Dyakov, felt that as a result of the partition, India had become a relatively more industrial and capitalist country".²⁸⁹ According to Marxist beliefs, there was a possibility of revolution maturing in India early because of the "relative importance" of the native bourgeoisie and the working class. But Stalin was hardly interested in such dialectics. All that he was interested in was power. Therefore he hardly took any interest in India.²⁹⁰ Neither Stalin had time, being busy in sorting out the affairs in Eastern Europe, to court the emerging nations, nor were they likely to fall under his control, nor were they powerful enough to threaten his interests; therefore, he could ignore them, which he did.

This is not to suggest that the Soviet leaders have lost faith in the ultimate triumph of communism all over the world. They always speak of the general crisis of capitalism or the inter-imperialist contradictions²⁹¹ which would lead to the inevitable destruction of capitalism and the consequent birth of a socialist world.

289. See P.4500

290. See PP. 94 - 101

291. See The Communist International, P.38, The Road to Communism, P. 490, Pravda, March 30, 1966, Pravda, April, 25, 1966, Pravda and Izvestia, June 8, 1969, Pravda, March 21, 1971, "25th CPSU Congress: Report of the CPSU Central Committee". Soviet Review Vol. XIII, No. 10 & 11 (March 4, 1976) PP. 24-25 and For Peace, Security, Cooperation and Social Progress in Europe, (Document Adopted by the Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties of Europe, Berlin, June 29-30, 1976) (New Delhi: New Age Printing Press, 1976), P. 10.

The post-Stalin leadership created a more humane communist society in the USSR.²⁹² But they had not put the interests of the movement before those of the USSR either. The United States was named the main bulwark of world reaction.²⁹³ There were serious clashes of interests between the USSR and United States. The latter had been acquiring bases around the former. Moscow had to strive hard to deny the United States the bases or limit them. The one way of trying to achieve this purpose was to court the non-aligned nations. They were also frequently at odds with the United States whose patronage of colonial powers for reasons of Western alliance management affected the interests of the Third World. Therefore, further aggravation of tensions between the United States and the Third World would be diplomatically expedient. And so, Moscow began courting the new nations.

Since it is their wont to expound their policies in ideological terms, the Soviet leaders found ideological explanations for their rapport with the new states. But even in these attempts to find ideological explanations for their new enthusiasm for friendship with the Third World countries, their concern for their national interests clearly stands out. Three of the four states which were said to have created the prerequisites for the creation of national democracies²⁹⁴ did not allow communist parties to function in their countries. This was violative of the concept

292. See P. 49

293. See P. 58

294. Ibid.

national democratic state one of the characteristics of which was that it should assure to its people broad democratic rights and the opportunity to work for agrarian reforms.²⁹⁵ a traditional communist way of demanding rights for their party-men. A little later, the CPSU extended support to the nationalism of the oppressed.²⁹⁶ Then the Soviet Union turned its attention to developing contacts with the so-called National Democratic or Revolutionary Democratic parties.²⁹⁷ The Soviet leaders must have either entertained the hopes of winning them over to communism or of ensuring the succession of friendly people to power when the time is ripe by using their multi-level contacts with the ruling oligarchy of the one party states.

However, the Soviet leaders' support to bourgeois nationalism was made to sound as though it was a tactical move. Their resolutions extending support to bourgeois nationalism speak of its progressive role being "not yet spent"²⁹⁸ or their friendship with it being temporary.²⁹⁹

295. Ibid.

296. See P. 59

297. See P. 61

298. See P. 60

299. See P. 25

We have the oft-quoted comment of Stalin, made in 1927, that the Kuomintang had "to be utilised to the end, squeezed out like a lemon and then thrown away". Quoted in Robert C. North, Moscow and the Chinese Communists (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1953), P. 96

Soviet interest has not been confined to national democratic states alone. Neither India was a national democracy, nor her ruling party, the present or the past, a revolutionary democratic party. Yet the Soviet Union invested heavily in India's development,³⁰⁰ developed best of relations with her on a durable basis, and in the process, ignored the interests of the CPI.³⁰¹

The new vigour in Soviet diplomacy was also facilitated by the encouraging rates of economic growth. This enabled Moscow to give, in addition to diplomatic support on colonial and racial issues, some economic aid to the Third World. By the late 1950s even Western economists agreed that the rate of the growth of the Soviet economy had "exceeded that of the United States".³⁰² And the confident Soviet leaders have been proudly speaking of the faster economic growth of the USSR and the communist bloc.³⁰³ Khrushchev was even optimistic about overtaking the United States in the economic field possibly by 1967 but definitely by 1970.³⁰⁴ The Soviet leaders used all these favourable factors to their country's advantage and, perforce, they found ideological sanction for their diplomatic moves by suitable alteration in the Marxist dogma.

300. See Chapter X

301. See Chapter III, pp. 112 - 113.

302. Alec Nove, Communist Economic Strategy: Soviet Growth and Capability (Washington: National Planning Association, 1959), P.16

303. See Pravda, January 28, 1959, The Road to Communism, pp. 41-43, and 269-70, Pravda and Izvestia, June 8, 1969, "25th CPSU Congress: Report of the CPSU Central Committee", Soviet Review, Vol. XIII, No. 10 & 11 (March 4, 1976), P.8.

304. Khrushchev's speech at a reception given by the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR to the graduates of military academies, on July 8, 1961. N.S. Khrushchev, Socialism and Communism: Selected Passages 1956-63 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House 1963). P. 43.

THE EVOLUTION OF INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

The Indian National Congress began taking sustained interest in international affairs after 1920;¹ Nehru was responsible for this interest.

In a resolution passed in 1928 the Congress declared that "The struggle of the Indian people for freedom is part of the world struggle against imperialism, with which contact should be established".² The Congress was naturally sympathetic to and expressed its solidarity with similar movements in China and Spain.³ In 1936 the party created a foreign department.⁴

In 1939 Britain declared India a belligerent without even consulting the Indian leadership though, by then, responsible ministries were functioning in the States. The Congress resented it. In a resolution passed on September 15, 1939, the party declared that it "has seen in Fascism and Nazism the intensification of the principle of Imperialism against which the Indian people have struggled for many years"; that "the issue of war and peace for India must be decided by the Indian people and no outside authority can impose this decision upon them"; that "their sympathy is entirely on the side of democracy and freedom"; that India could not "associate herself in a war said to be for democratic freedom when that freedom is

¹G.H. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-alignment (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), p. 27.

²Quoted, Ibid, p.27.

³Ibid, p.28.

⁴Ibid.

denied to her"; that the Congress was aware of the British and French declarations to the effect that they were fighting for democracy, but "the history of the recent past is full of examples showing the constant divergence between the spoken word, the ideals proclaimed, and the real motives and objectives"; that during the war of 1914-1918 slogans like "the preservation of democracy, self-determination, and the freedom of small nations" were raised "and yet the very Governments which proclaimed these aims entered into secret treaties embodying imperialist designs for the carving up of the Ottoman Empire"; that "the interests of Indian democracy do not conflict with the interests of British democracy or of world democracy"; that "there is an inherent and ineradicable conflict between democracy for India or elsewhere and Imperialism and Fascism"; and that India, with her vast resources, must play "an important part in any scheme of world reorganisation".⁵

That resolution contained, in an embryonic form, independent India's foreign policy: her refusal to be bamboozled into action by the pompous declarations of dominant powers; her insistence on taking her own decisions; and her demand for the extension of the principles of democracy and national self-determination to the colonial world.

By the time India attained independence in August 1947, the Cold War divisions were already visible;

⁵The text cited in Jawaharlal Nehru, The Unity of India: Collected Writings, 1937-1940 (London: Lindsay Drummond, 1941), pp.410-412.

Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech was nearly one and a half years old; and shortly after India's independence, Zhdanov was to unfold his two-camp concept. Nehru's response to these developments was non-alignment.

In fact, even before the attainment of full independence, Nehru unfolded his policy of non-alignment. Speaking on radio on September 7, 1946, after the formation of the interim government, he said that India would take full part in international conferences as a free nation with her own foreign policy and not merely as a satellite of another nation; she would keep away, as far as possible, from power politics of groups which had led to wars in the past and in future, would lead to wars on a much greater scale.⁶

A reading of some of Nehru's important speeches and works shows that idealistic, ideological and nationalistic considerations helped evolve the concept of non-alignment.

IDEALISTIC CONSIDERATIONS

Before realities of power mellowed him, Nehru was an impatient idealist and an admirer of Soviet Russia.⁷

He was opposed to old concepts of international relations on which he blamed many wars. Balance of power was, for him, "mobilised antagonisms" whose

⁶Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961, (New Delhi: Government of India, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1961), p.2. (hereinafter referred to as India's Foreign Policy).

⁷See pp. 78 - 85

"impotence" to "rid the world of war" stands "proven".⁸ Since the birth of nation states, he thought, nations relied for survival on this concept, and all these years they "have been engaged in wars with brief intervals during the greater part of which war clouds gathered on the horizon".⁹ Therefore, the efforts of the blocs to balance each other did not appeal to him because of the consequences he feared.

But in late 1960 he said to Patterson "maybe", immediately after the last war, conditions were such that alliances became to some extent "inevitable". "But an alliance inevitably is an alliance against somebody, not an alliance in the air. Some danger is apprehended from some other country. Now, that really means attracting first of all that country's hostility".¹⁰ Instead, he pleaded for more contacts with the USSR and China. Arthur Stein interprets this as an attempt at binding them to international obligations and responsibilities from which it would become increasingly difficult to withdraw.¹¹

Nehru believed that the Communist monolith would mellow with the passage of time because history shows that a "proselytising creed" is gradually "toned down" and

⁸Quoted in Inis L. Claude Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 85.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰George N. Patterson, Peking Versus Delhi (London: Faber and Faber, 1963), p. 284.

¹¹Arthur Stein, "India's Relations With the USSR 1953-1963", Orbis, Vol. VIII, No. 2, p. 361.

eventually learns to co-exist peacefully.¹² He told President Eisenhower in December 1956 that because the natural attitude of the Soviet Union was a suspicious one and because they felt themselves "looked down upon" by the West, the West might make conciliatory moves on a unilateral basis and thereafter examine Soviet reactions.¹³

Because of this belief, Nehru wanted both super-powers to avoid threatening postures and miscalculations which could result in a major war. He thought that by joining one bloc or the other new nations would only increase areas of tensions; they could contribute their mite towards peace by being non-aligned.

Nor was Nehru ready to yield his judgment to great powers because they were great. He once said in the Indian Parliament: "I just do not see why the possession of great armed might or great financial power should necessarily lead to right decisions or a right mental outlook".¹⁴

He also thought that by being non-aligned he would

¹²Quoted in Ernest W. Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser, and Nkrumah on Neutralism", in Laurence W. Martin ed., Neutralism and Non-alignment: The New States in World Affairs, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 108.

¹³Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961 (London: Heinemann, 1966), p. 113.

Khrushchev referred to derisions like the Soviet Union being described as a "colossus on feet of clay" by Churchill and others in his memoirs: see Strobe Talbott, transl. and ed., Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (London: Andre Deutsch, 1974), p. 355.

¹⁴In his reply to the debate on foreign affairs in the Lok Sabha (Lower House), on December 9, 1958, in India's Foreign Policy, p. 80.

retain freedom to take an independent stand on issues unhampered by alliance restraints. At an early stage in India's freedom, when he did not yet realise the impact of pulls and pressures of the Cold War on India's interests, Nehru told the United States House of Representatives on October 13, 1949: "Where freedom is menaced, or justice threatened, or where aggression takes place, we cannot be and shall not be neutral".¹⁵

However, it was not all idealism; there was a streak of realism in this idealist approach to the Cold War. He was fearful of the effects of war on India's interests. For instance, replying to the debate on foreign affairs in the Lok Sabha on September 2, 1957, Nehru referred to the effects of the Suez Crisis in 1956 on India's 5-year plan. He said that India was too humble to follow a crusading policy; she was aware of her limitations. However, he continued, where world peace was concerned, India wanted to have her say; where India's interests were directly threatened, whether in Goa or in Pakistan, she wanted to have a loud say, a positive say.¹⁶

While he was opposed to alliances because of his belief that they contributed to tensions, he was not totally opposed to all alliances under all conditions. Speaking in the Lok Sabha on September 29, 1954, he said that to him the original NATO seemed to be a justifiable

¹⁵ Pandit Nehru's Discovery of America (Madras: Indian Press Publications, (n.d.)), p. 24 (hereinafter referred to as Pandit Nehru's Discovery of America.)

¹⁶ India's Foreign Policy, pp. 69-71.

reaction for certain countries who were afraid of certain developments. However, later NATO gave protective cover to the colonies of some member-states; Portugal claimed this protection for Goa. He wondered why the Manila Conference was convened to form SEATO so soon after the Geneva Conference of 1954 ended the conflict in Indo-China.¹⁷ In the case of the Baghdad Pact (later known as CENTO) and SEATO, his opposition was due to his belief that they would create fear in the minds of Communist States and revive pre-Geneva conference tensions in South East Asia. Besides that, Pakistan joined these pacts with an eye on India.¹⁸ Nehru could not have ignored this either.

IDEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

During India's struggle for freedom, Nehru's dislike for a familiar imperialist Britain turned him into an admirer of an unfamiliar Soviet Russia. He wrote in his autobiography:

As between the Labour worlds of the Second International and the Third International, my sympathies were with the latter. The whole record of the Second International from the War onwards filled me with distaste, and we in India had had sufficient personal experience of the methods of one of its strongest supports - the British Labour Party. So I turned inevitably with good-will towards Communism, for, whatever its faults, it was at least not hypocritical and not imperialistic.¹⁹

¹⁷ Ibid., pp.88-90.

¹⁸ See Chapter III, p.102

¹⁹ Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography (London: John Lane the Bodley Head, 1947), p.163.

However, his was an emotional liking for Communist goals and not for Communist methods and system. He wrote in his Autobiography:

It was not a doctrinal adherence, as I did not know much about the fine points of Communism, my acquaintance being limited at the time to its broad features. These attracted me as also the tremendous changes taking place in Russia. But Communists often irritated me by their dictatorial ways, their aggressive and rather vulgar methods, their habit of denouncing everybody who did not agree with them. This reaction was no doubt due, as they would say, to my own bourgeois education and upbringing.²⁰

This dichotomous attitude to Communism was to remain a part of his mental make-up all through his life.

Nehru attended the Brussels Congress of Oppressed Nationalities in February 1927, and was elected to the Presidium and the 9-man Executive Committee of the League Against Imperialism which was founded at the Congress.²¹ Nehru wrote about the Brussels Congress: "... There is no doubt that the gathering was friendly towards the Communists²²..." He also recorded that it "was curious how, in our League Against Imperialism Committee meetings, I would usually be on the side of the Anglo-American members on petty matters of argument. There was a certain similarity in our outlook in regard to method at

²⁰Ibid. For more conflicting views on Communism, see pp. 591-592.

²¹Michael Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 110-11.

²²Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography, p. 162.

least".²³ His cautious attitude to this Marxist-oriented body was evident from the confidential report he made to the Indian National Congress. In that, he mentioned the disadvantages of the Congress party affiliating itself with the League Against Imperialism: 1. the Socialist character of the League and 2. the possibility that Russian foreign policy might use it.²⁴

Nehru and his family were invited to attend the 10th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1927. Nehru spent four days in Moscow and called on Kalinin, the President of the Soviet Union. Kalinin lived in 3 small rooms in the Kremlin. Nehru thought how different were the Soviet rulers from the British officials.²⁵ The invitation and what he was shown in Moscow naturally impressed him. On return home, he wrote and spoke a number of times on Soviet achievements. He thought that the contrast between extreme luxury and poverty was not visible in Russia, nor was the hierarchy of class or caste noticeable; that jails were liberal; that nationalities problems seemed to have been solved. But he was cautious again; he thought that it was difficult to draw any final conclusions about anything about Soviet Russia at that stage.²⁶

From then onwards, Nehru kept up his praise of the Soviet Union for a long time. Addressing the Bengal Students' Conference on September 22, 1928, he called the

²³Ibid., p. 163.

²⁴Michael Brecher, op.cit., p. 113.

²⁵Ibid., p.117.

²⁶Ibid., pp.117-118.

Soviet Union "the greatest opponent of imperialism" and reaffirmed his faith in Communism as an ideal of society. "For essentially it is Socialism, and Socialism is the only way if the world is to escape disaster".²⁷ He said at the same conference that Russia was an "outcaste like us from nations and much slandered ... Russia goes to the East as equal, not as a conqueror or a race proud superior".²⁸ He continued that the "continual friction that we see to-day is between England and Russia, not between India and Russia. Is there any reason why we in India should inherit the age-long rivalry of England against Russia? That is based on the greed and covetousness of British imperialism".²⁹

In his presidential address to the Indian National Congress in 1936, he said:

If the future is full of hope, it is largely because of Soviet Russia and what it does, and I am convinced that, if some world catastrophe does not intervene, this new civilisation will spread to other lands and put an end to the wars and conflicts which capitalism feeds.³⁰

He continued,

Russia is not supposed to be a democratic country after the Western pattern, and yet we find the essentials of democracy present in far greater degree amongst the masses there than anywhere else.³¹

²⁷Ibid., p. 126.

²⁸Quoted in Hemen Ray, "Changing Soviet Views on Mahatma Gandhi", The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.XXIX, No. 1 (November 1969), p. 95.

²⁹Ibid., p.96.

³⁰Quoted in Anjan Kumar Banerji, Nehru and Soviet Russia (Calcutta: Bensons, 1965), part II p.6.

³¹Ibid.

He had a practical reason too for trying to be friendly to Russia. He thought that Russia could not be ignored by India because she was her powerful neighbour; she could be friendly to India and co-operate with her or be a thorn in her side. In either case, India had to know her and understand her and shape her policy accordingly.³²

The Soviet Union had another attraction for Nehru; planning for economic development. Addressing the National Academy of Sciences on March 5, 1938, he said that the Soviet example has proved "how a consciously held objective, backed by co-ordinated effort, can change a backward country into an advanced industrial state with an ever-rising standard of living. Some such method we have to pursue if we are to make rapid progress".³³

Because of such admiration for Soviet Russia, he lashed out at Britain for perpetuating a policy of creating a Cordon Sanitaire against the Soviet Union and for trying to destroy her.³⁴

When Britain rejected the Soviet offer for a joint front against Nazi Germany, before the Soviet-German pact of 1939, Nehru attributed this to their "class feelings and hatred of the new order in Russia ...".³⁵ And when Ghandi expressed pain at the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939, Nehru wrote him a letter in January 1940 asking him to be cautious in his talks with the British and avoid taking an

³²Quoted in Michael Brecher, op.cit., p.119.

³³Jawaharlal Nehru, Unity of India, p.181.

³⁴Michael Brecher, op.cit., p.119.

³⁵Jawaharlal Nehru, op.cit., p.296.

anti-Russian stand. He wrote that the success of the Western powers in their attempts to "break up" Soviet Russia would be a "calamity from every point of view, quite apart from our agreement with Russian policy or not".³⁶ To avoid this "calamity" Nehru was very considerate in understanding even some of the Soviet Union's most dubious acts like the annexation of eastern Poland in the wake of the Soviet-German Pact of 1939. He wrote that the Soviet march into Poland was a "shock". He continued:

But it is yet difficult to say whether this was to counter the German army or to weaken the Poles or merely to take advantage of a particular situation from the nationalist point of view. From the meagre information that we possess it seems, however, that Russia's advance into Poland has certainly come in the way of German designs.³⁷

However, this zeal for Russia on Nehru's part must be put in perspective: all his praise for the Soviet Union must be understood in the context in which it was said. It was a natural response to anti-colonial and anti-imperialist slogans emanating from Moscow from a socialistically-minded leader of a colonial India. But that he would not submit to alien control of any type was made clear by him as early as 1930. The League Against Imperialism³⁸ passed a resolution at Frankfurt in July 1929 criticising Mahatma Gandhi's agreement with Lord Irwin, the then Governor-General of India, under which he agreed to drop civil disobedience movement for dominion

³⁶Quoted in Hemen Ray, op.cit., p.96.

³⁷Jawaharlal Nehru, op.cit., p.309.

³⁸See p.79.

status. The General-Secretary of the League wrote to Nehru describing the agreement as betrayal of the masses and asked him to admit his mistake and take the right course. Nehru replied ^{that} he was not prepared to brook interference in the affairs of the Congress party by an international organisation; and the League expelled Nehru.³⁹ This decision of the League reflected the new unfriendly line towards the national bourgeoisie adopted by the Comintern at its sixth congress.⁴⁰

With the passage of time Nehru began showing signs of disillusionment with Soviet Russia. By 1946 he wrote that Russia was already "showing an expansionist tendency and is extending to territories more or less on the basis of the Tsar's Empire".⁴¹ He also wrote in the same book: "All the evils of a purely political democracy are present in the USA; the evils of a lack of political democracy are present in the USSR".⁴²

By 1952, he declared: "Marx is out of date to-day. To talk about Marxism to-day, if I may say so, is reaction. I think Communists with all their fire and fury are in some ways utterly reactionary in outlook".⁴³

However, as A.P. Rana wrote, Nehru "glossed over minutiae and saw the Russian Revolution in the larger

³⁹Michael Brecher, op.cit., pp.114-115.

⁴⁰See Chapter I, pp. 30 - 31

⁴¹Jawaharlal Nehru, Discovery of India (London: Meridian Books Ltd., 1960), p.575. It was first published in 1946.

⁴²Ibid., pp.582-584.

⁴³At a press conference on February 28, 1952, quoted in Michael Brecher, op.cit., p.604.

perspective of History. What he saw Russia achieving for the common man in terms of his basic human needs moved him enormously and induced him to make many excuses for Russia."⁴⁴

Once Nehru wrote that Russian power was necessary to control Western power; should Russia succumb, it would be enormously more difficult for colonial people to struggle out of their fetters.⁴⁵ Thus, for Nehru, Soviet power was necessary as a pressure for wringing concessions from colonial powers; as is evident from this, he did not totally reject the concept of balance of power.

NATIONALIST CONSIDERATIONS

As a leader of a large country with a long history it was not unnatural for Nehru to be proud of his country. His strong nationalist emotions are discernible in some of his speeches and writings.

In September 1939 he wrote that if India had been free she might have even succeeded in preventing the war.

A free India, with her vast resources, can be of great service to the world and to humanity. India will always make a difference to the world; fate has marked us for big things. When we fall, we fall low; when we rise, inevitably we play our part in the world drama.⁴⁶

⁴⁴A.P. Rana, "The Intellectual Dimensions of India's Non-alignment", The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2 (November 1968-August 1969), p.304.

⁴⁵As quoted in ibid.

⁴⁶Jawaharlal Nehru, Unity of India, p.307.

On January 22, 1947, he spoke of India having become the leader of the freedom movement of Asia.⁴⁷ On March 8, 1948, he said that India was "potentially a great nation and a big power, and possibly it is not liked by some people that anything should happen to strengthen us".⁴⁸ On October 13, 1949, he told the United States House of Representatives that India did not "seek any material advantage in exchange for any part of our hard-won freedom".⁴⁹ On May 15, 1954, he described China as the third great power and added, "if you peep into the future and if nothing goes wrong - war and the like - the obvious fourth country in the world is India".⁵⁰

Because of such hopes, ambitions and fears, Nehru was not ready to let India lose her distinct personality⁵¹ and independent role by becoming a part of an alliance. In another speech in the Lok Sabha on February 25, 1955, he said that in an alliance between unequals, only the big powers count and the small become just their dependents.⁵²

In yet another speech in the Lok Sabha on March 25, 1957, while speaking on the Eisenhower Doctrine, he

⁴⁷In his reply to the debate on Objectives Resolution in the Constituent Assembly of India, India's Foreign Policy, p.12.

⁴⁸Speech in the Constituent Assembly, ibid., pp.36-37.

⁴⁹Pandit Nehru's Discovery of America, p.22.

⁵⁰Speech in the Lok Sabha. India's Foreign Policy p.305.

⁵¹In his article, "Changing India", Foreign Affairs, Vol. XLI, No. 3 (April, 1963) Nehru wrote: "We believed that India had, by virtue of long history and traditions, an individuality of her own and we should retain this without adhering to outworn ideas and traditions." p.455.

⁵²India's Foreign Policy, p.66.

rejected the concept of power vacuums. "It is an unreal approach to say that every country which has insufficient armaments is a vacuum".⁵³ He continued, every time an imperial power was compelled to withdraw, there was a vacuum and somebody else had to fill it. It was the same old story. "It can only be filled by the people of that country growing and developing themselves economically, politically and otherwise".⁵⁴

Nehru was convinced that India's interests would be better served by non-alignment. As a leader responsible for his country's interests, he could not disregard them. Sometimes he gave frank expression to this part of his foreign policy. In a speech in the Constituent Assembly on December 4, 1947, he said: "We are not going to join a war if we can help it; and we are going to join the side which is to our interest when the time comes to make the choice. There the matter ends".⁵⁵ At another time, also in a speech in the Constituent Assembly of India on March 8, 1948, he said that his instructions to India's delegates to international conferences were to consider questions at issue first in terms of India's interests and secondly, merits. He added that when India's interests were not involved, then they were to consider them only on the basis of merits.⁵⁶

To further his country's interests, Nehru kept sufficient elbow-room in implementing his foreign policy. In the speech mentioned above, he said: "It may be that

⁵³Ibid., p.195.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵India's Foreign Policy, p.24.

⁵⁶Ibid., p.33.

sometimes we are forced to side with this power or that power. I can quite conceive of our siding even with an imperialist power - I do not mind saying that; in a certain set of circumstances that may be the lesser of the two evils".⁵⁷ Realities of power convinced him that it was not possible to take a forthright stand at all times. In the speech just quoted, he also said: "Naturally, we cannot as a government go as far as we might have done as a non-official organisation in which we can express our opinions as frankly and as aggressively as possible. Speaking as a government we have to moderate our language".⁵⁸

Again, in a speech in the Lok Sabha on September 30, 1954, he said: "Many things happen in the world which we do not like and which we would wish were rather different, but we do not go like Don Quixote with lance in hand against everything we dislike; we put up with these things because we would be, without making any difference, merely getting into trouble."⁵⁹

WESTERN MISGIVINGS AND NEHRU'S RESPONSE

Caught, as it was, in the fear of Soviet expansion, the West was not in a mood to take non-alignment kindly. Some British Conservatives could hardly relish the idea of former colonials charting an independent course of action. "In view of their low opinion of the new states' capacity to handle their own affairs, Conservatives naturally regard them as frequently incompetent to offer

⁵⁷Ibid., p.35.

⁵⁸Ibid., p.31.

⁵⁹Ibid., (1971 edition), p.304.

an opinion even on the affairs of other underdeveloped countries."⁶⁰ As late as the early 1960s, an American writer, Arnold Wolfers, was expressing the view "that every increase in the area outside the alliance system narrows the opportunities for United States military deployment overseas. The liquidation of European colonial empires has already cut deeply into the territory once available for American and allied overseas bases and staging areas, which were indispensable for effective local deterrent and limited war".⁶¹ Such self-righteous and self-centred attitudes, which were not merely confined to private individuals but influenced western government policies, were hardly conducive to promoting goodwill between the West and newly-independent states.

Despite all good things he said about Soviet Russia, Nehru, as also other important leaders, was sincerely interested in maintaining a harmonious relationship with the west. India decided to remain in the Commonwealth, and, as an act of goodwill, requested Lord Mountbatten to continue as the Governor-General after independence, and adopted, with necessary changes, British parliamentary institutions. Nehru proved his devotion to democracy and therefore his affinity with Western liberal traditions by not falling in line with the common phenomenon in Afro-Asia: personal and one-party dictatorships. During his

⁶⁰ Laurence W. Martin, "A Conservative view of the New States", in the book edited by him, op.cit., p.71.

⁶¹ Arnold Wolfers, "Allies, Neutrals, and Neutralists in the Context of U.S. Defence Policy", ibid., pp.156-157. Wolfers was The Director, Washington Centre of Foreign Policy Research, when he wrote the article.

visit to the United States in 1949, Nehru acknowledged the influence of the United States Constitution on the making of the Indian Constitution.⁶²

During his second visit to the United States, in December, 1956, he acknowledged that during India's struggle for freedom "we received from your country (the United States) a full measure of sympathy and support. Our two Republics share common faith in democratic institutions and the democratic way of life and are dedicated to the cause of peace and freedom".⁶³

Nehru's socialism was a means to liberate the individual from want and not to subject him to authoritarian control. He wrote to Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, another veteran of the freedom movement, in April 1939: "I suppose I am temperamentally and by training an individualist and intellectually a Socialist; I hope that Socialism does not kill or suppress individuality; indeed I am attracted to it because it will release innumerable individuals from economic and cultural bondage".⁶⁴

There were no perceptible factors like territorial disputes militating against harmony in relations between India and the dominant Western powers; there was identity of beliefs in free institutions and respect for individual freedoms. However, identity of beliefs is no guarantee against tensions.

⁶²In his address to the House of Representatives on October 13, 1949. Pandit Nehru's Discovery of America, p.22.

⁶³India's Foreign Policy (1971 edition), p.599.

⁶⁴Quoted in Pradip R. Sarbadhikari, India and the Great Powers (The Hague: J.C. Baan, 1962), p.83.

Nehru doubted if, in big power rivalry, ideologies came into the picture at all, although there was a great deal of talk about them.⁶⁵ Nor could India accept that the West was all light and truth, and the Soviet Union all darkness and falsehood. In an article in Foreign Affairs in 1963, Nehru wrote that non-alignment "... implied, basically, a conviction that good and evil are mixed up in this world, that nations cannot be divided into sheep and goats to be condemned or approved accordingly, and that if we were to join one military group rather than the other it was liable to increase and not diminish the risk of a major clash between them".⁶⁶ While Anglo-American devotion to democracy is recognised in and shared by India, Indians were sceptical about their claim that the Cold War was all about democracy and human dignity versus tyranny and authoritarianism. While the United States and the United Kingdom have been democracies for a long time, their passion for democracy was confined to their borders.

American recipes for fighting communism were not appealing to liberal intellectuals in India. This was evident from the proceedings of the India-America Conference held in December, 1949, in New Delhi. The American speakers at the conference drew attention to Communist guerilla activity in South India,⁶⁷ and declared that the world had a simple choice between ballot and bullet; that no compromise was possible; and that India

⁶⁵Speech in the Constituent Assembly on March 8, 1948, India's Foreign Policy, (1961 edition), p.53.

⁶⁶Jawaharlal Nehru, "Changing India", p.457.

⁶⁷See Chapter III, p.100

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must align herself with the United States.⁶⁸ The Indian speakers responded that the bullet-ballot dichotomy was an over-simplification; that Communism has a real moral force which has an appeal to the masses; that American fear of Communism was overdone; that the basic need was to raise the standard of living rather than approach communism with force; that in its preoccupation with Communism, America strengthened reactionary regimes abroad instead of aligning itself with progressive forces; and that the then state of Russo-American relations was suppressing liberal opinion in the United States.⁶⁹

One American speaker declared that in the American foreign policy priorities Western Europe came first because of its industry, the Middle East came second because of its oil, the Arctic third because of its strategic location; the Far East ranking below all these.⁷⁰

Thus neither official nor non-official India was ready to accept the Western point of view in toto; nor, as an American at the India-America Conference implied, was India important in the American diplomatic priorities. Not surprisingly, therefore, India refused to become a member of the Western bloc.

Nehru sought to serve India's interests by being non-aligned rather than by becoming an active but minor actor in the Cold War; this resulted in active resistance

⁶⁸ Indian-American Relations, Proceedings of the India-America Conference held in New Delhi in December 1949, Indian Council of World Affairs, (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1950), pp.2-4.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid. See also Chapter VII Ip.273

from the United States and the United Kingdom as manifested in their unsympathetic attitude towards issues affecting India's interests.⁷¹ This further stiffened India's attitude to the West. Here was an opportunity which Russia was late in seizing, for it was not until after Stalin's death that Russia was prepared to take note of non-alignment free, in effect, from her ideological shibboleths.⁷²

⁷¹See Chapters V, VI and IX.

⁷²See Chapter III, pp. 101 - 105.

CHAPTER III

THE BACKGROUND

INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS 1947-1959

THE STALIN ERA

On assumption of power, after the general elections in 1945, the Labour Government led by Attlee declared its intention of granting independence to India. In India, Nehru was asked to form an interim government in September 1946. Nehru, who was in charge of the Department of External Affairs, lost no time in initiating talks with the Soviet side for the establishment of diplomatic relations. On April 13, 1947, an agreement was made to establish diplomatic relations.¹

Mrs. Vijaya Laxmi Pandit, Nehru's sister, was appointed the first Indian ambassador to Moscow; she reported in Moscow on August 13, 1947; the first Soviet ambassador, Novikov, presented his credentials in New Delhi on January 1, 1948.²

At this time, Stalin was more interested in stabilising his control over Eastern Europe than in winning the emerging nations' friendship; Soviet Indian experts were convinced of collaboration between the Indian national bourgeoisie and British "imperialism";³ nor did the Indian leadership go out of the way to please

¹Jagdish Vibhakar, A Model Relationship: 25 Years of Indo-Soviet Diplomatic Ties (New Delhi: Punjabi Publishers, 1972), pp.5-7.

²Ibid., p.7.

³See Chapter I, p.45.

Moscow; they retained Commonwealth and many other connections with Britain. Therefore, Indo-Soviet relations during this period were so cold that Stalin did not receive the first Indian ambassador even once during her entire tenure.⁴

Tensions between India and the West on many counts provided many opportunities⁵ which could be exploited by Moscow, if it so desired; but it remained apathetic. One such issue which remained live for a long time and which both blocs exploited for their diplomatic benefit in the subcontinent during the Cold War was Kashmir.

KASHMIR: Undivided Kashmir had an area of 84,471 square miles, and, according to the 1941 census, a population of 4,002,000 of whom 77 per cent were Muslims, and the rest Hindus, Buddhists and Sikhs.⁶

Like all the rulers of large native states, the Hindu Maharajah of Kashmir, Hari Singh, entertained hopes

⁴J.A. Naik, Soviet Policy Towards India From Stalin to Brezhnev (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1970), p.67.

⁵Some large native states like Hyderabad, which accepted British Suzerainty during the colonial era, entertained hopes of remaining independent after India became independent. This was unacceptable to the new nationalist government of India. Therefore, in September 1948, India used force to integrate Hyderabad with the Indian Union. There was bitter criticism of India for this action in the British Parliament and press. This was resented in India. See The Times, September 14, 16, 18 and 21, 1948.

The ruler of Hyderabad referred the issue to the Security Council in September 1948. The Soviet Union hardly took any interest in the issue. See The Times, September 17, 1948.

⁶W. Norman Brown, The United States, India and Pakistan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), p.180.

of remaining independent.⁷ But Pakistan subjected him to pressure, by an economic blockade, to merge his State with herself; this was bound to be inconvenient since in those days all of Kashmir's communications ran through the territories that became Pakistan. Closely on the heels of this pressure followed the Pakistani tribal invasion on October 22, 1947.⁸ The Maharajah's small army could not defend the State; he appealed to New Delhi for help. On October 24, 1947, New Delhi told him that the Indian Army would be sent in only if he decided the future of his state. On October 26, 1947, the Maharajah signed the Instrument of Accession and acceded to India.⁹

The Government of India declared that "as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invaders the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people".¹⁰

India then sent her army to clear Kashmir of invaders. In December 1947, New Delhi appealed to the United Nations. A cease-fire was arranged by the United Nations on January 1, 1949.¹¹ This left about one third

⁷The Indian Independence Act declared that with the grant of independence to India the suzerainty of His Majesty over native states would lapse and with it all power exercised by the Emperor over them would return to the rulers. See Acts of Parliament, 1947, Public, Vol. I, PCH 30.

⁸Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations (New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, 1967), p.110. Pakistan infiltrated armed tribesmen into Kashmir to occupy the state.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Quoted in Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, "Kashmir India and Pakistan", Foreign Affairs, Vol. XLIII, No. 3 (April 1965), p.529.

¹¹W. Norman Brown, op.cit., p.191.

of Kashmir under Pakistani control.

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ATTITUDE

Dulles, who was to become Secretary of State in Eisenhower's administration in due course, felt as early as 1947 that "Soviet Communism exercises a strong influence through the interim Hindu government".¹² Such pre-conceived notions and the Cold War fears must have influenced the Western stand on Kashmir; they took a consistently pro-Pakistani stand on Kashmir in the Security Council.

In the debate, in the Security Council, on Kashmir in January 1948, the British delegate, Noel-Baker, wanted the question of a plebiscite to be discussed first and the stopping of the war next.¹³

The United States' delegate, Austin, said that the tribesmen could not be induced to leave unless they were "satisfied that there is to be a fair plebiscite assured through an interim government that is in fact, and that has the appearance of being non-partisan".¹⁴

SOVIET APATHY

The Western stand on Kashmir was bound to cause tensions in the relations between India and the West. Moscow, however, did not show any interest in these

¹²Quoted in William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers (London: Pall Mall Press, 1972), p.121.

¹³United Nations Security Council Official Records, 236th Meeting, January 28, 1948, pp.282-283. The President of the Council disagreed with this suggestion and so Noel-Baker relented at the 237th Meeting on January 29, 1948. Ibid., p.290. (hereinafter referred to as UNSCOR).

¹⁴UNSCOR, 240th Meeting, February 4, 1948, p.369.

developments.

When the Indian delegate was called home for consultations, and consequently an adjournment of the Security Council meeting was asked for, Noel-Baker opposed it saying: "There is nothing irrevocable about an aircraft ticket. There may be something irrevocable in the departure of the Indian delegation".¹⁵ At this stage, the Soviet Union did a favour to India: the Ukrainian delegate, Tarasenko, intervened to say that "I have no doubt that it is essential to adjourn the question to enable the Indian delegation to proceed to India for consultations with its Government".¹⁶

The Security Council passed a resolution on April 21, 1948, mentioning plebiscite as the means of settlement of the dispute contingent upon "the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals, not normally resident therein, who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting, and to prevent any intrusion into the state of such elements and any furnishing of material aid to those fighting in the State". On the other hand, the Government of India was to reduce her forces" progressively to the minimum strength required for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order". The Soviet Union and the Ukraine

¹⁵Ibid., 244th Meeting, February 11, 1948, p.109.

¹⁶Ibid., 245th Meeting, February 11, 1948, p.119.
In 1946 too the Soviet Union supported the Indian resolutions against apartheid in South Africa. See M.C. Chagla, Roses in December: An Autobiography (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1974), pp.235-240. Britain and the United States opposed these resolutions. Ibid.

Indian Kashmir elected a Constituent Assembly which met on October 31, 1951.¹⁸ Pakistan challenged, in the Security Council in 1952, the right of the Constituent Assembly to decide the future of the state. The United States and Britain introduced a resolution saying that the decision of the Constituent Assembly would not constitute a disposition of Kashmir. After four years of virtual silence, the Soviet delegate, Malik, said on January 17, 1952, that the Kashmir question remained unsettled because the Anglo-American plans were of "annexationist, imperialist nature". They were interfering "in the internal affairs of Kashmir" to turn it into a "protectorate" of the United States and Britain under the pretext of rendering it "assistance" through the United Nations and finally introduce into it Anglo-American troops and turn it into a "colony and a military and strategic base". He pleaded for the people of Kashmir to be given an opportunity to decide the question themselves without outside interference. "This can be achieved if that status is determined by a Constituent Assembly democratically elected by the Kashmir people".¹⁹

By then Eastern Europe was firmly under the grip of Stalin; he found time to take note of developments in

¹⁷UNSCOR, 268th Meeting, April 21, 1948, pp.8-15.

¹⁸Sisir Gupta, op.cit., p.366.

¹⁹Quoted in Frank D. Collins, "Recent Developments in Kashmir Dispute", The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXVII, No. 696 (October 27, 1952), p.665.

other parts of the world. Kashmir's strategic importance and the rival camps' increasing interest in the state must have caused some rethinking in Stalin. However, this first sign of Soviet interest in developments in the Kashmir dispute did not in any way amount to supporting Indian interests. Malik spoke of Anglo-American interference "in the internal affairs of Kashmir" and not of India. While he pleaded for the fate of Kashmir being decided by "a Constituent Assembly democratically elected", he shrewdly avoided expressing any opinion whether the Constituent Assembly then elected in Indian Kashmir, which prompted the discussion in the Security Council, was democratically elected or not. Without saying it in so many words, Malik seemed to have been pleading for Kashmir being left alone to let it develop into another Afghanistan-type state.

Thus, Indo-Soviet relations had frigid beginnings in the Stalin era. However, Stalin did not do anything which would have introduced tensions into Indo-Soviet relations. He did not make his displeasure known with
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Sardar Patel's firmness in dealing with the Communist uprising in Telangana.²¹ Soviet propaganda treated this
"with as much reticence as possible so that it would not
suffer more than necessary from the anti-Communist

²⁰ Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, 1875-1950, was the Deputy Prime Minister of India. He was to India what Bismarck was to Germany. See D.V. Tahmankar, Sardar Patel (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970).

²¹ The Communists tried an uprising between 1946-1950 in the Telangana region of erstwhile Hyderabad State. This received due attention from Soviet commentators. See A. Dyakov, "The situation in India", New Times, No. 23 (June 2, 1948), pp. 15-16.

atmosphere which the rebellion provoked".²² Stalin also made small gestures of goodwill. In November 1950, he sent birthday greetings to Nehru;²³ in 1951, while the debates in the U.S. Congress held up the wheat-to-India bill, the Kremlin sent 50 thousand tonnes of wheat and announced that it would not haggle about money while the Indian people were starving.²⁴

Had Stalin lived longer, he would probably have revised his policy towards India, since by 1950 he had stabilised the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe; death intervened in March 1953. It was left to his successors to revise the policy towards India.

THE THAW IN INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Shortly after Stalin's death, the new leadership made conciliatory gestures towards the world, both Western as well as non-aligned.²⁵ India received due attention from the new leadership. In his speech to the Supreme Soviet on August 8, 1953, Malenkov said that the "position of such a considerable state as India is of great importance for the strengthening of peace in the East". He spoke of India's contribution to peace in Korea and expressed the hope that friendly relations between India and the USSR would grow.²⁶ India received her first

²²Peter Sager, Moscow's Hand in India: An Analysis of Soviet Propaganda (Bombay: Lalvani Publishing House, 1967), p.34.

²³The Hindu, November 16, 1950.

²⁴Chester Bowles, Ambassador's Report (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), p.220.

²⁵See David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1962) pp.125-138.

²⁶Quoted in K.P.S. Menon, The Flying Troika (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1963), p.57.

October Revolution slogan in 1954.²⁷

Thus, while Moscow was growing warm towards India, the United States introduced new tensions into Indo-American relations by making military alliances with Pakistan. Disappointed with the Arabs who did not give unreserved support to her on Kashmir,²⁸ Pakistan turned to the West. It was easy for any-one to understand that Pakistan was building up her strength against India. Indications to this effect were not lacking.²⁹

Nehru objected to the United States-Pakistan military alliance. In a letter to Nehru in February 1954, President Eisenhower assured that should Pakistan use the weapons being supplied by the United States against India, Washington would immediately undertake appropriate action both within and outside the United Nations to stop it. The American President also offered to give military aid to India if she so desired.³⁰ Nehru did not accept any military aid in those days.

The Soviet Union, naturally, denounced the new military alliances between Turkey and Pakistan and Turkey and Iraq.³¹ Thus, both India as well as the USSR saw a threat in these military alliances. This coincidence of

27. J.A. Naik, *op.cit.*, P. 79

28. Years later, General Ayub Khan expressed his disappointment with the Arabs on this count. See Friends and Not Masters: A Political Autobiography (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), P. 155

29. See The New York Times, November 22, 1953.

30. The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXII, No. 818 (February 28, 1955).

31. See Pravda, January 25, 1954 and April 17, 1955, and Izvestia, February 27, 1954.

interests and the change in the attitude of the Soviet Union towards the new nations contributed to warmth in Indo-Soviet relations.

The Soviet Union then began espousing the causes dear to Afro-Asia and adopting their slogans. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR supported the concept of Panchsheel³² on February 9, 1955.³³ While the United States Government rejected a suggestion by a black Congressman to send greetings to the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian nations, held in April 1955, the Soviet Union warmly greeted it.³⁴

EXCHANGE OF VISITS

Up until this time, the Soviet leaders were not welcome beyond the borders of the Communist world. Having decided to break out of these limits, the new Soviet leaders turned to the non-aligned countries from whom they could expect a favourable response.

An invitation was extended to Nehru to visit the Soviet Union. He visited the Soviet Union in June 1955. At the end of the visit, the drafting of the joint statement was left to the Indian side. However the Soviet government suggested that both governments condemn the creation of military blocs and state that neither

³²This was part of the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet signed on April 29, 1954. The five principles are: 1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty. 2. Mutual non-aggression. 3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs. 4. Equality and mutual benefit. 5. Peaceful co-existence; see India's Foreign Policy, p.99.

³³David J. Dallin, op.cit., p.297. See also E. Korovin, "Five Principles" International Affairs (Moscow) No. 5 (1956).

³⁴See G.H. Jansen, op.cit., pp.192-193. See also E. Zhukov, "The Bandung Conference of Asian and African Countries and Its Historic Significance", International Affairs (Moscow) No. 5 (1955).

would participate in any coalitions or actions directed against the other. The Indian side felt that such a wording would amount to "a negative military alliance". When this was explained to the Soviet side, it did not insist on its inclusion.³⁵

Bulganin and Khrushchev paid a three-week return visit to India in November-December 1955.

During this visit, they played up to India's national ego. Speaking at a Parliamentary Association meeting on December 13, 1955, Khrushchev referred to India's then population of 370 millions and said that this made her "one of the most powerful States on earth". He blamed the "colonialists" for not counting India among the great powers and declared that India is a great power and that she ought to rank among the great powers of the world.³⁶

Since there was something in common between Nehru and Soviet philosophy, i.e., preference for heavy industry, Khrushchev emphasised the need for heavy industry in some of his speeches.³⁷ They also removed a sore point in Indo-Soviet relations - the ridiculous estimate of Mahatma Gandhi during the Stalin era. Both leaders paid tributes to the Mahatma.³⁸

On their return home, the Soviet leaders reported to a special session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; it passed a resolution on December 29, 1955, which described

³⁵K.P.S. Menon, op.cit., p.119. For a reversal of this stand by India, see Chapter VII.

³⁶International Affairs (Moscow) No. 1 (1956) Supplement, p.215 (hereinafter referred to as Supplement). See also Bulganin's press conference on December 14, 1955, ibid., p.216.

³⁷Ibid., pp.175-176.

³⁸See Hemen Ray, op.cit., p.99.

the visit as "a major political event".³⁹

KASHMIR

Realising, as the Soviet leaders did, the emotive value of Kashmir in India, and aware of tensions in Indo-American and Indo-British relations because of Anglo-American support for Pakistan on the issue, Khrushchev and Bulganin seized the opportunity of their visit to India to extend Soviet support to her, for the first time, on Kashmir. According to Tyson, a visit to Kashmir was not included in the original programme; it was later added at the Soviet request.⁴⁰

Speaking in Srinagar, Kashmir, on December 10, 1955, Khrushchev "grieved that the imperialist forces succeeded in dividing India..."; but hastened to add that partition was "a decided issue".⁴¹ He also declared: "That Kashmir is one of the States of the Republic of India has been decided by the people of Kashmir. It is a question that the people themselves have decided."⁴²

Khrushchev also explained, by inference, as to why the Soviet Union supported India. "It is obvious to all", he said, "that the Baghdad pact is spearheaded against the Soviet Union and other peaceful countries. It is, therefore, our task to weaken this belligerent alliance."⁴³

He also told his audience that the Pakistani

³⁹Supplement, p.251.

⁴⁰Geoffrey Tyson, "India and the Russian visitors", International Affairs (London), Vol. XXXII, No. 2 (April 1956), p.174.

⁴¹Supplement, p.209.

⁴²Ibid., p.210.

⁴³Ibid.

government had told the Soviet ambassador in that country that the Soviet leaders "should give up" their "visit to Kashmir".⁴⁴ However, in the same speech he extended an olive branch to Pakistan. He said: "We should very much like to have similar relations with Pakistan, and it is not our fault that such relations have so far not developed. But we shall persistently strive to improve these relations in the interest of peace".⁴⁵

THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE IN 1957

In April 1956, Nehru offered to make the cease-fire line the international border and settle the dispute on the basis of the status quo.⁴⁶ In November 1956, the Constituent Assembly of Indian Kashmir adopted a constitution; its preamble declared that the State is and shall remain an integral part of India.⁴⁷ Pakistan, therefore, raised the issue in the Security Council.

A draft resolution was circulated by the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and others, even before India's delegate, Menon, completed his speech. The resolution said that the decision of the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir would not amount to making the disposition of the State, and that a plebiscite under the United Nations supervision would decide the issue.⁴⁸

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Ibid., p.211.

⁴⁶Russel Brines, The Indo-Pakistani Conflict (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968, p.151.

⁴⁷Sisir Gupta, op.cit., p.374.

⁴⁸UNSCOR, 765th Meeting, January 24, 1957, p.4.

Intervening in the debate, the Soviet delegate, Sobolev, said that "certain powers" were guided by their own interests which were aimed at "penetration into this region as one of great strategic importance". He defended the action of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly as one of ending the "uncertainty of their position", and said that the draft resolution failed to take "the real situation" into consideration. He also declared that "the Kashmir question has already been settled in accordance with the expressed wishes of the Kashmir people themselves".⁴⁹

This spirited defence of India's case notwithstanding, the Soviet delegate abstained when the draft resolution was put to vote.⁵⁰

Probably encouraged by this Soviet vote, the United States, United Kingdom and others introduced another resolution in February 1957 calling for the induction of United Nation troops into Kashmir. Sobolev, repeating his argument that Kashmir is an integral part of India, said that, under the Charter, UN forces could be used only for repelling aggression. "It goes without saying that the Charter does not provide for the use of United Nations forces to impose by force a plebiscite in any country". He, however, pleaded for direct negotiations between India and Pakistan. He did not oppose sending Jarring to the subcontinent, as proposed in the resolution under discussion, but did not want any deadline for the report; he proposed deletion of the deadline for

⁴⁹Ibid., p.16.

⁵⁰Russel Brines, op.cit., p.153.

the Report.⁵¹

The Australian and British delegates criticised the Soviet policy on Kashmir for its inconsistency: of regarding it an integral part of India, and yet, asking India and Pakistan to enter into direct negotiations for settlement of the dispute, and, accepting the proposal to send Jarring to the subcontinent to find ways for settlement of the dispute.

Sobolev replied that there was no inconsistency in the policy. He repeated the argument that Kashmir is an integral part of India. But it is complicated by the fact that Kashmir lies on the border between India and Pakistan and part of it is under Pakistani control; there are, therefore, bound to be differences of opinion on account of these factors. It is these factors that must be discussed by the parties to the dispute.⁵² The Soviet delegate seemed to be suggesting that the cease-fire line be made a permanent border through direct negotiations - a proposal Nehru had made in 1956.

When his amendments to delete the reference to UN forces and drop the deadline for the Jarring report were not accepted by the sponsors of the resolution, Sobolev vetoed it.⁵³

Immediately, the United States, United Kingdom and Australia submitted another resolution without reference

⁵¹UNSCOR, 770th Meeting, February 18, 1957, pp. 39-40. The Western resolution wanted Jarring to submit his report by April 15, 1957. Ibid.

⁵²Ibid., 773rd Meeting, February 20, 1957, p.4.

⁵³Ibid., p.29. The United States' delegate charged the Soviet Union with the abuse of veto "to perpetuate international conflict". Ibid., p.30.

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to UN forces. The resolution directed Jarring to go to the subcontinent and examine with the governments of India and Pakistan any proposals which would contribute to the settlement of the dispute "having regard to the previous resolutions of the Security Council"; this was an indirect reference to the plebiscite as a means of settlement. Jarring was to report by April 15, 1957. The Soviet Union abstained again.⁵⁴

GOA

This was another irritant in the relations between India and the West. A few months before the arrival of the two Russian leaders in India, Goa became a live issue. In August 1955, Portuguese soldiers shot dead 20 satyagrahis (volunteers offering passive resistance).⁵⁵ As always, Portugal refused to talk on the transfer of Goa and other pockets on India's western coast to India, clinging to the myth that they were Portuguese overseas provinces.

This was another emotive issue that Khrushchev used to impress Indian public opinion during his visit to India. Speaking at a rally in Calcutta on November 30, 1955, Khrushchev said: "There are countries which fasten themselves like ticks to a healthy body. I mean Portugal, which refuses to leave Goa, to relinquish its hold on that territory which legitimately belongs to India. (Applause)."⁵⁶

⁵⁴Ibid., 774th Meeting, February 21, 1957, p.14.

⁵⁵Michael Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography, p.563.

⁵⁶Supplement, p.204.

In an unimaginative reaction to this Soviet gesture, Dulles issued a joint communique with Dr. Paulo Cunha, the Portuguese Foreign Minister, on December 2, 1955, which called Goa an overseas Portuguese province.⁵⁷

Asked if the United States' government regarded Goa as a Portuguese province, Dulles said at a press conference: "As far as I know, all the world regards it as a Portuguese province. It has been Portuguese, I think, for about 400 years". To a further question whether he said a province or a colony, he replied "province". He also said that the United States did not take any position on the merits of the case; he thought that the Indian government did not question the status of these Portuguese pockets as being, under Portuguese law, provinces; he declared that that part of the world was definitely outside of NATO.⁵⁸

Asked if he considered the tempest it would stir up in India, he said that the United States had given it very careful consideration; the Communique was not lightly issued. "But we did feel that it was appropriate and right to indicate our attitude towards the emotionalism which was sought to be created by the Soviet rulers when they were in India ... But the creation and fomenting of

⁵⁷The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIII, No. 859, (December 12, 1955), p.966. While the Soviet Union was coming to terms with non-alignment, Dulles also said on June 9, 1956, that it was "an obsolete conception and, except under very exceptional circumstances, it is an immoral and short-sighted conception". See The New York Times, June 10, 1956.

⁵⁸Ibid., Vol. XXXIII, No. 860 (December 19, 1955), p. 1007.

that atmosphere of hatred was something we felt we should express ourselves against."⁵⁹

Khrushchev seized this opportunity provided by Dulles to make more pro-Indian statements. In his address to the Parliamentary Association for the Promotion of Hindi Language on December 13, 1955, Khrushchev referred to the criticism in the United States against his and Bulganin's speeches in India as being inflammatory and said: "If some people do not like what we said, that is purely a matter for their own conscience, but we are against colonialisms and we shall continue to say so always and everywhere."⁶⁰

He said that the Soviet leaders did not want to incite anybody against the United States and United Kingdom. "We speak of colonialism as an historical fact. I am surprised that our statements against colonialism, especially against the continuation of the colonial domination by Portugal of Goa and other Portuguese possessions on Indian territory have prompted certain statesmen in the United States to come out in support of the Portuguese colonialists, on the grounds that these possessions have been held by Portugal for nearly 400 years. No matter how many years have passed, stolen property remains stolen property and should be returned to its rightful owner."⁶¹

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Supplement, p.215.

⁶¹Ibid. After this demonstrative support by Soviet leaders, Soviet journals sometimes carried articles on Goa. See, for example, L. Alexandrova, "The Last of the Colonies of India", International Affairs (Moscow) No. 7 (1956).

Thus, in the post-Stalin era, there was a thaw in Indo-Soviet relations. It was evident that the new Soviet leadership tried to take advantage of the tensions in Indo-American relations in the wake of the United States military supplies to Pakistan under treaty commitments to gain influence in India by making proposals likely to appeal to India.

Moscow suggested the inclusion of India in the UN Disarmament Subcommittee in 1954; the United States, Britain and France opposed it.⁶² During the Middle East crisis in 1958, when the United States landed troops in Lebanon and Britain in Jordan, Khrushchev proposed, on July 19, 1958, a summit meeting of the Big Four, India and the UN Secretary-General.⁶³ This did not meet with Western approval either. If the West had accepted Soviet proposals, Moscow would have got the credit for adding to India's stature; and if they rejected, they would have had to bear the blame.

Khrushchev also exhibited a remarkable flair for public relations in pursuit of his diplomatic goal of gaining strong influence in India. He even ignored the interests of the CPI.⁶⁴ At a time when there were mid-term elections to the Andhra State Legislative Assembly

⁶²Arthur Stein, India and the Soviet Union: the Nehru Era (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969), p.41.

⁶³See New Times, No. 3 (Supplement, 1958).

⁶⁴The CPI has the stigma of co-operating with the British government in furtherance of Soviet interests during World War II and opposing the Congress' "Quit India" movement in August 1942. See Chattar Singh Sarma, India and Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1947, (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1959), p.152.

in 1955 and the CPI was a serious challenger to the Congress, Pravda wrote an editorial praising the progress made by India in various fields since independence.⁶⁵ According to Fic, when the Communist Chief Minister of Kerala had visited Moscow in 1959 to attend the XXIst Congress of the CPI, Moscow had advised him to play cool and avoid a collision course with the Central Government.⁶⁶ When the Indian Government dismissed the Communist Government of Kerala in July 1959, Pravda factually reported the event.⁶⁷

Khrushchev also replied to Rajaji's⁶⁸ letters in which he suggested that Russia unilaterally renounce the use of nuclear weapons in warfare.⁶⁹ While Khrushchev did not accept the proposal, his replies would influence liberal public opinion in India because Rajaji, in spite of being a private citizen and an uncompromising critic of Communism,⁷⁰ received courteous replies from the Soviet leader.

Notwithstanding all these attempts to please India, Indo-Soviet relations were strictly business-like. The

⁶⁵See Pravda, January 26, 1955. The Congress election machinery got thousands of copies of this editorial printed and distributed them among the voters. See Marshall Windmiller, "Indian Communism and the New Soviet Line", Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXIX, No. 4 (December 1956, p.354.

⁶⁶Victor M. Fic, Kerala: Yenan of India (Bombay: Nachiketa Publications Ltd., 1970), p.110.

⁶⁷Pravda, August 1, 1959.

⁶⁸C. Rajagopala Chari, known as Rajaji or C.R. in India, was one of the veterans of India's nationalist movement. He was the first Indian to become the last Governor-General of India to be appointed by the British Government. He retired from politics in 1953 and died in 1972.

⁶⁹See the texts of letters in International Affairs (Moscow) No. 2 (1958).

⁷⁰See Chapter VIII footnote 59.

failure of the Soviet Union to use her veto on the first and third resolutions on Kashmir in the Security Council debates in 1957⁷¹ suggests that. It is probable that Moscow did not exercise its veto because of its unhappiness with Nehru's persistent criticism of the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 and his calls for the withdrawal of her forces therefrom, after having been reticent in the beginning of the crisis.⁷² By her votes in the United Nations, the Soviet Union reminded India that she needed her support, too, and that a quid pro quo would be strictly followed in mutual dealings; this was also a hint to Pakistan that Soviet support for India was not irrevocable.

While Nehru got a resolution adopted by the Congress in 1954 making progressive realisation of a socialistic pattern of society its goal,⁷³ he did not tone down his criticism of Communism either.⁷⁴

By 1959, which is the starting point of this thesis, Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian relations, both of which had become increasingly strained since 1954, took a turn for

⁷¹See above pp. 106 - 109. The veto on the second resolution might have been due to the clause in it for the induction of UN forces into Kashmir which would be a precedent elsewhere, say in Hungary.

⁷²For Nehru's statements, see The Hindu, November 6, 1956, and India's Foreign Policy, pp. 555-559.

⁷³Marshall Windmiller, op.cit., p. 353.

⁷⁴See the World Marxist Review, Vol. I, No. 4 (December 1958) which printed Nehru's criticism of Communism, in his article "The Basic Approach", originally printed in the Congress Party's journal, Economic Review, and Pavel Yudin's reply to it, "Can We Accept Pandit Nehru's Approach?" See also K.P.S. Menon, op.cit., for the then Vice-President of India, Dr. Radhakrishnan's speeches in the Soviet Union in defence of individual freedom.

the worse.⁷⁵ It is possible that the warmth towards India, besides being a part of its new policy towards the new nations, was suggestive of Moscow's desire to keep its options open to build up India as a countervailing force to China in South Asia should conditions so require.

⁷⁵See Chapter VII pp. 200 - 216

COLONIALISM AND RACIALISM

In view of her past experiences, India is sensitive to colonialism and racial discrimination. This has been one of the factors contributing to friction between India and the West, which the Soviet Union skillfully exploited to her diplomatic advantage. The West's equivocal stand on colonial and racial issues cannot appeal to India. This dissatisfaction with the West is not confined to Indian government circles alone; it is shared by the common man, intellectuals and the press.

These differences between India and the West manifested themselves as early as 1949 at a gathering of Indian and American intellectuals held in New Delhi in the month of December of that year. An Indian delegate to the conference said that between 1946-1948, the United States hindered the United Nations from acting against racial discrimination in South Africa; and that she did not give whole-hearted support to the Indian efforts to tighten up the trusteeship system, especially with regard to South West Africa.¹ An American delegate replied that it would have been politically embarrassing for the United States had it taken a forthright stand on South Africa in view of certain similarities between her and parts of United States territory.² This was likely to create an

¹Indian-American Relations: Proceedings of the India-America Conference held in New Delhi in December, 1949. p.7.

²Ibid.

impression in India and other Afro-Asian states that the Western camp, ostensibly organised for universal freedom and human dignity, meant to apply these concepts only to white nations.

Since the Russian pressure was mainly directed against the West, and since she supported all calls for liquidation of colonialism and ending of racial discrimination, Soviet cliches like national liberation and human equality sounded more appealing to Afro-Asians than identical Western slogans which did not seem to apply to them.

The Soviet Union earned a good deal of credit in India for her stand on these emotional issues. This becomes clear in what Mrs. Gandhi told Sulzberger (correspondent of The New York Times) in March 1969. Asked to comment on the American charge that India is too close to the Soviet Union and votes too often with her in the United Nations, she said: "We happen to see things similarly on issues involving colonialism and racialism. Moscow has shown greater understanding than Washington of the mentality and needs of newly freed peoples. We are touchy because we are so close to pre-independence times and attitudes".³

To understand this Soviet success in India, it is necessary to discuss the impact of white racism on her and the attitudes adopted by the West and the Soviet Union to colonial and racial issues.

³The New York Times, March 16, 1969.

INDIA AND RACISM AND COLONIALISM

Political subjection and racial humiliations left a scar on India's memories; Indians deeply resent political and racial domination. Almost all great Indian leaders gave expression to their painful feelings about racial discrimination under colonial masters.

Writing on South Africa in The Times of India in June 1918, Mahatma Gandhi wrote: "Prejudices cannot be removed by legislation... They yield only to patient toil and education". His quarrel with South Africa was "for feeding the prejudice by legalising it".⁴ Speaking in Madras in October 1936, on South African treatment of Indians, he said, "They treat us as beasts".⁵

The Indian National Congress opposed racialism in all its manifestations. A resolution passed by the Congress denounced Nazism, particularly the "organised terrorism against the people of Jewish race".⁶

Commenting on Hitler's racial myths, Nehru wrote: "But we in India have known racialism in all its forms ever since the commencement of the British rule ... Generation after generation and year after year, India as a nation and Indians as individuals were subjected to insults, humiliation and contemptuous treatment ... As an Indian, I am ashamed to write all this, for the memory of it hurts, and what hurts still more is the fact that we

⁴Quoted in Louis Fischer, Gandhi: His Life and Message for the World, (New York: Signet Key Book, New American Library, 1954), p.25.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Quoted in Pradip R. Sarbadhikari, op.cit., p.22.

submitted for so long to this degradation".⁷

Referring to the exclusive English clubs in India, during the British Raj, he wrote: "For my part I have no objection to exclusive English or European clubs, and very few Indians care to join them; but when this social exclusiveness is clearly based on racialism and on a ruling class always exhibiting its superiority and unapproachability, it bears another aspect ...

"Racialism in India is not so much English versus Indian, it is European as opposed to Asiatic. In India every European, be he German, or Pole or Rumanian, is automatically a member of the ruling race. Railway carriages, station retiring rooms, benches in parks, etc., are marked 'For Europeans only'. This is bad enough in South Africa or elsewhere, but to have to put up with it in one's own country is a humiliating and exasperating reminder of one's enslaved condition".⁸

He also wrote that "racial discrimination and treatment of Indians in some of the British dominions and colonies were powerful factors in our determination to break from that group".⁹

Nehru's feeling of revulsion against European racism becomes evident from his reaction to the Japanese victories in World War II. "China went up in peoples' estimation, and though Japan was not liked, there was a feeling of satisfaction at the collapse of old-established European

⁷Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, p.327.

⁸Ibid., p.293.

⁹Ibid., p.428.

colonial powers before the armed strength of an Asiatic power".¹⁰

Sardar Patel spoke of "a monstrous order under which Indians had to get down from the carriages, dismount if they were riding a horse, and lower their umbrellas if they were carrying any, and salute any Britisher who happened to pass by".¹¹

After forming the provisional government, Nehru broadcast to the nation on September 7, 1946. In this speech, he rejected the Nazi doctrine of racialism wheresoever and in whatever form it might be practised. He said that India would work for the emancipation of colonies and recognition of racial equality.¹²

This was reiterated in a resolution passed by the Congress in December 1948.¹³ Nehru continued to give vent to India's views on the issues after independence. In his speech to the Canadian Parliament in October 1949, he said: "The so-called revolt of Asia is a legitimate striving of an ancient and proud peoples against the racial arrogance of certain western nations. Racial discrimination is still in evidence in some countries and there is still not enough realisation of the importance of Asia in the councils of the world".¹⁴

G.D. Birla, the owner of one of the two great

¹⁰ Ibid., p.385.

¹¹ Quoted in D.V. Tahmankar, op.cit., p.80.

¹² India's Foreign Policy, p.2.

¹³ See Pradip R. Sarbadhikari, op.cit., p.23.

¹⁴ The Indian Year Book of International Affairs, Vol. XI, (1962), pp.436-437.

industrial empires of India, spoke of Englishmen's superiority in business methods, their organising capacity and their many other virtues. "But their racial arrogance could not be concealed. I was not allowed to use the lift to go up to their offices, nor their benches while waiting to see them. I smarted under these insults".¹⁵

Sensitivity to colonial and racial issues is so deep rooted in India's national psyche that even a liberal like K.M. Panikkar said in New Delhi in October 1951 that MacArthur's "crushing defeat" at the Chinese hands, in his "offensive towards the Yalu", was "hailed all over Asia as a fitting reply to the humiliations suffered by the Asian peoples at the hands of the Western Powers for the last few decades".¹⁶

Commenting on the British softness towards South Africa, The Hindustan Times wrote on December 14, 1951: "Britain may lack the courage to face a moral issue of vital importance to the vast majority of the people of the Commonwealth, but the United Nations cannot degenerate into an assemblage of white nations, without committing suicide".¹⁷ Such, therefore, is the sensitivity of all

¹⁵Quoted in K.S. Ramanujam, "G.D. Birla is 81", Bhavan's Journal, Vol. XX, No. 18, (March 31, 1974), p.33.

¹⁶Quoted in Karunakar Gupta, Indian Foreign Policy in Defence of National Interest (Calcutta: The World Press Pvt. Ltd., 1956), p.49.

¹⁷Quoted in India and the United Nations (Report of a Study Group Set up by the Indian Council of World Affairs) (New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1957), p.118.

sections of Indian society to colonial and racial issues.

However, past grudges do not shape the events all the time. Past experiences would not have been a source of friction between India and the West but for the occasional unhappy experiences of some Indian immigrants in the United Kingdom and the attitude of the West to South African racism and Portuguese colonialism.

Indian immigrants were admitted into Britain in the 1950s and 1960s on a large scale. Increasing racial tensions in the country resulted in the practical stoppage of non-white immigration. Reacting to this, The Times of India commented: "Without exception, every legislative measure it has passed in the last 10 years has sought to reduce, not the general flow of immigrants, but only of those whose complexion isn't white. Yet, it pretends that its immigration policy isn't racist. What is it then?"¹⁸

Instances like the British passport holders of Indian descent in East Africa being denied the freedom to enter the United Kingdom at will naturally cannot appeal to India.¹⁹

Indian immigrants in Britain represent all strata of Indian society, from semi-literate rural folks to highly educated sections. Once they arrive in Britain, they even lose their separate identity; they become a part of an indistinguishable lump: the coloured. The not infrequent racial outbursts and sporadic acts of indignity

¹⁸The Times of India, February 7, 1973.

¹⁹See the editorial in The Guardian, January 26, 1973.

against them have, therefore, an impact on all sections of India.

Then, there are differences arising out of the Anglo-American attitude to South African racism, Portuguese colonialism also contributed to tensions in the relations between India and the West before that country decided to divest herself of her colonial empire.

There are 700,000 people of Indian origin in South Africa. Indian immigration to South Africa took place between 1860-1910 at the initiative of the government of Natal which felt the need for labour.²⁰ While the United States and the United Kingdom try to remove racial barriers in their own countries to the extent their people are ready to accept, they have been steadfast in their support of South Africa, notwithstanding proforma criticism of her segregation policies.

In former British Guiana where 48 per cent of the people are of Indian origin,²¹ the then Prime Minister, Dr. Cheddi Jagan, of Indian descent, was manoeuvred out of power through changes in the electoral system because of the United States fears that his Marxist leanings would make him a protege of the Soviet Union.

We will discuss the Anglo-American attitude to Portuguese colonial claim to Goa.²² Their attitude to her African colonies was not different until Portugal

²⁰ India and the United Nations, p.107.

²¹ The percentage of other racial groups is: 33 per cent blacks, 4 per cent American Indians, and 3 per cent whites. The Columbia Encyclopedia (New York and London, Third Edition, 1963), p.883.

²² See Chapter VI

herself changed after the coup in 1974. Alluding to this western softness to Portuguese colonialism, Nehru said in the Rajya Sabha in August 1954: "We talk about the crisis of our time and many people do it in different ways. Probably in the United States the crisis of the time is supposed to be Communism versus anti-Communism. Maybe to some extent. Well, the crisis of the time in Asia is colonialism versus anti-colonialism".²³ For the West, Portuguese colonialism was not a problem to be bothered about; for India and other Afro-Asian states this was unacceptable. This temperamental incompatibility between the West and newly independent states gave an opportunity to the Soviet Union to reinforce her anti-colonial and anti-racial image.

It is, therefore, logical to discuss the Anglo-American attitude to colonialism and racialism which improved Soviet image in India.

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS COLONIAL AND RACIAL ISSUES

The United States and the United Kingdom did not bother much to respect Afro-Asian sensitivities on colonial and racial issues even when the Cold War was at its height.

The Anglo-American policy towards South Africa gives the impression to Afro-Asia that for them a single white-dominated state is more important than a large number of Third World countries. For India, South Africa has a

²³Quoted in Norman D. Palmer, The Indian Political System (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp.257-258.

particularly poignant memory; it was there that the Mahatma began his political career and experimented his non-violent techniques against apartheid, which has since been perfected with more oppressive laws. Mention has already been made to Anglo-American opposition to Indian resolution against South African segregation policies.²⁴

Afro-Asians rightly feel that the flow of investments and weapons into South Africa can only add strength to the regime. Therefore, they plead for an end to the flow; the West ignores it. For instance, the United States investment in South Africa was of the order of \$ 1 billion by 1971 and the rate of return was over 20 per cent or double the rate of return the United States investments get all over the world.²⁵ In the recent past the United States and the United Kingdom have been demonstratively exhibiting their preference for South Africa. They voted against a draft convention in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, making apartheid a crime against international law in April 1973;²⁶ they also boycotted the Oslo Conference in the same month at which a call was made for a boycott of trade with South Africa in "an attempt to cripple apartheid";²⁷ and both simultaneously exercised vetoes in May 1973 to block a resolution in the Security Council that would have extended sanctions to

²⁴See Chapter III p.98 and also p.128 in this Chapter.

²⁵Larry W. Bowman, "South Africa's Southern Strategy and Its Implications for the U.S.", International Affairs (London) Vol. XLVII, No. 1, (January 1971), p.27.

²⁶The Times, April 3, 1973. It was approved by 21 to 2 with 5 abstentions.

²⁷The Times, April 16, 1973. It was attended by more than 50 countries; the Nordic countries met the cost of the conference.

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South Africa and the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique; this blocking of the resolution on Southern Africa was the fourth occasion on which the United States had used her veto, and the ninth for Britain.²⁸

Britain's Rhodesia policy would not appeal to Afro-Asia either. Eleven days before the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, Prime Minister Wilson ruled out, on October 31, 1965, the use of force against the white minority regime on "Kith and Kin" grounds.²⁹ The United States did not even respect the United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia fully. In November 1971, a Congress Conference Committee decided to permit the importation of Rhodesian chrome on grounds of national defence.³⁰

Some of the American policies are likely to give the impression that the United States exhibits more concern for the suffering of whites than non-whites. For instance, in his letters to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives on April 22, 1953, President Eisenhower pointed to the countless thousands of homeless refugees in Europe, the steady flow of persons escaping from Communist oppression, and problems of population pressure, and recommended the admission of

²⁸The Times, May 23, 1973.

²⁹Quoted in Thomas M. Franck and Nigel S. Rodley, "After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force", American Journal of International Law Vol. LXVII, No. 2, (April 1973). p.298.

³⁰The New York Times, November 5, 1971. There are moves in the Congress to reimpose the restrictions. The Guardian, July 7, 1975.

240,000 into the United States.³¹ Similar suffering in the overcrowded subcontinent in the wake of partition in 1947 or during the recent Bangladesh crisis did not evoke such a gesture. In fact, under the United States exclusion law, Indians were prohibited from immigrating to the United States until 1946, when the law was revoked.³²

On colonial issues too this discrimination was evident. The United States Congress passed a resolution for the liberation of Eastern Europe, Baltic Republics, Ukraine, and Central Asian Republics,³³ but no such concern was exhibited for the fate of Portuguese colonies, Rhodesia and South West Africa.

In the words of Schlesinger, since "the time of Franklin Roosevelt American policy had had a nominal commitment to anti-colonialism. But the State Department had been dominated by men, who, regarding NATO as our top priority, flinched from anything which might bruise the sensibilities of our European allies, some of whom still had colonial possessions".³⁴ Sometimes, Britain and the United States played into Khrushchev's hands by opposing his symbolic anti-colonial resolutions. When the Soviet

³¹The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXVIII, No. 729, (June 15, 1953), p.857. In a statement, the acting Secretary, Smith, also said: "Indonesian independence closed a traditional outlet for Dutch immigration". He pleaded for admission of immigrants from "Netherlands, a country badly devastated by the war and already seriously overcrowded". Ibid., p.859.

³²W. Norman Brown, The United States India and Pakistan (Cambridge, Massachussets: Harvard University Press, 1963), p.365.

³³Quoted in N.S. Khrushchev, op.cit., pp.6-7.

³⁴Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., op.cit., p.446.

leader proposed, on October, 12, 1960, a resolution asking that the question of colonialism be debated in the plenary session of the General Assembly and not in its Political Committee, these two countries opposed it in the beginning.³⁵ On December 14, 1960, they also abstained on an Afro-Asian resolution calling for an end to colonialism, although, unlike Khrushchev's resolution,³⁶ it did not fix any date-line for ending it.³⁷ According to Schlesinger, when the Afro-Asian resolution was to be voted upon, Harold Macmillan made a transatlantic telephone call and urged President Eisenhower to direct the United States delegation to abstain from voting, which the President did.³⁸

On his part, Salazar appealed to Anglo-American sensibilities to retain their support for his colonial empire. For instance, he wrote " ... in the attack on Angola, it is not only Portugal that is being attacked but that it is sought to weaken the positions - and not only the strategic positions - of the entire western world".³⁹ And he met with a positive response from them

³⁵Keessing's Contemporary Archives 1961-1962, p.17931.

³⁶See pp.129 - 130.

³⁷Keessing's Contemporary Archives 1961-1962, pp 17992-17993. It was adopted by 89 to nil with 9 abstentions. Lord Home, then Foreign Secretary, commented that "such a resolution and others like it, reveal an almost total lack of responsibility and certainly pay no heed to the main purpose of the United Nations which is to insure order and security of peace". The New York Times, December 29, 1961, as quoted in Francis O. Wilcox, "The Non-aligned States and the United Nations" in Laurence W. Martin, ed., op.cit., p.133.

³⁸Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., op.cit., p.446.

³⁹Dr. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, "Realities and Trends of Portuguese Policies", International Affairs (London) Vol. XXXIX, No. (April 1963), p.183.

in view of their need for bases in Azores and Cape Verde Islands.

Even a liberal American paper like The New York Times found fault with Afro-Asia for its excessive "anti-colonial" drive against South Africa and Portugal to the point of putting itself in open opposition to the West".⁴⁰

THE SOVIET ATTITUDE

The Soviet Union has an advantage over the United States and the United Kingdom: even in the past the Russian empire did not elevate Kipling's philosophy to the level of official creed as her adversaries in the Cold War did for a long time. The present Russian creed, Marxism, has the reputation of having rejected all inequalities. The Soviet Union would naturally like to maintain this image. Besides that, the friction between Afro-Asia and the West on account of colonial and racial issues was an additional reason to support all anti-colonial and anti-racial resolutions to win friends in the Cold War.

Therefore, even when Indo-Soviet relations were cold during the Stalin era, Moscow did not fail to support Indian resolutions against apartheid in South Africa.⁴¹ There was no let up in this support to Afro-Asia on colonial and racial issues. When he attended the United Nations sessions in 1960, Khrushchev presented a "declaration on granting independence to colonial countries

⁴⁰ See its editorial on July 14, 1963.

⁴¹ See Chapter III, p.98

and peoples" in the General Assembly on September 23, 1960; this demanded independence to all colonies not later than 1961.⁴²

The Soviet leaders and press also focused on instances of racial discrimination in the United States against blacks and American Indians.⁴³ In September 1960, Khrushchev proposed that the United Nations should "consider" choosing another state for its headquarters.⁴⁴ One of the reasons cited for the proposal was "scandalous" racial discrimination against non-whites, especially Africans, around New York. Should the Soviet Union be selected, he assured, she would gladly "guarantee the best conditions for (the United Nations) work, full freedom, and security for the representatives of all states, irrespective of their political or religious convictions or the colour of their skin".⁴⁵

The Soviet leaders also made it a point to speak out against colonialism and racialism at every opportune time. Thus, Brezhnev supported the struggle against racialism in South Africa and colonialism in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea and Rhodesia in his report to the XXIII Congress of the CPSU in March 1966.⁴⁶

⁴²Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1961-1962, pp. 17873 and 17992-17993.

⁴³See, for instance, Khrushchev-Russel correspondence in International Affairs (Moscow) No. 4, 1958, p.9.

⁴⁴Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1961-1962, p.17873.

⁴⁵Quoted in Alexander Dallin, The Soviet Union at the United Nations, op.cit., p.163.

⁴⁶Pravda, March 30, 1966. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XVIII, No. 12, p.9.

The Soviet Union cannot be unaware of the strong feelings in India on colonial and racial issues. The stronger the stand she takes on these issues, the greater the possibility of the Soviet Union influencing Indian public opinion. In the mid-1960s the Soviet Union changed her Kashmir policy.⁴⁷ But Moscow would not write off India. Unlike Kashmir, strong support on colonial and racial issues would not cost her any Afro-Asian country's friendship. Therefore, the Soviet Union would take a forthright stand against colonial and racial issues; this would create an impression in the Third World that the Soviet Union identified herself with its aspirations.

The Basic Document adopted by the international conference of Communist parties in June 1969, said that the "imperialists" support the fascist and racist regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia. It also spoke of the "barbarous" persecution of American negroes, and appealed to all people of the world to fight against the "misanthropic ideology and practices of racism".⁴⁸

The Soviet Union is also sensitive to occasional Western allegations of racial discrimination in her own territory. Every time such a charge is made, her spokesmen and press give explanations to deny it; more often, they get black students to deny such charges.

⁴⁷See Chapter V, pp. 153 - 66

⁴⁸Pravda, June 18, 1969. Complete text in CDSP., Vol. XXI, No. 28, pp. 16, 20 and 23.

For instance, in February 1963, Izvestia published an open letter from an African student, Akem Fondem, denying western charges of racism in the Soviet Union. He said in his letter: " ... We Africans know who our enemies and who our friends are. We know in which universities students with a black skin must enter under the protection of soldiers armed to teeth. It is enough to remember James Meredith".⁴⁹

In response to The Daily Telegraph's allegation that inter-racial marriage ceremonies in the Soviet Union were meant for political propaganda, Izvestia published in August 1963 the addresses of Soviet girls who married Africans for the benefit of those who wanted to write to them and find out the truth.⁵⁰

In view of the highly emotive value of race, the USSR and China also use it against each other. Pravda reported in September 1963 that at the Afro-Asian solidarity meeting in Moshi, the Chinese delegate said, pointing to the presence of the Soviet Union, that the "whites have nothing to do here".⁵¹ In its turn, the Soviet press quoted foreign press reports to establish China's commercial deals with South Africa and Rhodesia.⁵²

⁴⁹Izvestia, February 24, 1963. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XV, No. 8, p.32.

⁵⁰Izvestia, August 22, 1963. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XV, No. 34, p.39. See also Pravda, December 21, 1963, for the Ghanaian ambassador's denial of Western charges of maltreatment of African students in the USSR and Pravda's comment, in the wake of tensions between Ghanaian students in Moscow and the Soviet government after the death of a Ghanaian student, under "intoxication", by the roadside. For more defensive postures on charges of racial discrimination in the USSR, see Izvestia, January 7, 1964.

⁵¹Pravda, September 19, 1963. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XV, No. 38, p.21.

⁵²See Izvestia, December 22, 1966 and Pravda, June 23, 1969. See also Soviet Weekly, London, March 17, 1973, in which Tursun Rahimov alleged, in his article, the "Racialism of the Maoists", that the minority races in China, who constitute 6 per cent of the total population, are being discriminated against.

Not surprisingly, the Soviet Union would adopt an uncompromising attitude to South Africa since she happens to be a very contentious issue between the West and Afro-Asia.

The Liberian and Ethiopian complaints against continued South African rule over South West Africa was rejected by the International Court of Justice on July 18, 1966. Commenting on this judgment, a correspondent wrote in Pravda that one half of the judges, including the representative of the USSR, opposed the present arrangement, but the deciding vote was cast by the Chairman, an Austrian judge, Spender. The correspondent also said that the fate of South West Africa would ultimately be decided by the courage of her people and the support they get from friends rather than by juridicial decisions.⁵³ This was an indirect call for direct action which would be more appealing to Africans in the wake of their disillusionment with the Court.

The judgment was made on yet another occasion to call for revision of the Charter. In an article in Izvestia Prof. M. Lazarev and I. Yakolev said that the composition of the International Court of Justice failed altogether to reflect the new balance of forces in the world and in the United Nations. The article mentioned that 8 out of 15 judges of the Court represented the Western world. Contrasting this position with article 9

⁵³Pravda, July 21, 1966. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XVIII, No. 29, p.7.

of the Charter, which says that the composition of the Court must ensure the representation of major forms of civilisation and of major legal systems of the world, the writers said that the time had come for the revision of this state of affairs.⁵⁴ If a revision along the lines suggested by the article were effected, the Soviet camp would control one-third of the judges of the Court since one-third of the world is Communist; this would be unacceptable to the West, but acceptable to Afro-Asia since their representation would go up too.

A Tass statement on the judgement said that it was authorised to state that the Soviet government condemned the judgment. The statement said it was a challenge to the world community; it was "an outrage against international law"; and that it was in the interests of South African "racists" and "their imperialist patrons". It also said that the judgment all the more made the need for a change in the Court's membership clear.⁵⁵

Any military co-operation between Britain and South Africa causes a furore in the non-white world. So articles in the Soviet press denounce Anglo-South African naval exercises and arms supplies to South Africa.⁵⁶

There is a strong feeling among Afro-Asians that but for Western investments, Anglo-American in particular the South African system would not survive to defy world public opinion. Soviet journals sometimes focus on

⁵⁴Izvestia, July 24, 1966. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XVIII, No. 29, p.8.

⁵⁵Pravda, July 29, 1966. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XVIII, No. 30, p.28.

⁵⁶See, for example, Pravda, October 8, 1971.

western investments. An article in International Affairs (Moscow) in 1971 estimated British, American and West German investments in South Africa at \$5,300 million. The British share alone being \$ 3000 million. It also mentioned that 16 per cent of all earnings on British overseas investments come from South Africa. The article went on to mention that seven ministers of the then Conservative government held directorships in the companies which have subsidiaries in South Africa. It quoted from a report to the General Assembly, made by a special committee on apartheid, which said that economic sanctions against South Africa could not succeed without the co-operation of the United States, United Kingdom, West Germany, and Japan which accounted for 57 per cent of South Africa's exports and 60 per cent of her imports.⁵⁷

Almost all Afro-Asian countries press for economic sanctions against and cultural boycott of South Africa to end apartheid. Economic boycott is unacceptable to the West because of high profitability of investments there; sports boycott, even when Western governments want to observe, cannot be enforced in view of the presence of powerful groups, particularly in the United States and United Kingdom, sympathetic to South Africa and legal difficulties. On the other hand, the Soviet Union can and does effectively boycott South Africa and get her excluded from international competitions by threatening to

⁵⁷V. Kunin, "South Africa: Imperialist and Neocolonialist Bridgehead", International Affairs (Moscow) No. 1, (1971), pp.42-43. See also A. Butlinsky, "Knot of Apartheid contradictions", International Affairs (Moscow), No. 2, (1973).

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withdraw herself in the event of the former participating.⁵⁸

THE SOVIET UNION AND RHODESIA

When the talk of Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Rhodesia was in the air, Tass issued a statement saying that "imperialist-colonialist" forces were preparing for a new crime against the people of Africa "to turn Southern Rhodesia ... into a racist state on the order of the South African Republic".⁵⁹ It continued that notwithstanding her protestations to the contrary, Britain, in essence, "was giving its sanction to the creation of an anti-African alliance of Southern Rhodesian racists with the Portuguese colonialists and the inhuman regime in the South African Republic, an alliance that now serves as the main bulwark of colonialism in the southern part of Africa".⁶⁰ Against the background of Wilson's "kith-and-kin" speech, this Tass statement would sound credible for Afro-Asians. After the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Rhodesia on November 11, 1965, the Soviet government issued a statement saying that that would not have been possible without the colonialist "collusion" and without the blessing of the NATO countries, particularly the United States of America. The British government statements, it said, were attempts "to white-wash its actual policy". The statement said that back in

⁵⁸See The Times, June 25, 1973, for successful Soviet attempts to keep South Africa out of the Nottinghamshire International Regatta and Henley Royal Regatta.

⁵⁹Pravda, October 26, 1965. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 43, p.27.

⁶⁰Ibid., p.28.

1961, the constitution drafted by the British for Rhodesia, laid the foundation for the "racist state". The Soviet statement condemned the Unilateral Declaration of Independence and declared its full solidarity with the people of Zimbabwe".⁶¹ Thereafter, every visit to Rhodesia by a British government representative was interpreted by the Soviet press as an attempt by "imperialists" and "monopolists" to strengthen their base in Africa.⁶² A Tass statement on the Smith-Home agreement for the settlement of the Rhodesian question, which fell through, called it a "disgraceful deal" which would consolidate indefinitely the regime in Rhodesia.⁶³

THE SOVIET UNION AND BRITISH GUIANA

In the former British Guiana, Indo-Soviet interests converged. India's sympathy for Dr. Cheddi Jagan, former Prime Minister of that country when it was still a colony, was not only because of her opposition to colonialism but also because he is of Indian origin and people of Indian origin constitute the largest racial group there.⁶⁴ He also happens to be a Socialist leaning towards Moscow; hence the Soviet interest in him. Soviet journals

⁶¹Pravda, November 16, 1965. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 46, pp.22-23.

⁶²See, for example, Mikhail Zenovich's comment on Lord Allport's visit to Rhodesia in Pravda, June 25, 1967. See also the comment on the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, George Thomson's visit to Rhodesia in Pravda, October 30, 1967.

⁶³Pravda, December 4, 1971. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XXIII, No. 49, p.37.

⁶⁴See p.123 .

published a number of articles on Guiana from time to time.⁶⁵ When Jagan was manoeuvred out of power, the Soviet press, quoting the western press, wrote how ultimately the United States prevailed upon Britain to remove Jagan from power. Commenting on the elections in Guiana in December 1964, a correspondent wrote in International Affairs (Moscow) that Jagan's Peoples Progressive Party had won the elections in 1953, 1957 and 1961; that the United States and the United Kingdom did not like Jagan's policies; and so, the electoral system was amended making an absolute majority of popular votes necessary for forming a government.⁶⁶

A nation of 700,000 people, divided along racial lines could not have been a threat to the United States; and, after her Caribbean experience in 1962, the Soviet Union would not have made Guiana a base. Therefore, from the Indian point of view, the United States fears of Jagan looked exaggerated.

EVALUATION

India's and other Afro-Asian nations' touchiness on colonialism and racialism could not have been unknown to the United States and the United Kingdom. It was evident from the repeated references to these issues in the joint communiques issued by India and other Afro-Asian states. Almost all the Indo-Soviet, non-aligned states, and Afro-

⁶⁵See 1. World Events, International Affairs (Moscow), No. 10, (1957), p.119. 2. Izvestia, July 11, 1963. 3. Pravda, April 17, 1965.

⁶⁶N. Yegorova, "International Commentary", International Affairs (Moscow) No. 3, (1965), pp.79-80.

Asian conferences' communiques I have read as a part of my work for this Chapter, contained critical references to colonialism and racialism and calls for their extirpation.* In spite of such clear evidence of Afro-Asian feelings, the United States and United Kingdom never really took a firm stand against South Africa and Portugal. The feeling that these outdated systems would not survive but for the British and American support adds insult to Afro-Asian injuries, for by their policies the United States and United Kingdom made their preference for two anachronistic states over a large number of newly-independent states clear even during the time when they were supposed to be waging a war to win the minds of people against Communism.

I have found no such references to colonialism and racialism in the Indo-American communiques I read.⁶⁷ It is difficult to establish whether the United States resisted the inclusion of such references or India refrained from asking for such references to be included, knowing as she did their attitude. However, Nehru once made his disappointment with the Anglo-American attitude known in his speech in Indian Parliament, though not by direct reference to the countries. He said that it was surprising that countries devoted to democratic traditions,

* See Appendix III.

⁶⁷ For example: 1. The Indo-American Communique issued on December 14, 1959, at the end of President Eisenhower's visit to India. 2. The Indo-American Communique issued on November 9, 1961, at the end of Nehru's visit to Washington. Foreign Policy of India, Texts of Documents 1947-1964, pp.473 and 479 respectively.

the U.N. Charter, and human rights expressed themselves moderately, or did not express themselves at all, about racial policy in South Africa.⁶⁸

This Anglo-American policy could be either due to their unhappiness with the new nations' non-alignment policy, or susceptibility to pressure by their multinational corporations whose handsome contributions through repatriation of their huge profits from South Africa, to the balance of payments could not be overlooked,⁶⁹ or their need for bases in Portuguese colonies and South Africa, or sympathy for fellow whites, or a mixture of all these. Whatever may be the reason, Indian and other Afro-Asian states' aspirations and those of the United States and the United Kingdom were irreconcilable in this field.

The loud Soviet support to Afro-Asia on racial and colonial issues resulted in these states taking a realistic attitude to issues involving Soviet interests. Almost all of Afro-Asian states are authoritarian regimes; they do not, therefore, worry about another variation of authoritarianism prevalent in the Soviet Union. In the case of India and other democracies human ingenuity plays its role in shaping their inconsistent policies; we all have the capacity to see what we want to, and not to see what we do not want. The West did not want to see the

⁶⁸Speech in Lok Sabha on December 9, 1958; India's Foreign Policy, p.543.

⁶⁹See Anthony Thomas' report on ITT affair in Chile, "How Tight a Grip do Multi-Nationals have on the U.S. Policy", in The Times, March 22, 1973.

suppression of human dignity and freedom in South Africa and Portugal; likewise, India did not want to see the same thing in the Soviet bloc.

In assessing the success of Soviet diplomacy in this context, i.e. the skilful handling of Afro-Asia's emotions on colonial and racial issues, the suppression of freedom in the Soviet bloc is irrelevant: the point at issue between Afro-Asia and the West, which Moscow turned to its diplomatic advantage, was colonialism and racialism. The West gave succour to colonialism and racialism by its ambivalent stand; the Soviet Union identified herself with Afro-Asia. The West exhibited concern for national independence and freedom in Eastern Europe while propping up regimes which want to perpetuate colonialism and racial indignity in Africa; Afro-Asians, on the other hand, exhibited concern for Africa and ignored Eastern Europe. Politics rarely uphold moral absolutes.

It was easy for the Soviet Union to identify herself with Afro-Asia on these issues because she has similar grudges against the West. Except for the duration of the Second World War, she was treated by the West as a political pariah until very recently. If Afro-Asia was racially humiliated, Russia was politically humiliated; and in both cases it was the West which did that.

The Soviet Union was also happy with non-alignment, particularly Afro-Asia's equivocal stand on issues vitally affecting her interests, like the Soviet military intervention in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. It was not surprising if the Soviet Union gave unstinted support to

new nations on colonial and racial issues.

Russian press and journals liberally publish anti-colonial and anti-racial comments and articles. Some liberal newspapers in the West do publish articles critical of colonialism and racialism. But Western governments' stand on the issues, and occasional unhappy experiences of Afro-Asians in some of the Western countries offset the work of western liberal papers. Besides that, unlike the comments in western journals, what appears in Soviet journals has a semi-official status. Therefore, the Soviet Union gets more credit from the comments in her journals, sympathetic to Afro-Asia, than the West.

There is no group in India loyally holding a brief for the West, as the CPI does for Moscow. In view of politically conscious Indians' awareness of the Western stand on the issues, the United States Information Service and the British Information Service propaganda on liberty and human dignity did not carry much conviction in India.

On the other hand, the CPI and its "largest chain of newspapers"⁷⁰ boost up the anti-colonialist and anti-racialist image of the Soviet Union. Against the background of the Indian leaders' public appreciation of the Soviet stand on these issues,⁷¹ the CPI's portrayal of the Soviet Union as a state opposed to colonialism and racialism would not lack credibility.

The West cannot have a receptive audience in India

⁷⁰Ram Swarup, Communism in India in the Post-Nehru Period, Orbis, Vol. IX, No. 4 (Winter 1966), p.996.

⁷¹See p.117. See also Tass' interview with Mrs. Gandhi in Jagdish Vibhakar, op.cit., p.ii, and Mrs. Gandhi, op.cit., p.73.

and other Afro-Asian countries until they take a firm stand against extant colonialism in South West Africa and racial tyranny in South Africa and Rhodesia. In the meantime, the Soviet Union continues to cultivate Indian public opinion.

In article 3 of the Indo-Soviet treaty, the two countries declared: "Guided by their loyalty to the lofty ideal of equality of all peoples and Nations, irrespective of race or creed, the High Contracting Parties condemn colonialism and racialism in all forms and manifestations, and reaffirm their determination to strive for their final and complete elimination".⁷² This loud commitment to work for ending colonialism and racial discrimination from a predominantly white power like the Soviet Union makes a deep impression on India⁷³ and other Asian-African States.

⁷²See Appendix I.

⁷³Commenting on the emphasis that the Soviet policy lays on anti-colonial and anti-racial themes, Werner Levi wrote: "The net effect of this cleverly contrived policy was to create the impression in India that Russia was fighting colonialism and imperialism on humane grounds as a racist system, on social grounds as a reactionary system, and on economic grounds as an exploiting system. All major colonial grievances were thus taken care of". See his Free India in Asia, p.142.

KASHMIR

The year 1959 saw the coming into the open of Sino-Indian conflict on border alignments. The dispute which was simmering since 1954 turned bloody with frequent armed clashes in 1959. It was in 1959 that yet another Agreement of Co-operation was signed between Pakistan and the United States, thus making the former "America's most allied ally in Asia".¹ As we know now, Sino-Soviet relations were equally troublesome by then.

In the same year, Khrushchev had launched his peace offensive to the chagrin of China. In an article in Foreign Affairs in 1959, he wrote: "Whether you like your neighbour or not, nothing can be done about it, you have to find some way of getting on with him, for you both live on one and the same planet".² He also wrote that it "is ridiculous to think that revolutions are made to order".³

This was likely to appeal to Nehru who had made peaceful co-existence one of the fundamental principles of his foreign policy. It was, however, not this identity of views on a philosophical question which further cemented Indo-Soviet links; it was, probably, the coincidence of their interests in China which brought this

¹Ayub Khan, "The Pakistan-American Alliance: Stresses and Strains", Foreign Affairs Vol. XLII, No. 2 (January 1964), p. 195.

²N.S. Khrushchev, "On Peaceful Co-existence", Foreign Affairs Vol. XXXVIII, No. 1 (October 1959), p.1.

³Ibid., p. 5.

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about. Hereafter, Soviet policy in the subcontinent would be influenced by her perceptions of Chinese danger to her interests.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ON KASHMIR

IN 1962⁴

The Kashmir dispute was again taken up by the Security Council in February 1962, at Pakistan's initiative. Intervening in the debate, the Soviet delegate, Zorin, said that an urgent convening of the Security Council to consider the dispute was "unnecessary and uncalled for"; he objected to the meeting being held.⁵ It was postponed.

In May 1962, the Security Council returned to the issue. The statements made by the Soviet delegate, Morozov, were more pro-Indian than any made before on the issue. He began with the "so-called question of Kashmir", and went on to say that "... the main, the basic fact is the continuing occupation of one third of the territory of Kashmir by Pakistani forces". He thought that there was a "connection between the new and bellicose statements (of the Pakistani delegate to start a "liberation battle")... and these feverish military preparations and the flow of foreign arms into countries which are members of ... (CENTO and SEATO)".⁶

He spoke of "India's rights in respect of one third of Kashmir" under Pakistan's occupation and contrasted

⁴For a history of the dispute and the attitude of the two blocs to it in the early stages, see Chapter III pp.95-100 and 105 - 109

⁵U.N.S.C.O.R., 990th Meeting, February 1, 1962, p.25.

⁶Ibid. 1010th Meeting, May 4, 1962, pp.1-5.

Pakistan's "war-like sabre-rattling" with the "extreme restraint, patience and a love of peace in keeping with the general line of the neutral and peaceful policy followed by India".⁷ He also said that a plebiscite could have been held if the invading forces had been withdrawn in 1948 as demanded by the Security Council resolution adopted that year.⁸

On June 22, 1962, Ireland introduced a resolution. It made reference to earlier Security Council resolutions and urged India and Pakistan to enter into direct negotiations at the earliest convenient time with a view to the settlement of the dispute in accordance with the principles of the Charter.⁹ Morozov took objection to mention being made to earlier resolution calling for a plebiscite and vetoed the Irish resolution.¹⁰

In February 1964, Pakistan raised the issue again in the Security Council. In the ensuing debate, 7 members of the Council suggested a consensus statement which would require the UN Secretary-General to join the talks between India and Pakistan as "a good offices officer". India opposed the intervention of a third party and pleaded for bilateral settlement. The USSR and Czechoslovakia opposed the consensus statement. The result was that the Security Council left the question to be settled bilaterally.¹¹

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid. See Chapter III p.98 for the said resolution.

⁹UNSCOR, 1016th Meeting, June 22, 1962, p.2.

¹⁰Ibid., pp.16-17.

¹¹M.C. Chagla, op.cit., p.391 and 400.

When Nehru died in May 1964, Khrushchev sent three messages, one each to the President of India, Acting Prime Minister, and Mrs. Gandhi, and spoke on radio and television expressing his condolences.¹² Not long after, came the news of his ouster and the Chinese nuclear explosion; both events occurred on the same day, October 16, 1964. There was an undisguised feeling of regret in non-communist circles in India about Khrushchev's ouster. Prime Minister Shastri also expressed his fear of the Chinese nuclear explosion; he called it "a danger and a menace to mankind".¹³

India's weakness, as demonstrated by her defeat at the Chinese hands in 1962, Sino-Pakistani entente, and the Chinese nuclear explosion were weighty enough reasons for India to fear the consequences of a possible shift of policies under the new Soviet leadership. To add to that anxiety was the Chinese leaders' unusual warmth, exhibited in their greetings to the new Soviet leaders.¹⁴

On October 17, 1964, the National Secretariat of the CPI expressed the hope that the new Soviet leadership would "put an end to the wishful thinking of reactionaries" that change in Soviet leadership "is a concession to the

¹²The Hindu, May 28, 1964.

¹³The Hindu, October 17, 1964.

¹⁴Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai sent "warm greetings" to Brezhnev, Kosygin and Mikoyan. The message expressed joy "at every progress made by the great Soviet Union and the Soviet people on their road to advance", and spoke of the unity of "the Chinese and Soviet parties and our two countries on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism". The message ended: "May the fraternal, unbreakable friendship between the Chinese and Soviet peoples continue to develop". The Hindu, October 18, 1964.

dogmatist, adventurist and chauvinist line of the Chinese Government".¹⁵

On the same day, the Soviet Charge d'affaires met Shastri and assured him that the change in Soviet leadership did not mean any departure from the Leninist policies of the Soviet Union.¹⁶ That was a very vague commitment indeed!

MOSCOW'S NEW COURSE

By then Sino-Soviet relations were tense. China managed to exclude the Soviet Union from the proposed Second Afro-Asian Conference, which in the end was never to be held, at the Preparatory Committee meeting in Jakarta in April 1964. India proposed that the Soviet Union be invited; China threatened to walk out in the event of such a decision and got the issue shelved. In June 1964, yet another Preparatory Committee meeting was held in Geneva. As the controversy over Soviet participation continued at this meeting, too, the Soviet Union voluntarily withdrew her demand to participate in the projected Afro-Asian Conference.¹⁷

It is natural for any new team to blame all failures on the former rulers and to hope to work miracles. The new leadership could not have hoped to achieve anything better than improvement of relations with China. Moscow, therefore, held an olive branch to China. The initial Chinese response was encouraging. Chou En-lai attended

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷William E. Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations 1964-1965 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT, 1967), pp.57-58.

the October Revolution celebrations in 1964.¹⁸ But this warmth did not last long. The Chinese demand for reconciliation with Moscow was nothing short of rejection of XXth and XXIInd CPSU Congresses' approach to some fundamental ideological and political problems.¹⁹ This was an unacceptable proposition for Moscow, for even while announcing Khrushchev's "resignation", the Central Committee of the CPSU reaffirmed the validity of the theses of these Congresses.²⁰ It was not long before Peking described the new team's ideology as "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev".²¹

The new Soviet leadership took up the gauntlet. Moscow expressed, in June 1965, its desire to participate in the Afro-Asian meeting because "forces have emerged within the Afro-Asian movement that are trying to split, and chiefly, isolate it from the Socialist countries and the international workers movements".²² Chou En-lai replied in kind. He said it was "a question of principle" for China not to participate in any Afro Asian conference at which the Soviet Union was present.²³ The Moscow-Peking truce was over.

Digression is in order at this stage to trace the history of Sino-Pakistani entente which called for a reappraisal of Soviet policy in the subcontinent.

¹⁸ Ibid, p.62.

¹⁹ Ibid., p.95.

²⁰ Ibid., p.60.

²¹ Ibid., p.90.

²² Quoted, Ibid., pp.124-125.

²³ Ibid., p.127.

SINO-PAKISTANI ENTENTE

Pakistan recognised China in 1950, abstained on the U.N. General Assembly resolution branding China as aggressor in the Korean War,²⁴ voted for the resolution for Seating China in the U.N. in September 1950, but thereafter supported resolutions for postponing the question of her representation until 1961.²⁵ At the Bandung Conference in 1955, Pakistani Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali, met Chou En-lai twice and assured him that China need not feel embarrassed about the Pakistani resolution against Soviet imperialism since China was not imperialist, and, as a result, Chou En-lai declared himself satisfied with Pakistan's peacefulness and her desire to be friendly with her neighbours.²⁶

In 1963, Chou told the Associated Press of Pakistan: "After the formation of SEATO in 1954, the Pakistani Government often declared to the Chinese Government that its participation in that organisation was not for the purpose of being hostile to China and would not prejudice Pakistan's friendship for China".²⁷

Therefore, there was no compelling reason for China to be irrevocably committed to upholding Indian interests in Kashmir; she followed an equivocal policy. Thus, at a time when Sino-Indian relations were apparently cordial,

²⁴Werner Levi, "Pakistan, Soviet Union, and China", Pacific Affairs Vol. XXXV, No. 3 (Fall 1962), p.219.

²⁵W.M. Dobeu, "Ramifications of the China-Pakistan Border Treaty", Pacific Affairs Vol. XXXVII, No. 3 (Fall 1964), p.284.

²⁶Werner Levi, op.cit., pp.219-220.

²⁷Quoted in W.M. Dobeu, op.cit., p.284.

Chou En-lai declared in March 1956 that the Kashmiris had already decided to be an integral part of India; when border tensions between the two countries reached an acute stage, China repeated in July 1961 her stand on Kashmir, though indirectly, when she told India that she had never stated in any document that Kashmir was not a part of India; but, a few months before the border war between the two countries, China told the Indian Embassy in Peking in May 1962 that she had never accepted without reservation the position that Kashmir was under Indian sovereignty.²⁸

When shooting started on the Sino-Indian border in 1959, Ayub Khan proposed that India and Pakistan co-operate "without having pacts or treaties" in the defence of the subcontinent.²⁹ The quiet Sino-Pakistani understandings since the Bandung days being unknown then, and unwilling to give the impression of entering into an alliance against China and giving up the possibility of peacefully composing the differences with her, Nehru did not accept Ayub Khan's suggestion. There were also two compelling reasons for Nehru's rejection of the proposal: 1) An alliance with Pakistan, then still suspect in the Soviet eyes, would introduce complications into India's relations with the latter. 2) There was always the probability of the Pakistani offer being made contingent upon the solution of the Kashmir dispute on Pakistani terms. Therefore, Nehru rhetorically asked the question: "defence against whom?" He even said that "the real motive was not joint

²⁸Ibid., p.285.

²⁹Quoted by Norman D. Palmer, "Defence of South Asia", Orbis, Vol. IX, No. 4. (Winter 1966), pp.922-923.

defence but Kashmir".³⁰ And in December 1961, Ayub Khan confirmed Nehru's fear by saying that "Pakistan would offer joint defence to India in case of foreign aggression on the subcontinent provided India comes with clean hands to solve the Kashmir issue".³¹

Simultaneously, Pakistan tried to put her relations with China on a more secure basis. Pakistan-held Kashmir has common border with Sinkiang. After shooting incidents started on the Sino-Indian border, Ayub Khan got a memorandum prepared in 1959 proposing to China to demarcate the border between the two countries. There was no response from Peking. In December 1961, the Chinese ambassador met Ayub Khan and asked for Pakistan's support for the proposition that the question of Chinese entry into the United Nations be decided by simple majority in the General Assembly instead of a two-thirds majority. Ayub Khan asked him about his proposal for border demarcation. The ambassador replied that it was a complicated matter. Ayub Khan told him that "if border demarcation was a complicated matter, China's admission to the United Nations was even more complicated". Soon after this, the Chinese agreed for talks on border demarcation.³²

Nehru's request for weapons during the Sino-Indian border war and the ready response from the West

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ayub Khan, Friends, Not Masters, p. 162.

was resented in Pakistan.³³

On Western insistence at this time, India agreed to have talks with Pakistan on Kashmir.³⁴ "The Pakistanis ushered in the negotiations by announcing they had reached a border settlement with the Chinese".³⁵

SOVIET REAPPRAISAL OF KASHMIR POLICY

The growing Sino-Pakistani cordiality was not to Soviet liking. But Pakistan could not be appeased unless the Soviet Union changed her, what was then, India-oriented Kashmir policy. Moscow, therefore, decided to reappraise its South Asia policy.

When the brief war on the Rann of Kutch issue began on April 9, 1965, with the occupation of a few Indian

³³The New York Times, November 24, 1962. See also Ayub Khan, op.cit., pp.133-134, and his article "The Pakistan-American Alliance: Stresses and Strains", p.200.

President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan agreed on December 29, 1962, at Nassau to give \$120 million worth of military aid to India. The Hindu, December 30, 1962.

Pakistan received \$1.7 billion worth of military aid from the United States between 1954-1965. Sydney H. Schanberg, "Pakistan Divided", Foreign Affairs Vol. L, No. 1, (October 1971) p.133.

³⁴W.F.V. Eekelen, Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China, (The Hague: Martinus Nyhoff, 1964) p.205.

³⁵John Kenneth Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal: A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969) p.523. According to a statement made by Nehru in the Indian Parliament on March 5, 1963, under the Sino-Pakistani border treaty of March 2, 1963, Pakistan surrendered to China nearly 2500 square miles of Kashmir held by her, to which India maintains a judicial claim. G.V. Ambekar and V.D. Divekar ed., Documents on China's Relations with South and South East Asia 1949-1962, (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1964), pp.217-223.

posts by Pakistan,³⁶ the Soviet Union maintained strict neutrality. The Tass statement on the developments in Kutch said: "According to reports in the foreign press, the formal pretext for the conflict has been the differing interpretations by India and Pakistan of the location of the borders in the uninhabited region of the Rann of Kutch". It advised the parties that the military way of solving the problem would "drain the strength" of both, and expressed the hope that they would "display the necessary restraint and patience".³⁷

An invitation to Ayub Khan to visit the Soviet Union, extended while Khrushchev was in power, was renewed by the new leaders.³⁸ During Ayub's visit to the Soviet Union - the first ever by a Pakistani head of State and government - an agreement was signed on April 7, 1965, to double or treble the volume of their trade by 1967 in comparison with 1964.³⁹

The Soviet-Pakistani Communique neither mentioned Kashmir nor Kutch. But two points in the communique were significant: 1) "They declared resolute support for

³⁶ Pakistan claimed that the Indo-Pakistani border in the Rann of Kutch area was not delimited and laid claim to 9065 square kilometres out of the total area of 20,720 square kilometres of the Rann. The dispute was referred to an international tribunal after the cease-fire. It awarded 906.5 square kilometres to Pakistan. See B.L. Sukhwai, India: A Political Geography, (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1971), pp.216-217.

³⁷ Pravda, May 9, 1965. Complete text in CDSP, Vol.XVII, No. 19, p.25.

³⁸ Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Fulcrum of Asia: Relations Among China, India, Pakistan, and USSR (New York: Pegasus, 1970), p.262.

³⁹ Pravda, April 8, 1965. Complete text in CDSP, Vol.XVII, No. 14, pp.18-19.

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peoples who are engaged in a struggle for their national liberation and independence and for peoples fighting for the right to determine their own future in accordance with their own will". 2) "They also stated that international agreements must be fulfilled to promote universal peace and co-operation".⁴⁰ The first could be interpreted by Moscow as a reference to Vietnam, a very sensitive issue to the United States then; Pakistan could also consider it as a reference to Kashmir. The second could be interpreted by Pakistan as a reminder to India about her agreement to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir, a hypersensitive issue to her.

This is how Ayub Khan explained his diplomatic overtures to Moscow in his memoirs: "By joining SEATO and CENTO we had alienated her (the Soviet Union) and lost her sympathy. Since we had never been a party to any design against her and our membership of the Pacts was dictated solely by the requirements of our security, it should be possible to come to an understanding with the Soviet Union by removing her doubts and misgivings."⁴¹

While in the Soviet Union, Ayub Khan also told Kosygin that American and Soviet military aid to India "was encouraging her to perpetuate her forcible occupation of a large part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and to flout the United Nations resolutions with impunity".⁴²

Lal Bahadur Shastri visited the Soviet Union close on the heels of Ayub Khan. At a Soviet-Indian friendship rally, Kosygin said that there was nothing in the

⁴⁰ Pravda, April 11, 1965. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 15, pp. 21-22.

⁴¹ Ayub Khan, Friends and Not Masters, p. 117.

⁴² Ibid., p. 171.

development of Soviet-Indian ties that could be directed against other peace-loving countries; and when the Soviet Union strove to improve her relations with other countries, she did not do so at the expense of Soviet-Indian friendship. He alleged that the West revelled in disputes while the Soviet Union wanted friendship and co-operation between the liberated states. He continued that his country would like these states to solve border and other disputes between themselves by peaceful means.⁴³

While the USSR remained silent on Kashmir and Kutch, Shastri agreed to include a reference to Vietnam in the Indo-Soviet joint communique; it called for an end to the United States bombing of North Vietnam.⁴⁴

THE INDO-PAKISTANI WAR OF 1965 AND THE TASHKENT CONFERENCE

Pakistan repeated the 1947 pattern by infiltrating guerillas into Indian Kashmir in August 1965. In response, Indian forces occupied a number of points in Pakistan-held Kashmir from August 16, 1965, onwards by crossing the cease-fire line at Kargil where Pakistani forces tried to cut the Srinagar-Leh road. On September 1, 1965, Pakistan attacked Jammu; and on September 6, 1965, Indian forces crossed the international border towards Lahore.⁴⁵

On September 5, 1965, the UN Secretary-General, U

⁴³Pravda, May 16, 1965.

⁴⁴Izvestia, May 21, 1965.

⁴⁵Dr. K. Raman Pillai, op.cit., pp.115-116.

Thant, made public a report by the United Nations cease-fire observers in Kashmir which put the blame on Pakistan for the series of cease-fire violations leading to the war.⁴⁶

On September 6, 1965, the Secretary-General of SEATO told Pakistan that Kashmir was not covered by the treaty;⁴⁷ on September 7, 1965, Pakistan invoked CENTO, and it rejected the request too.⁴⁸

The Soviet press ignored the United Nations report and other factors and took a strictly neutral line. Pravda wrote that ^{the} Indian and Pakistani press gave different versions. "We will not go into a discussion here of which of these versions more precisely reflects the course of events. The main thing is to find a way to stop the bloodshed immediately and to liquidate the conflict". It wrote further that the masses of India and Pakistan wanted peace. "Our country has a long-standing traditional friendship with India ..."; and the Soviet Union's "relations with Pakistan are improving".⁴⁹

In identical letters sent to Shastri and Ayub Khan, on September 4, 1965, Kosygin wrote that India and Pakistan, two major Asian States, sponsors of the Bandung Conference, "have in fact taken the path of conducting military operations"; that the Soviet government was all the more concerned because the conflict "has broken out in an area directly contiguous to the

⁴⁶ The Hindu, September 6, 1965.

⁴⁷ Ibid., September 8, 1965.

⁴⁸ Ibid., September 9, 1965.

⁴⁹ Pravda, August 24, 1965. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 34, p. 15.

borders of the Soviet Union"; that "in the present grave situation the main emphasis should not be placed on the question of the causes of the conflict or of ascertaining who is right or wrong".⁵⁰ He called for "halting the tanks and silencing the guns" and withdrawal of forces by both sides to the cease-fire lines; he also offered Soviet good offices for composing the differences between the two countries. He ended his letter by stating the Soviet conviction, which "the experience of history confirms", that "all disputed questions, including questions connected with Kashmir, can be most effectively resolved only by peaceful means".⁵¹

A Tass statement referred to "forces trying to derive advantages for themselves" through "their inflammatory statements"; and commented that they were adding "fuel to the fire". If the drift continued, the statement warned, "many states, one after another, may find themselves drawn into the conflict".⁵²

This was an obvious reference to China which sided with Pakistan in the conflict. A few days after this Soviet statement, Peking handed a note to the Indian Charge d'Affaires, on September 17, 1965, alleging that India was maintaining 56 military installations on the Tibetan side of the Sikkim-Tibetan border and demanded that they be demolished within three days; otherwise, the Indian

⁵⁰ Pravda, September 12, 1965. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 37, p. 27.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Pravda, September 14, 1965. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 37, p. 28.

government would bear full responsibility for all the grave consequences arising therefrom.⁵³ The crisis, however, passed without any incident.

The Soviet Union supported the cease-fire resolutions passed in the Security Council on September 4 and September 6, 1965.⁵⁴ Kosygin also invited Shastri and Ayub Khan to meet in Tashkent to resolve the differences between them.⁵⁵ The Soviet Union also supported a third Security Council resolution passed on September 20, 1965, which demanded a cease-fire by 7.00 a.m. (G.M.T.) on September 21, 1965.⁵⁶

The war ended and the Indian and Pakistani leaders agreed to meet in Tashkent. The conference opened on January 4, 1966, and ended on January 11, 1966. Excepting the issues incidental to the war, no substantive problems were settled at Tashkent.⁵⁷

Shastri died in Tashkent at the end of the Conference. Kosygin attended Shastri's funeral in New Delhi.⁵⁸ The Russians seemed to have preferred Mrs. Gandhi to Morarji Desai in the contest for the leadership of the Parliamentary Congress party, as the latter was a rightist.⁵⁹

⁵³The Hindu, September 18, 1965. See also Russel Brines, The Indo-Pakistani Conflict, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), p. 371.

⁵⁴See The Sunday Times, September 5, 1965, and The Times, September 7, 1965.

⁵⁵Pravda, September 20, 1965. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 38, p.19.

⁵⁶The Times, September 21, 1965.

⁵⁷See The Hindu, January 12, 1966; for an analysis of the significance of Tashkent see below pp. 87-88.

⁵⁸The Hindu, January 13, 1966.

⁵⁹See for instance Maslennikov's comment, sympathetic to Mrs. Gandhi and disparaging to Desai, in Pravda, January 20, 1966. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, p.22.

The Soviet Union continued the efforts to improve relations with Pakistan. Until 1965, India received some preferential treatment in the May Day slogans; she used to follow Yugoslavia in the list. In the May Day slogans in 1965, India had 30th place in the list; her slogan was: "Warm greetings to the great Indian People ..."; Pakistan, Iran and Turkey were lumped together in the 47th place in the list of slogans.⁶⁰ In the May Day slogans in 1966, on the other hand, India was preceded by the UAR (27th place), Algeria (28th), Syria (29th), Burma (30th) and Guinea, Congo (Brazzville) and Mali (31st); India had 32nd place in the list, with her old slogan: "Warm greetings to the great Indian people..."; Pakistan followed India with a slogan of her own: "Warm greetings to the Pakistani people...".⁶¹

India also continued her efforts not to disturb her relations with Moscow in spite of clear signs of change in Soviet attitude to her.⁶² At the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution, Mrs. Gandhi personally represented India.⁶³

Kosygin visited Pakistan in April 1968. The joint-statement issued at the end of the visit did not refer to

⁶⁰Pravda, April 22, 1965. Complete text in CDSP, Vol.XVII, No. 16, p.4.

⁶¹Pravda, April 17, 1966. Complete text in CDSP, Vol.XVIII, No.15, p.21.

⁶²See p.156

⁶³The Hindu, November 7, 1967. China and Albania did not care to send delegations to the ceremony. Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign Policy", in Roy C. Macridis ed., Foreign Policy in World Politics, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, Inc., 1972), p.283.

Kashmir. It called for the settlement of the Vietnam problem on the basis of the Geneva Conference proposals of 1954. The two sides also "reaffirmed their conviction that any increase in the number of nuclear powers would damage the cause of world peace ...".⁶⁴ This was subtle Soviet pressure on India.⁶⁵ India's nuclear programme was by then in a technologically very advanced state of development. While India signed the Moscow treaty of 1963 banning nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, she refused to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty of 1968.

SOVIET ARMS FOR PAKISTAN

The Soviet Union administered another shock to India in 1968. After the visit of General Yahya Khan, then Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani army, to Moscow in June-July 1968, it became known that the Soviet Union had decided to sell arms to Pakistan.⁶⁶ A posture of even-handedness between India and Pakistan, which was part of the new Soviet policy, called for such sales; Moscow could not have forgotten General Ayub Khan's complaints to the Soviet leaders on their arms supply to India.⁶⁷ Moscow's desire for securing a stronger presence in Islamabad, in pursuit of her interests, was such that it

⁶⁴Pravda, April 22, 1968. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XX, No. 16, p.22.

⁶⁵See Chapter XI, p.382 for the Soviet government view on nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

⁶⁶Kuldip Nayar, Between the Lines, (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1969), p.103.

⁶⁷See p.155.

seemed to have ignored the possibility of strong reaction in India.

REACTION IN INDIA

Naturally, there was a lot of resentment in India. The press and the opposition reacted angrily.

The Statesman editorially commented, under the caption, "Let Down by Moscow" that the Soviet action was no different "from the familiar but fallacious Anglo-American doctrine of parity between the two countries (Pakistan and India)." The paper drew attention to "the Russian willingness to give military hardware and fighting material to Pakistan and the latter's notice to the United States of America to wind up the Peshawar (air) base", and said that they were not unconnected. Advising the government of India to understand the virtues of flexibility in international relations and stop taking friendship for granted, the editorial ended: "Obviously, the rigidity of India's relationship with China is doing it little good because it practically deprives it of all leverage with Moscow and Washington". The country should ponder over this, it added.⁶⁸

Mrs. Gandhi conveyed her concern about the reports of Soviet arms to Pakistan to the Soviet Charge d'Affaires on July 8, 1968.⁶⁹ She also declared on July 9, 1968,

⁶⁸The Statesman, July 9, 1968. The United States acquired the Peshawar air base in Pakistan under her military alliance with the latter. The U-2 plane shot down by the Soviet Union in May 1960 took off from Peshawar. See Adam B. Ulam, op.cit., pp.626 and 633.

⁶⁹The Statesman, July 9, 1968.

that non-alignment would not undergo any change. Any country could give arms to any country. "It is none of our business", she said.⁷⁰

President Hussain conveyed his concern to the Soviet leaders in his talks with them in Kremlin.⁷¹ At a lunch given in honour of Dr. Hussain on July 10, 1968, Kosygin assured him that his country would do nothing which could go against the interests of Soviet-Indian friendship.⁷²

Mrs. Gandhi addressed a letter to Kosygin on the issue.⁷³ Kosygin's reply was in general terms. He spoke of the "continuing warm and cordial friendship". It was understood that he made no direct reference to the issue of military sales to Pakistan.⁷⁴

The Hindu editorially commented that "the United States and other democratic countries, whose political and economic thinking is similar to our own, are more likely to have the same approach to India's problems as our Government's and this itself is a special reason to establish close ties with them". Referring to Mrs. Gandhi's assertion that non-alignment would continue, The Hindu said that this showed "how obsolete, negative, and purposeless a concept non-alignment is", and pleaded for "a positive, activist policy which will win the friends it can rely on...".⁷⁵

⁷⁰Ibid., July 10, 1968.

⁷¹Ibid. The Indian President was on a State visit to the USSR.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴Ibid., July 12, 1968.

⁷⁵July 21, 1968.

The Swatantra party moved an adjournment motion in the Indian Parliament on July 22, 1968, to censure the government "on the failure of its foreign policy as is evidenced by the Soviet Union's decision to supply arms to Pakistan". It was defeated.⁷⁶

The Soviet government remained unmoved by all this; it invited Ayub Khan to visit the Soviet Union again.⁷⁷

The reaction of the CPI and others friendly to the USSR was predictable. The CPI weekly, New Age, wrote that Soviet military sales to Pakistan would help her "move away from the SEATO and CENTO alliances" and would come in the way of Peking's anti-Indian machinations. The inspiration for the "right reaction" was not defence considerations but political, the real target being "the forces of progress within the country"⁷⁸. V.K.K. Menon, who so eloquently used to speak against similar United States moves, said: "The Soviet Union is in no way obligated to us and so is free to sell arms to Pakistan".⁷⁹

INDO-SOVIET MINISTERIAL TALKS

At the talks between Bhagat, a member of the Indian Council of Ministers, and Firyubin, Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, in New Delhi in September 1968, the former raised the question of Soviet arms supply to

⁷⁶Ibid., July 23, 1968. Both the pro-Moscow CPI and the parallel CPI (Marxist) opposed the resolution.

⁷⁷The Statesman, July 22, 1968.

⁷⁸New Age, July 19, 1968, as quoted in The Statesman, July 20, 1968.

⁷⁹Ibid.

Pakistan. Firyubin said that it was strange that India was not objecting to the influence of America and China in Pakistan, but was asking the Soviet Union, a friendly country, to stand aloof.⁸⁰ When the Indian minister asked for Russian views on Kashmir, the Soviet minister said that his country wanted direct talks between India and Pakistan. Pressed to state as to how the Soviet Union would vote in the Security Council if Pakistan raised the issue there again, Firyubin simply repeated that his country wanted direct talks between the parties. Then Bhagat raised the question of Radio Peace and Progress, a Russian radio station beaming highly tendentious and objectionable reports on Indian politics and personalities, except those whom Moscow considered "progressives". There were heated debates in Indian Parliament many times on this issue. Firyubin replied that the Indian papers and parties abused and defamed the Soviet Union and the system obtaining there; some reply had to be given to rebut these lies. When Bhagat said that the station was a Soviet government institution, Firyubin curtly replied that it was started to give fitting replies to the abuse of the Soviet Union in India.⁸¹

The joint communique on the Bhagat-Firyubin talks described them as "friendly and cordial". Kuldip Nayar, then editor of The Statesman, managed to get the gist of inside happenings at the meeting and published it in his paper. On September 24, 1968, the Soviet ambassador

⁸⁰Kuldip Nayar, op.cit., p.103.

⁸¹Ibid., pp.103-106 and 108-109.

complained to the Indian government about the leakage to The Statesman. Earlier, the Soviet representatives had warned that they had to reconsider the question of Soviet arms supplies to India if the news about them continued to appear in the press, which Pakistan quoted to Soviet embarrassment. Therefore, the Indian Cabinet issued instructions under the Defence of India Rules to prevent the news about foreign arms supply to India being published in papers. But in spite of that Pakistan managed to get all details about Soviet arms supply to India. The Soviet Union then asked India as to how it was that what they gave Pakistan remained a secret while what they supplied India became the talk of the town.⁸²

In March 1969, Marshal Grechko visited Pakistan and said, during his stay there, that the Soviet Union was giving arms to Pakistan to make her strong against her "enemies". The Russians denied the report in private but did not respond to Indian request for a public denial.⁸³

⁸²Kuldip Nayar, op.cit., pp.99-100. A few days later, Nayar was reproached by a Soviet journalist for carrying the dispatch mentioned above. The Indian editor was told that such write-ups would create "unbridgeable gulf" between the two countries; that India would lose by "alienating the Soviet Union". He was reminded of "the military and economic assistance" the Soviet Union was giving India, and told that such "attitude made us (the Soviet Union) befriend Pakistan". Ibid., pp.109-110.

⁸³Pran Chopra, Before and After the Indo-Soviet Treaty (New Delhi: S. Chand and Co., 1971), p.45.

It is interesting to recall what Suslov said on Sino-Pakistani entente in his report to the Central Committee, on February 14, 1964. He asked if any one could believe that the rapprochement with Pakistan was prompted by the interests of the development of the revolutionary struggle of the Asian peoples against imperialism about which the Chinese leaders made so much noise. Pravda, April 3, 1964.

EVALUATION

There is nothing permanent about foreign policies; they are a series of shifts to serve immediate diplomatic needs. The Soviet Kashmir policy was never a firm commitment to uphold India's point of view; nor was Pakistan ever totally shunned by Moscow.⁸⁴

Undoubtedly, the support that the Soviet Union gave India in the Security Council debate on Kashmir in 1962 was the strongest ever.⁸⁵ The explanation lies in many developments: 1) Sino-Soviet differences, which in the words of Griffith, reached the "point of no return" in the summer of 1959,⁸⁶ came into the open at the Rumanian Party Congress in June 1960.⁸⁷ 2) Relations between the Soviet and American blocs were not warm either, the Berlin crisis of 1961 having chilled the relations. 3) Pakistan still clung to Western alliances and was also developing cordial relations with Peking. 4) Sino-Indian relations also had reached the point of no return in 1959 and continued to worsen. It is possible that these considerations prompted the Soviet Union to extend strong diplomatic support to India and keep her influence there.

It is possible that the change in India's stand on Germany in September 1961 also influenced the Soviet decision to give strong support to India in the

⁸⁴For earlier Soviet wavering on Kashmir, see Chapter III pp. 105 - 109

⁸⁵See pp. 145-146

⁸⁶William E. Griffith, op.cit., p.3.

⁸⁷Edward Crankshaw, The New Cold War: Moscow vs Peking (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1963), pp.97-108.

Security Council in May 1962.

Until September 1961, India used to express her "sympathy" with the German national aspiration for the unification of their country.⁸⁸ In September 1961 Nehru agreed "that the facts on the existence of the two German States" could not be ignored.⁸⁹

Nehru probably considered this concession to the Soviet Union necessary in view of his desire to be non-aligned, in spite of the border trouble with China. Whatever might have prompted Nehru's decision, this was a welcome shift from the Soviet point of view. There was nothing for Moscow to lose by extending strong support to India on Kashmir; Pakistan was anyway in the rival bloc.

By the early 1960s, inter-bloc and intra-bloc politics underwent a great change; France defied America; China challenged Russia; Rumania began showing signs of adopting an independent course in foreign relations; and Pakistan

⁸⁸See, for example, India-Germany Joint Communiqué of July 16, 1956, India-Germany Joint Statement of March 31, 1957 and India-Poland Joint Statement of September 27, 1960. Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents, 1947-1964 (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1966), pp. 306-309 and 426. (Hereinafter referred to as Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents 1947-1964).

⁸⁹See the Indo-Soviet Joint Communiqué, September 11, 1961, ibid., p. 506. Nehru did not subscribe to Khrushchev's plan to turn West Berlin into a demilitarised free city. Ibid.

See Pravda, November 28, 1958, for Khrushchev's plan for West Berlin. See also John K. Galbraith, op. cit., pp. 194-197, for tensions between India and the United States caused by an inadvertent statement by Nehru, which questioned the West's right of access to West Berlin.

turned to Peking.

The Soviet writ ceased to run throughout the camp and the movement as was evident from the failure of Khrushchev in September 1963 to call an international conference to isolate China.⁹⁰

For some time after the assumption of power, the post-Khrushchev leadership seemed to have entertained hopes of repairing relations with China. Therefore, they made friendly gestures to Peking. A Sino-Soviet rapprochement, besides restoring the bloc unity, would also have facilitated a speedier and more effective Soviet aid to North Vietnam through the Chinese overland routes which would have gone a long way in neutralising the increasing American involvement in Vietnam. However, it did not work that way; there was no improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. Therefore, the Soviet leadership must have realised that, as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy, the world communist movement was, in the context of the mid-1960s, "of considerably diminished utility, and in some respects may even be a handicap to Moscow's posture as a global power".⁹¹

Failing in their attempts to repair relations with China, the new Soviet leadership began an attempt to scuttle Peking's efforts to increase its influence in Afro-Asia. The Soviet Union's attempts to placate Pakistan in the mid-1960s was a part of this attempt. It was evident that Pakistan's ire was with India and not

⁹⁰William E. Griffith, op.cit., p. 38. See also pp. 36-37.

⁹¹Vernon V. Aspaturian, op.cit., p. 283.

with Communism or the USSR.⁹² If any proof was necessary, the increasing warmth between Pakistan and China was enough. Strong Soviet influence in Pakistan would have had the advantage of neutralising the influence of two of Moscow's chief rivals there, the United States and China.

As early as 1958, the Soviet Union began claiming that thanks to Afro-Asian support it had become possible to stem the tide by which the West had striven to "impose an American diktat on other countries."⁹³ This process of undermining the United States' hold on the United Nations could be sustained and accelerated if more countries could be weaned away from Washington. Pakistan's loosening ties with the West and increasing warmth towards Peking called for an attempt to improve relations with Islamabad.

The Soviet Union had, by the early 1960s, built up a better image of herself among the Afro-Asian countries banking upon their anti-colonial and anti-racialist sentiments. It had close contacts with most of the Arab States. If the Arabs could be won over, Pakistan could be too. This was necessary to contain growing Chinese influence in Islamabad. There were no intractable problems between the Soviet Union and Pakistan. The price that Moscow had to pay to please Pakistan was to readjust its Kashmir policy; this was not a great price for it. In pursuit of its new diplomatic strategy, Moscow tactfully

⁹²See p.155.

⁹³Alexander Dallin, The Soviet Union at the United Nations (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1962), p.128.

adopted a neutral stand on Kashmir.

This was to India's disadvantage. But lacking both economic and military strength, India's capacity to influence Moscow's South Asia policy was very limited. This was evident from the outcome of Shastri's visit to Moscow in May 1965. While the Soviet side was silent on Kashmir and Kutch, Shastri not only spoke against the American involvement in Vietnam⁹⁴ but also agreed to a mention being made to Vietnam in the Indo-Soviet joint communique.⁹⁵

However, it would be stretching the point too far to suggest that the Soviet Union was prepared to alienate India to win Pakistan's support. It would make no sense to alienate a big country like India to win the friendship of Pakistan, comparatively small as well as used to frequently changing sides.⁹⁶

Moscow would appease India to the extent ^{that} this appeasement did not come in the way of readjustment of her South Asia policy in pursuit of its new strategy. Lacking either the capacity or the will to dispense with foreign aid, as China did when necessary, India had to accept the new Soviet policy. After some vacillation

⁹⁴See Pravda, May 16, 1965.

⁹⁵See p. 156

⁹⁶This becomes evident from Brezhnev's Report to the XXIII CPSU Congress in March 1966, wherein he said: "In the period under review our traditional friendship with India and with her great people, a friendship that has withstood the test of time has grown even stronger. There has been a certain improvement with our relations with Pakistan". Pravda, March 30, 1966. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XVIII, No.12, p.13.

during and after the Sino-Indian war, the Soviet Union finally decided to build the plant for the manufacture of MiG 21 planes in India.⁹⁷ India would not jeopardise the deal by any precipitate action as a protest against the new Soviet policy on Kashmir. Therefore, Moscow could safely revise its South Asia policy without the fear of diplomatic loss in India.

In so revising her South Asia policy, Moscow made sure to give the appearance of doing it with the lofty aim of composing differences between India and Pakistan and working for peace in the subcontinent. Against the background of Peking's ultimatum to India during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965⁹⁸ and the pro-Pakistani western policies, the USSR could hope to reap diplomatic benefits from her neutrality on the dispute and efforts to make peace between the parties to the dispute.

The new policy had its advantages for Moscow in its polemics with China. In the debates within the world movement, the Soviet policy of working for peace between India and Pakistan was likely to be juxtaposed with the Chinese policy of inflaming the situation with its threats and ultimata to India during the war.

If Pakistan could be weaned away from China, Moscow would also have had the satisfaction of breaking what in those days looked like ^aChina-Pakistan-Indonesia axis.⁹⁹

⁹⁷See Chapter VII p.230

⁹⁸See p.158

⁹⁹Indonesia was very friendly to Peking in those days. She even pulled out of the United Nations. See Adam B. Ulam, op.cit., pp.717-718. See also William E. Griffiths, op.cit., p.57.

It was undoubtedly a diplomatic triumph for the Soviet Union. She achieved something which the United States and the United Kingdom could not. In the Declaration issued at the end of the Tashkent meeting, Ayub Khan and Shastri expressed their "deep thankfulness and gratitude" to the leaders of the Soviet Union "for their constructive, friendly and noble role in organising the present meeting ...".¹⁰⁰

Moscow earned this respect because from Pakistan's point of view, there was a welcome change in Russian attitude: Moscow ceased to consider Pakistan a Trojan horse for imperialism and Kashmir, a part of India; the new policy equated India and Pakistan and recognised Kashmir as a disputed question. Pakistan resented also the gifts of Western arms to India in the wake of the Sino-Indian war of 1962. An improvement in Islamabad's relations with Moscow, while maintaining cordial relations with Peking, would strengthen Pakistan's bargaining position vis-à-vis the West and India. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Soviet Union's neutrality in the Indo-Pakistani dispute earned much respect for Moscow in Pakistan.

From India's point of view, there was a substantial change in the Soviet Kashmir policy. But India's capacity for diplomatic manoeuvres was very limited: her relations with Britain and the United States were not particularly cordial. President Johnson curtly asked Prime Minister Shastri, as also Ayub Khan, to postpone his

¹⁰⁰ Pravda, January 11, 1966. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, p.4. See also Adam B. Ulam op.cit., pp.715-716 for a comment on Tashkent.

visit to Washington, apparently on grounds of Congressional workload.¹⁰¹ The British Prime Minister, Wilson, issued a statement on September 6, 1965, saying that he was "deeply concerned" at the news that India "attacked Pakistan territory".¹⁰² Britain and the United States also banned military supplies to India, including those agreed to under emergency military aid in the wake of the Chinese invasion.¹⁰³

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, continued arms shipments to India.¹⁰⁴ and there was wide-ranging co-operation between India and the Soviet Union in the field of India's industrial development.¹⁰⁵ India would not forego all this because of her ire with the new Soviet policy. In addition to all these considerations, India has always been in a position to meet the Pakistani challenge all by herself; she cannot be that confident vis-a-vis China. In view of her weakness in comparison with China, India could not overlook the importance of the Soviet Union as a countervailing force for China. Therefore, India considered it necessary not to disturb her relations with Moscow in spite of the change in its Kashmir policy.

¹⁰¹The New York Times, April 28, 1965. Shastri was to visit the United States in June 1965. It was widely interpreted as a snub to Shastri because of his opposition to the escalation of the war in Vietnam. Shastri resented it and cancelled the visit instead.

¹⁰²The Times, September 7, 1965.

¹⁰³The Times, September 9, 1965.

¹⁰⁴The Hindu, September 18, 1965.

¹⁰⁵See Chapter X.

The post-Nehru leadership did not seem to command the same respect from Moscow that Nehru did, until Mrs. Gandhi consolidated her position and demonstrated her strength by her victory over her rightist rivals in 1971. Consequently, the Soviet Union became less discreet in the expression of her views on Indian politics and personalities¹⁰⁶ until she revised her South Asia policy again in the wake of Sino-American detente.

The increasingly pragmatic economic policies of Mrs. Gandhi,¹⁰⁷ before she adopted radicalism for reasons of political expediency in 1969, and the increasing rightist pressure within her party until 1969, seemed to have given the impression in Moscow that the Indian government yielded to the pressure of monopolies, both domestic as well as foreign.¹⁰⁸

By the time the Soviet Union decided to sell arms to Pakistan in the face of strong opposition in India,¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶See, for example, O.V. Martyshin, Toward a Definition of the Social Ideals of Gandhism, Voprosy Filosofii, No. 1, January 1965. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 19, pp.15-19. See also Pravda, March 5, 1966, for a critical comment on the arrest of Communists in India.

¹⁰⁷See Chapter X, pp.360-64.

¹⁰⁸There were instances like Russia's friend in India, V.K.K. Menon, being denied a Congress ticket to contest elections in 1967. N. Savelyev considered this "an episode in the stubborn struggle between the reactionary and progressive forces". See "Monopoly Drive in India", International Affairs, (Moscow), No. 4, (1967), p.40. See also Bhabani Sen Gupta, op.cit., p.258 for the Moscow Radio broadcast on November 29, 1967, calling for resistance when the Central Government dismissed the Communist-led government of West Bengal and compare this with Moscow's attitude to the dismissal of the first Communist government in Kerala in 1959, mentioned in Chapter III, p.113

¹⁰⁹See pp.161-64

political conditions in India appeared dangerously unstable. In the fourth general elections in 1967, the Congress party lost power in 9 states; coalition governments in these states were being formed and dissolved frequently; at the centre, Mrs. Gandhi held a bare majority in Parliament; labour unrest manifested itself in strikes; peasant unrest made its appearance in the Mao-style guerilla movement known as Naxalbari movement in West Bengal. There was a famine in the State of Bihar in 1966-1967.¹¹⁰ India devalued her currency by 57.5% in June, 1966; it was assumed that this was done under the pressure of the World Bank and the United States.¹¹¹

Whatever little ideological attraction that the Soviet Union had in the Congress Party's socialism seemed to be fast disappearing with Mrs. Gandhi's government revising the Industrial Policy Resolution¹¹² whenever economic considerations necessitated it. This was taken notice of in the Soviet press and journals.¹¹³

Obviously the Soviet Union considered that in the

¹¹⁰ See Izvestia, June 13, 1967, for a report on the famine. It said that most writers conclude that you cannot explain the crisis without considering social factors: incomplete agrarian reform; feudal remnants in the villages; and technical backwardness, a legacy of British colonial domination.

¹¹¹ Kosygin was reported to have described the devaluation as a blunder to the then Indian Minister for Commerce in July 1966. See Kuldeep Nayar, op.cit., pp.71-85.

¹¹² See Chapter X, p.316.

¹¹³ See Pravda, December 15, 1965 and April 20, 1966. See also N. Savelyev, op.cit., for a Soviet assessment of the growth of monopolies in India which "are now persistently reaching out towards the levers of government power in an effort to change the domestic and foreign policies". pp.35-36.

circumstances prevailing then, India was not a good bet, In comparison with India, which was beset by political instability and economic maladies, Pakistan looked a haven of stability with Ayub Khan firmly in the saddle.

India once served the Soviet Union's purpose well; her willingness to have friendly relations with Moscow, when the post-Stalin leadership was trying to break out of international ostracism in the mid-1950s was helpful to Soviet diplomacy. But Moscow's interests in the mid and late 1960s demanded new tactics; India would not be a stumbling-block in her way. True, there was a furore in India in the wake of the Soviet decision to supply arms to Pakistan; some newspapers suggested making up with America, others, with China.¹¹⁴ The Soviet Government's assessment of the world situation and India's strength, political, economic and military, must not have given any hints at the danger of its interests being affected by any diplomatic manoeuvres by India. The fact that India quietly accepted the change in Soviet Kashmir policy and abrasive comments in the Soviet media without any retaliatory steps must have convinced it of the correctness of its assessment.

The future Soviet policy on Kashmir has to be considered in the light of the developments in the recent past: the signing of the Indo-Soviet treaty in August 1971.¹¹⁵ Under article 10 of the treaty each high contracting party declared that "no obligation exists, nor shall any obligation be entered into, between itself

¹¹⁴See pp. 162 - 63

¹¹⁵See Chapter VII^I

and any other State or States, which might cause military damage to the other party".¹¹⁶ This obviously precludes Soviet military sales to Pakistan. Moscow cannot ignore Indian objections to future military supplies to Pakistan as it did in 1968 without damaging its present high standing in India; it makes no sense to do that. On the other hand there is strong evidence to suggest that the Indo-Soviet treaty was induced by the fear of growing Chinese might, increasing importance of Peking in international affairs, and the existence of unresolved territorial disputes between the Soviet Union and China and India and China. Therefore, the Soviet Union must still be interested in weaning Pakistan away from China.

To this end, Moscow has been making conciliatory gestures to Pakistan. In his address to the 15th Soviet Trade Union Congress, in March 1972, Brezhnev said that the Soviet Union was for having good relations with Pakistan; that "no conflicts and no contradictions in interests divide us from that country".¹¹⁷ He also pleaded for "the establishment of relations of lasting peace and good-neighbourship among India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. This would be a substantial contribution to the normalisation of the political climate throughout Asia".¹¹⁸ The Soviet Union also began the construction work on the Russian-aided steel mill in Pakistan in December 1972.¹¹⁹ The USSR and Czechoslovakia also

¹¹⁶ See Appendix I.

¹¹⁷ Pravda, March 21, 1972. Complete text in CDSF, Vol. XXIV, No. 12, pp. 7-8.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ The Times, January 2, 1973.

agreed to cancel that part of Pakistan's debt to them which was spent in Bangladesh while it was a part of Pakistan.¹²⁰

Pakistan must be equally interested in maintaining friendly relations with Moscow because of its strong influence both in Afghanistan as well as in India, the countries with which Islamabad has problems. China's polite refusal to conclude a treaty with Pakistan¹²¹ must have convinced Bhutto of the need for maintaining good relations with Moscow. He visited the Soviet Union in March 1972 and reported to his National Assembly that he had "been able to normalise our (Pakistani) relations with this Great Power and neighbouring State".¹²²

It is always shrewd politics to have some leverage with both parties to a dispute in the interests of diplomatic manoeuvrability. If the Soviet Union develops sufficient diplomatic influence in Pakistan, she may try to play a quiet role in finding a solution to the Kashmir dispute.

India is willing to settle the dispute on the basis of the status quo, i.e., turning the cease-fire line into

¹²⁰The Hindustan Times, March 12, 1973.

¹²¹See Chapter VIII p.275

¹²²President Bhutto's Address to the National Assembly, (Islamabad: The Department of Films and Publications, Government of Pakistan, 1972), p.37. (Hereinafter referred to as President Bhutto's Address to the National Assembly). See also Chapter XI, p.383 for a second visit to Moscow by Bhutto. See also P. Kutsobin and V. Shurygin, "South Asia: Tendencies Towards Stability", International Affairs (Moscow), No. 4, (1973), p.48. The article commends Bhutto for his new policy.

international border.¹²³ If the Soviet Union can assist both parties in finding a satisfactory settlement of the dispute, which is not easy, she will have outwitted China in the subcontinent.

In the event of the Soviet Union ignoring India's interests in Kashmir in pursuit of her own interests, there will be tensions in Indo-Soviet relations. In any case, if India is ready to forego economic aid, as she has to at some time or another, she can resist pressure from great powers. The great powers cannot force India into ceding Kashmir to Pakistan except by resort to force - a course of action which they are hardly likely to adopt.

¹²³See Chapter III, p. 106. At the Simla Conference in July 1972, Mrs. Gandhi and Bhutto agreed to "settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations, or any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon by them"; they also agreed to discuss "the final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir". See The Times, July 4, 1972.

CHAPTER VI

GOA

Goa, Daman and Diu, the three Portuguese colonial pockets lay on the West Coast of India. The total area of the Portuguese possessions was 1301 square miles; the population was 600,000.¹ They were occupied by Portugal in 1510.²

PORTUGUESE TENACITY

The Indian desire to liberate them from Portuguese control was natural and legitimate, more so after the British and the French³ left the shores of India.

The Portuguese were insistent on holding on to these territories, as they were in regard to their African colonies until recently. This defiance of the spirit of the times was not helpful for an amicable settlement of the dispute. Salazar amended his constitution in 1951 under which all Portuguese colonies were declared her overseas provinces in order legally to forestall demands

¹Russel Brines, op.cit., p.153.

²Jose Shercliff, "Portugal's Strategic Territories", Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXI, No. 2 (January 1953), p.324.

³The French had even smaller pockets along the eastern coast of India. Their four pockets of territories together had an area of 195 square miles, with Pondicherry as the capital. See the Times Atlas of the World (London: Times Newspaper Ltd., 1968), p.xvi.

Under an agreement concluded on October 21, 1954, France transferred power over these pockets to India. The Indo-French Treaty of May 28, 1956, completed the legal process. Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents 1947-1964, p.21.

for independence.⁴

With no free public opinion to restrain at home, and powerful sympathisers in NATO, Salazar could suppress passive resistance to colonialism in Goa with an iron hand.⁵

Nehru was for a negotiated settlement with Portugal. In his reply to the Lok Sabha debate on Goa, Nehru said on July 26, 1955, that if Portugal was prepared to accept that her colonial pockets were de facto parts of India, he would not mind if there was delay in their transfer to India; but where the basic right was denied, there was no use of argument.⁶ Portugal's position being what it was, there was no possibility of a peaceful settlement.

Nehru waited for fourteen years for a peaceful transfer of the Portuguese pockets; Salazar remained firm in refusing to discuss the issue.

In the meantime, relations between Pakistan and Portugal began improving; two years before the Indian action in 1961, Pakistan called India's claim to Goa spurious.⁷ At the NATO meeting in Paris in December 1961,

⁴John K. Galbraith, op.cit., p.277. For a defence of the Portuguese colonial policy, see O. Salazar, "Goa and the Indian Union: The Portuguese View", Foreign Affairs Vol. XXXIV, No.3 (April 1956).

⁵See Chapter III, p.109.

⁶India's Foreign Policy, p.115.

⁷Michael Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p.125.

When the Indian action began, a Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman called it "naked militarism" and "the mask is off". The Times, December 20, 1961.

The Dawn, a Pakistani paper, claimed for Pakistan "full and legitimate share" in the Portuguese colonial pockets as Pakistan is an equal successor to the former "British Indian Government". Quoted in The Hindu, December 20, 1961.

Nagueira, the Portuguese foreign minister was reported to have asked Dean Rusk, the U.S. Secretary of State, to suggest to Pakistan to move a couple of Pakistani divisions to the border to frighten India. Rusk, however, rejected the proposal.⁸ Faced as India was with territorial disputes with China and Pakistan, any Pakistani-Portuguese understanding was bound to be disconcerting for her.

Having put off action twice in the hope that Portugal's friends would force her to part with Goa⁹ Nehru finally used force to liberate Goa. The Indian forces went into action on December 18, 1961.

THE BRITISH REACTION

Lord Home, Foreign Secretary, said in the House of Lords on December 18, 1961, "We utterly deplore this action". When the Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, Duncan Sandys, read Lord Home's statement in the House of Commons, the Conservatives shouted "shame". John Hall (Conservative) said that this was "only the latest in a series of acts of aggression by India"; William Rees-Davies (Conservative) described Nehru's action as "hypocritical piracy".

In reply to a question from Woodrow Wyatt (Labour) as to why the government was taking such a lofty view of Nehru's action disregarding the imprisonment of thousands of Goanese by the Portuguese, Sandys said, "I have no doubt Mr. Wyatt's words will be favourably received in

⁸John K. Galbraith, op.cit.; p.282.

⁹The Hindu, December 31, 1961.

Delhi. In the case of Suez, we referred the matter to the United Nations and discussed it patiently there for many months".¹⁰ The British government did not seem to have forgotten Nehru's denunciations during the Suez crisis.

An editorial in The Times of December 18, 1961, described the Portuguese enclaves as an anomaly, but sarcastically reminded Nehru that he "has been the apostle of peaceful evolution. He has delivered homilies, lectures, admonitions, and reproofs to the rest of the world". A second editorial, on December 19, 1961, observed that the factors that had driven Nehru to this action could be traced far back; in this context, the editorial referred to Kashmir and Hyderabad. India's action in Goa was described as "ruthless aggression".

THE AMERICAN REACTION

J.K. Galbraith, the United States ambassador to India, interceded with Nehru and got the Goa action put off for "three or four days"; Washington gave only "vague diplomatic pressure" in return.¹¹ On December 18, 1961, the day the action began, the State Department sent a telegram to Galbraith asking him to request Nehru to stop action in Goa for six months. In return they promised "a major effort" with the Portuguese.¹² Nehru could not do that at that stage because the action was on.

On December 19, 1961, the State Department

¹⁰The Hindu, December 20, 1961.

¹¹A.M. Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (London: Andre Deutsch, 1966), p.457.

¹²John K. Galbraith, op.cit., p.284.

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demonstratively cancelled a scheduled showing of a film at a Department reception, on Nehru's visit to the United States in November 1961. It would be inappropriate to show the film at a time when the United Nations Security Council was meeting on the Portuguese allegation of aggression, the Department announced.¹³

According to Schlesinger, Salazar urged that, in the Security Council debate, the United States keep things to the "narrow issue of aggression"; and the State Department had assured the American ambassador in Lisbon that the United States would "not raise the colonial issue". This commitment, "undertaken without White House consultation, tied our hands at the United Nations".¹⁴

Galbraith sent a telegram to the State Department to the effect that the United States should drop support for the Portuguese colonies. But the American Embassy in Lisbon wanted that "we stand four-square by our Portuguese ally".¹⁵

Kennedy complained, indirectly, that the event took place so soon after Nehru's visit to the United States; he wrote, "I confess to a feeling that we should have discussed this problem".¹⁶

States often find it expedient to proceed without consultation of even allies. The United States did not consult its closest allies in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962; nor did Britain consult the United States on its

¹³The Hindu, December 21, 1961.

¹⁴A.M. Schlesinger Jr., op.cit., p.458.

¹⁵John K. Galbraith, op.cit., p.276.

¹⁶Quoted in A.M. Schlesinger Jr., op.cit., p.460.

Suez action in 1956.¹⁷ As the United States had abstained on the United Nations General Assembly resolution to end colonialism in 1960,¹⁸ Nehru could hardly expect a sympathetic hearing from the United States. No useful purpose would have been served by prior consultation.

THE SOVIET ATTITUDE

Since the days of the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit to India in 1955, the Soviet Union had kept up her support to India on the issue.¹⁹ A correspondent wrote in Pravda in March 1961 that what nourished the contempt with which Portugal rejected the strong demands of India was the support of her senior partners in NATO.²⁰

In the Soviet-Indian joint communique issued at the end of Nehru's visit to the Soviet Union in September 1961, Khrushchev declared that he had a profound understanding of and sympathy with the desire of the Indian people to achieve the immediate liberation of Goa, Daman and Diu from Portuguese colonialism.²¹

When the Indian army went into action, Brezhnev, then President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, was on a state visit to India. He declared: "Here in Bombay

¹⁷ During the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the allies, including Britain, were neither consulted nor informed by the United States until the blockade was about to take effect. Elie Abel, The Missiles of October (London: MacGibbon and Kneel Ltd., 1969), p.82.

On the Suez crisis of 1956, the "United Kingdom decided against any consultation before taking this action". D.D. Eisenhower, op.cit., p.76.

¹⁸ See Chapter IV, p.128

¹⁹ See Chapter III, p.111

²⁰ Pravda, March 24, 1961.

²¹ Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents 1947-1964, p.508.

we feel with what satisfaction and enthusiasm the Indian people receive the news about the beginning of the liberation of Goa and other territories on the Indian soil which were invaded by the Portuguese colonialists".²² At a later engagement, at the Indian Institute of Technology, Brezhnev finished his speech and resumed his seat, and as soon as his last slogan, "Long live the unbreakable friendship between the peoples of USSR and India", was translated into English, he sprang to his feet, raised his hand and shouted "Down with colonialism!"²³

In a letter to Nehru dated December 20, 1961, Khrushchev said, "... This step by the Government of India is a serious contribution to the cause of the noble struggle of peoples for the full and immediate liquidation of the disgraceful system of colonialism.

"The Government of India displayed the maximum patience and self-restraint in its striving to restore historical justice and to liquidate the last bases of colonial rule on the soil of free India by peaceful means. However, the colonialists, leaning on the support of the NATO military bloc, ignored the people's will and created

²²The Hindu, December 20, 1961.

²³Ibid. At a civic reception in New Delhi on November 27, 1973, during his second visit to India, Brezhnev reminisced of his visit to India 12 years ago and said he could not forget the joyous scenes at many places after the liberation of Goa. Mission of Friendship, (New Delhi: Soviet Land Booklets, Information Department of the USSR Embassy, 1973), p.15. Thus, he subtly reminded the audience of the support that the Soviet Union gave India on all issues impinging on her national interests.

Mission of Friendship is a collection of speeches by Brezhnev, Mrs. Gandhi and others, and articles written by Soviet and Indian leaders and officials published after the Soviet leader's visit to India, (hereinafter referred to as Mission of Friendship).

a constant threat to the peaceful labour of the Indian people".²⁴

Khrushchev also sent a telegram to Nehru on December 21, 1961, saying that the "resolute actions of the Indian Government to do away with seats of colonialism in its territory were absolutely lawful and justified". He also conveyed the Soviet people's wishes for the success of India's efforts for "the consolidation of her independence".²⁵

THE DEBATE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The United States,^{the} United Kingdom, France and Turkey sponsored a resolution in the Security Council on December 19, 1961, calling on India to halt hostilities.

The United States delegate, Adlai Stevenson, made a bitter attack on India. He said that that was a "fateful hour for the United Nations". He called Nehru, "an apostle of non-violence" and contrasted his action with his professions; and Mr. Menon, "so well-known in these halls for his advice on matters of peace and his tireless enjoinders to every one else to seek the way of compromise was on the borders of Goa inspecting his troops on the zero hour of invasion". The territories, Stevenson continued, had been Portuguese for 400 years. What was at stake was not colonialism but a cold violation of an article of the Charter which forbade the threat or use of force. Nehru,

²⁴Izvestia, December 22, 1961. Complete text in CDSP Vol. XIII, No. 51, p.28. See also S. Vishnevsky's strong attack on the West on its Goa policy in Pravda, December 20, 1961.

²⁵The Hindu, December 23, 1961.

he reminded his audience, often said no right end could be served by wrong means. The Indian tradition of non-violence had inspired the whole world, but this act of force knocked the ground from underneath the Indian pronouncements. "We must ask for an immediate cease-fire. We must insist on withdrawal of the invading forces".²⁶

Stevenson did not have a word against colonialism in his speech. In reply to Galbraith's criticism of this omission, Stevenson sent a telegram to him saying, "... an adverse reference to colonialism in his speech to the Security Council had been taken out of his main speech by the State Department".²⁷

The Soviet delegate, Valerian Zorin, on the other hand, opposed the Western resolution on the ground that it sought to apply the principles of the Charter in a manner contrary to the General Assembly's resolution on the abolition of colonialism passed in 1960.²⁸ He wanted sanctions against Portugal to force it to comply with the General Assembly resolution. When the Western resolution was put to vote, the Soviet Union vetoed it.²⁹

EVALUATION

The diplomatic benefits of the Soviet stand on Goa were obvious. Having moved a resolution for the immediate abolition of colonialism in September 1960,³⁰ Khrushchev could not have missed the opportunity of causing

²⁶The Hindu, December 20, 1961.

²⁷John K. Galbraith, op.cit., p.292.

²⁸See Chapter IV, p.128

²⁹The Hindu, December 20, 1961.

³⁰See Chapter IV, pp.129-130

further embarrassment to the West.

Indian public opinion was naturally incensed with the Western insensitivity to Indian feelings. The nationalists could interpret this as Western readiness to scuttle every Indian attempt at territorial unification; it had been the same in Hyderabad and Kashmir in the late 1940s as in Goa in 1961. However embarrassing Nehru's Goa action in the context of his penchant for sermonising³¹ was to the Indian intelligentsia, this was an episode which could not have endeared the West even to the most anti-Communist among them.³²

Nothing would have been lost by ignoring the event after it has passed; Kennedy continued subtle recriminations.³³ On the contrary, the Soviet Union

³¹Two weeks before he ordered the army to march into Goa, Nehru said, in a speech in Calcutta on December 3, 1961, that India was committed to the solution of international disputes by negotiations. The world situation was such, he said, that a small conflagration somewhere might set off a universal conflagration. The Times, December 4, 1961.

³²The Hindu wrote in an editorial that "Whatever may be Portugal's value to the West as a member of NATO, her role as a colonial power could not but be a liability to the West in its ideological warfare". See its edition December 21, 1961.

³³Nehru wrote a letter to Kennedy after the event. He asked, "Why is it that something that thrills our people should be condemned in the strongest language in the United States?" He had been "deeply hurt", he wrote, by the "extraordinary and bitter attitude of Mr. Adlai Stevenson".

Kennedy replied that Nehru had his sympathy on the colonial aspect of the issue. He continued, "All countries, including of course the United States, have a great capacity for convincing themselves of the full righteousness of their particular cause. No country ever uses force for reasons it considers unjust I fear that the episode in Goa will make it harder to hold the line for peace in other places. Quoted in A.M. Schlesinger Jr., op.cit., pp.459-460.

continued to justify India's action long after the event.³⁴

This contrast would make an impact on Indian public opinion. Masses may not understand ideological nuances, but they do feel the thrill of a nation's victory; incorporation of Goa and other Portuguese pockets into India represented just such an experience for them; the Soviet Union took a sympathetic attitude, and the West a hostile one.

Besides the temperamental incompatibility between Nehru's insistence on non-alignment and the equally insistent refusal of the United States to come to terms with it, the need for bases required the United States' appeasement of Portugal.³⁵ It was too much to expect India not to disturb Portuguese possessions for the sake of American national interests. The Americans probably feared that the Indian take-over of Goa would be a precedent for a similar Chinese action in Macao and Hong Kong; if nothing else, these islands served as listening posts for the West off the Chinese coast. This was hinted at in the press conference that Dulles gave,

³⁴In his Report on the international situation made to the Supreme Soviet on December 12, 1962, Khrushchev, said: "India, its government, showed patience, put up with this (Portuguese colonialism) for several years, then took and threw out the colonialists. Were they right in doing this? Of course they were!" The United States and United Kingdom, he continued, tried "to have India recognised as aggressor"; and "only the veto of the Soviet Union prevented this". Pravda, December 13, 1962.

³⁵The Portuguese islands of Azores and Cape Verde were strategically important to the United States. In 1952 the United States concluded an agreement with Portugal for the use of the Azores bases in peace and war. See Jose Shercliff, op.cit., p.321.

in defence of his statement that Goa was a Portuguese province, wherein he mentioned Macao;³⁶ Kennedy also alluded to this fear in his letter to Nehru in which he said that the Indian action in Goa would make it harder to hold the line for peace in other places.³⁷ China added to their uneasiness with a habitual anti-colonial statement issued on December 19, 1961, in support of the Indian Action, in spite of tensions in Sino-Indian relations.³⁸

The Soviet Union gained a strong psychological point over the West; unlike the West which taunted and hurt India's national psyche, the Soviets gave it solace by strong support and comforting words. Even East Germany, whose existence India was not prepared to recognise until 1961, and with which India was not ready to have diplomatic relations, in order not to hurt West Germany, until almost a decade after the Goa episode, supported India on Goa.³⁹ For many Indians, this gave the appearance that, while Russia was drumming up support for India, the West was making a concerted attack on her.

More important was the image building effect that the Soviet gesture to India could have had in the Afro-Asian world. The Anglo-American attitude to colonial

³⁶The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIII, No. 860, (December 19, 1955), p.1007.

³⁷See above, footnote 33.

³⁸It described Goa as an inalienable part of Indian territory and said, "What calls for serious attention is that the imperialist powers headed by the United States of America openly oppose and unjustifiably censure the Indian Peoples just demand for recovering Goa and support continued Portuguese occupation of Goa". See The Hindu, December 21, 1961.

³⁹The Hindu, December 20, 1961.

and racial issues did not endear them to these countries. By their stand on the issue, the United States and ^{the} United Kingdom made it known to the Third World that between a small European country and a large Asian country, they would prefer the European. This feeling was bound to be strengthened when the location of Goa is considered. It was not useful to the Western defence system; there was nothing to contain beyond Goa's borders except India's nationalism. Even Dulles agreed that Goa was beyond the pale of NATO.⁴⁰ Nor was there a danger of Portugal defecting to the Soviet camp in the event of the West not standing "four-square by our Portuguese ally" on the issue of Goa. The West could have guessed the Afro-Asian reaction; yet they took their pro-Portuguese stand. On their part, the Afro-Asian states introduced a counter-resolution rejecting the Portuguese complaint;⁴¹ the West remained unmoved. The former victims of colonialism could only conclude that the West was pro-colonial and the Soviet Union was anti-colonial.

In some cases, both super powers followed a negative policy during the Cold War era: the United States automatically opposing Soviet policies and vice versa. In the subcontinent, the United States followed this policy as far as India's territorial disputes with non-Communist states were concerned. Dulles came out in support of Portugal on Goa because of, what he considered, "the emotionalism which was sought to be created by the

⁴⁰ The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIII, No. 860, p.1007.

⁴¹ The Hindu, December 20, 1961.

Soviet rulers when they were in India".⁴²

That was the only moral justification for a negative policy of opposing the Soviet line even when it was right and in keeping with the spirit of the times. This policy continued for a long time after Dulles' death. The more the Soviet Union supported India, the greater the Western opposition; India, therefore, would come to depend more and more on Soviet diplomatic support in view of her disputes with her neighbours. In return, India would naturally take a sympathetic attitude to Soviet problems. The Soviet Union accepted parliamentary procedures at the United Nations to the extent that other major powers did. Therefore, the Afro-Asian votes at the United Nations would count. India, in those days, had some influence in the Afro-Asian bloc. By standing "four-square" by the more numerous Afro-Asian group on an issue which had a strong emotional appeal, the Soviet Union would try to be in its good books.

The Soviet Union did not face the dilemma that the West did in Goa: in the unlikely event of direct Western intervention in Goa, the West would lose face with the emerging world; and if it did not give effective support to Portugal, there would be a rift in the Western camp. The many authoritarian allies of America would grow sceptical about the usefulness of the pacts with the United States. The differences of approach to SEATO between Pakistan and the United States were evident even at the founding meeting; the United States considered it

⁴²See Chapter III, p. 110

applicable to Communist aggression, and Pakistan, to all types of aggression.⁴³ Pakistan heartily supported Portugal. The Western verbal support to the latter must have disillusioned Pakistan with her allies' willingness to stand by her in what she considered to be her vital national interests. It is not unimportant to recall that, from 1961 onwards, Pakistan began improving her relations with China, and later, for some time, with Russia, partly for reasons of pressure on the West, and partly as an insurance against the vicissitudes of power configurations.

Thus, the Western stand on Goa not only alienated the anti-colonial nationalist forces, but also failed to give complete satisfaction to some of their authoritarian allies. The West was the loser both ways; the Soviet Union again had won the approval of anti-colonial forces.

The Goan episode left a dent in the Asian front of the United States. Pakistan realised that the United States would not intervene in the areas she considered unimportant; Goa was unimportant for the West; so was Indian Kashmir. From her point of view, therefore, China would have had to be considered a better companion since she shared her enmity to India and had stakes in weakening India. The disarray in the Western camp must have given great satisfaction to Russia: fissures developed almost simultaneously in the European, as well as Asian, theatres of the Western alliance; in Europe it was due to de Gaulle's defiant nationalism, in Asia, to Pakistan's obsession with India. On the other hand, the Soviet Union won the laurels of the Afro-Asian world for her stand on Goa.

⁴³See Chapter VIII, pp. 276-77.

THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE

While Kashmir and Goa were of peripheral importance for the Soviet Union, the Sino-Indian border dispute had a direct bearing on Soviet interests, for China raised identical points in her border disputes with India and the USSR. Therefore, a closer examination of the Sino-Indian border dispute is necessary in the context of a study of Indo-Soviet relations.

A HISTORY OF SINO-INDIAN
RELATIONS

It is natural for fellow sufferers to support each other. The Indian National Congress expressed its sympathy with China and opposed the dispatch of Indian troops there, by the British government, in a resolution passed at Patna in 1925. A number of China days were observed; Nehru went to China on a goodwill mission and was received by General Chiang.¹ In 1942, Chiang visited India at the British government's invitation, met Gandhi and Nehru, and expressed the hope that Britain would give the Indians political power.²

In the absence of imperial oppression which created a fellow feeling in the past, conflicting national interests were bound to complicate Sino-Indian relations in view of the long and undemarcated border.

¹P.C. Chakravorthy, India's China Policy,
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), pp.5-6.

²Ibid.

Having consolidated their position in China, the Communist leaders began talking of liberating Tibet in 1950. Nehru wrote to Chinese leaders saying that while India would recognise Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, she wished that Tibetan autonomy be maintained. In their reply the Chinese said that in any event they were "going to liberate Tibet". Nehru wondered: "From whom they were going to liberate Tibet is, however, not clear".³

The Chinese forces entered eastern Tibet in late October 1950, but paused for nearly 11 months before marching to Lhasa. A note from India, dated October 26, 1950, called this "invasion of Tibet" deplorable.⁴ China was not deterred by such verbal protests.⁵

On November 7, 1950, Tibet appealed to the United Nations where India, contrary to its assurance to support her, backed out. On November 15, 1950, El Salvador filed a request that the Tibetan appeal be put on the agenda; on November 24, 1950, when the request came up for discussion, Britain, obviously in consultation with India, asked for postponement.⁶

Five weeks before his death, Sardar Patel,⁷ in a prophetic letter to Nehru dated November 7, 1950, pointed to the strong language used by China in her replies to

³Nehru's speech in Parliament, December 6, 1950. India's Foreign Policy, (1971 ed.), p.302.

⁴Quoted in Bhabani Sen Gupta, op.cit., p.107.

⁵The Soviet attitude to neutrals being what it was in those days, The New Times charged that in collaboration with Anglo-American "imperialists", India was nursing some designs on Tibet. See J.A. Naik, op.cit., p.48.

⁶P.C. Chakravorthy, op.cit., p.31.

⁷See Chapter III, footnote 20.

Indian protests and observed: "It looks as though it is not a friend speaking in that language but a potential enemy".⁸

The Sardar drew Nehru's attention to the "undefined state of the frontier and the existence on our side of a population with its affinities to Tibetans or Chinese have all the elements of potential trouble between China and ourselves. Recent and bitter history also tells us that Communism is no shield against imperialism and that Communists are as good or as bad imperialists as any other ... Chinese irredentism and Communist imperialism are different from the expansionism or imperialism of the Western Powers. The former has a cloak of ideology which makes it ten times more dangerous. In the guise of ideological expansion lie concealed racial, national and historical claims. The danger from the north and north-east, therefore, becomes both communist and imperialist". He pleaded for a change in the Indian defence calculations of "superiority over Pakistan" to reckon with Communist China.⁹

After independence, the new Government of India took steps to safeguard its position in the Himalayan Kingdoms of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim by renegotiating the British Indian treaties in July 1950, August 1949, and December 1950 respectively. Bhutan agreed to be guided by India in her external affairs; Sikkim continued to be an Indian protectorate with India having the right to

⁸See the text of the letter in the Appendix to D.V. Tahmankar, op.cit., pp.288-293.

⁹Ibid.

station an army anywhere in Sikkim.¹⁰ China did not seem to like these developments; The Peoples' Daily accused India, in September, 1950, of expansionist designs in the Himalayas.¹¹

Yet, Nehru pursued, with single-minded devotion, a policy of wooing China. For the success of his non-alignment policy, a positive response from the Communist bloc was necessary; Stalinist Russia hardly ever responded to Nehru's overtures;¹² he tried to break the ice by cultivating Chinese friendship. Besides that, short of inviting the United States to intervene, which he was not prepared to do, it was difficult for India to give effective assistance to Tibet, beset as she was with massive problems of her own.¹³

After the Chinese occupation of Tibet was complete, Nehru began appeasing China with vigour. India refused to participate in or sign the Peace Treaty with Japan made at the San Francisco Conference in September 1951.¹⁴ On April 29, 1954, the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet was signed. Under this, India gave up the right to station garrisons at Yatung and Gyantse in Tibet, as also the right to maintain post and telegraph installations,

¹⁰For India's treaty with Nepal, see Girilal Jain, India Meets China in Nepal (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1959), p.164. For the treaties with Bhutan and Sikkim, see Foreign Policy of India: Text of Documents 1947-1964, pp. 4 and 169 respectively.

¹¹Quoted in Bhabani Sen Gupta, op.cit., p.105.

¹²See Chapter III, pp. 94 - 101

¹³See George N. Patterson, op.cit., pp.287-288, for Nehru's views on this problem.

¹⁴India wanted, among other things, that the treaty should specifically state that Formosa would be returned to China and that the treaty must be acceptable to all nations with interests in the Far East. See Werner Levi, Free India in Asia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954), pp.120-122.

both secured after Colonel Younghusband's expedition to Tibet in 1904.¹⁵ The Panchsheel of the much-publicised and short-lived glory was a part of this agreement.¹⁶

Thereafter began another short-lived phase of what Bhabani Sen Gupta called "a highly-romanticised non-history", i.e. the slogan of 2000-year old Sino-Indian friendship.¹⁷ During this apparently friendly phase, Chou En-lai visited India four times between June 1954 and January 1957.¹⁸

But this phase did not last long. The inevitable national rivalries between large countries striving for influence began making their appearance to complicate Sino-Indian relations.¹⁹ Communist China had greater reason to dislike India's prominence in international forums in the 1950s because of her total exclusion therefrom, under the United States pressure, in spite of the United Nations Charter recognising her great power status. Besides national jealousies, there is a long and undefined border between the two countries; and a potentially explosive situation existed in Sino-Indian relations all along.

THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER

India and China have a 2,896-kilometre border. The dispute between them involves 90,000 square kilometres of

¹⁵White Paper I (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1961), p.98. See also pp.115-116 (hereinafter referred to as White Paper I or II).

¹⁶See Chapter III, p.103

¹⁷Bhabani Sen Gupta, op.cit., pp.21-22.

¹⁸P.C. Chakravorthy, op.cit., p.60.

¹⁹See K.M. Panikkar, In Two Chinas, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1955), pp.26-27, and Werner Levi, Free India in Asia, pp.37-38.

territory in the eastern, 2,000 square kilometres in the central and 33,000 square kilometres in the western sectors.²⁰ The border between them was never demarcated because until the 18th century there was no common border between them; they were separated by two vast and sparsely populated territories, Tibet and Uigur, which were independent entities.

The Chinese forces first entered Tibet in 1718 to restore the Seventh Dalai Lama and to drive away the Dzungar Mongols from Tibet.²¹ In 1720 the Manchus built a garrison in Lhasa.²² Every attempt to assert control over Tibet was resisted by the Tibetans.²³ China was, therefore, satisfied with nominal control. In the wake of the Chinese revolution in 1911, the Tibetans drove out the Chinese forces from Tibet in 1912 and declared their independence in 1913.²⁴ China did not recognise the independence.

The fear of Russian threat to her Indian empire made Britain encourage Chinese influence in Tibet.²⁵ This influence was to be respected only to the extent that the British interests were not affected. In 1904, an expedition was sent to Tibet under Colonel Younghusband's

²⁰ See Peking Review, No. 45 (November 8, 1963), p.19.

²¹ Tsepon W.D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History, (Newhaven and London: Yale University Press, 1967), p.139.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid., pp.198 and 204.

²⁴ Ibid., pp.245-248.

²⁵ Ibid., p.196. In a letter to the Secretary of State for India, Lord Curzon described this Chinese Suzerainty "a constitutional fiction - a political affectation" maintained because of "its convenience to both parties". Quoted, ibid., p.219.

command; this resulted in a convention being signed in September 1904 under which marts were established and garrisons stationed at Yatung and Gyantse.²⁶

When the British Indian Government decided to delimit the border between Tibet and India in the eastern sector, China was also invited to the Simla Conference in 1914, along with Tibet. The Simla Convention recognised the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA), a vast tract of tribal land, as a part of India. The line that delimited the border in this sector has been called the McMahon Line, after the British representative at the Simla Conference. By this time China had ceased to have even nominal control over Tibet, having been driven out of Tibet in 1912. China, however, refused to ratify the Convention.²⁷

Aksai Chin, claimed and occupied by China, in the western sector, was a part of Ladakh, a region in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Ladakh originally belonged to Tibet. Maharajah Gulab Singh of Kashmir defeated the Tibetans in 1842 and annexed Ladakh to Kashmir. This was confirmed by a treaty between Tibet and Kashmir in the same year.²⁸ When Britain claimed suzerainty over Kashmir, British India asked China to send a representative for delimiting the border. The Chinese reply dated January 13, 1847, stated that the border was "sufficiently and distinctly fixed so that it would be best to adhere to this ancient arrangement".²⁹ British India was not

²⁶Ibid., p.216.

²⁷P.C. Chakravathy, op.cit., p.135.

²⁸Tsepon W.D. Shakaba, op.cit., pp.177-179.

²⁹White Paper I, p.26. China now claims that 80 per cent of Aksai Chin forms part of Sinkiang and that there was no representative of Sinkiang at the 1842 conference between Kashmir and Tibet. See George N. Patterson, op.cit., p.191.

unduly concerned about the borders with Tibet because Chinese control over Tibet was fictitious and Tibet was no threat to India; therefore, no further steps were taken on the issue.

THE BORDER TENSIONS

When the maps published by Communist China began showing large tracts of Indian territory as Chinese, India raised the question with Peking. Every time India raised the question, she was told by China that they were old maps and would be rectified in due course.³⁰

Hardly a few months after the birth of Panchsheel, China sent a note to India, on July 17, 1954, alleging that 30 Indian soldiers had crossed into Tibet at Wu Je and called the act contrary to the spirit of Panchsheel. India denied the allegation and accused the Chinese of having entered Indian territory at Bara Hoti.³¹

In September 1957, China announced the construction of ^{the} Sinkiang-Tibet highway across Aksai-Chin. It was not until this Chinese announcement that the Indian government knew about the road. An Indian patrol party sent in August 1958 to the area was detained by the Chinese. An informal note from India sent in October 1958 brought this to the notice of the Chinese government.³² The Chinese reply in November 1958 stated that the Indian patrol was detained as it entered Chinese territory, and that in the

³⁰Nehru's speech in Lok Sabha, November 25, 1959.
India's Foreign Policy (1961 edition), p.360.

³¹White Paper I, pp.1-3.

³²Ibid., pp.26-27.

spirit of Sino-Indian friendship, it had been released on October 22, 1958.³³

An earlier Indian note to China, dated August 21, 1958, had drawn the Chinese government's attention to a map in China Pictorial, a Chinese magazine, which showed large areas of Indian territory as Chinese. The note also pointed out that Nehru had raised the issue with Chou in 1954 when he was in China and was told by the Chinese leader that they "were based on old maps and that the Government of the People's Republic of China had had no time to correct them." The note expressed the hope that since the Government of China had been in power for so many years, changes would be made in the maps.³⁴ The Chinese reply, dated November 3, 1958, said that "the reason why the boundary in Chinese maps is drawn according to old maps is that the Chinese Government has not undertaken a survey of China's boundary, nor consulted with the countries concerned, and it will not make changes in the boundary on its own".³⁵

In a letter to Chou En-lai, dated December 14, 1958, Nehru referred to a conversation he had with him, when the Chinese Prime Minister was in India, in which he was told that China intended to recognise the McMahon Line since it was accepted by Peking in the case of Burma. Referring to the official Chinese reply of November 3, 1958, Nehru said: "I was puzzled by this reply because I thought

³³Ibid., p.28.

³⁴Ibid., p.46.

³⁵Ibid., p.47.

there was no major boundary dispute between China and India".³⁶

Chou En-lai's reply in January 1959 exposed Nehru's wishful thinking on Sino-Indian relations. He wrote that "the Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited"; that Aksai-Chin is a part of Sinkiang-Uigur region; that all "this shows that border disputes do exist between China and India"; that China had not raised the border question before "because conditions were not yet ripe for its settlement"; that China "finds it necessary to take a more or less realistic attitude towards the McMahon Line", though it has never been recognised; and that the Chinese people expressed surprise at the way the Sino-Indian border, "particularly its Western Sections", was drawn on Indian maps.³⁷

Chou En-lai implied that he was ready to recognise the McMahon Line in return for the Indian acceptance of Chinese claims to Aksai Chin in the west. China desperately needs the Sinkiang-Tibet highway, which runs through Aksai Chin, to control Sinkiang and Tibet; hence, her insistence on having Aksai Chin; Nehru was not ready to accept this.

From this time onwards, border incidents increased in frequency. The first shooting on the Sino-Indian border occurred on August 26, 1959, when China opened fire on an Indian post, Longju, killing one border policeman, and injuring another; India had to abandon the post.³⁸

³⁶ Ibid., pp.48-49.

³⁷ Ibid., pp.52-54.

³⁸ White Paper II, 1961, p.6.

In March 1959, the long simmering Sino-Tibetan tensions erupted; there was a revolt in Tibet, resulting in the flight of the Dalai Lama to India where he was given political asylum upon his arrival on March 31, 1959.³⁹ The sympathetic reaction in India to Tibetan events must have caused concern to China. In a statement in the Lok Sabha in April 1959, Nehru said that it was not "upper strata reactionaries" who were solely responsible for the revolt in Tibet. It was "a strong feeling of nationalism" that resulted in the revolt; "any attempt to explain a situation by the use of rather worn-out words, phrases and slogans is seldom helpful".⁴⁰ However, the Government of India declared that it would not recognise any Tibetan government-in-exile in India.⁴¹

In the meantime border incidents continued. On October 21, 1959, an Indian patrol party was fired upon by the Chinese near Kongka Pass in the western sector. Nine Indian policemen were killed and 7 captured by China in the incident. In reply to an Indian protest, China claimed that the Kongka Pass was Chinese.⁴²

In 1959-1960 China built a second highway across Askai Chin, and "in the 1960 map the boundary has been pushed forward to include a much wider area".⁴³

India had to devise some policy to contain this

³⁹See Frank Moraes, The Revolt in Tibet (New York: Macmillan Co., 1960), pp.3-15.

⁴⁰Foreign Policy of India, p.324.

⁴¹Quoted in P.C. Chakravathy, op.cit., pp.97-98.

⁴²White Paper II, pp.14-16.

⁴³George N. Patterson, "Recent Chinese Policies in Tibet and Towards the Himalayan Border States", The China Quarterly, No. 12, (October-December 1962), p.195.

Chinese forward thrust. Between August-November 1959, the army was made responsible for the protection of the Himalayan border, until then guarded by border police.⁴⁴ Nehru's reply to Chinese encroachments was, what came to be called, the forward policy. This was an ineffective and disastrous policy of sending a handful of ill-equipped and ill-prepared soldiers to get into the icy wastes of Aksai Chin to establish posts without proper logistic support. In this way, the Indian army established posts in a 2,500-square mile area.⁴⁵ Now the Indian and Chinese armies found themselves face to face.

At this stage, China proposed that both sides withdraw their forces to a line 20 kilometres beyond the line of actual control. Nehru rejected this and proposed instead that both parties withdraw from areas claimed by the other and create a "no-man's land" of about 12,000 square miles.⁴⁶ This was not acceptable to China. Border incidents continued to occur with increasing frequency^{46A} until the war broke out in October, 1962.

THE BORDER WAR OF 1962.

The whole basis of Nehru's China policy was under attack in India; and he sought shelter under tough words. On his way to Ceylon on October 12, 1962, he said at a press conference in New Delhi: "I have given orders to the army to throw the Chinese out."⁴⁷ The failure of his

44. Lorne J. Kavio, India's Quest for Security, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), PP. 163-169.

45. Peking Review, No. 44, (November 2, 1962), PP. 8-9.

46. Gopal, "India, China and the Soviet Union", Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. XII, No. 2, (August 1966), P. 247.

46A. There were violent border incidents in June and October 1960, April, May, July, August and September 1961, January, May, July, September (twice) and October (10), 1962. See V. B. Karnik, Chinese Invasion: Background and sequel (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1966), PP. 274-76.

47 The Hindu, October 13, 1962.

China policy seemed to have frustrated him so much that he did not realise that by such tough words he was only giving the Chinese a pretext to attack. A Jen-min Jih-pao editorial of October 14, 1962, declared, citing Nehru's statement, that a massive invasion of China was imminent.⁴⁸

The war started on October 20, 1962, with massive Chinese attacks all along the border. At the height of the war, China made 3 proposals on October 24, 1962, for ending the conflict: 1) Both parties should agree to settle the dispute peacefully. Pending a peaceful settlement, both parties should respect the line of actual control along the entire border, and the armed forces of each side would withdraw 20 kilometres from this line and disengage. 2) If India agreed to the first proposal, China would withdraw her "frontier guards" in the eastern sector to the north of the line of actual control; at the same time, both China and India should undertake not to cross the line of actual control, i.e. the "traditional customary line" in the middle and western sectors. 3) Eventual talks between the Prime Ministers of India and China for the settlement of the border issue.⁴⁹

There was disagreement on what constituted the line of actual control; India and China interpreting it to suit their own interests. Chinese definition of the line was unacceptable to Nehru, who therefore rejected the

⁴⁸Peking Review, No. 42, (October 19, 1962), p.6. See also Neville Maxwell, India's China War, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1971), for a pro-Chinese interpretation of the events leading to the war of 1962 by a western writer.

⁴⁹Peking Review, No. 43, (October 26, 1962), pp. 5-6.

the Chinese proposals.⁵⁰ Anyway, there was nothing that India could do on the front; her army suffered a disastrous defeat. Victorious China declared a unilateral cease-fire on November 20, 1962, held all the territory she wanted in the western sector and pulled back from the eastern sector in due course.⁵¹

When the first shooting took place on the Sino-Indian border, on the eve of Khrushchev's visit to the United States, Tass issued a statement which took a neutral stand on the dispute.⁵² That was an indication that all was not well with Sino-Soviet relations. It is, therefore, proper briefly to take a look at the state of their relations in the context of the study of Soviet attitude to the Sino-Indian border issue.

SINO-SOVIET TENSIONS

As was proved by Tito's revolt against Stalin in 1948, in countries where Communism came to power largely due to indigenous efforts fealty to the Soviet Union would not last long. The Chinese party came to power entirely by its own effort. In his speech at the tenth party plenum in October 1962, Mao said that Stalin opposed, in 1945, the Chinese party staging a revolution; the Chinese party did not obey him and the revolution succeeded.⁵³ Mao also said that even after the success of the revolution, Stalin did not trust China, fearing that the

⁵⁰The Hindu, October 29, 1962.

⁵¹The Hindu, November 21, 1962.

⁵²See pp. 217-18.

⁵³Quoted in John Gittings, "The Great Power Triangle and Chinese Foreign Policy", The China Quarterly, No. 39, (July-September 1969), pp.43-44.

Chinese leader might become another Tito. When Mao went to Moscow to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union, "Stalin did not wish to sign"; he finally signed one after two months of negotiations. It was only after China's resistance to America that Stalin trusted China.⁵⁴

A self-confident China's claim to solving the problem of building Communism in underdeveloped countries would not be conceded by the Soviet Union, for that meant conceding to China the leadership of the movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America.⁵⁵

Wherever practicable, the Soviet Union would use the local parties as instruments of her diplomacy. For example, when the Soviet government praises the Indian government's socio-economic achievements in times of cordial relations, it means that the CPI is being given a hint that any activity which is likely to frustrate Soviet diplomatic goals would not be favoured during that period; conversely, when the Soviet Union feels that the Indian government's sentiments need not be unduly taken into consideration, as she seemed to have felt in 1968,⁵⁶ and begins to make critical comments about India, the CPI will be free to act. Therefore, Moscow does not want any competitors for the loyalty of parties.

In a large underdeveloped country like India with massive problems like poverty and unemployment, the

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), p.15.

⁵⁶See Chapter V, pp.161 - 62

Communist party can be particularly useful, as an instrument of pressure for Moscow, if it is strong and united.

In certain states of India, the CPI had a fairly large following; it polled a substantial number of votes.⁵⁷

Sino-Soviet differences had their impact on the CPI.

China encouraged leftist elements in the CPI first to attack the CPSU in the CPI;⁵⁸ and after the split in the party in November-December 1964, when the two factions in the party emerged as two separate parties, viz., the CPI (pro-Moscow) and the CPI (Marxist), China supported the latter. When the CPI(M) held its Congress in October-November 1964, the Peking Review wrote: "This Congress of historic significance announced the expulsion of the renegade Dange⁵⁹ group from the Communist Party of India".⁶⁰

The Soviet Union could not have endeared herself to Peking by her proposal for a conference on the Middle East crisis of 1958 between the United States of America, USSR, the United Kingdom, France and India.⁶¹ American attempts to keep out China from all international councils were

⁵⁷See Conclusions, p. 413.

⁵⁸At the World Federation of Trade Unions meeting in Peking in June 1960, the Chinese delegation attacked the Soviet Union. Hare Krisna Konar of the CPI, who was to join the leftist faction after the split in the party, was chosen by the Chinese to lead the attack on the CPSU in the CPI. He told this to the Calcutta District Committee of his party. See Donald S. Zagoria, op.cit., p.337.

⁵⁹Dange is the Chairman of the CPI.

⁶⁰Peking Review, No. 4, (January 22, 1965), p.17. This support did not last long as the CPI(M) was not ready to accept the Chinese line on Kashmir and other issues. See Bhabani Sen Gupta, "China and Indian Communism", The China Quarterly, No. 50, (April-June 1972), p.281.

⁶¹See Chapter III, p.112.

frustrating enough for Peking; the Soviet proposal ... ignored Chinese claims as well. Khrushchev's eagerness to promote India's stature for reasons of diplomatic expediency could not have been appealing to China considering the rivalries between Peking and New Delhi.

Then there were other factors which contributed to Sino-Soviet tensions like the "unreasonable demands designed to bring China under Soviet military control"; the Soviet refusal in 1959 to give technical data to make an atom bomb under an agreement made in 1957; Khrushchev's attempts to sell ^{the} two-China theory to Mao after his visit to the United States in 1959; the withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China in 1960; and the nuclear test ban ⁶² treaty of 1963.

IDEOLOGICAL DISPUTES

In a lengthy article on the origin and development of differences between the CPSU and the Communist Party of China, Chinese spokesmen said in 1963 that the Chinese party had never accepted the policy of complete negation of Stalin and the theses on peaceful transition to Socialism. They were "gross errors of principle".⁶³ The article referred to the objections to the theses made known to the Soviet leadership by Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi, and Chou En-lai.⁶⁴

⁶²See "The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves - Comment on the Open Letter of the CC of the CPSU, Peking Review, No. 37 (September 13, 1963), pp.7-20.

⁶³Ibid., p.7.

⁶⁴Ibid., p.9.

The encouraging rate of Soviet economic growth⁶⁵ and near-parity with the United States in military strength,⁶⁶ made the Soviet leadership increasingly self-confident. Therefore, while in his Report to the XXth Congress Khrushchev declared, with necessary reservations, that "war is not a fatalistic inevitability",⁶⁷ in his Report to the XXIst Congress, he confidently declared that there was no longer "capitalist-encirclement" of the Soviet Union and that peace is possible even while capitalism exists.⁶⁸ The United States' recognition of Soviet power gratified the Soviet ego; awareness of the dangers involved in further Soviet expansion made the Soviet leaders realists; and they advocated peaceful co-existence. On the other hand Chinese national ambitions remained unfulfilled because of American hostility to her. Therefore, any rapprochement before her grievances against the United States were redressed was unacceptable to Peking.

China naturally insisted on ideological equality. For instance, a Jen-min Jih-pao editorial on January 27, 1963, pleaded for unity in the international movement on the basis of the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement.

⁶⁵See Chapter I, p. 71.

⁶⁶In a speech in Obnova, Bulgaria, Khrushchev told his audience, with obvious satisfaction, that Kennedy himself told him that the United States and USSR were military equals. The Soviet leader, however, hastened to add that the USSR was stronger than the "imperialists". Pravda, May 19, 1962.

⁶⁷See Chapter I, p. 53.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 56.

It said that these two documents were unanimously agreed upon by the parties and "are binding on all the fraternal Parties ... No single Party or group of Parties have the right to change them or to declare them null and void".⁶⁹ The editorial went on to say that "it is impermissible to impose the programme, resolutions, line or policies of any one Party on other fraternal Parties, or to require other fraternal Parties to obey the irresponsible, self-contradictory statements made by the leader of a Party who talks this way one day and that way the next as if those statements were imperial decrees...".⁷⁰

TERRITORIAL DISPUTES

It is now known that China made irredentist demands on Russia as early as 1954. Mao told a delegation of socialist deputies of the Japanese Parliament in July 1964 that there are "too many places occupied by the Soviet Union" and that when Khrushchev and Bulganin visited China in 1954, the Chinese leaders took up the question of Mongolia but they (the Soviet leaders) refused to discuss it.⁷¹ Mao then recounted the territories occupied by Russia from Japan, Finland, Poland, Germany, and Rumania and added that they "took everything they could".⁷² China, he said, had not yet presented her "account" for the territories lost to Russia. In regard to the Kurile

⁶⁹Peking Review, No. 5, (February 1, 1963), p.9.

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Quoted in Dennis J. Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict: Documents and Analysis (Stanford: The Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, 1965), p.42.

⁷²Ibid.

Islands, Mao said, "the question is clear as far as we are concerned - they must be returned to Japan".⁷³

In a separate interview with a member of the Japanese Parliament, Chou En-lai said in July 1964 that in an interview with "Premier Khrushchev in January 1957, I requested that the USSR make proper arrangements for the territorial issues covering Japan, China, the Middle East, and the Eastern European countries including Finland. I could not get a satisfactory answer from him then, but the announcement of the issue was kept secret because the Sino-Soviet dispute was not public at that time."⁷⁴

According to Doolin, the total Chinese territorial claim on Russia is of the order of 600,000 square miles.⁷⁵ Thus China not only made territorial demands on Russia, but also egged on other countries to make similar demands and extended unilateral support to them. Had so many demands from so many countries materialised, it would have been a great diplomatic embarrassment to the Soviet Union.

Pravda replied in September 1964: "No one disagrees: the Czarist Government carried out a predatory policy just as the Chinese Emperors carried one out themselves to the extent of their abilities".⁷⁶

Khrushchev also made a statement, also to a Japanese Parliamentary Delegation in September 1964. He said that the Chinese emperors seized Mongolia, Sinkiang, Tibet and tried to conquer Korea. He also reminded his guests

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴Quoted, Ibid., p.45.

⁷⁵Ibid., see the foreword to the book.

⁷⁶Quoted, ibid., pp.51-52.

that the people of Sinkiang are ethnically different from the Chinese. He added that "the only difference being that the stronger aggressors grabbed more and the weaker one grabbed less".⁷⁷

Thus, from the Soviet point of view, China was a diplomatic nuisance, ideological challenge and territorial menace. Therefore, the Soviet Government could not have supported the Chinese claims on India; that would have created a dangerous precedent. Moscow could not uphold India's case either for fear of doing irreparable damage to bloc unity in those early stages of the split.

THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TO THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE

In February 1957, Chester Bowles had a lengthy discussion with Khrushchev in Moscow; much of it centred on India. When Bowles said to Khrushchev that the Soviet Union and the United States of America "might ultimately face a common problem in regard to China, he did not disagree".⁷⁸ As mentioned above, as early as 1954 Mao had raised the question of the propriety of Soviet control of Mongolia, and in 1957 Chou En-lai had asked Khrushchev to make territorial concessions to the countries whose territories Russia had occupied over centuries.⁷⁹ Therefore, Khrushchev had some weighty reason for not disagreeing with Bowles.

In spite of such problems with and apprehensions of

⁷⁷Quoted, ibid., pp.70-71.

⁷⁸Chester Bowles, "America and Russia in India", Foreign Affairs, Vol. XLIX, No. 4, (July 1971), p.637.

⁷⁹See pp.214 - 15

China, the Soviet Union adopted an attitude to the Sino-Indian border problem which can only be described as a riddle. The Soviet press did publish some articles critical of China; Khrushchev did blame China for the tensions and violence on the border; but the Indian claims were never upheld. Soviet atlases continue to show the Chinese version of the Sino-Indian border.⁸⁰

When the Tibetan revolt took place in March 1959, the Soviet press echoed Chinese denunciations. A correspondent wrote in Pravda that after the Communists came to power in China, the liberation of Tibet was peacefully solved". In spite of the Chinese government fully observing the 1951 agreement which guaranteed autonomy, the reactionary "leadership of Tibet entered into collusion with imperialist elements abroad and, against the will of the Tibetan people, took the path of open betrayal of the motherland by staging an armed uprising".⁸¹ The article repeated the Chinese charge that a centre for directing the uprising was set up in Kalimpong in India.⁸²

When the first of the shooting incidents took place in the eastern sector of the border, Tass issued a

⁸⁰ Atlas Narodov Mira Glavnoi Oohprava, (Moskva: Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1964), pp.60-63. This version was repeated in 1972. There was criticism of this Soviet action in the Indian Parliament. See below P. 242.

⁸¹ Pravda, March 30, 1959. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XI, No. 13, p.20.

⁸² Ibid. See also Pravda, April 5, 1959 and Izvestia, October 8, 1959, for more pro-Chinese articles on Tibet.

statement on September 9, 1959. Referring to the western versions of the incident, the statement said, "Those who inspired it are trying to discredit the idea of peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems and to prevent the strengthening of the Asian peoples' solidarity in the fight to consolidate national independence".⁸³ The statement continued that on the eve of Khrushchev's visit to the United States, the incidents were being exploited by those circles in the United States who were opposed to lessening of tensions.⁸⁴ It went on it "would be wrong not to express regret that the incident on the Chinese-Indian boundary took place". The Soviet Union has friendly relations with both China and India. "The Chinese and the Soviet peoples are tied together by indestructible bonds of fraternal friendship based on the great principles of socialist internationalism. Friendly co-operation between the USSR and India according to the ideas of peaceful co-existence is developing successfully". The Soviet leaders expressed the conviction, the statement said, that both parties would "settle the misunderstanding" taking into account their mutual interests in the spirit of traditional friendship.⁸⁵

Khrushchev was to arrive in the United States on September 16, 1959, with hopes of reaching some understanding with Eisenhower. The shooting occurred at a most inopportune time from his point of view. So, he

⁸³Pravda, September 10, 1959. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XI, No. 36, p.14.

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵Ibid.

exhibited his displeasure with China by this statement. Unlike the Soviet press comments on the Tibetan revolt, there was not a word of support for China in this statement, nor reproachful words for India, as there were, by implication, in the comments on Tibet.⁸⁶ The Soviet Union, thus, altered its policy within six months and served notice to China that Moscow's support would not be automatic. This was a very unusual statement for a socialist country to make on a dispute between a socialist and a non-socialist state. As China was to say, this statement advertised the schism in the camp.⁸⁷

On the Kongka Pass firing incident,⁸⁸ the Soviet press carried both the Indian as well as the Chinese versions.⁸⁹

In his foreign policy report to the Supreme Soviet on October 31, 1959, Khrushchev declared that peaceful co-existence of states with differing social systems assumed elements of mutual concessions and mutual consideration of interests, since otherwise normal relations could not be built among states.⁹⁰ He continued, "we greatly regret the incidents that have recently occurred on the borders of two states friendly to us ... we are especially aggrieved that these incidents

⁸⁶See p. 217

⁸⁷See Summary, p. i.

⁸⁸See p.206

⁸⁹See the Tass dispatches from Peking and New Delhi, dated October 27, 1959, in Pravda, October 29, 1959. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XI, No. 43, pp.31-32

⁹⁰Izvestia, November 1, 1962. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XI, No. 44, p.4.

have resulted in losses of life on both sides... It would gladden us if there were no repetition of the incidents on the Sino-Indian border and if the frontier disputes were settled through friendly negotiations to the mutual satisfaction of both sides".⁹¹

China revealed in 1963 that in a verbal notification to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, on February 9, 1960, the Central Committee of the CPSU had stated that "one cannot possibly seriously think that a state such as India, which is militarily and economically immeasurably weaker than China, would really launch a military attack on China and commit aggression against it"; that China's handling of the issue was "an expression of a narrow nationalist attitude"; and that "when shooting was heard on the Sino-Indian border on the eve of N.S. Khrushchev's trip to the United States, the whole world considered this to be an event that could hamper the peace-loving activity of the Soviet Union".⁹²

On June 22, 1960, Khrushchev told the head of the Chinese delegation to the Rumanian Party Congress: "I know what war is. Since Indians were killed, this meant that China attacked India". He also added, "We are Communists, for us it is not important where the frontier line runs".⁹³

When the Sino-Indian war broke out in 1962, the Soviet Union was locked in a potentially dangerous conflict

⁹¹Ibid., p.8.

⁹²Peking Review, No. 45 (November 8, 1963), p.19.

⁹³Ibid., p.20.

with the United States in the Caribbean. In an editorial on October 24, 1962, on the developments in the Caribbean, the Chinese paper Jen-min Jih-pao denounced Kennedy and the United States, and assured Cuba of the firm support of the entire socialist camp and of all peace-loving countries and peoples of the world".⁹⁴ A Chinese government statement on October 25, 1962, referred to the Soviet government statement of October 23, 1962, which threatened "to smash the aggressive schemes of the U.S. imperialist bloc ...", and said that China "fully supports this just stand of the Soviet Government".⁹⁵

Until Moscow agreed to Kennedy's terms for the settlement of the missile crisis, on October 28, 1962,⁹⁶ it was hard to predict what would happen. Therefore, Khrushchev had to make concessions to China to secure her support. Hence, forgetting all past humiliations on the insignificance of borders,⁹⁷ the Soviet press came out in support of the Chinese proposals of October 24, 1962, for ending the hostilities and composing the differences on the Sino-Indian border.

An editorial in Pravda on October 25, 1962, repeated cliches like communist peace policy and the West's war-mongering and declared that the Sino-Indian border problem was a "legacy" from the "British colonialists, who carved and recarved the map of Asia at their pleasure. The notorious 'McMahon Line' was imposed on the Chinese and

⁹⁴Peking Review, No. 43 (October 26, 1962), p.16.

⁹⁵Peking Review, No. 44 (November 2, 1962), p.5.

⁹⁶Elie Abel, op.cit., p.186.

⁹⁷See p. 221

the Indian people; it was never recognised by China".
 The editorial emphasised the bonds of common ideology between China and the Soviet Union and said that the "combined forces of the socialist camp securely guarantee every socialist country against the encroachment of imperialist reaction".⁹⁸

In an apparent warning to the CPI, the editorial said that the "fact must be faced that, with the exacerbation of relations of the kind now occurring, even some progressive-minded people may succumb to nationalistic influences and take a chauvinistic stand. But in questions of the fight for peace, the settlement of international disputes, this sort of attitude does no good. These matters call for an internationalist approach, for actions aimed not at fanning animosity and exacerbate the conflict but at settling it by peaceful means, through negotiations".⁹⁹

The editorial continued that the Soviet people "see the statement of the Chinese government as evidence of sincere concern over relations with India and eagerness to bring the conflict to a halt. The proposals made by the Chinese government are in our opinion constructive. Without impairing the prestige of the parties, they represent an acceptable basis for opening negotiations and peacefully settling the disputed issues with regard for the interests of both the Chinese People's Republic and India".¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XIV, No. 43, pp.17-18.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

Izvestia also wrote an editorial on October 26, 1962, in the same tenor.¹⁰¹

In so writing, the Soviet press completely ignored the repeatedly declared Chinese readiness to recognise McMahon Line in return for the Indian recognition of their claim to Aksai Chin in the West. Both Pravda as well as Izvestia were vehement in their denunciation of the McMahon Line.

In thus ignoring the Indian sentiments, Moscow must have been emboldened by, what Werner Levi called, the non-alignment of the non-aligned in the Sino-Indian conflict.¹⁰² Only Malaya and Cyprus clearly supported India;¹⁰³ Yugoslavia did as much by her pro-Indian press comments.¹⁰⁴ Therefore, there was no fear of Moscow losing face with the non-aligned.

But during the Sino-Indian war, the Soviet Union made a friendly gesture to India by agreeing to her setting up a consulate at the Black Sea port of Odessa. Then, only Poland and Czechoslovakia had consulates in Kiev; the only non-Communist country to have a consulate

¹⁰¹See the complete text, ibid., pp.17-18.

¹⁰²Werner Levi, "Indian Neutralism Reconsidered", Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXVII, No. 2, (Summer 1964), p.147.

¹⁰³The Hindu, October 29, 1962.

¹⁰⁴An editorial in Jen-min Jih-pao, on December 3, 1962, referred to various Yugoslav journals' support to India and declared that the Chinese people "are firmly opposed to any "mediation" in which that group takes part". Peking Review, No. 49 (December 7, 1962), p.8. This was a warning against Yugoslav participation in the Colombo Conference of non-aligned states which was convened to mediate in the Sino-Indian dispute. Yugoslavia did not participate.

was Turkey, at Batum on the Black Sea; China had none in the Soviet Union; and the three Soviet consulates in China were closed not long before the Sino-Indian war. The news from London, dated November 15, 1962, said that special significance was being attached to the opening of the Indian Consulate and the publicity being given to it in the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁵

On the arrest of Communists in India during the Sino-Indian war, Pravda quoted the Hungarian, Italian and British Communist Parties' criticism of the act and declared that the Soviet Communists were solidly behind these utterances. It spoke of the letters from the members of the CPSU "condemning the mass repressions against the fraternal Indian Communist Party".¹⁰⁶ The CPSU could not have allowed the Chinese party to don the robes of the guardian of the persecuted Communist parties all over the world, and sit idly by.

However, the moment the Cuban missile crisis was resolved, Sino-Soviet polemics reappeared;¹⁰⁷ and the Soviet Union ceased to mention the Chinese proposals of October 24, 1962, for the settlement of the Sino-Indian dispute. An editorial in Pravda in the first week of November 1962, accused the West of "pouring oil on the flames" by offering weapons to India, and pleaded for a

¹⁰⁵The Hindu, November 17, 1962.

¹⁰⁶Pravda, November 30, 1962. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XIV, No. 48, p.24.

¹⁰⁷An editorial in Jen-min Jih-pao was to say that during "the Caribbean crisis, they (Soviet leaders) spoke a few seemingly fair words out of considerations of expediency"; that when the crisis was over, "they went back on their words". See Peking Review, No. 45 (November 8, 1963), pp.18-27.

cease-fire and unconditional negotiations between India and China to settle the Sino-Indian border dispute.¹⁰⁸

In this editorial, the Chinese proposals of October 24, 1962, were neither mentioned nor extolled, as had been done in the Pravda and Izvestia editorials of October 25, and October 26, 1962, respectively.¹⁰⁹

Then, the Chinese government issued a statement on November 30, 1962, on Cuba. It praised Castro for "upholding the revolutionary principle of not begging the imperialists for peace".¹¹⁰ In other words, the statement taunted Moscow for "begging the imperialists for peace".

Khrushchev replied in kind. In his report on the international situation, made to the Supreme Soviet, on December 12, 1962, he said that the peaceful settlement of the Caribbean crisis met with "loud cries of dissatisfaction" from people who call themselves Marxists-Leninists "although their actions have nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism". He said that "... some go so far as to allege that the Soviet Union surrendered to imperialism".¹¹¹

Pointing to Hong Kong and Macao, Khrushchev taunted: "The aroma coming from these places is not a bit better than the smell from colonialism in Goa". But it would be wrong to prod China for untimely action. "If the government of the Chinese People's Republic tolerates Macao and Hong Kong, evidently there are weighty reasons for

¹⁰⁸ Pravda, November 5, 1962. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XIV, No. 43, p.18.

¹⁰⁹ See pp. 221 - 23.

¹¹⁰ Peking Review, No. 49 (December 7, 1962), p.9.

¹¹¹ Pravda, December 13, 1962. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XIV, No. 52, pp.3-8.

doing so".¹¹²

Referring to the "deplorable events" along the Sino-Indian border, Khrushchev reaffirmed the Soviet stand on the issue as contained in the Tass statement of September 9, 1959.¹¹³

While he was glad about the unilateral Chinese cease-fire, it "may be asked: How can you claim that this was a reasonable step, when it was taken after so many lives had been laid down and so much blood shed? Would it not have been better if the sides had not resorted to hostilities at all?

"Some are already saying that China, if you please, ceased hostilities apparently because India began to receive support from the American and British imperialists. Consequently, say such people, the Chinese People's Republic felt that if the conflict were to develop into a major war that would require even greater sacrifices.

"Yes, evidently the Chinese friends took account of the situation, and this again speaks for their wisdom and awareness that when war breaks out between friendly neighbouring states the imperialists always try to benefit by it".¹¹⁴

About the arrest of Communists in India, he said that if the war continued, even the pacifists would be placed in this category. "Here you have a debauch by reactionary forces, by the most brazen militarists and reactionaries".¹¹⁵

¹¹²Ibid.

¹¹³Ibid.

¹¹⁴Ibid.

¹¹⁵Ibid.

He continued, "Did China ever set herself the aim of invading India? No, we reject such assertions as slander. And, of course, we likewise absolutely do not accept the idea that India wanted to start a war with China".¹¹⁶

During the war, the Soviet Union exhibited vacillation on the MiG deal under which Soviet technical and economic aid was to be given to set up a factory for making MiG21 planes in India.¹¹⁷ Even the delivery of 12 MiG21 planes under an agreement made in July 1962 was delayed.¹¹⁸ Obviously, the Soviet leaders did not like to burn their bridges with China prematurely on account of India. However, they tried to retain goodwill for their country in India. For instance, the then President of India, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, told Professor Gordon that Russia threatened to stop oil supplies to China to force her to end the war.¹¹⁹ It is probable that the Soviet leaders either leaked this news out or told the Indian leadership to convince them of the constructive role they played behind the scene.

With the Caribbean crisis out of the way, more events occurred in the Soviet Union which could be interpreted as friendly gestures to India. On June 27, 1963, four

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Lorne J. Kavic, op.cit., p.200.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p.108.

¹¹⁹ Quoted in J.A. Naik, op.cit., p.157. V.K.K. Menon said: "... I have no doubt in my mind that one of the conducive factors behind the Chinese withdrawal was the Soviet unwillingness to give them support, not only military but in fuel and other things". Quoted in Michael Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World, p.169.

Soviet citizens smashed the photo-display windows at the Chinese Embassy in Moscow. Among the photographs on display were those of release of Indian prisoners of war by China and of the "persecution of Chinese nationals in India by the Indian Government", to use Hsinhua News Agency's words.¹²⁰

On July 25, 1963, Khrushchev, along with his wife and daughter, attended a luncheon in honour of Mrs. Gandhi at the Indian Embassy in Moscow. This was an extraordinary act of courtesy on the part of the Soviet head of government and party, for in those days she had no official position.

However, Moscow also made friendly gestures to Peking. On December 17, 1963, the Soviet Union voted against an Afro-Asian resolution to amend the United Nations Charter to enlarge the Security Council membership from 11 to 15 and that of the Economic and Social Council from 18 to 27, to give greater representation to the Third World in the United Nations bodies. The resolution was, however, passed in the General Assembly. On December 22, 1963, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement explaining why it had voted against. It said that any amendment to the Charter needed the support of two-thirds members of the United Nations, including that of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The United States was to be blamed for the abnormal situation of the Chiang "clique" representing

¹²⁰Quoted in The Hindu, July 2, 1963. The Chinese news agency called it "a planned act of sabotage", and a "flagrant provocative incident disrupting Sino-Soviet friendship". Ibid.

China on the Security Council. The Soviet Union would support the enlargement if the People's Republic of China consented to it. The statement continued that in reply to a Soviet query, China said that, under the then existing conditions, she could not assume obligations; that she did not approve of enlargement, but, preferred, instead, just distribution of the available seats in the United Nations bodies. Therefore, the Soviet Union wanted postponement of the vote; the Afro-Asian bloc insisted on it; so, the Soviet Union voted against the resolution.¹²¹

This apparently sweet and reasonable Soviet gesture towards China could be put to good diplomatic use by Khrushchev. The burden of rejection would be borne by China, if she rejected the proposal outright, and the Third World would take note of that. Khrushchev could also tell the leaders of the international movement that he was even prepared to court unpopularity among Afro-Asian countries for the sake of China, and yet China remained unappeased.

But in February 1964, Suslov spoke some tough words. In his report to the Central Committee on the 14th of that month, he said: "It is a fact that precisely at the height of the Caribbean crisis, the CPR government extended the

¹²¹Pravda, December 22, 1963. The Soviet statement also referred to an editorial in Jen-min Jih-pao on December 18, 1963, which said that if redistribution failed to satisfy the Afro-Asian group, then China would support the amendment to enlarge the United Nations bodies, and said that if this corresponded to the Chinese government's view, and if it would confirm this, then the whole situation would change. Ibid.

armed conflict on the Chinese-Indian border. No matter how the Chinese leaders have tried since then to justify their conduct at that time, they cannot escape responsibility for the fact that through their actions they in effect aided the extreme reactionary circles of imperialism, aggravating an already complex and difficult situation in the world".¹²²

However, the Soviet Union continued to waver in fulfilling her commitment to India on the delivery of MiG planes under the July 1962 agreement. In the spring of 1964, 6 MiG planes arrived "devoid of such essential equipment as fire-control radar" and with "meagre armament and a severely limited combat radius".¹²³ It is hard to establish if there were internal pressures on Khrushchev not to exacerbate Soviet relations with China on account of India. But this caution could always be cited by him in the deliberations of the leaders of international movement as a proof of his consideration for Chinese sensitivities.

The interviews granted by Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung to Japanese parliamentarians in July 1964 must have decided the issue.¹²⁴ Sometime that summer, due probably "to virtually irrevocable split with Peking", the Soviet Union agreed to build the MiG factory by the end of 1965. She also promised to keep India informed about subsequent improvements in the designs and equipment of

¹²²Pravda, April 3, 1964. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XVI, No. 13, p.11.

¹²³Lorne J. Kavic, op.cit., p.200.

¹²⁴See pp. 214 - 15

After Khrushchev's ouster, there were rumours to the effect that he was criticised for economic and military aid to India. Kosygin told Mrs. Gandhi, when she visited Moscow as Minister for Information and Broadcasting, that there was no truth in the reports.¹²⁶

EVALUATION

Soviet policy on the Sino-Indian border conflict changed according to Soviet diplomatic needs. Moscow adopted a neutral stand on the issue on the eve of Khrushchev's visit to the United States, where he hoped to come to an understanding with Washington on ending the East-West confrontation;¹²⁷ it took a pro-Chinese stand for the duration of the Caribbean crisis; and once the crisis had passed, Soviet comments on the border conflict were unfriendly to China.¹²⁸ By these turns and twists in her policy, the USSR probably expected China to cease her attacks on Moscow, at least to get its support on the border issue. But China remained implacable. On the contrary, Nehru was ready to give credit to the Soviet Union for every small concession that she made on the issue; he was even ready sympathetically to understand Soviet inability to remain neutral on the issue during the

¹²⁵Lorne J. Kavie, op.cit., p.200.

¹²⁶The Hindu, November 1, 1964. At this meeting he was also reported to have reiterated Soviet support to India on Kashmir. Ibid. But Soviet Kashmir policy did undergo a change. See Chapter IV, PP. 153-159

¹²⁷See p. 218

¹²⁸See pp. 221 - 223

Caribbean crisis in view of her treaty obligations and interests,¹²⁹ a concession he never made to the West.

He made every effort to keep the Soviet Union in good humour. Commenting on the Tass statement of September 9, 1959, Nehru said at a press conference in New Delhi on September 11, 1959: "Considering everything the statement was a fair one and an unusual one for the Soviet Government to sponsor". He added, "I appreciate it very much".¹³⁰ Such appreciation was not forthcoming from China even when the Soviet press openly supported the Chinese claims at the height of the missile crisis.

On the next day, September 12, 1959, in his reply to the debate in the Lok Sabha, Nehru said:

I would beg of you not to think of this matter in terms of Communism or anti-Communism. The House must have seen the statement issued more or less on behalf of the Soviet government. The House knows the very close relations that the Soviet government has with the Chinese government. The issue of that statement itself shows that the Soviet government is taking a calm and more or less objective, dispassionate view of the situation, considering everything.¹³¹

While China taunted Khrushchev for "capitulationism"

¹²⁹See pp.233

¹³⁰The Hindu, September 12, 1959.

¹³¹India's Foreign Policy, p.356. In his speech at the Rumanian Party Congress, on June 26, 1960, Khrushchev was reported to have said that the Chinese dispute with India had nothing to do with capitalism or socialism; it was purely a nationalist dispute and had done the cause of socialism untold harm, quite apart from such details as losing Kerala to Communism. Edward Crankshaw, op. cit., p.108.

in the Caribbean crisis, Nehru conveyed to him "our warm approval of the wisdom and courage you have shown in connection with the Cuban situation". He also spoke of Khrushchev's devotion to peace and the catastrophe for the world in the event of a super-power clash.¹³²

After the Soviet press had endorsed the Chinese proposal for the settlement of the dispute, Nehru even viewed the problem from the Russian angle. In an interview, recorded for the United States television network, CBS, Nehru said on October 30, 1962: "I should imagine that developments of the world situation in regard to Cuba etc., probably made it necessary for them (Russians) not to fall out with China". He expressed the hope that with Cuba out of the way it would be easier for them to "revert to their neutral attitude".¹³³ In another television interview, he reiterated that he would continue the policy of non-alignment and, "all that we expect from them (Russians) is to continue to be friendly with us and not to do anything injurious to us. I do think that they do have friendly feelings for us".¹³⁴ The Soviet Union did not find such understanding in Chinese pronouncements.

Nehru was determined to be non-aligned. He was aware of the disadvantages of complete dependence on the West. While readily responding to India's call for military aid during the Sino-Indian war, the United States and the United Kingdom asked Nehru to come to an understanding with Pakistan on Kashmir. Nehru was, therefore,

¹³²Pravda, October 31, 1962. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XIV, No. 43, p.13.

¹³³The Hindu, November 1, 1962.

¹³⁴The Hindu, November 10, 1962.

beckoning to the Soviet Union to take note of his desire to be non-aligned. This did not go unnoticed; Pravda published his BBC interview in which he reaffirmed that non-alignment would continue despite Western military aid.¹³⁵

On her part, the Soviet Union did not overlook the traumatic effects on India of the defeat suffered at the Chinese hands. Moscow tried to understand India's problems too. According to Galbraith, Nehru told him on October 29, 1962, that the Soviets "had indicated that they realised that assistance from us (United States) was inevitable, but hoped that this would not mean a military alliance between the United States and India".¹³⁶ This understanding on the part of the Soviet Union had a response from Nehru. He told the United States ambassador that he "wanted to avoid irritating the Soviets as much as possible".¹³⁷

The Soviet Union could not have ignored some of the domestic developments in India. There was a lively

¹³⁵Pravda, November 28, 1962. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XIV, No. 48, p.24.

¹³⁶John K. Galbraith, op.cit., p.445.

¹³⁷Ibid. Under instructions from the Ministry of Defence, the Indian press began to play down the United States arms lift. Galbraith thought that was in response to Soviet request. Therefore, he raised the issue with the Ministry of External Affairs and was told that publicity was not being given to prevent saboteurs from having knowledge of where the arms were being unloaded. He was unconvinced and addressed a letter to Nehru urging him to be forthcoming. He told him that "it was better to lose a truckload of ammunition to the saboteurs than to have a shipload not arrive for political reasons". Ibid. See pp.458, 461 and 464.

debate in India on non-alignment policy in the wake of the war with China. C. Rajagopala Chari,¹³⁸ called for "firm alliance with the United States and other Western powers".¹³⁹ The Indian press was critical of non-alignment too. The Indian Express wrote that if alignment was a bit of sovereignty lost, non-alignment meant a good bit of territory lost.¹⁴⁰ The Thought wrote, commenting on Nehru's defence of non-alignment, that he had said "things which all but obliterated the difference between friends in need and friends in words. If the West supplied us arms in the hour of our sorest trial, the Soviet Union promised us half-a-dozen MiG planes".¹⁴¹ The Citizen (Kanpur) wrote that "the tragedy is, nobody dares to say we are worshipping at the shrine and burning incense at the alter of the God that failed (non-alignment)".¹⁴²

The Soviet leaders also had a God that failed them, i.e. proletarian internationalism; this concept did not unite Russia and China. While the non-aligned world was beneficial to Russian diplomatic interests, China was becoming more and more a threat to her interests. Naturally, the Soviet Union would prefer a friendly non-aligned group to a hostile China, which did not respond, to what Moscow considered, friendly gestures from it.

Internal attacks on non-alignment in India seemed to have caused concern to the Soviet Union. The desertion

¹³⁸ See Chapter VIII, footnote 59.

¹³⁹ Quoted in Pravda, April 24, 1963. Complete text in CDSF, Vol. XV, No. 17, p.23.

¹⁴⁰ Quoted in Werner Levi, op.cit., pp.140-142.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid.

of the biggest non-aligned State, India, from the non-aligned group, for reasons of national security, would have caused second thoughts in many small non-aligned states on the continuance of non-alignment policy; this was an unpleasant prospect for the Soviet Union. This was reflected in an article published in Pravda by a "commentator". He thought that "world reaction" had exploited the India-China war to start an offensive against the young nationalist states. In the chorus of enemies of non-alignment policy, the voices of "reactionary circles" of several Asian countries, in the first place ⁱⁿ India itself, could be heard. The commentator referred to calls for radical revision of India's foreign policy by rightist parties in India to substantiate his argument.¹⁴³

The article then recounted how non-alignment helped young states: it enabled Egypt defend herself against the Anglo-French invasion; it enabled India to wrest Goa from Portugal; it facilitated the return of West Irian to Indonesia. Non-alignment helped in economic development too: Egypt got the Aswan dam, and India, 3 steel mills.¹⁴⁴

The article referred to the "clearly prompted articles" in the American press to the effect that if India did not join SEATO, it could lose out in the conflict over Kashmir and asserted that it was precisely because India did not follow the lead of the "imperialists" and maintained her neutrality that it was able to defend her rights to

¹⁴³Pravda, December 25, 1962.

¹⁴⁴Ibid.

the Indian lands claimed by Pakistan.¹⁴⁵

The commentator cautioned that joining the "imperialist bloc" would not strengthen the defence capability of young states. On the contrary, non-alignment created broad international support which ensured the security of young states.¹⁴⁶

The commentator declared that the Soviet Union supported non-alignment believing that in the present historical conditions it was in the best interests of the newly-liberated countries.¹⁴⁷

There were many other developments in India which could have caused concern to the Soviet Union. Ignoring Pravda's advice to shun chauvinism,¹⁴⁸ the CPI passed a resolution in November 1962, by a two-thirds majority, unequivocally condemning China.¹⁴⁹ It called on the Indians to unite behind Nehru "in defence of the motherland against Chinese aggression", and also made it clear that the party was not opposed to "buying arms from any country on a commercial basis".¹⁵⁰ With the hopes of exercising influence over the Chinese Communist Party, in any case fast receding, the Soviet Union would at least like to have an effective influence on the CPI. The CPI would lose face with the people unless it fell in line with the national mood; the party already carried the

¹⁴⁵Ibid.

¹⁴⁶Ibid.

¹⁴⁷Ibid.

¹⁴⁸See p. 222

¹⁴⁹Robert W. Stern, "The Sino-Indian Border Controversy and the Communist Party of India", Journal of Politics, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, (February 1965), p.85.

¹⁵⁰Quoted in Marcus F. Franda, Radical Politics in West Bengal (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1971), p.97.

stigma of having joined hands with the British and worked against the nationalist movement during the Second World War, in line with the then Soviet policy.¹⁵¹

Public opinion polls in India conducted in the wake of the Sino-Indian war showed a dramatic jump in United States popularity. In the USIS public opinion poll in October 1957, only 2.5 per cent held a "very good" opinion of the United States; it was 7 per cent only in mid-October 1962; in the last week of November 1962, however, it had jumped to 62 per cent. 85 per cent of those interviewed reported an improved view of the United States.¹⁵²

There was a natural nationalist backlash at the Soviet endorsement of the Chinese proposals made during the war. The Hindu editorially commented: "We can only conclude from this farrago of insinuations that the Russian papers and the Soviet Communist Party have not taken the trouble to examine the evidence or even to use their common sense in deciding what a country's natural boundaries are likely to be. The fact that a British official, named McMahon, drew a red line ... does not make it a creation of British imperialism".¹⁵³

Reminding Russia of her own border trouble with China, the paper said that the fact that "she would now choose to swallow Chinese claims to India's territory shows that she is afraid of further alienating a 'brother'".

¹⁵¹See Chapter III, p. 512

¹⁵²John K. Galbraith, op.cit., p.512.

¹⁵³The Hindu, October 28, 1962.

Communist country with whom relations have deteriorated in recent years. When India has taken great pains to keep out of military alliances or commitments, it is quite absurd to talk of 'imperialist' countries manipulating her border disputes for their own ends".¹⁵⁴

There were other unwelcome developments from the Soviet point of view: Moscow's favourites like V.K.K. Menon and K.D. Malaviya lost their cabinet posts; veteran liberal-nationalist leader, Acharya J.B. Kripalani, who lost to V.K.K. Menon in the 1962 general election, and M.R. Masani, one of the leaders of the rightist Swatantra Party, were elected to Indian Parliament, defeating the Congress candidates, in 1963;¹⁵⁵ in July 1963, the Indian government agreed to joint air exercises with the United States' and the United Kingdom's air forces;¹⁵⁶ and it also made a deal with the Voice of America under which the latter was to set up a 1,000,000-watt transmitter in Calcutta for the All-India Radio, subject to the condition that the station would broadcast Voice of America's programmes 3 hours a day for 3 years.¹⁵⁷

Such developments could not be totally ignored by the Soviet Union. In 1963 and 1964, China also deepened

¹⁵⁴Ibid.

¹⁵⁵Pravda, August 10, 1963.

¹⁵⁶The Hindu, July 23, 1963. Krasnaya zvezda (Red Star) the Soviet Defence Ministry organ, wrote on July 27, 1963, that the subordination of the Indian armed forces to the United States and British military leaders "might lead to serious consequences with regard to the maintaining of peace in South East Asia and security of India itself". Quoted in The Hindu, July 29, 1963.

¹⁵⁷Izvestia, July 20, 1963. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XV, No. 29, p.25. The deal fell through because of criticism in India.

the crisis in the Communist camp by making public the many points of difference between herself and the Soviet Union.¹⁵⁸ This made it easy for Khrushchev to make more friendly gestures to India.

China regarded India as one of the points of difference between herself and the USSR. In an article written by the editorial department of Jen-min Jih-pao entitled "The Truth about How the Leaders of the CPSU have Allied Themselves with India Against China", it was stated: "One of the important differences of principle between the Soviet leaders and ourselves turns on the Sino-Indian boundary question".¹⁵⁹ From India's point of view, to be one of the points of difference between China and the USSR was advantageous. Therefore, Nehru was anxious not to irritate Russia by becoming over-dependent on the United States. The People's Daily wrote on July 16, 1963, that one of the "cardinal tenets" of Nehru's foreign policy was to widen differences between China and Russia.¹⁶⁰ Nehru could not have either created or widened the gulf between them; conflicts were inherent in Sino-Soviet relations.

Moscow knew the Chinese irritation with its cordial relations with India. However, it would not embitter its relations with India just to satisfy China, the more so when New Delhi was trying to be considerate to Moscow

¹⁵⁸ See Peking Review, No. 35, (August 30, 1963) and No. 45 (November 8, 1963). See above pp. 209 - 216 and below p. 241 footnote 162.

¹⁵⁹ Peking Review, No. 45, (November 8, 1963), pp. 18-27.

¹⁶⁰ Quoted in The Hindu, July 17, 1963.

even when it would not uphold India's case on the border issue. Without alienating India, Russia did tacitly uphold the Chinese border claims through Soviet atlases;¹⁶¹ for a short while during the Caribbean crisis, Moscow even openly supported Chinese arguments. The Chinese attitude amounted to demanding Soviet support on their own terms; they would not appreciate any Soviet concern for India's feelings. Soviet diplomatic interests in India were inadvertently promoted by China; her publication of private correspondence and verbal exchanges between herself and the USSR, in which the latter was seen as defending India's position,¹⁶² neutralised the effects of the absence of open support to India. This, and Nehru's desire to be non-aligned, safeguarded the Soviet position, as a friendly power, in India.

Russia discreetly held and still holds an olive branch to China as far as the Sino-Indian border issue is concerned. This is borne out by the maps she put out and still does. During the Sino-Indian war, the government of India forfeited the Soviet atlas showing large areas of the

¹⁶¹See p.217

¹⁶²A Jen-min Jih-pao editorial in November 1963 revealed that when the Soviet Government informed the Chinese Government that the Soviet news agency, Tass, was going to issue a statement on the Sino-Indian border shooting on September 10, 1959, Peking had requested Moscow to refrain from doing so; but, instead, Tass had released the statement ahead of time, in the night of September, 9, 1959; that when Khrushchev was in Peking in October 1959, the Chinese leaders had personally explained to him about the border incidents; that he was not interested in listening to the Chinese version, and, instead, had said that anyway it was wrong to shoot people dead. See Peking Review, No. 45 (November 8, 1963), pp.18-27. See also Peking Review, No. 35 (August 30, 1963).

State of Jammu and Kashmir and entire NEFA as parts of China.¹⁶³ The Indian government protested to the Soviet government many times. Like the Chinese, the Russians always gave evasive replies and promised to look into the affair, but never did. Even after the Indo-Soviet treaty, the Soviets continued to publish maps showing the areas claimed by China as part of her territory. There was a heated debate in the Lok Sabha on May 25, 1972, on the latest Soviet maps continuing to show the Chinese version of the Sino-Indian border alignments. The members of the House reminded the Government of India that protests have been lodged with the Soviet government over the years and said that the oral assurances given by Moscow had no political significance. The harassed Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh, side-stepped the issue by attributing the opposition's criticism to the right wing's "stubborn hostility" to Russia.¹⁶⁴ That evasive reply is an apology for the Indian government's need for Soviet support, diplomatic, and, to an extent, economic.

The Soviet maps of the Sino-Indian border are not even neutral; they are 100 per cent pro-Chinese. To be neutral, they should have shown NEFA as Indian and Aksai Chin as Chinese, for that is the exact position on the border to-day; and even China said before the 1962 war that she was prepared to accept such a settlement.¹⁶⁵ But since their maps were biased in favour of China from

¹⁶³The Hindu, November, 16, 1962.

¹⁶⁴The Times, May 26, 1972. India reacts angrily when the West does any such thing on Kashmir.

¹⁶⁵See p.205.

the beginning, the Soviet leaders seem to be hesitant to revise their maps to make them conform to reality on the borders. Thus, on this issue, the Soviet Union seems to respect the Chinese feelings more than the Indian. This interpretation has to be read in the context of our knowledge of the alacrity with which histories are revised, and old works are taken out of circulation when a change of policy or leadership occurs in the USSR. Nothing would have prevented the Soviet leadership from bringing their maps up to date except their unwillingness to do so.

The Soviet policy on the Sino-Indian border issue seems to be not to commit herself to the Indian line even while cultivating as close a relationship with her as possible. It is always good to keep policy options open as long as it can be done. India's desire not to be completely dependent upon the West, her need for Soviet support, and the ossified state of Sino-Indian relations do not leave her much manoeuvrability. Here lies Soviet freedom. She can refuse to commit herself to India's stand on the border, which China would take note of whenever the time for composing the differences with Moscow is ripe, and yet maintain close relations with India, which New Delhi, at least for the present, wants.

THE INDO-SOVIET TREATY OF PEACE, FRIENDSHIP
AND CO-OPERATION

BACKGROUND

It has already been pointed out that there was some cooling in Indo-Soviet relations in the wake of the supply of Soviet arms to Pakistan in 1968.¹ India's response to this shift in the Soviet stand was to make attempts to improve relations with China and the United States;² she also exhibited reluctance to say anything in support of the Soviet Union in the Sino-Soviet border flareup in 1969.³ Nixon visited India in August 1969.⁴ However, on return home, he resumed arms supplies to Pakistan.⁵ In an attempt to improve relations with China, Mrs. Gandhi hinted at normalisation of relations with Peking in 1968 and again in 1969; there was, however, no response from it.⁶

While India's relations with Pakistan and China remained hostile, and Nixon reintroduced tensions into

¹See Chapter V, pp. 161 - 166

²Pran Chopra, op.cit., pp. 8-9.

³Ibid. For an instance of Soviet sensitivity to third countries' neutrality on the Ussuri incidents see M. Volgin's criticism of the Yugoslav press for having "borrowed without any commentary whatsoever the terminology of Peking's confederates in Tirana..." Izvestia, March 30, 1969. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XXI, No. 13, p. 22.

⁴Pran Chopra, op.cit., p. 53.

⁵Ibid., pp. 8-9. The United States suspended arms supplies to India and Pakistan in 1965, when war broke out between them. See Chapter IV, p. 88.

⁶William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers (London: Pall Mall Press, 1972), p. 322.

Indo-American relations by the resumption of arms supplies to Pakistan, the Soviet Union began to grow warm towards India in response to Mrs. Gandhi's resort to radicalism to defeat and disgrace her rightist political rivals in the ruling Congress Party.⁷

Irreconcilability of views and interests between its right and left wings led to a split in the Congress party in 1969. Mrs. Gandhi got the Parliament dissolved in 1970 and went to the polls in March 1971, with a radical manifesto. She secured a two-thirds majority in the lower house of Parliament.⁸

The Soviet leadership's satisfaction with the developments in India was evident from Brezhnev's Report to the XXIV Congress of the CPSU in March 1971. He said in it "... the struggle against the forces of reaction and against the henchmen of imperialism is under way everywhere, and in some countries the progressive forces have already achieved important gains. Suffice it to recall, for instance, such events as the recent nationalisation of large banks in India and the inspiring victory over right-wing forces in the recent elections to the House of the People of the Indian Parliament. This is evidence that the masses of people in this country resolutely oppose the reactionary, pro-imperialist forces and stand for the implementation of land reform and other social and economic transformations..."⁹

⁷For Soviet comments sympathetic to Mrs. Gandhi in the tussle for power in the Congress Party, see Pravda, August 24, 1969, Izvestia, September 14, 1969 and November 15, 1969.

⁸B.L. Sukhwai, op. cit., Appendix 1.

⁹Pravda, March 31, 1971. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XXIII, No. 12, p.9.

However, it is not India's internal developments between 1969-1971 that shaped the Indo-Soviet treaty; evidence suggests that international developments in the second part of 1971 were instrumental in its making. The fact that the treaty followed on the heels of Nixon's announcement of his plan to visit Peking suggests that the prospect of Sino-American detente caused concern in India and the Soviet Union. It is, therefore, proper to refer to evidence which testifies to the fear of China, common to both the USSR as well as India,¹⁰ which was heightened by the prospect of Sino-American detente and led to the treaty.

SOVIET APPREHENSIONS OF CHINA

Soviet apprehensions of China seemed to have begun long before public polemics between them broke out. This comes out clearly in Khrushchev's memoirs. According to Khrushchev, Mao Tse-tung's initial hesitancy to his suggestion, made during his visit to Peking in October 1954, for bringing in one million Chinese workers to work in Siberia was followed by generous Chinese offers to send more and more workers. Khrushchev reasoned: "What had the Chinese been up to? I will tell you. They wanted to occupy Siberia without a war".¹¹ When public polemics began much more was known about their fears and suspicions.

¹⁰See Chapter V, p. 158, Chapter VII and above, p. 244 for factors contributing to India's fear of China.

¹¹Strobe Talbott, transl. and ed., op.cit., p. 250.

Considerations of power politics call for wooing of as many enemies of one's enemy as possible; the Soviet Union does just that in India. When he was on a visit to India, Marshal Grechko was reported to have given an assessment of the clashes between Soviet and Chinese forces, on the Ussuri river in March 1969, to the Indian Government.¹² He was also reported to have assured India of Soviet aid in the event of Chinese attack.¹³

Moscow's apprehensions about China seem to have been heightened by the apparent indifference with which China has treated Soviet power.¹⁴ This is reflected in Brezhnev's Report made on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. He said in it that "doing the greatest possible harm to the USSR" is the sole criterion determining the Chinese leaders' approach to any major international problem.¹⁵ Referring to "the Chinese leaders' complaints about a mythical 'Soviet threat'", he asked why Peking did not respond to Moscow's proposals for "a special treaty renouncing the use of force" repeatedly made since 1969.¹⁶ This Chinese silence seems

¹²Kuldip Nayar, op.cit., p.118.

¹³The New York Times, March 10, 1969.

¹⁴"We Chinese are not afraid of atom bombs", said Chou En-lai in his interview with James Reston, "we are prepared against their (Russian) attack on us. That is why we are digging underground tunnels..." The New York Times, August 9, 1971.

¹⁵The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Report by L.I. Brezhnev, General-Secretary of the Central Committee of CPSU, December 12, 1972 (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1972), p.46. (Hereinafter referred to as the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

¹⁶Ibid., pp.46-47. He revealed that a draft treaty was submitted to Peking on January 15, 1971. Ibid.

to heighten Soviet fears of China and her intentions.

This fear does not seem to be confined to official quarters alone. Even as irrepressible a dissenter as Alexander Solzhenitzyn expressed similar fears in his letter to the Central Committee on September 5, 1973. He wrote: "For the next half-century our only genuine military need will be to defend ourselves against China, and it would be better not to go to war with her at all."¹⁷ He cautioned the Soviet leaders: "You have against you a country of almost a THOUSAND MILLION people, the like of which has never yet gone to war in the history of the world".¹⁸ He warned that if the Second World War cost the USSR 20 million lives, a war with China would cost 60 millions. "We shall have no ally in that war, none, at least, the size of, say, India".¹⁹

BREZHNEV'S PROPOSAL FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN ASIA

Such fear probably prompted Brezhnev to propose a scheme for collective security in Asia at the international

¹⁷See the text in The Sunday Times Weekly Review, March 3, 1974.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid. See also Yuri Sterligov, "Why the Maoists Are Digging In?", Soviet Weekly, (London) April 14, 1973.

This fear is, of course, two-sided. China is fearful of Soviet interventions in the affairs of Communist States. Speaking at the Rumanian Embassy in Peking on August 23, 1968, Chou En-lai likened Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 to Hitler's invasion of that country in the past. He warned that Rumania was facing the danger of foreign intervention and aggression and assured her of China's support. Peking Review, No. 34, Supplement, (August 23, 1968), pp.III-IV.

conference of Communist parties on June 7, 1969. "We think", he said at the conference, "that the course of events also places on the agenda the task of creating a system of Collective Security in Asia".²⁰ He did not spell out what exactly it meant. In his report to the Supreme Soviet a month later, Gromyko, however, rejected the "fictions" that it was aimed against any power in Asia. As both a European as well as Asian power, he said, the USSR is interested in all the people of Asia living in peace.²¹

In his speech to the 15th Congress of the Soviet Trade Unions, Brezhnev defined the concept on March 20, 1972, in these words: "Collective Security in Asia must, in our view, be based on such principles as renunciation of the use of force in relations between states, respect for sovereignty and the inviolability of borders, non-interference in internal affairs and the broad development of economic and other co-operation on the basis of full equality and mutual advantage".²² Anyway, the proposal did not meet with positive response from countries of Asia.

Such was the state of relations between India and China and China and the Soviet Union when President Nixon made his surprise announcement.

²⁰Pravda, June 8, 1969. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XXI, No. 23, p.16.

²¹Pravda, July 11, 1969.

²²Pravda, March 21, 1972. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XXIV, No. 12, p.7.

NIXON'S ANNOUNCEMENT TO VISIT PEKING

On July 16, 1971, President Nixon announced his plan to visit China. A statement issued in Peking said that since Nixon had expressed a desire to visit China, Chou En-lai had extended an invitation to him.²³

This about-turn by Nixon caused confusion even among America's close allies; it is not surprising if India and the Soviet Union were suspicious. For Nixon had written, as late as 1967, that Peking was a source of common danger for most Asian states.²⁴ While he wanted American ASia policy to come to "grips with the reality of China", this "does not mean, as many would simplistically have it, rushing to grant recognition to Peking, to admit it to the United Nations and to ply with offers of trade... It does mean recognising the present and potential danger from Communist China".²⁵ He also felt that dealing with "Red China is something like trying to cope with the more explosive ghetto elements in our own country".²⁶ For such a hostile critic of China as Nixon asking for an invitation from her and accepting it was bound to cause misgivings in Moscow and New Delhi.

²³The Times of India, July 17, 1971.

George W. Ball wrote that President Nixon's plan to stay for one week in Peking was "a longer bilateral visit than any American President has made to the government of any foreign nation in our entire national history". See his, "Nixon's Appointment in Peking - Is This Trip Necessary?" The New York Times Magazine, February 13, 1972.

²⁴Richard M. Nixon, "Asia After Vietnam", Foreign Affairs, Vol. XLVI, No. 1. (October, 1967), p.111.

²⁵Ibid., p.121.

²⁶Ibid., p.123.

(i) ITS IMPACT ON INDIA

On the surface, it seemed that India was happy with the development. Sardar Swaran Singh, India's Minister for External Affairs, welcomed it in the lower house of the Indian Parliament.²⁷ This was, however, not the whole truth. How the significance of this development was read in India was hinted at by Mrs. Gandhi in an interview with the correspondent of The New York Times, Sulzberger, on February 12, 1972. Asked as to where had Indo-American relations gone wrong, she replied: "I suppose your attitude toward India changed when your policy toward China changed".²⁸ Such, therefore, was the Indian view of the development.

There was a grave crisis in the subcontinent in the developments in East Pakistan. Nixon maintained silence at the military atrocities in East Pakistan and the problems posed to India by the crisis;²⁹ then he gave the world the startling news of his impending visit to China. This must have convinced India that it was time to take appropriate steps to safeguard her interests.

That the developing crisis in the sub-continent and the growing warmth between Washington and Peking hastened

²⁷The Times of India, July 17, 1971.

²⁸The New York Times, February 17, 1972.

The new respect for China in America drew sarcastic comments from some Indian correspondents. Commenting on Prof. J.K. Galbraith's visit to China, G.K. Reddy of The Hindu described it "as part of the new American craze for making a pilgrimage to the celestial citadel of Maoism". The Hindu, June 23, 1973.

²⁹See Chapter IX, pp.288 - 89.

the Indo-Soviet treaty, becomes clear from Mrs. Gandhi's speech at a rally, during Brezhnev's visit to New Delhi, on November 27, 1973. She said that during the Bangla crisis many people had thought that India was alone and that none supported her; that she had made trips to many countries to explain the true state of affairs; and that Russian support had given India greater confidence and strength. She continued: "Although we had been earlier also thinking along these lines, it was undoubtedly your standing by us during such an hour which gave us new encouragement and we could further cement our long-standing friendship by a formal treaty".³⁰

Sardar Swaran Singh, however, told the Parliament that the treaty had nothing to do with either Nixon's visit to Peking or the developments in East Pakistan; it had been in the making for 2 years.³¹ Singh was probably indulging in a public relations exercise when he denied any connection between the treaty and the significant international developments that took place in 1971; Mrs. Gandhi, on the other hand, agreed, more than two years after the treaty, that there was a connexion between the two.

It is not clear why India thought of a treaty with the Soviet Union before the developments in 1971 made it useful. It is probable that growing opposition in the United States to foreign commitments and hints of change being given by Nixon since 1969 made a fresh assessment

³⁰Mission of Friendship, p.28.

³¹The New York Times, August 11, 1971.

of India's needs and policies necessary.

The Nixon doctrine, enunciated at Guam in 1969, gave a notice even to the United States' allies that "... a direct combat role for United States general purpose forces arises primarily when there is an overt conventional attack. In such cases, we shall weigh our interests and our commitments, and we shall consider the efforts of our allies, in determining our response".³² It would not be wrong to say that at least since the Himalayan debacle of 1962, India enjoyed vicarious benefits from the United States commitments in South East Asia. Indian defence planners could take into consideration Chinese fear of Washington's response should any of Peking's military acts threaten the survival of their country.³³ Under the new doctrine, even the United States' allies were told that there would not be any automatic United States' response; India, therefore, could not expect any indirect benefits from United States' commitments.

Besides that, President Nixon, referring to the subcontinent in his State of the World Message to the Congress on February 25, 1971, said that the United States "will do nothing to harm the legitimate Soviet and Chinese interests in the area".³⁴ Such sweet reasonableness

³²Quoted in Earl C. Ravenal, "The Nixon Doctrine and Our Asian Commitments", Foreign Affairs, Vol. XLIX, No. 2, (January 1971), p.203.

³³For instance, the United States warned Peking not to intervene in the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 at the meeting of the Ambassadors of China and the United States in Warsaw on September 15, 1965. See The Times, September 16, 1965. See also The Times, September 15, 1965, and Chapter V, p.158.

³⁴The New York Times, February 26, 1971.

exhibited by Nixon towards China could not be appealing to India in view of the state of Sino-Indian relations; what China considered legitimate need not necessarily be so from the Indian point of view.

These considerations and the developments in 1971 must have convinced India that a closer relationship with the Soviet Union, whose interests, in respect of China, are identical with her, would be beneficial.

(ii) ITS IMPACT ON THE SOVIET UNION

Pravda reported Nixon's July 16 statement on the trip to Peking on July 18, 1971.³⁵ How deep was the Soviet concern with this development was reflected in Soviet press comments and articles by Soviet experts on the United States.

Commenting on Nixon's assurance that the journey was not directed against any other nation, a correspondent wrote in Pravda that "there is a big difference between the words and deeds of the US ruling circles".³⁶ He continued that "the contacts with Peking are also regarded by many people in the USA as a continuation of this reactionary anti-Communist course".³⁷ In support of this contention he quoted The Daily News (New York) which hoped that the visit was ... "Machiavellian policy with the

³⁵Pravda, July 18, 1971.

³⁶Pravda, July 25, 1971. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XXIII, No. 30, p.1.

³⁷Ibid.

long-range goal of setting Red China and Red Russia against each other".³⁸ The correspondent reminded his readers how Peking used to call for an implacable and uncompromising struggle against imperialism and pointed to continuing anti-imperialist "invocations".³⁹ He then made a survey of East European and other Communist papers all of which saw in this trip an anti-Soviet plot.⁴⁰

The Soviet specialist on the United States of America, G. Arbatov, wrote in Pravda that the United States attitude to China began to change only after the Chinese leaders' hostility towards the Soviet Union and their splitting line in the revolutionary and liberation movement became apparent.⁴¹ He referred to the days when anyone suggesting change in the United States China policy was accused of "treason" and averred that bourgeois and petit-bourgeois America supported the change because of the belief that China ceased to be revolutionary and hope that with its help the United States could "end the war in Vietnam on conditions quite acceptable to the American bourgeoisie".⁴² In support of this argument he quoted The New York Post, which wrote: "Why the Chinese

³⁸Ibid., p.2.

³⁹Ibid., p.1.

⁴⁰For instance, Hungarian paper Nepszabadsag felt that anti-Sovietism was one of the elements of the platform on which the Chinese-American rapprochement was taking place.

The Japanese Communist party paper, Akahata, wrote that the United States policy of rapprochement with China represented the implementation of "divide and rule" course.

The British Communist party paper, Morning Star, wrote that one of Nixon's goals was to provoke still greater disagreements among the Socialist states. Ibid., pp.2-3.

⁴¹Pravda, August 10, 1971. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XXIII, No. 32, p.1.

⁴²Ibid., p.2.

Communists decided to make things easier for the President at this moment is a problem for the Sinologists and Maoists".⁴³

Arbatov, however, felt that, judging by the United States' press comments, the American public was especially interested in the question of the possible effects of the new policy upon the United States' relations with the Socialist countries, in the first place with the USSR. This, he continued, was understandable in view of the political, economic and military might of the USSR.⁴⁴ He also wrote that many in the United States understood well that a great deal "depends on the direction and course of development of US relations with the Soviet Union".⁴⁵

Suspicion of what lay behind the visit was evident when he quoted The Washington Post, which wrote: "In spite of all American public denials, Nixon administration officials privately express an opinion that it is not in the interests of the USA to allay fully the Soviet Union's suspicions concerning US-Chinese agreements that may displease Moscow or make her uneasy".⁴⁶

Arbatov then referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings in which former State Department officials, persecuted during the McCarthy era, stressed

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Ibid., p.3.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Ibid., p.4.

that they conceived rapprochement with China as a means of breaking China away from the Socialist camp, of driving a wedge between the USSR and China by using Mao's readiness, revealed even in the 1940s, to look for ways of improving relations with Washington.⁴⁷

He, however, wrote that if the United States-China relations had a positive aim, the USSR would welcome the development; she, in fact, had expressed her readiness to improve relations with the United States and China at the XXIV Congress of the CPSU. But, at the same time, he warned that the "positions of the USSR and of world socialism are strong enough to meet any possible turn of events with confidence".⁴⁸

Arbatov's article, thus, was a mixture of fear and hope, conciliation and defiance; it must have been an epitome of Soviet leadership's reaction to Nixon's projected visit.

In view of such fears and suspicions, it was not unnatural that India and the Soviet Union expressed their solidarity through the treaty.

THE TREATY

Gromyko went to India in the first week of August 1971, and on August 9, 1971, the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation was signed.⁴⁹

After signing the treaty, Gromyko said that friendship and co-operation between the USSR and India did not

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹The Times of India, August 10, 1971.

rest on transient factors but on lasting vital interests of their peoples, and their interest in the maintenance of peace.⁵⁰ Sardar Swaran Singh described the treaty as an important landmark on the path of development of Indo-Soviet relations. Gromyko's visit, he continued, coincided with developments in the subcontinent which were causing general concern in both countries and which might pose a threat to peace and security.⁵¹

Singh assured the Parliament, after signing the treaty, that it strengthened India's policy of non-alignment; Mrs. Gandhi also repeated that non-alignment would continue; and T.N. Kaul, Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, assured the United States Ambassador, Keating, that it was not a military alliance and that it was only intended to give greater credibility to the concept of non-alignment.⁵²

The treaty has 12 articles;⁵³ it is concluded for the duration of 20 years and will be automatically extended for each successive period of five years unless either party gives notice to the other expressing its desire to let the treaty lapse, 12 months before its expiration (Article 10).⁵⁴

The inevitable embellishments of all political treaties, pious hopes and platitudes, have been given their place in the treaty. For example, Article 5 speaks of

⁵⁰Pravda, August 10, 1971. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XXIII, No. 32, p.6.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²The Hindu, August 10, 1971.

⁵³See Appendix I.

⁵⁴Ibid.

the parties' deep interest in ensuring universal peace and security; Article 6 attaches great importance to economic, scientific and technological co-operation between the parties and hopes that the signatories "will continue to consolidate and expand mutually advantageous and comprehensive co-operation in these fields..."; and Article 4 says that "India respects the peace-loving policy" of the USSR and that the USSR "respects India's policy of non-alignment and reaffirms that this policy constitutes an important factor in the maintenance of universal peace and international security and in the lessening of tensions in the world".⁵⁵

Articles 8, 9 and 10 constitute the significant part of the treaty.

Under Article 8, each party "solemnly declares that it shall not enter into or participate in any military alliance directed against the other party", and "undertakes to abstain from any aggression against the other party and to prevent the use of its territory for the commission of any act which might inflict military damage" on the other.⁵⁶

Under Article 9, each party "undertakes to abstain from providing any assistance to any third party that engages in armed conflict with the other party. In the event of either party being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Ibid.

measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries".⁵⁷

Under Article 10, each party "solemnly declares that it shall not enter into any obligation, secret or public, with one or more States: which is incompatible with this Treaty". Each party "further declares that no obligation exists, nor shall any obligation be entered into, between itself and any other State or States, which might cause military damage to the other Party".⁵⁸

REACTION IN INDIA

The universal acclaim that greeted the treaty in India, in which almost all anti-Communist leaders, parties and papers joined, shows how, in the wake of the Bangladesh crisis and the Sino-American detente the nation was gripped by a sense of fear and isolation.

(i) LEADERS

Rajaji welcomed the treaty and said, "President Yahya Khan of Pakistan cannot fail to be impressed by this development of friendship and co-operation between India and Russia. Although America has proved to be a broken reed in this connection, if Great Britain follows the lines of this treaty between India and Russia, it will be a matter of great satisfaction".⁵⁹

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹The Hindu, August 10, 1971. See Chapter III, p. footnote 68 for a brief biographical note on Rajaji. As the Chief Minister of Madras, he told the Communists in the Legislative Assembly in 1952: "I place my cards on the table and tell you plainly that I am your enemy No. 1 and you are my enemy No. 1. That is my policy from A to Z". The New York Times, May 10, 1952, as quoted in Werner Levi, Free India in Asia, p.83.

Jaya Prakash Narayan congratulated Mrs. Gandhi and Swaran Singh on the treaty and described it as "the surest guarantee of peace in South Asia".⁶⁰

(ii) PARLIAMENT

Participating in a discussion on the treaty in the Lok Sabha, Swaran Singh referred to Article 9 of the treaty⁶¹ and said: "This should act as a deterrent to any powers that may have aggressive designs on our territorial integrity and sovereignty. It is, therefore, in essence a treaty of peace ...".⁶²

The Leader of the Jan Sangh group in the House, A.B. Vajpayee, said that the treaty gives India "a friend who can be trusted, who can stand by us in the thick and thin".⁶³ He and Manoharan of the DMK (Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) demanded that Moscow withdraw Soviet maps showing Indian territory as Chinese, and hoped that Radio Peace and Progress would stop objectionable broadcasts on India's internal developments.⁶⁴

V.K.K. Menon wanted the Government of India to dispel the impression of some papers that it is a security pact.⁶⁵

⁶⁰Ibid.

Jaya Prakash Narayan was a Communist as a young man. He studied in various Universities in the United States. Later in his life he was disillusioned with Communism. He actively participated in the nationalist movement in India. He was a member of the Congress-Socialist group. After India's independence, he founded the Praja Socialist Party with other Socialists. He refused to join Nehru's cabinet and merge his party with the Congress in spite of the latter's request. Later he quit politics and joined the Gandhian bhoodan (land gift) movement.

⁶¹See Appendix I.

⁶²The Hindu, August 10, 1971.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Ibid., see also Chapter IV, p.165 and Chapter VII

⁶⁵Ibid.

Piloo Modi, a spokesman for the Swatantra group, however, felt that the treaty was couched more or less in the same language as the Warsaw Pact's, and that the Soviet Union gets more benefits from it.⁶⁶

Samar Guha of the Praja Socialist Party said there was no need for codifying Indo-Soviet relations. He attributed the treaty to the "fear of the ghost of China and its complicity with Pakistan".⁶⁷

Shibbanlal Saxena, Independent, said that Nehru stood by non-alignment, "I am sorry his daughter has buried it".⁶⁸

(iii) PRESS COMMENTS

The Hindu reported: "Indo-Soviet Defence Treaty Signed", in its edition on August 10, 1971.

It commented editorially that the "recent developments, particularly Gen. Yahya Khan's repeated threats to attack India, China's declaration of support to Pakistan and President Nixon's clear hint to India that in the event of its getting involved in a war either with Pakistan or China it will have to fend for itself, obviously left New Delhi with no alternative but to look elsewhere for effective assistance and what more powerful source could

⁶⁶Ibid. The Warsaw Pact is more specific. Article 3 of the Pact calls for consultations between signatories in the event of a threat of an armed attack; Article 4 deals with assistance to the victims of aggression "including the use of armed force"; and Article 5 provides for a joint command. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1955-1956, pp.14250-14251.

⁶⁷The Hindu, August 10, 1971.

⁶⁸Ibid.

there be than the Soviet Union?"⁶⁹

Referring to Singh's claim that the treaty strengthened non-alignment, the editorial said, "since non-alignment has become a dogma for New Delhi rather than a policy, Mr. Swaran Singh's claim should cause no surprise".⁷⁰

It, however, cautioned: "Apart from the unwisdom of putting all eggs in one basket, it will be foolish for India to get into a situation where it will have to consider every enemy of Russia as its own enemy. That will be the Dulles' doctrine in reverse...".⁷¹

The editorial went on to say that if circumstances created "a compulsive reason for New Delhi to sign the present treaty with Russia, Moscow has an equally strong reason, because of its troubles with China, a great Asian power, to sign the treaty with India, the other rising power".⁷²

It added that while the threat of a war with Pakistan was an immediate problem, the bigger and more important problem for India is economic development and assistance from the West and Japan. In pursuing friendship with Russia, the Government of India should therefore take care to see that relations with these countries are in no way neglected or marred.⁷³

The Times of India's editorial captioned, "Too Early to Judge", called it an "unusually bold step" which was

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Ibid.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Ibid.

open to criticism on grounds of its departure from "non-alignment as interpreted all these years". It, however, said that no policy could be regarded as permanent in these dangerous and fast-changing times. The treaty, it went on, would be judged primarily by one yardstick: "Whatever their reservations, the people of India will welcome it if it permits New Delhi to extend all out support to the Mukti Bahini (Bengali guerillas) undeterred by fear of aggression by Pakistan with or without China's connivance, encouragement and support". It further said that in spite of all the burden imposed by the crisis, New Delhi would "not have adopted the present course of action if President Nixon had not pursued a wholly perverse policy on the question of Bangladesh".⁷⁴

The Indian Express editorial endorsed Swaran Singh's description of the treaty as "an important milestone" in Indo-Soviet relations. The paper thought that the "draft of the treaty was evidently finalised in Moscow during the visit there of the Prime Minister's special emissary, Mr. D.P. Dhar ..."⁷⁵

The editorial went on to add that it could not be strictly described as a military alliance "for it does not explicitly provide for automatic assistance by one party to the other in case of aggression by a third country". This treaty, it went on, is unlike the Soviet-UAR treaty where the Soviet Union had underwritten the defence of UAR. Indo-Soviet treaty "purports to be a treaty between equals,

⁷⁴The Times of India, August 10, 1971.

⁷⁵The Indian Express, August 10, 1971.

not between a big power and a client state..." It is, therefore, in keeping with India's non-alignment.⁷⁶

Referring to Article 9 of the treaty, the editorial said it is "a guarantee of immediate action; but in the absence of a joint command, action can only follow consultations and the emphasis on "effective measures" is noteworthy".⁷⁷

The Soviet Union, the editorial said, "whom China increasingly regards as its main enemy, looks on the move for a Sino-American detente with ill-concealed suspicion. India would normally have welcomed the change in the US attitude towards China, but it cannot but be disturbed by the emergence of an apparent Washington-Peking-Islamabad axis".⁷⁸

China, the editorial continued, was giving weapons to Yahya, so was Nixon, against United States' public opinion, as a reward "for serving as a bridge between Washington and Peking".⁷⁹

When Washington "told New Delhi that in the event of China joining Pakistan in a war against India, this country should not count on US assistance, Mrs. Gandhi's Government obviously felt impelled to seek ways of breaking the encirclement with which this country was threatened. The immediate result is the new treaty between India and the Soviet Union".⁸⁰

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

SOVIET SATISFACTION

Such near-total support for the treaty in India was bound to be heartening to the Soviet Union. In its editorial on August 11, 1971, Pravda echoed Gromyko's views that not transient factors but lasting, vital interests of the two States form the foundation of the close relations between India and the USSR. The treaty, the editorial said, placed these relations on a still stronger legal and political basis.⁸¹

When Mrs. Gandhi visited Moscow in September 1971, Kosygin repeated Gromyko's theme at a lunch in her honour on September 28, 1971. He said that history has many examples of rapprochement between countries based on temporary and pragmatic coincidence of their interests. Indo-Soviet relations, he claimed, are built on a fundamentally different basis.⁸²

REACTION IN OTHER COUNTRIES

Senator Edward Kennedy, who was on a visit to Bengali refugee camps in India, said: "I think India has to preserve its national interest, ... and meet in particular its security requirements".⁸³

The Pakistani paper, The Dawn, reported on its front page: "Soviet Umbrella for India: Mutual Defence Treaty Signed".⁸⁴ Predictably, Bhutto called it a pact of aggression against Pakistan and China. He felt that

⁸¹Pravda, August 11, 1971.

⁸²Pravda, September 29, 1971.

⁸³The Hindu, August 10, 1971.

⁸⁴The Dawn, Karachi, August 10, 1971.

Russia felt isolated after it had suffered reverses in the Sudan, moved to the subcontinent from the Middle East, and found a willing partner in India.⁸⁵

In an editorial comment, The Dawn said: "After" all the Moscow-Delhi pact has been arrived at in a certain context. India is at present engaged in carrying out its plot, hatched a long time ago, to undo the partition of the subcontinent which it accepted only formally under the compulsion of circumstances". This would enable India, the editorial went on, to intensify the war by proxy and or direct aggression against Pakistan "and then invoke the provisions of the Moscow-Delhi pact in order to prevent friendly countries from coming to the aid of Pakistan". The editorial asked if Moscow was bound, in terms of the treaty, to accept India's word that any military activities it might be engaged in against Pakistan were "defensive" in nature.⁸⁶

The New York Times' editorial referred to apprehensions in Moscow and New Delhi about growing Sino-American rapprochement and India's sense of isolation as Pakistani civil war spilled over to India's side of the border, and commented that the Soviet-Indian friendship accord "strengthens Soviet influence in the second most populous nation in Asia - and the world - at the expense of the United States. It could increase the danger of a local war leading to a big power confrontation on the Indian

⁸⁵The Dawn, August 11, 1971. The Chinese Consul called on Bhutto at his hospital and had "constructive" talks on August 11, 1971. The Dawn, August 12, 1971.

⁸⁶The Dawn, August 11, 1971.

The Times (London) correspondent reported from New Delhi that India had discarded her non-alignment policy and that the treaty was in reality a defence pact.⁸⁸

The Times commented editorially:

In spite of Mrs. Gandhi's description of the treaty as one of non-aggression it has spikes on it; they are intended to be visible to those who might otherwise unthinkingly impale themselves upon them. Consultations over what either side regards as a threat may be a rather watered down version of defence treaties of the past, but very properly nowadays it is thought that war can be evaded if the threat of it is seen and acted upon.⁸⁹

EVALUATION

Brezhnev's call in 1969 for collective security in Asia was an attempt by Moscow to find a solution to her problems with China through diplomacy. When he defined the concept in 1972,⁹⁰ it was made open to all, including China. This definition made his concept a perfectly innocuous one, with laudable objectives like maintenance of peace and security in Asia to everyone's benefit. If China subscribed to it, since it was welcome to do so, Russia's fears about her border with her would be set at rest; if she rejected the concept, and the countries on her periphery endorsed it, Moscow's purpose would be served too. As it turned out, nothing of the sort had happened. Countries fearful of China, in South East Asia, like

⁸⁷The New York Times, August 10, 1971.

⁸⁸The Times, August 10, 1971. Peter Hazelhurst reported it.

⁸⁹Ibid.

⁹⁰See p. 249

Thailand, Philippines and Malaysia, had been aligned with the United States of America either directly or through Britain; others did not respond to the proposal.

As the plan of Collective Security had not materialised, the Soviet Union turned to bilateral treaties with countries located in areas important to her interests. It was Egypt first, followed by India and later Iraq.⁹¹

The Soviet treaties with the two Arab countries do not involve direct Soviet security interests to the same extent as the Indo-Soviet treaty. While Arab hostility to Israel is real, that of the Soviet Union is only a diplomatic necessity. Israel is far away from the Soviet Union; she is no threat to her security either. The interests of the Arabs and the Chinese do not clash; therefore, the Arabs would not like to irritate China on account of the Soviet Union.

The Indo-Soviet treaty stands on a different footing. There are serious clashes of interest between India and China and the USSR and China.⁹² Nixon's surprise announcement to visit Peking seemed to have heightened the already existing apprehensions of China in India and

⁹¹Both the Soviet-Egyptian and the Soviet-Iraqi treaties are more or less identical with the Indo-Soviet treaty. Both have a duration of 15 years with provisions for automatic extensions for each succeeding 5-year periods unless denounced by one of the parties. See Pravda, May 28, 1971, for Soviet-Egyptian treaty and Pravda, April 10, 1972, for Soviet-Iraqi treaty.

⁹²See Chapter VII and above pp.246-49

the Soviet Union.⁹³ The treaty seemed to have been a response from India and the USSR to Nixon's announcement.

Is the alliance with India useful to Soviet security interests? The Times, for instance, wryly commented that there was no chance of Indian divisions going to the Red Army's rescue.⁹⁴ In spite of the Indian refusal to offer bases to the Soviet Union, or the inability, to quote The Times again, of her divisions to rescue the Red Army, the treaty has its own uses to Moscow.

The very fact that India, which consistently refused to ally herself with the West, with which she has so much in common, made an alliance with Moscow was a diplomatic triumph for the USSR.

Besides that, treaties are not made only to wage wars; wars are only ultimate weapons for the preservation and promotion of national interests. An alliance with a large country which is an enemy of one's enemy, and the psychological pressure this exerts on the enemy are equally important considerations in treaty making. India is a large country; her relations with China are still cold;

⁹³Some of Nixon's casual comments in China seemed to have upset Brezhnev. He thought that the United States and China did not reveal everything they discussed; and that there was "some basis for thinking that the dialogue went beyond the framework of bilateral relations between the USA and China". He wondered how else could Nixon's statement in Shanghai that China and the United States "to-night hold the future of the world in their hands" be interpreted. See Brezhnev's speech at the 15th Soviet Trade Union Congress in Pravda, March 21, 1972. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XXIV, No. 12, p.7.

This suspicion of Sino-American detente seemed to have continued even after Nixon-Brezhnev summit. See, for example, G. Kadymov, "Why Peking Wants Uncle Sam to Stay in Asia?" Soviet Weekly, London, February 17, 1973.

⁹⁴See its editorial on the treaty, "Hands Joined Across the Himalayas", dated August 10, 1971.

and after the 1962 defeat, she emerged as a military power of considerable proportions with the world's fourth largest army, fifth largest air force, eighth largest navy and largest manufacture of armaments in the Third World.⁹⁵ If nothing else, the Indo-Soviet treaty would be a cause for serious concern for China, and unease for the United States of America, which evidently would not be happy watching the world's largest democracy become a Soviet ally. The Soviet Union, probably, hoped that her treaty with India would have a restraining influence on the United States dealings with China; for, this treaty would remind the United States foreign policy makers of their pet theory for a long time: the domino theory. United States policy makers could not ignore the possibility of the Indo-Soviet treaty having a domino effect on the countries on China's periphery and other United States allies who were unhappy with the way Washington unfolded its new China policy.⁹⁶ Any caution in United States relations with China would serve Soviet interests and allay her fears.

Moscow could expect another advantage from the treaty: this Moscow-New Delhi connection would heighten Chinese fears of the refugees from Sinkiang based in the Soviet Union and the Dalai Lama and Tibetan refugees living in India. China had exhibited her fear of these foreign-

⁹⁵See Inder Malhotra, Mrs. Gandhi's Active Resistance, The Guardian, July 16, 1974.

⁹⁶For a discussion of the effects of Nixon's surprise announcement on the United States allies, see George W. Ball, op.cit., p.52.

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based minority nationalist groups many times.⁹⁷ This Chinese fear of the refugees from her minority nationalities based in India and the Soviet Union is not of insignificant use for Soviet diplomacy.

Mrs. Gandhi's radical programmes had some appeal for Moscow. Closer relationship with India fits in with the view expressed by Brezhnev, in his Report made on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Communist revolution, that the "extent and concrete forms of friendly relations with young national states depend on the general political course of the particular state".⁹⁸ That means, the more "progressive" a non-Communist state is the closer would be Soviet relations with her. In his Report made on the 50th anniversary of the USSR in 1972, Brezhnev testified to the progressive character of India when he spoke of "the consolidation of progressive, anti-imperialist forces" there.⁹⁹ Therefore, Soviet explanation for the closer relations with India at present can have

⁹⁷For instance, participating in the debates on the Bangladesh crisis in the Security Council on December 4 and 5, 1971, the Chinese delegate referred to the Indian and Soviet delegates' reference to the presence of ten million East Pakistani refugees in India as one of the justifications for the Indian action, and asked them if on the same analogy India and the USSR would use the refugees from Tibet and Sinkiang as "a pretext for launching armed aggression against China". See The Peking Review, No. 50, (December 10, 1971), pp.7-8.

⁹⁸Pravda, November 4, 1967. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 44, p.16.

⁹⁹The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, pp.48-49. Brezhnev said: "... a policy is progressive if it firmly repulses neocolonialism, and promotes the sovereignty and independence of the young states, and their economic liberation from imperialism, and if it is for peace, for social progress and closer solidarity with the other progressive forces of our time, and particularly with the Socialist countries". Ibid., p.48.

ideological overtones. This is not to say that ideology has any great importance in Soviet foreign policy; but in the Communist milieu ideological rhetoric has its role. In its polemics with China, alliance with non-communist but "progressive" India scores a point for Moscow for whatever worth it is.

The treaty was a significant departure from India's original policy of not entering into such commitments with other states. India must have had weighty reasons for departing from her policy. The United States' attitude to India during the Bangladesh crisis could only give the impression in India that in the assessment of the United States' foreign policy makers India was insignificant. In fact, some influential public men and scholars in the United States mentioned this in their writings or talks.¹⁰⁰

India, naturally, feels that Soviet interest in her rather than United States' condescension is a better means of serving her interests. The United States' stand on crucial issues affecting India's interests, Kashmir, Goa, Bangladesh, or issues affecting her emotions, colonialism

¹⁰⁰ Chester Bowles wrote that Soviet interest in India is primarily based on "the Soviet estimation of India's geopolitical importance as a partial balance to the political influence and potential military weight of China". On the other hand, the United States government "has never considered India to be of major political significance to the future of Asia". India has been seen "as an impoverished nation struggling bravely but probably futilely to govern itself through democratic institutions, which for humanitarian reasons we have felt obliged to assist". "America and Russia in India", pp.637-638. See also India Abroad (New York), Vol. II, No. 18, (August 15, 1972), p.12, for similar views expressed by C. Gilpatric, who was Associate Director of the Rockefeller Foundation in India.

and racialism, bears testimony to the American public men's assertions of American government's assessment of India.

In sharp contrast to the United States policy, the Soviet policy gives due importance to India. This serves India's interests as well as soothes her national ego; and the Soviet Union gets due credit for this consideration.¹⁰¹ The lop-sided South Asia policy of the United States won support for the treaty from Indian liberals and liberal newspapers¹⁰² who have been critical of Soviet policies, domestic as well as foreign, and wary of India's cosy relationship with Moscow.¹⁰³

While the identity of ^{the} Sino-American approach to the Security Council debates on the Bangladesh crisis confirmed India's fear of the United States' new China policy, the stout Soviet diplomatic support to India, at a time when she was practically isolated in the United Nations, even

¹⁰¹ Welcoming Brezhnev to India, during his visit to New Delhi in November 1973, The Times of India commented editorially, on November 26, 1973: "The Indian people would have welcomed this gesture (the visit) at any time. They are bound to do so all the more at this stage when an acute and prolonged economic crisis has led some other capitals to cast doubt on this country's future. By coming here now Mr. Brezhnev is proclaiming his faith not only in the strength and durability of Indo-Soviet co-operation but also in India's progress and durability".

¹⁰² See pp. 260 - 65

¹⁰³ An editorial in The Times of India, on November 26, 1973, declared that Indo-Soviet friendship "long ceased to be a partisan affair in India and that in reality most critics of the government cherish it as much as its supporters".

Seven private companies put big advertisements in The Times of India on November 26, 1973, welcoming Brezhnev. Ibid.

Even an inveterate critic of Mrs. Gandhi, Madhu Limaye (a Socialist M.P.), met Brezhnev in New Delhi and told him that Indo-Soviet friendship does not depend upon either Mrs. Gandhi or her government. See The Times of India, December 1, 1973.

at the cost of Moscow suffering isolation itself in the process, demonstrated to the Indian public the usefulness of the treaty.¹⁰⁴

The fact that the Soviet Union had exhibited a willingness to share India's isolation from the rest of the Third World by supporting her on the Bangladesh crisis suggests that Moscow must have considered the Sino-American detente a serious enough development necessitating appropriate steps to preserve its interests. Once before, the Soviet Union ranged herself against the Third World for tactical reasons; on that occasion, Moscow gave an explanation for its decision.¹⁰⁵ But on Bangladesh no such statement was issued.

The seriousness with which Moscow stood by its ally, India, seemed to have been noted in Peking. Bhutto revealed that he proposed to Peking in 1972 that Pakistan and China conclude a treaty; but the Chinese leaders told him that "it was common interest rather than pacts which mattered".¹⁰⁶ Shorn of diplomatic niceties, Peking told Pakistan that it was not interested in the offer in view of the unacceptable risks involved in it. Such revelations strengthen the belief in India that the treaty would be a deterrent to any direct Chinese intervention.

Then, is the Indo-Soviet treaty a military alliance? The Indian Government is emphatic in stating that it is

¹⁰⁴See Chapter IX, pp. 297-299.

¹⁰⁵See Chapter VII pp. 228-29.

¹⁰⁶The New York Times, February 13, 1972. Chou En-lai had also pointed out to Bhutto that China "had a defence pact with another Communist country, the Soviet Union, and now look where that stands. They (the Chinese leaders) said their policy was now averse to pacts but that mutual interests were better and produced more binding ties". Ibid.

not, and that it remains non-aligned. However, non-alignment would be no bar to taking whatever Soviet aid becomes necessary should India's survival be at stake; states never sacrifice tangible interests for the sake of concepts, however venerable. The vagueness of the language of the treaty notwithstanding, the Indo-Soviet treaty can be effective in the military sense too should their interests be seriously jeopardised by any Chinese act. In fact vagueness of language is an asset: it keeps the adversary guessing as to the nature of ^a joint response; it does not bind the parties to automatic response in all cases; and yet it enables them to act effectively should the situation so demand.

The language of a treaty need not necessarily be the sole guide to action. This has been demonstrated many times by history. For instance, Britain acted under its treaty obligations when Belgian neutrality was violated in 1914; it intervened when Polish freedom was trampled in 1939. But, in spite of a commitment to defend "all conquests and colonies" of Portugal, under a secret article of the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 1661,¹⁰⁷ a British Foreign Office spokesman said, when it became clear that India intended to use force to integrate Goa with India, that "there would naturally be no question of engaging in hostilities against India".¹⁰⁸ The post world war II treaties prove this point too. At the Manila meeting, where the SEATO pact was signed on September 8, 1954, Pakistan was particularly insistent on using the word

¹⁰⁷ The Times, December 14, 1961.

¹⁰⁸ The Times, December 15, 1961.

"aggression" without qualifying it with Communist in article 4 of the treaty, obviously with India in view. While the United States accepted this to facilitate the signing of the treaty, her delegate immediately issued a unilateral declaration saying that the reference to aggression in article 4 would "apply only to Communist aggression", but affirmed that "in the event of other aggression or armed attack it will consult" under the provisions of the treaty.¹⁰⁹

Therefore, the imprecise language of the Indo-Soviet treaty need not make it ineffective. Article 9 of the treaty calls for "mutual consultations" in the event of either party being subjected to "an attack or a threat thereof" in order "to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures".¹¹⁰ An attack need not take place, "a threat thereof" will also set the machinery of consultation in motion; and the result may be "appropriate effective measures". These measures, probably, depend upon the quarter from which the threat arises and the seriousness of the threat. If it is one of those periodic Indo-Pakistani duels, New Delhi does not need direct Soviet intervention, and the United States would not tolerate any such Soviet act either. If, on the other hand, it is one of those familiar minor nuisances caused by China on the Sino-Indian border, the "appropriate effective measures" need only take the shape of anti-Chinese propaganda barrage from Moscow or

¹⁰⁹ Keessing's Contemporary Archives 1952-1954, p. 13764. See also Chapter IV, p. 71.

¹¹⁰ See Appendix I.

harassment of China on the Sino-Soviet border. In the unlikely event of a direct Chinese attack on India threatening the very survival of the country, Moscow, in all probability, will intervene under its treaty obligations. Under such circumstances, it would not be an easy decision for the United States to stop the Soviet intervention and let India be destroyed by China.¹¹¹

In the event of a Sino-Soviet war, Moscow does not need and New Delhi cannot directly render military help to it; but, India, with her large military establishment and resident Tibetan refugees and the Dalai Lama would be a source of serious worry for Peking. Indo-Soviet collaboration would, thus, impose a formidable burden on the Chinese military in view of thousands of miles of Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian border that it has to take care of and the danger that disaffection among dissident nationalities on the entire Chinese border would pose to it.

The terms of the treaty notwithstanding, the effectiveness of treaties last as long as mutual trust and common fears last. For instance, after the liberation of France, General de Gaulle signed a treaty with Stalin under which they agreed to take "all the necessary measures in order to eliminate any new menace coming from Germany and to take the initiative to make any new effort of aggression on her part impossible".¹¹² This treaty did

¹¹¹See p.261 for the then Indian Minister for External Affairs' view of Article 9.

¹¹²Article 3 of the treaty. Quoted in Roy C. Macridis, Foreign Policy in World Politics, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1972), p.83.

not last long. In view of the Soviet conduct in Eastern Europe, France did not hesitate to join NATO in 1949.

In a way, the Indo-Soviet treaty has one favourable factor for its durability: absence of common borders, and consequently the traditional fears associated with smaller and weaker states of their bigger and powerful states. However, differences need not arise only on territorial grounds; temperamental incompatibilities and clashes of interests rupture relations too. In spite of there being so much in common between India and the United States and the United Kingdom, in addition to absence of territorial disputes and common borders, tensions have always been present in Indo-American and Indo-British relations because India refused to see international developments through their eyes and because they ignored her vital interests in pursuit of theirs.

The effectiveness and durability of the Indo-Soviet treaty rests more particularly on the American attitude. It was the fear of what lay behind Sino-American detente which seemed to have resulted in the signing of the treaty. India and the USSR did not sign a treaty in spite of tensions in their relations with China for over a decade. If Washington allays the fears of the USSR and India about Sino-American detente, much of the usefulness of the treaty for India and the Soviet Union would be lost. As it happened many times before, if the immediate fear which gives birth to a treaty blows over, the treaty becomes defunct in effect even if it continues to exist on paper.

Moscow seems to be happy with its relations with

Washington now.¹¹³ As long as Washington ignores India's interests and heightens her sense of fear in pursuit of its triangular diplomacy, India's need for Soviet support will continue. Many of Mrs. Gandhi's statements and writings since the treaty bring out one thing: India's fear that Washington's actions were impinging on her vital interests.¹¹⁴ Since Moscow's relations with Peking are still tense, it would still support New Delhi to the extent^{that} Soviet interests are furthered by doing so.

But the Indian leadership cannot be unaware of the undesirability of overdependence on any power. New Delhi is aware of the change in Soviet policy towards Kashmir in the mid-1960s when Moscow's interests required it.¹¹⁵ India, therefore, must be interested in improving her relations with the United States and China to have more diplomatic manoeuvrability.¹¹⁶ There are no difficult problems in India's relations with the United States; attempts to improve relations between India and the USA

¹¹³In his address to the Indian Parliament on November 29, 1973, Brezhnev spoke of the usefulness of Soviet-American detente; in the Indo-Soviet Joint Declaration too this was welcomed. See Mission of Friendship, pp.60 and 78.

¹¹⁴See Mrs. Gandhi, "India and the World", Foreign Affairs, Vol. LI, No. 1, (October 1972), pp.74-75, and India News (London), Vol. XXVI, No. 2, (June 30, 1973).

¹¹⁵See Chapter V, pp. 153 - 66

¹¹⁶Mrs. Gandhi subtly served notice to Brezhnev that she intends to work for better relations with the United States and China, though she did not name them. Speaking at the civic reception to Brezhnev on November 27, 1973, in New Delhi, she said that the treaty is not directed against any country; that the Soviet Union is on friendly terms with almost all countries; and that in exactly the same way India is seeking to expand the area of friendship. See Mission of Friendship, p.28. For Mrs. Gandhi's overtures to China, see above, p.244

are already afoot.¹¹⁷

If there is necessary response from Peking, India would be willing to find a solution to her problems with China. India may consider the treaty an insurance against any Chinese military adventure in South Asia to her disadvantage; she would not like to turn it into an instrument for the perpetuation of Sino-Indian hostilities. It is significant that India did not endorse Brezhnev's Collective Security plan for Asia in the Indo-Soviet Joint Declaration issued at the end of the Soviet leaders' visit to India. Brezhnev tried to sell the concept to the Indian Parliament in his address to it;¹¹⁸ however, the Joint Declaration did not mention Collective Security by its Soviet nomenclature; it was only alluded to.¹¹⁹

India's misgivings about this Soviet scheme were expressed when Madhu Limaye (a Socialist M.P.) told Brezhnev that Collective Security looks like an attempt to gang up against China.¹²⁰ The absence of a reference to collective Security in the Indo-Soviet Joint Declaration suggests that the Indian Government feels likewise. Thus, in spite of the treaty, India is not

¹¹⁷Dr. Kissinger visited India in October-November 1974. During this visit an agreement was signed to create an Indo-American Joint Commission for promoting co-operation in economic, commercial, scientific, technological, educational and cultural fields. The Overseas Hindustan Times, November 7, 1974. The first meeting of the Commission was held in October 1975 in Washington at which India's Minister for External Affairs was present. A number of agreements were signed at this meeting to promote co-operation in various fields. The Overseas Hindustan Times, October 16, 1975.

¹¹⁸See The Mission of Friendship, p.58. He addressed the Parliament on November 29, 1973. Ibid.

¹¹⁹Ibid., p.81.

¹²⁰The Times of India, December 1, 1973.

automatically accepting the Soviet point of view on all issues. Another example of India being assertive in pursuit of her interests is provided by the underground nuclear explosion she conducted on May 18, 1974,¹²¹ in spite of the knowledge of Soviet opposition to further nuclear proliferation.¹²²

For the present, India may like to derive indirect benefit from Soviet power, through her treaty connections with Moscow; but in all probability, she would like to develop her own credible deterrent to Chinese power rather than be dependent on Soviet power; and this may not be to Soviet taste if credible deterrent means nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union may like to weaken Chinese positions in Pakistan,¹²³ Nepal and Bhutan; and this may not be to India's liking if that means ignoring India's interests in the region. The Soviet Union and India belong to two different categories: the former is a global power and the latter, a regional power. Therefore, it is more likely that Moscow's global strategy would clash with India's regional interests. The effective life of the Indo-Soviet treaty, therefore, depends upon the degree to which the Soviet Union and India are successful in making the

¹²¹The Guardian, May 19, 1974.

¹²²In his foreign policy report to the Supreme Soviet in July 1969, Gromyko mentioned that 90 states had already signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and expressed the hope that those countries where the issue was still under discussion would arrive at the only correct conclusion that it was necessary to sign and ratify the treaty. Pravda, July 11, 1969.

¹²³Bhutto repeated at a joint session of the two houses of Pakistani Parliament that his government was anxious to have good relations with the Soviet Union. The Guardian, August 27, 1974. See also Chapter IV, pp. 178-79.

former's global interests compatible with the latter's regional interests.

THE BANGLADESH CRISIS

BACKGROUND

The Muslim League, which spearheaded the movement for the partition of India on a communal basis, originally called for the creation of two Muslim states. In its resolution on March 23, 1940, it demanded "that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the northwestern and eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute "independent states" in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign".¹ By the time partition became a reality in 1947, the League managed to have one Muslim State, with its two wings being separated by a thousand miles of Indian territory. This physical distance between the two wings was reinforced by emotional distance due to differences in language and culture. While Bengalis constituted a majority of the population of Pakistan,² Jinnah, its founder, proposed to make Urdu the only official language; this was opposed by the Bengalis.³

In the words of a Bengali author, G.W. Choudhury, even in their own province, all the key posts in the

¹The Indian Annual Register, Vol. I, (Calcutta: The Annual Register Office, 1940), p.312. See also Z.A. Bhutto, "Pakistan Builds Anew", Foreign Affairs Vol.LI, No. 3, (April 1973), p.545.

²G.W. Choudhury, "Bangladesh: Why It Happened?", International Affairs (London) Vol.XLVIII, No. 2, (April 1972), p.242.

³Ibid., p.247.

administration were held by West Pakistanis with direct access to the central ruling "clique".⁴ "The Bengalis found a new ruling group set over them in place of the former British officials".⁵ West Pakistanis considered Bengali Muslims "as converts from lower-caste Hindus".⁶

In the economic field, too, disparities between the two wings continued to widen over the years. A report made to the Government of Pakistan by a panel of experts said that in 1959-1960 the per capita income in West Pakistan was 32 per cent higher than in East Pakistan; over the next 10 years the annual rate of growth of income in the West was 6.2 per cent while it was only 4.2 per cent in the East; so, by 1969-1970 the per capita income in the West was 61 per cent higher than in the East.⁷

Therefore, Mujib ur Rahman proposed a six-point plan in 1966. The six points were: 1) There should be a federal constitution. 2) The Centre should direct only foreign affairs and defence. 3) The two provinces should have different currencies, and there should be barriers to the movement of capital from one province to the other. 4) All collection by way of taxation and other revenues should vest in provinces. 5) All foreign exchange earned by East Pakistan should be at her disposal. 6) There should be an East Pakistani militia.⁸

⁴Ibid., p.243.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid., p.246. Even Bhutto conceded that East Pakistan was exploited "with callous thoroughness". See President Bhutto's Address to the National Assembly, p.19.

⁸Quoted in Herbert Feldman, "The Communal Problem in the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent: Some Current Implications", Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLIII, No. 2, (Summer 1969), p.162.

THE CRISIS

The first ever general election since the birth of Pakistan was held on December 7, 1970. Bhutto's party won in West Pakistan on the main theme of a "thousand years" war with India to restore national honour which Ayub Khan was alleged to have sacrificed at Tashkent, under Soviet pressure, in 1966.⁹ Mujib contested the elections on the basis of his six-point plan. He captured 167 out of 169 seats allotted to East Pakistan in the National Assembly; that was also an absolute majority in the House.¹⁰ The prospect of Mujib becoming the Prime Minister and the western wing losing its pre-eminence was unacceptable to most of the generals and Bhutto. The latter declared that Punjab was the bastion of power; that Mujib's victory was regional; that two majority groups must be recognised; that two prime ministers might be necessary; that he would not play the role of a loyal opposition leader.¹¹ Since Bhutto threatened to boycott the National Assembly unless Mujib came to terms with him, and since the army was not prepared to accept the six-point plan, the National Assembly, which was to meet on March 3, 1971, was indefinitely postponed on March 1, 1971.¹² This triggered off a violent reaction in East Pakistan; and on March 25, 1971, the military crackdown began.¹³

⁹G.W. Choudhury, "The Last Days of United Pakistan", International Affairs (London) Vol. XLIX, No. 2 (April 1973), p.235.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid., pp.236-237.

¹²Ibid., pp.237-238.

¹³Ibid.

ITS IMPACT ON INDIA AND HER RESPONSE

Refugees, fleeing from military brutalities, flooded the sensitive eastern zone of India. Seven out of ten million refugees were Hindus.¹⁴ There was a danger of their harrowing experiences in East Pakistan causing communal tension in India. The cost of the maintenance of the refugees was a great burden on India; special taxes were imposed for the purpose. Up to February 1972, India spent Rs. 3600 million on the refugees.¹⁵ A great majority of the refugees went to the Indian state of West Bengal. This state was politically unstable between 1967-1972; it was here that a Maoist group, known as the Naxalites, took to terrorism in 1967.¹⁶ There had always been trouble between Assamese and Indian Bengalis in the State of Assam. There was, therefore, fear that the flow of Bengalis from East Pakistan into Assam would aggravate troubles there.¹⁷ If the stalemate in East Pakistan continued indefinitely, there was a possibility of the leadership of the guerillas passing into the hands of extremists inimical to India endangering the security of north east India.¹⁸ The refugees became competitors for scarce jobs contributing to the fall in already poor wages. Mrs. Gandhi was, however, not for taking any precipitate action.

¹⁴M.S. Rajan, "Bangladesh and After", Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLV, No. 2 (Summer 1972), p.199.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Marcus F. Franda, op.cit., p.151. This movement was, however, suppressed.

¹⁷Pran Chopra, op.cit., p.119.

¹⁸Ibid., p.111.

The Indian Prime Minister wrote to the Secretary-General of the United Nations; she pleaded for international action to solve this problem.¹⁹ Sardar Swaran Singh, India's Minister for External Affairs visited the USSR, Britain and the United States in June 1971 to persuade them to act.²⁰

Mrs. Gandhi paid visits to London and Washington herself and pleaded for British and American pressure on General Yahya Khan to end repression and try to find a political solution; nothing of substance came of her trip to Washington (see below). In the meantime, conditions deteriorated in East Pakistan. The Government of India did help guerillas with weapons and training, and, in the third week of November, permitted the Indian army to reply in kind to the Pakistani army's shelling of Indian border villages in the course of their pursuit of guerillas from East Pakistan. On December 3, 1971, Pakistan bombed some of the airports of the Indian Air Force; and the war began.²¹

THE UNITED STATES ATTITUDE

Not even the United States military supplies, though small in quantities, to Pakistan were stopped until November 7, 1971.²² This could only create the impression

¹⁹Cited by Sardar Swaran Singh, the then Minister for External Affairs, in his speech to the Security Council on December 12, 1971. Bangladesh and Indo-Pak War: India speaks at the U.N., (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1972), pp.36-37.

²⁰The New York Times, June 19, 1971.

²¹The Times of India, December 4, 1971.

²²The New York Times, November 8, 1971.

in India and East Pakistan that the United States did not care for their interests much.

As has been mentioned above, Mrs. Gandhi visited Washington in November 1971. Welcoming her, on November 4, 1971, President Nixon said that the tragedies that had struck India then, particularly floods and tidal waves, generated a sympathetic response in the United States.²³ He did not refer to the East Pakistani tragedy at all. Mrs. Gandhi, on the other hand, spoke of the "man-made tragedy of vast proportions"—an obvious reference to East Pakistan—and pleaded for United States pressure on Yahya to release Mujib and work for a political settlement.²⁴

When the war broke out the United States took an anti-Indian stand. The New York Times editorially commented on December 4, 1971, that one of the causes of the war was "the self-righteous intransigence of India's response" to "brutal suppression" in East Pakistan.²⁵

On December 4, 1971, the State Department put out a statement saying that "the beginning of the crisis can fairly be said to be the use of force by Pakistan", but, "India bears the major responsibility for the broader hostilities" inasmuch as, "since the beginning of the

²³The New York Times, November 5, 1971. This was a reference to the cyclone that killed 10,000 people in the Indian state of Orissa. Ibid.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵However, another editorial of The New York Times on December 5, 1971, blamed the Nixon administration for having "ignored the fundamental threat to India posed by Yahya Khan's harsh repression in East Pakistan".

Yet another editorial in The New York Times on December 7, 1971, spoke of India's "aggressive war".

The Times, London, editorially commented on December 4, 1971, that even if by a miracle all refugees were to go back to East Pakistan, "India would not have been content to let things lie ... proximity has too powerful an effect for that".

crisis, Indian policy, in a systematic way, has led to the perpetuation of the crisis".²⁶

On December 6, 1971, the United States suspended economic aid to India. Making the announcement, Charles W. Bray of the State Department said: "The United States is not making a short term contribution to the Indian economy to make it easier for the Indian Government to sustain its military efforts".²⁷ The United States, a spokesman for the State Department said, was actively working for a settlement, including some autonomy for East Pakistan, when India suddenly attacked Pakistan.²⁸ On December 12, 1971, the United States nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise and 7 other amphibious ships were diverted to the Bay of Bengal, ostensibly for evacuating Americans and other foreigners from East Pakistan.²⁹ Since, on December 11, 1971, British planes evacuated all foreigners who wished to leave East Pakistan,³⁰ this American explanation was unconvincing; this could only be interpreted in India as an attempt to

²⁶The New York Times, December 5, 1971.

The British delegate abstained on all the United Nations votes on the Bangla crisis. However the Alec-Singh communique, issued at the end of the Indian minister's visit to London on June 22, 1971, called for "a solution acceptable to the people of East Bengal". Quoted in Pran Chopra, op.cit., p.133.

²⁷The New York Times, December 7, 1971.

²⁸The New York Times, December 8, 1971.

²⁹The New York Times, December 13, 1971.

³⁰The New York Times, December 12, 1971.

Frighten her.³¹

On December 14, 1971, a spokesman for Nixon hinted at the possibility of cancellation of the President's scheduled visit to Moscow unless it restrained India.³² In spite of the furor caused in India at the news of diverting United States ships to the Bay of Bengal, the ships sailed into the Bay on December 15, 1971.³³

Indian Public opinion was further incensed by columnist Jack Anderson's revelations in January 1972. He published "secret sensitive" texts of the National Security Council's Washington Special Action Group on the Crisis between India and Pakistan. These revealed that the President specifically directed the State Department "to tilt in favour of Pakistan".³⁴

Anderson revealed that the following the military crack-down in East Pakistan, the United States ambassador to India, Kenneth B. Keating, asked that the United States throw her moral support behind India.³⁵ It was also

31. See Chapter XI, PP. 391 - 92.

32. The New York Times, December 15, 1971.

33. The New York Times, December 16, 1971.

34. See the texts in The New York Times, January 6, 1972. Copies of the texts were handed over to Jack Anderson by an officer who did not agree with the "tilt"

35. Ibid.

revealed that the United States Consul in Dacca, A.K. Blood, reported that "genocide" was taking place in East Pakistan.³⁶ All these diplomatic reports were ignored by the President.

Even after the end of the war Nixon did not allow the frayed tempers in India to cool down; he raked up the issue again in his foreign policy report to the Congress. He reasserted in it that India was primarily to blame for the flare-up. This time he alleged that he had convincing proof, from a source in the Indian cabinet, that India wanted to seize Pakistan-held Kashmir and destroy the Pakistani armed forces.³⁷

THE SOVIET ATTITUDE

In the early 1960s when both the blocs were in a state of flux, and when Pakistan was cultivating Chinese friendship in defiance of the United States, the American ambassador to Pakistan, McConaughy, said, probably inadvertently, at Dacca in February 1963, that, motivated by a desire "to eliminate the economic discrepancy between East and West Pakistan", the United States wished to give aid to East Pakistan and strengthen relations with her. This caused a controversy in Pakistan. Pravda published Pakistani press comments on the speech and observed, that the "latest statement of the American ambassador was clearly aimed at creating a split between West and East

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ The New York Times, February 10, 1972.

Pakistan and at distracting the public from the struggle against the military alliance with the USA".³⁸ The Soviet Union could not have been unaware of the disparities between East and West Pakistan and the resultant disaffection in the East; but, such sympathetic comments would earn credit for the Soviet Union as an upholder of Pakistan's national integrity while causing estrangement between the United States and Pakistan. The then foreign policy tactics demanded such a course of action.

We have already discussed how the Soviet Union played host to the conference between India and Pakistan at Tashkent in 1966, and how it sold weapons to Pakistan in the face of opposition from India in 1968.³⁹ Ever since the Tashkent Conference Kosygin had been regularly sending greetings to the heads of government of India and Pakistan on the anniversary day of Tashkent every year; so he did in January 1971.⁴⁰ Izvestia also reported that a Soviet-Afghan agreement was concluded on the use of Afghan roads, built with Soviet assistance, for direct trade between the Soviet Union and Pakistan.⁴¹

However, in the wake of the crackdown in East Pakistan, Podgorny sent a message to Yahya Khan, dated April 2, 1971, which could be interpreted as an unfriendly act in Pakistan. The message said that the reports that "the military administration has found it possible to resort to extreme measures and has used armed force against

³⁸Pravda, February 23, 1963. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XV, No. 8, p.29.

³⁹See Chapter V, pp. 157 - 66

⁴⁰Pravda, January 10, 1971. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, p.19.

⁴¹Izvestia, January 30, 1971.

the East Pakistani population has been received with great alarm in the Soviet Union".⁴²

The arrest of Mujib, "who received such convincing support from the overwhelming majority of East Pakistan's population", has also "aroused concern in the Soviet Union". The Soviet Union, the message went on, could not "refrain from voicing a well-intentioned word from friends ...". The Soviet leadership remained convinced that the problem "must be solved by political means, without the use of force".⁴³

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Podgorny continued, made "an insistent appeal for the adoption of the most immediate measures to stop the bloodshed and repression against the populace in East Pakistan ...".⁴⁴

The message assured Yahya that in "addressing this appeal to you, we are guided by the generally accepted humanitarian principles set down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and by the concern for the welfare of the friendly Pakistani people". He ended the letter with the hope that the motives that guided the appeal would be correctly interpreted. The letter did not remain a diplomatic secret; it was published in Pravda.⁴⁵

Then came Gromyko's visit to New Delhi and the signing of the Treaty with India. On East Pakistan, the

⁴²Pravda, April 4, 1971. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XXIII, No. 14, pp. 35-36.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Ibid.

joint communique, issued at the end of Gromyko's visit, said that "there can be no military solution". It called for "urgent steps" in East Pakistan "to achieve conditions of safety for the return of the refugees to their homes".⁴⁶

Mrs. Gandhi visited the Soviet Union in September, 1971. At a lunch in her honour on September 28, 1971, Kosygin said that it was impossible to justify the actions of the Pakistani authorities. He also said that the influx of refugees, equal to the size of the population of an average European country, had created a problem for India. He appealed to Yahya to take steps for the political settlement of the problem that would take the legitimate interests of the population into account. He also assured that the Soviet Union would do everything she could to maintain peace.⁴⁷

The joint communique issued at the end of Mrs. Gandhi's visit, called for a political settlement of the problem of East Pakistan, taking into consideration the "inalienable rights and legitimate interests of the people of East Pakistan", and for the swift and safe return of the refugees.⁴⁸

As conditions along the India-East Pakistan borders deteriorated, there began a sustained campaign, in the Soviet Press, against Pakistan. A correspondent wrote in Pravda that Mujib's secret trial was an attempt on the

⁴⁶Pravda, August 12, 1971. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XXIII, No. 32, p.9.

⁴⁷Pravda, September 29, 1971.

⁴⁸Pravda, September 30, 1971.

part of Pakistan to shift responsibility for the events "to those who have been the victims of the large-scale bloody repressions the army has carried out ...". He wrote that the semi-feudal structure in Pakistan was not abolished until 1959; that, according to Pakistani official data, 22 families controlled 65 per cent of industrial production, 80 per cent of banking, and 97 per cent of insurance; that the feudal-monopoly combine used the most reactionary forms of ideology and propaganda, including theocratic tendencies and anti-communism; that, according to official data, East Pakistan received 37 per cent nationwide appropriations under 3 plans although it constituted nearly 60 per cent of the population. The article also repeated the Soviet government's calls for Mujib's release and a political settlement.⁴⁹

Pravda also reported that there were rallies in the diesel locomotive repair plant in Tashkent, a motor plant in Minsk; a bearings plant in Kuibyshev; and a foundry machinery plant in Alma Ata, against mass repression in East Pakistan.⁵⁰

In October 1971, a delegation led by N.P. Firyubin, Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, visited India for talks under the practice of annual consultations and in accordance with article 9 of the Indo-Soviet treaty.⁵¹ After the talks held on October 27, 1971, both "sides

⁴⁹Pravda, October 10, 1971. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XXIII, No. 41, pp.1-2.

⁵⁰Pravda, October 13, 1971. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XXIII, No. 41, p.36.

⁵¹See Appendix I.

agreed completely in their assessment of the present situation."⁵²

Yet another correspondent wrote in Izvestia on November 16, 1971, that "a burden unprecedented in modern history is being thrust on India," forcing her "substantially to reduce appropriations" for progressive socioeconomic reforms. He quoted the Associated Press to the effect that Pakistan had massed 250,000 troops on India's western border; India, in the words of a spokesman of the Indian defence ministry, he wrote, was bringing her troops to "combat readiness" in view of Pakistani steps. He obviously referred to China when he wrote that "... certain political forces located beyond the borders of these countries are not averse to warming their hands by kindling a conflict."⁵³

When the war broke out on December 3, 1971, the United States called a meeting of the United Nations Security Council on December 4, 1971, and introduced a resolution calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal of forces from each other's territories. The Soviet Union vetoed the resolution; Britain and France abstained, while China supported the United States resolution.⁵⁴

On December 5, 1971, the United States introduced yet another resolution calling for^a a cease-fire and withdrawal; the Soviet Union vetoed for the second time.⁵⁵

⁵²Pravda, October 28, 1971. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XXIII, No. 43, p.19.

⁵³Izvestia, November 16, 1971. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XXIII, No. 46, p.20. See also Pravda, November 9, 1971, and November 23, 1971, for more pro-Indian and pro-Bengali comments.

⁵⁴The New York Times, December 5, 1971.

⁵⁵The New York Times, December 6, 1971.

China introduced a resolution of her own condemning India; Russia threatened to veto; whereupon, China withdrew it. Russia sponsored a resolution calling on Pakistan to end all violence in East Pakistan and arrive at a political settlement; this was vetoed by China.⁵⁶

Tass issued a statement on December 5, 1971, saying that Pakistani repression in its eastern wing, and the bombing of Indian airfields on December 3, 1971, were the causes of the war. It said that the Soviet appeals to Pakistan for peaceful political settlement were ignored; that "... the Soviet leaders informed President Yahya Khan that an armed attack against India by Pakistan, under whatever pretext it might be made, would evoke the most resolute condemnation in the Soviet Union". The Soviet Union, the statement continued, could not remain indifferent as the war was taking place "in direct proximity to the borders of the USSR and, hence, involves its security interests". For some inexplicable reason, while the Soviet delegation to the United Nations was vetoing the American-sponsored cease-fire resolutions, the Tass statement went on to declare that the Soviet government was for the immediate cessation of bloodshed and for a political settlement in East Pakistan "based on respect for the legitimate rights and interests of its people". It asked other countries to "refrain from steps that would in one way or another signify their involvement in the conflict and would lead to the further complication

⁵⁶Ibid.

of the situation on the Hindustan peninsula".⁵⁷

In view of the Russian vetoes in the Security Council, the issue was taken to the General Assembly on December 7, 1971. Argentina and others moved a resolution calling for a cease-fire and pull-back of armies from each other's territories. There was overwhelming support for this resolution; it was adopted by 104 to 11 with 10 abstentions. The 11 who opposed the resolution were: the USSR, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Mongolia, Cuba, India and Bhutan. Those who abstained included Britain and France.⁵⁸ The USSR introduced its own resolution calling for a cease-fire without a withdrawal of forces and for a political settlement of the problem. It could not muster any appreciable support.⁵⁹

Addressing the Sixth Congress of the Polish Communist Party on December 7, 1971, Brezhnev said that the bloody suppression of the basic rights and clearly expressed will of East Pakistan's population and the tragedy of ten million refugees generated the conflict. The Soviet Union, he also said, "resolutely" calls for an end to the bloodshed, and peaceful political settlement of existing problems, taking into account the legitimate rights of the people and without any interference by external forces, and the creation of conditions for a

⁵⁷ Pravda, December 6, 1971. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XXIII, No. 49, pp.1-2.

⁵⁸ The New York Times, December 8, 1971.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

lasting and just peace in this region.⁶⁰

Since India ignored the General Assembly's call for a cease-fire and withdrawal, obviously because the war was going in her favour, the issue was taken back to the Security Council, where the United States moved yet another resolution on December 12, 1971, calling for a cease-fire. This time, however, the Soviet delegate, Malik, did not use his veto outright; instead, he asked for time to consult his government. He threatened that if the United States pressed for an immediate vote, he would veto the resolution; the United States did not.⁶¹

When the Security Council met again on December 13, 1971, the Soviet delegate exercised his third veto on the United States resolutions. On the same day, the Tass issued a statement describing the dispatch of United States ships to the Bay of Bengal as gunboat diplomacy.⁶²

The Soviet Union also remained unmoved by the inspired leak in Washington that Nixon might cancel his visit to Moscow.⁶³ The Moscow correspondent of The New York Times reported that the Soviet Union ignored the leak.⁶⁴ On the same day, a spokesman for the State Department said that the possibility of cancelling the visit was not "a live issue".⁶⁵

After the war ended, a correspondent wrote in Pravda that the "provocative support" from the United States

⁶⁰ Pravda, December 8, 1971. See also Pravda, December 10, 1971 and Izvestia, December 12, 1971, for more pro-Indian comments.

⁶¹ The New York Times, December 13, 1971.

⁶² The New York Times, December 14, 1971.

⁶³ See p. 206.

⁶⁴ The New York Times, December 16, 1971.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

and China enabled Pakistan to repress the Bengalis. The article then referred to the Chinese anti-Indian campaign in India's neighbouring countries since the border hostilities in 1962 "to compromise India" in the eyes of the people of developing countries and to isolate her in order to make the path easier for her (China) to assume the leadership of the "so-called" Third World.⁶⁶

"International observers", the correspondent continued, "noted the circumstance that Pakistan's warning about the possible start of a war with India in 10 days coincided with the stay in Pakistan of a Chinese delegation headed by Li Chui-Ching, the Minister of the Machine Building Industry. The warning period expired on December 3, and on December 3, Pakistani aircraft carried out a bombing strike against Indian airports".⁶⁷

While Nixon persevered in his policy of holding India largely responsible for the war even after the event,⁶⁸ the Soviet Union continued the policy of justifying the Indian action. Speaking at a lunch that Bhutto gave for the Soviet leaders in Moscow, Kosygin said on March 17, 1972, that the Bangla crisis was determined by a clash of opposing forces: on the one hand the forces of national liberation, and, on the other hand, the forces of an anti-popular military dictatorship that joined ranks with external aggressive circles hostile to the peoples of Hindustan, including the Pakistani people.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Pravda, December 28, 1971. Complete text in CDSP, Vol. XXIII, No. 52, p.1.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ See p. 292

⁶⁹ Pravda, March 18, 1972.

The Soviet Union, Kosygin continued, pleaded for a peaceful political settlement; this was ignored by Pakistan. If history were to repeat itself, the Soviet Union would again take the same position because she was convinced it was correct.⁷⁰

EVALUATION

The Soviet Bangla policy evolved as the crisis in the subcontinent deepened, and international power configurations changed. The American policy remained rigidly pro-Pakistani from the beginning to the end. To start with, in January 1971, Kosygin sent his Tashkent anniversary greetings to India and Pakistan; this was a reiteration of his mid-1960s policy of playing the role of a peace-maker between the two. In March 1971, there was a general election in India in which Mrs. Gandhi secured a two-thirds majority in the lower house of the Indian Parliament, on the basis of a radical manifesto, and formed a stable government. In the same month, a civil war broke out in Pakistan and it was at the verge of disintegration. Obviously, in terms of power equations, a large and stable country is preferable to a small and disintegrating one; it was not surprising if Moscow gave up the mid-1960s policy of parity between India and Pakistan.

The apparent justification for the American silence was the concept of state sovereignty and a desire to work for a peaceful settlement of the problem without offending Pakistan. None of these could impress India; East

⁷⁰Ibid.

Pakistan ceased to be an internal issue of Pakistan the moment millions of refugees crossed the border; the United States attempts at peaceful solution were never publicly mentioned until the war broke out; and then it was used to blame India. The United States completely ignored the moral dimension of the problem. Therefore, Podgorny's message to Yahya in April 1971,⁷¹ was bound to impress India, more so, because there was no particularly significant international development against the background of which this message could be described as a move of diplomatic expediency. It cannot be said either that at that early stage Pakistan's dismemberment was foreseen. In fact, even after the war broke out both the Tass statement as well as Brezhnev's speech at the Polish Party Congress called for an end to bloodshed and political settlement of the problem,⁷² though, curiously, the Soviet delegation was vetoing the American resolutions in the Security Council to more or less the same effect. Therefore, in India the Russian Bangla policy would be considered logical: in January 1971 when nothing happened in East Pakistan, Kosygin sent his usual annual Tashkent greetings; in April 1971 when the extent of human suffering in East Pakistan was known, Podgorny called for an end to military brutalities and respect for the rights of East Pakistanis; the contrast with the rigidly pro-Pakistani United States policy was obvious. This enabled

⁷¹See pp. 293 - 94

⁷²See pp. 298 - 99

Moscow to effectively influence Indian public opinion.

Nixon's dramatic announcement in July 1971 of a trip to Peking was equally a cause for concern for the Soviet Union.⁷³ Thereafter, the Soviet Bangla policy became a three dimensional one; it met the American diplomatic coup on the Chinese front with a Soviet one by signing a treaty with India; it countered Chinese support to Pakistan with strong support to India and sought to demonstrate the limitations on Chinese power effectively to tilt the balance in the subcontinent; it sought to bolster its position in India, which had suffered some set-back when Soviet arms were supplied to Pakistan in 1968, and in the process to earn the gratitude of the new nation, Bangladesh.

When the issue was raised in the United Nations, there was no unanimity among the Western nations on the Bangla crisis; Britain and France abstained from all votes in the United Nations. The complete identity of approach exhibited by the United States and China in the United Nations must have aroused Soviet fears. Therefore, the Soviet Union repeatedly used its veto; this was a reminder to the United States that she alone, or in conjunction with China, could not be very effective in finding a solution to the crisis without Moscow's co-operation. The political dividends that her policy in the United Nations could reap in India, considering India's pique with the United States, were not inconsider-

⁷³See Chapter VII I, p. 250.

able either.

After two Soviet vetoes in the Security Council, the issue was referred to the General Assembly where the Soviet isolation was complete. The Argentine resolution⁷⁴ was opposed by only Soviet bloc countries, excluding Rumania, and India and Bhutan. Unless an issue directly impinges on her own interests, like the United Nations censures on her invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union would not adopt a stand that would result in almost all countries of the Third World voting against her. When she did, as when she opposed, for tactical reasons, an Afro-Asian move to amend the United Nations Charter to enlarge some of the United Nations principal organs, the Soviet Foreign Ministry gave a patient explanation as to why it was done.⁷⁵ The fact that the Soviet Union chose to be alienated from Afro-Asia on this issue was probably because she considered that the growing Sino-American warmth directly affected her interests; this called for a countervailing step; so, she threw her support behind India.

It must, however, be mentioned that the Soviet Union seemed to have wavered a bit after exercising two vetoes. When the issue was debated in the General Assembly, the Soviet Union moved her own resolution, knowing the mood of the members, calling for a cease-fire without withdrawal of forces.⁷⁶ This was the first time during

⁷⁴See p. 299.

⁷⁵See Chapter VI, pp. 228-29

⁷⁶See p. 299

the crisis that the Soviet Union mentioned cease-fire in the United Nations. And when the issue went back to the Security Council, after the General Assembly's resolution was ignored by India, the United States moved another resolution on December 12, 1971, calling for cease-fire; this time the Russian delegate asked for time to consult his government; he did not exercise a veto outright. But this caution did not last long. As the war progressed into the second week, it was clear that Pakistan would lose its eastern wing. It makes diplomatic sense to support the winning side, the more so when the losing side is not going to go down in history as a martyr in the cause of any great moral mission. So the Soviet Union gave up its wavering and vetoed for the third time on December 13, 1971.⁷⁷

To America, the Soviet Bangla policy presented a challenge for a challenge: if the United States would upset the balance in the Far East to Russia's disadvantage by her new China policy, the Soviet Union would upset the balance in South Asia to America's disadvantage by her new South Asia policy. America could not completely ignore this development. However great was Nixon's eagerness to befriend China he would not write off India. This becomes evident from his Foreign Policy Report to the Congress in 1973.⁷⁸ The Soviet Union could, therefore, use her treaty with India and her strong support to New Delhi in the crisis, which enabled it successfully to defy the United States, for bargaining with Nixon: if the

⁷⁷See p. 300.

⁷⁸See Conclusions, p. 412, footnote 47.

United States President practised circumspection in his dealings with China, Moscow would be a restraining force on India in the Bangla crisis.

If warmth between China and the United States arouses fears, suspicions and jealousies in the USSR, too cosy a relationship between India and the USSR causes similar feelings in the United States, as is borne out by Nixon's Foreign Policy Report referred to above. Thus, China and India could be useful bargaining points for the United States and the USSR respectively in the process of adjusting their interests in that part of the world.

In the Bangla crisis, the Soviet Union seemed to have used her support of India and her standing there for defying as well as conciliating the United States. We have seen how the USSR defied the United States as well as the United Nations in allying herself with India in the crisis. Nixon's annual Foreign Policy Report in 1972 provides a clue as to how the Soviet Union used the Bangla crisis ultimately to conciliate the United States. He wrote that the "Soviet attitude during the crisis in South Asia has dangerous implications for other regional conflicts, even though in the end the USSR played a restraining role".⁷⁹ That cryptic reference to ^aSoviet "restraining role", although, "in the end", is significant. Reference has already been made to Nixon's allegations that India wanted to seize Pakistan-held Kashmir and destroy the Pakistani armed forces.⁸⁰ Since these two statements

⁷⁹The New York Times, February 10, 1972.

⁸⁰See p. 292

of Nixon, viz. Soviet restraining role in the end, and allegations that India intended to occupy Pakistan-held Kashmir and destroy ^{the} Pakistani armed forces, are found in the same document, I am inclined to think that the Soviet Union must have claimed credit for India's unilateral declaration of cease-fire in the western sector once Pakistani forces surrendered in East Pakistan. If it were so, the Bangla crisis was used by the Soviet Union to 1) Remind the United States that if she unilaterally decided to shape the destiny of the world or any part thereof, Moscow could foil such plans; and, that any Sino-American moves to the disadvantage of her interests would be stoutly resisted (her role in the United Nations in the Bangla crisis). 2) Signal to Washington that she would be prepared for a moderate and constructive role on the basis of equality and mutual benefit (her restraining role at the end of Bangla crisis). This message did not seem to have gone in vain: having exchanged toasts with Peking, Nixon turned his attention to summit meetings and agreements with Moscow with much vigour.

Until fears subside and normalisation takes place in Sino-Soviet relations, the Soviet Union would use every opportunity to thwart Chinese ambitions. In the Bangla crisis India was in a position to fend for herself with only Soviet diplomatic support and supply of some sophisticated weapons on commercial terms. China's client, Pakistan, was not in a similar position. All that China could give was vociferous support in and outside the United Nations, and some arms; she would not directly intervene, for fear of dangerous consequences. China's discomfiture was all the more glaring when viewed in the

context of her helplessness to save East Pakistan where there was an anti-Indian, anti-Soviet, pro-Mao party, the National Awami Party, led by Maulana Bhasani,⁸¹ who himself fled to India for shelter in the wake of the crackdown on Bengalis. Intelligent Pakistanis should have become aware of the limitations on China's ability decisively to tilt the balance in favour of Pakistan in the sub-continent. It is not surprising that Bhutto visited the Soviet Union in March 1972, on his own initiative, to repair Pakistani relations with Moscow.⁸² Again, after India conducted an underground nuclear explosion in May 1974, Bhutto decided to visit Moscow to discuss with the Soviet leaders its effects on Pakistan.⁸³ The visit took place in October 1974. At a dinner given by the Soviet government for Bhutto, he said that the Soviet Union exercised a positive influence on the normalisation of relations between the countries of South Asia. He also referred to Moscow's constructive contribution to the withdrawal of the Indian forces from Pakistani territory

⁸¹Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani led the National Awami Party. Since Communist party was banned in Pakistan, many Communists functioned through the NAP. He was suspect in the eyes of the Pakistani establishment before relations with China grew warm. In November 1963, he led a delegation to China on behalf of Ayub Khan. According to Bhasani's taped interview with Tariq Ali, who quoted it in his book *Military Rule or Peoples Power*, Mao told him (Bhasani) that China's relationship with Pakistan was extremely fragile and that the United States, the USSR, and India would do their best to break this. Mao also told him that his anti-Ayub agitation would only strengthen the United States, USSR and India and advised him to be cautious. Bhasani opposed the Tashkent accord between India and Pakistan. See Tapan Das, Sino-Pak Collusion and the U.S. Policy (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1972), pp. 98-100 and 121.

⁸²See Chapter V, p. 179

⁸³The Guardian, July 6, 1974.

and the release of 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war. He expressed his gratitude for this.⁸⁴ The fact that Pakistan considers that the maintenance of correct relations with Moscow is in her interest in view of its (Moscow's) influence in India speaks for Pakistani disbelief in China's ability to protect her (Pakistani) interests against India; the Soviet Bangladesh policy, to that extent, deflated Peking's image in the subcontinent.

In the subcontinent the Soviet policy achieved three objectives: 1) It called Pakistan's attention to Moscow's ability to manoeuvre in the subcontinent: her evenhandedness in the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, her initiative for the Tashkent Conference, her sale of arms to Pakistan in 1968 in spite of strong Indian opposition, and then her diplomatic help in the process of the birth of Bangladesh. The contrast was obvious: China does not have the same elbow-room. (Reference has just been made to instances which seem to suggest that Pakistan is conscious of this difference; that is a gain for Russia.)

2. The Treaty and Moscow's Bangladesh policy repaired relations with India, which showed some signs of cooling after the supply of Soviet arms to Pakistan in 1968. By her Bangladesh policy, the Soviet Union impressed the Indian public how effective and helpful the treaty is in protecting Indian interests. Nixon, on the other hand, indulged in an exercise in futility by the dispatch of naval ships to the Bay of Bengal. Nixon would not use his ships against India for fear of international complications; their presence in the Bay did not save East

⁸⁴ Pravda, October 25, 1974.

Pakistan either. He only angered Indian public opinion and thus unwittingly contributed to Russian popularity in India.⁸⁵

Twice did Sardar Swaran Singh publicly express India's gratitude to the Soviet Union for Podgorny's message to General Yahya Khan.⁸⁶ In the joint communique issued on September 29, 1971, at the end of Mrs. Gandhi's visit to the Soviet Union, the two sides agreed to maintain further contacts with one another and to continue the exchange of opinions on questions arising out of the Bangla crisis.⁸⁷ In essence, India agreed to take the Soviet Union into confidence before taking any action.⁸⁸ The state of Indian public opinion being what it was, such public expressions of gratitude to and confidence in the Soviet Union by the Indian leaders would further strengthen the popular image of Moscow in India.

While the Anglo-American press did its duty creditably by the suffering masses of East Pakistan, when the war broke out, some of the big papers could not resist their habit of making caustic comments on India.⁸⁹ The Soviet press not only focused on the suffering of East Pakistanis, but also justified India. One commentator in Pravda wrote that China wanted to compromise India in the

⁸⁵The New York Times editorially commented on December 16, 1971, that Pakistani military debacle was also "a diplomatic debacle for the United States".

⁸⁶See Pravda, June, 9, 1971, and August 12, 1971.

⁸⁷Pravda, September 30, 1971.

⁸⁸For President Kennedy's complaint to Nehru against his failure to consult with the United States before taking military action in Goa, See Chapter VI, p. 185

⁸⁹See p. 289.

eyes of the third world countries to make it easier for Peking to assume its leadership.⁹⁰ That amounted to saying that the Soviet Union considered India a candidate for leadership, which China was trying to pre-empt. Since India is aware of the controlled nature of the Soviet press, credit for such comments would be given to the Soviet government too. The Soviet government's indifference to Nixon's clumsily-handled threat of cancellation of visit to Moscow,⁹¹ would appeal to India's national ego. In the conditions prevailing then, this gesture would be interpreted in India as Soviet estimate of her importance even in comparison with Washington. All such steps during the crisis helped push Soviet prestige in India to the top.

3. The Soviet Union earned the gratitude of the new nation, Bangladesh. In contrast with Nixon's policy, the Soviet policy would certainly look benign to the suffering Bengalis.⁹² Moscow could claim some gains for the movement too. After having been banned for twenty years under Pakistani rule, the Communist Party was allowed to function openly in Bangladesh for sometime before she became a one-party state.⁹³

Thus, India fought an expensive war, bore a major

⁹⁰See p. 301

⁹¹See p. 300

⁹²For critical comments on the United States' policy during the Bangladesh crisis and expressions of gratitude to the Soviet Union by the leaders of the new nation, see Pravda, January 9, 1972, The New York Times, February 21, 1972, and Pravda, March 5, 1972.

⁹³Pravda, January 24, 1972.

burden of the maintenance of the refugees and emerged as the dominant power on the subcontinent; Bengalis suffered untold miseries; Pakistan suffered defeat and dismemberment; China's helplessness to give effective help to her friend was exposed; the United States suffered "a diplomatic debacle";⁹⁴ but, the Soviet Union scored many diplomatic successes over her rivals practically at no cost to herself.

⁹⁴See p. 311, footnote 85.

CHAPTER IX

INDO-SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS

BACKGROUND

Contrasting the historical developments in Europe with those in underdeveloped countries, Nehru once said that in Europe an economic revolution preceded a political revolution; when the latter came, certain resources had been built up by economic changes. In Asia, he said, it was the reverse. It is obvious, he continued, that these underdeveloped countries could not go through the long process which had industrialised Europe and America. There was constant social pressure which might well upset the political fabric unless the people were given something to satisfy their longings.¹

It has already been mentioned that Nehru was impressed by Soviet planning and thought that some such method had to be adopted in India to achieve quick progress.² At its annual session in 1931, the Indian National Congress discussed the question of planning and recommended state economic planning to eliminate poverty. In October 1938 a conference of ministers of industries adopted a resolution stating that industrialisation was the key to economic growth in India. A National Planning Committee was set up, under Nehru's Chairmanship, charged with the

¹Jawaharlal Nehru, India To-day and To-morrow (New Delhi: Indian Council for Cultural Relations, 1960), pp.15-16.

²See Chapter II p.82.

responsibility of developing such a plan.³

In April 1948, the Congress adopted an economic programme under which munitions, atomic energy and railways were to be under public ownership; and new ventures in coal, iron and steel, aircraft manufacture, shipbuilding, telegraphic and telephone industries, and minerals were to be reserved for the State.⁴

Realisation of some sort of an egalitarian society was one of the goals of the Indian National Congress. Mahatma Gandhi hoped to achieve it through his utopian ideal of the owners of means of production holding their properties in trust for the good of the society. But most other great leaders felt that that should be brought about by state intervention within the liberal-democratic set up. Accordingly, they included the Directive Principles of State Policy in part IV of the Indian Constitution. These, unlike the Fundamental Rights included in part III of the Constitution, are not enforceable by Courts of Law. The Directive Principles sound socialist in content: The State shall strive to discourage the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment, secure, within the limits of its economic capacity, the right to work, education, and public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness, and secure just and humane conditions of work

³Leo Tansky, The US and the USSR Aid to Developing Countries: A Comparative Study of India, Turkey and the UAR, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967), p.69.

⁴Michael Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography, pp.510-511.

and living wage etc.⁵

Dr. Solomon, an American engineer, who was Nehru's personal adviser between 1949-1950, advised the creation of a central agency to evolve a unified national plan. In March 1950, a 6-member Planning Commission was set up.⁶

While Mahatma Gandhi preferred cottage industries, Nehru was for heavy industry. He wanted "certain basic, key, mother industries in the country ... out of which other industries grow. If we do not do that we shall remain dependent on others".⁷

In 1956, Nehru got the Industrial Policy Resolution adopted in Parliament. This divided industries into 3 categories: 1) Industries the future development of which will be the exclusive responsibility of the State. 2) Those which will be progressively state-owned and in which the state will, therefore, generally take the initiative in establishing new undertakings. But private enterprise will also be expected to supplement the effort of the State. 3) All other industries whose future development will, in general, be left to the initiative and enterprise of the private sector. Under this policy, ammunitions, atomic energy, iron and steel, coal, heavy machine building industry etc. were exclusively reserved for the State.⁸

⁵See Articles 39-43 in Durga Das Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, Vol. I, (Calcutta: S.C. Sarkar & Sons Ltd., 1955), pp.395-398.

⁶Michael Brecher, op.cit., p.515.

⁷Quoted in Asha L. Datar, India's Economic Relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe 1953-1969 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p.21.

⁸P.J. Eldrige, The Politics of Foreign Aid in India (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), pp.197-199.

The birth of India as a free nation coincided with the beginning of the Cold War. For reasons discussed already, India's response to the Cold War was non-alignment.⁹

THE SOVIET UNION DECIDES ON GIVING AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The new nations' desire for quick economic development and their need for foreign aid inevitably made economic aid one of the components of Cold War diplomacy. The United States had already begun extending aid to new nations. The post-Stalin leadership, which had changed the strategy and tactics of Soviet foreign policy,¹⁰ could not ignore the importance of economic aid in foreign policy.

Perforce, they had to find an ideological justification for foreign aid. The Conference of World Communist Parties in 1960 and the XXIIInd CPSU Congress in 1961 found a high sounding ideological justification for it: "international duty".¹¹

However, the discussion of the problem of reconciling aid to bourgeois states with ideology continued. The author of a Soviet book, Pavlov, thought that the Indian bourgeoisie adopts a "contradictory" stand on the contem-

⁹See Chapter II. "Even in accepting economic help", said Nehru in March 1948, "or in getting political help, it is not a wise policy to put all our eggs in one basket. Nor should we get help at the cost of our self-respect". India's Foreign Policy, p.35.

¹⁰See Chapter I, pp. 53 - 62 and Chapter III, pp. 103 - 105

¹¹See Pravda, December 6, 1960, for the Statement issued by the Conference; and the Road to Communism, p.497.

porary world problems; on the one hand, it preserves the capitalist character of India's economic progress, on the other, it offers resistance to continued attempts of foreign monopolies to regain control over her economy.¹² He theorised that for the Indian bourgeoisie, "the achievement of economic self-sufficiency is vitally important, signifying above all the consolidation of the sovereign bourgeois state as the mainstay of political independence from imperialism and as a decisive factor for the class domination of the bourgeoisie within the country".¹³

Pavlov considered the public sector industries in non-Communist states as of state capitalist nature in view of the political domination of the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, it is progressive because it helps their independent economic development.¹⁴

By the late 1960s, some Soviet scholars even began doubting the wisdom of judging the developments in under-developed states strictly from the Soviet ideological angles. For example, a Soviet writer, Zarine, wrote in 1968 that classes are not well-defined in developing countries; racial, national, tribal and even religious feelings often predominate over class-consciousness. Therefore, the "degree to which these factors influence

¹²V.I. Pavlov, India: Economic Freedom Versus Imperialism (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1963), p.19.

¹³Ibid., p.16.

¹⁴Ibid., p.31. See also I.A. Benediktov, Bonds of Friendship: On Soviet Indian Friendship (New Delhi: Soviet Land Booklets, Information Department of the USSR Embassy in India, 1973), pp.17-18.

social life should be taken into account when analysing the social and class structure in the emerging countries".¹⁵

The proletariat in developing countries has "periodic or permanent connection with the countryside"; this hampers the development of its class-consciousness. The fact that the anti-imperialist struggle in former colonies and dependent territories is not yet over determines one of the features of class struggle in the Third World "namely, the historical necessity for all the nation's progressive forces to rally in a united anti-imperialist front against neocolonialism. This front unites various classes and social strata despite the antagonistic contradictions between them. Their close alliance is the guarantee of success in the struggle".¹⁶

While no general democratic programme, wrote Zarine, could be realised within the narrow framework of capitalism, nevertheless, in "present-day conditions, it is becoming less and less advisable to rely on sudden action by the revolutionary forces ...".¹⁷

He added that in "countries lacking the objective prerequisites for a socialist revolution, the liberation movement can only be a national-democratic one even under the most favourable conditions".¹⁸ If class collaboration could be advocated, as Zarine did, Soviet aid to the Third

¹⁵D. Zarine, "Classes and class struggle in Developing Countries", International Affairs (Moscow), No. 4 (1968), pp.47-48.

¹⁶Ibid., p.50.

¹⁷Ibid., p.52.

¹⁸Ibid. Zarine also found Leninist sanction for his argument in a quotation from Lenin's collected works Vol. II (Moscow, 1962), p.214. Ibid. For a definition of a national-democratic state, see Chapter I, pp. 57 - 58.

World countries could be justified too.

Since the mid-1960s, the Soviet writers and spokesmen have been emphasising the need for trade "with all countries participating in international division of labour irrespective of their social systems".¹⁹

By the mid-1960s, some Soviet economists began advocating that consideration be given to the economic aspects of foreign aid: some of them considered aid-giving primarily as an alternative to domestic investment and argued that it would be cheaper to import certain goods and materials than to produce them at home, as well as to have the East Europeans replace some of the raw materials they obtained from the Soviet Union by imports from Africa and Asia.²⁰

Thus, an ideological as well as economic justification for foreign aid was found.

We now take a look at Soviet assistance to India in various fields.

STEEL PLANTS

It is estimated that India has reserves of 20 billion tonnes of high-grade iron-ore;²¹ and 130 billion tonnes

¹⁹Prof. N. Iyubimov, "Soviet Foreign Trade Problems", *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 8 (1965), p.12. See also V. Arkhipov and A. Bykov, Free Trade or Exclusive Blocs? (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1971), p.27, and for a criticism of the Chinese autarkic policies, B.G. Gafurov et al., Asia and Africa: Fundamental Changes (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1972), pp.114-115.

²⁰Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, "New Trends in Soviet Economic Relations with the Third World", World Politics, Vol. XXII, No. 3 (April 1970), p.416.

²¹Barbara Ward, "India and the West", International Affairs (London), Vol. XXXVII, No. 4 (October 1961), p.442.

of coal.²² At the time of independence, India's total steel production was only 1 million tonnes. Therefore, the government of India wanted to set up a steel mill under state management to increase steel production.

BHILLAI As early as 1952, India approached the World Bank for a loan to set up a steel mill in the public sector. But the Bank refused credit and suggested that the government should let ^{the} private sector set up a mill.²³ India then turned to Britain and West Germany for help.

This was the period when the new Soviet leaders were looking for avenues for implementing their new forward policy.²⁴ India's weak bargaining position in her efforts to secure help from Britain and West Germany for a steel mill could not have gone unnoticed in Moscow. And the Soviet Union stepped in to help India.

Indian faith in British technology during this period becomes evident from what Khrushchev let the world know in his memoirs recently. He wrote: "Our engineers prepared a blueprint for the project and submitted it to the Indians, who asked if we would mind if they let some English engineers review the plant". Khrushchev commented that that "seemed like a fairly original way of doing business"; but the Soviet Union told India that she had no objection to that.²⁵

²²The Times of India Directory and Year Book 1972,
(Bombay) p.43.

²³Asha L. Datar, op.cit., p.69.

²⁴See Chapter III, pp. 103 - 105

²⁵Strobe Talbott, transl. and ed., op.cit., p.302.

The Soviet offer certainly improved India's bargaining position. The Soviet offer was also economically advantageous. The Indian government estimated that the difference between the interest charged on the Soviet Bhilai credit and the Rourkela (West German plant) credit would result in a saving of \$17 millions, equal to about 10 per cent of the German credit for the plant.²⁶

An agreement was signed in February 1960, to expand the production capacity of Bhilai to 2.5 million tonnes a year from the original 1 million tonnes.²⁷ Another recent agreement envisages this to go up to 4 million tonnes a year by September 1979.²⁸ Yet another protocol was signed in February 1973, for further expansion of Bhilai's capacity to 7 million tonnes a year.²⁹

However, financial stringency put under a cloud the expansion programme at Bhilai from 2.5 million tonnes to 4 million tonnes. This is because of the sharp rise in the cost of expansion - from the original Rs.2.50 billions to nearly Rs.10 billions based on June 1974 prices.³⁰ Indian steel technologists are opposed to any further expansion of Bhilai and Bokaro (see below). As it is, they say, the installed capacity is not being utilised because of bad maintenance, labour indiscipline and generally lower efficiency. These problems would only become more complex in larger plants.³¹

²⁶ Eastern Economist, February 11, 1955, p.218, as quoted in P.J. Eldrige, op.cit., p.34.

²⁷ Pravda, February 13, 1960.

²⁸ The Overseas Hindustan Times, February 20, 1975.

²⁹ The Hindustan Times, February 18, 1973.

³⁰ A.K. Sen, "Bhilai's Impressive Record", The Overseas Hindustan Times, February 20, 1975.

³¹ The Overseas Hindustan Times, January 2, 1975.

BOKARO In view of the shortage of steel felt by India, the government wanted to have one more steel mill under state management, at Bokaro.

There were some prominent Americans who felt that the United States should help India build a steel mill in ^{the} public sector. The then United States ambassador to India, Galbraith, wrote: "This project (Bokaro) is very important. It is needed, useful and symbolic. Many of the things we are doing are rather anonymous - we provide copper and other non-ferrous metals which are needed and useful but not very dramatic".³² A U.S. Steel Corporation team studied the Bokaro steel plant and found the site acceptable; it did not question the need for the plant.³³ But in the meantime the Clay Committee, appointed by the United States President to advise on aid and other related issues, submitted its Report. It said that too much of United States aid was given to public undertakings and not enough consideration had been given to the "interests of our economic system", and called for the expansion of the aid to private undertakings which "alone could make the greatest contribution to rapid economic growth and overall development".³⁴ President Kennedy came out strongly in favour of helping India build Bokaro in ^{the} public sector.³⁵ Galbraith also thought that enough had already been said along Clay's ideological line

³² John Kenneth Galbraith, op.cit., p.215.

³³ Ibid., p.468.

³⁴ Quoted in Leo Tansky, op.cit., p.6.

³⁵ John K. Galbraith, op.cit., p.572.

"to cause everyone to suppose our concern was to sustain capitalism rather than help the Indians".³⁶ All this did not help. The House of Representatives excluded Bokaro from the scope of the foreign aid bill for 1963-1964, without mentioning it. Thereupon, Nehru withdrew the request for aid for Bokaro.³⁷

Then, India turned to the Soviet Union, which agreed to help in the construction of the mill. A 20-member team of Soviet experts came to India in August 1964 to make a study of the project. Following this, an agreement was signed on January 25, 1965, for Soviet co-operation in the construction of Bokaro with an initial production capacity of 1.5 to 2 million tonnes to be later expanded to 4 million tonnes. The Soviet Union granted credit up to 200 million roubles.³⁸

Ever since the United States evinced interest in Bokaro, the Soviet press and scholars closely followed the developments. A correspondent wrote in Izvestia in June 1963 that the United States interest in Bokaro was influenced by "the fact that it is already difficult to make a propaganda fortune out of the stale surpluses of agricultural products that make up the lion's share of American aid".³⁹ Referring to suggestions in some United States quarters that the U.S. Steel Corporation should have a share in the capital of the plant in spite of the

³⁶Ibid., p.544.

³⁷Bokaro, A Mile Stone in India's Progress (New Delhi: Information Department of the USSR Embassy, (n.d.)), p.58 (hereinafter referred to as Bokaro).

³⁸Ibid., p.59.

³⁹Izvestia, June 9, 1963. Complete text in CDSF, Vol. XV, No. 23, p.20.

knowledge that India had resisted similar West German demands in Rourkela, Pavlov wrote: "A class about to be superseded on the historic scene is at times apt to lose all sense of proportion".⁴⁰ By the time Pavlov's book went to the print, the United States administration's efforts to finance Bokaro had not yet fallen through. Therefore, he wrote that the United States might change its attitude to public sector. "The Indian public which has long seen through the reasons for the British and West German monopolies' participation in state-sponsored steel projects will undoubtedly be able to discern the enforced nature of possible changes in American policies as well."⁴¹ He, thus, sought to ensure credit for the Soviet Union in case the United States changed. After the Indo-Soviet agreement for Soviet help for the construction of Bokaro was signed, a correspondent wrote in Pravda in January 1965 that the United States repeated the story of Aswan in India.⁴²

The United States estimates for the three stages of Bokaro were Rs.7,147.8 million; ⁴³ the Soviet estimates were Rs.10,273.22 million. ⁴⁴ Such plants with similar facilities as Bokaro were built in the United Kingdom, Japan, Italy, France, in the past few years at less than half the cost of Bokaro.⁴⁵ In the United States estimate,

⁴⁰V.I. Pavlov, op.cit., p.177.

⁴¹Ibid., p.178.

⁴²Pravda, January 30, 1965.

⁴³Before devaluation in June 1966, the exchange rate was \$1.00 = Rupees 4.76 and after devaluation, \$1.00 = Rs. 7.50.

⁴⁴Asha L. Datar, op.cit., pp.226-227.

⁴⁵Ibid., p.228.

the foreign exchange component was \$512.6 million. This was to be financed by a 20-year loan at $5\frac{3}{4}$ per cent interest. The foreign exchange component in the Soviet estimate was 200 million roubles; this credit was to be granted by Moscow at $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent interest for 12 years.⁴⁶

A Soviet booklet described Bokaro as "India's first 'Swadeshi' steel plant".⁴⁷ Swadeshi means indigenous. The Sanskrit word has an emotional connotation in India. In the first decade of this century, the Swadeshi movement had advocated the boycott of British goods and the use of Indian-made ones.⁴⁸ The Soviet publication tried to make use of that term for diplomatic benefit.

However, it has to be said that it is not mere propaganda; there is a large element of truth in the claim inasmuch as Indian participation and Indian-made equipment in the construction of Bokaro played a dominant role.

The Hindustan Steelworks Construction Limited (HSCL) was entrusted with the entire civil engineering work as well as with the work of supplying and erecting steel structures. The Heavy Engineering Corporation, Ranchi, supplied 28,780 tonnes of steel structures besides 163,000 tonnes supplied by the HSCL. Almost all steel structurals except for 16.5 thousand tonnes from the Soviet Union were to be procured indigenously. The Heavy Engineering Corporation also supplied 72,000 tonnes of equipment, i.e. one-fourth of the total used. The Mining and Allied Machinery Corporation, Durgapur, Instrumentation Ltd., Kota,

⁴⁶ Ibid., p.229.

⁴⁷ Bokaro, p.11.

⁴⁸ See K. Santhanam, British Imperialism and Indian Nationalism (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1972), p.47.

the Heavy Electrical Equipment, Hardware - all of them built with Soviet assistance - were also required to supply some sophisticated equipment. The indigenous content of equipment supplied for Stage I is 64 per cent.⁴⁹

In the technical and design work too, Indian participation was considerable. One hundred and ten smaller and subsidiary units out of a total of 286 were designed by Dastur Company, an Indian firm. A dozen Indian design experts specialising in different fields were associated with the preparation of the Detailed Project Report by the Soviet design institute, Gipromez. Almost all design work for the expansion stage will be in Indian hands. To sum up, about 90 per cent of building structures, 100 per cent of technological structures, 48 per cent of electrical equipment and 60 per cent of refractories are being obtained from indigenous sources.⁵⁰

According to I.S. Eroyan, head of the Soviet specialists at Bokaro, originally out of 197,000 tonnes of refractories required for the Bokaro plant, the Soviet Union was to deliver only 4,500 tonnes. But later it became clear that the Indian plants would not be able to deliver their share. So, the Soviet Union agreed to supply 45,000 tonnes. Saying that there is scarcity of refractories in the world, Eroyan wrote that, in fact, "we had to cut down refractory supplies to our own industry in order to fill in the gap in Bokaro".⁵¹

⁴⁹Bokaro, pp.60-61. However, elsewhere in the booklet the share of indigenous content is put at 55 per cent. Ibid., p.12.

⁵⁰Ibid., p.61.

⁵¹Ibid., p.24.

Under a protocol signed in February 1973, the capacity of Bokaro would be expanded to 10 million tonnes a year for which the Soviet Union would grant necessary credits.⁵²

HEAVY MACHINES

Nehru's preference for heavy machinery has already been mentioned.⁵³ It was natural, therefore, that the Government of India invited a British and a Soviet team to make reports on the possibility of building heavy machinery plants in India in the 1950s. Both made reports. The Soviet report was accepted because of the availability of credits.⁵⁴

In the late 1950s, three Russian-financed plants were set up: 1. The Heavy Engineering Plant at Ranchi which produces 80,000 tonnes of equipment a year for ferrous metallurgy, aluminium, chemical and cement industries and building machinery. 2. The Mining Equipment Plant at Durgapur which produces 45,000 tonnes of equipment for mining as well as ports. 3. The Heavy Electricals Plant in Hardwar which produces large and medium size electric machines and hydro and steam units. The plant manufactures turbine sets with capacities of 100,000 and 200,000 kilowatts each. When keyed up to designed capacity, the plant will be able to provide an

⁵²The Hindustan Times, February 18, 1973.

⁵³See p. 316

⁵⁴See Asha L. Datar, op.cit., pp. 204-205.

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increase in the installed generating capacity of 2.7 million kilowatts a year.⁵⁵

PHARMACEUTICALS

Even in 1950, the average life expectancy in India was 32.1 years.⁵⁶ Epidemics were common. Massive government effort was needed to improve the situation. Cheap medicines was one of the means of improving health.

In the 1950s, the pharmaceutical industry in India was heavily dominated by Western companies. Prices were high. Hardly any important medicines were manufactured in India; they were more encapsuled and packed. Drugs were heavily protected by patents.

In 1955-1956, the Soviet Union offered to set up plants to manufacture anti-biotics and surgical instruments.⁵⁷ Then, the United States firms in India offered to bring down import prices for drugs.⁵⁸

During the visit to the Soviet Union of an Indian economic delegation led by two cabinet ministers in May 1959, an agreement was signed for the construction of plants in public sector for the manufacture of medicines and surgical instruments with Soviet assistance and credits.⁵⁹ Three plants were set up under this agreement:

1. An anti-biotics plant at Rishikesh.
2. A synthetic

⁵⁵See S. Skachkov, "Projects of Soviet-Indian Economic and Technical Co-operation - An Important Factor in the Development of Indian Economy", in Mission of Friendship, pp.147-148.

⁵⁶The Times of India Directory and Year Book, p.139. It is now 52.5 years. Ibid.

⁵⁷Asha L. Datar, op.cit., p.70.

⁵⁸Ibid., p.71.

⁵⁹It was signed on May 29, 1959. Izvestia, May 31, 1959.

drugs plant at Hyderabad. 3. A surgical instruments factory in Madras.⁶⁰

OIL INDUSTRY

After becoming independent, India signed agreements with 3 western firms under which they set up refineries in India. Under these agreements, the companies were given complete freedom regarding the sources of supply of crude oil and prices.⁶¹

In 1959-1960, the USSR offered India some crude oil at 15-20 per cent below the world market price; India could not accept this as the Western refineries in India refused to refine it. The Government of India then decided to set up refineries in the public sector. The Soviet Union and Rumania offered assistance to set up refineries.⁶² After Rumania and the USSR had built two refineries in Gauhati and Barauni respectively,⁶³ western firms offered to set up refineries at nearly half the price of the USSR refinery. Thereupon, the Soviet Union brought down the cost of its second refinery at Koyali.⁶⁴

In those days western oil companies evinced no interest in prospecting for oil in India.⁶⁵ There was excess production over consumption in the non-communist world then; there was less incentive for western

⁶⁰I.A. Benediktov, op.cit., p.34.

⁶¹Asha L. Datar, op.cit., p.71.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³P.J. Eldrige, op.cit., p.123.

⁶⁴Asha L. Datar, op.cit., p.71-74.

⁶⁵Ibid., p.71.

companies to invest money in prospecting.⁶⁶

But India was eager to find her own sources of oil. Therefore, in September-October 1955, the then Minister for Petroleum and Chemicals had visited the USSR, United Kingdom, Rumania, France, Holland and Switzerland to explore the possibility of technical assistance for oil exploration. In November 1955, a Soviet team arrived in India to examine the question.

Later, the Soviet Union helped in prospecting and drilling work. In May 1958, gas was found near Jwalamukhi in the Punjab; and in September of the same year oil was struck on the gulf of Cambay in Gujarat.⁶⁷ In May 1960 oil was struck in Ankaleshwar, Gujarat; and in December 1960, in the Rudrasagar region of Assam.⁶⁸ By 1968-69, the annual production of oil from wells discovered with Soviet assistance reached 3.5 million tonnes.⁶⁹

In May 1963, a protocol was signed for expanding the capacities of the two Soviet-assisted refineries from 2 to 3 million tonnes each.⁷⁰ Since India still needs additional oil refining capacity, at the first session of the Inter-Governmental Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technical Co-operation in New Delhi in February 1973, a protocol was signed to set up a refinery at Mathura with

⁶⁶ Ibid., p.221.

⁶⁷ I.A. Benediktov, op.cit., p.30.

⁶⁸ Ibid., pp.30-31.

⁶⁹ Asha L. Datar, op.cit., p.223.

⁷⁰ I.A. Benediktov, op.cit., p.32.

an annual capacity of 6 million tonnes.⁷¹

TRADE

From the point of view of self-respect, paying one's way through is more appealing to new nations than depending upon foreign aid. That is why developing countries repeatedly press for trade concessions at international gatherings.

At the time of independence and for a long time thereafter, India's trade was heavily tied to Britain, with the United States coming in second place. It was natural that India would try to diversify her trade in view of the risks, political and economic, involved in over-dependence on one or two countries.

Since, to start with, Moscow used to advertise that its "disinterested" aid was rendered in a spirit of equality and with the mission of making the developing countries self-reliant, the new nations' urge to diversify their trade and earn their own means for development could not be ignored. There was appropriate response from the Soviet Union to such aspirations of the developing countries.

Since 1953, India and the Soviet Union have been making long-term trade agreements, generally for 5-year periods.

Under these agreements, the Soviet Union, and later also other East European countries, accepted the rupee as the unit of account in trade with India and it was agreed in principle that trade should be bilaterally balanced.⁷²

⁷¹S. Skachkov, op.cit., p.150.

⁷²Asha L. Datar, op.cit., p.88.

However, until 1958, if a surplus on either side developed in any year, the country concerned could demand settlement in sterling. Between 1959-1960 the agreements between India and the Communist bloc countries were revised and it was agreed not to demand payments in convertible currency but to hold rupee balances or on India's side to allow an overdraft on the partner country's rupee account until trade could be adjusted to absorb them.⁷³ Under these agreements, Indo-Soviet trade registered a remarkable increase as shown below in Table 1.

⁷³Ibid.

TABLE 1.

INDIA'S TRADE WITH THE USSR, BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 1959-1972

Value in million rupees

Year	India's Total Imports	India's Total Exports	Imports from the USSR	Exports to the USSR	Imports from Britain	Exports to Britain	Imports from the United States	Exports to the United States
1959	9,459.4	6,141.1	166.5	303.3	1,727.2	1,676.4	1,954.4	952.0
1960	11,216.2	6,324.2	158.7	287.8	2,171.5	1,706.9	3,275.6	998.3
1961	10,581.2	6,552.4	353.2	318.9	1,945.2	1,601.1	2,335.1	1,160.6
1962	10,770.9	6,863.5	555.0	382.8	1,783.1	1,627.5	3,152.6	1,169.6
1963	11,436.3	7,629.3	640.0	521.0	1,688.9	1,607.1	3,902.4	1,286.3
1964	12,633.1	8,352.4	779.8	823.8	1,621.1	1,693.6	4,361.4	1,509.2
1965	14,085.3	8,016.5	832.2	928.9	1,500.9	1,447.8	5,348.3	1,471.6
1966	20,323.7	11,646.9	1,120.6	1,248.3	1,635.1	2,020.1	7,496.2	2,196.2
1967	20,076.1	11,928.2	1,112.2	1,205.1	1,626.5	2,284.7	7,775.4	2,066.0
1968	19,086.3	13,541.9	1,917.0	1,481.7	1,275.0	2,008.3	5,727.9	2,339.1
1969	15,674.9	14,086.4	1,704.0	1,762.4	1,003.8	1,642.4	4,599.6	2,378.8
1970	15,702.8	15,198.2	1,237.1	2,033.1	1,052.5	1,759.9	4,561.3	2,055.8
1971	18,043.2	15,320.3	771.9	2,107.5	2,008.4	1,564.7	4,139.8	2,486.9
1972	16,723.4	18,060.6	883.9	2,752.8	2,111.9	1,785.8	2,449.7	2,776.6

NOTE: Compiled from the United Nations Year
Books of International Trade Statistics (UNYBITS)
Figures for 1959-1961 from UNYBITS, 1961, p.322

" " 1962 " " , 1962, p.322

" " 1963 " " , 1963, p.329

" " 1964-1966 " " , 1966, p.370

" " 1967-1969 " " , 1969, p.388

" " 1970-1972 " " , 1972, p.376

Explanatory Note: General Imports c.i.f.
National Exports f.o.b.
1959 calendar year; beginning from 1960, year beginning April 1
of the year stated.
1970-1972 General Imports and General Exports
For 1970-1972, the UNYBITS, 1972, gives the value in thousand United
States dollars. I converted the value into rupees at the current
exchange rate of \$1 = Rs.7.50. This has been done for the sake of
uniformity since the UN Year Books until 1970 give the value in rupees.

By 1971, India accounted for 40 per cent of Soviet trade with the Asian developing countries.⁷⁴ The Soviet-Indian Joint Declaration issued at the end of Brezhnev's visit to India in November 1973 aims at increasing Indo-Soviet trade "by-one-and-a-half to two times by 1980".⁷⁵

According to Patolichev, USSR Minister for Foreign Trade, in the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union's imports from India included about 12 types of goods; in 1972, the number went up to 60; the share of finished products and semi-manufactures rose from 25 per cent in 1960 to 48 per cent in 1972; in the last few years the Soviet Union began importing Indian engineering products like garage equipment, tractor and automobile storage batteries, fitters tools, medical instruments, power cables, wires etc.⁷⁶

India has been almost consistently having trade surpluses with the Soviet Union since 1964; except for the year 1968, in every other year India has enjoyed surpluses.⁷⁷ Since the partners are supposed to balance their trade under Indo-Soviet agreements,⁷⁸ sometime back, the USSR suggested package deals, such as the one for import of Indian railway wagons against export of Soviet civil aircraft, but this suggestion did not meet with success. Instead, India asked for more industrial raw materials, drilling equipment for oil exploration, mining

⁷⁴V. Arkhipov and A. Bykov, op.cit., p.33.

⁷⁵See Mission of Friendship, p.84.

⁷⁶N. Patolichev, "Indo-Soviet Trade Relations: Basis for Co-operation", The Times of India, November 26, 1973. The Soviet minister has been emphasising this point, i.e. Soviet imports of Indian manufactures, since 1965: see Izvestia, July 2, 1965.

⁷⁷See the table on p. 334

⁷⁸See p. 333

equipment and fertilisers of which the Soviet Union herself is short.⁷⁹

Many attempts at further expanding Indo-Soviet trade are running into difficulties. For instance, in 1973 a cotton conversion plan was tried. Under this, the Soviet Union supplied cotton to India for conversion into cloth for export to the USSR; but this was given up because of its low profitability to India.⁸⁰ The idea of Indo-Soviet co-operation in establishing plants in third countries has run into difficulties because India is unable to supply equipment on credit, as the Soviet Union can.⁸¹

As late as 1972, the Soviet Union represented only 5.29 per cent of India's imports and 15.24 per cent of her exports.⁸² The Soviet Union is uncomfortably aware of her modest place in the developing countries' trade in comparison with the West. A recent Soviet publication mentions that many developing countries belong "to the currency zones of the leading imperialist powers. Up to now, trade with the Western countries still makes up three quarters of their foreign trade turnover."⁸³

Therefore, the Soviet spokesmen focus on such aspects

⁷⁹M.K. Dhar, "Economic Relations with Moscow", The Overseas Hindustan Times, September 26, 1974. India seemed to have preferred United States civil aircraft. In January 1974, the Indian Airlines secured a United States Export-Import Bank loan of \$19.2 million to buy 3 Boeing 737 jets. India News (London), February 2, 1974.

⁸⁰India News (London) February 2, 1974. See also M.K. Dhar, op.cit.

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸²See the Table on p. 334.

⁸³V. Arkhipov and A. Bykov, op.cit., p.130.

of the developing countries' trade with the West which bring out, in contrast, the advantages of their (the developing States') trade with the Soviet Union, i.e., constant deficits in the developing States' trade with the developed states. For example, Benediktov wrote that in "their trade with the Western countries, the developing countries of ECAFE seem to be always in debt"; that their losses are "especially great when trading with the USA, Britain, and the Common Market markets"; that in 1964, "trade with the USA was responsible for approximately four-fifths of India's balance of trade deficit".⁸⁴

For diplomatic reasons, the Soviet Union also espouses the causes of the developing states at all international economic gatherings. For instance, at the UNCTAD meeting in Geneva in 1968, the Soviet Union proposed international agreements for stabilising commodity prices.⁸⁵ She and other East European countries joined the developing states in proposing that interest rates on government credits to developing states should not be more than 3 per cent, and that funds received in repayment of credits to developing states should be used to buy goods in these countries, specially those produced by enterprises built with the credits.⁸⁶ The USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia also proposed that advanced countries should unilaterally grant certain advantages and privileges to

⁸⁴I.A. Benediktov, op.cit., p.44.

⁸⁵V. Arkhipov and A. Bykov, op.cit., p.9.

⁸⁶Prof. F. Bystrov, "Behind the Asian Bank", International Affairs (Moscow) No. 6, (1966), p.76.

developing states to help them secure stable growth rates.⁸⁷

Then, the Soviet Union periodically makes pleasing gestures, and melodramatic proposals. In 1965 the Soviet Union lifted all customs duties on goods imported or originating from developing states.⁸⁸ Soviet economists suggested that in the second decade of development, the "imperialist states" should give the developing countries between \$32 to 36 billion a year in the first five years and \$90 to 100 billion in the second five years.⁸⁹ In December 1964, Moscow also expressed its readiness to cut its defence budget by 10 to 15 per cent on a reciprocal basis for saving money which could be used to extend loans to developing states.⁹⁰

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL

CO-OPERATION

An Agreement on Cultural, Scientific and Technical Co-operation was signed by India and the Soviet Union in 1960.⁹¹ An "Atom for Peace" agreement was signed in Vienna on February 6, 1961, under which both countries

⁸⁷A. Arkhipov and A. Bykov, op.cit., p.52.

⁸⁸Ibid., p.136.

⁸⁹Prof. S. Tikhvinsky, "Apropos of 'Partnership in Development'", International Affairs (Moscow), No. 10 (1970), pp.56 and 60. Tikhvinsky's argument was that 1% of the G.N.P. of the developed states, which was the target for aid to developing states agreed at UNCTADI, would make only \$23 billions available in 1975, whereas, according to United Nations estimates, by 1975 the developing states would have to pay between \$10 to 11 billions towards the annual loan instalment and their trade deficit would have gone up to \$24 billions. In this context, he also mentioned that the USA spent \$130 billions on the war in Vietnam. Ibid.

⁹⁰Prof. F. Bystrov, op.cit., p.78.

⁹¹Vladimir Kirillin, "Soviet-Indian Co-operation in Science and Technology", in Mission of Friendship, p.133.

agreed to co-operate in research on the uses of plutonium and uranium and an exchange of scientists in the field. The Soviet Union also agreed to supply uranium materials and where necessary to give technical assistance and equipment for exploration and mining of uranium in India.⁹²

In 1968, a Joint Indo-Soviet Committee on Scientific Co-operation was set up to co-ordinate scientific activities between the two countries.⁹³ In September 1971, after Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Moscow, an Inter-Governmental Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technical Co-operation was set up.⁹⁴

In May 1972, the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Indian Organisation on Space Research signed an agreement on co-operation in outer space research.⁹⁵ Under this agreement, an Indian-made 360-kilogram satellite, Aryabhata, was launched by a Soviet rocket from a Soviet Cosmodrome on April 20, 1975.⁹⁶

In October 1972, a bilateral governmental agreement on co-operation in the field of applied sciences and technology was signed.⁹⁷

Over 150 Soviet specialists and instructors lecture at the Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay, established with Soviet assistance over 17 years ago. Autonomous

⁹²P.J. Eldrige, op.cit., p.165.

⁹³Vladimir Kirillin, op.cit., pp.133-134.

⁹⁴Pravda, September 30, 1971.

⁹⁵Vladimir Kirillin, op.cit., p.134.

⁹⁶The Guardian, April 21, 1975. Under another agreement made in September 1975, a second Indian satellite will be launched in late 1977 or early 1978 from a Soviet cosmodrome. The Guardian, September 15, 1975.

⁹⁷Vladimir Kirillin, op.cit., p.134.

faculties of geophysics at the Osmania University, Hyderabad, of metallurgy at the Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, and of aircraft construction at the Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay, are being established with Soviet co-operation. Scholarships have been offered to Indian students to study at Soviet higher educational institutions. In 1973, there were 450 Indian students studying in Russia. Every year, 20 Russian students go to India to study languages, literature, history and economics.⁹⁸

Between 1956-1972, a research and practical paediatric centre, manned by Soviet paediatricians functioned in New Delhi. Between 1960-1973, the Soviet Union delivered 1000 million doses of smallpox vaccine to India.⁹⁹

In 1956, the first state-owned mechanised farm at Suratgarh in the Rajasthan desert was set up.¹⁰⁰ The Soviet Union gave agricultural machinery for the farm as a gift; the farm has an area of 30,000 acres.¹⁰¹ In 1967, the Soviet Union provided machinery for setting up five mechanised seed farms, one each in the states of Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Assam, and Tamil Nadu.¹⁰² These farms have an area of between 3000-4000 hectares each; the Soviet machinery for these farms was

⁹⁸V.P. Yelyutin, "Soviet Higher Schools and India", in Mission of Friendship, pp.143-145.

⁹⁹B.V. Petrovsky, "Soviet-Indian Co-operation in the Field of Medicine and Health Services", in Mission of Friendship, pp.160-161.

¹⁰⁰R.N. Sidiyak, "Soviet Indian Co-operation in Farming," in Mission of Friendship, p.162.

¹⁰¹I.A. Benediktov, op.cit., p.49. This farm was opened on August 15, 1955. Ibid.

¹⁰²R.N. Sidiyak, op.cit., p.162.

a gift.¹⁰³ In 1960 the Soviet Union gave India specimens of her best cattle and sheep breeds; between 1968-1973, 5,700 Grozny and Stavropol sheep breeds have been supplied.¹⁰⁴ In June 1971 an agreement was made for scientific and technical cooperation in the field of agriculture.¹⁰⁵

At the end of Brezhnev's visit to India in November 1973, an agreement was signed for cooperation between the Indian Planning Commission and the State Planning Committee of the USSR, GOSPLAN. This created a study Group consisting of the officials of Gosplan and the Indian Planning Commission and such others as may be deemed necessary by the Government of India from time to time. The main functions of the study Group will be to exchange experience and knowledge in economic forecasting, methodology of annual, medium and perspective planning formulation of projects and programmes, methods of monitoring and evaluation of planned programmes and projects, exchange of published reports and materials etc. It is expected to meet not less than once a year alternatively in Moscow and in New Delhi.¹⁰⁶

103. I.A. Benediktov, op.cit., P.50

104. R.N. Sidiyak, op.cit., P. 163

105. Ibid.

106. See the text of the agreement in Mission of Friendship, PP. 89-90

To sum up: the Soviet-aided projects in India account for one third of entire steel production, 80 per cent of metallurgical and 60 percent of electrical equipment produced in the country, 55 per cent of oil extracted, 30 per cent of oil refined, and 20 per cent of the electricity generated.¹⁰⁷

SOVIET AND WESTERN AID: A COMPARISON

At this stage it is proper to compare Soviet aid to India with the aid she received from other countries. Table 2 on the following page gives a picture of aid that India received from different countries. (Aid includes grants, credits free of interest and credits with interest.)

¹⁰⁷ S. Skachkov, op.cit., PP. 147-148. The source does not mention up to what year these percentages have been computed. Since the work was published in 1973, we have to assume, maybe, up to 1971-1972.

TABLE 2

FOREIGN AID UTILISED FOR INDIA'S DEVELOPMENT FROM APRIL 1951
TO OCTOBER 1970

Source ¹	Amount authorised by aid providing source ² crores of Rs.	Amount utilised by India ² crores of Rs.	Share of total foreign aid utilised by India per cent
United States	7,184	6,784	56.5
World Bank & IDA	1,764	1,478	12.3
West Germany	1,004	907	7.6
Britain	849	715	6.0
USSR	1,031	670	5.6
Canada	648	532	4.4
Japan	372	328	2.7
Italy	184	132	1.1
France	181	102	0.9
Czechoslovakia	97	66	0.6
Australia	63	61	0.5
The Netherlands	76	55	0.5
Yugoslavia	29	29	0.2
Poland	57	28	0.2
Switzerland	36	26	0.2
Belgium	32	22	0.2
Austria	24	21	0.2
Sweden	26	14	0.1
Denmark	14	10	0.1
Norway	12	10	0.1
New Zealand	6	5	Less than 0.05
Hungary	13	-	-
Bulgaria	11	-	-

1. Aid providing sources ranked in order of amount of aid utilised by India.

2. Includes both grants and loans. Rupee equivalents at current rate of exchange. A crore is Rs. 10 million.

SOURCE: Fact Sheet No. 23: United States Economic Assistance to India, June 1951 - April 1, 1971, (New Delhi: United States Information Service, n.d.), p.40, (hereinafter referred to as Fact Sheet No. 23).

As Table 2 shows, the Soviet Union's chief rival in the Cold War, the United States, contributed nearly seven times as much aid as the USSR; and India utilised ten times as much of the United States' aid as the Soviet aid.

Approximately, Rs. 2660 crores (one crore = Rs. 10 million) out of the total United States aid of Rs. 7,184 crores was provided in the shape of food supplies under the US Public Law 480 (PL 480) agreements between 1956-1971.¹³⁵ During this period India imported 60 million tonnes of food grains, besides other agricultural commodities, under these agreements.¹³⁶

The only outright grants that the Soviet Union gave India were the agricultural machinery she provided for the State farms,¹³⁷ and the money and equipment she donated for establishing the Indian Institute of Technology at Bombay.¹³⁸ The United States on the other hand gave 19.6 per cent of her total aid in the shape of grants.¹³⁹ The United States' total grants given to India is larger than the total Soviet aid.

Besides that, India used to pay for United States food supplies under PL 480 in rupees. By 1971, the total Indian currency in the American accounts in India was Rs. 2660 crores. 80.6 per cent of the rupee funds thus accruing to the United States was being returned to India

¹³⁵For All The People: American Economic Co-operation With Indian Development (New Delhi: the United States Information Service n.d.), p.4 (hereinafter referred to as For All The People).

¹³⁶Fact Sheet No. 23, p.27.

¹³⁷See pp. 240 - 41

¹³⁸See p. 339

¹³⁹See Fact Sheet No. 23, p.1. For the total United States aid, see Table 2.

in grants and loans for economic development, 6.4 per cent was reserved for loans to private enterprise, and 13 per cent was reserved for the United States government uses in India.¹⁴⁰ But this huge sum in rupees in the American accounts in India was causing tensions in Indo-American relations. Therefore, an agreement was signed between India and the United States of America on December 13, 1973, under which the United States gave away two-thirds of Rs. 2,660 crores (the total PL 480 funds under United States control) as a grant to India for economic development; the balance would be retained by the United States in her accounts in India, which bear no interest.¹⁴¹ This grant of Rs. 1,664 crores is also larger than the total Soviet aid to India.

American publications in India refer to a fact when they mention that 90 per cent of the United States' aid to India has gone to ^{the} state sector,¹⁴² for big irrigation and power projects, roads, railways, airlines, educational institutions, which received United States aid are all under State management. An estimated 23 per cent of all public sector capital formation in the first four 5-year plans came from the United States.¹⁴³ The total American aid given to private sector industries in India from the PL 480 funds,¹⁴⁴ under the Cooley Amendment,¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁰ Fact Sheet No. 23, p.4.

¹⁴¹ For All The People, pp.4-5.

¹⁴² Ibid., p.4.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ See above, and also p. 346.

¹⁴⁵ Named after Harold D. Cooley, former Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture of the United States House of Representatives. See Fact Sheet No. 23, p.32.

was only Rs. 1,262,630,100¹⁴⁶ out of the total United States aid of Rs.7,1840,000,000 crores,¹⁴⁷ i.e. only 1.76 per cent. Even if the total aid to private sector industries is considered in the context of total PL 480 rupee funds, from which this aid was granted, it was only a fraction of the amount: Rs.126.26 crores out of Rs.2,660 crores, i.e. 4.75 per cent.

All that food aid most certainly saved India from politically explosive situations and at the same time enabled her to pursue her economic goals as she did not have to divert her scarce foreign exchange for importing food. Since it is politically risky to let the masses go hungry, successive Indian governments would have been forced to spend large sums of foreign exchange to import food if PL 480 food had not been available for rupee payments. Besides that, 80 per cent of the PL 480 funds were made available to India as loans for economic development,¹⁴⁸ and now two-thirds of the PL 480 money has been given away as a grant.¹⁴⁹ Thus, PL 480 agreements conferred multiple benefits on India.

The Soviet leaders and spokesmen are painfully aware of their country's comparatively modest contribution to the developing countries' aid receipts. Their defensive arguments used to take three forms: 1. to claim vicarious benefits from Western aid; 2. to claim a qualitative difference for Soviet aid; and 3. to run down

¹⁴⁶Ibid., 35.

¹⁴⁷See Table 2.

¹⁴⁸See pp. 344-45

¹⁴⁹See p. 345.

the American food aid.

The Soviet spokesmen used to claim vicarious benefits from Western aid to the developing countries. Khrushchev thought that the Western aid to the developing states "should also be viewed as a particular kind of Soviet aid to these states. If the Soviet Union did not exist is it likely that the monopolies of the imperialist powers would aid the underdeveloped countries? Of course not".¹⁵⁰ The Soviet propaganda machinery does not have to fabricate reports to substantiate such claims; all that it has to do is patiently to sift through the United States Congressional Committee hearings and American newspaper reports and comments; this supplies enough material to use against the USA. Partly because of genuine fear, and partly as a means of inducing the Congress to pass foreign aid bills, the American Government spokesmen, including Presidents, frequently used to mention, during the Cold War days, Soviet aid to developing countries as one of the justifications for American aid.¹⁵¹

¹⁵⁰Quoted in Leo Tansky, op.cit., p.5. For similar claims in the context of Western aid to India, see V. Nikhamin, "India's Role in World Affairs", International Affairs (Moscow) No. 1, (1958), p.60, and V.I. Pavlov, op.cit., p.137.

¹⁵¹For Eisenhower's reference to Soviet aid, see Asha L. Datar, op.cit., p.3; for Johnson's reference to Soviet aid, see Milton Kovner, "Soviet Aid Strategy in Developing Countries", Orbis, Vol. VIII, No. 3, (Fall, 1964), p.624; for the testimony of the Director, the United States International Co-operation Administration, before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1958, making similar reference to Soviet aid, see Leo Tansky, op.cit., p.5. See also V.I. Pavlov, op.cit., p.184, for direct reference to the United States Foreign Assistance Act of 1957, which stated that the American aid would be available as long as the Communist threat continued.

Soviet reference to these statements would sound convincing in the Third World.

The Soviet Union also emphasises the qualitative difference between the Soviet and Western aid to the Third World. In an argument obviously directed at India, Khrushchev sought to make up for Moscow's inability to compete with Washington in the quantity of aid rendered to India by emphasising the quality of Soviet aid, i.e., the sacrifice involved in extending it. In a statement in May 1962, he said that the Soviet Union helped build Bhilai "not because we had surpluses of equipment for such mills" in the Soviet Union; "that machinery used in Bhilai would have been very useful in our own national economy".¹⁵²

Another qualitative difference claimed for Soviet aid is that it promotes self-reliance.¹⁵³ In the context of India where the Soviet Union has given substantial aid in establishing heavy and machine-building industries,¹⁵⁴ this sounds credible.

There were clashes between India and the United States of America on questions like agriculture versus industry and private versus public sectors in the economy. There was and is enough justification for Indian attempts at industrialisation. There are millions of landless labourers in India and not enough land to go round; they are either underemployed or unemployed, when monsoons fail.

¹⁵²Quoted in Milton Kovner, op.cit., p.634. See also I.A. Benediktov, op.cit., p.19.

¹⁵³See V.I. Pavlov, op.cit., p.206.

¹⁵⁴See pp. 320 - 332.

Unless this surplus rural labour is absorbed in industry and their minimum needs are taken care of, they would become an explosive political factor. The Communists in India did try to exploit peasant discontent when they attempted insurrections in the Telangana region of erst- while Hyderabad State in the late 1940s,¹⁵⁵ and in West Bengal in the late 1960s.¹⁵⁶ The Indian leaders had been aware of this problem. Nehru felt that political stability depended on the speedy fulfilment of the masses' longings.¹⁵⁷ He considered industrialisation necessary for this purpose;¹⁵⁸ he also thought that active state intervention was necessary to industrialise the country.¹⁵⁹ This was unacceptable to the United States, official as well as non-official.¹⁶⁰

There were recurrent suggestions from the United States that India should give more importance to agriculture and leave industrialization to private enterprise. In what was considered an article announcing his candidature for the American Presidency, Nixon wrote: "India is both challenging and frustrating: challenging because of its

¹⁵⁵See Chapter III, p. 100

¹⁵⁶See Chapter IX, p. 287.

¹⁵⁷See p. 314

¹⁵⁸See p. 316

¹⁵⁹See Chapter II, p. 82.

¹⁶⁰In 1951 the National Foreign Trade Convention asked the United States Government to declare that the USA "... looks upon industrial development abroad as the particular function of private enterprise ... until receptive and co-operative attitudes called for are shown" no United States aid would be given "except those of the most exigent military or humanitarian nature". Quoted in David A. Baldwin, "Foreign Aid: Intervention Influence", World Politics, Vol. XXI, No. 3, (April 1969), p. 431.

promise, frustrating because of its performance. It suffers from ... too much emphasis on industrialisation and not enough on agriculture and from too doctrinaire a reliance on government enterprise. Many are deeply pessimistic about its future".¹⁶¹ He thought that the USA should continue to aid India and persuade her "to shift its means and adjust its institutions ... drawing from the lessons not only of the United States but also of India's more successful neighbours, including Pakistan".¹⁶²

This lecturing on relative merits of different economic strategies and the desirable priorities continued even in times of India's dire needs, like the Bihar famine in 1966. During that crisis, President Johnson slowed down food deliveries in order, among other things, "to persuade the Indians to do more for themselves ...".¹⁶³

The Soviet Union tried to take advantage of these Indo-American differences. During his second visit to India in February 1960, Khrushchev said in Bhilai that many Western economists claimed that it would be better for countries like India to concentrate on agriculture and individual types of mineral raw materials, exporting them at low prices and obtaining industrial products at exorbitant prices. He warned that successful development

¹⁶¹Richard M. Nixon, op.cit., pp.118-119.

¹⁶²Ibid., p.120. Bhutto himself does not seem to share Nixon's flattering views on Pakistani economy. See President Bhutto's Address to the National Assembly, pp. 15-16.

¹⁶³Lyndon B. Johnson, Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), p.225.

of the country was possible only through industrialisation.¹⁶⁴ Since the Soviet aid to India was almost entirely given for the development of heavy industry, Moscow's spokesmen would claim that the USSR was helping India become self-reliant.¹⁶⁵

Obviously people do not eat steel and drink oil. Therefore, the United States' food supplies during India's perennial food crises would have a good impact on India, at least for the duration of the crises. In this field, the USSR's inability to help India is evident. Therefore, the Soviet spokesmen use the much-talked-of American practices, like keeping millions of acres of land fallow and, sometimes, destroying food to keep up prices, to run down food aid. Thus, a correspondent wrote in Pravda in June 1965 that in the name of the Food for Peace Programme, the United States, in fact, sold surplus agricultural products, which had accumulated on the shelves and had found no markets, to the developing countries.¹⁶⁶

Sometimes, the Soviet Union takes resort to dramatic

¹⁶⁴Pravda, February 15, 1960.

¹⁶⁵V.I. Pavlov, op.cit., see pp.141, 172, 206 and 212. See also below, p. 285.

¹⁶⁶N. Yakubov in Pravda, June 26, 1965. For a similar comment, see Pravda, August 7, 1966, and also Prof. S. Tikhvinsky, op.cit., p.60.

Sometimes, comments in the USA provide justification for such Soviet propaganda. For example, when Dr. Kissinger told the group dealing with the developments in the subcontinent during the Bangladesh crisis in December 1971, that President Nixon wanted the American aid to India to be suspended (See Chapter), an official present said that the price of vegetable oil was weakening in the United States, and that cutting off this commodity to India could have repercussions on the domestic market. He asked if oil could be shipped to India in place of wheat. The New York Times, January 6, 1972.

gestures on the food front to compensate for her inability to compete with the United States. In October 1973, at a time when there was an acute food shortage in India, and when PL 480 concessions were no longer available to import food for rupee payment,¹⁶⁷ the Soviet Union granted India a 2-million tonne wheat loan,¹⁶⁸ just one and a half months before Brezhnev's visit to India in November 1973. Such a gesture, against the background of large Soviet food imports from the United States and other countries in 1971-1972 was bound to be appreciated in India.

EVALUATION

The post-Stalin leadership's new diplomatic line of competing with the United States for influence beyond the confines of the Communist bloc¹⁶⁹ necessitated the extension of foreign aid to the developing countries. Of necessity, an ideological justification was found for foreign aid.¹⁷⁰

India provided ideological justification of sorts herself by adopting socialistic measures, either as goals or in practice.¹⁷¹ Therefore, the Soviet Union was assured of popularity in India for her aid because it was in keeping with India's national aspirations and interests, as perceived and expressed by her leaders.

However, ideology was of minor importance in Soviet

¹⁶⁷See p.344

¹⁶⁸See N. Patolichev, op.cit. See also Chapter III, p. 101

¹⁶⁹See Chapter III, pp. 103 - 105

¹⁷⁰See pp. 317 - 20 and Chapter I, pp. 57 - 60

¹⁷¹See pp. 315 - 16, Chapter III, p. 114 and Chapter VII.I p. 245

foreign aid. This becomes evident from the fact that in spite of the many doubts entertained in the Soviet Union regarding the character of the Indian national bourgeoisie,¹⁷² the Soviet Union decided to give India aid on a large scale.¹⁷³ A further proof of this argument is that in the 1950s and early 1960s Indian and Chinese relative growth was "widely regarded as a test between systems".¹⁷⁴ Though there is no direct evidence to relate the two, it is significant that the Soviet Union aided India's heavy machine building industry and consented to set up a plant for the manufacture of MiG-21 planes in India after the Sino-Soviet rivalry began to surface in 1959.

It is also possible that some economic considerations influenced the decision to extend foreign aid. Soviet machinery and technology are considered poor in quality in the West.¹⁷⁵ Moscow could hardly hope to secure markets for its machines and technology in the West. In view of Nehru's preference for heavy industry and machinery, he

¹⁷²See p. 318.

¹⁷³To start with, even Soviet offers of aid were suspect. Khrushchev said in his memoirs that Afghanistan distrusted the Soviet offer of aid. "To his credit Nehru graciously accepted (the Soviet aid)". See Strobe Talbott transl. and ed., op.cit., p. 302.

¹⁷⁴Alec Nove, Communist Economic Strategy: Soviet Growth and Capability, p. 65. When Sino-Soviet relations became tense, an "Observer" wrote in Jen-min Jih-pao on July 16, 1963: "There is no reason for thinking that aid rendered by a Socialist country to India will change its political orientation..." Peking Review, No. 29, July 19, 1963, pp. 12-14.

¹⁷⁵Even Khrushchev seemed to have concurred with this assessment. See his memoirs, Strobe Talbott transl. and ed., op.cit., p. 304. To fight this complex, the Russians keep claiming that their technology is superior to the Western. See ibid., pp. 302-303 and Pravda, January 18, 1963.

would be eager to accept Soviet offers, thus making India a place to exhibit Soviet machines. Since the post-Stalin leadership began giving more importance to providing consumer goods to their people,¹⁷⁶ they could import whatever India and other developing states could offer. Thus the new policy would serve diplomatic and economic interests.

Like Nehru's foreign policy, his domestic economic policy, i.e. mixed economy with active state intervention for the industrialisation of the country, was not to the United States' liking. There were recurrent suggestions that India should learn the virtues of private enterprise and give more importance to agriculture.¹⁷⁷ Unsolicited advice, however well-intentioned, is not likely to be appreciated. The resultant tensions in Indo-American relations worked to the advantage of the USSR; Khrushchev tried to exploit these differences between India and the United States.¹⁷⁸

Soviet aid to India has been of substantial help in India's attempts at industrialisation, and in breaking the foreign monopolies' hold on pharmaceutical and oil industries.¹⁷⁹ Under^{the} conditions of the Cold War, it also acted as a catalyst in bringing concessions from the West.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁶ See Adam B. Ulam, op.cit., p.556.

¹⁷⁷ See pp. 349 - 50

¹⁷⁸ See p. 350

¹⁷⁹ See pp. 320 - 31

¹⁸⁰ To start with, Western credits charged interest rates at commercial rates. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, charged $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent interest on her credits, which brought down interest rates on Western credits. Asha L. Datar, op.cit., pp.43 and 68. Britain and West Germany also helped build steel mills and other industries in public sector after Moscow offered to help build Bhilai see P.J. Eldrige, op.cit., p.14.

Soviet credits also helped utilise domestic capacity by specifically tying repayment to exports.¹⁸¹ Soviet aid to heavy industry has the added advantage of utilising India's machine-building industries' capacity. Bokaro gave "a tremendous stimulus to the country's engineering and refractory industries, some of which have been in a state of decline for lack of sufficient orders, ... it has also impelled them in developing the know-how for more sophisticated production in their fields".¹⁸² It is doubtful whether the United States would have consented to the use of machinery from Soviet-aided projects had Washington built Bokaro. Indian personnel's association with and the Indian machine-building industries' contribution to Soviet-aided projects in India gave her the satisfaction of marching towards sel-reliance.

Soviet long-range credit commitments are conducive to India's planned economy. The year-to-year basis of Western aid causes a lot of uncertainty in planning. Because of the nature of the Soviet system of government, it is possible for Moscow to enter into such commitments.¹⁸³

¹⁸¹Asha L. Datar, op.cit., p.47.

¹⁸²Tribhuwan Nath in Bokaro, p.61. See also above, pp. 326 - 327.

¹⁸³For instance, the Soviet Union made a preliminary offer to grant credits totalling 1,500,000,000 roubles in July 1959 for India's Third 5-year plan. Pravda, July 31, 1959.

In July 1960, Moscow also expressed its readiness to extend additional credits to the third plan to the tune of 500,000,000 roubles. Pravda, August 31, 1960.

At the end of Brezhnev's visit to India in November 1973, a 15-year Agreement on Further Development of Economic and Trade Co-operation between the USSR and India was signed. Much of what is said in it is a rehash of earlier commitments. See the text in Mission of Friendship, pp.85-88.

The Government of India also thinks that the long-term trade agreements with the Soviet Union and other East European countries¹⁸⁴ impart a welcome element of stability to India's exports.¹⁸⁵ These advantages from Indo-Soviet economic collaboration have naturally been popular in India.

However, the fact remains that the Soviet aid to India is only 5.6 per cent of the total foreign aid utilised by India as of October 1970; it is only one tenth of the United States' aid utilised by India in the same period.¹⁸⁶ The aid in the shape of grants made by the United States is much larger than the total Soviet aid to India.¹⁸⁷ And yet the Soviet Union received credit beyond all proportion to her aid, the United States does not seem to have received due credit for the impressive quantum of aid rendered to India.

This seems to be due to: 1) Soviet aid being in keeping with India's national temper,¹⁸⁸ 2) The indirect result of certain United States' policies; and 3) the Soviet Union's special techniques to catch the imagination of the people of India.

¹⁸⁴See pp. 332 - 35.

¹⁸⁵Quoted in Christopher Davis, "Pacts with Soviet Bloc May Lose Their Gloss", The Times' Supplement, Export Corridors of the World: India, August 15, 1974. See also Patolichev, Izvestia, July 2, 1965, for a similar argument.

¹⁸⁶See Table 2. It has to be mentioned that the high percentage of utilization of the United States' aid is, among other things, attributable to food supplies being a part of the aid. 37.02 per cent of all the United States' aid was in the shape of food. See Table 2 for total aid and p. 344 for total food aid.

¹⁸⁷See pp. 344 - 45

¹⁸⁸See pp. 314 - 16

The ever-present political tensions in Indo-American relations clouded the significance of American aid to India. The common man's interests and emotions are more likely to be aroused by problems like: Indian territory being claimed by some one (Kashmir), or Indian territory being held by some one (Goa), and so on, than by complicated questions like public versus private sector, or agriculture versus industry or the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the aid policies of different countries to India's balance of payments. Therefore, India's response to any other country's policies, including trade and aid, depends upon the impact which that country makes on the interests and emotions of the masses. On issues of popular interest in India, Kashmir, Goa, Bangladesh etc., the United States adopted an unsympathetic attitude, and the Soviet Union, a sympathetic attitude.¹⁸⁹

On the other hand, hungry masses care more for food supplies than diplomatic support on political issues. The United States supplied massive quantities of food in times of India's dire needs.¹⁹⁰ Washington was popular in India during such crises. But popularity and unpopularity are not constant factors. They keep changing. While food crises occur every now and then, the problem of Kashmir has been with India since her independence. The nationalist backlash against the United States' unsympathetic attitude on Kashmir affected the political

¹⁸⁹See Chapters V, VI and IX.

¹⁹⁰See p. 344

effectiveness of her aid policies in India. The Soviet Union was at an advantage on this count.

The United States exhibited a knack for both giving away huge sums of money to, as well as losing influence in India by her rigid stand on the virtues of free enterprise. Only a fraction of the total United States' aid to India was given to private enterprise;¹⁹¹ and yet, Washington managed to get the reputation more of trying to sustain capitalism in India than helping her.¹⁹²

The United States has not been averse to using economic pressure on India, when Washington considered it necessary. The United States suspended arms aid to India in 1965,¹⁹³ slowed down food deliveries during the Bihar famine in 1966,¹⁹⁴ and suspended economic aid during the Bangladesh crisis.¹⁹⁵

The Soviet Union did not hesitate to use such

¹⁹¹See p. 346

¹⁹²See p. 324.

¹⁹³See Chapter V, p. 174

¹⁹⁴See p. 350 Chester Bowles wrote that President Johnson did that "to persuade India to take a more tolerant view of ... the United States military activities in Vietnam". "America and Russia in India", p. 647.

¹⁹⁵See Chapter IX, p. 290. For a Soviet critical comment on the suspension of aid to India by the United States, see Izvestia, December 12, 1971. See also ibid., July 21, 1965, for a critical comment on President Johnson's letter to President Ayub Khan expressing Washington's inability to give \$500,000,000 aid to Pakistan's third 5-year plan since the Congress did not sanction it. For Mrs. Gandhi's implied criticism of the suspension of aid to India by the United States in 1971, see "India and the World", Foreign Affairs, Vol. LI, No. 1, (October 1972), pp. 67-68.

pressure elsewhere;¹⁹⁶ but in the case of India, Moscow did not use economic pressure in spite of New Delhi disagreeing with the USSR on ~~many~~ issues important to her interests.¹⁹⁷ This, in India's view, makes the Soviet aid reliable.

Other possible reasons for the disproportionate credit earned by Soviet aid in India is the special techniques adopted by Soviet economic diplomacy. The Soviet Union's strong espousal of the developing countries' causes is likely to appeal to them.¹⁹⁸ If such Soviet proposals were accepted by the West, Moscow would have got the credit for supporting the developing states' causes, and at the same time no additional burden would have to be borne by the USSR since all these concessions proposed by her had

196. When tensions reappeared in Soviet-Yugoslav relations in 1957-1958, Moscow told Belgrade in May 1958 that, in view of the needs of Soviet chemical industry, it was postponing for 5 years Soviet credits to Yugoslavia totalling \$ 285 million, agreed to by the Soviet Union in January 1956: Robert Bass and Elizabeth Marbury, ed., The Soviet Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-1958: A documentary Record (New York: Prospects Books, 1959), P. 189-190

197. See Chapter III, P. 114 Conclusions, PP. 415 - 18 Mrs. Gandhi wrote: " Aid is effective only if it is guided by considerations of development and when there is assurance of its continuity and not when it can be suspended or withdrawn abruptly" op.cit., PP. 67-68

198. See PP. 337 - 38

already been extended by her to the developing states; and if the West could not follow Moscow's lead, as when it abolished customs duties on the goods from developing states in 1965²⁰⁰ for reasons of lobby pressure or revenues, the West would get the blame.

Moscow makes a strong bid to meet the psychological needs of developing states. To be constantly at the receiving end is not appealing to the national egos of the developing states. It is almost a decade since Moscow has been laying more stress on mutual benefits from trade with and aid to developing states.²⁰¹ Soviet publications in India make it a point to emphasise the "mutually advantageous" nature of Indo-Soviet economic ties.²⁰²

The Soviet Union's buying of Indian manufactures²⁰³ also gives India a sense of achievement. Because of the nature of the American markets and the system of government, it will not be possible for the United States government to buy Indian manufactures unless they are competitive.

The constant publicity given to Soviet-aided projects also, probably, contributed to the success of Soviet aid

²⁰⁰See p. 338

²⁰¹Milton Kovner thinks that it was to mollify the anti-aid sentiment in the USSR that Pravda told its readers in June 1963 that Soviet credits bring in repayment to the USSR commodities traditionally exported by developing states which are used to satisfy the needs of the Soviet consumers. Op.cit., p.634.

²⁰²See S. Skachkov, op.cit., p.149. For similar expressions, see Pravda, July 28, 1965, and V. Arkhipov and A. Bykov, op.cit., p.34. See also R.K. Karanjia, "Hindi-Roosi Bhai-Bhaism", Illustrated Weekly of India Vol. XCIII, No.24 (June 11, 1972), p.13.

²⁰³See p.335

in impressing India. Prestige Soviet projects in India repeatedly appear in Indo-Soviet communiques, thus enabling the people of India to hear about them many times.²⁰⁴

The Soviet aid also has what has been described as "impact value".²⁰⁵ Moscow-financed projects stand out as clearly identifiable symbols of Soviet aid. These giant industries are a novelty in India, and have had considerable impact on the people, more so because of the popularity of machines with the contemporary masses. Large as the American aid to India has been, it has not created many such symbols. It is probable that that is why the Soviet Union prefers direct contribution to projects which she can help create; Moscow does not seem to like the idea of multilateral contribution to help developing countries. It may be because in such arrangements the distinctiveness of Soviet contribution is lost; and in comparison with the United States, Soviet contribution would also look insignificant.

It is noteworthy that the Soviet Union was missing from the list of countries which financed the huge bill

²⁰⁴For example, a protocol, signed by India and the Soviet Union in February 1973, envisaged the expansion of the capacities of the Soviet-aided steel mills in Bhilai and Bokaro to 7 and 10 million tonnes respectively (see pp. 322 & 328); these two projects and a refinery at Mathura with 6 million tonnes capacity, a copper mining and dressing complex at Malanjkhand and an underground railway line in Calcutta were mentioned, besides enumerating all prestige projects built with Soviet assistance until then, in the Indo-Soviet Joint Declaration issued on November 29, 1973 (see Mission of Friendship, p.83); the Agreement on Further Development of Economic and Trade Co-operation repeated all these projects; but this was not final; the Agreement left details of credits etc. to be "settled by separate agreements". (See Mission of Friendship, pp.85-86).

²⁰⁵P.J. Eldrige, op.cit., p.19.

for the settlement of one of the two explosive disputes between India and Pakistan, viz., the Indus river dispute, which was solved in 1960 under the aegis of the World Bank.* It is possible that the above considerations kept the USSR away from the World Bank-sponsored group in the settlement of the Indus dispute. This is not an unreasonable interpretation considering the fact that here was an opportunity for the Soviet Union to demonstrate that she was interested in co-operating with other developed states in the peaceful and constructive settlement of disputes involving the developing countries and not in competition for influence and confrontation. Since the XXth Congress, the Soviet Union has been declaring her faith in peaceful co-existence.²⁰⁶ One of the factors that contributes to peaceful co-existence is trust. A Soviet gesture like joining other nations in financing the expensive Indus dispute settlement would have contributed to mutual trust. It cannot be said that the Soviet absence from the list of donors was due to financial stringency. It was only in July 1960 that Moscow offered additional credits to India's third plan.²⁰⁷

However popular Soviet aid has been in India, its impact on the country's socio-economic structure should not

* See Appendix II.

²⁰⁶ See Chapter I, pp. 53 and also Chapter IV, p. 144

²⁰⁷ See p. 355. Another example of Soviet preference for direct aid for development of the Third World countries rather than through associations is provided by Moscow's opposition to the Asian Development Bank established in 1965. See Izvestia, December 3, 1965, and Prof. F. Bystrov., op.cit., p. 77.

be exaggerated. The Socialist leanings of India's leadership were born out of their convictions; the Socialistic-sounding Chapter IV of India's Constitution²⁰⁸ was included long before the Soviet Union began her aid programmes. The Soviet-aided Suratgarh State farm²⁰⁹ did not lead to collectivisation of agriculture, nor did the expansion of ^{the} public sector destroy ^{the} private sector in India. The private sector in India continues to grow. The total assets of the private corporate sector stood at Rs. 80,000 million in 1972, of which the assets of foreign companies in India were of the order of Rs. 24,155 million;²¹⁰ by March 1968, the overall total outstanding foreign private investment stood at Rs. 15,420 million;²¹¹ as against Rs. 600 million average annual inflow of foreign capital envisaged during the fourth plan period, in 1969-1970 there was a gross foreign investment of Rs. 810 million;²¹² in 1968-1969 the public sector in India contributed only 14 per cent to the Gross domestic product;²¹³ foreign companies in India contributed 33 per cent of the total production of the entire private sector;²¹⁴ even in an important sector like pharmaceutical industry, a field in which the Soviet Union helped India set up plants in

²⁰⁸See p. 315

²⁰⁹See p. 340

²¹⁰The Times of India Directory and Year Book, 1972, p. 308.

²¹¹Ibid., p. 309.

²¹²Ibid.

²¹³Ibid., p. 316.

²¹⁴Ibid., p. 308.

the public sector,²¹⁵ multi-national companies account for 60 per cent of the total production even now;²¹⁶ and the total profit remittances by foreign companies from India amounted to Rs.520 million in 1970-1971.²¹⁷

In the field of trade, there has been a big increase in Indo-Soviet trade turnover. It looks more spectacular in comparison with other countries' figures for trade with India because Indo-Soviet trade began from a very low level. In 1953, when the first Indo-Soviet long-term trade agreement was signed,²¹⁸ the total turnover of their trade was only Rs.17.5 millions; it was Rs.1,717.2 millions for Indo-American, and Rs.2,950.6 million for the Indo-British trade turnovers;²¹⁹ in 1972, the figures were Rs.3,636.7, Rs.5,226.3 and Rs.3,905.7 million respectively.²²⁰ While in 1953, the USSR supplied 0.1 per cent of India's imports and took 0.22 per cent of her exports, the United States supplied 13.99 per cent and took 17.43 per cent, and Britain, 25.34 per cent and 28.54 per cent respectively.²²¹ However, even in 1972, the Soviet Union supplied only 5.29 per cent of India's imports and took 15.24 per cent of her exports, while the United States supplied 14.65 per cent of her imports and took 15.37 per cent of her exports, and Britain, 12.63 per

²¹⁵See p. 329

²¹⁶The Overseas Hindustan Times, June 12, 1975.

²¹⁷The Times of India Directory and Year Book, 1972, p.308.

²¹⁸See p. 332

²¹⁹The United Nations Year Book of International Trade Statistics, 1954, p.267.

²²⁰See Table 1.

²²¹The United Nations Year Book of International Trade Statistics, 1954, p.267.

cent and 9.89 per cent respectively.²²²

Without any long-term trade agreements and the attendant publicity, Indo-American trade turnover registered a good increase. Obviously, Indo-British trade declined over the years. This is attributable to India's needs for credits to finance her imports for development and Britain's inability to extend them to the extent of her (India's) needs. Besides that, the Soviet Union agreed to accept Indian goods in repayment of her credits; therefore, of necessity, India had to export more to the USSR. The momentum thus generated in Indo-Soviet trade still continues. Nevertheless, it was not until 1968 that the Soviet Union began overtaking Britain in either supplying more of India's imports or taking more of her exports.²²³

But what of prospects for Indo-Soviet economic collaboration? There are some favourable factors for the further strengthening of Indo-Soviet economic relations. India's failure to attain the much-hoped-for take-off stage finds her in a desperate balance of payments position.²²⁴ Therefore, India has to expand her trade with and secure aid from as many quarters as possible. Besides that, the Planning Commission of India feels that, in view of the development of a good base for the

²²²See Table 1.

²²³See Table 1.

²²⁴According to the World Bank's estimates, India's import bill in 1974-1975 was to be \$5,000 million while her exports were estimated at \$3,200 million; she also had a debt servicing liability of \$700 million per annum, this left her with a deficit of \$2,500 million. See The Times (Supplement), August 15, 1974, p.XII.

manufacture of indigenous equipment, India should buy know-how abroad without its being tied to the purchase of equipment.²²⁵ This is not an alluring business prospect for Western companies. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, would not be averse to entering into such deals with India, more so because much of her machine-building industry was built with Soviet assistance.

But there are stronger logical and economic factors which suggest that the past dramatic expansion in Indo-Soviet economic relations is not likely to be repeated. Until recently, 60 per cent of Indian imports from the Soviet Union used to be machinery and equipment.²²⁶ But now India has a good machine-building capacity.²²⁷ This does not mean that India does not need any import of machinery. However, the type of machinery needed by India, which the Soviet Union is able to provide, can in most cases be produced by India herself. Thus, it looks as though the much-advertised quality of Soviet aid, viz., promotion of self-reliance, is itself going to be a constraint on further expansion of Indo-Soviet trade. That explains why by October 1970, Rs.361 crores out of Rs.1,031 crores authorised by the Soviet Union remained unutilised.²²⁸ India's inability to utilise Soviet-

²²⁵India News (London), February 9, 1974.

²²⁶N. Patolichev, op.cit.

²²⁷The Economic Survey Report for 1969-1970, pointed out: "The Indian economy has now developed to a stage at which a considerable part of the capital equipment required not only by industry but also by power, transport, communication, agriculture and other sectors can be fabricated within the country with import only of components and raw materials". Quoted in Asha L. Datar, op.cit., p.74.

²²⁸See Table 2. At the first meeting of Inter-Governmental Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technical Co-operation in February 1973, the then Indian Minister for Planning, D.P. Dhar, said that even in 1973 there were considerable unutilised Soviet credits available to India. The Hindustan Times, February 18, 1973.

authorised aid suggests that she has narrow options of equipment and commodities to buy in Soviet markets. This becomes clear from a look at Tables 1 and 2 for figures for Indian imports from Britain and the British aid utilised by India. Britain overtook the Soviet Union in supplying more of India's imports within 3 years of the USSR overtaking Britain.²²⁹ Similarly, by October 1970, Rs.715 crores out of Rs.849 crores authorised by Britain was utilised by India.²³⁰ Now, Britain is not a food exporting country. Therefore, high Indian imports from Britain and high utilisation of British aid by India suggests that India has more options in British markets.

Therefore, further expansion of Indo-Soviet trade will have problems for India. Under the Indo-Soviet trade agreements, the partners have to spend their export earnings in each other's markets. But with increasingly narrow options open to India, that may not be possible. A look at Table 1 shows that except for the year 1968, India has been consistently having trade surpluses with the Soviet Union since 1964.²³¹ Since India's export earnings in the Soviet Union are not useful elsewhere, payments being made in local currencies under Indo-Soviet agreements, she may not have the necessary incentive to export more.

As has already been pointed out, many attempts at increasing Indo-Soviet trade have run into difficulties.²³²

²²⁹See Table 1.

²³⁰See Table 2.

²³¹See Table 1.

²³²See pp. 335 - 36

Indo-Soviet trade can still be increased considerably if either the Soviet Union is ready to sell India commodities like oil, newsprint, fertilisers etc. or buy more and more manufactures from India. These two may not be very attractive to the Soviet Union. She can earn hard currency by exporting commodities like oil to the West. Detente has made expansion of trade with the West possible. Therefore, the Soviet Union may be more interested in buying Western manufactures than Indian because of the reputation of Western manufactures for quality.

Since India has to earn more hard currency to solve her balance of payments problems,²³³ she cannot export more of her traditional exports, tea, jute, cashew nuts etc., to the Soviet Union by diverting them from Western markets. Besides that the Soviet Union has been adopting increasingly tough commercial practices with India, as when, in March 1975, Moscow unilaterally revalued India's debt to Moscow in accordance with the declining value of the rupee in relation to world currencies; this added £200 million to the present bill for repayment of the existing Soviet credits.²³⁴ Her need for more hard currency, tough Soviet commercial practices and other

²³³According to the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, 25% of India's export earnings go towards foreign debt-servicing. The Overseas Hindustan Times, June 19, 1975. See also footnote 224.

²³⁴The Guardian, March 18, 1975. India objected to this; in April 1975, a Soviet team arrived in India for talks; the talks failed because both sides stuck to their points. The Overseas Hindustan Times, April 17, 1975. See also The Overseas Hindustan Times, June 19, 1975, for a report on hard Soviet bargains with India in trade deals.

reasons discussed above make it necessary for India to expand her trade with the West.²³⁵ Therefore, expansion of Indo-Soviet trade as envisaged during Brezhnev's visit to India in November 1973, seems too ambitious.²³⁶

²³⁵See Michael Lipton and Peter Tulloch, "India and the Enlarged EEC", International Affairs (London), Vol.L, No. 1, (January 1974), pp.52 and 60, for India's attempts to secure concessions from EEC and certain concessions granted by it.

An agreement signed by India with EEC in December 1973 also referred to joint investment policy and the transfer of technology. See The Times (Supplement), August 15, 1974, p.II.

²³⁶See p. 335.

CHAPTER XI

INDO-SOVIET MILITARY RELATIONS

When the Indo-Soviet Treaty was signed, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs asserted that it was not a military alliance.¹ However, over the years wide-ranging co-operation developed between India and the Soviet Union in the field of arms and ammunitions. India has been buying Soviet military equipment on a large scale since the 1960s. On nuclear non-proliferation, India and the Soviet Union adopted policies which were at variance with each other's preferences. On the question of turning the Indian Ocean into a Zone of peace, there is apparent agreement between Moscow and New Delhi. This chapter analyses how India and the Soviet Union managed their military relations both when their views were in harmony as well as in disharmony.

DEFENCE EQUIPMENT

Britain accounted for 90 per cent of Indian defence requirements and stores in 1950.² India had Britons as Chiefs of her Navy until 1958.³ Until the Sino-Indian war of 1962, India was unwilling to accept military aid.⁴ Nehru said at a press conference in April, 1956, that the Indian forces had in the past been developed largely on the basis of British equipment and for practical reasons it was convenient, other things being equal, to continue on that basis.⁵

1. See Chapter VIII, P. 258

2. Lorne J. Kavio, op.cit., P. 129.

3. Ibid., P. 119

4. See Chapter III, P. 102 and Chapter V, P. 152 - 53

5. Quoted in Lorne J. Kavio, op.cit., P. 130

It was reported that in the mid-1950s, when India was considering the question of buying British military aircraft, Hunters and Canberras, the Soviet Union offered, at bargain price, MIG 17s and IL - 28s; but this offer was turned down by New Delhi.⁶

By 1959 shooting had begun on the Sino-Indian border; Pakistan remained as hostile as ever, with considerable United States war equipment at her disposal. In view of his commitment to non-alignment, Nehru would not accept gifts of arms from any bloc before the 1962 war with China. When India felt the need for acquiring some sophisticated equipment on a commercial basis, New Delhi requested the United States to sell some Sidewinder air-to-air missiles in 1960 and 1961. It was considered in New Delhi that the addition of these missiles to the Indian Air Force's subsonic fighters would be an economical substitute for the lack of supersonic capability. But the United States Government refused to sell the missiles.⁷

It was in 1960 that the first arms supply agreement was made between the USSR and India.⁸ India acquired transport planes and helicopters for use in the Himalayas, under this deal.⁹ However Britain remained the primary military supplier to India until 1962.

6. The Arms Trade With the Third World (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research, 1971), P. 481 (hereinafter referred to as The Arms Trade With The Third World).

7. Lorne J. Kavio, op.cit., PP. 105-106. Kavio quoted The New York Times, June 11, 1960, to establish the Indian request in that year and its rejection by the United States.

8. The Arms Trade With The Third World, P. 203

9. Ibid., P. 476

The fall in the British share of Indian arms purchases was attributable to London's inability to subsidise its exports.¹⁰ Britain also helped India in setting up some important defence industries. For example, HAL/HS 748 transport planes are being manufactured in India under British licence since 1959; India is also making Vijayanta tanks under a British licence, since 1961.¹¹

In 1962 India decided to acquire some supersonic aircraft. Since the Western attitude was lukewarm, India inevitably turned to the Soviet Union to buy the aircraft. On May 23, 1962, V.K.K. Menon, the then Defence Minister, announced in Parliament the Indo-Soviet MiG-21 deal.¹² This caused misgivings in Britain and the United States.

The former United State ambassador to India, Galbraith, noted in his memoirs: "Everyone or nearly everyone agrees that the Soviets should not become the main suppliers of the Indian defence forces."¹³ In May, 1962, the United State Senate cut aid to India by 25 per cent; this was later restored.¹⁴ "The Senators thought that the MiG purchase was a reaction to the cut. The Indians thought the cut was punishment for the MiG deal."¹⁵

10. Ibid., P. 217

11. World Armament and Disarmament: SIPRI Year-Book 1972 (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1972), P. 135 (hereinafter referred to as SIPRI Year-Book 1972).

12. The Arms Trade With the Third World, P. 482

13. John K. Galbraith, op.cit., P. 378

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., P. 376

Galbraith worked out a deal with the British government in May-June, 1962, to counter the Soviet MIG offer. Under it, British Lightnings would be offered to India at concessional rates.¹⁶ The United States would underwrite part of the cost of the British fighters and the development of an engine for the Indian supersonic fighter.¹⁷ But Kennedy disliked the idea. In the words of Galbraith, the President said on the phone: "why should we spend \$40 million to save the Indians from a foolish bargain?"¹⁸ Later, at a White House meeting, it was decided to offer India fewer fighter planes and more heavy transport planes.¹⁹

In June, 1962, the then British Minister for Commonwealth Relations, Duncan Sandys, visited New Delhi to talk, according to Galbraith, about the Common Market and to try to stop the MIG deal.²⁰

Galbraith saw Nehru on June 21, 1962, and told him that in the United States "the word MIG has become a highly evocative term like U-boat and thus especially likely to arouse emotions".²¹ The ambassador then put forward the British alternative. "In the end he [Nehru] said no decision was imminent and the British alternative would be considered."²²

At first the British were reluctant to go through with the deal because of the cost involved, but later they relented.²³

16. Ibid., P. 370

17. Ibid., P. 383

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., PP. 384-385

21. Ibid., P. 386

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., P. 385

In the meantime Kashmir was discussed in the Security Council and the West took its usual stand.²⁴ In June, 1962, Nehru spoke in Parliament suggesting that the West was invariably unfriendly to India on the Kashmir dispute and also complained of pressure on the MIG deal; President Kennedy was unhappy with the speech.²⁵ And for some reason the State Department sent a telegram, on July 18, 1962, to the United States ambassador in India cancelling the deal under which India was to be given fewer fighter planes and more heavy transport planes as a substitute for MIGs.²⁶ And on July 31, 1962, an Indian delegation went to Moscow and finally concluded the agreement for the purchase of 12 MIG-21s and for Soviet technical aid in establishing production facilities.²⁷

In his memoirs, Khrushchev told us why the Soviet Union made the deal. He wrote that India wanted MIG-21 planes and licence to manufacture them in India. There were forces in India opposing the deal; they wanted American planes; and the United States had "already agreed to turn over the blueprints for its jet fighter to India. Thus we had a choice: we could sell our planes to the Indians or sit by and watch them be tied to the American aircraft industry."²⁸

It has already been mentioned that the Soviet Union hesitated to implement the deal for some time during and after the Sino-Indian war of 1962; but later respected it.²⁹

24. See Chapter V, PP. 146

25. John K. Galbraith, op.cit., P. 388

26. Ibid., P. 399

27. Lorne J. Kavic, op.cit., P. 100

28. Strobe Talbott, transl. and ed., op.cit., P. 310

29. See Chapter VII, PP. 227 & 230

In August, 1963, the Soviet Union promised to provide air-to-air missiles for the MiG fighters. At the end of the year Moscow agreed to establish in India a 42 million SA - 2 anti-aircraft missile complex, and a missile technology school to serve it.³⁰

In November, 1964, the then Indian Defence Minister, Y.B. Chavan, visited Britain. During this visit, Britain offered a credit of £ 4,700,000 to cover the external costs over the succeeding four years for the construction of the Leander-class frigates.³¹ Britain also gave technical assistance to build this class of frigates in Bombay. Chavan also asked for a British loan of three Daring-class destroyers; London offered three Weapon-class destroyers instead, which India declined.³² Since the United States was unresponsive to an Indian request for replacement of three destroyers, New Delhi accepted the Soviet offer of frigates in 1965.³³

The United States gave Pakistan her first sub-marine in 1964.³⁴ India did not have any until late in 1965. Therefore, it was natural for India to try to secure some submarines herself. When India approached Britain for a loan of £ 4 million to buy a submarine, she expressed her inability to lend the sum.³⁵ The United States' view was that India did not need submarines; that she was indulging in

30. The Arms Trade With the Third World, P. 484.

31. Lorne J. Kavio, op.cit., P. 201

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. The Hindu, August 12, 1965.

35. Ibid., August 7, 1965.

" over-preparedness ". India, therefore, turned to the Soviet Union.³⁶ On September 6, 1965, the Indian Defence Minister declared that New Delhi placed an order for four Soviet submarines.³⁷

The Soviet Union also granted licence to produce Atoll missiles in India.³⁸ After 1962, Soviet arms delivery to India became significant; between 1965-69, the USSR accounted for 80 per cent of all major weapons delivered to India.³⁹

Soviet attempts to improve relations with Pakistan in the mid-1960s have been mentioned earlier.⁴⁰ Pakistan was equally interested in improving her relations with the USSR to have more diplomatic manoeuvrability. In July, 1968, Pakistan asked the United States to dismantle her base in Peshawar.⁴¹ It has also been mentioned that in spite of vehement Indian opposition, the Soviet Union made an arms deal with Pakistan in 1968.⁴² The details of the Pak-Soviet arms deal were not made public. But Pakistan was reported to have received

36. Ibid., August 12, 1965.

When India sent a delegation to Moscow for negotiations to buy four submarines, a British Commonwealth Relations Office Spokesman hoped that no agreement would be reached which would put the close links between the Royal Navy and the Indian Navy " at risk ". Ibid., August 6, 1965.

37. The Arms Trade With The Third World, P. 484.

38. Ibid., P. 486

39. Ibid., P. 204

40. See Chapter V, PP. 153 - 59

41. The New York Times, July 28, 1968

42. See Chapter V, PP. 161 - 64

211
8
T 54/55 tanks, 130 mm. artillery guns, and spares for MIG aircraft and tanks acquired from China in 1965.⁴³

Though the Soviet share of Indian arms imports increased over the years, the West continued to supply some arms to India. It has been mentioned elsewhere that the British and American governments banned military supplies to India and Pakistan during the war in 1965.⁴⁴ The United States lifted the embargo in February, 1966, for cash or credit purchases of non-lethal weapons and, in April, 1967, for cash or credit purchases of spares for lethal equipment. Britain lifted the embargo in early 1966.⁴⁵ After lifting the embargo in April, 1967, the United States provided a \$ 17 million loan to India to complete the air warning system, the work on which was begun after the India-China War of 1962.⁴⁶ France granted a licence to produce Aerospatiale Harpon S-S missiles in India in April, 1969.⁴⁷

43. The Arms Trade With The Third World, PP. 204 & 499.

44. See Chapter V, PP. 174

45. The Arms Trade With The Third World, P. 485

46. Ibid.

47. SIPRI Year Book 1972, P. 135

The following tables⁴⁸ give the pattern of major weapon supplies to India and Pakistan between 1958 - 69.

Figures at 1968 prices

I N D I A

Supplier	1958	'59	'60	'61	'62	'63	'64	'65	'66	'67	'68	'69
UK	4	3	4	4	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	1
USA	1	-	1	2	2	2	2	-	-	-	-	-
USSR	-	-	2	2	2	2	1	2	4	4	4	4
FRANCE	3	-	-	2	-	1	-	-	1	1	1	1

PAKISTAN

Supplier	1958	'59	'60	'61	'62	'63	'64	'65	'66	'67	'68	'69
UK	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-
USA	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	-	1	1	-	-
USSR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1

1 = Less than \$ 10 million., 2 = 10 - 50 million;

3 = \$50 - 100 million; 4 = more than \$ 100 million.

Throughout the 1950s Britain provided more than 50 per cent of India's arms and ammunitions, most of the remaining used to be

48. The Arms Trade with the Third World, P. 468. See also Chapter V, P. 153, foot note 33

imported from other Western sources too.⁴⁹

In 1970-71, the USSR delivered to India fifty Sukhoi Su-7 fighter/bomber aircraft, fifty SA-2 'Guideline' missiles, one 'F' class submarine, one 'Petya' class frigate, six 'Osa' class torpedo boats, 450 T-54/T-55 main battle tanks and 150 PT-76 amphibious tanks.⁵⁰

During the same period, India also acquired twelve Canberra B.Mk. 15 and 16 bombers and six Westland Sea King ASW helicopters from Britain, twenty Alouette III helicopters from France and ten Canberra B (1) 12 bombers from New Zealand.⁵¹ Alouette III helicopters are also being produced in India under a French licence since 1970.⁵²

49. Ibid., P. 470.

50. SIPRI Year-Book 1972, P. 134

51. Ibid., P. 135

52. Ibid.

THE SOVIET UNION AND
INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLICY

Even while developing her own nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union launched a peace offensive in the late 1940s which reached its climax in the Stockholm Appeal for the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war.⁵³ Stalin probably hoped that such activity on the part of the communist movement would boost up Soviet moral image. But more than winning moral points over his rivals, he needed time to catch up with the United States in the nuclear field. By exploiting the war-weariness of Europe and North America, through the peace offensive, he would gain time.

The Post-Stalin leaders kept repeating their opposition to nuclear weapons; they also sought to win moral points over the West by steps like unilateral cessation of nuclear tests. In a letter to the Indian statesman, Rajaji,⁵⁴ on December 31, 1957, Khrushchev referred to Nehru's appeal of December 10, 1957, to the United States and USSR to end nuclear tests and said that his country would not conduct any nuclear tests with effect from January 1, 1958, if the United States and Britain did likewise.⁵⁵ There was no response from Britain and the United States.

On March 31, 1958, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a decree on unilateral cessation of atomic tests. The decree declared that if the United States and Britain would not

53. Adam B. Ulam, *op.cit.*, P. 450. It was made in 1950. *Ibid.*

54. See Chapter III, P. 113.

55. International Affairs (Moscow), No.2 (1958), P. 13

follow the Soviet example, the Soviet Union would, when she resumed the tests, conduct explosions until the number of such explosions equalled those of the British and American explosions since March 31, 1958, the day the Soviet Union stopped the tests.⁵⁶

Soviet fear and dislike of nuclear proliferation becomes evident from her unilateral scrapping of the agreements in 1959 with China to give her technical data to enable her to make nuclear bombs.⁵⁷

India has had the scientific and technological capability to make a plutonium device since 1964.⁵⁸ She expressed her natural concern when China exploded her first nuclear device in 1964.⁵⁹ And there were demands from some opposition parties, and even some members of the ruling Congress party, that India should acquire nuclear weapons too. Moscow took notice of these developments. A commentator wrote in Pravda that "reactionary" Swatantra

56. See the statement made by Gromyko in the Supreme Soviet on December 25, 1958, Pravda, December 26, 1958. See GDSR, Vol. XI, No. 3

The Soviet Union resumed testing in November, 1958, just as the United States and Britain decided to stop testing. Strobe Talbott, transl. & ed., op.cit., P. 69.

57. See Chapter VII, P. 2212

58. The Overseas Hindustan Times, May 30, 1974.

59. See Chapter V, P. 147

and Jan Sangh parties " have started a broad campaign for arming of India with nuclear weapons".⁶⁰ Referring to an unsuccessful bid within the ruling congress party to force the government to go in for nuclear weapons, the commentator said that the attempt failed because the party was "aware that the broad masses of the Indian people would not approve of this step, which is fraught with dangerous consequences for the country".⁶¹ The commentator applauded Shastri, the then Prime Minister, for his role in defeating the move.⁶² It was obvious from such comments that Moscow was opposed to India arming herself with nuclear weapons.

However, India continued to develop her nuclear technology. She refused to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 on the ground that it was unfair to non-nuclear powers on account of the prohibition of peaceful nuclear explosions by countries other than the nuclear weapon countries.⁶³ The Soviet government, however, did not make any direct comment on India's refusal to sign the NPT. In his report to the Supreme Soviet, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gromyko, made a general and indirect comment when he said:

We should like to express the hope that those countries in which the question of adhering to the treaty is still under discussion will arrive at the only correct conclusion, that it is necessary to sign and ratify it.⁶⁴

60. A. Kutsenko in Pravda, November 14, 1964. See CDSP.Vol.XVI, No.46, P. 19

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. The Overseas Hindustan Times, May 30, 1974.

64. Pravda, July 11, 1969. See CDSP, Vol XXI, No.28, P.9

In his speech at the Thirty First Session of the UN General Assembly on September 28, 1976, Gromyko said that more "effort must be made to ensure that the Treaty on the non-proliferation of this weapon becomes truly universal, that all states without exception sign it". Moscow News, Supplement to issue No. 40 (1976), P. 4

Instead, India conducted an underground nuclear explosion on May 18, 1974. She, however, declared that it was an explosion for peaceful purposes and that she would not make nuclear weapons.⁶⁵

The Soviet Union and the West held identical views on the need for all non-nuclear states subscribing to the NPT. But their reaction to India's nuclear explosion was a study in contrast.

The Soviet press made a factual report without comment.⁶⁶ If anything could be interpreted as an indirect Soviet expression of disapproval of India's action, it was the speech of the Soviet delegate at the meeting of the UN Disarmament Committee held in Geneva a few days after the event. The Soviet representative called for a total ban on nuclear testing, including underground testing.⁶⁷ Bhutto, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, who visited Moscow to discuss the effects of India's explosion on Pakistan,⁶⁸ drew a blank. While nothing can be said about the discussions behind the scene, the Soviet leaders were not prepared to say anything about India's explosion openly; the Soviet-Pakistani Joint Statement was silent on the issue.⁶⁹

The reaction in the West was sharp. Britain exploded a nuclear device at the underground testing site in Nevada on June 24, 1974.⁷⁰ But the British Minister of State at the Foreign Office,

65. The Guardian, May 19, 1974

66. See Pravda and Izvestia, May 19, 1974. See below PP. 399 - 400

67. Izvestia, May 26, 1974.

68. See Chapter IX, P. 309

69. Izvestia, October 27, 1974.

70. The Guardian, June 25, 1974

David Ennals, could not hide British government's "deep concern" and "disappointment" with the Indian action.⁷¹ The Anglo-American press made very harsh comments.⁷²

Recent disclosures have shown that with all the recurrent tensions and bitterness in Indo-American relations, there has been closer cooperation between the CIA and the Indian intelligence bureau, the CBI (Central Bureau of Investigation), in sensitive fields like monitoring the Chinese nuclear tests and missile launchings at a time when the spy satellite

71. The Guardian, July 10, 1974.

72. The New York Times, May 20, 1974, called the Indian explosion "another monument to human folly" and sarcastically commented that the "sixth member of the nuclear club may be passing the begging bowl before the year is out....."

The Daily Telegraph, May 20, 1974, commented that somehow "India succeeds in maintaining a peaceable mien, even when well armed with conventional weapons. The addition of a nuclear bomb to her arsenal marked "Made in India" will not alter that benign posture. " But the editorial felt that the new weapon would lessen India's fear of China "and possibly reduce her military dependence on the Soviet Union".

The Times, May 20, 1974, wrote that the news will be "received with little pleasure by those who are called upon to pay for India's inability to solve her appalling internal problems". Referring to the political reaction in India, the editorial said it looks as though "India needed influence more than food."

The Guardian, May 20, 1974 conceded that the nuclear powers could not "without hypocrisy condemn the Indians for joining their club". But felt that one easily foreseeable "temptation for any Indian Prime Minister would be to embark on a foreign adventure which, with a bomb would be bound to succeed in order to distract attention from the problems crowding in at home, of which India has more than her share".

was not adequately developed. This well-kept secret was revealed by an American journalist, M. Howard Kohn, in a television interview.⁷³ When the issue was raised in parliament, Prime Minister Desai told the members that in 1965 the Indian and American governments decided at the highest level to install remote sensing device with a nuclear power pack near the highest point of Nanda Devi peak in the Himalayas with the object of securing information about Chinese missile developments. When the expedition was approaching the summit, it was overtaken by a blizzard and was forced to retreat to the lower camp. In the precipitate descent under very trying and exacting conditions, they had to leave the pack securely cached. An attempt was made to retrieve and install the device in May, 1966. But it was discovered that a major avalanche had occurred around the area and the device could not be located. Another device was installed in the same area in 1967. It functioned normally until it was removed and returned to the United States in 1968.⁷⁴

Even in the field of organisation and training of Indian intelligence agencies, there was close cooperation between the United States and India. After the trauma of the Chinese attack in 1962, the government of India let in the American intelligence experts to help reorganise, expand and modernise the Indian agencies to cope with new challenges. A large number of Indian operatives and specialists were sent to the United States

73. The Hindu, April 14, 1978.

74. Ibid., April 18, 1978

for advanced training at the CIA establishments; there were American personnel at the Indian establishments for training Indians. During the late 1960s, the American presence in India was curtailed considerably and reduced to the bare minimum after the Bangladesh war. The Indian intelligence personnel continued to be sent to the United States even after Mrs. Gandhi started fiercely denouncing the CIA for its alleged attempts to destabilize the governments of the Third World countries.⁷⁵

Whatever might have been the nature of cooperation between India and the United States in sensitive fields and whether the Indian nuclear explosion was bitterly denounced or gently disapproved, there seems to be perfect agreement between what came to be known as nuclear "suppliers group"⁷⁶ and, more particularly,

75. Ibid., April 15, 1978

76. The United States, USSR, Britain, France, Japan, West Germany, China, Canada, Belgium, Holland, Italy, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden and Switzerland constitute this group. At a secret meeting in London in September, 1977, the group made an agreement which specifies that the signatories will apply a list of safeguards in all sales of nuclear technology. The code is not retroactive. The safeguards clause says that the government of exporter countries must give assurances that the supplies will not contribute to the production of weapons; that third supplier countries will not intervene by offering their own exports in the event of disagreement in negotiations on a contract between any importing country and one of the suppliers group; that suppliers will sell nuclear material only to those states pledged to accept international safeguards such as periodic inspection of production sites; and that buyers must agree to respect all international safeguards in the event of the resale of installations to third countries. See Competition Success Review, Vo. XIV, No. 9 (March, 1978), PP. 25 - 26

between the United States and the USSR to coerce near-nuclear powers like India to sign the NPT. Canada ended her cooperation with India in the nuclear field after the latter conducted an explosion in 1974. Ottawa also cancelled heavy water exports to India in 1976, pending nuclear contract with her.⁷⁷

During his visit to India in January, 1978, President Carter of the United States insisted on Indian acceptance of full scope safeguards for all the Indian nuclear installations; Prime Minister Desai firmly resisted the demand.⁷⁸

The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission rejected an Indian application for the release of a shipment of 7.6 tonnes of uranium in spite of strong Presidential recommendation that it be released.⁷⁹ This uranium was intended for use in Tarapur power plant; the United States has contractual obligations to supply it.⁸⁰ The Commission turned down the Indian application "in the spirit" of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act.⁸¹ This Act, however, comes into force in late 1979.⁸² When it comes into force, uranium shipments

77. Ashok Kapur, "Indo-Soviet Military Relations: Dependency, Inter-dependency and Uncertainties," India Quarterly, Vol. XXXIII, No. 3 (July-September, 1977), P. 279

78. The Hindu, January 3, 1978. The United States television teams, accompanying the President, operating with highly sophisticated equipment, picked up President Carter's private remarks to the Secretary of State, Vance. The President said: " When we get back, I think we ought to write" him [Desai] another letter, just cold and very blunt". This leak embarrassed the President. Ibid.

79. Ibid., April 22, 1978

80. Ibid.,

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid.

to all countries would be automatically terminated unless they accept "fullscope" safeguards.⁸³ And yet, certain nuclear materials were hastily cleared for dispatch to friendly developed European countries by the same Commission only a few days before rejecting the Indian application.⁸⁴

The Soviet Union supplies most of the heavy water imported by India. Under a contract signed by India and the Soviet Union in September, 1976, Moscow would export 200 tonnes of heavy water to India in a phased manner, the last consignment being sent in 1978.⁸⁵ The entire quantity supplied by the Soviet Union was required to be placed under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.⁸⁶ Thus, the Soviet Union is not any more lenient to India than the West.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid. Under the law, the President can overrule the Commission and the Congress will have sixty working days within which it could either approve or reject the action of the President. The President overruled the Commission on April 27, 1978. The Hindu, April 28, 1978

85. Ibid., April 20, 1978

86. Ibid.

THE INDIAN OCEAN AND THE SOVIET UNION

In the post-Cuban missiles crisis⁸⁷ period, the Indian Ocean littoral states, particularly the non-aligned, began calling for turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, probably to keep any future clash of the giants away from their region.

Sri Lanka (Ceylon) first proposed the zone of peace idea at the Cairo Non-aligned Summit of 1964.⁸⁸

Since Stalin's time, the Soviet Union was aware of her naval inferiority.⁸⁹ Soviet naval expansion began since 1964.⁹⁰ In spite of all the recent expansion, the Soviet navy seems to lack offensive capability.⁹¹ Soviet Admiral, Gorshkov, pleaded for forging the Soviet Navy into an instrument "without equal" in a series of articles in 1972 and 1973.⁹²

Demonstration of Soviet power becomes necessary in Moscow's competition with Washington for influence. Therefore, just as the littoral states began calling for turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, the Soviet Navy began making its appearance in the Ocean.

87. See Chapter VII, PP. 220 - 21.

88. Martin Woollacott, " 'Zone of Peace' Plan in Troubled Waters ", The Guardian, September 10, 1975.

89. See Chapter I, P. 68 for Stalin's awareness of it.

90. Hannes Adomeit, Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behaviour: From Confrontation to Coexistence? (Adelphi Papers No. 101) (London: The International Institute For Strategic Studies, 1973), P. 26

91. Ibid., P. 27

92. Ibid.

As the Afro-Asian states' demands for the removal of the big power navies became frequent, the Soviet Union began supporting the demand and expressing her readiness to discuss with other concerned powers and find a solution. If the United States removes her navy, Moscow would not lose face in withdrawing its. In any case, Soviet navy does not enjoy parity with that of the United States. Any "attempt to achieve parity with the adversary super-power on all levels would require a vast effort and even greater proportions of the Soviet economy for defence, and would probably take a long time".⁹³ If a mutually acceptable solution to the problem could be found with the United States, the USSR would be spared of the effort and money.

In June, 1971, Brezhnev himself proposed to Washington "mutual naval restraint". The United States sought but "received no further clarification of what the USSR may have had in mind nor any indication that they had an interest in pursuing this subject further".⁹⁵ The United States expressed interest in the idea "perhaps in the form of explicit understandings to avoid competition while safeguarding our respective interests in the Indian Ocean".⁹⁶

93. Hannes Adomeit, op.cit., P. 27

94. Quoted in K.P. Mishra, "Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: The Concept and Alternatives", India Quarterly, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (January-March, 1977), P. 27

95. Quoted, Ibid. See below, P. 401

96. Ibid.

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Again, in September, 1971, Soviet Union expressed her readiness to examine and solve the problem of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace together with other powers on an equal basis.⁹⁷ This was repeated in the Joint Declaration issued at the end of Brezhnev's visit to India in November, 1973.⁹⁸

In the meantime, Sri Lanka moved a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly in October, 1971; this was adopted on December 16, 1971. The resolution urged the great powers to consult the littoral countries with a view to reducing or scaling down their competition and contention, military or otherwise, in the area. It called for a halt to the "escalation and expansion of their military presence" and demanded that the great powers should withdraw from all their military bases and installations, remove all nuclear weapons and terminate all manifestations of great power rivalry in the area. It declared that "the right to free and unimpeded use of the zone by the vessels of all nations is unaffected".⁹⁹

Even while floating the ideas like "mutual naval restraint" and making promises to study the question of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, the Soviet Union continued the periodic visits of Soviet ships to the Indian Ocean. One such visit occurred during the Bangladesh war in December, 1971.¹⁰⁰ The Soviet Union dispatched two "task groups" of four combatants each to the Indian Ocean. The first was reported to have left on

97. Pravda, September 30, 1971

98. See Mission of Friendship, P. 81. Moscow also supported the idea during Mrs. Gandhi's visit to the USSR in 1976 and Desai's visit in 1977. See Moscow News, Supplement to issue No. 25 (1976) and Soviet Land, No. 22 (November 1977)

99. See U.N. Doc. A/Res/2832, December 16, 1971.

100. See Chapter IX.

December 6-7, 1971. A few days after the United States ship Enterprise was asked to move into the Indian Ocean,¹⁰¹ the second Soviet 'task group' was dispatched. The first Soviet group arrived in the Indian Ocean on December 18, 1971, two days after the war ended.¹⁰²

This was probably a coincidence. It is inconceivable that the Soviet Union would deepen the crisis by challenging the United States. As it was, on the Bangla issue, the isolation of the Soviet Union at the United Nations was complete.¹⁰³ Therefore, Moscow would not lay itself open to charges of indulging in gun-boat diplomacy. Even assuming that Moscow intended to demonstrate its solidarity with India by the dispatch of ships, certainly it could not have been as ignorant as not to know the distance that the vessels had to cover and the time it would take to reach the Indian Ocean, whether the units involved were part of its Far Eastern fleet or the Baltic or the Black Sea fleets. Moscow could not have been unaware of the limited capability of Pakistan to continue the war for any length of time in view of the great strategic disadvantage she suffered from - her then eastern wing being separated from the western wing by a stretch of one thousand miles of Indian territory. Moscow could not even hope to get

101. Ibid., P. 290

102. For a discussion of this naval diplomacy, see James M. McConnell and Anne M. Kelly, "Super-Power Naval Diplomacy: Lessons of the Indo - Pakistani Crisis 1971", Survival, Vol. XV, No. 6 (November - December, 1973).

103. See Chapter IX, PP. 297 - 99

the credit for having expressed its solidarity with India if her ships arrived after the end of the war. Therefore, it would not be unreasonable to argue that the dispatch of the Soviet ships during the Bangla war was a part of the routine visits of the Soviet vessels to the Indian Ocean.

The Anglo - American government did not exhibit the knack the Soviet government did, that is, serving their interests even while appearing to be considerate to the feelings of the littoral states. In spite of the opposition of the littoral states, the Congressional opposition in the United States¹⁰⁴ and even after, a group of US Congressmen, invited to inspect the Berbera Port in Somalia, where the Soviet Union was alleged

104. On March 19, 1974, The Kennedy - Pell resolution was introduced in the Senate opposing the Diego Garcia base. K.P. Misra, op.cit., P. 29

to have established a base, reported in 1975 that there were no Soviet military installations in the port.¹⁰⁵ Britain and the United States made an agreement on the expansion of the naval facilities in the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia.¹⁰⁶ Thus, Britain and the United States give the impression of being inconsiderate while the Soviet Union seems to be considerate to the feelings of the Indian Ocean littoral States.

105. Vijaya Gupta, The Ethiopia-Somalia Conflict and the Role of the External Powers (Foreign Affairs Reports, Vol. XXVII, No. 3), (New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, 1978), P. 41

Somalia became independent in 1960. Immediately thereafter, she began making irredentist claims first on Ethiopia and later on Kenya. In October, 1963, Somalia accepted Soviet military aid. After a coup in 1969, a socialistically-minded government came to power in the country. In 1974 Emperor Haile Selassie was overthrown in Ethiopia and a Marxist-Leninist government was formed. Somalia and the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of Friendship and cooperation in the same year. In the meantime, American-Ethiopian relations deteriorated. The Western and Arab countries were reported to have passed on huge sums of money to the Eritrean rebels in Ethiopia. In the wake of the revolution in Ethiopia, there was a steady improvement in Soviet-Ethiopian relations and Moscow refused to support Somali territorial claims on Ethiopia. Somalia terminated the Friendship Treaty on November 13, 1977. See, Ibid., PP. 41 - 47.

106. K.P. Misra, op.cit., P. 25

EVALUATION

In the 1950s India's dependence on the West for arms and ammunition was total; Britain held a dominant position among the suppliers of arms. In the mid-1950s Nehru held the view that, other things being equal, Indian armed forces would continue to be based largely on British equipment.¹⁰⁷ For five years after the Soviet entry into the world armament market,¹⁰⁸ India had not bought any equipment from the Soviet Union. Even her offer of aircraft at bargain prices was not accepted.¹⁰⁹

But by the late 1950s India perceived greater danger to her security. Pakistan ceased to be the only security problem; China began making menacing irredentist claims on India.¹¹⁰ Pakistan acquired considerable quantity of weapons from the United States.¹¹¹ Britain was either unable to subsidise her defence exports to India or unwilling to give what she asked for.¹¹² The United States chose to decide what was necessary for India and what was not.¹¹³ But this was not likely to inspire confidence in India in view of Washington's treaty obligations with Pakistan. This gave the Soviet Union an opportunity to become an important supplier of arms to India.

107. See P. 370

108. The Soviet Union entered the market using Czechoslovakia as her surrogate in the Egyptian-Czechoslovak arms deal in 1955. See David J. Dallin, *op.cit.*, P. 394

109. See. P. 371

110. See Chapter VII,

111. See P. 378 and Chapter V, P. 153 , footnote 33.

112. See P. 372 & 375

113. See P. 375 & 76

India could hope to derive the following benefits from her arms deals with the Soviet Union: 1) Since the Soviet Union accepted the rupee as the unit of account in trade with India,¹¹⁴ arms deals with Moscow would save foreign exchange. 2) India could hope to put pressure on Britain and the United States to respond favourably to Indian requests for weapons of her choice and to go slow on arming Pakistan - not an unjustified hope in conditions of the Cold War. 3) She could hope to reap diplomatic benefits from such deals in view of the increasing tensions on the Sino-Indian border: arming of India by the Soviet Union against another communist country, China, could be of considerable diplomatic advantage to New Delhi. 4) There were obvious military benefits: India's Soviet arms would neutralise Pakistan's American arms; and since much of the Chinese military hardware in those days was of Soviet origin, possession of similar type of equipment would foster confidence in the Indian military leadership.

The Soviet Union did vacillate on the MIG-21 deal.¹¹⁵ But Moscow's hesitant sale and licencing to manufacture certain items of military hardware would be preferable to India than Anglo-American unwillingness to give her what she needed.

114. See Chapter X, P. 332

115. See Chapter VII, P. 230

However, it has to be borne in mind that India approached the West first every time she decided on acquiring new weapons.¹¹⁶ Only when either the weapons offered were not of her choice or when she met with an outright refusal did she turn to Moscow.¹¹⁷

Besides, Britain and the United States proved to be undependable in times of India's dire security needs.¹¹⁸ The Soviet Union continued arms supplies to India even when she reappraised her South Asia policy in the mid-1960s.¹¹⁹

At a time when the Soviet Union was competing with the United States for influence in all fields, the promotion of sales of Soviet military equipment in the Third World countries could not be ignored both for reasons of prestige as well as commercial benefits. Moscow would have the satisfaction of having broken the Western monopoly over the supply of arms to the Third World; it would receive due credit from the new nations, particularly the non-aligned, for providing them with enough manoeuvrability in arms purchases.

116. India is now seriously considering the question of acquiring and manufacturing under licence Deep Penetration Strike Aircraft (DPSA). The three aircraft being considered are: the British-French twin-engined Jaguar, the French-built Mirage F1 and the Swedish Viggen. This time, all three are eager to clinch the deal. See the Hindu, February, 10, March 22, 26, and April 8, 1978.

117. In an interview granted to the Hamburg magazine, Der Spiegel in May, 1977, Prime Minister Desai blamed the United States for India's dependence on Soviet arms. See the Statesman, May 30, 1977.

118. See Chapter V, P. 174

119. Ibid., P. 174.

Arms sales to India, as also to other Third World countries, would have other advantages too: the opportunities they provide for developing contacts with the military personnel in the course of training them in the use of Soviet equipment. The Soviet Union was aware of the frequent coups and the political roles played by the military forces in almost all the Third World countries. In case the Indian Parliamentary democracy fails to solve the people's socio-economic problems and there is chaos in the country, Moscow probably hoped that the military would intervene in the fashion of military forces in other Third World countries. Therefore, if possible, the Soviet Union could use her contacts with the Indian defence personnel to build up a friendly group in the armed forces. Even if Indian parliamentary democracy proves resilient enough, as it appears to be, to survive, the contacts that Moscow would develop with the Indian defence personnel would be useful at least for gathering intelligence.

However, it has to be mentioned that India was cautious in her military deals with the Soviet Union. She has, at least by implication, shown her preference for and trust in the West. There were British Chiefs for the Indian Navy until 1958.¹²⁰ The Indian Air Force held joint exercises with the British and American Air Forces.¹²¹ India and the United States cooperated in monitoring the Chinese nuclear tests and missile launchings.¹²² The Soviet Union would have been equally interested in such joint enterprises in view of the State of Sino-Soviet relations. The fact that nothing of the sort

120. See above 370

121. See Chapter VII, P. 239

122. See P.P. 384-85

had happened speaks for the caution that India practised in her relations with Moscow. Similarly, Indian intelligence personnel went to the CIA establishments for training;¹²³ no such instances of cooperation between the Indian and Soviet intelligence organisations have been reported.

On India's nuclear policy, the Western attitude was brusque. It is evident that the Soviet Union is not less committed than the West to making the NPT truly universal.¹²⁴ However, Moscow did not make any direct comments on India's nuclear explosion in May 1974.¹²⁵ The achievement of the nuclear scientists caused great excitement in India. Under such conditions, Moscow's silence would be more pleasing to India than jarring Western comments.¹²⁶

Probably, her experience with China convinced the Soviet Union of the futility of trying to deflect a determined nation from its chosen path; the more the pressure that Moscow applied on China the more relentlessly Peking drove towards achieving self-reliance

123. See P. 386 See also Conclusions P. 417

124. See P. 382

125. See P. 383

126. See P. 384 , foot note 72

in nuclear technology.¹²⁷ Thus, Moscow seemed to have become aware of the limits on its power to influence other countries. Nothing would have been gained by Moscow's harsh criticism of India; all the good impact that Soviet diplomacy had made on Indian public opinion would have been lost.¹²⁸ It is also possible that Moscow considers India "as a partial balance to the political influence and potential military weight of China".¹²⁹ Therefore, it would be unwise to introduce bitterness into Indo-Soviet relations. Anyway, the West was performing the unpleasant task of pressurising India. If the West had succeeded, Soviet purpose would be served too; if it had failed, it would be imprudent for Moscow to try the same tactics. Moscow chose prudence and remained silent.

127. In fact Western pressure on India has similar effects. With the infrastructure available at the Bharat Heavy Electricals and in some other enterprises, the Indian nuclear scientists have developed an impressive expertise to fabricate an indigenous nuclear power plant. Dr. Ramanna, the Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Defence, forcefully advocates the manufacture of indigenous fuel by mixing natural uranium with plutonium, see The Hindu, March 23, 1978

Construction of four heavy water plants has been undertaken - at Kota, Baroda, Tuticorin and Talchar with a total production capacity of 300 tonnes per year. In two years time, India will be self-reliant in heavy water. The Hindu, April 20, 1978

128. See Chapter VIII, P. 274, footnotes 101 and 103.

129. Ibid., P. 273, foot note 100.

On the question of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace too, the Soviet Union followed the same tactics: quietly serving her interests while appearing to be considerate to the feelings of the littoral states. Anglo-American policies give the impression of being insensitive to the feelings of the littoral states.¹³⁰ When their demand for the removal of the big power navies became insistent, Anglo-American decision to establish a base in Diego Garcia was announced.

The Soviet strategy seems to be to hold the United States responsible for the deadlock on the issue. It is curious why having himself proposed "mutual naval restraint", Brezhnev did not show much interest in the idea.¹³² It is possible that the Soviet Union was hopeful of securing a base in Somalia in the wake of the coup in the country and steady improvement in Soviet - Somalia relations for a while.¹³³ Once the Soviet Union realised that it was unlikely to get a base in the region, she began insisting that the "key question" here (the Indian Ocean) is the removal of "foreign military bases".¹³⁴ Moscow now says that it "is prepared jointly

130. The biggest navy in the Indian Ocean is that of India, and the most modern and sophisticated navy is that of Iran. See Martin Woollacott, op.cit. It is possible that these two powers are interested in the removal of the navies of the great powers from the Ocean also for reasons of the prominence that their navies would enjoy after their (big power navies) exit.

131. See P. 394

132. See above, P. 390

133. See above, P. 394, foot note 105

134. Gromyko's speech to the Thirty First session of the UN General Assembly on September 28, 1976. See Moscow News Supplement to issue No. 40 (1976), P. 4

with other powers to seek ways of reducing, on a reciprocal basis, the military activity of non-coastal states.....¹³⁵ If Soviet proposal is accepted, Moscow will again something: removal of the existing United States bases in the Indian Ocean. Then, it agrees to "reducing, on a reciprocal basis, the military activity". In so doing, the Soviet Union will not lose anything. In the meantime, the Anglo-American base at Diego Garcia is held responsible for the stalemate.

It is noteworthy that the Soviet Union talks only of "reducing" the naval activity in the Ocean and not of its total elimination. It is possible that the Soviet Union wants to maintain her present practice of periodically sending its vessels to the Ocean to counter Chinese influence.¹³⁶ Peking's navy is not big enough to enable it to dispatch its ships to the four corners of the world. This is a field where the Soviet Union can demonstrate her power unmatched by China. It is also significant that Moscow does not indulge in sensational diplomatic acts like unilateral cessation of its naval activity in the Ocean, as it did with nuclear testing in the late 1950s.¹³⁷

Thus, Indo-Soviet military relations were confined to purchases of Soviet weapons on commercial basis. By implication, India showed her preference to the West. Yet, the West was not considerate to her; Moscow treated her with due considerateness, thereby demonstrating the importance it attaches to India as an independent political actor, unlike the West which gave the impression of treating her as no more than an object of their policies.

¹³⁵. Ibid.

¹³⁶. See Martin Woolcott, op.cit. See also conclusions, P.

¹³⁷. See P. 380

C O N C L U S I O N S

The Soviet Union began exhibiting friendliness towards India, as to other newly independent states, only in the post-Stalin era.¹ A desire for some relaxation in the Soviet Union itself after decades of terror, the confidence fostered by the Western failure to intervene in the East German workers' revolt in 1953 and the Hungarian revolt in 1956,² the rapid disappearance of colonial empires and the refusal of most of the new nations to toe the Western line in the Cold War must have convinced the new Soviet leadership of the need for a change in Soviet policy.

Notwithstanding the mutual threatening declarations by both blocs, maintenance of the status quo was the primary aim of the Cold War: the Soviet Union would not give up her hegemony in Eastern Europe; she would not, at the same time, risk a war in trying to impose Communism on other states.³ The United States would not tolerate the imposition of Communism on other states by the Soviet Union; but, she would not risk a war to free Eastern Europe from Soviet control either. The build-up of formidable military machines by both sides was a deterrent against any disturbance being caused to this status quo by either side. Since war between the two super-powers is destructive of both, they resorted to diplomatic means to neutralise each other in the Cold War.

1. See Chapter I, PP. 53 - 62 and Chapter III, PP. 101 - 105

2. See Chapter I, P. 48 , and Chapter III, P. 101

3. See Chapter I, P. 53

There was no chance of Moscow successfully persuading the newly liberated states to join in a military alliance against the West. But there was hope for the Soviet Union in the new developments: the refusal of most of the Afro-Asian States to join the Western alliances against the Soviet Union. The West, which used to decide the fate of most Afro-Asian countries while they were under colonial bondage considered this a loss; Moscow considered non-alignment a gain inasmuch as the West considered it a loss and began cultivating the friendship of the Third World.

The Soviet Union's attempts at currying the favour of the Socialist parties of Western Europe and dividing the West having failed,⁴ Moscow began cultivating the goodwill of the Third World. There were hardly any ideological considerations behind these moves.⁵

The secondary importance of ideology in Soviet foreign policy considerations comes out clearly when we consider Indo-Soviet relations in the context of the concept of national-democratic state evolved at the conference of international Communist Parties in 1960.⁶ Neither India was a national democratic state,⁷ nor the Congress Party a revolutionary democratic party, an appellation given to the ruling parties of national democratic states.⁸ Yet, the Soviet Union developed very close relations with India and invested considerably in India's economic development.⁹ Only in the last years of Mrs. Gandhi's regime did Brezhnev begin

4. See Chapter I, P. 52

5. Ibid., PP. 53 - 62

6. See Chapter I, P. 57 - 58

7. See Chapter, I, P. 58

8. See Chapter I, P. 61

9. See Chapter X.

an attempt to woo the Congress Party.¹⁰ This suggests that Moscow paid more attention to diplomatic expediency than ideological consistency.

One of the important factors responsible for the success of Soviet diplomacy in India is the temperamental incompatibility between India and the West. The West should have realised that nations in general, and those recently having acquired sovereign status in particular, tend to resent unsolicited advice. The West, the United States in particular, sought to tell India what was good for her and what was not; this was unacceptable to India.

As a large and ancient country, India has her own hopes and ambitions.¹¹ She naturally wanted to chart her own course in international affairs; this was not to the liking of Western policy-makers, who wanted the new nations to throw in their lot with the West. Besides this, India's national interests clashed with the American global interests in Pakistan,¹² Goa,¹³ Bangladesh¹⁴ and on colonial and racial issues.¹⁵ For reasons of

10. S.D. Sharma, then President of the Congress Party, was invited to pay a visit to the Soviet Union, which he did in July 1973. Izvestia, July 4, 1973. During his visit to India, Brezhnev discussed with the Congress President issues relating to contacts between the Congress and the CPSU. The Times of India, November 29, 1973.

But there was strong opposition within the Congress even to cooperation between the Congress and the CPI. Mrs. Gandhi took the view that the Congress did not need Communist support, but it could not spurn offers of cooperation from the CPI on the basis of its policies and programmes. See The Overseas Hindustan Times, February 13, 1975.

11. See Chapter II, PP. 85 - 88

12. See Chapter V,

13. See Chapter VI

14. See Chapter IX

15. See Chapter IV

their national interests and, probably also, as a means of pressure, Britain and the United States adopted an unfriendly stand on most issues vital to Indian interests; and precisely for the same reasons, India looked to Moscow for support.¹⁶

The Anglo-American press, which disagrees with their governments frequently on many issues, invariably reflected their governments' stand on issues vital to India's interests; on Kashmir their comments have always been pro-Pakistani,¹⁷ on Goa, they were pro-Portuguese;¹⁸ on Sikkim¹⁹ their comments almost reflected the Chinese stand;²⁰ on India's nuclear explosion, their comments were harsh.²¹ This general phenomenon was resented by Nehru as early as 1948.²² Thus, at both the official

16. Long before independence, Nehru considered Soviet power necessary to control Western power. See Chapter II, P. 85

17. See, for example, The Sunday Express, January 6, 1957, The Daily Express, January 8, 1957, and January 30, 1957, The Time and Tide, February 2, 1957, The Times, September 7, 1965

18. See Chapter VI, P. 184

19. Sikkim used to be an Indian protectorate (See Chapter VII, P. 198) which became a full-fledged state of India in April 1975.

20. See the editorial in The New York Times, "Imperial India", April 21, 1975; The observer also commented on the issue under the caption "Imperial India", April 20, 1975; The Guardian commented under the caption "The Swallowing of Sikkim", April 23, 1975. Some Indian newspapers criticised the action too. See The Overseas Hindustan Times, May 1, 1975, which commented under the caption, "A Merger is Arranged!"

21. See Chapter XI, P. 384 See also Chapter IV, P. , and Chapter IX.

22. Nehru said on March 8, 1948: "It is amazing how a certain section of the press, say, in the United Kingdom, deliberately and offensively misrepresents us." India's Foreign Policy, PP. 35-36. This resentment is not peculiar to India. The American media's criticism of Heath, when he was the Prime Minister, their writing off of Britain was recently resented in Britain. See The Times, January 1, 1974, and the editorial in The Guardian, on May 9, 1975.

as well as the non-official level there were tensions in Indo-American and Indo-British relations; Indo-American relations have been often tense because of Washington's alliances with and arms supplies to Pakistan.

Such tensions in Indo-American relations could not have been ignored by the Soviet leadership, the more so because the United States was the chief rival of the USSR.²³ The Soviet policy towards India evolved gradually over the years. Stalin hardly evinced any interest in exploiting the tensions between India and the West.²⁴ When the post-Stalin leadership changed the tactics of Soviet foreign policy, they established a business-like relationship with India; they never shunned Pakistan completely.²⁵ One thing that stands out clearly in Indo-Soviet relations is that Soviet support to India has been consistent and outspoken only on colonial and racial issues, i.e., issues on which the United States could not take an outright stand for reasons of Western alliance management. On Kashmir, the Soviet policy changed many times;²⁶ and, on the Sino-Indian border dispute, the Soviet stand has been equivocal.²⁷ The strong Soviet support to India on Bangladesh was extended because of the apprehensions caused in Moscow in the wake of sudden improvement in Sino-American relations.²⁸

23. See Chapter I, P. 58

24. See Chapter III, PP. 94 - 101

25. See Chapter III, PP. 106

26. See Chapter III, PP. 105-09 and Chapter V.

27. See Chapter VII, PP. 216 - 228

28. See Chapters VIII and IX

Soviet economic aid to India has remained reliable, i.e., it was not subject to sudden suspensions as the United States' aid was.²⁹

Once the USSR decided to cultivate the friendship of the new nations, she skilfully exploited the temperamental differences between them and Washington. While the United States gave the impression of demanding cooperation from the Third World on her own terms,³⁰ the Soviet Union would carefully maintain the image of a super-power which treats the new nations on a footing of equality.³¹

In its dealings with India the Soviet Union appears to have given due consideration to her size and potential.³² Moscow never suspended aid to India to pressure her into changing her policies as the United States did.³³

29. See Chapter X, PP. 290 & 358 - 59

30. The United States would not countenance non-alignment for a long time (see Chapter III, P. 110) and would not support the Third World on colonial and racial issues (see Chapter IV) and yet expected them to support her policies in the Cold War.

31. For instance, in his Report to the XXIIInd Congress of the CPSU in 1961, Khrushchev said that "the basic issues of world politics can no longer be settled without due regards for their [the newly liberated countries'] interests". See The Road to Communism, P. 41

32. See Chapter III, P. 104

33. See Chapter X, PP. 358 - 59

Khrushchev mentioned in his memoirs that in "a very cautious way", the Soviet Union asked Nkrumah to get rid of the British officers from the Ghanaian army. See Strobe Talbott transl. and ed., op.cit., P. 334. Nkrumah did that in 1961 on return from a 9-week trip to the USSR, Eastern Europe and China. See Ernest W. Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser and Nkrumah" in Laurance W. Martin ed., op.cit., P. 115. India had Britons as chiefs of her navy until 1958 (see Chapter XI, P. 370); the Soviet Union did not seem to have given such suggestions to her.

On the question of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, the United States and Britain gave the impression of being insensitive to the demands of the littoral states. Even while not being fully in tune with the mood of the littoral states, the Soviet Union managed to get the credit for being responsive to the demands of the littoral states by repeatedly subscribing to the concept in Indo-Soviet joint communiques.³⁴

Such Soviet considerateness towards India is not surprising in view of the convergence of Indo-Soviet interests first on the issue of Pakistan and later, on China. But in spite of this convergence of interests, there was hardly any military cooperation between India and the Soviet Union, apart from Indian purchases of Soviet weapons on commercial terms. The Indian Air Force held joint exercises with the British and American Air Forces after the Sino-Indian border war of 1962;³⁵ there was no similar cooperation between any wing of the Indian armed forces and its Soviet counterpart. Recent disclosures suggest that, even without entering into any formal alliances, India had been cooperating with the United States

34. See Chapter XI, pp. 391

35. See Chapter VII, P. 239 , See also above footnote 33.

in sensitive fields in the 1960s.³⁶

As a large country, India may like to emerge as a power in her own right. The Soviet Union is careful not to give the impression of coming in the way of Indian national ambitions. The Soviet leaders and spokesmen say things soothing to India's national ego.³⁷ While the Western press concentrates on poverty in India all the time, Soviet leaders pay tributes to the significant progress made by India since independence;³⁸ simultaneously, Soviet spokesmen also try to please the Indian intelligentsia by expressing their "great respect for Indian scientists" for their contribution in various fields.³⁹ This attempt to please India has gone to the extent of entertaining the Indian Guru of the Hare Krishna cult, so familiar in some big Western cities.⁴⁰

36. See Chapter XI, PP. 384 - 86

37. Thus, Brezhnev told the Indian Parliament on November 29, 1973 that in : "India's growing international role we see a convincing manifestation of the current process of deep democratisation of international relations....". He also said some countries do not like this; but the Soviet Union welcomes it. See Mission of Friendship, P. 61. See also Chapter III, P. 104

38. Brezhnev's speech at a civic reception on November 27, 1973. See Mission of Friendship, P. 24

39. See Vladimir Kirillin, op.cit., PP. 133 and 136, R.N. Sidiyak, op.cit., P. 164, The Hindustan Times, February 18, 1973, and The Overseas Hindustan Times, May 1, 1975.

40. In 1974, the Guru visited Moscow to introduce the philosophy of Krishna consciousness.

See The Bhavan's Journal, Bombay, Vol. XXI, No. 8 (November 10, 1974), PP. 62-67.

Even when Moscow does not like certain Indian policies, like her nuclear explosion in May 1974, it adopts a policy of restraint. Unlike the harsh criticism of India in the West on this count, the Soviet Union only expressed her opposition to Indian action indirectly.⁴¹

The Soviet Union exhibits the importance she attaches to India through the exchange of periodic visits between the Indian and Soviet leaders. Almost all the heads of State and government of the USSR and India have visited each other's countries one or more times.* On the other hand, the exchanges of visits between India and the United States are few. While Nehru paid State visits to the United States of America three times⁴² and Mrs. Gandhi twice,⁴³ of the seven Presidents that the United States has had since India's independence, only three, Eisenhower, Nixon and Carter paid brief visits to India.⁴⁴ President Johnson unceremoniously asked Prime Minister Shastri to postpone his visit to the United States of America in 1965.⁴⁵

41. See Chapter XI, PP. 383

* See Appendix IV

42. See Chapter II, PP. 86, 90 and Chapter VI, P. 185

43. For the first visit, See Lyndon B. Johnson, op.cit., P. 227 and the second visit, Chapter IX, P. 289

44. For Eisenhower's visit, see Chapter IV, P. 67, for Nixon's visit, see Chapter VIII, P. 244 and for Carter's visit, see The Hindu, January 2, 1978

45. See chapter V, PP. 173 - 74. See also Pravda, April 22, 1965, for a critical comment on Johnson's action.

There is an element of condescension in the American treatment of India.⁴⁶ In the assessment of American foreign policy-makers, India hardly ever figured importantly.⁴⁷ On the other hand, the Soviet Union's treatment of India has been appealing to India most of the time. American attempts to pressure India into changing her policies proved counter-productive; the care that the Soviet Union took in not applying pressure to India

46. An editorial in The New York Times, December 6, 1972, welcomed the then Indian Minister for External Affairs, Singh's statement, calling for renewed "friendly and cooperative ties" between India and the United States, badly bruised during the Bangladesh war, and commented: "The sober second thoughts reflected in Mr. Singh's friendly overtures may have been induced by a serious crop failure in India which requires the Indians to seek grain imports that only the United States can provide".
47. See Chapter II, P.92 and Chapter VIII, P. 273. President Nixon stated in his Foreign Policy Report in 1973: "India is a major country, her actions on the world stage necessarily affect us and our interests....we have natural concern that India not be locked into exclusive ties with major countries directed against us or against other countries with whom we have relationships which we value". See Foreign Policy Report, May 3, 1973 (United States Information Service (Mimeographed), P. 148. Yet, he and his advisers ignored Mrs. Gandhi's statement expressing the hope that the Indo-Soviet "treaty will pave the way for other friendly countries to have similar friendly pacts with us". See the Hindu, August 10, 1971. If the United States was concerned with the increasing Soviet influence in India, she should have signed a treaty with India to allay her fears about the sudden warmth in Sino-American relations and to neutralise the effects of the Indo-Soviet treaty on the Indian people. See below, P. 424.

won laurels for her.⁴⁸

India derived benefits from Soviet diplomatic support on many issues vital to her interests. Even in domestic affairs, India's cordial relations with Moscow had some beneficial effects: in the industrialisation of India under public ownership⁴⁹ and in taming the CPI.⁵⁰

A determined minority like the CPI can create much trouble in conditions of poverty and unemployment prevailing in India. The CPI progressively increased its share of votes;⁵¹ and, before the split in 1964,⁵² it had a considerable following in volatile states like West Bengal and Kerala.⁵³ The cordial relations between Moscow and New Delhi have turned the CPI into an

48. At a civic reception to Brezhnev, on November 27, 1973, the then Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Gandhi, said that "the Soviet Union has not, during so many years of friendship, ever put pressure on us or told us what to do or what not to do". See the Mission of Friendship, P. 30

49. See Chapter X

50. See Chapter III, PP. 112 - 13.

51. It polled 3.3 per cent of votes in the first general elections in 1952, 8.92 per cent in 1957 and 9.94 per cent in 1962. By 1967, the two factions of the CPI emerged as two parties, the CPI and the CPI (Marxist); they polled 4.80 per cent and 4.28 per cent respectively in the elections in 1967. In the elections in 1971, the CPI won 23 seats in the Lok Sabha, and the CPI (Marxist), 25 seats. The total membership of the House is 522. See B.L. Sukhwai, op.cit., PP. 137-138 and 216. See below, P. 422.

52. See Chapter VII, P. 211

53. After the split, the CPI (Marxist) emerged dominant in these states.

ally of Mrs. Gandhi, when she was in power.⁵⁴

Since Soviet diplomatic support on issues vital to Indian interests became necessary in view of hostile Anglo-American attitudes, India adopted a less than righteous stand on the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia; after all the United States and Britain did not always adopt a principled stand either. Such mutual concessions promoted cordiality in Indo-Soviet relations.

54. At its Xth Congress in February 1975, the CPI visualised its road to power by a combination of consolidation with the leftists inside the Congress and critical sniping at the Congress rightists. See The Overseas Hindustan Times, February 13, 1975.

At this Congress, the CPI criticised the Indian government for the increasing concessions to monopolies and the use of Defence of India Rules (DIR) and the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA). Ibid.

MISA was further tightened in the wake of the imposition of emergency in June 1975. Yet the CPI was the only opposition party to have welcomed the emergency; none of the leaders of the CPI was imprisoned after the declaration of emergency- the only party to have enjoyed such a concession. See The Guardian, June 27, 28, 29 and 30, 1975. See also above, footnote 10...

The Central Executive Committee of the CPI, in its resolution on the emergency said:

The present offensive of right reaction inside the country fully corresponds to the policy of destabilisation which US imperialism and the CIA have set as their goal in respect to all regimes in the Third World pursuing the policies of anti-imperialism, non-alignment, peace and cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

See National Emergency and Our Tasks (Communist Party Publication, No. 22) (New Delhi: New Age Printing Press, 1975), P. 3.

The Party declared that ".... the swift and stern measures" taken by the Prime Minister and the government "against the right reactionary and counter-revolutionary forces were necessary and justified". Ibid., P. 4

However, this narration of identity of interests and mutual regard for each other's feelings should not be carried too far. India and the Soviet Union have had their differences⁵⁵ and kept their distance.

On certain issues vital to Soviet interests, India did not yield her judgment. India was not ready to accept the concept of two Germanies until 1961; but even then Nehru did not subscribe to Khrushchev's plan for turning West Berlin into a demilitarised free city;⁵⁶ this refusal to support the Soviet plan for West Berlin continued in the post-Nehru era too;⁵⁷ even after the acceptance of two German States, India did not even have consular relations with East Germany until August 1970,⁵⁸ and full diplomatic relations, until October 1972;⁵⁹ Nehru opposed

55. At a Kremlin rally in honour of Mrs. Gandhi on July 14, 1966, Kosygin publicly admitted there were some differences between India and the Soviet Union. Pravda, July 15, 1966

56. See Chapter V, P. 168

57. See the Indo-Soviet Joint Communiqué of September 19, 1964, issued at the end of President Radhakrishnan's visit to the Soviet Union in Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents 1947-1964, P. 513, the the Indo-Soviet Joint Communiqué issued at the end of Prime Minister Shastri's visit to Moscow in Pravda, May 21, 1965 and also the Indo-Soviet Joint Statement issued at the end of Mrs. Gandhi's visit to the Soviet Union in July 1966 in For Peace and Progress (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1966), P. 60

58. Keessing's Contemporary Archives, 1969-1970, P. 24130.

59. Ibid., 1971-1972, P. 24813

Khrushchev's troika plan for the UN Secretariat⁶⁰ on the grounds that the executive would "not be able to function adequately or with speed;"⁶¹ while the Soviet Union was interested in getting the United Nations out of the Congo,⁶² Nehru considered its effective presence necessary to prevent civil war and large-scale foreign intervention;⁶³ while Khrushchev had tried to exploit colonial issues for Soviet diplomatic benefit by his resolution in the General Assembly in 1960,⁶⁴ Nehru had declared the "era of colonialism [as] being dead"⁶⁵; and, Nehru did not hesitate to establish friendly relations with Malaysia in spite of the knowledge of Soviet opposition to the formation of Malaysia.⁶⁶

60. Khrushchev presented his troika plan under which the UN Secretariat would be headed by three Secretaries-General, one each from the Western, Communist and neutral groups, in his speech to the UN General Assembly on September 23, 1960. See Ibid., 1961-1962, P. 17873.

61. India's Foreign Policy, P. 223.

62. See Robert C. Good, "The Congo Crisis: A Study of Post-Colonial Politics" in Laurence W. Martin ed., op.cit., P. 45, and Francis O. Wilcox, "The Non-aligned States and the United Nations", Ibid., P. 135

63. India's Foreign Policy, P. 525.

64. See Chapter IV, PP. 129 - 30.

65. He said this at the conference of the non-aligned states in Belgrade. See The Times, September 5, 1961.

66. See Izvestia, April 2, 1963, for Soviet opposition to the formation of Malaysia.

India never hesitated to act against Soviet agents in India or take other necessary steps in defence of Indian state interests. It was rumoured in 1960 that Efimov, a GRU⁶⁷ colonel, who was functioning as a cultural attache in India, was declared persona non grata by the government for espionage activities;⁶⁸ Nehru told a parliamentarian in 1961 that adequate precaution had been taken to see that no secret information would leak out to Soviet pilots training the Indian pilots in Ladakh in the use of the Soviet transport planes, AN-12;⁶⁹ in November 1962, India confiscated copies of the Russian atlas showing the Sino-Indian border alignments along the lines claimed by China;⁷⁰ between mid-1962 and mid-1963, six Soviet experts were withdrawn from Bhilai and sent back to the Soviet Union for their propagandistic work;⁷¹ and, as recently as March 1975, an Indian Air Force officer was cashiered and imprisoned for "conduct unbecoming of an officer" and the Soviet officers who had dealings with him were turned out of the country.⁷²

67. Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie, i.e., Central Administration for Intelligence Services, (Directorate of Soviet Military Intelligence)

68. Peter Sager, op.cit., P. 35

69. Arthur Stein, India and the Soviet Union: The Nehru Era, P. 199.

70. The Hindu, November 16, 1962.

71. Peter Sager, op.cit., P. 148

72. The Overseas Hindustan Times, March 27, 1975. The Soviet officials were trying to collect defence information from the Indian officer, Ibid.

On her part the Soviet Union had not always shown concern for the feelings of the Third World. Probably because of her pique with the Third World's failure to support her on the Congo and troika plan, the Soviet Union showed utter disregard for neutralist opinion by announcing her intention to resume nuclear testing on the eve of the opening of the conference of non-aligned countries in Belgrade in September 1961; she carried out the first test on the day the Conference began (September 1, 1961)⁷³; for tactical reasons, the Soviet Union voted against the Afro-Asian proposal to expand the United Nations' bodies in 1963;⁷⁴ Soviet atlases continue to show Chinese versions of the Sino-Indian border;⁷⁵ and the Soviet Union changed her Kashmir policy when her diplomatic interests called for it in the mid-1960s.⁷⁶

Thus, a spirit of realism permeates Indo-Soviet relations. When India and the Soviet Union differed, as they did many times, Moscow and New Delhi managed quickly and quietly to forget the events and continue their relations on a realistic basis. This spirit of mutual adjustment was sadly lacking in Indo-American relations; clashes of interests and differences of opinion between India and the United States always resulted in prolonged spells of chill and spite in their relations.

73. See The Times, September 1, 1961 and September 2, 1961.

74. See Chapter VII, pp. 228-29.

75. Ibid., p. 242.

76. See Chapter V, pp. 153 - 61.

However, in the relations between two political entities, there is never a dearth of factors which are likely to complicate them. If coincidence of interests has contributed to cordiality in Indo-Soviet relations, divergence of interests will naturally introduce discord into them. National interests of states need not necessarily coincide over a long period of time. Therefore, any change in one party's perception of the means of serving its interests which runs counter to the other party's perception of its interests is likely to complicate their bilateral relations.

Indian leaders' view of Indo-Soviet relations is practical. They think that countries "help one another because they need one another. Obviously, countries are not disinterested when they help one another". The record shows that in India, there is no "inclination to display tangible gratitude" to the Soviet Union.⁷⁷

Another important factor that is periodically likely to complicate Indo-Soviet relations is the institutional differences between them. The English language plays a dominant role in the intellectual life of India.⁷⁸ Liberal institutions, which have

77. Mrs. Gandhi said this in an interview granted to C.L. Sulzberger. See The New York Times, February 17, 1972. The correspondent asked her if India felt obligated to demonstrate gratitude to the Soviet Union.

78. Nehru thought that English "ties us [Indians] mentally or otherwise to the Anglo-American bloc. There is nothing that ties us more closely to that bloc than the English language, which inevitably brings the people of India nearer to its thoughts, activities, books, and cultural standards than those of the rest of the world from which Indians are linguistically cut off". Time and Tide, January 10, 1953, as quoted in Karunakara Gupta, op.cit., P. IV.

successfully worked in India for thirty years, are popular with the intelligentsia. As opposed to such preponderant Anglo-American cultural influences in India, the Soviet Union has only diplomatic influence;⁷⁹ and diplomatic fortunes change from time to time. Periodically, the institutional differences between the two countries presented problems to those in charge of managing Indo-Soviet relations in both countries.⁸⁰ The Soviet Union visibly exhibited her irritations with the Indian press' criticism of Soviet institutions and policies.⁸¹

79. It was not until 1965 that an Institute of Russian Research was founded in New Delhi for the study of Russian language and literature. See I.A. Benediktov, op.cit., P. 39.

80. During his visit to India in November-December 1955, the Indian correspondents asked Bulganin why there were no other political parties in the USSR. See the Supplement, P. 219 and for more recent instances, The Hindustan Times, February 18, 1973, The Times of India, November 30, 1973.

The Indian press widely reported the expulsion of Solzhenitzyn and made critical comments. See The Statesman, February 13, 14, and 15, 1974, The Hindu, February 13 and 14 and 15, 1974, The Times of India, February 13, and 14, 1974, The Hindustan Times, February 15 and 16, 1974, The Indian Express, February 13 and 14, 1974.

81. See Chapter V, SP. 165

Besides that, the Soviet Union is a global power and India, a regional power. Moscow's global interests are likely to clash with India's regional interests in due course.⁸² When that happens, even a small issue like the Soviet atlases reflecting the Chinese version of the Sino-Indian border,⁸³ will become an explosive issue; in times of flared tempers any issue can assume an explosive nature.

The Soviet leaders do not seem to have learnt any lessons from the reverses in Ghana, Egypt and Indonesia, where they identified themselves with the strong man of the hour whose caprice or fall or death affected the fortunes of Soviet policy in the concerned country.

In the recent past, the Soviet policy in India was centred on Mrs. Gandhi. The way Mrs. Gandhi was showered with flattery by Moscow supports this argument.⁸⁴ And when she

82. See Chapter VIII, PP. 282

83. See Chapter VII, P. 242

During his recent visit to the Soviet Union, the Indian Prime Minister, Desai, did some plain talking to Brezhnev on these Soviet atlases. The Hindu, October 27, 1977.

84. Brezhnev described Mrs. Gandhi as "an outstanding leader of of the Indian people" at the 15th Soviet Trade Union Congress in March 1972. See Pravda, March 21, 1972. Complete text in CISP, Vol. XXIV, No. 12, PP. 7-8. He repeated this while he was in New Delhi in November 1973. See Mission of Friendship, P. 15 The Soviet leader also presented to Mrs. Gandhi her life-size portrait painted by a Soviet artist. Ibid., see pictures following P. 88. A Soviet Historian and orientalist wrote that Mrs. Gandhi's period of power made an "eventful and historically-important impact" on India. He also thought that her speeches and writings reveal "the penetrating intellect of a real thinker and scholar". See Babojan Gafurov, From Ancient History to Contemporary Times (Delhi: Navyug Publishers, 1973), PP. 85 & 99

subverted the constitution, at least in spirit, by imposing emergency in June 1975, the Soviet press and government extended strong support to her.⁸⁵

It is evident that the Soviet stand was not appreciated by the Indian Public opinion. When the emergency was lifted, and general elections were held the "outstanding leader" was defeated in her own constituency, her party swept out of power and the CPI was humiliated.⁸⁶ This shortsighted Soviet policy has ignored the view expressed by unofficial India that Indo-Soviet friendship is not a partisan issue in India.⁸⁷ To that extent,

85. The day the Allahabad High Court declared Mrs. Gandhi's election invalid, Tass sent a report from New Delhi saying that during the trial "Indira Gandhi demonstrated the groundlessness of the Opposition's conjectures. Nevertheless, under pressure from reactionary forces, the judge ruled in favour of the right-wing parties". Pravda, June 13, 1975. Complete text in CDSF, Vol. XXVII, No. 24, P. 12. See also Pravda, July 4, 1975. See also Epilogue, P. 432

86. Some of the most prominent parliamentary leaders of the party were defeated. The Party could secure only seven seats as against its rival, CPI (M)'s 22 in the lower house of Parliament. The Statesman, March 23, 1977. For its performance in the elections in 1971, See above, P. 413

87. See Chapter VIII, P. 274.

Moscow alienated large sections of public opinion.

The new leaders of the government of India have exhibited statesmanship in not allowing the past Soviet abuses heaped upon them to come in the way of Indo-Soviet relations. Moscow also adjusted itself, as it has to, to the political changes in India.⁸⁸

But more important to the future of Indo-Soviet relations is the attitude to India of the United States, China and Pakistan. The cordiality that now prevails in Indo-Soviet relations is the indirect result of their policies.

Whatever clashes of interests there were between India and the United States were attributable to America's Cold War fears of the Soviet Union and China and her dislike of India's efforts to develop friendly relations with them. Now that Sino-American and Soviet-American relations are improving, there is no reason why Indo-American relations should not improve also. America's support to Pakistan during the Cold War was because of her usefulness as a military base against the rival camp; that facility is no longer available to the United States.⁸⁹ Therefore, it should not be difficult for the United States to change her South Asia policy.

In view of the state of relations between India and China,⁹⁰ the extraordinary attempts made by the United States to appease China caused misgivings in India. If the United States

88. See the Epilogue, PP. 435 - 37

89. See Chapter, XI, P. 376

90. See Mrs. Gandhi's statement which conveys this feeling in The Times, July 21, 1975

allays India's fears in this regard, Indo-American relations can improve. There are signs of change in the styles of United States' foreign policy, particularly after Carter assumed office, which are likely to have good effect on Indo-American relations.⁹¹

91. Even during President Nixon's second term this trend was visible. He said in his second inaugural address that time has passed when the United States will "presume to tell the people of other nations how to manage their own affairs". See The Sunday Times, January 21, 1973. During Dr. Kissinger's visit to India in October-November 1974, the United States agreed, in the Indo-American Joint communique, that there should be no intervention by outside powers in the affairs of South Asia. See The Overseas Hindustan Times, November 7, 1974. These two commitments are very much in tune with India's wishes. Dr. Kissinger also described India as a "major power" and the United States aid to her an expression of "our mutual interests". Ibid., Earlier in the year 1974, the then US ambassador to India, Moynihan, said "India's destiny is to be a world power". See For All the People, PP. 42-43. Such adjustments in the United States policy in South Asia and such flattery of India would go a long way in improving Indo-American relations.

After the assumption of office by President Carter and the formation of the Janata government in India, there are clear signs of improvement in Indo-American relations. Prime Minister Desai is the only Third World leader among the world leaders with whom President Carter periodically exchanges views, on global problems, through letters. (The Hindu, May 11, 1977) Carter visited India in January 1978. He and the Indian Prime Minister laid stress on shared ideals, democracy and basic human rights (See The Hindu, January 2,3,4, 1978) Desai paid a visit to the United States in June, 1978. While he stuck to the policy of not signing the NPT, he gave an assurance that India would not even conduct underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (See The Indian Express, June 14,15, 16, 1978) See also Chapter XI, PP. 381 - 84.

It is also likely that in view of Pakistan's inability to take Kashmir by force, and the unlikelihood of either China or the United States using force against India to get Kashmir for Pakistan, Islamabad would agree to find a solution to the dispute on the basis of the status quo.⁹² There have been encouraging signs of improvement in Indo-Pakistani relations in the recent past.⁹³

China is also in a mood to compose her differences with India. Her dislike of Mrs. Gandhi was strong because she had made India an ally of the Soviet.⁹⁴ But China does not have to fear India as much as she has to fear the Soviet Union.

92. It is significant that Pakistan had not raised the Kashmir issue when its leader, Sheikh Abdullah, signed an agreement with the Government of India accepting Jammu and Kashmir as a constituent part of India. See the Hindustan Times, November 14, 1974.

93. In June, 1976, India and Pakistan restored diplomatic relations, which were snapped during the Bangladesh War in 1971 (The Hindu, June 22, 1976). In June, 1976, trade by private sector was allowed (The Hindu, June 24, 1976). In July, 1976 rail and air links were restored (rail links were out during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965) (The Hindu, July 18, 1976). In February, 1978, the new Indian Minister of External Affairs, A.B. Vajpayee, visited Pakistan and concluded agreements for liberalising visa procedures, and stationing correspondents in each other's country. (The Hindu, February 8, 1978)

94. See Peking Review, No. 27 (July 4, 1975) for the Chinese reaction to Mrs. Gandhi's imposition of emergency.

When Mrs. Gandhi was defeated in the elections in March, 1977, The People's Daily, March 30, 1977, commented that her downfall was a heavy blow to Soviet expansionism in South Asia. Quoted in the Times of India, May 27, 1977

If Peking could establish friendly relations with the United States and other countries, to which it exhibited relentless hostility once, in order to strengthen itself diplomatically against Moscow, there is no reason why it cannot take the initiative for mending its relations with India to loosen her ties with Moscow. In so doing, China would not lose face because she was the victor in the war with India in 1962. On the Sino-Indian border, China has under its control what she wants - Aksai Chin.⁹⁵ There is no hope of India wresting it from China by force. Therefore, if China makes any proposals, which would not entail loss of face for India, for the settlement of the border dispute, there would be a favourable response

95. See Chapter VII, P. 242.

from India. There are already signs of thaw in Sino-Indian relations too.⁹⁶

96. In July, 1976, the Indian ambassador to Peking, K.R. Narayanan, started functioning. It is for the first time since the 1962 war that India is being represented in Peking by an ambassador (The Hindu, July 23, 1976). In September, 1976, China sent its ambassador, Chen Chao-yuan, to New Delhi. He spoke of profound friendship between India and China since ancient times. He referred to the unfortunate "set-backs" and asked for the Indian government's cooperation for strengthening the ties. (The Hindu, September 21, 1976). In May, 1977, the first trade agreement since 1962 was made (The Hindu, May 5, 1977). In February 1978, the Chinese Deputy Prime Minister, Teng Hsia-ping, said, while on a visit to Nepal, that China was "eager" to improve relations with India (The Hindu, February 5, 1978). The Indian Prime Minister, Desai, also expressed India's readiness to hold discussions with China to settle the difference (The Hindu, February, 8, 1978). A 16-member Chinese Trade Delegation arrived in India in the same month (The Hindu, February 10, 1978).

In March, 1978, a Goodwill Mission arrived on a 2-week tour. This was led by Wang Pin-nan, President of the Chinese Peoples' Association for Friendship with Foreign countries. He said that in 1971 Mao said that India is "a great nation" and the countries of India and China are bound to be friendly". (The Hindu, March 8, 1978). Wang invited Vajpayee, India's Minister for External Affairs, to visit China. The invitation was accepted in principle (The Hindu, March 9, 1978). Wang also met the Indian Prime Minister and spoke of the age-old ties between India and China.

The other issues which the Soviet Union exploited for her benefit - Soviet aid for India's industrialisation under state sponsorship and colonial and racial issues - have almost lost their usefulness now; the former because of India's near-self-sufficiency in certain branches of machine-building,⁹⁷ and the latter because of the practical disappearance of colonialism and some signs of change being exhibited by South Africa on racial segregation. It was the inability or unwillingness of the United States to take a strong stand against colonial and racial issues that played into the hands of the Soviet foreign policy makers. Since his inauguration, President Carter of the United States has been taking a strong line,⁹⁸ which will deprive Moscow of the special advantage it enjoyed all these years.⁹⁹

97. See Chapter X.

98. During his visit to Nigeria and Liberia in April, 1978, President Carter described apartheid as an "evil and oppressive system". He warned the racist regimes that time was running out for peaceful solutions leading to black majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia. He also told South Africa that elections in Namibia should be held under the UN supervision and that the South West African peoples Organisation (SWAPO), banned by South Africa, should be allowed to participate in the elections too. See The Hindu, April 4, 5, 1978.

99. See Chapter IV.

Thus, the study of Indian-Soviet relations undertaken in this thesis suggests: the Cold War had begun before the West made necessary adjustments to the post-colonial world that began emerging after World War II; the West wanted the new nations to support it in the Cold War without making necessary concessions to them, as, for instance, being considerate to their feelings by taking a forthright stand against the remnants of colonialism and racialism. The Western policies gave the appearance of being geared to upholding the status quo; this was unacceptable to the emerging world before colonialism and racial discrimination had been completely abolished. The new nations were interested in achieving quick economic development; most of them preferred socialism of sorts; and, they were also eager to accept aid from any quarter. The West, the United States in particular, preferred free enterprise. There were, thus, clashes of interest and temperament between the new nations and the West; the Soviet Union would not incur any loss by extending support to new nations on all these issues; so, she did.

India emerging into independent nationhood with pride in her ancient history and culture, conscious of her size and potential, naturally wanted to chart an independent course in world affairs. Her foreign policy was naturally conditioned by her past experiences, her ambitions and needs and her own brand of messianic zeal. These clashed with the interests of the West in the subcontinent. This clash of interests between India and the West worked to the advantage of Soviet diplomacy.

The future of Indian-Soviet relations depends upon the attitudes of the United States, China and Pakistan towards India. There are already signs of change in the attitudes of these countries towards India. Any improvement in their relations with India, in addition to the self-confidence she has gained after her recent emergence as a dominant power on the subcontinent, perceptible improvement in her economy¹⁰⁰ and the technological breakthroughs she achieved in the nuclear and space fields, will make it unnecessary for India to be dependent upon Soviet diplomatic support for promoting her interests.

If the spirit of realism that prevailed in Indo-Soviet relations all these years continues, Indian-Soviet relations are likely to continue on friendly terms since there are no disputes directly involving India and the Soviet Union. If; however, there is an improvement in Sino-Indian relations and if Moscow considers such an improvement, before its relations with Peking improve, an unfriendly act and exhibits its pique with India by taking retaliatory measures, tensions in Indian-Soviet relations are likely to appear.

100. India now enjoys a very comfortable balance of payments position. As on December 16, 1977, India's foreign exchange reserves, stood at five billion dollars. She also has food reserves to the tune of 20 million tonnes. See The Hindu, January 10, 11, 1978.

EPILOGUE

It has already been mentioned that the Soviet Union supported the imposition of emergency by Mrs. Gandhi.¹ Once she silenced the press and the opposition, she came out in her true colours. Mrs. Gandhi, who always used socialist rhetoric to serve her political ends, declared at the annual session of the Congress in 1975. "I do not believe in the right or the left."²

Obviously, the Soviet leaders were convinced that Mrs. Gandhi was the unquestioned leader of India. She was invited to pay a visit to the Soviet Union in June, 1976, when she appeared to be at the pinnacle of power having imprisoned all the opposition leaders. Her second son, Sanjay Gandhi, who was described as the "rising sun of India" by Mrs. Gandhi's sycophants, was also invited, as also her first son and her two daughters-in-law. Sanjay who is anti-communist, preceded his mother. He was already in Moscow, having first visited Soviet Central Asia, when his mother arrived. As usual, on June 8, 1976, Mrs. Gandhi was received at the airport by Brezhnev, Kosygin and Gromyko, among others.³ As Mrs. Gandhi came down the plane, Brezhnev greeted her and then told her that he was already acquainted with her son, Sanjay Gandhi, whereupon she introduced

1. See P.422 see also below P. 432

2. The Hindu, December 31, 1975

3. The Hindu, June 9, 1976. Just before her arrival, M. Manshikov, a former Soviet ambassador to India wrote that over the last few years Mrs. Gandhi had managed to free the Indian National Congress from right-wing people, although the struggle was still continuing. See Moscow News, No. 23 (1976).

her first son.⁴ Soviet television which telecast the airport reception etc., described Sanjay Gandhi as a " well-known public figure " in India.⁵

At the dinner on June 8, 1976, Brezhnev said that, life had confirmed the farsightedness of the Indian National Congress' policy of industrialising the country, of building an independent economy and of forming a powerful state sector.⁶

In an obvious reference to the imposition of emergency, he said:

The action your government has taken against internal and external reactionaries has been fully understood in the USSR. Their attempts to take the offensive have been firmly rebuffed by all Indian democratic forces.⁷

Mrs. Gandhi spoke of India's "determination to be ourselves and to preserve our identity....."⁸

In December, 1976, Mrs. Gandhi said that CPI " did collaborate with the British against the Congress and those fighting in the Quit India Movement ".⁹ This conveyed the meaning that the Indian communists are traitors . Mrs. Gandhi, however, softened her statement three days later and said that they were not enemies of the country - some gesture to Moscow for its support to her on emergency.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Moscow News, No. 24, (1976), P. 8

7. Ibid.

8. The Hindu, June 9, 1976.

9. The Hindu, December 25, 1976. See Chapter I, P.P. 40 - 42

In January, 1977 Mrs. Gandhi announced her decision to seek people's mandate. The Soviet Union kept up its support to her. In February, 1977, Kosygin expressed to Jagat Mehta, Secretary to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, his and his country's admiration for Mrs. Gandhi under whose stewardship India had made tremendous progress in recent years.¹⁰

And the Soviet press wrote along similar lines. Pravda wrote in March that the unity of India's democratic forces, in the first place of the CPI and the Congress, had been able to wreck the right reaction's designs in the summer of 1975.¹¹

The Janata Party.¹² Pravda wrote;

Stands out as the direct tool of extreme reaction, defender of the interests of landowners, usurers, local and foreign monopolies."¹³

On foreign policy, the paper continued, the Janata party's opposition to the country's traditional peace course and "such significant achievements as friendship and cooperation of India with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries " was brought out in bold relief.

10. The Times of India, February 6, 1977

11. Pravda, March 12, 1977.

12. This was formed on January 20, 1977. Four opposition parties coalesced to fight Mrs. Gandhi's authoritarian regime. See The Hindu, January 21, 1977

13. Pravda, March 12, 1977

Pravda also wrote on March 15, 1977, that the Congress party was basing itself on impressive successes "scored by India since independence, particularly in recent times" - a reference to Mrs. Gandhi's regime. A summarised version of this article was distributed by the Soviet Embassy in New Delhi.

A pre-election survey in New Times¹⁴ referred to the Congress' impressive record of achievements which no "unbiased observer disputes". The survey listed the party's achievements over the years particularly "after the introduction of the state of emergency in June 1975". The article decried the Janata party.¹⁶ The survey also felt that the youth congress' campaign against the CPI evoked a negative reaction from the general public.¹⁷

The results of the elections in March, 1977 were startling.¹⁸ It must have been a rude shock to the Soviet leaders, for the leaders whom their media have been denouncing as right reactionaries opposed to Indo-Soviet friendship were returned to power.¹⁹

14. No.11, March (1977), PP. 13-14.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid. The Congress refused to make an electoral alliance with the CPI on All-India basis. Only some local adjustments were made. see also New Times, No. 11 (March, 1977) for more criticism of the Janata party.

18. See the Hindu, March 21, 22, 23, 1977.

19. For instance, Pravda, July 29, 1968, wrote that the Jan Sangh and Swatantra parties did not like Indo-Soviet friendship. V. Pavlovsky wrote in International Affairs (Moscow) No.1 (1970) that the Jan Sangh and Swatantra were opposed to non-alignment; they were in favour of putting the country on a pro-Western track.

A former Jan Sangh leader, A.B. Vajpayee, is now India's Minister for External Affairs.

The Soviet leaders quietly adjusted themselves to the political changes in India. Izvestia wrote on March 22, 1977, quoting local observer, that Mrs. Gandhi lost because of the mistakes made and excesses committed during the emergency. The paper also felt that the Congress party's refusal to cooperate with out CPI played into the hands of the Janata party.

Gromyko paid a visit to India a month after assumption of office by the new Janata government. During this visit, the Soviet Foreign Minister made aid commitments to the tune of 250 million roubles. The Joint Statement issued at the end of his visit said that the position of both countries on many issue was either "identical or close". The Prime Minister of India, Desai, and the Minister for External Affairs, Vajpayee, were invited to pay a visit to the Soviet Union.²¹ Gromyko's visit seemed to have reassured the Soviet government that the new Indian government was not likely to change the country's foreign policy.²²

Prime Minister Desai visited Moscow in October, 1977. He was also received at the airport by Brezhnev, Kosygin, Gromyko and others. Large crowds turned up to greet the Indian leader.²³

At a state banquet, Desai said that the peaceful revolution that occurred in India in March, 1977 was "a warning to any leader who presumes to take the people for granted."²⁴

20. See the Hindu, April, 26, 27, 1977

21. Ibid., April 27, 1977

22. See Izvestia, April 29, 1977 and Pravda, May 11, 1977 which convey this feeling.

23. The Hindu, October 22, 1977

24. The Hindu, October 23, 1977

He also said that the mutual desire to strengthen Indo-Soviet relations shows that it is not based on personalities or ideologies but on equality, national interests and enlightened common purpose.²⁵ He said that during the elections in India non-alignment " was never a subject of debate ".²⁶

The Indian Prime Minister gratefully acknowledged Soviet help which he said, enabled India to emerge as one of the more important industrial nations.²⁷ Desai also addressed the Soviet people on television.²⁸

When the Joint Declaration was signed by Brezhnev and Desai, all the members of the politbureau of the CPSU were present.²⁹ The Soviet leaders seemed to have realised the risks involved in identifying themselves with any particular leader or group in "bourgeois" democratic countries like India, with which the Soviet Union developed friendly relations over the years. This view is strengthened by the way the Joint Declaration was drafted. It said that the Indian Prime Minister explained to the Soviet leaders

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., October 26, 1977

29. Ibid., October 27, 1977

leaders " the latest events in India leading to the formation of a new government in accordance with the will expressed by the Indian people and of its political, social and economic programmes.³⁰ The Soviet side neither welcomed nor associated itself with the changes.

The new government's economic programmes are not likely to appeal to the Soviet leaders.³¹ Any expression of disapproval of the new government's policies would introduce unnecessary tensions into Indian Soviet relations. Since the the new government

30. Soviet Land, No. 22 (November, 1977), P. 14

31. In May, 1977, a 10-year Plan, employment and faster economic growth oriented, was released by the Indian Finance Minister, H.M. Patel, for public discussion. This document was prepared by the Indian Renaissance Institute, founded by the late M.N. Roy. The Document calls for a shift in emphasis from direct state involvement in industrial growth to provision of services and and public utilities. It calls for importance being given to small industries The Hindu, May 18, 1977

In December, 1977, the Janata announced its new industrial policy which lays stress on cottage and small-scale industries, which would be widely dispersed in rural areas. Whatever can be produced by small and cottage industries must be so produced. The items reserved for small-scale industries were increased to 500 from 180. See the Hindu, December 25, 1977.

The CPI National Council, at its meeting in December 24 - 28, 1977 declared that the Janata government was bent on reversing the nationally accepted progressive policies and replacing them by reactionary policies. The Hindu, December 31, 1977

is interested in maintaining friendly relations, it would be unwise for the Soviet government to introduce strains into the relations. Moscow's identification with Mrs. Gandhi was resented by India. The new leaders have shown statesmanship in ignoring abuses heaped upon them by the Soviet media while they were in opposition.

Certain policies of the new government are likely to clash with Soviet interests.³² After all in the past too India had not toed the Soviet line.³³

It was not Mrs. Gandhi or her pseudo-radicalism³⁴ that have contributed to cordiality in Indian-Soviet relations. The quiet Soviet acceptance of her attacks on the CPI,³⁵ and her pro-capitalist policies during the emergency prove that there

32. For instance the Joint communique issued at the end of Prime Minister Desai's visit to the United States says that the African problems should be solved "without outside intervention which can aggravate regional conflicts and inhibit their resolution". See the Indian Express, June 16, 1978. This is evidently a reference to Cuban-Soviet interventions in Africa's mini-wars.

33. See PP. 415 - 16

34. The CPI which supported the imposition of emergency (See P.414) demanded the nationalisation of sugar, textile, jute and automobile industries and foreign drug companies. Instead, Mrs. Gandhi granted the industrialists a number of concessions, banned strikes and abolished bonus.

Recently, the CPI expressed repentance for supporting her. Its National Council thought that one of her aims in imposing the emergency was solving the capitalist crisis at the expense of the common man. See The Hindu, December 31, 1977

35. See above, P. 432.

were no ideological considerations behind Indo-Soviet friendship. The way Moscow shunned Mrs. Gandhi after her defeat shows how intensely pragmatic its policy is. British, and even Chinese, showed her courtesy.³⁶ But Gromyko had not even called on her when he was in New Delhi in May, 1977. Realism permeated Indian-Soviet relations in the past.³⁷ If the same spirit of accommodation continues, there is no reason why Indian-Soviet relations should not be smooth in spite of the change of government in India.

36. The British Prime Minister, Callaghan, sent her his good wishes after her defeat (The Hindu, March 27, 1977). He received her when he visited India (The Hindu, January 10, 1978). The Chinese Embassy in New Delhi invited her to a reception in honour of the visiting Chinese Goodwill Mission and arranged for a meeting between the leaders of the group and Mrs. Gandhi. (The Hindu, March 13, 1978).

37. See P. 418.

Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation
Between the Republic of India and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed on
August 9, 1971.

DESIROUS of expanding and consolidating the existing
relations of sincere friendship between them,

BELIEVING that the further development of friendship
and co-operation meets the basic national interests of
both the States as well as the interests of lasting
peace in Asia and the world,

DETERMINED to promote the consolidation of universal
peace and security and to make steadfast efforts for the
relaxation of international tensions and the final
elimination of the remnants of colonialism,

UPHOLDING their firm faith in the principles of
peaceful co-existence and co-operation between States
with different political and social systems,

CONVINCED that in the world today international
problems can only be solved by co-operation and not by
conflict,

REAFFIRMING their determination to abide by the
purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,

The Republic of India on the one side, and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics on the other side,

HAVE decided to conclude the present Treaty, for
which purpose the following Plenipotentiaries have been
appointed:

On behalf of the Republic of India:

Sardar Swaran Singh,

Minister of External Affairs

INDO-SOVIET TREATY

On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. Gromyko,

Minister of Foreign Affairs

who, having each presented their Credentials, which are
found to be in proper form and due order,

HAVE AGREED as follows:

ARTICLE I

The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that
enduring peace and friendship shall prevail between the
two countries and their peoples. Each Party shall respect
the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the other Party and refrain from interfering in the
other's internal affairs. The High Contracting Parties
shall continue to develop and consolidate the relations of
a sincere friendship, good neighbourliness and
comprehensive co-operation existing between them on the
basis of the aforesaid principles as well as those of
equality and mutual benefit.

ARTICLE II

Guided by the desire to contribute in every possible
way to ensure enduring peace and security of their people,
the High Contracting Parties declare their determination
to continue their efforts to preserve and to strengthen
peace in Asia and throughout the world, to halt the arms
race and to achieve general and complete disarmament,
including both nuclear and conventional, under effective
international control.

ARTICLE III

Guided by their loyalty to the lofty ideal of equality of all peoples and Nations, irrespective of race or creed, the High Contracting Parties condemn colonialism and racialism in all forms and manifestations, and reaffirm their determination to strive for their final and complete elimination.

The High Contracting Parties shall co-operate with other States to achieve these aims and to support the just aspirations of the peoples in their struggle against colonialism and racial discrimination.

ARTICLE IV

The Republic of India respects the peace loving policy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics aimed at strengthening friendship and co-operation with all nations.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects India's policy of non-alignment and reaffirms that this policy constitutes an important factor in the maintenance of universal peace and international security and in the lessening of tensions in the world.

ARTICLE V

Deeply interested in ensuring universal peace and security, attaching great importance to their mutual co-operation in the international field for achieving those aims, the High Contracting Parties will maintain regular contacts with each other on major international problems affecting the interests of both the States by means of meetings and exchanges of views between their leading statesmen, visits by official delegations and

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special envoys of the two Governments, and through diplomatic channels.

ARTICLE VI

Attaching great importance to economic, scientific, and technological co-operation between them, the High Contracting Parties will continue to consolidate and expand mutually advantageous and comprehensive co-operation in these fields as well as expand trade, transport and communications between them on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit and most-favoured-nation treatment, subject to the existing agreements and the special arrangements with contiguous countries as specified in the Indo-Soviet Trade Agreement of December 26, 1970.

ARTICLE VII

The High Contracting Parties shall promote further development of ties and contacts between them in the fields of science, art, literature, education, public health, press, radio, television, cinema, tourism and sports.

ARTICLE VIII

In accordance with the traditional friendship established between the two countries, each of the High Contracting Parties solemnly declares that it shall not enter into or participate in any military alliance directed against the other party.

Each High Contracting party undertakes to abstain

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from any aggression against the other Party and to prevent the use of its territory for the commission of any act which might inflict military damage on the other High Contracting Party.

ARTICLE IX

Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from providing any assistance to any third party that engages in armed conflict with the other Party. In the event of either Party being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries.

ARTICLE X

Each High Contracting Party solemnly declares that it shall not enter into any obligation, secret or public, with one or more States: which is incompatible with this Treaty. Each High Contracting Party further declares that no obligation exists, nor shall any obligation be entered into, between itself and any other State or States, which might cause military damage to the other Party.

ARTICLE XI

This Treaty is concluded for the duration of twenty years and will be automatically extended for each successive period of five years unless either High Contracting Party declares its desire to terminate it by giving notice to the other High Contracting Party twelve

INDO-SOVIET TREATY

months prior to the expiration of the Treaty. The Treaty will be subject to ratification and will come into force on the date of the exchange of Instruments of Ratification which will take place in Moscow within one month of the signing of this Treaty.

ARTICLE XII

Any difference of interpretation of any Article or Articles of this Treaty which may arise between the High Contracting Parties will be settled bilaterally by peaceful means in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding.

The said Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty in Hindi, Russian and English, all texts being equally authentic and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in New Delhi on the ninth day of August in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy one

On behalf of the
Republic of India

On behalf of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics

(Sd.) Swaran Singh
Minister of External Affairs

(Sd.) A.A. Gromyko
Minister of Foreign Affairs

APPENDIX II

The Indus Waters Agreement was signed in Karachi by Nehru and Ayub Khan on September 19, 1960. (The Times, September 20, 1960).

Under the Agreement, the three eastern tributaries of the Indus, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej, were allocated to India; Pakistan would have the Indus and its two other tributaries, Jhelum and Chenab (The Times, September 19, 1960).

But since Pakistan was getting water from the rivers allocated to India since pre-partition days, India committed herself to continue to supply water for a transitional period of the succeeding 10 years; which could be extended by 3 years on Pakistan's request (The Times, September 5, 1960).

In the meantime Pakistan was expected to make alternate arrangements from her own rivers which required the building of an irrigation complex at a cost of \$900 million (The Times, September 19, 1960).

It was here that the World Bank played a useful role. It and Australia, Canada, West Germany, New Zealand, the United States, and Britain footed the bill for the construction of the irrigation complex (The Times, September 20, 1960).

APPENDIX III

The following communiques contain such references:

1. The Afro-Asian Communique at the end of Bandung Conference, April 24, 1955. Foreign Policy of India, Texts of Documents 1947-1964, p.530.
2. The Communique of Belgrade Conference of Non-aligned Nations. The Hindu, September 7, 1961.
3. The Soviet-Indian Communique at the end of Nehru's second visit to the Soviet Union. Pravda, September 11, 1961.
4. The Communique of the Cairo Conference of Non-aligned Nations in 1964. See Pran Chopra, Before and After the Indo-Soviet Treaty, p.35.
5. The Soviet-Indian Communique issued at the end of President Radhakrishnan's visit to the Soviet Union, September 19, 1964. Foreign Policy of India, Texts of Documents 1947-1964, p.514.
6. The Soviet-Indian Communique at the end of Prime Minister L.B. Shastri's visit to the Soviet Union. Pravda, May 20, 1965.
7. The India-UAR-Yugoslavia communique issued at the end of the Conference of their heads of government. India-UAR-Yugoslavia Conference, New Delhi, October 21-24, 1966, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1966, p.29.
8. The Soviet-Indian Communique at the end of Mrs. Gandhi's visit to the Soviet Union, July 16, 1966. For Peace

and Progress, Publications Division, Ministry of
Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1966,
p.61.

9. Joint statement at the end of External Affairs Minister Dinesh Singh's visit to the Soviet Union, September 15, 1969. Pravda, September 20, 1969.
10. The Soviet-India Communique at the end of Mrs. Gandhi's visit to the Soviet Union. Pravda, September 26, 1971.
11. The Communique issued at the end of the Non-aligned Conference in Algiers, Pravda, September 13, 1973.
12. The Joint Declaration at the end of Brezhnev's visit to India, November 30, 1973. The Mission of Friendship, p.82.

APPENDIX IV

Nehru visited the Soviet Union twice (See Chapter III, P. 103 and Chapter V, P. 168), the first three Presidents of India visited the Soviet Union one time each (for Dr. Rajendra Prasad's visit to the Soviet Union see Pravda, June 22, 1960;) for Dr. S. Radhakrishnan's visit in the capacity of vice-President see Chapter III, P. 114, and for his visit in the capacity of the President, see Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents, 1947-1964, P. 513; for Dr. Zakir Hussain's visit to Moscow (see Chapter V, P. 163); Prime Minister Shastri visited the Soviet Union once (see Chapter V, P. 155); Mrs. Gandhi visited once as Minister for Information and Broadcasting and thrice as Prime Minister (see Chapter V, P. 160, Chapter VII, P. 231, Chapter IX, P. 295, and P. 431); see above P. 405 for the Congress Party's President's visit to Moscow.

Bulganin visited India once and Khrushchev, twice (see Chapter III, P. 104 and Pravda, February 12, 1960); Kosygin visited India thrice, once before becoming the Prime Minister (Pravda, February 22, 1961, see Chapter V, P. 159 and the Hindu February 1, 1968); Voroshilov, once (Pravda, January 21, 1960) and Brezhnev, twice once as the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (see Chapter VI, P. 186) and the second time as the General Secretary of the CPSU (see Mission of Friendship, PP. 75-84).

Note: Articles from newspapers cited in the thesis are not being listed below.

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
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