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The Relations between the Slovaks and the Central
Government of the First Czechoslovak Republic 1918-1938

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Thesis submitted for the degree of M.Litt in the Institute
of Soviet and East European Studies. University of Glasgow.

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B. L. A. London Nov. 1974.

Summary

This work is concerned with a study of the relations between the Slovaks and the Central Government of the First Czechoslovak Republic from 1918 to 1938 in most of the major areas of social development. It is divided into nine chapters of which Chapter ~~Five~~ and ~~Six~~ form the core of the work and are devoted to an examination of the policies of the central government in Slovakia. Other chapters deal with the history of Slovakia and the reasons why that region was finally to become a constituent part of the Czechoslovak Republic, and there is also an attempt to examine the role of both individual Slovak politicians and Slovak parties in the political life of the Republic. Some attention is also devoted to the import in the events which preceded the Munich crisis of 1938. Chapter ~~Nine~~ contains what I feel to be the conclusions that can be drawn from the examination of the problems to which my study is devoted.

CHAPTER ONE : INTRODUCTION

The disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918 and its replacement by a number of new, independent states did not put an end to the tensions and quarrels between different nationalities (Magyars, Germans, Romanians, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Poles, Ruthenians, Croats, Serbs, and Italians) which had been a constant feature of life under the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In many cases these quarrels were given new life and impetus by the creation of the "new" states, now being able to function on both an intra as well as an inter-national level. On the one hand, within each state one witnessed both two or more of the major "staatsbildend" nationalities, who together formed the majority of the population, at loggerheads, often over questions of the form of the organization of the state and governmental policies. As examples one might cite Serbs and Croats in Yugoslavia and Czechs and Slovaks in Czechoslovakia. Not to mention the grievances of the numerically weaker ethnic minorities vis-a-vis the central government of each state on whose territory they lived, e.g. Magyars in Romania and Czechoslovakia often claimed that they were the victims of discriminatory policies and practices on the part of their respective governments. Now on the other hand, there were often very bitter and sometimes bloody clashes and quarrels between the governments of these states over disputed boundaries and territories. [✓]Tesin in the case of Poland and Czechoslovakia; the Banat was disputed between Yugoslavia and Romania, whilst the complexities of the claims and counter-claims over Transylvania involved Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Ukraine, and Romania.

The height of these "nationalistic passions" was reached in the years 1919-1922, as understandably it was the Paris Peace Conference that had

been allotted the task of finalising the boundaries of these states. Hence each one was concerned to secure as much territory as possible in the hope that its claims would be recognised in full by the Conference. Disappointments over the Conference's final decisions on the frontiers of "the New Europe", the presence in each of the states of ethnic minorities, and the existence of irredenta were factors which help to explain why the years from 1918-1938 were marked by a large degree of tension and instability in Central and Eastern Europe. This effectively hampered any attempt at supra-national co-operation. The Hungarian Government and, I feel it is true to add, a large number (if not the majority) of ethnic Hungarians could never reconcile itself to the dismemberment of the old multi-national Hungary. Likewise, none of these national governments ever realised that, given the inextricably intermingled nature of the population of the region, it was impossible to make ethnic and national boundaries coincide totally. Furthermore there was no way of defining or re-defining inter-state boundaries so as to satisfy all the territorial claims of these states. Indeed these states were like a re-creation in miniature of the old Hapsburg Empire, but on a slightly more restricted scale, with a single state and state apparatus serving a number of different and in many cases divergent nationalities.

Such a state was Czechoslovakia; it contained both Czechs and Slovaks who only when taken together formed more than 60% of the total population. The remainder, being composed of Magyars, Germans, Ruthenians, and Poles, among other nationalities too small to mention. The history of this state from 1918 - 1938 has not been very closely examined by academics in Britain over the past 50 years. There has been, as it were, a tendency to view the First Czechoslovak Republic as a kind of Central European Utopia (especially in the years just before and after Munich). In view of its advanced industrial power and its progressive legal measures such as health

and unemployment insurance, legal regulation of workers' working conditions, land reform, etc. it seemed like a stable island of democracy in the sea of backward, authoritarian, agrarian regimes that surround it. Such a view, in spite of the truth of the above-mentioned features of Czech-Slovak society, becomes simplistic in the face of the one major problem in the interpretation of Czechoslovak history over the past 50 years.

The classic British response to this problem has been to seek the main causes for the Munich debacle in the collaboration of two related factors, viz.

1. The main factor and prime mover - the growth of the external threat from Germany from 1933 on, with the growth of Hitler's aggressive and expansionist policies (vide Ruhr, Austria, etc.).
2. His take-over, manipulation and direction of the Sudeten German Party under the leadership of Konrad Henlein, which was the mouthpiece for a large number of Sudeten grievances (both real and imaginary) as a means of exerting pressure on the Czechoslovak government in order to force it to accede to his (i.e. nominally Henlein's) demands. In addition Hitler exploited the Sudeten Germans as a Fifth Column which both before and after Munich could perform useful control, sabotage and intelligence-gathering operations for the Reich.

Such an analysis is, however, correct in as far as it goes, but these external factors alone are, in my view, insufficient to explain Czechoslovakia's collapse in the face of Munich. It fails to take into account internal factors of which there are enough of serious import as to merit closer examination. As indeed do all the factors involved in the fate of a new state whose conception and birth in 1918 were endowed with considerable

goodwill on the part of the victorious Allied and Associated Powers and great optimism on the part of politicians such as T. G. Masaryk, Benes and their colleagues.

Out of the many internal factors worthy of attention I have selected that of the Slovaks and more precisely the area of their relations with the Central Government from 1918-1938. I have done so for two main reasons. One, I consider this to be a particularly important factor in interpreting and evaluating the complexities of social, economic and political developments in Czechoslovakia during the period of the First Republic (which for the sake of simplicity I shall take as extending from the proclamation of Independence in Prague on 28th October 1918 up till the Munich Agreement in 1938). Two, far too little attention has been paid to the Slovaks in general and especially to their role after 1918, that I feel I would like to try to make a modest contribution towards redressing the balance as it were by helping to correct the imbalance in our knowledge and our interpretation of events.

I shall take as my starting-point the aftermath of World War One and the creation of the new and previously unheard-of state called Czechoslovakia.

From its very beginnings the new state was faced with many problems, all of which had their roots in conditions which had developed during the lifetime of the Hapsburg Empire or were a result of the effects of the War and the needs of the new situation that the Peace Settlements had created.

Leaving aside the question of Ruthenia (Podkarpatská Rus) we may say that the main underlying problem to be overcome was the question of the unification of the two halves of the country - the Czech Lands (Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia) and Slovakia - which were both unequally developed

in their economic and social structures, having been administered from different centres (Vienna and Budapest) under different governmental regimes which differed also in political experience and competence. Thus, since the Ausgleich of 1867, which split the administration of the Empire between the Austrian Germans and the Hungarian Magyars, the divergency in the socio-economic development of the two provinces had been reinforced by their allocation to two different spheres of governmental influences.

Whilst the Czechs under Austria were able by dint of a long and hard struggle to secure certain cultural and even political rights which meant the strengthening of their national awareness, through a growing use of the national tongue, the Slovaks had suffered from an increasingly severe policy of Magyarisation. The closure of the Matice Slovenska and the last few Slovak gymnasia in 1874-75 meant an end to Slovaks being able to receive secondary education in their own language. The results of this policy during the period 1875-1918 were not only the loss of the greater part of the Slovak intelligentsia, who became thoroughly Magyarised (the so-called Magyarones, who in spite of Slovak birth had adopted Magyar culture, speech, ways, and national awareness to a greater or lesser extent), but also an absolute decline in the numbers of Slovaks. This was due mainly to emigration (predominantly to the United States, but Slovaks also went to Vienna and Budapest in search of a better life), which absorbed the entire natural increase in population of Hungary and thus ^{they} became even more of a minority.

Thus, reviewing the situation in 1918, one must bear in mind the results of Hungarian policies towards the Slovaks (especially from 1875 on) in order

to try and understand why the Czech Lands and Slovakia stood at different stages of development on the eve of Czechoslovak independence.

Returning to our discussion of the problems which the young state faced, we may divide them (more or less arbitrarily, I am afraid) as falling into two groups:

1. Temporary problems which were a direct result of the end of the War and the creation of the new state.
2. Problems which demanded a long-term solution, well thought out policies and consistently applied and effective execution.

Of the first group of problems the most basic one was the transfer of power from the outgoing Hapsburg authorities to the new Czechoslovak ones. This transfer was effected in a relatively painless way in the Czech Lands, but events in Slovakia were to take a different turn. There the Hungarian officials did not relinquish their power until after the 30th October 1918, but in actual fact the writ of the Prague government did not extend as far as Slovakia. A confused situation prevailed with the Hungarians largely hostile to the new state, the Slovaks passive and hesitant at first, and a power vacuum in the area which neither Prague nor the new government of Count Károlyi in Budapest could effectively fill. After many and diverse events, the troops of the Hungarian Soviet Republic of Bela Kun withdrew and the Czechoslovak troops under their French commander were able to occupy the entire area of Slovakia and secure its boundaries. This, however, was not until June 1919.

In both parts of the country, however, the immediate need was to deal with the ravages brought about by the World War. In the first instance

it was necessary to set up a rudimentary administration to allocate food supplies and provide housing, repair war-torn industries and means of communication, as well as administer the network of government controls over industry, agriculture and the distribution and rationing of food and fuel supplies. In addition, some form of representative political body was devised in order to prepare a Constitution, pave the way for elections and the creation of an elected parliamentary body to function henceforth in accordance with the workings of the Constitution. All these matters occupied the two to three years of the life of the First Republic.

The legacy of the years of the Austro-Hungarian Empire might be a generic title for the mere fundamental problems which the Czechoslovak government attempted to solve. These can be sub-divided under the following headings:

1. Administration
2. Industry (including communications and finance)
3. Agriculture
4. Social conditions
5. Cultural conditions and education.

Administration

The immediate problem to be faced here was the transfer of the administration from Vienna to Prague, from Budapest to Prague and later to Budapest. Whilst this changeover could be effected in a reasonably smooth manner in the Czech Lands, as there were sufficient bureaucrats of Czech nationality in the Austro-Hungarian bureaucracy to man the new posts, in Slovakia the overwhelming majority were either Magyars or "Magyarones" (Magyarised Slovaks). Many of the former and some of the latter fled to Hungary. Of those who remained many were dismissed or pensioned off by the Czechoslovak authorities, either because of their "alleged" political unreliability or because they had refused to swear an oath of loyalty to the new regime. In any case the resulting dearth of Slovak officials could be filled from one source only - that of the Czech Lands, where there was now the extra prospect of using those Czech officials who had now left their posts in parts of the former Empire.

Ministries had to be set up and staffed and their activities co-ordinated. An army and a police force had to be created and put to work. More important, however, was the need for a common Czechoslovak set of laws. Until these had been formulated and put into operation, there were two sets of laws obtaining on Czechoslovak territory. In the Czech Lands Austrian law but in Slovakia Hungarian law prevailed. The difference between certain of their provisions, especially in their definition of "domicile" in regard to questions of citizenship and nationality, caused hardship and suffering to a number of individuals who found themselves in the unenviable position of being stateless¹. Finally, there was the local administrative sphere which required a uniform and efficient system in order to attend to local needs and interests.

Industry, Communications and Finance

Both halves of the country were, in comparison with the rest of Austria and Hungary respectively, highly developed areas. In comparison with the Czech Lands, however, Slovakia's industries were relatively weaker and had come into being later than in the Czech Lands, largely as a result of governmental initiative. They were sustained by government subsidies and protected by tariffs from external competition. Nevertheless, Slovakia contained a considerable proportion of Hungary's industry and played a vital role in her economy.

Once united together in a common state, both Czech and Slovak industries faced the problem of a shrinkage in their internal markets from 53 million to approximately 13½ million people. In addition there were two main factors which aggravated this problem:

1. The prevailing economic climate with inflation raging in most of the countries in the area, continual depreciation of their currencies, and depressed world economic conditions.
2. The creation of these new states meant an end to the relatively tariff-free movement of goods within the vast territory of the Empire. Each country sought to encourage the development of its own industries by high protectionist tariffs.

Hence Czechoslovak industry found itself with a large amount of excess productive capacity on its hands. The weaker Slovak industries now found that they had become the competitors of Czech industry in an uneven struggle in which they were hampered even more by the lack of good east-west communications and the high railway tariffs.

Both road and railway networks were centred on Vienna and Budapest respectively, which made quick east-west/west-east movement more difficult. In the eastern half of the country, with a lower population density, the state of the roads was none too good, especially in Ruthenia. The war had taken its toll of the railways, which were urgently in need of repairs both to track and rolling-stock, signalling equipment and stations. In Slovakia the situation was worsened by the fact, that goods tariffs were 150-200% higher than in the Czech Lands. This was due not only to the lack of any direct east-west line, but also to the fact that several of the lines were owned by private companies and there was consequently no unified tariff structure.

On the financial side the country was saved from a complete collapse of the currency by the orthodox financial policies of Rašín². The very soundness of the currency, however, mitigated against Czechoslovakia's economic revival as it tended to make her goods a bit too expensive in the international market. Credit institutions and banks had to be set on a sound footing once again and extended to Slovakia where such institutions were very poorly developed. An efficient tax and government monopoly system to ensure sufficient revenue had to be created; the budget meanwhile, showed a deficit for the first few years and hence loans were floated in the West, but Czechoslovakia's foreign indebtedness was never as great as that of some of her neighbours.

Agriculture

In agriculture, apart from the perennial need for improved farming methods, better irrigation, anti-flood measures such as the regulation of river courses and the building of dykes, the most important need was for land

reform. I do not intend to go into this question in any detail, but suffice it to say that it was in Slovakia and Ruthenia where this problem was to be found at its acutest. Wildly uneven and unjust distribution of land meant that the majority of the peasants had to subsist on tiny pieces of land, using primitive implements and poor methods, with the result that crop yields were exceedingly low. Traditionally this process had always been the main driving-force behind emigration. In order to put right this state of affairs it would require not only the legal measures of a Land Reform law but also the provision of expert help and money to help farmers modernise their methods, raise and improve their crop yields, and hence provide a better living for themselves.

Social Conditions

The living conditions of the majority of the industrial proletariat at the end of 1918, as well as those of the other urban classes, were far from satisfactory. Legislation regulating the length of the working day and a few other facets of working conditions was extant in Austria, whilst in Hungary there was hardly any. The Slovak proletariat was numerically far weaker than its Czech counterpart; union organization was also weaker and consequently both wages and general working and living conditions were worse in Slovakia than in the Czech Lands. During the first few years of the Republic, legislation was passed on a whole host of matters affecting workers and their living conditions. There were laws providing ^{for} unemployment payments to be made by the state (this was later transferred to the Trade Unions), laws on sickness insurance, retirement and widows' pensions, annual leave, child employment, and all the vital aspects of working men's lives. A start had to be made on the problem of providing enough housing of a decent standard for all those who came flocking into the cities in search of work, as well as those already living there. In addition there were provisions for improving public health, measures to prevent tuberculosis (amongst

other diseases), and to lessen the incidence of infant mortality. In the eastern half of the country health conditions were invariably worse, as there were fewer doctors and hospitals.

Apart from these general conditions and the measures adopted to deal with them I must mention one further social problem. This was that of the minorities, of whom the two largest groups were the Germans and the Magyars. Belonging to defeated nations these two minorities were not accorded the right of self-determination but were incorporated into the new state regardless of their marked hostility and opposition towards it. Hence relations between them and the Central Government were fraught with all kinds of difficulties. In this atmosphere of hurt national pride and exaggerated (and in many cases newly-found) nationalistic feeling, which prevailed after the creation of the state, any trivial incident or clash between members of these two minorities and Czechs or Slovaks would only enflame an already tense situation. The peaceful regulation of minority grievances and the provision of legal safeguards of their rights was of fundamental importance in trying to create some kind of feeling of loyalty towards the new state amongst these minorities. Otherwise they would always pose the threat that, under the influence of forces hostile to Czechoslovakia (as Hungary was and as Germany became from 1933 onwards), they would work towards the country's destruction and their reunification with their own nation. In the case of the Magyars this could clearly be seen in the first three years after 1918, when there were two unsuccessful attempts to restore the Hapsburgs in Hungary.

Culture and Education

Of the cultural problems I have only enough space to mention the expansion and modernisation of the educational system. In Slovakia this involved the provision of a whole area of secondary and higher education with Slovak as the language of instruction, something which had not existed since 1874.

Primary education in Slovakia also required expansion and modernisation. In this area the burden was shared between the various denominations and the state, with the state, however, supplying the major part of the financial wherewithal. As regards teaching personnel, a similar solution to that employed in the administrative apparatus was adopted and large numbers of Czech teachers came to work in Slovakia. The better conditions and extra remuneration attached to such posts were, however, a fruitful source of contention between Czech and Slovak teachers (as was the case in the bureaucracy) and Czech-Slovak rivalries and jealousies found plenty of fuel on which to feed. Church-State relations in so far as the Protestants were concerned presented no problems as the Protestant Church had spontaneously de-Magyarized itself after independence. Relations with the Catholics, however were complicated by the fact that most of the higher clergy were Magyars and many of the dioceses were subject to the authority of bishops whose seats lay outside the new state boundaries. The whole complex issue was not finally resolved until the late twenties with the signing of a Concordat with the Vatican which regulated the appointment of bishops and other clerics, as well as other questions of a religious nature. The establishment of good relations with the Vatican was of great importance especially in Slovakia where the majority (80%) of the population were Catholics and nearly all devout ones at that. Indeed, they were more than a little inclined to view with suspicion the policies and activities of the Central Government, in whom the Slovak clericals of Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (HSLS) saw the dangers of "free-thinking" and "Hussitism". Certain wanton acts of destruction of statues and religious objects by legionnaires and other over-zealous persons did nothing to allay Catholic suspicions.

Such was the general framework into which the Slovak problem (Slovenská otázka) fitted. It consisted of the same social, economic and political problems as in the Czech Lands, often present in a more acute form, as well as problems peculiar to Slovak conditions.

Historically, political life in Slovakia had been very limited, with the main impetus being in the struggle to maintain and develop a common Slovak literary language. Because it was only through the use of a "national" tongue that a people or nationality (narod)* could come to an awareness of its own distinct "national" character. In the various arguments between the protagonists of Czech as the literary language and those who advocated Slovak, there is no trace of the idea that Slovakia or the Czech Lands should form a fully independent political entity. Political demands never went beyond some form of autonomy, both in a cultural as well as a political sense. Those Czechs and Slovaks who believed in the concept of a common Czechoslovak people and language, with the Slovaks as a branch (kmeň) of this people (narod), did not however envisage their union in an independent Czechoslovakia. It was only after 1918 that protagonists of the "Czechoslovak" idea (see Chapter Three) began to identify this earlier idea of the ethnic and linguistic unity of the "Czechoslovak" people with the concept of an independent Czechoslovakia, a concept which is essentially a political one.

* narod = people (in sense of ethnic/linguistic group)

narod = nation (in sense of above + common territory = common political organization)

I feel here that I must utter the caveat that one should not be lured into thinking that participation of individual Slovaks or of foreign Slovak cultural organisations betokened the tacit agreement of the Slovaks in Slovakia to any of the actions undertaken in their name. To an even greater degree than in the Czech Lands, there was no way during the course of the war of sounding out the wishes and aspirations of the Slovaks as to their political future.

Neither was there only one political trend among Slovaks. The group of young intellectual Slovaks, pupils of Masaryk at the University of Prague, who were clustered around the periodical "Hlas" (Hlasists), were counter-balanced by the "clerical" group of Turčianský Svätý Martin. The Hlasists were in favour of Masaryk's political programme, whilst the "clericals", deeply Catholic, were suspicious of Masaryk's seemingly progressive ideas, which they saw as free-thinking and Hussite. They tended to view the simple and pious Catholic faith of the majority of the Slovaks as one of the main hallmarks of the Slovak people. Protestantism and the use of the Czech language and Kralice Bible they saw as a dangerous impact from Bohemia during the Hussite Wars. There was also the Russophile tendency of Svetozár Hurban-Vajanský, which envisaged some sort of link-up with Tsarist Russia for Slovakia, possibly as an independent principedom under a Romanov.

Furthermore, one must be cautious of the tendency of many writers to project their own ideological stand-point back into past events. This is evident in the non-communist historians of the First Republic who identified and imbued nineteenth-century ideas about the Czechoslovak people with a twentieth-century political content, as well as exaggerating the "national" content of the Hussite Wars. They saw such outbreaks as a sort of modern national liberation struggle and ignored their deeply religious nature and the fact that Bohemian nationalism was conceived as being a love for and

a loyalty to a particular geographical entity - Bohemia - which was irrespective of national and ethnic identity. Hence one could be a German Bohemian as well as a Czech Bohemian. Modern nationalism, however, depended on membership of a particular ethnic group which was distinguished from other such groups by, amongst other things, the possession of a common language.

In a similar manner communist historians, especially in the 1950s, were apt to view past events in terms of progressive versus reactionary trends, with the former triumphing in the communist take-over in February and the resultant establishment of a "socialist" state.

Indeed, one of the many pitfalls to be avoided in trying to arrive at a clearer interpretation of past Czechoslovak history is that the various changes of regime from 1918 on, viz First Republic, Second Republic, Protectorate, Third Republic (the 1945-1948 state), and the Communist Republic, and the conflict of various class, national and ethnic interests have meant that past events have often been overlaid with a variety of conflicting and often fundamentally opposing interpretations of the same set of events. For an example see Lettrich, A History of Modern Slovakia, Kirschbaum, Slovakia - Nation at the Cross-Roads of Europe, and Glaser, Czechoslovakia - A Critical History, all three works containing different and conflicting interpretations of the events of Czechoslovak history from 1918-1945. Like the Czech and Slovak communist historians, who tend to view history purely in terms of Marxian social and economic theory, they disregard or distort facts which cannot conveniently be fitted into their methodological framework in an attempt to defend the correctness of their own ideological position vis-a-vis their opponents.

Even the works of R. Seton-Watson, one of the few British academics to concern themselves with Czechoslovak history, betray his own bias in that he was an ardent propagandist of the idea of Czechoslovak independence. His works are firmly imbued with support for the Czechoslovak Government, and in his book The New Slovakia (Prague 1924) he gives very short shrift to the the grievances of the Magyar minority and those of the Slovaks in whose demands for autonomy he, like many other partisans of a Czechoslovak orientation, tends to see the machinations of Budapest and the Hungarian irredentist movement. In spite of a quite detailed and, to my mind, accurate analysis of Slovakia's problems, his sympathies still clearly lie with the Central Government and its policies.

Apart from his works there are very few works in English of any value on the history of Czechoslovakia and especially on the thorny question of the Slovak problem (Slovenská otázka). Consequently most of the literature which exists on this question is not in English but in Czech and Slovak as well as other languages.

The material I have consulted consists primarily of:

- i) works of the main protagonists - Beneš, Masaryk, Šrobar, Hlinka, etc. - including memoirs, biographies, and autobiographies, as well as serious studies on various social and political problems
- ii) works written by serious historians and academics such as Kamil Krofta, Albert Pražák and Professor Chaloupecký
- iii) works published in the post-1948 period
- iv) autonomist literature.

Amongst the first group are of course the works of T. G. Masaryk including Světová revoluce and Beneš' Světová válka a naše revoluce and Bohemia's Case for Independence to name but two, as well as Šrobar's Osvobozené Slovensko. There is a vast amount of memoir literature, especially from the period just after 1918, but most of it is of very uneven quality and hence of but limited usefulness.

The writers mentioned in the second group all share a common "Czechoslovak" orientation which should be taken into account when assessing the usefulness of their material and the validity of their arguments.

The publications of the Czechoslovak and Slovak Academies of Sciences, such as K počiatkom národného obrodzenia, Slováci a ich národný vývin, and Dejiny Slovenska, as well as the works of Vilem Plevza (mainly on the history and activity of the Communist Party in Slovakia during that period) and Juraj Kramer Slovenské autonomistické hnutie v rokoch 1919-1929 and Irredenta a separatismus v slovenskej politike (študia o ich vzťahu), also provide useful sources of material.

However, very few of the works cited above deal directly with the subject of the Slovaks and their relations with the Central Government from 1918-1938.

In view of this fact I have decided on my own methodological approach.

First of all I shall attempt to describe the conditions prevailing in Slovakia during 1918 and analyse the various problems that occurred as the result of the country's long historical development under the aegis of the Hungarian State for over 900 years. In addition I shall examine the effects of this long historical development on questions of social, economic and political progress. Having arrived at as complete as possible a picture of conditions in Slovakia in 1918 or just prior to its incorporation into Czechoslovakia, I

shall then proceed to compare conditions in the Czech Lands with those in Slovakia in order to analyse and illustrate the difficulties that were to lay in the way of the political unification of these two formerly separate areas into one common political unit.

From this starting point, I intend to trace the formulation and implementation of governmental policy in Slovakia from 1918 to 1938 on the one hand, and the reactions of the Slovaks, both individuals and institutions such as the Catholic and Protestant Churches, the trades unions and political parties, to such policies and to the government itself, on the other. I shall attempt to analyse not only such reactions but also the motives and thinking that conditioned them on both sides. In addition, I hope to trace the influence this interaction was to have on the entire development of the First Republic.

In this task I shall call upon not only the testimony of works written after the events with which they deal but also contemporary newspaper accounts, editorials and comments, in as far as these materials were available in the United Kingdom as I was unsuccessful in my attempts to obtain a scholarship to study such material for a year in Czechoslovakia. It is upon the analysis of such material that to a large extent I will draw upon in the chapters that deal with governmental policy in Slovakia, its implementation and the Slovak reaction to it. By utilising as many different sources as possible I hope to arrive at an overall view of Slovak feeling and not confine myself just to the statements of the most vociferous opponents of governmental policy and the largest single party in Slovakia by the mid-1920s - Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (HSĽS).

I hope, therefore, that by devoting a large amount of space to a careful and systematic analysis of press material in addition to books I will be able to

throw some new light on the whole question of Czech-Slovak relations during the First Republic and to assess to what extent the failure to solve the Slovak Problem was a weakening factor which, together with others, contributed to the collapse of Czechoslovakia in 1938.

CHAPTER TWO: SLOVAKIA FROM EARLIEST TIMES TO 1914

(1) From earliest times to 1526

Geographically the territory known as Slovakia lies in the heart of Europe. It is bound to the north and east by the Carpathian Mountains, to the west by the Small Carpathian and Beskyd Mountains, which divide it from Moravia, and to the south by the Danube and the upper arm of the Tisa River, which, however, do not constitute any great or unpassable barrier to north-south communications¹. The entire area is broken up by alternating high mountain ranges and deep valleys and river basins², which explains the lack (until very recently) of quick and effective east-west communication links, as well as the failure to develop any single large geographic centre, which could have served as a focus for Slovak national aspirations (such as Prague was for the Czechs).

The existence of Stone and Bronze Age settlements in Slovakia is fairly well attested by the normal archeological evidence³. This evidence indicates that Slovakia was well inhabited as early as 5000 B.C. The first indentifiable groups to settle there, however, were Celtic and Germanic tribes such as the Quadi and the Marcomanni, whose struggle with the Roman Empire is fairly well documented. Later, during the 5th century A.D., the Huns and other nomadic tribes invaded. This led not only to the final collapse of the Roman Empire in 476 A.D. but also to great movements of peoples within Europe in order to escape from the Hunnish invasions and the destruction that accompanied them.

It is sometime during the period between the fall of the Roman Empire and the beginnings of Samo's Empire (circa 623 A.D.) that we must locate the advent of the Slavs to Slovakia. There is reliable evidence, such as that of the historians Jornandes and Procopius, which alludes to the presence of Slav tribes in Eastern Europe during the 6th century A.D., although they

may have first penetrated into Slovakia from the end of the 4th century.

These tribes were organized in clans, each tribe being made up of several clans. At the head of each tribe stood a tribal chief called *knaz* (priest) or *knieža* (prince). The clan was in reality an extended family type of organization, composed of several families who were descended from a common ancestor, with a system of communal ownership of property.

Between the 4th and 8th centuries A.D. this type of clan organization began to be superseded by a form of political organization which united several related tribes, living in a compact area, into a primitive type of state.

The first such recorded state was the Empire of Samo, who is said to have been a Frankish merchant who successfully united the Slavs around him, defeating their overlords, the Avars, in battle in 624, and the Franks later in 631. His empire collapsed, however, after his death in 658 and many of the Slav tribes passed back under Avar domination.

Upon the defeat of the latter in 799 the Slavs became exposed to the growing power of the Frankish Empire whose emperor Charlemagne had spread Christianity throughout his Empire. By establishing border territories, or marks as they were called, Charlemagne was able to pave the way towards bringing parts of those areas inhabited by Slavs under his control.

The exact origins of the Great Moravian Empire (830-906) are of course shrouded in mystery. It is recorded, however, that soon after Prince Pribina of Nitra (one of the embryonic Slav principalities of the time; another one was Moravia under *Mojmír*) had become converted to Christianity and had had a church consecrated in Nitra in 833 he was driven from his throne by *Mojmír*, who then proceeded to unite the two principalities, whose

territories roughly corresponded to present-day Slovakia and Moravia. The exact nature of the Great Moravian Empire, its extent and the tribes it encompassed have often been the subject of some controversy between Czech and Slovak historians⁴. They have seen it as a forerunner (be it ever so distant) of either Czechoslovakia or an independent Slovakia. Hence they have, each in turn, stressed either the "Czech" or "Slovak" element in the Great Moravian Empire to the exclusion of the other side. It should of course be pointed out that at the time no such clearly defined ideas of nationality existed - indeed the differences between the various Slav languages were still small enough to enable speakers of one language or dialect to be almost immediately intelligible to speakers of another (cf. Cyril and Methodius' use of their native Salonika dialect in their missionary work).

The final collapse of the Great Moravian Empire in 906 meant that the Slovaks were absorbed without too much difficulty into the embryonic Hungarian State within whose bounds they were to develop for almost a full thousand years.

The process of their incorporation into Hungary was, however, a gradual one. The Slav tribes began to retreat from the valleys up into the hilly areas. No doubt they did so in order not to be caught in the clashes which occurred between the Germans and the Magyars, who were contending for control of the Danube Basin, as well as to escape the Magyar plunder expeditions which swept all over Europe during the first half of the 10th century.

Having been severely defeated by a combined Czech and German force under the command of the German King Otto I at the Battle of Augsburg in 955 the Magyars began to settle down to a more fixed way of life. Under the first two kings, Géza (972-997) and Stephen I (997-1038), the work of consolidating and Christianising the Hungarian State was begun.

Within such a state the Slovaks belonged almost exclusively to the developing feudal peasantry, which, as time went by, became more and more bound to the soil until finally in 1514 the Hungarian Diet passed a law to the effect that the peasants remained bound to the land for all time.

The cultural and economic development of Slovakia which was experiencing quite an upsurge was totally disrupted by the Mongol invasion of 1241. In order, therefore, to rebuild his shattered kingdom King Bela invited foreign settlers, especially Germans, to come and repopulate the towns and villages in the depopulated parts of the countryside. This meant that from now on the Slovak element in the towns would have to face German and other non-Magyar, as well as Magyar, economic competition.

The effects of the Hussite Wars on the complex of prevailing economic and social relations between different classes and different national and religious groups are difficult to ascertain with any degree of accuracy, but it appears that owing to the different circumstances obtaining in Slovakia at that time the basis for a broad-based movement such as that of the Hussites was lacking.

Bohemia's main export to Slovakia during this period was no doubt the Kralice Bible, the subsequent use of which was to strengthen the position of the Czech language in Slovakia. Even at that time Czech was beginning to be used as a supra-dialectal administrative and commercial language amongst the inhabitants of Slovakia and was thus a rival to Latin⁵. The latter, however, was to remain the official language of Hungary until well into the first half of the 19th century.

Another relevant fact connected with the period of the Hussite Wars, apart from the introduction of their ideas into Slovakia, is the use that later Magyar writers were to make of the Hussite raids into Slovakia. They claimed that the Slovaks were nothing but the reconverted descendants of

the Hussites who had remained behind in Slovakia when the main body of the Hussite forces finally withdrew. This was in spite of the overwhelming amount of evidence that testified to continuous Slav settlement in the area since the 8th century A.D. at least.

In essence Slovak life did not undergo any major changes until the defeat of Mohács in 1526.

(2) 1526-1780

From the Battle of Mohács in 1526 to the Treaty of Požarevac in 1718 Slovakia or Upper Hungary (A felvidék) became for a considerable part of the period the centre of Hungarian social and national life. For over a century and a half most of the Hungarian Plain (Alföld) was occupied by the Turks, whilst Transylvania enjoyed semi-autonomous status under Ottoman suzerainty.

I do not intend to categorise here the various battles, struggles, wars and revolts which occurred wholly or partially on Slovak territory during this period. Suffice it to say that they consisted in the main of four elements, viz. -

- (a) The struggle against the Turks;
- (b) The conflict between the Habsburgs with their centralizing tendencies and the nobles who sought to safeguard and increase their own privileges;
- (c) The disruption caused by the effects of the Protestant Reformation and the later Catholic Counter-Reformation;
- (d) Rebellions against the authority of the Crown (often originating in Transylvania). Sometimes such struggles

involved one of the parties enlisting the help of the
Turks.

The economic effects of all this unrest on Slovakia were appalling. Apart from the sheer loss of population and the destruction of property and buildings etc. as a result of the fighting, a very heavy burden fell on the tax-paying classes, viz. the peasants and townspeople. The former were liable not only for state taxes, but also for forced labour, building fortifications around towns and villages (gratius labour) and actually participating in the fighting. In addition, their normal feudal dues were greatly increased by the fact that, as Slovakia was the only area which remained under Habsburg control, a great influx of nobles seeking refuge from the Turks took place with the result that by 1787 on average every twentieth inhabitant was a noble and hence free from tax⁶.

Invariably a greater tax burden fell on the peasantry who were faced with a constant rise in the number of labour days they were compelled to work on the landowner's lands (roboty). This was primarily due to the lack of adequate labour and the latter's practice of extending their own domains by adding to them deserted and hence uncultivated peasant lands.

The towns were also adversely affected, both by the wars and the taxes imposed upon them by Vienna as well as by the effects of the nobility's efforts to extend its own privileges at their expense.

The multi-national character of Hungary, in which the ethnic Hungarians (Magyars) were themselves a minority of the population, was further reinforced (if not actually created) during the Turkish Wars by an influx of Croat, Serb and Romanian peasants. They poured into Hungary to fill those depopulated and devastated regions whose original inhabitants had either fled or been killed or taken off into slavery by the Turks⁷.

On the credit side of the balance sheet Slovakia undoubtedly derived benefit from being the cultural, political, social and economic centre of Hungary during this period. Bratislava became the most important city after the Turks had captured Buda. The Diet met either in Bratislava or Trnava and the former city was for a long time the seat of the highest governmental offices. The founding of the Catholic University of Trnava in 1635 gave a great impetus to Slovak cultural life; the institution was attended by a great many Slovaks and many books were published, in Slovak and in other languages. Another important influence on Slovak cultural life was Jan Amos Komenský (Comenius) whose works were amongst those most frequently published and read during the second half of the 17th century in Slovakia. His views, especially in the field of education, had a great effect on developments in Slovakia, amongst Slovak Protestants especially.

The advent of Maria Theresa to the Austrian throne in 1740 marks the beginning of the period of "enlightened absolutism" which paved the way for the National Revivals that took place amongst many of the peoples of Central and South-Eastern Europe. Her creation of a standing army, which eventually reached a total of 108,000 men, represented an increase in expenditure which could only be met by increased taxation. The bulk of this increasingly heavy burden of taxes fell on the peasantry; the nobles were in general exempt from most taxes and their takeover of deserted peasant holdings led to a decrease in the amount of tax that accrued from the land (i.e. peasant land).

Maria Theresa attempted to persuade the Hungarian nobility to agree to pay taxes in lieu of military service and also to regularize and standardize the peasants' feudal duties. Her attempts, however, met with nothing but opposition and she was forced to dissolve the Austrian Diet, which was not called again in her lifetime.

In 1767, because of her fears of a peasant uprising, she took steps to

record the peasantry's feudal duties and to make them as uniform as possible throughout the whole Empire. This code (Urbar) was translated and published in all the languages of the Empire. The lands held by both the landowners and the peasants were recorded, as well as the latter's obligations towards the former. The landowners were forbidden to add any new obligations to existing ones but were, however, able in many cases either to get around the new regulations completely or else use them to their own advantage.

Maria Theresa's reforms were continued and extended during the reign of her son Joseph II (1780-1790).

(3) 1780-1875

The 10 years of Joseph II's short reign witnessed his attempts to implement far-reaching reforms, especially in the fields of education, religion and state administration. Some of these reforms were to have a great influence not only on the development of the Slovak but also the Czech and Magyar National Revivals.

The process of centralizing the administration of the Empire involved not only the concentration of state offices in Buda, to the detriment of Bratislava, but also the replacement of Latin by German as the administrative language in use in state offices, the courts and high schools throughout the Empire. The end of Latin as an administrative language put an end to the use of a truly neutral language which favoured none of the various nationalities and did not emphasize national differences at all. It is no coincidence that from now on language (especially the mother tongue) began to be considered as the most important factor in the development of modern as opposed to medieval national feeling.

Joseph II's attempts to make noble lands liable for tax, as well as his Germanizing tendencies, met with the resolute opposition of the Hungarian

nobility, who saw in them a threat to their own privileges. Under the influence of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution of 1789 the nobility attempted to justify its defence of age-old Magyar (that is noble) rights and privileges by claiming the right to national self-determination, the nation naturally being identified with the nobility (natio hungarica). It is around the 1790s that we find the first recorded instances of laws being passed in the Diet to replace Latin by Magyar and ensure a privileged place for that language in public life.

In the Czech Lands the attempts of the Czech revivalists Dobrovský and Jungmann (later also Palacký) to polish, refurbish and modernize the Czech language received extra stimulus from the trend towards Germanization, which many of Joseph II's policies undoubtedly represented.

In the field of religious affairs, however, the issuing of a Tolerance Patent in 1781, which allowed freedom of worship to the Protestants, meant that they were now free to develop their own cultural activities and learned societies. The most famous of these institutions was the Chair of Czechoslovak Language attached to the Bratislava Evangelical Lycée, which was founded in 1803.

Another aspect of these religious reforms was the founding of a general seminary in Bratislava which opened in 1784. It was at this institution that Anton Bernolák (1762-1813) received his education. In 1787 he published his famous Philosophical-Critical Dissertation on Slovak Letters, in which he argued the need for a single literary form of the Slovak language which would fulfil a supra-dialectal role but still be based essentially on the western Slovak dialect that was spoken at that time in the area around Trnava⁸.

He later published a dictionary (Slovak-Czech-German-Latin-Magyar) and

a Grammar. By 1792 he, together with his associates, founded the Slovak Learned Society which had its main centre in Trnava and branches in several other Slovak cities. In the first few years of its existence it published a large number of works both in Latin and in Bernolák's newly-codified literary language on a variety of subjects. Bernolák's language was well accepted by the Catholics and it began to be used fairly extensively among Slovak writers, of whom perhaps the most famous was the poet Ján Hollý (1785-1849).

However, the Slovak Protestants, including Kollar and Šafárik, and certain of the Czech revivalists, such as Dobrovský, opposed Bernolák's innovations on the grounds that either Slovak was too vulgar and under-developed a language to be used in literature, as was Šafárik's view, or that it had far too few speakers and many differing dialects to sustain its own literary life. Thus, in face of the appearance of certain Magyarizing tendencies it was better for the Slovaks to join ranks with the Czechs and enjoy the benefits of their more developed literature and wider and better educated readership, rather than attempt to create an independent Slovak literature and literary language in the face of such difficult conditions (Magyarization, the low level of economic and social development in Slovakia, the multitude of dialects, etc.).

Furthermore, in contrast to Bernolák's concept of Slovak as a dialect of the Slav language and of the Slovaks as an independent branch (lmen) of the Slavs stood the idea of the Czech-Slovak branch of the Slavs (československý lmen), with the Czecho-Slovak language (?) as the common language of Czechs and Slovaks. In view of the large degree of mutual intelligibility of the two languages, as well as the 300-year-old tradition of Biblical Czech among the Slovak Protestants, it is easy to understand why Slovak should have been thought to be merely one of the dialects of Czecho-Slovak, of which literary Czech was the common literary language⁹ (especially when one takes into account that comparative studies in

Slavistics were still in their infancy).

It must be stressed, however, that the rapid growth which the Czech language underwent in this period (viz. not only Jungmann's neologisms, but also the many Germanisms which were entering into the language) meant that the Slovaks very often found these new forms very difficult, if not impossible to understand. Consequently the form of Czech which was recommended for use in Slovakia was often interspersed with Slovak elements in an attempt to arrive at a linguistic hybrid which would be both understandable and acceptable to Czechs and Slovaks.

The importance of the Bratislava Evangelical Lyceé for the Slovak National Revival is well demonstrated by the fact that it was there that Ľudovít Štúr (1815-56) studied and organized his fellow students into a society dedicated to the struggle for Slovak freedom. Along with Jozef Hurban and Michal Hodža he eventually succeeded in creating a new Slovak literary language which was supra-confessional and based on the widely-used central Slovak dialect.

As was the case with Bernolák's efforts, Štúr's new codification met with the opposition of certain Czechs (and also Kollár). For a time Slovakia had at least three literary languages, viz. Bernolák's Slovak, Štúr's Slovak and Biblical Czech, not counting new Czech (the new language with Jungmann's renovations and Germanisms) and Old Slovak (a form of Czech which included as a compromise some Slovak elements. It was some time however before both Catholics and Protestants alike accepted Štúr's new language. In 1845 Štúr was able to publish a newspaper (Slovenské národné noviny) which incorporated a literary supplement (Orol tatranský). Both these publications were written in the new language. In addition to this, in 1851 J.M. Hurban was able to publish the first volume of a journal devoted to intellectual pursuits (Slovak Views - Slovenské pohľady),

also in the new language. This publication, however, folded in August 1852 as the government demanded a very high sum of money as the deposit (kaucia) that all newspapers were required to submit from which fines for infringements of the censorship regulations or for libel were paid.

The resistance to [✓]Stur's efforts was caused in part, rightly or wrongly, by the feeling that the Slovaks, by insisting on their own literary language, were withdrawing from a common Czech-Slovak unity (odluka) and creating their own national language, and hence by extension their own national feeling and national identity. In short they were declaring themselves to be a separate nation at a time when the conditions for their successful national existence were far from auspicious. To many of the Czech thinkers of the time it seemed impossible for an independent Slovak nation to survive and prosper in the face of the growing dangers of Magyarization. And in view of the subsequent events, from the troubles of 1848-49 through the period of Bach's absolutism, the Ausgleich of 1867 and the final closure of the last three Slovak gymnasia in 1874 and the Matica Slovenska in 1875, who is to say that such fears were at the time not at least partly justified?

During the events of 1848-49 the Slovaks and their demands for cultural and territorial autonomy within the bounds of Hungary were rejected by Kossuth, who allegedly said "the sword shall decide between us". On the hand, Vienna distrusted the Slovaks and made sure that the Slovak volunteer forces were disarmed and dispersed once the Hungarians had been decisively defeated at Vilagos. Thus Slovak support for Vienna during the critical days of '48-49 did not bring its own reward. In fact it was quipped that the minorities received as a reward what the Hungarians got as a punishment. Hungary was divided into five districts after 1849, its constitution was abolished, and it was ruled directly from Vienna. No special rights or privileges were given to the non-Magyar nationalities and they received no

form of autonomy whatsoever. Vienna tended to use Kollar and his group's opposition to Štúr's language in order to hamper Slovak demands for cultural autonomy and the use of Slovak in education. Instead of Slovak, however, the Austrian Government permitted Kollar to publish the Slovak version of the government newspaper in Vienna in Biblical Czech. This language was also used as the official language of the whole Slovak area in the Košice district of Hungary, one of the five districts into which it was divided. Of these the Bratislava and Košice districts comprised most of Slovakia.

By 1852 it seemed that both Slovak Catholics and Protestants were agreed on the use of Štúr's form of literary Slovak together with some modification of the orthography on more etymological lines in order to reduce the gap between it and standard literary Czech. In the political atmosphere that prevailed in both Austria and Hungary during the period of reaction

from the defeat of the Hungarians in 1849 until 1859, when Austrian forces were defeated by the combined armies of Napoleon III and the Piedmontese in Italy, Slovak literary production fell to an all time low. There was only one newspaper that continued to use Štúr's language, and this was the Catholic News (Katholické noviny) under the editorship of a Slovak Catholic priest Ján Palarík.

Štúr himself spent the last years of his life under police surveillance; despairing at the failure of his and others' attempts to raise the general cultural and social level of the Slovaks he turned towards extreme Slavophile ideas. In his last work Slavdom and the world of the future (Slovanstvo a svet buducnosti) he expressed his belief in the historic mission of the Slavs under the leadership of Russia. This work was not published until ten years after his death, and then only in Russia.

After 1859 the Austrian Government was forced by its Italian defeat to restore the old county system of local government in Hungary, and

eventually to recognize the historic rights of the Hungarian Kingdom. A provincial Diet was set up that was to send a certain proportion of its members to a central legislative body in Vienna (Reichsrat). The latter body was to decide on all matters that pertained to the Empire as a whole. Magyar was proclaimed the official language in Hungary and Magyars once more assumed the leading role in the county (župa) administration. It should be stressed that the main political class still remained the land-owning nobility, both the magnates and the middle and lesser nobility (šlachta).

Along with these activities efforts were made at various times to found a Slovak literary institute Matica Slovenska¹⁰, which was to encourage the development of the Slovak language. Originally the idea of a pan-Slavistic institute was suggested by Jonáš Záborský, one of Kollar's co-workers. After this proposal was attacked by the Austrian press the idea was changed to a purely literary and cultural body. Despite all Kollar's efforts to persuade the Austrian authorities to allow the creation of such a body he was unable to get them to give their permission. It was in fact not until 1863 that the Constitution of the Matica Slovenska was finally approved by the authorities and it could be established in Turčianský Svätý Martin.

It was intended to encourage the publication of works in the new Slovak literary language, as well as to develop and enrich its vocabulary. Many other peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, notably the Serbs and Croats, already possessed such institutions, and they had played a very important role in the National Revivals that many of these peoples had undergone. In the twelve years of its existence the Matica Slovenska was active in the field of literature, linguistics, history, science and folklore. It provided both a focus for Slovak national aspirations and helped to compensate for the lack of any national political bodies, which at the time the Slovaks did not have and the creation of which would

hardly have been allowed by the Austrian authorities.

The Slovak national movement began to stir once again. After 1859 a small group of Slovaks under the leadership of Ondrej Radlinský and Jan Bobula sought to orientate Slovak policy towards the Liberal Party and such Hungarian liberal politicians as Deák and Eötvös with whom they sincerely believed they could reach an understanding, an understanding that would guarantee some sort of linguistic and cultural rights for the Slovaks. This was the beginning of the so-called "New School" policy (see Chapter Three).

Such a view was vehemently opposed by J.M. Hurban. He considered the liberalism of the afore-mentioned Hungarian politicians as merely a mask to fool public opinion and trick the nationalities into supporting them in the elections to the Provincial Diet. In these elections not a single Slovak candidate was successful. Furthermore, the Magyars had completely reasserted themselves in the county assemblies and the majority of Slovak officials had been dismissed. Hurban's views were thus in fact motivated by very sound fears. In order to try and remedy the situation he drew up a list of Slovak demands in the form of a memorandum which he presented to the Ministry of the Interior in Vienna in 1861. Apart from demands for national equality, public schooling, the right to form various types of associations whether literary, cultural, industrial or economic, the most important feature of this Memorandum was the demand for the area inhabited by the Slovaks to form a separate constituent province of the Empire. It was to have its own Diet, educational system and an independent Evangelical Church. This marked the beginnings of the Memorandum movement and most of these demands were incorporated in the Memorandum of the Slovak Nation drawn up and presented at a mass meeting of several thousand Slovaks in Turčianský Svätý Martin on the 6th and 7th June 1861. The most important difference between this and Hurban's version was that it demanded the creation of a separate Slovak autonomous territory (okolie) within Hungary

whose territorial integrity it respected. In spite of opposition, primarily from the "New School", the demand for the creation of the okolie was included, and in order to demonstrate the loyalty of the Slovaks to Hungary it was agreed that the Memorandum should be presented to the Hungarian Diet. The then premier, Kálmán Tisza, turned it over to the Nationalities Committee which was composed predominantly of Magyars. There it was quietly forgotten and thus suffered the same fate as the Slovak demands of 1848-49. It was, however, far less inclusive than these earlier demands, as it contained very few demands such as greater civil rights and was primarily concerned with guarantees of Slovak individuality and identity. A further attempt was made to achieve this goal when, in December 1861, a Memorandum containing the two main demands for the recognition of Slovak nationhood and the creation of a separate Slovak territory was presented to the Emperor Franz Joseph. He passed it on to the Reichsrat from where it eventually found its way back to the Magyar authorities who denounced it as an act hostile to the integrity of Hungary. It was thus of no more avail than all those memoranda which had preceded it.

Vienna refused to listen to Slovak demands and the policies of the "New School" were finally shown to be bankrupt by the events of 1874-75 when the Matica Slovenská and the last three Slovak gymnasia were closed by order of the Hungarian Government for allegedly anti-Magyar pan-Slav agitation. From now on there seemed to be only two directions in which Slovak national aspirations could be directed, towards the Historic Lands and the Czechs or towards Russia and the Russians. And these represent two distinct trends in Slovak political thought which we can see recurring in the 1890s, on the one hand with Masaryk and the Hlasists, and on the other in the somewhat "messianic" ideas of Svetozár Hurban-Vajanský (1847-1916).

The third alternative, which was to quietly continue the work of Stur,

especially in publishing and education, was also practised. And in spite of the great pressure of Magyarization Slovak national life and national consciousness still survived. It is precisely as a measure of the correctness of Stúr's ideas that we can see that the only way for the Slovaks to develop a modern nationalism was to develop and extend the use of their own language in all possible fields (just as the Magyars and Czechs had done earlier). This was something which could not be done by adopting a language, however close and understandable it might be, which was felt to be alien to the broad mass of the people.

By 1875, in spite of Magyarization, the closure of Slovak gymnasia and the Matica Slovenska and the failure of the Memorandum movement to extract any concessions at all from either Vienna or Budapest, Slovak national consciousness was well on its way towards being formed. Indeed it continued to develop, often in very quiet and unobtrusive ways, right up until 1918.

(4) 1875-1914

This period is characterized by several continuing trends in Slovak life. Firstly, the pressure of Magyarization increased. 1879 marked the introduction of a law making Magyar a compulsory subject in elementary schools, and no teacher was allowed to teach if he were ignorant of the Magyar language¹¹. The closure of the last three Slovak gymnasia in 1874 meant that Slovaks would have to go abroad, either to Vienna, Budapest or Prague, in order to gain further education, the lack of which in the Slovak language meant that it was now easier for the Magyars to win over and assimilate a large number of the Slovaks. This was indeed the avowed intention of the Hungarian authorities (vide Bela Grunwald's book A felvidek, first published in 1878).

Secondly, the minority status of the Slovaks in Hungary was further

weakened by increased emigration, especially to the USA. This may be seen from the fact that, whilst the Magyar population increased by 40.9% from 1867 to 1900, the increase registered by the Slovaks was only 11.6%¹². This gives some indication of the low level of both agriculture and industry in Hungary, in that they were both unable to keep pace with the natural increase in population¹³. From 1900 to 1910, however, if Hungarian statistics are to be at all trusted, the Slovak population showed an absolute decline from 2,002,165 to 1,946,537¹⁴.

Political life in Slovakia, which had reached its nadir by 1875, remained fairly inactive after the failure of the Slovak candidates in the 1881 elections. The Slovak National Party, whose programme was based on the 1861 Memorandum, decided to boycott the elections in 1884, a policy which they maintained for the next ten years. In 1894 the Slovak National Party joined the newly-organized People's Party of Count Zichy, which they left again in 1905. After their lack of success in 1896, 1901 and 1905 they succeeded in getting four candidates elected to the Hungarian Diet in 1906 and three in 1910.

During the 1890s the influence of T.G. Masaryk and his ideas on certain Slovak students studying in Prague led to the founding of a new newspaper Hlas, which was to be published in Skalica in Slovakia. The Czecho-Slovak Union (Jednota) had been founded the year before to propagate the idea of Czecho-Slovak unity. At first this organization was firmly supported by Slovak politicians Svetozar Hurban Vajanský and Martin Dula, but relations between Martin and Prague soon cooled. At the same time in Slovakia the young priest Andrej Hlinka was beginning his organizational activity among the Slovak peasantry. He became active in Zichy's People's Party and in 1898 stood as parliamentary candidate for the Ružomberok constituency, but lack of support caused him to fail. From that time on he began his efforts to found his own Slovak People's Party, which finally

broke away from Count Zichy's party after the 1905 elections.

The massacre of Černova occurred in 1907, when the Hungarian gendarmerie fired on a crowd of villagers who were attempting to prevent the consecration of a church in Hlinka's birthplace without Hlinka being present (having previously been suspended). More than a dozen people were killed, over sixty were injured, and in addition a savage political trial was instigated against eighteen of the villagers, which resulted in heavy fines and quite severe sentences¹⁵. This incident helped to draw world-wide attention to the "Slovak" question. Among those who became interested in the Slovaks were Henry Wickham Steed, R.W. Seton-Watson, Ibsen, Björnson, and the French academic Ernst Denis, all of whom played an important role in the struggle for Czech-Slovak independence from 1914 to 1918.

It should not be forgotten that during this period Slovak cultural life still managed to survive and was in many aspects quite active, especially in the fields of literature and the press. In 1881 Vajanský began to republish Slovak views (Slovenské pohľady), and cultural organizations such as the women's organization Živena, among others, were quite active. In addition to this Slovak workers in Bratislava and Budapest were beginning to organize themselves into unions in order to press their demands, often in conjunction with workers of other nationalities. The Hungarian Social Democratic Party was founded in 1890 and the Slovak party broke away in 1905.

Right until 1914 the pressure of Magyarization was maintained. Numerous Slovak intellectuals were tried and sent to prison and Slovaks were even tried for speaking Slovak in public places. The Slovak language was banished from the railways and other public services and there was a marked effort to Magyarize place names, names of rivers, etc. In 1895 the Bánffy government decreed that all local and state government officials were to

have Magyar names. Slovaks and other non-Magyars could Magyarize their names (and hence be considered as Magyars for official purposes) upon payment of a one-crown fee (10 d.). Count Apponyi's Education Act of 1907 further extended the process of Magyarization in schools.

The outbreak of war in 1914 was not marked by any great demonstration of either anti- or pro-Austro-Hungarian feeling among the Slovaks (understandably so in face of the fear of further Hungarian repressive measures). Slovak politicians adopted a policy of assuming a very low profile and apart from a few ritual declarations of loyalty towards the ruling house (such as Juriga made on the 26th April and 9th December 1915) the Slovaks remained politically very passive. Indeed under the prevailing conditions there was very little else that they could do until the very last months of the war. As was the case in the Historic Lands (but to a greater degree) most of the key events in the struggle for independence which culminated in the creation of an independent Czechoslovakia took place abroad and were thus far more influenced by external factors, such as the attitude of the allies, the course of the war, etc., than by prevailing home conditions. Of these the presence of a large and well-organized Slovak community in the USA was to play a key role.

CHAPTER THREE : THE CZECHOSLOVAK IDEA

The state known as Czechoslovakia which came into being in 1918 as a result of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was essentially a new political unit. Yet the idea which lay behind its creation, the idea that the Czechs and the Slovaks, despite the obvious differences in their political and historical development, were so closely related as to form one cultural and linguistic whole, already possessed a respectable lineage by 1918.

The controversies over the character of the Great Moravian Empire (see Chapter Two) need not detain us here. Like many other transient political units of the time it was not based upon any national or ethnic idea. Contacts between Czechs and Slovaks occurred almost throughout the entire period of their respective histories, but it was not until the 19th century that the Czechoslovak idea began to play an important and serious role in the thinking of Czech and Slovak intellectuals.

The exact nature of the ethnic and linguistic relationship between Czechs and Slovaks is a thorny topic that is best left to anthropologists and linguists. Yet it can still be asserted with a great degree of certainty that the two languages exhibit a markedly high degree of mutual intelligibility, which was undoubtedly a factor in facilitating contacts between the two peoples despite the different political systems they were subject to. Within the context of the Middle Ages and the feudal (ständerstaatlich) nature of society in the various kingdoms and principalities of Central Europe such as Bohemia and Hungary, normal contacts between Czechs and Slovaks took place mainly in the spheres of trade and culture. The

establishment of Charles University in 1348 in Prague was an important factor in this respect. The Hussite raids into Slovakia which took place in the 15th century did not meet with a great deal of success in spreading their religious ideas, but they certainly helped to encourage the use of the Czech language in Slovakia, where it was employed mainly as an administrative language second only to Latin. It was not entirely unknown for many Slovak townspeople, certain members of the ethnically-mixed Hungarian nobility, and even certain persons within the ruling dynasty to have some knowledge of this language. It finally became the literary and liturgical language of the Slovak Protestants who used the Czech-language Kralice Bible (1579-94).

During the Middle Ages and later, before the impact of the ideas of the Enlightenment were felt, national feeling as such was of an entirely different type compared to its 19th century version. It was in most cases based not upon membership of an ethnic or linguistic group but rather on territorial and geographical concepts. One was thus a "Bohemian" or a "Hungarian" irrespective of ethnic origin or mother-tongue. Furthermore political rights were almost exclusively the prerogative of nobility who conceived of themselves alone as constituting the "nation" as opposed to the "rabble" (peasants). They may not have thought of themselves in national (i.e. ethnic or linguistic) terms until after the impact of the Enlightenment as we do not really find any trace of the Czechoslovak Idea during this period.

The re-conquest of Hungary from the Turks marks a convenient turning-point in the history of the growing centralization of power in Austro-Hungary. By the time Joseph II attempted to implement his reforms the position of the Slovaks within Hungary had begun to deteriorate. The resistance of

the Hungarian nobility to the restrictions on their powers and privileges which these proposed reforms seemed to threaten found expression in their determined opposition to this proposal to adopt German as the sole administrative language to be used within his entire domain. German would thus replace Latin in Hungary. The Hungarian nobility, however, were successful in getting Magyar in place of German, although the process by which one replaced the other was a gradual one. It nevertheless meant that native Magyar speakers had a definite advantage in obtaining posts both in central and local administration. Magyar nationalism developed very slowly at first, but even prior to 1848 one can discern the beginning of that strain of xenophobic chauvinistic prejudice that flatly refused to admit that the Slovaks as well as the other nationalities should be allowed any basic cultural rights, such as the use of their own language in secondary and higher education or in local government.

The beginnings of the Czechoslovak Idea are rooted in the same soil from which sprang the ideas of pan-Slavism and Slav reciprocity. These date back to the period of the Enlightenment and the national revivals which followed in its wake and which occurred among most of the peoples of Central and South-Eastern Europe. Slav reciprocity meant that the Slavs were to be considered as one people or nation (národ) that had not yet been differentiated into widely separate and divergent peoples, as had happened in the case of speakers of Germanic and Romance languages. Unlike them, the Slav tongues still retained a greater degree of mutual intelligibility and a closer family likeness than any other language group in Europe. This fact, together with some extremely romantic notions about the youth, vigour and creative energies of the Slavs, led many thinkers to conclude that the future of Europe would be determined by the Slavs.

The Slovak poet Kollár, who however wrote in Czech, and both Bernolák and Štur (see Chapter Two) represent opposite points of view in the question of the ethnic and linguistic affinities of the Slavs. Kollár considered the Slavs as one people (narod) divided into four main branches (kmeny), viz. Russians, Czechs (including Slovaks), Poles, and Illyrians (South Slavs). He thus disapproved of Bernolák's and Štur's efforts to create a separate Slovak literary language, and for several valid reasons. The most important one among them was that he genuinely believed that the Czechs and the Slovaks were but one people, that Slovak was thus but a dialect of Czech, and that the Slovaks were too weak and oppressed to be able to sustain a separate literature and cultural life. Despite his use of Czech, Kollár's poetry was still able to rouse feelings amongst many Slovaks at their low level of material progress and with the poverty of the bulk of the Slovak population.

For Bernolák and later Štur the Slovaks were a separate branch of the Slavs and Slovak was either a dialect of the Slav language, which was Bernolák's view, or else an independent member of the Slav language group. It thus followed that Slovak national life could only be carried out through the medium of the Slovak language. Unlike the Serbs and the Romanians, however, the Slovaks had no state composed of their compatriots which might be able to offer them cultural and material support as was forthcoming from the nominally independent principalities of Romania and Serbia.

During the critical period of 1848-49 both the Czechs and the Slovaks had been equally unsuccessful in their attempts to extract some form of political concessions from the ruling house. Yet if we compare the cultural and material progress that had been achieved in both Slovakia and the Czech Lands between 1848 and the advent of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise (Ausgleich) in 1867, which effectively reorganized the Empire on a dualist

basis, we see that the Czechs had far and away a greater measure of success in renewing and refurbishing their language and adapting to the manifold needs of the modern industrial world as the industrial revolution was beginning to make itself felt in the Czech Lands by the late 1860s.

The Slovaks, however, were unable to obtain any concessions as regards autonomy or cultural rights from the Magyars in spite of the existence of a section of the Slovak political camp, the New School (Nova Skola)¹. It sought to wean Slovak policy away from dependence on the idea of Slav reciprocity and the goodwill of the sovereign in Vienna, to whom deputations of Slovaks would address their various pleas and memoranda. The members of this group thought that, in return for a definite expression of loyalty to the Crown of St. Stephen, the Magyars would be prepared to grant the Slovaks some concessions, such as the guaranteed use of Slovak by the administration in the courts and schools of those areas, where the majority of the population spoke no other language. The Nationalities Statute of 1868 seemed to contain such linguistic provisions, but not only did it remain a dead letter, as the provisions it foresaw were never carried out, it also started out with the assertion that all Hungarian citizens irrespective of nationality* formed part of the indivisible and unitary Hungarian nation. The version of the draft bill that was adopted and passed by the Diet was, thus, in direct contradiction to the version that had been drawn up by the Romanian and Serbian deputies, and which demanded recognition of the various nationalities* of Hungary as nations in their own right, equal rights, and a measure of linguistic and territorial autonomy. None of these demands were met.

* Here C.J.C. Street in his short work Slovakia - Past and Present, London 1928, misses the point when he writes that had this measure been adopted it would have satisfied all Slovak demands. Demands for territorial autonomy such as were made in 1848-49 inevitably meant legal recognition of Slovak nationality which this measure completely denied.

** The nationalities were grossly under-represented in the Hungarian Diet in proportion to their numbers. The Slovaks alone would have been entitled to over forty deputies, whilst they had never succeeded in electing more than seven, although the number of Slovak candidates was almost always greater than this. The following figures from the 1910 Hungarian Census give an idea of the numerical composition of the Hungarian population:

<u>Nationality</u>	<u>Absolute figures</u>	<u>%</u>
Magyars	9,944,627	54.5
Romanians	2,948,186	16.1
Slovaks	1,946,357	10.7
Germans	1,903,357	10.4
Sorbs and Croats	656,234	3.6
Ruthenes	464,270	2.5
Others	401,412	2.2
Total	18,264,443	100.0

Historically the Czechs first began to show an interest in the Slovaks during the period when the Czech language was being successfully revived and developed in the face of the entrenched position of German, which was still the main language of administration, culture, commerce, and education, during the first half of the 19th century in the Czech Lands. The Slovaks were seen as the closest Slav group to the Czechs and a bridge that linked them with the Russians on whose support the Czech revivalists wished to believe they could count. The weakness of both Czechs and Slovaks, compared to the stronger position of German and Magyar culture and language, was often one of the arguments that were put forward in order to discourage those Slovaks who sought to create a separate Slovak literary language. Some Czech thinkers argued that they needed the Slovaks in order to form a

stronger unit of some seven to eight millions which would be better equipped to face up to the cultural dangers of Germanization, which the large German minority in the Czech Lands, backed by the cultural resources of Germany, represented.

Many a young Slovak, dismayed at the conditions under which his people were living, saw in the progress that the Czechs were making during the 19th century a worthy object of admiration and a source of help. This sentiment was especially strong among those Slovaks who chose to go to the Czech lands in order to complete their education. Similar sentiments of admiration for the unity of Czechs and Slovaks and their close relationship to all Slavs were expressed in a book written by J. M. Hurban in 1839², in which the author, a young Slovak, describes his experiences and impressions of life in the Czech Lands during a visit he made there.

As the position of the Czech language grew more secure and the Czechs made advances in most economic and social spheres, so the development of Czech politics seemed to move away from the idea of the basic cultural unity of Czechs and Slovaks, the latter having traditionally been considered a branch of the Czech nation, and towards a more political interpretation of the rights of the Czech nation, based on the old laws and rights of the Bohemian Kingdom. Such arguments, utilising a historic rights approach, could not make any claims for the inclusion of the Slovaks in any autonomous or independent political unit with the Czechs. To have done so would have meant denying the right of the Magyars to retain Slovakia on the very same grounds of historical rights (historické právo) as were used by the Czechs to claim the restoration of "Bohemia" within its ancient boundaries. Undoubtedly the success of Štúr's linguistic "schism", as many Czechs and even some Slovaks (among them Šafařík and Kollar) termed the former's creation of an independent Slovak literary language, had dampened the enthusiasm for the Slovak cause which had earlier gripped many Czechs (Slovakia in fact

received very little attention from Czech politicians at home even during the First World War³). They were simply incapable of understanding the seeming stubbornness with which the numerically tiny and weak Slovak intelligentsia clung to the use of this new language in spite of the growing dangers of Magyarization.

T. G. Masaryk's impact on Czech political life was quite considerable, but he had a great effect on political developments in Slovakia too. In his work as Professor of Philosophy at Charles University he had among his pupils a number of Slovaks who were influenced by his ideas and sought to implement them in Slovakia, adapting them to suit Slovak conditions.

The existence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a state was all the then Czech politicians accepted unreservedly. Likewise during the first half of the century the Czech historian Palacký, during the troubled period of 1848-49 at the Slav Congress held in Prague, did urge the re-creation of an autonomous Czech district within the framework of Austria in its historic boundaries to which all those sixteen counties in Northern Hungary that were inhabited by Slovaks should be attached⁴. Here we can see in embryo the final form that the new state took in 1918. What Masaryk in his programme did stress was the fact that political advances such as the gradual enlargement of the franchise and the wider use of Czech in public life should rest on a solid base of advances in health care, literacy, and the general social welfare of the mass of the population. This policy of steady, small and solid advances (drobna práce) found ready adherents, among them Vavro Šrobár. He, together with other Slovak students, was eventually able to publish a newspaper that first appeared in June 1898 entitled The Voice (Hlas) which sharply attacked conditions in Slovakia and other Slovak political groups, whilst at the same time promoting Masaryk's ideas.

The establishment in Prague on the 7th May 1896 of a Czechoslovak Union (Československá jednota), whose aims were to strengthen Czech-Slovak unity and to support the cultural and economic development of Slovakia, was at first welcomed by the Martin group of the Slovak National Party. They soon withdrew their support, however, in view of their suspicions about the ideas and activities of Masaryk's pupils (called "Hlasists"), whose newspaper soon began to adopt a hyper-critical attitude towards them.

The latter group were led by the Protestant poet Svetozár Hurban-Vajanský, who believed that Slovakia could only progress when it had been liberated through a change in the world balance of power. In other words he believed in the liberating mission of the Russian Tsar, who together with national liberation would bring cultural, social, and economic progress to Slovakia. This point of view was diametrically opposed to Masaryk's idea of drobná práce, of which this group were most suspicious. Their suspicions were not so much motivated by the ideas themselves as by two factors not directly linked to this policy. These were the idea that was inherent in the concept of Czech-Slovak unity, that the Slovaks were but a branch (větev) of the Czech nation (narod) and Slovak was but a dialect of Czech. Thus they feared that there would once again be attempts made to persuade them to cultivate the use of Czech as their literary language. Secondly they may well have seen in the barrage of criticism directed against them in the columns of Hlas an attempt to exploit the discontent that their policy of political passivity, as seen in their boycott of election to the Diet in 1879, 1881, 1884, and 1887, aroused in Slovakia, and to replace their influence by that of the Hlasists. The latter would then be able to propagate their ideas without opposition from this group.

Another group of politicians within the National Party who were opposed to Masaryk's ideas were the Slovak Catholics under the leadership of Andrej

Hlinka, the vicar of Ruzomberok. He had been co-operating closely with Count Zichy's Hungarian People's Party since 1895, but his defeat in supplementary elections to the Diet in 1898 was eventually to lead him to try to organize his own clerical party, although such a party did not really come into existence until after 1918. His disagreement with Masaryk's pupils, apart from the vexed question of Czechoslovak unity, was not so much about the content of Masaryk's ideas but rather the progressive and secular spirit that motivated them. Hlinka himself had been undertaking work of a very similar nature among the Slovak peasantry for some time. He established various types of co-operative associations, temperance societies, reading circles, and institutions to provide cheap credit facilities. All his efforts to raise the cultural, moral and physical level of the Slovak peasants who comprised his flock, were imbued with a deep desire to preserve them in their simple and pious Catholic faith. He was therefore deeply distrustful of Masaryk's ideas, as they were rooted more in humanistic values than in religious ones. He saw in them the dangers of a corrosive influence that if it were allowed to operate in Slovakia unchallenged and unchecked might succeed in alienating Catholics from their faith. The fact that the Slovak Protestants seemed in the main to form the bulk of those who supported the idea of Czechoslovak unity must also have aroused his suspicions. Despite their agreement to use Slovak as their literary language, the traditions of the Czech language and the Czech Kralice Bible were still strong among them. This may in part explain their stronger identification with the Czechoslovak Idea and their preponderance among the ranks of its supporters.

It should be stressed that there were other reasons why Slovak Protestants played such a disproportionate role in the Czechoslovak independence movement. Firstly the Catholic Church in Hungary was heavily Magyarized and it was thus almost impossible for a nationally-conscious Slovak to rise to a position

of any importance in the Church hierarchy. Secondly, as Protestant clergy were allowed to marry, their children were very often given a good education and brought up to be conscious and proud of their own language and people. As we have seen, however, not all Protestants were pro-Czechoslovak and it was almost invariably dependent on the particular individual as the Hlasists were drawn from both denominations.

Masaryk's energetic defence of the Jews and his exposure of the absurd nature of the "blood libel" (based as it is upon a total ignorance of Jewish religious law) at the time of the Hilsner case, when a Jew (Hilsner) was accused of murdering a Christian girl-child in order to obtain her blood, deemed by ignorant Christians to be necessary for the baking of the Passover unleavened bread (Matzo), may also have aroused his suspicions. Not because Hlinka himself either believed this or thought it to be of any consequence, but rather because he may have thought that Masaryk had failed to realize that, in Slovakia, the Jews were almost exclusively identified with the Magyars and were excessively chauvinistic to the point of being more papal than the Pope, whilst a number of them were engaged in occupations such as money-lending and tavern-keeping that Hlinka saw, rightly or wrongly, as being partly responsible for the poor living conditions of the Slovak peasants. In his view a certain amount of, if not open anti-Semitism, than at least a carefully nurtured distrust of Jews might well prove effective in weaning the peasants away from their harmful influence. Here for once the Hlasists were of roughly the same opinion.

Masaryk however never formulated a systematic concept of what the Czechoslovak Idea would entail. In the pre-war period with the notable exception of Palacký (see page 48) it was mainly confined to the ethnic and linguistic sphere and did not have the additional connotation of a common state for Czechs and Slovaks.

The political implications were then not readily apparent and the basic idea of a unitary Czechoslovak people, and possibly language, did not receive such a sharp definition at the time. Masaryk did not attach a great deal of importance to the language issue. He did not object to the Slovaks using their own language, which he later considered an archaic dialect of Czech⁵. Many people considered the Slovaks to be more Slav and thus less Germanized than the Czechs although it is difficult to attach any exact meaning to these two terms.

During the First World War the Czechoslovak resistance movement led by Masaryk gradually came to the conclusion that the future interests of Czechs and Slovaks would best be served by the creation of a new state comprising the Czech Lands and Slovakia. Masaryk's concept was essentially based on the argument of a people's natural right to self-determination, although there was an element of historic rights in the delineation of the boundaries of the new state. The will of the majority of Bohemia's inhabitants, however, clashed with that of the German minority, who in their turn were to claim the right to national self-determination in 1918-19. The inclusion of the Germans has been seen as the triumph of historic rights over the right to national self-determination. It should, however, be pointed out that the will of the majority of Bohemia's inhabitants (the Czechs) was in favour of the creation of an independent Czechoslovakia in which the Slovaks could also be included on the basis of their right of national self-determination, expressed in their desire to live in a common state with the Czechs.

In seeking to explain their case to the Allies it was necessary to impart a more political hue to the Czechoslovak Idea and stress the essentially unitary nature of relations between Czech and Slovak. Thus one spoke of the Czechoslovaks as being one people with two distinct branches and two

very similar languages. This was done not only in order to make it possible to claim the creation of Czechoslovakia on the grounds of the right to national self-determination, or because the Allies knew very little about either Czechs or Slovaks and would have been confused had there been an attempt to explain the exact character of relations between the two peoples, but also because most of the members of the movement, both Czechs and Slovaks, genuinely believed that they constituted one nation and that the need to display national unity and present a united front was paramount. This last consideration also applied when the Republic had already been established for two of its neighbours, Poland and Hungary, were unfavourably disposed towards the new state. Furthermore, during the first few years of its existence the political leaders of the German minority refused to recognize it, maintained a very negative attitude towards its very existence, and refused to co-operate in any way with the Central Government.

One can thus understand why the state was basically a unitary one which did not provide any formal recognition of the autonomy or separateness of any one of its constituent parts, i.e. Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, or Slovakia. The need for national unity, both during and after the successful struggle for national liberation, in the minds of Czechs and Slovaks alike far outweighed the demands on the part of a few Slovaks for some recognition of Slovakia's nationhood or separateness (svojbytnost').

The American Slovaks⁶, who by 1925 numbered some 700,000⁷, were organized in various associations, of which the most important were the Slovak League, which was non-religious, the various Catholic unions, the Evangelical unions, Gymnasti (Sokol), and women's unions of both denominations. The Protestants numbered some 12% of the total number of Slovaks in the USA. The financial and cultural support which these organizations were able to give to their compatriots in Slovakia before 1918 was an important factor in helping to

stave off the worst effects of the Magyarization policies of the Hungarian Government.

Masaryk was able to utilize the support of the American Slovaks and Czechs in his struggle for Czechoslovak independence (see Chapter Four). It is questionable to what extent Slovaks in North America were aware of the wider ramifications of his version of the Czechoslovak Idea, for the various agreements (both of Cleveland and Pittsburgh) were primarily intended to influence the cause of the struggle for national liberation and could not be taken as committing the Slovaks in Slovakia to any form of autonomy that they may not have wished.

It is significant, in view of the later hysteria and accusations of bad faith that were thrown at Masaryk and Benes [✓] for allegedly conspiring to withhold from Slovakia the autonomy that was promised to her by virtue of the Pittsburgh Agreement (see Chapter Four), that during the period 1918-20 when the Constitution of the Republic was being drawn up not even those Slovak politicians who were members of Hlinka's People's Party saw fit to protest against the fact that no autonomy was envisaged for Slovakia. Neither did they object to the fact that the underlying concept of the state and the nation (in other words the Czechoslovak Idea) was basically a unitary one. When opposition to the Prague Government arose and the slogan of autonomy was first proclaimed it was clearly for political reasons. It did not reflect a widespread desire on the part of the majority of the Slovak population, whose discontent was caused by a whole range of social and economic factors.

The place of the Slovaks and Slovakia in the different versions of the Czechoslovak Idea⁸ that existed during the First Republic is an important theme in the history of this period. Unfortunately Slovaks seemed to judge the Central Government and its policies ~~far~~ more by its attitude to the vexed

question of Slovak nationhood and its recognition than by the solid results and successes of its policies from 1918-38 (especially in the field of education). Despite those material gains which might have been expected to strengthen the state and the Slovaks' attitude towards it, the question of Slovak national feeling was left unrecognized and unsolved during the entire lifetime of the First Republic.

CHAPTER FOUR: SLOVAKIA, THE WORLD WAR AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
INDEPENDENCE 1914-1918.

The outbreak of war in August 1914 was not greeted by any spontaneous manifestations of either pro- or anti-Habsburg feeling among the Czech and Slovak inhabitants of the Empire. A sombre mood prevailed; the departure of Czech and Slovak units to the Russian front often became the focal point for the singing of pro-Russian and pro-Entente songs, proof that a feeling of pan-Slav solidarity still existed amongst the Slav subjects of the House of Habsburg. The Magyars and Germans by contrast greeted the news of war with cries and shouts of joy and enthusiasm. Political activities were voluntarily stopped and both Czech and Slovak representatives in the Diet made ritual declarations of loyalty to the ruling dynasty. Such actions, however, were of little avail for the first desertions en masse of Czech troops to the Russians unleashed a wave of repressive measures and persecutions throughout the Empire, although in Slovakia the situation was even worse. Slovakia was chronically under-represented in the Hungarian Diet, its people were far poorer than in the Historic Provinces, their national consciousness was weaker whilst the pressures of Magyarization were much stronger than the corresponding pressures of Germanization to which the Czecha had been subjected in the Historic Provinces. It was therefore far less possible for the few political leaders that Slovakia had at the time to undertake any measures of either active or passive resistance against the Austro-Hungarian war effort. Hence, the main centres of Czech and Slovak resistance lay abroad in neutral and Entente countries, where, ever since the first hostilities, Czechs and Slovaks had been organizing propaganda campaigns and attempting to form military units within the Allied armies.

An important element in the struggle against the Habsburgs was the presence in different parts of the world of sizable Czech and Slovak communities,

of which the largest and best organized were to be found in the United States. The American Slovaks had been of great help in the last two decades of the last century to their compatriots back in Slovakia, not only by remitting money but also by sending books and newspapers printed in the United States in the Slovak language. This helped them to keep alive the idea of Slovak national identity at a time of intensified Magyarization. These communities were to play a vital role in the struggle for an independent Czechoslovak state.

As early as August 1914 groups of Czechs and Slovaks who resided outside the frontiers of Austro-Hungary began to organize some sort of resistance to the war effort of the Central Powers. In Paris, where there was a small colony of Czechs and Slovaks among whom may be counted the famous Slovak astronomer and aviator Štefánik, a Czech National Council was formed. The largest number of Czechs and Slovaks (after the USA) were to be found in the Russian Empire, and it was not therefore wholly unexpected that the Tsarist authorities would attempt to utilize such pan-Slav sentiments as these groups manifested in their war propaganda. Various manifestos, composed in all the languages of Austro-Hungary and issued in St. Petersburg, circulated among the non-German and non-Magyar sections of the Austro-Hungarian population and promised them liberation at the hands of the victorious Tsarist armies, whose early advances and gains were, however, soon reversed. The formation of units of Czech and Slovak volunteers to be attached to the Imperial Russian Army and called Družina was allowed.

The first meeting of Czechs and Slovaks took place in St. Petersburg on the 28th August 1914. This congress, as it was termed, announced the autonomy of Slovakia on the basis of common co-operation, and further resolved to struggle for the formation of a Czechoslovak Army to fight at the side of the Allied forces. In these first bursts of activity the place of Slovakia in the plans that were being advanced was understandably vague, as were most, if not all, of the plans themselves. However, given the first

wild hopes that those early Russian military victories engendered and the Russophile feelings of such Czech politicians as Karel Kramář, it is possible to understand the idea that the future state, be it Czechoslovak or Bohemian, would be a monarchy, very probably with a Romanov on the throne. This was a constant demand of those Czecho-Slovak units formed in Russia around March 1915. They were generally considered to be among the most conservative elements of the Czechoslovak movement for national liberation (zahraniční odboj). The vast majority of their members had been living in Russia for some years and many of them had naturally fallen under the more conservative influences of Tsarist political life.

In the West Masaryk had been active from the time of his first meeting with Seton-Watson in a hotel room in Rotterdam in neutral Holland in November 1914. At this meeting they discussed the war situation in general, as well as the prospects for the Czechoslovak independence movement. Shortly afterwards Masaryk escaped from Prague and eventually made his way to London where he was offered a teaching post at London University. A Memorandum entitled Independent Bohemia was handed to the then head of the Foreign Office Sir Edward Grey in April 1915. This Memorandum outlined Czechoslovak aims and suggested the creation of an independent Bohemian kingdom embracing Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and the Slovak districts of Northern Hungary. The value of such a new state to the Allies would lie primarily in its position in the middle of Europe, for together with other similarly new, renewed or enlarged states it would form part of a barrier to any pan-Germanic expansion to the East or South-East.

Slovakia is accorded very brief treatment in this work. The essence of Masaryk's views were contained in a few lines - "The Slovaks are Bohemians in spite of their using their dialect as their literary language. The Slovaks also strive for independence and accept the programme of union with

Bohemia"¹. This view remained essentially unchanged during the whole of Masaryk's life and is easily understood in the light of his family background. That side of Slovak national feeling which dates back as far as Bernolák (see Chapter Two), who considered the Slovaks to be a separate people and the direct descendants of the original Slav settlers of Slovakia, and is best typified by L'udovit Stur and his struggle to create a separate Slovak literary language, was entirely foreign to Masaryk. It is thus understandable that he should not have accepted such a clear-cut distinction between Czechs and Slovaks (and their respective languages), as was made by those Slovaks, who felt themselves to be a separate people from the Czechs (although still closely related to them), who possessed a different tradition and a historical development that was in many ways dissimilar to that which had occurred in the Historic Lands. The pressures of war and the need to present a united front in the independence struggle meant that these differences could not be over-stressed. Those western leaders with whom Masaryk, Benes and Stefanik had to deal had little sense of Central European history and would doubtless have been very confused had there been an attempt to portray the somewhat complex relationship that existed between Czechs and Slovaks (as well as the various interpretations of what this entailed) in the context of the simplistic but vitally necessary task of propagating the need to destroy Austro-Hungary and liberate her oppressed peoples. The feelings and opinions of Slovaks and their political leaders at home in Slovakia could not of course be accurately ascertained, and so it was the American Slovaks, being the largest and most well organized colony, who became the mouthpiece for their compatriots in Slovakia.

The first event of major importance in the United States was the signing of the Cleveland Agreement of the 22nd October 1915. The text of this agreement² was allegedly prepared by the Czech National Federation (Sdruzeni ceskych organizaci) and agreed to without alterations by members of the Slovak League (Slovenska liga). The agreement stipulated:

- 1) The autonomy of both the Historic Lands and Slovakia.
- 2) The union of the Czech and Slovak peoples (národa) in a federative union of states, which complete autonomy for Slovakia, her own parliament (snem), her own civil service, complete cultural freedom as well as full rights for the use of Slovak, and her own financial and political administration with Slovak as the official language.
- 3) Electoral rights: universal, secret and direct.
- 4) Form of government: a personal union with a democratic state organization (sriadenim) as in the United Kingdom.
- 5) These points form the basis for mutual agreement and may be enlarged or extended only on the basis of the mutual consent of both sides. The Czech National Federation reserves the right to make any appropriate changes as does the Slovak League.

Cleveland Ohio 22nd October, 1915.

The thinking behind the actual formulation of the text betrays a great concern for guarantees to ensure the autonomy of Slovakia, to the point of envisaging a kind of confederation to be written into the main body of the text. This leads one to believe that the text of the Agreement was identical to that of a Memorandum which the Slovak League was preparing just before the start of the War and which was to be presented to President Wilson and to circulate among foreign political leaders and diplomats. The references to "a personal union as in England" are very vague and imprecise. Obviously this arrangement is to some extent modelled on that of the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich of 1867. Yet one cannot tell

from the text whether this basis for regulating the relationship between the Historic Lands and Slovakia is in the context of an independent Czecho-Slovak state or within the bounds of a renewed and reformed Austro-Hungary organized and administered as a free confederation of several sovereign peoples. Such was the core of the ideas put forward in A. Popovic's book The United States of Austria, published in 1910.

The concept of a personal union is, however, almost entirely confined to a monarchical system of government, as the institution of a Presidency would be too prone to political instability and lack of continuity for it to function effectively in uniting two or more states in a common unit. At first Masaryk had suggested in his memorandum "Independant Bohemia" that the future Czecho-Slovak state would be a monarchy, yet prior to 1918 however he had changed his mind and come out in favour of a republic (as he himself says in his work "The New Europe") which would have made many of the provisions of the Cleveland Agreement very difficult to enforce.

The following month saw both the inauguration of a regular newspaper called La Nation Tchegue which appeared in Paris under the editorship of Professor Ernest Denis as well as the publication of a declaration, signed by Masaryk and representatives of all the Czech and Slovak organization in Europe and North America. It proclaimed the Habsburgs to have forfeited their right to the Czech throne. The most important feature of this document was that it placed "Bohemia's future" firmly in the hands of the Allies.

The next two years 1916 and 1917 were devoted to attempts to strengthening the propogation of the Czechoslovak cause and to recruiting troops for a Czechoslovak Army in the United States, Canada, France, Italy and the Balkans. In May 1916 Masaryk transformed the Czech National Committee into a National Council with himself as chairman, Benes as General Secretary

and Milan Rastislav Štefánik as the Slovakia's representative, although the latter had lived in France for several years and was a naturalised French citizen.

Masaryk at first welcomed the attempt, made toward the end of 1916, to form an association of all the representatives of the Czech political parties who sat in the Austrian Reichsrat. This association which was located in Prague itself was known as the Czech Union (Český Svaz) and had a smaller National Committee (Narodní Výbor) headed by a veteran politician of the Agrarian party Antonín Švehla. Masaryk's hopes that this organization would pursue overtly anti-Austrian policies were soon to be dashed. The Allied Powers in response to President Wilson's Note asking the belligerents to state their war aims, and said that one of their aims was "the liberation of Italians, Slavs, Rumanians and Czechoslovaks from foreign rule." This was without doubt a great triumph for the Czechoslovak independence movement as the Czechoslovaks (although being Slavs) were specifically mentioned by name.

The response from the Czech Union was a declaration of loyalty to the ruling house. This occurred just before the accession of Emperor Charles on the death of Franz Joseph and could conceivably have been the price that the Czechs had to pay in order to ensure the granting of a royal pardon to two Czech politicians, Alois Rašín and Karel Kramář then under sentence of death for allegedly seditious activities. Shortly afterwards both the Czech Union and its national Committee took part in the coronation ceremonies whilst three Czech politicians Štáněk, Šmerál and Mašálka took advantage of the occasion to publish a letter in which they disassociated themselves from the Allied Note and pledged their loyalty to the new Emperor.

Such reactions may be partially explained part of a wise policy of

keeping "two irons in the fire." The accession of a new Emperor and the abdication of the Tsar combined with the ever-increasing and widespread feeling of war-weariness had increased the chances that Austria would make a separate peace with the Allies. They would then be free to throw the entire weight of their forces against Germany. By April 1917 the United States was also to be counted among Germany's adversaries and a formidable one at that, whose military and economic strength was seriously under-rated by the Germans. In which case Austro-Hungary would have been preserved intact and it would have been a question of Czech and Slovak leaders at home trying to gain as wide a degree of autonomy as possible.

The re-opening of the Austrian Reichsrat on May 30th 1917 gave the leaders of the nationalities the opportunity to make speeches demanding national self-determination and the transformation of the Empire into a free union of national states. The Czech delegates who had been urged into speaking out by the actions of over a hundred Czech writers. They had issued a declaration calling upon their delegates to defend Czech national rights and civil liberties but did not forget to mention Slovakia as well, although the formulation they employed spoke of "the unity of all the branches of the Czechoslovak people in a democratic state; whereby the Slovak branch too should not be omitted."³

In Slovakia the situation during 1917 was still very quiet. Ferdinand Juriga, one of the three solitary Slovak deputies to the Hungarian Diet, had already made two ritual declarations of loyalty to the Hungarian Crown (on 26th April 1915 and again on 9th December 1915) and in his publishing activities which consisted mainly of pamphlets written in Slovak he still called upon Slovaks to support the regime, often appealing to their religious sentiments to do so. We should however not think of his activities as being in any way different from those Czech politicians

who made similar statements at a time when it seemed to be question of saving what one could. When the end of Austro-Hungary was in sight it was again Juriga who spoke out.

The October Revolution had had a great impact on both the conduct of the war and the morale of the combatants and the civilian populations. On the one hand it tended to increase the longing for peace on the part of the war-weary masses to whom the Bolshevik slogans of Bread, Land, and a just peace without indemnities or annexations must have had a certain appeal. On the other hand the virtual collapse of the Russian front meant that the end of the war would be further delayed, as the Germans could now concentrate the bulk of their offensive operations on the Western front, whilst it would still be some time before the United States would be able to put large numbers of men and vast amounts of material into the field. Hence in the last year before the Czecho-Slovak state was established (28th October 1918) the importance of the need for fresh troops in the form of the Czechoslovak legions, that were then in the process of formation and training, grew. With it came the eventual recognition by all the Allied Powers of Masaryk's National Council as the Provisional Government of a soon-to-be-liberated independent Czechoslovakia and the conclusion of various conventions and Agreements between the Allied governments and the Czechoslovak National Council.

Within the Czech Lands and Slovakia the last year of the war was marked by an upsurge in the number of strikes and other disturbances such as food riots and mutinies some of which were brutally repressed. There were successful general strikes, in the Czech Lands in January and in Slovakia in May as well as a declaration on Epiphany (6th January)⁴ by the Czech representatives in the Prague Diet. It demanded the right to independence on the basis of the historical rights of the Czech nation including the Slovak branch. Three other declarations that were of vital importance in

propagating the idea of a single state, which would contain in addition to Czechs and Slovaks substantial national minorities, were also passed in that year. Of these that of Pittsburgh which subsequently became known as the Pittsburgh Agreement (Pittsburghská Dohoda)⁵ was a major bone of contention in the argument between the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, which demanded autonomy on the basis laid down in the Agreement and indeed that this Agreement should be incorporated into the Constitution of the First Republic, and the supporters of the Central Government. There was considerable disagreement between these two sides of the interpretation to be put on the provisions of the Agreement and the extent to which they should or could be held to be binding on the actions and policies of the Central Government. There were in addition lesser controversies surrounding the formulation of the two other declarations. These were the Resolution of the 1st of May in Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš and that of Turčianský Svätý Martin from 30th October 1918.

The Resolution of the 1st of May was passed at a meeting of workers to celebrate the 1st of May in Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš in Slovakia. The text was formulated by Vavro Šrobár who had been one of the founder-members of the "Hlasist" movements (See Chapter Three) and naturally a firm supporter of the idea of Czechoslovak unity. Briefly the text of the resolution demanded the right of national self determination for all nations of Austro-Hungary "including the Hungarian branch of the Czechoslovak people (tedy i uhorskej vetve československého kmeňa)⁶. It has been suggested by one Hungarian revisionist writer Lajos Steier in his work "Ungarns Vergewaltigung" (The Rape of Hungary-Vienna 1928)⁷ that the text was changed to read thus from the original formulation which ran "tedy i uhorskej vetve slovenského kmeňa/národa" which means "and the Hungarian branch of the Slovak (or Slav?) people. This would have been interpreted as meaning that the Slovaks expressed their willingness to remain within Hungary with a certain measure of autonomy. Steier purports to show a copy of the declaration⁸ with the alterations entered by hand in ink, but

it is hard to give credence to his views which are motivated by a wild desire to show that the Slovaks did not wish to break away from their long historical association with the Crown of St. Stephen and were coerced into doing so. The weight of other available evidence fails to corroborate this idea.

On the 20th May shortly after this meeting the Slovak National Party held a conference, which representatives of all the existing political trends (except the Social Democrats) in Slovakia attended, and decided to send to Prague through the medium of the President of the Slovak National Party the following unanimous resolution. "The Slovak National Party stands for the unconditional and unrestricted right to self-determination of the Slovak people and claims on that basis for the Slovak people's their participation in the creation of an independent state, consisting of Slovakia, Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia."⁹ As Hlinka put it so succinctly. "The thousand-year marriage has failed. We must divorce."¹⁰

The previous month April 3rd saw the ceremony of the "National Oath" in Prague led by the veteran Czech writer Alois Jirasek, at which people pledged their allegiance to the future state. The Jubilee of the completion of the National Theatre (16-20th May) provided a further occasion for a demonstration of Czech-Slovak solidarity when a speech by the aged Slovak poet Hviezdoslav won great acclaim. The end of the following month brought the signing of the new famous (or infamous) Pittsburgh Agreement on June 30th.

This Agreement was negotiated during the course of Masaryk's highly successful tour of the United States which did much to bring the Czechoslovak cause to the notice of the American public, at a time when his Czechoslovak had just become involved in clashes with the Bolshevik Red Army. The representatives of Czechs and Slovaks met together in Pittsburgh to discuss the policy they were to adopt on the place of Slovakia in the future

independent Czechoslovak state. The provisions of the Agreement¹¹ were as follows:

Czech-Slovak Agreement concluded in Pittsburgh Pa., 30 May 1918.

The representatives of Slovak and Czech organizations in the United States, The Slovak League, The Czech National Federation and the Union of Czech Catholics discussed in the presence of the president of the Czecho-Slovak National Council Prof. Masaryk the Czecho-Slovak question and the present declarations of our program and concluded the following:

We approve the political program which strives for the union of Czechs and Slovaks in an independent state, consisting of the Czech Lands and Slovakia,

Slovakia is to have its own administration, its own parliament ("snem"), its own courts.

The Slovak language will be the official language in the schools, in the offices and in public life generally.

The Czecho-Slovak state will be a republic, its constitution will be democratic.

The organization of the cooperation of Czechs and Slovaks in the United States will be deepened and altered according to the needs of a changing situation and with the mutual understanding of both sides. Detailed arrangements

("Podrobné usanovenia") on the organization of a Czecho-Slovak state are to be left to the liberated Czechs and Slovaks and their authorized representatives.

Years afterwards this document was to become one of the most powerful weapons in the hands of Hlinka's Slovak People's Party and the central plank of its program of political opposition to the Central Government and its incessant demands for autonomy. It was constantly termed the

Slovak Magna Carta or Bill of Rights by the Autonomists who claimed that it was being denied to the Slovak people by the "Prague centralists" and their supporters in Slovakia.

The truth, however, is a little more complex. Firstly one could not expect a document, drawn up by what were in effect American citizens to be binding on the future actions of Czech and Slovak politicians, actions that to a large extent would have to be dictated by circumstances prevailing at the time and which could not have conceivably been foreseen by the signatories to the Agreement. Secondly Masaryk had good reason to consider this merely "a local understanding as to policy"¹²; concluded in order to appease a small Slovak faction that was dreaming of God knows what sort of independence for Slovakia¹³ as he was undoubtedly worried by the fact that a Hungarian nobleman and politician of allegedly socialist persuasions, Micheal Karolyi, had been visiting the United States in an effort to persuade its government to preserve the territorial integrity of Hungary as well as by other campaigns for an independent Slovakia linked to either, Hungary, Russia, or Poland¹⁴. Masaryk therefore acted in order to ensure that it would be his program for an independent Czechoslovak state that would be seen to have the whole-hearted support of the American Czechs and Slovaks. The last clause of the Agreement, however, which left the final arrangements in the hands of the liberated Czechs and Slovaks themselves, is capable of widely differing interpretations, but it does serve to show that Masaryk did not act in bad faith by signing this agreement. The last clause clearly ensures that the final shape of the future shape and Slovakia's place in it would be decided back in a liberated Czechoslovakia.

Events were moving fast back in the Czech Lands. The National Committee in Prague was reformed on the basis of the relative strength of the parties as represented by the last elections to the Reichsrat in 1911. At first

the Slovaks, who were, if anything, chronically under-represented in the Hungarian Diet (of 453 members), where they only had three deputies instead of at least the forty that their relative share in the Hungarian population should have given them, were only allotted four representatives, but this number was later raised to fifty-six and finally to seventy. The aims of the Committee were in fact to pave the way for an eventual take-over of power from out of the hands of the Austrian authorities. It soon began to function almost as a state within a state. The eventual result of such action meant that the final assumption of authority, which took place in the name of the Czechoslovak Provisional Government, happened smoothly and without any bloodshed.

In Slovakia, however, the existence of a similar body was not revealed until the 19th of October or nine days before the take-over in Prague. One of the three Slovak deputies in the Hungarian Diet Ferdiš Juriga, now spoke out. He had been one of Andrej Hlinka's co-workers in his efforts to raise the cultural and social level of the Slovak peasantry of his diocese and himself had suffered a fine of 1200 crowns (approx. \$48) and two years' imprisonment in 1906 for two articles he wrote in the newspaper Katolicke noviny¹⁵. In his speech to the Diet, which was frequently interrupted by shouts of protest from the Magyar members, he declared that the Slovaks claimed the right to national self-determination and refused to recognise the right of the Magyars to represent Slovakia at the Paris Peace Conference. This right was vested exclusively in the Slovak National council which together with its competent organs was alone empowered to speak in the name of the Slovak people.

Local branches of this body soon sprang up but they lacked both the administrative staff and the military and police arms that were available in the Czech Lands, where a very large number of Czechs who held such positions could be counted upon to support the National Committee when the

time came. In view of this fact and further that the Hungarian military and police authorities remained in power even after the formal proclamation of Czechoslovak independence in Prague on the 28th of October 1918, then it should come as no surprise that the text of the Declaration of Turčianský Svätý Martin should reflect a somewhat cautious note. This Declaration was drafted at a meeting of a number of representatives from the Slovak National Party, Slovak People's Party and the Social Democrats which took place from the 29th - 30th of October.

Briefly this Declaration¹⁶ echoed the demands of Juriga's proclamation of the 19th October, but it also spoke of the "unitary Czechoslovak nation (narod)" living within the bounds of Hungary" and went on to say that "the Slovak people ("narod") were linguistically and cultural-historically a part of the unitary Czecho-Slovak nation. In all the cultural battles which the Czech nation has fought and which have made it famous the world over the Slovak nation too has had its share. "The Declaration further demanded the right to national self-determination for the Czecho-Slovak nation and expressed its agreement with President Wilson's Note of the 18th of October and its acceptance by Austro-Hungary's Foreign Minister Julius Andrassy.

The formulation of the text suggests that the Slovak leaders were unaware of the Allies' intentions and wished to ensure that they would not be consigned to the Hungarians at any Peace Conference by claiming to be an indivisible part of a unitary Czecho-Slovak nation. This formulation is however imprecise as the text in other places speaks of both of a Czech and a Slovak nation. It may merely reflect the speed with which the declaration was drawn up the variety of versions of which there were at least three, and above all, the fact that events were moving too fast for them to keep up.

In connection with this last point many stories have been told in

autonomist publications about the arrival of Milan Hodža from Budapest that evening (30th), with news of the proclamation of the Republic in Prague on the 29th. It is alleged that he deliberately changed the wording of the declaration to read more in favour of the idea of a unitary Czechoslovak nation or alternatively browbeat those delegates present into doing so by threatening that this was the only way in which they could get the Allies to accept their demands. As far as we can tell there is no concrete evidence to support these allegations. All Hodža seems to have done is to have crossed out the clause calling for separate representation for Slovakia at the Paris Peace Conference, as this was not a matter for the central government in Prague, and to have brought the demand for national self-determination into accord with the situation created by Andrassy's acceptance of President Wilson's Note.

Neither does there appear to be any trace of a secret clause in the Declaration, according to the terms of which after a period of ten years the Slovaks would be free to change their minds, if they so desired, about remaining in a common state with the Czechs. Some of the original signatories may have stayed behind to debate various issues, some of which may have arisen out of matters concerned with the Declaration (as is asserted by the publicist and journalist Ferdinand Peroutka in his monumental work Budování Statu) but, as the majority of the delegates had departed by the 31st, those who remained behind could not possibly be considered as being empowered to alter the original Declaration in any way whatsoever.

The most plausible explanation for this legend of a secret clause seems to be that there was a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Slovak National Council on 31st October at which the question of Slovakia's status within Czechoslovakia was discussed and it appears that there was a suggestion that it should acquire autonomy within a set period of time.

The maximum figure of ten years was mentioned. This view is reputedly based on the minutes of this meeting that were never published¹⁷.

Many Declarations and Resolutions had been passed. Many speeches had been made. But this does not alter the fact, however unpalatable it may have been to many Slovaks, that the Slovak National Council was unable, for many good and valid reasons, to carry out a transfer of powers and impose its own authority on Slovakia as had the Czech National Council been able to do in the Czech Lands. The Central Government in Prague had eventually to resort to military force in order to assert its authority over Slovakia and remove the Hungarian armed presence. We shall have to examine this confused and chaotic transition period, which lasted from the end of the War until the middle of the next year, together with events in the western half of the country where the political system was rapidly being evolved in order to determine how and why Slovakia gained a type of administration that was later to attract so much criticism and opposition.

CHAPTER FIVE : CENTRAL GOVERNMENT POLICY IN SLOVAKIA 1918-1929

Introduction

The creation of an independent Czechoslovak state is generally considered as dating from between the 18th and the 28th October. That is, from the time of Masaryk's Declaration of Czechoslovak Independence in Washington on the 18th to the final proclamation of an independent state on 28th October. The later legalistic arguments as to the exact date on which the new state came into being could not however affect in any way the fact that a transfer of power from Austro-Hungarian to Czechoslovak hands happened in the western half of Czechoslovakia yet failed to occur in the eastern half. The reasons why the Slovaks were unable to rid themselves of the former Hungarian officials who had ruled over them will be examined in detail in this chapter.

Section One

The Establishment of Czechoslovak Power in Slovakia 1918-1919

i) Slovakia in 1918

Slovakia in 1918 was in a very poor condition. Four years of war had imposed a great burden on her people in the form of losses in agricultural and industrial production, loss of life on the battlefield and the cumulative effects of tendencies that had been apparent even before the war had begun. Vis-a-vis the Czech Lands Slovakia was economically and educationally weaker, her roads and railways were not as extensively developed and this rendered

communications more difficult and hampered the development of Slovakia's industry. Her agricultural population was proportionally larger than in the Czech Lands¹ (60.6% against 41%)² whilst the distribution of land was very unequal. Just over half the total number of holdings comprised a mere 0.2% of the total area³ whilst at the opposite end of the scale 47.4% of the total area comprised only 0.9% of the total number of holdings⁴.

Life expectancy, infant mortality and adult mortality rates and the rate of population increase (see Table One), all these indices showed that Slovakia was weaker than the Czech Lands. The net increase in population for the Slovaks was only 16%⁵ (279,770)⁶ from 1850-1900 whilst the Magyars registered the astounding figure of 81%⁷. Even if we take the unreliability of Hungarian statistics into account this was an astonishingly small increase. Their excess of live births over deaths in the same period, calculated on the basis of the average natural increase per 1000 inhabitants can be shown to have numbered at least half-a million. The missing 250,000 may be attributed to two main factors.

1. Migration within Hungary and emigration abroad, primarily to the United States.
2. Statistical Magyarization whereby Slovaks allowed themselves for a variety of reasons to be recorded in the census as Magyars. (The test of nationality was based on a rather loose definition of habitual and customary language.)

Bearing these factors in mind we may understand why the number of Slovaks in Hungary showed an absolute decline of 40,774⁸ or 2.3% over the period 1900-1910. (As shown in the Hungarian census figures for 1900 and 1910).

The Industrial Revolution had come to Hungary later than it did to the western half of the Dual Monarchy and thus Hungary still remained far more

agrarian a country. The last twenty to thirty years of the nineteenth century saw an upswing in the pace of industrialization that to a certain extent was deliberately fostered by the Hungarian government. It spent large sums of money in the form of subsidies to various industries, many of which were located in Slovakia. According to the following figures⁹ Slovakia and Ruthenia, containing only 17.1% of the total population of Hungary and 19.3% of its total area, received in the period 1888-1914 33.5% of the total amount of subsidies and 40% of that allocated to the textile industry¹⁰. Both Slovakia and Ruthenia played an important role in Hungary's economy - there were over 25,000 workers employed in the metallurgical industry alone, including the famous Krompachy works in Slovakia which had an annual iron-ore output of over 1 million tons, half of which was exported to Austria¹¹. The following figures may serve to illustrate what proportion of Hungary's industries were located in those areas that were later incorporated into the Republic. Slovakia and Ruthenia together contained:

TABLE TWO

50% of Hungary's timber.
23.6% of her iron.
58.3% of her iron-ore
All the zinc.
54.7% of the manganese ore.
25.0% of her salt.
26.8% of her metallurgical industries.
20% of her wood.
33.7% of her textiles.
93.7% of the paper industry.
19.0% of the stone
27.4% of the wine and beer
18.6% of all mines and factories employing more than
twenty workers.

21.1% of all those employing more than one hundred workers.

17.4% of the total number of industrial enterprises.

Table Three (see Appendix) gives a comparison of industrial production in Czech Lands and Hungary and Slovakia in 1913 which serves to give us an indication of how much of the Republic's industry could be expected to be located in the eastern half of the country. The total number of industrial workers was only 178,677¹³ (227,900 if we include small-scale enterprises, craftsmens workshops etc.¹⁴) whereas it was no less than 1,881,935 in the Czech Lands.¹⁵ Despite the fact that a large number of Slovaks lived and worked outside Slovakia (in 1900 the Census showed that of the 2,019,641 Slovaks in Hungary only 1,416,549 were living in Slovakia)¹⁶ and the relatively high share of Hungary's industries that were located in Slovakia and Ruthenia the area possessed far fewer industrial workers than the Czech Lands. This holds true even when the difference in area and population is taken into account and allowance is made for the many Slovaks who worked in industries located in and around Budapest as well as for the fact that the two areas are being compared on the basis of pre-war data, which does not reflect damage caused to industry in both halves of the country by the war.

Economic factors however are not themselves sufficient to explain the political passivity that Slovak leaders continued to show even after the Republic was established.

ii) The Slovak National Council and the Liberation of Slovakia

The existence of a Slovak National Council (SNR-Slovenská národná rada) was not in fact revealed until the 19 October when the sole Slovak deputy

in the Hungarian Diet Ferdiš Juriga (See Chapter Four) made a fiery speech in which he demanded virtual independence for the Slovaks, refused any longer to recognise the authority of the Diet in Slovak affairs and reserved this right exclusively for the SNR. The Declaration of Turčianský Svätý Martin¹⁷ which took place two days after the transfer of power in the Czech Lands makes it quite clear that it is this body which alone shall possess the right to speak in the name of the Slovak people. Yet by the 4th November, a mere five days later, we find that a Provisional Slovak Government (dočasná slovenská vláda) had been nominated in Prague with Vavro Šrobár at its head. He was sent to Slovakia with a small force of gendarmes to restore order.¹⁸ By the 23rd January 1919 the SNR together with any other bodies¹⁹ were abolished by a Government decree issued in Prague by the Minister with full powers to administer Slovakia (Minister s plnou moci pre správu Slovenska). This decree was dated the 8th January but long before then the SNR had lapsed into inactivity.

The actions of the Central Government were motivated by three main factors viz.

1. The lack of contact between the SNR and the Revolutionary National Assembly (RNS - Revoluční národní shromáždění) in Prague which was mainly due to the confused situation in Slovakia at the time²⁰.
2. The alarming reports emanating from Slovakia that spoke of looting, rioting, armed intervention by Hungarian troops and police, acts of violence against unarmed Slovak civilians as well as the alleged occupation of parts of Slovakia by Hungarian troops.
3. The possibility that the SNR might have entered into direct negotiations with the Hungarian government of Count Karolyi who had come to power after the overthrow of the now discredited government of Count Tisza.

It may be remembered that there were two main wings within the Slovak National Party (Slovenská Národná Strana - SNS) in Martin²¹. One of them was openly suspicious of a pro-Czechoslovak course whilst the other was markedly in favour of such an orientation in Slovak political policy. The first group comprised not only those Slovak Catholics ("clericals") grouped around the leadership of Andrej Hlinka but Protestants as well of whom the most noted was the poet Svetozár Hurban-Vajanský who had always opposed the implementation of Masaryk's ideas and teachings in Slovakia. (See Chapter Three).

The other group consisted principally of the "Hlasists" (See Chapter Three) who even before the war had been drawing closer to the small group of Slovak Social Democrats with whom they found a common cause in the struggle for universal suffrage. Like the Hlasists they too had a pro-Czech-Slovak orientation and thus felt impelled to use the 1st May celebrations to make some sort of demonstration in favour of Czechoslovak unity. This they did by issuing a proclamation that demanded the right to national self-determination for the Slovaks in Hungary. ...

The worries of the Central Government in Prague were not lessened by the fact that early in the month of November the Hungarians had concluded an armistice in Belgrade with the French general Franchet D'esperey. This like a previous armistice concluded in Padua²² left the administration of Hungary in the hands of the former Hungarian authorities²³ and neglected to draw any provisional demarcation line between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The implications of these provisions were not lost on the Czechoslovak authorities who had been anxious to avoid the very situation which had been created by the signing of these armistices. That is they had wished to do nothing that might give Karolyi's regime a legitimate excuse to interfere in Slovakia on the pretext that it was still legitimately part of Hungary. Further grounds

for concern were seen in reports of the establishment in Prešov of an East Slovak Republic by the pro-Hungarian and anti-Czechoslovak separatist Viktor Dvorcsak²⁴ and the opinions of one Dr. Jan Mudron.²⁵ The latter was reported in the Hungarian Press as being the head of a party in Martin that was in favour of Slovak autonomy within the bounds of Hungary whose territorial integrity was to be maintained.²⁶ Hence we can begin to understand the apprehensions that lay behind the Central Government's inclination to attempt to occupy Slovakia militarily and force the Hungarians to withdraw rather than to wait for the final decision of the Paris Peace Conference on the final boundaries between Slovakia and Hungary.

Count Karolyi took great pains to try to disassociate himself, his government and the Hungarian people from the acts of the previous regime.²⁷ He thus would be in a better position to claim that Hungary was no longer the prison-house of the nationalities, but a free and democratic multi-national state where each nationality would have political and territorial autonomy. He could argue that it was the will and desire of all these ethnic groups to remain in close political association with the Magyars. In order to show his sincerity and as a mark of his good faith he was prepared to allow plebiscites to be conducted, in order to demonstrate the truth of his claims.

As Minister for the Nationalities in Karolyi's cabinet he appointed Oscar Jaszi, a Social Democrat and a man of considerable talents²⁸ who had made a special study of the nationalities problem (A nemzetiségi kérdés) in Hungary. Jaszi further possessed the advantages of enjoying the sympathy of certain Slovaks who had got to know him during the struggle for the establishment of a universal and secret franchise in Hungary during the pre-war period.²⁹

This man was now entrusted by Karolyi with the task of solving the nationalities problem in Hungary. To this end he issued a call to the SNR to enter into negotiations with the Hungarian government in order to effect the withdrawal of both Hungarian and Czechoslovak troops from the area and the transfer of the territory thus vacated to the authority of the SNR. Šrobár was filled with apprehension at this move on the part of Karolyi's government for he considered merely a ruse to enable the Hungarians to reassert their control over Slovakia³⁰ and seize as much territory as possible.

At this time a new political institution appeared on the scene which was to have considerable influence on the course of events in Slovakia. This was the Slovak Club, an all-party association comprising all those who had been nominated to represent Slovakia in the Revolutionary National Assembly, a body that had essentially developed from the Czech National Committee. Its main function was to prepare a permanent Constitution.

Unlike the other representatives in RNS the Slovaks were not members of the various clubs or associations of the different political parties but were all grouped together in the Slovak Club. Of its 54 members that were at first allocated to Slovakia a good dozen were Czechs whilst of the Slovaks some thirty were Protestants,³¹ a fact that is treated with a great deal of sinister significance in autonomist literature. The preponderance of Czechs and Slovak Protestants has been seen by them as merely a device to ensure that Slovakia was firmly incorporated in a rigidly centralised Czechoslovakia.

According to R. W. Seton-Watson³² who later spoke to many of the Slovak representatives none of the members of the Slovak Club, even the Catholic ones, disagreed at the time with the measures that the Club undertook.

Although one might have expected the Slovak Protestants and the Czechs to have had a more unreservedly pro-Czechoslovak attitude one cannot close one's eyes to the fact that to a very large extent it was the pressing needs of the moment that decided policy. Hlinka's criticism that the Provisional Slovak Government was neither elected nor nominated by the people³³ is just not valid in view of the objective situation. Neither for that matter was the SNR a popularly elected chosen or nominated body.

The Provisional Slovak Government was of very short duration. Its authority ceased with the establishment of the first Central Government on the 14th November 1918.³⁴ Dr. Šrobár as has already been mentioned was sent to restore order in Slovakia on the authority of RNS. Together with a small number of armed police (Between 50 and 70) and with some two hundred troops at his disposal he began to move onto Slovakia from Skalica, a small town on the Moravian border, where he proclaimed the establishment of the Czechoslovak state on the 6th November.³⁵ He was then recalled to Prague³⁶ and the occupation of Slovakia by Czechoslovak forces proceed very slowly. There was a lack of arms, only a small number of men available and the state of their morale³⁷ was low as they had not expected to have to fight again once the armistice had been signed.

In an effort to reach some understanding with the Prague government over the question of Slovakia, Karolyi sent a representative to Prague. He arrived on 7th November³⁸ but the negotiations into which he entered with the central government were unsuccessful and were soon broken off. By the 11th November Karolyi's government issued a proclamation in Budapest protesting against what it termed the Czech invasion and declaring its determination to maintain the frontiers of Hungary by armed force if necessary. Military preparations were also undertaken and part of the reserves were mobilised as well as artillery and armoured units.³⁹

These preparations had their desired result. The Czechoslovak units were forced back and there was heavy fighting for the town of Trnava which was located in the centre of a rich grain-growing area. It had a large unrequisitioned stocks of grain that belonged to rich Hungarian owners of large estates and these were an important source of future food supplies.⁴⁰ Trnava was re-captured from the Hungarians around the 24th November and this action was necessitated by the large number of wagon loads of grain and other supplies that the Hungarians were beginning to transport to Hungary.⁴¹

All the Slovak representatives in RNS protested strongly against the Hungarian attack,⁴² declaring that there could be no question of a foreign (Czech) invasion of Slovakia as it was an internationally recognised part of the CSR. Furthermore the Czech troops were carrying out the instructions of the Provisional Slovak Government. The Slovak deputies also pointed to the participation of Slovak troops in Czechoslovak military operations as an expression of their right to national self-determination.⁴³ Two declarations to the Slovak people were issued, one in order to stop the flood of false rumours that were circulating among the Czech troops about the reasons for these military operations in Slovakia⁴⁴ and the other to assure the Slovaks of Czech feelings of love for their Slovak compatriots and their fraternal help in liberating themselves from the Magyars.⁴⁵

The Slovak delegates also took the step of declaring that in view of the creation of a Czechoslovak Government and the opening of RNS the authority of SNR had passed to RNS and the Czechoslovak Government. Furthermore the SNR could not enter into negotiations nor assume any political power (státní moc). The members of the Slovak Club declared however that they would have no objections if the Czechoslovak ambassador in Budapest, Dr. Emil Stodola, the President of the Slovak Club, Matus Dula and a Slovak member

of the RNS Dr. Milan Hodža were to open negotiations with the Hungarian Government on the question of the withdrawal of their forces from Slovakia. There could be no question of a withdrawal of Czech troops.⁴⁶

The SNR could not have exercised any authority anyway as its President M. Dula, who had been elected President of the Slovak Club thanks to the efforts of Srobar who apparently had decided to ignore the SNR entirely and had chosen this method of transferring its authority to the Club,⁴⁷ had been arrested by the Hungarians when they occupied Turčianský Svätý Martin in the middle of November 1918.⁴⁸

Interestingly enough the fact was that Dula and other Slovaks were alleged to have been negotiating with Karolyi at the beginning of October 1918 in order to try and gain some sort of autonomy for Slovakia within Hungary.⁴⁹ According to Karolyi's account* the meeting took place in Budapest some time

* It may be instructive to quote most of the relevant passage from Karolyi's memoirs.

"My first meeting was with the leaders of the Slovak National Party, Mattheus Dula, its President and several others who demanded autonomy for Slovakia but separation from Hungary was never even mentioned. They showed themselves most tractable and their lines of thought largely coincided with ours. When we had closed the discussion Dula pointed out to me that although we were in full agreement they could not pledge themselves definitely to a leader of the Opposition whose word would not be binding on official Hungary."

after the 8th October.⁵⁰ The Leaders of the Slovak National Party demanded autonomy for Slovakia but not independence and were generally in agreement with Karolyi on all points. Their willingness to agree to autonomy was, I feel, mainly a tactical move on their part. They hoped to ensure that, were things not to go well for the Czechoslovak and were Karolyi to come to a position of power for at that time he was still only an opposition politician, the Slovaks would at least have a certain minimum of concrete demands to which he had agreed and to which they hoped to be able to hold him and any new government that he might form.

As we shall see from Milan Hodža's actions in Budapest the Prague Government was most anxious to avoid any course of action that might lend the slightest hint of legality to the Karolyi regime. They were concerned lest they annoy the Allies or prejudice their case at the Paris Peace Conference which was scheduled to open at the beginning of 1919. In this case Šrobar may well have considered that the wisest course of action was to remove Dula and the other members of the party from Slovakia to the sanctuary of Prague, where Hungarian influence could not penetrate.

That the Hungarians were still eager to exploit the SNR for their own ends may be deduced from the suggestions that Karolyi made to the Prague government in a telegram. He proposed that Slovakia should be administered neither by the Magyars, nor by the Czechs but by the SNR who in return would recognise the integrity and indivisibility of Hungary. When this latter demand became known in the RNS the Slovak deputies were reported to have shouted angrily "We don't want it - we'd rather die."⁵¹ Karolyi's offer, which was undoubtedly based on the military strength of the Hungarian position and the corresponding weakness of the Czechoslovak forces, was understandably rejected on the grounds that Slovakia was already part of Czechoslovakia, a state recognised by the Allies.

Thus the Belgrade Armistice could only apply to those parts of Hungary that had not yet been recognised as parts of independent states or as independent states.⁵² In the matter of the evacuation of Hungarian troops from Slovakia, however, Dr. Milan Hodža now replaced Dr. Emil Stodola as Prague's accredited representative in Budapest. The latter was recalled to Prague where his statistical knowledge of Slovak affairs was needed to prepare material for the coming Paris Peace Conference.⁵³

Hodža's activities in Budapest seem to have aroused a storm of anger and indignation among his fellow politicians.⁵⁴ It seems that although he was clearly aware that his only task was to negotiate the evacuation of Slovak territory by Hungarian forces he evidently exceeded his mandate and caused the Central Government a great amount of embarrassment by not only discussing areas outside his competence but also by agreeing to the drafting of a provisional demarcation line that left much territory claimed by Czechoslovakia within Hungary.⁵⁵ In his discussions with the Hungarians the idea of some form of shared administration was mooted whereby areas in Slovakia that had more than 50% Slovaks among the inhabitants would come under the jurisdiction of the SNR whilst those areas in which Magyars predominated were to have linguistic autonomy.⁵⁶

Hodža's actions may have been motivated by four different reasons, viz.

- a) A desire to gain time to enable the Czechoslovak forces to regroup, take in reinforcements and fresh supplies.
- b) To try to secure as many concessions as possible, including the widest possible degree of autonomy, in the event that the Peace Conference would decide in favour of the Hungarians.
- c) A desire to play a leading role within this autonomous set-up inside Hungary.

- d) To try and use the threat that Slovakia would remain associated with Hungary in some way in order to extract concessions from the Prague government in the form of autonomy for Slovakia in which he, Hodza could play a major role.

Hodza later claimed in a work published in 1929 that he was innocent of all such charges and this his only concern had been to try and gain as much time as possible as the Hungarian forces were far superior in number to those at the disposal of the Republic in Slovakia and the Italian legions had not yet arrived.⁵⁷ He claims that he rejected Karolyi's first draft version of an agreement that was to hand over part of Slovakia, the so-called Slovak Imperium, to the control of the SNR whilst at the same time leaving in place the former officials of the state administration and the judiciary, and that he stood firmly on the basis of Slovakia as an integral part of the CSR.⁵⁸

He further argues that he was compelled to negotiate further but on an unofficial basis only, after both the Slovak Club and the Central government had issued declarations against his negotiating with the Hungarians on the 1st December 1918.⁵⁹ He was very worried by the lack of understanding that the French generals Espercy and Henrys had repeatedly shown to his pleas that they should order the Hungarian troops to retreat. In order to force them to recognise the fact that Czechoslovak forces had been recognised as Allied troops and thus had a perfectly valid case for occupying Slovakia, he eventually had to get this point straightened out in a note from the head of the Allied forces. This note however failed to contain any demarcation line and thus Hodza was forced to negotiate a provisional one that still left certain areas claimed by Czechoslovakia inside Hungary. This act further angered Benes and many Czech and Slovak leaders and led eventually to his recall.

The whole affair seems to be somewhat of a series of total misunderstandings due primarily to a lack of communication between Paris, Budapest and Prague. Hodža was unable to know how his actions in Budapest would be interpreted in Prague and Paris. These reports in the Hungarian Press on the progress of the negotiations were sure to cause a great deal of alarm in view of their tendency to distort the truth. Beneš committed an error of judgement too in not recalling Hodža sooner or at least giving a clearer set of instructions before making a hasty declaration which seemed to disavow him and which may have encouraged the Hungarian Government in their efforts to exploit every possible sign of disharmony and disagreement between Czechs and Slovaks. Jaszi as Minister for the Nationalities was continually receiving information from Hungarian high officials in Slovakia that indicated that there were still some possibilities of Hungary retaining Slovakia.⁶⁰ The Liptov Župan Egon Rakovszky claimed for example in a report dated 16th November, that in a private conversation he had had with Dula some two weeks before, the latter had intimated that a settlement of the Slovak question on the Swiss cantonal model might still be possible.⁶¹

In view of this great propaganda effort Hodža definitely must bear a major part of the responsibility for this fiasco as he exceeded his authority in continuing to negotiate with the Hungarians on even an unofficial basis. As a man well used to the conspiratorial nature of Hungarian politics he should have been a lot wavier of trying to outsmart the Hungarians single-handed.

Whether or not Hodža's account of his actions is true they were quickly disavowed both by the Slovak Club and Beneš who was in Paris preparing Czechoslovakia's case at the Peace Conference. There he had to face the angry recriminations of the French and the Americans who as Czechoslovakia's Allies⁶² had felt that she had broken the solidarity of the Allied approach

to the defeated Central Powers by negotiating with one of them. Prague was finally forced to recall Hodža from Budapest and break off the negotiations. This was especially pressing in view of the skilful use that the Hungarian Press were making of Hodža's visit by publishing false reports, reports that greatly alarmed members of the National Council,⁶³ the executive body of RNS, as well as members of the Slovak Club. The latter body was forced to issue various dementae as well as a proclamation to the Slovaks explaining the reasons why the negotiations had been broken off.⁶⁴ The net result of Hodža's actions however must have been to make Šrobár and other Prague politicians very suspicious of any attempts to establish an administrative body in Slovakia that would have any degree of autonomy.⁶⁵ This could well have been one of the major factors in influencing the decision to set up a Ministry with full powers for the administration of Slovakia. This came into being on the 23 January 1919 and was most decisively an instrument for the implementation of central government directives and policy in Slovakia.

The military situation improved during December 1918 and Czechoslovak troops gradually began to re-occupy most of the main towns in Slovakia.⁶⁶ In a note from Commander Vyx of the Allied forces to the Hungarian Government dated 3rd December the Allies declared that they recognised the Czechoslovak troops operating in Slovakia as Allied troops. The latter, stiffened by contingents of French and Italian troops began to advance as the Hungarians withdrew in accordance with the instructions contained in a note that was handed to the Hungarian Government by the Allies on the 4th December.⁶⁷ By the end of December about two-thirds of Slovakia had been evacuated,⁶⁸ although this is not to say that there had been clashes of a local nature with the withdrawing of Hungarian forces.⁶⁹ By January 18th, 1919 this process had been virtually completed.⁷⁰

During the first week of December Šrobár had already begun to draw up contingency plans for the administration of Slovakia.⁷¹ He began by drawing up lists of all those persons in Slovakia who would be capable of carrying out the necessary functions of public administration. In a law, dated 10th December⁷² and entitled "Law on Extra-ordinary Provisional Measures in Slovakia" he took measures to prevent anarchy arising in Slovakia in the wake of the withdrawal of Hungarian troops.⁷³ Indeed such was its purpose as was clearly stated by Karel Kramář the presiding chairman of the Cabinet (predseda vlády). As Peroutka says this was a clear indication that Slovakia lacked the same organizational backbone that had ensured such a smooth transfer of power in the Czech Lands.⁷⁴

The most important aspect of this law was to be found in Paragraph 1⁴ which stated that the Central Government had the right to give full powers to one of its members to carry out any measures that he saw fit to ensure the maintenance of good order and the smooth functioning of the state administration. Decrees issued by him to this end required only his signature in order to be valid.⁷⁵ These wide powers were later consolidated by the dissolution of all local administrative bodies and the transfer of their powers to a commission that was to be appointed by the Minister with full powers for the administration of Slovakia, as this post became known. The Minister was mentioned in the law by name and was none other than Vavro Šrobár.

The most striking feature of this new administrative arrangement was that for the time being it left in their posts all those former Hungarian officials who were prepared to swear an oath of loyalty to the Czechoslovak Republic.⁷⁶ In view of the ill-feeling that this move was bound to cause in Slovakia when those same hated officials who had formed part of the

old oppressive Hungarian state-apparatus were seen to be still at their posts under the new Republic many Slovaks may have looked upon slightly askew at this aspect of central government policy.

Upon deeper reflection however we can appreciate the wisdom of such a policy inspite of its effect on public opinion. Its two main virtues were

- a) It greatly alleviated the enormous and insurmountable problem that would have arisen had Šrobar attempted to replace all the officials essential to the administration of Slovakia by Slovaks loyalty to the Central Government.
- b) It gave those Slovak officials who had become Magyarized and were registered as Magyars in the Hungarian Censuses a chance to declare themselves as Slovaks.

This was something which it would have been very difficult for them to do under the old order and still keep their posts. According to the 1910 Census⁷⁷ of 12,447 state officials in Hungary only 35 were recorded in the census as being of Slovak nationality. Of 948 county officials there were only 18 of 823 municipal officials only 11, of 1133 public and district notaries only 33, of 660 secondary school teachers only 10 and none of 464 judges and crown law officials. Similar figures can be seen in the 1900 Census⁷⁸ when the total number of Slovak men and women in all branches of public life was 3,428 as against 111,208 Magyars, 10,023 Roumanians and 13,790 Germans.⁷⁹

In connection with these Magyarones (as these Magyarized Slovaks were called) a twofold question now arises. How many of them were there and how reliable would they be in the new Republic?

As to their number it seems highly unlikely that the low number of Slovaks shown in the above figures was correct. There had been no Slovak secondary

education since 1874 and hence those officials who declared themselves to be Slovaks must have received their secondary education in schools where Magyar was the exclusive language of instruction. Given the rate of population increase for the Slovaks between 1875 and 1910 it seems impossible that there could not have been many more Slovaks among those officials who for one reason or another preferred to let themselves be known as Magyars although it is very difficult to ascertain what the exact number of Magyarone officials were.

The question of loyalty and political allegiance is still harder to define. In the Czech Lands, with a few exceptions, most Czechs who had worked as officials under the Austrian regime were not considered to represent any danger as there was absolutely no chance of a return to Austrian rule. In Slovakia, however, the situation was entirely different and we can understand the apprehension with which the employment of Magyarones was viewed. For not only was Magyarization a crueller and more brutally repressive process than the corresponding pressures of Germanization in the Czech Lands but also the national consciousness of the Slovaks was as a consequence lower and more easily extinguished. This is clear from the phenomenon that some of the most vociferously anti-Slovak propogandists were themselves of Slovak origin. Such a man was Bela Grunwald who was one of the prime instigators behind the decision to close the last three Slovak gymnasia and the Matica Slovenska in the years 1874-1875. Many Magyars and Magyarones however were later to complain that they were all measured with the same measure and found wanting. They were forced to retire or leave the country without their being given an opportunity to prove their loyalty to the new state. Doubtless many of these complaints were ill-founded, but they still serve to show that the Republic's administrators had valid grounds for viewing the Magyarone element with some degree of suspicion and hostility.

It should be stressed that all these Hungarian officials were only to be left at their posts as temporary expedient, whilst Šrobár and his colleagues grappled with the problem of trying to create a reliable and efficient form of civil administration for Slovakia.⁸⁰

The same decree that named Šrobár as Minister for Slovakia⁸¹ also named government referants who were essentially equivalent to the Ministers. Their competence was limited to the territory of Slovakia and were subordinate to the relevant ministries in Prague, as can be seen in the very wording of the decree.⁸² Although this institution of referants ensured that many of Slovakia's needs and problems could be dealt with one the spot without the necessarily being referred to Prague for guidance, they were conceived essentially as being there to aid and assist the Minister in his task and not with any intention of providing Slovakia with a form of ministerial autonomy.⁸³

There were originally 13 referants⁸⁴ viz. Interior, Agriculture, Finance, Trade, Railways and Posts, Justice, Militia, Education, Catholic Affairs, Protestant Affairs, Social Welfare, Food and Public Works. The referants for both Catholic and Protestant Affairs were not nominated at the time of their establishment as he did not yet have the consent of the individuals he had in mind.⁸⁵ The Referant for Catholic Affairs was to be Andrej Hlinka. In this we may detect an attempt on Šrobár's part to try and involve Hlinka in actively playing a part in Slovakia's government. Perhaps this was intended to smooth out any feelings of hurt and envy the latter might have had in view of the disproportionately large role that Šrobár was not playing in Slovak affairs. Hlinka, however, did not accept this offer and as we shall see later from his journey to Paris was already set on an anti-Prague course.

The local administrative system of Hungary differed markedly from that of Austria in that the organs of state control were not separated from those of local government. Political control in Hungary rested in the hands of bodies called "counties" (komitats or župy) and the larger towns which themselves were equivalent to a county. The counties were sub-divided into districts (okresy).

In this system⁸⁶ a major role was played by an official called a župan or ispán. He was the nominated head of a county and represented the interests of the Hungarian government. The majority of the officials in a county or large town were elected to their posts by the county committee that was an elected body comprising both elected members and "virilists". The latter were those taxpayers who paid the greatest amount in direct state taxes whilst the franchise for local government was as limited as that for elections to the Diet.

The county system in Hungary not only gave a great deal of autonomy to local areas but was also of great antiquity. It had always been a feature of Hungary since the creation of the Kingdom of Saint Stephen and there is some evidence that it may even have pre-dated the advent of the Magyars and thus may well have been a feature of the Slav principalities that existed in the 8th and 9th centuries. As an institution that had such a long tradition in Hungary it had always effectively been the preserve of the Hungarian nobility even in those areas in which the nationalities predominated and this had become a further means of ensuring Magyar hegemony.

Thus in addition to the referants Šrobar was forced to nominate Slovaks to fill the posts of those 16 župans who were head of the 16 counties that were roughly equal to the entire territory of Slovakia. Such posts in view of their importance could not be left in the hands of their former occupants.

The new Slovak župans who themselves comprised 11 lawyers, 2 priests, 2 doctors and an estate owner⁸⁷ were given quite wide powers similar in scope to those enjoyed by Šrobár but limited to the smaller area of a county.⁸⁸ Once the old Hungarian župans had been dismissed, Šrobár and his aides proceeded to abolish the old county committee and appoint a new one in its place, consisting of 15 nominated members of the public and ten county officials.⁸⁹

Having thus created a skeleton administrative apparatus for Slovakia, Šrobár and his referants made their way to Žilina, which was to be the seat of their operations until Bratislava could be occupied and made ready for their arrival. This in fact did not take place until 4th February 1919.⁹⁰

Meanwhile Šrobár and his colleagues were inundated with the thousand and one problems of one sort or another that required their immediate attention as he describes in his memoirs.⁹¹ By this time Slovakia had at least acquired some form of administrative machinery, albeit one whose functioning was often hampered by poor communications,⁹² and her frontiers were in the process of being secured even though they had yet to acquire a definitive shape at the coming Paris Peace Conference. It should be stressed that the system of administration that Slovakia possessed at the beginning of 1919 was a somewhat centralist one, there was at this time however, no discernable disagreement with Central Government policies in using such methods to secure Slovakia's incorporation into the CSR on the part of the Slovaks whose representatives in Prague themselves did not want, as yet, any form of autonomy for Slovakia.⁹³

Slovakia had by the beginning of 1919 at last been incorporated into the CSR. In this process however the SNR had played a relatively minor role.

This inability of any credible Slovak body in Slovakia to play any serious part in its own liberation and the creation of an administrative system suited to its needs was one of the factors that were to influence central government attitudes towards the question of Slovakia's autonomy for a long time to come.

Section Two

The Early Years 1919-1923 Until the Introduction of the New Zupa System

Although at the beginning of 1919 few people could have foreseen that CSR and Hungary were soon to engage in a fresh bout of fighting over Slovakia, it was still clear to most observers of the political scene that a great deal of work would have to be done before Slovakia could be given a settled and final form of administration.

At that time most of Central Europe was still in an extreme state of chaos as those newly-created states struggled to overcome those difficulties into which they had been plunged. These were essentially a result of the Great War. In many of Czechoslovakia's neighbours (especially Austria and Hungary) there was rampant inflation as the pre-war Austro-Hungarian crown sank to unbelievably low levels,⁹⁴ as well as the now familiar spectacle of food shortages, hunger riots and other forms of civil disturbance. There were attempts to set up Soviet republics in parts of Germany, the Baltic states and Hungary, some of which were, for a short time, successful.

It is against such a background that we must attempt to evaluate the situation in Slovakia. The danger of a Magyar attack still existed and the Hungarian government was still concocting schemes for the autonomy of the Ruthenes⁹⁵ and the Hungarian Germans.⁹⁶ These schemes were incorporated in laws published in December 1918 and January 1919 and were followed by a similar scheme for the Slovaks in March of 1919.⁹⁷ Various pro-Hungarian bodies, such as the Upper Hungary League, constituted on 10th February 1919,⁹⁸ also added their voices to the swelling tide of protests against the "Czech" invasion and occupation of Slovakia, as the Hungarians termed it. As yet there were no military hostilities but there had been no let-up

in the propaganda war. It was evidently aimed at trying to convince the Paris Peace Conference which was convened in plenary session for the first time on January 18th 1919⁹⁹ of the justice of Hungarian claims to Slovakia and other former Hungarian territories.

The situation in Central Europe was in fact so chaotic with so many military conflicts that the Council of Ten (One of the main bodies at the conference) was forced to issue a warning that "territory gained by force would seriously prejudice the claims of those who use such means."¹⁰⁰

Militarily all was quiet in Slovakia during the first three months of 1919. Srobar's main preoccupations were to ensure that the population was as adequately supplied as possible in a situation where there were severe shortages of almost every conceivable item.

Srobar's efforts were not helped by a strike of railway and postal workers early in the spring of 1919 that threatened to paralyse all traffic. It was broken only by the arrival of several thousand volunteers from Bohemia and Moravia. This strike was inspired from Budapest where by the 21st March Karolyi's government had been finally brought down and replaced by the Bolshevik regime of Bela Kun. It itself this strike was a milestone for it marked the beginnings of a trend, the results of which were to bedevil Czech-Slovak relations and provide the Slovak Autonomist movement with an important propaganda point. This employment of Czech officials and workers in Slovakia whose numbers grew as time went on was later to be seen by some Slovaks as barring their way towards their gaining posts commensurate with their qualifications and aspirations. This was above all true of those Slovaks who thanks to the all-round improvement in education

in Slovakia now possessed secondary and higher educational qualifications. The higher salaries and allowances that were paid to Czech officials (primarily because they received extra payments for living away from their domicile¹⁰¹ and thus in many cases had to maintain two homes) were also a great source of envy and indignation.

By 1919 despite the firm pro-Czechoslovak stance of members of the Slovak Club and Šrobar's government, opposition to Prague's policies seems to have reared its head. There were reports that the former Slovak deputy Ferdiš Juriga had founded a "Slovak-Hungarian irredenta"¹⁰² and that a warrant for his arrest had been issued by the Prague government on the 13th February.¹⁰³ I am inclined to think that these reports were entirely false and were perhaps deliberately put about by the Hungarians in order to try to sow the seeds of discord between Czechs and Slovaks. Peroutka who is normally a reliable source in these matters seems to have overlooked these reports but he maintains¹⁰⁴ that Juriga was solidly pro-Czechoslovak until January 1920. We have no reason to disbelieve especially in view of Juriga's reactions to the news of Hlinka's trip to Paris, in September 1919.¹⁰⁵ Hlinka's actions however would seem to indicate that he had been dissatisfied with Šrobar's activities in Slovakia for some time. He may well have discussed his apprehensions with Juriga as both men belonged to the same small group of Slovak clericals but there is no evidence to suggest that Juriga would necessarily have agreed with his point of view.

The fall of Károlyi's government was partly due to a decision of the Peace Conference that ordered the Hungarians to give up considerable areas of Transylvania to the Roumanians.¹⁰⁶ Bela Kun the leader of the newly-proclaimed Hungarian Soviet Republic which was allied to the Soviet Union refused to carry out the Conference's orders. It was obvious from his actions

and the very fact that he had come to power, that the sudden loss of Hungary's former extensive territories had greatly outraged Magyar public opinion. One could therefore not expect any improvement in the situation regarding Slovakia and her frontiers as now nationalistic feelings had been reinforced by ideological reasons. An autonomously organised and socialist Hungary in the form of a free association of national Soviet republics may have been presented to some Slovak workers a more alluring alternative than a non-socialist CSR, which under the leadership of Alois Rasin the Minister of Finance was pursuing highly orthodox financial remedies against inflation.

The Central Government in Prague however was unable to devote all its time, energy or attention to the problems of Slovakia. On the international front Czechoslovakia was occupied both militarily and diplomatically in a dispute with Poland over the Duchy of Teschen¹⁰⁷ as well as the many other complex questions of pre-war debts, war debts, reparations and the establishment of definitive state boundaries. At home in Prague the National Assembly was busy trying to draft a Constitution and issue important pieces of social legislation, such as an eight-hour working day and a six-day working week, sickness, unemployment, old-age and widows pensions as well as the preparatory legislation for a land reform, a measure that was long overdue in both halves of the Republic.

In the midst of all this activity the Slovaks suffered the misfortune to the only one man who was as well-known to the outside world as Beneš and Masaryk. Milan Rastislav Štefánik (See Chapter Three) was killed when his aircraft crashed shortly before it was due to land in Bratislava on 4th April 1919. Later Autonomist Literature and especially those histories

that were written during the Slovak State that lasted from 1939 to 1945 often accused the Czechs of having deliberately shot down his aircraft in order to eliminate all trace of Slovak influence on decisions taken at the very highest level. This charge is blatantly nonsensical as Stefanik was an ardent centralist and "Czech-slovak" for whom there were essentially no differences between the two peoples.

This greatest value for the Republic was a symbolic one. For with Benes and Masaryk he represented the creation of the CSR as the joint effort of both Czechs and Slovaks. After his death Slovak Autonomists could point to his absence and level the charge that the Republic was a Czech state with Czech leaders, run by Czechs for Czechs only.

During April and May 1919 Bela Kun and his comrades continued to strengthen the Hungarian army.¹⁰⁸ It was not long before Hungary and Czechoslovakia were at war. (20th May)¹⁰⁹ The tide of military conflict need concern us but little let it suffice to say that at first the Czechoslovak forces suffered grave losses. Kosice was captured and at one time the Hungarians threatened to cut off the eastern most part of Slovakia,¹¹⁰ before the Hungarians were defeated with the help of the Roumanians whose army occupied Budapest. Thus the Bolshevik regime in Hungary was brought to an end.

An interesting experiment in appealing to the class as well as the national consciousness and feelings of Slovaks as well as those of Ruthenes and Magyars was the establishment of a Slovak Soviet Republic in Presov in Eastern Slovakia on 16th June. It lasted however a brief two weeks and thus we cannot obtain a great amount of information as to the degree of popular support that it enjoyed amongst ordinary Slovaks. It did have, however, the support of Communists of all nationalities including Czechs and Slovaks who, organised in their own Czechoslovak section, actively supported Bela Kun's government and even, in certain cases fought in the ranks of the Hungarian Red Army. Its president was a Czech Antonin Janovsek.

In Paris the Peace Conference finally accorded to Czechoslovakia almost everything that she had demanded. It was here in September 1919 that Andrej Hlinka chose to bring Slovakia's grievances (as he saw them) to the attention of such an international forum as the Peace Conference. He was probably encouraged in this course of action by his companion Father Jehlička, who later became one of the most virulent anti-Czechoslovak propagandists there was, settling eventually in Budapest. This encourages us to speculate on the possibility that Jehlička was already a paid Hungarian agent at the time of Hlinka's visit to Paris.

In any case Hlinka greatly outraged both Czechs and Slovaks alike for not only did he undertake his journey without the consent or knowledge of the central government but he succeeded in seriously embarrassing the government in so doing. He travelled via Warsaw where he was furnished with a false Polish passport, no doubt, with the connivance of the Polish government who were only too willing to do anything that it could to embarrass its neighbour in view of their quarrel over Teschen. By bringing such a sensitive and delicate issue as the question of Slovak autonomy to a conference where the eyes of the world would be on Czechoslovakia Hlinka succeeded in acutely embarrassing the Czechoslovak Government by pointing out that all was not well between Czechs and Slovaks who were to form the basis of the new state.¹¹¹ We have no cause to doubt Hlinka's loyalty or suspect him of being pro-Hungarian in any way, but by his actions he helped focus the attentions of Czechoslovakia's enemies on a potential weakness which it might repay to exploit.

Hlinka's activities were condemned by his fellow-Slovaks in the Slovak Club. Upon his return to Slovakia he was arrested and sentenced to a period of imprisonment. This however was more like a form of internment as he was

not kept in a cell¹¹² nor brought to trial. He was finally released in March 1920. A vote of the Slovak Club deprived him of his seat¹¹³ but he stood in the 1920 parliamentary elections and was elected.

It was whilst he was in Paris that we first see him referring to the provisions of the Pittsburg Agreement (See Chapter Four), especially to the fact that Slovakia was to have its own Parliament (snem). He seems to have completely ignored the provisions of its last clause to the effect that the final say on detailed arrangements was to be left to the fully authorised representatives of the Czechs and Slovaks after their liberation. How authorised, nominated and not elected representatives can be is naturally open to debate. If, however, the mass of Slovak voters disagreed with central government policy in as far as the non-implementation of the Pittsburg Agreement was concerned would not the results of the voting in the Parliamentary elections in 1920 been different? As it was most of the vote went to parties that were overwhelmingly pro-Czechoslovak in their orientation. Even Hlinka's party did not campaign alone but in electoral alliance with the Czechoslovak People's Party. There was no massive swing of abstentions or anything that could be even remotely interpreted as an anti-government vote. We thus have to find Hlinka's charge of deliberate breach of faith on the part of the Central Government not proven. This is not to say that the argument that the Slovak League, one of the signatories to the Agreement, was not yet at the time of signing a properly constituted body under American law and thus, the whole Agreement was null and void from the start was a particularly convincing or relevant one. This declaration never had any enforceable legal content. Its great significance lay in its propaganda value at the time in helping to convince the Allies of the need to create an independent Czechoslovakia.

As in his criticisms of the Provisional Slovak Government Hlinka here betrays his lack of understanding of the objective conditions that determined many of the Central Government decisions. This may be seen chiefly in his insistence that the Central Government should have done something diametrically opposite to what it did and could do despite the fact that such courses of action as he advocated at the time were totally unrealisable.

Hlinka wanted Slovakia to have its own parliament yet at the very same time¹¹⁴ Srobar was complaining of the difficulties he was encountering in his attempts to find župans for the four counties that had just been liberated. Either there were no suitable and qualified Slovak candidates for these posts or even if there were, they were unwilling to shoulder the responsibilities that were involved for one reason or another. Thus personnel questions soon began to dominate Slovakia's reconstruction and the influx of Czechs may well have been one of the reasons why the Slovak People's Party raised its share of the vote from 17.4% in the first elections to the National Assembly held in 1920 to 30% in the elections to the new Župa that were held at the end of September 1923.¹¹⁵ In addition there were several anti-religious incidents that in themselves were trivial but served to inflame Catholic opinion. The most well-known of these was the destruction of the Column of the Immaculate Conception, a monument in Prague,¹¹⁶ that was erected to commemorate the Battle of the White Mountain in 1620 at which Bohemia lost her independence. There were also alleged incidents of Czech Sokols* tearing down crucifixes

*Sokols were essentially gymnastic organizations of Czechs that helped to foster a national spirit. In 1918-20 many of their members were armed and helped form units of militia to keep order in both halves of the Republic.

from the walls of buildings whenever they entered Slovak towns¹¹⁷ and similar manifestations of an anti-clerical attitude.¹¹⁸ This was the heritage of the struggle against Austria where the Catholic Church had always been identified with the ruling house. All these incidents were unimportant in themselves but they played into the hands of Hlinka Slovak People's Party (Hlinkova Slovenská ľudová strana - HSĽS) who saw in them yet one more indication of the ill-will of the centralist, atheistic and communistic Czechs.¹¹⁹

Slovakia's problems were so complex and inter-dependent that it is clear that a concerted attack on them would have to be made in several different fields at once of which the most important were Health, Education, Land Reform and Communications especially roads and railways. In order to achieve this it would be necessary to create a new and permanent administrative system as well as to find the experienced and qualified personnel to staff it.

The Župa Reform

An attempt to do this may be seen in the reform of local government that took place in 1923. It was introduced after long delays in Slovakia only, although it was intended to be uniformly applied to the whole of the Republic from 1st January 1923.

Resistance to this reform was for three main reasons. One there were many people in both halves of the Republic who were opposed to the destruction of the old historical units that had long traditions behind them and to which a certain amount of local pride and feeling was attached. Secondly there were fears that it might be dangerous to create such small areas as the 21 new župy were intended to be as ethnic minorities such as the Germans

in the Czech Lands and the Magyars in Slovakia would most probably constitute a majority in several of them. They then would effectively have autonomy and this was something that the National Democrats, who tended to be the most chauvinistic of the Czechoslovak parties, wanted to avoid at all costs. The same argument applied to Slovakia as it seemed most likely that HSL'S would control most of the 6 župy that were to be in Slovakia. Thirdly the provincial system of administration (see below) in the Czech Lands meant that certain political parties had their political strongholds in the provinces and this was above all true of the Czechoslovak People's Party. It drew most of its political strength from Moravia which was an area that was far more Catholic in its religious feeling than Bohemia.

The reform itself¹²⁰ had its roots essentially in the need to find some form of uniform administrative system for the entire country. The old Hungarian and Austrian systems had been taken over unchanged¹²¹ after the creation of the Republic and there were important differences between them. In the Austrian half of the Republic the basic administrative unit was the province (země) of which there were three. Namely the old historical entities of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. Bohemia was a unit that had a population of some seven million and an area of some 22,00 square miles - a fact that made this sort of provincial administration very slow and cumbersome.¹²² To a lesser extent this was true of Moravia and Silesia as well. In contrast to Hungary, Austria possessed a double set of local government bodies that possessed limited competence in financial, cultural and social spheres.¹²³

Hungary however was organized on the lines of very ancient self-governing corporations called counties (župy in Slovak) that consisted of both country areas and towns large enough to have municipal rights (právo municipalne).¹²⁴ Each county was further divided into districts (okresy) and smaller towns

that had a regulated magistracy (regulovaný magistrát) were equivalent to a district. Both were directly subordinated to the relevant county. The county was an instrument of both central and local government with an executive committee that consisted of both elected members and those who paid the greatest amount in direct state taxes (virilists). The majority of county officials were elected whilst the chief officials (župan - ispan) was appointed by the Hungarian government and responsible to it.

The reform envisaged that the entire territory of the Republic would be divided into 21 župy¹²⁵ of which 6 were to be in Slovakia, 9 in Bohemia and 5 in Moravia and Silesia and 1 for the whole of Těšín whose fate was yet to be decided.

The župy, as such, were to consist of both an elected and an appointed or nominated element. The former was to take the form of a representative committee (zastupitel'stvo) elected for a period of six years - the same was to apply to the districts (okresy) - on the basis of adult universal direct and secret franchise. It was to have 35 members¹²⁶ but in Slovakia there was an additional provision that one-third of the members were to be nominated by the central government "in the case of exceptional circumstances."¹²⁷ Despite attempts to make the official posts elective as well,¹²⁸ the officials who staffed the new system were all appointed and were empowered to sit in on meetings of the representative committee, to take part in debate and even to vote (up to 5 of their number).¹²⁹

The župan who was the chairman of both the representative committee and its specialist committees was appointed by the minister of Interior. The latter retained powers to dissolve the committee and prescribe new elections.¹³⁰

He, the Minister, had various powers with regard to the representative committee. He opened and closed its sessions, fixing the dates on which they were to take place. A permanent committee of eight members and eight substitutes was to take the place of the representative committee when the latter was not in session.¹³¹

The establishment of such a system in Slovakia was motivated by a desire to avoid giving Slovakia the kind of autonomy¹³² that a provincial system would have entailed. For if Slovakia would have been preserved as a single administrative unit analogous to Bohemia, then it may well have meant that the Autonomist movement would have gained a strong foot-hold and power base.¹³³ This in the view of the Slovak Club¹³⁴ would have strengthened the irredentist efforts of the Magyars who could use the movement as a means of weakening Czechoslovakia.¹³⁵

One can thus see that the institution of the New Minister was in as far as Slovakia was concerned motivated in many instances by a desire to maintain a firm grip on Slovakia's administration by the Central Government. The provision which allowed one-third of the members to be nominated seems to have become more or less standard practice¹³⁶ and was to remain in force until 1st January 1940. The institution of a Minister for Slovakia was retained with a permanent seat in Bratislava, although the offices of the Referants were gradually closed and their powers transferred to Prague.¹³⁷ Subordinate offices for departments of the Ministries of the Interior, Public Works, Agriculture, Social Welfare and Health remained and were subject to the Minister for Slovakia.¹³⁸ By 1927 however this institution had lapsed¹³⁹ and was not renewed.

At the apex of this new system in Slovakia there should have been a body called the Provincial County Union (Zemský župný sväz) that would have provided a forum for the discussion of those matters which effected Slovakia as a whole but this body never came into being. This was possibly for the same reasons as were behind the creation of the counties themselves.¹⁴⁰

The idea of a county-based system of local government for the Republic may well have had its roots in Slovakia's past but it should be stressed that there were important differences between the Hungarian system and the new "Srobarian" system. Firstly, the actual territorial division of Slovakia into six large counties in place of the 16 smaller ones that existed under Hungary meant that these new units cut right across old boundaries in a fairly artificial way, especially as care had been taken not to create any counties where the Magyars might be in a majority. Secondly, the new system was more centralised as the Central Government not only appointed the župan but also nominated one-third of the representative committee and appointed the officials. The latter had quite wide powers in regard to their intervention in the functioning of the representative committee. In addition to these features the new counties had more limited areas of competence and finance than had previously been the case and the agencies of the various central ministries did not come under their control. The status of those towns that had municipal rights (municipálne právo) and were thus equivalent to a county was reduced to that of a district (okres) with the two notable exceptions of Bratislava and Košice.¹⁴¹ Thus all towns now had the same status as only the smaller towns with a regulated magistracy (regulovaný magistrát) had had under the old system. This demotion of some of the larger towns as well as the disappearance of what were after all very old and familiar units of local government must have provoked a certain amount of hostility to the Central Government and its policies. It might conceivably have helped to gain for HSL'S the votes of those who wished to express a protest against hurt local pride.

The situation in Slovakia after the defeat of Bela Kun's armies and their withdrawal from Slovakia as a result of the Roumanian occupation of Budapest was still such as not to leave any room for complacency on the part of the Central Government. There was no guarantee that any Hungarian government which would eventually replace Kun's defunct regime would be any more inclined to give up its claims to Slovakia. Inside the Republic the financial situation was not good either as we shall see.

Economy and currency

During 1919 and part of 1920 there were frequent strikes and other forms of industrial unrest throughout the Republic. Those disturbances were caused mainly by fluctuations in the exchange value of the Czechoslovak crown that had a severe effect on the cost of living. On the Zurich exchange the value of the crown fell from 34 swiss centimes¹⁴² to 4 centimes from spring 1919 to summer 1920 when it rose again to 13 centimes. The effect on prices was most unhealthy¹⁴³ and the index for foodstuffs and other necessities stood at 1384 in 1920¹⁴⁴ taking 1913 as the base year (=100). This rise in prices inevitably fired a demand for higher wages but they do not seem to have increased as fast as the rise in prices as we can see from Table Four below. (The figures apply to the whole of the Republic)¹⁴⁵

TABLE FOUR

INCREASE IN AVERAGE EARNINGS FROM 1913 TO 1920

<u>Type of Industry</u>	<u>%</u>
Chemical Industry	500
Clothing Industry	900
Textiles and Paper	900--1000
Food Industry	1000
Furniture Industry	1100
Iron, Building	1000--1300

In Slovakia this trend was worsened by the measures that Alois Rasin the Minister of Finance took to protest the crown against further rapid depreciation. This involved separating the crown¹⁴⁶ from the Austro-Hungarian currency whose value was falling rapidly. This was achieved by closing all the frontiers for a week from March 3rd to 9th 1919 and stamping all the banknotes in circulation with the exception of one and two-crown notes. These were later withdrawn as were most of the stamped notes and replaced by new notes printed in the U.S.A. In Slovakia many banknotes with forged stamps on them circulated and this caused financial losses to many Slovaks.¹⁴⁷ Furthermore many Slovaks had been forced to subscribe to Hungarian War loans¹⁴⁸ that Czechoslovakia had decided not to honour. Prior to the stamping operation however the Austro-Hungarian bank in Vienna was offering advances of up to 75% of the nominal value of these bonds in cash.¹⁴⁹ Once the Czechoslovak currency had been established this process of conversion was now impossible and many Slovaks suffered severe financial losses by accepting whatever was offered. A third factor that helped to swell discontent was the system of food-rationing with its attendant but necessary evils of fixed prices, price controls and requisitioning. Slovakia (as part of Hungary) was largely spared this during the War¹⁵⁰ as a result of the Hungarian policy of trying to keep most of Hungary's grain production within the country. A fixed purchase price for grain inevitably meant that the producers were getting less than they could have obtained in a free market and this new doubt greatly annoyed the Slovak peasantry especially at a time when the price of most goods was fast rising. The Slovak consumer too, unused to such privations must also have grumbled and blamed the Central Government for Slovakia's ills.

The post-war economic climate in Slovakia

Late 1920 marked the beginnings of a post-war economic depression¹⁵¹ which lasted to the end of 1923 and affected the whole of Central Europe. This crisis was a direct consequence of the new situation that had come into

being as a result of the collapse of Austro-Hungary and Germany's defeat. Each of the new states that had once been part of Austro-Hungary began to erect tariff barriers in an attempt to foster the growth of its own industries by protecting them from foreign competition.

Czechoslovakia contained within itself a considerable proportion of the productive capacity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire., a capacity that was now in excess of the needs of its thirteen million inhabitants. Some of this excess could well be absorbed in the form of increased exports but it seemed difficult to avoid the closure of some plants. Slovakia's industries were newer and in many cases had come into being as the result of governmental initiative and were sustained by subsidies. The Czechoslovak Government however did not renew this subsidy without which in the difficult conditions that prevailed after the end of the War these industries could not survive. They were unable to compete with similar industries in the Czech Lands and simply folded. (Some 200 factories were in fact closed).¹⁵² This had the effect of widening the gap between the two halves of the Republic for although many new factories were built in the Czech Lands after the war very few important new factories were established in Slovakia.¹⁵³ The Central Government failed to realise the significance of Slovakia's industries in providing an outlet for the increase in the available labour force that was a consequence of Slovakia's higher birthrate, higher in fact than the average for the Republic or any part of it with the notable exception of Ruthenia (see Table Five). The opportunities for absorbing the increase in population in agriculture were strictly limited, especially in view of the fact that it was no longer possible for groups of agricultural workers to migrate down to Hungary to work there during the harvest season, which was a feature of Slovak life right up to 1918. It in fact continued thereafter, albeit at a reduced tempo and to countries further afield such as Austria, Germany and France. Given all these factors it comes as no surprise to

see that Slovakia was faced with a serious employment problem as reflected in both emigration statistic (Table 23) and the lower proportion of those for whom the labour exchanges in Slovakia were able to find work (Table Six). The effects of the economic crisis on Slovak industry are summarised in Table Seven from where we can see that during the last four months of 1922 14,355 workers were laid off out of a total industrial work-force of 224,500.¹⁵⁵

The Central Government conceived of itself as having a mission to try and raise Slovakia's standard of living and narrow the gap between the two halves of the country, once the frontiers had been secured and a permanent administrative system established. It failed however to realise the importance of industrialization in this process. This lack of concrete industrial policy a failing which tended to perpetuate itself right up till the end of the Republic was one of its most serious failures. One whose effects political parties such as HSL'S and the Communists would ^{not} be slow in exploiting.

The Hungarian Factor

The political situation at home and abroad during 1919 and 1920 also gave the Central Government cause for alarm. Although Hungary finally signed the Treaty of Trianon on 4th June 1940 it was clear that the new regime of Admiral Horthy had, like its predecessors, not given up the idea of trying to regain some if not all of the territories that had once been under Hungarian control. As Hungary was thus opposed to Czechoslovakia it naturally found a ready ally in Poland with which it enjoyed good relations and in Italy which had ambitions of its own in Central Europe. Czechoslovakia therefore laid great emphasis on maintaining good relations with France but also sought to ensure some form of close cooperation with two of the successor states that had sizeable Magyar minorities and thus were equally threatened.

by Hungarian revisionism viz. Roumania and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SHS) as Yugoslavia was then known.

During the first attempt at the restoration of Charles Habsburg to the throne of Hungary, which occurred in May 1920 and resulted in all three countries mobilising their armed forces, the foundations were laid for what was later to be known as the Little Entente. This was essentially a close military alliance between Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Roumania, aimed primarily at preventing not only such a restoration but also any possible revision of Hungary's treaties with her neighbours. These treaties had left large Magyar minorities in each of the three countries. Minorities that were significantly larger than the corresponding minorities of Slovaks, Serbs, Croats and Roumanians left in post-Trianon Hungary. The 1920 Hungarian Census gives the following figures for such minorities in Hungary.¹⁵⁶

TABLE EIGHT

MINORITIES IN HUNGARY 1920

Slovaks	141,882	1.8% of population
Roumanians	23,760	0.3% of population
Ruthenes	1,500	-
Croats	36,858	0.5% of population
Serbs	17,131	0.2% of population

The Czechoslovak Census of 1920 gave the figure of 634,827 Magyars,¹⁵⁷ the 1931 Roumanian Census 1,353,675 Magyars¹⁵⁸ and 382,070 Magyars¹⁵⁹ lived in the Vojvodina district of Yugoslavia. The total population of Hungary in 1920 was no more than 7.5 million even including the Hungarian Jews, so that at least two million Magyars were living on the territory of states other than

Hungary. This fact helps to illuminate both the driving force behind Hungarianism irredentism and the fear that it inspired. A fear which affected all the three governments of the Little Entente to varying degrees.

Of these three countries Czechoslovakia was probably more worried than either Roumania or Yugoslavia by the presence of the Magyar minority in Slovakia as she was the only country to be hemmed in between two hostile neighbours, Poland and Hungary. And it was in Slovakia where the Republic's greatest length of frontier with both these two countries was located.

Charles Habsburg's two restoration attempts naturally caused great alarm among the Slovaks. It seemed clear that if the Habsburgs were successfully restored to the throne of Hungary then her case for a revision of her frontiers might be considerably strengthened as well as her claims for the restoration of some of her former territories. This was because Charles might also claim the right to rule over all the lands that had comprised the Kingdom of Saint Stephen. Such a move, were it ever to succeed which was most unlikely, would upset the delicate balance of power that the Peace treaties had created in Central Europe. It was, therefore, to be expected that the Allied Powers (especially Britain and France) would back the actions of the Little Entente and lend them their full support. Fortunately such a course of action became unnecessary as both attempts failed and Czechoslovakia could once again continue to grapple with the task of post-war reconstruction.

Constitutional Developments

By 1920 a permanent Constitution had been drafted and adapted and the first free election was held in accordance with its provisions.

The Constitution provided for a President and a bi-cameral assembly. The latter was elected on the basis of an adult (21 years of age and over) direct,

secret and universal franchise with a system of proportional representation with the entire territory of the Republic divided into twenty-one electoral districts. The last feature however aroused a certain amount of dissatisfaction for owing to the more mountainous nature of the terrain in the eastern half of the country the electoral districts in Slovakia and Ruthenia were larger than in the Czech Lands and consequently the number of inhabitants represented by a deputy in both chambers of the National Assembly varied significantly.¹⁶⁰ There were only nine deputies allocated to the whole of Ruthenia in the lower house, the chamber of Deputies, whilst Prague with a similar population had forty-five. Objections were also raised to the provision that a party had to reach a minimum quota of votes in each electoral district in order for one of its candidates to be elected. This meant that if the votes cast for it in one district were not sufficient to elect a deputy they could not be accredited to those cast for candidates of the same party in another electoral district. This explains the anomaly of the elections to the National Assembly held for the first time in Ruthenia on 16th March, ¹⁹²⁴ when the Jewish Party polled a total of 7% of the vote in both electoral districts but failed to reach the quota in either, whilst the Agrarians with only 5.3% of the overall poll were able to get one deputy elected.

Another feature of the system that was open to criticism was the fact that the Constitution had been drawn up and adopted by a body that was not elected but had rather sprung into being as a revolutionary assembly that claimed to represent the will of the Czechs and Slovaks. Public opinion in the Czech Lands however had swung to the left since the last elections to the Reichsrat in 1911 on the basis of which the members of the Revolutionary National Assembly allocated their seats. It could thus be asserted that as such it no longer accurately reflected the wishes of the Czech electorate.

The Slovaks had 56 representatives of whom apart from several Czechs the majority were Slovak Protestants. The Slovak Catholics could therefore claim that they were not adequately represented and were not in agreement with the final form that the state took as reflected in the Constitution. So could those socialists who were not satisfied with the mere provision of social legislation and wanted more state ownership and stronger workers councils, as well as members of the ethnic minorities Germans, Poles, Ruthenes and Magyars who were not represented in the Assembly. At the time of its deliberations the Germans were united in their efforts to remain linked to Austria whilst the final attachment of Ruthenia to Czechoslovakia was not confirmed till the middle of 1919.

This was a regrettable omission as the minorities would later be able to claim that they had been incorporated into the Czechoslovak state against their will and disagreed fundamentally with the nature of the state structure, despite the provisions for the use of the minority language in all areas where the minority population was in excess of a certain figure. These minority guarantees were incorporated into the Constitution as Czechoslovakia had already committed herself to such provisions in the peace treaties she had signed.

At the time the Constitution was being drafted, in the wake of the euphoria generated by the liberation of the Czechs and Slovaks from the Habsburgs, a certain centralizing trend prevailed. In view of the situation prevailing in Slovakia at the time this was not entirely unjustified. The State was conceived as a basically unitary organism rather than a federation or confederation of different constituent parts. The Slovaks had appeared to give their assent to the notion of a unitary Czechoslovak nation by adopting that version of the Declaration of Turčianský Svätý Martin (see Chapter Four)

that was proposed by Samuel Zoch¹⁶¹ and spoke of both a unitary Czechoslovak nation and a Slovak nation instead of Emanuel Stodola's version that spoke of the Slovaks freely joining the Czechoslovak State.¹⁶²

In view of the fact that the Hungarians were still in control of Slovakia such a formulation may have seemed too bold and frank to the majority of the delegates who may well have tended to err a little on the side of caution.

The municipal elections, which were held in June 1919 only in the Czech Lands, as there was still fighting in Slovakia, which lacked any permanent administration, factors, which made the holding of elections impracticable, showed a great swing to the Social Democrats who captured one-third of the poll. This proportion was maintained in the 1920 elections to the National Assembly, the results of which will be discussed in detail in the next section.

By 1923 therefore Slovakia had come a long way. Her boundaries and territory had been secured and a permanent administrative machinery established. The Central Government having overcome the immediate post-war problems of food supplies etc., and, having received a mandate in the elections, was now in a position to be able to implement long term policies in Slovakia. Such policies should have gone some way to improving the living conditions of its inhabitants to a significant degree. The results of Central Government policies up to 1929 will be examined in the light of relevant statistical material in **Section Four**.

Section Three

PARTY POLITICS IN SLOVAKIA 1918-1929

Prior to 1918 Slovak political life was of a very limited nature. There was, in fact, only one Slovak political party SNS-Slovenská národná strana the Slovak National Party and although there existed different trends within the SNS they had by 1918 not yet been formed into separate parties. Andrej Hlinka had attempted to form a Slovak People's Party (SLS-Slovenska ľudova Strana) after his unsuccessful candidature in 1908 when he had stood as a candidate of Count Zichy's Hungarian People's Party (Néppart). His efforts began in 1912, but by the outbreak of the First World War when all political activities were voluntarily stopped, a real grass-roots party organization had not yet been set up.

The Hungarian political system offered fewer opportunities for the development of a modern party political life in Slovakia than was the case in the Czech Lands. Combined with a very restrictive franchise that amounted to no more than 6% of the total adult population, went a systematic use of terror and other violent methods which were directed against both the political opponents of the regime as well as members of the nationalities. Both these groups were thus prevented from freely exercising their right to vote for a candidate of their own nationality. In all the Diets that sat from 1847 to 1918 taken together, there had been no more than twenty Slovak mandates whilst on the basis of their numbers alone¹⁶³ the Slovaks should have comprised nearly 10% of the 453 members of the Diet. The very backwardness of Hungarian political life with its attendant evils of bribery corruption and nepotism had the result that Slovak political efforts were

almost entirely expended in maintaining their small foot-hold in the Diet and attempting to hold back the ever-swelling tide of Magyarization that threatened to engulf them.

Help, as was almost invariably the case in Slovakia from 1848 to 1918 came to the Slovaks from outside. And from two very different sources. The first of these was the Czech Lands where conditions for the development of Czech political parties were more favourable under Austrian rule. As a consequence of the successful revival of Czech cultural and national life there existed not one but several Czech political parties. They sought to defend Czech interests such as the growing demands for a wider use of the Czech language in education and other fields, within the Austrian parliamentary system. The United States of America during the later half of the nineteenth century had absorbed a large number of Slovak immigrants (perhaps as many as 250,000). These Slovaks had in the freer atmosphere of that country been able to organize themselves into various cultural associations. The latter published books, newspapers and periodicals in Slovak, copies of which, were often sent to Slovakia as well as financial support in the form of money remittances to members of the family and relatives, whom the emigrants had left behind in Slovakia. Apart from these two forms of support however the American Slovaks were able to help their compatriots to resist the lure and allure of the Hungarian national idea (A Magyar allami eszme) by maintaining and cultivating a deeply-felt sense of Slovak uniqueness (svojbytnost') if not of Slovak nationhood. The latter provided the Slovaks in Slovakia with an alternative ideology to the official Hungarian line.

Thus these two factors, the Czechs and the American Slovaks, within the Slovak body politica, like a catalyst on the various trends in Slovak political life that were to develop into independent political parties after 1918.

These trends were principally three in number, clericalism, "Hlasists" and agrarianism.¹⁶⁴ The first of these was represented by the small group of Catholic priests under the leadership of Andrej Hlinka. During the pre-war period this group had been active in trying to organize self-help organizations amongst the Slovak peasantry. These cooperative associations were both for temperance purposes and in order to provide a source of cheap credit so that the Slovak peasant could be free from the grip of the money-lender and the inn-keeper, who in many cases happened to be Jews. It was thus inevitable that a certain tinge of anti-semitism was often to be found in the political program and ideology of these groups. Just as the first trend was sustained by the help and support of the American Slovaks, who despite the more liberal and secular atmosphere of American Society still retained their deep religious belief, the second trend, that of the "Hlasists" (See Chapter Three) reflected the influence of the milieu and ideas of the Czech Lands on Slovakia.

"Hlasists" is a generic term for a diverse group of individuals, comprising men such as Vavro Šrobár, the Stodola brothers and Pavel Blaho among others. What they all had in common was that they were influenced by the ideas of Tomas Garrigue Masaryk. The latter had been expounding his ideas through the medium of both his teaching activities at the newly-formed Czech university in Prague as well as on the pages of his own periodical Čas which he purchased in 1895. He had had a short career also as a politician in the Austrian Reichsrat where he had formed his own one-man Party (the Realist Party). The "Hlasists" who were so-called after the newspaper in which they put forward their ideas, subjecting the state of affairs in Slovakia to a vigorous barrage of criticism, saw the panacea for Slovakia's ills in Masaryk's concept of "drobná práce". This was a policy that was aimed at making small significant advances in such fields of social welfare as health, housing and education as a preliminary step before making any

political demands. The "Hlasists" also advocated the necessity for close cultural cooperation with the Czechs and were, by and large, ardent Czechoslovaks. They sincerely believed in a unitary view of the relationship between Czech and Slovak. They considered that these two peoples were two distinct branches of one nation with one language of which Czech and Slovak were two distinct but closely related groups of dialects. Their Czechoslovakism as well as the progressive and secular nature of many of their ideas often brought them into conflict with members of the clerical group. These conflicts continued often in a more acute form after the establishment of the Republic in 1918.

The third discernable trend was that of agrarianism which is closely linked with the name of Dr. Milan Hodža. Although he was well at home in the political environment of Budapest he was an ardent Slovak nationalist who had successfully stood as a candidate in the elections to the Hungarian Diet in 1905 and 1906 where he represented the constituency of Kulpín in Slovakia. In view of the predominantly agrarian nature of Slovakia and the large number of small-holders and landless agricultural labourers there was undoubtedly a large number of potential voters among such groups of Slovaks whose desires for land reform could be effectively translated into support for a Slovak agrarian party. Hodža was most probably impressed by the growth of the Czech Agrarian Party led by Antonín Švehla and sought to emulate a similar sort of success in Slovakia.

Social Democracy could not be counted as a major political trend in view of the small proportion of the working population engaged in industry but its importance should not be discounted. Its origins were both outside of the SNS and Slovakia proper. For it was in Budapest where the beginnings of the Social Democratic Party may be discerned. A separate Slovak Social Democratic

Party was not in fact created under Hungary. Slovak social democrats were grouped for a time in a separate section of the Hungarian party until dissatisfied with the attitude of that party with regard to the question of Slovak autonomy they left the Hungarian party and joined the Czech party. The vast potential strength of the Social Democrats was not realised until 1920 when in the Parliamentary elections the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party polled over half-a-million votes in Slovakia alone. After the split between the left and right wings of the party which resulted in the eventual foundation of the Communist party in 1921 the total number of votes cast in 1925 declined to 50% of the 1920 figure.

A fifth group and one that was associated with the SNS was the small group of Slovak Protestants under the poet Svetozár Hurban-Vajansky. He placed their faith in the Russian Czar. Slovakia's liberation would come from Russia alone, an attitude which engendered a policy of passive and patient waiting for the day of liberation. This group was antagonist to the efforts of the "Hlasists" and was completely caught out by the events of the War. They played a very small part in Slovak political life after 1918.

The period from 1918 to 1920 was a crucial period for the formation of Slovak political parties as by 1920 all those parties which were to play a part in Slovak political life had already been formed in readiness for the forthcoming Parliamentary elections. But each of the parties still contested the election either in alliance with a Czechoslovak party or as an actual part of a Czechoslovak party. Political activity was also to be seen among the members of the minorities in both Slovakia and Ruthenia where Magyar, Jewish and even Ruthene political parties and groupings soon sprang up.

Two main Slovak political parties were founded. These were the agrarian Slovak National and Peasants Party (SNRS-Slovenská Národná a roľnícka strana) and the Slovak People's Party (SLP-Slovenská ľudová strana).

The latter party came into being after the end of the war in November of 1918. It may well have owed its inception to the desires of a group of Slovak priests to ensure the replacement of Magyar bishops by candidates drawn from amongst their own number.¹⁶⁵ A Slovak People's Party had been founded as early as 1905 when a group of Slovak politicians Šrobár and Hodža but not Andrej Hlinka attempted to draw on the type of support which the Hungarian People's Party (Meppart) had been enjoying in Slovak areas for some ten years. Once having gained Slovak votes however the latter party reneged on its promises to try and gain some small concessions for the minorities. It thus became necessary for the Slovak National Party within whose ranks the Slovak People's Party functioned to try and gain those Slovak votes which had formerly gone to the Hungarian People's Party, by adopting a similar sort of program.¹⁶⁶ A main element of this program was an appeal to religious feelings of Catholics. The post-war party took over this trait and a certain proportion of its support was due to the fact that many Slovaks looked upon the party as the defender of their religious feelings¹⁶⁷ which had been outraged by such acts of vandalism as the destruction of the Column of the Immaculate Conception in Prague. Hlinka protested against this act in the National Assembly.¹⁶⁸ This together with similar acts that were often the result of an excess of anti-religious zeal genuinely outraged the feelings of many Catholics who were in no way drawn to SL'S by its persistent campaign for autonomy. Catholics looked upon their parish priest (farár) as their leader¹⁶⁹ and in voting for SL'S they were in many cases just following his advice.

The demands of the Congress of Slovak Priests in Slovakia¹⁷⁰ held in Žilina on the 21st and 22nd January 1919 were for the retention of church schools the creation of a Catholic college of theology in Bratislava, the autonomy of the Catholic Church in Slovakia and the occupation of vacant bishoprics in Slovakia by Slovaks. These demands were supported by SL'S who pressed Šrobar to accept them. The last two however were matters that only Rome could decide and the Vatican refused to accept those candidates whose names were put forward by the Priests Congress and SL'S. Relations between SL'S and Šrobar worsened, the large number of non-Catholic in the Slovak Club being yet another bone of contention. The Priests Council in Slovakia (a resolution dated 28th November 1918) asked for representative places in the Club to be granted to Slovakia. There was undoubtedly jealousy on the part of Slovak Catholic priests at the seemingly disproportionate role that Slovak Protestants seemed to play in the Slovak Club¹⁷² and there were calls for Slovaks to support Slovak Catholic students so as to build up a Slovak Catholic intelligentsia.¹⁷³ The first few issues of the party newspaper Slovak in 1919 were mainly concerned with attempts to stem the flood of support for the Social Democrats.¹⁷⁴ The party leaders were evidently not only worried about the election prospects of their own party but feared that Social Democratic influence if left unchecked would lead to a loss of religious faith among many Slovak Catholics. Thus a further element of hostility and opposition to non-religious secular ideologies such as Social Democracy and Marxism became part of the basic ideology of SL'S which in 1925 added its leaders name to its title to become the Hlinka Slovak People's Party. (HSL'S). This was the only political party which incorporated the name of its leader in its title during the existence of the First Republic and this was to a certain degree the reflection of the impact of Hlinka's personality on his followers.

The Slovak National and Peasants' Party (SNRS) came into existence at the beginning of 1919¹⁷⁵ as a result of the fusion of the SNS with the group of Slovak Agrarians led by Hodža and Šrobár, the latter having refused the offer of help from SL'S in founding this new party.¹⁷⁶ Political agrarianism in Slovakia had been quite strong prior to 1918.¹⁷⁷ In the western part of Slovakia around the town of Skalica Dr. Pavel Blaho had been active in organising cooperative societies among the Slovak peasantry as well as providing educational activities to help raise the standard of Slovak agriculture.¹⁷⁸ By 1914 there were some 34 cooperative societies in the whole of Slovakia.¹⁷⁹ The major force behind Slovak Agrarianism was Dr. Milan Hodža, a skilled politician who had been one of those whom the heir to the throne of Austro-Hungary Franz Ferdinand had been inclined to consult for information on the political aspirations of the minorities.¹⁸⁰ In his activities in Budapest Hodža had pursued the moderate course of attempting to create a mass party in Slovakia so as to win cultural autonomy for the Slovaks within Hungary.¹⁸¹ In this policy he cooperated with other minority political leaders especially Serbs and Roumanians.¹⁸² An essential prerequisite for the creation of a mass party, which, as nearly 70% of the population in Slovakia were involved in agriculture, could not be other than agrarian in nature, was the introduction of a universal, secret, direct and equal franchise. In the struggle to achieve this he found an ally in the Slovak Social Democrats. He was in no way in sympathy with their ideas yet looked upon them as being concerned like him to defend Slovak interests.¹⁸³ His political demands had a certain social content but this was primarily limited to some small measure of land reform to alleviate the chronic land hunger of the Slovak peasantry.¹⁸⁴

The SNS which formed the other half of the SNRS was very much the junior partner. It was much smaller as regards membership and the number of

subordinate party branches. The SNS was in fact the remainder of the old pre-war party after the Clericals and Agrarians had constituted themselves as a separate party. Its members consisted of the conservative group of politicians based in Turčianský Svätý Martin, both Protestant and Catholic, who during the course of the war had maintained a very passive posture. They were in many cases unable to realise that a new era had come into being with the establishment of the Republic in 1918. The old unity of the SNS, which had represented most of the main political trends in Slovak life with the notable exception of the Social Democrats, could not now be regained.

Section Four

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT POLICIES IN SLOVAKIA 1918-1929

With the establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic and the final incorporation of Slovakia into it the Central Government had taken on responsibilities for an area that was, in every way far more under-developed than the Czech Lands. Its economy was largely based on agriculture and was unable to sustain a sufficiently high level of economic activity to be able to provide work for the annual increase in population. The causes of this underdevelopment were both historically and climatically determined. For years Slovakia had been a land of net emigration.¹⁸⁵ The very slow growth in her population especially that of the Slovaks disguised in fact a fairly high fertility index and birth rate. This can be from the low increase in the population in the decade 1901-1910 4.6 per 1000 inhabitants - a figure that is lower than anywhere else in Europe with the exceptions of France and Ireland.¹⁸⁶ The effects of emigration on Slovakia can be seen from the fact that the increase per thousand inhabitants of middle age from 1850-1900 was only 2.8 in Slovakia but 6.7 in the Czech Lands. In addition to this there was a certain incidence of migration within Hungary. This took two main forms viz. the seasonal migration of agricultural labourers, who worked in Hungary during harvest-time, and a more settled migration of Slovaks to Budapest and the surrounding area (as well as to Vienna) where they worked in industry, domestic service and on building-sites. By the late 1890's there were in fact considerable colonies of Slovak workers in both cities although it was in Budapest that we find the beginnings of the Slovak Social Democratic movement.

There exists a demographic tendency for the fertility of a population measured in the number of children per couple to drop from a high level characteristic

of agricultural societies to a lower level, which is to be found in more advanced industrial societies. Slovakia was no exception to this rule and the number of children per couple was higher than in the Czech Lands. We may thus deduce that it was most likely that the population of Slovakia would contain a higher proportion of dependents than in the Czech Lands. We can see from the data¹⁸⁷ contained in Table 9 that this was indeed the case.

TABLE NINE

Ratio of Dependent to active sections of the population in the Czech Lands and Slovakia

	<u>Czech Lands</u>			<u>Slovakia</u>		
	Dependent in %	Active in %	Ratio	Dependent in %	Active in %	Ratio
1910	50.4	49.6	1.01:1	60.2	39.8	1.51:1
1920	55.4	44.6	1.24:1	60.4	39.6	1.56:1
1930	51.6	58.4	1.07:1	58.8	41.2	1.43:1

We thus see that the active population was smaller in Slovakia. Yet it had to bear a greater burden in the higher number of dependents in an economy where the per capita income was much lower than the Czech Lands and hence the standard of living too. This fact shows that the higher ratio of dependent to active sectors of the population was one of the many factors that would have to be overcome in order to raise living standards in Slovakia. In my survey of the Central government policies I shall in my final summary in the last chapter try to distinguish between the extent to which these policies merely alleviated the external symptoms of Slovakia's problems and how far they were successful in initiating long-term changes in Slovakia's society, changes that would have eventually helped to eliminate or greatly diminish these problems peculiar to Slovakia.

Education in Slovakia 1918-1929

In underdeveloped societies education must be one of the main, if not the main, priority. It must first provide at the basic level the necessary means for the entire population to acquire literacy. In Slovakia by the end of 1921 82.44% of the population could read and write as opposed to 97.45% in Bohemia, 96.45% in Moravia, 85.85% in Silesia and around 54.00% in Ruthenia.¹⁸⁸ In the case of Slovakia these average figures conceal variations between different regions and the fact that men tended to be more literate than women. They also give no clue to the proportion of the population who were semi-literate, that is, they could read but not write or vice versa.

Literacy is the foundation upon which any further education is based. Slovakia would require in the years to come a certain number of teachers, administrative workers, officials and technical experts in all professions and walks of life. It would take time to create an educational system capable of satisfying all Slovakia's needs for qualified personnel. Meanwhile the help of a large number of such personnel from the Czech Lands was vital and absolutely indispensable, although their presence in Slovakia would undoubtedly cause certain problems.

From 1875 to 1918 there had been no secondary schools at all with Slovak as the language of instruction. Even in Slovak primary schools an ever-increasing proportion of teaching time was devoted to the study of Magyar. It seems that the Hungarian government was prepared to spend more money on making little Magyars out of little Slovaks than in teaching little Magyars to read and write. The effects of this policy can be seen in the very small proportion of the Hungarian intelligentsia who were recorded as Slovaks in the 1910 Census. Sveton¹⁸⁹ gives the figure of 0.1% of Slovaks as belonging

to the intelligentsia in the period 1905-1907 and 1911-1913. The figures for the entire Hungarian population are 0.5% and 0.7% respectively.

Even if we allow for a large number of Magyarized Slovaks among the Hungarian intelligentsia - the total proportion would still not exceed 1% of the total Slovak population. This was clearly too low a figure to be able to supply all the staff with the necessary educational qualifications to fill those posts in Slovakia that the central government would have to create in order to implement its policies

Prior to 1918 the only schools that the Slovaks possessed were elementary (primary) schools. These were run mainly by the various religious denominations who in return for financial support from the Hungarian government were obliged to teach the Hungarian language and to cultivate the feeling of belonging to a common state in their teaching.¹⁹⁰ In fact the Magyar language was required to be taught to such a level that "the child of non-Magyar tongue can on the completion of the fourth school-year express its thoughts intelligibly in the Magyar language in word and writing." (Paragraph 18 of the 1907 Education Act).¹⁹¹ This provision meant that most of the teaching time was devoted to Magyar. Ministerial order No. 80000/1910 fixed this at 21 to 22 hours per week¹⁹² as Paragraph 18 conferred on the Minister for Education the right to determine the number of hours prescribed for the teaching of Magyar.

Likewise the feeling of belonging to a common state meant in reality that Slovak pupils were punished or expelled from Magyar schools for alleged "pan-slavistic agitation" which in many cases was nothing other than the normal manifestation of the desire to speak or study one's native tongue.¹⁹³

By 1918 there were only 276 Slovak primary schools with 390 teachers and 30,118. According to A. Štefánek who was both Referent for Education in Srobar's administration of Slovakia and Minister for Education in the 1929 Udržal Cabinet, only 94 of these schools could be described as Slovak - the rest having been almost completely Magyarized.¹⁹⁴ A further factor in the low level of education in Hungary was the lax attendance and the number of children of school-age who were not inscribed, which in 1913 amounted to no less than 32,700.¹⁹⁵

After 1918, the most urgent question that faced the Central Government in its educational policy was the need to provide enough teachers to ensure that Slovaks could obtain education in Slovak right up to university level. This would necessitate using a large number of Czech teachers in the first few years whilst enough Slovak ones were undergoing training. Various conflicts arose on the question of the employment of Czech teachers. There were allegations that the professional, moral and personal qualities of some of the Czechs who were sent to Slovakia were unsatisfactory whilst the question of the salaries, allowances and living conditions of these teachers, as compared to those of their Slovak colleagues, also provoked controversy. Finally, the widespread use of Czech as both a medium of instruction and in periodicals, school-books and other publications as well as the vexed question of various attempts that were made to reform the Slovak orthography, allegedly so as to bring it closer to Czech¹⁹⁶ were also things that made many Slovaks slightly apprehensive and uneasy about the central government's intentions in Slovakia. Naturally such incidents were eagerly seized upon by the Hungarian revisionists as conclusive proof that Slovaks would welcome a return to Hungarian rule. This was a most forlorn hope.

The referent for Education, A. Štefánek issued an order in December 1919 dismissing all teachers in Slovakia who had not yet taken or did not wish to

take an oath of loyalty to the Republic as well as those who had no knowledge of Slovak.¹⁹⁷ This move was bitterly criticised by Magyars as an example of the government's anti-Magyar bias. Given the fact that in 1918 the majority of teachers were Magyars whilst the majority of their pupils were Slovaks what then was to be done with those teachers who had no knowledge of Slovak or whose knowledge was insufficient for teaching purposes? In 1918 there were only 390 Slovak primary school teachers but 5,000 Magyars¹⁹⁸ although the latter group constituted but 21.5% of the population of Slovakia.¹⁹⁹ A reduction in the number of monoglot Magyar primary school teachers was in view of these facts almost inevitable even if there had been no question of their loyalty to the state (which there of course was). Individual cases of hardship were bound to occur²⁰⁰ yet this does not prove there was any attempt to deprive Magyar teachers of their livelihood. Later various dates were fixed by which teachers had to pass an exam in the Slovak language, Geography, History and the Czechoslovak constitution.²⁰¹

Primary education was made compulsory and extended from six to eight years from the age of six to fourteen (Law 226/1922). There was a proviso that in Slovakia this was to be introduced gradually in as far as the personnel situation would permit but at the latest by the beginning of the school-year 1927/28.

Secondary education was also split between the various religious denominations and the State.²⁰² The question of the three catholic gymnasias that were taken under state control ostensibly because of the unregulated state of the Catholic Church in Slovakia which would have meant closing them or leaving them in Magyar hands²⁰³ was regarded by HSL'S as coming under their sphere of competence.²⁰⁴ They therefore asked for at least three of the gymnasias to

be returned to the control of the church but this was not done chiefly because of the opposition of Šrobar who was later Minister for Education in the Beneš cabinet that lasted from 26th September 1921 to 7 October 1922. This was later to serve as an excuse for HSL'S departure from the coalition into opposition against the government.²⁰⁵

In Slovakia there were basically two types of secondary schools. The "Burgerschulen" or "mestiansky" that provided an essentially less academic and more practical course of study over a period of three years than the second type the grammar-school (gymnasium or real-school) which was devoted to a more academic approach.

Law No. 137/1925 regulated the structure of the first type of school and brought it into accord with the structure current in the Czech Lands. It was to be entered, after passing the necessary examinations, upon the completion of five years of elementary education and last for three years. During this time the same subjects as at elementary school were to be studied at a more intensive level.²⁰⁶ The number of children in such schools also known as upper elementary schools by 1926/27 is shown in Table Ten. We may note the low percentage of Magyar pupils who went on to study at this level compared with the number of Slovak pupils. Approximately 8.9% of Slovak elementary school pupils (in 1926/27) as compared to only 2.9% of Magyars. This led to complaints that this was a deliberate policy of denationalization.²⁰⁷ It should be pointed out that the proportion of those undergoing secondary education who were Magyars and Jews was somewhat high. A possible explanation for this phenomenon was that Magyar Jews now wished their children to receive secondary education in Slovak. By 1930 of 136,737 Jews in Slovakia 44,009 described themselves as Slovaks²⁰⁸ in the Census. This was a considerable increase on the figure of 29,290 Jews of Slovak or Czech nationality in the

1921 Census.²⁰⁹ One can only surmise that one of the effects of this rise in the number of Slovak Jews and an even sharper drop in the number of Magyar Jews from 21,744 in 1921²¹⁰ to 9,728 in 1930²¹¹ was that most of the Jewish children who received secondary education did so in Slovak schools. 1200 out of 4438 Magyars attended Slovak, German and Ruthene secondary schools in 1927/28.²¹² This may well have been the expression of their parents wishes to identify themselves as Slovaks instead of Magyars.

The more academic grammar-type schools, as well as commerical, agricultural, technical schools and teacher-training establishments were all taken over from the Magyars and developed to fit Slovakia's needs. This meant primarily the introduction of Slovak as the language of instruction in the majority of such establishment, a fact that was deeply resented by the Magyars.²¹³

If we consider the data shown in Table Eleven we see that the proportion of secondary school pupils who were Magyars was still 16% in 1927/28 whilst the percentage of purely Magyar establishments was still 13.8%.

We now turn to the question of the establishment of higher education facilities and more specifically the creation of a Slovak university which came into being in 1919-1920. It bore the name of a famous Czech thinker and pedagogue of the 17th century, Jan Amos Komenský (Comenius as he is better known in the West) and was really the Elizabeth University buildings in Bratislava, an institution founded in 1912 and poorly attended during the War, it formed the nucleus of the new Slovak university although a distant precursor may be found in the Academia Istropolitana which was a 15th century theological college at which secular subjects were taught as well. (It was founded in Bratislava in 1467 but failed to develop). It was attended by many Slovaks. Several other institutions were also founded in the Republic at this time and

and it was partly the lack of adequate finance that prevented the university from opening with more than one faculty, the others being added later. The Medical Faculty opened on 30.7.1919, the Philosophical Faculty from 22.10.1921 and the Law Faculty from the winter semester of 1921/22 (Paragraph 3 Law No. 8/1927 Sb. Z.a.N)

In addition to this problem there was the problem of finding enough staff to ensure that the university could function. This could be solved initially by the same means as were adopted in other areas, namely the expedient of employing Czech professors. This was in itself a wise move but the Slovak Autonomists were annoyed²¹⁴ by the choice of such men as Dr. Albert Prazák and Dr. Vaclav Chaloupecký who as men of high standing were extremely pro-Czechoslovak in their views but not chauvinists. The pride of these Autonomists had also been hurt by the decision to name the university after Comenius and not some more identifiably Slovak figure.²¹⁵

The importance of a University for Slovakia cannot be under-estimated. For the first time Slovaks would be able to obtain higher education in their own language. It would not be possible to train those specialists of whom Slovak would later have need. As Stefanek says in his work on the sociography of Slovakia²¹⁶ a considerable number of specialists trained under these professors of whom the Autonomists were so critical.²¹⁷ By 1930 there were 2,038 students enrolled of whom 1,447 were from Slovakia. In 1919 the University had started with only 144 students at the Medical Faculty.²¹⁸ Of the total higher education budget of 91 million crowns in 1930 this university received 9% or 8,100,000 crowns²¹⁹ which for a much smaller university (The Charles University had over 8,00 students alone)²²⁰ and the only one of its kind in Slovakia was not ungenerous. One can however criticise the fact that no technical institute or Polytechnic, comparable to those in the Czech Lands, was founded in Slovakia during this period.

Unfortunately it requires a considerable amount of time to train university professors of sufficient calibre. It is therefore not surprising to learn that as late as 1943/44 approximately 20% of the professors at the Comenius University were still Czechs (20 out of 107).²²¹ In 1938 there were only 24 Slovak professors and 56 Czechs²²² although this in no way distracts from the very solid achievements of the university up to 1929 when it possessed 55 professors, 34 docents, lecturers and assistants and 151 other members of staff. 8,085 students had passed through its portals of whom 769 took the degree of doctor.²²³

As we can see from these data and those contained in Tables Ten and Eleven by 1928/29 there had been considerable quantitative as well as qualitative changes in improvement. This had contributed to a significant raising of education levels in Slovakia compared to 1918 although there still remained a great deal to be done.

Land Reform in Slovakia 1918-1929

Perhaps even more than in the Czech Lands there was a pressing need for Land Reform. The proportion of the land in Hungary that belonged to owners whose holdings exceeded 100 hectares was 45%. 81% of these holdings consisted of estates of 1000 hectares or more. In the Czech Lands only 12% of the total land area consisted of holdings exceeding 100 hectares.²²⁴ In Slovakia 18.4% of the total land area was 750 metres above sea-level or higher whilst this proportion was only 7.3% in the Czech Lands.²²⁵ This meant that the overall fertility of the land was lower due to the greater proportion of hill and mountain - land. This problem was compounded by the lower level of agricultural techniques and the fact that most of the more fertile land belonged to Magyar landowners whose estates were concentrated along the southern edge of Slovakia.²²⁶ Thus there were a considerable number of landless agricultural labourers who together with their dependents were estimated to comprise 31% (553,500) of the

total agricultural population in 1910.²²⁷ It was this uneven distribution of land which was the principal driving force behind Slovak and Magyar emigration.²²⁸

The main principles of the Land Reform were elaborated in Law 215/1919 of the 16th April.²²⁹ It laid down that all land of more than 250 hectares in extent or more than 150 hectares of agricultural land were to be sequestered although special exceptions could be granted for holdings up to 500 hectares in area. Compensation was to be paid in cash or in bonds, according to the average price prevailing in 1913-1915 plus various allowances for the state of the property taken over, and any improvements that had been made since 1st August 1914 as well as for any other property or livestock which had also been sequestered. From the day the property was taken over, 4% interest was to be paid on the amount assessed as compensation but the owner could not demand immediate payment.

A further measure (Law 81/1920 from 30th January 1920) laid down guidelines for the distribution of the land, those persons who were eligible to receive land and in what quantities. A previous measure had already created a State Land Office (Law 330/1919 - 11th June 1919). This body was charged with supervising the implementation of the Land Reform and was given very wide powers to decide to whom and in what quantities and in what way it would distribute the land.

These measures also laid down the amount of land that could be distributed in lots varying from 6 to 15 hectares depending on its quality, to peasant applicants in order to create viable peasant small holdings. This law annulled the upper limit of 500 hectares (that could be exempted) in order to preserve parks and cultural and historic monuments etc. It soon came to be established practice that in order to effectively utilise farm machinery

and buildings, an estate would not be completely broken up but only reduced in size so that enough land would be left to form a medium-sized estate. Such estates became known as Residual Estates and the question of the people they were given to, former owners and leases, estate officials and legionnaires who fought in the Czechoslovak legions, often led to charges of political favouritism, nepotism and corruption.

The provision of credit facilities to enable applicants to purchase holdings with advances of up to 90% for the land and 50% for the buildings was regulated by yet another law. (No.161/1920 11th March). It provided for a fixed rate of interest and a long period for repayments, and guaranteed that the loan could not be called in before time.

In Slovakia even before the Land Reform came into effect Šrobar issued a special order²³⁰ that allowed peasants to use pasture-land belonging to the owners of large estates in return for a small sum. This was done to help the poorer sections of the peasantry obtain pasture for their flocks. Because of delays in completing the Land Reform by 1926, the government was forced to rent off sequestered land to 65,034 peasants who had the smallest holdings. They received about 33,780 hectares about 0.5ha each.²³¹ Similarly part of the sequestered land had to be given over to satisfy the needs of housing and building. By 1930 approximately 2,422 hectares for building purposes had been distributed to 14,089 applicants in Slovakia.²³²

By 1929 the Land Reform was not yet completed (See Tables Twelve, Thirteen and Sixteen for results up to 1930-1.) Even if the entire land area of Slovakia would have been divided into equal holdings then the average size of each holding would have been 10.3 hectares. Of this only 6.3 hectares would have agricultural land. This does not take, however, into account the

variations in soil fertility and the use of machinery, which tended to be more widespread on the larger holdings. The effects of the Land Reform were to alleviate rather than solve problems of Slovakia's agriculture although it did distribute a certain amount of land to those who needed it. The creation of the residual estates has been criticised by those who argued that most of the available land should have been distributed to those with holdings of less than thirty hectares. If this had been done agricultural production might well have fallen as holdings of above fifty hectares were more suited to large-scale production methods including the use of machinery. Such a course of action would not have solved the underlying problems of Slovakia's agriculture which, to my mind, lay deeper in the relations between the total available amount of agricultural land and the size of the agricultural population. The latter increased by no less than 15.5% (for the active sector) in absolute terms from 1921 to 1930 in Slovakia but by only 6% in the Czech Lands.²³³ By 1929 the problem of Slovakia's rural over population was still far from being solved.

Health Care in Slovakia 1918-1929²³⁴

Slovakia undoubtedly had a lower level of general health care than in the western half of the Republic, which was the legacy of conditions which had existed under Hungary. Despite this fact, the increase in population in Slovakia continued to be higher than in the Czech Lands throughout the whole life time of the Republic. We can thus deduce that a considerable burden would fall on health facilities in Slovakia as a direct result of the large number of children who were born every year.

Slovakia benefited from the general advances in medicine that were made during this period although the improvement was not as rapid as in the Czech Lands. Adult mortality rates fell from 19.0 per 1000 in 1919 to 17.2 per 1000 in

1929²³⁵ a drop of 9.4%. Infant mortality was some 11% lower in 1929 at 165.3 per 1000 live births than in 1920 (the figure for 1919 is artificially low at 130 per 1000 live births due to the effects of the War) when it stood at 185.9 per 1000 live births.²³⁶ Mortality from tuberculosis remained almost constant at around 200 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants from 1921 to 1929 although it declined sharply from a figure of approximately 340 in 1918.²³⁷ These declines might not seem to reflect a high level of central government expenditure in this field as in the western half of the country mortality rates overall declined much faster but it should be borne in mind that Slovakia was a predominantly rural society where the difficulties of providing medical services that would be within reach of the majority of the population, were hampered by several factors. The most significant of these were the low population density, the difficult nature of the terrain which was often mountainous and the fact that 76.3% of Slovakia's population in 1930 lived in communities of 5,000 or less as against 81.4% in 1921.²³⁸ This meant that the provision of such services as piped water (which was properly cleaned and filtered) and efficient sewage and drainage systems was harder to implement. And to a certain extent the existence of such modern amenities has a decisive effect on both general health and mortality rates. By 1929 Slovakia had 8,240 hospital beds almost double the 1922 figure, 4,281 beds.²³⁹ A start had been made on the momentous task of improving public health in Slovakia but there still remained much to be done in order to try and narrow the gap between the two halves of the Republic. In the matter of public health and other social factors such as housing, employment and education all play a role. A lower standard of living prevailed in Slovakia where the per capita income in 1930 measured by the amount of bank deposits was only 1200 crowns whereas it was more than three and a half times that level, 4250 crowns,²⁴⁰ in the Czech Lands. This discrepancy would also be reflected in a lower level of general health.

The reorganization of Justice in Slovakia

This was linked with special problems. The most pressing ones were the lack of a well-developed Slovak legal terminology and the small number of Slovak lawyers and judges. In fact according to the 1900 Hungarian Census there was not a single judge or crown court official who openly declared himself as a Slovak. In addition a problem had been created by the decision to leave the old Hungarian body of law in force in Slovakia. (Law 11/1918 - 28th October 1918). In the Czech Lands Austrian law remained in force. Thus the Republic was forced to keep two divergent systems of law in operation. Eventually this necessitated the establishment of a special ministry (that for the unification of the laws) which had the task of reconciling any conflicts that occurred between these two systems as well as bringing the provisions of both these systems into accord with the new body of Czechoslovak law that was gradually being created. The most serious area of divergence in the interpretation of Austrian and Hungarian law was in the definition of domicile with regard to the acquisition of citizenship. This affected mainly members of the Magyar minority who found themselves suddenly "stateless". They were in many cases not recognised as Czechoslovak citizens despite their long years of residence in those areas that later formed part of the territory of the Republic.²⁴¹

In line with general practice in the case of former Hungarian officials in Slovakia, judges too were not asked to swear allegiance to Czechoslovakia but were only requested to give an undertaking to observe the new decrees and laws of the Republic. The great majority refused to do so and withdrew to Hungary leaving the Slovaks no choice but to employ Czech judges and officials.

The judicial system was reorganized on the basis of three instances. Slovakia together with Ruthenia came under the jurisdiction of two High courts one in Bratislava and the other in Košice. Under them came Circuit courts and then District courts. All three levels of court dealt with both criminal and civil offences and the High Courts and Circuit Courts also functioned as courts of appeal. The seriousness of the offence determined at which level it would be tried whilst the final court of appeal was the Czechoslovak Supreme Court in Brno. A separate section for appeals from Ruthenia was established at the Košice High Court. The Presidents of the High Courts had wide administrative jurisdiction over the courts under their jurisdiction out of the budget provided by the Ministry of Justice as well as the right to appoint subordinate court officials. A uniform system of pensions and salaries for the entire Republic was set up and those districts whose centres lay in Hungary were rearranged under existing centres. The new High Courts came into operation on 1st January 1921 and in line with the protection of the rights of linguistic minorities as defined by the Peace Treaties the courts in those districts where there were minorities of more than 20% of the total population whose language was other than Czech or Slovak were obliged both to issue and accept communications in the minority language.

The amounts spent on the courts in Slovakia rose from 14 million crowns²⁴² or 6.6% of the total budget in 1921²⁴³ to 61 million²⁴⁴ or 19.8% in 1929²⁴⁵ which seems to be an equitable proportion. The qualitative improvement must have been incomparable as in the pre-1918 period Hungarian judges would often impose very harsh sentences for the most harmless displays of national feeling and the general level of the legal proceedings was often lacking in objectivity and impartiality.²⁴⁶

Railways 1918-1929

The development of road and rail systems in Slovakia was an essential step towards the integration of her economy with that of the Czech Lands. Prior to 1918 the natural focal point for her economic activities had been Budapest. There converged all the railway lines from all parts of Hungary including Slovakia, lines that conveyed raw material and semi-finished goods down to Hungary and brought back to Slovakia finished goods and other articles. With the emergence of the Republic in 1918 there occurred a change of direction from south to west in the orientation of Slovakia's exports. It was necessary therefore to improve and develop those lines that connected Slovakia to the Czech Lands, something which had been totally neglected under the Hungarian administration.

Furthermore there also existed the problem of differential railway tariffs for passengers and freight. These were generally higher in Slovakia than in the Czech Lands. They were a result of such historical factors as higher charges under Hungary and the private ownership of many lines in Slovakia whose owners charged more than was the case in the Czech Lands.²⁴⁷ Such charges have been estimated to have been 52% higher per ton/kilometre than on private lines in the Czech Lands,²⁴⁸ a factor which seriously affected the ability of goods produced in Slovakia to compete in markets in the Czech Lands. The greater distances involved in transporting both finished goods and raw materials inevitable meant proportionally higher costs.

Although the railways system had not suffered any direct war damage during World War I the Hungarians had weakened it by taking away some 20,000 wagons and locomotives.²⁴⁹ The later bout of fighting between the CSR and the Hungarian Soviet Republic had caused considerable damage to the railways especially to bridges and this was worsened by very bad flooding in 1919.²⁵⁰

An investment program for the development of the railway system in the Republic was drawn up as early as 1920.²⁵¹ It foresaw the construction of sixteen new lines totalling 556 kilometres of which 385 kilometres²⁵² were to be in Slovakia. Of the total of 963 million crowns that were to be spent on the construction of these lines no less than 757 millions was for those lines that were wholly or partially in Slovakia. In addition to this expenditure over 1,000 million crowns a year was projected from 1921 to 1925, when the program was due to be completed. This was intended to pay for all the ancillary works, improvements to track and to buildings and the provision of new locomotives and rolling-stock.²⁵³

The scope and expenditure of this program was totally unrealistic in the light of both the post-war economic situation and the amount of technical help necessary. By 1925 only one line of 34 kilometres length had been completed (from Zvolen to Krupina), the studies for the other lines were not yet completed²⁵⁴ and the necessary experts were lacking.²⁵⁵ By 1930 a total length of 160 kilometres of line had been completed although the entire program was not completed even by the end of the Republic. At least 1,600 million crowns were spent²⁵⁶ in 20 years -25% of the projected expenditure of 6,431 million crowns. Although the central government was not entirely successful in implementing this investment program and executing all the projects foreseen it was able by 1930 to expend 207 million crowns on the construction of new railways in Slovakia, of a projected 757 million crowns. The amount of goods carried in trucks in Slovakia rose from 977,140 tonnes in 1922 to 1,896,431 tonnes in 1929.²⁵⁷

The Provincial Administration Reform of 1928

We now turn our attention once more to the sphere of public administration. The Zupa reform was introduced in Slovakia on 1st January 1923 but failed to take root in the Czech Lands where the old provincial system was maintained.

Thus, as in the case of the legal code, the Republic still lacked a uniform system of local government.

The Provincial Administrative reform was intended to overcome this duality. It was also motivated by certain political considerations, as we can see in the actual timing of its introduction, that were primarily connected with the attitude of HSL'S towards joining the coalition. It was at this time comprised of the main non-socialist parties both Czechoslovak and German for whom the extra 23 seats which HSL'S won in the 1925 Parliamentary elections would have been a valuable addition to its majority. In return HSL'S were bound to demand some concessions towards the realization of autonomy for Slovakia. HSL'S entered the coalition on the 15th January 1927 and the law relating to the establishment of the new provincial administrative system was promulgated on 14th July 1927 (Law 125/1927)

Upon close examination of this measure we can see that it was far from the kind of autonomy that HSL'S had envisaged as far back as 1922 when they presented a Bill in the National Assembly. This Bill contained provisions for a wide measure of autonomy for Slovakia²⁵⁸ in all fields of social and economic affairs including a Parliament (snem) for Slovakia. This proposal was defeated by a large majority in the National Assembly.

The new law contained two main elements. These were both elected members and nominated members of the new administrative bodies. The basic unit was the province (Krajina) of which there were to be four viz. Bohemia, Moravia Silesia, Slovakia and Ruthenia. The autonomous position of Silesia whose population consisted of a large german minority (40% of the total) and a small number of Poles as well as Czechs was thus formally abolished. Each province was to have an elected provincial assembly (zastupitel'stvo) which formed

a permanent committee to represent it whenever it was not in session as well as various specialist committees. An interesting stipulation was that only two-thirds of the members were elected. The remaining one-third was nominated by the government as was the provincial President who presided over the assembly and its component bodies, his various deputies and the officials who ran the Provincial Office.²⁵⁹ The assembly was a consultative body whose members discussed matters arising out of the various spheres of competence allocated to the assembly such as health, transport and economic affairs. The appointed (i.e. nominated) bureaucratic organs were responsible for the day-to-day administration of the Province and the implementation of decisions that the assembly or one of its committees had taken. The appointed members usually belonged to the various political parties whose candidates had been successfully elected to the assembly. The proportion of elected to nominated members was not always 2:1 but sometimes greater as can be seen from Table Fourteen. This was because nominated members were appointed in proportion to the strengths of the parties that had contested the elections. From Table Fourteen we can see the proportion of the vote that each party needed in order to gain one seat (elected and nominated being aggregated) and that the Agrarians were awarded a greater number of nominated seats than was warranted by the number of votes they obtained. Yet one of the smaller parties the National Democrats did much better. The former party gained only 2% of the poll yet it had twice as many seats as the SNS who gained 2.46% of the poll or the Jewish Parties who received 3.42%

Apart from the imperfect representative machinery of this new system went another provision which further reduced the power of the elected element. The official Referents who were the heads of the various departments of the Provincial Office were given the right to be present and vote at any meeting

of the assembly when items, that fell under the competence of their particular department were under discussion.

The provinces were sub-divided into districts (okresy). These were organized on similar lines including the one-third of nominated members and a nominated head (načelník) of the district assembly. The latter body was to have between eighteen and thirty-six members in total.

The basic problem that hampered the functioning of this rather cumbersome system was however financial. The provincial administrations were empowered to obtain funds by means of direct state taxes and taxes on goods and services.²⁶⁰

In the case of Slovakia the total available tax reserve was proportionally smaller than in the Czech Lands, because of the lower standard of living in Slovakia and the fact that many Czech firms, including banks, that traded in Slovakia had their head offices in Prague where they paid their taxes. Slovakia's income from various local taxes in 1928 (compared to the rest of the Republic) was as follows.²⁶¹

TABLE FIFTEEN

	Kcs.	%
Bohemia	940,402,719	64
Moravia-Silesia	346,229,948	23
Slovakia	195,093,010	13
TOTAL	1,481,725,737	100

Slovakia's share was thus rather low in respect of the proportion of the total population of the Republic who lived in Slovakia (23%). This fact had become apparent during the period when the new zupa system was still functioning in Slovakia. Over 75% of their total budget was expended on

the construction of roads and the proportion of state taxes that each Zupa was forced to levy varied from 60-70% in Bratislava and Kosice to over 100% in each of the other four Zupy,²⁶² despite the efforts of the Minister for Slovakia to redress the balance.

If Slovakia would have been granted full autonomy in accordance with the demands of HSL'S then it still would have been dependent financially to a certain extent on the Central Government as the amount of money that could have been raised by way of taxes within Slovakia alone would not have proved sufficient to provide as much investment in all the necessary social services as was done by the Central Government. And in view of the harsh economic climate of the Thirties this was even truer as agriculture in Slovakia remained in a very depressed state for most of this period. By 1930 it still provided the main source of income for almost 60% of the population.

Conclusion

By 1929 industrial production in Czechoslovakia in most branches of industry had reached the pre-war level. In the few years from 1920 to 1929 the foundations had been laid in Slovakia for a radical transformation of the administrative and educational systems. Considerable improvements had been made on the railways, although these were hamstrung by lack of funds, and in other areas such as health care. There were many shortcomings in government policies of which, as we shall see, the most serious was the lack of a coherent industrial programme for industrializing Slovakia. In spite of these shortcomings there had been undoubted progress in many fields since 1918.

Section Five

THE SLOVAK RESPONSE TO CENTRAL GOVERNMENT POLICIES 1918-1929

The results of the parliamentary elections in 1920 were slightly bewildering in as far as Slovakia was concerned. The Social Democratic Parties both Czechoslovak and Magyar gained no less than 46% of the total vote, which in view of the predominantly agrarian nature of Slovakia's economy was somewhat unexpected. One would have expected both SL'S and SNRS to have done much better than the 18% which they both received. Our interpretation of this swing to the Social Democrats in Slovakia should be tempered with caution. It cannot be taken as either massive endorsement of government policy in Slovakia or a protest against it. In the difficult conditions that prevailed throughout 1920 all the parties were agreed on the need to maintain a united front and there was no sign at all that the members of SL'S disagreed with the fundamental provisions of the constitution. Hlinka's trip to Paris had been condemned as much by members of his own party as by anyone else. We may best interpret these results both within Slovakia and in the broader context of the Republic as an expression of both protest and concern at social and economic conditions and the hope that in voting the Social Democrats into office they would be able to implement measures to combat these social and economic problems.

Šrobár, as the Minister for Slovakia, still retained wide powers. It appears that he had incurred the displeasure of the Social Democrats by putting obstacles in the way of their attempts to expand the Social Democratic union

organization in Slovakia whilst at the same time actively encouraging the formation of SNRS. He was disliked too by SL'S who resented his strongly pro-Czechoslovak orientation. An opportunity to oust him soon occurred in April 1920 and was seized upon by the Social Democrats and both the Czechoslovak People's Party and SL'S. This arose out of an incident in which the representatives of striking agricultural workers were fired upon by the police.²⁶³ All the members of the above-mentioned parties thus joined forces and attacked Šrobár savagely²⁶⁴ calling him a murderer and holding him responsible for the police actions. As a result of this campaign he was forced to resign. His successor was a Slovak Social Democrat, Ivan Déřer, whilst Šrobár was appointed to the Head of the newly-created Ministry for the Unification of the Laws.

Déřer was²⁶⁵ and still is²⁶⁶ in the opinion of V.S. Mamatey a centralist who for a Slovak was so lacking in faith in his own people that he considered that most of them were lacking any human consciousness at all.²⁶⁷ He even went as far as to play on Šrobár's role in the events that preceded the signing of the Declaration of Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš in April 1918 in order to suggest that Šrobár had in mind some sort of autonomy for Slovakia.²⁶⁸ This charge seems totally unbelievable in view of the kind of man Šrobár was and is in Mamatey's eyes a good pointer to Déřer's lack of tact, quality that was highly desirable in the holder of such a sensitive political post as that of the Minister for Slovakia.

In the election campaign all the Slovak parties polled in close association with their counter-parts in the Czech Lands. SL'S did not poll separately but on a joint ticket with the Czechoslovak People's Party. SNRS did poll separately as the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party refrained from campaigning in

in Slovakia in order not to split the agrarian vote. This form of cooperation continued in the Assembly itself. The Slovak Club was not renewed and these Slovak parties formed joint clubs with their Czech partners, although as we shall see in both cases, these associations were short-lived.

The success of the Social Democrats in Slovakia was a great disappointment for SL'S which was forced to attribute these successes to a deliberate policy of government terror as we may see from the tenor of the following statement that Juriga made in the National Assembly on 10th June and which it would be most instructive to quote.²⁶⁹ He said "We (i.e. SL'S) do not consider the elections of April 18th and 20th as a free expression of the Slovak people. They involved non-Slovak soldiers, non-Slovak officials and other non-Slovak factors. A terrifying censorship of the press, an arbitrary imprisonment of our people and leaders prevented this act from being an expression of the free will of our population."

This statement marks the beginning of the long journey of SL'S into opposition and the dissolving of all ties with the Czechoslovak People's Party. In this process the question of Slovakia's autonomy was to play a large role. It had not been an issue during the election campaign. Hlinka however had as early as 1919 become convinced of the need for autonomy to the extent of undertaking a trip to Paris to try to convince the Peace Conference to make some provision for this in the peace treaties that involved Czechoslovakia. Autonomy was for SL'S a means of combating what it considered to be the excessive and centralizing influence of the Minister for Slovakia and ensuring a political role for itself in the administration of Slovakia. The results of the elections which showed that SL'S could only obtain 18% of the total poll made it even more imperative for it to try and eliminate Social Democratic influence in Slovakia and replace it with its own. It cannot be entirely ruled out that

SL'S considered itself to be the only genuine Slovak political party as the SNS had joined with the Slovak Agrarians to form SNARS. This party could not help but fall under the influence of the parge and powerful Czech Agrarian party in whose parliamentary club it sat.

In spite of this movement towards opposition SL'S was still prepared to cooperate with the other Slovak parties and its parliamentary partner the People's Party. During September 1920 when a caretaker Cabinet of officials had to be resorted to, SL'S limited its actions to protesting against this arrangement and promising not to put any obstacles in the way of this cabinet as long as it upheld the rule of law.²⁷⁰

No detailed schemes for autonomy were advanced during 1920 and SL'S merely demanded that Slovakia's administration should be entrusted to a committee headed by the Minister for Slovakia.²⁷¹ SL'S even entered into negotiations with the new Minister for Slovakia, Dr. Michura. It drew closer both to the Slovak Agrarians and the Social Democrats who both adopted this demand as part of their program and formed a Political committee representing all the Slovak parties in Prague in November 1920.

There was a certain tension between these conciliatory moves and the desire to strike out on an anti-Prague autonomist course. This can be seen in the attitude of SL'S executive committee towards certain incidents in which Czech troops had clashed with SL'S supporters at their public meetings in Slovakia. The most serious of these incidents occurred in Námestovo on the 10th October 1920 and led to the deaths of two SL'S supporters. SL'S exploited such incidents in order to demand the creation of a separate Slovak army²⁷² and threaten to give up their seats in the National Assembly and return to Slovakia if their demands were not met.

The inauguration of three Slovak catholic bishops which had been one of the party's demands removed a possible source of friction. SL'S entered into negotiations with the caretaker Prime Minister, Dr. Jan Černý with a view to its being represented in the new Cabinet. SL'S demanded autonomy in the form of a representative assembly presided over by the Minister of Slovakia and the return of three Catholic gymnasias to the control of the Church.

All the gymnasias run by the Catholic Church had after 1918 been taken over by the state as it was not deemed wise to leave them under the control of the Magyarized Catholic clergy. As the Evangelical Church had reformed itself and rid itself of its Magyar clergy a similar course of action was not undertaken in the case of evangelical gymnasias. The government however was contemplating taking them into state control because of the shortage of funds that the Evangelical Church was experiencing.²⁷³ As three Catholic bishops had not been appointed there was no excuse for the government not to return the three gymnasias.²⁷⁴ It was loath to do so in view of the fact that the Slovak bishops stated that they could afford to contribute only 10% of the total amount needed to cover the cost of running the three schools including teachers salaries. This seemed a bad bargain to the government as it would seem to have very little influence over the schools in return for contributing 90% of the costs. This would have entailed the abandoning of the principle of a state school system to which the Social Democrats were committed. In order to pressurize the government into conceding to their demands both SL'S and the People's Party withdrew from parliamentary commissions and refused to return unless their demands were met. As the government needed their votes in order to be able to bring in measures to increase the turnover tax it was forced to give in. The then Minister for Education in Černý's Cabinet, Dr Šusta formally promised to hand over these schools to the jurisdiction of the Church.

Meanwhile Susta had been replaced by Brobar in the new Cabinet headed by Benes. Brobar, who was opposed to the activities of SL'S in Slovakia with whom his party SNRS was in electoral competition, did not consider himself bound by the promises made by Dr. Susta upon whose head the Social Democratic press had heaped the blame for this decision despite the fact that he was only doing his job.²⁷⁵ Both SNRS and the Slovak Social Democrats had protested at this government capitulation and stated that this was a political affair that should be decided by all the parties. The Government had been embarrassed by having to abandon the principle of a state school system and give in to religious pressures and were thus not too worried by the threats that SL'S made saying that it would cause difficulties.²⁷⁶ SL'S saw that it would not get the schools after all and refused to vote for the budget.²⁷⁷ The People's Party tried to make it a compulsory matter of club discipline and SL'S left the club and founded their own association. The issue of the three schools was not the real reason, as before this issue had come up in September the leaders of SL'S had stated that their stay in the People's Party Club was only a temporary one, as they were prevented from defending Slovak interests by the discipline which membership of the Club imposed.²⁷⁸ After their departure from the coalition SL'S began a campaign of agitation against Czech teachers in Slovakia.²⁷⁹

The first Slovak plan for autonomy appeared at the end of June the following year, 1921,²⁸⁰ and envisaged the creation of a Czecho-slovak Federal Republic.²⁸¹ This was to consist of two sovereign states the Czech lands and Slovakia²⁸² each of which was to have its own Constitution, legislation and Foreign Policy. The independence of each state was limited through the person of the joint President of the Republic and the need to make war and conclude peace jointly. This federalist structure was to be set on the basis of a fundamental agreement which would regulate its functioning and additional agreements on a most

favoured nation basis were to be concluded in order to solve common problems. The same number of votes was to be accorded to each state in joint consultations so that Slovakia would not be overwhelmed by the Czech Lands with its greater population and more-developed economy.

The project that SL'S presented in the National Assembly on 25th January 1922 was very similar in content to this plan. Both were in fact very much based on the Austro-Hungarian model after the Ausgleich of 1867 and were the creations of Dr Bela Tuka, a former Hungarian university professor. He had succeeded in a very short time in gaining Hlinka's confidence and became editor of Slovak, although he was suspected by some of being a Magyar agent. His task was thought to be to utilise the position of extreme opposition to the Central Government to try to prepare the way for Slovakia to rejoin Hungary through the strategem of uniting SL'S with the Hungarian Christian Socialist Party.²⁸³

The project presented in the National Assembly envisaged the creation of a Slovak Diet of 61 members. It was to have competence in the fields of education, religion, trade, justice, agriculture, public works, social welfare and finance. Its Cabinet would be appointed by the President of the Republic but acts of the President would have to be counter-signed by the competent Slovak minister in order to be valid in Slovakia, whilst laws enacted in Prague could be declared invalid in Slovakia if they were rejected by a two-thirds majority of the Diet. Common spheres of competence were to be the army, foreign affairs and communications, there was to be a common budget. One third of all central government officials in Slovakia were to be Slovaks - a somewhat impractical proposal in 1922 - and Slovakia was to have its own army units stationed on its territory. We can thus see that some of the most extreme proposals contained in the original plan had been slightly modified but it

still remained a wholly federalist solution that in the political climate of the time was highly unlikely to be considered practicably by most of the deputies and senators of the National Assembly. Indeed it was defeated by a very large majority when the time came to put SL'S' proposal to the vote.

This rejection confirmed the SL'S in its opposition course. At its Congress in Žilina in August 1921 this had become perfectly clear with the publication of a memorandum entitled (with more than a touch of histrionic pathos) "A cry of Distress addressed to the civilised world by a nation condemned to death."²⁸⁴ This document gave voice to the economic grievances of those who had been hardest hit by the post-war economic crisis and lay the blame for this state of affairs exclusively at the door of the central government, asserting that this was the reflection of a deliberate government policy. Despite this attitude of extreme opposition there were still hopes that SL'S could be induced into joining the coalition as late as September 1921 when Masaryk visited Slovakia. He was greeted upon arrival by Hlinka who assured him of Slovakia's loyalty to Czechoslovakia. Masaryk in turn assured him that Slovakia's individuality would be respected and some form of autonomy rooted in the Constitution would be granted to Slovakia.²⁸⁵ By this he probably had in mind some form of administrative autonomy. This was suggested by Milan Hodža who proposed the creation of a provincial assembly based on the new župy system.²⁸⁶ This type of autonomy may have been suggested to avoid the situation that might have been created if Slovakia had been granted its own Diet, as this might have clashed with the powers of the Minister for Slovakia. In the legislation enacted by the Revolutionary National Assembly in 1919 these powers had been very generally defined in order to cope with the threat of a Hungarian occupation of Slovakia.²⁸⁷

This form of autonomy did not really satisfy the demands of SL'S and two months later it dissolved its links with Srámek's People's Party. Srámek

incidentally had been the first one to articulate the demand for autonomy that was being voiced in Slovakia.²⁸⁸ The reasons for the SL'S decision to go into opposition could well have lain not so much in the failure to obtain concessions in the fields of schooling and autonomy as in the shrewd realization that in a period of economic depression that began in 1921 it would be easier to obtain votes in opposition to the government than as part of it. This meant that it was not faced with the unwelcome task of explaining central government policies to the voters. To many Slovaks these policies seemed totally ineffective in view of the worsening economic crisis and the closures of industrial plant in Slovakia.

The leaders of SL'S were (for the most part) patriotic Slovaks but they had never had to bear the responsibilities of government and thus found it easier to make political capital of the prevailing situation. They were in many ways typical representatives of the very small Slovak educated class (intelligentsia). As almost all of the economic activity in Slovakia up to 1918 had been in the hands of Magyars, Germans or Jews it was not surprising that they should not have possessed much understanding of economic affairs and the need for economic development as well as political liberty.

The Slovak National and Peasants' Party proved to be a most ephemeral creation. Composed of two highly divergent elements it proved impossible for both the Agrarians and the Narodniari, as members of SNS were termed, to remain in one party. There was dissatisfaction amongst the latter because of the small number of seats that were given to former members of SNS (of 24 seats in both chambers only 4 were allocated to SNS).²⁸⁹ There were also differences of opinion between former Hlasists and the more conservative Martin politicians who were critical of Srobar's policies in Slovakia during his time as Minister for Slovakia.

SNS parted company with the Slovak Agrarians on 30th March 1922 and reverted to its original name.²⁹⁰ It now began to move towards a more independent policy and the first party program spoke of gradual autonomy for Slovakia and self-government for its counties and districts on the basis of the Pittsburgh Agreement.²⁹¹ At the same time the program stressed its loyal attitude to the Czechoslovak state and its feelings for the Czechs based on fraternal affection and pan-slav reciprocity. The party newspaper Národné noviny attacked the proposed Župa Bill in its issue of the 24th April 1921. It specifically objected to the provision that one-third of the members of the representative body were to be nominated, the ban on the discussion of political matters, the purely consultative role of the assembly and the fact that it could be dissolved by the Ministry of the Interior. In addition it objected to the fact that the Provincial County Union (Zemský župný sváz) would be able to carry out only those measures which it had been instructed to do so by the Central Government and pointed out the dangers of decentralization in South and East Slovakia where the demotion of some of the old župa centres meant that they could no longer function as bastions against the Magyar threat. The Magyars would thus gain a certain degree of autonomy in those areas which was not a desirable thing.²⁹³ The leader of SNS Dr. Emil Stodola now put forward his proposals for self-government in a short work entitled "O Samosprave Slovenska".²⁹⁴ In this he put forward his plans for the introduction of a system of self-government based on the existing territorial units and in accorded with the Pittsburgh Declaration. He criticised the lack of guarantees to the Slovaks of their legal equality and suggest that the County Union should have more than 24 members that is 4 from each of the six new župy that were to cover the whole of Slovakia. He suggested that each large župa should send between 4 to 6 members each and the smaller ones at least 2 to 3 members. As there were 17 župy in Slovakia this would have had the effect of at least doubling the size of the County Union. In Stodola's plan it was to become the Diet which Slovakia had been promised in the Pittsburgh Agreement. At the end of his project he stressed

the fact that it did not represent the official policy of SNS.²⁹⁵

In two declarations in March and May 1922 issued by SNS there was little mention of autonomy. The party declared that it adhered to the Martin declaration but invited itself to asking for Slovak linguistic rights, individuality and religious feelings to be protected. It suggested that a committee whose members were to be drawn from all political parties in Slovakia should be created to assist the Minister for Slovakia.²⁹⁶ The Slovak Agrarians limited their concept of self-government to the spheres of administration, economic and educational affairs and church matters whilst SNS based their approach on the provisions of the Pittsburgh Agreement²⁹⁷ which meant nothing less than a separate Diet (snem) for Slovakia.

SL'S welcomed this new policy of SNS²⁹⁸ and the two parties agreed that the principles on which they could cooperate were to be discussed at a joint Congress. The influential Catholic wing of SNS was to a large extent responsible for this move and at the joint Congress held in Trenčianské Teplice in May 1921 Stodola's proposals were discussed. A joint declaration asked for the revision of the qualifications of Czech civil servants working in Slovakia, protested against the župa law, . . . demanded that the old župy be left untouched and urged the creation of a Schools Council for Slovakia that would influence the curriculum (to ensure that it had a strongly religious basis) and control staff appointments.²⁹⁹ On the question of autonomy they decided to meet again to draft a resolution.³⁰⁰

SNS was, however, opposed to Tuka's dualist plans.³⁰¹ In a memorandum which Stodola handed to Benes[✓] on the occasion of the latter's visit to Bratislava on 5th May 1922 he stressed that administrative, linguistic and religious matters

were not enough and that Slovakia needed provincial institutions such as a schools council, and a provincial administration and administrative council in order to best solve its problems.³⁰² Both Tuka's plan and Stodola's proposals had urged that this new system of self-government be set up by the end of 1923 yet there was still a fundamental difference between the attitudes of SNS and SL'S. The former still clung to the idea that Czechs and Slovaks constituted two branches of one nation whilst SL'S had based its demands on the concept of an independent Slovak nation.³⁰³ Gradually SNS began to retreat from this position. In May 1922 it issued a proclamation (Ohlas) in which it defended Slovak individuality and this was followed in July by a Declaration that said that its earlier statement from March had been misused as an argument against autonomy.³⁰⁴ Stodola was not happy at these developments and resigned as did two other members Ivanka and Pauliny, who joined the National Democrats.³⁰⁵ SNS was weakened by these internal rifts³⁰⁶ and this was one of the factors that prevented the party from playing a major role in Slovak politics. In the zupa elections in 1923 it received less than 1% of the total vote. Unable to make an impact on the electorate it tended to form electoral alliances with other parties and eventually fell under the influence of HSL'S.

The Slovak Agrarians rejoined the main Czech party soon after the split with SNS. Hodza tended to cooperate with HSL'S for tactical reasons in his struggle with the "Hrad" group of politicians but the Agrarians as a party tended not to criticise central government policy in Slovakia except where it formed part of their broader campaign on such matters as land reform and taxes on grain imports to protect domestic producers. The Land reform had strengthened the Agrarian positions in both the Republic and Slovakia³⁰⁷ where in view of the predominance of the agricultural population its future was assured. The party never polled less than a quarter of a million votes and was after HSL'S the largest single party in Slovakia. Its ideology³⁰⁸ was based on the

importance of the peasantry for the economy of the country and the idea that "the country was one family" ie. that social conflict between class and class had no place in agriculture. The Agrarians were in general ardent proponents of the Czechoslovak idea and thus had little sympathy for HSL'S demands for autonomy, although Hodža was not entirely devoid of understanding for the need to create an efficient system of self-government for Slovakia.

The triumph of the Social Democrats was short-lived. A gradual process of schism eventually led to the birth of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSC) towards the autumn of 1921. In Slovakia this process had begun in March 1920 when meetings of Magyar workers in Žilina proposed the foundation of a socialist party of Czechoslovakia that would incorporate all the Republic's nationalities.³⁰⁹ At its conference in Košice from the 23rd to the 30th June 1920 it called for the creation of workers Soviets in Czechoslovakia and fulfilled the 21 conditions necessary before a party could join the Comintern.³¹⁰ The left-wing of the Social Democrats who eventually became the KSC was especially strong in Slovakia. The Slovaks formed their own party on 19th August 1920³¹¹ which included members of all the members living in Slovakia. The left-wing in Slovakia and Ruthenia held a Congress³¹² in Ľubochňa at which the delegates represented 24,000 members.³¹³ The Congress accepted the 21 necessary conditions of the Comintern.³¹⁴ The founding Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party was held on the 14th May 1921 but the Polish and German communists were opposed to joining and this did not take place until the autumn of 1921 when the Unifying Congress took place after the intervention of the Comintern and Lenin personally. The effect of this split on Social Democratic support in Slovakia was not fully seen till 1925 when it polled only 4.3% of the vote.

By 1923 SL'S had experienced an increase in its support. Its share of the poll in zupa elections was 30% and to a certain extent we must attribute this

rise to the effects of the economic crisis when about 300 factories were closed.³¹⁵ Although SL'S increased its share of the poll compared to the Parliamentary elections it was not the only party to do so. The Agrarians gained 21% of the vote in the zupa elections. One cannot therefore conclude that SL'S autonomist slogans reflected the wishes of the majority of the Slovaks or as they were later to claim SL'S represented the political will of the Slovak people.³¹⁶

The Communist party was unable in this period to present an attractive alternative to SL'S. The Provincial Action Committee for Slovakia and Ruthenia set up in September 1920 was abolished from the New Year 1922, together with the secretariat as well as the Union organizations.³¹⁷ The Action Committee had wide powers and could correspond directly with the Comintern in Moscow. The four regional organizations set up in its place lacked these powers and suffered from a shortage of trained political cadres. The first regular Congress of the Communist Party held in 1923 approved the idea of a unitary Czechoslovak nation.³¹⁸ Although this was reversed the following year at the 2nd party Congress after the intervention of the Comintern³¹⁹ it remained in practice till the 5th Congress in 1929 when a new line was initiated by Klement Gottwald.³²⁰ This failure to understand the Slovak national question³²¹ was marked by the fact that no separate Slovak Communist Party was created although the KSC was known as the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) in Slovakia.³²² This was definitely a factor in the failure of the party to stem the flow of votes to HSL'S³²³, which reached its peak in 1925.

Support for HSL'S reached its peak in the parliamentary elections, when it gained no less than 34% of the vote. The Social Democrats slumped to a tiny 4.3% whilst the Communists gained 12%. This indicated that a great deal of

the support that the socialist parties had enjoyed in Slovakia in 1920 had since evaporated. Some of it was captured by SL'S. By its aggressive use of the slogan of autonomy for Slovakia as the only solution for its problems SL'S was undoubtedly successful in turning a great amount of social discontent into support at the polls. This discontent was directly attributable to the effects of the economic crisis which lasted until well into 1923.

The Communist Party was hard pressed to try and counter the propaganda campaign being waged by HSL'S. Under the influence of Klement Gottwald and Julius Verčák a press campaign was waged in the Communist press for the autonomy of Slovakia as a necessary prerequisite to the fundamental reconstruction of Slovak society, which in their eyes was the only solution to Slovakia's problems. It was also a democratic demand of Slovak workers and a means of combating the influence of HSL'S.³²⁴ There was in fact a convergence of ideas between the two parties and there had even been talks to try and explore the possibilities of some form of joint action.³²⁵ In the fifties Gottwald's part in this campaign was suppressed and Verčák was accused of neglecting the connection between the class struggle and the national question.³²⁶ Gottwald published an article in Pravda Chudoby on the 30th July 1924 in which he suggested that the Party should join together the national with the social demands of Slovaks.³²⁷ At the All-Slovakia Conference of the KSC in Žilina on 25th July 1926 he presented a memorandum the title of which was adopted as the conference slogan.³²⁸ It was entitled "Vypracte Slovensko". That is, free Slovakia from the oppressive operations of the Czech haute bourgeoisie.³²⁹ In it he put forward the theory that Slovakia suffered from the joint exploitation of both Czech and Slovak bourgeoisie. Despite this theoretical approach no mass actions were undertaken to press for the granting of autonomy and no counter-weight to HSL'S was created. The KSC was unable to make a wider impact on the electorate and by 1929 its share of the poll in the parliamentary elections had slumped to 10%.

HSL'S maintained their attitude of extreme opposition until 1927 when they entered the ruling coalition. The price of their entry was the introduction of a provincial form of administration which HSL'S hoped would provide some genuine form of autonomy. In fact it was as much subject to the control of the central government as was the earlier župa system. In the second set of elections to the župy held in 1927 HSL'S showed a loss of some 100,000 votes. This may well have been caused as much by an abatement in the general level of discontent, in view of the fact that industrial production was once more rising, as by the decision of HSL'S to join the coalition. The latter act may well have disappointed many of the party's supporters who perhaps had begun to realize that despite its demagoguery it was incapable of effecting any real changes in living standards. Furthermore by joining the government, whose policies in Slovakia HSL'S had been fiercely attacking since 1922 it could well have strained its creditability in the eyes of some of its supporters. They may well have considered that the party was, after all, only interested in pursuing its own ends, at the expense of the voters.

The Slovak Agrarians under Hodža were fervent advocates of the Provincial Administrative Reform.³³⁰ Perhaps they hoped to ensure that the Agrarian party would continue to hold its own against HSL'S. In the elections to the new Provincial Assembly held in 1928 they won, with one more seat than HSL'S although they polled less votes. The Communists on the other hand were in principle in favour of autonomy but were critical of the large element of control that the Central Government retained over the functioning of this administrative system through the appointed civil servants who carried out the actual day-to-day administration of the province. KSC also disapproved of the undemocratic provision that one-third of the members of the representative body were to be nominated.³³¹

Right up to 1929 the Social Democrats were unable to regain a significant number of votes from KSC although their actual share of the poll more than doubled by the time of the 1929 Parliamentary elections. Derer's influence in the party successfully blocked any attempts to try to reappraise the party's attitude to the question of Slovak autonomy. This may well account for the fact that they were unable to outdo the Communists electorally although their union organization in Slovakia had the most numbers.³³²

The event that really shook public opinion in Slovakia and to a certain extent served to divide Slovak political parties into pro and anti-autonomist camps was the "Tuka affair". This was eventually to serve as an excuse for HSL'S to leave the coalition although this was probably more a case of its desire to regain lost votes in the coming parliamentary elections, [The Provincial elections in 1928 when it captured only 26% of the poll had been something of a disappointment] than any genuine concern for Tuka or belief in his innocence of the charges that were to be brought against him.

The affair started in a quiet enough way. On New Year's Day 1928 Dr Vojtech Tuka published an article in the party newspaper Slovak in which he brought up the question of the existence of a secret clause in the Declaration of Turčianský Svätý Martin from 30th October 1918.³³³ According to the terms of this clause after a period of ten years had elapsed from the date of the Declaration the Slovaks would be free to decide whether Slovakia would continue to remain an integral part of the Republic or not. Consequently there would arise in Slovakia after that date, he claimed, a juridical vacuum ("Vacuum juris" was in actual fact the title of the article). The laws of the Republic would no longer have any validity, taxes could legally be withheld etc.

After a private prosecution³³⁴ by one of the signatories to the Declaration which served to maintain this affair in the forefront of public interest the Central government was forced to act. This was in order not to allow these claims which went far beyond the concept of autonomy and amounted to no less than a legal justification of Slovakia's independence, to remain unchallenged. Tuka was stripped of his immunity as a deputy and put on trial in the latter half of 1929. He was charged with treason and espionage, convicted and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment although there was some question of the reliability of the evidence. His connections with the Hungarians however were revealed during the course of the trial.

The majority of Tuka's colleagues in HSL'S refused to disavow him and maintained their belief in his innocence and saw the trial as a frame-up by the Central Government, a crude attempt to discredit the movement in the eyes of the electorate. All the members of HSL'S had displayed a resolute attitude to the question of Hungarian revisionism during Lord Rothermere's press campaign in the Daily Mail in June and August 1927 and could not be considered as in any way pro-Magyar yet in their attitude to Tuka they were content to follow Hlinka's example as his word was generally taken as law within the party. Only Juriga dared to disagree with him and for this crime he was expelled from the party in February 1929. He formed his own splinter group which, in the 1929 elections failed to capture enough votes to elect even one deputy.

HSL'S showing was not as good as it might have hoped. Its share of the poll fell to 28.1% and it registered a loss of 83,000 votes compared with the last parliamentary election in 1925. The Czecho-Slovak parties, excluding KSC, polled some 100,000 votes more than HSL'S. Although this result was

better than in the Župa elections in 1927 we are still forced to conclude that the improved showing of the Czechoslovak parties who, represented a firm commitment to the Czechoslovak state were generally in favour of no more autonomy than was already provided by the Provincial reform, reflected a measure of disappointment and disillusionment among HSL'S' former supporters. This however cannot be interpreted as a positive expression of the approval of central government policies by the majority of Slovaks.

1929 was the best year for industrial production in many branches of industry in the Republic. Production once more began to exceed the level of 1913 and this factor may well influence how Slovaks voted in the elections. It together with the revelations that sprang out of Tuka's trial may well account for the failure of HSL'S to regain the position it won in the 1925 elections. Unfortunately this rise in production proved to be an all too brief intermezzo before Czechoslovakia was caught up in the effects of the Depression. In Slovakia it would prove to be very severe indeed and a most rigorous test of the efficiency of central government policies.

CHAPTER SIX : CENTRAL GOVERNMENT POLICY IN SLOVAKIA 1930-1938

Section One;

Slovakia and the years of Crisis

The Czechoslovak Republic was during the last decade of its existence faced with one type of crisis or another. At the beginning of the Thirties a world-wide economic depression occurred. It was eventually to hit the Republic's industries quite severely and its effects receded but slowly. Hitler's successful rise to power in 1933 marked the very beginnings of the crisis involving the Republic's external security that was to culminate in the signing of the Munich Agreement in 1938.

It is against such a background what we must view the situation in Slovakia during this period and attempt to analyse the specific effects of these two crisis on Slovakia attitudes towards the Central Government and its policies. In addition to this the participation of the Slovaks in the events that preceded Munich can only be understood if we try to take into account their reactions to the implementation of central government policies during the life time of the First Republic from 1918 to 1938. Thus I feel it would be most instructive to attempt a qualitative analysis of the results of central government policies over this period.

1929, the year of the great Wall Street crash in the United States that marked the beginning of the Depression, was the year in which industrial production in most branches of Czechoslovak industry reached its highest all-time level. Production finally overtook the pre-war level of 1913. Just one year later, however, it had already began to fall and did not regain this level until just before the end of the First Republic.

As we can see from Table Twenty-two in the appendix Czechoslovakia was not really badly affected by the crisis until 1932. Then output fell by over a third. It took longer for her to recover than it did for other countries and by 1934 output was still running at approximately one-third below that of 1929.

Slovakia was also badly hit by this crisis as it affected all export industries upon which the foreign trade of Czechoslovakia was based. Hungary was one of Slovakia's most important trading partners and Slovakia accounted for about half the total trade between the CSR and Hungary¹. Slovakia's trade with Hungary consisted predominantly of raw materials, wood, paper and iron ore whilst Hungarian exports to Slovakia were almost exclusively agricultural produce.

By 1930 however the Central Government was forced to abandon its trade agreement with Hungary in view of the domestic agricultural crisis which broke in 1928 and depressed the price of agricultural products². This was done in order to prevent the continuing and unrestricted importation of agricultural produce from Hungary from driving domestic prices any lower. The effects of this move on Slovakia's trade with Hungary were drastic. By 1934 Slovak exports stood at 14.9% on their 1929 level³. This fact meant that many Slovak industries, primarily timber, iron and manganese ore, cotton and saw mills and clothing, were badly affected and had to decrease their production.

Thus in the case Slovakia we have to consider the combined effects of both the agricultural and the industrial crisis. Unemployment or short-time working among the Republic's industrial workers meant that they received less money than before. They were thus forced to reduce their consumption of many items. A drop in consumption, meant a reduction in demand and this in turn meant that Slovak agricultural products faced a shrinkage in their market in the Czech Lands. This in turn helped to keep agricultural prices

low, which effectively depressed the living standards of most of Slovakia's agricultural population.

In a predominantly agrarian country unemployment outside the industrial sector is a very difficult concept to define adequately. In times of crisis agricultural producers may respond by selling or slaughtering some of their live-stock, reducing the area sown and by consuming a larger part of their own production. For that sector of the population that possess some land can never be said to be totally devoid of any means of subsistence. The case of landless agricultural workers however must have been far worse, as not only were they deprived of employment, as there was far less demand for their services in view of the economic crisis, but as the majority were not members of a union they did not receive unemployment pay but only a much lower level of assistance⁴.

Emigration had always been one of Slovakia's greatest problems and a hall-mark of the inability of her economy to absorb all the natural increase in population. Obviously the effect of central government policies in this field would be of great interest to many Slovaks. In terms of absolute figures there was undoubtedly some improvement over the pre-war period as Slovakia's migration losses were 216,557 for 1901-1910 alone⁵, yet as we can see from Table Twenty-three Slovakia accounted for over half the total number of applications for passports. Even though the number of applications fell sharply in the 1930-37 period* Slovakia's share actually increased, from 52.6% for 1920-30 to 53.3% for 1920-37 and 57.6% for 1930 to 1937. In terms of applications per thousand of population the position was as follows:

TABLE TWENTY-FOUR

	Slovakia	CSR
1920-37	59/1000	20.7/1000
1920-30	57/1000	24/1000
1930-37	8.5/1000	3.6/1000

From this analysis we can see that Slovakia was proportionally far more severely effected. With only some 23% of the total population of the Republic she almost invariably had more than 50% of the applicants who were granted passports. Slovakia's migration losses have been calculated as 124,032 for 1921-30 and 116,901 for 1930-40 on the basis of the difference between the actual increase in Slovakia's population and the excess of births over deaths within the same period⁶. These losses amount to 27.2% of the natural increase for the period 1921-30 and 31.5% for 1930-40 respectively⁷. From these data we can see the extent to which Slovakia was characterized by a relatively high level of emigration and clearly this fact must have influenced Slovak attitudes to the Central Government in some way. It was most probably one of the many factors that account for the support shown for HSL'S even after 1929 as although the actual numbers of passports granted show a steep decline Slovakia still continued to furnish the majority of the applicants.

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*Data supplied to me by the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the US Department of Justice show a decrease in the number of immigrants to the United States from Czechoslovakia from 102,194 in 1921-1930 to only 14,393 in 1930-40.

The demographic effects of emigration upon the original population structure vary in their intensity and nature according to the size and type of the emigratory movement. In Slovakia certain areas had been more prone to emigration than others with the result that the ratio of men to women was substantially altered and the proportion of older age groups in the population increased as emigration primarily effected young males, most of whom were unmarried⁸.

By 1934 a marked downward trend was noticeable in the figures for the annual birth-rate in Slovakia that was steeper than the decline in the death-rate, so that the average annual increase in population, i.e., the excess of live births over deaths, lessened. This phenomenon alarmed many Slovak demographers who saw Slovakia threatened with depopulation⁹ as a result. For a decline in the birth-rate was the almost inevitable concomitant of the process of industrialization and could be seen in all the industrial countries, yet Slovakia still remained a predominantly agrarian country. If we compare the figures for the total number of those (both in the active and dependent sectors) who drew their livelihood from agriculture in the 1921 and 1930 Censuses¹⁰ we see at once that there was little change in Slovakia. There was even a small rise in the absolute number of those in the agricultural sector¹¹.

TABLE TWENTY-FIVE

PERSONS ACTIVE IN AGRICULTURE

	1921	% of population	1930	% of population
Slovakia	1,761,748	58.76	1,822,114	57.72
Bohemia	1,896,657	28.43	1,636,976	23.02

Let us now consider the next set of figures¹² that show the average number of persons involved in agriculture per 100 hectares of land.

TABLE TWENTY-SIX

	Including Pasture Land	Excluding Pasture Land
Bohemia	48.7 per 100 hectares	52.4 per 100 hectares
Slovakia	61.2 per 100 hectares	76.1 per 100 hectares

One hectare of land thus had to support more people in Slovakia than in Bohemia in spite of the fact that yields¹³ were lower and the conditions for agriculture less favourable¹⁴. If we compare the number of people engaged in agriculture from 1910 to 1920 we arrive at the following figures^{15, 16}.

TABLE TWENTY-SEVEN

	1910	1921	1930
Slovakia	1,813,348	1,817,878	1,892,042
Bohemia	2,184,826	1,980,389	1,710,723
Increase/Decrease	1910-1930	1910-1921	1921-1930
Slovakia	+78,694	+4,530	+74,164
Bohemia	-474,103	-204,437	-269,656

In Bohemia it thus follows that all the additional labour force that became available due to the natural increase in population must have found employment in other sectors of the economy. In Slovakia however the increase in the agricultural population amounted to 6% of the natural increase for 1910-1921 and 22.3% of that for 1921-1930. Slovakia by 1930 therefore still remained a mainly agricultural country upon which the effects of the economic crisis were somewhat hidden as there were not so many industrial workers who could be made idle. The unemployment figures for Slovakia are therefore somewhat surprising (see Table Twenty-Eight) for they reveal that up to 1936 Slovakia's share of unemployment increased constantly reaching a final figure of 14.08% of the Republic's unemployed in 1936.

It should be stressed that from 1931 to 1936 not only did the total number of unemployed rise faster than in the Republic as a whole but that it also fell at a slower rate. It has been argued that Slovakia recovered faster from the effects of the Depression because the number of workers insured against illness was 13.4% higher in Slovakia in July 1937 than it was in 1929 whilst in the Czech Lands it was still below that level¹⁷. This may be due, wholly or in part to the fact that the production of crude iron rose sharply from 1934 to 1936, when it attained levels of production that had not been reached since 1922. The extraction of iron and manganese ores, necessary to the production of steel, and the hewing of brown coal also recorded increases. The amounts of both brown coal and iron ore overtook the 1929 level in 1937 whilst that of manganese ore remained a little below its highest recorded level of 1930. What is significant is that in the Czech Lands the production of iron ore did not regain its former high level of 1928 by 1937, although its recovery was just as swift as in Slovakia. Table Thirty-One would seem to confirm that this recovery in Slovak industrial output did not occur until February 1937 with the exception of the isolated month of November 1936.

This rapid rise in the output of heavy industry was the reflection of the growing uncertainty and insecurity that had enfolded Central Europe since 1933. The large investments that the Central Government was forced to make in arms production and the construction of frontier defences help to explain this rise in steel production that benefitted heavy industry. In other sectors of the economy unemployment did not begin to decline below 400,000 (see Table Thirty-One) until April 1937¹⁸ and many light industries (especially in the German parts of Bohemia and Moravia) were very badly hit. Unemployment was perhaps one of the main factors behind the growth of Konrad Henlein's Sudetendeutsche Partei. By 1937 industrial production in Czechoslovakia was still only 96.3% of the 1929 level (Europe's as a whole was 112.1% and the USA's 102.7%) and her share of

world exports had shrunk from 1.84% in 1929 to 1.36% in 1937¹⁹. These were unfavourable indices of the state of her economy which as it was so highly dependent on exports was of a type that was highly susceptible to prolonged economic crises.

Thus the situation in Slovakia during the Thirties could at best be described as static. The Central Government was unable to cope adequately with an economic crisis which it could do very little to control as it had no way of intervening in what was basically a free enterprise economy. Some Slovaks and almost certainly the poorer ones may than have been very easily tempted into blaming the Central Government for their economic state. They thus tended to give their support to HSL'S. The party seemed to have undergone a swing to the right, possibly under the influence of the many European states that possessed authoritarian and Fascist regimes, which in certain cases claimed to have a Clerical or Christian Socialist ideology. In spite of the very harsh effects of the crisis however central government support was not completely eroded. The parliamentary elections of 1935 demonstrated clearly that a large proportion of the electorate was still prepared to accept that Central Government policies, inadequate as they might have been, nevertheless represented a genuine effort at the amelioration of conditions of Slovakia.

Section Two:

Political Developments in Slovakia during the '30's

Most of the works of both a general and a specific nature that deal with the history of the Czechoslovak Republic during this period concentrate their attention almost exclusively on two closely-linked phenomena, viz, the growth of Henlein's Sudetendeutsche Partei (SDP) within Czechoslovakia and the establishment of a Nazi regime in Germany. Both these factors were to be involved in the sequence of events that culminated in the Munich Agreement and the subsequent transfer of Czechoslovak territory that this entailed.

The impact of these two phenomena upon the general internal political development within the First Republic has been comparatively little studied by historians. For both the economic effects of the Depression era and the threat to Czechoslovakia's security that the Nazi regime represented, coupled with the continuing hostility of her Northern and Southern neighbours Poland and Hungary, were factors that were to have an important bearing on the attitude of the Slovaks both to the existence of the Czechoslovak state and their role in it. The Slovak Autonomists were quick to utilise the opportunities that a changed situation presented, in order to extract the maximum of concessions from the Central Government, but in concrete terms little was achieved before 1938.

The Tuka Trial provided a convenient excuse for HSL'S to leave the coalition and go into opposition, this move was prompted far more by electoral considerations than by any belief in Tuka's innocence. The loss of votes that the party sustained in the 1929 elections to the National Assembly (see Chapter Seven) cannot be directly attributed to the revelations about Tuka's activities as a spy and agent provocateur for the Hungarians that emerged from his trial. It represents however an

upswing from the even lower position it had reached in the 1927 County (Župa) and the 1928 Provincial elections. It was most probably due to HSL'S having entered the coalition, as it was primarily a party that to some extent functioned as a reservoir for the floating protest vote of those who wished to register their discontent with one or other aspect of social and economic conditions in Slovakia. In their propoganda they tended to blame the Central Government for deliberately neglecting Slovakia's economic development and treating it merely as an agricultural colony where they could send the excess civil servants who could not be found jobs in the Czech Lands. It was thus very difficult for such a party to justify its entry into a government coalition when for years its appeal to the voters had been based upon a virulent anti-government stance. It was thus obvious that it had to convince its supporters that this volte-face in its policies had come about for very good reasons. Namely some form of concessions in the shape of an administrative system responsive to Slovak needs that went towards providing a measure of autonomy for Slovakia.

The Provincial Reform of 1928 (discussed at length in the preceding chapter) was intended to provide HSL'S with concrete proof that their demands had been met²⁰. The actual nature of the proposed reform however was such that the proposed administrative system would only have very limited and rigorously delineated spheres of competence. It would still be subject to the overall control of the government authorities who appointed the President of the Provincial Assembly, the latter having a wide range of powers. Such a system did not provide any of the necessary elements of an autonomous system of government although this point may not have been readily apparent to the majority of the electorate.

The tactics that HSL'S adopted in trying to present the reform as a triumph do not seem to have been successful. Part of the party's supporters who

had helped it achieve the a spectacular success in the 1925 elections now failed to be convinced that they should continue to support it. The party lost ground in the 1927 County (župa) elections to the tune of a 100,000 votes²¹, over 60,000 votes in the first elections to the newly-created Provincial Assembly in 1928 and 80,000 votes in the 1929 elections to the National Assembly. Obviously the entry of HSL'S into the coalition was only one of the many reasons behind this loss of popularity as was the introduction of the Provincial Reform. The economic situation in Slovakia was not too good-inspite of the increase in industrial output which by 1929 had overtaken pre-war levels there was an agricultural crisis and the selling price for many Slovak agricultural commodities remained at a low level on the Prague exchanges²².

By 1930 the index of industrial output in Slovakia had fallen to 89.2% of the 1929 level. This fact was bound to have an adverse effect on the general economic situation by further depressing the demand for agricultural produce as the living standards of unemployed industrial workers inevitably fell. It is most unlike that HSL'S were able to foresee the coming economic crisis but by having left the coalities when they did they had placed themselves in a better position to exploit the discontent that the Depression would arouse.. Had they remained in the coalition they would surely have been seen to have compromised themselves in the eyes of some of their supporters by their continued association with a government that did not do enough to combat the effects of the Depression in Slovakia.

Although Hlinka steadfastly clung to his belief that Tuka was innocent of the charges and saw the trial as a attempt to try and discredit his party in the eyes of the Slovak electorate²³, on the part of the Central Government, he and most of the leading party officials did not take their demands for autonomy to the point of envisaging some sort of association with one of the surrounding states either Poland or Hungary. Indeed their

attitude to Hungary was a markedly negative one. During the revision campaign conducted in 1928 by Lord Rothermere who published two articles in the Daily Mail (which he owned at the time) supporting a revision of Hungary's frontiers and later visited Hungary itself where he was accorded a raptuous welcome²⁴, the party's united opposition to this was most clearly and unequivocally shown and all Slovak and Czechoslovak political parties and other organizations were united in their denunciation of Rothermere's efforts²⁵.

This however does not mean that the party did not continue to press for the attainment of Slovak autonomy within the framework of the Czechoslovak state. In fact after the reverse of 1929 the party seems to have recovered from the strains of being a part of the coalition, when there seemed to be a danger it might break up into several opposing factions²⁶, and taken a turn to the right.²⁷ Tuka was replaced by the ardent polonophile Karel Sidor, the older generation of Hlinka's contemporaries was dying out and was being replaced by younger more radical men some of whom professed open admiration for Europe's authoritarian and Fascist regimes. These men became known as the Nástupisti after a radical fortnightly magazine Nástup that reflected their views.

The first act of this new radicalised party was to present its second Bill on Slovak Autonomy on the 8th May 1930²⁸. This proposal may have been similar in content to its first Bill which was presented in the National Assembly on 27th January 1922 in the draft of which Tuka had a hand. This plan also formed part of the Zilina Memorandum (see Chapter Five) and with corrections in 1930 and 1934 constituted the basis of HBL'S' demands in June and August 1938 and the Slovak Autonomy Law of the 22nd November 1938.²⁹ It provided for wide territorial autonomy for Slovakia as a separate province (krajina) with its own one chamber Diet (snem) that was to have legislative powers in the following areas Administration,

Schools, Church, Justice, Social Welfare, Trade, Agriculture, Public Works and Finance. There was to be a Cabinet appointed by the Diet with a Provincial President appointed by the President of the Republic. The areas of Foreign Policy, Defence, Posts and Communications were to remain within the competence of the Central Government. This plan was no more successful than the first Bill and was easily defeated by a large majority³⁰.

By doing so the Central Government had demonstrated that there was to be no change in their attitude to the question of Slovak autonomy. The views of such centralist Slovak politicians as Ivan Derer, Minister of Education from 1929 to 1934, were still the decisive factor in their refusal to accede to HSL'S demands. They could argue that Slovakia already possessed an adequate system of self-government in the form of the Provincial administration (see Chapter Five) and that any further extension of its autonomy would be premature. By refusing to discuss the matter further with HSL'S they undoubtedly helped to maintain it in its radical anti-government attitude and made it harder for the moderates within the party to control the "radical" wing. The insensitive handling of the question of the reform of the Slovak orthography (see below) provided the "radicals" with even more ammunition.

Attempts had been made to try and bring the two literary languages, Czech and Slovak, closer together by establishing a new Slovak orthography for the literary language. The effect of this reform would have been to have narrowed the gulf between standard literary Czech (spisovná čeština) and the Slovak literary language. HSL'S was bitterly opposed to any such move as they feared that it was motivated by a desire to create a "Czechoslovak" literary language that would undo the effects of Stur's reforms (see Chapter Four) and pave the way for the Slovaks to return to the use of Czech as their literary language. Indeed Derer had given

instructions for the production of a new grammar that was intended to bring Czech and Slovak closer together³¹. And the reform itself openly stated that this was the case and that Czech norms had been used as a standard³².

The institution that was most closely connected with these proposed linguistic reforms was the Matica Slovenská. This had been the most important Slovak cultural body in the nineteenth century and had been closed by order of the Hungarian authorities in 1875. It did not come into being again until the establishment of the Republic in 1918. Its main functions were to encourage the development of the Slovak language and maintain contacts with the various Slovak communities abroad especially in the United States³³.

The Matica endeavoured to maintain a strictly non-political stance and was even criticised by HSL'S for doing so³⁴. This was despite the attacks made on it by Dr Prazak and other extreme "Czechoslovakists" who disliked the manner in which it sought to defend Slovak individuality (svojbytnost') and the use of the Slovak language to the extent of Slovakizing any articles that appeared in its journal in Czech. This was a reversal of the older tradition from the first period of the Matica's activity 1863-75 when articles were published in both languages³⁵.

The "Rules of Slovak-Orthography" appeared in 1931 and were the results of the work of a committee of the Matica under the chairmanship of Vaclav Vazny, reputedly an ardent adherent of the theory of a unitary Czech-Slovak people³⁶. These new rules caused a great controversy and widespread discontent among many Slovaks because the reformed orthography attempted artificially to reduce Slovak to the level of a mere dialect of Czech. It ignored the stabilization in the usage of the Slovak literary language that occurred during the '20's and '30's as well as the many advances in

Slovak terminology to which the increased activities of the Matica in the field of publishing had helped to contribute.

A mass meeting of the Matica held on 12th May 1932³⁷ rejected the reforms, Vazny resigned and the meeting was taken over by Hlinka's supporters who then proceeded to elect several members of HSL'S to serve on the executive committee of the Matica³⁸. The infiltration of HSL'S members was a continual process and by May 1937 two important members of HSL'S Tiso and Durčanský were elected as committee members³⁹. HSL'S was thus able to use the Matica for their own ends⁴⁰ and this was a factor in the success that HSL'S had in being able to elicit a great amount of help and support in its autonomy campaign from the American Slovaks.

A Congress of the Young Slovak Generation was held at Trenčianské Teplice from 25-26th June 1932 at which 500 young Slovak intellectuals of all shades of political belief discussed the economic, social and cultural problems of Slovakia⁴¹. Once again Hlinka's supporters were able to gain control of the Congress and pass a resolution that declared their exclusive support for and their total identification with HSL'S efforts to secure autonomy for Slovakia⁴².

The most important event of 1932 and the one that shows how firmly the party was set on its new and militant course was the electoral alliance that it now concluded with the Slovak National Party (SNS) under the leadership of Martin Rázus, in Zvolen in October 1932. This was followed by a joint Congress held in Trenčín in December of the same year at which Hlinka said "I shall defend the nation even at the expense of the Republic ("i za cenu republiky")⁴³. How far this remark was meant to be taken as a serious threat by the Central Government and to what extent it was intended to impress the voters with the seriousness of the party's intentions is not clear but it is hard to believe that Hlinka despite the tenacity with which he clung to the single concept of autonomy in his struggle for

electoral influence in Slovakia would willingly undertake actions deliberately calculated to weaken or to undermine the Republic. It is possible that this remark was as much intended to impress the radical wing of the party and restore Hlinka's authority as leader. The SNS abandoned its former alliance with the National Democrats who had been trying unsuccessfully to groom the SNS as a conservative party of big business in Slovakia⁴⁴, and threw in its lot with HSL'S. Together with the Ruthenian Autonomous Agricultural Union and the Polish separatist parties they later formed the Autonomist Bloc. It contested the 1935 elections as such and not as single parties, which was undoubtedly advantageous to the smaller groups who might not otherwise have stood much chance of having any of their candidates elected. The rationale behind this bloc was obviously one of uniting all the autonomist forces despite national differences. Yet it is clear that Hlinka took care to avoid any sort of link with either the Magyar parties who contested the election as a single united group or Konrad' Henlein's Sudetendeutsche Partei. Hlinka may well have wanted to avoid giving the impression that HSL'S was prepared to work with forces hostile to the idea of the Czechoslovak state as the homeland primarily of Czechs and Slovaks. For the latter group he wanted to claim not just minority rights but the position of being the second nation in the state. It was thus crucial that he did not base the case for Slovak autonomy upon the same arguments that were being used by the minorities' leaders.

HSL'S other Slovak partner in the Autonomist Bloc, SNS, was a small party that had never gained more than 5% of the vote. It possessed however the pretige of having been the oldest and the only real political party to exist in Slovakia prior to 1918. Since then it had been cast into the shadow by the plethora of other parties that had come into being and were playing a regular part in Slovak political life.

One can therefore understand this party's willingness to associate itself

with a larger grouping although this meant that it tended to be totally indentified with the policies and tactics of the grouping and the way in which it set about presenting its demands. SNS was in any case numerically far too weak for it to be able to develop any credible alternative to the programme that HSL'S put forward.

It is hard to determine the exact nature of the material advantages that SNS derived from its association with HSL'S within the Autonomist Bloc. The extra votes that SNS could muster would be welcome enough, although somewhat few in number, whilst the mere fact that such a grouping had been created could be exploited in HSL'S propoganda as a sign that it was now set on the right path. At long last it had been listened to and its opinions agreed with. Such interpretation could be placed upon SNS' decision to agree to the formation of an electoral alliance with HSL'S although how effectively this could be exploited to win new votes remains open to question. It is, I think, far more likely that, as SNS was the only other Slovak party of any major significance by "absorbing" it and drawing it into close collaboration HSL'S was able to inherit the kudos that was associated with SNS. It could thus present itself as the only genuine Slovak party, heir to a long and honoured tradition of defending Slovak interests from external oppression.

Such motives may not have been present at all. HSL'S may just have been concerned to try to form a bloc of all Slovak parties in Slovakia. Such a move would have the effect of distancing the Slovak bloc from both the Czechoslovak and the Magyar parties in Slovakia. Perhaps Hlinka hoped to be able to turn to the party's advantage the discontent that the economic situation was causing in Slovakia where by 1933 there were at least 88,000 registered unemployed according to official figures⁴⁵. He thus hoped to win extra support for the Bloc and its policies. Judging from the results of the elections to the National Assembly in 1935 the course of action that the Bloc followed in demanding autonomy, a pre-

requisite for solving Slovakia's problems was only marginally successful. By 1938 however the Bloc had made significant gains in local government elections in Slovakia⁴⁶ at the expense of the Communists⁴⁷ among others. Although by then they may have had the successful example of the SdP before their eyes and may well have been influenced by their tactics and met methods of organization.

In 1933 two serious incidents occurred that demonstrated the extent to which the question of Slovak autonomy dominated relations between the Central Government and many Slovaks. The first of these occurred when the then Prime minister Malypetr made a speech in the National Assembly in which he alleged that more was invested by the Central Government in Slovakia than was obtained from it in the way of taxes. This speech made on 20th May 1933 was officially placarded all over the towns and villages of Slovakia and stated that for the period from 1919 to 1932 the Central Government expended some 15,600 million crowns in Slovakia whilst receipts totalled only some 14,000 million⁴⁸. Not only was Malypetr's speech distorted in the Press so as to make it seem that he said things that he never did such as the statement that Slovakia was costing the Czech Lands money (Na Slovensko se dopláci) but such a comparison was impossible to make. Separate accounts for each province were not kept and the budget for each Ministry was drawn up on a state-wide basis. Furthermore many firms that had branch offices in Slovakia had their head offices in Prague and it was there where they paid all their taxes. This line of argument which had been first adduced with a view to providing a reason why Slovakia should not yet be granted autonomy was blatantly untrue, ineffective and had the added disadvantage of needlessly antagonising part of Slovak public opinion. Even such a politician as Milan Hodža, who could in no way be suspected of favouring HSL'S made a speech in Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš in which he openly stated that no such direct comparisons were possible.

The other incident that occurred the same year and which helped to widen

the gulf even further between the Central Government and the Autonomists was the affair of the Nitra celebrations. These were intended to celebrate the 1,100 anniversary of the founding of the first church in Slovakia in Nitra in the year 833, A.D. Many government figures and local dignitaries were invited to the celebrations but Hlinka was not among those who were officially invited to attend and speak. He did however attend in his capacity as a private citizen. His supporters were highly offended by what they took to be a personal affront to him as well as an indication of the Central Government's unwillingness to recognise the importance of the Autonomist movement in Slovak public life. Here the views of a such centralists as Dérer may have played a key part as by the beginning of the Thirties they were hardly on speaking terms with the Slovak Autonomist⁴⁹ and this factor may have had a decisive role in influencing those who were responsible for issuing the invitations, not to invite Hlinka to address the crowds who had gathered to witness the proceedings and listen to the speakers.

Hlinka's supporters were present in the crowd in sufficient force to be able to take over the proceedings and bring Hlinka to the podium from where he gave a passionate speech demanding autonomy. Most of those responsible for this disturbance went unpunished. The 150 or so who were arrested and charged with anti-government rioting later had most of the charges against them dropped. The few who were punished were granted an amnesty in 1935⁵⁰. Dérer however was enraged by this incident which shocked public opinion in both halves of the Republic and asked the Government to dissolve HSL'S. It however refused to do.

During October 1933 it did dissolve two German parties the German Nazi and the German National Party whose activities seemed to herald the dangers of a Nazi upsurge among the Republic's three-and-a half million Germans. This action was taken by virtue of a law, passed earlier in the year, that empowered the Government to dissolve any political party or

other organization and halt its activities if they constituted a threat to national security and the safety of the Republic. By its actions the government prevented any overt subversion of the state. Yet the removal of the two parties created a political vacuum that was soon to be filled by a movement led by a schoolmaster, Konrad Henlein, which had its roots in German gymnastic organizations (Turnvereine). Such a movement had the advantage of not overtly Nazi from the outset as it limited itself at first to demanding autonomy and more help for German areas that were very badly affected by the Depression. Gradually however this movement came more and more under the direct control of Berlin from where it received its orders as well as financial help in the form of subsidies to enable to carry on its political activities.

Although Masaryk suffered a stroke on the 1st May 1934 that left the left side of his body paralysed he still nevertheless stood for re-election as President, as he was then unsure of the National Assembly's attitude to Beneš, whom he wanted to see as his successor⁵¹. He was duly elected for the fourth time on the 24th May and received 327 votes whilst the only other candidate, the Communists' leader, received 38. The National Democrats, the Magyar Nationalists and HSL'S all cast blank votes. Despite his illness however Masaryk did not resign till the 21st November 1935 when he nominated Beneš as his successor. By then however elections to the National Assembly had taken place that had radically altered the balance of forces within the coalition.

The success of the SdP in the 1935 elections in which they won 44 seats in the Chamber of Deputies meant that the ruling coalition was not reduced to a minority⁵². As the SdP could not be expected to join unless all its demands were met, something to which the other parties in the coalition were loath to agree, the position of HSL'S had been considerably enhanced despite the fact that in electoral terms the Autonomist Bloc had not done as well as might have been expected. Negotiations were thus opened

with a view to bringing HSL'S into the coalition and Hlinka presented Malypetr with a list of 32 economic and social demands as a pre-condition to entry. He was however unable to agree to their demands and negotiations were thus discontinued as far as entry into the coalition was concerned although both Benes and Hodza, as we shall see, continued to negotiate with HSL'S.

Benes' election to the Presidency was not as straightforward as it might have seemed, for he did not have the support of all the Czechoslovak parties. Both the Agrarians and the National Democrats were opposed to his candidature and proposed their candidate Antonin Nemec a little-known member of the National Democrats. The electoral victory of the SdP whose support neither candidate wished to solicit as the party was far too aggressively anti-government in its attitudes meant that neither Benes who was supported by the Socialist parties and the Communists as well as the Czechoslovak People's Party nor Nemec who had the support of the Agrarians, National Democrats, Fascists and the Tradesmens Party⁵³, could raise the necessary majority. The attitude of HSL'S was thus vital⁵⁴. The Communists were prepared to support Benes because not only had the Soviet Union been admitted to the League of nations in 1934 but a new policy of seeking a "united front" of all anti-fascist forces had been inaugurated by the Comintern in 1935 and prescribed as policy for all national communist parties⁵⁵.

HSL'S would obviously demand some concession in return for their support and thus Benes entered into negotiations with Tiso who had now become Hlinka's second-in-command. According to Tiso's account of their meeting Benes promised to use his influence to settle both the Slovak and the Ruthenian questions⁵⁶. In addition he also promised some sort of concrete form of autonomy for Slovakia⁵⁷. This account may or may not be true but it is known that Slovakia was not granted any new system of self-government other than the Provincial system that functioned unchanged from 1929 to

1938 until after the end of the First Republic in October 1938.

Benes' election was secured when Hodža decided to bring over the Slovak Agrarians to his side in opposition to the right wing of the party under Beran who had now become chairman occupying the post that had been left vacant since Švehla's death. Hlinka was persuaded by Tiso and the Vatican also exerted pressure on him to swing HSL'S behind Benes⁵⁸. Benes was elected President on the 18th December 1935 gaining 340 out of 440 votes cast⁵⁹.

Meanwhile Hodža had been appointed Prime Minister on the 5th November and he was the first and only Slovak to hold the post during the first Republic. His appointment in Slovakia however was regarded as a personal choice and not as any concession to Slovak feelings for he had never really identified himself with purely Slovak affairs⁶⁰. Prague not Slovakia had been the main centre for his political activities and as head of the Slovak agrarians a large party in Slovakia and one that was invariably identified with the Central Government it would have been surprising had HSL'S expected that he would be more sympathetic to their demands. For the Central Government the presence of a Slovak as Prime Minister was a useful proof that Slovaks could rise to very high positions and that there was no deliberate policy of excluding them as such in Prague's personnel policy.

Hodža opened negotiations with HSL'S on the 21st January 1936 and HSL'S' demands included the 32 demands they had earlier put to Malypetr as well as demands for a Slovak Diet (snem) with a wide field of competence including legislative powers, recognition of Slovak distinctness (Svojbytnost', the Slovak language and the restoration of the Minister with full powers for Slovakia⁶¹. As HSL'S had once experienced the effects of being part of the government coalition on its electoral support they were understandably wary and were not prepared to settle for less than what was contained in

the Pittsburgh Agreement. Understandably only far-reaching concessions would be sufficient to convince the voters that they had not sold out merely in order for a few members of the party to become Ministers and sit in the Cabinet. As they themselves had constantly raised the question of the incorporation of the Pittsburgh Agreement into the Constitution and asked for its provisions to be put into effect, they could not therefore afford to be seen by their supporters to be settling for anything less.

Hodža refused to accept these demands on the grounds that they neither were economically viable at the present time nor did the security situation of the country allow them to be carried out. HSL'S then asked for an undertaking that these would be carried out at some future date but Hodža refused to give it and the negotiations were broken off on the 27th March⁶².

The Central Government was plainly unable to accede to all these demands in their entirety, even if they had been willing to do so. For not only would such a scheme for Slovak autonomy destroy the basis on which the state was built, as a unitary state for the Czechs and Slovaks with legal guarantees of the status and rights of ethnic minorities, but once autonomy had been granted to the Slovaks it would be difficult to resist similar demands on the part of the Germans or any other ethnic minority. The prospect of the State being transformed into a loose confederation of autonomous ethnic areas was a decidedly unwelcome one. The threatening and aggressive behaviour of Nazi Germany had made the Central Government conscious of the need to strengthen its border defenses whilst the hostility of both Hungary and Poland, where Colonel Beck pursued a markedly pro-German foreign policy, were forces still to be reckoned with. Autonomous areas might therefore be easier to subvert into breaking away from the Republic and adhering to one or other of her neighbours, especially Hungary whose leaders still cherished ambitions of regaining some

if not all of her former territories. One can thus understand the unwillingness of the Central Government to accede to such demands. In the case of Slovakia full autonomy would most probably have meant that HSL'S would play the major role in the administration of Slovakia. There were those in the party amongst the younger and more radical elements, individuals whose loyalty to the Czechoslovak state was not as unequivocal as among the older generation who were more or less on temporaries of Hlinka. We have already mentioned the polonophile tendencies of Sidor and the pro-German, pro-Hungarian, Austrian and Italian tendencies of Durčanský Brothers and Moch^{er} but it should be stressed that the discipline and organizational methods of the principal Fascist regimes of the time if not their actual ideologies made a deep and lasting impression on many members of the younger generation within the party. In the Czech Lands there were those who had been attracted by Mussolini's and later Hitler's style of fascism but they were few in number and without much serious political influence although the extreme right-wing of the National Democrats tended towards Fascism. The National Democrats and two small fascist groups contested the 1935 elections together as the National Unity group (Narodní sjednocení) but their share of the poll was not very large. By 1937 National Unity had been dissolved and the influence of these Fascist groups remained miniscule and without importance right up till the end of the Republic.

The position of the other political parties in Slovakia, primarily the Czechoslovak parties, during this period is very interesting and somewhat paradoxical. For although their voter support as a percentage of the total poll at each election either remained stable or even increased, as was the case of the Czechoslovak Social Democrats; it would still be true to say that they had been forced into a defensive role by the offensive campaign waged by HSL'S. Most of these parties shared the disadvantage of having almost invariably been part of the ruling government coalition.

and were thus identified in autonomist propoganda with forces inimical to the cause of Slovak autonomy. During the prolonged economic crisis they were unable to produce any effective solutions for Slovakia's economic and social problems. They could not explain the reasons why the crisis had come about except in terms of world economic forces over which the Central Government had but little control. The measures that Malypetr introduced in June 1933 including a loan to raise money for public works to relieve unemployment⁶³ were only marginally effective. The Autonomists on the other hand could claim that conditions in Slovakia would improve if a) she were granted autonomy and b) if all the Czechs in Slovakia who by 1938 numbered over 120,000 together with their dependents, would leave and thus vacate their positions turning them over to Slovaks.

The Communist Party also possessed a ready-made explanation that was rooted in Marx's critique of capitalist society, a critique that related Slovakia's problems to some wider economic and social criteria. In 1937 they presented a plan for the economic, social and cultural amelioration of Slovakia (Plan hospodárskeho, sociálneho a kultúrneho povznesenia Slovenska) that foresaw a wide-spread program of industrialization as the only way to solve these problems of under-development. In spite of its propoganda and an increase in the number of strikes and other forms of industrial unrest the Communists were unable to increase their share of the poll to any significant extent, although by 1935 they were able to do slightly better than the Social Democrats but remained third after the Autonomist Bloc and the Agrarians.

The latter party were able to fairly well in maintaining their share of the poll in 1935 and HSL'S was not able to make any inroads into their basis of support among the Slovak peasantry. In view of the effects of the economic crisis one can only conclude that the more prosperous section

of the peasantry who had proportionally larger holdings were less affected and thus tended to remain loyal to the Agrarians whilst the poorer peasants with smaller holdings and the land less agricultural workers and seasonal workers who were far more severely affected by the crisis tended to support HSL'S and the Autonomist Bloc. The Slovak Agrarians remained consistently one of the larger and more successful political groups in Slovakia and a great deal of their success was due to the leadership of Milan Hodža one of the most able and talented of Slovak politicians.

In comparison with the Agrarians, Social Democratic influence in Slovakia was not very great. Against the background of the economic crisis the party did very well as its share of the poll increased consistently from 1929 to 1935 at a time when the number of industrial workers was still below the 1930 level (see Table Thirty-One) and did not reach that figure again until November 1936. By 1937 the last year for which figures are available the total number of industrial workers in Slovakia was only 15% higher than the pre-war level whilst industrial output was only 21% higher⁶⁴. A factor that could help to explain the relatively good performance of the Social Democrats in Slovakia and the persistence of voter loyalty was that the Social Democratic Unions were reasonably wealthy and could thus pay unemployment benefits to their members. In 1937 they numbered some 77,301 members; 10.9% of the total work-force including agricultural workers and 25% of all Union members⁶⁵. They were thus the largest single Union group and probably contained within their ranks the majority of unionised industrial workers in Slovakia.

By the end of 1937 death had removed both the leader of SNS Martin Rázus and Tomas Garrigue Masaryk from the political scene. Hlinka was gravely ill (he died the following year) and Dr. Jozef Tiso took on more and more of the duties of party head. For the coming year 1938 HSL'S adopted a new slogan - "V Novom Roku do Utoku" (Into the attack in the New Year⁶⁶). We

shall examine more closely what exactly this was to mean in the context of the struggle for Slovak autonomy when we come to examine political developments during the last year of the Republic in greater details in Chapter Eight.

Section Three:

Central Government Policy in Slovakia 1918-1938

Achievements and Failures

In trying to assess the amount of progress that Slovakia made during the First Republic we must be wary of making comparisons between Slovakia and the Czech Lands which would invariably show that in every respect Slovakia was worse off. The two countries having departed from widely differing levels in practically all aspects of political, economic and cultural life in 1918, such comparisons would be misleading. Valid terms of reference could only be found in comparison with another territory similar to Slovakia at the starting point, and in measuring Slovakia's rate of growth (development). The former is outside the scope of this dissertation; the latter will be attempted. Nevertheless, comparisons with the Czech Lands cannot be entirely avoided, if only because they comprised the tools of political contention in the period under scrutiny. One of the other problems to be overcome is that the last census in inter-war Czechoslovakia was held on the 1st December 1930. Consequently we thus have no way of accurately assessing in as much detail as is provided in a census social and economic conditions in Slovakia at the end of the Republic.

All the information utilised in this section has been drawn from two main sources viz. the 1930 Census and the Statistical Handbook (Annuaire Statistique) for 1938. In the case of the latter work the last year for which complete figures are given is often 1936 or 1937. We are thus forced to assume that conditions in Slovakia were little changed by the end of 1938 and thus the picture that can be built up on the basis of such available data will be little affected by this fact.

Because of this general paucity of information none of the following sub-

sections will be as detailed as in the previous chapter. I shall be chiefly concerned with tracing the progress made during the entire period despite the overall economic and social effects of the Depression years. Many of these gains especially in the field of education with which we begin this survey were to serve as a solid base for the future development of Slovakia during the years to come. Indeed, one can suggest that post-war progress could^{only} have been as rapid as it was thanks to the points of departure painstakingly built up in the previous years.

Population and Emigration

Slovakia continued to register an above-average birth-rate although from 1934 onwards it fell to below 10 per mille. The population increased from 2,996,336 in 1920 to 3,555,157 in 1937⁶⁷, an increase of 558,821 in 18 years but if we take the excess of births over deaths in the same period⁶⁸ we arrive at a figure of some 714,000. The difference between these two figures represents the migratory loss which includes both emigration and migration within the Republics from Slovakia to the Czech Lands. The loss for this period amounts to approximately 155,000 or 21.7% of the natural increase. Most of this loss must have occurred up to 1930 as the incidence of emigration was much higher than after 1930 although Slovakia's share of those applying for passports remained obstinately high. The annual migratory loss per 1000 of population also remained higher than for the Czech Lands and the Republic, 3.4 for Slovakia as opposed to only 0.8 for the Czech Lands⁶⁹.

The effects of such a loss as undoubtedly to distort the demographic structure as the majority of the emigrants must have been able-bodied men who went away in search of work. This inevitably affected the sex ratio in certain areas leading to a decline in the marriage rate. Here we can see one of the factors that led to the continuous decline in the birth-rate throughout the First Republic. This caused fears on the part of Slovak demographers and doctors that Slovakia would be faced with the additional problem of progressive depopulation and an aging population⁷⁰.

Fortunately the emigration statistics for the period 1930-1938 show a marked decline to a fraction of what they were for the preceding period. Emigration to the United States declined greatly,⁷¹ Canada limited the annual quota for Czechoslovakia to 6,000 agricultural workers whilst Australia reduced her annual quota for immigrants from the CSR to only

300.⁷² The migratory loss for this period was correspondingly lower, perhaps no more than 30,000 from 1930 to 1937 although it is difficult to arrive at an accurate set of figures as after 1930 no census was held until 1940. And the Data from 1940 census in Slovakia is not available in this country.

A further source of population loss was the high incidence of infant mortality. It declined only very slowly from 185,9 per thousand in 1920 to 161,4 in 1930 and finally to 143,3 in 1938, a decline of some 22,9% over eighteen years. From 1910 to 1938 there were 313,000 deaths of children aged 1 year and less⁷³ but Slovakia's population was still increasing by 1936 at more than twice the average for the Republic and no less than thirteen times the rate for Bohemia alone.⁷⁴

This meant that the Central Government had to provide in its policies for the fact that there would be a large section of Slovakia's population consisting of young children. This would place great demands on the health and education services. In addition to this high birth rate the mortality rate fell by 23,1% from 1919 to 1938.⁷⁵ This was due no doubt to the improvement in health care. There was thus great pressure on the productive segment of the population as the ratio between the productive and non-productive sectors improved only marginally from 1921 to 1930. This disproportion between the level of development of the Slovak economy which by 1930 still remained one based predominantly on agriculture, to which in 1930 no less than 62,5% of the active 52,5% of the dependent and 56,8% of the overall population belonged,⁷⁶ and the rate of natural increase meant that the labour market was unable to supply enough jobs to absorb all the yearly increase in the work force. The very success of the Central Government in helping to lower both infant and adult mortality rates served only to acerbate this problem as not only did more children survive but they tended to live longer.⁷⁷ It should be stressed that this population increase bore very heavily on the agricultural section of the community.

For as we shall see, they had to support more people on less land, land that was less fertile and hence less productive than was the case in the Czech Lands.

In the twenty years of the First Republic the Central Government did achieve notable success in reducing the loss of life by a steady reduction in mortality rates. Unfortunately it had no coordinated employment and development policies that would have enabled it to cope with the consequences of its own actions. By reducing mortality rates it had to cope with a relatively large yearly increase in births, which although it tended to decline consistently right up till the end of the Republic, nevertheless meant a considerable pressure on health, education services and the labour market. In the conditions of the Thirties the Central Government was not able to adequately solve the Slovak employment problem and this lack of a suitable policy played in the hands of the Autonomists who sought to show that the Central Government had totally neglected Slovakia, a charge that was blatantly untrue although the degree of success of the Central Government in this field was strictly limited.

Education

The progress that was made after the establishment of the Republic in 1918 continued after 1930 albeit at a slower pace due to the inevitable restriction of Central Government expenditure in almost all fields. This was in turn caused by the fall in tax income that occurred because of the drop in both industrial production and consumption after 1929.

Tables Thirty-Nine and Forty-One give the total number of educational establishments in Slovakia during the period from 1918 to 1938. It is readily apparent that the number of elementary schools grew at a fast

rate than those of secondary and higher education. It should be stressed that the proportion of the population that was aged from 0-24 years was higher in Slovakia, as follows.⁷⁸

TABLE FORTY

	0-4	5-14	15-24	Total in %
CSR (Average)	9.57	16.72	19.25	45.54
Bohemia	8.01	14.62	18.99	41.62
Slovakia	11.95	19.93	19.50	51.38

In addition to this, fact the proportion that was non-active and thus dependent on the active section also grew faster than in either Bohemia or in the Republic as a whole. We may thus safely assume that the proportion of children of school-age (5-14) was higher in Slovakia than in the Czech Lands as a result of the higher birth-rate.

Assuming Slovakia's share of the population to be around 23.7% in 1930 than on the basis of the above figures we may calculate that Slovakia's share of the total 5-14 age group in the Republic was 28.2%. Any provision of primary education therefore had to be able to find enough places for all those children of school-age as attendance was compulsory. By the school-year 1935-1936 Slovakia possessed no less than 22.3% of the Republic's elementary schools (4,480 out of a total of 20,005).⁷⁹ The reason why the total percentage of elementary schools was lower than the percentage of children of school age was that the average size of classes in Slovakia was higher than the average for the Republic (55.0 as against 40.0 for the Republic in 1930).⁸⁰

The total number of elementary schools rose from 3,416 in 1921 to 4,133 in 1930 and 4,316 in 1934-35. The number of pupils rose from 466,786 in

1921 to 507,743 in 1930 and 618,785 by 1934-35. The total number of schools in 1918 (before the establishment of the Republic) was 3,605 of which no less than 3,298 had Magyar as the language of instruction. They were attended by no less than 343,982 children out of a total of 376,604. There were only 276 Slovak schools with 30,118 pupils.⁸¹ Not only were there significant rises in the number of schools and pupils but there were important qualitative changes as well including the provision of many new school buildings and the improvement of old ones. The use of Slovak as the major language of instruction meant that for the first time almost every Slovak child could receive instruction in his own language. In order for this to be brought about a whole new generation of Slovak teachers had to be trained. In the field of teacher training colleges Slovakia was reasonably well-provided for and by 1935-36 possessed 27.4% of such establishments (17 out of 62).⁸²

In the field of secondary and higher education the fact that by the end of the Republic Slovakia had not reached parity with the Czech Lands can in no way detract from the fact that a great deal had been achieved in a very short time. There had been no secondary education in Slovak since 1875, and thus not only had the central government to provide new buildings and have text books printed but it also had to find the necessary teachers. Till Slovaks themselves could be trained, it was necessary to resort to a policy of employing Czech teachers to fill the gaps, which did not always meet with the understanding it deserved. Yet it is difficult to see how this could have been avoided as most of the Magyars and Magyarized Slovaks who comprised the bulk of secondary teachers in 1918 most probably did not possess sufficient command of Slovak to be able to teach in it at secondary level. As we can see from Table Thirty-Nine the number of secondary school pupils rose from 14,621 in 1920-21 to 16,646 in 1929-30. (No date is available after this date). The Comenius University in Bratislava had 518 students at the end of the winter term in 1921, 1,761 at the end of 1930

and 2,247 at the end of 1935. The total number of Slovak university students both at this university and those in the Czech Lands never amounted to more than 10-12% of the total for the Republic.

Secondary and higher education were however not compulsory. Even in the Czech Lands not every pupil who completed his primary education went on to study at the secondary level. This was dependent in many cases on the social status of his family and their relatives affluence. Slovakia had a lower standard of living and consequently this was reflected in a lower number of Slovak students in secondary and higher education.

If we compare the state of Slovak education as shown in these Tables in 1918 and again at the end of the Republic we can see that much had been achieved despite the recurrent economic crisis of 1921-23 and 1930-37. Although illiteracy in Slovakia still remained higher than in the Czech Lands it seems to have declined considerably between 1921 and 1930. The different age-limit and the greater variety of date shown in the 1930 Census make a direct comparison difficult. Taking the average figures of 6.7% for men, 9.4% for women and 8.16% overall as the basis in 1930 we can see that they represent a great improvement since 1921 when corresponding figures were 12.82%, 16.48% and 14.71% respectively. This improvement was not equally shared among all the different nationalities in Slovakia and the Slovaks in fact scored worse than the Magyars, Germans and Jews but better than the Ruthenes. This drop in illiteracy was most probably due to the institution of compulsory elementary schooling which now meant that illiteracy was tending to be confined more and more to the older sections of the population.

Health Care

The general decline in mortality rates that was mentioned in the section

on population and emigration does not take into account the fact that mortality varied from class to class and from one occupational group to another. Climatic conditions as well as individual and public hygiene are all factors which influence the incidence of mortality whilst the number of doctors, hospital beds and the ease or difficulty of overland-communications also determine the number of those who may survive sickness or injury.

Slovakia had fewer doctors, hospital beds and pharmacies than the Czech Lands even by the end of the Republic. Yet if we look at the number of doctors who were practising medicine in Slovakia by 1937 (Table Forty-Three) we note that the number had more than doubled since 1920. Considering the lengthy nature of a doctor's training and the rather large cost to the State that this increase had meant, it was a significant achievement and represented a considerable investment on the part of the Central Government. By 1936 Slovakia had an above-average number of mid-wives and pharmacies per hundred thousand inhabitants but once the actual area of the country was taken into consideration it was not as well provided as the Czech Lands. Slovakia had 16.06% of the Republic's doctors in 1936 which was indeed an improvement but less than the proportion of the Republic's population that lived in Slovakia. (23%). Given the predominantly rural nature of Slovakia it was difficult to provide an adequate number of doctors to ensure that every single inhabitant had access to medical help. The majority of Slovakia's population lived in communities of 5,000 or less⁸³ but by 1936 Slovakia still only had 46% of the average number of doctors per square kilometre for the Republic⁸⁴ and this fact coupled with a similar shortage of mid-wives and pharmacies may well have contributed to Slovakia's mortality rates remaining above those in the Czech Lands. In spite of its many shortcomings central government policy in this field must be seen as partially successful as mortality rates did fall whilst the number of doctors rose significantly.

Agriculture

The following figures show the number of persons engaged in agriculture from 1921 to 1930 in Slovakia.⁸⁵ (No date available after that date).

TABLE FORTY-FOUR

	1921		1930	
Active	751,800	63.0%	868,300	62.5%
Dependents	1,059,800	58.7%	1,019,400	52.5%
Total	1,811,600	60.4%	1,887,700	56.8%

We can thus see that although the proportion of the total population involved in agriculture fell from 60.4% to 56.8% between 1921 and 1930 whilst there was a rise in absolute terms of 76,100 persons. The active population fell by only from 63.0% to 62.5% but rose in absolute terms by 116,500 whilst the dependent sector fell in absolute figures by 40,400. This is most probably to be interpreted as a decrease in the average size of agricultural families. The absolute rise in the number of the agricultural population meant that a proportion of the natural increase found employment in the agricultural sector of the economy unlike the Czech Lands where the agricultural population fell in both percentage and absolute terms.

By 1930 at least the agricultural character of Slovakia had not undergone any radical changes. Indeed although the absolute number of industrial workers in 1930 stood some 20,000 higher than in 1910,⁸⁶ in percentage terms it was lower at 17.9% of the total work-force in 1930 as against 19.7% in 1910. In 1921 the total industrial work-force was 224,500, 18.9% of the active population, whilst by 1930 it was 247,300 but only 17.9%. The economic crisis of 1921-23 and the subsequent closure of some 200 factories⁸⁷ in what amounted to a small-scale dismantling⁸⁸ of Slovak

industry was undoubtedly a factor in the process that helped to keep Slovakia a basically agrarian country.

The results of the Land Reform as summarised in Table Seventeen refer to 1936 when the process of re-distribution was more or less completed. The average size of the holding that was distributed to the vast majority of applicants (98.0%) was only 1.57 hectares on average of which only 1.32 hectares were agricultural land. Over 70% of such land was distributed in the form of small holdings whilst the remainder (30%) went in the form of residual estates. The Land Reform helped to solve the chronic land hunger of part of the Slovak peasantry. Given however the constant pressures of population growth and the fertility and amount of available agricultural land it could not be expected to solve the long-term problems of Slovakia's agriculture.

In addition to the Land Reform the Central Government made a determined effort to implement necessary agricultural works such as the control of river currents and the improvement of water courses as we can see from Table Forty-Five, although there doubtless remained a great deal of work still to be done. It should be remembered that many of the problems that afflicted agriculture in Slovakia were not considered as coming under the area of competence of the Central Government. These were generally problems that had their origins in the nature of the economic system and the role of market forces within it, forces which determined the levels at which agricultural products could be sold and thus exchanged for industrial goods. The rate of increase in the agricultural population, the ratio between dependent and active sections of the population, the average size of holding, crop yields and soil fertility were all factors in the complex of problems which agriculture in Slovakia had to face.

Slovakia's agriculture had not undergo any radical changes during the lifetime

of the Republic and Central Government policy was mainly concerned with carrying out the Land Reform and gradually instituting improvements in agricultural methods in order to try to improve yields. A start was made in providing veterinary services and building agricultural colleges and schools where new knowledge and techniques could be imparted to the rising generation of Slovak farmers.

Like many other aspects of Slovak life the condition of agriculture in 1918 was the result of a long process of historical development stretching back over hundreds of years. One could not therefore expect the Central Government in a mere two decades to be able totally to rectify all its shortcomings. This was even more true during the period when Czechoslovakia was subject to a persistent economic depression that had a deep and lasting effect on its own economic development. Under such circumstances Central Government policy cannot be judged too critically for in the limited areas of Land Reform and the provision of veterinary and educational services it was fairly successful as yields in general rose fairly consistently during the Republic. To a certain extent this must have been due to the success that some aspects of the government agricultural policy did achieve in Slovakia.

Communications

The railway investment program of 1925 was not fully completed by the end of the Republic although most of the major lines were built. Some of them were delayed because of the economic depression whilst the completion of the Margecany-Červená Skála line was further hampered by strikes of construction workers in 1931.

By 1936 Slovakia together with Ruthenia had 4,354 kilometres⁸⁹ of track in use as opposed to only 3,680 in 1921⁹⁰ and 3,879 in 1929⁹¹. Thus towards the end of the Republic Slovakia possessed no less than 27.75% of the total length of track in use in the Republic. In view of the fact however that Slovakia alone contained 32% of the total area of the Republic and population densities were lower in the eastern half of the country it could not be said that the network was sufficient to meet all Slovakia's needs.

The rate of progress in bringing more track into use in Slovakia and Ruthenia was faster in the second decade of the Republic's existence. Only 199 kilometres of track were added to the network between 1921 and 1929 but 457 kilometres between 1929 and 1936 which indicates that the pace of construction was considerably higher during the Thirties despite the economic crisis that must to some extent must have curtailed government spending in this as well as other fields. A great deal still remained undone however and such problems as a unified railway tariff were still not solved by 1938. Thus Slovakia's exports to the Czech Lands were still hampered by a relatively higher tariff per ton/kilometre than was generally charged within the Czech Lands. The main constraint on Slovakia's development represented by the legacy of all its communication routes being orientated towards Budapest had been largely overcome by the end of the Republic, but the problems of maintaining the track, updating and improving

both the rolling-stock and the signalling systems to a uniform standard still remained to be overcome.

The road network was also improved and by 1936 Slovakia had 14,713 kilometres of road representing 20.96% of the Republic's total⁹² as opposed to 11,355 kilometres in 1930⁹³ and 13,136 (Est) kilometres in 1920.⁹⁴

Thus we may note that despite the various economic crisis there was a marked, if not sufficient, improvement in overland communications in Slovakia between 1918 and 1938.

Personnel and Staffing

The problems which were involved in finding sufficient reliable staff to man both the central administrative apparatus and local government in Slovakia meant that from the beginning it was necessary to use Czech personnel in the absence of qualified and experienced Slovaks. The presence however of a large number of Czechs permanently resident and working in Slovakia who together with their dependents numbered 120,096 by 1930⁹⁵ was seized upon by HSL'S as proof of its argument that the Central Government was determined to treat Slovakia as a colony. A colony that was to be exploited as a source of raw materials, ruled directly from Prague through the intermediary of a few Slovaks and many Czechs loyal to the Central Government. In return for the loyalty these Czech officials were rewarded with better posts and higher salaries than many of their Slovak counterparts.

We have already discussed the reason for the extra allowances in Chapter Five and we will limit ourselves to mentioning the that irrespective of the truth or falsehood of HSL'S claims it is very doubtful whether Slovakia could have been administered at all in the period 1918-1921 were

it not for these much-maligned officials. Now as time passed and the first Slovak secondary school and university graduates made their appearance it became increasingly obvious that many of the positions which they considered as rightfully theirs by virtue of their educational qualifications alone were still occupied by Czechs. The latter having once given up their posts in the Czech Lands or in former parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire thus had no jobs to return to and tended to hang onto their posts in Slovakia. These qualified Slovaks or at least part of their number felt that this was the reflection of a deliberate government policy rather than the consequences of an imbalance between the number of qualified applicants and the number of suitable posts available. Those Czech officials who already held posts could not be deprived of them merely on account of their nationality. Not only would such actions have been felt to be markedly unjust but also would have threatened the security of tenure that many office-holders, irrespective of nationality, had come to expect from their jobs. A similar situation prevailed in the administrative apparatus of the Central Government in Prague where there were very few opportunities for accommodating Slovak graduates. The latter in view of the seriousness of the economic situation would be facing competition from Czech and German graduates from institutions of higher education located in the Czech Lands. Here as well some Slovaks believed that there was active discrimination against them.

One writer, ^vCulen, in a work published during the quasi-independent Slovak Republic,⁹⁶ went as far as produce a set of statistics, whose origins he fails to disclose, that show astonishingly low proportions of Slovaks employed in Central Government institutions in Prague. Using the 23% of the Republic's population who were inhabitants of Slovakia and hence not only Slovaks, he then proceeds to draw up tables of relative discrimination against Slovaks in each of the Ministries and other institutions. This he does by comparing the extent to which the proportion

of Slovaks falls short of this figure of 23%. Such an approach is highly suspect, not only because of the impossibility of checking the date on which it is based but also as it makes the unspoken assumption that there was a surplus of unemployed qualified Slovaks, who were not only sufficient in number to staff all the central and local government organs in Slovakia but also could have provided 23% of the holders of the posts in Central Government bodies, in Prague. In view of the fact that secondary education in Slovakia had only been available in Slovak since 1918 and effectively since 1920 such an assumption seems false. The low number of Slovaks in Prague need not necessarily be taken as proof of any discrimination against Slovaks as such on the part of the Central Government in Prague.

If we examine carefully the data presented in Table Twenty we can see at a glance that there are two salient points. One that the proportion of Slovaks who worked in all branches of administration and the free professions was as early as 1920 far higher than one could have expected. No less than 48.5% of all the administrative personnel in Slovakia were Slovaks whilst only 23.0% were Czechs. Unfortunately these figures do not give us any indication of what proportion of the high administrative posts were held by Czechs, although the latter did tend to predominate at the higher level especially in the railway service where they were originally brought in to overcome the effects of a crippling railway strike in 1919 that had been engineered from Budapest.

The numbers and proportions of Magyars shown in the figures for 1920 are still quite high and this probably reflects Šrobár's policy of leaving in place as a temporary expedient those former Hungarian officials who were prepared to swear an oath of loyalty to the Republic. By 1930 the number of Magyars employed had dropped in all but public service and the free professions. Their place had to a large extent been taken by Slovaks

and Czechs, the numbers of whom show considerable rises. In state service the number of Slovaks rose by 37.6% but the proportion of the total number of Slovaks that were employed in this field remained unchanged at 20.8%. Whilst the number of Czechs rose by only 14.1% no fewer than 45.1% of the total number were employed in state service in 1930 where they still constituted 41.3% of the total number of employees in this field, compared to 1920 when 46.1% of Czechs made up 49.4% of those in state service. Thus we may conclude that despite the increase in the number of Slovaks in state service the dominant element remained Czech. This field and that of the railways and public service were in fact the only three areas in which the Czechs increased their percentage share, whilst overall their share of the total of administrative personnel remained almost static at 22.9% in 1930 (23.0%). Thus, although the number of Czechs grew by 16.01% overall in absolute terms in percentage terms they constituted no greater proportion of the whole in 1930 than they had done in 1920. From this we may conclude that their presence was not a great inhibiting factor in the employment of Slovaks. Indeed in the ten years that separate these two sets of statistics the number of Slovaks grew in all fields, with the sole exception of the railways where it remained almost totally static whilst the actual number of employees fell by 8.1%. The highest rise in the number of Slovaks, 126.7% was recorded in the field of public service and the free professions which itself expanded by 72.31% in this period. In every case the rise in the number of Slovaks was greater than the percentage increase in the total number of employees in each field. An increase of over a third in the number of Slovaks in a decade surely indicates that the untruth of many of the accusations of bias and favouritism levelled at the Central Government by HSL'S.

If any one group had cause to complain it was surely the Magyars whose numbers declined by a third overall but by even greater proportions in the fields of state service, railways and posts. In education the drop was of

the order of one-quarter which in view of the fact that prior to 1918 Magyar had been the most widely used language of instruction seems remarkably small. It may reflect the fact that despite Magyar complaints to the contrary there were at least at the primary level sufficient teachers of Magyar tongue. The only bright spot was in public service and the free professions where the number of Magyars increased by 4.25%. This relatively large drop in the number of Magyar may reflect not only government policy in refusing to employ men whose loyalty was felt to be unreliable but also the fact that a certain number of Magyar officials had decided to return to Hungary once Central Government power had been firmly established in Slovakia.

Unfortunately I have been unable to find sufficient data to allow me to make a similar broad comparison for the state of affairs that prevailed at the end of the Republic. I can therefore make no firm conclusions about employment trends up to 1938. On the basis of the information in Table Twenty we may venture the tentative conclusion that although the total of Slovaks employed in these field was relatively small it has nevertheless increased considerably in only a decade. Indeed the proportion of the total working population, engaged in state and public service and the free professions in Slovakia rose from 4.0% in 1921 to 4.6% in 1930. The dependent sector rose from 2.7% to 4.2% and the proportion of the total population that belonged to this category from 3.2% to 4.4%.⁹⁷ These figures were not much below those recorded for the Czech Lands in 1930 where those engaged in public and state service and the free professions reached 5.0% of the working population, 4.0% of the dependent section and 4.7% of the total population⁹⁸. In absolute terms the numbers of those involved in this field were as follows.

TABLE FORTY-SIX

	1921	1930	% increase 1921-30
Working population	46,800	64,200	37.1
Dependents	49,300	80,800	63.8
Total	96,100	145,000	50.9

We may note the rise in the number of dependents which might be interpretable in terms of an increase in the number of married men with children in this field or a rise in the average size of families. In any case while the number of those active in these fields rose by only 37.1% the number of dependents rose by 63.8%.

We can thus see that the number of Slovaks employed in state and public service did rise. Although, given the economic circumstances there were still probably not enough posts to satisfy all the demand from qualified Slovaks. Apart from its educational policies however the Central Government did not seem to have any policies that were specifically designed to encourage the number of Slovaks in these fields. This was probably the weakest point in its efforts to combat autonomist propoganda. The number of Slovaks rose in response to the demand for qualified personnel which was only indirectly a consequence of Central Government policies such as a planned expansion in the provision of educational services and the reform of local government.

Conclusion

As we have seen many of the Central Governments policies in Slovakia did meet with a limited measure of success in implementing their objectives. Yet despite these success Slovakia was still faced with serious economic

and social problems that stemmed mainly from the inability of its basically agrarian economy to generate enough wealth to provide the majority of its inhabitants with a reasonable standard of living. These problems had deep historical roots and could not expect the Central Government to solve them all in only two decades. It is clear however that its policies were somewhat piecemeal and patchy. There was no over-riding long term and inter-related goals within whose framework policies could be laid. Improvements in individual areas such as health and education were often made without taking into account the effect they might have on other areas such as employment. The improvements in health care led to a lowering of mortality rates and a rise in the number of those who survived, which despite the falling birth-rate, had serious consequences. For it threw great pressure not only on the ability of Slovakia's economy to absorb the extra productive forces within the existing labour market but also on the available food supply that could be grown. Although yields did increase there was obviously a limit to the amount of food that a basically peasant system of small holdings could produce under given climatic and soil fertility conditions.

The most serious shortcoming on the part of the Central Government was the lack of any industrial policy. The latter should have been aimed at developing Slovakia's industries and her mineral wealth, as a means of overcoming the problem of providing enough work for the growing population and raising the general standard of living. As we have seen progress on the industrial front was virtually static until the end of 1937 when industrial output began to rise once again. In my view this lack of a long-range industrial policy was one of the main factors in Slovakia's continuing underdevelopment vis-a-vis the Czech Lands. The effects of this underdevelopment and the unfortunate conjuncture of the economic crisis that occurred from 1921-23 and during most of the Thirties helped to swell support for HSL'S whose leaders it would be fair to say, did not

Understand the need for economic development either. Drawn from the ranks of the small Slovak intelligentsia that was composed mainly of teachers, priests, lawyers and officials, they had very little understanding of business, as most of the businesses in Slovakia were in the hands of non-Slovaks, Magyars, Germans or Jews up till 1918. None of the other political parties with the possible exception of the Communist whose call for Slovakia's industrialization came only in 1937 really understood the deep-laying reasons behind Slovakia's problems. During the Thirties the Central Government was too occupied with the problems caused by the Depression and the threat to its security from Nazi Germany to be able to devote enough time and energy to solving Slovakia's problems. To a certain extent anyway it was content to leave economic matters to be regulated by the existing market forces and restrained from massive intervention in the private sector. Unfortunately Slovakia's industries before the First War had been largely fostered through the provision of aid from the Hungarian Government and once it was terminated under the Republic many of them were unable to continue. The continuing failure of the Central Government to realise the need to encourage industrial development in Slovakia was perhaps the greatest weakness of its policies which despite the severe economic climate that prevailed during much of this period, achieved good and lasting results especially in the field of education.

CHAPTER SEVEN : ELECTIONS IN SLOVAKIA 1918-1938

The existence of a political system in which the government is comprised of several parties, elected at regular intervals is supposed in theory to be highly responsive to the public will. Yet the reasons that impell voters to give their support to or withdraw it from any particular party are complex and difficult to elucidate with any degree of accuracy. Thus on the surface the results of elections are seen to reflect only the rise or fall in the popularity of political parties and groups without necessarily helping to reveal the reasons that lay behind voter behaviour.

The establishment of the Republic in 1918 meant that Slovakia was to experience almost overnight a vast expansion in the area of political activity. Under Hungary not only was the franchise restricted to some 6% of the adult male population, the ballot open and the constituencies in many cases wildly gerrymandered but also even within this framework the Hungarian authorities exercised a great deal of pressure and intimidation in order to prevent the election to the Diet of both non-Magyar candidates who represented the nationalities and the Magyar opponents of the governing party.

It would be an error to assume however that Slovakia was characterised by a total lack of political activity. It was nevertheless present despite the fact that it was on a far less developed level than in the Czech Lands. It should be stressed that neither in Slovakia nor in the Czech Lands were political activities entirely uninfluenced by the general social, economic, political and cultural level of Austria or Hungary respectively.

By the late 1890's the greater degree of political rights under Austria, including a wider franchise, had helped to create the conditions in which a larger number of Czech parties could flourish. Even at this early stage

the main trends in Czech political development viz. social democracy, agrarianism and clericalism could be clearly seen.

In Slovakia there was in actual fact only a single political party, the Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná strana) or SNS) which functioned as an umbrella group under which divergent political trends were to be found. These trends had not yet developed into separate independent political parties as their existence would have seemed highly problematical in view of Slovakia's low level of material and cultural development and the prevailing atmosphere of Magyarization and national oppression.

After Slovakia was finally incorporated into the Republic in June the way was open for various Slovak political groups to constitute themselves as independent political parties. This was a natural response to a changed situation by Slovak politicians themselves, a situation in which the scope and opportunities for political activity were wider than ever before and the prizes for successful parties and politicians correspondingly greater. There is, I think, no truth in the charge that party politics and political strife were an unwelcome gift from the Czechs to the Slovaks as even in the pre-war period disharmony among various groups was by no means unknown.

In spite of the slightly imperfect electoral law which functioned in such a manner as to lessen Slovakia's representation in both chambers of the National Assembly, for with 22.8% of the population in 1930 she was allotted only 61 deputies in the Lower House, the Chamber of Deputies (Poslanecká sněmovna) instead of 69, the franchise was unquestionably wider than could ever have been envisaged under Hungary where there was ever only a handful of Slovak deputies in the Hungarian Diet of some 453 members. Thus in the National Assembly the Slovak members had far greater control over laws that affected them directly as there were now enough of

them to make their voice heard.

Over a million and a half people were now eligible to vote in 1920 in the parliamentary elections in Slovakia alone. This fact may well have been an attraction to many "Czechoslovak" parties to campaign in Slovakia as well as in the western part of the country. These parties had till 1918 functioned separately in the Czech Lands. They had either coalesced with similar groups in Slovakia as in the case of the Czechoslovak Social Democrats and the Czecho-Slovak People's Party, which contained the small group of Slovak clericals, led by Andrej Hlinka, or had simply changed their name to include the title Czechoslovak in order to comply with the new state of affairs that had come into being with the establishment of the Republic. Such parties campaigned in Slovakia either by themselves or in an electoral alliance with a Slovak party. In the first category come the Czechoslovak People's Party (with its Slovak members), the Czecho-Slovak National Socialists and the Social Democrats. The second category was represented by the Slovak National and Peasants' Party formed by the merger of the old Slovak National Party and a group of Slovak agrarians under the leadership of Milan Hodza. This newly-formed party campaigned in its own right in Slovakia but was allied to a Czechoslovak party, the Republican Party of Agrarians with whom it sat and it voted in the National Assembly. This fact cannot be considered in any way as giving credence to the Autonomist charge that the Czechs deliberately introduced party politics into Slovakia in attempt to "divide and rule". Differences of opinion and class, religious and ethnic divisions already existed in Slovakia. Even if the Czechoslovak parties refrained from campaigning there, there were still sufficient Slovak political groupings who would have competed just as hard for as large as possible a share of the vote.

The 1920 election results do not help us to deduce much about the attitudes of different groups in Slovakia to the Central Government's policies. For

such policies as there were had not yet been placed upon a permanent basis by the time of the elections. Slovakia had been free of Hungarian forces for less than a year and Srobar's administration was struggling to cope on a day-to-day basis with the many problems that Slovakia faced.

In addition to this Slovakia like the rest of the Republic was affected by a great degree of social unrest. In most of Europe the first two to three years after the end of the First World War was a period of great hopes and expectations among the war-weary populations of the successor states. They perhaps expected that once these states had been firmly established and the peace treaties signed there would be a swift return to the more normal conditions of peace-time that had last prevailed in 1913. They also hoped to see the implementation of a large number of basic social reforms such as land reform, and eight-hour working day and a forty-eight hour week sickness, unemployment, old-age and dependants' insurance schemes, the provision of various types of pensions and some form of public housing. This latter commodity was in very short supply in many countries at the end of the war. The expectations of the broad mass of the population had been undoubtedly heightened and this their disappointment of the fact that in view of the tremendous havoc which the war had caused it would be some time before all their demands and expectations could be satisfied, was understandably all that much greater. The Russian Revolution was also an important factor in influencing the mood of the people to a certain extent it was however by no means the only such one.

Among all the states of Central Europe Czechoslovakia was, by and large, the one that was soonest able to return to some degree of normality. The post-war economic crisis whose effects lasted till 1923 and the persistence of revisionist hopes in rump Hungary were however two factors that darkened the overall picture. The need to maintain a strong and united state in view of the dangers which these and other factors presented was reflected in the centralist nature of the Constitution adopted in 1920. It did not

acknowledge the autonomy or individuality of any single constituent part of the Republic as such. The status of Ruthenia was still a matter on which the final decision lay in the hands of the Paris Peace Conference.

The centralism of the Constitution was matched by a salient feature of the parliamentary elections in Slovakia in 1920. Only one party campaigned as a Slovak party in electoral alliance with a Czech party. This was the Slovak National and Peasants' Party. All other groups and parties polled either as a part of or in conjunction with a Czechoslovak party. In this we may see a concern for unity in the face of the many economic, social and political dangers which the Republic seemed to be facing in 1920.

Both the results of the 1920 elections in the entire country and in Slovakia show certain similarities as can be seen by a comparison of Tables in the Appendix. The Social Democrats won an overwhelming share of the vote nationwide viz. 25.7% for the Czechoslovak Party, 11.1% for the German Party, 1.8% for the Magyar-German Party whilst 8.1% went to the Czechoslovak National Socialists; a total of 46.7% of the entire vote was thus cast in favour of the socialist parties. In Slovakia itself the figures were as follows.

Table Forty-Eight

Czechoslovak Social Democrate	38.5%
Magyar-german Social Democrats	8.0%
Czechoslovak National Socialists	2.2%
Total of votes for socialist parties.	48.7%

This result is somewhat surprising as not only is it higher than the result over the country as a whole but it bears no relationship to the number of industrial workers in Slovakia which was primarily an agrarian

country. The victory of the Socialists in the Czech Lands could be explained as the natural consequence of the number of industrial workers amongst the population which both proportionally and in terms of absolute numbers was far higher than in Slovakia. It should however be pointed out that in later years the Communist Party gained a relatively significant share of the poll (39.4% in 1924) in Subcarpathian Ruthenia which was even less industrialised than Slovakia and whose living conditions were very low indeed. One should therefore be cautious in analysing voters' motives for a particular party it may be in certain cases purely an expression of some form of protest rather than a positive identification with and commitment to the particular ideology espoused by any one of the parties.

The election results for 1920 show the extent to which Slovakia was caught up in the same social discontent that was sweeping the Czech Lands. A notable difference in voter behaviour between the two halves of the country was that whilst it could be safely assumed that in the Czech Lands many of the industrial workers and their dependents, forming the bulk of those who supported the socialist parties, should continue to vote for one or other of these parties (including the Communists) at all subsequent parliamentary elections no such assumption could be made about those who had voted socialist in Slovakia in 1920. They were far more likely to be tempted into switching their support to any seemingly credible alternative party. Especially if the latter were to prove able to exploit existing discontent and lay the blame for it at the feet of the Central Government and its policies, with whom the socialist parties were strongly identified during the period of the so-called Red-Green Coalition (primarily of the Agrarian and socialist parties) from 1920 to 1925.

The effects of the post-war economic crisis of 1921-23 were deeply felt in Slovakia where the process of closing factories and re-assembling them elsewhere had already begun even before the crisis arose.¹ This process was of course not the result of governmental initiative or pressure but

was mainly dictated by the way in which private companies were to interpret economic criteria and implement these interpretations in practice. The resulting unemployment and loss of productive capacity were facts that the Slovak People's Party could muster in their political struggle against the Central Government. In this the slogan of autonomy for Slovakia played a large part. Both these facts could be interpreted to the Slovak electorate as the result of deliberate government policies, intended to turn Slovakia into a purely agricultural appendage of the Czech Lands. In fact after 1920 there was a return to a free market economy and thereafter the amount of direct Central Government intervention in the economy was insignificant. To a large extent the tactics of Hlinka's party consisted mainly in attributing all Slovakia's ills to either deliberate or else inept Central Government policies. In actual fact many of these problems had deep-rooted causes and in several cases had been even more acute under the former Hungarian administration.

By 1923 however the Slovak People's Party had definitely adopted an anti-Prague course. This was confirmed by the exaggerated and pathetic language of the Žilina Memorandum presented at the party's Congress in 1922. By the time of the first Xupy elections in 1923 the party had succeeded in improving its share of the poll compared with the 1920 parliamentary elections when as part of the Czechoslovak People's Party it polled 235,389 votes (17.4%) and won twelve in the Chamber of Deputies.²

The 1925 parliamentary elections reflect both the growing success of the Slovak People's Party (which now called itself after its leader the Hlinka Slovak People's Party HSL'S) and the effect of the schism within the Social Democratic Party that eventually led to the founding of an independent Czechoslovak Communist Party. The latter was perhaps the only political organization to include within its ranks members belonging to all the major nationalities of the Republic.

The Social Democrats' share of the poll slumped nationally from 25.7% to 8.9%, whilst the Communists collected 13.11% of the total vote. In Slovakia this drop was even more pronounced; from 38.5% to a mere 4.2% with the Communists gaining no less than 13.2% of the poll.

A no less spectacular result was that achieved by HSL'S in capturing 34.3% of the total poll in Slovakia. This figure is only slightly smaller than that achieved by the Social Democrats in 1920. The Slovak National Party had parted company with the Slovak Agrarians who re-joined the mainstream of the Czechoslovak party. It fared very badly in the elections, obtaining only 2.4% of the vote in Slovakia whilst the Agrarian Party gained 17.4% in Slovakia and improved its share of the poll nationwide from 9.7% to 13.7%.

Agrarianism was thus not without its attractions for a certain section of Slovakia's agricultural population; these were probably those more prosperous peasants and land-owners who owned enough land to be able to produce a surplus for market. As the Agrarians formed part of every government coalition from 1920 to 1938, we are forced to conclude that those who were dissatisfied with their standard of living and tended to blame the Central Government rightly or wrongly for not doing enough to improve their lot, were not among those who voted consistently for this party.

Thus HSL'S must have drawn part of its support from the poorer sections of the Slovak peasantry. By 1925 the Land Reform in Slovakia was far from being completed³ and even those who received land had on average a very small holding that was barely sufficient to support their family. A part of the Slovak intelligentsia, schoolteachers, civil servants, local government officials etc, may also have given their support to HSL'S or to the Slovak National Party as a mark of their disgruntlement over the

large influx of Czechs into Slovakia where they held high positions that were not always commensurate with their qualifications.⁴ The additional allowance that Czech officials in Slovakia drew, partly because they still often had to maintain two homes, one in the Czech Lands and the other in Slovakia, were often the source of a great amount of jealousy and resentment on the part of their Slovak colleagues.

A factor which should not be overlooked in ascertaining the sources of later support for HSL'S is the friction that was caused by the difference in outlook between the Czechs in Slovakia and the Slovaks. The latter were still very deeply influenced by the religious teachings of both Catholic and Protestant Churches. They could thus not fail to be concerned at what they saw as the Czechs' secularism, their progressive ideas, and lack of respect for Slovak religious feeling. One can therefore understand the concern with which the Churches sought to retain as much control over education as possible, seeing in it a possible barrier against the spread of modern secular ideas from the Czech Lands to Slovakia.

The entry of HSL'S into the ruling coalition in 1927 may well have been a factor in the loss of 100,000 votes which it sustained in the 1927 župy elections.⁵ Alternatively it may reflect a growing sense of disillusionment on the part of a minority of the party's supporters, who perhaps felt that the party was not really able to bring about, by means of exerting pressure on the Central Government, any real improvement in their living conditions.

The Provincial Reform of 1928 may also have contributed to this feeling of disappointment for it contained very few real provisions for Slovakia's autonomy (See Chapter Five). The drop in support for HSL'S from a high point of 489,111 in the 1925 parliamentary elections to a figure of 325,588 in the 1928 elections to the provincial assembly (as the electorate for both elections was virtually the same) may well be explicable in terms of

voter disillusionment. The figures contained in Table Fifty-Three show that the percentage of the poll which went to certain parties remained remarkably stable whilst other parties displayed more volatile fluctuations. The smaller Czechoslovak parties in Slovakia tended to retain a similar percentage of the poll in both local government and parliamentary elections, whilst the larger parties seemed to experience greater movements in voter loyalty. In percentage terms HSL'S share of the poll fell from 34.3% in 1925 to 24.64% in 1928 (Provincial elections). Whilst the Agrarians, Social Democrats Czechoslovak People's Party, Czechoslovak National Socialist, National Democrats as well as the Communists all increased their share of the poll. A certain number of voters therefore must have switched their allegiance away from HSL'S to those other parties.

The results of the 1929 parliamentary elections must be considered against the background of what was later to become known as the Tuka Trial. The facts of the case are as follows. Dr. Vojtech Tuka the editor of Slovak the party newspaper published an article entitled "Vacuum Juris" on New Year's day 1928 in which he asserted the existence of a secret clause in the Declaration of Turčianský Svätý Martin (See Chapters Two and Three). According to the terms of such a clause after a period of ten years had elapsed from the date of the founding of the Republic Slovakia would be free to decide whether or not she would continue to be associated with the Czech Lands in the same manner as before or opt for greater autonomy, independence or some form of association with another state. All laws and ordinances issued by the Central Government were no longer valid and a legal vacuum (Vacuum juris) had ensued which meant for example, according to the arguments advanced in the article that it would be perfectly legal to withhold payment of taxes.

The publication of this article led to Tuka's eventual arrest on the 29th January 1929 but this did not happen until after a private action over this

very question of a 'secret clause' had been brought against him.⁶ He was tried and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment for espionage and treason on the 15th October 1929 and his activities as a Hungarian spy and agent provocateur as well as his links with the Hungarian-financed irredent movement in Vienna and Geneva were revealed at his trial.

The effects of such revelations on the election results is somewhat problematical. The election took place on 27th October just twelve days after Tuka's sentence. Although HSL'S lost some 86,000 votes compared to the last parliamentary elections in 1925 it gained 78,000 votes in comparison with the 1928 elections to the newly-formed Provincial Assemblies. (See Chapter Five). The elections took place on 2nd December 1928 and thus the fact of Tuka's arrest could have played no part in the loss in votes which HSL'S sustained in 1928. It is hard to believe that there was therefore any significant transfer of votes from HSL'S to the Czechoslovak parties as although it is clear that they did not fully recover the position they held in the 1925 parliamentary elections. Indeed although by the time of the last parliamentary elections in 1935 they gained almost the same number of votes as in 1925 percentage-wise their share of the poll (30.1%) was still below that of 1925 (34.3%). Although the Autonomist Bloc of which HSL'S formed the major party together with the Slovak National Party, the Polish autonomous parties and a Ukrainian party (polled an extra 74,000 votes outside Slovakia achieving 6.9% of the national poll), compared to the 1928 Provincial elections the Agrarians' share of the poll fell slightly from 20.5% to 19.4% although in absolute terms it rose by 7,000 votes. The Czechoslovak National Socialists, National Democrats, Social Democrats all registered small percentage gains whilst the Czecho-Slovak People's Party and the Communists lost ground.

As HSL'S was beginning to experience a decline in its share of the poll,

indicating a loss in its popularity, as early as 1927 when it lost over 100,000 votes in the second Zupy elections, we may conclude that the 1929 result represented a stage in the party's recovery from this low point in its fortune. If the Tuka trial had really shaken the Slovak electorate then one might have reasonably expected Fedis Juriga's break-away splinter party to have gained more than the slight number of votes it actually did (5,395). We must thus conclude that the reasons behind the party's failure to regain the position it had achieved in 1925 lay elsewhere.

The departure of HSL'S from the coalition on the 8th October 1929 was thus perhaps motivated, not so much by any decision to defend Tuka based on a misguided belief in his innocence (as shown by his nomination as a candidate in the 1929 elections he was however not returned as far as we know) but by a realization that such a step might help to arrest the decline in popularity which the party had experienced. The new provincial system of local government that had come into operation in 1928 did not really ensure a good measure of autonomy or satisfy voters' desire for Slovakia to be guaranteed some genuine form of self-government so that the living standards of the mass of the people could be improved. If HSL'S had continued its association with the ruling coalition this might have damned it in the eyes of too many voters as being part of a government which did not do enough for Slovakia. A return to opposition might therefore once again serve to identify the party as the only one genuine Slovak defender of Slovak interests. Such tactics seem to have been fairly successful, for the party gained 28.1% of the poll as opposed to 24.6% in the 1928 Provincial elections.

The Social Democrats in both halves of the Republic continued to improve their share of the poll. The Slovak National Party did not poll independently in 1929 but joined an electoral bloc, comprising the National Democrats and the Carpathoruthenian Labour Party, which however won only 4.9% of the total poll in the Republic. The SNS never polled on its own

again in any parliamentary election, although from the provincial election results of 1928 and 1935 we may estimate that its share of the vote in Slovakia lay in the range of 2%-3% and 30,000 - 40,000 votes. Unlike HSL'S it was never able to gain a larger following and transform itself into a mass party.

Both the German and Magyar minorities in Slovakia had a large number of their own political parties. The salient fact about the Magyar parties was that they did not apparently attract the entire Magyar vote as the total percentage of the poll that went to these parties was lower than the proportion of Magyars in the population as a whole, although the number of those of voting age may have shown a different percentage. It cannot be entirely ruled out that a small proportion of Magyar voters may cast their votes for one or other of the Czechoslovak parties or even for HSL'S although this seems a very unlikely possibility. The German parties were generally far too small to be able to get any representatives elected in local government or parliamentary elections. They tended to form electoral alliances either with Magyar parties in Slovakia or with German parties that polled in the Czech Lands. In many cases the German parties in Slovakia were often only branches of larger similar parties whose main sphere of operations lay in the Czech Lands. Some Germans in Slovakia (as in the Czech Lands) may well have voted for non-German parties.

1935 gives an interesting opportunity to compare the extent to which voter support for each party varied from provincial to parliamentary elections or not as the case may be. In Slovakia the Agrarians lost a small part of their support (See Table Fifty-Three) whilst the Social Democrats gained slightly, the relative positions of the other major parties being but little changed. The votes cast for the Autonomist Block in Slovakia were about 1% less than the combined votes of HSL'S and the Slovak National Party in the 1935 Provincial elections.

The economic and political consequences of the World Depression (1929-1933) were not without effect on the 1935 election results in both the provincial and parliamentary election results. The growing strength of the Sudetendeutsche Partei led by Konrad Henlein can be gauged from the fact that nationally it polled 15.1% of the vote, capturing the majority of the German vote including most of the German vote in Slovakia. If we compare the results of the parliamentary elections with the percentage that each party obtained in the Provincial elections we do not find any great variation. If however we compare the 1929 parliamentary results with those of 1935 we may see that the four Czechoslovak parties, the Agrarians, the Social Democrats, National Socialists and the People's Party all registered small percentage losses. viz.

Table Fifty-Four

	1929	1935
Social Democrats	13.0%	12.5%
National Socialists	10.4%	9.1%
Agrarians	15.0%	14.2%
People's Party	8.4%	7.4%

These losses may very well have been caused by some German voters switching their allegiance from these parties to Henlein's Sudetendeutsche Partei as two German parties also showed heavy losses. The German Social Democrats share fell from 6.9% to 3.6% and the Christian Socialist People's Party from 4.7% to 2.0%.

The success of Henlein's movement, as well as the economic, social and political conditions of the Thirties, may well account for the increased militancy of HSL'S after 1929 when it left the coalition. Henlein's movement may well have served as a model for HSL'S although a further factor

in this process of radicalization was the emergence of a young radical wing within the party called the "Nastupists" (See Chapter Six).

In spite of the 30.1% of the total vote in Slovakia which the Autonomist Bloc captured in 1935 other influences were still to be felt and HSL'S could not be said to represent the majority of Slovak voters. The Agrarians and the Social Democrats in Slovakia still maintained a considerable share of the poll whilst the Agrarians actually polled better in Slovakia (17.6%) and Ruthenia (19.6%) than in Bohemia (12.7%) or Moravia (14.2%). Paradoxically enough the Communists also obtained better results in Ruthenia (25.6%) and Slovakia (12.9%) than in Bohemia (9.0%) or in Moravia (8.6%).

From a study of the election results from 1920 to 1935 we can conclude that although Hlinka's party and its strivings for autonomy were undoubtedly attractive to many Slovaks, Slovak public opinion as reflected in voter support for the various parties that contested both local government and parliamentary elections was strongly divided. One cannot therefore conclude that all Slovaks desired autonomy per se, more than they wished to secure any possible improvement in their material conditions of life.

CHAPTER EIGHT : SLOVAKIA AND MUNICH

The extent to which the demands for Slovakia's autonomy that HSL'S made during the time of the Munich crisis were a factor that effectively weakened the Central Government and rendered it less able to resist the demands of its Allies is one that is open to debate. By pressing its claims however at such a crucial time when the Republic's government was being subject to great pressures from outside HSL'S undoubtedly did contribute to the general complex of forces and events that were to culminate in the signing of the Munich Agreement and all that was later to entail.

Various interpretations have been advanced to explain why the party chose to behave in such a way at a time when the Republic itself was in great danger. Both communist writers of the 50's¹ and some Czechoslovak exiles in the West² have purported to show that HSL'S deliberately sought to betray the Republic's Constitution by undertaking actions that were designed to bring Slovakia out of the Republic and create an independent Slovak state, which in fact did not come into being until March 1939. Such interpretations are generally based on the facts of the Party's links with other bodies inimical to the continued existence of the Republic such as the Sudetendeutsche Partei as well as the creation of the independent Slovak state that lasted from 1939 to 1945 and was controlled exclusively by HSL'S. Very often ideological objections to the anti-Communist and Catholic outlook of the party and the Fascist nature of the Slovak state have also been adduced as being conclusive proof of the disloyalty of HSL'S. If we try to disregard the superficial, one-sided interpretations and hurried judgements that are often to be found in such studies and consider the facts in a more objective fashion we shall soon see that the truth of the matter is more complicated than at first appears.

Two later studies one by a Slovak communist historian³ and the other by a

German researcher⁴ have been shown that such is the case. The party was never a monolithic whole but contained within itself both pro-German, pro-Polish and pro-Hungarian orientations. The intervention of foreign governments in the crisis was a factor that helped to determine which orientation would finally prevail. Hitler calculated that the older generation of HSL'S members despite their basic loyalty to the state would be unable to resist the opportunity that the crisis presented to press forward with their demands for Slovak autonomy. This does not show evidence of any collusion between Tiso (who became party leader on Hlinka's death) and Hitler or any of his intermediaries in the SdP as at that time not even all its members were fully aware of Hitler's plans.⁵ As we shall see there was some form of cooperation between SdP and HSL'S which was limited to some measure of coordination of their efforts to secure autonomy in the parliament.

This does not rule out the possibility that there were contacts between the pro-German group within the party, Mach and both Ďurčanský brothers, and Hitler's emissaries in Berlin and Vienna who might have been doing all they could to achieve a state of affairs in which Slovakia could obtain its independence and turn itself into a totalitarian regime on the lines of Germany or Italy. Without the relevant documents however the truth of such an assertion can unfortunately not be tested.

The death of the leader of the SNS, Martin Rázus in the summer of 1937 had removed a moderating influence from the leadership of the Autonomist Bloc. Within the ranks of HSL'S the existence of two distinct groups was becoming more and more evident. The young radical group were known as the "Nastupists" and were grouped around a fortnightly publication Nástup (Advance) that had commenced publication on 15th April 1933.⁶ It was published and edited by the Ďurčanský brothers Jan and Ferdinand. The line of the magazine was generally anti-communist, anti-semitic and anti-Czech and reflected the views of these young radicals who were admirers

of the existing fascist regimes in Europe and advocates of their ideologies. The Austrian model was especially attractive to them based as it was in the ideas of the Austrian philosopher Otto Spann. His philosophy was essentially a blend of the Christian Socialist ideas that had first been expressed in an encyclical of Pope Leo X and the medieval notion of a corporate state (Ständerstaat). Such an ideology aimed at a society in which the entire population would be organized in various corporations in such a manner to abolish competition and class conflict and promote the harmonious coexistence of all members of society.

The seventh Party Congress of HSL'S held at Piešťany in June 1935⁷ showed clearly how far the "Nástupists" were able to monopolize the debates. They were able to gain the upper hand and get a resolution passed that rejected an offer to join the government on the grounds of the signing of the Czechoslovak-soviet treaty of 16th May 1935 against which the resolution protested as a sign of the Bolshevization of the ČSR. Mach and others were able to replace a resolution that expressed a conciliatory attitude to the Central Government with one that called for Czechoslovakia's inclusion in the Anti-Comintern Pact on the side of nations guided by Christian principles. (One doubts whether Germany could have been included in this category). Such a declaration must have been pleasing to the representatives of German, Italian and French Fascists groups who were present at the Congress⁸. The report of this resolution appeared late and in a censored form in the Slovak Press.⁹

HSL'S' links with the numerically insignificant groups of Czech Fascists - the National Union of Fascists and the National League of Fascists dated back to 1934 when they held a joint conference¹⁰ with the SNS and the right-wing of the National Democrats at which issues of a common policy and common tactions were discussed. In 1935 one of the Fascist Leaders, Stribný, visited Bratislava where he later entered into negotiations with

Hlinka. These however were fruitless as the Fascists did not join the Autonomist Bloc.

An important decision reached at the seventh Congress was a general agreement among most of the delegates to arrange celebrations of the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Pittsburg Agreement (See Chapter Four). This could serve as a focal point for a renewed campaign for the provisions contained in this document to be incorporated into the Republic's Constitution. By this time however Hlinka had moved away from the idea of demanding mere autonomy for Slovakia and towards the idea of formal political recognition of Slovak national individuality. This would be best provided by the creation of an independent Slovak government with responsibility for all areas of Slovakia's life except Foreign Affairs, Finance and Defence which were to be left under the control of the Central Government in Prague.¹¹ The recognition of the Slovaks as the second nation in the state would really have meant a federalization of the Republic. This would necessarily have meant the creation of virtually two sovereign states with an elaborate and complex delimitation of area of joint interest and responsibility as was the practice of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after the Ausgleich of 1867. It is not therefore surprising that the Central Government was unable to agree to such extreme interpretations of the notion of autonomy.

During 1938 the other parties in Slovakia were forced onto the defensive by HSL'S who were fully aware of the favourable implications of the international situation for their struggle to gain some degree of autonomy as Tiso had analysed the international situation at a meeting of the party presidium in 1937.¹² The Republic was only just recovering from the effects of the world economic crisis. Coupled with this fact went the additional factor of the European political climate which seemed most threatening. Roumania and Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia partners in the Little Entente, seemed to be falling more and more under German

domination. Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936 must also have troubled the leaders of a state with such a large German minority. His success in entering and occupying the Rhineland could not fail to be seen as a great triumph for German nationalism and one that would give a boost to separatist tendencies within the Sudeten German minority.

Czechoslovakia's allies, Britain and France, seemed hesitant and unable to make a firm stand against Germany. The Soviet Union seemed to be an ally that could not be counted upon either politically or militarily in view of the Moscow show trials and the later purges of the Red Army. The Italian invasion of Abyssinia seemed to highlight the inefficiency of the League of Nations as an instrument for the maintenance of world peace and a means of ensuring the security of any of its members. One could go as far as to say that Czechoslovakia was beginning to be faced with the progressive downfall of its security system that had been built up over many years by Beneš upon the basis of treaties and mutual non-aggression pacts between Czechoslovakia and many of her neighbours, agreements that had often been concluded under the auspices of the League.

The invasion of Austria in March 1938 and her incorporation (Anschluss) into the German Reich was an event that, at a stroke, nullified and neutralised the effectiveness not only of the Republic's many treaties and their provisions but also her military preparedness. In short she was not more or less surrounded by hostile countries. Her programme of building frontier defences had been primarily directed against Germany -- her defences on the border with Austria were less extensive and were not yet in any state of completion. Hungary was still implacably hostile and strongly pro-German and pro-Italian. Poland, under Colonel Beck had also been pursuing a strongly pro-German foreign policy and was thus not concerned at the threat to Czechoslovakia's security. In fact she would certainly have opposed the passage of Soviet troops across her territory to aid Czechoslovakia in the case of her being attacked.

The "Nastupist" wing of HSL'S grew in influence as by the end of 1937 all the Party's Press was in the hand of radicals.¹³ Sidor was the editor of Slovak. Mach was in charge of Slovenská Pravda whilst Durčanský remained with Nastup. The latter publication had been banned for a period of six months from 1st October 1937 to 15th April 1938¹⁴ after the appearance of an article by one of the Durčanský brothers that urged the transformation of Slovakia into a totalitarian state. This banning order led to riots at the Comenius University in Bratislava among the large number of pro-Nastup students who were supporters of Mach and Durčanský's ideas. Such ideas were not so different from those advocated earlier by Dr. Vojtech Tuka. The latter was pardoned by the President and released in 1937 after having made a somewhat relectant confession¹⁵ on condition that he resided in Plzen and took no part in political life. He returned to Slovakia only after Munich.

In an interview in a German-language Prague newspaper, Bohemia, on 29th December 1937, Hlinka reiterated his demands for the recognition of Slovak national individuality and stated that death would be preferable to Czechoslovak unity (i.e. the "unitary" idea of one state, one nation and possibly one language too).¹⁶ The new year 1938 began with a good many slogans appearing in the party Press such as "V Novom Roku do utoku-in the New Year into the attack" and "Sbohom Praho-Good-bye Prague! The latter slogan also appeared in an article in Slovak on the 23rd January that threatened to say good-bye to Prague i.e. that the Slovaks would seek independence if no concessions were forthcoming from the Central Government on the vexed question of Slovakia's autonomy.

In answer to a declaration by Hodža of his willingness to try and reach an equitable solution of the Slovak question¹⁷ one of the party's senators Mederly⁴ proclaimed on 4th March a five-point programme of his party's demands which were as follows.

- 1) The recognition of Slovak national individuality.
- 2) The use of Slovak as the official language in all areas of Slovak life.
- 3) A Parliament (snem) for Slovakia.
- 4) A reorganization of the territorial division of the state. This probably meant that the Moravian Slovaks would be brought under the jurisdiction of Slovakia.
- 5) A reform of the schools with the reorganization of the curriculum along Christian lines.

Hodža replied to these demands in a radio broadcast on the 28th March when he stated that the Government would halt de-nationalizing trends and remove anomalies in its minority policies. This speech led to the first joint declaration of HSL'S and the minorities on 29th March 1938.

A delegation from the SdP went to Ruzomberok on the 8th February to discuss the possibilities of joint action with Andrej Hlinka.¹⁸ He however was not pro-German and was wary of the German government's church policy. As an experienced Slovak politician he must have been fully aware of the attitude of the Hungarian government on the question of border rectifications and the revision of the Treaty of Trianon. It hoped to regain at least the southernmost strip of territory along the Danube where the largest part of the Magyar minority was to be found. Hlinka may thus have sanctioned some sort of cooperation with the United Magyar Party¹⁹ for tactical reasons in order to be able to exert more pressure on the Central Government but he would be careful to refrain from doing anything that might be construed as strengthening the Magyar revisionist claims. In his talks with the SdP Hlinka thus limited himself to a loose coordination of the party Press with that of the SdP. An issue of the Slovak on the 27th February spoke of HSL'S and the minorities fight for the same goal i.e. autonomy.

The Anschluss in Austria had a profound effect on the internal political

situation. The German Agrarian Party (Bund der Landwirte) voluntarily dissolved itself on the 22nd March and joined the SdP and was soon followed by the remaining two German "activist" parties. The policy of "activism" or German cooperation with the central government was now effectively dead. The reduction in its parliamentary majority which the coalition thus suffered made it all the more imperative for the government to try and reach an understanding with HSL'S. Its entry into the coalition was however opposed by the Social Democrats and Hodza was forced to abandon the attempt. Hlinka and Tiso fully understood the impact of the Anschluss on the central Government. HSL'S overcame its reluctance and issued a joint declaration on the 29th March 1938 with the United Magyar Parties and the Polish United Party. They demanded political autonomy for the non-Czech peoples and an end to the fiction of a Czechoslovak nation. Hlinka had originally not wanted to associate his party too closely with this kind of approach as he did not wish the Slovaks to be considered as a minority but as the second nation in the state. Nevertheless, the opportunities presented by the Anschluss were too good to be missed as by joining forces with the minorities Hlinka hoped that the Central Government would be more likely to accede to his demands, especially in view of the tense international situation that had been worsened by the Anschluss.

The Central Government however was unable to agree to such demands. Its attention was primarily directed towards reaching a solution of the Sudeten German problem and trying to improve its deteriorating security situation. There was also the question of the opposition to any such demands that existed amongst the members of the various Czechoslovak parties especially those Slovaks who like Derer were strongly committed to political centralism. President Benes, too, was opposed to any weakening of the unitary nature of the State and the Czechoslovak idea.

The Polish government was concerned to make as much political and diplomatic capital as possible out of these Slovak demands for autonomy. It maintained

a special section in the Foreign Ministry²⁰ that devoted itself to a study of Slovak affairs. The Polish Press usually supported Slovak demands.²¹ Hlinka himself had visited Poland in August 1937 and the delegation of American Slovaks who brought the original copy of the Pittsburg Agreement to Slovakia in June 1938 were accorded great hospitality upon their arrival in Poland en route to Slovakia.²² The Polish consul in Bratislava was instructed on the 28th March 1938 to get into contact with HSL'S for the purpose of arranging political talks at the highest level.²³ This probably would have amounted to no more than discussions between the consul and the pro-Polish section of the party. Sidor was invited to Warsaw in May by Colonel Beck who persuaded him of the advantages of a Slovak-Polish union, although such a scheme was decidedly unpopular in Slovakia.

Sidor was placed at a disadvantage in the struggle for the leadership of the party after Hlinka's death in August 1938. His polonophile ideas were unpopular both within the party and among the Slovak population as a whole and Hlinka's death had robbed him of a valuable patron whose support had enabled him to maintain his position in the party. He was thus forced to come to an understanding with Tiso who became the undisputed leader of the party although the position of head of the party was formally left unoccupied for a year as a mark of respect for Hlinka.²⁴

The high point of the autonomy campaign came in June when the Party Congress was held and the delegation from the Slovak League of America arrived. They brought with them the original copy of the Pittsburgh Agreement which was to be shown to the crowd at the celebrations of the 20th anniversary of its signing. This delegation saw themselves as mediators between Czechs and Slovaks²⁵ but their role was rejected by the Centralists and they were cleverly used by HSL'S to put forward their propoganda. Benes and Hodza met the delegation and Hodza assured them of his goodwill in solving the Slovak question.

The Party Congress was held on the 4th and 5th June. Mach and Durčanský put forward a plan for the revision of the Constitution to provide for Slovak autonomy and a separate Slovak army.²⁶ As this group had been maintaining contacts with Nazi circles²⁷ in Vienna the creation of a separate Slovak army might well have been in Germany's interests. It could conceivably have been used, given the right political conditions, to subvert the Republic or to carry out any other tasks the Reich might have required of it.

Several demonstrations were organized at which Hletko, the leader of the American delegation, showed the original copy of the Pittsburgh Agreement to crowds of several thousands people. At one such meeting in Bratislava the representatives of the SdP were to be seen at the side of Hlinka and Hletko. This was probably a reflection of the tactical necessity that forced the old guard to cooperate with the SdP with whose aspirations and ideology they felt no sympathy. They were also under pressure from the younger pro-German section of the party, Mach and Durčanský, to cooperate with the SdP and the latter group as we have seen had been in contact with the Republic's enemies in Vienna.

Beneš was slow to accept the need to negotiate with HSL'S. In a speech that he made on a tour of Slovakia he urged the Slovaks to stop being Slovaks and to start being Czechoslovak.²⁸ That is they should consider not merely their own interests but the dangers facing the Republic.

Such dangers had intensified during the month of September. On the first day of the month Hlinka went to Berchtesgaden where he received his final directives on the part the SdP was to play in the downfall of Czechoslovakia where a sustained campaign of agitation, ostensibly for Sudeten autonomy, and of subversion was to be unleashed. On the Slovak side after the death of Hlinka the Party Presidium where Tiso could effectively command a majority agreed on 19th August to present an eighty-page document to the National

Assembly. This outlined plans for the alteration of the Constitution so as to accommodate Slovak demands for autonomy.

No further action was taken until 7th September. Then a delegation of HSL'S members went to Prague to present a memorandum listing their demands to Lord Runciman, the English mediator whom the Central Government had agreed to accept in an effort to solve the Sudeten question. Negotiations between the two parties had been going on for some time but so far had not reached any agreement. It was vital for Hitler's plans that no such agreement should be reached so as to provide him with a convenient excuse to seize the border areas of Czechoslovakia and thus satisfy his territorial demands.

The HSL'S delegation met with Hodza who advised Tiso to seek an audience with President Benes. Tiso was received the following day.²⁹ Benes was angered by HSL'S contacts with the SdP and the fact that it had taken part in joint consultations with the SdP who then issued a communique celebrating this fact. Here HSL'S let itself be used by the SdP as a means of putting even greater pressure on the government by hinting that HSL'S might be lured away from its basic loyalty to the idea of a Czecho-slovak state. It would then conduct its campaign on the basis of minority rights. Such an approach was quite dangerous as it would leave the Czechs as an isolated minority (45-48%) of the population and destroy the ideological basis for the Czechoslovak state. It would then be in danger of falling apart into its constituent areas each of which would be easy prey for such hostile forces as Magyar revisionism and German nationalism.

Tiso refused to let himself be pushed into such an extreme stance. He was unable to accept Benes' offer to settle his demands on the basis of the Fourth Plan, one that had been worked out in the negotiations with the Sudeten Germans and which they had rejected. Tiso declined this offer because it would have had the effect of creating areas for national minorities in Slovakia and thus given a measure of self-government to the

Magyar minority. This was in fact one of the demands of the United Magyar Parties, led by Esterhazy. Tiso however was inclined to view such plans with suspicion for to create such areas meant running the risk that might secede either voluntarily or be subverted into joining Hungary. Any alterations to Slovakia's borders, essentially her long and exposed frontier with Hungary was something to which most of HSL'S were completely opposed.

The issue of Slovak on the 11th September carried an article by Tiso. In it he stated that his patience was at an end and engaged in angry polemics with Benes over his unwillingness to make any more concessions to the Party's demands. This article was not meant to imply that negotiations were at an end but were merely intended to put pressure on Benes to continue to negotiate. Behind the scenes the other pressures on him some of which like the Sudeten German situation made an early settlement of the Slovak demands imperative. On the 13th September a meeting of Slovak senators and deputies belonging to the political parties that made up the coalition passed a resolution calling for a reasonable decentralization of power within the country.

At the same time Tiso was ordered by the party leadership to try and reach an agreement with Benes. A delegation of HSL'S members, consisting of Tiso, Sidor, Sokol and Buday met with Benes on the 15th September. Benes suggested an agreement to regulate their differences but he was not prepared to give any recognition in writing of Slovak national individuality which he made dependent on the acceptance of the Fourth Plan by the Slovaks. The negotiations failed but the way was left open for further talks.

The same day the Sudeten crisis reached its breaking-point. Henlein fled across the border to Germany where he issued his famous "Heim ins Reich" call to his followers, saying that they were no longer willing to remain part of Czechoslovakia but wanted to go home to the Reich. A campaign of civil disturbances and open rebellion began in the Sudetenland and armed bodies of men, the Freikorps, were involved in clashes with Czech police.

There were casualties on both sides but order was soon restored. The campaign of agitation bluff and counter-bluff continued on an international plane with Hitler using these events to exert pressure on the British and French Governments to force the Czecho-slovak ^{government} to agree to cede those areas that were inhabited mainly but not exclusively by Germans to the Reich.

On the 19th September Tiso called a meeting of HSL'S senators and deputies to Bratislava where they passed a resolution in which they stated their determination to continue to fight for autonomy (dobojovat' boj o autonomiu). This meant that, willy-nilly, negotiations with Benes would have to continue.

Benes for his part put forward a proposal in the National Assembly that HSL'S should enter the coalition but he was unable to get a majority for such a plan. Hodza however needed the votes of HSL'S³⁰ in order to be able to resist the joint proposals of the British and French governments. These proposals were for various territorial concessions to be made to appease Hitler's demands. In return for their support Hodza put forward a plan that contained various social economic and political concessions. These involved the handing over of responsibility for educational, cultural, social and economic affairs to an elected body, together with a recognition of Slovak national individuality.

Tiso promised to put these proposals to a meeting of the Party presidium called for the 21st September which would decide whether or not they were acceptable. Meanwhile reports had been appearing in the Czech Press that HSL'S had agreed to join the coalition. These premature reports angered the members of the Presidium and they agreed only to the talks being continued. This however brought no result and on the 22nd September Benes dismissed Hodza and appointed a military man General J. Sflow. He took a more energetic stand on the need to reach an understanding with HSL'S and bring them into the coalition. Negotiations began again and a plan was drawn up that combined various provisions that were calculated to satisfy

HSL'S demands.

Paragraph Two of Article One³¹ of this plan provided for equal recognition for those who wanted to regard themselves as Czechs or Slovaks or even Czechoslovaks. There were provisions for the use of Slovak as the official language (Article Three) as well as various economic concessions including the stipulation that 30% of all central government and civil service posts were to be reserved for Slovaks within a period of seven years. Article nine provided for the political administration of Slovakia based upon a renewed county (župa) system. There was also to be a Slovak parliament (snem) with competence in legal, administrative, economic and cultural matters. These provisions however represented no improvement on what Hodža had offered but Tiso was by then inclined to accept in view of the announcement of the Polish and Hungarian^{governments} that they, too, had territorial demands, most of which concerned parts of Slovakia. The party leadership accepted these proposals only as a basis for further negotiations.

The following day saw the mobilization of part of the reserves. It proceeded smoothly everywhere in the Republic and there were various declarations of loyalty to the Republic from groups of Slovaks, including a resolution of a meeting of workers in Trnava organised by the Socialist and Communist parties in Slovakia that affirmed the loyalty of the Slovaks to the state.³² Slovak units assembled and took up their positions without any signs of disaffection or disloyalty.

Negotiations continued and two Slovaks (but not members of HSL'S) were appointed to the cabinet. External events however preoccupied the central government to such an extent that by the time it finally accepted the decisions of the Munich conference on 30th September and began to implement plans to give effect to these decisions no final solution of the Slovak question had been reached. Slovak in fact did not receive autonomy until after the establishment of the second or post-Munich Republic which lasted

until the German invasion on the 14th March 1939. Developments in Slovakia after Munich lie outside the scope of this work.

The question of the extent to which the Slovaks played a significant part in the collapse of the First republic is a most difficult matter to determine. All the Slovak members of the main political parties stood firmly behind the Central Government in its difficulties. Only HSL'S continued to press its demands at a most crucial time and it in fact deliberately sought to exploit the fact that the Central Government was under great pressures from outside in order to make sure that its demands were met. We need not see in this any conclusive proof that Tiso was actively seeking to betray the Republic by weakening the Central Government at a time of crisis yet it cannot be entirely ruled out that he was biding his time throughout the month of September and possibly earlier in an attempt to see how the crisis would be resolved. In the event of the break-up of the republic his first concern would be to protect Slovakia's interests even if that were to require the creation of an independent Slovak state.

The behaviour of HSL'S during this time could certainly be interpreted as irresponsible. Its leaders seemed to view the crisis merely as a means of getting what they wanted. They seemed blind to the threat that was posed to the existence of the state or maybe they were totally apathetic as to what was to happen as long as their demands were met. By presenting Runciman with a memorandum outlining their demands they must have unavoidably created the impression that the Slovaks too desired a radical transformation of the state and added to the British feeling that the Czechs were to a large extent to blame for their predicament. The majority of HSL'S members undoubtedly did not intend to destroy the Republic yet the actions of their leaders who may have genuinely desired nothing more than that Slovakia should gain autonomy certainly did nothing at all to help the situation. Their demands only added to the pressures that the government had to face. Neither was the Government itself entirely blameless. It had had many

years in which to devise some sort of autonomous system that could have satisfied the needs of state security as well as Slovak demands. Instead it did nothing and when an occasion arose that compelled it to take this matter in hand once and for all it found itself overtaken by outside events. Events, that were to radically affect not only the fate of the Republic but that of Slovakia too and to bring about great changes in its history. Effectively it was not no longer possible for the central government to procrastinate any longer. Forces were moving on the international stage that were soon to make the concept of autonomy totally redundant and lead to the creation of an independent but short-lived Slovak Republic Under the protective umbrella of Nazi Germany.

CHAPTER NINE

Conclusions: Achievements and Failures of Central Government Policy in Slovakia

In an analysis of historical events we can only limit ourselves to what actually occurred and the conditions and causes that lay behind those events. It is both futile and entirely fruitless to engage in speculation based on what might have happened but did not, as they can throw no light on the actual course of events. The temptation to do so is particularly strong in view of those tragic turning-points in Czechoslovakia's history which were to have serious consequences for that country's future. In my analysis of central government policy, however, I shall attempt to point out those features that might have contributed towards the growth and electoral success of that segment of Slovak political opinion which was opposed to the central government and its policies during most of the First Republic.

In essence the problem which confronted the Central Government was that with the establishment of the Republic in 1918 areas of different and unequal economic development were now joined together in one political and administrative unit. Indeed in the early years of the Republic the unitary nature of the State was markedly to the fore. The two different systems of local self-government that were instituted in Slovakia in this period were also subject to strong central government control. In any case they did not possess any powers with regard to the implementation of central government policy in Slovakia which was normally done through the agency of central government Ministries. It can be argued, therefore, that there was a certain lack of local initiative in the drafting of policy as this was done in Prague where the various ministers and their staffs could not have been as aware of conditions in Slovakia and the precise nature of the economic and social problems of that region.

Slovakia, as we have seen, was an area with a predominantly agricultural population. Within Hungary, however, it had also been of considerable importance both in the production of raw materials for industry and in manufacturing capacity. The establishment of the Republic in 1918 led to excess capacity in view of the fact that the manufacturing industries in the Czech Lands alone, who were producing for the entire Austro-Hungarian Empire, a market of 60 million people, now found their markets shrunken to some 14 million. The establishment of the successor states had created extra barriers to exports as each new state had its own customs procedures and duties, which in the context of the Austro-Hungarian Empire had not existed, and was also concerned to protect and encourage its own industries behind a high tariff wall. Furthermore the post war economic crisis of 1921-23 had a substantial effect on industrial production in many countries. Slovakia's industries had been established to a considerable extent through the provision of subsidies by the Hungarian government on which it was still dependent. Although in general Hungarian law remained in force in Slovakia after 1918 those laws that regulated the provision of industrial subsidies were naturally not enforced and nothing was done by the Central Government to prevent the closure of many factories during and after the 1921-23 crisis.

This was not, to my mind, a deliberate government policy. Such decisions were not the prerogative of the government as these enterprises still remained in private hands and the decision to close them was taken by the firms concerned. It was not the reflection of a government policy aimed at reducing Slovakia to a mere agricultural appendage of the Czech lands as the Autonomists were later to suggest, whose understanding of the workings of industry and business was almost non-existent, but rather the reflection of the lack of an industrial development policy on the part of the government. It failed to realise the need to maintain industry in Slovakia as the only way to provide extra employment

possibilities for the increasing population which in Slovakia and Ruthenia increased at a much faster rate than in the Czech Lands. Industrial development was also the only way in which, given the nature of Slovakia's agriculture with its low yields and fertility and smaller per capita area of cultivatable land, living standards could overall be raised and the economy of the region stimulated. The question arises that in view of the low per capita income in Slovakia the Central Government might not have felt inclined to grant the region a large measure of autonomy if it were still to have to remain dependent on the Central Government for the provision of funds both for items requiring capital expenditure and investment (roads, railways etc.) and recurrent costs such as the salaries of administrative staff, teachers etc.

This failure to grasp the significance of industry for Slovakia although mitigated by both the severe economic crisis that the Central Government had to face and the political crisis that it found itself involved in with Hungary and later with Nazi Germany is not entirely excused by them. It is in fact symptomatic of a wider and deeper failure to grasp the malaise that affected Slovakia which was rooted in the discrepancy between the available economic resources and the demands being placed upon them by an increasing population for whom agriculture could no longer provide a source of adequate income. The discontent which many of the poorer sections of the population felt and which among Slovaks was exploited with a certain measure of success by HSL'S must have been heightened by the fact that once Slovakia had become part of the Republic comparisons of living standards were no longer made between Slovakia and Hungary, which under most recent times has depended on agriculture as the main occupation of its people but between Slovakia and the Czech Lands. And in every respect Slovakia could be shown to be worse off. This however was in general the result of the different historic developments and climatic conditions which had prevailed in Austria and Hungary respectively and not the fault of the central government. The inability of the Central Government to narrow the

gap between the two areas which despite the many significant advances that the Central Government achieved in the twenty years still remained as wide in 1938 as in 1918 is the inevitable reflection of its failure to understand both the roots of Slovakia's problems and the roots of public discontent in Slovakia.

Considerable advances were made in health, education especially, railways and the employment of Slovaks in public service and the free professions. These could be classified as successes of central government policy in themselves were it not for the fact that they left untouched the main problem which was one of underdevelopment. They provided the basis for the raising of living standards by laying the foundations for better health and education services, better communications and employment opportunities. The continual increase in Slovakia's population, however, meant that there would be pressure on health and education services. Without an increase in the size of the industrial sector it would become increasingly difficult to find employment in the professions and public service for all those with appropriate qualifications whom the schools and universities turned out, as there must be a limit to the number of white-collar jobs which a basically agricultural economy can sustain. As it was the Central Government did not do too badly for the percentage of the active population engaged in free professions, state and public service rose from 4.0% in 1920 to 4.6% in 1930.¹ Absolute figures it rose from 46,800 in 1921 to 64,200 in 1930 a rise of 37% whilst the active population increased from 1,193,400 in 1921 to 1,393,200 in 1930 - a rise of only 16%. Yet at the same time the number of industrial workers rose from 224,500 in 1921 to 247,300 in 1930 - a rise of little over 10% although the proportion of the active population made up of industrial workers and Sveton's figures include artisans and craftsmen as well, fell from 18.9% in 1921 to 17.9% in 1930. This last figure suggests that Slovakia had undergone a certain measure of deindustrialization in the intervening period or at best the

industrial sector had not grown as fast as others. The rise of 37% for the free professions, state and public service between 1921 and 1930 must be explained in part by the expansion of the education service especially in the field of secondary and higher education, as by then a large number of Slovak teachers would have completed their training.

The degree of success which the Central Government achieved in these fields is best illustrated by the fact that the independent Slovak Republic which lasted from 1939 to 1945 would certainly not have been able to find enough qualified Slovak personnel to staff all its administrative posts had it not been for the policies of the Central Government of the First Republic which HSL'S spent so much of ~~its~~ time denigrating and attacking.

The failure of the Central Government to maintain and expand Slovakia's industrial capacity was caused by several factors. Firstly such a course of action would have required a large amount of money the expending of which in the conditions of economic crisis that prevailed during most of the 1930's would have seemed a most foolhardy venture in view of the vast amount of idle plant in the Czech lands had the money for such a venture been available. Secondly any moves to expand Slovakia's industrial output would surely have been opposed by industrialists in the Czech Lands would have lost their markets in Slovakia and might have feared that they would have to compete with Slovak products in the Czech Lands. Thirdly could industrial production be raised in Slovakia without having to reduce it in the Czech lands? Fourthly as all the governments of the First Republic were a coalition of different parties policies tended to have to be agreed at the level of the lowest common denominator of agreement. It is difficult to imagine that all the different political parties would have agreed to such a policy. Fifthly many of the decisions on policy in Slovakia were taken by men who were primarily politicians and thus could not be expected to have a clear understanding of Slovakia's needs over a long term, for despite

the advances which have been made since 1938 it was still not proved possible to close the gap between the two halves of the country, although it has been narrowed considerably.

It is difficult to assess the changes which had taken place in Slovakia's social structure by the end of the First Republic as no Census was held after 1930. We can however point out the advances in many fields of policy, the results of which are to be found in Chapter Six. The effects of the Depression were however not only economic for in the wake of wide-spread unemployment and the decline in both industrial output and agricultural production that occurred in many countries of the world during the Thirties came great political changes. In Czechoslovakia these occurred on both a national and an international level. The rise of Hitler's Germany profoundly affected both the Republic's security and the attitude of its neighbours. Poland and Hungary. The latter saw in Germany a useful ally in their struggle against Czechoslovakia. Prior to 1933 hostility towards Czechoslovakia on the part of both Hungary and Poland had of course existed but relations with Germany were correct if not very cordial. The growth of Fascism in Germany affected political developments within the Republic as well. The growth of Sudetendeutsche Partei can be traced both to the impact of the Depression and the direct interference of Germany whilst in the case of HSL'S it may be seen in the increasing influence that the "Nastupist" wing of the party began to exert.

We should not however make the mistake of assuming that HSL'S represented the whole of Slovak opinion none of the Slovak parties went to the polls independently but formed electoral alliances with other parties based in the Czech Lands or were part of a Czechoslovak party organisation that covered the entire Republic. This was due primarily to the tenseness of the international situation. Hungary was still implacably hostile even after the signing of the Treaty of Trianon and by 1922 two attempts had been made to restore Karl Habsburg to the

throne of Hungary. The election results in 1920 showed that most Slovak voters had cast their votes for parties that were firmly committed to the Czechoslovak state. Even SL'S despite Hlinka's trip to Paris in 1919 did not poll on an anti-Prague line and there seems to have been no mention of autonomy in its electoral campaign.

Yet by the beginning of 1922 the party was launched on a definite anti-Prague line with its demands for Slovakia's autonomy. Although it may well have been to the advantage of the Hungarian government to whip up autonomist feelings in Slovakia the reasons why SL'S latched onto the one issue of autonomy must be sought within the context of internal political developments. SL'S had gone to the polls in 1920 fully expecting that it would capture a large part of the Slovak vote. Its main rival seemed to be the Slovak People's and Peasants' Party and not the Social Democrats. Its shock must have been all that much greater when the actual results of the elections revealed the massive support that the latter had gained. SL'S was a predominantly clerical party whose composition reflected the fact that the Slovak intelligentsia was made up mainly of priests, teachers, lawyers and a few officials. Very few of its members were owners of businesses or factories as such enterprises in Slovakia tended to belong to non-Slovaks, Magyars, Jews and Germans. Thus the party's understanding of the role of industry was limited and it tended to regard it with suspicion for it feared that industrial workers would very quickly lose their Catholic faith the preservation of whose interests was one of the cardinal features of the party's ideology. Thus, although it was fully prepared to use the economic effects of the 1921-23 crisis on Slovakia's industries for its own purposes, it had no industrial policies of its own.

It can be argued that just as the massive vote for the Social Democrats in 1920 was primarily an expression of hope for a better future, so the success of HSL'S in capturing 34% of the total vote and probably at least 40% of the votes of

Slovaks in 1925 can be considered a protest against the inability of the Central Government fully to cope with the effects of the economic crisis on Slovakia. The party's leaders after the 1920 elections may well have realized the need for an issue which would enable them to attract votes away from the Social Democrats. The schism within the Social Democrats and the economic crisis thus provided the opportunity for such a policy to succeed but it was still necessary to find an issue that would convince Slovak voters that SL'S was the only party that had their interests at heart. The question of Slovakia's autonomy began to assume the role of universal panacea for all Slovakia's ills. Thus the party had a simple and direct answer as to why all was not well with Slovakia. It seemed to be saying that only autonomy would solve the grave economic and social problems that existed in Slovakia. Conversely the unwillingness of the Central Government to accede to its demands was seen to prove ill-will which it bore towards Slovakia was regarded as palpable evidence of its desire to treat Slovakia as a colony of the Czech Lands. There was I feel never any real examination of the actual circumstances under which autonomy could make a significant contribution to the raising of living standards in Slovakia.

By 1929 the Autonomis fervour seemed to be on the wane. Economic conditions had eased somewhat and the political climate in Europe seemed fairly quiet. The pro-Czechoslovak parties in Slovakia had retained a considerable share of the poll in 1925 and again in 1929. Some Slovak historians² have tended to argue, especially with regard to the 1935 results, that all votes cast for parties that did not support the Central Government should be considered as a vote for autonomy and against centralism. Such an interpretation is mistaken for it ignores the reasons why the Magyar nationalist parties and the Communists derived the support they did. The Magyars tended to vote for their own parties both out of hostility to the state in which they found themselves living and as a protest against their minority status and the irritations that went with

it. The Communists however were opposed to the very nature of Czechoslovak society and were in practice till 1930 at least, contralists as Slovakia did not have its own independent party and trade union organs. Among the Slovaks at least there seems little evidence to show that in the 1918-1929 period more than 50% of the population were at all sympathetic to the idea of the autonomy. In many cases they tended to follow the advice of their parish priest and may well have voted for HSL'S because it was presented to them as the one party that would defend the interests of the Faith.

The beginnings of the world-wide economic crisis in 1929 mark a turning point in the relations between the Slovaks and the Central Government. Till then it had not had to face any great amount of outside interference by its enemies in its struggle with the Autonomists. The sole exception to this was Hungary where the Horthy government was continually occupied in attempts to encourage anti-Prague feeling for its own revisionist ends but such attempts did not pose any serious threat to the security of the Republic. After an initial period of extreme opposition in the early Twenties most of the German parties were playing a positive role within the political system of the Republic.

After 1930 the growing discontent which the Depression caused was skillfully exploited both by political parties within the Republic and its external enemies. The German minority were especially hard hit as they were almost exclusively dependent on industry. In time their discontent spawned a political movement that was ultimately to provide Hitler with a means of subverting the Republic from within. After its somewhat mediocre showing in the 1929 elections when it failed to recapture the position it gained in 1925 HSL'S experienced a swing to the right. The "Nastupists" were not characterised by a genuine respect for the Republic form of government as were the older generation of party members. The converse was in fact true and most of the adherents of this group were admirers of Fascist ideologies and states.

By 1935 autonomist feelings had begun to affect the German minority as well as a section of the Slovaks and the Magyars. The situation in which the Republic found during this period was most perilous. There was prolonged economic crisis which gave rise to continuing discontent, Nazi Germany had joined Poland and Hungary as those states that were hostile to Czechoslovakia and the 1935 elections saw the triumph of both the Sudetendeutsche Partei and The Autonomist Bloc. The former ostensibly demanded autonomy for the German areas of the Republic and increased economic aid for their unemployed whilst the latter was an association of HSL'S, the Slovak National Party, the Polish separatists and a Ruthenian party. Its programme was based on demands for autonomy not only for the Slovaks but for the other nationalities whose parties were members of the Bloc. The Sudetendeutsche Partei became the largest party in the Republic as a result of the 1935 election and this made the creation of a coalition extremely difficult. Attempts were made to induce HSL'S to join the coalition but the price which it demanded was too high. The other Czechoslovak parties could not bring themselves to agree to Slovakia becoming autonomous. This would be unacceptable not only because it might well tend to increase the party's power and prestige in Slovakia but because it might very well encourage the other nationalities in their demands. And this was something which the Central Government wished to avoid at all costs.

HSL'S tried to exploit every opportunity to press its demands even during 1938 when the Republic was experiencing great international difficulties. Just as the Central Government failed to realize the importance of industry in Slovakia's economy so it was unable to come to some agreement with HSL'S. It cannot be concluded however that even if agreement had been reached Munich and its consequences could have been avoided. Neither can we assume that autonomy would necessarily by itself have been able to solve Slovakia's problems.

Autonomy was not the main concern of all the Slovak parties. In 1935 the Czechoslovak parties gained a larger percentage of the poll than the Autonomist Bloc although it is not possible to tell how many Czech voters were resident in Slovakia. There seems to be little evidence to show that more than 50% of the Slovak population supported HSL'S and its demands, which if they had been granted by the Central Government would not have meant any improvement in economic conditions in Slovakia. The double tragedy was that not only did both the Central Government and HSL'S fail to understand the need to increase the amount of industry in Slovakia (as did most other parties except the Communists) but external events were moving so fast that neither party was to be given the time to be able to reach a settlement which might have laid the basis for a more equitable framework within which the gap between the Czech Lands and Slovakia could be narrowed. This however would be a long-term task as the historical conditions which had determined Slovakia's development prior to 1918 could not be overcome in as short a time as two decades. By 1968, thirty years after the end of the First Republic and after the development which Slovakia had undergone during the independent Slovak Republic, the post-war Republic and the post-1948 socialist Republic, during which a great deal of investment took place in Slovakia and much economic progress occurred, the Slovak problem and the relations between Czechs and Slovaks were still far from resolved. Even at the time of writing it is still too soon to tell whether the type of federalization of the ^VČSSR which took place after 1968 will finally prove to be the adequate solution.

APPENDIX
OF
STATISTICAL TABLES

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<u>Table Thirty-eight:</u>	Illiteracy in Slovakia 1921 and 1930
<u>Table Thirty-nine:</u>	Education in Slovakia 1921-1936
<u>Table Forty:</u>	See Chapter Six
<u>Table Forty-one:</u>	Primary education in Slovakia 1921-1936
<u>Table Forty-two:</u>	School construction in Slovakia 1919-1936
<u>Table Forty-three:</u>	Practising doctors in Slovakia 1920-1937
<u>Table Forty-four:</u>	See Chapter Six
<u>Table Forty-five:</u>	Agricultural improvements in Slovakia 1919-1936
<u>Table Forty-six:</u>	See Chapter Six.

<u>Table Forty-Seven</u>	Election results in Czechoslovakia 1929 and 1935 for the Chamber of Deputies (Poslanecká Sněmovna)
<u>Table Forty-Eight</u>	See Chapter Seven
<u>Table Forty-Nine</u>	Elections to the Chamber of Deputies Results in Slovakia 1920 and 1925
<u>Table Fifty</u>	Elections to the Chamber of Deputies Results in Slovakia 1929 and 1935
<u>Table Fifty-One</u>	Results of <u>župa</u> elections in Slovakia 1923
<u>Table Fifty-Two</u>	Results of Provincial elections in Slovakia 1928 and 1935
<u>Table Fifty-Three</u>	Percentage of the vote gained by major political parties in all local government and parliamentary elections in Slovakia, 1920-1935

TABLE ONE

COMPARATIVE DATA ON THE CZECH LANDS AND SLOVAKIA 1901-1910

	<u>Czech Lands</u>	<u>Slovakia</u>
Illiteracy (1910)	24.3 per 1000	349 per thousand
<u>Agricultural population</u>	34.2% of total	68.3% of total
Active sector	42.9%	64.3%
Dependants	25.8%	60.2%
<u>Industrial population</u>	39.5%	14.8%
Active sector	38.9%	19.7%
Dependants	40.2%	19.5%
<u>Mortality</u>		
Adult (1901-1910)	22.29 per 1000	24.9 per 1000
Infant (1901)	221.7 per 1000 live births	198.0 per 1000
Birth rate (1910)	32.45 per 1000	36.9 per 1000
Natural increase	10.16 per 1000	12.0 per 1000

Source: Manuel Statistique I Prague 1920

Svetel' J Vyvoj obyvatel'stva na Slovensku Bratislava 1969

pp. 154-5, p.235.

TABLE THREE

TOTAL INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION IN HUNGARY SLOVAKIA AND THE

CZECH LANDS in 1913

	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Hungary</u>	<u>Slovakia</u>	<u>% of</u>	<u>Czech</u>	<u>Slovakia</u>
				<u>Hungary</u>	<u>Lands</u>	<u>as % of</u>
						<u>Czech Lands</u>
Million tonnes						
Coal	"	1.3	-	-	14.5	-
Brown Coal	"	8.9	0.1	0.5	23.0	0.42
Iron Ore	"	2.1	1.2	57.0	1.0	120.0
Thousand tonnes						
Oil	"	2.1	*	-	-	-
Raw Iron	"	609.0	187.0	30.7	1041.0	17.9
Lead	"	1.1	0.9	81.8	3.8	28.1
Copper	"	0.4	0.3	75.0	1.4	21.4
Salt	Metric Tons	2940.0	550.0	18.7	-	-
Mercury	"	90.0	88.8	98.7	-	-
Silver	"	8.696	2.756	31.7	44.767	6.0
Gold	"	2.924	0.138	4.7	.267	51.0
Antimony	"	-	450.0	-	-	-

Source: Faltás J. and Průcha. V. Průběh hospodarského vývoje na Slovensku

1918-45 Bratislava 1967 p.16

TABLE FIVE

NATURAL INCREASE IN POPULATION IN ^vCSR 1919-1923

	<u>BOHEMIA</u>	<u>MORAVIA</u>	<u>SILESIA</u>	<u>SLOVAKIA</u>	<u>RUTHENIA</u>	<u>Average for ^vCSR</u>
<u>1919</u>	0.02	3.72	3.14	11.53	12.54	3.97
<u>1920</u>	5.63	8.42	9.49	12.40	12.22	7.64
<u>1921</u>	8.09	11.03	14.67	16.91	16.40	11.32
<u>1922</u>	7.14	9.00	13.45	15.76	23.23	10.45
<u>1923</u>	8.60	11.15	14.94	18.43	22.90	12.25

Expressed as an excess of live births over deaths per 1000 inhabitants

Source: Manuel Statistique Vol III Prague 1928 p.322

TABLE SIX

UNEMPLOYMENT IN SLOVAKIA 1919-1924

The Proportion in % of those who were found work from among those applying for work through the medium of state labour exchanges.

	<u>BOHEMIA</u>	<u>MORAVIA</u>	<u>SILESIA</u>	<u>SLOVAKIA</u>	<u>RUTHENIA</u>	<u>Average for CSR</u> ✓
<u>1919</u>	39.9	50.5	36.4	-	-	41.1
<u>1920</u>	58.3	54.3	52.7	-	-	58.3
<u>1921</u>	62.8	54.5	53.3	24.5	57.4	60.7
<u>1922</u>	51.8	38.6	28.4	28.2	61.0	48.8
<u>1923</u>	57.1	49.3	48.8	35.7	61.2	55.3
<u>1924</u>	71.7	67.5	68.5	42.9	53.0	69.7

Source: Manuel Statistique Vol III Prague 1928 p.456

TABLE SEVEN

FACTORIES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA WHERE PRODUCTION WAS EITHER TOTALLY OR PARTIALLY STOPPED DURING THE LAST FOUR MONTHS OF 1922 WITH THE NUMBERS OF WORKERS LAID OFF

Branch of Industry	Production completely halted		Production partly halted	
	No. of	No. of	No. of	No. of
	<u>factories</u>	<u>workers</u>	<u>factories</u>	<u>workers</u>
Mines and Iron-works	5	4,630	16	760
Textiles	2	615	9	260
Chemicals	1	100	3	465
Tanneries	5	480	2	90
Paper-mills	2	1,220	-	-
Glassworks	2	530	-	-
Wood-processing	2	435	1	-
Sawmills	6	4,000 (Approx)	1	60
Food Processing	1	185	2	210
Building and Ceramics	2	250	-	-
Other	2	65	1	-
Total	30	12,510	27	1,845

Source: Faltus and Průcha V. Prehl'ad hospodárskeho vývoja na Slovensku
1918-45 Bratislava 1967 p.40

TABLE NINE

c) NUMBER OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL TEACHERS 1921-1930

	31.12.21	1926/27	1930
Slovak	4,609	4,987	6,671
Ruthene	74	117	129
German	261	241	282
Magyar	1,440	1,307	1,498
Other	141	296	479
	6,525	6,948	9,059

d) NUMBER OF SECONDARY SCHOOL PUPILS 1920-1930

	1920/21	1926/27	1930
Slovak (inc. Czechs)	8,227	13,679	12,879
German	1,036	1,184	1,188
Magyar	4,867	2,876	2,579
Ruthene	81	124	
Total	14,261	17,863	16,646

Sources a) Manuel Statistique Vol II Prague 1925 p.1 passim

Manuel Statistique Vol III Prague 1928 p.1

Manuel Statistique Vol IV Prague 1932 p.346

Annuaire Statistique 1938 Prague 1937 p.241

b) Manuel Statistique Vol II Prague 1925 p.5

Manuel Statistique Vol III Prague 1928 p.3

Manuel Statistique Vol IV Prague 1932 p.346

Annuaire Statistique 1938 Prague 1937 p.246

TABLE NINE (continued)

Sources c) Manuel Statistique Vol II Prague 1925 p.23

Manuel Statistique Vol III Prague 1928 p.12

Manuel Statistique Vol IV Prague 1932 p.362

d) Manuel Statistique Vol II Prague 1925 p.9

Manuel Statistique Vol IV Prague 1932 p.23

Manuel Statistique Vol III Prague 1928 p.7

TABLE TENELEMENTARY SCHOOL EDUCATION IN SLOVAKIA 1918 to 1926/27Elementary Schools

	1918			1926/27			
	School	Teachers	Pupils	Schools	Teachers	Pupils	
Slovak	276	390	30,118	2,652	4,354	277,794	
Magyar	3,298	5,000	343,992	695	1,235	79,149	
German	-	-	-	107	229	14,182	
Ruthene	31	35	2,494	101	114	8,203	
Mixed	-	-	-	51	234	12,649	
<hr/>							
State							
Communal	No full details			1,104	2,244	128,085	
Roman Catholic							
Greek Catholic in 1916-1918				1,758	2,930	209,670	
Lutheran	Reports of Royal			450	569	31,603	
Calvinist	Hungarian Statistical			216	272	15,828	
Jewish	Office			63	132	5,278	
Private				15	19	1,116	
Total	3,605	5,425	376,604	3,606	6,166	392,580	
% Slovak	7.6	7.5	7.9	% Magyar	19.2	20.0	20.1

Source Seton-Watson R.W. (Ed) Slovakia Then and Now London 1931 p.125.

TABLE TEN CONT'D.Upper Elementary Schools

	1918			1926/27		
	Schools	Teachers	Pupils	Schools	Teachers	Pupils
Slovak	-	-	-	109	633	22,826
Magyar	83	-	12,000 (Est.)	17	72	2,235
German	-	-	-	3	12	492
Ruthene	-	-	-	1	3	138
Mixed	-	-	-	6	62	2,105
<hr/>						
State				109	670	24,176
Communal						
Roman Catholic				18	78	2,460
Greek Catholic						
Lutheran				5	18	629
Jewish	No Data			3	12	360
Private				1	4	171
Total				136	782	27,796
			% Magyar	12.5	9.2	8.0

Source: Seton-Watson R.W. (Ed) Slovakia Then and Now London 1931 p.126.

TABLE ELEVENSECONDARY EDUCATION IN SLOVAKIA 1913/4 to 1927/28Number of Secondary Schools

	1913/14	1918/19	1919/20	1927/28
Slovak				
Grammar Type	-	18	35	39
Teacher Training				
Colleges	-	6	13	13
Total	-	24	48	52
German				
Grammar Type	-	-	4	3
Magyar				
Grammar Type	44	28	13	7
Training Colleges	15	9	1	2
Total	59	37	14	9
Ruthene				
Training College	-	-	1	1
Total				
Grammar	44	46	52	49
Colleges	15	15	15	16
Total	59	61	67	65
% Magyar	100	60.6	20.6	13.8

Secondary School Pupils

1927/28

	% of Population		%
Slovak-Czech	68.0	14,224	76.8
German	4.7	1,175	6.3
Magyar	21.5	2,973	16.0
Ruthene	2.8	137	0.7

Source: Seton-Watson R.W. Slovakia Then and Now London 1931 p.127.

TABLE TWELVE

SIZE OF FARMS IN SLOVAKIA 1921 and 1930

Size of farm	No. of farms		in %	
	1921	1930	1921	1930
In ha				
0.1-2	171,786	163,732	40.8	36.6
2-5	113,500	125,647	26.9	28.1
5-10	81,420	94,807	19.3	21.2
10-50	48,980	56,207	11.6	12.5
50-100	2,161	2,574	0.5	0.6
+100	3,779	4,369	0.9	1.0
Total	421,626	447,336	100.0	100.0

Size of farm	Agricultural		land		Average size of farm	
	In ha	in 1000 ha	in %	in %	in ha	in ha
	1921	1930	1921	1930	1921	1930
0.1-2	146,9	148,6	5.8	5.2	0.8	0.9
2-5	362,6	400,2	13,2	14.0	3.1	3.1
5-10	542,3	630,4	19,8	22.0	6.6	6.6
10-50	723,7	816,1	26,4	28.5	14.7	14.5
50-100	118,8	123,4	4.3	4.3	54.9	47.5
+100	850,6	742,8	31.0	26.0	225.2	165.3
Total	2,744,9	2,861,5	100	100	6.5	6.4

Source: Sveton. J. Vývoj Obyvatel'stva na Slovensku Bratislava 1969

Tables 33 and 34

pp.168-169.

TABLE THIRTEEN

RESULTS OF LAND REFORM IN SLOVAKIA BY 1931

Land at the disposition of the Land Office	1,406,219 ha
Agricultural land	594,120 ha
Agricultural land distributed	311,981 ha
To owners of residual estates	57,656 ha
To owners of medium-sized holdings	13,792 ha
To owners of small holdings	240,533 ha

Number of applicants in each category		Average size of plot
Residual Estates	483	120 ha
Medium-sized holdings	1160	11.4 ha
Small holdings	298,378	0.8 ha

Source: Svetoš. J. Vývoj obyvatel'stva na Slovensku Bratislava 1969 p.168.

TABLE FOURTEEN

DATE ON PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS IN SLOVAKIA 1928

	% of poll	No. of elected members	%	No. of nominated members	%	Total	%
HSL'S	24.64	9	25.0	6	33.33	15	27.77
SNS	2.46	1	2.77	-	5.55	1	3.70
Agrarians	20.54	8	22.22	8	44.44	16	29.62
People's Party	3.31	1	2.77	1	5.55	2	3.70
National Socialists	2.74	1	2.77	1	5.55	2	3.70
Social Democrats	7.33	3	8.33	1	5.55	4	7.40
Communists	14.42	5	13.88	-	-	5	9.25
Magyar Christ. Soc.	9.14	3	8.33	-	-	3	5.55
Magyar Nat. Party	7.88	3	8.33	-	-	3	5.55
Jewish Parties	3.42	1	2.77	18	-	1	1.85
		36		18		54	

Percentage of poll necessary to gain one member in the Provincial assembly

HSL'S	1.64
SNS	2.46
Agrarians	1.28
Cz. People's Party	1.65
Cz. National Democrats	0.995
Cz. National Socialists	1.37
Cz. Social Democrats	1.83
Communists	2.88

TABLE FOURTEEN CONT'D.

Magyar Christian Socialists	3.04
Magyar National Party	2.66
Jewish Parties	3.42

Source: Provincial Election Results for Slovakia from 2.12.1928

quoted in Lipscher. L. Vývin politickej správy na Slovensku Bratislava
1969 p.169.

TABLE SIXTEEN

SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION OF LANDHOLDINGS IN SLOVAKIA IN 1930

Size of holdings in Hectares of agricultural land	Number of Holdings		Size in Hectares		Amount of Agricultural land (ha)	
	Absolute	%	Absolute	%	Absolute	%
0-1	102,738	22.6	62,693	1.3	49,265	1.7
1-2	77,563	17.0	137,031	2.9	116,270	4.1
2-5	127,730	28.1	505,387	10.8	432,881	15.1
5-10	92,266	20.3	746,077	15.9	655,033	22.9
10-20	39,287	8.6	621,894	13.3	526,030	18.4
20-50	9,071	2.0	403,045	8.6	260,756	9.1
50-100	2,112	0.5	320,668	6.8	148,445	5.2
Above 100	2,668	0.6	1,647,715	35.2	673,429	23.5
Without agricultural land	1,520	0.3	243,816	5.2	---	---
Total	454,955	100.0	4,687,626	100.0	2,862,109	100.0

Source: Faltus J. a Průcha V. Prehľad hospodarského vývoja na Slovensku Bratislava 196 p.121 Table 25
1918-1945

TABLE SEVENTEEN

RESULTS OF THE LAND REFORM IN SLOVAKIA BY 1937

	All land In Hectares	Agricultural land In Hectares
Sequestered	1,396,100	498,700
By Exchange	11,300	8,500
Total for distribution	1,407,400	507,200
Distributed	690,500	323,200
Returned to owners	562,100	178,200
Remaining at the disposition of the Land Office	154,800	5,800
Total	1,407,400	507,200

Category of land distributed	Number of Holdings	Size in Hectares (Thousand ha)		Average Size of holding
		Ag. Land	Ag. Land	
Smallholdings of up to 30 ha	187,423	290,500	247,600	11.55 ha
Residual Estates	611	74,700	60,000	122,200 ha
Other large estates	1,494	325,300	15,600	216.400 ha
Total	189,528	690,500	323,200	--- --- ---

Source: Faltus, J. a Průcha V. Prehľad hospodárskeho vývoja na Slovensku 1918-1945 Bratislava p.145 Tables 31 and 35

TABLE SEVENTEEN CONTINUED

LAND REFORM IN SLOVAKIA 1936

	Total in Hectares	Agricultural land (In hectares)
Land at the disposition of the Land Office	1,407,329	504,173
Land distributed to new owners	684,880	332,932
Land returned to previous owners	534,175	167,463
Land remaining at the disposition of the Land Office	188,274	3,778
-		
Land distributed	684,880	332,932
Small-holdings (0.1-0.3 ha) To 186,648 applicants	298,034	246,777
Residual Estates (611) To 564 applicants	75,225	60,627
Other lands without buildings (1385) Mainly forest to 1,326 applicants	311,621	15,528
Other	224	11
Average size of small-holding	1.59 ha	1.32 ha
Average size of residual estate	123 ha	99 ha

Source: Annuaire Statistique 1938 Prague 1937 pp.55-56

TABLE EIGHTEEN

UNEMPLOYMENT SUPPORT 1919-1923 (in million of Kcs.)

	<u>1919</u>	<u>1920</u>	<u>1921</u>	<u>1922</u>	<u>1923 (Till 30.10)</u>
Bohemia	215.7	80.3	58.0	137.3	223.8
Moravia	26.0	5.8	8.1	41.0	64.8
Silesia	9.9	3.2	3.0	10.79	15.0
Slovakia	8.8 (3.3%)	4.9 (5.1%)	6.6 (8.8%)	18.90 (9.0%)	27.8 (8.3%)
Ruthenia	-	.578	.221	1.19	1.448
Total	260.5	94.9	76.1	209.9	333.0

Source: O Priemyslu Slovenska 1923 Bratislava

TABLE NINETEEN

EMPLOYMENT IN VARIOUS BRANCHES OF INDUSTRY IN SLOVAKIA

AND SUB-CARPATIAN RUTHENIA 1918-1926

HOURS WORKED IN THOUSANDS

<u>Nature of Industry</u>	<u>No. of</u>	<u>1914</u>	<u>1918</u>	<u>1919</u>	<u>1920</u>	<u>1921</u>	<u>1922</u>	<u>1923</u>	<u>1924</u>	<u>1925</u>	<u>1926</u>
<u>Factories</u>											
Wood-processing	11	9,045	5,508	4,244	4,953	4,978	4,276	3,786	3,850	4,541	3,955
Chemicals	19	8,352	9,153	6,243	7,611	7,849	5,566	4,531	4,558	4,444	4,594
Building Materials	6	5,195	3,248	2,086	1,788	2,015	2,305	2,585	3,488	4,305	4,592
Glass	3	2,937	1,668	1,703	1,348	2,267	1,187	965	1,339	1,197	468
Electric Power	3	477	543	238	327	286	460	443	440	584	891
Breweries	3	435	123	179	226	251	330	236	268	338	343
Leather	6	2,358	2,316	2,069	2,434	2,002	1,026	1,024	1,435	1,551	1,480
Mills	8	1,680	1,497	1,339	1,646	1,751	960	989	1,047	1,005	853
Paper & Cellulose	9	9,528	7,790	6,777	8,128	9,339	5,823	5,455	7,207	6,169	6,370
Foodstuffs	6	4,155	2,477	2,163	2,180	2,150	1,740	898	1,708	2,123	1,914
Textiles	12	29,080	20,469	14,020	13,288	18,599	15,829	15,069	16,666	19,619	17,993
Metal-working	18	14,271	14,856	8,048	10,030	10,162	7,538	7,059	9,315	11,029	10,893
Mining	8	11,469	13,386	10,175	12,991	15,357	5,684	6,845	8,330	8,732	8,625
	112	98,922	83,034	59,284	66,910	77,006	52,724	49,885	60,111	65,537	62,971

Employment in %

100	83.94	59.93	67.64	77.85	53.30	50.43	60.77	66.35	63.66
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TABLE TWENTYDISTRIBUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL BY NATIONALITYIN SLOVAKIA 1921-19301930

	State Service	Education	Public Service	Postal Service	Railways	Total
Czechs	9,874	1,398	2,304	1,980	6,272	21,828
Slovaks	11,363	7,090	13,042	4,321	18,739	54,555
Magyars	1,486	1,682	4,971	295	1,434	9,868
Ruthenes	118	156	394		152	820
Jews	65	162	1,770		20	2,017
Germans	642	577	2,355	108	501	4,183
Others	25			55	22	102
Foreigners	338	182	1,431		138	2,089
Total	23,911	11,247	26,267	6,759	27,278	95,462

1921

Czechs	8,654	1,423	1,214	1,718	5,753	18,832
Slovaks	8,258	4,283	5,736	2,623	18,705	39,605
Magyars	3,661	2,290	4,764	686	3,475	14,876
Ruthenes	92	173	379	21	172	837
Jews	215	316	1,290	24	63	1,908
Germans	860	508	1,399	148	847	3,762
Others	26	10	154	4	48	242
Foreigners	220	167	836	56	448	1,727
Total	21,986	9,170	15,772	5,350	29,511	81,789

1 Includes free professions.

TABLE TWENTY CONTINUED

Percentage increase or decrease in the numbers of administrative personnel
Of different nationalities in Slovakia 1921-1930

	State Service	Education	Public Service	Postal Service	Railways	Total
Czechs	+14.10	-1.7	+89.66	+10.74	+9.00	+16.01
Slovaks	+37.60	+47.0	+126.70	+67.74	+0.20	+37.76
Magyars	-59.41	-26.5	+4.25	-57.00	-52.90	-33.36
Ruthenes	+28.26	-9.8	+5.38		-11.60	+11.26
Jews	-69.77	-48.7	+37.21		-68.20	+5.71
Germans	-25.35	+11.6	+68.33	-27.03	-40.80	+11.26
Others	-4.00			+1275.00	-54.10	-58.33
Foreigners	+53.64	+9.0	+71.18		-69.10	+20.96
Average	+8.80	+22.6	+72.31	+26.30	-8.10	+14.43

Percentage employment of Czechs and Slovaks 1921-1930

1930

Czechs	45.1	6.1	10.5	9.7	28.6	100.00
Slovaks	20.8	13.0	23.9	8.0	34.3	100.00

1921

Czechs	46.1	7.6	6.4	9.2	30.7	100.00
Slovaks	20.8	10.8	14.5	6.6	47.3	100.00

Source: Boháč, A. "Češi na Slovensku" Statistický obzor Sv.16 (1935)

Nos. 4-5 pp.183-190

Quoted in Macartney C.A. Hungary and Her Successors London 1937

pp.133-134 and in Slovenská vlastiveda Sv.III Bratislava 1944

Štefánek A. "Základy Sociografie Slovenska" p.385

TABLE TWENTY-ONEMISCELLANEOUS DATA ON NATIONALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNELIN SLOVAKIA

	<u>Civil Servants</u>		<u>EMPLOYEES</u>		<u>Workers</u>		<u>Labourers</u>	
Czechs	2916	50.5%	3216	21.4	123	2.4	17	1.3
Slovaks	2436	42.2	10735	71.6	4494	67.2	1073	82.6
Magyars	164	2.9	7710	4.7	385	7.5	175	13.4
Ruthenes	19	0.1	96	0.6	36	0.7	1	
Germans	192	3.4	221	1.4	73	1.4	15	1.3
Jews	12	0.1	5		2		1	
Others	3		8		4		7	0.6
Foreign								
Nationals	32	0.8	54	0.3	42	0.8	10	0.8
Total	5774	100.0	15045	100.0	5159	100.0	1299	100.0

PERCENTAGE OF CZECHS AND SLOVAKS BY RANK

	<u>Civil Servants</u>	<u>Employees</u>	<u>Workers</u>	<u>Labourers</u>
Czechs	46.4	51.3	2.0	0.3
Slovaks	13.0	57.3	23.9	5.8

SOME DATA FOR 1935

	<u>Czechs</u>	<u>Slovaks</u>	<u>Magyars</u>	<u>Ruthenes</u>	<u>Germans</u>	<u>Total</u>
District Heads	13	62	-	1	1	77
Communal notaries	40	1002	151	24	17	1234
Local Government	1581	3192	267	82	61	5182
Magistrates	225	147	79	47	55	553
Sub-magistrates	40	89	9	14	2	154
Clerks etc.	355	836	100	86		1377

TABLE TWENTY-ONE (continued)

<u>Expressed in %</u>	Total Czechs-Slovak							
District Heads	16.5	80.5	-	1.5	1.5	100.0	0.6	1.2
Communal Notaries	3.2	81.2	12.2	2.0	1.4	100.0	1.8	18.7
Local Government	30.5	61.5	5.2	1.6	1.2	100.0	70.1	59.8
Magistrates	40.7	26.5	14.3	8.5	10.0	100.0	9.9	2.7
Sub-magistrates	25.9	57.9	5.8	9.1	1.3	100.0	1.8	1.8
Clerks etc.	25.6	60.8	7.3	6.3	-	100.0	15.8	15.8
							100.0	100.0

Source: Slovenská Vlastiveda Sv. III "Zaklady sociografie Slovenska"

p.385

TABLE TWENTY-TWO

INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION IN THE CSR AND OTHER COUNTRIES 1929-1934

1929 = 100

	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934
✓ CSR	100,0	89,2	80,7	63,5	60,2	66,2
Other Countries	100,0	86,3	74,8	63,0	71,3	77,0

Source: Statistický Zpravodaj č.6 1938 Tabulková Příloha str. 12

(Quoted in Obsovský. R. et al Přehled Hospodářského Vyoje

Československa v letech 1918-1945 Praha 1965 p.312

TABLE TWENTY-THREE

EMIGRATION FROM CSR 1920-1937

(Shows the number of passports granted and not the actual number of those who left the country permanently)

Year	SLOVAKIA	CSR	%
1920	13,373	34,942	38.2
1921	15,023	35,212	42.6
1922	16,737	39,459	42.4
1923	16,595	32,341	51.3
1924	35,202	54,273	64.8
1925	8,715	19,350	45.0
1926	14,409	26,129	55.0
1927	12,053	23,596	51.1
1928	13,544	24,540	65.1
1929	19,401	30,715	63.1
1930	17,832	26,893	62.1
1931	4,753	9,845	48.5
1932	2,364	5,343	64.2
1933	3,132	4,831	64.8
1934	3,016	5,065	59.5
1935	3,707	5,686	65.1
1936	4,831	7,201	67.0
1937	8,595	14,772	58.1
TOTAL	213,283	400,193	53.3
1920-30	182,885	347,450	52.6
1930-37	30,398	52,743	57.6
Annual Average			
1920-37	11,845	22,233	
1920-30	16,625	31,588	
1930-37	3,799	6,592	

TABLE TWENTY-THREE CONTINUED

Source: Annuaire Statistique 1938 Prague 1937 p.33

in Mikus. J. Slovakia A Political History 1918-1950

Milwaukee 1963 p.38

TABLE TWENTY-EIGHT

UNEMPLOYMENT IN SLOVAKIA 1929-1936

(In Thousands)

	Slovakia	CSR	%
1929	2.5	41.6	6.00
1930	4.9	105.4	4.64
1931	17.3	291.3	5.93
1932	58.6	554.1	10.55
1933	88.0	738.3	11.93
1934	87.0	677.0	12.85
1935	92.3	686.3	13.44
1936	87.7	622.7	14.08

Source: Annuaire Statistique 1938 Prague p.216-217

TABLE TWENTY-EIGHT CONTINUEDUNEMPLOYMENT IN SLOVAKIA JUNE 1931 TO NOVEMBER 1932

Date	Industrial Workers	Agricultural Workers	Seasonal Workers In Agriculture	Total
1/6/31	21,834	11,013	19,767	52,614
1/7/31	20,290	8,336	14,837	43,463
1/10/31	29,902	27,864	42,092	99,858
1/12/31	50,003	45,594	72,508	168,105
1/1/32	54,939	50,426	80,419	185,784
1/2/32	54,809	47,602	80,389	182,800
1/3/32	52,607	42,027	70,722	165,356
1/4/32	44,329	30,308	54,265	128,902
1/5/32	37,293	26,904	42,210	106,407
1/6/32	37,988	25,647	38,184	101,819
1/7/32	35,668	17,633	31,419	84,720
1/8/32	38,224	21,346	34,596	94,166
1/9/32	41,765	23,342	36,847	101,954
1/10/32	43,116	27,940	43,924	114,980

Source: Mlynarík. J. "Vyvrcholenie hnutia nezamestnaných na Slovensku v rokoch 1929-33" Historický časopis 14/1966 p. 59

TABLE TWENTY-NINE

THOSE RECEIVING UNEMPLOYMENT SUPPORT THROUGH THE GHEENT SYSTEM AS A PERCENTAGE

OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF UNEMPLOYED

	<u>Unemployed according to</u>		<u>% of Total Unemployed</u>
	<u>Labour Exchanges</u>	<u>Those receiving support including state's share</u>	
1926	69.8 (In Thousands)	34.0	50.1
1927	52.9	17.6	33.3
1928	38.6	16.3	42.2
1929	41.6	23.8	57.1
1930	105.4	51.4	48.7
1931	291.3	102.2	35.0
1932	554.1	284.6	33.3
1933	738.3	247.6	34.9
1934	677.0	246.0	36.3
1935	686.3	235.6	34.3
1936	622.7	208.0	33.4
1937	408.90	151.0	32.0

Source: Postavení dělnické třídy v kapitalistickém Československu

Chyba A. Praha 1972 p.147.

TABLE THIRTY

UNEMPLOYMENT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1921-1938

Year	Unemployed	% of Work Force
1921	71,500	3.2
1922	127,000	5.7
1923	207,300	9.4
1924	96,400	4.4
1925	49,000	2.2
1926	67,880	3.1
1927	52,900	2.4
1928	38,600	1.7
1929	41,600	1.9
1930	105,000	4.8
1931	291,300	13.2
1932	554,100	28.3
1933	738,300	33.5
1934	677,000	30.7
1935	686,300	31.2
1936	622,700	28.3
1937	408,900	18.6
1938	256,200	11.6

Source: Chyba A Postavení dělnické třídy v Kapitalistickém
Československu Praha 1972 p.135

TABLE THIRTY-ONE

SLOVAKIA'S INDUSTRY 1930-1937

1930=1,000

	<u>Number of industrial workers</u>							<u>Number of hours worked (In Thousands)</u>						
	<u>1932</u>	<u>1933</u>	<u>1934</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1936</u>	<u>1937</u>		<u>1932</u>	<u>1933</u>	<u>1934</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1936</u>	<u>1937</u>	
January	772	697	647	725	794	990		726	647	591	670	762	993	
February	771	705	666	739	802	1008		725	651	623	686	774	1008	
March	758	677	702	741	828	1029		684	616	669	685	807	1029	
April	753	690	721	768	865	1078		696	629	686	712	832	1078	
May	743	685	726	772	872	1102		661	623	677	713	844	1102	
June	751	705	744	780	890	1121		706	655	609	730	864	1121	
July	746	721	758	807	910	1126		686	662	731	737	865	1126	
August	736	736	764	827	908	1159		688	702	729	779	894	1159	
September	738	740	768	839	948	1170		698	702	736	808	951	1170	
October	748	715	792	827	982	1167		720	684	785	817	995	1167	
November	762	715	768	847	1000	1169		739	687	758	822	1000	1169	
December	710	665	742	813	973	1139		669	628	696	781	972	1139	

Sources: Die Slowakische Industrie/o Slovenskem Priemyslu Bratislava 1932-37

TABLE THIRTY-TWO

Mineral Production in Slovakia 1930, 1933-1937

	<u>1930</u>	<u>1933</u>	<u>1934</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1936</u>	<u>1937</u>
Iron Ore	970,042	192,274	264,284	362,729	541,466	1,057,094
Iron Scrap	21,669	15,426	17,920	20,000	19,084	18,361
Manganese Ore	68,371	5,900	40,454	49,165	64,330	62,930
Copper Ore	72,578	--	--	--	--	--
Quicksilver	219	137	3,992	8,668	8,345	5,359
Au-Ag-Pb-Zn Ores	44,137	58,216	74,450	91,637	101,953	103,025
Coal	598,490	559,997	636,754	641,611	685,109	842,574
Asphalt	669	--	--	--	--	--
Naptha	12,494	11,137	12,378	11,683	11,802	13,335
Natural Gas (M ²)	1,831,716	135,389	225,150	232,370	130,700	117,848
Salt						
Antimony Ore	1,770	12,421	14,399	24,161	16,119	18,181

Figures unreliable

Source: Die Slowakische Industrie/O Slovenském Priemyslu 1932-1937

Bratislava

TABLE THIRTY-THREE

INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION BY BRANCHES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1927-1937 1929=100

Year/Month	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O
1927	90.5	94.4	91.7	98.1	107.7	86.7	112.7	92.2	88.1	101.1	87.7	96.1	93.7	90.2	95.8
1928	87.2	76.7	84.0	91.9	86.5	78.5	88.5	91.3	---	106.0	84.7	90.1	91.1	78.4	89.0
1929	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1930	85.9	85.4	83.4	83.6	91.4	91.8	84.6	96.6	96.8	90.8	84.2	93.3	96.1	99.3	89.2
1931	78.8	72.0	75.1	64.4	79.6	89.9	66.6	92.9	93.9	82.5	79.3	98.1	95.8	94.5	80.7
1932	66.5	40.0	54.3	45.8	69.5	80.9	49.7	80.5	91.6	67.9	68.1	79.3	99.4	85.5	68.5
1933	64.4	41.1	48.6	41.4	53.1	85.8	48.5	74.0	90.3	63.3	70.3	71.6	88.4	87.2	60.2
1934	64.9	47.5	51.8	40.0	46.8	90.2	52.0	80.5	95.4	75.9	87.8	77.9	94.5	95.3	66.5
1935	66.0	60.0	54.3	44.6	46.3	93.6	53.3	87.3	113.4	73.9	66.8	78.0	99.4	101.4	70.1
1936	71.5	75.9	56.9	43.9	60.1	97.2	57.8	95.8	109.6	91.3	90.9	82.3	95.1	116.2	80.2
1937	91.6	105.8	60.8	56.3	70.0	124.3	69.0	114.4	122.7	102.3	96.9	91.7	89.1	139.3	96.3
1937 I	85.4	106.0	61.3	52.9	38.2	108.7	60.9	106.4	112.0	103.8	90.8	81.8	112.3	131.5	92.6
II	90.4	103.6	60.3	52.4	38.5	110.4	58.7	109.1	114.3	108.2	89.1	85.6	87.7	134.7	92.2
III	86.9	100.3	60.6	54.2	36.8	118.9	59.7	114.2	122.7	112.0	93.9	89.3	88.6	133.0	93.5
IV	85.5	104.2	61.4	54.4	55.9	119.2	64.5	117.4	120.6	115.6	103.4	91.9	85.4	132.4	96.7
V	84.8	107.9	60.0	54.1	76.0	123.8	68.7	122.4	131.0	114.6	108.2	91.6	97.0	135.4	99.8
VI	84.7	107.3	59.1	53.2	89.2	117.8	72.3	121.6	118.7	110.7	109.4	92.4	89.5	131.9	98.7

TABLE THIRTY-THREE (continued)

Year/Month	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O
1937 VII	92.0	106.2	58.8	51.5	94.3	117.7	74.9	128.2	119.6	98.7	102.6	94.8	82.2	134.1	97.1
VIII	95.8	106.9	60.6	53.6	97.3	131.3	76.7	117.2	113.6	98.7	105.2	95.0	75.1	140.1	98.1
IX	99.3	101.9	62.0	56.7	95.5	137.0	75.3	113.6	129.9	98.8	93.8	98.7	74.8	141.4	97.8
X	96.3	108.1	61.9	62.2	89.0	134.9	74.4	111.6	127.5	93.6	93.8	95.4	83.0	149.5	97.6
XI	98.7	110.3	62.2	65.6	77.1	134.4	72.9	110.1	125.5	88.3	83.8	94.1	95.8	155.8	96.9
XII	99.6	107.5	61.1	64.5	63.2	137.7	73.0	101.6	137.1	84.4	88.7	89.9	97.8	151.6	95.1

<u>Key</u>	
A =	Mining
B =	Metallurgical industries
C =	Glass
D =	Porcelain
E =	Stone and Brick
F =	Chemicals
G =	Wood-processing
H =	Paper
I =	Polygraphics
J =	Textiles
K =	Leatherware
L =	Clothing
M =	Food Industries
N =	Electricity
O =	Average for all industries

Source: Annuaire Statistique 1938 Praha 1937 p.61.

TABLE THIRTY-FOUR

INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1921-1937

1929=100

1921	60,1	1929	100,0
1922	54,7	1930	89,2
1923	57,6	1931	80,7
1924	76,0	1932	63,5
1925	79,0	1933	60,2
1926	76,7	1934	66,5
1927	89,0	1935	70,1
1928	95,8	1936	80,1
		1937	96,3

Source: Postavení dělnické třídy v kapitalistickém Československu

p.21 Chyba Antonín Praha 72 pp.298.

TABLE THIRTY-FIVEEXCHANGE VALUE OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK CROWN 1919-1939

<u>Pre-war parity of Austro</u>	<u>Found Sterling</u>	<u>U.S. Dollar</u>
<u>Hungarian Crown</u>	24.02	4.93
1919 March	75-81	147-162
August	91-99	19-23
October	126-161	29-35
1920 January	222-283	52-79.5
March	287-337	74.5-98.5
June	181	45.5
October	261-328	74.5-88.8
1921 January	283-328	74.0-91.5
March	300	76.0
June	272	72.0
October	353-419	90.5-104
1922 January	219-277	52.2-66.5
March	233-270	53.2-62.0
June	231	52.4
August	123-183	27.5-41
October	125-140	28.4-31.5
1923	160	34.4
1924	147	34.6
1925	158	33.33
1926-1931 January	164	33.74
October	134	34.36
1932	114	33.93
1933	113	33.92
1934	109	20.45
1935	117	23.74
1936	119	25.15
1937	140	28.69

TABLE THIRTY-FIVE continued

1938	142	28.88
1939	135	29.23

Source: Currency Conversion Tables A Hundred Years of Change Bidwell R.L. (Ed)

Rex Collings London 1970.

TABLE THIRTY-SIX

POPULATION OF SLOVAKIA 1920-38

15.2.1921	2,993,859
1.12.1930	3,324,111
1937 (Est.)	3,555,257

Year	Births	Deaths	Natural Increase	Loss/Gain (Migration etc)	Actual Increase
1910	839,759	657,319	182,440	-105,238	77,202
1921-30	1,019,942	565,658	454,284	-124,032	330,252
1930-40	849,396	510,418	338,978	-116,901	222,077

Year	Births	Deaths	Natural Increase	Loss/Gain (Migration etc)	Actual Increase
------	--------	--------	---------------------	------------------------------	--------------------

Per 1000 Inhabitants

1910-21	27.64	21.64	6.00	-3.46	2.54
1921-30	32.57	18.05	14.52	-3.97	10.55
1930-40	24.17	14.52	9.65	-3.33	6.32

Source: Sveton. J. Vývoj obyvatel'stva na Slovensku Bratislava 1969

pp.255-256

TABLE THIRTY-SEVENPOPULATION CHANGES IN SLOVAKIA 1919-1938

Year	Births	Deaths	Natural Increase	Infant Mortality
	(Per 1000 inhabitants)			(Per 1000 live births)
1919	30.6	19.0	11.6	130.0
1920	32.6	20.4	12.2	185.9
1921	38.2	21.1	17.1	181.6
1922	36.4	20.6	15.8	180.4
1923	35.9	17.5	18.4	156.4
1924	33.9	18.0	15.9	161.3
1925	32.5	17.7	14.8	166.6
1926	32.5	18.7	13.8	179.3
1927	30.9	18.3	12.6	177.4
1928	30.6	17.9	12.7	178.1
1929	29.0	17.2	11.8	165.3
1930	29.2	15.8	13.4	161.4
1931	27.9	16.2	11.7	162.6
1932	27.5	15.6	11.9	168.6
1933	24.8	14.8	10.0	145.0
1934	24.2	14.5	9.7	153.9
1935	23.6	14.3	9.3	141.8
1936	23.0	13.8	9.2	143.5
1937	22.6	14.0	8.6	149.8
1938	24.1	14.6	9.5	143.3

Source: Svetoš, J. Vývoj obyvateľ'stva na Slovensku Bratislava

1969 p.258

TABLE THIRTY-EIGHT

ILLITERACY IN SLOVAKIA 1921 AND 1930

1921

12.82 Men
16.48 Women
14.71 Average

(The figures refer to those person aged over six years)

1930

Per 1000 inhabitants

	Men	Women	Average
Slovaks	62.6	91.5	77.7
Ruthones	245.3	341.7	296.9
Germans	35.4	50.3	42.8
Magyars	46.1	55.6	50.2
Jews	9.6	28.2	19.9
Others	658.0	699.0	680.4
Foreigners	115.5	126.1	121.0
Total	67.5	94.5	81.6

(Figures refer to those aged over ten years)

Sources: 1921 - Manuel Statistique Vol II Prague 1925 p.391

1930 - Annuaire Statistique 1938 Prague 1937 p.11

TABLE THIRTY-NINEEDUCATION IN SLOVAKIA 1921-1936

a) Number of educational establishments of various types

	1921/22	1926/27	1929/30	1935/36
Universities	1	1	1	2
Polytechnics	-	-		
Agricultural Schools	12	27	29	31
Commercial Schools	11	19	22	16
Professional And Industrial Schools	22	25	35	34
Teachers Colleges	9	16	14	17
Elementary Schools	3,306	3,606	3,807	4,480
Upper Primaries	111	136	137	175
Creches	240	127	132	153
Secondary Schools	38	41	44	46

b) Number of students at the Comenius University in Bratislava

31.12.20	247
30.05.21	268
31.13.21	518
1926/27	1,417
1928/29	1,761
1932/33	2,395
1933/34	2,344
1934/35	2,364
1935/36	2,247

Source Manuel Statistique I-IV Prague 1920-34
Annuaire Statistique 1938 Prague 1937

TABLE FORTY--ONE

PRIMARY EDUCATION IN SLOVAKIA 1921-1936

1921

Language of Instruction	Upper primaries		Elementary Schools	
	Schools	Pupils	Schools	Pupils
Slovak	85	14,871	2,315	243,199
Ruthene	1	88	89	6,555
German	33	515	102	13,055
Magyar	18	3,875	718	81,324
Other/Mixed	4	1,268	82	11,666
Total	141	20,617	3,306	355,799

Language of Instruction	Elementary School Annexes (Single Classroom) Schools	Pupils
Slovak	1,542	50,132
Ruthene	80	2,655
German	75	2,336
Magyar	565	17,445
Other/Mixed	53	11,849
Total	2,315	74,417

Number of Primary School Pupils on 31/12/21 according to the Census

Nationality	Upper Primary	Elementary Schools
Slovak	18,133	312,511
Ruthene	137	5,870
German	560	17,412
Magyar	3,790	101,268
Other	1,879	4,726
Total	24,499	441,787

TABLE FORTY--ONE1930

Language of Instruction	Upper Primary		Elementary School	
	Schools	Pupils	Schools	Pupils
Slovak	113	21,960	2,960	353,434
Ruthene	1	140	101	10,016
German	5	566	166	14,253
Magyar	13	1,684	709	83,568
Other/Mixed	9	3,041	56	19,055
Total	141	27,417	23,992	480,326

1934/35

Slovak	154	53,478	3,161	426,309
Ruthene	2	261	135	12,317
German	6	2,664	116	19,368
Magyar	13	4,440	729	99,968
Total	175	60,823	4,141	557,962

Sources: 1921 - Manuel Statistique Vol II Prague 1925 pp.20-24

1930 - Manuel Statistique Vol IV Prague 1932 p.362

1934/35 - Annuaire Statistique 1938 Prague 1937 pp.254-255

TABLE FORTY-TWO

SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION IN SLOVAKIA 1919-1936

<u>Total</u>	<u>Universities</u>		<u>Secondary</u>		<u>Special</u>		<u>Elementary</u>		
No. of Schools	Costs :	No.	Cost :	No.	Cost :	No.	Cost :	No.	Cost
87	149.5 :	1.	49.3 :	10	31.5 :	5	8.6 :	71	60.1

Expressed as a percentage of the total number of schools built in the Republic and their total costs (In millions of Mcs.)

<u>Total</u>	<u>Universities</u>		<u>Secondary</u>		<u>Special</u>		<u>Elementary</u>		
No. of Schools	Costs :	No.	Cost :	No.	Cost :	No.	Cost :	No.	Cost
14.34	13.93 :	3.57	15.86 :	22.22	18.22 :	26.30	32.01 :	13.79	11.73

Percentage of different types built

<u>Total</u>	<u>Universities</u>		<u>Secondary</u>		<u>Special</u>		<u>Elementary</u>	
100.0		1.14		11.49		5.75		81.62

Percentage of total costs

100.0		33.14		21.04		5.80		40.02
-------	--	-------	--	-------	--	------	--	-------

Source: Annuaire Statistique 1938 Prague 1937 p.246.

TABLE FORTY THREE

PRACTISING DOCTORS IN SLOVAKIA 1920-1937

1920	769
1926	1253
1930	1431
1936	1805
1937	1878

Source: Manuel Statistique Vol II p.450
Manuel Statistique Vol III p.361
Manuel Statistique Vol IV p.326

Statistická Ročenka ČSSR 1969 Praha 1969 p.505

Statistická Ročenka ČSSR 1968 Praha 1968 p.512

Statistická Ročenka ČSSR 1963 Praha 1963 p.433

TABLE FORTY-FIVE

AGRICULTURAL IMPROVEMENT WORKS IN SLOVAKIA 1919-1936

Length of River Controlled

Area Reafforested

1919-1936	1936	1919-1936	1936
141,747	21,560	171,558	35,281

% of such work done in the Republic

27.8%	43.2%	14.2%	17.8%
-------	-------	-------	-------

Construction costs of such schemes in Million KCS

1919-1936	1936	1935	1934
24.60	2.90	3.06	2.88

% of total cost of such schemes in the Republic

14.27	25.39	25.42	23.61
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Source: Annuaire Statistique 1938 Etat 1937 pp. 257-258.

TABLE FORTY-SIX

ELECTION RESULTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1920 and 1925

FOR THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES (POSLANECKÁ SNĚMOVNA)

<u>Name of Party</u>	<u>Votes cast</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Deputies</u>	<u>Votes cast</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Deputies</u>
Soc. Democrats	1,590,520	25,7	74	631,403	8,9	29
Nat. Socialists	500,821	8,1	24	609,153	8,6	28
People's Party	699,728	11,3	33 ¹	691,095	9,7	31
Nat. Democrats	387,552	6,3	19	284,601	4,0	13
Agrarians	603,618	9,7	28	970,940	13,7	45
Tradesmen's Party	122,813	2,0	6	286,058	4,0	13
Communists	-----	-----	---	934,223	13,2	41
SNS	242,045	3,9	12 ²	35,435	0,5	---
HSL'S	(235,389)	---	12 ³	489,111	6,9	23
Bund der Landwirte	241,747	3,9	11	571,765	8,0	24
German Nat. Party	-----	-----	---	240,918	3,4	10
German Nazi Party	328,735	5,3	15	168,354	2,4	7
German Christ. Soc.	156,751	2,5	7	314,438	4,4	13
German Soc. Democrats	689,589	11,1	31	411,365	5,8	17
United German Parties	129,013	2,1	6	-----	---	---
Mag. German Soc. Dem.	108,546	1,8	4	-----	---	---
Mag. German Christ. Soc.	139,355	2,2	5	98,337	1,4	4
Magyar Agrarians	26,520	0,4	1	-----	---	---
Socialist Party (Hudec and Modravec)	58,580	0,9	3	-----	---	---
TOTAL	6,200,032 ⁴		281	7,107,411 ⁴		298

TABLE FORTY-SIX continued

1. Includes Hlinka's group.
2. Polled as Slovak People's and Peasants' Party. Included Slovak Agrarians under Hodza.
3. Total of votes and mandates included in that given for People's Party.
4. Includes votes cast for small parties who did not reach the necessary quota in any electoral district and hence were unsuccessful in getting their candidates elected.

Sources: Dejiny Československa IV Praha 1967 pp. 548-549

Manuel Statistique vol II Prague 1925 p.347

Röcenka CSR 1930, 1925

TABLE FORTY-SEVEN

ELECTION RESULTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1929 and 1935

FOR THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES (POSLANCECKA SNEMOVNA)

<u>Name of Party</u>	<u>Votes cast</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Deputies</u>	<u>Votes cast</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Deputies</u>
Soc. Democrats.	963,312	13,0	39	1,034,774	12,6	38
Nat. Socialists	767,571	10,4	32	755,880	9,2	28
People's Party	623,522	8,4	25	615,877	7,5	22
Nat. Democrats	359,533	4,9	15 ¹	----	----	--
Agrarians	1,105,429	15,0	46	1,176,593	14,3	45
Tradesmen's Party	291,238	3,9	12	448,047	5,4	17
Communists	753,444	10,2	30	849,509	10,3	30
National Unity	----	----	--	456,353	5,6	17 ⁴
Fascists	70,857	0,9	3	167,433	2,0	6
SNS	----	----	--	----	----	--
HSL'S	425,052	5,7	19	----	----	--
Bund der Landwirte	----	----	-- ²	142,399	1,7	5
Autonomist Bloc	----	----	--	564,273	6,9	22 ³
German Nazi Party	204,096	2,8	8	----	----	--
German Christ. Soc.	348,097	4,7	14	162,781	2,0	6
Sudetendeutsche Partei	----	----	--	1,249,530	15,2	44
United German Parties	396,383	5,4	16	----	----	--
Regional Christ. Soc. Party	257,231	3,5	9	291,831	3,5	9
United Jewish and Polish parties	104,539	1,4	4	----	----	--
German National Party	189,071	2,6	7	----	----	--
TOTAL (including votes cast for smaller parties not shown here)	7,385,085		300	8,231,412		300

TABLE FORTY-SEVEN (continued)

1. Including the votes cast for SNS
2. Polled with United German Parties
3. Consisted of HSL'S, SNS, Autonomist Ukrainian Agricultural Union and Polish separatists.
4. Consisted of National Democrats and two Fascist parties National League (Stríbrný) and National Front (Dr. Mareš)

Sources: Dějiny Československa IV Praha 1967 pp. 548-549

Ročenka ČSR 1929 and 1935

Manuel Statistique vols. III and IV. Prague 1928 and 1932

TABLE FORTY-NINEELECTIONS TO THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES (POSLANECKA SNEMOVNA)RESULTS IN SLOVAKIA 1920 and 1929

<u>Name of Party</u>	<u>18. 4. 20</u> <u>Votes cast</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>25.11.25</u> <u>Votes cast</u>	<u>%</u>
Soc. Democrats	510,341	38,5	60,635	4,2
Nat. Socialists	29,564	2,2	36,909	2,5
Nat. Labour Party	---	---	13,608	0,9
People's Party	235,389	17,5	18,036	1,2
Nat. Democrats	---	---	24,954	1,7
Agrarians	---	--- ¹	248,034	17,4
Tradesmens' Party	---	---	11,576	0,8
Communists	---	---	189,111	13,2
SNS	242,045	18,5	35,435	2,4
HSL'S	---	--- ²	489,111	34,3
Bund der Landwirte	---	---	109,635	7,6 ³
German Nat. Party	---	---	3,410	0,2
German Soc. Democrats	---	---	5,137	0,3
Mag.-German Soc. Dem	108,546	8,0	---	---
Magyar Christ. Soc.	139,355	10,3	98,337	6,8
Magyar Agrarians	26,520	22,0	---	---
Magyar Nat. Party	4,214	0,3	---	---
Jewish Parties	45,217	3,4	38,442	2,7
Jewish Economic Parties	---	---	5,144	0,3
Autonomous Provincial Union	---	---	6,894	0,4
Independent Communists	---	---	356	---
Total	1,341,191		1,425,595	

1. Polled with SNS as Slovak National and Peasants' Party.

2. Polled with Czechoslovak People's Party

3. Includes votes cast for Magyar Nat. Party.

Source: Macarteny C.A. Hungary and her Successors London 1937 p.117

TABLE FIFTY

ELECTIONS TO THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES (POSLANECKA SNEMOVNA)

RESULTS IN SLOVAKIA 1929 and 1935

<u>Name of Party</u>	<u>27.10.29</u>		<u>19. 5. 35</u>	
	<u>Votes cast</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Votes cast</u>	<u>%</u>
Soc. Democrats	135,506	9,4	184,389	11,3
Nat. Socialists	43,968	3,0	51,930	3,1
People's Party	36,548	2,5	37,489	2,3
Nat. Unity	---	---	25,490	1,5
Nat. Democrats	53,745	3,7	---	---
Agrarians	278,979	19,4	286,739	17,6
Tradesmens' Party	30,134	2,1	41,996	2,6
Communists	152,242	10,6	210,785	12,9
SNS	---	---	---	---
HSL'S	403,683	28,1	489,641	30,1 ³
Slovak People's Party (Juriga)	5,395	0,4	---	---
Fascists (League against tied candidates)	1,810	0,2	---	---
National Group of Fascists	---	---	32,609	2,0
German Electoral Community	13,704	0,9	---	---
Bund der Landwirte	---	---	255	---
Sudetendeutsche Partei	---	---	27,558	1,6
German Social Democrats	4,824	0,3	5,409	0,3
Magyar Christ. Soc.	122,801	8,1	---	---
Magyar Nat. Party	104,106	7,3	---	---
United Magyar Parties	---	---	230,713	14,2
Magyar Traders' Party	6,901	0,5	---	---
Smallfarmers	6,901	0,5	---	---
Jewish and Polish Parties	33,679	2,3	---	---
Total	1,434,926		1,625,549	

TABLE FIFTY CONTINUED

1/Polled with National Democrats.

2/Polled as part of Autonomist bloc.

3/Polled as Autonomist Bloc.

4/Polled as part of National Unity.

5/Polled as part of Magyar Christian Socialist.

Source: Macartney C.A. Hungary and Her Successors London 1937 p.117.

TABLE FIFTY-ONERESULTS OF ŽUPA ELECTIONS IN SLOVAKIA 1923

<u>Name of Party</u>	<u>Votes cast</u>	<u>%</u>
Social Democrats	67,500	5.0
National Socialists	38,000	2.8
National Democrats	13,600	1.2
Agrarians	286,600	21.4
Tradesmen Party	5,100	0.4
Communists	173,600	12.9
SNS	10,400	0.8
HSL'S	401,300	30.0
United German Parties	6,600	0.5
Magyar Agrarians	5,100	----
United Magyar Opposition	73,000	5.4
Magyar Christian Socialists	127,600	12.9
Magyar Peasants' Party	52,400	3.9
Jewish Parties	47,700	3.5
Carpathian Ruthene Party	14,900	1.1
Greek Catholic Party	2,400	----
National Bloc	1,700	----
United State Parties	1,600	----
Economic Party	1,600	----
<u>Total</u>	1,336,200	

Source: Lipscher L. K. Vývinu politickej správy na Slovensku

Bratislava 1966 p.114.

TABLE FIFTY-TWORESULTS OF PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS IN SLOVAKIA 1928 and 1935

<u>Name of Party</u>	<u>Votes cast</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Deputies</u>	<u>Votes cast</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Deputies</u>
Social Democrats	96,901	7.33	3	148,984	9.86	4
National Socialists	36,181	2.74	1	45,134	2.98	1
National Democrats	26,300	1.99	1	18,579	1.24	-
Agrarians	271,520	20.54	8	285,672	18.89	8
Tradesmens' Party	15,371	1.16	-	31,641	2.09	1
Communists	190,595	14.42	5	185,494	12.26	5
People's Party	43,689	3.31	1	30,563	2.02	-
SNS	31,679	2.46	1	40,965	2.71	1
HSL'S	325,588	24.64	9	430,880	28.52	11
Magyar National Party	104,106	7.88	3	polled with christ soc.		
Magyar Christ Soc.	120,769	9.14	3	225,407	14.91	5
Fascists	-----	-----	-	26,461	1.75	-
Magyar Small Traders	13,635	1.03	-	-----	-----	-
United Jewish Parties	45,244	3.42	1	-----	-----	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>1,321,578</u>		<u>36</u>	<u>1,469,780</u>		<u>36</u>

Source: Manuel Statistique Vol. IV 1932 p.465

Lipscher L. K. Vývinu politickej spravy na Slovensku Bratislava 1966
p.169.

Ročenka ČSR 1935 Praha 1935.

TABLE FIFTY-THREE

PERCENTAGE OF THE VOTE GAINED BY MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES IN ALL LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN SLOVAKIA 1920-35

<u>Party</u>	<u>1920</u>	<u>1923</u>	<u>1925</u>	<u>1928</u>	<u>1929</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1935</u>
	PRL	Z	PRL	PR	PRL	PR	PRL
Social Democrats	38.5	55.0	44.2	7.3	9.4	9.8	11.3
National Socialists	2.2	2.8	2.5	2.7	3.0	2.9	3.1
National Democrats	-----	1.2	1.7	1.9	3.9	1.2	1.5 ¹
Agrarians	18.5	21.4	17.4	20.5	19.4	18.8	17.6
Tradesmens' Party	-----	0.4	0.8	1.1	2.1	2.0	2.6
Communists	-----	12.9	13.2	14.4	10.6	12.2	12.9
SNS	---2	0.8	2.4	2.4	--10	2.7	---4
HSL'S	---3	30.0	34.3	24.6	28.1	28.5	30.1 ⁵
German Soc. Dem.	-----	0.5 ⁶	0.3	-----	0.3	-----	0.3
Bund der Landwirte	-----	-----	-----	-----	0.9 ⁷	-----	1.6 ⁸
Magyar Soc. Dem.	8.0	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Magyar Christ. Soc.	10.3	12.9	6.8	9.1	8.1	14.9	14.2 ⁹
Magyar Nat. Party	0.3	-----	7.8	7.3	-----	-----	-----
Jewish Parties	3.4	3.5	3.0	3.4	2.3	-----	-----
Cz. People's Party	17.5	-----	1.2	3.3	2.5	2.0	2.3

PRL - Parliamentary election PR - Provincial election Z - Zupa election

- | | |
|---------------------------------|---|
| 1. Polled as National Unity | 6. Votes for United German Parties |
| 2. Polled with Slovak Agrarians | 7. Votes for German Electoral Community |
| 3. Polled with People's Party | 8. Votes for Sudetendeutsche Partei |
| 4. Polled with Autonomist Bloc | 9. Votes for United Magyar Parties |
| 5. Polled as Autonomist Bloc | 10. Polled with National Democrats |

Sources: Manuel Statistique Vol II -IV Prague 1925-32

Rečenka 1920, 1923, 1925, 1928, 1929, 1935.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER ONE

1. See Seton-Watson R.W. The New Slovakia Prague 1924 for a detailed account of such cases.
2. See Rašín, A. The Financial Policy of Czechoslovakia during the First Year of its existence Oxford 1923.

CHAPTER TWO

1. Oddo G.L. Slovakia and Its People New York 1960 p.1.
2. Denis E. Les Slovaques Paris 1917 pp.87-92.
3. Dejiny Slovenska I Bratislava 1961 pp.15-50.
4. Kirschbaum, J. Slovakia-Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe New York 1960 pp.23-44.
5. O vzájomných vzťahoch Čechov a Slovákov Bratislava 1956 pp. 99-124.
6. Seton-Watson R.W. (Ed) Slovakia Then and Now London 1931 p.298.
7. Sinor D. A History of Hungary London 1959 pp.209-212.
8. K počiatkom národného obrodzenia Bratislava 1964 pp.97-171.
9. Masaryk T.G. Nova Evropa Praha 1920 p. 161.
10. Butvin, J. "Snahy o založenie Matice Slovenskej" Historický časopis 11/1963 pp.169-94.
11. Rotnagl J. Česi a Slováci Praha 1945 p.41.
12. Dejiny Slovenska II Bratislava 1968 p.410.
13. Macartney C.A. Hungary and Her Successors London 1937 p.80.
14. Ibid p.33.
15. Seton-Watson R.W. (Scotus Viator) Racial Problems in Hungary London 1908 pp.339-351.

CHAPTER THREE

1. Dejiny Slovenska II Bratislava 1968 p.248 passim.
2. Hurban J.M. Cesta Slováka ku bratrům slovenským na Moravě a v Čechách
Žilina 1929.
3. Galandauer J. "Jak se slovenská otázka prosazovala do českého
politického programu v období příprav samostatného československého
štátu 1916-1918" Historický časopis 19/1971 pp.177-197.
4. Palacky. F. Spisy drobné I Praha 1898 p.79.
5. Masaryk T.G. Nová Evropa Praha 1920 p.161.
6. Hrušovský Fr. Slovenske dejiny Turčianský Svätý Martin 1939 pp.342-355.
7. Slovenská citanka Praha 1925 p.451.
8. Lipták. L. Slovensko v 20 storočí Bratislava 1968 p.123 passim.

CHAPTER FOUR

1. Seton-Watson R.W. Masaryk in England London 1943 p.125.
2. Hrušovský Fr. Op. Cit. p.364.
For an english version see
Yurchak P. The Slovaks Whiting Indiana 1947 pp.211-212.
3. Lipták L. Op. Cit. p.69. Here the author insists that this stipulation
was inserted at the insistence of the Slovak politician Vavro Šrobár,
one of the original Hlasists (see Chapter Three) and who later became
the first Minister with responsibility for Slovakia (see Chapter Five).
4. Dejiny Československa III Praha 1968 p.475.
5. Hrušovský Fr. Op. Cit. p.368.
6. Šrobár V. Oslobodené Slovensko Praha 1928 p.108
Dejiny Československa III p.714.
7. Steier L. Ungarns Vergewaltigung Vienna 1928 p.553.
8. See also Chaloupecký V. "Martinská deklarace a její politické osudy"
Český časopis historický Vol IV P.328. In this article the author claims

that such a facsimile was published in the newspaper Slovenský denník on 28th April 1928.

9. Lipták, L. Op. Cit. p.70.
10. Ibid p.70.
11. Hrušovský Fr. Op. Cit. pp.368-369.
12. Masaryk. T.G. The Making of a State London 1927 p.208.
13. Ibid p.208.
14. Ibid p.210.
15. Hrušovský Fr. p.337.
16. Dějiny Československa III pp.724-725.
17. Krajčovičová N. "Slovenská národná rada 1918" Historický časopis 17/1969 pp.177-197.

CHAPTER FIVE

1. Stodola, K. Štatistika Slovenska Turčianský Svätý Martin 1910 p.120.
2. Ibid p.120.
3. Ibid p.120.
4. Ibid p.120.
5. Ibid p.25.
6. Sveton J. Vývoj obyvateľstva na Slovensku Bratislava 1969 p.255 Table 1. The author gives 381, 710 as the total increase in population in Slovakia during this period.
7. Stodola K. Op. Cit. p.25.
8. Sveton J. Die Slowaken in Ungarn Bratislava 1943 p.15.
9. Macartney C.A. Op. Cit. p.82.
10. Ibid p.82.
11. Ibid p.82.
12. Ibid p.83.
13. Faltus, J. and Průcha, V. Prehľad hospodárskeho vývoja na Slovensku 1918-1945 Bratislava 1967 p.14.

14. Sveton. J. Vývoj obyvateľ'stva p.154 Table 23.
15. Faltus. J. and Prucha V. Op.Cit. p.14.
16. Stodola K. Op. Cit. pp.23-25.
17. Krajčovičová. N. Op. Cit. pp.179-182.
18. Šrobár. V. Op. Cit. p.195.
19. Mlynarík. J. "Slovenská národná rada a včlenovanie Slovenska do
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XVI.4.1968 p.505.
20. Šrobár. V. Op. Cit. pp.193-201.
21. Mlynarík. J. Op. Cit. pp.507-509.
22. Opočenský J. Zrození našeho státu Praha 1928 p.179.
23. Chaloupecký. V. Zápas o Slovensko Praha 1930 p.85.
24. Mlynarík. J. Op. Cit. p.515.
25. Ibid p.515.
26. Ibid p.514 Footnote 24.
27. Szana A. Die Geschichte der Slowakei Vol I Bratislava 1930 p.229.
28. Peroutka. F. Budování státu I. Praha 1936 p.343.
Podrimavský M. "Oskar Jašík a národnostná otázka" Historický časopis
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29. Šrobár V. Po. Cit. p.252.
30. Ibid p.253.
31. Mikus. J. A Political History of Slovakia 1918-1950 Wisconsin 1963 p.12.
32. Seton-Watson R.W. The New Slovakia p.24.
33. Peroutka F. Op. Cit. p.216.
34. Lipscher L. K vývinu politickej spravy na Slovensku v rokoch 1918-1938
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35. Szana A. Op. Cit. p.228.
36. Šrobár. V. Op. Cit. p.206.
37. Peroutka F. Op. Cit. p.315.
38. Šrobár. V. Op. Cit. p.211.
39. Peroutka. F. Op. Cit. p.318.
40. Šrobár. V. Op. Cit. p.222.

41. Ibid p.225.
42. Peroutka. F. Op. Cit. p.318.
43. Ibid p. 319.
44. Šrobár. V. Op. Cit. pp.260-264.
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49. Opočenský. J. Op. Cit. p.178.
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51. Peroutka F. Op. Cit. p.319.
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53. Chaloupecký. V. Op. Cit. p.148.
54. Šrobár. V. Op. Cit. p.300.
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